Bancroft-Whitney Co. PUBLISHERS m AND SKLLInS OP LAW BOOKS SAN FRANCISCO . •|-I-H-7:M-. ■•^l^.tvV..T*i T ni4 ,.\ THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS COMMON LAW, STATUTORY, EQUITABLE AND MARITIME By LEONARD A. JONES AUTHOR OF MORTGAGES. LANDLORD AND TENANT, COLLATERAL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED By EDWARD M. WHITE IN TWO VOLUMES Volume One INDIANAPOLIS THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY PUBLISHERS COPYRIGHT 1888, 1894 BY LEONARD A. JONES ALL RIGHTS RESERVED COPYRIGHT 1014 BY THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 1914 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION Numerous statutes have been enacted and very many rulings have been made by the courts on the subject of liens since the publication of the last edition of this work. In this revision the author has made a diligent effort to set out the substance of such statutes and has cited a very large number of the decisions of the courts made during the last twenty years. He has found it necessary to add many new sections and parts of sections and to add many annotations and authorities supporting the new text. Old section numbers have been retained to better faciliate the finding of the great number of references to former editions cited so generally by the courts. Where new sec- tions have been added they have been designated by letters following the old section numbers. EDWARD M. WHITE. September 1, 1914. ni 734G76 PREFACE Ten years ago, I published a treatise on the Law of Mort- gages of Real Property. This was followed by two other treatises which were intended to complete the consideration of the general subject of mortgages, — one upon Railroad Mortgages, and the other upon Chattel JMortgages. In the Preface to the first edition of the latter work, published seven years ago, I said: — "I have regarded these volumes upon different phases of the subject of mortgages as constituting in fact one work covering the whole subject; and I have, therefore, referred from one treatise to another as freely as I would to other sections of the same treatise. It is my purpose to follow this method still further, in the preparation of two other treatises, — one upon Pledges, including Collateral vSecurities, and one upon Liens, — which with those I have already published, will form a complete series of works on Property Securities. The three forms of security upon property — Mortgages, Pledges, and- Liens — will then be treated in works which are not only separately complete, but which will also have reference to the relations of the subjects to each other." The task which I then set for myself I now complete in publishing the present work upon Liens. Much hard labor — all of it, so far as authorship is concerned, being my own personal labor — has gone into these seven volumes. The favor with which the profession has received the works of this series, heretofore published, I attribute largely to the fact that I have dealt with the subjects at close cpiarters, so to speak; that is. I have sough to examine the subjects in such detail as to enable me to state and discuss all the difficult V vi PREFACE. and doubtful questions that have arisen and been passed upon by the courts. Alany of these might have been hidden or passed by under a statement of an elementary principle: but as these works were intended for the practising lawyer, rather* than the student, I have deemed it my province to find out the uncertainties in the law, and, if I could, to refer them to some principle, or to classify them, and at least to state them, if I could do no more. The subjects with which these works deal have their full share of intricate questions; and the subject of Liens not less than the others. A formidable dif^culty in making a satisfactory treatise upon the subject of Liens has been encountered in the statutory law which forms so important a part of it. It is not so much that new liens have been created by statute, as that the common law liens upon per- sonal property, as well as equitable liens upon both personal property and real property, have been in many instances modihed or enlarged. By statute, moreover, maritime liens have been in like manner affected. Finally, many liens have been created which had never been asserted at law^ or in equity, or in the admiralty. The statutory law is, however, no less important than the judicial, to a complete understand- ing of the subject; and, besides, the decisions of the courts are largely based upon the statutes, and can be understood only by reference to them. I have therefore deemed it essential to state the statute law, sometimes in the language of the statutes, and sometimes briefly and in substance. This part of the work has been more difficult than anv other. L. A. J. Boston, Tune 4, 1888. TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS OF VOLUME I CHAPTER I. LIENS AT COMMON LAW.' Sec. Sec. 1. Introductor3^ 16. 2. The word "lien." 17. 3. Definitions. 18. 4. Lien at law an implied obliga- tion. 19. 5. A lien by contract. 6. Lien where price agreed upon. 20. 7. Lien by contract. 21. 8. Lien by operation of law. 9. Lien only to extent of inter- 22. est. 10. Lien confers no right of prop- 23. erty upon the holder. 11. A mortgage more than a lien, 24. 12. An attachment on process not a lien. 25. 13. A judgment only a general lien. 14. A lien either specific or gen- 26. eral. 15. Limited lien not to be ex- tended. Specific liens. Definition of general lien. Lien for general balance by agreement of parties. General liens regarded with jealousy. Possession necessary to lien. Possession essential to create and preserve lien. Change of possession may not defeat lien. The possession must be right- ful. Possession need not be actual or direct. Mechanic acquires no lien when working for another mechanic. Lien of bailee performing ser- vice. Sec. 27. Equitable liens in general. 28. Possession not required in equitable liens. 29. Lien effective without change of possession. CHAPTER H. EQUITABLE LIENS. Sec. 30. Lien created by agreement. 31. Equitable lien created. 32. Intention to create lien. 33. Property to be designated. 34. Property must be identified. Vll CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. 35. Ayrcemcnt between several persons. 36. Lien on changing stock of goods. 37. Equitable lien distinguished from a trust. 3S. E(iuitable lien agreement ful- liUed. 39. Lien given to save rights. 40. Lien for purchase-money re- served. 41. Equitable lien arises from conditional delivery. 42. Equitable lien on future prop- erty. 43. Equitable lien arises from or- er to pay out of particular fund. 44. Rule applying to attorneys and clients. 45. An order on specific fund ef- fectual to create lien. 46. Assignment of lien effectual on notice to creditor. 47. Equitable assignment not re- vocable. 48. Agreement to pay out of designated fund will not create equitable lien. 49. Creditor's lien on money in hands of debtor's agent. 50. Appropriation necessarj- to constitute equitable lien. 51. Rule strictly held to. 52. Promise to pay out of par- ticular fund not sufficient. 53. Workmen have no lien on money retained from funds due contractor. 54. Designation of particular fund must be clear and definite. 55. Bill of exchange not an equi- table assignment. 56. Bill of exchange against con- signment as lien. Sec. 57. A check not an equitable as- signment. 58. Lien of holder of bill of ex- change based on agreement. 59. Reference in a draft to appro- priation of proceeds held to create lien. 60. Lien created when consignee receives goods under ex- press direction. 61. General lien of consignee of goods. 62. Delivery of bill of lading suf- ficient to create equitable lien. 63. Lien of one making advances to purchase merchandise. 64. Executory agreement to pur- chase and consign property. 65. Lien on crop to be raised. 66. Equitable lien ariises under contract on crop lien. 67. Liens for advances to manu- facturers on goods. 68. Xo implied lien on personal property on account of mon- ey advanced. 69. Contract betwen planter and factor. 70. Equitable lien will not arise from advancement to im- prove property. 71. Lien not created by voluntary payment. 72. Voluntary payment of insur- ance premiums creates no liens. 73. No equitable subrogation to one paying a debt of another. 74. One paying debt of railroad company entitled to subro- gation. 74a. Equitable lien on legacy. 75. Mere loan of money. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. IX Sec. 76. Surety has no lien on estate of his principal. n. Lien by agreement to giv^e a mortgage. 78. Agreement to give other se- curit}'. 79. Debtor's agreement to insure for benefit of his creditor. 80. x\greement to build and con- vey a mill as security. 81. For debt omitted from mort- gage by mistake. 82. Agreement of purchaser of land to pay debt which is lien on the land. 83. Verbal contract to pay the debt of another. 84. Creditor's lien on capital stock of corporation. 85. Lien of creditors of a corpo- ration upon its property transferred to another cor^ poration. Sec. 86. 87. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. Superiority of lien of corpo- rate creditor after transfer of stock to another corpora- tion. Lien of minority sharehold- ers of corporation. Shareholder's equitable lien on funds specially deposited. Liens created by assumption of mortgage or other liens. Consolidated company subject to liens of original corpora- tion. Bonds of original corporation not a lien. Equitable lien against rail- road company. Court of equity appropriate tribunal for enforcing equi- table liens. Lien at law not enforcible in equity. Disposition of property sub- ject to equitable lien. Priorities. CHAPTER III. LIENS BY STATUTE. Sec. Sec. 97. Introductory. 105. 98. Taxes a lien on real estate. 99. State's statutory lien on real 106. estate. 107. 100. Lien of state on criminal's property. 108. 101. Improvement liens. 109. 102. Water rates as liens. 110. 103. Liens upon animals damage 111. feasant. 104. Possession not required to 112. support statutory liens. Character, operation and ex- tent of lien. Statutory lien — How acquired. Statutory lien may be modi- fied by statute. Repeal of statutory lien. Rule in other courts. Revival of lien. Statutory liens governed by the law of forum. Statutory liens legal rather than equitable. CONTKNTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER IV. AN ATTORNIIV'S GI-INIiKAL OR KliTAINlNG LIEX. Sec. Sec. 113. Attorney's general lien a 134. common-law lien. 114. General lien declared by stat- 135. utes. 115. .\ttorncy's lien on client's pa- 136. pers. llo. -Attorney's lien does not 137. amount to a pledge. 117. .Attorney's lien on life insur- 138. ance policy. 118. Lien extends to an execution 139. in attorney's hands. 119. Lien attaches only when cli- ent's papers come into at- 140. torney's hands. 120. Lien may attach to articles. 141. 121. Xo lien on client's will. 142. 122. Presumption of attorney's lien. 143. 122a. Inspection of papers on which attorney has lien. 144. 123. Lien covers general balance 145. of account. 124. Lien limited to debts due him 146. as attorney. 125. None but attorneys can have 147. lien. 126. Lien special under some cir- 148. cumstances. 149. 127. Attorney's general lien on pa- pers. 150. 128. Discharge of attorney's lien. 129. .Agent of attorney has no lien. 150a, 130. Lien of member of attorney's firm. 151. 131. Lien not affected by client's assignment in bankruptcy. 132. Lien on papers can not be ac- 152. tively enforced. 133. Lien enforced by execution or order. Court may determine exist- ence and amount of lien. Application for surrender of papers to client. Court may order papers of client surrendered to him. Attorne}''s lien on money col- lected. Does not attach to money de- posited specially. Does not attach to papers for services rendered to an ex- ecutor. Lien on money recovered on judgment. Xo lien until money collected. Lien on money collected by award. Lien prevails over claim of assignee of judgment. Lien of associate counsel. Whether a lien or right of set-off. Lien for general balance of account. Attorney's special lien on fund in court's hands. Rule in Pennsylvania. X''o general lien upon a fund in court. Court's jurisdiction over at- torneys. Summary jurisdiction of courts over attorneys. Attorney can not hold entire sum of money of his client for his fee. How a lien may be pleaded in defense. CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1. XI CHAPTER V. AN ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CPIARGING LIEN ON JUDGMENTS. Sec. 153. Attorney's lien ment. upon a judg- 154. Attorney's lien upon judgment may be made a general lien. 154a .. Prosecuting ai lien. ttorney has no 155. Attorney's lien not recognized at common law. 156. Time and manner of origin of attorney's lien. 157. Origin of lien is obscure. 158. Attorney's lien — General ruk on judgment 159. No lien in several states. 160. California. 161. Illinois. 162. Massachusetts. 163. Missouri. 164. Rhode Island. 165. Attorney's lien able costs. limited to tax- 166. Attorney's lien on a judgment. 167. Rule in United States courts. 168. Rule extended by statutes. 169. Alabama. 169a . Alaska. 170. Arkansas. 171. Colorado. 171a . Connecticut. 171b . District of Columbia, 172. Florida. 173. Georgia. 173a . Idaho. 173b . Illinois, 174. Indiana. 175. Iowa. 176. Kansas. 177. Kentucky. 177a . Louisiana. 177b . Maine. 177c. . Massachusetts. Sec. 178. Michigan. 179. Minnesota. 180. Oregon. 181. Mississippi. 181a. Missouri. 182. Montana. 183. Nebraska. 184. New York. 185. Present code of New York. 186. Lien on cause of action. 187. Ownership of costs. 188. Attorney's undefined lien. 189. Action to establish lien. 189a. North Dakota. 189b. Oklahoma. 189bb. Oregon. 189c. South Carolina. 189d. South Dakota. 190. Tennessee. 190a. Texas. 190b. Utah. 191. Verm'ont. 191a. Virginia. 192. Washington. 192a. West Virginia. 192b. Wisconsin. 192c, Wyoming. 193. No lien until judgment is en- tered. 194. Default not a judgment. 195. Pending appeal will not pre- vent dismissal. 196. Client may settle before judg- ment. 197. Action for damages settled by parties. 198. Settlement by parties will not affect attorney's lien. 199. Attorney's withdrawal from case. xn CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. Sec. 200. Only attorney is entitled to 218. a lien. 219. 201. Lien by contract. 201a. Attorney's lien on fund re- 220. covered. 221. 201b. Defendant's attorney can 222. have no lien on fund. 223. 202. No lien where court is not court of record. 224. 203. Settlement in fraud of attor- 225. neys. 226. 204. Collusion between debtor and 227. creditor. 204a. Waiver of attorney's lien. 228. 205. Court of admiralty. 229. 206. Assignment of judgment. 230. 207. Actions not assignable. 231. 208. Action founded on negotia- 232. ble instrument. 209. Notice of attorney's lien. 233. 210. Statutory provisions as to no- 234. tice of lien. 235. 211. Notice to adverse party. 236. 212. Actual notice not necessary. 237. 213. Lien on damages recovered. 238. 214. Judgment for costs only. 215. Rule in court of the king's 239. bench. 216. Rule in equity. 240. 217. Rule in the United States. Judgment as set-ofif. When set-off good against the attorney's lien. Rule in some of the states. Delay in objecting to set-off. Assignment of judgment. Equitable assignment of the judgment. Lien by agreement. Lien created by parol. Attorney's lien assignable. Attorney's lien superior to lien of attachment. Not defeated by bankruptcy. Attorney's lien on lands. Rule in some states. Waiver of attorney's lien. Attorney's process to secure rights. Settlement by parties. The English practice. Application to protect lien. Money paid into court. Delay in asserting lien. Attorney need not be a party to the record. Action to dissolve partner- ship. Proceeding to wind up insolv- ent insurance com.pany. CHAPTER VI. BANKER S LIENS. Sec. Sec. 241. Bank has a lien. 245. Banker's lien only secures 242. Banker's lien part of the law debts that are due. merchant. 246. Rule in equity. 243. Only banks have bankers' 247. Customer's several accounts liens. regarded as one account. 244. Banker's lien on securities of 248. Lien attaches only to securi- his debtor. ties of the customer. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Xlll Sec, Sec. 249. Xo lien on trust securities. 256. 250. No lien on iiduciaries' ac- counts. 257. 251. Xo lien on pledged securities for general debts. 258. 252. Surplus of pledged securities. 253. Nature and "extent of lien as dependent upon terms of 259. contract. 260. 254. No lien on box containing se- curities. 261. 255. Circumstances effecting lien. X'o lien on securities casually left at the bank. Lien on paper received for col- lection. Lien on paper received for collection — Application of doctrine. Doctrine in New York. Lien on paper of a corre- sponding bank. No lien where no advances are made. CHAPTER VII. CARRIERS LIENS. Sec. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 27L 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. Sec. Lien of common carrier on 280. goods carried. 280a Origin of the lien. Rule in some states. 281. Carrier's lien, a specific lien. 282. Condition giving carrier a lien. 283. Stoppage in transitu not af- fected. 284. Owner bound by carrier's 285. lien. Carrier's lien on passenger's 286. baggage. Lien of carrier by water. 287. Lien for freight. 288. No lien under a charter party. Master signing bills of lading. 289. Terms of bill of lading. No lien before commence- 290. ment of voyage. 291. One not a common carrier has no lien without reserv- 292. ing it. Lien of substitute carrier. 293. Agent of bailee has no lien. Goods of the United States. Insurance of goods. . Lien only for usual freight rate. Carrier's lien for charges. No lien for demurrage im- plied. Expenses of keeping proper- ty rejected. Carrier and warehouseman. Local custom for carriers by water. No lien for transportation from a wharf. Shipowner's lien for expenses. Shipowner's lien for contribu- tions. Carrier has lien for freight charges paid for it. Lien for import duties paid. First carrier a forwarding agent. Authority of carriers to for- ward goods. Connecting carrier has no lien. XIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. Sec. 294. Guaranty not binding on con- 317. necting carrier. 295. No lien where freigiit is pre- 318. paid. 296. Way-bill accompanying goods. 319. 297. First carrier receiving pay- ment. 320. 298. Carrier employed by another carrier has lien. 321. 299. Lien only for customary freight rate. 322. 300. Second carrier bound by first 323. carrier's agreement. 324. 301. Lien does not cover advances for matters not connected 325. with the carriage. 302. Damage to goods before 326. reaching last carrier. 327. 303. Lien on stolen goods. 328. 304. American decisions. 329. 305. Carrier's lien on goods wrong- fully diverted. 330. 306. Apparent authority of shipper. 307. The carrier's lien can not be 331. set up by a wrongdoer. 308. Carrier may waive lien. 332. 309. Carrier's lien continues on goods placed in warehouse. 310. Carrier's lien lost by delivery. 332a, 311. Delivery to the consignee up- on condition. 333. 312. Nature of delivery necessary 334. to terminate lien. 313. Payment of freight and deliv- 335. ery of goods. 314. Terms of charter party may 336. be such that chartered freight will not be due until 337. cargo has been delivered. 315. Cargo in hands of consignee. 338. 316. Promise to pay carrier not presumed from taking pos- 339. session. Lien continues when posses- sion is secured by fraud. No lien where goods are de- livered through mistake. The carrier has a lien upon all the goods carried. Delivery of part of the goods not a waiver. Separate liens on separate goods. Lien waived by contract. Extension of time of payment. Promissory note does not af- fect carrier's lien. When carrier has no lien for freight charges. Waiver of carrier's lien. Waiver of lien not inferred. Waiver by attachment. Action to collect freight charges. Waiver by issuance of an ex- ecution. Lien defeated by injury to goods. Carrier's lien not affected by consignee's failure to receive goods. . Condition precedent to car- rier's lien. Carrier's lien lost. Claiming general lien does not waive special lien. Carrier's lien founded on pos- session. Sale of goods by carrier au- thorized by statutes. Sale by carrier must be made in good faith. Sale by carrier of perishable goods. Statute of the United States. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XV CHAPTER VIII. LIENS OF CORPORATIONS ON THEIR MEMBERS SHARES. Sec. 375. Corporation at common law had no lien on its mem- bers' shares. 376. Lien of corporation by statute. Zn . By-laws to regulate transfer of shares. 378. Notice where by-law rests up- on inferential authority. 379. Statute constructive notice of lien. 380. Usage of corporations in claiming liens. 381. Lien can only be authorized by statute. 382. Lien conferred on existing corporation. 383. Option by statute does not create a lien. 384. Bank can have no lien on its own stock. 385. Lien may cover liability equitable shareholder. 386. Equitable shares subject lien. 387. Enforcement of lien on hold- er of legal title of shares. 388. Equitable assignee has no lien. 389. Priority of lien over equitable pledge. 390. Availability of lien in state other than that where cor- poration is organized. 391. Corporations' lien on dends. 392. Lien not confined to owned. 393. The word "indebted." 394. Lien not restricted to particu- lar debt. 395. Liens not confined to debts due for shares. 396. By-laws restricted by statute. of to divi- stock Sec. 397. Lien on calls for shares. 398. Debt of partnership or of a surety. 399. Debt of joint trustee. 400. Lien in case of bankruptcy. 401. Surety subrogated to right of lienholder. 402. Lien of corporation securing several debts. 403. Lien may be waived by cor- poration. 404. Lien after notice of transfer of stock. 405. Notice to its officer is notice to a corporation. 406. Corporation may be estopped to claim lien. 407. Waived by taking a transfer of the shares. 408. No waiver by taking other security. 409. Lien acquired after attach- ment of stock. 410. Stock pledged after the bank has waived its lien. 411. Transfer of part of the shares not a waiver. 412. Usage may operate against lien. 413. No waiver by reason of the corporation allowing stock to remain outstanding. 414. Issuing of certificate will not amount to a waiver. 415. Lien not enforcible on unau- thorized debt. 416. Payment of debt discharges lien. 417. Lien not lost because debt is barred by statute of limita- tions. XVI CONTKNTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER IX. LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES AND MERCHANTS. Sec. 418. Factor or consignee under common law has lien on goods in his possession. 419. One who has no authority to make sales is not a factor. 420. Lien of merchandise broker. 421. Lien of stock-broker. 422. Broker employed on commis- sion has a lien. 423. An insurance broker is a fac- tor. 424. Extent of insurance broker's lien. 425. Agent's specific lien. 426. Factor's lien for general bal- ance. 427. A general lien is not implied when there is a special agreement which is incon- sistent with such a lien. 428. Factor has no lien on goods received under express di- rections. 429. Factor's agent has no lien as against principal. 450. Efifect of factor's assignment for creditors. 431. Goods received after death of principal. 432. Xo lien on goods when con- signor has informed factor that goods do not belong to him. 433. ."Xgent's lien. 434. Lien of consignee depends on manner of consignment. 435. Lien of consignee on insur- ance money. 436. State statutes. 436a. Delaware. 436b. Florida. Sec. 436c, . Georgia. 437. Louisiana. 438. Maine. 439. Maryland. 440. Massachusetts. 440a . Missouri. 440b . Xew York. 441. Ohio. 442. Pennsylvania. 443. Rhode Island. 444. Wisconsin. 445. Debt is foundation oi ■ agent's lien. 446. Lien covers interest on debt. 447. Debt must be due. 448. Factor can not claim Hen for debt due his principal. 449. Factor has no lien for old debt due from his principal 450. The lien covers acceptances as well as advances in mon- ey. 451. Lien for duties paid. 452. Lien exists even wh( is barred. 2re debt 453. Lien for advancement on crop. 453a . -Arkansas. 453 b 1. Florida. 454. Georgia. 455. Idaho. 455a . Kentucky. 456. Louisiana. 456a . Minnesota. 456h 1. Mississippi. 457. Xorth Carolina. 457a . Xorth Dakota. 458. South Carolina. 458a .. South Dakota. 458b >. Tennessee. 459. Virginia. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XVll Sec. Sec. 459a. Liens for water furnished for 469. irrigation. 470. 459b. Colorado. 459c. Idaho. 459d. Kansas. 470a 459e. Louisiana. 459f. New Mexico. 459g-. Oklahoma. 471. 459h. Oregon. 459i. South Dakota. 472. 459j. Texas. 473. 459k. Washington. 460. Efifect of a delivery of goods. 474. 461. Delivery to common carrier. 462. No lien while consignor con- 475. trols goods. 476. 463. Delivery of bill of lading es- 477. sential. 478. 464. No lien for advancements ex- cept when goods are deliv- 479. ered. 465. Advances made on faith of bill 480. of lading. 466. Lien lost by losing posses- 481. sion. 467. Possession necessary to lien. 482. 468. Loss of temporary possession no waiver. Revival of the lien. Disclosure of his principal does not defeat the factor's lien. . Factor waives his lien by failing to follow principal's instructions. Lien ends with payment of the debt. Enforcement of factor's lien. Factor employed to purchase goods. Factor's special property in goods. Factor's right to sell goods. Factor may sell at a fair price. Rule in certain states. Factor's lien attaches to pro- ceeds of sale. Factor's right to retain pro- ceeds of sale. Bill of sale from principal to agent. Factor may sue for the debt notwithstanding he has lien. Carrier may enforce con- signee's lien. CHAPTER X. LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. Sec. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. Fiilder of goods has no lien thereon at common law. A riparian owner has no lien on property cast adrift on his land. Finder's right to compensa- tion for his services. Landlord has no lien on chat- tels left on his premises. Reward offered. Sec. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. Offer of a reward becomes a contract. Ofifer of reward by a sheriff. Rendition of services in se- curing reward. Conditions in offer of reward must be complied with. No lien implied from offer of "Liberal Reward." Withdrawal of ofifer of re- ward. XVIU CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. Sec. 494. I-"indcr entitled to a portion 496. Waiver of reward for lost of reward. property. 495. Reward to detective. 497. State statutes. CHAPTER XL innkeepers' and BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPERS' LIENS. Sec. 498. An innkeeper's particular lien. 499. Lien on goods of a third per- son. 500. Attempt to limit lien of inn- keeper on goods of a third person. 501. Settled rule. 502. Knowledge of innkeeper as to ownership of baggage. 503. Innkeeper's lien on goods. 504. No lien on a horse unless it belongs to his guest. 505. Innkeeper defined. 506. What constitutes one a guest. 507. Husband liable for wife's bill at an inn. 508. Lien on infant's baggage. 509. Innkeepr can not detain guest's person. 510. Property exempt from exe- cution. 511. Distinction betwen guest and boarder. 512. A lodging-house keeper not an innkeeper. 513. Lien affected by special agree- ment. 514. When boarding-house keep- er's lien attaches. 515. Statutes giving liens to board- ing-house keepers. 516. Lien secures only reasonable charges. 517. Liens for advanced money. 518. General lien for amount of the bill. Sec. 519. 520. 521. 522. 522a. 523. 524. 525. 52Sa. 525b, 526. 526a. 527. 527a. 527b. 527c. 527d. 527e. 528. 529. 530. 531. 531a. 531b. 531c. 532. 532a. 533. 533a. Possession is essential to the preservation of this lien. Guest's possession secured by fraud will not prevent inn- keeper' lien. Temporary loss of possession will not waive lien. Xo waiver by accepting other security. Priority. Lien waived by unlawful sale. Care and use of the property detained. Innkeeper's lien confers no right of sale. Alabama. , Arizona. California. Colorado. Connecticut. District of Columbia. , Florida. Georgia. , Illinois. Iowa. ^ Kansas. , Kentucky. Louisiana. Maine. Maryland. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Mississippi. Missouri. Montana. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XIX Sec. 533b, . Nebraska. 534. Nevada. 534a. New Hampshire, 535. New Jersey. 535a. New Mexico. 536. New York. 536a. North Carolina. 536b, , North Dakota. 536c. Ohio. 536d. , Oregon, 537. Pennsylvania. Sec. 537a. South Carolina. 537b. South Dakota. 537c. Tennessee. 537d. Texas. 538. Utah. 538a. Virginia. 539. Washington. 539a. West Virginia. 539b. Wisconsin. S39c. Wyoming. CHAPTER XII. LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. Sec. ^ Sec. 540. In general. 557. 541. Lien by agreement. 542. Lien on property not in ex- 558. istence. 543. Chattel mortgage clause. 559. 544. Lease that is a mortgage must be recorded. 560. 545. Lease of farm to be worked on shares. 561. 546. Rule in Missouri. 547. Delivery sufficient to protect 562. a lien. 548. Provision giving lessor own- 563. ership. 549. Lease reserving right of re- 564. entry. 565. 550. Re-entry. 551. Common-law right of re- straint. 566. 552. Lien of a distress warrant. 553. Lien attaches from beginning 567. of tenancy. 554. Lien prior to that of attach- 568. ment or execution. 569. 555. Priority of lien to tenant's mortgage. 570. 556. Landlord's lien paramount to mortgage lien. Lien not paramount to re- corded chattel mortgage. Fraudulent cancellation of mortgage not effective. Tenant's assignee in bank- ruptcy. Assignment takes precedence of distress warrant. Distress warrants at common law. All property on premises lia- ble to distress for rent. Exemptions from distress on the ground of public policy. Privilege of trade. General exemption laws do not apply as against a dis- tress. Lien for rent attaches only on tenant's property. The lien attaches only to per- sonal property. Lien covers entire crop. Lien does not attach to prop- erty not on premises. Lien attaches to mortgaged property. XX CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 571. Distress attaches to property only where demise exists. 572. Rent payable must be fixed and certain. 573. Distress only after rent is due. 574. Extent of landlord's lien. 575. The statutory lien for rent does not depend upon the maturity of the rent. 576. Expenses, costs and the like. 576a. Protection of bona fide pur- chaser. 577. Loss of lien by sale of prop- erty. 578. Loss of lien by sale of tenant to innocent purchaser. 578a. Efifect of removal of prop- erty to another state. 579. Consent of landlord to remov- al of property. 580. Notice of lien to purchaser of crop. 581. Loss of lien by sale of goods in usual way. 582. Sale by tenant will not afifect landlord's lien. 583. Estoppel of landlord. 584. Liability of purchaser to land- lord. 585. Lien not waived by taking note. 586. Lien not waived by taking mortgage. 587. Not waived by taking obliga- tion of third person. 588. Remedy of landlord who has taken security. 589. Tender of rent due must be kept good. 590. Lien lost by levy of an ex- ecution. 591. Lien not lost by appointment of receiver. 592. Lien lost by accepting surren- der of the leasehold estate. Sec. 593. No distraint for rent term expires. after 594. A landlord's lien not impaired by his tenant's subletting the premises. 595. Loss of lien by destruction of the property. 596. Notice unnecessary at mon law. com- 597. Rule in United States notice to tenant. as to 598. Who may distrain. 599. Rights of purchaser at closure sale. fore- 600. Against whom distraint be had. may 601. Injunction by landlord. 602. Alabama. 603. Alabama (continued), lord's liens upon crops Land- 604. Alabama (continued), of tenants in common, Liens 605. Arizona. 606. Arkansas. 607. Arkansas (continued), for supplies advanced. Lien 608. Delaware. 609. District of Columbia. 610. Florida. 611. Georgia. 612. Georgia (continued), tress for rent. Dis- 613. Illinois. 614. Illinois (continued), upon crops. Lien 615. Indiana. 616. Iowa. 617. Kansas. 618. Kentucky. 619. Kentucky (continued), for rent. Lien 620. Louisiana. 621. Maine. 622. Maryland — Distress for rent. 623. Maryland (continued), on crops. Lien CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXI Sec. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 631a, 631b 631c, 632. Minnesota. Mississippi. Missouri. New Jersey — Distress for rent. New Jersey (continued). Liens for rent — When ten- ant's goods seized on exe- cution. New York. New Mexico. North Carolina. , North Dakota. . Oklahoma. Oregon. Pennsylvania. Sec. 633. Pennsylvania (continued). Tenant's goods seized on execution. 634. South Carolina. 635. South Carolina (continued). Lien for rent and advances for agricultural purposes. 636. Tennessee. 637. Tennessee (continued). Fur- nishers' liens. 638. Texas. ■ 638a. Utah. 639. Virginia. 639a. Washington. 639b. West Virginia. 640. Wisconsin. CHAPTER XIII. LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. Sec. Sec. 641. Agistors and livery-stable 654. Florida. keepers have no lien at com- 655. Georgia. mon law. 655a. Hawaii. 642. Lien can not be created by 655b. Idaho. usage. 656. Illinois. 643. Rule questioned in Pennsyl- 657. Indiana. vania. 658. Iowa. 644. Lien on horse kept for train- 659. Kansas. ing. 660. Kentucky. 645. The owner of a stallion has 661. Louisiana. a lien upon a mare for the 662. Maine. charge for serving the mare. 663. Massachusetts. 646. Statutes of the several states. 664. Michigan. 647. Alabama. 665. Minnesota. 647a ,. Alaska. 665a. Mississippi. 647b 1. Arizona. 666. Missouri. 648. Arkansas. 667. Montana. 649. California. 668. Nebraska. 650. Colorado. 669. Nevada. 651. Connecticut. 670. New Hampshire. 652. Delaware. 671. New Jerse}'. 653. District of Columbia. 672. New Mexico. xxn CONTENTS OF VOI-UxME I. Sec. 673. New York. 673a. North Dakota. 674. Ohio. 674a. Oklahoma. 675. Oregon. 676. Pennsylvania. 676a. South Dakota. 677. Tennessee. 678. Texas. 678a. Utah. 679. Vermont. 680. Virginia. 680a. Washingtoa 680b. West Virginia. 681. Wisconsin. 682. Wyoming. 683. A statute creating the lien at- taches from its enactment. 684. Property exempt from execu- tion subject to the lien. 685. Lien of stable keeper is pure- ly statutory. 686. Joint and several lien. 687. Lien does not include isolated cases of feeding. 688. No lien where keeper keeps horse for own benefit. 689. Servant has no lien on mas- ter's cattle. 690. Lien upon notice in writing. 690a. Sheriff holding cattle under mortgage may contract for their keeping. Sec, 691. Prior chattel mortgage su- perior to stable keeper's lien. 691a. Consent of owner may be im- plied. 692. Lien of stable keeper some- times held superior to lien of mortgage. 692a. Lien can not be made supe- rior to prior mortgage. 693. Lien of stallion keeper super- ' rior to subsequent mort- gage. 694. Possession of keeper is con- structive notice to a purchas- er. 695. Mortgage by owner while in temporary possession. 696. Lien by agreement will not hold against mortgage. 697. Facts held to be waiver of keeper's lien. 698. Lieu not lost by delivery of horse temporarily to owner. 699. Loss of possession will de- prive keeper of lien. 700. Acts of ownership by lien- holder. 701. Waiver by including in claim that for which keeper has no lien. CHAPTER XIV. LUMBERMEN S LIENS. Sec. 702. No lien at common law for cutting and hauling timber. 703. Lien at common law where possession is retained. 704. Statutory liens in lumbering 707. Florida. states. 708. Georgia. 704a. Alabama. 709. Louisiana. Sec. 705. Alaska. 705a. Arizona. 705b. Arkansas. 706. California. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXIH Sec. Sec. 710. Maine. 721. 711. Maine (continued) Enforce ment of the lien. 722. 712. Michigan. 713. Minnesota. 111. 713a. Mississippi. 724. 713b. Missouri. 725. 713c. Montana. 714. Nevada. 726. 715. New Hampshire. 727. 715a. New York. 728. 715b. North Carolina. 716. Oregon. 729. 717. Vermont. 718. Washington. 730. 719. Wisconsin. 730a, 719a. Wyoming. 720. Liens for services or manual labor depend on : statutes. 730b Rule by statutes in some states. Contractor not agent of own- er to employ men. Constitutionality of statutes. The term "personal services." Contractor has no lien for la- bor of servants. What are logs or lumber. Priority of lumberman's Hen. Property upon which lien at- taches must be identified. Lien upon logs worked upon by laborer. Enforcement of labor lien. . Lien on dififerent kinds of timber cut under one con- tract. . Continuous services under contract. CHAPTER XV. mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens upon PERSONAL PROPERTY. Sec. Sec. 731. Lien for labor at common law. 740. 1Z2. Common-law lien a specific lien. IZZ. Necessity that work be done 741. at owner's request. 734. Consent of owner may be im- 742. plied. 735. Consent of owner may be in- ferred. 743. 736. Lien of a city or town. IZl . The lien belongs strictly to 743a the person who has contract- ed with the owner to do the 744. work. 738. Lien for work of agents. 745. 739. Lien for all goods delivered under one contract. Lien on part of the property for repair of all the prop- erty. Time of delivery of articles to a workman. Lien at common law only be- cause of added value of arti- cle. Printer has no lien at com- mon law. , Workman must observe the terms of his contract. Precedence over mortgage de- pends on circumstances. Possession is essential to the existence of this lien. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. 746. Possession of an officer is possession of his corpora- tion. 747. Delivery of property waives lien. 748. Mode of payment may be in- consistent with a lien. 749. Statutes of states providing liens. 750. Alabama. 750a. Alaska. 751. Arizona. 7Sla. Arkansas. 752. California. 753. Colorado. 753a. Connecticut. 753b. Delaware. 754. District of Columbia. 755. Florida. 756. Georgia. 757. Idaho. 758. Indiana. 759. Kansas. 759a. Kentucky. 760. Louisiana. 761. Maine. 761a. Maryland. 762. Massachusetts. 763. Michigan. 764. Minnesota. 765. Mississippi. 765a. Nebraska. 765b. Nevada. 765c. New Hampshire. 766. New Jersey. 767. New Mexico. 767a. New York. 768. North Carolina. 768a. North Dakota. Sec. 768b . Oklahoma. 769. Oregon. 769a. , Pennsylvania. 769b . Rhode Island. 770. South Carolina. 770a. , South Dakota. 771. Tennessee. 112. Texas. 772a. . Utah. 772b . Vermont. IIZ. Virginia. 112,2.. , Washington. IIA. Wisconsin. lis. Wyoming. 116. No lien for farm laborers in the absence of statutes. 111. Alabama. 778. Arkansas. 779. Arkansas (continued). Speci- fic liens in favor of em- ployers. 779a . California. 779b . Colorado. 780. Florida. 781. Georgia. 781a . Idaho. 782. Louisiana. 782a, . Michigan. 782b . Minnesota. 783. Mississippi. 784. North Carolina. 784a . North Dakota. 784b . Oregon. 784c. . South Carolina. 785. South Dakota. 786. Tennessee. 786a . Texas. 786b . Washington. 786c, . Wisconsin. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXV CHAPTER XVI. PARTNERSHIP LIENS. Sec. 787. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. Member of partnership has lien. Creditor of partnership has no lien. Quasi lien of joint creditors. No equity of joint creditors in absence of joint property. Conveyance by one partner to the other. Transfer of one partner's in- terest to creditor. Partners may pay debts of in- dividual member. Sec. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. Dissolution of partnership by death of a partner. Levy of execution by creditor of member. Legal title of real estate con- veyed to partners. Effect of notice on one deal- ing with individual member of firm. Character of partnership property impresed upon real estate. Sale of real estate by surviv- ing partner. CHAPTER XVH. SELLER S LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY, Sec. Sec. 800. Lien of seller on goods sold. 809. 801. Part payment will not divest seller of his lien. 810. 802. Lien amounts to a special in- terest. 811. 803. Seller not bound to deliver 812. on receiving notes of a third person. 804. Seller's lien only for the price 813. and for charges. 805. Exercising right of lien does not rescind the contract. 814. 806. Seller's lien depends on his retaining possession. 815. 807. Constructive delivery will not divest seller's right to a lien. 808. Marking and setting aside 816. goods is not a delivery. Qualified delivery will not divest lien. Only actual delivery will di- vest the seller's lien. No lien after fair delivery. When ownership passes the lien is not reserved by a mere agreement. Sale contract divests lien when possession is already in purchaser. Condition of sale is waived by delivery. Not every delivery of goods without insisting upon the performance of such con- dition is absolute. Retaining lien by special con- tract. CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1. Sec. Sec. 817. Lien by contract is good only S38. between the parties. 818. No lien except by mortgage. 819. Contract to mortgage is 839. equitable lien. 820. Property will not pass under conditional sale. 840. 821. Difficulty to determine what is change of possession. 822. Where character of property 841. is changed by purchaser. 823. Delivery by warehouse re- ceipt. 842. 824. Delivery order differs from bill of lading. 843. 825. Warehouse receipts differs from a delivery order. 844. 826. Wharfinger's certificate not a 845. title document. 827. Vendor estopped from set- 846. ting up his lien. 828. Rule where warehouseman enters goods in purchaser's 847. name. 829. Seller not deprived of lien by notice of sale to ware- 848. houseman. 849. 830. Possession by purchaser by fraud will not divest lien. 831. Vendor not bound by order 850. to warehouseman given by vendee. 851. 832. Warehouseman's charge will 852. not affect vendor's lien. 833. Seller loses lien by holding goods as bailee for pur- 853. chaser. 834. Delivery of part of goods sold is not delivery of 854. whole. 835. Goods sold must be sepa- rated. 855. 836. Rule sometimes stated. 837. Intention to separate goods 856. from other goods. Delivery of part only of . goods sold will not divest seller's lien. Lien of seller not affected by the purchaser pledging the goods to a third person. Vendor may retain the part of the goods not delivered for whole bill. Sale by purchaser out of pos- session will not affect sell- er's lien. Estoppel of seller to assert a lien. Estoppel of seller to assert lien — Illustrations. Estoppel of seller. Seller's estoppel by represen- tations to the sub-purchaser. Seller estopped by permitting vendee to assume to be owner. Seller retains lien in case of sale by vendee when he has not assented to the sale. Waiver of seller's lien. Seller waives lien by attach- ing the goods as the prop- erty of the purchaser. Giving of credit by seller generally waives his lien. Admissibility of evidence. Allowing credit not a waiver when seller retains posses- sion. Taking note no waiver of lien where seller keeps pos- session of goods. Taking negotiable note from buyer no waiver of seller's lien. Lien waived by delivery of goods sold at auction. Parol evidence admissible to show that goods were sold on credit. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXVll CHAPTEk XVIII. THE SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Sec. 857. Right of seller to stop goods in transitu. 858. The right of stoppage in transitu tirst equitable one. 859. Right of stoppage in transitu not recognized by civil law. 860. Right of stoppage in transitu now a legal right. 861. Effect of exercising the right. 862. Vendor holding goods by virtue of lien. 863. Vendor's sale of the goods. 864. Proof of vendor's claim made against vendee's in- solvent estate. 865. Resale or rescission by act of vendee. 866. Resale or rescission of the contract. 867. Rescission after right of stoppage ceases to exist. 868. Upon what property the right may be exercised. 869. Who may exercise the right of stoppage in transitu. 870. Right only exercised by one holding the relation of ven- dor to the consignee. 871. Stoppage of goods consigned to factor. 872. Pledgee's exercise of the right. 873. Lienor no right of stoppage after shipment of goods to owner. 874. Suret}- has no general right of stoppage. 875. General agent's right in be- half of principal. 876. Act of one stopping goods in transitu ratified by ven- dor. Sec. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. No right of stoppage where goods have been fully paid for. Right of stoppage not pre- vented by acceptance of vendee's note. Right cut off when note, or- der or bill of third person accepted as payment. Right of stoppage not pre- vented by indebtedness of vendor to vendee. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not affected by part payment of purchase- money. 882. Contract of sale not re- scinded by bankruptcy of buyer. 883. Vendor's right to recover where after notice goods are delivered to bankrupt. 884. Right of stoppage in tran- situ exercised only in case of buyer's insolvency. 885. Question of buyer's insolv- ency is for the jury. 886. Vendor bound to deliver goods to solvent vendee. 887. When insolvency at the time of sale immaterial. 888. Notice of vendor to carrier. 889. Demand by vendor. 890. Vendor may claim goods in the hands of any person hav- ing their charge. 891. Notice to agent is notice to the carrier. 892. Notice is sufficient when goods are still in a ware- house. CONTKNTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. Sec. 893. Duty of shipowner to notify 910. ship's master of notice of stoppage given him. 911. 894. Vendor gains nothing by de- manding goods from ven- 912. dee. 895. No proof necessary before de- manding goods of a carrier. 913. 896. Right of carrier to take time to investigate authority of vendor's agent. 914. 897. Carrier guilty of conversion by ignoring vendor's notice. 915. 898. Duty of the carrier to deter- mine which of two different claimants of goods had the 916. better right. 899. Liability for delivery after notice. 917. 900. Vendor must pay the carrier's charges. 918. 901. Vendor's right of stoppage prevails against carrier's lien for general balance of ac- 919. count. 902. When the right of stoppage 920. in transitu may be exer- cised. 921. 903. Goods shipped to seller's own order. 904. Different kinds of actual de- 922. livery. 905. Right of vendor when tran- sit has not commenced. 923. 906. Right not prevented by pro- curing warehouse receipt. 907. Delivery to carrier not gen- 924. erally constructive delivery to vendee. 908. Xot material that the carrier has been designated by the 925. vendee. 926. 909. Delivery to carrier sometimes is a constructive delivery to the purchaser. Delivery to carrier may be delivery to vendee. Delivery on board of the vendee's ship. Right exercised even where delivery is made on board vendee's ship. Effect where bill of lading requires delivery to vendor's order. Receipt that goods are shipped on seller's account. Bill of lading not conclusive proof that delivery has been made to vendee. Vendor may act as agent of vendee in taking bill of lad- ing. Transit continues until goods arrive at destination. Transit not ended by the ar- rival of vessel at port of call. Vendee may take possession at any point en route. Mere demand by vendee not sufficient. Delivery before point of des- tination may terminate transit. Transit continues while goods are held by a forwarding agent. Transit is no1 ended when vendee repudiates the pur- chase. Refusal of insolvent vendee to take the goods may deter- mine the question of deliv- ery. Rule in similar case. Right of stoppage remains so long as carrier holds the goods not as vendee's agent. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXIX Sec. Sec. 927. Necessity that carrier part 943. witli possession of goods at transitus. 944. 928. Transit ends when consignee claims the goods and the carrier wrongfully refuses 945. to deliver them. 929. Goods still in transit when on arrival they are in the 946. hands of a local carrier. 930. Goods in quarantined vessel after arrival are still in tran- sit. 947. 931. Eft'ect of placing goods in a custom-house. 948. 932. Entry of goods at custom- house without the payment 949. of duties. 933. Transit not ended by storage 950. of goods in government warehouse. 951. 934. Customs officer is not a mid- 952. dleman after consignee has paid the duties. 935. Goods placed in a ware- 953. house by the carrier to await consignee's sending for them are still in transit. 936. Wharfinger a middleman. 954. 937. Goods in the carrier's car at destination are still in tran- sit. 938. Transit ends when the ven- dees take possession of the 955. goods. 939. Rule to determine what con- stitutes possession much discussed. 956. 940. Right of vendee to construc- tive possession while goods 957. are in hands of carrier. 941. When carrier made agent of consignee transit ends. 958. 942. By agreement the carrier may become the buyer's agent. Carrier's consent necessary to be made agent of buyer. Transit ends when goods are put in warehouse used by the purchaser. Goods landed at wharf and freight paid usually ends transit. Assignment of bill of lading by vendee to third person for value defeats right of stoppage in transitu. Rule where instrument is not strictly a bill of lading. Assignee for creditors not a purchaser for value. Pre-existing debt a valuable consideration. Transfer of bill of lading af- ter stoppage in transitu. Pledge by a factor or agent. Fraudulent sale of the bill of lading will not affect right of stoppage. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not defeated by transfer of bill of lading as security. Effect of transfer of bill of lading in pledge on right to make sale that will defeat the vendor's right of stop- page in transitu. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading by vendee to his fac- tor. Advances made on bill of lad- ing. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading. Delivery order given by ven- dor to vendee. XXX CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. 959. Difference between ware- house receipt and delivery order. 960. Sale of goods in transitu without indorsement of bill of lading. 961. Rule where original vendor has notice of resale of the goods by his vendee. 962. Delivery of part of cargo does not determine right of stoppage of whole cargo. Sec. 963. Effect of notice of stoppage after part of goods are de- livered. 964. By the resale by vendee and delivery of bill of lading right of stoppage ended. 965. The right of stoppage para- mount to all liens against the purchaser. CHAPTER XIX. WAREHOUSEMEN S AND WHARFINGERS LIENS. Sec. Sec. 967. A warehouseman's lien is a 974. common-law lien. 968. Rule in some states as to lien on goods stored but not in 975. a warehouse. 969. Carrier may store goods re- fused by consignee. 970. Warehouseman's lien for 976. freight charges paid by him. 977. 971. Authority of mortgagor of chattels to charge them with lien for storage. 978. 972. Right of lienholder to add to claim amount for keeping 979. property. 973. Waiver by warehouseman of 980. his lien. 981. Delivery of part of the goods not defeating lien on the re- mainder for whole bill. Warehouseman's or wharfin- ger's lien not lost because the goods have a fraudulent trade-mark. Enforcement. Important distinction between the lien of a warehouseman and that of a wharfinger. The lien of a wharfinger a general lien. Right of wharfinger to lien not inferred. Lien reduced to a specific lien. Statutes declaring lien. CHAPTER XX. ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. Sec. Sec. 982. Common-law lien not subject 984. Transfer of possession. to sale or assignment. 985. Transfer of the lien debt. 983. Lien a personal privilege. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXXI Sec. 986. Forfeit of lien by lienhold- er's sale of property. 987. Right of wrong-doer to set up lien. 988. Effect of a sale of the prop- erty by lienholder. 989. Interest of lienholder not at- tachable. 990. Assignment of statutory Hens. Sec. 991. Equitable lien pased by as- signment of debt. 992. Attorney's lien assignable. 993. Transfer of lien by subroga- tion. 994. The seller's lien passed to surety paying the debt. 995. No subrogation to a lien un- til the debt is paid. CHAPTER XXL WAIVER OF LIENS. Sec. Sec. 996. Introductory. 1010. 997. Common-law lien founded upon possession. 1011. 998. Contract lien not discharged by owner taking possession. 1012. 999. Intention as affecting waiv- er. 1013. 1000. Lien once lost not regained. 1001. Delivery of part. 1014. 1002. No lien where parties make special contract inconsis- 1015. tent with a lien. 1003. Lien excluded by special 1016. contract for payment at a future time. 1004. Principle extended to cases 1017. where credit is claimed without special contract. 1018. 1005. Effect of express agreement to give credit. 1019. 1006. An agrement for credit by note conditional upon the giving of the note. 1020. 1007. Waiver of lien by condition- al agreement. 1021. 1008. Effect of agreement to pay in advance. 1022. 1009. Taking debtor's note not a 1023. waiver. Note taken as payment a waiver of right to lien. Taking security does not de- stroy lien. Equitable lien not waived by taking legal lien. Lien not displaced by mort- gage. Waiver of lien by attach- ment by lienor. Waiver of lien by inconsis- tent agreement. Special contract giving the seller a lien not a waiver of statutory lien. Estoppel to set up lien by taking bill of sale. Waiver by claim of owner- ship by lienor. Refusal to deliver property on grounds inconsistent with a lien. Lien not waived by failure to assert it, Claim of general lien no waiver of special lien. Two liens for the same debt. Lien lost of the claim is mixed with other claims. xxxu CONTIiNTS OF VOLUME I. Sec. ILL'4. 1025. 1026. 1027. 1028. Lien lost by merger into judgment. Tender of actual indebted- ness. Lien not extinguished by tender of performance of agreement. Lien not waived by giving receipt for property with- out reservation. Waiver from unintentional relinquishment of a right not known to exist. Sec. 1029. Nonperformance of con- tract. 1030. Use of property for its pres- ervation. 1031. Waiver of a lien a new con- sideration. 1032. Effect of execution of con- tract on Sunday on right to lien. 1032a. Lien not ordinarily lost by obtaining a judgment for the debt. CHAPTER XXII. REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. Sec. 1033. A common-law lien defined. 1034. Conversion by lienor. 1035. Right of possession under lien. 1036. Lienholder's measure of dam- ages in trover and trespass. 1037. First step in enforcing lien. 1038. Jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce lien. 1039. Has jurisdiction when mat- ters of account are in- volved. 1040. Jurisdiction dependent on fact that accounts may re- quire adjustment after sale. 1041. In what states courts of equity have jurisdiction to enforce liens. 1042. Jurisdiction of courts of LTnited States. 1043. Loss of lien by taking prop- erty to another state. 1044. Lien of partnership not lost by dissolution. Sec. 1045. 1046. 1047. 1048. 1049. 1049a, 1049b 1049c, 1050. 1051. 1051a. 1052. 1053. 1053a. 1054. 1054a. 1055. Lien on two funds or two properties. Application of equitable principle as between cred- itors of different persons. Enforcement as to rights of other lienholders or pur- chasers as dependent on nature of lien. Rights of bona fide purchas- ers for value. Statutes as to remedies by sale. , Alaska. . Arizona. . California. Colorado. Delaware. District of Columbia. Florida. Georgia. Idaho. Indiana. Kentucky. Maine. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. XXXlll Sec. 1056. Massachusetts. 1056a. Michigan. 1056b. Minnesota. 1057. New Hampshire. 10S7a. New Mexico. 1057b. New York. 1057c. North Dakota. 1058. Oregon. 1059. Pennsylvania. 1059a. Rhode Island. Sec. 1059b. South Dakota. 1059c. Tennessee. 1060. Texas. 1060a. Utah. 1060b. Virginia. 1060c. Washington. 1060d. West Virginia. 1060e. Wisconsin. 1060f. Wyoming-. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II CHAPTER XXIII. grantor's OR vendor's implied lien for purchase-money. Sec. Sec. 1061. Nature of the lien. 1077. 1062. Grounds of the doctrine. 1063. How far adopted in this^ 1078. country. 1079. 1064. When lien presumed to ex- ist. 1080. 1065. Against whom the lien ex- ists. 1081. 1066. The debt secured by the lien. 1082. 1067. In whose favor the lien ex- ists. 1068. Lien in favor of tenant in 1083. common. 1084. 1069. Subject-matter of the lien. 1070. Lien under judicial sale. 1085. 1071. For unliquidated claim. 1072. Lien where real and per- sonal property is sold to- 1086. gether. 1073. Evidence to show note was 1087. accepted in payment. 1074. Lien generally not waived 1088. by taking note or bond. 1075. Lien not waived by gi fing receipt. 1089. 1076. Lien, when defeated by vendee's conveyance. Protection of innocent pur- chaser. Purchaser's equitable rights. Lien defeated by grantee's mortgage. Priority of lien by mort- gage over equitable lien. Judgment creditor as quasi purchaser for value. Right of assignee in bank- ruptcy in property subject to lien. Purchaser with notice. Rule when deed shows pur- chase-money not paid. Necessary allegations in an- swer as defense against lien. Lien lost by taking mort- gage. Waiver by taking a mort- gage. Lien waived although se- curity taken proves worth- less. Immaterial when securitj' is taken. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. pre- of Sec, 1090. Taking security only sumptive evidence waiver. 1091. Estoppel of vendor. 1092. Assignability of vendor's lien. 1093. Subrogation to the lien. 1094. Lien in favor of third per- sons. 1095. Effect of indorsement note without recourse carry the lien. 1096. Exception to the rule nonassignability of lien. 1097. Effect of indorsement several notes. 1098. Lien not lost by changing the evidence of the debt. Sec. 1099. 1100. 1101. ;r- 1101a. of 1102. to 1102a. 1102b. of 1103. of 1103a. ng 1104. Enforcement of lien when debt is barred. Must the remedy at law be exhausted before bill in equity can be filed? Enforcement of lien by parties to bill. , Vesting of lien on death of vendor in executor. The bill. Defenses. , The decree. Judgment for balance of debt. Recovery of attorney's fee in equity to enforce lien. Marshalling assets. CHAPTER XXIV. THE vendor's implied LIEN FOR PURCH.\SE-MONEY. Sec. 1105. Money paid prematurely as charge on the estate. Sec. 1106. Lien for purchase-money paid where purchaser de- clines to complete contract. CHAPTER XXV. THE VENDOR S LIEN BY CONTRACT OR RESERVATION. hec. 1107. 1108. 1109. 1110. nil. Lien by contract not a ven- dor's lien. Legal eflfect of title bond. Security not impaired by holder of contract. Reservation of lien in deed as creating an equitable mortgage. Lien reserved a lien by contract. Sec. 1112. Reservation of lien in deed as creating mortgage. 1113. Purchaser not liable for pur- chase-money in accepting a mortgage deed. 1114. Title imperfect until the debt is paid. 1115. Obligation of a married woman. 1116. Waiver of the lien. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. XXXV Sec. 1117. Order of liability of par- cels sold. 1118. Account of vendor in pos- session. 1119. Assignment of purchase- money note or bond. 1120. Order of payment of several notes. 1121. Notice to purchaser when deed does not refer to a note. 1122. Subrogation to the lien. 1123. Statute of limitations. Sec. 1124. No obligation to exhaust personalty before resort- ing to real estate. 1125. Proceedings to enforce such lien. 1126. Remedies of vendor. 1127. Tender of performance. 1127a. Temporary eviction of ven- dee. 1128. Lien of vendor exhausted by foreclosure sale. 1129. Efifecl of sale of land to pass growing crops. 1130. Restraint of purchaser from impairing vendor's lien. CHAPTER XXVI. IMPROVEMENT LIENS OF OCCUPANTS. Sec. Sec. 1131. Rule at common law. 1140. 1132. Rule of civil law adopted. 1141. 1133. Rule adopted by courts of law. 1142. 1134. Value of improvements set off. 1143. 1135. Relief to one in possession under defective title. 1136. Party in possession allowed 1144. lien for improvements. 1137. Allowance in equity for 1145. lasting improvements. 1138. Lien of vendee for perma- 1146. nent improvements made. 1139. Lien by acquiescence of owner. In general. Statutes providing compen- sation by set-oft. Statutes providing full equi- table compensation. Statutes giving the occu- pant a lien on the land for his improvements. Owner's land not taken without consent. Constitutionality of the statutes. Good faith of occupant a condition of recovery. CHAPTER XXVn. IMPROVEMENT LIENS OF JOINT TENANTS, TENANTS IN COMMON, AND TENANTS FOR LIFE OR FOR YEARS. Sec. 1147. Lien of joint tenant or ten- ant in cominon. Sec. 1148. Lien against tenant in com- mon who is an infant. XXXVl CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. Sec. 1149. No lien except where im- 1155. provements are made with 1156. consent of joint tenant. 1150. J.icn of tenant in common or joint tenant by agree- 1157. nient. 1151. Lien of tenant in common 1158. settled before partition. 1152. Lien for excess of purchase- 1159. money furnished by one tenant in common or joint tenant. 1160. 1153. Lien for money advanced by tenant in common to discharge mortgage. 1161. 1154. Lien of tenant in common for price paid for adverse 1162. title. No lien for rents collected. Lien of tenant in common not good as against cred- itors' attachment liens. Judgment creditor not a purchaser in some states. Owelty of partition a first lien. Life tenant can not charge estate with value of im- provements. Exceptions to rule that life tenant can not charge the estate with improvements. Lien of lessee for improve- ments made. Lien for improvements un- der agreement for a lease. CHAPTER XXVIII. LIENS ARISING UNDER DEVISES. Sec. 1163. 1164. 1165. 1166. 1167. 1168. Equitable lien on devise of real estate subject to debts and legacies. Mode of imposing the lien or charge. Debts and legacies payable out of personal estate. When devised land is charged with payment of legacies. Lien of legatee for support. Superiority of lien of lega- tee over lien for improve- ments. Sec. 1169. Waiver by legatee of lien on devisee's land. 1170. Effect of executor's bond on lien. 1171. Lien not discharged by ac- cepting note or security. 1172. As against purchasers and creditors. 1173. Probate of will as notice of liens created by it. 1174. Lien of debts on land of deceased during adminis- tration. CHAPTER XXIX. LIENS ARISING UNDER TRUSTS. Sec. 1175. For repairs ments. Sec. and improve- 1176. Lien of next friend on es- tate of minor benefited by him. CONTENTS OF VOLUME IT. XXXVll Sec. 1177. Lien of trustee for expenses in executing his trust. 1178. Resulting trust an equitable lien. 1179. Lien of owner of trust funds invested in lands where title not in his name. 1179a. Extent of lien to secure trust funds. Sec. 1180. Equitable lien in favor of owner of trust fund. 1181. Lien in favor of cestui que trust upon securities. 1182. Whether creditor has lien on property purchased by his debtor. 1183. No equitable lien on account of money expended in re- moving incumbrances. CHAPTER XXX. MECHANICS LIENS. — STATUTORY PROVISIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS. Sec. Sec. 1184. Mechanic's lien a creature 1208. Michigan. of statute. 1209. Minnesota. 1184a I. What law governs. 1210. Mississippi. 1185. Lien reserved by written 1211. Missouri. contract. 1212. Montana. 1186. Plan of stating the statu- 1213. Nebraska. tory law. 1214. Nevada. 1187. Alabama. 1215. New Hampshire, 1187a .. Alaska. 1216. New Jersey. 1188. Arizona. 1217. New Mexico. 1189. Arkansas. 1218. New York. 1190. Colifornia. 1219. North Carolina. 1191. Colorado. 1219a ,. North Dakota. 1192. Connecticut. 1220. Ohio. 1194. Delav.'are. 1220a .. Oklahoma. 1195. District of Columbia. 1221. Oregon. 1196. Florida. 1222. Pennsylvania. 1197. Georgia. 1223. Rhode Island. 1198. Idaho. 1224. South Carolina. 1199. Illinois. 1225. Tennessee. 1200. Indiana. 1226. Texas, 1201. Iowa. 1227. Utah. 1202. Kansas. 1228. Vermont. 1203. Kentucky. 1229. Virginia. 1204. Louisiana. 1230. Washington. 1205. Maine. 1231. West Virginia. 1206. Maryland. 1232. Wisconsin. 1207. Massachusetts. 1233. W^yoming. XXXVIU CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. CHAPTER XXXI. MECHANICS LIENS — CONTRACT OR CONSENT OF OWNER. Sec. 1234. Contract or consent of the owner. 1235. Contract of owner neces- sary to establish lien. 1236. Immaterial whether con- tract written or oral. 1237. Lien under contract with owner's agent. 1238. Agent's authority. 1239. No lien on land of a minor. 1240. No lien by owner on his own building. 1241. The contract to be real, not fictitious. 1242. Contract with owner to be precise. 1243. Capacity of owner to con- tract. 1244. No power by equitable own- er to bind legal owner. 1245. No power by tenant to sub- ject owner's land to lien. 1246. Building erected on land of a stranger. 1247. Right of purchaser in pos- session to subject proper- ty to lien. 1248. Right of one having a con- tract for purchase of a house to subject it to a lien. 1249. Lien on building erected by one having a bond for a deed. 1250. Lien on building alone. 1251. Consent of owner. 1252. Lien for labor. 1252a. Contract between the own- er of land and builder. 1253. Consent of owner to im- provement not implied. Sec. 1254. Consent of owner implied under some circumstances. 1255. By statute in some states, consent implied from knowledge. 1256. Owner estopped to deny consent. 1257. Lien on the interest of per- son having improvements made. 1258. Necessity that person mak- ing improvements have some estate. 1259. Lien of title subsequently acquired. 1260. Contract of married woman as foundation of lien. 1261. Common-law disability of a married woman. 1262. Married woman's land not subject to lien when con- tract is with husband only. 1263. Wife's knowledge of im- provements not enough to show her consent. 1264. Lien on married woman's estate under statutes when she consents. 1265. Difference in statutory terms. 1266. Husband's agency estab- lished under some circum- stances. 1267. Liens where wife's real es- tate is in husband's name. 1268. Lien either where title be- longs to husband or taken by him to defraud. 1269. Furnished on husband's credit. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. XXXIX Sec. 1270. Lien on land held by joint tenancy. 1271. Husband's estate by cur- tesy subject to lien. 1272. Word "owner" includes lease- hold estate. 1273. Effect of forfeiture of lease. 1274. Lien on leasehold estate may include buildings and fix- tures, etc. 1275. Lien not extended beyond lessee's interest. 1276. Interest of lessor not sub- jected by the lessee. Sec. 1277. 1278. 1279. 1280. 1281. 1282. Lessee's interest only sub- ject to lien for improve- .ments he has agreed to make. Whether lessor's permission to lessee to make repairs subjects estate to lien. Necessity that lessor author- ize improvements. Covenant to build or repair. Statute under which lien is claimed. Rule in Pennsylvania. CHAPTER XXXII. MECHANICS LIENS OF SUBCONTRACTORS. Sec. Sec. 1283. Who are subcontractors as 1292. defined by statutes. 1293. 1284. Presumption of reliance on 1294. lien. 1285. Modes adopted by mechan- ic's lien statutes. 1295. 1285a. Lien of subcontractor on bonds and warrants. 1286. Notice to the owner. 1296. 1287. Extent of lien. 1288. Changes in the contract. 1288a. Notice by subcontractor as 1297. required by statute. 1289. Subcontractor bound by con- 1298. tractor's contract. 1299. 1289a. Contractor no lien where he has agreed to turn over building free of liens. 1300. 1290. Effect of payment to con- tractor on lien of subcon- 1301. tractor. 1290a. Rule in Georgia. 1302. 1290b. Rule in Michigan. 1291. Whether premature payment 1303. to contractor will defeat lien of subcontractor. Estoppel of owner. Estoppel of subcontractor. Subcontractor's lien limited to the indebtedness of con- tractor to him. Right of owner to limit his liability to subcontractor by agreement. Subcontractor can only look to indebtedness due con- tractor. Set-off not arising out of the contract. Burden on subcontractor. Right of subcontractor where contractor abandons the work. Subcontractor has no lien for damages and expenses. Lien defeated by assignment of debt. Lien defeated by garnish- ment of owner. Duty of subcontractor who holds disputed account. xl CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. 1304. Subcontractors' direct lien under statutes. 1304a. Constitutionality of lien statutes. 1305. Burden on owner to protect his property from liens. 1306. Lien of subcontractor limited to value of work. Sec. 1307. Payments by original con- tractor to laborer to be ap- plied to account. 1308. Payments made by owner upon account. 1309. Payments to subcontractor. CHAPTER XXXIII. MECHANICS liens: FOR WHAT LABOR AND MATERIALS GIVEN. Sec. , Sec. 1309a. Building the subject of 1320. liens. 1309b. Foundation constitutes a 1321. building. 1309c. Terms "Structure" and "Im- provement." 1322. 1309d. "Building" not inclusive of every species of erection on land. 1323. 1310. Lien confined to the particu- lar building. 1311. Lien on the structure upon 1324. which the labor or material is bestowed. 1325. 1312. Houses on distinct lots. 1313. Labor under one contract, 1326. t upon several buildings. 1314. Buildings erected under sep- 1327. arate contracts. 1315. Labor upon lots belonging to 1328. different owners. 1316. Building projecting upon land of another. 1317. Contract to erect two or 1329. more buildings for entire 1330. sum. 1318. Apportionment of liens. 1319. Apportionment of liens with- 1331. out particular statute. Apportionment by agreement of parties. Contract for work on several houses divided so as to give separate liens on each. Distinct alterations or re- pairs not recovered for un- der one lien. Mingling of lienable ac- counts with those for which there is no lien. Lien for work done away from the premises. Xo lien for articles fur- nished. Materials furnished with ref- erence to their use. Materials intended for a par- ticular use. Rule of some states that ma- terial furnished must be ac- tually used in construction of the building. Rule in other states. Xo lien for materials fur- nished solely on the credit of the purchaser. Evidence of purpose for which materials were fur- nished. CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11. xli Sec. 1332. 1333. 1334. 1335. 1336. 1337. 1338. 1339. 1340. 1341. 1342. 1343. 1344. 1345. 1346. 1347. 1347a 1348. Material-man not precluded from showing that mater- ials were furnished on the credit of the building by charging them to the buy- er. Materials charged to build- ing. Materials sold by purchaser. No lien for machinery fur- nished for a mill unless done as part of its con- struction. Machinery purchased. No lien for machinery fur- nished for the manufacture of materials. Work in making slight changes incidental to plac- ing machinery. Lien for repair work. Reservation of title till ma- terials are paid for. Whether a fixture. Fixtures unsuitable or not accepted. Lien for furnaces, ranges, and heaters. A drain pipe, a part of a house. Lien for putting mirrors into the walls of a house. Repairs in refitting a theater. Materials furnished for up- holstering a hall. . Powder used in construction of a railroad. Grading about a building not construction work. Sec. 1349. Lien for constructing a side- walk. 1350. Fences and sodding. 1351. Furnace stack. 1352. No lien for lumber furnished and used in erecting a scaf- fold. 1353. When lien does not arise for labor in pulling down a building. 1354. Lien may exist for taking down a building. 1355. No lien for removing a build- ing. 1356. No lien for labor in hauling lumber. 1357. No lien for labor in cooking for workmen. 1358. No lien on a claim for breach of contract. 1359. No lien for loan of money. 1360. Surety has no right to a lien for materials furnished. 1361. Artisans and mechanics equally entitled to liens. 1362. Owner can have no lien on his own property. 1363. General manager not a la- borer. 1364. Bookkeeper not a laborer. 1365. No lien for superintending the construction of a build- ing. 1366. Superintendent of a mine who also works entitled to a lien. 1367. Architect not entitled to a lien. CHAPTER XXXIV. mechanics' liens : what property is subject to. Sec. 1368. Land subject to lien. 1369. The whole land of the own- er subject to lien. Sec. 1370. Meaning of the phrase "Lot of land." 1371. Lots appurtenant to a mill. xlii CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. 1372. Quantity of land necessary for use and occupation. 1373. Lien on building separate from the land. 1374. Several and not a joint lien. 1375. Public buildings of states and municipal corporations. 1376. Lien not on public buildings but on moneys. 1377. Lien on fund by force of city ordinance. 1378. Property of quasi public cor- porations. 1379. Grain corporation, not a pub- lic corporation. Sec. 1380. House of minister plenipo- tentiary of foreign power. 1381. Contract to erect building to be used for unlawful pur- pose. 1382. Land held under homestead exemption. 1383. Xo lien on house built on government land. 1384. In general. 1385. Lien for machinery not a separate lien. 1386. Machinery not affixed to real estate not subject to lien. 1387. Lien on fixtures in general. 1388. Trade fixtures. CHAPTER XXXV. MECHANICS liens: THE CLAIM, CERTIFIC.\TE, OR NOTICE. Sec. Sec. 1389. How lien is procured. 1399. 1390. Particulars required to be stated in the notice. 1391. Form of notice or claim not material. 1400. 1392. Statement must show prima facie right to Ijen. 1393. Partnership claim of lien. 1401. 1393a. Claim filed by assignee. 1394. Only one lien under one con- 1402. tract. 1403. 1395. Subcontractor may make sin- gle claim for all material furnished. 1404. 1396. Claim for materials to show that they were used or fur- 1405. nished for use in the build- ing. 1406. 1397. Name of the owner or reput- ed owner to be stated. 1407. 1398. Name of owner when the lien attached must be stated. 1408. Where property has been conveyed, necessity that no- tice name owner at time of filing statement. Rule under statute requiring name of owner to be stated if known. Sufficiency of statement as to ownership. Owner of building. Statement of name not nec- essary in the absence of a statute requiring it. Account or claim to be spe- cific. Terms, conditions, and time given. Statement of credits in a no- tice. Dates of items in a claim to be stated. Statement not to be in ex- cess of amount due. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. xliii Sec. Sec. 1409. Account to show the amount 1430. of the lien. 1410. Sufficiency of statement of 1431. amount of balance due. 1411. Claim bad when contract 1432. shown only partly complet- ed and amount due not dis- 1433. closed. 1412. Including nonlienable items. 1434. 1413. Overstatement of amount due not necessarily fatal. 1414. Intentional omission of 1435. credits. 1415. Statute may protect one 1436. against an overstatement of 1437. amount due. 1416. Statement of aggregate price of work and materials. 1438. 1417. Statutes requiring the filing of true account. 1439. 1418. Bill of particulars when re- quired by statute not com- plied with by filing for bal- 1440. ance due. 1419. Account containing a lump- 1441. ing charge. 1420. Rule under some statutes. 1442. 142L In general. 1422. Insufficient description of 1443. property in a notice. 1423. Notice not invalid for de- 1444. scribing too much land. 1424. Imperfect but sufficient de- 1445. scriptions. 1425. Description of limited area of land. 1446. 1426. Failure of description not cured by survey after suit filed. 1447. 1427. Limitation from completion of building. 1448. 1428. Same limitation affecting subcontractor. 1429. Transfer of title during progress of building. 1449. Filing statement premature- ]y. Filing lien within a limited time after last work done. Notice where there are dis- tinct contracts. Notice for wages under a monthly or yearly contract. Where materials are fur- nished for several houses under one contract. Materials furnished on run- ning account. Continuous contract. Presumption that accounts are based upon independent contracts. Abandonment of work deemed completion of work. Suspension of work and its resumption not commence- ment of the work. No lien for work under abandoned contract. Contract for additional work or material. Date of last material sup- plied but not used. The lien relates back to the beginning of the work. Filing lien after substantial completion. Lien filed within time limit- ed from the completion of additional work. Alterations and repairs made after substantial comple- tion. Completion of contract after possession given to owner. Extension of time for filing lien by delivery of material at house after its comple- tion. Whether lien is filed in time question of fact. xliv CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. 1450. Rule for computing time. 1451. In general. 1452. Form of verification of claim. 1453. Affidavit made by agent. 1454. Verification to the best of one's knowledge or belief. Sec. 1455. Notice or claim not to be amended after filing. 1456. Effect of amendment when allowed by statute to re- store lien which has been lost by failure to give no- tice. CHAPTER XXXVI. MECH.\NICS' liens: PRIORITY AS REGARDS MORTGAGES AND OTHER INCUMBRANCES AND LIENS. Sec. Sec. 1457. Building as part of realty. 1471. 1458. A mortgage for purchase- money. 1459. Priority of recorded mort- 1472.^ gage. 1460. Recordation of mortgage as dependent on statutes. 1473. 1461. Marshalling securities. 1462. Priority as to building alone. 1462a. Improvement placed on 1474. mortgaged land. 1463. Conveyance of land to secure 1475. a debt. 1464. Machinery attached to such building. 1476. 1465. Priority of mechanic's lien as dependent on priority of 1477. contract under some stat- utes. 1466. Contract too moderate to 1478. create prior lien. 1467. Relief of mechanic against a 1479. mortgage. 1468. Impairment of mortgagee's rights by prior contract. 1480. 1469. Priority of lien from com- mencement of the building. 1470. Lien dates from commence- ment of building. 1481. Application of rule in favor of subcontractors as well as contractors. Excavation for the founda- tion of a building a com- mencement of the building. Necessity that work should be done with intention of continuing it. Work not done on the prem- ises. Effect of stopping work by owner after building is cominenced. Enlargement of contract aft- er work is commenced. Right of mortgagor to sub- ject property to lien as against mortgagee. Repairs or additions made to completed building. Mortgage attaches to after acquired property but sub- ject to existing conditions. Rule as to priority in states in which a Hen attaches from commencement of work. Meaning of phrase "com- mencement of work." CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11. xlv Sec. 1482. Labor and materials per- formed and furnished un- der one contract. 1483. Time of performing labor or furnishing materials. 1484. Merger of mortgage having priority over mechanic's lien. 1485. Estoppel of lienor by his acts or agreement. 1486. Mortgage given precedence of a lien by reason of es- toppel. 1486a. A mortgage under some circumstances subordinated to subsequent liens. Sec. 1487. 1488. 1489. 1490. 1491. 1492. Vendor's lien for purchase- money superior to mechan- ic's lien. Subsequent conveyance. Sale of property subject to lien. Precedence of prior attach- ment. Judgment lien acquired dur- ing the construction of building. No priority among different persons having mechanics' liens upon the same build- ing. CHAPTER XXXVII. MECHANICS liens: ASSIGNMENT OF. Sec. 1493. Assignability of a mechan- ic's lien. 1494. Lien not destroyed by as- signment of the lien debt. 1495. Mechanic's lien assignable in equity. 1496. Assignment of note for lien debt. Sec. 1497. Assignee must show his right as such. 1498. Completion of contarct by assignee with owner's con- sent. 1499. No particular words neces- sary to assign a debt or lien. CHAPTER XXXVIII. MECHANICS liens: WAIVER AND LOSS OF. Sec. 1500. Lien waived by agreement either express or implied. 1500a. Agreement not to file a lien a waiver of right to do so. 1501. Waiver of right by an im- plied agreement. 1502. Waiver binding between con- tractor and owner binding on all persons. Sec. 1503. Waiver on promise of pay- ment. 1504. Lien waived in favor of a mortgagee not to be en- forced as against him. 1505. Release of lien not inferred from doubtful expressions. 1506. Estoppel of subcontractor from claiming a lien. xlvi CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. Sec. 1507. Waiver by subcontractor of 1524. lien by directing owner to pay contractor. 1525. 1507a. Waiver by surety on con- tractor's bond. 1508. Lien discharged by payment 1526. of the debt. 1509. Unaccepted orders on the 1527. owner. 1510. Contract enforcible when 1528. payable otherwise than in money. 1529. 1511. Dissolution of lien by tiling a bond with sureties. 1512. Right of contractor to en- 1530. force lien after abandoning contract. 1531. 1513. Contractor's abandonment of contract may deprive those under him from claiming a 1532. lien. 1513a. Prevention of completion 1533. of contract by the act of the owner. 1534. 1514. Under provisions allowing the owner to complete the work abandoned by the 1535. contractor. 1515. Rule by statutes in a few 1536. states. 1516. Waiver of subcontractor's lien by abandonment of 1537. work. 1517. Building contract terminated by death of contractor. 1538. 1518. Lien not lost by destruction of building. 1539. 1519. Lien waived by taking col- lateral security. 1540. 1520. Intention to waive the lien. 1521. Lien not waived by taking 1541. security on same property. 1522. Lien and security must be on 1542. same property. 1523. Agreement that taking of se- curity will not waive lien. Agreement to take a convey- ance a waiver. Agreement for payment by a conveyance as waiver of lien. Confusion of accounts in a note as a waiver of lien. Taking note of third person not a waiver. When contractor not deemed collateral security. Agreement to pay for work out of particular money not security. Lien waived by deposit of money as security. Taking a fire insurance pol- icy as security not a waiver of lien. Taking debtor's note not a waiver. Taking a promissory note not prima facie payment. In some states taking a promissor}' note, prima fa- cie payment. Notes payable after time for filing the lien. Taking note not due until time when lien can not be asserted as a waiver. Discharge of lien by notes expressly received in pay- ment. Destruction of building cuts off lien. In some states the lien re- mains on the land. Lien on land second to prior mortgage. Lienholder not subrogated to insurance money paid. Not defeated by subsequent conveyance. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. xlvii Sec. 1543. 1544. 1545. 1546. 1547. Lien defeated by conveyance by owner where it does not attach until notice is filed. Lien cut off by sale under prior mortgage. Lienholder required to look to the title upon which im- provement is made. Lien not defeated by bank- ruptcy of owner. Jurisdiction of court to en- force lien not divested by bankruptcy of owner. Sec. 1548. 1549. 1550. 1550a 1551. 1552. Only interest of bankrupt taken by assignee in bank- ruptcy. Lien for balance after a div- idend. Lien not defeated by ap- pointment of receiver. . Death of owner of the property. Lien not to be enforced aft- er the debt has become barred by the statute of limitations. Lien not divested by judg- ments against the owner. CHAPTER XXXIX. MECHANICS liens: PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE. Sec. Sec. 1553. Proceedings to enforce liens 1562. dependent on the practice in different states. 1554. Rules of practice. 1563. 1555. Lien not extended to cases falling only within the 1563a spirit of the law. 1564. 1556. Liberal construction after the lien has attached. 1565. 1557. Lien law has no extra-terri- torial effect. 1558. Effect of repeal of statute 1566. under which mechanic's 1567, lien has accrued. 1568. 1559. Whether proceedings are le- gal or equitable dependent upon the statute. 1569. 1560. In code states the foreclos- ure of a lien an equitable 1570. suit. 1561. Court of equity can not take 1571. jurisdiction to enforce a lien without the aid of a statute. 1572. Filing complaint to enforce lien generally the com- mencement of a suit. Suit brought on notice by publication. . Rule for computing time. Lapsed lien not revived by suit. Action to foreclose lien pre- mature if brought before the debt is payable. Notice to commence suit. Parties plaintiff. Partners to give joint notices and bring joint proceedings to enforce a lien. Consolidation claims or ac- tions. Parties defendant in suits to enforce liens. Necessary parties defendant where suit is an equitable proceeding. The owner a necessary party. xlviii CONTENTS OF VOLUME IF. Sec. Sec. 1573. Husband and wife. 1592, 1574. Contractor a necessary party in suit by subcontractor to 1593. enforce lien. 1575. Not necessary to join all 1594. joint contractors. 1576. Contractor who has assigned his contract not a necessary 1595. party defendant. 1577. Indorser of note a proper party. 1578. Grantor not a necessary par- 1596. ty where he has conveyed the real estate. 1597. 1579. Subsequent mortgagee or 1598. other incumbrancer to be made a party. 1580. Trustee and cestui que trust 1599. both to be made parties. 1581. Prior lienholder not a nee- 1600. essary defendant. 1601. 1582. Prior lien not affected by mortgage foreclosure. 1583. Prior mortgagee necessary 1602. party where lienholder has prior lien on building alone. 1584. Other lienors, 1585. New parties to be sum- 1603. moned any time prior to final decree. 1604. 1586. Where the owner dies, his executor or administrator 1604a to be substituted as party. 1587. Petition or complaint to sub- stantially conform to the 1605. statute. 1606. 1588. What the complaint must 1607. show. 1589. Averments in the complaint continued. 1608. 1590. Complaint to aver that the materials were used in the 1609. structure. 1591. Complaint to show that de- 1610. fendant was owner or had some interest. Not required to prove the precise title of owner. Necessary allegations of sub- contractor. To aver an indebtedness by owner to original contrac- tor. Not necessary to allege in the complaint that the indebt- edness arose under a par- ticular contract. Allegations as to date of execution of contract. One contract. Abandonment of contract through no fault of con- tractor. Damages allowed to defend- ant by way of set-off. Description of the land. Efifect of variance in de- scription in notice and in the complaint. Variance as to parties be- tween claim filed and the complaint, not ground for dismissal. Case proved to be substan- tially as alleged. Variance as to amount of the lien claim. . Owner to appear and an- swer complaint to enforce lien. Amendment of complaint. Evidence admissible. Question for the court to de- termine whether a lien ex- ists. Judgment to direct a sale ot owner's interest. Interest allowed from date of finding. Decree for sale of separate buildings on separate lots. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. xlijc Sec. 1611. Judgment where money has been paid into court. 1612. Sale on credit. 1613. Judgment for a deficiency. 1614. A personal judgment to be rendered only for a defi- ciency after a sale. 1614a. Receivers. 1615. Judgment against contractor in suit by subcontractor. Sec. 1616. Costs. 1616a. Attorneys' fees. 1617. Reversal of decree of sale. 1617a. Appeal. 1617b. Distribution of proceeds of sale. 1617c. Effect of agreement to post- pone execution. CHAPTER XL. LIENS OF MECHANICS AND OTHERS UPON RAILROADS. Sec. 1698. General lien laws usually not applicable to railroads. 1619. Railroad considered as an en- tirety. 1620. Railroad regarded as one im- provement. 1621. No lien on subscription for railroad. 1622. Railroad bridge not a build- ing. 1623. Railroad bridge not an im- provement. 1623a. Tools used in building bridge not materials used. 1624. Terms "structure," "erec- tion," or "improvement." 1625. Lien for railroad ties superior to lien of mortgage. 1625a. Prior mortgage on railroad property superior to me- chanic's lien. 1626. Rule in some states. 1627. Liens for repairs subordinate to lien for existing mort- gage. 1628. Liens of contractors and la- borers. 1629. Who a laborer. Sec. 1630. Lien of labor personal. 1631. No lien for money advanced to laborers. 1632. Equitable subrogation to lien. 1633. Contractor who is stockhold- er not estopped from assert- ing contractor's lien. 1633a I. Statutes creating liens upon railroads. 1634. Alabama. 1635. Arizona. 1636. Arkansas. 1637. California. 1638. Colorado. 1639. Connecticut. 1641. Florida. 1642. Georgia. 1643. Idaho. 1644. Illinois. 1645. Indiana. 1646. Iowa. 1647. Kansas. 1648. Kentucky. 1649. Maine. 1650. Maryland. 1651. Massachusetts. 1652. Michigan. 1653. Minnesota. 1 CONTENTS OF VOLUME IT. Sec. 1654. Mississippi. 1655. Missouri, 1656. Montana. 1657. Nebraska. 1658. Nevada. 1659. New Hampshire. 1660. New Jersey. 1661. New Mexico. 1662. New York. 1663. North Carolina. 1663a. North Dakota. 1664. Ohio. 1664a. Oklahoma. 1664b. Oresron. Sec. 1665. Pennsylvania. 1666. Rhode Island. 1666a. South Dakota. 1667. Tennessee. 1668. Texas. 1669. Utah. 1670. Vermont. 1671. Virginia. 1672. Washington. 1673. Wisconsin. 1674. Vendor's lien on railroad company's land. 1675. Priority of mortgage over subsequent judgment. CHAPTER XLI. MARITIME LIENS. Sec. Sec. 1676. Lien defined. 1688. 1677. Characteristics of maritime liens. 1678. Maritime lien a strict right. 1689. 1679. Lien for repairs and supplies. 1680. Demand for supplies and re- 1690. pairs to be made by the master. 1691. 1681. Home port of vessel. 1682. Supplies and repairs pre- sumed to be furnished on 1692. owner's credit. 1683. Lien for supplies where there are several owners. 1693. 1684. No lien for supplies sent to vessel's home port. 1694. 1685. Lien where owners hold the 1695. vessel out as foreign ves- sel. 1696. 1686. Presumption that repairs are furnished on credit of the vessel. 1697. 1687. Lien for supplies furnished to vessel in foreign port by home citizen. Rule where supplies or re- pairs are obtained by own- er and not master. Supplies charged to vessel when ordered by owner. Rule where dealing is with charterer. No lien for supplies obtained by charterer at place of his residence. Character of vessel deter- mined by place of owner's residence. Lien only for necessary re- pairs and supplies. No lien for family supplies. No lien for purchase-money of cargo. Lien arising from actual fur- nishing of repairs or sup- plies. No lien for general balance of account. CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. Sec. 1697a. No lien in favor of part 1712. owner for advances or sup- plies. 1713. 1697b. Husband's lien for supplies 1714. furnished where wife is owner. 1698. No maritime lien in favor of 1715. underwriters for unpaid premiums of insurance. 1716. 1699. Lien of one advancing money to pay off lien. 1700. Seamen's liens upon vessel 1717. and its proceeds for pay- ment of their wages. 1718. 1701. Seamen's liens on freight for their wages. 1719. 1702. Seaman's lien enforced by proceeding in admiralty. 1720. 1703. Landsmen assisting in load- ing vessel not entitled to 1720a lien. 1704. Seaman's lien against char- 1721. tered vessel. 1705. Fishermen's liens for serv- ices on board vessel. 1722. 1706. Master of ship not entitled to lien for his wages. 1706a. Master as against owner not entitled to payment out of 1722a. surplus proceeds of sale of 1723. vessel. 1707. Ship's husband not entitled to 1724. lien for advancements made to satisfy ship's bill. 1725. 1708. Services of freight agent not maritime in character. 1709. Shipping broker not entitled 1725a. to lien on vessel for serv- ices in obtaining charter- 1726. party. 1727. 1710. Chief engineer at an annual 1728. salary not entitled to lien. 1711. Quarantine commissioners 1729. entitled to liens. Pilots entitled to lien where their services are required. Stevedore entitled to lien. Workmen removing ballast from vessel in port entitled to liens. Watchman in port not enti- tled to lien. Cooper entitled to lien in putting cargo into good condition. Towage services presump- tively a lien on vessel. Maritime lien for salvage services. Lien for wharfage arising against foreign vessel. Lien in admiralty in favor of vessel on cargo for freight. . Lien in contract of affreight- ment. Lien for labor and materials in construction of vessel un- der general maritime law. No lien in L^nited States for work done and materials furnished in constructing vessel. . Liens for repairing vessels. Lien on vessels at common law. Competent for state to cre- ate lien by statute. Admiralty courts no jurisdic- tion to enforce liens for construction of vessel. What included in statutory liens. Contract of owner. Materials for two vessels. Lien only for materials actu- ally used in construction. Statutory liens enforced in what courts. Hi CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. Sec. Sec. 1730. Admiralty courts g overned 1766. by provisions of state stat- 1767. ute. 1768. 1731. Xo lien on vessel at her home port. 1769. 1732. Statutory lien limited to time specified for its < enforce- 1770. ment. 1733. Filing specifications. 1771. 1734. Departure from port. 1735. Lienholders to ; join in suit. 1771a. 1736. Alabama. 1737. Arizona, 1772. 1738. California. 1739. Connecticut. 1773. 1739a. Delaware. 1774. 1740. Florida. 1741. Georgia. 1775. 1742. Illinois. 1743. Indiana. 1743a. Iowa. 1776. 1744. Kentucky. 1745. Louisiana. 1777. 1746. Maine. 1747. Maryland. 1778. 1748. Massachusetts. 1749. Michigan. 1779. 1750. Minnesota. 1751. Mississippi. 1752. Missouri. 1780. 1753.. Montana. 1754. New Hampshire 1755. New Jersey. 1781. 1756. New York. 1757. North Carolina. 1758. Ohio. 1781a. 1759. Oregon. 1760. Pennsylvania. 1761. South Carolina. 1782. 1762. Tennessee. 1763. Texas. 1783. 1764. Vermont. 1764a. Virginia. 1765. Washington. West Virginia. Wisconsin. Maritime lien arising from torts committed by master. Lien arising against vessel to blame in collision. No maritime lien upon im- movable structure. Personal injuries from negli- gence. . Damages resulting in death of person. Rank of liens given by state laws. Rank of maritime liens. Decisions not in accord with rule. Nonmaritime liens postponed until maritime liens satis- fied. Priority as between different maritime liens. Liens payable in inverse or* der of their dates. Contemporaneous liens paid pro rata. Pro rata distribution not ap- plied to vessels of northern lakes. Liens payable in order of dates at which claims ac- crue. Prior lien for supplies pre- ferred over subsequent lien for damages. Decree for damages in col- lision case overriding all prior liens. Lien for damages against tug boat. Claim for damages by differr ent lienors on account of collisions. CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11. liii Sec. Sec. 1784. Priority of lien for necessary 1800a repairs over prior lien for damages for breach of con- 1801. tract. 1785. Material-men's liens superior ISOla to government's claim of forfeiture. 1786. Lien for seamen's wages fa- 1802. vored in admiralty. 1787. Priority of salvage lien over 1803. liens for repairs and ma- terials. 1804. 1788. Rank of liens for towage. 1789. Lien of owner not allowed to prejudice other liens. 1805. 1790. Law of place of contract and of forum. 1791. Comity in enforcing liens. 1806. 1792. Classification of liens. 1793. Mortgagor in possession may 1806a confer right of lien. 1793a. Mortgage not a maritime contract. 1807. 1794. Liens for supplies in foreign ports superior to prior 1807a mortgages. 1795. Mortgage lien postponed to 1808. construction lien. 1796. Rank of bottomry bond. 1809. 1797. No lien while vessel in court's custody. ' 1810. 1797a. Partial payments. 1810a 1798. Lien security carried with assignment of debt. 1799. Maritime lien not lost by sale of vessel. 1811. 1799a. Lien for repairs in nature of proprietary right. 1800. Lien sometimes lost by delay in enforcing it. 1812. Limitation as against bona fide purchaser. When lien lost in case of ocean vessel. Rule not applied to vessel making daily trips about harbor. Rule in navigation of lakes and rivers. Lienholder may await return of vessel. Due diligence to require creditor to follow the ves- sel. Claim for seamen's wages stale as against bona fide purchaser. When lien for damages not deemed stale. State statute providing for notice not applicable to for- eign vessel. When lien will not be held to be seasonably filed. . Lien waived by an agree- ment. Lien not lost by accepting a note. Accepting long-time note a waiver. Additional security. Maritime lien not to be di- vested b~y any proceeding for forfeiture in common- law court. No lien for unpaid balance after vessel has been sold under execution to satisfy lien. Liens to transfer to proceeds of sale by good faith sale. TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II. §§ 1061-1812.] Aaron v. Warner, 62 Miss. 370 1120 Abbott V. American Hard Rub- ber Co., 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 578 87 Abbott V. Abbott, 18 Nebr. 503 183, 198, 207 V. Nash, 35 Minn. 451 1516 V. United R. Co. of St. Louis, 138 Mo. App. 530 181a Abel V. Potts, 3 Esp. 242 212 Abelman v. Myer, 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 470 1401 Aberaman Iron Works v. Wick- ens, L. R. 4 Ch. 101 1106 Abercrombie v. Ely. 60 Mo. 23 1375 Abernathy v. Ross. 14 Ky. L. 282 1068 Abham v. Boyd, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 30 1506, 1584 Abington v. Steinberg, 86 Mo. App. 639 626 Abel V. Lee, 6 Tex. 427 115, 137, 159 Abraham v. Ag-new, 83 Wis. 246 719 V. Carter, 53 Ala. 8 542 V. Hall, 59 Ala. 386 603 V. Nicrosi, 87 Ala. 173 602 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 229 188, 189, 209 Acme, The, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 366 1808 1700 Acorn, The, 32 Fed. 638 Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 586 1489 Acton V. Wadding-ton, 46 N. J. Eq. 16 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1074, 1083, 1092, 1098, 1099 Adams v. Adams. 16 Vt. 228 1243 V. Buchanan, 49 Mo. 64 1076, 1081, 1086 V. Buhler, 116 Ind. 100 1589 V. Buhler, 131 Ind. 66 1200 V. Clark, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 215 266, 281 V. Central City Granite Brick &c. Co., 154 Mich. 448 1369 V. Cowherd, 30 Mo. 458 1116, 1119 V. Feeder, 19 Ky. L. 581 1092 V. Fox, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 442 166, 184, 232, 235 V. Goodrich. 55 Ga. 233 781 V. Gorham, 6 Cal. 68 825 V. Grand Island & W. C. R. Co., 10 S. Dak. 239 1619, 1620, 1666a V. Grand Island & W. C. R. Co., 12 S. Dak. 424 1666a V. Hobbs, 27 Ark. 1 556 Adams v. Island City, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 210 1718 V. Jordan (Tex. Civ. App.), 136 S. W. 499 1102a V. La Comb, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 440 569, 632 V. Lee, 82 Ind. 587 174, 220, 235 V. Mackenzie, 59 Ore. 89 1588 V. Phillips, 75 Ala. 461 1585 V. Russell, 85 111. 284 1109, 1487 V. Shaffer, 132 Ind. 331 1200 Addison v. Enoch, 168 N. Y. 658 48, 52 Adee v. Adee. 55 App. Div. (N. Y.) 63 184 Aderhold v. Bluthenthal, 95 Ala. 66 576a, 603 Adg-er v. Pringle. 11 S. Car. 527 1098 Adler V. World's Pastime Ex. Co., 126 111. 373 1367, 1412 V. World's Pastime Ex. Co., 26 111. App. 528 1199 Adone v. La Porte (Tex. Civ. App.), 124 S. W. 134 990 A. D. Patchin, The, 12 Law Rep. 21 1798 Adsit V. Hall, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 373 186 Aeronaut, The, 36 Fed. 497 1690, 1691 Aeschlimann v. Presbyterian Hospital, 165 N. Y. 296 1413 Aetaza v. Smallpiece, 1 Esp. 23 310 Aetna Elev. Co. v. Deeves, 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 842 1276, 1278 V. Deeves, 57 Misc. (N. Y.) 632 1218 Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Comer, 136 Ga. 24 1375 Aetna National Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 40 N. Y. 82 57 A. F. Englehardt Co. v. Kauf- man, 5 App. Div. (N. Y.) 475 806 Agee V. Mayer, 71 Ala. 88 603 Agnes Barton, The, 26 Fed. 542 1687, 1808 Agnew V. McGill, 96 Ala. 496 1102 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Smith, 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 840 184 Aguire v. Parmelee. 22 Conn. 473 902, 922, 965 Ahearn v. Boyce, 19 Mo. App. 552 1513a V. Evans, 66 111. 125 1644 Ah Louis V. Harwood, 140 Cal. 500 1398, 1433 Ahrend v. Odiorne. 118 Mass. 261 1062, 1063 Aiken v. Wasson, 24 N. Y. 482 725, 1629, 1645 Iv Ivi TAELE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §g 1061-1812.] Aikens v. Frank, 21 Mont. 192 1501 V. Stadell, 9 Kans. App. 298 577 Aina, The, 40 Fed. 269 1699 Ainis V. Ayres, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 376 878 Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 116 1265 Ainslie v. Kohn, 16 Ore. 363 1304a, 1406, 1453 Ainsworth v. Atkinson, 126 Ind. 318 1559 Aitcheson v. Endless Chain Dredge, 40 Fed. 253 1677, 1696 Aitken, In re, 4 B. & Aid. 47 150 Akeley v. Miss. & R. R. Boom Co., 64 Minn. 108 713 Akerman v. Humphrey, 1 Car. & P. 53 958 Akers v. Kirke, 91 Ga. 590 1262 V. Luse, 56 Iowa 346 1088, 1090 Alabama v. Stanton, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 423 1117 Alabama Cotton Oil Co. v. Mee- den, 150 Ala. 587 747 Alabama, The, 19 Fed. 544 1677 Alabama, The, 22 Fed. 449 1808 Alabama &c. Lumber Co. v. Tis- dale, 139 Ala. 250 1299, 1404, 1413 Alanson Sumner, The, 28 Fed. 670 1700, 1732, 1756 Alaska Fishing- & Development Co., In re, 167 Fed. 875 1717 Albany v. Lynch, 119 Ga. 491 1375 Albany, The, 4 Dill. (U. S.) 439 1682 Alberti v. Moore, 20 Okla. 78 1615 Albert Palmer Co. v. Van Orden, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 179 185, 189, 210 Albion, The, 1 Hagg. 333 1778 Albrecht v. Foster Lumber Co., 126 Ind. 318 1200. 1405, 1412, 1413, 1559 Albright v. Mills, 86 Ala. 324 603 V. Smith, 2 S. Dak. 577 1304, 1305, 1441 Alcalde, The, 132 Fed. 576 1679, 1680 Alden v. Carver, 13 Iowa 253 970 V. White, 32 Ind. App. 393 174 Alderman v. Hartford, etc., Co., 66 Conn. 47 1253 V. Nelson, 111 Ind. 255 174 Alderson v. Lee, 52 Ore. 92 716 Alderson, Ex parte, 1 Mad. 53 45, 47 Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162 3 Aldrich v. Cooper, 1 'White & Tudor's Lead. C. in Eq. (7th Eng. ed.) (1897) 36 953 Aldridge v. Dunn, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 249 1074, 1081, 1098 Aleck V. Jackson, 49 N. J. Eq. 507 1594 Alexander v. Berry, 54 Miss. 422 69 V. Ellison, 79 Ky. 148 1091, 1147 V. Hooks, 84 Ala. 605 1072 V. Munroe, 54 Ore. 500 180 V. Pardue, 30 Ark. 359 542 V. Slavens, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 351 1504 Alford V. Wilson, 62 Te::. 484 1103 Algonquin, The, 88 Fed. 318 1800 Alice Tainter, The, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 391 1682 Alida, The, Abb. Adm. (U. S.) 173 1728 Aline, The, 1 W. Rob. Ill 1781 Alkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. Cas. 493 470 Allan V. Gripper. 2 C, & J. 218 940 Allegheny National Bank's Ap- peal, 99 Pa. St. 148 1158 Allen V. Agnew, 24 N. J. L. 443 627 V. Becket, 84 N. Y. S. 1007 981 V. Bennet, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 672 1064 V. Center Valley Co., 21 Conn. 130 788, 789 V. Elwert, 29 Ore. 428 1355 v: Frumet M. & S. Co., 73 Mo. 688 1211, 1408, 1412, 1431, 1436, 1437, 1494, 1597 V. Glover, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 483 786a V. Gripper, 2 Cr. & J. 218 942 V. Grissom, 90 N. Car. 90 789, 791 V. Houston Ice & Brew. Co., 44 Tex. Civ. App. 125 583, 638 V. Jones, 24 Fed. 11 800 V. Loring, 34 Iowa 499 1081 V. Mackay, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 219 1769 V. Maury, 66 Ala. 10 825 V. Megguire, 15 Mass. 490 23 V. Middleton, 99 Ga. 758 1053 V. Montgomery, 48 Miss. 101 69 V. Newberry, 21 How. (U. S.) 244 1730 V. Ogden, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 174 972 V. Rowe, 19 Ore. 188 1255, 1402 V. Sales, 56 Mo. 28 1254, 1276, 1542 V. Schvs-0!5,-evt, 113 Ga. Gff 12:)3 V. Shortridge, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 34 68 V. Smith, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 638 521 V. Spencer, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 117 22, 24 Allen County v. United States Fidelity &c. Co., 122 Ky. 825 1203 Alley V. Lanier, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 540 1225, 1272 Allgood V. Merrybent & D. R. Co., 33 Ch. Div. 571 1674 Alligator, The, 153 Fed. 216 1717 Allis V. Meadow Spring Distilling Co., 67 Wis. 16 1232, 1520, 1569 Allison V. Bristol Marine Ins. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 209 326 Allman v. Corban, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 74 1335 Allred v. Hale, 85 Ga. 570 781, 1053, 1197 Alsager v. St. Katherine's Dock Co., 14 M. & W. 794 322 Alsberg v. Latta, 30 Iowa 442 927, 940 Alston V. Wilson, 64 Ga. 482 611 Alt V. Weidenberg, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 176 687, 968 TABLE OF CASES. Ivii [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Althouse V. "Warren, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 657 1532, 1536, 1608, 1613 Althen v. Tarbox, 48 Minn. 18 1262 Altieri v. Lyon, 13 N. Y. 617 1543 Alvey V. Reed, 115 Ind. 148 1239 Alvord V. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 524 V. Hendrie, 2 Mont. 115 1212, 1433 Alwood V. Mansfield, 33 111. 452 613 Amazon Irrigating- Co. v. Briesen, 1 Kans. App. 758 759 Ambrose Mfg. Co. v. Gapen, 22 Mo. App. 397 1211, 1283 American Bridge Co. v. Hous- tain, 113 Minn. 16 1421 American Cotton Co. v. Phillips, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 79 638 American Eagle, The, 19 Fed. 379 1798 American Fire Ins. Co. v. Prin- gle, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 138 1439, 1470, 1472, 1475 American Ins. Co. v. Coster, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 323 1800 American Lead Pencil Co. v. Davis, 108 Tenn. 442 190 American Nat. Bank v. Barnard, 15 Colo. App. 110 1552 American Radiator Co. v. McKee, 140 Ky. 105 1599 V. Pendleton, 62 Wash. 56 1384 American Trading & Storage Co. V. Gottstein, 123 Iowa 267 1039 American Trust Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 173' Fed. 471 1723, 1746 America, The, 16 Lavv^ Rep. 264 1776, 1781 Ames v. Birkenhead Docks, 20 Beav. 332 1675 v. Dyer, 41 Maine 397 1367 V. Palmer, 42 Maine 197 262, 304, 307 Amherst College v. Smith, 134 Mass. 543 1170 Amidon v. Benjamin, 126 Mass. 276 1542 v. Benjamin, 128 Mass. 534 1397, 1399 Amorv v. Flvn, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 102 485 V. Reilly, 9 Ind. 490 1107 Amos v. Clare, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 35 1282 V. Garvin (Ala.), 39 So. 990 777 Amos D. Carver, The, 35 Fed. 665 1773, 17Sla Amstel. The, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 215 1V13 Ancaster v. Mayer, 1 Bro. C. C. 454 1165 Anders v. Blount, 67 Ga. 41 571 Anderson v. Alseth, 6 S. Dak. 566 785 V. Armstead, 67 111. 452 1264 V. Beard, 54 Ga. 137 454 V. Berg, 174 Mass. 404 1207 V. Bosworth, 15 R. L 433 138, 150 V. Davison, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 431 1164 V. DeBraekeleer, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 343 184 V. Griffith, 66 Mo. 44 1086 Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319 639 V. Huff, 49 N. J. Eq. 349 1286 V. Itasca Lumber Co., 86 Minn. 480 179 V. Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co., 2 Woods (U. S.) 628 1674 V. Mather, 44 N. Y. 249 1265 V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 86 Kans. 179 176 V. Mississippi, 23 Miss. 459 98 V. Perry, 98 Tex. 493 1015 V. Reed, 106 N. Y. 333 823 V. Tingley, 24 Wash. 537 718 V. Volmer, 83 Mo. 403 1211 Anderson Lumber Co. v. Fried- lander, 54 N. J. L. 375 1216 Anderson's Appeal, 3 Pa. St. 218 571 Andrews v. Brown. 21 Ala. 437 799 V. Burdick, 62 Iowa 714 1287, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1541 V. Crandell, 16 La. Ann. 208 661 V. Hobgood, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 693 1092 V. Key, 77 Tex. 35 1101 V. Mann, 31 Miss. 322 791 V. Morse, 12 Conn. 444 158, 167, 201a, 209, 217 V. St. Louis Tunnel R. Co., 16 Mo. ApD. 299 1655 V. Scotten, 2 Bland (Md.) 629 1074 V. Stewart, 81 Ga. 53 568, 611 V. Wade, 3 Sad. (Pa.) 133 1018 Andrews Mfg. Co. v. Porter, 112 Ala. 381 603 Andrews &c. Co. v. Atwood, 167 111. 249 1184a, 1300 Andrus v. Coleman, 82 111. 26 1074 Angela Maria, The, 35 Fed. 430 1791, 1792 Angell V. Bennett, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 85 205 Angier v. Bay State Distilling Co., 178 Mass. 163 1341, 1343 Angler, The, 83 Fed. 845 1800 Anglo-American Sav. & L. Assn. V. Campbell, 13 App. D. C. 581 1459 Anglo-California Bank v. Gran- gers' Bank, 16 Rep. 70 381 Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330 522, 524, 1011 Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio St. 11 1063, 1080 Ann C. Pratt, The, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 340 1810 Anne, The, 1 Mason (U. S.) 508 278 A.nnis v. (jilmore, 47 Maine 152 711, 728 Ansley v. Pasahro, 22 Nebr. 662 1063, 1458 Antelope. The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 130 1705 Antler Park, etc., Min. Co. v. Cunningham, 29 Colo. 284 1249, 1616a Apperson v. Farrell, 56 Ark. 640 1470 Appleman v. Myre, 74 Mich. 359 729 Apollo, The, 1 Hagg. Adm. (U. S.) 306 1697a Arata v. Tellurium Gold & Sil- vsr Mining Co., 65 Cal. 340 1401, 115 I Iviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I Arbuckle v. Illinois M. R. Co., 31 111. 429 1644 V. Nelms, 50 Miss. 556 625 A Raft of Cypress Logs, 9 Chic. L. N. 26 1719 Archer v. Archer, 147 App. Div. .(N. Y.) 44 1064 V. McMeehan, 21 Mo. 43 418, 426 Archibalfl v. Citizens' Bank, 64 Miss. 523 1751 Arctic, The, 22 Fed. 126 1756, 1773, 1780 Arcturus, The, 17 Fed. 95 1706 Arcturus, The, 18 Fed. 743 1776, 1799, 1802 A. R. Dunlap, The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 350 1699, 1713 Argo V. Field, 112 Ga. 677 1053a Arians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26 702, 703, 719, 731 Arkansas Cent. R. Co. v. McKay, 30 Ark. 682 1589 Arkansas, The, 17 Fed. 383 1770 Armentrout v. Gibbons, 30 Grat. (Va.) 632 1111 Armitage v. Mace, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 107, 113 673, 685, 688 Armstrong v. Ashley, 22 App. (D. C.) 368 1146 V. Chemical Nat. Bank, 41 Fed. 234 251 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 62 Mo. 639 291 V. Hallowell, 35 Pa. St. 485 1389 V. Jackson, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 374 1144, 1145 V. Nichols, 32 Ind. 408 1262 V. Walker, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 156 636 Armstrong Cork Co. v. Mer- chants' Refrig. Co., 184 Fed. 199 1277 Arnold v. Budlong, 11 R. I. 561 1325 V. Coburn, 32 W. Va. 272 1125 V. Delano, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 33 800, 802, 808, 821, 828, 850, 852, 853, 861, 948 V. Farmers' Exchange, 123 Ga. 731 1588 V. Morris, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 498 36 V. Patrick, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 310 1079 V. Spurr, 130 Mass. 347 1254 V. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 424 376, 377, 398 Aronson v. Oppegard, 16 N. Dak. 595 631a Arthur v. Schooner Cassius, 2 Story (U. S.) 81 284, 338 V. Sylvester, 105 Pa. St. 233 125 Arthur B., The, 1 Alaska 353 1703 Artisan, The, 8 Ben. (U. S.) 538 1799 Artisan, The, 9 Ben. (U. S.) 106 1704 Asay V. Sparr, 26 111. 115 614 Ascher v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 36 U. C. Q. B. 609 892, 931 Ash V. Putnam, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 302 866 Ashbrook v. Roberts, 82 Ky. 298 1063 Ashdown v. Woods. 31 Mo. 465 1535 Ashford v. Iowa &c. Lumber Co., 81 Nebr. 561 1213 Ashmore v. Whatley, 99 Ga. 150 1048 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Aspunwall v. Hickford. 3 B. & P. 44n 265 Associates v. Davison, 29 N. J. L. 415 1216, 1248, 1252a Aste V. Wilson, 14 Colo. App. 323 1191, 1505 Astrand v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 92 184 Atascosa v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202 1375 Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mc- Connell, 25 Kans. 370 1647 Athenian, The, 3 Fed. 248 1779, 1787, 1788, 1802 Atkins V. Barwick, 1 Stra. 165 865 v. Byrnes, 71 111. 326 585, 586 V. Colby, 20 N. H. 154 857, 878, 902, 921 V. Little, 17 Minn. 342 1235, 1257, 1334 V. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 29 Fed. 161 87 V. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa 150 554 Atkinson v. James, 96 Ala. 214 603 V. Lindsey, 39 Ind. 296 1091 V. Woodmansee, 68 Kans. 71 1605, 1616a Atlanta Land & Loan Co. v. Haile, 106 Ga. 498 1110 Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Four States Grocer Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 135 S. W. 1135 5 Atlanta R. Co. v. Owens, 119 Ga. 833 203 Atlantic Coast Brew. Co. v. Don- nelly, 59 N. J. L. 48 1216 Atlantic Dynamite Co. v. Balti- more & O. S. W. R. Co., 101 111. App. 13 1560, 1644 Atlantic, The, Crabbe (U. S.) 440 1799 Atlantic, The, 53 Fed. 607 1677, 1700, 1704, 1706 Atlantic Trust & Banking Co. v. Nelms, 115 Ga. 53 78 Atlantic Trust Co. v. Carbondale Coal Co., 99 Iowa 234 73, 1520 Atlantic Works v. Glide, The, 157 Mass. 525 1729, 1748 Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Main Line Realty Corp., 112 Va. 7 1276, 1277 Atlas S. S. Co. v. Colombian Land Co., 102 Fed. 358 265 Atlas, The, 42 Fed. 793 1706 Attebury v. Burnett, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 617 1119, 1126 Atterbury v. Somers, 35 Misc. (N. Y.) 805 513 Attorney-Gen. v. Baliol College, 9 Mod. 407 1136, 1137 V. Continental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 325 57 V. North American Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 387 240 Attorney, In re, 87 N. Y. 521 135, 146 Atwater v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 543 Atwood V. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575 1063 V. Williams, 40 Maine 409 1304 Audenreid v. Randall, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 99 802, 946 Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush (Ky.) 572 490 TABLE OF CASES. lix [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Aug-ir V. Warder, 68 "W. Va. 752 1574, 1613 Auf?ustine Kobbe, The, 37 Fed. 696 1713 Aiierustine Kobbe, The, 37 Fed. 702 1699 Aug-ustine Kobbe, The, 39 Fed. 539 1781 Auld V. Travis, 5 Colo. App. 535 650 Aurand v. Martin. 188 111. 117 1312 V. Martin, 87 111. App. 337 1312 Aurora Nat. Bank v. Black, 129 Ind. 595 758 Aurora Shipping- Co. v. Boyce, 191 Fed. 960 1759 Aurora, The, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 96 1679 Au Sable River Boom Co. v. Sanborn, 36 Mich. 358 1000, 1009, 1048, 1537 Austen v. Halsey, 6 Ves. 475 1090 Austin V. Hieronymus. 117 Ala. 620 704a Austin V. Munroe. 47 N. Y. 360 1243 V. Selig-man, 18 Fed. 519 789 V. Wohler, 5 Bradw. (111.) 300 1199, 1245, 1469 Austin & N. W. R. Co. v. Dan- iels, 62 Tex. 70 1495, 1668 V. Rucker. 59 Tex. 587 1630, 1668 Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex. 623 1083 Averill v. Longfellow, 66 Maine 237 193 Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619 1087, 1092, 1332, 1458, 1480 V. Hackley, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 407 1020 Aycock Bros. Lumber Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 54 Fla. 604 1119 Ayers V. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593 1081 V. Johnson, 7 N. J. L. 119 628 Aylmore v. Kahn, 5 Ohio Cir. D. 410 674 Ayres v. Revere, 25 N. J. L. 474 1184, 1216, 1554, 1572 Auxvasse Milling- Co. v. Cornet, 85 Mo. App. 251 626 Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 151 1240, 1362 Babbitt v. Condon, 27 N. J. L. 154 1216, 1258 Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244 857, 861, 862 Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189 719, 726 Bach V. Kidansky. 186 N. Y. 368 1063 Baohman, In re, 12 N. Bank. Repr. 223 ,377393 Bacon v. Bacon, 94 Va. 686 253', 398 V. Carr, 112 Iowa 193 616 v. Howell, 60 Miss. 362 556 Badger Lumber Co. v. Holmes, 55 Nebr. 473 1315, 1370 V. Marion Water Supply Co., 48 Kans. 182 1341, 1344, 1378 V. Parker, 85 Kans. 134 1202 V. Stipp. 156 Mo. 366 1442 Baeder v. Carnie, 44 N. J. L. 208 1755 Bags of Linseed. 1 Black (U. S.) 108 270, 308, 310, 311, 315, 1720 Bagwell V. Jamison, Cheeves (S. Car.) 249 598 Bailey v. Adams, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 201 1002 V. Block (Tex. Civ. App.), 125 S. W. 955 1060 V. Culverswell, 8 B. & C. 448 875 V. Davis, 19 Ore. 217 689 V. Finch, L. R. 7 Q. B. 34 250 V. Hudson River R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70 ■ 61 V. Hull, 11 Wis. 289 1608 v. Johnson, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 61 1543, 1588, 1589, 1594 V. Mason, 4 Minn. 546 1558 V. O'Pallon, 30 Colo. 419 650, 1050 V. Quick, 28 La. Ann. 432 620 V. Quint, 22 Vt. 474 745, 997 V. Smock, 61 Mo. 213 1119 V. Tindall, 59 Tex. 540 1079, 1081 V. Welch, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 244 96 Bailey v. Wright, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 484 571. 585 Bailey Const. Co. v. Purcell, 88 Va. 300 1559 Bailey, In re, 12 Ch. Div. 268 1164 Bailey, In re, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 64 185, 228 Bailev, In re, 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. i40 220 Bailey, In re, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 608 228 Bain v. Clark, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 424 592 V. "Wells, 107 Ala. 562 603 Baird v. Peall, 92 Cal. 235 1190 Baizley v. Adorilla, The, 121 Pa. St. 231 1722, 1724, 1760 Baker v. Abrams. 42 Nebr. 880 1520 V. Compton, 52 Tex. 252 1107, 1109. 1110 V. Cook, 11 Mass. 236 155, 162 V. Dewey, 15 Grant Ch. (U. C.) 668 811, 850 V. Fessenden, 71 Maine 292 1023, 1322, 1339 V. Fleming-, 6 Ariz. 418 1063 V. Fuller, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 318 462 V. Gilbert. 93 Ind. 70 1090 V. Hoag, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 203 484 V. Hoag, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 113 487 V. Hoag-, Seld. Notes (N. Y.) 45 487 V. Stone (Tenn.), 58 S. W. 761 1262 V. Stratton, 52 N. J. L. 277 507 V. Updike, 155 111. 54 1086 V. Waldron, 92 Maine 17 1249, 1309b V. "Winter, 15 Md. 1 1206 V. Young-, 90 Ala. 426 1103 Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 76 789, 790, 791 Balch V. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318 1344, 1348 V. New York ^ O. M. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 521 725, 1629, 1662 V. Symes, T. & R. 87 121, 126, 128, 1011 Ix TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Baldwin v. Bradish Johnson, The, 3 Woods (U. S.) 582 1793a, 1794 V. Merriclt, 1 Mo. App. 281 1343 V. Morgan, 73 Miss. 276 783 V. Whaley, 78 Mo. 186 1128 Balize, The, 52 Fed. 414 1706a Balkcom v. Empire Lumber Co., 91 Ga. 651 708 Ball V. Doherty, 128 N. Y. S. 1014 1404 V. Hill, 48 Tex. 634 1098, 1099 V. Paquin, 140 N. Car. 83 1260 V. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749 578a, 580, 625 Ball & Wood Co. v. Clark & Sons Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 356 1298 Ballard v. Burgett, 20 N. Y. 314 820 V. Camplin, 161 Ind. 16 1063, 1094 V. Carter, 71 Tex. 161 1101, 1125 V. Johnson, 114 N. Car. 141 574 V. Mayfield, 107 Ala. 396 603 V. Ross, 38 Wash. 209 98, 101 V. Wiltshire, 28 Ind. 341 1743 Ballew V. Roler, 124 Ind. 557 1093 Ballinger v. Tarbell, 16 Iowa 491 222 Ballou V. Black, 21 Nebr. 131 1213, 1304, 1304a, 1320, 1436 Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. St. 95 145, 151 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Trim- ble, 51 Md. 99 1067, 1099, 1158 Bametzrieder v. Canevin, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 18 1286 Bancroft v. Crosby, 74 Cal. 583 1092, 1096 Bang V. Brett, 62 Minn. 4 1076 Bangor v. Goding, 35 Maine 73 108 Bangs V. Berg, 82 Iowa 350 1392, 1407 Bank v. Brooks, 42 Leg. Int. 26 33 V. Donaldson, 6 Pa. St. 179 1163 V. Lanier, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 369 384 Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457 1076, 1092, 1095, 1107, 1108 Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 Bush (Ky.) 54 376, 404, 405, 410 Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank, 20 N. Y. 501 377 Bank of Charleston v. Curtiss, 18 Conn. 342 1313, 1350, 1369, 1413, 1421 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 492 1145 Bank of Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421 375, 377, 378 Bank of Kentucky v. Herndon, 1 Bush (Ky.) 359 788, 789, 792 Bank of Knoxville v. Bradley, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 279 1068 Bank of Louisiana v. Wilson, 19 La. Ann. 1 1745 Bank of Metropolis v. New Eng- land Bank, 1 How. (U. S.) 234 237 V. New Eng. Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212 260 Bank of Pennsylvania v. Gries, 35 Pa. St. 423 1367 Bank of Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 152 57 Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497 62, 418, 465 Bank of Rome v. Haselton, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 216 33 Bank of United States v. Mac- alester, 9 Pa. St. 475 251 Bank of Utica v. Smalley, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 770 388 Bank of Washington v. Nock, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 373 38, 253 Banks v. McQuatters (Tex. Civ. App.), 57 S. W. 334 1067, 1083 Banner, Ex parte, 2 Ch. Div. 278 869 Bansands v. Middlesex County Bank, 26 Conn. 144 384 Barber v. Hoffman (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 769 1123 V. Marble, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 114 547 V. Reynolds, 44 Cal. 519 1413, 1481, 1491, 1614 Barclay v. Wainwright, 86 Pa. St. 191 1282, 1330, 1523 Barclay's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 495 1392 Barclift v. Lillie, 82 Ala. 319 1076 Bardwell v. Anderson, 13 Mont. 87 1418 V. Mann, 46 Minn. 285 1558 Barilari v. Ferrea, 59 Cal. 1 1441 Barkdill v. Herwig, 30 La. Ann. 618 1120 Barker v. Berry, 8 Mo. App. 446 1235, 1262, 1263 V. Berry, 4 Mo. App. 585 1262 V. Brown, 138 Mass. 340 284, 343, 969 V. Havens, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 234 262 V. Maxwell, 8 Watts (Pa.) 478 1310 V. Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430 260 V. St. Quentin, 12 M. & W. 441 155, 157, 234 V. Smark, 3 Beav. 64 1099 Barker &c. Lumber Co. v. Mara- thon Paper Mills Co., 146 Wis. 12 1232 Barlow v. Delany, 36 Fed. 577 1071 Barlow Bros. Co. v. Gaffney, 76 Conn. 107 1290 Barnacle v. Henderson, 42 Nebr. 169 1532 Barnahee v. Holmes, 115 Iowa 581 231 Barnard v. Campbell, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 286 947 V. Hassan, 60 Ore. 62 1394 V. McKenzie, 4 Co'n. 1151 1191, 1356, 1554, 1614 V. McLeod, 114 Mich. 73 1208 V. Norwich & "W. R. Co., 4 Cliff. (U. S.) 351 42 V. Wheeler, 24 Maine 412 329 Barndt v. Parks, 103 Minn. 360 1391 Barnes v. Fisher, 9 Mo. App. 574 1548 V. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80 867 V. Newcomb, 11 Weekly Dig. (N. Y.) 505 139 V. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 467 158, 204, 209, 234, 235 Barnes' Appeal, 76 Pa. St. 50 559, 633 Barnes, Ex parte, 84 Ala. 540 602 TAHLE OF CASES. Ixi [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Barnesley v. Powell. 1 Amb. 102 229 Barnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. 630 244, 248, 256, 418 V. Griffith, 27 N. J. Eq. 201 1459 V. Mason, 7 Ark. 253 5, 818 V. Salyers, 11 Ky. L. 465 1063, 1099 V. Stevens, 16 Ind. App. 420 1504, 1506 V. Walker, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 323 515 V. Warren, 82 Ala. 557 418 Barr v. Logan, 5 Harr. (Del.) 52 800 Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mas. (U. S^107 933 V. Lewis, 100 Ind. 120 1061, 1070 V. Millikan, 156 Ind. 510 1304a V. Nichols, 85 Ark. 58 751 Barror v. Carrier, 34 Ind. App. 353 1066 Barrow v. Coles, 3 Camp. 92 820 Barrow, Ex parte, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 783 936, 942 Barrows v. Baughman, 9 Mich. 213 1519, 1524 Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59 420 V. Longmore, 13 Ad. & El. 639 447 Barstow v. McLachlan, 99 HI- ^^^ 641 1^5*^ V. Robinson, 2 Allen (Mass.) 605 1609, 1696, 1728, 1748 Barthell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 138 Mass. 6SS 175 Bartle v. Oilman, 18 N. T. 260 187 Bartlett v. Bilger, 92 Iowa 732 1315, 1459 V. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587 84 V. Loundes, 34 W. Va. 493 555 V. Pritchard, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 512 820 V. Sullivan, 87 111. 219 613 Bartley v. Smith, 43 N. J. ^^^3^^^^^ Barton v. Grand Lodge, 70 Ark. 613 1291 V. Groseclose, 11 Idaho 227 820 V. Herman, 3 Daly (N. Y.) 320 1613, 1614 Barto's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 386 IZoO, 1/bZ Bartram v. Farebrother, 4 Bing. 579 865, 875, 924 Basham v. Toors, 51 Ark. 309 1189, 1306, 1438, 1440 Bashor v. Nordyke &c. Co., 25 Kans. 222 1520 Bass V. Upton, 1 Minn. 408 (Gil. 292) 9'70 Bassett v. Baird, 85 Pa. St. 384 1547 V. Brewer, 74 Tex. 554 1408, 1449, 1452 V. Menage, 52 Minn. 121 1486a, 1579 V. Swarts, 17 R. I. 215 1470, 1472, 1511 Basshor v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 65 Md. 99 1206, 1337, 1623a V. Kilbourn, 3 McAr. (D. C.) 273 1397, 1422 Batchelder v. Hutchinson, 161 Mass. 462 1465 v. Rand, 117 Mass. 176 1313, 1317 Batchelder, In re, 2 Lowell (U. S.) 245 813, 829, 852 Bates V. Bigelow, 86 Ark. 86 1075, 1085 V. Childers, 4 N. Mex. 347 1061, 1063, 1092, 1103 V. Emery, 134 Mass. 186 1726 V. Harte, 124 Ala. 42*7 1344 V. National Bank. 88 Hun (N. Y.) 236 1218 V. National Bank, 157 N. Y. 322 1218 V. New York Ins. Co., 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 238 391 V. Santa Barbara, 90 Cal. 543 1190, 1375, 1613, 1616 Bates Machine Co. v. Trenton & N. R. R. Co.. 70 N. J. L. 684 1660 Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 151 991 Bath Sav. Inst. v. Sagadahoe Nat. Bank, 89 Maine 500 377 Batre v. Auze, 5 Ala. 173 1101 Battle v. McArthur, 49 Fed. 715 1655 Battle Creek Lumber Co. v. Po- land, 150 Mich. 690 1442 Battler, The, 67 Fed. 251 1773 Bauer v. Long. 147 Mich. 351 1270 Baum v. Covert, 62 Miss. 113 1341. 1387 V. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172 1074, 1083, 1086, 1087, 1092 Baumann v. Post, 12 N. Y. S. 213 971, 981 Bawtree v. Watson, 2 Keen 713 216 Baxley v. Segrist, 85 Ala. 183 603 Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465 548, 1110 v. Hutchings, 49 111. 116 1238, 1245 V. Sisters of Charity, 15 La. Ann. 686 1204 Bay V. Pope, 18 Cal. 694 1141 Bayard v. McGraw, 1 Bradw. (111.) 134 1524, 1532, 1580 Bayer v. Reeside, 14 Pa. St. 167 1407 Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 46 1063, 1064, 1076, 1081 V. Merrill, 10 Allen (Mass.) 360 513, 514 Baylies v. Sinex, 21 Ind. 45 1272, 1276, 1384 Bazemore v. Davis, 55 Ga. 504 1136, 1149 Bazin V. Segura. 5 La. Ann. 718 620 Beach v. Huntsman, 42 Ind. App. 205 1200 v. Wakefield, 107 Iowa 567 1201, 1509, 1646 Beadles v. Hartmus, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 476 475 Beakley v. Rainier (Tex.), 78 S. W. 702 449 Beal v. Harrington, 116 111. 113 1061, 1076, 1086 Beall V. Butler, 54 Ga. 43 577 V. Golmar, 122 Ala. 414 553 V. Hudson County Water Co., 185 Fed. 179 1009 V. White, 94 U. S. 382 104, 555, 576a, 592, 609, 744 Beals V. Congregation, The, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 654 1390, 1391, 1397, 1614 Ixii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Beam v. Blanton, 38 N. Car. 59 40, 811 V. First M. E. Church, 3 Clark (Pa.) 343 1378 Bean v. Bolton, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 87 1019 V. Brown, 54 N. H. 395 1308 V. Edg-e, 84 N. Y. 510 820 V. Johnson, 17 Ky. L. 585 660 V. Soper, 56 Maine 297 710, 711 Bear v. Burlington, C. R. & M. R. Co., 48 Iowa 619 1201 V. Whusler, 7 Watts (Pa.) 144 1114 Beardsley v. Chapman, 1 Ohio St. 118 1142 V. Cook, 143 N. Y. 143 1287 Beams, In re, 18 N. Bank Reg. 500 931, 933, 962 Beasley v. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 27 App. D. C. 595 294 V. Webster, 64 111. 458 1199 Beattie v. Dickinson, 39 Ark. 205 1109 Beatty v. Parker, 141 Mass. 523 1252, 1344 Beck V. Birdsall, 19 Kans. 550 1161 V. Catholic University, 172 N. Y. 387 1249 V. Lavin, 15 Idaho 363 757 V. Minnesota and W. Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62 616 V. Tarrant, 61 Tex. 402 1093, 1099 V. Venable, 59 Ind. 408 541 Beck Coal & Lumber Co. v. H. A. Peterson Mfg. Co., 237 111. 250 1348 Beckel v. Petticrew, 6 Ohio St. 247 1308, 1329, 1334 Becker v. Brown, 65 Nebr. 264 668, 691 V. Dalby, (Iowa) 86 N. W. 314 616 V. Hallgarten, 86 N. Y. 167 921, 946 V. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313 1190 Beckham v. Scott, (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. SO 1110 Beckhard v. Rudolph, 68 N. J. Eq. 315 1216 v. Rudolph, 68 N. J. Eq. 740 1216 Beckstead v. Griffith, 11 Idaho 738 455, 781a Beckwith v. Union Bank, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 604 246. 245 Bedford v. Burton, 106 U. S. 338 1115 V. Gartrell, 88 Miss. 429 625 Bedsole v. Peters, 79 Ala. 133 1187, 1286. 1287, 1374, 1422, 1614 Beebe Stave Co. v. Austin, 92 Ark. 248 751a Beech V. Canaan, 14 Vt. 485 191 Beehler v. Ijams, 72 Md. 193 1272, 1460 Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 446 590 Beers v. Knapp, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 104 1335 Beh V. Moore, 124 Iowa .')64 691 Beidler v. Hutchinson, 233 III. 192 1329 Beilharz v. Illingsworth, (Tex.) 132 S. W. 106 1495 Beinecke v. Secret, The, 3 Fed. 665 1682, 1689, 1690, 1691 Beken v. Kingsbury, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 555 440b Belanger v Hersey, 90 111. 70 1199, 1554, 1587 Belcher v. Capper. 4 M. & G. 502 272 V. Grimsley, 88 N. Car. 88 631 Belding v. Gushing, 1 Gray (Mass.) 576 1373 Belfast, The, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 624 1681, 1686, 1724, 1725, 1729 Bell V. Allen, 76 Ala. 450 603 V. Bair, 28 Ky. L. 614 1143 V. Barnet, 2 J. J. Marh. (Ky.) 516 1134 V. Hurst, 75 Ala. 44 603 V. McDuffle, 71 Ga. 264 1107 V. Matheny, 36 Ark. 572 606 V. Mecum, 75 N. J. L. 547 1216 V. Moss, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 189 875, 878, 888, 894 V. New York, 105 N. Y. 139 1376 V. Radcliff, 32 Ark. 645 453 V. Teague, 85 Ala. 211 1187 V. Vanderbilt, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 467 1375 V. Vanderbilt, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 332 1376 Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 88 1585 Belmont Farms v. Dobbs Hdw. Co., 124 Ga. 827 1532 Bement v. Trenton Locomotive Co., 32 N. J. L. 513 1216 Benbow v. The James Johns, 56 Ore. 554 1759 Bender's Will, In re. 111 App. Div. (N. Y.) 23 184 Benheim v. Pickford, 31 App. D. C. 488 171b Benedict v. Danbury & N. R. Co., 24 Conn. 320 1289, 1639 V. Field, 16 N. Y. 595 803 V. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515 857, 861, 884, 885, 887, 965 Bengal, The, Swab. 4B8 1810 Benjamin v. Benjamin, 17 Conn. 110 158, 217, 222 Bennett v. Akin, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 251 1163, 1167, 1168 v. Beadle, 142 Cal. 239 1738 V. Bennett, 84 Miss. 493 1149 V. Gray, 82 Ga. 592 708. 1044 V. Murphy, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 102 1086 v. Shackford, 11 Allen (Mass.) 444 1324 V. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448 1061. 1063. 1067 Bennitt v. Wilmington Star M. Co., 119 Til. 9 1580, 1585 Benny v. Rhodes, 18 Mo. 147 478 Bensel, In re, 68 Misc. (N. Y.) 70 184 Benson v. Mole, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 66 1031 V. Shines, 107 Ga. 406 1572 V. Snvder, 42 W. Va. 223 1101 Bent V. Barnett, 90 Ky. 600 1239 V. Lipscomb, 45 W. Va. 183 192a TABLE OF CASES. Ixiii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, Bently v. Davidson, 74 Wis. 420 1559 Berentz v. Belmont Oil Min. Co., 148 Cal. 577 1190 Berg-er v. Berger, 104 Wis. 282 1063 V. Turnblad, 98 Minn. 163 1325 Berg-fors v. Caron, 190 Mass. 168 1514 Bergstrom, In re, 131 App. Div. (N. Y.) 794 184 Berkey, etc., Furniture Co. v. Sherman Hotel Co., 81 Tex. 135 554, 557 Berkshire Woollen Co., v. Proc- tor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417 511 Bernal v. Pirn, 1 Gale 17 320 Bernays v. Field, 29 Ark. 218 606, 1095, 1096 Berndston v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq. 481 862, 902, 909, 953 Berrie v. Howitt, L. R. 9 Bq. 1 229 Berry v. Berry, 8 Kans. App. 584 617 V. Bog-g-ess, 62 Tex. 239 1109 V. Grace, 62 Fed. 607 313 V. Van Winkle, 2 N. J. Eq. 269 1161 Bertha M. Miller, The, 79 Fed. 365 1693 Bertheolet v. Parker, 43 Wis. 551 1390, 1589, 1591 Berwind-White Coal Min. Co. v. Metropolitan S. S. Co., 166 Fed. 782 1746, 1800 Best V. Baumgardner, 122 Pa. St. 17 1222 Bethel v. Chicago Lumber Co., 39 Kans. 230 1262, 1452 Betts V. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & B. 57 837, 962 Bevan v. Crooks, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 452 564 V. Thackara, 143 Pa. St. 182 1260, 1392 V. Waters, Moody & M. 235 641, 644, 731 Bevan, In re, 33 Beav. 439 136 Bewick v. Muir, 83 Cal. 368 1190 Beyer v. Fenstermacher, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 95 571 B. F. Lee Co. v. Sherman, 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 557 1222 B. F. Woolsey, The, 7 Fed. 108 1723, 1729, 1798 Bibb v. Prather, 1 Bibb (Kv.) 313 1105 Bibbins v. Polk County, 100 Iowa 493 98 Bibend v. Liverpool & London Fire & Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 78 42 Bickford v. Ellis, 50 Maine 121 232 Bicknell v. Trickey, 34 Maine 273 711. 1205 Biddlo v. Biddle, 3 Har. (Del.) 539 608 Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co., 31 Cal. 160 891 Bierly v. Royse, 25 Ind. 202 703, 1054 Bierschenk v. King, 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 360 1578 Biesenbach v. Key, 63 Tex. 79 638 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, s§ 1061-1S12.] Bigelow V. Doying, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 403 1218 V. Heaton, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 496 308, 701 V. Heaton, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 43 317 V. Sheehan, 161 Mich. 667 178 Bigelow, In re, 2 Ben. (U. S.) 469 384, 398 Biggs V. Barry, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 259 921 V. Clapp, 74 111. 335 1299 V. Piper, 86 Tenn. 589 636 Big Horn Lumber Co. v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 455 1442 Bills V. Mason, 42 Iowa 329 1119 Bingham v. Vandegrift, 93 Ala. 283 557 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208 503, 504 v. Slingerland, 55 N. J. Eq. 55 1216 Binstead v. Buck, 2 W. Bl. 1117 483 Birch v. Magic Transit Co., 139 Cal. 496 1255 Bird v. Anderson, 41 N. J. L. 392 627 V. Brown, 4 Exch. 7S6 875, 876, 885, 928 V. Georgia R. R., 72 Ga. 655 291, 292, 293 V. St. John's Episcopal Church, 154 Ind. 138 1599 Bird of Paradise, The, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 545 270, 322, 324, 327, 1720, 1808 Birdsall v. Cropsey, 29 Nebr. 672 1108 Birley v. Gladstone, 3 M. & S. 205 31 Birmingham Building & L. Assn. V. Boggs, 116 Ala. 587 1458 Birmingham Iron Foundry v. Glen Cove Co., 78 N. Y. 30 1557 Birney v. Wheaton, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 519 507 Bischoff V. Trenholm, 36 S. Car. 75 634 Bishop V. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 69 209, 222 V. Globe Co., 135 Mass. 132 388, 390, 405 V. Honey, 34 Tex. 245 1381 V. Shillito, 2 B. & Aid. 329 820 V. Snell, 37 Ala. 90 1086 Bissel V. Price, 16 111. 408 289, 302 Bissell V. Lewis, 56 Iowa 231 1201, 1264, 1423, 1519, 1528 V. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252 8, 641, 691, 744 Bitter v. Monat Lumber &c. Co., 10 Colo. App. 307 1373 Bivens v. West (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 112 577 Bixby V. Whitcomb, 69 N. H. 646 1287 Bizzell V. Nix, 60 Ala. 281 1099, 1123 Black V. Appolonio, 1 Mont. 342 1408, 1413, 1556 V. Black, 32 N. J. Eq. 74 236 V. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky. ) 310 498, 499, 504, 1041 V. Latham, 63 Tex. 414 587 V. Rose, 2 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 277 313, 319 Ixiv TAELE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Bro. Ch. 420 1061. 1062 Black Diamond Coal Min. Co. V. H. C. Grady, The, 87 Fed. 232 1681. 1703 Blackford v. Ryan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 161 678, 691 Blackman v. Marsicano, 61 Cal. 638 1190 V. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508 917. 965, 973 Blackshear V. Burke, 74 Ala. 239 811 Blaine v. The Chas. Carter, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 328 1801 Blair v. Lanning, 61 Ind. 499 174 V. Marsh. 8 Iowa 144 1119 V. Morgan, 59 S. Car. 52 458 V. St. Louis H. & K. R. Co., 23 Fed. 704 1655 V. St. Louis, H. & K. R. Co., 25 Fed. 232 1655 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 24 Fed. 148 86 V. "Walker, 26 Fed. 73 1655 Blaidsdell v. Smith. 3 Bradw. (111.) 150 1110, 1119 Blake v. Counselman. 95 Iowa 219 616 V. Nicholson. 3 M. & S. 167 731. 740, 743. 974, 1002 V. Pitcher, 46 Md. 453 1256, 1327, 1532 Blakeley v. Moshier, 94 Mich. 299 1535, 1537 Blakely v. Dinsdale, 2 Cowp. 661 911 Blakenev v. Nalle, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 635 1226 Blakey v. Blakey, 27 Mo. 39 1365, 1629 Blanchard v. Ely, 179 Mass. 586 1056 V. Fried. 162 111. 462 1312, 1421 V. Martha "Washington, The, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 463 1681 V. Portland & R. F. R. Co.. 87 Maine 241 1365 V. Raines, 20 Fla. 467 597, 610 Blanche v. Bradford. 38 Pa. St. 344 562 Bland v. Robinson, 148 Mo. App. 164 181a Blanton v. Brandenburg. 143 Ky. 651 1508 Blatchford v. Blanchard, 160 111. 115 1524 Blattner v. Wadeligh, 48 Kans. 290 1397 V. Woodworth, 31 N. T. 285 1542 Blauvelt v. Van Winkle, 29 N. J. Eq. Ill 1172 Bleaden v. Hancock, Mood. & M. 465 743 Bledsoe v. Mitchell, 52 Ark. 158 580 Blevins v. Rogers. 32 Ark. 258 1092 Blewitt V. Greens, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 588 1102a Blight V. Davies, 28 Beav. 211 466 Bliss V. Patten. 5 R. I. 376 1223, 1253, 1260. 1262. 1263 Blitz V. Fields. 118 Mich. 85 1208. 1290b Block V. David. 120 N. Car. 402 768 V. Latham, 63 Tex. 414 638, 1045 V. Murray, 12 Mont. 545 1274, 1276 V. Pearson, 19 Okla. 422 1262 Block V. Smith. 61 Ark. 266 606 Blohm. The. 1 Ben. (U. S.) 288 1700 Blomstrom v. Dux, 175 111. 43o 108G. 1087, 1088 Blonde v. Menominee Bay Shore Lumber Co., 106 Wis. 540 719 Bloom V. McGehee, 38 Ark. 329 589, 743a Bloomingdale v. Memphis & Charleston R. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) 616 884, 888, 891, 895, 897 Bloomington Hotel Co. v. Garth- wait, 227 111. 613 1199, 1431 Blossom V. Champion, 28 Barb. (N. T.) 217 857, 946 Blount V. Dagger, 115 Ga. 109, 1262 Bloxam V. Morley, 4 B. & C. 951 802 V. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941 800, 802, 832, 850 Blum V. Jones, 51 Ala. 149 603 V. Marks, 21 La. Ann. 268 887, 927, 965 Blumauer v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596 ^ 718 Blumenthal v. Anderson, 91 N. Y. 171 228 Blythe v. Poultney, 31 Cal. 233 1287, 1299, 1512 Board V. Wilson, 34 W. Va. 609 1069, 1092 Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410n 973, 1018, 1019 Board of Comrs. v. Snodgrass &c. Mfg. Co.. 52 Kans. 253 1375 Board of Education v. Dupar- quet, 50 N. J. Eq. 234 1498 V. Greenbaum, 39 111. 609 1375 v. Neidenber, 78 111. 5^ 1375 V. Scoville, 13 Kans. 17 1202, 1375 Board of Supervisors v. Gillen, 59 Miss. 198 1375 Bob Connell, The, 1 Fed. 218 1717 Bock V. Gorrissen, 30 L. J. Ch. 39 427 Bodey v. Thackara, 143 Pa. St. 171 1262. 1263 Bodley v. Denmead, 1 W. Va. 249 1351, 1535 Bogart V. John Jay, The, 17 How. (U. S.) 399 1703a, 1794 Boggs V. Martin, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 239 262, 320, 331 V. Price, 64 Ala. 514 576a Bohanan v. Paterson, 9 Wend. (N. T.) 503 151 Bohannon v. Hammond, 42 Cal. 227 1723 Bohem v. Seabury, 141 Pa. St. 594 1513a, 1568 Bohmer v. City Bank, 77 Va. 445 379, 388, 413 Bohn V. McCarthy, 29 Minn. 23 1235, 1304a Bohn Mfg. Co. V. Hynes, 83 Wis. 388 • 800, 821, 852 Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 381 325, 859, 878, 882. 887. 893. 922 Bold Buccleugh, The, 7 Moore P. C. 267 1777 Bolin V. Huffnagle, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 9 910. 911. 912 Boling V. Howell. 93 Ind. 329 1083 ■ Bolivar, The, Olcott's Adm. 474 1805 TABLE OF CASES. Ixv [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Bolland v. Bygrave, R. & M. 271 241, 245 Bollar V. Schoenwirt, 30 Misc. (N. Y.) 224 184 Bolter V. Kozlowski, 211 111. 79 1199 Bolton V. Duncan, 61 Ga. 103 585 V. Hey, 148 Pa. 156 1502 V. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 431 834, 923, 925, 940 V. Puller, 1 B. & P. 539 241 Bolton's Appeal, 3 Grant (Pa.) 204 1434 Bombay, The, 38 Fed. 512 1690 Bombeck v. Devorss, 19 Mo. App. 38 1211, 1574 Bond V. Carter, 96 Tex. 359 586, 688 V. Kent, 2 Vern. 281 1080 V. Newark, 19 N. J. Eq. 385 1487 Bonnell v. Holt, 89 111. 71 1092 Bonsall v. Comly, 44 Pa. St. 42 632 V. Taylor, 5 Iowa 546 1532 Boogren v. St. Paul City R. Co., 97 Minn. 51 179 Boon V. Murphy, 6 Black. (Ind.) 272 1086, 1089 Boone v. Darden, 109 N. Car. 74 631 Boos V. Ewing-, 17 Ohio 500 1080 Booth V. Oliver, 67 Mich. 664 544 V. Pendola, 88 Cal. 36 1190, 1313, 1314, 1569 Borden v. Croak, 131 111. 68 542 V. Mercer, 163 Mass. 7 1356, 1406 Boring v. Jobe (Tenn.), 53 S. W. 763 190 Borror v. Carrier, 34 Ind. App. 353 1063 Borst V. Corey, 15 N. Y. 505 1099 Boston V. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 76 Va. 180 1228, IGIS, 1619 Boston & Colorado Smelting Co. V. Pless, 8 Colo. 87 209, 211, 221 V. Pless, 9 Colo. 112 171 Boston & K. C. Cattle Loan Co. V. Dickson, 11 Okla. 680 674a Boston, The, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 309 1798, 1801 Bosworth V. Tallman, 66 Wis. 533 217 Boteler v. Espen, 99 Pa. St. 313 1277, 1278 Botsford V. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 405 1178 V. New Haven, M. & W. R. Co., 41 Conn. 454 1618, 1639 Bottomly v. Grace Church, 2 Cal. 90 1327, 1328, 1590 Bottorf V. Conner, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 287 1100 Bouker Contracting- Co. v. Pro- ceeds of Sales &c., 168 Fed. 428 1703 Bourcier v. Edmonson, 58 Tex. 675 638 Boiirg-et V. Donaldson, 83 Mich. 478 1301 Bourg-ette v. Williams, 73 Mich. 208 712, 1558 Boutner v. Kent, 23 Ark. 389 1325 Bouton V. McDonough, 84 111. 384 1375, 1614 Bouvier v. Brass, 12 Ariz. 310 699 Bovard v. Mayflower, The, 39 Fed. 41 1760 Bowden v. Bridgman, (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 1043 1092 V. Dugan, 91 Maine 141 691, 691a Bowen V. Aubrey, 22 Cal. 566 1287, 1502 V. Burke, 13 Pa. St. 146 806 V. Fisher, 14 Ind. 104 1100 V. Phinney, 162 Mass. 593 1207, 1289, 1304 Bovv-ers V. Davis, 79 111. App. 347 614 Bowes V. New York Christian Home, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 509 1218, 1564 Bowles V. Jones, 29 Ky. L. 1022 619 V. Rogers, '6 Ves. 95 1082 Bowlin V. Pearson, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 341 1002 Bowling V. Garrett, 49 Kans. 564 1484 V. Scales, 1 Tenn. Ch. 618 235 Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489 115, 127, 130, 137, 140 Bowman v. Faw, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 472 1081 V. Hilton, 11 Ohio 303 262, 289, 301 V. Smiley, 31 Pa. St. 225 632 V. Spalding, 8 Ky. L. (Ab- stract) 691 791 Bowman Lumber Co. v. Newton, 72 Iowa 90 1311, 1313, 1317, 1418 Bowser V. Scott, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 86 572 Boyce V. Day, 3 Ga. App. 275 611 V. Expanded Metal &c. Co., 136 111. App. 352 1599 V. Stanton, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 346 1117 Boyd V. Blake, 42 Minn- 1 1248, 1259, 1369, 1604a V. G. W. Chase & Son Mer- cantile Co., 135 Mo. App. 115 181a V. Jackson, 82 Ind. 525 1083, 1098 V. Jones, 8 Ky. L. (Abst.) 602 1178 V. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 582 1178 V. Martin, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 382 1069 V. Blole, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 118 1329, 1331 V. Mosely, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 661 806, 821 V. Stipp, 151 Iowa 276 616 Boyer v. Austin, 75 Mo. 81 1086 V. Clark, 3 Nebr. 161 220 Boylan v. Victory, 40 Mo. 244 1436, 1729 Boyle V. Boyle, 106 N. Y. 654 201a V. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 134 Mo. App. 71 181a V. Robbins, 71 N. Car. 130 1219 Bovnton v. Braley, 54 Vt. 92 1028 V. Champlin, 42 111. 57 1063, 1086 V. Libby, 62 Maine 253 820 Boynton Furnace Co. v. Gilbert, 87 Iowa 15 1289 Bozeman v. Ivey, 49 Ala. 75 1116 Ixvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 10G1-1S12.] Bozman v. Masterson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. 758 1103a Bozon V. Bolland, 4 Myl. & C. 354 127, 132, 149, 153, 166 Brabant v. Lillie, 117 Mich. 167 712 Brabazon v. Allen, 41 Conn. 361 1313 Brace v. Marlborough, 2 P. W. 491 10 Bracher v. Olds, 60 N. J. Eq. 449 158 Brackett v. Pierson, 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 281 702 Brackett, In re, 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 257 184 Bradbury v. Butler, 1 Colo. 430 1559 V. Donnell, 136 Mo. App. 676 1117 Bradeen v. Brooks, 22 Maine 463 818 Braden v. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518 158. 204, 209 Bradford v. Anderson, 60 Nebr. 368 1460 V. Dorsey, 63 Cal. 122 1190 v. Harper, 25 Ala. 337 1063, 1074, 1116 V. Howe, 11 Ky. L. 10 1117 V. Marvin, 2 Fla. 463 1063, 1089 V. Neill &c. Const. Co., 76 111. App. 488 1509, 1532 V. Peterson, 30 Nebr. 96 1263, 1264 V. Underwood Lumber Co., 80 Wis. 50 719 Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs, 31 Ch. Div. 19 389, 404 Bradish v. James, 83 Mo. 313 1421, 1423 Bradley v. Bosler, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 125 1100 V. Cassels, 117 Ga. 517 781 V. Curtis. 79 Ky. 327 1069, 1116, 1119 V. Michael, 1 Ind. 551 800 V. Richmond, 6 Vt. 121 154a V. Piggot, "Walk. (Miss.) 348 569 V. Root, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 632 45, 47 V. Simpson, 93 111 93 1199 V. Spofford, 23 N. H. 444 982, 987, 1035 Bradshaw v. Warner, 54 Ind. 249 820 Bradt v. Koon, 4 Cow. (N. Y) 416 219, 223 Brady v. Anderson, 24 111. 110 1519, 1532, 1554 Braeger v. Bolster, 60 Wash. 579 718 Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97 548 V. Elwood, 53 Iowa 30 175 V. Kings, 155 N. Y. 538 1287 Brame v. Swain, 111 N. Car. 540 1128 Branch v. Galloway, 105 N. Car. 193 457 V. Taylor, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 248 1126 Brandao v. Barnett, 12 CI. & F. 787 241, 242, 244, 255, 427 Brander v. Phillips, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 121 475, 476, 478 Brandt v. Bowlby, 2 B. & Ad. 932 820 V. Verdon, 18 N. Y. S. 119 1411 Branham v. Nye, 9 Colo. App. 19 1404 Branin v. Connecticut & P. R. R. Co., 31 Vt. 214 1670 Brantford City, The, 29 Fed. 373 1791 Branth v. Branth, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 592 168, 209 Brasfield v. Powell, 117 N. Car. 140 456 Brasher v. Alexandria Cooperage Co., 50 La. Ann. 587 1204 Bratt V. Bratt, 21 Md. 578 1069 Bratton v. Ralph, 14 Ind. App. 153 1539 Brawley v. Catron, 8 Leigh (Va.) 522 1071, 1077 Bray v. Smith, 87 Iowa 339 1245, 1254 V. Wise, 82 Iowa 581 699 Breault v. Archamboult, 64 Minn. 420 713 V. Merrill & Ring Lumber Co., 72 Minn. 143 713 Breckenbridge v. Millan, 81 Tex. 17 557 Breene v. Merchants' & Mechan- ics' Bank, 11 Colo. 97 84 Bremen v. Foreman, 1 Ariz. 413 1188, 1247, 1257, 1608 Brenan v. Currint, Sayer 224 6 Breneman v. Harvey, 70 Iowa 479 1375, 1376 Brennan v. Swasey, 16 Cal. 140 1190, 1406, 1409. 1420, 1521, 1613 Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 596 376, 377, 388, 393, 417 Brewer v. Chappell, 101 N. Car. 251 457, 631 Brewster v. McNab, 36 S. Car. 274 634 V. Sime, 42 Cal. 139 950 Bridges v. National Bank, 185 N. Y. 146 384 Briggs V. Austin, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 612 543, 548 V. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246 284, 291, 305, 335, 1033, 1051a V. Hill, 6 How. (Miss.) 3 62 1063, 1092 V. Large, 30 Pa. St. 287 564 V. Light Boat, A, 7 Allen (Mass.) 287 1677, 1727 V. Light Boat Upper Cedar Point, 11 Allen (Mass.) 157 279 V. Light-Boats, The, 11 Allen (Mass.) 525 1748 V. Planters' Bank, Freeman's Ch. (Miss.) 574 1110 V. Titus, 7 R. I. 441 1223, 1271, 1308 Bright V. Boyd, 1 Story (U. S.) 478 1131, 1132, 1135, 1136 V. Larcher, 4 De G. & J. 608 1165 Brinckerhoff v. Board of Edu- cation, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 443 1375 TABLE OF CASES. Ixvii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Brinckerhoff v. Board of Educa- tion, 37 How. Pr. (N. T.) 499 1375 V. Vansciven, 4 N. J. Eq. 251 1074, 1083, 1086 Brindley v. Cilgwyn Slate Co., 55 L. J. Q. B. 67 912 Bring-ham v. Knox, 127 Cal. 40 1637 Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 23 N. J. Eq. 477 1487 Brintnall v. Smith, 166 Mass. 2^3 663 Brisben v. Wilson, 60 Pa. St. 452 632 Brisben's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 405 1164 Brisco V. Minah Consol. Min. Co., 82 Fed. 952 1074, 1083 Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326 1061, 1083 V. Callahan, 77 Mo. 134 1087 V. McElween, 43 Miss. 556 572, 625 Bristol-Goodson Electric Lig-ht, &c., Co. V. Bristol Gas, &c., Co., 99 Tenn. 371 1506 Bristol, The, 11 Fed. 156 1769, 1799, ISOOa, 1806 Bristol, The, 29 Fed. 867 1769 Bristow V. Evans, 124 Mass. 548 1421, 1601 V. Whitmore, 9 H. L. Cas. 391 1177 British Empire Shipping- Co. v. Somes, El. & Bl. 353 804 V. Somes, 8 H. L. Cas. 338 972 Brittan v. Barnaby, 21 How. (U. S.) 527 313 Brittinum v. Jones, 56 Ark. 624 1155 Broach v. Smith, 75 Ga. 159 1063 Broadwell v. King-, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 449 1092 Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. 417 500, 502 Brock V. Hidy, 13 Ohio St. 306 1126 V. J. J. Haley & Co., 88 S. Car. 373 458 Brodenham v. Hoskins, 2 De G. M. & G. 903 248 Broderick v. Poillon, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 554 1235, 1589, 1605 Broders v. Bohannon, 30 Ore. 599 547, 548 Brodt V. Rohkar, 48 Iowa 36 1201, 1558 Brogan v. McEachern, 103 Maine 198 711 Brokaw v. Tyler, 91 111. App. 148 1281 Brom V. Herring-, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 653 1110 Bromley v. Hopewell, 2 Miles (Pa.) 414 633 Bronson Electric Co. v. Rhen- bottom, 122 Mich. 608 388 Brook v. Wentworth, 3 Anst. 881 743 Brooke Iron Co. v. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 442 911. 921 Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554 1725, 1729, 1730, 1756, lS06a Brooks V. Blackwell, 76 Mo. 309 1211, 1607 Brooks V. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 101 U. S. 443 1290, 1470, 1620, 1625 V. Cunningham, 49 Miss. 108 572 V. Hanford, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 342 206, 217 V. Harrison. 41 Conn. 184 513, 527 V. Lester, 36 Md. 65 1460, 1469, 1472, 1474 V. Mastin, 69 Mo. 58 1533 V. Snell, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 48 196, 205 V. Staton, 79 Ky. 174 463 V. Young-, 60 Tex. 32 1092, 1098 Brooks, In re, 2 Nat. Bank Reg. 466 1092 Brosnan v. Trulson, 164 Mass. 410 1605 Brothers v. Williams, 65 Wis. 401 681 Brothers Apap, The, 34 Fed. 352 1810 Brown v. Arundell, 10 C. B. 54 564 V. Barrett, 75 Mo. 275 1086 V. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618 132, 190, 193, 230 V. Blankenship, 108 Ky. 464 1087 V. Brown, 109 N. Car. 124 631 V. Budd, 2 Ind. 442 1092 V. Byam, 65 Iowa 374 1088 V. Christie, 35 Tex. 689 1063, 1086 V. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564 262 V. Danforth, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 321 1581 V. East, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 407 1105 V. Georgia C. & N. R. Co., 101 Ga. SO 173, 198 V. Gilman, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 255 1080, 10S6, 1087 V. Goble, 97 Ind. 86 1559 V. Goolsby, 34 Miss. 437 1585 V. Hamil, 76 Ala. 506 603 V. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484 916 V. Harper, 4 Ore. 89 1494, 1495 V. Holmes, 21 Kans. 687 1021 V. Howard, 86 Maine 342 1054a V. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136 1163, 1164, 1165 V. Kough, 29 Ch. D. 848 51 V. LaCrosse City Gas Light & Coke Co., 16 Wis. 555 1421, 1600 V. Lowell, 79 111. 484 1199, 1287 V. Lyon, 81 Miss. 438 1104 V. McGran, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 479 475 V. McKee, 80 Tex. 594 1102 V. Moore, 26 111. 421 1199, 1465 V. Morgan, 163 Fed. 395 175 V. Morrison, 5 Ark. 217 692a, 1235, 1248 V. Myers, 145 Pa. St. 17 1416 V. New Bedford Inst, for Sav- ings, 137 Mass. 262 251, 252 v. New York, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 587 144, 200 V. New York, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 21 44, 187, 188, 193 V. North, 8 Ex. 1 916 V. Peterson, 25 App. D. C. 359 997, 1014 Lxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Brown v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 36 App. D. C. 221 262 V. Porter, 2 Mich. N. P. 12 1079 V. Rash, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 203 1122 V. Rodocker, 65 Iowa 55 1358 V. School Dist., 48 Kans. 709 1495, 1499 V. Simpson, 4 Kans. 76 1063 V. Sims, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 138 564 V. Sloan, 55 Nebr. 28 788 V. Smith, 55 Iowa 31 1494 V. Smith, 24 S. Dak. 231 770a V. Thomas, 14 111. App. 428 547 V. Tanner, L. R. 3 Ch. 597 314 V. Truax, 58 Ore. 572 83, 1018 V. Turner, 60 Mo. 21 626 V. Vanlier, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 239 1063, 1082 V. Volkening-, 64 N. T. 76 1581 V. Welch, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 582 1602 V. Williams, 120 Pa. St. 24 l-'.OO, 1500a V. Wrig-ht, 25 Mo. App. 54 1211, 1421 V. Young, 55 S. Car. 309 458 V. Zeiss, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 240 1235, 1236, 1543 V. Zeiss, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 345 1586 Brown & Haywood Co. v. Trone, 98 Wis. 1 1431 Brown Const. Co. v. C. L. Const. Co., 234 111. 397 1289 Browne v. Davis, 109 N. Car. 23 1143 V. Smith, 2 Browne (Pa.) 229n 1368 Brownell v. Twyman, 68 III. App. 67 613 Brownell Improvement Co. v. Nixon, 48 Ind. App. 195 98 Browning v. Belford, 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 144 331 Browninski v. Pickett, 113 Ky. 420 1304 Brown's Estate, In re, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 286 1163 Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 580 515 Broxton Artificial Stone Works V. Jowers, 4 Ga. App. 91 1424 Bruce v. Anderson, 176 Mass. 161 177c V. Berg, 8 Mo. App. 204 1435, 1444 v. Pearsall, 59 N. J. L. 62 1216 V. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194 1127 V. Wait, 3 M. & W. 15 447, 464 Brudenell v. Boughton, 2 Atk. 268 1164 Brum V. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Woods (U. S.) 156 85 Bruner v. Sheik, 9 Watts & S. (Pa.) 119 1245 Bruner's Appeal, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 269 1045 Brunold v. Glasser, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 285 1263 Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. & E. 17 13, 28, 155, 196, 203, 216, 218, 234 Brunswick, etc., Co. v. Murphy, 89 Miss. 264 557, 971 Brush V. Kinsley, 14 Ohio 20 1063, 1092 Bruton V. Beasley, 135 Ga. 412 708 Bryan v. Abbott, 131 Cal. 222 1397 V. Madison Supply Co., 135 Ga. 171 611 V. Sanderson, 3 McArthur (D. C.) 431 553 V. Whitford, 66 111. 33 1199 Bryans v. Nix, 4 M. & W. 775 465, 907 Bryant v. Grady, 98 Maine 389 1532, 1533 V. Mercier, 82 Ga. 409 612 V. Stephens, 58 Ala. 636 1045, 1067, 1079, 1100, 1124 Bryon V. Carter, 22 La. Ann. 98 375, 377, 380, 381 Bryson v. Collmer, 33 Ind. App. 494 1069, 1092 Buchan v. Summer, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165 94, 796 Buchanan v. Roy, 2 Ohio St. 251 1563 V. Selden, 43 Nebr. 559 14.'!3 V. Smith, 43 Miss. 90 1210 Buck V. Hall, 170 Mass. 419 1600 V. Lee, 36 Ark. 525 556 V. Paine, 50 Miss. 648 783 V. Payne, 52 Miss. 271 783 Buckeye State, The. 1 Newb. (U. S.) Ill 1802 Buckingham v. Flummerfelt, 15 N. Dak. 112 1348 V. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 652 1091 Buckland v. Pocknell, 13 Sim. 406 1071, 1074 Buckley v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 171 111. 284 1312 v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 62 111. App. 202 1312 v. Furniss, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 137 801, 837, 878, 887, 921, 962, 965 V. Handy, 2 Miles (Pa.) 449 1018 v. Packard, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 421 478 V. Runge (Tex. Civ. App.), 136 S. W. 533 1083, 1110 V. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 1283, 1404, 1556 Buckner v. Lancaster, (Tex. Civ. Aop.) 40 S. W. 631 21 v. Mcllroy, 31 Ark. 631 606, 985 Buckstaff V. Dunbar, 15 Nebr. 114 1256 Budd V. Busti, 1 Har. (Del.) 69 1063 V. Lucky, 28 N. J. L. 484 1216 V. School Dist. No. 4, 51 N. J. L. 3t) 1216, 1286 Buddecke v. Spence, 23 La. Ann. 367 437 Buddington v. Stewart, 14 Conn. 404, 409 1682 Buel V. Lockport, 3 N. Y. 197 1502 Buffalo V. Yattan, Sheldon (N. Y.) 483 735 Buffalo German Ins. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 670 384 Buffalo Oolitic Limestone Quar- ries Co. V. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116 1011, 1018 Buffington v. Hilley, 55 Ga. 655 597, 1018 TABLE OF CASES. Ixix [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1001-1812.] Buford V. McCormick, 57 Ala. 428 1069, 1083, 1085 Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Con- nor, 150 Cal. 265 1599, 1615, 1616a Building & Loan Assn. v. Co- burn, 150 Ind. 684 1373, 1462 Bulger V. Holly, 47 Ala. 453 1083 Bulkly V. Healy, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 608 1599 Bullard v. Bank, IS Wall. (U. S.) 589 384 V. Dudley, 101 Ga. 299 1197 V. Randall, 1 Gray (Mass.) 605 57 Bullitt V. Eastern Kentucky Land Co., 99 Ky. 324 1105 Bullock V. Graham, 87 Ky. 120 1102, 1103 V. Horn, 44 Ohio St. 420 1291, 1297 V. Tschergi, 4 McCrary (U. S.) 184 821 Buncombe v. Tommey, 115 U. S. 122 1618, 1663 Bunn V. Valley Lumber Co., 51 Wis. 376 817 Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568 322, 801. 834, 837, 877 Bunton v. Palm, (Tex.), 9 S. W. 182 1487 Buntyn v. Shippers' Compress Co., 63 Miss. 94 1210 Burbank v. Wright, 44 Minn. 544 1572 Burbridge v. Marcy, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 446 1235, 1236, 1281 Burch V. Burch, 52 Ind. 136 1164 V. Burch, 82 Ky. 622 1155 Burchard v. Rees, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 377 571 Burdick v. Moon, 24 Iowa 418 1262, 1264 V. Murray, 3 Vt. 302 731, 1002, 1036 V. Moulton, 53 Iowa 761 1256 Burford v. Crandell, 2 Cr. C. C. 86 387 Burger v. Hughes, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 180 1088 V. Potter, 32 111. 66 1088 Burgess v. Fairbanks, 83 Cal. 215 1100 V. Gun, 3 Har. & J. (Md.) 225 27-5 V. Kattleman, 41 Mo. 480 546 V. Wheate, 1 W. Bl. 123 1105 Burghall v. Howard, 1 H. Bl. 366 858 Bui-gie V. "Davis, 34 Ark. 179 751a, 778 Burgin v. Marx, 158 Ala. 633 581 Burgin & Sons Glass Co. v. Mc- Intire, 7 Ga. App. 755 173 Burgwald v. Weippert, 49 Mo. 60 1260 Burk V. Lane Lumber Co., 28 Ky. L. 545 1143 Burke V. Coyne, 188 Mass. 401 1235 V. Dunn, 117 Mich. 430 800 V. Mackenzie, 124 Ga. 248 1239 Burket v. Boude, 3 Dana (Ky.) 209 618 Burkett V. Munford, 70 Ala. 423 1126 Burkhart v. Howard, 14 Ore. 39 1119 V. Reisig, 24 111. 529 1199 V. Scott, 69 W. Va. 694 192a Surkitt V. Harper, 79 N. Y. 273 1235, 1236, 1251, 1265, 1281 Burks V. Burks, 12 Ky. L. 552 1102a Burleigh v. Palmer, 74 Nebr. 122 139 Burleigh Bldg. Co. v. Merchant Brick & Bldg. Co., 13 Colo. App. 455 1444 Burlingim v. Cooper, 36 Nebr. 73 1560 Burling's Est., In re., 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 377 1354 Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Chicago Lumber Co., 15 Neb. 390 282 Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Verry, 48 Iowa 458 1646 Burlington Mfg. Co. v. Comrs. of Courthouse and City Hall, 67 Minn. 327 1375 Burn V. Brown, 2 Stark. 272 428 V. Burn, 3 Ves. Jr. 573 33 V. Carvalho, 4 Mylne & C. 690 43, 45, 55, 58 V. Whittlesey, 2 Mac Ar. (D. C.) 189 1599 Burnham v. Winsor, 5 Law Rep. 507 931, 932 Burns V. Allen, 1 New Eng. Rep. 143 137 V. Allen, 15 R. L 32 151 V. Griffin, 24 Grant's Ch. (U. C.) 451 1098, 1105 V. Harris, 67 N. Car. 370 789 V. Sewell, 48 Minn. 425 1328 V. Taylor, 23 Ala. 255 1063, 1091 Burpee v. Townsend, 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 681 184 Burr V. Graves, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 552 693, 1225, 1272 V. Maultsby, 99 N. Car. 263 1470, 1488 V. Van Buskirk, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 263 593 V. Wilson, 13 U. C. Q. B. 478 931 Burrell v. Way, 176 Mass. 164 1605 Burrill v. Cleeman, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 72 332a Burritt v. Rench, 4 McLean (U. S) 325 956 Burrough v. Elv, 54 W. Va. IIS 21 V. White, 18 Mo. App. 229 1389, 1418 Burroughs v. Burroughs, 164 Ala. 329 1071 V. Gilliland, 90 Miss. 127 1074 V. Tostevan, 75 N. Y. 567 1614 Burrus v. Roulhar, 2 Bush (Kv.) 39 ■ 1086 Burt V. Parker Co., 77 Tex. 338 1286 V. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632 1063, 1083 Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320 825 V. McKinney, 6 Bush (Ky.) 428 1102a V. Smith, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 464 582 Ixx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I. §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Buser v. Shephard, 107 Ind. 417 1558 Busfield V. Wheeler, 14 Allen (Mass.) 139 1033, 1044, 1056, 1499 Bush V. Willis, 130 Ala. 395 580, 602, 603 Bush, Ex parte, 7 Viner's Abr. 74 113, 131, 154, 156 Buskirk v. Purinton, 2 Hall (N. Y.) 561 304 Buswell V. Marshall, 51 Vt. 87 548 Butchers' Union, &c., Co. v. Cres- cent City, &c., Co., 41 La. Ann. 355 113, 115, 177a Butler V. Doug-lass, 3 Fed. 612 1123 V. Gain, 128 111. 23 1199, 1286, 1554 V. Gannon, 53 Md. 333 622 V. Ng-. Chung, IGO Cal. 435 1190 V. Rahm, 46 Md. 541 1675 V. Rivers, 4 R. I. 38 1257 V. Williams, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 241 1116 V. Woolcutt, 2 B. & P. (N. R.) 64 265, 303, 901 Butler-Ryan Co. v. Silvey, 70 Minn. 507 1523, 1532 Butt V. Ellett, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 544 542 Butterfield v. Baker, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 522 550 V. Okie, 36 N. J. Eq. 482 1076, 1083 Button V. Schroyer, 5 Wis. 598 1108 Butts V. Carey, 143 App. Div. (N. Y.) 356 184 V. Cuthbertson, 6 Ga. 166 1009 Byard v. Parker, 65 Maine 576 1570 Bynum v. Hill, 71 N. Car. 319 1165 Byre v. Herran, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 344 1380 Byrne v. Union Bank, 9 Rob. (La.) 433 375, 381 Byrnes v. Fuller, 1 Brev. (S. Car.) 316 867 Byrns v. Woodward, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 444 1116 Cabarga, The, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 75 1696, 1728 Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa. St. 254 921 Cabot, The, Abb. Adm. (U. S.) 150 1707 Cade V. Brownlee, 15 Ind. 369 1069 Cadwalader v. Tindall. 20 Pa. St. 422 564 Cady V. Fair Plain Literary Assn., 135 Mich. 295 1552 V. McDowell, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) ,84 515 Caay Lumber Co. v. Conkling, 70 Nebr. 807 1392 Cage V. Wilkinson, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 223 146, 158, 166 Cahill V. Cahill, 9 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 241 198, 207 V. Capen, 147 Mass. 493 1315 V. Lee, 55 Md. 319 592, 622 Cain V. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 1146 V. Hockinsmith Wheel & Car. Co., 157 Fed. 992 115 Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Cauble, 85 111. 555 1644 Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Watson, 85 111. 531 1283, 1644 Cairo & Vincennes R. Co. v. Fack- ney, 78 111. 116 990, 1041, 1495, 1631, 1644 Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio St. 281 902, 929, 935, 965 Caldwell v. Asbury, 29 Ind. 451 1260, 1421 V. Bartlett, 3 Duer (N. Y.) 341 306 V. Fraim, 32 Tex. 310 1110 V. Lawrence, 10 Wis. 331 982, 990, 1493 V. Tutt, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 258 521, 698 Caldwell Institute v. Young, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 582 1203, 1276 Calef V. Brinley, 58 N. H. 90 1215 Calhoun Brick Co. v. Pattillo Lumber Co., 10 Ga. App. 181 1435 California Portland Cement Co. V. Wentworth Hotel Co., 16 Cal. App. 692 1190, 1327, 1438, 1493 California Powder Works v. Blue Tent Gold Mines (Cal.), 22 Pac. 391 1405 California, The, 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 463 1712 Calkins v. Steinbach, 66 Cal. 117 1153 Call V. Seymour. 40 Ohio St. 670 820 Callaway v. Walls, 54 Ga. 167 454 Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 Mass. 74 1147 v. Coxe, 1 Gill (Md.) 95 219 Calvin v. Duncan, 12 Bush (Ky.) 101 1126 Camanche, The, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 448 1718 Cambria Iron Co.'s Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 58 587 Cambridge &c. Mfg. Co. v. Ger- mania Bank, 128 Ga. 178 1197 Camden v. Vail, 23 Cal. 633 1080, 1086, 1088 Camden Iron Works v. Camden, 60 N. J. Eq. 211 1344 Cameron v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 118 N. Car. 266 768 v. Grouse, 11 App. Div. N. Y.) 391 430 V. Fay, 55 Tex. 58 1541 v. McCullough, 11 R. I. 173 1223, 1262 V. Marshall, 65 Tex. 7 1382 V. Mason, 7 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 180 1063 Camp V. GifCord, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 434 1071 V. West, 113 Ga. 304 559 Campbell v. Abbott, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 93 673, 701 v. Bowen, 22 Ind. App. 562 615 V. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438 1153 V. Campbell, 11 N. J. Eq. 268 1151 V. Henry, 45 Miss. 326 1086 V. J. W. Taylor Mfg. Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 307 1335 V. J. W. Taylor Mfg. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 344 1335 V. Los Angeles Gold Mine Co., 28 Colo. 256 1616a V. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y. ) 334 35 V. Muliett, 2 Swanst. 551 788 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ lOGl-1812.] Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401 991, 1063, 1107, 1119 V. Reeves, 3 Head (Tenn.) 226 429 V. Roach, 45 Ala. 667 1085, 1094, 1100 V. Scarf e, 1 Phila. (Fa.) 187 1289 V. Sidwell, 61 Ohio St. 179 1080 V. Terney, 7 N. J. L,. J. 189 158 Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Powell, 78 Tex. 53 854 Campbell, etc.. Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412 610 Canada, The, 7 Fed. 119 1618, 1713 Canal Bank v. Hudson, 111 U. S. 66 1136, 1164 Canal Co. v. Gordon. 6 Wall. (U. S.) 561 1450, 1500, 1620 Canary, The, No. 2, 22 Fed. 532 1730, 1745 Cane v. Martin, 2 Beav. 584 122, 122a Canisius v. Merrill, 65 111. 67 1350 1554 Cann v. Fidler, 62 Ind. 116 ' 1163 Canney v. Canney, 131 Mich. 363 201 V. McDaniel, 46 Tex. 303 1092 V. Williams, 14 Colo. 21 1389, 1390, 1406, 1417, 1556, 1614 Cannon v. Bonner, 38 Tex. 487 1086 Canterbury v. Jordan, 27 Miss. 96 552, 625 Canton Roll. & M. Co. v. Rolling Mill Co. of A., 155 Fed. 321 1329 1587 Canton, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 437 1703, 1704 Cantrell v. Ford (Tenn.), 46 S. W. 581 190 Cantwell v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 160 Mo. App. 393 281 Cape Fear Steamboat Co. v. Tor- rent, 46 Ga. 585 1741 Capelle v. Baker, 3 Houst. (Del.) 344 1194, 1555 Capital Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Crutcher, 140 Ky. 394 1507 Capitol, The, 22 How. (U. S.) 129 1725 Capp V. Stewart, 38 Ind. 479 1262 Capper v. Spottiswoode, Tamlyn 21 1080 Capron v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304 1308, 1366, 1441, 1558 Cardinal v. Edwards, 5 Neb. 36 699, 1002 Carew v. Stubbs, 155 Mass. 549 1252a. 1288, 1458, 1542 Carey v. Boyle, 53 Wis. 574 1069, 1093 V. Boyle, 56 Wis. 145 1069 V. Seifert, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 577 1222 Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Bierbauer, 76 Minn. 434 1244 Carey-Lombard &c. Co. v. Jones, 187 111. 203 1279 Cargo V. Argos, L. R. 5 P. C. 134 283, 2S7 Cargo ex Sultan, Swab. 504 2S7 Carhart v. Reviere. 78 Cal. 173 1119 Carlisle v. Kinney, 66 Barb. (N. y.) 363 800 V. Knapp, 51 N. J. L. 329 1216, 1283 Carlton v. Buckner, 28 Ark. 66 1092, 1096 Carman v. Mclncrow, 13 N. Y. 70 1218, 1287. 1294 Carnes v. Hubbard, 10 Miss. 108 1086 Carney v. La Crosse & Milw. R. Co., 15 Wis. 503 1574 V. Tully, 74 111. 375 1199 Carolina, The, 30 Fed. 199 1771 Carpenter v. Bayfield Western R. Co., 107 Wis. 611 719 V. Black Hawk G. M. Co., 65 N. Y. 43 1674 V. Gillespie, 10 Iowa 592 553, 582 V. Leonard, 5 Minn. 155 1260,1313 V. Mitchell, 54 111. 126 1092, 1111, 1115, 1119, 1141 V. Momsen, 92 Wis. 449 422 V. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 1 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 410 209 V. Small, 35 Cal. 346 1141 Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285 1063. 1083 V. Holbrook, 1 Mo. 240 1110 V. Hooper, 48 Kans. 253 1313, 1451, 1607 V. National Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45 57 V. Thompson, 67 Mo. 472 1086, 1090 Carrico v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 33 Md. 235 1086 Carrie, The, 46 Fed. 796 1806 Carriger v. Mackey. 15 Ind. App. 392 1462 Carroll v. Bancker, 43 La. Ann. 1078 620 V. Draughon, 154 Ala. 430 169 V. Mullanpay Sav. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 240 381 V. Shapard, 78 Ala. 358 1086 V. Swift, 129 La. 43 800, 811 V. Van Rensselaer, Harr. (Mich.) 225 1063 Carson v. Electric Light & Power Co., 85 Iowa 44 616 V. Kelley, 57 Tex. 379 1102a V. Steamboat Daniel Hillman, 16 Mo. 256 1436 V. White, 6 Gill (Md.) 17 1404, 1417 Carson Opera House Assn. v. Miller, 16 Nev. 327 1289, 1304 Carswell v. Patzowski. 3 Pennew. (Del.) 593 1194 Carter v. Andrews, 56 111. App. 646 613 V. Attoway, 46 Tex. 108 1101 V. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214 167, 172, 219 V. Brady, 51 Fla. 404 1301 V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 130 Mo. App. 719 181a V. Davis, 8 Fla. 183 167, 172, 220 V. Du Pre, 18 S. Car. 179 635 V. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., 12 Iowa 287 1541 V. Keeton, 112 Va. 307 1276 V. Leonard, 65 Nebr. 670 1119 Ixxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §.§ 10G1-1S12.] Carter v. Martin, 22 Ind. App. 445 1502 V. Rockett, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 437 79 V. Sims, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 166 1109 V. The Byzantium, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 1 1532 V. Townsend, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 1 1808 V. Walters, 63 Ga. 164 598 Carter County Court v. Butler, 81 Ky. 597 1116 Carthage Superior Limestone Co. V. Central Methodist Church, 156 Mo. App. 671 1412 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521 932, 959 Carver v. Bagley, 79 Minn. 114 713 V. Coffman, 109 Ind. 547 1149, 1151 V. Crookston Lumber Co., 84 Minn. 79 713 V. Eads, 65 Ala. 190 1063, 1064, 1094 V. United States, 7 Ct. CI. (U. S.) 499 200 Cary Hdw. Co. v. McCarty, 10 Colo. App. 200 1272, 1423, 1439 Casar v. Sargeant, 7 Iowa 317 175, 210 Cascade Boom Co. v. McNeeley Logging Co., 37 Wash. 203 718 Case V. Allen, 21 Kans. 217 692 V. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793 V. Davis, 15 Pa. St. 80 633 V. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44 523, 524 V. Kloppenburg, 27 La. Ann. 482 620 Case Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 40 Fed. 339 1340, 1581 Caserly v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 157 1604a Case Plow Works v. Union Iron Works, 56 Mo. App. 1 976 Casey v. Ault, 4 Wash. 167 718 v. March, 30 Tex. 180 115, 137, 141, 159 V. Weaver, 141 Mass. 280 1308, 1534, 1608 Cash v. First Nat. Bank, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 109 786a Cashman v. Henry. 75 N. Y. 103 1260 Cassell V. Lowry, 164 Ind. 1 1099 Casserly v. Waite. 124 Mich. 157 1560 Castagnetto v. Coppertown Min. &c. Co., 146 Cal. 329 1392 Castanola v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 24 Fed. 267 946 Caster v. McClellan, 132 Iowa 502 1275 Castikyan v. Sloan, 33 App. D. C. 420 472 Castle V. Sworder, 5 H. & N. 281 852 Castor V. Jones, 86 Ind. 289 1163 Gate V. Gate. 87 Tenn. 41 1092 Catherine Whiting, The, 99 Fed. 445 1756 Catlin V. Douglass, 33 Fed. 569 1202, 1438 Cator V. Pembroke, 1 Bro. G. G. 301 1076, 1084, 1105 Cattanach v. Ingersoll, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 285 1306 Cattell V. Ferguson, 3 Wash. St. 541 1262, 1266 V. Simons, 6 Beav. 304 216 Caulfleld v. Polk, IV Ind. App. 429 1300, 1336 Cayo V. Pool's Assignee, 108 Ky. 124 276, 317 Caylor v. Thorn, 125 Ind. 201 1200 Cayuga Co. National Bank v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. 631 61, 62 Cecil V. Henry (Tex.), 93 S. W. 216 1075 Cecil Bank v. Farmers' Bank, 22 Md. 148 260 Central & Montgomery R. Co. v. Henning, 52 Tex. 466 1668 Central Bank v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 668 628 Central Bldg. Co. v. Karr Sup- ply Co., 115 111. App. 610 1598 Central Loan &c. Go. v. O'Sulli- van, 44 Nebr. 834 1262 Central Lumber Co. v. Bradock Land &c. Co., 84 Ark. 560 . 1189, 1329 Central Nat. Bank v. Brecheisen, 65 Kans. 807 659 Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Chi- cago Portrait Co., 122 Ga. 11 336 V. Shiver, 125 Ga. 218 1197 Central R. Co. v. Pettus, 112 U. S. 116 101, 147, 169, 201, 208 V. MacCartney, 68 N. J. L. 165 316 Central Trust Co. v. Bartlett, 57 N. J. L. 206 1469 V. Cameron, Iron & Coal Co., 47 Fed. 136 1309d, 1472 V. Condon, 67 Fed. 84 1666a V. Georgia Pac. R. Co., S3 Fed. 386 1654 V. Richmond, N. I. & B. R. Co., 68 Fed. 90 1525 V. Sheffield &c. R. Co., 42 Fed. 106 1187, 1341, 1556 V. Texas & St. L. R. Co., 27 Fed. 178 1655 V. Utah Cent. R. Co., 16 Utah 12 1669 Central Trust Go. of N. Y. v. Richmond, N. I. & B. R. Co., 105 Fed. 803 177 Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 589 270, 327, 1692 Cessna's Appeal, 7 Sad. (Pa.) 183 1389 Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. Car. 444 1219, 1313, 1468, 1480 Chadwick v. Broadwell, 27 Mich. 6 998, 1002 GhafTin v. McFadden, 41 Ark. 42 1588 Challoner v. Bouck. 56 Wis. 652 1477 V. Howard, 41 Wis. 355 1605 Chalmers, Ex parte, L. R. 8 Ch. 289 840, 852 Chamberlain v. Heard, 22 Mo. App. 416 626 V. Masterson, 26 Ala. 371 511 V. Wood, 100 Maine 73 710 Chamberlin v. McCarthy, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 158 1274 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Chaniberlin v. Peltz, 1 Mo. App. 183 81 Chamberlin-Hunt Academy v. Port Gibson Brick &c. Co., 80 Miss. 517 1287 Chambers v. Benoist. 25 Mo. App. 520 1591 Chambersburg Ins. Co. v. Smith, 11 Pa. St. 120 412 Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 398 1083 Champlin v. McLeod, 53 Miss. 484 1088 Chance v. McWhorter, 26 Ga. 315 1079, 1083 Chancellor v. Law, 148 Ala. 511 583 Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 157 268. 322. 1002 V. Chandler, 78 Ind. 417 1100 V. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2 861, 875, 919, 929, 953, 965 V. Hanna, 73 Ala. 390 1187, 1451, 1559, 1560 Chanslor v. Chanslor, 11 Bush (Ky.) 663 1180 Chapin v. Miles & Ricketts, 151 111. App. 164 614 V. Persse &c. Paper "Works, 30 Conn. 461 1310; 1311, 1314, 1325, 1328, 1330, 1539 V. Waters, 116 Mass. 140 1165 Chapman v. Abrahams, 61 Ala. 108 1067 V. Allen, Cro. Car. 271 641, 742 V. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115 1063, 1071 V. Brewer, 43 Nebr. 890 1468, 1521 V. Chapman, 55 Ark. 542 1088 V. E!lg-in, J. & E!. R. Co., 11 Ind. App. 632 758 V. Haw, 1 Taunt. 341 llrMj V. Kent, 3 Duer (N. Y.) 224 426 V. Lee, 64 Ala. 483 1099, 1100 V. Liggett, 41 Ark. 292 1063, 1083, 1092 V. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283 1101 V. Searle, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 38 833 V. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413 842 V. Stockwell, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 650 1074 V. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267 1061 V. The Engines of the Green- point, 38 Fed. 671 1718 V. Wadleigh, 33 Wis. 267 1469, 1476 V. White, 6 N. Y. 412 57 Chappel V. Comfort, 31 L. J. C. P. 58 274 Chappell V. Cady, 10 Wis. Ill 115, 731 Charboneau v. Orton. 43 Wis. 96 151 Charles v; Godfrey, 125 Wis. 594 1616 V. Neigelson, 15 111. App. 17 691 Charles Carter, The, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 328 1786 Charles E. E'alk, The, 157 Fed. 780 1679, 1697a Charles Hemje, The, 5 Hughes (U. S.) 359 1697 Charles Spear, The, 143 Fed. 185 1688 Charleston Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Brockmyer, 18 W. Va. 586 12.31, J-33, 1260, 1487 Charlotte Vanderbild, The, 19 Fed. 219 16S6, 1793 Ciiarlwood V. Berridge. 1 Esp. 345 234 Charnley v. Honig, 74 Wis. 163 i r 1513a Charnock v. Colfax. 51 Iowa 70 1375 Chase v. Chase, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 306 . 233 V. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 485 V. Ingalls, 122 Mass. 381 820 V. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581 77, 82, 1063, 1071, 1105 V. Steel, 9 Cal. 64 795 V. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180 6, 320, 322, 741, 850 V. Westmore, Selw. N. P. 1322 973 Chastian v. Lumpkin, 134 Ga. 219 173 Cheatham v. Rowland. 72 N. Car. 340 1243, 1580 Chelmsford, The, 34 Fed. 399 1680, 1681, 1687, 1808 Cheney v. Bonnell, 58 111. 268 1273 V. Troy Hospital. 65 N. Y. 282 1218, 1286, 1599 Cherry v. North & South R. Co., 65 Ga. 633 1560 V. Strong, 96 Ga. 183 1605 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dob- bins, 23 Ky. Law 1588 280a Cheshire v. Des Moines City R. Co., 153 Iowa 88 175 Cheshire Provident Inst. v. Stone, 52 N. H. 365 1215. 1465, 1468 Chester Rolling Mills v. The Ho- patcong, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 634 1809 Chevret v. Mechanics' Mill & Lumber Co., 4 Wash. 721 730 Chicago V. Hasley, 25 111. 595 1375 V. Robbins, 2 Black (U. S.) 418 1492 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Union Rolling Mill Co., 109 U. S. 702 1006, 1016, 1340, 1536, 1644 Chicago & B. I. R. Co. v. Moran, 187 111. 316 1440 Chicago & Great Western Land Co. V. Peck, 112 111. 408 1086 Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. V. Jenkins, 103 111. 588 282 Chicago Artesian Well Co. v. Co- rey, 60 111. 73 1199 Chicago Building & Mfg. Co. v. Talbotton Creamery & Mfg. Co., 106 Ga. 84 1520 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. V. Painter, 15 Nebr. 394 929, 965 Chicago Lumber Co. v. Allen, 52 Kans. 795 1492 V. Des Moines Driving Park, 97 Iowa 25 1201 V. INIerrimack &c. Bank, 52 Kans. 410 1438 V. Osborn, 40 Kans. 168 1257, 1393, 1453 V. Schweiter, 45 Kans. 207 1245, 1247, 1458, 1470 Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 10G1-1S12.] Chicago Lumber Co. v. Tomlin- son, 54 Kans. 770 1428 V. Woods, 53 Iowa 552 1508 V. Woodside, 71 Iowa 359 1290 Chicago Lumber, etc., Co. v. Gar- mer, 132 Iowa 282 1290 Chicago Marine & Fire Ins. Co. V. Stanford, 28 111. 168 57 Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Dorsey Fuel Co., 112 111. App. 382 282 Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Hubbell, 54 Kans. 232 280a Chicago Smokeless Fuel Gas Co. V. Lyman, 62 111. App. 538 1274 Chickering-Chase Bros. Co. v. White, 127 Wis. 83 507, 515 Child V. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207 377 Childers v. Greenville, 69 Ala. 103 1287 Childs V. Anderson, 128 Mass. 108 1315 V. Bostwick, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 146 1454, 1614 V. Northern R. Co., 25 U. C. Q. B. 165 897 V. Shower, 18 Iowa 261 1145 Chilton V. Braiden, 2 Black (U. S.) 458 1063, 1115 Chimera, The, Coote, Adm. 138 1781 China, The, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 53 1769 Chisholm v. Randolph, 21 111. App. 312 1199, 1532 V. The J. L. Pendergrast, 32 Fed. 415 1706 V. Williams, 128 111. 115 1257, 1532, 1591 Chitwood V. Trimble, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.) 78 1111, 1116, 1119 Choate v. Tighe, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 621 1069 Choteau v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114 1220, 1257, 1272, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1370, 1437, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1492 Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382 381 Chowning v. Barnett, 30 Ark. 560 109 Chrisman v. Hay, 43 Fed. 552 1074 Christian v. Allee, 104 111. App. 177 1074, 1090, 1408 V. Clark, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 630 1120 V. Ellis, 1 Grat. (Va.) 396 787 V. Field, 2 Hare 177 1182 V. Illinois Malleable Iron Co., 92 111. App. 320 1313 Christian-Craft Grocery Co. v. Kling, 121 Ala. 292 1370, 1462a Christman v. Charleville, 36 Mo. 610 1558 Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 69 48, 57 Christnot v. Montana G. & S. M. Co., 1 Mont. 44 1308 Christopher v. Christopher, 64 Md. 583 1076 Christy v. Ogle. 33 111. 295 1127a V. Perkins, 6 Daly (N. T.) 237 193 Church V. Allison, 10 Pa. St. 413 1284 V. Bloom, 111 Iowa 319 583 V. Griffith, 9 Pa. St. 117 1274 V. McLeod, 58 Vt. 541 820 Church V. Smith, 39 Wis. 492 1107 V. Smithea, 4 Colo. App. 175 1462 Chusan, The. 2 Story (U. S.) 455 1681, 1800a, lS06a, 1808 Cimbria, The. 156 Fed. 378 1681, 1682, 1800 Cincinnati Tobacco Warehouse Co. V. Leslie, 117 Ky. 478 63, 983 Circassian, The, 1 Ben. (U. S.) 209 1713 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Culver, 54 N. H. 327 232 Citizens' State Bank v. Adams, 91 Ind. 280 1100 Citizen's State Bank of Monroe- ville, Ind., v. Kalamazoo Coun- ty Bank, 111 Mich. 313 377 Citizens' Sav. Bank of Olin v. Woods, 134 Iowa 232 586, 616 City Bank Case, Ex parte, 3 De G., F. & J. 629 248, 251 City Nat. Bank of Marshalltown V. Crahan. 135 Iowa 230 1014 City of Camden, 147 Fed. 847 1693, 1699 City of London, The, 1 W. Rob. (U. S.) 88 1700 City of Mexico, The, 28 Fed. 239 1694 City of New York, The, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 187 1690 City of Pittsburgh, The, 45 Fed. 699 1677, 1760 City of Salem, The. 10 Fed. 843 1759 City of Salem. The. 31 Fed. 616 1699, 1732 City of Tawas, The, 3 Fed. 170 1779, 1788, 1802 Claes V. Dallas &c. Loan Assn., 83 Texas 50 1226, 1462 Claflin V. Bennett, 51 Fed. 693 147 Clain V. Hutton, 131 Cal. 132 1356 Clanton v. Eaton, 92 Ala. 612 603 Clapp v. Peck, 55 Iowa 270 878 935 V. Peterson, 104 111. 26 ' 84 v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa 273 878, 960 Clara A. Mclntyre, The, 94 Fed. 552 , 1679 Clare v. Lockard, 122' N. Y. 263 231 Clark V. Adams, 33 Mich. 159 712 V. Anderson, 88 Minn. 200 1430 V. B. B. Richards Lumber Co., 68 Minn. 282 846 V. Beyrle, 160 Cal. 306 1190, 1375 V. Binninger, L. Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 421 228 V. Boarman, 89 Md. 428 1431, 1573 V. Burns, 118 Mass. 275 503 V. Dobbins, 52 Ga. 656 454, 577 V. Draper, 19 N. H. 419 800, 802, 854 V. Erwin, 72 Miss. 926 854 V. Farrar, 74 N. Car. 686 457 V. Fraley, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 264 572 V. Hale, 34 Hale 398 733 V. Hall, 10 Kans. 80 1330 V. Hall, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 382 i or, V. Haynes, 57 Iowa 96 616 V. Huey, 12 Ind. App. 224 1391 V. Hunt, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 553 1074 V. Kingsley, 8 Allen (Mass.) 543 1207, 1534 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxv [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Clark V. Lowell & L. R. Co., 9 Gray (Mass.) 2:>,1 304, 305 V. Manning-, 90 111. 380 1199 V. Manning-, 95 111. 580 1580, 1585 V. Manning, 4 Bradw. (111.) 649 1580 V. Mauran, 3 Paige (N. T.) 373 45, 880 V. Merchants' Bank, 2 N. Y. 380 258 V. Moore, 64 111. 273 1013, 1016, 1199, 1465, 1519, 1531, 1536 V. Parker, 58 Iowa 509 1257, 1539 V. Raymond, 27 Mich. 456 1591 V. Schatz, 24 Minn. 300 1392 V. Smith, 6 M. & G. 1051 196, 203 V. Smith, 14 111. 361 1728 V. Stilson, 36 Mich. 482 1098 V. Taylor, 91 Cal. 552 1616 Clarke v. Boyle, 51 111. 104 1199 V. Curtis, 11 Leigh (Va.) 559 1072 V. Royle, 3 Sim. 499 1074 V. Soiithwick, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 297 30, 35 Clarkson v. E)des, 4 Cow. (N. T.) 195 262 V. Louterback, 36 Fla. 600 1495 Claybrooks v. Kelly, 61 Tex. 634 1067, 1069 Clay, Succession of, 34 La. Ann. 1131 1063 Clayton v. Butterfleld, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 300 507 V. Farrar Lumber Co., 119 Ga. 37 1574 Clayton, The, 5 Biss. (U. S.) 162 1704 Clear Creek Co. v. Root, 1 Colo. 374 1191, 1559 Clement v. Newton, 78 111. 427 1532 Clementson v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 42 U. C. Q. B. 263 949 Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 392 21, 68, 460 Cleveland v. Martin, 2 Head (Tenn.) 128 1108, 1119 Cleveland C. & S. R. Co. v. Knick- erbocker Trust Co., 86 Fed. 73 1618, 1619, 1664 Cleveland &c. Lumber Co. v. Piggse, 84 Ark. 126 1235 Clevenger v. Dunaway, 84 111. 367 613 Cleverly v. Moseley, 148 Mass. 280 1401, 1421, 1600 Clifford V. Beems, 3 Watts (Pa.) 246 632 V. Gruelle, 17 Ky. L. 842 1092 V. Turrill, 2 De G. & Sm. 1 121 Clifton V. Foster, 103 Mass. 233 1546 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wa.sh. 239 192 Clinton, The. 160 Fed. 421 1681 Close V. Clark, 16 Daly (N. T.) 91 1411 V. Waterhouse, 6 East 523n 731 Cloud V. Kendrick, 1 Wklv. N. Cas. (Pa.) 601 ' 1349 v. Needles, 6 Md. 501 590 Clough V. McDonald, 18 Kans. 114 1202, 1289, 1304, 1428 V. Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co., 64 Minn. 87 713 Clyde V. Simpson, 4 Ohio St. 445 89, 1163 Clyde V. Steam Trans. Co., 36 Fed. 501 1729, 1773, 1794 Clymene, The, 12 Fed. 346 1712 C. N. Johnson, The, 19 Fed. 782 1804 Coakley v. Rickard. 120 N. Y. S. 1118 184 Coal-Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15 1743 Coates V. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 513 V. Donnell, 16 J. & S. (N. Y.) 46 42, 542 V. Doran, 83 Mo. 337 57 V. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422 917, 921 Cobb V. Howard, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 524 1798 Cobbey v. Dorland, 50 Nebr. 373 183 Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 148 624, 640 V. Kerswell, 35 Maine 126 710, 724, 1010 V. Stephens, 137 Ind. 683 1405 Cocheco Bank v. Berry, 52 Maine 293 1440, 1465 Cochran v. Ripy, 13 Bush (Ky.) 495 825 V. Waits, 127 Ga. 93 611 V. Wimberly, 44 Miss. 503 1109 Cochrane v. Schryver, 17 N. Y. Week. Dig. 442 512, 513, 515 Cockburn v. Watkins, 76 Ala. 486 603 Cockrill V. Joyce, 62 Ark. 216 241, 248 Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. (N. Y ) 637 259 ■V-. Beebe, 29 N. J. L. 550 1216 V. Hudson County Dry Dock, &c., Co., 31 N. J. L. 477 1216, 1258, 1358, 1370 Code V. Carlton, 18 Nebr. 328 1657 Codling V. Nast, 8 Mo. App. 573 1417 Codwise v. Taylor, 4 Sneed. (Ky.) 346 1102a Coe V. Hart, 6 Am. L. Reg. 27 'i^^ V. New Jersey Midland R. Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 110 74 V. New Jersey M. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 105 1384, 1660 V. New Jersey M. R. Co., 34 N. J. Eq. 266 1660 V. Ritter, 86 Mo. 277 1418, 1579 Coenen v. Staub, 74 Iowa 32 1349 Coffey V. Smith, 52 Ore. 538 1444 Coffin V. Heath, 6 Met. (Mass.) 76 1147, 1148 V. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 640 1629 Cogel V. Mickow, 11 Minn. 475 1382 Coggill V. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 3 Gray (Mass.) 545 820 Cohee v. Baer, 134 Ind. 375 1604a Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296 571, 612 V. Kyler, 27 Mo. 122 1387 V. Woollard, 2 Tenn. Ch. 686 1102a Cohn V. Hager, 30 Ark. 25 1189, 1235 V. Wright, 89 Cal. 86 1405, 1589 Coit V. Fougera, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 195 1086, loss V. Schwartz, 29 Kans. 344 445 V. Waples, 1 Minn. 134 986 Colclough V. Mathis, 79 Ga. 394 611 Coldeleugh v. Johnson, 34 Ark. 312 1123 Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Cole V. Barron, 8 Mo. App. 509 1404, 1407, 1449, 1591, 1615 V. Bennett, 6 Price 15 203 V. Berry, 42 N. J. L. 308 820 V. Clark, 85 Maine 336 1235 V. Colby, 57 N. H. 98 1313, 1314, 1317 V. Custer County Agric, &c., Assn., 3 S. Dak. 272 1421. 1600 V. Grant, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 105 217 V. McNeill, 99 Ga. 250 1365 V. Scott, 2 Wash. (Va.) 141 1064 V. Smith, 24 W. Va. 287 40, 1069, 1072 V. Turner, 4 Russ. 376 1163 V. Tyng-, 24 111. 99 973 V. Uhl, 46 Conn. 296 1444, 1603 Colean Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 122 111. App. 172 613 Coleg-rave v. Manley, T. & R. 400 122, 122a. 132 Coleman V. Austin, 99 Ga. 629 173, 210 V. Ballandi, 22 Minn. 144 1382 V. Fairbanks, 28 La. Ann. 93 620 V. Howell, (N. J.) 16 Atl. 202 1171 V. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132 233 V. Siler, 74 Ala. 435 579, 583, 585, 603 Cole Mfg. Co. V. Falls, 90 Tenn. 466 1225, 1304a Coles V. Marquand, 2 Hill (N. T.) 447 577 V. Withers, 33 Grat. (Va.) 186 1099, 1109, 1116 Colfax, The, 179 Fed. 975 1680, 1756 Collett V. Preston, 15 Beav. 458 216 Colley V. Doughty, 62 Maine 501 1570 Collier v. Hecht-Brittingham Co., 7 Ga. 178 174 V. Pfenning, 34 N. J. Eq. 22 1487 Collins V. Blake, 79 Maine 218, 108 V. Cowan, 52 Wis. 634 730 V. Hathaway, Olc. (U. S.) Adm. 205 V. Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648 248 V. Megraw, 47 Mo. 495 1263, 1264 V. Mott, 45 Mo. 100 1335, 1341, 1384, 1478 V. New Albany, 59 Ind. 396 1370 V. Nickerson, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 125 205 V. Patch, 156 Mass. 317 1368 V. Snoke, 9 Wash. 566 1398 Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. 83 571, 633 Collins Granite Co. v. Devereux, 72 Maine 422 761 Collinson v. Owens, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 4 75 Collman v. Collins, 2 Hall (N. T.) 569 304 Colman v. Goodnow, 36 Minn. 9 1248, 1259, 1451, 1452 Colorado Iron Works v. Ricken- berg, 4 Idaho 262 1283 V. Riekenberg, 4 Idaho 705 1327 V. Taylor, 12 Colo. App. 451 1249 Colorado State Bank v. David- son, 7 Colo. App. 91 171, 173 Colquitt V. Kirkman, 47 Ga. 555 655, 692 Colt V. Fougers, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 195 1071 v. Lawrenceburg Lumber Co., 44 Ind. App. 122 1262 Colter V. Frese, 45 Ind. 96 1200, 1286, 1305 Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 19 Ky. L. 1761 1130 Columbia, The, 27 Fed. 704 1769, 1799 Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Woolfolk, 94 Ga. 507 308 Columbus, The, 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 4S7 1690, 1729, 1731 Combination Land Co. v. Mor- gan, 95 Cal. 548 1077 Combs V. Lippincott, 35 N. J. L. 481 1216 Comfort, The, 25 Fed. 158 1686 Commercial Bank of Albany v. Hughes, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 92 241 Commercial Loan, &c., Assn. v. Trevette, 160 111. 390 1504 Commercial Nat. Bank v. Heil- bronner, 108 N. Y. 439 418, 466, 478 Commercial Telegram Co. v. Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176 188, 189, 194, 209 Commerell v. Poynton, 1 Swanst. 1 122a Commonwealth v. Lelar, 8 Leg. Int. 50 590 Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. V. Ellis, 192 Pa. St. 321 1500a Compher v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co., 137 Mo. App. 89 181a Compton V. State, 38 Ark. 601 151, 230, 231 Comstock V. McCracken, 53 Mich. 123 731, 1023 V. McEvoy, 52 Mich. 324 1208 Conant v. Brackett, 112 Mass. 18 1276, 1280 V. Seneca Co. Bank, 1 Ohio St. 298 376, 404 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. S.) 386 451, 946 V. Nicoll, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 291 451 V. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. (U. S.) 262 451 Concord Apartment House Co. v. O'Brien, 228 111. 476 1505 V. O'Brien, 128 111. App. 437 1502, 1505 Condict V. Flowers. 106 111. 105 1540 Condon v. Church of St. Augus- tine, 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 168 1616 Cones V. Brooks, 60 Nebr. 698 132, 183 Confiscation Cases, 1 Woods (U. S.) 221 620 Conklin v. Bauer, 62 N. Y. 620 1245, 1247 V. Carver, 19 Ind. 226 657. 687 V. Second Nat. Bank, 45 N. Y. 655 384 V. Wood, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 662 1390. 1 1^4. 1455 Conlan v. Leonard, 82 N. J. L. 108 1581 Conlee v. Clark. 14 Ind. App. 205 1445 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 462 564 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 81 Ky. 540 405 Connell v. Beattie, 34 Ark. 113 1126 V. Drumback, 18 Ohio C. C. 502 159 Conner v. Banks, 18 Ala. 42 1116, 1119 V. Boyd, 73 Ala. 385 196 V. Lewis, 16 Maine 268 1248 Connolly v. Bouck. 174 Fed. 312 63 Connor v. Mason, 143 Ky. 635 1203 Conover v. Warren, 6 111. 498 1063 Conrad v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. S.) 386 11 V. Patzelt, 29 La. Ann. 465 620 V. Starr, 50 Iowa 470 1201, 1257, 1469, 1558 Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387 743 V. Little, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 395 9 Conroy v. Woods. 13 Cal. 626 791, 795 Consignees' Favorite Box Co. v. Speer, 5 Ga. App. 156 708 Consolidated Engineering Co. v. Crowley, 105 La. 615 1204, 1328 Constantia, The, 6 Rob. Adm. 321 884, 886 Constantine v. The River Queen, 2 Fed. 731 1716 Center v. Farrington, 46 Minn. 336 1397 Continental B. & L. Assn. v. Hut- ton, 144 Cal. 609 1404 Converse v. Hill, 14 La. Ann. 89 859 V. Sorley, 39 Tex. 515 1101 Conveyor, The, 147 Fed. 586 1700 Conway v. Crook, 66 Md. 290 1206, 1262, 1263, 1264 v. Lowry, 7 W. N. C. (Pa.) 64 632 V. Starkweather, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 113 571 Conwell V. Kuykendall, 29 Kans. 707 576 Conyer.'? v. Funis, 2 Mason (U. S.) 236 882 V. Gray, 67 Ga. 329 151 Good V. Pollard, 10 Price 109 1011 Cook V. Atkins, 173 Ala. 363 999 1075 V. Banker, 50 N. Y. 655 ' • 96, 1081, 1183 V. Black, 54 Iowa 693 32 V. Cobb, 101 N. Car. 68 784 V. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439 103 V. Heald, 21 111. 425 1554 V. Kraft, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 409 1081 V. Murphy, 150 Pa. St. 41 1289, 1502 V. Prentice, 13 Oregon 482 498 501 V. Ross, 117 N. Car. 193 1365 V. TuUis, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 332 1180 V. Vreeland, 21 111. 431 1199 V. Williams (Pa.), 24 Atl. 746 1289 Cooke V. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105 137, 146, 154, 228 Cook, In re, 3 Biss. (U. S.) 116 1470, 1546 Cook's Admr. v. Brannin, 87 Ky. 101 431, 463 Cooley V. Holcomb. 68 Conn. 35 1445 V. Patterson, 52 Maine 472 165, 194 Coombe v. Knox, 28 Mont. 202 182 Coombs V. Bristol & Exeter R. Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 401 310 Cooper V. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722 835, 921 V. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213 620 V. Cleghorn, 50 "Wis. 113 1340 V. Jackson, 107 Ga. 255 1367 V. Kimball, 123 N. Car. 120 457 V. Merritt, 30 Ark. 686 1105 V. Singleton, 19 Tex. 260 1102a Cooper, Ex parte, 11 Ch. Div. 68 320, 834, 836, 837, 926, 940 Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Delahant, 36 Ore. 402 1406, 1453 Cooper's Trusts, In re, 4 De G., M. & G. 757 1164 Coorsen v. Ziehl, 103 Wis. 381, 562 1262, 1264 Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 6 Sawyer (U. S.) 574 1063, 1064 Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 97, 80, 795 Cope V. Vallette Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625 1677 Copeland v. Dixie Lumber Co., (Ala.), 57 So. 124 1613 V. Kehoe, 67 Ala. 594 105, 1253, 1260, 1261, 1263 V. Manton, 22 Ohio St. 398 1287, 1301 V. Stein, 8 T. R. 199 433 Copeland v. Bosquet, 4 Wash. 588 820 Copley V. Hay, 16 Daly (N. Y.) 446 1511 V. O'Neil, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 299 1239 Coplinger v. The David Gibson, 14 Ind. 480 1743 Copp V. Copp, 103 Maine 51 711 Coram v. Ingersoll, 148 Fed. 169 177G Corbett v. Chambers, 109 Cal. 178 1398 V. Gushing, 4 N. Y. S. 616 522a v. Greenlaw, 117 Mass. 167 1259, 1414 V. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 301 1149, 1159 Corbin Banking Co. v. Mitchell, 141 Ky. 172 376 Corbitt V. Reynolds, 68 Ala. 378 576a, 603 Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 1 1084, 1090, 1092, 1098 Cordova Coal Co. v. Long, 91 Ala. 538 1071 Corey v. Harte, 21 Weekly Dig. 247 228 Corlies v. Howland, 26 N. .J. Eq. 311 1063, 1074, 1082, 1083, 1090 Corliss, Mr., 34 Alb. L. J. 364 791, 795 Cornelia Planing Mills v. Wil- cox, 129 Ga. 522 1262 Cornell v. Barney, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 134 1273, 1281 V. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394 1235, 1236, 1280, 1281 Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Cornell v. Conine-Eaton Lumber Co., 9 Colo. A pp. 2:>.5 1572 V. Lamb, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652 571, 598 V. Lamb, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 407 586 V. Matthews, 27 N. J. L. 522 1216 Corning v. Ashley, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 483 691a V. Loomis, 111 Mich. 23 1099 Cornwall v. Haig-ht, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 327 800 V. Arctic, The, 75 Fed. 601 1699 Corsair, The, 145 U. S. 335 1725, 1729 Corwine v. Corwine, 23 N. J. Eq. 368 1164 V. Corwine, 24 N. J. Eq. 579 1163 Cory V. Barnes, 63 Vt. 456 816 Coryell v. Ferine. 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 23 1722, 1725 Cosgrove v. Farwell, 114 111. App. 491 1519 Cost V. Newport Builders, &c., Co., 85 Ark. 407 1289, 1298 Costello V. Portsmouth Brewing Co., 69 N. H. 405 377 Coster V. Greenpoint Ferry Co., 5 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 146 185, 198, 210 Costigan v. Stewart, 76 Kans. 353 176 Cotes V. Shorey, 8 Iowa 416 1236, 1325, 1327 Cotta V. Carr, 27 Misc. (N. Y.) 545 673 Cotten V. McGehee, 54 Miss. 510 1092 Cottman v. Martin, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 563 1074 Cotton V. Arnold, 118 Mo. App. 596 697 Cottrell V. Finlayson, 2 Code Rep. (N. Y.) 116 151 Couch V. Davidson, 109 Ala. 313 603 Coug-hlan v. Longini, 77 Minn. 514 1445 Coughlin V. N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443 164, 165, 184, 188, 193, 196, 197, 203, 206, 208 Coulter, In re, 2 Sawyer (U. S. 42 1546 Coumbe, In re, 24 Grant (Ont.) Ch. 519 276, 330 Counsman v. Modern "Woodmen, 69 Nebr. 710 208 Count de Lesseps, The, 17 Fed. 460 1722 Couper V. Gaboury, 69 Fed. 7 1641 Courtemanche v. Blackstone Val. St. R. Co., 170 Alass. 50 1207. 1244 Courtney v. Insurance Co., 49 Fed. 309 1213 V. McGavock, 23 Wis. 619 197, 208, 209 Couturie v. Roensch (Tex.), 134 S. W. 413 474 Covell V. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 611 921. . Smith (N. Y.) 722 1235, 1589 V. Stansfield, 10 C. B. 398 424 V. Williams, 82 Ga. 105 1053 V. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313 809, 836, S3S, 841, 852, 885, 960 D. L. Billings Co. v. Brand, 187 Mass. 417 1439 D. M. French, The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 43 1799, 1804 Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65 1147 V. Bever, 63 Kans. 458 1237 V. Clinton, 2 Utah 417 1405, 1532 V. Garretson, 24 Iowa 351 552, 553, 582, 616 V. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) 382 423, 986, 1033, 1056 Dobbins v. Walton, 37 Ga. 614 404 Dohson V. Thurman, 30 Ky. L. 1331 1417 Dobschuetz v. Holliday, 82 111. 371 1273, 1274 Dod V. Fourth Nat. Bank. 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 265 259, 261 Dodd V. Brott, 1 Gil. (Minn.) 205 179, 222 Dodge V. Evans, 43 Miss. 570 1063, 1064, 1083 V. Hall, 168 Mass. 435 1600 V. Manning, 1 N. Y. 298 1163 V. Romain (N. J. L.), IS Atl. 114 1262 V. Schell, 20 Blatch. (U. S.) 517 201 V. Walsham, 16 R. L 704 1223 Dodsley v. Varley, 12 Ad. & EI. 632 802 Dodson V. Wentworth, 4 M. & G. 1080 885, 921, 944 Doe V. Monson, 33 Maine 430 710, 729 Doebling v. Loos, 45 Mo. 150 1533 Dole V. Bangor Auditorium Assn., 94 Maine 532 1205, 1445 Dolinski v. First Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.). 122 S. W. 276 1113 Dollahite v. Orne, 2 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 590 1119 Dolliver v. American Swan Boat Co., 32 Misc. (N. Y.) 264 184 Dolphin, The, 6 Ben. (U. S.) 402 1700 Dolphin, The, 1 Flip. (U. S.) 580 1698 Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v. Watters, 50 Ga. 573 515 Domnau v. Green, 4 Wils. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) 322 690 Donaher v. Boston, 126 Mass. 309 1325 Donahue v. Cromartie, 21 Cal. 80 1190, 1327, 1331, 1335, 1341 Donahy v. Clapp, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 440 1289 Donald v. Hewitt. 33 Ala. 534 28, 41 Donaldson v. Holmes, 23 111. 85 1245, 1256 Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Donaldson v. McDowell, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 290 1720 V. O'Connor, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 09.5 1.558 V. Wilkerson, 170 Ala. 507 603 V. Wood, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 394 1350 Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. 301 931 933 940 Donegan v. Hentz, 70 Ala. '437 'l086 Donnell v. Manson, 109 Mass. 576 1748 V. Starlight, The, 103 Mass. 227 710.744,1729,1748,1795 Donnellan v. Hardy. 57 Ind. 393 795 Donnelly v. Adams, 115 Cal. 129 1190 V. Bdelen. 40 Md. 117 1167, 1172 Donovan v. Donovan, 85 Mich. 63 1074 V. Frazier, 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 521 1533 Doolittle V. Jenkins. 55 111. 400 1073 V. Plenz. 16 Nebr. 153 1213, 1317, 1319. 1406, 1418 Door V. Life Ins. Clearing Co., 71 Minn. 38 379 Dora, The, 34 Fed. 343 1778, 1786, 1796 Dora, The, 34 Fed. 348 1699 Dore V. Sellers, 27 Cal. 588 1287 Dorestan v. Krieg, 66 Wis. 604 1232, 1301, 1302 Dorman v. Crozier, 14 Kans. 224 1453, 1454 Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Atk. 124 1133 Dorsey v. Hall, 7 Nebr. 460 1108 V. Langworthv, 39 Greene (Iowa) 341 1381 Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251 1134 Doty V. Deposit Building and Loan Assn., 103 Ky. 710 1072 Dougherty v. Kellum, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 643 636 Doughty V. Devlin, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 625 1218, 1293, 1589 Douglas V. McCord, 12 Bradw. (111.) 278 1199, 1287 V. St. Louis Zinc Co., 56 Mo. 388 1389, 1470. 1547, 1548 V. Shumway, 13 Gray (Mass.) 49S 822 Douglass V. Blount, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 493 1120 v. Huston, 6 Ohio 156 94 V. McFarland, 92 Cal. 656 752 Dover v. Gregory, 10 Sim. 393 1166 Dow v. Ker, Speers' Ch. (S. Car ) 413 77 Dowd' V. Dowd, 126 Mich. 649 712 Dowdney v. McCullom, 59 N. T. 367 1510 Dowell V. Cardwell, 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 217 44 Dowling V. Eggemann, 47 Mich. 171 137 Downer v. Zanesville Bank, W^right (Ohio) 477 379 Downey v. Chicago T. & T. Co., 86 111. App. 664 613, 614 Downingtown Mfg. Co. v. Frank- lin Paper Mill Co., 63 N. J. L. 32 1216 Dows v. Greene, 24 N. Y. 638 946 V. Greene, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 72 465 V. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121 820 V. Perrin. 16 N. Y. 325 946, 952 Doyle V. McLeod, 4 Wash. 732 718 V. Orr, 51 Miss. 229 1084 V. State, 61 Ind. 324 1559 V. Triutt, 23 Mo. App. 448 1211 V. True, 36 Maine 542 710, 729 V. Wagner, 100 Minn. 380 1421 Drago V. Smith, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 536 184 Drake v. Green, 48 Kans. 534 1455, 1456 V. O'Donnell, 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 25 1287, 1290 V. Taylor, 6 Blatchf. (U. S.) 14 34 V. Whaley, 35 S. Car. 187 635 Drakford v. Turk, 75 Ala. 339 599, 603 Dredge No. 1, The, 137 Fed. 110 1699 Dreiband v. Candler, 166 Mich. 49 178 Dresser v. Lemma. 122 Wis. 387 702 V. Mo. & Iowa R. Construc- tion Co., 93 U. S. 92 1085 Drew V. Mason, 81 111. 498 1341 Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 129 63 V. Richards, 48 Nebr. 322 1389 v. Richards, 50 Nebr. 509 1421 Driesbach, v. Keller. 2 Pa. St. 77 1354 Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 251 445, 470 V. Moreman, 61 Ga. 395 1067 Driscoll V. Hill. 11 Allen (Mass.) 154 1308 V. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N Y. 96 375, ^81 Driver v. Ford, 90 111. 595 1199 V. Hudspeth, 16 Ala. 348 1107, 1123 v. Jenkins, 30 Ark. 120 541 V. Maxwell, 56 Ga. 11 611 Drope V. Thaire, Latch 126 513 Drumm Com. Co. v. Core, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 216 1116 Drummond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 54 Nebr. 417 744 Druse v. Horter, 57 Wis. 644 1232 Du Bay v. Uline, 6 Wis. 588 1589 Dubois v. Hull, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 26 1071, 1088, 1090, 1098, 1100 V. Wilson, 21 Mo. 213 1470 Du Brutz V. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 201 241 Dubuque, The, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 20 1706, 1800, 1802 Ducker v. Gray, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 163 1086 Duckwall V. Jones, 156 Ind. 682 1616a Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 87 Mo. 218 1163 Dudley v. Dickson, 14 N. J. Eq. 252 1063, 1080, 1086 V. Goddard. 11 Ky. 480 1069 v. Harvey, 59 Miss. 34 625 V. Jones, 77 Tex. 69 1513 V. Toledo A. A. & N. M. t\.. Co., 65 Mich. 655 1494, 1652 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1001-1S12.] Duffy V. Baker, 17 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 387 1445 V. Brady, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 432 1600 V. England. 176 Ind. 575 418 V. McManus, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 657 1588, 1600 Dufolt V. Gorman. 1 Minn. (Gil. 234) 301 279 Dufur Oil Co. v. Enos, 59 Ore. 528 30, 63 Du,r V. Manning, 148 Pa. St. 96 1238 Goodhart v. Lowe, 2 Jac. & W. 349 859, 861 Goodin v. Elleardsville Hall Assn., 5 Mo. App. 289 1343, 1384, 1387 Goodman v. Baerlocker, 88 Wis. 287 123^ V. Pence, 21 Nebr. 459 1494 V. Stewart, Wright (Ohio) 216 262 V. White, 26 Conn. 317 1579 Goodnough Mercantile & Stock Co. V. Gallowav, 156 Fed. 504 34, 716 XCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Goodnough v. Galloway, 171 Fed. 940 29 Goodrich v. Bodley, 35 La. Ann. r,25 564, 620 V. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157 153, 185, 186, 231 V. McDonald, 142 N. Y. 157 209 V. Willard, 7 Gray (Mass.) 183 641 Goodrich Lumber Co. v. Davie, 13 Mont. 76 1421 Goodrow V. Buckley, 70 Mich. 513 712 Goods, E;x parte, 2 Deac. Bkrptcy. R. 389 468 Goodwin v. Cunningham, 54 Nebr. 11 1470 V. Mitchell (Miss.). 38 So. 657 625 V. Scannell, 6 Cal. 541 825 Goodwine v. Morey, 111 Ind. 68 1127 Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213 1063, 1083, 1104 V. Correy, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 552 585 V. Deal, 23 Ore. 153 1392, 1397, 1554, 1555 V. Digg-s, 9 La. Ann. 422 993 V. Freeman, 112 Minn. 482 782b V. Hennings, 89 Nebr. 252 183 V. Johnson, 186 111. 18 1110, 1119 V. Johnson, 186 111. App. 423 1101 V. Kearney, 17 Ohio 572 257 V. Manning, 44 Miss. 756 1075 V. Rixey, 76 Va. 694 1111 V. Torrey, 15 N. J. Eq. 112 1429, 1439, 1470, 1578 Gordon Hardware Co. v. San Francisco & S. R. Co., 86 Cal. 620 1394, 1396, 1412, 1445 Gorgas v. Douglas, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 512 1310, 1315 Gorman v. Sagner, 22 Mo. 137 1501, 1519 V. Williams, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 776 699 Gortemiller v. Rosengarn, 103 Ind. 414 1243 Gorthy v. Jarvis. 15 Dak. 509 784a Gosline v. Thompson, 61 Mo. 471 1560 Gosling V. Birnie, 7 Bing, 339 828 Goss V. Greenleaf, 98 Maine 436 1375 V. Helbing, 77 Cal. 190 1341 V. Lester, 1 Wis. 43 1045 V. Strelitz, 54 Cal. 640 1307, 1455 Gossler v. Schepeler, 5 Daly (N. Y.) 476 869, 872 Gould V. Jacobson, 58 Mich. 288 1730, 1749 V. Wise, 18 Nev. 253 1238, 1255, 1276, 1372 Goulding v. Smith, 114 Mass. 487 1449 Gourdier v. Tliorp, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 697 1599 Gove V. Gather, 23 111. 634 1382 Grace v. Nesbitt. 109 Mo. 9 1418 V. Oakland Bldg. Assn., 166 111. 637 1417, 1457 V. Shively, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 217 632 Grace Greenwood, The, 2 Biss. (U. S.) 131 1794 Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 605 273, 1690 Gracie Kent. The, 169 Fed. 893 1688 Graf V. Cunningham, 109 N. Y. 369 1299, 1513 Graham v. Dyster, 6 Maule & S. 1 478 V. Gardner, 45 Wash. 648 718 V. Holt, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 61 1532, 1535, 1565 V. Magann Fawke Lumber Co., 118 Ky. 192 759a V. Meehan, 4 Bradw. (111.) 522 1199 V. Moffett, 119 Mich. 303 1069, 1071, 1088 V. Mt. Sterling Coal Road Co., 14 Bush (Ky.) 425 1378, 1618, 1619, 1648 V. Richerson, 115 Ga. 1002 1063 V. Seignious, 53 S. Car. 132 580 V. Smith, 27 U. C. C. P. 1 934 V. Winchell, 4 Ohio C. D. 139 691a Grainger v. Old Kentucky Paper Co., 105 Ky. 683 1462 Grand Island Banking Co. v. Koehler, 57 Nebr. 649 1471 Grand Opera House Co. v. Ma- guire, 14 Mont. 558 1462 Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Che- boygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 181 178 Grand Rapids Chair Co. v. Run- nels, 77 Mich. 104 712 Grand Trunk, The, 1 Paine (U. S.) 73 1706 Granite State, The, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 277, 710, 744, 1465, 1793, 1794 Granman v. Humboldt, The, 86 Fed. 351 1703 Granquist v. Western Tube Co., 240 111. 132 1235 v. Western Tube Co., 144 111. App. 230 1235 Grant v. Hazeltine, 2 N. H. 541 196 v. Hill, 4 Gray (Mass.) 361 857, 865 V. Lookout Mountain Co., 93 Tenn. 691 190 V. Mechanics' Bank, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 140 379, 39i, 393 V. Poillon, 20 How. (U. S.) 162 1697a V. Strong, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 623 1519, 1520, 1525 V. Taylor, 3 J. & S. (N. Y.) 338 242, 243, 255 V. Vandercook, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 165 1614 V. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152 104, 552, 553, 566, 577, 581, 582, 616 Grant's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 477 632, 633 Grantwood Lumber & Supply Co. V. Abbott, 80 N. J. L. 564 1216, 1280 Grapengether v. Fejervary, 9 Iowa 163 1063 Grapeshot, The, 22 Fed. 123 1696, 1756, 1773, 1780, 1781, 1782, 1797, 1802 Grapeshot, The, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 129 1679, 1688, 1699 Gratitude, The, 42 Fed. 299 1781, 1801 Graton & Knight Mfg. Co. v. Woodworth-Mason Co., 69 N. H. 177 1335, 1480 TABLE OF CASES. XCVU [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Graves v. Bemis, 8 Allen (Mass.) 593 1207 V. Coutant, 31 N. J. Eq. 763 1063, 1082, 1083, 1098, 1099 V. Eades, 5 Taunt. 429 234 V. Graves, 8 Sim. 43 1164 V. Pierce, 53 Mo. 423 1335, 1384, 1385, 1386, 1418 Gray v. Baird, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 212 1067 V. Bremer, 122 Iowa 110 601 v. Carleton, 35 Maine 481 108, 1240 V. Dick, 97 Pa. St. 142 1416 V. Dunham, 50 Iowa 170 1600 V. Elbing-, 35 Nebr. 278 1436 V. Havemeyer, 53 Fed. 174 1617 V. Holdship, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 413 1384, 1387 V. Lawson, 36 Ga. 629 209, 212 V. New Mexico Pumice Stone Co., 15 N. Mex. 478 1616a V. Pope, 35 Miss. 116 1261 V. Rawson, 11 111. 527 566, 613 V. Walker, 16 S. Car. 143 1224, 1252, 1253 V. Wilson, 4 Watts (Pa.) 39 590, 633 Gray's Harbor Boom Co. v. Ly- tic Logging- &c. Co., 36 Wash. 151 718 Great Northern R. Co. v. Swaf- field, L. R. 9 Ex. 132 281, 283, 332 Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Hunter, 15 Nebr. 32 1236, 1329, 1340, 1453 Great Western Planing Mill Co. V. Bermans, 19 Mo. App. 671 1483 Great Western R. Co. v. Crouch, 3 H. «& N. 183 332 Great Western R. Co., Ex parte, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 470 266 Great West No. Two. The, v. Oberndorf, 57 111. 168 278 Greek v. McDaniel, 68 Nebr. 569 183, 208 Greeley v. Harris, 12 Colo. 226 1556 Green v. Betts, 1 Fed. 289 1119, 1126 V. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1 1132, 1133 V. Campbell, 52 Cal. 586 270 V. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49 1574, 1575 V. Demoss, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 371 1082, 1092 V. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214 15, 16, 17, 418, 731, 732 V. Farrar Lumber Co., 119 Ga. 30 1290a V. Fox, 7 Allen (Mass.) 85 1002, 1010. 1535 V. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 517 1541 V. Jackson Water Co., 10 Cal. 374 1560 V. Jacobs, 5 S. Car. 280 543 V. Jarvis (Tenn.). 42 S. W. 165 1101, 1102a V. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 6 1066 V. Putnam, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 500 1151 V. Sanford, 34 Nebr. 363 1572, 1585 Green v. Southern Express Co., 39 Ga. 20 173, 210 V. Sprague, 120 111. 416 1465 Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Adams, 107 Iowa 672 1293 V. Independent School Dist., 125 Iowa 227 1375 V. Miller, 98 Iowa 468 1413 V. Thomas, 106 Iowa 420 1413, 1516 Green &c. Lumber Co. v. Bain, 77 111. App. 17 1564 Greene v. Cook, 29 111. 186 1108 V. Ely, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 508 1417 V. Paul, 155 Pa. St. 126 1242 V. Robinson, 110 Ala. 503 1187 Greenfield v. New York, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 320 133 Greenleaf v. Beebe. 80 111. 520 1260, 1264 Greenlee V. Rowland, 85 Ark. 101 170 Greeno v. Barnard, 18 Kans. 518 1063 Greenough v. NlchoLs, 30 Vt. 768 1228 v. Wiggington, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 435 1260, 1270 Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 296 1329, 1437 Greenwood v. Harris, 8 Mo. App. 603 1404, 1408 Greer v. Church, 13 Bush (Ky.) 430 820 Gregory v. Morris, 96 U. S. 619 29, 816 V. Stryker, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 628 731 Gregson, In re, 26 Beav. 87 131 Greider's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 422 593 Greines, In re, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 542 1511 Gresham v. Galveston County (Tex.), 36 S. W. 796 422 Gress Lumber Co. v. Rodgers, 85 Ga. 587 1585 Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa 108 923, 927, 929, 935, 937, 965 Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 1163 Grewar v. Alloway, 3 Term. Ch. 584 1346 Grey v. Vorhis, 8 Hun (N. Y.) 612 1452, 1454 Gribblo v. Ford (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 1007 190 Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. (D. C.) 319 832, 852 Gridley v. Garrison, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 647 217 V. Sumner, 43 Conn. 14 1192, 1286, 1287 Grieff v. Cowguill, 2 Disn. (Ohio) 58 418, 468 Oriel's Appeal (Pa.), 9 Atl. 861 1490 (Jrier v. Cowan, Addison (Pa.) 347 571 Griff V. Clark, 155 Mich. 611 1406. 1408 Griffin v. Byrd, 74 Miss. 32 1072 i V. Chadbourne, 32 Minn. 126 713 V. Ernst, 124 App. Div. (N. I Y.) 289 1336, 1384 I V. Seymour, 15 Colo. App. 487 1245 I Griffith V. Buck, 13 Md. 102 791 1 V. Speaks, 111 Ky. 149 660 XCVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Griffiths V. Perry, 1 El. & El. 680 823, 837, 852, SGI Griggs V. Horton, 84 Ark. 623 606, 607 V. Stone, 51 N. J. L. 549 1216, 1386 V. White, 5 Nebr. 467 183 Griggsby v. Hair, 25 Ala. 327 1092 Grimes v. Grimes, 141 Ind. 480 1069, 1102 Grimm v. Pacific Creosoting Co., 50 Wash. 415 718 Gring v. Cargo of Lumber, 38 Fed. 528 308 Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485 499, 503, 504, 509, 513, 521, 531, 641, 735 V. Suydan, 5 N. Y. Super. Ct. 132 34, 62 Griswold v. Bragg, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 202 1133, 1140, 1142, 1144, 1145 V. Carthage &c. R. Co., 8 Mo. App. 52 1494 Gritton v. McDonald, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 252 1074 Grode v. Van Valen, 25 N. J. Eq. 95 1173 Groesbeck v. Evans. 40 Tex. Civ. App. 216 638 Gross V. Hartley. 66 Miss. 116 625 V. Eiden, 53 Wis. 543 721, 726 Gross, In re. 24 L. T. (N. S. ) 198 251 Grosvenor v. Phillips, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 147 461, 465 Groth V. Stahl, 3 Colo. App. 8 1263 Grove v. Brian, 8 How. (U. S.) 429 460 V. Miles, 71 111. 376 1108, 1118 Growning v. Behn, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 383 1079 Grubb V. Crane, 5 111. 153 1098 Grubbs v. Wysors, 32 Grat. (Va.) 127 1120, 1122 Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 111. 178 1092 Grundeis v. Hartwell, 90 111. 324 1199 Gubbins v. Equitable Trust Co., 80 111. App. 17 614 Gudger v. Barnes, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 570 1123 Guelich v. Clark, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 315 1164 Guernsey v. Reeves, 58 Ga. 290 1287 Guerrant v. Dawson, 34 Miss. 149 1586 Guesnard v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 76 Ala. 453 290, 451 Guest V. Lower Merion Water Co., 142 Pa. St. 610 1375, 1378 V. Opdyke, 31 N. J. L. 552 627 Guiding Star, The, 9 Fed. 521 1698, 1699, 1722, 1758, 1794, 1795 Guiding Star, The, 18 Fed. 263 1729, 1730, 1772, 1773, 1774, 1775, 1793a Guild V. Borner, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 266 230 V. Rogers, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 502 629 Guilford v. Smith. 30 Vt. 49 307, 921, 933, 942 Guise V. Oliver, 51 Ark. 356 778 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Blount, (Tex. Civ. App.), 136 S. W. 566 1092 Gulf C. & S. P. R. Co. V. North Texas Grain Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 93 336 Gulf, W. T. & P. R. Co. V. Browne, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 437 302 Gumbel v. Beer, 36 La. Ann. 484 800 Gump V. Showalter, 43 Pa. St. 507 646, 676 Gunn V. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610 109, 1145 V. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. 491 32-2, 826, 852, 853 Gunter v. Beard. 93 Ala. 227 1127a V. Du Bose, 77 Ala. 326 603 Gurney v. Behrend. 3 El. & Bl. 622 895, 946, 952 V. Crockett, Abb. Adm. (U. S.) 490 1715 V. Sharp, 4 Taunt. 242 428 V. Walsham, 16 R. I. 698 1223 Gustine v. Phillips. 38 Mich. 674 885 Gutshall v. Kornaley, 38 Colo. 195 1454 Guy V. Carriere, 5 Cal. 511 1247, 1458 V. Du Uprey. 16 Cal. 195 1239 Guy, The, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 758 1681, 1808 Gwathmey v. Etheridge, 99 N. Car 571 457 Gwin'v. Selby, 5 Ohio St. 96 788 Gwyn v. Richmond & Danville R. Co., 85 N. Car. 429 873 Gwynne, Ex parte, 12 Ves. 379 835, 836, 861 H Haag V. Hillemeier, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 390 1218 H. A. Baxter, The, 172 Fed. 260 1811 Habegger v. Kipp, 96 Minn. 456 179 Hackett v. Badeau, 63 N. Y. 476 1252a Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 111. 677 555, 577, 614 V. Powell, 17 Ala. 314 603 Haddow V. Lundj', 59 N. Y. 320 1180 Haden v. Buddensick, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 3 1218 Hadley v. Nash, 69 N. Car. 162 1109, 1119 V. Pickett, 25 Ind. 450 1080 Hadlock v. Shumway, 11 Wash. 690 718. Haebler v. Luttgen, 61 Minn. 315 418 Haeussler v. Thomas, 4 Mo. App. 463 1462a, 1469. 1478 Hagan v. American &c. Mission- ary Soc, 14 Daly (N. Y.) 131 1293 Hagar v. Union Nat. Bank, 63 Maine 509 375, 384, 391 Haggard v. Scott, 142 Iowa 682 811 Haegertv v. Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 437 41, 820 Hague V. Dandeson, 2 Ex. 741 391 Hahn v. Bonacum, 76 Nebr. 837 1213 V. Bonacum, 76 Nebr. 890 1468 V. Sleepy Eye Milling Co., 21 S. Dak. 324 785 Hahn's App., 39 Pa. St. 409 1469 Haifley v. Haynes, 37 Mich. 5.35 576a, 712, 1048 Haight V. Holcomb, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 213 184, 214 TABLE OF CASES. XCIX [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & P. 563 465, 869, 880 Haines v. Chandler, 26 111. App. 400 1199 Halbert v. Gibbs, 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 126 184 Haldeman v. McDonald (Tex.) 58 S. W. 1040 1382 Hale V. Baker. 60 Tex. 217 1107, 1114 V. Barrett, 26 111. 195 973 V. Brown, 59 N. H. 551 724, 725 V. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 2 McCrary (U. S.) 558 1521, 1544 V. Burton, Dudley (Ga.) 105 571 V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626 95, 541 V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 64 N. Y. 550 810 Halff V. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278 902, 917, 921, 929, 935 Half Moon, The, 46 Fed. 812 I8u7a Hall V. Acken, 47 N. J. L. 340 1239 V. Amos, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 89 562 V. Ayer, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 220 184, 212 V. Banks, 79 Wis. 229 1301, 1304 V. Bullock, 29 Ky. L. 1254 1243 V. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304 108 V. Citv of Buffalo, 1 Keyes (N. Y.) 193 56 V. Click, 5 Ala. 363 1119 V. Cowen, 51 Wash. 295 1335 V. Erkfitz, 125 Mich. 332 1262 V. Hall, 50 Conn. 104 1063 V. Hall, 11 Tex. 526 1041 V. Hinckley, 32 Wis. 362 1469 V. Hudson, 2 Spr. (U. S.) 65 1697a V. Jackson, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 194 426 V. Johnson, 57 Mo. 521 1211, 1607 V. Lockerman, 127 Ga. 537 173. 203 V. McGaughey, 114 Ga. 405 553, 611 V. Mobile & Montgomery R. Co., 58 Ala. 10 1110, 1111, 1119 V. Mullanphy Planing Mill Co., 16 Mo. App. 454 1464, 1478, 1479 V. Ody, 2 B. & P. 28 215 V. Parker, 94 Pa. St. 109 1282 V. Pettigrove, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 609 1519 V. Pike, 100 Mass. 495 505 V. St. Louis Mfg. Co., 22 Mo. App. 33 1335, 1385, 1464 V. Scovel, 10 N. Bank. R. 295 1066 V. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 61S 1313, 1317 V. Spaulding, 40 N. .1. L. 166 1216, 1456 V. Stevens, 116 N. Y. 201 1808 V. Thomas, 111 N. Y. S. 979 1413, 1421, 1492 V. Tittabawassee Boom Co., 51 Mich. 377 712, 738, 743a, 1021, 1025 TIallagan v. Herbert, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 253 1455 Hallahan v. Herbert, 57 N. Y. 409 1493, 1495 V. Herbert, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 209 1251, 1257, 1558 V. Herbert, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 326 109 Hallam v. Coulter, 24 Ky. L. 2200 177 Hallett V. Bousfleld, 18 Ves. 187 288, 461 V. Hallett, 2 Paige ("N. 15 10 11 Y.) 89, 1163 Lea 1346 Wall. 946 Halley v. Alloway, (Tenn.) 523 Halliday v. Hamilton, (CJ. S.) 560 Halliwell Cement Co. v. Elser, 156 Mo. App. 291 1235, 1263 Hallock V. Smith, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 267 1090, 1096 Hallowell v. Fawcett, 30 Iowa 491 476 Halloway v. Vincent, 143 Mo. App. 434 1069 Halpin V. Hall, 42 Wis. 176 727 Halsey, In re, 13 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 353 202 Halstead v. Stahl, 47 Ind. .\pp. 600 1200 Halsted &c. Co. v. Arick, 76 Conn. 382 1313 Hamblen v. Folts, 70 Tex. 132 1092 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 93 801, 802, 834, 841, 847, 852, 962 Hamilton v. Buck, 36 Maine 536 710, 720 V. Dunn, 22 111. 259 1199 V. Gilbert, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 680 1098 V. McLaughlin, 145 Mass. 20 701 V. Naylor, 72 Ind. 171 1200 V. Reedy, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 38 552, 567 V. Schwehr, 34 Md. 107 1461 V. Williford, 90 Ga. 210 1240 V. Windolf, 36 Md. 301 622 V. Wright, 27 Ky. L. 1144 1099 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Lewis, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 509 1119 Hamlett v. Tallman, 30 Ark. 505 542, 589 Hammett v. Linneman, 48 N. Y 399 815 Hammersmith v. Hilton, 8 Mo. App. 564 1568 Hammond v. Anderson, 1 B. & P. (N. R.) 69 832, 836, 962 V. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294 8, 744 V. Harper, 39 Ark. 248 606 V. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529 _ 1063, 1092 V. Pullman, 129 Mich. 567 712 V. Shephard, 50 Hun (N. Y.) ^^,318 1558, 1563a V. Will, 60 111. 404 614 Hammond &c. Co. v. Hartzell, 125 Mich. 177 14''4 Hammonds v. Barclay, 2 East 227 3, 10, 431, 445, 450 Hampton v. Christensen, 148 Cal. 729 1100 Hanch v. Ripley, 127 Ind. 151 691 Hancock's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 1 1222 TAELE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Hancox v. Dunning, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 494 1734, 1756 Handel v. Elliott, 60 Tex. 145 109, 1226, 1558 Hanes v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178 1558 Haney v. Adaza Co-Operative Creamery Co., 108 Iowa 313 1494 Hanger v. Fowler, 20 Ark. 667 229, 230 Hankee v. Arundel Realty Co., 98 Minn. 219 1599 Hankinson v. Hankinson, 61 S. Car. 193 458 V. Vantine, 152 N. T. 20 1278 Hanna v. Colorado Sav. Bank, 3 Colo. App. 2S 1393a, 1417 V. Davis, 112 Mo. 599 1080 V. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163 174, 193, 197, 201a, 203, 206, 207 V. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21 6, 419, 422, 731, 1019 V. Wilson, 3 Grat. (Va.) 243 1099 Hannah &c. Mercantile Co. v. Mosser, 105 Mich. 18 1424 Hannan v. Osborn, 4 Paige (N. y.) 336 1155 Hannon v. Gibson, 14 Mo. App. 33 1235, 1321 V. Gibson, 14 Mo. App. 331 1605 Hansel v. Noble, 95 Pa. St. 345 731 Hansen v. Kinney, 46 Nebr. 207 1433 V. Prince, 45 Mich. 519 544 Hanson v. Cordano, 96 Cal. 441 1309 V. Meyer, 6 East 614 836, 837 V. News Pub. Co., 97 Maine 99 1253, 1338 Hapgood V. Cornwell, 48 111. 64 791 Happy V. Mosher. 48 N. Y. 313 1756, 1809 Haralson v. Boyle, 22 La. Ann. 210 620 V. Langford, 66 Tex. Ill 1102a V. Speer, 1 Ga. App. 573 708 Harbeck v. Southwell, 18 Wis. 418 1232 Hardeman v. De Baughn, 49 Ga. 596 461 Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756 1108, 1123 V. Marble, 13 Bush (Ky.) 58 1203, 1565 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 493 505 Harding v. Conlon, 146 App. Div. (N. Y.) 842 184 Hards v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 8 Biss. (U. S.) 234 1465 Hardwick v. Griffith, 11 Idaho 751 455 Hardy v. Mathews, 101 Mo. App. 708 626 Hare v. Stegall, 60 111. 380 614 V. Van Deiisen, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 92 1071, 1086 Hargett v. McCadden, 107 Ga. 773 227 Harker v. Conrad, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 301 1329, 1421 Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 820 Harlan v. Bennett, 32 Ky. L. 473 114, 177 V. Rand, 27 Pa. St. 511 722, 1245, 1289, 1311, 1342 Harlan v. Stufflebeem, 87 Cal. 508 . 1190, 1446, 1599 Harman v. Allen, 11 Ga. 45 1272, 1276 V. Anderson, 2 Camp. 242 828, 921 Harman's App., 124 Pa. St. 624 1444 Harmon v. Ashmead, 68 Cal. 321 1190, 1401, 1438 V. Ashmead, 60 Cal. 439 1565. 1588 V. Juge, 6 La. Ann. 768 620 V. San Francisco & S. R. Co., 86 Cal. 617 1190, 1394, 1412, 1413, 1569 V. San Francisco &c. R. Co. (Cal.), 23 Pac. 1024 1315 Harms v. Solen?, 79 111. 460 614 Harnish v. Herr, 98 Pa. St. 6 1416 Harper V. Wilkings, 63 Miss. 215 1069 Harriet Ann, The, 6 Biss. (U. S.) 13 1805 Harriet, The, Olcott (U. S.) 229 1715 Harrington v. DoUman, 64 Ind. 255 1200, 1408, 1413 V. Miller, 4 Wash. 808 1398, 1559, 1569, 1572, 1578 V. Union Oil Co., 144 Fed. 235 1015 Harris v. Berrv (Tex. Civ. App.), 123 S. W. 1148 1102a V. Boggs, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 489 564 V. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93 55 V. Dammann, 3 Mackey (D. C.) 90 573, 574, 590, 609 V. Dennie, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 292 290, 451 V. Fly, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 421 89, 1163, 1164 V. Graham, 86 Ark. 570 1262 V. Hanie, 37 Ark. 348 1071 V. Hanks, 25 Ark. 510 1066, 1090 V. Harlan. 14 Ind. 439 1079 V. Harris, 9 Colo. App. 211 1392 V. Harris, 18 Colo. App. 34 1574 V. Hart, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 606 904, 921 V. Jones, S3 N. Car. 317 543 V. King, 16 Ark. 122 1108 V. Nicolopulo, 38 La. Ann. 12 800 V. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249 861, 921, 922, 932, 948 V. Schultz, 64 Iowa 539 1341 V. Shields, 111 Va. 643 1110 V. Tuttle, 114 Ky. 882 787 V. Watkins, Kay 438 1163 V. Woodruff, 124 Mass. 205 644 V. Youngstown Bridge Co., 93 Fed. 355 1501 Harrisburg, The, 119 U. S. 199 1771a Harrison v. Castner, 11 Ohio St. 399 1142 V. Guill, 46 Ga. 427 612 V. Jenks, 23 La. Ann. 707 620 V. Mora, 150 Pa. St. 481 465 V. Schoff, 101 Iowa 463 1064 V. Union Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 522 85 V. Woinen's Homeopathic Assn. 134 Pa. St. 558 1335, 1384, 1444 Harrison &c. Iron Co. v. Council Bluffs Water Works Co., 25 Fed. 170 1378, 1530, 1576 TABLE OF CASES. CI [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Haishbarg-er v. Foreman, 81 111. 364 1083 Harshman v. Armstrong, 119 Ind. 224 174 Harson v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140 487, 488, 490 Hart V. Barney & Smith Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. 543 820 V. Boston R. B. & L. R. Co., 121 Mass. 510 1651 V. Carpenter, 24 Conn. 427 820 V. Globe Iron Works, 37 Ohio St. 75 172, 1384, 1548 V. Mullen, 4 Colo. 512 1191. 1614 V. Proceeds of The Oakland, 32 Fed. 234 1786 Hartford Bldg-. &c. Assn. v. Goldreyer, 71 Conn. 95 1192, 1455 Hartley v. Hitchcock, 1 Stark. 408 310, 745, 972, 1000 V. Richardson, 91 Maine 424 1444. 1448 Hartman v. Keown, 101 Pa. St. 338 700 Hart's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 355 1665 Hartshorne v. Johnson, 7 N. J. L. 108 265 V. Seeds, 1 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 460 646, 676 Harvey v. Brewer. 178 N. T. 5 121S V. Hampton, 108 111. App. 501 580, 614 V. Kelly, 41 Miss. 490 1111 V. Morris, 63 Mo. 475 1126 V. Wallace, 99 111. App. 212 1199 Harvey In re, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 287 151 Harvill v. Lowe. 47 Ga. 214 1109 Harwood v. La Grange, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 619 44 Haseltine v. Aushernian, 87 Mo. 410 626 Haskell v. Gallagher, 20 Ind. App. 224 1388 V. Rice, 11 Gray (Mass.) 240 802, 837, 841 V. Scott, 56 Ind. 564 1080, 1093 Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514 800, 809 Haslett v. Gillespie, 95 Pa. St. 371 1222 Hassett v. Curtis, 20 Nebr. 162 1213 v. Rust, 64 Mo. 325 1211, 1575, 1613 Hastings v. Belknap, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 190 569, 577 V. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9 84 V. Wood.s, 2 Mo. App. 148 1375 Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J. Eq. 697 1174 Hatch V. Faucher. 15 R. I. 459 1223 Hatcher v. Briggs, 6 Ore. 31 1135 V. Hatcher, 1 Rand. (Va.) 53 1107, 1116 Hatchett v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App.), 53 S. W. 357 638 Platfleld v. Haubert, 51 W. Va. 190 820 Hathaway v. Davis, 32 Kans. 693 1272, 1273, 1274 V. Fall River Nat. Bank, 131 Mass. 14 251 Hathorne v. Panama Park Co., 44 Fla. 194 1559, 1594 Hattie Low, The, 14 Fed. 880 1706 Hattie M. Bain, The, 20 Fed. 389 1709, 1713 Hatton V. Bodan Lumber Co., 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478 990, 1060 Haugh v. Blythe, 20 Ind. 24 1088 Haughery v. Thiberge, 24 La. Ann. 442 1204 Hauptman v. Catlin, 20 N. Y. 247 1218, 1260 Hause V. Judson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 7 965 Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. S. 401 29 V. Vilmar, 2 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 222 48 Havana, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 402 1681, 1706, 1729,1791 Havens v. West Side Elec. Light Co., 17 N. Y. S. 580 1276 Haverly v. Becker, 4 N. Y. 169 82 Havighorst v. Lindberg, 67 111. 463 1199, 1290, 1507 Hawes v. Chaillee, 129 Ind. 435 1076, 1086 V. Mitchell, 15 Gray (Mass.) 234 1748 V. Watson, 2 B. & C. 540 828, 845 Hawk V. Leverett, 71 Ga. 675 1078 Hawk Eye Woollen Mills v. Conk- lin, 26 Iowa 422 789 Hawkins v. Chambliss, 120 Ga. 614 781 V. Giles, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 318 543, 548 V. Loyless, 39 Ga. 5 173, 196, 209, 210 V. Thurman, 1 Idaho 598 • 1116 Plaworth v. Wallace, 14 Pa. St. 118 1274 Haxtun Steam-Heater Co. v. Gor- don, 2 N. Dak. 246 1470 Ilayden v. Logan, 9 Mo. App. 492 1319 V. McDermott. 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 14 217 V. Wulfing, 19 Mo. App. 353 1404, 1407 Hayes v. Campbell, 63 Cal. 143 278, 305 V. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228 1248, 1252a, 1259 V. Hammond, 162 111. 133 1413, 1418 Hayes' Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 380 1551 Hayford v. Cunningham,. 72 Maine 128 1723, 1729, 1746 Haygood v. Dannenberg Co., 102 Ga. 24 173 Haynes v. County of Coles, 234 111. 137 1301 V. Holland (Tenn.), 48 S. W. 400 1352 V. McGeehee, 17 Fla. 159 610 Ha7/s V. Goodman, 16 Montg. County Law Repr. 43 1370 V. Mercier. 22 Nebr. 656 1397, 1591 V. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48 267, 878, 885, 887, 921, 922, 965 Hazard v. Howland, 2 Spr. (U. S.) 68 lC97a V. Manning, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 613 731, 1027 Cll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Hazard Powder Co. v. Loomis, 2 Disney (Ohio) 544 1:^20, '1435, 1436, 1480 Hazelrigg v. Boarman, 8 Ky. L. (abstract) 607 1088 Hazeltine v. Moore, 21 Hun (N. Y.) 355 1071, 1086 Hazenwinkle Grain Co. v. Mc- Comb. 116 HI. App. 541 33, 34 Hazlehurst v. Sea Isle City Ho- tel Co. (N. J.) 25 Atl. 201 1458 H. C. Behrens Lumber Co. v. Lager, 26 S. Dak. 160 1262 H. C. Grady, The, 87 Fed. 232 1703 H. C. Houston Lumber Co. v. Wetzel & T. R. Co., 69 W. Va. 682 1624 Healey Ice Mach. Co. v. Green, 181 Fed. 890 1262 Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228 1599 Healy Ice Mach. Co. v. Parks, 155 111. App. 232 .1476 Heard v. Holmes, 113 Ga. 159 1197, 1293 Hearne v. Chillicothe & Bruns- wick R. Co., 53 Mo. 324 1283 Heart v. State Bank, 17 N. Car. Ill 375 Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 162 191, 204, 209 Heath v. Solles, 73 Wis. 217 1262, 1264 V. Tyler, 44 Md. 312 1206, 1448 'Heaton v. Horr, 42 Iowa 187 1334 Heavenrich v. Alpena Circuit Judg-e, 111 Mich. 163 178 Hecht V. Spears, 27 Ark. 229 1092 Heekmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. T. 211 1218, 1236, 1287, 1299, 1599 Hedden Const. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 62 Misc. (N. Y.) 129 1283 Hedden Const. Co., In re, 72 Misc. (N. Y.) 153 1218 Hedlund v. Payne, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 603 1253 Hefflin v. Bell, 30 Vt. 134 820 Heffner v. Gwynne-Treadwell Cotton Co., 160 Fed. 635 428 Heg-ler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 820 Heideg-ger v. Atlantic Milling Co., 16 Mo. App. 327 1384, 1464 Heidelbach v. Jacobi, 28 N. J. Eq. 544 1460 Heidenbluth v. Rudolph, 152 111. 316 1506 Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 6 Fed. 138 1550 Heier v. Meisch, 33 Mo. App. 35 1394 Heim v. Elliott, 66 "Wash. 361 1230 V. Vogel, 69 Mo. 529 1579 Heinekey v. Earlee, 8 El. & Bl. 410 867, 924 Heinrich v. Carondelet Gymnas- tic Soc, 8 Mo. App. 588 1417 Heins v. Peine, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 420 446 Heist V. Baker, 49 Pa. St. 9 1110 Heister v. Mount, 17 N. J. L. 438 158, 204 Hektograph Co. v. Fourl, 11 Fed. 844 199 Helen Brown, The, 28 Fed. Ill 1734; 1748 Heller v. Elliott. 45 N. J. L. 564 849 Helm V. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291 1190, 1309c V. Meyer, 30 La. Ann. 943 437 V. Swiggett, 12 Ind. 194 386 Helser v. Pott. 3 Pa. St. 179 571, 592 Heltzell V. Chicago & A. R. Co., 77 Mo. 315 1655 V. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R. Co. 77 Mo. 482 1655 Heman v. Britton, 88 Mo. 549 84, 85 Hempstead Real Estate, etc., Assn. V. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620 557, 638 Henchett v. Kimpson, 2 Wils. 140 628 Henchey v. Chicago, 41 111. 136 167, 193 Henderson v. Burton. 3 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 259 1063 V. Connolly, 123 111. 98 1252a. 1487, 1592 V. Hughes, 4 Ga. App. 52 611 V. Kanawha Dock Co., 185 Fed. 781 1680 V. State, 109 Ala. 40 603 V. Sturgis, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 336 1218, 1301, 1438, 1440, 1559 Hendrick v. Foote, 57 Miss. 117 1115, 1119 V. Posey, 104 Ky. 8 177 Hendrick Hudson, The, 3 Ben. (U. S.) 419 1677 Hendrie, etc., Co., The, v. The Holy Cross, etc., Co., 17 Colo. App. 345 1249 Henley v. Wadsworth, 38 Cal. 356 1289, 1513 Henly v. Walsh, 2 Salk. 686 735 Henry v. Bunker, 22 Mo. App. 650 1211 V. Davi§, 60 Miss. 212 625 V. Hand, 36 Ore. 492 1221 V. Hinds, IS Mo. App. 497 1304, 1432, 1589 V. Mahone, 23 Mo. App. S3 1393 V. Plitt, 84 Mo. 237 1350, 1404 V. Rice, 18 Mo. App. 497 1235 V. Traynor, 42 Minn. 234 179, 227 Henry & C. Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47 1304, 1304a, 1556 V. Halter. 58 Nebr. 685 1367, 1432 Henry County v. Allen, 50 Mo. 231 49 Henry Dennis, The. 47 Fed. 918 1697 Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 729 1206, 1434 V. Noble, 95 Pa. St. 345 740 Henson v. Reed, 71 Tex. 726 1093 V. Westcott, 82 111. 224 1091 Hentig v. Sperry, 38 Kans. 459 1391 Henvell v. Whitaker, 3 Russ. 343 1166 Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. St. 72 28, 1063, 1179 Herbert v. Herbert, 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 333 1243, 1286, 1287 V. Schofleld, 9 N. J. Eq. 492 1063 Hercules, The, 1 Brown Adm. 560 1802 Herman v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 121 Fed. 184 184 TAlILli OF CASES. cm [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Herman v. Perkins, 52 Miss. 813 783 Hermann v. New York, 130 App. Div. (N. Y.) 539 1283 Hern v. Hopkins, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 269 1429. 1439, 1470, 1472, 1491 Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393 540 Herrell v. Donovan, 7 App. D. C. 322 1289 Herrick v. Carman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 224 260 Herrin v. Warren, 61 Miss. 509 1210, 1287, 1302, 1654 Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 326 820 Herring-Hall-Marvin Co. v. Kroeger, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 672 1375 Herron v. Gill, 112 111. 247 552, 577, 580, 614 V. Graham, 3 Wkly. N. Cas. (Pa.) 176 1532 Hersey In re, 171 Fed. 1001 616 Hersh v. Carman, 51 Nebr. 784 1533 Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86 170, 229, 230 V. Shenk, 58 Pa. St. 382 1354 Hertzfeld v. Bailey, 103 Ala. 473 1076 Hervey v. Gay. 42 N. J. L. 168 1272 V. Illinois Midland R. Co., 28 Fed. 169 86 V. R. I. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 820 Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235 820 Heslop V. Gatton, 71 111. 528 1164 v. Metcalfe, 3 Mylne & C. 183 122a 132 Hess V. Poultney, 10 Md. 257 'l206 Hester v. Allen, 52 Miss. 162 783 Heston v. Martin, 11 Cal. 41 1406, 1409 Hett V. Collins, 103 111. 74 1099 Hewes v. Dehon, 3 Gray (Mass.) 205 1165 H. E. Willard, The, 52 Fed. 387 1697, 1697a, 1725 Hewison v. Guthrie, 2 Bing. (N. C.) 755 322, 850, 1000 V. Guthrie, 3 Scott 298 1011 Hevs^itt V. Truitt, 23 Mo. App. 443 1211 Hewlet V. Flint, 7 Cal. 264 852 Heyde v. Suit, 22 Ind. App. 83 1423 Heyward v. Maynard, 119 App. Div. (N. Y.) 66 184 Heyvv^ood v. Waring, 4 Camp. 291 21 Hezekiah Baldw^in, The, 8 Ben. (U. S.) 556 1677 H. F. Cady Lumber Co. v. Reed, 90 Nebr. 293 1286 Hibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim & Stu. 552 1160 Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis & N. O. Transp. Co.. 13 Fed. 516 85 Hickey v. Collom. 47 Minn. 565 1328 V. O'Brien, 11 Daly (N. Y.) 292 1614 Hickman v. Thomas, 16 Ala. 666 503, 641 Hickox V. Fay, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 1024 v. Greenwood, 94 III. 2 66 1199, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1257, 1487 Hicks V. Morris, 57 Tex. 65S 1066, 1093, 1098 V. Murray, 43 Cal. 515 1390 Hicks V. Roanoke Brick Co., 94 Va. 741 1375 Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lum- ber Co., 150 N. Car. 281 1063 Hiester v. Green, 48 Pa. St. 96 1063, 1114 Higgins V. Bretherton. 5 C. & P. 2 269 V. Carlotta &c Co., 148 Cal. 700 1279 V. Ferguson, 14 111. 269 1256 V. Higgins, 121 Cal. 487 33 V. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413 231, 452 Higgs V. Smith, 100 Ark. 543 1100 High V. Batte, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 186 1100 Highlander, The, 4 Blatch. (U. S.) 55 1006, 1535, 1536 Highlander, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 510 1704 Hight V. Fleming, 74 Ga. 592 781 Hightower v. Bailey, 108 Ky. 198 1304 v. Rigsby, 56 Ala. 126 1092 Higley v. Rinkle, 57 Kans. 222 1184a Hilderbrandt v. Savage, 4 Wash. 524 1614 Hilger v. Edwards, 5 Nev. 84 743a, 1029 Hill V. Aldrich, 48 Minn. 73 1458 V. Alliance Bldg. Co., 6 S. Dak. 160' 1496 V. Bishop, 25 111. 349 1325 V. Bourcier, 29 La. Ann. 841 992 V. Bowers, 45 Kans. 592 1350 V. Braden, 54 Ind. 72 1200, 1310, 1327 V. Brinkley, 10 Ind. 102 155, 167. 174 V. Burgess, 37 S. Car. 604 733 V. Coats, 109 111. 266 614 V. Cole, 84 Ga. 245 1110 V. Downs, 9 Ky. L. 767 1116 V. George, 1 Head (Tenn.) 394 636 V. Gill, 40 Minn. 441 1235, 1252a, 1259, 1392 V. Golden Gate, The, 1 Newb. (U. S.) 308 1682, 1683, 1691 V. Grigsby, 32 Cal. 55 1107 V. Kauffman, 98 Md. 247 1206 V. La Crosse & M. R. Co., 11 Wis. 214 1232, 1378, 1425, 1600, 1618 V. McLean, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 107 1080, 1087 V. Mathewson, 56 Conn. 323 1286 V. Miles, 83 Ark. 486 248 V. Newman, 38 Pa. St. 151 1356 V. Pine River Bank, 45 N. H. 300 404 V. Reeves, 57 Ga. 31 611 v. Ryan, 54 Ind. 118 1310 V. Sloan, 59 Ind. 181 1534 Hillburn v. O'Barr, 19 Ga. 591 1257 Hillhouse v. Pratt, 74 Conn. 113 1247, 1248 Hilliker v. Francisco, 65 Mo. 598 1306, 1404, 1418 Hills v. Elliott, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 56 1327, 1330 V. Halliwell, 50 Conn. 270 1551 v. Ohlig, 63 Cal. 104 1190, 1405 CIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §sS l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Hillsburg v. Harrison, 2 Colo. App. 298 731, 743a, 753, 779b, 797, 1025 Hills' Elstate, In re, 2 Clark (Pa.) 96 1434 Hill's Trusts, In re, 16 Ch. Div. 173 1164 Hilman v. Brigham, 117 Iowa 70 616 Hilton V. Merrill, 106 Mass. 528 1252a 1254 V. Vanderbilt, 82 N. T. 591 ' 478 Hilton Bridg-e Const. Co. v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 145 N. Y. 390 1574 Himely v. Wyatt, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 102 562, 564 Himes v. Langley, 85 Ind. 77 1071, 1088 Hinchley v. Greany, 118 Mass. 595 1504 Hinchman v. Graham, 2 Serg-. & R. (Pa.) 170 1329 V. Lybrand, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 32 1500, 1519, 1520, 1524 Hinckley v. Field's Biscuit &c. Cracker Co., 91 Cal. 136 1190, 1283 Hinckley &c. Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240 > 1228 Hindert v. American T. & S. Bank, 198 111. 538 1199 V. American T. & S. Bank 100 111. App. 85 1199 Hines v. Chicago Bldg. Mfg. Co., 115 Ala. 637 1535 V. Perkins, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 395 1107. 1116 Hine, The, v. Trevor, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 555 1725, 1729, 1743a, 1750 Kingston v. Wendt, 1 Q. B. Div. 367 287, 288 Hinman v. Rogers, 4 Ohio Dec. 303 159 Hinson v. Gamble, 65 Ala. 605 229 Hinton v. Goode, 73 Ga. 233 781 Hippie V. Canal-Boat Fashion, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 40 1760 Hipsley v. Price, 104 Iowa 282 616 Hiram R. Dixon, The, 33 Fed. 297 1722 Hirschorn v. Caney, 98 Mass. 149 820 Hiscock V. Norton, 42 Mich. 320 1061, 1071 ■Hiscox V. Greenwood, 4 Esp. 174 733 V. Harbeck, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 506 1728 Hitchcock V. Hassett, 71 Cal. 331 542 V. Kiely, 41 Conn. 611 1260, 1268 Hitchings v. Olsen, 184 Fed. 305 1729 1755 Hitt v. Pickett, 9 Ky. 644 1107*, 1116 Hoag V. Hay, 103 Iowa 291 1247 Hoagland v. Dusk, 33 Nebr. 376 1520, 1532 V. Van Btten, 22 Nebr. 681 1599 Hoatz V. Patterson, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 537 725 Hobbs V. Davis, 50 Ga. 213 551 V. Head & Dowst Co., 184 Fed. 409 1215 V. Head & Dowst Co., 185 Fed. 1006 1215 Hobbs V. Spencer, 49 Kans. 769 1202 Hobbson v. Townsend, 126 Iowa 453 1327 Hobley v. Day, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 644 1257 Hobson V. Edwards, 57 Miss. 128 1119 V. Watson, 34 Maine 20 155, 158, 193, 214 Hockaday v. Lawther, 17 Mo. App. 636 1099 Hodgdon v. Waldron, 9 N. H. 66 275, 276, 743a, 1029 Hodges V. Kimball, 49 Iowa 577 465 V. Planters' Bank, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 306 376, 404 V. Roberts, 75 Tex. 517 1116 Hodgkins v. Bowser, 195 Mass. 141 663 Plodgson V. Loy, 7 T. R. 436 801, 881 Hodnett v. Bormer, 107 Ga. 452 230 V. Stewart, 131 Ga. 67 173 Hodo V. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. 393 515 Hodson V. Warner, 60 Ind. 214 820 V. Wright, 1 Ala. App. 433 777 Haeussler v. Mo. Glass Co., 52 Mo. 452 1387 Hoey V. Hews, 3 La. Ann. 704 620 Hofer's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 360 1435 Hoffa V. Person, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 721 Hoffman v. Barthelmess, 63 Ga. 759 495 v. Brungs, 83 Ky. 400 463 V. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 125 Mich. 201 306, 312 V. Laurans, 18 La. 70 1272 v. McColgan, 81 Md. 390 1275 V. McFadden, 56 Ark. 217 1260, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265 V. Miller, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 334 257 V. Walton, 36 Mo. 613 109, 1261, 1390, 1408, 1414 Hoff's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 218 1465 Hofgesang v. Meyer, 2 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) Ill 1218, 1286, 1287 Hogan V. Black. 66 Cal. 41 160 V. Gushing, 49 Wis. 169 720 V. Missionary Soc, 14 Daly (N. Y.) 131 1297 Hoges V. Holeman, 1 Dana (Ky.) 50 787 Hogue V. Sheriff, 1 Wash. T. 172 997 V. Sheriff, 1 Wash. T. 195 786b Holbrook v. Ives, 44 Ohio St. 516 1515 V. Vose, 6 Brosw. (N. Y.) 76 931, 932, 946, 947, 958, 960 V. Wight. 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 169 418, 461, 465 Holcroft V. Halbert, IP Ind. 256 1743 Holden V. Cox, 60 Iowa 449 576a, 581, 616 V. Winslow, 18 Pa. St. 160 1437 Holderman v. Manier, 104 Ind. 118 728, 732, 745, 1054 Holderness v. Collison, 1 Man. & R. 55 967, 979 V. Collison, 7 B. & C. 212 265 967 979 V. Shackels, 3 M. & R.' 25 'lOOO TABLE OF CASES. cv [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Holl V. Griffen, 10 Bing-. 246 828 HoUaday v. Rutledge, 145 Ala. 656 603 Holland v. Jones, 9 Ind. 495 1578 V. McCarty, 24 Mo. App. 82 1211, 1372, 1421, 1423 V. Wilson, 76 Cal. 434 1190 Holler' V. Apa, 18 N. Y. S. 588 1604a, 1616 Holliday v. Bartholomae, 11 111. App. 206 570 V. Mathewson, 146 Mich. 336 1208, 1373, 1382 Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 228 26, 733 V. Hill, 69 Miss. 73 625 V. Napier, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 182 958 Hollins V. Hubbard, 165 N. Y. 534 432 465 Hollins, In re, 197 N. Y. 361 ' 184 Hollis V. Claridge, 4 Taunt. 807 115, 125, 146 V. Hollis, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 524 1088 Hollister v. Mott, 132 N. Y. 18 1512, 1513 Holly V. Huggeford, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 73 307, 429, 982, 983, 986, 989 Holman v. Patterson, 29 Ark. 357 1075, 1108 Holmes v. Bailey, 92 Pa. St. 57 465 V. Balcom, 84 Maine 226 482 V. Bank, 87 Pa. St. 525 465 V. Bell, 139 App. Div. (N. Y.) 455 184 V. Hall, 8 Mich. 66 544 V. Oregon &c. R. Co., 5 Fed. 75 1806a V. Pye. 107 Ga. 784 611 V. Richet, 56 Cal. 307 1327, 1590 V. Waymire, 73 Kans. 104 229 Holroyd v. Breare. 4 B. & Aid. 43 215 V. Gwynne, 2 Taunt. 176 820 Hoist V. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240 875, 926, 930, 931, 936 Holt V. Bank of Aug-usta, 13 Ga. 341 64, 74 V. Quimby, 6 N. H. 79 221 Holt Mfg. Co. V. Collins, 154 Cal. 265 779a Holzhour V. Meeer, 59 Mo. 434 1352. 1353 Homans v. Combe, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 365 1457 Home Brew. Co. v. Johnson, 41 Ind. App. 44 1445 Home Lumber & Supply Co. v. McCurley, 84 Kans. 751 1404, 1412 Home Sav. &c. Assn. v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688 1481 Hommel v. Lewis, 104 Pa. St. 465 1330. 1332 Honaker v. Jones, 102 Tex. 132 1072, 1110 V. Jones, (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S. W. 49 1072 Honore v. Bakewell, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 67 1074, 1092 Hood V. Baker, 165 Ind. 562 99 V. Hanning, 4 Dana (Ky.) 21 555 Hooker v. McAllister, 12 Wash. 46 680a, 689 V. McGlone, 42 Conn. 95 1247, 1259, 1268, 1567 Hooper v. Brundage, 22 Maine 460 165, 220, 231 V. Byles, 2 Vern. 480 1182 V. Fletcher, 145 Cal. 375 1287 V. Hood, 54 Cal. 218 1190, 1401, 1572 V. Strahan, 71 Ala. 75 1076, 1083 V. Welch, 43 Vt. 169 115. 191, 193, 194, 209, 212, 217 Hoopes V. Worrall, 1 Del. Co. Rep. (Pa.) Ill 676 Hoops V. Crowley, 12 Serg'. & R. (Pa.) 219n 632 Hooven, Owens & Reutschler Co. V. Featherstone, 99 Fed. ISO 1421, 1432 Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 522 643, 689, 993, 994, 995 V. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79 921, 931, 935, 944 Hope Mining Co., In re, 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 710 109, 1557 Hope, The, 1 Asp. 563 1787 Hope, The, 49 Fed. 279 1698 Hope, The, 191 Fed. 243 1748 Hopkins v. Forrester, 39 Conn. 351 1413, 1533 V. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476 1161 V. Gilman, 47 Wis. 581 1161 V. Rays, 68 N. H. 164 715 V. Simpson, 3 Houst. (Del.) 90 60S V. Wood, 79 111. App. 484 614 Hopkinson v. Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74 57 Hopper V. Childs, 48 Pa. St. 310 1282 v. Haines, 71 Md. 64 623 V. Hays, 82 Mo. App. 494 579 Horace Waters & Co., v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302 515 Horn V. Baker, 9 East 215 820 Hornbrooks v Lucas, 24 W. Va. 493 585, 586 Horncastle v. Farran, 3 B. & Aid. 497 322 Horning v. Wiederspalen, 28 N. J. Eq. 387 1164 Horton v. Carlisle, 2 Disney (Ohio) 184 1325, 1326 V. Champlin, 12 R. I. 550 157, 164, 214 V. Horner, 14 Ohio 437 1092 Hoskins v. Carter, 66 Iowa 638 1201 V. Knight, 1 M. & S. 245 573 V. Paul, 9 N. J. L. 110 557, 564, 627 V. Rowe, 61 Iowa 180 1068 V. Wall, 77 N. Car. 249 1063, 1110 Plostler, Case of, Yelv. 66 6 Hotaling v. Cronise, 2 Cal. 60 1421, 1542 Hough v. Collins, 176 111. 188 1237 v. Edwards, 1 H. & N. 171 118, 157 Houghton V. Bauer, 70 Iowa 314 616 V. Blake, 5 Cal. 240 1300, 1327, 1328 V. Matthews, 3 Bos. & Pul. 485 448, 449, 466 CVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; A^ol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Houghton V. Rogan, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 285 1119 Houlditcli V. Desanges, 2 Starlt. 337 850 Houser v. Cooper, 102 Ga. 823 750 Houston V. Dickson, 66 Tex. 79 1064, 1102a V. McCluney. 8 W. Va. 135 1150, 1156 V. Stanton, 11 Ala. 412 1076 Hovey v. East Providence, 17 R. L. 80 1375 V. Elliott, 21 J. & S. (N. Y.) V. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124 29, 30 V. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 66 217 V. Smith, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 372 600 How V. Kirchner, 11 Moore P. C. 21 326 Howard v. Doolittle, 3 Duer (N. Y.) 464 1276 v. Herman, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 79 1086 V. Macondray, 7 Gray (Mas.s. ) 516 327 V. Osceola, 22 Wis. 453 115, 204, 208 V. Riker, 11 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 113 iSV V. Robinson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 119 1465 V. Shepherd, 9 C. B. 297 951 V. Tucker, 1 Barn. & Ad. 712 326 V. Veazie, 3 Gray (Mass.) 233 1248, 1254, 1465 Howard, The, 29 Fed. 604 1691, 1730, 1731 Howe V. Kindred, 42 Minn. 433 1520, J542 V. Klein, 89 Maine 376 220 V. Patterson, 78 Maine 227 1548 V. Schmidt, 151 Cal. 436 IIGO V. Stewart, 40 Vt. 145 S68 Howe, In re, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 124 77 Howell V. Alport, 12 U. C. C. P. 375 P34 V. Harding, 8 East 362 115 V. Hathaway, 28 Nebr. 807 1264 Howe Machine Co. v. Miner, 28 Kans. 441 94 V. Sloan, 87 Pa. St. 438 564 Howes V. Ball, 7 B. & C. 481 745 V. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76 691, 6Pla V. Reliance Wire-Works Co., 46 Minn. 44 1324, 1329, 1513a Howett V. Selbv, 54 111. 151 1199 Howitt V. Merrill, 113 N. Y. 630 235 Howland v. Porlaw, 108 N. Car. 567 631 V. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604 490 Hoye Coal Co. v. Colvin, 83 Ark. 528 1574 Hoyt V. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142 1163 v. Miner, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 525 1297, 1599 V. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613 794 V. Story, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 262 48, 50, 52, 60 Hoyt, In re, 3 Biss. (U. S.) 436 1232, 1470, 1492 Hubbard v. Bellew, 10 Fed. 849 80 V. Brown, 8 Allen (Mass.) 590 1412, 1445 Hubbard v. Clark, (N. J.) 7 Atl. 26 1101 v. Clark, 3 Stew. N. J. Dig. 540 1082 V. Ellithorpe, 135 Iowa 259 175 201a v. Moore, 132 Ind. 178 1200,' 1574 V. Moss, 65 Mo. 647 626 v. Roach, 2 Fed. 393 1719 Hubbell v. Hendrickson, 175 N. Y. 175 1061, 1064 V. Schreyer, 56 N. Y. 604 1400, 1614 Hubbersty v. Manchester, Shef- field & Lincolnshire R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 59 397 Hubble V. Dunlap, 101 Ky. 419 177, 203 Huckleby v. State, 57 Fla. 433 90 Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 446 105 Hudmon v. Trammel!, 86 Ala. 472 1589 Hudson v. Granger, 5 B. & Aid. 27 433, 472 V. Vaughan, 57 Ala. 609 603 V. Wright, 3 Ala. App. 290 603 Hudson Trust & Saving Inst. v. Carr-Curran Paper Mills, (N. J.) 44 Atl. 638 laS Huff v. Clark, 59 Tex. 347 1382 V. Earl, 3 Ind. 306 1000 V. Jolly, 41 Kans. 537 1245, 1258 Huffman v. Cauble, 86 Ind. 591 1116, 1124 Hug V. Hintrager, 80 Iowa 359 1290, 1427, 1453 Hughes V. Anslyn, 7 Mo. App. 400 12^2 V. Gibson, 15 Colo. App. 318 1289 V. Kershow, 42 Colo. 210 1020, 1141 V. Lambertville Electric Light, etc. Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 435 1384 V. Lansing, 31 Ore. 118 1500 V. Lennv, 5 M. & W. 183 745 V. McCasland, 122 111. App. 365 1199, 1257 V. Mavre, 3 T. R. 275 115 V. Peters, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 67 1262, 1263 V. Smith, 114 La. 297 1204 V. Torgerson, 96 Ala. 346 1367, 1572. 1586, 1600 V. Whitaker, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 399 637 Hughes' Admr. v. Sebre, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Kv.) 227 600 Hulett V. Whipple, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 224 1081 Hull V. Phillips, 128 Mo. App. 247 181a Hull of a New Brig, The, 1 Story (U. S.) 244 1748 Hull of a New Ship, The, 2 Ware (U. S.) 203 1798 Hulse V. Washburn, 59 Wis. 414 1588 Hulsman v. Whitman, 109 Mass. 411 1467 Humboldt Lumber Mill Co. v. Crisp, 146 Cal. 686 l.-,3r> Humboldt. The, 86 Fed. 351 1709 Humbolt Bldg. Assn. v. Volmer- ing (Kv. App.), 47 S. W. 1084 1470 Hume V. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66 1078 TABLE OF CASES. evil [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Hume V. Riggs, 12 App. D. C. 355 609 V. Simmons, 34 Fla. 584 1196 Hummer v. Scliott, 21 Md. 307 1086 Humpiirey v. Browning, 46 111. 476 167 229 V. Thorn, 63 Ind. 296 1090 Humphreys v. McFarland (Miss.) 48 So. 1027 1498 V. Reed, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 435 331 Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636 192 Hunder v. Le Conte, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 728 589 Hunn V. Bowne, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 38 846 Hunnicutt, etc. Co. v. Van Hoose, 111 Ga. 518 1512 Hunstall v. Withers, 86 Va. 892 1099 Hunt V. Harbor, 80 Ga. 746 1092, 1119 V. Haskell, 24 Maine 339 262, 270, 335 V. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503 190. 230. 2.35 V. McMahan, 5 Ohio 133 1144 V. Marsh, 80 Mo. 3 96 1074, 1086, 1090 V. N. Y. & Brie R. Co., 1 Hil- ton (N. Y.) 228 302 V. Ward, 3 T. R. 467 936 V. Waterman, 12 Cal. 301 1087. 1088 V. Wing, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 139 776, 786 Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 111. 318 1235, 1327 V. Mathews, 67 Ark. 362 578 V. Trukee Lodge, 14 Nev. 24 1214, 1285, 1298, 1304a, 1556 V. Walter, 128 N. Y. 668 1513a V. Whitfield, 89 111. 229 559, 580, 614, 1046 Huntington v. Barton, 64 111. 502 1554 Huntley v. Holt, 58 Conn. 445 1262, 1263 Huntsman v. Linville River Lumber Co., 122 N. Car. 583 768 Hurd V. Hartford & N. Y. Steamboat Co., 40 Conn. 48 285 V. Hixon, 27 Kans. 722 1382 V. Wheeling & L. E. R. Co., 4 Ohio N. P. 404 159 Ilurlbert v. Brigham, 56 Vt. 368 115, 137, 146 V. New Ulm Basket Works, 47 Minn. 81 1401, 1589 Hurlburt v. Just, 126 Mich. 337 1413 Hurley v. Hollyday, 35 Md. 469 1074, 1116 V. Lally, 151 Mass. 129 1207 V. Tucker, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 580 U-:! Hurlock V. Smith, 39 Md. 436 1098 Huron, The, 29 Fed. 183 1687, 1734, 1748 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 832 Hursey v. Hassam, 45 Miss. 133 1210, 1614 Hursh V. Bvers, 29 Mo. 469 513 V. Carman, 51 Nebr. 784 1532 Hurst V. Bell. 72 Ala. 336 603 V. Marshall, 75 Tex. 452 1093 V. Sheets, 21 Iowa 501 175, 217 Huse V. Washburn, 59 Wis. 414 1232, 1559, 1600, 1613 Hussey v. Fields, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 394 1705 V. Manufacturers' & Me- chanics' Bank, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 415 375, 414 V. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432 603 V. Thornton, 4 Mass. 405 820 Husted V. Ingraham, 73 N. Y. 251 77 95 819 V. Mathes, 77 N. Y. 388 1251, 1254, 1260, 1265 Hutchings v. Nunes, 1 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 243 875, 876 V. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 25 Ga. 61 269 Hutchins v. Blaisdell, 106 Maine 92 710 V. Olcutt, 4 Vt. 549 1010 Hutchinson v. Howard, 15 Vt. 544 115, 191, 193, 202, 227 V. Patrick, 22 Tex. 318 1114 V. Fetters, 18 Vt. 614 191, 196, 203 V. Worthington, 7 App. D. C. 548 171b, 1015 Hutton V. Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14 271, 272, 461 V. Moore, 26 Ark. 382 1092, 1107 Huxford V. Bogardus, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 94 1614 Hyde v. Culver, 4 La. Ann. 9 1745 V. German Nat. Bank, 115 Wis. 170 719 V. Tanner, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 75 1174 Hydraulic Brick Co. v. Bormans, 19 Mo. App. 664 1471, 1478 Hyer v. Smith, 48 W. Va. 550 820 Hylton V. Brown, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 165 1133 Hynson v. Cordukes, 21 La. Ann. 553 620 Hyperion's Cargo, The, 2 Low. (U. S.) 93 1720 laege v. Bossieux, 15 Grat. (Va.) 83 1494, 1495 Ida Meyer, The, 31 Fed. 89 1703 Idas, The, Brown & L. 65 1697a Iglehart v. Arminger, 1 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 519 1092 Ilett v. Collins, 103 111. 74 1086 Ilex, The, 2 Woods (U. S.) 229 1713 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Alexan- der, 20 111. 23 284 v. Wells, 104 Tenn. 706 190 Illinois, The, 2 Flip. (U. S.) 383 1698 Ilsley v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65 903, 912 Imogene M. Terry, The, 19 Fed. 463 1706 Imperial Bank v. London Docks Co., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 195 823, 874, 994 Independent Sash, Door & Lum- ber Co. v. Bradfield, 153 Mo. App. 527 1211, 1453 Indiana I. & I. R. Co. v. Larrew, 130 Ind. 368 1645 Indiana Mut. B. & L. Assn. v. Papton, 18 Ind. App. 304 1597 Indianapolis Northern Trac. Co. V. Brennan, 174 Ind. 1 1200 Indiana, The, Crable (U. S.) 470 1883 CVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] India, The, 14 Fed. 476 1690 India, The, 16 Fed. 262 1690 Indoe V. Morman, 26 Wis. 588 1126 Industrial Loan Assn. v. Saul, 68 N. Y. S. 837 981 V. Saul, 34 Misc. (N. T.) 188 976 Ingalls V. Green, 62 Vt. 436 691 V. Vance, 61 Vt. 582 641, 685, 691, 691a, 692a - Ing-ersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263 190 V. Coran, 211 U. S. 335 177c V. Van Bokkelin, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 670 1036 Inglis V. Usherwood, 1 East 515 878, 889, 911, 915 Ingraham v. Rich (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 549 638 Inslee v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454 861, 884, 887, 921, 937, 965 Instalment Bldg. v. Wentworth, 1 Wash. St. 467 1401, 1559 Insurance Co. v. Baring, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 159 1679, 1699 V. Dunham, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 1 1698, 1722, 1729 V. Proceeds of Sale, 24 Fed. 559 1698 V. Proceeds of Sale, 23 Blatchf. (U. S.) 292 1698 V. Stinson, 103 U. S. 25 1541 International Boom Co. v. Rainy Lake River Boom Corp., 97 Minn. 513 713 International, The, 30 Fed. 375 1704 Interstate B. & L. Assn. v. Ayers, 177 111. 9 1248, 1470 V. Ayers, 71 111. App. 529 1470 Inverarity v. Stowell, 10 Ore. 261 1275, 1384, 1457 lola. The, 189 Fed. 972 1682, 1741 Iowa Brick Co. v. Des Moines, 111 Iowa 272 1290, 1375 Iowa Mortgage Co. v. Shan- quest, 70 Iowa 124 1443, 1483 Iowa Stone Co. v. Crissman, 112 Iowa 122 1290 Ira B. Ellems, The, 48 Fed. 591 1720 Ireland v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 79 Mo. 572 1619 V. Livingston, L. R. 5 H. L. 395 869 Iris, The, 100 Fed. 104 1722a, 1724, 1725 Irish v. Lundin, 28 Nebr. 84 1249 Iron Co. V. Murray, 38 Ohio St. 323 1500, 1501 Iron Works v. Jensen, 3 Wash. St. 584 1764a Irvin V. Garner, 50 Tex. 48 1080 Irvine v. Muse, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 477 1086, llOS v. Palmer, 10 Tenn. 463 74a Irwin V. Crawfordsville, 72 Ind. Ill 1423 V. Miller, 72 Miss. 174 765 V. Workman, 3 Watts (Pa.) Isaack v. Clark, 2 Bulst. 306 496 Isaac May, The, 21 Fed. 687 1699, 1793 Isbell V. Dunlap, 17 S. Car. 581 784c, 778 Island City. The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 375 1706, 1715 Itasca Cedar & Tie Co. v. Brainerd Lumber &c. Co., 109 Minn. 120 713 Ivall V. TVillis, 17 Wash. 645 71S Ives V. Polak, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 411 958 Ivey V. White, 50 Miss. 142 1210, 1267 Jackman v. Hallock, 1 Ohio 318 1092 Jacks V. Smith, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 315 571 Jackson v. Bain, 74 Ala. 328 603 V. Clopton, 66 Ala. 29 144, 169, 203 V. Corley, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 417 638 v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 342 641, 742 v. Hill, 39 Tex. 493 1098, 1101 V. Holland, 31 Ga. 339 641 V. Ivory (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. 716 1092 V. Kasseall, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 231 641, 690, 691 V. Loomis, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 168 1133 V. Ludeling, 2 Woods (U. S.) 254 1146 V. McCray, 63 Kans. 238 659 V. Nichol, 5 Bing. (N. Cas.) 508 267, 885, 901, 919, 920, 921, 922, 929, 940, 965 V. Rutledge, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 626 1069, 1115 V. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270 1086 V. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25 180 Jackson's Appeal, 6 Sad. (Pa.) 327 632 Jacobs V. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71 10, 26, 715, 721, 722, 723, 982 V. Latour, 5 Bing. 130 16, 330, 644, 1014 V. Union Trust Co., 155 Mich. 233 99 Jacobus V. Mutual Beneiit L. Ins. Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 604 1216. 1459, 1472 Jacquith V. American Express Co., 60 N. H. 61 1043 Jacubeck v. Hewitt, 61 Wis. 96 728 Jaffrey v. Allan, 3 Paton 191 859 Jalie V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 511 James v. Bird, 8 Leigh (Va.) 510 40, 811 V. Dalby, 107 Iowa 463 1262, 1264 V. Griffin, 1 M. & ■^'. 20 924 V. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 623 884, 902, 904, 908, 919, 921, 924, 940 V. Hambleton, 42 111. 308 1312. 1313 V. Van Horn, 39 N. J. L. 353 1216, 1312, 1455, 1456, 1472 James B. Lambie Co. v. Bigelow, 34 App. D. C. 49 1195 James Farrell, The, 36 Fed. 500 1686, 1687 James Freeman Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S. Car. 558 461 James Guy, The, 1 Ben. (U. S.) -I I O 1 fi J\ 9 James Guy, The, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 496 1681 TABLE OF CASES. CIX [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] James H. Prentice, The, 36 Fed. 777 1728 Jameson v. Gile, 98 Iowa 490 1250 James River &c. Co. v. Banner, 3 N. Dak. 470 1457 James T. Easton, The, 49 Fed. 656 1793a, 1808 Jamison v. Barelli, 20 La. Ann. 452 1204 V. Ranck, 140 Iowa 635 175 Janes v. Osborne, 108 Iowa 409 1487 Jaquith v. American E!xpress Co., 60 N. H. 61 519 Jarboe v. Templer, 38 Fed. 213 1613 Jarchow v. Pickens, 51 Iowa 381 557 Jarden v. Pumphrev, 30 Md. 361 1202 Jarechi v. Philharmonic Soc, 79 Pa. St. 403 1341 Jarman v. Farley, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 141 1083, 1090 Jarrell v. Block, 19 Okla. 467 1383 V. Rogers, 15 Mass. 389 15 23 251 V. State Bank, 22 Colo. 3o" 'l479 Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co. V. Sutton, 46 Kans. 166 1257, 1589 Jaytes v. Franklin Savings Bank, 85 111. 256 1500 J. C. Rich, The, 46 Fed. 136 1722, 1725 J. C. Williams, The, 15 Fed. 558 1707, 1708 Jean v. Spurrier, 35 Md. 110 622 V. Wilson, 38 Md. 288 1473 Jeanie Landles, The, 17 Fed. 91 1688 Jeffards v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 45 184 Jefferson v. Church of St. Mat- thew, 41 Minn. 392 1307, 1410 Jefferson, The, 20 How. (U. S.) 393 1725 Jeffersonville Water-Supplv Co. v. Ritter, 146 Ind. 521 1405 Jeffrey v. Moran, 101 U. S. 285 1675 Jeffries v. Fitchburg R. Co., 93 Wis. 250 320 V. Snyder, 110 Iowa 359 981 Jeffryes v. Agra & Masterman's Bank, L. R. 2 Eq. 674 247 J. E. Greilick Co. v. Rogers, 144 Mich. 313 1208 V. Taylor, 143 Mich. 704 1408 Jenckes v. Jenckes, 145 Ind. 624 1200. 1494 Jenkins v. Adams, 22 Hun (N. Y.) 600 189, 210 V. Freyer, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 47 1173 V. Means, 59 Ga. 55 1141 V. Stephens. 60 Ga. 216 231 Jenkins & Reynolds Co. v. Wells, 220 111. 452 1617a Jenks V. Osceola Tow^ns"hip, 45 Iowa 554 lb4a Jenkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496 916 V. Usborne, 7 M. & G. 678 875, 958 Jennie B. Gilkey, The, 19 Fed. 127 1681, 1698 Jennie Middleton, The, 94 Fed. 683 1682 Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323 377, 388 V. Sturdervant, 140 Ind. 641 1163, 1164 V. Wilier, (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. 24 1301 Jenny Lind, The, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 513 1756 Jensen v. Dorr, 159 Cal. 742 1738 Jerecka Mfg. Co. v. Struther, 8 Ohio C. D. M. 5 1220 Jersev v. Britain Ferry Float- ing Dock Co., L. R. 7 Eq. 409 1074 Jerusalem, The, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 345 1777 Jessup V. Atlantic & G. R. Co., 3 Woods (U. S.) 441 1642 V. Stone, 13 Wis. 466 1232, 1469, 1470, 1487, 1592 Jesurun v. Kent, 45 Minn. 222 764 Jewell V. McKay, 82 Cal. 144 1616 V. Peron, 94 Mich. 83 1515 Jewett V. Keenholts, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 193 1174 Jewitt, In re, 34 Beav. 22 136 J. F. Spencer, The, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 151 1679 J. F. Warner, The, 22 Fed. 345 1806a Jimison v. Reifsnelder, 97 Pa. St. 136 562 Jobe V. Chedister, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 346 1088 V. Hunter, 165 Pa. St. 5 1266 Jodd V. Duncan, 9 Mo. App. 417 1250, 1528 John A. Morgan, The, 28 Fed. 895 1706 John and Mary, The, 1 Swal. 471 1810 John C. Fisher, The, 50 Fed. 703 ISOS John Cutrell, The, 9 Fed. 777 1717, 1811 John Dillon, The, 46 Fed. 527 1800 John Farron, The, 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 24 1726, 1729, 1794 John G. Stevens, The, 40 Fed. 331 1781 John G. Stevens, The, 170 U. S. 113 1769, 17G1 John M. Bonner Memorial Home V. Collin County Nat. Bank, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 313 1117 John M. Welch, The, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 54 1719 John Paul Lumber Co. v. Hor- mel, 61 Minn. 303 1442 Johns V. Bolton, 12 Pa. St. 339 1532 V. Sewell, 33 Ind. 1 1089 Johnson v. Algor, 65 N. J. L. 363 13] 7 V. Ballard, 44 Ind. 279 174. 220 v. Barnes &c. Bldg. Co., 23 Mo. App. 546 1211, 1408, 1412 V. Bennett, 6 Colo. App. 362 1191, 1571 V. Boudry, 116 Mass. 196 1609 V. Building Co., The, 23 Mo. App. 546 1412 V. Campbell, 120 Mass. 449 435 V. Cantrill, 92 Ky. 59 1069 V. Cawthorn, 1 Div. & B. Eq. (N. Car.) 32 lOEl ex TArsLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I. §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Johnson v. Chicag-o & P. Elev. Co., 105 111. 462 1742, 1770 V. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388 1729 V. Coney, 120 Ga. 767 79 V. Davis, 60 Mich. 56 332a V. De I'eyster, 50 N. Y. 666 1599 V. Dewey, 36 Cal. 623 1276, 1278 V. Douglass, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 36 566, 570 V. Durner, 88 Ala. 580 602, 1103a V. Emanuel, 50 Ga. 590 551 V. Farnum, 56 Ga. 144 811 V. BVazee, 20 S. Car. 500 1224 V. Godden, 33 Ark. 600 1086 V. Gold, 32 Minn. 535 1407 V. Griffiths (Tex. Civ. App.), 135 S. W. 683 1226 v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172 499, 502 v. Hulett, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 11 638 V. Johnson Railroad Signal Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 79 158 Jones, 51 Miss. 860 Keeler, 46 Kans. 304 Leman, 131 111. 609 Lockhart, 16 Tex. Civ. 1115 1584 1177 1126 1095 1270 649 App. 32 v. McClure, 10 N. Mex. 506 1367 V. McCurry, 102 Ga. 471 173 V. McGrew, 42 Iowa 555 1063, 1083 V. McKinnon, 45 Fla. 388 1063 V. McMillan, 13 Colo. 423 171 V. Nunnerly, 30 Ark. 153 V. Parker, 27 N. J. L. 239 1239, 1262, 126 V. Perry, 53 Cal. 351 V. Pike, 35 Maine 291 1205, 1248 V. Prussing, 4 111. App. 575 571, 613, 614 V. Puritan Min. Co., 19 Mont. 30 1373 V. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 810 184 y. Salter, 70 Minn. 146 ' 1312 v. Spencer, 49 Ind. App. 166 1200, 1283 v. Story, I Lea (Tenn.) 114 166 V. Sug-g, 21 Miss. 346 1086 v. Tacneau, 23 La. Ann. 453 620 V. Townsend, 77 Tex. 639 V. Tutewiler, 35 Ind. 353 V. Upham, 2 El. & El. 250 V. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 517 V. Weinstock, 31 La. Ann. 698 1204 John S. Parsons, The, 110 Fed. 994 16S4 Johnston v. Cochrane, 84 N. Car. 446 1115, 1126 V. Gwathmay, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 317 1092 V. Harrington, 5 Wash. 73 1392, 1449, 1452 V. Smith, 70 Ala. 108 1103, 1129 John T. Moore, The, 3 Woods (U. S.) 61 1698. 1715, 1745, 1794 Joiner v. Perkins, 59 Tex. 300 1064, 1074, 1094, 1098, 1102 Jollv V. Stallings, 78 Tex. 605 1070 Jones V. Paisley, 27 Okla. 220 1286, 1444 V. Bank, 10 Colo. 404 84 V. Bonner, 2 Exch. 230 203, 234 1098 1262 632 1758 228 421 564 632 Jones V. Byrne, 149 Fed. 457 1116 V. Church of Holy Trinity, 15 Nebr. 81 1490 V. Doss, 27 Ark. 518 991, 1092 V. Dull' Grain Co., 69 Nebr. 91 183, 204 V. Earl, 37 Cal. 630 88*8, 891 V. Eubanks, 86 Ga. 616 611, G12 V. Findley, 84 Ga. 52 576 V. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 422 791 V. Fox, 23 Fla. 454 610 V. Frost, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 773 V. Gallagher, 3 Utah 54 V. Goldbeck, 8 Wkly. N. Cas (Pa.) 533 V. Gundrim, 3 Watts & S (Pa.) 531 572, 598, V. Hartsock, 42 Iowa 147 1570, 1571 V. Hurst, 67 Mo. 568 1495, 1532, 1568 V. Janes, 56 Ga. 325 1063 V. Jeffres, 11 Bush (Ky.) 636 1204 V. Johnson, SI Ga. 293 1585 V. Jones, 8 M. & W. 431 962 V. Keen, 115 Mass. 170 1727, 1748, 1795 V. Kern, 101 Ga. 309 1450 V. Louisville Tobacco Ware- house Co., 135 Ky. 824 619 V. Lusk, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 356 789 793 V. Manning, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 631 1276 V. Marks, 40 111. 313 470a V. Menke, 168 N. Y. 61 1281 V. Morgan, 39 Ga. 310 115, 203 V. Morrill, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 623 501 V. Mount Zion, 30 La. Ann. 711 1204 V. Parker, 51 Wis. 218 1069, 1093 V. Parsons, 25 Cal. 100 795 V. Pearle, 1 Strange 556 335, 519, 523, 986, 1032, 1038 V. Peppercorne, Johns. Ch. 430 252 V. Phelan, 20 Grat. (Va.) 229 V. Pothast, 72 Ind. 158 1262, V. Ragland, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 539 1063, 1082, V. Rush, 156 Mo. 364 V. Shawhan, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 257 725, 1171, 1365, 1532 V. Shorey, 8 Iowa 416 1325 V. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 319 307, 987, 1035 V. Swan, 21 Iowa 181 1235, 1236, 1325, 1330, 1437, 1443 V. Tarlton, 9 M. & W. 675 334, 1019, 1025 V. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172 519, 523, 850 V. Vantress, 23 Ind. 533 1089 V. Walker, 63 N. Y. 612 1251, 1262, 1263, 1265 V. Walker, 44 Tex. 200 638 V. White, 72 Tex. 316 1532 V. Wolfe (Tenn.), 42 S. W. 216 1071 V. T^'vlie, 82 Ga. 745 612 V. Young, 180 111. 216 1184a 639 1270 1099 1090 TABLE OF CASES. CXI [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Jones V. Young, 78 111. App. 78 1184a Jones & Magee Lumber Co. v. Boggs, 6a Iowa 589 1560, 1565 V. Murphy, 64 Iowa 165 1289, 1290, 1395, 1441 Joost V. Sullivan, 111 Cal. 286 1444 Joplin Sash & Door Worlvs v. Shade, 137 Mo. App. 20 1211 Joralmon v. McPhee, 31 Colo. 26 1457 Jordan v. Board of Education, 39 Minn. 298 1375 V. Bryan, 103 N. Car. 59 631 V. Hunt, 3 Dowl. P. C. 666 203 V. James, 5 Ohio 88 418, 465, 861, 946 V. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 245, 246 V. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170 206 V. Wimer, 45 Iowa 65 1063, 1071, 1083 Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 1587 Joseph V. Seward, 91 Ala. 597 1102a Joseph Brown, The, (U. S.) Adm. 202 1773 Joseph Cunard, The, Olcott (U. S.) 120 1713 Josephine Spangler, The, 9 Fed. 773 1695, 1794 Josephine, The, In re, 39 N. Y. 19 1729 Joseph N. Eisendrath Co. v. Gebhardt, 222 111. 113 1184a, 1199 Joule V. Jackson, 7 M. & W. 450 563 Jourdaine v. Lefevre, 1 Esp. 66 241 Joyce V. Swann, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 84 916 V. Wilkenning, 1 MacArthur (D. C.) 567 573, 609 J. P. Tweed v. Richards, 9 Ind. 525 1743 J. R. Thompson, The v. Lewis, 31 Ala. 497 110 J. S. Warden, The, 155 Fed. 697 1755 Judah V. Kemp, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 411 1019 Judge V. Curtis, 72 Ark. 132 606. 1033 Judson V. Etheridge, 1 C. & M. 743 641 V. Stephens, 75 111. 255 1245, 1257, 1272, 1276 Judy V. Farmers & Traders' Bank, 81 Mo. 404 252 Julia Ann, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 382 1811 Julia L. Sherwood, The, 14 Fed. 590 1756 Just V. State Sav. Bank, 132 Mich. 600 406 Justice V. Justice, 115 Ind. 201 174. 201a, 227 J. W. Tucker, The, 20 Fed. 129 1676, 1773, 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779. 1780, 17S8, 1800, 1801, 1802 Kahn v. Bank of St. Joseph, 70 Mo. 262 396 Kalorama, The, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 204 1681, 1688 Kane v. O'Connors, 78 Va. 76 1178 JCangas v. Boulton, 127 Mich. 539 712 Kankakee Coal Co. v. Crane Bros. Mfg. Co., 128 111. 627 1532 V. Crane Bros. Mfg. Co., 138 111. 207 1519 Kansas City Elevated R. Co. v. Service, 77 Kans. 316 176 Kansas City Hotel Co. v. Sauer, 65 Mo. 279 1374 Kansas City Plaining Mill Co. v. Brundage, 25 Mo. App. 268 1235, 1262-1264 Kansas Lumber Co. v. Jones, 32 Kans. 195 1383 Kansas Mtg. Co. v. Weyer- heuser, 48 Kans. 335 1470, 1472, 1478 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Thacher, 17 Kans. 92 176, 211 Kappler v. Sumpter, 35 App. D. C. 404 171b Karnosky v. Hoyle, 97 Miss. 562 1751 Karns v. McKinney, 74 Pa. St. 387 562, 564 Karo, The, 29 Fed. 652 273 Kassing v. Keohane, 4 111. App. 460 567 Kate Hinchman, The, 6 Biss. (U. S.) 367 1776, 1779, 1794 Kate Tremaine, The, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 60 1713 Katzenbach v. Holt, 43 N. J. Eq. 536 1503 Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 64 1061, 1063, 1090 Kaufman v. All Persons, &c., 16 Cal. App. 287 1025 v. Keenan, 2 N. Y. S. .395 1S9 V. Leonard, 139 Mich. 104 967 973 v. Underwood, 83 Ark. 118 606, 607 Kay V. Smith, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 41 1554 1556 v. Towsley, 113 Mich. 281 ' 1470 Keahey v. Bryant (Tex. Civ. App.), 134 S. TV. 409 579 Kealey v. Murray, 61 Hun (N. Y.) 619 1254, 1397, 1454 Keane v. Athenry &c. R. Co., 19 W. R. 43 1674 V. Athenry &c. R. Co., 19 W. R. 318 1674 Kearney v. Wurdeman, 33 Mo. App. 447 1412, 1432, 1567 Kearsarge, The, 1 Ware (U. S.) 546 1696, 1746, 1809 Keas V. Burns, 23 Iowa 233 1142 Keating v. The John Shay, 81 Fed. 216 1703, 1713 Keating &c. Mach. Co! v. Mar- shall Elec. &c. Co., 74 Tex. 605 1226, 1341, 1443, 1470, 1480 Keefe v. Minehan, 93 III. App. 586 1199 Keehn v. Keehn, 115 Iowa 467 229 Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490 823, 824, 835, 910 Keeling Brew. Co. v. Neubauer Decorating Co.. 194 111. 580 1199 Keenan v. Dorflinger, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 153 193, 203 Keep Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 285 277 CXll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II. §§ 1061-1812.] Kehoe v. Hansen, S S. Dak. 198 1356 V. Miller. 10 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 393 185, 189, 210 Keim v. Myers, 44 Ind. App. 299 615 Keim's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 42 864 Keith V. Fink, 47 111. 272 792 V. Horner, 32 111. 524 1063, 1092 V. "Wolf, 5 Bush (Ky.) 646 1074 Kellebrew v. Hines, 104 N. Car. 1S2 1069 Kellenberg-er v. Boyer, 37 Ind. 188 1202, 1488, 1578 Keller v. Denmead, 68 Pa. St. 449 1257 V. Houlihan, 32 Minn. 486 1390, 1392, 1452 V. Lewis, 53 Cal. 113 1126 V. Struck, 31 Minn. 446 1382 V. Tracy, 11 Iowa 530 1572 V. Weber, 27 Md. 660 596, 597, 600, 622 Kelley v. Borden City Mills, 126 Mass. 148 1339, 1369 V. Chapman, 13 111. 530 1571 V. Goodwin, 95 Maine 538 621 V. Horselu, 147 Ala. 508 229 V. Kelley, 77 Maine 135 710, 724, 728, 1023 V. King-, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 360 638 V. Northern Trust Co., 190 111. 401 1199 Kellogg V. Howes, 81 Cal. 170 1190, 1287 V. Howes, 136 U. S. 639 1190 V. Little &c. Mfg-. Co., 1 Wash. St. 407 1421 Kellog Newspaper Co. v. Peter- son, 162 111. 158 613 Kelly V. Ailing, 84 Conn. 487 1192 V. Davenport, 1 Browne (Pa.) 231 590 V. Johnson, 251 111. 135 1199, 1289 V. Karsner, 81 Ala. 500 1075, 1102 V. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30 38, 77, 83 V. Laws, 109 Mass. 395 1397, 1401 V. McGehee, 137 Pa. St. 443 1260, 1573 V. Mills, 41 Miss. 267 1094 V. New York City R. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 467 150a V. Pavne, 18 Ala. 371 1096, 1119 V. Phelan, 5 Dill. (U. S.) 228 244 V. Rosenstock, 45 Md. 389 1473, 1474 V. Rowane, 33 Mo. App. 440 1512, 1513a V. Ruble, 11 Ore. 75 1063, 1094 Kelly, In re, 18 Fed. 528 968 Kelsey v. Beers, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 228 1811 V. Layne, 28 Kans. 218 641, 643, 687 Kemp V. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 573 861, 893, 953, 954. 960, 962 Kempe v. Kempe, 5 De G., M. & G. 346 1164 Kendal, Ex parte, 17 Ves. 514 1046 Kendall v. Fader, 199 111. 294 llS4a V. Fader, 99 111. App. 104 1413 V. Haynes Lumber Co., 96 Wis. 659 719 Kendall v. Marshall, 48 L. T. (N. S.) 951 919, 921 Kendall Mfg. Co. v. Bundle, 78 Wis. 150 1519 Kendrick v. Eggleston, 56 Iowa 128 1088, 1090 Kenly v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 306 1206, 1286 Kennard v. Harvey, 80 Ind. 37 576a, 580, 615 Kennebec Framing Co. v. Pick- ering, 142 Mass. 80 1442 Kennedy v. Apgar, 93 N. Y. 539 1349, 1579, 1584 v. Groves, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 266 638 V. House, 41 Pa. St. 39 1421 V. Lange, 50 Md. 91 562 V. Reames, 15 S. Car. 548 458, 543, 635 V. South Shore Lumber Co., 102 Wis. 284 719 Kennon v. Wright, 70 Ala. 434 603 Kenny v. Gage. 33 Vt. 302 1228, 1461 Kensington, Ex parte, 1 Deac. 58 446 Kent v. Brown, 59 N. H. 236 1341, 1343, 1344 V. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92 1063, 1069 V. Muscatine &c. R. Co., 115 Iowa 383 1646 V. New York Cent. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 628 1270, 1662 V. San Francisco Sav. Union, 130 Cal. 401 1086 V. Williams, 114 Cal. 537 1086 Kenton Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 84 Ky. 430 405, 408 V. Bowman, 15 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 578 376 . Kenyon v. Covert, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 638 1756 V. Peckham, 10 R. I. 402 1223 Keogh V. Main, 18 J. & S. (N. Y.) 183 1454 Keppel V. .Tackson, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 320 1372 Kerby v. Daly, 45 N. Y. 84 1240, 1362 Kerckhoff-Cuzzner Mill &c. Co. V. Cummings, 86 Cal. 22 1190 V. Olmstead, 85 Cal. 80 1438 Kerford v. Mondel. 28 L. J. Exch. 303 1025 Kern v. Hazelrigg, 11 Ind. 443 1092 V. School Directors, etc., 155 111. App. 62 1063 Kerns v. Flynn, 51 Mich. 573 1574 Kerr v. Hoskinson, 5 Kans. App. 193 99 V. Moore, 54 Miss. 286 990, 1494, 1495 Kerrick v. Ruggles, 78 Wis. 274 1248 Kerrigan v. Fielding, 47 App. Div. (N. Y.) 246 1511 V. Fielding, 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 635 1511 Kerr-Murray Mfg. Co. v. Kala- mazoo Heat &c. Co., 124 Mich. Ill 1208 Kersey v. O'Day, 173 Mo. 560 181a Kershaw v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Mo. App. 575 1348, 1419 Kessler v. McConachy, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 435 562 TABLE OF CASES. CXlll [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Ketchum v. Watson, 24 111. 591 820 Kettlewell v. Watson, 21 Ch. Div. 685 1061 Key City, The, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 653 1800 Keystone Iron-Works Co. v. Douglass Sug-ar Co., 55 Kans. 195 1470 Keystone Min. Co. v. Gallagher, 5 Colo. 23 1191, 1393a Kezartee v. Marks, 15 Ore. 529 1221, 1310, 1397, 1402, 1406, 1421, 1452 Kidd V. Wilson, 23 Iowa 464 1201. 1249, 1260, 1262, 1264 Kidder v. Page, 48 N. H. 380 1045 Kiel V. Carll, 51 Conn. 440 1408, 1413^ 1595 Kieldseb v. Wilson, 77 Mich. 45 704, 725 Kiene v. Hodge, 90 Iowa 212 1457, 1472 Kiersage, The, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 421 1727, 1794 Kiessig v. AUspaugh, 91 Cal. 234 1190 Kiewit V. Carter, 25 Nebr. 460 1511 Kilbourne v. Jennings, 38 Iowa 533 1289 V. Wiley, 124 Mich. 370 178, 1094 Kilpatrick v. Harper, 119 Ala. 452 576a Kimball v. Ship Anna Kimball, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 4 1009, 1010 V. Thomnson, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 283 791 Kimball, The, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 37 324, 327, 1808 Kimble v. Esworthy, 6 Bradw. (111.) 517 1086 Kimbrough v. Curtis, 50 Miss. 117 1119 King V. Bates, 57 N. H. 446 820 V. Blackmore, 72 Pa. St. 347 588 V. Blount, 37 Ark. 115 606 V. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 260 1164 V. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413 1725, 1733, 1756, 1810 V. Indian Orchard Canal Co., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 231 25, 731, 745, 997 V. Kellev, 25 Minn. 522 713 V. I.amon, 193 111. 537 1199 V. Lamon, 91 111. App. 74 1199 V. May, 1 Doug. 193 118 V. Richards, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 418 303, 304 V. Rowlett. 120 Mo. App. 120 626 V. Sankey,' 6 N. & M. 839 119 V. Smith, 42 Minn. 2S6 1245, 1251, 1542 V. Thompson, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 204 1138 V. Young Men's Assn., 1 Woods (U. S.) 386 1111, 1125 King, Ex. parte, 17 Ves. 115 iS^i Kingsbury v. Milner, 69 Ala. 502 1102a Kingsland v. Chetwood, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 602 1155 Kingston, The, 23 Fed. 200 168S, 1730, 1756, i:.M Kingston, The, 34 Fed. 402 1G91 Kinloch v. Craig, 3 T. R. 119 464. 871 Kinney v. Blackmer, 55 Conn. 261 1192, 1286 V. Duluth Ore Co., 58 Minn. 455 1494 V. Bnsminger, 94 Ala. 536 1086 V. Mathias, 81 Minn. 64 1315 V. Robison, 52 Mich. 389 178, 220 V. Sherman, 28 111. 520 1512 Kinsey v. Spurlin (Tex. Civ. App.) 102 S. W. 122 1389 V. Stewart, 14 Tex. 457 137 Kinsley v. Buchanan, 5 Watts (Pa.) 118 1532 Kinzey v. Thomas, 28 111. 502 1519 Kipp V. Rapp, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 169 233 V. Rapp, 7 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 385 214 Kirby v. Kirby, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 565 193 V. McGarry, 16 Wis. 68 1232, 1554 V. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 46 787 V. Tead, 13 Met. (Mass.) 149 1259, 1271 Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore P. C. 361 270, 326 Kirk v. Sheets, 90 Ala. 504 1101 V. Williams, 24 Fed. 437 1112, 1113 Kirkham v. Boston, 67 111. 599 1063, 1073, 1086 Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 14 18, 265, 732 Kirkpatric v. Bank of Augusta, 30 Ga. 465 1741 V. Cason, 30 N. J. L. 331 658 V. Chesnut, 5 S. Car. 216 1163 Kirn v. Champion Iron Fence Co., 86 Va. 608 1229 Kirschner v. Mahoney. 96 N. Y. S. 195 1296 Kirsey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426 42, 65, 66 Kirtland v. Moore, 40 N. J. Eq. 106 1216 Kitchen v. Spear, 30 Vt. 545 927 Kitson v. Crump, 1 Wkly. N. Cas. (Pa.) 164 1342 Kitteridge v. Freeman, 48 Vt. 62 745, 997 Kittredge v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 399 13 v. Newmann. 26 N. J. Eq. 195 1262, 1458 v. Sumner, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 50 989 Kittrell v. Hopkins. 114 Mo. App. 431 1412 Kittridge v. Ribas, 18 La. Ann. 718 620 Kizer Lumber Co. v. Mosely, 56 Ark. 544 1434, 1436, 1559 Kleber v. ^^ard, 88 Pa. St. 93 562 Kleinert v. Knoop, 147 Mich. 387 1451, 1605 Kline v. Comstock, 67 Wis. 473 727, 728 v. Cutter, 34 N. J. Eq. 329 1216 V. Cutter, 35 N. .T. L. 534 1216 v. Green, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 190 673 CXIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Kling V. Railway Const. Co., 7 Mo. App. 410 1306, 140S Klondike Lumber Co. v. Will- iams, 71 Ark. 331 1235, 1361 Klopp V. Lebanon Bank, 46 Pa. St. 88 401 Knabb's Appeal, 10 Pa. St. 186 1421 Knapp V. Brown, 45 N. Y. 207 1236, 1277, 1281 V. Brown, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 118 1235 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 74 Mo. 374 1619 V. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345 1375 Knapp Elec. "Works v. Mecosta Elec. Co., 110 Mich. 547 1591 Knapp, In re, 85 N. Y. 284 115, 137, 139, 146, ■155, 188, 220, 231 Knaube v. Kerchner, 39 Ind. 217 1348, 1349 Knauft V. Miller, 45 Minn. 61 1314 Knickerbrocker Ice Co. v. Van- dermark, 50 111. App. 231 1283 Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Voor- hees, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 639 184 Knight V. Begole, 56 111. 122 1199 V. Blanton, 51 Ala. 333 1101 V. Knight, 113 Ala. 597 1074 V. Norris, 13 Minn. 473 1367, 1406, 1409, 1440 V. Old Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 429 384 V. Providence &c. R. Co., 13 R. I. 572 289 Knights V. Wiffen, L. R. 5 Q. B. 660 843, 845 Knisely v. Williams, 3 Grat. (Va.) 265 1116 Knobeloch, Ex parte, 26 S. Car. 331 634 Knott V. Carpenter, 3 Head (Tenn.) 542 1262, 1264 V. Shepherdstown Mfg. Co., 30 W. Va. 790 29, 31 Knowles v. Joost, 13 Cal. 620 1287 V. Pierce, 5 Houst. (Del.) 178 564 V. Sell, 41 Kans. 171 617 Knox V. Hunt, 18 Mo. 243 581, 626 V. Starks, 4 Minn. 20 1469 Knutzen v. Hanson, 28 Nebr. 591 1213 Koch V. Sumner, 145 Mich. 358 1599 Koenig v. Boehme, 14 Mo. App. 593 1211 V. Mueller, 39 Mo. 165 1341 Kohler v. Hayes, 41 Cal. 455 820 Kollock V. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393 719, 726 Kollum V. Emerson, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 79 1697a Koons V. Beach, 147 Ind. 137 174, 201a Korbly v. Loomis, 172 Ind. 352 1200 Kornegay v. Styron, 105 N. Car. 14 1810 Kotcher v. Perrin, 149 Mich. 690 1208 Kountz V. Consolidated Ice Co., 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 639 1222 Kountz Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Ice Co., 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 266 1384 Krauss v. Brunett, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 428 1218 Kremer v. Southern Exp. Co., 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 356 284 Kretzmer v. The William A. Levering, 35 Fed. 783 1755 Kreutz v. Cramer, 64 N. J. Eq. 648 1216 Krey v. Hussmann, 21 Mo. App. 343 1211 Kritzer v. Tracy Eng. Co., 16 Cal. App. 287 1190 Krone v. Klotz, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 587 184 Krotz V. A. R. Beck Lumber Co., 34 Ind. App. 577 1244, 1245 Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Ambler 252 418, 466 Kuehn v. Syracuse Rapid Tran- sit R. Co., 186 N. Y. 567 184 Kuhns V. Turney, 87 Pa. St. 497 1260 V. Westmoreland Bank, 2 Watts (Pa.) 136 401 Kulp V. Chamberlain, 4 Ind. App. 560 1200 Kunkle v. Reeser, 5 Ohio N. P. 401 1435 Kurtz V. Dunn, 36 Ark. 648 606 Kuschel V. Hunter, 118 Cal. xvi 1487 Kusterer v. Beaver Dam, 56 Wis. 471 197, 206-208 Kyle V. Bellenger, 79 Ala. 516 10S6, 1111 Kyle, Ex parte, 1 Cal. 331 160, 165 Kymer v. Suwercropp, 1 Camp. 109 862, 863 Lablache v. Kirkpatrlck, 8 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 256 210 Labouisse v. Orleans Cotton- Rope &c. Co., 43 La. Ann. 245 1063, 1092 Lacey v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), Ill S. W. 965 1107 Lachenmeyer v. Lachenmeyer, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 422 209 Lackington v. Atherton, 7 M. & G. 360 831, 905 V. Atherton, 8 Scott (N. R.) ^8 926 Lackner v. Turnbull, 7 Wis. 105 1605 La Crosse & M. P. Co. v. Van- derpool, 11 Wis. 119 1622 Ladd V. Ferguson, 9 Ore. 180 180 Ladner v. Balsley, 103 Iowa 674 586, 616 Lady of the Lake, The, L. R. 3 Adm. & Ecc. 29 1697a La Forgee v. Colby, 69 111. App. 443 1369 Lagoo V. Seaman, 136 Mich. 418 712 Lagow V. Badollet, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 416 1022 La Grille v. Mallard, 90 Cal. 373 1283, 1345 Laing v. The Forest Queen, 69 Minn. 537 1750 Laird v. INIoonan, 32 Minn. 358 1235, 1304, 1304a, 1305, 1306 Lake v. Brannin, 90 Miss. 737 1290 V. Craddock. 3 P. T^'ms. 158 1147 V. Gaines, 75 Ala. 143 603 TABLE OF CASES. cxv [References are to Sections — Vol. I, Lake v. Gibsonj 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 290 1147 V. Ingham, 3 Vt. 158 212 Lalaurie v. Woods, 8 La. Ann. 366 620 Lamb v. Cannon, 38 N. J. Eq. 362 1458 V. Hannemann, 40 Iowa 41 1201, 1235, 1406, 1437, 1453 V. Utley, 146 Mich. 654 815 Lambard v. Pilte, 33 Maine 141 1205. 1343 Lamberson, In re, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 297 139 Lambert v. Davis, 116 Cal. 292 779a V. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527 680b V. Robinson, 1 Esp. 119 281 V. Williams, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 413 1310 Lambeth v. Ponder, 33 Ark. 707 556 Lamb Lumber Co. v. Roberts, 23 S. Dak. 191 1247, 1382 Lamont v. Washington &c. R. Co., 2 Mack (D. C.) 502 183, 196 Lamotte v. Wisner, 51 Md. 543 577, 580 Lamport v. Beeman, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 239 1104 Lampson v. Bowen, 41 Wis. 484 1571 Lancaster v. Whiteside, 108 Ga. 801 577, 578 Lancaster Countv Nat. Bank's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 214 1164, 1171 Land v. Roby, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 333 576a, 580 Landau v. Cottrill, 159 Maine 308 1469 Landers v. Dexter, 106 Mass. 531 1310, 1313, 1314 Landis v. Gooch, 1 Disn. (Ohio) 176 476 Landreth v. Powell, 122 Tenn. 195 190 Landry v. Blanchard, 16 La. Ann. 173 722, 760 Landyskowski v. Martyn, 93 Mich. 575 1513a Lane v. Bailey, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 395 251 V. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17 731 V. Hallum, 38 Ark. 385 170 V. Jackson, 5 Mass. 157 865 V. Jones, 79 Ala. 156 1187, 1374, 1410, 1414, 1423, 1431, 1532 V. Lane Potter Lumber Co., 40 Mont. 541 713 V. Ludlow, 6 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 316 1105 V. Old Colony &c. R. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 143 312, 320, 321 V. Penniman, 4 Mass. 91 270 V. Robinson, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 623 902, 909, 921 V. Snow, 66 Iowa 544 1250 V. Steinmetz, 9 W. N. C. (Pa.) 574 562, 564 Lang V. Adams, 71 Kans. 309 1572 V. Buffalo Seamen's Union, 22 Alb. L. J. (N. Y.) 114 233 Langan v. Sankey, 55 Iowa 52 1494 Langford v. Leggitt, 99 Miss. 266 • 783 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Langford v. Mackay, 12 Bradw. (111.) 223 1199, 1463 Langsdorf v. Le Gardeur, 27 La. Ann. 363 620 Langstaff v. Stix, 64 Miss. 171 940 Langston v. Anderson, 69 Ga. V. Roby, 68 Ga. 406 217 Langworthy v. New York &c. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 195 262 Langworthy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 19 N. Dak. 433 1219a Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. Car. 337 1219, 1325 Lanigan v. Bradley &c. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 201 1498 Lann v. Church, 4 Madd. 391 149, 166, 228 Lanning v. Tompkins, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 308 77 '^ansing v. Ensign, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 363 185 V. Rattoone, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 43 576 Lanyon v. Blanchard, 2 Camp. 597 423 Lapene v. Meegel, 26 La. Ann. SO 456 Lapenta v. Lettieri, 72 Conn. 377 1499 Lapham v. Ransford, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. 81 123S Laraway v. Tillotson, 81 Vt. 487 577 Larch, The, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 427 1697a, 1707 T.arch, The, 3 Ware (U. S.) 28 1697 Larkin v. McMullin, 120 N. Y. 206 1286, 1287, 1293, 1299, 1512 Larkins v. Blakeman, 42 Conn. 292 1314 Larmine v. Carley, 114 111. 196 470a Earner. In re, 20 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.) 73 138 Larscheid v. Hashek Mfg. Co., 142 Wis. 172 1061 V. Kitten, 142 Wis. 172 1091 Las-well v. Presbyterian Chnirch, 46 Mo. 279 1406, 1409, 1452 Latham v. Staples, 46 Ala. 462 1094 Lathrop v. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282 611 Latson v. Nelson, 11 Pac. Coast L. J. 589 1287. 1289 Lauer v. Bandow, 43 Wis. 556 1248. 1262, 1263 V. Dunn, 115 N. Y. 405 1218. 1301 V. Dunn, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 191 1218, 130], 1511 Laughlin v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 153 Mo. App. 508 181a V. Reed, 89 Maine Z26 1546 Lauman's Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 473 1392, 1404 Launberga, The, 154 Fed. 959 1796 Launsbury v. Iowa &c. R. Co., 49 Iowa 255 1290 Lauretta, The, 9 Fed. 622 1799. 1800 Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172 1063, 1090, 1101 V. Atkins, 20 Nebr. 206 206 v. Hall, 60 Ala. 214 603 ex VI TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Lavigne v. Naramore, 52 Vt. 267 1110 Laviolette v. Redding, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 81 1272, 1532 Lavoie v. Burke, 69 N. H. 144 1215 Law V. Butler, 44 Minn. 482 1092 Lawrence v. Meyer, 35 Ark 104 1090 V. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521 260 V. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. T.) 107 1459 V. Weeks, 107 N. Car. 119 457 Lawrenceburgh Ferry-boat v. Smith, 7 Ind. 520 1743 Lawson v. Cundiff, 81 Mo. App. 169 1090 V. Dickenson, 8 Mod. 306 126 V. Hogan, 93 N. Y. 39 1598 V. Kimball, 68 N. H. 549 1215 Lawton v. Case. 73 Ind. 60 1200. 1590 Lax V. Peterson, 42 Minn. 214 1313, 1317 Leach v. Minick, 106 Iowa 437 1462 V. Thompson, 138 111. App. 85 1291 Leads V. Little, 42 Minn. 414 1599 Leahart v. Deedmeyer, 158 Ala. 295 169 Leak v. Cooks, 52 Miss. 799 783 V. Williams, 30 Ky. L. 782 1067 Learned v. Brown, 94 Fed. 876 1681, 1698, 1745 Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. T. 222 30 V. Corvin, 92 App. Div. (N. Y.) 544 39 Leask v. Hoagland, 64 Misc. (N. Y.) 156 184 V. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376 949 Leavenson v. Lafontaine, 3 Kans. 523 176, 217 Leaver v. Kilmer, 71 N. J. L. 291 1373 Leavy v. Kinsella, 39 Conn. 50 849, 972 Le Blanc, In re, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 8 88 Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. Car. 276 594, 631 Ledford v. Smith, 6 Bush CKv.) 129 1063, 1074 Ledos v. Kupfrian, 28 N. J. Eq. 161 1080, 1083 Ledoux V. Jones, 20 La. Ann. 530 620 Lee V. Burke, 66 Pa. St. 336 1306. 1416 V. Citizens Nat. Bank, 13 Ohio Dec. 913 378, 384 V. Creditors, 2 La. Ann. 599 111 V. Glemingsburg, 7 Dana (Ky.) 28 490 V. Gould, 47 Pa. St. 398 747, 1002 V. Hovt, 101 Iowa 101 1327 V. Kimball, 45 Maine 172 946, 949 V. Lee's Admr., 30 Kv. L. 619 40 V. Murphy, 119 Cal. '364 1086 V. O'Brien. 54 Tex. 635 1556 V. Phelps, 54 Tex. 367 1556 V. Storz Brew. Co., 75 Nebr. 212 1604 V. Vanmeter, 98 Ky. 1 660, 691 V. Winston, 68 Ala. 402 229 Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. & P. 320 917, 921, 944 Leese v. Martin, L. R. 17 Elq. 224 254 Leftwich Lumber Co. v. Flor- ence Mut. Bldg. &c. Assn., 104 Ala. 584 1494, 1532, 1617c Legg V. Evans, 6 M. & "W. 36 986 V. Mathieson, 2 Giff. (U. S.) 71 1675 V. Willard, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 140 1014 Leggett V. Bank of Sing Sing, 24 N. Y. 283 376, 377, 393, 398 Legnard v. Armstrong, 18 Bradw. (111.) 549 1199 Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Cen- tral R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 252 1630 Lehman v. Howze. 73 Ala. 302 603 v. Stone, 4 Wills. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) 121 576a, 638 V. Tallahassee Mfg. Co., 64 Ala. 567 244 Lehman, Ex parte, 59 Ala. 631 169, 203, 217, 218 Lehmann v. Schmidt, 87 Cal. 15 1018 Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 111. 317 1092 Leiberman v. Bowden, 121 Tenn. 496 1076 Leiby v. Wilson, 40 Pa. St. 63 1282 Leiegne v. Schwarzler, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 130 1400, 1594 V. Schwarzler, 10 Daly (N. Y.) 547 1218 Leighton v. Serveson, 8 S. Dak. 350 189d Leightsey v. Rentz, 85 S. Car. 401 458 Leird v. Abernathy, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 626 1102a Leismann v. Lovely, 45 Wis. 420 1238 Leisse v. Schwartz, 6 Mo. App. 413 1263, 1404 Leitch V. Owings, 34 Md. 262 622 Leith's Estate, In re, L. R. 1 P. C. 296 4, 7 Leiweke v. Jordan, 59 Mo. App. 619 1067 Leland v. The Medora, 2 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 92 1709, 1800, 1801, 1805 Lemay v. Johnson, 35 Ark. 225 606 Lembeck v. Jarvis Terminal Cold Storage Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 492 310 V. Jarvis Terminal Cold Stor- age Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 781 309 Lemieux v. English, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 545 1299 Lemly v. La Grange Iron &c. Co., 65 Mo. 545 1422 Lempriere v. Pasley. 2 T. R. 485 431 Lenel's Succession, 34 La. Ann. 868 1204 Lenox v. Yorkville Co., 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 673 1608 Leonard v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498 1375 V. Cook, (N. J. Eq.), 20 Atl. 855 • 1487 TABLE OF CASES. CXVll [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ lOGl-1812.] Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black (U. S.) 476 800, 850 V. Decker, 22 Fed. 741 1770 V. Harris, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458 515 V. Reynolds, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 73 1375 V. Sheard, 1 El. & 131. 667 837 Leonard Richards, The, 41 Fed. 818 1781 Leonard's Exrs. v. Winslow, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 139 265 Leopold V. P^urber, 84 Ky. 214 1128 V. Godfrey, 50 Fed. 145 613 V. Godfrey, 11 Biss. (U. S.) 158 552 Le Roy v. Globe Ins. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 657 88 Lesher v. Roessner, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 217 209, 214 Leslie v. Hinson, 83 Ala. 266 990 Lessard v. Revere, 171 Mass. 294 1375 Lessasier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods (U. S.) 35 949 Lessells v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 364 673 Lessels v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 73 690, 694, 1009 Lesseps v. Ritcherm, 18 La. Ann. 653 620 Lester v. Houston, 101 N. Car. 605 1219, 1235 V. Pedigo, 84 Va. 309 1229 Leszynsky v. Merritt, 9 Fed. 688 115, 122, 135 Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607 43, 45, 47, 55 Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 99 265, 901 Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 571 815 Levering v. Bank, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 152 1700 Levy v. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 149 423, 447, 469 V. Rudolph, 22 Ky. L. 258 1096 V. Steinbach, 43 Md. 212 217 V. Twiname, 42 Ga. 249 552 Lewin v. Whittenton Mills, 13 Gray (Mass.) 100 1411 Lewis V. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61 1108 V. Caperton, 8 Grat. (Va.) 148 1081 V. Chapmen, 59 Mo. 371 1116 V. Chicksaw Co., 50 Iowa 234 1375 V. Covilland, 21 Cal. 178 1086, 1092 V. Cranmer, 36 N. J. Eq. 124 1102a V. Day, 10 Wkly. Dig. 49 185, 198 V. Galena &c. R. Co., 40 111. 281 460 V. Hancock, 11 Mass. 72 270 V. Harris, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 353 1178 V. Hawkins, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 119 1108, 1123 V. Henderson, 22 Ore. 548 1076 V. Kinealy, 2 Mo. App. 33 137 V. Lozee, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 79 585 Lewis V. Lyman, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 437 550 V. McDowell, 88 N. Car. 261 1123 V. Mahon, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 374 636 V. Mason. 36 U. C. Q. B. 590 865, 878, 931 V. Omaha St. R. Co. (Nebr.), 114 N. W. 281 114, 183 V. Owens, 124 Ga. 228 781 V. Pusey, 8 Bush (Ky.) 615 1116 V. Saylors, 73 Iowa 504 1311 V. Shearer, 189 111. 184 1064, 1092 V. Tyler, 23 Cal. 364 641 Lewis' Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 312 598, 632, 633 Lewis Co. V. Knowlton, 84 Minn. 53 993 Lewis, Ex parte, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 483 1719 Lex V. Holmes, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 10 1262 L'Hommedieu v. Dayton, 38 Fed. 926 1026 L'Hote Lumber Co. v. Dugui, 115 La. 669 1204 Libbev v. Tidden, 192 Mass. 175 1367 Liberty No. 4, The, 7 Fed. 226 1781, 1798 Lichtentag v. Feitel, 113 La. 931 1204 Lichty V. Houston Lumber Co., 39 Colo. 53 1447 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21 10, 20, 335, 418, 466, 858, 862, 986, 1033 V. Mason, 2 T. R. 63 946 V. Mason, 5 T. R. 367 807 V. Mason, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 753 909, 951 V. Mason, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 797 858 Liebstein v. Newark, 24 N. J. Eq. 200 1487 Liefert v. Galveston &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.). 57 S. W. 899 332a Lienard v. Dresslar, 3 Fost. & Fin. 212 473 Liesmann v. Lovely, 45 Wis. 420 1248 Liggett Spring & Axles' Co. In re appeal of, 111 Pa. St. 291 . 241 Lighthouse v. Third Nat. Bank, 162 N. Y. 336 744 Lightner v. Brannen, 99 Ga. 606 611 Lillie V. Case, 54 Iowa 177 1108 Lillie Laurie, The, 50 Fed. 219 1787, 1793a Lillie Mills, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 307 1799, ISOOa Lillie, The, 42 Fed. 237 1800. 1810, 1811 Limerick v. Ketcham, 17 Okla. 532 1262 Lime Rock, The, 49 Fed. 383 1690, 1699, 1799a, 1808 Linda Flor, The, Swab. 309 1781 Lindauer v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 75 261 Lindbloom v. Kidston, 2 Alaska 292 1079 CXVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Lindemann v. Belden Consol. M. &c. Co., 16 Colo. App. 342 1367 Linden Steel Co. v. Imperial Refining- Co., 146 Pa. St. 4 1334, 1421 Lindholm v. Itasca Lumber Co., 64 Minn. 46 179 Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106 1200, 1260, 1455 V. Miller, -67 111. 244 613 Lindner v. Hine, 84 Mich. 511 176 Lindsay v. Gunning, 59 Conn. 296 1369 V. Huth, 74 Mich. 712 1451 V. Lowe, 64 Ga. 438 1053 Lindsay &c. Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. S. 126 713 V. Zoecler, 128 Iowa 558 1201 Lindsay v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397 1092, 1096 V. Lindsey, 45 Ind. 552 1163 Lindslev v. Caldwell, 234 Mo. 498 181a Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland (Md.) 236 1099, 1108 Linn v. Bass, 84 Ala. 281 1094 V. O'Hara, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 560 1513 Linne v. Stout, 41 Minn. 483 1604 Llnneman v. Bieber, 85 Hun (N. Y.) 477 1494, 1532 Linthicum v. Tapscott, 28 Ark. 267 1099 Linton v. Butz, 7 Pa. St. 89 813 Linville v. Savage, 58 Mo. App. 509 1080 Lipman v. Jackson Iron Works, 128 N. Y. 58 1485 Lippincott V. Leeds, 77 Pa. St. 420 1260 Lipscomb v. Fuqua, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 535 1110 Liquid Carbonic Acid Mfg. Co. V. Lewis, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 481 553 Lissa V. Posey, 64 Miss. 352 1081 Litchfield v. Johnson, 4 Dill. (U. S.) 551 1142, 1145, 1146 Litherland v. Cohn Real Estate &c. Co., 54 Ore. 71 1236 Lithgow V. Sweedberg (Tex.), 78 S. W. 246 772 Litt V. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169 883, 888, 899 V. Cowlev, 1 Holt N. P. 338 887 Littell &c. Co. V. Miller, 3 Wash. 480 1397 Little V. Brown, 2 Leigh (Va.) 353 1066, 1080 V. Rogers, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 478 162 V. Sexton, 89 Ga. 411 173 V. Vredenburgh, 16 Bradw. (111.) 189 1262, 1269, 1519 Littlefield v. Morrill, 97 Maine 505 710 Littlejohn v. Millirons, 7 Ind. 125 1257 Littler v. Friend. 167 Ind. 36 1276 Little Rock, H. S. & T. R. Co. V. Spencer, 65 Ark. 183 1629 Littleton Savings Bank v. Osce- ola Land Co., 76 Iowa 660 1240 Little Valeria &c. Co. v. Inger- soll, 14 Colo. App. 240 1276 Live Oak, The, 30 Fed. 78 1793, 1805 Livermore v. Wright, 33 Mo. 31 1431, 1432 Livesey v. Hamilton, 47 Nebr. 644 1532 Livingston v. Farish, 89 N. Car. 140 631 V. Lovgren, 27 Wash. 102 718 V. Mildrum, 19 N. Y. 440 1218. 1581 V. Newkirk, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 312 1104 L. L. Lamb, The, 31 Fed. 29 1704 Lloyd V. Arney, 43 Ind. App. 450 1200 V. Hibbs, 81 Pa. St. 306 1262 Lloyd, In re, 22 Fed. 90 789 L. Luderbach Plumbing Co. v. Its Creditors, 121 La. 371 620 Loaners' Bank v. Nostrand, 21 J. & S. (N. Y.) 525 232 Lochte V. Lefehvre, 128 La. 108 456 Locke V. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1 794 v. Prescott, 32 Beav. 261 248 Lockett V. Nicklin, 2 Ex. 93 856 Lockhart v. Smith, 40 S. Car. 112 458 Lockwood V. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 9 R. I. 308 377 Loeb V. Blum, 25 La. Ann. 232 904 V. Peters, 63 Ala. 243 857, 885, 887, 946, 949, 964 Loewenberg v. Arkansas &c. R. Co., 56 Ark. 439 294 Lofton V. Moore, 83 Ind. 112 1164 Logan V. Attex, 7 Iowa 77 1235, 1532, 1589 V. Billings &c. R. Co., 40 Mont. 457 713 V. Taylor, 20 Iowa 297 1487 Logwood V. Robertson, 62 Ala. 523 1069 Lomax v. Dore, 45 111. 379 1199, 1571 V. LeGrand, 60 Ala. 537 576a, 603, 777 Lombard v. Johnson, 76 111. 599 1568 London & N. "W. R. Co. v. Bart- lett, 7 H. & N. 400 919 V. Glyn, 1 El. & El. 652 2S0 London Chartered Bank v. White, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 413 244 Long v. Abeles, 77 Ark. 156 1189, 1492, 1513 V. Burke, 2 Bush (Ky.) 90 1074 V. Caffrey, 93 Pa. St. 526 1289, 1500, 1500a V. McLanahan, 103 Pa. St. 537 1282, 1310 V. Pace, 42 Ala. 495 1102 V. Scott, 24 App. D. C. 1 1178 V. Wilkinson, 57 Ala. 259 1092 Long Island, North Shore &c. Transp. Co., In re, 5 Fed. 599 1806a Long Island R. R. Co., In re, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 37 381 Longstreet v. Phile, 39 N. J. L. 63 1034 Longstreth v. Pennock, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 575 560 Longwell v. Ridinger, 1 Gill (Md.) 57 600 TABLE OF CASES. CXIX [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Longworth v. Handy, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 75 115, 137, 147, 226 Lonkey v. Cook, 15 Nev. 58 1214, 1304, 1304a V. Wells, 16 Nev. 271 1214, 1418, 1420 Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion &c. R. Co., 109 N. Car. 658 1470, 1574 V. Sanford, 112 N. Car. 655 1574 Loomis V. Davenport &c. R. Co., 17 Fed. 301 1069, 1076, 1086, 1088 Loonie v. Hogan, 9 N. Y. 435 1245, 1248, 1296 Lord V. Collins, 76 Maine 443 108, 662 V. Johnson, 120 111. App. 55 613 V. Jones, 24 Maine 439 644, 731 V. Lord, 22 Conn. 595 1165 V. Wilcox, 99 Ind. 491 1101, 1102 V. Wormleig-hton, Jac. 580 122a Loring- v. Small, 50 Iowa 271 1375 Los Angeles County v. Winans, 13 Cal. App. 234 93 Los Angeles Gold Min. Co. v. Campbell, 13 Colo. App. 1 1616a Los Angeles Pressed Brick Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Boule- vard &c. Co., 7 Cal. App. 460 1328 Losie V. Underwood Lumber Co., 79 Wis. 631 719 Loss V. Fry, 1 City Ct. (N. Y.) 7 744, 1793 V. Fry, 1 Robt. (N. Y.) 7 744, 1793 Loth V. Carty, 85 Ky. 591 619 Lothian v. Wood, 55 Cal. 159 1279, 1387 Lottawanna, The, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 201 1706a Lottawanna, The, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 558 1680, 1725, 1729 1730, 1731, 1745, 1776, 1793a, 1806a Loud V. Pritchett, 104 Ga. 648 708 Louis Dole, The, 14 Fed. 862 1799 Louisa Jane, The, 2 Low. (U. S.) 295 1718 Louisa, The, 2 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 48 1799 Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485 1067, 1092, 1094 Louis Olsen, The, 52 Fed. 652 1706, 1729 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mc- Guire, 79 Ala. 395 1019 V. Proctor, 21 Ky. L. 447 177 Louisville Bank v. Newark Bank, 11 Nat. Bank R. 49 384 Louisville Building Assn. v. Kerb, 79 Ky. 190 1462, 1487 Louisville E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson. 138 U. S. 501 1648 Love V. Cox, 68 Ga. 269 781, 1197 V. Shartzer, 31 Cal. 487 1141 Lovett V. Brown, 40 N. H. 511 982, 989 V. Moore, 98 Ga. 158 173 Low V. Martin, 18 111. 286 973 Lowden v. Sorg, 233 111. 79 1552 V. Sorg, 129 111. App. 261 1389 Lowe V. Howard Co., 94 Ind. 553 1375 Lowenstein v. Myer, 114 Ga. 442 756 Lowery v. Peterson, 75 Ala. 109 1107, 1108, 1119 V. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239 60 Low, In re. 2 Low. (LJ. S.) 264 1705 Lowis V. Cutter, 6 Mo. App. 54 1408 Lowrey v. Smith, 97 Ind. 466 1093 V. Svard, 8 Colo. App. 3 57 1614 Loyd V. Guthrie, 131 Ala. 65 1535 V. Krause, 147 Pa. St. 402 1289 V. McCaffrey, 46 Pa. St. 410 57 Lucas V. Campbell, 88 111. 447 137 V. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278 256, 825, 828, 921 V. Hunter, 153 Pa. St. 293 1313 V. Peacock, 9 Beav. 177 166 V. Rea (Cal.), 101 Pac. 537 1604 V. Taylor, 105 Md. 90 1747 V. Wade, 43 Fla. 419 1064 Lucas Co. V. Roberts, 49 Iowa 159 1290 Luce V. Curtis, 77 Iowa 347 1462 Luckett V. White, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 480 1163 Lucy V. Hopkins, 11 Ky. L. 907 1063, 1099 Ludgate Hill, The, 21 Fed. 431 1693 Ludington v. Gabbert, 5 W. Va. 330 1116 Ludlow V. Grayall, 11 Price 58 1183 Ludwick V. Davenport-Treasy Piano Co., 112 N. Y. S. 1023 767a Luigart v. Lexington Turf Club, 130 Ky. 73 1276 Lula, The, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 192 1679, 1681, 1686, 1688, 1699, 1793 Lumbard v. Syracuse &c. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 491 1287, 1293, 1294, 1299 Lumbering Mfg. Co. v. School Dist., 13 Ore. 283 1375 Lumbley v. Gilruth, 65 Miss.«23 625 V. Thomas, 65 Miss. 97 783 Lumpkin v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 36 Ga. 135 174 V. Snook, 63 Iowa 515 1503 Lundauer v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 75 259 Lundy v. Pierson, 67 Tex. 233 1110 Luneau v. Edwards, 39 La. Ann. 876 177a, 229 Lunquest v. Ten Evck, 40 Iowa 213 1131, 1142 Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W. Va. 458 1359, 1580 Lunt V. Bank of North Ameri- ca, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 221 57 Lupin V. Marie, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 169 904 V. Marie, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 77 40, 811, 814 Lupton V. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 614 1164 V. Rugges, 2 Pennew. (Del.) 515 608 Lurch V. Brown, 119 N. Y. S. 637 515 V. Wilson, 114 N. Y. S. 789 502 Luscher v. Morris, 18 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 67 1584 Lusk V. Davis, 27 Ind. 334 1743 V. Hopper, 3 Bush (Ky.) 179 1093, 1116, 1119 Luter V. Cobb, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 525 1556 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ lOGl-1812.] Luther v. Arnold, 8 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 24 598 Lutz V. Ely, 3 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 475 1413 V. By, 3 B. D. Smith (N. Y.) 621 1536 Lybrandt v. Eberly, 36 Pa. St. 347 1357 Lycett V. Stafford &c. R. Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 261 1674 Lyde v. Mynn, 4 Sim. 505 78 Lyle V. Barker, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 457 1036 Lynam v. King, 9 Ind. 3 1272, 1276 Lynch v. Cashman, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 660 1287 V. Cronan, 6 Gray (Mass.) 531 1408, 1412 V. Smith, 154 111. App. 469 576a, 580 Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq. 736 206 V. Parker, 155 Mass. 481 691a Lyndhurst, The, 48 Fed. 839 1800a, 1806a Lyon V. Champion, 62 Conn. 75 1263 V. Clark, 132 Mich. 521 1074 V. Elser, 72 Tex. 304 1226 V. Logan, 66 Tex. 57 1600, 1601 V. Logan, 68 Tex. 521 1313 V. McGuffev, 4 Pa. St. 126 1259 V. New York &c. R. Co., 127 Mass. 101 1651 V. Ozee, 66 Tex. 95 1226, 1382 Lyon Lumber Co. v. Equitable L. &c. Co., 174 111. 31 1519 Lyons v. Carter, 84 Mo. App. 483 1619 V. Deppen, 90 Ky. 305 557 V. Howard, 16 N. Mex. 327 1217 Lyste^s Appeal, 54 Mich. 325 1555 Lytle V. Bach, 29 Ky. L. 424 177 M Maanss v. Henderson, 1 East 335 447 Mabie v. Sines, 92 Mich. 545 712 McAllister v. Case, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 299 1218 V. Clopton, 51 Miss. 257 1210 V. Des Rochers, 132 Mich. 381 1413 McAlpin V. Duncan, 16 Cal. 126 1190, 1286, 1287, 1290 McAlpine v. Burnett, 23 Tex. 649 1084 McArthur v. Porter, 1 Ohio 99 1098 McAuley v. Mildrum, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 396 1218, 1313, 1543 McBratney v. Rome &c. R. Co., 17 Hun (N. Y.) 385 206 McBride v. Farmers' Bank, 26 N. Y. 450 259 McBroom's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 92 1665 McCaa v. Grant, 43 Ala. 262 169, 202 McCabe v. Britton, 79 Ind. 224 174 V. Fogg, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 488 185, 189 V. McRae, 58 Maine 95 1500 McCaffery v. Knapp, 74 111. App. 80 1742 McCaffrey v. Wooden, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 316 3 V. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459 542, 544 McCain v. Portis, 42 Ark. 402 170, 228 McCall V. Eastwick, 2 Miles (Pa.) 45 1520 McCamly v. Waterhouse, 80 Tex. 340 1119 McCandless' Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 489 1158 McCandlish v. Keen, 13 Grat. (Va.) 615 40, 1063, 1072 McCants V. Bush, 70 Cal. 125 1190 McCarthy v. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 442 1263 V. Groff, 48 Minn. 325 1439 V. Miller, 122 111. App. 299 1461 V. Neu, 93 111. 455 1555 McCartney v. Buck, 8 Houst. (Del.) 34 1331, 1333, 1347, 1361, 1555 McCarty v. Burnet, 84 Ind. 23 1272, 1274 V. Carter, 49 111. 53 1239, 1245, 1253, 1256, 1257, 1280 V. Van Etten, 4 Minn. 461 1421 V. Williams, 69 Ala. 174 1074 McCaslin v. Nance, 4 6 S. Car. 568 7S4c V. State, 44 Ind. 151 1116, 1124, 1127 McClain v. Williams, 11 S. Dak. 227 515 McClaugherty v. Croft, 43 W. Va. 270 1101 McClintic v. Wise, 25 Grat. (Va.) 448 1119, 1120 McClintock v. Criswell, 67 Pa. St. 183 1277 V. Rush, 63 Pa. St. 203 1407, 1421 McClure v. Harris, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261 1086 McColl V. Eraser, 40 Hun (N. Y.) Ill 1180 McComb V. Judsonia State Bank, 91 Ark. 218 817 McCombie v. Davis, 7 East 5 20, 307, 460, 987 McCombs V. Becker, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 342 543, 548 McConnell v. Beattie, 34 Ark. 113 1108, 1119, 1122 McCorkle v. Herrmann, 117 N. Y. 297 1294 McCormack v. Butland, 191 Mass. 424 12,'-j4 V. Phillips, 4 Dak. 506 1184, 1559 McCormick v. Blum, 75 Miss. 81 783 V. Hadden, 37 111. 370 820 V. Lawton, 3 Nebr. 449 1213, 1263, 1264, 1578 V. Los Angeles City Water Co., 40 Cal. 185 1357 McCoy V. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463 1131, 1144, 1145 V. McCoy, 36 W. Va. 772 229 V. Quick, 30 Wis. 521 1425, 1537, 1571, 1600 McCraw v. Gilmer, 83 N. Car. 162 814 TABLE OF CASES. CXXl [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] McCready v. Rumsey, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 574 377, 379, 388 McCree v. Campion, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 9 1361, 1475 McCreery v. Claffin. 37 Md. 435 564 McCrie v. Hixon Lumber Co., 7 Kans. App. 39 1462 McCrillis v. Wilson, 34 Maine 286 724 McCrisaken v. Osweiler, 70 Ind. 131 758 McCristal v. Cochran, 147 Pa. St. 225 1309b, 1353 McCue V. Whitwell, 156 Mass. 205 1252a, 1514 McCulloug-h V. Baker, 47 Mo. 401 1513a V. Caldwell's Exr., 8 Ark. 231 692a V. Flournoy, 69 Ala. 189 229 V. Kibler, 5 S. Car. 468 458 McCutchon v. Wilkinson, 12 La. Ann. 483 456 McDaniel v. Cain, 159 Ala. 344 605 McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316 503, 504, 518 McDearmid v. Foster, 14 Ore. 417 749, 769, 776 McDermott v. Palmer, 8 N. Y. 383 1349 McDole V. Purdy, 23 Iowa 277 1063, 1067, 1071, 1088 McDonald v. Backus, 45 Cal. 262 1190, 1575 V. Beach, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 55 788, 790 V. Bennett, 45 Iowa 456 641, 658 V. Elyton Land Co., 78 Ala. 382 1071 V. Kelly, 14 R. I. 335 1223, 1498 V. Lindall, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 492 1423 V. Mayor, 170 N. Y. 409 1454 V. Minneapolis Lumber Co., 28 Minn. 262 1371 V. Napier, 14 Ga. 89 146, 167, 203 V. Patterson, 186 111. 381 1427 V. Patterson, 84 111. App. 326 1608 V. Rosengarten, 134 111. 126 1452, 1453 V. Smith, 57 Vt. 502 217, 218 V. The Nimbus, 137 Mass. 360 1725, 1725a, 1748, 1807 V. Willis, 143 Mass. 452 1451 McDonell v. Dodge, 10 Wis. 106 1238 McDonough v. Cross, 40 Tex. 251 1086 V. Sherman, 138 App. Div. (N. Y.) 291 184 McDougall V. Crapon, 95 N. Car. 292 745, 749, 768, 997 McDowell V. Bank of Wilming- ton, 1 Harr. (Del.) 27 377, 391, 398 V. Bank of Wilmington & Brandywine, 1 Harr. (Del.) 369 241 V. Rockwood, 182 Mass. 150 1207 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 670 196, 197 V. The Lena Alowbray, 71 Fed. 720 1706 McElmurray v. Turner, 86 Ga. 215 781 McElroy v. Braden, 152 Pa. St. 78 1289, 1502 V. Dice, 17 Pa. St. 163 632 McElwaine v. Hosey, 135 Ind. 481 1200 McElwee v. Metropolitan Lum- ber Co., 69 Fed. 302 834, 842 V. Sandford, 53 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 89 1401 McEvoy V. Niece, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 686 638 McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 309 823, 852, 881, 958 McEwen v. Union Bank &c. Co., 35 Mont. 470 1450 McE'arland v. Farmer, 42 N. H. 386 820 v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467 22. 24. 731, 740, 997, 1001 McFarlane v. Foley, 27 Ind. App. 484 1341 McFeron v. Doyens, 59 Ore. 366 1221, 1385, 1494 McFetridge v. Piper. 40 Iowa 627 927, 929, 937, 940 McGee v. Fitzer, 37 Tex. 27 556 McGeever v. Harris, 148 Ala. 503 1263 McGeorge v. Stanton-DeLong Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 7 719, 774 McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506 499, 502, 504, 641. 691, 692a, 744 McGill v. Howard, 61 Miss. 411 625 McGiliick V. McAllister, 10 111. App. 40 598 McGillicuddy v. Edwards, 96 Maine 347 662 McGillivray v. Case, 107 Iowa 17 1451, 1453 McGinnis v. The Grand Turk, 2 Pitts. (U. S.) 326 1715 McGinniss v. Purrington, 43 Conn. 143 1248 McGirr v. Sell, 60 Ind. 249 820 McGlauflin v. Beeden, 41 Minn. 408 1392 V. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177 1589 McGonigal v. Plummer, 30 Md. 422 1076, lOSG McGowan v. Gate City Malt Co., 89 Nebr. 10 1213 McGrade v. German Savings Inst., 4 Mo. App. 330 57 McGrath v. Barlow (Miss.), 21 So. 237 580 McGraw v. Bayard, 96 111. 146 1199, 1504, 1559, 15S0, 1585 v. Godfrey, 56 N. Y. 610 1259, 1613 McGreary v. Osborne, 9 Cal. 119 1272 McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 237 187, 188, 214 V. Cook, 4 Will. (Tex.) Civ. Cas. Ct. App. 141 1375 V. Matthis, 32 Ga. 417 1119 McGrew v. McCarty, 78 Ind. 496 1310 McGugin V. Ohio River R. Co., 33 W. Va. 63 1231, 1235, 1283, 1554 McGuinn v. Federated Mines &c. Co., 160 Mo. App. 28 1276 McGuinness v. Boyle, 123 Mass. 570 1316 McHendry v. Reilly. 13 Cal. 75 1069 McHenry v. Kniclverbocker, 128 Ind. 77 l.'Ol cxxu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] McHenry v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co.. 4 Harr. (Del.) 448 284 Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio St. .519 12G0 McHorney v. The D. B. Steelman, 70 Fed. 326 1800 Mcllvain v. Hestonville &c. R. Co., 5 Phila. (Pa.) 13 137S. 161S Mcllvane v. Hilton, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 594 507 Mclntire, In re, 142 Fed. 593 639 Mcintosh V. Schroeder, 154 111. 520 1564 V. Thurston, 25 N. J. Eq. 242 1248, 1252a, 1272, 1458 Mclritosk V. Bach, 110 Ky. 701 230 Mclntyre v. Carver, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 392 14, 26, 731, 733 V. Trautner, 63 Cal. 429 1190, 1445 V. Trautner, 78 Cal. 449 1616 Mack V. Colleran, 136 N. Y. 617 1294, 1307 V. Colleran, 18 N. Y. S. 104 1297, 1307 McKay v. Green, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 56 1101, 1182 V. Gulf Refining- Co., 176 Fed. 93 1740 McKee v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 41 Fed. 117 1491, 1589 McKeen v. Haseltine, 46 Minn. 426 1356, 1520, 1532 McKelvain v. Allen, 58 Tex. 383 1110 McKelvey v. Jarvis, 87 Pa. St. 414 1308 V. Wonderly, 26 Mo. App. 631 1211 McKenzie v. Baldridge, 49 Ala. 564 1127 V. Wardwell, 61 Maine 136 214 ^klcKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276 1088 Mackey v. Craig, 144 Ind. 203 1102 McKibben v. Worthington's Exrs., 103 Kv. 356 1054a McKillip V. McKillip, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 552 1071 McKim V. Moody, 1 Rand. (Va.) 58 1146 McKinnev v. Reader, 6 Watts (Pa.) 34 632 v. White, 162 N. Y. 601 1396 McKinnon v. Johnson, 54 Fla. 538 1061, 1073 McKircher v. Hawley, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 289 598, 599 McKleroy v. Cantey, 95 Ala. 295 602 V. Tulane, 34 Ala. 78 1126 McKnight v. Parish of Grant, 30 La. Ann. 361 1204 V. Spain, 13 Mo. 534 100 v. Washington, 8 W. Va. 666 1231, 1289, 1290 Mackreth v. Symmons. 15 Ves. 329 1061, 1074, 1075, 1083 Mack S. S. Co. v. Thompson, 176 Fed. 499 1717 McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa 297 1262 McLaughlin v. Green, 48 Miss. 175 1210, 1539 V. Reinhart, 54 Md. 71 1505, 1524 v. Riggs, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 410 600 McLaurie v. Thomas, 39 111. 291 1086, 1092 McLean v. Breithaupt, 12 Ont. App. 383 935 McLean v. Fleming, L. R. 2 H. L. (Scotch) 128 274 V. Klein, 3 Dill. (U. S.) 113 543 v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean (U. S.) 587 398, 407 V. Sanford, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 603 1276 V. Wiley, 176 Mass. 233 1444 V. Young, 2 MacAr. (D. C.) 184 1424 McLearn v. McLellan, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 625 1063 McLeod V. Capell, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 196 1225 V. Evans, 66 Wis. 401 37 Maclzer v. Swan, 75 Kans. 496 580 McMahon v. Bridwell, 3 Mo. App. 572 1306 V. Vickery, 4 Mo. App. 225 1341 McManigle v. Grouse, 34 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 384 676 Macmanus v. Thurber, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 604 68 McMaster v. Merrick, 41 Mich. 505 998, 1002, 1412 McMeekin v. Worcestor, 99 Iowa 243 742 McMillan v. Phillips, 5 Dak. 294 1286 V. Schenider, 147 Mich. 258 1270 V. Seneca Lake Grape &c. Co., 5 Hun (N. Y.) 12 1286, 1290, 1298 McMillen v. Rose, 54 Iowa 522 1121 McMonagl© v. Nolan, 98 Mass. 320 1748 V. Wilson, 103 Mich. 264 1413 McMurray v. Hutcheson, 10 Daly (N. Y.) 64 1511 V. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 1532 McMurrich v. Bond Head Harbor Co., 9 U. C. Q. B. 333 375 McMurry v. Brown, 91 U. S. 257 1519, 1524, 1525 McNab &c. Mfg. Co. v. Paterson Bldg. Co., 71 N. J. Eq. 133 1216, 1345, 1412 McNagney v. Frazer, 1 Ind. App. 98 174 McNail V. Ziegler, 68 111. 224 806, 850 McNamara v. Godair, 161 111. 228 641 McNamee v. Ranch, 128 Ind. 59 1421 McNaughton v. Elkhart, 85 Ind. 384 1492 McNeal v. Clement, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 363 1512 McNeal Pipe Co. v. Howland, 111 N. Car. 615 1378, 1480 McNeal Pipe &c. Co. v. Bullock, 38 Fed. 565 1374, 1378, 1587 McNicholas v. Tinsler, 127 111. App. 381 1276 McNiel, Ex parte, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236 1725, 1729 McNultv v. Offerman, 141 App. Div. (N. Y.) 730 1255 McNutt V. Strayhorn, 39 Pa. St. 269 789 Macomber v. Bigelow, 126 Cal. 19 1494 Macon & Western R. Co. v. Mea- dor, 65 Ga. 705 895, 901, 902, 937, 9C0 TABLE OF CASES. CXXlll [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; yol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] McPhee v. Guthrie, 51 Ga. 83 1141, 1145 V. Kay, 30 Nebr. 62 1451 V. Liitclifield, 145 Mass. 565 1401 McPheeters v. Merimac Bridge Co., 28 Mo. 465 1375, 1618 McVherson v. Cox. 96 U. S. 404 115, 119, 134, 167 V. Johnson, 69 Tex. 4S4 1123 V. Smith, 14 Wash. 226 718 V. Walton, 42 N. J. Eq. 282 1216 McQuaide v. Stewart, 48 Pa. St. 198 1308 McQuinn v. Federated &c. Mill. Co., 160 Mo. App. 28 1211 McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co., 86 Fed. 344 1700, 1756 V. Creditors, 16 La. Ann. 305 1022 V. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194 192 McRimmon v. Martin, 14 Tex. 318 1084 McSorley v. Larissa, 100 Mass. 270 1142 Mac, The, L. R. 7 Prob. Div. 126 1677 McWhirter v. Swaffer, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 342 1092 McWilliams v. Allan, 45 Mo. 573 1414, 1418 V. Brookens, 39 Wis. 334 1127 V. Jenkins, 72 Ala. 480 166, 229 Macy V. DeWolf. 3 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 193 1697a Madaris v. Eldwards, 32 Kans. 284 1486 Madden v. Barnes, 45 Wis. 135 1074 V. Kempster, 1 Camp. 12 434 Maddox v. Maddox, 146 Ala. 460 576a V. Oxford, 70 Ga. 179 1178 Madison County Coal Co. v. Steamboat Colona, 36 Mo. 446 1436 Madison Supply &c. Co. v. Ricli- ardson, 8 Ga. App. 344 568, 611 Madrid, The, 40 Fed. 677 1722, 1729, 1773. 1793a, 1794 Maelzer v. Swan, 75 Kans. 496 580, 617 Maggie Hammond, The, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 435 1720a, 1729 Maggie P., The, 32 Fed. 300 1715 Magowan v. Stevenson, 58 N. J. L. 31 1216 V. Stevenson, 58 N. J. L. 408 1216 Magruder v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 217 1099, 1116 Maguire v. Card, 21 How. (U. S.) 248 1729, 1730 Mahan v. Surerus. 9 N. Dak. 57 1184a Maher v. Shull, 1 Colo. App. 322 1249 Maher, In re, 169 Fed. 947 3 Mahley v. German Bank, 174 N. Y. 499 1218 V. German Bank, 66 App. Div. (N. T.) 623 1218 Mahon v. Guilfoyle, IS N. Y. S. 93 1512 Mahone v. Southern Tel. Co., 33 Fed. 702 201a Maine, The, 184 Fed. 968 1698 Main St. Hotel Co. v. Horton Hdw. Co., 56 Kans. 448 1287 Main, The, 51 Fed. 954 1713 Mairs v. Bank of Oxford, 58 Miss. 919 1084 Major v. Bukley, 51 Mo. 227 1084 V. Collins, 11 Bradw. (111.) 658 1312, 1495, 1610 Majors v. Maxwell, 120 Mo. App. 281 990 Makings v. Makings, 1 De G., F. & J. 355 1163, 1164 Malbon v. Birney, 11 Wis. 107 1512, 1513 Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare 39 43, 55 v. Burrett, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 234 299 V. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412 1031 V. La Crosse Abattoir Co., 80 Wis. 170 1232, 1304, 1304a V. Marion Water-Works Co., 77 Iowa .715 1290 Malmgren v. Phinney, 50 Minn. 457 1458, 1560 Malon V. Scholler, 48 Ind. App. 691 ^1076 Malone v. Big Flat Min. Co., 76 Cal. 578 141.i V. Shamokin Val. &c. R. Co., 85 Pa. St. 25 1665 V. Shamokin Val. &c. R. Co., 34 Leg. Int. 438 1665 V. Wright (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 455 253 V. Zielian, 1 Man. (Del.) 285 1432 Malone's Committee v. Lubus, 29 Ky. L. 800 .„^*^^^ Malter v. Falcon Min. Co., 18 Nev 209 1390, 1397, 1401, 1556 Mame, The. 189 Fed. 419 1717 Man V. Shiffner. 2 East 523^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Manasses v. Dent. 89 Ala. 565 603 Manchester v. Searle, 121 Mass. 4]^8 1242, 1466 Mandeville v. Reed, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 173 ^^^ ^ 1548 Maneely v. New York, 119 App. Div (N. Y.) 376 1570 Mangum v. Stadel, 76 Kans. 764^ ^^^ Manhasset, The, 18 Fed. 918^^^ ^'^^^^ Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Pauli- son, 28 N. J. Eq. 304 1439 Manhattan, The, 46 Fed. 79^7 ^^ ^^^^^ Manifold V. Jones, ^^\^^^W\\ ^^,^ Manlowsky v. Stephan, 233 HI- 409 161ba Maniy v. Do-"Yfo6'l4?7%5'l585 V. Slason, 21 Vt. 2n^^_ ^^^^^ ^^^^ Mann v. Corrigan, 28 Kans. 194 1647 V. Forrester, 4 Camp^^60 ^^^ ^^^ V. Schroer, 50 Mo. 306 ' 1600 Manning v. Frazier 96 111. 2*9 1072 V. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202 499, o ^ U V. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746 513 Manningford v. Toleman, 1 Coll. 670 -iT:«!> Mann Lumber Co. v. Bailey Iron Works Co., 156 Ala. 598 750 CXXIV TADLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — ^Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Manor v. Heffner, 15 Ind. App. 299 1327 Mansfield v. Dameron, 42 W. Va. 794 1074 V. Dorland, 2 Cal. 507 160, 165 Mantonya v. Reilly, 184 111. 183 1298 V. Rutly, 83 111. App. 275 1299 Manuel v. Reath, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 11 632 Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsbury Hotel Co.. 96 Cal. 322 1439, 1569 Marcardier v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 8 Cranch (U. S.) 39 1692 Marcella Ann, The, 34 Fed. 142 1747 Marchand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 147 Mo. App. 619 1066 Marean v. Stanley, 34 Colo. 91 1617a V. Stanley, 5 Colo. App. 335 1508, 1552 Mareng-o, The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 52 1697, 1697a Marfleld v. Goodhue, 3 N. T. 62 478 Marg-art v. Swift, 3 McCord (S. Ca r)378 552 Margorie, The, 151 Fed. 183 1800 Maria and Elizabeth, The, 12 Fed. 627 1781 Marine & F. Ins. Bank v. Jaun- cey, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 486 60 V. Jauncey, 5 N. T. Super. Ct. 257 55, 58 Marion County v. Rives, 133 Ky. 477 177 Marion S. Harris, The, 85 Fed. 798 1686 Marion, The, 1 Story (U. S.) 68 1723 Mark v. Murphy, 76 Ind. 534 1480 Mark Lane, The, 13 Fed. 800 1713 Markoe v. Andras, 67 111. 34 1111, 1119 Marks v. Lahee, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 408 743 V. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172 976 Markwald v. Creditors, 7 Cal. 213 921 Marlette v. Crawford, 17 Wash. 603 718 Marmon v. White, 151 Ind. 445 1138 Marquat v. Marquat, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 417 1092 Marquess v. Ladd, 30 Ky. L. 1142 618 Marquette Mfg'. Co. v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283 820 Marrener v. Paxton, 17 Nebr. 634 1213, 1304, 1329 Marryatt v. Riley, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 119 1586 Mars V. McKay. 14 Cal. 127 1187 Marschall v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S. W. 812 190a Marseilles Mfg'. Co. v. Morgan, 12 Nebr. 66 695 M.irsh V. Alford, 5 Bush (Ky.) 392 1261 V. Flint, 27 Maine 475 729 V. Fraser, 27 Wis. 596 1232, 1559 V. Oneida Cent. Bank, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 298 241 V. Titus, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 550 67, 846 V. Turner, 4 Mo. 253 1063, 1084 V. Union Pac. R. Co.. 3 Mc- Crary (U. S.) 236 295 Marshall v. Cooper, 43 Md. 46 V. Curtis, 5 Bush (Ky.) 607 'l729 v. Giles, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 488 571 V. Giles, 2 Treadw. Const. (S. Car.) 637 572 V. Hall, 42 W. Va. 641 1101 V. Kaighn, 2 Wkly. N. Cas. 426 1341 V. Marshall (Tex.), 42 S. W. 353 1064, 1074 V. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140 184, 187, 188, 193, 209, 214, 220, 231 Marsh's Admr. v. Elsworth, 37 Ala. 85 111 Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 606 815, 820 v. Kenyon, 44 Conn. 349 1313 1317 1413 V. Stickney, 55 Maine 383 ' 1546 V. Stickney, 60 N. H. 112 1243 Martens v. O'Neill. 131 App. Div. (N. Y.) 123 1290 Martin v. Adams, 104 Mass. 262 813 V. Berry, 159 Ind. 566 1579 v. Black, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 641 569, 577 V. Black, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 580 569, 591 V. Burns, 54 Kans. 641 1418 V. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67 1086, 1090, 1099, 1100 V. Eversal. 36 111. 222 1327, 1331 V. Harrington, 57 Miss. 208 229 V. Hawks, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 405 209, 212, 214 V. Hawthorne, 5 N. Dak. 66 784a V. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418 lOS V. Kanouse, 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 146 217 V. Kennedy, 83 Ky. 335 177 V. Martin, 164 111. 640 1092 V. Morgan, 64 Iowa 270 1290, 1298, 1593 V. Nichols, 121 Ga. 506 1197 V. 0'Ba.nnon, 35 Ark. 62 1108, 1119 V. Pepall, 6 R. I. 92 1271 V. Roberts, 57 Tex. 564 1185, 1226 V. Simmons, 11 Colo. 411 1421 V. Smith, 33 Ky. L. 582 177 V. Smith, 58 N. Y. 672 304 V. Smith, 25 W. Va. 579 1069 V. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345 553. 575, 592, 616 V. Swift, 120 111. 488 1614 V. Turner (Ky. App.), 115 S. W. 833 1092, 1097 V. Wakefield, 42 Minn. 176 724, 728 V. Warren, 109 Mich. 584 1208 Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389 805, 852, 861 Martine v. Nelson, 51 111. 422 1361 Martin, In re, 4 Fed. 208 1450 Martino Cilento, The, 22 Fed. 859 1806 Martsolf v. Barnwell, 15 Kans. 612 1465 Marvin v. Marvin, 75 N. Y. 240 1563a V. Taylor, 27 Ind. 73 1578 V. Wallis, 6 El. ,& Bl. 726 809 TABLE OF CASES. CXXV [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Mary Bell, The, 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 135 1680 Mary Chilton, The. 4 Fed. 847 1681, 1682, 1683, 1685, 1688 Marye v. Dyche, 42 Miss. 347 551, 562, 625 Mary Gratwick, The, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 342 1729 Maryland Brick Co. v. Dunkerly, 85 Md. 199 1329, 1434 V. Spilman, 76 Md. 337 1313, 1329, 1520 Maryland Land &c. Assn. v. Moore, 80 Md. 102 1076 Mary McCabe, The, 22 Fed. 750 1684 Mary Morgan, The, 28 Fed. 196 1688, 1691, 1811 Marysville Nat. Bank v. Snyder, 85 Mo. App. 82 666 Mary, The, 1 Paine (U. S.) 671 1695 Masich v. Shearer. 49 Ala. 226 1084 Maskell v. Farrington, 3 De G., J. & S. 338 1164 Mason v. Daily (N. J. Eq.), 44 Atl. 839 1086, 1087 V. Germaine, 1 Mont. 263 1408, 1413, 1470, 1494, 1495 V. Hatton, 41 U. C. Q. B. 610 806 V. Lickbarrow, 1 H. Bl. 357 857 859 V. Morley, 34 Beav. 471 'lOll V. Redpath, 39 U. C. Q. B. 157 865, 924 V. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280 503, 504, 518 V. Wilson, 43 Ark. 172 923, 929 Mason Stable Co. v. Lewis, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 359 673 Massachusetts & So. Const. Co. v. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145 154, 157, 165-167, 189c Massachusetts Iron Co. v. Hooper, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 183 375 Massey v. Mcllwain, 2 Hill's Bq. (S. Car.) 421 77 Masters v. BaVreda. 18 How. (U. S.) 489 880 V. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447 1086, 1091 Masterson v. Burnett (Tex Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 987 1110 V. Cohen, 46 Tex. 520 1114 V. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145 1108 Mather Humane Stock Transp. Co. V. Anderson, 76 Fed. 164 1625a Mathes v. Staed, 67 Mo. App. 399 581 Mathews v. Burke, 32 Tex. 419 576a V. Davis, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 324 1146 V. Victor Hotel Co., 132 N. Y. S. 375 515 Mathew^son v. Saunders, 11 Conn. 144 1163 Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. 486 6, 731, 732 Matlock V. Matlock, 5 Ind. 403 787 Matter v. Wathen, 99 Ark. 329 806 Matthews v. Creditors, 10 La. Ann. 718 620 V. Gibbs, 30 D. J. Q. B. 55 333 V. Menedg-er, 2 McLean (U. S.) 145 418, 466 V. Stone, 1 Plill (N. Y.) 565 564 Matthews v. Wagenhaeuser Brew. Assn., 83 Tex. 604 1283, 1435 V. Young, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 525 1500a Matthias v. Mesnard, 2 Car. & P. 353 564 Mattie May. The. 45 Fed. 899 1713 Mattie May. The, 47 Fed. 69 1713 Mattison v. Young, 24 N. J. Eq. 535 384 Mattix V. Weand, 19 Ind. 151 1063, 1079, 1080, 1091 Mauch Chunk v. Shortz, 61 Pa. St. 399 1344 Mauck V. Rosser, 126 Ga. 268 1613 Maud Carter, The, 29 Fed. 156 1722, 1791 Maude Webster, The, 8 Ben. (U. S.) 547 1770 Mauney v. Ingram, 78 N. Car. 96 641 Maupin v. McCormick, 2 Bush (Ky.) 206 1074 Maxen v. Landrum, 21 La. Ann. 366 433, 437 Maxey v. White, 53 Miss. 80 625 Maxwell v. The Powell, 1 Woods (U. S.) 99 1811 May v. Lewis, 22 Ala. 646 1126 V. McGaughey, 60 Ark. 357 577 578a V. Wilkinson, 76 Ala. 543 1083, 1099, 1123 Mayer v. Mutchler, 50 N. J. L. 162 1216, 1286 Mayes v. Hendry, 33 Ark. 240 1090, 1100 V. Ruffners, 8 W. Va. 384 1231, 1397 Mayfield v. White, 1 Browne (Pa.) 241 632 Mayham v. Coombs, 14 Ohio 428 1086, 1088 Maynard v. Anderson, 54 N. Y. 641 1018 V. Ivey, 21 Nev. 241 1406, 1412, 1554 May Queen, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 588 1793 Mavrhofer v. Board of Educa- tion, 89 Cal. 110 1375 Mays V. Rogers, 37 Ark. 155 1174 V. Sanders, (Tex.) 36 S. W. 108 1113 V. Sanders, 90 Tex. 132 190a May &c. Brick Co. v. General Engineering Co., 180 111. 535 1405, 1407 Mead v. Thompson, 78 III. 62 614 Meakin v. Duvall, 43 Md. 372 1172 Meands v. Park, 95 Maine 527 710 Meany v. Head, 1 Mason (U. S.) 319 10 Mears v. Kearney, 1 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 303 1090 Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 384 398, 408 V. Merchants' Bank, 45 Mo. 513 377 V. Seton, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 229 376 Mechanics' Mut. L. Assn. v. Al- bertson, 23 N. J. Eq. 318 1216 Mechanics' P. M. Co. v. Nast, 7 Mo. App. 147 1421 CXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Mechanics' Sav. Bank & Trust Co. V. Scoggin (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 718 1141 Medewe's Trust, In re, 26 Beav. 588 251, 252 Meehan v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 83 Minn. 187 1605 V. Williams, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 367 1608 V. Williams, 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 73 1543 Meek v. Parker, 63 Ark. 367 1537 Meeker v. Wilson, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 419 451, 1014 Meekins v. Walker, 119 N. Car. 46 457 Meeks v. Sims, 84 111. 422 1532 Mehl V. Fisher, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 330 1607 Mehrle v. Dunne, 75 111. 239 1.513 Meier v. Meier, 15 Mo. App. 68 72 V. Thomas, 5 Mo. App. 584 626 Meig-han v. American Grass Twine Co., 154 Fed. 340 184 Meigs V. Dimock, 6 Conn. 458 1063 Melasky v. Jarrell (Tex. Civ. App.), 131 S. W. 856 583, 638 Meletopulo v. Ranking, 6 Jur. 1095 907 Melick V. Benedict, 43 N. J. L. 425 572 Mellis V. Race, 78 Mich. 80 1235 Mellor V. Valentine, 3 Colo. 255 1235, 1256, 1258, 1441 Melton V. Coffelt, 59 Ind. 310 1127 Memphis v. Laski, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 511 1542 Memphis & L.. R. R. Co. v. Freed, 38 Ark. 614 870, 910 Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146 789, 792, 795 Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works, L. R. 9 Ch. App. Cas. 350 87 Menken v. Taylor, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 445 1120, 1122 Menominie, The, 36 Fed. 197 1676, 1699, 1729, 1750, 1773 Mensing v. Cardwell, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 16 638 Menzel v. Tubbs, 51 Minn. 364 1315 Mercantile & Exch. Bank v. Gladstone, L. R. 3 Ex. 233 901 Mercer v. Cross, 79 Ga. 432 611 V. Graves, L. R. 7 Q. B. 499 155, 216, 218 Merchant v. Humeston, 2 Wash. 433 1406, 1422 V. Ottumwa Water Power Co., 54 Iowa 451 1494 V. Session, 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 24 2.33 Merchants' & Mechanics' Sav. Bank v. Dashiell, 25 Grat. (Va.) 616 1229, 12S3 Merchants' Bank v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 118 825 V. Shouse, 16 Rep. 442 381 V. Shouse, 102 Pa. St. 488 375, 391 Merchants' Banking Co. v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 5 Ch. Div. 205 801, 827, 910 Merchants' Bank of London V. Maud, 19 ^V. R. 657 246 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Arm- strong, 107 Ga. 479 174, 238 v. Coates, 79 Mo. 168 57 v. Pope, 19 Ore. 35 478 Merkle v. O'Neal, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 289 600 Merriam v. Currier, 191 Mass. 133 1748 Merrick v. Avery. 14 Ark. 370 1721, 1808 v. La Hache, 27 La. Ann. 87 620 Merrick, In re, 91 Mich. 342 745 Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont. 113 1285, 1304, 1304a, 1382, 1470 Merrill v. Bartlett, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 46 1697a V. Bickford, 65 Maine 118 1163 V. Fisher, 204 Mass. 600 1787 V. Hunnewell, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 213 836 V. Ressler, 37 Minn. 82 543 Merriman v. Bartlett, 34 Minn. 524 1392 v. Jones, 43 Minn. 29 1283 Merrit v. Fisher, 19 Iowa 354 616 Merritt v. Crane Co., 225 111. 181 1594 V. Hopkins, 96 Iowa 652 1201, 1290 V. Judd, 14 Cal. 59 1108 V. Merchandise, 30 Fed. 195 1797 V. Pearson, 58 Ind. 385 1304a V. Peirano, 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 563 968 V. Wells, 18 Ind. 171 1083 Mervin v. Sherman, 9 Iowa 331 1519, 1520 Merwin v. Chicago, 45 111. 133 154a Messmore v. Stephens, 83 Ind. 524 1081, 1099 Metcalf V. Fosdick, 23 Ohio St. 114 548 V. Hunnewell, 1 Gray (Mass.) 297 1248 V. Hutchinson, 1 Ch. Div. 591 1164 Metz V. Cutcher, 83 S. Car. 396 1560 Metzger v. McCann, 92 111. App. 109 1312 Mexal V. Dearborn, 12 Gray (Mass.) 336 1017 Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438 692, 1235, 1382, 1457 V. Bloom, 37 Ark. 43 556 V. Broadwell, 83 Mo. 571 1262, 1269 V. Delaware R. Const. Co., 100 U. S. 457 1529 V. Hornby, 101 U. S. 728 1625, 1633 V. Ives, 28 Colo. 461 1560, 1608 V. Oliver, 61 Tex. 584 638 V. Seebald, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 326 1614a Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Brown, 46 Kans. 543 1245, 1470 Mevers v. Bennett, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 471 1235, 1243, 1543 v. Bloom, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 554 190a V. Buchanan, 46 Miss. 397 1242 TABLE OF CASES. cxxvn [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Meyers v. McAllister, 94 Minn. 510 800, 806 V. Thomas, 3 Mo. App. 604 1312 Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 2 C. P. 83 465 Michael v. Reeves, 14 Colo. App. 460 1343, 1387 Micou V. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607 1126 Middlesex v. State Bank, 38 N. J. Eq. 36 223 Middlesex Freeholders v. State Bank, 38 N. J. Eq. 23 225 Middlesworth v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 184 Fed. 857 190a Middleton v. Fowler. 1 Salk. 282 262 V. Hill, 1 M. & S. 240 215 V. Mag-nay, 2 Hem. & Mil. 233 1162 Middletown Savings Bank v. Fellowes, 42 Conn. 36 1247, 1248, 1258, 1472 Midland County Sav. Bank v. T. C. Prouty Co., 158 Mich. 656 990 Midland R. Co. v. Wilcox, 122 Ind. 84 1492, 1494, 1495, 1619, 1645 Midland Val. R. Co. v. Moran Bolt &c. Mfg-. Co., 80 Ark. 399 1637 Miedreich v. Rank, 40 Ind. App. 393 174 Mildred, The, 43 Fed. 393 1677 Miles v. Coutts, 20 Mont. 47 1289 V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504 832, 837, 841, 852, 853, 878, 962 V. James, 36 111. 399 554, 614 V. New Zealand Alford Est. Co., 32 Ch. Div. 266 389 Miles, Ex parte, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 39 869 Milg-ate v. Kebble, 3 Man. & G. 100 802 Millard v. Harvey, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1167 1139 V. Webster, 54 Conn. 415 923 V. West, 50 Iowa 616 1581 Miller v. Anne, 17 Lane. Law Rev. 312 1262 V. Atlee, 3 Exch. 799 151 V. Barroll, 14 Md. 173 1436, 1437, 1542 V. Batchelder, 117 Mass. 179 1441 V. Bider (Iowa), 105 N. W. 594 601 V. Blose. 30 Grat. (Va.) 744 1178 V. Brown, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 155 1382 V. Calumet Lumber &c. Co., 121 111. App. 56 1605 V. Calumet Lumber &c. Co., Ill 111. App. 651 1298 V. Clark, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 543 1248 V. Crabbe, 66 Mo. App. 660 666, 691 V. Denny, 99 Ky. 53 1071 V. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 30 Md. 392 257 V. Fosdick, 26 Ind. App. 293 1325 V. Henderson, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 290 1523 V. Hershey, 59 Pa. St. 64 1222 V. Hoffman, 26 Mo. App. 199 1187, 1211, 1370, 1568, 1600 V. Hollingsworth, 33 Iowa 224 1235, 1262, 1325 Miller v. HoUingsworth, 36 Iowa 163 1264 v. Linguist (Tex. Civ. App.), 141 S. W. 170 1110 V. Mclntyre, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 61 1585 V. Mansfield, 112 Mass. 260 284 V. Marston, 35 Maine 153 503, 641, 644 V. Mead, 127 N. Y. 544 1247 V. Mead, 3 N. Y. S. 784 1252a V. Mead, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 636 1251 V. Moore, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 739 121S, 1532, 1535, 1536, 1559, 1599 V. Morg-an, 22 La. Ann. 625 1769 V. Morrison, 47 W. Va. 664 1101 V. Newell, 20 S. Car. 123 158, 189c, 207, 227 V. People's Lumber Co.. 98 111. App. 468 1199 V. Price, 20 Wis. 117 787 V. Price, 4 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 983 471 V. Schmitt, 67 N. Y. S. 1077 1370 V. Seal, 71 Iowa 392 1201 V. Shepard, 50 Minn. 268 1315. 1319 V. Stoddard, 50 Minn. 272 1460 V. Ticknor, 7 Bradw. (111.) 393 1583 V. Wilkinson, 167 Mass. 136 1444 Miller Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 50 Ark. 380 1247 Miller's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 481 864 Milligan v. San Antonio &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 918 1668 Milliken v. Warren, 57 Maine 46 800, 802, 852, 853 Millikin v. Jones, 77 111. 372 641 V. Shapleigh, 36 Mo. 596 261 Milliman v. Neher, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 37 30 Mills V. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457 919, 924, 930, 936 V. County of Thurston, 16 Wash. 378 98 V. Heeney, 35 111. 173 1609 V. Hobbs, 76 Mich. 122 1382 V. La Verne Land Co., 97 Cal. 254 1493 V. Matthews, 7 Md. 315 1272, 1276, 1280 V. Olsen, 43 Mont. 129 1307, 1417 V. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 515 V. Terry Mfg. Co., 91 Tenn. 469 1326 Millsap V. Ball, 30 Nebr. 728 1213, 1599 Milner v. Cooper, 65 Iowa 190 553, 610 V. Norris, 13 Minn. 455 1483 V. Ramsey. 48 Ala. 287 1101 Miltimore v. Nofziger Bros. Lum- ber Co.. 150 Cal. 790 1190, 1492 Milwain v. Sandford, 3 IVTinn. 147 1532 Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Brown, 3 Kans. App. 225 1494 INIims v. Macon &c. R. Co.. 3 Kelly (Ga.) 333 1062, 1069, 1074 Minah Consol. Min. Co. v. Bris- coe, 32 C. C. A. 390 1061 Mineah v. Stotts. 130 Iowa 530 1238 CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Idaho Consol. Mines Co., 20 Idaho 300 1198 Miner v. Beekman. 50 N. Y. 337 1139 V. Hoyt, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 193 1296, 1300 V. Moore, 53 Tex. 224 1382 Miners' Co-Op. Assn. v. The Monarch, 2 Alaska 383 1720, 1720a Minerva, The, 1 Hagg. Adm. 347 1704 Minge v. Barbre, 51 La. Ann. 1285 456 Mining- Co. v. Cullins, 104 U. S. 1 T fi "1 ^ fi fi Minna, The. 11 Fed. 759 1700, 1705 Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 74 Minn. 30 1441, 1445 V. Great Northern R. Co., 81 Minn. 28 1445 Minnitt v. Talbott, L. R. Ir. 1 Ch. Div. 143 1175 Minor v. Hoyt, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 193 1599 V. Marshall, 6 N. Mex. 194 1401, 1451, 1554 Minton v. Underwood Lumber Co., 79 Wis. 646 719 Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. (U. S.) 477 1697, 1707 Misa V. Currie, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 554 242 244 Misch V. O'Hara, 9 Dalv (N. Y.) 361 515 Mississippi Planing Mill v. Pres- byterian Church, 54 Mo. 520 1404 Mississippi, The, 6 Fed. 543 1748 Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O'Don- nell, 24 Mont. 65 1343, 1387, 1397, 1571, 1572, 1590 Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Baker, 14 Kans. 563 1629, 1647 V. Brown, 14 Kans. 557 1647 Missouri River Lumber Co. v. Finance Co., 93 Iowa 640 1201 Mitchel V. Ede, 11 Ad. & Ell. 888 460, 911, 915 Mitchell V. Butt, 45 Ga. 162 1094 V. Comfort, 31 L. J. C. P. 58 273 V. Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86 1077, 1083 V. Fidelity Trust &c. Vault Co., 20 Ky. L. 713 1054a V. Hodges, 87 Ind. 491 1270 V. Mitchell, 143 App. Div. (N. Y.) 172 184 V. Monarch Elevator Co., 15 N. Dak. 495 784a V. Oldfield, 4 T. R. 123 122, 209, 215 V. Packard, 168 Mass. 467 1367 V. Page, 107 Maine 388 710 V. Penfleld, S Kans. 186 1202 V. Sanford, 149 Mo. App. 72 626 V. The Magnolia, 45 Mo. 67 1729 Mitchell's Admr. v. Stewart, 13 Serg'. & R. (Pa.) 295 633 Mivalaz v. Genovely, 121 Ky. 235 1293. 1532 Mivelaz v. Johnson, 124 Ky. 251 1397, 1421 v. Johnson, 30 Ky. L. 389 1424, 1532 Mix v. Ely, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 513 1406, 1586 Mize v. Barnes, 78 Ky. 506 1094, 1110 Moakes v. Nicolson, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 290 915 Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Whitney, 39 Ala. 468 481 Mobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cullom, 49 Ala. 558 375, 395 Mobley v. Dent, 10 S. Car. 471 634 Mochon v. Sullivan, 1 Mont. 470 1184, 1212, 1470, 1559 Moeller v. Holthaus, 12 Mo. App. 526 1076 Moet V. Pickering, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 770 975 V. Pickering, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 37,2 975 Mofat V. Henderson, 18 J. & S. ' (N. Y.) 211 102 Mohawk Bank v. Burrows, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 317 217 Moher v. Rasmusson, 12 N. Dak. 71 784a Mohr v. Boston &c. R. Co., 106 Mass. 67 906, 919 V. Clark, 3 Wash. T. 440 786b Monaghan v. Goddard, 173 Mass. 468 1252 V. Putney, 161 Mass. 338 1444 Monat V. Fisher, 104 Mich. 262 1208 Monat Lumber &c. Co. v. Free- man, 7 Colo. App. 152 1191, 1588 Money v. Dorsey, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 15 1109 Monk v. Exposition Deepwater Pier Corporation, 111 Va. 121 1060b Monongahela JS'av. Co. v. The Bob Connell, 1 Fed. 218 1719 Monroe v. Clark, 107 Maine 134 1328 V. "West, 12 Iowa 119 1248, 1257, 1469 Monroe B. & L. Assn. v. Johns- ton, 51 La. Ann. 470 800, 811 Monsoon, The. 1 Spr. (U. S.) 37 1690 Montague v. Mial, 89 N. Car. 137 594, 631 Montandon v. Deas. 14 Ala. 33 1272, 1519, 1520 Montauk, The, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 455 1704 Montauk, The, v. Walker, 47 111. 335 1742 Monteith v. Kirkpatrick, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 279 289 Montgomery v. Allen, 107 Ky. 298 1248, 1259 V. Carr, 18 Ky. L. 607 177 Montgomery Iron Works v. Dor- man, 78 Ala. 218 1422 Monticello Bank v. Sweet, 64 Ark. 502 1459 Montieth v. Great Western Print- ing Co., 16 Mo. App. 450 999 Moody V. Tschabold, 52 Minn. 51 1458 V. Webster, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 424 423 Mooney v. Hough, 34 Ala. 80 603 V. Musser, 45 Ind. 115 475, 476 Moore v. Alexander, 81 Ala. 509 1101 TABLE OF CASES. CXXIX [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ 1-lOCOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Moore v. Anders, 14 Ark. 628 1107, 1119 V. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377 381, 406 V. Bowen, 9 Rep. 588 185 V. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492 1502 V. Erickson, 158 Mass. 71 1252 V. Faison, 97 N. Car. 322 631 V. Hitchcock, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 292 731 V. Holcombe, 3 Leigh (Va.) 597 1076, 1077 V. Ingram, 91 N. Car. 376 1063 V. Jackson, 49 Cal. 109 1247, 1276 V. Jacobs, 190 Mass. 424 1534 V. Knight, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 427 1129 V. L-ackey, 53 Miss. 85 1110, 1111, 1119 V. Lincoln Park &c. Co., 196 Pa. St. 519 1682 V. Martin, 58 Ga. 411 1053 V. Newbury, 6 McLean (U. S.) 472 1808 V. Parrish, 163 111. 93 1418 V. Raymond, 15 Tex. 554 1092 V. Rolin, 87 Va. 107 1430 V. Taylor, 40 Hun (N. Y.) 56 228 V. Taylor. 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 343 233 V. The Robilant, 42 Fed. 162 1690, 1798, 1810 V. Vaughn, 42 Nebr. 696 1275 V. Westervelt, 1 Code R. (N. S.) 131 187 Moores v. Lunt, 60 N. Y. 649 1725a V. Lunt, 1 Hun (N. Y.) 650 1725a V. Lunt, 4 T. & C. (N. Y.) 154 1725a Moran v. Chase, 52 N. Y. 346 1218, 1313, 1349 V. Schnugg, 7 Ben. (U. S.) 399 1457 More V. Lott, 13 Nev. 376 935 Morehouse v. Collins, 23 Ore. 138 1600 V. Moulding, 74 111. 322 1199,1299 Moreland v. Metz, 24 W. Va. 119 1101, 1125, 1127a Moreton v. Harrison, 1 Bland (Md.) 491 1099 Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. (U. S.) 491 1722 Morey v. Herrick, 18 Pa. St. 123 1178 Morgan v. Arthurs, 3 Watts (Pa.) 140 1335 V. Bank of North America, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 73 377, 380 V. Benthein, 10 S. Dak. 650 1382 V. Campbell, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 381 551, 553, 560, 614 V. Chicago & A. R. Co., 76 Mo. 161 1562, 1571, 1655 V. Congdon, 4 N. Y. 552 731, 739, 974 V. Dalrymple, 59 N. J. Eq. 22 1061 V. Muldoon, 82 Ind. 347 1492 V. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471 1681 V. Roberts, 38 111. 65 161 V. Stevens. 6 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 356 1296 V. Taylor, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 304 1413 V. Taylor, 5 N. Y. S. 920 1413 Morganstern v. Thrift, 66 Cal. 577 787 Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morganton Graded School, 150 N. Car. 680 1375 Mori V. Howard. 143 Ky. 480 1076 Morison v. Gray, 2 Bing. 260 875 Moritz V. Larsen, 70 ^Vis. 569 1559 V. Splitt, 55 Wis. 441 1592 Morley v. Hay. 3 M. & Ry. 396 940, 965 Mornan v. Carroll, 35 Iowa 22 1242, 1646 Moroney's Appeal. 24 Pa. St. 372 1459 Morrell v. Miller, 36 Ore. 412 180 Morrell Hdw. Co. v. Princess Gold Min. Co., 16 Colo. App. 54 1273 Morrill v. Jenkins, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 214 600 V. Merrill, 64 N. H. 71 737, 748 Morris v. Fromlet, 3 Ohio N. P. 287 1073 V. Ham,. 47 Ark. 293 1092 V. Parker, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 187 632 V. Pate, 31 Mo. 315 1080 V. Ross, 184 Pa. St. 241 1289 V. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590 857, 861, 935, 965 V. Terrell, 2 Rand. (Va.) 6 1146 V. Tinker, 60 Ga. 466 1141 Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Lewis, 12 N. J. Eq. 323 1487 Morris County Bank v. Rock- av/ay Mfg. Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 189 1329, 1470 V. Rockaway Mfg. Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 150 1310, 1312 Morrison v. Brown, 83 111. 562 1115 V. Clark, 20 Utah 432 1235, 1262 V. Hancock, 40 Mo. 561 1304, 1328 V. Henderson, 126 Pa. St. 216 1222 V. Minot, 5 Allen (Mass.) 403 1207, 1412 V Philipi, 35 Minn. 192 1398 V. Ponder, 45 Ga. 167 147, 173 V. State, 111 Ga. 642 611 V. Steamboat Laura, 40 Mo. 260 1532 V. Whaley, 16 R. I. 715 1223 Morrison, In re, 10 N. Bank Reg. 105 „^ 408 Morrow v. Turney's Admr., 35 Ala 131 ^''1 Morse v. Androscoggin R. Co., 39 Maine 285 74-5 V. Cooke, 13 Price 473 203 V Dole, 73 Maine 351 1465 V. School Dist., 3 Allen (Mass.) 307 1252 V. Sherman, 106 Mass. 430 800 Mors-le-Blanch v. Wilson, L. R. 8 C. P. 227 309 Morton v. Austin, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 389 1010, 1532 V. Hallam, 89 Ky. 165 204ti V. Naylor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 583 47, 48, 60 V. Tucker, 145 N. Y. 244 1218 V. Urquhart, 79 Minn. 390 21. TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Mosely v. Norman, 74 Ala. 422 169, 193, 203, 217, 218 Moses V. Franklin Bank, 34 Md. 574 57 Moses Taylor, The, 4 "Wall. (U. S.) 411 1725, 1729, 1738, 1750 Mosher v. Independent School Dist., 44 Iowa 122 1375 Moshier v. Meek, 80 111. 79 10G3, 107:^, 1076, 1092 Moss V. Shear, 25 Cal. 38 1141 Moss' Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 1G2 632, 633 Mossburg V. United Oil &c. Co., 43 Ind. App. 465 1352 Mosteller v. Holborn, 21 S. Dak. 547 1018 Mott V. Lansing, 57 N. Y. 112 1731, 1756, 1809 V. Mott, 107 Maine 481 710 Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 483 933 V. Heyer, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 629 931, 932, 933 Moule, Ex parte, 5 Madd. 462 227, 228 Moulton V. Bennett, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 586 150 V. Greene, 10 R. I. 330 732, 741 V. Norton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 286 571 Moultrie Lumber Co. v. Jenlvins, 121 Ga. 721 1197 Mount V. "Williams, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 77 7 Mountain City Market &c. Assn. V. Kearns, 103 Pa. St. 403 1272 Mt. Desert, The, 158 Fed. 217 1690 Mount Holly Paper Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 513 376 Mt. Tacoma Mfg-. Co. v. Cultum, 5 Wash. 294 1421 Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34 498 Mowrey v. Vandling-, 9 Mich. 39 1102 Mowry v. Hill, 14 R. L 504 1223 Moxley v. Shepard, 3 Cal. 64 1492 Moyes v. Kimball, 92 Maine 231 1507a M. Pugh Co. V. Wallace, 198 111. 422 1199 Muellerweisse v. Pile Driver E;. O. A., 69 Fed. 1005 1724, 1725 Muench v. Valley Nat. Bank, 11 Mo. App. 144 241, 242, 999 Muir V. Cross, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 277 1519 V. Fleming, 1 D. & R. N. P. C. 29 428 Muldoon V. Pitt, 54 N. Y. 269 1235, 1236, 12S1 Mulherrin v. Hill, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 58 1116 Mulholland v. Thompson-Hous- ton Elec. L. Co., 66 Miss. 339 1751 Mulkey v. Thompson, 3 Ga. App. 522 756 Mull V. Jones, 18 N. Y. S. 359 1411 Muller V. New York, 23 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 261 184 V. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325 868 Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. Ann. 20 1367 Mulliner v. Florence. 3 Q. B. Div. 484 335, 423, 518, 524 Mulrey v. Barrow, 11 Allen (Mass.) 152 1207, 1252a, 1441, 1500a Mulvane v. Chicago Lumber Co., 56 Kans. 675 1248, 1313 Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 475 1276 Mundine v. Berwin, 62 Tex. 341 1185 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68 1558 V. Munson, 40 Hun (N. Y.) 304 33 Munford v. Pearce, 70 Ala. 452 1126, 1127 Munger v. Curtis, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 465 1218, 1460, 1543 V. Green, 20 Ind. 38 1121 V. Lenroot, 32 Wis. 541 721, 1645 Munn V. Burch, 25 111. 35 57 Munns v. Isle of Wight R. Co., , L. R. 5 Ch. App. 414 1674 Munroe v. Sedro Lumber &c. Co., 16 Wash. 694 718 Munsell v. Carew, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 50 550 Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453 641. 658, 683. 684, 743a, 1018, 1021, 1025, 1030 Murch V. Wright, 46 111. 487 820 Murphree v. Countiss, 58 Miss. 712 1092 Murphy v. Adams. 71 Maine 113 719. 990, 1495, 1498 V. Brown, 12 Ariz. 268 105, 605 V. Buckman, 66 N. Y. 297 1513 V. Hardiman, 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 670 1299 V. Hussa, 70 N. J. L. 381 1216 V. Liope, 3 J. & S. (N. Y.) 542 1009 V. McGough, 105 Ga. 816 1053 V. Morton, 139 Pa. St. 345 1502 V. Murphy, 15 Mo. App. 600 12G0, 1263 V. Murphy, 22 Mo. App. 18 1323, 1365 V. Myar, 95 Ark. 32 606 V. Warren, 55 Nebr. 215 788 V. Williams (Tex. Civ. App.), 116 S. W. 412 122« Murphy Tugs, The, 28 Fed. 429 1710, 1717 Murray v. Able, 19 Tex. 213 1119 V. Earle, 13 S. Car. 87 1224, 1253, 1500, 1507 V. Gouverneur, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 438 1133 v. Jibson, 22 Hun (N. Y.) 386 185 V. Keyes, 35 Pa. St. 384 1260 V. Pinkett, 12 CI. & F. 764 249 V. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 1189. 1382, 1559 V. Witte, 16 S. Car. 504 1098 Murray, In re, 3 W. N. (1867) 190 131 Mushlitt V. Silverman, 50 N. Y. 360 1554, 1556 Muskegan, The, v. Moss, 7 Ohio St. 377 1728 Muskegon Booming Co. v. Un- derbill, 43 Mich. 629 821, 919 Muspratt v. Gregory, 3 M. & W. 677 563, 564 Musson V. Elliott, 30 La. Ann. 47 811 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXl [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §j 1061-1812.] Muto V. Smith, 175 Mass. 175 1424 Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Rowand, 26 N. J. Eq. 389 1216, 1367, 1459, 1469, 1470, 1472 Mutual B. & L. Assn. v. Wyeth, 105 Ala. 635 1101 M. Vandercook, The, 24 Fed. 472 1706, 1718, 1781, 1787, 1798 Myer v. Dupont, 79 Ky. 416 1C21 V. Jacobs, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 32 418 Myers v. Humphries (Tex.), 47 S. W. 812 1011 V. McHugh, 16 Iowa 335 175 V. Mayfield, 7 Bush (Ky.) 212 618 V. Smith, 27 Md. 91 622 V. Uptegrove, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 316 731, 739, 741, 1009 Mystic, The, 30 Fed. 73 1717, 1788, 1792 N Nagle V. Garrigues, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 155 1 V. McFeeterm, 97 N. Y. 196 418, Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752 1 Nans V. Cumberland Gap Park Co., 103 Tenn. 299 1 Napier v. Jones, 47 Ala. 90 1 Narble v. Jones &c. Lumber Co., 19 Nebr. 732 1 Nash V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 62 Iowa 49 1289, 1 V. Mosher, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 431 986, 988, 1 V. Orr, 9 Ga. App. 33 V. Taylor, 83 Ind. 347 1 Nashville Trust Co. v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513 ■ 1 Nass V. Chadwick, 16 Tex. 157 1 Nathan v. Shivers, 71 Ala. 117 National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55 1 v. Eyre, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 175 V. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 V. Petterson, 200 111 v. Rogers, 166 N. Y V. Sprague, 20 N. J. 215 1 380 Eq. 13 1458, 1 V. Williams, 38 Fla. 305 1 V. Watsontown Bank, 105 U. S. 217 376, Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Sulli- van, 117 La. 163 National Bank of Deposit v. Sardy, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 555 Nat. Bank of Metropolis v. Sprague, 21 N. J. Eq. 13 793, 1 National Bank of Phoenixville V. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Sup. Ct. 275 National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676 National Cash Register Co. v. Brocksmit, 103 Iowa 271 V. Schwab, 111 Iowa 605 V. \v'ait, 158 111. App. 16S National Cash Register Co., In re, 174 Fed. 579 450 086 225 106 329 290 798 611 163 097 102 337 457 217 250 560 29 459 249 403 456 62 248 241 384 820 820 613 National Fire Proofing Co. v. Huntington, 81 Conn. 632 1375 National Foundry & Pipe Works V. Oconto Water Co., 52 Fed. 43 1335, 1375, 1378, 1618 National Life Ins. Co. v. Ayres, 111 Iowa 200 1201, 1435 National Lumber Co. v. Bow- man, 77 Iowa 706 1421, 1479 National Supply Co. v. Strana- han, 161 Ind. 602 1200 National Valley Bank v. Har- man, 75 Va. 604 1121 National Wall Paper Co. v. Sire, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 405 1277 Naylor v. Dennle, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 198 865, 866, 965 V. Lane, 5 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y ) 149 214, 220, 222 V. Lane, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 400 217 978 V. Mangles, 1 Bsp. 109 Nazareth Institute v. Lowe, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 257 1203 Neal V. Brandon, 70 Ark. 79 607 V. Murphey, 60 Ga. 388 lUS V. Speigle, 33 Ark. 63 1086 Neale v. Clautice, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 372 622 V. Janney, 2 Cr. C. C. 188 375 V. Reid, 3 Dow. & Ry. 153 79 Neal-Millard Co. v. Chatham Academy, 121 Ga. 208 1375 Neate v. Ball, 2 Bast 117 865, 867 Nebraska, The, 69 Fed. 1009 1807a Neeb v. McMillan, 98 Iowa 718 554 Neel v. Clav, 48 Ala. 252 1071, 1107 Neeley v. Phillips, 70 Ark. 90 607 V. Searight, 113 Ind. 316 1200, 15S9, 1590 Neely v. Goodwin, 91 Ala. 604 1102 V Ruleys, 26 W. Va. 686 1125 Neese v. Riley. 77 Tex. 348^^^^ ^^^^ Neifert v. Ames, 26 Kans. 515 617 Neil v. Kinnev, 11 Ohio St. 58 1487 V. Rosenthal, 120 App. Div. (N. Y.) 810 1107 Neil Cochran, The, 1 Brown Adm. 162 _ ^ ,,.-,^^^" Neill V. Francis, The, 21 Fed 921 1690, Ibyi Neilson v. Iowa Eastern R. Co., 44 Iowa 71 1462a, 1470, 1624, 1625 v. Iowa Eastern R. Co., 51 Iowa 184 777, 1201, 1236, 1331, 1334, 1619, 1620 Neish V. Graham, 8 El. & Bl. 505 326 Neith Lodge v. Vordenbaumen, 111 La. 213 1204 Nellie Bloomfield, The, 27 Fed. 524 ,,.. ^^^^ Nellis V. Bellinger, 6 Hun (N. Y ) 560 1251, 1254, 1265 Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 360 1144. 1145 V. Association for Protection of Wrecked Property, 43 L. J. C. P. 218 333 V. Campbell, 28 Pa. St. 156 1310, 1372 cxxxu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Nelson v. Cover, 47 Iowa 250 1262, 1264 V. Kelly, 91 Ala. 569 77 V. Wilson, 6 Bing. 56S 196, 203 V. Withrow, 14 Mo. App. 270 1309, 1323, 1365, 1408, 1419 Nelson, The, 1 Hagg. Adm. 169 1796 Nesbitt V. Bartlett, 14 Iowa 485 576a, 577, 581, 582 Nesbitt, Ex parte, 2 Scho. & Lef. 279 122 Nesmith v. Dyeing Co., 1 Curtis (U. S.) 130 460, 461, 465 V. Washington Bank, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 324 375, 404 Ness V. Wood, 42 Minn. 427 1239, 1243, 1280 Nestoi-, The, 1 Sumner (U. S.) 73 1681, 1685, 1808 Nevada, The, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 144 1799 Nevam v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207 15, 731, 732, 745, 1000 Neversink, The, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 539 1679, 1681 New V. Pyle, 2 Houst. (Del.) 9 608 Newbauer v. Newbauer, 112 Mich. 562 712 Newberg v. Schwab, 5 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 19 222 Newberry v. Detroit & Lake Su- perior Iron Mfg. Co., 17 Mich. 141 404 Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Maine 231 158, 165, 214, 232 New Castle, N. R. Co. v. Simp- son, 26 Fed. 133 1665 New Champion, The, 17 Fed. 816 1680, 1686 Newcomer v. Hutchings, 96 Ind. 119 1421 New Ebenezer Assn. v. Gress Lumber Co., 89 Ga. 125 1436 Newell V. Campbell Mach. Co., 17 R. L 74 1223 V. Clark, 46 N. J. L. 363 590, 628 V. Haworth, 66 Pa. St. 363 1277 V. West, 149 Mass. 520 115, 206 New England Car Spring Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 11 Md. SI 1341, 1627, 1650 New England Loan & Trust Co. V. Willis, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 128 1110 Newgass v. Atlantic & D. R. Co., 72 Fed. 712 1671 New Glenwood Canning Co., In re, 150 Iowa 696 973 Newhall v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 51 Cal. 345 946, 950 V. Kastens, 70 111. 156 1199, 1283, 1644 v. Vargas, 13 Maine 93 861, 863, 869, 878, 881, 887, 890, 931 V. Vargas, 15 Maine 314 Sei, 862, 863, 869, 878, 890, 931 New Haven & Northampton Co. V. Campbell, 128 Mass. 104 316, 320 Newhouse v. Morgan, 127 Ind. 436 1200 New Jersey Midland R. Co. v. Wortendyke, 27 N. J. Eq. 658 74 Newland, Ex parte, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 515 119 New Lincoln Hotel Co. v. Shears, 37 Nebr. 478 541 New London & Brazilian Bank v. Brocklebank, 21 Ch. Div. 302 387, 399 Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323 625 V. Brown, 27 Kans. 117 1397 V. Grant, 36 Mont. 77 1390 V. Moore (Ky.). 17 S. W. 740 1106 V. Ward (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 868 638 New Orleans v. Vaught, 12 La. Ann. 339 620 New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. George, 82 Miss. 710 282 New Orleans Nat. Banking Assn. V. Wiltz, 4 Woods (U. S.) 43 375, 377, 381, 384 New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Hanson, ISS Fed. 638 800, 811 Newson v. Thornton, 6 East 17 869, 964 Newton v. Harland, 4 Scott (N. R.) 769 122a V. Hull, 90 Cal. 487 1127 V. Porter, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 416 115 V. Trigg, 1 Shower 269 509 New York v. Crawford, 111 N. Y. 638 1299 New York & Cleveland Gas Coal Co. V. Plumer. 96 Pa. St. 99 1108 New York & N. E. R. Co. v. San- ders, 134 Mass. 53 316 New York Cent. & H. A. R. Co. v. Lockwood Mfg. Co., 142 Ala. 322 311 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. V. Davis, 86 Hun (N. Y.) 86 320 New York Sensation, The, 61 Hun (N. Y.) 624 1756 New York Weyer v. Beach, 79 N. Y. 409 1614 Ney v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 20 Iowa 347 1629 Niagara, The, 31 Fed. 163 1733, 1756 Nice V. Walker, 153 Pa. 123 1502 Nichol V. Dunn, 25 Ark. 123 1093 Nicholls V. Hart, 5 Car. & P. 179 881 V. Le Feuvre, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 81 921, 922, 923 Nichols v. Culver, 51 Conn. 177 1308, 1311. 1354, 1406, 1409, 1413, 1427, 1444, 1445, 1604 V. Glover, 41 Ind. 24 89, 1092, 1098 V. Halliday, 27 Wis. 406 513, 515 V. Pool, 89 111. 491 128, 161 V. Speller, 120 N. Car. 75 457 Nicholson v. Bower, 1 El. & EL 172 865 V. Chapman, 2 H. Bl. 254 483, 484 Nicholstone City Co. v. Smalley, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 21 1238 Nickel V. Blanch, 67 Md. 456 1319 Nickelson v. Negley, 71 Iowa 546 616 Nicolette Lumber Co. v. People's Coal Co., 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 575 280a, 287 Nicoll V. Mumford, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 522 788 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXlll [References are to Sections— Vol. 1, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Nicoll V. Nicoll, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 446 209, 217, 219 Nicrosi v. Roswald, 113 Ala. 592 603 Nielsen v. Albert Lea, 91 Minn. 38S 196 Nippert v. J. B. Williams, The, 42 Fed. r)33 1699 V. Williams, The, 39 Fed. 823 1699 Nixon V. Cydon Lodge No. 5, K. of P., 56 Ivans. 298 1184a, 1283, 1418, 1458, 1470 V. Ossenbeck, 129 Ky. 588 177 Noar V. Gill, 111 Pa. St. 488 1330, 1332 Noble V. Adams, 2 Marsh. 366 910 Noblett V. Harper (Tex. Civ. App.), 136 S. W. 519 1064, 1086 Noe V. Gibson, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 513 591 Noel V. Murray, 13 N. Y. 167 1808 V. Temple, 12 Iowa 276 1201 Noerenberg' v. Johnson, 51 Minn. 75 1460 Noftzger v. Moffett, 63 Kans. 354 210 Nolan V. Lovelock. 1 Mont. 224 1413 Nolander v. Burns, 48 Minn. 13 1249 Nold V. Ozenberger, 152 Mo. App. 439 1211, 1270 Nolen V. Royston, 36 Ark. 561 606 Noll V. Swineford, 6 Pa. St. 187 1404, 1417 Norcross v. Norcross, 53 ISIaine 103 505, 511 Noidemeyer v. Loescher, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 499 269, 298 Nordine v. Knutson, 62 Minn. 264 1452 Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Hawk- eye Woollen Mills, 53 Iowa 521 1272, 1479 Norenberg v. Johnson, 51 Minn. 75 1460 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Howison, 81 Va. 125 , 1229 Norfolk Hardwood Co. ' v. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 202 Mass. 160 811 Norman v. Harrington, 62 Ala. 107 1068 Norman, The. 6 Fed. 406 1682, 1690, 1691 Norman, The, 28 Fed. 383 1680 Norris v. Archibald, 29 Pitts. Leg. J. (N. S.) 289 1071 Norris' Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 122 1470 Notara v. Henderson, L. R. 7 Q. B. 225 283, 287 North V. Globe Fence Co., 144 Mich. 557 1442 V. La Flesh, 73 Wis. 520 1262, 1264, 1265, 1269, , 1410, 1412, 1500, 1603 North American Commercial Co. V. United States, 81 Fed. 748 1785 North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ack- ley, 58 111. 572 161 Northcote v. Henrich Bjorn, The, 11 App. Cas. (D. C.) 270 1680 Northern Bank v. Keizer, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 169 400 Northern Light, The, 106 Fed. 748 1715 Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613 888, 890, 931, 933 North Presbyterian Church v. Jevne, 32 111. 214 1199 North River Construction Co., In re, 38 N. J. Eq. 433 73, 1632 Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307 114, 130a, 179 North Shore Boom & Driving Co. V. Nicomen Boom Co., 52 Wash. 564 23 North Star Iron Works v. Strong, 33 Minn. 1 1369, 1421, 1423, 1425 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R., 1 Gray (Mass.) 263 284 Norway, The, 3 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 245 1025 Norway, The. 3 Ben. (U. S.) 163 1722 Northwestern Cement Co. v. Nor- wegian Seminary, 43 Minn. 449 1421 Northwestern Loan & Investment Assn. V. McPherson, 23 Ind. App. 250 1313, 1443 Norton v. Clark, 85 Maine 357 1502 V. Sinkhorn, 63 N. J. Eq. 313 1376 V. Switzer, 93 U. S. 355 1729 Norton & Gorman Contracting Co. V. Unique Const Co., 195 N. Y. 81 1355 Nottingham v. McKendrick, 38 Ore. 495 1499 Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 104 1781 Now Then, The, 50 Fed. 944 1686, 1688 Noxon V. Glaze, 11 Colo. App. 503 .565 V. Gregory, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339 217 Noyes v. Burton, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 631 1543, 1548,, 1564 V. Kramer, 54 Iowa 22 1069, 1074, 1078 Nu.gent V. Priebatsch, 61 Miss. 402 1081 Nunan v. Doyle, 18 N. Y. S. 192 1599 Nutt V. Codington, 34 Fla. 77 1196 Nutter V. Fouch, 86 Ind. 451 1069, 1076, 1098, 1099, 1100 Nye &c. Co. v. Berger, 52 Nebr. 758 1435 Nvholm, Ex parte, 43 L. J. Bank 21 333 Nystrom v. London &c. Mtg. Co., 47 Minn. 31 1421 O Oakes v. Moore, 24 Maine 214 702, 731 Oakford v. Drake, 2 F. & F. 493 869 Oakland, City of Sav. Bank v. State Bank, 113 Mich. 284 406 Oakland Mfg. Co. v. Lemieux, 98 Maine 488 1563 Oakley v. Van Noppen, 95 N. Car. 60 1219 Gates V. Haley, 1 Dalv (N. Y.) 338 1218, 1301, 1548 Oatfield v. Waring, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 188 71 Ober V. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396 34 V. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199 991, 1119 CXXXIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §S 1061-1S12.] Obermiei- v. Core, 25 Ark. 562 S06, 811, 818 O'Brien v. Gooding, 194 111. 466 1559 V. Hanson, 9 Mo. App. 545 1257, 1259, 1384 V. Joyce, 117 Mass. 360 1142 V. Norris, 16 Md. 122 884, 885, 887, 965 V. Perfection Pile Preserv- ing- Co., 49 V^ash. 395 718 V. Pettis, 42 Iowa 293 1201 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 210 162, 165 Ocean Spray, The, 4 Sawy- (U. S.) 105 1705 O'Clair v. Hale, 25 Misc. (N. T.) 31 715a O'Connor v. Burnham, 49 Wash. 443 718 V. Current Riv. R. Co., Ill Mo. 185 1493, 1494, 1597 V. Schaeffel, 11 N. Y. S. 737 1608 V. Smith, 40 Ohio St. 214 1071 Odd Fellows' Hall v. Masser, 24 Pa. St. 507 1329, 1330, 1408, 1532, 1538 Odom V. Clark, 146 N. Car. 544 456 O'Donnell v. Kramer, 65 Cal. 353 1287 Odorilla, The, v. Baizley, 128 Pa. St. 283 1726, 1760, 1810 O'Driscoll V. Bradford, 171 Mass. 231 1444, 1445 Odum V. Loomis, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. § 524 1226 O'Farrell v. Nance, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 484 571 Offut V. Trail, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 20 622 Ogrden v. Alexander, 63 Hun (N. T.) 56 1393 Og-g V. Tate. 52 Ind. 159 1245 Ogle V. Atkinson, 1 Marsh. 323 .884 V. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 759 869, 911 V. Ogle, 41 Ohio St. 359 1069, 1092 V. Taylor, 49 Md. 158 1167. 1172 O'Halloran v. Leachey, 39 Ind. 150 1286 O'Hara v. Jones, 46 111. 288 554, 586, 588 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Kasson, 37 N. Y. 218 418 Ohio Falls Car. Mfg. Co. v. Cen- tral Trust Co., 71 Fed. 916 1011 O. H. Vessels, The, 177 Fed. 589 1722a O. H. Vessels, The. 183 Fed. 561 1690 Giles V. Green, 91 Wis. 217 719 Oishei v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 110 App. Div. (N. Y.) 709 184 O'Keef V. Seip, 17 Kans. 131 1202, 1236, 1237 O'Kelley v. Ferguson, 49 La. Ann. 1230 620 Okisko County v. Matthews, 3 Md. 168 1434 Olvolona Savings Inst. v. Trice, 60 Miss. 262 554 Old Natchez, The, 9 Fed. 476 1677 Oldridge v. Sutton, 157 Mo. App. 485 34 Olds V. Tucker, 35 Ohio St. 581 147 Old Second Nat. Bank v. Alpena County Sav. Bank, 115 Mich. 548 1092 I O'Leary v. Burns, 53 Miss. 171 1210, 1600 I Ole Oleson, The, 20 Fed. 384 1695, 1713 Ole Oleson. The, 29 Fed. 264 1703 Olga, The, 32 Fed. 329 1790, 1791, 1792 Olive V. Smith, 5 Taunt. 56 424, 449 Oliver v. Davis, 81 Iowa 287 1273 V. Davy, 34 Minn. 292 1458, 1460 V. Fowler, 22 S. Car. 534 1224, 1494 V. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga. 249 781 V. Moore, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 482 465 V. Phelps, 20 N. J. L. 180 627 V. Sheeley, 11 Nebr. 521 238 V. Woodman, 66 Maine 54 702, 710, 727, 729 Oliwill V. Verdenhalven, 7 N. Y. S. 99 185, 189 Olmstead v. Brush, 27 Conn. 530 1165 Olmsted v. McNall, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 387 1341 Olsen V. Sargent, 75 N. Dak. 146 189a Olson V. Heath Lumber Mfg. Co., 37 Minn. 298 1455 Olympic Theatre, In re, 2 Browne (Pa.) 275 1328, 1329, 1354, 1387, 1461 Olyphant v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 28 Fed. 729 92 O'Malley v. Coughlin, 3 Tenn. Ch. 431 1225, 1235, 1261 Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234 1257, 1274 Ommen v. Talcott, 188 Fed. 401 462 Onachita Nat. Bank v. Weiss, 49 La. Ann. 573 418, 437 Onderdonk v. Voorhis, 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 24 1733, 1756 One Hundred Fifty-one Tons of Coal, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 368 311 O'Neil V. Garrett, 6 Iowa 480 929 940 965 V. Percival, 20 Fla. 937 ' 1261 V. St. Olaf's School, 26 Minn. 329 1235, 1304a, 1392 V. Taylor, 59 W. Va. 370 1310, 1421, 1442 Onore, The. 6 Ben. (U. S.) 564 1716 Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42 267, 901, 919, 942, 965 Oppenheimer v. Morrell, 118 Pa. St. 189 1334, 1352, 1352 Orange County Irr. Co. v. Orange Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 130 S. W. 869 638 Orchard v. Rackstraw, 9 C. B. 698 • 503 Oregon Lumber Co. v. Beckleen, 130 Iowa 42 1275, 1278 Orient, The, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 620 1781. 1786 Orleans, The, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 175 169Ta, 1725 Orleans, The, v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 175 1706 Orman v. Crystal River &c. Co., 5 Colo. App. 493 1617 I Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768 1081 I Ormerod v. Tate, 1 East 464 142 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXV [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Orpheus, The, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 29 1722 Orr V. Fuller, 172 Mass. 597 1317 V. North Western M. L. S. Co., 86 111. 260 1199, 1313 Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174 1084, 1087 Ortman v. Plummer, 52 Mich. 76 1069, 1071 Ortonville v. Greer, 93 Minn. 501 1469, 1470 Ortwine v. Caskey, 43 Md. 134 1434, 1436, 1449, 1578 Ostaorn v. Gantz, 60 N. Y. 540 815 Osborne v. Barnes, 179 Mass. 597 1458 V. Dunham (N. J.), 16 Atl. 231 115 V. Royer, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 217 1119 V. Waters, 92 Ark. 388 170 Osborn, Succession of, 40 La. Ann. 615 1063 Osg-ood V. Groning-, 2 Camp. 466 332a Ostenson v. Severson, 126 Iowa 197 1066 Oster V. Rabeneau, 46 Mo. 595 1211, 1423, 1426 Othmer v. Clifton, 69 Iowa 656 1290 Otis V. Dodd, 90 N. Y. 336 1235, 1236, 1251, 1265, 1281 Otley V. Haviland, 36 Miss. 19 1210 Ott V. His Creditors, 127 La. 827 437 Ottiwell V. Muxlow, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 308 1251, 1254 Ottowa, The, 1 Brown Adm. 356 1770 Ouelette v. Fluff, 93 Maine 168 711 Oury V. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278 1093 Outcalt V. Durling-, 25 N. J. L. 443 1036 Outton V. Mitchell, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 239 1098 Overall v. Taylor, 99 Ala. 12 1083 Overly v. Tipton, 68 Ind. 410 1127 Overton v. Meggs (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 208 1139 Owen V. Bankhead. 76 Ala. 143 1101 V. Iglanor, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 15 427 V. Johnson, 174 Pa. St. 99 1343 V. Mason, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 156 203 V. Moore, 14 Ala. 640 1100 V. Reed, 27 Ark. 122 991 Owens V. Ackerson, 8 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 199 1599 V. Atlantic Trust & Banking Co., 119 Ga. 924 377 V. Claytor, 56 Md. 129 1164 V. Davis, 15 La. Ann. 22 1745 V. Northrup, 30 Wis. 482 1238 V. Weedman, 82 111. 409 800, 807, 852 Oxenham v. Esdaile, 2 Y. & J. 493 1 Pacific Lumber &c. Co. v. Dailey, 60 Wash. 566 1503 Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 106 Cal. 224 1470 Pacific Rolling Mills Co. v. James Street Const. Co., 68 Fed. 966 1672 Pacific States &c. Bldg Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319 1481 Pacific, The, 9 Fed. 120 1722, 1724 Pacific, The, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 569 1696, 1728 Pack V. Circuit Judge of Iosco County, 70 Mich. 135 712 V. Simpson, 70 Mich. 135 729 Packard v. The Louisa, 2 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 48 1805 Packwood v. Briggs, 25 Wash. 530 71 Paddock v. Stout, 121 111. 571 1371, 1532, 1539, 1549, 1580 Page V. Bettes, 17 Mo. App. 366 1211, 1431, 1432, 1435, 1437 V. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124 820 V. Grant, 127 Iowa 249 1290 V. Middleton, 118 Pa. St. 546 564 Paige V. Peters, 70 Wis. 178 1383 Pain V. Isaacs, 10 Wash. 173 786b Paine v. Bonney, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 734 1317 V. Dorough (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S. W. 369 638 V. Gill, 13 Wis. 561 727 V. Hall's Safe & Lock Co., 64 Miss. 175 625 V. Tillinghast, 52 Conn. 532 1237, 1252, 1254 V. Woodworth, 15 Wis. 298 727 Pairo V. Bethell, 75 Va. 825 1229, 1372, 1559, 1577, 1612 Palangio v. Wild River Lumber Co., 86 Maine 315 1649 Palim V. Cooke, 125 Ga. 442 756 Fallen v. Bogy, 78 Mo. App. 88 466 Palmer v. Chandler, 47 Tex. 332 1102a V. Hand, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 434 839 V. Harris, 100 111. 276 1126 V. Howard, 72 Cal. 293 812, 820 V. Lorillard, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 348 332a V. McGinnes, 127 Iowa 118 1413 V. Tucker. 45 Maine 316 703, 1001 V. Uncas Min. Co., 70 Cal. 614 1366, 1509, 1532 V. Van Orden, 17 J. & S. (N. Y.) 89 189 Palmer, Ex parte, 2 Hill Eq. (S. Car.) 215 1160 Pamplin v. Rowe. 100 Ark. 144 1126 Panama, The, Olcott (U. S.) 343 1798 Paola R., The, 32 Fed. 174 1678, 1698, 1709 Pape V. Steward, 69 Ark. 306 579, 580 Papineau v. Wentworth, 136 Mass. 543 663, 699 Paragon, The, 1 Ware (U. S.) 322 1778, 1787 Parberry v. Johnson, 51 Miss. 291 1520 Pardue v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 52 Nebr. 201 1513a Paris V. Vail. 18 Vt. 277 548 Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106 1066 Parish's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. Ill 1310' Park V. The Edgar Baxter, 37 Fed. 219 1798 Parke v. O'Conner, 36 Ind. 531 1375 Parke & Lacy Co. v. Inter Nos Oil &c. Co.. 147 Cal. 490 1453, 1600 Parker v. Alexander, 2 La. Ann. 188 993 CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Parker v. Anthony, 4 Gray (Mass.) 289 1242 V. Baxter, 86 N. Y. 121 820 V. Baxter, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 410 59, 60 V. Bell, 7 Gray (Mass.) 429 725, 1252, 1304, 1361, 1421 V. Blighton, 32 Mich. 266 196, 203 V. Brancker, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 40 476 V. Byrnes, 1 Low. (U. S.) 539 828 931 93 ^ V. Crittenden, 37 Conn. 148 ' 842 V. First Nat. Bank, 3 N. Dak. 87 784a V. Poy. 43 Miss. 260 1083 V. Gossage, 2 Cr. M. & R. 617 884 V. Kelly, 10 S. & M. (Miss.) 184 1119 V. McBee, 61 Miss. 134 1090, 1092 V. Mclver, 1 Des. (S. Car.) 274 917 V. Massachusetts R. Co., 115 Mass. 580 1651 V. Parker, 71 Vt. 387 191 V. Savage Placer Min. Co., 61 Cal. 348 1603 V. Scott, 82 Iowa 266 1290 V. Sewell, 24 Tex. 238 1086 V. The Little Acme, 43 Fed. 925 1680 V. Williams, 77 Maine 418 710, 72S Parkes, Ex parte, 1 G. & J. (Md.) 228 1074 Parkinson v. Manny, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 521 1760 Parks V. Crockett, 61 Maine 489 710 V. Hall, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 206 800, 806, 836 V. Simpson, 124 Ga. 523 611 Parrot v. Sweetland, 3 Mylne & K. 655 1071 Parsley v. David, 106 N. Car. 225 1594 Parson v. Martin, 86 Ala. 352 1092 Parsons v. Brown, 97 Iowa 699 1367 V. Hawlev, 92 Iowa 175 175 V. Hoyt, 24 Iowa 154 1114 V. Moses, 16 Iowa 440 11.^1, 1142 Partridge v. Dartmouth College, 5 N. H. 286 740 V. Logan, 3 Mo. App. 509 1080, 1086, 1088 Paschal v. Brandon, 79 N. Car. 504 1127 Paschal, In re, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 483 137, 146 Patapsco, The, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 329 1681, 1686, 1690 Patent Brick Co. v. Moore, 75 Cal. 205 1589, 1590 Paton v. Robinson, 81 Conn. 547 4 Patrick v. Hazen, 10 Vt. 183 115 V. Leach, 12 Fed. 661 118, 155 V. Leach, 17 Fed. 476 238 V. Leach, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 635 183 V. Morrow, 33 Colo. 509 30 V. Smith, 120 Mass. 510 1400, 1421 Patrick Land Co. v. Leavenworth, 42 Nebr. 715 1457, 1458 Patten v. Northwestern Lumber Co., 73 Wis. 233 719 Patten v. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350 465, 869, 878, 884, 955 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 29 Fed. 590 292, 293 Patten & Danies Lumber Co. v. Gibson, 9 Cal. App. 23 1421 Patten's Appeal, In re, 45 Pa. St. 151 857, 861, 862, 864 Patterson v. Edwards, 29 Miss. 67 1071 v. Frazier, 123 Pa. St. 414 1222 V. Hawkins, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 483 636 V. Pennsylvania Reform School, 92 Pa. St. 229 1375 V. Seaton, 70 Iowa 689 792 V. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 610 Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind 240 960 Patton V. Matter, 21 Ind. App. 277 1435 Pauer v. Fay, 110 Cal. 361 1493 Paul V. Bark Ilex, 2 Woods (U. S.) 229 1713 V. Hoeft, 28 N. J. Eq. 11 1458 V. Nample, 44 Minn. 453 1209 Paulding v. Ketty, 9 Mart. (La.) (O. S.) 186 585 Paulsen v. Ingersoll, 62 Wis. 312 719 V. Manske, 126 111. 72 1257, 1504 Pawashick, The, 2 Low. (U. S.) 142 1791 Paxton V. Paxton, 38 W. Va. 616 1101 v. Rich, 85 Va. 378 1120, 1123 Payne v. Atterbury, Harr. Ch. 414 1105 V. Avery, 21 Mich. 524 1063, 1071 V. Buford, 106 La. 83 800, 847, 859 V. Hathaway, 3 Vt. 212 74 V. Holt, 61 Ga. 355 612 V. Hornby, 25 Beav. 280 794 V. Shadbolt, 1 Camp. 427 814, 834 v. Spiller, 23 La. Ann. 248 456 V. Wilson. 74 N. Y. 348 34, 77, 96, 991, 1012, 1218, 1286, 1294, 1459 V. Wilson, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 302 1218, 1460, 1543 Paynter v. James, L. R. 2 C. P. 348 313 Peabody v. Eastern Methodist Society, 5 Allen (Mass.) 540 1244 Peacock v. Hammitt, 15 N. J. L. 165 628 Peak v. Blicott, 30 Kans. 156 37 Peake, Ex parte, 1 Madd. Ch. 191 1082 Pearce v. Foreman, 29 Ark. 563 1082, 1085 v. Knapp, 71 Misc. (N. Y.) 324 1218 V. The Thomas Newton, 41 Fed. 106 1720a V. Wabash R. Co., 89 Mo. App. 437 291, 299 Pearl v. Robitchek, 2 Daly (N. 'V'il^S 209 Pearl, The, 189 Fed. 540 1725, 1757 Pearson v. Dawson, El. Bl. & El. 448 844 Pearsons v. Tincker, 36 Maine 383 990, 1493, 1494, 1498 Pease v. Kelly. 3 Ore. 417 1063, lOSO Pease, Ex parte, 1 Rose 232 244 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Peatman v. Centerville Light &c. Co., 105 Iowa 1 1412, 1494 Peay v. Feild. 30 Ark. 600 105 Peck V. Bridwell, 6 Mo. App. 451 1591 V. Bridwell, 10 Mo. App. 524 1432, 1520, 1597 V. Glass, 6 How. (Miss.) 195 1153 V. Hensley, 21 Ind. 344 1573 V. Hinds, 68 111. App. 319 1389 V. Jenness, 7 How. (U. S.) 612 10, 13, 28 V. Larsen, 12 Eq. 378 273 V. Standart, 1 Bradw. (111.) 228 1317 Peckham v. Fox, 1 Cal. App. 307 1616a Pedesclaux v. Legare, 32 La. Ann. 380 1063 Peebles, In re, 2 Hughes (U. S.) 394 388 Peeples v. Hayley, 89 Ark. 252 555 Peet V. Beers, 4 Ind. 46 1093 V. McGraw, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 653 499, 504 Peets & Norman Co. v. Baker, 95 Miss. 576 625 Pell V. Bauer, 133 N. Y. 377 1492, 1568 Pelly V. Wathen, 7 Hare 351 119, 130 Peniberton, Ex parte, IS Ves. 282 126 Pendergast v. Bank of Stockton, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 108 377 V. Yandes, 124 Ind. 159 758 Pendleburg v. Meade, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 728 1235 Pendleton v. Franklin, 7 N. Y. 508 1731 Peninsular Lumber Co. v. Feh- renbach, 1 Marv. (Del.) 98 1194 Penn v. McGhee, 6 Ga. App. 631 174 Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 291 1368, 1429, 1470, 1472 V. Locust Realty Co., 224 Pa. 437 1289 Pennsylvania & D. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. St. 168 1365, 1629, 1665 Pennsylvania Co. v. Mehaffey, 75 Ohio St. 432 1664 V. Thatcher, 78 Ohio St. 175 94, 159 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Am. Oil Works, 126 Pa. St. 485 265, 267, 857, 861 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. (Geor- gia Railroad &c. Co., 94 Ga. 636 268, 321 Penny v. Little, 4 111. 301 613 Penrose v. Calkins. 77 Cal. 396 1422 Pensacola R. Co. v. Schaffer, 76 Ala. 233 1498 People V. Bank of Dansville, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 187 37 v. Butler, 2 Nebr. 5 1375 V. City Bank, 93 N. Y. 582 259 V. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32 37 V. Crockett, 9 Cal. 112 375, 380, 383 V. Hardenbergh, 8 Johns. (N. Y. )335 214233 V. Husband. 36 Mich. 306 ' 524 V. Judge, 27 Mich. 138 1585 V. Merchant's & Mechanics' Bank, 78 N. Y. 269 57 People V. New York Com. Pleas. 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 649 217 People's Bank v. Cage, 40 La. Ann. 138 1092 v. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 179 430, 434, 474, 1018 People's B., L. & S. Assn. v. Clark (Tex.) 33 S. W. 881 1477 People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. (U S.) 393 1722, 1724, 1729 People's Ind. Rice Mill Co. v. Be- noit, 117 La. 999 1204, 1382 Peoples' Sav. Assn. v. Spears, 115 Ind. 297 1247, 1253 Peperday's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 621 1260, 1460, 1491 Pepper v. George, 51 Ala. 190 1079 Pequeno v. Taylor, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 375 911, 912 Perdue, In re, 2 N. Bank. R. 182 1082, 1098 Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Smith, 36 Ind. App. 439 1645 Perez v. Alsop, 3 P. & - F. 188 319 Peri v. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 521 184 Perkins v. Boardman, 14 Gray (Mass.) 481 696 V. Boyd, 37 Colo. 265 1455 V. Boyd, 16 Colo. App. 266 1242, 1616a V. Coleman, 51 Miss. 298 1520 V. Davis, 120 Mass. 408 1458 V. Emory, 55 Md. 27 1172 V. Gibson. 51 Miss. 699 1092, 1094 V. Agilvie, 140 Ky. 412 1037 V. Perkins, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 95 190, 230, 235 V. Pike, 42 Maine 141 710 V. Swank, 43 Miss. 349 1083 V. United States Elec. Co., 16 Fed. 513 1102b V. Wilson, 1 Man. (Del.) 196 1412 Perreault v. Shaw, 69 N. H. 180 1357 Perrine v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 22 Ala. 575 383, 401 Perry v. Board of Missions, 102 N. Y. 99 39, 93 V. Bragg, 109 N. Car. 303 457 V. Chester, 53 N. Y. 240 222 V. Conroy, 22 Kans. 716 1429 V. Dowdell, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 96 1015 v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334 1063, 1073 V. Haines, 191 U. S. 17 1756 V. Perrv, 127 N. Car. 23 556 V. Potashinski, 169 Mass. 351 1289 V. Waggoner, 68 Iowa 403 557, 616 V. Woodson, 61 Tex. 228 1090 Person v. Oberteuffer, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339 34, 67 V. Wright, 35 Ark. 169 542 Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114 1114 V. Newkirk, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 103 571, 592 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 23 Mo. 107 1670 V. Tunell, 43 Minn. 473 1071, 1072 Petersburg Sav. & Ins. Co. v. Lumsden, 75 Va. 327 396, 401, 414 Peterson v. Carson (Tenn.), 48 S. W. 383 1073 v. Hall, 61 Minn. 268 125, 422 V. Peterson, 76 Nebr. 282 183 cxxxvni TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Peterson v. Sayward, 9 Wash. 503 71S V. Struby, 25 Ind. App. 19 174, 223 V. Watson, 1 Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 487 196, 205 Peterson, The, v. The Nellie and Annie, 37 Fed. 217 1706 Petrel, The, v. Dumont, 28 Ohio St. 602 1729 Petrie v. Myers, 54 How. Pr. (N. y.) 513 256 Petry v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 510 1076 V. Randolph, 85 Ky. 351 619 Pettibone v. Thompson, 72 Misc. (N. Y.) 486 48, 52 Petzenka v. Dallimore, 64 Minn. 472 665, 691 Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 324 1002, 1535, 1729 Pharr v. Collins, 35 La. Ann. 930 266 Phebe, The, 1 Ware (U. S.) 354 1797 Phelan v. Terry, 101 Minn. 454 782b Phelps V. Comber, 29 Ch. Div. 813 61 V. Conover, 25 111. 309 1098 V. Curts, 80 111. 109 1082 V. Maxwells' Creek Gold Min. Co., 49 Cal. 336 1276, 1279, 1397, 1615 V. Seely, 22 Grat. (Va.) 573 1178 V. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 554 429 V. The Camilla, Taney (U. S.) 400 1519 Phelps &c. Windmill Co. v. Baker, 49 Kans. 434 1341, 1453 V. Shay, 32 Nebr. 19 1341, 1382 Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St. 339 1344 Philadelphia & Reading- R, R. Co. V. Dows, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 101 320 Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Maine 410 1063 Philips V. Philips, 2 Bro. C. C. 273 1165 Phillip V. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256 1599 Phillips V. Adams, 78 Ala. 225 1123 V. Brown, 74 Maine 549 1205 V. Eg-gert, 133 Wis. 318 1767 V. Fryer, 80 Mich. 254 704 V. Germon, 43 Iowa 101 175 V. Gilbert, 101 U. S. 721 1313, 1317. 1511 V. Gilbert, 2 McAr. (D. C.) 415 1504 V. Hog-ue, 63 Nebr. 192 48, 52. 147 V. Maxwell, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 25 636 V. Myers, 30 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184 1725a V. Rector &c. of University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472 1228 V. Roberts, 26 W. Va. 783 1231 V. Rodie, 15 East 547 270 V. Saunderson, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. (Miss.) 462 1080 V. Schall, 21 Mo. App. 38 1061 V. Skinner, 6 Bush (Ky.) 662 1074 V. Stag-g-, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 108 165, 166 V. The Thomas Scattergood, 1 Gilpin (U. S.) 1 1715 Phillips V. Trezevant, 67 N. Car. 370 788 789 V. Vose, 81 Maine 134 730a', 990 V. Wright, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 342 1367, 1728, 1731 Phoenix Iron Co. v. The Hopat- cong, 127 N. Y. 206 1756 V. Vessels, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 429 1728 Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Batchen, 6 Bradw. (111.) 621 1199, 1465, 1495, 1605 Pibble V. Kent, 10 Ind. 325 976 Pickard v. Yencer, 21 Hun (N. Y.) 403 233 Pickens v. Plattsmouth Inv. Co., 31 Nebr. 585 1247 Pickert v. Ridgefield Park R. Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 316 1487 Pickett V. Bullock, 52 N. H. 354 806, 848, 1014 V. Gollner, 7 N. Y. S. 196 1350 V. McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467 666, 691 Pickman v. Woods, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 248 322 Picquet v. McKay, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 465 276, 1018, 1019 Pierce v. Gardner. 83 Pa. St. 211 1114 V. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242 787 V. Lawrence, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 572 230 V. Marple, 148 Pa. St. 69 1510, 1523, 1606 V. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 24 Wis. 551 1674 V. Moreman, 84 Tex. 596 1101 V. Scott, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 344 552, 590 V. Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 151 731 Pierson v. David, 1 Iowa 23 1063 V. Haddonfield, 66 N. J. Eq. 180 1376 V. Safford, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 521 185 Pike V. Empfield, 21 Colo. App. 161 1190 V. Greenbaum, 12 Ky. L. 423 818 V. Norrington, 82 Ind. 190 1375 V. Scott, 60 N. H. 469 1215, 14G5 Pilcher's Succession, 39 La. Ann. 362 787 Pilkington v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 261 184 Pilling V. Armitage, 12 Ves. 78 1139 Pillow V. Helm, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 545 1092 Pilz V. Killingsworth, 20 Ore. 432 1348, 1370, 1555, 1588 Pimlott V. Hall, 55 N. J. L. 192 1216 Pinch V. Anthony, 8 Allen (Mass.) 536 30 Pinchain v. Collard, 13 Tex. 333 1063, 1074, 1094 Pinder v. Morris, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 165 196, 209 Pine Saw Logs v. Sias, 43 Mich 356 712 Pinkerton v. LeBeau, 3 S. Dak. 440 1554 V. Woodward. 33 Cal. 557 511 Pinkham v. Pinkham, 60 Nebr. 600 40 TACLE OF CASES. CXXXIX [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Pinkston v. Cedar Hill «fec. Co., 123 Ga. 302 1262 V. Young, 104 N. Car. 102 1219, 1290, 1470 Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104 6, 262, 322, 731, 1002 Pinnins^- v. Skipper, 71 Md. 347 1500a, 1520, 1532 F'innock v. Harrison, 3 M. & W. 532 731 Pintard v. Goodloe, Hemp. (U. S.) 502 1061 Pioneer Mining- Co. v. Delamotte, 185 Fed. 752 llS7a Pioneer, The, 30 Fed. 206 1677 Pioneer, The, 53 Fed. 279 1808 Piper V. Hoyt, 61 Vt. 539 1228 Pique V. Arendale, 71 Ala. 91 1075 Pirate, The, 32 Fed. 486 1691, 1712, 1806 Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. Dak. 178 lS9d, 217 Pirola V. W. J. Turner Co., 238 111. 210 12S5a Pitkin V. Fletcher, 47 Iowa 53 587 Pitschke v. Pope, 20 Colo. App. 328 1365 Pitschki V. Anderson. 48 Tex. 1 1099 Pittman v. Robbins (Tex. Civ. App.) 59 S. W. 600 1126 Pitts V. Parker, 44 Miss. 247 1063, 1092, 1107, 1119 Pittsburg Const. Co. v. West Side Belt R. Co., 232 Pa. 578 1665 Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Pet- ers Land Co., 123 Ga. 723 1197, 1276, 1325 Place V. Hayward, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 59 220 Planters' & Merchants' Mut Ins. Co. V. Selma Sav. Bank, 63 Ala. 585 385, 3S6 Planters' Bank v. Dodson, 17 Miss. 527 1093 Planters' Compress Co. v. How- ard, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 285 583 Planter The, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 324 1725 Piatt V. Birmingham Axle Co., 41 Conn. 255 388, 413 V. Griffith, 27 N. J. Eq. 207 1458, 1459 V. Jerome, 19 How. (U. S.) 384 195 V. Piatt, 105 N. Y. 488 1174 V. Piatt, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 592 1174 V. Piatt, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 659 139 V. The Georgia, 34 Fed. 79 1711 Platteville v. Bell, 6G Wis. 326 1375 Plattner Implement Co. v. Inter- national Harvester Co. of America, 133 Fed. 376 418 Pleasants v. Kortrecht, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 694 190, 230 Plimpton V. Plimpton, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 458 1142 Plowman v. Riddle, 14 Ala. 169 1074, 1096 Plummer v. Eckenrode, 50 Md. 225 1310, 1319 V. Great Northern R. Co., 60 Wash. 214 192 V. School Dist. No. 1, 90 Ark. 236 1375 Plurede v. Lesasseur, 89 Maine 172 710, 711 Plymouth, The, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 20 1770 Plymouth Rock, The, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 503 1681, 1682 Poe V. Ekert. 102 Iowa 361 70 V. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607 1061, 1069, 1076, 1079, 1081 Poer V. Peebles. 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1 572, 618 Poerschke v. Kedenburg, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 172 1218, 1564 Poillon V. New York, 47 N. Y. 666 1375 Poland V. The Spartan, 1 Ware (U. S.) 134 1701 Polk V. Kyser. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 676 1119 V. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611 499, 511, 515 Pollock V. Landis, 36 Iowa 651 513, 518 V. Morrison, 176 Mass. 83 1421 V. Morrison, 177 Mass 42 1421 Pomeroy v. White Lake Lumber Co., 33 Nebr. 243 1235 Pond Mach. Tool Co. v. Robinson, 38 Minn. 272 1335, 1336, 1353 Ponder v. Safety B. & L. Co., 22 Ky. L. 1074 1459 Ponti V. Eckels, 129 Wis. 26 1615 Pool V. Sanford, 52 Tex. 621 1226, 1556 V. Wedemeyer, 56 Tex. 287 1226, 1392, 1416, 1554, 1571 Poole V. Houston & T. C. R. Co., 58 Tex. 134 891, 899, 952 V. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554 1725, 1729, 1756, lS06a V. Seney, 66 Iowa 502 789 V. Union Pass. R. Co., 1 Monag. (Pa.) 170 1330 Pooley V. Great Eastern R. Co., 34 L. T. (N. S.) 537 843 Poor V. Oakman, 104 Mass. 309 1247 Pope V. Armstrong, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 214 146, 158, 166, 167 V. Graham, 44 Tex. 196 1226, 1382, 1533 V. Heckscher, 109 App. Div. (N. Y.) 495 1247 Porch V. Agnew Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 328 1238, 1342 Porter v. Dubuque, 20 Iowa 440 1063, 1081, 1086 V. Hanson, 36 Ark. 591 170, 229, 230 v. Jacksom 95 Ind. 210 1163, 1164 V. Lane, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 357 217 V. Miles, 67 Ala. 130 1588 V. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 120 U. S. 649 1625a V. Rice, (Ky.), 128 S. W. 70 619 V. The Sea Witch, 3 Woods (U. S.) 75 1787 V. Wilder, 62 Ga. 520 1599 V. ^Voodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174 1063 Porteus V. Watney, 3 Q. B. Div. 223 274 Portland Lumbering & Mfg. Co. V. School Dist., 13 Ore. 283 1221, 1375 Portoues v. Badenoch, 132 111. 377 1327, 1581, 1600 cxl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Portsmouth Savings Bank v. Riley, 54 Nebr. 531 1470 V. Yeiser, 81 Nebr. 343 1102b Post V. Campbell, S3 N. Y. 279 1218, 1286 V. Vetter, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 248 1276 Post Steamboat Co. v. Lou&hran, 12 App. D. C. 430 1690 Potee Brick Co. of Baltimore City. In re, 179 Fed. 525 623 Pothomer v. Dawson, Holt (N. P.) 383 1033 Potshuisky v. Krempkan, 26 Tex. 307 1382 Potter V. Ajax Min. Co., 19 Utah 421 190b V. Conley, 83 Kans. 676 1201 V. Greenleaf, 21 R. I. 483 590 V. Hunt, 68 Mich. 242 213 V Mayo, 3 Greenl. (Maine) 34 155, 162, 193, 196, 1200, 1327, 1328 Potting-er v. Hecksher, 2 Grant Cas. CPa.) 309 921, 965 Potts V. Blackwell, 4 Jones' Eq. (N. Car.) 58 791 V. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455 267, 268, 291, 320, 900, 901 Pou V. Coving-ton &c. R. Co., 84 Ga. 311 1197 Pouns V. Gartman, 29 Miss. 133 1098 Powell V. Daily, 63 111. 646 540, 542, 1127 V. Hunter, 204 Mo. 393 1127 V. Jones, 72 Ala. 392 43 V. Perry, 127 N. Car. 22 631 V. Rogers, 105 111. 318 1617 V. Smith, 74 Miss. 142 625 V. State, 84 Ala. 444 603 V. Weaver, 56 Ga. 288 454 V. Webber, 79 111. 134 1199 Power v. Kent, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 172 196, 209 V. McCord, 36 111. 214 1199, 1327, 1393a Powers V. Badgers Lumber Co., 75 Kans. 687 1605 V. Botts, 58 Mo. App. 1 666, 699 V. Florence, 7 La. Ann. 524 620 V. Hogan, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255 1598 V. Hubbell, 12 La. Ann. 413 661 V. Sixty Tons of Marble, 21 La. Ann, 402 981 V. Yonkers, 114 N. Y. 145 1299 Prather Engineering v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 152 Mich. 582 1559 Pratt v. Clark, 57 Mo. 189 1061, 1063, 1067, 1100 v. Duncan, 36 Minn. 545 1348 V. Eaton, 65 Mo. 157 999. 1074, 1090 V. Reed, 19 How. (U. S.) 395 1679 V. Tudor, 14 Tex. 37 1184, 1614a V. Vanwyck, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 495 1100 Premier Steel Co. v. McElwaine- Richards Co., 144 Ind. 614 1313, 1434 Prentiss v. Garland, 67 Maine 345 1010 V. Livingston, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 380 115 Presbyterian Church v. Allison, 10 Pa. St. 413 1329, 1332, 1378 v. Stettler, 26 Pa. St. 246 1538 Presbyterian Congregation v. Carlisle Bank, 5 Pa. St. 345 396, 411 Prescott v. De Forest, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 159 598 V. Maxwell, 48 111. 82 1287 Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133 1092, 1096, 1097, 1120 V. Neale, 12 Gray (Mass.) 222 486, 487, 968 Prettyman v. Unland, 77 111. 206 568, 580, 614 Preusser v. Florence, 4 Abb. N. Cas. 136 1298 V. Florence, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 385 1298 Prewett v. Dobbs, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 431 570 Price V. Cutts, 29 Ga. 142 77 V. Davis, 88 Va. 939 1122 V. Jennings, 62 Ind. Ill 1239 V. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 47 1367 V. Lauve, 49 Tex. 74 1116 V. Limehouse, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 544 571 V. McCallister, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 248 562 V. Palmer. 23 Hun (N. Y.) 504 93 V. Roetzell, 56 Mo. 500 626 V. Seydel. 46 Iowa 696 1262, 1264 V. Wisconsin Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267 444 Price, Ex parte, 2 Ves. 407 228, 229 Prickett v. Sibert, 71 Ala. 194 1092 Pride v. Smalley, 66 N. J. L. 578 155, 158 Pride of Ainerica, The, 19 Fed. 607 1798, 1808 Pride of the Ocean, The, 3 Fed. 162 1781 Priebatsch v. Third Baptist Church, 66 Miss. 345 1210 Prime v. Koehler, 77 N. Y. 91 1031 Prince v. Neal-Millard Co., 124 Ga. 884 1304, 1304a Princess, The, 185 Fed. 218 1747 Princeton Bank v. Gibson, 20 N. J. L. 138 628 Printup V. Barrett, 46 Ga. 407 70 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 134 App. Div. (N. Y.) 301 1039 Pritchett v. Hape. 21 Ky. L. 408 1116 Proctor V. Hart, 72 Miss. 288 1121 V. Jones, 2 Car. & P. 532 808 V. Nicholson, 7 Car. & P. 67 516, 517 V. Tows, 115 111. 138 1245, 1248 Proctor Coal Co. v. Tye, 29 Ky. L. 804 177 Proetzel v. Rabel, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 559 1110 Prospect, The, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 526 1799, 1800 Provident Inst, for Savings v. Jersey City. 113 U. S. 506 102 Provost V. Shirk, 223 111. 468 1199 1397 V. Wilcox, 17 Ohio 359 ' 1795 Pruitt V. Kelley, 4 Willson Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) 175 638 TABLE OF CASES. cxli [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ 1-1060£; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Quinn v. The Mayor, 2 E. D. Prutzman v. Bushong-, 83 Pa. St. 526 1257 P. T. Walton Lumber Co. v. Cox, 29 Okla. 237 1220a Puckett V. Reed, 31 Ark. 131 577 Puett V. Beard, 86 Ind. 172 174, 201a, 220 Pugh V. Boyd, '38 Miss. 326 181 V. Holt, 27 Miss. 461 1110 Pulis V. Sanborn, 52 Pa. St. 368 1002 Pullen V. Ward, 60 Ark. 90 1111 Pullis V. Hoffman, 28 Mo. App. 606 1412 Pullis Bros. &c. Co. v. Natchi- toches Parish, 51 La. Ann. 1377 1301 Pulver V. Harris, 52 N. Y. 73 187, 193, 196, 206, 209 V. Harris. 62 Barb (N. Y.) 500 207 Purcell V. Lincoln, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 230 196, 205 V. Thomas, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 306 572 Purchase v. Bellows, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 103 217 Purdy V. Bullard, 41 Cal. 444 llOS Purfel V. Sands, 1 Ashni. (Pa.) 120 632 Purtell V. Chicago &c. Bolt Co., 74 Wis. 132 1378, 1618, 1622, 1673 Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 390 1131. 1132, 1133, 1135, 1139 V. Ross, 55 Mo. 116 1575 V. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456 174 Q Quaack v. Schmid, 131 Ind. 185 1200, 1421 Quackenbush v. Carson, 21 111. 99 1421 Quale V. Moon, 48 Cal. 478 1514 Queal V. Stradley, 117 Iowa 748 1418 Queen v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404 884 Queen of St. Johns, The, 31 Fed. 24 1682, 1789, 1808, 1810 Quickstep, The, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 665 1781 Quillian v. Central R. «& Bank- ing Co., 52 Ga. 374 737 Quimby v. Durgin, 148 Mass. 104 1310, 1534 V. Hazen. 54 Vt. 132 104, 723, 725 V. Sloan, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 93 1543. 1548 V. Sloan, 2 B. D. Smith (N. Y.) 594 1614 Quinby v. Wilmington, 5 Houst. (Del.) 26 1536 Quincey v. Francis, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 286 193, 207 Quinlan v. Russell, 15 J. & S. (N. Y.) 212 53 V. Russell, 94 N. Y. 350 1377 Quinman v. Clapp, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 394 189 Quinn v. Allen, S5 111. 39 1375 V. Logan, 67 Tex. 600 1226 V. New York, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 558 1235 Smith (N. Y.) 558 1589 V. Wallace, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 452 562 Quist V. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748 25, 752 , R Rachels v. Doniphan Lumber Co. 98 Ark. 529 • 170 Rackley v. Scott, 61 N. H. 140 1541 Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 1115 Raeder v. Bensberg, 6 Mo. App. 445 1367 Ragsdale v. Estis, 8 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 429 594 V. Kinney, 119 Ala. 454 603 Railway Company v. Cronin, 38 Ohio St. 122 1664 V. McCoy, 42 Ohio St. 251 1664 V. McKinley, 99 U. S. 147 251 Raitt V. Mitchell, 4 Campb. 146 322, 1002, 1004 Rakestraw v. Hamilton, 14 Iowa 147 1119 Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W. 670 476 Raleigh, The, 32 Fed. 633 1707, 1812 Raleigh, The, 2 Hughes (U. S.) 44 1811 Ramage v. Towles, 85 Ala. 588 1086 Ramirez v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S. W. 254 1083 Rand v. Barrett, 66 Iowa 731 557, 558 V. Grubbs, 26 Mo. App. 591 1507 V. Parker, 73 Iowa 396 1262 Randall v. Roche, 30 N. J. L. 220 1686, 1721, 1755 V. Rosenthal (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 906 638 V. Van Wagenen, 115 N. Y. 527 209 Randall, Ex parte, 149 Ala. 640 169 Randel v. Brown, 2 How. (U. S.) 406 23 Randle v. Boyd, 73 Ala. 282 1101 V. Fuller, 6 T. R. 456 215 Randolph v. Builders, &c. Supply Co., 106 Ala. 501 1187 V. Randolph, 34 Tex. 181 146 Randolph, The, Gilp. (U. S.) 457 1697a Ranger Mercantile Co. v. Terrett (Tex. Civ. App.), 106 S. W. 1145 638 Rankin v. Black, 1 Head (Tenn.) 650 1152 V. Jones, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 169 791 V. Memphis &c. Packet Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 564 284, 313, 338 Ransom v. Brown, 63 Tex. 1S8 1107, 1110 V. Van Deventer, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 307 792 Ranson v. Sheehan, 78 Mo. 668, 1384, 1425, 1428 Rapaune Chemical Co. v. Green- field, &c. R. Co., 59 Mo. App. 6 1655 Rapid Transit. The. 11 Fed. 322 1681,' 1683, 1688, 1772. 1773, 1774, 1778, 1801 cxlii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 10G1-1S12.] Rapp V. Spring Val. Gold Co., 74 Gal. 532 1190 Rara Avis G. & S. M. Co. v. Bauscher, 9 Colo. 3S5 1364, 1366 Rasquin v. Knickerbocker Stage Co., 12 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 324 196, 203, 204, 233 Ratclift' V. Daniel, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 498 562 Ratcliffe v. Mason, 92 Ky. 190 1069 Rathbun v. Colton, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 471 1175 V. Hayford, 5 Allen (Mass.) 406 1312, 1313, 1315 V. State, 15 Idaho 273 1376 Rauh V. Ritchie, 1 111. App. 1>68 600, 613 Rawling-s v. Hunt, 90 N. Car. 270 631 V. New Memphis Gaslight Co., 105 Tenn. 26S 1465 Rawls V. Deshler, 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 12 946, 947 V. Moye, 98 Ga. 564 991 Ray V. Goodman, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 586 1123 V. Hixon, 107 Ga. 768 173 V. Schmidt, 7 Ga. App. 3S0 708 Raymond v. Ewing-, 26 111. 329, 1199, 1571 V. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425 248 V. Post, 25 N. J. Eq. 447 1216 V. Tyson, 17 How. (U. S.) 53 268, 325 Raynes v. Kokomo Ladder & Furniture Co.. 153 Ind. 315 758 R. Connor Co. v. Aetna Indem- nity Co., 136 Wis. 13 1375 Rea V. Burt, 8 La. Ann. 509 620 Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15 508 V. Bostick, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 321 137 V. Duppa, 6 T. R. 361 156, 209, 234 V. Gaillard, 2 Desaus. (S. Car.) 552 78 V. Hull of a New Brig, The, 1 Story (U. S.) 244 1746 V. Joselyn, Sheld. (N. Y.) 60 202 Reading v. Hopson, 90 Pa. St. 494 1470, 1491 Reading F. Ind. & Trust Co. v. Reading Iron "Works, 137 Pa. St. 282 377 Real Estate Co. v. Phillips, 90 Md. 515 1605 Reardon v. Higgins, 39 Ind. App. 363 29, 68, 657 Reaves v. Meredith, 123 Ga. 444 1197 Reavis v. Barnes, 36 Ark. 575 606 Red Bud Realty Co. v. Smith, 90 Ark. 281 87 Redenbaugh v. Kelton, 130 Mo. 558 850 Redfarn v. Sowerby, 1 Swanst. 84 121 Redford v. Gibson, 12 Leigh (Va.) 332 1074 Redington v. Frye, 43 Maine 578 710, 711,' 723 Redman v. Williamson, 2 Iowa 488 1235, 1245, 1257 Red River Line, In re, 115 La. 867 1745 Red River Lumber Co. v. Chil- dren of Israel, 7 N. Dak. 46 1299 v. Friel, 7 N. Dak. 4G 1406 Reece v. State, 5 Ga. App. 663 611 Reed v. Ash, 3 Nev. 116 21 V. Bartlett, 9 111. App. 267 599 V. Boyd, 84 111. 66 1199 V. Gregory, 46 Miss. 740 1101 V. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 23 1800 V. Norton, 90 Cal. 590 1405 V. Pacific Ins. Co., 1 Mete. (Mass.) 166 72, 425 V. Teneyck, 103 Ky. 65 513, 522 Reeder v. Anderson's Admr., 4 Dana (Ky.) 193 485 V. Nay, 95 Ind. 164 1098 Reed's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 565 1665 Rees V. Jutte, 153 Pa. St. 56 1760 V. Ludington, 13 Wis. 276 1232, 1470, 1487 Reese v. Bald Mountain, &c. Co., 133 Cal. 285 1366 V. Bank of Commerce, 14 Md. 271 375, 388, 393, 414 V. Burts, 39 Ga. 565 1107 V. Cole, 93 N. Car. 87 457 V. Corlew, 60 Tex. 70 1226, 1556 V. Kinkead, 18 Nev. 126 1063, 1067 Reeve v. Downs, 22 Kans. 330 1126 V. Blmendorf, 38 N. J. L. 125 1216, 1287, 1289. 1301, 1303, 1408 Reeves v. Capper, 6 Scott 877 468 V. McKenzie, 1 Bailey (S. Car.) 497 562, 571 Refeld v. Ferrell, 27 Ark. 534 1063 V. Ferrell, 30 Ark. 465 1066 Regulator, The, 1 Hask. (U. S.) 17 1680, 1681, 1682, 1688 Rehrer v. Zeigler, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 258 1404 Reichert v. Krass, 13 Ind. App. 348 1559 Reid v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 262 1460 V. Berry, 178 Mass. 260 1348 Reidenback v. Tuck, 85 N. Y. S. 352 976 Reillv V. Hudson, 62 Mo. 383 1211, 1335, 1470, 1478, 1608, 1613 V. Stephenson. 62 Mich. 509 721, 727 V. Williams, 47 Minn. 590, 1317, 1458 Reily v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 333 1091 Reindollar v. Flickinger, 59 Md. 469 1206, 1389, 1390, 1397. 1554 Reineman v. Covington C. &c. R. Co., 51 Iowa 338 308 Reinhardt v. Bianchard, 78 111. App. 26 580 Reis, In re, 3 Woods (U. S.) 18 595 Relfev. Relfe, 34 Ala. 500 1099, 1108 Remington Typewriter Co. v. McArthur, 145 Iowa 57 616 Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 378 192a, 217, 231 Renton v. Conley, 49 Cal. 185 1287 Rennard v. Morrison, 120 Ga. 28 1276 Republic Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Cameron (Tex. Civ. App), 143 S. W. 317 1382 TABLE OF CASES. cxliii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Resse v. Planing Mill Co., 55 Kans. 518 1202 Restrick Lumber Co. v. Wyrem- bolski, 164 Mich. 71 1248 Retriever, The, 93 Fed. 480 1709 Revenue Cutter No. 2, The, 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 143 1722a Rewis V. Williamson, 51 Fla. 529 1061, 1063 V. Humphery, 1 McClel. & Y. Y. 173 977, 978 Rex V. Humphery, 1 McClel. & Y. 194 977 Rex Buggy Co. v. Ross, 80 Ark. 388 885 Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354 251 Reynolds v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 43 N. H. 580 875, 885, 887, 888, 896, 928, 929, 940 V. Case, 60 Mich. 76 691 V. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 115 543 V. Ellis, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 47 544, 547 V. Jex, 34 L. J. Q. B. 251 273 V. Lawrence, 147 Ala. 216 1101 V. Manhattan Trust Co., 83 Fed. 593 1503, 1625 V. Morse, 52 Iowa 155 1119 V. Port Jervis Boot & Shoe P^actory, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 64 196 V. Reynolds, 10 Nebr. 574 23S V. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 323 567 V. Taylor, 144 N. Car. 165 631 R. Haas Electric, &c. Co. v. Springfield Amusement Park Co., 236 111. 452 1335 Rhea v. Revnolds, 12 Nebr. 128 1108 Rheola, The, 19 Fed. 926 1771 Rhoades v. Rhoades, 88 111. 139 1167 Rhodes v. Arthur, 19 Okla. 520 1067 V. Hines, 79 App. Div. (N. Y.) 379 702 V. Mooney, 43 Ohio St. 421 849, 862 V. Webb-Jameson Co., 19 Ind. App. 195 1532 Rialto Mining & Milling Co. v. Lowell, 23 Colo. 253 1588 Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197 465 v. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479 789, 790 V. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60 1277 v. Garnhart, 35 Wis. 282 192b, 222 V. Hall, 41 Wis. 453 1578, 1592 V. Hodge, 26 Kans. 164 1329 V. Nantasket Co., 140 Mass. 256 1313, 1316 V. Rhone (Colo.), Ill Pac. 585 1298 V. Rice, 36 Fed. 858 1063, 1079, 1086 Rich, The, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 308 1681 Richards v. Bestor, 90 Ala. 352 602 V. Fisher, 8 W. Va. 55 1108 V. Gaskill, 39 Kans. 428 422 V. John Sprv Lumber Co., 169 111. 238 1266 v. Leaming, 27 111. 431 1086, 1092 V. McGrath, 100 Pa. St. 389 632 V. McPherson, 74 Ind. 158 1079, 1086 V. O'Brien, 173 Mass. 332 1207 V. Reed, 39 Ind. 330 1559 Richards v. Ridgely, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 87 1086 V. Symons, 15 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 35 641 Richardson v. Baker, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 323 1100 V. Blakemore, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 290 636 V. Bowman, 40 Miss. 782 1063, 1069 V. Brooklyn C. &c. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 69 237 V. Central Lumber Co., 112 111. App. 160 1367 V. Goss, 3 B. & P. 119 940, 941, 944, 980 V. Green, 46 Ark. 267 1074 V. Hamlett, 33Ark. 237 1119 V. Hickman, 32 Ark. 406 1550 V. Hoxie, 90 Maine 227 710 V. Koch, 81 Mo. 264 1275, 1384, 1385, 13S6 V. Langston, 68 Ga. 658 781 V. McLaurin, 69 Miss. 70 625 V. Morton, L. R. 13 Eq. 123 1165 V. Peterson, 58 Iowa 724 576a, 610 V. Reid, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 606 1235 V. Rich, 104 Mass. 156 286 V. Rust, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 243 43 V. Stillinger, 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 477 1100 Richey v. Du Pre, 20 S. Car. 6 458 Richie v. Brackett, 109 III. App. 631 967 V. McCauley, 4 Pa. St. 471 633 Richmond v. Duesberry, 27 Grat. (Va.) 210 555, 639 Richmond & I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N. I. & R. Co., 68 Fed. 105 1648 Ricker v. Joy, 72 Maine 106 14i:0 Ricks V. Redwine, 73 Ga. 273 781 Riddle v. Welden, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 9 564 RidcWer v. Varnum, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 280 836 Rider v. Clark, 54 Iowa 292 32 Ridgely v. Iglehart, 3 Bland (Md.) 540 3, 4, 21, 93, 1174 Ridgeway v. Kennedy, 52 Mo. 24 820 V. Toram, 2 Md. Ch. 303 1100 Rieflin v. Grafton, 63 Wash. 387 1230, 1444 Rieser, In re, 137 App. Div. (N. Y.) 177 184 Riggs V. Eicholz, 127 La. 745 177a V. Whitney, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y ) 3 88 591 Riley v. Watson, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 568 1218 Rinaker v. Freeman, 87 111. App. 283 1367 Rindge v. Oliphant, 62 Tex. 682 1099 Ringgold v. Bryan, 3 Md. Ch. 488 1076 Ringle v. Wallis Iron Works, 149 N. Y. 439 1413 Rinn v. Electric Power Co. of Staten Island, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 305 1367 Ripley v. Gage, 3 Nebr., 397 1375 Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 B. Mon. Ky. 465 1092 cxliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ 1-lOCOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Ritten v. Union Pacific R. Co., 16 Rep. 199 90 Rittenhouse v. Swango (Kv.), 128 S. W. 299 1064 Ritter v. Stevenson, 7 Cal. 388 1184, 1190, 1499 Rivara v. Ohio, 3 E. D. Smitli (N. Y.) 264 968 Riverside County v. Butcher, 133 Cal. 324 1190 Roach v. Chapin, 27 111. 194 1199 12*»S V. Chapman, 22 How. (U. s!) 393 1722 V. Chapman, 22 How. (U. S.) 129 1722, 1724, 1725 Roanoke Land &c. Co. v. Karn, 80 Va. 589 1229 Robards v. Robards, 27 Ky. L. 494 1143 Robarts v. Buee, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 198 216 Robb v. Mudge, 14 Gray (Mass.) 534 791 V. Wagner, 5 La. Ann. Ill 620 Robbins v. Arendt, 148 N. T. 673 1543 V. Blevins, 109 Mass. 219 1207, 1286 V. Gray, 2 Q. B. 501 499 v. Masteller, 147 Ind. 122 1080, 1087 Robbins, In re, 132 App. Div. (N. T.) 905 184 Robert Gaskin, The, 9 Fed. 62 1799 Robert J. Mercer, The, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 284 1712 Roberts v. Austin. 26 Iowa 315 57 V. Campbell, 59 Iowa 675 1588 V. Doty, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 128 196 V. Fowler, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 632 1493, 1495 V. Francis, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 127 1109 V. Gates, 64 111. 374 1568 V. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597 5,«541, 542, 547, 606, 982, 1494 V. McCarty, 9 Ind. 16 798 V. Miller, 32 Mich. 289 1208 V. Mitchell, 94 Tenn. 277 190 V. Riggs, 84 Ky. 251 1382 V. Union El. R. Co., 84 Hun (N. Y.) 437 184 V. Wilcoxson, 3 6 Ark. 355 1013, 1014, 1521 V. Windermere, The, 2 Fed. 722 1713 Robertson v. Guerin, 50 Tex. 317 1092, 1098 V. Moore, 10 Idaho 115 1390, 1608 V. Shutt, 9 Bush (Ky.) 659 177, 219, 220 Robey v. Oilier, L. R. 7 Ch. 695 61 Robins v. Bunn, 34 N. J. L. 322 1184, 1578, 1586 Robinson v. Appleton. 124 111. 276 1063, 1114, 1116 V. Baker, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 137 262, 291, 304, 305 V. Black, 56 Tex. 215 1101 v. Columbia Spinning Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 238 973 V. Dix, 18 W. Va. 528 1126 Robinson v. Harbour, 42 Miss. 795 1119 V. Hays, 186 Fed. 295 192 V. Holt, 85 Ala. 596 603 V. Kaplan, 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 686 673 V. Lehman, 72 Ala. 401 603, 1046 V. McWhirter, 52 Tex. 201 1087 V. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2 1136 V. Springfield Iron Co., 39 Hun (N. Y.) 634 1031 V. Staples, 5 La. Ann. 712 620 V. State Ins. Co., 55 Iowa 489 1289 V. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269 499 V. Wappans, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) V. Ward, 13 Ohio St. 293 1142 V. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380 1081 V. Wilson, 15 Kans. 595 1382 V. Rob Roy, The. 30 Fed. 696 1702 Robson V. Kemp, 4 Esp. 233 433 Rochford V. Fleming, 10 S. Dak. 24 98 V. Rochford, 188 Mass. 108 1245 V. Rochford, 192 Mass. 231 1207 Rochfort V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 50 App. Div. (N. Y.) 261 184 Rockefeller v. Thompson, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 395 1734 Rock Island Bridge, The, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 213 1676, 1770 Rockwood V. Walcott, 3 Allen (Mass.) 458 1299, 1568 Rodbourn v. Seneca Lake Grape & Wine Co., 67 N. Y. 215 1218, 1299 V. Seneca Lake Grape &c. Co., 5 Hun (N. Y.) 12 1218 Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. 393 917 921 949 Rodgers v. Furse, 83 Ga. 115 ' 223 v. Grothe, 58 Pa. St. 414 985, 988, 1033 Rodick V. Gandell. 12 Beav. 325 50 Rodman v. Sanders, 44 Ark. 504 1093 Roe V. Scanlan. 98 Ky. 24 1375, 1376 Roecliff, The. L. R. 2 P. 363 1769 Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 1215 Rogers V. Blum. 56 Tex. 1 1109, 1116 V. Currier, 13 Gray (Mass.) 129 105, 1327, 1328, 1727, 1748 V. Grigg (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 654 576a, 638 V. Heath, 62 Vt. 101 228 V. Hosack, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 319 48 V. Huntingdon Bank. 12 Serg. 6 R. (Pa.) 77 379, 393, 395, 402 V. James, 33 Ark. 77 1092, 1119 V. Phillips, 8 Ark. 366 1261 V. Powell, 1 Bradw. (111.) 631 1199 V. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53 861, 885, 887 V. Tucker, 94 Mo. 346 1080 V. Walker, 24 Fed. 344 782 V. Whitehouse, 71 Maine 222 820 Rogers Development Co. v. Southern Cal. Real Estate Inv. Co., 159 Cal. 735 1069 TABLE OF CASES. cxlv [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Roget V. Merritt, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 117 803 Roland v. Centerville, M. &c. R. Co., 61 Iowa 380 1289, 1290 Rollin V. Cross. 45 N. Y. 766 1244, 1245, 1247, 1251, 1257. 1259, 1493, 1494, 1495 Rollins V. Forbes. 10 Cal. 299 1559 V. Proctor, 56 Iowa 326 585, 592 Roman v. Thorn, 83 Ala. 443 1571, 1572 Romanik v. Rapoport, 148 Apn. Div. (N. Y.) 688 1218 Rombeck v. Devorss. 19 Mo. App. 38 1574 Ronald v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 30 Fed. 228 134, 200 Rood V. McCargar, 49 Cal. 117 103 Rooker v. Hoofstetter, 26 Can. Sup. Ct. 41 77 Rooney v. Second Ave. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 368 184, 187, 188, 193 Roop V. Herron, 15 Nebr. 73 787 Roose V. Billing-sley & N. C. Co., 74 Iowa 51 1424 V. McDonald, 23 Ind. 157 1735 Root V. Bryant, 57 Cal. 48 1460 Roper V. Day, 48 Ala. 509 1119 V. McCook, 7 Ala. 318 1100, 1119 Rosborough v. Rutland. 2 S. Car. 378 1163 Rose V. Gray, 40 Ga. 156 577 V. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499 732 V. Munie, 4 Cal. 173 1460 V. Persse &c. Paper Works, 29 Conn. 256 1311, 1338, 1537, 1578 V. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672 1105, 1106 Rosema v. Porter, 112 Mich. 13 664 Rosenback v. Salt Springs Nat. Bank, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 495 377, 384 Rosenbaum v. Carlisle, 78 Miss. 882 1299 V. Hayes, 8 N. Dak. 461 466 v. Paletz, 114 N. Y. S. 802 1290 Rosenberg v. Shaper, 51 Tex. 134 559, 638 Rosenberger v. Hallowell, 35 Pai-. St. 369 632 Rosenfield v. Express Co., 1 Woods (U. S.) 131 895 Rosenkranz v. Wagner, 62 Cal. 151 1287, 1594 Ro.senstein v. Forester, 57 Ga. 94 611 Rosenthal v. Dessau. 11 Hun (N. Y.) 49 952 V. Die Gartenlaube, The, 5 Fed. 827 1694 V. Maryland Brick Co., 61 Md. 590 1206, 1458, 1470 Rosenzv/eig v. Frazer, 82 Ind. 342 1054 Rosette v. Wynn, 73 Ala. 146 1083 Rosevear China Clav Co., Ex parte, 11 Ch. Div. 560 902, 909, 912 Ross v. Adams, 13 Bush (Ky. ) 370 1063 v. Clark, 126 111. Apn. 460 1071, 1086, 1103 V. Heintzen, 36 Cal. 313 1092 Ross V. Irving, 14 111. 171 1144, 1145 V. Laughton, 1 Ves. & B. 349 122a V. Simon, 16 Daly (N. Y.) 159 1397 V. Simon, 8 N. Y. S. 2 1276 V. Swan, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 463 1110 V. Whitson, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 50 1063 Rossi V. MacKellar, 13 N. Y. S. 827 1254 Rotch V. Hussey. 52 Iowa 694 1074 Roth V. Williams, 45 Ark. 447 556, 606 Rothe V. Bellingrath, 71 Ala. 55 1272, 1273. 1274, 1276, 1280, 1490 Rothery v. Wood, 3 Camp. 24 590 Rothgerber v. Dupuy, 64 111. 452 1199, 1283, 1554, 1624 Rotzler v. Rotzler, 46 Iowa 189 601 Roulet V. Hogan. 203 111. 525 1199 v. Hogan, 107 111. App. 164 1199 Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vern. 482 78 Rousculp V. Ohio Southern R. Co., 19 Ohio Civ. Ct. 436 1664 Rouse V. Wooten, 104 N. Car. 229 457, 631, 784 Rousey v. Mattox, 111 Ga. 883 611 Roush V. Miller, 39 W. Va. 638 1065 Row V. Dawson, 1 Ves. Jr. 332 43 Rowe V. Fogle. 88 Ky. 105 177, 203 V. Pickford, 1 Moore C. P. 526 940, 941 V. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83 904, 917, 921 Rowell V. Harris, 121 Ga. 239 1287 V. Klein, 44 Ind. 290 1202 Rowen v. Alladio, 51 Ore. 121 1387 Rowland v. Day, 17 Ala. 681 1091 v. Dolby, 100 Md. 272 439, 466 v. Hewitt, 19 111. App. 450 552 V. New York, N. H. &c. R. Co., 61 Conn. 103 2S0a Rowland, In re, 55 App. Div. (N. Y.) 66 184 Row^ley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 307 857, 861, 910 V. James, 31 111. 298 1199 Royal V. McPhail. 97 Ga. 457 1519 Royal Arch, The, 1 Swab. 269 1801 Royal Consol. Mining Co. v. Royal Consol. Mines Co., 157 Cal. 737 1064, 1091 Royal George, The. 1 Woods (U. S.) 290 1722 Roylance v. San Luis Hotel Co., 74 Cal. 273 1430 R. S. Carter, The. 38 Fed. 515 1781 R. S. Carter, The, 40 Fed. 331 1781 Ruck v. Hatfield, 5 B. & Aid. 632 909, 916 Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251 262, 277, 857, 861, 887, 888, 894, 900, 965 Rudd V. Ford, 91 Ky. 183 619 V. Peters, 41 Ark. 177 1262 Rude V. Mitchell, 97 Mo. 365 1416, 1417, 1418 Ruff V. Jarrett, 94 111. 475 1599 Rufltin, Ex parte, 6 Ves. 119 788, 791 Rugg V. Hoover, 28 Minn. 404 1392, 1397 Ruggles V. Blank, 15 Bradw. (111.) 436 1249, 1360, 1603 cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Ruggles V. Bucknor, 1 Paine (U. S.) 35S 327 V. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 472 712 V. Walker, 34 Vt. 468 731, 983, 986, 989, 1008 Ruhl V. Ruhl, 24 W. Va. 279 1111 Rumbell, The, 148 U. S. 1 16V6 Rumrill v. Huntington, 5 Day (Conn.) 163 217, 219, 222 Runge V. Gilbrough (Tex. Civ. App.), S7 S. W. 832 1107 Rusche V. Pittman, 34 Ind. App. 159 1248 Rush V. Able, 90 Pa. St. 153 1367, 1407, 1441 V. Fisher, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 44 1257 V. Hendley, 4 Wills. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) § 200 638 V. Perot, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 175 1282 Rusforth V. Hadfield, 6 East 519 262, 265, 732 V. Hadfield, 7 East 224 14, 19, 731 Russell V. Bell, 44 Pa. St. 47 1416, 1585 V. Conway, 11 Cal. 93 160 V. Doty, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 576 571 V. Hadduck, 3 Gilman (111.) 233 237, 260 V. Hayden, 40 Minn. 88 1421 V. Howell, 74 N. H. 551 1550a V. McCormick, 45 Ala. 587 1066 V. Myers Excursion & Trans- fer Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 192 1729, 1755 V. Painter, 50 Ark. 244 751a V. Somerville, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 395 189, 228 V. Todd, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 26y 1100 V. Watt, 41 Miss. 602 1084, 1094 Russell Wheel & Foundry Co. v. Hammond, 130 Mich. 7 377 Russ Lumber Co. v. Garrettson, 87 Cal. 589 1190, 1588, 1594, 1615 Rust-Owen Lumber Co. v. Holt, 60 Nebr. 80 1202 Rutherford v. Cincinnati & P. R. Co., 35 Ohio St. 559 1618, 1664 V. Gaines, 103 Tex. 263 1066 v. Mothershed, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 360 1092 Rutland v. Brister, 53 Miss. 683 1094 Rutledge v. Walton, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 458 636 Ryan v. Desmond, 118 111. App. 186 1242 Ryan v. Guilfoil, 13 Wash. 373 718 V. Kelly, 9 Mo. App. 396 1211 v. Klock, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 104 1218, 1407 Ryan Drug Co. v. Rowe, 66 Minn. 480 1325 Ryberg v. Snell, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 294 946 Ryerson v. Quackenbush, 26 N. J. L. 236 628 V. Smith, 152 111. 641 1301 Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 111. 326 1086 Ryman's A.pp.. 124 Pa. St. 635 1444 Safford v. McDonough, 120 Mass. 290 805 Sage V. Gittner, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 120 970 Saginaw, The, 32 Fed. 176 1697 Sagmeister v. Foss. 4 Wash. 320 1397 Sahll V. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142 1119 Saint V. Smith, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 51 641, 642 St. Clair Coal Co. v. Martz, 75 Pa. St. 384 1367 St. Croix Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 6 Dak. 215 1558 St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55 719 St. Germans v. Crystal Palace R. Co., L. R. 11 Eq. 568 1674 St. Jago de Cuba, The, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 409 1519, 1680, 1682, 1685, 1688, 1785 St. John V. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261 115, 119, 141, 161, 165, 209, 213, 231 V. Hall, 41 Conn. 522 1494, 1499 St. Johns Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 113 Mich. 165 98 St. Joseph, The, 1 Brown Adm. 202 744, 1494 St. Joze Indiano, The, In re, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 208 884, 903 St. Kevin Min. Co. v. Isaacs, 18 Colo. 400 1614 St. Lawrence, The, L. R. 5 Prob. D 250 1788 St. Lawrence, The, 1 Black (U. . S.) 522 1722, 1725, 1729, 1799, 1808 St. Louis v. Ferry Co., The, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423 IGSl St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. &c. R. Co., 125 U. S. 658 1625a v. Matthews, 75 Tex. 92 1668 St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Bennett, 35 Kans. 395 211 V. Dysart (Tex. Civ. App.), 130 S. W. 1047 190a St. Louis Bolt &c. Co. V. Dona- hoe, 3 Mo. App. 559 1655 St. Louis Bridge & Construction Co. V. Memphis C. &c. R. Co., 72 Mo. 664 1619 St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Lear, 54 Ark. 399 294 St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. O'Reilly, 85 111. 546 1199. 1286, 1287, 1317, 1447, 1599 St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149 377, 391, 393, 398 St. Louis Type Foundry v. Taylor (Tex.), 35 S. W. 691 564 St. Louis W. & W. R. Co. V. Ritz, 30 Kans. 30 1648 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Kerr, 153 111. 182 1460 St. Paul & M. Pressed Brick Co. V. Stout, 45 Minn. 327 1441 St. Paul Labor Exchange Co. v. Eden, 48 Minn. 5 1323, 1542 TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] St. Paul Roller-Mill Co. v. Great Western Despatch Co., 27 Fed. 434 946 St. Peter's Catholic Church v. Vannote, 66 N. J. E:q. 78 1287 Salem v. Lane &c. Co., 189 111. 593 1259, 1375 V. Lane &c. Co., 90 111. App. 560 1375 Salina State Bank v. Burr, 7 Kans. App. 197 617 Salmon v. Downs, 55 Tex. 243 1097, 1130 V. Hoffman, 2 Cal. 138 1063 Salomons v. Nissen, 2 T. R. 674 946 Salte V. Field, 5 T. R. 211 865 Salter v. Goldberg-, 150 Ala. 511 1187, 1373 Saltus V. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267 304, 335, 1019 Salvo V. Schmidt, 2 Speers (S. Car.) 512 600 Salzer Lumber Co. v. Claflin, 16 N. Dak. 601 1247 Sampley v. Watson, 43 Ala. 377 1083 Sampson v. Buffalo, N. Y. &c. R. Co., 13 Hun (N. Y.) 280 1662 Samuel J. Christian, The, 16 Fed. 796 1776, 1781, 1782, 1786 Samuel Marshall, The, 49 Fed. 754 IGSO, 1683, 1691, 1725, 1731 Samuel Ober, The, 15 Fed. 621 1700, 1704 San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Schorn (Tex. Civ. App.), 127 S. W. 246 190a Sanarens v. True, 22 La. Ann. 181 620 Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver Min. Co., 18 Utah 66 190b Sanders v. Gillett, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 183 217, 220 V. Helfrich Lumber & Mfg. Co., 29 Ky. L. 466 63 V. Keber, 28 Ohio St. 630 820 V. McAffee, 41 Ga. 684 1086, 1090 V. Ohlhausen, 51 Mo. 163 626 V. Seelye, 128 111. 631 115, 119, 161 Sanderson v. Bell, 2 Crompt. & M. 304 125 V. Taft, 6 Gray (Mass.) 533 1242 San Diego Lumber Co. v. Wool- dredge, 90 Cal. 574 1190 Sands v. Champlin, 1 Story (U. S.) 376 1163 V. Sands, 74 Maine 239 726, 1024 Sandstrom v. Smith, 12 Idaho 446 1607 Sandval v. Ford, 55 Iowa 461 1287, 1289 Sanford v. Frost, 41 Conn. 617 1444 v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379 1469 V. Modine, 51 Nebr. 728 548 San Francisco Lumber Co. v. O'Neill, 120 Cal. 455 1190 Sanger v. Magee, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 397 579 V. Upton, 91 U. S. 50 84 San Jacinto, The, 30 Fed. 266 1797 San Juan & St. L. M. &c. Co. v. Finch, 6 Colo. 214 1191, 1559, 1571 San Juan Hdw. Co. The., v. Car- rothers, 7 Colo. App. 413 1588 San Rafael, The, 141 Fed. 270 1738 Santa Anna, The, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 79 1706a Santa Clara Val. Mill Co. v. Will- iams, 96 Cal. xviii 1446, 1614 Sarah Cullen, The, 49 Fed. 166 1691 Sarah E. Kennedy, The, 29 Fed. 264 1703, 1704 Sarah Harris, The, 7 Ben. (U. S.) 177 1688 Sarah Jane, The, 1 Low. (U. S.) 203 1700 Sarah J. Weed, The, 2 Low. (U. S.) 555 1681, 1687, 1707. 1798 Sarah Starr, The, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 453 1681 Saranac & L. P. R. Co. v. Arnold, 72 App. Div. (N. Y.) 620 184 Saratoga, The. 100 Fed. 480 1717 Sarchet v. Davis, The, Chabbe (U. S.) 185 1688 Sarchett v. Legg, 60 Ore. 213 1221 Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co. 8 Pick. (Mass.) 90 375, 391 V. Gile, 8 N. H. 325 820 V. Usher, 55 N. H. 287 691 Sarles v. Sharlow, 5 Dak. 100 1455 Sarmiento v. Catherine C, The, 110 Mich. 120 1749, 1808 Sassman v. Brisbane, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 159 632 Saulsbury v. Eason, 47 Ga. 617 454, 70S V. McKeller, 59 Ga. 301 584, 611 Saunders v. Leslie, 2 Ba. & B. 509 1090 V. Reilly, 6 N. Y. St. 452 787, 788, 789, 792, 795 Savage v. Hazard, 11 Nebr. 323 1108 Savannah & Charleston R. Co. v. Callahan, 49 Ga. 506 781 Savannah F. & W. R. Co. v. . Bundick, 94 Ga. 775 2S0a V. Talbot, 123 Ga. 378 305 Savannah, G. & N. R. Co. v. Grant, 56 Ga. 68 1197, 1642 Savannah Steam Rice Mill v. Hull, 103 Ga. 831 967 Saville v. Campion, 2 B. & Ad. 503 271, 323 Savings Bank v. Creswell, 100 U. S. 630 758 Savoy v. Dudley, 168 Mass. 538 1439 Sawyer v. Fisher. 32 Maine 28 816 V. Hoag, 17 M^all. (U. S.) 610 84 V. Joslin, 20 Vt. 172 945 V. Shick, 30 Okla. 353 1220a Sawyer-Austin Lumber Co. v. Clark, 82 Mo. App. 225 1600 Saylor v. Taylor, 77 Fed. 476 1787 Sayre-Newton L. Co. v. Park, 4 Colo. App. 482 1574 Scaife v. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237 576a, 578, 603 Scales V. Griffin, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 54 1245, 1247, 1248 V. Paine, 13 Nebr. 521 1264 Scanlan v. Cobb, 85 111. 296 1580 Scannell v. Beauvais, 38 La. Ann. 217 800 V. Hub Brewery Co., 178 Mass. 288 1329, 1344 cxiviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270 334, 641, 644, 645, 731, 742, 743a, 1021, 1025, 1032 Scatcherd Lumber Co. v. Rike, 113 Ala. 555 1729, 1736 Schaefer v. Purviance, 160 Ind. 63 1101 Schaeffer v. Pithian, 17 Ind. 463 793 Schaettler v. Gardiner, 47 N. Y. 404 1613 Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61 1543 Schaghticoke Powder Co. v. Greenwich &c. R. Co., 183 N. Y. 306 1347a Schall V. Kinsella, 117 La. 687 620 Schaller-Hoerr Co. v. Gentile, 153 111. App. 458 1199 Schallert-Ganahl Lumber Co. v. Sheldon, 97 Cal. xviii 1430 Schanck v. Arrowsmith, 9 N. J. Eq. 314 1163, 1171, 1173 Schaper v. Bibb, 71 Md. 145 1341, 1343, 1387 Scharff v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 216 1101 Scharlock v. Oland, 1 Rich. (S. Car.) 207 158, 189c Schearff v. Dodge, 33 Ark. 340 1108 Scheible v. Schickler, 63 Minn. 471 1445 Scheibner v. Cohnen, 108 Mich. 165 1419 Scheid v. Rapp, 121 Pa. St. 593 1289, 1500a Schenck v. Vannest, 4 N. J. L. 329 628 Schenley's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 98 1274 Schermerhorn v. Gardenier, 184 N. Y. 612 65, 77 V. Gardepier, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 564 453 Scherrer v. Music Hall Co., 18 N. Y. S. 459 1511, 1584 Schiefer v. Freygang, 141 App. Div. (N. Y.) 236 184 Schindler v. Green, 149 Cal. 752 1447 Schlosser v. Moores, 16 N. Dak. 185 457a, 784a Schmalz v. Mead, 125 N. Y. 188 1247, 1252a. 1262 V. Mead, 15 Dalv (N. Y.) 223 1262 Schmeiding v. Ewing, 57 Mo. 78 1597, 1613 Schmelzer v. Chicago Ave. S. & D. Co., 85 111. App. 596 1288 Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. St. 335 465, 886 V. Hammond, 51 "W. Va. 408 192a Schmid v. Carter, 95 Ky. 1 29 Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 Miss. 597 789 792. 794 Schmidt v. Anderson, 253 111. 29 1434 V. Blood, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 268 974 V. Gilson, 14 Wis. 514 1532, 1608 V. Hennepin County Barrel Co., 35 Minn. 511 392, 398 Schmidt, Ex parte, 62 Ala. 252 1260 Schmitt V. Wright, 6 Mo. App. 601 1267 Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y. 554 1243 Schnebly v. Ragan, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 120 1064, 1095 Schneider v. Dayton, 111 Mich. 396 968 V. Evans, 25 Wis. 241 294, 296 V. Hobein, 41 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 232 1286, 1287 V. Kolthoff, 59 Ind. 568 1200, 1404, 1534 V. Reed, 123 Wis. 488 1138 Schneiderhorst v. Luecking, 26 Ohio St. 47 1291 Schnell v. Clements, 73 111. 613 1271, 1573 Scholes v. Hughes, 77 Tex. 482 1421 Scholfield V. Bell, 14 Mass. 40 865 School District v. Conrad, 17 Kans. 522 1375 V. Howell, 44 Kans. 285 1417 Schoole V. Noble, 1 H. Bl. 23 156, 215 Schooner Mary Ann Guest, The, 1 Olc. Adm. 498 898, 946 Schorn v. McWhirter, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 313 1116 V. McWhirter, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 201 1108, 1116 Schotsmans v. Lancashire &c. R. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 332 861, 911, 912 Schouweiler v. McCaull, 18 S. Dak. 70 458a Schrandt v. Young, 62 Nebr. 254 668 Schriever v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 30 Misc. (N. Y.) 145 184 Schriffer v. Saum, 81 Pa. St. 385 1262 Schroeder v. Galland, 134 Pa. St. 277 1289, 1502 V. Mueller, 33 Mo. App. 28 1313, 1394, 1408, 1415 Schukraft, v. Ruck, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 1 Schulenberg v. Havden, 146 Mo. 583 1462 V. Prairie Home Institute, 65 Mo. 295 1328 Schulenburg v. Hawley, 6 Mo. App. 34 1328 V. Memphis, C. &c. R. Co., 76 Va. 180 1618 V. Robison, 5 Mo. App. 561 1323, 1526 V. Vrooman, 7 Mo. App. 133 1313, 1321, 1448 V. Werner, 6 Mo. App. 292 1211, 1404 Schulenburg &c. Lumber Co. v. Strimple, 33 Mo. App. 154 1412 Schultz V. Asay, 2 Penny. (Pa.) 411 1313 V. Hay, 62 111. 157 1299 Schultze V. Alamo &c. Brew. Co., 2 Tex. Civ. App. 236 1248, 1443, 1470, 1554 Schumacher v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 207 111. 199 282, 283, 320 v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 108 111. App. 520 284, 974 Schuyler v. Hayward, 67 N. Y. 253 1247 TABLE OF CASES. cxlix [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Schuyler v. Leggett, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 660 571, 598 Schwab V. Oatman, 56 Misc. (N. Y.) 393 967 Schwabacher v. Kane, 13 Mo. App. 126 965 Schwartz v. Allen, 7 N. Y. S. 5 1343 V. Knig-ht, 74 Cal. 432 1190, 1283, 1430, 1438 V. Saunders, 46 111. 18 1264, 1487, 1539 V. Schwartz, 21 Hun (N. Y.) 33 143, 208 Schwarz v. Stein, 29 Md. 112 1074, 1086, 1116 Schweizer v. Mansfield, 14 Colo. App. 236 1276 Scio, The, L. R. 1 Adm. & Eccl. 353 744 Scoggin, In re, 5 Sawyer (U. S.) 549 179, 180 Scotia, The, 35 Fed. 907 1790 Scotia, The, 35 Fed. 916 1713 Scott V. Cook, 8 Mo. App. 133 1448 V. Crawford, 12 Ind. 410 1100 V. Darling, 66 Vt. 510 137 V. Delahunt, 65 N. Y. 128 1793 V. Delahunt, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 079 S Y 4 4 V. Edgar, 159 Ind. 38 1074, 'l083 V. Franklin, 15 East 428 241, 244 V. Goldinghorst, 123 Ind. 268 1309b, 1423, 1573, 1588 V. Griggs, 49 Ala. 185 1106 V. Guernsey, 48 N. Y. 106 1155 V. Guernsey, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 163 1155 V. Hempel, 33 Fla. 313 1196 V. Jester, 13 Ark. 437 967 V. McEwen, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 176 569 V. McMillan, 76 N. Y. 141 30 V. Mann, 36 Tex. 157 1092 V. Mercer, 98 Iowa 258 644 V. Mercer (Iowa), 63 N. W. 325 658 V. Morris, 131 111. App. 605 115, 161 V. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. 437 1147 V. Orbison, 21 Ark. 202 1075, 1504 V. Pettit, 3 B. & P. 469 882, 904, 921, 940, 941, 944 V. Porcher, 3 Mer. 652 46 V. Pound, 61 Ga. 579 611 V. Scott, 196 Pa. St. 132 1222 V. Stebbins, 91 N. Y. 605 1164 V. Ward, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 112 1532 Scott & Holston Lumber Co. v. Sharvy, 62 Minn. 528 713 Scroggins v. Foster, 76 Miss. 318 625 V. Hoadley, 56 Ga. 165 1108 Scruggs V. Decatur, 155 Ala. 616 1374 V. Gibson, 40 Ga. 511 611 Scudder v. Harden, 31 N. J. Eq. 503 1216. 1554 Scull V. Shakespeare, 75 Pa. St. 297 1722 Scull's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 141 790 Scully V. Porter, 57 Kans. 322 576a, 577, 580, 617 Seaboard, The, 119 Fed. 375 1690 Sealigson v. Mitcham, 74 Tex. 571 1086 Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243 854, 1071, 1086 V. Wills, 4 Allen (Mass.) 212 318, 997 Seary v. Wegenaar, 120 App. Div. (N. Y.) 419 1615 Sease v. Dobson, 34 S. Car. 345 458 Seaton v. Chamberlain, 32 Kans. 239 1202, 1430 V. Hixon, 35 Kans. '663 1202, 1430, 1565 Seattle Lumber Co. v. Richardson & Elmer Co., 66 Wash. 671 1230 V. Sweeney, 43 Wash. 1 1236 Seavey v. Godbold, 99 Miss. 113 583 Sea Witch, The, 34 Fed. 654 1726 Secomb v. Nutt. 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 324 884, 885, 919, 921, 960, 962 Second Nat. Bank v. Walbridge, 19 Ohio St. 419 825 Second Nat. Bank of Louisville V. Nat. State Bank, 10 Bush (Ky.) 367 384 Secret, The. 15 Fed. 480 1691 Secrist v. Delaware, 100 Ind. 59 1375 V. Stivers, 35 Iowa 580 576 Sedam v. Williams, 4 McLean (U. S.) 51 791 Seebaum v. Handy, 46 Ohio St. 560 641, 699 Seely v. Neill, 37 Colo. 198 1458 Seeman v. Biemann, 108 Wis. 365 1232, 1289 V. Schultze, 100 Ga. 603 1349 Seibel v. Simeon, 62 Mo. 255 1547 Seibs V. Englehardt, 78 Ala. 508 1585, 1587 Seisel v. Folmar, 103 Ala. 491 602 Seitz V. Union Pac. R. Co., 16 Kans. 133 1109, 1257 Selah, The, 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 40 1792 Selby V. Hurd, 51 Mich. 1 1026 V. Stanley, 4 Minn. 65 (Gil. 34) 1063 Selden v. Meeks, 17 Cal. 128 1190, 1406, 1409, 1420 Selfridge v. Leonard-Heffner Co., 51 Colo. 314 1559 Selina, The, 2 Notes Cas. Adm. & Ecc. 18 1787 Selma Sash &c. Factory v. Stoddard, 116 Ala. 251 1187 Selna v. Selna, i:i5 Cal. 357 1064 Seiner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. S. 1049 673 Selph V. Howland, 23 Miss. 264 1261 Selz V. Mayer. 151 Ind. 422 788 Seminole, The, 42 Fed. 924 1800 Senator, The, 21 Fed. 191 1713 Senior v. Brebnor, 22 111. 252 1199 Sens v. Trentune, 54 Tex. 218 1226 Sensenbrenner t. Mathews, 48 Wis. 250 997 Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259 1061, 1063, 1064, 1081 Serapis, The, 37 Fed. 436 1798 Sergeant v. Denby, 87 Va. 206 1313 Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52 1107 Sessoms v. Tayloe, 148 N. Car. 369 631 cl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Seventh Avenue Meat & Provi- sion Co. V. Del Favero, 123 N. Y. S. 46 184 Sevier v. Shaw, 25 Ark. 417 575 Sewall V. Duplessis, 2 Rob. (La.) 66 1272 V. Hull of a New Ship, The, 1 Ware (U. S.) 565 1746, 1748 V. Lancaster Bank, 17 Serg-. & R. (Pa.) 285 379, 393, 409, 411 Sexton V. Albertie, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 452 1261 V. Pike, 13 Ark. 193 212, 226 V. "Weaver, 141 Mass. 273 1308, 1415, 1420, 1569 Seymour v. Alkire, 47 W. Va. 302 1009 V. Canandaigua & Niagara Falls R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 284 77 V. Hoadley, 9 Conn. 418 470 V. Newton, 105 Mass. 272 841, 913, 937, 960, 965 V. Slide & Spur Gold Mines, 42 Fed. 633 1064, 1090 S. G. Owens, The, 1 "Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 370 1713 Shackleford v. Beck, 80 Va. 573 1229, 1389, 1417 Shacklett v. Polk, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 104 1261 Shaeffer v. "Weed, 3 GiL (IH.) 511 1382 Shafer v. Archbold, 116 Ind. 29 1286 V. Guest, 35 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184 518 V. Hogue, 70 "^'is. 392 719 Shaffer v. Stevens, 143 Ind. 295 615 Shall V. Briscoe, 18 Ark. 142 1063, 1083, 1092 Shamokin Val. & P. R. Co. v. Malone, 85 Pa. St. 25 1665 Shank v. Shoemaker, 18 N. Y. 489 193, 196 Shanks v. Klein. 104 U. S. 18 796, 799 Shannon v. Cavenaugh, 12 Cal. App. 434 601 v. Rutterv (Tex. Civ. App.), 140 S. "W. 858 1125 V. Shultz, 87 Pa. St. 481 1260 Shape V. Mitchell, 116 Iowa 636 1294 Shapiro v. Thompson, 160 Ala. 363 553 Shapleigh v. Hull, 21 Colo. 419 1249 Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. H. 347 155, 166, 220 Shappendocia v. Spencer, 73 Ind. 128 758 Sharon Town Co. v. Morris, 39 Kans. 377 1406. 1453 Sharp V. Collins, 74 Mo. 266 1080 V. J^lelds, 1 Keisk. (Tenn.) 571 " 636 V. Fields, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 326 230 V. Fly, 9 Bax. (Tenn.) 4 1079 V. Johnson, 38 Ore. 246 641, 675 V. Morgan, 9 Ga. App. 487 611 V. "^^hipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 557 423, 466, 469 Sharpe v. Allen, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 518 230 Sharpe v. Clifford, 44 Ind. 346 1262 Sharpley v. South & East Coast R. Co., 2 Ch. Div. 663 1487 Shattell v. Woodward, 17 Ind. 225 1375 Shattuck V. Beardsley, 46 Conn. 386 1192, 1393, 1423 Shaver v. Murdock, 36 Cal. 293 1289, 1513 v. "Western Union Telegraph Co., 57 N. Y. 459 54 Shaw V. Allen, 24 Wis. 563 1592 V. Berry, 31 Maine 478 498 V. Bradley, 59 Mich. 199 704 V. Ferguson, 78 Ind. 547 419, 479 V. FJellman, 72 Minn. 465 1444 V. Gookin, 7 N. H. 16 1789 V. Martin, 20 Idaho 168 1602 V. Neale, 6 H. L. Cas. 581 229 V. Stewart, 43 Kans. 572 1287, 1438 V. Tabor, 146 Mich. 544 1064 V. Thompson, 105 Mass. 345 1207, 1319 V. Young, 87 Maine 271 1276, 1278 Shea V. Minneapolis, St. P. & S., Sts. M. R. Co.. 63 Minn. 228 315 Shealey v. Clark, 117 Ga. 794 611 V. Livingston, 8 Ga. App. 642 708 Shearer v. Rasmussen, 102 Wis. 585 1494 V. Wilder, 56 Kans. 252 1252a Sheble v. Curdt, 56 Mo. 437 626 Shedoudy v. Spreckels Bros. Commercial Co., 9 Cal. App. 398 981 Sheedy v. McMurtry, 44 Nebr. 499 183 Sheehan v. South River &c. Co.. Ill Ga. 444 1235 Sheeks-Stephens Store Co. v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 282 778 Sheer v. Cummings, 80 Tex. 294 1245 Sheffield v. Loeffler, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 606 1299 Shelbourne, The, 30 Fed. 510 1702 Shelby v. Moore, 22 Ind. App. 371 615 V. Perrin, 18 Tex. 515 1080 Sheldon v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578 1208 V. Parker. 3 Hun (N. Y.) 498 1756 V. Smith. 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 593 1459 sneiiaoarger v. i'hayer, la Kans. 619 1202, 1304 Shelley v. Estes, 83 Mo. App. 310 1086 V. Tuckerman, 83 Nebr. 366 541 Shelton v. Cooksey, 138 Mo. App. 389 1086 V. Jones, 4 Wash. 692 1107, 1119 Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Griffith. 76 Va. 913 397 V. Miller, 80 Va. 821 1229 Shepard v. Briggs, 26 Vt. 149 547 V. Rice, 8 N. Y. S. 472 972 Shepardson v. Johnson, 60 Iowa 239 1201. 1462 Sheppard v. Mesenger, 107 Iowa 717 1244 TABLE OF CASES. cli [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Sheppard v. Newhall, 47 Fed. 468 946. 949, 953, 964 V. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52 1724, 1729, 1733, 1756 V. Taylor, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 675 1701 V. Thomas, 26 Ark. 617 991, 1119 Sheratz v. Nicodemus, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 9 1075 Sheridan v. Colton, 113 Mich. 112 '1- V. Ireland, 66 Maine 65 710, 730a Sheiman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283 598 V. Rugee, 55 Wis. 346 96o Sherry v. Schraage, 48 Wis. 93 1600 Sherwood v. Central Michigan Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 109^ 76 V. Seaman, 2 Bosw. (N. ^-J^., 127 1'^ ' ShetslineV. Keemle, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 29 588 Shewalter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 84 Mo. App. 589 291 Shickle &c. Iron Co. v. Council Bluffs Water Works Co., 33 Fed. 13 1530 Shields v. Dodge, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 356 "*'' "v. Keys, 24 Iowa 298 1572, 1586 V. Sorg, 129 111. App. 266 1572 Shilling V. Templeton, 66 Ind. 585 1262, 1337 Shines v. Johnson, 18 Ky. U 853 1064 Shingleur-Johnson Co. v. Can- ton Cotton Warehouse Co., 78 Miss. 875 -?.^^'.??J Shinn v. Fredericks, 56 111. 439 1119 V. Taylor, 28 Ark. 523 1109 Ship Packet, 3 Mason (U. S.) 334 471 Shippen v. Paul, 34 N. J. Eq. 315 1487 Shireman v. Jackson, 14 Ind. 459 820 Shirley v. Congress Steam Sugar Refinery, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 505 1064, 1082 V. Shirley, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 452 1105 Shlrling v. Kennon, 119 Ga. 501 611 Shirts V. Irons, 54 Ind. 13 217 Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa 533 511 Shoener v. Cabeen, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 65 467 Short V. Ames, 121 Pa. St. 530 1309a, 1421, 1422 V. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 1079 V. Miller, 120 Pa. St. 470 1309a, 1330 Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74 1064, 1084, 1099 Shorthill Co. v. Bartlett. 131 Iowa 259 1295 Shreveport Nat. Bank v. Ma- ples, 119 La. 41 1204, 1265 Shriver v. Birchall, 2 Wkly. N. Cas. 172 1330 Shropshire v. Duncan, 25 Nebr. 485 1500 V. Lyle, 31 Fed. 694 1074 Shryock v. Hensel, 95 Md. 614 1401 Shue V. Ingle, 87 111. App. 522 698 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73 492, 493 Shumate v. Harbin, 35 S. Car. 521 1143 Shurtz V. Colvin, 55 Ohio St. 274 1086 Sibley v. Casev, 6 Mo. 164 1261 V. Pine County, 31 Minn. 201 226 992 Sickman v. Wollett, 31 Colo. 58*1392 Sides V. Cline, 19 Pa. Co. Ct. 481 676 Sidlinger v. Kerkow, 82 Cal. 42 1190, 1600 Sidwell V. Gen. Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co., 23 Ky. L. 1501 968 Siebrecht v. Hogah, 99 Wis. 437 1232, 1300 Siegmund v. Kellogg-Mackay- Cameron Co., 38 Ind. App. 95 1343, 1391 Siffken v. Wrav, 6 East 371 866, 874 Sigerson v. Kahmann, 39 Mo. 206 807 Sigler V. Knox County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511 788, 793 Sikes V. Page, 12 Ky. 780 1129 Silvester v. Coe Quartz Mine Co., 80 Cal. 510 1190, 1328, 1368, 1434, 1454 Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 33 115, 155, 162, 196 V. Carrier, 60 Mo. 581 1310, 1328, 1404 V. Fielder, 46 Ala. 304 603 V. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857 836 Simon v. Blocks, 16 Bradw. (111.) 450 1199, 1536 V. Brown, 38 Mich. 552 1093 V. Goldenberg, 15 La. Ann. 229 620 Simonds v. Buford, 18 Ind. 176 1200, 1586 Simonsen v. Stachlewicz, 82 Wis. 338 1293 Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Citi- zens' State Bank, 105 Iowa 264 1201 Simpson v. City, 109 La. 897 1204 V. Hartopp, Willes, 512 563 V. Hinson, 88 Ala. 527 603 V. Lamb, 7 E. & B. 84 215 V. Mundee, 3 Kans. 172 1063 Sims V. Bradford, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 434 645, 693 V. National Commercial Bank, 73 Ala. 248 1064, 1101 V. Sampey, 64 Ala. 230 1070, 1098 Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 677 1543, 1614 V. Sinclair, 79 Va. 40 1157, 1178 Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. St. 9 1324, 1329. 1435 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Becket, 85 N. Y. S. 301 981 V. Miller, 52 Minn. 516 532 V. Sammons, 49 Wis. 316 855 Singletary v. Golman (Tex. Civ. App.). 123 S. W. 436 990 clii TADLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I iSinnickson v. Lynch, 25 N. J. U 317 1574 binton V. Roberts, The, 34 Ind. 448 1722. 1725, 1743 V. Steamboat Roberts, 46 Ind. 476 1495, 1499, 1534, 1724, 179S, 180LI, ISUb Siren, The, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 152 279 Sirocco, The, 7 Fed. 599 1704 Siron v. Ruleman, 32 Grat. (Va.) 215 1163 Sisson V. Holcomb, 58 Mich. 634 1259 Sitton V. Dubois, 14 Wash. 624 786b Sitz V. Deihl, 55 Mo. 17 1109 Skaggs V. Hill. 12 Ky. L. 382 177, 203, 230 V. Nelson, 25 Miss. 88 1092, 1119 Sketoe V. Ellis, 14 111. 75 576 Skillin V. Moore, 79 Maine 554 1247 Skillinger, The, 1 Flip. (TJ. S.) 436 1009 Skinner v. Caughey, 64 Minn. 375 665, 689 V. Purnell, 52 Mo. 96 1088 V. Sweet, 3 Madd. 244 228 V. Upshaw, 2 Ld. Raym. 752 262 Sklpwith V. — , the Innkeeper, 1 Bulst. 170 499 Skolfleld V. Porter, 2 Ware (U. S.; 437 1704 Skyrme v. Occidental M. & M. Co., 8 Nev. 219 1441, 1494, 1495, 1499, 1532, 1556, 1558 Slack V. Collins, 145 Ind. 569 21, 806, 1071 Slagle V. DeGooyer, 115 Iowa 401 1502 Slappey v. Charles, 7 Ga. App. 796 708 Slaughter v. Owens, 60 Tex. 668 1090, 1098, 1099 V. Winfrey, 85 N. Car. 159 631 Slayden v. Palmo (Tex. Civ. App.), 90 S. W. 908 1060 Sleeper v. Parrish, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 247 569, 632 Slight V. Patton, 96 Cal. 384 1404 Slingerland v. Binns, 56 N. J. Eq. 413 1216, 1291 -Sloan V. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387 1092 V. Hudson, 119 Ala. 27 580 Slocum V. Clark, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 475 577 Slubey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504 836, 837, 962 Sly V. Pattee, 58 N. H. 102 1215, 1235, 1243, 1465, 1468 Smaet v. Sanders, 5 C. B. 895 476 Small V. Foley, 8 Colo. App. 435 1312 V. Moates, 9 Bing. 579 272 V. Small, 16 S. Car. 64 1105 V. Stagg, 95 111. 39 1092, 1093 Smaltz V. Hagy, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 99 1437 , Smalley v. Ashland Brown Stone Co., 114 Mich. 104 1208, 1532 V. Clark, 22 Vt. 598 191, 229 V. Gearing, 121 Mich. 190 1208, 1289, 1500a V. Northwestern Terra Cotta Co., 113 Mich. 141 1208 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Smallhouse v. Kentucky &c M Co., 2 Mont. 443 1363, 1629 Smaw V. Cohen, 95 N. Car. 85 1219 Smelker v. Chicago & N. W. R Co., 106 Wis. 135 192b Smiley v. Jones, 3 Tenn. Ch. 312 1173 Smith V. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461 548 V. Baily, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 128 1218, 1548 V. Barnes, 38 Minn. 240 1235, 1246 V. Baum, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 267 189, 233 V. Blois, 8 La. Ann. 10 620 V. Bobb, 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 322 600 V. Bow^les, 2 Esp. 578 868 V. Bradbury, 148 Cal. 41 1190 V. Brocklesby, 1 Amstr. 61 215 V. Bryan, 34 111. 364 108 V. Butts, 72 Miss. 269 1520 V. Cayuga Lake Cement Co., 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 524 184 V. Central Trust Co., 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 75 184, 187, 202 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 56 Iowa 720 175 V. Coe, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 365 1287, 1290 V. Coe, 29 N. Y. 666 1242, 1330 V. Colcord, 115 Mass. 70 514, 515 V. Colson, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 91 572 V. Corey, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 642 1608 V. Dayton, 94 Iowa 102 616 V. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132 503, 504 V. Dennie, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 262 814 V. Dodge, 59 N. J. Eq. 584 1291 V. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302 1136 V. Eighth Ward Bank, 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6 245 V. Emerson, 126 Mass. 169 1207 V. Equitable Trust Co., 215 Pa. 418 77 V. Evans, 37 Ind. 526 796 V. Evans, 110 Ga. 536 217 V. Field, 5 T. R. 402 865, 867 V. First Nat. Bank, 115 Ga. 608 384 V. Frank Gardener Hdw-. Co., 83 Miss. 654 1286 V. Fvler, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 648 572 V. Goodwin, 4 B. & Ad. 413 589 V. Goss, 1 Camp. 282 921, 936, 965 V. Greenup, 60 Mich. 61 21 V. Hague, 25 Kans. 246 1129 V. Headlev, 33 Minn. 384 1369 V. High, 85 N. Car. 93 1063, 1110 V. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431 921, 944 V. Iowa City Loan & Build- ing Assn., 60 Iowa 164 1287, 1289 V. Johnson, 2 MacAr. (D. C.) 481 1258, 1393, 1532 V. Jones, 65 Miss. 276 62.") V. Jones, 18 Nebr. 481 796 TABLE OF CASES. cliii [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Smith V. Kennedy, 89 111. 485 1185, 1348, V. Keyes, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 650 506. V. Lowden, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 696 V. Lozo, 42 Mich. 6 V. Lynes, 5 N. Y. 41 V. Marden, 60 N. H. 509 V. Meanor, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa ) 375 V. Meri-iam, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 403 1287, 1290. V. Meyer, 25 Ark. 609 556, V. Mills, 145 Ind. 334 V. Moore, 26 111. 392 1108, 1199, V. Morris, 120 Mass. 58 V. Nevv-bauer, 144 Ind. 95 1304a, 1349 518 217 820 815 670 588 1298 576a 1092 1257 1254 1539 V. Norris, 120 Mass. 58 1252a, 1413, 1415 V. O'Brien, 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 325 967 V. Owen, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 411 1123 V. Owen, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 51 1116 V. Parsons, 33 W. Va. 644 1101 V. Pate (Tex.), 43 S. W. 312 1110 V. Pierce, 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1550 628 v. Price, 42 111. 399 1108 V. Rowland, 13 Kans. 245 1063, 1107, 1124 V. St. Paul &c. Ins. Co., 106 Iowa 225 1250 V. Scott, 31 Wis. 420 997, 999 V. Shaffer, 50 Md. 132 1609 V. Shell Lake Lumber Co., 68 Wis. 89 576a. 1048 V. Sheriff, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 443 572 V. Sherman Min. Co., 12 Mont. 524 1212, 1404 V. Sieveking-, 5 E. & B. 589 274 V. Smith. 105 Ga. 717 611 V. Smith, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 420 1063, 1092, 1095 V. Smith, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 164 30, 77 V. Stevens, 36 Minn. 303 665, 692 V. Sturgis, 3 Ben. (U. S.) 330 1800 V. Taber, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 313 543 548 V. Tate, 30 Ind. App. 367 'l200 V. Turner, 50 Ind. 367 1127 V. Van Hoose, 110 Ga. 633 1590 V. Vaughan, 78 Ala. 201 1071 V. Vicksburg S. & T. R. Co., 112 La. 985 196 V. Wells, 4 Bush (Ky.) 92 585 993 V. Wright, 153 Mo. App. 719 'l81a V. Young. 62 111. 210 161 Smith Bridge Co. v. Bowman, 41 Ohio St. 37 1618, 1664 V. Louisville &c. R. Co., 72 111. 506 1199 Smoot V. Shv, 159 Mo. App. 126 181a V. Strauss. 21 Fla. 611 610 Smoyer v. Roth, 10 Sad. (Pa.) 32 562 Smullen v. Hall. 13 Daly (N. Y.) 392 1543 Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 267 499, 500 Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245 858, 882 Snell V. Clark Const. Co., 16 Cal. App. 253 1190 V. Mohan, 38 Ind. 494 1559 Snippel V. Blake. 80 Iowa 142 1743a Snitzler v. Filer. 135 111. App. 61 1199. 1445 Snively's Appeal, 129 Pa. St. 250 1158 Snodgrass v. Holland, 6 Colo. 596 1571, 1585 Snook V. Davidson. 2 Camp. 218 423 Snow V. Council, 65 Ga. 123 1197 Snyder v. Hitt, 2 Dana (Ky.) 204 555, 570 V. Kunkleman, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 487 585 V. Snyder, 115 N. Y. S. 993 1072, 1092 V. Sparks, 73 Nebr. 804 1275 Snyder, In re. 190 N. Y. 66 150a Societe Generale de Paris v. Tramways Union Co., 14 Q. B. D. 424 389 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 105 1145 Sodergren v. Flight. 6 East 622 320 321 Sodini v. Winter, 32 Md. 130 1206, 1235, 1304, 1327, 1500, 1532 Sohier v. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345 1160 Soils, The, 35 Fed. 545 1699 Solneig, The. 103 Fed. 322 1680 Solomon v. Franklin, 7 Idaho 316 355b Somes v. British Empire Ship- ping Co., 8 H. L. Cases 338, 345 972 V. British Empire Shipping Co., 30 L. J. Q. B. 229 281 Sontag V. Brennan, 75 111. 279 1518, 1539 V. Doerge, 14 Mo. App. 577 1441 Sorg V. Crandall, 129 111. App. 255 1552 V. Crandall, 233 111. 79 1368, 1369, 1403, 1588 Souders v. Vansickle, 3 Halst. (N. J.) 31 557 V. Borelli, 80 Conn. 392 1499 V. Dawes, 7 Cal. 575 1248, 1481 v. Dawes, 14 Cal. 247 1445 V. Hurlbut, 58 Conn. 511 1458 Southern Cal. L. Co. v. Schmitt, 74 Cal. 625 1190, 1614 Southern Dock Co. v. Gibson, 22 La. Ann. 623 1729 Southei'n Grocer Co. v. Adams, 112 Ga. 60 456 Southern R. Co. v. Born Steel Range Co.. 126 Ga. 527 332 V. Bouknight, 70 Fed. 442 1675 South, Ex parte, 3 Swanst. 393 43 South Fork Canal Co., The. v. Gordon, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 561 112 South Portland, The, 100 Fed. 494 1765 South Side Lumber Co. v. Date, 156 111. App. 430 1283 Southwestern Freight & Cotton Press Co. v. Plant. 45 Mo. 517 807 V. Stanard, 44 Mo. 71 800, 803, 807 Southwestern R. Co. v. Bently, 51 Ga. 311 269 cliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Southwick, In re, 1 Johns. Ch. (NY. )22 229 Sowle v. Holdridgo, 63 Ind. 213 1127 Sowles V. Hall, 73 Vt. 55 30 Spafford v. Dodge, 14 Mass. 66 1769 V. True, 33 Maine 283 710 Spalding' v. Chelmsford, 117 Mass. 393 1142 V. Ruding-, 6 Beav, 376 953 Spalding Lumber Co. v. Brown, 171 111. 487 1199 Spang-ler v. Green, 21 Colo. 505 ' 1191 Sparks v. Butte County Grav. Min. Co.. 55 Cal. 389 1190, 1283 V. Dunbar, 102 Ga. 129 1197 V. Hess, 15 Cal. 186 1063, 1107, 1124 V. Ponder, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 431 638 V. Texas Loan Co. (Tex.), 19 S. W. 256 1067 Spartali v. Benecke. 10 C. B. 212 850, 851 Spaulding v. Adams, 32 Maine 211 998 V. Thompson Eccl. Soc, 27 Conn. 573 1287, 1291 Spaulding, The, 1 Brown Adm. 310 1781 Spears v. Du Rant. 76 S. Car. 19 1599 V. Hartly, 3 Bsp. 81 452, 978 V. Taylor, 149 Ala. 180 1011, 1116 Special Tax School v. Smith, 61 Fla. 782 1375 Speer v. Hart, 45 Ga. 113 454 Spence v. Griswold, 23 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 239 1585 V. Palmer. 115 Mo. Apn. 76 1116 Spencer v. Clinefelter, 101 Pa. St. 219 632 V. Doherty, 17 R. I. 89 1223. 1588, 1591 V. McGowan, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 256 562 Spengler v. Stiles-Tull Lumber Co., 94 Miss. 780 1498 Speth V. Brangman, 27 Ky. L. 295 660 Spinning v. Blackburn, 13 Ohio St. 131 1262 Spofford V. True, 33 Maine 283 729, 1024 Spokane Lumber Co. v. McChes- ney, 1 Wash. St. 609 1230, 1234a, 1235, 1304, 1554 Spoor V. Holland, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 445 1036 Sprague V. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104 77 V. Drew, 3 Stew. N. J. Dig. 434 1079 V. Green, 18 Bradw. (111.) 476 1614 V. McDougall, 172 Mass. 553 1465, 1470 Sprag'ue Inv. Co. v. Mouat Lum- ber &c. Co., 14 Colo. App. 107 1310, 1317, 1397, 1398. 1422. 1494 Spring V. South Carolina Ins. Co., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 268 469 Springer v. Kroeschell, 161 111. 358 1244 V. Lipsis, 110 111. App. 109 613 Spring-field &c. Co. v. Best, 63 Kans. 187 1325 Springfield & M. R. Co. v. Stew- art, 51 Ark. 285 1()S6 Springman v. Hawkins, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 249 1116 Sproessig v. Kentel, 17 N. Y. S. 839 1513a Sproule V. McNulty, 7 Mo. 62 965 Spruhen v. Stout, 52 Wis. 517 1232, 1334, 1559 Spruill V. Arrington, 109 N. Car. 192 457, 631 Spry Lumber Co. v. Trust Co., 77 Mich. 199 1235 Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio 442 1381 Spurlock V. Pacific R. R., 61 Mo. 319 377 Squires v. Abbott, 61 N. Y. 530 1733, 1756 V. Fithian, 27 Mo. 134 1436 Stabler v. Spencer, 64 Ala. 496 1070 Stacy V. Bryant, 73 Wis. 14 719 Stadel V. Aikins, 65 Kans. 82 617 Stafford v. Produce Exch. Bank. Co., 61 Ohio St. 160 377 v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 316 1063, 1080 Staggs V. Small, 4 Bradw. (111.) 192 1092 Stagner v. Woodward (Ky.), 1 S. W. 583 1512 Stahl V. Lowe, 18 Ky. L. 946 77 Stallman v. Kimberly, 121 N. Y. 393 967, 981 Stamps V. Gilman, 43 Miss. 456 551, 562, 625 Standard Oil Co. v. Lane, 75 Wis. 636 1335 V. Sowden, 55 Ohio St. 332 1532 Stanford v. Andrews, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 664 230 Stanhope v. Dodge. 52 Md. 483 1110 Stanley v. Bouck. 107 Wis. 225 990 V. Chicago Trust &c. Bank, 165 111. 295 253 V. Chicago Trust &c. Bank, 61 111. App. 257 393 V. Johnson, 113 Ala. 344 1069 Stansell v. Roberts. 13 Ohio 148 1092 Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 467 861. 884. 948 V. Embrey. 93 U. S. 548 44 Stanwood, The, 49 Fed. 577 1787 Staples V. Bradlev, 23 Conn. 167 335 V. Somerville, 176 Mass. 237 1375 Stapp V. The Clyde, 43 Minn. 192 1725, 1731, 1750 Stark V. Starr, 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 15 1133, 1134, 1146 State V. Adams, 76 Mo. 605 546 V. Anderson, 91 U. S. 667 1674 V. Bell, 136 N. Car. 674 631 V. Copeland, 86 N. Car. 691 631 V. Crook, 132 N. Car. 1053 631 V. Eads, 15 Iowa 114 1201, 1570 V. Edgefield &c. R. Co., 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 92 231 V. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 135 Mo. App. 160 V. Goll, 32 N. J. L. 285 V. Neal, 129 N. Car. 692 V. Pender, 83 N. Car. 651 V. Port Roval &c. R. Co., Fed. 67 84 181a 746 631 631 1675 TABLE OF CASES. clv [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ lOCl-1812.] State V. Reader. 36 S. Car. 497 635 V. Rose, 90 N. Car. 712 631 V. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281 1414 V. Tiedermann, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 399 1375 V. Vandever, 2 Har. (Del.) 397 608 V. Vanler, 78 S. Car. 103 784c V. Webb, 87 N. Car. 558 631 State Bank v. Armstrong, 4 Dev. (N. Car.) 519 241 V. Brown, 142 Iowa 190 1119. V. Lowe, 22 Nebr. 68 668, 691 State Sash Mfg. Co. v. Norwegian Seminary, 45 Minn. 254 1435, 1441 State Trust Co. v. De La Vergne Refrigerating Macli. Co., 105 1^'ed. 468 800, 811 Staton V. Bmbrey, 93 U. S. 548 44 Statts, Kx parte. 4 Cowen (N. Y.) 76 150 Steamboat Charlotte v. Ham- mond, 9 Mo. 59 1532 Steamboat Rover v. Stiles, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 483 1735 Steamboat Virginia v. Kraft, 25 Mo. 76 301 Steamer Gazelle v. Lake, 1 Ore. 183 1558 Steamer St. Lawrence, The, 1 Black (U. S.) 522 1729 Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 450 1558 Steamship Dock Co. v. Heron's Admx., 52 Pa. St. 280 375, 377, 381 Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Ore. 88 128, ISO Stebbins v. Culbreth. 86 Md. 656 1343 V. Phoenix F. Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350 377, 379, 386, 391, 397 Steel V. Argentine Min. Co., 4 Idaho 505 1244 Steele v. McBurney, 96 Iowa 449 1201 V. Steele, 64 Ala. 438 1164 Steenbergen v. Gowdy, 93 Ky. 146 1307, 1382 Steger v. Artie Refrigerating Co., 89 Tenn. 453 1344 Steigleman v. McBride, 17 111. 300 1257, 1312, 1539, 1610 Stein V. McAuley, 147 Iowa 630 21 Steininger v. Raeman, 28 Mo. App. 594 1402a Steinkamper v. McManus, 26 Mo. App. 51 1211. 1328, 1574, 1615 Steinkemeyer v. Gillespie, 82 111. 253 1119 Steinman v. Henderson, 94 Pa. St. 313 1262 V. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466 6, 320, 418, 643, 731, 739, 967, 974, 977 Steinmetz v. St. Paul Trust Co., 50 Minn. 445 1560 Steltz V. Armory Co., 15 Idaho 551 1599 Stelzer v. La Rose, 79 Ind. 435 1100 Stenberg v. Liennemann, 20 Mont. 457 1274 Stephen v. Coster, 3 Burr. 1408 980 V. Coster, 1 W. Bl. 413, 423 980 Stephens v. Adams, 93 Ala. 117 585, 602 Stephens v. Anthony, 37 Ark. ■otl 1119 V. Duffy, 41 Ind. App. 385 1421 V. Farrar, 4 Bush (Ky.) 13 177 V. Greene County Iron Co., 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 71 1116 V. Hicks, 156 N. Car. 239 1219 V. Holmes, 64 111. 336 1355, 1554 V. Motl, 81 Tex. 115 1110 V. Shannon, 43 Ark. 464 1063, 1083, 1084, 1099 V. Weston, 3 B. & C. 535 166, 215 Stephen's Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 9 1063 Stephenson v. Haines, 16 Ohio St. 478 549 V. The Francis, 21 Fed. 715 1679, 1680, 1682, 1683, 1685, 1688-1691, 1783 Stepina v. Conklin Lumber Co., 134 111. App. 173 1603 Sterling, Ex parte, 16 Ves. 258 123, 126, 131 Stern v. Simpson, 62 Ala. 194 603 Sterner v. Haas, 108 Mich. 48S 1:;0S Stetson & Post Lumber Co. v. W. & J. Sloane Co.. 60 Wash. 180 1601 Stetson & P. Mill Co. v. McDon- ald, 5 Vv^ash. 496 1330, 1452 Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619 1277 Stevens v. Boston &c. R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 262 304, 305 ,v. Burnham, 62 Nebr. 672 1274 V. Campbell, 21 Ind. 471 1578 V. Chadwick, 10 Kans. 406 1107, 1119 V. Hurt, 17 Ind. 141 1100 V. Lincoln, 114 Mass. 476 1245, 1313, 1316 V. Lodge, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 594 562 V. Ogden, 130 N. Y. 182 1294, 1301 V. Rainwater, 4 Mo. App. 292 1086, 1090 V. Robins, 12 Mass. 180 449 V. Watson, 4 Abb. Dec. 302 96 V. Wheeler, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 658 919, 938 Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 M. & S. 535 6, 115, 119, 128 V. Crapnell, 114 111. 19 1066 v. Maxwell, 2 N. Y. 408 1127 V. Stonehill, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 301 1240, 1362, 1475 Stewart v. Caldwell, 54 Mo. 536 1100 V. Christy, 15 La. Ann. 325 1204 V. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513 21, 115, 137, 158, 181, 229 V. Gogoza, 3 Hughes (U. S.) 489 1450 V. Hilton, 7 Fed. 562 224 V. Hopkins, 30 Ohio St. 502 52 V. McCready, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 62 515 V. McQuaide, 48 Pa. St. 191 1307 V. Naud, 125 Cal. 596 981 V. Potomac Ferry Co.. 12 Fed. 296 1764a V. Simmons, 101 Minn. 375 1588 V. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373 1174 V. Wood, 63 Mo. 252 1105 V. Wright, 52 Iowa 335 1287, 1289 clvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Stewart-Chute Lumber Co. v. Missouri Pac. Lumber Co., 28 Nebr. 39 1327, 1329 V. IMissouri Pac. Lumber Co., 33 Nebr. 29 1657 Stewart Contracting- Co. v. Tren- ton &c. R. Co., 71 N. J. L. 568 1289, 1500a Stewartson v. "Watts, 8 Watts (Pa.) 392 1114 Stickle V. High Standard Steel Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 549 1116 Stickney v. Allen, 10 Gray (Mass.) 352 745. 997, 1007 Stidger v. McPhee, 15 Colo. App. 252 144E Stieff Co. V. Ullrich, 110 Md. 629 1020 Stiles V. Galbreath, 69 N. J. Eq. 222 1045 Stillings V. Gibson, 63 N. H. 1 747 Stimson V. Durham &c. Co., 146 Cal. 281 1287 Stimson Mill Co. v. Los Angeles Tract Co., 141 Cal. 30 1352 Stine V. Austin, 9 Mo. 558 1436 Stoaks V. Stoaks, 146 Iowa 61 616 Stockton Lumber Co. v. Schuler, 155 Cal. 411 1415 Stockton Malleable Iron Co., In re, 2 Ch. Div. 101 393 Stockwell V. Campbell, 39 Conn. 362 1343 V. Carpenter, 27 Iowa 119 1201, 1235, 1236, 1248, 1257, 1325, 1462 Stoddard v. Benton, 6 Colo. 508 222 Stoddard Woollen Manufactory V. Huntley, S N. H. 441 1002 Stoermer v. People's Savings Bank, 152 Ind. 104 1579 Stokes V. La Riviere (Eng.) 917, 921 Stollenwerck v. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224 419 Stoltze V. Hurd, 20 N. Dak. 412 1555 Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 344 828 845 Stone V. Bohm. 79 Ky. 141 577^ 619 V. Hyde, 22 Maine 318 155, 231, 232 V. Juvinall, 125 111. App. 562 143u V. Smith, 3 Daly (N. Y.) 213 1218 V. Tyler, 173 111. 147 1614a Stoner v. Neff. 50 Pa. St. 258 1458 Stone Land &c. Co. v. Boon, 73 Tex. 548 1116 Stoner's Appeal, 135 Pa. St. 604 1222 Storm V. (3reen, 51 Miss. 103 625 Storms V. Smith, 137 Mass. 201 691a, 971 Stornoway, The, 46 L. T. 773 273 Story V. Buffum, 8 Allen (Mass.) 35 1748 V. Flournoy, 55 Ga. 56 585 V. Patton, 61 Mo. App. 12 666 V. Russell, 157 Mass. 152 1705 Stott V. Scott, 68 Tex. 302 690 Stout V. Golden, 9 W. Va. 231 1231, 1289 V. McLachlin. 38 Kans. 120 1 23 S 1 283 V. Sawyer, 37 Mich. 313 1336*. 1728 V. Sower, 22 111. App. 65 1199, 1371, 1465, 1536 Stoveld V. Hughes, 14 East 308 842 Stovell V. Neal, 90 Cal. 213 1190 Stow v. Hamlin. 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 452 187 Strahorn v. Union Stock Yards &c. Co., 43 111. 424 460 Strandell v. Moran. 49 Mass. 533 1415 Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525 1370 V. Richmond &c. R. Co., 101 Fed. 511 1628 Strathmore v. Vane, L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 586 252 Stratton v. Gold, 40 Miss. 778 1092, 1110, 1114, 1119 V. Hussey, 62 Maine 286 158, 165, 201a, 214. 220 V. Schoenbar (Maine), 10 Atl. 446 1205, 1391 Strauss v. Baley, 58 Miss. 131 625 Strauss' Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 353 1114 Strawn v. Cogswell, 28 111. 457 1421 V. O'Hara, 80 111. 53 1199 Strebbins v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350 376 Streeper v. McKee, 86 Pa. St. 188 1547 Street Lumber Co. v. Sullivan. 201 Mass. 484 1587 Streubel v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 12 Wis. 67 109, 1558 Strickland v. Summerville, 55 Mo. 164 1116 V. Thornton. 2 Ga. App. 377 577 Stricklin v. Cooper. 55 Miss. 624 1114 Stringer. Ex parte. 9 Q. B. D. 436 394 Stringfeilow v. Coons, 57 Fla. 158 1196. 1299, 1532 v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209 1064, 1072 Strohecker v. Irvine, 76 Ga. 639 230 Strohm v. Good, 113 Ind. 93 1076 Strohn. The, 191 Fed. 213 1682 Stroma, The, 41 Fed. 599 1690 Stroma. The, 53 Fed. 281 1690 Strong V. Taylor, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 437 820 V. Van Deursen, 23 N. J. Eq. 369 1252a. 1458, 1459 Stroud V. Pace, 35 Ark. 100 1083 Stryker v. Cassidy. 76 N. Y. 50 1367 V. Cassidy, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 18 725, 1365 Stuart V. Broome, 59 Tex. 466 1407, 1539 V. Harrison, 52 Iowa 511 1080, 1086 V. Twining-, 112 Iowa 154 616 Stubbs V. Clarinda &c. R. Co., 62 Iowa 280 1293. 1593 V. Clarinda &c. R. Co., 65 Iowa 513 1359, 1408, 1413 V. Lund, 7 Mass. 453 870, 902, 910 Sturges V. Breen, 27 Kans. 235 1329 Sturgis V. Slacum, 18 Pick. (Mass ) 36 449 Sturtevant v. Orser. 24 N. Y. 538 866 Stnyvesant v. Browning, 1 J. & S. (N. Y.) 203 1276 Sugg V. Farrar. 107 N. Car. 123 999 Suliote, The, 23 Fed. 919 1679 Sulliman v. Short, 26 La. Ann. 512 620 Sullivan v. Brewster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 681 1287 V. Cleveland, 62 Tex. 577 554, 638 v. Clifton, 55 N. J. L. 324 691 V. Ellison, 20 S. Car. 481 585, 634 V. McCann, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 61 184 TABLE OF CASES. clvii [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Sullivan v. O'Keefe, 53 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426 193, 206 V. Park, 33 Maine 438 335 V. Sanders, 9 Mo. App. 75 1211 V. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch. 59 65, 464 Sullivan's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 107 725 Sultana, The, 19 How. (U. S.) 362 1681 Sulzer-Vogt Machine Co. v. Rush- ville Water Co., 160 Ind. 202 1200 Surnmeril v. Elder. 1 Binn. (Pa.) 106 880 Summerman v. Knowles, 33 N. J. L. 202 1216 Summers v. Cook, 2S Grant Ch. (U. C.) 179 1072 v. Stark, 76 111. 208 1487 Summerville v. Wann, 37 Pa. St. 1S2 1335 Sumner v. Cottey, 71 Mo. 121 820 v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 76 460 v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139 820 Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 Mees. & W. 248 509 Superintendent of Schools v. Heath, 15 N. J. Eq. 22 1216, 1287, 1301 Superior, The, 1 Newb. (U. S.) 176 1681, 1774, 1776, 1779 Supervisors of Ulster County v. Brodhead, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 411 200 Surplus of the Ship Trimountain, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 246 1787 Sutherland v. Harrison, 86 111. 363 1104 V. Rverson, 24 111. 517 1235 Sutton V. Albatross, The, 2 Wall. Jr. 327 1009, 1171, 1532, 1537 V. Gibson, 119 Ky. 422 78 Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Bax- ter, 109 Ga. 597 173, 230 Swain v. Cato, 34 Tex. 395 1066 V. Senate, 2 Bos. & Pul. 99 203 V. Shepherd, 1 Moody & R. 223 820 Swallow, The, 1 Bond. (U. S.) 189 1810 Swan V. Benson, 31 Ark. 728 1083 V. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501 510 V. Morris, S3 Ga. 143 611 V. Swan, 8 Price 518 1147 Swank v. Elwert, 55 Ore. 487 631c Swanston v. Morning Star Min- ing Co., 13 Fed. 215 159, 196, 206 Swanwick v. Sothern, 9 Ad. & El. 895 905 Swarthout v. Curtis, 5 N. Y. 301 1172 Swasey & Co. v. Steamer Mont- gomery, 12 La. Ann. 800 111 Sweeley v. Sieman, 123 Iowa 183 132 Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 166 258, 260 Sweet V. Bartlett, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 661 193, 203 V. James, 2 R. I. 270 1223, 1324, 1532 V. Pym, 1 East 4 20, 310, 466, 745, 973 Swettv. Black, 1 Spr. (U. S.) 574 1798 ' Swope V. Stantzenberger, 59 Tex. 387 1382, 1425 Sydney L. Wright, The, 5 Hughes (U. S.) 474 1690 Syeds v. Hay, 4 T. R. 260 980 Sykes v. Betts, 87 Ala. 537 1072, 1107 Sykes Steel Roofing Co. v. Ber- stein, 156 111. App. 500 1389 Sylvan Glen. The. 9 Fed. 335 1725 Sylvan Stream, The. 35 Fed. 314 1696, 1725, 1729, 1756 Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344 493, 494 Symns v. Schotten, 35 Kans. 310 935 Syrickland v. Stiles, 107 Ga. 308 611 T Tabor v. Armstrong, 19 Colo. 285 1300 Tabor-Pierce Lumber Co. v. In- ternational Trust Co., 19 Colo. App. 108 1327, 1430 Tacoma Foundry &c. Co. v. Wolff, 4 Wash. S18 1405 Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 4 Wash. 305 1405 Taggard v. Buckmore, 42 Maine 77 1300 Taggart V. Kern, 22 Ind. App. 271 1270 Talbott V. Goddard. 55 Ind. 496 132? Talcott V. Bronson, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 501 203, 233 Taliaferro v. Stevenson, 58 N. J. L. 165 1521 Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511 991, 1119 Tamvaco v. Simpson, L. R. 1 C. P. 363 323, 326 v. Simpson, 19 C. B. N. S. 453 322 Tancred v. Leyland, 16 Q. B. 669 596 Tangier, The, 2 Low. (U. S.) 7 1699, 1707 Tanner v. Hicks, 4 Sm. <& M. (Miss.) 294 1119 V. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28 836, 837, 838, 905 Tanqueray-Willaume, In re, 20 Ch. Div. 465 116G Tansley v. Turner, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 151 835 Tarborough v. Wood, 42 Tex. 91 1063 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360 861 Tarpy v. Persing. 27 Kans. 745 617 Tarr v. Muir, 107 Ky. 283 1263 Tarver v. Tarver, 53 Ga. 43 173 Tate V. Bush, 62 Miss. 145 1070 V. Meek, 8 Taunt. 280 271, 313, 323 Tatum V. Cherry, 12 Ore. 135 1235 Tavlor V. Alloway, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 216 1084 V. Badoux (Tenn.), 58 S. W. 919 190 V. Baldwin, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 626 71, 1081, 1147, 1149 V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 4 Dill. (U. S.) 570 1201. 1470, 1524, 1625-1627, 1646 V. Carryl, 20 How. (U. S.) 583 1810a V. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335 1165 V. Doll Lead & Zinc Co., 131 Wis. 348 1436 V. Eckford, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 21 1109 clviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ 1-lOGOf; Vol. II, §§ lOGl-1812.] Taylor v. Fields, 4 Ves. 396 788 V. Ford, 1 Bush (Ky.) 44 1074 V. Foster, 22 Ohio St. 255 1135, 1159 V. Gilsdorff, 74 111. 354 1243, 1266, 1367 V. Harwell, 65 Ala. 1 1164 V. Hathaway, 29 Ark. 597 778 V. Huck. 65 Tex. 238 1185, 1226, 1382 V. Hunter, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 569 1074 V. La Bar. 25 N. J. Eq. 222 1459, 1474 V. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 625 1299 V. Murphy, 148 Pa. St. 337 1304, 1502 V. Nelson, 54 Miss. 524 625 V. Reed, 68 N. J. L. 178 1216 V. Robinson, 8 Taunt. 648 434 V. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 207 Mo. 495 181a V. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715 181a V. Smith, 87 App. Div. (N. Y.) 78 322a V. StuU, 79 Nebr. 295 183 V. Taylor, L. R. 17 Eq. 324 1164 V. Taylor, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 54 1586 V. Wahl, 72 N. .1. L. 10 1216 V. Weston, 77 Cal. 534 388 Teal V. Spangler, 72 Ind. 380 1534 Teaz V. Chrystie, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 109 1532 V. Krystie, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 621 1532 Tcbay v. Kirkpatrick. 146 Pa. St. 120 1289, 1502 Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347 1090 V. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 124 N. Car. 342 768 Tedford v. Wilson, 3 Head (Tenn.) 311 42 Telfener v. Dillard. 70 Tex. 139 1585 Tell V. Woodruff, 45 Minn. 10 1558 Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509 171 Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. &. Aid. 680 809 Templeman v. Gresham, 61 Tex. 50 638. 1041 Templeton v. Home. 82 111. 491 108, 1558 Templin v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 73 Iowa 548 1235, 1283 Ten Broeck v. De Witt, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 617 209, 212 Ten Eyck v. Pontiac &c. R. Co.. 114 Mich. 494 1625a Tenney v. Sly, 54 Ark. 93 1313 Tennis Bros. Co. v. Wetzel &c. R. Co., 140 Fed. 193 1231, 1329 V. Wetzel &c. R. Co., 145 Fed. 458 1231, 1329 Tenth Nat. Bank v. Smith, Const. Co.. 218 Pa. 584 1282 Terbo.ss v. Williams, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 407 593 Terhune v. Colton, 10 N. J. Eq. 21 1173 Terney v. Wilson. 45 N. J. L. 282 223 Terrell v. McHenry. 121 Ky. 452 1287 Terril v. Rogers, 3 Hayw. (Tenn.) 203 308 Terry v. Bamberger, 44 Conn. 558 430 V. George, 37 Miss. 539 1119 V. McClmtock, 41 Mich. 492 1023 Tete V. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 308 375, 377 Tewksbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis. 581 982, 990, 1493, 1494 Texarkana Nat. Bank v. Daniel (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. 704 1114 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Bayliss, 62 Tex. 570 638 Texas & St. L. R. Co. v. Allen, 1 White & W. Tex. App. Civ. Cas. § 568 1226, 1668 V. McCaughey, 62 Tex. 271 1495, 1668 Texas Bldg. Co. v. National Loan and Inv. Co.. 22 Tex. Civ. App. 349 1301 Thacher v. Hannahs, 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 407 449 V. Moors, 134 Mass. 156 419 Thames v. Caldwell, 60 Ala. 644 1090 Thames Iron Works Co. v. Pat- ent Derrick Co., 1 Johns. & H. 93 524, 1033, 1038, 1040 Thames, The, 10 Fed. 848 1709 Tharpe v. Dunlap, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 674 1083, 1092, 1119 Tharrett v. Trevor. 7 Exch. 161 150 Thatcher v. Harlan, 2 Houst. (Del.) 178 1021 Thaxter v. Williams, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 49 1245, 1258 Thayer v. Daniels. 113 Mass. 129 162 V. Finnegan, 134 Mass. 62 1163, 1166, 1169 Thielman v. Carr, 75 111. 3S5 1199, 1465 Thigpen v. Leigh. 93 N. Car. 47 457 V. Maget, 107 N. Car. 39 631 Third Nat. Bank v. Buffalo Ger- man Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 581 384 Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 88 545 V. Barber, 10 Md. 380 1417 v. Board of Education, 71 111. 283 1375 V. Bridges, 73 Mo. 530 1076, 1088 V. Frankfort &c. R. Co., 116 Ky. 879 280a, 291, 300, 302 V. Hodge, 58 Kans. 166 1202 V. Huesman, 10 Ohio St. 152 1220, 1406, 1409, 1413, 1418 V. Illinois Industrial Univer- sity, 71 111. 310 1375 V. James, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 381 1404 v. Kiblinger. 77 Ind. 85 1200 V. Mowers, 27 Kans. 265 1470 V. Osborn, 19 How. (U. S.) 22 1679, 1688, 1699 V. Ownby, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. § 1212 1571 V. Remington Typewriter Co., 30 Ohio C. C. 691 515 V. Shell, 76 Miss. 556 625 V. Turner, 16 Md. 105 1206 V. Wyatt, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 132 1092 Thomas' Admrs. v. Von Kapff's Exrs., 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 372 79 Thomas' Estate, 76 Pa. St. 30 1446, 1478 TABLE OF CASES. clix [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Thomas Fletcher, The, 24 Fed. I 375 1680, 1681, 1796 ] Thomas McManus, The, 24 Fed. 509 302 Thomason V. Cooper, 57 Ala. 560 1090 Thomas Sherlock, The, 22 P"ed. 253 1699, 1802 Thompkins v. Manner, IS J. & S. {N. Y.) 511 189 Thompson v. Allen, 56 Wash. 582 1756 V. Anderson, 86 Iowa 703 566, 581 V. Armstrong, 11 N. Dak. 198 820 V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 28 Md. 396 808 V. Dawson, 3 Head (Tenn.) 384 1091 V. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 403 951 V. Oilman, 17 Vt. 109 1134 V. Gilmore, 50 Maine 428 711 V. Gray, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 75 807 V. Heftner, 11 Bush (Ky.) 353 1114 V. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283 505, 518 V. McGill, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 401 1081 V. Mead, 67 111. 395 554, 568, 614 V. Powell, 77 Ala. 391 603 V. Riggs, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 152 57 V. Shepard, 85 Ind. 352 1266 V. Sheppard, 85 Ala. 611 1074, IIOl; V. Small, 1 C. B. 328 322 V. Spencer, 95 Iowa 265 1201 V. Spinks, 12 Ala. 155 603 V. Stewart, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 187 911 V. Thompson, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 127 884 V. Thompson, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 126 1094, 1099 V. Trail, 2 Car. & P. 334 897 V. Wedge, 50 Wis. 642 806, 811, 850, 855 V. Wickersham, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 216 1382 V. Wise Bay Min. &c. Co., 9 Idaho 363 1616a Thompson Ecclesiastical Soc, 27 Conn. 573 1192 Thompson's Case, 2 Browne (Pa.) 297 1511, 1552 Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Brook- lyn Heights Realty Co., Ill App. Div. (N. Y.) 358 1353 Thomson v. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301 1127 V. Smith, 111 Iowa 718 820 V. Tilton, 22 Ky. L. 1004 618 Thornton v. Carver, 80 Ga. 397 576a, 577 V. Knox, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 74 1063, 1074, 1084 V. Neal, 49 Ala. 590 1101 Thorp Block Sav. &c. Assn. v. James, 13 Ind. App. 522 1459 Thorpe v. Durbon. 45 Iowa 192 1109, 1458, 1487 Thorsen v. J. B. Martin, The, 26 Wis. 488 1725 Thostesen v. Doxsee, 78 Nebr. 40 574 Threfall v. Berwick, L. R. 7 Q. B. 711 499, 501 Throckmorton v. Shelton, 68 Conn. 413 1499 Thum V. Wolstenholme, 21 Utah 446 72 Thurman v. Pettitt. 72 Ga. 38 1197 V. Stoddard, 63 Ala. 336 1076 Thurston v. Blanchard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 18 853 Thutakawa v. Kumamoto, 53 Wash. 231 1230 Tibbetts v. Moore, 23 Cal. 208 1421, 1425, 1600 Tice V. Moore, 82 Conn. 244 1290 Tichenor v. Allen. 13 Grat. (Va.) 15 1082 Ticonderoga, The, Swabey 215 1769 Tiernan v. Beam, 2 Ohio 383 1092, 1101 V. Thurman, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 277 1063, 1083, 1084, 1086 Tiffany v. Stewart, 60 Iowa 207 217, 222 Tifft V. Verden, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 153 572 Tiger, The, 90 Fed. 826 1800 Tigress, The, 32 L. J. Adm. 97 886, 895, 898, 957 Tiley v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 9 Hun (N. Y.) 424 1543 Tilford V. Wallace, 3 Watts (Pa.) 141 1554 Tillar V. Clayton, 75 Ark. 446 1116, 1127 Tillman v. Reynolds, 48 Ala. 365 132, 196 Tilton, In re, 19 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 50 1756 Tingley v. White, 17 R. I. 533 1223 Tinker v. Geraghty, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 687 1421 Tinsley v. Bovkin, 46 Tex. 592 1226 V. Craige, 54 Ark. 346 607 V. Tinsley, 52 Iowa 14 1074, 1079 Tischendorf-Chreste Lumber Co. V. Hegan, 134 Ky. 1 1203 Title Guarantee & T. Co. v. Wrenn, 35 Ore. 62 1221, 1459 Titsworth v. Frauenthal, 52 Ark. 254 557 Titusville Iron Works v. Key- stone Oil Co., 130 Pa. St. 211 1309a T. L. Wadsworth, The, 13 Fed. 46 1693 Tobey v. McAllister, 9 Wis. 463 1088 Tod V. Kentucky Union R. Co., 52 Fed. 241 1648 Todd V. Davey, 60 Iowa 532 1128 V. Gernert, 223 Pa. 103 1432 V. Howell, 47 Ind. App. 665 1200 Toledo, D. & B. R. Co. v. Hamil- ton, 134 U. S. 296 692a, 1625a, 1664 Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Gilvin, 81 111. 511 846 Tombs V. Rochester R. Co., 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 583 1502 Tome V. Four Cribs of Lumber, Fed. Cas. No. 14083 485 Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark. 557 556 Tommey v. Spartanburg &c. R. Co., 7 Fed. 429 1618 V. Spartanburg &c. R. Co., 4 Hughes (U. S.) 640 1663 Tompkins v. Cooper, 97 Ga. 631 1103 Tonawanda, The, 27 Fed. 575 1799 1803 Tonawanda, The, 29 Fed. 877 ' 1799 Toney v. Goodley, 57 Mo. App. 235 577 clx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §5 1061-1S12.] Tonopah Lumber Co. v. Nevada Amusement Co., 30 Nev. 445 1214, 1435 Tooko V. Hollingworth, 5 T. R. 215 858 882 Tooker v. Rinaldo, 11 Hun (n! Y.) 154 1218 Toole V. Jowers, 49 Ga. 299 454 Tooley v. Gridley, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 493 1070 Toop V. Smith, 181 N. Y. 283 1396 Topp V. Standard Metal Co., 47 Ind. App. 483 1200 Topping- V. Brown, 63 111. 348 1199, 1583 Torrey v. Martin (Tex.), 4 S. W. 642 1147, 1150 Totten &c. Foundry Co. v. Mun- cie Nail Co. 148 Ind. 372 1335, 1550 Tower v. Moore, 104 Iowa 345 1462 Towery v. Meeks, 17 Kv. L. 248 1091 Towle V. Raymond, 58 N. H. 64 644 Towner v. Remick, 19 Mo. App. 205 1211 Townley v. Crump, 5 Nev. & M. 606 823, 838 Towns V. Boarman, 23 Miss. 186 625 Townsend v. Brooks. 76 Ala. 308 777 V. Cleveland Fire-Proofing Co.. 18 Ind. App. 568 28, 1375 V. Newell, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 332 1014 Townsend Saving-s Bank v. Ep- ping. 3 Woods (U. S.) 390 109, 708 Townsley v. Crump, 4 Ad. & El. 58 841 Tracy v. Rogers, 69 111. 662 1199, 1245, 1257, 1258, 1368 V. Wetherell, 165 Mass. 113 1325 Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Shef- field City Co., 137 Ala. 547 98 Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523 736 Trak v. Searle, 121 Mass. 229 1355, 1554 Trammell v. Hudmon, 78 Ala. 222 1287, 1571 V. Hudmon, 86 Ala. 472 1187 v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210 1226, 1438, 1443, 1470 Traphagen v. Hand. 3 6 N. J. Eq. 384 1079 Trapp v. "Watters, 6 Ga. App. 480 708 Trappan v. Morie, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 1 573 Trask v. The Dido, 1 Haz. Pa. Reg. 9 205 Travis v. Meredith, 2 Marv. (Del.) 376 1283 v. Thompson, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 236 236, 296, 299, 304 Treadwell v. Aydlett, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 388 910, 961 Tredinnick v. Red Cloud Consol. Min. Co., 72 Cal. 78 1190, 1313, 1421 Tr'-e V. The Indiana, Crabbe (U. S.) 479 1683 Treloar v. Hamilton, 225 111. 102 1184a, 1415 Trent v. Hunt, 9 Exch. 14 596 Trescott v. Smyth, 1 McCord Ch. (S. Car.) 486 570 Treusch v. Shryock, 51 Md. 162 1206, 1235, 1304, 1436 Treusch v. Shryock, 55 Md. 330 1206. 1310, 1319, 1407 Tribble v. Oldham, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 137 1075 Trieber v. Knabe. 12 Md. 491 562, 564, 622 Trimble v. Puckett, 14 Ky. L. 209 96 Trinity House v. Clarke, 4 ^L & S. 288 271 Triplett v. Lake. 43 W. Va. 428 1066 Trippito V. Edwards, 35 Ind. 467 1041 Trist V. Child, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 441 43, 48, 52 Triumph, The, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 433 1676, 1776 Trotter v. Erwin, 27 Miss. 772 1099 Trout V. McQueen (Tex.) 62 S. W. 928 594 Trueblood v. Shellhouse, 19 Ind. App. 91 1413 Truebody v. Jacobson, 2 Cal. 269 1064 Truesdell v. Gay, 13 Gray (Mass.) 311 1309d TruUinger v. Kofoed, 7 Ore. 228 1519, 1520 Trust v. Pirsson, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 292 731, 968, 1002, 1003 Trustees v. Greenough. 105 U. S. 527 201 208 Tuck V. Calvert, 33 Md. 209 'll09 V. Moss Mfg. Co., 127 Ga. 729 1197 Tucker v. Adams. 52 Ala. 254 603 V. Gest, 46 Mo. 339 1260 V. Hadley, 52 Miss. 414 1076, 1081 V. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516 869, 922, 926, 940, 941 V. Taylor, 53 Ind. 93 745, 747, 1054 Tuckey v. Lovell, S Idaho 731 781a Tufts V. Sylvester, 79 Maine 213 865, 927 Tulane Imp. Co. v. W. B. Green Photo Supply Co.. 124 La. 619 620 Tullis V. Bushnell, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217 184, 189, 193, 203, 210 V. Bushnell, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465 185 rulloch V. Rogers, 52 Minn. 114 1421 Tumalty v. Parker, 100 111. App. 382 698 Tunstall v. Winton, 31 Hun (N. Y)219 220 V. Withers, 86 Va. 892 1099 Tuperv V. Edmondson, 32 La. Ann. 1146 620 Turk V. Skiles, 45 W. Va. 82 1076 Turkes v. Reis, 14 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 26 1069 Turner v. Crawford, 14 Kans. 499 217 V. Deane, 18 L. J. Ex. 343 130 V. Horner, 29 Ark. 440 1063, 1092. 1096 V. Horton, 18 Wyo. 281 719a V. Indianapolis R. Co., 8 Biss. (U. S.) 315 1550 V. Lassiter, 27 Ark. 662 1127 V. Liverpool Docks Co.. 6 Ex. 543 869, 911, 913, 916, 953 V. Marriott, L. R. 3 Eq. 744 1105 V. Phelps, 46 Tex. 251 1101 TABLE OF CASES. clxi [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Turner v. Robbins, 78 Ala. 592 1373, 1374, 1422 V. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28 962 V. Strenzel, 70 Cal. 28 1287, 1594 V. Wentworth, 119 Mass. 459 1313, 1343, 1449 Turnes v. Brenckle. 249 111. 394 1199 Turney v. Saunders, 4 Scam. (111.) 527 1257 Turno v. Parks, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 35 155, 185, 220 Turrill v. Crawley, 13 Q. B. 197 499 Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 720 156. 228 Tuthill V. Skidmore, 12 4 N. Y. 148 800, 802. 857 Tutt V. Davis, 13 Cal. App. 715 1063 Tuttle V. Dennis, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 35 • 646 V. Howe, 14 Minn. 145 1260, 1494, 1495 V. Walker, 69 Ala. 172 579 V. Walton, 1 Ga. 43 377 Tuttle, In re, 21 Wkly. Dig-. 528 198 Twiggs V. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279 173, 233 Twitty V. Clarke, 14 La. Ann. 503 620 Two Hundred and Seventy-five Tons of Mineral Phosphates, 9 Fed. 209 1720 Two Marys, The, 10 Fed. 919 1723, 1798 Tyler v. Blodgett &c. Lumber Co., 78 Mich. SI 745, 1009 V. Currier, 13 Gray (Mass.) 134 1327 V. Gould, 48 N. Y. 6S2 57 V. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93 1327, 1382 V. Slemp, 124 Ky. 209 226 V. Slemp, 28 Ky. L. 959 177 V. Superior Court, 30 R. L 107 157, 164 Tyler Tap. R. Co. v. Drlscol, 52 Tex. 13 1618, 1668 Tydings v. Pitcher, 82 Mo. 379 1084 Tvgart Valley Brew. Co. v. Vil- ter Mfg. Co., 184 Fed. 845 1231 Tvrone & C. R. Co. v. Jones, 79 Pa. St. 60 1665 Tvsen v. Wabash R. Co., 15 Fed. 763 89, 1094 U Ufford v. Wells, 52 Tex. 612 1110 Uhl V. Dighton, 25 111. 154 613 Underbill v. Corwin. 15 111. 556 1199 Underwood v. Walcott, 3 Allen (Mass.) 464 1415 Underwriters' Wrecking Co. v. The Katie, 3 Woods (U. S.) 182 1795 Union Bank v. Creamery Pack- age Mfg. Co.. 105 Iowa 136 820 V. Laird, 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 390 376, 388, 408, 411 Union Express, The, 1 Brown Adm. (U. S.) 537 1688 Union Hall Assn. v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 1135 Union Lumber Co. v. Simon, 150 Cal. 751 1424, 1616a Union National Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 111. 212 57 Union Nat. Sav. Assn. v. Helberg, 152 Ind. 139 1564 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Davidson, 21 Colo. 93 1574 V. United States, 2 Wyo. 170 279 Union Slate Co. v. Tilton, 73 Maine 207 761. 1042 Union Stove Works v. Klingman, 164 Ind. 589 1309c Union Trust Co. v. Casserly, 127 Mich. 183 1435 V. Trumbull, 137 111. 146 33, 62 Union Warehouse Co. v. Mc- Intyre, 84 Ala. 78 555 Union Water-Power Co. v. Cha- bot, 93 Maine 339 562, 621 United R. Co. of St. Louis v. O'Connor, 153 Mo. App. 128 181a United States v. Burlington &c. Ferry Co., 21 Fed. 331 1729 V. Lutz, 2 Blatch. (U. S.) 383 807 V. The Haytian Republic, 65 Fed. 120 1785 V. Villalonga, 23 Wall. (U. S ) 35 474 V. Wilder, 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 308 279 United States B. & Loan Assn. V. Thompson, 19 Ky. L. 424 1098 United States Blowpipe Co. v. Spencer, 40 \V. Va. 698 1552 V. Spencer, 61 W. Va. 191 1389 United States Express Co. v. Haines, 67 111. 137 302 United States Nat. Bank v. Bon- acum, 33 Nebr. 820 1343 United States Trust Co. v. New York W. S. & B. R. Co., 25 Fed. 800 92 United States Water Co. v. Sunny Slope Realty Co., 152 Mo. App. 300 1211, 1442 United States Wind Engine Co. v. Oliver, 16 Nebr. 612 964 Unity Joint Stock Mut. Banking Assn. v. King, 25 Beav. 72 1139 University of Lewisburg v. Re- ber, 43 Pa. St. 305 1378 University Publishing Co. v. Pif- fet, 34 La. Ann. 602 620 Upland Land Co. v. Ginn, 14 Ind. App. 431 1061 Upper Appomattox Co. v. Hamil- ton, S3 Va. 319 639 Upshaw V. Hargrove, 6 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 286 1086 Upson V. United Engineering &c. Co., 72 Misc. (N. Y.) 541 1218. 1293. 1307 Urquhnrt v. Mclver, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 103 987 Utility, The, Bl. & H. (U. S.) 218 1800a, 1801 Utter V. Crane, 37 Iowa 631 1293 Uvalde Asphalt Pav. Co. v. New York, 191 N. Y. 244 1218 Vail V. Drexel, 9 Bradw. (111.) 439 1100. 1126 V. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312 1086 clxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Vail V. Meyer, 71 Ind. 159 1260, 1262, 1270 Vairin v. Hunt, 18 La. 498 620 Valentine v. Hamlett, 35 Ark. 538 606 V. Jackson, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 302 572 V. Ranson, 57 Iowa 179 1417 Valle V. Cerre's Admr. 3 6 Mo. 575 465 V. Fleming-, 29 Mo. 152 1135 N'allejo V. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143 271 Vallett V. Whitewater Valley Canal Co., 4 McLean (U. S.) 192 93 Valley Lumber & Mfg-. Co. v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 662 1432, 1442, 1448 V. Nickerson, 13 Idaho 682 1444, 1448 Valley Pine Lumber Co. v. Hod- gens, 80 Ark. 516 722 Valpy V. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837 921 938 V. Oakeley, 16 Q. B. 941 837, 852, 861 Valverde v. Spottswood, 77 Miss. 912 1690, 1751 Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank. 52 N. Y. 1 37 Van Allen, In re, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 225 241 Vnn Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 608 1174 Van Billiard v. Nace, 1 Grant's Ca.ses (Pa.) 233 1284 Van Buren Storage & Van Co. V. Mann, 139 111. App. 652 976 Van Casteel v. Booker. 2 Ex. 691 911, 916 Vance Shoe Co. v. Haught, 41 W. Va. 275 1101 Van Cleve Glass Co. v. Erratt, 110 Mich. 689 1325 Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N. Y. 571 1513, 1514 V. Van Vechten, 43 Hun (N. Y. )304 1299 Van Court V. Bushnell. 21 111. 624 1258, 1532 Van Denburgh v. Greenbush, 4 -Hun (N. Y.) 795 1375 Van Der Beck v. Thomason, 50 Misc. (N. Y.) 524 184 Vandergrift's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 126 1222 Vanderzee v. Willis, 3 Bro. Ch. 21 251 Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How. (U. S.) 82 1676, 1678, 1799 V. & M. Lumber Co., In re, 182 Fed. 231 1015 Vandoren v. Todd, 2 Green Ch. (N. J.) 397 1071, 10S6, 1089 Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 111. 499 820 Van Dyke v. Cole, 81 Vt. 379 1130 Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220 997, 1018, 1645 Van Etten v. Cook. 54 Ark. 522 751a V. State, 24 Nebr. 734 115 Van Every v. Adams, 10 J. & S. (K. Y.) 126 187 Van Frank v. St. Louis C. G. & Ft. S. R. Co.. 93 Mo. App. 412 1655 Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. V. 'Astor, 119 App. Div. (N. Y.) 214 1495 Van Lone v. Whittemore, 19 Bradw. (111.) 447 1370 Vanmeters' Exrs. v. Vanmeters, 3 Grat. (Va.) 148 89 Van Namee v. Bank of Troy, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 161 257 Van Nest Woodworking Co. v. Winka, 116 N. Y. S. 619 1444 Van Patten v. Leonard, 55 Iowa 520 616 Van Pelt v. Hartough, 31 N. J. L. 331 1216 Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299 629 Vansands v. Middlesex County Bank, 26 Conn. 144 375, 377, 380 Van Sickle v. Belknap, 129 Ind. 558 101 v. Watson, 103 Tex. 37 1117 VanSlyck v. Arseneau, 140 Mich. 154 712 Van Stone v. Stillwell Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128 1532, 1533, 1536 Vantilburgh v. Black, 2 Mont. 371 1421 Van Winkle v. Van Houten, 3 N. J. Eq. 172 1166 Van Zandt v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 149 Fed. 27 259 Variol v. Doherty, 1 McGloin (La.) 118 993 Varley v. Bauman Clothing Co., In re, 188 Fed. 761 750 Varner v. Rice. 39 Ark. 248 606 v. Spencer, 72 N. Car. 381 631 Varney v. Jackson, 66 Mo. App. 349 666 Vasser v. Buxton, 86 N. Car. 335 820 Vaughan v. Providence & Wor- cester R. Co., 13 R. I. 578 291, 294, 304, 306 v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drew. 408 130 Vaughen v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. St. 522 1341 Vaughn v. Davies. 2 H. Bl. 440 215 v. Hopson, 10 Bush (Ky.) 337 820 v. Strickland, 108 Ga. 659 611, 612 V. Vaughn, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 472 190 Vausse v. Russel, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 329 567 Vechte v. Brownell, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 212 576 Velox, The, 21 Fed. 479 1713, 1719, 1792 Veltman v. Thompson, 3 N. Y. 438 1728, 1809 Vonable v. Beauchamp, 3 Dana (Ky.) 321 1154 Venezuela, The, 173 Fed. 834 1688 Venture, The, 26 Fed. 285 1760, 1773, 1794 Verdome Turkish Bath Co. v. Schettler, 2 Wash. St. 457 1337 Verity v. Wylde. 4 Drew. 427 216 Vermilye v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. (U. S.) 138 482 Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Aid. 1 79 Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. ."51 465, 877, 880, 885, 946, 955 TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to Sections — Vol. I Vickery v. Richardson, 189 Mass. 53 1236, 1413 Victorian No. 2. The, 26 Ore. 194 1"98 Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Texas State Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 99 S. W. 1049 855 Victor, The, 1 Lush. 72 1769 Vigilant, The, 151 Fed. 747 1729 Viley V. Lockwood, 102 Tenn. 426 701 Villenuve v. Sines, 92 Mich. 556 712 Villere v. Succession of Shaw, lOS La. 71 620 Vilter Mfg-. Co. v. Tygart Val- ley Brew. Co., 168 Fed. 1002 1231 Vinal V. Spofford. 139 Mass. 126 641, 697- Vinson v. Cantrell (Tenn.), 56 S. W. 1034 1044 V. Hallowell, 10 Bush (Ky.) 538 542 V. State, 124 Ga. 19 1197 Vinton v. Baldwin. 95 Ind. 433 422 V. Builders' & Manufacturers' Assn. 109 Ind. 351 1200 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. V. McNair & Pearsall, 139 N. Car. 326 456 Virginia Rulon, The, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 519 1719 Virgin, The, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 538 1786 Vivion V. Nicholson, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 43 30 Voell V. Kelly, 64 Wis. 504 204, 206, 209 Vogel V. Luitweiler, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 184 1283 Vogel & Binder Co. v. Montgo- mery, 133 App. Div. (N. Y.) 836 1492 Vogelsang v. Fisher, 128 Mo. 386 808, 841, 854, 910 Voight Brew. Co. v. Donovan, 103 Mich. 190 178, 196 Volker-Scowcroft LumDer Co. v. Vance, 32 Utah 74 1227, 1382 Volmer v. Wharton, 34 Ark. 691 577, 580 Volunteer, The, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 551 268, 270, 327 Von Berg v. Goodman, 85 Ark. 605 606 Von Platin v. Winterbotham, 203 111. 198 1199, 1289 Von Tobel v. Ostrander, 158 111. 499 1427 Voorhis v. Olmstead, 66 N. Y. 113 843 Vordenbaumen v. Bartlett, 105 La. 752 1204 Vose v. Cockcroft, 44 N. Y. 415 1729, 1806a V. Whitney, 7 Mont. 385 690a, 692 Vreeland v. Blunt, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 182 56 V. Boyle. 37 N. J. L. 346 1216 V. Bramhall, 39 N. J. L. 1 1216 V. Ellsworth, 71 Iowa 347 1201, 1293, 1303, 1574 V. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Eq. 574 102 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] W Wabash & E. Canal Co. v. Beers, 2 Black (U. S.) 448 109, 1557 Wabash R. Co. v. Achemire, 19 Ind. App. 482 1645 Wabash St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ham, 113 U. S. 587 91 Waddell v. Carlock, 41 Ark. 523 5, 1099, 1123 v. The Daisy, 2 Wash. T. 76 1722, 176ia Wade v. Greenwood, 2 Rob. (Va. ) 474 1102b v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 450 461 V. Orton, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 444 196, 198, 203 V. Reitz, IS Ind. 307 1200, 1404, 1455 Wademan v. Thorp, 5 Watts (Pa.) 115 1384 Wades v. Figgatt, 75 Va. 575 639 Wadsworth v. Hodge, 88 Ala. 500 1260, 1261 Wagar v. Briscoe, 38 Mich. 587 1235, 1244, 1245, 1247, 1257, 1384, 1555 Waggoner v. St. John, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503 1729 Wagner v. Brinkerhoff, 123 Ala. 516 1063, 1064 v. Citizens' Bank &c. Co., 122 Tenn. 164 250 v. Darby, 49 Kans. 343 1330 V. Goldsmith, 51 Ore. 63 180 Wagon Co. v. Hutton, 53 W. Va. 154 820 Wainwright v. Barclay, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 221 12S2 Wait V. Atchison &c. R. Co., 204 Mo. 491 181a V. Baker, 2 Ex. 1 913. 916 Wakefield v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 506 1127 v. Van Dorn, 53 Nebr. 23 1584 Wakefield Bank, Ex parte, 1 Rose 243 244 Walbridge v. Pruden. 102 Pa. St. 1 593, 632 Walcott v. Carpenter (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S. W. 981 1120 Waldron v. Zacharie, 54 Tex. 503 1098 Wales V. Coflin, 100 Mass. 177 1142 Walkenhorst v. Coste, 33 Mo. 401 1236 V. Lewis. 24 Kans. 420 1108, 1119 Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258 15, 418, 426, 449 v. Burt. 57 Ga. 20 9, 1247 v. Casgrain, 101 Mich. 604 1069 v. Cassels, 70 S. Car. 271 703 V. Daimwood, 80 Ala. 245 1187, 1559 V. Equitable Mortg. Co., 114 Ga. 862 173. 223 V. Floyd. 30 Ga. 237 236 V. Fuqua, 24 Miss. 640 1070 V. Jessup, 43 Ark. 163 1261 V. Johnson, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 552 564 V. Kee, 16 S. Car. 76 1119 V. Kennedy, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 433 503 :lxi) TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Walker v. Mississippi Val. &c. R. Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 481 1628 V. Paine, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 662 1235, 1614 V. Patterson's Estate, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 650 638 V. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247 115, 191, 193, 217, 218 V. Sarven, 41 Fla. 210 1068 V. Struve, 70 Ala. 167 1074, 1086, 1098 V. Syms, 118 Mich. 183 1208 V. Ware &c. R. Co., 35 Beav. 52 1674 V. Ware &c. R. Co., 12 Jur. (N. S.) 18, pt. 1 1674 V. Williams, 30 Miss. 165 1092 W'alkei- Co. v. Dubuque Fruit Co., 113 Iowa 428 475 Walkvrien, The, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) 241 1682 Wall V. Club Land &c. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 88 S. W. 534 1128 V. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515 503, 691 V. Robinson, 115 Mass. 429 1314 Wallace v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 216 Pa. 311 284 V. Campbell, 54 Tex. 87 1081 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 112 Iowa 565 175 V. Eawyer, 54 Ind. 501 154a V. Melchior, 2 Browne (Pa.) 104 1329 V. Smith, S La. Ann. 374 620 V. Woodgate, Ry. & M. 193 310, 317, 642 V. Woodgate, 1 Car. & P. 575 468, 641, 742 Wallach v. Cheley, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 209 609 Waller's Lessee v. Best, 3 How. (U. S.) Ill 13 Walley v. Montgomery, 3 East 585 884, 928 Wallis V. Smith, 21 Ch. Div. 243 1138, 1512 Walls V. Ducharne, 162 Mass. 432 1413 V. Long. 2 Ind. App. 202 22, 683, 698, 1054 Walsh V. McBride, 72 Md. 45 1086, 1093 V. McMenomy, 74 Cal. 356 1291 Walter v. Hanson, 33 Minn. 474 1063 V. Ross, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 283 463, 880, 946, 951 Walters v. The Mollie Dozier, 24 Iowa 192 1729 -Walton V. Dickerson, 7 Pa. St. 376 137 V. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18 1081-1083 Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355 578a Wanamaker v. Yerkes, 70 Pa. St. 443 800, 837 "Wangler v. Franklin, 70 Mo. 659 820 Waples-Painter Co. v. Ross (Tex.). 141 S. W. 1027 1226 Warbu.ton v. Coumbe, 34 Fla. 212 755 V. Edge, 9 Sim. 508 132 Ward V. Blalock, 72 Ga. 804 611 V. Chamberlain, 2 Black (TJ. S.) 430 1676 Ward V. Craig, 87 N. Y. 550 115, 131, 143, 146, 152 V. Kelly, 7 Mo. App. 565 1305 V. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413 1218, 1274, 1345 V. Morr Transfer &c. Co., 119 Mo. App. 83 981 V. Sherbondy, 96 Iowa 477 175 V. Stark, 91 Ark. 268 5, 93 V. Syme, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 598 184 V. Thompson, 22 How. (U. S.) 330 1697a V. Thorndyke, 65 Wash. 11 1537 V. Walker, 111 Iowa 611 616 V. Watson, 27 Nebr. 768 219 V. Wordsworth, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 598 153 Warden v. Marshall, 99 Mass. 305 813 V. Sabins, 36 Kans. 165 1202, 1469, 1470, 1488 Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274, 1083, 1099 Warehouse & Builders' Supply Co. V. Galvin, 19 Wis. 523 1720 Ware River R. Co. v. Vibbard, 114 Mass. 447 800, 841 Warfield v. Campbell, 38 Ala. 527 167, 169, 219 v. Oliver, 23 La. Ann. 612 620 Warford v. Hankins, 150 Ind. 489 1063. 1066 Waring v. Cox, 1 Camp. 369 875 V. Dewberry, 1 Str. 97 62a V. SlinglufE, G3 Md. 53 598 V. Waring, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 246 1174 Warner v. Bliven, 127 Mich. 665 1072 V. Morse, 149 Mass. 400 1179a V. Scott, 63 111. 368 1086 V. Van Alstyne, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 513 1064, 1104 V. Yates, 118 Tenn. 548 1571 Warner Elev. Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Invest. &c. Assn., 127 Mich. 323 1340 Warren v. Barnet, S3 Ala. 208 603 V. Branch, 15 W. Va. 21 1063, 1107, 1116 V. Fenn, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 333 1061, 1062, 1069, 1074, 1082 V. First Nat. Bank, 149 111. 9 466 V. Forney, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 52 585 V. Kelley, 80 Maine 512 1680, 1682, 1725, 1729, 1746 V. Quade, 3 Wash. 750 1405. 1421 V. Smith, 44 Tex. 245 1262 V. Woodard, 70 N. Car. 382 784 Waschow V. Waschow, 155 111. App. 167 1014 Washburn v. Burns, 34 N. J. L. 18 1216, 1262, 1270 V. Kahler, 97 Cal. 58 1293, 1449 Washington v. Williamson, 23 Md. 244 552, 573 Washington Iron Works v. Jen- sen, 3 Wash. 584 1559 Wasson v. Davis, 34 Tex. 159 1080, 1098 Waterbury Lumber &c. Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 1287, 1430 Waterfleld v. Wilber, 64 Mich. 642 1102 TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] "Waterman v. Younger, 49 Mo. 413 1307 Waters v. Goldberg, 124 App. Div. (N. Y.) 511 1393 V. Grace, 23 Ark. 118 146 V. Johnson, 134 Mich. 436 1398 Waters-lr'ierce uil Co. v. United States-Mexican Trust Co., 44 Tex. Civ. App. 397 1627, 1668 Wathen v. Russell, 20 Ky. L. 709 177 Watitins v. Bugge, 56 Nebr. 615 1435 Watrous v. Ellinendorf, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 461 1590 Watson V. Beatty, 10 Sad. (Pa.) 108 476 V. Bell, 45 Ala. 452 1127 V. Columbia Bridge Co., 13 S. Car. 433 1224 V. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147 508, 517 V. Gardner, 119 111. 312 1272, 1585, 1587 V. Johnsun, 33 Ark. 737 556, 606 V. Lyon, 7 De G. M. & G. 288 128 V. May, 62 Ark. 435 778 V. New York Central R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157 107, 1558 V. Smith, 63 Iowa 228 217 V. Vansickle (Tex. Civ. App.), 114 S. W. 1160 1117 V. Wellington, 1 Russ. & M. 602 43, 55 V. Wells, 50 Conn. 468 1063 V. Williams, 110 Ga. 321 781 Watson, Ex parte, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 35 889, 921 Watt V. Pittman, 125 Ind. 168 1163 V. Schofleld, 76 111. 261 576a, 580, 614 V. Vezin. 15 Phila. (Pa.) 180 1455 V. White, 33 Tex. 421 1092 Waiters v. Parker (Tex.), 19 S. W. 1022 1102 V. Wells, 7 Ga. App. 778 173 Watts V. Christie, 11 Beav. 546 248 V. Newberry, 107 Va. 233 191a v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116 744, 758, 1054 V. Ward, 1 Ore. 86 485 V. Whittington, 48 Md. 353 1206, 1329 "VVatts-Campbell Co. v. Yueng- ling, 125 N. Y. 1 1335, 1384, 1444 V. Yuengling, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 302 1335 Waubaushene, The, 22 Fed. 109 1698 Waugh V. Denham, 16 Irish C. L. 405 499 Waycross Opera House Co. v. Sossman, 94 Ga. 100 1346 Weathersbee v. Garrar, 97 N. Car. 106 457 Weathersby v. Sleeper, 42 Miss. 732 70 W^eaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286 1085 V. Brown, 87 Ala. 533 1092, 1102a v. Demuth, 40 N. J. L. 238 1519, 1524 V. Sells, 10 Kans. 609 109, 1325, 1327, 1330, 1334, 1558 v. Sheeler, 118 Pa. St. 634 1244, 1257, 1259 V. Sheeler, 124 Pa. St. 473 1257 Webb v. Parker, 130 App. Div. (N. Y.) 92 184 v. Robinson, 14 Ga. 216 1081, 1083, 1092 V. Sharp, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 14 555, 577, 581, 609 Webbe v. Curran, 198 111. 18 1199 V. Curran, 97 111. App. 525 1199 Webber v. Cogswell, 2 Canada Sup. Ct. 15 738 V. Mackey, 4 Bradw. (111.) 458 1102b Weber v. Bushnell, 171 111. 587 1184a, 1494, 1527 V. Bushnell, 69 111. App. 26 1184a v. Weatherby, 34 Md. 656 1256, 1343, 1387 V. Werner, 138 App. Div. (N. Y.) 127 184 V. Whetstone, 53 Nebr. 371 668, 694, 698 Webster v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 394 394 V. Keck, 64 Nebr. 1 128 V. McCollough, 61 Iowa 496 1083, 1087 V. Mann, 56 Tex. 119 1109 V. Nichols, 104 111. 160 542, 544, 567, 1039 V. Real Estate Improvement Co., 140 Mass. 526 1356 V. Wakeling, 2 Wkly. N. Cas. Ill 1349 Webster Citv Steel Radiator Co. V. Chamberlin, 137 Iowa 717 1272 Weed V. Hall, 101 Pa. St. 592 1130 V. Standley, 12 Fla. 166 544 V. Tucker, 19 N. Y. 422 105 Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bou- telle, 56 Vt. 570 153, 155. 165, 166, 191, 193, 212, 227 Weeks v. Goode, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 367 1019 V. Little, 89 N. Y. 566 1599 V. Walcott, 15 Gray (Mass.) 54 1252 V. Wavne Circuit Judges, 73 Mich. 256 223 Wees V. Blbon, 61 W. Va. 380 1389 Weeter Lumber Co. v. Fales, 20 Idaho 255 1198 Wegener v. Smith, 24 L. J. 2 P. 25 274 Wehr v. Shryock. 55 Md. 334 1554 Weicher v. Cargill, 86 Minn. 271 179 Weichselbaum Co. v. Farmers' Supplv Co., 119 Ga. 183 708 v. Pope, 119 Ga. 182 708, 781 Weil V. Levi, 40 La. Ann. 135 229 V. McWhorter, 94 xVla. 540 576a Weill V. Kent, 107 La. 322 620 V. Kent, 52 La. Ann. 2139 456 V. Weill, 10 N. Y. S. 627 168 Weinberg .v. Rempe, 15 W. Va. 829 1069, 1115 Weis V. Ashlev, 59 Nebr. 494 646 Weisman v. B"uffalo, 10 N. Y. S. 569 1512 Weiss V. Jahn, 37 N. J. L. 93 573, 627 Welch V. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 91 C. C. A. 399 1076 V. Hicks, 27 Ark. 292 1102 V. McGrath, 59 Iowa 519 1403 clxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Welch V. Porter, 63 Ala. 225 1187, 1470, 1490 V. Porter, 77 Iowa 347 1462 V. Sherer, 93 111. 64 1292, 1599 V. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 16.t 1141 V. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 511 1141 Welde V. Henderson, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 633 1558 Weldon v. Gould, 3 Esp. 268 732 Welker v. Appleman, 44 Ind. App. 699 427 Wellborn v. Bonner, 9 Ga. 82 1063 V. Williams, 9 Ga. 86 1092 Weller v. McNabb, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 422 1268, 1542 Wellesley v. Welleslev, 4 Mylne & Cr. 561 78 Wellman v. Morse, 76 Fed. 573 1680 V. Smith, 114 La. 228 1204 Wells V. Board of Education, 78 Mich. 260 1514 V. Cahn. 51 Cal. 423 1287 V. Canton Co., 3 Md. 234 1470, 1478 V. Christian, 165 Ind. 662 1344 V. Elsam, 40 Mich. 218 178, 220, 223 V. Francis, 7 Colo. 396 1108, 1125 V. Harter, 56 Cal. 342 1086 V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246 140, 145, 158, 165, 193, 200 V. Hornish, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 30 571, 572 V. Mehl, 25 Kans. 205 1648 V. Moore, 31 Okla. 135 189b V. Morrow, 38 Ala. 125 1085, 1119 V. Riley, 2 Dill. (U. S.) 566 1142, 1146 V. Sequin, 14 Iowa 143 566 V. Smith, 44 Miss. 296 1107 V. Southern Minn. R. Co., 1 Fed. 270 1629 V. Thompson. .'lO Ala. S3 fi03 Welsh V. Barnes, 5 N. Dak. 277 698 V. Bell, 32 Pa. St. 12 800, 806 V. Hole, 1 Doug. ?38 113, 137, 209, 234 V. The North Cambria, 40 Fed. 655 1725 V. Woodbury, 144 Mass. 542 1465 Welsh's Appeal, 5 Sad. (Pa.) 494 1174 Wemple v. Hauenstein, 46 N. Y. S. 288 32 Wendell v. Binninger, 132 App. Div. (N. Y.) 785 184 V. Pinneo, 127 111. App. 319 1061. 1064 Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 137 Ky. 339 618 Wendt V. Martin, 89 111. 139 1235, 1262. 1263. 1269 Wentroth's Appeal, 82 Pa. St. 469 725 Wentworth v. Dav. 3 Mete. (Mass.) 352 487-489, 491, 493 V. Dow.s, 117 Mass. 14 1599 V. Miller, 53 Cal. 9 550 V. Outwaite, 10 M. & M^. 436 861, 917, 921, 962 Wentworth's Appeal, 24 Pitts- burg L. .1. 95 1665 Wera v. Bowerman, 191 Mass. 458 1361 Werner v. George Zehler Pro. Co., 31 Ohio C. C. 632 159 V. Ropiequet, 44 111. 522 613 Wernke v. Hazen, 32 Ind. 431 1133 Wert V. Naylor, 93 Ind. 431 1083 Wertz V. Lamb, 43 Mont. 477 1212, 1406, 1409, 1452 Wertz's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 173 1164 Wescott V. Bunker, 83 Maine 499 1205, 1235, 1416, 1418, 1420 Wesley v. Wood, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 33 1 84 West V. Bacon, 164 N. Y. 425 231 v. Bacon, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 371 184 V. Fleming, 18 111. 248 1552 V. Klotz, 37 Ohio St. 420 14S5 V. Martin, 51 Wash. 85 1765 V. Pullen, 88 111. App. 620 1237 V. Reeves, 53 Nebr. 472 1487 West Branch Bank v. Arm- strong, 40 Pa. St. 278 39.8, 409 West Chicago &c. Com. v. West- ern Granite Co., 200 111. 527 1285a, 1560 West Coast Lumber Co. v. Knapp, 122 Cal. 79 1190 V. Newkirk, 80 Cal. 275 1190, 1276, 1356, 1398, 1400, 1401 "U^ester v. Long, 63 Kans. 876 617 Western Bank v. Marion County Distilling Co., 89 Ky. 91 818 Western Cornice &c. Co. v. Leavenworth, 52 Nebr. 418 1421 Western Iron Works v. Mon- tana Pulp &c. Co., 30 Mont. 550 1423 Western Plumbing Co. v. Fried, 33 Mont. 7 1454 Western Sash &c. Co. v. Gaul Const. Co., 126 N. Y. S. 1110 1492 V. Heiman, 65 Kans. 5 1605 V. Heiman, 71 Kans. 43 1392 Westfield v. Great Western R. Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. 276 332 Westland v. Goodman, 47 Conn. 83 1606 Westmoreland v. Foster, 60 Ala. 448 990 V. Wooten, 51 Miss. 825 576a, 625 W^est Norfolk Lumber Co., In re, 112 Fed. 759 773, 1229 West of England Bank v. Batch- elor, 51 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 199 117 Weston V. Dunlap, 50 Iowa 183 1201 V. Morse, 40 Wis. 455 1729, 1767 V. Olsen, 55 Wis. 613 1559, 1616 V. Weston, 46 Wis. 130 1573 Westport Lumber Co. v. Harris, 131 Mo. App. 94 1244 Westwood V. Bell, 4 Camp. 349 423, 447 Westzynthius, In re, 5 B. & Ad. 817 953 Westzynthius, In re, 2 Nev. & M. 650 859 Wethered v. Garrett, 140 Pa. St. 224 1600 Wetherell v. Thirtv-first St. B. & L. Assn., 153 111. 361 381 ■^'etmore v. Marsh, 81 Iowa 677 1393 Wetsel v. Mayers, 91 111. 497 554, 614 Wexford, The, 7 Fed. 674 1799 TABLE OF CASES. clxvii [References are to Sections — Vol. I Wexler v. Rust, 144 App. Div. (N. Y.) 296 1296 Weyer v. Beach, 79 N. Y. 409. 1218, 1564, 1614 V. Beach, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 231 1287 Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 425 432 V. Sanbourn, 43 N. H. 171 725 Whalen v. Collins, 164 Mass. 146 1310 Whaley v. Jacobson, 21 S. Car. 51 458, 635 Wharton v. Douglas, 92 Pa. St. fifi 1310 Wheaton v. Berg, 50 Minn. 525 1248 V. Newcombe, 16 J. & S. (N. Y.) 215 187 V. Trimble, 145 Mass. 345 1254, 1264 Wheeler v. Almond, 46 N. J. L. 161 1216, 1456, 1565 V. Hall, 41 Wis. 447 1589 V. Howell, 3 Kay & J. 198 1163 V. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383 1223 V. Scofield, 67 N. Y. 311 1513 V. Scofield, 6 Hun (N. Y.) 655 1254 V. Teetzlaff, 53 Wis. 211 820 Wheelock v. Hull, 124 Iowa 752 1290 Wheless v. Meyer &c. Grocer Co., 140 Mo. App. 572 807, 808, 810 Whetsel v. Roberts, 31 Ohio St. 503 1094 Whetstone v. Baker, 140 Ind. 213 1069 W. H. Howard Com. Co. v. Na- tional Livestock Bank, 93 111. App. 473 656 Whidden v. Toulmin, 6 Ala. 104 573 Whigham v. Fountain, 132 Ga. 277 976 Whistler, The, 30 Fed. 199 1756 Whitaker v. Big Sandy Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 263 1101 V. New York &c. R. Co., 3 N. Y. St. 537 186 V. Smith, 81 N. Car. 340 778, 784, 1362, 1366, 1663 Whitcomb v. Straw, 62 N. H. 650 158, 165 White V. Americus, 19 Fed. 848 1697a, 1707 V. Bird, 23 La. Ann. 270 456 V. Blakemore, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 49 1099. 1107. 1108, 1123 V. Chaffln, 32 Ark. 59 1189, 1335, 1478, 1571, 1572 V. Cole, 87 Tex. 500 1126 V. Cole, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 277 1123 V. Downs, 40 Tex. 225 1063, 1092, 1100. 1111 V. Dumpke, 45 Wis. 454 1391, 1532 V. Fisher, 77 Ind. 65 1083 V. Gainer, 2 Bing. 23 lOlS V. Gainer, 9 Moore 41 1020 V. Griffin, 2 Jones' L. (N. Car.) 3 791 V. Harlow, 5 Gray (Mass.) 463 122 V. Hovt, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 232 731 V. Jones, 92 N. Car. 388 1063 §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] White V. McAllister Co., 67 Mo. App. 314 576a, 579, 580 V. Miller, 18 Ta. St. 52 1304, 1305, 1329 V. Mitchell, 38 Mich. 390 929 V. Moses, 21 Cal. 34 1134 V. Mullens, 3 Idaho 434 1397 V. Parish, 20 Tex. 688 789, 791 V. Prior, 88 Mich. 647 712 V. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105 731, 733, 734, 737, 742 V. Solomonsky, 30 Md. 585 861 V. Stanton, 111 Ind. 540 1200, 1421, 1423, 1424 V. Stover, 10 Ala. 441 1063 V. Street, 67 Tex. 177 1067 V. Taylor, 107 Ky. 20 1063 V. The Cynthia, 2 Fed. 112 1730 V. The Emma, 37 Fed. 703 1703 V. Vann, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 70 289 298 V. Wakefield, 7 Sim. 401 'l084 V. Washington School Dis- trict, 42 Conn. 541 1192, 1287 V. Welsh, 38 Pa. St. 396 800, 857, 902, 905 V. Williams, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 502 1074, 1092, 1096 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 518 893, 917, 919. 939, 940, 941, 943 V. Chadwell, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 4^2 78 9 v. Fisher, 64 Tex. 638 1120 V. Jessup, 7 Colo. App. 460 114, 171, 1018 V. O'Sullivan, 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 577 30 V. Vaughan, 6 ii,ast 523n 265 Whitehorn v. Cranz, 20 Nebr. 392 1108 Whitehurst v. Yandall, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 228 1116 White Lake Lumber Co. v. Rus- sell, 22 Nebr. 126 1237, 1421, 1423, 1556 v. Stone, 19 Nebr. 402 1213 Whitelegge v. De Witt, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 319 184 Whiteley v. Learoyd, L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 196 1181 V. Learoyd, L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 347 1181 Whitenack v. Noe, 11 N. J. Eq. 321 1216, 1408, 1423 White's Appeal, 10 Pa. St. 252 1244, 1388 White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 646 1681 v. Toledo Ins. Co., 12 Ohio St. 601 415 Whiteside v. Lebcher, 7 Mont. 473 1286 v. School Dist., 20 Mont. 44 1375 Whitford v. Newell, 2 Allen (Mass.) 424 1207. 1236, 1313, 1314, 1354 Whitham v. Wing, 108 Maine 364 1205 Whiting V. Coons^ 2 La. Ann. 971 661 V. Eichelbergerm, 16 Iowa 422 543 V. Lake, 91 Pa. St. 349 632 V. Story, 54 Iowa 81 1375 clxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Sections — Vol. I, §§ l-1060f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1812.] Whitlock V. Hay, 58 N. Y. 484 825 Whitlock Mach. Co. v. Holway, 92 Maine 414 968 Wliitmore v. Poindexter, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 248 637 V. Sliiverick, 3 Nev. 288 797 Whitney v. Beckford, 105 Mass. 267 292 V. Joslin, 108 Mass. 103 1207, 1415, 1516, 1573 V. McConnell, 29 Mich. 12 820 V. Richardson, 31 Vt. 300 1134, 1145, 1146 Whittaker v. Clarke, 33 Tex. 647 159 Whitten v. Saunders, 75 Va. 563 1117 Whittier v. Banking- Co., 4 Wash. 666 1S26 V. Blakely, 13 Ore. 54G 1221, 1406, 1420 V. Hollister, 64 Cal. 283 12S7, 1289 V. Puget Sound &c. Bank Co., 4 ^Wash. 666 1327 V. Wilbur, 48 Cal. 175 1287, 1500a Whittington v. Farmers' Bank, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 489 241 Vv^hittle V. Newman, 34 Ga. 377 204a, 236, 237 Whitwell V. Aurora, 139 Mo. App. 597 181a V/hitworth v. Benbow, 56 Ind. 194 793 Whole Creek Iron Works v. Ne^w York &c. L. &c. Co., 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 242 1566 Wick V. Ft. Plain &c. R. Co., 27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 577 1662 Wickham v. Levistones, 11 La. Ann. 702 111, 1745 Wickman v. Robinson, 14 Wis. 493 1105 Wiggins V. Bridge, 70 Cal. 437 12S7, 1512 V. Houghton, 89 Mich. 468 712 Wight V. Maxwell, 4 Mich. 45 1720 Wightman v. Brenner, 26 N. J. Eq. 489 1216, 1286 Wigton's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 161 1538 Wilber v. Baker, 24 Hun fN. Y.) 24 189, 233 V\?'ilcox V. Alexander (Tex.), 32 S. W. 561 603 V. First Nat. Bank, 93 Tex. 322 1111 V. Five Hundred Tons of Coal, 14 Fed. 49 308 V. Kellogg, 11 Ohio 394 788, 789, 793 V. Woodruff. 61 Conn. 578 1313 Wilczinki v. Lick, 68 Miss. 596 557 Wilder v. French, 9 Ciray (Mass.) 393 1242 Wilder's Sons Co. v. Walker, 98 Ga. 508 1574 Wilds V. Smith, 2 Ont. Apn. 8 834, 867, 931 Wildy V. Mid-Hants R. Co., 16 W. R. 409 1675 Wiley V. Carlisle. 93 Ala. 237 1102b V. Connelly, 179 Mass. 360 1495 V. Smith, 1 Ont. App. 179 902, 931, 934, 944 Wilkerson v. Rust. 57 Tnd. 172 1257, 1272. 1276, 1310 Wilkes V. Harper, 1 N. Y. 586 73 V. Smith, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 86 1117 Wilkie V. Bray, 71 N. Car. 205 1219 1235 Wilkins v. Abell, 26 Colo. 462* 1273, 1276 V. Batterman, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 47 212, 214 V. Carmichael, 1 Doug. 101 113, 156, 1706 V. Litchfield, 69 Iowa 465 1245, 1247, 1248 V. Taliafero, 52 Ga. 208 572 Wilkinson v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 637 1375, 1378, 1618 V. Ketler, 69 Ala. 885 550, 603 V. May, 69 Ala. 33 1063, 1064, 1092, 1101 V. Parmer, 82 Ala. 367 1072 Willamette Steam Mills Co. v. Kremer, 94 Cal. 205 1190, 1372, 1421, 1600 Willamette Steam Mills Lumber Co. V. Los Angeles College Co., 94 Cal. 229 1190, 1569 Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mas. (U. S.) 91 1706 V. Magoon, 30 Mich. 273 1263 V. Reas, 26 Wis. 540 1063, 1088 V. Whinfield, 2 Kans. App. 53 692 698 V. White, 56 Hun (N. Y.) 58l' 430 Wilier V. Bergenthal, 50 Wis. 474 1232, 1559, 1571, 1592, 1605, 1613 Willett V. Carroll, 13 Md. 459 1167 V. Kinney, 54 Ore. 594 716 Willetts V. Earl, 53 N. J. L. 270 1216 Willey V. Topping, 146 Pa. St. 427 1502 William and Emmeline, The, 1 Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 66 1680 William Cook, The, 12 Fed. 919 1690, 1691 Williamette Falls &c. Co. v. Remick, 1 Ore. 169 1323, 1366 V. Riley, 1 Ore. 183 149!?, 1558 William Gates, The, 48 Fed. 835 1778 William Law, The, 14 Fed. 792 1712 William P. Donnelly, The, 156 Fed. 302 1730, 1756 Williams v. Alcorn Elec. Ligiit Co., 98 Miss. 468 1365 V. Allsup, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 417 8, 744 V. Aylesbury & C. R. Co., 21 "W. R. 819 1674 V. Baker, 100 Mo. Aop. 284 1092 V. Birch, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 299 434 V. Bradford (N. J.), 21 Atl. 331 1216 V. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621 490 V. Chapman, 17 111. 423 1571, 1728 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 112 Mo. 463 1429, 1655 V. Chisholm, 128 111. 115 1199 V. Christian, 23 Ark. 255 1092, 1095 V. Controllers. 18 Pa. St. 2V5 1375 V. Crow, 84 Mo. 298 1071, 1074 v. Cunningham, 52 Ark. 439 1109 V. Deiitscher Verein Club, 14 N. Y. S. 368 1579 V. Edison Elec. Ilium. Co., 16 N. Y. S. 857 1579 V. Eldorado, etc.. Gold Min. Co., 35 Colo. 127 1249, 1273 TABLE OF CASES. clxix [References are to Sections— Vol. I, §§ l-l()60f; Vol. II, §§ 1061-1S12.] Williams v. Finley, 99 Tex. 468 1127a V. Gibbes, 20 How. (U. S.) 535 1 1 .S 6 V. Hawley, 144 Cal. 97 1366 V. Holmes, 8 Exch. 861 561 V. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. 508 48, 166, 223, 1225 V. Ing-ersoll, 23 Hun (N. Y.) 284 44, 227 V. Judd-Wells Co., 91 Iowa 378 1315 V. Lowe, 4 Nebr. 382 375 V. McCartv, 74 Ala. 295 1074. 1098 V. Moore, 4 N. H. 235 801, 837 V. Nichol, 47 Ark. 254 1164 V. Porter, 51 Mo. 441 1211, 1422, 1425, 1607, 1613, 1615 V. Potter, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 316 629 V. Rice, 60 Mich. 102 1178 V. Rittenhouse &c. Co., 198 111. 602 1199 V. Roberts, 5 Ohio 35 1063, 1086 V. Roe, 59 Ala. 629 1102 V. Samuels, 90 Ky. 59 1069 V. Santa Clara Min. Co., 66 Cal. 193 1190, 1255, 14S0 V. Sax (Tenn. Ch. App.), 43 S. W. 868 1102a V. The Sirius, 65 Fed. 226 1703 V. Tilt, 36 N. Y. 319 418 V. Uncompahgre Canal Co., 13 Colo. 469 1236, 12.?S V. Waldo, 3 Scam. (111.) 264 108 V. Webb, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 430 1453 V. Willing-ham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533 1508 V. Woods, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 41 570, 618, 619 V. Young, 21 Cal. 227 1092 Williams, In re, 3 Ir. Eq. 346 241, 244 Williamson v. Hogan, 46 111. 504 1729 V. New Jersey S. R. Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 277 1216, 1660 V. New Jersey S. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311 1660 V. Shank, 41 Ind. App. 513 1245 V. Woten, 132 Ind. 202 1067 Williams &c. Co. v. Bailev, 68 W. Va. 681 1231 V. Rowell. 145 Cal. 259 1344 William T. Graves, The, 8 Ben. (U. S.) 568 1794 William T. Graves, The, 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 189 1811 Williard v. Magoon, 30 Mich. 273 1235 Willingham v. Hardin, 75 Mo. 429 1076 V. Leake, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 453 1115 V. Long, 70 Ala. 587 1187, 1287 V. Rushing, 105 Ga. 72 475 Willis V. Bovd. 103 Ga. 130 1197 V. Gay, 48 Tex. 463 1084, 1086 V. Searcv. 49 Ala. 222 1106 Willison V. Douglas, 66 Md. 99 1500, 1519, 1520, 1524 Willman v. Friedman, 3 Idaho 734 1108 "Wills V. Barrister, 36 Vt. 220 641 Wilmhurst v. Bowker, 7 M. & G. 882 884 Wilson V. Balfour, 2 Camp. 579 21 Wilson V. Curry, 149 Ala. 368 603 V. Emmett, 19 Beav. 233 122 122a V. Ewing, 79 Ky. 549 "' 1072 V. Forder, 30 Pa. St. 129 1434 V. Graham, 5 Munf. (Va.) 297 1086 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 56 Maine 60 262 V. Guyton, 8 Gill (Md.) 213 16, 487, 492 V. Heather, 5 Taunt. 695 •! V. Hopkins, 51 Ind. 231 1200 V. House, 10 Bush (Ky.) 406 177, 230 V. Howell, 48 Kans. 150 1327 V. Huntingdon, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 197 1375 V. Keating, 4 De G. & J. 588 1079 V. Kymer, 1 M. ien by operation of law. 21. 9. Lien only to extent of in- terest. 22. 10. Lien confers no right of property upon the holder. 23. 11. A mortgage more than a lien. 12. An attachment on process 24. not a lien. 13. A judgment only a general 25. lien. 14. A lien either specific or gen- eral. 26. Limited lien not to be ex- tended. Specific liens. Definition of general lien. Lien for general balance by agreement of parties. General liens regarded with jealousy. Possession necessary to lien. Possession essential to cre- ate and preserve lien. Change of possession may not defeat lien. The possession must be rightful. Possession need not be actu- al or direct. Mechanic acquires no lien when working for another mechanic. Lien of bailee performing service. § 1. Introductory. — The present chapter is intended merely as an introduction to the general subject of common- law liens. Liens at common law naturally introduce the I § I LIENS. 2 other forms of liens treated of, namely, equitable liens, liens by statute, and maritime liens. The characteristic of these liens are generally described by stating how they differ from liens at common law. The common-law liens attach exclusively to personal prop- erty,^ though there are also liens upon personal property in equity and by statute. The common-law liens upon personal property are, in many instances, modified or enlarged by statute; while also equitable liens, upon both personal prop- erty and real property, are in many instances modified or enlarged by statute. By statute, moreover, maritime liens are in like manner affected. Finally, new liens have been created by statute which have never been asserted at law or in equity, or by maritime law. It is impossible therefore to treat of all common-law liens by themselves; to treat of all equitable liens by themselves ; and then to treat of all maritime liens by themselves. The subject must be divided by reference to the subject-matter of the liens: first, by refer- ence to the kinds of property to be affected, and then by reference to the classes of persons in whose favor the liens arise. As to the kinds of property, there are the two natural divisions of personal and real; and maritime property, being governed by peculiar laws, forms a third division. When we come to the consideration of the liens pertaining to the several trades and callings, such as the liens of attorneys, bankers and others, within the division of liens upon personal property, it has seemed best to treat of them in separate chapters, because these liens generally differ from each other by marked peculiarities ; and, moreover, as a matter of prac- tical convenience in referring to the book, it has seemed bet- ter to arrange the subjects alphabetically, rather than to at- tempt an order of arrangement as indicated by the principles governing these liens. The introductory chapters upon common-law liens, 1 Oxenham v. Esdaile, 2 Y. & J. 493; Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Mer. 404. 3 LIENS AT COMMON LAW, § 2 equitable liens and statutory liens treat of some of the principal characteristics of these liens in a general manner; but reference should be had to other parts of the work treat- ing of particular liens for a fuller development and illustra- tion of many points touched upon in these general chapters, and for others not referred to in them. As regards liens upon personal property, there are some principles and rules applicable to several different kinds of liens in respect to the assignment, waiver and enforcement of these liens; and therefore the first volume, which is devoted to liens upon personal property, closes with general chapters relating to the assignment of liens, the waiver of liens, and enforce- ment of liens. § 2. The word "lien." — The word "lien" is here used in its legal and technical sense." Much confusion has arisen from using the word in a loose manner, at one time in its technical sense, and at another in its popular sense. It is often convenient and proper to speak of the lien of a mort- gage, or of the lien of a pledge. Of course it will often hap- pen, when the word is used in this sense, that the description of the lien shows that the word is used merely to denote the charge or incumbrance of a mortgage, pledge, attachment or judgment. And so in many other instances the word is used in a popular sense to denote a charge which is not in a strict sense a lien by law, custom, statute or in equity. But in a treatise upon the subject it is imperative, not only to use the 2 The word "lien" became a law primarily means to "tie," to term at a comparatively recent "bind." The common-law right of date. The right existed, under the retainer implies possession; and a name of a right of retainer, as common-law lien implies posses- early as the reign of Edward IV.; sion but the term is sometimes but the name "lien" does not seem used in a broader sense than the to have been given to this right mere right to retain; it is often till about the beginning of the used to designate rights which do eighteenth century. The word is not depend upon possession, as in derived from the French, and, fur- the case of statutory, equitable ther back, from the Latin, and and maritime liens. 8 3 LIENS. 4 word in its proper sense, but also to distinguish between the proper and improper use of the word in the decisions that are used as authorities, or are commented upon. In equity the word "lien" is used in a broader sense than at law. It denotes a right of a particular nature over a thing constituting incum- brance upon it and the lien may be enforced by a proceeding against it and possession of the thing is not necessary to the existence of the lien. § 3. Definitions. — A lien has been well defined to be "a right in one man to retain that which is in his possession be- longing to another, till certain demands of him the person in possession are satisfied."-^ The code of California^ declares that "a lien is a charge imposed in some mode other than by a transfer in trust, upon specific property, by which it is made security for the performance of an act." "The term 'lien,' " says Chancellor Bland,^ "is applied in various modes; but, in all cases, it signifies an obligation, tie, or claim annexed to, or'attaching upon property, without sat- isfying which such property cannot be demanded by its own- er. Lien, in its proper sense, is a right which the law gives. But it is usual to speak of lien by contract, though that be more in the nature of an agreement for a pledge. And there are liens which exist only in equity, and of which equity alone can take cognizance. The existence of a lien, however, and the benefit which may be derived from it, as well as the mode in which that benefit may be obtained, depend upon princi- ples of law and circumstances so various, that it is always in- 3 Hammonds v. Barclay, 2 East National Cash Register Co., 174 227, 235, per Grose, J.; and see Fed. 579, 98 C. C. A. 425. McCaffrey v. Wooden, 62 Barb. 4 Civ. Code 1906, § 2872. So in (N. Y.) 316, 328, per Johnson. J.. North Dakota, Rev. Code 1905, § affd. 65 N. Y. 459, 22 Am. Rep. 644. 6123; South Dakota, Rev. Code Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 1903 (Civ.), § 2017; Oklahoma, Mich. 162, ie N. W. 371, 42 L. R. Comp. Laws 1909, § 4112. A. 531, 74 Am. St. 380, which holds 5 Ridgely v. Iglehart, 3 Bland that no right of sale exists; In re (Md.) 540; In re Maher, 169 Fed. 997. 5 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 4 dispensably necessary carefully to attend to those particulars by which its very substance may be materially affected." In a narrow sense the term "lien" implies a right of one in possession of personalty to hold it as against its owner for the satisfaction of a claim due from the owner. In a broader sense it is a legal charge on either personalty or real estate for the satisfaction of a debt or an obligation. In equity and in maritime law it may exist without possession. § 4. Lien at law an implied obligation. — A lien at law is an implied obligation whereby property is bound for the dis- charge of some debt or engagement. It is not the result of an express contract; it is given by implication of law.^ It is true that we often speak of a lien by contract; but such an obligation is rather in the nature of an agreement for a pledge or mortgage. In its strict and proper sense a lien is a right which the law gives, for, to make a lien by law, possession must be given, and possession under a contract for security generally constitutes a pledge or a mortgage, according to the terms of the contract. A lien by contract without possession is an equitable lien or charge. If a lien be given 6 In re Leith's Estate, L. R. 1 persons applying for these serv- P. C. 296, 305, per Lord Westbury; ices are not strangers, the usage Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Mer. 404, of their deal may be such that per Grant, Master of the Rolls; the law will create a lien. For Wilson V. Heather, 5 Taunt. 695; instance, the course of their deal Ridgely v. Iglehart, 3 Bland (Md.) may be that payment for the serv- 540; Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. ices is always made before the 244, 23 Am. Dec. 206. In the lat- property is taken away." A lien ter case Hutchinson, C. J., said : may only be created by contract "The usual cases in which the law implied or expressed of the owner creates a lien are, where the per- of property or his agent or with- son performing services would out the owner's consent by force have no other sure remedy; as a of a positive statute or rule of blacksmith shoeing a horse for a law. Paton v. Robinson, 81 Conn, stranger; or a watchmaker clean- 547, 71 Atl. 730. See also, Garri- ing a watch for a stranger; or an son v. Vermont Mills, 154 N. Car. innkeeper furnishing entertainment 1, 69 S. E. 743. for travellers; and, where the § 5 LIENS. 6 by express contract in a case where the law would otherwise imply a lien, the express stipulation excludes the implied lien, and limits the rights of the parties to the express contract^ § 5. A lien by contract. — A lien by contract exists only where it is expressly agreed that a party may retain the prop- erty as security for the work done or expense incurred in respect of it. There must be something more than a con- tract for the payment of the price. The law implies no lien from such a contract, but the parties may so form their con- tract as to create a lien, if they choose.^ Where an intention is shown by the terms of a written contract to charge particular property, duly identified, with a debt or an obligation, an equitable lien is created. Even a verbal contract w^ill charge personal property with a lien.® A lien by contract can not, any more than an implied lien, exist without possession. The contract itself is not equiva- lent to possession, and it does not give possession. Thus a declaration at the end of a promissory note or other obliga- tion, that it constitutes a lien upon certain property, does not amount to a contract for a lien, unless the creditor re- tains possession of the property. ^'^ § .6. Lien where price agreed upon. — It was at one time doubted whether a lien could exist at common law where the parties had specially agreed as to the price ;^^ but this doubt was removed by the judgment in Chase v. Westmore,^^ and the rule was there established that such agreement does not 7 In re Leith's Estate, L. R. 1 lo Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, P. C. 296. 25 Am. Rep. 584; Barnett v. Ma- 8 Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 244, son, 7 Ark. 253; Waddell v. Car- 23 Am. Dec. 206. lock, 41 Ark. 523. 9 Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Four n Brenan v. Currint, Sayer 224; States Grocer Co. (Tex. Civ. Case of an Hostler, Yelv. 66, note ; App.), 135 S. W. 1135; Ward v. Stevenson v. Blakelock, I M. & S. Stark Bros., 91 Ark. 268, 121 S. W. 535. 382. 12 5 M. & S. 180 (1816). 7 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 6 impair the right of lien unless a future time of payment is fixed by the parties, or some other stipulation be made which is inconsistent with the lien. Lord Ellenborough, delivering the judgment of the court in this case, said: "We believe the practice of modern times has not proceeded upon any dis- tinction, between an agreement for a stipulated price, and the implied contract to pay a reasonable price or sum ; and that the right of detainer has been practically acknowledged in both cases alike. In the case of Wolf v. Summers, ^^ Mr. J. Lawrence does not appear to have been aware of any such distinction. It is impossible, indeed, to find any solid reason for saying, that if I contract with a miller to grind my wheat, at 15s. a load, he shall be bound to deliver it to me, when ground, without receiving the price of his labor; but that if I merely deliver it to him to grind, without fixing the price, he may detain it until I pay him, though probably he would demand, and the law would give him the very same sum. Certainly, if the right of detainer, considered as a right at common law (and it must be so considered in this case), exists only in those cases where there is no manner of con- tract between the parties, except such as the law implies, this court can not extend the rule ; and authorities were quoted to establish this proposition; but, upon consideration, we are of opinion, that those authorities are contrary to reason, and to the principles of law, and ought not to govern our present decision." The learned Chief Justice notices in detail some of the early authorities and dicta in which it was held that the fixing of a price beforehand defeats the exercise of the right of lien.^^ But all this is now chiefly interesting as shownng the 13 2 Campb. 631. a tailor that he shall have so 14 In 2 Rol. Abr. 92, a dictum of much for making my apparel, he Williams, J., is quoted in these cannot keep them until satisfac- words : "If I put my clothes to tion for the making." See also, a tailor to make, he may keep case of Brenan v. Currint, Sayer them until satisfaction for the 224. There are expressions in making. But if I contract with other cases to the effect that a LIENS. 8 history of the doctrine, for since the judgment in Chase v. Westmore it is everywhere held to be immaterial as regards the lien whether the price be fixed by special agreement or not.i^ § 7. Lien by contract. — A lien by express contract super- sedes the lien impiled at common law,^^ but upon a failure of the owner of the property to comply with the stipulations of the contract, so that a lien can arise within its terms, the Hen is a right accompanying an implied contract, as by the Lord Chancellor in Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 275. Chief Justice Ellen- borough, however, in Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180, suggests that Williams, J., above quoted, should be understood to speak of a contract for time, as well as the amount of payment, and that the authorities built upon his saying are founded on a mistake; for the earliest authority on the subject makes no distinction between an implied contract and a contract for a fixed price. This authority is in the Year Book, Easter Term, 5 Edw. IV. fol. 2, b. "Note, also by Haydon, that an hostler may detain a horse if the master will not pay him for his eating. The same law is, if a tailor make me a gown, he may keep the gown until he is paid for his labor. And the same law is, if I buy of you a horse for 20s., you may keep the horse until I pay you the 20s. ; but if I am to pay you at Michael- mas next ensuing, then you shall not keep the horse until you are paid." The distinction drawn is where a future time of payment is fixed. "If so material a dis- tinction as that which depends upon fixing the amount of the price had been supposed to exist at that time, we think," says Lord Ellenborough, "it would have been noticed in this place; and, not be- ing noticed, we think it was not then supposed to exist." In a case so late as 1809 Lord Eldon speaks of a lien, except in the case of a lien for purchase-money, as prima facie a right accompany- ing the implied contract; and says that if possession be commenced under an implied contract, and afterward a special contract be made for payment, in the nature of the thing the one contract de- stroys the other. But, as Lord Ellenborough remarks in Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180, it is evi- dent that the Lord Chancellor was speaking of a special contract for a particular mode of payment, — a contract inconsistent with the common-law right. 15 Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 B. & Aid. 50; Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254; Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. 486, 27 Am. Rep. 723; Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104; Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Dec. 410. 16 In re Leith's Estate, L. R. 1 P. C. 296. 9 LIENS AT COMMON LAW, g 9 common-law lien may attach. Thus, where one agreed to supply to the owner of a sawmill a certain quantity of logs to be' sawed into boards and transported to market at a stipu- lated price, to be paid upon the delivery of specified quanti- ties, and the mill-owner was to have a lien for the price, the other party failed to furnish the specified quantity of logs, so that the mill-owner was unable to saw and deliver the specified quantity of boards and claim a lien within the terms of his contract; but it was held his common-law lien attached to the boards in his hands, notwithstanding the special agree- ment.^'^ § 8. Lien by operation of law. — A lien which arises by operation of law may possibly override all other rights in the property to which it attaches, while a lien which is created by contract or by statute is subordinate to all prior existing rights therein. Thus the lien of a workman who has repaired a chattel may be superior to an existing mortgage upon it.^^ But a farmer who, under a special contract with the owner of horses, has kept and fed them during the winter, has no lien upon them for the price of keeping as against the mort- gagee.^^ § 9. Lien only to extent of interest. — As a general rule, a person can create a lien on property only to the extent of his interest in it. He need not be the sole and absolute owner in order to give a lien upon property; but if he has an equitable title with possession, or some legal interest with possession, he may create a lien upon such interest as he has; but this lien will not ordinarily affect rights of other part owners, or of a mortgagee or other incumbrancer. One who is merely 17 Mount V. Williams, 11 Wend. Scott v. Delahunt, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) (N .Y.) n. Z72, affd. 65 N. Y. 1<28; Jones on 18 See post, § 744; Williams v. Chat. Mort. (5th ed.), § 474. Allsup, 10 C. B. N. S. 417; Ham- 19 See post, §§ 691-693; Bissell mond V. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294; v. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252. § lO LIENS. lO a conditional purchaser, so long as the condition on which title was to vest in him is not fulfilled, can not create a lien on the property so as to impair the title of the owner.^'^ One who has no title to property can confer no lien upon it, either by his act or by express contract. ^^ § 10. Lien confers no right of property upon the holder. — A lien, whether implied or by contract, confers no right of property upon the holder. It is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re. It is neither a right of property in the thing, nor a right of action for the thing. It is simply a right of detain- er.^^ "Liens are not founded on property," says Mr. Justice Buller;^-^ "but they necessarily suppose the property to be in some other person, and not in him who sets up the right." Consequently the interest of the lienholder is not attachable, either as personal property or as a chose in action.-^ ^11. A mortgage m.ore than a lien, — A mortgage is some- times inaccurately called a lien. "And so it certainly is," says Mr. Justice Story,^^ "and something more; it is a transfer of the property itself, as security for the debt. This must be admitted to be true at law, and it is equally true in equity, for in this respect equity follows the law. It does not con- sider the estate of the mortgagee as defeated and reduced to a mere lien, but it treats it as a trust estate, and according 20 Walker v. Burt, 57 Ga. 20. 23 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21 Conrow v. Little, 41 Hun (N. 21, 24. Notwithstanding an agree- Y.) 395. ment to the contrary, a lien, or a 22 Brace v. Marlborough, 2 P. contract for a lien, transfers no W. 491; Hammonds v. Barclay, 2 title to the property subject to the East 227; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. lien. California Civ. Code 1906, (U. S.) 612, 12 L. ed. 841, per Grier, § 2888. J.; Meany v. Head, 1 Mason (U. 24 Meany v. Head, I Mason (U. S.) 319, Fed. Cas. No. 9379, per S.) 319, Fed. Cas. No. 9379; Jacobs Story, J. ; Ex parte Foster, 2 v. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71. Story, 131, 1'47, Fed. Cas. No. 4960, 25 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 per Story, J. ; Jacobs v. Knapp, Pet. (U. S.) 386, 441, 7 L. ed. 189. 50 N. H. 71. II LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 12 to the intention of the parties, as a qualified estate and se- curity. When the debt is discharged there is a resulting trust for the mortgagor. It is therefore only in a loose and general sense that it is sometimes called a lien, and then only by way of contrast to an estate absolute and indefeasible." In like manner we speak of the lien of a pledge. But a pledge is also a lien and something more. It is a deposit by a debtor of personal property by way of security, with an implied power in the creditor to sell it upon default. But a lienholder has no power of sale, and except as authorized by statute he can not at law enforce his lien. He can only hold possession of the property.^^ § 12. An attachment on process not a lien. — An attach- ment on mesne process does not constitute a lien in any pro- per legal sense of the term. Though an attachment is some- times spoken of as a lien, the term is then used only in a gen- eral sense, by way of analogy and illustration. "An attach- ment," says Judge Story,^'^ "does not come up to the exact definition, or meaning of a lien, either in the general sense of the common law, or in that of the maritime law, or in that of equity jurisprudence. Not in that of the common law, be- cause the creditor is not in possession of the property: but it is in custodia legis, if personal property; if real property, it is not a fixed and vested charge, but it is a contingent, con- ditional charge, until the judgment and levy. Not in the sense of the maritime law, which does not recognize or enforce any claim as a lien, until it has become absolute, fixed, and vested. Not in that of equity jurisprudence, for there a lien is not a jus in re or a jus ad rem. It is but a charge upon the thing, and then only when it has, in like manner, become abso- lute, fixed, and vested." 26 Jones on Collateral Securi- 27 Ex parte Foster, 2 Story (U. ties, §§ 1, 2. S.) 131. Fed. Cas. No. 4960. § 13 LIENS. 12 s? 13. A judgment only a general lien. — Even a judgment does not constitute a lien upon the real estate of the debtor. It is only a general charge upon all his real estate to be en- forced by an execution and levy upon some part or the w^hole of it. It is not a common-law lien, for it is not supported by possession. It had its origin in the statute of 2 West- minster, 13 Edw. I.,^® giving the right to an elegit, ^^ though a judgment charging the lands of the debtor is called a lien in the courts of equity in England, and in the courts of law of many of our states. ^*^ Lien upon a judgment is a vague and inaccurate expression," said Mr. Justice Erle.^^ § 14. A lien either specific or general. — A lien is either specific or general. The former attaches to specific property as security for some demand which the creditor has in respect to that property, such as a demand for the unpaid price of work done, or materials furnished in repairing or construct- ing a specific chattel. The code of California^^ declares that a special lien is one which the holder thereof can enforce only as security for the performance of a particular act or obliga- tion, and of such obligations as may be incidental thereto. A specific lien may arise by implication of law, by usage of trade, by the contract of the parties, or by statute. This im- plied lien was doubtless the first in the order of development in English jurisprudence; and in this country it was adopted as a part of the common law. "It is not to be doubted," said Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania,-*^^ that the law of parti- cular or specific lien on goods in the hands of a tradesman or artisan for the price of work done on them, though there is no trace of its recognition in our own books, was brought 28 St. 1, ch. 18. V. Fales, 5 N. H. 527; Kittredge v. 29 Ex parte Foster, 2 Story (U. Bellows, 7 N. H. 399. S. Cir.), 131, Fed. Cas. No. 4960. si Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & 30 Peck V. Jenness, 7 How. (U. El. 19. S.) 612, 12 L. ed. 841, per Grier, J.; 32 Civ. Code 1906, § 2875. Waller's Lessee v. Best, 3 How. 33 Mclntyre v. Carver, 2 Watts (U. S.) Ill, 11 L. ed. 518; Dunklee & S. (Pa.) 392, 395, Zl Am. Dec. 519. 13 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 1 5 hither by our ancestors, and that it is a part of our common law. It was as proper for their condition and circumstances here as it had been in the parent land; and though a general lien for an entire balance of accounts, was said by Lord Ellen- borough^^ to be an encroachment on the common law, yet it has never been intimated that a particular lien on specific chattels for the price of labor bestowed on them does not grow necessarily and naturally out of the transactions of mankind as a matter of public policy. Originally the remedy by retainer seems to have been only coextensive with the workman's obligation to receive the goods; a limitation of it which would, perhaps, be inconsistent with its existence here, for we have no instance of a mechanic being compelled to do jobs for another. But even the more recent British decisions have extended it to the case of every bailee who has, by his labor or skill, conferred value on the thing bailed to him." The principal specific or particular liens upon personal property at common law are those of mechanics and arti- sans,^'' of inkeepers,^^^ of carriers, ^^"^ of sellers or vendors,'^^° and of landlords under the process of distress. ^'"^ § 15, Limited lien not to be extended. — A lien expressly or impliedly limited to a particular debt will not be extended to cover another debt, except by express agreement or plain intention of the parties.^*^ Thus, where certain dyers who had a lien on goods dyed by them for the price of the dyeing of the same, also claimed a lien upon them for other goods dyed and returned by them at a prior time, it wa's held that the lien could not be thus extended, because it was to be inferred 34Rushforth V. Hadfield, 7 East ssb See post, ch. VII. 224. So North Dakota: Rev. Code 35c See post, ch. XVII. 1905, § 6126; South Dakota: Rev. ssdSee post, ch. XII. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 2020; Okla- 36 jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. homa: Comp. Laws 1909, § 4115. 389, per Wilde, J.; Walker v. 35 See post, ch. XV. Birch, 6 T. R. 258. 35a See post, ch. XI. § 1 6 LIENS. 14 from the manner of dealing between the parties that the dyers relied upon the personal credit of the owners of the goods for the price of dyeing those which had been re- turned.^'^ One who has a specific lien upon property can not retain it for the payment of other debts due him by the owner with- out a special agreement to that efTect.^^ § 16. Specific liens. — Specific liens have always been fav- ored by the courts. Lord Mansfield, in a case where he was obliged to decide against a general lien, said:^® "The con- venience of commerce, and natural justice, are on the side of liens; and therefore, of late years, courts lean that way." In a later case Chief Justice Best said i^*' "As between debtor and creditor the doctrine of lien is so equitable that it can not be favored too much." Similar declarations have been made by the courts in this country. Thus, in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Chief Justice Dorsey said :*^ "The doctrine of lien is more favored now than formerly; and it is now recognized as a general principle, that wherever the party has, by his labor or skill, improved the value of property placed in his possession, he has a lien upon it until paid. And liens have been implied when, from the nature of the transaction, the owner of the property is assumed as having designed to create them, or when it can be fairly inferred, from circumstances, that it was the understanding of the parties that they should exist. The existence of liens has also been sustained where they con- tributed to promote public policy and convenience." § 17. Definition of general lien. — A general lien is one which the holder thereof is entitled to enforce as a security 37 Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214. -lo Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130. 38 Nevan v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207. 4i Wilson v. Guyton, 8 Gill 39 Green V. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214; (Md.) 213. I. W. Black. 651. 1-5 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § l8 for the performance of all the obligations, or all of a particu- lar class of obligations, which exist in his favor against the owner of the property.^^ A general lien is one which does not necessarily arise from some demand which the creditor has in respect to the property upon which the lien is claimed, but is one for a general balance of accounts. A general lien may exist: First, where there is an express contract; sec- ond, where it is implied from the usage of trade; third, from the manner of dealing between the parties in the particular case; fourth, or where the defendant has acted as a factor. ^^ Lord Mansfield made this statement of the general rule of law in a case where he decided that a dyer had no lien on goods delivered to him in the course of trade, except for the price of the dyeing, because there was no express contract to give a lien for a general balance, and none could be inferred from any usage of trade or manner of dealing between the parties; but on the contrary the manner of dealing showed that the dyer relied solely upon the personal credit of the owner. The principal general liens are those of factors and brok- ers,^* of bankers,*^* of attorneys upon their clients' papers and moneys,^^*" and of warehousemen and wharfingers.^^'' § 18. Lien for general balance by agreement of parties. — A lien for a general balance may arise by agreement of parties, or by a usage which implies an agreement. In 1788 certain dyers, bleachers and others, in Manchester, at a public meeting, agreed not to receive goods to be dyed or bleached, except upon the condition that they should respectively have a lien upon them, not only for work done upon the particular goods, but also for a general balance of account. In trover, by the assignee of a bankrupt, for a quantity of yarn which 42 California Civ. Code 1906, 44 See post. ch. IX. § 2874; North Dakota Rev. Code 44a See post, ch. VI. 1905, § 6125. 44b See pogt^ chaps. IV, V. 43 Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214. 44c See post, ch. XIX. § 19 LIENS. l6 the owner, with notice of this agreement, delivered to a bleacher, it was held that the latter had the right to hold the yarn for a general balance of account due him from the bank- rupt. ^^ It was contended that though one individual might impose such an agreement upon his customers, it was not competent for a class of men to do so. But Lord Kenyon said: "It seems to me that that is a distinction without a difference; there is no reason why a body of persons should not make such an agreement as (it is admitted) the defend- ant himself might have made." And Lawrence, J., upon this point said: "The question here is whether an agreement, which is on the side of natural justice be or be not illegal, it having been made by a number of persons. But I can not say that it is illegal, when it is supported on such a founda- tion: and if it be not illegal, it must be binding upon the parties." § 19 General liens regarded with jealousy. — General liens are regarded by courts of law with jealousy. Lord Ellenborough, speaking of such liens in a case where it was sought to establish liens for carriers for a general balance of account by force of usage, said :^*^ "They are encroachments upon the common law. If they are encouraged, the practice will be continually extending to other traders and other mat- ters. The farrier will be claiming a lien upon a horse sent to him to be shod. Carriages and other things which require fre- 45 Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. inns, and are also bound to pro- R. 14. "We are now desired to tect the property of those guests, abrogate an agreement which the They have no option either to parties themselves have made, and receive or reject guests; there- which the courts have said that fore I said it was a material cir- justice requires; and it is said cumstance in the present case that that, unless we do so, the inn- these persons had an option either keepers will enter into similar to work or not as they pleased." resolutions. But their case is Per Lord Kenyon. widely different from the present; 46 Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East for they are bound by law to re- 224, 229; and see same case, 6 ceive guests who come to their East 519. 17 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 21 quent repair will be detained on the same claim; and there is no saying where it is to stop. It is not for the convenience of the public that these liens should be extended further than they are already established by law. But if any particular inconvenience arise in the course of trade ,the parties may, if they think proper, stipulate with their customers for the in- troduction of such a lien into their dealings." § 20. Possession necessary to lien. — A hen in its proper legal sense imports that one is in possession of the property of another, and that he detains it as security for some demand which he has in respect of it. "The question always is, whether there be a right to retain the goods till a given de- mand shall be satisfied. "'^''^ A lien, therefore, implies : First, possession by the creditor; second, title in the debtor; third, a debt arising out of the specific property. A lien being a right to detain goods until a certain demand in respect to them is satisfied, possession is implied in the beginning of the lien ; and, as a general rule, a continuance of possession is equally implied. Lord Kenyon"*^ expressed the general rule when he declared that : "The right of lien has never been carried further than while the goods continue in possession of the party claiming it." Mr. Justice Buller^^ observes that "liens at law exist only in cases where the party entitled to them has the possession of the goods; and if he once part with the possession after the lien attaches, the lien is gone." § 21. Possession essential to create and preserve lien. — Possession is essential to the creation and preservation of liens under the common law,^** and the rule is not different ^"^ Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Mer. ^9 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 404, per Grant, M. R. 21. 48 Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4, ap- ^o Reed v. Ash, 3 Nev. 116; proved by Lord Ellenborough in Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Binn. McCombie v. Davies, 7 East 7. (Pa.) 392; Stewart v. Flowers, 44 §21 LIENS. l8 with many of the statutory liens. ^^ "A lien," said Lord Ellen- borough, "is a right to hold; and how can that be held which was never possessed ?"^^ The right begins and ends with possession. It attaches only while the property actually re- mains in possession of the creditor. If he suffers it to go out of his possession, he can not regain it by any judicial proceed- ing. But where one is deprived of the possession of person- alty upon which he has a lien for work or labor, he may, in West Virginia, recover in trover or detinue or he may have the property sold under attachment or execution. The lien which he has, however, gives him only right of possession. ^^ A lien is only a mode of enforcing satisfaction by the mere passive holding of the creditor. He thus prevents the debtor from deriving any benefit from his own until he pays the debt he owes in respect to the property. As illustrating the necessity of possession to sustain a lien, may be instanced the case of a trainer of race-horses, who has the benefit of the general principle that the person exer- cising care and skill in the improvement of a chattel is en- titled to a lien for his services. But to perfect a lien he must, in accordance with another general principle, retain exclu- sive and continuous possession of the horse. If by usage or agreement the owner may send the horse to run at any race he chooses, and may select the jockey, the trainer has no con- tinuing right of possession, and consequently no lien. Cole- ridge, J., in a case involving the question of a trainer's lien under such usage or agreement, said: "Now a good test of Miss. 513. 7 Am. Rep. 707; Slack 547, 18 Atl. 717, 6 L. R. A. 82; Smith V. Collins, 145 Ind. 569, 42 N. E. v. Greenop, 60 Mich. 61, 26 N. W. 910. Possession can not be sur- 832. rendered and the lien thereafter ^^ Heywood v. Waring, 4 Camp, asserted. Stein v. McAuley, 147 291. And see Wilson v. Balfour, Iowa 630, 125 N. W. 336, 27 L. R. 2 Camp. 579; Ridgely v. Iglehart, A. (N. S.) 692; Buckner v. Lan- 3 Bland (Md.) 540, per Bland Ch. caster (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 53 Burrough v. Ely, 54 W. Va. 631. 118, 46 S. E. 371, 102 Am. St. 926. 51 Fishell V. Morris, 57 Conn. 19 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 2.2. the existence of such right of possession is to consider in whose possession the race-horse is when it is employed in doing that for which it has been trained. The evidence showed that the horse, during the race, was in the owner's possession, and in his possession rightfully and according to usage or contract. The horse, before the race, is placed for convenience in the stable of the trainer; but during the race it is in the care of the jockey nominated by the owner. It appears, too, that if on any occasion the jockey were selected by the trainer, the trainer, pro hac vice, would have only the delegated authority of the owner. I think it is part of the understanding that the owner shall have the possession and control of the horse to run at any race. This is quite incon- sistent with the trainer's continuing right of possession. "^^ § 22. Change of possession may not defeat lien. — As be- tween the immediate parties, a change of possession may not defeat the lien. It is only between the claimant and third persons that continued possession is essential. As between the claimant and the owner, possession is by no means essen- tial, except when, by surrendering the possession, the claim- ant can be fairly understood to have surrendered his lien; and then the question is, not whether he has yielded his posses- sion, but whether he has surrendered his lien. When the lienholder has parted with possession, it is a question for the jury whether he has so far voluntarily parted with the pos- session as to warrant the conclusion that he intended to aban- don his lien. If the owner of the property has obtained pos- session without the knowledge or consent of the lienholder, the latter is not divested of his lien. The lien would continue in such case after the change of possession. ^^ A lienholder may so part with the possession as to lose his lien with respect to third persons, though not as against the 54 Forth V. Simpson, 13 Q. B. Cas. (N. Y.) 117; Walls v. Long, 680. 2 Ind. App. 202, 28 N. E. 101. 55 Allen V. Spencer, 1 Edm. Sel. § '2}^ LIENS. 20 owner of the property. Thus, where the owners of a saw- mill permitted boards, sawed by them at a stipulated price, to be removed from their mill-yard to the bank of a canal at the distance of half a mile from the mill, it was held that they lost their lien in respect to third persons, though not against the owner of the boards, it being expressly stipulated be- tween the parties that the lien should continue notwithstand- ing the removal. ^^ § 23. The possession must be rightful. — A lien can not arise in favor of a person who has received possession of the property for a purpose inconsistent with the notion of a lien.^" Thus, if he has received certificates of stock for the purpose of raising money upon them for the owner, he can not retain them for an indebtedness to himself. His posses- sion of the certificates in such case is in trust. "To create a lien on a chattel, the party claiming it must show the just pos- session of the thing claimed; and no person can acquire a lien founded upon his own illegal or fraudulent act, or breach of duty: nor can a lien arise, where, from the nature of the contract between the parties, it would be inconsistent with the express terms, or the clear intent of the contract. "'^^ The mere fact that a creditor has possession of his debtor's goods gives him no lien upon them.^^ § 24. Possession need not be actual or direct. — While pos- session is essential to a lien at law, the possession need not be actual and direct possession of the creditor, but may be that of his agent, servant or warehouse-keeper, acting under his authority.^*^ A lien may be protected by placing the prop- 56 McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 ley, J.; North Shore Boom & Wend. (N. Y.) 467, reversing 10 Driving Co. v. Nicomen Boom Wend. (N. Y.) 318. Co., 52 Wash. 564, 101 Pac. 48. 57 Randel v. Brown, 2 How. (U. ^9 Allen v. Megguire, 15 Mass. S.) 406, 11 L. ed. 318. 490; Jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. 58 Randel v. Brown, 2 How. (U. 389, per Parker, C. J. S.) 406. 11 L. de. 318, per McKin- go Allen v. Spencer, 1 Edm. Sel. 21 LIENS AT COMMON LAW. § 26 erty in the hands of a third person, with notice of the lien, although such person may not be expressly the agent of the lienholder. § 25. Mechanic acquires no lien when working for another mechanic. — A mechanic who works for another upon the premises of the latter acquires no lien upon the articles manu- factured or repaired, because he has no sufficient possession to support a lien. One who works in peeling tanbark for a contractor on the lands of a third person has no lien on the property for the payment of his labor, for he has no posses- sion sufficient to create such lien.^^ One who makes and burns brick upon the land of another without a lease of the land, or other interest than a right to enter and make the brick for a stipulated price per thousand, has no such pos- session of the brick as to give him a lien for his labor. If the right exists in such case in the absence of any express con- tract, it must rest on the common-law right of mechanics and artisans to retain property upon which they have bestowed labor. For the maintenance of such a lien possession is es- sential, and the possession must be actual, without relinquish- ment or abandonment. One who has merely a license to use the brickyard and materials of another for the purpose of making and burning brick, in the case mentioned, has no such possession of the ward as will support a lien. His possession of the brick manufactured is only a qualified and mixed pos- session, which can form no valid basis for a lien.®^ § 26. Lien of bailee performing service. — A lien at com- mon law belongs strictly to the bailee who by contract per- forms the service for which the lien is claimed, and who re- ceives into his custody the thing upon which the skill and Cas. (N. Y.) 117; McFarland v. <52 King v. Indian Orchard Canal Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467. Co., 11 Ciish. (Mass.) 231. 61 Quist V. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748. 99 Pac. 204. § 26 LIENS. , 22 labor are to be expended. Inasmuch as an exclusive right to the possession of the thing is the basis of the lien, a servant, or laborer, or journeyman, or subcontractor of such bailee, can not claim to retain the thing for his own services, except as such a lien is provided for by statute; for the pos- session of the laborer or other person employed by the bailee is the possession of such bailee.^^ Thus, if the ow^ner of a machine employs a mechanic to make repairs upon it, and the mechanic, w^ithout the owner's authority, employs another to perform the entire work, the latter can not claim a lien for the work, although he has performed the entire work, and claims a lien in accordance with the contract with the owner. 63 Hollingsworth v. Dow. 19 Zl Am. Dec. 519, per Gibson, C. J.; Pick. (Mass.) 228; Jacobs v. Wright v. Terry. 23 Fla. 160, 2 Knapp, 50 N. H. 71; Mclntyre v. So. 6. Carver, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 392, CHAPTER II. EQUITABLE LIENS. Sec. Sec. 27. Equitable liens in general. 48. 28. Possession not required in equitable liens. 29. Lien effective without 49. change of possession. 30. Lien created by agreement. 50. 31. Equitable lien created. 32. Intention to create lien. 51. 33. Property to be designated. 52. 34. Property must be identified. 35. Agreement between several 53. persons. 36. Lien on changing stock of goods. 54. 37. Equitable lien distinguished from a trust. 38. Equitable lien agreement 55. fulfilled. 39. Lien given to save rights. 56. 40. Lien for purchase-money re- served. 57. 41. Equitable lien arises from conditional delivery. 58. 42. Equitable lien on future property. 43. Equitable lien arises from 59. order to pay out of partic- ular fund. 44. Rule applying to attorneys 60. and clients. 45. An order on specific fund ef- fectual to create lien. 61. 46. Assignment of lien effectual on notice to creditor. 62. 47. Equitable assignment not re- vocable. 23 Agreement to pay out of designated fund will not create equitable lien. Creditor's lien on money in hands of debtor's agent. Appropriation necessary to constitute equitable lien. Rule strictly held to. Promise to pay out of par- ticular fund not sufficient. Workmen have no lien on money retained from funds due contractor. Designation of particular fund must be clear and definite. Bill of exchange not an equi- table assignment. Bill of exchange against con- signment as lien. A check not an equitable as- signment. Lien of holder of bill of ex- change based on agree- ment. Reference in a draft to ap- propriation of proceeds held to create lien. Lien created when consignee receives goods under ex- press direction. General lien of consignee of goods. Delivery of bill of lading sufficient to create equita- ble lien. § 27 LIENS. 24 Sec. Sec. 63. Lien of one making ad- 80. vances to purchase mer- chandise. 81. 64. Executory agreement to pur- chase and consign prop- 82. erty. 65. Lien on crop to be raised. 66. Equitable lien arises under 83. contract on crop lien. 67. Liens for advances to manu- 84. facturers on goods. 68. No implied lien on personal 85. property on account of money advanced. 69. Contract betw^een planter and factor. 86. 70. Equitable lien will not arise from advancement to im- prove property. 71. Lien not created by volun- 87. tary payment. 12. Voluntary payment of insur- 88. ance premiums creates no liens. 12>. No equitable subrogation to 89. one paying a debt of an- other. 90. 74. One paying debt of railroad company entitled to subro- gation. 91. 74a. Equitable lien on legacy. 75. Mere loan of money. 92. 76. Surety has no lien on estate of his principal. 93. n. Lien by agreement to give a mortgage. 78. Agreement to give other se- 94. curity. 79. Debtor's agreement to in- 95. sure for benefit of his creditor. 96. Agreement to build and con- vey a mill as security. For debt omitted from mort- gage by mistake. Agreement of purchaser of land to pay debt which is lien on the land. Verbal contract to pay the debt of another. Creditor's lien on capital stock of corporation. Lien of creditors of a corpo- ration upon its property transferred to another cor- poration. Superiority of lien of cor- porate creditor after trans- fer of stock to another corporation. Lien of minority sharehold- ers of corporation. Shareholder's equitable lien on funds specially depos- ited. Liens created by assumption of mortgage or other liens. Consolidated company sub- ject to liens of original cor- poration. Bonds of original corpora- tion not a lien. Equitable lien against rail- road company. Court of equity appropriate tribunal for enforcing eq- uitable liens. Lien at law not enforcible in equity. Disposition of property subject to equitable lien. Priorities. § 27. Equitable liens in general. — An equitable lien arises either from a written contract which shows an intention to charge some particular property with a debt or obligation, or 25 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 2.^ is declared by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as applied to the relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings. Equitable liens by contract of the parties are as various as are the contracts which parties may make. Equitable liens by contract can not be classified under any of the common divisions of equitable liens, and therefore are treated of in the present chapter. Of implied equitable liens, those arising by orders and as- signments, those arising from advances made and money paid for others, those arising from agreements to give mort- gages, and those arising in favor of creditors and stockhold- ers of corporations, are also treated of in the present chapter. But this second division of equitable liens, that is, liens im- plied and declared by courts of equity from equitable con- siderations, is necessarily subdivided into several other dis- tinct subjects, v^hich are so well defined and so important that it has seemed best to treat of them in several separate chap- ters of this work. Whether an attorney's special lien upon a judgment recovered is purely an equitable lien seems to be a matter of dispute, and the nature and origin of this lien are discussed in the chapter devoted to it.^ Partnership liens, which arise from general equitable principles applied to the relations of the parties, are treated in a separate chapter;^ and so are liens of grantors of real property for purchase- money, and of vendees for purchase-money paid before ob- taining title; liens of joint owners of real property for repairs and improvements made by one for the joint benefit; liens of trustees for improvements which permanently enhance the value of the trust property ; and liens of purchasers and others for improvements upon real estate under void contracts of purchase, or under parol gifts, or under the erroneous belief that they are the real owners of the property.' 1 See post, ch. V. s See post, chaps. XXIII-XXIX. 2 See post, ch. XVI. § 28 LIENS. 26 § 28. Possession not required in equitable liens. — Equit- able liens do not depend upon possession as do liens at law. Possession by the creditor is not essential to his acquiring and enforcing a lien. But the other incidents of a lien at com- mon law must exist to constitute an equitable lien. In courts of equity the term "lien" is used as synonymous with a charge or incumbrance upon a thing, where there is neither jus in re, nor ad rem, nor possession of the thing.^ The term is applied as well to charges arising by express engagement of the owner of property, and to a duty or intention implied on his part to make the property answerable for a specific debt or engagement.^ Mr. Justice Erie once remarked that "the words equitable lien are intensely undefined."*^ It is necessarily the case that something of vagueness and uncertainty should attend a doc- trine that is of such a wide and varied application as is this of equitable lien. And yet the principles are as well defined as other equitable principles, and their application to certain well-established classes of liens is well settled. To apply them to that undefined class of liens which arises from the contracts of parties may be more difficult, because these liens are as various as are the contracts, and precedents which exactly apply may not be found. This wide application of the doctrine is one element of the importance of this branch of equity jurisprudence. "There is perhaps no doctrine," says Mr. Pomeroy,'^ "which more strikingly shows the difference between the legal and the equitable conceptions of the juri- 4 Peck V. Jenness, 7 How. (U. burn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. St. 72. No S.) 612, 12 L. ed. 841, per Grier, equitable lien acquired by fur- J. ; Donald v. Hewitt, 33 Ala. 534, nishing materials used in public 73 Am. Dec. 431; Field v. Lang, buildings. Townsend v. Cleveland 87 Maine 441, 32 Atl. 1004. Fire-Proofing Co., 18 Ind. App. •"> Equitable liens arising from 568, 47 N. E. 707. the equitable circumstances of the c Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & El. case are unknown to the jurispru- 19. dence of Pennsylvania. In re ^ Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., § 1234. Cross' Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 471 ; Hep- 27 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 28 dical results which flow from the dealings of men with each other, from their express or implied undertakings." Equitable liens have commonly been regarded as having their origin in trusts. Perhaps they are better described as analogous to trusts. Remedies at law are for the recovery of money. Remedies in equity are specific. "Remedies in equity, as well as at law," says Mr. Pomeroy,^ "require some primary right or interest of the plaintifT which shall be main- tained, enforced or redressed thereby. When equity has jur- isdiction to enforce rights and obligations growing out of an executory contract, this equitable theory of remedies can not be carried out, unless the notion is admitted that the con- tract creates some right or interest in or over specific prop- erty, which the decree of the court can lay hold of, and by means of which the equitable relief can be made efficient. The doctrine of 'equitable liens' supplies this necessary ele- ment; and it was introduced for the sole purpose of furnish- ing a ground for the specific remedies which equity confers, operating upon particular identified property, instead of the general pecuniary recoveries granted by courts of law. It follows, therefore, that in a large class of executory contracts, express and implied, which the law regards as creating no property right, nor interest analogous to property, but only a mere personal right and obligation, equity recognizes, in addition to the personal obligation, a peculiar right over the thing concerning which the contract deals, which it calls a 'lien,' and which, though not property, is analogous to prop- erty, and by means of which the plaintiff is enabled to follow the identical thing, and to enforce the defendant's obligation by a remedy which operates directly upon that thing. The theory of equitable liens has its ultimate foundation, there- fore, in contracts, express or implied, which either deal with, or in some manner relate to, specific property, such as a tract 8 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., § 1234. § 29 LIENS. 28 of land, particular chattels or securities, a certain fund, and the like." § 29. Lien effective without change of possession. — An agreement which creates a charge upon specific property is in equity an effectual lien as between the parties without a change of possession, even though void as against subsequent purchasers in good faith, without notice, and creditors levy- ing executions or attachments; and if the agreement be fol- lowed by a delivery of possession, before the rights of third persons have intervened, it is good absolutely.^ Thus the owner of a tannery, in consideration of money advanced by another for the purchase of skins, agreed to tan them and place the leather in the hands of his creditor for sale upon commission, and that the skins, whether tanned or not, should be considered as security for the payment of the money advanced. After several months the tanner became financially embarrassed, and was also disabled by illness from continuing his business. The parties then entered into a new contract whereby the creditor was to take possession of the tannery and use it with such materials as might be necessary to finish the skins and sell them as previously agreed. Four days afterward the debtor filed his petition in bankruptcy. The creditor having taken possession of the tannery, tke debtor's assignee in bankruptcy brought replevin for the skins. It was held that the creditor had an equitable lien upon them which was binding, not only upon the debtor but upon his assignee, and that the second contract, though made in contemplation of bankruptcy, was not fraudulent, inas- much as it was made in good faith to secure the benefits of the first contract, which created a valid charge upon the prop- erty.*^ 9 Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. S. Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 23 401, 26 L. ed. 1075; Gregory v. N. E. 475; Reardon v. Higgins, 39 Morris, 96 U. S. 619, 24 L. ed. Ind. App. 363, 79 N. E. 208. 740; Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg. 10 Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. Co.. 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266; S. 401, 26 L. ed. 1075; Goodnough 29 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 30 The court, Mr. Justice Matthews delivering the opinion, said in substance that, while it is true that the creditor could not have compelled his debtor, by an action at law to deliver to him the possession of his tannery and its contents, and could not have recovered possession of the skins, tanned or untanned, by force of a legal title; yet it is equally true that in equity he could, by injunction, have prevented the debtor from making any disposition of the property inconsistent with his obligations under the contract; and upon proof of his inability or unwillingness to complete the performance of his agreement, the court would not have hesitated, in the exercise of a familiar jurisdiction, to protect the interests of the creditor by placing the property in the custody of a re- ceiver for preservation, with authority, if such a course seemed expedient, in its discretion, to finish the unfinished work, and ultimately, by a sale and distribution of its pro- ceeds, to adjust the rights of the parties. § 30. Lien created by agreement. — A charge in the nature of a lien upon real as well as personal estate may be created by the express agreement of the owner, and it will be en- forced in equity, not only against such owner, but also against third persons who are either volunteers, or who take the es- tate on which the lien is given, with notice of the stipula- tion.^^ "Such an agreement raises a trust which binds the Mercantile & Stock Co. v. Gallo- 22, N. E. 475, reversing 21 J. & S. way, 171 Fed. 940. See also, Na- (N. Y.) 331; Fresno Canal Co. tional Bank v. Rogers, 166 N. Y. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 34 Pac. 275 ; 380, 59 N. E. 922, affg. 44 App. Div. Smith v. Smith, 51 Hun (N. Y.) (N. Y.) 357, 61 N. Y. S. 155. As to 164, 20 N. Y. St. 597, 4 N. Y. S. 669, the eflfect of a mere statement in a affd. 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. note that an attorney holds a lien 259. Where an attorney has on property, see Schmid v. Car- rendered services as counsel for ter's Admr., 95 Ky. 1, 15 Ky. L. a temporary receiver and the re- 402, 23 S. W. 364. ceiver is discharged and the prop- yl Clarke v. Southwick, 1 Curt. erty held by him is turned back (U. S.) 297, Fed. Cas. No. 2863 ; to the corporation and it is agreed Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, between the attorney, the receiver LIENS. 30 estate to which it relates; and all who take title thereto, with notice of such trust, can be compelled in equity to fulfil it. It is obvious that the law gives no remedy by which such a lien can be established, and the trust thereby created be declared and enforced. Equity furnishes the only means by which the property on which the charge is fastened can be reached and applied to the stipulated purpose."^- The basis of an equitable lien is a contract, express or implied, dealing with specific property. It may be implied from the acts of the owner no less than from his express contract. ^^ If the owner of land agrees, in writing, for a valuable con- sideration, to pay to another person a certain sum "out of the proceeds of the sale of said lands, if the same shall be sold, or, if the said lands shall not be sold, and a com- pany shall be formed for the purpose of working the mines thereon," then to convey stock to that amount, it being un- derstood and agreed that such amount is to be a charge on the estate of the owner, a charge in the nature of a lien upon the land is thereby created, which may be enforced in equity against all who take title to the lands with notice of the charge. ^^ and the corporation that the lat- ter -would assume the receiver's debt to the attorney and that he might have a lien for the debt, an equitable enforceable lien was thereby created against the corpo- ration's property in the hands of a permanent receiver thereof. Whitehead v O'Sullivan, 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 577, 33 N. Y. S. 1098, 67 N. Y. St. 801; Dufur Oil Co. v. Enos, 59 Ore. 528, 117 Pac. 457; Patrick v. Morrow, 33 Colo. 509, 81 Pac. 242, 108 Am. St. 107. When a child pays money to its father under his agreement to buy a home which shall belong to the child after the death of the par- ent and he buys property using such money and his own money for the purpose and takes title in his own name, at his death the child will have an equitable lien on the property for the sum ad- vanced by her. Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. Y. 222, 73 N. E. 984, 106 Am. St. 542. 12 Pinch V. Anthony, 8 Allen (Mass.) 536, per Bigelow, C. J. And see Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 23 N. E. 475; Scott v. McMillan, 76 N. Y. 141; Milliman V. Neher, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 37. isVivion V. Nicholson, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 116 S. W. 386. !-» Pinch V. Anthony, 8 Allen 31 EQUITABLE LIENS. §31 § 31. Equitable lien created.— To create an equitable lien by agreement, it must appear that the parties to it intended to create a charge upon the property.^^ Thus, a clause in a charter-party, whereby the freighter bound the goods to be taken on board for the performance of every covenant there- in contained, does not give the ship-owner any lien in equity on the goods brought home in the ship, either for dead freight or for demurrage that became due by virtue of the provisions of the charter-party. The Court of King's Bench determined that there was no lien at law.^^ The ground of the judgment was, not that a lien might not have been con- tracted for, but that the clause of the charter-party did not contain a contract to that effect. In the subsequent suit in equity, the Master of the Rolls, Sir William Grant, delivering the judgment, said :^'^ "The plaintififs however suppose, that although a court of law has said that the clause does not give them a lien, a court of equity may say that it gives them what is precisely tanta- mount to a lien, namely, a right to have their demand satis- fied out of the produce of the goods in preference to any other creditors of the bankrupt freighter. Putting this clause out of the question, it was not contended that equity gives the ship-owner any lien for his freight beyond that which the law gives him. There are, to be sure, liens which exist only in equity, and of which equity alone can take cognizance : but it can not be contended that a lien for freight is one of them. As to liens on the goods of one man in the possession of an- other, I know of no difference between the rules of decision in courts of law, and in courts of equity. The question that so frequently occurs, whether a tradesman has a lien on the (Mass.) 536; Sowles v. Hall, 11 16 Birley v. Gladstone, 3 M. & Vt. 55, 50 Atl. 550. S. 205. 15 Knott V. Shepherdstown Mfg. ^^ Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Meri- Co., 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266; vale, 401, 403. In re Farmers' Supply Co., 170 Fed. 502. § 3- LIENS. 32 goods in his hands for the general balance due to him, or only for so much as relates to the particular goods, is decided in both courts in the same way, and on the same grounds. To extend the lien, the party claiming it must show an agree- ment to that effect, or something from which an agreement may be inferred, such as a course of dealing between the parties, or a general usage of the trade. Lien, in its proper sense, is a right which the law gives. But it is usual to speak of lien by contract, though that be more in the nature of an agreement for a pledge. Taken either way, however, the question always is, whether there be a right to detain the goods till a given demand shall be satisfied. That right must be derived from law or contract." § 32. Intention to create lien. — The intention must be to create a lien upon the property, as distinguished from an agreement to apply the proceeds of a sale of it to the pay- ment of a debt. A debtor verbally agreed that his creditot should have a lien upon a certain stock of cattle, and that the cattle should be placed in charge of a third person to hold until they should be in a suitable condition to be sold. The debtor placed his cattle in charge of his sons, as herders, without declaring any lien or trust upon the property, and afterward died. The creditor sought to charge with a lien the funds arising from a sale of the cattle by the executor. But the court held that the evidence merely showed an inten- tion on the part of the debtor to apply the proceeds of the property to the payment of his debt to the plaintiff, but that there was no lien.^^ 18 Cook V. Black, 54 Iowa 693, paid directly to the bank and be- 7 N. W. 121 ; Wemple v. Hauen- long to it so far as required to stein, 46 N. Y. S. 288, 19 App. Div. pay it back, the bank has a valid (N. Y.) 552. But where a bank lien as between the parties and furnishes money to buy cattle persons having notice of the trans- upon which it is agreed it shall action. Gardner v. Planters' Nat. have a lien and the proceeds of Bank of Honey Grove, 54 Tex. the sale of the cattle were to be Civ. App. 572, 118 S. W. 1146. 33 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 33 A written agreement made by a son to his father,- whereby the son undertook to pay a mortgage on the lands of his father, does not create a lien upon the son's interest in such lands as heir after his father's death, the agreement showing no intent that such a lien should be created. ^^ § 33. Property to be designated. — The instrument creat- ing the lien is not effectual unless it plainly designates the property to be charged,^" though only such an identification is required as is essential to an enforcement of the lien.^^ By a marriage settlement, the husband provided for an annuity to his wife in case she should survive him, from and after his decease, for her natural life; and for the payment of such annuity he did "promise, covenant and agree, that the same shall be and the same is hereby made and constitutes a lien and charge upon all the property and estate, real and personal of every name and nature, kind and description, which he may own and to which he may be entitled at the time of his decease." His estate, though ample at the date of the settle- ment, was insolvent at the time of iiis decease. In a suit by the widow to enforce the lien it was held that the settlement 19 Rider v. Clark, 54 Iowa 292, 6 N. W. 271. 20 Burn v. Burn, 3 Ves. Jr. 573; Bank of Rome v. Haselton, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 216; Bank v. Brooks, 42 Leg. Int. 26; Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 111. 146, 27 N. E. 24; Hazenwinkle Grain Co. v. Mc- Comb, 116 111. App. 541. 21 Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 111. 146, 27 N. E. 24. In this case a wool merchant leased part of his store to a warehouse com- pany, who, without taking posses- sion, issued to him warehouse re- ceipts for wool, which he placed on the leased premises. He re- tained control of the wool, and 3 removed or changed it at pleas- ure. The wool called for by the various receipts was not set apart or marked in any way, and the wool in the store was of different grades, which were not specified in the receipts. The merchant made an assignment for the ben- efit of his creditors, and his as- signee took possession of the wool. It was held that the ware- house company had no lien on the wools, the receipts being void for indefiniteness and want of pos- session. See also, Higgins v. Hig- gins, 121 Cal. 487, 53 Pac. 1081, 66 Am. St. 57. § 33 LIENS. 34 did not • create an equitable lien, as against the hus- band's creditors, either upon the property which he owned at the time of making the agreement, or that which he owned at the time of his death, for the reason that it failed to desig- nate, with sufficient certainty, the property to be charged therewith.^- Mr. Justice Boardman, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The charge or lien must have taken ef- fect, if at all, at the date of the contract, and must plainly designate the property charged. In the present case that was impossible. The property to be charged was not known to the contracting parties. The intestate may not then have owned it. It was utterly uncertain what property, if any, he would own at his death. The contract could not have been enforced specifically as to such property in his lifetime, be- cause the court could not possibly ascertain the property to be bound by its decree. If the property had been then owned by him and described the equitable lien would have attached. * * * But it does not appear that the property owned by the intestate at his death was owned by him twelve years before when this contract was made. It was wholly uncer- tain whether property owned by him [then] would remain his at his death. Between the parties to the contract there was no obligation to retain it. As to such property the in- testate owed no duty to the plaintiff. We apprehend this does not constitute that degree of certainty in designating the property to be charged which the law requires. * * * j^ is not enough that at some future time the descriptions will become certain. It must not be forgotten that, as against the party himself, his heirs-at-law and those claiming under him voluntarily, such an agreement may raise a trust which will be enforced in equity. But as to the purchasers and others acting in good faith and without notice, a different rule applies." 22 Mundy V. Munson, 40 Hun (N. Y.) 304. 35 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 34 § 34. Property must be identified. — It is essential to an equitable lien that the property to be charged should be capable of identification, so that the claimant of the lien may say, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what property it is that is subject to his lien.^^ Though possession is not necessary to the existence of an equitable lien, it is necessary that the property or funds upon which the lien is claimed should be distinctly traced, so that the very thing which is subject to the special charge may be proceeded against in an equitable action, and sold under decree to satisfy the charge. A fund is not thus traced when it has gone into the general bank account of the recipient, or after it has been mixed with funds from other sources.^^ Money which has been intermixed with other money can not be the subject of an equitable lien after the money itself, or a specific substi- tute for it, has become incapable of identification.^^ A firm of merchants furnished to a firm of silk manufac- turers raw materials, for silk goods, and funds to purchase such materials, upon an agreement whereby the goods when manufactured were to be delivered to and sold by the mer- chants, who were authorized to deduct from the proceeds of the sales the amount due them for advances and insurance and for commissions. Some two years afterward the manu- facturers failed, and made a general assignment of their prop- erty. The assignee took possession of the debtors' stock, 23 Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; when proceeds come into exist- Hazenwinkle Grain Co. v. Mc- ence. Wilson v. Seeber, 72 N. J. Comb, 116 111. App. 541. When Eq. 523, 66 Atl. 909. As to lost a note is sent to a bank for col- identity of property, see Oldridge lection there is no lien for at- v. Sutton. 157 Mo. App. 485, 137 torney on amount collected. Ober S. W. 994. V. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396, 45 S. E. 24 Grinnell v. Suydam, 5 N. Y. 382, 98 Am. St. 118. A contract of Super. Ct. 132; Goodnough Mer- an attorney whereby he is to re- cantile & Stock Co. V. Galloway, ceive one-third of the proceeds 156 Fed. 504. resulting from a suit conducted by 25 Drake v. Taylor, 6 Blatchf. him, gives him an equitable lien (U. S.) 14, Fed. Cas. No. 4067. upon the proceeds of the suit § 35 LIENS. 36 among which were nineteen pieces of silk finished, and about forty-five pieces unfinished. The merchants claimed an equit- able lien upon these goods for a balance due them, and brought suit to enforce the lien; but it was held they could not recover, because they did not trace their advances to these particular goods.^^ § 35. Agreement between several persons. — An equitable lien is created by an agreement between several persons that the cost of certain improvements shall be a lien on their re- spective estates, though these are not immediately connected with the improvements. Certain mill-owners associated themselves for the purpose of building reservoirs, and agreed that there should be a lien on their respective estates for the share of the expenses which each was to pay. This agree- ment was held to create an equitable lien which each member who had paid more than his proportion might enforce against the property of any other member who had paid less than his proportion.^'^ Such an agreement is not executory merely, but executed. It creates a trust which a court of equity will work out so as to secure the payment of the obligations in the manner the parties intended they should be paid. The lien is created in behalf of each member of the association, and not in behalf of the association collectively, because such appears to be the intent of the agreement. The covenant is a several covenant of each with each member. The other members of the association need not be joined in a suit by one member against the purchaser of the property of another for contri- bution, because the others have no interest in the suit.^^ Mr. Justice Curtis, delivering judgment, said: "If there was any property of this association capable of 26 Person -v. Oberteuffer, 59 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334, 8 Am. Dec. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339. 570. 27 Clarke v. Southwick, 1 Curt. 28 Clarke v. Southwick, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 297, Fed. Cas. No. 2863. (U. S.) 297, Fed. Cas. No. 2863, per And see Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Curtis, J. 37 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 36 being applied, and which equitably, ought to be applied in payment of its debts, before resorting to the lien asserted by the bill, all the members would be necessary parties, because they would then have an interest, both in the account of the debts and of the property, and in its application. But there is no such property. The works which the association has erected for the improvement of these mills can not be sold without defeating the very object for which the association was formed. Every member has a right to have them pre- served, and to have every other member pay his contributory share, in order that they may be preserved. So far from these works constituting a fund to be resorted to in relief of the contributors, they are the very object of the contribution, and equity requires it to be made in order that the original purposes of the parties may be fulfilled. It is objected that the defendant may hereafter, by other suits, have other debts of the association charged on his estates, so that he is ex- posed to pay more than his just share, and thus be forced to seek for contribution himself in another suit. If this were so, it would be a fatal objection ; but the defendant not being a member of the association, and so not being personally liable, can never be forced to pay any more than three sixths of any debt, and so can never have any claim for contribution; for this proportion is what is justly and ultimately chargeable on his estates." § 36. Lien on changing stock of goods. — An equitable lien may be imposed upon a changing stock of goods by agreement of the parties. Persons who have been induced to execute a bond to release an attachment on a stock of goods belonging to a business firm, upon a promise that the goods so released shall be held for the obligors' indemnity and se- curity, have an equitable lien on such stock of goods for the amount they have been compelled to pay by reason of having executed such bond; and such lien may be enforced as against the general assignee of the firm for the benefit of their credi- § Z7 LIENS. 38 tors.^^ The fact that it was agreed that the owners of the stock of goods should keep it replenished up to its value at that time, and the further fact that, without knowledge or consent of the obligors, the owners disposed of parts of the stock and put in other stock to supply its place, do not affect the lien; but this will attach to the mingled goods in the con- dition they are in at the time the lien is enforced.^*^ § 37. Equitable lien distinguished from a trust. — An equit- able lien is distinguished from a trust in this respect: A bank which receives a draft for collection holds the proceeds when collected as trustee of the depositor, and upon the failure of the bank the depositor is entitled to have the amount paid by a receiver of the bank's property in preference to the gen- eral creditors. The receiver of the bank takes its assets sub- ject to the same equities under which the bank held them. It is immaterial whether the identical moneys collected by the bank passed into the hands of the receiver or not, for in some shape they went to swell the assets which fell into the receiver's hands. ^^ "It is not to be supposed the trust fund was dissipated and lost altogether, and did not fall into the mass of the assignor's property; and the rule in equity is well established that so long as the trust property can be traced and followed into other property into which it has been con- verted, that remains subject to the trust ; * * * -yve do not understand that it is necessary to trace the trust fund into some specific property in order to enforce the trust. If it can be traced into the estate of the defaulting agent or trus- tee, this is sufficient. "^^ 29 Arnold v. Morris, 7 Daly (N. McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 Y.) 498. X. W. 173, 214, 57 Am. Rep. 287; 30 Arnold v. Morris, 7 Daly (N. Peak v. F:ilicott, 30 Kans. 156, 1 Y.) 498. Pac. 499, 46 Am. Rep. 90. 31 People V. Bank of Dansville, ^- Per Cole, C. J., in McLeod v. 39 Hun (N. Y.) 187; People v. City Evans, 66 Wis. 401. 28 N. W. 173, Bank, 96 N. Y. 11; Van Alen v. 214, 57 Am. Rep. 287. American Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 1 : 39 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 39 The discussion of this matter is not followed farther, be- cause the principle involved is one of trust rather than lien. A lien is a charge on some specific thing, as lands, goods or bonds; but a trust may exist with reference to any funds or a mere credit. § 38. Equitable lien agreement fulfilled. — An equitable lien under an agreement of the parties arises only when the terms and conditions contemplated by the agreement are ful- filled. A contractor about to furnish certain manufactured articles to the government agreed that advances to be made him by a bank, to enable him to carry out his contract, should be a lien on the drafts to be drawn by him on the govern- ment for the proceeds of the articles manufactured. The gov- ernment afterv^ard annulled the contract, the contractor being at the time largely indebted to the bank for advances made. The contractor many years afterward recovered a judgment in the court of claims against the government for a violation of the contract. It was held that the bank had no lien on this judgment. The lien, by its terms, only at- tached to the proceeds of sales of the manufactured goods. There was no lien on the contract itself; and there could be none on the damages for a breach of the contract. ■'^•^ § 39. Lien given to save rights. — It is sometimes declared to be a general doctrine of equity that a lien will be given when the plaintiff's rights can be secured in no other way. This doctrine was asserted in a recent case by the Court of Appeals of New York."^ The plaintiff was chairman of a committee appointed by a convention of the Episcopal Church 33 Bank of Washington v. Nock, St. 169. See also, Finnell v. Hig- 9 Wall. (U. S.) Z7i, 19 L. ed. 717; ginbotham, 97 Ky. 21, 16 Ky. L. and see Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 758, 29 S. W. 740; Leary v. Corvin, 30, 19 N. W. 580. 92 App. Div. (N. Y.) 544. 88 N. Y. 34 Perry v. Board of Missions. S. 109. modified 181 N. Y. 222, 72, 102 N. Y. 99, 6 N. E. 116, 1 N. Y. N. E. 984. 106 Am. St. 542. § 39 LIENS. 40 to procure a residence for the bishop of the diocese of Al- bany. With the advice of the bishop and consent of the com- mittee, he purchased certain premises, and, at the request of the bishop, commenced making necessary repairs and im- provements. The committe reported to the convention at its annual meeting, which adopted a resolution directing a transfer of the title to the defendant, and requiring the latter to execute a bond and mortgage to secure the payment of an existing mortgage and of the sum advanced for repairs. At this time the repairs vv^ere in progress, and the plaintiff went on and completed the work, advancing the money required for the purpose. The premises were conveyed to the de- fendant, who executed a mortgage, and applied the mon- eys obtained upon it as directed, but they were insufficient to pay the whole amount advanced by the plaintiff. The plain- tiff, having completed the repairs, demanded payment of the balance due him, and, upon the defendants' refusal to reim- burse him, brought an action for equitable relief, asking to have a lien in the nature of a mortgage declared upon the property, and that he be allowed to foreclose the same. It was held that he was entitled to this relief, as his rights could be secured in no other way. Judge Danforth, deliver- ing the judgment of the court, said: ''The advances were directly for the benefit of the real estate. They were ap- proved by the convention, by whose directions the title was conveyed to the defendant, but neither the convention nor the defendant have incurred any corporate liability; and, while it may be said that the advances were made on the promise, of or in the just and natural expectation that, a mortgage would be given, it is also true that they were made on the credit of the property, for the improvement of which they were expended. The repairs and improvements were permanently beneficial to it; made in good faith, with the knowledge and approbation of the parties interested, and ac- cepted by them, not as a gratuity, but as services for which 41 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 4I compensation should be given. The plaintiff's right to re- muneration is clear, and, unless the remedy sought for in this action is given, there will be a total failure of justice." § 40. Lien for purchase-money reserved. — Upon a sale of real and personal property together for one price, a lien for the purchase-money reserved in the conveyance will be en- forced in a court of equity, both upon the real and upon the personal property. Thus, where a lease of certain coal prop- erty, with all the personal property of the lessee upon the demised premises, was sold and transferred for a gross sum for both, and in the instrument of transfer a lien was re- served for the payment of the purchase-money, the lien was declared to be valid as between the parties and as against those having actual notice of it, and was enforced by a sale of both the real and personal property. ^^ Of course, there is no implied equitable lien for purchase-money in favor of a vendor of personal property ;^^ but there is no reason why the lien should not exist by contract or reservation, or why a lien upon both real and personal property, reserved by the same contract, should not be enforced against all the property. § 41. Equitable lien arises from conditional delivery. — An equitable lien arises from a conditional delivery of goods upon a sale, the condition being that the goods shall be paid for before the title passes. Thus, where goods were sold at auc- tion to be paid for in approved indorsed notes, and, in accord- ance with a usage, the goods were delivered to the buyer 35 Cole V. Smith, 24 W. Va. 287. so Lupin v. Marie, 6 Wend. (N. Where one accepts a deed stipu- Y.) 11, 21 Am. Dec. 256; Cole v. lating that he will pay annually Smith, 24 W. Va. 287; McCandlish to another a certain sum, such sum v. Keen, 13 Grat. (Va.) 615, per becomes an equitable lien on the Lee, J.; James v. Bird's Admr., real estate conveyed. Pmkham v. 8 Leigh (Va.) 510, 31 Am. Dec. 668; Pinkham, 60 Nebr. 600, 83 N. W. Beam v. Blanton, 38 N. Car. 59. 837. See also, Lee v. Lee's Admr., 30 Ky. L. 619, 99 S. W. 306. § 4^ LIENS. 42 when called for, the notes being left for subsequent adjust- ment, and, before the notes were delivered, the purchaser stopped payment and assigned the goods so bought, with other property, for the benefit of his creditors, it was held that the vendee was a trustee for the goods until the notes should be delivered; that the vendor had an equitable lien upon them for the purchase-money, and a better right than the voluntary assignee."" One may have an equitable lien upon a boat for work and material furnished under an agreement for such a lien. Thus, where one built and put up an engine in a boat under an ex- press contract with the owner that he should have a lien upon the boat for the price of the engine, it was held that he had an equitable lien upon the boat, not dependent for its validity upon his retaining possession.^^ §42. Equitable lien on future property. — There may be equitable lien upon future property."^ ^\'henever a positive lien or charge is intended to be created upon real or personal property not in existence, or not owned by the person who grants the lien, the contract attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon the particular property as soon as he acquires title and possession of the same.'*'' An equitable lien upon "'' Haggerty v. Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 437. 28 Donald v. Hewitt, 33 Ala. 534, 73 Am. Dec. 431. 39 Under the Codes of Califor- nia, North Dakota and South Da- kota, an agreement may be made to create a lien upon property not yet acquired by the party agree- ing to give the lien, or not yet in existence. In such case the lien agreed for attaches from the time when the party agreeing to give it acquires an interest in the thing, to the extent of such in- terest. California: Civ. Code, 1906, § 2883; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, S 6130; South Dakota: Rev. Code (Civ.j, 1904, § 2024. A lien ma}' be created by contract, to take immediate effect, as security for the performance of obliga- tions not then in existence. Cali- fornia: Civ. Code 1906, § 2884; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, § 6132; South Dakota: Rev. Code (Civ.), 1904, § 2025. ■10 Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Y. 113; Coates v. Donnell, 16 J. & S. (N. Y.) 46; Barnard v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 4 CliflF. (U. S.) 351, Fed. Cas. No. 1007; Coe v. Hart, 43 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 43 future property may be even more effectual than such a lien upon property in existence, for the registration laws apply to liens upon property in existence, but not to liens upon future property. Therefore it happens that, while, as against credit- ors, lien can not be created by contract upon a personal chat- tel in existence at the time of such contract without registra- tion, yet, as this rule does not apply to a contract in regard to future property, a lien effectual as against creditors may be created by agreement upon future property, such, for in- stance, as the products of a farm, or the profits of the farm, not then in existence.*^ § 43. Equitable lien arises from order to pay out of par- ticular fund. — An equitable lien arises from an order given by a debtor to his creditor to receive payment out of a particular fund, and this is effectual from the time the creditor receives the order or assignment, though the debtor become bankrupt before the order is received by the drawee. Thus, a mer- chant at Liverpool, having property in the hands of an agent at Bahia, agreed with a creditor to apply such property to the discharge of his indebtedness to him, and sent directions to his agent to convert the property and apply the proceeds to that purpose; but, before such instructions could reach his agent, he became bankrupt. "*- The chancellor, Lord Cotten- 6 Am. L. Reg. 27; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426; Bibend v. Liv- erpool & London Fire & Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 78. 41 Jones on Chattel Mortgages, fSth ed.) § 157; Tedford v. Wilson, 3 Head (Tenn.) 311. 42 Burn V. Carvalho, 4 Mylne & Cr. 690. In Ex parte South, 3 Swanst. 393, Lord Eldon says: "It has been decided in bankruptcy, that if a creditor gives an order on his debtor to pay a sum in discharge of his debt, and that or- der is shown to the debtor, it binds him; on the other hand this doctrine has been brought into doubt, by some decisions in the courts of law, who require that the party receiving the order should in some way enter into a contract. That has been the course of their decisions, but is certainly not the doctrine of this court." See also, Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 2 Sim. 333, 2 Russ & Mylne, 457; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607; Watson v. Wellington, 1 Russ. & Mylne, § 44 LIENS. 44 ham, held that, notwithstanding the assignment by the bank- rupt, the creditor had an interest in the goods, in the nature of a lien, which equity would protect. He stated the rule to be that, in equity, an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a third person having funds of the debtor, to pay the creditor out of the same, is a binding, equitable assignment of so much of the funds. A part of a particular fund may thus be assigned by an order, and the holder may enforce payment against the drawee. No particular form of words is necessary to effect an equitable assignment. Any words which show an inten- tion of transferring or appropriating a chose in action to the use of the assignee, and which place him in control of the same, are sufficient. ^^ § 44. Rule applying to attorneys and clients. — This rule applies to agreements made by attorneys with their clients, whereby they are to receive a share of the fund to be re- covered as a contingent compensation for professional ser- vices, for such agreements, when made for the prosecution of certain classes of claims, of which may be instanced claims against a government, or in one of the executive departments of a government, are not in violation of public policy.'*^ Such agreements, if they virtually assign a part of the claim, or an interest in it, create a lien upon the fund recovered. ^^ 602, 605; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare ^3 Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Jr. 39; Crowfoot v. Gurney, 2 Moo. 332, per Lord Hardwicke. & Scott 473; Row v. Dawson, 1 44 Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. Ves. Jr. 332, per Lord Hardwicke; 548, 23 L. ed. 983; Fairbanks v. Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. 280, Sargent, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 588, revd. per Lord Thurlow; Trist v. Child, 104 N. Y. 108, 9 N. E. 870, 6 L. R. 21 Wall. (U. S.) 441', 22 L. ed. 623, A. 475, 58 Am. Rep. 490; V^illiams per Swayne, J. ; Field v. New v. Ingersoll, 23 Hun. (N. Y.) 284, York, 6 N. Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435; affd. 89 N. Y. 508; Brown v. New Richardson v. Rust, 9 Paige (N. York, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 21. Y.) 243; Powell v. Jones, 72 Ala. 45 Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 392. 548, 23 L. ed. 983 ; Dowell v. Card- 45 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 45 Thus, where professional services were rendered by an at- torney under such an agreement, in prosecuting a claim against the Republic of Mexico, and the claim was finally, through his efforts, allowed, it was held that he had a lien upon the fund recovered, and that a court of equity would exercise jurisdiction to enforce the lien, if it appeared that equity would give him a more adequate remedy than he could obtain in a court of law.'*^ § 45. An order on specific fund effectual to create lien. — An order upon a specific fund, of which the drawee has notice, though he has not accepted it, or though he may have re- fused to accept it, is effectual, not only as between the parties, but also as against the drawer's assignee in bank- ruptcy, or his voluntary assignee, for the benefit of his credit- ors.^''' A debtor, being about to sell some leasehold prop- erty, gave to a creditor an order for the payment of the pur- chase-money. The order was not accepted, though the well, 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 217, Fed. and thereafter the amount of Cas. No. 4039; Wilson v. Seeber, counsel's fee was adjusted by 72 N. J. Eq. 523, 66 Atl. 909; Deer- an agreement between him and the ing V. Schreyer, 58 App. Div. (N. attorney. It was held, in an ac- Y.) 322, 68 N. Y. S. 1015. tion by counsel against the attor- 46 Wylie V. Coxe, 15 How. (U. ney and the trustee, that the S.) 415, 14 L. ed. 753; Staton v. agreement for a contingent fee Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, 23 L. ed. 983. impressed an equitable lien for Where the amount of compensa- plaintiff's compensation upon the tion to be paid the attorney in trust fund, and that a judgment such case is not fixed, evi- for the same, as adjusted, effectu- dence of what is ordinarily ated the lien. Harwood v. La charged by attorneys in cases Grange, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 619, 42 of the same character is ad- N. Y. St. 905, 16 N. Y. S. 689, missible. An attorney, prosecut- revd. 137 N. Y. 538, 32 N. E. 1000. ing certain actions under an 47 Ex parte Alderson, 1 Mad. 53, agreement that his fees should be affd. nom. Ex parte South, 3 a proportionate share of the re- Swanst. 392; Lett v. Morris, 4 covery, employed counsel, and Sim. 607; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 agreed to divide the fees with Mylne & Cr. 690; Yeates v. him. The proceeds of the actions Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. 280; Clark v. were deposited with a trustee, Mauran, 3 Paige (N. Y.) Z7Z. § 46 LIENS. 46 drawees had notice of it. Before the transaction was com- pleted by payment of the order, the debtor became bankrupt. Lord Thnrlow, in holding that the order was an equitable assignment of the purchase-money, said:^^ ''This is noth- ing but a direction by a man to pay part of his money to an- other for a foregone valuable consideration. If he could transfer, he has done it; and it being his own money, he could transfer. The transfer w^as actually made. They were in the right not to accept it, as it was not a bill of ex- change. It is not an inchoate business. The order fixed the money the moment it was shown to [the parties upon whom it was drawn]." The assignment of a mail contract, accompanied by an agreement that the assignee should receive all the moneys that might become payable under the contract for carrying the mail, constitutes an equitable lien on the funds which is superior to a subsequent order given by the assignor upon the same fund.^^ § 46. Assignment of lien effectual on notice to creditor. — But the assignment is not effectual until the creditor is noti- fied of the assignment to himself. Though a consignment be made with directions to apply the proceeds to a creditor of the consignor, that is no effectual appropriation or lien in favor of the creditor until the creditor is notified of the ap- propriation. Until such notice the directions amount to no more than a mandate revocable at the pleasure of the c signor, who may make any disposition of the property or of its proceeds that he may see fit to make.^^ § 47. Equitable assignment not revocable. — An order whicli amounts to an equitable assignment can not be re- voked. An order given by a landlord on his tenant to pay ■1^ Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. -lo Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige (N. 280. Y.) 632. 5f^ Scott V. Porcher, 3 Mer. 652. 47 , EQUITABLE LIENS. • § 48 to another the rents to accrue during a certain time, and assented to by the tenant, operates as an equitable assign- ment of such rents, which is effectual not only as against third persons, but also against the landlord himself.^^ Al- though he revokes the order, the tenant is not only justified in paying the rents in accordance with the order, but may be compelled to do so. The order itself amounts to an assign- ment of the fund without any formal acceptance, whether written or verbal. ^^ Such an order differs in this respect from a bill of exchange or check, inasmuch as these do not specify a particular fund, whereas the order mentioned does specify a particular fund. § 48. Agreement to pay out of designated fund will not create equitable lien. — A mere agreement, whether by parol or in writing, to pay a debt out of a designated fund, when received, does not give an equitable lien upon that fund, or operate as an equitable assignment of it.^^ The agreement is personal merely. There must be an order, or something that places the creditor in a position to demand and receive the amount of the debt from the holder of the fund without further action on the part of the debtor; something that would protect the holder of the fund in making the payment. 51 Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill (N. reversing 6 Paige (N. Y.) 415; Y.) 583; Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill (N. (N. Y.) 632. Y.) 583; Hauselt v. Vilmar, 52 Lett V. Morris, 4 Sim. 607; 2 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 222, Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. 280; 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 574, af- Ex parte Alderson, 1 Mad. 53. firmed 76 N. Y. 630; Wood v. 53 Wright V. Ellison, 1 Wall. (U. Mitchell, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 629, 44 S.) 10, 17 L. ed. 555; Christmas v. N. Y. St. 694, 17 N. Y. S. 782; Ad- Russell, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 69, 20 L. dison v. Enoch, 168 N. Y. 658, 61 ed. 762; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. N. E. 1127; Phillips v. Hogue, 63 (U. S.) 441, 22 L. ed. 623; Dillon Nebr. 192, 88 N. W. 180; De Win- v. Barnard, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 430, ter v. Thomas, 34 App. D. C. 80; 22 L. ed. 673; Williams v. Inger- Pettibone v. Thomson, 72 Misc. soil, 89 N. Y. 508; Rogers v. Ho- (N. Y.) 486, 30 N. Y. S. 284. sack's Exrs., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 319, § 48 . LIENS. 48 A covenant by a debtor to pay certain debts out of a particu- lar fund, when the same should be received, is merely a personal covenant. ^^ Thus, to create in favor of a con- tractor a lien upon particular funds of his employer, there must be not only an express promise of the employer upon v^hich the contractor relies, to apply them in payment of such services, but there must be some act of appropriation on the part of the employer relinquishing control of the funds, and conferring upon the contractor the right to have them thus applied when the services are rendered. A con- tractor entered into an agreement with a railroad company to build a portion of its road, which had just been mortgaged by the company to raise money to pay its existing debts and to complete and equip the road. The mortgage provided, among other things, that the expenditure of all sums of money realized from the sale of the bonds should be made with the approval of at least one of the mortgage trustees, and that his assent in writing should be necessary to all con- tracts made by the company before the same should be a charge upon any of the sums received from such sales. The contractor obtained the assent of two of the trustees to his contract; and, having completed the work, upon the bank- ruptcy of the company claimed a lien upon the property in the hands of the assignees in bankruptcy acquired or re- ceived from the mortgage bonds. It was held, however, that he acquired no lien, because he was never given control of the funds to be received from the bonds. ^^ Upon this point Mr. Justice Field said: "Before there can arise any lien on the funds of the employer, there must be, in addition to such express promise, upon which the contractor relies, some act of appropriation on the part of the employer de- priving himself of the control of the funds, and conferring upon the contractor the right to have them applied to his 5-1 Rogers v. Hosack's Exrs., 18 55 Dillon v. Barnard, 21 Wall. Wend. (N. Y.) 319; Hoyt v. Story, (U. S.) 430, 22 L. ed. 673. 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 262. 49 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 49 payment when the services are rendered or the materials are furnished. There must be a relinquishment, by the em- ployer, of the right of dominion over the funds, so that with- out his aid or consent the contractor can enforce their appli- cation to his payment when his contract is completed. * * * In the case at bar there is no circumstance impairing the dominion of the corporation over the funds received from the bonds; there is only its covenant with the trustees that the expenditure of those funds shall be made with the ap- proval of one of them, and that one of them shall give his written assent to its contractors before they are paid out of such funds. There is no covenant with the contractor of any kind in the instrument, and no right is conferred upon him to interfere in any disposition which the corporation may see fit to make of its moneys. The essential elements are wanting in the transaction between him and the corporation to give him any lien upon its funds. No right, therefore, exists in him to pursue such funds into other property upon which they have been expended. The case, as already inti- mated, is on his part, one of simple disappointed expectation, against which misfortune, equity furnishes no relief." § 49. Creditor's lien on money in hands of debtor's agent- — A creditor has no lien on money in the hands of the debt- or's agent until the debtor has given an order upon the agent to pay it to the creditor. A tax was levied for the amount of the subscription of a county to a railroad company, and an agent was appointed in behalf of the county to receive the money when collected, and to pay it over when ordered. It was held that the railroad company had no specific or other lien on money collected and in the hands of the agent before he had been ordered to pay it over. The county could recall the money in the hands of its agent at any time before pay- ment to the company. ^^ 56 Henry County v. Allen, 50 Mo. 231. 4 § 5^ LIENS. 50 § 50. Appropriation necessary to constitute equitable lien. — To constitute an equitable lien on a fund, there must be some distinct appropriation of the fund by the debtor, such as an assignment or order that the creditor should be paid out of it. It is not enough that the fund may have been created through the efforts and outlays of the party claiming the lien.^" It is not enough that a debtor authorizes a third person to receive a fund and to pay it over to a creditor.'^^ One who was largely indebted to his banker, being pressed for payment, wrote to the solicitor of a railroad company which was indebted to him, authorizing the solicitor to re- ceive the money so due to him, and to pay it to the banker. The solicitor, by letter, promised the banker to pay him such money on receiving it. The solicitor received the amount, but paid it over to the debtor instead of the banker. It was held that the transaction did not amount to an equitable as- signment, because there was no order or assignment by the debtor placing the fund in the control of the creditor. There was nothing more than a promise or undertaking on the part of the solicitor, for the breach of which he may be responsi- ble in law, but not in equity.'^^ Lord Truro, delivering the judgment upon appeal, said:^'' 'T believe I have adverted to all the cases cited which can be considered as having any bearing upon the present case: and the extent of the prin- ciple to be deduced from them is, that an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt owing shall be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds belonging to the giver of the order, directing such person to pay such funds to the creditor, will create a valid equitable charge upon such fund ; in other words, will 5" Wright V. Ellison, 1 Wall. (U. "^9 Rodick v. Gandell, 12 Beav. S.) 16, 17 L. ed. 555; Hoyt v. Story, 325. 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 262. 60 Rodick v. Gandell 1 De G., 58 Rodick V. Gandell, 12 Beav. M. & G. 76-3, 111. 325. affirmed 1 De G.. M. & G. 763. 51 EQUITABLE LIENS. g 52 Operate as an equitable assignment of the debts or fund to which the order refers." He then proceeds to examine the letters referred to, with reference to determining whether they come within the principle declared. He says that the debtor's letter to the solicitor does not come within the prin- ciple, because it was not an order upon one owing money to him, nor upon one having funds of his. It was not an order upon the railway company, nor upon any officer of the com- pany, such as to make it available against the company. He concludes, after a full examination of all the circumstances, that the letter was not intended to be, and did not, according to the law applicable to the subject, operate as an equitable assignment to the banker of the debt due from the railway company. It was a mere authority to the solicitor to re- ceive, which might or might not be acted upon. §51. Rule strictly held to. — The rule that an equitable assignment can be effected only by a surrender of control over the funds or property assigned is one that is strictly held to. A promise that certain goods shall be held in trust for the benefit of another, and that the proceeds shall be paid to him, does not amount to an equitable assignment of the goods or specific lien upon them ; for in such case the owner retains control of the goods, and may appropriate them or their proceeds to the payment of other creditors, and the holder of such promise cannot follow the goods any more than he could follow their proceeds. He has no lien either upon the goods or their proceeds. The owner has violated his promise, and for this he is personally respon- sible.^^ § 52. Promise to pay out of particular fund not sufficient. — The promise of a debtor to pay a debt out of a particular fund is not sufficient. There must be an appropriation of 61 Gibson v. Stone, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 285, 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 468. § 53 LIENS. 52 the fund pro tanto, either by giving an order on the specific 5und, or by transferring the amount otherwise in such a man- ner that the holder of the fund is authorized to pay the amount directly to the creditor without the further interven- tion of the debtor.^- Thus, a mere personal agreement by a claimant against the United States, whereby he promises to pa)' an attorney a percentage of whatever sum may be appro- priated by Congress through his efiforts to secure the pay- ment of the claim, does not constitute a lien on the fund to be appropriated; there being no order on the government to pay the percentage out of the fund so appropriated, nor any assignment to the attorney of such percentage.*^^ The rem- edy for the breach of such an agreement is at law, and not in equity. A sale of goods upon the mere promise of the purchaser to pay for them out of the avails of their sale, and of a stock of other goods then owned by the purchaser, does not give the seller a lien on the goods after their delivery, nor on the avails of their sale, that can be specifically enforced.^* Such an agreement merely creates the relation of debtor and creditor, and does not effectually appropriate the funds to the payment of the specific debt. § 53. Workmen have no lien on money retained from funds due contractor. — Workmen have no lien on money re- •52 Trist V. Child, 21 Wall.(U. S.) S.) 441, 22 L. ed. 623. In this case, 441, 22 L. ed. 623; Wright v. Elli- Congress having appropriated a son, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 16, 17 L. ed. sum for the payment of the 555; Hoyt v. Story, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) claim, the attorney obtained an in- 262; Gibson v. Stone, 43 Barb. (N. junction against the claimant from Y.) 285, 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 468; withdrawing this sum from the Addison v. Enoch, 168 N. Y. 658, treasury until he had complied 61 N. E. 1127; Phillips v. Hogue, 63 with his agreement about compen- Nebr. 192, 88 N. W. 180; De Win- sation; but the Supreme Court re- ter V. Thomas, 34 App. D. C. 80; versed the order. Pettibone v. Thomson, 72 Misc. 64 Stewart v. Hopkins, 30 Ohio (N. Y.) 486, 130 N. Y. S. 284. St. 502, affd. 104 U. S. 303, 26 L. ed. 63 Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. (U. 769. 53 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 54 tained by the owner of property out of sums due to a con- tractor, for the owner's own protection against claims for labor and materials. A provision in a contract for work and the furnishing of materials whereby the employer is author- ized to retain, out of the moneys that may be due to the con- tractor, such amount as may be necessary to meet the claims of all persons who have done work or furnished materials, and who shall have given notice of their claims within a lim- ited time, until such liability shall be discharged, creates no equitable lien upon the fund retained, and raises no equitable assignment of it in favor of laborers or material-men. The contract does not provide for any application of the moneys retained to the payment of claims contained in the notice. The only benefit a laborer or material-man could secure by filing such notice would be, that he would stop the payment of the amount to the contractor, and he would know where his debtor had funds wherewith to pay the claim ; but he could reach these funds only by trustee process, or some other form of attachment.*^ § 54. Designation of particular fund must be clear and definite. — The designation of the particular fund must be clear and definite to give effect to an order as an equitable assignment, in distinction from an order drawn against a general credit. The president of a company wrote a letter stating that, if a certain person in its employ would make an order on its treasurer for any portion of his salary, and the payee would file it with the treasurer, the sum would be paid monthly so long as the employe remained with the com- pany and the order "remained unrevoked." The employe accordingly drew an order for three hundred dollars in monthly payments of fifty dollars, closing the order with the words, "and charge the same to my salary account." The order and letter were filed with the treasurer, but before 65 Quinlan v. Russell, 15 J. & S. (N. Yj 212, affd. 94 N. Y. 350. § 55 LIENS. 54 anything was paid upon the order the drawer wrote the treasurer countermanding the order. In a suit against the company to recover the amount of the order, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover; that, treating the order as a bill of exchange, the company accepted it only condi- tionally that it "remained unrevoked;" and that it did not operate as an equitable assignment, inasmuch as the order was not a requirement to pay out of a designated fund or from a particular source. Upon this point the court said: "The order does not, in terms, direct the payment of the salary or wages or any part thereof to the payee. It is a request, or at most a direction, by the drawer, to pay certain specific s-ums of money, generally, for a certain period and on particular days, without the designation therein of any claim for a debt due or to become due to him, unless it is contained in the further direction to charge the amounts paid to his salary account. This, it is true, recognizes the fact that there was a relation betwen the parties at the time which entitled the drawer to a cerdit for services rendered by him, and for which a salary was payable, but the direction would have been as proper if the sums thus to be charged were for moneys lent and advanced previous to the earning of the salary, as for a salary actually earned, and for which an indebtedness had accrued. It was not a requirement that the payment should be made out of a designated fund, or from a particular source, but it was a provision made for the reimbursement of what should be paid in compliance with the request or direction. "^'^ § 55. Bill of exchange not an equitable assignment. — A bill of exchange does not of itself constitute an equitable as- signment of the sum named, unless it specifies a particular fund upon which the order or bill is drawn, and the drawer has divested himself of all right to control the fund.^^ A bill <"'*» Shaver v. Western Union Tel- ^'~ Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. egraph Co., 57 N. Y. 459. 280; Watson v. Wellington, 1 Russ. 55 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 56 of exchange in the ordinary form does not specify any par- ticular fund upon which it is drawn, and therefore does not constitute an equitable assignment of any sum in the hands of the drawee; and an order which is payable out of a par- ticular fund is not a negotiable bill of exchange, for such an instrument must be payable absolutely, and not contingently out of a particular fund. Even after an unconditional ac- ceptance of a bill, it cannot in strictness be held to operate as an assignment to the payee of the drawer's funds in the hands of the drawee, since the latter becomes bound by the consent of acceptance, irrespective of the funds in his hands.^^ § 56. Bill of exchange against consignment as lien. — If a bill of exchange drawn against a consignment does not itself refer to the consignment, and the consignee is not otherwise instructed to hold the consignment or the proceeds of it for the payment of the bill, there is no appropriation for the pay- ment of the bill which will constitute a lien.®^ A mere letter of advice from the consignor to the con- signee that a bill of exchange has been drawn against the consignment does not, it seems, operate as a specific appro- priation of the proceeds to the payment of the bill. Even if the letter of advice amounts to a specific direction to apply the proceeds of the consignment to the payment of such bill, it does not operate as a specific appropriation of the proceeds to the payment of the bill unless it be shown that the pur- chaser or holder of the bill took it on the faith that the pro- & M. 602, 605; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sheffield, 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 416, Sim. 607; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 affd. 3 N. Y. 243; Harris v. Clark, Mylne & C. 690; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 N. Y. 93, 51 Am. Dec. 352. 3 Hare 39; Chapman v. White, 6 ^-s Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield. 3 N. Y. 412, 57 Am. Dec. 464; Marine N. Y. Super. Ct. 416, affd. 3 N. Y. & Fire Ins. Bank v. Jauncey, 5 N. 243. Y. Super. Ct. 257; Winter v. Drury, «» Frith v. Forbes, 4 De G., F 5 N. Y. 525; Cowperthwaite v. & J. 409, 421, per Turner, J. 57 LIENS. 56 ceeds of the shipment were to be applied to its payment. ''^^ But a draft or order made payable out of a particular fund is an assignment of the fund pro tanto.'^^ § 57. A check not an equitable assignment. — A check drawn upon a bank does not operate as an equitable assign- ment of the funds of the drawer to the amount of the check, nor does it create any lien upon such funds,'^^ if it is drawn in the ordinary form. In such form it does not describe any particular fund, or use any words of transfer of the whole or a part of any particular amount standing to the credit of the drawer. Such a check is in legal effect like an unaccepted bill of exchange in the ordinary form. It does not operate as an equitable assignment of any part of the funds of the drawee in the hands of the drawer; and it is immaterial that the drawer is not a bank."^^ Accordingly, where an insur- "0 Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield. 3 N. Y. 243. affg. 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 416. '1 Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. 280; Hall v. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes (N. Y.) 193, 2 Abb. Dec. 301 ; Vreeland v. Blunt, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 182. The fund drawn upon in this case had been set apart for certain specified purposes, among which was the payment of the sum men- tioned in the order, and the order itself specified the fund. It was of course an equitable appropria- tion of the amount so drawn. "2 Hopkinson v. Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74; Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 69, 20 L. ed. 762; Thompson v. Riggs, S Wall. (U. S.) 663, 18 L. ed. 704; Bank of Re- public V. Millard. 10 Wall. (U. S.) 152, 19 L. ed. 897; First National Bank V. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 24 L. ed. 229. New York: Chapman V. White, 6 N. Y. 412, 57 Am. Dec. 464; People v. Merchants' & Me- chanics' Bank, 78 N. Y. 269, 34 Am. Rep. 532; Duncan v. Berlin, 60 N. Y. 151 ; Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep. 314; Tyler v. Gould, 48 N. Y. 68Z Missouri: Dickinson v. Coats, 79 Mo. 250, 49 Am. Rep. 228; Mer- chants' Nat. Bank v. Coates, 79 Mo. 168; Coates v. Doran, 83 Mo. 337. The former case expressly dissents from AIcGrade v. German Savings Inst., 4 Mo. App. 330. Pennsyl- vania : Loyd v. McCaffrey. 46 Pa. St. 410. Maryland : Moses v. Franklin Bank, 34 Md. 574. Mas- sachusetts : Carr v. Nat. Security Bank. 107 Mass. 45, 9 m. Rep. 6; Dana v. Third Nat. Bank, 13 Allen (Mass.) 445, 90 Am. Dec. 216; Bul- lard v. Randall, 1 Gray (Mass.) 605, 61 Am. Dec. 433. "3 Attornev-General v. Conti- 57 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 58 ance company gave its check in the ordinary form upon a trust company in payment of a loss, but before its presenta- tion a receiver of the company was appointed, who withdrew all the funds on deposit, it was held that the payee was not entitled to have the amount of the check paid out of funds in the receivers hands in preference to the claims of other creditors. The fact that there was a receipt upon the back of the check, intended to be signed by the payee was held not to create a lien upon the fund drawn upon. A state- ment of the consideration for a draft or check, either gen- erally or specifically, whether on the back or in the body of the instrument, does not create a lien or appropriation of the particular fund without some expression to that effect. '^^ § 58. Lien of holder of bill of exchange based on agree- ment. — The lien of the holder of a bill of exchange upon the fund in the hands of the drawee has its foundation in a special agreement or implied understanding of the parties, entered into at the time of discounting or purchasing the bill, that the fund in the hands of the drawee is appropriated to the payment of the bill."^^ In upholding the lien and de- voting the fund to the payment of the bill, the court executes the agreement and carries out the understanding of the parties. Even a verbal understanding between the drawer and a person discounting the bill, that it is founded on a ship- nental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 325, Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 111. 27 Am. Rep. 55; Lunt v. Bank of 212, 22 Am. Rep. 185; Iowa: Rob- North America, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) erts v. Austin, 26 Iowa 315, 96 Am. 221. There are some authorities Dec. 146; South Carolina: Fogar- to the effect that a check in the ties v. State Bank, 12 Rich. L. (S. usual form is an equitable assign- Car.) 518, 78 Am. Dec. 468. ment of so much of the drawer's "^ Attorney-General v. Conti- deposit as the check calls for. Such nental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 325, is the rule adopted in the follow- 27 Am. Rep. 55. : ing States : Illinois : Munn v. ''■J Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Mylne & Burch, 25 111. 35; Chicago Marine C. 690; Flour City Nat. Bank v. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Stanford, 28 111. Garfield, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 579. 168, 81 Am. Dec. 270; Union Nat. § 58 LIENS. 58 ment of goods, and that their proceeds shall be applied to the payment of the bill, is sufficient to effect an equitable transfer or lien."^ A merchant shipped a cargo of wheat to commission merchants in New York, and the next day drew a draft upon the consignees and procured a discount of it at a bank, upon the representation that the cargo had been shipped to the drawees, and with the understanding that the draft was drawn against the proceeds of the shipment. The drawer at the same time wrote to the consignees that the draft had been drawn, and requested them to accept it. The next day the drawer, being insolvent, made a general assign- ment for the benefit of his creditors. The assignee seized the wheat before it reached the consignees and sold it. In an action by the bank, a lien was established in its favor as against the assignee. The court say that the evidence showed that the draft was discounted by the bank upon the credit of the wheat which had been shipped by the drawer, and relied upon the avails of the same for the acceptance and payment of the draft. The bank was told that the wheat had been shipped, and that the draft was drawn against the shipment, and this justified the conclusion that the draft was discounted upon the credit of the shipment.'^^ "*j Flour City Nat. Bank v. Gar- ating the bill of exchange. If the field, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 579. This is goods or their proceeds after- contrary to some expressions to be wards come into the drawer's found in earlier cases. Marine & hands, the holder of the bill will Fire Ins. Bank v. Jauncey, 5 N. have no equitable lien upon them. Y. Super. Ct. 257, is perhaps the The consignee, moreover, has the case most directly in conflict with right to apply the proceeds to the the above. It is there said that a payment of any general balance bill of exchange, though under- due him from the consignor, or stood to be drawn against certain in any other way that the con- goods or their proceeds, makes no signor and consignee might agree special appropriation of either to upon. This decision in effect over- the payment of the bill. The ruled the same case before the drawer has the same legal con- equity court in 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 486. trol of the goods or of their pro- '''^ Flour City Nat. Bank v. Gar- ceeds in the hands of the con- field, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 579. signee that he had before negoti- 59 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 59 § 59. Reference in a draft to appropriation of proceeds held to create lien, — A brief reference in a draft against a consignment to an appropriation of tlie proceeds has, to- gether with other evidence of the appropriation, been lield to create a lien."^ Thus, in one case, it appeared that the draft against a consignment of corn directed the amount to be charged "as advised,'' and the consignee was advised by letter of the drawing of the draft. This reference made in the draft was regarded by the court as extending the nature of the transaction beyond that of tlie mere discounting of a bill of exchange; for the bankers discounting the bill were justified in concluding that property had been shipped to the consignee, and that he had been directed to pay the draft out of the proceeds of the shipment. It was a fact found that the discount was made with the knowledge of, and in re- liance upon, that arrangement. Direct evidence of this was not given, but circumstances were proved from which that conclusion was reasonably drawn, and they were sufficient to establish the fact that when the bill was discounted it was done on the understanding that its payment had been pro- vided for from the proceeds of the shipment. The letter and the bill, and the understanding of the parties, so far qualified the nature of the direction and request made in the bill as substantially to render it an order for a corresponding amount of the proceeds of the shipment. That created a charge or lien upon the corn and its proceeds in favor of the bankers discounting the bill under these circumstances. There was something more than a simple direction by the shipper to the consignee to apply the property to the payment of the bill, for the bill itself was negotiated and discounted on the distinct understanding that the proceeds of the corn should be applied to its payment.^'' "8 Parker v. Baxter, 19 Hun (N. "^ Per Daniels, J., in Parker v. Y.) 410, aflfd. 86 N. Y. 586. Baxter, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 410. § 6o LIENS. 60 § 60. Lien created when consignee receives goods under express direction. — If a consignee receives goods under an express direction to apply the proceeds to the payment of a particular bill of exchange, an equitable lien is created in favor of the holder of the bill, if he took it relying upon such appropriation, and this will prevail against the general lien of the consignee. In general it may be said that if, at the time a consignment is made, the consignee be notified that a draft has been drawn against it, and the draft is discounted on the faith of the con- signment and instructions, then the nature of the trans- action is extended beyond the mere discounting of a bill of exchange drawn against a consignment.^*^ The party dis- counting the bill has an equitable lien upon the goods or their proceeds to the extent of his advances. §61. General lien of consignee of goods. — The general lien of a consignee can not be set up against the express directions of the consignor given at the time when the con- signment is of¥ered and accepted, whereby a lien is created in favor of the payee of a draft drawn against the consign- ment.^^ If a consignee thinks proper to accept a consign- ment with express directions to apply it or the proceeds in a particular mode, he can not set up his general lien in oppo- sition to those directions. In such a case, only what re- mains after answering the particular directions becomes sub- ject to the general lien.^^ If the consignee be notified that a bill of exchange in favor of a third person is to be paid out 80 New York: Parker v. Baxter, & J. 409; Cayuga Co. Nat. Bank 19 Hun (N. Y.) 410, affd. 86 N. Y. v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. 631 ; Bailey v. 586; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill '(N. Hudson River R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70. Y.) 583; Hoyt v. Story, 3 Barb. 82 Frith v. Forbes, 4 De G., F. (N. Y.) 262; Marine & Fire Ins. & J. 409, per Turner, J. See, how- Bank V. Jauncey, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) ever, Robey v. Oilier, L. R. 7 Ch. 486; Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 695; Phelps v. Comber, 29 Ch. D. 239, 82 Am. Dec. 346. 813; Brown v. Kough, 29 Ch. D. 81 Frith V. Forbes, 4 De G., F. 848. 6l EQUITABLE LIENS. § 62 of the proceeds of the consignment, this direction, in con- nection with the bill of exchange, amounts to an appropria- tion of the consignment to the payment of the bill of ex- change, and the holder of the bill has a lien upon the con- signment or the proceeds of it. The lien exists whether the bill be accepted or not. If it be not accepted, the consign- ment is subject to the lien in favor of the holder of the bill ; if it be accepted, the consignee becomes personally liable upon the acceptance, and the lien also attaches to the con- signment or the proceeds of it, so long as the proceeds can be traced. But a mere direction of "Advice of draft" on a bill does not operate as an appropriation of the consignment ; and the case of Frith v. Forbes, so far as it goes to establish a gen- eral principle of law to this effect, is impugned by the later English cases.^^ § 62. Delivery of bill of lading sufficient to create equi- table lien. — The delivery of a bill of lading to one who dis- counts a draft drawn against the shipment is a sufficient ap- propriation of the property to give the holder of the draft an equitable lien upon the property. Ordinarily the question of an equitable lien does not arise in such a case, because the delivery of the bill of lading amounts to a pledge and de- livery of the property itself. But an equitable lien might be declared in such a case.^* The fact that the discount of the draft is obtained on the delivery of the bill of lading is con- S3 Phelps V. Comber, 29 Ch. the bank which discounted the D. 813; Brown v. Kough, 29 Ch. draft had filed a bill in equity for D. 848; Robey v. Oilier, L. R. 7 relief, it was clear that the bank Ch. 695; In re Entwistle, 3 Ch. would have been entitled to a de- D. 477. cree declaring its demand against 84 Bank of Rochester v. Jones, the consignor who drew the draft 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290. In an equitable lien on the goods this case, which was a discount consigned. And see Cayuga Co. of a draft on the security of a Nat. Bank v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. bill of lading delivered at the 631. time, Paige, J., declared that, if g 63 LIENS. 62 elusive that an assignment of the property, either legal or equitable, was made for the security of the draft. There is no equitable lien upon moneys advanced to the drawer of a bill of exchange on the security of a bill of lading of goods against which the bill of exchange is drawn, upon the failure of the consignee and the sale of the goods for a sum insufficient to repay the advances upon them. When the borrower receives the money upon such a bill of ex- change and bill of lading, the money is his, and not the money of the lender; nor is it clothed wnth a trust, or subject to a lien in his favor. The lender has parted with his money, and has in place of it the security he bargained 'for.^^ A warehouse receipt, like a bill of lading, gives the holder a lien upon the goods named in the receipt, provided it is issued by a public warehouseman, and the goods can be identified.^^ § 63. Lien of one making advances to purchase mer- chandise. — Where in terms the parties agree that one mak- ing advances for the purchase of merchandise to be shipped to him shall have a lien upon the same, the lien arises upon the purchase of the merchandise before it is consigned to the creditor. The lien in such case attaches to the mer- chandise purchased and in the hands of the debtor at the time of his bankruptcy, and may be asserted as against the debtor's assignee in bankruptcy. Jndge Story said that the possession of the property by the debtor was not a badge of fraud, or against the policy of the law, or in any manner to be deemed inconsistent with the just rights of his general creditors; and therefore the agreement to give a lien or equi- table charge was binding upon the property in the hands of the assignee. ^''^ s-^ Grinnel v. Suydam, 5 N. Y. 86 Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, Super, Ct. 132; National Bank of 137 111. 146, 27 N. E. 24. Deposit V. Sardy, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 8" Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story 555, 57 N. Y. S. 625, affd. 44 App. (U. S.) 555, Fed. Cas. No. 4864; Div. (N. Y.) 357, 61 N. Y. S. 155. Cincinnati Tobacco Warehouse 63 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 64 Such lien is a specific lien on the merchandise shipped to the person making the advances, and not a general lien as against an equitable owner of a share of the merchandise, though the debtor to whom the advances were made agreed that any surplus in the merchandise or the proceeds thereof, after satisfying the advances upon the same, should stand as security for any other indebtedness of his to the person who made the advances, the latter at the time knowing of the rights of the equitable owner of a part of the merchan- dise. The agreement for a general lien, after satisfying the specific lien, was a valid one as between the parties to it, but it could not afiford the rights of an equitable owner of a part of the merchandise who did not consent to such agreement. ^^ Where one who has advanced money for the development of mining property entered into a contract by which he was given the right to manage the property and pay himself out of the profits or out of the money received from a sale of the property, such a contract gives him an equitable lien on the property which he may foreclose when it has been shown that no profits may be derived from the operation of the mine.^^ § 64. Executory agreement to purchase and consign property. — Under an executory agreement to purchase and consign property, no lien arises until the property is actually acquired by the debtor, and perhaps not till it is actually con- signed to the creditor in accordance with the agreement. A merchant accepted a draft under an agreement that the drawer would invest the proceeds in cotton, and ship the Co. V. Leslie 117 Ky. 478, 78 S. W. rich Lumber & Mfg. Co., 29 Ky. 413, 25 Ky. L. 1570, 64 L. R. A. L. 466, 93 S. W. 54. 219. In the absence of a valid S8 Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 129, agreement to that effect the mere 30 N. E. 732. advancement by a third person of 89 Connolly v. Bouck, 174 Fed. the money with which property is 312. 98 C. C. A. 184. See also, Du- purchased gives him no lien on fur Oil Co. v. Enos, 59 Ore. 528, such property. Sanders v. Helf- 117 Pac. 457. § 65 LIENS. 64 same to the merchant for sale. The drawer obtained a dis- count of the draft at his bank, and the proceeds were placed to his credit. Two days afterward, the money still stand- ing to his credit, he died. In a contest between the acceptor and the creditors of the drawer it was held that at law the money raised on the bill became unconditionally the property of the drawer, and at his death passed to his administrator, and that in equity the acceptor had no lien upon the proceeds of the draft. ''^ If there was any lien, it arose out of the agreement of the parties, — the agreement that the proceeds of the draft should be used for the purchase of cotton to be consigned to the acceptor. Until the cotton was purchased, the thing did not come into being upon which the lien could attach. Whether the agreement to consign created a lien at all, or merely a personal covenant, might be a question of doubt. But certainly no lien could attach to the money, be- cause there was no contract in regard to the money under which a lien could arise. Any lien implied by the contract was upon the cotton. While the drawer lived, a lien upon the cotton was a possible thing; it would arise upon the pur- chase and consignment of it in accordance with the agree- ment. Whether the lien would arise upon the purchase be- fore the consignment, is a question which did not arise in this case, though the court incidentally discussed the ques- tion, and expressed a doubt whether the lien would attach upon the purchase of the cotton. § 65. Lien on crop to be raised. — A lien by express con- tract upon a crop to be raised prevails against the debtor's assignee in insolvency. The creditor having the earliest lien by contract has an equity superior to that of the general creditors. ^^ The maxim, qui prior est tempore, potior est in jure, applies. »o Holt V. Bank of Augusta, 13 9i Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426. Ga. 341. 65 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 6/ A farmer entered into a contract with a firm of traders by which they were to become his agents for the sale of his crops, advance him money, and accept his drafts, for the pay- ment of which he pledged his crops on hand, and the grow- ing crops of the year. Upon the faith of this agreement the traders made large advances to the farmer, who died at the close of the year largely indebted to them. His executor took possession of the crops, and resisted the claim of lien on the part of the traders, upon the ground that they were in no better condition as to the crops than the other creditors of the deceased. It was held, however, that the agreement constituted a lien which a court of equity would enforce. ^^ § 66. Equitable lien arises under contract on crop lien. — An equitable lien arises under a contract whereby a creditor is to receive half the proceeds of a certain crop upon which the contract gives a lien. Thus, where a mortgagor, in con- sideration of the mortgagee's forbearance in foreclosing the mortgage, agreed to cultivate the mortgaged land in cotton for one year, and to give the mortgagee one half of the cot- ton raised, the value of the same to be credited on the mort- gage notes, and gave a lien on the whole crop for the pay- ment of the one half, the debtor having died during the year, and his estate having been declared insolvent, it was held that the mortgagee obtained an equitable lien on the cotton, which he could enforce in a court of equity, and that his lien was superior to the equity of the general creditors. ^^ § 67. Liens for advances to manufacturers on goods. — A firm of merchants entered into an agreement with a firm of silk manufacturers, whereby the former agreed to furnish the latter with raw materials for the manu- facture of silk goods, and to advance funds for purchase 92 Sullivan v. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch. 59; 93 Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426. Schermerhorn v. Gardenier, 184 N. Y. 612, n N. E. 1196. 6 § 68 LIENS. 66 thereof; and the goods when manufactured were to be de- livered to and sold by the merchants, and the balance of the proceeds of each sale, after deducting commissions, insur- ance, and advances, was to be paid to the manufacturers. After this arrangement had continued some years the manu- facturers failed, and made a general assignment for the bene- fit of their creditors. The assignee took possession of all the stock and machinery of the debtors, and among the stock were many pieces of silk goods, finished and un- finished. The merchants who had made the advances claimed an equitable lien on these for the balance due them from the manufacturers, and brought suit to enforce the same. It was held, however, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, for, assuming that a lien was created by the agree- ment, there was no sufficient evidence to identify the prop- erty or its proceeds as that which the plaintiffs had ad- vanced.^* An agreement whereby a merchant was to advance money to a tanner, to enable him to buy hides for his tannery, pro- vided that the advances should be charged to the tanner, and that the hides bought by him with such money should be bought in the merchant's name and should be his as security for all sums due him. The hides were in fact bought in the tanner's own name. It was held that, while the merchant had a lien on the hides, this lien was not valid against a bona fide purchaser from the tanner without notice of the merchant's lien.^^ § 68. No implied lien on personal property on account of money advanced. — There is no implied lien upon personal property in favor of one who has advanced money for it, without having either the title or possession.^® Thus, a 94 Person v. Oberteuffer, 59 96 Allen v. Shortridge, 1 Duv. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339. (Ky.) 34; Macmanus v. Thurber, 95 Marsh v. Titus, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 50 Hun (N. Y.) 604, 20 N. Y. St. 92, 550, 6 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 29. 3 N. Y. S. 33. An advancement of 6/ EQUITABLE LIENS. § 68 merchant received from another merchant a sum of money, for which he gave a receipt stating that he received it as an advance on a shipment of flour then making on board a cer- tain ship, to be consigned to the house of the merchant mak- ing the advances. The flour was afterwards purchased by the merchant who received the advances, and was delivered by the seller on board a ship freighted by this merchant. The latter, having stopped payment about the same time, agreed with the seller of the flour, who was ignorant of the agreement with the merchant who made the advances, to rescind the sale, and gave him back the bill of parcels. It was held that the merchant who made the advances had no lien on the flour that could prevent the merchant who re- ceived the advances from rescinding the contract with the seller of the flour, and redelivering to him the flour. To constitute a lien upon a corporeal chattel at common law, possession is essential; and while in equity a fund may be appropriated by an assignment without delivery of the fund itself, yet this is only where, from the nature of the fund, a transfer of possession is impossible. There can be no ap- propriation of a chattel susceptible of delivery which will prevail against third persons, without a delivery good at common law.^^ Chief Justice Tilghman upon this point said : "Any order, writing, or act which makes an appropria- tion of a fund, amounts to an equitable assignment of that fund. The reason is plain, the fund being neither assignable at law nor capable of manual possession, an appropriation of it is all that the case admits. A court of equity will there- for protect such appropriation, and consider it as equal to an assignment. But very different is the case of a parcel of money to the owner of a horse debt was not paid in a reasonable with an agreement that the horse time, will create an equitable lien should be delivered to the lender on the horse. Reardon v. Higgins, and be delivered to him as securi- 39 Ind. App. 363, 19 N. E. 208. ty and empowering him to sell ^7 Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Bin. the horse and pay himself if the (Pa.) 392. § 6g LIENS. 68 flour, which admits of actual delivery. Every man who pur- chases an interest in property of this kind, ought to take im- mediate possession; if he does not, he is guilty of negligence, and can have no equity against a third person, who contracts with the actual possessor without notice of a prior right. "^^ § 69. Contract between planter and factor. — A contract whereby a planter agrees to ship his crop of cotton to his factor, to reimburse him for advances and supplies, does not create a lien upon the cotton raised.^^ A merchant, in the spring of the year, made advances to a planter on his verbal promise to give a lien on his crops for the year to secure the advances. In June, the planter died suddenly without having given the lien, and his estate was insolvent. On a bill in equity by the merchant to marshal the assets of the estate, it was held that he had no equitable ground for relief. To entitle one to the benefit of an agri- cultural lien under the statute, he must comply strictly with the conditions of the statute. When one comes into a court of equity to compel specific performance of a contract, he must first show that all has been done that could be done to comply with the law. If he has been negligent in the matter, the court will not lend its aid to complete the con- tract, for this would be to encourage negligence in parties making contracts.^ In like manner an agreement between an owner and a builder, that a balance of account due the builder should be paid out of the income of the building, does not create a lien upon such income which can be enforced in equity.^ § 70. Equitable lien will not arise from advancement to improve property. — An equitable lien does not arise in favor 98 Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Bin. i Cureton v. Gilmore, 3 S. Car. (Pa.) 392, 398. 46. 99 Allen V. Montgomery, 48 Miss. 2 Alexander v. Berry, 54 Miss. 101. 422. 69 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 70 of one who has made advances to another to enable him to make improvements upon his property, though there was an understanding at the time that a lien should be given upon the property improved. Thus, where one loaned money to a mill-owner to be used in rebuilding a certain mill which had been destroyed, and it was understood that the lender was to have a lien on the mill to secure him, but no writing was made except a note for the money, upon the death of the borrower and the insolvency of his estate, it was held that equity would not sustain a lien on the mill in favor of the lender, to the prejudice of other creditors of the bor- rower.^ Had there been a written agreement that a mortgage should be given, equity might have declared such agreement to be an equitable mortgage; or had there been an express oral agreement that a mortgage should be given, and it could be shown that the failure to execute the mortgage was by reason of some fraud or accident, there might be good ground for relief in equity. But mere neglect to execute the mortgage, or neglect to execute a written agreement for a mortgage, is not such an accident as equity will relieve against. "It does not come to the aid of the sleeper, but of him who, though awake, has been entrapped by fraud or been prevented from getting his agreement put into writing by inevitable accident."^ Money advanced by one person to enable another to make improvements upon his property, as for instance to erect upon his own land a steam mill with machinery, creates no lien upon the mill and machinery. The advances constitute merely a debt from the party to whom the money is ad- 3 Printup V. Barrett, 46 Ga. 407. as against the land owner's cred- Where one advanced money to a itors where the owner dies and land owner to put improvements does not make such devise. Beach on the land under a contract that v. Bullock, 19 R. I. 121, 32 Atl. 165. the owner would devise the land 4 Printup v. Barrett, 46 Ga. 407, to him, has no lien on the land per McCay, J. § /I LIENS. 70 vanced.'^ Where advances are made to a husband to make improvements on his wife's land the lender can not enforce an equitable lien against the land.'^* § 71. Lien not created by voluntary pa5mient. — A lien upon the property of another is not created by a voluntary payment of a liability of his w^ithout request.^ But a request might be inferred from circumstances.^ Under special cir- cumstances, a joint ow^ner of property may have a lien upon the interest of the other part owners for advances made for repairing and preserving the property, especially if such re- pairs were necessary, and their consent to make them was unreasonably withheld. But in such case the party asserting the lien must show the special circumstances which will give him such lien.^ Constructive liens will not now be extended and applied to cases where by the rules of law they are not already clearly established : for such liens are not now en- couraged.^ § 72. Voluntary payment of insurance premiums creates no lien. — One who voluntarily pays premiums of insurance for another, in the absence of any agreement or understand- ing that for such payments he should have a lien upon the policy or its proceeds, has no lien upon the proceeds collected by him as the agent of the insured. ^^ ^ Weathersby v. Sleeper, 42 taxes with interest on such Miss. 732. To like effect see Gar- amount decreed as a prior lien on land V. Hull, 13 Smedes & M. such land, superior to such prior (Miss.) 76, 51 Am. Dec. 140. incumbrance. Packwood v. Briggs, •-■^Poe V. Ekert. 102 Iowa 361, 25 Wash. 530, 65 Pac. 846. 71 N. W. 579. 7 Oatfield v. Waring, 14 Johns. 6 Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 188. (N. Y.) 626. But where one in 8 Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb, good faith pays taxes on the land (N. Y.) 626. And see Doane v. of another, believing that he has a Badger, 12 Mass. 65. lien on the land, but which is af- 9 Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb, terward declared to be subject to (N. Y.) 626, per Allen, J. a prior lien, he is entitled to have 10 Meier v. Meier, 15 Mo. App. the amount so paid by him as 68, affd. 88 Mo. 566. 71 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 73 One who procures insurance for another in pursuance of a request to do so and to forward the policy, and not as a broker or general agent, has no lien on the policy. By under- taking to execute the order, he binds himself to comply with the terms and forward the policy, and this precludes the supposition that he was to have any lien upon it or interest in it. And though such person be the ship's husband for the general management of a vessel which is the subject of the insurance, yet he has no lien on the policy for the balance of his account. ^^ § 73. No equitable subrogation to one paying a debt of another. — There is no equitable subrogation in favor of one who pays a debt for which he is not personally bound, and which is not a charge upon his property, so as to entitle him to be subrogated to a lien which the creditor had upon the estate of the debtor. ^^ A stranger, by voluntarily paying the wages of workmen who are entitled to a lien, obtains no right in equity to a sub- rogation to their lien, in the absence of any assignment, or of an agreement that he should have the benefit of their lien. The superintendent of the work of constructing a railroad, without an)^ obligation on his part, voluntarily, for the pur- pose of befriending the workmen, advanced his own money to pay them their wages, supposing the railroad company to be solvent. He had no assignment, legal or equitable, of the wages paid, and there was no understanding that he was to have the benefit of their lien. It was held that he was not entitled, by subrogation, to the workmen's statutory lien 11 Reed v. Pacific Ins. Co., 1 policy, equity will give a lien on Mete. (Mass.) 166. Where the the proceeds of the policy to the owner of an insurance policy uses bank. Thum v. Wolstenholme, 21 funds of a bank to pay premiums Utah 446, 61 Pac. 537. on his policy and he is the man- 12 Jones on Mortgages, § 874a; ager of the bank, and the funds Wilkes v. Harper, 1 N. Y. 586. used by him can be traced into the § 74 LIENS. 'J 2 for such wages. ^^ "The statutory lien given to workmen is to be confined within its legitimate limits. It is not to be extended by a forced application of the principle of subroga- tion in equity to cases not within the mischief which the law was designed to remedy. The object of the legislature was to secure to a very meritorious but helpless class of persons the payment of the wages of their toil, and to that end to give them personally a paramount lien on the assets of the employer. It did not contemplate giving to creditors from whom the company might borrov^ money on its own credit with which to pay its workmen, such a lien on the assets for their reimbursement."^* § 74, One paying debt of railroad company entitled to subrogation. — But one who pays a debt of a railroad com- pany for rolling-stock under a contract with the com- pany for security by subrogation to the rights of the vendor, under his contract with the company, is entitled to such subrogation to the vendor's lien, and can not be con- sidered a mere volunteer in making the payment. ^^ § 74a. Equitable lien on legacy. — There is an equitable lien upon a legacy in favor of the testator's estate for the amount 13 In re North River Construe- pany's bookkeeper by the bank tion Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 433, affd. 40 who is to pay the money collected N. J. Eq. 340. "It has never been on them to the bank, the bank ac- held that one vi^ho lends or ad- quired a lien on the accounts. At- vances money to a corporation to lantic Trust Co. v. Carbondale enable it to pay laborers, w^ho, if Coal Co., 99 Iowa 234, 68 N. W. their wages had remained unpaid. 697. would have been entitled to the 14 in re North River Construc- lien therefor, is, merely by virtue tion Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 433, afifd. 40 of such loan or advance, entitled N. J. Eq. 340, per Runyon, Chan- to that lien by equitable subroga- cellor. tion." But where a bank advances 15 Coe v. New Jersey Midland money for a pay roll to a coal R. Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 110, revd. 27 company under an agreement that N. J. Eq. 658. And see Payne v. the com.pany's accounts shall be Hathaway, 3 Vt. 212; New Jersey assigned to it and such accounts Midland R. Co. v. Wortendyke, 27 are loft in the hands of the com- N. J. Eq. 658. yi) EQUITABLE LIENS. § 76 of a debt due from the legatee to the testator. Such a lien may be spoken of as an equitable right of set-ofif. "The right to retain is grounded upon the principle that it would be in- equitable that a legatee should be entitled to his legacy while he retains in his possession a part of the funds out of which his and other legacies are to be paid. He should not receive anything out of such a fund without deducting there- from the amount of that fund which he has in his hands as a debt to the estate. An assignee of the legatee takes his legacy subject to the same equity which exists against it in his hands." Such lien is prior to that of a judgment creditor of the legatee.^® § 75. Mere loan of money. — A mere loan of money to be used in the purchase of land does not create a lien upon the land for its repayment. ^^ § 76. Surety has no lien on estate of his principal. — A surety as such has no lien on the estate of his principal. The fact that this money has gone to increase his principal's estate raises, perhaps, a natural equity that it should be returned to the surety out of the estate. But this natural equity yields to legal rights. Thus, if one accepts drafts for the accom- modation of another under an agreement that the drawer shall use the proceeds of the drafts in the purchase of mer- chandise to be consigned to the acceptor, and the drawer dies before using the proceeds in the purchase of such mer- chandise, the acceptor can not maintain a lien upon the money raised upon the drafts, although this still stands to the credit of the drawer at his banker's. The fact that the money was raised on the credit of the acceptor, and that he accepted for accommodation, gives him no lien on the money. The money is the property of the drawer, and passes upon his death to his executor or administrator without charge. 16 Irvine v. Palmer, 91 Tenn. i7 Collinson v. Owens, 6 Gill 463, 19 S. W. 326, 30 Am. St. 893. & J. (Md.) 4. § 77 LIENS. 74 Money collected on notes received by a bank for collection is impressed with a trust in favor of the owner of the notes in the event the bank fails. ^^ § 77. Lien by agreement to give a mortgage. — An agree- ment, on a sufficient consideration, to give a mortgage on specific property, creates an equitable lien upon such prop- erty, which takes precedence of the claims of the promisor's general creditors, and of the claims of subsequent purchasers and incumbrances with notice of the lien.^^ If the written agreement shows a clear intention to make some particular property a security for a debt or obligation, equity will treat the instrument as an executory agreement to give security.-'' The agreement creates a specific lien 18 Holt V. Bank of August, 13 Ga. 341, per Nisbet, J. ; Sherwood V. Central Michigan Savings Bank. 103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 352. 19 Jones on Mortgages, §§ 163- 167. New York: Husted v. In- graham, 75 N. Y. 251 ; Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; In re Howe, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 124, 19 Am. Dec. 395; Wood v. Lester, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 145; Seymour v. Canandaigua & Niagara Falls R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 284, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y. ) 531; Smith v. Smith, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 164, 4 N. Y. S. 669, 20 N. Y. St. 597, affd. 125 N. Y. 224. 26 N. E. 259; Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. 1000. South Carolina: Dow v. Ker, Speers' Ch. (S. Car.) 413; Mas- sey V. Mcllwain, 2 Hill's Eq. (S. Car.) 421, 428. In Price v. Cutts. 29 Ga. 142, 74 Am. Dec. 52, how- ever, it is said that an agreement to execute a mortgage in prae- senti, the actual execution of it failing through inadvertence or other cause, does not constitute such a lien as will prevail against subsequent judgment creditors. When the maker of a note con- tracts in writing that if the note is not paid he will execute a deed of trust as security covering all his real estate, the payee is en- titled to assert an equitable lien on such real estate upon the note not being paid when due. Woarms V. Hammond, 5 App. D. C. 338. See also. Rooker v. Hoofstetter, 26 Can. Sup. Ct. Rep. 41. ■-i^ Pom. Eq. Jur. 1235; Seymour V. Canandaigua & Niagara Falls R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 284; Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, 19 N. W. 580; Nelson v. Kelly, 91 Ala. 569, 8 So. 690. No equitable lien, attempted to be created by a verbal promise to mortgage tobacco not yet plant- ed can be enforced where the to- bacco is exempt from execution. Stahl V. Lowe, 18 Ky. L. 946, 19 Ky. L. 210. 38 S. W. 862. 75 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 78 upon the property, which takes precedence of the claims of subsequent creditors and purchasers with notice.^^ Where the agreement was that a mortgage should be given upon one building and lot out of several buildings and lots, which were together sufficiently identified, and after- wards a mechanic's lien was filed against all the houses and lots, the fact that the original agreement did not point out the particular premises to be mortgaged was held not to im- pair its effect as an equitable lien, at least as against the claimant of a mechanic's lien, who could not be afifected by the application of the lien to any one of the houses and lots, his lien being upon all.^^ § 78. Agreement to give other security. — An agreement to give any other security rests upon the same principle. If one borrows a promissory note from a friend to obtain a dis- count at a bank, and promises by letter to give his friend a bill of sale of a schooner as security, and the borrower dies without giving the bill of sale, and the lender of the note is obliged to take it up, he has an equitable lien on the schooner in preference to the general creditors of the deceased. The bill of sale must be considered as made at the time of the giving of the note.^^ In like manner, if a person covenant that he will, on or be- fore a certain day, secure an annuity by a charge upon free- hold estates, or by investment in the funds, or by the best means in his power, such covenant will create a lien upon any 2iLanning v. Tompkins, 45 22 Payne v. Wilson 74 N. Y. 348. Barb. (N. Y.) 308; See also. 23 Read v. Gaillard, 2 Desaus Falmouth Nat. Bank v. Cape Cod (S. Car.) 552, 2 Am. Dec. 696. See Ship Canal Co., 166 Mass. 550, 44 similar case in regard to undeliv- N. E. 617; Smith v. Equitable ered deed to land to pay debt Trust Co., 215 Pa. 418, 64 Atl. 594; where grantor died. Sutton v. Galbraith v. First State Bank & Gibson. 119 Ky. 422, 27 Ky. L. HI, Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 133 84 S. W. 335. S. W. 300; Schermerhorn v. Gard- enier, 184 N. Y. 612, 11 N. E. 1196. § 79 LIENS. 76 property to which he becomes entitled between the date of the covenant and the day so limited for its performance.^^ The deposit of title deed does not give a lien on them.^^ § 79. Debtor's agreement to insure for benefit of his cred- tor. — In this way a debtor's agreement to insure for the ben- efit of a creditor may give the latter an equitable lien upon an insurance obtained in the debtor's name, to the extent of the creditor's interest.^^ Thus, where a mortgagor cove- nants to keep the premises insured for the benefit of the mortgagee, and obtains a policy of insurance in his own name, upon the happening of a loss the mortgagee has an equitable lien upon the fund payable under the policy.^^ But the mere fact that one is a mortgagee of premises which the mortgagor has insured in his own name gives him no lien upon the money payable upon the policy. The con- tract of insurance is a personal contract of indemnity be- tween the insured and the underwriter. The mortgagor has an insurable interest, and he may insure for his own benefit; and the mere fact that he is personally liable to pay a debt which is a lien upon the property insured does not afifect his right to claim the full benefit of the insurance. A mortga- gee's equitable right to claim the benefit of such insurance arises only where he has a contract with the mortgagor for insurance as a further security. The mortgagee's equitable lien in such case rests wholly upon contract.^^ Where a life insurance policy is taken out by a creditor on the life of his debtor, but by mistake the policy is made paya- 24Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 27 Thomas' Admrs. v. Von Mylne & Cr. 561; Roundell v. Kapff's Exrs., 6 Gill. & J. (Md.) Breary, 2 Vern. 482; Lyde v. 372; Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige Mynn, 4 Sim. 505, 1 Mylne & K. (N. Y.) 437, per Walworth, Ch. 683. 28 Neale v. Reid, 3 Dow. & Ry. 25 Atlantic Trust & Banking Co. 158; Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige (N. V. Nelms, 115 Ga. 53, 41' S. E. 247. Y.) 437; Jones on Mortgages, § 26 Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Aid. 1. 401. y'j EQUITABLE LIENS. § 8l able to the estate of the insured, the creditor, in case of the death of the insured, has no lien on the policy.^" § 80. Agreement to build and convey a mill as security. — A written contract was made by the owners of timber land for the sale of the standing timber at an agreed price, the purchaser agreeing to build a sawmill worth nine thousand dollars upon a forty-acre tract, the title to which the vendors were to convey to him. It was also agreed that the pur- chaser might mortgage the mill site and mill to a third per- son for the sum of sixty-five hundred dollars, and should give a second mortgage to the vendors to secure the performance of the contract. The purchaser, by means of the contract, borrowed about ten thousand dollars, and, after the mill was built, conveyed the mill and mill site to the lender by way of mortgage to secure the advances, before the vendors had conveyed the title of the mill lot to the vendee. It was held that under the circumstances the mortgagee was equitably entitled to a lien upon the mill lot, but that the amount of such lien could not exceed the sum mentioned in the con- tract.3° § 81. For debt omitted from mortgage by mistake. — An equitable lien can not be claimed for a debt omitted by a debtor in securing his creditor by a chattel mortgage for the supposed amount of his indebtedness. Thus, where personal property was exchanged for land of less value, and the dif- ference in value was secured by a chattel mortgage upon the personalty exchanged, and it was afterwards discovered that the land was subject to taxes for a considerable amount which the mortgagor should have included in the amount of his mortgage, it was held that the mortgagee was not en- titled to an equitable lien upon the goods for the amount of 29 Johnson v. Coney, 120 Ga. 767, so Hubbard v. Bellew, 10 Fed. 48 S. E. nz. 849. § 82 LIENS. 78 such taxes. Certainly such a Hen will not be established as against other creditors of the mortgagor after his insol- vency.^^ The mortgagee might have ascertained at the time of the transacton whether the taxes had been paid, had he exercised ordinary care and diligence. The mortgagee hav- ing chosen to take, without examination, the statement of the mortgagor and his covenant in his deed of the land, a court of equity will not give him relief. Whether, in case the mortgage note had by fraud or mistake been made for an amount less than a certain liquidated sum which by agree- ment the mortgage was to secure, the mortgagee would have an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the goods in the hands of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, is a question which the court did not consider. § 82. Agreement of purchaser of land to pay debt which is lien on the land. — A covenant or agreement of a purchaser of land to pay a debt which is supposed to be a lien on the land binds the land with a trust for the payment of such lien. Thus, a debtor confessed judgment to his creditor, but by mistake the judgment was not docketed in the county where the debtor's land was situated. The debtor afterwards sold the land to one who agreed to pay the supposed judgment lien as a part of the consideration. Afterward, on learning that the judgment had not been docketed so as to make it a lien on the land, the purchaser refused to pay it. On a bill filed by the creditor against the purchaser, it was held that the latter took the land charged with an equitable lien or trust for the payment of the judgment; and the fact that the amount of the judgment was greater than the parties sup- posed was held to constitute no defense.^^ An agreement, not under seal, given by a grantor of land at the time of the conveyance, stipulating that he would sup- -^ Chamberlin v. Peltz, 1 Mo. ''2 Haverly v. Becker, 4 N. Y. App. 183. 169. 79 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 84 port and maintain the grantor, and pledging for that purpose the product of the land, and, should that prove insufficient, appropriating the entire fee, is an equitable lien upon the land in the nature of a mortgage.^^ § 83. Verbal contract to pay the debt of another. — A verbal contract by one person to pay the debts of another, who should thereupon convey to the former certain lands, is void under the statute of frauds, and can support no rights, either legal or equitable. ^^ If a party pays money under such a void contract, he may, perhaps, recover it back in assump- sit; but a court of equity will not create a lien upon real es- tate in favor of the party paying, unless, from the nature of the transaction, rights have sprung up which ought to be held binding upon the specific property.^^ That the parties to such contract are father and son does not afiford any equit- able ground for declaring a lien. § 84. Creditor's lien on capital stock of corporation. — The creditors of a corporation have an equitable lien upon the capital stock for the payment of its debts. ^^ When debts are incurred a contract arises with the creditors that the capital stock shall not be withdrawn or applied, otherwise than upon their demands, until these are satisfied. 'Tf diverted, they may follow it as far as it can be traced, and subject it to the payment of their claims, except as against holders who have taken it bona fide for a valuable consideration and without notice. It is publicly pledged to those who deal with the corporation, for their security."^'^ Therefore a corporation 33 Chase V. Peck. 21 N. Y. 581. Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587; 34 Kelly V. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; 19 N. W. 580. Clapp v. Peterson, 104 111. 26; He- 35 Per Champlin, J., in Kelly v. man v. Britton, 88 Mo. 549; Gill Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, 19 N. W. 580. v. Balis, 72 Mo. 424. 36 Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 37 Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 23 L. ed. 220; Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 60, 23 L. ed. 220, per Swayne, J. Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 731; § 85 LIENS. 80 is not allowed to injuriously affect the rights of a creditor by purchasing its own stock and retiring it. Every stockholder is conclusively charged with notice of the trust character which attaches to its capital stock; and. therefore, if a stock- holder takes from the corporation other property in exchange for such stock, he takes such property subject to an equity in favor of a creditor of the corporation to have the property in place of the stock applied to the payment of the debt to himself.^* The creditor of a corporation has also an equitable lien upon its property and assets; and if the corporation distrib- utes these among its stockholders, leaving a creditor unpaid, he may, after obtaining judgment against the corporation, and the execution has been returned unsatisfied, maintain a creditor's bill against a stockholder to reach whatsoever he has received in the distribution.^^ But as against a prior attaching creditor of the corporation no superior equitable lien exists.'*® A claim of the corporation against a stockholder for his unpaid subscription for shares is an asset of the company, and a creditor has the same right to look to it as to any other asset of the company, and the same right to insist upon its payment as upon the payment of any other debt due the com- pany.*^ § 85. Lien of creditors of a corporation upon its property transferred to another corporation. — A corporation to which all the property of another corporation is transferred, which is thereupon dissolved without providing for the payment of its debts, takes the property subject to a lien in favor of the creditors of the old corporation to the amount of the prop- 38 Clapp V. Peterson, 104 111. 26. & Mechanics' Bank, 11 Colo. 97, 39 Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587; 17 Pac. 280. Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9. 4i Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 40 Jones V. Bank, 10 Colo. 464, 23 L. ed. 220. 17 Pac. 272; Breene v. Merchants' 8r EQUITABLE LIENS. § 86 erty transferred.^^ Any arrangement whereby one corpora- tion takes from another all its property, so that the old cor- poration is deprived of the means of paying its debts, and is enabled to dissolve its corporate existence and place itself practically beyond the reach of creditors, is unconscionable unless the new corporation pays the debts of the old. It mat- ters not whether the stockholders of the two "corporations are the same or different, only that the equity is all the stronger where the stockholders of both are the same. Equity certainly can not permit the owners of one corporation to organize another, and transfer from the former to the latter all the corporate property, without paying all the corporate debts.^3 A life insurance company, being about to close up its busi- ness, reinsured its policies in another company, to which it assigned certain bonds for the protection of sureties upon an indemnifying bond, under a contract that, after the liability of the sureties should be at an end, such bonds should be ap- portioned among the stockholders of the company effecting the reinsurance. It was held that the bonds became the property of the stockholders as against all the world, except the creditors of the company; but that in favor of such credi- tors they constituted a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the company, and in the hands of such stockholders, or of any depositary, such bonds w^ere subject to an equitable lien in favor of the creditors, w^hich might be enforced upon the failure of the company reinsuring to comply with its con- tract.-** § 86. Superiority of lien of coqjorate creditor after trans- fer of stock to another corporation. — And so where the stock- ^- Brum V. Merchants' Mut. Ins. 43 Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis Co., 4 Woods (U. S.) 156, 16 Fed. & N. O. Transp. Co., 13 Fed. 516, 140; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis per McCrary, C. J. & N. O. Transp. Co., 13 Fed. 516: 44 Heman v. Britton. 88 Mo. 549. Harrison v. Union Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 522. 6 § 87 LIENS. 82 holders of a corporation which is in debt transfer all its assets to another corporation in consideration of receiving stock of such other corporation, and of its assuming the liabilities of the old corporation, a creditor of such old corporation has a lien upon the property so transferred which is superior to that of a mortgagee of the property made by the new cor- poration, if t-he mortgagee had notice of the debt at the time of taking the mortgage.*^ Treat. J., delivering the opinion, said : "The transferred assets were greater than the assumed obligations by the new corporation. Hence all persons subse- quent in interest with notice of such equitable lien take sub- ordinate thereto. The evidence discloses that, although the transfer from the old to the new corporation was not for- mally recorded, all the parties were sufficiently informed with respect thereto. The equitable doctrine applies, viz., that they took subject to the prior equitable lien." § 87. Lien of minority shareholders of corporation. — The minority shareholders of a corporation have an equitable lien upon its property which the majority have sold to themselves, in breach of their fiduciary relation. "The majority can not sell the assets of the company, and keep the consideration, but must allow the minority to have their share of any con- sideration which may come to them."^^ There is an implied contract in the association together of the members of a cor- poration, that its powers shall be exercised only for the pur- pose of accomplishing the objects for which the corporation 45 Blair v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., ors of the selling company do not 24 Fed. 148, affg. 22 Fed. 36; Fogg thereby acquire an equitable lien V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 17 Fed. upon the property sold for the 871. The case of Hervey v. Illinois payment of their claims, but they Midland R. Co., 28 Fed. 169, is in merely acquire the right to look contradiction of this view. It is for payment to the purchasing there held that, where a railroad company. company purchases the property 46 Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph of another railroad company, and Works, L. R. 9 Ch. App. Cas. 350, assumes its indebtedness, credit- 354, per Mellish, L. J. 83 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 87 was formed.'*'^ The majority of the members are in fact the corporation, so far as its management is concerned: they can bind the whole body of the associates in all transactions with- in the scope of the corporate powers. But when they assume to control the corporation, they assume the trust relation oc- cupied by the corporation towards its stockholders.^^ Al- though stockholders are not partners, nor strictly tenants in common, they are the beneficial joint owners of the corporate property, having an interest and power of legal control in exact proportion to their respective amounts of stock. The corporation itself holds its property as a trust fund for the stockholders who have a joint interest in all its property and eflfects, and the relation between it and its several members is, for all practical purposes, that of trustee and cestui que trust. When several persons have a common interest in property, equity will not allow one to appropriate it exclu- sively to himself, or to impair its value to the others. Com- munity of interest involves mutual obligation. Persons oc- cupying this relation towards each other are under an obliga- tion to make the property or fund productive of the most that can be obtained from it for all who are interested in it; and those who seek to make a profit out of it, at the expense of those whose rights in it are the same as their own, are un- faithful to the relation they have assumed, and are guilty at least of constructive fraud. Among the disabilities imposed by courts of equit}^ upon those who occupy a fiduciary rela- tion toward others, respecting property which is to be ad- 47 Abbot V. American Hard Rub- and applied by him to pay a lien ber Co., 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 578. 21 upon his individual property, will How. Pr. (N. Y.) 193. be followed by equity and it will 48 Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nav. impress upon such officer's prop- Co., 27 Fed. 625, 23 Blatchf. (U. S.) erty, into which the fund went, a 517. See also, Atkins v. Wabash, lien for its repayment, if the prop- St. L. & P. R. Co., 29 Fed. 161, 21 erty is still held by him. Red Bud Am. L. Rev. 104. And funds of Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, the corporation wrongfully taken 131 S. W. 340. by an officer of the corporation § 88 LIENS. 84 ministered for beneficiaries, is that which precludes the fidu- ciary from purchasing- the property on his own account, with- out such a full and complete understanding in advance with the beneficiaries as will repel all inferences that the fiduciary intended to derive any peculiar advantage for himself. * * * The fiduciary can not retain his bargain by showing that the sale was public, or that the price was fair, or that there was no intention on his part to gain an unfair advantage. Where he has a duty to perform which is inconsistent with the char- acter of a purchaser, he can not divest himself of the equities of the beneficiaries to demand the profits that may arise from the transaction."** An equitable lien may be decreed to exist in favor of such minority shareholders upon the property of the old corpora- tion in the hands of the new corporation to the extent of the value of the property which they have been deprived of. Such lien is prior to the lien of the stockholders of the new cor- poration, but is subject to the lien of the holders of its mort- gage bonds. § 88. Shareholder's equitable lien on funds specially de- posited. — The shareholders of a corporation have an equit- able lien upon a fund specially deposited for the payment of a dividend declared by the company. Each shareholder has a lien upon the fund to the extent of the dividend to which he is entitled. The Erie Railway Company, having declared a dividend of one per cent, upon its stock, deposited the money to pay the same with Duncan, Sherman & Co., bankers. Some three months afterwards the money remaining with the bank- ers was withdrawn by the company, and subsequently passed, with its other property, to a receiver of the road. Upon the application of a stockholder entitled to such dividend, it was held that he had an equitable lien upon the fund deposited 40 Per Wallace, J., in Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co.. 27 Fed. 625. 85 EQUITABLE LIENS. | 89 for its payment, and that this lien followed the fund into the hands of the receiver, who held it as trustee for the benefit of the stockholders who had not been paid.^° In like manner a lien was declared in a case where an in- surance company had declared a dividend, and given notice of it to the stockholders, and had prepared checks upon a fund in bank for delivery to the stockholders as they should call. A great fire occurred before all the stockholders had been paid, whereby the company was rendered insolvent and its property passed into the hands of a receiver. The divi- dend was regarded as so far appropriated to the stockholders that they were entitled to it as against the general creditors of the company.^^ § 89. Liens created by assumption of mortgage or other liens. — Liens may be created by the assumption of a mort- gage or other lien upon property. An equitable lien is created in behalf of a creditor by an agreement made with the debtor by a third person whereby the latter undertakes to pay the debt, or to secure the payment of it. A common instance of the creation of such a lien occurs where the consideration for the conveyance of property is the assumption of the payment by the vendee of an existing lien upon the property, or debt of the vendor in respect of the property.^^ Thus, where two or more railroad companies consolidate, and part of the con- sideration for the transfer of the property of one of the roads to the consolidated company is the payment by it of certain unsecured equipment bonds issued by the company making the transfer, and the consolidated company agrees to "pro- tect" such bonds, the bondholders thereby acquire an equit- 50 In re Le Blanc, 14 Hun (N. Vanmeters' Exrs. v. Vanmeters, 3 Y.) 8, 4 Abb. N. C. 221. affd. 75 Grat. (Va.) 148; Clyde v. Simp- N. Y. 598. son, 4 Ohio St. 445; Nichols v. 51 Le Roy v. Globe Ins. Co.. 2 Glover, 41 Ind. 24; Harris v. Fly, Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 657. 7 Paige (N. Y.) 421 ; Hallett v. 52 Jones on Mortgages, § 162; Hallett, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 15. § 90 LIENS. 86 able lien on the property of the consolidated company for the payment of their bonds. ^^ § 90. Consolidated company subject to liens of original corporation. — A consolidated corporation may be subject to liens existing against original corporation. The holder of the bonds of a railroad corporation, which are a specific lien upon the income of property which has passed by consolidation from the hands of the original debtor corporation to another corporation, can enforce his lien against the latter corpora- tion, when it receives such income. He has a lien on the in- come of the property in whosesoever hands it may come with notice of the lien, and he has the right to enforce this lien in- dependently of any proceeding he may have at law to reach other property in the hands of the debtor corporation. He has the right to pursue the debtor, or to enforce his lien against the income; or he may pursue all his remedies at the same time.^^ But the lien does not attach in favor of a stock- holder of a railroad company upon its consolidation with another company, though the consolidated company gave him notes for his interest in the old company instead of stock, which the agreement of consolidation provided should be is- sued to the stockholders in the old corporation. The stock- holder had no interest in the lands of the old company. These belonged to the corporation, and the stockholder merely had an interest in the corporation. The corporation, and not the stockholders, sold and transferred the lands to the consoli- dated company. An individual stockholder had nothing to sell but his stock.*"* § 91. Bonds of original corporation not a lien. — But if the bonds of the original corporation were neither a lien upon its 53 Tysen v. Wabash R. Co., 15 54 Rjtten v. Union Pacific R. Fed. 763, 11 Biss. (U. S.) 510, revd. Co., 16 Rep. 199. 114 U. S. 587, 5 Sup. Ct. 1081, 29 55 Cross v. Burlington & S. W. L. ed. 235. R. Co., 58 Iowa 62, 12 N. W. 71. 87 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 92 property nor its income, though it is agreed that they shall be protected "as to the principal and interest as they shall re- spectively fall due" by the consolidated company, and the bonds were issued after the passage of statutes authorizing the consolidation, the holders have no lien upon the property of the consolidated company, nor upon the proceeds of a sale of such property made under a mortgage executed by the consolidated company. The agreement to protect the bonds created only a personal obligation to see that they should be paid at maturity. It was claimed also that the payment of the bonds was a part of the consideration of the transfer, and that the case came within the principle of a vender's lien for unpaid purchase-money. But the court, by Mr. Justice Gray, upon this point declared: "We are unable to perceive any analogy between the two cases. The doctrine of vendor's lien applies only to sales of real estate. The consolidation of the stock and property of several corporations into one was not a sale; and it did not effect real estate only, but included franchises and personal property."^^ § 92. Equitable lien against railroad company. — x\n equit- able lien can not be declared against railroad property in the hands of a receiver, to secure the payment for necessary sup- plies furnished the company before the appointment of the receiver, as against a mortgage then subsisting upon the property.^'^ The creditor in such case only holds the relation of a general creditor of the corporation, with no lien upon anything to secure his claim. The mere act of appointing a receiver to preserve the property pendente lite does not change the character of the debt from an unsecured to a se- cured claim. The court may require the receiver to pay the current expenses of the road out of the current earnings be- 56 Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. R. New York, W. S. & B. R. Co., 25 Co. V. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 29 L. Fed. 800; Olyphant v. St. Louis ed. 235, 5 Sup. Ct. 1081. Ore & Steel Co., 28 Fed. 729. 57 United States Trust Co. v. § 93 LIENS. 88 fore anything is paid upon the mortgage. The current run- ning expenses ma}^ include, by order of court, expenses in- curred within a certain time prior to the date of the appoint- ment of the receiver. But if the current earnings are insuffi- cient to pay the current debts incurred within the time speci- fied, the court will not declare a debt not incurred within that limited time a lien upon property previously pledged to the payment of the mortgage. § 93, Court of equity appropriate tribunal for enforcing equitable liens. — A court of equity is the appropriate tribunal for enforcing an equitable lien.^^ "In equity, there is no dif- ficulty in enforcing a lien or any other equitable claim, con- stituting a charge in rem, not only upon real estate, but also upon personal estate, or upon money in the hands of a third person, whenever the lien or other claim is a matter of agree- ment, against the party himself and his personal representa- tives, and against any persons claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, and against assignees in bankruptcy, who are treated as volunteers; for every such agreement for a lien or charge in rem constitutes a trust, and is accordingly governed by the general doctrine applicable to trusts. "^^ A court of equity, whose powers are limited to certain mat- ters strictly defined, may be without jurisdiction to enforce an equitable lien. Such was formerly the case in Massachu- setts when there was only a very limited equity jurisdiction. But wherever there is full equity jurisdiction — that is. an equity jurisdiction coincident and coextensive with that exer- cised by the Court of Chancery in England — there is jurisdic- tion for the enforcement of any equitable lien or charge f^ o8 Vallette v. Whitewater Val- •"'f' Fletcher v. Morey, Fed. Cas. ley Canal Co.. 4 Fed. Cas. No. No. 4864, 2 Story (U. S.) 555. 565. 16820. 4 McLean (U. S.) 192; 60 Fletcher v. Morey, Fed. Cas. Ridgely V. Iglehart, 3 Bland (Md.) No. 4864, 2 Story (U. S.) 555, 565; 540; Brown v. Truax, 58 Ore. 572, Los Angeles County v. Winans, 13 115 Pac. 597. Cal. App. 234, 109 Pac. 640. Equity 89 EQUITABLE LIENS. § 95 and, unless there be a special remedy provided by statute, this jurisdiction should be invoked for the enforcement of any equitable lien. The usual mode of enforcing an equitable lien is by an or- der of sale of the property to which it is attached. ^^ § 94. Lien at law not enforcible in equity. — A lien at law or by statute can not be enforced in equity. Except as rem- edy in equity is expressly provided by statute, a court of equity can enforce an equitable lien, either upon a legal or equitable estate in lands; but a lien which is purely legal, which is created by statute and is dependent upon statutory provisions for its enforcement, can not be aided in equity if the lien fails at law.^^ In the absence of statutory provisions no lien will be foreclosed in equity except in conformity with established rules of equitable jurisprudence. Thus, a general lien of a judgment will not be turned into the specific lien of a decree in equity and enforced by a sale under such decree. Equity will not interfere where there is a full and complete remedy by statute. The foreclosure of a lien is either a statu- tory or an equitable proceeding. At law there is no remedy beyond retaining possession. § 95. Disposition of property subject to equitable lien. — If the owner of property subject to an equitable Hen disposes of it, in hostility to the lien, to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the lien, so that the lien is destroyed, the lienor has a cause of action against the person so selling the property for the restoration of such equitable lien.^^ This right is im- will look to the substance to as- ^2 Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb, certain whether a lien is created Ch. (N. Y.) 165, 47 Am. Dec. 305; by it. Ward v. Stark, 91' Ark. 268, Douglass v. Huston, 6 Ohio 156; 121 S. W. 382. Howe Machine Co. v. Miner, 28 61 Perry v. Board of Missions, Kans. 441; Pennsylvania Co. v. 102 N. Y. 99, 106, 1 N. Y. St. 169; Thatcher, 78 Ohio St. 175, 85 N. E. Price V. Palmer, 23 Hun (N. Y.) 55. 504, 507. 63 Husted v. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. § 95 LIENS. 90 portant where the lienor has no personal claim against such owner, as where by contract one is to have a share of the property or fund recovered by another, and has by a contract a lien upon the property or fund so recovered. In such case the creditor's only claim is against the fund recovered, and, it being a lien by contract, its maintenance does not depend upon possession. It is an equitable charge enforcible only in a court of equity. The person who recovers the fund or prop- erty and holds it in his own name can transfer it to a pur- chaser for value and in good faith without notice of the lien; but in so doing he- inflicts a special injury upon the lienor, for which an action lies for damages for the destruction of the lien, or, perhaps, an action in the nature of an action for money had and received for the proceeds of his interest. The cause of action in either case arises at the time of the wrong- ful sale of the property, and the statute of limitations com- mences to run from that time.^^ 251 ; Hale v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, 64 N. Y. 550, 555 ; Hovey V. Elliott, 21 J. & S. (N. Y.) 331, 118 N. Y. 124, 137, 23 N. E. 475. 64 Hovey v. Elliott, 21 J. & S. 331, 118 N. Y. 124, 23 N. E. 475. In this case the plaintiffs made an agreement with a person who had a large claim pending before the mixed commission on British and American claims, under the treaty of 1871, for the value of certain cotton, by which the plaintiffs were to aid the claimant, and he was to pay them for their serv- ices twenty-five per cent, of any amount allowed on the claim, and this amount was made a lien upon any money, draft, or evidence of indebtedness, which might be paid or issued thereon. A large sum was recovered, and a receiver was appointed for one half of the award, and he was directed to in- vest the money in certain bonds, and this he did. A suit to estab- lish the lien was dismissed, and the receiver was directed to pay the funds to the claimant. The re- ceiver, under instructions of the court, turned over the bonds to the claimant, who sold them to purchasers who were chargeable with notice of the plaintiff's claim to a lien; and these pur- chr.sers, in turn, sold them to bona fi'^'e purchasers who had no notice of the claim. Thereafter the judgment dismissing the action to establish the lien was, on appeal, reversed, and judgment was en- tered that the plaintiffs had a lien on the award, or the proceeds thereof. It was held that this last judgment created no lien, for there was then no property on 91 EQUITABLE LIENS. 96 A purchaser of property in which there is an equitable lien, when chargeable with knowledge of it, is liable to the lien- holder for the amount of his lien.^^ § 96. Priorities. — A specific equitable lien upon land is preferred to a subsequent judgment lien.^^ If the equitable lien and the judgment lien come into existence at the same time, the former is not entitled to preference in case it was created to secure an antecedent indebtedness, with no new consideration advanced at the time on the faith of it.'^'^ Subsequent purchasers and creditors are bound by equit- able liens if they acquire their rights with either actual or constructive notice of them. Thus a purchaser of land may, by written agreement, create an equitable lien in favor of a surety upon the purchase-money note for it who pays the note, and such lien will prevail against a creditor with no- tice.^® In like manner if a purchaser of land borrows money which a lien could be established: but it established the fact that a lien had existed on the bonds be- fore they were sold to bona fide purchasers without notice and the lien destroyed; that the pur- chasers of the bonds with notice of the claim of lien were liable to action for their wrongful act in destroying the lien, but that the cause of action accrued at the time of such wrongful sale, and was barred by the six years' lim- itation under the statute of lim- itations. This holding of the court below was upon appeal (118 N. Y. 124), declared erroneous ; that the purchasers of the bonds hav- ing made the purchase pendente lite were chargeable with knowl- edge of the plaintiffs' claim, and were bound by the result as ef- fectually as if they had been made parties to the suit, and for the purposes of the lien might be deemed to have held the bonds, and upon the sale thereof to hold the proceeds in trust for the plain- tiffs; that when the decree was obtained they were bound to pay the plaintiffs an amount sufficient to satisfy their lien, and concur- rently in time with the arising of such duty the right to demand its performance accrued; that prior to said decree the plaintiffs' lien was simply equitable, to be en- forced only by suit in equity; that, therefore, during the pendency of the former action the statute of limitations did not run. 65 Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 23 N. E. 475. 66 Stevens v. Watson, 4 Abb. Dec. 302. 67 Dwight V. Newell, 3 N. Y. 185. 68 Bailey v. Welch, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 244. § 96 LIENS. 92 to pay the purchase-money and agrees with the lender that he shall have a purchase-money lien upon the land, the pur- chaser has an equitable lien for the money advanced which is superior to the rights of creditors or purchasers with actual notice.®^ A prior equitable lien is preferred to a mechanic's lien upon the same property, though the claimant under the latter had no notice of the equitable lien at the time his lien took ef- fectJ^* But a specific equitable lien upon lands is not preferred to a prior lien by judgment thereon; and this is so although the lands be acquired by the debtor after the recovery of the judgmentJ^ A mechanic's lien is subject to an equitable lien existing at the time the claimant files his notice of claiming a lien. Until he files his notice he has no greater equities than other gen- eral creditors, and is affected by all equities existing at that time in favor of others dealing with his debtor. His lien at- taches only to the estate and interest of the debtor as it then exists, which is the estate and interest left to the debtor after satisfying prior liens and equities.'^^ f'9 Trimble v. Puckett, 14 Ky. L. bought from P., it being the farm 209, 19 S. W. 591. The agreement I now live on." was in a note as follows : "On "o Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348. I promise to pay P. dol- '^1 Cook v. Banker, 50 N. Y. 655. lars as purchase-money furnished 72 Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348, by P., and to have the same effect affg. 11 Hun (N. Y.) 302. as though the land had been 97. Introductory. 105. 98. Taxes a lien on real estate. 99. State's statutory lien on real estate. 106. 100. Lien of state on criminal's property. 107. 101. Improvement liens. 108. 102. Water rates as liens. 109. 103. Liens upon animals damage 110. feasant. 111. 104. Possession not required to support statutory liens. 112. CHAPTER III. LIENS BY STATUTE. Sec. Sec. Character, operation and ex- tent of lien. Statutory lien — How ac- quired. Statutory lien may be modi- fied by statute. Repeal of statutory lien. Rule in other courts. Revival of lien. Statutory liens governed by the law of forum. Statutory liens legal rather than equitable. § 97. Introductory. — By legislation many of the liens rec- ognized by the common law, and many of those asserted in equity, have been materially enlarged in their scope, or made more effectual by provisions for their enforcement; while only in one instance, that of distress for rent, has the com- mon-law right been modified or restricted. But modern leg- islation has in many instances gone beyond the liens prev- iously recognized at law or in equity, and has created a great number of new liens; and the tendency of legislation in this country is to extend this remedy for the protection of all per- sons who labor or supply materials for others, and for the protection of the state and of municipal corporations in the enforcement of taxes and other claims. Of the liens created for the protection of individuals, those known as "mechanics' liens"^ are the most familiar; for statutes of this kind have been enacted in all, or nearly all, the states and territories. Laborers upon plantations are protected by agricultural liens 1 See post, chaps. XXX-XL. 93 § 9^ LIENS. 94 upon the crops raised. Laborers and contractors upon rail- roads are protected by liens upon the roads. In the mining states liens are given to miners and others upon the mines and their products. In states where lumbering is an import- ant industry, lumbermen are protected by liens upon logs. Livery-stable keepers and agisters of cattle are protected by liens. Corporations are given liens upon the shares of their members for debts due from them. In many states liens have been given to landlords in place of the common-law remedy of distress. In many states, also, attorneys have been given complete protection by effectual liens upon judg- ments obtained by them, and upon the causes of action, in place of the somewhat indefinite and restricted rights they had under the general equity jurisdiction of the courts. For the details of legislation upon all these subjects, and its application, reference may be had to the chapters treating of these particular matters. In the dififerent states many different liens have been created, which it is impossible to notice in detail in this treatise. The law governing them, so far as it is not declared by the statutes creating them, may generally be determined by analogy to the more common statutory liens, the con- struction and interpretation of which are settled by adjudica- tions. Only a few of the statutory liens, other than those before referred to, which are made the subjects of separate chapters, will be briefiy mentioned in this chapter. § 98. Taxes a lien on real estate. — Taxes are generally made a lien upon the real estate assessed, but a right of prior payment does not constitute a lien. A statute which pro- vides that taxes shall be preferred to all payments and in- cumbrances, and shall be a lien upon the real estate of the person assessed, does not create a lien upon his personal property. A right of prior payment is a preference in the appropriation of the proceeds of the debtor's property. It is not a qualified right which may be exercised over his prop- 95 LIENS BY STATUTE. § 99 erty. It does not attach to the specific article of property. Hence, if the personal property of the person assessed be at- tached or assigned before it is seized by the tax-collector, the right of prior payment given by the statute is lost.^ § 99. State's statutory lien on real estate. — A statutory lien in favor of the state upon the land of a collector of taxes and his sureties attaches not only to the lands owned by him at the time of the approval and recording of his bond, but also to after-acquired lands, the same as in the case of a judgment.^ The lien of the state is not discharged upon lands sold by the 2 Anderson v. Mississippi, 23 Miss. 459. See also, Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Sheffield City Co., 137 Ala. 547, 34 So. 625. But in Washington, where the statute makes taxes assessed on personal property, a lien on such property, the lien can not be avoided be- cause a portion of the property has been sold and other goods added to take their place since the levy for taxes was made. Laws 1895, p. 520. § 21; Mills v. County of Thurston, 16 Wash. 378, 47 Pac. 759. Where taxes on per- sonalty are not made a lien there- on by statute, a specific lien held by a creditor before the taxes be- came due is superior to the gen- eral tax lien. Wise v. L. & C. Wise Co., 12App. Div. (N. Y.) 319, 42 N. Y. S. 54, affd. 153 N. Y. 507, 47 N. E. 788. See also, St. Johns Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 113 Mich. 165, 71 N. W. 588; Gifford v. Callaway, 8 Colo. App. 359, 46 Pac. 626. A tax lien is superior to the lien for a local improvement. City of Ballard v. Ross, 38 Wash. 209, 80 Pac. 439. Under an Iowa stat- ute a lien for taxes on personal property is not superior to the lien of a previous mortgage exe- cuted by the owner. Iowa Code, § 865; Bibbins v. Polk County, 100 Iowa 493, 69 N. W. 1007. The county's lien for taxes is not destroyed when it buys in the land at a tax sale. Rochford v. Flem- ing, 10 S. Dak. 24, 71 N. W. 317. In Indiana a tax lien is superior to an individual claim on prop- erty. Brownell Improvement Co. v. Nixon, 48 Ind. App. 195, 92 N. E. 693. 3 Crawford v. Richeson, 101 111. 351 ; Kerr v. Hoskinson, 5 Kans. App. 193, 47 Pac. 172. A judicial sale of property in a proceeding to which the state is not a party will not divest the state's lien for taxes. Huckleby v. State, 57 Fla. 433, 48 So. 979. The lien for taxes is not affected by the change of ownership of the real estate as- sessed. Jacobs v. Union Trust Co., 155 Mich. 233, 118 N. W. 921. The lien of a school fund mort- gage is superior to the lien of taxes. Hood v. Baker, 165 Ind. 562, 75 N. E. 608, 76 N. E. 243. § lOO LIENS. 96 collector after the approval of his bond, although the legisla- ture has extended the time of payment of taxes to the col- lector. Sureties upon the collector's bond, who have given written consent to such extension, are not discharged there- by, and, upon answering for the collector's default, are sub- rogated in equity to the lien of the state upon his lands, the lands he has conveyed, and the land he has acquired since the approval of his bond.* Such a Hen is a general lien like the lien of a judgment, and is subject to the equity of third persons. It is subject to a prior unrecorded mortgage, in accordance with the well-es- tablished doctrine of equity that prior equitable interests in a specific piece of real property have priority over a general statutory lien created subsequent to the transaction with the owner, which gives a party an interest in the particular piece of land in question.^ § 100. Lien of state on criminal's property. — A lien is sometimes given to a state upon the property of a defendant in a criminal prosecution for the payment of the costs of the prosecution in case of conviction, from the time of the arrest or indictment found; and such lien can not be divested by any subsequent assignment by the defendant, though this be an assignment to counsel to assist him in his defense.^ § 101. Improvement liens. — Statutes authorizing cities and towns to make improvements in streets generally pro- vide that the expense thereof, or some part of such expense, may be assessed upon the land fronting upon such streets, and such assessments are made a lien upon the property.''' 4 Crawford v. Richeson, 101 111. c McKnight v. Spain, 13 Mo. 534. 351. "^ Fitch V. Creighton, 24 How. 5 Crisfiel V. Murdock, 55 Hun (U. S.) 159, 16 L. ed. 596. In a (N. Y.y 143, 8 N. Y. S. 593, 28 N. Y. suit by a contractor to enforce St. 460, modified 127 N. Y. 315, 27 a lien for street improvement on N. E. 1046. the abutting lots, the complaint 97 LIENS BY STATUTE. § I02 § 102. Water rates as liens. — Water rates are sometimes made a lien upon the premises where the water is used. An act which makes water rates a charge upon lands in a muni- cipality, with a lien prior to all incumbrances, in the same manner as taxes are, gives them priority over mortgages on such lands made after the passage of the act, whether the water be introduced on the mortgaged land before or after the giving of the mortgage,^ if the mortgage was made after the enactment of the statute making such rates a lien upon the property.^ Such an act does not deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of law. The mortgagee, in such case, takes the mortgage subject to the statute. He voluntarily consents to making the water rates a first lien upon the property in accordance with the statute. A lien may be given for the expense of placing a water- meter in a building, and the charge for extra consumption of water over and above the quantity covered by the usual water rate for the building may be made a lien upon the land.^*' Such a lien is given by virtue of the taxing power of the state. is sufficient if it pleads all the acts done by the municipal offi- cers, and all facts essential to show their authority, and need not set forth their proceedings, nor incorporate, by reference or otherwise, the contract under which the work was done, nor any other instrument, except the final estimate or assessment. Van Sickle V. Belknap. 129 Ind. 558, 28 N. E. 305. The lien created by assessments for local improve- ments is inferior to the lien of general taxes. City of Ballard v. Ross, 38 Wash. 209, 239, 80 Pac. 439. 8 Provident Inst, for Savings v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. 7 ed. 1102, 5 Sup. Ct. 612. The court, by Bradley, J., even says that they are not prepared to assert that an act giving preference to mu- nicipal water rates over existing mortgages or other incumbrances would be unconstitutional: for the providing of water for a city is one of the highest functions of municipal government, and tends to enhance the value of all real estate within its limits; and the charges for the use of the water may well be entitled to rank as a first lien, without regard to ex- isting liens. 9 Vreeland v. Jersey City, Zl N. J. Eq. 574. 10 Laws of New York. 1873. ch. §103 ' LIENS. 98 § 103. Liens upon animals damage feasant. — By the com- mon law, a person finding upon his land animals belonging to another, doing injury by treading down his grass or grain or the like, was entitled to distrain them until satisfaction should be made him for his loss.^^ In the American States this right has existed from a very early period in the history of the country. It is now generally conferred by statutes which also prescribe and regulate the remedies for enforcing the right. Such statutes, it has been judicially determined, are not in excess of the legislative power, or in violation of any principle of constitutional law. These statutes, in fact, create a lien in favor of the injured party upon the animals found trespassing, and provide remedies for enforcing the lien. Such remedies are clearly within the province of legislation. It is competent to provide that the owner of the lands shall be indemnified for the actual damages sustained, and shall be paid a reasonable compensation for keeping the animals and for making the seizure. The sums so awarded are not in the nature of a penalty for the trespass, but merely indemnity to the party injured. The temporary seizure and detention of the property awaiting judicial action, is not in violation of the constitutional provision directing that no person shall be de- prived of his property without due process of law.^- § 104. Possession not required to support statutory liens. — Some statutory liens differ from common-law liens in not requiring possession to support them. The protection af- forded at common law by possession is, in case of statutory liens, afforded by notice to the owner, or by attachment of the property within a limited time.^^ A statutory lien with- out possession may by force of the statute have the same 335, § 73; Mofat v. Henderson, 18 12 Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439; J. & S. (N. Y.) 211. Rood V. McCafgar, 49 Cal. 117. 113 Black. Com. 7. is Quimby v. Hazens, 54 Vt. 132, per Powers, J. 99 LIENS BY STATUTE. § I06 operation and efficacy that a common-law lien has with pos- session.^* § 105. Character, operation and extent of lien. — The character, operation, and extent of the lien must be ascertain- ed by the terms of the statute creating and defining it ; and the courts can not extend the statute to meet cases for which the statute itself does not provide, though these may be of equal merit with those provided for.^^ Thus where a Hen for taxes is given by statute^*' to every agent, guardian, or execu- tor who, being seized or having the care of lands, pays the taxes thereon for the benefit of the owner, in order to main- tain such lien, he must show that he was seized of the land or had the care of it. It is not sufficient that he advanced the money for the payment of the taxes. A note given by the owner of land to his agent for money advanced for the payment of taxes, in which he declares that he recognizes the existence of the statutory lien, does not create a Hen where none would exist by statute. ^'^ It is, nevertheless, a sound rule of construction, that a stat- ute giving a lien is regarded as a remedial statute, and is to be liberally construed so as to give full eft'ect to the remedy, in view of the beneficial purpose contemplated by it.^^ § 106. Statutory Hen — How acquired. — A statutory lien can exist only when it has been perfected in the manner pre- scribed by the statute authorizing it. Thus, under an act which created a building association, and provided that the shares of stock should, from the date thereof, be a lien on the 1-1 B call V. White, 94 U. S. 382, le Arkansas Dig. of Stats. 1904, 24 L. ed. 173, per Clifford, J.; § 7131. Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152. 17 Peay v. Feild, 30 Ark. 600. 15 Copeland v. Kehoe, 67 Ala. is Eckhard v. Donohue, 9 Daly 594; Rogers v. Currier, 13 Gray (N. Y.) 214; Hudler v. Golden, 36 (Mass.) 129, per Metcalf, J.; Mur- N. Y. 446; Weed v. Tucker, 19 N. phy V. Brown, 12 Ariz. 268, 100 Y. 422, 433; Murphy v. Brown, 12 Pac. 801. Ariz. 268, 100 Pac. 801. § loy LIENS. lOO real and personal estate of the corporation, it was held that the mere payment of the subscription for shares, without their being actually issued, did not create a lien on the prop- erty of the association.^^ The subscriber became entitled to the rights of a stockholder in the association by such pay- ment, but the lien did not necessarily flow from the relation of stockholder to the association. It was necessary under the statute that the stock should be actually issued in order to create a lien which could be enforced against other incum- brancers, for the statute declared that the stock should be a lien only from the date of the certificate. § 107. Statutory lien may be modified by statute.— A lien created by statute may be taken away or modified by a sub- sequent statute.^*^ Such a lien is no part of the contract, but merely an incidental accompaniment of it. It derives its validity from the positive enactment, and, therefore, a subse- quent statute modifying or removing the lien can not be con- sidered as in any manner impairing the obligation of the con- tract itself. ''The lien is but a means of enforcing the con- tract, a remedy given by law, and, like all matters pertaining to the remedy, and not to the essence of the contract, until perfected by proceedings whereby rights in the property over which the lien is claimed have become vested, it is entirely within the control of the law-making power in whose edict it originated.^^ A repeal of a statute giving a lien is merely the taking away of a remedy afforded by the statute; it does not impair the obligation of the contract. Thus, the lien of a judgment upon real estate is purely statutory, and it is within the power of the legislature to abolish the lien at any time before it has ripened into a title by a sale. A statute abolishing such a lien does not take away 19 Winston v. Kilpatrick, 5 Daly -O Frost v. Ilsley, 54 Maine 345. (N. Y.) 524, affd. in the Court of See post, chaps. XXX-XL. Appeals, 1 N. Y. Week. Dig. 569. 21 Frost v. Ilsley, 54 Maine 345, per Barrows, J. lOI LIENS BY STATUTE. § Io8 any property, or affect the obligation of contracts, but simply affects a legal remedy.^" § 108. Repeal of statutory lien. — The repeal of a statutory lien defeats the lien remedy, although at the time of the re- peal the proceedings prescribed by the statute for enforcing the lien had been instituted and were pending in court. ^^ The repeal of the lien remedy does not, however, impair any personal remedy the creditor may have by virtue of the obli- gation of the contract between the parties. The remedy which the law affords for the enforcement of contracts constitutes no part of the contract itself, and any change of the law which does not amount to a deprivation of all effectual rem- edy does not in any just sense impair the obligation of the contract. A lien is onh?^ a cumulative remedy to enforce a contract, and is as much within legislative control as any other remedy afforded by law.^^ But if a lien be given by statute to be enforced as another statutory lien is enforced, the repeal of the remedy in the latter case does not repeal the remedy applicable to the for- mer, if there be no words in the repealing act which include the former. It was so held where a statute gave a lien on ani- mals for feeding and sheltering them, the lien "to be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods and personal baggage by innkeepers or keepers of boarding-houses. "^^ Chief Justice Peters, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "That meant enforcement in the manner then existing, — not as it might be in the future by a new enactment. A reference was the readiest way to describe the process to be employed for 22 Watson V. N. Y. Central R. Scam. (111.) 264; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Co., 47 N. Y. 157. Ind. 304; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 23 Bangor v. Coding, 35 Maine 418. See post, § 1558. 12), 56 Am. Dec. 688; Gray v. Carle- 24 Templeton v. Home 82 111. ton, 35 Maine 481 ; Woodbury v. 491. per Scott, J. Grimes, 1 Colo. 100; Templeton v. 25 Collins v. Blake, 79 Maine Home, 82 111. 491; Smith V. Bryan, 218, 9 Atl. 358; Lord v. Collins, 34 111. .364; Williams v. Waldo, 3 76 Maine 443. § I09 LIENS. 102 enforcement. The repeal of the process in the one case does not repeal the process in the other, there being no words in the act of repeal including the latter. Suppose the inn-hold- ers' lien had been wholly abrogated, would it be pretended that the lien on animals would fall with it? There is no de- pendency between the two classes of liens or their enforce- ment." § 109. Rule in other courts. — Other courts, however, hold that liens which have become fixed rights under the statutes creating them can not be taken away by repealing the stat- utes. If the lien arises directly upon the performing of labor, or the doing of any other act, the lien can not be defeated by subsequent repeal. If the lien arises upon the taking of some preliminary step to enforce it, then the lien can not be de- feated after such step has ben taken.^^ Thus, a mechanic's lien which has attached through the giving of notice, or otherwise complying with the statute, can not be destroyed by the legislature by a repeal of the statute. The lien in such case has become a part of the obligation of the contract between the parties, which the legislature can not impair.^'^ Whenever a mechanic's lien is created for material furnished under a contract for the erection of a building, the right to the lien becomes a vested right at the time the material is furnished, and it is not within the power of the legislature to afterwards destroy such right by repealing the statute under which the right has accrued. ^^ In like manner, where by 26 Wabash & Erie Canal Co. v. the state declared this lien was Beers, 2 Black (U. S.) 448, 17 L. deemed an additional reason why ed. 327; Streubel v. Milwaukee & the statute providing for the en- Miss. R. Co., 12 Wis. 67; Hallahan forcement of the lien should be V. Herbert, 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. regarded as entering into and Y.) 326, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 209, affd. forming part of the contract. See 57 N. Y. 409; Chowning v. Bar- § 1558. nett, 30 Ark. 560. 2S Weaver v. Sells, 10 Kans. 609; 27 Handel v. Elliott, 60 Tex. 145. Hoffman v. Walton, 36 Mo. 613. The fact that the constitution of I03 LIENS BY STATUTE. ' § 112 statute a lien is acquired by performing labor in carrying on a quartz mill, a repeal of the statute after the lien has attached by performance of the work does not defeat the lien.^^ Upon this principle a lien is not affected by a homestead ex- emption, created by a statute subsequently enacted, or by a state constitution subsequently adopted. To enforce such ex- emption as against an existing lien would be obnoxious to the objection of impairing the validity of contracts, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States.^*^ § 110. Revival of a lien. — A lien which has already ex- pired by limitation is not revived by the enactment of a stat- ute enlarging the time for perfecting such a lien. The legis- lature can not create a cause of action out of an existing transaction, for which there was no remedy at the time of the enactment. ^^ § 111. Statutory liens governed by the law of forum. — Statutory liens are regulated by the law of the forum, and can not be claimed by virtue of the law of another state.^- Not only is the enforcement of the lien dependent upon the law of the forum, but its existence also.^^ The statute has no extraterritorial operation. ^^ The lien has no binding opera- tion in another state as against a purchaser of the property in that state in good faith for a valuable consideration. § 112. Statutory liens legal rather than equitable. — Statu- tory liens are in their nature legal rather than equitable, and 29 In re Hope Mining Co., 1 Montgomery 12 La. Ann. 800; Lee Sawy. (U. S.) 710, Fed. Cas. No. v. Creditors, 2 La. Ann. 599, 600; 6681. Wickham v. Levistones, 11 La. 30 Townsend Savings Bank v. Ann. 702; Cause v. Bullard, 16 La. Epping, 3 Woods (U. S.) 390, Fed. Ann. 107. Cas. No. 14120; Gunn v. Barry, 15 33 Cause v. Bullard, 16 La. Ann. Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212. 107. 31 Thompson, The J. R. v. Lewis, 34 Marsh's Admr. v. Elsworth, 31 Ala. 497. 2,1 Ala. 85. 32 Swasey & Co. v. Steamer §112 ■ LIENS. 104 legal rather than equitable proceedings are generally pro- vided for their enforcement. A common form of remedy is a legal attachment. Yet in some states the statutory remedy is by an equitable action similar to an equitable action for the foreclosure of a mortgage. The jurisdiction of a court of equity invoked to enforce a statutory lien rests upon the statute, and can extend no further. Thus, in some states, mechanic's liens are enforced by ordinary equitable proceed- ings, resulting in a decree for the sale of the property. The equitable jurisdiction is in such cases created by statute, and the remedy can not be enlarged by the exercise of the gen- eral equity jurisdiction of the court.^^ 35 The South Fork Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 561, 18 L. ed. 894. See post, §§ 1559-1561. CHAPTER IV. AN ATTORNEY'S GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. Sec. Sec. 113. Attorney's general lien a 131. common-law lien. 114. General lien declared by stat- 132. utes. 115. Attorney's lien on client's 133. papers. 116. Attorney's lien does not 134. amount to a pledge. 117. Attorney's lien on life in- 135. surance policy. 118. Lien extends to an execution 136. in attorney's hands. 119. Lien attaches only when cli- 137. ent's papers come into at- torney's hands. 138. 120. Lien may attach to articles. 121. No lien on client's will. 139. 122. Presumption of attorney's lien. 122a. Inspection of papers on 140. which attorney has lien. 123. Lien covers general balance 141. of account. 124. Lien limited to debts due him 142. as attorney. 125. None but attorneys can have 143. Hen. 126. Lien special under some cir- 144. cumstances. 145. 127. Attorney's general lien on papers. 146. 128. Discharge of attorney's lien. 129. Agent of attorney has no 147. lien. 130. Lien of member of attor- 148. ney's firm. lo; Lien not affected by clienf's assignment in bankruptcy. Lien on papers can not be actively enforced. Lien enforced by execution or order. Court may determine exist- ence and amount of lien. Application for surrender of papers to client. Court may order papers of client surrendered to him. Attorney's lien on money col- lected. Does not attach to money deposited specially. Does not attach to papers for services rendered to an executor. Lien on money recovered on judgment. No lien until money collect- ed. Lien on money collected by award. Lien prevails over claim of assignee of judgment. Lien of associate counsel. Whether a lien or right of set-oflf. Lien for general balance of account. Attorney's special lien on fund in court's hands. Rule in Pennsylvania. 113 LIENS. I06 Sec. Sec. 149. No general lien upon a fund 151. Attorney can not hold entire in court. sum of money of his client 150. Court's jurisdiction over at- for his fee. torneys. 152. How a lien may be pleaded I50a. Summary jurisdiction of in defense, courts over attorneys. § 113. Attorney's general lien a common-law lien. — An attorney's general lien is a common-law lien founded upon possession, and is a right on the part of an attorney to retain papers or other property that may have come into his possession, or moneys that he, in the course of his pro- fessional employment, has collected, until all his costs and charges against his client are paid. Like other common-law liens springing from possession, it is a passive lien, a mere right of retainer, without any power of enforcement by sale. For this reason it is frequently called the attorney's retain- ing lien. An attorney's lien upon papers was enforced as early as 1734. In a case where an attorney had been employed by one who became bankrupt, the assignee petitioned that this attorney should be required to deliver up the papers, and come in and prove his demand pari passu with the other creditors. Lord Chancellor Talbot said:^ "The attorney hath a lien upon the papers in the same manner against as- signees as against the bankrupt, and though it does not arise by any express contract or agreement, yet it is as effectual, being an implied contract by law; but as to papers received after the bankruptcy they can not be retained, and there- fore if the assignees desire it let the bill be taxed, and, upon payment, papers delivered up." The practice of protecting an attorney by a lien upon the papers and moneys of the client in his hands was an estab- lished one in 1779. In that year, in a suit before Lord Mansfield, in which it was sought to establish a lien in favor of the captain against the ship for his wages, the counsel 1 Ex parte Bush, 7 Viner's Abr. 74. I07 ATTORNEYS GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. § 114 instanced the case of attorneys who cannot be compelled to deliver up their client's papers until their fees are paid; whereupon Lord Mansfield, interrupting the argument, ob- served that "the practice, in that respect, was not very ancient, but that it was established on general principles of justice, and that courts both of law and equity have now car- ried it so far that an attorney or solicitor may obtain an order to stop his client from receiving money recovered in a suit in which he has been employed for him, till the bill is paid."^ Again, in the same year, in a case directly involving the question, the same judge said: "An attorney has a lien on the money recovered by his client, for his bill of costs; if the money come to his hands, he may retain it to the amount of his bill. He may stop it in transitu if he can lay hold of it. If he apply to the court, they will prevent its being paid over till his demand is satisfied. I am inclined to go still further, and to hold that, if the attorney gave notice to the defendant not to pay till his bill should be discharged, a payment by the defendant after such notice would be his own wrong, and like paying a debt which has been assigned, after notice."^ This lien has its origin in the inherent power of courts over the relations between attorneys and their clients ap- pearing before them. The same power which authorizes courts summarily to enforce the performance by attorneys of their duties toward their clients intervenes to protect the rights of attorneys as against their clients.* § 114. General lien declared by statutes. — In this country this general lien, in several states, is declared by statute. Thus, in Alabama,^ attorneys have a lien on all papers and 2 Wilkins V. Carmichael, 1 v. Crescent City Live Stock Land- Dougl. 101, 104 (1779). ing &c. Co., 41 La. Ann. 355, 6 3 Welsh V. Hole, 1 Dougl. 238. So. 508. 4 Butchers' Union Slaughter- 5 Civ. Code 1907, § 3011. house & Live Stock Landing Co. § 114 LIENS. 1 08 money of their clients in their possession, for services rend- ered to them, in reference thereto, and may retain such papers until said claims are satisfied, and may apply such money to the satisfaction of said claim. In Colorado,*' a lien is given to attorneys upon any money or property in their hands belonging to their clients for any fee or balance of fee due them. In Georgia,^ attorneys have a lien on all papers and moneys of their clients in their possession, for services rendered to them, and may retain such papers until said claims are satisfied, and may apply such money to the satisfaction of their claims. In lowa,^^ an attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon any papers belonging to his client which have come into his hands in the course of his professional employment and money in his hands belonging to his client. It has been held that this statute is not extended by the provisions of the common law but is in lieu thereof and fixes the rights of the parties. The statute provides for the only lien to which an attorney is entitled and to obtain it the requirements of the statute must be observed. ^"^ In Kansas, ^^ an attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon any papers of his client which have come into his possession in the course of his professional employment, and upon money in his hands belonging to his client. In Kentucky,^^ attorneys at law have a lien upon all claims or demands including all claims for unliquidated damages, put into their hands for suit or collection, or upon which suit has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by the parties, or. in the absence of such agreement, for a c Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 294. lO^Ward v. Sherbondy, 96 Iowa See Whitehead v. Jessup, 7 Colo. 477, 65 N. W. 413. App. 460, 43 Pac. 1042. n Gen. Stats. 1909, § 435. »Code 1911, § 3364. 12 Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 107. T. 10 Code Ann. 1897, § 321. Harlan v. Bennett, 32 Ky. L. 473, 106 S. W. 287. I09 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 114 fair and reasonable fee for their services. In Minnesota^^ and Oregon,^* an attorney has a lien for his compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, upon the papers of his client which have come into his possession in the course of his professional employment, and also upon money in his hands belonging to his client. The Minnesota statute makes this provision, however; whenever an attorney refuses to deliver money or papers upon which he claims a lien, the court may order him to do so, conditional upon the giving of security by the client, or it may inquire into the facts, or direct a trial of the controversy by a jury.^^^ In North Dako- ta, ^^ an attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensa- tion in and for each case upon any papers belonging to his client which have come into his hands in the course of his pro- fessional employment in the case for which the lien is claimed and for money in his hands belonging to his client in the case. In Nebraska, ^^ Washington,^^ and Wyoming,^^ an at- torney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon the papers of his client which have come into his possession in the course of his professional employment, and upon money in his hands belonging to his client. In South Da- kota, ^^ an attorney has a lien for a general balance of com- pensation in and for each case upon any papers belonging to his client which have come into his hands in the course of his professional employment in the case for which the lien is claimed, and for money in his hands belonging to his client in the case. It has been held that, under the statute, the right of an attorney to a lien is dormant until actively assert- ed.^^^ 13 Gen. Stats. 1913, § 4955. North- Lewis v. Omaha St. Ry. Co. rup V. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307, 113 (Nebr.), 114 N. W. 281. N. W. 701. 17 Remington and Ballinger's 14 Ballinger and Cotton's Codes Ann. Codes and Stats. 1910, § 136. and Stats. 1902, § 1063. is Comp. Stats. 1910, § 3821. 14a Gen. Stats. 1913, § 4956. 19 Rev. Code (Pol.) 1903, § 702. 15 Rev. Code 1905, § 6293. 19a Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. Dak. 16 Ann. Stats. 1911, § 3607; 178. § 115 LIENS. IIO In Alaska,^*^ an attorney has a lien for his compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, upon the papers of his client which have come into his possession in the course of his professional employment, upon money in his hands belonging to his client. § 115. Attorney's lien on client's papers. — An attorney has a lien upon his client's papers for a general balance due him for services, not only in the suit or matter to which such papers relate, but for other professional matters.-^ Thus he 20 Carter's Ann. Code 1900, ch. It, § 742. 21 Hollis V. Claridge, 4 Taunt. 807; Hughes v. Mayre, 3 T. R. 275; Howell v. Harding, 8 East 362; Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 M. & S. 535; McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404, 24 L. ed. 746; Leszyn- sky V. Merritt, 9 Fed. 688. Georgia: Jones v. Morgan, 39 Ga. 310, 99 Am. Dec. 458. Wisconsin: Howard v. Osceola, 22 Wis. 453; Chappell V. Cady, 10 Wis. Ill; In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235, per Brown, J. New Hampshire: Den- nett V. Cutts, 11 N. H. 163; Wright V. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339. New York: In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284 Ward V. Craig, 87 N. Y. 550^ Prentiss v. Livingston, 60 How Pr. (N. Y.) 380; St. John v Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261. Nebraska: Elliott v Atkins, 26 Neb. 403, 42 N. W 403; Van Etten v. State, 24 Neb 734, 40 N. W. 289; Comp. Stat 1887, ch. 708. Illinois: Sanders v Seelye, 128 111. 631, 21 N. E. 601 Scott v. Morris, 131 111. App 605. Louisiana: Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse &c. Co. v. Cres- cent City Live Stock Land- ing &c. Co., 41 La. Ann. 355, 6 So. 508. \'ermont: Hurl- bert v. Brigham, 56 Vt. 368; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169, 5 Am. Rep. 267; Hutchinson v. How- ard, 15 Vt. 544; Walker v. Sar- geant, 14 Vt. 247; Patrick v. Ha- zen, 10 Vt. 183. Ohio: Longworth V. Handy, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 75, 13 Ohio Dec. 47. Texas: Able v. Lee, 6 Tex. 427; Casey v. March, 30 Tex. 180. Arkansas: Gist v. Han- ly, 33 Ark. 233. Mississippi: Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 707. In Arkansas the statute in relation to the attor- ney's lien upon judgments is merely declarative of the law as it stood at the time of its enact- ment. It does not have the ef- fect to take away the lien upon papers and securities which the law previously gave. In Pennsyl- vania an attorney has no lien for professional compensation on a fund paid into court, but he may retain papers or money in his hands owned by his client until his fees in the particular case are paid or he may deduct his fees from his client's money before he can be compelled to pay over the money to his client. Cain v. Hock- ensmith Wheel & Car Co., 157 Fed. Ill ATTORNEY S GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. § ii6 / has a lien upon a bond or mortgage delivered to him for the purpose of obtaining a foreclosure of the mortgage, not only for his costs and charges in that proceeding, but for any sum due him from the client for other professional busi- ness;'" and he has a lien upon a bond, a promissory note, or other negotiable paper, or upon a town warrant, or other municipal obligation in his hands for collection.^^ § 116. Attorney's lien does not amount to a pledge. — But although the documents in an attorney's hands be bonds or notes, payable to bearer, his lien does not amount to a pledge; for the only right he has over them is a right to re- tain them till his reasonable charges against his client are paid. He has no right of sale as a pledgee has. His lien upon such documents is valuable in proportion to their value to the client. The more embarrassing the attorney's posses- sion is to the client, the greater the leverage the possession gives the attorney. In the case of the ordinary papers in a suit, the attorney's lien is not of great value, except in case the papers are of intrinsic value. A workman's lien upon a 992. It seems to be uncertain whether such a lien exists in Mas- sachusetts. Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 33, per Colt, J. In Newell V. West, 149 Mass. 520, 21 N. E. 954, it was held that an agree- ment by a client that he will pay his attorney for his services in collecting certain claims a fixed sum of money, to be paid out of the proceeds of such claims when collected, does not operate to transfer to the attorney any inter- est in the claims. In this case it was said, however, that an attor- ney receiving moneys for his cli- ent might set off his claim for serv- ices against the client's claim for the money collected; but in this case the attorney, having collect- ed the money in his capacity as administrator of his client, could not assert any attorney's liens. 22 Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489; Newton v. Porter, 5 Lans. 416, affd. 69 N. Y. 133, 25 Am. Rep. 152; Osborne V. Dunham, (N. J.), 16 Atl. 231. In New York an attorney has a lien for services upon his client's cause of action which at- taches to a verdict, etc., and this is true even where the client is the administrator of an estate. In re Ross, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74, 107 N. Y. S. 899. 23 Howard v. Osceola, 22 Wis. 453; Sanders v. Seelye, 128 111. 631, 21 N. E. 601. § 117 LIENS. 112 chattel upon which he has labored is a valuable and direct security, because the owner wants the chattel, and must pay the amount of the lien before he can get it from the work- man. But in the case of an attorney, his lien is very fre- quently upon papers which have no intrinsic value, and are not even indispensable to the prosecution of the suit to which they relate. §117. Attorney's lien on life insurance policy. — Such a paper, however, as a life-insurance policy belonging to a client, would seem to be a valuable security in his attorney's hands. Thus, a solicitor acted for his client in obtaining a re-assignment to his client of a life policy which the client had mortgaged, and the policy and re-assignment came into the attorney's hands and remained there, his charges not being paid. The client afterward wished to borrow money upon the policy, but, as he stated, forgot where the policy was. Upon application to the insurance office a certified copy of the policy was issued, and the client executed an assignment to the person who loaned him the money. Due notice of the assignment was given to the insurance com- pany, which had no notice of the attorney's lien. The lender afterwards, apparently wanting to enforce his secur- ity, discovered that the policy was in the hands of the at- torney, and that he claimed a lien upon it. The lender brought suit in equity to have the policy delivered up to him, claiming that the assignment to him constituted a first charge on the policy and had priority over the claim of the solicitor. But the court dismissed the suit. Mr. Justice Fry observed in the first place, that the assignee prima facie took the policy subject to all the equities under the general rule applicable to every assignee of a chose in action. He disposed of the objection that the solicitor should have given notice to the insurance office of his lien by pointing out that the solicitor had no right to the fund represented by the policy, and no right to constitute the insurance office a 113 ATTORNEY S GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. § ii8 trustee in his behalf; that the solicitor had merely a passive right to hold the policy, the piece of paper constituting the instrument, until his claim should be paid; and that this was in fact merely a right to embarrass the person who might claim the fund, by the nonproduction of this piece of paper. 2"* Finally the learned judge commented upon the laches of the lender in not requiring the production of the policy at the time of the assignment, saying that he ran the risk of its being in the hands of some person who might have a lien upon it. § 118, Lien extends to an execution in attorney's hands. — This lien extends to an execution or a copy of a judgment in the attorney's hands, but it does not reach to the judg- ment itself.^^ This lien rests upon possession, and there can be no possession of a judgment.^^ "It is but a decision of a court upon a claim made by one party against another. It 24 West of England Bank v. Batchelor, 51 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 199. 25 Wright V. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339. A clerk of court who has possession of the papers could not probably have any lien upon them, because the papers are public and part of a public record. In a note to King V. May, 1 Doug. 193 (1779), Lord Mansfield desired the bar would take a note of this, that it might be publicly known. "A case, in some respects similar, oc- curred in this term, when I hap- pened not to be in court, but I have seen a very accurate note of it. It came on upon a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against the de- fendant, who was clerk of assize on the Norfolk circuit, for not obeying a writ of certiorari to re- move an indictment for murder, 8 and a special verdict founded upon it. The defendant insisted that he had a right to retain the record till he should be paid his fees for drawing, engrossing, etc., which the attorney for the prisoner re- fused to do, on the ground of their being exorbitant. However, on the attorney's undertaking to pay as much as should, on a reference to the master, be reported to be due, the record was returned into court, upon which the rule was discharged." Lord Mansfield said he would be very unwilling to de- termine that a clerk of assize has a lien on the records of the court for his fees, for that he foresaw great inconvenience from such a doctrine. 26 Hough V. Edwards, 1 H. & N. 171, per Martin, B. ; Patrick v. Leach, 12 Fed. 661, 2 McCrary, (U. S.) 635. § 119 LIENS. 114 exists but in intendment of law. The records of the courts are the evidence of such judgments; but these are public, pre- served in the custody of public officers, over which neither the attorney nor his client has any control, and of which neither has any rightful possession. The execution is no such representative of the judgment, as to give to the holder any control over the judgment. Neither does the possession of the execution, or of a copy of the judgment by the at- torney, or any third person, disable a creditor from exercis- ing any of his rights as such. The indispensable requisite to any ordinary lien, possession, is wanting."^''' § 119. Lien attaches only when client's papers come into attorney's hands. — This lien attaches only when the client's papers come into the attorney's hands,^^ and come to him, moreover, in the course of his professional business. ^^ The lien must arise from professional employment.^*^ Thus he has no lien on papers which he has received as mortgagee^^ or trustee ;^^ but, if he receives the papers in his professional capacity, it does not matter that he sustains some other busi- ness relation to his client.^^ Where an attorney has prosecuted a suit and recovered land for his client, and the latter has afterwards sold it and taken a deed of trust and bond for the purchase-money, and has made the attorney a trustee in the deed of trust and de- livered the papers to him, the attorney has a lien upon the papers for his services in the suit; and if the client brings a bill in equity for the removal of such trustee and the delivery of the papers, it is the duty of the court to decide upon the 27 Wright V. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 30 Worrall v. Johnson, 2 Jac. & 339, per Bell. W. 218. 28 St, John V. Diefendorf, 12 3i Pelly v. Wathen, 7 Hare 351, Wend. (N. Y.) 261. 18 L. J. Ch. 281. 29 Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 M. 32 Ex parte Newland, L. R. 4 & S. 535; Sanders v. Seelye, 128 Ch. Div. 515. 111. 631, 21 N. E. 601. 33 King v. Sankey, 6 N. & M. 839. 115 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 122 existence and amount of the lien claimed by the attorney, and to decree such delivery on payment of the amount of the lien found to exist; and it is proper for the court to decree such delivery on the performance of this condition, though the attorney, by neglecting to file a cross bill, can have no decree for affirmative relief.^^ § 120. Lien may attach to articles. — The lien attaches not only to papers, but to other articles which come into the attorney's hands professionally, such as articles delivered to him to be exhibited to witnesses. ^^ § 121. No lien on client's will. — An attorney has no lien on his client's will,^^ nor on original records of court.^'^ § 122. Presumption of attorney's lien. — There is a pre- sumption in every case that an attorney has a lien on the papers in his hands, for compensation for his services rend- ered. If he has given up his employment and withdrawn from the case, he will be entitled to such lien, unless it is shown that he has agreed to make no claim to compensation, or to claim no lien for his services.^^ The client has a right 34 McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. charge of the solicitor by 404, 24 L. ed. 746. the client. In the former case 35 Friswell v. King, 15 Sim. 191. it is said that the client is In this case the lien was enforced entitled to an order for the de- upon certain copies of a very ex- livery of the necessary papers in pensive book used in evidence. the case for the further prosecu- 36 Redfarn v. Sowerby, 1 Sw^nst. tion of the action, subject to the 84; Balch v. Symes, 1 T. & R. 87. solicitor's lien, and subject to re- 37 Clifford V. Turrill, 2 De G. delivery after the hearing. Cole- & Sm. 1. grave v. Manley, T. & R. 400; 38 Leszynsky v. Merritt, 9 Fed. Wilson v. Emmett, 19 Beav. 233; 688; Finance Co. v. Charleston C. Cane v. Martin, 2 Beav. 584. But & C. R. Co., 48 Fed. 45. By in case the client discharges the the English authorities a distinc- solicitor, the latter is under no tion is made between the case of obligation to produce the papers, a solicitor withdrawing from a or to allow the client to inspect case and the case of the dis- them. "The discharged solicitor," § 1 22a LIENS. Il6 to change his attorney if he likes, but if he does so the law imposes certain terms in favor of the attorney; namely, that the papers in the suit cannot be taken out of his hands until his reasonable charges are paid. The things upon which he claims a lien are things upon which he has expended his own labor or money; and he should have a lien in the same way as any other workman who is entitled to retain the things upon which he has worked until he is paid for his work.^® § 122a. Inspection of papers on which attorney has lien. • — Whether, during such retention, the client or the succeed- ing attorney has the right to inspect the papers is a ques- tion upon which the authorities are not in harmony, though the weight of authority seems to be in favor of such right.*^ But none of the decisions permit an inspection of the papers, except when a particular suit is in progress and the papers pertain to that suit. Upon an application for an order of court requiring the attorney holding the papers to submit them to the inspection of his client or the succeeding at- torney, it must be shown that a particular suit to which the papers pertain is in progress. A general allegation that the attorney is prosecuting actions against his former client, and that in such actions he would have great advantage in hold- ing possession of the papers which he had received as attor- said Lord Eldon, "ought to be able Oldfieid, 4 T. R. 123; Ex parte to make use of the nonproduction Nesbitt, 2 Scho. & Lef. 279. of the papers in order to get at ^o Ross v. Laughton, 1 Ves. & what is due him." In Massa- B. 349; Commerell v. Poynton, 1 chusetts it is held that, if an Swanst. 1. Both cases are much attorney voluntarily withdraws shaken by Lord v. Wormleighton, from a suit, he is not entitled Jac. 580; Newton v. Harland, 4 to withhold a paper in his Scott (N. R.) 769. But see, in possession and prevent it from be- support of them, Colegrave v. ing used in evidence until his fees Manley, 1 T. & R. 400; Heslop v. are paid. White v. Harlow, 5 Gray Metcalfe, 3 Mylne & C. 183; Cane (Mass.) 463. v. Martin, 2 Beav. 584; Wilson v. 39 Ex parte Yalden, 4 Ch. Div. Emmett, 19 Beav. 233; Finance Co. 129, per James, L. J.; Mitchell v. v. Charleston C. & C. R. Co., 48 Fed. 45, 46 Fed. 426. 117 ATTORNEYS GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. § I23 ney of such client, and that an inspection of such papers is necessary for the proper conduct of such cases, is insuffi- cient, as against the denial of the attorney that there is any suit pending in which he had acquired knowledge as attor- ney, or to which the papers retained by him relate, and which suit he is now prosecuting against the client. If it were shown to the court that such a misuse of papers was threatened, contemplated, or made, the papers would be at once impounded and lodged with the clerk.'*^ § 123. Lien covers general balance of account. — This lien covers the attorney's general balance of account as against his client, and is not limited to the services rendered in the particular matter in which the papers were received. ^^ Upon a petition by an assignee in bankruptcy to have deeds and papers belonging to the bankrupt delivered up by an attorney who claimed a lien upon them for his general bill, it Y^as objected that the bill should be limited to the services rendered in the particular matter in which the papers were received. But Eldon, Lord Chancellor, said:^^ "The gen- eral lien must prevail. Different papers are put into the hands of an attorney, as different occasions for furnishing them arise. In the ordinary case of lien I never heard of a question, upon what occasion a particular paper was put into his hands: but if in the general course of dealing the client from time to time hands papers to his attorney, and does not get them again when the occasion that required them is at an end, the conclusion is that they are left with the attorney upon the general account. If the intention is to deposit papers for a particular purpose, and not to be subject to the general lien, that must be by special agreement: otherwise they are subject to the general lien, which the Attorney has upon all papers in his hands. ■*i Finance Co. v. Charleston C. -^2 Finance Co. v. Charleston C. & C. R. Co., 48 Fed. 45. & C. R. Co., 46 Fed. 426. 43 Ex parte Ste^-ling, 16 Ves. 258. § 124 LIENS. Il8 § 124. Lien limited to debts due him as attorney. — But the attorney's hen is hmited to debts due to him in the char- acter of attorney. It does not extend to general debts.'** Accordingly, the hen of the solicitor of a railway company for his costs does not include costs incurred in relation to the promotion of the company before incorporation, such costs, by the usual clause in the act, having been made a statutory debt to be paid by the company.*^ § 125. None but attorneys can have lien. — No one who is not an attorney, solicitor, or barrister, can maintain this lien upon papers. A real estate broker has no hen on papers and plans placed in his hands for the purpose of effecting a sale of the property, though he has rendered services and incur- red expenses in an ineffectual attempt to make a sale.^^ It was claimed that the position of a real estate broker in re- gard to papers placed in his hands is the same as that of an attorney or solicitor or other bailee who expends time^or money upon the property of a bailor. But it may be said, in answer to this claim, that the lien of an attorney or solicitor is peculiar to his profession. It is, moreover, a general lien for his balance of account, and not a particular lien for his labor or expense upon that particular article, such as is given by the common law to any bailee who expends time and money upon the property of another at his request. The real estate broker does not perform any labor upon the papers themselves, such as would give a particular lien at common law. Every one, whether an attorney or not, has by the common law a lien on a specific deed or paper de- livered to him to do any work or business thereon, but not on other muniments of the same party, unless the person claiming the lien be an attorney or solicitor.^^ 44 Worrall v. Johnson, 2 Jac. & 4C Arthur v. Sylvester, 105 Pa. W. 214, per Plumer, M. R. St. 233. 45 In re Galland, L. R. 31 Ch. 47 Hollis v. Claridge, 4 Taunt. Div. 296. 807. 119 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 126 A conveyancer who has not been admitted as an attorney or solicitor can not have the benefit of the law and custom which gives the latter a general lien; but such conveyancer, like any other person, may have a lien for services done upon any particular paper. The case of a real estate broker is like that of an auctioneer to whom a mortgage was delivered for the purpose of ob- taining the money due thereon, and he made several applica- tions to the mortgagor, but received no money. The court of Exchequer held that he had no lien on the deed in respect of the charges for making the application. Baron Bolland said:^^ "The distinction is, that, where any work is to be done on a chattel to improve it, or to increase its value, the lien attaches; but where it is merely delivered, as in this case, to make a demand upon it, no such right can be supported. My opinion does not rest upon principle alone, but is illus- trated by the cases cited of the trainer and the livery-stable keeper. A livery-stable keeper is easily contradistinguished from a trainer or a breaker. The breaker or trainer, by the exercise of his labour and skill, gives to the horse, de- livered to him to be broken or trained, qualities and powers which are not given by the livery-stable keeper." The auctioneer and the real estate broker do not come within the rule of the common law giving a lien, unless they show work done upon the papers upon which they claim a lien; and they certainly do not come within the rule giving a lien to attorneys upon papers in their hands. § 126. Lien special under some circumstances. — Under some circumstances the attorney's lien upon papers is special, instead of being general, as is ordinarily the case. The at- torney has a lien only upon such papers as are delivered to 48 Sanderson v. Bell, 2 Crompt. tion has a lien on the proceeds for & M. 304. A broker entrusted with his commission. Peterson v. Hall, a note and mortgage for negotia- 61 Minn. 268, 63 N. W. 733. § 127 * LIENS. I20 him for use in his professional employment. ^^ If he has re- ceived the papers for a specific purpose, not connected with his professional employment, he can have no lien on them for his general balance of account. If it be agreed or under- stood that the papers are delivered for a specific professional purpose, a specific instead of a general lien may arise for the specific service rendered. ^^ § 127. Attorney's general lien on papers. — An attorney's general lien upon papers may be followed by a particular lien upon the judgment recovered by the use of them. The former lien is not, however, transferred or transmuted into the latter. The former passive lien remains, though it may be of no value after judgment, and a new active lien arises upon the judgment. Thus, if a solicitor, having in his possession a deed belonging to his client, who has ceased to employ him, produces the deed in a suit which is prosecuted by another solicitor, the former solicitor is not entitled to a lien upon the fund recovered in the suit for his general pro- fessional charges against the client, but at most only for his costs in that suit. So long as he held the deed, he had by means of it a lien for his general professional demands. The lien upon the deed he could never actively enforce; but, hav- ing possession of it, he might make advantageous terms with the client who wants to produce it in evidence. But if he voluntarily produces the deed, and a fund is secured by the use of it, the solicitor is not entitled to a lien upon the fund so obtained for his general professional demands, but only for his costs in the cause. If the doctrine were otherwise, the attorney's lien would in most cases extend to the general balance of his account against his client, and would not be confined to his costs in the particular cause in which he ob- tains judgment; for it generally happens that the solicitor 49 Balch V. Symes, 1 T. & R. 87; See also, Ex parte Pemberton, 18 Lawson v. Dickenson, 8 Mod. 306. Ves. 282. 50 Ex parte Sterling, 16 Ves. 258. 121 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 128 has in his hands the documents necessary to establish his client's title.^^ The lien upon the fund is newly created and is a new lien. It is a lien for the solicitor's costs in the cause only, but a lien which can be actively enforced. The passive lien upon the papers used in a cause may, perhaps, continue as before, but very likely may be of no value.^^ § 128. Discharge of attorney's lien. — An attorney's lien upon papers is discharged by his taking security for his whole demand, or by his agreeing to postpone payment for a definite time. A client, after having settled his solicitor's bill for services by giving notes payable in three years, ap- plied to him before the notes were due for the papers in his hands, wishing to employ another solicitor. The solicitor declined to give up the papers unless the client would also pay for services the solicitor had rendered him in his capacity as executor, though the client had no assets with which to discharge the debt. It was decreed that the solicitor should give up the papers upon the client's paying for the services rendered after the time of the settlement and the taking of the notes. Lord Eldon said a lien on the papers in favor of the solictor was inconsistent with the giving of credit for three years by means of the notes. °^ Looking at the gen- eral doctrine of lien. Lord Eldon said: "It may be described as prima facie a right accompanying the implied contract." That there could be a lien when there is a special agreement to give credit upon security would involve a contradiction of the agreement. "My opinion therefore is, that where these 51 Bozon V. Bolland, 4 Myl. & Todd, 52 N. Y. 489, aflfg. 64 Barb. C. 354. Lord Chancellor Gotten- (N. Y.) 146, seems at first view to ham said he found no decision to sustain a contrary doctrine. This the contrary except Worrall v. case is criticised in In re Wilson, Johnson, 2 Jac. & W. 214, which 12 Fed. 235, by Brown, J. he could not reconcile with any 53 Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. sound principle. 275. 52 Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. § 129 LIENS. 122 special agreements are taken, the lien does not remain; and whether the securities are due or not, makes no difference."^* But the attorney's lien upon papers is not extinguished by his taking a note or acceptance from his client for the amount due him, unless it appear that the note or acceptance was given or received in payment of such balance. ^° This lien is lost by the attorney's voluntary surrender of the papers to his client; for possession is indispensable to this lien.^^ The lien is lost when the attorney has parted with the possession of the papers by his own act, even though this was a mistake on his part.^'^ But it is not lost by a transfer of possession to an agent, for the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal; and it is not lost by a transfer to another, subject to the lien.^^ If the papers are obtained from him wrongfully, his lien remains, and he may maintain trover for them.^^ § 129. Agent of attorney has no lien. — An attorney's agent or correspondent has no lien upon the papers of the client for the balance of his own account against the attor- ney, but he has a lien upon the papers in his hands in the particular case, for the amount due him by the attorney in that particular case only. To this extent the agent's lien is good against the client.®* § 130. Lien of member of attorney's firm. — One member of a firm of attorneys has no lien for an individual demand 54 Cowell V. Simpson, 16 Ves. Dubois' Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 231, 80 275; also Balch v. Symes, T. & R. Am. Dec. 478. 87; Watson v. Lyon, 7 De G., M. 57 Dicas v. Stockley, 7 C. & P. & G. 288; Stearns v. Wollenberg, 587. 51 Ore. 88, 92 Pac. 1079; Webster 58 Watson v. Lyon, 7 De G., M. V. Keck, 64 Neb. 1, 89 N. W. 410. & G. 288. 55 Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 M. 59 Dicas v. Stockley, 7 C. & P. & S. 535; Dennett v. Cutts, 11 N. 587. H. 163. 60 Dicas v. Stockley, 7 C. & P. 56 Nichols V. Pool, 89 111. 491; 587. 123 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 132 upon papers of a client in the hands of the firm. The firm alone has a right to hold and retain the papers, in such case, and the firm alone has a right of lien thereon."^ And so a solicitor having a lien for his account upon papers which have come into his hands professionally from a client acting in his individually capacity, cannot retain them for a debt due him from a firm of which the client is a member.^^ An attorney cannot have a lien upon papers to a greater extent than his client's interest in them. § 131. Lien not affected by client's assignment in bank- ruptcy. — An attorney's lien upon papers is not affected by his client's assignment in bankruptcy or insolvency, or for the benefit of creditors. The assignee in either case takes subject to the attorney's equitable right at the date of the assignment. ^^ The lien is good against all persons claiming under the client. ^^ He must therefore satisfy an attorney's lien existing at that time either upon papers or money col- lected, before he can claim the papers or moneys then in the attorney's hands.^^ The lien is not lost because the debt in respect of which the lien is claimed is barred by the statute of limitations.^^ § 132. Lien on papers can not be actively enforced. — This lien of the attorney upon his client's papers can not be actively enforced. It is a passive lien. It amounts to a mere right to retain the papers, as against the client, until he is fully paid.^^ The papers can not be sold, neither can ci Pelly V. Wathen, 7 Hare 351, 64 In re Gregson, 26 Beav. 87. 14 Jur. 9; In re Forshaw, 16 Sim. 65 18 Alb. L. J. 214. 121; Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 66 in re Murray, 3 W. N. (1867) Drew 408; Bowling Green Sav. 190. Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489. 67 Bozon v. Bolland, 4 Myl. & 62 Turner V. Deane, 18 L. J. Ex. C. 354, per Cottenham, L. C; 343. Heslop v. Metcalfe, 3 Myl. & C. 63 Ex parte Bush, 7 Vin. Abr. 183; Colegrave v. Manley, T. & R-. 74; Ex parte Sterling, 16 Ves. 258; 400; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. Ward V. Craig, 87 N. Y. 550. 618, per Cooper, C; In re Wil- § 133 LIENS. 124 the possession of them be parted with, without loss of the lien. No active proceedings of any kind can be taken either at law or in equity to enforce the lien for which the papers are held. The lien, however, continues till the debt for which the lien exists is paid.^^ An attorney's lien upon a promissory note in his hands for collection gives him no right to a judgment against the defendant for the amount of his fees after the defendant has paid the note to the attorney's client.^^ § 133. Lien enforced by execution or order. — Indirectly an attorney's lien upon papers in a suit for his fees may, under some circumstances, be enforced by order and execu- tion. Thus, where the plaintiff in a suit petitioned the court for an order substituting other attorneys in place of the attorney who had been conducting it, and directing him to turn over the papers in his hands pertaining to the action, and there being a dispute in regard to the amount of the compensation due the attorney, the court ordered the plain- tiff to file a bond conditioned to pay the sum that should be found due him, and referred the question of the compensa- tion to a referee. Upon the coming in of the referee's re- port the court confirmed it, and ordered that the attorney should have execution for the amount. Upon appeal it was held that the court had power to compel compliance with its own order in this manner, though it might also have pro- son, 12 Fed. 235, per Brown, J., 26 Sweeley v. Sieman, 123 Iowa 183, Alb. L. J. 271'; Cones v. Brooks, 60 98 N. W. 571; In re Gillespie, 190 Neb. 698, 84 N. W. 85; Sweeley v. Fed. 88. Sieman, 123 Iowa 183, 98 N. W. 68 Warburton v. Edge, 9 Sim. 571; Foss v. Cobler, 105 Iowa 728, 508; Young v. English, 7 Beav. 75 N. W. 516. There is no equity 10; In re Gillaspie, 190 Fed. 88. jurisdiction of suit for fees, in an ^'^ Tillman v. Reynolds, 48 Ala. attempt to enforce attorney's lien. 365. 125 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 134 ceeded to enforce the order by proceedings in the nature of contempt. '^'^ Where the cHent offers to give security for the amount that may be found due to his attorney, the latter should be ordered to deliver up the papers on security being given, especially if there be any doubt in regard to the validity of his claim.''^^ § 134. Court may determine existence and amount of lien. — It is sometimes proper for the court to determine the existence and amount of the lien, and to establish the condi- tion upon which the attorney shall deliver up the property. Upon a bill in equity for the removal of a trustee in a deed of trust, and for the surrender of the bond secured by such deed where the trustee claimed a lien upon it for professional services, it is the duty of the court to decide on the existence and amount of the lien, and to decree such delivery on pay- ment of the amount of the lien, if one be found to exist. If the attorney has neglected to file a cross bill, he can have no decree for afifirmative relief; but it is proper for the court to establish the condition on which the delivery of the bond to the complainant shall be made, and to require such delivery on the performance of that condition.'''- A litigant is not debarred of his right to change his at- torney by having agreed to pay a fee contingent upon the amount recovered. Such agreement is regarded as provid- ing for the mode of compensation only. On a motion for a substitution the court will grant it upon the client's filing a stipulation, and the entry of an order declaring the atorney's claim a lien to the extent of the services rendered, the amount to be afterwards determined, should any moneys or judgment be recovered; and that notice of the lien be given to the other party to the suit.'''^ TO Greenfield v. New York, 28 72 McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. Hun (N. Y.) 320. 404, 24 L. ed. 746. 71 Cunningham v. Widing, 5 73 Ronald v. Mut. Reserve Fund Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 413. Life Assn., 30 Fed. 228. § 135 LIENS. 126 § 135. Application for surrender of papers to client. — Where an attorney's lien is questioned b)^ a client, upon a summary application to the court requiring- the attorney to surrender papers intrusted to his care, the question of the existence and amount of the lien may be determined by the court or a referee upon a proper investigation. The court can not, upon such application, disregard the attorney's claim of a lien, and without investigation order the sur- render of the papers. The court will never disregard the right of the attorney or deny him his lien where it has justly attached.'^ But, on the other hand, it has been held that if the client claims that, by contract with his attorney, the lat- ter upon giving up his employment has no claim for compen- sation, and therefore should surrender the papers in his hands, the fact in controversy can not, except by consent, be determined by the court in a summary way. It must be left to be determined in a suit to be brought by the attorney for his compensation; the lien, if any, remaining in statu quo meanwhile. If such suit be not brought within a time limited, or be not then diligently prosecuted, the court would order the papers to be given up.'^^ § 136. Court may order papers of client surrendered to him. — A court has jurisdiction to order a solicitor to deliver up his client's papers, upon the client's paying into court, or upon his giving security in a sum sufficient to answer the solicitor's demand, before this is adjusted, where his reten- tion of the papers on which he claims a lien would embarrass the client in the prosecution or defense of pending actions.'^* There is a dictum of Lord Romilly, who as Master of the Rolls was very conversant with these matters, in these words:"" "Where a solicitor sends in his bill, and claims 74 In re Attorney, 87 N. Y. 521, tg In re Galland, L. R. 31 Ch. 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 152. Div. 296. "^5 Leszynsky v. Merritt, 9 Fed. "^ In re Bevan, 33 Beav. 439. 688. 127 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 137 a stated balance to be due to him, the cHent is entitled, as a matter ahnost of course, to have his papers de- Hvered over to him on payment of the amount claimed into court." In another case Lord Romilly again states his practice:''^ "The course I adopt in all these cases is this: Where a sum is claimed by a solicitor to be due to him, and some delay occurs in the taxation imputable to the fault of no one, I order the papers to be delivered over on the amount being secured, and on an undertaking to produce them as required in the course of the taxation." Mr. Justice Chitty stated the result reached in the case before cited as follows i"^^ "The court, in the exercise of its discretion says that if the solicitor is completely secured, and it takes care not to enter upon a matter of controversy as to the amount, but to give him the amount which he claims and a sum to answer the costs of the taxation, it is inequitable that he should be allowed to embarrass the client further by holding the papers." § 137. Attorney's lien on money collected. — An attorney also has a lien upon moneys collected by him on his client's behalf, in the course of his employment, whether upon any judgment or award or not.^" It does not matter that there 78 In re Jewitt, 34 Beav. 22. v. Bostick, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 321; 79 In re Galland, L. R. 31 Ch. Hurlbert v. Brigham, 56 Vt. 368; Div. 296. Casey v. March, 30 Tex. 180; Kin- 80 Welsh V. Hole, 1 Doug. 238; sey v. Stewart, 14 Tex. 457; Able In re Paschal, 10 Wall. U. S. 483, 19 v. Lee, 6 Tex. 427; Stewart v. L. ed. 992; In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 284; Bowling Green Savings Bank 707; Lewis v. Kinealy, 2 Mo. App. V. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489; Longworth 33. Contra, Lucas v. Campbell, 88 V. Handy, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 75, 13 III. 447. It seems not to exist in Ohio Dec. 47; Diehl v. Friester, 37 Pennsylvania under the name of Ohio St. 473, per Okey, C. J.; lien, but rather under the name of Cooke V. Thresher, 51 Conn, a right of defalcation. Walton v. 105; Burns v. Allen, 1 New Eng. Dickerson, 7 Pa. St. 376; Dubois' Rep. 143 ; Dowling v. Eggemann, Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 231, 80 Am. Dec. 47 Mich. 171, 10 N. W. 187; Read 478. § 138 LIENS. 128 is no express agreement as to the rate or measure of com- pensation, or as to the source from which this should be paid. A lien upon the moneys collected may be implied from the facts and circumstances of the case. Where the client is insolvent and unable to contribute to the disburse- ments in the proceedings, it can not be doubted that there is an understanding that the attorney is to look to the fund ultimately recovered for reimbursement of the money paid by him, and for compensation for his services.^^ § 138. Does not attach to money deposited specially. — Such lien does not, how^ever, attach to money delivered to the attorney by his client for a specific purpose, such as the payment of a mortgage, to which the attorney agrees to apply it.^^ So, if the money is delivered to him to apply to the settlement of a suit, he can not retain his fees out of it. Thus, where a guardian for minors, being plaintifif in an ejectment suit, agreed with the defendant to discontinue the action, and, leave of the Probate Court being had, to convey to him the interest of his wards in the land, in consideration of the payment of one hundred and fifty dollars, and the costs of the petition to the Probate Court, and the defendant deposited with his attorney in the ejectment suit one hun- dred dollars, taking from him a paper acknowledging the re- ceipt of the money as "towards the settlement," such de- posit is a special one, for a special purpose, and the attorney cannot retain his fees out of it. The plaintiff having peti- tioned the court in which the ejectment suit was pending for an order requiring the attorney to pay over this money, the order was made accordingly.^' Chief Justice Durfee re- marked that the money was left with the attorney and re- ceived by him for a special purpose. He could not, there- si In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; 82 In re Larner, 20 Weekly Dig. Scott V. Darling, 66 Vt. 510, 29 Atl. (N. Y.) 72. 993. 83 Anderson v. Bosworth, 15 R. I. 443, 8 Atl. 339, 2 Am. St. 910. 129 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 141 fore, consistently with his agreement or duty, apply it to any other purpose without leave of his client. The equity of this view was the stronger, because the attorney, by giving the receipt, put it in the power of his client to use it, in effect- ing the settlement, as so much money in the attorney's hands. § 139. Does not attach to papers for services rendered to an executor. — Such lien does not attach for professional services rendered to an executor, in the administration of the estate of the decedent, upon property belonging to the deceased which was in the attorney's hands at the time of the decease and upon which he then had no lien. The at- torney's claim in such case is against the executor who em- ployed him, and not against the deceased or his estate.^^ § 140. Lien on money recovered on judgment. — The lien of an attorney attaches to money recovered or collected by him upon a judgment.^^ Upon the judgment before it was collected, he had a lien for his costs; but when he has actual- ly collected the money upon the judgment, this lien is satis- fied, and a new lien attaches for any claim he may have against his client for his services or disbursements, either in the cause in which the judgment was obtained or any other.^^ § 141. No lien until money collected. — The attorney has no lien upon a judgment for damages until he has collected the money ;^^ and until such a collection his client may re- ceive the money and give an effectual discharge of the 84 Delamater v. M'Caskie, 4 4 N. Y. St. 631, on appeal, 12 N. E. Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 549. See In re 22. Contra, Burleigh v. Palmer, 74 Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284, revg. 8 Abb. Nebr. 122, 103 N. W. 1068. N. C. (N. Y.) 308; In re Lamberson, 85 Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 297; Barnes v. Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. Newcomb, 11 Weekly Dig. (N. Y.) Todd, 52 N. Y. 489. 505; Matter of Robinson, 125 App. S6 Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246. Div. (N. Y.) 424, 109 N. Y. S. 827; 8T See Chapter V. Piatt V. Piatt, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 659, 9 § 142 LIENS. 130 judgment. The attorney's general lien is rendered effect- ual by his possession and onh^ by possession.^® § 142. Lien on money collected by award. — The lien of an attorney extends to money collected upon an award as well as that collected upon a judgment. Chief Justice Ken- yon, so deciding, placed his decision upon "the convenience, good sense, and justice of the things." He further says, ''The public have an interest that it should be so; for other- wise no attorney will be forward to advise a reference."^* § 143. Lien prevails over claim of assignee of judgment. — This lien prevails against one to wdiom the client has as- signed the claim while suit is pending, if the consideration of the assignment be a pre-existing debt, and the assignment be made in a state where a pre-existing debt is not regarded as a valuable consideration, as, for instance, in New York.^^ It also prevails against the client's assignment for the bene- fit of his creditors.^^ § 144. Lien of associate counsel. — Associate counsel em- ployed by the attorney in a suit also have a lien for their fees where the attorney has such a lien; or, if the attorney collects the judgment, he may deduct not only his own fees, but is protected in the payment of like reasonable fees to other attorneys or counsel employed in the suit.^^ But coun- sel have no lien on a judgment recovered. This is confined to the attorney of record. ^^ § 145. Whether a lien or right of set-off. — It is a matter in dispute whether the attorney's claim upon moneys col- 88 St. John V. Diefendorf. 12 9 1 Ward v. Craig, 87 N. Y. 550, Wend. (N. Y.) 261 ; Casey v. 9 Daly (N. Y.) 182. March, 30 Tex. 180. !»2 Jackson v. Clopton, 66 Ala. 89 Ormerod v. Tate, 1 East, 464. 29. 90 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 21 ^3 Brown v. New York, 9 Hun Hun (N. Y.) 33. (X. Y.) 587. 131 ATTORNEY S GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. 146 lected for his client, for the payment of any indebtedness of the cHent to him, rests upon the law of Hen or the law of set-off. The courts generally declare that the right results from the law of lien; but some courts hold that it results from the law of set-off.^^ Thus, in a Pennsylvania case, it is said to be a right to defalcate, rather than a right of lien.^^ § 146. Lien for general balance of account. — An attor- ney's lien upon moneys collected extends not only to his services and disbursements in the case wherein the moneys are collected, but also to pay the general balance due him for professional services and disbursements.^^ He may re- tain money to a reasonable amount to cover a stipulated fee in another case, in which he has performed only a part of the services, if in good faith he intends to perform the re- mainder.^''' In some cases, however, it has been held that the lien of an attorney upon moneys of his client secures only his serv- ices in the matter in which he collected the money, not his services about other business of his client,^® unless, perhaps, 94 Wells V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246. 95 Dubois' Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 231, 80 Am. Dec. 478; Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. St. 95; McKelvy's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 615. 96 Hurlbert v. Brigham, 56 Vt. 368; In re Attorney, 87 N. Y. 521, 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 152; In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; Ward v. Craig-, 87 N. Y. 550; Cooke v. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105. In the lat- ter case the client had orally agreed that the attorney should have a lien, not only for his serv- ices in that case, but for previous services. Contra, Pope v. Arm- strong, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 214. 9" Randolph v. Randolph, 34 Tex. 181. In In re Paschal, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 483, 19 L. ed. 992, which was a case from the state of Texas, and was regarded as gov- erned by the laws of that state on this subject, the lien of an at- torney was conferred for his fees and disbursements in the cause in litigation and in proceedings brought to recover other moneys covered by the same retainer. But the court did not undertake to de- cide whether an attorney's lien ex- tends to the whole balance of his account for professional services. 98 Waters v. Grace, 23 Ark. 118; McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89; Pope V. Armstrong, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 214; Cage v. Wilkinson, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 223. § 147 LIENS. 132 in case such other business is covered by the same retainer.^^ The lien which an attorney has upon his cHent's papers is commensurate with the client's right and title to them. If the client has taken to his attorney, for his opinion, papers which the client has received from another person for in- spection pending- negotiations for a sale of property or other business transaction, the attorney can not, upon a claim of lien, retain the papers as against the person to whom they belong. Judge Gibbs, of the Court of Common Pleas, states a similar case,^ "suppose one having a diamond offers it to another for sale for £100, and gives it to him to examine, and he takes it to a jeweler, who weighs and values it; he refuses to purchase, and, being asked for it again, he says the jeweler must be first paid for the valuation; as between the jeweler and purchaser, the jeweler has a lien; but as against the lender, he has no right to retain the jewel." § 147. Attorney's special lien on fund in court's hands. — An attorney may have a special lien upon a fund in court or in the hands of a receiver, recovered by him, and a court of equity, having such a fund in its possession, will protect the attorney in retaining out of it a reasonable compensa- tion for his services.^ The lien in such cases, however, is not one for a balance due the attorney for services generally, but only for his services in recovering that particular fund.^ There may be circumstances, however, under which an at- torney may in effect be given a general lien upon money in court recovered by him. Thus where the amount due on a 99 In re Paschal, 10 Wall. (U. worth v. Handy, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 75, S.) 483, 19 L. ed. 992. 13 Ohio Dec. 47; Spencer's Appeal, 1 Hollis V. Claridge, 4 Taunt. 6 Sad. (Pa.) 488, 9 Atl. 523; Fowler 807. V. Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Va. 112, 14 2 Central Railroad v. Pettus, 113 S. E. 447, per Brannon, J. As to U. S. 116, 28 L. ed. 915, 5 Sup. Ct. the law in Georgia, see Morrison 387; Cowdrey v. Galveston, &c., R. v. Ponder, 45 Ga. 167. Co., 93 U. S. 352, 23 L. ed. 950; Olds 3 Fowler v. Lewis' Admr., 36 V. Tucker, 35 Ohio St. 581; Long- W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447, 133 ATTORNEY S GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN. § I49 judgment recovered for the purchase-price of property sold by plaintiff to defendant is paid into a court of equity for distribution, plaintiff's attorneys are entitled to receive therefrom the money due them from plaintiff for meritorious services rendered by them to him in other suits growing out of said purchase, where such services were rendered, with the expectation that they would be paid for out of the proceeds of such judgment.^ But the attorney for defendant has no lien upon a fund garnisheed by the plaintiff.^* § 148. Rule in Pennsylvania. — Even in Pennsylvania, where an attorney's lien upon moneys collected is hardly recognized under that name, but is called rather a right of defalcation, a court of equity will protect an attorney who is entitled to a compensation out of a fund within its control. Thus, where a fund was brought into a court of equity by the services of an attorney, who looked to that alone for his compensation, the court, though declaring his interest not to be a lien, yet regarded him as the equitable owner of the fund to the extent of the value of his services, and in- tervened for his protection, awarding him a reasonable com- pensation to be paid out of the fund.^ What is a reasonable compensation the court may determine by itself, or through an auditor, without referring the matter to a jury.^ § 149. No general lien upon a fund in court. — But an at- torney has no general lien upon a fund in court recovered by 4 Claflin V. Bennett, 51 Fed. pensation to the counsel engaged, 693, affd. 57 Fed. 257, 6 C. C. A. in his sound discretion, according 326. to his estimate, of what they rea- 4a Phillips V. Hogue, 63 Neb. sonably deserve to have." See, to 192, 88 N. W. 180. the same effect, Dubois' Appeal, 38 5 Spencer's Appeal, 6 Sad. (Pa.) Pa. St. 231, 80 Am. Dec. 478; 488, 9 Atl. 523; McKelvy's Appeal, Irwin v. Workman, 3 Watts (Pa.) 108 Pa. St. 615; Freeman V. Shreve, 357. In the latter case the fund 86 Pa. St. 135. In the latter case Mr. was in the hands of the sheriff. Justice Sharswood said: "It is true ^ McKelvy's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. that a chancelor will, out of a 615. fund for distribution, order com- §150 LIENS. 134 him for his client. His lien in such case is a lien upon the judgment, and is a special lien confined to his costs or serv- ices in the particular proceeding which produced the fund.'^ His general lien depends upon possession, and does not at- tach to a fund recovered until he obtains actual possession of that fund. If the attorney collects the whole fund, then this becomes subject to his general lien; if, however, he col- lects only such part of the fund as is sufficient to pay his costs or services, for which he had a lien upon the judgment, then the amount he receives is applicable to such costs or services, and not to his general balance of account against the client. § 150. Court's jurisdiction over attorneys. — A court has summary jurisdiction over attorneys to order the payment of money wrongfully withheld from clients. ''The summary jurisdiction," said Chief Justice Durfee in one case,^ ''evidently originates in the disciplinary power which the court has over attorneys as officers of the court. The opin- ion seems to have been prevalent at one time that the juris- diction extended only to attorneys employed as such in suits depending in court, to hold them to their duty in such suits; but a more liberal view has obtained, and it is now well set- tled that the jurisdiction extends to any matter in which an attorney has been employed by reason of his professional character.^ In general, the jurisdiction applies only between attorney and client, but it is not confined strictly to that rela- tion."^° In the case in which the decision was rendered, from which this quotation is taken, the petition was made, not by the client, but by the opposite party. The attorney "> Bozon V. Bolland, 4 Myl. & C. 357; Ex parte Statts, 4 Cowen (N. 354; Lann v. Church. 4 Madd. 391. Y.) 76; Ex parte Cripwell. 5 Dowl. 8 Anderson v. Bosworth, 15 R. Pr. Cas. 689; De Wolf v. , 2 I. 443, 8 Atl. 339, 2 Am,. St. 910. Chit. 68; In re Knight, 1 Bing. 91. 9 In re Aitkin, 4 B. & Aid. 47; 10 In re Aitkin, 4 B. & Aid. 47; Grant's Case, 8 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) Tharrett v. Trevor, 7 Exch. 161. 135 attorney's general or retaining lien. § 150a had received money from his client, the defendant in a suit, to be applied "towards the settlement" of the suit, and the attorney had given a receipt for the money to this efifect. This receipt the client passed over to the plaintiff as so much money in the client's hands applicable to the settlement. The client claimed the right to retain his fees out of this money; and the plaintiff accordingly petitioned the court in which the suit was pending for an order requiring the at- torney to pay over the money. The court held that a case was presented for the summary jurisdiction of the court, and that it had discretionary power to order the money paid into its registry by a day named. ^^ In an early case in New York, the plaintiff's attorney, in a qui tam action, claimed and received certain costs from the defendant in partial settlement of the same. The costs were taken in the mistaken supposition that the defendant was liable to pay them. Nearly four years afterwards, upon his petition, the court ordered the attorney to refund them.^^ § 150a. Summary jurisdiction of courts over attorneys. — While the summary jurisdiction of the court over its at- torneys is sometimes exercised to force them to pay over to their clients money wrongfully withheld from them, it is also exercised by the courts to protect attorneys in their rights to liens on the client's money, property or choses in actions secured and upheld by the services of the attorney. While litigants have an undoubted right to settle their suits and dismiss them, the courts will preserve the liens of their attorneys against fraudulent and collusive set- tlements and dismissals. ^-'' 11 Anderson v. Bosworth, 15 R. 12a Miedreich v. Rank, 40 Ind. I. 443, 8 Atl. 339, 2 Am. St. 910. App. 39, 82 N. E. 117; Kelly v. 12 Moulton V. Bennett, 18 Wend. New York City Ry. Co., 122 App. (N. Y.) 586, cited in Anderson v. Div. (N. Y.) 467, 106 N. Y. S. 894; Bosworth, 15 R. I. 443, 8 Atl. 339, 2 In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 Am. St. 910. N. E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) llOln, § 151 LIENS. 136 § 151, Attorney can not hold entire sum of money of his client for his fee. — An attorney who has collected money for a client can not hold the entire amount, and refuse to pay it over, because a small part is due to him as fees. He will be allowed to retain enough to cover these, but no more.^'^ If an attorney retains money collected for a client, upon a disagreement as to the amount due him for services, and the client obtains a judgment for a part of the amount retained, the client is not then entitled to an order of court requiring the attorney to pay over the amount of the judgment. He has by obtaining judgment waived the right to a summary process; for the parties no longer stand in the relation of attorney and client, but in that of debtor and creditor.^* The client's remedy is either by suit or by summary process. "If the client is dissatisfied with the sum retained," says Chief Justice Black, "he may either bring suit against the attorney, or take a rule upon him. In the latter case, the court will compel immediate justice, or inflict summary pun- ishment on the attorney, if the sum retained be such as to show a fraudulent intent. But if the answer to the rule con- vinces the court that it was held back in good faith, and be- lieved not to be more than an honest compensation, the rule will be dismissed, and the client remitted to a jury trial. "^' 123 Am. St. 533; Northrup v. Hay- bill, was ordered to give up a por- ward, 102 Minn. 307, 113 N. W. 701. tion of them. Charboneau v. Or- But a contract for a contingent ton, 43 Wis. 96; Burns v. Allen, fee providing that the client 15 R. I. 32, 23 Atl. 35. should not settle the case w^ithout i4 Windsor v. Brown. 15 R. I. the attorney's consent is invalid. 182, 9 Atl. 135. See also, In re In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. Davies, 15 Weekly Rep. 46; Bo- E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) llOln, hanan v. Peterson, 9 Wend. (N. 123 Am. St. 533. Y.) 503; Cottrell v. Finlayson, 2 13 Miller V. Atlee, 3 Exch. 799, Code Rep. (N. Y) 116, 4 How. Pr. 13 Jur. 431; Conyers v. Gray, 67 (N. Y.) 242. Ga. 329. Under the English prac- i^ Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. tice, a solicitor having a lien upon St. 95. See also, In re Harvey, deeds of property greatly exceed- 14 Phila. (Pa.) 287. ing in value the amount of his 137 ATTORNEYS GENERAL OR RETAINING LIEN, § I52 § 152. How a lien may be pleaded in defense. — In a pro- ceeding by a client to recover money collected by his attor- ney, the latter need not set up in his answer a technical counterclaim for the value of his services; but it is suffi- cient that he alleges the performances of the services and their value, and his right to retain this sum from the amount collected. If the value of the services is equal to or exceeds the sum collected, he may retain the whole amount.^® 10 Ward v. Craig, 87 N, Y. 550. CHAPTER V. AN ATTORNEY'S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN ON JUDGMENTS. Sec. Sec. 153. Attorney's lien upon a judg- 176. ment. 177. 154. Attorney's lien upon judg- 177a. ment may be made a gen- 177b. eral lien. 177c. 154a. Prosecuting attorney has no 178. lien. 179. 155. Attorney's lien not recog- 180. nized at common law. 181. 156. Time and manner of origin 181a. of attorney's lien. 182. 157. Origin of lien is obscure. 183. 158. Attorney's lien on judgment 184. — General rule. 185. 159. No lien in several states. 186. 160. California. 187. 161. Illinois. 188. 162. Massachusetts. 189. 163. Missouri. 189a. 164. Rhode Island. 189b. 165. Attorney's lien limited to 189bb. taxable costs. 189c. 166. Attorney's lien on a judg- 189d. ment. 190. 167. Rule in United States courts. 190a. 168. Rule extended by statutes. 190b. 169. Alabama. 191. 169a. Alaska. 191a. 170. Arkansas. 192. 171. Colorado. 192a. 171a. Connecticut. 192b. 171b. District of Columbia. 192c. 172. Florida. . 193. 173. Georgia. 173a. Idaho. 194. 173b. Illinois. 195. 174. Indiana. 175. Iowa. Kansas. Kentucky. Louisiana. Maine. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Oregon. Mississippi. Missouri. Montana. Nebraska. New York. Present code of New York. Lien on cause of action. Ownership of costs. Attorney's undefined lien. Action to establish lien. North Dakota. Oklahoma. . Oregon. South Carolina. South Dakota. Tennessee. Texas. Utah. Vermont. Virginia. Washington. West Virginia. Wisconsin. Wyoming. No lien until judgment is entered. Default not a judgment. Pending appeal will not pre- vent dismissal. 138 139 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 153 Sec. Sec. 196. Client may .settle before 215. judgment. 197. Action for damages settled . 216 by parties. 217 198. Settlement by parties will 218 not affect attorney's lien. 219 199. Attorney's withdrawal from case. 220, 200. Only attorney is entitled to 221 a lien. 222 201. Lien by contract. 223 201a. Attorney's lien on fund re- covered. 224 201b. Defendant's attorney can 225 have no lien on fund. 226 202. No lien where court is not 227 court of record. 203. Settlement in fraud of at- 228 torneys. 229 204. Collusion between debtor 230 and creditor. 231 204a. Waiver of attorney's lien. 232 205. Court of admiralty. 206. Assignment of judgment. 233 207. Actions not assignable. 234 208. Action founded on negotia- 235 ble instrument. 236 209. Notice of attorney's lien. 237 210. Statutory provisions as to 238 notice of lien. 211. Notice to adverse party. 239 212. Actual notice not necessar3\ 213. Lien on damages recovered. 240 214. Judgment for costs only. Rule in court of the king's bench. Rule in equity. Rule in the United States. Judgment as set-off. When set-off good against the attorney's lien. Rule in some of the states. Delay in objecting to set-off. Assignment of judgment. Equitable assignment of the judgment. Lien by agreement. Lien created by parol. Attornej'-'s lien assignable. Lien superior to lien of at- tachment. Not defeated by bankruptcy. Attorney's lien on lands. Rule in some states. Waiver of attorney's lien. Attorney's process to secure rights. Settlement by parties. The English practice. Application to protect lien. Money paid into court. Delay in asserting Hen. Attorney need not be a party to the record. Action to dissolve partner- ship. Proceeding to wind up in- solvent insurance com- pany. § 153. Attorney's lien upon a judgment. — The lien of an attorney upon a judgment is properly denominated a lien in the broad sense of the term, although it rests merely on the equity of the attorney to be paid his fees and disbursements out of the judgment which he has obtained. It is not a lien that depends upon possession, as liens ordinarily do. There can be no possession of a judgment, for this exists only in §154 LIENS. 140 intendment of law. The execution issued upon a judgment does not represent the judgment, and the "possession of the execution is not a possession of the judgment.^ In regard to possession, this lien of an attorney resembles the mari- time lien of a seaman upon the vessel for his wages. Both liens are exceptions to the general rule as respects the ele- ment of possession. This lien, therefore, not arising from a right on the part of the attorney to retain something in his possession, but being a right to recover for his services in obtaining a judg- ment for his client, is called the attorney's charging lien. It is so called because the costs and fees of the attorney are made a charge upon the judgment recovered, and this charge is enforced by the court. Some confusion has arisen in the decisions on this subject from a failure in many cases to ob- serve the distinction between the retaining lien and the charging lien. The latter lien never extends beyond the costs and fees due the attorney in the suit in which the judg- ment is recovered; but a retaining lien extends to the gen- eral balance due the attorney from the client for professional services and his disbursements in connection therewith.^ In other words, the charging lien is a special lien, and the re- taining lien is a general lien.^ § 154. Attorney's lien upon judgment may be made a gen- eral lien. — By agreement, however, the attorney's lien upon a judgment may be made a general lien in equity, and an oral agreement is sufificient for this purpose. Thus, where an attorney had rendered services and expended money in instituting and conducting several suits for a client, and it 1 Wright V. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 821; In re Wilson. 12 Fed. 235, per 339; Ward v. Wordsworth, 1 E. Brown, J.; Goodrich v. McDonald, D. Smith (N. Y.) 598; Fowler v. 41 Hun (N. Y.) 235; Fowler v. Lewis, 36 W. \'a. 112, 14 S. E. 447, Lewis, 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. quoting text. 447, quoting text. 2 Weed Sewing Machine Co. v. 3 Bozon v. Bolland, 4 Myl. & C. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. 354. 141 ATTORNEYS SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 155 was orally agreed between them that the attorney might retain so much of the avails of a particular suit as should be sufficient to pay for all his services, not only in that suit but his previous services in other matters, and the attorney had conducted the suit to a favorable conclusion and obtained judgment, and after the client's insolvency collected the same upon execution, it was held that he had an equitable lien upon the avails, both for his services and expenses in the suit and for the previous services covered by the agree- ment,^ The attorney's lien arises generally without an express agreement therefor. It is founded upon the idea of a con- tract implied by law, and is as effectual as if it resulted from an express agreement.^ § 154a. Prosecuting attorney has no lien. — The lien does not exist in favor of a prosecuting attorney who in his offi- cial capacity has obtained a judgment in behalf of a state or municipal corporation. It is not consistent with public pol- icy to allow public property or public funds to be detained or seized to pay the debt of an individual.^ § 155. Attorney's lien not recognized at common law. — An attorney's lien for his costs is not recognized at common law, but only in equity, unless declared by statute." The 4 Cooke V. Thresher, 51 Conn. Heisk. (Tenn.) 511; 24 Am. Rep. 105. 327; Merwin v. Chicago, 45 111. 5 Ex parte Bush, 7 Vin. Abr. 74; 133, 92 Am. Dec. 204. Cowell V. Simpson, 16 Ves. 279; "^ Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. Massachusetts & So. Const. Co. 33; Baker v. Cook, 11 Mass. 236; V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145, per Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; Hill Simonton, J. v. Brinkley, 10 Ind. 102; Potter 6 Wood V. State, 125 Ind. 219, v. Mayo, 3 Greenl. (Maine) 34, 14 25 N. E. 190; Wallace v. Lawyer, Am. Dec. 211; Stone v. Hyde, 22 54 Ind. 501, 23 Am. Rep. 661; Maine 318; Hobson v. Watson, 34 Bradley v. Richmond, 6 Vt. 121; Maine 20, 56 Am. Dec. 632; For- Jenks V. Osceola Township, 45 sythe v. Beveridge, 52 111. 268, 4 Iowa 554; Memphis v. Laski, 9 Am. Rep. 612; Compton v. State, § 155 LIENS. 142 common law recognizes only liens acquired by possession. A lien at law is not in strictness either a jus in re, or a jus ad rem, but simply a right to possess and retain property until some charge attaching to it is paid. The lien of an attorney upon a judgment is an equitable lien. In a strict sense, there is no such thing as a lien upon a thing not in possession. Baron Parke says :^ "The lien which an attorney is said to have on a judgment (which is, perhaps, an incorrect expression) is merely a claim to the equitable interference of the court to have that judgment held as a security for his debt." More recently Chief Justice Cock- burn expressed the same view, saying:*' "Although we talk of an attorney having a lien upon a judgment, it is in fact only a claim or right to ask for the intervention of the court for his protection, when, having obtained judgment for his client, he finds there is a probability of the client depriving him of his costs." Again, Mr. Justice Erie said: "Lien, properly speaking, is a word which applies only to a chattel; lien upon a judg- ment is a vague and inaccurate expression ; and the words equitable lien are intensely undefined. "^^ An attorney's lien upon a judgment, as by force of usage we are permitted to designate his claim upon the judgment recovered, is founded upon the same equity which gives to every person who uses his labor and skill upon the goods of another, at his request, the right to retain the goods till he is paid for his labor. ^^ This equitable principle is derived 38 Ark. 601; Patrick v. Leach, 12 nWeed v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, Fed. 661, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 635, 48 Am. Rep. 821; Turno v. Parks, per McCrary. J.; Pride v. Smal- 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 35; ley, 66 N. J. L. 578, 52 Atl. 955. Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. H. 347, 8 Barker v. St. Quintin, 12 M. & per Richardson, C. J. The lien of W. 441. an attorney upon a judgment was 9 Mercer v. Graves, L. R. 7 Q. established in New Hampshire by B. 499. the above decision. Wright v. 10 Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339. El. 19. 143 attorney's special or charging lien. § 156 from the civil law. It is considered reasonable and proper that an attorney, by whose labor and at whose expense a judgment has been obtained for his client, should have an interest in that judgment which the law will regard and protect. ^2 Lord Kenyon declared "that the convenience, good sense, and justice of the thing required it." § 156. Time and manner of origin of attorney's lien. — The time and manner of the origin of this lien are not shown by any reported case. Probably it had been the practice of judges to aid attorneys in securing their costs out of judg- ments obtained for their clients before the right to the lien had been formally adjudicated.^^ It was doubtless recog- nized upon the ground of justice that the attorney had con- tributed by his labor and skill to the recovery of the judg- ment, and the court, wishing to protect its own officers, exercised its power to that end; or, as Lord Kenyon puts JJ..14 ''The party should not run away with the fruits of the cause without satisfying the legal demands of his attorney, by whose industry, and in many instances at whose expense, those fruits are obtained." In the argument of a case before the King's Bench in 1779, before Lord Mansfield,^^ in which it was sought to establish a lien in favor of a captain against the ship for his wages, the counsel instanced the case of at- torneys, who can not be compelled to deliver up their client's papers until they are paid; upon which Lord Mansfield said that the practice in this respect was not very ancient, but that courts both of law and of equity had then carried it so far that an attorney might obtain an order to stop his client from receiving money recovered in a suit till his bill should be paid. Sir James Burrough, who was present, mentioned to the court that the first instance of such an order of court 12 In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284. Doug. 101, 104. Some years after- 13 Ex parte Bush, 7 Vin. Abr. 74. wards this lien was recognized by 14 Read v. Duppa, 6 T. R. 361. Chief Justice Wilmot in Sclioole i5Wilkins V. Carmichael, 1 v. Noble, 1 H. Bl. 23 (1788). § 157 LIENS. 144 was in the case of one Taylor of Evesham, about the time of a contested election for that borough; and Lord Mans- field said he himself had argued the question in the Court of Chancery. Doubtless the lien was first established in the courts of chancery. Lord Hardwicke, in a case before him, in 1749, said:^*^ "I am of opinion that a solicitor, in consideration of his trouble, and the money in disburse for his client, has a right to be paid out of the duty decreed for the plaintiff, and a lien upon it. * * * and it is constantly the rule of this court." § 157. Origin of lien is obscure. — It must be confessed that the origin of this lien is obscure and uncertain. The attempts to account for it are many and diverse. It seems from Comyn's Digest^^ that it was founded on an old rule of court, that a client should not discharge his attorney without leave. Lord Kenyon said the lien depended on the general jurisdiction of the court over the suitors. Baron Parke refers to Welsh v. Hole^® as the first case establishing an attorney's lien on a judgment. This lien is declared to be merely a claim to the equitable interference of the court to have the judgment held for his debt.^^ Baron Martin, adopting and explaining this view, says the right of the attorney is merely this, that, if he gets the fruits of the judgment into his hands, the court will not deprive him of them until his costs are paid.-" These definitions are adopted and further developed in a recent decision in Rhode Island, Chief Justice Durfee saying :^^ "Primarily, without doubt, le Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 720. 21 Horton v. Champlin, 12 R. I. 1"^ Attorney, B. 11; also, Bacon's 550, 34 Am. Rep. 722. And see Abr. Attorney E. Massachusetts & So. Const. Co. v. 18 1 Doug. 238 (1779). Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. The 19 Barker v. St. Quintin, 12 M. attorney's lien includes only his & W. 441. taxable fees and disbursements 20 Hough V. Edwards, 1 H. & and not his general compensation. N. 171. Tyler v. Superior Court, 30 R. I. 145 attorney's special or charging lien. § 158 the lien originates in the control which the attorney has by his retainer over the judgment, and the processes for its enforcement. This enables him to collect the judgment and reimburse himself out of the proceeds. It gives him no right, how^ever, to exceed the authority conferred by his re- tainer. But inasmuch as the attorney has the right, or at least is induced, to rely on his retainer to secure him in this way for his fees and disbursements, he thereby acquires a sort of equity, to the extent of his fees and disbursements, to control the judgment and its incidental processes against his client and the adverse party colluding with his client, which the court will, in exercise of a reasonable discretion, protect and enforce. And on the same ground, the court will, when it can, protect the attorney in matters of equit- able set-ofT. We think this is the full scope of the Hen, if lien it can be called." § 158. Attorney's lien on judgment — General rule. — It may be stated as a general rule that an attorney has a lien upon a judgment obtained for his client for his costs in the suit. In most of the states this rule was first established by the courts. In some states the lien did not exist till it was declared by statute; and in several states, in which the courts had established the lien, this has by statute been extended or modified so that it is quite a different thing from the lien which the courts established and enforced. A summary statement in a note hereto annexed shows in what states this lien prevails in some form;^- but it will be necessary 107, 73 Atl. 467, 23 L. R. A. (N. Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168; S.) 1045. The lien does not attach Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn. 444, until judgment is rendered. Tyler 31 Am. Dec. 752; Benjamin v. Ben- V. Superior Court, 30 R. I. 107, 7Z jamin, 17 Conn. 110; Cooke v. Atl. 467, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105. District 22 The lien exists in — Alabama: of Columbia: see § 171b. Florida: see §169. Alaska: see § 169a. Ar- see § 172. Georgia: see § 173. kansas: see § 170. Colorado: see Idaho: see § 173a. Illinois: see § 171. Connecticut: see § 171a; § 173b. Indiana: see § 174. Iowa: 10 § 159 LIENS. 146 hereafter to refer in detail to the legislation and the adjudi- cations in those states where the attorney's lien on a judg- ment has been materially changed. § 159. No lien in several states. — In several states the lien does not exist.''^ In most of these states an attorney is see § 175. Kansas: see § 176. Kentucky: see § 177. Louisiana: see § 177a. Maine: see § 177b; Hobson V. Watson, 34 Maine 20, 56 Am. Dec. 632; Newbert v. Cun- ningham, 50 Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612; Stratton v. Hussey, 62 Maine 286. The lien extends to fees in suits incidental to the judg- ment obtained. Newbert v. Cun- ningham), 50 Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612. Maryland: In Marshall V. Cooper, 43 Md. 46 (1875), the court said that no case involving the question of the attorney's lien had arisen or been decided in the appellate court. In Stokes's Case, 1 Bland (Md.) 98, the Chancellor said that contracts between solici- tors and suitors must be decided like other contracts. Massachu- setts: see §§ 162, 177c. Michigan: see § 178. Minnesota: see § 179. Mississippi: see § 1'81 ; Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep, 707; Pope v. Armstrong, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 214; Cage v. Wilkinson, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 223. Missouri: see § 181a. Montana: see § 182. Nebraska: see § 183. New Hamp- shire: Young V. Dearborn, 27 N. H. 324; Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co., 37 N. H. 223; Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; Whitcomb v. Straw, 62 N. H. 650. New Jersey: Barnes V. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 467; Braden V. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518; Heister V. Mount, 17 N. J. L. 438; Johnson V. Johnson Railroad Signal Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 79, 40 Atl. 193; Pride V. Smalley, 66 N. J. L. 578, 52 Atl. 955; Hudson Trust & Savings Inst. V. Carr-Curran Paper Mills (N. J.). 44 Atl. 638; Campbell v. Terney, 7 N. J. L. J. 189; Bracher v. Olds, 60 N. J. Eq. 449, 46 Atl. 770. New York: see §§ 184-189. North Dakota: see § 189a. Oklahoma: see § 189b. Oregon : see § 180. Rhode Island : see § 164. South Carolina: see § 189c ; Scharlock v. Oland, 1 Rich. (S. Car.) 207; Miller v. New- ell, 20 S. Car. 123, 128, 47 Am. Rep. 833. South Dakota: see § 189d. Tennessee: see § 190. Texas: see § 190a. Utah: see § 190b. Ver- mont: see § 191. Virginia: see 191a. Washington: see § 192. West Virginia: see § 192a. Wisconsin: see § 192b. Wyoming: see § 192c. 23 The lien does not exist in: California: see § 160. Nevada: Ap- parently the lien does not exist. North Carolina: Apparently the lien does not exist. Ohio: Does not exist. Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. 473. But it is held in the absence of a statute that the attorney has a lien on a judgment obtained by him for his client for reasonable fees agreed to be paid and that an assignment of the judgment will not defeat the at- torney. Hinman v. Rogers, 4 Ohio Dec. 303. He may have a lien for 147 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. l6l not entitled to any taxable costs, and, the lien being in gen- eral limited to such costs, it can not exist except by force of special statutes where there are no such costs. Gener- ally there can be no lien for unliquidated fees, or for fees agreed upon, unless the right be conferred by statute.^^ § 160. California. — There is no statute giving costs to the attorneys; and, inasmuch as the lien can not be extended to cover a quantum meruit compensation, an attorney in this state has no lien on a judgment recovered by him.^^ § 161. Illinois. — Formerly an attorney had no lien upon a judgment for his fees in the litigation resulting in its re- covery ;^'^ but a recent statute-'^ gives attorney's liens upon all claims, demands and causes of action placed in their hands his fees on a fund in the hands of his client. Pennsylvania Co. V. Thatcher, 78 Ohio St. 175, 85 N. E. 55. He can not recover for his services in a personal in- jury case from the defendant vv^hen settlement has been agreed upon by the parties directly and the money has been paid to his client. Wer- ner V. George Zehler Pro. Co., 31 Ohio C. C. 632. As to enforce- ment of attorney's lien where set- tlement has been made without his consent, see Hurd v. Wheeling & L. E. R. Co., 4 Ohio N. P. 404; Connell v. Brumback, 18 Ohio C. C. 502, 10 Ohio C. D. 149. The court will protect an attorney's lien on a fund brought into court as a result of his services. Wood V. Biddle, 7 Ohio N. P. 225, 8 Ohio Dec. 707. Pennsylvania: This lien does not exist. Texas: An attorney has no lien for his services upon a judgment. Casey v. March, 30 Tex. 180; Able v. Lee, 6 Tex. 427; Whittaker v. Clarke, 33 Tex. 647. United States Court of Claims: No lien is allowed to an attorney who has prosecuted a case to judgment against the United States. Brooke's Case 12 Opin. Atty.-Gen. 216. 24 Swanston v. Morning Star Mining Co., 13 Fed. 215, 4 Mc- Crary (U. S.) 241. 25 Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331; Mansfield v. Borland, 2 Cal. 507; Russell v. Conway, 11 Cal. 93; Ho- gan V. Black, 66 Cal. 41, 4 Pac. 943. 26 Forsythe v. Beveridge, 52 111. 268, 4 Am. Rep. 612; Nichols v. Pool, 89 111. 491; Sanders v. See- lye, 128 111. 631, 21 N. E. 601; Scott v. Morris, 131 111. App. 605. But see North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ackley, 58 111. 572, revd. 171 111. 100, 49 N. E. 222, 44 L. R. A. 177. 27 See post, § 173b, post, and Rev. Stat. 1913, p. 1571. § l62 LIENS. 148 for suit or collection, for the amount of fees agreed upon or for a reasonable fee where no amount has been agreed upon. It seems that, where the employment is by a special con- tract, the attorney has an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the litigation. Thus, where an attorney undertook the collection of a debt secured upon land under a special con- tract whereby he was to receive one-fifth of the proceeds whether the same might be in land or money, and the suit was prosecuted to a decree and sale of the land, and the client purchased the land at the sale, it was held that the attorney was entitled to an equitable lien under the contract, and a decree in his favor was entered accordingly.^'^ § 162. Massachusetts.-^ — An attorney has no lien at com- mon law on a judgment recovered by him;^^ but it is pro- vided by statute that an attorney lawfully possessed of an execution, or who has prosecuted a suit to final judgment in favor of his client, shall have a lien thereon for the amount of his fees and disbursements in the cause ; but this does not prevent the payment of the execution or judgment to the judgment creditor without notice of the lien. This statutory lien covers only taxable costs, and does not extend to coun- sel fees.^^ Under this statute an attorney has no lien before judgment which will prevent his client from settling with the opposite party without the attorney's knowledge or con- sent. Even after judgment, the attorney's lien does not pre- vent a settlement if this be made without notice of the lien.^^ The attorney of the defendant having recovered a judg- 28 Smith V. Young, 62 III. 210. 3 1 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22 And see Morgan v. Roberts, 3S Pick. (Mass.) 210; Thayer v. III. 65. Daniels, 113 Mass. 129. 29 Pub. Stats. 1882, p. 913, § 42. 32 Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. This was evidently derived from 33; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; the statute of 1810, ch. 84. Rev. cited in Potter v. Mayo, 3 Greenl. Laws 1902, ch. 165, § 48. (Maine) 34, 14 Am. Dec. 211. 30 Baker v. Cook, 11 Mass. 236: Dunklee v. Locke, 13 Mass. 525. 149 attorney's special or charging lien. § 164 ment for costs is entitled to them as against the plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against the defendant. The plaintiff's judgment should be for the balance after deduct- ing the attorney's claim for costs.^^ The attorney may en- force his lien upon a judgment by an action on the judgment in the name of the client.^* § 163. Missouri. — It was formerly held that attorneys had no lien for their fees upon judgments recovered by them. They were not allowed under the laws of this state any fees which were taxed as costs.^^ The statute^® now provides that from the commencement of an action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim the attorney has a lien upon his client's cause of action which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in the client's favor and the proceeds thereof, and his lien is not affected by any settle- ment between the parties before or after judgment to which he does not consent. § 164. Rhode Island. — An attorney probably has a lien for his costs upon the judgment recorded, but it is regarded only as a sort of equity to control the judgment and its inci- dental processes, against his client and the adverse party colluding with his client. The court will, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, protect and enforce this equity. Though the judgment be for costs only, it does not belong to the attorney absolutely, so that he is authorized to bring suit upon it without the client's consent.^''' 33 Little V. Rogers, 2 Mete. 550, 34 Am. Rep. 722, per Durfee, (Mass.) 478. C. J.: "We think this is the full 34 Woods V. Verry, 4 Gray scope of the lien, if lien it can be (Mass.) 357. called." The attorney's charging 35 Frissell v. Haile, 18 Mo. 18. lien attaches only after judgment 36 See post, § 181a, and Rev. is entered. Tyler v. Superior Stat. 1909, § 964. Court, 30 R. I. 107, 7Z Atl. 467, 23 37 Horton v. Champlin, 12 R. I. L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045. See § 157. § i65 LIENS. 150 § 165. Attorney's lien limited to taxable costs. — It is also a general rule that an attorney's lien upon a judgment for his fees is limited to the taxable costs in the case, in the ab- sence of any statute extending the lien.^^ The costs for which he has a lien are the taxable costs in the suit in which the judgment is rendered. The lien does not extend to costs in any other suit.^^ His lien is limited to the taxable costs included in the judgment, and does not extend to fees accruing, and ad- vanc-es made subsequently;**' nor to commissions on the amount of the judgment collected, though a charge of such commissions might properly be allowed as between attorney and client;*^ nor to disbursements or incidental expenses not taxable as costs ;*^ nor to costs in other suits. *^ The lien upon the fruits of a suit is limited to the services ren- dered therein; and, although a number of separate suits in- volve the same questions, and are argued and determined 38 Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612; Hoop- er V. Brundage, 22 Maine 460; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 210; Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co., 37 N. H. 223; Wright V. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339; Wells V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; Whitcomb V. Straw, 62 N. H. 650; Weed Sew- ing Machine Co. v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. 821; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 108; Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331; Mans- field V. Borland, 2 Cal. 507; Massa- chusetts & So. Const. Co. V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. This was the rule in England, until the statute of 18 Victoria. This was the rule in New York, until the Code of Civil Procedure provided that the meas- ure of the attorney's compensa- tion, for which he should have a lien, should be left to the agree- ment, express or implied, of the attorney and his client. Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 1902, § 66. Coughlin v. New York Central & Hud. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75. 39 Phillips V. Stagg, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 108. 40 In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235; Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612; Cooley v. Patterson, 52 Maine 472; Currier v. Boston & Maine R. Co., Zl N. H. 223; Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331; Mansfield v. Dorland, 2 Cal. 507. 41 Wright v. Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339. 42 Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246. 43 St. John v. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261; Massachusetts & So. Const. Co. V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. 151 attorney's special or charging lien. § 166 together, the fruits of one are not subject to a lien for serv- ices rendered in the others. ^^ The lien does not extend to prospective services in the hearing of an appeal. ^^ This lien can not be defeated by the discharge of the at- torney by the client.^*' The lien exists equally whether the services are rendered by one attorney or more ; or whether the suit be commenced by one attorney, and prosecuted to final judgment by another.'*^ § 166. Attorney's lien on a judgment. — An attorney's lien upon an uncollected judgment is confined to the judgment in the very action in which the services were rendered. ^^ The theory upon which the lien is founded is that the attor- ney has, by his skill and labor, obtained the judgment, and hence should have a lien upon it for his compensation, in analogy to the lien which a mechanic has upon any article which he manufactures. When, therefore, an attorney has several actions for a client, and recovers judgment in but one of them, he can not, in the absence of a special agree- ment, have a lien upon that judgment for his compensation in all the actons. ^^ And, so, where an attorney recovered ■i^ Massachusetts & So. Const. 27 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 409, reversed Co. V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. 40 N. Y. 577; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 ■15 Massachusetts & So. Const. Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 108; Shapley v. Co. V. Giirs Creek, 48 Fed. 145. Bellows, 4 N. H. 347; Wright v. 40 Gammon v. Chandler, 30 Cobleigh, 21 N. H. 339; McWil- Maine 152. Hams v. Jenkins, 72 Ala. 480; For- ^~ Stratton v. Hussey, 62 Maine bush v. Leonard, 8 Minn. (Gil. 267) 286. 303; Weed Sewing Machine Co. v. 48Lann v. Church, 4 Madd. 391; Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. Bozon V. Bolland, 4 Myl. & C. 354; 821; Pope v. Armstrong, 3 S. & M. Lucas V. Peacock, 9 Beav. 177; Ste- (Miss.) 214; Cage v. Wilkinson, 3 phens V. Weston, 3 Barn. & Cress. S. & M. (Miss.) 223; Fowler v. 535; In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235, Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Va. 112, 14 26 Alb. L. J. 271; Williams v. In- S. E. 447, quoting text, gersoll, 89 N. Y. 508; St. John v. 49 Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261; Y. 508, per Earl, J.; Johnson v. Adamsv. Fox,40Barb. (N. Y.) 442, Story, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 114; Massa- §167 LIENS. 152 three judgments for his clients, who afterwards became bankrupts, and their assignee selected other attorneys, to whom the first attorney transferred all the papers upon an agreement that his lien should not be waived, but should be satisfied out of the first moneys coming into the assignee's hands out of the suits, it was held that his lien in each case was limited to the funds collected upon the particular judg- ment in obtaining which the services were rendered; and, money having been collected upon two of the judgments, there was no lien upon this for services rendered in recover- ing the third judgment, upon which nothing was collected. ^° When several attorneys have rendered services for the complainant in a suit, they are equally entitled to a lien for compensation on the fruits of the judgment; but if one of them has obtained an assignment of such fruits, his posses- sion can not be disturbed in favor of another. The equities of all the attorneys are equal, but where one of them has ob- tained an assignment of the judgment he has, so to speak, the legal title in addition to his equity, and his legal title must prevail.^^ § 167. Rule in U. S. courts. — In the United States courts^^ and in those of several states, however, there are chusetts & So. Const. Co. v. Gill's and charges in the cause itself, and Creek, 48 Fed. 145. not to services in any other mat- so In In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235, a ter. In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235, well-considered case, Brown, J., per Brown, J. says: "Neither principle nor au- si Massachusetts & So. Const, thority can sanction an increase in Co. v. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. the amount of a lien upon an un- ^2 United States : Wylie v. Coxe, collected judgment through subse- 15 How. (U. S.) 415, 14 L. ed. quent services in independent mat- 753; Cowdrey v. Galveston H. & ters." The same rule undoubtedly H. R. Co., 93 U. S. 352, 23 L. ed. prevails under the provision of 950; McPherson v. Cox, 96 Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 1902, U. S. 404, 24 L. ed. 746. These § 66, which gives an attorney "a arose under express contracts. As lien upon his client's cause of ac- the statutes of the United States tion" from its commencement. expressly recognize the right of at- This refers, doubtless, to services torneys to charge their clients 153 attorney's special or charging lien. § 167 adjudications that an attorney's lien upon a judgment cov- ers his services without regard to taxable costs in obtaining the judgment, though there be no agreement between the attorney and his client as to the amount which the attorney is entitled to charge for his services. ^-^ The lien exists for a reasonable compensation, which may be determined by the court, or by a referee, upon a summary application. The extent of the lien is to be ascertained upon the basis of a quantum meruit. It is argued that the rule restricting the lien to the amount of the taxed costs arose from the fact that in England these costs are the only charges for which an action might be maintained, the services of barristers be- ing in theory gratuitous, and their charges only an honorary obligation of quiddam honorarium; and, consequently, where the payment of the fees and charges of an attorney may be legally enforced, as is the case in this country, the reason for the restriction fails, and the lien should cover fees other than the taxed costs, and should include the charges of coun- sel. The taxed costs of the attorney in England had no merit or justice superior to the claim of counsel in this coun- try for a reasonable compensation; and, therefore, the lien should here be extended so as to secure such compensa- tion 54 reasonable compensation for their 444, 31 Am. Dec. 752. Florida: services, in addition to taxable Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183; Car- costs (1 Comp. Stat. 1901, § 823), ter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214. Ala- it would seem that the United bama: Warfield v. Campbell, 38 States will also protect the implied Ala. 527, 82 Am. Dec. 724. Missis- contract. Massachusetts & So. sippi: Pope v. Armstrong, 3 b. & Const. Co. V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. M. (Miss.) 214. Georgia: McDon- 145. aid V. Napier, 14 Ga. 89. In lili- es Illinois: Henchey v. Chicago, nois and Georgia there is no allow- 41 111. 136; Humphrey v. Brown- ance of taxable costs, ing, 46 111. 476, 95 Am. Dec. 446, 5^ Warfield v. Campbell, 38 Ala. per Breese, C. J. Indiana: Hill v. 527, 82 Am. Dec. 724, per Walker, Brinkley, 10 Ind. 102. Connecti- C. J.; McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. cut: Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn. 89, per Nisbet, J. § l68 LIENS. 154 § 168. Rule extended by statutes. — In other states and territories the lien has been extended by statute or adjudi- cation so as to cover not merely taxable costs, but a reason- able compensation to the attorney for his services in obtain- ing the judgment. The adjudications and statutes whereby the lien has been made to cover fees and disbursements in- stead of costs are so different in the several states that it is necessary to state the law for several of the states in detail. But even in states which have adopted the rule that the lien covers the attorney's compensation it does not apply when the decree is for alimony in a suit by a wife for divorce or separation. The alimony is intended for the support of the wife, and the greater the necessity for such an allow- ance, the greater the reason why the courts should dis- countenance its appropriation for any other purpose. Coun- sel must rely upon the costs and counsel fee awarded for his compensation, and therefore no claim to the alimony or any part of it, or to the enforcement of it by any process issued or otherwise, can inure to the benefit of her attorneys. ^^ § 169. Alabama. — The attorney by the statute of Ala- bama is given a lien upon suits, judgments and decrees for money, which lien is superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy said suit, judgment or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied.^® 55 Branth v. Branth, 57 Hun client. German v. Browne, 137 (N. Y.) 592, 10 N. Y. S. 638, 19 Ala. 429, 34 So. 985. An attor- Civ. Proc. R. 28; Weill v. Weill, ney's lien may be enforced on the 10 N. Y. S. 627, 18 Civ. Proc. R. amount of a decree paid into court 241. by petition to the chancellor. Ful- 50 Code 1907, § 3011. Such stat- ler v. Clemmons, 158 Ala. 340, 48 ute is not retroactive in its opera- So. 101. A client has a right to tion. Leahart v. Deedme;j^er, 158 compromise and dismiss his case Ala. 295, 48 So. 371. Attorney will whether he has an attorney or not. waive his lien on funds colletced Ex parte Randall, 149 Ala. 640, 42 on a judgment for his client by So. 870. The attorney's lien does voluntarily paying it over to the not extend to land or other simi- 155 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 170 § 169a. Alaska. — An attorney has a lien for his compen- sation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, upon money in the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party, and upon a judgment to the extent of the costs included therein, or, if there be a special agreement, to the extent of the compensa- tion agreed on or from the giving notice thereof to the party against whom the judgment is given, and filing the original with the clerk where such judgment is entered and dock- eted. This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights exist- ing between the parties to the action or proceeding.^^ § 170. Arkansas.^^ — An attorney has a lien from the com- mencement of his client's cause of action, claim or counter- claim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, judg- ment or final order in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come. The court where the action was instituted shall determine and enforce the lien. When the judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property, his lien amounts to an interest to the extent of it in the property so recovered. His lien covers not only his costs, but compensation for his services to the lar property recovered for the cli- ent. Carroll v. Draughon, 154 Ala. 430, 45 So. 919. The lien seems to have been first established in this state by the decision in Warfield V. Campbell, 38 Ala. 527, 82 Am. Dec. 724. See also, McCaa v. Grant, 43 Ala. 262; Ex parte Leh- man, 59 Ala. 631 ; Jackson v. Clop- ton, 66 Ala. 29; Mosely v. Nor- man, 74 Ala. 422; Central R. Co. V. Pettus. 112 U. S. 116, 28 L. ed. 915, 5 Sup. Ct. 387. 5T Carter's Ann. Code 1900, ch. l(i, § 742. 58 Kirby's Digest of Stats. 1904, §§ 4458-4462, as amended by Kir- by's Supp. 1911, § 4458a; Lane v. Hallum, 38 Ark. 385; Gist v. Han- ly, ZZ Ark. 233. In the latter case, Harrison, J., said: "The attorney is virtually an assignee of a portion of the judgment, or of the debt or claim, equal to his fee, and the ad- vances which he has made for his client. For the parties then to make any arrangement or settle- ment between themselves, without his consent, by which his right might be defeated, would be a fraud upon him, against which he is entitled to protection." § I/O LIENS. 156 amount agreed upon, if there be any agreement, otherwise to a reasonable amount. But the Hen is Hmited to cases where there has been an actual recovery, and can not be extended to professional services, which merely protect an existing title or right of property.^'' His lien for services does not prevail against one who, in good faith and without notice of his lien, has made payments on account of the judg- ment. The attorney may assert his lien, however, by filing a written statement of it with the clerk of the court within ten days of the rendition of the judgment; whereupon the clerk makes upon the record a memorandum of the lien, which he also indorses upon the execution, and such memor- andum is made actual notice of the lien to all persons. This is necessary, however, only for the protection of those who, in good faith and without notice, have made payments to the judgment creditor upon or in consequence of the judg- ment. The notice is not necessary to protect the attorney against a purchaser of the judgment.^*^ It is now provided by statute that an attorney has a lien on real or personal property recovered for his client and this lien amounts to an interest in the property so recovered and whether the lien exists may be determined in a suit to foreclose it.^^ •^» Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86, 658. See also, DeGraffenreid v. 14 S. W. 469. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 66 Ark. CO McCain v. Portis, 42 Ark. 402; 260, 50 S. W. 272. An attorney Porter v. Hanson, 36 Ark. 591. having a lien on his client's prop- yl Dig. of Stats., 1904, §§ 4457, erty for services rendered cannot 4458, 4460. Greenlee v. Rowland, 85 add thereto a debt due him from Ark. 101, 107 S. W. 193; Osborne the client for services theretofore V. Waters, 92 Ark. 388, 123 S. W. rendered in another case. Davis 374. Where persons have notice v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S. W. of an attorney's lien on property 822, 45 L. R. A. 196. An allotment they are bound to act according- of land in a partition suit is not a ly and in a compromise relative to recovery of the land so as to give the disposition of such property the attorney a right to a lien there- the attorney's lien will not be lost on under a statute giving a lien to when not accomplished by his con- an attorney on real estate recov- sent. Rachels v. Doniphan Lum- ered for his client. Gibson v. ber Co., 98 Ark. 529, 136 S. W. Buckner, 65 Ark. 84, 44 S. W. 1034. 157 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 171a § 171. Colorado. — In Colorado it is provided by statute that all attorneys and counselors at law shall have a lien upon any mone}', property, choses in action, or claims and demands in their hands, and upon any judgment they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining, in whole or in part, and on any and all claims and demands in suit, for any fees or balance of fees due or to become due from any client. This lien may be enforced by the proper civil action. ''- It is held where the judgment defendant pays the judg- ment without any notice that the attorney intends to claim such a lien, the debtor will be discharged from any liability.^^ § 171a. Connecticut. — In Connecticut under a statute which provides that a plaintiff in an action may dismiss or withdraw his suit at any time before verdict, it is held that where an action has been compromised and withdrawn by the plaintiff it will not be redocketed on the motion of plain- C2 Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 293. This invests the attorney with a lien immediately upon the render- ing of a judgment in his client's favor. As betwreen him and his client nothing is required to ren- der such lien complete, though to make it valid as against the judg- ment debtor, notice must be given to him prior to the settlement of the judgment. Johnson v. Mc- Millan, 13 Colo. 423, 22 Pac. 769. No particular form of notice is re- quired. Fillmore v. Wells, 10 Colo. 228, IS Pac. 343; Boston & Colo- rado Smelting Co. v. Pless, 9 Colo. 112, 10 Pac. 652. C3 Colorado State Bank v. Da- vidson, 7 Colo. App. 91, 42 Pac. 687. See also Whitehead v. Jes- sup, 7 Colo. App. 460, 43 Pac. 1042. As to enforcement of at- torney's lien, see Davidson v. La Plata County, 26 Colo. 549, 59 Pac. 46. Notice to a bank's at- torney of an attorney's lien on a judgment is notice to the bank. Davidson v. La Plata County, 26 Colo. 549, 59 Pac. 46. Where an attorney, under an agreement with his client in an action to enforce a vendor's lien, purchases the property at the sale and takes title in his own name as trustee to de- velop and sell the property to pay attorney's fees and expenses of the litigation, the agreement will amount to a waiver of the attor- ney's lien. Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 12 Pac. 811. A filing of notice by an attorney with the clerk of his lien, not being pro- vided for by the statute, will not be held to be notice to the judg- ment debtor of such lien or of the attorney's intention to hold a lien. Colorado State Bank v. Davidson, 7 Colo. App. 91, 42 Pac. 687. § 171b LIENS. 158 tiff's attorney who moves to redocket it, charging that if was withdrawn to defraud him and to defeat him in the col- lection of his fees.^* § 171b. District of Columbia. — In the District of Colum- bia it is held that a mere recital in a deed of conveyance to the effect that the grantee takes the land conveyed subject to a pending suit in equity will not charge such grantee with notice of a contract between the grantor and his attorney, giving the attorney a contingent interest in the land for his services and compensation in conducting the pending suit.*'"* § 172. Florida. — A lien is allowed upon a judgment for the reasonable and fair remuneration of the attorney, the statutes not providing for any taxable costs. ^'^ This lien is superior to any equitable set-off of the judgment debtor. § 173. Georgia.*^^ — It is provided that an attorney, upon suits, judgments and decrees for money, shall have a lien superior to all liens, except tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy the suit, judgment or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied. Attorneys at law have the same right and power over such suits, judgments and decrees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them. Upon all suits for the recovery of real or personal property, 64 Gen. Stats. 1902, §§ 595, 596. at the moment when the judg- De Wandelaer v. Sawdey, 78 Conn. ment is entered and is superior 654, 63 Atl. 446. to other liens attaching to such C5 Bendheim v. Pickford, 31 App. judgment. Hutchinson v. Worth- D. C. 488. A contract providing ington, 7 App. D. C. 548. See also, that an attorney shall receive for Kappler v. Sumpter, 33 App. D. C. his compensation a portion of the 404. sum recovered in an action which 60 Carter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214, he brings and prosecutes for his 257; Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183. client will constitute a valid lien 67 Code 1911, § 3364. And see on any fund recovered in such Morrison v. Ponder, 45 Ga. 167. case, and such a lien will attach 159 attorney's special or charging lien. § 173 and upon all judgments or decrees for the recovery of the same, attorneys have a lien on the property recovered, for their fees, superior to all liens but liens for taxes, which may be enforced by such attorneys or their representatives as liens on personal and real estate, by mortgage and foreclo- sure; and the property recovered remains subject to such liens, unless transferred to bona fide purchasers without no- tice. If an attorney files his assertion claiming a lien on property recovered on a suit instituted by him, within thirty days after a recovery of the same, then his lien binds all persons. The same liens and modes of enforcement thereof, which are allowed to attorneys who are employed to sue for any property, upon the property recovered, are equally al- lowed to attorneys employed and serving in defense against such suits, in case the defense is successful. *^^ If no notice of the lien be given, a settlement by the parties can be set aside by the attorney only in case he shows that it was made with the intent to defeat his lien.®® The lien, however, attaches as soon as the suit is com- menced; and the client can not defeat the lien by dismissing the action before trial against the attorney's objections.^** The only notice necessary to a defendant in a pending action of the lien of the plaintiff's attorney on the suit and its pro- ceeds for his fees in that case is knowledge of the fact that the suit has been instituted and is pending. A settlement made directly with the plaintiff, though without other no- tice of the attorney's lien, will leave the defendant liable in the action to a recovery for the benefit of the attorney to the extent of his fees, if there was a cause of action between the parties; and the attorney may prosecute the suit, and re- cover accordingly."^^ After judgment the attorney may proceed to enforce his 68 Code 1911, § 3364. 7o Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 69 Hawkins v. Loyless, 39 Ga. 279. 5; Green v. Southern Exp. Co., 39 "i Little v. Sexton, 89 Ga. 411, Ga. 20. 15 S. E. 490. 173 LIENS. 1 60 lien upon it by levy, and the judgment debtor can not arrest the levy on the ground that the judgment creditor has agreed with him for value to give indulgence; nor can he set up the claim that the attorney has been paid, and that therefore he has no lien, unless he himself has made such payment.'^^ Under the statute of Georgia a lien is created on the lands of an attorney's client for the fees of the attorney, and it is also provided that a lien for attorney's fees attaches in favor of the attorney upon a suit filed by him and that the client can not settle the same where to do so will defeat the attorney's lien. He is also given a lien for his services on property recovered by him for his client and on property of his client where he has successfully defended the title, but to defeat bona fide purchasers he is required to file a notice of his lien, although as between the attorney and client no such notice is necessary.'^^ ''- Tarver v. Tarver, 53 Ga. 43. ■^3 Coleman v. Austin, 99 Ga. 629, 27 S. E. 763. The lien of an attorney is created by recovering judgment for his client and re- cording a notice of his lien. Lovett V. Moore, 98 Ga. 158, 26 S. E. 498. See also, Colorado .State Bank v. Davidson, 7 Colo. App. 91, 42 Pac. 687. Where a client compromises his suit but a nonsuit is awarded on grounds other than the terms of the compromise, the suit ends and the lien of the attorney is ex- tinguished. Brown v. Georgia C. & N. R. Co., 101 Ga. 80, 28 S. E. 634. An attorney has no lien for making an application to have a homestead set apart. Haygood v. Dannenberg Co., 102 Ga. 24, 29 S. E. 293. An attorney's lien may be enforced in the same manner as mortgages are foreclosed. Ray v. Hixon, 107 Ga. 768, 33 S. E. 692. The lien need not be enforced by foreclosure. Burgin & Sons Glass Co. v. Mclntire, 7 Ga. App. 755, 68 S. E. 490. An attorney's lien can- not be enforced as against a surety, where the action is against a principal and surety and the surety does not assert his defense because of the assurances made by the plaintiff that no claim would be enforced against him. Hall v. Lockerman, 127 Ga. 537, 56 S. E. 759. Where attorneys have liens against separate properties for different amounts and the suits to enforce them are consolidated, the judgment of the court is irregular but not void. Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597, 35 S. E. 142. A plaintiff cannot withdraw his case so as to defeat his attor- neys' lien, where if the suit had i6i attorney's special or charging lien. 173b § 173a. Idaho. — The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counsellors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who ap- pears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come ; and can not be efTected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements, as herein provided.*^* § 173b. Illinois. — Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of action, including all claims for liquidated damages, which may be placed in their hands by their clients for suit or collection, or upon which suit or proceeded it would have resulted in a recovery upon which the at- torney would have had a lien. Walker v. Equitable Mortg. Co., 114 Ga. 862, 40 S. E. 1010. See also, Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Ragan, 104 Ga. 353, 30 S. E. 745; Johnson v. McCurry, 102 Ga. 471, 31 S. E. 88. But in a case for a divorce and alimony, where the parties resume marital relations, the attorney cannot press the case and have recovery of his feds. Chastain v. Lumpkin, 134 Ga. 219, 67 S. E. 818. An attorney may be estopped from asserting a lien. Waiters v. Wells, 7 Ga. App. 778, 68 S. E. 450. No notice need be filed of the attorney's lien as be- tween himself and client. Such a lien will attach upon the attorney's employment. Burgin & Sons Glass Co. V. Mclntire, 7 Ga. App. 755, 11 68 S. E. 490. A party will not be chargeable with notice that an at- torney will, under his contract with his client, be entitled to a part of the property involved in a suit if he succeeds in the suit. Hodnett v. Stewart, 131 Ga. Gl , 61 S. E. 1124. 74Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 167. Dahlstrom v. Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 110 Pac. 243. When the defendant or his attorney has no notice that plaintiff's attorney claims to hold a lien on a judg- ment, the judgment debtor may pay the judgment or he may settle it with the holder of the judgment and be entirely discharged from any liability to plaintiff's attor- ney who procured the judgment for his client. Dahlstrom v. Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 110 Pac. 243. § 174 LIENS. 162 action has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by and between such attorneys and their clients, or, if in the absence of such agreement, for a reasonable fee, for the services rendered or to be rendered for their clients on account of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action: provided, however, such attorneys shall serve notice in writing upon the party against whom the clients may have such suits, claims, or causes of action, claiming such lien and stating therein the interest they have in such suits, claims, demands, or causes of action, and such lien shall attach to any verdict, judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which may be recovered, on account of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action, from and after the service of the aforesaid notice. On peti- tion filed by such attorneys or their clients any court of com- petent jurisdiction shall, on not less than five days' notice to the adverse party, adjudicate the rights of the parties and enforce such lien in term time on vacation."^^ § 174. Indiana. — It is provided by statute that any attor- ney practicing his profession in any court of record in this state shall be entitled to hold a lien, for his fees, on any judgment rendered in favor of any person or persons em- ploying such attorney, to obtain the same: provided, that such attorney shall at the time such judgment shall have been rendered, enter, in writing, upon the docket or record wherein the same is recorded, his intention to hold a lien thereon, together with the amount of his claim.'^^ •^5 Rev. Stat. 1913, p. 1571, § 55. tered. Blair v. Lanning, 61 Ind. 76 Burns' Rev. Stat. 1914, §8274. 499; Day v. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, The statute applies only to 10 N. E. 126; Alderman v. Nelson, a "judgment rendered." Hanna v. Ill Ind. 255, 12 N. E. 394; Wood Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, v. Hughes, 138 Ind. 179, 11 N. E. 31 N. E. 846, 51 Am. St. 246. Un- 588. Such lien has priority over der this statute it is held that the the claims of persons against the lien must be entered within a rea- judgment plaintiff and cannot be sonable time after judgment is en- defeated by setting off one judg- 1 63 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 174 This lien extends to a judgment for alimony obtained by an attorney in proceedings for divorce on behalf of the wife. ment against another. Johnson v. X. E. 615; Koons v. Beach, 147 Ballard, 44 Ind. 270; Adams v. Lee, Ind. 137, 45 N. E. 601, 46 N. E. 82 Ind. 587; Puett v. Beard, 86 587; Alden v. White, 32 Ind. App. Ind. 172, 44 Am. Rep. 280. Such liens cannot be discharged without the consent of the attorney. Mc- Cabe V. Britton, 79 Ind. 224. The assignee of such a judgment does not become liable for the lien when nothing is collected on the judgment. Peterson v. Struby, 25 Ind. App. 19, 56 N. E. 72>Z, 57 N. E. 393, 68 N. E. 913. Where an at- torney under a written contract fixing the amount of his contin- gent fee brings a suit on a life in- surance policy and the defendant's attorney' with knowledge of such contract secures the plaintiff to sign a dismissal of the suit, and the suit is dismissed over the pro- 599. An attorney cannot have a lien test of the plaintiff's attorney, it declared in his favor on a judg- ment after his claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Mc- Nagney v. Frazer, 1 Ind. App. 98, 27 N. E. 431. Liens of attorneys can only be taken upon judgments rendered, and clients may settle their claims at any time before judgment, without the consent of their attorneys. Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846, 51 Am. St. 246. Where an attornej^ with the consent of his client takes a lien for debts due that are not a lien on the judg- is held to be a fraud by the parties to the suit for which plaintiff's at- torney may have redress. Mied- reich v. Rank, 40 Ind. App. Z9:i, 82 N. E. 117. While an attorney has no lien on a fund secured for his client under the statute, he may have an equitable lien. He can have no lien on a fund secured for his client by compromise where no judgment is entered. Koons v. Beach, 147 Ind. 137, 45 N. E. 601, 46 N. E. 587. Where, before sum- mons is served on a defendant in an injury case, the defendant set- ment, creditors who have no lien ties with claimant without any no- on such judgment cannot com- plain. Harshman v. Armstrong, 119 Ind. 224, 21 N. E. 662. In an action to enforce an attorney's lien the amount thereof must be stated. Day v. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, 10 N. E. 126. The lien an at- torney holds on a judgment may be assigned. Day v. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, 10 N. E. 126. Attorneys also have equitable liens for their tice of the filing of a complaint, plaintiff's attorney is not entitled to a lien and cannot successfully prosecute an action to recover. Lumpkin v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 36 Ga. 135, 70 S. E. 1101. As to recovery of lien to pay conditional fees, see Penn v. McGhee, 6 Ga. App. 631, 65 S. E. 686. For en- forcement of liens by two law firms in same case, see Merchants fees upon funds that they secure Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 107 Ga. by their services for their clients. 479, 33 S. E. 473. Generally an Justice v. Justice, 115 Ind. 201, 16 attorney may continue an action § 175 LIENS. 164 If she knows of the lien and assents to the amount of the fee claimed, she is bound for such amountJ''^ § 175. Iowa.'''® — An attorney has a lien for a general bal- ance of compensation on money due his client in the hands of the adverse party, or attorney of such party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney claiming the lien was employed, for the time of giving notice in writing to such adverse party, or attorney of such party, if the money is in the possession or under the control of such attorney, which notice shall state the amount claimed, and, in general terms, for what services. After judgment in any court of record, such notice may be given and the lien made effective against the judgment debtor, by entering the same in the judgment docket oppo- site the entry of the judgment.'^^ for his fees where the action is settled and compromised by the client without the consent of at- torney. Collier v. Hecht-Britting- ham Co., 7 Ga. 178, 66 S. E. 400. An attorney having taken no steps to perfect a statutory lien on a judgment obtained by him, and the statute of limitations having run against his action at law, he can- not sue in equity to establish a lien on the judgment for services rendered under an agreement that they should be paid for out of any judgment obtained. McNagney v. Frazer, 1 Ind. App. 98, 27 N. E. 431. 7" Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456. Prior to this statute, attor- neys had no lien on the judgment for their fees. Hill v. Brinkley, 10 Ind. 102. Entry of notice is es- sential. Alderman v. Nelson, 111 Ind. 255, 12 N. E. 394. Strictly speaking, a judgment is rendered when it is announced by the court; yet under this statute, which is loosely drawn, it appears that it was intended that the judgment should be entered on the docket or court records before the entry of the attorney's intention to claim lien upon it; and it follows that the entry of notice of such lien can be made at any time within a reasonable time after the record- ing of the judgment; and the en- trj-- of such notice upon the day following the entry of the judg- ment is within a reasonable time. Blair v. Lanning, 61 Ind. 499; Day V. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, 10 N. E. 126. T8 Code 1897, §§ 321, 322. "9 Where the plaintiff, in an ac- tion for damages for a personal injury, agrees in writing with his attorney to pay him one-third of the amount that may be ultimately recovered, and a judgment is re- i65 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 175 Any person interested may release such lien by executing a bond in a sum double the amount claimed, or in such sum covered for $2,000, and the attor- ney enters on the judgment docket notice of "an attorney's lien on this judgment for $2,000 for serv- ices rendered plaintiff in this cause," and the judgment is re- versed, and the claim compromised by the parties for $1,650, the lien so entered is binding upon the de- fendant to the extent of one-third the amount agreed upon in the settlement. Winslow v. Central Iowa R. Co., 71 Iowa 197, 32 N. W. 330. Rothrock, J., said : "Counsel for appellant contend that the lien entered of record was on the judg- ment, and not upon money in the possession of the adverse party due the plaintiff in action. It is true that the entry made upon the judgment docket states that a lien is claimed on the judgment. We think, however, that the plaintiffs had no right to make any claim other than that provided by stat- ute, and the section of the code above cited does not provide for a lien on the judgment, as such. It expressly provides for a lien on money in the hands of the adverse party or his attorney. It is fur- ther claimed that as the statute provides where notice of the lien is placed upon the judgment docket, and thus made effective against the judgment debtor, the notice ceased or expired when the judgment was reversed, because there was then no 'judgment debtor.' We think, however, that the words 'judgment debtor,' as used in the fourth subdivision of the section above quoted, are merely descriptive of the person against whom the lien may be en- forced. It will be observed that notice of the lien upon money in the hands of the adverse party is not required to be personally served after judgment. The ad- verse party is charged with notice by the entry on the judgment docket. From the time of such entry he cannot prejudice the rights of the attorney claiming the lien by a settlement with his client; and as the law does not place the lien upon the judgment, but upon the claim against the ad- verse party, or the money in his hands, we think the notice re- mained binding upon the defend- ant as long as the money remained in its hands. If the plaintiffs had merely stated in the entry upon the judgment docket their lien upon the money claimed of the railroad company, and in its hands, due to [the defendant] for the in- jury of which he complained, the notice would have been in strict conformity with the statute, and would have been binding on the railroad company through all the further progress of the case, and up to the actual payment of the demand. We do not think the fact that the word 'judgment' was used in the entry instead of 'suit,' 'ac- tion,' or 'claim,' or some other equivalent word, was a matter of any consequence in fixing the rights of the parties." §175 LIENS. 1 66 as may be fixed by a judge, payable to the attorney, with security to be approved by the clerk of the court, condition- ed to pay the amount finally due the attorney for his serv- ices, which amount may be ascertained by suit on the bond. Such lien will be released unless the attorney, within ten days after demand therefor, files with the clerk a full and complete bill of particulars of the services and amount claim- ed for each item, or written contract with the party for whom the services were rendered. ^*^ Under these statutes the attorney's lien attaches before judgment. Even in case the suit is for damages in an action of tort, though the lien may not be enforcible until the dam- ages are determined by judgment, yet the lien attaches from the time of the service of notice. This notice must be in writing.®^ It may be served at the commencement of the action; and such notice is sufficient to cover all services ren- dered in the action, whether before or after the service of the notice.®^ The lien attaches from the time of the notice, and has priority to any lien of attachment obtained by pro- ceedings in garnishment subsequently commenced. ^^ Before notice of the lien the parties may settle without reference to the claim of the attorney for his fees;^^ but not after- wards.^^ A right of set-off existing at the time the notice is given is superior to the attorney's liens; but the lien is su- perior to a right of set-ofF subsequently arising.^^ Before notice of the attorney's lien, it is competent for the parties, acting in good faith without collusion, to settle the suit with- out reference to the attorney's claim for his fees.^^ 80 Cross V. Ackley, 40 Iowa 493. 381; Brainard v. Elwood, 53 Iowa SI Phillips V. Germon, 43 Iowa 30, 3 N. W. 799. 101. 86 Hurst V. Sheets, 21 Iowa 501. 82 Smith V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 87 Casar v. Sargeant, 7 Iowa 317. 56 Iowa 720, 10 N. W. 244. Where an attorney contracts with S3 Myers v. McHugh, 16 Iowa his client in a suit for damages to 335. accept one-half of the sum recov- 84 Casar v. Sargeant, 7 Iowa 317. ered, he is entitled to a lien for 83 Fisher v. Oskaloosa, 28 Iowa one-half of the money paid his 1 67 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 176 § 176. Kansas.^'- — An attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon money due to his client, and client in a compromise. V. Des Moines City R Chesliire Co., 153 Iowa 88, 133 N. W. 324. The at- torney is entitled to a lien for a general balance of his compensa- tion whether his contract with his client be oral or written or upon a contingency. Cheshire v. Des Moines City R. Co., 153 Iowa 88, 133 N. W. 324. An attorney under the common law has a lien upon a judgment procured by him for his client for his compensation, and the Iowa Code giving such a lien is but a declaration of the common law, with certain addi- tions added, as to the giving of notice, etc. Brown v. Morgan, 163 Fed. 395. The execution of a bond will release a lien of an attorney, and where an attorney on demand being made on him fails to file a bill of particulars of his lien and claim he will lose his lien. Jami- son V. Ranck, 140 Iowa 635, 119 N. W. 1^. As to the sufficiency of no- tice to fasten a lien by an attorney upon funds in the hands of his client's adversary, see Barthell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 138 Iowa 688, 116 N. W. 813. When a judgment directs a claim of a named creditor to be first paid, his right is superior to the attorney claiming under his lien. Ward v. Sherbondy, 96 Iowa 477, 65 N. W. 413. An attorney's lien on papers is a possessory one and is lost when he loses possession of such papers. Foss v. Cobler, 105 Iowa 728, 75 N. W. 516. The clerk of the court who receives the amount of a judgment from defendant upon which an attorney has a lien is required to pay the lien to the attorney. Hubbard v. Ellithorpe, 135 Iowa 259, 112 N. W. 796, 124 Am. St. 271. An attorney in the absence of a statute has no equit- able lien for his compensation. Ward v. Sherbondy, 96 Iowa 477, 65 N. W. 413. Where after an ap- peal is taken from a judgment, the judgment is reduced by agreement and compromise, the amount ac- tually received forms the basis upon which the attorney's lien must be estimated. Parsons v. Hawley, 92 Iowa 175, 60 N. W. 520. See also, Wallace v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 112 Iowa 565, 84 N. W. 662. An attorney who has secured a judgment in the fed- eral court may sue in equity the parties to the judgment to enforce his lien. Brown v. Morgan, 163 Fed. 395. f^s Dasslers' Gen. Stats. 1909, § 435. Where a suit is brought in Kansas and also in Missouri on the same cause of action by dif- ferent attorneys and the general attorney for the defendant settles the suit in Missouri without know- ing about the Kansas suit or that any notice had been given by plaintiff's attorney in the Kansas suit that he held a lien for his fees, it is held that the Kansas attorney can enforce a lien against the de- fendant for his fees. Anderson v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 86 Kans. 179, 119 Pac. 379. An attorney is entitled to a lien out of a fund re- covered by him in a bastardy suit, where he has been employed by §1/6 LIENS. l68 in the hands of the adverse party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party. Such notice must be in writing, and may be served in the same manner as a sum- mons, and upon any person, officer or agent upon whom a summons under the laws of this state may be served, and may also be served upon a regularl)^ employed salaried at- torney of the party.^^ Any person interested in such mat- ter may release such lien by giving security in a penalty equal to the amount claimed by the attorney, and condition- ed to pay the amount that may finally be found due for his services. Under this statute the lien exists even when the only claim in suit is one for damages for personal injuries, un- liquidated and undetermined by judgment or verdict.^" The notice need not state all the amount for which a lien is claim- ed. The lien is given for the amount agreed to be paid by the client, or, in the absence of any agreement, for the reason- able value of the services.®^ ''The lien of the attorneys at- taches to the fruits of the judgment. It attaches to the money payable to the client, if it is the proceeds of the labor and skill of the attorneys. If attaches also on moneys received by way of compromise by the client in the cause, for the money is regarded as the fruit of the attorneys' labor and skill. And if the client settles the case after judgment, the mother of the child to prose-. Service, 17 Kans. 316, 94 Pac. 262, cute the proceeding and is prom- 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1105. ised a fee for so doing. Costigan 89 Leavenson v. Lafontane, 3 V. Stewart, 76 Kans. 353, 91 Pac. Kans. 523. Service upon a station 83. It is held to be contrary to agent of a railroad company is not public policy for an attorney and sufficient. Kansas Pacific R. Co. his client to agree that the client v. Thacher, 17 Kans. 92. shall not settle, compromise or so Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. otherw^ise adjust a cause of action Thacher, 17 Kans. 92. vi'ithout first procuring, the attor- f*! Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. ney's written consent to do so. Thacher, 17 Kans. 92. Kansas City Elevated R. Co. v. 169 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 177 SO as to deprive the attorneys of their costs and fees, the lat- ter have an action against the former. "^^ § 177. Kentucky.-'"^ — Attorneys have a lien upon all claims or demands, including all claims for unliquidated 92 Lindner v. Hine, 84 Mich. 511, 48 N. W. 43, per Champlin, C. J. 93 Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 107. Under this statute the institution and prosecution of a suit to judg- ment is sufficient notice to the judgment debtor that the plaintiff's attorney has a lien upon it for his reasonable compensation. If the debtor, after such implied notice or after actual notice, pays the amount of the judgment to the plaintiff in person, he is still liable to the attorney for the amount of his lien. Stephens v. Farrar, 4 Bush (Ky.) 13, and see Robertson V. Shutt, 9 Bush (Ky.) 659. An attorney cannot claim a lien on a judgment recovered for a taxpayer on account of money having been illegally appropriated by the coun- ty. Marion County v. Rives, 133 Ky. 477, 118 S. W. 309. The only way a plaintiff and defendant may compromise a case w^ithout the consent of the plaintiff's attorney is by follovvfing the provisions of the statute, and where they do so compromise and a consideration is paid the defendant, plaintiff's at- torney may prosecute his claim for lien against the defendant, and it is not necessary to plead bad faith or make plaintiff a party to the action. Proctor Coal Co. v. Tye, 29 Ky. L. 804, 96 S. W. 512. An at- torney for plaintiff under contract to prosecute a cause is entitled to enforce his Hen even where his name does not appear on the rec- ord. Tyler v. Slemp, 28 Ky. L. 959, 90 S. W. 1041. Where a compro- mise is entered into by parties without the consent of plaintiff's attorney for the purpose of de- frauding him of his lien, it will not defeat his lien. Hubble v. Dunlap, 101 Ky. 419, 41 S. W. 432. As to effect of good-faith compro- mises between parties under the statute on the lien of plaintiff's attorney where he does not con- sent to the compromise, see Wa- then V. Russell, 20 ,Ky. L. 709, 47 S. W. 437; Martin v. Smith, 33 Ky. L. 582, 110 S. W. 413; Louisville & N. R. Co. V. Proctor, 21 Ky. L. 447, 51 S. W. 591. Where plain- tiff's attorney has employed addi- tional counsel with the plaintiff's consent, he is also entitled to a lien. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Proctor, 21 Ky. L. 447, 51 S. W. 591. An attorney cannot appeal a case against his client's consent in order to secure his fee and lien therefor. Nixon v. Ossenbeck, 129 Ky. 588, 112 S. W. 645. An attor- ney's lien under the statute where in a replevin suit an alternative judgment is entered for the prop- erty or its value and damages is not prior to defendant's lien on such property or its proceeds. Montgomery v. Carr, 18 Ky. L. 607, 37 S. W. 580. Defendant's attorney cannot assert a lien on property which he has successfully §177 LIENS. 170 damages, put into their hands for suit or collection, or upon which suit has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by the parties, or, in the absence of such agreement, for a reasonable fee for the services of such attorneys; in any action which is prosecuted to recover, they shall have a lien upon the judgment for money or property, which may be recovered in such action — legal costs excepted — for such fee; and if the records show the name of the attorney, the defendant in the action shall have notice of the lien; but if the parties before judgment, in good faith, compromise or settle their differences without the payment of money or other thing of value, the attorney shall have no claim against the defendant for any part of his fee. Under this statute, an attorney has no lien before judg- ment on a claim for unliquidated damages in actions of tort; and such an action may be compromised and dismissed by agreement of the parties, against the objection of the attor- ney.^^ If no judgment is recovered in a suit, there is noth- ing to which an attorney's lien can attach.^^ But it has been held that where a plaintifif in an action to recover land dismisses the suit upon a compromise, by vir- defended for his client. Forrester 608. An attorney has a lien on a V. Howard, 30 Ky. L. 375, 98 S. recovery of property under a set- W. 984. Attorney can have no off or counterclaim. Harlan v. liens on claims in their hands for Bennett, 32 Ky. L. 473, 106 S. W. the state. Hendrick v. Posey, 104 287. The attorney's lien does not Ky. 8, 41 S. W. 702, 45 S. apply to money or property recov- W. 525. An assignment of ered by them for clients through property and rights by plain- legislative appropriations. Hallam tiff will not defeat the lien of v. Coulter, 24 Ky. L. 2200, 73 S. W. plaintiff's attorney. Central Trust 772. Co. of N. Y. V. Richmond, N. I. & 9^ Wood v. Anders, 5 Bush (Ky.) B. R. Co., 105 Fed. 803, 45 C. C. 601. A. 60. Attorneys for defendant ^^ Wilson v. House. 10 Bush who successfully defend a suit to (Ky.) 406. It is for the attorney recover land from their client can to show the nature and extent of assert no lien on the land. Lytle his recovery. Martin v. Kennedy, v. Bach, 29 Ky. L. 424, 93 S. W. S3 Ky. 335, 7 Ky. L. 311. lyi attorney's special or charging lien. § 177b tue of which the defendant pays off certain claims against him, plaintiff's attorney does not by such compromise lose his statutory lien on the land sued iov.^^ If by agreement of the parties the action is dismissed, each party paying his own costs, and it does not appear that there was any intention to defeat the claim of the plaintiff's attorney, he can enforce no lien against the defendant.^'^ § 177a. Louisiana.''^ — A special privilege is granted in favor of attorneys at law for the amount of their profes- sional fees on all judgments obtained by them, and on the property recovered by the said judgment, either as plain- tiff or defendant, to take rank as a first privilege thereon. This privilege can not be extended so as to effect property which the creditor may have acquired in execution or in sat- isfaction of the judgment.^^ § 177b. Maine. — Executions shall not be set off against each other, when the sum due on one of them has been law- fully and in good faith assigned to another person, before the creditor in the other execution became entitled to the sum due thereon; nor when there are several creditors or debtors in one execution, and the sum due on the other is due to or from a part of them only; nor to so much of the first execution as is due to the attorney in the suit for his fees and disbursements therein.^ 9C Skaggs V. Hill, 12 Ky. L. 382, compensation for his services out 14 S. W. '363. of a fund secured for his client, ^"^ Rowe V. Fogle, 88 Ky. 105, 10 and where the sum recovered is S. W. 426. attached by the client's creditors, ^^ Const, and Rev. Law^s 1904, § the attachment lien is inferior to 2897, as amended by Act No. 124, the claim of the attorney. First Acts 1906, p. 210. See Butchers' Nat. Bank v. Martin, 127 La. 744, Union & Slaughterhouse Co. v. 53 So. 977. See amendment in Crescent City Live Stock &c. Co., 41 Const, and Rev. Laws 1908, p. 641. La. Ann. 355, 362, 6 So. 508; Riggs 99 Luneau v. Edwards, 39 La. v. Eicholz, 127 La. 745, 53 So. 977. Ann. 876, 6 So. 24. An attorney is entitled to receive 1 Stats. 1903, p. 768, § 28. //' LIENS. 172 § 177c. Massachusetts. — An attorney by statute is given a lien on any judgment he may procure for his cHent for his fees and disbursements, but this provision does not prevent the payment of the execution or judgment to the judgment creditor by a person without notice.^ § 178. Michigan. — In 1867, all laws restricting or con- trolling the right of parties to agree with their attor- neys for compensation were repealed, and the taxable costs were made payable to the parties.^ Since that date the taxa- ble costs form no part of the attorney's compensation, but this is left wholly to agreement, express or implied. A lien for such compensation is in some sort recognized by the pro- vision that, in setting off executions, one against another, the set-off shall not be allowed as to so much of the first execution as may be due to the attorney in that suit for his taxable costs and disbursements.^ The result is that, al- though no lien is expressly given to attorneys by statute, the courts recognize their lien to the extent of their taxable costs, at least,^ and probably to the extent of the compen- 2 Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 165, § 48. 363, 85 N. E. 171. Under an agree- Where an attorney's client assigns ment between an attorney and his a judgment which the attorney has client where it is stipulated that obtained for him, the attorney may the attorney is to conduct a case still collect on such judgment the to contest a will, he to receive for amount of his fees, but he has no his services a certain sum out of authority to collect more than is the sum recovered for his client, due him for such fees. Bruce v. he has an equitable lien for such Anderson, 176 Mass. 161, 57 N. E. sum in the event the litigation 354. Where an attorney is sued succeeds in securing a sum of by his client for an accounting and money for such client. Coram v. for money retained which is Ingersoll, 148 Fed. 169, 78 C. C. A. claimed by him for debts he has 303; Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. incurred for expert witnesses but 335, 53 L. ed. 208, 29 Sup. Ct. 92. he fails to bring such witnesses in 3 Laws 1867, p. 83. as parties, he will lose his lien and ■* Howell's Stats. Ann. 1912, § claim to retain such money with 13049. which to pay such witnesses. Fal- ^ Kinney v. Robison, 52 Mich, ardeau v. Washburn, 199 Mass. 389, 18 N. W. 120. ^7Z attorney's special or charging lien. 178 sation agreed upon,^ or, in case there is no agreement, to the extent of a reasonable compensation. 6 Wells V. Elsam, 40 Mich. 218. Where under a contract between an attorney and his client it is agreed that the attorney shall re- ceive for his services a fee con- tingent on his recovering judg- ment for his client in litigation proposed and to be prosecuted, such fee to constitute a lien on any money or judgment obtained to the extent of such fee and the contract is made in good faith and a judgment or money is recovered, such contract amounts to and oper- ates as an assignment to the at- torney to the extent of his agreed lien. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 181, 126 N. W. 56, 137 Am. St. 495. Where one purchases property knowing that the attor- ney for the seller under an agree- ment has a lien for his services on such property, the property is bought subject to such lien, and the lien may be foreclosed in equity. Kilbourne v. Wiley, 124 Mich. 370, 83 N. W. 99. A notice given by plaintiff's attorney to a defendant stating that he holds a lien on any money which his client may ob- tain by settlement or judgment from said defendant and that if any settlement was made without his consent he would hold the defend- ant liable for his claim is equiva- lent to a notice that there was a contract between said attorney and his client for such a lien. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 181, 126 X. W. 56, 137 Am. St. 495. Where a client has agreed with his attorney to give him a contingent fee and a lien on the money or property re- covered in litigation prosecuted, he cannot give a valid discharge of such lien to the prejudice of the attorney where the opposite party has notice of such lien. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 181, 126 N. W. 56, 137 Am. St. 495. A dis- missal will not be set aside because made without the consent of plain- tiff's attorney. Voigt Brewery Co. V. Donovan, 103 Mich. 190, 61 N. W. 343. But see Heavenrich v. Al- pena Circuit Judge, 111 Mich. 163, 69 N. W. 226. An attorney called in to assist another attorney by consent of the client has a lien for his services on a judgment ob- tained by his client in the action. People V. Pack, 115 Mich. 669, 74 N. W. 185. See also Bigelow v. Sheehan, 161 Mich. 667, 126 N. W. 707. The court having charge of a fund may direct a payment to an attorney for his services and that he have a lien on such fund. Wip- fler V. Warren, 163 Mich. 189, 128 N. W. 178. An agreement between a client and his attorney to pay an attorney fee and giving the attor- ney a lien therefor amounts to an assignment of a portion of th'e judgment or thing obtained. Drei- band v. Candler, 166 Mich. 49, 131 N. W. 129. § 1/9 LIENS. 174 § 179. Minnesota.' — An attorney has a lien for his com- pensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, upon money in the hands of the adverse party to an action or pro- ceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party; and upon a judg- ment to the extent of the costs included therein, or, if there is a special agreement, to the extent of the compensation specially agreed on, from the time of giving notice to the party against whom the judgment is recovered.'^ This lien ' Gen. Stats. 1913, § 4955. Under this statute the attorney has no lien until he gives notice of it to the judgment debtor. Dodd v. Brott, 1 Gil. (Minn.) 205, 66 Am. Dec. 541. If the attorney's com- pensation has been agreed upon, the writ must specify the amount of the lien claimed. Forbush v. Leonard, 8 Gil. (Minn.) 267. Statu- tory costs having been abolished in Minnesota, by Laws of 1860, p. 244, the lien can exist only in case there has been a special agreement as to compensation. Forbush v. Leon- ard, 8 Gil. (Minn.) 267. The attor- ney has no lien upon a judgment for compensation, unless he has made a special agreement with -bis client as to the amount of it. In re Scoggin, 5 Sawyer (U. S.) 549, Fed. Cas. No. 12511. But a differ- ent view was taken in a later case, and it was held that under an implied contract it is sufficient if the notice fairly inform the party that a lien is claimed, what it is for, and upon what it is to be in- dorsed. Crowley v. Le Due, 21 Minn. 412. 8 Under this provision an attor- ney's lien upon a judgment is su- perior to the claim of a creditor in whose favor execution has been levied. The clause respecting no- tice was not intended to affect at- taching creditors of the judgment creditor, but was rather intended to regulate the conduct of and to protect the judgment debtor, Henry v. Traynor, 42 Minn. 234, 44 N. W. 11 ; First State Bank v. Sib- ley County Bank, 96 Minn. 456, 105 N. W. 485; Habegger v. Kipp, 96 Minn. 456, 105 N. W. 489. An at- torney has a lien upon a cause of action of his client, for his fees from the service of the summons, and no notice to the adverse party is necessary. Rev. Laws 1905, § 2288; Desaman v. Butler, 114 Minn. 362. 131 N. W. 463. A compromise of such a cause without the attor- ne3''s consent will be set aside and the court will redocket the cause to protect the attorney's lien. Desa-- man v. Butler, 114 Minn. 362, 131 N. W. 463. See also. Farmer v. Stillwater Co., 108 Minn. 41, 121 N. W. 418; Lindholm v. Itasca Lum- ber Co., 64 Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931; Weicher v. Cargill, 86 Minn. 271, 90 X. W. 402; Anderson v. Itasca Lumber Co., 86 Minn. 480, 91 N. W. 12, 291. An attorney can have no lien on a right of action for tort. 175 ATTORNEYS SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 1 80 is, however, subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the action or proceeding. § 180. Oregon.^ — The statute is the same as the above, with the exception that it is also provided that the original notice shall be filed with the clerk where the judgment is entered or docketed. Under this statute the attorney can not have a lien for his compensation, unless he has a special agreement as to the amount of it.^^ Under such a statute giving a lien upon "money in the hands of the adverse party," something more is required in order to give a lien than a mere debt from such party to the client. Money, in this connection, means some specific fund which has actually come into the party's possession as cus- todian or trustee, to obtain which the suit is brought. After judgment is obtained on the demand, or for the money, the lien can be acquired upon the judgment only by giving notice in the manner provided by statute. ^^ Boogren v. St. Paul City R. Co., 97 Minn. 51, 106. N. W. 104. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379. 114 Am. St. 691. See also, Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307, 113 N. W. 701. 9 Bellinger & Cotton's Codes and Stats. 1902. § 1063. The attorney may waive his lien by taking other security. Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Ore. 88, 92 Pac. 1079. 10 In re Scoggin, 5 Sawyer (U. S.) 549, Fed. Cas. No. 12511, 8 Rep. 330. 11 In re Scoggin, 5 Sawyer (U. S.) 549, Fed. Cas. No. 12511, 8 Rep. 330. This, case arose upon the statute of Oregon. The right to the lien de- pends on the notice. Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Ore. 88, 92 Pac. 1079. See also, Morrell v. Miller, 36 Ore. 412, 59 Pac. 710. Under Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. Codes and Stats. 1902, § 1063, an attorney emploj^ed for a contingent fee can have no lien before judgment is obtained. Jackson v. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798, 5 L. R. A. (N. .S.) 390. Parties may settle a suit at any time before notice of lien by an attorney. Day v. Lar^en, 30 Ore. 247, 47 Pac. 101. See also, Wagner v. Goldschmidt, 51 Ore. 63. 93 Pac. 689. The remedy of an attorney seeking to enforce his lien is in equity. Alexander v. Munroe, 54 Ore. 500, 101 Pac. 903, 103 Pac. 514. An assignment for costs be- fore judgment entered is valid as against the right of set-off held by the defendant against such judg- ment. Ladd V. Ferguson, 9 Ore. 180. § l8l LIENS. 176 § 181. Mississippi. — Doubt has been expressed whether an attorney has a lien for his fees on a fund collected under a judgment recovered by him, where the amount of his fees has not been fixed by special contract, or by established pro- fessional usage; and it seems that a lien would not exist for fees resting wholly upon the principle of quantum meruit. But, however this might be, it was held that such a lien could not be asserted on the trial of a motion against the sheriff for failure to pay over money collected on execution issued upon such a judgment. The attorney's claim should be as- serted directly, and not in this collateral way.^^ It is clearly settled that the lien of the attorney attaches upon judgments recovered by him, with their incidents and fruits; but it is difficult to make out, from the decided cases, the various limitations, conditions, and incidents of such lien.^^ § 181a. Missouri. — The compensation of an attorney or counselor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the com- mencement of an action or the services of an answer con- taining a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come ; and can not be afTected by any settle- ment between the parties before or after judgment. ^^ 12 Pugh V. Boyd, 38 Miss. 326. S. W. 262; Taylor v. St. Louis And see Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715, 97 S. W. Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 707. 155. The liability of a defendant is 13 See Stewart v. Flowers, 44 created by the service of a notice Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 707. by plaintiff's attorney of his lien as 14 Rev. Stats. 1909, §§ 964, 965. provided by the statute. Wait v. Wolf V. United R. Co. of St. Louis, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 204 155 Mo. App. 125, 133 S. W. 1172; Mo. 491, 103 S. W. 60. The statute Laughlin V. Excelsior Powder Mfg. giving an attorney a lien will be Co., 153 Mo. App. 508, 134 S. W. 116 ; liberally construed. Wait v. Atchi- United R. Co. of St. Louis v. son, T. & S. F. R. Co., 204iMo. 491, O'Connor, 153 Mo. App. 128, 132 103 S. W. 60. Where after an at- 1/7 attorney's special or charging lien. § i8ia torney has been employed by plaintiff and he has given the no- tice to the plaintiff's adv^ersary of his lien on any sums recovered in the action which he brings and a settlement is afterwards made be- tween the parties without the con- sent of the attorney, he may follow the proceeds into the hands of his client or any other person, or he maj" recover from the defendant, or in case judgment is entered he may enforce his lien against the judg- ment. Curtis v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 118 Mo. App. 341, 94 S. W. 162. See also, Whitwell v. Aurora. 139 Mo. App. 597, 123 S. W. 1045. It is held to be a violation of the confidential relations between an attorney and his client for the at- torney to be permitted to hold a lien on a certificate of stock which he has been instrumental in having placed in his name, when he must have known that it belonged to a third party. He can have no lien upon the stock even as against his client. Lindsley v. Caldwell, 234 Mo. 498, 137 S. W. 983, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161n. Filing a motion to set aside a sale of real estate is the commencement of an action within the meaning of the statute giving an attorney a lien for his services. Smoot V. Shy, 159 Mo. App. 126, 139 S. W. 239. A settlement of a suit between the parties may only be set aside by the attorney who has complied with the statute in giving his notice to the defendant, and even where there has been a subsequent satisfaction of a judg- ment entered by plaintiff without his attorney's consent, the attor- ney to recover must show fraud on the part of his client. Stephens v. 12 Metropolitan St. R. Co., 157 Mo. App. 656, 138 S. W. 904. The pay- ment of a judgment by a defendant to plaintiff with the consent of plaintiff's attorney will estop the attorney from seeking any relief against the defendant where he fails to get his fees from plaintiff. Compher v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co., 137 Mo. App. 89, 119 S. W. 493. An attorney who is employed by plaintiff's attorney with his consent to assist in the case is wtihin the statute allowing a lien in favor of attorneys. Smith v. Wright, 153 Mo. App. 719, 134 S. W. 683. A client may settle or as- sign his judgment, subject to the lien of his attorney, without the consent of the attorney. Boyle v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 134 Mo. App. 71, ,114 -S. W. 558. See also Boyd V. G. W. Chase & Son Mer- cantile Co., 135 Mo. App. 115, 115 S. W. 1052. An attorney can have no lien for services rendered in the collection of a minor's inheritance. Kersey v. O'Day, 173 Mo. 560, 73 S. W. 481. Where an attorney has a contract with his client for a cer- tain per cent, of a recovery of dam- ages and the client conveys the land for which damages are claimed and the attorney fails to notify the grantee of his lien, he can not hold a lien on such land. Hull V. Phillips, 128 Mo. App. 247, 107 S. W. 21. Under the provisions of the act of 1901 (Ann. Stats. 1906, pp. 876, 879), it was held that the notice an attorney gives to a de- fendant of his lien when the de- fendant is a corporation must be served personally on the officer of the corporation and that a notice by registered letter is not sufificient. § i82 LIENS. 178 § 182. Montana.^^ — The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the com- mencement of an action or the service of an answer con- taining a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosever hands they may come ; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. § 183. Nebraska.^^ — An attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon money in the hands of the Abbott V. United R. Co. of St. Louis, 138 Mo. App. 530, 119 S. W. 964. See also as to liability of de- fendant for plaintiff's attorney fee after notice, Carter v. CJiicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 136 Mo. App. 719, 119 S. W. 35. An administrator who is a defendant does not become liable for plaintiff's attorney fees where such attorney only files a copy of his agreement as to fees in the pro- bate court. Bland v. Robinson, 148 Mo. App. 164, 127 S. W. 614. As to effect of set-off of defendant to plaintiff's cause of action where plaintiff's attorney claims a lien for fees under his contract see State v. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 135 Mo. App. 160, 115 S. W. 1081. The statute giving attorneys a lien on the client's cause of action from the beginning of a suit is constitu- tional. Taylor v. St. Louis Mer- chants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 207 Mo. 495. 105 S. W. 740. 15 Code Civ. Proc. 1895, § 430. The lien of an attorney may exist without the amount of his fee hav- ing been agreed /Upon. In the ab- sence of an agreed sum he is en- titled to the reasonable value of his services. Coombe v. Knox, 28 Mont. 202, 12 Pac. 641. See also Gilchrist v. Hore, 34 Mont. 443, 87 Pac. 443. In an action to foreclose his lien on a judgment obtained by him for his client he should make the judgment debtor a party. Coombe v. Knox, 28 Mont. 202, 72 Pac. 641. 10 Cobbey's Ann. Stats. 1911, § 3607. An attorney has a lien from the time of giving a notice to the adverse party. Zentmire v. Brailey, 89 Nebr. 158, 130 N. W. 1047. It is not necessary that the notice to be served on defendant should be in writing. Any actual notice will render him personally liable. Cones v. Brooks, 60 Nebr. 698, 84 N. W. 85. In an action followed by judg- ment against an insurer for a total loss, an endorsement by the clerk on the summons that if defendant failed to appear the plaintiff would take judgment for a designated sum with attorney's fees and costs is held not sufficient to give plain- 179 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 183 adverse party in an action or proceeding in which the at- torney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party. Under the statute it w^as regarded as doubtful by the cir- cuit court of the United States whether an attorney can enforce a lien upon a judgment obtained by him for his client against a third person, for a judgment is not money in the hands of the judgment debtor belonging to his client. ^'^ There can be no lien before judgment upon a cause of action for tort which, in case of the death of either of the parties, would not survive. ^^ tiff's attorneys a lien on such judg- ment. Cobbey v. Borland, 50| Nebr. Z72>, 69 N. W. 951. As to what is sufficient notice to the debtor of attorney's lien see Greek v. Mc- Daniel, 68 Nebr. 569, 94 N. W. 518. Where after the beginning of a divorce plaintiff's attorney applies for an order requiring the defend- ant to pay temporary alimony and the plaintiff dismisses her case, the attorney is not entitled to revive the action and prosecute for his ow^n use. Peterson v. Peterson, 76 Nebr. 282, 107 N. W. 391, 124 Am. St. 812. An attorney's lien is in- ferior to the right of the defendant to a proper set-off. Field v. Max- well, 44 Nebr. 900, 63 N. W. 62. Where plaintiff's right has been ex- tinguished prior to the time his at- torney files notice of his lien, there is nothing in the possession of de- fendant upon which such lien could attach. Sheedy v. McMurtry, 44 Nebr. 499, 63 N. W. 21. An at- torney's lien is not effected by plaintiff's assignment of a judgment where the lien has attached before such assignment. Taylor v. StuU, 79 Nebr. 295, 112 N. W. 577. Only attorneys entitled to practice law can have a lien on money in the hands of the defendant. Gordon v. Hennings, 89 Nebr. 252, 131 N. W. 228. Where a defendant is a non- resident of the state a notice of his lien may be served on defendant's attorney by plaintiff's attorney. Zentmire v. Brailey, 89 Nebr. 158, 130 N. W. 1047. A compromise and satisfaction of a judgment upon which plaintiff's attorney has a lien in fraud of his rights will not prevent the attorney from filing an intervening petition and from hav- ing his rights determined. Jones v. Duff Grain Co., 69 Nebr. 91, 95 N. W. 1. An attorney bringing a suit for his client for personal injuries has a lien on the claim of his client. Lewis V. Omaha St. R. Co. (Nebr.), 114 N. W. 281. 1" Patrick v. Leach, 2 McCrary 635, 12 Fed. 661. But see Taylor v. Stull, 79 Nebr. 295, 112 N. W. 577, where it is held that an attorney has a lien on a judgment in a bas- tardy case which his services have procured. 18 Abbott V. Abbott, 18 Nebr. 503, 26 N. W. 361. § l84 LIENS. i8o The notice required by this statute is a personal notice, and it should be in writing.^^ This lien covers the attorney's reasonable fees and dis- bursements in the suit, and is paramount to the right of the parties in the suit. But the lien is restricted to the claim set forth in the notice.^*' § 184. New York. — In New York, prior to the Code of 1848,^^ an attorney had a lien upon a judgment re- covered by him, but the amount of his lien was lim- ited to his taxable costs. By that code the taxation of costs was abolished, and the compensation of the attorney was left to be determined by the contract of the parties, either expressly or impliedly made. The implied equitable lien was consequently extended to cover the agreed compensa- tion, whatever the amount, in all cases w^here the cause of ac- tion was assignable or judgment was obtained. To the extent of his compensation the attorney was deemed an equitable assignee of the judgment, and had a lien upon it when re- covered.^2 In the absence, however, of any agreement on the subject, it was at one time thought that the amount of the taxable costs continued to be the measure of compensa- tion allowed to the attorney, and consequently the extent of his lien. 22* But the rule seems afterwards to have been well 19 Patrick V. Leach, 12 Fed. 661, How. Pr. (N. Y.) 54; Tullis v. 2 McCrary (U. S.) 635. Bushnell, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217, 65 20 Griggs V. White, 5 Nebr. 467; How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; Hall v. Ayer, Beyer v. Clark, 3 Nebr. 161. 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 220, 19 How. Pr. 21 See post, § 303. (N. Y.) 91; Smith v. Central Trust 22 Rooney v. Second Ave. R. Co., Co., 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 75; Mat- 18 N. Y. 368; Marshall v. Meech, ter of Regan, 58 App. Div. (N. Y.) 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572 Wright V. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96 Ward V. Syme, 1 E. D. Smith (N Y.) 598, 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 16 Coughlin V. N. Y. Cent. & Hud R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep 1, 68 N. Y. S. 527, 31 Civ. Proc. R. 387, reversed, 167 N. Y. 338, 60 N. E. 658. The case of Haight v. Hol- comb, 7 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 213, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 173, is overruled. 22 a Rooney v. Second Ave. R. Co., 75; Crotty v. Mackenzie, 52 IS X. Y. 368, per Harris, J.; Adams v. i8i ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 184 settled that the attorney might, in the absence of a definite agreement as to the amount of his fees, recover the reason- able value of his services; and such value is a fact to be estab- lished, like any other fact, by evidence.^^ Fox, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 442. 27 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 409, reversed 40 N. Y. 577. It was thought that, if a lien were allowed for an attorney's serv- ices where his compensation was not agreed upon, the effect might be to tie up the collection of the judgment until the attorney could go into court and recover another judgment against his client fixing the amount of his compensation in the original suit. This seemed to be an extraordinary proceeding, and one for which there was no precedent. 23 Whitelegge v. De Witt, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 319; Garr v. Mairet, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 498; Gallup v. Perue, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 525. In re Row- land, 55 App. Div. 66, 66 N. Y. S. 1121, 8-N. Y. Ann. Cas. 397, afifd. 166 N. Y. 641, 60 N. E. 1120. The lien of an attorney is on a claim of his client as well as on a cause of action or counterclaim. Adee v. Adee, 55 App. Div. 63, 66 N. Y. S. 1101. The lien attaches to an award. Wendell v. Binninger, 132 App. Div. 785, 117 N. Y. S. 616, See also, In re Robbins, 132 App. Div. 905, 116 N. Y. S. 1146. An at- torney has a lien on money in his hands belonging to his client and this is not determined because of a showing by the attorney that he still preserves and has the money intact. In re Farrington, 146 App. Div. 590, 131 N. Y. S. 312. An at- torney for a client, though not shown of record as such, who has charge of his case, is entitled to a lien the same as if he were appear- ing of record. Harding v. Conlon, 146 App. Div. 842, 131 N. Y. S. 903. Land is subject to an attorney's lien. West v. Bacon, 13 App. Div. 371, 43 N. Y. S. 206. As to liability of defendant for plaintiff's attor- ney's fees when he has (been noti- fied of such lien but settles with and pays the plaintiff, see Peri v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 521, 46 N. E. 849. The attorney, independently of his stat- utory lien, has a lien under the common law on the papers and se- curities of his client, given into his possession by his client where no action is pending, and on the ap- plication of the client the court may hear and determine the lien and require the attorney to return such property. In re Edward Ney Co., 114 App. Div. 467, 99 N. Y. S. 982. See also In re Bender's Will, 111 App. Div. 23, 97 N. Y. S. 171. An attorney has a lien on property held by an executor for his services rendered. In re Bender's Will, 111 App. Div. (N. Y.) 23, 97 N. Y. S. 171. See also, as to lien and enforcement. Agricul- tural Ins. Co. V. Smith, 112 App. Div. 840, 98 N. Y. S. 347; Oishei v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 110 App. Div. 709, 97 N. Y. S. 447, 35 Civ. Proc. R. 240, 18 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 91. The attorney can have no lien on property to which his client has no claim or in which he has no in- § i84 LIENS. 182 terest. In re Brackett, 114 App. Div. 257, 99 N. Y. S. 802. Plalntifif may release his cause of action without his attorney's consent. Van Der Beek v. Thomason, SO Misc. 524, 99 N. Y. S. 538. Where one attorney is substituted for another, he still has a first lien on the re- sults of the litigation. Johnson v. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 99 N. Y. S. 1059. As to the effect of a client dismissing his case without consent of his attorney with whom he has a contract to give a part of the recovery, see Sullivan v. Mc- Cann, 113 App. Div. 61, 98 N. Y. S. 947, 37 Civ. Proc. R. 113. Where suit is adjusted and dismissed by the parties and nothing is paid to the plaintiff, the attorney cannot prosecute the action in favor of his own lien. Burpee v. Tov/nsend, 29 Misc. 681, 67 N. Y. S. 467. See also as to liability of defendant after notice, Schriever v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 30 Misc. 145, 30 Civ. Proc. R. 67, 61 N. Y. S. 644, 890, 63 N. Y. S. 217; Bollar v. Schoenwirt, 30 Misc. 224, 63 N. Y. S. 311. An attorney has a lien on proceeds derived from a judgment obtained by him for his client. In re Gates, 51 App. Div. 350, 64 N. Y. S. 1050, 31 Civ. Proc. R. 88. See generally on attorney's lien on client's cause of action under § 66, Stover's Ann. Code of Civ. Proc; Rochfort v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 50 App. Div. 261, 63 N. Y. S. 1036, 30 Civ. Proc. R. 285; Pilking- ton V. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 49 App. Div. 261, 63 N. Y. S. 211, 30 Civ. Proc. R. 276; Dolliver v. American Swan Boat Co., 32 Misc. 264,31 Civ. Proc. R. 94,8 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 74, 65 N. Y. S. 978; Meighan V. American Grass Twine Co., 154 Fed. 346, 83 C. C. A. 124; Zaitz v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 52 App. Div. 626, 65 N. Y. S. 395; Jeffards V. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 49 App. Div. 45, 63 N. Y. S. 530; Zim- mer v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 32 Misc. 262, 65 N. Y. S. 977. An at- torney can have no lien on his cli- ent's papers secured by him from his client for a fraudulent purpose. Hey ward v. Maynard, 119 App. Div. 66, 103 N. Y. S. 1028. An attorney's lien will not be affected by any settlement made between the parties. Kuehn v. Syracuse Rapid Transit R. Co., 186 N. Y. 567, 79 N, E. 1109; Roberts v. Union El. R. Co., 84 Hun (N. Y.) 437, 65 N. Y. St. 592, 32 N. Y. S. 387. The assignee of an attor- ney's claim and lien has the same rights therein as had his assignor. Muller V. New York, 23 Civ. Proc. R. 261, 29 N. Y. S. 1096. An at- torney who refuses to prosecute his client's cause has no lien on the results of such prosecution. Halbert v. Gibbs, 16 App. Div. 126, 45 N. Y. S. 113. Where an an- swer sets up no counterclaim or new or affirmative matter and the parties agree to a settlement, de- fendant's attorney is not entitled to any lien. Saranac & L. P. R. Co. V. Arnold, 72 App. Div. 620, 76 N. Y. S. 1032. Where plain- tiff's attorney after bringing a suit for injuries to his client serves a notice on defendant as required by the statute and the parties settle the case between themselves with- out the consent of the attorney, he may be allowed to continue the prosecution, and if he recover an amount in excess of a reasonable i83 ATTORNEYS SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 184 fee or the fee he has agreed upon it may be remitted. Herman v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 121 Fed. 184. Where a cause is submitted to arbitration and the report is that awards are made for and against each of the parties, which are to be set oflf against each other, the attorney for one of the parties must go to his own client for his pay before resorting to the other party, or he must show that she is insolvent. Webb V. Parker, 130 App. Div. 92, 114 N. Y. S. 489. The attorney can have no lien on the printed record used on appeal to the court of appeals. In re Bergstrom, 131 App. Div. 794, 116 N. Y. S. 247. But see order, Coakley v. Rickard, 120 N. Y. S. 1118, reversed In re Hollins, 197 N. Y. 361, 90 N. E. 997. The statute giving an attorney a lien on his client's cause of action will include an action for tort which is unassignable. Astrand v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 24 Misc. 92, 52 N. Y. S. 294. Where an agreement is to pay an attorney his disbursements, such disburse- ments may be included in his lien on a judgment obtained. Ander- son V. DeBraekeleer, 25 Misc. 343, 55 N. Y. S. 721. Where a defend- ant pays a claim and takes a re- ceipt on the day the action thereon is returnable but before the court meets, the attorney can not con- tinue to prosecute on the theory that he has a lien for his costs. Seventh Ave. Meat & Provision Co. v. Del Favero, 123 N. Y. S. 46. An attorney who accepts a retainer to prosecute or defend an action and who withdraws from the case without just cause can not claim the common-law right to a lien on the papers and pleadings. In re Rieser, 137 App. Div. 177, 121 N. Y. S. 1070. An attorney may have a lien upon the pro- ceeds obtained by him for his cli- ent as compensation for premises taken by a city. Ferris v. Law- rence, 138 App. Div. 541, 123 N. Y. S. 209. The lien of an attor- ney on a judgment becomes merged when the judgment is as- signed to him. McDonogh v. Sherman, 138 App. Div. 291, 122 N. Y. S. 1033. An attorney's lien can not be secured by an attor- ney's agreement to furnish evi- dence or facts where the attorney is not acting as attorney for the party. Holmes v. Bell, 139 App. Div. 455. 124 N. Y. S. 301. An attorney representing a guardian releases his lien on a check re- ceived by him by turning the same over to the guardian. Weber v. Werner, 138 App. Div. 127, 122 N. Y. S. 943. The payment of com- pensation to one of the attorneys of record where several attorneys appear with him will satisfy the lien for attorney's fees and release the parties from liability. Schiefer V. Freygang, 141 App. Div. 236, 125 N. Y. S. 1037. Only an attor- ney can secure a lien and an at- torney's lien can not be acquired by a corporation. In re Bensel, 68 Misc. 70, 124 N. Y. S. 726. An attorney has a lien on his client's money in his possession for his services rendered the client in a different proceeding than the one in which the money is collected. Krone v. Klotz, 3 App. Div. 587, 25 Civ. Proc. R. 320, 38 N. Y. S. 225. An attorney has no lien on i85 LIENS. 184 § 185. Present code of New York. — Under the present code of New York,^'* the compensation of an attorney or counselor for his services is governed by agreement, express or .implied, which is not restrained by law.^^ From the com- mencement of an action, or the service of an answer contain- ing a counterclaim,^'^ the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action, claim, or counter- claim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, judg- ment, or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds action pending in the municipal court of Bufifalo. Drago v. Smith, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 536, 72 N. Y. St. 418. 36 N. Y. S. 975. A settle- ment between the parties without the consent of the attorney claim- ing a lien will be vacated and a judgment entered thereon will be cancelled to permit the attorney to enforce his lien. Knickerbocker Inv. Co. V. Voorhees, 128 App. Div. 639, 112 N. Y. S. 842. Where an attorney has a lien against prop- erty, a part of which has been sold, the attorney in enforcing his lien must resort first to the un- sold part of the property. Butts V. Carey, 143 App. Div. 356, 128 N. Y. S. 533. An attorney can have no lien on his client's cause of action where he enters suit against the direction of his client. Mitchell V. Mitchell, 143 App. Div. 172, 127 N. Y. S. 1065, 3 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 36, 73 N. Y. St. 719. An attor- ney's lien is assignable. Leask v. Hoagland, 64 Misc. 156, 118 N. Y. S. 1035. An attorney's lien on a judgment obtained by him for his client is superior to an ofTset of the adverse party, who holds a judgment against plaintifiE. Wes- ley v. Wood, 73 Misc. 33, 132 N. Y. S. 248. Both plaintiff and de- fendant should be made defendants to a proceeding by an attorney to ascertain and enforce his lien. In re Winkler, 146 App. Div. 927, 131 N. Y. S. 124. Where the judgment for plaintiff is wholly based on dis- bursements incurred and for com- pensation of his attornej\ and the plaintiff is not a resident of the state and is not solvent, the de- fendant can not defeat the collec- tion of the judgment by setting up as a set-off a judgment in his favor against the plaintiff in another court in the same action. Smith V. Cayuga Lake Cement Co., 107 App. Div. 524, 95 N. Y. S. 236. 2-1 Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 1902, § 66. 25 Turno v. Parks, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 35. 2<-> The defendant's attorney has no lien where the claim set up by the defendant does not constitute a cause of action, so as properly to constitute a counterclaim with- in the meaning of the term as used in the statute, but is a claim which could only be set up in re- duction of the damages which the plaintiff might recover. Pierson v. Safford, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 521. 185 attorney's special or charging lien. § 186 thereof, in whosesoever hands they may come, and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment or final order. This provision gives full and complete protection to the at- torney. His lien extends to both costs and services, and can not be affected by a settlement between the parties, though no notice of the lien be given.^''^ § 186. Lien on cause of action. — In New York the lien is now upon the cause of action, and continues till a final judg- ment is reached. It is not in terms upon the judgment. It attaches to every verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor.^^ The lien, being upon the cause of action, continues until a judgment is rendered which is final. It does not cease upon the first judgment rendered, if this be not final. If such a judgment be rendered against the plain- tiff, this may be reversed, and the cause of action established in favor of the plaintiff by another judgment. If the first and erroneous judgment destroyed the lien, there could be, no lien thereafter, for the lien is created by the commence- ment of the action. It follows that the lien must continue until the judgment is final, either for want of power to ap- peal, or for failure to appeal in time. A final judgment 2T Albert Palmer Co. v. Van Or- Civ. Proc. R. 141; Lewis v. Day, 10 den, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 79, modi- Week. Dig. 49, afifd. by Court of fied 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 44, 49 Appeals, 31 Alb. L. J. 305; Moore N. Y. Super. Ct. 89; McCabe v. v. Bowen, 9 Rep. 588; Goodrich Fogg, 60 N. Y. 488; Lansing v. v. McDonald, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 235, Ensign, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 363; 11 Civ. Proc. R. 147, 2 N. Y. St. In re Bailey, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 144, reversed 112 N. Y. 157, 19 N. 64, affd. 31 Hun (N. Y.) 608, 5 E. 649; Oliwill v. Verdenhalven, 7 Civ. Proc. R. 253; Tullis v. Bush- N. Y. S. 99, 17 Civ. Proc. R. 362, nell, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; 26 N. Y. St. 115. Kehoe v. Miller, 10 Abb. N. C. (N. 2S Goodrich v. McDonald. 41 Y.) 393; Murray v. Jibson, 22 Hun Hun (N. Y.) 235, 11 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 386; ;Coster V. Greenpoint 147, 2 N. Y. St. 144; Whitaker Ferry Co., 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. v. X. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 3 N. 146; Dimick v. Cooley, 3 N. Y. V. St. 537. § 187 LIENS. 186 against the plaintiff determines that there was no cause of action, and, therefore, nothing to support a Hen. It follows, also, that a client has not an absolute right to stop the litiga- tion after a judgment against the plaintiff upon the merits ; but this right is subject to the attorney's lien for his costs and the attorney's approval. While that judgment remains the plaintiff has no cause of action, and the attorney has prac- tically, by the judgment, lost the benefit of his lien. If the attorney is not content with the judgment, and wishes to remove the adverse judgment as an obstacle in the way of enforcing his lien, his only remedy is to appeal and prosecute the action to final judgment. And this he may do. He may, at his own expense, prosecute the appeal against the wishes of the client in order to obtain a reversal of the judg- ment, so that, upon a new trial and a favorable judgment, he may have the chance of collecting his costs from the oppo- site side by means of such judgment.^^ § 187. Ownership of costs. — Under the code of New York the costs recovered in a suit belong to the party and not to the attorney.^*^ He simply has a lien for his compensation, whether this exceeds in amount the costs taxed in the judg- ment, or falls short of the amount of such costs.^^ Thus the 29 Adsit V. Hall, 3 How. Pr. (N. termined by the provision of the S.) (N. Y.) Z7i. code as it previously stood, which 30 Wheaton v. Newcombe, 16 declared that "the compensation J. & S. (N. Y.) 215; Stow v. Ham- of the attorney is governed by lin, 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 452; Garr agreement, express or implied, V. Mairet, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 498; which is not restrained by law." Easton v. Smith, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Smith v. Central Trust Co., 4 Dem. Y.) 318; Moore v. Westervelt, 1 Sur. (N. Y.) 75. Code R. (N. S.) 131, 3 Sandf. ;(N. 3i Wheaton v. Newcombe, 16 J. Y.) 762; Bartle v. Oilman, 18 N. & S. (N. Y.) 215; Rooney v. Sec- Y. 260; Van Every v. Adams, 10 ond Ave. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 368; J. & S. (N. Y.) 126. The amend- McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. ment in 1879 of § 66 of the Code 237; Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. of Civil Procedure does not state 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Wright v. in words what the attorney's lien Wright, 70 N. Y. 96; Pulver v. is for, but leaves this to be de- Harris, 52 N. Y. 72; Crotty v. Mc- 187 attorney's special or charging lien. § 188 attorney may agree with his client to receive a share of the recovery in addition to his costs and disbursements, in lieu of all charges for his services, and his interest in the action can not be affected by any compromise made between the parties. ^^ But it seems that there can be no lien for com- pensation, beyond the taxed costs based upon an express agreement, unless the agreement be made before or pending the action. It can not be based upon an agreement made after judgment.^^ An attorney who appears and answers for the defendant after notice that the parties have settled acquires no lien for costs.^^ § 188. Attorney's undefined lien. — Under the code the amount of the attorney's compensation for which he has a lien is undefined, unless there be an express agreement of the parties.^^ When the right is clear and only the amount is in question, this may be determined upon a petition and reference, or by the judge, or by a jury passing upon an issue sent to it. Upon a summary application by a client to com- pel the attorney to pay over moneys collected, the court has jurisdiction to determine the question of the amount of his compensation, where this is the only matter in dispute, al- though the items of his account are such as in ordinary cases would subject them to taxation.^® Kenzie, 10 J. & S. (N. Y.) 192; Y. C. & H. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, Creighton v. Ingersoll, 20 Barb. 27 Am. Rep. 75; Ackerman v. (N. Y.) 541; Brown v. New York, Ackerman, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 11 Hun (N. Y.) 21. 229; Brown v. New York, 11 Hun 32Forstman v. SchuHing, 35 (N. Y.) 21, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 587; Hun (N. Y.) 504. Rooney v. Second Ave. R. Co., 18 33 Smith V. Central Trust Co., 4 N. Y. 368; McGregor v. Comstock, Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 75. 28 N. Y. 237; Crotty v. McKen- 34 Howard v. Riker, 11 Abb. zie, 10 J. & S. (N. Y.) 192. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 113. 36 in re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; 35 In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; Commercial Telegram Co. v. Wright V. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96; Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 10 N. Zogbaum v. Parker, 55 N. Y. 120; Y. S. 433, 19 Civ. Proc. R. 32, 32 Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, N. Y. St. 445. 10 Am. Rep. 572; Coughlin v. N. § 189 LIENS. 188 § 189. Action to establish lien. — In New York the attor- ney must take the same steps to estabHsh his lien upon the cause of action that he was previously required to take to establish it upon the judgment ; that is, he must obtain leave of court to prosecute the action for the purpose of determin- ing his right of recovery in the suit, and for the purpose of establishing his lien upon the subject-matter of the action; though it would seem that he is not required to show that the settlement was a fraud upon him, but only that it in- equitably affected his lien upon the cause of action.^''' After a settlement between the parties, the lien can not be enforced upon a mere motion to compel the defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorney his taxable cost by awarding a judgment therefor.^^ No notice of a lien on a judgment which is exclusively for costs and disbursements is required, as the record itself is sufficient notice of the existence of the lien and a discharge obtained by payment of the judgment to the client, and not to the attorney, may be set aside on motion.^^ 3- AlcCabe v. Fogg, 60 How. Pr. 17 Civ. Proc. R. 362, 26 N. (N. Y.) 488; Smith v. Baum. 67 Y. St. 115; Kehoe v. Miller, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 267; Tullis v. Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 393; Deutsch Bushnell, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217, 65 v. Webb, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; Albert Pal- 393; Quinnan v. Clapp, 10 Abb. N. mer Co. v. Van Orden, 64 How. Pr. Cas. (N. Y.) 394; ussell v. Somer- (N. Y.) 79; Goddard v. Trenbath, ville, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 395; 24 Hun (N. Y.) 182, afifd. 85 N. Commercial Telegram Co. v. Y. 647; Wilber v. Baker, 24 Hun Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 10 (N. Y.) 24; Jenkins v. Adams, 22 N. Y. S. 433, 19 Civ. Proc. R. 32, Hun (N. Y.) 600; Dimick v. Cool- 32 N. Y. St. 445. Under the pres- ey, 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 141; ent code it seems that the attor- Ackerman v. Ackerman, 14 Abb. ney may proceed without leave of Pr. (N. Y.) 229; Palmer v. Van court. Orden, 17 J. & S. (N. Y.) 89; 38 Smith v. Baum, 67 How. Pr. Thompkins v. Manner, 18 J. & (N. Y.) 267. S. (X. Y.) 511; Oliwill v. so Kaufman v. Keenan, 2 N. Y. Verdenhalven, 7 N. Y. S. 89, S. 395, 18 N. Y. St. 933. 189 attorney's special or charging lien. § 189b § 189a. North Dakota.'*" — An attorney has a lien upon money due his client in the hands of the adverse party, or attorney of such party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney claiming the lien was employed from the time of giving notice in writing to such adverse party or the at- torney of such party, if the money is in the possession or under the control of such attorney, which notice shall state the amount claimed and in general terms for what services. After judgment in any court of record such notice may be given and the lien made effective against the judgment debtor by entering the same in the judgment docket oppo- site the entry of the judgment. §189b. Oklahoma. ^^ — From the commencement of an ac- tion at law or in equity or from the filing of an answer con- taining a counterclaim, the attorney or attorneys who repre- sent the party in whose behalf such pleading is filed, shall have a lien upn his client's cause of action or counterclaim, and same shall attach to any verdict, report, decision, finding or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof, wherever found, shall be subject to such lien and no settle- ment between the parties without the approval of the attor- ney shall effect or destroy such lien. Such lien shall attach from and after such attorney is contracted with, provided such attorney serves notice upon the defendant or defend- ants, or proposed defendant or defendants, in which he shall set forth the nature of the lien he claims and extent thereof, 40 Rev. Code 1905, § 6293. Plain- power him to prevent a bona fide tiff may settle and dismiss his settlement by the parties. Wells suit without notice to his attor- v. Moore, 31 Okla. 135, 120 Pac. ney. Olsen v. Sargent, 75 N. Dak. 612. An attorney may bring an 146, 107 N. W. 43. action against the defendant for 41 Comp. Laws 1909, § 274. colluding with plaintiff to defraud The lien may be disolved by the attorney out of his fees. As bond. Comp. Laws 1909, § 263. to evidence held sufficient to prove Before judgment is entered the at- collusion see Wells v. Moore, 31 torney has no such interest in his Okla. 135, 120 Pac. 612. client's cause of action to em- § i89bb LIENS. 190 or from and after the service of such notice. Such notice shall not be necessary, provided such attorney has filed such pleading in a court of record, and endorsed thereon his name, together with the words "lien claim." § 189bb. Oregon.— See ante, § 180. § 189c. South Carolina. — In South Carolina an attorney's lien is limited to his disbursements and the costs taxed; and therefore a federal court sitting in that state can not declare a lien on the fruits of its judgment for services rendered in the state courts in litigation concerning the same subject- matter. There is no provision by statute on the subject, and that rule of the English courts is followed strictly.^^ § 189d. South Dakota.^^ An attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation in and for each case upon money due his client in the hands of the adverse party, or attorney of such party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney claiming the lien was employed, from the time of giving notice in writing to such adverse party, or attorney of such party, if the money is in the posses- sion or under the control of such attorney, which notice shall state the amount claimed, and, in general terms, for what services. After judgment in any court of record such notice may be given, and the lien made efifective against the judg- 42 Scharlock v. Oland, 1 Rich. L. Serveson, 8 S. Dak. 350, 66 N. W. (S. Car.) 207; Miller v. New- 938. An attorney's lien on plain- ell, 20 S. Car. 123, 47 Am. Rep. tifif's appealed judgment for costs 833; Massachusetts & So. Const. is not superior to the rights of Co. V. Gill's Creek, 48 Fed. 145. the parties where defendant also 43 Rev. Code (Pol.) 1903, § 702. has a judgment for costs on ap- By filing his lien an attorney se- peal, and will not prevent the cures an interest in the judgment plaintiff from setting off his judg- and the cause of action on appeal ment against defendant's judg- which is not disturbed by the as- ment. Garrigan v. Huntimer, 21 signment of interest. Leight'on v. S. Dak. 269, 111 N. W. 563. ipi attorney's special or charging lien. § 190 ment debtor, by entering the same in the judgment docket opposite the entry of the judgment. The statutes also provide that mutual final judgments may be set off pro tanto, one against the other, upon application and notice. Under them both the right to set-of¥ and the right to attorney's lien are dormant until actively asserted. The judgment creditor may not ask for a set-ofT, and the attorney may not take any steps to perfect his lien. The attorney's lien attaches and becomes an active instead of a potential right, "from the time of giving notice in writing to the adverse party;" and proceedings regularly initiated, though not concluded, in court, to set off mutual final judg- ments, will not be affected by a subsequent notice by the at- torney of his claim for lien.^* § 190. Tennessee*^ — Any attorney who is employed to prosecute a suit that has already been brought in anv court of record in this state shall have a lien upon the plaintiff's right of action from the date of his employment in the case; provided, the record of the case will first be made to show such employment by notice upon the rule docket of such court, or a written memorandum filed with the papers in the case, or by notice served upon the defendant in the case. The attorney's lien attaches not only to the judgment but to the property, whether real or personal, which is the sub- 44 Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. Dak. given and [the judgment holder's] 178, 52 N. W. 581. In this case, right to set-off was so acted upon, before the attorney had given no- the attorney's claim for lien was tice to the adverse party of his still only a possibility. — an inchoate claim of a lien, this party "had right. He had not yet done the openly asserted and begun to ex- very thing which, under the stat- ercise their right to have these ute, was required to make it an judgments set off, by giving no- operative lien, and did not do it, tice of such application to the nor attempt to do it, until another court, as provided by statute. The and adverse right had attached, a attorney claiming the lien knew right which the subsequent notice of this, for the notice was served did not displace." upon him. When this notice was ^.^ Supp. 1903, p. 615. § I90 LIENS. 192 ject of the litigation.*'^ The attorney is entitled to an equit- able lien on the property or thing in litigation for his just and reasonable fees, and the client can not, while the suit is pending, so dispose of the subject-matter in dispute as to deprive the attorney of his lien."*^ If property be attached in the suit, the attorney has a lien upon such property for his fees.*^ The lien dates from the commencement of the suit, and its pendency is, of itself, notice to all persons of the exist- ence of the lien. It may be preserved and extended by stating its existence in the judgment or decree. Notice from the pendency of the suit affects not only the client, but his 46 Hunt V. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618; Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 29; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 472; Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 95. Where a defendant after notice of the employment of an attorney to prosecute a claim against him settles the claim with claimant it may, in defense of a suit by the attorney against it to recover his fee, show that the em- ployment of the attorney was in- valid. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S. W. 178, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 282n, 119 Am. St. 1003n. Where an attor- ney is employed to prosecute a suit for minors and married wo- men to recover property conveyed by their ancestor and succeeds in recovering it, he is entitled to a lien thereon for his reasonable compensation. Boring v. Jobe (Tenn.), 53 S. W. 763. But where no lien is declared either in a judgment or in a chancery suit which he has brought to sub- ject lands to a sale to satisfy a judgment at law, the attorney can have no lien for his services. Gribble v. Ford (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 1007. An attorney who has prosecuted a suit for a minor is entitled to a lien on his recovery for his reasonable compensation. American Lead Pencil Co. v. Da- vis, 108 Tenn. 442, 67 S. W. 864. An attorney may waive his lien on a judgment by taking the promise of the creditor to pay his fees. Cantrell v. Ford (Tenn.), 46 S. W. 581. An attorney's lien may be adjudged at any time while the cause is still under the control of the court and an assign- ment of the judgment will not de- feat the lien. Taylor v. Badoux (Tenn.), 58 .S. W. 919. Where there is no recovery there can be no lien for the attorney. Land- reth V. Powell, 122 Tenn. 195. 121 S. W. 500. 4'!' Hunt V. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503; Pleasants v. Kort- recht, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 694. 48 Pleasants v. Kortrecht, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 694. 193 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 190a creditors and purchasers, and the defendant as well.^*^ Under the present statutes attorneys beginning a suit have a lien on plaintiff's cause of action for their charges where the charges are fixed by contract or by legal proceedings/'^ § 190a. Texas.''^ — In an action against unknown owners to recover land, on service by publication, the court is au- thorized to appoint an attorney to represent such unknown owners and allow his compensation, and such attorney has a lien, but it can not be foreclosed as against interested parties not made parties to the action. Such a lien can only be enforced in an equitable suit and on due notice. An attorney has a lien on goods in a store for preparing and defending a deed of trust thereof without knowing that the vendor had bought the goods on credit by means of false representations, and the lien of the attorney is superior to the claim of the seller attempting to rescind the contract of sale. 49 Covington v. Bass, 88 Tenn. 496, 12 S. W. 1033. 50 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wells, 104 Tenn. 706, 59 S. W. 1041. A defendant cannot set of? a judg- ment held by him so as to defeat the attorney's lien on the judg- ment. Roberts v. Mitchell, 94 Tenn. 277, 29 S. W. 5, 29 L. R. A. 705. The attorney's lien can not be defeated by a compromise of the parties in fraud of his rights. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wells, 104 Tenn. 706, 59 S. W. 1041. The attorney in a suit for a stockhold- er to vacate a fraudulent convey- ance has a lien on the property recovered in the w^rit. Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 93 Tenn. 691, 28 S. W. 90, 27 L. R. A. 98. 51 Acts 1866, p. 125. Middles- worth v. Houston Oil Co. of Tex- as, 184 Fed. 857, 107 C. C. A. 181; Meyers v. Bloon, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 554, 50 S. W. 217. An attorney has no general lien on a judgment obtained to secure his fees in pro- curing same. Button v. Mason, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 52 S. W. 651. An attorney who has con- tracted with his client in a per- sonal injury suit to receive a part of the sum recovered for his serv- ices, where the defendant has ac- tual knowledge of the terms of such contract, can not be defraud- ed out of his compensation by a settlement between his client and the defendant. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. V. Dysart (Tex. Civ. App.), 130 S. W. 1047. See also, Marschall V. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S. 13 § 190b LIENS. 194 § 190b. Utah.^2 — The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restricted by law. From the com- mencement of an action, or the service of an answer con- taining a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and can not be vacated by any settle- ment between the parties before or after judgment. § 191. Vermont. — In Vermont an attorney has a lien for his costs upon a judgment recovered by him in favor of his client; but this lien does not bind the opposite party so as to prevent his settling or discharging the suit and cause of ac- tion. °^ In the early decisions this lien was confined to the taxable costs in this suit.^^ But in a later decision the rule was established that the lien extends to the attorney's rea- sonable fees and disbursements in the suit in which the judg- ment was recorded. "No good reason can be given," say the court,^^ "for limiting an attorney's charging lien to what under our law are the taxable costs in favor of his client in W. 812; San Antonio & A. P. R. for his client, as against his Co. V. Sehorn (Tex. Civ. App.), client or his assignee. Parker v. 127 S. W. 246; Mays v. Sanders, Parker, 71 Vt. 387, 45 Atl. 756. 90 Tex. 132, Zl S. W. 595. Where a suit is brought and the 52 Comp. Laws 1907, § 135. Pot- cause is submitted to a committee ter V. Ajax Min. Co., 19 Utah 421, of award, plaintiff's attorney has a 57 Pac. 270; Sandberg v. Victor lien on the recovery by such Gold & Silver Min. Co., 18 Utah award. Plutchinson v. Howard, 15 66, 55 Pac. 74. Vt. 544. 53 Hutchinson v. Pettes, 18 Vt. 54 Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. 614; Walker v. Sargent, 14 Vt. 247; (Vt.) 162. Beech v. Canaan, 14 Vt. 485; Smal- 50 Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. ley V. Clark, 22 Vt. 598; Fairbanks Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. V. Devereaux, 58 Vt. 359, 3 Atl. 500. 821; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169, An attorney is entitled to a lien 5 Am. Rep. 267; Hutchinson v. on a judgment obtained by him, Howard, 15 Vt. 544. 195 attorney's special or charging lien. § 191a the suit. If he is to be given a lien at all upon a judgment recovered by his services, it should be to the extent of the value of his services in the suit. His services are presumed to have been skilfully performed, and valuable because so performed. They enhance his client's claim presumably to the extent of the value of his services, the same as the tailor's services, in manufacturing a patron's cloth into a coat, en- hance the value of the materials to the extent of the value of the services. We are aware that the decisions in this country are not uniform on the extent of an attorney's charging lien. In some states it is held to cover his reasonable charges and disbursements in the suit, while in others it is limited to the amount of costs taxable in favor of his client in the suit. But these are what the law allows to be recovered in favor of the prevailing part}^ They are taxed between party and party, and not between attorney and client, and are in no sense the measure of the value of the attorney's services and disbursements in the suit. They include frequently court, clerk, witness, and ofificer's fees, in the suit, which the client has advanced. I can not help thinking that this class of de- cisions has their origin in not observing the distinction be- tween taxable costs which, at the common law, was a taxa- tion between the attorney or solicitor and his client, and taxable costs under our statutes, which is a taxation in favor of the recovering party against the defeated party." § 191a. Virginia.^^ — Any person having or claiming a right of action sounding in tort, or for unliquidated damages ^>c< Code 1904, § 3201a. Where of his client. Watts v. Newberry, drafts or other evidences of in- 107 Va. 233, 57 S. E. 657. Where debtedness are given to an attor- a defendant assigns a debt from ney by his client to be applied the collection of which the attor- to the payment of the client's in- ney expected to collect his fees debtedness, such property so pos- the attorney may intervene by pe- sessed by the attorney is not sub- tition. Fitzgerald's Exrx. v. Irby, ject to a lien of the attorney for 99 Va. 81, 37 S. E. 777. his services in paying the debts 192 LIENS. 196 on contract, may contract with any attorney at law to prose- cute the same, and such attorney shall have a lien upon such cause of action as security for his fees for any services rend- ered in relation to said cause of action or claim. And when any such contract shall be made and written notice of the claim of such lien shall be given to the opposite party, his attorney or agent, any settlement or adjustment of such cause of action shall be void against the lien so created, ex- cept as proof of liability on such cause of action: provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the existing law in respect to champertous contracts. § 192. Washington.^^ — It is provided by statute that an attorney may have a lien on money in the hands of the ad- verse party in an action or proceeding in which the attorney was employed from the time of giving notice of the lien to •^^ Remington & Ballinger's Code 1910, § 136. Where parties enter into collusion to defeat the attorney's lien and the col- lection of his feeSj the court, upon a proper showing, will order the case to proceed in order to protect his lien. Cline Piano Co. V. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742. But where under the statute an attorney is required to file a notice of his lien on a judgment and before he does so the judgment is assigned in good faith without any collusion be- tween the assignor and assignee, such judgment will not be subject to a lien filed after the assignment. Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 118 Pac. 827, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226n. An attorney who has advanced money to his client with which to pay costs under a contract with his client that he is to be repaid can have no lien on a judgment for costs recovered in the action. Rob- inson V. Hays, 186 Fed. 295, 108 C. C. A. Z7Z. An attorney may have a lien on the subject-matter of an action which will attach on money in possession of the adverse party, after written notice of the lien is given such adverse party, and where such notice is given, if the defendant settles with the client without consent of the at- torney, he is still liable to such attorney to satisfy the lien. Mc- Rea V. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924. See also, Plummer V. Great Northern R. Co., 60 W^ash. 214, 110 Pac. 989. An at- torney has a lien for services ren- dered in an action on a judgment from the time of filing notice of such a lien with the clerk of the court where such action is pend- ing. Wooding v. Crain, 11 Wash. 207, 39 Pac. 442. 197 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 192a that party, and upon a judgment to the extent of the value of any services performed by him in the action, and it is held in such a case that the lien will not attach until the judgment is formerly entered. § 192a. West Virginia.^^ — Attorneys are authorized to make contracts with their clients for their fees, and their liens on judgments received cover not merely their taxable costs, but their services and disbursements. While the lien is a special lien for services rendered in obtaining the par- ticular judgment or decree, yet it extends to all services rendered in obtaining that judgment or decree, though the services may have been rendered in other suits, if these are so connected with the principal cause as to form the basis on which the judgment or decree is rendered, or is essential to the rendering of such judgment or decree. 192b. Wisconsin.''^ — It is provided by statute that one having or claiming a right of action in tort or for unliquidated 58 Ann. Code 1906, § 1112; Renick v. Ludington, 16 VV. Va. 378; Fowler v. Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447. An attorney's lien on a judgment he has obtained for his client may- be assigned by him and a suit thereon be maintained by the as- signee. Fisher v. Mylius, 62 W. Va. 19, 57 S. E. 276. An attorney can have no lien on a fund result- ing from a sale of property where the whole of such fund is required to pay a prior lien. Schmertz v. Hammond, 51 W. Va. 408, 41 S. E. 184. The lien on an attorney on a judgment obtained by his efiforts for his client is good against an assignee of svich judgment whether the assignee had notice or not. Bent V. Lipscomb, 45 W. Va. 183, 31 S. E. 907. Where an attorney has brought a suit under an agree- ment with his client that he is to receive as his compensation a cer- tain per cent, of the judgment, he has a right in the chose in action and can prevent a collusive set- tlement between the parties made to defeat him in collecting his fee and he may apply to the court in the action between such parties to have the cause go on to final judg- ment for his benefit. Burkhart v. Scott, 69 W. Va. 694, 72 S. E. 784. The attorney's charging and re- taining liens apply only to the per- sonal relation between attorneys and their clients, and will not be extended so as to disturb the rights of third persons, interested in the litigation but who have not employed the attorneys. In re Gillaspie, 190 Fed. 88. 59 Rev. Stats. 1898 § 2591a, as amended by Laws 1907, §§ 2591a, § 192b LIENS. 198 damages on contract may contract with an attorney to prose- cute his action and give him a Hen thereon and upon the pro- ceeds or damages derived in any action brought for the en- forcement of such cause of action, as security for his fees and he may, by giving notice to the opposite party, or his attor- ney, make any settlement between the parties without the attorney's consent invahd as against the lien. If any such cause of action shall have been settled by the parties thereto after judgment has been procured without notice to the at- torney claiming such lien, such lien may be enforced and it shall only be required to prove the facts of the agreement by which such lien was given, notice to the opposite party or his attorney and the rendition of the judgment, and if any such settlement of the cause of action is had or effected be- fore judgment therein, then it shall only be necessary to en- force said lien to prove the agreement creating the same notice to the opposite party or his attorney and the amount for which said case was settled, which shall be the basis for said lien and it shall at no time be necessary to prove up the original cause of action in order to enforce said lien and suit. § 192c. Wyoming.^" — An attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensation upon money due to his client, and in the hands of the adverse party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party. § 193. No lien until judgment is entered. — An attorney has no lien for costs until a judgment is entered, or at least 2591m, p. 570. But a notice to de- v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 106 fendant that the attorney has been Wis. 135, 81 N. W. 994. See also, given a lien by contract with the Rice v. Garnhart, 35 Wis. 282; plaintiflF is not enough to amount Smelker v. Chicago & N. W. R. to a notice of the assignment to Co.. 106 Wis. 135, 81 N. W. 994. the attorney of a certain interest 60 Comp. Stat. 1910, § 3821. in the cause of action. Smelker 199 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 193 until after the verdict; unless it is given upon the cause of action by statute, as is now the case in New York under the present code;*^^ and, until the lien attaches, the parties can settle the suit regardless of his claim for costs. °^ The re- taining of an attorney to prosecute an action, and the com- mencement of it by him, give him no lien upon what may in the event of a trial be recovered therein ;^^ for otherwise it would not be in the power of the parties to settle their con- troversy until such lien should be satisfied, and it would be in the power of the attorney to continue the litigation for his own benefit in case of a favorable result, without incurring ♦51 Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 1902, § 66. See § 186, supra. 62 Nevir York: Coughlin v. N. Y. C. & Hud. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443. 27 Am. Rep. 75; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 62; Rooney v. Second Ave. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 368; Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Crotty v. MacKenzie, 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 54, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 192; Shank v. Shoemaker, 18 N. Y. 489; Sweet v. Bartlett, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 661; Tullis v. Bush- nell, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; Brown v. New York, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 21; Sullivan V. O'Keefe, 53 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426; Christy v. Perkins, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 237; Quincey v. Francis, 5 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 286. Vermont: Foot v. Tewksbury, 2 Vt. 97; Walker v. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247; Hutchinson v. Howard, 15 Vt. 544; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169, 5 Am. Rep. 267; Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570. New Hampshire: Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; Young v. Dearborn, 27 N. H. 324. Maine: Potter v. Mayo, 3 Greenl. (Maine) 34, 14 Am. Dec. 211; Gammon v. Chand- ler, 30 Maine 152; Hobson v. Wat- son, 34 Maine 20, 56 Am. Dec. 632; Averill v. Longfellow, 66 Maine 237. Indiana: Hanna v. Is- land Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846. Other States: Lamont V. Washington & G. R. Co., 2 Mack. (D. C.) 502, 47 Am. Rep. 268; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618; Henchey v. Chicago, 41 111. 136; Mosely v. Norman, 74 Ala. 422. Contra: That an attorney's lien for compensation attaches to the cause of action. Keenan v. Dorflinger, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 153. In New York, since the Code of 1879, the lien attaches to the cause of action. So also in Geor- gia, Tennessee and a few other states, the lien by statute dates from the commencement of the action. See §§ 173, 175, 186, 190, supra. 63 Kirby v. Kirby, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 565. § 194 LIENS. 200 any liability should the result be adverse/''* Accordingly, in a case where a judgment was recovered by a plaintiff in an action for assault and battery, and he assigned this to his attorney as security for costs, giving notice of the assignment to the defendant, but upon appeal the judgment was reversed and a new trial was granted, and before the new trial was had the parties settled, and the plaintiff executed a release to the defendant, it was held that, the assignment of the judg- ment having become a nullity by the reversal, the attorney had no lien, either legal or equitable, and could not proceed with the action and obtain a further judgment. The defend- ant, after a reversal of the judgment, had a right to settle with the plaintiff, and was not bound to take care of the interests of the attorney, though knowing that the attorney relied upon the fruits of the action as security for his services. The defendant owed no duty to the attorney, even so far as to inform him of the settlement, so as to save him from ex- pending labor and money in preparing for a new trial. ^^ § 194. Default not a judgment. — The entry of a default does not constitute a perfected judgment, and the parties may after that, and before an actual entry of judgment, make a bona fide settlement of the claim and costs of suit without reference to the attorne3^'s fees. He has then no lien that can stand in the way of such a settlement.*''*^ An order of court after verdict, that judgment be entered the attorney his lien. Such order is a final determination of the case, and is the end of all litigation as to the merits of the case. The time when the judgment is entered up in form is immaterial.^''^ When exceptions are taken in the trial court, and these 64Pulver V. Harris, 52 N. Y. 1Z, «" Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169. per Grover, J. And see Henchey 5 Am. Rep. 267. V. Chicago, 41 111. 136. 67 Young v. Dearborn, 27 N. H. or. Pulver v. Harris, 52 N. Y. IZ, 324. affirming 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 500. 20I attorney's SrECIAL OR CIIAR(}ING LIEN. § 1 96 are overruled or sustained by the law court, the certificate of that court making- a final disposition of the cause is the final judgment of the court, and the attorney's lien attaches when the certificate is received by the clerk of the court in which the suit is pending-, and a subsequent settlement of the parties can not be allowed to defeat it.^^ Whether a final judgment has been rendered or not de- pends upon the records of the court in which the trial was pending. Whether an appeal has been taken from the judg- ment must be shown from the records. ^^ When the judg- ment is against several defendants, an appeal taken by one of them operates in his favor alone, and as to the defendants who have not appealed, the attorney's lien may be enforced by issuing execution against tliem."^^ When a judgment is nullified on a review, the attorney's lien for costs on such judgment is lost.'''^ § 195. Pending appeal will not prevent dismissal. — While a suit is pending on a writ of error in the Supreme Court of the United States, the court will not prevent the parties from agreeing to dismiss the case, though in the court below there was a judgment for costs and the attorney claims a lien upon the judgment. "To permit the attorney to control them [the proceedings.]" say the court, "would, in efi^ect, be com- pelling the client to carry on the litigation at his own ex- pense, simph^ for the contingent benefit of the attorney."'^^ § 196. Client may settle before judgment. — Therefore, until a judgment is entered, the client may settle or compro- mise the suit in any manner that he may think to be for his interest, without consulting his attorney; and the attorney 68 Cooley V. Patterson, 52 Maine Y. S. 433, 19 Civ. Proc. R. 32, 32 472. N. Y. St. 445. GO Gammon v. Chandler, 30 "i Dunlap v. Burnham, 38 Maine Maine 152. 112. 70 Commercial Telegram Co. v. "i- Piatt v. Jerome, 19 How. (U. Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 10 N. S.) 384, 15 L. ed. 623. § 196 LIENS. 202 has no right to interfere or power to prevent such settlement or compromise/^ If, after such settlement, the attorney proceeds to enforce judgment, this will be set aside as irregular.'^ Under statutes which give an attorney a lien upon the judgment and execution for his fees and disbursements in ob- taining the same, he has no lien before judgment, for the lien is one that is expressly created upon the judgment and exe- cution. Before judgment the client may settle the action and discharge the debtor without the consent of the attor- ney;"^ or the client may at any time before the entry of judg- es Chapman v. Haw, 1 Taunt. (U. S.) 341; Nelson v. Wilson. 6 Bing. 568; Clark v. Smith, 6 M. & G. 1051; Francis v. Webb, 7 C. B. 731; Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. & E. 17; Emma Silver Min- ing Co. (limited) v. Emma Silver Mining Co., 12 Fed. 815; Peterson V. Watson, 1 Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 487, Fed. Cas. No. 11037; Brooks v. Snell, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 48, Fed. Cas. No. 1961 ; Purcell v. Lincoln, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 230, Fed. Cas. No. 11471; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 33; Grant v. Hazeltine, 2 N. H. 541; Young v. Dearborn, 27 N. H. 324; Lamont v. Washington & G. R. Co., 2 Mack. (D. C.) 502, 47 Am. Rep. 268; Foot v. Tewksburj^ 2 Vt. 97; Hutchinson v. Pettes, 18 Vt. 614; Tillman v. Reynolds, 48 Ala. 365; Parker v. Blighton. 32 Mich. 266; Voigt Brew. Co. v. Donovan, 103 Mich. 190, 61 N. W. 343; Nielsen v. Albert Lea, 91 Minn. 388, 98 N. W. 195; Swanston V. Morning Star Mining Co., 13 Fed. 215, 4 McCrary (U. S.) 241; Wood V. Anders, 5 Bush (Ky.) 601; Conner v. Boyd, 11 Ala. 385. New York: Power v. Kent, 1 Cow. 172; McDowell v. Second Ave. R. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 670; Shank v. Shoemaker, 18 N. Y. 489; Wade v. Orton, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 444; Coughlin v. N. Y. Cent. & Hud. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75; Pulver v. Harris, 52 N. Y. 1Z; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96; Roberts v. Doty, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 128; Reynolds v. Port Jervis Boot & Shoe Factory, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 64; Eberhardt v. Schuster, 10 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 374, 391, note; otherwise since 1879. Smith v. Vicksburg S. & T. R. Co., 112 La. 985, 36 So. 826. ''i McDowell v. Second Ave. R. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 670; Pinder V. Alorris, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 165. See, however, Rasquin v. Knick- erbocker Stage Co., 12 Abb. Prac. (N. Y) 324, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 293. "5 Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. c>2>; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; Coughlin v. N. Y. Cent. & Hud. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75; Hawkins v. Loyless, 39 Ga. 5. 203 attorney's special or charging lien. § 198 ment assign his interest in the cause of action and thus de- feat the lien of the attorney. "° § 197. Action for damages settled by parties. — An action for unliquidated damages may always be settled by the parties, against the assent of the attorney, in the absence of a statute protecting him from the beginning of the litiga- tion."^" Thus, where a person having a claim against a rail- road company, for damages resulting from negligence, agreed with an attorney that he should have half the amount that might be recovered for his services in prosecuting the suit, and while the suit was pending settled with the defend- ant and gave a release, it was held that the release was a bar to the further prosecution of the action, though the defend- ant had notice of the attorney's interest in the claim. "^^ If the attorney has omitted to protect himself by giving notice of his lien, and the parties compromise before judgment, and with notice of such settlement he proceeds with the suit for his costs, he must show that the adverse party made the set- tlement collusively, with the design of defeating the attor- ney's demand for his costs or fees; and failing to show this, his proceedings will be set aside.''^^ § 198. Settlement by parties will not affect attorney's lien, — Where by statute the lien is upon the cause of action and attaches from the commencement of the suit, as is now the case in Georgia,"^^^ Idaho,^^*' Missouri, "^° Montana,'^'' New "^^ Potter V. Mayo, 3 Greenl. "^ McDowell v. Second Ave. R. (Maine) 34, 14 Am. Dec. 211. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 670. "" Kusterer v. Beaver Dam, 56 ~'>^ A judgment of non-suit ends Wis. 471, 14 N. W. 617, 43 Am. attornej^'s lien, and settlement by Rep. 725; Hanna v. Island Coal a client before he has brought a Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846, new suit leaves him without rem- 51 Am. St. 246; Courtney v. Mc- edy. Brown v. Georgia C. & N. Gavock, 23 Wis. 619. R. Co., 101 Ga. 80, 28 S. E. 634. See 78CoughIin V. N. Y. C. & Hud. ante, § 173. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. '»'^See ante, § 173a. Rep. 75. '9<^See ante, § 181a. '9dSee ante, § 182. §198 LIENS. 204 York,^^ Oklahoma/'^'^^ and Tennessee,^^ Utah,^^* no settle- ment or compromise can be made between the parties which will affect the attorney's lien, unless made with his consent or by leave of court. The attorney may proceed with the action to final judgment. And, according to the practice in New York, he may do this without obtaining leave of court. ^^ But if the action be for unliquidated damages, such, for instance, as an action for personal injuries, the lien can hardly attach until it has been established by verdict, when it be- comes for the first time certain and vested. Thus, in an action for damages arising from assault and battery, the plaintiff will be allowed to discontinue the action against the objection of his attorney who insists that the suit shall go on, so that he may get his taxable costs in case a recovery is had.^^ And so where a lien is given upon a cause of action from the time of giving notice of it to the adverse party, there can be no lien before judgment upon a cause of action for tort which, in case of the death of the parties or of either of them, would not survive.^* Where the attorney has a lien upon the cause of action, a settlement made in good faith by the parties will not be set aside at the instance of the plaintiff's attorney, where it ap- pears that the sum agreed to be paid to his client exceeds the amount necessary to satisfy his lien, and especially where the defendant has offered to pay this amount directly to the attorney.^^ so See ante, § 186. S3 Cahill v. Cahill. 9 N. Y. Civ. soaSee ante, § 189b. Proc. R. 241; Wade v. Orton. 12 81 See ante, § 190. Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 444. 81^ See ante, § 190b. §4 Abbott v. Abbott, 18 Nebr. 82Forstman v. Schulting, 35 503, 26 N. W. 361. Hun (N. Y.) 504; Lewis v. Day, 85 in re Tuttle, 21 Weekly Dig. 10 Weekly Dig. 49; Coster v. 528. Greenpoint Ferry Co., 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 146. 205 attorney's special or charging lien. § 200 § 199. Attorney's withdrawal from case. — When an at- torney withdraws from a case of his own motion before judg- ment, the court will impress no lien in his favor on any ultimate recovery, as a condition to the substitution of other attorneys, unless a special reason is shown for this.*^ § 200. Only attorney is entitled to a lien. — Only the at- torney who is in charge of the suit at the time the judgment is entered is entitled to this lien;^^ though of course a former attorney may be given a lien by special agreement between him and his client.®^ Counsel employed to assist an attorney in the trial of a cause have no lien for their services upon the judgment recovered.®^ Where the original attorney holds an irrevocable power of attorney coupled with an interest in the claim, and a new attorney is substituted by motion of the party, the former attorney has rights which the court will protect. Thus the United States Court of Claims held in such a case that, where an attorney's fees are fixed by statute, a substitution will not be ordered until the original attorney's fees are ascertained and paid. Where the attorney's fee is contingent, the court will assure him of a lien upon the ultimate judgment, and secure his immediate reimbursement of the expenses that have been incurred.^^ 86Hektograph Co. v. Fourl, 11 (N. Y.) 587, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 21; Fed. 844. Gibson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. S7 Wells V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246. R. Co., 122 Iowa 565, 98 N. W. But under the Iowa statutes an 474. attorney giving notice has a lien so Carver v. United States, 7 Ct. for the reasonable value of his CI. (U. S.) 499. In this case it services even though he is dis- was ordered that the original at- charged, and a new suit is brought torney have and retain a lien upon by another attorney. Gibson v. the cause of action, and papers Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 122 and effects of the client, and upon Iowa 565, 98 N. W. 474. the judgment, for his contingent 88 In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235; fees and costs. To like effect, see Ronald v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Supervisors of Ulster County v. Association, 30 Fed. 228. Brodhead, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 89 Brown v. New York, 9 Hun 411. § 20I LIENS. 206 §201. Lien by contract. — By contract this lien may be availed of by an agent not an attorney at law, if he renders services of the same character as those rendered by an attor- ney at law. Thus, where one who was not an attorney was employed to prosecute a claim against the government, under a stipulation that he should receive for his services one-half of the amount that might be recovered, and he employed at- torneys and controlled the suit, and after many years re- covered a judgment for a large sum, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to vacate the appearance of the agent's attorney, and to substitute his own attorney, with- out paying to the agent, or his representative, one-half of the amount of the judgment, in accordance with the agree- ment.^^ A party to a suit prosecuted for himself and others having a like interest is entitled to a lien for his reasonable costs, counsel fees, charges and expenses incurred in the proper prosecution of the suit, and such lien may be enforced against the trust funds brought under the control of the court by the suit so instituted.^^ § 201a. Attorney's lien on fund recovered. — An attorney has a lien upon a fund recovered by his aid paramount to the claims of persons interested in the fund of their creditors. ^^ The lien in such case exists without the aid of !5i In Dodge v. Schell, 20 Blatchf. not conferred." See also, Canney (U. S.) 517, 12 Fed. 515, Wallace, v. Canney, 131 Mich. 363, 91 N. J., said: "If [the agent] had been W. 620. an attorney, the agreement and ^- Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. services would have created a S. 527, 26 L. ed. 1157; Central R. lien. There is no magic in the & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. name attorney, which conjures up S. 116, 28 L. ed. 915, 5 Sup. Ct. a lien. It is the nature of the 387. services and the control, actual ^3 Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 172, or potential, which the mechanical 44 Am. Rep. 280; Koons v. Beach, or professional laborer has over 147 Ind. 137, 45 N. E. 601, 46 N. the object intrusted to him which E. 587; Justice v. Justice, 115 Ind. determine whether a lien is or is 201, 16 N. E. 615. See also, Strat- 207 attorney's special or charging lien. § 20 lb the statute.'^'* An attorney who has rendered services in a partition suit has a lien for those services upon his client's share of the proceeds, paramount to the claims of third per- sons to whom the client, pending the suit, assigns and mort- gages his interest in the property as security for money owing them by him.^'' An attorney who by his services has procured a will to be set aside and established his client's right to share in the estate of the testator, acquires an equit- able lien for his fees upon the fund so secured to his client, and is entitled to priority of payment over a judgment creditor of the latter whose lien attaches after the contract for such professional services was entered into.^^ § 201b. Defendant's attorney can have no lien on fund. — The lien being upon the judgment obtained by the attorney, it follows that the defendant's attorney can have no lien, un- less a judgment for costs or in set-of¥ is obtained,®^ There are, however, some decisions not consistent with this general proposition. Thus it has been held that the attorney of bondholders who has unsuccessfully resisted a suit by other bondholders to foreclose the mortgage security may be al- lowed a lien upon the dividends which would go to these bonds, and that purchasers of the bonds pendente lite took subject to such lien.®^ ton V. Hussey, 62 Maine 286; An- petition of these counsel for an drews v. Morse, 12 Conn. 444, 31 allowance out of the general fund Am. Dec. 752. in court was before me, I had no 94 Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 hesitation in dismissing it. The Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846, 51 labors of these counsel were ad- Am. St. 246. verse to the purposes of the suit, 95 Boyle V. Boyle, 106 N. Y. 654, and wholly obstructive. They 12 N. E. 709. were not directed to the benefit 96 Justice V. Justice, 115 Ind. 201, of the fund, and did not inure to 16 N. E. 615. its benefit. There was, in my 9" See post, § 230. opinion, no imaginable ground on 98 Mahone v. Southern Tel. Co., which a claim against the fund, 33 Fed. 702. Hughes, J., deliver- on their part, could be rested, and ing judgment said: "When the their petition was dismissed. The § 202 LIENS. 208 § 202. No lien where court is not court of record. — No lien exists upon a judgment rendered in a court not of record for services performed in such court in obtaining the judg- ment. In such courts there are no attorneys, in the sense in which the term is used in courts of record ; and it is said to be only in respect of the office of attorney or soHcitor that the lien exists. Besides, courts not of record possess only limited jurisdiction, and have no such equitable control over their judgments as will enable them to adjudicate upon and enforce liens thereon.^^ Therefore no lien exists for services rendered by an attorney in a justice's court, nor in a probate court ;^ nor was there such a lien for services rendered in the Surrogate's Court of New York, before that court was made by statute a court of record;- and whether there is since that statute seems to be a disputed question. question now is a different one. These petitioners rendered various services as counsel, under the di- rection and at the command of their immediate clients. They did their masters' bidding, at the re- quest and for the supposed inter- ests of their clients. How valua- ble or effectual their work was to the general fund, or even to their special clients, is not to the point in the present inquiry. They did work and labor for their own cli- ents at the special instance and request of those clients, and are entitled to a quantum meruit com- pensation from some source. Pri- marily, it should probably come from their clients personally; but these are residents of a distant state, and may not be solvent or accessible. Petitioners prefer to look to the fund, near at hand, in this court, which has accrued from the bonds of their clients which they proved in the cause, and upon which a dividend was decreed." A final judgment for alimony is subject to a lien of an attorney who has procured the judgment. Hubbard v. Ellithorpe, 135 Iowa 259, 112 N. W. 796. 124 Am. St. 271. 99 Flint v. Van Dusen, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 606; Fox v. Jackson, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 355; Read v. Jos- elyn, Sheld. (N. Y.) 60; Eisner v. Avery, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 466. See In re Halsey, 13 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 353. See. however, ante, § 201. 1 McCaa v. Grant, 43 Ala. 262. 2 Flint V. Van Dusen, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 606. Such a lien was said to exist in Eisner v. Avery, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 466. But in a later case it was held that § 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amend- ed in 1879, does not apply to sur- rogates' courts, because in these tribunals actions are unknown. The lien established under that 209 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 203 But the attorney's lien extends to an award of arbitrators.^* § 203. Settlement in fraud of attorneys. — A settlement made by the parties before judgment, in fraud of the at- torney's rights, and with the intention to cheat him out of his costs, would be set aside so as to allow the suit to proceed for the purpose of collecting his costs. ^ Slight circum- clause of the code is for services of the attorney in an action, and is confined to actions for the re- covery of money, or actions wherein a demand for money is asserted by way of counterclaim. The surrogates' courts have no jurisdiction to try and determine such a cause. Smith v. Central Trust Co.. 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 75. -^ Hutchinson v. Howard, IS Vt. 544. See ante, § 142. 3 Swain v. Senate, 2 Bos. & Pul. 99; Cole v. Bennett, 6 Price 15; Morse v. Cooke, 13 Price 473; Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. & E. 19. New York: Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 501; Tullis v. Bushnell. 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; Rasquin V. Knickerbocker Stage Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 324, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 293; Sweet v. Bartlett, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 661; Dimick v. Cooley, 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 141; Zogbaum v. Parker, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 341; Dietz v. McCallum, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 493; Keenan v. Dorflinger, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 153; Owen v. Mason, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 156; The Victory, 1 Blatchf. & H. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 16937, per Betts, J. Georgia: Mc^ Donald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89; Jones V. Morgan, 39 Ga. 310, 99 Am. Dec. 458. Kentucky: Hubble v. Dun- lap, 101 Ky. 419, 41 S. W. 432, de- cided under statute which did not forbid compromise. Vermont : 14 Hutchinson v. Pettes, 18 Vt. 614. Michigan: Parker v. Blighton, 32 Mich. 266. Alabama : Ex parte Leh- man, 59 Ala. 631 ; Jackson v. Clop- ton, 66 Ala. 29; Mosely v. Norman, 74 Ala. 422. In Coughlin v. New York Central & Hudson Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75, Earl, J., said: "There are many cases where this has been allowed to be done. It is impossi- ble to ascertain precisely when this practise commenced, nor how it originated, nor upon what prin- ciple it was based. It was not upon the principle of a lien, be- cause an attorney has no lien upon the cause of action, before judg- ment, for his costs; nor was it upon the principle that his serv- ices had produced the money paid his client upon the settlement, be- cause that could not be known, and in fact no money may have been paid upon the settlement. So far as I can perceive, it was based upon no principle. It was a mere arbitrary e.xercise of power by the courts; not arbitrary in the sense that it was unjust or improper, but in the sense that it was not based upon any right or principle recog- nized in other cases. The parties being in court, and a suit com- menced and pending, for the pur- pose of protecting attorneys who were their officers an^ subject to their control, the courts invented this practice and assumed this 203 LIENS. 2IO stances are often regarded as competent proof of collusion, — as that the party has a good cause of action for a larger sum than that received in settlement, and is irresponsible and un- able to satisfy his attorney's costs; or that there is an appear- ance of concealment in the settlement; and in some cases it seems to be held that a settlement or compromise of a good cause of action without the consent of the attorney is in- effectual to deprive the attorney of his lien, though there is no other evidence of any intention to deprive the attorney of his lien.^ But generally, suspicious circumstances alone are not enough to authorize the court to interfere for the attor- ney's protection. There must be something to show that the judgment debtor fraudulently colluded with the judgment creditor to defeat the attorney's lien.^ Fraud must not only be alleged, but proved.^ The mere fact that the parties to a suit make a settlement after verdict, but before entry of judgment and pending a stay of proceedings, is not conclusive that the parties acted extraordinary power to defeat at- tempts to cheat the attorneys out of their costs. The attorneys' fees were fixed and definite sums, easily determined by taxation, and this power was exercised to secure them their fees." Under the pres- ent code of New York, the attor- ney has complete protection from the beginning of the action. See ante, § 185. A clause prohibiting a settlement between parties with- out the consent of attorneys is void as opposed to public policy. Matter of Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) llOln, 123 Am. St. 533, and cases cited. In Georgia an attorney has a lien up- on a cause of action prosecuted by him but he must show a good cause of action in his client. Code 1911, § 3364; Atlanta R. Co. v. Owens, 119 Ga. 833, 47 S. E. 213. Where defendant agrees to allow judg- ment to be entered against him on assurance that he will not be forced to pay it, the attorney can not enforce the judgment to re- cover his lien. Hall v. Locker- man, 127 Ga. 537, 56 S. E. 759. 4Skaggs V. Hill, 12 Ky. L. 382, 14 S. W. 363. See, however, Rowe V. Fogle, 88 Ky. 105, 10 Ky. L. 689, 10 S. W. 426, 2 L. R. A. 708. 5 Francis v. Webb, 7 C. B. 731; Clark v. Smith, 6 M. & G. 1051; Nelson v. Wilson, 6 Bing. 568. 6 Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846, 51 Am. St. 246. "Characterizing a trans- action as fraudulent does not make it so in law unless it is so in fact." Per Fox, J. 211 attorney's special or charging lien. § 204 collusively to defraud the attorney of his rights. Something more must be shown.''^ Baron Parke on this spoint justly said:^ "It is quite competent to parties to settle actions be- hind the backs of the attorneys, for it is the client's action and not the attorney's. It must be shewn affirmatively that the settlement was effected with the view of cheating the at- torney of his costs." The burden of proving collusion or bad faith in the settlement rests with the attorney. Where a judgment is not vacated by an appeal, but is merely suspended, the lien attaching to it is also suspended, but upon affirmance of the judgment attaches again with full force. If the client compromises the judgment pending an appeal, the attorney may still enforce his lien.^ § 204. Collusion between debtor and creditor. Even after judgment, if the debtor acts in collusion with his credit- or and pays him, with the intention of cheating the attorney out of his lien, the debtor is not protected in making such payment, though he has received no actual notice of the lien.^° If notice of the attorney's lien has been given to the adverse party and the latter disregards the notice and pays the judgment, or compromises it with the client, such adverse party is liable to the attorney for the amount of his lien.^^ A settlement of a judgment in an action for damages for a 7 Wright V. Burroughes, 3 C. B. Y.) 324, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 293; 344; Francis v. Webb, 7 C. B. 731 Nelson v. Wilson, 6 Bing. 568 Jones V. Bonner, 2 Exch. 230 Jones V. Duff Grain Co., 69 Nebr. 91, 95 N. W. 1. ^1 New Jersey: Barnes v. Tay- Wade V. Orton, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. lor, 30 N. J. Eq. 467; Heister v. S.) (N. Y.) 444. Mount, 17 N. J. L. 438; Braden v. 8 Jordan v. Hunt, 3 Dowl. P. C. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518. In this 666. state the attorney's right of lien 9 Covington v. Bass, 88 Tenn. exists only where he has received 496, 12 S. W. 1033. the money upon the judgment, or 10 Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. has arrested it in transitu, or (Vt.) 162; Heister v. Mount, 17 where the defendant has paid the N. J. L. 438; Howard v. Osceola. money after receiving the notice 22 Wis. 453; Rasquin v. Knicker- of the attorney's claim. Braden bocker Stage Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. v. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518. § 204a LIENS. 212 personal injury, effected by the defendant's attorney with the plaintiff, a married woman, without notice to her counsel, may be set aside as fraudulent and not binding, even without placing it upon the ground that the plaintiff's attorney has a lien for his fees, and that the settlement was made in fraud of his rights. ^^ But even as regards a settlement before judgment without the attorney's consent, the courts so far take notice of and regard the equitable claim of the attorney to be paid for his services in the case, that, wherever the party is obliged to ask the aid of the court to enforce or carry into effect his settlement, the court will refuse its assistance if any want of good faith to the attorney be discovered in the transac- tion.^^ The fact that there was no consideration, or no adequate consideration, for the settlement and discharge of the suit is evidence of bad faith. ^^ § 204a. Waiver of attorney's lien. — The lien does not exist after the client has accepted satisfaction of his judgment, and it does not attach to property received in satisfaction of it. After an attorney had procured a judgment against a rail- road company, all its property and franchises were sold to satisfy various liens. The client and others became pur- chasers, the company was reorganized, and stock was issued to the purchasers, by mutual agreement among them, in pay- ment of their claims against the old company. Liens prior to the judgment procured by the attorney absorbed all the purchase price. It was held that the attorney had no lien, 12 Voell V. Kelly, 64 Wis. 504, payable in settlement, and if the 25 N. W. 536. defendant pays over the money 13 Young V. Dearborn, 27 N. H. regardless of the lien he becomes 324. liable. Fischer-Hansen v. Brook- i-iYoimg V. Dearborn, 27 N. H. lyn Heights R. Co., 173 N. Y. 492, 324. Under New York statutes 66 N. E. 395. reversing 63 App. an attorney's lien on a cause of Div. 356, 71 N. Y. S. 513. action attaches at once to a fund 213 attorney's special or charging lien. § 205 by virtue of the judgment, on the stock which was issued to his client. ^^ § 205. Court of admiralty. — A court of admiralty will not allow an out-door settlement of a suit by a seaman for wages, made without the concurrence of his proctor, to bar his claim for costs. Notwithstanding the settlement, the court will retain the suit and allow^ the proctor to proceed for costs. ^^ The court w'ill consider a settlement so made, unless explained, to have been made for the purpose of de- priving the proctor of his costs. Collusion to defeat the lien of an attorney is at law a ground for avoiding a settlement so far as the attorney is concerned. But a court of admiralty proceeds upon a broader principle in protecting the proctor. Costs are treated as his distinct and exclusive right, although nominally granted to the party. They are, moreover, granted or denied, according to the merits and equities of the party in relation to the subject-matter of the litigation. Accord- ingly, where a suit for wages had almost reached a hearing, and the proctor had incurred large expenses, when the libel- ant made a secret settlement and gave a release in full, and it appeared that he had a good cause of action for more than the amount paid in settlement, the court protected the proc- tor, and decreed the payment of costs to him, notwithstanding the settlement. ^'^ In suits for personal torts, settlements made by seamen in the absence of the proctor are allowed when deliberately 15 Morton v. Hallam, 89 Ky. 165, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 401, Fed. Cas. 11 Ky. L. 447, 12 S. W. 187; Whit- No. 12348; Collins v. Hathaway, tie V. Newman, 34 Ga. Zll . Ok. (U. S. Adm.) 176 Fed. Cas. No. 16 Brig Planet, 1 Sprague (U. 3014; Ship Cabot, Newb. (U. S. S.) 11, Fed. Cas. No. 11204; Col- Adm.) 348, Fed. Cas. No. 8759; lins V. Nickerson, 1 Sprague (U. Trask v. The Dido, 1 Haz. Pa. S.) 126, Fed. Cas. No. 3016; An- Reg. 9; Gaines v. Travis, Abb. (U. gell V. Bennett, 1 Sprague (U. S.) S. Adm.) 297. 85, Fed. Cas. 387; The Victory, 1 i7 The Victory, 1 Blatchf. & H. Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 443, Fed. Cas. (U. S.) 443, Fed. Cas. No. 16937. No. 16937; The Sarah Jane, 1 § 2o6 LIENS. 214 made for a consideration not shown to be inadequate, and the proctor is tendered his costs. The latter will not be al- lowed to proceed with the suit merely because he objects to the settlement. ^^ And even though the proctor is not pro- tected in the settlement, if this be made in good faith, and the situation of the respondent was such that there was more danger of undue influence upon him than upon the libelant, the proctor will not be allowed to proceed with the suit to recover his costs. ^^ In a suit for a tort the respondent is not bound to regard the costs of the libelant's proctor in the light of a lien on him or on any funds under his control, be- cause no costs could exist until damages had been decreed against the respondent, and because a recovery in such a suit does not conclusively carry costs as an incident in admiralty.^*^ § 206. Assignment of judgment. — Unless the cause of action be assignable in its nature, the client can not give his attorney any lien upon it which will prevent a settlement by the parties, even by agreement.^^ Although in such case 18 Brooks V. Snell, 1 Sprague the client, recited that the sum (U. S.) 48, Fed. Cas. No. 1961. agreed upon "should in some form 19 Purcell V. Lincoln, 1 Sprague be charged upon or paid out of (U. S.) 230, Fed. Cas. No. 11471; any sums to be recovered upon Peterson v. Watson, 1 Blatchf. & the Alabama claims." It was held H. (U. S.) 487, Fed. Cas. No. that there was no effective assign- 11037. ment to the attorney of any right 20 Peterson v. Watson, 1 in those claims, and that, even if Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 487, Fed. there were, the United States stat- Cas. No. 11037. i^te, Comp. Stats. 1901, § 3477, 21 Swanston v. Morning Star would render the assignment Mining Co., 13 Fed. 215, 4 Mc- void. New York: Coughlin v. Crary (U. S.) 241, 14 Rep. N. Y. Cent. & Hud. Riv. R. 321; Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846; New- Rep. 75, reversing 8 Hun (N. Y.) ell V. West, 149 Mass. 520, 21 N. 136; Eberhardt v. Schuster, 10 Abb. E. 954. An agreement between an N. C. (N. Y.) 374, note; McBrat- attorney at law and his client for ney v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 17 Hun the payment of a certain sum for (N. Y.) 385, affd. 87 N. Y. 467; the former's professional services Sullivan v. O'Keefe, 53 How. Pr. in prosecuting Alabama claims of (N. Y.) 426; Brooks v. Hanford, 215 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 20/ there be a definite agreement for a lien in which the amount of the fees is fixed, and the defendant is notified of this at the commencement of the action, the attorney can have no lien before judgment is rendered. A claim against a town for personal injuries caused by a defective sidewalk is not an assignable cause of action, and, therefore, an agreement by the plaintill to give his attorney for his fees half of the amount that he might recover in the action creates no lien upon the cause of action, and does not prevent the defendant from making a settlement with the plaintiff and paying him a sum of money for a release and discontinuance of the action against the attorney's protest. The attorney had no vested interest in the claim, and no lien even for his taxable costs.-^ Where, in an action to recover land which the plaintiff claimed was held under fraudulent sales and transfers, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with his attorney w'here- by he was to receive for his services a part of the property that might be recovered in the action, and, pending the liti- gation, the plaintiff settled with the defendant, it was held that the attorney, who had taken no steps to perfect a lien in accordance with the statute, could not intervene to con- tinue the suit by virtue of the contract.^^ § 207. Actions not assignable. — An action for slander or libel, or for assault and battery, is not assignable ; and the at- 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 342; Quincey torney in a divorce case where no V. Francis, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. lien is allowed on the amount re- Y.) 286; Pulver v. Harris, 52 N. covered as alimony. Jordan v. Y. 73, affirming 62 Barb. (N. Y.) Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N. 500; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. W. 826, 4 Am. St. 836; Lynde v. 96, affirming 9 J. & S. 432. Other- Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq. 736, 52 Atl. 694, wise by statute in New York since 58 L. R. A. 471, 97 Am. Rep. 692. 1879. See § 185. Wisconsin: 22 Kusterer v. Beaver Dam, 56 Voell V. Kelly, 64 Wis. 504, 25 N. Wis. 471, 14 N. W. 617, 43 Am. W. 536, per Cole, C. J.; Kusterer Rep. 725. V. Beaver Dam, 56 Wis. 471, 14 23 Lavender v. Atkins, 20 Nebr. N. W. 617, 43 Am. Rep. 725. There 206, 29 N. W. 467. may be a lien in favor of an at- § 208 LIENS. 2l6 torney can have no lien on the cause of action before judg- ment. Though the chent promised the attorney before the suit was begun that he should receive for his services the damages that might be recovered, the client may discontinue the suit at any time before judgment without the attorney's consent.-^ Even under the new Code of New York, the at- torney's lien does not attach so as to prevent a discontinu- ance of the action without costs when the plaintiff has for- given the defendant, and the parties want the further prose- cution of the action stopped.^'' Whenever the cause of action is for tort, and would not survive the death of either of the parties, the attorney is not entitled to a lien upon it.-*^ In like manner a cause of action for personal injuries, in- curred through the negligence of a person or corporation, is not assignable in its nature, and does not survive a settle- ment by the parties before judgment without consent of the attorney.^" § 208. Action founded on negotiable instrument. — AVhere, however, the action is founded upon a negotiable instrument, or a contract in writing, which is in the attorney's possession, his lien attaches to the contract before judgment, and his client can make no settlement or assig-nment of the action without discharging his attorney's fees.-^ The lien in such case attaches from the time the contract is delivered to the -•* Quincey v. Francis, 5 Abb. N. -'" Kusterer v. Beaver Dam, 56 C. (N. Y.) 286; Miller v. Newell, Wis. 471. 14 N. W. 617, 43 Am. 20 S. Car. 123, 47 Am. Rep. 833; Rep. 725. Cahill V. Cahill, 9 N. Y. Civ. Proc. ^s Coughlin v. N. Y. Cent. & R. 241; Hanna v. Island Coal Co., Hud. Riv. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 51 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E. 846, 51 Am. Rep. 75. per Earl, J.; Court- Am. St. 246. New York: Pulver ney v. McGavock, 23 Wis. 619; V. Harris, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 500, Kusterer v. Beaver Dam, 56 Wis. affirmed 52 N. Y. 73. 471. 14 N. W. 617, 43 Am. Rep. 725; 25 Cahill v. Cahill, 9 N. Y. Civ. Howard v. Osceola, 22 Wis. 453; Proc. R. 241. Dennett v. Cutts, 11 N. H. 163. 26 Abbot V. Abbott, 18 Nebr. 503. 26 N. W. 361. 21/ attorney's special or charging lien. § 208 attorney and he commences the action. In such case the lien attaches not only for his attorney's services rendered in that suit, but also for his general account for professional services rendered the client. The settlement or assignment is subject to the attorney's general lien.-'' In such case, also, the rule that a bona fide settlement, payment or assignment of the cause of action made before judgment, without notice of the attorney's lien, prevails against the lien, has no application; neither has the rule that the attorney's lien upon a judgment yields to the right of set-off of the opposite party.^'^ Under such circumstances an attorney may posecute an appeal even against his client's wishes or intervene and obtain a review in his own name."'"'' The attorney may be in effect an assignee of the judgment by virtue of the law that gives him a lien upon it, so that his lien will be effectual, though he does not hold the con- tracts upon which the judgment is based. Thus, in a suit against a corporation to enforce payment of debts, if the at- torney succeeds in bringing a fund under the control of the court for the common benefit of a class of creditors, he is entitled to reasonable costs and counsel fees out of the fund, both as regards the claim of the complainants who employed him, and as regards other creditors who come in and secure the benefit of the proceedings. If after decree and pending the proof of claims, the corporation buys up all the claims, the attorney's lien upon the fund is not defeated,"^ provided the law of the state where the suit was pending entitles the attorney to a lien upon the decree, in such manner that he is regarded as an assignee of the decree to the extent of his fees. 29 Schwartz v. Schwartz. 21 Hun 98 X. W. 414; Greek v. McDaiiiel, (N. Y.) 33. 68 Nebr. 569, 94 N. W. 518. 30 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 21 Hun 3i Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. (N. Y.) 33. S. 527, 26 L. ed. 1157; Central 30a Counsman v. Modern Wood- Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, men, 69 Nebr. 710, 96 N. W. 672, 113 U. S. 116, 28 L. ed. 915, 5 Sup. Ct. 387. ^ 209 LIENS. 218 The right of the attorney in such case is superior to any which the defendant corporation could acquire subsequent to the decree, by the purchase of the claims of the creditors. ^- § 209. Notice of attorney's lien. — Where the judgment is for damages as well as for costs, the attorney should give no- tice of his lien to the judgment debtor; otherwise he will not be protected against a settlement of the judgment with his client.^^ But the notice affords such protection, so that, if the debtor afterwards pays the judgment, he does so in his own wrong, for the attorney may proceed with the execution against the debtor, and enforce payment of it to the extent of his fees and disbursements."^ The circumstance that a 32 Central Railroad & Banking- Co. V. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116, 28 L. ed. 915, 5 Sup. Ct. 387. 33 Welsh V. Hole, 1 Doug. 238, per Lord Mansfield; Read v. Dup- per, 6 T. R.. 361; Mitchell v. Old- field, 4 T. R. 123. New York: Pul- ver V. Harris, 52 N. Y. 11; Mar- shall V. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Crotty v. MacKen- zie. 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 54, 42 N. Y. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 156; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 229; Bishop v. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 69; Lesher v. Roessner, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 217; Martin v. Hawks, 15 Johns. (N. /.) 405; St. John v. Diefen- dorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261; Carpenter v. Sixth Av. R. R. Co. 1 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 410; NicoU V. Nicoll, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 446; Pinder v. Morris, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 165, Colem. & C. Cas. 489; Power V. Kent, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 172; Ten Broeck v. De Witt, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 617; Pearl v. Robitchek, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 138. Georgia: Gray V. Lawson, 36 Ga. 629; Hawkins V. Loyless, 39 Ga. 5. Vermont : Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 162; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169, 5 Am. Rep. 267. Wisconsin : Courtney v. McGavock, 23 Wis. 619; Voell v. Kelly, 64 Wis. 504, 25 N. W. 536, per Cole, C. J. Other States : Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn. 444, 31 Am. Dec. 752 Barnes v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 467 Young V. Dearborn, 27 N. H. 324 Boston & Colorado Smelting Co. V. Bless, 8 Colo. 87, 5 Pac. 650. 34 Commercial Telegram Co. v. Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 10 N. Y. S. 433, 32 N. Y. St. 445, 19 Civ. Proc. R. 32; Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157, 19 N. E. 649; Randall v. Van Wagenen, 115 N. Y. 527, 22 N. E. 361, 12 Am. St. 828; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 98; In re Wolf, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 407, 4 N. Y. S. 239, 21 N. Y. St. 224. Where a wife, in an action for separation, pro- cures a decree for alimony, costs and attorney's fees, and the de- fendant, though verbally advised 219 ATTORNEYS SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 2IO dispute may exist concerning the amount of his compensa- tion or his right to remuneration will not defeat the pro- ceeding; for the court is empowered through the intervention of a reference to determine the validity of his claim, as well as of the objections which may be made against it by either of the parties to the judgment or others.^^ § 210. Statutory provisions as to notice of lien. — In sev- eral states there are statutory provisions in regard to giving notice of the lien. Thus in Georgia the lien continues if the attorney files a claim of lien upon the property recovered within thirty days after the recovery.^'''' In Indiana the at- torney has a lien on the judgment if he enters in writing upon the docket or records, at the time such judgment is rendered, his intention to claim' a lien. In Iowa and North and South Dakota the lien attaches during the pendency of the suit, if the attorney gives notice of his claim to the ad- verse party. It attaches from the time of such notice. After judgment the notice may be given by entry in the judgment docket. In Kansas, also, the lien exists from the time of giving notice of the lien to the adverse party.^"^"" In Minne- sota and Oregon the lien exists from the time of giving no- of a lien of plaintiff's attorneys on 979, 19 Civ. Proc. R. 28; Lachen- the judgment, secretly procures meyer v. Lachenmeyer, 65 How. plaintiff to execute a satisfaction Pr. (N. Y.) 422. New Jersey: of the decree, the satisfaction will Braden v. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518. be set aside for the protection of 35 Commercial Telegram Co. v. plaintiff's attorneys, even after the Smith, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 10 N. death of plaintiff. The conduct Y. S. 433, 32 N. Y. St. 445, 19 Civ. of the defendant in obtaining the Proc. Zl. satisfaction piece had the effect of '^^^ It is not necessary to file substituting the attorneys of the notice except as against third plaintiff, the plaintiffs herein, thus persons. Coleman v. Austin, 99 to enable them to carry on the case Ga. 629, 27 S. E. 763. by the appropriate remedies until asb^ notice served upon the at- their lien is paid, or the modes of torney of the adverse party is suf- procedure for collection exhausted. ficient notice. Noftzger v. Mof- Branth v. Branth, 57 Hun (N. Y.) fett, 63 Kans. 354, 65 Pac. 670. 592, 10 N. Y. S. 638, 32 N. Y. St. §211 LIENS. 220 tice of the lien to the adverse party. After judgment the Hen exists in Minnesota from the time of giving notice to the judgment debtor; and in Oregon from the time of fihng no- tice with the clerk where the judgment is entered. In ]\Ion- tana the lien attaches from the commencement of the suit; but after judgment, notice must be filed within three days in the office of the clerk in which the judgment is obtained. In Nebraska and Wyoming, if any lien exists, it is from the time of filing notice of it with the adverse party. In New York, under the present code, the lien exists from the commencement of the suit, and no notice of the lien need be given. ^*' But notice of the lien is necessary where no lien is expressly given by statute.^'^ In Tennessee, also, the lien dates from the commencement of the suit, the pending of which is of itself notice of the lien. Where by statute the lien exists from the time of giving notice of it, the parties, acting in good faith, may make a valid settlement at any rime before the notice is given, in the manner prescribed.''' §211. Notice to adverse party. — The notice should be given to the adverse ]iarty personally, and not to his attor- ney. It would be inequitable to require a party to pay a judg- ment, or any part of it, a second time, when it appears that he has never received notice of any lien upon it, though such notice may have been given to his attorney."^'* But notice to the attorney of record, or to the attorney in 36 Coster V. Greenpoint Ferry See. however, Jenkins v. Adams, Co., 5 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 146; 22 Hun (N. Y.) 600. Dimick v. Cooley, 3 Civ. Proc. R. 37 Lablache v. Kirkpatrick, 8 Civ. (N. Y.) 141; Kehoe v. Miller, 10 Proc. R. (N. Y.) 256. Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 393; Tullis v. 38 Casar v. Sargeant. 7 Iowa 317; Bushnell, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 217, 65 Hawkins v. Loyless, 39 Ga. 5; How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465; Albert Green v. Southern Express Co. 39 Palmer Co. v. Van-Orden, 64 How. Ga. 20. Pr. (N. Y.) 79, 4 Civ. Proc. R. 44. 39 Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 62. 221 attorney's special OR CHARGING LIEN. § 212 fact, may often be sufficient. ^^ Where, however one mem- ber of a law firm in a particular matter is individnally the at- torney of the party, and the other members have nothing to do with the case, a notice of an attorney's lien served upon either of the other members of the firm is not notice to the attorney actually engag'ed in the case, so as to bind him or his client. ^^ The placing of a paper upon the files of the court in which the judgment was rendered is not notice to the judgment debtor, in the absence of a statute making it so. If, without knowledge of such paper or other notice of the attorney's lien upon the judgment the debtor makes a bona fide settle- ment of the judgment with the creditor, by payment or other- wise, the attorney can not look to the debtor for his unpaid fees.« § 212. Actual notice not necessary. — But actual notice of the attorney's claim to a lien is not in all cases necessary for the protection of his rights. If the judgment debtor acts in the face of circumstances which are sufficient to put him upon inquiry, he acts contrary to good faith, and at his peril; and a discharge of the judgment under such circumstances is, as to the attorney, void in the same manner as it would be after an actual notice of his claim to a lien.^" But the mere fact that the attorney appears in a cause is not sufficient notice of his lien.^^ 40 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Thach- H. 324; Sexton v. Pike, 13 Ark. er, 17 Kans. 92. 193. Vermont: Weed Sewing 41 St. Louis & San Francisco R. Mach. Co. v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, Co. V. Bennett, 35 Kans. 395, 11 48 Am. Rep. 821; Lake v. Ingham, Pac. 155. 3 Vt. 158; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. ■1^ Boston & Colo. Smelting Co. 169, 5 Am. Rep. 267, per Wilson, J. V. Pless, 8 Colo. 87, 5 Pac. 650; New York: Wilkins v. Batterman, Wright V. Wright. 70 N. Y. 96, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; Martin v. 7 Daly (N. Y.) 62. Hawks, IS Johns. (N. Y.) 405; Ten 4;:Abel v. Potts. 3 Esp. 242; Cur- Broeck v. De Witt. 10 Wend. (N. rier v. Boston & M. R. Co. 37 N. Y.) 617. H. 223; Young v. Dearborn. 27 N. -»4 Gray v. Lawson, 36 Ga. 629. 213 LIENS. 222 AVhere a judgment debtor settled a judgment by offsetting claims against his creditor and agreeing to pay the costs of the plaintiff's attorney, it was held that the terms of the agreement imparted to the debtor notice of the attorney's lien and of the amount of it.*^ § 213. Lien on damages recovered. — An attorney has no lien upon the damages recovered in a suit before the money comes into his hands, although his demands against his client equal or exceed the amount of judgment. He has a lien for his costs out of a judgment for damages and costs; but he may lose this if he does not give notice to the judg- ment debtor before the latter discharges the judgment by payment to the plaintiff.^^ § 214. Judgment for costs only. — When the judgment is for costs only, this is of itself a legal notice of the lien, which can be discharged only by payment to the attorney.^^ The judgment debtor pays such a judgment to the creditor at his 45 Hall V. Ayer, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 220, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 91. 46 St. John V. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261. 47 New York: Marshal v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Mc- Gregor V. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 237; Wilkins v. Batterman, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; Haight v. Holcomb, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 213, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 173; Lesher v. Roessner, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 217; Naylor v. Lane, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 149, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 400; Martin v. Hawks, 15 Johns. (X. Y.) 405; Kipp v. Rapp, 7 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 385; Ennis V. Currie, 2 Month. L. Bui. 66. Maine: Hobson v. Watson, 34 Maine 20, 56 Am. Dec. 632; New- bert V. Cunningham, 50 Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612; McKenzie v. Wardwell, 61 Maine 136; Strat- ton V. Hussey, 62 Maine 286. There are a few decisions that are inconsistent with the view that a judgment for costs only be- longs absolutely to the attorney. Thus in People v. Hardenbergh, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 335, it was held that such a judgment might be settled between the parties, if the debtor acts in good faith and with- out notice from the judgment creditor's attorney of his claim of a lien. And in the recent case of Horton v. Champlin, 12 R. I. 550, 34 Am. Rep. 722, it was held that an attorney who had obtained a judgment for his client for costs only had no authority to bring a suit on the judgment without his client's consent and direction. 223 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 215 peril. His pa3^ment is equivalent to paying the assignor a debt which has been assigned after notice of the assignment. Where a judgment was recovered for six cents damage and costs, and the plaintiff's attorney gave notice of his lien, and the sherifr to whom the execution was committed ar- rested the defendant, and afterwards voluntarily permitted his escape, the attorney was allowed to sue the sheriff in the name of his client; and the sheriff was not allowed to avail himself of a release afterwards obtained from the client, for this was a fraud upon the attorney.^^ § 215. Rule in court of the King's Bench. — The rule in the court of the King's Bench was that no set-off should be allowed to the prejudice of the attorney's lien for his costs. '^^ The courts of Common Pleas, however, did not follow the King's Bench in this practice, but allowed a set-off in all such cases, upon the ground that the lien of the attorney was subject to, and must give way to, the equitable rights of the parties. '^^ The two courts thus stood in conflict until the 4S Martin v. Hawks, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 405. 49 Mitchell V. Oldfield, 4 T. R. 123 (1791); Randle v. Fuller, 6 T. R. 456; Smith v. Brocklesby, 1 Anstr. 61; Middleton v. Hill, 1 M. & S. 240; Stephens v. Weston, 3 B. & C. 535; Holroyd v. Breare, 4 B. 6 Aid. 43, 700; Simpson v. Lamb, 7 E. & B. 84. soSchooIe V. Noble, 1 H. Bl. 23; Vaughn v. Davies, 2 H. Bl. 440; George v. Elston, 1 Scott, 518; Emden v. Darley, 4 B. & P. 22. In Hall V. Ody, 2 B. & P. 28, be- fore the Common Pleas of Eng- land, in which the lien was de- clared to be subject to set-off. Lord Eldon, then recently appointed chief justice of that court, ex- pressed his surprise that by the settled practice of that court the attorney by whose diligence the fund had been recovered was not entitled to take his costs out of it. in preference to the right of the opposite party to the set-off; and emphatically declared that it was in direct contradiction to the practice of every other court, as well as to the principles of jus- tice; and he acquiesced in the de- cision in that case only because the attorney who claimed the lien had acted with the knowledge of the settled practices of that court, and therefore had no right to claim the advantages of a more just principle. § 2l6 LIENS. 224 adoption of the new rules in ISSS,'^^ when the rule of the King's Bench was made applicable to all the courts. Now, however, under the Judicature Acts of 1873, it seems that the equitable rule prevails. ^- § 216. Rule in equity. — In equity it seems to have been long established that a solicitor's lien is not to interfere with the equities between the parties. In a case before Lord Langdale, M. R., in 1838,'^'" it was held that a solicitor's lien upon a balance due to his client could not extend beyond the amount of the true balance as ultimately ascertained, and that the court would not allow the lien to interfere with the equities between the parties. As before remarked, the rule in equity seems now to have become the rule of all the courts since the Judicature Act.^^ But even in equity a judgment for costs alone is not sub- ject to set-ofF by another judgment for costs in a dififerent matter so as to interfere with the attorney's lien for his costs. ""^ Thus, if a plaintiff in an action obtains a judgment for costs against the defendant, and in a different matter he becomes liable to pay costs to the defendant, neither the plaintiff* nor the defendant can have the costs set off to the detriment of the attorney having a lien for his costs. But if the judgments for costs have been rendered in the same matter, Ihey may be set off'. The principle is declared to be that, where a solicitor is employed in a suit or action, he must be considered as having adopted the proceeding from the beginning to the end, and acted for better or worse. His •''1 General Rules of Hilary Term, B. 499; Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. 1853, Rule 63. & E. 19. -•- See ante, § 24. 55 Robarts v. Buee, L. R. 8 Ch. ■">3 Bawtree v. Watson, 2 Keen Div. 198; Cattell v. Simons, 6 713. See, also, Cattell v. Simons, Beav. 304; Collett v. Preston, IS 6 Beav. 304; Verity v. Wylde, 4 Beav. 458. Explained, however, in Drew. 427; Robarts v. Buee, L. R. Robarts v. Buee, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 8 Ch. Div. 198. 198. ^■i Mercer v. Graves. L. R. 7 Q. 225 ATTORNEY'S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 217 client may obtain costs in some matters in the suit or action and not in others, and the solicitor takes his chance and may ultimately enforce his lien for any balance which may appear to be in favor of his client.^^ § 217. Rule in the United States. — In this country the rule of the court of Common Pleas in England has been followed in the greater number of states. The lien of an attorney upon a judgment is upon the interest of his client in the judgment, and is subject to an existing right of set- off in the other party to the suit.'^^ In other words, an attor- ns Robarts V. Buee, L. R. 8 Cli. Div. 198, per Hall, V. C •^" National Bank v. Eyre, 3 Mc- Crary (U. S.) 175, 8 Fed. 732, ; Shirts V. Irons, 54 Ind. 13; Renick v. Lud- ington, 16 W. Va. 378. Connecti- cut: Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168; Rumrill v. Huntington, 5 Day (Conn.) 163; Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn. 444, 31 Am. Dec. 752; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 17 Conn. 110. Georgia: Smith v. Evans, 110 Ga. 536, 35 S. E. 633; Langston v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406. Kansas : Turner V. Crawford, 14 Kans. 499, over- ruling Leavenson v. Lafontaine, 3 Kans. 523. New York: Mohawk Bank v. Burrows, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 317; Porter v. Lane, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 357; Nicoll v. Nicoll, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 446; People V. New York Com. Pleas, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 649, 28 Am. Dec. 495; Cragin v. Travis, 1 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 157; Noxon v. Gregory, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339; Brooks v. Hanford, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 342; Hayden v. McDermott, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 14; Martin v. Kanouse, 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 146, 9 Abb. Pr. 370; Davidson v. Alfaro, 16 Hun 15 (N. Y.) 353, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 481; Sanders v. Gilette, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 183. The practice in New York has been to allow the set-off since Porter v. Lane, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 357, was decided in 1811. In some earlier cases, as in Devoy v. Boyer, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 247, and Cole v. Grant, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 105, Colem. & C. Cas. 368, the lien of the attorney for his costs was not allowed to be affected by the set- off. In equity the doctrine of these cases was followed at a later day in Dunkin v. VanDenbergh, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 622, and Gridley v. Garrison, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 647. A set-off as against the attorney's lien for costs was refused in Smith V. Lowden, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 696; Gihon v. Fryatt, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 638, 3 Code Rep. 204; Purchase V. Bellows, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 105 22 N. Y. Super. Ct. 642. Since the passage of the act of 1879, § 66, no set-off is allowed as against the at- torney's lien. Naylor v. Lane, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 400, 18 J. & S. (N. Y.) 97, 5 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 149; Ennis v. Curry, 22 Hun (N. Y.) 584, reversing 61 How. Pr. (N. § 2l8 LIENS. 226 ney can have a lien for an amount no greater than what is actually found to be owing by the opposite party to his client. It is subject to the equitable claims of the parties in the cause, as well as to the rights of third parties, which can not be varied or affected by it. § 218. Judgment as set-off. — When a defendant has a right by statute to set ofT a judgment in his favor against a judg- ment against him, the court, in order to protect the attor- ney's costs, will not interfere. ^^ An attorney's lien upon a payment is not equivalent to an equitable assignment to him of the judgment debt,^^ or to an equitable interest in the Y.) 1 ; Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pen- cil Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 66. See § 185. Iowa: Hurst v. Sheets, 21 Iowa 501 ; Tiffany v. Stewart, 60 Iowa 207, 14 N. W. 241; Watson v. Smith. 63 Iowa 228, 18 N. W. 916. Alabama: Mosely V. Norman, 74 Ala. 422; Ex parte Lehman, 59 Ala. 631. The statute gives a legal right to set off one judgment against another. Civil Code, 1907, § 5861. South Dakota: Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. Dak. 178, 52 N. W. 581. See § 189b. Texas: Wright v. Treadwell, 14 Tex. 255; Fitzhugh v. McKinney, 43 Fed. 461. Maryland: Levy v. Steinbach, 43 Md. 212; Marshall v. Cooper, 43 Md. 46. Minnesota: Morton v. Urquhart, 79 Minn. 390, 82 N. W. 653. Nebraska: Field v. Maxwell, 44 Nebr. 900, 63 N. W. 62. Ver- mont: McDonald v. Smith, 57 Vt. 502; Walker v. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247; Hooper v. Welch, 43 Vt. 169, 5 Am. Rep. 267, per Wilson, J.; Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 58 Vt. 359, 3 Atl. 500. Wisconsin: Bos- worth v. Tallman, 66 Wis. 533, 29 N. W. 542; Yorton v. Milwaukee R. Co., 62 Wis. 367, 21 N. W. 516, 23 N. W. 401; Gano v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 60 Wis. 12, 17 N. W. 15. 58 Mercer v. Graves, L. R. 7 Q B. 499; Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. & E. 19; Ex parte Lehman, 59 Ala. 631; Mosely v. Norman, 74 Ala. 422, Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 58 Vt. 359. 3 Atl. 500; McDonald v. Smith, 57 Vt. 502. See Walker v. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247. Royce, J., said: "We recognize nothing in this particular species of lien which ought, in a case like this, to be interposed against a salutary pro- vision of statute law. We think it clear that the lien here asserted should be held subordinate to the defendant's right of set-off." In Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 58 Vt. 359, 3 Atl. 500, Ross, J., referring to that decision, said: "The principles then announced have remained the unquestioned law of the subject from the time of its rendition in 1842 to the present time." 59 Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 E. & E. 19, per Campbell, C. J., Erie and Crompton, JJ. 227 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. 220 proceeds of the judgment. The protection the courts afford to the attorney stops very far short of putting him in the position of cestui que trust to his client, so as to compel the client to act as his trustee in collecting the judgment.^*^ The attorney can not maintain a bill in equity in such a case against a judgment debtor to restrain him from exercising his own legal rights under a statute allowing a set-off.^^ § 219. When set-off good against the attorney's lien. — • But when the set-ofT is one which would have been a good defense to the action where the judgment was recovered, the judgment debtor has a right of set-off against the attorney's lien.62 It is clear that a set-ofT acquired after the judgment should not be allowed to prevail against the attorney's lien.^^ § 220. Rule in some of the states. — In other states, how- ever, the rule of the King's Bench is followed,®^ and it is held 60 Mercer v. Graves, L. R. 7 Q. B. 499, per Blackburn, J. 61 Mercer v. Graves, L. R. 7 Q. B. 499, per Lush, J. 62 Robertson v. Shutt, 9 Bush (Ky.) 659; Calvert v. Coxe, 1 Gill (Md.) 95; Carter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214. In Nicoll v. Nicoll, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 446, Justice Cowen said that no authority could be produced where the attorney's lien Mi^as ever recognized on a trial at law as barring a set-off, the right to which would otherwise be perfect. 63 Bradt v. Koon, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 416; Warfield v. Campbell, 38 Ala. 527, 82 Am. Dec. 724; Rumrill v. Huntington, 5 Day (Conn.) 163; Ward v. Watson, 27 Nebr. 768, 44 N. W. 27. 6-1 New Hampshire: Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. H. 347; Currier v. Boston & Maine R. R. 37 N. H. 223. Maine: Stratton v. Hussey, 62 Maine 286; Hooper v. Brund- age, 22 Maine 460; Howe v. Klein, 89 Maine 376, 36 Atl. 620. New York: Since the act of 1879, § 66. See § 185; Turno v. Parks, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 35; Naylor V. Lane, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 149, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 400, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 91; Davidson v. Alfaro, 80 N. Y. 660; In re Bailey, 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 140, 66 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 64; Contra, Sanders v. Gillett, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 183; Garner v. Gladwin, 12 Weekly Dig. 9, criticised in Turno v. Parks, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 35. An attorney has a lien on motion costs in favor of his client which attaches the instant the costs are due. Costs arising upon an appeal from an order are motion costs. § 220 LIENS. 228 that an attorney's lien upon a judgment for his costs is not subject to a right of set-off in the adverse party; and when by statute he is given a right of lien for his fees, the same rule applies. His lien for costs is paramount to the right of the debtor to set off a judgment he holds against the judg- ment creditor. So strong is the equity of the attorney to claim and maintain his lien that even a statute which requires the officer to set off executions held by the parties against each other is construed as containing an implied condition that this should not be done in derogation of the attorney's right to claim the judgment as his own, by way of a lien upon it, to the extent of his costs. The right to set oft' one judgment against another, in the absence of a statutory provision, is one of equitable discre- tion, and will not be allowed where the just rights of another party, such as an assignee, would be disturbed; and the court will not allow such a set-off to the deteriment of the claim of an attorney for his fees in obtaining a judgment where it appears to be right that his claim should be respected.^^ In Maine^^ and Michigan'''^ it is provided by statute that executions shall not be set off against each other as to so much of the executions as is due to the attorney in the suit for his fees and disbursements therein. Such costs are the property of the Johnson v. Ballard, 44 Ind. 270. attorney, and are not subject to Other States: Dunklee v. Locke, any offset in favor of the plain- 13 Mass. 525; Boyer v. Clark, 3 tiff. Place V. Hayward, 3 How. Nebr. 161 ; Robertson v. Shutt, 9 Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 59, 8 N. Y. Civ. Bush (Ky.) 659; Carter v. Davis, Proc. R. 352. And see Tunstall v. 8 Fla. 183. Winton, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 219, af- 65 Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. firmed 9 N. Y. 660; Marshall v. 473. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. ec Rev. Stat. 1903, ch. 86, § 28. 572; In re Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; C7 Comp. Laws 1897, § 10348; Turno v. Parks, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) and see Wells v. Elsam, 40 Mich. (N. Y.) 35. Indiana: Puett v. 218; Kinney v. Robison, 52 Mich. Beard, 86 Ind. 172, 44 Am. Rep. 389, 18 N. W. 120. 280; Adams v. Lee, 82 Ind. 587; 229 attorney's special or charging lien. § 222 § 221. Delay in objecting to set-off. — When a set-off has been allowed by order of court, the attorney can not after de- lay interfere at a subsequent term of court. Thus, where judgments in two actions betw^een the same parties were by order of court set off against each other, the court refused, at a subsequent term and after the lapse of two years, to rescind the order upon the motion of the attorney of one of the parties, upon the ground that his lien was affected by it, for it was then too late; though the court could not have made the order had the objection been interposed at the time.*'^ § 222. Assignment of judgment. — But an assignment of a judgment by the judgment creditor to his attorney, in pay- ment or security for his fees in the suit, is effectual to prevent a set-off against such judgment of another judgment pre- viously recovered by the judgment debtor against the judg- ment creditor.^^ If an attorney undertakes the defense of a suit for an insolvent client in consideration that the costs that might be recovered should belong to him, and he re- covers a judgment for costs and assigns this to the attorney, a judgment against the defendant can not be set off against such judgment for costs. The attorney's claim in such case is not one of lien, but of ownership.'''^ If the assignment be made before the right of set-off attaches, the assignment of course prevails. ''^^ If the assignment be made after a right of 68 Holt V. Quimby, 6 N. H. 79. Dec. 527; Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 69 Benjamin v. Benjamin, 17 58 Vt. 359, 3 Atl. 500. Conn. 110; Rumrill v. Huntington, "o Ely v. Cook, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. 5 Day (Conn.) 163; Rice v. Garn- Y.) 336, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 406, modi- hart, 35 Wis. 282. Otherwise in fied 28 N. Y. 365; Perry v. Chester, Iowa and Vermont, where it is 53 N. Y. 240; Naylor v. Lane, 5 held that the judgment in such Civ. Proc. R. 149, 66 How. Pr. (N. case passes subject to the equities Y.) 400, 1'8 J. & S. (N. Y.) 97; New- against it in the hands of the as- berg v. Schwab, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 19, signor. Tiffany v. Stewart, 60 17 J. & S. 232. Iowa 207, 14 N. W. 241; Ballinger 7i Firnienich v. Bovee, 1 Hun V. Tarbell. 16 Iowa 491, 85 Am. (N. Y.) 532, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 98. § 223 LIENS. 230 set-off given by statute has accrued, then the statutory right of set-off is paramount to the attorney's right under the as- signmentJ^ The assignee, however, should give notice to the judg- ment debtor of the assignment, for otherwise the latter may make a settlement with the judgment creditor which will discharge the judgment and destroy the lien under the as- signmentJ^ An attorney's lien is merged in an assignment to him as security for his costs, and his only title or claim to the judg- ment after that arises from his title as owner.'^^ § 223. Equitable assignment of the judgment. — An agree- ment between an attorney and his client that the attorney shall have a lien for his services to a certain amount upon a judgment to be recovered, constitutes a valid equitable as- signment of the judgment pro tanto which attaches to the judgment as soon as entered.'^ Such an agreement is within the principle that an agreement between a debtor and credi- tor that the creditor shall have a claim upon a specific fund for payment of his debt is a binding equitable assignment of the fund pro tanto. This is a settled rule in equity. Some- times it has been objected that if such an assignment em- braces only a part of the fund, it is not obligatory on the "2 Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 58 365, 2 Abb. Dec. 14; Williams Vt. 359, 3 Atl. 500. v. Ingersoll, 89 (N. Y. 508; '3 Boston & Colorado Smelting Weeks v. Wayne Circuit Judges, Co. V. Pless, 8 Colo. 87, 5 Pac. 650; 73 Mich. 256, 41 N. W. 269; Pot- Stoddard v. Benton, 6 Colo. 508; ter v. Hunt, 68 Mich. 242, 36 N. Bishop V. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. W. 58; Wells v. Elsam, 40 Mich. S.) (N. Y.) 69. 218. An assignment by a judg- '4 Bishop V. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. ment creditor and an entry of (N. S.) (N. Y.) 69; Dodd v. Brott, satisfaction by the assignee will 1 Gil. (Minn.) 205, 66 Am. Dec. 541. not defeat an attorney's lien on 7^5 Terney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. L. the judgment. Peterson v. Struly, 282; Middlesex v. State Bank, 25 Ind. App. 19, 56 N. E. 733, 57 38 N. J. Eq. 36, 19 Cent. L. N. E. 599. J. 393; Ely v. Cook, 28 N. Y. 231 attorney's special or charging lien. § 225 debtor without his assent, because his single obligation can not be split up into several without his consent. This objec- tion prevails only at law, but does not affect the remedy in equity.'^ '^ The equity of the attorney under such an agreement is superior to the claim of the judgment debtor to set off against the judgment a judgment against the plaintiff, which the debtor had purchased after the entry of the judgment against himself, and before he had notice of the assignment. Failure to give notice of the assignment does not subject the assignee to merely equitable claims of the debtor, which do not attach to the debt itself and which accrue to him after the assignment. A claim of set-off against a judgment aris- ing from a subsequent purchase of a judgment against the judgment creditor is not a set-off which attaches to the debt. A prior assignment, whether legal or equitable, of the judg- ment, prevents the right of set-off from attaching. The as- signee's equity, being prior in time, is superior.'^" § 224. Lien by agreement. — Where a client agrees that his attorney shall have a paramount lien upon the claim in suit for his fees, charges and disbursements, and to secure this agreement executes a power of attorney to a third per- son giving him the control of the suit, such power of attor- ney with the agreement operates to vest in the attorney an interest in the claim, of which he can not be divested by the client of his own motion without satisfying his part of the agreement. It is the duty and practice of courts to protect attorneys in rights so acquired against the hostile acts of those from whom they are acquired. '^^ § 225. Lien created by parol. — A lien upon a chose in ac- tion may be created by parol. Thus, an oral agreement by a "« See §§ 43-62. 416; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 77 Terney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. L. 96, affirming 9 J. & S. (N. Y.) 432. 282; Bradt v. Koon, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 78 Stewart v. Hilton, 7 Fed. 562, 19 Blatchf. (U. S.) 290. § 226 LIENS. 232 client with his attorney that the latter should have a lien for all sums that the client might become entitled to from any of the suits or proceedings conducted by the attorney, which lien should be superior to any right the client might have, was held to operate as an equitable lien upon an award to the client as damages for a malicious prosecution."^ § 226. Attorney's lien assignable. — The lien of an attor- ney for his fees is, like any chose in action, assignable. It is incident to the judgment to which it is attached, and is neces- sarily as much assignable as is the judgment to which it is incident.^^ An attorney's lien is superior to the rights of a third per- son who is assignee of the judgment,*^ for the assignee has no greater equities than the assignor had; and though the assignee had no notice of the lien, this may be enforced as against him. § 227. Attorney's lien superior to lien of attachment. — An attorney's lien on a judgment is superior to the lien of a subsequent attaching or execution creditor.*- It is imma- terial whether the client be the plaintiff or defendant in the suit. In equity, especially, the position of the party is of no consequence, because a nominal defendant may be adjudged entitled to the whole or a part of the funds in controversy. In "9 Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. 82 Ex parte Moule, 5 Madd. 462; Y. 508; Middlesex Freeholders v. Damroii v. Robertson, 12 Lea State Bank, 38 N. J. Eq. 36, 19 (Tenn.) 372; Miller v. Newell, 20 Cent. L. J. 393. S. Car. 123, 47 Am. Rep. 833; 80 Day V. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, Hutchinson v. Howard, IS Vt. 544; 10 N. E. 126; Sibley v. Pine Coun- Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bou- ty, 31 Minn. 201, 17 N. W. 337. telle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. 821; 81 Cunningham v. McGrady, 2 Henry v. Traynor, 42 Minn. 234, Baxt. (Tenn.) 141; Longworth v. 44 N. W. 11; Justice v. Justice, Handy, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 75, 13 Ohio 115 Ind. 201, 16 N. E. 615; Hargett Dec. 47; Sexton v. Pike, 13 Ark. v. McCadden, 107 Ga. 773, 33 S. E. 193; Tyler v. Slemp, 124 Ky. 209, 666. 28 Ky. L. 959, 90 S. W. 1041. 233 attorney's special or charging lien. § 228 equity, also, an attorney may have a lien before judgment by virtue of a special agreement that he shall be compensated out of the fund recovered; and such lien prevails against an attaching creditor of the client. ^^ It matters not that such agreement is by parol and not in writing; and it is not need- ful, in order to make such lien valid, that notice of it should be given to the debtors. ^^ § 228. Not defeated by bankruptcy. — An attorney's lien is not defeated by the insolvency or bankruptcy of the client, or by his general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, pending the action, if judgment is finally entered in his favor.^^ The assignee in insolvency or bankruptcy stands in the debtor's place, and takes the estate burdened by the equitable incumbrance of the lien.^^ Thus, where a rail- road company, pending an action against it, became insolvent and a receiver was appointed, and a judgment for costs was afterwards entered in its favor, it was held that the receiver had no title to such costs; and the other party to the action, having paid the judgment to the receiver with notice of the lien, was not protected from an execution issued to the at- torney on such judgment.*" But as against the judgment debtor, if he obtains a dis- 8-5 Williams v. Jngersoll, 23 Hun ment of the debt, and the creditor (N. Y.) 284, affd. 89 N. Y. 508. admitted for the residue, if any; 84 Williams v. Ingersoll, 23 Hun or the creditor may retain the (N. Y.) 284, aflFd. 89 N. Y. 508. property, if the assignee does not 85 Cooke V. Thresher, 51 Conn. require it to be sold as provided, 105. and enforce his lien. Rogers v. 86 There are two ways of pro- Heath, 62 Vt. 101, 18 Atl. 1043, per ceeding when one has a lien on Rowell, J. property for securing the payment 8" In re Bailey, 66 How. Pr. (N. of a debt against an insolvent Y.) 64, 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 140, debtor. If the assignee or the affd. 31 Hun (N. Y.) 608, 5 Civ. creditor requires it, the property Proc. 253; Russell v. Somerville, 10 is sold under an order of the Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 395; Clark v. court of insolvency, the net pro- Binninger, 1 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) ceeds applied toward the pay- 421. § 228 LIENS. 234 charge in bankruptcy or insolvency after the rendition of the judgment, the attorney's lien upon the judgment is dis- charged with the judgment, like any other debt of the bank- rupt.*^ If a receiver of the client's property is appointed, and a judgment upon which an attorney has a lien passes into his hands, the attorney can obtain full protection in all proceed- ings taken by the receiver upon such judgment, and may, if need be, apply to the court for relief out of the assets or funds collected by the receiver. ^^ The receiver acquires no other or better title than the as- signor had, but takes the property subject to the liens af- fecting it. If an attorney takes from his client collateral security for professional services, and upon demand of a receiver of his client's property delivers the security to the receiver with a written notice of his lien thereon and takes a receipt therefor, he does not thereby waive his lien.^^ The receiver of a corporation appointed pending an action against it, who collects costs arising from a successful de- fense, may be required to pay them over to the attorney who conducted the defense.^^ In equity an attorney has a lien for his fees and disburse- ments upon a fund in court recovered by his services.^^ This lien can not be defeated by the insolvency of the client, or by his assignment of the fund. His assignee in bankruptcy or his assignee by purchase takes the fund subject to the at- torney's lien with which it was affected as against the client, 88 Blumenthal v. Anderson, 91 firming 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 140, N. Y. 171. 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 64. 80 Moore v. Taylor, 40 Hun (N. 92 Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. Y.) 56. 720; Ex parte Price, 2 Ves. 90 Corey v. Harte. 21 Weekly 407; Skinner v. Sweet, 3 Madd. Dig. 247. 244; Lann v. Church, 4 Madd. 391; 91 In re Bailey, 31 Hun (N. Y.) Ex parte Moule, 5 Madd. 462; 608. 5 X. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 253, af- Jones v. Frost, L. R. 7 Ch. App. m. See ante, § 201a. 235 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 229 But a court of equity, before awarding any part of the fund in satisfaction of the attorney's lien, will inquire if the fee is reasonable. ^^ § 229. Attorney's lien on lands. — An attorney has no lien on his client's lands for services rendered in defending them against an effort to charge them with the payment of the debt of another;^* nor for services in prosecuting a suit in equity to establish the title of his client to the lands.®^ To 93 McCain v. Portis, 42 Ark. 402. ••>4Shaw V. Neale, 6 H. L. Cas. 581; Lee v. Winston, 68 Ala. 402; McWilliams v. Jenkins, 12 Ala. 480. 95 McCullough V. Flournoy, 69 Ala. 189; Hinson v. Gamble, 65 Ala. 605; Hanger v. Fowler, 20 Ark. 667; Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86, 14 S. W. 469; Smalley v. Clark, 22 Vt. 598; Cozzens v. Whit- ney, 3 R. I. 79; Humphrey v. Browning, 46 111. 476, 95 Am. Dec. 446; Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 707; Martin v. Harrington, 57 Miss. 208; Fowler V. Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Va. 112. 14 S. E. 447; McCoy v. McCoy. Z(i W. Va. 772, 15 S. E. 973; Holmes V. Waymire. 11 Kans. 104, 84 Pac. 558. See also. Kelley v. Horsely. 147 Ala. 508. 41 So. 902. Under a statute of Louisiana giving attor- neys a lien for fees "on all judg- ments obtained by them," it was held in Luneau v. Edwards, 39 La. Ann. 876. 6 So. 24, that it did not create a lien on land re- covered, and in Weil v. Levi, 40 La. Ann. 135, 3 So. 559, that it did not on land success- fully defended. In some early cases in England a lien seems to have been given upon the land in favor of the silicitor; as where a solicitor had been employed by the committee of a lunatic, he was regarded as subrogated to the lien of the committee upon the lunatic's estate, both real and per- sonal. Barnesley v. Powell, 1 Amb. 102; Ex parte Price, 2 Ves. 407, referred to by Chancellor Kent in In re Southwick, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 22. In the cases first cited, there is a dictum by Lord Hardwicke to the effect that a solicitor has a lien on the estate recovered in the hands of his client. But the House of Lords, in Shaw v. Neale, 6 H. L. Cas. 581, repudiated the doctrine that an attorney or solicitor has an im- plied lien on the estate recovered. Interrupting the argument. Lord Wensleydale said "I never heard such a proposition at law." Lord St. Leonards : "Nor I in equity." In consequence of the decision in Shaw V. Neale, 6 H. L. Cas. 581, it was enacted by 23 & 24 Vic. (1860) ch. 127, § 28, that in every case in which an attorney or solicitor shall be employed to prosecute or defend any suit, the court or judge before whom the suit has been heard may declare such attorney or solicitor entitled to a charge upon the property recovered or § 230 LIENS. 236 extend the attorney's lien to lands recovered in a suit would be, in effect, to create an equitable mortgage in his favor, and would be subject not only to the objections urged against such a lien in England, but to the further objection in this country, that it would be contrary to the policy of our regis- try system.^^ An attorney's lien for his fee upon the judgment recovered does not attach to land which is sold in satisfaction of the judgment and purchased by the client.^' § 230. Rule in some states. — In some states, however, it is held that an attorney is entitled to an equitable lien on the property or thing in litigation, whether real or personal, for his just and reasonable fees, and the client can not, while the suit is pending, so dispose of the subject-matter in dispute as to deprive him of his lien.®^ preserved through his instrumen- tality for the costs, charges, and expenses of or in reference to such suit. This statute has been the subject of construction or appli- cation in several cases. See 16 Ir. L. T. 331. Of course the lien under this statute is confined to the client's interest in the land. Thus, if a tenant in tail employs a solicitor to defend a suit, the lat- ter gets a charge on the estate of his client, but not on that in the remainder. If the client bars the estate tail, and gets the fee, the solicitor gets a charge on the fee; but otherwise only the interest of the client. Berrie v. Howitt, L. R. 9 Eq. 1. 96 Hanger v. Fowler, 20 Ark. 667; Humphrey v. Browning, 46 HI. 476. 95 Am. Dec. 446. 9" Cowen V. Boone, 48 Iowa 350; Keehn v. Keehn, 115 Iowa 467, 88 N. W. 957. And see Wish- ard V. Biddle, 64 Iowa 526, 21 N. W. 15. Apparently the same rule prevails in Mississippi: Stew- art v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 7 Am. Rep. 707. Otherwise in Arkansas: Porter v. Hanson, 36 Ark. 591. 98 Tennessee: First recognized in Hunt v. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503; Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 95; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618. But when the land in controversy is con- veyed to the complainant partly in exchange for land conveyed to the defendant, the attorney of the lat- ter has no lien for his fees on the land so conveyed to his client. Sharp V. Fields, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 326, Kentucky : Skaggs v. Hill, 212 Ky. L. 382, 14 S. W. 363. In Colorado : Fillmore v. Wells, 10 Colo. 228, 15 Pac. 343. 3 Am. St. 567, the lien was declared to extend to realty recovered, but the decision was based expressly on a statute; and ^2>7 ATTORNEYS SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 230 In Arkansas an attorney's lien has been extended by stat- ute so as to charge lands recovered by the attorney. The lien is declared to be an interest in the property, whether real or personal, recovered by judgment, to the amount of such judgment. ^^ In Georgia the code gives a lien on all property, both real and personal, recovered by judgment, superior to all liens except those for taxes. ^ One who purchases the land after the attorney has filed a bill to enforce his lien purchases with notice of the lien and takes the property subject to such lien.- In Kentucky a statute provides that an attorney prosecut- ing to recover an action for property, real or personal, shall have a lien on it for his fee.^ the opinion in the case admits that it could not be sustained by the common law, saying: "There are a few decisions which seem to sus- tain the attorney's right to look, through his lien, to the land for his taxable fees; but the weight of authority undoubtedly sanctions the proposition that no such privi- lege is awarded by the common law." 99 Kirby's Digest 1904, § 4458; Porter v. Hanson, 36 Ark. 591; Compton v. State, 38 Ark. 601. Such a lien had been previously denied in Hanger v. Fowler, 20 Ark. 667. In the late case of Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86, 14 S. W. 469, it was held that "a solicitor has no Hen upon his client's land for his fee for services rendered in removing a cloud from his title to it;" that the lien pro- vided by said act "is limited to cases where there has been an actual recovery, and cannot be ex- tended to professional services which merely protect an existing title or right of property." The court declared that, without a statute to authorize it, attorneys cannot sustain a claim against real estate for services in either prosecuting or defending a suit in- volving it. See ante, § 170. iCode 1911, § 3364; Wil- son v. Wright, 72 Ga. 848. Pro- curing a restraining against a sale of land by the sheriff does not give him a right to lien. Hodnett v. Bormer, 107 Ga. 452, 33 S. E. 416. See ante, § 173. 2 Wilson V. Wright, 12 Ga. 848. As to right to join different claims against different pieces of land in enforcing lien on land see Suwan- nee, etc., Co. V. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597, 35 S. E. 142. 3 Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 107; Skaggs V. Hill, 12 Ky. L. 382, 14 S. W. 363. But under this statute, "where nothing is recovered for his client there is nothing to which an attorney's lien can attach." Wilson v. House, 10 Bush (Ky.) 406. Where an attorney recovers § 230 LIENS. 238 There can be no lien, however, unless the suit be for specific land, or it impounds the property in litigation by some process which places it within the custody of the court. ^ His lien upon land which is the subject of a decree is also entitled to priority of satisfaction over the lien of a judgment creditor of the client acquired subsequently to the decree.^ The creditor's right is against the property of the debtor, and not against the interest of a third person in such property, though this interest be a mere lien or equity. Independent of the registration laws, the creditor's equity is equal and not superior to the equity of third persons, and therefore whichever is prior in time has the better right." But the defendant's solicitor is not entitled to a lien on his client's land for services rendered in defending a suit in which it was sought to establish a resulting trust in such lands, although the defense was successful. The lien exists only in case of the actual recovery of land by a suit instituted for that purpose. It can not be extended to services which merely protect an existing title or right to property.''' land in a suit for his client, he has a lien on it. Mclntosk v. Bach, 110 Ky. 701, 62 S. W. 515. ■* Sharpe v. Allen, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 518; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618. ^ Pleasants v. Kortrecht, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 694, though the principle perhaps not properly ap- plied to the facts. "The inclina- tion of the courts of this country, and of none more so than those of this state, has been to enlarge the doctrine of equitable liens and charges with a view to the attain- ment of the ends of justice, with- out much respect for the technical restrictions of the common law. It was a logical result of this ten- dency that our Supreme Court should follow the lead of Lord Hardwicke, made before the Revo- lution, rather than the modern doctrine of the House of Lords. And it was both natural and wise that the lien of the lawyer on the fruits of his professional labor should be treated as equitable, rather than legal. The proper ad- ministration of justice is essential to the well-being of the republic, and cannot be secured without an enlightened and prosperous bar." Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618. c Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch. 618. " Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 29; Stanford v. Andrews, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 664; Sharp v. Fields, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 326; Guild v. Borner, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 266; Win- chester V. Heiskell, 16 Lea 239 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 230 An attorney has no lien upon the assets of an estate real- ized from a sale of its lands for defending a suit brought to establish a demand against it. Nor has he a lien upon a fund arising from sale of land of a person or estate, already owned by such person or estate, for (Tenn.) 556, affg. 119 U. S. 450, 30 L. ed. 462, 7 Sup. Ct. 281; but the merits of the case were not considered by the Supreme Court; Fowler v. Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447. The lan- guage used in the first decision in which a lien on land was recog- nized (Hunt V. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503, seemed to imply- that the lien existed in favor of counsel, whether retained by the plaintiff or the defendant, and to give a Hen on the land in contro- versy to the lawyer of the suc- cessful party. "In consequence of this construction the practice of the courts was, for a time, very liberal, and the lien was declared in favor of the counsel of the de- fendant as well as of the plaintiff. Upon further consideration it was seen that this extension of the doctrine could not be sustained upon the principles of the original decision, nor upon general prin- ciples. It operated as a restraint upon the free disposition of prop- erty, and created a new and secret trust, not only unknown to the common law, but not warranted by its principles, and in conflict with the policy of our registration laws. It was therefore held by this court that the lien exists only in the case of the actual re- covery of land, by a suit instituted for the purpose, just as at common law the lien was on the money judgment recovered. The lien, it was said, is declared to exist from the commencement of the suit, — manifestly contemplating a suit for the specific property; and the doc- trine, although an extension of the principle of the common law, may be sustained upon the ground that the lis pendens is notice to all the world of the plaintiff's right, and no great harm can result from carrying out of this right, a lien in favor of the attorney running pari passu with the lien of the lis pendens. But the lis pendens is no notice to any one of the defend- ant's rights, which stand precisely as if no suit were pending; and consequently a lien on that right, without contract, would be with- out any rule or analogy to sup- port it, besides being in conflict with the policy of our registration laws." Cooper, J., in Pierce v. Lawrence, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 572, 1 S. W. 204. See, however, Strohecker V. Irvine, 1(y Ga. 639, 2 Am. St. 62, holding that the lien of an at- torney for services in successfully resisting a levy on a homestead and obtaining it to be set apart as an exemption is in the nature of labor done on the homestead and of purchase-money thereof, and the homestead is subject thereto. §231 LIENS. 240 services purely defensive, in resisting suits brought to estab- lish demands against it.^ An attorney's lien on land for services in defending a suit affecting the land may be rendered binding upon the parties, and those claiming under them, pending the litigation, if de- clared by the court in which the services were rendered; but such lien does not affect third persons having prior liens upon the land.^ § 231. Waiver of attorney's lien. — This lien may be waived by an arrangement or transaction between the attor- ney and his client which shows the attorney's intention to rely upon some other security or mode of payment. ^*^ The taking of a promissory note by the attorney does not neces- sarily imply a waiver of his lien, for this may have been given merely for the purpose of fixing the amount of the debt. But the taking of a distinct and independent security will generally amount to a waiver of the lien, for the attorney in such case has carved out his own security, and is pre- sumed to have intended to waive his lien. It is true, how- ever, that the waiver arising from the acceptance of collateral security is presumptive only, and may be rebutted by evi- dence of an intention not to rely exclusively upon it, but to retain the equitable lien.^^ An attorney waives his lien upon a judgment by keeping silent about it when his silence would operate as a fraud upon another. On a motion to open a default, the court required the defendant to stipulate not to dispose of a judgment in his favor against a third person, and to make the judgment in plaintifT's favor a lien thereon. The attorney who repre- 8 Fowler v. Lewis' Admr., 36 W. Y. 425, 58 N. E. 522, modifying 13 Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447. App. Div. 371, 43 N. Y. S. 206. See 9 Pierce v. Lawrence, 16 Lea also, Barnahee v. Holmes, 115 (Tenn.) 572, 1 S. W. 204. Iowa 581, 88 N. W. 1098. 10 Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. 11 Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 378; West v. Bacon, 164 N. Va. 378. 241 attorney's special or charging lien. § 231 sented defendant had a lien on such judgment for his services in procuring it, but made no mention thereof, and, as a notary pubhc, took defendant's acknowledgment of the stipulation. It was held that he was estopped to assert his lien against the claim of plaintiff under the stipulation.^^ The attorney waives his lien by his acquiescence in a satisfaction of the judgment by the payment of money or the transfer of property to his client, and he can not afterwards enforce his lien upon such money or property, but must look to his client alone for his compensation.^^ An attorney's lien upon a judgment is waived by his pro- curing in transfer to his client of land attached in the suit in satisfaction of the judgment. His lien upon the judgment does not follow the land when the title is perfected in the client. Subsequent purchasers of the land from the client have a right to suppose the lien has been w^aived or satisfied. ^^ An attorney's lien upon a judgment is not discharged by his delay in collecting it, though this delay be for several years. ^^ It is not lost though his claim against his client is barred by the statute of limitations.^^ It is not divested by his allow- ing his claim to become dormant, so that it has to be revived by other attorneys. ^'^ Neither is it lost by the attorney's receiving or collecting a part of the judgment, and paying over the part so collected to his client without deducting his fees. He can enforce his lien upon the balance of the judgment. ^^ It would seem that an attorney's lien would not prevail 12 Clare v. Lockard, 122 N. Y. ^^ Cowen v. Boone, 48 Iowa 350. 263, 24 N. E. 453, reversing 2 N. 15 Stone v. Hyde, 22 Maine 318. Y. S. 646. 16 Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 13 Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 413. N. Y. 157, 19 N. E. 649, reversing 17 Jenkins v. Stephens, 60 Ga. 41 Hun (N. Y.) 235; In re Knapp, 216. 85 N. Y. 284; Marshall v. Meech, is Hooper v. Brundage, 22 Maine 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; St. 460. John V. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 261. 16 § 232 LIENS. 242 against a state in whose favor he has obtained a judgment, in the absence of a special statute giving such a lien.^^ § 232. Attorney's process to secure rights. — In general it may be said that the attorney has the same remedial pro- cess as his client to obtain satisfaction to the extent of his lien, inasmuch as he is regarded to that extent as an equit- able assignee of the judgment. Therefore, where a judg- ment has ben rendered for the defendant in a replevin suit, the attorney has a right to enforce the replevin bond taken from the plaintiff for the return of the goods. And if the sheriff has taken an insufficient bond, the attorney has a right to the damages which may be recovered from the sheriff for his neglect in taking such bond. The judgment in such suit belongs to the attorney to the extent of his lien.^*^ An attorney who has prosecuted a bastardy process to final judgment and execution has a lien upon the bond given by the respondent in that process.^^ When an attachment has been made, the lien of the at- tachment inures to the benefit of the attorney for his fees and costs, and this can not be defeated by any settlement made by the client with the debtor, without his consent.^^ Where a judgment is a lien upon real estate, and this is about to be sold under execution, an attorney's lien upon the judgment will not be protected by a stay of a sale under the execution, but the sheriff may be stayed from paying the proceeds of sale to the plaintiff or his assignee under the exe- cution until the amount of the attorney's compensation can be ascertained.^^ 19 Compton V. State, 38 Ark. 601. Wood v. State, 125 Ind. 219, 25 N. At any rate, no decree of a lien E. 190. See ante, § 154a. could be taken against a state, 20 Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 though, in case the funds are with- Maine 231, 79 Am. Dec. 612. in the control of the court, it may, 21 Bickford v. Ellis, 50 Maine in the exercise of its equitable 121. powers, have the fees paid out of 22 Gist v. Hanly, 33 Ark. 233. the fund. State v. Edgefield & 23 Loaners' Bank v. Nostrand, Ky. R. R. Co., 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 92; 21 J. & S. (N. Y.) 525. 243 ATTORNEY S SPECIAL OR CHARGING LIEN. § 233 But the attorney can hardly be considered as the assignee of the judgment in such a sense as to entitle him to go into another court to enforce his lien by an action in his own name.^^ The attorney may enforce his lien by an action on the judgment in the name of the creditor.^^ The lien of an attorney upon a judgment is enforced ac- cording to the law of the state where the judgment was re- covered and the lien attached, and not according to the law of another state where it is sought to collect the judgment.'^ § 233. Settlement by parties. — When the parties have col- lusively settled a suit before judgment, with the design of preventing the attorney from obtaining his costs or fees, the court may allow the attorney to go on with the suit and ob- tain a judgment for the amount of his costs or fees, notwith- standing the settlement.^'^ If the settlement has been filed -■i Adams v. Fox, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 442; 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 409. 25 Stone V. Hyde, 22 Maine 318. 26 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Culver, 54 N. H. 327, 20 Am. Rep. 134. 2" Rasquin v. Knickerbocker Stage Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 324, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 293; People V. Hardenbergh, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 335; Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 501; Chase v. Chase, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 306; Flint v. Hubbard, 16 Colo. App. 464, 66 Pac. 446. In some cases it is said that, before an attorney can proceed with an action after settle- ment and discontinuance by the client, the attorney should obtain leave of court to enforce his lien by supplementary proceedings. Dimick v. Cooley, 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 141. In this case the court say: "It would be an unwise and dangerous practice, extremely hazardous to the rights of both parties, to allow an attorney to continue the action, after settle- ment by the parties, for the pur- pose of collecting his costs, with- out first obtaining the consent of the court, that he may proceed for that purpose. When such per- mission is given, it is the duty of the court to direct as to the time and manner, and watch the pro- ceedings and doing of the attor- ney, so as fully to protect the rights of both parties, and not un- necessarily annoy and embarrass either." Per Barker, J. In Moore V. Taylor, 2 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 343, it is said that leave of court to institute such proceedings is especially requisite where the affidavit says nothing about any lien. § 233 LIENS. 244 in the court, the attorney should first obtain an order setting it aside. His course then is to bring the case to trial and final judgment in the name of his client. He is not entitled to an order to enter judgment for the amount of his costs without bringing the cause to trial; and a judgment so obtained is irregular.^^ In such cases the attorney must establish the collusion.^*' A plaintiff who has obtained a judgment may consent that the judgment in his favor be set aside by the court, but it must be subject to the right of his attorney to his fees, and afterwards the attorney may proceed to establish his right to his fees, in doing which he must establish the plaintiff's right to recover on the state of facts existing at the time the case was first disposed of, independently of the question of fees.^*^ Where a judgment is compromised, pending appeal, with- out notice to the attorneys of the successful plaintiff, they may enforce their lien against defendant in equity.^^ In New York, according to the later and present practice, the attorney is entitled to proceed with the action without first obtaining leave of the court to do so.^^ He may prose- cute the suit to trial and final judgment in the name of his client, with a view to the protection of his own rights. 28 Pickard v. Ycncer, 21 Hun (N. for his compensation if the appeal Y.) 403, 10 Week. Dig. 271; Smith was successful. Walker v. Equita- V. Baum, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 267; ble Mortg. Co., 114 Ga. 862, 40 S. Wilber v. Baker, 24 Hun (N. Y.) E. 1010. 24. 32 Pickard v. Yencer, 21 Hun 29 Lang V. Buffalo Seamen's (N. Y.) 403. 10 Week. Dig. 271; Union, 22 Alb. L. J. (N. Y.) 114. Wilber v. Baker, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 30 Twiggs V. Chambers, 56 Ga. 24; Forstman v. Schulting, 35 Hun 279; Coleman v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132; (N. Y.) 504; Merchant v. Sessions, Rodgers v. Furse, 83 Ga. 115, 9 S. 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 24. The E. 669. case of Goddard v. Trenbath, 24 31 Covington v. Bass, 88 Tenn. Hun (N. Y.) 182, holding that 496, 12 S. W. 1033. A client can leave of court must be obtained to not withdraw a writ of error when prosecute the suit in such cases, his attorney would have a lien is overruled. 245 attorney's special or charging lien. § 234 In this state, however, if the attorney is the equitable owner of the entire judgment recovered, as is the case where the judgment is for costs only, he should prosecute in his own name an undertaking given to secure its payment, inas- much as the code directs that every action shall be prose- cuted in the name of the real party in interest, whether he be a legal or equitable assignee of the cause of action.^^ If he brings such action, even with leave of the court, in the name of his client, for the purpose of enforcing his lien, a previous assignment by his client of the cause of action and release of the judgment will bar the action. The order al- lowing the attorney to proceed does not determine that the attorney is entitled to recover the sum he claims, nor does it determine any of the issues between the parties.^'* § 234. The English practice. — The English practice in such cases seems to have been for the attorney whose lien has been destroyed by the conduct of the parties to move the court to vacate the satisfaction of judgment, and to ap- ply for a rule calling upon the opposite party to pay him his costs.^^ Although the parties to the suit have collusively settled the judgment, the attorney has no such authority over the execution in his hands as to enforce it against the judgment debtor of his own mere motion and without his client's consent. He must apply to the equitable jurisdic- tion of the court.^*^ A similar mode of practice prevails, or has prevailed, in some of our state courts. 1 The plaintiff's attorney may also be protected upon his 33 Kipp V. Rapp, 2 How. Pr. (N. Graves v. Eades, 5 Taunt. 429; S.) (N. Y.) 169, 7 Civ. Proc. R. Reid v. Dupper, 6 T. R. 361; Charl- 316. wood V. Berridge, 1 Esp. 345; 34 Kipp V. Rapp, 2 How. Pr. (N. Jones v. Bonner, 2 Exch. 230. S.) (N. Y.) 169, 7 Civ. Proc. R. 36 Barker v. St. Quintin, 12 M. 316. & W. 441; Brunsdon v. Allard, 35 Welsh V. Hole, 1 Doug. 238; 2 E. & E. 19. § 235 LIENS. 246 application to the court for a rule restraining the judgment debtor from paying the money to the plaintiff until the at- torney's lien is satisfied. Where a decree has been entered for the payment of money to a complainant, and his solicitor has given the de- fendant notice that he claims a lien on the moneys decreed to be paid, and this notice is disregarded by the defendant, the latter may, on an order of the court to show cause, be required to pay to the solicitor such amount as he should establish a lien for upon a reference made by the court.^''^ § 235. Application to protect lien. — An application to the court by an attorney to protect his lien upon a judgment is addressed to the discretion of the court.^^ The right of the attorney to claim the lien should be clear to justify the court's interference. But it has the power to interfere, whether the lien be for the taxable costs or for compensa- tion, when a lien for this is given by statute. When the amount of compensation is in dispute, the court may direct that a sufficient sum to cover the claims be brought into court to await an action at law, or other procedure between the attorney and client to settle the amount. ^^ In Indiana a complaint by an attorney to set aside an entry of satisfaction of a judgment on the ground that it was fraudulently made should allege the amount of fees due him, either by stating the contract with his client respecting his fees, or by averring the value of his services. ^"^ The complaint should allege that the lien was taken, and notice of it filed at the time of the rendition of the judgment, for 37 Barnes v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. Y.) 442, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 409; 467. Fox V. Fox, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 38 Adams v. Fox, 40 Barb. (N. 409. See Matter of Speranza, 186 Y.) 442, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 409; N. Y. 280. Howitt V. Merrill, 113 N. Y. 630, 40 Dunning v. Galloway, 47 Ind. 20 N. E. 868, 2 Silvernail Ct. App. 182; Adams v. Lee, 82 Ind. 587; 158. Day v. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, 10 39 Adams v. Fox, 40 Barb. (N. N. E. 126. 247 attorney's special or charging lien. § 237 such entry and notice are required to make the lien effectual. ^^ In some cases the courts, after declaring the lien, have directed a reference to a master to determine the proper amount of the attorney's charges;'*- but perhaps the better practice is to declare the lien, and leave the attorney to enforce his claim by an appropriate proceeding against his client. ^^ § 236. Money paid into court. — Upon an application by a solicitor for money which has been paid into court under a decree, his claim can not be passed upon without notice to his client and proof to maintain his claim, though the client has assigned to him the cause of action upon which the de- cree was founded as security for his services.^"* § 237. Delay in asserting lien. — But if the attorney waits for an unreasonable time after his client has settled with the opposite party, and discharged the judgment, the satis- faction will not be set aside in order to allow the attorney to obtain his costs. ^^ Great and unreasonable delays and 41 Day V. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383, services rendered by him, nor need 10 N. E. 126. he, upon trial, go into proof of 42 Hunt V. McClanahan, 1 Heisk. the same; but the services will be (Tenn.) 503; Yourie v. Nelson, 1 treated as a whole. Walker v. Tenn. Ch. 614; Bowling v. Scales, Floyd, 30 Ga. 237. But after the 1 Tenn. Ch. 618; Barnes v. Taylor, client has possessed himself of the 30 N. J. Eq. 467. entire fund recovered, the attorney 43 Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heisk. can not proceed by rule to collect (Tenn.) 95. his fees. The court has no juris- 44 Black v. Black, 32 N. J. Eq. diction to control its officers and 74. When an attorney claims a the parties connected with a ju- lien upon money in the hands of dicial proceeding after the litiga- an officer of the court, and the tion has ended. Whittle v. New- claim is controverted by the client, man, 34 Ga. ZIT . a rule is the proper remedy in 45 Winans v. Mason, 33 Barb. Georgia to settle the question. To (N. Y.) 522, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) such rule the attorney need not 153. attach a bill of particulars of the § 238 LIENS. 248 laches on his part in asserting his rights are fatal to his claim, as they would be to the claim of any ordinary suitor. Al- though proceedings by an attorney to enforce his claim do not constitute an action within the literal operation of the statute of limitations, yet in enforcing a remedy of this char- acter, depending upon the equitable powers of the court, and, to a certain extent, upon its discretion, it will in general be governed by the analogy of the statute.'*'^ After the litigation is ended and the client has possessed himself of the entire fund recovered by the litigation, the court has no powder to give relief to the attorney."*' § 238. Attorney need not be a party to the record. — An attorney is not bound to make himself a party to the record in order to enforce his lien for fees against a judgment ob- tained for his client. If he has given notice to the judgment debtor of his lien, he may enforce it notwithstanding a com- promise and settlement between the judgment debtor and his client; the court may, however, allow the attorney to intervene, after judgment, and be made a party to the suit, when that course seems necessary for the protection of his rights.^s In Nebraska, it is said that under some circumstances the attorney may properly be admitted as a party plaintifif in the action for the purpose of protecting and enforcing his lien. In such proceeding it would be the proper practice for the attorney, on being admitted as a party, to file a petition in his own name against both plaintiff and defendant, setting for the particulars of his claim, so that if it be disputed answers could be filed, and issues made up as in other cases. "^^ 46 Richardson v. Brooklyn C. & on a counterclaim for his client N. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 69. has a lien on the recovery 47 Whittle V. Newman, 34 Ga. and may enforce his Hen on the 377. judgment in counterclaim. Mer- 48 Patrick v. Leach, 17 Fed. 476, chants' Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 3 McCrary (U. S.) SSS. An attor- 107 Ga. 479, 33 S. E. 473. ney for a defendant who recovers 49 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 10 249 attorney's special or charging lien. § 240 § 239. Action to dissolve a partnership. — In an action to dissolve partnership the court will not appoint a receiver in order to secure the lien of the plaintiff's attorney; for a re- ceiver is appointed in such an action only when it is abso- lutely necessary to do so for the protection of the property. If the attorney has given notice of his claim before the set- tlement, he may be allowed to go on with the suit and enter up judgment for his costs. ^^ § 240. Proceeding to wind up insolvent insurance com- pany. — In proceedings to wind up an insolvent life insurance company an attorney was retained by certain policy holders, and appeared in their behalf. A dividend to each of his clients was declared, whereupon he claimed a lien and moved that the receiver pay the dividends to him. It did not appear that these policy holders were formal parties to the proceed- ings, or that the attorney entered his appearance of record, nor that his services procured the dividends. The attorney's motion was denied, except upon his filing authority from his clients to receive such dividends. It was doubted whether he had any lien under the code; and, whether he had or not, the court could not make an order practically enforcing a lien without notice to the clients. ^^ Nebr. 574, 7 N. W. 322, cited with contract between a client and his approval in Oliver v. Sheeley, 11 attorney, where there is no claim Nebr. 521, 9 N. W. 689; Elliott v. for a lien, would not be notice Atkins, 26 Nebr. 403, 42 N. W. 403. to the adverse party that he in- "An attorney, therefore, who de- tended to assert the claim against sires to enforce a claim for his him, as it might be presumed that services must file a lien to that such attorney intended to rely on effect; otherwise he can not en- the responsibility of his own cli- force a claim against the adverse ent." Per Maxwell, J. party. This claim for a lien may -"<^ Anon. 2 Daly (N. Y.) 533. be filed with the papers in the ^^ Attorney-General v. North case, and the adverse party will American Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. be chargeable with notice of its 387. existence. The existence of a . CHAPTER VI. BANKER'S LIENS. Sec. Sec. 241. Bank has a lien. 252. 242. Banker's lien part of the law merchant. 253. 243. Only banks have bankers' liens. 244. Banker's lien on securities 254. of his debtor. 245. Banker's lien only secures 255. debts that are due. 256. 246. Rule in equity. 247. Customer's several accounts 257. regarded as one account. 248. Lien attaches only to se- 258. curities of the customer. 249. No lien on trust securities. 250. No lien on fiduciaries' ac- 259. counts. 260. 251. No lien on pledged securi- ties for general debts. 261. Surplus of pledged securi- ties. Nature and extent of lien as dependent upon terms of contract. No lien on box containing securities. Circumstances effecting lien. No lien on securities casual- ly left at the bank. Lien on paper received for collection. Lien on paper received for collection — ^Application of doctrine. Doctrine in New York. Lien on paper of a corre- sponding bank. No lien where no advances are made. § 241. Bank has a lien. — A bank has a Hen on all moneys, funds and securities of a depositor for the general balance of his account.^ Thus, if a bank discounts a note for a depositor, 1 Jourdaine v. Lefevre, 1 Esp 66; Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 481 Scott V. Franklin, 15 East 428 Bolton V. Puller, 1 B. & P. 539 Giles V. Perkins, 9 East 12; Bol- land V. Bygrave, R. & M. 271; In re Williams, 3 Jr. Eq. 346; Brandao v. Barnett, 12 CI. & F. 787; Marsh V. Oneida Central Bank, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 298; Beckwith v. Union Bank, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 604; Commercial Bank of Albany V. Hughes, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 94; In re Van Allen, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 225; Ford's Admr. v. Thorn- ton, 3 Leigh (Va.) 695; State Bank V. Armstrong, 4 Dev. (N. Car.) 519; Whittington v. Farmers' Bank, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 489; McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington & Brandy- 250 251 BANKER S LIENS. § 242 and this is not paid at maturity, all funds of the depositor held by the bank at the time of the maturity of the note, or afterwards acquired in the course of business with him, whether on general deposit or in the form of commercial paper placed by him in bank for collection, may be applied to the discharge of his indebtedness to the bank on such note,- And the rule is the same as regards any other indebt- edness, such as an overdraft or an advance of any kind. § 242. Banker's lien part of the law merchant. — The lien of bankers is part of the law merchant, and the courts are bound to take judicial notice of it, just as they are bound to recognize the negotiability of bills of exchange. Thus wine, 1 Harr. (Del.) 369; Gibbons V. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509, 63 N. W. 519, 55 Am. St. 463. It is de- clared in the codes of Califor- nia, Idaho, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota and South Da- kota that a banker has a gen- eral lien, dependent on possession, upon all property in his hands be- longing to a customer, for the bal- ance due to him from such cus- tomer in the course of the busi- ness. California: Civ. Code 1906, § 3054; Idaho: Rev. Code 1908, § 3449; Montana: Code (Civ.) Ann. 1895, § 3937; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, § 6288; Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909, § 4144; South Dakota: Rev. Civ. Code 1903, § 2155. In Pennsylvania the doctrine of bankers' liens does not prevail. It is regarded as opposed to well-established legal principles, and as a cus- tom it can not therefore ob- tain. In re Liggett Spring and Axle Co.'s Appeal, 111' Pa. St. 291, 2 Atl. 684. In California under § 3054 of the Civil Code, a bank has a lien on an overdraft on a paid-up policy given to the bank instead of an assigned policy. Du Brutz V. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 201, 87 Pac. 467. See, also, National Bank of Phoenixville v. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Sup. Ct. 275. Under § 3449 of the Rev. Stats, of Idaho, 1908, giving a bank a lien on all property belonging to its custo- mers, it is held that the bank has no lien on stocks of merchandise. In re Gesas, 146 Fed. 734, 11 C. C. A. 291, the lien that a banker has on his customer's deposit can not be enforced in equity, but it may be declared. Wynn v. Talla- poosa County Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228. 2 Muench v. Valley Nat. Bank, 11 Mo. App. 144. The right that a bank has to take its depositor's money to satisfy a debt he owes the bank is in effect, the right of set-off. Gibsonburg Banking Co V. Wakeman Bank Co., 20 Ohio C C. 591, 10 Ohio C. D. 754. See also, Cockrill \. Joyce, 62 Ark. 216, 35 S. W. 221. § 243 LIENS. 252 Lord Lyndhurst, in a case before the House of Lords, said:^ "There is no question that, by the law merchant, a banker has a Hen for his general balance upon securities deposited with him. I consider this as part of the established law of the country, and that the courts will take notice of it; it is not necessary that it should be pleaded, nor is it neces- sary that it should be given in evidence in the particular instance." Lord Campbell in the same case said: "The usage of trade by which bankers are entitled to a general lien, is not found by the special verdict, and unless we are to take judicial notice of it, the plaintiff is at once entitled to judgment. But, my lords, I am of the opinion that the general lien of bankers is part of the law merchant and is to be judicially noticed — like the negotiability of bills of ex- change, or the days of grace allowed for their payment. When a general usage has been judicially ascertained and established, it becomes a part of the law merchant, which courts of justice are bound to know and recognize. Such has been the invariable understanding and practice in West- minster Hall for a great many years ; there is no decision or dictum to the contrary, and justice could not be administered if evidence were to be given toties quoties to support such usages, issue might be joined upon them in each particular case." § 243. Only banks have banker's liens. — Courts will not, however, judicially take notice of the lien of bankers who are not strictly such. In the case of persons engaged in discount- ing, buying, advancing on, or selling bills or notes, a lien for a general balance will not be presumed to exist in the absence of an express agreement. If a usage exists to give such a lien, it should be proved.^ 3Brandao v. Barnett, 12 CI. & Grant v. Taylor, 3 J. & S. (N. Y.) Fin. 787, 3 C. B. 519, 6 M. & Gr. 338. 630, approved in Misa v. Currie, L. ^Grant v. Taylor, 3 J. & S. (N. R. 1 App. Cas. 554; Muench v. Y.) 338. Valley Nat. Bank, 11 Mo. App. 144; 253 BANKERS LIENS. ^ 244 § 244. Banker's lien on securities of his debtor. — A banker has a Hen on all securities of his debtor in his hands for the general balance of his account, unless such a lien is incon- sistent with the actual or presumed intention of the parties.' The lien attaches to notes and bills and other business paper which the customer has intrusted to the bank for collection, as well as to his general account.*^ Whether there is such a lien in a particular case depends upon the circumstances attending it. If there is nothing in the transaction which repels the presumption that the banker gave credit on the strength of the debtor's securities in his hands, he has a lien upon them for the general balance due him from the debtor. And so if the securities be deposited after the credit was given, the banker has a lien for his general balance of ac- count, unless there be an express contract or circumstances that show an implied contract inconsistent with such lien. A banker has a lien for a general balance of account upon securities left with him by a customer without any special agreement;'^ and if a portion of the securities so left be after- wards pledged to secure a particular debt, the banker has a lien upon the securities not so pledged for his balance of account.^ ^Davis V. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 488, Bank, 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 177, per Lord Kenyon ; Kelly v. Phe- 71 N. Y. S. 416. Ian, 5 Dill. (U. S.) 228; Fed. Cas. eRarnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. No. 7673; Brandao v. Barnett, 6 630; Ex parte Pease, 1 Rose 232; Man. & Gr. 630, 3 C. B. 519, 12 Ex parte Wakefield Bank. 1 Rose CI. & F. 787; approved in Lon- 243; Scott v. Franklin, 15 East don Chartered Bank of Australia 428. V. White, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 413, ^Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 481. and in Misa v. Currie, L. R. 1 8 Dumont v. Fry, 13 Fed. 423, App. Cas. 554; In re European reversed 130 U. S. 354, 32 L. ed. Bank, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 41 ; Wyman 934, 9 Supt. Ct. 486. Where collat- V. Colorado Nat. Bank, 5 Colo. 30, eral is delivered to a bank to se- 40 Am. Rep. 133; In re Williams, cure certain named rates "or any 3 Jr. Eq. 346, 20 L. T. N. S. 282; other liability" of the maker, the Lehman v. Tallassee Mfg. Co., 64 bank is authorized to sell the col- Ala. 567; Delahunty v. Central Nat. lateral for the payment of any in- § 245 LIENS. 254 § 245. Banker's lien only secures debts that are due. — A banker's lien secures only such debts as are due and paya- ble to the banker at the time he claims to retain his cus- tomer's funds or securities.^ If a bank discounts a note for a customer, and places the proceeds to his account, it has no right to retain the amount of his general deposit to apply upon an indebtedness of the customer not yet matured. To do this would be in complete hostility to the purpose con- templated in the contract of discount. "The purpose exist- ing and understood by the parties in that act is, that the customer of the bank may draw out at his pleasure the avails of the discount. After the paper discounted falls due and payable and remains unpaid, unless other rights have intervened, the bank may hold a balance of deposits and apply it toward the payment of the paper. But these de- debtedness owed by the pledgor to the bank. Cross v. Brown, (R. I.) 33 Atl. 370. 3 Jordan v. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467, 30 Am. Rep. 319; Beckwith V. Union Bank, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 604. In the latter case a depositor was an indorser on a bill held by the bank. He made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors before the bill matured, and at that time there was a balance to his ac- count at the bank nearly equal to the amount of the indorsed bill. The bill was protested at maturity and charged to his account by the bank, before notice of the assign- ment was given to the bank. It was held, however, that the as- signee was entitled to recover the entire sum in deposit, the situa- tion of the bank not being affected by want of notice of the assign- ment. In a case in Illinois, Fourth Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 68 111. 398, where a customer obtained a discount of his note at a bank, and the money was placed to his credit, and he became insolvent be- fore the maturity of the note, hav- ing at the time a deposit to his credit against a part of which he had drawn a check, it was held that the bank had no lien as against the check holder who presented this check for payment before the maturity of the note. The value of this decision as an authority elsewhere is impaired by the rule adopted in this state that a check is an appropriation of so much of the depositor's account, giving him a right of action for it against the bank. See Bollard v. Bygrave, Ry. & M. 271. In case a note is discounted by the bank for its de- positor it will have no lien on his funds until the note matures. Smith V. Eighth Ward Bank, 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6, 52 N. Y. 290. 255 banker's liens. § 247 posits in a bank create between it and the depositor the relation of debtor and creditor. Now a debtor in one sum has no Hen upon it in his hands, for the payment of a debt owed by him, which has not yet matured ; nor has a bank, more than any other debtor. Both hold, as debtors, the moneys of their creditors, and may set up no claim to them not given by the law of set-off, counterclaim, recoupment, or kindred rules. "^^ § 246. Rule in equity. — In equity it has been held that the lien of a bank may attach before the indebtedness has ma- tured. Thus, where a depositor, having obtained a discount at a bank, died before the note matured, upon evidence of danger that his estate and also the indorser's would prove to be insolvent, it was held that the bank should be allowed to retain enough of the funds of the depositor in the hands of the bank to meet the note when it should be due.^^ Of course securities may by express agreement be pledged to cover debts not matured or contingent liabilities;^- but such a lien is a different thing from a banker's implied gen- eral lien. But ordinarily equity follows the statute and the law in regard to a set-off, unless there are peculiar circumstances presented. The insolvency of a debtor sometimes moves equity to grant a set-off which would not be allowed at law; and that consideration doubtless much moved the court in the Virginia case above cited. ^^ § 247. Customer's several accounts regarded as one ac- count. — If a customer keeps several deposit accounts with loPer Folger, J., in Jordan v. i^Merchants' Bank of London v. Nat. Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N. Maud, 19 W. R. 657. Y. 467, 30 Am. Rep. 319. i3 Jordan v. Nat. Shoe & Leather 11 Ford's Admr. v. Thornton, 3 Bank, 74 N. Y. 467, 30 Am. Rep. Leigh (Va.) 695. See Fourth Nat. 319, per Folger, J. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 68 111. 398. § 247 LIENS. 256 a bank, they are to be regarded as one account as regards the bank's right of Hen. Thus, if a customer, as a matter of convenience, keeps with a bank three accounts, namely, a loan account, a discount account and a general account, and becomes a debtor to the bank on one account, the bank has a lien for the debt upon the customer's balance upon another account.^^ "In truth," said Lord Justice James, "as between banker and customer, whatever number of accounts are kept in the books, the whole is really but one account, and it is not open to the customer, in the absence of some special contract, to say that the securities which he deposits are only applicable to one account." Of course this rule applies only where all the accounts belonged to the depositor in the same capacity. A bank discounted for a customer, bills of exchange drawn against goods consigned to India upon the security of the bills of lading. As a further security against a fall in the price of the goods, the bank retained a sum from the full discount value of the bills, and carried this to a suspense account until it should receive advice of the payment of the bills, and gave to the customer accountable receipts for such margins or sums retained. This was the usual course of dealing between the parties; and it was also the habit of the bank, when it had been advised that the bills had been paid in full, to carry over the retained margin to the credit of the customer in his general banking account. The customer pledged three of such receipts with a party who gave notice to the bank of such assignment. On the same day the cus- tomer suspended payment, being largely indebted to the bank upon an overdrawn account and on suspended accounts. It was held that the bank was entitled to a lien on the receipts for such margins or suspended account for such sums as were actually due and payable to it at the times when the receipts became payable, in respect of liabilities contracted before i4ln re European Bank, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 41. 257 BANKER S LIENS. 248 notice was received by the bank of the pledge or assignment of the receipts. ^^ § 248. Lien attaches only to securities of the customer. — As a general rule the lien attaches only to securities belong- ing to the customer in his own right, unless the securities be transferable by delivery, or have been intrusted to the cus- tomer by the owner in such a way that he appears to be the owner, andvhas the power of transferring them as if they were his own; in which case the banker receiving the securities in good faith may acquire a title which the cus- tomer did not have.^*' If the property is subject to a trust, of which the banker must necessarily have notice, or of which he actually has notice, the trust must prevail against the banker's lien.^" If a depositor keeps two accounts, one of which is a trust account, the bank can acquire no lien on the latter account for a deficiency in the individual account. If the banker has knowledge of this, he is liable for permitting the cus- tomer to transfer money from his trust account to his private account. ^^ A banker has no lien on the deposit of a partner on his separate account for a balance due to the bank from the firm.^^ i"'Jeffryes v. Agra & Master- man's Bank, L. R. 2 Eq. 674, 35 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 686, 14 W. R. 889. isBarnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. 630, per Lord Denman, C. J.; Col- lins V. Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648. If the payee of a check given for a particular purpose deposits it in his own name in a bank and the bank makes advances to him on the faith of the deposit, not hav- ing notice of the trust, its rights are superior to those of the drawer of the check. Erisman v. Delaware County Nat. Bank, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 144, Z7 W. N. C. 518. See also, Cockrill v. Joyce, 62 Ark. 216, 35 S. W. 221; Hill v. Miles. 83 Ark. 486, 104 S. W. 198. iT^Manningford v. Toleman, 1 Coll. 670; Locke v. Prescott, Z2 Beav. 261. 18 Bodenham v. Hoskins, 2 De G., M. & G. 903. i^Watts v. Christie, 11 Beaver 546; Ex parte City Bank Case, 3 De G., F. & J. 629; Raymond v. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425, 6 So. 692, 17 Am. St. 398. 17 § 249 LIENS. 258 § 249. No lien on trust securities. — One can not create an effectual lien by an agreement to transfer to a bank securities which he holds in trust, though they stand in his own name and are within his control. The agreement to transfer does not amount to the same thing as an actual transfer, so far as the rights of the beneficial owner are concerned; for the bank will not have a lien by the agreement as against such owner. Thus, one holding shares in a banking company in his own name, though part of them were purchased with trust funds, and were in fact held in trust, agreed to transfer a cer- tain number of shares to the banking company as security for advances; but no transfer was actually made, and he be- came bankrupt without having shares sufficient to satisfy the trust and his agreement to assign. It was held that the banking company had no lien on the shares held in trust. -'^ Referring to the trustee's agreement to transfer, Lord Cot- tenham. Lord Chancellor, said : "All that he has done has been an attempt to commit a breach of trust, and a fraud undoubtedly on the bank, by saying, T will pledge these shares so standing in my name for the purpose of securing the debt which I owe to you.' Then here are two equities, that is to say, here is a trustee of the property, which he held for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, endeavoring to create an equity upon that property to secure his own debt. Which of these two equities is to prevail? Undoubtedly the former." § 250. No lien on fiduciaries' accounts. — A bank receiv- ing deposits to the account of a customer, as executor, ad- ministrator, trustee or agent is chargeable with notice of the trust, and can not have a lien upon the deposits to secure his private debts to the bank.-^ If the bank officers have -OMurray v. Pinkett, 12 CI. & F. opening of an account as executor 764. operated as a notice to the bank -1 Bailey v. Finch, L. R. 7 Q. B. of the trust, it being a statement 34. Blackburn, J., said that the to the bank : "This account which I 259 banker's liens. . § 250 actual knowledge that the money deposited by a customer is held by him in a fiduciary capacity, the bank for stronger reasons is affected with equities of the beneficial owners of the fund. Thus, where a customer opened an account with a bank in his own name, as general agent, and it was known to the bank that he was the agent of an msurance company; that the conducting of this agency was his chief business; that the account was opened to facilitate that busi- ness, and was used as a means of accumulating the premiums on policies collected by him for the company, and of making payments to it by checks, the bank is chargeable with notice of the equitable rights of the company, though he deposited his own money to the same account and drew checks against it for his private use. Therefore, when such depositor bor- rowed money from the bank for his own use upon the security of his wife's name and property, and the loan not being paid it was charged to the depositor's account as gen- eral agent, it was held that the bank had no lien as against the insurance company on such deposits.-- Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Evi- dently the bank has no better right than the depositor, un- less it can obtain it through its banker's lien. Ordinarily, that attaches in favor of the bank upon the securities and moneys am opening is not my own unlimit- a profitable one to the bank was ed property, but it is money which alleged by the customer as a rea- belongs to the estate which I am son why he should have the accom- administering as executor; conse- modation; but it was not pledged quently, there may be persons for the payment of the loan, either who have equitable claims upon in express terms, or by any acts it." The bank would be bound by or conduct from which such an in- any equity which did exist in an- tention could be inferred. But, as other. And see Jones on Col- against the insurance company, it lateral Securities, (3d ed.) § 474; could have made no difference if Wagner v. Citizens' Bank & Trust the depositor had attempted to Co., 122 Tenn. 164, 122 S. W. 245. pledge his account; for the bank 22National Bank v. Insurance had notice that this did not be- Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693. long to him. The existence of this account as § 251 . LIENS. 260 of the customer deposited in the usual course of lousiness; for advances which are supposed to be made upon their credit. It attaches to such securities and funds, not only against the depositor, but against the unknown equities of all others in interest, unless modified or waived by some agreement, express or implied, or by conduct inconsistent with its assertion. But it can not be permitted to prevail against the equity of the beneficial owner, of which the bank has notice, either actual or constructive. In the pres- ent case, in addition to the circumstance that the account was opened and kept by [the depositor] in his name as gen- eral agent, and all the presumptions properly arising upon it, we have found that other facts proven on the hearing justify and require the conclusion that the bank had full knowledge of the sources of the deposits made by [the depositor] in this account, and of his duty to remit and account for them as agent for the insurance company. It is, consequently, chargeable with notice of the equities of the [insurance company]." § 251. No lien on pledged securities for general debts. — A banker or broker holding securities pledged for the pay- ment of a particular debt, or deposited for a special pur- pose, has no lien upon them for a general balance of account or for the payment of other claims.-^ The general lien is limited and defined by the express contract. Thus, if a partnership and an individual member of the firm have ac- counts with the same bank, and the partner deposits certain 23Vanderzee v. Willis, 3 Bro. Nat. Bank, 131 Mass. 14; Jarvis Ch. 21; In re Medewe's Trust, 26 v. Rogers, IS Mass. 389. New Beav. 588; In re Gross, 24 L. T. York: Lane v. Bailey, 47 Barb. (N. S.) 198; Armstrong V. Chemical (N. Y.) 395; Wyckoff v. Anthony, Nat. Bank, 41 Fed. 234, 6 L. R. A. 90 N. Y. 442, affirming 9 Daly (N. 226n ; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. Y.) 417; Davenport v. Bank of S. 354, 32 L. ed. 934, 9 Sup. Ct. 486. Buffalo, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 12. Ken- Massachusetts : Brown v. New tucky : Woolley v. Louisville Bedford Inst, for Savings, 137 Banking Co., 81 Ky. 527, 5 Ky. L. Mass. 262; Hathaway v. Fall River 562. 26i banker's liens. § 251 railway shares as collateral security for a certain promissory note of his own discounted by the bank, or for any sums he may thereafter owe to the bank, the fact that the shares were the property of the firm, and that the discounts ob- tained by the use of them were employed for the purposes of the firm, does not entitle the bank to hold the shares as a security for a balance due him from the firm.-^ A customer of a bank deposited with it as security for his current indebtedness on discounts the note of a third person secured by mortgage, and afterwards withdrew the same for the purpose of foreclosure and collection, under an agree- ment to return the proceeds or to furnish other securities. He purchased the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, and at the request of the bank deposited with it the deed of the property. His indebtedness to the bank was afterwards fully paid, and for a time he had no dealings with it. After- wards he incurred other debts to it, and was largely indebted to it when he became a bankrupt. It was held that the bank had no equitable lien on the property mentioned in the deed.-^ Thus, also, where a deposit was made in a bank for the express purpose of paying coupons which had been made payable at the bank, it was held that the bank, having ac- cepted the deposit, knowing the purpose for which it was -4Ex parte City Bank Case, 3 count, said that it was untenable: De G., F. & J. 629. Lord Campbell, "First, that it disregards the fact L. C. : "It cannot be said that a that one of the parties to the con- contract was entered into by tract, [the bank], did not even which the shares were not to be know of the partnership title, and a security for the separate debt dealt with the transaction as a of [the partner], and were to be transaction on the separate ac- a security for the joint debt of the count; and, secondly, that it dis- partnership." Turner, L. J., re- regards also the distinction be- ferring to the argument that the tween the rights and liabilities of shares having become the prop- the parties to the contract, and the erty of the partnership, the pledge extent of the contract itself." must be taken to have been on the -•"•Railroad Co. v. McKinley, 99 joint and not on the separate ac- U. S. 147, 25 L. ed. 272. § 252 LIENS. 262 made, could not retain the money and apply it to a prior indebtedness of the depositor on another account.-^ § 252. Surplus of pledged securities. — Where, however, the bankers have the right to sell the security pledged for a specified debt, after they have epcercised this right, and have in their hands a surplus of money remaining after satis- fying the specific charge, they may set off this money against further sums due to them.-" But before a sale, and while the security is held with a mere power of sale, which the debtor or his assignee may defeat, and which the bankers had not even signified their election to exercise, the bankers are not in a position to set off the debts due them against the surplus proceeds of the securities which might arise in case they should sell them under the power. ^^ Where a customer deposited a life insurance policy with his bankers, accompanied by a memorandum of charge to secure overdrafts, not exceeding a specified amount, it was held that the bankers' general lien was displaced, and the charge was limited to the amount specified. The court re- garded it as inconsistent with the terms of the agreement that the bankers should claim a general lien under an implied contract, when by the express contract the charge was limit- ed to a stipulated sum.-^ -6Bank of the United States v. the property included in the de- Macalester, 9 Pa. St. 475. posited deeds, and in Strathmore 27Jones V. Peppercorne, Johns. v. Vane the security was limited Ch. 430; Judy v. Farmers' & to cover a part only of the debt. Traders' Bank, 81 Mo. 404. See, also, In re Medewe, 26 Beav. ^SBrown v. New Bedford Inst. 588, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 421, 28 L. J. for Savings, 137 Mass. 262. Ch. 891, where it was held that a 29 Strathmore v. Vane, L. R. security given by a customer to 33 Ch. Div. 586. To like effect see his bankers for the balance "which Wylde v. Radford, 33 L. J. (Ch.) shall or may be found due on the 51, 12 W. R. 38, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1169, balance of" the account, covered which cannot be distinguished, ex- the existing account only, and not cept that in the latter case the a floating balance, security was limited to a part of 263 banker's liens. § 255 § 253. Nature and extent of lien as dependent upon terms of contract. — If a lien is given to bankers by express contract, the nature and extent of the lien depend upon the terms of the contract. Thus, where an agreement was made by a contractor about to furnish certain manufactured articles to the government that advances, to be made by a bank to en- able him to fulfil his contract, should be a lien on the drafts to be drawn by him on the government for the proceeds of the articles manufactured, it was' held that the bank had no lien on a judgment obtained against the government for damages for violation of the contract, all the drafts drawn upon the government for the articles manufactured and de- livered having been paid in full to the bank.^*^ § 254. No lien on box containing securities. — ^Bankers have no lien on a box containing securities deposited with them by a customer for safe keeping, he keeping the key and having access to the box, and the bankers not having access to the contents of it.^^ The same rule would apply to securities left with a banker for safe keeping in a sealed- up parcel,^- and to a box of plate deposited in the bank vaults for safe custody.^^ § 255. Circumstances effecting lien. — There can be no lien where the securities have come into the banker's hands un- 30 Bank of Washington v. Nock, E. 273. See, also, First Nat. Bank 9 Wall. (U. S.) 2,7i, 19 L. ed. 717. v. Scott, 123 N. Car. 538, 31 S. E. Where a rate is put up as col- 819; Fullerton v. Chatham Nat. lateral at a bank that "the above Bank, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 529, 40 N. collateral is also put up and Y. S. 874; Bacon's Admr. v. Bacon's pledged * * * for any other Trustees, 94 Va. 686, 27 S. E. 576; note or indebtedness which the Malone v. Wright, (Tex. Civ. holder now has or may hereafter App.), 34 S. W. 455. have against me," it is held to be siLeese v. Martin, L. R. 17 Eq. retained as collateral for notes 224. given for stock in the creditor 32Per Hall, V. C, in Leese v. bank. Stanley v. Chicago Trust & Martin, L. R. 17 Eq. 224. Savings Bank, 165 111. 295, 46 N. ssEx parte Eyre, 1 Ph. 227. § 255 LIENS. 264 der circumstances inconsistent with the existence of a gen- eral lien. A Portuguese merchant residing in Lisbon em- ployed his correspondent, a merchant in London, to invest money for him in exchequer bills. The latter purchased the bills and deposited them in a box that he kept at his bankers', the key of which he himself retained. Whenever it became necessary to receive the interest on the bills and to exchange them for new ones, the London merchant was in the habit of taking them out of the box and giving them to the bankers for that purpose ; and when such purpose was accomplished, as soon as conveniently might be, the bankers handed them or the new bills back to their customer, who locked them up in the box. The amount of interest re- ceived by the bankers w^as passed to the credit of the cus- tomer. The bills themselves were never entered to his account, nor had the bankers any notice or knowledge that they were not the customer's own property. Finally the customer delivered the exchequer bills to the bankers for the purpose of receiving the interest and exchanging them for new bills; but after the exchange, on account of the cus- tomer's illness, the new bills remained in the possession of the bankers for some two months, and until the customer's failure, he having in the meantime considerably overdrawn his account. In a suit by the true owner of the bills against the bankers, it was held in the House of Lords that they had no lien for the general balance of their account upon the securities, although these were transferable by delivery.^^ Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Chancellor, said: "It is impossible, considering how this business was carried on, that we can come to any other conclusion than this, that it was an under- standing between the parties that the new bills were to be returned after the interest was received, or after the old bills •5-iBrandao v. Barnett, 3 C. B. also Grant v. Taylor, 3 J. & S. 519, 12 CI. & F. 787, overruling 1 (N. Y.) 338. M. & G. 908, 2 Scott, N. R. 96. See 265 banker's liens. § 257 had been exchanged. If so — if that was the understanding — or if that was the fair inference from the transaction, it is quite clear that there could be no lien, that it does not come within the general rule. * * * Although from the accidental circumstance of the illness of [the customer], the particular bills happened to remain for a longer period in the hands of the bankers than was usual, that accidental circumstance alone will not vary the case, or give the bankers a lien, if under other circumstances that lien would not attach." Lord Campbell concurring, on another point said: "No reliance, I think, can be placed on the circumstances of the interest received on the old exchequer bills going to the credit of the account of the customer; for while he gives the bankers the interest to keep for him with one hand, he locks up the new exchequer bills in his tin box with the other." § 256. No lien on securities casually left at the bank. — A banker has no lien on securities casually left with him after he has refused to advance money on them. In a leading case on this point, a person went to a banker to raise a certain sum of money on the security of a lease. The banker con- sidered the proposition and rejected it. But the lease, in the language of the report, was "casually left" in the pos- session of the bankers, and the bankruptcy of the owner of the lease having afterwards happened, the bankers claimed they were entitled to hold this lease by virtue of a banker's lien upon it. The court held that there was no lien upon the lease. ^"' § 257. Lien on paper received for collection. — A bank has a lien on paper received for collection from a corresponding bank, although it is not the property of that bank, if there be nothing on the face of the paper and no notice in any way to the collecting bank that the paper does not belong to the 35Lucas V. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278, Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630; Petrie 1 Moore 29. See, also, Barnett v. v. Myers, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 513. § 257 LIENS. 266 bank that transmits it. In a leading case before the Supreme Court of the United States, it appeared that two banks were in the habit of transmitting to each other paper for collec- tion. They had for several years an account current be- tween them in which they mutually credited each other with the proceeds of all paper remitted for collection which ap- peared to be the property of the respective banks. One bank transmitted to the other certain paper ; indorsed by the bank which sent it, and apparently belonging to it, for collection. The bank which received the paper collected it, and held the proceeds, when the bank which had trans- mitted it proved to be insolvent, and indebted to the other bank. The paper in fact belonged to a third bank, which brought suit against the collecting bank for the proceeds of the paper. The Supreme Court held that the bank which had collected the paper, in the absence of knowledge or no- tice of facts to put it upon inquiry that the paper did not belong to its correspondent, had the same right of lien for a general balance of account upon the paper and its proceeds that it would have had if the paper had actually belonged to its correspondent.^^ The court said that the plaintifif bank contributed to give to the bank which proved insolvent credit with the defendant bank, by placing in its hands paper which was apparently the property of the insolvent bank, thus en- abling this bank to deal with the paper as if it were the real owner of it. The defendant bank, on the other hand, was not in any way responsible for the confidence which the plaintiff bank reposed in its agent. The superior equity is on the side of the defendant bank, which is entitled to a lien for a general balance of account with its corresponding bank. 36Bank of Metropolis v. New Kearney. 17 Ohio 572; Miller v. England Bank, 1 How. (U. S.) 234, Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 30 11 L. ed. 115, affirmed 6 How. (U. Md. 392. See. also, Hoffman v. S.) 212, 12 L. ed. 409, followed in Miller, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 334; Van Russell V. Hadduck, 3 Gilm. (111.) Namee v. Bank of Troy, 5 How. 233, 44 Am. Dec. 693; Gordon v. Pr. (N. Y.) 161. 267 banker's liens. § 259 § 258. Lien on paper received for collection — Application of doctrine. — A similar case was decided in like man- ner by the Supreme Court of Colorado."' It appeared that a customer of a banker drew his draft on London, payable to the banker, to whom he delivered it to col- lect and placed to the customer's account. The banker indorsed and transmitted the draft to a national bank for collection. At this time the banker was indebted to the national bank for over-drafts. The draft was paid, but be- fore the proceeds came into the actual possession of the national bank, it received notice that the drawer of the draft had delivered it to his banker for collection, and that he claimed the proceeds. In a suit by the drawer against the national bank, it was held that he could not recover; but that this bank had a lien upon the proceeds for a balance of ac- count against the banker from whom the bank received the draft. The bank received the draft without notice of the equities between the original parties, and thus became a bona fide holder of the draft for value. ^^ The possession of the paper by the bank transmitting it is regarded as prima facie evidence that it owned the paper; and the bank receiving it, having no notice to the contrary, is entitled so to treat it. § 259. Doctrine in New York. — This doctrine does not apply in New York, because under the rule established in Coddington v. Bay,^^ the taking of paper as security for, or in payment of, an antecedent debt, is not a valuable con- sideration therefor, and therefore a collecting bank not mak- ing any present advance upon their paper, or giving any 37Wyman V. Colorado Nat. Bank, 3320 Johns. (N. Y.) 637, 11 Am. 5 Colo. 30, 40 Am. Rep. 133. Dec. 342; Van Zandt v. Hanover 38In support of this rule see Nat. Bank, 149 Fed. 27. 79 C. C. A. Clark V. Merchants' Bank, 2 N. Y. 23. 380; Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 166, 17 L. ed. 681. § 26o LIENS. 268 new credit, or assuming any new responsibility on the faith of such paper, has no Hen upon it for a balance of account arising from previous dealings between the banks. ^"^ Where two banks acts as collecting agent for each other, keeping a running account and settling balances at stated intervals, and the collections not being kept separate from other funds of the bank, the relation between the banks is simply that of debtor and creditor. The creditor bank ac- quires no lien upon any specific fund, and upon the failure of the debtor bank, is not entitled to any preference over other creditors."*^ § 260. Lien on paper of a corresponding bank. — If a bank receives paper "for collection" from a corresponding bank, or with other notice that the paper does not belong to the latter, but that it is sent for collection for the account of a third person, such banker can not retain the paper or its proceeds to answer a balance owing by the corresponding banker. If the corresponding banker indorsed the paper "for collection," the negotiability is thereby limited to that pur- pose, and, notwithstanding the rule that one who has placed his name on negotiable paper shall not afterwards be al- lowed to impeach the instrument, the banker who has in- dorsed paper for collection is competent to prove that he w^as not the owner of it, and did not mean to give title to it or to its proceeds when collected. ^- The fact that a banker received the paper, with knowledge that it was indorsed for collection only, may appear other- 40McBride v. Farmers' Bank, 26 4i People v. City Bank of Roch- N. Y. 450. And see Lindauer v. ester, 93 N. Y. 582. Fourth Nat. Bank, 55 Barb. (N. -t^Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. (U. Y.) 75; Dod v. Fourth Nat. Bank, S.) 166, 17 L. ed. 681; Cecil Bank 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 265. As to the v. Farmers' Bank, 22 Md. 148. And rule in Coddington v. Bay, 20 see Bank of the Metropolis v. New Johns. (N. Y.) 637, 11 Am. Dec. Eng. Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212, 12 342, see Jones Collateral Securities L. ed. 409. (3d ed.), §§ 117-123. 269 banker's liens. § 261 wise than by an indorsement in terms for collection only. Such knowledge may be shown by any competent evidence. If the paper be indorsed in blank, and sent to a banker with a letter of instructions, in which it is stated that the paper is sent for collection, the banker is not an assignee of the paper, but merely an agent for its collection, and can not hold the paper or its proceeds for a general balance of ac- count due from the correspondent who sent it, and who was also an agent for collection. ^^ A banker's lien is sustained in such case upon the presump- tion that credit was given upon the faith of the securities, either in possession or in expectancy. If the banker has knowledge of circumstances which should put a prudent man upon inquiry as to the title of the securities, he is affected with notice of such facts as the inquiry would lead to.^* § 261. No lien where no advances are made. — The col- lecting bank can not, however, maintain a lien, if it has made no advances and given no credit to the corresponding bank on account of the paper received and collected. Where a bank employed to collect paper transmits it to another bank^ either by express authority or under authority implied from the usual course of trade, or from the nature of the trans- action, the principal may treat the latter bank as his agent, and, when it has received the money, may recover it in an action for money had and received. ^"^ Where there is no 43Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, effect it may have between them- 6 Conn. 521. The authorities re- selves, cannot affect the claims of lied upon in this case are Barker a third person, who has confided V. Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430; Herrick v. the collection of a bill to one of Carman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 224. them, without assent, either ex- Chief Justice Hosmer, giving press or implied, to the mode of the opinion, said : "The cus- transacting their business." torn of transmitting bills for -i-iRussell v. Hadduck, 3 Gilman collection from one bank to (111.) 233, 44 Am. Dec. 693. another, and crediting in ac- -JSWilson v. Smith, 3 How. (U. count the avails received, whatever S.) 763, 11 L. ed. 820. § 26l LIENS. 270 mntual arrangement between corresponding banks, or pre- vious course of dealing between them, whereby it is express- ly or impliedly understood that remittances of paper are to be placed to the credit of the remitting bank, or where there is no credit given upon the faith of the particular paper re- mitted, or of the usual course of dealing, the collecting bank has no lien upon the money collected in that manner; and the owner of the bill or note remitted for collection, through his banker, may recover the amount, although the collecting bank has placed the amount to the credit of the correspond- ing bank in payment of a subsisting indebtedness.^^ 46Millikin v. Shapleigh, 36 Mo. Barb. (N. Y.) 265; Lindauer v. 596, 88 Am. Dec. 171. And see, Fourth Nat. Bank, 55 Barb. (N. also, Dod V. Fourth Xat. Bank, 59 Y.) 75. CHAPTER VII CARRIERS' LIENS. Sec. Sec. 262. Lien of common carrier on 285. goods carried. 263. Origin of the lien. 286. 264. Rule in some states. 265. Carrier's lien, a specific lien. 287. 266. Condition giving carrier a lien. 288. 267. Stoppage in transitu not af- fected. 289. 268. Owner bound by carrier's lien. 290. 269. Carrier's lien on passenger's 291. baggage. 270. Lien of carrier by water. 292. 271. Lien for freight. 272. No lien under a charter 293. party. 273. Master signing bills of lad- 294. ing. 274. Terms of bill of lading. 295. 275. No lien before commence- ment of voyage. 296. 276. One not a common carrier has no lien without reserv- 297. ing it. 277. Lien of substitute carrier. 298. 278. Agent of bailee has no lien. 279. Goods of the United States. 299. 280. Insurance of goods. 280a. Lien only for usual freight 300. rate. 28L Carrier's lien for charges, 301. 282. No lien for demurrage im- plied. 283. Expenses of keeping proper- ty rejected. 302. 284. Carrier and warehouseman. 271 Local custom for carriers by water. No lien for transportation from a wharf. Shipowner's lien for ex- penses. Shipowner's lien for contri- butions. Carrier has lien for freight charges paid by it. Lien for import duties paid. First carrier a forwarding agent. Authority of carriers to for- ward goods. Connecting carrier has no Hen. Guaranty not binding on connecting carrier. Xo lien where freight is pre- paid. Way-bill accompanying goods. First carrier receiving pay- ment. Carrier employed by another carrier has lien. Lien only for customary freight rate. Second carrier bound by first carrier's agreement. Lien does not cover ad- vances for matters not connected with the car- riage. Damage to goods before reaching last carrier. § 262 LIENS. 272 Sec. Sec. 303. Lien on stolen goods. 321. 304. American decisions. 305. Carrier's lien on goods 322. wrongfully diverted. 323. 306. Apparent authority of ship- per. 324. 307. The carrier's lien can not be set up by a wrongdoer. 325. 308. Carrier may waive lien. 309. Carrier's lien continues on 326. goods placed in warehouse. 327. 310. Carrier's Hen lost by deliv- 328. ery. 329. 311. Delivery to the consignee upon condition. 330. 312. Nature of delivery necessary to terminate lien. 331. 313. Payment of freight and de- livery of goods. 332. 314. Terms of charter party may be such that chartered freight will not be due un- 332a til cargo has been deliv- ered. 333. 315. Cargo in hands of consignee. 334. 316. Promise to pay carrier not presumed from taking pos- 335. session. 317. Lien continues when posses- 336. sion is secured by fraud. 318. No lien where goods are de- 337. livered through mistake. 319. The carrier has a lien upon 338. all the goods carried. 320. Delivery of part of the goods 339. not a waiver. Separate liens on separate goods. Lien waived by contract. Extension of time of pay- ment. Promissory note does not afifect carrier's lien. When carrier has no lien for freight charges. Waiver of carrier's lien. W^aiver of lien not inferred. Waiver by attachment. Action to collect freight charges. Waiver by issuance of an ex- ecution. Lien defeated by injury to goods. Carrier's lien not affected by consignee's failure to re- ceive goods. Condition precedent to car- rier's lien. Carrier's lien lost. Claiming general Hen does not waive special lien. Carrier's lien founded on possession. Sale of goods by carrier au- thorized by statutes. Sale by carrier must be made in good faith. Sale by carrier of perishable goods. Statute of the United States. § 262. Lien of common carrier on goods carried. — A common carrier has a particular or specific lien upon the goods carried for his hire in carrying them.^ He is invested 1 Skinner v. Upshaw, 2 Ld. 5 Wall. (U. S.) 545, 18 L. ed 662; Raym. 752; Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Ames v. Palmer, 42 Maine 197, 66 Salk. 249; Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Am. Dec. 271; Wilson v. Grand Salk. 282; The Bird of Paradise, Trunk R. Co., 56 Maine 60, 96 273 carriers' liens. § 263 with this peculiar privilege, it is said, on account of his obli- gation to receive and carry any goods offered, and his lia- bility for their safety in the course of transportation.^ He is necessarily in possession of the goods, and, at the end of the journey, he is allowed to retain possession until he re- ceives a reasonable remuneration for his services. The car- rier's right to retain the goods until he is paid for his services is his lien. This right is merely a right of possession. The property is necessarily supposed to be in some other person. One can not have a lien upon his own property. The lien confers no right of property. It does not enable the car- rier to sell the goods, except as he is authorized to do so by some modern statute, even though the keeping of them be attended with expense and inconvenience.^ The lien merely confers a right of possession until the charges for carriage are paid. This right avails against the true owner of the goods, though some one else be liable for the freight, unless they have been shipped in fraud of the owner.^ § 263. Origin of the lien. — As regards the origin of this lien and the reasons for its existence, it does not seem neces- sary to go beyond the common-law principle that a bailee of goods who alters or improves their condition is entitled to a Am. Dec. 35; Sullivan v. Park, 33 Hilton, 11 Ohio 303; Sutton v. St. Maine 38; Hunt v. Haskett, 24 Louis & S. F. R, Co., 159 Mo. App. Maine 339, 41 Am. Dec. 387; Pin- 685, 140 S. W. 76. A tender to the ney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104; Galena carrier for the correct amount due & Chicago Union R. Co. v. Rae, as freight will discharge the car- 18 III. 488, 68 Am. Dec. 574; Clark- rier's lien. Brown v. Philadelphia son V. Edes, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 470; B. & W. R. Co.. 36 App. D. C. Langworthy v. N. Y. & Harlem R. 221. Co., 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 195; 2 Per Holt, C. J., in Yorke v. Barker v. Havens, 17 Johns. (N. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, per Y.) 234, 8 Am. Dec. 393; Rucker Lord Ellenborough, in Rushforth V. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251, 19 Am. v. Hatfield, 6 East 519. Rep. 84; Brown v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 3 See post, §§ 335-374. 564; Boggs v. Martin, 13 B. Mon. -t Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. (Ky.) 239; Goodman v. Stewart, (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54. Wright (Ohio) 216; Bowman v. 18 § 264 LIENS. 274 Hen on them for his compensation. The reason assigned for the existence of the lien, that carriers are bound to carry for any persons who may require them to do so, does not apply to carriers by water, who, nevertheless, have a lien for carry- ing goods. This lien for the freight of goods carried by sea does not depend upon any peculiar maritime law or custom. It is a common-law lien as much as is the lien given to car- riers by land; and the common-law principle whicl> lies at the foundation of most common-law liens is suf^cient to justify the lien of carriers by land, and carriers by water as well. § 264. Rule in some states. — In several states the car- rier's lien is declared by statute. The statutes of these states differ much in the terms in which the lien is declared. Some of them materially change the common-law rules, and there- fore it seems important to give a synopsis of these statutes. In Alaska any person who is a common carrier or who shall, at the request of the owner or lawful possessor of any personal property, carry, convey, or transport the same from one place to another, shall have a lien upon such property for his just and reasonable charges for the labor, care and attention he has bestowed and the food he has furnished, and he may retain possession of such property until such charges be paid.'*'' In California,^ North Dakota and South Dakota,*^ every person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal property, renders any service to the owner thereof, by labor or skill, employed for the protection, improvement, safe-keeping, or carriage thereof, has a special lien thereon, dependent on possession, for the compensation, if any, which is due to him from the owner for such service. ■*a Carter's Ann. Codes 1900, p. § 2144 as amended by Stats, and 414, § 277. Amends. Codes 1909, p. 1000. 5 Civ. Code 1906, § 3051, as « North Dakota Rev. Code 1905, amended by Stats, and Amends. §§ 5661, 6286; South Dakota Rev. Codes 1907, p. 85. See also, Code (Civ.) 1903, § 2153. 2/5 carriers' liens. § 264 In Colorado'^ and Wyoming^ every common carrier of goods or passengers who shall, at the request of the owner of any personal goods, carry, convey or transport the same from one place to another, and any warehouseman or other person who shall safely keep or store any personal property, at the request of the owner or persons lawfully in possession thereof, shall in like manner have a lien upon all such per- sonal property, for his reasonable charges for the transpor- tation, storage, or keeping thereof, and for all reasonable and proper advances made thereon by him in accordance with the usage and custom of common carriers and ware- housemen. In Georgia^ a carrier has a lien for freight upon the goods carried, and may retain them until the freight is paid, un- less this right is waived by special contract or actual deliv- ery. But such lien does not arise until the carrier has com- plied with his contract as to transportation. He can, how- ever, recover pro rata for the actual distance the goods are carried, when the consignee voluntarily receives the goods at an intermediate point. In Iowa ^^ personal property transported by, or stored or left with, any warehouseman, forwarding and commission merchant, express company, carrier or bailee for hire is sub- ject to a lien for the lawful charges on the same, and for the transportation, advances, and storage thereof. In Louisiana^^ carriers' charges and the accessory ex- penses are a privilege on the thing carried, including neces- sary charges and expenses paid by carriers, such as taxes, storage, and privileged claims required to be paid before moving the thing. 7 Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 4.569. also, Laws 1907, ch. 160, § 27; Laws sComp. Stats. 1910, § 3756. 1911, ch. 155, § 26. 9 Code 1911, § 2741. 11 Merrick's Rev. Code 1900, § 10 Code Ann. 1897, § 3130. See 3217, art. 9. § 265 LIENS. 276 In New Mexico^^ common carriers have a lien on the things carried for the freight due, if payment of freight was to have been made on delivery of the things carried. All persons carrying goods for hire or pay are deemed common carriers. In Minnesota^^ and Oregon^"* any person who is a com- mon carrier, and any person who, at the request of the owner or lawful possessor of any personal property, carries, conveys, or transports the same from one place to another, and any person who safely keeps or stores any personal property, at the request of the owner, or lawful possessor thereof, shall have a lien and power of sale for the satisfac- tion of his reasonable charges, but a voluntary surrender of possession shall extinguish the lien herein given. In Montana, ^^* a carrier has a lien for freightage, which is regulated by the laws on liens. In Utah any railroad company or other common carrier except an express company, after the failure of the owner or consignee for sixty days to receive freight or baggage and pay the charges may place the same in storage, and the per- son or company receiving the same shall have a lien for the charges of the carrier and for storage. ^° The liens of carriers are also in other states either ex- pressly or incidentally recognized in the statutory provis- ions authorizing the sale of goods by carriers, and the sat- isfaction of their charges out of the proceeds. § 265. Carrier's lien, a specific lien. — The carrier's lien is a particular or specific lien, attaching only to the specific goods in his possession, and in general secures only the un- paid price for the carriage of those specific goods. ^^ It is i2Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2244, i4a Civ. Code 1895, § 2848. 2245, 3873. isComp. Laws 1907, § 1416. 13 Laws 1907, ch. 114. 16 Butler v. Woolcott, 2 B. & P. i4BeIHnger & Cotton's Ann. (N. R.) 64; Hartshorne v. John- Codes and Stats. 1902, §§ 5674, son. 7 N. J. L. 108; Leon- 5675. ard's Exrs. v. Winslow, 2 2^]^ carriers' liens. § 265 only by express agreement, or by an agreement implied from the general usage of trade, or from previous dealings between the same parties, that his lien can be extended to cover his general balance of account. ^^ The claim of a lien for a general balance is not encouraged by the courts. ^^ Such usage must be proved by clear and satisfactory in- stances, sufficiently numerous and general to warrant a con- clusion affecting the custom of the country. A few instances of such a usage will not serve to establish the requisite proof of it.^^ Thus, proof of instances of such a usage by carrier in a particular part of the country for ten or twelve years, and in one instance so far back as thirty years, though not opposed by other evidence, was regarded by the King's Bench as insufficient to establish a general usage. Lord Ellenborough, referring to the evidence in this case, said:-*^ "In many cases it would happen that parties would be glad to pay small sums due for the carriage of former goods, rather than incur the risk of a great loss by the detention of goods of value. Much of the evidence is of that description. Other instances again were in the case of solvent persons, who were at all events liable to answer for their general balance. And little or no stress could be laid on some of Grant Cas. (Pa.) 139. The i» Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East carrier's lien in the absence 519, 2 Smith 634; Whitehead v. of contract is only for the charges Vaughan, 6 East 523n; Holderness on the goods shipped and not for \. Collison, 7 B. & C. 212; Kirk- the shipment of previous goods. man v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 14. Atlas S. S. Co. V. Colombian Land -O Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East Co., 102 Fed. 358, 42 C. C. A. 398. 224, 3 Smith 221. The words of I'i'Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East Lord Ellenborough seem to imply 519, 7 East 224, 2 Smith 634; his opinion that notice of the Wright V. Snell, 5 B. & A. D. 350: usage to the party dealing with a Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Am. Oil carrier might create a general lien; Works Co., 126 Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl but in the same case Gosse, L. J., 671, 12 Am. St. 885. said: "I take it to be sound law 18 Holderness v. Collison, 7 B. that no such lien can exist except & C. 212; Aspinwall v. Hickford, by the contract of the parties, ex- 3 B. & P. 44n. press or implied." § 266 LIENS. 278 the more recent instances not brought home to the knowK edge of the bankrupt at the time. Most of the evidence therefore is open to observation. If indeed there had been evidence of prior dealings between these parties upon the footing of such an extended lien, that would have furnished good evidence for the jury to have found that they continued to deal upon the same terms. But the question for the jury here was, whether the evidence of a usage for the carrier to retain for their balance was so general as that the bankrupt must be taken to have known and acted upon it? And they have in effect found either that the bankrupt knew of no such usage as that which was given in evidence, or know- ing, did not adopt it." No usage can enable the carrier to retain the goods as against a consignee to whom they belong, for debts due him from the shipper.^^ § 266. Condition giving carrier a lien. — A condition or provision in a contract giving the carrier a general lien must be clearly brought home to the knowledge of the customer. It seems proper that the carrier's right to create a lien for his general balance should be restricted in the same way that his right to limit his common-law liability is restricted; that is to say, it should be incumbent upon the carrier, in case he attempts to make any change from the usual mode of dealing, to bring home to his customers such notice or knowledge of the charge as warrants the implication of a contract to that effect. An agreement by a trader with a railway company providing for a general lien does not apply, after the trader's failure, to goods sent to the company by a receiver and manager appointed to carry on the trader's business in liquidation; and if such receiver, in order to ob- tain a delivery of such goods, pays under protest a prior 21 Wright V. Snell, 5 B. & Aid. (N. Car.) 99; Butler v. Woolcott, 350; Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bing. 2 B. & P. (N. R.) 64. 279 carriers' liens. § 267 indebtedness of the trader to the company, the company is liable in a proper action for the repayment of the amount so paid.^^ If the carrier demands a further sum besides the freight, or any charge connected with the carriage of the goods, and refuses to deliver them unless such further sum is first paid, the consignee, who is ready to pay the freight, is not bound to tender this to the carrier before bringing trover. The carrier's refusal to give up the goods, except upon receiving a payment he had no right to demand, is evidence of a con- version.^^ A common carrier cannot seize goods while in transit for a debt due himself wholly unconnected with the shipment. He cannot by his own act prevent himself from performing his contract, and then plead his own act as an excuse for not performing it.^* § 267. Stoppage in transitu not affected. — A consignor's right of stoppage in transitu is not affected by an agreement for a general lien, such as a contract, express or implied, between the consignee of goods and the carrier, that the latter shall have a lien for a general balance of account. -■" -- Ex parte Great Western R. sylvania R. Co. v. Am. Oil-Works Co., L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 470. 126 Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. 671, 12 Am. 23 Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. St. 885: "When the consignor ex- (Mass.) 215, 57 Am. Dec. 41. The ercised his right of stoppage, the further sum demanded by the car- goods were deliverable to him, and rier in this case was for the pas- the carrier's right of detention de- sage of a third party, the con- pended on the relations thus cre- signor's son, who accompanied the ated. It the consignor was not goods. debtor for previous carriage, and -•* Pharr v. Collins, 35 La. Ann. had not contracted that these 939, 48 Am. Rep. 251. goods might be retained from him 25 Wright V. Snell, 5 B. & Aid. for such debt, then the carrier's 350; Potts V. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., lien did not extend beyond the 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. Rep. 247; charges applicable to the goods Farrel v. Richmond & D. R. Co., stopped, and on payment or tender 102 N. Car. 390, 9 S. E. 302, 3 L. of these he was entitled to a de- R. A. 647, 11 Am. St. 760; Penn- livery of the goods. If the right 268 LIENS. 280 A usage for carriers to retain goods, as a lien for a general balance of account between them and the consignees, does not affect the right of the consignor to stop the goods in transitu.-^ § 268. Owner bound by carrier's lien. — But the owner of goods who stops them in transitu is bound by the carrier's specific lien, and cannot take the goods from him without first paying or tendering the freight thereon. -'^ § 269. Carrier's lien on passenger's baggage. — This lien attaches in favor of a carrier of passengers to the luggage of a passenger, either to secure the payment of his fare, or charges for extra luggage. ^^ Upon a railroad the lien at- taches not only to luggage which the passenger delivers to the company's servants to be marked and carried as such, but also to whatever the passenger takes with him as lug- of the carrier to extend its lien by contract with the owner to the general balance due from such owner be conceded, as it may be, still the lien is confined to the goods of such owner. The goods which by the exercise of the right of stoppage become those of the consignor can not be made subject to a lien for the debt of the con- signee." Per Williams, J. 26 Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 508, 7 Scott 577; Pennsyl- vania R. Co. V. Am. Oil Works, 126 Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. 671, 12 Am. St. 885; Hays v. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48. 2" Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. (V. S.) 53, 15 L. ed. 47; The Eddy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 481, 18 L. ed. 4.%; The Volunteer, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 551, Fed. Cas. No. 16991; Chandler V. Belden, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 157; Potts V. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. Rep. 247; Cow- ing V. Snow, 11 Mass. 415; Penn- sylvania Steel Co. V. Georgia Rail- road & Banking Co., 94 Ga. 636, 21 S. E. 577. 2SWolf V. Summers, 2 Camp. 631. "There is no reason why there should not be the same lien for the recovery of passage money as for the recovery of freight." Per Lawrence, J. Woods v. Devin, 13 ni. 746, 56 Am. Dec. 483, per Treat, C. J. ; Nordemeyer v. Loescher, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 499; Southwestern R. Co. V. Bently, 51 Ga. 311; Hutch- ings V. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 25 Ga. 61, 71 Am. Dec. 156. In Cal- ifornia: so declared by the Code, § 2191 of Civ. Code of 1906. Also in Georgia: Code 1911, § 3360. 28 1 . carriers' liens. § 270 gage into the passenger coach; for this is considered so far in the possession of the agents of the company as to author- ize it to exercise the right of detainer for the passenger's fare, or for freight upon the article itself.-^ If a person goes to a coach office and has a place booked for him in a particular coach, and leaves his portmanteau, the carrier has a lien upon this for some part, but not the full amount, of the regular fare,^^ in case the passenger does not occupy his place. But if a person merely leaves his port- manteau at the coach office, w^hile he goes to inquire if there is an earlier coach, and no place is actually booked for him, the coach proprietor has no lien at all.^^ § 270. Lien of carrier by water. — Carriers by water have a lien as well as carriers by land. A ship owner has a lien for freight upon the goods carried, whether the vessels be chart- ered, or be general ships carrying goods for all persons for hire. The master is not bound to deliver possession of any part of his cargo until the freight and other charges due in respect of such part are paid.^- This lien may be regarded as a maritime lien, because it is recognizable in the admiralty, and, under the usages of commerce, arises independently of the agreement of the parties. The ship owner may retain the goods until the freight is paid, or he may enforce it by a -OHutchings v. Western & At- Mass. 12; Cowing v. Snow, 11 lantic R. Co., 25 Ga. 61', 71 Am. Mass. 415; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Dec. 156. Maine 339, 41 Am. Dec. 387; Froth- 30Higgins v. Bretherton, 5 C. & ingham v. Jenkins, 1 Cal. 42, 52 P. 2. Am. Dec. 286; Green v. Campbell, siHiggins v. Bretherton, 5 C. & 52 Cal. 586. In Hlinois it is pro- P. 2. vided by statute that there shall 32Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore also be a lien upon "goods, wares, P. C. 361 ; Phillips v. Rodie, 15 and merchandise shipped, taken in. East 547; Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. and put aboard any water craft for (U. S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662; The Vol- sums due for freight, advanced unteer, 1 Sum. (U. S.) 551, Fed. charges and demurrage." Kurd's Cas. No. 16991 ; Lane v. Penniman, Rev. Stats. 1912, p. 100, § 2. 4 Mass. 91; Lewis v. Hancock, 11 § 2/1 LIENS. • 282 proceeding in rem in the admiralty court. ^" But although the lien is maritime and cognizable in the admiralty, it stands upon the same ground with the common-law lien of the car- rier on land, is subject to the same principles except as re- gards enforcement, and may therefore be considered in con- nection with the liens of carriers by land.^^ §271. Lien for freight. — There is ordinarily a lien for freight under a charter-party. This lien arises in- dependently of the express terms of the charter-party, unless these are inconsistent with it; and it exists even where the charter freight is a fixed sum, having no direct relation to the quantity of goods carried. Whatever be the contract, if the ship owner undertakes to carry the goods and not mere- ly to lease his ship, it seems that there is a lien for freight. ^^ The substance of the charter-party is considered, and not the form of it. If the ship be clearly leased to the charterer, there can be no lien, because the hirer is in exclusive pos- session for the term.^^ But the nature of the service is to be considered, as well as the terms of the charter-party, in determining whether the ship owner has parted with pos- session. Where there is no express demise of the ship and the nature of the service does not show that the charterer w^as to have possession, he does not become the owner for the voyage ; but the possession continues in the ship owner, and he may have a lien on the cargo for his freight. ^^ ssBird of Paradise, 5 Wall. (U. 35Carver's Carriage of Goods by S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662, per Clifford, Sea, § 655; Tate v. Meek, 8 Taunt. J.; The Volunteer, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 280. 551, Fed. Cas. No. 16991; Certain 36Hutton v. Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14, Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. (U. 2 Marsh. 339. And see Vallejo v. S.) 589, Fed. Cas. No. 2559. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143; Trinity 34Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. (U. House v. Clarke, 4 M. & S. 288. S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662, per Clifford, 37Saville v. Campion, 2 B. & J.; Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (U. Aid. 503. S.) 108, per Taney, C. J. See post, § 1720. 283 carriers' liens. § 273 § 272. No lien under a charter-party. — Under a charter- party for the voyage the ship owner generally has no lien on goods shipped by the charterer, because he is considered the owner for the voyage, and the ship owner has no pos- session of the ship or goods sufficient to maintain a lien.^^ But where the charter-party expressly reserves to the ship- owner a lien on the lading of the ship, the charterer in effect covenants that, whatever may be the lagal operation of the charter-part}^ as between themselves, the charterer's pos- session of the ship shall be the owner's possession, so far as the right of the latter to a lien on the cargo is concerned, and he may assert his lien as against the cargo, though this belongs to the charterer. ^^ If the latter sells the cargo dur- ing the voyage, the purchaser, with notice of the charter party, takes it subject to the lien in favor of the ship owner to which it was subject before the sale. The lien remains good even against an indorsee of the bill of lading with no- tice. ^<* § 273. Master signing bills of lading. — If the master, be- ing the agent of the ship owner, signs bills of lading for the goods of third persons, or bills of lading which are transferred to others, subject only to the freight specified therein, and not expressly reserving a lien to the ship owner for the charter freight, the ship owner is regarded as having waived his lien under the charter party, and he is estopped from en- forcing such lien beyond the freight specified in the bills of lading, though this may be less than the charter freight. Third persons are authorized to deal with the holder of such bills of lading on the basis of the freight therein specified.'*^ ssHutton V. Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14, rendered by Tindal, C. J., in this 2 Marsh. 339; Belcher v. Capper. 4 case, are not qualified as in the M. & G. 502. text above, and are not in accord 39Small V. Moates, 9 Bing. 579. with later decisions. 40Small V. Moates, 9 Bing. 574. •iiposter v. Colby. 28 L. J. Ex. Some passages in the judgment 81; Gardner v. Trechmann, 15 Q. § 274 LIENS, 284 The goods of third persons shipped in a general ship are not affected by a claim in a charter-party, of which he has no notice or knowledge, giving the ship owner a lien on all the cargo and freight for arrears of hire due to him under the charter-party,^- A shipper is not bound to assume that there is a charter-party, and he is not bound by its contents until he is put upon inquiry,^^ But if the charterer of a ship, under a charter-party giving the owner a lien on any part of the cargo for all the freight, fraudulently issues a bill of lading for the goods of a third party, using the master's name without his knowledge or authority, who had no knowl- edge of the charter-party, the goods are subject to the lien given by the charter-party.^^ And so if the master of a ship coUusively issues bills of lading to shippers with the purpose of depriving the ship owner of his lien, the latter may nevertheless detain the goods for the freight due under the charter-party.^'' And so, if the master acts without authority in issuing bills of lading which make the freight payable to third persons, the ship owner may still have a lien on the goods for the balance of the charter freight. ^*^ It is not in the power of the master to charge the charter-party so as to release the charterer from his contract with the owner, and deprive the latter of his lien on the cargo for his freight. All the power delegated to the master while the charter-party continues to operate, is to perform the undertakings of the owner in the fulfilment of the contract.''" § 274. Terms of bill of lading. — The bill of lading may by its terms incorporate the charter party, or a provision of it B. Div. 154; Mitchell v. Scaife, 4 44The Karo, 29 Fed. 652. Camp. 298; Chappel v. Comfort, 31 -i^Faith v. East India Co., 4 B. L. J. C. P. 58; The Karo, 29 Fed. & Aid. 630. 652. ■lOReynolds v. Jex, 34 L. J. Q. B. -tsThe Stornoway, 46 L. T. Hi. 251'. 43Per Lord Romilly, in Peek v. ^TQracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. (U. Larsen, 12 Eq. 378. S.) 605, 5 L. ed. 696. 285 carriers' liens. § 274 giving a lien for freight, so that the owner's lien for charter freight will be preserved.'*^ A provision, however, that freight shall be paid as per charter-party may mean onh'- that freight is payable at the rate mentioned in the charter- party, so that the lien would be limited to such rate,^^ and further liens given by the charter-party would not be pre- served.^*^ Under such a general reference to the charter- party, a lien given by that for dead freight, or demurrage, does not attach as against holders of the bills of I'ading who have no other knowledge of the provisions of the char- ter-party.^^ A charter-party expressly provided that the owner should have a lien on the cargo for freight, dead freight, and de- murrage, and also provided that the captain should sign bills of lading at any rate of freight: "but, should the total freight, as per bills of lading, be under the amount estimated to be earned by this charter, the captain to demand payment of any difference in advance." Goods were shipped and a bill of lading issued whereby freight was made payable at a less rate than that provided for by the charter party; the bill of lading also containing a clause providing that extra expenses should be borne by the receivers, and "other conditions as per charter party." Upon the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, the owner claimed and compelled payment at the rate mentioned in the charter-party. In a suit by the consignees to recover the excess paid above the freight specified in the bill of lading, it was held^^ that the bill of lading did not incorporate the stipulation of the charter- party as to the payment of freight ; that no right of lien 48Porteus V. Watney, 3 Q. B. ^oSmith v. Sieveking. 5 E. & B. Div. 223; Wegener v. Smith, 24 L. 589. J. C. P. 25; Gray v. Carr, L. R. 6 ^1 McLean v. Fleming. L. R. 2 Q. B. 522. H. L. (Scotch) 128; Chappel v. -i^Fry V. Chartered Mercantile Comfort, 31 L. J. C. P. 58. Bank, L. R. 1 C. P. 689. 52Gardner v. Trechmann, 15 Q. B. Div. 154. §2/5 LIENS. 286 existed for the difference between the freight under the charter-party and that payable under the bill of lading; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to delivery of the goods upon payment of the freight specified in the bill of lading. Brett, M. R., said: *'In the first place, I am of opinion that the charter-party gave no right of lien for that difference ; the excess of the amount estimated to ])e earned by the charter- party over the freight payable under the bills of lading was to be paid immediately before the ship sailed; it was to be demanded by the captain; the ship owner had no right of lien for that excess even against the charterer; the stipulation was a mere reservation of a right which the ship owner could not enforce by lien. Secondly, if the right of lien ever existed, it was ousted by the terms of the bill of lading. There are many cases as to what is brought into the bill of lading by this general reference to the charter-party. It brings in only those clauses of the charter-party which are applicable to the contract contained in the bill of lading; and those clauses of the charter-party can not be brought in which w^ould alter the express stipulations in the bill of lading." § 275. No lien before commencement of voyage. — A ship owner has no lien for freight, before the commencement of the voyage, on goods taken on board the ship. If the owner of the goods sells them before the voyage begins, and gives an order for their delivery to the purchaser, the shipowner can not detain them for the freight under an agreement for a charter-party made with the vendor, the charter-party never having been executed in accordance with the agreement. The purchaser is entitled to the goods, and the shipowner must look to the vendor for damages for violation of the contract. ^^ A carrier or other person who has undertaken to perform a definite service in the carriage of goods can not claim a 53Burgess v. Gun, 3 Har. & J. (Md.) 225. 287 carriers' liens. § 276 lien if he has failed to perform his contract. Thus, if he has undertaken to haul all the logs upon a certain lot within a certain time, and only partly performs the contract, he can not hold the logs he has hauled on the ground of a lien for the service he has done.^* It would seem, however, that there is no good reason for any legal distinction in this respect between a private carrier and a common carrier. § 276. One not a common carrier has no lien without re- serving it. — One who is not a public or common carrier, but specially undertakes to carry particular goods for hire, is said to have no lien for his services, unless he specially re- serves it by agreement. But if he holds himself out to the public as a carrier for hire, he is as much a common carrier on his first trip as on any subsequent one, and is entitled to a lien for his services. ^^ Upon general principles, however, there seems to be no reason why a private carrier should not have a lien for per- forming services similar to those rendered by a public car- rier. His services go to increase the value of the thing car- ried, in the same manner that a mechanic adds to the value of a chattel by his labor upon it. The old notion of the origin of the lien, that it is a privilege given to a carrier on account of his obligation to receive and carry any goods offered, nec- essarily confined the lien to public carriers. We have already suggested doubts whether this should be accounted the true foundation for this lien; and it is admitted that all car- riers by water have the lien, whether they be public or private carriers. The usage, moreover, seems now to be common that private carriers by land may demand and receive the same lien that is given to common carriers. The statutes of 54Hodgdon v. Waldron, 9 N. H. (Ind.) 465; Caye v. Pool's Assig- 66. nee. 108 Ky. 124, 21 Ky. L. 1600, 55Fuller V. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 55 S. W. 887, 49 L. R. A. 251, 94 120; Picquet v. M'Kay, 2 Blackf. Am. St. 348. § 277 LIENS. 288 several states recognizing or declaring carriers' liens make no distinction between public carriers and private carriers. It seems that where logs have been transported by being towed through a canal or river, or rafted together and floated, the person performing the service has a lien upon the logs for his compensation, upon the same principle which gives a lien for the freight of goods forwarded by ordinary convey- ances.^*' A lumberman who carries lumber for hire upon a river, though not a common carrier, has a lien in the same way that a carrier by water, who is not a common carrier, has a lien. § 277. Lien of substitute carrier. — One substituted in the carrier's right occupies his place, but can occupy no better position. An offtcer levied upon goods which the consignor had stopped in transitu, and paid the carrier's charges. The consignor thereupon took the goods from the officer upon a writ of replevin, and the officer neither demanded the freight charges paid by him, nor in any way placed his right to retain possession upon the ground of the carrier's lien. It was held that he could not afterwards set up a claim of lien for such charges in defense to the suit.^" ^^Wing V. Griffin, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 162; In re Coumbe, 24 Grant (Ont.) Ch. 519. See Hodg- don V. Waldron, 9 N. H. 66. 57Keep Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 285. The case of Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84, is criticised. In that case, the officer attached the goods under the same circum- stances as stated in the text, and paid the carrier's charges. It was rightly declared by the court that the officer was justified in paying them, and was substituted to all the rights of the carrier. It was further held that, before the of- ficer's possession could be dis- turbed, he must be reimbursed for the money so advanced by him. But it does not appear by the facts stated, whether the officer demand- ed repayment of such advances, or disclosed the fact that he had paid them. Under these circumstances, the court, in the Tennessee case, say that there may have been facts which justified the decision, but that the facts stated do not justi- fy it. 289 carriers' liens. § 279 § 278. Agent of bailee has no lien. — A carrier acting solely for the bailee or lessee of goods has no lien upon them as against the owner. Thus, a carrier employed to move house- hold goods, including a leased sewing-machine, can not assert any lien for his services upon such sewing-machine as against the owners. ^^ A carrier received goods from commission merchants for transportation to Europe, knowing, or having reason to know, that the merchants were acting merely as agents for the owner, and, upon the failure of the commission house, the owner demanded the goods of the carrier, who claimed a lien upon them, and refused to deliver them. In an action of replevin to recover the goods, it appeared that the com- mission merchants had no authority to bind the owner by the contract of freight made by them, and that, inasmuch as the carrier was put upon inquiry as to the agency and authority of the commission merchants, the owner was not bound by the contract they had made with the carrier, and that the owner could maintain the action without paying or tender- ing the carrier's charges. "'^'•^ § 279. Goods of the United States. — There can be no lien upon goods belonging to the United States, or any other sovereignty, for services rendered by a carrier in transport- ing such goods. ^^ i'^Gilson V. Gwinn, 107 Mass. 126, subsequent lien for materials. The 9 Am. Rep. V3. The same rule was Great West No. Two v. Obern- applied to the lien of a pilot on a dorf, 57 111. 168. vessel for his pilotage, where per- ^*JHayes v. Campbell, 63 Gal. 143. sons not authorized by the owner 60£)ufolt v. Gorman, 1 Minn, took command of the vessel and (Gil. 234) 301, 66 Am. Dec. 543. carried her out of the regular And see The Siren, 7 Wall. (U. course of the voyage. The Anne, S.) 152, 19 L. ed. 129; The Davis, 1 Mason (U. S.) 508, Fed. Gas. No. 10 Wall. (U. S.) 15, 19 L. ed. 875; 412. The same rule is applied to United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumn. the lien of a keeper of ani- (U. S.) 308, Fed. Gas. No. 16694; mals. In like manner the mort- Briggs v. Light Boat Upper Gedar gage of a vessel is superior to a Point, 11 Allen (Mass.) 157. Gon- 19 § 28o LIENS. 290 § 280. Insurance of goods. — An insurance against fire ef- fected by carriers "on goods their own, and in trust as car- riers," in a warehouse, covers the whole value of goods in their hands as carriers, and also any interest they have in them for their lien as carriers.''^ In Louisiana^- it is provided by statute that there shall be a privilege for money paid by the carrier for prior neces- sary charges and expenses, such as taxes, storage, and privi- leged claims required to be paid before moving goods; and in case the thing carried be lost or destroyed without the fault of the carrier, this privilege for money paid by the carrier shall attach to the insurance effected on the thing for the benefit of the owner; provided written notice of the amount so paid by the carrier, and for whose account, with a descrip- tion of the property lost or destroyed, be given to the insurer or his agent within thirty days after the loss; or, if it be impracticable to give the notice in that time, it shall be sufficient to give the notice at any time before the money is paid over. § 280a. Lien only for usual freight rate. — In the absence of an express contract, the lien is for the usual and proper rate of freight. If there was a misunderstanding as to the amount of the charge, the carrier may hold the goods for the usual freight, though a smaller rate was named to the shipper. Thus a shipper at the freight office of a railroad asked the freight cashier the rate to a place named. The cashier, not knowing the rate, repeated the question to the way-bill clerk, who, on account of noise, misunderstood the cashier, and gave an erroneous rate. His only means of knowing the rate was by reference to the tariff-sheet which hung in the office for the convenient use and information tra, Union Pacific R. Co. v. 62Merricks Rev. Civ. Code 1900, United States, 2 Wyo. 170. § 3217, art. 9. 61 London & N. W. R. Co. v. Glyn, 1 El. & El. 652. 291 carriers' liens. § 281 of all shippers, the rates in which could not be changed by any employe. The cashier's duties did not require him to know the rate. On the erroneous answer of the way-bill clerk, the cashier figured up the amount of plaintiff's ship- ment, who afterward delivered his goods, paid the amount to the railroad company, and requested shipment to the place named. Shortly thereafter the error was discovered, but the shipper could not be found, and the goods were forwarded with instructions to the agent at the place of delivery to hold them for the additional charges based on the correct rate, and which were fair and reasonable, and would have been paid by plaintiff if he had been correctly informed be- fore shipment. The shipper refused to pay additional charges, demanded the goods, and sued for conversion. It was held, that there was no contract of shipment, and the railroad company was entitled to hold the goods until it received its reasonable charges for transportation.^^ § 281. Carrier's lien for charges. — A carrier has no lien for charges not connected with the transportation of the goods, and not within the contemplation of the parties.®* Thus, ordinarily, a carrier has no lien for the storage of goods which he has carried, unless there be a special contract allowing him to charge for storage. ^^ Nor has he a lien upon 63Rowland v. New York, N. H. Atl. 1060, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327, & H. R. Co., 61 Conn. 103, 23 110 Am. St. 550. See post, § 297. Atl. 755, 29 Am. St. 175; Thomas 64Lambert v. Robinson, 1 Esp. V. Frankfort & C. R. Co., 116 Ky. 119; Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. 879, 25 Ky. Law 1051, 1(> S. W. (Mass.) 215, 57 Am. Dec. 41; Great 1093; Savannah F. & W. R. Co. Northern R. Co. v. Swaffield L. R. V. Bundick, 94 Ga. 775, 21 S. E. 9 Ex. 132, per Pollock, B. The car- 995; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co. rier can have no lien on the bag- V. Hubbell, 54 Kans. 232, 38 Pac. gage of a passenger for the fare 266; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. of the owner's infant child trav- Dobbins, 23 Ky. Law 1588, 65 S. eling with her. Cantwell v. Ter- W. 334; Nicolette Lumber Co. v. minal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 160 People's Coal Co., 26 Pa. Super. Mo. App. 393, 140 S. W. 966. Ct. 575, reversed, 213 Pa. 379, 62 c^Lambert v. Robinson, 1 Esp. § 282 LIENS. 292 goods for damages arising from the consignee's neglect to take them away within a reasonable time after notice to him of their arrival. Thus, a railroad company can not retain goods to satisfy a charge for the detention of cars by the failure of the consignee to remove the goods after notice; for the claim is in the nature of demurrage, and no lien exists for this. Such detention is a breach of contract sim- ply, for which, as in case of a contract in reference to pilot- age or port charges, the party must seek his redress in the ordinary manner. He can not enforce it by detaining the goods.®® § 282. No lien for demurrage implied. — A lien for demur- rage in favor of carriers by land is not implied by law, and can not be asserted except by virtue of an express agree- ment, or of a custom so recognized as to have the force of a contract. The rules and regulations of a railroad company, providing for a lien for demurrage, though published, are not binding upon the consignor or consignee of goods with- out their consent, or the consent of one of them, when the contract for shipping the goods was made. Even the knowl- edge of such rules by the shipper or consignee, without as- sent thereto, does not bind him. The law does not presume assent to the rules of a railroad company, for damages caused by delay of the consignee in receiving goods shipped, from the publication of such rules. ®'^ 119; Somes v. British Empire said: "The right to demurrage, if Shipping Co., 30 L. J. Q. B. 229. it exists as a legal right, is con- ecCrommelin v. N. Y. & Harlem fined to the maritime law, and R. Co., *43 N. Y. (4 Keyes) 90, 1 only exists as to carriers by sea- Abb. Dec. 472. going vessels. But it is believed 6TBurlington & M. R. R. Co. v. to exist alone by force of contract. Chicago Lumber Co., 15 Neb. 390, All such contracts of affreight- 19 N. W. 451; Crommelin v. N. Y. ment contain an agreement for de- & Harlem R. Co., *43 N. Y. (4 murrage in case of delay beyond Keyes) 90, 1 Abb. Dec. 472; Chi- the period allowed by the agree- cago & Northwestern R. Co. v. ment, or the custom of the port Jenkins, 103 111. 588. Walker, J., allowed the consignee to receive 293 carriers' liens. § 283 § 283. Expenses of keeping property rejected. — Al- though a carrier may have no lien for charges incurred in keeping goods which the consignee neglects or refuses to receive, yet he may recover of the owner the expenses so incurred. Thus, the owner of a horse sent it by railroad consigned to himself, and, on the arrival of the horse at its destination, there being no one present to receive it, the station-master sent it to a livery-stable. The owner's servant soon arrived, and was referred to the livery-stable keeper, who refused to deliver the horse except on payment of charges. The next day the owner demanded the horse, and the station-master finally offered to pay the charges and let the owner take away the horse; but he de- clined to take it and went away. The horse remained at the livery-stable for some months, until the charges for his keep- ing amounted to £17, when the railroad company paid the charges and sent the horse to the owner, who accepted it. It was held that the owner was liable for these charges. *^^ Baron Pollock said : "As far as I am aware, there is no decided case in English law in which an ordinary carrier of goods by land has been held entitled to recover this sort of charge against the consignee or consignor of goods. But in my opinion he is so entitled. It had long been debated and remove the goods. But the fee for car service or storage mode of doing business by the two charges. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. kinds of carriers is essentially Co. v. Dorsey Fuel Co., 112 111. different. Railroad companies App. 382; Schumacher v. Chicago have warehouses in which to store & N. W. R. Co., 207 111. 199, 69 N. freights. Owners of vessels have E. 825. But see 108 111. App. 520. none. Railroads discharge cargoes A lien for demurrage charges is carried by them. Carriers by ship recognized in Mississippi. Wolf v. do not, but it is done by the con- Crawford, 54 Miss. 514; New Or- signee. The masters of vessels leans & N. E. R. Co. v. George, 82 provide in the contract for demur- Miss. 710, 35 So. 193. rage, while railroads do not." See 68Great Northern R. Co. v. also. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. Swaffield, L. R. 9 Ex. 132; Schu- v. A. H. George & Co., 82 Miss. macher v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 710, 35 So. 193. A railroad com- 207 111. 199, 69 N. E. 825. pany has a right to a reasonable § 284 LIENS. 294 whether a ship owner has such a right, and gradually, partly by custom and partly by some opinions of authority in this country, the right has come to be established."^'* Chief Baron Kelly and Baron Pigott and Amphlett delivered sepa- rate opinions to the same effect. The question whether a lien existed for the charges of keeping the horse did not arise, but Pollock, B., incidentally expressed the opinion that such a lien did not exist, while Amphlett, B., said that, as at present advised, he should not wish to be considered as hold- ing that, in a case of this sort, the person who, in pursuance of a legal obligation, took care of a horse and expended money upon him, would not be entitled to a lien on the horse for the money so expended. § 284. Carrier and warehouseman. — A railroad com- pany may, however, assume the double character of car- rier and warehouseman, and is entitled to reasonable com- pensation as warehouseman, and a lien as such, in the same manner as any other warehouseman.'''^ A consignee who has notice of a rule or custom of the railroad company to charge for storage, where goods have been called for within a certain time after their arrival at their destination, is re- garded as having impliedly promised to pay charges for stor- age in accordance with such custom or rule ; and the company may retain the goods till its reasonable warehouse charges, as well as its freight charges, are paid."^^ If the consignee refuses to receive the goods, the contract for carriage hav- 69Citing Notara v. Henderson, 138 Mass. 340; Illinois Cent. R. Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. 225, where all the v. Alexander, 20 111. 23. authorities are reviewed with "iCulbreth v. Philadelphia W. & care. Cargo ex Argos, L. R. 5 P. B. R. Co., 3 Houst. (Del.) 392; C. 134. McHenry v. Philadelphia W. & B. TOMiller V. Mansfield, 112 Mass. R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 448; Darling- 260; Norway Plains Co. v. Boston ton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 99 & M. R. 1 Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Mo. App. 1, 72 S. W. 122. But see Am. Dec. 423; Barker v. Brown, Wallace v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 216 Pa. 311, 65 Atl. 665. 295 carriers' liens. § 286 ing been performed, the carrier may store the goods for the use of the owner,'''- and retain a lien upon them. § 285. Local custom for carriers by water. — A well-estab- lished local custom for carriers by water to deliver goods to a storage agent, when the consignee is not present to re- ceive them, and to make an additional charge for storage, becomes a part of the implied contract under which the goods are shipped, and the goods may be detained for the payment of such storage as well as the freight. The car- rier has the right, in the absence of an agreement, to make a charge for storage where this is necessary for the protection of the goods; and this charge may be included in the general charge for freight, or it may be a separate charge.'''^ The fact that the agent of the carrier who stores the goods is allowed to retain the entire amount of the charge for storage, for his own compensation, does not afTect the case. § 286. No lien for transportation from a wharf. — A com- mon carrier by water has no lien for transporting goods from a wharf, at their place of destination, to the consignee's place of business in the same city, in the absence of any authority from either the consignor or consignee. The fact that the goods are marked with the consignee's place of business does not impart such authority.'^^ 'i'2Rankin v. Memphis & C. Pack- reasonable time, the carrier may et Co., 9 Heisk. (Term.) 564, 24 place them in a warehouse or leave Am. Rep. 399; Kremer v. Southern them in the cars and collect stor- Express Co., 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 356; age as well as freight. Its lien Arthur v. The Cassius, 2 Story extends to both. Schumacher v. (U. S.) 81, Fed. Cas. No. 564; Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 108 111. Fisk V. Newton, 1 Denio (N. Y.) App. 520, afifd. 207 111. 199, 69 N. E. 45, 43 Am. Dec. 649; Briggs v. 825; Dixon v. Central of Georgia Boston & Lowell R. Co., 6 Allen R. Co., 110 Ga. 173, 35 S. E. 369. (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. Dec. 626; The -SHurd v. Hartford & N. Y. Eddy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 481, 18 L. Steamboat Co., 40 Conn. 48. ed. 486. The carrier has a lien for "-iRichardson v. Rich, 104 Mass. freight and where the consignee 156, 6 Am. Rep. 210. fails to unload cars for an un- § 287 LIENS. 296 § 287. Ship owner's lien for expenses. — A ship owner has a Hen at common law for extraordinary expenses incurred for the preservation of the cargo from damage arising from causes for which the ship owner is not responsible.^'' Such are the expenses of unloading and drying the cargo to save it from the wreck of the ship. The inquiry in such cases is whether the expenditure was incurred in saving the property at risk, as distinguished from an expenditure in performing the contract to carry the cargo to its destination and to earn freight. It is not only the right of the shipowner to incur expenses, where reasonably practicable under all the cir- cumstances, to save the goods intrusted on board the ship, but it is his duty to do so, and he is liable for not doing so, where his agent, the master, has neglected this duty.'^ The master, if necessary, may raise money by a respondentia bond upon the goods, in order to do what is necessary for their safety.''^'^ The authority of the master to incur extraordinary ex- penses for the preservation of the goods does not arise where the ow^ner of the goods or his representative is at hand, or it is practicable to communicate with him."^ § 288. Ship owner's lien for contributions. — The ship owner has also liens for general average contributions from the cargo where the expenditure has been for the purpose of saving the whole venture, the ship as well as the cargo. "^ In that case the owners of each part saved must contribute ratably, and the master may retain each part of the property saved until the amount of the contribution in respect of it is paid or secured. The ship owner is the only person who '5Hingston v. Wendt, 1 Q. B. ""Cargo ex Sultan. Swab. 504, Div. 367; Cargo ex Argos. L. R. 510; The Glenmanna, Lush. 115. 5 P. C. 134; Nicolette Lumber Co. "^Cargo ex Sultan, Swab. 504; V. People's Coal Co., 26 Pa. Super Cargo ex Argos, L. R. 5 P. C. 134. Ct. 575. "J'Crooks v. Allan, 5 Q. B. Div. 'SNotara v. Henderson. L. R. 7 38; Hingston v. Wendt, 1 Q. B. Q. B. 225. Div. 367, per Blackburn, J. 297 carriers' liens. § 289 can exercise this lien; and he is liable in damages to a part owner of the cargo for not exercising it and securing pay- ment of the contributions.^^ § 289. Carrier has lien for freight charges paid by it. — By well-settled commercial usage, a carrier may pay the freight charges of previous carriers and have a lien for such pay- ment. Each independent carrier who pays such back freight may be said to become the agent of his predecessors to for- ward the goods and collect the freight. He may also be regarded as in a manner substituted or subrogated to their rights. But more properly the carrier is to be regarded as the agent of the owner or consignee to receive and forward the goods. But, whatever may be the theoretical founda- tion of the right, usage, growing out of the necessities of the case, has made the right a part of the common commercial law.^^ If, upon the delivery of the goods to the consignee, they are found to be damaged, and it appears that the last carrier was not associated with the preceding carriers, and that the damage did not occur while the goods were in the hands of such last carrier, his lien for his own freight charges and for those of the prior carriers paid by him can not be defeated by a claim for damages. A carrier receiving goods from a prior carrier is not obliged to open the packages for soCrooks V. Allan, 5 Q. B. Div. nized it, and hence it has become 38. See Hallett v. Bousfield, 18 a part of the law itself. This Ves. 187. commercial convenience and uni- siRissel V. Price, 16 111. 408. versal necessity is the true reason "The reason of this is founded in why this principle has been en- commercial convenience and neces- grafted upon and become a part sity, from which has originated a of the law itself, although, for the universal custom, pervading the sake of harmony, and to avoid ap- whole country, — indeed, it might parent contradictions in legal be said, the whole commercial maxims, artificial reasons have world, — which has been so long es- been invented, and legal iniplica- tablished and so universally known tions raised, in order to support that the courts themselves have it." Per Caton, J. long taken notice of and recog- § 290 LIENS. 298 examination as to the condition of the goods; but if they are apparently in good order he has a right to pay the back freight, and have a lien on the goods for the charges paid as well as his own charges.^- If the consignee notifies the car- rier before he receives the goods, and pays the back charges to a prior carrier, that the goods have been damaged, and that he is not to receive them, he does so at his own risk. He has no right to meddle with the goods against the express direction of the owner, or other person in legal control of them. § 290. Lien for import duties paid. — If a carrier pays the import duties on goods, he has a lien upon them for his reimbursement. The United States has a specific lien on all imported goods for the duties on them,^" and, though this lien may be preserved for the benefit of the carrier who has paid the duties, a new lien arises in his favor under his implied authority to advance all reasonable back charges which con- stitute a lien on the goods, and for which they could be detained.^^ § 291. First carrier a forwarding agent. — When a con- signor delivers goods to a carrier to be carried over succes- sive routes, beyond the route of the first carrier, he makes the first carrier his forwarding agent; and the second carrier s^Knight V. Providence & Wor- thorized the consignment. To en- cester R. Co., 13 R. I. 572, 43 Am. title him to claim his lien for his Rep. 46; Monteith v. Kirkpatrick, own charges and his advances, the 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 279, Fed Cas. No. law imposed upon him nothing be- 9721; Bissel v. Price, 16 111. 408; yond what a prudent man would, White V. Vann, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) under like circumstances, have 70, 44 Am. Dec. 294; Bowman v. done in the management of his Hilton, 11 Ohio 303. In this case own business. Birchard, J., said in substance that ssDennie v. Harris, 9 Pick, the carrier receiving the goods (Mass.) 364, nom. Harris v. Den- from a previous carrier, in appar- nie, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 292, 7 L. ed. 683. ent good order, has a right to pre- S4Guesnard v. Louisville & Nash- sume that the owner had duly au- ville R. Co., 76 Ala. 453. 299 CARRIERS LIENS. § 29 1 has a lien, not only for the freight over his own route, but also for the freight paid by him to the first carrier.^^ Even if the first carrier makes a mistake in directing the goods, or in taking bills of lading, by reason of which the goods are sent to a wrong destination, the last carrier has a lien upon the goods, not only for the freight earned by him, but also for the sums paid by him for the freight from the commencement of the transportation. The first carrier who receives the goods, and directs them over the route of the succeeding carrier, is the owner's agent, and the successive carriers after- wards carrying the goods act under the authority of the owner, and can not be considered as wrong-doers, though they carry the goods to a place to which the owner did not intend they should be sent.^*^ The question whether the lien continues to the successive carriers, and may be exercised by the last carrier, is in every case to be answered in accordance with the fact whether the first carrier to whom the goods were delivered is made, either expressly or impliedly, the agent of the owner to for- ward the goods. ^^ If there is no such agency, and the first carrier at the end of his own route forwards the goods, con- trary to the instructions of the owner, by an unauthorized route, then the subsequent carriers do not become the agents of the owner, but simply the agents of the first carrier, and, ssBriggs V. Boston & Lowell R. 116 Ky. 879, 25 Ky. L. 1051, 76 S. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. W. 1093. Dec. 626; Potts v. N. Y. & N. E. seBriggs v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. Rep. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. 247; Crossan v. New York & N. Dec. 626; Denver & R. G. R. Co. E. R. Co., 149 Mass. 196, 21 N. E. v. Hill, 13 Colo. 35, 21 Pac. 914, 4 367; Bird v. Georgia R. R., 72 Ga. L. R. A. Z76; Price v. Denver & 655; Vaughan v. Providence & R. G. R. Co., 12 Colo. 402. 21 Pac. Worcester R. Co., 13 R. L 578; 188; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. Shewalter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 401, 9 N. E. 799. 84 Mo. App. 589. See also, Pearce s^Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. V. Wabash R. Co., 89 Mo. App. 437; (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54; Arm- Thomas V. Frankfort & C. R. Co., strong v. Chicago, St. P. & A. C. R. Co., 62 Mo. 639. § 292 LIENS. 300 although they may act in perfect good faith, they have no lien upon the goods for their freight, or the freight of other car- riers advanced by them. If the owner had constituted the first carrier his forwarding agent, the owner's consent to the diversion of the goods from the intended route would have been imphed, and the subsequent carriers would have become entitled to a lien for the freight.^* § 292. Authority of carriers to forward goods. — A rail- road receiving goods consigned to a place beyond its own line is clothed with the apparent authority to forward the goods by any usual route ; and although the route selected is not that by which the owner of the goods intended they should be carried, the charges for freight by such route will constitute a valid lien upon the property.^^ This rule was follov/ed in a case in the Circuit Court of the United States.®*^ It appeared that a carload of lumber was shipped in Ohio for Denver, Colorado. It was delivered to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, with instructions to forward it from Chicago over a particular railroad with which the owners had contract arrangements for special rates. The Baltimore and Ohio Company disregarded these instructions, and in the usual course of business forwarded the car by a different route. On the arrival of the car at Denver the owners declined to pay the freight charges, and brought ■'^sBriggs V. Boston & Lowell R. was held that the forwarding Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. company is only a special agent Dec. 626. with limited powers; that whoever S!>\Vhitney v. Beckford. 105 deals with such agent is bound to Mass. 267, 271 ; Bird v. Georgia R. take notice of the extent of his R., 72 Ga. 655. authority; and that if such carrier, '-•^Patten v. Union Pacific R. Co., discharging his instructions, deliv- 29 Fed. 590; Denver & R. G. R. Co. ers the goods to the wrong car- V. Hill, 13 Colo. 35, 21 Pac. 914, 4 rier, the latter, though he carries L. R. A. 376. The case of Fitch them to the place of destination, V. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1, does so at his own risk, and has 40 Am. Dec. 33, is criticised and no claim for freight or lien upon dissented from. In that case it the goods. See post, § 298. 30I carriers' liens. § 293 a writ of replevin. They claimed that the Baltimore and Ohio Company, in disregarding their instructions, had ex- ceeded its authority, and that the carriage by the unauthor- ized route created no charge for freight and no right of lien. The court, however, adopted the rule above stated, and held that the last carrier was entitled to a lien for its own charges and for prior charges paid to other carriers. "Any other rule," said Mr. Justice Brewer, ''would work a serious hind- rance to the immense transportation business of to-day, while this rule protects both carrier and owner. If the first carrier disobeys his instructions, by which loss results to the owner, such carrier is liable to an action of damages, and, as is proper, the wrong-doer suffers the loss. At the same time, the second and innocent carrier, having done the work of transportation, receives, as it ought, the just freight therefor. The first carrier is the agent of the owner. If he has done wrong, why should not the principal be remitted to his action against his wrongdoing agent, and why should the burden of litigation be case upon the innocent second carrier.^ Plaintiffs say that, in this case, they would have to go to Ohio to main- tain their action; but, if they select an agent in Ohio, and that agent does wrong, why should they not go to Ohio to punish him for his wrong? And why should the defendant, innocent of any wrong, be forced to g'o thither to litigate with their agent ? And why should the owner, who has his goods car- ried to the place of destination, be permitted to take them from the carrier without any payment for such transporta- tion? Is the route by which the freight is transported a mat- ter so vital to him that, carried over the wrong route, he is entitled equitably to the possession of his goods free from any burden of freight ?" § 293. Connecting carrier has no lien. — A connecting car- rier who receives goods, knowing at the time that they were directed to be sent by another route, has no lien upon them. In such case his receiving them is wrongful, and his trans- ^ 294 LIENS. 302 porlation of them afterwards would be voluntary. He would have no lien upon them for freight charges, and consequently he could not detain them from the consignee. His refusal to deliver them in such case would be a conversion for which trover would lie. The question whether the carrier had knowledge of a direction that the goods should be trans- ported by a different route is a question for the jury, and it would be proper for them to take into consideration the marks on the packages of goods, though these alone might not be conclusive. ^^ The fact that when the connecting car- rier received the goods from the first carrier, they were load- ed in a car appropriately marked for the particular railroad over which the first carrier was instructed to forward them, does not of itself amount to an implied notice to the second carrier of such instruction. ^- § 294. Guaranty not binding on connecting carrier. — A guaranty that the through freight shall not exceed a certain sum is not binding upon other independent connecting car- riers on the route having no knowledge or notice of the guar- anty.^^ Each carrier after the first may charge, and pay back charges, at the usual rates; and the last carrier, or the ware- houseman who receives the goods and pays the back charges, has a lien for the total amount of such charges, without re- gard to the guaranty. It is regarded as unreasonable that the subsequent carrier, who receives and forwards the goods in the usual way, should be bound by a secret contract be- tween the owner and a prior carrier, which may prevent his receiving his ordinary rates. Whether the bill of lading in 91 Bird V. Georgia R. R., 72 Ga. 15 S. W. 1030; Wolf v. Hough, 22 655; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Hill, Kans. 659; Vaughan v. Providence 13 Colo. 35, 21 Pac. 914. & W. R. Co., 13 R. I. 578; Loewen- 92Patten v. Union Pacific R. Co., berg v. Arkansas & L. R. Co., 56 29 Fed. 590. Ark. 439, 19 S. W. 1051; Beasley v. 93Schneider v. Evans, 25 Wis. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 27 App. 241, 3 Am. Rep. 56; St. Louis, I. M. D. C. 595. & S. R. Co. v. Lear, 54 Ark. 399, 303 CARRIERS LIENS. § 29/ this case showed the special rate guaranteed was immaterial, because on the trial the parties stipulated that the succeed- ing carriers had no knowledge of the guaranty. § 295. No lien where freight is prepaid. — The prepayment of freight negatives the carrier's right to the lien ordinarily implied by law, if he has knowledge of such prepayment. Thus, if -a railroad company makes a contract for carrying goods to their place of destination at a point beyond its own line, and receives the price of transportation to such place in advance, another railroad company, which receives the goods from the first company with knowledge that a thorough con- tract had been made, can not assert a lien upon the goods upon the ground that the sum allowed by the first company was insufficient to pay the connecting company its full share of freight charges. A carrier who receives goods from an- other carrier with knowledge that a through contract for car- rying them has been made, and the freight prepaid, is bound by that contract, and can assert no lien upon the goods. '^^ § 296. Way-bill accompanying goods. — If a bill of lading or way-bill accompanying the goods shows that the freight has been paid wholly or in part for the through route, the succeeding carriers would be affected with knowledge of such prepayment; for if they consult the bill of lading they will have actual knowledge, and if they do not consult it they may be regarded as guilty of negligence, and constructively affected with knowledge of what the bill of lading actually shows. ®^ § 297. First carrier receiving payment. — Where the first carrier has received payment on a through contract not known to the succeeding independent carrier, the latter, com- 94Marsh v. Union Pacific R. Co., 241, 3 Am. Rep. 56, per Paine, J.; 3 McCrary (U. S.) 236, 9 Fed. 873. Travis v. Thompson. 11 Barb. (N. s^^Schneider v. Evans, 25 Wis. Y.) 236, per Hogeboom, J. § 298 LIENS. 304 ing into possession of the goods under a lawful authority, may have a right to charge for his own services at the ord- inary rate of transportation, and assert a lien therefor.'''^ If the first carrier has received payment for freight over his own and a connecting line, but has allowed a less sum for the carriage over the connecting line than by the tariff of the lat- ter it is entitled to receive, the connecting carrier acquires a lien for the additional freight, although when the fatter ac- cepted the goods for carriage it might have had notice from the way-bill that there had been an attempt to prepay the freight."^ § 298. Carrier employed by another carrier has lien. — If a carrier employs another carrier in his place to forward the goods, the latter has a lien, unless payment has been made to the carrier who received the goods in advance, in which case the substituted carrier has no lien, but must look to the per- son who employed him. In such case there is no privity of contract between the shipper and the carrier who performs the service. ^^ The carrier to whom the goods were deliv- ered had the right to exact payment for his services in ad- vance; and, having done so, he is. not the owner's agent to employ any other carrier to perform the service for him and to collect payment of the freight again. Consequently, the substituted carrier, though acting in good faith and without knowledge of prepayment of the freight, can not collect it ^"Travis v. Thompson, 37 Barb. be sound, for, by general usage, (N. Y.) 236. Judge Hogeboom the last carrier pays all prior suggests the distinction, that such freight charges, and business could carrier may have no lien for pre- not well be conducted unless he vious charges paid by him upon is protected in making such pay- the goods, for the reason that he ment. is not obliged to receive the ^^Crossan v. New York & N. E. goods charged with this burden, R. Co., 149 Mass. 196, 21 N. E. 367, and, at any rate, was bound to in- 3 L. R. A. 766, 14 Am. St. 408. quire whether such previous 'J«Nordemeyer v. Loescher, 1 charges had been prepaid. But Hilton (N. Y.) 499. this distinction does not seem to 305 carriers' liens. § 298 again, or retain the goods for its payment to himself. He can act only in subordination to the original contract with the owner. Where there is no arrangement between con- necting carriers, a subsequent carrier is not bound by a re- ceipt given by the first carrier for the through carriage of the goods; so that, although the first carrier has given a receipt stating that the freight charges have been paid through to the place of destination, the last carrier, having received and transported the goods without notice of such prepayment, has a lien upon the goods for his own unpaid charges. "'^ It is said that, while the receipt is binding upon the carrier who gave it, yet, before the subsequent carrier could be held to its terms, it must appear either that he had given authority to the first carrier to make such a contract, or that he had undertaken the transportation with notice that such a con- tract had been made. Although the prior carrier has agreed with the owner that his charges should be applied to the account of a prior in- debtedness of his to the owner, a subsequent carrier who has in good faith, and in accordance with the usual custom of business, paid the freight charges of the prior carrier without knowledge of such contract, is entitled to retain the goods until such charges are repaid to him.^ oowolf V. Hough, 22 Kans. 659. A ultimate carrier, without knowl- decision to the contrary is Fitch edge of such prepayment, has re- V. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1, ceived the goods from another 40 Am. Dec. 33, which has been carrier, and paid him the full discredited in all the later decis- amount of the customary charges ions. In that case it was held for the previous transportation of that, if the consignor has paid in the goods, he can assert no lien advance to the original carrier a against the consignee either for portion of the freight charges, the the charges he has paid to the ultimate carrier can assert a lien prior carrier, or for his own serv- for only the remainder of the ices in carrying the goods. See proper charges after deducting the ante, § 292. payment on account. If the freight iWhite v. Vann, 6 Humph, has been wholly prepaid, but the (Tenn.) 70, 44 Am. Dec. 294. 20 § 299 LIENS, 306 § 299. Lien only for customary freight rate.— If the last carrier has paid to a previous carrier an amount in excess of the usual and proper charges for transporting the goods, he can assert a lien for only the customary and reasonable rates of transportation. - § 300. Second carrier bound by first carrier's agreement. — If the last carrier has not paid the prior charges, his lien is limited to the amount agreed upon with the first carrier.^ Thus, where a railroad company makes a through contract for the carriage of goods, and delivers them to an independ- ent connecting company to be delivered at the place of des- tination, the latter, on carrying them to such point, must deliver them to the consignee upon his tendering the sum agreed upon, if this sum equals the regular charges of the lat- ter company, whether it includes any charges for the former company or not ; and if such company refuses, upon a tender of such sum, to deliver the goods, the consignee may replevy them. The first company assumed the burden of satisfying the charges of the roads over which the goods were to be carried; and the last carrier, not having paid the ^prior charges, can assert a lien only for the amount agreed upon, and must settle as it can with the company that made the contract. § 301. Lien does not cover advances for matters not con- nected with the carriage. — The lien does not cover advances made for matters not connected with the carriage of the goods. The lien extends only to the carrier's own charges for carrying his goods, and such charges of prior carriers as he ^Travis v. Thompson, Zl Barb. ^Evansville & Crawfordsville R. (N. Y.) 236; Mallory v. Burrett, Co. v. Marsh, 57 Ind. 505; Thomas 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 234; Pearce v. Frankfort & C. Co., 116 Ky. 879, V. Wabash R. Co., 89 Mo. App. 25 Ky. Law 1051, 76 S. W. 1093. 437, reversed 192 U. S. 179, 48 L. ed. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 231. 307 CARRIERS' LIENS. § 3O2 may have paid. It does not extend to or cover advances made on claims against the owners or consignees wholly foreign to, and disconnected with, any cost or charge for transportation. It is the duty of the carrier to examine the charges that are made by a prior forwarding agent or carrier, and the fact that he has paid charges upon the goods does not enable him to retain them for a greater sum than the usual and proper charges previously incurred in their transportation. If the carrier has paid charges which include a prior debt due the forwarding agent or carrier from the shipper, he can not hold the goods against the owner or consignee for the amount paid on account of such prior debt.* § 302. Damage to goods before reaching last carrier. — The fact that the goods have suffered damage before they reach the last carrier, who has received them from a prior carrier, does not deprive the last carrier of his lien for freight and for charges paid.^ The last carrier, in receiving the goods in good faith and in apparent good order, and paying the costs and charges upon them, is regarded as acting as the agent of the owner, and not as the agent of the prior car- rier; and the last carrier is not liable for any damage to the goods which took place while they were in the hands of a prior carrier.'^ A similar rule applies where the first carrier expressly limits its liability to its own line, but undertakes to forward goods, and prepays the charges for such further carriage: the lien of the first carrier is not in such case impaired by damages incurred by the fault of the second carrier. Thus, where an express company received a package of money to ^Steamboat Virginia v. Kraft, 25 Co. v. Browne, 27 Tex. Civ. App. Mo. 76. 437, 66 S. W. 341. 5Bowman v. Hilton, 11 Ohio 303; «Hunt v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 1 Thomas v. Frankfort & C. R. Co., Hilton (N. Y.) 228; Bissel v. Price, 116 Ky. 879, 25 Ky. Law 1051, 76 16 111. 408. S. W. 1093; Gulf, W. T. & P. R. § 303 LIENS. 308 be carried to the terminus of its line, and to forward it by a stage company, and through the delay of the stage company it did not reach its destination until the consignee had left, and the consignor ordered its return, it was held that the express company had a lien on the package after its return for its own charges, and also for the advances it had made to the stage company/ § 303. Lien on stolen goods. — Whether a carrier has a lien upon goods which have been stolen, so that he can de- tain them for his charges against the true owner, is a ques- tion upon which the authorities are not in harmony. The English courts hold that he has a lien even upon such goods. In an early case. Chief Justice Holt declared that a common carrier might detain goods for his charges, although they were delivered to him by one who had stolen them.^ He cited the Exeter Carrier's case, "where A stole goods, and delivered them to the Exeter carrier, to be carried to Exe- ter: the right owner finding the goods in possession of the carrier, demanded them of him, upon which the carrier re- fused to deliver, without being paid for the carriage. The owner brought trover, and it was held that he might justify detaining against the right owner for the carriage ; for when A brought them to him, he was obliged to receive them and carry them; and therefore, since the law compelled him to carry them, it will give him remedy for the premium due for the carriage." § 304. American decisions. — The American decisions upon this point generally discard the English doctrine, and hold that the carrier has no lien for the carriage of goods "United States Express Co. v. v. Woolcutt, 2 B. & P. (N. R.) 64. Haines, 67 111. 137. See The This view was incidentally recog- Thomas McManus, 24 Fed. 509. nized in King v. Richards, 6 sYorke V. Genaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. Whart. (Pa.) 418, Z7 Am. Dec. 420. 866, Powell, J., dissenting; Butler 209 carriers' liens. § 304 which he has received from a wrong-doer, without the con- sent of the owner, express or implied; for they say that the duty of the carrier to receive and carry goods arises only when they are offered by the owner, or by his authority.'* The chattel does not generally in such case become more valuable to the owner by reason of such carriage; on the contrary, he is quite as liable to be injured as benefited by its transportation after it is wrongfully taken out of his possession. And, moreover, it is a settled general principle that no man can be divested of his property without his con- sent, so that even an honest purchaser under a defective title can not hold it against the true owner. ^'^ The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, asserting this funda- mental principle against the carrier, ask:^^ "Why should the carrier be exempt from the operation of this universal principle? Why should not the principle of caveat emptor apply to him ? The reason, and the only reason, given is, that he is obliged to receive goods to carry, and should therefore have a right to detain the goods for his pay. But he is not bound to receive goods from a wrong-doer. He is bound only to receive goods from one who may rightfully deliver them to him, and he can look to the title, as well as persons in other pursuits and situations in life. Nor is a carrier bound to receive goods, unless the freight or pay for the carriage oRobinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 58 N. Y. 672; Collman v. Collins, (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54; 2 Hall (N. Y.) 569; Buskirk v. Stevens v. Boston & W. R. Purinton, 2 Hall (N. Y.) 561; Corp., 8 Gray (Mass.) 262; Clark Everett v. Saltus, 15 Wend. (N. V. Lowell & L. R. Co., 9 Gray Y.) 474; Travis v. Thompson, Zl (Mass.) 231; Gilson v. Gwinn, 107 Barb. (N. Y.) 236; King v. Rich- Mass. 126, 9 Am. Rep. 13; Ames ards, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 418, 37 Am. v. Palmer, 42 Maine 197, 66 Am. Dec. 420. Dec. 271; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 loSaltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Doug. (Mich.) 1, 40 Am. Dec. ZZ; Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541. the first direct adjudication; uRobinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. Vaughan v. Providence & W. R. (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54. Co., 13 R. I. 578; Martin v. Smith, § 305 . LIENS. 310 is first paid to him; and he may in all cases secure the pay- ment of the carriage in advance." § 305. Carrier's lien on goods wrongfully diverted. — The same rule applies where the goods have merely been wrong- fully diverted from the route authorized by the owner, and have come into the hands of the carrier without the consent of the owner, expressed or implied. Though the carrier is ignorant of this fact, and supposes that the goods have been rightfully delivered to him, he can not in such case detain them for the payment of his services, or' the payment of the charges of the previous carrier. Having in fact obtained possession of the goods wrongfully, though innocently, he is bound to deliver them to the owner or consignee on de- mand, and, on refusal, such owner or consignee may take them by writ of replevin, or recover their value in an action of trover.^- A carrier who receives goods from a wharfinger, with whom the owner has deposited them without authority i2Fitch V. Newberry, 1 Doug. owner's agent to forward the (Mich.) 1, 40 Am. Dec. 33; Robin- goods, and had no right to ex- son V. Baker, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 137, ercise any control over them, ex- 51 Am. Dec. 54; Stevens v. Boston cept to deliver them to the agent & W. R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 262. of the railroad company. Yet, in In Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. violation of their duty, the canal (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54, the company shipped the flour to New owner of a parcel of flour delivered York, and thence by vessel to it to a canal-boat company to be Boston. It was held that the own- transported to Albany. This com- ers of the vessel had no lien upon pany gave bills of lading wherein the flour for the freight. These they agreed to deliver it at Albany cases are distinguished from to a person named, who was the such cases as Briggs v. Bos- agent of the Western Railroad ton & L. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) Company. The owner sent one of 246, 83 Am. Dec. 626, where the these bills to this agent, and the owner makes the first carrier his other to the consignee at Boston, agent to forward the goods, and thus reserving to himself the right, the owner thus becomes responsi- and assuming the responsibility of ble for mistakes of this agent in giving to the agent the directions forwarding them. Savannah F. & for forwarding the goods. The W. R. Co. v. Talbot, 123 Ga. 2>7S,, canal company did not become the 51 S. E. 401. 311 carriers' liens. § 307 to forward them, has no lien on them for freight aganist the owner. ^^ For a stronger reason, a carrier who receives goods from an agent, with notice that the agent in contracting with the carrier has exceeded his authority, can not hold them for his charges as against the principal, who may reclaim them without paying such charges. ^^ § 306. Apparent authority of shipper. — But a carrier re- ceiving goods from one who, by the owner's act, has been clothed with an apparent authority, has a lien on them as against such owner.^^ Thus, if the carrier receives goods from one to whom the owner has delivered them, intending at the time to part with his property in them, though he may have been induced to sell and deliver them by fraud or false pretences, which would authorize him to disaf^rm the con- tract and reclaim them from the person to whom ne had delivered them, the carrier stands in the position of a bona fide purchaser, and has a valid lien upon them for his charges and advances.^® § 307. The carrier's lien can not be set up by a wrongdoer. — This lien of a common carrier is a personal privilege which he alone can set up. It does not deprive the owner of the goods of his right to immediate possession as against a wrongdoer. The owner has constructive possession, and may sue any one in trover or trespass who forcibly or wrong- fully takes them from the carrier. Such trespasser or wrong- doer can not set up the carrier's right of possession to de- stroy the right of the general owner to maintain such ac- laClark v. Lowell & L. R. Co., i^Vaughan v. Providence & W. 9 Gray (Mass.) 231. R. Co., 13 R. I. 578. i4Hayes v. Campbell, 63 Cal. 143. leCaldwell v. Bartlett, 3 Duer In this case the carrier was put (N. Y.) 341 ; Hoffman v. Lake upon inquiry as to the terms upon Shore & M. S. R. Co., 125 Mich, which the agent could contract 201, 84 N. W. 55. for the carriage of the goods. § 3°^ LIENS. 312 tion.^''^ If such wrongdoer pays the freight and charges of the carrier, he does not thereby acquire the carrier's lien and a right to hold the goods. ^^ § 308. Carrier may waive lien. — Of course the carrier may waive his lien, and he does so b}^ delivering the goods with- out first requiring payment of the freight.^" By relinquish- ing possession he is deemed to yield up the security he has by means of it, and to trust wholly to the personal responsi- bility of the owner or consignee. Possession is the first re- quisite of a common-law lien, and if this l:»e parted with the lien is gone. He may hold possession by an agent, but, if such agent acts on his instructions in such a way as to give the possession to the owner or consignee, the lien is lost. In like manner a maritime lien for freight and demurrage is waived by an unconditional delivery of the cargo,-" un- less there is an understanding that the lien is to remain, or there is an established local usage of the port where the cargo is delivered that the lien shall remain.-^ § 309. Carrier's lien continues on goods placed in ware- house. — The placing of the goods in a warehouse is not a delivery that destroys the carrier's lien, if the carrier still retains exclusive control of the goods. If the warehouse be I'Ames V. Palmer, 42 Maine 197, 1 N. W. 619; Terril v. Rogers, 3 66 Am. Dec. 271, supported by Hayw. (Term.) 203; Gring v. Car- similar cases between principal go of Lumber, 38 Fed. 528; Egan and agent: Daubigny v. Duval, 5 v. A Cargo of Spruce Lath, 43 T. R. 604; McCombie v. Davies, Fed. 480, affirming 41 Fed. 830; 7 East 5; Holly v. Huggeford, 8 Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Pick. (Mass.) 1Z, 19 Am. Dec. 303; Woolfolk, 94 Ga. 507, 20 S. E. Jones V. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 319, 9 Am. 119. Dec. 75. -^Egan v. A Cargo of Spruce iSGuilford V. Smith, 30 Vt. 49. Lath, 41 Fed. 830, affd. 43 Fed. isBigelow V. Heaton, 4 Denio 480. Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (N. Y.) 496; Wingard v. Banning, (U. S.) 108. 39 Cal. 543; Reineman v. Coving- -'Wilcox v. 500 Tons of Coal, ton C. & B. R. Co., 51 Iowa 338. 14 Fed. 49. 313 CAKRIEkS LIENS. § 310 his own, he of course retains such control. So, if by law a shipowner is required to land and store the goods in a parti- cular place, or in a public warehouse, his lien is not thereby affected.-^" But if the carrier stores them in the warehouse of an in- dependent person who has a lien for warehousing charges, it seems that the carrier's lien will be lost.-^ §310. Carrier's lien lost by delivery, — A carrier who has once parted with the possession of the goods with the inten- tion of making delivery can not revive his lien by a resump- tion of possession, nor has he any right by reason of his claim to stop the goods in transitu,-^ unless he has lost possession by fraud. ^* If one who has a lien on goods ships them to the owner on his account and at his risk and expense, his lien is gone, for this is equivalent to a delivery to the owner. The lien can not be recovered by stopping the goods in transitu, and and procuring a redelivery by means of a bill of lading from the carrier issued after the commencement of the voyage.-^ 2] "Wilson V. Kymer, 1 M. & S. 157, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in- terrupting the argument, asked: "Is not this point incontrovertible, that, when goods on board a ship are subject to lien, if they are taken out of the ship in invitum and by compulsion of law, the lien shall be preserved in the place of safe custody where the goods are deposited by law?" The carrier's lien is terminated by delivery to consignee as agent for consignor. Lembeck v. Jarvis Terminal Cold storage Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 781, 63 Atl. 257. 22Mors-le-Blanch v. Wilson, L. R. 8 C. P. 227. Brett, J. : "I very much doubt whether, if the master were so to deposit the goods on shore as to give another person a lien upon them, he would not as a matter of course lose his own lien, even though such other person should undertake to the master not to deliver the goods to the consignee without being paid the master's claim for freight." 23Sweet v. Pym, 1 East 4, per Buller, J.; Artaza v. Smallpiece. 1 Esp. 23; Coombs v. Bristol & Exeter R. Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 401; Hartley v. Hitchcock, 1 Stark. 408. 24Wallace v.' Woodgate, Ry. & M. 193. 2^Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4; Lem- beck V. Jarvis Terminal Cold Stor- age Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 492, 59 Atl. 360, affd. 69 N. J. Eq. 781, 63 Atl. 257. Even when delivery is made § 311 LIENS. 314 A ship-owner's lien for freight depends upon his posses- sion of the goods, and is lost by delivering them to the con- signee voluntarily, and without notice that he looks to him for the payment of his charges ;-*^ or when any agreement is entered into by the parties in regard to the payment of freight, which involves a prior surrender of the possession. This lien, without possession, can not, like some maritime liens, be enforced by a proceeding in rem.-'^ §311. Delivery to the consignee upon condition. — What acts on the part of a shipowner amount to a waiver of his lien for freight, it is often dif^cult to determine. It is not divested by a delivery to the consignee or his agent if con- ditions are annexed to the delivery, or if there be an under- standing, express or implied, that the lien shall continue. ^^ The shipowner, or the master as his agent, may agree with the consignee or owner that the goods shall be deposited in the warehouse of the consignee or owner, and that such de- posit shall not be regarded as a waiver of the lien, and the courts, both at law and in admiralty, will uphold the agree- ment and support the lien.-^ by the carrier to the consignee who agrees to hold until the freight was all paid, if the con- signee disposes of the goods to another person who has no notice or knowledge that the freight is unpaid, the carrier will lose his lien as against such purchaser. Lembeck v. Jarvis Terminal Cold Storage Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 492, 59 Atl. 360, afifd. 69 N. J. Eq. 781, 63 Atl. 257. 26Cranston v. Cargo of 250 Tons Coal, 2 Fed. 614; Darlington v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 99 Mo. App. 1, 72 S. W. 122. 27Cutler V. Rae, 7 How. (U. S.) 729, 12 L. ed. 890; Dupont v. Vance, 19 How. (U. S.) 162, 15 L. ed. 584; Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (U. S.) 108. 28Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (U. S.) 108. No delivery such as will deprive a carrier of its lien is made by the carrier placing loaded cars on which the freight is un- paid, on the spur tracks of a con- signee. New York Cent. & H. A. R. Co. V. Davis, 86 Hun. (N. Y.) 86, 34 N. Y. S. 206; Southern Ry. Co. V. Lockwood Mfg. Co., 142 Ala. 322, 37 So. 667, 68 L. R. A. 277, 110 Am. St. 32. 2!)The Eddy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 481, 18 L. ed. 486, per Clififord, J. 315 carriers' liens. § 312 The mere manual delivery of an article by a carrier to the consignee does not of itself operate necessarily to discharge the carrier's lien for the freight; the delivery must be made with the intent of parting with his interest in it, or under circumstances from which the law will infer such an intent. The act of the party is characterized by the intent with which it is performed, either expressly or by necessary implications. Therefore, a delivery made under the expecta- tion that the freight will be paid at the time is not such a delivery as parts with the lien, and the carrier may after- ward libel the articles in rem, in admiralty, for the freight."*^ § 312. Nature of delivery necessary to terminate lien. — What delivery is effectual to terminate a carrier's lien is often an important and difficult question. Delivery of the goods and payment of the freight are, in the absence of any special contract, acts to be done at the same time. A delivery may be complete for one purpose, and not for another. Thus, a delivery may be complete so far as to terminate the liability of a carrier, and yet be upon an implied condition as to pay- ment. If a railroad company carries coal to its place of des- tination, and the owner's servants deposited it in bins on the company's land adjoining the owner's land, the lien is not lost.31 20151 Tons of Coal, 4 Blatchf. they would have no right to re- (U. S.) 368, Fed. Cas. No. 10520. take the flour, if he should refuse See Egan v. A Cargo of Spruce to pay? But suppose, instead of Lath, 41 Fed. 830, which is distin- one load, there should be a hun- guished. dred barrels, and the first load "iLane v. Old Colony & F. R. should be allowed to go without Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 143. Hoar, payment, the rest being taken from J., said : "Suppose the railroad the cars and put upon the platform company should allow a customer, in the freight house, the company for whom they had brought a lot knowing that enough was left to of flour, to unload it from the cars make them secure, and the demand onto his wagon, and, as he started should be made as the owner was with the load, should demand the about removing the last load, freight, could it be supposed that could this destroy the right to re- § 313 LIENS. 316 §313. Payment of freight and delivery of goods. — The payment of the freight and the delivery of the goods are or- dinarily to be concurrent acts. Even if the bill of lading of a cargo provides for the payment of the freight on the right delivery of the cargo, the delivery of the cargo is not a condition precedent to the right to demand the freight. ^- The delivery of the cargo and the payment of the freight are still to be concurrent acts, and the master is not bound to deliver the cargo unless the consignee stands ready to pay the freight at the same time. On the other hand, the master is not entitled to demand the freight unless he is ready to deliver the cargo. There must be concurrent readiness on both sides — on the one to deliver, and on the other to pay. The ship owner or master may require a pro rata payment of the freight of goods as they are landed from day to day on the wharf, if the goods are at the same time delivered to the consignee. ^'^ But the master can not properly demand payment of the freight upon the whole shipment, when he has landed and is ready to deliver only a part of it.^^ The consignee is entitled to an opportunity to examine the goods and see if the obligations of the bill of lading have been ful- filled by the ship owner. When the landing of a cargo occu- pies several days, and the consignee does not receive the tain for the lien?" But where the R. Co., 125 Mich. 201, 7 Detroit carrier delivers the goods shipped Leg. News 503, 84 N. W. 55. to the consignee for the purpose ^-Tate v. Meek, 8 Taunt. 280, per of allowing him to unload the Gibbs, C. J.; Paynter v. James, same to save demurrage and not L. R. 2 C. P. 348; Black v. Rose, for any other purpose and the con- 2 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 277; Rankin signee then ships them over an- v. Memphis & C. Packet Co., 9 other line and has not paid the Heisk. (Tenn.) 564, 24 Am. Rep. lien of the first carrier and does 339. not pay the last carrier and the 33Black v. Rose, 2 Moore P. C. last carrier had no knowledge that (N. S.) 277. the first carrier was not paid, his 34Brittan v. Barnaby, 21 How. lien is a first and prior lien su- (U. S.) 527, 16 L. ed. 177; Berry v. perior to the first carrier's lien. Grace, 62 Fed. 607. Hoffman v. Lake Shore & M. S. 317 carriers' liens. § 314 goods and make pro rata payments of freight, if such pay- ments are demanded the master may dehver the goods on the wharf; and if they are not taken by the consignee after no- tice, the master may store the goods for safe keeping at the consignee's expense and risk, in the name of the ship owner, to preserve his lien for the freight. ^^ A frequent and even general practice at a particular port for the owners to allow goods to be transported to the ware- houses of the consignee, and there inspected before freight is paid, is not such a custom as will displace the ordinary mari- time right of the ship owner to demand payment of the freight upon the delivery of the goods upon the wharf.^® § 314. Terms of charter-party may be such that charter freight will not be due until cargo has been delivered. — The terms of the charter party may be such, however, that the chartered freight will not be due until the cargo has been completely delivered. Thus, a ship was chartered to go to Algoa Bay for a cargo, with which to proceed to London, where it was to be delivered on payment of freight at certain specified rates. The freight was to be paid "on unloading and right delivery of the cargo." The master was to sign bills of lading under which the freights w^ere to be collected by the charterer. It was held that the charter-party freight was not due till the objects of the voyage had been carried out."^ "On principle," said Lord Justice Wood, "we conceive that the freight can not be due from the charterers on a charter-party such as the present, until they have had the full use of the ship for the purposes for which they chartered it. It is, in fact, analogous to the demise of property until a g'iven purpose is answered, the purpose in this case being-, first, the outward voyage; second, the taking in of a complete s^Brittan v. Barnaby. 21 How. 36The Eddy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 481, (U. S.) 527, 16 L. ed. 177, per 18 L. ed. 486. Wayne, J.; The Eddy, 5 Wall. 37Biown v. Tanner, L. R. 3 Ch. (U. S.) 481, 18 L. ed. 486. 597. § 315 LIENS. 318 cargo at such profit freight as the charterers might be able to obtain above the freights they have agreed' to pay to the owner; and, third, the delivering of the cargo to the con- signees by the charterers. * * * Now, it is not alleged that there was any undue delay on the part of the charterers in the unloading and delivering. Until, therefore, that was absolutely completed, it appears to us the freight was not due to the owner." The shipowner's right of lien was not involved in this case. A lien w^as expressly given by the charter-party, and the decision was not inconsistent with such a lien. The question in the case arose between a mortgagee of the ship, who had taken possession while the cargo was being discharged, and an assignee of the freight from the ship- owner. But the decision had an important application, and would cut away the lien for freight in like cases where no lien is expressly reserved. ^^ § 315. Cargo in hands of consignee. — If a cargo is placed in the hands of a consignee, with the understanding that the lien is to continue, a court of admiralty will regard the trans- action as a deposit of the goods, for the time, in the ware- house, and not as an absolute delivery, and on that ground will consider the shipowner as being still constructively in possession so far as to preserve his lien.^^ It is the duty of the consignee, and not of the shipowner, to provide a suitable and safe place for the storage of the goods; and several days are often consumed in unloading and storing the cargo. If the cargo could not be unladen and placed in the warehouse of the consignee without waiving the lien, it would seriously interfere with the convenience both of the shipowner and the merchant. In such a case it is frequently understood between the parties that such a transfer of the goods to the consignee's warehouse shall not be regarded as ssCarver on Carriage of Goods •••'Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (U. by Sea, § 658. .S.) 108. 319 carriers' liens. § 317 a waiver of the shipowner's lien, but that he deserves the right to proceed in rem to enforce it, if the freight be not paid. But such a transfer of the goods into the possession of the consignee will defeat the lien, unless an understand- ing that it shall not have this effect can be shown to have existed between the parties, or unless it be plainly inferable from the established local usage of the port.^" § 316. Promise to pay carrier not presumed from taking possession. — A promise to pay the amount of a carrier's lien upon goods is not necessarily presumed from the taking possession of such goods with knowledge that such a lien is claimed. Thus, where a railroad company, having deliv- ered a portion of a cargo of coal on the order of the con- signee to a purchaser of the whole cargo, on the arrival of the remainder of the coal notified the purchaser that it claimed a lien on such remainder for the freight of the en- tire cargo, and directed him not to unload it, but the pur- chaser did unload and take possession of the coal without paying the freight, it was held the purchaser could not be conclusively presumed as a matter of law to have promised to pay the freight.*^ § 317. Lien continues when possession is secured by fraud. — The carrier's lien is not lost in case the goods are obtained from him by fraud. He has not in such case volun- tarily parted with the possession. His right of possession remains, and he may assert his right by replevying the goods, though they be in the hands of the consignee.^- Thus, if ^"Bags of Linseed, 1 Black (U. Rep. 360, is distinguished. The S.) 108; Shea v. Minneapolis St. question whether the law implies P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 63 Minn. 228, a contract to pay the freight was 65 N. W. 458. not adjudicated. But see Central 4iNew York & N. E. R. Co. v. R. Co. v. MacCartney, 68 N. J. L. Sanders, 134 Mass. S3. The case 165, 52 Atl. 575. of New Haven & Northampton Co. ^-Wallace v. Woodgate, Ry. & V. Campbell, 128 Mass. 104, 35 Am. M. 193. § 3l8 LIENS. 320 the goods are delivered to the consignee in consequence of his false and fraudulent promise to pay the freight as soon as the delivery is complete, such delivery does not amount to a waiver of the lien, and the carrier may, notw^ithstanding, maintain replevin for the goods. '^^ But there must be some evidence of fraud or trick in ob- taining possession, or the loss of possession will defeat the lien. In replevin by a railroad company, to enforce a lien for freight upon a horse, it appeared that the car contain- ing the horse arrived at the depot about eleven o'clock in the morning; that the consignee, being notified by telephone, asked if the horse could remain in the car till the following morning, and gave directions about the care of the horse ; that the horse was allowed to remain in the car; and that in the morning the consignee sent and got the horse without paying the freight. It was held that a verdict finding that the company voluntarily abandoned its lien upon parting with possession of the horse would not be reversed on appeal, and that the action of replevin could not be maintained. ^^ §318. No lien where goods are delivered through mis- take. — A carrier can have no relief in equity on the ground of a mistake in fact in delivering the goods to the consignee under the belief that he is solvent, when in fact his estate proves to be insolvent. It is no fraud on the part of the con- signee that immediately after the delivery of the goods he dies, and his estate proves to be insolvent.'*^ ^sBigelow V. Heaton, 6 Hill (N. 44Geneva, Ithica & S. R. Co. v. Y.) 43, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 496. The Sage, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 95. Hardin, carrier's lien is not lost by delivery P. J., said: "We see no evidence to the assignee of the shipper for of trick, fraud, or overreaching on such assignee takes the goods the part of the defendant to ob- charged with the carrier's lien. tain possession." Caye v. Pool's x\ssignee, 108 Ky. -isSears v. Wills, 4 Allen (Mass.) 124, 55 S. W. 887, 49 L. R. A. 251. 212. 321 CARRIERS LIENS. 320 § 319. The carrier has a lien upon all the goods carried. — The consignee can not insist upon a delivery of any part until the whole freight is paid.^*^ The carrier may deliver by instalments, if the goods are in distinct parcels, and the freight charges are divisible; and he may require the freight on each instalment to be paid upon the delivery of it.*" § 320. Delivery of part of the goods not a waiver. — A delivery of a part of the goods is not a waiver of the Hen upon the remainder for the whole freight. ^^ The lien is gone upon the part delivered, but remains good upon the part retained for the payment of the entire freight, that upon the goods delivered as well as that upon the goods still retained. Even if the goods were delivered to the carrier in separate par- cels at different times, but all the parcels are carried under one contract, the lien will attach in respect to the charges incurred in the carriage of the whole upon any one or more of the parcels; or, in other words, if some of the parcels be delivered, the lien for the carriage of these will attach to those not delivered. ^^ Moreover, in such case, the carrier may treat all the parcels as one lot of goods, for the purpose of the lien, but not if the goods were shipped under several contracts.^" •leperez v. Alsop, 3 F. & F. 188. 47Black V. Rose, 2 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 277, 11 L. T. N. S. 31. ^sSodergren v. Flight, 6 East 622; Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. Div 68; Potts V. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. Rep. 247^ New Haven & Northampton Co. v Campbell, 128 Mass. 104, 35 Am Rep. 360; Lane v. Old Colony & F. R. R. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 143; Boggs V. Martin, 13 B. Men. (Ky.) 239; Frothingham v. Jenkins, 1 Cal. 42, 52 Am. Dec. 286; Phila- delphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Dows, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 101; Stein- 21 man v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254; Fuller v. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 86 Hun (N. Y.) 86, 34 N. Y. S. 206, 68 N. Y. St. 54, affd. 158 N. Y. 674, 52 N. E. 1125. ■isChase v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180;Schumacher v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 207 III. 199, 108 III. App. 520, 69 N. E. 825; Jeffries v. Fitchburg R. Co., 93 Wis. 250, 67 N. W. 424, 33 L. R. A. 351, 57 Am. St. 919. soBernal v. Pim, 1 Gale 17; Sodergren v. Flight, 6 East 622. §321 LIENS. 322 The part of the goods remaining will be discharged from the lien for the freight upon the part delivered, it such was the intention of the parties. ^^ § 321. Separate liens on separate goods. — If separate con- tracts be made for the carriage of separate parcels of goods, a separate lien will attach to each parcel, and the lien is lost by the delivery of such parcel. If, in such case, several bills of lading have been given, and these have been assigned to different persons, the carrier can not have a lien for the freight due under one bill of lading upon the goods comprised in another which is not held by the same person. ^^ Separate liens upon separate lots of goods carried may, by the action of the parties, be changed into a general lien upon all the goods. Thus, if several cargoes of coal carried by a railroad company are so far distinct subjects of contract that the company may deliver and demand freight for one before delivering another, and the consignee may demand the delivery of one without waiting for the arrival of the whole, there is a separate lien upon each cargo for the freight of that cargo, and a lien for the freight of several cargoes de- livered could not be asserted against the cargo not delivered. But if the several cargoes be mingled together in bins upon the company's land by direction of the consignee, so that they can not be distinguished, then all the coal will be re- garded as delivered together, and the separate lien upon each cargo will be merged in a general lien upon the wdiole quantity. If, then, portions of the coal be taken from the bins by the owner, and delivered to purchasers from time to time, the railroad company may at any time forbid the •■^^New Haven & Northampton rier may legally hold any one of Co. V. Campbell, 128 Mass. 104. the cars for freight due on all 35 Am. Rep. 360. of the cars. Pennsylvania Steel 52Sodergren v. Flight, 6 East 622. Co. v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., If several car loads are shipped 94 Ga. 636, 21 S. E. 577. under a single contract, the car- 323 carriers' liens. § 322 taking away of any more of the coal without payment of the unpaid freight, and may assert a lien upon the coal remaining for the freight of all the cargoes. ^^ § 322. Lien waived by contract. — The lien is waived by a contract whereby the carrier gives credit for the freight extending beyond the time when the goods are to be deliv- ered.^^ A charter party which provides that a part of the freight shall be paid by the charterer's acceptance, payable three months after delivery to him of a certificate of the right of delivery of the cargo, displaces the lien for such part of the freight, although the charterer had become bank- rupt before the arrival of the vessel at the port of discharge. The subsequent bankruptcy of the charterer can neither operate to erase the clause of the charter party giving credit for an instalment of the freight, nor to shorten the term of the credit. ^^ There can be no lien on a cargo for freight where the charter party provides for the payment of it two months after the delivery of it, or in thirty days after the return of the vessel to the home port.^^ The taking of bills of exchange or promissory notes for the freight, payable at a future time after the time at which the goods should be delivered, is a waiver of the lien.^''' It seems, however, that, if the paper be dishonored before the goods have been delivered, the lien will revive.^* 53Lane v. Old Colony & F. R. Wells, 10 Conn. 104. And see Tam- R. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 143. vaco v. Simpson, 19 C. B. N. S. 54Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 B. & 453; Alsager v. St. Katherine's Aid. 50; Alsager v. St. Katherine's Dock Co., 14 M. & W. 794; Thomp- Dock Co., 14 M. & W. 794; Foster son v. Small, 1 C. B. 328. V. Colby, 3 H. & N. 705, 28 L. J. ocpickman v. Woods, 6 Pick. Ex. 81; Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. (Mass.) 248. & S. 180; Raitt v. Mitchell, 4 Camp. ^'''Hewison v. Guthrie, 2 Bing. 146; Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. (N. C.) 755; Horncastle v. Far- (N. Y.) 157, 9 Am. Dec. 193; Pin- ran, 3 B. & Aid. 497; Bunney v. ney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568. 55 Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. (U. 5SGunn v. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662; Pinney v. 491. § 323 LIENS. 324 § 323. Extension of time of payment. — If the provision be that the freight shall be paid by bills on a specified time after delivery, then the shipowner has a lien on the cargo until payment by bills in the manner provided, the delivery of the cargo and the payment of the freight being con- comitant acts.^^ If the delivery of the cargo be a w^ork of several days, the bills should bear date from the last deliv- ery, and to avoid a waiver of the lien the master may in the first instance land the cargo in his own name. A charter-party provided that freight at a certain rate per ton should be paid part in cash at a certain time before the voyage could be ended, and part in bills having specified times to run from the day on which the ship should arrive in the Thames on her return upon her homeward voyage. The charterers became bankrupt, and neither they nor their as- signees tendered the bills for freight. In an action by the assignees for the goods, it was held that the shipowner was entitled to retain them until payment. Abbott, C. J., delivering the judgment, said:^^ "Upon this instrument, therefore, and between the parties to this suit, we think the defendant had the possession of the ship and goods for the voyage, and a lien on the goods for the stipulated hire of the ship, there being nothing to show that the delivery of the goods was to precede the payment of that hire in cash and bills, as provided for by the deed." § 324. Promissory note does not affect carrier's lien. — A promissory note or bill of exchange given for freight and falling due before the delivery of the goods does not dis- charge the lien, but the carrier may stand upon his lien as fully as if the note or bill had never been given. ^^ By the 50 Tate V. Meek, 8 Taunt. 280 Yates V. Railston, 8 Taunt. 293 Bohtling V. Inglis, 3 East 381 soSaville v. Campion, 2 B. & Ad. 503. See, also, Faith v. East Indian Co., 4 B. & Aid. 630. Tamvaco v. Simpson, L. R. 1 C. eiRird of Paradise, 5 Wall. (U. P. 363. S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662. 325 carriers' liens. § 325 general commercial laws, a bill or note given for a precedent debt does not extinguish the debt or operate as payment, unless such was the express agreement of the parties. The creditor may return the bill or note when it is dishonored, and proceed upon the original debt, the bill or note being re- garded as accepted upon the condition of its payment. The rule is different in Massachusetts, the presumption of law there being that a promissory note extinguishes the debt for which it was given. Yet in Massachusetts this presump- tion may be repelled by evidence that such was not the in- tention of the parties. Upon this ground it was held that under the Massachusetts rule it is not to be presumed that a shipowner, having a lien upon a cargo for the payment of the freight, intended to waive his lien by taking the notes of the charterer drawn so as to be payable at the time of the expected arrival of the ship in port.^^ § 325. When carrier has no lien for freight charges. — There can be no lien for freight when the contract for its payment is inconsistent with a lien. If the time, place and manner of payment of the freight are regulated by the char- ter-party in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the existence of a lien, then the only way of compelling pay- ment is by an action upon the charter party. Thus, where a ship was chartered at New York for several voyages, part- ly at the option of the charterer, with the agreement that the time of the employment should be the full term of fifteen months, with a privilege to the charterer to extend it to twenty-four months, the charterer paying at the rate of two thousand dollars per month, payable semi-annually at New York, it was held that the circumstances indicated that the owner meant to waive his lien upon the cargo for freight, 62The Kimball, 3 Wall. (U. S.) owner, and were to be held over or 37, 18 L. ed. 50. There was evi- renewed in case they fell due be- dence that the notes were given fore the arrival of the ship, for the accommodation of the ship- 326 LIENS. 326 and to trust wholly to the personal responsibility of the charterer. A libel filed at San Francisco to hold the cargo responsible for the freight was accordingly dismissed. ^^ § 326. Waiver of carrier's lien. — There is a waiver of the lien as against an indorsee for value of a bill of lading, when this holds out that the goods are to be delivered free of freight. Where a bill of lading of goods shipped at Liver- pool for Sidney provided for the payment of the freight in Liverpool by the shipper one month after the sailing of the vessel, and the bill of lading passed into the hands of in- dorsees for value, it was held that the representations of the bill of lading were such that no lien could be claimed against the consignee at the port of discharge, though the csRaymond v. Tyson. 17 How. (U. S.) 53, IS L. ed. 47. In this case, not only the time but the place of payment was regarded as of importance in determining whether the lien was waived. "Place for the payment of money is a substantial part of any con- tract to pay it there. It can be insisted upon by him who is to receive it, and cannot be right- fully refused or omitted by him who has to pay it. A broken promise of that kind gives to the creditor a right of action against the debtor for its recovery. Why upon principle should a promise to pay freight at a parti- cular time, and at a place other than that where the owner of the ship has undertaken to deliver the cargo, be required to be paid else- where? It is the payer's privi- lege to pay it there. And, should it not be paid, why should the owner have more than a right of action for its recovery, or larger remedies by suit, than are given in any other contract? We confess we do not see why. Place for the payment of freight, other than that for which the cargo is shipped and discharged, amounts to a stipula- tion that freight will not be de- manded at the last, as a condition for the cargo's delivery. All of the authorities concur in this, that place for the payment of freight is a waiver of a lien upon the cargo unless there are already cir- cumstances or stipulations to show that it could not have been meant. It is so, because it is at variance with the enforcement of such a lien according to the usage of trade; and it is so, because, when parties to a charter-party depart from that usage by agreeing to pay and receive freight at another place than that where the common law gives to an owner of a ship a lien to enforce payment, it must be regarded that the owner had some sufficient reason for not in- sisting upon his right according^ to the common law." 327 CARRIERS LIENS. § 326 master had been advised by the shipowner that the freight had not been paid, and directed not to deliver the goods unless the freight should be paid.^^ The shipowner can not claim a lien for freight when this is inconsistent with a bill of lading given with his authority, if the bill of lading represents the freight to have been paid, when in fact it had not been paid, an indorsee for value of the bill of lading is entitled to claim that the representation is true; and no lien for freight can be claimed as against him.®^ And so, if the bill of lading holds out that the goods are to be delivered free of freight to the consignee, there can be no lien for freight. Such is the effect of a representation in the bill of lading that the freight is payable by the shipper in advance, on sailing or at a fixed time afterward; and though the shipper fails to pay as agreed, no lien for freight can arise as against the consignee.*''^ But a mere provision ('4Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore P. C. 361, following How v. Kirch- ner, 11 Moore P. C. 21, and dis- senting from Gilkison v. Middle- ton, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 134, and Neish V. Graham, 8 EI. & Bl. 505. In Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore P. C. 361, Lord Kingsdown, deliv- ering the judgment, said: "No doubt parties who have superseded by a special contract the rights and obligations which the law at- taches to freight in its legal sense may, if they think fit, create a lien on the goods for the performance of the agreement into which they have entered, and they may do this either by express conditions con- tained in the contract itself, or by agreeing that in case of failure of performance of that agreement, the right of lien for what is due shall subsist as if there had been an agreement for freight. But in such case the right of lien de- pends entirely on the agreement, and if the parties have not, in fact, made such a contract, it is very difficult to understand upon what grounds it can be implied, or why, upon failure of performance of the agreement which they have made, the law is to substitute for it an- other and very different contract which they have not made." CaHoward v. Tucker, 1 Barn. & Ad. 712; Tamvaco v. Simpson, L. R. 1 C. P. 363. 66H0W V. Kirchner, 11 Moore P. C. 21; Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore P. C. 361. In the latter case there is a dictum of Lord Kingsdown that freight payable in advance is not freight. It is not money for carrying goods, but for taking them on board. But this view is not affirmed in later cases. Carver's Carriers of Goods by Sea, 666. This dictum is commented upon and explained in Allison v. \.Z^7 LIENS. 328 that the freight shall be paid in advance does not seem to be inconsistent with a lien, especially if the consignee is himself liable for it. An agreement for prepayment of freight does not alter its legal character of freight.^''' § 327. Waiver of lien not inferred. — No waiver of the lien will be inferred, however, unless it is evident from the terms of the contract that it is contemplated that delivery is to precede the payment for freight. ^^ Accordingly a stipu- lation in a charter party that the freight shall be paid within ten days after the return of the vessel to the port of departure does not displace the lien on the return cargo, inasmuch as the delivery of the cargo might be rightfully postponed be- yond the ten days after the returning of the ship.*^^ And so a stipulation that the freight shall be paid in five days or in ten days after the discharge of the cargo is held not to dis- place the lien, inasmuch as the word discharge, in this con- nection, is construed to mean merely the unloading of the cargo from the ship, and not the delivery of it to the owner or consignee. "^^ Bristol Marine Ins. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 209. On the princi- pal point decided, the cases of Gilkison v. Middleton, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 134, and Neish v. Graham, 8 El. & Bl. 505, are dis- cussed and dissented from in the Privy Council cases. 67 Allison V. Bristol Marine Ins. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 209. espaith v. East India Co., 4 B. & Aid. 630; Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 545, 18 L. ed. 662; Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 589, Fed.. Cas. No. 2559; Howard v. Macondray, 7 Gray (Mass.) 516. In this case, Dewey, J., delivering the judg- ment of the court, said: "While it is conceded that the mari- time lien for freight may be considered as waived, when there are stipulations in the con- tract as to time and place of pay- ment inconsistent with the exist- ence of such lien, in the cases re- ported there seems manifestated a strong disposition to limit this ex- clusion of such lien to cases plain- ly importing such exclusion." Rug- gles V. Bucknor, 1 Paine (U. S.) 358, Fed. Cas. No. 12115, per Thompson, J., is to the same effect. C9The Volunteer, 1 Sum. (U. S.) 551, Fed. Cas. No. 16991. 70The Kimball, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 37, 18 L. ed. 50; Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 589, Fed. Cas. No. 2559. 329 carriers' liens. § 331 § 328. Waiver by attachment. — An attachment by the carrier of the property on which a Hen is claimed for freight is a waiver or forfeiture of the lien.'^^ § 329. Action to collect freight charges. — A carrier may bring an action for his freight charges, and attach other goods to secure the demand, without discharging his lien, especial- ly if the owner has wrongfully taken the goods from him by means of a writ of replevin. ''^^ § 330. Waiver by issuance of an execution. — A lien is de- stroyed by the carriers taking on execution the same goods upon which the lien is attached, for he thereby gives up possession to the sheriff.^^ §331. Lien defeated by injury to goods. — The carrier's lien may be defeated by an injury to the goods carried, hap- pening by the carrier's fault, to an amount larger than his charge for freight.'^'* His right to freight, and to detain the goods for its payment, results from his performance of the contract to carry the goods. If he fails to carry the goods and have them ready for delivery, he can not claim his freight. If, through his fault the goods sustain damage to an amount exceeding the amount of his charges for freight, he is not entitled to demand anything for the carriage of the goods; and if the damages be less than the freight charges, the amount he is entitled to demand is reduced to that ex- tent. His lien is, of course, only coextensive with his right to claim and recover freight. If by reason of such injury to the goods he is not entitled to demand any freight, he has "iWingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. '^Dyer v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 543. 42 Vt. 441, 1 Am. Rep. 350; Hum- ''■2Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Maine phreys v. Reed, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 412. 435; Boggs v. Martin, 13 B. Mon. 73Jacobs V. Latour, 5 Bing. 130; (Ky.) 239. See ante, § 302. Re Coumbe, 24 Grant Ch. (Ont.) 519. § 332 LIENS. 330 no right to retain the goods for the payment of the freight, and if he does so they may be taken from him by replevin. There is no good reason why the carrier's liabihty for dam- ages to the goods accruing through his fault should not be asserted and determined by way of defense to his claim for freight, as well as by a cross action. It would be con- trary to the analogies of cases involving similar relations of subject-matter and parties, to say nothing of the hard- ships to the consignee, to require him to pay the freight upon the goods, and then to trust to the responsibility of the car- rier at the end of a lawsuit for the recovery of the damages to the goods sustained through the fault of the carrier."^^ § 332. Carrier's lien not affected by consignee's failure to receive goods. — The refusal of the consignee to accept the goods after they arrive at their destination does not in any way afTect the carrier's lien, whether this is implied by law or arises under an express stipulation of contract."^ But upon the refusal of the consignee to accept the goods and pay the freight, the carrier is not entitled to take the goods forthwith back to the place whence they were shipped. He is bound to keep them for a reasonable time at the place where they were to be delivered, so as to give the consignee an op- portunity of obtaining the goods upon paying the carrier's demand.^" If the goods are left in the carrier's hands with- out fault on his part, he is bound to take reasonable measures for their preservation, and may recover, and have a lien, for the expenses so incurred. ''^^ "3 Dyer v. Grand Trunk R. Co., general lien, with power of sale 42 Vt. 44r, 1 Am. Rep. 350, per in satisfaction of it. Barrett, J.; Browning v. Belford, '^''''Great Western R. Co. v. 83 App. Div. 144, 82 N. Y. S. 489. Crouch, 3 H. & N. 183; Southern "GWestfield v. Great Western R. Co. v. Born Steel Rang Co., 126 R. Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. 276. In this Ga. 527, 55 S. E. 173. case the contract provided for a "SGreat Northern R. Co. v. Swaffield. L. R. 9 Ex. 132. 331 carriers' liens. § 334 332a. Condition precedent to carrier's lien. — The per- formance of the carrier's contract is a condition precedent to his right to demand freight, and consequently to his obtain- ing a lien for the freight. ^^ A carrier loses a lien by failing cient, unless delivery be dispensed with or prevented by the owner.^*^ § 333. Carrier's lien lost. — The carrier's lien is lost v^hen the performance of his contract becomes impossible. Thus, if a ship be lost on the voyage, and the shipowner has no means of carrying the cargo on to its destination, he has no lien upon it for freight. ^^ But if the shipowner sub- stantially performs the contract, as by trans-shipping the goods to another ship, he may still exercise his lien, or en- able the owner of the other ship to do so.^- And so if a ship- owner deliver the cargo at a port which is within the terms of the charter party, though the charterer had ordered the vessel to discharge at a port to which it had become im- possible for her to go, on account of the breaking out of a war, the shipowner does not lose his lien for his chartered freight. ^^ § 334. Claiming general lien does not waive special lien. — Claiming a general lien, or a lien for other charges, is not generally a waiver of a specific lien for freight. If the carrier claims to detain the goods, not only on the ground that he has a lien for freight, but also a lien for other charges, "^Osgood V. Groning, 2 Camp. 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 348; Burrill v. 466; Duthie v. Hilton, L. R. 4 C. Cleeman, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 72. P. 138; Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 si Nelson v. Association for Pro- Johns. (N. Y.) 348; Taylor v. tection of Wrecked Property, 43 Smith, 87 App. Div. 78, 84 N. Y. L. J. C. P. 218; Ex parte Nyholm, S. 13; Liefert v. Galveston L. & 43 L. J. Bank. 21. H. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S. S2 Matthews v. Gibbs, 30 L. J. Q. W. 899. B. 55, per Cockburn, C. J. sojohnson v. Davis, 60 Mich. 56, saDuncan v. Koster, L. R. 4 P. 26 N. W. 830; Palmer v. Lorillard, C. 171. § 335 LIENS. 332 and the consignee disputes the latter claim, he should ten- der payment of the freight, for he is not relieved from paying this, though the carrier improperly joins with it a further claim of lien.^^ The carrier's conduct may, however, be such as to do away with the necessity of a tender. ^^ Where a car- rier detained three pigs out of a lot carried, to satisfy a balance due on former shipments, and the owner was ready to pay the freight on the present shipment, but the carrier refused to deliver the pigs until payment of the old account should be made, it was held that he waived a tender of the freight for the last shipment. ^^ § 335. Carrier's lien founded on possession. — The car- rier's lien, like all other common-law liens founded upon pos- session, gives him no right to sell the property, but only a right to retain it until his charges are paid.^' He can enforce his lien indirectly by obtaining judgment for his charges and levying the execution upon the goods. But a sale with- out process is a conversion; the measure of damages for which is the market value of the goods, deducting the amount of the lien.^^ 84Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. the plaintiff was ready to pay: it 270. was equivalent to saying to the ssjones v. Tarlton, 9 M. & W. plaintiff, 'Do what you will, ten- 675. der what you will, it is of no use; 88Jones V. Tarlton, 9 M. & W. I will not receive it unless you 675. Alderson, B. : "I think if the pay the old account also.' " defendant absolutely refused to ^"Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East deliver the pigs when they were 21; Jones v. Pearle, 1 Stra. 556; demanded, until payment by the Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. Div. plaintiff, not only of the freight 484; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Maine for that particular cargo, but also 339, 41 Am. Dec. 387; Fox v. Mc- of the freight due on a former Gregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Saltus account, and which, as now appears v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, by the finding of the jury, the de- 32 Am. Dec. 541. fendant was not entitled to de- s^Briggs v. Boston & Lowell mand, that must be considered as R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 a waiver of any tender of the pre- Am. Dec. 626; Staples v. Bradley, cise sum really due, and which 23 Conn. 167, 60 Am. Dec. 630. 333 carriers' liens. § 336 The right of possession under the lien continues although the debt itself be barred by the statute of limitations. The possession, however, even for that length of time, confers no title to the property upon the bailee. The ov^^ner may at any time demand the property, and is entitled to it upon tendering the amount due upon the property under the lien. A shipowner can not, of his own motion, sell the goods in order to pay the freight, except by virtue of a statute. His usual and proper remedy is by libel in rem before an admir- alty court, by whose decree his rights may be protected.*^ § 336. Sale of goods by carrier authorized by statutes. — In almost every state and territory there are statutes which enable carriers to sell goods upon which they have liens for freight, and by means of these statutes the passive com- mon-law lien is converted into an active lien. These stat- utes are of two classes. One class in terms provides a rem- edy by sale for the enforcement of the carrier's lien. And this remedy is usually the same as that provided for the en- forcement of other liens. For these provisions, see the chap- ter on Remedies. The other class in terms provides for the sale of unclaimed goods, and for the payment of the car- rier's charges and expenses out of the proceeds. The result is substantially the same in both cases; the carrier is enabled to dispose of the goods and to get the amount due him. Al- though the provisions of the latter class of statutes are wide- ly different in the several states, and it is impossible to make an adequate general statement of them, inasmuch as they re- late only incidentally to liens, it does not seem desirable to give them in detail, and so they are only referred to.^^ 89Sullivan v. Park, 33 Maine 438; law for the enforcement of a car- Hunt V. Haskell, 24 Maine 339, 41 rier's lien, by allowing, a sale to Am. Dec. 387. pay charges, does not, in the ab- ooAlabama : Civ. Code 1907, sence of express provision, take § 6139. This statute, though af- away any equitable remedy which fording an adequate remedy at may have previously existed. 337 LIENS. 334 § 337. Sale by carrier must be made in good faith. — In making a sale under the statute of unclaimed goods, to pay Crass V. Memphis & C. R. R. Co., 96 Ala. 447, 11 So. 480. See Gen. Acts 1911, p. 387, for recent law authorizing sale of unclaimed freight. Alaska : Carter's Ann. Code. 1900, pp. 414, 418, 419. Arizona : Rev. Stat. 1901, § 873. Arkansas: Kirby's Dig. of Stats., 1904, § 8002. California: Civ. Code 1906, §§ 2144, 2204, 3051; Pol. Code 1906, §§ 3152, 3153; Stats, and Amends. Codes 1907, pp. 85, 86; Stats, and Amends. Codes 1909, p. 1000. Colorado: Ann. Stats. 1912, §§ 4569, 7620 et seq. Connecticut: Gen. Stats. 1902, §§ 4675-4679; Pub. Acts. 1911, p. 1450, §§ 26, 27. Delaware : Laws, Rev. Code as amended 1893, ch. 164, p. 816. District of Columbia: Code 1901, §§ 642-644. Georgia: Code 1911, §§ 2741, 2743, 2757, 3366; Central of Georgia R. Co. V. Chicago Portrait Co., 122 Ga. 11, 49 S. E. 721, 106 Am. St. 87. Idaho: Rev. Code 1908, §§ 1546- 1549, 3446. Illinois: Rev. Stats. 1913, p. 100, § 2; p. 2460, §§ 1-4. Indiana: Burns' Rev. Stats. 1914, § 3893. Iowa: Code 1897, §§ 3130, 3131; Code Supp. 1907, § 3131, p. 784. Kansas : Gen. Stats. 1909, § 4810. Kentucky: Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 785. Louisiana: Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, arts. 3217, 3265. Maine: Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 54, §§ 16-20. Alaryland : Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, pp. 651, 652, §§ 267-270; Laws 1910, ch. 406. Massachusetts : Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 95, §§ 1-7. Michigan: Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 5727-5738, 6238, 6239; Pub. Acts 1901, p. 369; Howell's Stat. Ann. 1912, § 6591. Minnesota: Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7037. Mississippi: Code 1906, ch. 54, §§ 2293-2295. Missouri: Rev. Stats. 1909, §§ 8274-8277. Montana: Civ. Code 1895, § 2848. Nebraska: Ann. Stats. 1911, §§ 12176, 12177. Nevada: Rev. Laws 1912, §§ 337- 542; Stats. 1909, p. 216. New Hampshire : Pub. Stats. 1901, ch. 160, §§ 26-28. New Jersey: Comp. Stats. 1910, pp. 369, 370, §§ 6, 7; pp. 3137, 3138, §§ 57-60. New Mexico: Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2239-2245, 3873. New York: Birdseye's C. & G. Consol. Laws 1909, p. 1866, § 280; p. 4747, § 46. North Carolina: Revisal 1905, § 2637. North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, ch. 57, § 5661; chapts. 74, 86 and 87. Ohio : Gen. Code, §§ 8365-8375. Oklahoma : Comp. Laws 1909, §§ 454, 472, 4142. Oregon : Ann. Codes and Stats. 335 CARRIERS LIENS. 338 the freight and charges, a carrier is held not only to good faith in making the sale, but to reasonable diligence in ascertaining and giving notice of the contents of the pack- ages sold. But, while he is required to examine all external marks and indications of the contents, he is not required or authorized to open the packages for the purpose of ascer- taining their contents. If, knowing, or having reason to know, the contents of the packages, he withholds his knowl- edge or belief, and sells valuable goods to a favorite having superior knowledge, at a nominal price, this is a fraud which vitiates the sale, and renders him and the purchaser liable in damages to the owner. ^^ § 338. Sale by carrier of perishable goods. — If, however, the goods are of a perishable nature, in the absence of the consignee, it is a matter of necessity for the carrier to sell them. But in such case he sells, not bv virtue of his lien, but (Bellinger & Cotton) 1902, §§ 3892- 3903, 5674, 5675. Pennsylvania : Purdon's Digest (13th ed.) 1903, p. 2265, §§ 1-3. See, also, Laws 1909, p. 19. Rhode Island: Gen. Laws 1909, p. 619, § 5. South Carolina: Acts 1913, p. 140 et seq., repealing Code of Laws (Civ.) 1912, §§ 2610-2613. South Dakota: Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 1548. Tennessee : Ann. Code 1896, p. 841, §§ 3598, 3599. Texas: Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, arts. 725-727; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. V. North Texas Grain Co., Zl Tex. Civ. App. 93, 74 S. W. 567. Utah : Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 1416- 1417. See also. Laws 1911, p. 271. Vermont: Pub. Stats. 1906, ch. 239, §§ 5663-5668. See, also. Laws 1912, p. 231. Virginia: Code 1904, p. 669, ch. 54a, §§ 28, 29. Washington: Ann. Codes and Stats. (Remington & Ballinger's) 1910. §§ 1191-1196. Wisconsin: Stats. 1898, §§ 1637- 1640. Wyoming: Comp. Stats. 1910, §§ 3756-3762. Author's note: §§ 340-374. In the first edition of this work a full abstract of the statutes of the several states providing for the enforcement of Carriers' Liens was given, one section being de- voted to each state. In the second and third editions it has not seemed best to give as much space to a detailed statement of the statutory remedies, but instead to make ref- erence in § 337 to the statutes. 9iNathan v. Shivers, 71 Ala. 117, 46 Am. Rep. 303. § 339 LIENS. 336 by virtue of his trust relation to the owner, and in his interest. Out of the proceeds he may retain his freight and charges. To justify the sale, it must be shown that the goods were perishable, and that the sale is one of absolute necessity in the interest of the owner.^^ §339. Statute of the United States. — A statute of the United States^^ provides that whenever the collector shall be notified of a lien for freight on any goods imported, he shall hold the same until it is shown that the freight has been paid or secured. Under this statute the consignee should first tender the amount of freight he admits to be due, and if declined, he should tender a sufficient bond con- ditioned to pay all freight that may be found to be due, or that may be adjudged due by any court of competent juris- diction. Should this be declined, proof of these tenders should be hade to the collector, who, if he finds the bond adequate to secure the carrier, should release the goods on the deposit with him, for the use of the carrier, of the bond originally tendered.®^ 92Arthur v. Schooner Cassius, 2 93U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, § 2981. Story (U. S.) 81, Fed. Cas. No. 94Wyman v. Lancaster, 32 Fed. 564; Rankin v. Memphis & C. 720. Packet Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 564, 24 Am. Rep. 339. CHAPTER VIII. LIENS OF CORPORATIONS ON THEIR MEMBERS' SHARES. Sec. ■ Sec. 375. Corporation at common law 392. had no lien on its mem- bers' shares. 393. 376. Lien of corporation by stat- 394. ute. 377. By-laws to regulate transfer 395. of shares. 378. Notice where by-law rests 396. upon inferential authority. 397. 379. Statute constructive notice of 398. lien. 380. Usage of corporations in 399. claiming liens. 400. 381. Lien can only be authorized 401. by statute. 382. Lien conferred on existing 402. corporation. 383. Option by statute does not 403. create a lien. 384. Bank can have no lien on its 404. own stock. 385. Lien may cover liability of 405. equitable shareholder. 386. Equitable shares subject to 406. lien. 387. Enforcement of lien on hold- 407. er of legal title of shares. 388. Equitable assignee has no 408. lien. 389. Priority of lien over equitable 409. pledge. 390. Availability of lien in state 410. other than that where cor- poration is organized. 411. 391. Corporations' lien on divi- dends. 412. Lien not confined to stock owned. The word "indebted." Lien not restricted to par- ticular debt. Liens not confined to debts due for shares. By-laws restricted by statute. Lien on calls for shares. Debt of partnership or of a surety. Debt of joint trustee. Lien in case of bankruptcy. Surety subrogated to right of lien holder. Lien of corporation securing several debts. Lien may be waived by cor- poration. Lien after notice of transfer of stock. Notice to its officer is notice to a corporation. Corporation may be estopped to claim lien. Waived by taking a transfer of the shares. No waiver by taking other security. Lien acquired after attach- ment of stock. Stock pledged after the bank has waived its lien. Transfer of part of the shares not a waiver. Usage may operate against lien. 337 22 375 LIENS. 338 Sec. 413. 414. 415. No waiver by reason of the corporation allowing stock to remain outstanding. Issuing of certificate will not amount to a waiver. Lien not enforcible on un- authorized debt. Sec. 416. Payment of debt discharges lien. 417. Lien not lost because debt is barred by statute of limit- ations. § 375. Corporation at common law has no lien on its member's shares. — A corporation has no lien at common law upon the shares of its members for any indebtedness to the company.^ The reason sometimes given for this is that secret liens are repugnant to the general policy of the common law. But there is in fact no sufficient ground in law upon which to rest a claim to such a lien. Such posses- sion as a corporation has of its members' shares does not give it a possessory lien for their debts.- The corporation really has no possession of stock that it has issued to its LXeale v. Janney, 2 Cr. C. C. 188, Fed. Cas. No. 10069; Driscoll v. West Bradley & Gary Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96, per Folger, J.; Mc- Murrich v. Bond Head Harbor Co., 9 U. C. Q. B. 333. Kentucky: Dana V. Brown, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 304; Frankfort & S. Turnpike Co. v. Churchill, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 427, 17 Am. Dec. 159; Fitzhugh v. Bank of Shepherdsville, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 126, 16 Am. Dec. 90. Louis- iana: New Orleans Nat. Banking Asso. V. Wiltz, 10 Fed. 330, 4 Woods (U. S.) 43; Bryon v. Car- ter, 22 La. Ann. 98; Byrne v. Union Bank, 9 Rob. (La.) 433. Massa- chusetts: Massachusetts Iron Co. V. Hooper, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 183; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick. (Mass.) 90, 19 Am. Dec. 306; Nesmith v. Washington Bank, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 324; Hussey v. Manufacturers' & Mechanics' Bank, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 421, per Shaw, C. J. Pennsylvania: Steamship Dock Co. V. Heron, 52 Pa. St. 280; Mer- chants' Bank v. Shouse, 102 Pa. St. 488, 16 Rep. 442. Other States: Ha- gar V. L^nion Nat. Bank, 63 Maine 509; Vansands v. Middlesex Coun- ty Bank, 26 Conn. 144; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 30 Am. Rep. 398; Mobile Mut. Ins. Co. V. Cullom, 49 Ala. 558; Bank of Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 38 Am. Rep. 330, per George J.; Heart v. State Bank, 17 N. Car. Ill; Peo- ple V. Crockett, 9 Gal. 112; Wil- liams V. Lowe, 4 Nebr. 382, affd. 94 U. S. 650. 24 L. ed. 216, per Gantt. J. -Fitzhugh V. Bank of Shepherds- ville, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 126, 16 Am. Dec. 90. 339 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 376 members except in case they transfer it to the corporation. The corporation is not a debtor to its members for the stock it has issued to them, so that no right can arise against them by way of set-ofT. A further reason against such a lien is that it would operate as a restraint upon the transfer of stock, in the nature of a restraint of trade, and such a restraint is not allowed except by force of an express provision of statute.^ The lien of a corporation upon its members' shares pre- vents a transfer by the shareholder, but it gives the cor- poration no right of sale.^ § 376. Lien of corporation by statute. — Inasmuch as the common law implies no lien in favor of a corporation upon its shares for the debts of its shareholders, and inasmuch as it is not only reasonable but desirable that there should be such a lien,' it has become usual in statutes or charters creating moneyed or commercial companies to provide ex- pressly for such lien. In some states there are general laws declaring this lien, and in some instances prescribing the mode of enforcing the lien.'^ These statutes provide that the transferees of stock ^Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 30 Am. Rep. 398. ^Tete V. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 4 Brew. St. (Pa.) 308. 5In Alabama corporations have a lien upon the stock standing in the name of a debtor, and may- enforce it after thirty days' notice to the debtor, by selling the same at public auction, ten days' notice of sale being first published. Civ. Code 1907, § 3476. A mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon stock is void as to bona fide creditors and purchasers unless a transfer is reg- istered within fifteen days. Civ. Code 1907, § 3471. Arkansas: A corporation shall at all times have a lien upon all the stock or property of its members invested therein for all debts due from them to such corporation. Kirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, § 853. Colorado: Banks organized un- der the statutes of the state have a lien upon the stock and dividends of shareholders for their debts. Ann. Stats. (Mills) 1912, p. 155, § 364. As to transfers of stock, see same section. Connecticut: Every corporation has at all times a lien upon all the stock owned by any person there- in for all debts due to it from 3/6 LIENS. 340 shall take it subject to all the liabilities of the stockholders who make the transfers ; or forbid transfers so long as the holder of the shares is indebted to the company; or declare that the corporation shall have a paramount lien upon all shares to secure the debts of the shareholders to the cor- poration.® him. Gen. Stats. 1902, § ^2,7Z; Pub. Acts 1903, ch. 194, § 21. Florida: No shares of a private corporation shall be transferred until all previous assessments there- on shall have been fully paid in. Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2656. Georgia: The by-law^s of a cor- poration may create a lien upon the shares of other property of the stockholders in favor of the company; such lien is binding upon the corporators themselves, and upon all creditors given credit with notice, or purchasers at public or private sale purchasing with notice. Code 1911, § 3375. Michigan: Shares of building and loan associations are subject to a lien for the payment of un- paid dues and such other charges as are lawfully incurred, and the by-laws may prescribe the manner of enforcing this lien. Howell's Stats. 1912, § 7663. Minnesota: Stock shall not be transferred upon the books of the corporation while any indebtedness of the record holder thereof to the corporation remains unpaid. Gen. Stats. 1913, § 6176. Nevada: Banks have prior liens upon stock of shareholder to the extent of assessment and may sell stock of delinquent shareholder, after giving due notice. Rev. Laws •1912, art 651. p. 200. Utah: A private corporation has a lien on the amount paid in by a stockholder upon his subscrip- tion, and the dividends thereon for any balance due for the stock. Comp. Laws 1907, § 333. Vermont: A private corporation may sell at public auction the shares of a delinquent stockholder according to its by-laws. Pub. Stats. 1906, § 4268. West Virginia: No share shall be transferred without the consent of the board of directors, until all previous calls thereon have been paid. Code 1906, §2336. ^Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 229, 7 L. ed. 152; Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 596, 9 L. ed. 547; National Bank V. Watsontown Bank, 105 U. S. 217, 26 L. ed. 1039; Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 390, 4 L. ed. 269. Pennsylvania: Mount Holly Paper Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 513. New York: Strebbins v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350; Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 424; Leggett v. Bank of Sing Sing, 24 N. Y. 283. Ohio: Conant v. Seneca Co. Bank, 1 Ohio St. 298. Kentucky: Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 Bush (Ky.) 54; Kenton Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 15 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 578; Kenton Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 84 Ky. 430, 8 Ky. L. 467, 1 S. W. 717; Corbin Banking Co. v. Mit- 341 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 377 § 377. By-laws to regulate transfer of shares. — By virtue of the general authority to regulate the transfer of shares conferred upon corporations by statute or special charter, many authorities hold that corporations may enact by-laws creating liens upon the shares of their members; and that it matters not that this statutory authority to regulate the transfer of shares is conferred in the most general terms. '^ chell, 141 Ky. 172, 132 S. W. 426. Maryland: Hodges v. Planters' Bank, 7 G. & J. (Md.) 306; Reese V. Bank of Commerce, 14 Md. 271, 74 Am. Dec. 536. "Child V. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207. The decision of this case as reported, 1 Str. 645, was upon the ground that the corpora- tion had a sort of set-off. Brent V. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 596, 9 L. ed. 547; Pender- gast V. Bank of Stockton, 2 Saw- yer (U. S.) 108, Fed. Cas. No. 10918; In re Bachman, 12 N. Bank. Reg. 223. In Child v. Hud- son's Bay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207, power was given to the Hud- son Bay Company by their charter to make by-laws for the better government of the com- pany and for the management of their trade, and they made a by-law that, if any of their mem- bers should be indebted to the company, his company stock should be liable in the first place for the payment of such debts as he might owe to the company, and that the company might seize and detain the stock as security for such in- debtedness. In a contest between the assignees in bankruptcy of the shareholder and the company, the by-law was adjudged good upon the ground that the legal interest in all the stock was in the com- pany. Alabama: Cunningham v. Ala- bama L. Co., 4 Ala. 652. The charter gave the directors power "to make rules concerning the transfer of stock." California: Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 852, 5 L. R. A. 233, 12 Am. St. 145. "Our opinion proceeds upon the proposition that the acceptance of the certificate of stock contain- ing the condition in question, and the subsequent borrowing of money, without anything to ex- clude the idea that the condition was to govern, creates an implied contract from which an equitable Hen arises. This was the ground of decision in the Connecticut case, which expressly states that it did not proceed on the ground of usage." Per Hayne, J. Connecticut: Vansands v. Mid- dlesex County Bank, 26 Conn. 144. Delaware: McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington, 1 Harr. (Del.) 27, 2 Del. Ch. 1. In the latter report, however, it appears that the by- law was authorized expressly by the act of incorporation. Georgia: Tuttle v. Walton, 1 Ga. 43. A provision that stock is only transferable on the books of the corporation does not give a lien 377 LIENS. 342 Without any by-laws, corporations may issue certificates containing a condition to the effect that transfers upon the on the stock. Buena Vista L. & S. Bank V. Grier, 114 Ga. 398, 40 S. E. 284. See, also, Owens v. At- lantic Trust & Banking Co., 119 Ga. 924, 47 S. E. 215. Iowa: Dempster Mfg-. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N. W. 735, 106 Am. St. 340; Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Warren County Bank, 97 Iowa 204, 66 N. W. 154. Louisiana: Bryon v. Carter, 22 La. Ann. 98. See New Orleans Nat. Banking Asso. v. Wiltz, 4 Woods (U. S.) 43, 10 Fed. 330; Bath Sav. Inst. v. Sagadahoc Nat. Bank, 89 Maine 500, 36 Atl. 996. Michigan: See Russel Wheel & Foundry Co. v. Hammond, 130 Mich. 7, 89 N. W. 590. And it is held that such lien is not waived by a by-law providing that the holder of stock shall give the bank an option to buy should the holder desire to sell. Citizen's State Bank of Monroeville, Ind., v. Kalamazoo County Bank, 111 Mich. 313, 69 N. W. 663. Mississippi: Bank of Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 38 Am. Rep. 330. Missouri: Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 45 Mo. 513, 100 Am. Dec. 388; St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149; Spurlock v. Pacific R. R., 61 Mo. 319. New Hampshire: Costello v. Portsmouth Brewing Co., 69 N. H. 405, 43 Atl. 640, where a provi- sion allowing the appropriation of the stock at par to pay the debt was upheld. New York: Leggett v. Bank of Sing Sing, 24 N. Y. 283; Mc- Cready v. Rumsey, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 574; Stebbins v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350; Rosenback v. Salt Springs Nat. Bank, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 495; Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 424. In Ohio it is held that a sav- ings and loan company may re- serve a lien against its stock- holders by stipulating the same in the stock certificate and that the lien is good as against a purchaser of the stock who buys even be- fore the vendor becomes indebted to the corporation, but the stock is presented for transfer after such indebtedness. Stafford v. Produce Exchange Banking Co., 61 Ohio St. 160, 55 N. E. 162, 76 Am. St. 271. Pennsylvania: Reading F. Ins. & Trust Co. v. Reading Iron Works, 137 Pa. St. 282, 21 Atl. 169, 27 Wkly. Notes Cas. 91; Tete v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 308; Morgan v. Bank of North America, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 73, 11 Am. Dec. 575; Geyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 Pitts. (Pa.) 41. In this case the charter declared the stock assignable "sub- ject to such restrictions and limi- tations as the stockholders, at a general and regular meeting, may adopt." Rhode Island: Lockwood v. Me- chanics' Nat. Bank, 9 R. I. 308, 11 Am. Rep. 253. This is one of the latest and ablest decisions sustain- ing this view. After an elaborate examination of the authorities. Potter, J., said: "We consider, therefore, that it is well settled by reason and authority, that the power to make by-laws to regulate 343 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 2>in books shall be subject to the indebtedness of the stock- holders to the corporations ; and such condition creates an implied contract from which an equitable lien arises.^ The stockholders are regarded as having an implied power to enact by-laws giving the corporation a lien upon its mem- bers' shares, either by providing in express terms that the company shall have a paramount lien for any indebtedness of its members, or by prohibiting a transfer of shares upon its books while the holder is indebted to it.. But it is conceded in some of these decisions that a by- law made upon such authority does not bind others than the members of the corporation whose privilege and duty it is to know its rules and regulations, so far as these affect their interests;^ or purchasers and creditors having notice of such lien.^° Under a statute which provides that shares shall be trans- ferable in such manner as may be agreed upon in the articles the management of the business of the association is sufficient to justify a by-law creating a lien on the stock. That the power to regulate the transferring or man- ner of transferring stock is suffi- cient to authorize a by-law creat- ing such a lien. That the power to regulate the transferring or manner of transferring of stock is sufficient to authorize a by-law that the stock shall be transferable only at the bank, or on the books; and, in that case, until such trans- fer, the purchaser would take only an equitable, not a legal, title, and subject to any claim of the bank, by charter or by-law, or valid usage, or agreement. That a ma- jority, at a regular or legally called meeting, when a quorum is present, is sufficient to enact by-laws. That a by-law informally adopted may be subsequently ratified, and, with- out any record of adoption, may be proved by the usage and acts of the bank, and parties dealing with it." sVansands v. Middlesex County Bank, 26 Conn. 144; Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 852, 5 L. R. A. 233, 12 Am. St. 145. 9 MacDowell v. Bank of Wil- mington, 1 Harr. (Del.) 27. loSteamship Dock Co. v. Heron's Admx., 52 Pa. St. 280, per Thomp- son, J.; Lockwood v. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 9 R. I. 308, 11 Am. Rep. 253; Morgan v. Bank of North America. 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) IZ, 11 Am. Dec. 575; Tuttle v. Walton, 1 Ga. 43. The question whether a bona fide purchaser without no- tice of such by-law would be pro- tected against the lien was left undecided. § 378 LIENS. 344 of association, the directors have no power to adopt a by-law prohibiting a transfer of shares by one indebted to the cor- poration, although the corporation in its articles of associa- tion delegated to the board of directors the power to make by-laws for the management of its business. ^^ § 378. Notice where by-laws rest upon inferential author- ity. — If such a lien is not created or authorized in special terms, but only by inference, notice of the lien by recital in the certificate may be essential to make the lien effectual. Thus, where the charter of a corporation provided in general terms that the mode and manner of transferring stock might be regulated by by-laws, and a by-law was enacted that no transfer of stock should be made while the stockholder was indebted to the company, and that the certificate should contain notice of the lien, it was held that a purchaser of stock without actual notice of the lien was not bound by the by-law, and took the stock free of the lien.^^ The pur- chaser in such case was not affected with constructive no- tice through the charter that there would be any by-law preventing a stockholder indebted to the corporation from iiBank of Attica v. Manufactur- ment of its own affairs. They are ers' & Traders' Bank, 20 N. Y. self-imposed rules, resulting from 501. The question, whether a an agreement or contract between statutory power to determine the the corporation and its members manner in which a transfer on the to conduct the corporate business books may be made includes a in a particular way. They are power to forbid it in case the share- not intended to interfere in the holder is indebted to the corpora- least with the rights and privileges tion, was not determined in this of others who do not subject them- case. selves to their influence. It may i2Bank of Holly Springs v. Pin- be said with truth, therefore, that son, 58 Miss. 421, 38 Am. Rep. 330. no person not a member of the "By-laws of private corporations corporation can be affected in any are not in the nature of legisla- of his rights by a corporate by- tive enactments, so far as third law of which he has no notice." persons are concerned. They are Per George, J. And see Lee v. mere regulations of the corpora- Citizens' Nat. Bank, 13 Ohio Dec. tion for the control and manage- 913, 2 Cin. R. 298. 345 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 380 disposing of his stock, but only with notice that there might be some regulation of the mode and manner of the trans- fer; and the purchaser had a right to presume that the regu- lation referred to was one announced in the certificate that it was transferable at the company's office, in person or by attorney, and was not bound to inquire further. § 379. Statute constructive notice of lien. — But a statute conferring or authorizing such a lien is constructive notice of the lien to all persons affected by it. When a lien in favor of a corporation is created by statute, either general or special, it is not necessary for the corporation to make any claim to such lien, or to give any notice of it in its certificates of stock, in order to maintain the lien either as against the shareholder or his pledgee or purchaser. ^^ § 380. Usage of corporations in claiming liens. — In a few cases it has been said that a usage of a corporation to claim a lien upon its members' stock for any indebtedness to it, or an informal regulation to that effect, made known to a purchaser of stock at the time of his taking a transfer, may have the effect of giving the corporation such a lien.^"* Thus, i3First Nat. Bank v. Hartford America, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 12,, 11 Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 45 Conn. Am. Dec. 575. In this case it ap- 22; Rogers v. Huntingdon Bank, 12 pears that there was no by-law or Serg. & R. (Pa.) 11; Grant v. Me- written regulation of the board giv- chanics' Bank, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) ing a lien upon the stock, but the 140; Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 court held that a lien arose from Serg. & R. (Pa.) 285; Stebbins v. the borrowing of money from the Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) bank with knowledge of its usage 350; McCready v. Rumsey, 6 Duer in that regard, and said: "A course (N. Y.) 574; Downer's Admr. v. of dealing, a usage, an understand- Zanesville Bank, Wright (Ohio) ing, a contract, express or im- 477; Farmers' Bank v. Iglehart, 6 plied, is the lien of the parties Gill (Md.) 50; Bohmer v. City and a law to them, provided they Bank, 11 Va. 445; Door v. Life Ins. are not repugnant to the charter Clearing Co., 71 Minn. 38, 73 N. or the laws of the land. * * * W. 635, 70 Am. St. 309. The bank had an undoubted right i4Morgan v. Bank of North to say to any stockholder: 'We § ^So LIENS. 346 in a case in Connecticut where neither the charter nor the by-laws of a bank contained any provision in regard to such a lien, but the bank had from its organization, a period of fifteen years, used a form of certificate which provided that it was transferable at the bank, subject to the indebtedness a certificate, having obtained discounts at the bank, after- wards made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, and his assignee claimed the right to have the stock trans- ferred to himself; and, in a suit against the bank upon its refusal to allow such transfer, it was held that the provi- sion in the certificate was binding upon the shareholder by reason of his acceptance of the certificate in that form, such acceptance being equivalent to an agreement that the stock should be subject to the lien.^^ His assignee also was re- garded as estopped to deny that the stock was held subject to the lien created by such assent. It is even declared that a by-law, though unauthorized by statute or charter, is as binding on all the members of the corporation, and others acquainted with their mode of doing business, as is the charter itself, or any public law of the state.^^ But of course such a by-law, though established by usage and binding upon the members of the corporation, can have no force or effect as against others, unless knowledge of the by-law be brought home to them. It is not binding upon a purchaser or pledgee wdthout notice,^" nor upon a judgment creditor of the stockholder.^^ discount your note; but, remem- or implied, it is a bar, in law and ber, until it is paid, we shall hold equity, to this action." your stock in security; you shall i^Vansands v. Middlesex County not be permitted to transfer it Bank, 26 Conn. 144. until you pay us.' * * * Call this leQeyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 answer of the bank what you Pitts. (Pa.) 41, per Williams, J. please, lien, set-oflf, legal or equita- i^People v. Crockett, 9 Cal. 112. ble, pledge, retainer, stoppage, iSBryon v. Carter, 22 La. Ann. course of dealing, general under- 98. standing, usage, contract express 347 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 381 § 381. Lien can only be authorized by statute. — That such a lien can only be created or authorized by statute is the conclusion in which the latest and best authorities on this point generally concur, although there is still some conflict of opinion. A corporation can not, under the authority given to it to regulate transfers of stock, create or declare by by- law a secret lien in its favor upon its stockholders' shares to secure their debts to the corporation.^^ Such a by-law can be made only in pursuance of a general statute, or of some provision in its special charter.^^ A by-law made sim- ply in pursuance of an incidental authority must be a rea- sonable one, and a by-law which interferes with the common rights of property, and the dealings of third persons with reference to it, is not considered a reasonable one.^^ A by- law creating a lien upon its members' stock is certainly a very serious hindrance to dealings in such stocks, for there would be no safety in a transfer of the certificate only, without an actual transfer upon the books; and, unless the right of the corporation is declared upon the face of its certificates of stock, the lien would also be a secret one, and as such ob- jectionable.^- i^Anglo-California Bank v. Grangers' Bank, 16 Rep. 70, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 543; Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377; Bryon v. Carter, 22 La. Ann. 98; Crook V. Girard Iron & Metal Co., 87 Md. 138, 39 Atl. 94, 67 Am. St. 325. But see, Wetherell v. Thirty- First St. B. & L. Asso., 153 111. 361, 39 N. E. 143, affd. 43 III. App. 509, where it is held that a by- law creating a lien in the absence of a statute is valid. 20New Orleans Nat. Banking Association v. Wiltz, 4 Woods (U. S.) 43, 10 Fed. 330; Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96; Carroll v. Mullanpay Sav. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249; Chou- teau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382; Merchants' Bank v. Shouse, 16 Rep. 442; In re Long Island R. R. Co., 19 Wend. (N. Y.) Zl, 32 Am. Dec. 429; Byrne v. Union Bank, 9 Rob. (La.) 433; Steamship Dock Co. v. Heron's Admx., 52 Pa. St. 280. 2iDriscoll V. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96; Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. zn. 22Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382. "This power, however, of regulating transfers of stock confers no corporate authority to control its transferability by pre- § ^82 LIENS. 348 Moreover, the natural and obvious purpose of a power given to a corporation to regulate the transfer of its stock is simply to enable the corporation to determine who are its members, who is entitled to take part in its meetings and vote, and who are entitled to receive its dividends. § 382. Lien conferred on existing corporation. — Such a lien may be conferred by statute upon a corporation already organized in respect of shares already issued for debts al- ready incurred. In such case the lien is created by the stat- ute immediately upon its going into effect, so that an in- debtedness to the corporation from a shareholder existing at the time will be secured in preference to a pledgee to whom the shareholder has delivered the certificate with a power of attorney for its transfer, provided the corporation has received no notice of such pledge of the certificate.^^ § 383. Option by statute does not create a lien. — An op- tion given by statute to a corporation to prohibit a transfer by a member indebted to the corporation does not of itself create a lien. There is no lien in such case until the com- pany or its directors have exercised the option conferred by the statute and declared a lien.^* It would seem that a corporation having authority to enact such a by-law could not enact one which would have a retrospective effect. ^^ scribing to whom the owner maj'^ dividends, and it is construed ac- sell, and to whom not, or upon cordingly, the corporation being what terms. The truth is, the pro- left to exercise the power or not, vision is considered as being in- at its own pleasure, as being alone tended exclusively for the benefit interested in the matter." Per of the company, in order that they Leonard, J. may, by proper regulations, provide ^spirst Nat. Bank v. Hartford themselves with the means of Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 45 Conn. knowing who they are bound to 22. treat as members liable to assess- 24Perrine v. Fireman's Ins. Co., ment and entitled to vote at cor- 22 Ala. 575. porate meetings and to receive 25People v. Crockett, 9 Cal. 112. 349 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 385 § 384. Bank can have no lien on its own stock. — Under the National Banking Act of 1864, a bank can not have a lien on its own stock held by a debtor, although its articles of association and its by-laws are framed with a direct view to giving it such a lien; for, aside from the fact that the act of the preceding year contained an express provision for such a lien, which was omitted in the substituted act of 1864, it was considered that such a lien would be inconsistent with the general policy of the act which prohibits loans upon the security of shares of its own capital stock.-*^ § 385. Lien may cover liability of equitable shareholder. — Under some circumstances this lien may cover the liability of one who is merely an equitable shareholder. The by-laws of an incorporated savings bank, enacted under statutory au- 26Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 369, 20 L. ed. 172; Bullard v. Bank, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 589, 21 L. ed. 923; National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676, 27 L. ed. 592, 2 Sup. Ct. 778; New Orleans Nat. Banking Asso- ciation V. Wiltz, 4 Woods ( U. S.) 43, 10 Fed. 330; Evansville Nat. Bank v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 2 Biss. (U. S.) 527, Fed. Cas. No. 4573, 10 Am. Law. Reg. (N. S.) 774; Louisville Bank v. Newark Bank, 11 Nat. Bank. R. 49; Dela- ware L. & W. R. Co. V. Oxford Iron Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 340. The earlier cases in this state, Young V. Vough, 23 N. J. Eq. 325, and Mattison v. Young, 24 N. J. Eq. 535, overruled. Second Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Nat. State Bank, 10 Bush (Ky.) 367, 14 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 281; Rosenback v. Salt Springs Nat. Bank, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 495; Conklin v. Second Nat. Bank, 45 N. Y. 655; Bridges v. National Bank, 185 N. Y. 146, aflfg. 106 App. Div. 616, 94 N. Y. S. 1140; Hagar v. Union Nat. Bank, 63 Maine 509; Thompson's Nat. Bank Cases, 523, per Virgin, J., Lee v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 13 Ohio Dec. 913, 2 Cin. S. C. Rep. 298; Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 115 Ga. 608, 41 S. E. 983; Buffalo German Ins. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 670, 64 N. E. 1119; affg. Third Nat. Bank v. Buffalo German Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 581, 48 L. ed. 801, 24 Sup. Ct. 524. See also. Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 115 Ga. 608, 41 S. E. 983; Buffalo German Ins. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 162 N. Y. 163, 56 N. E. 521, 48 L. R. A. 107. Contra, see Bansands v. Middlesex County Bank, 26 Conn. 144; In re Bige- low, 2 Ben. (U. S.) 469, 1 Nat. Bank. R. 667; Knight v. Old Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 429; In re Dunkerson, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 227, Fed. Cas. No. 4156; Evansville Nat. Bank v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 2 Biss. (U. S.) 527, Fed. Cas. No. 4573. § 3^6 LIENS. 350 thority, declared a lien in favor of the bank on the stock of any shareholder who might be indebted to it in any manner. On the dissolution of a partnership owning stock in the bank, the continuing members of the firm bought all the interest of the retiring members and assumed all the part- nership debts. The new firm became the equitable owners of the stock. It was held that the lien of the bank might be enforced upon such stock for the liabilities of the new firm incurred in subsequent transaction with the bank.-"^ § 386. Equitable shares subject to lien. — Shares which equitably belong to a debtor of the corporation, as well as those standing in his own name, are subject to the lien in its favor. But if the officers of a corporation knowingly permit shares to be transferred to a mere nominal holder, it seems that a bona fide purchaser from him, even without a trans- fer on the books of the company, will be entitled to relief against the lien of the company for a debt due from the real owner. ^^ If a certificate of stock be assigned with a power of attorney to complete the transfer upon the books, while the corporation might have a lien against the stockholder in whose name the shares were standing, or against the equita- ble owner, if the rights of others dealing with the equitable owner in good faith are not interfered with, yet the cor- poration can not assert its lien against an equitable owner after he has transferred the certificate to a purchaser in good faith. 27Planters' & Merchants' Mut. -^Stebbins v. Phoenix F. Ins. Co., Ins. Co. V. Selma Savings Bank. 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350; Planters' & 63 Ala. 585. "We can perceive no Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seima good reason, and we are not aware Sav. Bank, 63 Ala. 585. The lan- of any authority, requiring it, to guage of some decisions would limit the lien to debts owing the imply that the lien could only be bank by the holder of the legal asserted against the stockholder title only, excluding such as may of record. Helm v. Swiggett, 12 be due from the owner of the com- Ind. 194. plete equitable title." Per Brickell, C.J. 351 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 389 § 387. Enforcement of lien on holder of legal title of shares. — Though the shareholder be only the holder of the legal title, the equitable ownership being in another, the lien may be enforced for the debt of the shareholder of record. ^^ § 388. Equitable assignee has no lien. — As a general rule, the equitable assignee of a certificate of stock can have no other or greater rights than his assignor had; and, therefore, if the corporation had a lien as against the as- signor, the assignee can not obtain a transfer of the legal title upon the books without paying the amount for which the stock is affected with a lien.^*^ The corporation can assert its lien against the stockholder of record, although he had already pledged the certificate be- fore incurring the debt for which the corporation claims the lien, provided the corporation had no knowledge of the pledge at the time the stockholder became indebted to it.^^ § 389. Priority of lien over equitable pledge. — Even if the corporation has notice of an equitable pledge of the shares, it may have priority by reason of provisions of the articles of 2!>New London & Brazilian Bank 74 Am. Dec. 536; Bishop v. Globe V. Brocklebank, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. Co., 135 Mass. 132. See Bronson 302; Burford v. Crandell, 2 Cr. C. Electric Co. v. Rhenbottom, 122 C. 86; Young v. Vough, 23 N. J. Mich. 608, 81 N. W. 563. Eq. 325; affd. 24 N. J. Eq. 535. siin re Peebles, 2 Hughes 394, soUnion Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. Fed Cas. No. 10902, Piatt v. Bir- (U. S.) 390, 4 L. ed. 269; Brent mingham Axle Co., 41 Conn. 255. V. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. "In contemplation of law, the stat- (U. S.) 596, 9 L. ed. 547; McCready ute was known to petitioner when V. Rumsey, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 574; he accepted the certificate; it was, Bank of Utica v. Smalley, 2 Cow. to him, as if he had been embodied (N. Y.) 770, 74 Am. Dec. 526; therein; it was in the nature of a Bohmer v. City Bank of Rich- qualification or restriction of his mond, n Va. 445; Taylor v. Wes- equitable interest; it was notice to ton, n Cal. 534, 20 Pac. 62; Jen- him that if, after a reasonable time nings V. Bank of California, 79 Cal. had elapsed, he refrain from giving 323, 21 Pac. 852, 5 L. R. A. 233, 12 any notice of his interest in the Am. St. 145; Farmers' Bank v. stock to the corporation, a statute Iglehart, 6 Gill (Md.) 50; Reese lien might come into existence at V. Bank of Commerce, 14 Md. 271, any moment." Per Pardee, J. § 390 LIENS. 352 association, the terms of which are known to the pledgee. The articles of association of a company provided that it should have a first and paramount lien on every share for all debts due from the shareholder to the company. A share- holder deposited his shares with his banker as security for a balance due him on current account, and notice of the deposit was given to the company.^^ The certificate stated that the shares were held" subject to the articles of associa- tion. It was held that the company had priority over the bankers in respect of a debt due from the shareholder to the company, although the debt became due after notice of the deposit of the shares with the banker. The decision was placed upon the ground that, by the articles of association, a contract had been entered into between the company and the shareholder whereby the company was tp have a first lien on his shares for any debt due him; and that by this contract a priority was conferred upon the company as against all persons claiming only an equitable interest in the shares, and having notice of the articles of association; the deposit of the shares without a transfer creating only an equitable interest. ^^ § 390. Availability of lien in state other than that where corporation is organized. The lien of a corporation, when conferred by general law or charter, may be availed of in a state other than that in which the corporation was organ- ized, when a suit is brought against the corporation in such other state by a person claiming to be an equitable assignee of shares of its stock, to recover damages for refusing to make a transfer upon the books. The rights and obligations 32Bradford Banking Co. v. company could not claim priority Briggs, 31 Ch. Div. 19, affirmed after notice of the advance by the in Miles v. New Zealand Alford banker. Estate Co., 32 Ch. Div. 266. The 3.3Societe Generale de Paris v. former case overruled 29 Ch. Div. Tramways Union Co., 14 Q. B. D. 149, where it was held that the 424. 353 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 392 of the stockholders of a corporation as between them and the corporation are to be determined by the laws of the state under which the corporation was organized.^^ §391. Corporations' lien on dividends. — Corporations have an equitable lien upon the dividends of their sharehold- ers to secure their debts. The rule against an implied lien in favor of corporations upon the shares of their members does not apply in respect to dividends declared upon such shares. Dividends are considered as so much money in pos- session of the bank belonging to the stockholder; and it is not inconsistent with any provision of the National Banking Act, or in conflict with any principle of public policy, that the bank should have an equitable lien upon such dividends.^^ The dividends, when payable, are a debt owing by the cor- poration to the shareholder, and in a suit by the shareholder for such debt the corporation could set oft any debt owing to the corporation by the shareholder.^^ § 392. Lien not confined to stock owned. — The lien is not confined to stock owned by the stockholder at the time the debt was incurred, •'''^ unless the language of the statute or charter giving the lien suggests such a restriction. If the charter provides that the corporation shall "at all times have a lien upon the stock or property of its members invested -iBishop V. Globe Co., 135 Mass. (Pa.) 140; Farmers' Bank v. Igle- 132. hart, 6 Gill (Md.) 50; McDowell 35Hague V. Dandeson, 2 Ex. 741; v. Wilmington Bank, 1 Har. (Del.) Hagar v. Union Nat. Bank, 63 27. Maine 509; Thompson's Nat. Bank seSt. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co., Cas. 523; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149; Hagar Co., 8 Pick. (Mass.) 90, 19 Am. v. Union Nat. Bank, 63 Maine 509; Dec. 306; Stebbins v. Phoenix F. Merchants' Bank v. Shouse, 102 Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350; Bates Pa. St. 488. V. N. Y. Ins. Co., 3 Johns. Cas. 238; 37Schmidt v. Hennepin County St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Barrel Co., 35 Minn. 511, 29 N. W. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149; Grant v, 200, 15 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Mechanics' Bank, 15 Serg. & R. 576. 23 393 LIENS. 354 therein, for all debts due from them to such corporation," the lien attaches to stock of members whenever afterwards acquired during the indebtedness. There is a lien whenever the indebtedness and the ownership of the stock concur. § 393. The word "indebted." — The word "indebted," in statutory provisions for liens in favor of corporations, applies as well to debts to become due as to those actually due and payable. ^^ Thus the lien applies in favor of a bank that has discounted a note or bill on which a shareholder is liable, though the note or bill has, not matured. ^'-^ So the liability of a shareholder for an unpaid balance of his subscription for the shares is a debt within the meaning of such provision for a lien, even before such balance of the subscription has been called. A provision that shares of a bank shall not be transferable unless the shareholder shall discharge all debts due by him to the company was held to embrace all debts of the share- holder, wdiether payable presently or in the future. The ob- ssGrant v. Mechanics' Bank, 15 Ins. Co., 3 Pitts. (Pa.)mf mfw mf Serg. & R. (Pa.) 140; Geyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 Pitts. (Pa.) 41; St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149. In Grant V. Mechanics' Bank, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 140, Tilghman, C. J., said : "Where words are not technical, their meaning is, in general, best ascertained by com- mon parlances. Laws are made for the people, and should be ex- pressed in language which they understand. Now the word 'in- debted' has not acquired a tech- nical signification, and, in com- mon understanding, means a sum of money which one has contracted to pay another, whether the day of payment be come or not. Even in law lan- guage we speak of debitum in praesenti, solvendum in future — a present debt, to be paid in a fu- ture time. So, in act of assembly language, a debt signifies money payable at a future time." See, also, Stanley v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank, 61 111. App. 257, affd. 165 111. 295, 46 N. E. 273, where it is held that the word "debt" embraces a rate given for stock in the bank. 30 Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 596, 9 L. ed. 547; In re Bachman, 12 Nat. Bank Reg. 223; Rogers v. Huntingdon Bank, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 11; Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 283, 285; Leggett v. Bank of Sing Sing, 24 N. Y. 283. 355 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 394 ject of the provision was to protect and secure the bank, and to accomplish this the lien must cover debts not matured. '^'^ There is an English case, not to be relied upon, however, where, under articles of association which provided that the company should have a lien upon all shares of any member for any money due the company. Master of the Rolls Jessel held that the lien was limited to moneys due and payable from a shareholder to the company, and was not applicable where the indebtedness was a mere acceptance of a bill of exchange.'*^ But if the words used to describe the debts for which there may be a lien imply more than a mere indebtedness, as where the words used are "debts actually due and payable to the corporation," the debts contemplated are such as are due at the time the lien attaches, and not those payable in future, such as notes and bills afterwards to mature. ^^ § 394. Lien not restricted to particular debt. — Where the statute authorizing a lien is general in its terms and ap- plies to all debts due the corporation, the lien will not be re- stricted to a particular debt or a particular class of debts. Thus, under the Companies Act of England, the provision that "the company may decline to register any transfer of shares made by a member who is indebted to them," is not limited to cases where the member is indebted for calls, or otherwise indebted in respect of the particular shares pro- posed to be transferred, but enables the company to decline to register the transfer, if the member is indebted on any account whatever.''^ But a provision of statute or charter, giving a corporation a lien to secure any indebtedness to it from a shareholder, does not authorize the corporation to make an accommoda- •lOLeggett V. Bank of Sing Sing, -t-Reese v. Bank of Commerce, 14 24 N. Y. 283. Md. 271, 74 Am. Dec. 536. •iiln re Stockton Malleable Iron ^sEx parte Stringer, 9 Q. B. D. Co., 2 Ch. Div. 101. 436. § 395 LIENS. 356 tion loan to a shareholder, where it is not within the power of the corporation to make such a loan. The lien is in aid of the legitimate powers of the corporation, and can not be held to imply a sanction to a division of the corporate assets to accommodation loans to a stockholder.** § 395. Liens not confined to debts due for shares. — Where the language of the statute declaring the lien is broad enough to embrace every form of indebtedness to the com- pany which a member may incur, the courts will not confine the lien to debts due for the shares, or for calls upon them, but will extend it to debts due generally from the share- holder. The object in creating the lien is the security of the corporation, and there is no good reason for limiting general words embracing an indebtedness of any kind to an indebtedness of a special kind, namely, that for shares, or calls upon them.*^ § 396. By-laws restricted by statute. — If the by-law of a corporation creating a lien upon its stock is broader in terms than the statute authorizing it, the by-law will be re- stricted in its operation to the terms of the statute.**^ Thus, where a statute gives a lien upon the shares of a stockholder for the balance due the corporation upon his subscription to the stock, the company has no lien upon the stock for any other debts due the company, though such a lien be declared by a by-law to that effect.*''' Even if such a by-law has any effect, it can only apply to the interest of the debtor stock- holder after the lien of the stock debt is satisfied.*^ 4^Webster v. Howe Machine Co., 70 Mo. 262; and see Presbyterian 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atl. 482. Congregation v. Carlisle Bank, 5 •isRogers v. Huntingdon Bank, Pa. St. 345. 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 11; Mobile 47Petersburg Savings & Ins. Co. Mut. Ins. Co. V. Cullom, 49 Ala. v. Lumsden, 75 Va. 327. 558; Cunningham v. Alabama Life 48Petersburg Savings & Ins. Co. Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ala. 652. v. Lumsden, 75 Va. 327. 46Kahn v. Bank of St. Joseph, 357 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 398 § 397. Lien on calls for shares. — A lien for calls upon shares applies only to the shares upon which the calls are made, and not to other paid up shares of the shareholder. Under a statute which provided that no shareholder should be entitled to transfer any share, after a call had been made in respect thereof, until he should have paid the call, and should have paid all calls for the time being due on every share held by them, the court of Queen's Bench held that the company had no power to hold paid up shares as a security for the amount of a call on other shares. ^^ A like decision was made in Virginia under a statute providing that stock should not be transferred without the consent of the com- pany until all moneys payable to the company on such stock should have been paid.^^ § 398. Debt of partnership or of a surety. — A by-law pro- hibiting a transfer of shares by a member indebted to the corporation applies where the only indebtedness is by a part- nership in which the shareholder is a copartner. ^^ It applies as well where the liability of the shareholder is that of a surety or indorser, as where his liability is that of a principal debtor. ^- 49Hubbersty v. Manchester, Shef- field & Lincolnshire R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 59. Otherwise, however, in Stebbins v. Phoenix F. Ins. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 350. soShenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Griffith. 76 Va. 913; Code 1873, ch. 57, § 26. See Code 1904, § llOSe (57). siGeyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 Pitts. (Pa.) 41, per Williams, J.; Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 384; Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 424; In re Bige- low, 2 Ben. (U. S.) 469, Fed. Cas. Xo. 1395; German Security Bank V. Jefferson, 10 Bush. (Ky.) 326. ^-St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149; Leggett v. Bank of Sing Sing, 24 N. Y. 283, Allen, J., dissenting; West Branch Bank v. Armstrong, 40 Pa. St. 278; Schmidt v. Hennepin County Bar- rel Co., 35 Minn. 511, 29 N. W. 200; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean (U. S.) 587, Fed. Cas. No. 8888; McDowell v. Bank of Wil- mington & Brandywine, 1 Har. (Del.) 27; Bacon's Admr. v. Ba- con's Trustees, 94 Va. 686, 27 S. E. 576. § 399 LIENS. 358 § 399. Debt of joint trustee. — Where the articles of asso- ciation of a banking company provided that it should have a paramount lien on the shares of any shareholders for all moneys owing the company from him alone or jointly with any other person, and trustees invested in shares of the com- pany which were transferred into their joint names, and one of the trustees was a partner in a firm which was in- debted to the company, it was held that the l^ank had a lien on the shares for this debt which must prevail over the title of the cestui que trust ; for the lien was within the express terms imposed by the articles of association as a condition upon which one might become a member of the company. ^^ § 400. Lien in case of bankruptcy. — Upon the bankruptcy of a stockholder whose shares are subject to a lien to the corporation, the corporation is entitled to appropriate the proceeds of such shares to the payment of the debt, and to prove against the bankrupt's estate for any balance of the debt not paid. This is the general rule; though under the insolvent laws of some of the states it is held that, after the corporation has applied the proceeds of the shares under its lien, it is postponed until the general creditors have been made equal out of the general estate by receiving an equal percentage, and then the residue is distributed pro rata among all the creditors."* § 401. Surety subrogated to right of lien holder. — A surety upon a debt of a stockholder, secured by a lien upon his stock, upon paying the debt is subrogated to the credit- or's lien.^^ The debt to the corporation is the object of the ^3New London & Brazilian Bank ^^Klopp v. Lebanon Bank, 46 Pa. V. Brocklebank, 21 Ch. Div. 302. St. 88; Petersburg Savings & Ins. s^German Security Bank v. Jef- Co. v. Lumsden, 75 Va. 327; Young ferson, 10 Bush (Ky.) 326; North- v. Vough, 23 N. J. Eq. 325; Kuhns ern Bank v. Keizer, 2 Duv. (Ky.) v. Westmoreland Bank, 2 Watts 169. (Pa.) 136. 359 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 402 lien, and for which it is security, and equity lays hold of this security for the benefit of the surety. The equitable right of the surety in such case attaches at the time the lien of the corporation commences, although the corporation may not know of the existence of his suretyship. The surety's right of subrogation does not depend upon his giving any notice to the corporation, but upon the fact of his suretyship and his payment of the debt. Notice is important only for the pur- pose of preventing the corporation from allowing a transfer of the stock upon payment of the debt in ignorance of the surety's claim. ^^ If a corporation having a lien upon stock to secure a debt upon which there is a surety allows the stockholder to trans- fer his shares to secure another debt, or permits the stock to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of an- other debt, the surety is discharged.^" Where a corporation, though having the power to declare a lien, has neglected to do so, and consequently has no lien, it loses no right against the surety by allowing the debtor to make a transfer. There is nothing in such case to which the surety can be subrogated. ^^ § 402. Lien of corporation securing several debts.---In case a corporation has a lien to secure several debts, upon one of which there is a surety, the question arises whether the surety upon that debt, upon paying it, is subrogated to the lien, so as to be entitled in equity to have the shares ap- plied to the discharge of that debt in priority to the other debts afterward incurred. In a case in Rhode Island, where the charter of a bank provided that the stockholders should at all times be liable for the payment of debts due the bank, it was declared that this provision was not adopted with the 56 Klopp V. Lebanon Bank, 46 'jSPerrine v. Fireman's Ins. Co., Pa. St. 88. 22 Ala. 575. •'">''■ Kuhns V. Westmoreland Bank, 2 Watts (Pa.) 136. § 403 LIENS. ^ 360 view of securing an indorser, and it was held that the cor- poration could not be compelled to apply the shares to the payment of such indorsed debt in preference to any other debt due to it, although such other debt might be of later date.^^ This decision would seem to be correct in case the corporation had no notice at the time the subsequent debt was incurred that there was a surety upon the prior debt. But, in case the corporation should allow the stockholder to incur a further debt after a surety had paid a prior debt and had claimed the right of subrogation, it would seem that the corporation should not be allowed to avail itself of its lien to the detriment of the surety; and it would also seem that, if the corporation knew of the relation of suretyship at the time the obligation was incurred, it could not after- ward allow the stockholder to incur a further indebtedness to the detriment of the surety. The surety has an interest in the lien from the time the obligation is incurred, and it may reasonably be presumed that he incurred the obliga- tion on the strength of the lien.®° § 403. Lien may be waived by corporation. This lien, though declared by statute, may be waived by the corpora- tion entitled to it, and the waiver may be made by an officer s*>Cross V. Phoenix Bank, 1 R. I. pledge would be of no value to the 39, 41. "It was intended to secure bank, whilst as to all debts exceed- the payment of such debts of each ing the amount of stock, and for stockholder as became insecure, which its additional security would whether by the failure of principal be needed, the pledge would be or surety, or by the failure of both; wholly inapplicable. This never and such intent is inconsistent could have been the understanding, with an application of the pledge either of the legislature, or the regulated bj^ a priority of date. stockholders, on becoming such; Such a rule would make the pro- nor could the surety of an indebt- vision operate only for the benefit ed stockholder indulge the expec- of the surety, where security tation, with any degree of confi- would not be needed until the in- dence, that such could be the con- debtedness exceeded the amount struction of such a provision." of the stock; and if in all such cases 60See Rogers v. Huntingdon the surety was sufficient, the Bank, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 11. 361 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 404 having the general management of its daily business: thus the cashier of a bank may waive the lien in behalf of the bank;^^ and he does this by entering a transfer upon the books of the bank. Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court, said:**- "A complete transfer of the ti- tle to the stock upon the books of the bank, it is not doubted, would have the effect to vest it in the transferee free from any claim or lien of the bank. The consent of the bank made necessary to such transfer, is the waiver of its rights, as its refusal would be the assertion of it. The transfer, when thus consummated, destroys the relation of membership be- tween the corporation and the old stockholder, with all its in- cidents, and creates an original relation with the new mem- ber, free from all antecedent obligations. This legal relation and proprietary interest, on which it is based, are quite in- dependent of the certificate of ownership, which is mere evidence of title. The complete fact of title may very well exist without it. All that is necessary, when the transfer is required by law to be made upon the books of the corpo- ration, is that the fact should be appropriately recorded in some suitable register or stock list, or otherwise formally entered upon its books. For this purpose the account in a stock ledger showing the names of the stockholders, the number and amount of the shares belonging to each, and the sources of their title, whether by original subscription and payment or by derivation from others, is quite suitable, and fully meets the requirements of the law." § 404. Lien after notice of transfer of stock. — Whether, after notice to a corporation of an equitable transfer of the shares, it can acquire a lien upon them as against the equi- table assignee, is a question which has already been con- fiiNational Bank v. Watsontown C2Xational Bank v. Watsontown Bank, 105 U. S. 217, 26 L. ed. 1039; Bank, 105 U. S. 217, 26 L. ed. 1039. Case V. Bank, 100 U. S. 446, 25 L. ed. 695. § 405 LIENS. 362 sidered.^" But it is certain that a corporation can not claim a lien after it has permitted its debtor to transfer the shares upon its books, so as to give the assignee not merely the equitable but the legal title, unless the corporation in express terms, known and assented to by the assignee, reserves a lien at the time of the transter.^^ But the assent of a corporation to a general assignment of a debtor for the benefit of his creditors, subject to preferences authorized by law, does not amount to a waiver of a lien by the corporation on the debtor's shares, for the lien is a preference authorized by law, and, moreover, the assignee in a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors stands in no better situation than the assignor.^^ § 405. Notice to its officer is notice to a corporation. — Notice to an ofificer of a corporation who has a general charge and management of its business is notice to the cor- poration. Thus, notice to the cashier of a bank of an out- standing equity is notice to the bank.^® His knowledge that a stockholder's shares had been pledged by delivery of the certificate to secure his note to a third person should put him upon inquiry, even after the maturity of that note, to as- certain whether the note had been renewed; for a renewed note should be secured by the original pledge, and if the bank under such circumstances should make a loan to the stock- holder, even after the maturity of the original note for which c^Bradford Banking Co. v. 64HiII v. Pine River Bank, 45 N. Briggs, 29 Ch. D. 149, 10 Am. & H. 300; Hodges v. Planters' Bank, Eng. Corp. Cas. 120, overruled in 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 306. 31 Ch. Div. 19; and see Nesmith esDobbins v. Walton, 37 Ga. 614, V. Washington Bank, 6 Pick. 95 Am. Dec. Zl . (Mass.) 324; Bank of America v. 66Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 McNeil, 10 Bush. (Ky.) 54; Con- Bush (Ky.) 54; Connecticut Mut. ant v. Reed (Seneca County Bank), Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 81 Ky. 540, 1 Ohio St. 298; Newberry v. De- 5 Ky. L. 639. troit & Lake Superior Iron Mfg. Co., 17 Mich. 141. 363 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 407 the shares were pledged, the lien of the bank would be sub- ject to the pledge to secure the renewed note.^" But notice to an employee of a corporation who has no power to transact its general business with third persons, and who is well known to have no such power, does not affect the corporation ; and a waiver of a lien by such an employe does not bind the corporation.*^^ A corporation is not estopped to assert a lien by the fact that, on a stockholder's presenting a certificate for transfer, the person in charge of the transfer- book promised to make a transfer and issue a new certifi- cate as soon as an officer whose signature was necessary should return, when it does not appear that such person had any general authority, or any knowledge of the stock- holder's indebtedness.^^ § 406. Corporation may be estopped to claim lien. — A corporation is estopped to claim a lien as against one who has been induced to make a loan upon a pledge of its stock to a shareholder by representations of the officers of the company that the stock was unincumbered, and that he could safely make a loan upon it.'^^ § 407. Waived by taking a transfer of the shares. — A corporation haing a lien by its charter upon the shares of a stockholder for his indebtedness to the corporation waives this lien by taking a transfer of the stock as collateral secur- 67Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 eoRishop v. Globe Co., 135 Mass. Bush (Ky.) 54. The pledgee was 132, 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161. under no obligation to the bank to '''OMoore v. Bank of Commerce, notify it of the renewal of the 52 Mo. 377; Oakland City Sav. note. Bank v. State Bank, 113 Mich. 284, csKenton Insurance Co. v. Bow- 71 N. W. 453, dl Am. St. 463; Des man, 84 Ky. 430, 1 S. W. 717, 8 Ky. Moines L. & T. Co. v. Des Moines L. 467, 15 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Nat. Bank, 97 Iowa 668, 66 N. W. 578. 914. See also. Just v. State Sav. Bank, 132 Mich. 600. § 408 LIENS. 364 ity for such indebtedness. The taking of the transfer shows that the corporation did not rely upon the lien.'^^ § 408. No waiver by taking other security. — A cor- poration does not waive its Hen by taking other security for the debt, as, for instance, by taking sureties upon it or a mortgage upon other property; for a creditor may lawfully take and hold several securities for the same debt, and he can not be compelled to surrender either until the debt is paid.'^- § 409. Lien acquired after attachment of stock. — A lien acquired by a corporation for an indebtedness incurred after a stockholder's shares have been attached or levied upon by a creditor, and service of such attachment or levy has been made upon the company, is subject to the lien of such attachment or levy.'^^ If the liability of the shareholder was incurred before, though the debt does not become payable till after, the attachment or levy by the creditor, the lien of the corporation is superior to that of the creditor.'^* Moreover, if the debt secured by the lien be renewed, the lien attaches to the renewed debt, though the debtor's shares be attached before or after the renewal. '^^ § 410. Stock pledged after the bank has waived its lien. — Where a bank waived its charter-right of lien upon a stock- holder's shares for a period of six months, and within that time the stockholder pledged bis shares for a debt, the TiMcLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 467, 1 S. W. 717, 15 Am. & Eng. McLean (U. S.) 587, Fed. Cas. No. Corp. Cas. 578. 8888. "3Geyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 72Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. Pitts. (Pa.) 41. (U. S.) 390, 4 L. ed. 869; In re '^Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 Morrison, 10 N. Bank. Reg. 105; Serg. & R. (Pa.) 285; West Branch Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 4 Rawle Bank v. Armstrong, 40 Pa. St. 278. (Pa.) 384; Kenton Insurance Co. 'sSewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 V. Bowman, 84 Ky. 430, 8 Ky. L. Serg. & R. (Pa.) 285. 365 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 412 right of the bank does not attach again immediately upon the expiration of that period, unless the debt for which the pledge was made has been paid, but is subordinate to the right of the pledgee until the debt is paid or the pledge re- leased. ^^ §411. Transfer of part of the shares not a waiver. — The lien is not waived by permitting a transfer of a part of the shares. Though the debt be for a less sum than the value of the debtor's stock which the corporation holds a lien upon, it may hold all his shares till the debt is paid. It is not bound to appropriate part of the shares as security for the debt and transfer the rest.'' Of course the corporation may permit the debtor to transfer part of his stock, and by such action it will not waive its lien upon the shares still remaining in his name.'^*' § 412. Usage may operate against lien. — A usage may operate against a lien which the by-laws of a corporation enact in its behalf. Thus, where by the by-law the consent of the directors of a corporation was required to a transfer of stock by a stockholder indebted to it, but in practice such 76Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 cision of any value it might other- Bush (Ky.) 54. wise have. This for a curiosity: 'i'TSewall V. Lancaster Bank, 17 "Since the days of Lord Bacon, Serg. & R. (Pa.) 285; and see who promulgated the idea, banks, Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. then in their infancy, have been (U. S.) 390, 4 L. ed. 269. odious to the common mind, and '3'8 First Nat. Bank v. Hartford by pursuing with steadiness the Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 45 Conn. law of their existence and individ- 22. In Presbyterian Congregation uality, they exposed themselves to V. Carlisle Bank, 5 Pa. St. 345, the the keen and deep sarcasm of fact that the bank consented to a Burke. The present case is a transfer of part of the shares was pregnant instance of the facility apparently one ground of the with which they bring themselves court's refusal to permit the bank within the condemnation of what- to assert a lien to the remainder; ever is magnanimous, just and but the blind prejudice of the court manly in our nature." against all banks deprives the de- § 413 LIENS. 366 cases were never brought before the board, it was held that a transfer made without such consent, but according- to the usage of the company, was effectual, and passed the title to the stock unincumbered by a lien.'^ § 413. No waiver by reason of the corporation allowing stock to remain outstanding. — The fact that the corporation allows its debtor's certificate of stock to remain outstand- ing does not amount to a waiver of its lien. AVhen the lien is created by proper statutory authority, the corporation may assert the lien, although the shareholder has pledged his certificate to secure a prior loan. If the pledgee chooses to hold this certificate, and not obtain a transfer to himself upon the books of the company, he does so at his own risk. The corporation is not bound to call for a surrender of the cer- tificate when it makes a loan to a shareholder. It does not waive its lien by leaving the certificate outstanding.^*^ § 414. Issuing of certificate will not amount to a waiver. — The issuing of a certificate of shares upon which a corpora- tion has a possible right of lien does not amount to a waiver or abandonment of that right, ^^ though the certificate makes no reference to the lien, but declares that the shares are trans- ferable only at the corporation's ofifice, personally or by at- torney on surrender of the certificate.^^ V 415, Lien not enforcible on unauthorized debt. — If the transaction in which a corporation seeks to enforce a lien was unauthorized by its charter, and was a perversion of its cor- ■''^Chambersburg Ins. Co. v. v. Lumsden, 75 Va. Z21 ; Hussey v. Smith, 11 Pa. St. 120. Manufacturers' & Mechanics' Bank, soBohmer v. City Bank, 11 Va. 10 Pick. (Mass.) 415. 445, and see Piatt v. Birmingham 82Reese v. Bank of Commerce, 14 Axle Co., 41 Conn. 255. Md. 271, 74 Am. Dec. 536. siPetersburg Savings & Ins. Co. 367 LIENS ON CORPORATE STOCK. § 41? porate powers, it confers no right upon the corporation to enforce the lien.^^ § 416. Payment of debt discharges lien. — Of course, if the debt is discharged, the Hen is gone.^'* § 417. Lien not lost because debt is barred by statute of limitations. — The lien is not lost though the right of action for the debt be barred by the statute of limitations, for the statute does not cancel the debt, but merely takes away the right of action for it; just as, in the case of a mortgage or pledge securing such a debt, the mortgage or pledge re- mains valid, and may be enforced, although the right of ac- tion upon the debt is barred. ^^ ssWhite's Bank v. Toledo Ins. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. (U. Co., 12 Ohio St. 601. S.) 596, 9 L. ed. 547; Jones on 8-iFarmers' Bank v. Iglehart, 6 Mortgages (6th ed.) § 1203; Jones Gill (Md.) 50. on Chattel Mortgages (5th ed.) 85 Geyer v. Western Ins. Co., 3 § 112; Jones on Collateral Securi- Pitts. (Pa.) 41; Farmers' Bank v. ties (3d ed.), § 581. Iglehart, 6 Gill (Md.) 50; Brent v. CHAPTER IX. LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES AND MERCHANTS. Sec. 418. Factor or consignee under common law has lien on goods in his possession. 419. One who has no authority to make sales is not a fac- tor. 420. Lien of merchandise broker. 421. Lien of stock-broker. 422. Broker employed on com- mission has a lien. 423. An insurance broker is a fac- tor. 424. Extent of insurance broker's lien. 425. Agent's specific lien. 426. Factor's lien for general bal- ance. 427. A general lien is not im- plied when there is a spe- cial agreement which is inconsistent with such a lien. 428. Factor has no lien on goods received under express di- rections. 429. Factor's agent has no lien as against principal. 430. Efifect of factor's assignment for creditors. 431. Goods received after death of principal. 432. No lien on goods when con- signor has informed factor that goods do not belong to him. 433. -Agent's lien. Sec. 434. 435. 436. 436a. 436b. 436c. 437. 438. 439. 440. 440a. 440b. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 453a. Lien of consignee depends on manner of consignment. Lien of consignee on insur- ance money. State statutes. Delaware. Florida. Georgia. Louisiana. Maine. Maryland. Massachusetts. Missouri. New York. Ohio. Pennsylvania. Rhode Island. Wisconsin. Debt is foundation of agent's lien. Lien covers interest on debt. Debt must be due. Factor cannot claim lien for debt due his principal. Factor has no lien for old debt due from his princi- pal. The lien covers acceptances as well as advances in money. Lien for duties paid. Lien exists even where debt is barred. Lien for advancement on crop. Arkansas. 368 3^9 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 418 Sec. 453b. 454. 455. 455a. 456. 456a. 456b. 457. 457a. 458. 458a. 458b. 459. 4S9a. 459b. 4S9c. 459d. 459e. 459f. 459g. 459h. 459i. 459j. 459k. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. Sec. Florida. 466. Georgia. Idaho. 467. Kentucky. 468. Louisiana. Minnesota. 469. Mississippi. 470. North Carolina. North Dakota. South Carolina. 470a. South Dakota. Tennessee. Virginia. 471. Liens for water furnished for irrigation. 472. Colorado. 473. Idaho. Kansas. 474. Louisiana. New Mexico. 475. Oklahoma. 476. Oregon. South Dakota. 477. Texas. 478. Washington, Effect of a delivery of goods. 479. Delivery to common carrier. No lien while consignor con- 480. trols goods. Delivery of bill of lading es- 481. sential. No lien for advancements ex- cept when goods are deliv- 482. ered. Advances made on faith of bill of lading. Lien lost by losing posses- sion. Possession necessary to lien. Loss of temporary posses- sion no waiver. Revival of the lien. Disclosure of his principal does not defeat the factor's lien. Factor waives his lien by failing to follow princi- pal's instructions. Lien ends with payment of the debt. Enforcement of factor's lien. Factor employed to purchase goods. Factor's special property in goods. Factor's right to sell goods. Factor may sell at a fair price. Rule in certain states. Factor's lien attaches to pro- ceeds of sale. Factor's right to retain pro- ceeds of sale. Bill of sale from principal to agent. Factor may sue for the debt notwithstanding he has lien. Carrier may enforce con- signee's lien. § 418. Factor or consignee under common law has lien on goods in his possession. — It is a general common law rule that a factor or consignee has, in the absence of any express agreement, a lien upon the goods in his hands, and upon the proceeds of the same, as his security for all advances made, or acceptances given to his principal in the business of his agency, or connected with the goods consigned to him. The 24 4i8 LIENS. 370 law implies or infers the lien from the relation between the parties.^ The factor's lien is a general lien covering the balance of account due him from his principal. He has a general lien, because he is an agent for a continuous service. 1 Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Ambler 252 (1755). ["Before this case] it was certainly doubtful whether a fac- tor had a lien and could retain for the balance of his general ac- count," remarked Lord Mansfield in Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214 (1768). The case of Kruger v. Wilcox was decided by Lord Hard- wicke, Chancellor. He examined four merchants upon the custom and usage of merchants in regard to such a lien. "All the four mer- chants, both in their examination in the cause and now in court, agree that, if there is a course of dealings and general account be- tween the merchant and factor, and a balance is due to the factor, he may retain the ship and goods, or produce, for such balance of the general account, as well as for the charges, customs, etc., paid on ac- count of the particular cargo." Lord Hardwicke gave his opin- ion that a factor has a lien for his general balance, which was after- wards confirmed by Lord Mans- field in Godin v. London Assur- ance Co., 1 Burr. 489, and Fox- croft V. Devonshire, 2 Burr. 931; by Lord Kenyon and Mr. Justice Ashurst, in Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258, and by Mr. Justice Buller in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21. Alabama: Barnett v. Warren, 82 Ala. 557, 2 So. 457. California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota: A factor or commission merchant has a gen- eral lien, dependent on possession, for all that is due him as such, upon all articles of commercial value that are intrusted to him by the same principal. California: Civil Code 1906, § 3053; Idaho: Rev. Code 1908, § 3448; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, § 6287; Montana: Code (Civ.) Ann. 1895, § 3936; South Dakota: Rev. Code 1903, § 2154; Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909, § 4143. Louisiana: Onachita Nat. Bank v. Weiss, 49 La. Ann. 573, 21 So. 857. Minnesota: Haeb- ler v. Luttgen, 61 Minn. 315, 63 N. W. 720. Missouri: Archer v. Mc- Mechan, 21 Mo. 43. New York: Nagle V. McFeeters, 97 N. Y. 196; Williams v. Tilt, 36 N. Y. 319. See Holbrook V. Weight, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. Dec. 607; Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Kasson, 37 N. Y. 218; Myer v. Ja- cobs, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 32; Commer- cial Nat. Bank v. Heilbronner, 108 N. Y.439, 15 N. E. 701. Ohio: Jor- dan v. James, 5 Ohio 88; Griefif v. Cowguill, 2 Disn. (Ohio) 58, 13 Ohio Dec. 37; Matthews v. Mened- ger, 2 McLean (U. S.) 145, Fed. Cas. No. 9289. Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909, § 4143. Pennsylvania: Stein- man v. Wilkins, 7 Watts. & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254; Haeb- ler V. Leuttgen, 61 Minn. 315, 63 N. W. 720; Dufify v. England, 176 Ind. 575, 96 N. E. 704; Plattner Im- plement Co. V. International Har- vester Co. of America, 133 Fed. 376, 66 C. C. A. 438. 371 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 419 An agent employed to perform services upon a particular thing has a lien for such services upon the thing upon which he has bestowed his labor. It is a lien for that particular service, and not for any other service or for any other debt. Lord Kenyon in an early case said : "There is no doubt, and, indeed, the point has been so long settled that it ought not now to be brought into dispute, but that, in general, a factor has a lien for his general balance on the property of his principal coming into his hands. "^ At first the factor's right by custom to a general Hen ap- pears to have been made the subject of proof in the cause. ^ Afterwards the right was regarded as fully established;'* and in modern practice no proof is ever required that such a general lien exists, as a matter of fact. Judicial notice is taken of the factor's right to a general lien.^ § 419. One who has no authority to make sales is not a factor. A warehouseman to whom goods are intrusted for the purpose of sale, but with authority merely to receive of- fers and to negotiate sales to be reported to the owner and concluded by him, is not a factor or other agent intrusted with the possession of merchandise for sale within the meaning of a factor's act.® One who carries on the business of slaughtering hogs, and curing, storing, and selling the product, as well for himself as for others, and who makes advances to others on receiving their hogs and holds the product until he sells it, is a factor, ^Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258, ^Barnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. 262. No lien when goods never in 630, per Lord Denman, C. J. factor's possession. Elwell v. ^Thacher v. Moors, 134 Mass. Coon (N. J. Eq.) 46 Atl. 580. 156. See, also, Stollenwerck v. 3 As in Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Amb- Thacher, 115 Mass. 224. A ware- ler 252, 1 Burr. 494. houseman with authority to sell 4 Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214; has a lien. Whigam v. Fountain, Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 132 Ga. 277, 63 S. E. 1115. 251. § 420 LIENS. 372 and has a lien on the property so received and held, for his services and advances.^ § 420. Lien of merchandise broker. — A merchandise brok- er, like any other agent, may have a specific lien, when he has such possession of the property that he can exercise the right. If the property does not come into his hands, or into the hands of some one who holds it in his interest, he can exercise no right of lien. Generally he is not intrusted with the possession of the property which he is employed to sell; but his business is merely that of a negotiator between the contracting parties, and ordinarily he has no property in his hands on which the right of lien can attach. He must gen- erally contract in the name of his principal, while a factor may buy and sell in his own name. A broker ordinarily has no possession of the goods he is employed to sell, nor has he any right to obtain possession. When in any case he has possession, his lien is a specific lien upon the goods for his services in negotiating a sale of the same, and not a general lien for a balance of account due from his principal.** Moreover, when a broker claims a right of lien for broker- age as against property coming into his hands, he can not enforce it unless he was employed by the owner. If he knew or had reason to believe that the person by whom he was employed was himself merely an agent, he was bound to inquire as to his authority, and to know that he could not retain the property for a debt due from the agent to himself.® § 421. Lien of stock-broker. — A stock-broker holding stocks and bonds of a customer upon which he has made ad- "Shaw V. Ferguson, 78 Ind. 547; him and expenses incurred, and his Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. lien is prior to a lien given by the Dec. 410. See East v. Ferguson, 59 owner to another. Dewing v. Hut- Ind. 169. An agent managing a ton, 40 W. Va. 521, 21 S. E. 780. general trading business, having sBarry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59. the right to buy, sell and barter, oBarry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59. has a lien for advances made by 373 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 422 vances is a pledgee of the securities rather than the holder of a lien upon them,^*^ though his interest is sometimes spoken of as a lien.^^ If stocks are placed in the hands of a broker for sale, and he makes advances upon them, he may be re- garded as a factor for that purpose, and he would have a lien upon them or upon their proceeds for his advances and com- missions. There is an important distinction between the rights of a broker having a lien, and those of a factor who has a lien. In the case of a factor there is an exception to the rule that no sale can be made under a lien except in pur- suance of statutory authority, or by a decree of a court of equity. A factor may sell to reimburse himself for advances made and liabilities incurred on account of the consignment. It is important for a stock-broker that he should be regarded as a factor if his special interest in his customer's stocks is to be regarded as a lien; and inasmuch as he ordinarily holds the customer's securities, which are generally regarded as merchandise, he may properly be considered as a factor governed by the general law regulating factors.^- He has such a special interest in stocks upon which he has made advancements, that he may properly refuse to sell the stocks if the customer's order to sell is expressly given for the purpose of reinvesting in other stocks which the broker would be obliged to hold as security for his advances. ^^ The broker in such case is entitled to the management and con- trol of the stocks. § 422. Broker employed on commission has a lien. — A broker or agent employed upon a commission to obtain a loan has a lien on the fund, and may retain out of it the amount of 10 Jones on Collateral Securities i^Biddle's Law of Stockbrokers, (3d ed.), §§ 151-154, 722. pp. 118-120. 11 Jones V. Gallagher, 3 Utah 54, i3Jones v. Gallagher, 3 Utah 54, 1 Pac. 15, reversed 129 U. S. 193, 1 Pac. 15, reversed 129 U. S. 193, 32 L. ed. 658, 9 Sup. Ct. 335. 32 L. ed. 658, 9 Sup. Ct. 335. § 423 LIENS. 374 his commission. ^^ He is not, however, a factor, and therefore is not entitled to a lien for his general balance of account. His lien is specific; though having in his hands money of his principal, he may, in an action for the money by his prin- cipal, he may, in an action for the money by his principal, have a right of set-off in respect of his principal's existing in- debtedness to him. A real estate agent or broker has a lien for his fees and advancements upon deeds which come into his possession by reason of his employment. His lien, however, is not a gen- eral lien.^^ § 423. An insurance broker is a factor. — An insurance broker, however, who is intrusted with his principal's poli- cies, is a factor rather than a broker, and, like a factor, he has a lien on such policies, and the money collected by him for losses under the policies, for his general balance.^® It is customary to intrust an insurance broker with the policies which he has effected, particularly marine policies, so that he may be able to adjust any losses which may occur. It is the broker's right to retain the policies so long as the prin- cipal is indebted to him. He has a lien on the policies for premiums paid and for his commissions.^^ If the broker acts for his principal continuously, or has an open insurance account with him, he has a lien upon the policies for the gen- eral balance of his insurance account. ^^ Even if the broker i4Vinton v. Baldwin. 95 Ind. 433; leLevy v. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 149; Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Snook v. Davidson, 2 Camp. 218; Dec. 410. Peterson v. Hall, 61 Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. 60. Minn. 268, 63 N. W. 733. i^Levy v. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 149; isRichards v. Gaskill, 39 Kans. Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. 60; 428, 18 Pac. 494. His lien is only Sharp v. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) on specific securities. Carpenter 557. V. Momsen, 92 Wis. 449, 65 N. W. is Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. 1027, 66 N. W. 692. See also, 60; Sharp v. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Gresham v. Galveston County Y.) 557; Man v. Shiffner, 2 East (Tex.), 36 S. W. 796; Peterson v. 523; Moody v. Webster, 3 Pick. Hall, 61 Minn. 268, 63 N. W. 7ZZ. (Mass.) 424. 375 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. 424 has knowledge that the person who employs him is merely an agent for the insured, he is entitled to his special lien; and if it is not known to him that his employer is merely an agent, he has a lien for his general balance against Tiis em- ployer in the same way as if he had acted directly for the insured. ^^ An insurance broker may assert his general lien even against an assignee of the policy. Thus, where the owner of goods sells them after directing his broker to effect insur- ance upon them, and the broker retains the policy and col- lects money for a loss, he can hold the money for his general balance as against the purchaser.-^ § 424. Extent of insurance broker's lien. — If one acts both as an insurance broker and as a factor for the sale of goods, his lien extends to a general balance of both accounts; he may retain a sum received for a loss on a policy, not only for a balance due him upon his insurance account, but also for a balance due him for advances and commissions upon goods. "^ But if the principal has remitted the premiums, payable in respect of the insurance, so that he has no longer any lien as a broker upon the policy, he is not entitled to hold it for the general balance due from his principal to him as a fac- tor.22 lOMann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. 60; Sharp V. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 557; Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. 349. "I hold that, if a policy of insurance is effected by a broker, in ignorance that it does not be- long to the persons by whom he is employed, he has a lien upon it for the amount of the balance which they owe him. * * * The only question is, whether he knew or had reason to believe that the per- son by whom he was employed was only an agent; and the party who seeks to deprive him of his lien must make out the afifirmative. The employer is to be taken to be the principal till the contrary is proved." Per Gibbs, C. J. In Snook V. Davidson, 2 Camp. 218, and in Lanyon v. Blanchard, 2 Camp. 597, the broker must be taken to have had notice that the person who employed him was not the principal. ^oMan V. Shififner, 2 East 523. 2iOIive V. Smith, 5 Taunt. 56. 22Dixon V. Stansfield, 10 C. B. 398. § 425 LIENS. 376 § 425. Agent's specific lien. — An agent, who is not a brok- er or general agent, who effects insurance for his principal, and pays or becomes bound for the premium, has a specific "^ lien on the policy so long as he retains it. If he surrenders the policy to his principal, his lien is gone. Although the insurers are entitled to deduct the premium, if unpaid, from the amount payable upon a loss, yet, if the agent has paid the premium to the insurers, he has no equity to stand in their place, and to claim payment out of the sum due for the loss.^^ But such an agent who procures a policy in pursuance of a specific order, and under directions to forward the policy to his principal, has no lien on the policy. "By undertaking to execute the order," said Chief Justice Shaw,^^ "he bound himself to comply with the terms and forward the policy; and this precludes the supposition that he was to have any lien upon it or interest in it." A ship's husband, for the general management of the vessel insured, has no lien on a policy for the balance of his account, where he has procured the insurance under specific directions to forward the policy to the owner.^^ If the broker knew at the time of effecting a policy that the person who employed him was acting for another, he has no lien upon the policy for the general balance due him from such agent, but only a special lien for the premium and com- missions due on that policy.^^ § 426. Factor's lien for general balance. — A factor's lien for his general balance attaches only to goods received by him in his general capacity as factor; it does not attach to goods received by him under a special agreement for a par- ticular purpose. "The lien which a factor has on the goods 23Cranston v. Philadelphia Ins. 25Reed v. Pacific Ins. Co., 1 Met. Co., 5 Binn. (Pa.) 538. (Mass.) 166. 24Reed v. Pacific Ins. Co., 1 Met. 26Man v. Shiffner, 2 East 523. (Mass.) 166. 377 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 427 of his principal arises upon an agreement which the law im- plies; but where there is an express stipulation to the con- trary, it puts an end to the general rule of law."^^ Thus, where the owner of certain cotton deposited it with a brok- er for sale, under a special agreement that the latter should pay the proceeds to the owner, it was held that the broker had no lien on this cotton for the balance of his general ac- count arising upon other articles; for the express stipulation of the parties excluded the idea of such a lien. The goods not having been sold, the owner, or his assignee in bankruptcy, was entitled to have them returned.-^ The special agreement may, however, be consistent with the implied lien. Wool merchants in Ohio, in consideration of further advances by their factors in New York, agreed to ship them wool enough to balance their account for such ad- vances and a large indebtedness already existing, and any indebtedness that might subsequently accrue. It was held that the lien of the factors upon the wool received was not limited to their advances on each shipment, but was avail- able for the satisfaction of the general balance due them.-'^ If a factor receives goods in the general course of busi- ness without notice of the fact that they were consigned to him for a special purpose, he has a lien upon them for his general balance. ^° § 427. A general lien is not implied when there is a spe- cial agreement which is inconsistent with such a lien.^^ — 27Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258, 3iBrandao v. Barnett, 3 C. B. per Lord Kenyon. 519. A factor's contract is not in- -SWalker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258. consistent with his common-law See Hall v. Jackson, 20 Pick. lien, where it provides that money (Mass.) 194; Garrison v. Vermont advanced by him to purchase wool Mills, 152 N. Car. 643, 68 S. E. 142. is to be repaid as the same is ex- 29Chapman v. Kent, 3 Duer (N. pended. Welker v. Appleman, 44 Y.) 224. Ind. App. 699, 90 N. E. 35. soArcher v. McMechan, 21 Mo. 43. § 428 LIENS. 378 If a transaction between two houses having many dealings between them is shown to be an isolated dealing on a par- ticular footing, and to have been intended to be brought to a point and settled by itself, it does not enter into the gen- eral account between the parties and become subject to a lien for a general balance. A firm of merchants in Hamburg di- rected their correspondents in London, a firm of merchants, to purchase Mexican bonds upon certain terms, and to hold them in safe custody at the disposal of the Hamburg firm. The bonds were accordingly purchased July 2, and the next day the London firm drew upon the Hamburg firm for the amount, which, they said, balanced the transaction. The bills were accepted and paid. On the 19th of November the Hamburg firm requested that the bonds be sent to them by post ; but on the same day the London firm wrote that they had stopped payment, but that the bonds had not been jeop- ardized. The Hamburg firm afterwards stopped payment. In a suit by the representatives of this firm for the delivery of the bonds, it was held that the bonds were not subject to the general balance of account between the two firms.^^ Under an agreement that certain advances shall be paid out of the proceeds of a certain consignment, the factor is bound to apply the proceeds of such consignment to the payment of the specific advances, and can not apply them to a debt due him not contracted under the agreement, and for which he had no lien.^^ § 428. Factor has no lien on goods received under ex- press directions. — A factor has no general lien on goods which he has received under express directions to apply the proceeds of in a particular way. He must first carry out the instructions of the consignor as to the application, and 32Bock V. Gorrissen, 30 L. J. Ch. saQwen v. Iglanor, 4 Cold. 39. (Tenn.) 15. 379 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 429 then, if there is a surplus, his general Hen may attach to this.^'^ He has no Hen on goods which are dehvered to him as agent for the use of his principal. Such a delivery is consid- ered as a delivery to the principal, and the possession is con- sidered to be in the principal. ^'^ No lien arises in favor of an agent with whom goods or a policy of insurance is deposited for safe keeping.'^*' And so if he is intrusted with property for a particular purpose, he can not retain it under a claim of a general lien.^" An agent employed merely to purchase certain goods is entitled to a lien for his advances in making the purchase, but he is not entitled to a lien for a general balance due him from his prin- cipal.^^ § 429. Factor's agent has no lien as against principal. — A third person, to whom a factor has intrusted his princi- pal's goods for sale, has no lien on them as against the princi- pal.^'^ The relation of a factor to his principal is one of trust, and he can not delegate his authority to another, or substitute another in his place, without the sanction of his principal, express or implied. A transfer of the goods by the factor to another, whom he authorizes to act in his place, is a conversion of the goods by the factor. The prin- cipal may thereupon sue the factor in trover for the conver- sion, or, waiving the tort, he may sue him in assumpsit for the value of the goods. '^^ 34Frith V. Forbes, 32 L. J. Ch. 10. ton Co., 160 Fed. 635. 87 C. C. A. The factor must follow his princi- 606. pal's instructions, but where no in- Si'Gurney v. Sharp, 4 Taunt. 242. structions are given the factor has 36Muir v. Fleming, 1 D. & R. a lien for expenses, liabilities and N. P. C. 29. commission and the principal or s^Burn v. Brown, 2 Stark. 272. one acting for him cannot recover ssDe Wolf v. Rowland, 2 Paine the possession without payment or (U. S.) 356, Fed. Cas. No. 3852. tender of the amount of the lien. sophelps v. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 554. Heffner v. Gwynne-Treadwell Cot- 40Campbell v. Reeves, 3 Head (Tenn.) 226. § 43° LIENS. 380 The lien of a factor is a personal privilege, and can not be set up by any other person in defense to an action by the principal. He may avail himself of it or not, as he pleases. ^^ § 430. Effect of factor's assignment for creditors. — If a factor or consignee makes a general assignment for the ben- efit of his creditors, the assignee has no right to sell the goods, for the factor or consignee can not delegate his au- thority to another without the consent of the principal. All that passes by the assignment is the lien on the goods. The assignee has lawful possession of the goods under the as- signment, but this gives him no right of way to assume to himself the entire property, or right of disposing of the goods. A sale of the goods by him is a tortious conversion of them. His legal right extends no further than to hold the goods by virtue of the lien, or to foreclose the lien in the manner provided by statute.^" § 431. Goods received after death of principal. — Although the death of the principal is a revocation of the agent's au- thority, yet the possession of goods acquired by a factor after the death of his principal, where he has made advances upon the goods, may entitle him to a lien.^^ But if the factor does not obtain actual or constructive possession of the goods till after the death of the principal, he has no lien for an existing debt, or general balance of ac- 4iHolly V. Huggeford, 8 Pick. factor's Hen for advances thereon (Mass.) IZ, 19 Am. Dec. 303. is discharged. Cameron v. Crouse, 42Terry v. Bamberger, 44 Conn. 11 App. Div. 391, 42 N. Y. S. 58. A 558, 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 234, Fed. factor having a lien on notes has Cas. No. 13837, affd. 103 U. S. 40, no implied authority to assign 26 L. ed. 317; Willard v. White, 56 them to pay his debts. People's Hun 581, 32 N. Y. St. 151, 10 N. Y. Bank v. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 179, 12, S. 170. The assignee for the bene- Pac. 949. fit of a factor's creditors may legal- 43Hammonds v. Barclay, 2 East ly retain the possession of goods 227; Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 T. R. consigned his assignor until the 485. 381 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 432 count. ^^ Thus a manufacturer wrote to commission mer- chants to whom he was indebted, and inclosed an invoice of goods which he was about to ship to them, but died before the letter was mailed or the goods had left his possession. His son the next day forwarded the letter and the goods, and the merchant sold the goods, and gave credit for the proceeds in reduction of their balance of account against the manufacturer. In a suit against them by the administrator of the deceased, it was held that they must pay over the proceeds of these goods to the administrator.'*^ § 432. No lien on goods when consignor has informed factor that goods do not belong to him. — A factor has no gen- eral lien on goods which the consignor has informed him be- long to another person to whose credit he is directed to place the proceeds. ^^ Dealers in livestock shipped to brokers in Chicago certain carloads of stock, which had been purchased with the money of a banker at the place of shipment, and the dealers so informed the broker, and directed him to place the proceeds of sale to the credit of the banker in a certain bank in Chicago, in accordance with their custom in previous transactions. The stock really belonged to the banker, though the dealers had shipped it in their own names without consulting him, in order to get better rates of freight. The brokers applied the proceeds of the sale, less their commissions, to an old account against the dealers for advances made to them for which they claimed a factor's 44 Cook's Admr. v. Brannin, 87 sion and custody of the consignor, Ky. 101, 9 Ky. L. 955, 7 S. W. 877. is not sufficient to create a lien. •isFarnum v. Boutelle, 13 Met. In the present case, it appears that (Mass.) 159. "But before such lien the goods remained on the prem- attaches, the goods must have been ises of the intestate at the time of delivered or sent to the consignee, his decease, and were subsequently or at least, put upon their transit forwarded by his son." Per Shaw, to him; and an intention so to con- C. J. sign them, and an intimation of 4c\Veymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. such intention by letter, whilst 425; Darlington v. Chamberlain, 120 they remain in the actual posses- 111. 585, 12 N. E. 78. § 433 LIENS. 382 lien. It was held that their claim was inadmissible as against the owner of the stock. ''''^ A consignee who receives shipments of goods upon which others have made advances, and taken transfers of bills of lading as security, acquires no lien upon them to the pre- judice of those who have made the advances. ^^ A factor and consignee who has received property with knowledge that a draft has been drawn against him for the proceeds by the consignor in favor of a third person can not apply the proceeds on any other account. Even if he might himself enforce a lien for a general balance of account, he can not retain the proceeds and pay the same over to a firm to which the consignor was indebted, though the consignee is a member of that firm.'*'^ § 433. Agent's lien. — If the agent has notice of the bankruptcy of his principal, or of his assignment for the benefit of his creditors, before he gets possession of the property, he can not hold it under a claim of a general lien.^^ But if he has received a bill of lading or other insignia of property in the goods before notice of his principal's bank- ruptcy, he is not divested of his right of lien, though he has such notice before the goods actually arrive, for the bill of lading confers title and constructive possession. The bankruptcy of the principal after the factor has received the goods does not divest him of his lien.°^ 'I'Darlington v. Chamberlain, 120 21; Fourth Nat. Bank v. American III. 585, 12 N. E. 78. Mills Co., 137 U. S. 234, 34 L. ed. 4SFirst Nat. Bank v. Ege, 109 N. 655, 11 Sup. Ct. 52. If the prin- Y. 120, 16 N. E. 317, 4 Am. St. 431. cipal before his insolvency has •^''Fisher v. First Nat. Bank, 37 transferred the goods to the fac- 111. App. 333. See also, Hollins v. tor in discharge pro tanto of Hubbard, 165 N. Y. 534, 59 N. E. the lien debt, the latter is not 317. bound to set off the amount of ac- ooCopland v. Stein, 8 T. R. 199; commodation drafts drawn by the Robson V. Kemp, 4 Esp. 233, per principal for the factor's benefit, Lord Ellenborough, C. J. which were not due when the goods 5^ Hudson V. Granger, 5 B. & Aid. were so transferred, and have not 383 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 434 After a factor has obtained possession of the goods, his lien is not divested by an attachment of them by a creditor of his principal. ^- § 434. Lien of consignee depends on manner of consign- ment. — Whether a consignee has a lien upon goods which have been wrongfully consigned to him depends very much upon the manner in which the consignment is made.^^ A carrier has no lien on such goods for freight as against the rightful owner,^"^ and the consignee could acquire no lien as against such owner by paying the freight. As regards the duties upon goods imported by one who has come wrong- fully into possession of the goods, the United States would have a lien, and the duties must be paid if the goods are entered, and withdrawn from the custody of the United States; but this lien would not ordinarily be transferred to the consignee under the wrongful consignment, who has paid the duties and received the goods, for no lien can be implied in favor of one who acts adversely to the rights of the owner.^^ But the owner may be estopped by his conduct from deny- ing that such consignee paid the duties for his use and at his request. Thus, if the owner, intending to replevy the goods, stands by and knowingly allows the consignee, who honestly believes the goods were properly consigned to him, to pay the customs duties, the owner can not maintain his action of replevy without tendering the amount so paid. Under been paid by the principal. Fourth debt due him from the consignor. Nat. Bank v. American Mills Co., Burns' Ann. Stats. 1914, § 862 137 U. S. 234, 34 L. ed. 655, 11 Sup. Louisiana: See post, § 437. Ct. 52. ''SFowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 02Maxen v. Landrum, 21 La. 401, 9 N. E. 799, per Field, J. Ann. 366. In Indiana: Goods at- "''i See ante, §304. tached in the hands of a consignee "'SFowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. shall be subject to a lien for any 401, 9 N. E. 799. § 435 LIENS. 384 such circumstances the consignee obtains an equitable lien upon the goods by reason of such payment. ^^ It is held, however, that, although the consignor has ob- tained the goods by means of fraudulent representations, a factor who has in good faith received the goods for sale, and made advances upon them to the consignor, acquires a valid lien, and the original vendor can not obtain them from him without paying the advances.^''' But a factor who has obtained possession of the property on which he claims a lien by means of misrepresentations, or in any manner which makes his possession unauthorized or tortious, is not entitled to a lien.^^ § 435. Lien of consignee on insurance money. — A con- signee who has insured the goods on which he has made advances has a lien upon the insurance money collected by him for a loss by fire without his fault, though the insur- ance was effected for the benefit of the consignor. He had a lien upon the goods, and when these were destroyed the amount recovered by him upon their loss was substituted in their place, and w^as held subject to the same lien.^^ § 436. State statutes. — In several states there are statutes which protect factors in their dealings with consignors. These statutes are generally made a part of the Factors' Acts of these states. The general purpose of the Factors' Acts is to enable third persons to deal with agents intrusted with goods, or with the documents of title to goods, for sale, as though they were the absolute owners of the goods. '^'^ The same ^6Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. faith or he will have no lien. Peo- 401, 9 N. E. 799. pie's Bank v. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 57Williams v. Birch, 6 Bosw. (N. 179, 12, Pac. 949. Y.) 299, affd. 36 N. Y. 319. oojohnson v. Campbell, 120 iiSMadden v. Kempster, 1 Camp. Mass. 449. 12; Taylor v. Robinson, 8 Taunt. eojones on Collateral Securities 648. A factor must act in good (3d ed.), § 333. 385 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 436a .acts also generally afford a similar protection to factors who make advances to consignors upon goods consigned. § 436a. Delaware. ^^ — In all cases in which commission merchants, factors, and all common carriers, or other per- sons, shall have a lien under existing laws upon any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property, for or on account of the costs or expenses of carriage, storage, or labor bestowed on such goods, wares, merchandise, or other per- sonal property, if the owner or consignee of the same shall fail or neglect, or refuse to pay the amount of charges upon any such property, goods, w^ares, or merchandise, within sixty days after demand thereof, made personally upon such owner or consignee, or at his last known place of residence, then in such case it shall and may be lawful for any such commis- sion merchant, factor, common carrier, or other person hav- ing such lien as aforesaid, after the expiration of said period of sixty days, to expose such goods, wares, merchandise, or other personal property to sale at public auction, and to sell the same, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to discharge said lien, together with costs of sale and advertis- ing: provided, that notice of such sale, together with the name of the person or persons to whom such goods shall have been consigned, shall have been first published, for three successive weeks, in a newspaper published in the coun- ty, and by six written or printed hand-bills, put up in the most public and most conspicuous places in the vicinity of the depot where said goods may be. Upon the application of any of the persons or corpora- tions having a lien upon goods, wares, merchandise, or other property, as mentioned above, verified by affidavit, to any judge of the superior court of this state, or to the chan- cellor, setting forth that the place of residence of the owner or consignee of any such goods, wares, merchandise, or other eiRev. Code 1893, pp. 816, 817. 25 § 436b LIENS. 386 property is unknown, or that such goods, wares, merchandise, or other property are of such a perishable nature, or so dam- aged, or showing any other cause that shall render it im- practicable to give the notice as required in the first section of this act, then, in such case, it shall and may be lawful for the judge, or chancellor, hearing such application, to make an order, to be by him signed, authcw.-izing the sale of such goods, wares, merchandise, or other property upon such terms as to notice as the nature of the case may admit of and to such judge shall seem meet ; provided, that in case of perishable property, the affidavit and proceedings required by this section may be had before a justice of the peace. § 436b. Florida.'^- — Any person or persons who shall pro- cure a loan or advance of money or goods and chattels, wares or merchandise or other things of value, to aid him, her or them in the business of planting, farming, timber getting or any other kind of businesses in this state, from any factor, merchant, firm or person in this state, or in the United States or in any foreign country, shall, by this act, be held to have given to the lender, lenders, or person making such advance, a statutory lien of prior dignity to all other incum- brances saving and excepting liens for labor and liens in favor of landlords, upon all the timber getting, all the crops, and products grown or anything else made or grown by said person or persons, through the assistance of said loan or advances: provided, that the lien above given shall not be created unless the person or persons obtaining or procuring such loan or advance shall give to the person or persons making such loan or advance an instrument of writing con- senting to said lien ; and the same shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county wherein such business of planting, farming or timber getting is con- ducted. et'Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2208. 387 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 437 § 436c. Georgia/'" — A factor's lien extends to all balances on general account, and attaches to the proceeds of the sale of goods consigned, as well as to the goods themselves. Pe- culiar confidence being reposed in the factor, he may, in the absence of instructions, exercise his discretion according to the general usages of the trade; in return greater and more skillful diligence is required of him, and the most active good faith. §437. Louisiana.''^ — Every consignee or commission agent who has made advances on goods consigned to him, or placed in his hands to be sold for account of the consignor, has a privilege for the amount of these advances, with inter- est and charges, on the value of the goods, if they are at his disposal in his store or in a public warehouse, or if, before their arrival, he can show, by a bill of lading or letter of advice, that they have been dispatched to him. This privi- lege extends to the unpaid price of goods which the consignee or the agent shall have thus received and sold. Such privi- lege is preferred to that of any attaching creditor on the goods consigned to him, for any balance due to him, whether specially advanced on said goods or not: provided they, or an invoice or bill of lading, have been received by him prev- ious to the attachment. This privilege shall not have a preference over a privilege pre-existing in behalf of a resident creditor of this state. ^^ In the event of the failure of the con- signee or commission agent, the consignor has not only a right to reclaim the goods sent by him, and which remain unsold in the hands of the consignee or agent, if he can prove their identity, but he has also a privilege on the price of such as have been sold, if the price has not been paid by the esCode 1911, § 3502. Bank v. Weis, 49 La. Ann. 573, 21 64 Rev. Civ. Code 1900, arts. 3247, So. 857. 3248. Ott V. His Creditors, 127 La. tJ-'Buddecke v. Spence, 23 La. 827, 54 So. 44; Ouachita Nat. Ann. 367; Maxen v. Landrum, 21 La. Ann. 366. § 43^ LIENS. 388 purchaser, or passed into account current between him and the bankrupt. Under this statute giving a consignee a lien by way of pledge upon goods consigned to him for his advances upon them, if he has control of the goods, or if before their ar- rival he can show by a bill of lading, or letter of advice, that they have been dispatched to him, the consignee, after re- ceiving such letter of advice, or a bill of lading, has a lien which can not be defeated by the consignor's drawing a draft against the goods, obtaining a discount of it, and using the proceeds for the purchase of the goods so consigned. ^° § 438. Maine.^" — Every person in whose name merchan- dise is forwarded, every factor or agent intrusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or ware- house-keeper's receipt for the delivery of such merchandise, and every such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who is intrusted with the possession of merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as security for ad- vances to be made thereon, shall be deemed the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any lien or contract made by such shipper or agent with any other person for the sale or disposal of the whole or any part of such merchandise, money advanced, or negotiable instrument, or other obliga- tion in writing, given by such person upon the faith thereof. No person taking such merchandise in deposit from such agent as security for an antecedent demand shall thereby acquire or enforce any right or interest therein other than such agent could then enforce. But the true owner of such merchandise, upon repayment of the money so advanced, restoration of the security so given, or satisfaction of all legal liens, may demand and receive his property, or recover the balance remaining as the produce of the legal sale there- of, after deducting all proper claims and expenses thereon. 66Helm V. Meyer, 30 La. Ann. 67Rev. Stat. 1903, ch. 33, §§ 1-3. 943. 389 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 44O § 439. Maryland. ^^ — Any person intrusted with and in possession of any bill of lading, storekeeper's or inspector's certificate, order for the delivery of goods, or other docu- ment showing possession, shall be deemed the true owner of the goods, wares, or merchandise described therein, so far as to give validity to any contract thereafter to be made by such person with any other person or body corporate for the sale or disposal of the said goods, wares, or mer- chandise, or for the pledge or deposit thereof as a security for any money or negotiable instrument advanced or given on the faith of such documents, or any of them; provided, that such person or body corporate shall not have notice, by such document or otherwise, that the person so intrusted is not the actual and bona fide owner of such goods, wares, and merchandise. If any person or body corporate shall take any goods, wares, or merchandise, or any document mentioned in the foregoing clause, in deposit or pledge from any person so intrusted with the same, or to whom the same may be con- signed, or who may be intrusted with and in possession of any such bill of lading, storekeeper's or inspector's certificate, order for the delivery of goods, or other such document showing possession, without notice, as a security for any debt or demand existing before the time of such deposit or pledge, then such person shall acquire such right, title, or in- terest as was possessed and might have been enforced by the person from whom he received the same, and no more. § 440. Massachusetts.^^ — A shipper who is in lawful pos- session of merchandise at the time of shipment and in whose name it is shipped for sale shall be deemed the true owner 68Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 2, § his lien on the goods. Rowland v. 3. Where a factor has placed the Dolby, 100 Md. 272, 59 Atl. 666. goods in a warehouse and given See Farmers' Packing Co. v. the receipt to his principal he so Brown, 87 Md. 1, 39 Atl. 625. far gives up possession as to end coRgv. Laws 1902, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3. § 44oa LIENS. 390 thereof so far as to entitle the consignee to a lien thereon for money advanced, or securities given to the shipper for or on account of such consignment, unless the consignee, at or before the time when he made the advances or gave the securities, had notice, by the bill of lading or otherwise, that the shipper was not the actual and bona fide owner. When a person intrusted with merchandise, and having authority to sell or consign the same, ships or otherwise transmits or delivers it to any other person, such other person shall have a lien thereon for any money or merchan- dise advanced, or negotiable security given by him. on the faith of such consignment, to or for the use of the person in whose name such consignment or delivery was made ; and for any money, negotiable security, or merchandise received for the use of the consignee by the person in whose name such consignment or delivery was made, if such consignee had, at the time of such advance or receipt, probable cause to believe that the person in whose name the merchandise was shipped, transmitted, or delivered was the actual owner thereof, or had a legal interest therein to the amount of said lien. § 440a. Missouri.^^ — When any commission merchant or w^arehouseman shall receive, on consignment, produce, mer- chandise or other property, and shall make advances thereon, either to the owner or for freight and charges, it shall be lawful for the person who may make such advances, if the same be not paid to him within sixty days from the date of such advances, to cause the produce, merchandise or prop- erty on which the advances were made to be advertised and sold in the same manner as unclaimed property. § 440b. New York.'^^ — Every factor or other agent, in- trusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom- -oRev. Stats. 1909, § 8278. Kingsbury, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) TiBirdseye's C. & G. Consol. 555, 100 N. Y. S. 323. Laws 1909, p. 4214, § 43; Beken v. 391 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 440b house permit, or warehouseman's receipt for the de- livery of any merchandise, and every such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be intrusted with the possession of any mer- chandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise, for any money advanced, or negotiable in- strument or other obligation in writing given by such other person upon the faith thereof. Every person wdio shall hereafter accept or take any such merchandise in deposit from any such agent, as security for any antecedent debt or demand, shall not acquire there- by, or enforce any right or interest in or to such mer- chandise or document, other than was possessed or might have been enforced by such agent at the time of such deposit. Nothing contained in the preceeding subdivisions of this section shall be construed to prevent the true owmer of any merchandise so deposited, from demanding or receiving the same, upon prepayment of the money advanced, or on re- storation of the security given, on the deposit of such mer- chandise and upon satisfying such lien as may exist thereon in favor of the agent who may have deposited the same; nor from recovering any balance wdiich may remain in the hands of the person with whom such merchandise shall have been deposited, as the produce of the sale hereof, after satisfy- ing the amount justly due to such person by reason of such deposit. Nothing contained in this section shall authorized a com- mon carrier, warehouseman, or other person to whom mer- chandise or other property may be committed for transporta- tion or storage only, to sell or hypothecate the same. §441 LIENS. 392 §441. Ohio.'- — Every person in whose name any mer- chandise shall be shipped shall be deemed the true owner thereof, so far as to entitle the consignee of such merchandise to a lien thereon: 1. For any money advanced or negotia- ble security given by such consignee, to or for the use of the person in whose name such shipment shall have been made ; and, 2. For any money or negotiable security received by the person in whose name such shipment shall have been made to or for the use of such consignee. The lien so pro- vided for shall not exist where such consignee shall have notice, by the bill of lading or otherwise, at or before the advancing of any money or security by him, or at or before the receiving of such money or security by the person in whose name the shipment shall have been made, that such person is not the actual and bona fide owner thereof. § 442. Pennsylvania."^ — Whenever any person intrusted with merchandise, and having authority to sell or consign the same, shall ship or otherwise transmit the same to any other person, such other person shall have a lien thereon : 1. For any money advanced or negotiable security given by him on the faith of such consignment to or for the use of the person in whose name such merchandise was shipped or transmitted ; 2. For any money or negotiable security received for the use of such consignee by the person in whose name such merchandise was shipped or transmitted. But such lien shall not exist for any of the purposes aforesaid, if such consignee shall have notice, by the bill of lading or otherwise, before the time of such advance or receipt, that the person in whose name such merchandise was shipped or transmitted is not the actual owner thereof. § 443. Rhode Island."^ — The consignee of merchandise shipped shall have a lien thereon for any money or negotia- 72Gen. Code 1910, §§ 8358, 8359. -4Gen. Laws 1909, p. 612, § 1. "sPurdon's Digest (13th ed.) 1903, p. 1608, §§ 1-4. 393 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 445 ble security b}' him advanced upon the faith of such ship- ment to, or for the use of, the person in whose name the shipment shall have been made, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if such person were the true owner thereof: provided, at the time of the advance, the consignee shall have no notice or knowledge that the shipper was not the true owner of such merchandise. § 444. Wisconsin.'''^ — Every consignee of property shall have a lien thereon for any money advanced or negotiable security given by him to or for the use of the person in whose name the shipment of such property is made, and for any money or negotiable security received by such person for his use, unless he shall, before advancing any such money, or giving such security, or before it is received for his use, have notice that such person is not the actual owner thereof. Every factor, broker or other agent intrusted by the owner with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house per- mit, warehouse receipt or other evidence of the title to per- sonal property, or with the possession of personal property for the purpose of sale, or as security for any advances made or liability by him incurred in reference to such property, shall have a lien upon such personal property for all such advances, liability incurred, or commissions or other moneys due him for services as such factor, broker or agent, and may retain the possession of such property until such advances, commis- sions, or moneys are paid, or such liability is discharged. "^^ § 445. Debt is foundation of agent's lien. — A debt due from the principal to the agent is the foundation of the 75Stats. 1898, §§ 3345-3347. York statute, from which that of 76This statute applies to receipts Wisconsin was taken; for in the given by private warehouses, and latter state there are no bonded not merely to bonded warehouses. warehouses. Price v. Wisconsin In this respect the statute is con- Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 43 Wis. strued differently from the New 267. § 446 LIENS. 394 agent's lien. The debt must be certain and liquidated. A liability of an agent as surety for his principal does not entitle him to a lien, in the absence of an express contract,'^^ unless this liability is connected with the agency. The debt must be one contracted in the agent's business. It is usually limited to advances, expenses, and commissions incurred in this business. The debt which is covered by the lien is not limited to the advances and charges pertaining to a particular consignment ; but the lien covers the grand balance of account between the parties in their relation of principal and factor. If a consignee pays freight on goods which prove not to be of the quality ordered, he has a lien for the freight as against the seller.'''^ § 446, Lien covers interest on debt. — The lien covers in- terest upon the debt as well as the debt itself, though this be payable immediately, but the factor is permitted or re- quested to defer the sale of the goods in his possession. '^^ § 447. Debt must be due. — The debt must be due from the owner of the goods which the factor retains by virtue of his lien,^*^ unless the debt be in the form of negotiable paper of a third person, transferred to the factor by the owner of the goods, or the factor is employed by an agent for an undisclosed principal. If a broker effects insurance in ignorance that the person who employs him is not the owner of the property insured, but is acting for another, he has a lien for the balance of account due him from the person who employs him. He is supposed to have made advances on the credit of the policy which is allowed to remain in his '"Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 58; Heins v. Peine, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) Cowp. 251; Hammonds v. Barclay, 420. 2 East 227. soBarry v. Longmore. 12 Ad. & TSCoit V. Schwartz, 29 Kans. 344. El. 639. 'i'SEx parte Kensington. 1 Deac. 395 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 448 hands. ''*^ If the broker receives notice that a third person is interested in the policy, his lien upon it is limited to the amount of his general balance at that time.^- A merchant, after advising his factor of an intended con- signment of oats, and drawing upon him in anticipation, indorsed the bill of lading to a third person. The latter sent the bill of lading to the factor first mentioned, who took possession of the cargo and paid the freight. It was held that the factor had no lien on the cargo for his ad- vances, because he held the goods, not as agent of the per- son to wdiom he made the advances, but as the agent of the person from whom he received the bill of lading.^^ And so if an insurance broker effects a policy in the name of an agent employed by the master of a vessel, the agency being known to the broker, he can not, upon collecting the amount of a loss under the policy, retain it for a debt due to him from the agent. ^"* The employer is to be taken as the principal until the contrary is proved, and knowledge of the agency is brought home to the insurance broker.^"* § 448. Factor can not claim lien for debt due his princi- pal. — A factor can not claim a lien for debts not due to him- self, but to his principal. Thus, a factor sold goods of his principal in his own name to a purchaser who did not pay for them at the time, but sent other goods to the factor to be sold for him, never having employed him as a factor before. This purchaser then became bankrupt, and his assignees claimed the goods sent by him to the factor, and which re- mained unsold, tendering the charges upon them. The fac- tor refused to deliver the goods, claiming a lien upon them siVVestwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. 349; s^Bruce v. Wait, 3 M. & W. 15. Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. 60, per S'lp'oster v. Hoyt, 2 Johns. Cas. Ellenborough, C. J. (N. Y.) 327. See ante, § 432. 82Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. s-^Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. 349; 60. See Levy v. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 1 Holt 122, per Gibbs, C. J.; 149. Maanss v. Henderson, 1 East 335. § 449 LIENS. 396 for the price of the goods sold by him to the bankrupt. There was then a balance due the factor from his first princi- pal.^^ It was held that the assignees of the bankrupt were entitled to recover. § 449. Factor has no lien for old debt due from his principal. — A factor has no lien for a debt due from his principal before he became his factor, unless it was con- tracted in anticipation of the relation of principal and factor. "I do not find," said Chambre, Justice, ^^ "any authority for saying that a factor has any general lien in respect of debts which arise prior to the time at which his character of factor commences; and if a right to such a lien is not established by express authorit}^, it does not appear to me to tall within the general principle upon which the liens of factors have been allowed. It seems to me that the liens of factors have been allowed for the convenience of trade, and with a view to encourage factors to advance money upon goods in their possession, or which must come to their hands as factors; but debts which are incurred prior to the existence of the re- lation of principal and factor are not contracted upon this principle." To give a lien for such debts would, he says, op- erate the contrary way, since it would tend to prevent insol- vent persons from employing their creditors as factors, lest the goods intrusted to them should be retained in satisfac- tion of former debts. A factor's lien for a general balance rests on the custom of trade, and nothing can fall within the custom of trade but what concerns trade. Therefore collateral obligations, S6 Houghton V. Matthews, 3 Bos. srHoughton v. Matthews, 3 Bos. & Pul. 485. Lord Alvanley, C. J., & Pul. 485; Mann v. Forrester, 4 dissented, being of opinion that the Camp. 60, per Ellenborough, C. J.; moment the goods were sent, the Olive v. Smith, 5 Taunt. 56; Wal- relation of principal and factor ker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258; Stevens arose, and when that relation com- v. Robins, 12 Mass. 180; Sturgis menced, the right to a general lien v. Slacum, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 36, per attached. Wilde, J. 397 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 45O such as money due for rent, are not within the custom which authorizes a factor to retain for a general balance. ^^ The factor's lien does not cover the price of goods sold by the factor to his principal. It does not cover any debt not connected with the general purposes of the relation of principal and agent. ^'^ § 450. The lien covers acceptances as well as advances in money. — An agent or consignee to whom goods are con- signed for sale under an agreement that he will accept bills drawn upon him for the amount, has a lien on the goods for the amount of his acceptances, and is entitled to retain the goods until the acceptances are paid. It is a necessary in- ference in such case that the drafts are to be drawn on the credit of the goods, and that the consignee is to have a lien on the goods to secure him against his acceptances. It the consignee had upon the request of the consignor advanced money upon the goods, he would clearly have had a lien upon the goods to secure his advances; and his acceptances amount in fact to advances. ^^ The debt need not be paya- ble immediately. The factor may retain goods to meet his liability upon an acceptance payable at a future time.^^ ssHoughton v. Matthews, 3 Bos. for his accommodation, to the & Pul. 485, per Heath, J.; Ex parte amount of the goods thus con- Deeze, 1 Atk. 228. signed. What is the legal infer- soThacher v. Hannahs, 4 Rob. ence from such a state of facts? (N. Y.) 407. Factors have no liens What other inference can there be, on goods bought for their princi- except that the drafts were drawn pals, for damages sustained by the on the credit of the goods, and the principal's refusal to receive other goods were to be held as an indem- goods bought by them. Beakley nity against the drafts? There V. Rainier, (Tex.) 78 S. W. 702. could have been no other under- 90Nagle V. McFeeters, 97 N. Y. standing, and no other legal ef- 196. "Here was the principal con- feet can be given to the arrange- signing goods to his agents to sell, ment." Per Earl, J. See also under an agreement that he should Eaton v. Truesdail, 52 111. 307. be permitted to draw upon them ^i Hammonds v. Barclay, 2 East drafts which they were to accept 227. § 451 LIENS. 398 §451. Lien for duties paid. — There is a lien in favor of the government upon goods in its possession for the duties due thereon; but the lien is restricted to the duties upon the particular goods. ^- The consignee can not take the goods until he has paid the duties. Neither can the creditor of the owner by any attachment or other process take the goods out of the possession of the officer of customs by attachment or other process until tlie lien for duties be actually dis- charged. '^^ The owner's property in the goods is not divested by the possession of the United States for the purpose of main- taining the lien for duties. That possession is not adverse to the title of the owner, and, indeed, may be properly deemed not so much an exclusive as a concurrent and mixed pos- session for the joint benefit of the owner and of the United States. It leaves the owner's right to the immediate pos- session perfect the moment the lien for the duties is dis- charged. And if he tenders the duties, or the proper security therefor, and the collector refuses the delivery of the goods, it is a tortious conversion of the property, for which an ac- tion of trespass or trover will lie.^"* § 452. Lien exists even where debt is barred. — Though the debt has been barred by the statute of limitations, a lien for such debt attaches to goods of the principal which after- wards come into the agent's hands, for the debt is not dis- charged by the statute, but only the remedy by action; he has a subsisting demand, and therefore if goods come 92Dennie v. Harris, 9 Pick. »3Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. (U. (Mass.) 364; Meeker v. Wilson, 1 S.) 292, 7 L. ed. 683. Gall. (U. S.) 419, Fed. Cas. Xo. o^Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 9392; Dias v. Bouchaud, 10 Paige Pet. (U. S.) 262, 8 L. ed. 392; Con- (N. Y.) 445, reversed 1 X. Y. 201, ard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. 4 How. Prac. 291; Guesnard v. S.) 386, 7 L. ed. 189; Conard v. Louisville & XashviUe R. Co., 76 Xicoll, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 291, 7 L. ed. Ala. 453. 862. 399 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 453b into his possession he has the remedy in his own hands, and has no occasion for an action. '^^ § 453. Lien for advcincement on crop. — By common law, one who advances money or suppHes to a farmer or planter to enable him to make a crop acquires no lien upon the crop for such advances.'-*" Such a lien may, however, be created by express agreement,"-*' and in some states it is given by statute. Such a lien is commonly called an agricultural lien. § 453a. Arkansas.-'- — if any landlord, to enable his tenant or employe to make and gather the crop, shall advance such tenant or employe any necessary supplies, either of money, provisions, clothing, stock, or other necessary articles, such landlord shall have a lien upon the crop raised upon the premises for the value of such advances, which lien shall have preference over any mortgage or other conveyance of such crop made by such tenant or employe. Such lien may be enforced by an action of attachment before any court or justice of the peace having jurisdiction and the lien for advances and for rent may be joined and enforced in the same action. § 453b. Florida.'*'* — Any person or persons who shall procure a loan or advance of money or goods and chattels, wares or merchandise, or other things' of value, to aid him, her or them in the business of planting, farming, timber get- ting or any other kind of businesses in this state, from any factor, merchant, firm or person in this state, or in the United States or in any foreign country, shall, by this act, 95Spears v. Hartly, 3 Esp. 81, per App. Div. N. Y. 564, 95 N. Y. S. Lord Eldon; Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. 494, affd. 184 N. Y. 612, 11 N. E. & Ad. 413. 1196. 9fi Franklin v. Meyer, 36 Ark. 96. I'SKirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, § 97Bell V. Radcliflf, 32 Ark. 645; 5033. Schermerhorn v. Gardenier, 107 99Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2208. § 454 LIENS. 400 be held to have given to the lender, lenders, or person mak- ing such advance, a statutory lien of prior dignity to all other incumbrances, saving and excepting liens for labor and liens in favor of landlords, upon all the timber getting, all the crops, and products grown or anything else made or grown by said person or persons, through the assistance of said loan or advances: provided, that the lien above given shall not be created unless the person or persons obtaining or procuring such loan or advance shall give to the person or persons making such loan or advance an instrument of writing consenting to said lien; and the same shall be re- corded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county wherein such business of planting, farming or timber getting is conducted. § 454. Georgia.^ — Landlords furnishing supplies, money, horses, mules, asses, oxen, farming utensils of necessity, to make crops, shall have the right to secure themselves from the crops of the year in which such things are done or fur- nished, upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the par- ties, with this condition, that the liens so provided for shall arise by operation of law from the relation of landlord and tenant, as well as by special contract in writing,^ whenever the landlord shall furnish the articles above enumerated, or any one of them, to the tenant, for the purpose therein named. The lien of the landlord has priority;^ but if the crop be delivered into the possession of a factor or of his agent, he has a lien upon it at common law. In such case his lien is superior to that of a landlord for the rent of the land upon iCode 1911, § 3348. See statute be alleged in the plaintiff's affi- for further conditions. davit to foreclose the lien. The 2lnasmuch as it is one of the affidavit must state all the facts conditions of a valid crop lien that necessary to constitute a valid lien, it should be created by a special Powell v. Weaver, 56 Ga. 288. contract in writing, that fact should 3Code 1911, § 3348. 40I LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 4553- which the cotton is raised, if the landlord's lien has not been foreclosed and the factor has no notice of it.'* The lien given to merchants and factors upon growing crops does not cover money advanced with which the planter is to purchase provisions and supplies; and a note given for money, which upon its face recites that the money is to be used to purchase provisions, does not create a debt which is secured by the lien.^ The al^davit to foreclose such lien must state that the de- ponent is either a factor or a merchant, and that, as such, he has furnished either provisions or commercial manures, or both, to the defendant ; and it must also state the terms upon which such supplies were furnished.^' It must also aver a demand of payment of the debt and a refusal to pay, and that the lien is prosecuted within one year after the debt be- came due.^ § 455. Idaho. — A person furnishing or advancing neces- saries is given a lien to secure his account, but he must file a notice of such lien and describe generally the crop and land on which he holds such lien.^ § 455a. Kentucky.^ — A landlord shall have a superior lien, against which the tenant shall not be entitled to any exemption, upon the whole crop of the tenant raised upon the leased or rented premises to reimburse him for money or property furnished to the tenant to enable him to raise the crop, or to subsist whilst carrying out his contract of tenancy. But the lien of the landlord shall not continue for more than one hundred and twenty days after the expiration of the term, and, if the property upon which there is a lien be removed openly from the leased premises, and without ■iClark V. Dobbins, 52 Ga. 656. ^Callaway v. Walls, 54 Ga. 167; See also, Garrick v. Jones, 2 Ga. Anderson v. Beard, 54 Ga. 137. App. 382, 58 S. E. 543. 8 Rev. Code 1908, § 5141; Beck- f'Saulsbury v. Eason, 47 Ga. 617. stead v. Griffith, 11 Idaho 738, 83 See Speer v. Hart, 45 Ga. 113. See Pac. 764; Hardwick v. Griffith, 11 also, Dart v. Mayhew, 60 Ga. 104. Idaho 751, 83 Pac. 768. 6Toole V. Jowers, 49 Ga. 299. ^Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 2323. 26 § 456 LIENS. 402 fraudulent intent and not returned, the landlord shall have a superior lien upon the property so removed for fifteen days from the date of its removal, and may enforce his lien against the property wherever found. § 456. Louisiana.^"' — A privilege is given for debts in- curred for necessary supplies furnished to any farm or plan- tation on the product of the crops of the year and the pro- ceeds thereof. This privilege must be confined to the crop cultivated, standing, or being gathered and taken off at the time the supplies were furnished. It can not be extended to the crop subsequently planted, and sold with the planta- tion to a third party. \^ A privilege in favor of one w^ho furnishes supplies to a plantation springs only from the law that confers it. It can not be the subject of contract. An acknowledgment that a creditor has a privilege on a crop can not, therefore, be recognized as conferring a lien on it, unless it be shown that he, not the creditor, has furnished the supplies to make it.^- lOMerrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, art. 3217. See Wolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1339. Wood v. Cal- loway, 21 La. Ann. 471. The con- stitution provides that '"no mort- gage or privilege shall affect third persons, unless recorded in the par- ish where the property to be affect- ed is situated." Consequently a privilege in favor of a merchant for supplies furnished a planter must be recorded in the book of mortgages and prvileges in order to have effect against third per- sons. White v. Bird, 23 La. Ann. 270. The recording of a privilege too late is equivalent to not re- cording it at all, so far as seizing creditors are concerned. Lapene v. Meegel, 26 La. Ann. 80. iiMcCutchon v. Wilkinson. 12 La. Ann. 483; Given v. Alexander, 25 La. Ann. 71. Where one holds a mortgage at the time the mort- gagor purchases supplies to culti- vate a crop and seizes the crop to satisfy the mortgage and sells the same, the purchaser gets title, but he takes it subject to the rights of the furnisher of such supplies. Weill V. Kent, 52 La. Ann. 2139, 28 So. 295. See also Brasfield v. Powell, 117 N. Car. 140, 23 S. E. 106. The privilege extends only to advancements necessary for the operation of the plantation. Henry Lochte V. Lefebvre, 128 La. 108, 54 So. 578. It does not cover a nec- essary portion for seed for planting the next year. Dunlap v. Berthelot, 122 La. 531, 47 So. 882. See also, Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Sulli- van, 117 La. 163, 41 So. 480. i2Payne v. Spiller, 23 La. Ann. 403 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 456a It is also provided^^ that the appointments or salaries for the overseer for the current year are a privilege on the crops of the year and the proceeds thereof; debts due for neces- sary supplies furnished to any farm or plantation, not includ- ing articles furnished and which were sold to laborers; and debts due for money actually advanced and used for the pur- chase of necessary supplies; and the payment of necessary expenses for any farm or plantation, are privileges on the crops of the year and the proceeds thereof. The privileges granted to the overseer, the laborers, the furnishers of supplies, and the party advancing money neces- sary to carry on any farm or plantation, shall be concurrent, and shall not be divested by any prior mortgage, whether conventional, legal, or judicial, or by any seizure and sale of the land while the crop is on it.^^* All the privileges on the growing crop in favor of the class of persons mentioned shall be concurrent, except that in favor of the laborer, which shall be ranked as the first privilege on the crop. § 456a. Minnesota.^^ — There is a lien for a loan or pur- chase of seed grain when the person receiving the same executes a note containing a statement of the amount and kind of seed and the terms of the agreement relative thereto. To preserve the lien, such note or contract must, within thirty days after the execution of the same, be filed with 248; Southern Grocer Co. v. Co. v. McNair & Pearsall, 139 N. Adams, 112 Ga. 60, 36 So. 226. The Car. 326, 51 S. E. 949. A verbal privilege is exhausted when the contract giving a lien on crops is amount of the lien intended is re- binding on the parties, but a writ- ceived. Minge v. Barbre, 51 La. ing is necessary under the statutes Ann. 1285, 26 So. 180. to establish a claim and lien as i3Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, against third persons. Odom v. art. 3217. A lien of one who Clark, 146 N. Car. 544, 60 S. E. 513. has made advances to aid in ^^a Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code raising a crop is assign- 1900, art. 3217 (9). able. Virginia-Carolina Chemical i4Gen. Stats. 1913, §§ 6994-6996. § 456b LIENS. 404 the clerk of the town or municipality in which the land upon which the crop is to be grown, is situated. This lien continues for one year upon the crop growing or grown as against the owner and all creditors and purchasers. The holder of the lien may, after condition broken, take possession of the crop or so much of it as may be necessary for his security. § 456b. Mississippi.^^ — Every lessor of land shall have a lien on the agricultural products of the leased premises, how- ever and by whomsoever produced, to secure the payment of the rent and of money advanced to the tenant, and the fair market value of all advances made by him to his tenant, and the fair market value of all advances made by him to his tenant for supplies for the tenant and others for whom he may contract, and for his business carried on upon the leased premises; and this lien shall be paramount to all other liens, claims, or demands upon such products. And the claim of the lessor for supplies furnished may be enforced in the same manner and under the same circumstances as his claim for rent may be ; and all the provisions of law as to attachment for rent and proceedings under it shall be applicable to a claim for supplies furnished, and such attachment may be levied on any goods and chattels liable for rent, as well as on the agricultural products. A landlord shall have a lien, for one year, for the reason- able value of all live stock, farming tools, implements, and vehicles furnished by him to his tenant, upon the property so furnished, and upon all the agricultural products raised upon the leased premises; and the property so furnished shall be considered as supplies, and the lien therefor may be enforced accordingly. Such lien shall be a superior and first lien, and need not be evidenced by writing, or, if in writing, it need not be recorded. 15 Code 1906, §§ 2832, 2833. 405 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 457 § 457. North Carolina.^^^' — If any person shall make any advance either in money or supplies to any person who is engaged in or about to engage in the cultivation of the soil, the person so making such advance shall be entitled to a lien on the crops which may be made during the year upon the land in the cultivation of which the advances so made have been expended, in preference to all other lines existing or otherwise, except the laborer's or landlord's liens, to the extent of such advances:^" provided an agreement in writ- lORevisal 1905, § 2052. I'i'The advances must be made in money or supplies to a person about to engage in the cultivation of the crops, and after the agree- ment for such advances has been made, or simultaneously with the making and delivery of the agree- ment. The advances must be ex- pended in the cultivation of the crop of that year, and the lien must be on the crop of that year, made by reason of the advances. Clark V. Farrar, 74 N. Car. 686; Reese v. Cole, 93 N. Car. 87. One who makes advances of agricultural supplies to a tenant or cropper does so with notice of the rights of the landlord, and takes the risk of the tenant or cropper abandon- ing or otherwise violating his con- tract. If the cropper abandons his contract, this being special and en- tire, he can not recover of the land- lord for a partial performance, and his interest becomes vested in the landlord, divested of any lien which may have attached to it for ad- vances while the cropper was in possession. Thigpen v. Leigh, 93 N. Car. 47. The lien in aid of ad- vances is in preference to all other liens except that of the landlord for rents. Wooten v. Hill, 98 N. Car. 48, 3 S. E. 846; Branch v. Gal- loway, 105 N. Car. 193, 10 S. E. 911; Spruill v. Arrington, 109 N. Car. 192, 13 S. E. 779. A mortgagee of a cotton crop has no lien for further advances made to enable the mortgagor to secure the crop, which will take precedence of a second mortgage duly recorded. The fact that the advances were essential to the gathering of the crop, which might otherwise have been lost, does not aid the claim. The doctrine contended for is a principle of maritime law, which applies in favor of those who, by personal efforts and at great peril, save vessels and cargoes from loss at sea; but it is not a principle of the common law, nor can it be rec- ognized when in conflict with stat- utory regulations in reference to liens. Weathersbee v. Farrar, 97 N. Car. 106, 1 S. E. 616. Pending a real action, in which defendants were finally adjudged to be the owners of the land in question, the court appointed a receiver of the rents and profits, up to which time plaintiffs were in possession under claim of title. During such posses- sion plaintiffs executed an agricul- tural lien for advances. It was held that the lienees were entitled 457a LIENS. 406 ing shall be entered into before any such advance is made to this effect, in which shall be specified the amount to be advanced, or in v^hich a limit shall be fixed beyond which the advance, if made from time to time during the year, shall not go; which agreement shall be registered, in the office of the register of the county in which the person to whom the advance is made resides, within thirty days after its date.^^ The lien for work on crops or farms or materials shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance which attached upon the property subsequent to the time at which the work was commenced or the materials were furnished.^^ § 457a. North Dakota.-^ — Any person who shall furnish to another seed to be sown or planted on the lands owned to recover for advances made to plaintiffs up to the time the re- ceiver entered, but the advances made after such entry would de- pend upon the circumstances un- der which they were made. An agricultural lien which describes the land on which the crop is to be grown as "a tract of land in Granville County known as the 'C. H. Dement, dec'd,' or any other lands he may cultivate during the year 1888," is sufficient; the words "or any other lands he [the de- fendant] may cultivate," being mere surplussage. Perry v. Bragg, 109 N. Car. 303, 14 S. E. 97. The lien is operative only on the land particularly described. Gwathmey V. Etheridge, 99 N. Car. 571, 6 S. E. 411; Cooper v. Kimball, 123 N. Car. 120, 31 S. E. 346. 18 The lien is valid as between the parties, although not regis- tered within the time limited. Gay V. Nash, 78 N. Car. 100; Reese v. Cole, 93 N. Car. 87. But if the lien is not registered, it is invalid as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Lawrence v. Weeks, 107 N. Car. 119, 12 S. E. 120; Nichols v. Speller, 120 N. Car. 75, 28 S. E. 632. 19A mortgagor in possession can not create such a lien against the mortgagee. Brewer v. Chappell, 101 N. Car. 251, 7 S. E. 670. A lien for advances made to a landlord is subject to a contract previously made by the landlord with a crop- per who is to receive a share of the crops. Rouse v. Wooten, 104 N. Car. 229, 10 S. E. 190; Meekins v. Walker, 119 N. Car. 46, 25 S. E. 706. ' 20Rev. Code 1905, §§ 6271, 6272. In North Dakota one who fur- nished seed has a lien on the crop for all his account, whether all the seed is sown or not. Schlosser v. Moores, 16 N. Dak. 185, 112 N. W. 78. 407 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 458 or contracted to be purchased, used, occupied or rented by him, shall upon filing the statement provided for by statute, have a lien upon all the crop produced from the seed so furnished to secure the payment of the purchase-price thereof. Any person entitled to a lien hereunder shall within thirty days after the seed is furnished file in the office of the register of deeds of the county in v^hich the seed is to be sown or planted a statement in writing, verified by oath, showing the kind and quantity of seed, its value, the name of the person to whom furnished and a description of the land upon which the same is to be or has been planted or sown. Unless the person entitled to the lien shall file such statement within the time aforesaid he shall be deemed to have waived his right thereto. §458. South Carolina.^^ — Any person who shall make ad- vances-^ in provisions, supplies, and other articles for agricul- tural purposes, shall have a lien in preference to all other liens, existing or otherwise, upon such provisions, supplies, and other articles, until the same shall be consumed in the use.-"* 2iCode of Laws 1912, § 4170; soil," and entitled to incumber it Leightsey v. Rentz, 85 S. Car. 401, with liens. But a contract by the 67 S. E. 456; Lockhart v. Smith, 50 owner of land, whereby he gives to S. Car. 112, 27 S. E. 567; Dicks v. another the possession of land for Nimmons, 88 S. Car. 428, 71 S. E. a year for the purpose of planting 47. cotton, and the owner is to receive --A mule can not be considered all of the crop above a certain an "advance" to be expended quantity, is substantially a lease for upon the land. McCullough v. Kib- a year, and gives the lessee such an ler, 5 S. Car. 468; Hankinson v. interest in the crops as enables him Hankinson, 61 S. Car. 193, 39 S. E. to incumber them with liens for ad- 385. See Richey v. Du Pre, 20 S. Car. vances, subject to the landlord's 6; Kennedy v. Reames, 15 S. Car. lien by statute for rent to the ex- 548. A mere employe, who culti- tent of one third of the crop. Wha- vates the crop of another for hire, ley v. Jacobson, 21 S. Car. 51; Ken- either in money or a part of the nedy v. Reames, 15 S. Car. 548. crop, is not, in the sense of the ag- 230n proof of an attempt of the ricultural acts, "a cultivator of the person to whom the advances have § 45^^ LIENS. 408 § 458a. South Dakota.-^ — Any person, co-partnership, as- sociation or corporation who shall furnish to any person wheat, oats, barley, rye, corn, flax or potatoes, to be sown or planted upon any lands owned, used, occupied or rented by such person, shall have a lien only upon the crop pro- duced from the kind of seed furnished by such person upon the lands aforesaid, upon filing the notice hereinafter speci- fied to secure payment for the seed so furnished. Such liens shall have preference in the order of the filing thereof, and shall have priority, over all other liens and incumbrances upon said crops, except threshers' liens, if filed within thirty days after the seed grain is furnished. Any person, co- partnership, association or corporation entitled to a lien un- der this article shall make an account in writing, stating the quantity of seed furnished in bushels, by kind, and the value thereof, the name of the person to whom furnished, and a description of the land upon which the same has been, or is to be planted or sown, and after making oath to the correct- ness of the account shall file the same in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the person to whom such seed is furnished resides, except when such person re- sides in an unorganized county, and in such case, said state- ment shall be filed in the county to which said unorganized county is attached for judicial purposes. been made to dispose of the crop 55 S. Car. 309, 33 S'. E. 357. The or to defeat the lien, a warrant may lien for advancements may be be issued for a seizure and sale of against the crops of a lessee, the crop by the sheriff. Code of Brock v. J. J. Haley & Co., 88 S. Laws 1912, § 4166. An agreement Car. 373, 70 S. E. 1011. for an agricultural lien not signed 24Rev. Code (Civ. Proc.) 1903, by the one who is to make the ad- §§ 731-736; Schouweiler v. Mc- vances, but by the borrower only, Caull, 18 S. Dak. 70, 99 N. W. 95. is void. Sease v. Dobson, 34 S. P'or a sufficient description in a Car. 345, 13 S. E. 530. See also, notice of lien under the South Blair v. Morgan, 59 S. Car. 52, 37 Dakota statute, see First Nat. S. E. 45. An agricultural lien need Bank v. Peavy Elevator Co., 10 S. not be attested. Brown v. Young, Dak. 167, 72 N. W. 402. 409 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 458b § 458b. Tennessee.-^ — Any debt by note, account, or otherwise, contracted for supplies, implements of industry or work stock, furnished by owners of the land to lessees, or by lessees to subtenants, and used in the cultivation of the crop, shall be and constitute a lien upon the crop grow- ing or made during the year upon the premises, in as full and perfect a manner as provided by statute with regard to rents; provided, the said lien is expressly contracted for on the face of the note or writing, between the owner of the land or lessees, or between the lessees and subtenants. The agreement or contract so entered into shall not have priority of the lien of the owner of the land for the rent; but no recovery for the value of the crop can be had as against the purchaser of the crop without notice. The landlord, in additions to liens already given him by law, shall have a further lien on the growing crop, for nec- essary supplies of food and clothing furnished by the land- lord or his agent, to the tenant, for himself or those depend- ent on him, to enable the tenant to make the crop; provided, an account of such necessary supplies is kept as the articles are furnished, and is sworn to before some justice of the peace, before the enforcement of the lien. This lien shall be secondary to that of the landlord for his rent, and may be enforced in the same manner. The affidavits above pro- vided for shall be made, as to the truth and justice of the account, before the magistrate or clerk of the court shall issue the writ of attachment. Landowners and persons controlling land, by lease or otherwise, shall have a lien on the crops raised on such lands by share croppers for supplies, implements, and work stock furnished such croppers, for himself or those dependent on him, to enable the cropper to make a crop. Such furnisher shall have the same rights, and enforce them in the same way and at the same time, as provided for landlords. 25 Ann. Codes 1896, §§ 5304, 5305. § 459 LIENS. 410 § 459. Virginia.-'^ — If any person, other than a landlord, make advances, either in money or supplies, or other thing of value, to any one v^ho is engaged in, or who is about to engage in, the cultivation of the soil, the person so making such advances shall be entitled to a lien on the crops which may be made or seeded during the year upon the lands in or about the cultivation of which the advances so made have been, or were intended to be, expended to the extent of such advances : provided, however, that an agreement in writing, signed by both parties, shall be entered into, or in which shall be specified the amount advanced or in which a limit shall be fixed beyond which any advances made from time to time during the year shall not go; and the said agreement to be delivered to the clerk of the county in which the land lies, and by him docketed in a book to be kept by him for that special purpose; such agreement shall be docketed by said clerk in the same manner that judgments are now required by law to be docketed, and from the time they are so dock- eted shall have the same force and effect as if they were recorded in the deed-book, and for such service said clerk shall receive a fee of twenty-five cents, which lien shall be valid as to purchasers without notice from and creditors of the party or parties obtaining such advance or advances only from the time when the said agreement shall have been delivered to the said clerk to be docketed as hereinbefore provided. Any person about to dispose of the crops, or in any way to defeat the lien, may be restrained by a decree in equity. § 459a. Liens for water furnished for irrigation. — In a number of states liens by statute are given to water com- panies and persons for the agreed or ascertained value of water furnished to land owners or those in possession there- of. These liens are sometimes created against crops grown on the land or the lands themselves, or both. 26Acts 1910, ch. 345, amending Code 1904, § 2494. 411 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 459b § 459b. Colorado.-' — It is provided by statute that any person, company or association furnishing water for any tract of land shall have a first and prior lien on said water right and land upon which the water is used, for all deferred payments for said water right; said lien to be in all respects prior to any and all other liens created or attempted to be created by the owner and possessor of said land; said lien to remain in full force until the last deferred payment for the water right is paid and satisfied according to the terms of the contract under which the water right was acquired; the con- tract for the water right upon which the lien is founded to be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county where the land is situated. Upon default of any payment secured by the lien, the person, persons, company of persons, association or incorpo- rated company owning said lien may foreclose it according to the terms and conditions of the contract granting and selling the water right to the consumer; all sales to be first advertised in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the land is situated, for six consecutive weeks and then to be sold to the highest bidder at the front door of the courthouse, or such place as may be agreed upon in the terms of the contract, and the sheriff of the county is re- quired to give all notices of sale and to sell all property and make and execute a good and sufficient deed to the pur- chaser and at such sale no person, company of persons, asso- ciation or incorporated company owning or holding any lien shall bid in or purchase any land or water right at a less price than the amount due on said deferred payments and the costs incurred in making the sale of said land and water right. The sheriff shall execute a certificate of sale as in case of the sale of other property, subject in all respects to redemption as in case of a sale on exception and if not re- deemed the sheriff shall execute a deed. 27Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 5781. § 459C LIENS. 412 § 459c. Idaho. -^ — Any person, association or corporation contracting to deliver water to any party or parties, the vahie of which shah be fixed by contract or as provided by law is given a first hen upon the land for the irrigation of which said water is furnished and delivered. If the title to said land is in the United States or in the state of Idaho, then the said amount shall be a first lien upon any crop or crops which may be raised upon said tract of land which said lien shall be recorded and collected as provided by law for other liens in Idaho. Any mortgage or other liens upon said tracts of land that may hereafter be given, shall in all cases be subject to the lien for the price of water as herein provided. § 459d. Kansas.-'' — It is provided by statute that any person, association or corporation, which shall under con- tract with the owner of a tract or piece of land, his agent, trustee, or under contract with the husband or wife of such owner, furnish water for irrigating any portion of said tract of land, shall have a lien upon the whole crop grown upon said tract or parcel of land during the year the water is so furnished, for the full amount of the contract price. § 459e. Louisiana.^^ — The statute provided that any per- son, association of persons or corporation who shall furnish water to another for the purpose of aiding or assisting him in the growing or maturing of a crop, shall have a privilege co-equal with the supplies upon said crop to secure the pay- ment of the agreed compensation therefor. § 459f. New Mexico.^^ — The statute authorizes incorpo- rated cities, towns and villages to assess the lots and parcels of ground within their limits to pay the expenses of pro- 2SRev. Code 1908, § 3288. •"'OLa. Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, 29Gen. Stats. 1909, § 4403. p. 1341. 31 Laws 1909, p. 206, § 3. 413* LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 459h curing water to be used in the growing of grass and other products and provides that upon the failure of the owner or agent of any such lot or parcel of land so assessed to pay the sum so assessed against the same a lien will attach to such lot or ground in favor of such city, town or village and shall be enforced against the same to be provided by ordi- nance of such city, town or village. § 459g. Oklahoma.^- — Persons, corporations or associa- tions of persons have the right to make contracts to furnish water and for the sale of permanent water rights to persons who own or have a possessory right to land for the pur- pose of irrigating such land for mining, milling or stock raising and such contracts shall be secured by liens on the land or otherwise. The statute provides what shall be the obligations of the contracting parties in cases of shortage of water and the relative rights of all land owners within the territory where such water is held for irrigating pur- poses and provides that such contracts may be recorded and that water rights secured shall be considered as easements and shall run with the land and that the mere conveyance of the land shall also convey such rights. § 459h. Oregon.^^ — Any person, firm or corporation who shall supply water to any person for irrigation of crops shall have a lien upon all crops raised by the use of such water for the reasonable value of the water supplied, which lien shall be a continuing one and shall bind said crops after, as well as before the same have been gathered and without record shall be preferred to all other liens or incumbrances upon said crop whatever. Such liens may be enforced by a suit in equity, and upon 32Comp. Laws 1909, § 3917. Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. Code 33Gen. Laws 1913, p. 139, § 6544; 1902, § 5012. § 459i LIENS. '414 judgment or decree of foreclosure the court or judge shall allow as a part of the cost a reasonable sum as attorney's fees. § 459i. South Dakota.^^ — The statute authorizes town- ships to construct wells and make contracts for furnishing water to land owners and gives the township a lien upon said lands mentioned in such water contracts from the time the contract is filed with the register of deeds and the township may foreclose its said lien by advertising as now or as may hereafter be provided by law for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages. § 459j. Texas.^^ — Every person, corporation or associa- tion of persons which has constructed or may hereafter con- struct any ditch, canal, dam, lake or reservoir for the pur- pose of irrigation and who shall lease or rent water from said ditch, canal, dam, lake or reservoir to any person or as- sociation of persons or corporation owning any lands sub- ject to irrigation from any such ditch, canal, dam, lake or reservoir, such person, corporation or association of persons owning such ditch, canal, dam, lake or reservoir shall have a preference lien, superior to every other lien, upon the crop or crops raised upon the land thus irrigated under such lease or contract. § 459k. Washington.^^ — Any person, company or asso- ciation of persons or incorporated company furnishing water for any tract of land shall have a prior lien on said water right and land upon which said water is used for all de- ferred payments for said water right and for any mainte- nance fee due; said lien to be in all respects prior to any other lien or liens created by the owner or possessor of 34Rev. Code 1903, p. 489, § 2700. scRemington & Ballenger's Ann. 35Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, art. 5009. Codes & Stats. 1910, § 6721. 415 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 460 said land; said lien to remain in full force and effect until the last deferred payment for the water right is fully paid and satisfied according to the terms of the contract under which said water right was acquired and until all delinquent maintenance fees are fully paid. § 460. Effect of a delivery of goods. — On general prin- ciples a delivery of goods by the owner to a third person, with the intention of passing a special property to a factor as security for advances, should be sufficient to confer a lien from the time of such delivery, though the factor might not obtain the actual possession of the goods till long after- ward.^^ The delivery of possession to an agent or servant of the factor is a delivery to the factor himself, and his lien attaches from the time of such delivery. ^^ It is immaterial whether the depositary be a common carrier, a shipmaster, or warehouseman, or any other bailee, provided only such bailee receives the goods on account of the factor who is to have a special property in them. It is material, however, whether the bailee's receipt of the goods for the factor be evidenced by some document, for the document is evidence of a change of property. In this respect a bill of lading or shipping receipt issued by a carrier is important; for in the absence of this or other sufficient evidence of an intention on the part of the consignor to vest the specific property in the consignee, the consignor may change the destination of the goods at any time before they come into the actual possession of the consignee. ^^ 37Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. (U. v. Davidson, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 392; S.) 384, 12 L. ed. 1123; Grove v. Ganseford v. Dutillet, 13 Mart. Brien, 8 How. (U. S.) 429, 12 L. (La.) 284; Sumner v. Hamlet, 12 ed. 1142; Nesmith v. Dyeing Co., Pick. (Mass.) 76; Nesmith v. Dye- 1 Curt. (U. S.) 130, Fed. Cas. No. ing Co., 1 Curtis (U. S.) 130, Fed. 10124. Cas. No. 10124. 38McCombie v. Davis, 7 East 5, soMitchel v. Ede, 11 Ad. & El. per Lord Ellenborough; Clemson 888; Lewis v. Galena & C. U. R. § 461 LIENS. 416 But unless the consignment be made in pursuance of an express agreement, or one implied from the dealings be- tween the parties, no lien attaches until the factor has ac- cepted it upon the terms of the letter of consignment.'*^ § 461. Delivery to common carrier. — The delivery of goods to a common carier consigned to a factor under a contract made before that time, is such a delivery to the factor as will cause his lien to attach for advances made.*^ Thus, if a planter deliver cotton to a carrier for a consignee in pursuance of an agreement that he should have the sell- ing of the crop, and should reimburse himself from the pro- ceeds of the sales for advances made by him to the planter to enable him to make the crop, such delivery is a delivery to the factor, whose lien immediately attaches to the cotton. It is essential to the acquisition of a lien by a factor that he should have and retain possession of the property upon which he claims a lien. "A man can not have a lien on goods unless he have in some sort the possession of the goods. ""*- But the possession may be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the goods should be so appropriated to the factor that they are essentially under his control."*^ § 462. No lien while consignor controls goods. — But a factor's lien can not attach while the goods remain under Co., 40 111. 281; Strahorn v. Union Hardeman v. De Baughn, 49 Ga. Stock Yards & Transit Co., 43 111. 596. 424, 92 Am. Dec. 142. 42Hutton v. Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14, ^owinter v. Coit, 7 N. Y. 288, 57 per Gibbs, C. J. See also Hallett Am. Dec. 522. v. Bousfield, 18 Ves. 187; Garrison 4iNesmith v. Dyeing Co., 1 Cur- v. Vermont Mills, 152 N. Car. 643, tis (U. S.) 130, Fed. Cas. No. 68 S. E. 142. 10124; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 43Nesmith v. Dyeing Co., 1 Cur- Wend. (N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. Dec. tis (U. S.) 130, Fed. Cas. No. 10124; 607; Grosvenor v. Phillips, 2 Hill Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 152 N. (N. Y.) 147; Elliott v. Cox, 48 Ga. Car. 643, 68 S. E. 142; James Free- 39; Wade v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 450; man Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S. Car. 558, 70 S. E. 802. 417 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 463 the consignor's control. A delivery of goods to a carrier is undoubtedly a delivery to the factor to whom they are consigned, if the delivery is made with the intention of pass- ing a special property in the goods, and the consignor wholly parts with control of the goods. But the rule is otherwise wdien goods are sent by a consignor on his own account without any previous arrangement, and they remain while in transit under the consignor's control. Thus, a manufac- turer put goods into the hands of a carrier at Providence, to be carried to Boston and left at a tavern where the car- rier's wagon usually stopped. The manufacturer then went to Boston and presented an invoice of the goods to his factor, stating that they were on the way, and obtained an advance on them. While the goods were on their way they were attached at the suit of a creditor of the manufacturer. It was held that the factor had no lien.^'^ Chief Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion, said: "Authorities were cited by the defendants to show, that when goods are consigned, a de- livery to a common carrier, is in law a delivery to the con- signee. This is no doubt so, where the goods are sent in pursuance of a previous order by the consignee. But in this case, so far from a previous order from the consignees, they w^ere sent by the consignors for their own account, subject to their own order, and there would be no change of legal possession, till some further act done or destination given to the goods by them, and before any such act done, the goods were attached. The new advance created no such lien, because no actual or constructive possession was ob- tained before the attachment." § 463. Delivery of bill of lading essential. — A delivery of the bill of lading, or some authorized appropriation of 'i^Baker v. Fuller, 21 Pick. before a factor can have a lien for (Mass.) 318. See Farnum v. Bou- his advances. Ommen v. Talcott, telle, 13 Met. (Mass.) 159, per 188 Fed. 401, 112 C. C. A. 239, re- Shaw, C. J. A delivery is essential versing 175 Fed. 261. 27 § 463 LIENS. 418 the goods, is essential. While a delivery of a bill of lading amounts to a transfer of the property, the making of a bill of lading in the name of an agent, by direction of the prin- cipal, does not affect a transfer to such agent without de- livery to him. A firm of merchants in Philadelphia, being indebted to their agent in Boston, without previous arrange- ment delivered on board a ship bound for Boston certain flour, taking bills of lading in three parts, by wdiich the ship- owner agreed to deliver the flour to the agent. The ship- owner retained one of the bills of lading, and the merchants retained the others. The latter, finding themselves in a failing condition, and not having paid for the flour, delivered the bills of lading to their vendor, and returned to him the bill of the flour. The ship-owner refused to deliver posses- sion to the vendor, who obtained possession by replevin. The ship-owner delivered his part of the bill of lading to the agent in Boston. It was held that the latter obtained no title to flour. There was no authorized delivery of a bill of lading to the consignee, and there was no possession or right of possession conferred upon him. The consignors, not having delivered the bills of lading, could countermand the shipment. ^^ A factor acc|uires no lien until the property comes into his actual or constructive possession. A merchant who has made advances on goods which he experts to buy acquires no right thereto, before delivery to him, as against a mort- gagee of the owner; though the goods are all the time in possession of a third party. ■*'^' Until actual delivery or con- signment of the goods the lien is only an incipient one; and if the debtor dies before such delivery or consignment the incipient lien can' not prevail against the right of the other creditors to have all the debtor's property, including the promised consignment, divided equally among all the cred- 45Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. 4GFrost v. Deutsch (Tex.), 13 S. 283, Fed. Cas. No. 17122. W. 981. 419 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 465 itors interested, although the debtor's administrator, after his intestate's death, dehvered the goods according to the original agreement.'*''' § 464. No lien for advancements except when goods are delivered. — Of course, if a factor makes advances upon a mere executory agreement of his principal to make a con- signment, he acquires no lien until there is some sort of a delivery to him, either actual or constructive. A factor's lien at common law is a right to retain a thing of which the factor has the actual or constructive possession. It can not apply to property which the owner has merely agreed to send to his factor to secure and reimburse him for advances made upon it.^^ In equity, perhaps, a specific performance of the contract might be enforced, in case this should be indis- pensable to justice. ^^ But at law the factor would have only a right of action for the non-performance of the agreement. § 465. Advances made on faith of bill of lading. — If the consignee has made advances upon the faith of a bill of lading, or shipping-receipt, a delivery to the carrier is a sufficient delivery to the consignee to enable him to main- tain a lien upon the goods for his advances. A factor can claim a lien on goods in his possession either actual or con- structive.^*^ A bill of lading is now regarded as a document of title, 4T Cook's Admr. v. Brannin, 87 49 Sullivan v. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch. 59. Ky. 101, 9 Ky. L. 955, 7 S. W. 877; ^ODavis v. Bradley, 28 Vt. 118, Brooks V. Staton's Admr., 79 Ky. 65 Am. Dec. 226; Dows v. Greene, 174; Hoffman v. Brungs, 83 Ky. 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 72, afifd. 24 N. Y. 400; Ermeling v. Gibson Canning 638; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. Co., 105 111. App. 196. (N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. Dec. 607; Gros- 48Kinloch v. Craig, 3 T. R. 783; venor v. Phillips, 2 Hill (N. Y.) Bruce v. Wait, 3 M. & W. 15; Kin- 147; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio 88. loch V. Craig, 3 T. R. 119; Farnum See Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197; V. Boutelle, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 159; Valle v. Cerre's Admr., 36 Mo. 575, Elwell V. Coon (N. J. Eq.), 46 Atl. 88 Am. Dec. 161; Hollins v. Hub- 580. bard, 165 N. Y. 534, 59 N. E. 317. § 465 LIENS. 420 conferring the right of possession and constructively pos- session itself. Therefore a factor, upon receiving a bill of lading, has the right to take possession of the goods, and his lien attaches immediately. ""^ The transaction is no longer an intended consignment, but it has become an actual con- signment by the transmission and delivery of the bill of lading. ^'- But a consignment under a bill of lading is not essential to the vesting of a lien in the factor. That document may itself confer a title: it certainly manifests the intent of the consignor to have the carrier hold the property and deliver it to the factor; but this intent may be manifested in other ways. Any other competent evidence of such intent is ad- missible, and may be equally conclusive.''^ Yet it has been held in some cases that a delivery to a siHaille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & Pul. 564. See, also, Bryans v. Nix, 4 M. & W. 775, 791; Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; Patten v. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350; Meyerstein v. Bar- ber, L. R. 2 C. P. 83; Schmertz V. Dwyer, 53 Pa. St. 335; Holmes V. Bank, 87 Pa. St. 525; Holmes v. Bailey, 92 Pa. St. 57. Thus, merchants in Cuba contracted, through their factors in New York, to deliver to merchants in New York a certain quantity of sugar. There was an arrangement of long standing, by which the factors made advances to the Cuban merchants on an agreement by the latter to consign to them on which they were to have a lien for their advances, and, when the sugar was sold, credit the con- signors with the proceeds. Deliv- eries were made through the fac- tors on the contract with the New York merchants, when a dispute arose as to the quantity necessary to complete the contracts. The Cuban merchants shipped seventy tons of sugar to their factors, with bill of lading to the latter's order, and instructed them not to deliver to the New York merchants, un- less they accept a draft for the balance due on the former deliv- eries, together with the price of the seventy tons then shipped. The New York merchants refused to accept, and seized the sugar and the balance in their own hands by writ of foreign attachment. It was held that the factors were entitled to a lien on the balance, and on the seventy tons for the advances made to the consignors. Harrison v. Mora, 150 Pa. St. 481, 24 Atl. 705. 52Desha v. Pope, 6 Ala. 690, 41 Am. Dec. 76. 53 Nesmith v. Dyeing Co., 1 Cur- tis (U. S.) 130, Fed. Cas. No. 10124, per Curtis, J.; Bryans v. Nix, 4 M. & W. 775, per Parke, B. 421 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. 466 carrier is not sufficient to give a lien to a consignee who has made advances under an agreement that he should re- ceive and sell the goods, and apply the proceeds towards the advances made, in preference to a creditor who has levied an attachment upon the goods before the shipping- receipts have been forwarded to the consignee, provided no bill of lading or shipping-receipt has been delivered to the consignee. ^^ Some authorities even go to the extent of holding that the factor must have actual possession before he can have a lien. Although the factor has a bill of lading of a consign- ment to him, and has made advances upon it and paid the freight, he has no lien without possession of the goods. The lien does not attach to goods in transit to the factor, or to goods of which the factor has only the right of posses- sion.^^ § 466. Lien lost by losing possession. — The lien of a factor is lost by parting with the possession of the goods on which the lien is claimed, so that neither the goods nor their pro- ceeds are within his control.'"'*' If he reships them to his principal, he can not afterwards stop them in transitu.^" If ^^Elliot V. Bradley, 23 Vt. 217; Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290; Desha V. Pope, 6 Ala. 690, 41 Am. Dec. 76; Hodges v. Kimball, 49 Iowa 577, 31 Am. Rep. 158. See Davis V. Bradley, 28 Vt. 118, in connec- tion with Elliott V. Bradley, 23 Vt. 217. 55 Oliver V. Moore, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 482; Woodruff v. Nash- ville &c. R. Co., 2 Head (Tenn.) 87. 5*5Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Ambler, 252; Godin v. London Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 489; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21, per Buller, J.; Sharp v. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 557; Bligh v. Davies, 28 Beav. 211; Matthews v. Menedger, 2 McLean (U. S.) 145, Fed. Cas. No. 9289; Rowland v. Dolby, 100 Md. 272, 59 Atl. 666; Ermeling v. Gibson Can- ning Co., 105 111. App. 196; Garri- son v. Vermont Mills, 152 N. Car. 643, 68 S. E. 142, 69 S. E. 743; Rosenbaum v. Hayes, 8 N. Dak. 461, 19 N. W. 987; Warren v. First Nat. Bank, 149 111. 9, 50 111. App. 193, 38 N. E. 122, 25 L. R. A. 746; Fallen v. Bogy, 78 Mo. App. 88. •j"Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4; Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Ambler 252, § 467 LIENS. 422 in any way he allows his principal to have control of the goods, he waives his lien. But if he sells the goods to a third person, who is accountable to him for the price, his lien upon the goods is transferred to a lien on the price. ^* "Where a factor is in advance for goods by actual payment, or where he sells under a del credere commission, whereby he becomes responsible for the price, there is as little doubt that he has a lien on the price, though he has parted with the possession of the goods. If he acts under a del credere commission, he is to be considered, as between himself and the vendee, as the sole owner of the goods. There is no doubt of the authority of a factor to sell upon credit, though not particularly authorized by the terms of his commission so to do; but if he so sell without a del credere commission, it is well established that he does not become a surety: the debt is due to the owner of the goods only."^^ § 467. Possession necessary to lien. — A broker who has not had possession of the merchandise sold by him can not maintain a lien against the proceeds of the sales, if these come into his hands after the principal has assigned such proceeds with notice to the broker of the assignment. An iron-master employed brokers to sell iron and collect the proceeds for a stipulated commission. A large contract of a sale was made and several shipments made under it, the brokers making the collections. Upon a further shipment the iron-master assigned the bill for it with notice to the brokers, who collected the amount of the bill and claimed the right to deduct this from their commissions for the en- tire contract, both for the iron delivered and that which had not been delivered. It was held that they had no lien.®*^ i^sHoughton V. Matthews, 3 Bos. ^^'Houghton v. Matthews, 3 Bos. & Pul. 485; Commercial Nat. Bank & Pul. 485, per Chambre, J. V. Heilbronner, 108 N. Y. 439, 15 eoshoener v. Cabeen. 15 Phila. N. E. 701, reversing, 20 J. & S. (Pa.) 65. (N. Y.) 388. 423 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 469 The court said: "They were simply brokers for the sale of the iron, and agents for the collection of the proceeds of the sale. They were not factors or commission merchants to whom the iron was consigned for sale. They had no possession of it, or right of possession of it, and therefore had no lien on it or its proceeds for their commissions. Their claim was a mere personal claim for the services ren- dered and to be rendered, by them as brokers and agents for collection. They therefore could not retain this money as against the assignee, whose claim it had become before the money came into their hands." § 468. Loss of temporary possession no waiver. — The agent, however, may allow his principal to have temporary possession of the goods under an agreement reserving the right of lien, and still retain his lien. The possession of the principal is in such case regarded as the possession of the agent. ®^ Possession obtained by the principal by means of fraud or misrepresentation,^- or by compulsion, does not destroy the factor's lien.^^ If a factor at the request of his principal reships goods upon which he has made advances to the place from which they were consigned, he has the right to retain them in the hands of his agent at that place, until his advances are paid; and the principal can not obtain the possession of them until he has paid or tendered the amount of such advances. ^^ § 469. Revival of the lien. — An insurance broker who has a lien, whether special or general, upon policies taken out for his principal, waives it by delivering them to his ci Reeves v. Capper, 6 Scott 877. 63 Ex parte Goode, 2 Deac. C2 Wallace v. Woodgate, 1 Car. & Bkrptcy. R. 389. P. 575. 64Griefif v. Cowgill, 2 Dis. (Ohio) 58, 13 Ohio Dec. 37. § 470 LIENS. 424 principal or his agent. ''•"' But if the poHcies are returned to the broker after a loss has occurred, to enable him to collect the insurance, his lien will revive. Such revival is not in strictness a revival of a pre-existing lien; but when the poli- cies come back into the l^roker's possession a lien attaches, as it would upon new policies coming into his hands. But his lien for a general balance will not attach again if, at the time the policies come ag'ain into his hands, circumstances have occurred which would prevent the attaching of a gen- eral lien if they then for the first time came into his hands. If, for instance, the policies are not, at the time of their return to the broker, the property of the principal for whom the broker took them out, he can have no lien upon them.^^ § 470. Disclosure of his principal does not defeat the factor's lien. — A factor having a lien on goods does not pre- clude himself from insisting on his lien, by holding out his principal as the owner of the goods. *^^ Upon a sale by a factor to a purchaser to whom the prin- cipal is disclosed, the purchaser can not offset a debt due to him from the principal so as to defeat the factor's lien.*^^ If a purchaser from a factor, having knowledge of the factor's lien, pays over the purchase-money to the principal, he renders himself liable to the factor for the amount of his lien.*^^ It is said that in order to charge the purchaser, the factor should, in addition to giving notice of his lien, offer to indemnify him from the consequences of an adverse suit by the principal, ''^' but this is regarded by Judge Story as a questionable point. "^ OJLevy V. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 149 Sharp V. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 557; Cranston v. Philadelphia Ins Co., 5 Binn. (Pa.) 438. 66Levy V. Barnard, 8 Taunt. 149 Sharp V. Whipple, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 557; Spring v. South Carolina Ins Co., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 268, 5 L •j'Seymour v. Hoadley, 9 Conn. 418. '>*Alkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. Cas. 493. ^i^Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 251. "OLord Mansfield in Drinkwater V. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 251. ed. 614. "1 Story, Agency, § 409. 425 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 472 § 470a. Factor waives his lien by failing to follow princi- pal's instructions. — A factor waives his lien by disobeying his principal's instructions to sell the merchandise he has bought for his principal; and if his principal has deposited money with him as margins, the principal may recover the money under the common courts in an action of assumpsit.'^- § 471. Lien ends with payment of the debt. — The lien ceases to exist upon the payment of the debt due him from his principal.'''^ But a factor does not lose his lien by draw- ing a draft on his principal for the amount of his advances and charges, especially if the draft has not been paid, and the principal has become insolvent before the draft has be- come due."^ § 472. Enforcement of factor's lien. — As regards the en- forcement of his lien, a factor has an advantage over other persons having liens at common law or by custom ; for he is intrusted with the goods for the purpose of selling them, and ordinarily it is his right to sell them and apply the pro- ceeds to the payments of his principal's indebtedness to him. He has a lien, therefore, not only upon the goods while he holds them, but when he has sold them his lien attaches to the proceeds. '^^ Moreover, by virtue of the Factors' Acts and recent stat- '-•Jones V. Marks, 40 111. 313; '^De Wolf v. Howland, 2 Paine Larminie v. Carley, 114 111. 196, C. C. (U. S.) 356, Fed. Cas. No. 29 N. E. 382. 3852. 'SWoodrufif V. N. & C. R. Co., '^^Hudson v. Granger, 5 B. & Aid. 2 Head (Tenn.) 87; Ship Packet, 27, per Bayley, J.; Jones on 3 Mason (U. S.) 334, Fed. Cas. Pledges, §§ 333-353. But a factor No. 10655. Where the owner of for the purpose of sale having a goods, before suing to recover factor's lien is not authorized to them from the factors, tenders the pledge the goods for his own debt amount due the factors for ad- or for advances. Castikyan v. vances and expenses, he is entitled Sloan, 33 App. D. C. 420. to recover. Miller v. Price, 4 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 983, 39 Pac. 781. § 473 LIENS. 426 utes giving bills of lading a negotiable character, a factor may take advantage of his lien by pledging the goods re- ceived for sale, for these statutes enable third persons to deal with a factor for sale as though he w^ere the absolute owner of the goods. § 473. Factor employed to purchase goods. — The case of a factor employed to purchase goods is different from that of one employed to sell them; for while the latter has by the very nature of his employment the implied consent of his principal to sell the property and satisfy his lien from the proceeds, the former has no such implied consent; and therefore, while the factor for purchase has a lien on the goods purchased for advances made on the purchase, the additional right of selling the goods in order to reimburse himself for his advances is not conferred upon him.'^*' Moreover, a factor for purchase has no advantages under the Factors' Acts."*" § 474. Factor's special property in goods. — A factor has a special property in the goods intrusted to him for sale. He has the right to manage the property and to sell it at his discretion, unless expressly restricted by instructions from his principal. He is not, however, the owner of the goods, and unless he sells them in the usual course of his business, or forecloses his lien as authorized b}- statute in some states, he has no right except to detain the goods until his demands against his principal are satisfied. He has no general property in the goods. "No doubt a factor who has made advances upon goods consigned to him, may be re- garded, in a limited sense, and to the extent of his advances, as an owner. Yet, in reality, he has but a lien, with a right of possession of the goods for its security. He may protect that possession by suit against a trespasser upon it, and he "•'Lienard v. Dresslar, 3 Fost. "~ Jones on Pledges, §§ 344, 345. & Fin. 212. 427 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 475 may sell the property to reimburse advances, remaining, however, accountable to his consignor for any surplus. But after all he is not the real owner. He is only an agent of the owner for certain purposes. The owner may, at any time before his factor has sold the goods, reclaim the pos- session upon paying the advances made with interest and expenses. He has not lost his ownership by committing the custody of the goods to a factor and by receiving advances upon them. He is still entitled to the proceeds of any sale which may be made, even by his agent, the factor, subject only to a charge of the advances and expenses. A factor, therefore, notwithstanding he may have made advances upon the property consigned to him, has but a limited right. That right is sometimes called a special property, but it is never regarded as a general ownership. At most it is no more than ownership of a lien or charge upon the property.""^ § 475. Factor's right to sell goods. — A factor who has made advances, or incurred liabilities, on a consignment, has a right to sell so much of the consignment as may be necessary to reimburse such advances, unless there is some agreement between him and the consignor which varies the right. '^^ "Thus, for example, if, contemporaneous with the consignment and advances or liabilities, there are orders given by the consignor, which are assented to by the factor, "sUnited States v. Villalonga, 23 '9 Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. (U. Wall. (U. S.) 35, 23 L. ed. 64, 10 S.) 479, 10 L. ed. 550; Brander v. Ct. CI. 22, per Strong, J. The fac- Phillips, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 121, 10 L. tor's possession where he has made ed. 909; Beadles v. Hartmus, 7 advances of the goods in his pos- Baxt. (Tenn.) 476; Mooney v. Mus- session and not that of the owner. ser, 45 Ind. 115; Walker Co. v. Du- Couturie v. Roensch, (Tex.) 134 buque Fruit Co., 113 Iowa 428, S. W. 413. He can only satisfy 85 N. W. 614, 53 L. R. A. 775. his lien, where he has one, by Also Willingham v. Rushing, 105 some proceeding provided by law Ga. 12, 31 S. E. 130, holding that for its foreclosure. People's Bank the right is not terminated by the V. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 179, 73 Pac. death of the principal. 949. § 47^ LIENS. 428 that the goods shall not be sold until a fixed time, in such a case, the consignment is presumed to be received by the factor subject to such orders; and he is not at liberty to sell the goods to reimburse his advances or liabilities, until after that time has elapsed. The same rule will apply to orders not to sell below a fixed price ; unless, mdeed, the consignor shall, after due notice and request, refuse to pro- vide any other means to reimburse the factors. And in no case will the factor be at liberty to sell the consignment, contrary to the orders of the consignor, although he has made advances, or incurred liabilities thereon, if the con- signor stands ready, and offers to reimburse and discharge such advances and liabilities. On the other hand, wdiere the consignment is made generally, without any specific orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor makes ad- vances or incurs liabilities on the footing of such consign- ment, there the legal presumption is, that the factor is in- tended to be clothed with the ordinary rights of factors, to sell, in the exercise of a sound discretion, at such time and in such mode as the usage of trade and his general duty re- quire ; and to reimburse himself for his advances and liabili- ties out of the proceeds of the sale; and the consignor has no right, by any subsequent orders given after advances have been made or liabilities incurred by the factor, to suspend or control this right of sale, except so far as respects the surplus of the consignment not necessary for the reimbursement of such advances or liabilities. Of course, this right of the factor to sell to reimburse himself for his advances and lia- bilities, applies with stronger force to cases where the con- signor is insolvent, and where, therefore, the consignment constitutes the only fund for indemnity. "^'^ § 476. Factor may sell at a fair price. — A factor may sell the goods at a fair market price and reimburse himself for so Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 479, 10 L. ed. 550, per Story, J. 429 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. 476 advances, after a reasonable notice to his principal, although the latter has limited him to a higher price, or given express instructions not to sell.*^^ The English rule is otherwise; the factor there having no right to sell against his principal's consent in order to satisfy his advances, after giving notice of his intention to do so.^^ J^iBrandei- v. Phillips, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 121, 10 L. ed. 909; Landis V. Gooch, 1 Disn. (Ohio) 176, 12 Ohio Dec. 559; Watson v. Beatty, 10 Sad. (Pa.) 108, 22 Wkly. Notes Cas. 169, 13 Atl. 521; Hallowell v. Fawcett, 30 Iowa 491; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 40, per Wilde, J. "But after such a reasonable time had elapsed, knd a demand had been made upon the plaintifif to repay the money advanced, and he had refused so to do, he had no further power, by any principle of law or justice, to control the defendant's right of sale to his prejudice. Such a power would be inconsistent with the understanding of the parties as it must be presumed to have been when the advances were made; and it would enable the principal to impair the defendants' security at his own will and pleasure for an unlimited time, if he were disposed so to do. To sanction such a right would operate injuriously on the interests of consignees, and would check the continuance of those large advances, by the aid of which a flourishing trade has been carried on, for years past, to the great profit of the mercantile community. Although such advances may some- times lead to over-trading, and may induce individuals to venture upon rash speculations, yet it can- not be doubted, that on the whole they have contributed to the in- crease of the wealth and prosper- ity of the country. The principle, therefore, involved in this case is of great importance, and has been considered by the court with great care." S-Smart v. Sanders, 5 C. B. 895. Chief Justice Wilde, delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The substantial question in this case is, whether a factor who has made advances on account of his princi- pal, has a right to sell the goods in his hands, contrary to the orders of his principal, on the principal's making default in repajang those advances. It is now settled law, that a factor has a lien for his ad- vances. But the defendant claims more than a lien; he claims a right, if the principal, when called on to repay the advances, makes a default in doing so, to sell the goods at such prices and times, as, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he thinks best for his principal. Xo case in an English court can be produced in support of this doc- trine; yet it is a right which one would expect to find enforced every day, if it existed. The silence of our law books is a strong argu- ment against the existence of such a right. * * * But, it is said, a factor for sale has an authority as such (in the absence of all special orders) to sell; and, when he after- § 477 LIENS. 430 Where a consignor, after advances have been made by his factor, instructs him not to sell for less than a certain price, and the factor replies that it is doubtful whether the goods could be sold at the price fixed, and that he would await further instructions, and that he would return the goods and remit on account if desired, and after the lapse of a reason- able time without receiving any response from the consignor, it was held that the factor might sell the goods for the best price he could get in the market.^'' § 477. Rule in certain states. — In two or three states the right of the factor to reimburse himself by sales is declared by statute. Thus, in California, ^^ a factor has a general lien, dependent on possession, for all that is due to him as such, upon all articles of commercial value that are intrusted to him by the same principal. A factor must obey the in- structions of his principal to the same extent as any other employe, notwithstanding any advances he may have made to his principal upon the property consigned to him, except that, if the principal forbids him to sell at the market price, he may nevertheless sell for his reimbursement, after giving to his principal reasonable notice of his intention to do so, wards comes under advances, he thereby acquires an interest; and, having thus an authority and an interest, the authority becomes thereby irrevocable. The doctrine here implipd, that, whenever there is in the same person an authority and an interest, the authority is irrevocable, is not to be admitted without qualification. In the case of Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W. 670, goods had been consigned to a factor for sale, with a limit as to price. The factor had a lien on the goods for advances; and the principal, in consideration of those advances agreed with the factor that he should sell the goods at the best market prices, and realize thereon against his advances: the court held that this authority was revocable, on the ground that there was no consideration for the agree- ment. Now, in that case, there was an authority given, and one which the principal was fully at liberty to give; the party to whom it was given had an interest in it, yet the authority was held to be revocable." ^3Mooney v. Musser, 45 Ind. 115. 84 Civ. Code 1906, §§ 2027, 3053; North Dakota Rev. Code 1905, §§ 5583, 6287; South Dakota Code (Civ.) 1903. §§ 1488, 2154. 431 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 478 and of the time and place of sale, and proceeding in all respects as a pledgee. In Georgia, ^^ a factor's lien extends to all balances on gen- eral account, and attaches to the proceeds of the sale of goods consigned, as well as to the goods themselves. Pe- culiar confidence being reposed in the factor, he may, in the absence of instructions, exercise his discretion according to the general usages of the trade. In return, greater and more skilful diligence is required of him. and the most active good faith. § 478. Factor's lien attaches to proceeds of sale. — The factor's lien attaches to the proceeds of all sales made by him, whether these be in money or securities, so long as he retains them in his possession. The factor sells the goods, and thereby parts with the lien on the goods ; but at the same moment he takes the proceeds, whether the money or security, which he may take in his own name, and thus, as between him and his principal, the lien is imme- diately transferred to the proceeds. ^"^ But the fact that the factor has a lien on the proceeds of a sale of goods on which he had a lien does not authorize him to sell them or pledge them in payment or for the security of his own debt, or in an unusual and irregular manner f^ unless the principal's indebtedness to him equals or exceeds the value of the goods, so that the factor is substantially the owner. ^^ But while a factor or commission merchant has no authority to pledge the goods consigned to him, if he has advanced money upon the goods, he thereby acquires a lien upon and special property in them to the amount of such advances, and he may pledge such special interest in S5Code 1911, § 3502. s^Benny v. Rhodes, 18 Mo. 147, 86 Brander v. Phillips, 16 Pet. (U. 59 Am. Dec. 293; Buckley v. Pack- S.) 121, 10 L. ed. 909; Commercial ard, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 421; Graham Nat. Bank v. Heilbronner, 108 N. v. Dyster. 6 Maule & S. 1. Y. 439, 15 N. E. 701. ssEaton v. Bell, 5 B. & Aid. 34. § 479 LIENS. 432 them for his own use.^^ He has no authority to dispose of the goods consigned to him out of the ordinary course of business, nor can he dispose of them in violation of the order of his principal, even to repay advances, at least until he has called upon his principal for reimbursement. He can not sell a debt existing in open account and not yet due, arising from a sale of the goods, so as to transfer a good title to the claim, when the principal is not in default and has not been called upon to repay the advances. °^ § 479. Factor's right to retain proceeds of sale.— A fac- tor who sells his principal's property, on which he has a lien for his services and advances, may retain the amount of his lien out of the proceeds, whether the sale was author- ized or not. Thus, if the factor sell the goods after the death of his principal, without waiting for the appointment and consent of an administrator, in an action against him for the value of the goods, the measure of damages is the value of the property, less the amount of his lien ; and if no question is made in regard to the price obtained, the damages would be such price less the amount of his lien.'^^ Though the sale be a conversion, he may insist upon his lien in defence to an action for the conversion. § 480. Bill of sale from principal to agent. — An agent un- der a del credere commission has a lien for his advances and commissions, and a bill of sale to him by his principal of the goods in his possession is in effect a foreclosure of his lien upon them. Even if his principal be insolvent at the time, the bill of sale, though perhaps technically illegal, will be sustained as a foreclosure of the lien. In such a case, when the agent has used large acceptances of his principal S9Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Pope, 701; Hilton v. Vanderbilt, 82 N. Y. 19 Ore. 35, 26 Pac. 622. 591; Mart^eld v. Goodhue, 3 N. Y. 90Conimercial Nat. Bank v. Heil- 62. bronner, 108 N. Y. 439, 15 N. E. 'JiShaw v. Ferguson, 78 Ind. 547. 433 LIENS OF FACTORS, BROKERS, CONSIGNEES, ETC. § 482 for his own benejfit, he is not obliged, for the benefit of cred- itors of his principal, to set off these against his principal's indebtedness to him, and release the security of his lien to that extent. It was not unlawful for him to retain, with his principal's consent, his lien for the entire indebtedness. '^- § 481. Factor may sue for the debt nothwithstanding he has lien. — A factor may maintain an action for the debt, al- though he has a lien on the goods in his possession for the debt; and in an action by trustee process, or process of gar- nishment, by a third person against the factor, the principal may be charged as trustee or garnishee, and judgment en- tered against the principal. ^^ § 482. Carrier may enforce consignee's lien. — A carrier who has been compelled to pay the consignee's lien may him- self enforce it. Thus, when a consignee has a lien for ad- vances upon goods on board ship, which are taken from the ship by an attaching officer on a writ against the consignor, without tendering to the carrier or the consignee the amount of the consignee's lien, the carrier, after having been com- pelled to pay the amount to the consignee, may maintain an action therefor against the officer. The carrier is bound to the consignee for the safe delivery of the goods. The prop- erty having been taken from the carrier's possession upon legal process against the consignor, the carrier, being thus prevented from delivering it to the consignee according to his contract, has the consignee's rights and remedies to en- able him to answer over to the consignee for the value of his interests. Certainly, if he pays such consignee for his interest with or without suit, he succeeds to all his rights of recapture or rights of action.^* 92Fourth Nat. Bank v. American o^Vermilye v. Adams Exp-vess Mills Co., 29 Fed. 611, 30 Fed. 420. Co., 21 Wall. (U. S.) 138, 22 L. ed. 93Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. WJiit- 609; Holmes v. Balcom, 84 Maine ney, 39 Ala. 468. 226, 24 Atl. 821. 28 CHAPTER X. LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. Sec. 483. Finder of goods has no lien thereon at common law. 484. A riparian owner has no lien on property cast adrift on his land. 485. Finder's right t6 compensa- tion for his services. 486. Landlord has no lien on chattels left on his prem- ises. 487. Reward offered. 488. Offer of a reward becomes a contract. 489. Offer of reward by a sheriff. Sec. 490. Rendition of services in se- curing reward. 491. Conditions in offer of re- ward must be complied with. 492. No lien implied from offer of "Liberal Reward." 493. Withdrawal of offer of re- ward. 494. Finder entitled to a portion of reward. 495. Reward to detective. 496. Waiver of reward for lost property. 497. State statutes. § 483. Finder of goods has no lien thereon at common law. — The finder of a chattel has at common law no lien upon it for the labor and expenses he may have been to in securing it, and in taking care of it for the owner. A quan- tity of timber belonging to one Nicholson was accidentally loosened from a dock in which it was placed on the bank of the Thames, and was carried a considerable distance by the tide and left at low water upon a towing-path. Chap- man, finding it there, placed it in a safe place beyond the reach of the tide at high water. The owner then demanded the timber of Chapman, who refused to deliver it up, unless a certain sum should be paid to him for his trouble in secur- ing and taking care of the timber. In an action of trover by the owner against Chapman, the court held that he had no 434 435 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 483 lien on the timber.^ Lord Chief Justice Eyre, delivering the opinion, said: "It is therefore a case of mere finding and taking care of the thing found (I am willing to agree) for the owner. This is a good office, and meritorious, at least in the moral sense of the word, and certainly entitles the party to some reasonable recompense from the bounty, if not from the justice of the owner; and of which, if it were refused, a court of justice would go as far as it could go, towards enforcing the payment. * * * So it would be if a horse had strayed, and was not taken up as an estray by the lord under his manorial rights, but was taken up by some good-natured man, and taken care of by him, till at some trouble and perhaps at some expense, he had found out the owner. So it would be in every other case of finding that can be stated (the claim to recompense differing in degree, but not in principle) ; which therefore reduces the merits of this case to this short question, whether every man who finds the property of another, which happens to have been lost or mislaid, and voluntarily puts himself to some trouble and expense to preserve the thing, and to find the owner, has a lien upon it for the casual, fluctuating and uncertain amount of the recompense which he may reasonably de- serve? It is enough to say, that there is no instance of such a lien having been claimed and allowed; the case of the pointer dog- was a case in which it was claimed and dis- allowed, and it was thought too clear a case to bear an argu- ment. Principles of public policy and commercial necessity support the lien in the case of salvage. Not only public pol- icy and commercial necessity do not require that it should be established in this case, but very great inconvenience may be apprehended from it, if it were to be established. * * * I mentioned in the course of the cause another great incon- venience, namely, the situation in which an owner seeking 1 Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. - Binstead v. Buck, 2 W. Bl. Black. 254, 1117. § 484 LIENS. 436 to recover his property in an action of trover will ])e placed, if he is at his peril to make a tender of a sufficient recom- pense, before he brings his action: such an owner must al- ways pay too much, because he has no means of knowing exactly how much he ought to pay, and because he must tender enough. I know there are cases in which the owner of property must submit to this inconvenience; but the num- ber of them ought not to be increased: perhaps it is better for the public that these voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are charities and moral duties, but not legal duties, should depend altogether for their re- ward upon the moral duty of gratitude. But at any rate, it is fitting that he who claims the reward in such case should take upon himself the burthen of proving the nature of the service which he has performed, and the quantum of the rec- ompense which he demands, instead of throwing it upon the owner to estimate it for him, at the hazard of being nonsuited in an action of trover." § 484. A riparian owner has no lien on property cast adrift on his land.-^ — If a bridge be swept away by a flood, and parts of it lodge upon the land of a riparian owner, who removes them at his own expense after the owner of the bridge had refused to do so, the landowner is liable in trover for a conversion of the fragments of the bridge.* A riparian owner cannot even claim a lien for preserving a raft cast upon his land.^ The claim in these cases is very unlike that of salvage of goods at sea. The distinction be- tween salvage, properly so called, and the taking care of goods found upon the banks of rivers, is fully pointed out by Chief Justice Eyre, in the leading case already noticed:® 3 Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. ^ Eter v. Edwards, 4 Watts Bl. 254; Baker v. Hoag, 3 Barb. (Pa.) 63. (N. Y.) 203, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 113. 6 Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. 4 Foster v. Juniata Bridge Co., Bl. 254. 16 Pa. St. 393. 437 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 484 "The only difficulty that remained with any of us, after we had heard this case argued, was upon the question whether this transaction could be assimilated to salvage? The taking care of goods left by the tide upon the banks of a navigable river, communicating with the sea, may in a vulgar sense be said to be salvage; but it has none of the qualities of salvage, in respect of which the laws of all civilized nations, the laws of Oleron, and our own laws in particular, have provided that a recompense is due for the saving, and that our law has also provided that this recompense should be a lien upon the goods which have been saved. Goods carried by sea are necessarily and unavoidably exposed to the perils which storms, tempests, and accidents (far beyond the reach of human foresight to prevent) are hourly creating, and against which, it too often happens that the greatest dili- gence and the most strenuous exertions of the mariner can- not protect them. When goods are thus in imminent danger of being lost, it is most frequently at the hazard of the lives of those who save them, that they are saved. Principles of public policy dictate to civilized and commercial countries, not only the propriety, but even the absolute necessit}', of establishing a liberal recompense for the encouragement of those who engage in so dangerous a service. Such are grounds upon which salvage stands. * * * But see how very unlike this salvage is to the case now under considera- tion. In a navigable river within the flux and reflux of the tide, but at a great distance from the sea, pieces of timber lie moored together in convenient places; carelessness, a slight accident, perhaps a mischievous boy, casts off the mooring- rope, and the timber floats from the place where it was deposited, till the tide falls and leaves it again somewhere upon the banks of the river. * * '-^ The timber is found lying upon the banks of the river, and is taken into the pos- session and under the care of the Defendant, without any extraordinary exertions, without the least personal risk, and § 485 LIENS. 438 in truth, with very little trouble. It is therefore a case of mere finding, and taking care of the thing found (I am will- ing to agree) for the owner." § 485. Finder's right to compensation for his services. — Whether a finder can recover compensation for his services in respect of the property found seems to have been an un- settled question at the time of the decision of Nicholson v. Chapman,'^ in 1793. But in a Kentucky case, in 1836,^ it was held that the finder may recover for his time and expenses, on the ground that there is an implied request on the part of one who has lost a chattel to every one else to aid him in recovering it. It now seems to be an established doctrine that the finder is entitled to be paid his reasonable expenses incurred in respect of the thing found.'' Thus, the owner of a boat, who has taken it from a person who found it adrift on tidewater and brought it to shore, is liable for the necessary expense of preserving the boat while it remained in his possession. "His claim is for the reasonable expenses of keeping and repairing the boat after he had brought it to the shore; and the single question is, whether a promise is to be implied by law from the owner of a boat, upon taking it from a person who has found it adrift on tide water and brought it ashore, to pay him for the necessary expenses of preserving the boat while in his possession. We are of opinion that such a promise is to be implied. The plaintiff, as the finder of the boat, had the lawful possession of it, and the right to do what was necessary for its preservation. Whatever might have been the liability of the owner if he had chosen to let the finder retain the boat, by taking it 7 2 H. Bl. 254. Y.) 102, 6 Am. Dec. 316; Tome v. 8 Reeder v. Anderson's Admrs., Four Cribs of Lumber, Fed. Cas. 4 Dana (Ky.) 193. 14083, Taney (U. S.) 533. Contra, 9 Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. Watts v. Ward, 1 Oregon 86, 62 286; Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. (N. Am. Dec. 299. 439 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 487 from him he made himself liable to pay the reasonable ex- penses incurred in keeping and repairing it."^^ § 486. Landlord has no lien on chattels left on his premises. — In the absence of an agreement, a landlord, un- less he is an innkeeper, has no lien on chattels left on his premises by an outgoing tenant. ^^ The law applicable to cases of deposits by the finding of goods lost on land, and deposits of property made by the force of winds or floods, which are termed involuntary deposits, is applicable to the case of goods left by the outgoing tenant. The law in'those cases gives no lien for the care and expense of the finder in keeping and preserving the property.^^ It is only in case that the loser offers a reward for the restoration of the property that the finder has a lien upon it to the extent of the reward so offered. § 487. Reward offered. — Though the finder of lost prop- erty has no lien upon it at common law for his services in re- covering and restoring it to the owner, yet, if the owner has offered a reward for the return of the property, or has en- tered into an agreement to pay for its discovery and restora- tion, the finder has a lien upon the property for the payment of the reward, ^^ or of the labor and expense of rescuing it 10 Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. the latter case Dorsey, C. J., said: 286, per Gray, J. "If any article of personal prop- yl Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray erty has been lost, or strayed (Mass.) 222. away, or escaped from its owner, 12 Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray and he offers a certain reward, (Mass.) 222, per Metcalf, J. payable to him who shall recover 13 Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. and deliver it back to his posses- (Mass.), 352, 2)1 Am. Dec. 145; sion, it is but a just exposition Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray of his offer, that he did not ex- (Mass.), 222; Cummings v. Gann, pect that he who had expended 52 Pa. St. 484; Wood v. Pierson, his time and money in the pursuit 45 Mich. 313, 7 N. W. 888; Har- and recovery of the lost or es- son v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140; Wilson caped property, would restore it V. Guyton, 8 Gill (Md.) 213. In to him, but upon the payment of 488 LIENS. 440 under the agreement.^'* The finder in such case is entitled to receive his compensation before he parts with the pos- session of the property. He stands in the same position as a mechanic or artisan who performs services upon property at the request of the owner; and, Hke a mechanic or artisan, he has a lien upon the property itself for the amount of his com- pensation.^^ § 488. Offer of a reward becomes a contract. — An ofTer of a reward becomes a contract with any one who complies with the terms of the ofTer. Thus, where one offered a re- ward of twenty dollars for the return of a watch which he had lost, but refused to pay the reward, and the finder re- fused to deliver the watch, in an action of trover by the owner against the finder, judgment was given for the de- fendant. ^^^ Chief Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion in the leading case of Wentworth v. Day, said : "The duty of the plaintiff to pay the stipulated reward arises from the prom- ise contained in his advertisement. That promise was, that whoever should return his watch to the printing-office should receive twenty dollars. No other time or place of payment was fixed. The natural, if not the necessary implication is, the proffered reward, and that as security for this, he was to re- main in possession of the same until its restoration to its owner, and then the payment of the re- ward was to be a simultaneous act. It is no forced construction of his act to say that he designed to be so understood by him who should become entitled to the re- ward. It is, consequently, a lien created by contract. It is for the interest of property holders so to regard it. It doubles their prospect of a restoration to their property. To strangers it is everything; for few, indeed, would spend their time and money, and incur the risks inci- dent to bailment, but from a be- lief in the existence of such a lien. Public convenience, sound policy, and all the analogies of the law, lend their aid in support of such a principle." 14 Baker v. Hoag, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 113, reversed 7 N. Y. 555, Seld. Notes 45, 59 Am. Dec. 431. 15 Baker v. Hoag, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 113, reversed 7 N. Y. 555, Seld. Notes 45, 59 Am. Dec. 431. iG Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 352, 2,1 Am. Dec. 145; Har- son V. Pike, 16 Ind. 140. 441 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 489 that the acts of performance were to be mutual and simul- taneous: the one to give up the watch, on payment of the reward; the other to pay the reward, on receiving the watch. Such being, in our judgment, the nature and legal effect of this contract, we are of opinion that the defendant, on being ready to deliver up the watch, had a right to receive the reward, in behalf of himself and his son, and was not bound to surrender the actual possession of it, till the reward was paid; and therefore a refusal to deliver it, without such pay- ment, was not a conversion. It was competent for the loser of the watch to propose his own terms. He might have promised to pay the reward at a given time after the watch should have been restored, or in any other manner incon- sistent with a lien for the reward on the article restored; in which case, no such lien would exist. The person restoring the watch would look only to the personal responsibility of the advertiser. It was for the latter to consider, v/hether such an offer would be equally efficacious in bringing back his lost property, as an offer of a reward secured by a pledge of the property itself; or whether, on the contrary, it would not afford to the finder a strong temptation to conceal it. With these motives before him, he made an offer, to pay the reward on the restoration of the watch ; and his subsequent attempt to get the w^atch, without performing his promise, is equally inconsistent with the rules of law and the dictates of justice." § 489. Offer of reward by a sheriff. — A telegram to a sheriff offering a reward for the recovery of a stolen horse is a general offer, and binds the sender to any person who recovers the horse, and gives a lien on it till the reward is paid. The reward in this case was claimed by one Cum- mings, an innkeeper, who had previously detained the horses of two men who had stopped at his inn, suspecting that the horses had been stolen. He sent for the sheriff, and had one of the men arrested. When the sheriff' received the tele- § 490 LIENS. 442 gram, he showed it to Cunimings, who had the horse in his possession. The sheriff claimed the reward, and it was paid to him; and the owner of the horse took it by replevin from Cummings. Judge Thompson, delivering the opinion of the court, said:^' "The recovery of the property was the object, and the hands by which the result should be accomplished were no'thing to the [owner] plaintiff. It was as much an offer to Cummings as to the sheriff or anybody. It amounted to nothing unless to a successful party. It was but an offer until its terms were complied with. When that was done, it thenceforth became a binding contract, which the offerer was bound to perform his share of. * * * The service is to be performed for a reward offered, not especially to any one, but to any one who may undertake and perform the request. It is valuable towards both the owner and his prop- erty, and why should there not be a lien ? The owner may live at a distance, and if the finder is required to yield up the property and then look to the owner, it might be great in- justice to him; whereas it is no injury to the owner, who constitutes the finder his bailee by his advertisement to per- form the services of seizure and taking care of the property." § 490. Rendition of services in securing reward. — To en- title a person to a reward he must show a rendition of services with a view of obtaining the reward. The finding of property lost, and advertising it without knowledge of the offer of a reward, does not entitle the finder to a reward of- fered. If a finder has any claim, it is in fact a claim upon a contract. Where a contract is proposed to all the world, in the form of an offer of a reward for the recovery, or for in- formation leading to the recovery of property lost, any one may assent to it, and it is binding if he complies with the terms of the offer; but he cannot assent without knowledge 17 Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. Day, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 352, Zl Am. St. 484. See, also, Wentworth v. Dec. 145, per Shaw, C. J. 443 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 492 of the proposition.^^ But it is not necessary that notice should be given to the party offering the reward that his proposal is being acted upon.^^ § 491. Conditions in offer of reward must be complied with. — A finder must comply with all the conditions of an offer of reward. If this be payable at a certain place, it must be demanded at that place. But a demand at a place named may be waived.^*' § 492. No lien implied from offer of "liberal reward." — But no lien is implied by an offer of "a liberal reward."' Under such an offer it may well be asked, as it was by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,^^ "Who was to be the arbiter of the liberality of the offered reward? It cannot be sup- posed that the owner, by his offer, designed to constitute the recoverer of his property the exclusive judge of the amount to be paid him as a reward. And it is equally unrea- sonable and unjust to say that the owner should be such ex- clusive judge. In the event of a difference between them upon the subject, the amount to be paid must be ascertained by the judgment of the appropriate judicial tribunal. This would involve the delays incident to litigation, and it would be a gross perversion of the intention of the owner to infer, from his offered reward, an agreement on his part, that he was to be kept out of the possession of his property till all the delays of litigation were exhausted. To the bailee thus 18 Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. proposition stated in the text, but 604, 10 Am. Rep. 654. And see the case is not in point. Fitch V. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248, lo Harson v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140. 97 Am. Dec. 791; Lee v. Flemings- 20 Wood v. Pierson, 45 Mich, burg, 7 Dana (Ky.) 28. The Court 313, 7 N. W. 888. And see Went- of Appeals of Kentucky departed worth v. Day, 3 Mete. (Mass.) from this authority in Auditor v. 352, 27 Am. Dec. 145. Ballard, 9 Bush (Ky.) 572, 15 21 Wilson v. Guyton, 8 Gill Am. Rep. 728. Williams v. Car- (Md.) 213, per Dorsey, C. J. See wardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621, is some- Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. times cited to the contrary of the 7Z, 23 L. ed. 697. § 493 LIENS. 444 in possession of property, such a lien would rarely be valu- able except as a means of oppression and extortion; and, therefore, the law will never infer its existence either from the agreement of the parties, or in furtherance of public con- venience or policy." § 493. Withdrawal of offer of reward. — An offer of a re- ward for lost property may be withdrawn at any time, until something- is accomplished in pursuance of the offer. Serv- ices afterwards rendered by one who was ignorant of the withdrawal of the offer do not entitle him to the reward. ^^ "Until something is done in pursuance of it, it is a mere offer, and may be revoked. But if, before it is retracted, one so far complies with it, as to perform the labor, for which the reward is stipulated, it is the ordinary case of labor done on request, and becomes a contract to pay the stipulated com- pensation. It is not a gratuitous service, because something is done which the party was not bound to do, and without such offer might not have done."-^ § 494. Finder entitled to a portion of reward. — A finder may be entitled to a portion of a reward offered proportioned to the value of the property returned. Thus, where a person had lost from his pocket a number of bank-bills, contained in a paper wrapper, amounting to more than fifteen hundred dollars, he published an advertisement, in which he described the money lost, and offered a reward of two hundred dollars to any person who would find and restore the same. The plaintiff having seen the advertisement, and having ob- served an unusual number of bank-bills in the possession of a man whom he suspected of having stolen or found them, 22Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 352, Zl Am. Dec. 145, per (Mass.) 352, Zl Am. Dec. 145; Shaw, C. J. And see Symmes Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344, 4 Am. Dec. IZ. 23 L. ed. 697. 142, per Parker, J. 23Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. 445 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 496 gave notice to the defendant, who in consequence recovered a large part of the sum lost. It was held that the finder was entitled to be paid a pro rata proportion of the reward of- fered.''^ "An offer of a reward might undoubtedly be so ex- pressed as to exclude any apportionment ; for the owner of the property may prescribe his terms for the restoration of it, he having a right to reclaim it wherever it might be found. But where a compensation is offered in general terms, like those in the present case, it is consistent with honesty and fair dealing, and with the interest of the loser himself, and not inconsistent with any principle of law, that a proportion of the reward should be recovered, according to the sum actually restored. "^^ § 495. Reward to detective. — A detective officer may have a lien upon property recovered from the wrongful pos- session of another, under an agreement that he shall be paid for his services ; but he has no lien in case the wrongful holder has already sent the property to the owner, and the officer compels him by arrest to recall it before it was de- livered to the owner.-*' § 496. Waiver of reward for lost property. — A reward for lost property is not waived by insisting on its identifica- tion.-' It is a question of fact for the jury whether the finder of a chattel has given a fair and reasonable opportunity for its identification before restoring it, and whether the claim- ant should have been given an opportunity to inspect it in order to decide whether it belonged to him. Lord Coke states the duties of a finder thus:-^ "If a man therefore which 2i Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 2G Hoffman v. Barthelmess, 63 344, 4 Am. Dec. 142. Ga. 759, 36 Am. Rep. 129. 25 Per Parker, J., in Symmes v. 27 Wood v. Pierson, 45 Mich. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344, 4 Am. Dec. 313, 7 N. W. 888. 142. 28 Isaack v. Clark, 2 Bulst. 306, 312. § 497 LIENS. 446 finds goods, if he be wise, he will then search out the right owner of them, and so deliver them unto him; if the owner comes unto him, and demands them, and he answers him, that it is not known unto him whether he be the true owner of the goods, or not, and for this cause he refuseth to deliver them; this refusal is no conversion, if he keep them for him." In a Michigan case on this point, Mr. Justice Graves, after quoting this passage, says :-^ "Lord Coke very clearly enforces the right and duty of the finder to be certain of the true owner before he makes delivery. As he is bound to hold for the true owner, and is liable in case of misdelivery, the law makes it his duty as well as his right, even when there is no reward, to 'search out,' or in other language, find the 'right owner,' or see to it that he submits to no other than the 'right owner.' Undoubtedly if Chapman's [the finder's] conduct was such that a jury would, under the circumstances of the case, feel satisfied that he was actually perverse and unreasonable, and pursued a course which was adapted to baffle fair investigation, instead of maintaining the attitude of a man whose duty it was, in the quaint terms of Lord Coke, to 'search out the right owner,' it would be just to regard him as having detained the prop- erty unlawfully." § 497. State statutes. — In several states there are stat- utes which confer a lien upon the finder of a chattel for his services and expenses in recovering it and taking care of it. Some of these statutes are confined wholly to estrays, others apply to goods, and still others to both estrays and goods. ^^ 20 Wood V. Pierson, 45 Mich. Iowa: Code 1897, § 2373. 313, 7 N. W. 888. Maine: Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 100, 30 Connecticut: Gen. Stat. 1902, §§ 10-18. §§ 4680, 4681. Oregon: Bellinger & Cotton's Illinois: Kurd's Rev. Stats. Ann. Codes and Stats. 1902, 1913, ch. 50. §§ 3887-3891. Indiana: Burns' Ann. Stats. 1914, §§ 7155-7186. 447 LIEN OF A FINDER OF LOST GOODS. § 49/ It is not practicable to give a statement of the provisions of these statutes, and therefore only a reference is made to them, with the exception only of the statute in force in Cali- fornia, North Dakota, and South Dakota, which is given on account of its comprehensiveness and brevity as well. In California,^^ North Dakota, and South Dakota,^- it is provided that — The finder of a thing is entitled to compensation for all expenses necessarily incurred by him in its preservation, and for any other service necessarily performed by him about it, and to a reasonable reward for keeping it. The finder of a thing may exonerate himself from liability at any time by placing it on storage with any responsible person of good character, at a reasonable expense. The finder of a thing may sell it, if it is a thing which is commonly the subject of sale, when the owner cannot, with reasonable diligence, be found, or, being found, refuses upon demand to pay the lawful charges of the finder, in the follow- ing cases: 1. When the thing is in danger of perishing or of losing the greater part of its value; or, 2. When the lawful charges of the finder amounts to two-thirds of its value. A sale under the provisions of the last section must be made in the same manner as the sale of a thing pledged. The owner of a thing may exonerate himself from the claims of the finder by surrendering it to him in satisfaction thereof. 31 Civ. Code, 1906, §§ 1864-1872. 32 North Dakota, Rev. Code See as to lost money, Pol. Code 1905, §§ 5478-5486; South Dakota, 1906, § 3136 et seq. Rev. Code 1903, §§ 1384-1392, 2976. CHAPTER XL INNKEEPERS' AND BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPERS' LIENS. Sec. 498. An innkeeper's particular lien. 499. Lien on goods of a third per- son. 500. Attempt to limit lien of inn- keeper on goods of a third person. $01. Settled rule. 502. Knowledge of innkeeper as to ownership of baggage. 503. Innkeeper's lien on goods. 504. No lien on a horse unless it belongs to his guest. 505. Innkeeper defined. 506. What constitutes one a guest. 507. Husband liable for wife's bill at an inn. 508. Lien on infant's baggage. 509. Innkeeper cannot detain guest's person. 510. Property exempt from exe- cution. 511. Distinction between guest and boarder. 512. A lodging house keeper not an innkeeper. 513. Lien affected by special agreement. 514. When boarding-house keep- er's lien attaches. 515. Statutes giving liens to boarding-house keepers. 516. Lien secures only reasonable charges. 517. Liens for advanced money. Sec. 518. General lien for amount of the bill. 519. Possession is essential to the preservation of this lien. 520. Guest's possession secured by fraud will not prevent innkeeper's lien. 521. Temporary loss of posses- sion will not waive lien. 522. No waiver by accepting other security. 522a. Priority. 523. Lien waived by unlawful sale. 524. Care and use of the property detained. 525. Innkeeper's lien confers no right of sale. 525a. Alabama. 525b. Arizona. 526. California. 526a. Colorado. 527. Connecticut. 527a. District of Columbia. 527b. Florida. 527c. Georgia. 527d. Illinois. 527e. Iowa. 528. Kansas. 529. Kentucky. 530. Louisiana. 531. Maine. 531a. Maryland. 531b. Massachusetts. 531c. Michigan. 532. Minnesota. 448 bee. 536d. Oregon. 537. Pennsylvania. S37a. South Carolina. 537b. South Dakota. 537c. Tennessee. 537(1. Texas. 538. Utah. 538a. Virginia. 539. Washington. 539a. West Virginia. 539b. Wisconsin. 539c. Wyoming. 449 innkeepers' liens. § 499 Sec. 532a. Mississippi. 533. Missouri. 533a. Montana. 533b. Nebraska. 534. Nevada. 534a. New Hampshire. 535. New Jersey. ' S35a. New Mexico. 536. New York. 536a. North Carolina. 536b. North Dakota. 536c. Ohio. § 498. An innkeeper's particular lien. — An innkeeper has a particular lien, for the reason that he is under an obliga- tion to serve the public. He is bound to receive a guest and his ordinary luggage, and is liable for the value of this if stolen. His liabiHty for the goods of his guest is a special and extraordinary one, and is founded upon grounds of pub- lic policy. In this respect his lien is similar to that of a com- mon carrier, though the two liens are distinct, and are not to be confounded. The innkeeper, in return for the obliga- tion imposed upon him to entertain any guest who may come to his house, and the liability incurred for the safe keeping of his goods, is invested with a lien upon the property of his guest; and this lien has some exceptional characteristics. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these characteristics is that the lien is not confined to property owned by the guest, but attaches to all property brought with him, and in good faith received by the innkeeper as the property of the guest. ^ § 499. Lien on goods of a third person. — An innkeeper has a lien upon the goods of a third person brought to the 1 Cook V. Prentice, 13 Oregon 34, 19 Am. Rep. 244; Shaw v. Berry, 482, 11 Pac. 226, 57 Am. Rep. 28, 25 31 Maine 478, 52 Am. Dec. 628. But Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 700; Black v. see Elliott v. Martin, 105 Mich. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) 310. See 506, 63 N. W. 525, 55 Am. St. 461. also, Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 29 § 499 LIENS. 450 inn by a guest. At first the judges were equally divided on the question whether an innkeeper had a lien upon a horse brought to the inn by a stranger.- In the next case they were divided three to one in favor of the lien.^ In Johnson V. Hill'* it was stated by counsel to have been held by all the judges, that even in the case where a robber had brought a horse, which he had stolen, to an inn, the innkeeper was en- titled to receive compensation from the owner before the latter could insist on a redelivery to himself. Chief Justice Abbot said he had no doubt as to the law as stated. Thus it has become the settled law with reference to this lien, that there is no distinction between the goods of a guest and those of a third person brought by a guest, and in good faith received by the innkeeper as the property of the guest. ^ Skipwith V. the Inn- keeper, 1 Bulst. 170. 3 Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269, 1 Roll. 449, Poph. 127. 43 Stark. 172 (1822). 5 Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269, 1 Roll. 449n; Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172; Worke v. Gre- naugh. 2 Ld. Raym. 866, 1 Salk. 388; Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 267; Turrill v. Crawley, 13 Q. B. 197; Threfall v. Borwick, L. R. 7 Q. B. 711; Manning v. Hollen- beck, 27 Wis. 202; Fox v. Mc- Gregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Grin- nell V. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) 319; Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156; Peet v. McGraw, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 653; Covington v. Newberger, 99 N. Car. 523, 6 S. E. 205; McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506, 11 S. W. 316, 3 L. R. A. 654, per Folkes, J.; Polk V. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867. In Waugh v. Denham. 16 Irish C. L. 405, 410, Pigot, C. B., said, as to the reason of this rule : "When an innkeeper receives a guest, with the horse on which he travels, or when, in the ordinary course of business, a carrier re- ceives goods from the possession of the sender, he deals with a per- son having all the indicia of prop- erty. Possession is, in itself, prima facie evidence of ownership. To incumber an innkeeper, or a carrier, with the obligation of in- quiring and determining the rela- tion in which the guest or the sender of the goods, stands in ref- erence to his possession of what he brings, would be totally inconsist- ent with the relation in which both the innkeeper and the carrier stand towards the public, for whose benefit they profess to act, and do act, in their respective callings. The business of either could not be carried on if, in the one case, the doors of the inn were closed against a traveler, or in the other, if the carrier's conveyance were 451 INNKEEPERS LIENS. § 5OO The innkeeper cannot investigate the title of property brought by his guests, and is bound, unless there is some- thing to excite suspicion, to receive, not only the guest, but his horse or other property brought by him, as belonging to him because it is in his possession. Therefore, if a guest de- parts leaving his horse, and after many months it appears that the guest had stolen the horse, and the owner demands possession, the innkeeper may retain him for his charges in keeping him.° Of course there is no personal obligation on the part of the owner to pay the charges for keeping the horse; and if, upon a sale by virtue of the lien, the proceeds are insufficient to pay the innkeeper's charges, he has no claim, and can have no judgment or decree against the owner for the balance.'^ An innkeeper has a lien on a carriage brought to the inn by a guest for its standing-room, though the carriage does not belong to the guest himself.'^ § 500. Attempt to limit lien of innkeeper on goods of a third person. — It has sometimes been attempted to limit this principle, that the lien of an innkeeper attaches to goods of a third person brought to an inn by a guest, to such articles and property as a guest may ordinarily travel with. delayed at each stopping place on rendered to the thief in the carry- his journey, until such inquiry ing of the goods." See also. Rob- should be made. But no such mis- ins v. Gray, 2 Q. B. 501, 14 Reports chief can result from the qualifi- 671. cation which Lord Tenterden ap- '" Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) plied to the rights and obligations 310. But see Elliott v. Martin, 105 of an innkeeper. There can, I ap- Mich. 506, 63 N. W. 525, 55 Am. St. prehend, be no room for doubt that 46t, where it is held that an hotel a similar qualification applies to the keeper has no lien on a horse for rights and liabilities of a carrier: his board under an agreement with and that if a carrier knows (for ex- one leaving the horse with him, ample) that a thief gives him the who was not the owner, goods of the true owner to carry, '^ Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) he cannot charge the owner for 310. the service which he has knowingly ^ Turrill v. Crawley, 13 Q. B. 197. § 50I LIENS. 452 This claim was set up in a case where an attorney's clerk had put up at a public house and had departed without pay- ing his bill, but leaving the lawyer's blue bag and his letter- book behind him. The innkeeper wrote to the lawyer stat- ing that the clerk had left his bill unpaid, and that he held the letter-book, which he would forward on receiving the amount of the bill. The attorney's counsel contended that the innkeeper's lien extends only to those things wnth which a man ordinarily travels ; but the court were of opinion that there was a clear case of lien.^ The bag, they said, was brought by the guest to the inn, wuth some things of his own in it, in the ordinary way. The innkeeper could have no sus- picion that it contained property belonging to a third per- son. They regarded the case as very distinguishable from Broadwood v. Granara,^** in which case there appear dicta to the effect that an innkeeper is not bound to receive and pro- tect as the property of a guest such an article as a piano. ^^ § 501. Settled rule. — It is now^ settled, however, that the lien is not limited to such things as a guest ordinarily takes with him. An innkeeper who receives a piano in his charac- ter as innkeeper, believing it to be the property of his guest, is entitled to a lien upon it for his guest's board and lodging, although in fact the piano is the property of another person, who had consigned it to the guest to sell on commission.^- In a case before the Queen's Bench, ^^ where an innkeeper 9 Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. (N. keeper knew that the piano was the S.) 267. The bill seems to have property of the manufacturer, been somewhat after the style of who had loaned it to the guest. Falstaff's — but one half-penny 12 Cook v. Prentice, 13 Oregon worth of bread to this intolerable 482, 11 Pac. 226, 57 Am. Rep. 28, deal of sack. (King Henry IV., 25 Am. L. Reg. 700; and see note Part I, Act. ii, So. 4.) to the same, p. 704, by C. A. Rob- 1010 Ex. 417. bins; Jones v. Morrill, 42 Barb. 11 Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. (N. Y.) 623. 417. The real ground of the decis- i3 Threfall v. Berwick, L. R. 7 ion in this case was that the inn- Q. B. 711, afifd., L. R. 10 Q. B. 210. 453 innkeepers' liens. § 502 had received in good faith a piano as part of the goods of his guest, it was held that he had a lien upon it. Mr. Justice Lush said: "The innkeeper's lien is not restricted to such things as a traveling guest brings with him in journeying; the contrary has been laid down long ago. It extends to all goods the guest brings with him, and the innkeeper receives as his. * * * If he has this lien as against the guest, the cases have established beyond all doubt that he has the same right as against the real owner of the article, if it has been brought to the inn by the guest as owner." And in the same case Mr. Justice Quain said: "There is no authority for the proposition that the lien of the innkeeper only ex- tends to goods which a traveler may be ordinarily expected to bring with him. * * * The liability, as shewn by the old cases, extends to all things brought to the inn as the property of the guest and so received, even a chest of chart- ers, or obligations: and why not a pianoforte? If, therefore, the innkeeper be liable for the loss, it seems to follow that he must also have a lien upon them. And if he has a lien upon them as against the guest, the two cases cited (and there are more) shew that if the thing be brought by the guest as owner, and the landlord takes it in thinking it is the guest's own, he has the same rights against the stranger, the real owner, as against the guest." § 502. Knowledge of innkeeper as to ownership of bag- gage. — If the innkeeper knows that the goods brought to the inn by a guest belong to another person, he can have no lien upon them for the guest's personal expenses.^ ^ Thus, if a manufacturer sends a piano to a guest at a hotel for his 14 Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172; Wright v. Sherman, 3 S. Dak. 290, Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. 52 N. W. 1093, 1094, 17 L. R. A. 417, 425; McGhee v. Edwards, 87 792; Lurch v. Wilson, 114 N. Y. S. Tenn. 506, 509, 11 S. W. 316, 789, 62 Misc. (N. Y.) 259. 3 L. R. A. 654, quoting text; § 503 LIENS. 454 temporary use, and the hotel-keeper knows that it does not belong to the guest, he acquires no lien upon it.^'^ § 503. Innkeeper's lien on goods. — The innkeeper's lien can only attach to goods received by one in his capacity as innkeeper.^*' Neither the liability nor the privileges of an innkeeper attach to one who is not the keeper of a public house. The owner of a steamship carrying passengers for hire is not an innkeeper, although the passenger pays a round sum for transportation, board, and lodging. ^^ An innkeeper may also be a stable-keeper; but as an innkeeper he cannot claim a lien for stabling the horses of one who is not a guest, ^^ as, for instance, a mail contractor. ^^ Where an innkeeper receives horses and a carriage to stand at livery, the circumstance that the owner, at a subsequent time, oc- casionally took refreshment at the inn, and sent a friend to be lodged there at his charge, was held not to entitle the inn- keeper to a lien in respect of any part of the demand.^'' 15 Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. 417, 425. 16 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208; Orchard v. Rackstraw, 9 C. B. 698; Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. Dec. 409; Miller v. Marston, 35 Maine 153, 56 Am. Dec. 694; Walker v. Kennedy, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 433, 7 Pa. Dist. 516. 17 Clark V. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. Rep. 456. 18 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208; Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. Dec. 409; Grinnell V. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663. A different view was taken in Mason v. Thomp- son, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 284, 20 Am. Dec. 471, which related to the liability of an innkeeper for a harness belonging to one who was not himself a guest. Wilde, J., said: "To constitute a guest, in legal contemplation, it is not essential that he should be a lodger or have any refreshment at the inn. If he leaves his horse there, the innkeeper is charge- able on account of the benefit he is to receive for the keeping of the horse." Lord Holt held a different opinion in the case of Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866; but the opinion of the ma- jority of the court has ever since been considered as well settled law. See also, McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574; Wall v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515, 19 Pac. 469. 19 Hickman v. Thomas, 16 Ala. 666. 20 Smith v. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132. 455 INNKEEPERS LIENS. § 504 § 504. No lien on a horse unless it belongs to his guest. — An innkeeper has no lien on a horse placed in his stable, unless placed there by a guest, or by his authority."^ Thus, if a person is stopped upon suspicion, and his horse is placed at an inn by the police, the innkeeper has no lien on the horse, and if he sells him for his keeping he is lial^le in trover to the owner. ^- But if one sends his horse or his trunk in advance to an inn, saying he will soon be there himself, it may be that he should be deemed a guest from the time the property is taken in charge by the host.^^ If one leaves a horse and carriage in the care of an inn- keeper, the latter has a lien upon them for such care, though the guest lodges elsewhere.^^ The innkeeper is bound to provide for his guest's horse as well as for the guest himself, and he has a lien upon the horse, and may refuse to deliver him to the guest until the charges against the guest are paid. If the guest goes away and leaves the horse, the innkeeper is not bound to turn the horse loose, and give up his lien, but may still keep the horse and look to his lien for remuneration.^^ If an innkeeper is also a keeper of a livery stable, and he 21 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208; Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506, 11 S. W. 316, 3 L. R. A. 654; Elliott v. Martin, 105 Mich. 506, 63 N. W. 525, 55 Am. St. 461. 22 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208. 23 Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 490, 38 Am. Dec. 663. 24 Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, 1 Salk. 388; McDan- iels V. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574; Peet v. McGraw, 25 Wend (N. Y.) 653. In the lat- ter case Chief Justice Nelson said: "It is not necessary in point of fact, that the owner or person putting the horses to be kept at a public inn, should be a guest at the time, in order to charge the innkeeper for any loss that may happen or to entitle him to the right of lien. * * * jf the horses be left with the inn- keeper, though the owner may put up at a different place, the former is answerable for the safe keeping, and should of course be entitled to the summary remedy for his reasonable charges." 25 Black V. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) 310. 505 LIENS. 456 receives a horse in the latter capacity, and the owner after- wards becomes a guest at his house, no lien upon the horse arises in favor of the innkeeper for the entertainment of the guest.^^ § 505. Innkeeper defined. — An innkeeper is defined to be one who keeps a house where a traveler is furnished with everything which he has occasion for whilst upon his way;^'^ or one who holds out that he will receive all travelers and sojourners who are willing to pay a price adequate to the sort of accommodation provided.-^ A house of public en- tertainment in London, where beds and provisions were fur- nished, but which was called a tavern and cofTee-house, and was not frequented by stage-coaches, and had no stable, was held to be an inn. The keeper of the house did not charge, as a mere lodging-house keeper, by the week or month, but for the number of nights. He did not, like a lodging-house keeper, make a special contract with every man who came; but held himself ready, without making a special contract, to provide lodging and entertainment for all, at a reasonable price.^^ One may be at the same time an innkeeper and a board- ing-house keeper, and in such case it may be difTficult to de- termine whether a person entertained at the house is a guest of the innkeeper or a boarder. Perhaps the more prom- 26 Smith V. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132. In Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 285, 20 Am. Dec. 471, it was held in effect, that if an innkeeper, who is also a keeper of a livery stable, re- ceives a horse to be fed, without giving notice that he receives it as a keeper of a livery stable, he is answerable as an innkeeper. It was found by the jury, as a matter of fact, that he received the horse as an innkeeper. -' Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 286, per Bayley, J. 2S Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 286, per Best, J. 29 Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 286. A mere lodging- house keeper is not entitled to a lien provided by statute for an innkeeper or boarding house keeper. Hardin v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 493. 84 S. W. 591. 457 innkeepers' liens. § 507 inent occupation might control, and afford a presumption in a case where there is no other evidence. But if there is any evidence in the matter, the question is one for the jury, and not a matter of law for the court. The duration of the stay of the guest or boarder, the price paid, the amount of ac- commodation afforded, the transient or permanent charac- ter of his residence and occupation, his knowledge or want of knowledge of any difference of accommodation afforded to, or price paid by, boarders and guests, are all to be re- garded in settling the question. ^^ It is not necessary that one should be licensed as an inn- keeper in order to subject him to the liabilities or entitle him to the privileges of an innkeeper. § 506. What constitutes one a guest. — To constitute one a guest, it is not necessary that he should be at the inn in person. It is enough that his property is there in charge of his wife, or servant, or any agent who is there in his em- ployment, or as a member of his family, provided such per- son is there in such a way that the law will imply that the property is in the possession of the owner, and not merely in the possession of his agent.^^ § 507. Husband liable for wife's bill at an inn. — Where a husband and wife board at a hotel, the husband is presump- tively liable for the bill. It is competent, however, for the hotel-keeper to show that the husband was impecunious, and that credit was given to the wife so as to justify the deten- tion of her property for their bill.^- 30 Hall V. Pike, 100 Mass. 495, 32 Birney v. Wheaton, 2 How. per Colt, J.; Danforth v. Pratt, Pr. (N. Y.) (N. S.) 519. So de- 42 Maine 50; Norcross v. Nor- cided independently of the cress. 53 Maine 163. statute of 1884, ch. 381, providing 31 Coykendall v. Eaton, 55 Barb. that married women may make (N. Y.) 188, Zl How. Pr. (N. Y.) contracts in the same manner as 438; Smith v. Keyes, 2 Thomp. & if single. C. (N. Y.) 650. § 508 LIENS. 458 If board is furnished to a man and his wife under a con- tract with the husband, the innkeeper or boarding-house keeper has no Hen upon the wife's effects, which are her separate property, brought with her to the house; for no Hen can exist against a guest who does not become Hable to the keeper of the house.^^ A boarding-house keeper has no Hen on the separate prop- erty of a married woman boarding at the house, Hving apart from her husband, where the husband has engaged, and by express agreement promised, to pay her board. "^ Where a father and his two daughters boarded at a hotel, and the board of the three was charged to the father, it was held that the hotel-keeper could not detain the trunks of one of the daughters for the board of the three, but only for that of such daughter alone ; and not for her board if this was charged to the father.^^ § 508, Lien on infant's baggage. — An innkeeper has a lien on the baggage of an infant guest for the price of his entertainment, and also for money furnished him and ex- pended by him in procuring necessaries. The innkeeper is legally bound to receive and entertain an infant as well as an adult applicant. The price of his entertainment is re- coverable from him or his guardian on the ground that the entertainment is necessary.-^^ § 509. Innkeeper' cannot detain guest's person. — An inn- keeper cannot detain the guest's person, or the clothes or ornaments on his person, as security for his bill,"'^ although 33 Mcllvane v. Hilton, 7 Hun 36 Watson v. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) (N. Y.) 594; Chickering-Chase 147. And see Read v. Amidon, 41 Bros. Co. V. White, 127 Wis. 83, Vt. 15, 98 Am. Dec. 560. Other- 106 N. W. 797. wise in England, § 516. 34 Baker v. Stratton, 52 N. J. L. 37 Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 Mees. 277, 19 Atl. 661. & W. 248, 1 H. & H. 13; Wolf v. 35 Clayton v. Butterfield, 10 Summers, 2 Camp. 631. Rich. (S. Car.) 300. 459 innkeepers' liens. § 509 there are some dicta by early authorities to the effect that he had this right. ^^ There has, however, been no claim of such a right since the case of Sunbolf v. Alford in the Court of the Exchequer.^^ In that case Sunbolf sued his inn- keeper in trespass for assaulting and beating him, shaking and pulling him about, stripping ofi his coat, carrying it away, and converting it to his own use. The innkeeper pleaded his lien. Lord Abinger, chief baron, giving an opinion against the innkeeper, said: "If an innkeeper has a right to detain the person of his guest for the nonpayment of his bill, he has a right to detain him until the bill is paid, — which may be for life; so that this defence supposes, that, by the common law, a man who owes a small debt, for which he could not be imprisoned by legal process, may yet be de- tained by an innkeeper for life. The proposition is mon- strous. Again, if he have any right to detain the person, surely he is a judge in his own cause: for, he is then the party to determine whether the amount of his bill is reason- able, and he must detain him till the man brings an action against him for false imprisonment, and then if it were de- termined that the charge was not reasonable, and it appeared that the party had made an offer of a reasonable sum, the detainer would be unlawful. But, where is the law that says a man shall detain another for his debt without process of law? As to a lien upon the goods, there are undoubtedly cases of exception to the general law in favor of particular claims; and if an innkeeper has the possession of the goods, and his debt is not paid, he has a right to detain them by virtue of that possession ; but I do not agree that he has any right to take a parcel or other property out of the possession of the guest. If the guest is robbed of goods while they are in his own hands, the innkeeper is not liable. It appears to 38 Bacon's Abr. Inns, D ; New- 213; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. ton V. Trigg, 1 Shower 269; Dun- Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663. lap V. Thorne, 1 Rich. (S. Car.) 39 3 Mees. & W. 248, 254. § 5IO LIENS. 460 me. therefore, being without any authorities on the subject, that the plea is in principle utterly bad, and that there is no ground for the attempt to justify an assault, under the pre- tence of detaining a man for a debt due to an innkeeper. It is also bad under the pretence of justifying the stripping the plaintiff's coat off his back, and thereby inviting a breach of the peace, and making an assault necessary in order to exer- cise the right to the lien on the coat." §510. Property exempt from execution. — Property of a guest is not exempt from an innkeeper's lien by reason of the fact that it is property which would be exempt from general execution. Thus, the lien may attach to the coat of a guest, notwithstanding his claim that it is a part of his ordinary wearing apparel, and is exempt from execution. '^'^ "An inn- keeper's lien exists by common law, and we see nothing in the statute exempting certain property from execution to indicate an intention to abrogate the common law in this respect. The statute exempts only from general execution. It was never designed to prevent persons from giving a lien upon whatever property they see fit. Where a lien is given it may of course be enforced. Had the plaintiff given a chattel mortgage upon his coat to secure his hotel bill, no one would doubt the right of the defendant to foreclose it, notwithstanding the coat might have been part of the plain- tiff's ordinary wearing apparel. When the plaintiff became defendant's guest at his hotel he gave the defendant a lien upon his coat as effectually as if he had given him a mort- gage upon it. The law implied that from the act of becom- ing the defendant's guest and taking his coat with him. The rule is too well established to require support from author- ities." §511. Distinction between guest and boarder. — The dis- inction between a guest and a boarder is that the former 40 Swan V. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501, 503, 29 Am. Rep. 492. 461 innkeepers' liens. § 512 comes without any bargain as to the length of time he is to stay, and therefore may go when he pleases. A guest may remain a long time at an inn without becoming a boarder. He may contract to pay by the week or month without los- ing his character as a guest and assuming that of a boarder."*^ If one goes to a hotel as a wayfaring man and a traveller, and the relation of innkeeper and guest is once established, the presumption is that this relation continues so long as the traveller remains, and the length of his stay is immaterial so long as he retains his character as a traveller. The simple fact of his agreeing to pay a certain price by the week does not take away his character as a traveller and guest. "A guest for a single night might make a special contract, as to the price to be paid for his lodging, and whether it were more or less than the usual price, it would not affect his character as a guest. The character of guest does not depend upon the payment of any particular price, but upon other facts. If an inhabitant of a place makes a special contract with an innkeeper there, for board at his inn, he is a boarder, and not a traveller or a guest, in the sense of the law.""*^ §512. A lodging-house keeper not an innkeeper. — One who keeps a lodging-house, in which no provision is made by him for supplying his lodgers with meals, is not an inn- keeper. That there is a restaurant in the basement of the house which is leased to and managed by another person, and that this is connected by passageways and doors with the upper part of the house to facilitate access to the restau- 41 Berkshire Woollen Co. v. 657; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. Proctor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417; 118; Polk v. Melenbacker, 136 Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa 533; Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867, Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Maine 42 Berkshire Woollen Co. v. 163; Chamberlain v. Masterson, Proctor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417, per 26 Ala. 371; Pinkerton v. Wood- Fletcher, J. ward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. § 513 LIENS. 462 rant from the lodging-rooms, does not make the keeper of the lodgings an innkeeper. ^^ § 513. Lien affected by special agreement. — The inn- keeper's lien does not at common law apply to goods of a boarder,'*^ or to the goods of a person received under a special agreement, ^^ for in such case the innkeeper does not assume an innkeeper's responsibility, nor is he obliged to receive the boarder or other person under a special agree- ment. By statute, however, in several states, boarding- house keepers are given the same lien that innkeepers have. A boarding-house keeper has no lien except by virtue of a statute upon the property of his boarders; and a lodging- house keeper has no lien except by virtue of a statute on the property of his lodgers for rent due. The latter can neither be regarded as an innkeeper nor as a boarding-house keeper.'*^ §514. When boarding-house keeper's lien attaches. — A boarding-house keeper's lien under a statute attaches as and when the board is furnished. Thus, if a guest of a boarding- house keeper pays board by the week, though by his contract nothing is due until the end of the week, the lien neverthe- less attaches in the meantime. ^^ Otherwise, a guest who had obtained credit upon the strength of the lien might destroy the security by selling or removing the goods before 43 Cochrane v. Schryer, 17 N. Landis, 36 Iowa 651 ; Reed v. Y. Week. Dig. 442. Teneyck, 103 Ky. 65, 19 Ky. L. •i4Drope V. Thaire, Latch 126; 1690, 44 S. W. 356. Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 45 Wintermute v. Clarke, 5 485; Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Allen Sandf. (N. Y.) 242; Hursh v. (Mass.) 360; Brooks v. Harrison, Byers, 29 Mo. 469. 41 Conn. 184; Ewart v. Stark, 8 46 Cochrane v. Schryver, 17 N. Rich. L. (S. Car.) 423; Hursh v. Y. Week. Dig. 442. See Atter- Byers, 29 Mo. 469; Coates v. bury v. Somers, 35 Misc. (N. Y.) Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 ; Man- 805, 72 N. Y. S. 1094. ning V. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 47 Smith v. Colcord, 115 Mass. 746. 51 Am. Dec. 688; Nichols v. 70; Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Allen Halliday, 27 Wis. 406; Pollock v. (Alass.) 360. 463 innkeepers' liens. § 515 the bill for board had become payable by the contract. Such a result would be inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the lien. A sale of such property by the boarder is in- effectual as against the lien, except from the time that notice of the sale is given to the boarding-house keeper, or the property is actually removed ;^^ and in the case of a notice of a sale to a third person, the lien is effectual to secure the amount due up to the time of such notice. ^^ § 515. Statutes giving liens to boarding-house keepers. — By statute in several states, boarding-house keepers and others have a lien similar to that of an innkeeper. These statutes generally apply to innkeepers as well, and these common-law rights are sometimes modified. These statutes are, therefore, important not only as conferring a lien similar to that of an innkeeper upon other persons, but also in de- termining the extent of the innkeeper's lien. In Alabama,^° keepers of hotels, inns, boarding-houses, and restaurants have a lien on the goods and personal bag- gage of their guests and boarders to secure the payment of any money due from them for board and lodging, and may enforce the same by a seizure and sale of such goods and baggage in the manner provided by law. In Arizona, proprietors of hotels, inns, boarding, and lodg- ing-houses have a lien on baggage and other property of value of their guests or boarders or lodgers, for their ac- commodation, board or lodging and room rent, and such extras as are furnished at their request, with the right of possession of such baggage or other property of value, until all such charges are paid.^^ In Arkansas, every person operating any hotel, inn or boarding-house has a lien upon the baggage and per- 48 Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Allen 50 Civ. Code, 1907, § 4827. (Mass.) 360. ^i Rev. Stats. 1901, § 2916. As 49 Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Allen to enforcement, see § 1049b. (Alass.) 360. §515 LIENS. 464 sonal effects of all persons receiving food, entertainment or accommodation.^^ In California,''" hotel men, boarding-house and lodging- house keepers have a lien upon the baggage and other prop- erty of value of their guests, or boarders, or lodgers, brought into such hotel, inn, or boarding or lodging house, by such guests, boarders or lodgers, for the proper charges due from such guests, or boarders, or lodgers, for their accommodation, board and lodging, and room rent, and such extras as are furnished at their request, with the right to the possession of such baggage, or other property of value, until all such charges are paid. In Colorado,^"* the keeper of any hotel, tavern, or board- ing-house, and any person v^ho rents furnished or un- furnished rooms, has a lien upon the baggage and furniture of his or her patrons, boarders, guests, or tenants, for such boarding, lodging or rent, and for all costs incurred in en- forcing such lien. In Connecticut,^^ when a special agreement shall have been made between the keeper of any boarding or lodging house and any person boarding or lodging at such house, regarding the price of such board or lodging, all the baggage and effects kept by such person at such house shall be subject to a lien in favor of the keeper of such house, for all such sums as shall be at any time due him from such person for board or lodging; and such boarding-house or lodging-house keeper may detain such baggage and effects until such debts shall be paid; and, if not paid within sixty days after it is due, he may sell said property, or such part thereof as shall be neces- sary, and apply the proceeds to the payment of such debt. In the District of Columbia,^*^ every innkeeper, keeper of a boarding-house or house of private entertainment has 52 Kirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, The lien may be enforced by sale § 5054. after notice, § 3441. 53 Civ. Code 1906, §§ 1861, 1862. 55 Gen. Stats. 1902, § 4165. 54 Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 4568. 56 Code 1901, § 1261. 465 innkeepers' liens. § 515 a lien upon and may retain possession of the baggage and effects of any guest or boarder for the amount which may be due him from such guest for board and lodging until such amount is paid. In Florida,''' a lien prior in dignity to all others exists in favor of keepers of hotels and boarding-houses for the board and lodging of and for moneys advanced to guests, upon the goods and chattels belonging to such guests in such hotel or boarding-house. In Georgia, ^^ innkeepers and boarding-house keepers have a lien for their dues on the baggage of their guests, which is superior to other liens, except liens for taxes, special liens of landlords for rent, liens of laborers, and all general liens of which they had actual notice before the property claimed to be subject to lien came into their control, to which ex- cepted liens they are inferior. The innkeeper has a lien on the goods of all his guests for all his reasonable charges, and may retain possession until they are paid; his lien attaches though the guest has no title, or even stole the property, and the true owner must pay the charges upon that specific article before receiving the same.^^ In Idaho, *^*^ an innkeeper has a lien on goods and property received by him for safe keeping, and may hold or store the same with some responsible person until all his just and rea- sonable charges are paid. In Illinois,^^ hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables of their guests or boarders brought into such hotel, inn, or boarding-house by such guests or boarders, for the proper charges due from such guests or boarders for their accommodation, board, 5" Gen. Stats. 1906, §§ 2195, 2206. specific article on which the lien 58 Code 1911, § 3360. is claimed. Domestic Sewing- 59 An innkeeper has no lien on Machine Co. v. Watters, 50 Ga. the goods in possession of his 573. guest, as against the true owner, 60 Rev. Code 1908, § 1546. unless there be charges upon the ^i Rev. Stats. 1913, p. 1557, § 1. 30 § 515 LIENS. 466 and lodging, and such extras as are furnished at their re- quest. In Indiana,"- the owner or keeper of any hotel, inn, restau- rant, boarding or eating-house, shall, after demand for pay- ment, be made of the person or persons owing any such claims or bills, have a lien against the personal property and the wages due of any person or persons who may owe said owner or keeper for food, lodging, entertainment or other accommodation, to the extent only of his said claim, and the property may be sold to satisfy such claim, by said owner or keeper, after obtaining judgment for the same in any court of competent jurisdiction and posting a written notice on the outer door of his hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding or eating- house, at least ten days before the day of sale at public out- cry to the highest bidder; and any sum of money remaining from said sale, after satisfying the claim, costs and expenses of sale, shall be turned over to the person or persons whose property was sold. When proper divisions of such property can be made, such part only as shall be necessary to satisfy the claim, cost and expenses shall be sold. In lowa,^^ hotel, inn, rooming-house and eating-house keepers have a lien upon, and may take and retain possession of, all baggage and other property belonging to or under con- trol of their guests or patrons, which may be in such hotel, inn, rooming-house or eating-house, for the value of their accommodations and keep, and for all money paid for or ad- vanced to, and for such extras and other things as shall be furnished such guests, or patrons; and such property so re- tained shall not be exempt from attachment or execution to 62 Burns' Rev. Stats. 1908. hotel, etc., lien will attach to § 7850. sample case carried by traveling 63 Code Supp. 1907, § 3138, as salesman, although the hotel amended by Laws 1909, p. 185. keeper knows when he receives Under statute giving lien to hotel salesman as guest that goods be- keepers on all property belong- long to his employer. Brown ing to or under control of their Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586. guests which may be in such 467 innkeepers' liens. § 515 the amount of reasonable charges of such hotel, inn, room- ing-house or eating-house keeper, against such guests or patrons and the costs of enforcing the lien thereon. In Kansas,*'^ the keeper of an inn, hotel or boarding-house, whether individual, partnership or corporation, has a lien on the baggage and other property in and about such inn brought to the same by or under the control of his guests or boarders, for the proper charges due him from such guests or boarders for the accommodation, board and lodging, and for all money paid for or advanced to them not to exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, and for such other extras as are furnished at the request of such guests. In Kentucky,^^ all hotel-keepers, innkeepers, boarding- house keepers and keepers of houses of private entertain- ment have a lien on all baggage and all personal prop- erty owned by, and brought to, such houses of entertainment by the persons receiving the board, nursing, care or attention from such landlords, for the contract price of such board, care and attention as are received, and in case of no contract price for such board, nursing, care or attention, then for a reason- able price for same. In Louisiana, ^^ innkeepers and all others who let lodgings or receive or take boarders have a privilege, or more proper- ly a right of pledge, on the property of all persons who take their board or lodging with them, by virtue of which they may retain property, and have it sold, to obtain payment of what such persons may owe them, on either account above mentioned, and this privilege shall extend to extras not to exceed ten dollars, supplied by the proprietors of hotels, inns and boarding-house keepers. Innkeepers, hotel, boarding- house and lodging-house keepers enjoy this privilege on all the property which the sojourners have brought to their place, whether it belongs to them or not, because this prop- 64 Laws 1913, p. 360. 66 Merricks' Rev. Civ. Code 65 Carroll's Stats. 1909, § 2179a. 1900, §§ 3217, 3232-3235, 3264. §5^5 LIENS. 468 erty so brought into their place has become pledged to them by the mere fact of its introduction into their place. The term "travellers" applies to strangers and such as, being transiently in a place where they have no domicile, take their board and lodging at an inn. In Maine, ^^ innkeepers or keepers of boarding-houses have a lien on the goods and personal baggage of their guests and boarders, to secure the payment of any money due from them for board or lodging. In Maryland,*^^ persons taking boarders or lodgers have a lien upon their personal effects, goods, or furniture, brought upon the premises, for such board or lodging, w^hether the price be due or not. In Massachusetts,*'^ boarding-house keepers have, for all proper charges due for fare and board or lodging, a lien on the baggage and effects brought to their houses and belong- ing to their guests, boarders or lodgers, except when such guests or boarders are mariners."*^ In Michigan,"^^ whenever the keeper of any hotel or inn or boarding or lodging house shall receive into his hotel or inn or boarding or lodging house any person as a guest or boarder or lodger, he shall have a lien upon and right to de- tain the baggage and effects of such guest or boarder or lodger to secure and compel payment of his customary charges for the food and lodging furnished such guest or 6" Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, § 65. of a husband brought to a board- 68 Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 71, ing-house by his wife, for board § 8. furnished to his wife and child, 69 Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 198, § 28. who had been driven from home See Smith v. Colcord, 115 Mass. by the husband's cruelty and neg- 70. lect. Mills v. Shirley, 110 Mass. '''0 This lien is not so broad in 158. some respects as the common- "i Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 5317- law lien of an innkeeper. It at- 5323; Howell's Stats. Ann. 1912, taches only to property belong- § 4208; Polk v. Melenbacker, 136 ing to the guests or boarders. It Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867. does not attach to the property 469 innkeepers' liens. § 515 boarder or lodger. It has been held that this statute in no- wise affects the rights of an innkeeper to the lien existing at common law. In Mississippi,'^ keepers of hotels, boarding-houses and restaurants have a lien on the goods and personal bag- gage of their guests and boarders to secure the payment of any money due from them for board and lodging. In Missouri,'^^ hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables of their guests or boarders, brought into such hotel, inn, or boarding-house by such guests or boarders, and upon the wages,'^'* of such guests or boarders, for their proper charges due from such guests or boarders, for their accommodation, boarding and lodging, and such extras as are furnished at their request. In Montana,"^ hotel men, boarding-house and lodging- house keepers have a lien upon the baggage and other prop- erty of value brought into such hotel, inn or boarding or lodg- ing house, by such guests or boarders, for their accommo- dation, board, or lodging and room rent, and such extras as are furnished at their request, with the right to the posses- sion of such baggage or other property of value, until all such charges are paid, provided, however, that nothing in the act shall be construed to give a lien upon prop- erty sold on the installment plan and title to which is to remain in the vendor until final payment. '- Code 1906, § 3057. ment of a lien upon wages. In a ■"■s Rev. Stats. 1909, § 8247. The process by garnishment the last lien does not cover goods belong- thirty days' wages are exempt. ing to a third person taken to Hodo v. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. the inn or boarding house by the 393. Where the plaintiff fails to guest. Wyckoff v. Southern establish his lien, he is entitled Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382. to a general judgment for the '4 A lien for wages cannot be debt for board shown to be due. enforced in the manner provided Hodo v. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. by the statute for the enforce- 393. ment of the innkeeper's lien. The '5 Code Ann. (Civ.) 1895, § 2502, mode provided is by sale, and as amended by Laws 1899, p. 132. this is not apt for the enforce- §515 LIENS. 470 In Nebraska,"" the keeper of any inn or hotel, whether individual, partnership or corporation, has a lien on the baggage and other property in and about such inn be- longing to or under the control of his guests or boarders for the proper charges due him from such guests or boarders for the accommodation, board and lodging, and for all money paid for or advanced to them not to exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, and for such other extras as are furnished at their request; and said innkeeper or hotel-keeper shall have the right to detain such baggage and other property until the amount of such charges is paid, and such baggage and other property shall be exempt from attachment or exe- cution until such innkeeper's lien and the cost of satisfying it are satisfied. In New Hampshire,^'^ any person keeping a boarder or lodger, not a mariner or seaman, has a lien upon the baggage and effects of such boarder or lodger brought to his boarding house or lodging house until all proper charges for the fare and board or room rent of such boarder or lodger are paid or tendered. In New Jersey,'''^ all hotel, inn, and boarding-house keep- ers have a lien on all baggage and property belonging to guests, boarders and lodgers at said hotel, inn, or boarding- house, for the amount of their bill or bills due to the pro- prietor thereof for the hire of rooms or board in said hotel, inn, or boarding-house, and have the right, without the pro- 76 Laws 1913, ch. 58, § 5. They have a lien upon the horse "^■7 Pub. Stats, and Sess. Laws of a boarder for his own fare and 1901, ch. 141, § 1, as amended by board, but not for the keeping of Laws 1909, ch. 80. The statute the horse. The terms of the embraces innkeepers who, in ad- statute limit the lien to the fare dition to their business as inn- and board of the guest. It does keepers strictly, also take board- not include the fare and board ers. Such keepers of boarders of his horse. Cross v. Wilkins, are entitled to a lien upon the 43 N. H. 332. baggage and effects of their ''^ Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 3134, boarders for their fare and board. § 44. 471 INNKEEPERS LIENS. § 515 cess of law, to retain the same until the said amount of in- debtedness is discharged. In New Mexico/^ innkeepers and those who board others for pay have a lien on the property of their guests, while the same is in their possession, and until the same is paid. In New York,^'^ a keeper of a hotel, apartment hotel, inn, '9 Comp. Laws 1897, § 2239. 80 Birdseye's C. and G. Consol. Laws 1909, p. 3230, § 181. A stat- ute (1879, ch. 530) enumerates lodging-houses keepers among those entitled to the benefits of the act; but it has been held that a mere lodging-house keeper has no lien upon the effects of the lodger by force of the latter stat- ute, and certainly had none be- fore. Cochrane v. Schryner, 17 N. Y. Week. Dig. 442. No lien can be acquired under this act upon the goods of a third person brought to the house by a board- er. Misch V. O'Hara, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 361. Under this statute it is only the baggage and effects of a boarder that are affected by the lien, and the lien is given only for the amount that may be due for board by such boarder. Mc- Ilvane v. Hilton, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 594. This statute applies to cases of special contracts for board at a fixed rate by the week or month, although an innkeeper, under such circumstances, would have no lien. Misch v. O'Hara, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 361. The statute applies only to those who make a business, in whole or in part, of keeping boarders. Cady v. McDowell, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 484. See Barnett v. Walker, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 323, 79 N. Y. S. 859. The lien ex- ists with reference to perma- nent as well as transient board- ers. Stewart v. McCready, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 62. The Legislature has a constitutional right to give an innkeeper a lien on the goods of a third person brought to the inn by a guest. Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143, affg. 106 App. Div. 431, 94 N. Y. S. 702. A boarding house keeper under the Statute of 1897, ch. 418, § 71, may have a lien on a piano brought to the inn by a guest even where the piano is owned by a third person. Leonard v. Harris, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458, 131 N. Y. S. 909. Under Lien Law (Consol. Laws 1909, ch. 33, § 181), which provides that an innkeeper shall have no lien on property brought by a guest, where he knows the property is not legally in the possession of the guest or when he has notice that such property does not belong to the guest, it is held that the required notice to the hotel keeper must be an actual notice and that he will not be charged with con- structive notice. Mathews v. Victor Hotel Co., 132 N. Y. S. 375, 74 Misc. (N. Y.) 426. Notice to a servant of the Hotel Co. that property brought to the house by a guest does not belong to the 515 LIENS. 472 boarding house or lodging house, except an emigrant lodg- ing house, has a lien upon, while in possession, and may de- tain the baggage and other property brought upon their premises by a guest, boarder or lodger, for the proper charges due from him, on account of his accommodation, board and lodging, and such extras as are furnished at his re- quest. If the keeper of such hotel, apartment hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house knew that the property brought upon his premises was not, when brought, legally in posses- sion of such guest, boarder or lodger, or had notice that such property was not the property of such guest, boarder or lodger, a lien thereon does not exist. In North Carolina,^^ every hotel and boarding-house keeper wdio shall furnish board, bed or room to any person shall have the right to retain possession of and a lien upon all baggage or other property of such person that may have been brought to such hotel or boarding house, until all rea- sonable charges for such room, bed and board are paid. In North Dakota, ^^ hotel, inn, boarding-house and lodging- house keepers shall have a lien upon the baggage and other property of their guests, boarders or lodgers, brought into such hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house by such guests, boarders or lodgers for the proper charges due from such guests, boarders or lodgers for their accommodation, board and lodging and room rent and such extras as are furnished guest is notice to the company. Lurch V. Brown, 119 N. Y. S. 637, 65 Misc. Rep. 190. Notice to the innkeeper that property brought by a guest does not belong to him, where the notice is received after the property is brought will not prevent the innkeeper from having a lien on it for the board and lodging of the guest prior to the time when such notice is given. Lurch v. Wilson, 114 N. Y. S. 789, 62 Misc. Rep. 259. Un- der the Laws of 1897, ch. 118, § 71, an innkeeper has a lien on the property of the guest brought to the house unless the innkeeper knows the property does not be- long to the guest or is legally in his possession. Barnett v. Wal- ker. 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 323, 79 N. Y. S. 859. SI Revisal 1905, § 2037. 82 Rev. Code 1905, p. 1000, § 6292. 473 innkeepers' liens. - § 515 at their request, and the right to the possession of such bag- gage or other property until all such charges are paid. In Ohio,^^ the keeper of any inn, whether individual, part- nership or corporation, has a lien on the baggage and other property in and about such inn belonging to or under the control of his guests or boarders for the proper charges due him from such guests or boarders for the accommoda- tion, board, lodging, and for all money paid for or advanced to them, and for such extras as are furnished at their re- quest. Boarding-house keepers furnishing board to persons em- ployed by any contractor or sub-contractor, in the construc- tion of a railroad, shall have a lien for the payment of the same upon such railroad and such lien shall have and main- tain precedence over any lien taken, or to be taken. ^^ In Oklahoma innkeepers and boarding-house keepers have a lien on the baggage of their guests. ^^ In Oregon, ^"^ hotel-keepers, innkeepers, lodging-house keepers and boarding-house keepers have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables of their guests, lodgers or boarders brought into such hotel, inn, lodging house or boarding house by such guests, lodgers or boarders, for the reasonable charges due from such guests, lodgers or board- ers for their accommodation, board and lodgings, and such extras as are furnished at the request of such guests, lodgers or boarders, and they may retain possession of such property until such charges be paid. In Pennsylvania,^^ the keeper of any inn or hotel, v/hether individual, partnership, or corporation, shall have a lien on the baggage and other property, in and about such inn, belong- ing to, or under the control of, his guests or boarders, for the proper charges due him from such guests or boarders for 83 Gen. Code 1910, §§ 5981, 5984; s^ Comp. Laws 1909, § 4148. Thomas v. Remington Type- S6 Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. writer Co., 30 Ohio C. C. 691'. Codes and Stats. 1902, § 5703. S4 Gen. Code 1910, § 8345. 87 Laws 1913, p. 483. §515 LIENS. 474 the accommodation, board and lodging, and for all money paid for or advanced to them, not to exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, and for such other extras as are furnished at their request; and said inn-keeper or hotel keeper shall have the right to detain such baggage and other property un- til the amount of such charges is paid, and such baggage and other property shall be exempt from attachment or execu- tion until such inn-keeper's lien, and the cost of satisfying it, are satisfied. In South Dakota,^^ an innkeeper or keeper of a boarding- house is liable for all losses of or injury to personal property placed by his guests or boarders under his care, unless oc- casioned by an irresistible superhuman cause, by a public enemy, by the negligence of the owner, or by the act of some one whom he brought into the inn or boarding house ; and upon such property the innkeeper or keeper of a boarding- house has a lien and a right of detention for the payment of such amount as may be due him for lodging, fare, board- ing or other necessaries by such guest or boarder; and the said lien may be enforced by a sale of the property. In Tennessee,^^ keepers of hotels, boarding-houses, and lodging-houses, whether licensed or not, have a lien on all furniture, baggage, wearing apparel, or other goods and chattels brought into any such hotel, boarding or lodging- house, by any guest or patron of the same, to secure the pay- ment by such guest of all sums due for board or lodging. In Texas, ^° proprietors of hotels and boarding-houses have a special lien upon all property or baggage deposited with them for the amount of the charges against them or their owners, if guests at such hotel and boarding-house. 88 Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 1381. Dak. 227, 76 N. W. 930, 49 L. R. A. Under the South Dakota statute 610, 74 Am. St. 791. it is held that an innkeeper has 89 Ann. Code 1896, § 3590. no lien on the property of a third ^^ Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, art. person brought to the inn by a 5663. guest. McClain v. Williams, 11 S. 475 innkeepers' liens. § 515 In Utah,^^ every hotel, tavern, boarding-house keeper, or person who lets furnished rooms has a lien upon the baggage of his patrons, boarders, guests, and ten- ants, for the amount that may be due from any such persons for such boarding, lodging, or rent, and he is authorized to hold and retain possession of such baggage until the amount so due for boarding, lodging, or rent, or either, is paid. In Virginia,^- every innkeeper, keeper of an ordinary, boarding-house, and a house of private entertainment has a lien upon the baggage and effects of any guest or boarder for the amount which may be due for board and lodging until such amount is paid. In Washington, ^^ all hotel keepers, innkeepers, lodging- house keepers, and boarding-house keepers in this state has a lien upon baggage, property, or other valuables of their guests, lodgers, or boarders brought into such hotel, inn, lodging house or boarding-house by such guests, lodgers, or boarders, for the proper charges due from such guests, lodgers or boarders for their accommodation, board or lodg- ing, and such other extras as are furnished at their request, and shall have the right to retain in their possession such bag- gage, property or other valuables until such charges are fully paid, and to sell such baggage, property or other valuables for the payment of such charges. In West Virginia,^* the owner or keeper of any hotel, inn, eating, boarding or lodging house or restaurant has a lien upon and may keep possession of the baggage or other personal property of any kind, of any person or persons which he or they may have therein, for all such claims or bills for lodging, entertainment or accommodation, to the ex- tent only of his said claim or bill. 91 Comp. Laws 1907, § 1402. 93 Remington & Ballinger's Ann. 92 Pollard's Ann. Code 1904, Codes and Stats. 1910, § 1201. § 2489. 94 Code 1906, § 4283. §515 LIENS. 476 In Wisconsin, ^'^ every innkeeper, hotel keeper and keeper of a boarding-house or lodging house, whether indi- vidual, copartnership, or corporation, has a lien upon and may retain the possession of all the baggage and other effects brought into his inn, hotel, boarding-house or lodg- ing house by any guest, boarder or lodger, whether the same is the individual property of such guest, boarder, or lodger, or under his control, or the property of any other person for whose board, lodging, or other accommodation the person contracting for such board and lodging is liable, for the proper charges owing such innkeeper, hotel keeper, or keeper of a boarding-house or lodging house for any board, lodging or other accommodation furnished to or for such guest, boarder, or lodger, and for all money paid or advanced to any such guest, boarder, or lodger, not exceeding the sum of fifty dollars, and for such extras as are furnished at the written request signed by such guest, boarder or lodger, until the amount of such charges is paid; and any execution or attachment levied upon any such baggage or effects shall be subject to such innkeeper's lien and the costs of satisfying it. It is provided, however, that no lien shall be placed upon any property mentioned in this paragraph for any bill or ac- count which is chargeable against any person mentioned herein for malt, spirituous, ardent or intoxicating liquors fur- nished to any of the aforesaid persons.^^ In Wyoming,^" any keeper of a hotel or boarding-house or lodging-house or restaurant has a lien upon the baggage or other personal property of any person who shall obtain board or lodging, or both, from such keeper, for the amount due for 05 Stats. 1898, § 3344, as amended for his charges which an innkeep- by Laws 1913, ch. 341. er had at common law upon the 96 This statute is changed in goods of his guest for the price form, though apparently not in of his board and lodging. Nichols substance, from that of 1863, ch. v. Halliday, 27 Wis. 406. Chicker- 89, § 1. That was held to give to ing-Chase Bros. Co. v. White, 127 a boarding-house keeper the same Wis. 83, 106 N. W. 797. lien upon the effects of a boarder 9" Comp. Stats. 1910, § 3770. 477 innkeepers' liens. § 518 such board or lodging, and is hereby authorized to retain the possession of such baggage or personal property until the said amount is paid. §516. Lien secures only reasonable charges. — The land- lord has a lien for his reasonable charges, whatever may be the amount of his bill, provided the guest be possessed of his reason and be not an infant. If the goods of a guest be seized upon execution, or be attached, they can only be taken subject to the landlord's reasonable charges, and not merely subject to a lien for a reasonable quantity of wines. '^^ Lord Abinger, in his summing up to the jury, said: "It has been urged that the plaintiff was asked not to allow his guest more than a certain quantity of brandy and water, and the guest's mother sent to him to that efTect ; however, I must say that I never heard that the landlord of an inn was bound to in- vestigate the nature of the articles, which were ordered by a guest before he supplied them. The landlord of an inn may supply whatever things the guest orders, and the guest is bound to pay for them, provided that the guest be possessed of his reason, and is not an infant. In either of these latter cases the landlord must look to himself." §517. Liens for advanced money. — The lien covers ad- vances of money made to a guest on the credit of his effects. ^^ § 518. General lien for smiount of the bill. — The lien of an innkeeper is a general one for the whole amount of his bill. The lien covers the charges for the guest's personal enter- tainment, and the charges made specially against the prop- 98 Proctor V. Nicholson, 7 Car. between the innkeeper and the & P. 67. guest, at the time of the advances, 99 Proctor V. Nicholson, 7 Car. that the goods in question were & P. 67. Lord Abinger instructed to be considered as security for the jury that they were to con- these sums. See Watson v. Cross, sider whether it was understood 2 Duvall (Ky.) 147. 5i8 LIENS. 478 erty brought by the guest, such as horses and a carriage.^ In a case before the Queen's Bench Division, Lord Justice Bramwell fully and clearly stated the law, saying:- "The first question for our decision is, What was the innkeeper's lien; was it a lien on the horses for the charges in respect of the horses, and on the carriage in respect of the charges of the carriage and no lien on them for the guest's reasonable expenses, or was it a general lien on the horses and carriage and guest's goods conjointly for the whole amount of the de- fendant's claim as innkeeper. I am of opinion that the latter w^as the true view as to his lien, and for this reason, that the debt in respect of wdiich the lien was claimed was one debt, although that debt was made up of several items. An inn- keeper may demand the expenses before he receives the guest, but if he does not, and takes him in and finds him in all things that the guest requires it is one contract, and the lien that he has is a lien in respect of the whole contract to pay for the things that are supplied to him while he is a guest. If this was not the case a man might go to an hotel with his wife, and then it might be said that the innkeeper's lien was on the guest's luggage for what he had consumed, and on the wife's luggage for what she had had. The con- tract was, that the guest and his horses and carriage shall be received and provided for. There was one contract, one debt, and one lien in respect of the whole of the charges." 1 Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283; Pollock v. Landis, 36 Iowa 651 ; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 20 Am. Dec. 471 ; Mc- Daniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574; Fox v. Mc- Gregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41. In some early cases it was said that the horse of a guest might be detained for his own meals, and not for the guest's personal entertainment. Bac. Abr. Inns, D, citing Rosse & Bramsteed's case, 2 Roll. 438, and 2 Roll. Abr. 85; but these cases do not support the doctrine. The reason for the doctrine is said to be, that chat- tels are in the custody of the law for the debt which arises from the thing itself, and not for any other debt due from the same party. Story Bailm. § 476. As remarked in effect by Story, this doctrine is without substantial support. - Mulliner v. Florence, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 484, 488. 479 innkeepers' liens. § 519 Lord Justice Colton, in the same case, to like effect said: "The innkeeper has a general lien for the whole amount of his bill. As to the horses, harness, and carriage, there would be a lien for any special expenditure, and there is no reason for exempting the horses, harness, and carriage from the general lien an innkeeper has in the guest's goods by the gen- eral law. The innkeeper is bound to receive the horses, harness, and carriage with the guest as much as he is bound to receive the guest himself — the liability of the innkeeper with respect to them is the same as his liability with respect to the other goods of the guest, and there is no reason for excluding the claim of the innkeeper although the horses, harness, and carriage are not received in the dwelling-house, but in adjoining buildings. There is no authority for saying that the innkeeper's lien does not extend to the horses, har- ness, and carriage the guest brings with him, as much as to other things of the guest." If one who is already a guest at a hotel brings his horses and carriages there, a lien attaches to them for the charges then existing against the guest, as well as for the subsequent entertainment of the guest and his horses.^ The lien does not cover board to become due in the future, but only that which is due at the time of the detention.^ A lien for charges for the entertainment of a servant who is a guest at a hotel alone without his master, may be en- forced against the master's horse and wagon which the ser- vant brought with him and used in his master's business.^ § 519. Possession is essential to the preservation of this lien. — If the guest be allowed to take his goods away with him, the innkeeper cannot retake the goods and assert his 3 Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. ^ Smith v. Keyes, 2 Thomp. Div. 484. & C. 650. 4Shafer v. Guest, 35 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184, 6 Robt. 264, 268. § 520 LIENS. 480 lien; and even if the guest returns again with the same goods, the innkeeper cannot hold them for a prior debt.^ But a boarding-house keeper, having a valid lien under the laws of Massachusetts upon the trunk of a boarder, does not lose it by sending it by an express company to New Hamp- shire, with instructions not to deliver it until the amount of the claim for which the trunk was detained should be paidJ § 520. Guest's possession secured by fraud will not pre- vent innkeeper's lien. — If the guest fraudulently removes his goods, or even through fraudulent representations ob- tains the consent of the innkeeper to th^ir removal, the right of lien remains. Thus, if the guest pays his bill with a fraud- ulent draft, which he represents to be good, the lien is not released.* § 521. Temporary loss of possession will not waive lien. — The lien is not defeated by the occasional absence of the guest, if he has the intention of returning.® For example, if a traveller leave his horse at the inn, and then go out to dine or lodge with a friend, he does not thereby cease to be a guest, and the rights and liabilities of the parties remain the same as though the traveller had not left the inn. And if the owner leave the inn and go to another town, intending to be absent two or three days, it seems that the same rule holds good.^^ And so if one goes to an inn with two race- horses and a groom, in the character of a guest, and remains there for several months, taking the horses out every day for exercise and training, though he is occasionally absent for c Jones V. Pearle, 1 Strange 556; S.) 638; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill Jones V. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172. (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Cald- ■^ Jaquith v. American Express well v. Tutt, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 258, Co., 60 N. H. 61. 43 Am. Rep. 307. 8 Manning v. Hollenbeck. 27 10 Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Wis. 202. Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663, per Bron- 9 Allen V. Smith, 12 C. B. (N. son, J. 481 innkeepers' liens. § 523 several days, but always with the intention of returning to the inn, the innkeeper's lien is not destroyed. In the ab- sence of any alteration in the relation of the parties, that of innkeeper and guest is presumed to continue. ^^ § 522. No waiver by accepting other security. — An inn- keeper who accepts security from a guest for the payment of hotel charges does not waive his lien at common law upon the goods of his guest for the amount of such charges, unless there is something in the nature of the security, or in the cir- cumstances under which it was taken, which is inconsistent with the existence or continuance of the lien, and therefore destructive of it.^^ This lien, like other liens, is waived by an arrangement for payment at a future day. § 522a. Priority. — This lien takes precedence of a chattel mortgage not recorded until after the indebtedness was in- curred for which the lien is claimed. ^^ § 523. Lien waived by unlawful sale. — An innkeeper who sells the goods of a guest without judicial or statutory au- thority waives his lien, and renders himself liable in trover for the value of the property, and it is no excuse for such a sale that the retention of the chattel is attended with ex- pense. ^^ In an action by the owner of the property for the conversion, the innkeeper might set off his charges if the 11 Allen V. Smith, 12 C. B. (N. (Mass.) 382; Case v. Fogg, 46 Mo. S.) 638. 44. In Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 12 Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. 172, Chief Justice Pratt is report- D. 330; Reed v. Teneyck, 103 Ky. ed as saying, "that, though the inn- 65, 19 Ky. L. 1690, 44 S. W. 356. keeper might detain a horse for 13 Corbett V. Cushing, 4 N. Y. his meat for one night, yet he Supp. 616, 23 N. Y. St. 55. could not sell the horse and pay 14 Jones V. Pearle, 1 Strange 556; himself; if he did it was a conver- Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. sion, for he is not to be his own 484; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray carver." 31 § 5^4 LIENS. 482 owner was his guest and liable for the debt; but if the prop- erty detained belonged to a third person, there could be no set-of¥ in a suit by him for a conversion of the property. Thus, if the property be horses, which had been stolen or ob- tained by fraud from the owner, the damages to which the owner would be entitled in an action against the innkeeper, for an unlawful sale of them, would be the full value of the horses at the time of sale. In a leading case on this subject before the Queen's Bench Division, Lord Justice Bramwell said:^^ "The defendant, who had only a lien on the horses, was not justified in selling them, and he has therefore been guilty of a conversion, and that enables the plaintiff to main- tain this action for the proceeds of the sale. The very notion of a lien is, that if the person who is entitled to the lien, for his own benefit parts with the chattel over which he claims to exercise it, he is guilty of a tortious act. He must not dispose of the chattel so as to give some one else a right of possession as against himself. The lien is the right of the creditor to retain the goods until the debt is paid. * * * If the plaintiff after the sale of the horses had thought fit to go to the vendee and say to him, 'Those horses are mine,' and the vendee had refused to give them up, he could have maintained an action against the vendee for the full value of the horses; but instead of acting in this manner he has treated the sale by the defendant as a conversion. He is not to be worse off because he has brought his action against the defendant instead of against the vendee. It is said if the plaintiff succeeds that the defendant's lien would be useless to him, and that the plaintiff would be better off than he was before the sale of the horses by the defendant. I do not think there is anything unreasonable in holding the defend- ant liable if the defendant was not bound to feed the horses."' § 524. Care and use of the property detained. — An inn- keeper retaining the goods of his guest by virtue of a lien is 1--5 Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. Div. 484, 489, 491. 483 innkeepers' liens. § 525 not bound to use greater care as to their custody than he uses as to his own goods of a similar description.^*^ Whether the innkeeper has the right to use the property may depend in some degree upon circumstances. It seems that he may do so if the property is of a nature that involves expense to keep it, such as a horse. Where, soon after a horse and w^agon and other articles were left with an inn- keeper to be kept for a few days, he had good reason to be- lieve that the person leaving the property did not own it, and had abandoned it and was acting in bad faith towards the owner, and the innkeeper did not know who or where the owner was, and the owner, as the innkeeper had reason to believe, did not know where the property was, it was held that the innkeeper had the right to use the property mod- erately and prudently to the extent of compensating him for his charges for keeping; and such use, being lawful, was not a conversion. ^'^ § 525. Innkeeper's lien confers no right of sale. — The inn- keeper's lien, like other liens at common law, confers no right of sale in satisfaction of the debt. It is a right to retain and nothing more.^^ By statute, however, a remedy by sale is quite generally provided. In several states the statutes which authorize carriers to sell property on which they have a lien apply also to innkeepers.^'' In a few states there are general statutes applicable to all holders of liens, which authorize the sale of any property for the satisfaction of the lien debt in the manner prescribed.^^ 16 Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. Fox v. AlcGregor, 11 Barb. (N. D. 330. Y.) 41. 1"^ Alvord V. Davenport, 43 Vt. ^9 Such is the case in Illinois, 30. Kansas. Michigan, Nebraska, New IS Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. Mexico, New York, Oregon, Wis- Div. 84; Thames Iron W. Co. v. consin, Wyoming. Patent Derrick Co., 1 Johns. & H. 20 Arizona : § r049a. Colorado: 93, 97; Case v. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44; § 1050. Florida: § 1052. Georgia: People V. Husband, Z6 Mich. 306; § 1053. Idaho: § 1053a. Illinois: § 525a LIENS. 484 § 525a. Alabama.^^ — If the charges when due are not paid within ten days after demand therefor, such hotel, inn, board- ing house or restaurant keeper may, on giving ten days' notice of the time and place of such sale, by advertisement in some newspaper published in the county in which the hotel, inn, boarding house or restaurant is located, once a week for two successive weeks, or, if there be no such paper, by posting the notice in three conspicuous places in the county, sell the goods and baggage for the payment of the charges and expenses of keeping and of the sale; and the balance, if any there be, he shall pay over to the owner. § 525b. Arizona.^^ — Whenever any trunk, carpet bag, valise, box, bundle, furniture, merchandise or baggage has heretofore, or hereafter come into the possession of the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house as such, and has remained or shall remain unclaimed for the period of six months, such keeper may proceed to sell the same by public auction, and out of the proceeds of such sale may re- tain the charges for storage, if any, and the expenses of ad- vertising and sale thereof; but no such sale shall be made until the expiration of four weeks from the first publication of notice of such sale in a newspaper published in the nearest city, town, village, or place in which said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house or warehouse is situated. Said notice shall be published once a week for four weeks in some newspaper, daily or weekly, of general circulation, and shall contain a description of each trunk, carpet bag, valise, bundle, box, furniture, merchandise, or baggage, as near as may be, the name of the owner, if known, the name of such keeper, and § 10S4. Maine: § 1055. Massachu- Utah: § 1060a. Virginia: § 1060b. setts: § 1056. New Hampshire: Wisconsin: § 1060c. Wyoming: § 1057. New Mexico: § 1057a. § 1060e. North Dakota: § 1057b. Oregon: 21 Civ. Code 1907, § 4828. § 1058. South Dakota: § 1057b. 22 Rev. Stats. 1901, § 2917. Tennessee : § 1059a. Texas : § 1060. 485 innkeepers' liens. § 526 the time and place of such place (sale); and the expenses incurred for advertising shall be a lien upon such trunk, car- pet bag, valise, box, bundle, furniture, merchandise, or bag- gage at a ratable proportion, according to the value of such property or thing or article sold; and in case any balance arising from such sale shall not be claimed by the rightful owner within one week from the day of said sale, the same shall be paid into the treasury of the county in which such sale took place; and if the same be not claimed by the owner thereof or his legal representatives within one year there- after, the same shall be paid into the general fund of said county. § 526. California.-^ — Whenever any trunk, carpet-bag, valise, box, bundle, or other baggage has heretofore come, or shall hereafter come, into the possession of the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house, as such, and has remained, or shall remain, unclaimed for the period of six months, such keeper may proceed to sell the same at public auction, and out of the proceeds of such sale may retain the charges for storage, if any, and the expenses of advertising and sale thereof; but no such sale shall be made until the ex- piration of four weeks from the first publication of notice of such sale, in a newspaper published in or nearest the city, town, village, or place in which said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house is situated. Said notice shall be published once a week, for four successive weeks, in some newspaper, daily or weekly, of general circulation, and shall contain a de- scription of each trunk, carpet-bag, valise, box, bundle, or other baggage, as near as may be, the name of the owner, if known, the name of such keeper, and the time and place of such sale; and the expenses incurred for advertising shall be a lien upon such trunk, carpet-bag, valise, box, bundle, or other baggage, in a ratable proportion, according to the 23 Civ. Code 1906, § 1862. § • 526a LIENS. 486 value of such piece of property, or thing, or article sold; and in case any balance arising from such sale shall not be claimed by the rightful owner within one week from the day of said sale, the same shall be paid into the treasury of the county in which such sale took place ; and if the same be not claimed by the owner thereof, or his legal representativ^es, within one year thereafter, the same shall be paid into the general fund of said county. § 526a. Colorado.^^ — After appraisement as prescribed by statute, the keeper of any hotel, tavern or boarding-house. or any person who rents furnished or unfurnished rooms, may, after giving ten days' prior notice of the time and place of such sale, with a description of the property to be sold, by publication in some newspaper published in the county where he resides (or if there be no such newspaper, then by posting in three public places within such county) and de- livering to the owner of such personal property, or if he do not reside in the county, transmitting by mail to him at his usual place of abode, if known, a copy of such notice, proceed to sell all such personal property, or so much thereof as may be necessary, at public auction, for cash in hand, at any pub- lic place within such county, between the hours of ten a. m. and. four p. m. of the day appointed, and from the proceeds thereof may pay the reasonable costs of such appraisement, notice and sale, and his reasonable charges for which he has a lien, together with the reasonable costs of keeping such property up to the time of sale. The residue of the proceeds and of the property unsold he shall render to the owner. § 527. Connecticut.^^ — Whenever the keeper of any hotel or inn shall receive into his hotel or inn any person as a -^ Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, place of sale is necessary. The §§• 4571-4576. attachment of the lien, coupled 25 Gen. Stats. 1902, § 4166. No with the right to sell on the ex- •special notice of the time and piration of a definite limitation, 487 innkeepers' liens. § 527a boarder, he shall have a Hen upon and right to detain the baggage and effects of such boarder; and such lien may be enforced in the manner hereinafter provided. At any time after thirty days after the person incurring any debt or obligation has left the hotel or inn wherein such debt or obligation was incurred, the debt or obligation being still due and unpaid, the proprietor of said hotel or inn may sell at public auction for cash at the office of said hotel or inn any or all baggage or property left at said hotel or inn, and apply the avails of said sale toward the payment of said debt or obligation; provided, that such sale shall be advertised three times in a newspaper published or having a circulation in the town where said hotel or inn is situated, commencing at least five da3^s before said sale ; and that, in case the last usual place of abode of said debtor is known to or can rea- sonably be ascertained by said hotel keeper, notice of the time and place of sale shall be given him by mailing such notice to him in a registered letter, postage paid, at such last usual place of abode at least five days before the time of sale. The proceeds of such sale, after deducting the amount due to the proprietor of such hotel or inn, and all expenses connected with such sale, shall be paid to the owmer of the property, or his legal representatives, if called for or claimed by him or them at any time within one year from the date of said sale, and if such balance is not claimed or called for as aforesaid within said period, then it shall escheat to the state. § 527a. District of Columbia.-^ — If the amount due and for which such a lien is given is not paid after the end of a month after the same is due, and the property bound by said lien does not exceed the sum of fifty dollars, then the party entitled to such lien, after demand of payment upon the is, in legal efifect, if not in ex- at the option of the creditor, press terms, notice to the debtor Brooks v. Harrison, 41 Conn. 184. that, at the termination of the 26 Code 1901, § 1263. time fixed, a sale may be made § 527b LIENS. 488 debtor, if he be within the District, may proceed to sell the property so subject to lien at public auction, after giving no- tice once a week for three successive weeks in some daily newspaper published in the District, and the proceeds of such sale shall be applied, first, to the expenses of such sales and the discharge of such lien, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner of the property. § 527b. Florida.^'^ — The liens of a hotel or boarding-house keeper may be enforced by retaining the personal property and chattels of their guests, for a period not exceeding three months, and by a bill in equity or by an ordinary suit at law and the levy of an execution on such retained property. § 527c. Georgia.-^ — Boarding-house keepers may satisfy their liens, where there is no notice of conflicting liens, by giving notice for thirty days of their intention to sell, and by selling publicly to the highest bidder. If there is a conflict- ing lien, they shall be satisfied as other liens on personal property not mortgaged. § 527d. Illinois.-^ — Unless charges for hotel accommoda- tions are paid within sixty days from the time when the same accrues, the hotel proprietor shall have the right to sell the baggage and effects of delinquent guests at public auction after giving ten days' notice of the time and place of such sale, by publication of such notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which said hotel is sit- uated, and also by mailing ten days before such sale, a copy addressed to such guest at his postoffice address, if known to said hotel proprietor, and if not known, then to his place of residence registered by said guests in the register of such hotel; and after satisfying such lien out of the proceeds of 27 Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2212. 29 Rev. Stats. 1913, p. 1371, § 2. 28 Code 1911, §§ 3366, 3368, 3530. 489 innkeepers' liens. § 5276 such sale, together with any costs that may have been in- curred in enforcing said lien, the residue of said proceeds of sale, if any, shall, within six months after such sale, on de- mand, be paid by said hotel proprietor to such guest; and if not demanded within six months from the date of such sale, such residue or remainder shall be deposited by such hotel proprietor with the county treasurer of the county in which such hotel is situated, together with a statement of such hotel proprietor's claim, the amount of costs incurred in enforcing the same, a copy of the published notice, and the amount received from the sale of said property so sold at said sale; and said residue shall, by said county treasurer, be accredited to the general revenue fund of said county, subject to the right of said guest or his representatives to reclaim the same at any time within three years from and after the date of such deposit with said county treasurer, and such sale shall be a perpetual bar to any action against said hotel proprietor for the recovery of such baggage or property, or of the value thereof, or for any damages growing out of the failure of such guest to receive such baggage or property. § 527e. lowa.-^^ — The innkeeper or hotel keeper shall re- tain such baggage and other property upon which he has a lien for a period of ninety (90) days, at the expiration of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he may sell such bag- gage and other property at public auction after giving ten (10) days' notice of the time and place of sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the county vvhere the inn or hotel is situated, and also by mailing a copy of such notice addressed to said guest or boarder at the place of residence registered by him in the register of such inn or hotel. After satisfying the lien and any costs that may accrue, any residue remaining shall, on demand within six (6) months, be paid to such guest or boarder, and if not so de- manded within six (6) months from date of such sale, such 29a Laws 1913, p. 286. § 5-8 LIENS. 490 residue shall be deposited by such innkeeper or hotelkeeper with the treasurer of the county in which the inn or hotel is situated, together with a statement of the innkeeper's claim and the costs of enforcing same, a copy of the published no- tice, and the amounts received for the goods sold at said sale; said residue shall by said county treasurer be credited to the general revenue fund of said county, subject to a right of said guest or boarder, or his representative, to reclaim at any time within three (3) years of the date of deposit with the said treasurer. § 528. Kansas.^*^ — An innkeeper or hotel keeper shall have the right to detain baggage and other property until the amount of his proper charges are paid, and such baggage and other property shall be exempt from attachment or execution until such innkeeper's lien arid cost of satisfying it are paid. Said innkeeper, boarding house or hotel keeper shall retain such baggage and other property upon which he has a lien for a period of ninety days, at the expiration of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he may sell such baggage and other property at public auction, first giving notice of the time and place of sale by posting at least three notices thereof in public places in the county where the inn or hotel is situated, and also by mailing a copy of such notice addressed to said guest or boarder at the place of residence designated by the register of such inn or hotel. §529. Kentucky .^^ — AYhen any lien exists in favor of any hotel-keeper, inn-keeper, boarding-house keeper and keeper of a house of private entertainment, he may, before a justice of the peace or a judge of the quarterly court of the county where the debt is created, by himself or agent or attorney, make affidavit to the amount due him and in arrears for board, nursing, keeping, care and attention to the person so ?.<• Laws 1913, p. 360. si Carroll's Stats. 1909. § 2179a, 3, p. 964. 491 INNKEEPERS LIENS. S 531 receiving same, and describing, as near as may be, the bag- gage or other personal property owned by, and brought to such house of entertainment ; and, thereupon such officer shall issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff or any constable or town marshall of said county, authorizing him to levy upon and seize the said goods for the amount due, with in- terest and costs ; but if the said goods have been removed from said place with the consent of such landlord, the lien herein provided for shall not continue longer than ten days from and after such removal. § 530. Louisiana."- — Whenever any trunk, carpet bag, valise, box, bundle, or other baggage which shall hereafter come into the possession of the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house, as such, and shall remain un- claimed or unredeemed for the period of six months, such keeper may proceed to sell the same at public auction, and without judicial proceeding, and out of the proceeds of such sale may retain the amount due him for board, lodging and extras, and the charges for storage, if any, and the expense of advertising and sale thereof, but no such sale shall be made until the expiration of four weeks from the first pub- lication of notice of such sale in a newspaper published in or nearest the city, town, village or place in which said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house is situated. In case any bal- ance arising upon such sale shall not be claimed by the right- ful owner within one week from the day of said sale, the same shall be paid to the Charity Hospital of New Orleans. § 531. Maine.^^ — Innkeepers and keepers of boarding- houses, having liens on the goods and personal baggage of their guests and boarders, may enforce the same by a sale of such goods or baggage, in the manner following: After 32 Merrick Rev. Civ. Code 1900. 33 Rev. Stat. 1903, ch. 93, § 65. art. 3236. § 53ia , LIENS. 492 such goods or personal baggage have remained in the pos- session of such innholder or boarding-house keeper for six months, unredeemed, they may be sold at auction to pay the sum due for board or lodging, and the expense of advertising and selling the same. Thirty days' notice of the time and place of sale must be given in a newspaper published in the tow^n where such articles are held, if any, otherwise by post- ing in three conspicuous places therein; with a description of such articles, and the name of the owner; and the proceeds of sale, after deducting all charges and expenses of advertis- ing and notice, shall be applied in satisfaction of the claim upon which such articles are sold, and the balance, if any, shall be held for the benefit of the person entitled thereto. All such sales shall be recorded in the office of the town clerk where the sale took place, with a description of the articles sold, the charges and expenses, and the prices at which they were sold. § 531a. Maryland.^^ — The lien of persons taking boarders or lodgers is enforced by sale of the personal effects, goods, and furniture of their guests, upon reasonable notice of not less than ten days after the debt for such board or lodging shall have become due and payable, at either public or private sale, to satisfy such debt, the proceeds after paying expenses of such sale to be applied in liquidation of such indebtedness, and the balance, if any, paid over to such debtors. §531b. Massachusetts.^^ — A person having a lien, other than for work and labor or for money expended on or about personal property under a contract, express or implied, after demand of payment in writing, may file a petition in the superior court, a police, district or municipal court or with a trial justice of the county in which the petitioner resides for 34 Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 71, 35 Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 198, §§ 23- § 8. 28. 493 innkeepers' liens. § 532 an order for the sale of the property to satisfy his hen. A notice must then be served on the owner of the property by the court's officer or by the petitioner, and if the owner is unknown or a non-resident the notice may be pubHshed. At the hearing, if the Hen is found to exist, the court may order the property sold. The liens of lodging and boarding-house keepers may also be enforced as above designated. § 531c. Michigan.^*' — Any hotel-keeper or innkeeper or boarding or lodging-house keeper who shall have a lien for fare, accommodations or board upon any goods, baggage or other chattel property, and in his possession for three months at least after the departure of the boarder or lodger or guest leaving the same, or who for a period of six months shall have in his custody any unclaimed trunk, box, valise, pack- age, parcel or other chattel property whatever, may proceed to sell the same at public auction, after first having given notice to the county treasurer of such intended sale, and out of the proceeds of such sale may, in case of lien, retain the amount thereof and the expense of storage, advertisement and sale thereof. § 532. Minnesota."" — Property held by the proprietor or manager of a hotel or boarding-house for non-payment of charges for food, entertainment or accommodation, may be sold at public auction ninety days after such default occurs. The sale shall be made by sheriff or constable upon the notice and in the manner provided for in the case of sales under execution from justices' courts. 36 Howell's Stats. Ann. 1912, belong to strangers, provided the §§ 4209-4212. innkeepers have no knowledge of 37 Gen. Stats. 1913, § 6081. Inn- the fact. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Mil- keepers' liens attach to goods in ler, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N. W. 56, 21 possession of guests, though they L. R. A. 229n, 38 Am. St. 568. § 532a LIENS. 494 § 532a. Mississippi.^^ — Keepers of hotels, boarding-houses and restaurants may enforce their liens by a seizure and sale of such goods and baggage in the manner provided by law for enforcing liens for purchase-money of goods. § 533. Missouri.^-' — Hotel, inn and boarding-house keep- ers may sell for cash the baggage and other valuables of their guests or boarders, upon which they may have a lien for charges or which may be left with them unclaimed, after having retained possession of the same for the period of not less than six months, first giving five days' notice of such sale, stating the time, place, and terms of the sale, by ad- vertisement in a newspaper published in the city or county where said sale is to take place, and if no daily paper is pub- lished therein, then by one week's notice in a weekly paper published therein, or by printed or written handbills put up at five places in such city or county aforesaid; and any sums of money received from the proceeds of such sale, after pay- ing all charges, and the expense of the sale and of storing the articles (which said expense of storage shall be fifty cents on each parcel), shall be paid into the county treasury, and in the city of St. Louis into the city treasury, for the benefit of the owner, if he shall thereafter appear; but if such money be not claimed within one A^ear, it shall go into the school fund of the county or city : provided, that when such lien is claimed upon the wages of any such guest or boarder, the justice shall notify the party designated by the plaintiff as owing such guest or boarder, that suit has been instituted to enforce such lien, and such notice shall be served in the same manner and have the same force and effect as garnishments in attachments, and the party served shall be required to answer, and shall receive the same fees as pro- vided by statute. 3S Code 1906, § 3057. so Rev. .Stats. 1909, § 8248. 495 innkeepers' liens. § 533b § 533a. Montana.^*' — Whenever any trunk, carpet bag, valise, box, bundle, furniture, merchandise or baggage has heretofore, or hereafter come into the possession of the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house as such, and has remained or shall remain unclaimed for the period of six months, such keeper may proceed to sell the same by public auction, and out of the proceeds of such sale may re- tain the charges for storage, if any, and the expense of ad- vertising and sale thereof; but no such sale shall be made until the expiration of four weeks from the first publication of notice of such sale in a newspaper published in the nearest city, town, village, or place in which said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging-house or warehouse is situated. Said notice shall be published once a week for four weeks in some daily or weekly newspaper, of general circulation, and shall contain a description of each trunk, carpet bag, valise, bundle, box, furniture, merchandise, or baggage, as near as may be. the name of the owner, if known, the name of such keeper, and the time and place of such sale; and the expenses incurred for advertising shall be a lien upon such trunk, carpet bag, valise, box, bundle, furniture, merchandise, or baggage at a ratable proportion, according to the value of such property or thing or article sold; and in case any balance arising from such sale shall not be claimed by the rightful owner within one w^eek from the day of said sale, the same shall be paid into the treasury of the county in which such sale took place ; and if the same be not claimed within one year thereafter, the same shall be paid into the general fund of said county. § 533b. Nebraska.^^ — The innkeeper or hotel-keeper shall retain such baggage and other property, upon which he has a lien, for a period of ninety days, at the expiration of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he may sell such baggage and other property at public auction, after giving ten days' 40 Civ. Code 1895, § 2503, p. 1171. ^^ Laws 1913, cli. 58. § 6. § 534 LIENS. 496 notice of the time and place of sale in a newspaper of circu- lation in the county where the inn or hotel is situated, and also by mailing a copy of such notice addressed to said guest or boarder at the place of residence registered by him in the register of such inn or hotel. § 534. Nevada.^^ — Whenever any person shall leave a hotel or lodging-house indebted to the proprietor or proprie- tors thereof, and shall remain absent for the period of six months, it shall be lawful for such proprietor or proprietors to sell, or cause to be sold, at public auction, any baggage or property of such person so indebted, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay such indebtedness, expenses, and charges of sale, which may have been left at such hotel or lodging-house by such person. All baggage or property, of whatever description, left at a hotel or lodging-house for the period of twelve months, may be sold at public auction by the proprietor or proprietors thereof, and the proceeds arising from such sale, after deduct- ing the expenses and charges of sale and storage, shall be paid over to the county treasurer of the county in which such baggage or property is left, to be held by him for the period of six months for the benefit of the owner thereof, at which time, if the same is not paid to the owner, or some person legally entitled to the same, it shall be transferred to the school fund of the county. All sales made under the preceding provisions shall be made by a licensed auctioneer, or by some constable of the township in which such baggage or property may be left; provided that no sale shall be valid unless a notice of such sale shall be posted up in three public places in such township for the period of twenty days immediately preceding the day of sale, giving a particular description of the property to be sold, the time and place of such sale, the name of the hotel or 42 Rev. Laws. 1912, §§ 2151-2153. 497 INNKEEPERS LIENS. i; 535a lodging-house at which such baggage or property may be left, the name of the owner or owners of such baggage or property, when known, and signed by such auctioneer or constable. § 534a. New Hampshire.''" — Any person having a lien on personal property, by pledge or otherwise, where no time is limited for the payment of the debt or redemption of the property, may sell the same or so much thereof as is needful, at auction, notice of the sale being given as required by the statute, and from the proceeds he may reimburse himself for his debt and the expenses incident to the sale. § 535. New Jersey.^^ — All baggage and property held by any hotel, inn, and boarding-house keeper for a guest's un- paid bills shall, after the expiration of six months from the date of such detention, be sold at public auction, upon a no- tice published for three days in a public newspaper published in the city or town where said hotel, inn, or boarding-house shall be kept, and the proceeds thereof shall be applied to the payment of such lien and the expenses of such sale, and the balance, if any remaining, shall be paid over to the owner of such property or his representatives; and if said balance is not claimed by such owners within thirty days, then the said balance to be paid to the overseer of poor-house of said city or town for the support of the poor. § 535a. New Mexico.^^ — In order to enforce their liens innkeepers and those who board others for pay, may, after the debt for which the lien is claimed becomes due and paya- ble, serve the party or parties against whom the lien is sought to be enforced with a written notice, setting forth the amount of the indebtedness, upon what account or cost the same ac- crued, and that if the same is not paid within ten days after 43 Pub. Stats. & Sess. Laws 1901, 44 Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 3134, § 45. ch. 141, § 3. 45 Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2240-2242. 32 § 536 LIENS. 498 the service of said notice, the property will be advertised for sale to satisfy said indebtedness. If default be made in the payment of the debt, after notice, then it shall be lawful for the lien claimant or creditor to advertise and sell such prop- erty at public auction to the highest bidder for cash after giving twenty days' notice of such sale by at least six hand- bills posted up in public places in the county in which such sale is to be made; such notices of sale shall set forth time and place of sale and a description of the property to be sold. After sale the proceeds of such sale shall be applied to the payment of the costs of advertising and making the sale and the satisfaction of the demand of the lien claimant, and the residue, if any, shall be refunded to the lien debtor; provided, that the lien claimant shall not be precluded from bidding on or purchasing the property of such sale. § 536. New York.^^ — Any hotel-keeper, innkeeper, boarding-house, apartment-hotel or lodging-house keeper, except an emigrant lodging-house keeper, has a lien upon, while in possession, and may detain the baggage and other property brought upon his premises by a guest, boarder or lodger, for the proper charges due from him, on account of his accommodation, board and lodging and such extras as are furnished at his request. If the keeper of such hotel, apartment-hotel, inn, boarding or lodging-house knew that the property brought upon his premises was not, when brought, legally in possession of such guest, boarder, or lodger, a lien thereon does not exist. A lien against personal property, other than mortgage on chattels, if in the legal possession of the lienor, may be satis- fied by the public sale of such property. Notice must be given to the owner of the property if within the county, and if not, by mailing to him at his last known place of residence. 46Birdseye's C. & G. Consol. Laws 1909, pp. 3230, 3231, 3237, 3238, 3239. 499 innkeepers' liens. § 536 The notice must state the nature of the debt or agreement with an itemized statement of the claim; a brief description of the property against which the lien exists and its estimated value; and the amount of such lien at the date of the notice. The notice shall also require the owner to pay the amount due within ten days from the service thereof and shall state the time when and place where such property shall be sold. Each sale of personal property to satisfy a lien thereon shall be at public auction to the highest bidder, and shall be held in the city or town where the lien was acquired. After the time for the payment of the lien, specified in the notice required to be served by the preceding section, notice of such sale describing the property to be sold, and stating the name of the owner and the time and place of such sale, shall be published once a week, for two consecutive weeks, in' a newspaper published in the town or city where such sale is to be held, and such sale shall be held not less than fifteen days after such notice published or posted in not less than six conspicuous places therein. Redemption may be made before sale, and after sale the lienor shall retain an amount sufficient to satisfy his lien and expenses. The balance shall be held by the lienor subject to the demand of the owner. If this is not claimed within thirty days of sale, such balance must be deposited with the treas- urer of the city or village or supervisor of the town. With such deposit there must be an affidavit of the lienor stating the name and place of residence of the owner of the property sold, if known, and articles sold, the prices obtained therefor, that the notice required by this article was duly served and how served upon such owner, and that such sale was legal and how advertised. There shall also be filed therewith a copy of the notice of sale published or posted. The officer with whom such balance is deposited shall credit the same to the owner of the property, and pay the same to such owner, his assignee or legal representative on demand and § 536a LIENS. 500 satisfactor}'' evidence of identity. If such balance remain in the possession of such ofBcer for a period of five years un- claimed by the person legally entitled thereto, it shall be transferred to the general funds of the town, village or city, and be applied and used as other moneys belonging to such town, village or city. This remedy is not exclusive. § 536a. North Carolina.'^^ — If the charges of a hotel or boarding-house keeper are not paid within ten days after they become due then the hotel or boarding-house keeper is au- thorized to sell said baggage or other property at the court- house door, after first advertising such sale for ten days at said courthouse door and three other public places in the county, and out of the proceeds of sale to pay the costs and expenses of sale and all costs and charges due for said board, bed or room, and the surplus, if any, pay to the owner of said baggage or other property. § 536b. North Dakota.^" — Upon default being made in the payment of a debt secured upon personal property, such lien may be foreclosed upon the notice, and in the manner pre- scribed for the foreclosure of mortgages upon personal prop- erty, and the holder of such lien shall be entitled to the pos- session of the property covered thereby for the purpose of foreclosing the same. § 536c. Ohio.'*'^ — The innkeeper shall retain such baggage and other property, upon which he has a lien, for sixty days, at the expiration of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he may sell it at public auction, after giving ten days' notice of the time and place of such auction in a newspaper of gen- eral circulation and in the county where such inn is situated, and by mailing a copy of such notice addressed to such guest ^- Revisal 1905, § 2038. ^9 Gen. Code 1910, §§ 5985, 5986. 4«Rev. Code 1905, § 6296. 50I innkeepers' liens. § 537 or boarder at the place of residence registered by him in the register of such inn. After satisfying the lien and costs that may accrue, the residue, on demand within six months there- after, shall be paid to the guest or boarder, to whom the prop- erty belonged or [by whom it] was controlled, and if not so demanded, shall be deposited by such innkeeper with the treasurer of the county in which such inn is situated, with a statement of the innkeeper's claim, the cost of enforcing it, a copy of the published notice, and the amount received for such property sold at such sale. Such residue shall be cred- ited by the county treasurer to the general revenue fund of the county, subject to the right of such guest or boarder, or the representatives, to reclaim it within three years from the date of such deposit. § 536d. Oregon.^*^ — If the charges for which hotel-keep- ers, innkeepers, and boarding-house keepers have a lien are not paid within sixty days after they become due, the prop- erty may be sold at public auction after advertisement for three weeks. The proceeds shall be applied first to the dis- charge of such lien and the cost of selling such property, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner on demand. § 537. Pennsylvania.^^ — The innkeeper or hotelkeeper shall retain such baggage and other property upon which he has a lien for a period of ninety days, at the expiration of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he may sell such bag- gage and other property at public auction, after giving ten days' notice of the time and place of sale in a newspaper of circulation in the county where the inn or hotel is situated, and also by mailing a copy of such notice, addressed to said guest or boarder at the place of residence registered by him in the register of such inn or hotel. 50 Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. ^i Laws 1913, p. 483. Codes & Stats. 1902, § 5704. § 537a LIENS. 502 After satisfying the lien and any costs that may accrue, any residue remaining shall, on demand within six months, be paid to such guest or boarder; and if not so demanded with- in six months from date of such sale, such residue shall be deposited by such innkeeper or hotelkeeper with the treas- urer of the county in which the inn or hotel is situated, to- gether with a statement of the claim of the innkeeper or hotel proprietor and the costs of enforcing the same, a copy of the published notice, and of the amounts received for the goods sold at said sale. Said residue shall, by said county treasurer, be credited to the general revenue fund of said county, subject to a right of said guest or boarder, or his representative, to reclaim at any time within three years of the date of deposit with said treasurer. § 537a. South Carolina.^^ — At any time after the expira- tion of ten days after the person incurring the debt or obliga- tion has left the hotel the proprietor of any hotel, inn or boarding-house may sell, at public auction, for cash, at hotel or boarding-house ofifice, any or all baggage or property left at said hotel, inn or boarding-house, to satisfy said debt or obligation without any process at law or equity; provided, that said sale shall be advertised by written or printed posters at three public places in the vicinity for at least ten days before said sale. § 537b. South Dakota^^ — Baggage or other property and effects belonging to the person who, after obtaining board, lodging or other accommodation at any hotel or inn, shall abscond or absent himself or herself from such hotel or inn without having paid for such board, lodging or other accom- modations, may at the expiration of thirty days be sold by the keeper of such hotel or inn at private or public sale, and the net amount realized from such sale shall be credited to the unpaid account of the absconder. 52 Code of Laws 1912, § 2617. 53 Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 1382. 503 innkeepers' liens. § 537d § 537c. Tennessee.''^ — At any time after thirty days after the person incurring the debt or obligation has left the hotel, inn, or boarding-house, and the debt or obligation being still due and unpaid, the owner or proprietor of such hotel, inn, or boarding-house may sell, at public auction, for cash, at hotel or boarding-house office, any or all baggage or property left at said hotel, inn, or boarding-house, to satisfy said debt or obligation, without any process at law or equity, provided that said sale shall be advertised by written or printed posters for at least ten days before said sale. § 537d. Texas.^^ — When possession of any of the prop- erty left in a hotel or boarding-house has continued for sixty days after the charges accrue, and the charges so due have not been paid, it shall be the duty of the persons so holding such property to notify the owner, if in the state and his resi- dence is known, to come forward and pay the charges due, and, on his failure within ten days after such notice has been given him to pay the charges, the persons so holding the property, after twenty days' notice, are authorized to sell the same at public sale and apply the proceeds to the payment of said charges and shall pay over the balance to the person entitled to the same. If the owner's residence is be- yond the state or is unknown, the person holding said prop- erty shall not be required to give ten days' notice mentioned in the preceding article before proceeding to sell. If the person who is legally entitled to receive the balance men- tioned in this chapter is not known, or has removed from the state or from the county in which such property was so held, it shall be the duty of the person so holding said property to pay the balance to the county treasurer of the county in which said property is held, and take his receipt therefor. Whenever any balance shall remain in the possession of 54 Ann. Code 1896, § 3596. 55 Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, arts. 5667-5670. § 538 LIENS. 504 the county treasurer for the period of two years unclaimed by the party legally entitled to the same, such balance shall become a part of the county fund of the county in which the property was so sold, and shall be applied as any other county fund or mone)^ of such county is applied or used. §538. Utah/'*^ — At any time after thirty days after default made in the payment of a debt se- cured by a lien upon personal property, such lien may be foreclosed by advertisement, upon the notice in the manner provided for the foreclosure of mortgages on personal property; provided that a copy of the notice shall, at the time of posting or publication, be delivered to the owner of the property, or if he does not reside in the county, shall be transmitted to him by mail at his usual place of abode, if known. After paying reasonable expenses of the sale, together with the amount due and the cost of keeping the property up to the time of the sale, the residue, if any. shall be rendered to the owner of the property. If the prop- erty be sold by -advertisement, a statement shall be rendered to the owner of the property as the law prescribes shall be made to a mortgagor, and on failure to render such state- ment, the lienholder shall forfeit to the owner the sum of twenty-five dollars damages. The fees for the publication of notice shall in no case exceed the sum of three dollars, and the fees of the person crying the sale shall be two dollars per day. § 538a. Virginia.''" — If the debt for which an innkeeper's lien exists be not paid within ten days after it is due and the value of the property affected by the lien does not exceed twenty dollars, he may sell such property or so much thereof as may be necessary, by public auction, for cash, and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the debt and expenses of 56 Comp. Laws 1907, § 1405. ^~ Code Ann. 1904. §§ 2491, 3207. 505 innkeepers' liens. § 539 sale, and the surplus, if any, he shall pay to the owner of the property. Before making such sale, he shall advertise the time, place, and terms thereof, in such manner as to give publicity thereto, and also give to the owner, if he be in the county or corporation, ten days' written notice of the same and of the amount claimed to be due. If the owner can not be found in such county or corporation, posting the notice at three public places therein shall be sufficient service thereof. If the value of the property be more than twenty dollars but does not exceed one hundred dollars, the party having such lien, after giving notice as hereinbefore provided, may apply by petition to any justice of the county or corporation where- in the property is, or, if the value of the property exceed one hundred dollars to the county or corporation court of such county or corporation, for the sale of the property; and if, on the hearing of the case on the petition, the defense, if any made thereto, and such evidence as may be adduced by the parties respectively, the court or justice shall be satis- fied that the debt and lien are established and the property should be sold to pay the debt, such court or justice shall order the sale to be made by the sheriff or sergeant of the said county or corporation or any constable thereof, who shall make the same and apply and dispose of the proceeds in the same manner as if the sale were made under a writ of fieri facias. If the owner of the property be a resident of this state, the notice required by this section may be served in the usual mode prescribed by statute. If he be a non-resi- dent, it may be servd by posting a copy threof in three public places in the county or corporation wherein the property is. § 539. Washington.^^ — Whenever any baggage, property, or other valuables which have been retained by any hotel- keeper, innkeeper, lodging-house keeper, or boarding-house keeper in his possession by virtue of a lien thereon shall re- main unredeemed for the period of three months after the 58 Remington & Ballingcr's Ann. Codes and Stats. 1910, § 1202. § 539^ LIENS. 506 same shall have been so retained, then it shall be lawful for such hotel-keeper, innkeeper, lodging-house keeper, or board- ing-house keeper to sell such property at public auction, after giving the owner thereof ten days' notice of the time and place of such sale, through the post-of^ce, or by advertising in some newspaper published in the county where such sale is made, or by posting notices in three conspicuous places in such county, and out of the proceeds of such sale to pay all legal charges due from the owner of such property, including proper charges for storage of the same, and the overplus, if any, shall be paid to the owner upon demand. 539a. West Virginia.^'' — The owner or keeper of any hotel, inn, eating, boarding or lodging house, or restaurant, shall have a lien upon and may keep possession of, the bag- gage or other personal property of any kind, of any person or persons which he or they may have therein, for all such claims or bills for lodging, entertainment or accommodation, to the extent only of his said claim or bill ; and after the ex- piration of three months from the date of the departure of such person or persons, and all or part of such claims re- maining unpaid and not arranged, said property or such part thereof as may be neccessary, shall be sold to the highest bidder for cash, in the same way, upon the same advertise- ment, and by the same ofificers, that personal property is now sold by execution; and any money remaining from said sale after satisfying the claim, costs and expenses of sale, shall be paid to the person or persons, whose property was sold. § 539b. Wisconsin.*^^ — Every innkeeper or boarding-house keeper having a lien upon baggage and effects of guests or boarders for board due, may, in case such debt remain unpaid for three months and the value of the property effected there- by does not exceed one hundred dollars, sell such property at public auction and apply the proceeds of such sale to the pay- 59 Code Ann. 1906, § 4283. eo Stats. 1898, § 3347. 507 innkeepers' liens. § 539c ment of the amount clue him and the expenses of such sale. Notice, in writing, of the time and place of such sale and of the amount claimed to be due shall be given to the owner of such property personally or by leaving the same at his place of abode, if a resident of this state, and if not, by publication thereof once in each week, for three weeks successively, next before the time of sale in some newspaper published in the county in which such lien accrues, if there be one, and if not, by posting such notice in three public places in such county. If such property exceed in value one hundred dollars, then such lien may be enforced against the same by action in any court having jurisdiction. § 539c. Wyoming.^^ — If the amount due for such board or lodging is not paid within sixty days from the time the same shall have become due and payable, any such keeper may proceed to have such baggage or other personal prop- erty sold for the satisfaction of his lien in the following man- ner: He shall give ten days' prior notice of the sale of said articles by him held under his lien, a copy of which he shall immediately transmit, by registered letter, to the owner of the articles at his usual place of abode if known, and he shall post said notice of sale in three conspicuous and public places in the city, town, village or place where said keeper resides, giving a description of the articles to be sold and the time and place of sale, one of which notices shall be posted in the ofifice of the hotel, lodging house, boarding-house or restaurant, if still maintained. At the time mentioned in said notices, the said keeper may proceed to sell to the highest bidder for cash, all of such personal property held under the lien, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to pay his claim, and the residue of the unsold property, together with the surplus proceeds of such property sold, if any, he shall surrender to the owner, his heirs or legal representatives, on application therefor. eiComp. Stats. 1910, § 3770. CHAPTER XII. LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. Sec. Sec. 540. In general. 562. 541. Lien by agreement. 542. Lien on property not in ex- 563. istence. 543. Chattel mortgage clause. 544. Lease that is a mortgage 564. must be recorded. 565. 545. Lease of farm to be worked on shares. 546. Rule in Missouri. 566. 547. Delivery sufficient to pro- tect a lien. 567. 548. Provision giving lessor ownership. 568. 549. Lease reserving right of re- 569. entry. 550. Re-entry. 570. 551. Common-lav/ right of re- straint. 571. 552. Lien of a distress warrant. 553. Lien attaches from begin- ning of tenancy. 572. 554. Lien prior to that of at- tachment or execution. 573. 555. Priority of lien to tenant's mortgage. 574. 556. Landlord's lien paramount 575. to mortgage lien. 557. Lien not paramount to re- corded chattel mortgage. 576. 558. Fraudulent cancellation of 576a. mortgage not effective. 559. Tenant's assignee in bank- 577. ruptcy. 560. Assignment takes prece- 578. dence of distress warrant. 561. Distress warrants at com- mon law. 508 All property on premises lia- ble to distress for rent. Exemptions from distress on the ground of public policy. Privilege of trade. General exemption laws do not apply as against a distress. Lien for rent attaches only on tenant's property. The lien attaches only to personal property. Lien covers entire crop. Lien does not attach to property not on premises. Lien attaches to mortgaged property. Distress attaches to prop- erty only where demise exists. Rent payable must be fixed and certain. Distress only after rent is due. Extent of landlord's lien. The statutory lien for rent does not depend upon the maturity of the rent. Expenses, costs and the like. Protection of bona fide purchaser. Loss of lien bj' sale of property. Loss of lien by sale of ten- ant to innocenf purchas- er. 509 LANDLORD S LIENS FOR RENT. Sec. 578a. Effect of removal of prop- erty to another state. 579. Consent of landlord to re- moval of propert}'. 580. Notice of lien to purchaser of crop. 581. Loss of lien by sale of goods in usual w^ay. 582. Sale by tenant will not af- fect landlord's lien. 583. Estoppel of landlord. 584. Liability of purchaser to landlord. 585. Lien not w^aived by taking note. 586. Lien not waived by taking mortgage. 587. Not waived by taking obli- gation of third person. 588. Remedy of landlord who has taken security. 589. Tender of rent due must be kept good. 590. Lien lost by levy of an ex- ecution. 591. Lien not lost by appoint- ment of receiver. 592. Lien lost by accepting sur- render of the leasehold estate. 593. No distraint for rent after term expires. 594. A landlord's lien not im- paired by his tenant's subletting the premises. 595. Loss of lien by destruction of the property. 596. Notice unnecessary at com- mon law. 597. Rule in United States as to notice to tenant. 598. Who may distrain. 599. Rights of purchaser at fore- closure sale. 600. Against whom distraint may be had. Sec. 601. Injunction by landlord. 602. Alabama. 603. Alabama (continued). Land- lord's liens upon crops. 604. Alabama (continued). Liens of tenants in common. 605. Arizona. 606. Arkansas. 607. Arkansas (continued). Lien for supplies advanced. 608. Delaware. 609. District of Columbia. 610. Florida. 611. Georgia. 612. Georgia (continued). Dis- tress for rent. 613. Illinois. 614. Illinois (continued). Lien upon crops. 615. Indiana. 616. Iowa. 617. Kansas. 618. Kentucky. 619. Kentucky (continued). Lien for rent. 620. Louisiana. 621. Maine. 622. Maryland — Distress for rent. 623. Maryland (continued). Lien on crops. 624. Minnesota. 625. Mississippi. 626. Missouri. 627. New Jersey — Distress for rent. 628. New Jersey (continued). Liens for rent — When ten- ant's goods seized on exe- cution. 629. New York. 630. New Mexico. 631. North Carolina. 631a. North Dakota. 631b. , Oklahoma. 631c. Oregon. 632. Pennsylvania. § 540 LIENS. 510 Sec. Sec. 633. Pennsylvania (continued). 637. Tennessee (continued). Fur- Tenant's good seized on nishers' liens, execution. 638. Texas. 634. South Carolina. 638a. Utah. 635. South Carolina (continued). 639. Virginia. Lien for rent and ad- 639a. Washington, vances for agricultural 639b. West Virginia, purposes. 640. Wisconsin 636. Tennessee. § 540. In general. — The right of a landlord to a first lien upon his tenant's goods for his rent has always been regarded as just and proper. It is a right greatly to the interest of tenants, especially those of the poorer class, for it gives them credit, and enables them to hire property which they otherwise could not. This lien has been regarded with such favor that at common law the landlord was allowed to take the enforcement of it into his own hands, and by the hands of a bailiff of his own appointment to seize and sell his tenant's chattels found on the premises for the rent in ar- rear.^ At common law, however, the landlord had no lien for rent upon his tenant's goods;- but he had a right to seize or distrain the goods found upon the leased premises for rent or board unpaid. This right of distraint may in some sense be termed a lien, though it differs essentially from the landlord's lien created by statute. One essential difference is, that by the common-law process no fixed lien upon the property existed until the property was actually seized or levied upon; while by statute a lien is ordinarily im- posed upon the property from the beginning of the tenancy. The process of distraint, modified more or less by statute, is still in use in several states,^ and in many others a lien is 1 Gibson v. Gautier, 1 Mackey some form in Delaware, § 608; (D. C.) 35. Florida, for the enforcement of sPowell V. Daily, 63 111. 646, 45 liens, §610; Georgia, §612; Illi- N. E. 414, affirmed 61 111. App. nois, and there is also a Hen on 552. crops, §§613, 614; Kentucky, and 3The right of distress exists in there is also a lien, §§618, 619; 511 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 541 given to landlords by statute ;^ but aside from the one or the other, it is competent for the landlord and tenant to create a lien upon the tenant's property by contract. This contract is usually in the form of a mortgage clause in the lease. This creates a lien as against the tenant and those having notice of the contract, and the lien can be made effectual against all the world by giving notice of it by recording. §541. Lien by agreement. — ^To create a present lien by agreement, the words used should indicate that the lien is created and attaches at the time of the execution of the in- strument; and it is not sufficient that they indicate that the lien is to be created at a future time. Thus a lease of a hotel, stipulating for the payment of a certain rent, contained these words : "And a lien to be given by said lessees to said lessors, to secure the payment thereof, * * * on all the furniture which shall be placed in said hotel by said lessees." It was held that these words indicated a covenant on the part of the lessees to create a lien by future action; and that no present lien was created upon the furniture then in the hotel, or upon such as should afterwards be placed in it.'"" It Maryland, §§622, 623; Mississippi, in the nature of an attachment, § 625; New Jersey, §§ 627, 628; Pennsylvania, §§ 632, 633; South Carolina, also a lien, §§ 634, 635; Texas, lien enforced by distress, §638; Virginia, §639; West Vir- ginia, § 639b. There is no right of distress for rent in California and Colorado. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 18 Pac. 342. Distress is expressly abolished in District of Columbia, Minnesota, New York, Wisconsin and Utah. 4Liens in favor of landlords ex- ist in some form in Alabama, §§602-604; Arizona, §605; Arkan- sas, §§ 606, 607; District of Co- lumbia, § 609; Florida, though en- forced by distress, § 610; Georgia, §§ 611, 612; Illinois, §§ 613, 614; Indiana, § 615; Iowa, § 616; Kan- sas, § 617; Kentucky, § 619; Louisiana, § 620; Maine, § 621; Maryland, § 623; Mississippi, § 625; Missouri, § 626; New Jer- sey, § 628; New Mexico, § 630; North Carolina, § 631; South Car- olina, §§ 634, 635; Tennessee, §§ 636, 637; Texas, § 638. 5 Hale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, 1 J. & S. (N. Y.) 40; New Lincoln Hotel Co. v. Shears, 57 Nebr. 478, 78 N. W. 25, 43 L. R. A. 588, IZ Am. St. 524. § 541 LIENS. • 512 was a covenent, however, of which a court of equity would decree specific performance ; for while a contract for the sale of chattels will not ordinarily be specifically performed, for the reason that a party can have adequate compensation at law, this reason does not apply to an agreement for a lien or security upon personal property when there can be no remedy at law.® Where in such case a mortgagee of the tenant, with full notice of the equities of the lessor, seized the furniture and sold it, so that a specific performance was rendered impossible, it was held that the lessor could have a lien declared upon the proceeds of such sale, and in this way obtain the benefit of the lien contracted for." If, however, the mortgagee took his mortgage and made a loan in good faith without notice of the provision in the lease in respect to a lien to be given the lessor, no equitable lien is raised in favor of the latter as against the proceeds of the furniture in the mortgagee's hands. ^ A lien in favor of the landlord as against his tenant may be created by a verbal agreement that the landlord shall have a lien upon the tenant's crop for rent, or for supplies fur- nished him ; and it will be operative against all persons ex- cept bona fide purchasers without notice.*^ Such an agree- ment does not contravene any provision of the statute of frauds. ^^ The landlord may take possession of the crop under such verbal agreement whenever by its terms he is entitled to do so, and he may defend the possession as against CHale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 Beck v. Venable, 59 Ind. 408. Evi- N. Y. 626, 633, 1 J, & S. (N. Y.) dence held sufficient to sustain a 40, per Allen, J. finding that the purchaser paid for "Hale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 the property without notice of N. Y. 626, 633, 1 J. & S. (N. Y.) landlord's lien. See Shelley v. 40. .Tuckerman, 83 Nebr. 366, 119 N. sHale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 7 W. 663. J. & S. (N. Y.) 207, affd. 64 N. lOMorrow v. Turney's Admr., Y. 550. 35 Ala. 131. 9Gafford v. Stearns, 51 Ala. 434; 513 landlords' liens for rent. § 542 the tenant or any one claiming under him who is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. ^^ § 542. Lien on property not in existence. — A lien may be imposed by contract upon property not then in existence, but which the parties contemplate will be in existence dur- ing the time the lien is to operate; the lien will take effect and be rated in equity when the property is acquired and used as contemplated. ^- Thus a clause in a lease which mortgages all the crops to be raised on the leased premises for the current year is valid in equity, and the lien attaches to the crops as they come into existence. ^^ A lease of a hotel contained a stipulation that all fixtures, furniture, and other improvements should be bound for the rent. At the date of the lease the house was unfurnished. It was held that the stipulation created a lien, valid at least in equity; that this lien was for the full amount of the rent reserved for the whole term, and not simply for any portion that might from time to time become delinquent, and that it had priority of a mortgage given after the lease took effect, but before any rent became delinquent, to a person having knowledge of the stipulation in the lease. ^"^ Inasmuch as the essence of the right of lien at law is possession, there can be in law no lien by contract upon a iiGafford v. Stearns, 51 Ala. Y. 113; McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 434; Driver v. Jenkins, 30 Ark. N. Y. 459, 22 Am. Rep. 644; Coates 120; Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, v. Donnell, 16 J. & S. (N. Y.) 46, 602, 25 Am. Rep. 584. affd. 94 N. Y. 168. See, however, i2See Jones on Chattel Mort- Borden v. Croak, 131 111. 68, 22 gages, §170; Wright v. Bircher's N. E. 793, 19 Am. St. 23; Powell Exr., 72 Mo. 179, Z7 Am. Rep. 433; v. Daily, 163 111. 646, 45 N. E. 414, Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. 160; affd. 61 111. App. 552. First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 111. i^Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 483, 28 N. E. 955; Everman v. 544, 22 L. ed. 183. Robb, 52 Miss. 653, 24 Am. Rep. i^Wright v. Bircher's Exr., 72 682; Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Mo. 179, Z7 Am. Rep. 433. 33 § 543 LIENS. 514 future or an unplanted crop,^^ at least until possession is taken after the crop has been raised ;^^ but such a lien may be created by statute, ^^ and, as already noticed, it is valid in equity. But such a lien not being good at law, it cannot avail against exemption rights in favor of the tenant's family.^^ Under a contract whereby a tenant undertakes to secure his landlord by a lien upon a crop to be raised, a mortgage or other incumbrance given by the tenant upon the crop to another, who takes it in good faith and without knowledge of such contract before the landlord takes possession of the crop, has precedence. ^^ An agreement by a lessee to deliver wool to his lessor in payment or security for rent creates no lien upon wool not shipped to the lessor, as against the lessee's assignee in in- solvency.^^ § 543. Chattel mortgage clause. — A clause in a lease making the rent a charge upon property while not a lien by statute, is in effect a chattel mortgage, and is valid and enforcible as such.^^ Thus a clause making rent a charge on the crops and farming stock upon the leased premises, "whether exempt from execution or not," is in effect a chat- tel mortgage.-- It is immaterial that the instrument does not contain any words of grant or conveyance. If it creates a lien or equitable charge, its validity and the rights of the parties depend upon the same principles as in case of a chat- tel mortgage executed in technical terms. ^^ But an instru- i^Hamlett v. Tallman, 30 Ark. landlord has no lien for rent re- SOS; Alexander v. Pardue, 30 Ark. served. 359; Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, 2iMerrill v. Ressler, 37 Minn. 25 Am. Rep. 584. 82, 33 N. W. 117; Wisner v. Ocum- icGittings V. Nelson, 86 111. 591. paugh, 71 N. Y. 113. i^Abraham v. Carter, 53 Ala. 8. 22Fejavary v. Broesch, 52 Iowa isVinson v. Hallowell, 10 Bush 88, 2 N. W. 963, 35 Am. Rep. 261. (Ky.) 538. saMcLean v. Klein, 3 Dill. (U. isPerson v. Wright, 35 Ark. 169. S.) 113, Fed. Cas. No. 8884; Feja- 20Hitchcock v. Hassett, 71 Cal. vary v. Broesch, 52 Iowa 88, 2 N. 331, 12 Pac. 228. In California the W. 963, 35 Am. Rep. 261; Atwater 515 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 543 ment without words of grant or conveyance is not a legal mortgage vesting the title and giving the right to seize and sell.-^ It creates merely an equitable mortgage, which should be enforced in equity. The chattel mortgage or agreement for a lien, unless made to cover the owner's property, or the crops to be raised in general, affects only such property as is in direct terms con- veyed to the landlord, or such property as is expressly made subject to a lien for his benefit. An instrument which pro- vides that the legal title to certain parts of the product of a farm, such as the butter and cheese to be made and grain to be raised upon it during the year, shall belong to the land- lord until the rent is paid, gives no lien for the rent upon the hay to be raised on the farm.-^ If the mortgage clause contains a provision which in a chattel mortgage would render it fraudulent as to creditors, the mortgage clause, though valid between the parties, will be void as against the lessee's assignee under a general as- signment for the benefit of his creditors. Thus, where, in a lien clause of a lease made in New York, a lessor agreed V. Mower, 10 Vt. 75; Merrill v. Ressler, 37 Minn. 82, 33 N. W. 117; Harris v. Jones, 83 N. Car. 317; Whiting v. Eichelberger, 16 Iowa 422; Briggs v. Austin, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 612, 29 N. Y. St. 245, 8 N. Y. S. 786; Smith v. Ta- ber, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 313, 14 N. Y. St. 644. 24Kennedy v. Reames, 15 S. Car. 548, 552; Green v. Jacobs, 5 S. Car. 280. In this case at the bot- tom of an agricultural lien were added the words: "I consider the above instrument of writing a mortgage of all my personal prop- erty, such as," etc. 25 Briggs V. Austin, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 612, 29 N. Y. St. 245, 8 N. Y. S. 786. The court say: "We may add, in the language of Landon, J., in McCombs v. Becker, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 342, 5 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 550, in dealing with a similar ques- tion, that the difficulty with the plaintiff's case is, that he did not, by his agreement with his tenant, provide that the title to the hay should remain in him. He made such an agreement as to the but- ter and cheese and grain, and this agreement as to them discloses more strikingly the lack of it as to the hay." See also, Smith v. Taber, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 313, 14 N. Y. St. 644; Hawkins v. Giles, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 318, 12 N. Y. St. 426. § 544 LIENS. 516 with the lessee, a retail merchant, that in default of paying the rent, or in a case of seizure of his goods under legal pro- cess, the lien should be enforced against all the goods and personal propert)^ on the demised premises in the same man- ner as if it were a chattel mortgage, and it was further sti- pulated that the lessee should remain in possession of the mortgaged goods, and might continue to deal with them in the prosecution of his business, the lien clause, though valid between the parties, both as to property in existence and on the demised premises when the lease was executed, and as to that afterwards acquired, is, under the rule established in New York, fraudulent on its face as to creditors, and there- fore void as to an assignee of the lessee.-® § 544. Lease that is a mortgage must be recorded. — A lease, or a provision of a lease, which is in legal effect a chattel mortgage of the lessee's goods, must be recorded or filed as such a mortgage, in the absence of any statute giving effect to the lien, in order to make the stipulated lien effectual against purchasers, mortgagee, and creditors.-^ Thus, a lease which provides that the lessor shall have a lien for the rent upon all goods and property that may be upon the de- mised premises, belonging to the lessee or to any one claim- ing the whole or any part of the premises under him as as- signee, under-tenant, or otherwise, and that the lien might be enforced by taking possession of the property and selling the same, in the same manner as in the case of a chattel mort- gage, is in legal effect a chattel mortgage, and is void as to the lessee's creditors if not filed or recorded. In such case, 26Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. Fla. 166; Booth v. Oliver, 67 115, 8 N. E. 392, 57 Am. Rep. 701, Mich. 664, 35 N. W. 793. Such 7 Eastern Rep. 342. a provision is not so binding as 27McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. an unrecorded mortgage. Holmes Y. 459, 22 Am. Rep. 644; Reynolds v. Hall, 8 Mich. 66, 11 Am. Dec. V. Ellis, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 47, affd. 444; Dalton v. Laudahn, 27 Mich. 103 N. Y. 115, 8 N. E. 392, 57 Am. 529. Rep. 701; Weed v. Standley, 12 517 landlords' liens for rent. § 545 the only way to give effect to the intention of the parties is to treat the transaction as a chattel mortgage. A stipulation in the lease that the rent shall be a first lien on the buildings and improvements that may be put upon the premises by the lessee, and upon his interest in the lease and premises, is a security in the nature of a mortgage. It is en- forcible against the lessee and all persons claiming under him, except creditors and purchasers without notice, al- though it be not acknowledged or recorded. It attaches as a lien or charge upon the property named as soon as the lessee acquires title to it, not only as against him, but as against all persons claiming under him, either voluntarily or with notice, or in bankruptcy.-^ A lien given by a lease containing a mortgage clause can only be enforced by the landlord or his assignee. It is in- separable from the lease. A purchaser from the lessor of the leased property, subject to the lease, stands in place of the lessor, and may enforce the lien.^^ § 545. Lease of farm to be worked on shares. — A lease of a farm to be worked on shares, which provides that the lessor shall have a lien on the growing crops, and that the lessee would execute a chattel mortgage of the same when requested, must be filed or recorded as a chattel mortgage, in order to preserve the lien as against that of a mortgage by the lessee, duly filed or recorded, of his interest in the crops, when the mortgagee has taken the mortgage in good faith and without notice of the terms of the lease. ^'^ The possession of the lessor in such case, though he re- 28Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. buildings afterwards erected by 160; Wright v. Bircher's Exr., 72 the lessee on the leased premises. Mo. 179, 37 Am. Rep. 433. A pro- First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 111. vision in a lease, giving the lessor 483, 28 N. E. 955. a lien for rent "upon any and all ^OHansen v. Prince, 45 Mich, goods, chattels, or other property 519, 8 N. W. 584. belonging to the lessee," does not, 30Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun (N. as against third persons, include Y.) 88. § 546 LIENS. 518 sided upon the farm with the lessee, is not such a possession as would relieve him from the necessity of filing or recording his lease, in order to preserve the lien as against a subse- quent purchaser or mortgagee of the lessee."^ The pos- session of one tenant in common is regarded in law as the possession of both, as between themselves, but it is not no- tice to subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of any lien he may have in the share of his cotenant who is in actual pos- session of his share. § 546. Rule in Missouri. — In a case in Missouri, the court regarded a landlord having a lien reserved by his lease as a pledgee, rather than a mortgagee, of the property subject to the lien. The lease in this case provided that the landlord should have a lien on the furniture which the lessee should place in the leased building. Afterwards the lessee gave a deed of trust on the same furniture to secure a loan. The landlord subsequently entered for nonpayment of rent, took possession of the furniture, used it for a time, and then sold it for less than the amount of his claim. In a suit by the mortgagee against the landlord, to obtain payment for the use of the furniture while it was in his possession, it was held that the landlord was merely a pledgee of the property; and that, while he might retain possession of it, he could not use it without accounting for the value of its use."- The lien did not confer upon the landlord the title to the property. The mortgagee in the chattel mortgage, however, became invested with the title of ownership of such property after breach of the condition; and though the landlord, by virtue of his lien, was entitled to the immediate possession, he had not the title, and could not use the property without liability to the mortgagee, in whom the title was vested. In an earlier case in this state it was held, that the lien of siThomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun (N. s^State v. Adams, Id Mo. 605. Y.) 88. 519 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 547 a landlord reserved in a lease of land rented for the purpose of cutting timber and wood is not equivalent to a chattel mortgage, so as to preclude the lessee from disposing of the timber and w^ood cut before the landlord's re-entry for con- dition broken. The lien attaches to whatever property, upon which the lien was reserved, that may be found upon the premises or in the tenant's possession at the time of the re- entry.^^ § 547. Delivery sufiicient to protect a lien. — There may, however, be a sufficient delivery to a third person to protect the lien. Under a lease of a farm, the lessor was to have half of the products of the farm for rent, and a lien upon the other half for advances to be made. Among the products of the farm there was a quantity of cheese, which the parties carried to a railroad depot, and left with the agent for ship- ment to New York for sale, with the understanding that the lessor should receive the entire proceeds, and should account to the lessee for his share after payment of the advances made on a general settlement. Afterwards, on the same day, the lessee sold his interest in the cheese, which he pointed out to the purchaser at the depot, and verbally de- livered to him, without the knowledge of the lessor, and with the intention to embarrass or defeat his enforcement of his lien. It was held that the sale was void as to the lessor; and that, even if the sale was made in good faith, there was no change of possession sufificient to affect the lessor. ^^ If a lessor, having an equitable lien under a provision of the lease, does not take possession before the property passes into the hands of an assignee of the lessee for the benefit of his creditors, the equities of the other creditors are as great as his, and the court will not interfere to give his lien pre- ference.^^ ssBurgess v. Kattleman, 41 Mo. 35Reynolds v. Ellis, 34 Hun (N. 480. Y.) 47, affd. 103 N. Y. 115, 8 N. 34Shepard v. Briggs, 26 Vt. 149. E. 392, 57 Am. Rep. 701. § 548 LIENS. 520 A provision in a lease, that the lessor shall hold the crop to be raised as security for the rent, is inoperative as a lien against a purchaser in good faith, but is good as against a mere wrongdoer, who has no claim but possession derived through the wrongful act/"^*^ A provision in a lease of a farm, that whenever any of the products shall be sold the proceeds shall be paid to the lessor until he shall receive the full rent of it, is a mere personal covenant, and gives the lessor no lien upon such proceeds. ^''^ The mere fact that the landlord agrees for rent to be paid in a share of the crop to be raised by the tenant gives the landlord no lien upon the crop.^^ No lien attaches to a promissory note given for rent of land. The fact that it is given for rent adds nothing to its legal efYect.^*^ § 548. Provision giving lessor ownership. — A provision which in effect gives the lessor the ownership and control of a crop to be raised on the leased premises, makes his lien effectual against the lessee and all persons claiming under him. Such is the effect of a provision in a lease of a farm that the crops to be raised should be and remain the sole property of the lessor as a lien and security for the payment of the rent.**^ A provision in a lease of a farm, that the lessor retains a full lien on all the crops as security for the payment of the rent, was held to constitute him the sole owner of the crops, and to entitle him to the control of 36FowIer v. Hawkins, 17 Ind. 40Paris v. Vail, 18 Vt. 277; 211. See also, Broders v. Bohan- Smith v. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461, vir- non, 30 Ore. 599, 48 Pac. 692. tually overruling Brainard v. Bur- STBarber v. Marble, 2 Thomp. ton, 5 Vt. 97, which held that a & C. (N. Y.) 114. See Brown v. lessor could acquire no property Thomas, 14 111. App. 428. in crops before they are grown ssDeaver v. Rice, 4 Dev. & B. and delivered to him. Broders v. L. (N. Car.) 431, 34 Am. Dec. 388. Bohannon, 30 Ore. 599, 48 Pac. soRoberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, 692; Sanford v. Modine, 51 Nebr. 25 Am. Rep. 584. 728, 71 N. W. 740. 521' LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 549 them.'*^ Such a provision was regarded as the same in prin- ciple as that in the cases cited above, where the lessor was to have the sole property in the crops as a lien. The provision that the lessor should have a lien on the crops is a legal im- plication of the control and ownership which were expressed in the other cases. In a perpetual lease of real estate with fixtures and ma- chinery, the lessor reserved a lien upon the property for the purchase-money and rents, but giving tlie lessee liberty to remove at his pleasure any portion of the machinery upon condition of substituting other machinery equally good. It was held that this reservation of a lien was not in legal effect a chattel mortgage, which the law required to be filed to make it valid, but that to the extent of the reservation the property never passed to the lessee; and therefore that the lien in favor of the lessor w^as superior to that of creditors of the lessee who had attached the property."*^ If a lease be wholly inoperative, or operative only between the parties as an agreement, so that no legal title or estate passes to the lessee, then the title to crops raised upon the leased premises is in the landlord and not in the lessee, and a lien given by the lease may be enforced, not only as be- tween the parties, but also as against attaching creditors of the lessee. Such creditors would acquire under the attach- ment only such title to the crops raised upon the leased prem- ises as the lessee had; and the lessee in such case has no at- tachable interest. ^^ § 549. Lease reserving right of re-entry. — A lease which reserves a right of re-entry upon nonpayment of rent is in 4iBaxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465, 70 426; Briggs v. Austin, 55 Hun Am. Dec. 429. See McCombs v. (N. Y.) 612, 29 N. Y. St. 245, 8 N. Becker, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 342, 5 Y. S. 786. Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 550; Smith 42Metca!f v. Fosdick, 23 Ohio V. Taber, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 313, 14 N. St. 114. Y. St. 644; Hawkins v. Giles, 45 -isBuswell v. Marshall, 51 Vt. Hun (N. Y.) 318, 12 N. Y. St. 87. § 550 LIENS. 522 effect a lien for the rent. And so, for a stronger reason, a conveyance of land in fee, subject to the payment of annual rents by the grantee to the grantor, with a reservation to the grantor of the right to enter and avoid the conveyance upon default of payment, gives the grantor a lien upon the premises for the rent, superior to that of a mortgagee of the grantee. ■^^ § 550. Re-entry. — A provision in a lease that the lessor may enter upon the leased land and hold or sell the crops for the payment of the rent due him, gives no priority until he takes possession over subsequent purchasers and creditors of the lessee. Until the lessor takes possession, the crops remain the property of the lessee, who may sell them, or his creditors may attach or levy execution upon them.^^ But where a lessor was to have part of a grain crop as rent, and was to have possession of the whole crop until the rent should be paid, a sale of the crop by the lessee was held not to pass the title as against the lessor. The purchaser took pos- session of the crop in the field, and placed it in charge of an agent, but the lessor took the grain from the agent and re- moved it to his w^arehouse. The court declared that so far as the crop was in possession of the lessee, he held it simply as a servant of the lessor, and that the lessee could give no right to the possession as against the lessor. ^^ § 551. Common-law right of distraint.— At common law the landlord's right under a distraint attached only from the time of seizure for rent then due and payable, while a land- lord's statutory lien attaches from the commencement of the tenancy.'*' "At common law the landlord could distrain any 44Stephenson v. Haines, 16 Ohio rew, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 50; Wilkin- St. 478. son v. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435. 45ButterfieId v. Baker, 5 Pick. ^GWentvvorth v. Miller, 53 Cal. (Mass.) 522; Lewis v. Lyman, 22 9. Pick. (Mass.) 437; Munsell v. Ca- 4TMorgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. 523 landlords' liens for rent. § 552 goods found upon the premises at the time of the taking, but he had no lien until he had made his right active by actual seizure. A statutory lien implies security upon the thing be- fore the warrant to seize it is levied. It ties itself to the property from the time it attaches to it, and the levy and sale of the property are only means of enforcing it. In other words, if the lien is given by statute, proceedings are not nec- essary to fix the status of the property. But in the absence of this statutory lien it is necessary to take proceedings to ac- quire a lien on the property of the tenant for the benefit of the landlord. This the landlord is enabled to do in a sum- mary way to satisfy the rent which is due him, and in this he has an advantage as creditor over creditors at large of the tenant. "^^ § 552. Lien of a distress warrant. — The lien of a distress warrant dates from the time of its levy.'*'^ Consequently a prior levy of a general execution or attachment takes prior- ity of the landlord's lien under the distress warrant. ^"^ This was the common law before the passage of the English stat- ute of 8 Anne,^^ which provided that after the first day of May, 1710. no goods upon leased lands should be liable to be taken on execution, unless the party at whose suit the execution is sued out shall, before the removal of such goods, (U. S.) 381, 22 L. ed. 796; Wood- Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. side V. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417; 417; Herron v. Gill, 112 III. 247, Gibson v. Gautier, 1 Mackey (D. 252. C.) 35; Stamps v. Gilman, 43 ^OLevy v. Twiname, 42 Ga. 249; Miss. 456; Marye v. Dyche, 42 Rowland v. Hewitt, 19 III. App. Miss. 347. 450; Hamilton v. Reedy, 3 Mc- 48Morgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. Cord (S. Car.) 38. Where a dis- (U. S.) 381, 22 L. ed. 796, per tress warrant for rent and an at- Davis, J. See also, Hobbs v. tachment for an ordinary debt are Davis, 50 Ga. 213; Johnson v. levied at the same time, and on Emanuel, 50 Ga. 590. the same property, the distress 49Pierce v. Scott, 4 Watts & S. has priority. Canterberry v. Jor- (Pa.) 344; Hamilton v. Reedy, 3 dan, 27 Miss. 96. McCord (S. Car.) 38; Leopold y. siCh. 14. Godfrey, 11 Biss. (U. S.) 158; § 553 LIENS. 524 pay to the landlord all sums due for the rent of the premises at the time of the taking of such goods, provided the arrears do not amount to more than one year's rent. This statute was always in force in Maryland,^- and, being in force when the District of Columbia was set off in 1801, it became a part of the law of that District, ^^ and continues in force to the present day. That statute does not, however, form a part of the common law as generally adopted in this country, and therefore the old common-law rule would prevail here when not modified by statute, and a creditor's execution, levied on the tenant's goods prior to a distraint, would take pre- cedence of the landlord's claim for rent.''^^ But the statutes similar to the English statute have been generally adopted in this country in states where the right of distress exists. § 553. Lien attaches from beginning of tenancy. — The landlord's statutory lien for rent attaches from the beginning of the tenancy. ^^ The lien exists independently of the pre- scribed methods for enforcing it. The lien attaches to the property from the commencement of the tenancy, and the levy upon the property and the sale of it in the manner pre- 52Washington v. Williamson, 23 v. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345, 3 N. W. Md. 244. Also in force in South 92; Garner v. Cutting, 32 Iowa Carolina, Margart v. Swift, 3 Mc- 547; Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa Cord (S. Car.) 378. 152, 156; Carpenter v. Gillespie, 10 s^Gibson v. Gautier, 1 Mackey Iowa 592; Doane v. Garretson, 24 (D. C.) 35. Iowa 351, 355; Gilbert v. Green- 54Rowland v. Hewitt, 19 111. baum, 56 Iowa 211. 9 N. W. 182; App. 450; Herron v. Gill, 112 111. Milner v. Cooper, 65 Iowa 190, 21 247, 252; Ege v. Ege, 5 Watts N. W. 558; Bryan v. Sanderson, 3 (Pa.) 134, 139; Pierce v. Scott, 4 McArthur (D. C.) 431; Gibson v. Watts & S. (Pa.) 344; Hamilton Gautier, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 35. But V. Reedy, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 38; such landlord can not secure title Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152, to such property as against an in- 156; Doane v. Garretson, 24 Iowa terested third person by taking 351; Craddock v. Riddlesbarger, 2 the possession of the property. Dana (Ky.) 205, 208. Hall v. McGaughey, 114 Ga. 405, 55Morgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. 40 S. E. 246. (U. S.) 381, 22 L. ed. 796; Martin 525 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 554 scribed by the statute are only the means of enforcing the lien. The lien is given by the statute, and not by the pro- ceedings tp enforce the lien. A subsequent mortgage of the property or levy of execution upon it is subject to the lien for rent, and upon a sale of the property under such mort- gage or execution the landlord may intervene, and is entitled to payment of his rent in arrear out of the proceeds before any payment is made on account of the mortgage or judg- ment, although he has taken no steps to enforce his lien."*^ And so, if the property subject to such lien comes into the possession of a court of equity, or of its officers, it comes into such possession subject to the lien created by the statute in favor of the landlord. ^'^ § 554, Lien prior to that of attachment or execution. — A statutory lien takes precedence of a subsequent lien by attachment or execution levied upon the tenant's property.^^ This is so even as regards crops which are raised by a tenant upon shares ; for while the right of property as between him and his landlord is in the tenant until a division of the crop takes place, yet a creditor of the tenant cannot seize the whole crop by execution or attachment regardless of the landlord's lien.^^ 56Bryan v. Sanderson, 3 McAr- 72; O'Hara v. Jones, 46 111. 288; thur (D. C.) 431; Fox v. David- Finney v. Harding, 136 111. 573, 27 son, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 102; Liquid N. E. 289, 12 L. R. A. 60S, per Carbonic Acid Mfg. Co. v. Lewis, Shope, J.; Thompson v. Mead, 67 32 Tex. Civ. App. 481, 75 S. W. 111. 395; Wetsel v. Mayers, 91 111. 47; Beall v. Folmar, 122 Ala. 414, 497; Atkins v. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa 26 So. 1; Shapiro v. Thompson, 150, 4 N. W. 905; Neeb v. McMil- 160 x\la. 363, 49 So. 391; Evans v. Ian, 98 Iowa 718, 68 N. W. 438; Sul- Groesbeck, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 43, livan v. Cleveland, 62 Tex. 677; 93 S. W. 1005. Berkey, etc., Furniture Co. v. Sher- a'J'Bryan v. Sanderson, 3 McAr- man Hotel Co., 81 Tex. 135, 16 S. thur (D. C.) 431; Fox v. Davidson, W. 807. 1 Mackey (D. C.) 102. soAtkins v. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa ssMiles V. James, 36 III. 399; 150, 4 N. W. 905. Cunnea v. Williams, 11 111. App. § 555 LIENS. 526 A landlord's lien upon a crop of cotton raised upon the leased premises, and surrendered to him by the tenant in payment of rent and supplies furnished, is paramount to a judgment lien operative against the cotton before it was de- livered to the landlord. ^"^ § 555. Priority of lien to tenant's mortgage. — The lien of a landlord for rent attaches to the tenant's chattels upon the premises at the commencement of the tenancy, and to such chattels of his as he may afterward bring upon the premises at any time during the continuance of the tenancy, from the time he brings them upon the premises.*'^ The lien of the landlord has priority, therefore, over a deed of trust or mort- gage made by the tenant after the commencement of the tenancy, whether the chattels covered by the deed were upon the premises when it was executed, or were subsequently acquired and placed upon them by the tenant.^- It is imma- terial that the mortgage purports to cover chattels to be acquired and placed upon the premises in the future; for in such case the terms of the deed are inconsistent with the statutory rights of the landlord, and must give place to them. Effect will not be given to a mortgage of after-acquired prop- erty to the prejudice of the rights of third persons. A land- lord's lien attaches to after-acquired chattels, such as machin- ery, placed upon the leased premises, in preference to a mort- gage of such chattels by the tenant after the chattels had been placed on such premises. *^^ eoOkolona Savings Inst. v. Bartlett v. Loundes, 34 W. Va. Trice, 60 Miss. 262. 493, 12 S. E. 762. Where a record- eiBeall v. White, 94 U. S. 382, ed mortgage is placed on a crop 24 L. ed. 173; Fowler v. Rapley, and it is subject to the landlord's IS Wall. (U. S.) 328, 21 L. ed. 35; lien and the landlord has the crop Webb V. Sharp, 13 Wall. (U. S.) sold to pay his lien, any surplus 14, 20 L. ed. 478; Hadden v. must be paid to the mortgagee. Knickerbocker, 70 111. 677, 22 Am. Peeples v. Hayley, 89 Ark. 252, 116 Rep. 80. S. W. 197. See also Beall v. Fol- 62Beall V. White, 94 U. S. 382, mar, 122 Ala. 414, 26 So. 1. 24 L. ed. 173; Richmond v. Dues- esUnion Warehouse Co v. Mc- berry, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 210, 213; Intyre, 84 Ala. 78, 4 So. 175. 527 landlords' liens for rent. § 556 When the landlord's lien is created by statute and attaches from the beginning of the tenancy, or from the time the property subject to it is placed upon the demised premises, the lien necessarily attaches before the mortgage, unless the mortgage was made before the tenancy commenced, or before the property was placed upon the premises. The landlord's lien does not prevail against the tenant's mort- gagee whose mortgage is delivered and recorded before the lien attaches. When the lien attaches only upon the levy of a distress warrant, a mortgage executed and made an effect- ual lien before such levy must prevail as against the land- lord.«* § 556. Landlord's lien paramount to mortgage lien. — A landlord's statutory lien upon his tenant's crop is paramount to a mortgage of the crop executed by the tenant. ^° The landlord's lien accrues as soon as there is any crop upon which it may attach, and though the mortgage lien may at- tach at the same time, inasmuch as the statutory lien was created and was ready to attach from the beginning of the tenancy, it takes priority of a mortgage lien subsequently created by the tenant. Although the owner of land has given a bond to convey it which does not provide for possession, but does provide that the obligee shall pay rent if he fails to pay the purchase- money, he has a lien for the rent which is superior to a chat- tel mortgage executed by the obligee upon the crop to be grown upon the land. The mortgagee relies on the title bond at his peril. He is bound to take notice of the limita- tion of the obligee's rights under the contract of sale.'^^ 64Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. beth v. Ponder, 33 Ark. 707; Wat- L. 417; Hood v. Harming, 4 Dana son v. Johnson, 33 Ark. 737; Roth (Ky.) 21; Snyder v. Hitt, 2 Dana v. Williams, 45 Arkk. 447; Adams (Ky.) 204. V. Hobbs, 27 Ark. 1; McGee v. 65Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Fitzer, 37 Tex. 27; Perry v. Perry, Ark. 557; Meyer v. Bloom, 37 Ark. 127 N. Car. 23, 37 S. E. 71; Dun- 43; Smith v. Meyer, 25 Ark. 609; lap v. Dunseth, 81 Mo. App. 17. Buck V. Lee, 36 Ark. 525; Lam- ceBacon v. Howell, 60 Miss. 362. § 557 LIENS. 528 § 557. Lien not paramount to recorded chattel mortgage. — A landlord's lien does not take precedence of a recorded chattel mortgage existing when the lien attaches. ^''^ There are some statutory liens that are given precedence over existing mortgages, such as the lien for repairing vessels. Such pre- ference is given upon the principle that the mortgagee is as much benefited by the repairs of the vessel, as is the mort- gagor. There may also be in many cases an implied author- ity in the mortgagor left in possession to incur upon the faith of the property whatever expense is necessary for its preservation.^^ But no such reason exists in the case of a landlord's lien. The mortgagee is not benefited by the rent- ing of the premises to the mortgagor, out of which act the landlord's lien has its origin, nor is the mortgaged property thereby preserved or enhanced in value. The lien of a mort- gage of chattels executed before a lease is prior to the land- lord's lien under the lease, although the mortgagee has act- ual knowledge that such chattels are being used upon the leased premises.*'^ But an unrecorded chattel mortgage on goods of a tenant is not good as against the landlord's statu- tory lien for rent."^" 67 Rand v. Barrett, 66 Iowa 731, 24 N. W. 530; Perry v. Waggoner, 68 Iowa 403, 27 N. W. 292; Jar- chow V. Pickens, 51 Iowa 381, 1 N. W. 598; Hempstead Real Estate, etc., Assn. v. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620; Souders v. Vansickle, 3 Halst. (N. J.) 313; Breckenbridge v. Millan, 81 Tex. 17, 16 S. W. 555; Bruns- wick, etc., Co. V. Murphy, 89 Miss. 264, 42 So. 288. Where one in possession of land under a con- tract of purchase executes a trust deed on his crops, he can not, by surrendering the contract, and agreeing to pay rent for that year, create a landlord's lien superior to the trust deed. Wilczinski v. Lick, 68 Miss. 596, 10 So. 1Z. The law is otherwise in Delaware. Ford V. Clewell, 9 Houst. (Del.) 179, 31 Atl. 715, Chief Justice dis- senting. As to when lien at- taches see Davis Gasoline Engine Co. V. McHugh, 115 Iowa 415, 88 N. W. 948. See post, § 570. 6SJones on Chattel Mortgages, § 474; Hempstead Real Estate, etc., Assn. v. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620. cojarchow v. Pickens, 51 Iowa 381, 1 N. W. 598. '''OBerkey, etc.. Furniture Co. v. Sherman Hotel Co., 81 Tex. 135, 16 S. W. 807. 529 landlords' liens for rent. § 559 A mortgage of the tenant's personalty on the leased prem- ises, executed before the beginning of the second term of his tenancy, is superior to the landlord's lien for rent accruing under such second term/^ Where a landlord entitled to a share of a crop in place of rent purchases the tenant's share for a consideration which includes the satisfaction of the rent, his lien is extinguished, and his title acquired by such purchase is subject to a chattel mortgage of the crop given by the tenant to a third person. '^^ The same rule applies to conditional sales thus, if goods be sold to a tenant with the proviso that the vendor shall retain title until the purchase-money is paid, this is a conditional sale, and the landlord can only subject them to his lien by paying the purchase-money due, or keeping good a tender thereof.''^^ § 558, Fraudulent cancellation of mortgage not effective. — A fraudulent cancellation of the prior chattel mortgage does not give the landlord's lien priority. Thus, if the mort- gage note be assigned after the landlord's lien has attached, without an assignment of the mortgage, and the mortgagee fraudulently enters satisfaction on the margin of the record, and after this a third person is substituted for one of the original lessees without making a new lease, the mortgage is still entitled to priority."'* § 559. Tenant's assignee in bankruptcy. — The tenant's as- signee in bankruptcy or insolvency, or for the benefit of creditors, takes the property subject to the landlord's lien. If the lien is created by the lease or by statute, the assignee takes the property subject to the lien, whether the assign- ment took place before or after a distraint or attachment "iLyons v. Deppen, 90 Ky. 305, 73Bingham v. Vandegrift, 93 14 S. W. 279, 12 Ky. L. 202. Ala. 283, 9 So. 280. i'2Titsworth v. Frauenthal, 52 "4Rand v. Barrett, 66 Iowa 731, Ark. 254, 12 S. W. 498. 24 N. W. 530. 34 § S^O LIENS. 530 Upon the property by the landlord. His right is not affected by the assignment. '^^ At common law the right of distraint would be cut off by a prior assignment in insolvency or for the benefit of creditors."^ Where at the present time a lien is given by statute, but a distress warrant is one of the reme- dies for enforcing it, the lien does not depend upon a levy of the distress warrant, but exists independently of that,'^'^ and therefore takes precedence of an assignment in insolvency or for the benefit of creditors. § 560. Assignment takes precedence of distress warrant. — An assignment in bankruptcy of a tenant's property takes precedence of a distress warrant levied after the commence- ment of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The assignment re- lates back to the commencement of the proceedings, and by operation of law vests the title to the estate of the bankrupt in the assignee. No lien attaches under a distress warrant until the property is actually seized under it. If the lien at- tached before the filing of the petition, it could be enforced in the bankruptcy court; but if it did not exist then, it could not be brought into existence afterwards."^ In Pennsylvania, a landlord having a right to distrain for rent in arrear, at the date of the issuing of a warrant in bank- ■^sEames v. Mayo, 6 III. App. ^THunter v. Whitfield, 89 111. 334; Hoskins v. Paul, 9 N. J. L. 229; In re Wynne, Chase (U. S.) 110, 17 Am. Dec. 455; Rosenberg 227, 256, Fed. Cas. No. 18117; Ros- V. Shaper, 51 Tex. 134; In re enberg v. Shaper, 51 Tex. 134; Wynne, Chase (U. S.) 227, 256, per Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584. C. J. Chase, Fed. Cas. No. 18117. Though the landlord himself be Landlord's right of lien for rent the assignee, his acceptance of the secured by notes is not negotiable. trust is not a waiver of his right. The purchaser of such notes In Pennsylvania, whenever an exe- stands in the shoes of the land- cution will carry a valid sale over lord in enforcing the lien. Camp the assignee, it carries with it a v. West, 113 Ga. 304, 38 S. E. 822. claim for rent. Barnes' Appeal, 76 'CIn re Wynne, Chase (U. S.) Pa. St. 50. 227, 256, per C. J. Chase, Fed. Cas. 'SMorgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. No. 18117. (U. S.) 381, 22 L. ed. 796. 531 landlords' liens for rent. § 562 rnptcy, is entitled to be paid in full by the assignee in bank- ruptcy, before the removal of the goods, rent in arrear not exceeding one year, in preference to all other creditors. "^^ Whether the lien of a distress warrant, which has already been levied upon the tenant's property at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, is dissolved by the assignment in bankruptcy, in the same manner as an at- tachment upon mesne process is dissolved, is a question that has occasioned some discussion. ^^ § 561. Distress warrants at common law. — At common law all chattels found upon the demised premises were prima facie distrainable, whether they belonged to the tenant or not. The landlord's prerogative of distraint is an ancient one, having its origin in feudal tenures. It seems to have originated from two remedies of the common law still more ancient. By the processes of gavelet and cessavit the land- lord could seize the land itself for rent in arrear, and hold it until payment was made. These processes fell into disuse long ago, and in their place the landlord's right of distress arose, whereby, instead of seizing the land, he seized all movables upon the land, and held them until he received pay- ment. In process of time he was authorized by statute to sell the property seized, and in this w'ay we have the modern process of distraint. ^^ § 562. All property on premises liable to distress for rent. — The general rule still is, that all chattels found upon the demised premises are prima facie liable to distress for rent. Certain property may be exempt upon grounds of public policy, or by force of express statute; but it is incumbent TOLongstreth v. Pennock, 20 (U. S.) 381, 393, 22 L. ed. 19(i. The Wall. (U. S.) 575, 576, 22 L. ed. case was decided on another point. 451; Gibson v. Gautier, 1 Mackey 81 Emig v. Cunningham, 62 Md. (D. C.) 35. 458, per Bryan, J. so Morgan \r. Campbell, 22 Wall. § 562 LIENS. DO^ upon the claimant of such property to show that it falls within such exemption. The fact that the chattels belong to a stranger was no ground for exemption at common law, and is not now except when so declared by statute, or exempted on grounds of public policy.^- The goods of a married woman found upon the demised premises may be distrained for rent due by her husband ;^^ so the goods of an under- tenant.^^ This common-law rule has generally been modified by statute in America, so that the goods of a stranger on the premises are not liable to distress, but only the goods of the tenant, or of some other person who is liable for the rent.^^ 82Kleber v. Ward, 88 Pa. St. 93; Spencer v. McGowen, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 256; Ratclifif v. Daniel, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 498; Cromwell v. Owings, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 55, 58; Kennedy v. Lange, 50 Md. 91; Giles v. Ebsworth, 10 Md. 533; Trieber v. Knabe, 12 Md. 491, 71 Am. Dec. 607. In the latter case a distress for the rent of a hotel was levied upon a pianoforte belonging to a stranger, and leased to a music teacher who boarded in the hotel; and not being in use as an instrument of trade or profession, and there not being a sufficiency of other goods on the premises, the pianoforte was held liable to distraint. See also. Reeves v. McKenzie, 1 Bailey (S. Car.) 497; Kessler v. Mc- Conachy, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 435; Price V. McCallister, 3 Grant. Cas. (Pa.) 248; Karns v. McKin- ney, 74 Pa. St. 387; Whiting v. Lake, 91 Pa. St. 349; Stevens v. Lodge, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 594; Hime- ly V. Wyatt, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 102; Union Water-Power Co. v. Cha- bot, 93 Maine 339, 45 Atl. 30. S3 Emig V. Cunningham, 62 Md. 458; Blanche v. Bradford, 38 Pa. St. 344, 80 Am. Dec. 489. 8^ Lane v. Steinmetz, 9 W. N. C. (Pa.) 574; Smoyer v. Roth, 10 Sad. (Pa.) 32, 13 Atl. 191. A sub- tenant can not compel the les- sor to sell the goods of the or- iginal lessee, in satisfaction of the rent in arrear, before having recourse to his own. Jimison v. Reifsneider, 97 Pa. St. 136. If the landlord distrain upon a subtenant, he must show affirm- atively that a former distress up- on his immediate tenant was un- productive. Quinn v. Wallace, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 452. 85 Mississippi : Stamps v. Gil- man, 43 Miss. 456; Marye v. Dyche, 42 Miss. 347. Kentucky: Hall V. Amos, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 89. Virginia: Act of 1818, p. 82, §15; Davis v. Payne's Admr., 4 Rand. (Va.) iZ2. 533 landlords' liens for rent. § 563 § 563. Exemptions from distress on the ground of public policy.- — The landlord's prerogative of distress authorized the seizure of any chattels found upon the premises, though they might not belong to the tenant, on the ground that the landlord may be supposed to have given credit to all the visible property upon the premises. Upon considerations of public policy, certain property was exempt from seizure. Chief Justice Willes in 1744 stated clearly the exemtions then established, saying :^^ "There are five sorts of things which at common law were not distrainable : — "1. Things annexed to the freehold. "2. Things delivered to a person exercising a public trade to be carried wrought worked up or managed in the way of his trade or employ. "3. Cocks or sheaves of corn. "4. Beasts of the plough and instruments of husbandry. "5. The instruments of a man's trade or profession. "The first three sorts were absolutely free from distress, and could not be distrained, even though there were no other goods besides. "The two last are only exempt sub modo, that is, upon a supposition that there is sufficient distress besides. "Things annexed to the freehold, as furnaces, mill-stones, chimney-pieces, and the like cannot be distrained, because they cannot be taken away without doing damage to the freehold, which the law will not allow. "Things sent or delivered to a person exercising a trade, to be carried wrought or manufactured in the way of his trade, as a horse in a smith's shop, materials sent to a weaver, or cloth to a tailor to be made up, are privileged for the sake of trade and commerce, which could not be carried on if such 86 Simpson v. Hartopp, Willes, son, 7 M. & W. 450, 454, per Baron 512. And see, in support, Mus- Parke; Fenton v. Logan, 9 Bing. pratt V. Gregory, 3 M. & ,W. 677, 676, per Tindal, C. J. per Lord Denman; Joule v. Jack- 5^4 LIENS. 534 things under these circumstances could be distrained for rent due from the person in whose custody tliey are."^' § 564. Privilege of trade. — Upon the ground of the privi- lege of trade, ^^ it is well settled that all goods delivered to tradesmen, ^^ artificers, manufacturers, ^° carriers, factors, ^^ auctioneers, '^- and the like, are exempt from distress for S7 In further explanation of, and comment upon, these exemp- tions, Chief Justice Willes con- tinues : "Cocks and sheaves of corn were not distrainable before the statute 2 W. & M. ch. 5 (which was made in favor of landlords), because they could not be restored again in the same plight and condition that they were before upon a replevin, but must necessarily be damaged by being removed. Beasts of the plough, etc., were not distrainable in favor of husbandry (which is of so great advantage to the nation), and likewise because a man should not be left quite destitute of get- ting a living for himself and his family. And the same reasons hold in the case of the instru- ments of a man's trade or pro- fession. But these two last are not privileged in case there is dis- tress enough besides; otherwise they may be distrained. These rules are laid down and fully explained in Co. Lit. 47 a, b, and many other books which are there cited; and there are many subsequent cases in which the same doctrine is established, and which I do not mention be- cause I do not know any one case to the contrary." 88 Muspratt v. Gregory, 3 M. & W. 677, 678; Oilman v. Elton, 3 Brod. & B. 75; Findon v. Mc- Laren, 6 Q. B. 891; Matthias v. Mesnard, 2 Car. & P. 353; Brown V. Sims, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 138; Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 462; Walker v. Johnson, 4 Mc- Cord (S. Car.) 552; horse at liv- ery stable, Youngblood v. Lowry, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 39, 13 Am. Dec. 698; cattle reserved for agistment, Cadwalader v. Tindall, 20 Pa. St. 422; a merchant's books of account, Davis v. Arledge, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 170, 30 Am. Dec. 360; St. Louis Type Foundry v. Tay- lor (Tex.), 35 S. W. 691. 89 For an exceptional case see Goodrich v. Bodley, 35 La. Ann. 525. ^^ Knowles v. Pierce, 5 Houst. (Del.) 178; Hoskins v. Paul, 9 N. J. L. 110, 17 Am. Dec. 455. 91 Howe Machine Co. v. Sloan, 87 Pa. St. 438, 30 Am. Rep. 376; Walker v. Johnson, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 552; Brown v. Sims, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 138; Briggs v. Large, 30 Pa. St. 287; McCreery v. Claflflin, 37 Md. 435, 11 Am. Rep. 542; Trieber v. Knabe, 12 Md. 491, 71 Am. Dec. 607. 92 Himely v. Wyatt, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 102; Brown v. Arun- dell. 10 C B. 54; Williams v. Holmes, 8 Exch. 861. 535 landlords' liens for rent. § 565 rent. In general terms, if a tenant in the course of his busi- ness is necessarily in possession of the property of those with whom he deals, or those who employ him, such property is not liable for distress for rents, ^^ but goods of a stranger, in the tenant's possession as a matter of favor and without hire, are not exempt. '^^ Upon a like principle are exempt the goods of a traveler at an inn,^^ and goods of a boarder in his own use;^*^ other- wise if the boarder's goods are with his consent in the ten- ant's use.^'^ The goods of others, in the hands of tenants who are such bailees, are exempt from distress, not on account of a special privilege to the tenant, but for the benefit of trade and com- merce, and for the purpose of protecting the owner of the goods, who has confided them to the tenant for sale, stor- age, transportation, manufacture, repair, or the like pur- pose. ^^ The fact that the goods belong to a bailee must be proved in order to establish the exemption on this ground. ^^ § 565. General exemption laws do not apply as against a distress. — A distress is not an execution for debt, and there- fore the goods of a tenant have never been held to be pro- tected by any of the exemption laws which put the property of a debtor beyond the reach of his creditors. In like man- ner, although the constitution of a state declares that the property of a wife shall be protected from the debt of her husband, this declaration has no effect upon the right of dis- ss Karns V. McKinney, 74 Pa. 173; Lane v. Steinmetz, 9 W. N. St. 387, 390. C. (Pa.) 574. 94 Page V. Middleton, 118 Pa. ^^Matthews v. Stone, 1 Hill (N. St. 546; 12 Atl. 415. Y.) 565, revd. 7 Hill (N. Y.) 428. 95 Harris v. Boggs, 5 Blackf. 98McCreery v. Claflflin, Zl Md. (Ind.) 489. 435, 442, 11 Am. Rep. 542. 9CRiddle V. Welden, 5 Whart. 99Bevan v. Crooks, 7 Watts. (Pa.) 9; Jones v. Goldbeck. 8 & S. (Pa.) 452. W. N. C. (Pa.) 533, 14 Phila. (Pa.) § 566 LIENS. 536 tress. If the goods of the wife were upon the premises of any other tenant, they would be liable to distraint, and in such case the goods of an unmarried woman could be seized. It was not intended to give any greater immunity to a mar- ried woman's property than was extended to it before mar- riage.^ § 566. Lien for rent attaches only on tenant's property. — A landlord's statutory lien for rent does not generally at- tach to goods of other persons which happen to be upon the demised premises.- It does not attach to the goods of a sub- tenant of a part of the demised premises,^ unless specially so provided by statute, as is the case in Louisiana.* The terms of the statutes in the different states are, however, quite dis- similar, and reference must be had to these statutes to de- termine the extent of the lien. Thus, in Iowa, the statute gives a lien upon property used upon the premises. The lien, therefore, attaches to all per- sonal property kept by the tenant upon the premises for the prosecution of the business for which the tenancy was cre- ated. Therefore the lien attaches to merchandise kept for sale upon the leased premises. The lien is given not merely in case of leases of farms and agricultural lands, but also in case of leases of houses and storerooms. The property used upon the premises is made subject to the lien. The word is employed in a large and liberal sense, and the only limita- tion intended is that incident to the nature and purposes of the occupation of the premises. Thus, the cloths and goods of a merchant tailor, when used for the purposes of sale, and for making into garments for customers, upon premises hired lEmig V. Cunningham, 62 Md. ey (D. C.) Z6; Wells v. Sequin, 458, per Bryan, J.; Noxon v. 14 Iowa 143. Glaze, 11 Colo. App. 503, 53 Pac. •'^Gray v. Rawson, 11 111. 527. 827. 4See post, § 620. 2Johnson v. Douglass, 2 Mack- 537 landlords' liens for rent. § 568 for such purposes, are subject to the statutory Hen of the landlord.^ § 567. The lien attaches only to personal property. — If it be sought to enforce the lien or to levy a distress warrant upon a dwelling-house, some agreement changing the char- acter of the property must be shown, for the presumption is that it is part of the realty.*' The lessee may, however, by stipulation in the lease, give the lessor a lien on buildings to be erected by the lessee, and such a lien, like the landlord's ordinary lien by statute, will prevail against the lessee's as- signee in insolvency, or for the benefit of his creditors.''' Things fixed to the realty are not, as a general rule, sub- ject to distress or to a lien; but a tenant's trade fixtures, when separated from the realty by the tenant, may be dis- trained for rent.^ A fixture which is removable at the tenant's pleasure, it being only slightly attached to the realty, so that it may be removed without destroying its character, such, for instance, as a spinning-mule fastened to the floor of a mill with screws, is distrainable.'' § 568. Lien covers entire crop. — A landlord's lien upon crops covers the entire crops raised upon the demised prem- ises. Therefore, where land is rented for a share of the crops, and the tenant delivers to the landlord his share of the oats raised upon the land, but makes default in paying the rent upon the land planted in corn, the landlord has a lien on the remainder of the oats for the payment of the rent of the land planted with corn. The lien is not confined to SGrant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152; "Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. Thompson v. Anderson, 86 Iowa 160. 703, 53 N. W. 418. sReynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. CKassing v. Keohane, 4 111. App. Y.) 323; Vausse v. Russel, 2 Mc- 460; Hamilton v. Reedy, 3 McCord Cord (S. Car.) 329. (S. Car.) 38. OFurbush v. Chappell, 105 Pa. St. 187. § 569 LIENS. 538 any particular crop, but embraces all the crops, or any por- tion of them, and extents to crops on every part of the prem- ises for the whole rent.^^ If, however, the different tracts are not all rented by one demise, but there is a distinct rent for each, the crops on one tract are not subject to lien for rent of another tract. ^^ § 569. Lien does not attach to property not on premises. — The landlord's lien is not made to attach to property not on the demised premises, unless he is authorized by statute to follow it after removal, as in case he can show that the re- moval was fraudulent.^- A purchaser from a tenant, in good faith, of property not on the demised premises, is not af- fected by a landlord's lien afterwards established. A distress at common law for rent must be made upon the demised premises, ^^ and the right terminates with removal, unless the right be expressly extended by statute. Even where the tenant assigns the goods to a receiver, under a creditor's bill, and the receiver removes them from the demised premises into the public street, they are not then liable to distraint, though the creditor has notice that the tenant's rent is in arrear,^^ Goods removed from the premises by assignees for the benefit of creditors are not liable to distress. -^^ Goods of a stranger can only be distrained for rent while they are on the demised premises. ^*^ § 570. Lien attaches to mortgaged property. — A land- lord's lien attaches to property which is already subject to a loPrettyman v. Unland, 11 111. i^Martin v. Black, 9 Paige (N. 206; Thompson v. Mead, 67 111. Y.) 641, 38 Am. Dec. 574. 395; Andrew v. Stewart, 81 Ga. i^Hastings v. Belknap, 1 Denio 53, 7 S. E. 169; Madison Supply & (N. Y.) 190; Martin v. Black, 3 Hardware Co. v. Richardson, 8 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 580, affd. 9 Paige Ga. App. 344, 69 S. E. 45. (N. Y.) 641, 38 Am. Dec. 574. iiQittings V. Nelson, 86 111. 591. iGAdams v. La Comb, 1 Dall. i2Nesbitt V. Bartlett, 14 Iowa (U. S.) 440, 1 L. ed. 214; Scott v. 485. McEwen, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 176; i3Bradley v. Piggot, Walk. Sleeper v. Parish, 7 Phila. (Pa.) (Miss.) 348. 247. 539 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 571 mortgage or other incumbrance, when it is placed upon the demised premises, but the lien attaches in such case subject to the prior mortgage or incumbrance.^' Care must be taken, however, that no substantial injury be done to the interest of the mortgagee in seizing and selling the equity of redemp- tion.^^ A distress at common law could not, however, be levied upon an equity of redemption. ^^ But this may generally be done under the modern statutes modifying the common law remedy.-*^ §571. Distress attaches to property only where demise exists. — The right of distress at common law cannot arise until there has been an actual demise at a fixed rent, payable either in money, services, or a share of the crops. Unless there is rent due, there can be no distress. The first re- quisite to support the proceeding is proof of a demise under which rent is payable.-^ The right is incident to the reserva- I'i'Johnson v. Douglass, 2 Mack- ey (D. C.) 36; Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417; Holliday V. Bartholomae, 11 111. App. 206; Johnson v. Douglass, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 36; Fisher v. Kollerts, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 398, 408; Williams V. Wood, 2 Met. (Ky.) 41, 42. See ante, § 557. isWoodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417. In this case Mr. Justice Depue said: "The property mort- gaged may be a single chattel of considerable value, or the mach- inery in a factory, or the stock of goods in a store, which may be sold in entirety, or in parcels, subject to the lien of the mort- gage, without any appreciable in- jury to the right of the mort- gage. To permit the officer to take such possession only as will enable him to make a legal sale under his execution, would be consonant with public policy, and consistent with sound legal prin- ciples, provided that, in doing so, no substantial injury be done to the interests of the mortgagee." lOSnyder v. Hitt, 2' Dana (Ky.) 204; Trescott v. Smyth, 1 Mc- Cord Ch. (S. Car.) 486. 20Prewett v. Dobbs, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 431. 2iCohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296; Moulton v. Norton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 286; Grier v. Cowan, Ad- dison (Pa.) 347; Wells v. Hornish, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 30; Helser v. Pott, 3 Pa. St. 179; Johnson v. Prussing, 4 111. App. 575; Jacks v. Smith, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 315; Mar- shall V. Giles, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 488; Reeves v. McKenzie, 1 Bailey (S. Car.) 497; Hale v. Bur- ton, Dudley (Ga.) 105. 572 LIENS. 540 tion of rent where the reversiqnary interest remains in the lessor.-- The rent need not be reserved eo nomine, if it ap- pear that it is really payable.-^ The rent must be due and payable;-^ but rent payable in advance may be distrained for as soon as it is payable by the terms of the demise. ^^ § 572. Rent payable must be fixed and certain. — For the purpose of a distress the rent must be fixed and certain, but it is sufficiently fixed and certain if it is capable of being re- duced to a certainty by computation.-^ If, for instance, the rent be payable in cotton, as this has a certain commercial value from day to day throughout the country, the exact money value of the rent is capable of exact calculation.-^ If the rent be payable in grain or other produce, or in a share of the crops, or in merchandise, and the price of these be stipulated in the contract, or can be determined by a market price, the remedy will lie.-^ But if there be no fixed price -^Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652; Schuyler v. Leggett, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 660; Wells v. Hor- nish, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 30. 23Price V. Limehouse, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 544. 24Anders v. Blount, 67 Ga. 41; Fry V. Breckinridge, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 31; Evans v. Herring, 27 N. J. L. 243; Burchard v. Rees, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 2,11. 25Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 113; Russell v Doty, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 576; Peters V. Newkirk, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 103 Giles V. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270, 272, 53 Am. Dec. 374; Bailey v Wright, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 484 O'Farrell v. Nance, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 484; Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 83 Beyer v. Fenstermacher, 2 Whart (Pa.) 95; Anderson's Appeal, 3 Pa. St. 218. 26Smith V. Colson, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 91; Valentine v. Jackson, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 302; Smith v. Fyler, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 648; Dutch- er V. Culver, 24 Minn. 584; Brooks V. Cunningham, 49 Miss. 108; Tiflft V. Verden, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 153; Smith v. Sheriff, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 443; Fraser v. Davie, 5 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 59; Ege v. Ege, 5 Watts (Pa.) 134; Detwiler v. Cox, 75 Pa. St. 200. 27 Brooks v. Cunningham, 49 Miss. 108; Fraser v. Davie, 5 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 599. 28Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556; Jones v. Gundrim, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 531; Fry v. Jones, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 11. See Mc- 541 landlords' liens for rent. § 573 for the rent, or this be payable in services and no price has been agreed upon for the services, there can be no distress for the rent.^^ A share of the profits of a business reserved as rent may be distrained for, if the amount can be determined from the books of account. ^° If the rent be payable in goods upon the order or demand of the lessor, a prior demand is neces- sary to sustain a distress. ^^ Under a lease for a fixed rent in money, and an additional rent of thirty dollars for each five hundred dollars of improvements made on premises by the lessor, the additional rent may be distrained for, for the amount of the rent can be determined.^- Under a covenant to pay rent in Indiana scrip, distress was held not to lie. Presumably the value was too uncertain. ^^ § 573, Distress only after rent is due. — At common law, the landlord could distrain his tenant's goods for rent only after the rent was due and payable;^* and if, in the mean w^hile, and before the rent was due, a judgment creditor issued an execution and levied upon the same goods, he had priority over the landlord. By the statute of 8 Anne^^ it was provided, that whenever execution was levied upon the ten- ant's goods on the premises, the judgment creditor should be bound to pay to the landlord the rent due at the time of the levy to the extent of one year's rent, and the sheriff might include this in the levy against the tenant. Under this Cray v. Samuel, 65 Ga. 739. See soMelick v. Benedict, 43 N. J. however. Bowser v. Scott, 8 L. 425. Blackf. (Ind.) 86; Clark v. Fraley, siHelser v. Pott, 3 Pa. St. 179. 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 264; Poer v. Pee- 32Detwiler v. Cox, 75 Pa. St. bles, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1. 200. 29Briscoe v. McElween, 43 33purcell v. Thomas, 7 Blackf. Miss. 556. See however, Wilkins (Ind.) 306. V. Taliafero, 52 Ga. 208; Dailey v. 343 Bl. Com. 6, 7; Evans v. Her- Grimes, 27 Md. 440; Wells v. ring, 27 N. J. L. 243; Weiss v. Hornish. 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 30; Jahn, Z1 N. J. L. 93. Marshall v. Giles, 2 Treadw. 35Ch. 14. Const. (S. Car.) (iZl. § 574 LIENS. 542 statute it seems to be settled that the landlord had a claim only to the rent which had actually accrued prior to the levy of an execution upon the tenant's goods, and no claim for an instalment of rent then accruing.^® But generally, under the statutes in this country modify- ing the right of distress, the landlord may claim the accruing rent up to the time of the levy of the execution. When an execution is levied upon a tenant's goods after a periodical instalment of rent has begun to accrue, the landlord is en- titled to be paid not only the rent then in arrear, but the amount for the periodical instalment then accruing. Thus, where the tenancy is from month to month, and one month has commenced, we may assume that the landlord's lien for the rent of that month commences with the month. It com- mences before the rent is due, and has priority over a lien acquired by execution issued during the month. The land- lord is entitled to the whole of the accruing rent for that month. ^" § 574. Extent of landlord's lien. — But the landlord's lien does not extend beyond the accruing rent of the period in which the execution is levied, although the officer, instead of removing the goods, keeps them upon the premises for a longer period. ^^ The landlord may have his remedy against the sheriff, but not against the tenant's goods. 36Hoskins v. Knight, 1 M. & S. -"58 Harris v. Dammann, 3 Mackey 245, 247; Trappan v. Morie, 18 (D. C), 90, 94. "If we should go Johns. (N. Y.) 1 ; Washington v. any further, and hold that the rent Williamson, 23 Md. 244; Harris v. which accrued for the next period Dammann, 3 Mackey (D. C.) 90, afterwards should be paid, there per Cox, J.; Denham v. Harris, would be no limit in time in cases 13 Ala. 465; Whidden v. Toulmin, of leases running for a term of 6 Ala. 104. years. We should have to hold 37Joyce V. Wilkenning, 1 Mac- that, at the commencement of the Arthur (D. C.) 567; Gibson v. term the landlord's lien attached Gautier, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 35; for the rent of the whole term, Harris v. Dammann, 3 Mackey giving him a preference for the (D. C.) 90. whole over an execution creditor 543 landlords' liens for rent. § 576 §575. The statutory lien for rent does not depend upon the maturity of the rent. Even before the rent falls due, it takes precedence of a lien by attachment. ^^ The lien attaches at the commencement of the tenancy for the entire term, although it is not enforcible as to rent which has not accrued, so long as the property is dealt with in the usual course of business, as contemplated by the lease. ^^ The lien may be enforced for rent not due whenever this is necessary to pre- vent such a disposition of the property by the tenant as would make the security worthless. ^^ Therefore, Vv^here a building was leased as a store-room, and occupied with a stock of mer- chandise, it was held that the execution of an absolute sale or of a mortgage of the stock by the tenant rendered the lien enforcible for the rent of the entire unexpired term of the lease. ^^ § 576. Expenses, costs, and the like. — Where the rent is payable in a share of the crops grown on the demised prem- ises, and by the terms of the lease the lessee is to gather and deliver to the landlord his share, and he fails to do so, and the landlord is obliged to gather it himself, he has a lien for the value of such labor as a part of the rent which the tenant agreed to pay, or in addition thereto. ^^ The lien for rent includes also the costs of the action brought to enforce the lien by attachment. ^^ Under a covenant to pay for gas used upon the premises, who levied pending tiie term. This 40 Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa would effectually cover up the 345, 3 N. W. 92. tenant's property from his other -ii Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa creditors." Per Cox, J. To the 345, 3 N. W. 92. same effect see Ballard v. John- •*- Gilbert v. Greenbaum, 56 Iowa son, 114 N. Car. 141, 19 S. E. 98; 211, 9 N. W. 182. Fleming v. Davenport, 116 N. Car. ^3 Secrist v. Stivers, 35 Iowa 153, 21 S. E. 188; Thostesen v. Dox- 580. see, 78 Nebr. 40, 110 N. W. 567. 44 Conwell v. Kuykendall, 29 39 Sevier v. Shaw, 25 Ark. 417; Kans. 707. Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345, 3 N. W. 92. 576a LIENS. 544 a sum due for gas is to be regarded as rent in arrear, and may- be distrained for.^^ A landlord can only distrain for rent in arrear. He cannot distrain for interest,'*" nor for a claim on any other account, ^'^ nor for attorney's fees, though embraced in a note given for rent.-*^ § 576a. Protection of bona fide purchaser. — Whether a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice, of crops grown on rented premises is protected as against the landlord, is a question upon which the authorities are not in accord. The divergence of opinion on this point may sometimes be ex- plained by the dissimilar terms of the statutes by which the liens are created. On the one hand it is held that the lien of the landlord does not follow the crops into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. ^^ Trover or trespass by the landlord against one who has converted the crop will not lie, for the reason that the land- lord is not, by virtue of his lien, either the owner or entitled to possession. ''^ 45 Fernwood Masonic Hall Assn. V. Jones, 102 Pa. St. 307. 46 Lansing v. Rattoone, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 43; Vechte v. Brownell, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 212. •*■!■ Sketoe v. Ellis, 14 111. 75. 48 Jones V. Findley 84 Ga. 52, 10 S. E. 541. 49 Finney v. Harding, 136 HI. 573, 27 N. E. 289, 12 L. R. A. 605, revg. 32 HI. App. 98, Craig, J., dis- senting, citing Nesbitt v. Bartlett, 14 Iowa 485; Westmoreland v. Wooten, 51 Miss. 825; Scaife v. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237; Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 328, 21 L. ed. 35; Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 382, 24 L. ed. 173; Frazer v. Jack- son, 46 Ga. 621 ; Thornton v. Car- ver, 80 Ga. 397, 6 S. E. 915; Haifley V. Haynes, 37 Mich. 535; Smith v. Shell Lake Lumber Co., 68 Wis. 89, 31 N. W. 694,— which, with more or less pertinency, sustain the view that the lien of the landlord does not follow the crops into the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice. Darby v. Jorndt, 85 Mo. App. 274; Dawson v. Ellis, 151 111. App. 92. But see Land v. Roby, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 333, 120 S. W. 1057. T'OWatt V. Scofield, 76 111. 261; Frink v. Pratt, 130 111. 327, 22 N. E. 819; Corbitt v. Reynolds, 68 Ala. 378. In the first named case the court said. "It is true, the plaintiff had a lien given by the statute, but it is a mere lien. The landlord had not, by virtue of the 545 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 576a One having a lien at common law, being necessarily in possession, could maintain trespass against a wrongdoer, or trover against one who should convert the goods, by virtue of his special property therein. The possession of the lienor is notice to the world of his rights, whatever they might be. But in case of the landlord's statutory lien, "it is manifest, there being no actual possession by the landlord, and no record of which the public are required to or can take notice, the lien, although not a secret lien within the meaning of that term as used in judicial writings, and which is created by contract or act of the parties, is nevertheless secret, in the sense that it is unknown by any public record, or by the indicia of possession, and rests in the breasts of the landlord and tenant. "^^ On the other hand, there are numerous cases which hold that the lien of a landlord is paramount as against a bona fide purchaser from the tenant of crops grown on the rented premises. ^^ There are also cases which hold that one who purchases property upon the leased premises takes it with lien alone, and without levy of a distress warrant, a right of pos- session. He could not take pos- session of the tenant's crops at any time he chose, before the rent was due, nor could he, after it was due, by virtue of the lien alone. The statute gives no such author- ity. The remedy is, therefore, by action on the case for a fraudu- lent act, intended to impair the landlord's security, when the cir- cumstances warrant, like the cases of a lien by mortgage or execu- tion." 51 Finney v. Harding, 136 111. 573, 583, 27 N. E. 289; Land v. Roby, 56 Tex., Civ. App. 333, 120 S. W. 1057. 52 For this view, the cases mainly relied upon are Kennard v. Harvey, 80 Ind. Zl ; Mathews v. Burke, 32 Tex. 419; Davis v. Wil- son, 86 Tenn. 519; 8 S. W. 151; Richardson v. Peterson, 58 Iowa 724, 13 N. W. 63; Holden v. Cox, 60 Iowa 449, 15 N. W. 269; and perhaps others, — the holding in which, more or less directly, is that the lien of the landlord is paramount as against a bona fide purchaser. Lynch v. Smith, 154 111. App. 469. See also, Maddox V. Maddox, 146 Ala. 460, 41 So. 426; Land v. Roby, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 2>ZZ, 120 S. W. 1057; White v. Mc- Allister Co., 67 Mo. App. 314; Scul- ly v. Porter, 57 Kans. 322, 46 Pac. 313; Frorer v. Hammer, 99 Iowa 48, 68 N. W. 564. 35 577 LIENS. 546 constructive notice of the landlord's rights and subject to his lien.^^ § 577. Loss of lien by sale of property. — The prevailing rule is that the landlord's lien upon his tenant's goods is lost by a sale to a purchaser in good faith for a valuable con- sideration. If the property was not upon the leased premises at the time of the purchase, and there is no evidence that it had been fraudulently removed, there is strong ground to believe that the purchaser took the property in good faith, and therefore free of the landlord's lien.^'* A purchaser of a crop of cotton, who buys after it has been removed by the tenant to a gin, and without notice, takes it discharged of the landlord's lien.^"^ And so a factor who, without notice of any lien, makes advances on cotton raised upon rented land and stored with him by the tenant, has a lien on the cotton in 53 Smith V. Meyer, 25 Ark. 609; Lehman v. Stone, 4 Willson Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) 8121, 16 S. W. 784; Aderhold v. Bluthenthal, 95 Ala. 66, 10 So. 230; Weil v. Mc- Whorter, 94 Ala. 540, 10 So. 131 Lomax v. Le Grand, 60 Ala. 537 Boggs V. Price, 64 Ala. 514 Scaife v. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237. Where chattels at the time they are mortgaged are on leased lands, the burden is on the holder of the mortgage to establish the priority of his mortgage lien over that of the landlord. Rogers v. Grigg Tex. Civ. App., 29 S. W. 654; Land V. Roby, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 333, 120 S. W. 1057; Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala. 59, 24 So. 1 ; Kilpatrick v. Harper, 119 Ala. 452, 24 So. 715. See post, §580. 54Nesbit V. Bartlett, 14 Iowa 485; Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152. See also Toney v. Goodley, 57 Mo. App. 235; Gillespie v. Mc- Clesky, 160 Ala. 289, 49 So. 362; Laraway v. Tillotson, 81 Vt. 487, 70 Atl. 1063. But if one buys grain of one he knows to be a tenant, knowing that the grain was raised on such premises, he is not a pur- chaser in good faith under the rule in Illinois. Lynch v. Smith, 154 111. App. 469. The burden to prove that the lien of the landlord has been waived is on the purchaser from the tenant. Bivins v. West (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 112. ssPuckett V. Reed, 31 Ark. 131. But if he has notice of the land- lord's lien, he buys subject there- to. Aikins v. Stadell, 9 Kans. App. 298, 61 Pac. 325. But see Frorer v. Hammer, 99 Iowa 48, 68 N. W. 564, holding that the claims of a bona fide purchaser are subject to the landlord's lien. Lancaster v. Whiteside, 108 Ga. 801, 33 S. E. 995. 547 landlords' liens for rent. § 578 preference to the landlord's lien for rent.^^ In like manner a landlord's lien does not prevail against any bona fide pur- chaser from the tenant. ^'^ Whether the purchaser buys the goods upon the leased premises and himself removes them, or whether he buys them of the tenant after they have been removed by the latter, is chiefly of importance with reference to the question whether the purchaser bought in good faith without notice of the lien, for a lien is not lost by a sale to a purchaser with notice of the lien.^^ § 578. Loss of lien by sale of tenant to innocent purchaser. — Clearly the landlord's lien on a crop is lost by a sale by the tenant to a purchaser without notice after its removal from the leased premises. ^^ The lien does not change the owner- ship of the crop, nor put any restraint upon the incidents of ownership, except as against persons dealing with the tenant with notice of the lien. The lien of course prevails against the tenant himself so long as he has possession, and against volunteers and purchasers from him with notice, though upon a valuable consideration. The statute itself may be a suflficient notice of the lien so long as the tenant remains in 56Clark V. Dobbins, 52 Ga. 656; Ky. 141, 2 Ky. L. 40; Herron v. Wilson V. Walker, 46 Ga. 319; Gill, 112 111. 247; Hadden v. Frazer v. Jackson, 46 Ga. 621; Knickerbocker, 70 111. 677, 22 Am. Rose V. Gray, 40 Ga. 156; Beall v. Rep. 80; Lamotte v. Wisner, 51 Butler, 54 Ga. 43; Thornton v. Md. 543; Dawson v. Ellis, 151 111. Carver, 80 Ga. 397, 6 S. E. 915 ; May App. 92; Frorer v. Hammer, 99 V. McGaughey, 60 Ark. 357, 30 S. Iowa 48, 68 N. W. 564. W. 417. ^sVolmer v. Wharton, 34 Ark. 57Webb V. Sharp, 13 Wall. (U. 691; Scully v. Porter, 57 Kans. S.) 14, 20 L. ed. 478; Slocum v. il2, 46 Pac. 313; Strickland v. Clark, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 475; Coles v. Thornton, 2 Ga. App. 2>77, 58 S. E. Marquand, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 447; 540. Frisbey v. Thayer, 25 Wend. (N. ^"Scaife v. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237; Y.) 396; Martin v. Black, 9 Paige Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala. 59, (N. Y.) 641, 38 Am. Dec. 574; Hast- 24 So. 1; Lancaster v. Whiteside, ings V. Belknap, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 100 Ga. 801, 2>2, S. E. 995; Hunter 190; Davis v. Payne, 4 Rand. v. Mathews, 67 Ark. 362, 55 S. W. (Va.) ZiZ, ZiZ; Stone v. Bohm, 79 144. § 578a LIENS. 548 possession upon the rented land. But when the crop is re- moved from the rented land by the tenant, he then has a separate possession of the crop only, distinct from the land, and such possession must furnish security to all who deal with him in good faith and for value; otherwise there would be no safety in dealing in agricultural products. Statutes are always to be construed in accordance with the common law, and are not regarded as infringing upon its rules and principles, except so far as may be expressed, or fairly im- plied to give them full operation. When a charge merely is created by statute, it cannot be supposed, unless the inten- tion is clearly expressed or may be justly inferred, that the charge is to have a superiority which the common law does not attach to such a charge. The common law protects pur- chasers in good faith from secret liens of which they have no notice. ^^ § 578a. Effect of removal of property to another state. — If goods upon which there is a statutory lien be removed to another state where another statutory lien attaches to them, the latter will prevail; for a statute has no force beyond the limits of the state which enacted it, and if another state per- mits the statute to be carried into effect within its jurisdic- tion, it does so upon the principle of comity. Thus the lien upon a crop of cotton, created by a statute of Arkansas which gives a lien to a landlord upon a crop grown on de- mised premises to secure accruing rent, is, when the cotton comes into the hands of a broker in New Orleans, under con- signment from the lessee, and without knowledge of the lien on the consignee's part, subordinated to the consignee's lien for advances, arising under the laws of Louisiana.®^ soScaife v. Stovall, (>1 Ala. 237, May v. McGaughey, 60 Ark. 357, per Brickell, C. J. 30 S. W. 417; Ball v. Sledge, 82 61 Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. Miss. 749, 35 So. 447. 355, 32 L. ed. 712, 9 Sup. Ct. 340; 549 landlords' liens for rent. § 580 § 579. Consent of landlord to removal of property. — The mere consent of a landlord to a removal of a crop from the rented premises is not necessarily a waiver of his lien on the crop. Much must depend upon the purpose for which the consent was given. If the landlord consents to a removal and sale of the crop, a sale to a bona fide purchaser would operate as a destruction of the lien. But if he should consent to a removal in order that the crop might be better prepared for market, or more safely stored, it would be unjust to infer that he waived, or intended to waive, the lien. All the at- tendant circumstances should be considered, and from these the intention of the landlord should be inferred ; and from these also it should be determined whether one dealing with the tenant in good faith, and finding the crop in the posses- sion of the tenant, separated from the possession of the rented premises, has been misled. ^^ § 580. Notice of lien to purchaser of crop. — There are, however, some decisions that go to the extent of charging the purchaser of a crop from a tenant, with notice of the statutory lien, in the same way that a purchaser from a mortgagor is chargeable with notice of a duly recorded mort- gage of the property. In such case the purchaser can ac- quire no better title than the vendor had, and the removal of the crop by the purchaser amounts to a conversion, which renders the purchaser liable for the value of the crop con- verted, to the extent of the rent due or to become due from the tenant.®^ 62Tuttle V. Walker, 69 Ala. 172; conditionally that his tenant may Coleman v. Siler, 74 Ala. 435. ship and sell the crop. Foxworth Sanger v. Magee, 29 Tex. Civ. App. v. Brown, 120 Ala. 59, 24 So. 1 ; 397, 69 S. W. 234; Keahey v. Bry- Gilliam v. Smither (Tex.), 33 S. ant (Tex. Civ. App.), 134 S. W. W. 984; White v. McAllister Co., 409; Pape v. Steward, 69 Ark. 306, 67 Mo. App. 314. 63 S. W. 47; Hopper v. Hays, 82 63Kennard v. Harvey, 80 Ind. Mo. App. 494. The landlord's lien 2,1; Watt v. Scofield, Id 111. 261; is waived when he consents un- Volmer v. Wharton, 34 Ark. 691; § 58l LIENS. 550 The purchaser may be chargeable with such notice from a knowledge of circumstances from which he should infer the existence of the lien. Thus, if one purchasing corn knows that the seller had been living, during the year in which the corn was raised, upon the farm of another, where the corn was then stored, and that the owner of the land was living there at the time of the sale, the purchaser is chargeable with notice of the landlord's lien.^* The pur- chaser's knowledge of the fact of the tenancy, and of the fact that the corn was raised on the demised premises, has been held to imply notice to him of any lien the landlord may have for unpaid rent f^ but the better opinion seems to be that mere knowledge by the purchaser of the fact that rent is due and owing from the tenant is not sufficient to invalidate his purchase as against the landlord.^® § 581. Loss of lien by sale of goods in usual way. — A lien upon a stock of goods kept as merchandise upon the leased premises is displaced by sales in the usual course of trade, if the goods are delivered to the purchasers and they remove them from the leased premises. The lien in such case is upon the chattels in bulk, or upon the stock in mass, and not Lamotte v. Wisner, 51 Mtl. 543; 65Watt v. Scofield, 76 111. 261; Lynch v. Smith, 154 111. App. 469; White v. McAllister Co., 67 Mo. Scully V. Porter, 57 Kans. 322, 46 App. 314; Dawson v. Ellis, 151 111. Pac. 313; Foxworth v. Brown, 120 App. 92; Pape v. Steward, 69 Ark. Ala. 59, 21 So. 413; McGrath v. 306, 63 S. W. 47; Land v. Roby, Barlow (Miss.), 21 So. 237; Gra- 56 Tex. Civ. App. 333, 120 S. W. ham V. Seignious, 53 S. Car. 132, 1057; Harvey v. Hampton, 108 111. 31 S. E. 51. App. 501 ; Graham v. Seignious, 53 C4Hunter v. Whitfield, 89 111. S. Car. 132, 31 S. E. 51; Reinhardt 229; Prettyman v. Unland, 77 111. v. Blanchard, 78 111. App. 26; Mael- 2(!)6; Sloan v. Hudson, 119 Ala. 27, zer v. Swan, 75 Kans. 496, 89 Pac. 24 So. 458; Maelzer v. Swan, 75 1037. Kans. 496, 89 Pac. 1037; Ball v. 66Herron v. Gill, 112 111. 247, Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 251. As to evidence of notice, see 100 Am. St. 654; Bush v. Willis, Bledsoe v. Mitchell, 52 Ark. 158, 130 Ala. 395, 30 So. 443; Mangum 12 S. W. 390. v. Stadel, 76 Kans. 764, 92 Pac. 1093. 551 landlords' liens for rent. § 581 in detail.*'^ Business could not be safely carried on unless goods sold and delivered in the usual course of business be- came discharged of the lien. In the case of goods kept for sale, it would seem that the lien would not attach to goods sold in good faith and for a valuable consideration before proceedings are commenced to enforce the lien.®^ In case the leased property is a farm or agricultural land, the crops and stock of the tenant, his cows, horses, and hogs, are not kept for sale to the same ex- tent as goods in a store ; and yet the landlord knows that they are legitimate and very common subjects of traffic and trade; and such property, equally with goods kept for sale, should not be affected by a lien established after a sale made in good faith for a valuable consideration.^'^ Whatever the goods may be, therefore, the general rule applies that third persons purchasing from the tenant in the usual course of business take a title free from the lien. "If the cattle and hogs in question were used upon the premises for the purpose of being fed and improved in the usual way of stockraising, the lien attached, or, if kept for sale only, and not for improve- ment, and the premises were leased, in whole or in part, for that purpose, then the lien attached, subject to the right of purchasers. If the premises were leased for the purpose of keeping cattle and hogs for sale, and the cattle and hogs in question were kept for that purpose only, and were sold in the ordinary course of business before any action to enforce the lien was brought, the lien did not attach as against the purchaser."'^^ 6'Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. Burgin v. Marx, 158 Ala. 633, 48 (U. S.) 328, 336, 21 L. ed. 35, per So. 348. Clifford, J.; Webb v. Sharp, 13 esGrant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa Wall. (U. S.) 14, 15, 20 L. ed. 478; 152. Holden v. Cox, 60 Iowa 449, 15 N. esNesbitt v. Bartlett, 14 Iowa W. 269; Knox v. Hunt, 18 Mo. 243; 485. Mathes v. Staed, 67 Mo. App. 399; '''OThompson v. Anderson, 86 Iowa 703, 53 N. W. 418. § 582 LIENS. 552 § 582. Sale by tenant will not affect landlord's lien. — A sale b}^ a tenant of his entire stock of merchandise upon which a landlord's lien has attached, does not displace the lien, in case the sale is made to a person who knows that the premises are leased, and who continues to occupy them, and to sell the goods in the ordinary way.''^^ Even a second sale of this sort does not displace the lien. Purchasers of goods and chattels take them at common law, subject to the liens which existed against the vendor, and the same rule applies f in case of a sale by a tenant of chattels which are subject to a I landlord's statutory lien, where the sale is of the stock in I mass, which is not removed from the premises, or with knowledge of the lien,''^^ and not in the usual course of trade. The lien, when it has once attached, continues to attach to the chattels into whosesoever hands they may come during the time allowed for instituting proceedings to enforce the lien, unless the lien is displaced by the removal of the goods, or by a sale of them in the ordinary course of trade. § 583. Estoppel of landlord. — The landlord may estop himself by his declarations and conduct from claiming his lien as against a purchaser who has knowledge of his lien. Thus, a tenant sold a part of a crop of corn raised upon the leased premises, and the purchaser before he paid for the corn informed the landlord of his purchase, who said it was all right, that he was satisfied, that he had settled with the tenant, and that nothing was due except a part of the crop which remained, and which he was to gather at his own ex- pense. After this the purchaser sold the corn to a second purchaser, and paid the tenant for the corn. It was held that ''■iMan V. Shiffner, 2 East 523; "^Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152; Godin V. London Assurance Co., 1 Carpenter v. Gillespie, 10 Iowa Burrow 489; Burton v. Smith, 13 592; Doane v. Garretson, 24 Iowa Pet. (U. S.) 464, 483, 10 L. ed. 24; 351; Nesbitt v. Bartlett, 14 Iowa Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 485. 328, 21 L. ed. 35. 553 landlords' liens for rent. § 585 the landlord had waived his lien by his declarations and conductJ^ Where a landlord has a lien for advances as well as for rent upon his tenant's crop, and he agrees with a merchant not to make any advances if the latter will furnish his tenant with supplies, and the merchant, on the faith of such agreement, makes advances, the landlord's lien for any advances subse- quently made is necessarily postponed to the merchant's lien for his advances; and the landlord cannot claim to appropri- ate any part of the proceeds of sale of the tenant's crop to his lien for such advances, until the merchant's lien is fully paid.^* § 584. Liability of purchaser to landlord. — On the other hand, the purchaser may by his declarations or acts make himself liable to the landlord for the rent. Thus, where a factor received cotton from a tenant with full knowledge of the landlord's special lien for the rent of the premises, and, as the landlord was about to seize the cotton upon a distress warrant, the factor informed him that there was cotton enough to pay his advances and the rent, and thereby pre- vented the landlord from asserting his lien by distress, it was held that an implied promise to pay the rent arose from these facts, and that the landlord could recover the rent from the factor.'^^ § 585. Lien not waived by taking note. — A landlord's lien on his tenant's property for rent is not waived by his 73Goeing v. Outhouse, 95 111. rell (Tex. Civ. App.), 131 S. W. 346. To like effect, Wright v. 856; Allen v. Houston Ice & Dickey Co., 83 Iowa 464, 50 N. W. Brew. Co., 44 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 206; Fishbaugh v. Spunangle, 118 97 S. W. 1063; Wood v. Duval, 100 Iowa ZZ7, 92 N. W. 58; Chancellor Iowa 724, 69 N. W. 1061. v. Law, 148 Ala. 511, 41 So. 514; 74Coleman v. Siler, 74 Ala. 435; Church V. Bloom, 111 Iowa 319, Seavey v. Godbold, 99 Miss. 113, 82 N. W. 794; Planters' Compress 54 So. 838. Co. v. Howard, 41 Tex. Civ. App. '''SSaulsbury v. McKellar, 59 Ga. 285, 92 S. W. 44; Melasky v. Jar- 301. § 585 LIENS. 554 taking his tenant's note or bond, even with personal security, though a vendor's Hen would be waived by his taking such note and security.'''^ The distinction is that the right or lien of a landlord is a legal right, not a mere equitable lien; and before the court can say that the landlord has waived this legal right, there must be some plain evidence to show it.''^^ The taking of a note of course suspends the remedy by dis- tress or by suit to foreclose the lien until the note becomes due.^^ But after this he may proceed, although he has pre- viously negotiated the note, provided he has taken it up be- fore commencing proceedings/'' The landlord's lien is not lost by his assigning the tenant's promissory note for the rent, and afterwards taking it up "6Rollins V. Proctor, 56 Iowa 326, 9. N. W. 235; Giles v. Ebs- worth, 10 Md. 333 ; Snyder v. Kun- kleman. 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 487; Coleman v. Siler, 74 Ala. 435; Lewis V. Lozee, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 79; Story v. Flournoy, 55 Ga. 56; Sullivan v. Ellison, 20 S. Car. 481 ; Bailey v. Wright, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 484; Coleman v. Siler, 74 Ala. 435; Stephens v. Adams, 93 Ala. 117, 9 So. 529; Smith v. Wells' Admx., 4 Bush. (Ky.) 92; Atkins V. Byrnes, 71 111. 326; Cunnea v. Williams, 11 111. App. 72; Frank- lin V. Meyer, 36 Ark. 96; Gordon V. Correy, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 552; Paulding v. Ketty, 9 Mart. (La.) (O. S.) 186, 187. Otherwise where tenant's note for a share of the produce reserved as rent is taken. Warren v. Forney, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 52. ""Denham v. Harris, 13 Ala. 465; Smith v. Wells' Admx., 4 Bush (Ky.) 92. "sPiske V. Judge, 2 Speers (S. Car.) 436; Fife v. Irving, 1 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 226; Hornbrooks v. Lucas. 24 W. Va. 493, 49 Am. Rep. 277; Worsham v. McLeod (Miss.), 11 So. 107. In the English case of Davis v. Gyde, 2 Ad. & El. 623, it is held the taking of a note does not suspend the right of distress, unless there be a special agree- ment that the note shall have this effect. This case and the South Carolina case are fully and ably discussed by Judge Green in Horn- brooks V. Lucas, 24 W. Va. 493, 49 Am. Rep. 277, and the position taken by the South Carolina case is sustained. This position seems to be clearly right. The decision of the English court seems to be based upon the peculiar favor in which the right of distress is held in England. But in this country no such favor is extended to the right of distress. 79Giles v. Ebsworth, 10 Md. 333. 555 landlords' liens for rent. § 586 upon non-payment by the maker.^*' And so, if he has trans- ferred the note under an agreement that he would collect the rents and pay them to the transferee, the landlord, still retaining possession of the note, may maintain a distress warrant against the tenant for the rent represented by the note.^^ § 586. Lien not waived by taking mortgage. — A land- lord's lien upon goods for rent is not displaced by his taking a mortgage upon the same goods for the rent. The mort- gage is regarded as a cumulative security, and he may en- force either security.^- The acceptance of an obligation of an inferior or even of an equal degree does not extinguish a prior obligation, unless such is the express agreement of the parties. Rent is regarded as an obligation of a higher degree than any simple contract, and therefore the execution of a promissory note for rent, secured also by a chattel mortgage, does not operate as a waiver of the right to enforce payment by distress, ^^ without an express understanding to that efifect, even if by such an understanding it would so operate ; for this has been questioned. ^^ soFarwell v. Grier, 38 Iowa 83. expressly renounced, or there be siBolton V. Duncan, 61 Ga. 103. some contract between the par- 82Franklin v. Meyer, 36 Ark. 96. ties inconsistent with it. Per Ea- The rule in this case is distin- kin, J. The foreclosure of the guished from that which applies mortgage waives the landlord's to a vendor's lien for purchase- lien. Citizens' Sav. Bank of Olin money. The vendor's lien is the v. Woods, 134 Iowa 232, 111 N. W. mere creation of courts of equity, 929. See also, Ladner v. Balsley, independent of common law^ or 103 Iowa 674, 72 N. W. 787. statute. Courts of equity apply to ssDavis v. Gyde, 2 Ad. & El. this lien such equitable qualifica- 623; Atkins v. Byrnes, 71 111. 326; tions as they see fit; and one of O'Hara v. Jones, 46 111. 288, 291; these qualifications is that this Hornbrooks v. Lucas, 24 W. Va. lien can not coexist with an ex- 493, 497, 49 Am. Rep. 277, per press lien, or with other security, Green, J.; Cornell v. Lamb, 20 unless there be shown a manifest Johns. (N. Y.) 407. intention to retain it. The land- 84Hornbrooks v. Lucas, 24 W. lord's lien, however, is a legal Va. 493, 497, 49 Am. Rep. 211. right, and it remains unless it be § 587 LIENS. 556 There are authorities which hold that the lien must be re- garded as waived whenever, from the circumstances, it can be inferred that the lien was not relied upon.®^ But this inference cannot be drawn from the taking of a security which is not enforcible against third persons, such, for instance, as a chattel mortgage which is not recorded.^® If a landlord receives from his tenant his draft upon a third person, accepted by such person, and thereupon gives his tenant a receipt for the rent, he waives his lien though the draft is never paid.^''^ § 587. Not waived by taking obligation of third person. — A landlord's lien is not released by a voluntary obligation executed by a third person upon purchasing the tenant's goods upon the demised premises, not in the ordinary course of business, whereby the obligor binds himself to pay for the tenant the rent due from him to the landlord at that time, if the consideration for such obligation moves from the ten- ant and not from the landlord. ^^ In such case the landlord, who has seized the goods on the premises for the rent, can- not be compelled by other attaching creditors, who attack the purchase of the goods as fraudulent, to resort first to the voluntary promise of the purchaser to pay the rent, before seeking satisfaction out of the goods themselves under his lien.^^ § 588. Remedy of landlord who has taken security. — A landlord who has taken collateral security for his rent may 85In a Mississippi case it was Bond v. Carter (Tex.), T^ S. W. held that a landlord who had tak- 45. The statutory lien of the en a mortgage on his tenant's landlord on a tenant's crop may- crops to be raised must, as against be waived by the landlord's agent, third persons, confine himself to Wimp v. Early, 104 Mo. App. 85, the security afforded by the deed 78 S. W. 343. of trust, and can not recover sepjtkin v. Fletcher, 47 Iowa 53. from a purchaser in good faith the 87Cambria Iron Co.'s Appeal, value of crops sold to him and 114 Pa. St. 58, 6 Atl. 563. raised by subtenants. Gaines v. ^^Block v. Latham, 63 Tex. 414. Keeton, 68 Miss. 473, 10 So. 71; soRlock v. Latham, 63 Tex. 414. 557 landlords' liens for rent. § 589 pursue all his remedies at the same time. He may sue the tenant personally, may seize his goods by distress where this remedy is given, or may foreclose his statutory lien for the rent in the manner provided, and he may at the same time proceed to enforce the collateral security.^" A landlord may distrain although he has recovered a per- sonal judgment for the rent, and special bail has been entered for a stay of execution. ^^ A landlord waives his lien on property seized under a dis- tress warrant when he proceeds to take a personal judgment without foreclosing his lien on the property.^- The reservation of a lien by the terms of the lease is not a waiver of the right to distrain, although the lien reserved is more extensive than that given by statute. ^^ A stipulation in a lease that the landlord may re-enter if the rent remain unpaid for a certain period after it becomes due, does not take away or suspend his immediate right of distress.^* § 589. Tender of rent due must be kept good. — A tender of the rent due does not release or discharge a landlord's lien, unless the tender be kept good by payment of the money into court. ^^ And so a distress for rent after a tender of the rent and charges due is unlawful, unless the tenant fails to make the tender good on demand. ^^ A tender made after costs have been properly incurred is not effectual unless such costs are included in the tender.^'' soCunnea v. Williams, 11 111. 95Bloom v. McGehee, 38 Ark. App. 72; King v. Blackmore, 72 329; Hamlett v. Tallman, 30 Ark. Pa. St. 347, 13 Am. Rep. 684. 505. 9iShetsline v. Keemle, 1 Ash- 96 Smith v. Goodwin, 4 B. & mead (Pa.) 29. Ad. 413; Davis v. Henry, 63 Miss. 92Wise V. Old, 57 Tex. 514; 110. Bond V. Carter (Tex.), IZ S. W. 45. 97Hunder v. Le Conte, 6 Cow. 930'Hara v. Jones, 46 111. 288. (N. Y.) 728. 94Smith V. Meanor, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 375. § 590 LIENS. 558 § 590. Lien lost by levy of an execution. — As against a distress warrant at common law, a landlord's lien is destroyed by the levy of an execution upon the tenant's goods, for an execution takes precedence of all debts except specific liens. ^^ But to place the tenant's goods in custodia legis by an execu- tion and levy, the sheriff must not only take, but must keep, the actual possession of the goods. The landlord's right to distrain is not suspended unless the sheriff takes possession of the goods, and his right revives if the officer withdraws from the premises without leaving a bailiff in charge. °^ Goods which have previously been levied upon by foreign attachment are in the custody of the law and cannot be distrained.^ And so are goods taken on replevin. - If the landlord consents to a sale of his tenant's goods taken in execution, upon the promise of the officer made be- fore the sale that he would pay the rent claimed, he waives his right to sue the sheriff under the statute.^ To render such waiver eft'ectual, it is not necessary that the jury should believe that the landlord actually waived his right under the statute and relied upon the promise of the sheriff', and it is error to submit such an incjuiry to them.* J>SHarris v. Dammann, 3 Mackey made in the same manner as the (D. C.) 90; Gibson v. Gautier, 1 levy of a second execution. Mackey (D. C.) 35; Pierce v. iPierce v. Scott, 4 Watts & S. Scott, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 344; (Pa.) 344. Kelly V. Davenport, 1 Browne ^Commonwealth v. Leiar, 8 Leg. (Pa.) 231; Dawson v. Dewan, 12 Int. 50, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 173. But Rich. L. (S. Car.) 499; Potter v. goods replevied may be dis- Greenleaf, 21 R. I. 483, 44 Atl. 118. trained for subsequent arrears of ooBeekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. rent.,- Woglam v. Cowperthwaite, (N. Y.) 446, 20 Am. Dec. 707; New- 2 Dall. (U. S.) 68, 1 L. ed. 292; ell V. Clark, 46 N. J. L. 363. In Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts (Pa.) 39, New Jersey, however, a levy is 42. valid without an actual seizure -Rothery v. Wood, 3 Camp. 24; and continued possession. A dis- Cloud v. Needles, 6 Md. 501. tress for rent of property already -^Cloud v. Needles, 6 Md. 501. seized upon execution may be 559 landlords' liens for rent. § 592 § 591. Lien not lost by appointment of receiver. — The landlord's lien is not lost by the appointment of a receiver but property rightfully in the hands of a receiver is in the custody of the court, and cannot be distrained upon without permis- sion of the court by which the receiver was appointed.^ In such case the landlord should apply for an order on the re- ceiver to pay the rent, or for leave to proceed by distress or otherwise.^ A receiver of the tenant's goods does not ordinarily be- come liable for the rent of the leased premises by entering upon them in order to take possession of the goods and to dispose of them under the order of court. Therefore, for rent becoming due after a sale by the receiver and the re- moval of the goods by the purchaser, the landlord has no lien upon the proceeds of the sale, notwithstanding a statutory provision allowing the landlord to follow and distrain goods for rent due after their removal from the premises, in case they have not been sold to a bona fide purchaser without notice.^ A landlord's statutory lien is not defeated by the conver- sion of the tenant's property into money by a receiver, under an order of court, but will attach to the proceeds in the re- ceiver's hands. The money in such case takes the place of the property, and is distributed to the persons who establish their claims to it.^ § 592. Lien lost by accepting surrender of the leasehold estate. — Of course a landlord's lien for rent is lost by his ac- ceptance of a surrender of the leasehold estate by the lessee. ^Noe V. Gibson, 7 Paige (N. Y.) eEverett v. Neff, 28 Md. 176. 513; Riggs v. Whitney, 15 Abb. Pr. "Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. (N. Y.) 388; Martin v. Black, 3 222, 9 Atl. 632, 10 Atl. 309. Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 580, affd. 9 Paige sGilbert v. Greenbaum, 56 Iowa (N. Y.) 641, 38 Am. Dec. 574; 211, 9 N. W. 182. Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 Atl. 632, 10 Atl. 309. § 593 LIENS. 560 But such a surrender can be effected only by express words, by which the lessee manifests his intention of yielding up his interest in the premises, or by operation of law, where the parties, without express surrender, do some act which im- plies that they have both agreed to consider the surrender as made.^ But when acts are relied upon as evincing such agreement, they should be such as are not easily referable to a different motive. Even the delivery by the tenant to the landlord of the keys of a leased building, and the leasing of the same by the latter to another tenant, is not conclusive evidence that a surrender has been accepted. ^° But a surrender and acceptance of a part of the demised premises does not destroy the landlord's right of distress as to the residue. ^^ As between the landlord and tenant, the execution of a new lease during the term of an existing lease is a surrender of the old lease. But as against the holder of a chattel mort- gage of the tenant's goods, executed after the making of the first lease, but before the making of the second lease, the lien of the landlord upon such goods for rent accruing under the second lease, for the period covered by the first lease, is not postponed to that of the chattel mortgage, if the land- lord had no knowledge of it at the time of making the second lease. ^^ § 593. No distraint for rent after term expires. — A land- lord cannot distrain for rent after the term has expired, and the tenant has surrendered the possession. ^^ A statutory right to distrain goods removed from the premises within 9Beall V. White, 94 U. S. 382, 389, uPeters v. Newkirk, 6 Cow. (N. 24 L. ed. 173. per Clifford, J.; Ca- Y.) 103. hill V. Lee, 55 Md. 319; Bain v. i^Rollins v. Proctor, 56 Iowa Clark, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 424; Wol- 326, 9 N. W. 235. cott V. Ashenfelter, 5 N. Mex. 442, isTerboss v. Williams, 5 Cow. 23 Pac. 780, 8 L. R. A. 691. (N. Y.) 407, affd. 2 Wend. (N. Y.) lOMartin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345, 148; Greider's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 3 N. W. 92. 422. 56 1 landlords' liens for rent. § 596 thirty days, or other certain period, exists only during the continuance of the lease and the tenant's possession of the premises, unless otherwise specially provided. ^^ A landlord cannot distrain after the determination of his own estate by surrender to the owner of the paramount estate, though rent be in arrear and due from his former tenant, and the goods of the latter remain on the premises. ^^ § 594. A landlord's lien not impaired by his tenant's sub- letting the premises. The sub-lessee's property may be thereby subjected to a double lien, — that of the landlord and that of his immediate lessor; but the lien of the landlord is paramount. The lessee can pass no better estate and no better right to the use of the land than he himself possessed. ^*^ A lessee who has parted with his whole term cannot dis- train on his sub-lessee. ^^ § 595. Loss of lien by destruction of the property. — A landlord's Hen or privilege upon the goods of his tenant is lost by their destruction by fire, and does not attach to the insurance. ^^ § 596. Notice unnecessary at common law. — In a pro- ceeding by distress for rent, notice to the tenant was un- necessary at common law. In a case in the Exchequer Chamber,^^ Parke, Baron, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "We think that the common law casts no such obligation on the distrainor. It has been expressly laid down i4Burr V. Van Buskirk, 3 Cow. Car. 276; Trout v. McQueen (N. Y.) 263; Terboss v. Williams, (Tex.), 62 S. W. 928. 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 407, affd. 2 Wend. i^Ragsdale v. Estis, 8 Rich. L. (N. Y.) 148. (S. Car.) 429. i^Walbridge v. Pruden, 102 Pa. i^In re Reis, 3 Woods (U. S.) St. 1. 18, Fed. Cas. No. 11684. i^Montague v. Mial, 89 N. Car. i^Tancred v. Leyland, 16 Q. B. 137; Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. 669; Trent v. Hunt, 9 Exch. 14; Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660, 666. 36 § 597 LIENS. 562 that, if the lord distrain for rent or services, he has no oc- casion to give notice to the tenant for what thing he dis- trains; for the tenant, by intendment, know^s what things are in arrears for his lands ;^^ * * * ^l^^ ^j^g authority for this is Yearb. Pasch. 45 E. 3, fol. 9 A. pi. 13;2i where Lord Chief Justice Fyncheden, in answer to the argument that the lord, on the taking of a distress, ought to give notice to the tenant of the cause of the taking, says it is not so, for the tenant is always held, by common intendment, to know what things are in arrear from his land, as rent and service, etc." § 597. Rule in United States as to notice to tenant. — Under statutes which substantially adopt the common law remedy of distress, no notice to the tenant is necessary, or demand upon him,^^ before seizure. The statute in such case becomes a part of the contract of leasing, and regulates and limits the rights of the parties. Virtually, the landlord, in pursuing this remedy, takes possession of the property in pursuance of the contract of leasing, which usually embraces a consent that the possession may be so taken in default of payment. The service of the warrant is a sufficient notice. The warrant is a process of law with reference to this con- tract. It is substantially a proceeding in rem, under which a seizure of the property in the possession of the owner, for the enforcement of a lien upon it, is held to be a sufficient notice to the owner, if no other notice is required by the statute. ^^ This remedy, by which the property liable to seizure is levied upon without personal notice to the tenant, is not in conflict with the constitutional provisions which secure the 201 Roll. Abr. 664 (a), tit. Dis- 666; Bufifington v. Hilley, 55 Ga. tress (8), pi. 1. 655. 21F0I. 9, A. pi. 13. 23Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 22Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 467. 467; Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660, 563 landlords' liens for rent. § 598 right of trial by jury, and declare that no person shall be de- prived of property without due process of law.-"* Especially is this the case under statutes which provide that the tenant may replevy the property taken on distress within a limited time, and that the tenant thereupon may have the matters in dispute tried by a jury.-^ § 598. Who may distrain. — At common law, only the lessor could distrain for rent.-^ By statute this remedy may of course be given to the landlord's personal representative for rent becoming due before his death, or to his grantee or assignee. Rent accruing after the death of the landlord be- longs to the heirs-" or devisees.-^ Under statutes conferring a lien for rent, this may be enforced by the landlord himself, or by any one standing legally in his place, as by his grantor, assignee, heir, or personal representative. In either case the relation of landlord and tenant must exist either by direct contract, or indirectly by operation of law.^° The right of distress is inseparable from the reversion.^" Therefore a tenant who has sublet a portion of the demised premises, for the entire period of the term, cannot distrain for rent;^^ otherwise if he has sublet for a part only of his term.^- Tenants in common may distrain severally ,^^ each for his own share of the rent; or one may distrain in the name of all if not forbidden by the others to do so.^^ One tenant in 24Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. ley, 16 Johns (N. Y.) 289; Wright 467. V. Link, 34 Miss. 266. 25Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 30Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. (N. 467. Y.) 652; Schuyler v. Leggett, 2 2GCo. Lit. 162 a; Bagwell v. Cow. (N. Y.) 660. Jamison, Cheeves (S. Car.) 249; i2 siprescott v. De Forest, 16 Henry VIII., ch. Z7. Johns. (N. Y.) 159. 27Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283; 32Ege v. Ege, 5 Watts. (Pa.) Wright V. Williams, 5 Cow. (N. 134. Y.) 501. 33De Coursey v. Guarantee 28Lewis' Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 312. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 81 Pa. 29McGillick V. McAllister, 10 St. 217. 111. App. 40; McKircher v. Haw- 34Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. § 599 LIENS. 564 common who has leased his interest to his cotenant may dis- train for rent.^^ If the lessors be joint tenants, all must join in the distress, unless one distrains in the name of all.^^ But one of two executors may distrain when the contract of rent was made with him alone. ^^ § 599. Rights of purchaser at foreclosure sale. — Whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale can distrain for the rent of the premises depends upon his relation to the tenant. Where the property was already subject to a lease for a term of years at the time of making the mortgage, the mortgagee may be considered as the assignee of the reversion, and en- titled, after condition broken, to all the remedies for the col- lection of accruing rent. But if a lease be made of premises already subject to a mortgage, upon the foreclosure of the mortgage the leasehold estate is extinguished with the equity of redemption. A purchaser at a foreclosure sale of such a mortgage cannot distrain for accruing rent unless the tenant attorns to him ; and a mere notice by the purchaser to the tenant, to pay the rent to him, when the tenant does not con- sent, does not make the tenant liable to him for the rent. The relation of landlord and tenant does not exist in such case.^^ § 600. Against whom distraint may be had. — At common law the remedy by distress for rent was confined to the lessor and his representatives, against the tenant for life, or in tail, and his representatives, but did not exist against the personal representatives of tenants for years. Goods in their hands 584; Waring v. SlingluflF, 63 Md. -"Carter v. Walters, 63 Ga. 164. 53; Jones v. Gundrim, 3 Watts & ssReed v. Bartlett, 9 111. App. S. (Pa.) 531. 267. And see McKircher v. Haw- 35Luther v. Arnold, 8 Rich. L. ley, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 289. See also, (S. Car.) 24, 62 Am. Dec. 422. Drakford v. Turk, 75 Ala. 339. ^GWaring v. Slingluff, 63 Md. 53. 565 landlords' liens for rent. § 602 are in custodia legis.^^ By statute and adjudication, in sev- eral states, the proceeding by distress upon the death of any tenant survives, and may be prosecuted against his personal representative.^^ A landlord, by accepting administration of his tenant's estate, waives his right to distrain. ^^ Upon the death of tenant the landlord may distrain, before administration is granted, for rent due and in arrear, for no notice is necessary before distress. ^^ § 601. Injunction by landlord. — The landlord may have an injunction against the tenant or his assignee to restrain the sale or removal of the property subject to the lien from the demised premises, in the absence of a special statutory provision for the purpose. ^^ But if the landlord can enforce his lien by attachment, as provided by statute, an injunction w^ill not be issued.** § 602. Alabama.*^ — Landlords of storehouses, dwelling- houses, and other buildings have a lien for rent upon the goods, furniture, and efifects of tenants and subtenants, and this lien is superior to all other liens on such property except that for taxes. *^ This lien may be enforced by attachment 39So, also, by Stat. 32 Henry Admr. v. Sebre, 2 A. K. Marsh. VIII., ch. 2>7; Smith v. Bobb, 12 (Ky.) 227. Sm. & M. Miss.) 322; Salvo v. -isGarner v. Cutting, 32 Iowa Schmidt, 2 Speers (S. Car.) 512. 547; Gray v. Bremer, 122 Iowa 40McLaughlin v. Riggs, 1 Cranch 110, 97 N. W. 991; Miller v. Bider, (U. S.) 410, Fed. Cas. No. 8872. Illi- (Iowa), 105 N. W. 594; Shannon v. nois : Rauh v. Ritchie, 1 111. App. Cavenaugh, 12 Cal. App. 434, 107 188. Mississippi: Smith v. Bobb, Pac. 574. 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 322 New •*4Rotzler v. Rotzler, 46 Iowa York: Morrill v. Jenkins. 2 N. Y. 189. Leg. Obs. 214. Indiana: Alerkle v. 45Civ. Code 1907, §§ 4747, 4748, O'Neal, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 289. 4752. The common-law remedy of 4iHovey v. Smith, 1 Barb. (N. distress was abolished in 1812. Y.) 372. Frazier v. Thomas, 6 Ala. 169. This 42Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660; lien prevails as against a claim of Longwell v. Ridinger, 1 Gill. exemption. Ex parte Barnes, 84 (Md.) 57. See, however, Hughes' Ala. 540, 4 So. 769. 46A11 property kept upon the 6o3 LIENS. 566 when the rent or any instalment thereof is due, and the ten- ant fails or refuses, on demand, to pay such rent or instal- ment, and also when the tenant has fraudulently disposed of the goods, or is about to do so, or has made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, or has made a transfer of all, or substantially all, of his goods without the consent of his landlord.^''' This lien may be enforced by the assignee of the landlord's claim for rent. §603. Alabama^^ (continued). Landlords' liens upon crops. — A landlord has a lien"^^ on the crop grown on rented premises, and used in connection with such tenancy, is subject to the lien, whether in or outside of the building. Stephens v. Adams, 93 Ala. 117, 9 So. 529. A landlord's lien does not extend to a mule and dray used by the tenant in connection with his mercantile business. Accounts for goods sold by a tenant on credit in the "usual course of trade" are not subject to a landlord's lien. Mc- Kleroy v. Cantey, 95 Ala. 295, 11 So. 258; Bush v. Willis, 130 Ala. 395, 30 So. 443. A stipulation in a lease, that the tenant shall be taxed with attorneys' fees in case of his violation of the lease, en- titles the landlord to recover at- torneys' fees in an action to en- force his lien. Johnson v. Burner, 88 Ala. 580, 7 So. 245; Richards v. Bestor, 90 Ala. 352, 8 So. 30; Seisel v. Folmar, 103 Ala. 491, 15 So. 850. 47 Where the tenant assigned a stock of goods on which a land- lord's lien existed, and the as- signee converted the same into money, the landlord may recover by garnishment the money in tlie hands of the assignee in an at- tachment suit against the tenant. McKleroy v. Cantey, 95 Ala. 295, 11 So. 258. Where the tenancy is continued after the expiration of the original term, by express con- tract or by implication, the lien attaches to the goods afterwards brought upon the premises, and remaining there when the attach- ment to enforce the lien is sued out; and this lien prevails against the claim of a purchaser from the tenant. Abraham v. Nicrosi, 87 Ala. 173, 6. So. 293. 48 Code 1907, §§ 4734, 4737, 4739. A landlord's lien for rent is su- perior to a chattel mortgage of crops for supplies furnished, when the mortgage was taken under cir- cumstances which made it the duty of the mortgagee to inquire as to the existence of the land- lord's lien. Manasses v. Dent, 89 Ala. 565, 8 So. 108; Simpson v. Hinson, 88 Ala. 527, 7 So. 264; Wil- son v. Curry, 149 Ala. 368, 42 So. 753. ■49This lien attaches only where the relation of landlord and ten- ant exists, and not where there is 567 landlords' liens for rent. § 603 land^^ for rent for the current year,^^ and for advances,^^ an implied liability for use and occupation, or where one of sev- eral tenants in common occupies and cultivates the entire premises. Kennon v. Wright, 70 Ala. 434; Tucker v. Adams, 52 Ala. 254; Hadden v. Powell, 17 Ala. 314. It arises under a contract whereby the landlord rents land to another to l>e cultivated for a stipulated part of the crops to be grown thereon; for such a contract creates the relation of landlord and tenant. Wilson v. Stewart, 69 Ala. 302. The statute contem- plates only the conventional rela- tion of landlord and tenant sub- sisting because of the contract between the parties. A mortgagee under a mortgage executed prior to the entry of the tenant is not, on giving notice to his mortga- gor's tenant, entitled to the statu- tory lien on the crops grown on the rented premises for the pay- ment of the rent, and he can not enforce this by attachment. Drak- ford v. Turk, 75 Ala. 339. A rent- al agent is not given a lien on crops for his advancements. Mc- Daniel v. Cain, 159 Ala. 344, 48 So. 52. soThe lien attaches to the crop whether this be raised by the ten- ant or by some one under the ten- ant. Givens v. Easley, 17 Ala. 385. But it seems that the attach- ment must issue against the ten- ant, and not against the under-ten- ant, unless the contract with the latter has been assigned to the landlord. Simmons v. Fielder, 46 Ala. 304. 51 As to the landlord's rights against an under-tenant, and the equities of creditors of the under- tenant, see Robinson v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 401. The landlord's writ of attachment is usually in the form of a mandate to attach so much of the crops grown on the rented premises as may be suffi- cient to satisfy his demand with costs. This authorizes an attach- ment not only of the crops be- longing to his tenant, but also the crops raised on the premises by an under-tenant. Agee v. Mayer, 71 Ala. 88. The statute, Code 1907, § 4744, requires in express terms that the crop of the tenant in chief shall be exhausted before a levy is made on the crop of the under-tenant, unless the tenant in chief has not made a crop, or it is insufficient to satisfy the lien; and a levy made in violation of this provision "shall be vacated on motion, at the first term there- after." But the under-tenant may intervene at the return term of the writ, and move a vacation of the levy on his crop. Lehman v. Howze, 7Z Ala. 302. The landlord has a lien for tobacco and snuff supplied to the tenant and for cash advanced to prevent the ten- ant's mule from being sold on ex- ecution. Donaldson v. Wilkerson, 170 Ala. 507, 54 So. 234. The land- lord has a lien for blacksmith tools furnished to the tenant. Hol- laday v. Rutledge, 145 Ala. 656, 39 So. 613. The lien does not ex- pire with the lease, but remains subject to the lien. Couch v. Dav- idson, 109 Ala. 313, 19 So. 507. 52The lien for advances is of 6o3 LIENS. 568 made in money or other thing of value, '^^ whether made directly by him, or at his instance and request by another person, or for which he has assumed the legal responsibility,^^ equal dignity with the lien for rent,— Wilson v. Stewart, 69 Ala. 302; Thompson v. Powell, 11 Ala. 391, — unless there be some fact or agreement which operates as a waiver, as in Coleman v. Siler, 74 Ala. 435. See also, Foster v. Na- pier, 74 Ala. 393. A landlord's lien for rent and advances extends to the crops of subtenants, but a statutory lien for advances to make a crop does not. Albright v. Mills, 86 Ala. 324, 5 So. 591. A landlord's lien is superior to that of a mere hireling under sections 4734 and 4743 of the Code of 1907. Hudson v. Wright, 3 Ala. App. 290, 57 So. 90. The landlord's lien for advances is much more compre- hensive than the lien given to any other person making advances, and embraces everything useful for the purposes enumerated, or tending to the substantial comfort and well-being of the tenant, his family, or persons employed about the service; and this lien laps over from year to year for any balance due, so long as the tenancy con- tinues. Cockburn v. Watkins, 76 Ala. 486; Thompson v. Powell, 11 Ala. 391. Code 1907, § 4736; Bush v. Willis, 130 Ala. 395, 30 So. 443; Bain v. Wells, 107 Atl. 562, 19 So. 774. A landlord may have a lien for advancements made before the tenant begins to put in the crop. Ragsdale v. Kinney, 119 Ala. 454, 24 So. 443. 53AS regards the landlord's ad- vances, the words of the statute are very comprehensive, and it would be difficult to define what articles of commerce are beyond its terms. Lake v. Gaines, 75 Ala. 143; Mooney v. Hough, 34 Ala. 80, 4 So. 19. The fact that one incon- siderable item of the total is not of the character for which a lien is given does not vitiate the claim for other items, and a motion to discharge the levy in toto on that ground is properly denied. Gid- dens V. Boiling, 92 Ala. 586, 9 So. 274. If the advances are not paid for in the current year, the resi- due becomes a lien on the next crop, if the tenancy continues. Code 1907, § 4736; Lake v. Gaines, 75 Ala. 143. As to day of maturity see Code 1907, § 4735. ^4 This provision was not in- tended to confer upon the land- lord the power to appoint an- other to make advances to his tenant, and thereby clothe such person with the lien ; but merely to afford him indemnity against any liability he might as- sume for his tenant. Therefore, if advances are made by a third person with the understanding that he is to look to the tenant, and not to the landlord, for pay- ment, although made at the in- stance of the landlord and on his request, if there is no liability resting on the landlord the lien does not exist. Bell v. Hurst, 75 Ala. 44. A landlord who, without the knowledge and consent of his tenant, assumes a liability to a third person for advances to the tenant, and pays the debt, acquires 569 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 603 at or before the time at which such advances were made, for the sustenance or well-being of the tenant or his family, for preparing the ground for cultivation, or for cultivating, gathering, saving, handling, or preparing the crop for mar- ket; and he shall have a lien also upon all articles advanced, and upon all property purchased with money advanced, or obtained by barter in exchange for any articles advanced, for the aggregate price or value of all such property or articles so advanced; and such liens for rent and advances shall be paramount, and have preference of all other liens. ^^ no lien, but the Hen will attach if, after the landlord has become liable, he informs the tenant, who ratifies his act by promising to pay the debt. Clanton v. Eaton, 92 Ala. 612, 8 So. 823; Evans v. Bil- lingsley, 32 Ala. 395. Under this statute a landlord has no lien for advances made to his tenant as a hired laborer, to be paid for his labor. Powell v. State, 84 Ala. 444, 4 So. 719. The landlord can not transfer to another the right to make advances and to have a landlord's lien therefor. Hender- son V. State, 109 Ala. 40, 19 So. 7ZZ. See also, Ballard v. Mayfield, 107 Ala. 396, 18 So. 29. 55A landlord's lien for advances is superior to the lien of another person for advances made after the renting, though before any ad- vances were made by the land- lord. Wells V. Thompson, 50 Ala. 83. Such lien is superior to a subsequent chattel mortgage made by the tenant for additional ad- vances, as the mortgagee is charg- ed with notice of the tenancy, and consequently of the lien. Atkin- son V. James, 96 Ala. 214, 10 So. 846. But he may by his acts estop himself from denying the liabil- ity of the property to another in preference to his lien. Brown v. Hamil, 76 Ala. 506. But the land- lord may maintain a special action against one who, with notice of the lien, destroys, removes or con- verts the crop or so changes its character that the landlord can not enforce his Hen. Hussey v. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432; Lake v. Gaines, 75 Ala. 143; Hurst v. Bell, 72 Ala. 2Z6; Kennon v. Wright, 70 Ala. 434; Thompson v. Powell, 77 Ala. 391. Notice to a purchaser from the tenant, that the crop was raised on rented land and that the rent is unpaid, does not operate as notice that the landlord had made advances to the tenant and that he has a lien therefor. Wil- son v. Stewart, 69 Ala. 302; Wilkin- son V. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435. Actual knowledge is not necessary to charge a purchaser with notice of the lien, but anything that should put him upon inquiry is sufficient. Lomax v. Le Grand, 60 Ala. 537; Aderhold v. Bluthenthal, 95 Ala. 66, 10 So. 230. A purchaser in good faith from the tenant, after the latter has removed the crop from 6o3 LIENS. 570 The landlord may assign his claim, and the assignee takes his rights and remedies.^® the rented premises, is protected as a purchaser without notice. Scaife x. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237. The affidavit need not specify the par- ticular articles advanced, or set forth an itemized account. It is sufficient if it shows that the rela- tion of landlord and tenant exist- ed, that advances for the purposes specified were made, that a spe- cified balance remains unpaid, and that a statutory ground for attachment exists. Cockburn v. Watkins, 76 Ala. 486; Bell v. Al- len, 76 Ala. 450. If the claim for advances is past due, the affidavit should aver specially that a de- mand for payment was made be- fore the action was brought. Bell V. Allen, 76 Ala. 450. The affidavit is to be construed liberally, and is sufficient if it sets forth with substantial accuracy the general facts, either expressly, or by nec- essary implication. Gunter v. Du Bose, n Ala. iK^; Fitzsimmons v. Howard, 69 Ala. 590. As to suffi- ciency of affidavit, see Robinson V. Holt, 85 Ala. 596, 5 So. 350. The landlord's lien is not divested by the death of the tenant and by the fact that an administrator ha.s possession of the property. Wil- cox V. Alexander (Tex.), 32 S. W. 561. The removal of the property where it has not been sold to a bona fide purchaser for value who had no notice of the landlord's lien will not affect such lien. An- drews Mfg. Co. V. Porter, 112 Ala. 381, 20 So. 475. oSSimmons v. Fielder, 46 Ala. 304. Otherwise before so provid- ed. Foster v. Westmoreland, 52 Ala. 223; Hussey v. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432; Lavender v. Hall, 60 Ala. 214; Lomax v. Le Grand, 60 Ala. 537; Hudson v. Vaughan, 57 Ala. 609; Warren v. Barnet, 83 Ala. 208, 3 So. 609. The remedy of the landlord against a purchaser of the crop with notice of the lien, who has received and converted it to his own use, is by special ac- tion on the case. He can not maintain a bill in equity unless he shov/s that his remady at law is inadequate. Kennon v. Wright, 70 Ala. 434. Otherwise where the statutory remedy can not be pur- sued. Abraham v. Hall, 59 Ala. 386. Until he has sued out a valid attachment, and had it levied on the crop, he can not recover in a statutory suit against a third per- son to try the right of property. Jackson v. Bain, 74 Ala. 328. The landlord can not maintain trover for the conversion of the crop by a wrongdoer. His lien has no ele- ment of property. He has neither a jus in re nor a jus ad rem. Cor- bitt V. Reynolds, 68 Ala. 378; Fol- mar v. Copeland, 57 Ala. 588. He has merely a statutory right to charge the crop with the payment of the rent and advances in prior- ity to all other rights or liens. The property and the right of property remain in the tenant. The latter may therefore make a bona fide sale to a purchaser which would prevail over the landlord's lien, Wilson V. Stewart, 69 Ala. 302; 571 landlords' liens for rent. § 605 The lien is enforced by attachment either when the claim is due and the tenant fails or refuses, after demand made, to pay the same, or before it is due, m case there is good cause to believe that the tenant is about to remove or dispose of any part of the crop without paying such rent and advances, or without the consent of the landlord or assignee, or has removed it without paying such rent and advances, and without the consent of the landlord or assignee, or the land- lord has good cause to believe the tenant is about to dispose of the articles advanced or purchased.^''' § 604. Alabama-^^ (continued). Liens of tenants in com- mon. — Persons who farm on shares or who raise crops by joint contributions in such manner as to make them tenants in common in such crops, or their assignees, have a lien upon the interest of the other in such crops for any balance due for provisions, supplies, teams, materials, labor, services, and money, or either, furnished to aid in the cultivating and gathering such crops, under contract, or furnished when the interests of such crops require it, in case of a failure of either to contribute the amount and means as agreed upon by the parties. This lien may be enforced in the same manner as a land- lord's lien is enforced ; but it may also be enforced in any other appropriate mode. § 605. Arizona.^^ — Every landlord shall have a lien on all property of his tenant not exempt by law, placed upon Stern V. Simpson, 62 Ala. 194; Blum part only of the tenant's goods. V. Jones, 51 Ala. 149; Thompson Couch v. Davidson, 109 Ala. 313, V. Spinks, 12 Ala. 155. 19 So. 507. 57As to affidavit for attachment ssCiv. Code 1907, §§ 4792, 4793. on account of removal, see Bax- 59Rev. Stats. 1901, § 2695. The ley v. Segrist, 85 Ala. 183, 4 So. landlord's lien attaches for the 865; Nicrosi v. Roswald, 113 Ala. w^hole term of the lease on all 592, 21 So. 338. The landlord may property of the tenant not ex- proceed by attachment against a empt, used on or placed on the § 6o6 LIENS. 572 or used on the leased premises until his rent shall be paid, and such landlord, his agent or attorney, may seize, for rent, any personal property of his tenant that may be found on the premises, or in the county where such tenant shall reside, but no property of any other person, although the same may be found on the premises, shall be liable for seizure for rent due from such tenant, and in case of failure of the tenant to allow the landlord, his agent, or attorney to take possession of such property for the payment of rent, said landlord shall have the right to reduce such property to his possession by action against the tenant to recover the possession of the same, and may hold or sell the same for the purpose of paying said rent unless said rent shall be paid before sale, and every land- lord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing upon the homestead premises for rent thereof, whether the same is payable wholly or in part in money or specific articles of prop- erty or products of the premises or labor, and also for the faithful performance of the terms of the lease, and such lien shall continue for a period of six months after the expiration of the term for which the premises were leased, and in all cases when the demised premises shall be let or lease as- signed, th landlord shall have the same right to enforce his lien against the special lessor or assignee as he has against the tenant to whom the premises were leased. § 606. Arkansas. '^^ — Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crop grown upon the demised premises in any year for rent that shall accrue for such year, and such lien shall con- tinue for six months after such rent shall become due and payable. ^^ real estate, and the lien will con- his lien, but can enforce the same tinue until the rent is paid. Mur- by attachment. Kirby's Dig. 1904, phy V. Brown, 12 Ariz. 268, 100 §§ 5040, 5041 ; Ferniman v. Nowlin, Pac. 801. 91 Ark. 20, 120 S. W. 378. 60Kirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, •^iJf the rent contract includes §§ 5032-5043. The landlord can not other indebtedness in the amount apply the crop to the payment of expressed as rent, the landlord's 573 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT, § 606 Whenever any landlord shall indorse upon any written agreement made by and between his tenant and the em- ployees of such tenant, his written consent to the terms of such agreement, then, and in that case only, shall the lien of such employees have precedence over that of the landlord, and that only for the compensation specified in such agree- ment, the services therein specified having been rendered toward the production of the crop against which the land- lord's lien attaches. lien is limited to the amount due for rent only; and in a contest be- tween the landlord and another incumbrancer, the latter may show the true amount due for rent. Roth v. Williams, 45 Ark. 447; Varner v. Rice, 39 Ark. 344; Hammond v. Harper, 39 Ark. 248. But a creditor who has no lien on the property can not complain that the landlord has applied a part of the crop to the satisfac- tion of a debt for which the land- lord has no lien. Hammond v. Harper, 39 Ark. 248. The land- lord's lien does not pass to an as- signee of the rent debt. Varner V. Rice, 39 Ark. 344; Nolen v. Royston, 36 Ark. 561; Bernays v. Feild, 29 Ark. 218; Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, 25 Am. Rep. 584; Block V. Smith, 61 Ark. 266, 32 S. W. 1070. But if the debt is reas- signed to the landlord, the lien re- vives. Varner v. Rice, 39 Ark. 344. And though the note for rent be executed by the tenant to a creditor of the landlord with his consent, and it is afterwards re- delivered by the creditor to the landlord, the lien, which before was dormant, revives and unites in the landlord the debt and the right to enforce satisfaction out of the crop. The original payee of the note may properly be made a party to the suit for the protec- tion of the tenant. Varner v. Rice, 39 Ark. 344. Although the assign- ment of the rent note does not carry the landlord's lien, yet, if the tenant delivers the crop to one holding the rent note as col- lateral security for a debt due from the landlord, the payment will be upheld as against a mort- gagee of the crop. Watson v. Johnson, 33 Ark. 737. Though the landlord's lien can not be trans- ferred, it can be released. Buck- ner v. McHroy, 31 Ark. 631. If the landlord, after assigning his rent note, redeems it, his lien is revived. Dickinson v. Harris, 52 Ark. 58, 11 S. W. 965. Where a tenant in his lease has contracted to repair fences and agrees to pay damages upon his failure to do so, the cost of such repairs becomes a part of the rent stipulated and the landlord has a lien on the crops for such costs. Von Berg v. Goodman, 85 Ark. 605, 109 S. W. 1006. A landlord is entitled to a lien on crops for the price fur- nished the tenant to raise such crops. Ferniman v. Nowlin, 91 Ark. 20, 120 S. W. 378. § 6o6 LIENS. , 574 Any person subrenting lands or tenements shall only be held responsible for the rent of such as are cultivated or oc- cupied by him. Any landlord who has a lien on the crop for rent shall be entitled to bring suit before a justice of the peace, or in the circuit court, as the case may be, and have a writ of attach- ment for the recovery of the same, whether the rent be due or not, in the following cases: First. When the tenant is about to remove the crop from the premises without paying the rent. Second. When he has removed it, or any portion thereof, without the consent of the landlord. ^^ Before such writ of attachment shall issue, the landlord, his agent or attorney, shall make and file an affidavit of one of the above facts, that the amount claimed, which shall be therein stated, is, or will be, due for rent, or will be the value of the portion of the crop agreed to be received as rent, stat- ing the time when the same became or would become due, and that he has a lien on the crop for the rent;^^ and he shall file with the justice or clerk, as the case may be, a bond to the defendant, with sufficient security, in double the amount of his claim as sworn to, conditioned that he will prove his debt or demand and his lien in a trial at law, or that he will pay such damages as shall be adjudged against him. 62A landlord's lien gives him no Lemay v. Johnson, 35 Ark. 225, 233; right of possession of the crop, Hammond v. Harper, 39 Ark. 248; and he can not therefore main- Griggs v. Horton, 84 Ark. 623, 104 tain replevin. He must proceed S. W. 930. by attachment. Bell v. Matheny, esThe affidavit may be amend- 36 Ark. 572. While a landlord ed. Nolen v. Royston, 36 Ark. must refrain from an active in- 561. It is not impaired by includ- jury to a junior incumbrancer, he ing in the demand a claim for is under no obligation to collect which he has no lien. Kurtz v. his debt, or to husband the crop Dunn, 36 Ark. 648. The lien is so as to make it cover both debts. primarily for rent and is extend- If the tenant virrongfully disposes ed by statute to advances of of a part of the crop subject to money and supplies. Kaufman v. his lien, he may enforce his lien Underwood, 83 Ark. 118, 102 S. W. against the residue of the crop. 718. 575 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 607 The writ may be levied on the crop in the possession of the tenant, or any one holding it in his right, or in the posses- sion of a purchaser from him with notice of the lien of the landlord.*'* § 607. Arkansas^^ (continued). Lien for supplies ad- vanced. — In addition to the lien now given by law to land- lords, if any landlord, to enable his tenant or employee to make and gather the crop, shall advance such tenant or em- ployee any necessary supplies, either of money, provisions, 64As against a purchaser of the crop with notice of the lien, the landlord's remedy is by specific attachment, while the crop is in the purchaser's hands, or by bill in equity if he has sold it, to have the proceeds applied to the pay- ment of the rent. Reavis v. Barnes, 36 Ark. 575. An action by the landlord against one taking the crop, with a knowledge of the existence of the lien, will be barred in six months after the maturity of the rent. King v. Blount, 37 Ark. 115; Valentine v. Hamlett, 35 Ark. 538. The land- lord may by an action in equity force one to account to him who has purchased from the tenant the crops raised by him. Murphy V. Myar, 95 Ark. 32, 128 S. W. 359, Ann. Cas. 1912 A. 573. Where mortgagees pay the tenant's rent for a previous year, it is a suffi- cient circumstance to put them on inquiry as to the landlord's lien and as to the nonpayment of rent. Judge v. Curtis, 72 Ark. 132, 78 S. W. 746. 65Kirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, §§ 5033-5036. This act, concluding with a repeal of all acts incon- sistent therewith, had no effect to repeal the provision of Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 4452, that the evidence of the waiver of the landlord's lien for supplies shall be in writ- ing by indorsement upon the mort- gage or other instrument by which the employe transfers his interest in the crop. The land- lord has a lien on a cropper's share for advances. Tinsley v. Craige, 54 Ark. 346, IS S. W. 897, 16 S. W. 570. For supplies furnished a tenant held to be within the statute authorizing a lien there- for, see Earl v. Malone, 80 Ark. 218, 96 S. W. 1062. An oral waiver by the landlord is suffi- cient under Kirby's Dig. 1904, § 5033, to permit the lien of employes to have preference over his lien. Griggs v. Horton, 84 Ark. 623, 104 S. W. 930. See also, Neeley v. Phillips, 70 Ark. 90, 66 S. W. 349. Where a land- lord becomes surety for his ten- ant to buy a horse, he does not have a lien on the crop therefor which is superior to a mortgage lien. Kaufman v. Underwood, 83 Ark. 118, 102 S. W. 718. See also. Neal v. Brandon, 70 Ark. 79, 66 S. W. 200. § 6o8 LIENS. 576 clothing, stock, or other necessary articles, such landlord shall have a lien upon the crop raised upon the premises for the value of such advances, which lien shall have preference over any mortgage or other conveyance of such crop made by such tenant or employee. Such lien may be enforced by an action of attachment before any court or justice of the peace having jurisdiction, and the lien for advances and for rent may be joined and enforced in the same action. The purchaser or assignee of the receipt of any ginner, w^arehouse holder, or cotton factor or other bailee, for any cotton, corn or other farm products in store or custody of such ginner, warehouseman, cotton factor, or other bailee shall not be held to be an innocent purchaser of any such produce against the lien of any landlord or laborer. § 608. Delaware.*'^ — A distress lies for any rent arrear either of money, or a quantity or share of grain, or other produce, or of anything certain, or that can be reduced to certainty, and whether the same be a rent accruing upon a demise for life, or a term of one or more years, or a less time, or at will, or a rent-charge, rent-seek, quit-rent, or otherwise, issuing out of, or charged upon, any lands, tenements, or hereditaments. The person entitled to such rent, whether the original lessor, or an assignee, heir, executor, or administrator, may distrain for the same, either personally or by his bailiff. A distress may be made either during the demise, or after- ward, while the tenant, or any person coming into possession by, or under him, shall continue to hold the demised prem- ises, and the title to said premises shall remain in the person 66Rev. Code, as amended, 1893, by it is delivered at the land- ch. 120, §§ 19-66. The lien of a lord's premises. Ford v. Clewell, landlord is superior to that of a 9 Houst. (111.) 179, 31 Atl. 715. See chattel mortgage executed prior to also, Lupton v. Hughes, 2 Pennew. the beginning of the tenancy and (Del.) 515, 47 Atl. 624. even before the property covered 577 landlords' liens for rent. § 608 to whom the rent accrued, or his heirs, devisees, executors, or administrators, or be in his immediate reversioner or re- mainderman. A distress may be as well of the grain, grass and other pro- duce found upon the premises out of which the rent issues, or upon which it is charged, whether growing, or severed, in sheaves, stacks, or otherwise, as the horses, cattle and other goods and chattels being upon said premises; except goods and chattels not the property of the tenant, but being in his possession in the way of his trade, or upon the said premises in the regular course of any occupation, or business, there carried on,^^ which exception shall extend to horses and carriages at a livery stable, to property of boarders in a boarding-house, and to the beasts of a drover depastured while passing through the county, as well as to the more obvious cases of exemption at common law; also except stoves not the property of but hired by the tenant, and beasts not the property of the tenant, escaping into the said premises through defect of fences, which the tenant, or his landlord, was bound to repair. If the tenant, either during his term, or estate, or after the end thereof, remove his goods and chattels, or any of them, from the said premises without payment of the rent due, or growing due, for the said premises, and without license from the landlord, or his agent, in writing under his hand, the goods and chattels, so removed, unless sold fairly for a valu- able consideration and delivered to the buyer, shall be liable, wherever found, to be distrained for said rent for forty days after the removal, or if the rent be not in arrear at the time of the removal, for forty days after the rent shall become in arrear. The person on whose demand a distress is made, has a G'^The goods of a subtenant, on a warrant at the suit of the removed from the demised prem- landlord against the original ten- ises after the expiration of the ant, for rent in arrears. New v. term, are not liable to distress, Pyle, 2 Houst. (Del.) 9. 37 § 609 LIENS. 578 special property in the things distrained until replevin, or sale thereof, so that he may take the same, wherever found, and recover damages for carrying away, or injuring them. If the property distrained be not replevied within five days after written notice to the tenant of the property distrained, and the cause of the distress, it must be appraised at its true value. After the expiration of six days from the day of appraising the property, it may be sold at public vendue to the highest bidder, first giving at least six days' notice of the sale. If the goods and chattels of a tenant, being upon premises held by him by demise under a rent of money be seized upon execution or attachment, they are liable for one year's rent of the premises, in arrear, or growing due, at the time of the seizure, in preference to such process. A prior distress of such goods for rent in arrear does not preclude the landlord from such preference. ^^ § 609. District of Columbia.*^^ — The landlord has a tacit lien upon such of the tenant's personal chattels on the prem- csAfter execution has been lev- ceeds of it, in preference to the ied on the tenant's goods, the execution creditor, but he is en- landlord can not distrain on a titled to the rent growing due up portion of them, and take the pro- to the time of the purchase of the ceeds of a sale of them on a claim terin. Cause v. Richardson, 4 of a balance due him for the pre- Houst. (Del.) 222. ceding year, and then claim an 69Code 1901, §§ 1229-1231. The entire year's rent out of the sale first section of the statute abol- of the residue on the execution, ishes the common-law right of for the current year. Hopkins v. the landlord to distrain for rent. Simpson, 3 Houst. (Del.) 90. See The statute is a substitute for the also, State v. Vandever, 2 Har. right abolished. Wallach v. Ches- (Del.).397; Biddle V. Biddle, 3 Har. ley, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 209. See (Del.) 539. If, at an execution also, on this statute, Fowler v. sale of the tenant's goods, the Rapley, IS Wall. (U. S.) 328, 21 landlord buys in the unexpired L. ed. 35; Webb x. Sharp, 13 Wall. term, he is not entitled to a year's (U. S.) 14, 20 L. ed. 478; Beall v. rent growing due at the time of White, 94 U. S. 382, 24 L. ed. 173. sale, to be paid out of the pro- 579 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 609 ises as are subject to execution for debt, to commence with the tenancy and continue for three months after the rent is due/*' and until the termination of any action for such rent brought within the said three months. This hen may be enforced, — First. By attachment, to be issued upon affidavit that the rent is due and unpaid, or, if not due, that the defendant is about to remove or sell all or some part of said chattels;"^ or, Second. By judgment against the tenant and execution, to be levied on said chattels or any of them, in whosesoever hands they may be found ;'^^ or. Third. By action against any purchaser of any of said chattels with notice of the lien, in which action the plaintiff 70Where the tenant's chattels have been sold by virtue of an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, the landlord's claim upon the fund, to the extent of three months' rent, has priority over the claims of simple contract creditors. Fox v. Davidson, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 102. The lien is for the periodical rent accruing when the levy is made, but not for succeeding periods, during M^hich the officer keeps the goods upon the premises. Harris v. Dam- mann, 3 Mackey (D. C.) 90. 'i'llf the rent is payable month- ly, the landlord may issue his at- tachment for rent vi^hich will be due and payable for the month during a part of which the tenant occupied the premises. Joyce v. Wilkenning, 1 MacArthur (D. C.) 567. '2The landlord has no right to an attachment against the ten- ant's chattels which have been re- moved from the premises before the rent is due. His remedy is by judgment against the tenant and execution, to be levied upon such chattels or any of them, in whoso- ever hands they may be found. Wallach v. Chesley, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 209. The statute provides for several conditions of things: "First, when the rent is due, and, next, when the rent is not yet ma- tured. When the rent is due, the lien may be enforced by an at- tachment issued upon an affidavit that the rent is due and unpaid. There is no trouble about that. But it will occur to anybody, that the tenant may, just before the maturity of his rent, and in order to avoid compulsory payment of it, remove his chattels, or change the property in them. To meet that contingency, it is further pro- vided that, even before the rent is due, if the landlord will make affidavit that the tenant is about to remove or sell all or some part of his chattels, the attachment may issue. And those are the only two cases provided for in the statute, in which an attachment is the remedy intended." Per Cox, C. J. § 6io LIENS. 580 may have judgment for the value of the chattels purchased by the defendant, but not exceeding the rent in arrear.'''^ § 610. Florida.^^ — Every person to w^hom rent may be due, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns shall have a lien upon the property found upon or off the premises leased or rented, and in the possession of any person as follows: 1. Upon agricultural products raised on the land leased or rented for the current year. This lien shall be superior to all other liens, though of older date. 2. Upon all other property of the lessee, or his sublessee or assigns, usually kept on the premises. This lien shall be superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the bringing of such property on the premises leased. 3. Upon all other property of the defendant. This lien shall date from the levy of the distress w^arrant. Landlords also have a lien on the crop grown on rented ''^li the goods subject to a landlord's lien be seized and sold upon execution by another credit- or, the landlord may move the court out of which the execution issued for an order for the pay- ment of the rent out of the pro- ceeds of the sale. This motion may be made at any time before the money is paid over, the offi- cer being bound, on notice from the landlord, to retain the money. Gibson v. Gautier, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 35. A lien on crops and other personal property may be secured by an instrument executed by the tenant, and this lien is not lost as against the tenant's creditors by a failure to acknowledge it and have it recorded. Hume v. Riggs, 12 App. D. C. 355. '-iGen. Stats. 1906, §§ 2237, 2239, 2240-2246. Formerly there was no lien for rent until a warrant of distress was issued. Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336. The statute is not restricted to rents of agri- cultural lands, but applies to all rental of real property. Jones v. Fox, 23 Fla. 454, 2 So. 700; Fox v. Jones, 26 Fla. 276, 8 So. 449. The lien given by the statute is a charge upon the property of the tenant, and the landlord can not be deprived of his lien at the will of the tenant by assigning the goods, in the house rented, to a third party. Campbell, etc., Mfg. Co. V. Walker, 22 Fla. 412, 422, 1 So. 59; Fox v. Jones, 26 Fla. 276, 8 So. 449. The landlord's lien for rent and also his lien for advances may be enforced by a single dis- tress warrant covering both claims. Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 467. A seizure of the prop- erty. in the tenant's possession is a sufficient notice of the proceed- ing. Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 467. 581 landlords' liens for rent. § 611 land for advances made in money, or other things of value, whether made directly by them or at their instance and re- quest by another person, or for which they have assumed the legal responsibility, at or before the time at which such ad- vances were made, for the sustenance or well-being of the tenant or his family, or for preparing the ground for cultiva- tion, or for cultivating, gathering, saving, handling or prepar- ing the crop for market; and they shall have a lien also upon each and every article advanced, and upon all property pur- chased with money advanced, or obtained by barter or ex- change for any articles advanced, for the aggregate value or price of all such property or articles so advanced; and such liens upon the crop shall be of equal dignity with liens for rent, and, upon the articles advanced, shall be paramount to all other liehs. The lien is enforced by a distress warrant directed to the executive officer of the court. This is issued upon an affidavit stating the amount or quantity and value of the rent due, and whether it is payable in money, cotton, or other agricul- tural product or thing. If the property levied upon be not replevied and the defendant has not appeared within ten days, it is sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the lien claim and costs. '^^ §611. Georgia.'^ — Landlords have a special lien for rent on crops made on land rented from them, superior to all other ■^^If the tenant claims that cer- Prior to this statute the landlord tain property is exempt from levy had no lien except by contract on and sale, the question should be the crop until the levy of a dis- settled in law^. The landlord can tress warrant. Lien for rent is not invoke the aid of a court of superior to exemption set apart equity to enforce his lien. Haynes in crops under the code. Shirling V. McGeehee, 17 Fla. 159. The af- v. Kennon, 119 Ga. 501. The lien fidavit is equivalent to a declara- of the landlord is superior to the tion. Smoot v. Strauss, 21 Fla. lien of a common-law judgment. 611. Floyd V. Cook, 118 Ga. 528, 45 S. 76 Code 1911, §§ 3340-3341, 3348. E. 441, 63 L. R. A. 450. 6ii LIENS. 582 liens except liens for taxes,'" to which they shall be inferior, and shall also have a general lien on the property of the debtor, liable to levy and sale, and such general lien shall date from the time of the levy of a distress w^arrant to enforce the sameJ^ Such general lien of landlords shall be inferior to liens for taxes and the general and special lien of laborers, but shall rank with other liens, and with each other, according to date, the date being from the time of levying a distress war- rant. The special liens of landlords for rent shall date from the maturity of the crops on the lands rented, unless other- ""Saulsbury v. McKellar, 59 Ga. 301. This lien is superior to an agreement between the tenant and one who cultivated the premises with him on shares, whereby the latter was to have all the cotton to be raised thereon. Alston v. Wilson, 64 Ga. 482. The tenant is not entitled to any exeption out of the crop till the rent of the land upon which the crop was raised is paid. Davis v. Meyers, 41 Ga. 95. This special lien can be en- forced only by distress warrant. The title to the crop is not in the landlord, and therefore he can not sue for it in trover, or for its value in assumpsit. Worrill v. Barnes, 57 Ga. 404; Colclough v. Mathis, 79 Ga. 394, 4 S. E. 762. Landlord must foreclose his lien. He can not take possession as against a purchaser. Hall v. Mc- Gaughey, 114 Ga. 405, 40 S. E. 246. A bona fide purchaser of crop from tenant takes it free from landlord's lien. Holmes v. Pye, 107 Ga. 784. 33 S. E. 816. Before the landlord can assert his lien on a crop, he must prove that it was raised on the rented land. The burden of this proof is upon him. Saulsbury v. McKellar, 55 Ga. 322. "SWhen the hire of animals or other personalty upon a farm is included in the rent for the whole, the entire sum is rent, and may be collected by distress. Lathrop v. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282. An affidavit to enforce the special Hen should al- lege a demand and refuse to pay the rent. Hill v. Reeves, 57 Ga. 31 ; Lathrop v. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282. This is not necessary in case of a general lien. Buffington v. Hilley, 55 Ga. 655. The affidavit to fore- close the landlord's lien for sup- plies is sufficient if it sets out fully the relation of landlord and tenant, states that the landlord furnished the tenant with supplies to make a crop for a particular year, states the amount claimed, and a demand and refusal to pay after the debt became due. It is not necessary to set out the prop- erty on which the lien is claimed. Ward V. Blalock, 72 Ga. 804; Scruggs V. Gibson, 40 Ga. 511; Sharp V. Morgan, 9 Ga. App. 487, 71 S. E. 766; Nash v. Orr, 9 Ga. App. 33, 70 S. E. 194; Smith v. Smith, 105 Ga. 717, 31 S. E. 754. 58: LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 6ll wise agreed on, but shall not be enforced by distress warrants until said rent is due, unless the tenant is removing his prop- erty, or when other legal process is being enforced against said crops, when the landlord may enforce said liens, both general and special."^ This special lien may be foreclosed by the transferee in his own name. ^9 An ordinary distress for rent implies that the plaintiff is the landlord. An assignee can suc- ceed to a landlord's lien only by an assignment of the same in writing. Code 1911, § 3343; Driv- er V. Maxwell, 56 Ga. 11. With- out such assignment, the right to enforce the lien remains in the landlord. If the proceeding be by an assignee, both the contract and the assignment must be set out or described in the affidavit. Lath- rop V. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282. Inas- much as the landlord's special lien dates from the maturity of the crop, and his general lien from the levy of a distress warrant, a mere transfer of a note given for rent, which transfer is made in writing before either of these events happen, is not an assign- ment of any lien. Lathrop v. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282. A levy is not required to fix the landlord's lien on crops. Cochran v. Waits, 127 Ga. 93, 56 S. E. 241. Under the Act of September 27, 1883 (Code 1911, § 3343), a special lien for rent arises in favor of the trans- feree of a rent note when the crop matures, if the transfer was made in writing before such ma- turity. Andrew v. Stewart, 81 Ga. 53, 7 S. E. 169; Garner v. Doug- lasville Banking Co., 136 Ga. 310, 71 S. E. 478. It is a misdemeanor for a tenant to dispose of prop- erty on which the landlord has a lien without the consent of the landlord. 2 Code 1911, § 729; Mor- rison V. State, 111 Ga. 642, 36 S. E. 902; Reece v. State, 5 Ga. App. 663, 63 S. E. 670. If the tenant is removing his property, the land- lord may distrain before the rent is due. Rosenstein v. Forester, 57 Ga. 94. When a landlord is lulled into security so that he permits a creditor of the tenant to take possession of the tenant's crop a promise will be implied on the part of the possessor to pay the rent. Shealey v. Clark, 117 Ga. 794, 45 S. E. 70. A laborer's lien in the absence of equitable grounds can not participate in a fund in court under other process. Bryan v. Madison Supply Co., 135 Ga. 171; 68 S. E. 1106. The lien of the landlord for rent is superior to the lien for supplies furnished. Madison Supply & Hardware Co. V. Richardson, 8 Ga. App. 344, 69 S. E. 45. For holding in conflict between lien of laborer and for furnishing materials where the la- borer has a special contract with the tenant, see Rousey v. Mattox, 111 Ga. 883, 36 S. E. 925. No de- mand need be made before fore- closure, when the tenant is re- moving his crops from the prem- ises. Vaughn v. Strickland, 108 Ga. 659, 34 S. E. 192. § 6ii LIENS. 584 Landlords^*^ furnishing supplies, money, horses, mules, asses, oxen, farming utensils of necessity, to make crops, have the right to secure themselves from the crops of the year in which such things are clone or furnished, upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties with the following conditions :^^ ^f*If a landlord having a lien for his rent and a lien for supplies as- signs the latter lien for the pur- pose of enabling the tenant to procure supplies of the assignee, and the supplies are furnished by the assignee on the faith of this lien, the landlord is estopped from attacking the validity of the lien in the hands of the assignee. Zachry v. Stewart, 67 Ga. 218. In order to have a lien for supplies, the landlord himself must furnish them. He has no lien by reason of having become his tenant's surety for the price of the articles, when these are furnished by some other person directly to the ten- ant. The landlord may furnish them directly from his own stores, or may order them from others on his credit. He has a lien if he is the real purchaser for the ten- ant, and it does not matter that the tenant has joined him in a joint and several note for the price. If, however, the tenant is the real purchaser in the first in- stance, there is no lien. Scott v. Pound, 61 Ga. 579; Swann v. Mor- ris, 83 Ga. 143, 9 S. E. 1G1. An as- signee of a note by a tenant to his landlord may enforce the Hen. Mercer v. Cross, 79 Ga. 432, 5 S. E. 245. A landlord is entitled to a lien for supplies furnished to the tenant at the tenant's request, but furnished by a third person, where the landlord, at the tenant's request, assumes entire liability for the debt. Henderson v. Hughes, 4 Ga. App. 52, 60 S. E. 813; Garner v. Douglasville Banking Co., 136 Ga. 310, 71 S. E. 478. For a description of property held sufficient in a contract creating a landlord's lien for supplies fur- nished, see Strickland v. Stiles, 107 Ga. 308, ZZ S. E. 85. Special liens held by landlord for rent and supplies are superior to com- mon-law judgment liens. Coch- ran V. Waits, 127 Ga. 93, 56 S. E. 241. Where a tenant contracts with a trustee as landlord the trustee may foreclose a lien in his own name for supplies fur- nished, even though the land and such supplies furnished belonged to the trustee's principal. Farga- son V. Ford, 119 Ga. 343, 46 S. E. 431. siThe lien may be enforced as provided in Code 1911, § 3366, which is a general provision for the enforcement of liens upon personal property. See Ch. xxii, infra. A landlord who has agreed to board his tenant may have a lien on the crop for such board. Jones V. Eubanks, 86 Ga. 616, 12 S. E. 1065. A tenant is not estopped to deny the right of the landlord to foreclose a lien for rent of a former year, by reason of the fact that he has agreed 585 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 6ll 1. The liens shall arise by operation of law from the re- lation of landlord and tenant,^- as well as by special con- tract in writing, whenever the landlord shall furnish the articles above enumerated, or any one of them, to the ten- ant, for the purpose therein named. 2. Whenever said liens may be created by special con- tract in writing, as now provided by law, the same shall be assignable by the landlord, and may be enforced by the as- signees in the manner provided for the enforcement of such liens by landlords. 3. They shall only exist as liens on the crop of the year in which they are made,^^ and may be foreclosed before the debt is due if the tenant is removing or seeking to remove his crop from the premises, or where other legal process, not in favor of the landlord nor controlled by him nor levied at his instance or procurement, is being enforced against said crop. 4. Every person giving a lien under this section, having previously given a lien or liens under it or any other lien, shall, when giving a new lien hereunder, on the same prop- erty to another person, inform such person, if interrogated, as to the facts of the amount of such lien or liens and to whom given. ^"^ that the lien shall include the debt of the former year. Parks V. Simpson, 124 Ga. 523, 52 S. E. 616. See also, Fletcher Guano Co. V. Vorus, 10 Ga. App. 380, IZ S. E. 348. A landlord has a lien for the price of his horse sold to the ten- ant, in accordance with a contract to that efifect where such horse was necessary to the making of the crop. Boyce v. Day. 3 Ga. App. 275, 59 S. E. 930. The land- lord must foreclose his special lien for supplies furnished in or- der to defeat a judgment creditor. Lightner v. Brannen, 99 Ga. 606, 27 S. E. 703. S-*There is no lien against crop- per. Fields V. Argo, 103 Ga. 387, 30 S. E. 29. ssparks v. Simpson, 124 Ga. 523, 52 S. E. 616. 84Such person giving false in- formation as to the facts afore- said shall be deemed a common cheat and swindler, and, on con- viction thereof, shall be punished as prescribed in Penal Code 1911, § 714. These liens are hereby declared to be superior in rank to § 6l2 LIENS. 586 §612. Georgia (continued). Distress for rent.^^ — The landlord shall have power to distrain for rent as soon as the same is due, or before due if the tenant is seeking to re- move his goods from the premises. ^^ The landlord's lien for his rent shall attach from the time of levying his distress warrant, but it shall take precedence of no lien of older date except as to crop raised on the prem- ises. Landlords may have, by special contract in writing, a lien upon the crops of their tenants for such stock, farming utensils, and provisions furnished such tenants for the pur- pose of making their crops. ^^ Any person who may have rent due may, by himself, his agent or attorney, make application to any justice of the peace within the county where his debtor may reside, or where his property may be found, and obtain from such jus- tice a distress warrant for the sum claimed to be due, on the oath of the principal or agent, or attorney, in writing, for the said rent, which may be levied by any constable, duly other liens, except liens for taxes, the general and special liens of laborers and the special liens of landlords, to which they shall be inferio.r, and shall, as between themselves and other liens not herein excepted, rank according to date. Code 1911, § 3348. 85 Code 1911, §§ 3700, 3701, 5390- 5392. To justify a distress war- rant, the relation of landlord and tenant must exist. Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296; Payne v. Holt, 61 Ga. 355; Ferguson v. Hardy, 59 Ga. 758. A tenant who sublets to another stands in the relation of landlord to him, and may distrain. Harrison v. Guill, 46 Ga. 427. A proceeding before a justice to foreclose a landlord's lien must be brought in the mili- tia district in which defendant re- sides or has property. Jones v. Wylie, 82 Ga. 745, 9 S. E. 614. The affidavit for a distress warrant is amendable. Bryant v. Mercier, 82 Ga. 409, 9 S. E. 166; Jones v. Eubanks, 86 Ga. 616, 12 S. E. 1065. 8GA tenant seeking to remove from the premises any portion of the commercial crops before the rent is due, without his landlord's consent, is subject to distress im- mediately, no matter what may be the purpose or intent of such re- moval. Daniel v. Harris, 84 Ga. 479, 10 S. E. 1013; Jones v. Eu- banks, 86 Ga. 616, 12 S. E. 1065; Vaughn v. Strickland, 108 Ga. 659, 34 S. E. 192. 87Code 1911, §3702. 587 landlords' liens for rent. § 613 qualified, on any property belonging to said debtor, whether found on the premises or elsewhere, who shall advertise and sell the same, as in case of levy and sale under execution; provided, if the sum claimed to be due exceeds one hundred dollars, and said warrant shall be levied by a constable, it shall be his duty to deliver the warrant, with a return of the property levied upon, to the sheriff of said county or his deputy, who shall advertise and sell as now provided by law for sheriff's sales. The party distrained may in all cases replevy the property so distrained, by making oath that the sum, or some part thereof, distrained for is not due, and give security for the eventual condemnation money; and in such case the levy- ing officer shall return the same to the court having cog- nizance thereof, which shall be tried by a jury as provided for in the trial of claims. When property distrained may be claimed by a third per- son, the same shall be claimed on oath, and bond given as required in cases of other claims, which shall be returned and tried as provided by law for the trial of the right of property levied upon by execution. § 613. Illinois.^^ — In all cases of distress for rent, the landlord, by himself, his agent or attorney, may seize for rent any personal property of his tenant that may be found in the county where such tenant shall reside ;^^ and in no 88 Hurd's Rev. Stats. 1913, ch. 162 111. 158, 44 N. E. 411, affd. 59 80, §§ 16-30. The statutes of this 111. App. 89. See also. Springer v. state in regard to the landlord's Lipsis, 110 111. App. 109, affd. 209 right of distress do not create 111. 261, 70 N. E. 641; Downey v. the right, but recognize and regu- Chicago T. & T. Co., 86 111. App. late the right which existed by 664. It is not necessary that the common law. Penny v. Little, 4 lease should reserve the right. 111. 301; Johnson v. Trussing, 4 Penny v. Little, 4 111. 301. 111. App. 575. Except as to crops SDUnder this statute the land- a landlord can only acquire a lien lord has no lien upon the personal by commencing proceedings. Kel- property of the tenant prior to the log Newspaper Co. v. Peterson, actual levy of the distress war- 6i3 LIENS. 588 case shall the property of any other person, although the same may be found on the premises, be liable to siezure for rent due from such tenant. ®® The person making the distress must immediately file with a justice of the peace, or with the clerk of a court of rec- ord of competent jurisdiction, a copy of the distress warrant, with an inventory of the property levied upon.^^ Upon the filing of such copy the justice of the peace or clerk issues a summons against the party against whom the distress warrant is issued, returnable as other summons. The suit thereupon proceeds as in case of an attachment. The defendant may avail himself of any set-ofT or other defence which would have been proper if the suit had been for the rent in any form of action and with like effect. ^^ rant. Leopold v. Godfrey, 50 Fed. 145; National Cash Register Co. V. Wait, 158 111. App. 168. The landlord need not enforce his lien by distress where the tenant de- livers the crop to him to satisfy the lien. Colean Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 122 111. App. 172. 90 The landlord cannot distrain the goods of a stranger or a sub- tenant, the latter being liable only to his immediate lessor. Gray v. Rawson, 11 111. 527; Emmert v. Reinhardt, 67 111. 481. The dis- tress can be levied only upon property of the tenant found in the county. Uhl v. Dighton, 25 111. 154. When the facts are such as to put a purchaser on guard and he buys from the tenant not- withstanding such facts, he will be liable to the landlord for the value of such property. Carter v. An- drews, 56 111. App. 646. The bur- den is on the landlord to show that the purchaser had notice of the landlord's lien. Brownell v. Twyman, 68 111. App. 67. See also, Faith v. Taylor, 69 111. App. 419. 91 As to requisites of allega- tion, proof, and practice, see Bart- lett V. Sullivan, 87 111. 21'9; Rauh V. Ritchie, 1 111. App. 188; Alwood V. Mansfield, 33 111. 452; Cox v. Jordan, 86 111. 560, 561. The land- lord cannot by distress warrant enforce a lien under the Land- lord and Tenant Act on account of the tenant's failure to faithfully perform the provisions of the lease. Lord v. Johnson, 120 111. App. 55. 92 See Cox v. Jordan, 86 111. 560; Lindley v. Miller, 67 111. 244; Al- wood V. Mansfield, 33 111. 452. In an action of trespass by a tenant against his landlord for an illegal distress, the latter, it seems, may recoup to the extent of the rent unpaid, although this may not be due. Cunnea v. Williams, 11 111. App. 72. 589 landlords' liens for rent. § 613 The judgment has the same effect as in suits commenced by summons, ^^ and execution may issue thereon, not only against the property distrained, l)ut also against the other property of the defendant. But the property distrained, if the same has not been replevied or released from seizure, shall be first sold. If any property distrained is of a perishable nature and in danger of immediate waste or decay, and it has not been replevied or bonded, the landlord or his agent or attorney may, upon giving notice to the defendant or his attorney, if either can be found in the county, or if neither can be found, without any notice, apply to the judge or a master in chancery of the court in which, or the justice of the peace before whom, the suit is pending, describing the property, and showing that the same is so in danger, and if such judge, master or justice of the peace is satisfied that the property is of a perishable nature and in danger of imme- diate waste or decay, and if the defendant or his attorney is not served with notice, or does not appear, that he can not be found in the county, he may issue an order to the person having possession of the property, directing the sale thereof, upon such time and such notice, terms, and condi- tions as the judge, master, or justice of the peace shall think for the best interests of all the parties concerned. The money arising from such sale must be deposited with the clerk of the court in which, or the justice of the peace before whom the suit is pending, there to abide the event of the suit. The right of the landlord to distrain the personal goods of the tenant shall continue for the period of six months after the expiration of the term for which the premises were demised or the tenancy is terminated. ^^ 93 See Clevenger v. Dunaway, 84 it. Werner v. Ropiequet. 44 III. 111. 367. 522. The landlord has no lien, ex- 94A warrant issued afterward cept on crops grown or growing, is illegal and void, and affords no for his rent until the seizure of protection to the officer levying said other property by distress 6i4 LIENS. 590 When the rent is payable wholly or in part in specific articles of property or products of the premises, or labor, the landlord may distrain for the value of such articles, pro- ducts or labor.^^ The same articles of personal property which are, by law, exempt from execution, except the crops grown or growing upon the demised premises, shall also be exempt from dis- tress for rent.^*' § 614. Illinois'^" (continued). Lien upon crops. — Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing or in some other proceedings. A. N. Kellogg Newspaper Co. v. Peterson, 162 111. 158, 44 N. E. 411, 53 Am. St. 300. 95 A warrant under this section is not vitiated by the use of the term "damages" instead of "rent." Craig V. Merime, 16 111. App. 214. 96 It is against public policy to allow a tenant to waive his ex- emption in a lease. Curtiss v. Ellenwood, 59 111. App. 110. 97 Kurd's Rev. Stat. 1913, p. 1540, §§ 31-34. If a landlord is not en- dangered he has no right to dis- train for undue rent. Hill v. Coats, 109 111. App. 266. This stat- ute makes a distinction between agricultural products and the gen- eral personal property of the ten- ant. A lien is given upon the crops grown in any year for the rent that shall accrue during such year, but no specific lien is given as to any other property of the tenant. The giving of a lien upon crops by implication excludes the idea of a lien on any other prop- erty of the tenant. Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 111. 677, 22 Am. Rep. 80; Herron v. Gill, 112 111. 247. The distinction was doubt- less owing to the fact that agricul- ture is the chief industry of the state. It may have been thought that it could work no serious in- jury to trade if one kind of prop- erty alone were subject to a statu- tory lien, but that to extend this lien to all the personal property owned by a tenant in the county would interfere with it very ma- terially. Morgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 381, 390, 22 L. ed. 796, per Davis, J. The levy of a distress warrant is not essential to the landlord's right of posses- sion of the property upon which he has a lien for rent. Such war- rant is not his exclusive remedy for the assertion and protection of his lien. The statute gives him a lien upon the crop. The lien does not grow out of the levy of the distress warrant. The landlord may take possession of the crop, and he may hold it as against a purchaser from the tenant or an attaching creditor to the extent of the rent due him. Hunter v. Whitfield, 89 111. 229; Wetsel V. Mayers, 91 111. 497; 591 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 614 Upon the demised premises for the rent thereof whether the same is payable wholly or in part in money or specific arti- cles of property or products of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful performance of the terms of the lease. Such lien shall continue for the period of six months after the expiration of the term for which the premises were de- mised. In all cases where the demised premises shall be sublet, or the lease is assigned, the landlord shall have the same right to enforce his lien against the sublessee or assignee that he has against the tenant to whom the premises were demised. When a tenant abandons or removes from the premises or any part thereof, the landlord or his agent or attorney may seize any grain or other crops grown or growing upon the premises or part thereof so abandoned, whether the rent Thompson v. Mead, 61 111. 395; Mead v. Thompson, 78 111. 62; Miles V. James, 36 111. 399; Pretty- man V. Unland, 11 111. 206. Where the landlord has not attempted to exercise his right to distrain he has no lien upon the after ac- quired property of the possession of the lessee's assignee. Downey V. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 86 111. App. 664. A landlord, without the levy of a distress war- rant, cannot maintain trespass, trover nor replevin. Chapin v. Miles & Ricketts, 151 111. App. 164; Bowers v. Davis, 79 111. App. 347. A lease giving a landlord a first lien on his tenant's goods, whether they are exempt by law or not, is like a chattel mortgage lien. Gubbins v. Equitable Trust Co., 80 111. App. 17. The land- lord's lien is not defeated by a sale of the crop by the tenant to one having notice of the fact of tenancy and that such crop grew on the leased land. Harvey v. Hampton, 1C8 111. App. 501. The landlord is not entitled to pos- session as against the tenant until the rent is due. Watt v. Sco- field, 76 111. 261. But a lien at- taches before rent is due. Harvey V. Hampton, 108 111. App. 501. The lien can only be lost by waiver, or by failing to enforce it within the proper time. The abandon- ment of proceedings by distress is not a waiver of the lien. Wetsel V. Mayers, 91 111. 497. This lien does not render a purchaser of the crops from the tenant for value, without notice of the lien, liable to the landlord for their conversion. Finney v. Harding, 136 111. 573, 581, 27 N. E. 289, 12 L. R. A. 605, reversing, 32 111. App. 98; Craig, J., dissenting. § 6l4 LIENS. 592 is due or not.*^^ If such grain or other crops or any part thereof is not fully grown or matured, the landlord or his agent or attorney shall cause the same to be properly cul- tivated and harvested or gathered, and may sell and dispose of the same, and apply the proceeds, so far as may be neces- sary, to compensate him for his labor and expenses, and to pay the rent; provided, the tenant may redeem at any time before sale by tendering the rent due, and the reasonable compensation and expenses of cultivation and harvesting or gathering the same, or he may replevy the property seized. ^^ If any tenant shall, without the consent of his landlord, sell and remove, or permit to be removed, or be about to sell and remove, or permit to be removed, from the demised premises, such part or portion of the crops raised thereon, as shall endanger the lien of the landlord upon such crops for the rent agreed to be paid, it shall and may be lawful for the landlord to institute proceedings by distress before the rent is due, as is now provided by law, in case of the removal of the tenant from the demised premises ; lamd thereafter the proceedings shall be conducted in the same manner as is now provided by law in ordinary cases of dis- tress, where the rent is due and unpaid.^ 98 Except as so provided, prop- 1 See Finney v. Harding, 136 111. erty cannot be taken under a dis- 573, 27 N. E. 289, 291, 12 L. R. A. tress warrant until the rent is due. 605, where Shope, J., quotes and Asay V. Sparr, 26 111. 115; Hare discusses this provision as bear- V. Stegall, 60 111. 380; Harms v. ing upon the landlord's rights Solem, 79 111. 460; Johnson v. against a bona fide purchaser. If Trussing, 4 111. App. 575; First the tenant feeds the crops to stock, Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 111. 483, 28 thereby placing them beyond the N. E. 955. reach of the landlord's lien for 99 The landlord's rights are not rent, the tenant is guilty of re- affected by notice from the tenant moval of the crops within the of his intention to leave. Hare v. meaning of the act relating to Stegall, 60 111. 380. See Hammond landlord and tenant. Hopkins v. V. Will, 60 111. 404. Wood, 79 111. App. 484. 593 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 6i6 §615. Indiana.- — In all cases where a tenant agrees to pay, as rent, a part of the crop raised on the leased prem- ises, or rent in kind, or a cash rent, the landlord shall have a lien on the crop raised under such contract for the pay- ment of such rent; which lien, if the tenant refuse or neglect to pay or deliver to the landlord such rent when due, may be enforced by sale of such crop, in the same manner as the lien of a chattel mortgage containing a power to sell: pro- vided, that nothing herein contained shall prohibit the ten- ant, after notice in writing to the landlord or his agent, from removing from such leased premises his own part of said growing crop, and no more than such part, and from also disposing of the same whenever the rent is to be paid in part of the crop raised; but in other cases, he may remove not more than one-half of the crop growing or matured. § 616. lowa.^ — A landlord shall have a lien for his rent upon all crops grown upon the leased premises,'* and upon 2 Burns' Ann. Stats. 1914, § 8070; Kennard v. Harvey, 80 Ind. il ; Shaffer v. Stevens, 143 Ind. 295. If rent is to be paid partly in money and partly in crops until the same are measured and the share of the landlord delivered and the cash rent paid, the tenant has no title to the crops; the land- lord may sue a purchaser of the crops from the tenant in violation of the contract for conversion. Gif- ford V. Meyers, 27 Ind. App. 348, 61 N. E. 210. Purchasers of crops from tenants are bound to take notice of the liens given landlords by the statute. Shelby v. Moore, 22 Ind. App. 371, 53 N. E. 842; Campbell v. Bowen, 22 Ind. App. 562, 54 N. E. 409. The landlord has a lien on crops of his tenant rented for cash rent even though 38 the crops in the possession of the tenant are exempt from execution. Keim v. Myers, 44 Ind. App. 299, 89 N. E. ill. 3 Code Ann. 1897, §§ 2992, 2993. •1 The lien attaches to crops grow^n upon the demised premises by a sublessee of the tenant. Houghton v. Bauer, 70 Iowa 314, 30 N. W. 577; Beck v. Minnesota and W. Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62, 107 N. W. 1032, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 930. The lien is not divested by a sale of the crops by the tenant, but the landlord may follow them into the hands of the purchaser; and if he has consumed them, he is liable to the landlord in damages.. Holden v. Cox, 60 Iowa 449, 15 N. W. 269. Evans v. Collins, 94 Iowa 432, t2 N. W. 810. The landlord's statutory lien is not waived by a 6i6 LIENS. 594 any other personal property of the tenant which has been used^ or kept thereon during the term and not exempt lease providing that he shall have a lien on all the property of the lessee used on the premises though exempt from execution. Smith V. Dayton, 94 Iowa 102, 62 N. W. 650. See also, Blake v. Counselman, 95 Iowa 219, 63 N. W. 679. While a landlord has a lien on the tenant's property he has no right to possession until after rent accrues and cannot replevin such property. Hilman v. Brig- ham, 117 Iowa 70, 90 N. W. 491. The landlord's lien attaches to a crop raised by a subtenant. Beck v. Minnesota & W. Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62, 107 N. W. Ii032, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 930. As be- tween the landlord and tenant the lien will attach whether the ten- ancy is at will or for a definite term. In re Hersey, 171 Fed. 1001. See also, German State Bank V. Herron, 111 Iowa 25, 82 N. W. 430. The landlord's lien ex- tends to property and may be fol- lowed in the hands of the pur- chaser from the tenant. Boyd v. Stipp, 151 Iowa 276, 131 N. W. 22. Property of one member of a partnership kept on leased prem- ises is not subject to the land- lord's lien. Ward v. Walker, 111 Iowa 6i'l, 82 N. W. 1028. But see, Becker v. Dalby (Iowa), 86 N. W. 314. In attachment by a landlord against his tenant the lien of the tenant's employe for wages is superior to that of the landlord. Stuart v. Twining, 112 Iowa 154, 83 N. W. 891. The right of the landlord's lien termi- nates with the tenancy. Bacon v. Carr, 112 Iowa 193, 83 N. W. 957. The lien of the land- lord attaches to property brought on the leased premises for the rent for the whole term of the tenancy. Des Moines Nat. Bank V. Council Bluffs Sav. Bank, 150 Fed. 301. The lien of a landlord gives him no right to the posses- sion of the tenant's property, but he may enforce such lien by judi- cial proceedings. Remington Typewriter Co. v. McArthur, 145 Iowa 57, 123 N. W. 760. The lien for rent is superior to the lien of a judgment on property not ex- empt from execution, but the judgment lien for alimony is su- perior. Stoaks V. Stoaks, 146 Iowa 61, 124 N. W. 757. The land- lord is not compelled to proceed by attachment to enforce this lien, but he may resort to other rem- edies. Citizens' Sav. Bank of Olin V. Woods, 134 Iowa 232, 111 N. W. 929. "Not exempt from execution" as used in the statute giving a lien on crops and other property brought on the leased premises, applies to the other property and not to crops grown on the prem- ises. Hipsley v. Price, 104 Iowa 282, 73 N. W. 584. Non-lienable items must not be joined in a suit to enforce liens for rent. Crill v. Jeffrey, 95 Iowa 634, 64 N. W. 625; Evans v. Collins, 94 Iowa 432, 62 N. W. 810. Where the rent claim is blended with other claims in a note the landlord's lien is lost. Ladner v. Balsley, 103 Iowa 674, 72 N. W. 787. ^ A different rule applies to 595 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 6i6 from execution, for the period of one year after a year's rent, or the rent of a shorter period, falls due ; but such lien sales of other personal property. Thus, if a tenant keeps a stock of goods upon the demised prem- ises merely for sale, he may make sales in the ordinary course of business, and the landlord cannot follow the goods sold. Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152. The prop- erty must be actually used on the premises to entitle the landlord to a lien thereon for rent. Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152. Horses and wagons used in connection with a grocery business carried on up- on the leased premises, but kept in another place, are not subject to the landlord's lien. Van Patten V. Leonard, 55 Iowa 520, 8 N. W. 334. No lien is given by the statute upon notes and accounts due the tenant and kept on the premises. Van Patten v. Leonard, 55 Iowa 520, 8 N. W. 334. The landlord has a lien on property kept upon the premises for the purpose of sale, although not used for any other purpose. The lien is given only upon the property of the tenant. The landlord has no lien upon the property of third persons, al- though it be used by the tenant upon the demised premises dur- ing the term of the lease. Perry V. Waggoner, 68 Iowa 403, 27 N. W. 292. The lien is subject to the course of business of the tenant, "so as to not interfere with sales of property contemplated by the character of the business prose- cuted by the tenant, to which the landlord is presumed to have as- sented upon the leasing of the premises. Thus, a retail dealer may sell goods in the ordinary course of business, free from the lien of his landlord for rent, and the tenant of a farm may sell marketing produce and livestock, which are usually kept for sale by farmers; in such cases the land- lord's lien does not follow the property." Richardson v. Peter- son, 58 Iowa 724, 13 N. W. 63. In Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa 152, the court said, in efifect, that the lien attached when the property was brought upon the leased premises, and that it secured the payment of rent before it became due. The doctrine of that case was ap- proved in Garner v. Cutting, 32 Iowa 547. In Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345, 3 N. W. 92, it was held that the lien given by the statute attached from the commencement of the lease upon all property of the tenant then on the leased premises, and upon all other prop- erty afterward brought thereon, for the rent of the entire term. That rule was approved in Gil- bert V. Grenebaum, 56 Iowa 211, 9 N. W. 182; and Milner v. Cooper, 65 Iowa 190, 21 N. W. 558. In Garner v. Cutting, 32 Iowa 547, it was also held that the landlord might have an injunction to pre- vent the acts of his tenant which wofild destroy or impair the secu- rity given by his lien. But a land- lord cannot enjoin an electric light company, occupying his land un- der a lease for a term of years, from removing before the end of the lease to other premises with- 6i6 LIENS. 596 shall not in any case continue more than six months after the expiration of the term. In the event that a stock of goods or merchandise, or a part thereof, subject to a land- lord's lien, shall be sold under judicial process, order of court, or by an assignee under a general assignment for benefit of creditors, the lien of the landlord shall not be enforcible against said stock or portion thereof, except for rent due for the term already expired, and for rent to be paid for the use of demised premises for a period not ex- ceeding six months after date of sale, any agreement of the parties to the contrary notwithstanding. The lien may be effected by the commencement of an action, within the period above prescribed, for the rent alone, in which action the landlord will be entitled to a writ of attachment, upon filing w^ith the proper clerk or the jus- tice an affidavit that the action is commenced to recover rent accrued within one year previous thereto upon prem- ises described in the affidavit.® in the city, on which the company- intends to continue and enlarge its business, the company not be- ing in arrears for rent, and its property being easily identified. The statute was not designed to enable the landlord to do more than to protect the security which the law gave him. Carson v. Elec- tric Light & Power Co., 85 Iowa 44, 51 N. W. 1144. (•It seems the word "effected," as used by the statute, must be regarded the same as "enforced," for it does not require an action to effectuate the lien. It exists for and during the statutory per- iod, although no action is brought to enforce it. If, however, it is desired to enforce the lien, then an action is required. A tenant sold certain wheat on which his landlord had a lien. The landlord sued his tenant before the expira- tion of the six months prescribed, and recovered judgment, and, af- ter the expiration of that time, sued the purchaser of the wheat for the amount of the prior judg- ment. It was held that the lien was not affected by the action against the tenant, and that the action against the purchaser was barred. Nickelson v. Negley, 71 Iowa 546, Z2 N. W. 487. This rem- edy is purely statutory, and must be strictly construed. Merrit v. Fisher, 19 Iowa 354. An action for rent, commenced by ordinary attachment before rent is due, cannot be deemed an action to effect a landlord's lien, and the plaintiff takes thereby only such a lien as an ordinary attachment 597 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 617 If any tenant of farm lands shall, with intent to defraud, sell, conceal, or in any manner dispose of any of the grain, or other annual products thereof upon which there is a land- lord's lien for unpaid rent, without the written consent of the landlord, he shall be guilty of larceny and punished ac- cordingly.'^ § 617. Kansas.^ — An}^ rent due for farming land shall be a lien on the crop growing or made on the premises. Such lien may be enforced by action and attachment therein.^ When any such rent is payable in a share or certain pro- portion of the crop, the lessor shall be deemed the owner gives. Clark v. Haynes, 57 Iowa 96, 10 N. W. 292. The action under the statute to effect the lien can- not be commenced before the rent is due; and if the landlord needs to aid his lien by preventing a dis- position of the property, he must do so by an application in equity for an injunction. Garner v. Cut- ting, 32 lovi^a 547, 552. An attach- ment may be issued against the crop of a sublessee grown upon the lands demised to the tenant, in an action by the landlord on a promissory note given by the ten- ant to secure the rent. Houghton ■ v. Bauer, 70 Iowa 314, 30 N. W. 577. A mortgagee of chattels, after being garnished by a credi- tor of the mortgagor, may pay over to the landlord, out of the surplus in his hands, after satis- fying the mortgage debt, the rent accrued upon the building in which the goods were kept, and which was in arrear when the mortgagee tok possession. Doane V. Garretson, 24 Iowa 351, 354. 'Supp. 1907, § 4852a. 8 Dassler's Gen Stats. 1909, §§ 4713-4717. SNeifert v. Ames, 26 Kans. 515. The lien exists without process or a seizure on attachment. Scully V. Porter, 57 Kans. 322, 46 Pac. 313; Wester v. Long, 63 Kans. 876, 66 Pac. 1032. The landlord having a lien on crops is entitled to pos- session until the rent is paid and may maintain replevin therefor against an execution creditor of the tenant. Dale v. Taylor, 63 Kans. 674, 66 Pac. 993. The lien may be enforced against a sub- lessee upon the landlord's attach- ment. Berry v. Berry, 8 Kans. App. 584, 55 Pac. 348. The tenant is not a necessary party where a landlord seeks to enforce his lien against a purchaser from the ten- ant. Gill V. Buckingham, 7 Kans. App. 227, 52 Pac. 897. The land- lord's statutory lien for rent is superior to the lien of a chattel mortgage given by the tenant to one who advances money to har- vest the crop. Salina State Bank V. Burr, 7 Kans. App. 197, 52 Pac. 704. 6i7 LIENS. 598 of such share or proportion, and may, if the tenant refuse to deliver him such share or proportion, enter upon the land and take possession of the same, or obtain possession there- of by action of replevin. The person entitled to the rent may recover from the purchaser of the crop, or any 'part thereof, with notice of the lien, the value of the crop purchased, to the extent of the rent due and damages. ^*^ When any person who shall be liable to pay rent (whether the same be due or not, if it be due within one year there- after, and whether the same be payable in money or other thing) intends to remove, or is removing, or has within thirty days removed his property, or the crops, or any part thereof, from the leased premises, the person to whom the rent is owing may commence an action in the court having jurisdiction; and upon making an affidavit stating the amount of rent for which such person is liable, and one or more of the above facts, and executing an undertaking as in other cases, an attachment shall issue in the same manner and with the like effect as is provided by law in other ac- tions. ^^ lOSee Neifert v. Ames, 26 Kans. 515. Knowledge of facts by a purchaser from a tenant as to the tenancy, the nonpayment of rent and the landlord's lien sufficient to put such purchaser on inquiry amounts to notice of such lien binding upon him. Stadel v. Ai- kins, 65 Kans. 82, 68 Pac. 1088; Maelzer v. Swan, 75 Kans. 496, 89 Pac. 1037. As to what facts will charge a purchaser of crops with notice, see Mangum v. Stadel, 1() Kans. 764, 92 Pac. 1093. iiLand was rented to be culti- vated in wheat, the rent being a share of the crop. When the wheat was ripe the tenant har- vested and removed the entire crop from the premises, against the protest of the landlord, who afterward commenced an action against the tenant for the value of his share of the wheat, and at the same time procured an order of attachment to be issued and levied upon the entire crop. It was held that the action with the order of attachment was rightly brought, and could be maintained. The landlord had a lien upon the whole crop for the payment of his share ; and was not confined to the remedy of replevin under § 25 of the act, but could proceed by attachment under § 27. Tarpy v. 599 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 6i8 In an action to enforce a lien on crops for rent of farming lands, the affidavit for an attachment shall state that there is due from the defendant to the plaintiff a certain sum, naming it, for rent of farming lands, describing the same, and that the plaintiff claims a lien on the crop made on such land. Upon making and filing such affidavit and executing an undertaking as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, an order of attachment shall issue as in other cases, and shall be levied on such crop or so much thereof as may be necessary ; and all other proceedings in such attachment shall be the same as in other actions. § 618. Kentucky.^- — Rent may be recovered by distress, attachment, or action, and shall bear six per cent, interest per annum from the time it is due. When rent is reserved in money,^^ a landlord may, before a justice of the peace, police judge, or a judge of the quarterly court where th.e land lies, file an af^davit showing the amount of rent due him and in arrear, and thereupon such officer issues a dis- tress warrant directed to the sheriff, marshal, or constable, authorizing such officer to distrain for the amount due, with interest and costs. Persing, 27 Kans. 745. And see Neifert v. Ames, 26 Kans. 515; Dale V. Taylor, 63 Kans. 674, 66 Pac. 993. The lien attaches to ev- ery part of the crop; and if a tenant removes any appreciable part of it, an attachment may is- sue. The motive of the tenant is immaterial. Knowles v. Sell, 41 Kans. 171, 21 Pac. 102. 12 Carroll's Stat. 1909, §§ 2299, 2301, 2306, 2316. As to constitu- tionality of the act, see Burket v. Boude, 3 Dana (Ky.) 209; Thom- son v. Tilton, 22 Ky. L. 1004, 59 S. W. 485. The delivery by the ten- ant to the landlord of the ten- ant's portion of the crop before the lien expires will preserve it just as well as the insti- tution of a suit. Marquess v. Ladd, 30 Ky. L. 1142, 100 S. W. 305. i^Distress is available only when rent is payable in money. Myers v. Mayfield, 7 Bush (Ky.) 212, 213; Poer v. Peebles, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1, 3. The lien reserved in a lease contract does not attach to property thereafter acquired by the tenant as against the tenant's creditors. Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 137 Ky. 339, 125 S. W. 732. § 6l9 LIENS. 600 A distress warrant may issue although the lease be not ended, but only for rent then due, and not after the lapse of six months from the time it was due. All valid liens upon the personal property of a lessee, as- signee, or under-tenant, created before the property was carried upon the leased premises, prevail against a distress warrant, or attachment for rent. If liens be afterwards created while the property is on the leased premises, and on property upon which the landlord has a superior lien for his rent, then, to the extent of one year's rent, whether the same accrued before or after the creation of the lien, a dis- tress or attachment has preference, provided the same is sued out in one hundred and twenty days from the time the rent was due.^* § 619. Kentucky (continued). Lien for rent. — A land- lord shall have a superior^^ lien on the produce of the farm or premises rented, on the fixtures, on the household furni- ture, and other personal property of the tenant, or under- tenant, owned by him, after possession is taken under the 14A creditor who levies execu- against the tenant's creditors, but tion upon property subject to a not as against bona fide purchas- landlord's lien must, upon notice, ers who take the property oflf the tender the rent in arrear not ex- premises. Stone v. Bohm, 79 Ky. ceeding one year. Craddock v. 141. The landlord, however, has Riddlesbarger, 2 Dana (Ky.) 205; priority over the tenant's mort- Burket v. Boude, 3 Dana (Ky.) gagees, whose liens have been ac- 209; Williams v. Woods, 2 Mete. quired after the property has been (Ky.) 41. To render the lien ef- taken to the leased premises, to fectual against an attaching cred- the extent of one year's rent, if itor, if the rent is not due at the the remedy has been pursued time of such attachment, the land- within the time allowed by law. lord should sue out an attachment English v. Duncan, 14 Bush (Ky.) or a distress warrant and have it ZIT ; Fisher v. Kollerts, 16 B. Mon. levied on the attached property (Ky.) 398, 408; Williams v. Wood, on which he has a lien. Williams 2 Mete. (Ky.) 41. The lien is v. Wood, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 41. subject to the exemption statute isCarroll's Stats. 1909, §§ 2309, of May 17, 1886, Stats. 1909, §§ 1697- 2310, 2317. The lien is superior as 1701a. Rudd v. Ford, 91 Ky. 183, 6oi LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 620 lease ; but such lien shall not be for more than one year's rent due or to become due, nor for any rent which has been due for more than one hundred and twenty days.^** And if any such property be removed openly from the leased prem- ises, and without fraudulent intent, and not returned, the landlord shall have a superior lien on the property so re- moved for fifteen days from the date of its removal, and may enforce his lien against the property wherever found. ^''' Property distrained for rent, or so much as is sufificient to make satisfaction, is sold by the ofificer, unless within ten days from the day of levy the demand be replevied, or by other legal procedure a sale is prevented. A distress for rent, at any time before sale, may be re- plevied for three months by the defendant's giving a bond with good surety. § 620. Louisiana. -The lessor has, for the payment of his rent, and other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on the movable effects of the lessee, which are found on the property leased. ^^ 12 Ky. L. 740, 15 S. W. 179. The liwillv^iu's Hen on crops is superior to the lien of a chattel mortgage given to an insurance company. Bowles' Exr. v. Jones, 29 Ky. L. 1022, 96 S. W. 1121. icUnder this statute the land- lord, in order to prevail against other liens, must assert his rent claim in ninety days; and to pre- vail against all other rights and equities of third persons, he must assert it in one hundred tv^^enty days. A distress warrant not issued within the latter time can- not prevail against the tenant's assignee under an assignment for the benefit of his creditors. Petry V. Randolph, 85 Ky. 351. 3 S. W. 420; Loth v. Carty, 85 Ky. 591, 4 S. W. 314; Stats. 1909, ch. 75, art. II.; Porter v. Rice, (Ky) 128 S. W. 70; Jones v. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co., 135 Ky. 824, 121 S. W. 633, 123 S. W. 307. I'^'This provision is a material change from the statutes of 8 Anne, ch. 14, and 2 George II. ch. 19, under which, in order to pre- serve the lien after removal of the property, it was necessary to show that the removal was fraudulent. Under the statute of Kentucky it is immaterial whether the remov- al be with a fraudulent intent or not. Stone v. Bohm, 79 Ky. 141, 144, 2 Ky. L. 40. iSMerrick's Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 2705-2709. if*The lease need not be record- 620 LIENS. 602 In case of predial estates, this right embraces everything that serves for the labors of the farm,-° the furniture of the lessee's house, and the fruits produced during the lease of the land; and in the case of houses and other edifices, it in- cludes the furniture of the lessee.-^ and the merchandise contained in the house or apartment, if it be a store or shop. ed. Johnson v. Tacneau, 23 La. Ann. 453, 454. Furniture lodged by the lessee upon the leased prem- ises is pledged for the rent. A seizure by the landlord, and a re- lease of the seizure by the les- see's giving bond, does not de- stroy or impair the privilege. Harrison v. Jenks, 23 La. Ann. 707. The landlord's privilege springs from the nature of the debt. A seizure does not give the privilege, and a release of the seizure does not take it away. The bond is only an additional security. The privilege still ex- ists against the property. Harri- son V. Jenks, 23 La. Ann. 707. See Conrad v. Patzelt, 29 La. Ann. 465 ; Schall v. Kinsella, 117 La. 687, 42 So. 221. The landlord's privilege, for rent due and for rent not due, prevails against a seizure by a judgment creditor of the lessee. Harmon v. Juge, 6 La. Ann. 768; Robinson v. Staples, 5 La. Ann. 712; Gleason v. Sheriff, 20 La. Ann. 266. The sheriff may be or- dered to retain in his hands the proceeds of the property sold, and such order continues the land- lord's privilege in force. New Orleans v. Vaught, 12 La. Ann. 339. As to the landlord's reme- dies in such case, see Robb v. Wagner, 5 La. Ann. 111. The les- sor is not bound to enforce his privilege before pursuing the lessee's sureties. Ledoux v. Jones, 20 La. Ann. 539. Agree- ments in the lease whereby the lessee is to repair are secured by the privilege. Warfield v. Oliver, 23 La. Ann. 612. But on the other hand the covenant of a landlord to pay for improvements erected by a tenant does not con- stitute a lien on the premises. Confiscation Cases, 1 Woods (U. S.) 221. The lessor has no priv- ilege on a debt due the lessee. Edwards v. Fairbanks, Louque's Dig. 583. But a banker's movable effects, subject to the privilege, embrace notes, certificates of stock, and the like, on the prem- ises. Matthews v. Creditors, 10 La. Ann. 718. The right of pledge held by the lessor on the chattels of his sublessee is only for the amount owing by the sublessee at the time of the seizure. Tu- lane Imp. Co. v. W. B. Green Photo Supply Co., 124 La. 619, 50 So. 601. In case the lessor's right of pledge is lost he may still have his preference. O'Kelley v. Fer- guson, 49 La. Ann. 1230, 22 So. 783. 20The lessor's privilege extends to horses and carts kept by the lessee on the premises. Bazin v. Segura, 5 La. Ann. 718. 2iLalaurie v. Woods, 8 La. Ann. 366. 6o3 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 620 But the lessee shall be entitled to retain, out of the prop- erty subjected by law to the lessor's privilege, his clothes and linen, and those of his wife and family; his bed, bedding and bedsteads, and those of his wife and family; his arms, military accoutrements, and tools and instruments neces- sary for the exercise of the trade or profession by which he gains his living and that of his family. -- This right of pledge includes, not only the effects of the principal lessee or tenant, but those of the under-tenant-^ so far as the latter is indebted to the principal lessee at the time when the proprietor chooses to exercise his right.-"* A payment made in anticipation, by the under-tenant to his principal, does not release him from the owner's claim. This right of pledge affects, not only the movables of the lessee and under-lessee, but also those belonging to third per- 22The lessor cannot seize a piano, organ, or other musical instrument hired for use, and not the property of the inmates or sublessee. Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, p. 682; Wolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1337; Act 1874, No. 63, p. 112. The lessor does not lose his lien by a sale made by his tenant to a purchaser wrho becomes his tenant. Villere V. Succession of Shaw, 108 La. 71, 32 So. 196. The lessor's privilege extends only to that part of the lessee's property that is on the leased premises. L. Luderbach Plumbing Co. v. Its Creditors, 121 La. 371, 46 So. 359. A steam engine used in plowing is a farming uten- sil and the vendor's privilege thereon takes precedence over that of a lessor. Lahn v. Carr, 120 La. 797, 45 So. 707. See also, Weill v. Kent, 107 La. Z22, 31 So. 761. 23Under-tenant is the same as under-lessee. University Pub. lishing Co. v. Piffet, 34 La. Ann. 602. 24Goods of a sublessee are only liable to seizure for rent that is past due. Sanarens v. True, 22 La. Ann. 181. If the sublessee does not disclose the title under which he occupies the premises, the lessor's privilege will cover the goods for the whole amount of rent due. Simon v. Goldenberg, 15 La. Ann. 229. If the sublessee owes no rent to the lessee, the landlord cannot seize his goods. Kittridge v. Ribas, 18 La. Ann. 718; Simon v. Goldenberg, 15 La. Ann. 229; Powers v. Florance, 7 La. Ann. 524; Wallace v. Smith, 8 La. Ann. 374. One who pays storage on his goods in a ware- house is a sublessee. Vairin v.^ Hunt, 18 La. 498. 620 LIENS. (304 sons, when their goods are contained in the house or store, by their own consent, express or implied. ^^ Movables are not subject to this right, when they are only transiently or accidentally in the house, store, or shop, such as the baggage of a traveler in an inn, merchandise sent to a workman to be made up or repaired, and effects lodged in the store of an auctioneer to be sold.-^ 2'JTherefore, if goods of a third person be consigned by their own- er to the lessee, to be sold by the latter at a price fixed by the own- er, with the agreement that the lessee shall keep, as his compen- sation, all that he should obtain above such price, and that no rent should be charged, the goods are affected by the privilege. Good- rich V. Bodley, 35 La. Ann. 525. The goods of a third person who is allowed to occupy a portion of the leased premises without rent, the lessor's motive being an ex- pected benefit to his own business from having such person in his house, are subject to the land- lord's privilege. University Pub- lishing Co. V. Piffet, 34 La. Ann. 602. As to the consent which makes the goods of a third per- son liable, see also, Twitty v. Clarke, 14 La. Ann. 503. When the lessor's privilege has attached before a sale by the lessee, the purchaser cannot defeat a seizure by the lessor. Davis v. Thomas, 23 La. Ann. 340. Otherwise if sale take place before any de- fault. Smith V. Blois, 8 La. Ann. 10. Goods on the leased premises belonging to a partnership are subject to the lessor's privilege where the lessee is a member of the partnership. Hynson v. Cor- dukes, 21 La. Ann. 553. Property of a wife carrying on a separate trade in a building leased to hus- band is liable for the rent. Des- lix V. Jonc, 6 Rob. (La.) 292. Un- der the rule that privileges are stricti juris, the court is preclud- ed from assuming that the effects of a third person are affected by the lessor's privilege after their removal from his house or store. The privilege must be restricted as against third persons to the conditions imposed by this arti- cle. Merrick v. La Hache, 27 La. Ann. 87; Silliman v. Short, 26 La. Ann. 512; Bailey v. Quick, 28 La. Ann. 432. The effects of a third person removed from the prem- ises cannot be seized by the les- sor, even within fifteen days of their removal. Merrick v. La Hache, 27 La. Ann. 87. If a lessee not in default for his rent trans- fers goods back to a vendor, and obtains credit for the price, and the vendor sells to another, the lessor's privilege is defeated, though the lessee was in an em- barassed condition at the time. Smith V. Blois, 8 La. Ann. 10. -•'Sugar and molasses manufac- tured for third persons from cane belonging to them, and grown on another plantation, are not liable to the landlord's privilege. Les- seps V. Ritcher, 18 La. Ann. 653; Coleman v. Fairbanks, 28 La. Ann. 6o5 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 620 In the exercise of this right, the lessor may seize the objects, which are subject to it, before the lessee takes them away, or within fifteen days after they are taken away, if they continue to be the property of the lessee, and can be identified.-" The right which the lessor has over the products of the estate, and on the movables which are found on the place leased, for his rent, is of a higher nature than a mere privi- lege.-^ The latter is only enforced on the price arising from the sale of movables to which it applies. It does not enable the creditor to take or keep the effects themselves specially. The lessor, on the contrary, may take the effects themselves and retain them until he is paid.-^ 93. Nor on goods of a third per- son transiently stored. Rea v. Burt, 8 La. Ann. 509, 511. -''A lessor who makes a seizure before the rent is due is not liable in damages although the lessee had no fraudulent intent, provided the lessor acts without malice and in the honest belief or fear that the lessee will remove his property from the leased premises. Dillon v. Porier, 34 La. Ann. ITOO. The attempt of a lessee or of his vendee, to forci- bly remove from the leased prem- ises, property subject to the les- sor's privilege is a trespass, sound- ing in damages. Cooper v. Cap- pel, 29 La. Ann. 213. The privi- lege cannot be asserted against goods removed except within the time limited. Langsdorf v. Le Gardeur, 27 La. Ann. 363 ; Haral- son V. Boyle, 22 La. Ann. 210; Farnet v. Creditors, 8 La. Ann. 372; Carroll v. Bancker, 43 La. Ann. 1078, 1194, 10 So. 187. •-is Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, art. 3218; Garretson v. Creditors, 1 Rob. (La.) 445; Hoey v. Hews, 3 La. Ann. 704. -'-♦As against others having a legal right to the property, the lessor cannot detain the lessee's property continuously; he cannot prevent a sale of the property on the pretence that it would not bring the amount of his debt. No right of his is violated by a sale made in the exercise of a legal right of another against the prop- erty. If his right is preserved and his debt is paid in whole or in part by the appropriation of the entire proceeds of the prop- erty, he has no just ground of complaint. Case v. Kloppenburg, 27 La. Ann. 482. And see Cooper V. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213. The lessors have the first privilege on movables seized upon a plan- tation, except on the crops, upon which the laborers have a prefer- ence. Duplantier v. Wilkins, 19 La. Ann. 112. A steam engine used to pump water for irrigation, to- gether with a thresher and ma- chinery for raising a rice crop, 620 LIENS. 606 Privileges on crops are ranked in the order of preference :^*^ 1. Privilege of the laborer.^^ 2. Privilege of the lessor.^- 3. Privilege of the overseer. 4. Pledges for advances. 5. Privilege of furnishers of supplies and of money, and of the physician. ^^ When a lessor sues for rent, whether the same be due or not due, he may obtain the provisional seizure of such furni- ture or property as may be found in the house, or attached to the land leased by him;^^ and in all cases it shall be sufifici- ent to entitle a lessor to said writ, to swear to the amount which he claims, whether due or not due, and that he has good reasons to believe that such lessee will remove the furniture or property on which he has a lien or privilege out of the premises, and that he may be thereby deprived of his lien; provided, that in case the rent be paid when it falls due, the costs of seizure shall be paid by the lessor, unless he prove that the lessee did actually remove, or attempt or in- tend to remove, the property out of the premises; provided, when not used for any other pur- pose is a farming utensil. Lahn V. Carr, 120 La. 797, 45 So. 707. soWolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1342; Act No. 89 of 1886. 31 Wolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1339; under Act No. 66 of 1874. 32The privilege of a vendor who has delivered personal property is inferior to that of a lessor. Gale's Succession, 21 La. Ann. 487; Har- rison v. Jenks, 23 La. Ann. 707. 33Physicians have a lien and privilege for medical services ren- dered to any person, on the crop of said person. Such lien is con- current in rank with the lien and privilege now given by law to the furnisher of supplies; if the debt- or is a laborer such privilege may be enforced upon his wages or his interest in the crop. The amount of such lien shall not exceed the sum of fifteen dollars for any one year. Wolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1330. Threshermen have a lien for services rendered, under contract or otherwise, on the crop threshed, and said lien is next in rank with the lien and privilege of the lessor. Laws 1906, Act No. 53. 34Garland's Rev. Code of Prac- tice, 1901, arts. 287, 288. As to seizure, when demand for rent be made within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, see art. 1125. 6o7 landlords' liens for rent. § 621 that in all cases of provisional seizure of furniture or other property at the instance of lessors, the lessee shall be per- mitted to have the seizure released upon executing a forth- coming bond or obligation, with a good, solvent security for the value of the property to be left in his possession, or for the amount of the claim, with interest and costs; provided, further, that the value of the property shall be fixed by the sheriff, or one of his deputies, with the assistance of two appraisers selected by the parties, twenty-four hours' notice being previously given to the lessor or his counsel to select an appraiser. The lessor may seize, even in the hands of a third person, such furniture as was in the house leased,^^ if the same has been removed by the lessee, provided he declare on oath that the same has been removed without his consent, within fifteen days previous to his suit being brought. §621. Maine.^^ — When a lease of land, with a rent pay- able, is made for the purpose of erecting a mill or other build- ings thereon, such buildings and all the interest of the lessee are subject to a lien and liable to be attached for the rent due. Such attachment, made within six months after the rent becomes due, is effectual against any transfer of the property by the lessee. In all cases where land rent accrues and remains unpaid, whether under a lease, or otherwise, all buildings upon the s^Factors and agents of the is a security only, the same as lessee are not third persons in the a mortgage. Kelley v. Goodwin, sense of this provision. Tupery 95 Maine 538, 50 Atl. 711. The V. Edmondson, 32 La. Ann. 1146. lien of a landlord against a build- 36Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, §§ 44, ing erected on the leased premises 45. When it is provided in a is enforceable when the rent be- farm lease that the crops raised comes due whether the tenant during a named season shall be owns the building or not. Union and remain the lessor's property Water-Power Co. v. Chabot, 93 until the rent is paid, the lessor's Maine 339, 45 Atl. 30. title is not an absolute one, but § 622 LIENS. 608 premises while the rent accrues, are subject to a lien and to attachment for the rent due, as provided in the preceding paragraph, although other persons than the lessee may own the whole or a part thereof, and whether or not the land was leased for the purpose of erecting such buildings; provided, however, that if any person except the lessee is interested in said buildings, the proceedings shall be substantially in the forms directed for enforcing liens against vessels, with such additional notice to supposed or unknown owners, as any jus- tice of the Supreme Judicial Court orders, or the attachment and levy of execution shall not be valid except against the lessee. § 622. Maryland.'^" — Distress for rent. — A landlord, or his agent,-^^ before levying a distress, must make oath that the tenant is justly and bona fide indebted to him in the sum named, or is entitled to a certain quantity or proportion of the produce claimed by the landlord, for rent in arrear and already due, and that no part of it has been received except the credits given. ^^ 37 Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 53, §§ 8-12, 18-21. Certain property, spe- cifically named, is exempt from distress. Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 53, § 17. The property of a boarder or sojourner in a board- ing-house is exempt by the stat- ute. But it must be such property as is in the personal use of the boarder or his family, and not such as is in general use by the household. Leitch v. Owings, 34 Md. 262. And see Trieber v. Knabe, 12 Md. 491, 71 Am. Dec. 607. 38 What agency sufficient: Giles V. Ebsworth, 10 Md. ZZZ; Jean v. Spurrier, 35 Md. 110. A distress for rent is a remedy by the act of the party, and a landlord may con- stitute any person as his bailiff to make it. Myers v. Smith, 27 Md. 91. It is customary, however, to have the warrant directed to a sheriff, who may execute it by his deputy. Myers v. Smith, 27 Md. 91. 39If by mistake a larger sum is alleged to be due than is ac- tually due, the whole distress is not rendered void, but the land- lord may recover what is actually due. Jean v. Spurrier, 35 Md. 110. The object of the provision was to protect the tenant from oner- ous and oppressive proceedings and from an excessive distress, and the statute is to receive a reasonable construction. Cross v. Tome, 14 Md. 247. It is not nec- essary to state the terms of the 6o9 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 622 When the distress is for grain or produce, the bailiff shall summon two appraisers to estimate the money value of the same, and thereupon the distress is levied as in ordinary- cases, taking the estimated value to be the money rent. At any time before such grain or produce is sold, the tenant may deliver the grain or other produce, with the expenses of the distress, whereupon the proceedings shall cease.^'^ Whenever property shall be removed from premises which have been rented within sixty days prior or subsequent to the time when the rent has or will become due, and whether such removal be by night or day, it shall be lawful for the landlord to follow, seize and sell such property under distress for the rent due at any time within sixty days after the time when the rent becomes due ; provided, that such property shall not have been sold to a bona fide purchaser without notice or taken in execution.'*^ The rents of real estate of minors or of leasehold estates that may not be due at the death of such minor shall for the year in which such minor may die be paid to the guardian, who may maintain distress or suit to recover such rent. renting, or the items of the charges and credits. But the ac- count must state when the rent became due, so that the tenant may be protected against being called on a second time for the same debt, and so that it may be known that the rent is in arrear and may be collected by distress. Cross V. Tome, 14 Md. 247; Butler V. Gannon, 53 Md. 333, 346. No ac- tion lies for distraining for more rent than is due and in arrear. Hamilton v. Windolf, 36 Md. 301, 11 Am. Rep. 491. 40N0 notice or demand prelim- inary to the levy of the distress is necessary. Offutt v. Trail, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 20. But there must be notice preliminary to the sale. Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660. Before sale the goods must be appraised by two sworn ap- praisers. These must be reason- ably competent, but need not be professional appraisers. Cahill v. Lee, 55 Md. 319. ■11 Neale v. Clautice, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 372. Where a receiver has taken possession of the ten- ant's goods and sold them, the landlord is not entitled to a lien on the proceeds of such sale for rent becoming due after the sale and removal of the goods by the purchaser, notwithstanding this provision.Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 Atl. 632, 10 Atl. 309. 39 § 623 LIENS. 610 If such guardian dies before the recovery of said rent the executor or administrator of such guardian may recover the same by distress or suit. Whenever any landlord shall give notice of rent due to the sheriff or constable who may be about to sell the goods and chattels of his tenant under execution there shall be appended to said notice an affidavit of the amount of his rent claimed to be due. §623. Maryland.^- (continued). Lien on crops. — In all cases of renting lands wherein a share of the growing crop or crops is reserved as rent, the rent reserved is a lien on such crop or crops, which cannot be divested by any sale made by the tenant, or by his assignment in bankruptcy or insolvency, or by the process of law issued against the tenant. ^^ In all cases wherein advances by the landlord have been made upon the faith of the crops to be grown, the rent re- served and such advances made are a lien on such crop or crops, which shall not be divested by any sale made by the tenant, or by any administrator of a deceased tenant, or by the assignment of the tenant in insolvency, or by the process of law issued against the tenant; provided, that at the time of the said renting, the contract under and by which the said advances are to be made shall be reduced to writing, duly at- tested and executed by the said landlord and tenant.** 42 Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 53, the chattels of the tenant as se- §§ 22, 23. rurity for rent is invalid as ■*3If the landlord receives his against creditors of the tenant share, he cannot, as against the whose debts were created before tenant's mortgage of his share, set the tenant entered into possession, up a parol agreement by the ten- In re Potee Brick Co. of Balti- ant to let him have the entire crop more City, 179 Fed. 525. for arrearages of years before. 44These provisions apply only Hopper V. Haines, 71 Md. 64, 18 to the counties of St. Mary's, Atl. 29, 20 Atl. 159. An agree- Prince George's, Charles and Cal- ment between the tenant and the vert. See Hopper v. Haines, 71 landlord that the latter shall hold Md. 64, 18 Atl. 29, 20 Atl. 159. 6ii LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 625 § 624. Minnesota.^^ — The landlord's common-law right of distress for rent in arrear, as modified by the statute 2 Wil- liam & Mary, ch. 5,^® allowing the property to be sold, existed in this state until the remedy was abolished by statute in 1877, The common law of a state or territory which had no political existence before the Revolution is the common law as modified and amended by English statutes passed prior to our Revolution.^''' § 625. Mississippi.^^ — Every lessor of land shall have a lien on all the agricultural products of the leased premises, ^^ 45 Gen. Stats. 1913, § 6806; But- cher V. Culver, 24 Minn. 584. 46 Stats, at Large, 1688-1696, p. n. 47Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 148. 48 Code 1906, §§ 2832, 2833. Sec- tion 2832 is an addition to the law^ of landlord and tenant, as it ex- isted before the Code of 1880. Under the Codes of 1871 and 1857, the landlord's common-lav\r remedy for rent w^as assumed to exist, and was regulated and modified by those codes. Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270. The com- mon-law process of distress was abolished by the statute, which provides for a summary method of attaching the tenant's property, and selling the same to pay the rent due by him. Marye v. Dyche, 42 Miss. 347. An advance or loan of corn in a preceding year is not within the statute. Lumbley v. Gilruth, 65 Miss. 23, 3 So. 11. The lien may be enforced against such products after their removal from the premises, and prevails against a bona fide purchaser for value. Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323, 5 So. 753. The land- lord's lien is not lost by the sale of the tenant's chattels, and where the tenant delivers such property to a merchant who is his creditor for shipment out of the state and sale, the proceeds to be credited on the tenant's account, such act will amount to conversion and the merchant becomes liable to the landlord to the extent of the lien. Peets & Norman Co. v. Baker, 95 Miss. 576, 48 So. 898. See also, Eason v. Johnson, 69 Miss. 371, 12 So. 446; Powell v. Smith, 74 Miss. 142, 20 So. 872. A lessee of a plantation sublet a part thereof, and his tenant, after making a crop of cotton, and before it was gathered, abandoned the premises, and the lessee sold the cotton to defendants. The lessor of the plantation was held to have a lien on such cotton for rent due him from his lessee. Hollingsworth V. Hill, 69 Miss. IZ, 10 So. 450. The lien for money advanced to gath- er a crop of a tenant is inferior to the landlord's lien for rent. Goodwin v. Mitchell (Miss.), 38 So. 657. 4!»The right of the landlord to enforce this lien is not prejudiced or in any manner diminished by § 625 LIENS. 6l2 however and by whomsoever produced, to secure the pay- ment of the rent, and the fair market value of all advances made by him to his tenant for supplies for tenant and others for whom he may contract, and for his business carried on upon the leased premises, and this lien shall be paramount to all others liens, claims, or demands upon such products ;^° and the claim of the lessor for supplies furnished may be en- forced in the same manner, and under the same circum- stances, as his claim for rent may be; and all the provisions of law as to attachment for rent and proceedings under it shall be applicable to a claim for supplies furnished, and such attachment may be levied on any goods and chatteb^^ liable the termination of the lease and removal of the tenant from the demised premises, nor by the re- moval of the products from the premises. The lien continues un- til it is extinguished by lapse of the period prescribed for its en- forcement, just as if there had been no removal of the tenant or of the products. Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270; Ball v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447. 50A third person can assert his lien only as subject to the land- lord's lien, but the tenant can de- feat a recovery of possession by such third person by setting up the landlord's lien. McGill v. Hovirard, 61 Miss. 411. This stat- ute (1873) took away the power of the tenant to incumber the crop so as to impair the lien of the landlord. Arbuckle v. Nelms, 50 Miss. 556; Storm v. Green, 51 Miss. 103. For rule in case ten- ant has option to purchase, see Bedford v. Gartrell, 88 Miss. 429, 40 So. 801. See also, Strauss v. Baley, 58 Miss. 131. A guaranty of supplies gives no lien. Ellis v. Jones, 70 Miss. 60, 11 So. 566. A lien on the crop exists for ginning and baling cotton. Duncan v. Jayne, 76 Miss 133, 23 So. 392. ^iThere is a distinction between the agricultural products of the leased premises and other goods and chattels of the tenant. The statute creates a lien on the for- mer, and gives the attachment to enforce it, while only a right to seize the latter is conferred. Goods and chattels of the tenant, other than agricultural products of the leased premises, are not subject to a lien for rent or ad- vances for supplies, and they can be seized only on the premises, or off of them, within the time pre- scribed by statute; but this limi- tation of time or place is not ap- plicable to the agricultural prod- ucts of the leased premises, on which the landlord has a lien, with the right to enforce it by seizure under attachment wherev- er and whenever found. Henry v. Davis, 60 Miss. 212, per Campbell, C. J.; Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270. The landlord's lien on 6i3 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 625 for rent, as well as on the agricultural products aforesaid. A landlord shall have a lien, for one year, for the reasonable value of all livestock, farming tools, implements, and vehicles furnished by him to his tenant, upon the property so fur- nished, and upon all the agricultural products raised upon the leased premises; and the property so furnished shall be con- sidered as supplies, and the lien therefor may be enforced ac- cordingly. Such lien shall be a superior and first lien, and need not be evidenced by writing, or, if in writing, it need not be recorded. The remedy is by attachment in the nature of a distraint, and sale of the property after three months. ^^ Attachments may be made upon apprehension that the tenant will remove his effects from the leased premises. At- crops is effectual to secure rent of farm house. Scroggins v. Fos- ter, 76 Miss. 318, 24 So. 194. See, further, as to the nature of the alien, Westmoreland v. Wooten, 51' Miss. 825. The lien passes to an assignee of the landlord's claim against the tenant for rent and supplies. Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323, 5 So. 753; Taylor v. Nelson, 54 Miss. 524; Thomas v. Shell, 76 Miss. 556, 24 So. 876. But an assignee is not entitled to the remedy by distress. Gross V. Bartley, 66 Miss. 116, 5 So. 225. A ginner's lien is super- ior to that of a landlord. Duncan V. Jayne, 76 Miss. 133, 23 So. 392. 52 Code 1906, §§ 2838, 2845. A distress for rent is not the com- mencement of a suit, but a seiz- ure of the tenant's goods for the satisfaction of the rent, just as if a judgment had been rendered therefor. Towns v. Boarman, 23 Miss. 186; Canterberry v. Jordan, 27 Miss. 96; Smith v. Jones, 65 Miss. 276, 3 So. 740. And under the statute an attachment is not a mesne process returnable into a court, but is in the nature of a final process. Maxey v. White, 53 Miss. 80, 83. No lien for rent, either by common law or by stat- ute, existed in this state prior to the Agricultural Lien Act of 1873. Arbuckle v. Nelms, 50 Miss. 556. The right of distress by attach- ment, under the statutes of this state modifying the common law of distress, exists not because of any lien, but because of rent in arrear, or because of a contem- plated removal. Stamps v. Gil- man, 43 Miss. 456; Marye v. Dyche, 42 Miss. 347. If an ofificer making a distress for rent fails to give a notice to the tenant or his repre- sentative, this is ground for quash- ing the writ. Wright v. Craig, 92 Miss. 218, 45 So. 835. § 625 LIENS. 614 tachment may also be made after such removal within thirty- days after the rent becomes diie.^^ If a tenant removes his chattels from the premises leaving any part of the rent unpaid, the landlord may, w^ithin thirty days afterwards cause them to be seized wherever they may be found, as a distress for the arrears of rent; but no goods so carried of¥ and sold in good faith, before such seizure, shall be seized for rent.^'* Distress may be made after the termination of the lease, provided it be made within six months afterwards, and dur- ing the continuance of the landlord's title, and during the possession of the tenant. ^^ The distress must be reasonable, and must not be removed from the county.^^ No goods or chattels found on the demised premises, and not belonging to the tenant, or to some person liable for the rent, shall be distrained for rent; but a limited interest in such goods may be distrained. No person claiming title to such property shall avail himself of this provision, unless by 53Code 1906, §§ 2848, 2849. To authorize a distress on account of apprehension that the tenant will remove his property before the rent is due, the landlord must have some ground for this appre- hension, and must show^ this by evidence, else the distress will be wrongful. Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556. The removal, more- over, must be such as would en- danger or defeat a distress for rent. Stamps v. Gilman, 43 Miss. 456; Dudley v. Harvey, 59 Miss. 34. 54 Code 1906, §§ 2849, 2850. To authorize a seizure of goods and chattels of the tenant away from the leased premises, within thirty days after their re- moval, it is not necessary that the affidavit for attachment shall state that the goods and chattels have been removed from the premises. Henry v. Davis, 60 Miss. 212. One buying property for value from a tenant on leased premises, ex- cept agricultural products, where he buys prior to distress for rent, gets a good title as against the landlord even if such purchaser knows that rent is due and that the landlord looked to the goods for the collection of the rent. As to agricultural products such a purchaser will receive no title. Richardson v. McLaurin, 69 Miss. 70, 12 So. 264. soCode 1906, § 2852. 56Code 1906, § 2853. 6i5 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 626 making and filing an affidavit that the goods distrained are his property, and not the property of the tenant, nor held in trust for the tenant, and giving bond and security in the man- ner directed for the tenant. ^''^ § 626. Missouri.^^ — Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops growm on the demised premises in any year, for the rent that shall accrue for such year, and such lien shall con- tinue for eight months after such rent shall become due and payable, and no longer. When the demised premises, or any portion thereof, are used for the purpose of growing nursery stock, a lien shall exist and continue on such stock until the 57 Code 1906, §§ 2867, 2868. A person claiming the goods dis- trained is precluded from main- taining an action for them if he has failed to interpose a claim in pursuance of this provision. Paine V. Hall's Safe & Lock Co., 64 Miss. 175, 1 So. 56. 58Rev. Stats. 1909, §§ 7888, 7896. The right of distress for rent has never existed in this state. Crock- er V. Mann, 3 Mo. 472. The lien given by statute can only be en- forced by process of law. The landlord can not himself seize the crops. Knox v. Hunt, 18 Mo. 243. By express stipulation in the lease, the landlord may be author- ized to take possession of the crop and sell it. Sheble v. Curdt, 56 Mo. 437. Legal process to collect the landlord's lien is only neces- sary when the tenant refuses to allow the landlord to sell it for the rent. Auxvasse Milling Co. V. Cornet, 85 Mo. App. 251'. The crop during the continuance of the lien is not subject to process of law at the suit of any other creditor of the tenant. Knox v. Hunt, 18 Mo. 243. If th- tenant abandons the crop, and the land- lord harvests it, it is not subject to seizure by a creditor of thv tenant. Sanders v. Ohlhausen, 51 Mo. 163. H there is no indebted- ness for rent, though the tenant may be otherwise indebted to tnf landlord, the tenant may dispose of the crop. Brown v. Turner, 60 Mo. 21. In a suit by the landlord against one who has purchased the crop, a prima facie case is made when it is proven that he is the owner of the land, that it was rented to the tenant, and that the crop raised on such land was raised by the tenant during the year named. Mitchell v. Sanford, 149 Mo. App. 72, 130 S. W. 99. See also. King v. Rowlett, 120 Mo. App. 120, 96 S. W. 493. A pur- chaser having paid the landlord the rent may set it up as a de- fense to an action brought against him for the purchase price. Hardy v. Mathews, 101 Mo. App, 708, 74 S. W. 166. 626 LIENS. 6l6 same shall have been removed from the premises and sold, and such lien may be enforced by attachment in the manner hereinafter provided. Whether the rent is due or not, if it will be due within one year, and the person liable to pay it intends to remove, or has within thirty days removed, his property from the leased premises, or attempts to dispose of it so as to endanger or delay the collection of the rent, or when the rent is due and unpaid, the landlord may, upon affidavit of the fact, obtain an attachment of such property, including the crops grown on the premises. ^^ 59The landlord has a lien under this statute on the whole crop. The tenant is not prohibited from removing any portion of it, pro- vided he does not endanger the landlord's collection of his rent. This is a question for the jury, to be determined with reference to the property remaining on the premises. Haseltine v. Ausher- man, 87 Mo. 410; Meier v. Thom- as, 5 Mo. App. 584. A lien for rent due and unpaid may be en- forced by attachment, accom- panied by the affidavit required. Chamberlain v. Heard, 22 Mo. App. 416. The growing crop of a ten- ant may be attached by the land- lord for rent due. Crawford v. Coil, 69 Mo. 588. Though the pro- vision for attachment in favor of the landlord was not enacted for the purpose of enforcing the lien upon the crop grown upon the premises, yet it may be properly used for that purpose. Hubbard V. Moss, 65 Mo. 647. This rem- edy is not exclusive. The land- lord may proceed under the gen- eral attachment law. Sanders v. Ohlhausen, 51 Mo. 163; Price v. Roetzell, 56 Mo. 500. The pro- ceeding may be maintained by the landlord, not only against his im- mediate lessee, but also against a sublessee, provided the rent ac- crued during the term of such les- see. Therefore, where an under- tenant had removed a wheat cr ip from the land within thirty days next before the commencement of the suit for an attachment, and while the rent was still owing by the lessee to the landlord, it was held that the landlord was entitled to an attachment against the un- der-tenant's wheat for the rent due by the lessee to the landlord. Garroutte v. White, 92 Mo. 237, 4 S. W. 681. The landlord can only attach the tenant's property when he is removing or is about to re- move the crop from the premises, etc. Abington v. Steinberg, 86 Mo. App. 639. 6iy landlords' liens for rent. § 627 § 627. New Jersey''*' — Distress for rent. — All distresses shall be reasonable and not too great. No person shall take any distress wrongfully, ^^ or cause any distress to be driven or conveyed out of the county. No person shall be distrained for any cause whatsoever by his beasts of the plough, or sheep, or by the implements of his trade, while other distress or chattels whereof the debt or demand may be levied, or sufficient for the same, may be found. Where any goods or chattels shall be distrained for any rent reserved and due, and the tenant or owner of the goods so distrained shall not within ten days next after such dis- tress, and notice thereof, with the cause of such taking, left at the chief mansion-house or other most notorious place on the premises charged with the rent distrained for, replevy the same, with sufficient security to be given to the sheriff, according to law, then in such case, after such distress and notice and expiration of the said ten days, the person dis- training may, on two days' notice to the tenant, with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, or with the constable of the township, precinct, or place where such distress shall be taken, cause the goods and chattels so distrained to be in- ventoried and appraised by three sworn appraisers, and after such inventory and appraisement may lawfully sell at public vendue the goods and chattels so distrained (giving five days' public notice by advertising the articles to be sold, and the time and place of sale, in at least three of the most public places in the township where such distress shall be made), for the best price that can be gotten for the same, towards satisfaction of the rent for which the said goods and chattels shall be distrained, and of the charges of such distress, ap- praisement, and sale, leaving the overplus, if any, in the hands of such sheriff, under-sheriff, or constable, for the owner's use. 60Comp. Stats. 1910, pp. 1939- for rent unless he can maintain 1943. an action for it. Oliver v. Phelps, 6IA landlord can not distrain Spen. (N. J.) 180. § ^2^] LIENS. 6l8 The landlord may seize in distraint sheaves, cocks, or stacks of grain or corn, or grain or corn loose or in the straw, or flax, hemp, or hay in any barn, crib or granary, or upon any hovel, stack, rick or barrack, or elsev^^here upon any part of the land charged with such rent, and may lock up the same in the place where the same may be found. The lessor or landlord, lessors or landlords, or his, her or their steward, bailiff, receiver or other person or persons em- powered by him, her or them may seize as a distress for arrears of rent any of the goods and chattels of his, her or their tenant or tenants and not of any other person,^^ al- though in possession of such tenant or tenants, which may be found on the demised premises, except such goods and chat- tels as are by law privileged from distress; and also any hogs, horses, cattle or stock of his, her or their respective tenant or tenants, and not of any other person, although in possession of such tenant or tenants feeding or depasturing on the de- mised premises, or upon any common appendant or appur- tenant, or anyways belonging to all or any part 'of the premises demised;*'^ and also to take or seize all or any grain or produce whatsoever, growing or being on the prem- ises, or any part thereof, so demised or holden as a dis- tress for arrears of rent,'^'* and the same to cut, dig, pull, C2The right of distress is lim- N. J. L. 110, 17 Am. Dec. 455. 0th- ited to the goods of the tenant. erwise under the South Carolina Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. statute, § 634. There is no lien on 417. The goods of one of several the goods of the tenant except joint lessees may be distrained. from the time of actual seizure Hoskins v. Paul, 9 N. J. L. 110, 17 under the distress warrant. Wood- Am. Dec. 455. Goods of which side v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417. the tenant is a joint owner with 63By the ancient rule of law, the a stranger may be distrained; but cattle of the tenant, being on a only his interest can be distrained common appendant or appurte- and sold. Allen v. Agnew, 24 N. nant to the demised premises, J. L. 443. Goods of a tenant on were not subject to the landlord's the premises may be distrained levy. This clause extends his although the tenant has made an remedy to such property. Guest assignment of them under the in- v. Opdyke, 31 N. J. L. 552, 555. solvent act. Hoskins v. Paul, 9 f'^The power of distress as to 6ig landlords' liens for rent. § 627 gather, make, cure, carry and lay up in some proper and convenient place on the premises, and for want thereof in some other place to be procured by such lessor or land- lord, lessors or landlords (due notice of such place being given to such tenant or lessee, or left at his or her place of abode), and to appraise, sell and dispose of the same in the time and manner hereinbefore directed ; provided always that it shall not be lawful for any lessor or landlord, at one time to distrain for more than one year's rent in arrear, and that such distress must be made within six months after the same shall become due, or, where the rent is payable in instalments, then within six months after the year's rent shall have be- come due. If any tenant or tenants, or lessee or lessees, for life or lives, term of year or years, at will, sufferance, or otherwise of any messuage, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall convey away or carry off or from such premises, his, her or their goods or chattels, leaving the rent or any part thereof unpaid, the landlord or lessor, landlords or lessors, or any person or persons by him, her or them for that purpose law- fully empowered, within the space of thirty days next after such conveying away or carrying off such goods or chattels, may take and seize such goods and chattels wherever the same shall be found as a distress for the said arrears of rent, and the same to sell or otherwise dispose of, in such manner as if the said goods and chattels had actually been distrained in and upon such premises ; provided always that no landlord or lessor or other person entitled to such arrears of rent shall take or seize any such goods or chattels, as a distress for the same, which shall be sold bona fide, or for a valuable con- produce "growing or being on the sor's right to distrain growing premises" is not limited to such crops is not affected by the sale as belongs exclusively to the ten- of such crops by the tenant. Bird ant. Guest v. Opdyke, 31 N. J. L. v. Anderson, 41 N. J. L. 392. 552, 555. It follows that the les- 628 LIENS. 620 sideration, before such seizure made to any person not privy to such fraud. This paragraph shall extend to all cases where rent shall have accrued and shall be unpaid, upon any demise or contract hereafter made, although by the terms thereof the rent shall not be payable.®^ § 628. New Jersey.^*^ (continued). Liens for rent. When tenant's goods seized on execution. — No goods or chat- tels upon any messuage, lands or tenements leased for term of life or years, at will or otherwise, shall be liable to be taken, by virtue of any execution, attachment, or other process, unless the party at whose suit the said execution or other process is sued out, shall, before the removal of such goods from the premises, pay to the landlord all rent due for the premises at the time of the taking such goods or chattels, by .virtue of such process, or which shall have accrued up to (>5This provision construed, Weiss V. Jahn, Zl N. J. L. 93. eeComp. Stats. 1910, pp. 3066- 3068. The landlord must give no- tice to the officer of the rent due him, before the removal of the goods. Ayers v. Johnson, 7 N. J. L. 119. If the sheriff w^rongfully proceeds to sell and remove the goods after such notice, he is lia- ble for the tort, but the plaintiff in execution is not. Princeton Bank v. Gibson, 20 N. J. L. 138. As to distress of goods vi^hich have already been seized upon execu- tion, see Nevi^ell v. Clark, 46 N. J. L. 363. A levy and sale of the goods amount to a removal, whether the goods are actually taken from the premises or not, for a sale effects the very evil which the statute was designed to remedy. Ryerson v. Quackenbush, 26 N. J. L. 236. It is proper practice for a landlord. who is entitled to have his ar- rears of rent paid before the re- moval or sale of goods levied on. to apply to the court for a rule that the proceeds of the sale un- der execution be applied to the payment of his rent. Fischel v. Keer, 45 N. J. L. 507. This was done as early as 1718, under the Act 8 Anne, ch. 14, passed in 1710; Waring v. Dewberry, 1 Str. 97; and the practice has continued down to the present time. Hen- chett V. Kimpson, 2 Wils. 140; Cen- tral Bank v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 668. If the rent be not due, the landlord has no right to demand payment before removal, except by force of the statute. Schenck v. Vannest, 4 N. J. L. 329. To au- thorize a payment out of the pro- ceeds of an execution sale of rent to the landlord, it must appear that rent was due him upon such a lease or contract as would give 621 landlords' liens for rent. § 629 the day of the removal of the goods from the premises, whether by the terms of lease the day of payment shall have come or not, making a rebate of interest on the sum, the time of payment of which, by the terms of the lease, shall not have come ; provided, the said arrears of rent do not amount to more than one year's rent ; and in case the said arrears shall exceed one year's rent, then the said party at whose suit such process is sued out, paying the landlord one year's rent, may proceed to execute his process; and the sheriff or other officer is empowered and required to levy and pay to the plaintiff as well the money so paid for rent as the money to be made by virtue of such process. If the goods have been removed from the leased premises by virtue of such process, the same shall not be sold until ten days after such removal, and then not unless the plaintiff shall, before the sale, pay to the landlord all rent due as above provided: provided the landlord shall, before the expiration of the said ten days from the time of such removal, give notice to the officer holding the execution or other process of the amount of the rent in arrear, and claim the same.*^'^ No such goods shall be removed from the premises except openly and in the daytime, and then not unless the officer shall at the time of such removal give notice thereof to the defendant, or, in his absence, to some person of his family re- siding on the premises. § 629. New York.*'^ — Distress for rent under the com- mon-law rules as modified by statute prevailed in this state down to 1846, when it was abolished by statute. him the right to distrain. Kirk- goods beyond the demised prem- patrick v. Cason, 30 N. J. L. 331. ises, when removed by an officer The fact that the rent is reserved by virtue of an execution. Pea- to be applied to a special pur- cock v. Hammitt, 15 N. J. L. 165. pose does not affect its character cswilliams v. Potter, 2 Barb. as rent. Ryerson v. Quackenbush, (N. Y.) 316; Guild v. Rogers, 8 26 N. J. L. 236. Barb. (N. Y.) 502; Van Rensselaer c' Before this provision, the v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299. landlord could not follow the § 630 LIENS. 622 § 630. New Mexico.*'" — Landlords shall have a lien on the property of their tenants which remains in the house rented, for the rent due, and said property may not be removed from said house without the consent of the landlord, until the rent is paid or secured."** No person is entitled to a lien who has taken collateral security for the payment of the sum due him. To enforce the lien a written notice may be served on the debtor, setting forth the amount of the indebtedness and the nature of it, and, if the same is not paid within ten days after the service of such notice, the property may be advertised for twenty days and then sold at auction. The lien claimant may bid for or purchase the property at such sale. The lien may also be enforced by suit in the ordinary form, and sale of the property upon which the lien has attached upon execution, as in other cases. If such property does not satisfy the execution, other property of the defendant may be levied upon. Rentals shall constitute a first lien on any and all improve- ments and crops upon the land leased, prior and superior to any other lien or encumbrance whatsoever whether created with or without notice of the lien for rental due or to become due. When any rental is due and unpaid the Commissioner may forthwith attach, without attachment bond, all improve- ments and crops upon the land leased, or so much thereof as may be suf^cient to pay such rental together with all costs necessarily incurred in the enforcement of such lien, and the enforcement of such lien shall work a forfeiture of such lease. fi^Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2234-2243. the landlord consents to a remov- 'i'OWhere there are several al of a tenant's property from a rooms in one building, each oc- separate room so occupied to an- cupied by a separate tenant, a.s other room in the building, his lien between the landlord and the sev- for the rent of the first room is eral tenants each apartment so oc- lost. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 cupied is a "house" within the N. Mex. 442, 23 Pac. 780, 8 L. R. meaning of the statute, and, when A. 691. 623 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. § 631 The failure of any lessee of state land to pay the rental there- for when due or to furnish additional security for any de- ferred payment, when required by the Commissioner, shall be sufficient cause for declaring any such lease forfeited. ^^* §631. North Carolina.'^^ — When lands shall be rented or leased by agreement, written or oral, for agricultural pur- poses, or shall be cultivated by a cropper, unless otherwise agreed between the parties to the lease or agreement, any and all crops raised on said lands shall be deemed and held to be vested in possession of the lessor or his assigns at all times, until the rents for said lands shall be paid,''^^ and until all the stipulations contained in the lease or agreement shall be performed, or damages in lieu thereof shall be paid to the lessor or his assigns, and until said party or his assigns shall be paid for all advancements made and expenses incurred in ■"•a Laws 1912, p. 179, § 16. 'iRevisal 1905, §§ 1993, 1995-1997, 3664, 3665. Distress for rent is unknown in this state. Dalgleish V. Grandy, 1 N. Car. 249, Cam. & Nor. Conf. (N. Car.) 22; Deaver V. Rice, 20 N. Car. 567, 34 Am. Dec. 388. Under this statute the landlord has a first lien upon the crop to secure his rent and ad- vances, with the right of posses- sion. Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. Car. 276. See Sessoms v. Tay- loe, 148 N. Car. 369, 62 S. E. 424; Reynolds v. Taylor, 144 N. Car. 165. 56 S. E. 871. "-The landlord has such a prop- erty in his tenant's crop by virtue of his lien and right of possession that he can maintain an action for the recovery of the same. Mon- tague V. Mial, 89 N. Car. 137; Liv- ingston V. Parish, 89 N. Car. 140; Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. Car. 276; Rawlings v. Hunt, 90 N. Car. 270. The landlord can not claim a delivery until the crop is gath- ered and ready for division. Jor- dan V. Bryan, 103 N. Car. 59, 9 S. E. 135. The only statutory pro- vision giving the landlord a lien where rent is payable in kind, un- til a division has been made and his share set apart to him in sev- eralty, is in the case of leases for agricultural purposes, under § 1754. Rowland v. Forlaw, 108 N. Car. 567, 13 S. E. 173. When advancements are necessary to the cultivation of the crop they will be presumed to create a lien against the tenant's property, but when they are inappropriate and unnecessary for such purpose it must be shown that they were made to aid in raising the crop. Windsor Bargain House v. Wat- son, 148 N. Car. 295, 62 S. E. 305. Advancements made to the tenant on the landlord's credit to aid in making the crop, where the land- 631 LIENS. 624 making and saving said crops. '^ This lien shall be preferred lord promises to be responsible, are within the statute and will give the landlord a lien. Powell V. Perry, 127 N. Car. 22, Zl S. E. 71. The landlord's title is not impaired by the tenant's convey- ing the crop to a third person, who purchases without notice of the landlord's claim. Belcher v. Grimsley, 88 N. Car. 88. A tenant who retains actual possession of the crop can not be indicted for larceny for secretly taking away part of the crop. State v. Cope- land, 86 N. Car. 691. Otherwise if the tenant's actual possession has terminated by a delivery to the landlord. State v. Webb, 87 N. Car. 558. TSThe advances, whether made in money or merchandise, must be such as go directly or indirectly to make or save the crop, and the tenant must be the judge of what best serves his purpose. Womble V. Leach, 83 N. Car. 84. At the end of a tenant's first year, the landlord leased the land for an- other year to the same tenant, and agreed that he should retail? the landlord's share of the former crop to enable him to make an- other crop. It was held that this constituted an advancement for the second year, and gave the land- lord a lien on the crop thereof, though his share of the first year's crop had never been set apart or divided from the bulk belonging to the tenant, and though such share was to be returned in kind or paid for in money. Thigpen v. Maget, 107 N. Car. 39, 12 S. E. 272. Where the lessor furnishes table board to the lessee and his fam- ily, in order that the latter may make and save his crops, such board at once becomes an advance- ment, and the lessor is not re- quired to prove an express agree- ment showing that it was to be so considered between the parties. Brown v. Brown, 109 N. Car. 124, 13 S. E. 797. Supplies necessary to make and save a crop are such articles as are in good faith fui- nished to and received by the ten- ant for that purpose. It may be properly left to the jury to find whether, upon the evidence, a mule and wagon were treated as ad- vancements. Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. Car. 276. The debt for ad- vances must be created in good faith. It must not be made col- lusively. The landlord can not be allowed to supply such things as advancements as are manifest- ly not such, and which he has rea- son to believe are not so intended. Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. Car. 276. Advances by the landlord to a sublessee, made without the knowledge and privity of the les- see, are not entitled to priority over advances procured by the les- see for the sublessee from a third person. Moore v. Faison, 97 N. Car. 322, 2 S. E. 169. A person having an agricultural lien on a crop for advances made to the landlord, the lien having been ac- quired after the making of a con- tract by the landlord with a crop- per, under which the latter is to receive a share of the crop for working it, holds the lien subject to the right of the cropper to his 625 landlords' liens for rent. § 631 to all other liens/"* and the lessor or his assigns shall be entitled, against the lessee or cropper or the assigns of either, who shall remove the crop or any part thereof from the lands without the consent of the lessor or his assigns, or against any other person who may get possession of said crop or any part thereof, to the remedies given in an action upon a claim for the delivery of personal property.'^'^ In case there is any controversy between the parties, this may be determined in court forthwith ; but in case of a con- tinuance or appeal, the lessee must give an undertaking to pay whatever the adverse party may recover in the action. If the lessee fails to give the undertaking, the ofhcer delivers the property to the lessor, on his giving an undertaking to return it in case judgment be against him. In case neither party gives such undertaking, the clerk of court issues an order to the officer, directing him to take into his possession the property, or so much as is necessary to satisfy the claim- ant's demand and costs, and to sell the same in the manner prescribed for the sale of personal property under execution, and to hold the proceeds subject to the decision of the court. '^ Any lessee or cropper, or the assigns of either, or any other person, who shall remove said crop, or any part thereof, from such land, without the consent of the lessor or his assigns, and without giving him or his agent five days' notice of such intended removal, and before satisfying all the liens held by the lessor or his assigns, on said crop, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and if any landlord shall unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly, and without process of law, and unjustly, seize share. Rouse v. Wooten, 104 N. of the crop, though all of it has Car. 229, 10 S. E. 190. been delivered to a third person. ''■* See Brewer v. Chappell, 101 Boone v. Darden, 109 N. Car. 74, N. Car. 251, 7 S. E. 670; Spruill v. 13 S. E. 728. Arrington, 109 N. Car. 192, 13 S. E. -e Revisal 1905, §§ 1995-1997. The 779. lien includes costs as well as "oThe landlord may maintain rents. Slaughter v. Winfrey, 85 the action for a certain part only N. Car. 159. 40 § 631a LIENS. 626 the crop of his tenant when there is nothing due him, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'^' § 631a. North Dakota."^^ — A Hen by contract upon crops shall attach only to the crop next maturing after the delivery of such contract, except in the case of liens by contract to secure the purchase-price, or rental, of the land upon which such crops are to be grown. §631b. OklahomaJ^ — Any rent due for farming land shall be a lien on the crop growing or made on the premises. Such lien may be enforced by action and attachment therein, as hereinafter provided. When any such rent is payable in a share or certain pro- portion of the crop, the lessor shall be deemed the owner of such share or proportion, and may, if the tenant refuses to deliver him such share or proportion, enter upon the land and take possession of the same, or obtain possession thereof by action of replevin. The person entitled to rent may recover from the pur- chaser of the crop, or any part thereof, with notice of the lien, the value of the crop purchased, to the extent of the rent due and damages. 77As to indictments under this S. E. 203; State v. Crook, 132 N. provision, see State v. Pender, 83 Car. 1053, 44 S. E. 32. N. Car. 651 ; State v. Rose, 90 N. "8 Rev. Code 1905, § 6131. Where Car. 712; Varner v. Spencer, 72 the lease provides that the land- N. Car. 381. In a prosecution for lord may hold the grain raised on removing crops without first sat- the leased land for advances made isfying lessor's lien, or giving five to the tenant, the landlord can days' notice thereof, it is held not, by purchasing claims against not to be a defense that the les- the tenant not connected with the see was damaged more by the lease, hold the crop for the pay- failure of the lessor to comply ment of such debts. Aronson v. with his contract than the amount Oppegard, 16 N. Dak. 595, 114 N. of rent due. State v. Bell, 136 N. W. 111. Car. 674, 49 S. E. 163. But see, "» Comp. Laws 1909, §§4100- State V. Neal, 129 N. Car. 692, 40 4102. 62y landlords' liens for rent. § 632 When any person who shall be liable to pay rent (whether the same be due or not, if it be due within one year there- after, and whether the same be payable in money or other things) intends to remove or is removing, or has, within thirty days, removed his property, or his crops, or any part thereof, from the leased premises, the person to whom the rent is owing may commence an action in the court having jurisdiction; and upon making an afifiidavit, stating the amount of rent for which such person is liable and one or more of the above facts, and executing an undertaking as in other cases, an attachment shall issue in the same manner and with the like efYect as is provided by law in other actions. In action to enforce a lien on crops for rent of farming lands, the affidavit for attachment shall state that there is due from the defendant to the plaintiff a certain sum, nam- ing it, for rent of farming lands, describing the same, and that the plaintiff claims a lien on the crop made on such land. Upon making and filing such affidavit and executing an undertaking as prescribed in the preceding section, an order of attachment shall issue as in other cases, and shall be levied on such crop, or so much thereof as may be neces- sary; and all other proceedings in such attachment shall be the same as in other actions. § 631c. Oregon. — The lien on personal property not a decree or judgment, such as the lien of a landlord on his tenant's furniture when reserved in the lease and where the lease does not provide a mode of enforcement, must be fore- closed in a suit for that purpose.®^ § 632. Pennsylvania.^^ — Any person having any rent in arrear^- or due upon any lease for life or lives, or for one or 80 Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. 8I Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.), pp. Codes & Stats. 1902, § 423; Swank 2174-2184. V. Elwert, 55 Ore. 487, 105 Pac, 82 A landlord issuing a distress 901. is required to credit on the rent § 632 LIENS. 628 more years, or at will, ended or determined, may distrain for such arrears, after the determination of the said respec- tive leases, in the same manner as he might have done if such lease had not been ended or determined; provided, that such distress be made during the continuance of such lessor's title or interest. ^^ The landlord may take and seize as a distress for arrears of rent any cattle or stock of his tenant, feeding or depastur- ing upon all or any part of the premises demised or holden; and also all sorts of corn and grass, hops, roots, fruit, pulse, or other product whatsoever, which shall be growing on any part of the estate so demised or holden, in the same manner as other goods and chattels may be seized, distrained, and disposed of.®^ And the purchaser of any such product shall all actual payments of rent, and such sums as the parties have agreed to treat as payment on ac- count of rent. But he is under no obligation to deduct any claim for unliquidated damages which the tenant may have against him. Therefore the fact that he fails, in issuing the w^arrant of distress, to credit on the rent such claim for unliquidated damages, does not entitle the tenant to recover damages for distraining for more rent than was in arrear. Spencer V. Clinefelter, 101 Pa. St. 219. As to the recovery of damages for an excessive distress, see Fern- wood Masonic Hall Assn. v. Jones, 102 Pa. St. 307; Richards v. McGrath, 100 Pa. St. 389; Mc- Elroy v. Dice, 17 Pa. St. 163; McKinney v. Reader, 6 Watts. (Pa.) 34. A distress can not be made on Sunday, nor by breaking open an outer door. Mayfield v. White, 1 Browne (Pa.) 241. 83 The right continues after the termination of the term, without limitation as to time. The stat- ute gives the landlord this right whenever the rent is in arrear, and he retains the title. Moss's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 162; Clififord v. Beems, 3 Watts (Pa.) 246; Lewis's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 312; Whiting v. Lake, 91 Pa. St. 349; In re De Lancey Stables Co., 170 Fed. 860. A lessee for years who transfers all his interest to a third person, with a reservation of rent, can not distrain unless the instrument of transfer reserves an express power of distress. Manuel v. Reath, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 11. After the determination of the landlord's es- tate by surrender to the owner of the paramount estate, the landlord has no right to distrain, for rent in arrear, on the goods of his former tenant remaining on the premises. An officer acting under such a warrant is a trespasser. Walbridge v. Prudent, 102 Pa. St. 1. 84 Property of a stranger on 629 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 632 have free egress and regress to and from the same where growing, to repair the fences from time to time, and, when ripe, to cut, gather, make, cure, and lay up and thresh, and after to carry the same away, in the same manner as the ten- ant might legally have done had such distress never been made. Property to the value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of all wearing apparel of the defendant and his family, and all bibles and school-books in use in the family (which shall remain exempted as heretofore), and no more, owned by or in possession of any debtor, shall be exempt from levy and sale on execution, or by distress for rent.^^ Leased pianos,®^ musical instruments, sewing machines and typewriters are also exempt. ^''^ In case any lessee shall fraudulently or clandestinely con- vey or carry off or from such demised premises^^ his goods and chattels, with intent to prevent the landlord or lessor from distraining the same for arrears of such rent so re- served as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawftil to and for such lessor, within the space of thirty days next ensuing such the demised premises is generally liable to distress for rent. Kleber V. Ward, 88 Pa. St. 93. 85 Joint owners of chattels levied on, under distress for rent due upon their joint lease, are not entitled to the benefit of the ex- emption law. Bonsall v. Comly, 44 Pa. St. 42. A subtenant, or assignee of the tenant, who has not been recognized as such by the landlord, can not claim the benefit of the exemption law, as against a distress for rent, when the goods are levied on as those of the original lessee. Neither the relation of landlord and ten- ant, nor that of debtor and cred- itor, exists between the landlord and such subtenant or assignee. Rosenberger v. Hallowell, 35 Pa. St. 369. A privilege from distress may be waived. McKinney v. Reader, 6 Watts (Pa.) 34; Win- chester V. Costello, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 279, 283; Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. St. 225, 72 Am. Dec. 738. 86 Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.), p. 2176. S7 Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.), p. 2175. ss A removal in the daytime, though without the knowledge of the landlord, is not fraudulent. Grant's App., 44 Pa. St. 477; Grace v. Shively, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 217; Hoops V. Crowley, 12 Serg. & R. § 632 LIENS. 630 conveying away or carrying off such goods or chattels as aforesaid, to take and seize such goods and chattels, ^^ wherever the same may be found, as a distress for the said arrears of such rent, and the same to sell or otherwise dis- pose of, in such manner, as if the said goods and chattels had actually been distrained by such lessor or landlord in and upon such demised premises, for such arrears of rent. When any goods or chattels shall be distrained for any rent reserved and due, and the tenant or owner shall not, within five days after such distress and notice thereof,^" with the cause of such taking left on the premises, replevy the same,^^ then the person distraining may cause the goods to be appraised by two reputable freeholders under oath, and after such appraisement may, after six days' public notice. (Pa.) 219n; Purfel v. Sands, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 120; Morris v. Parker, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 187. 89 The goods of a stranger can not be followed and distrained under this clause. Sleeper v. Par- rish, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 247; Adams v. La Comb, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 440, 1 L. ed. 214. But goods of an assignee after term may be followed. Jones V. Gundrin, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 531. Nor can goods fairly sold to an innocent purchaser be distrained. Clifford v. Beems, 3 Watts (Pa.) 246. Such goods can not be distrained for rent not due at the time of removal. Conway V. Lowry, 7 W. N. C. (Pa.) 64; Grace v. Shively, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 217. As to the law appli- cable to Philadelphia, see Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.) p. 2177. The same applied to Pittsburg And Allegheny. In Pennsylvania, out- side of Philadelphia, Pittsburg ^nd Allegheny, a landlord has no right to distrain upon goods fraudulently removed from the demised premises with intent to defraud the landlord of his distress, for rent that is not yet due, nor has a court of equity jurisdiction to detain the goods upon the premises until the land- lord is in a condition to distrain. Jackson's Appeal, 6 Sad. (Pa.) 327, 9 Atl. 306. 90 The day of making the dis- tress is to be excluded in comput- ing the time, and if the last day fall on Sunday, the landlord has until the next day to remove the goods. McKinney v. Reader, 6 Watts (Pa.) 34, Z7 ; Brisben v. Wilson, 60 Pa. St. 452; Davis v. Davis, 128 Pa. St. 100, 18 Atl. 514. s>i Replevin is the only remedy for an unlawful distress where notice has been given and the goods appraised. Sassman v. Bris- bane, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 159. 631 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 633 sell the goods distrained for the satisfaction of the rent and charges. ^^ § 633. Pennsylvania^^ (continued). Tenant's goods seized on execution. — The goods and chattels upon any lands or tenements which are demised for life or years, or otherwise, taken by virtue of an execution, and liable to the distress of the landlord, are liable for the payment of any sums of money due for rent at the time of taking such goods in execution:''^ provided, that such rent shall not exceed one year's rent.^^ 92 The landlord ought not to sell the goods after a tender of the rent and costs made at any- time before the sale. Richards v. McGrath, 100 Pa. St. 389. And see Johnson v. Upham, 2 El. & El. 250. A sale can be made only af- ter appraisement. Davis v. Davis, 128 Pa. St. 100, 18 Atl. 514. Even after the sale has commenced, if the tenant tenders the difference between the amount realized by the sale and the full amount of the rent claimed, with costs, and the landlord refuses the tender and proceeds with the sale, he is liable in an action of trespass for the value of the goods afterwards sold. Richards v. McGrath, 100 Pa. St. 389. 93 Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.), pp. 2184-2186. 94 This right is confined to goods which were upon the de- mised premises at the time of the levy, and which were liable to dis- tress. When the tenant's goods were removed from the premises, and the removal was neither clan- destine nor fraudulent, and the landlord distrained a part of them at the place of removal, he can not, as against an execution cred- itor whose execution was levied the day after, claim any portion of the proceeds for rent due. He should have returned the goods to the demised premises, so that if the sheriff levied upon them they would have been liable for the rent within the terms of the stat- ute. Grant's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 477. 95 The landlord's preference for one year's rent is not confined to the rent for the year immediately preceding the execution. Richie v. McCauley, 4 Pa. St. 471. But the landlord is entitled only to the rent due at the time of the levy, out of the proceeds of the prop- erty. Case V. Davis, 15 Pa. St. 80. Only the immediate landlord of the defendant, either by a direct lease or by a legal assignment of the lease, is entitled to receive one year's rent out of the pro- ceeds of the sheriff's sale. Brom- ley V. Hopewell, 2 Miles (Pa.) 414, affd. 14 Pa. St. 400. The land- lord's right to be paid out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale de- § 634 LIENS. 632 After sale by the officer of such goods, he must first pay out of the proceeds the rent so due.'^*^ § 634. South Carolina.^' — No goods or chattels, lands or tenements, which are or shall be leased for life or lives, term of years, at will, or otherwise, shall be liable to be taken by virtue of any execution or any pretence whatsoever, unless the party at whose suit the said execution is sued out shall, before the removal of such goods from off the said premises, by virtue of such execution or extent, pay to the landlord of the said premises or his bailiff all such sum or sums of money as are or shall be due for rent for the said premises at the time of the taking such goods or chattels by virtue of such pends on his power to distrain the goods sold. Lewis' Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 312. After a levy of an execu- tion upon goods liable to distress, the plaintiff can not stay proceed- ings without the consent of the landlord first had in writing. The rent is a prior charge by law, and the sale under execution is for the benefit of the landlord. Barnes' Appeal, 76 Pa. St. 50. This right continues after the determination of the term. Moss' Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 162. The landlord is entitled to claim rent payable in advance out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of the tenant's goods upon the demised premises. Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 83. The tenant's waiver of the benefit of the ex- emption law in favor of the exe- cution creditor gives the latter no preference over the claim of the landlord, in whose favor there is no such waiver. Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 83. 96 Of course the landlord must give notice of his claim for rent before the return of the execution. Mitchell's Admr. v. Stewart, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 295. The land- lord may distrain upon goods on the demised premises which have been previously taken in execu- tion and released. Gilliam v. To- bias, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 313. In case the landlord had previously to the levy and sale distrained the prop- erty and the tenant had replevied it, the landlord would be entitled to have out of the proceeds of the sale only the amount of rent that had accrued subsequently to the distress. Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts (Pa.) 39. «' Code of Laws 1912, §§ 3513- 3517. Distress for rent was abol- ished in 1868. 14 Stat. 105. In 1878 the law as it formerly existed was restored, with the single excep- tion that no property could be taken except such as belonged to the tenant in his own right. Acts 1876-88, p. 511; Mobley v.* Dent, 10 S. Car. 471, 472; Sullivan v. Elli- son, 20 S. Car. 481. After an exe- 633 landlords' liens for rent. § 634 execution : provided, the said arrears of rent do not amount to more than one year's rent/''^ In case any lessee shall, fraudulently or clandestinely, con- vey or carry off or from such demised premises his goods or chattels, it shall and may be lawful to and for such lessor or landlord, within the space of ten days next ensuing such conveying away or carrying off such goods or chattels as aforesaid, to take and seize such goods and chattels, wherever the same shall be found, as a distress for the said arrears of such rent; and the same to sell or otherwise dispose of, in such manner as if the said goods and chattels had actually been distrained by such lessor or landlord, in and upon such demised premises, for such arrears of rent, any law, usage or custom to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding. Nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to empower such lessor or landlord to take or seize any goods or chattels, as a distress for arrears of rent, which shall be sold bona fide and for a valuable consideration be- fore such seizure made; and no property shall be seized under a distress warrant for such, except such as belongs to the tenant in his own right. ^^ cution has been levied upon the 99 This provision includes goods tenant's personal property subject on the premises as well as those to distress, the landlord may, be- removed therefrom; but property fore removal of the property, give mortgaged bona fide by the ten- notice of his claim for rent, and ant before seizure under the dis- have judgment against the officer tress vv^arrant, though still on the for the proceeds of the sale, or premises, does not, within the for so much of the proceeds as meaning of the statute, belong to may be necessary to pay his claim the tenant, and is therefore not for rent for that year before sat- liable to be distrained for rent isfying the execution. Sullivan v. due. Ex parte Knobeloch, 26 S. Ellison, 20 S. Car. 481. Car. 331, 2 S. E. 612. Where a 98 An agricultural lienholder can tenant makes an assignment in the not, by virtue of his lien for ad- usual form for the benefit of his vances, take crops out of the creditors, the assigned property is landlord's possession unless he no longer his in his own right, first pay arrears of rent due. Bischoff v. Trenholm, 36 S. Car. Brewster v. McNab, 36 S. Car. 75, 15 S. E. 346. Otherwise under 274, 15 S. E. 233. § 635 LIENS. 634 When tenants pur autre vie, and lessees for years or at will, hold over the tenements to them devised after the de- termination of such leases, it shall and may be .lawful for any person or persons, to whom any rent is in arrear or due, to distrain for such arrears, after the determination of the said respective leases, in the same manner as they might have done if such lease or leases had not been ended or deter- mined: provided, that such distress be made within the space of six calendar months after the determination of such lease, and during the continuance of such landlord's title or inter- est, and during the possession of the tenant from whom such arrears became due. § 635. South Carolina^ (continued). Lien for rent and advances for agricultural purposes. — Each landlord leasing lands for agricultural purposes- shall have a prior and pre- ferred lien for rent to the extent of all crops raised on the lands leased by him, whether the same be raised by the tenant or other persons, and enforcible in the same manner as liens for advances, which said lien shall be valid without recording or filing: provided, that, subject to such lien and enforcible in the same way, the landlord shall have a lien on all the crops raised by the tenant for all advances made by the landlord during the year: provided, further, every lien for advances and for rent^ shall be indexed in the office of the the New Jersey statute. See ante, from asserting it as against a sec- §627. ond lien for supplies by reason 1 Code of Laws 1912, §§ 4162, of paying, or allowing to be paid, 4164, 4165. As to proceedings for a first lien for supplies in prefer- foreclosure, see Code of Laws ence to the lien for rent. Carter 1912, §4167. V. Du Pre, 18 S. Car. 179. 2 The lien arises from the con- 3 A landlord, to secure a lien tract of renting without an ex- for advances made to his tenant, press agreement that there shall or for rent exceeding one-third of be a lien. Carter v. Du Pre, 18 the crop, must comply with the S. Car. 179; Kennedy v. Reames, statute relating to agricultural 15 S. Car. 548. A landlord having advances. This statute was not a first lien for rent is not estopped intended to do more than to se- 635 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 635 register of mense conveyances of the county in which the Henor resides within thirty days from the date of the lien (and the indexing of the said lien shall constitute notice thereof to all third persons, and entitle the same to the bene- fit of this article) : said index shall show the names of the lienor and lienee, the date and amount of lien, and a brief description of the place so cultivated; and said indexing shall be a sufficient record of the same, and the property covered by said lien, so indexed as aforesaid, if found in the hands of subsequent purchasers or creditors, shall be deemed liable to said lien. The landlord shall have a lien upon the crops of his tenant for his rent in preference to all other liens. ^ Laborers who assist in making any crop shall have a lien thereon to the extent of the amount due them for such labor, next in prior- cure the rent proper to the land- lord, and then leave him to make agricultural advances to his ten- ants upon the same terms and conditions, as to recording and the like, as are imposed upon all others. Therefore, where a land- lord leased land to a tenant for a stipulated rent, and also agreed to make advances, which were to be repaid out of the crop, but the contract was not recorded nor filed, it was held that the landlord could not recover for such ad- vances the crop made by the ten- ant, which had been seized under a warrant issued upon a mer- chant's recorded lien of later date. Whaley v. Jacobson, 21 S. Car. 51. See also, Kennedy v. Reames, 15 S. Car. 548. 4 A complaint alleged that cot- ton covered by plaintiffs' lien for rent was shipped to defendants, to be sold by them as factors ; that defendants knew of plaintiff's lien, and were instructed by the ship- per to apply the proceeds from the sale of the cotton to the dis- charge of the lien; and that, after the sale of the cotton, defendants refused to pay the money due plaintiffs when demanded. It was held that such facts were suffi- cient to constitute a cause of ac- tion for the amount of rent due as money had and received, and it was error to dismiss the com- plaint, on the ground that there was no privity of contract be- tween plaintiffs and defendants. Drake v. Whaley, 35 S. Car. 187, 14 S. E. 397. The lien attaches to all the crops of the tenant on the premises, though the tenant agreed to set apart for the rent a specific portion of the crops. State V. Reader, 36 S. Car. 497, 15 S. E. 544. 636 LIENS. 636 ity to the landlord, and as between such laborers there shall be no preference. All other liens for agricultural supplies shall be paid paid next after the satisfaction of the liens of the landlord and laborers, and shall rank in other respects as they do now under existing laws. No writing or recording shall be necessary to create the liens of the landlord, but such lien shall exist from the date of the contract, whether the same be in writing or verbal. § 636. Tennessee.'^ — Any debt by note, account, or other- wise, created for the rent of land, is a lien on the crop grow- ing or made on the premises, in preference to all other debts, from the date of the contract.^ The lien continues for three months after the debt be- comes due, and until the termination of any suit commenced within that time for such rent. This lien may be enforced:'^ 1. By original attachment is- sued on afSdavit that the rent is due and unpaid, or, before due, on affidavit that the defendant is about to remove or sell the crop;^ 2. Or by judgment at law against the tenant and execution to be levied on the crop in whosesoever hands it may be. 5 Code 1896, §§ 5299-5304. 6 The lien exists when the farm- ing is on shares, as well as when the rent is payable in money. Sharp V. Fields, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 571. The lien attaches to the crop whether raised by the lessee or a sublessee, and it attaches as against a sublessee, although he may have paid the tenant the rent due from him. Rutledge v. Wal- ton, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 458. The lien is superior to the laws exempting property from execution. Hill v. George, 1 Head (Tenn.) 394. " A court of equity also has jurisdiction of an attachment to enforce a landlord's lien for rent. Sharp V. Fields, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 571. Damages for the tenant's failure to comply with an implied contract for good husbandry, where the renting is for a part of the crop, can not be enforced under those provisions giving at- tachment for rent. He must seek these by an action on the case. Patterson v. Hawkins, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 483. 8 The lien begins from the date of the contract. The landlord may make his inchoate lien specific, before the rent has becorrfe due, by attaching the crop upon the (iZ7 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 636 The person entitled to the rent may recover from the pur- chaser of the crop, or of any part of it, the vahie of the prop- erty not exceeding the amount of the rent and damages.'' The landlord, in addition to liens already given him by law, shall have a further lien on the growing crop for neces- sary supplies of food and clothing furnished by the landlord or his agent to the tenant, for himself or those dependent on him, to enable the tenant to make the crop:^" provided an account of such necessary supplies is kept as the articles are furnished, and is sworn to before some justice of the peace before the enforcement of the lien. This lien shall be sec- ondary to that of the landlord for his rent, and may be en- forced in the same manner.^ ^ premises. The lien thus fixed re- lates back to the date of the con- tract, and overreaches any title acquired by a purchaser of the crop from the tenant, though without notice of the lien. Phil- lips V. Maxwell, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 25. 9 The landlord may maintain a suit against a purchaser of the crop from the tenant, before he has recovered any judgment against the tenant for the rent due. Richardson v. Blakemore, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 290; Davis v. Wilson, 86 Tenn. 519, 8 S. W. 151; Biggs V. Piper, 86 Tenn. 589, 8 S. W. 851. A factor who sells cotton for a tenant, and appropriates the proceeds to a debt due him with the tenant's consent, is not liable to the landlord. The factor is not a purchaser, but a seller; and the fact that the tenant paid him the proceeds does not make him a pur- chaser within the meaning of this provision. Armstrong v. Walker, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 156. 10 This lien, unlike the lien for general supplies, may be created without any contract in writing. Lewis V. Mahon, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 374. 11 The landlord may join in one suit demands for rent and for supplies which are a lien on the same crop, but he must give the amount of each demand constitut- ing the aggregate sum. Dougher- ty V. Kellum, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 643. The affidavit need not state the form of the demand, as, whether it is a note or account ; but it must state that an account of the supplies was kept as the articles were furnished, and the account must be sworn to at or before the time of suing out the attachment. An account meets the require- ments of the act, though it be a mere memorandum upon a loose sheet of paper. Dougherty v. Kel- lum, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 643. § 637 LIENS. 638 § 637. Tennessee (continued). Furnishers' liens.^^ — ^ny debt by note, account, or otherwise, contracted for sup- pHes, implements of industry [husbandry, 9 Baxt. 374] or work stock furnished by the owners of the land to lessees or by lessees to subtenants,^^ and used in the cultivation of the crop, shall be and constitute a lien upon the crop growing or made during the year upon the premises, in as full and per- fect a manner as provided with regard to rents: provided, the said lien is expressly contracted for on the face of the note or writing, between the owner of the land or lessees, or between the lessees and subtenants.^'* The agreement or contract so entered into shall not have priority of the lien of the owner of the land for the rent ; but no recovery for the value of the crop can be had as against the purchaser of the crop without notice. The landlord's lien for rent, supplies and for labor and moneys furnished tenants, and also furnishors' liens on crops for supplies, implements of industry, or work stock contract- ed as required by existing law, shall continue for six months from and after the debt becomes due, and until the termina- tion of any suit commenced within that time for the enforce- ment of such liens: provided nothing in this bill shall be con- strued to apply to or in any way effect [affect] suits already commenced. ^^ 12 Code 1896, § 5303. charge created by contract. Whit- es This section was intended to more v. Poindexter, 7 Baxt. give the owner a security for sup- (Tenn.) 248. A landlord has no plies furnished, and also at the lien for supplies furnished upon same time to give security to a a parol contract. Hughes v. Whit- tenant as against his subtenant, aker, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 399. subordinate, however, to the lien I'^An agreement in writing to of the landlord for rent. This "bind and trust his half of the lien is given only to the landlord crop to the said [creditor] for and to lessees. It has all the inci- any debt he may owe or contract dents of a landlord's lien, and is to him," creates no lien for ad- enforced in the same way. It is vances. Dunlap v. Aycock, 10 not a right of property in the Heisk. (Tenn.) 561. crop, but a right to enforce a ^^ Acts 1905, p. 77. As to un- 639 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 638 § 638. Texas.^^ — All persons renting or leasing- lands or tenements, at will or for a term, shall have a preference lien^^ upon the property of the tenant, hereinafter indicated, upon such premises, ^^ for any rent that may become due, and for all money and the value of all animals, tools, provis- ions, and supplies furnished by the landlord to the tenant to enable the tenant to make a crop on such premises, and to gather, secure, house, and put the same in condition for market, the money, animals, tools, provisions, and supplies so furnished being necessary for that purpose, v^hether the lawful disposal of goods under rent lien, see Supp. 1903, §§5299- 5330. 16 Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, arts. 5475-5485, 5490. iThe lien of a landlord for rent and for advances is superior to the lien of a laborer. Paine v. Dorough, (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S. W. 369. The lien may be assigned. Hatchett v. Miller, (Tex. Civ. App.), 53 S. W. 357. 17 A claim for rent due by an in- solvent lessee is a lien superior to attachments of the property subject to the lien, and is entitled to be first satisfied out of the moneys arising from a sale of the attached property. Sullivan v. Cleveland, 62 Tex. 677. 18 The landlord's lien attaches upon whatever property the lessee has on the rented premises when the warrant issues and is levied, without reference to the time when the debt for the rent ac- crued. One who has purchased property from the lessee upon leased premises not in the ordi- nary course of business stands in this respect in the same position as the lessee. Block v. Latham, 63 Tex. 414; Meyer v. Oliver, 61 Tex. 584; Lehman v. Stone, 4 Wills. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.), § 121, 16 S. W. 784. A landlord's lien under art. 5475 of Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, and the remedy by distress war- rant prescribed by the statute, are inconsistent with the relationship of tenant in common, and none of the consequences resulting from such relationship can be inferred in such a case. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bayliss, 62 Tex. 570. The landlord has no lien on the tenant's property as against other creditors where he has become surety for the tenant for the price of articles furnished to the tenant and used in raising a crop. Kelley V. King, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 44 S. W. 915; Ranger Mercantile Co. V. Terrett (Tex. Civ. App.), 106 S. W. 1145. The landlord may waive his lien and thereby make it inferior to a mortgage lien. Orange County Irr. Co. v. Orange Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.), 130 S. W. 869. As to landlord's waiver, see also Melasky v. Jar- rell (Tex. Civ. App.), 131 S. W. 856. 638 LIENS. 640 same are to be paid in money, agricultural products, or other property; and this lien shall apply only to animals, tools, and other property furnished by the landlord to the tenant, and to the crop raised on such rented premises. All persons leasing or renting any residence or storehouse or other building shall have a preference lien upon all the property of the tenant in said residence or storehouse or other building^^ for the payment of the rents due and that may become due; provided, the lien for rents to become due shall not continue or be enforced for a longer period than the current contract year, and such lien shall continue and be in force so long as the tenant shall occupy the rented premises, and for one month thereafter.-" !'■> Where a married woman is the lessee of a hotel, her furniture in the hotel, whether it be her separate property or community property, is subject to the lien. Biesenbach v. Key, 63 Tex. 79. An enclosed square in a city, with no improvements save a pavilion, was rented for a pleasure resort. The tenants erected a shooting and skating gallery and swings and benches on the grounds for the ac- commodation of visitors. It was held that, on improvements placed on the ground outside of the pa- vilion, the landlord had no Hen under this provision. Rush v. Hendley, 4 Wills Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.), § 200, 15 S. W. 201 The landlord's lien under this sec- tion does not attach to furniture and fixtures used on the leased premises but belonging to third persons. Davis v. Washington, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 67, 43 S. W. 585. The lien extends for the entire term of the lease. Johnson v. Hu- lett, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 120 S. W. 257. 20 This article. Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, § 5490, was enacted in 1889. It is apparent, taking all the pro- visions together, that the legisla- ture intended to limit the opera- tion of the landlord's lien to year- ly renting. The provision of the statute, that the lien shall con- tinue in force so long as the ten- ant shall occupy the rented prem- ises, prescribes the rule only when the lien has attached by reason of rents due, or such as are accruing and will certainly become due, un- der the particular tenancy. It does not impose a charge in advance upon the property of the tenant for any rents that might by possi- bility become due for another term or tenancy, whether such term be created by contract or by the tenant's holding over. There- fore, when a tenant from month to month mortgages the personal property on the mortgaged prem- ises to another, and the rent for the month in which the mortgage is executed has been paid, and the property remains upon the prem- 641 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 638 It shall not be lawful for the tenant, while the rent and such advances remain unpaid, to remove or permit to be re- moved from the premises so leased or rented any of the agricultural products produced thereon, or any of the ani- mals, tools, or property furnished as aforesaid, without the consent of the landlord. Such preference lien shall continue as to such agricultural products, and as to the animals, tools, and other property furnished to the tenant as aforesaid, so long as they remain on such rented or leased premises, and for one month thereafter; and such lien, as to agricultural products, and as to animals and tools furnished as aforesaid, ises by permission of the mort- gagee from month to month, the lien of the landlord is subordinate to that of the mortgage. At the time the mortgage is made in such case, the tenant holds the proper- ty free from any charge and unin- cumbered by any lien. He could then remove it from the rented premises, dispose of it by sale, or incumber it at will. The mort- gagee occupies the same position with respect to the landlord's lien as if the mortgage had been exe- cuted before the property had been brought upon the rented premises. Hempstead Real Estate &c. Assn. V. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620. Rogers v. Grigg (Tex. Civ, App.), 29 S. W. 654. The landlord who leases a vacant lot has no lien for rent on a building placed on the ground by the tenant. Allen v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co., 44 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 97 S. W. 1063. A landlord who lets a storehouse for one year, at a rent payable at the end of the term, has a lien for the year's rent on the proceeds of the tenant's goods seized in the storehouse on attachment, and sold as perishable a few months after the year com- menced. Ohio V. Shutt, 78 Tex. 375, 14 S. W. 860. One who pur- chases property of a tenant with knowledge of the landlord's lien thereon can not hold such prop- erty as against such lien. York v. Carlisle, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 46 S. W. 257. But see, Newman v. Ward (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 868. The lien for furnishing sup- plies extends only to the crop pro- duced during the year wherein such supplies were furnished. Walker v. Patterson's Estate, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 650, 77 S. W. 437. The lien of a landlord attaches to crops raised by a subtenant or assignee. Edwards v. Anderson, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 611, 82 S. W. 659. The defense of innocent purchaser from a tenant of crops raised on rented land is not good where the purchase is made within thirty days after the removal of the crops from the rented premises. American Cotton Co. v. Phillips, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 79, 71 S. W. 320. 41 § 638 LIENS. 642 shall l)e superior to all laws exempting sncli property from forced sales. Such lien shall not attach to tlie goods, wares, and mer- chandise of a merchant, trader, or mechanic, sold and de- livered in good faith in the regular course of business to the tenant.-^ The removal of the agricultural products, with the consent of the landlord, for the purpose of being prepared for market, shall not be considered a waiver of such lien, but such lien shall continue and attach to the products so removed, the same as if they had remained on such rented or leased prem- ises. When any rent or advances shall become due, or the ten- ant shall be about to remove from such leased or rented premises, or to remove his property from such premises, it shall be lawful for the person to whom the rents or advances are payable, his agent, attorney, assigns, heirs, or legal rep- resentatives, to apply to a justice of the peace of the precinct wdiere the premises are situated, or in which the property upon which a lien for rents or advances exists, may be found, or to any justice having jurisdiction of the cause of action for a warrant to seize the property of such tenant.-- 21 A sale by a merchant of his entire stock in forty-two days at wholesale and retail is not made in the ordinary course of business and such sales do not free the goods from the landlord's lien. Freeman v. Collier Racket Co., 100 Tex. 475, 101 S. W. 202. 22 The lien, being given by stat- ute, exists independently of a dis- tress warrant, which is only a means of securing the property and making the lien effective. Templeman v. Gresham, 61 Tex. 50; Pruitt v. Kelley, 4 Willson Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.), § 175, 15 S. W. 119. The lien is therefore superior to an assignment to se- cure creditors. Rosenberg v. Sha- per, 51 Tex. 134. The lien is not lost by the failure of the landlord to sue out a distress warrant for rent, nor acquired by his resort to that remedy; but the lien may be preserved by suit to foreclosure, which will prevent its loss by the expiration of the time limited in the statute for its continuance. Bourcier v. Edmondson, 58 Tex. 675; Rosenberg v. Shaper, 51 Tex. 134. In a trial of the rights of property where the goods of the tenant are attached by a creditor, and the landlord claims a prior 643 LANDLORDS LIENS FOR RENT. 638 The plaintiff, his agent or attorney, shall make oath that the amount sued for is for rent or advances, or shall produce a writing signed by such tenant to that effect, and shall fur- lien thereon, the landlord's lien can not be enforced. Groesbeck V. Evans, 40 Tex, Civ. App. 216, 83 S. W. 430, 88 S. W. 889. If a purchaser from a tenant disposes of the goods pending the land- lord's foreclosure of his lien thereon, such purchaser is liable for conversion. Jackson v. Cor- ley, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 417, 70 S. W. 570. See also, Zapp v. John- son, 87 Tex. 641, 30 S. W. 861; Sparks v. Ponder, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 431, 94 S. W. 428; Mensing v. Cardw^ell, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 75 S. W. 347. As to the rights of a landlord to foreclose his lien against a sublessee after assign- ment by landlord's consent, see, Kennedy v. Groves, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 110 S. W. 136. The land- lord is not restricted to the use of the summary remedy by dis- tress provided by the statute. It allows him this remedy in case he is willing to subject himself to the burden prescribed by it. But he may also use the remedies ap- propriate for the enforcement of liens upon personal property. He may foreclose the lien by suit, though by so doing he takes the chances of finding the property forthcoming to answer his judg- ment. Bourcier v. Edmondson, 58 Tex. 675; Randall v. Rosenthal (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 906. If a tenant's goods are attached upon the rented premises, and there remain until they are sold under the process, he is liable for rent during the entire period of such occupancy; and though the goods are not subject to seizure for rent under a distress warrant while they are in the custody of the law, yet, immediately upon a sale being made under the attach- ment, the landlord's lien can be enforced by seizure of the goods while they are still upon the prem- ises for all the rent due up to the time of seizure. Meyer v. Oliver, 61 Tex. 584. The remedy by distraint under the statute is not dependent upon the ownership of the premises at the time the writ is issued, nor is it in any way affected by the fact that the rela- tion of landlard and tenant has then ceased. If rent is due and the lien subsists, a distress war- rant may issue to enforce the lien. Meyer v. Oliver, 61 Tex. 584. In a proceeding to enforce the lien by foreclosure, if the landlorfl does not have access to the prem- ises so as to enable him to in- ventory the articles which he wishes to subject to his lien, it is sufficient that he describes them in a general way, as by referring to the property as a quantity of household furniture and other per- sonal property owned by the ten- ant, and now in his possession on the rented premises. A gen- eral description, with the exact lo- cality of the house containing it, tjie name of the person in pos- session and of the owner is suffi- cient. Bourcier v. Edmondson, 58 Tex. 675. § 638 LIENS. 644 ther swear that such warrant is not sued out for the purpose of vexing and harassing the defendant;-^ and the person applying for such warrant shall execute a bond, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by the jus- tice of the peace, payable to the defendant, conditioned that the plaintiff will pay the defendant such damages as he may sustain in case such warrant has been illegally and unjustly sued out, which bond shall be filed among the papers of the cause; and, in case the suit shall be finally decided in favor of the defendant, he may bring suit against the plaintiff and his sureties on such bond, and shall recover such damages as may be awarded to him by the proper tribunal. Upon the filing of such oath and bond, it shall be the duty of such justice of the peace to issue his warrant to the sheriff or any constable of the county, commanding him to seize the property of the defendant, or so much thereof as will satisfy the demand. It shall be the duty of the officer to whom such warrant is directed to seize the property of such tenant, or so much thereof as shall be of value sufficient to satisfy such debt and costs, and the same in his possession safely keep, unless the same is replevied as herein provided, and make due return thereof to the court to which said warrant is returnable, at the next term thereof. The defendant shall have the right at any time within ten days from the date of said levy to replevy the property so seized.-* 23 Affidavit that the warrant was moval of the property from the not sued out for "injuring or ha- rented premises, the lien is there- rassing" is sufficient. Biesenbach by fixed against both the tenant V. Key, 63 Tex. 79. The amount and his vendee. Ingraham v. Rich must be stated definitely, not (Tex. Civ. App.), 136 S. W. 549. "about" a given sum. Jones v. 24 Even if a distress warrant is Walker, 44 Tex. 200. Where a suit released in such replevin suit the for foreclosure of lien and for landlord still has his statutory rent is brought in a justice court lien. McEvoy v. Niece, 20 Tex, within thirty days after the re- Civ. App. 686, SO S. W. 424. 645 landlords' liens for rent. § 638a If the property is of a perishable or wasting kind, and the defendant fails to replevy as herein provided, the officer making the levy, or the plaintiff or the defendant, may apply to the court or judge thereof to vsdiich the warrant is re- turnable, either in term time or vacation, for an order to sell such property. § 638a. Utah.^^ — Lessors, except as hereinafter pro- vided, shall have a lien for rent due upon all the property of the lessee not exempt from execution as long as the lessee shall occupy the leased premises, and for thirty days there- after. A lien for rent as herein provided for shall have priority over all other liens, excepting taxes, mortgages for purchase money, and liens of employes for services for one year prior to sale. Where any rent shall become due or the lessee shall be about to remove his property from such leased premises, it shall be lawful for the lessor, his attorney, agent, or assigns, to apply to a justice of the peace of the precinct, or if the rent is not less than the sum of $300, then to the district court of the district wherein the premises are situated, for a war- rant to seize the property of such lessee. The lessor, his attorney, agent, or assigns shall, before the issue of such writ of attachment, file in the court aforesaid an affidavit duly sworn to, setting forth the amount of rent sued for over and above all offsets and counterclaims, and a brief description of the leased premises, and shall further state, under oath, that said writ of attachment is not sued out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the per- son applying for such writ of attachment shall execute a bond, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, condi- tioned that the lessor will pay the lessee such damages as he may sustain in case such wn-it of attachment has been illegally 25 Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 1407-1414. § 639 LIENS. 646 and unjustly sued out, which bond shall be approved and filed with the papers in the case. Upon the filing of such affidavit and bond, it shall be the duty of the court wherein the same is filed to issue a writ of attachment to the proper person, commanding him to seize the property of the defendant not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as shall satisfy the demand. It shall be the duty of the officer to whom the writ of at- tachment is directed to seize the property of such lessee not exempt from execution, or as much thereof as shall be of value sufficient to satisfy such debt, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, and to keep the same until the determination of the action pending between the lessor and the lessee, un- less the property be sooner released from bond or the at- tachment be discharged. A bond for the release of the attachment may be made, in the manner provided by law for the release of the property taken under attachment or for the discharge of a writ of at- tachment. All property, including growing and harvested crops and all ore mined or upon the premises, or so much of said prop- erty as may be necessary to pay the amount of rent due and costs, shall be liable to sale to enforce the payment of the lien hereby created. § 639. Virginia.^*' — Rent of every kind may be recovered by distress or action. He to whom rent or compensation is due, whether he have the reversion or not, his personal repre- sentative or assignee, may recover it, whatever be the estate -'C Pollard's Code 1904, §§ 2787, the leased premises is superior to 2788, 2790, 2791, 2792, 2795. As to the lien of a mortgage or trust exemptions, see Code 1904, § 3630. deed which is created after such As to lien of landlords on the goods are placed on said premises. crops for advances, see Code 1904, In re Mclntire, 142 Fed. 593; An- § 2496. The lien of the landlord derson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, on his tenant's goods carried on 31 S. E. 998. 647 landlords' liens for rent. § 639 of the person owning [owing] it, or though his estate or in- terest in the land be ended. Rent may be distrained for within five years from the time it becomes due, and not afterwards, whether the lease be ended or not. The distress shall be made by a constable, sheriff, or sergeant of the county or corporation wherein the premises yielding the rent, or some part thereof, may be, or the goods liable to distress may be found, under warrant from a justice or clerk of the circuit or corporation court, founded upon an affidavit of the person claiming the rent, or his agent, that the amount of money or other thing to be dis- trained for (to be specified in the affidavit), as he verily be- lieves, is justly due to the claimant, for rent reserved upon contract, from the person of whom it is claimed. The distress may be levied on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee or under-tenant, found on the premises, or which may have been removed therefrom not more than thirty days. If the goods of such lessee, assignee, or under-tenant, when carried on the premises, are subject to a lien, which is valid against his creditors, his interest only in such goods shall be liable to such distress. If any lien be created thereon while they are upon the leased premises, they shall be liable to distress, but for not more than one year's rent, whether it shall have accrued before or after the creation of the lien. No other goods shall be liable to distress than such as are declared to be so liable. If, after the commencement of any tenancy,-^ a lien be obtained or created by deed of trust, 27 If, after the commencement mond v. Duesberry, 27 Grat. of a tenancy for a year, the tenant (Va.) 210. Real estate was leased mortgages his furniture on the to a firm for the term of three leased premises, and the rent for years, to commence on the 1st of that year is paid, but the tenant January, 1876. On the 19th day of holds over under a new lease, the June, 1876, before the rent of that lien of the mortgage is valid year became due, one of the les- against the lien of the landlord for sees executed a deed of trust on rent, the former being a lien when the furniture. The rent for the the latter lease commenced. Rich- year 1876 was paid. The rent for 639 LIENS. 648 mortgage, or .otherwise upon the interest or property in goods on premises leased or rented, of any person liable for the rent, the party having such lien may remove said goods from the premises on the following terms, and not otherwise, that is to say: on the terms of paying to the person entitled 1877 was assigned to a third party, who levied a distress warrant upon the furniture on the leased premises for that year's rent, which was in arrear, the holder of the note claiming, among other things, that the trust deed consti- tuted a prior lien on the property to the rent for the year 1877, and praying an injunction to stop the sale of the property levied on un- til the rights of the parties could be determined, and for the ap- pointment of a receiver. It was held: 1. That the deed of trust was created "after the commence- ment of the tenancy" under which the distress was made, — that the tenancy of the two years, 1876 and 1877, was the same; 2. That the payment of the rent for the year 1876 was no discharge of the prior right of the lessors or their as- signee to "one year's rent," within the meaning of the statute; 3. That goods carried on the leased premises and incumbered "after the commencement of the tenancy" are charged with a defi- nite portion of the rent arising under the tenancy during the term, and not with the specific rent of any particular year or pe- riod of time. "One year's rent" and "a year's rent" are used in the statute to denote the amount of rent to be distrained for in the one case, and to be paid or se- cured in the other. And it mat- ters not for what year it accrued, or whether it was before or after the creation of the lien, or whether or not other rents may have accrued after the lien was created and had been paid by the tenants. As long as any rent aris- ing under the tenancy remains un- paid by the persons liable therefor, as soon as it becomes due the per- son entitled to it may distrain the goods for an amount not exceed- ing the rent for a year. Wades v. Figgatt, 75 Va. 575. As to mar- shalling proceeds of sale as be- tween successive mortgages of property subject to distress, see Jones v. Phelan, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 229. A tenant under a lease for a term of years, which contained no covenant or stipulation for a re- newal, executed a deed of trust which conveyed the machinery and other personalty on the premises. Thereafter, but before registration of the deed of trust, an agreement for renewal of the lease was entered into. It was held that possession under the agreement for renewal was to be treated as a new tenancy, and that the lien of the trust deed took priority over the landlord's lien for rent accruing after the expiration of the original term. Upper Appomattox Co. v. Hamil- ton, 83 Va. 319, 2 S. E. 195. 649 landlords' liens for rent. § 639 to the rent so much as is in arrear, and securing to him so much as is to become due, what is so paid or secured not being more altogether than a year's rent in any case. If the goods be taken under legal process, the officer executing it shall, out of the proceeds of the goods, make such payment of what is in arrear; and as to what is to become due, he shall sell a sufficient portion of the goods on a credit till then, taking from the purchasers bonds with good security, paya- ble to the person so entitled, and delivering such bonds to him. If the goods be not taken under legal process, such payment and security shall be made and given before their removal.-^ It shall be deemed a misdemeanor for any person renting lands of another, either for a share of the crop or for money consideration to remove therefrom, without the consent of the landlord, any part of such crop until the rents and ad- vances are satisfied."*'^ Where goods are distrained or attached for rent reserved in a share of the crop, or in anything other than money, the claimant of the rent, having given the tenant ten days' no- tice, or, if he be out of the county, having set up the notice in some conspicuous place on the premises, may apply to the court, to which the attachment is returnable, or the court of the county or corporation in which the distress is made. The court having ascertained the value, either by its own judgment, or, if either party require it, by the verdict of a jury impaneled without the formality of pleading, shall order the goods distrained or attached to be sold to pay the amount so ascertained. 28 This statute creates a lien in warrant or attachment, which favor of the landlord, and a lien remedies, in case of a bankrupt, of a high and peculiar character. are superseded by the effect and The lien it creates must be re- operation of the bankrupt act. In spected and enforced. The land- re Wynne, Chase (U. S.) 227, Fed. lord's lien under that statute is Cas. No. 1817. given by the statute independent- 2Say\cts 1906, p. 104. ly of proceedings by distress § 639a LIENS, 650 §639a. Washington.-^ — Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing upon the demised lands of any year for the rents accrued or acquiring [accruing] for such year, whether the same is paid wholly or in part in money or specific articles of property, or products of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful performance of the lease; and the lien created by the provisions of this sec- tion shall be a preferred lien, and shall be prior to all other liens. Any person claiming the benefit of this statute must, with- in forty days after the close of said work and labor, or after the expiration of the term, or after the expiration of each year of the lease, for which any lands were demised, file for record with the county auditor of the county in which said work and labor was performed, or said demised lands are sit- uated, a claim which shall be duly verified,^*' and said lien may be enforced in a civil action :^^ provided that the lien so created in favor of landlords shall only apply when the lease has been recorded. § 639b. West Virginia.^- — Rent of every kind may be re- covered by distress or action. A landlord may also, by action, recover (where the agreement is not by deed) a rea- sonable satisfaction for the use and occupation of lands; on the trial of which action, if an}^ parol demise, or any agree- ment (not being by deed) whereon a certain rent was re- served, shall appear in evidence, the plaintiff shall not there- fore be nonsuited, but may use the same as evidence of the amount of his debt or damages. In any action for rent, or for such use and occupation interest shall be allowed as on other contracts. Rent may be distrained for within one year after the time 29 Remington & Ballinger's Ann. si As provided in Remington & Codes & Stats. 1910, §§ 1188, 1190. Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stats., so In accordance with Reming- 1910, § 1172. ton & Ballinger's Ann. Codes & 32 Code 1906, §§ 3400, 3403-3405. Stats. 1910, § 1168. 651 landlords' liens for rent. § 639b it becomes due, and not afterwards, whether the lease be ended or not. The distress shall be made by any sheriff or constable of the county wherein the premises yielding the rent or some part thereof may be or the goods liable to dis- tress may be found, under a warrant from a justice founded upon the affidavit of the person claiming the rent, or his agent, that the amount of money or other thing to be dis- trained for (to be specified in the afifidavit), as he verily be- lieves is justly due to the claimant for rent, reserved upon contract from the person of whom it is claimed. The distress may be levied on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee or under-tenant, found on the premises, or wdiich may have been removed therefrom not more than thirty days. If the goods of such lessee, assignee, or under-tenant, when carried on the premises are subject to a lien, which is valid against his creditors, his interest only in such goods shall be liable to such distress. If any lien shall be created thereon while they are upon the leased premises, they shall be liable to distress, but not for more than one year's rent, whether it shall have accrued before or after the creation of the lien. No goods shall be liable to distress other than such as are declared to be so liable in this section. If, after the commencement of any tenancy, a lien be ob- tained or created by deed of trust, mortgage, or otherwise, upon the interest or property in goods or premises leased or rented, of any person liable for the rent, the party having such lien may remove said goods from the premises on the following terms, and not otherwise, that is to say: On the terms of paying to the person entitled to the rent, so much as is in arrear, and securing to him so much as is to become due ; what is so paid or secured not being more altogether than a year's rent in any case. If the goods be taken under legal process, the officer executing it shall, out of the pro- ceeds of the goods, make such payment of what is in arrear; and as to wdiat is to become due, he shall sell a sufficient § 640 LIENS. 652 portion of the goods on a credit till then, taking from the purchasers, bonds, with good security, payable to the person so entitled, and delivering such bonds to him. If the goods be not taken under legal process, such payment and secur- ity shall be made and given before their removal. § 640. Wisconsin.^'^ — The common-law right of distress, as it existed in England prior to the American Revolution, existed in this state down to 1866, when it was abolished by statute.^'* 33 Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 34 Laws 1866, ch. 74. 148. CHAPTER XIII. LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. Sec. Sec. 641. Agistors ; and livery stable 664. keepers have no lien at 665. common law 665a. 642. Lien can not be created by 666. usage. 667. 643. Rule quest ione< d in Pennsyl- 668. vania. 669. 644. Lien on horse kept for 670. training. 671. 645. The owner ■ of a stallion has 672. a lien uf )on a , mare for the 673. charge for serving the 673a. mare. 674. 646. Statutes of the several 674a. states. 675. 647. Alabama. Gie. 647a. Alaska. 676a. 647b. Arizona. 677. 648. Arkansas. 678. 649. California. 678a. 650. Colorado. 679. 651. Connecticut. 680. 652. Delaware. 680a. 653. District oi t Co lumbia. 680b. 654. Florida. 681. 655. Georgia. 682. 655a, . Hawaii. 683. 655b . Idaho. 656. Illinois. 657. Indiana. 684. 658. Iowa. 659. Kansas. 685. 660. Kentucky. 661. Louisiana. 686. 662. Maine. (i^l. 663. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Mississippi. Missouri. Montana. Nebraska. Nevada. New Hampshire. New Jersey. New Mexico. New York. North Dakota. Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon. Pennsylvania. South Dakota. Tennessee. Texas. Utah. Vermont. Virginia. Washington. West Virginia. Wisconsin. Wyoming. A statute creating the lien attaches from its enact- ment. Property exempt from exe- cution subject to the lien. Lien of stable keeper is purely statutory. Joint and several lien. Lien does not include iso- lated cases of feeding. 65; 641 LIENS. 654 Sec. Sec. 688. No lien where keeper keeps 694. horse for own benefit. 689. Servant has no lien on mas- • ter's cattle. 695. 690. Lien upon notice in writing. 690a. Sheriff holding cattle under 696. mortgage may contract for their keeping. 697. 691. Prior chattel mortgage su- perior to stable keeper's 698. lien. 691a. Consent of owner may be implied. 699. 692. Lien of stable keeper some- times held superior to lien 700. of mortgage. 692a. Lien can not be made supe- 701. rior to prior mortgage. 693. Lien of stallion keeper supe- rior to subsequent mort- gage. Possession of keeper is con- structive notice to a pur- chaser. Mortgage by owner while in temporary possession. Lien by agreement will not hold against mortgage. Facts held to be waiver of keeper's lien. Lien not lost by delivery of horse temporarily to owner. Loss of possession will de- prive keeper of lien. Acts of ownership by lien- holder. Waiver by including in claim that for which keep- er has no lien. •^641. Agistors and livery stable keepers have no lien at common law. — Agistors of cattle and livery stable keepers have no lien at common law for the keeping of cattle or horses. Such a lien can arise only by virtue of a statute, or of a special agreement in the nature of a pledge.^ "By the 1 Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. 271; Bevan v. Waters, 3 Car. & P. 520; Wallace v. Woodgate,, 1 Car. & P. 575; Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 342; Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866; Judson v. Ether- idge, 1 C. & M. 743; Richards v. Symons, 15 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 35. Iowa: Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290; McDonald v. Bennett, 45 Iowa 456. Massachu- setts : Goodrich v. Willard, 7 Gray (Mass.) 183; Vinal v. Spof- ford, 139 Mass. 126; Goell v. Morse, 126 Mass. 480. New York: Jackson v. Kasseall, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 231; Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 491, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Bissell v. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252. Vermont: Ingalls V. Vance, 61 Vt. 582, 584, 18 Atl. 452; Wills v. Barrister, 36 Vt. 220; for keeping sheep, Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 244, 23 Am. Dec. 206. Other States: Miller v. Marston, 35 Maine 153, 155, 56 Am. Dec. 694; Kelsey v. Layne, 28 Kans. 218, 42 Am. Rep. 158; Lewis v. Tyler, 23 Cal. 364; Hickman v. 655 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. 642 general law," said Baron Parker,- "in the absence of any- specific agreement, whenever a party has expended labor and skill in the improvement of a chattel bailed to him, he has a lien upon it. Now the case of an agistment does not fall within that principle, inasmuch as the agistor does not confer any additional value on the article, either by the exer- tion of any skill of his own, or indirectly by means of any in- strument in his possession, as was the case with the stallion in Scarfe v. Morgan;^ he simply takes the animal to feed it." The statutes, however, create rights in the nature of com- mon-law liens, for they are rights to retain the property as security, and are lost by parting with possession.* The livery stable keeper does not come within the reason of the rule of law which gives a lien to an innkeeper, namely, that the innkeeper is bound to entertain and provide for any one who presents himself in the character of a guest; for the keeper of a livery stable is under no obligation to take and feed the horse of a customer.^ An execution cannot be levied on the lien of an agistor.^ § 642. Lien cannot be created by usage. — Nor can such a lien be created by the force of any usage prevailing in a par- ticular town or city; but to acquire the force of law, such usage or custom must have been established, and have be- come general, so that a presumption of knowledge by the parties can be said to arise. ^ Thomas, 16 Ala. 666; Mauney v. Ingram, 78 N. Car. 96; Jackson V. Holland, 31 Ga. 339; Millikin V. Jones, 11 111. 372; Saint v. Smith, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 51; Fishell v. Morris, 57 Conn. 547, 18 Atl. 717, 6 L. R. A. 82; Sharp v. Johnson, 38 Ore. 246, 63 Pac. 485, 84 Am. St. 788. 2 Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 342. 34 M. & W. 270. 4 Seebaum v. Handy, 46 Ohio St. 560, 22 N. E. 869. 5 Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290, per Adams, J.; Mc- Ghee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506, 11 S. W. 316, 3 L. R. A. 654, per Folkes, J. 6 McNamara v. Godair, 161 111. 228, 43 N. E. 1071, affg. 59 111. App. 184. 7 Saint V. Smith, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 51. 643 LIENS. 656 The lien may be created by force of a special agreement, and in such case, if the owner of a horse remove it for the purpose of defrauding the keeper of his lien, the latter may retake the horse, and his lien will revive with the restored possession.^ § 643. Rule questioned in Pennsylvania. — In a Pennsyl- vania case the doctrine of the cases which deny the agistor of cattle a lien is called in question.^ In this case Chief Jus- tice Gibson dissents from the view that liens are confined to bailments for skilled labor; that the lien results from the labor and care of any bailee, whether skilled or not, and not from the improved condition of the thing bailed. "It is," he says, "difiicult to find an argument for the position that a man who fits an ox for the shambles, by fattening it with his 8 Wallace v. Woodgate, Ry. & M. 193. 9 Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254. This case is cited, and the views of Chief Justice Gibson approved, in Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 522, per Thompson, J., and in Kelsey v. Layne, 28 Kans. 218, 224, 42 Am. Rep. 158. In the latter case Brew- er, J., said: "The theory of the common law was, that if the labor and skill of the bailee increased the value of the article bailed, he had a lien. In other words, it was the profit of the bailor and not the loss of the bailee which deter- mined the lien. Now it would seem far more just that when the bailee parted with anything, either property or labor, at the instance of the bailor, he should be pro- tected, irrespective of the ques- tion whether such property or la- bor increased the value of the thing bailed, or simply preserved it in existence. Often times in- deed, as suggested by Chief Jus- tice Gibson in the quotation just made, the feeding and care of the agistor actually increase the in- trinsic value. Further it may be remarked that the general tenden- cy of all legislation and adjudica- tion is to afford protection to him who parts with labor or material for the benefit of another. Wit- ness the various mechanics' lien laws for the protection of those who bestow labor or furnish ma- terial for the improvement of real estate, the law requiring railroads to give a bond to secure the pay- ment of all laborers, and the stat- utes like the one now in consid- eration before us. These statutes, which rest upon obvious consid- erations of justice, are to be rea- sonably construed in order to ac- complish the ends intended." 657 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 644 provender, does not increase its intrinsic value by means ex- clusively within his control." The learned Chief Justice re- fers to the argument of Baron Parke in Jackson v. Cum- mins/° that the lien extends only to cases in which the bailee has directly conferred additional value by labor or skill, or indirectly by the instrumentality of an agent under his con- trol, as in the case of Scarfe v. Morgan, ^^ where the owner of a stallion was allowed to have a lien for a single service, which resulted in the mare's being with foal. In the latter case the lien, of course, could have no other foundation than the improved condition and increased value of the mare, in- dependently of the consideration of skill. "In Jackson v. Cummins," said Gibson, C. J., in conclusion, "we see the ex- piring embers of the primitive notion that the basis of the lien is intrinsic improvement of the thing by mechanical means; but if we get away from it at all, what matters it how the additional value has ben imparted, or whether it has been attended with an alteration in the condition of the thing? It may be said that the condition of a fat ox is not a permanent one ; but neither is the increased value of a mare in foal permanent ; yet in Scarfe v. Morgan the owner of a stallion was allowed to have a lien for the price of the leap. The truth is, the modern decisions evince a struggle of the judicial mind to escape from the narrow confines of the earlier precedents, but without having as yet established principles adapted to the current transactions and conven- ience of the world." § 644. Lien on horse kept for training. — But a livery stable keeper has a lien at common law on a horse which he keeps for the purpose of exercising and training to run at races, ^- although the races be for bets and wagers which are 105 M. & W. 342. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270, 283; 114 M. & W. 270. Forth v. Simpson, 13 Q. B. 680; 12 Bevan v. Waters, 3 Car. & P. Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130, 2 520, Moo. & M. 235; Scarfe v. Moo. & P., 201; Harris v. Wood- 42 § 645 LIENS. 658 made illegal by statute, and the stable keeper knew that the horse was so used while in his possession. ^^ Even though the parties were in pari delicto, potior est conditio possiden- tis, and the law will not assist the owner of the horse to ob- tain possession without paying the keeper and trainer. ^^ It may happen that a trainer, while having a lien at com- mon law for his labor bestowed upon a horse, may have a statutory lien for boarding the horse. Whether both liens, in such case, can be enforced together, depends upon the law of the state under which the liens arise. ^^ One who takes a horse to be kept and cared for has a lien for the service, ^^ but the lien arises from the special service in caring for the horse, if he needs medical treatment. A stable-keeper has no lien for incidental treatment of a horse rendered in the usual course of keeping it without a special contract for a lien.^''' § 645. The owner of a stallion has a lien upon a mare for the charge for serving the mare.^^ — The lien is specific, and the mare cannot be retained for a general balance of account. This lien is given upon the general principle that, where a bailee has expended his labor and skill in the improvement rufif, 124 Mass. 205, 26 Am. Rep. i" Miller v. Marston, 35 Maine 658; Shields v. Dodge, 14 Lea 153, 56 Am. Dec. 694. (Tenn.) 356; Towle v. Raymond, is Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & 58 N. H. 64; Scott v. Mercer, 98 W. 270, 283. Parke, B., said: "The Iowa 258, 67 N. W. 108, 60 Am. St. object is that the mare may be 188; Farney v. Kerr (Tenn.), 48 S. made more valuable by proving W. 103. in foal. She is delivered to the 13 Harris v. Woodruff, 124 Mass. defendant, that she may by his 205, 26 Am. Rep. 658. skill and labor, and the use of his 14 Harris v. Woodruff, 124 Mass. stallion for that object, be made 205, 26 Am. Rep. 658. so; and we think, therefore, that 15 Towle V. Raymond, 58 N. H. it is a case which falls within the 64. principle of those cited in argu- 1*"' Lord V. Jones, 24 Maine 439, ment." 41 Am. Dec. 391. 659 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS, 645 of a chattel delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge in that respect. In this country a similar lien has in most of the states been conferred by statute. ^'^ The lien is sometimes extended so as to attach also to the offspring, and sometimes it is made to attach to the offspring alone. The lien is also generally enlarged so that it does not depend upon possession, but without possession may be asserted within a limited time by 19 Alabama: Civ. Code 1907, §§ 4810-4813. Arizona: Rev. Stats. 1901, § 4508. Arkansas: Castle's Supp. 1911, §§ 5049-5052. It is sub- sequent to the lien of a prior re- corded mortgage. Easter v. Goyne, 1 Ark. 222, 11 S. W. 212. California: Civ. Code 1906, I 3062. Colorado: Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912. p. 2975, § 7130. Delaware: Laws 1893, p. 827. Florida: Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2207. Georgia: Code 1911, § 3361. Idaho : Sess. Laws 1913, p. 550, § 4, amending Sess. Laws 1909, p. 212, § 4. Illinois: Hurd's Rev. Stats. 1913, ch. 8, §§ 68, 69. Indi- ana: Burns' Ann. Stats. 1912, §§ 3252-3255. Iowa: Laws 1909, p. 133. Kansas : Dassler's Gen. Stats. 1909, § 4818. Kentucky: Carroll's Stats. 1909, §§ 2503, 2504. Louisi- ana : Wolff's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1332. Maine: Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, § 58. As to time with- in which lien on the get may be enforced, see Gile v. Atkins, 93 Maine 223, 44 Atl. 896, 74 Am. St. 341. Michigan: Pub. Acts 1907, ch. 145; Howell's Ann. Stats. 1912, § 2918. Minnesota: Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7080. Mississippi: Code 1906, §§ 3076, 3077. Missouri: Rev. Stats. 1909, §§ 8240, 8241. Mon- tana : Laws 191'3, ch. 45. Nebraska : Laws 1913, ch. 49. New Hamp- shire: Laws 1905, ch. 33. New Mexico: Laws 1912, ch. 23. New York: Birdseye's C. & G. Consol. Laws 1909, p. 3227. See Supp. 1910, p. 665. North Carolina: Revisal 1905, § 2024. (See amendment ap- plicable to Wilkes county, in Pub. Local Laws 1911, ch. 743.) North Dakota: Laws 1909, p. 199, § 13. Ohio: Gen. Code 1910, §§ 8355-8357. Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909, §§ 146, 147. Oregon: Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. Codes & Stats. 1902, §§ 4322, 4323, as amended by Gen. Laws (special session) 1903, pp. 14-16. See Gen. Laws 1911, p. 352. South Carolina: Code 1912, §4172. South Dakota: Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 264. Tennessee: Ann. Code 1896, §§ 3554, 3555. As to superiori- ty of subsequent mortgage, see Sims V. Bradford, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 434. Texas: Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, arts. 5652, 5633. Utah: Laws 1911, p. 321, § 15. Vermont : Pub. Stats. 1906, §§ 2659-2662, as amended by Laws 1910, p. 100. Virginia: Code Ann. 1904, § 2490a. Washington: Remington & Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stats. 1910, §§ 3161-3165, as amended by Laws 1913, p. 155. West Virginia: Code 1906, § 3124. Wisconsin: Stats. 1898, art. 3347a. Wyoming: Comp. Stats. 1910, §§ 3771, 3772. § 646 LIENS. 660 attachment. The Hen exists from the time of service, and one who purchases the mare after the service, but before the fibng of the notice of lien, and before the time for fiHng such notice has expired, takes her subject to the existing lien.-*^ § 646. Statutes of the several states. — The statutes of the several states giving liens to agistors, stable keepers, and others, differ much in terms. Generally the lien attaches only to the animals taken care of; and it does not attach to v^agons, carriages, harnesses, and other articles left with the horses and cattle which are to be kept.-^ But in a few states it is provided that the lien shall attach to such arti- cles.^- In some states the lien is given only to livery stable keepers; in others it is also given to agistors, ranchmen, and farmers. In some the statutes apply in favor of those whose business it is to board horses, or to pasture or feed cattle; while others seem to be broad enough to cover isolated cases of boarding horses or keeping cattle. The statutes of several states expressly provide that the lien shall not attach to property which has been stolen, or which does not belong to the person who intrusts it to a stable keeper or agistor.-^ The reason for an innkeeper's lien attaching to such property does not hold in case of stable keepers and agistors, and therefore the lien does not attach to such property unless it is expressly made to attach. If the statute is silent on the subject, it does not apply to stolen animals, or such as belong to other persons.-^ 20 Tuttle V. Dennis, 58 Hun (N. such as carriages and harness. Y.) 35, 11 N. Y. S. 600, 33 N. Y. St. Hartshorne v. Seeds, 1 Chester 445. Statute giving lien on off- Co. Rep. (Pa.) 460. spring for service of sire held un- -- See post, Delaw^are, § 652; Mis- constitutional. Weis V. Ashley, souri, § 666; New Jersey, § 671; Vir- 59 Nebr. 494, 81 N. W. 318, 80 Am. ginia, § 680; and Wisconsin, § 681. St. 704. 23 See post. North Dakota, 21 Thus a lien given by statute § 673a; South Dakota, § 676a; Mon- upon a horse for his keeping does tana, § 667; Wyoming, § 682. not extend to any other property 24 Gump v. Showalter, 43 Pa. St. intrusted to the stable keeper, 507. 66l LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS* LIENS. § 647b § 647. Alabama.-^ — Keepers, owners, or proprietors of livery stables, or other places for feeding and caring for stock for pay, have a lien on all stock kept and fed by them for the payment of their charges, for keeping and feeding such stock, and have right to retain such stock, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the payment of charges for keeping and feeding such stock: provided, that said lien on any stock so kept, fed, and cared for shall continue for six months in possession of persons with notice of such lien. If the charges when due are not paid within ten days after demand therefor, the keepers, owners or proprietors are authorized, after giving thirty days' notice, once a week for three successive weeks, in a newspaper published in the county in which such stables are located, or, if there be no such paper, by posting the notice for thirty days in three conspicuous places in the county, to sell the stock for the payment of the charges and expenses incident thereto; and the balance, if any, is to be paid over to the owner. § 647a. Alaska. — Any person who shall pasture or feed any horses, cattle, hogs, sheep or other live stock, or bestow any labor, care or attention upon the same at the request of the owner or lawful possessor thereof, shall have a lien upon such property for his just and reasonable charges for the labor, care and attention he has bestowed and the food he has furnished, and he may retain possession of such prop- erty until such charges be paid. If not paid within three months, the person having such lien may sell after notice.-® § 647b. Arizona.-" — Proprietors of livery or public stables have a special lien on all animals placed with them for feed, care and attention, as also upon such carriages, buggies, vehi- cles, or other equipments as may have been placed in their care, for the amount of the charges against the same. All 25 Code 1907, §§ 4806, 4807. 27 Rev. Stats. 1901, §§ 2922, 2931- 26 Carter's Code 1900, p. 414, 2934. As to enforcement, see post, §§ 277-278. § 1049a. § 648 LIENS. 662 farmers, ranchmen, and others who furnish pasture, hay, or other feed for any cattle, horses, or other stock to be fed on the premises of such person or persons furnishing such pas- ture, hay, or feed, have a lien on such stock for the amount of the charges due and unpaid for such pasturage, hay or other feed, and shall have the right to take possession of and retaki such stock until such charges are paid by the owner or own- ers thereof; the lien may be enforced by taking possession and selling after notice. § 648. Arkansas.^^ — Keepers of livery, sale or feed stables, or wagon yards, have a lien for their reasonable charges and costs on all horses, mules or other stock or property left in their charge to be kept, sheltered, fed, sold or otherwise cared for. Such keepers are authorized to keep possession of such property until such charges are paid, or tendered to them by the owner thereof. In case an}^ such property shall be left with such keeper, and not be called for by the owner, and the charges and costs paid thereon before they shall amount to the value thereof, and the cost of selling the same, it shall be lawful for such keeper to cause the same to be sold. Such sale shall be at public outcry, after first giving the owner thirty days' actual notice, or constructive notice, to be published in a newspaper authorized to publish legal no- tices, specifying the day, hour and place of such sale, and out of the proceeds of such sale shall be paid: 1st. The costs and expenses of sale ; 2d. The amount due such keeper for his charges : and the balance, if any, shall be held by such keeper for the use and subject to the order, of the owner of the property so sold. § 649. California.-^ — Livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors, and persons 'pasturing horses or stock, have a 28 Dig. of Stats. 1904, §§ 5044- 29 Civ. Code 1906, § 3051'. As to 5047. former statute of 1870, and the 663 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 65 1 lien, dependent on possession, for their compensation in car- ing for, boarding, feeding or pasturing such horses or stock. § 650. Colorado."'*^ — Any ranchmann, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, tavern-keeper, livery stable keeper, or any other person to whom any horses, mules, asses, cattle, sheep or hogs shall be intrusted, for the purpose of feeding, herd- ing, pasturing, keeping or ranching, shall have a lien upon such horses, mules, asses, cattle, sheep or hogs for the amount that may be due for such feeding, herding, pasturing, keeping or ranching, and for all costs incurred in enforcing such lien. §651. Connecticut.'^^ — When a special agreement shall have been made between the owner of any cattle, horses, sheep, or swine, and by any person wdio shall keep and feed such animals, regarding the price of such keeping, such ani- mals shall be subject to a lien, for the price of such keeping, in favor of the person keeping the same; and such person so keeping said animals may detain the same until such debt shall be paid; and if it be not paid within twenty-one days after it is due he may sell such animals or so many thereof as shall be necessary, at public auction, upon giving written notice to the owner of the time and place of said sale at least six days before said sale, and apply the proceeds to the payment of such debts, returning the surplus, if any, to said owner. Code before it was amended in of said lien, as required by Ann. 1878, see Johnson v. Perry, 53 Cal. Stats., § 114. Bailey v. O'Fallon, 351. 30 Colo. 419, 70 Pac. 755. See Auld so Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, I 4568. v. Travis, 5 Colo. App. 535, as to For mode of enforcing, see gen- lien of an agistor on partnership eral provision, ch. 22, § 1050, infra. property. A sale of an animal upon w^hich si Gen. Stats. 1902, § 4167. As to a lien is claimed is invalid when sale, see Gen. Stats. 1902, § 842. no notice is given to the owner § 652 LIENS. 664 § 652. Delaware.^- — Any hotel keeper, innkeeper, or other person who keeps a livery or boarding stable, and for price or reward at such stable furnishes food or care for any horse, or has the custody or care of any carriage, cart, wagon, sleigh or other vehicle, or any harness, robes or other equip- ments for the same, shall have a lien upon such horse, car- riage, cart, wagon, sleigh, vehicle, harness, robes or equip- ments, and the right to detain the same to secure the pay- ment of such price or reward, and may, after the expiration of fifteen days from the time the same or any part thereof became due and payable, the same remaining unpaid in whole or in part, sell the property upon which he has such lien at public sale, at such livery or boarding stable, to the highest and best bidder or bidders therefor, first giving at least ten days' notice of such sale by handbills posted in five or more public places in the county in which such sale is to be had and by advertisement in a newspaper published in said county, describing the property to be sold and naming the day, hour and place of sale thereof, and may apply the money arising from said sale to the payment of the amount then remaining due, including therein compensation at the same rate as such stipulated price or reward for food, care or custody furnished or bestowed as aforesaid up to the time of sale, together with the costs and expenses of sale. If the keeper of the stable has parted with the custody of the property subject to such lien, he may at any time within ten days from the parting of such custody make an affidavit describing the property and stating the amount due, and thereupon a warrant may issue for the seizure of the prop- erty and the delivery thereof to the keeper of the stable. § 653. District of Columbia.^-"^ — It shall be lawful for all persons keeping or boarding any animals at livery within the district, under any agreement with the owner thereof, to 32 Code 1893, p. 824. 33Code 1901, § 1262. 665 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 655 detain such animals until all charges under such agreement for the care, keep, or board of such animals shall have been paid: provided, however, that notice in writing shall first be given to such owner in person or at his last known place of residence of the amount of such charges and the intention to detain such animal or animals until all charges shall be paid. § 654. Florida. ^^ — A lien prior in dignity to all others exists in favor of all keepers of livery, sale or feed stables for feeding or taking care of any horse or other animal put in their charge, upon such horse or other animal, § 655. Georgia."'^^ — Innkeepers and livery stable keepers have a lien for their dues on the stock placed in their care for keeping, which shall be superior to other liens, except liens for taxes, special liens of landlords for rent, liens of laborers, and all general liens of which they had actual notice before the property claimed to be subject to lien came into their control, to which excepted liens they shall be in- ferior. The keeper of a livery stable is a depositary for hire, and is bound to the same diligence and entitled to the same lien as an innkeeper.^*^ Every livery stable keeper may also assert his lien by making a statement in writing of the amount due him, with a description of the stock on which the lien is claimed, and making affidavit thereto, and recording it in the clerk's office of the superior court of the county where the service was rendered, and when so recorded the lien has the same effect as is now given by retaining possession. The lien must be recorded while the property is in the possession of 34Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2205. to priority, see Colquitt v. Kirk- 35 Code 1911, § 3360. For mode man, 47 Ga. 555; Elliott v. Hodg- of enforcing the lien, see general son, 133 Ga. 209, 65 S. E. 405. provisions, ch. xxii., 1053, infra. As scCode 1911, § 3515. § 655a LIENS. 666 the livery stable keeper. Such lien may be foreclosed as mortgages on personalty are now foreclosed. '^^ § 655a. Hawaii.""'' — Whoever pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by virtue of a contract with or by the consent of the owner of such animals for a compensation agreed upon, has a lien on such animals for such pasturing, feeding or shelter- ing to secure payment thereof wath costs. If the owner of such animal or animals after demand and notice in writing that such lien will be enforced served upon him, shall fail to pay the amount due for such pasturing, feed- ing or sheltering within thirty days, the holder of the lien may cause such animal or animals to be sold at public auc- tion, upon notice of such sale being given for fifteen days by publication in an English or Hawaiian newspaper, or by post- ing such notice in the Hawaiian and English languages at the court house of the district where no newspaper is published. § 655b. Idaho.''^ — Livery or boarding or feed stable pro- prietors, and persons pasturing live stock of any kind, have a lien, dependent on possession, for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding or pasturing such live stock. If the liens as herein provided are not paid within sixty days after the work is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at public auction, after giving ten days' public notice of the sale by advertising in some newspaper published in the county where such prop- erty is situated, or if there be no newspaper published in the county then by posting notices of the sale in three of the most public places in the county, for ten days previous to such sale. The proceeds of the sale must be paid over to the owner. STCode 1911, § 3370. mon v. Franklin, 7 Idaho 316, 62 STaRev. Laws 1905, §§ 2179, 2180. Pac. 1030. 38Rev. Code 1908, § 3446; Solo- 66; LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. 658 § 656. Illinois."^ — Stable keepers and other persons have a Hen upon the horses, carriages, and harness kept by them, for the proper charges due for the keeping thereof and ex- penses bestowed thereon at the request of the owner, or the person having the possession thereof. Agistors and other persons keeping, yarding, feeding or pasturing domestic animals have a lien upon the animals agistered, kept, yarded or fed, for the proper charges due for the agisting, keeping, yarding or feeding thereof. § 657. Indiana.^" — The keepers of livery stables and all others engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, and other live stock, have a lien upon such property for the feed and care bestowed by them upon the same, and shall have the same rights and remedies as are provided for tradesmen, mechanics and others.'*^ § 658. lowa.^- — Keepers of livery and feed stables, herd- ers and feeders and keepers of stock for hire, have a lien on 39 Kurd's Rev. Stats. 1913, ch. 82, §§ 2, 3. For mode of enforcing liens, see ch. xxii., § 1054, post. One only selling feed to another in charge of an animal is not en- titled to any lien. W. H. How- ard Com. Co. V. National Live- stock Bank, 93 111. App. 473. 40 Burns' Ann. Stats. 1914, § 8294. The statute does not apply to iso- lated cases of feeding cattle. Conklin v. Carver, 19 Ind. 226. The lien is not assignable. Rear- don v. Higgins, 39 Ind. App. 363, 79 N. E. 208. Where animals are fed and boarded by the consent of the mortgagee the agister has a lien superior to the lien of the mortgage. Woodard v. Myers, 15 Ind. App. 42, 43 N. E. 573. The liveryman's lien is not assignable and the assignee can not defend a replevin suit for a horse by the owner by setting up such assign- ment. Glascock V. Lemp, 26 Ind. App. 175, 59 N. E. 342. 41 See post, § 758. 42Code Ann. 1897, § 3137. Prior to the enactment of this statute, March 10, 1880, a livery stable keeper in this state had no lien. McDonald v. Bennett, 45 Iowa 456; Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290. The statute giving a lien upon personal property stored or left with a warehouse- man or other depositary did not give such a lien. McDonald v. Bennett, 45 Iowa 456. A profes- sional trainer of horses for speed has no lien. Scott v, Mercer (Iowa), 63 N. W. 325. § 659 LIENS. 668 all stock and property coming into their hands, as such, for their charges, and expense of keeping, when the same have been received from the owner or from any person: pro- vided, however, this lien shall be subject to all prior liens of record. The owner or claimant of the property may release the lien and shall be entitled to the possession of the property on tendering to the person claiming the lien a bond in a penal sum of three times the amount for which the lien is claimed, signed by two sureties, residents of the county, who shall justify as required in other cases, conditioned to pay any judgment the person claiming the lien shall obtain, for which the property was liable under the lien. If such charges and expenses are not sooner paid, the lien- holder may sell said property at public auction, after giving to the owner or claimant ten days' notice in writing of the time and place of such sale, if found within the county, and also by posting written notices thereof in three public places in the township where said stock was kept or let. Out of the proceeds of such sale he shall pay all of said charges and ex- penses of keeping said stock together with the costs and ex- penses of said sale, and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the owner or claimant of said property. § 659. Kansas.*^ — The keepers of livery stables, and all others engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, or other live stock, shall have a lien upon such property for the feed and care bestowed by them upon the same, and if reasonable or stipulated charges for such feed and care be not paid within sixty days after the same becomes due, the property, or so ^--^Dassler's Gen. Stat. 1909, 1909, § 4809) have been followed. §§ 4809, 4813-4816. An agistor's lien Central Nat. Bank v. Brecheisen, by contract with a mortgagor will 65 Kans. 807, 70 Pac. 895. See not prevail over a prior mortgage Jackson v. McCray, 63 Kans. 238, unless the statutes (Gen. Stats. 65 Pac. 227. 669 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 660 much thereof as may be necessary to pay such charges and the expenses of publication and sale, may be sold. § 660. Kentucky. ^^ — All owners and keepers of livery stables, and persons feeding or grazing cattle for compensa- tion, shall have a lien upon the cattle placed in such stable or put out to be fed or grazed by the owner or owners thereof, for their reasonable charges for keeping, caring for, feeding and grazing the same; and this lien shall attach whether the cattle are merely temporarily lodged, fed, grazed and cared for, or are placed at such stable or other place or pasture for regular board; but it shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions as provided in case of a landlord's lien for rent. When such lien exists in favor of any person, he may, before a justice of the peace, or a judge of the quarterly court of the county where the cattle were fed or grazed, by himself or agent, make affidavit to the amount due him and in arrear for keeping and caring for such cattle, and de- scribing as near as may be the cattle so kept by him; and thereupon such officer shall issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff or any constable or town marshal of said county, au- thorizing him to levy upon and seize the said cattle for the 44 Carroll's Stats. 1909, §§ 2500- penses is constitutional. Griffith 2502. Speth v. Brangman, 27 Ky. L. v. Speaks, 111 Ky. 149, 23 Ky. L. 295, 84 S. W. 1149. The lien of a 561, 63 S. W. 465. A lien on a prior mortgage is superior to the horse reserved in a note for pur- lien of a stable keeper, not em- chase-money is superior to the lien ployed by the mortgagee. Lee v. of an agister wh knows of such Vanmeter, 98 Ky. 1, 17 Ky. L. 548, lien. Bean v. Johnson, 17 Ky. L. 32 S. W. 137. Where some of the 585, 32 S. W. 175. The existence animals on which an agistor has a of an agistor's lien can not be ad- lien are surrendered to the owner judged as against an attaching the lienor may hold the rest for creditor of the owner where the all the claim. Griffith v. Speaks, animal upon which the lien is 111 Ky. 149, 23 Ky. 561, 63 S. W. claimed was under the full control 465. The act giving persons feed- of the owner. Feltman v. Chinn, 19 ing and caring for animals a lien Ky. L. 1147, 43 S. W. 192. on them for such services and ex- § 66 1 LIENS. 670 amount due, with interest and costs; but if the said cattle have been removed from the custody of the livery stable keeper, or person feeding or grazing them, with his consent, the lien herein provided for shall not continue longer than ten days from and after such removal; nor shall such lien, in any case of such removal, be valid against any bona fide pur- chaser without notice at any time within ten days after such removal. A warrant, as herein provided, may be issued to another county than that in which the cattle were fed or grazed; the lien may also be enforced by action as in case of other liens. The proceedings under a warrant shall, in all respects, be the same as is provided in cases of distress w'arrants, and none of the cattle so fed or grazed shall be exempt from seizure or sale. § 661. Louisiana. — Under the provision of the code^^ which entitles a party to the expenses incurred in the pre- servation of property, and to the right to retain it, it is held that the feeding of horses may be classed among the ex- penses incurred in their preservation, and that a privilege exists therefor.'*® But a keeper of public stables has no privilege on horses placed with him on livery for money loaned to their owner. ^^ § 662. Maine. "^^ — Whoever pastures, feeds or shelters ani- mals by virtue of a contract with or by consent of the owner, 45 Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, court deemed it unnecessary to §§ 3224-3226. decide. 4<5Andrews v. Crandell, 16 La. -^'Whiting v. Coons, 2 La. Ann. Ann. 208. In Powers v. Hubbell. 961. 12 La. Ann. 413, it was held that ^sRev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, § 59. the keeper of a livery stable has A proceeding to enforce lien for no privilege by law upon car- board of a horse is purely a pro- riages kept in his stable. Whether ceeding in rem. McGillicuddy v. he has a privilege for preserving Edwards, 96 Maine 347, 52 Atl. the horses by feeding them, the 785. 6/1 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. 663 has a lien thereon for the amount due for such pasturing, feeding or sheltering, and for necessary expenses incurred in the proper care of such animals in payment of taxes assessed thereon, to secure payment thereof with costs, to be en- forced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession and choses in action.^'' § 663. Massachusetts.'" — Persons having proper charges due them for pasturing, boarding or keeping horses or other domestic animals, brought to their premises or placed in their care by or with the consent of the owners thereof, have a lien on such horses or other domestic animals for such charges. At the expiration of ten days after a demand in writing, 4'J See ante, § 531. After a sale under execution issued upon a petition to enforce the lien, a second petition to enforce a lien for keeping the animals during the time intervening be- tween the dates of tlie two peti- tions can not be maintained, though commenced while the ani- mals still remain in the posses- sion of the lien-holder, and there is a surplus arising from the pro- ceeds of the sale. After the sale, there is nothing upon which the lien can attach. It can not attach to the surplus. Lord v. Collins, 76 Maine 443, 446, per Foster, J. : "There is nothing in the statute we are considering which by ex- press words or by necessary im- plication contemplates the en- forcement of a lien upon anything other than the animals which have been furnished food or shelter. The petitioner claims to sustain this petition as against said ani- mals in addition to the judgment of lien in his behalf before granted, and to have his claim satisfied 'out of said property or the proceeds thereof.' The stat- ute does not go to that extent, where, by the petitioner's own motion, the property has been sold to satisfy a lien in favor of the same party, and originating from one and the same bailment." 50Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 198, § 29. The stable keeper's lien is not lost by his useing horses kept by him for the owner. Brintnall v. Smith, 166 Mass. 253, 44 N. E. 221. Where one boarding a horse for another allows the owner to take and keep possession for sev- eral weeks, he waives his lien on such horse. Papineau v. Went- worth, 136 Mass. 543. See also, Hodgkins v. Bowser, 195 Mass. 141, 80 N. E. 796. § 664 ' , LIENS. 672 petition may be made for the sale of the property, and notice thereon may be served seven days before the hearing.^^ § 664. Michigan.'^- — Whenever any person shall deliver to another any horse, mule, neat cattle, sheep or swine to be kept or cared for, such person shall have a lien thereon for the keeping and care of such animals, and may retain pos- session of the same until such charges are paid. The person having such lien may commence a suit for the recovery of such charges, by summons in the usual form, before any justic of the peace of the city or township in which he resides, or in any court, as the case may require, against the person liable for the payment thereof. If such summons be returned personally served upon the defendant, the same proceedings shall thereupon be had, in all respects, as in other suits commenced by summons, in which there is a per- sonal service of process, and judgment shall be rendered in such suit in like manner. If the officer return upon such summons, that the defendant cannot be found within his county, the same proceedings shall be thereupon had, in all respects, as near as may be, as in suits commenced by at- tachment, in which there is not a personal service of a copy of the attachment upon the defendant, and judgment shall be rendered in such suit in like manner. If the plaintiff re- oiln other respects the lien is Howell's Stats. Ann. 1912, enforced under the general provi- §§ 13804-13812. One boarding a sions stated in ch. xxii., § 1056, horse, brought to him by one not Massachusetts. One who has a the owner, to have lien must show lien on a horse for boarding it that such person was authorized who in good faith demands an to act for the owner. Elliott v. excessive sum for the delivery Martin, 105 Mich. 506, 63 N. W. of possession to the owner will 525. Where a tender is made by not lose his lien where no tender the owner for the keeping and of the amount due is made to feeding his horse and the same him. Folsom v. Barrett, 180 Mass. is accepted, even if the amount 439, 62 N. E. 723, 91 Am. St. 320. is too small, the keeper's lien is •52Comp. Laws 1897, ch. 297, discharged. Rosema v. Porter, 112 §§ 10746, 10749-10752, 10754; Mich. 13, 70 N. W. 316. dj}^ LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 665 cover judgment in such suit, execution shall issue thereon in the same manner and with the like effect, as upon judg- ment rendered in suits commenced by attachment; and the property upon which the plaintiff holds such lien, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to satisfy such execution may be sold thereon in the same manner as if it had been seized and held upon an attachment in such suit. If the property upon which any such lien shall be enforced consist of horses, cattle, sheep, swine or other beasts, and any expenses shall have been incurred by the person having such lien after the same accrued, in keeping and taking care of such property, the amount of such expenses shall be an additional lien upon the property, and shall be computed and ascertained upon the trial or assessment of damages, and in- cluded in the judgment. § 665. Minnesota.^^ — A lien and right of detainer shall exist for the keeping, feeding, pasturing, or otherwise caring for domestic animals or other beasts, including medical or surgical treatment thereof and shoeing the same; such liens shall embrace all lawful charges against such property paid to any other person by the person claiming such lien and the price or value of such care and all reasonable disbursements occasioned by the detention or sale of the property. If any sum secured by such lien be not paid within ninety days after it becomes due the holder may sell the property and out of the proceeds of such sale there shall be paid, first, the dis- bursements aforesaid, and second, all charges against the 53 Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7037. The 472, 67 N. W. 365. The lien of a lien takes precedence of a chattel livery stable keeper applies to mortgage executed before such exempt property such as a horse, keeping. Smith v. Stevens, 36 Flint v. Luhrs, 66 Minn. 57, 68 N. Minn. 303, 31 N. W. 55. The lien W. 514, 61 Am. St. 391. There is is inferior to that of a previously no lien in favor of a groom for executed and recorded mortgage. care of horse. Skinner v. Caughey, Petzenka v. Dallimore, 64 Minn. 64 Minn. 375, 67 N. W. 203. 43 665 a LIENS. 674 property paid by any person against any other person, and third, the total indebtedness then secured by the lien. The remainder, if any, shall be paid on demand to the owner or other person entitled thereto. ^^ § 665a. Mississippi.^'' — The owner of every livery stable, sale stable, or feed stable shall have a lien on every horse, mule, cow, or other animal for the price of feeding, groom- ing, training or keeping the same at the instance of the owner of the animal, and shall have the right to retain pos- session of the animal until such price be paid. The lien shall be subordinate to any prior incumbrance on such animal of which the owner of the stable had notice, actual or construc- tive, unless the animal were fed, groomed, trained or kept bv the consent of the incumbrancer. § 666. Missouri."'''*' — Every person who shall keep, board or train any horse, mule or other animal shall, for the amount 54As to provisions for sale see Laws 1907, ch. 114, § 4. As to unlawful disposal of animal, see Annot. Stats. 1906, ch. 47, § 4232. 55Code 1906, ch. 84, §§ 3082, 3084. 56Rev. Stats. 1909, §§ 8238, 8239. The lien is inferior to that of a prior mortgage. Miller v. Crabbe. 66 Mo. App. 660, 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1'371; Pickett v. McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467. The stable keeper has no lien on a carriage kept at the stable, together with a horse which he is boarding. Zartman- Thalman Carriage Co. v. Reid, 99 Mo. App. 415, 73 S. W. 942. The agistor has a lien only for the amount which is due at the time he gives up possession. Powers V. Botts, 58 Mo. App. 1. Re- plevin will lie for possession of an animal obtained by one having notice that there was an agistor's lien against it. Story v. Patten, 61 Mo. App. 12. One has a lien for caring for and doctoring a horse. Maryville Nat. Bank v. Snyder, 85 Mo. App. 82. A mort- gage recorded in a county other than where the mortgagee resides will not defeat the foreclosure of an agistor's lien on the horse de- scribed in the mortgage. Duke V. Duke, 93 Mo. App. 244. A lien for pasturing stock must be based on a contract, express or implied. Cunningham v. Hamill, 84 Mo. App. 389. Where a horse and buggy are kept at the livery stable the stableman has no lien on the buggy as against a mortgage. Varney v. Jackson, 66 Mo. App. 349. 675 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 666 due therefor, have a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness or equipment coming into his possession therewith, and no ovv^ner or claimant shall have the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with his consent or on the payment of such debt; and such lien shall be valid gaainst said property in the pos- session of any person receiving or purchasing it with notice of such claim. The lien provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be enforced as follows: The person claiming the lien shall file with a justice of the peace of the w^ard, district or township in which he resides, a statement duly verified by himself, his agent or attorney, setting forth his account and a de- scription of the property on which the lien is claimed, and thereupon the justice shall issue a summons, as in ordinary civil actions, returnable forthwith; and upon the return of the summons, duly served, shall set the cause for hearing at any time after the lapse of one day. If summons be returned "defendant not found," and if it be proved to the satisfaction of the justice that the defendant is not a resident of the county, the justice shall order a notice of the proceedings to be published for three successive days, in a daily newspaper, if one be published in the county, and if there be none, then once in a weekly, if such be published in the county; and if no paper be published in the county, then by six handbills put up in six public places in the county, notifying the defendant of the filing and the particulars of the account, the description of the property on which the lien is claimed, its whereabouts, and the day and place set for the hearing of the cause, which shall be at least ten days from the day of the last publication of the notice ; and the proof of such publication shall be filed in the justice's office on or before the day of trial. When the defendant shall have been summoned or notified as aforesaid, the cause shall, on the day fixed for trial, be tried as any ordinary case in a justice's court. If the judgment be for the § 667 LIENS. ^^jd plaintiff, the justice shall order the property upon which the lien shall have been found to exist to be sold to satisfy the same. If the lien be not established, and the defendant shall not have been summoned, or shall not have voluntarily ap- peared to the action, the cause shall be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff. If the defendant shall have been summoned, or shall have appeared to the action, and the plaintiff shall have established an indebtedness on the account sued on, but shall have failed to establish the lien claimed, the judgment shall be for the plaintiff for such indebtedness, but the costs of suit, or any part thereof, may be taxed against him. § 667. Montana.^" — A ranchman, farmer, agister, herder, hotel-keeper, livery, boarding or feed stable keeper, to v^hom any horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs or other stock shall be intrusted, and there is a contract, express or implied, for their keeping, feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching, has a lien upon such stock for the amount due for keeping, feed- ing, herding, pasturing or ranching the same, and is author- ized to retain possession thereof until the sum due is paid, and may enforce his lien as in the case of a pledge. § 668. Nebraska.^^ — When any person shall procure, con- tract with, or hire any other person to feed and take care of any kind of live stock, the latter shall have a lien upon such 57 Code (Civ.) 1895, § 3935. caution; and instead of adopting 58Ann. Stats. 1911, § 3117. See the language of the statutes of Gates V. Parrott, 31 Nebr. 581, 48 New Hampshire and other eastern N. W. 387. The original statute states, which gave a lien in ex- was enacted February 18, 1867, press terms to the agisters of and is probably the earliest stat- cattle, they only created an es- ute passed by any western state toppel against the person Con- or territory for the protection of tracting, hiring, or procuring the feeders and herders of cattle. feeding and caring for of livestock State Bank v. Lowe, 22 Nebr. 68, to gain possession of such stock, ZZ N. W. 482. Cobb, J., in this by replevin or other legal means, case, said: "Our legislature seems until he should make payment, or to have proceeded with great tender the same therefor." It d'jy LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 669 property for the feed and care bestowed by him upon the same for the contract price therefor, and, in case no price has been agreed upon, then for the reasonable value of such feed and care. The person entitled to such lien may fore- close the same in the manner provided by law for the fore- closing of chattel mortgages: provided, that at least thirty days before the sale of the property for the satisfaction of such lien, the person entitled thereto shall file in the office of the county clerk, in the county in which said live stock may be fed and kept, an affidavit describing the same, and setting forth the amount justly due for the feeding and keeping of the same. § 669. Nevada.^^ — Any ranchman, or other person or per- sons, keeping corrals, livery or feed stables, or furnishing hay, grain, pasture or otherwise boarding any horse or horses, mule or mules, ox or oxen, or other animal or ani- mals, shall have a lien upon and retain possession of the same, or a sufficient number thereof, until all reasonable charges are paid, or suit can be brought and judgment ob- tained for the amount of such charges, and execution issued and levied on said property: provided, nothing in this act was accordingly held that the indicating an intent by the agistor statute did not create a lien su- to waive his lien. Becker v. perior to that of a chattel mort- Brown, 65 Nebr. 264, 91 N. W. gage previously executed, deliv- 178. The agistor may adopt other ered, and recorded. Where one means than a statutory fore- is put in the possession of sheep closure where the owner consents under an agreement giving him a to it. Dale v. Council Bluffs Sav. share of the wool and the increase Bank, 65 Nebr. 692, 91 N. W. 526, of the sheep for his care and 94 N. W. 983. Even where a pur- feed is entitled to a lien on such chaser for value of livestock has sheep for the contract price. no notice of an agistor's lien he Schrandt v. Young, 62 Nebr. 254, still takes the title, subject to an 86 N. W. 1085. As between the agistor's lien. Weber v. Whet- parties or those having notice of stone, 53 Nebr. 371, 73 N. W. 695. an agistor's lien, such lien is not 59 Rev. Laws 1912, §§ 5499, 5500. lost by change of possession not § 670 LIENS. 678 shall be so construed as to include any debt other than for the boarding, keeping, or pasture of such animal or animals, together with costs of suit and sale. Sales of such animal or animals shall be made as other sales of personal property under execution. The officer making such sale shall be en- titled to such fees for his services as are allowed by law in cases of other sales of personal property. § 670. New Hampshire.*'*^ — A person to whom horses, cattle, sheep or other domestic animals shall be intrusted to be pastured or boarded, shall have a lien thereon for all pro- per charges due for such pasturing or board, until the same shall be paid or tendered. § 671. New Jersey.*^^ — All livery stable, boarding and ex- change stable keepers, shall have a lien on all horses and other animals left with them in livery for board, or sale, or exchange ; and also upon all carriages, wagons, sleighs and harness left with them for storage, sale or exchange, for the amount of the bill due to the proprietor of any such stable for the board and keep of any such horse or other animal, eopub. Stats. & Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 141, § 2. For mode of enforc- ing, see general provision, ch. xxii., § 1057, infra. Under this statute a person pasturing a milch cow for the season, in the usual manner, under an agreement with the owner, is so far intrusted with the animal as to have a lien upon it for the charge of pasturing, as against the owner, and third persons having no title or right of possession. Smith v. Harden, 60 N. H. 509, 512, per Doe, C. J. : "The statute does not expressly exclude a lien when the contract is to pasture or board an animal a month, a week, a day. or parts of successive days, or when the owner is to have the use and possession of it a part of every day; and there is not satis- factory evidence of an intent to leave the creditor, in such cases as this, without equitable secur- ity." It is also declared that the right of the owner to take the cow from the pasture daily to milk is as consistent with a lien as the right of a boarder to carry various articles of his luggage from his boarding house without affecting the boarding house keep- er's lien. eiComp. Stats. 1910, p. 3135, § 50. 6/9 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 673 and, also, for such storage; and shall have the right, without the process of law, to retain the same, until the amount of such said indebtedness is discharged. All property held by any such livery stable, boarding and exchange stable keeper shall, after the expiration of thirty days from the date of such detention, be sold at public auc- tion; upon a notice of said sale being first published for the space of two weeks in some newspaper circulating in the city or township in which said livery or boarding and exchange stable is situate; and also, after five days' notice of said sale, set up in five of the most public places in said city or town- ship, and the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the pay- ment of such lien, and the expenses of such sale; and the balance, if any remaining, shall be paid over to the owner of such property, or his representatives; and if the said balance is not claimed by such owner within sixty days after such sale, then the said balance to be paid over to the overseer of the poor of said city or township, for the support of the poor. § 672. New Mexico.*'- — Livery stable keepers, and those who furnish feed or shelter for the stock of others, have a lien on the stock while the same is in their possession, and until the same is paid for. After ten days' notice in writing stat- ing the amount of the indebtedness, and then after giving twenty days' notice by posting, the lien may be enforced by sale at auction. § 673. New York.®^ — A person keeping a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or pasturing or boarding one or 62 Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2239- notice to the owner is essential 2242. to the lien, even though the owner 63Laws 1906, ch. 687; Birdseye's obtains the possession wrongfullj*. C. & G. Consol. Laws 1909, p. Kline v. Green, 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 3234. Mason Stable Co. v. Lewis. 190, 31 N. Y. S. 599. Demanding 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 359, 74 N. Y. more than the lien is held for St. 379, 38 N. Y. S. 82. A will not deprive the stable keeper V\5 LIENS. 680 more animals, or who in connection therewith keeps or stores any wagon, truck, cart, carriage, vehicle or harness, has a lien dependent upon the possession upon each animal kept, pastured or boarded by him, and upon any wagon, truck, cart, carriage, vehicle or harness of any kind or description, stored or kept provided an express or implied agreement is made with the owners thereof, whether such owner be a mortgagor remaining in possession, or otherwise, for the sum due him for the care, keeping, boarding or pasturing of the animal or for the keeping or storing of any wagon, truck, cart, carriage, vehicle or harness, under the agreement and may detain the animal or wagon, truck, cart, carriage, vehicle and harness accordingly, until such sum is paid.^^ of his lien. Campbell v. Abbott, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 93, 111 N. Y. S. 782. See also, Seiner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. S. 1049. A liveryman board- ing a horse and occasionally clean- ing a buggy for the owner has a lien on the horse but none on the buggy. Cotta v. Carr, 27 Misc. (N. Y.) 545, 58 N. Y. S. 317; Robinson v. Kaplan, 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 686, 47 N. Y. S. 1083. 64When the owner of a horse demands it from a livery-stable keeper without offering to pay him his charges for keeping it, the livery-stable keeper is entitled to a reasonable time in which to make up the account of what is due, and serve it, with notice of the lien, in the manner required by the statute. "Otherwise, it would be in the power of an un- scrupulous debtor, by suddenly making such a demand, to cut off the livery-stable keeper altogether from his lien, unless he were pre- pared at the moment to hand the debtor the bill of charges and the notice in writing, which the stat- ute requires. Such a construction would operate rather to defeat the statute than to aid the en- forcement of the remedy, which is the construction required in remedial statutes. Where an ac- count is running on from day to day, or from week to week, for the keeping of a horse, the livery-stable keeper would have to be continually serving writ- ten notices of his lien and his charges under such a construc- tion as the justice has given; and it is a much more rea- sonable one, that when the owner of a horse demands the ani- mal, without offering to pay what is due for keeping it, the livery-stable keeper should have thereafter a reasonable length of time to make up the account, and serve it with the notice in the formal manner which the statute requires for his protection; and as in this case, an account running over a period of eight months has 68 1 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 674 §673a. North Dakota.^^ — Any farmer, ranchman, or herder of cattle, tavern-keeper or livery-stable keeper, to whom any horses, mules, cattle or sheep shall be intrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching, shall have a lien upon said horses, mules, cattle, or sheep for the amount that may be due for such feeding, herding, pasturing or ranching, and shall be authorized to retain possession of such horses, mules, cattle or sheep until the said amount is paid; provided, that these provisions shall not be construed to apply to stolen stock. These provisions shall not be construed to give any farmer, ranchman or herder of cattle, tavern-keeper, or livery stable keeper any lien upon horses, mules, cattle or sheep put into their keeping for the purposes mentioned in the previous paragraph, when said property was not owned by the person intrusting the same at the time of delivering them into the possession of said farmer, ranchman, herder, tavern-keeper or livery stable keeper. § 674. Ohio.^^ A person who feeds or furnishes food and care for any horse, mare, foal, filly, gelding, cattle, sheep, swine, mule or ass, by virtue of any contract or agreement with the owner or person having lawful possession thereof, to be made up of charges, credits and serve notice on him. A no- and offsets, four or five hours tice directed to and served upon was not an unreasonable length the husband, when in fact the of time to enable the defendant horse belonged to his wife, is a to do so." Eckhard v. Donohue, nullity. Armitage v. Mace, 48 N. 9 Daly (N. Y.) 214, 216, cited with Y. Super. Ct. 107, affd. 96 N. Y. approval in Lessells v. Farns- 538, on another point, worth, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) esNorth Dakota Rev. Code 1905, 364. If a stable keeper boards a ch. 82, §§ 6264-6266. For mode of horse which is already subject to enforcing liens, see ch. xxii., infra, a mortgage, the mortgagee has a 66Gen. Code 1910, §§ 8353, 8354. superior lien. One who desires The lien of an agistor is superior to assert his right to the posses- to that of a mortgage. Aylmore sion of a horse by virtue of his v. Kahn, 5 Ohio Cir. D. 410, 11 lien must ascertain the real owner Ohio Cir. Ct. 392. § 674a LIENS. 682 shall have a lien therefor to secure the payment of the same upon such animal. A person feeding or furnishing food and care for any horse, mare, foal, filly, gelding, cattle, sheep, swine, mule or ass shall retain such animal for the period of ten days, at the expiration of which time, if the owner or person having law- ful possession of it does not satisfy such lien, he may sell such animal at public auction, after giving the owner ten days' notice of the time and place of sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the food was fur- nished or the care bestowed; and after satisfying the lien and costs that may accrue, any residue remaining shall be paid to the owner or person legally entitled to it. § 674a. Oklahoma/'^ — Any person or persons employed in feeding, grazing or herding any domestic animals, whether in pasture or otherwise, shall, for the amount due for such feed- ing, grazing or herding, have a lien on said animals. Any person or persons, partnership, firm or corporation within this state, or in any border county of the adjacent states, furnishing or providing to the owners of such domes- tic ^animals, shall, for the amount due for such corn, forage, feed and hay, have a lien on said animals. All liens, not to excceed in the aggregate twenty-five per cent, of the value of such animals, against any domestic animal or animals for labor, grazing, herding or feeding, or for corn, feed, forage or hay, furnished the owner of such domestic animals as herein provided, and actually used for such purpose, shall be prior to all other liens thereon, and no recital or stipulation in any mortgage or other incum- brance on any cattle so fed shall be held to supersede or vitiate the lien here provided for. 67Comp. Laws 1909, §§ 143-145; Pac. 876; Boston & K. C. Cattle Crismon v. Barse Live Stock Loan Co. v. Dickson, 11 Okla. 680, Commission Co., 17 Okla. 117, 87 69 Pac. 889. 683 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 6/6 § 675. Oregon.'^'^ — Any person who shall depasture or feed any horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, or other livestock, or bestow any labor, care, or attention upon the same, at the request of the owner or lawful possessor thereof, shall have a lien upon such property for his just and reasonable charges for the labor, care, and attention he has bestowed and the food he has furnished, and he may retain possession of such property until such charges be paid. Lien is enforced by sale after notice. § 676. Pennsylvania.''^ — All livery stable keepers and inn- keepers have a lien upon any and every horse delivered to them to be kept in their stables, for the expense of the keep- ing; and in case the owner of the said horse or horses, or the person who delivered them for keeping to the keeper of the livery-stable or innkeepers, shall not pay and discharge the said expense, provided it amount to thirty dollars, within fifteen days after demand made of him personally, or, in case of his removal from the place where such livery-stable or inn is kept, within ten days after notice of the amount due, and demand of payment in writing left at his last place of abode, the livery-stable keeper or innkeeper may cause the horse or horses aforesaid to be sold at publicc sale, according to law ; and, after deducting from the amount of sales the costs 68 Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. the board of their drivers. McMan- Codes & Stats. 1902, §§ 5674, 5675. igle v. Grouse, 34 Leg. Int. (Pa.) One is not entitled to a lien who 384. Or the care of wagons and does not feed or bestow labor or the like. Hartshorne v. Seeds, 1 care on the live stock of another, Chest. Co. Rep. 460. The lien does but who only pays for the feed. not attach to stolen horses. Gump Sharp V. Johnson, 38 Ore. 246, 63 v. Showalter, 43 Pa. St. 507; Pac. 485, 84 Am. St. 788. Hoopes v. Worrall, 1 Del. Co. 69Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.), p. Rep. (Pa.) 111. The liveryman's 1890, § 16. This lien is joint and lien for boarding and keeping a several on all the horses kept. horse does not extend to a phae- Young V. Kimball, 23 Pa. St. 193. ton and harness kept with the The lien is restricted to the board horse at the livery stable. Sides of the horses, and does not cover v. Cline, 19 Pa. Co. Ct. 481. § 676a LIENS. 684 of sale and the expense of keeping, shall deliver the residue upon demand to the person or agent of the person who de- livered the horse or horses for keeping. § 676a. South Dakota/^ — Any farmer, ranchman, or herder of cattle, tavern-keeper, or livery stable keeper, to v\^hom any horses, mules, cattle, or sheep shall be instrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding, pasturing or ranching, shall have a lien upon said horses, mules, cattle, or sheep for the amount that may be due for such feeding, herding, pas- turing or ranching, and shall be authorized to retain pos- session of such horses, mules, cattle or sheep until the said amount is paid provided, that these provisions shall not be construed to apply to stolen stock. These provisions shall not be construed to give any farmer, ranchman or herder of cattle, tavern-keeper or livery-stable keeper any lien upon horses, mules, cattle or sheep put into their keeping for the purposes mentioned in the previous paragraph, v^^hen said property was not owned by the person intrusting the same at the time of delivering them into the possession of said farmer, ranchman, herder, tavern keeper, or livery stable keeper. § 677. Tennessee.'''^ — Whenever any horse or other ani- mal is received to pasture for a consideration, the farmer shall have a lien upon the animal for his proper charges, the same as the innkeeper's lien at common law. This lien shall include the charges for the service of any stallion, jack, bull or boar, when the charge for the service of such animal to the female shall have been stipulated and agreed upon between the parties. Livery stable keepers are entitled to the same lien on all ■J^o Rev. Code 1903, (Civ. Proc.) superior to that of a mortgagee §§ 722, 723. virho knows that the horse is being 7iAnn. Code 1896, §§ 3552, 3553, trained. Farney v. Kerr (Tenn. 3556. The Hen of a trainer is Ch.), 48 S. W. 103. 685 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 678a Stock received by them for board and feed, until all reason- able charges are paid. § 678. Texas.'- — Proprietors of livery or public stables have a special lien on all animals placed with them for feed, care, and attention, as also upon such carriages, buggies or other vehicles as may have been placed in their care, for the amount of the charges against the same, and this article shall apply to and include owners or lessees of pastures, who shall have a similar lien on all animals placed with them for pasturage. § 678a. Utah.''^^ — Any ranchman, farmer, agistor or herder of cattle, tavern keeper, or livery stable keeper, tQ whom any horses, mules, cattle, sheep, or asses, shall be intrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching, shall have a lien upon such animals for the amount that may be due him for such feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching, and shall be authorized to retain possession of such animals until said amount is paid. At any time after thirty days after default made in the payment of a debt secured by a lien upon personal property, such lien may be foreclosed by advertisement, upon the notice and in the manner provided for the foreclosure of mortgages on personal property; provided, that a copy of the notice shall, at the time of posting or pujDlication, be delivered to the owner of the property, or if he does not reside in the county, shall be transmitted to him by mail at his usual place of abode, if known. Any residue of the proceeds of the sale over expenses and claim, shall be rendered to the owner of the property. ■^SRev. Stats. 1911, art. 5664. For to that of a prior mortgage, manner of enforcing the lien, see Blackford v. Ryan (Tex. Civ. general provision, ch. xxii., § 1060. App.), 61 S. W. 161. The liveryman's lien is inferior 73Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 1401, 1405. § 679 LIENS. 686 § 679. Vermont.'^ — Persons liaving charges due them for pasturing, boarding or keeping domestic animals, placed, with the consent of the owners thereof, in the care of such persons, may, if the charges become due while such animals remain in their possession, retain the possession of such ani- mals until such charges are paid, and, after thirty days from the time the charges become due, if the property affected does not exceed one hundred dollars in value, may sell such animals in the manner provided for the sale of property under a lien for repairs. § 680. Virginia.' ■' — Every keeper of a livery stable, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses or other ani- mals, vehicles or harness, shall have a lien upon such horses and other animals, vehicles, and harness, for the amount which may be due him for the keeping, supporting, and care thereof, until such amount is paid. § 680a. Washington.'^ — Any farmer, ranchman, herder of cattle, tavern keeper, livery and boarding stable keeper, or any other person to whom any horses, mules, cattle, or sheep shall be intrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding, pasturing, and training, caring for or ranching, shall have a lien upon said horses, mules, cattle, or sheep for the amount that may be due for such feeding, herding, pasturing, train- ing, caring for, or raxiching, and shall be authorized to retain possession of such horses, mules, cattle, or sheep until the said amount is paid. This lien may be enforced by an action in any court of competent jurisdiction; and said property may be sold on execution for the purpose of satisfying the amount of such judgment and costs of sale, together with 74 Pub. Stat. 1906, § 2658. One merely hired to care for 75Pollard's Code 1904, §§ 1197, sheep, the legal possession being 1198. in the owner, has no lien. Hooker 76 Remington & Ballinger's Ann. v. McAllister, 12 Wash. 46, 40 Pac. Codes and Stats. 1910, §§ 1197, 1198. 617. 68/ LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS, § 682 the proper costs of keeping the same up to the time of said sale. § 680b. West Virginia. — Persons keeping live stock for hire shall have the same rights and remedies for the recovery of their charges therefor as innkeepers have.'^'^ When the Humane Society of West Virginia shall provide any neglected or abandoned animal with proper food, shelter and care, it shall have a lien upon such animal for the ex- pense thereof, and such expense shall be charged against the ov^^ner of said animal and collectible from said owner in an action thereforJ^ § 681. Wisconsin. "^^ — Every keeper of a livery or board- ing stable, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses, carriage, harness, mules, cattle, or stock, shall have a lien upon and may retain the possession of any such horses, car- riage, harness, mules, cattle, or stock for the amount which may be due him for the keeping, supporting, and care thereof, until such amount is paid. § 682. Wyoming.^^ — Any ranchman, farmer, agistor, or herder of cattle, tavern-keeper, or livery-stable keeper, to whom any horses, mules, asses, cattle, or sheep shall be in- trusted for the purpose of feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching, shall have a lien upon said horses, mules, asses, cattle, or sheep for the amount that may be due for such feed- '^Code 1906, § 3471. keeping of horses can not be '^'sCode 1906, § 501. The lien is changed into one to enforce a not lost by attaching the property specific lien upon such horses. A by the keeper of the live stock. complaint for legal relief can not Lambert v. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. be changed by amendment into 527, 31 S. E. 951, 44 L. R. A. 561, one for equitable relief. Brothers 72 Am. St. 828. v. Williams, 65 Wis. 401, 27 N. W. 79Stats. 1898, § 3344, as amended 157. in Laws 1911, ch. 394. An ac- soComp. Stats. 1910, § 3754. tion of contract for the care of § 683 LIENS. 688 ing, herding, pasturing, or ranching, and shall be authorized to retain possession of the same until the said amount is paid. These provisions do not apply to stolen stock. § 683. A statute creating the lien attaches from its enact- ment. The fact that the keeping of a horse began before the enactment of the statute giving a lien does not deprive the keeper of a lien for the keeping subsequent to such enact- ment, especially if the keeping of the horse subsequent to the enactment w^as not in pursuance of a contract made prior thereto. In such case the lien does not attach for that part of the account w^hich accrued prior to the taking effect of the statute; but it does attach for that part of the account accruing subsequently.^^ The lien attaches as soon as feed and care are bestow^ed, though the charges therefor are not then due.^- § 684. Property exempt from execution subject to the lien. — Though the horses, cattle or other stock upon which the statute gives a lien be exempt from execution and from distress for rent, the property is subject to the lien in the same manner as other property not so exempt.®^ The lien at- taches to such property, although the lien can be enforced only by execution.^* § 685. Lien of stable keeper is purely statutory. — Inas- much as the lien of a stable keeper is purely statutory, it is for him to comply u^ith all the conditions precedent which the statute requires. ^^ Thus, if a statute requires the giving of notice to the owner of an intention to claim a lien and of the amount of the charges, the person claiming the lien must 8iMunson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290; see ante, 19 N. W. 290. § 510. 82Walls V. Long, 2 Ind. App. 202, 84Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 28 N. E. 101. 453, 19 N. W. 290. 83Fitch V. Steagall, 14 Bush ssjngalls v. Vance, 61 Vt. 582, (Ky.) 230; Munson v. Porter, 63 18 Atl. 452. 689 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 687 ascertain the real owner of the property, and serve notice of his lien upon that person. If the notice be directed to and served upon a person who is not the owner, it is a nullity as against the person who is.^^ § 686. Joint and several lien. — A statutory lien for the keeping of several horses is a joint and several lien upon all the horses, and one horse may be detained for the keeping of all of them.^" § 687. Lien does not include isolated cases of feeding. — A statute giving a lien to a livery stable keeper, and to those engaged in feeding horses and cattle, does not include isolated cases of feeding, but only those whose business it is to feed horses and cattle. But where it appears that for three or four years a farmer has been keeping, feeding and caring for stock belonging to a neighbor, such farmer will be entitled to a lien upon the stock for his feed and care, notwithstanding it may appear that he fed and pastured no other stock for third parties, and that the number of cattle belonging to such neighbor so kept and cared for at no time exceeded twelve in number.^^ Brewer, Justice, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "This is not a case where a farmer has only for a single sea- son pastured a single head of stock for a neighbor, but where for year after year the party has pastured and fed several head of stock. It is true that she only did this for one per- son, but still she did it to such an extent and for such a length of time that it seems to us she comes fairly within the protection of the statute. She was engaged in feeding his stock. That, pro hac vice, may be considered her business. scArmitage v. Mace, 48 N. Y. ssConklin v. Carver, 19 Ind. 226; Super. Ct. 107, 113, afifd. 96 N. Y. Kelsey v. Layne, 28 Kans. 218, 538. 225, 42 Am. Rep. 158. See Alt v. STYoung V. Kimball, 23 Pa. St. Weidenberg, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 176. 193. 44 § 688 LIENS. 690 No one would for a moment seriously contend that a party must engage in it as an exclusive business before becoming entitled to the protection of the statute. Suppose, as in the case of Brown v. Holmes,®^ that 92 cattle were wintered for a single person ; could it be said for a moment that the agistor was not engaged in the business of feeding and taking care of cattle, simply because he had only the cattle of one per- son? So in this case, while the number of cattle is not so great, yet the length of time is much greater." § 688. No lien where keeper keeps horse for own benefit. — No lien arises under a statute for keeping a horse under a special agreement whereby the stable-keeper is to use the horse for the joint benefit of himself and the owner; as where he was to take the horse around the country and enter it for races, the owner to pay all expenses, and to divide the earn- ings with the stable-keeper. For expenses which the stable- keeper has paid for the care and board of the horse at other stables the statute gives him no lien, though the expenses are for board which would give other persons a lien.^^ § 689. Servant has no lien on master's cattle. — When the relation of master and servant exists, the servant can acquire no lien on his master's cattle for depasturing or feeding them.^^ A servant hired as a groom to a horse has no lien upon the horse for his services, but he has a lien for feed furnished by him which the owner ought to have furnished. If the horse is in the groom's custody at his own stable, he is a bailee, and entitled to the lien of a bailee. A contract to feed and keep the horse is not necessary in order to create a lien; but the case stands as if the horse had been left for 8913 Kans. 482. 23 Pac. 881; Skinner v. Caughey, soArmitage v. Mace, 96 N. Y. 64 Minn. 375, Gl N. W. 203; Hook- 538, affirming 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. er v. McAllister, 12 Wash. 46, 40 550. Pac. 617. 9iBailey v. Davis, 19 Ore. 217. 691 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. 690 keep and care without more being said, in which case it is clear that the owner could not have demanded the horse without paying the charges. ^- § 690. Lien upon notice in writing. — Where a statute gives a lien provided notice in writing shall first be given to the owner of the amount of the charges and the intention to claim a lien,^^ an inchoate lien attaches when a horse is placed in a stable; and it becomes complete from the time of giving such notice. It then relates back, and covers all charges due for the care and board of the horse from the beginning. Such a statute is a remedial one, giving a lien where none existed before, and should be liberally construed to advance the remedy. The lien is not cut off by a sale of the horse before the notice is given. ^^ Except in case the statute gives a lien after notice to the owner of intention to claim a lien, the statutory lien of a livery stable keeper arises only when the animal is placed ^^Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 522, 1 Pearson (Pa.) 255. 93As in New York, see ante, § 673. 94Lessells v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 11, affd. 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 364; Eckhard V. Donohue, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 214. There are some statements incon- sistent with the foregoing in Jack- son V. Kasseall, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 231. It is there said that if the notice operates retrospectively, it would be immaterial, for the purposes of the lien, at what stage of the period of keeping the notice is given; one given on the last day would be as effectual as one given on the first day. Such a construction would defeat the very object of requiring a notice to be given, which evidently is to advise the owner and all others interested that a lien is claimed, and to enable them to take such action as they may deem neces- sary in view of such claim. Per Smith, J. It is, however, express- ly declared by the court that it was not intended to deal with the question whether a lien could be created as against the owner for past charges; and the court only decided that no such lien could be created as against a mortgagee holding a mortgage duly filed. This case is referred to and ex- plained in Lessells v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 364, 367. 690a LIENS. 092 with the livery stable keeper by its owner, or some one hav- ing authority for him.'^^ § 690a. Sheriff holding cattle under mortgage may con- tract for their keeping. — A sheriff who has taken possession of cattle under a mortgage for the purpose of foreclosure and sale may contract for their keeping^^ pending the fore- closure, and the keeper has a lien therefor. The sheriff was legally authorized to make the foreclosure, and as it was necessary for the proper carrying out of the powers vested in him by statute that the cattle should be cared for and pastured until the day of sale, he was authorized through his deputy to make a contract for that purpose, and the lien fol- lowed by virtue of the statute. § 691. Prior chattel mortgage superior to stable keeper's lien. — A chattel mortgage upon a horse is superior to a sub- sequent lien of a stable keeper, where the horse is placed in the stable by the mortagor, after the making of the mort- gage, without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. ^^ o^Domnau v. Green, 4 Wills. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) § 322, 19 S. W. 909; Stott v. Scott, 68 Tex. 302, 305, 4 S. W. 494. 'JCVose V. Whitney, 7 Mont. 385, 16 Pac. 846. 97See §§ 744, 971; Jackson v. Kasseall, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 231; Bissell V. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252; Charles v. Neigelson, 15 111. App. 17; Sargent v. Usher, 55 N. H. 287, 20 Am. Rep. 208; State Bank V. Lowe, 22 Nebr. 68, 33 N. W. 482; Ingalls v. Green, 62 Vt. 436, 20 Atl. 196; Howes v. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76, 15 N. E. 123; Wall v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515, 517, 19 Pac. 469; McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506, 510, 11 S. W. 316, quoting text; Ingalls V. Vance, 61 Vt. 582, 18 Atl. 452; Reynolds v. Case, 60 Mich, le, 26 N. W. 838; W^right V. Sherman, 3 S. Dak. 290, 52 N. W. 1093; Easter v. Goyne, 51 Ark. 222, 11 S. W. 212; Hanch v. Ripley, 127 Ind. 151, 26 N. E. 70; Miller v. Crabbe, 66 Mo. App. 660, 2 Mo. App. Repr. 1371; Pickett v. Mc- Cord, 62 Mo. App. 467; Blackford V. Ryan (Tex.), 61 S. W. 161; Beh V. Moore, 124 Iowa 564, 100 N. W. 502; Lee v. Van Meter, 98 Ky. 1, 17 Ky. L. 548, 32 S. W. 137; Beck- er V. Brown, 65 Nebr. 264, 91 N. W. 178; Bowden v. Dugan, 91 Maine 141, 39 Atl. 467; Erickson v. Lampi, 150 Mich. 92, 113 N. W. 778; Petzenka v. DalHmore, 64 693 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS* LIENS. § 691a It is not to be supposed that a statute giving a lien for the keeping of animals was intended to violate fundamental rights of property by enabling the possessor to create a lien without the consent of the mortgagee, when the person in possession could confer no rights as against the mortgagee by a sale of the animals. The keeper of animals intrusted to him by the mortgagor undoubtedly acquires a lien as against the mortgagor, but it is a lien only upon such interest in them as the mortgagor had at the time, and not a lien as against the mortgagee, between whom and the keeper of the animals there is no privity of contract."^ The mort- gagor, though in possession, is in no sense the mortgagee's agent, nor does he sustain to the mortgagee any relations which authorize him to contract any liability on his behalf. The statute can not be construed to authorize the mortgagor to subject the mortgagee's interest to a lien without his knowledge or consent, as security for a liability of the mort- gagor, unless such a construction clearly appears from the language of the statute to be unavoidable.^^ § 691a. Consent of owner may be implied. — It is true that "the consent of the owner," required by some statutes for maintaining the lien, is satisfied by an implied consent. A mortgagee, and not the mortgagor, of horses is the owner whose consent is necessary; and if, at the time of taking his mortgage he knew that the mortgagor kept his horses at a boarding stable, or that he was engaged in a business in which men generally hire their horses boarded, and he should leave them with the mortgagor without directions for their keeping, he would be held to their being so kept. But if the Minn. 472, 67 N. W. 365; Sullivan 3 S. Dak. 290, 52 N. W. 1093, 1095. V. Clifton, 55 N. J. L. 324, 26 Atl. 'J!»McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 964, 20 L. R. A. 719, 39 Am. St. 506, 510, 11 S. W. 316, quoting text; 652. Wright v. Sherman, 3 S. Dak. 290, 98 Ingalls V. Green, 62 Vt. 436, 52 N. W. 1093; Beh v. Moore, 124 20 Atl. 196; Wright v. Sherman, Iowa 564, 100 N. W. 502. § 691a LIENS. 694 mortgagee has given no consent other than that which is implied from his allowing the mortgagor to remain in pos- session of the horses, the mortgagor in possession would have power to^ create a paramount lien upon them; or, in other words, he would have power to supersede and render worthless the lien of the mortgage. The mortgagee cannot be deemed impliedly to consent to an arrangement for the destruction of his security unless he has knowledge that the mortgagor, in the usual course of business, will subject the property to a lien. A mortgagor of horses in his posses- sion for use in his business cannot, by keeping them at the barn of an employee who furnishes feed for them, create a lien as against the mortgagee.^ iHowes V. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76, 15 N. E. 123. The court said: "In every case of this kind the in- quiry is whether such consent is found," and that this "depends, where animals are left with a mortgagor by a mortgagee, not only upon the terms of the ex- press contract relating to them, but also upon all the circumstances surrounding the transaction indi- cating the expectation of the mort- gagee as to the management of them by the mortgagor. If from these the mortgagee may be pre- sumed to have understood that the mortgagor would take them to a stable keeper to be boarded, and no objection was made, such con- sent should be implied; otherwise, it should not." See also, Storms V. Smith, 137 Mass. 201 ; Ingalls V. Vance, 61 Vt. 582, 18 Atl. 452; Wright V. Sherman, 3 S. Dak. 290, 52 N. W. 1093. In this case Kel- lum, P. J., referring to the ques- tion of the mortgagee's implied consent, said : "Such consent may, of course, be shown by circum- stances; but to show it requires something more than the simple fact of leaving the property in the mortgagor's possession, for that is the general and almost univer- sal custom, while for the mort- gagor in possession to place such property out to be boarded or taken care of is unusual and ex- ceptional; and, when the mort- gagee simply does what is usually done in such cases, he ought not to be taken as thereby consent- ing in advance that the mortgagor may do what is usually not done in such cases." In Corning v. Ash- ley, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 483, 21 N. Y. St. 703, 4 N. Y. S. 255, aflfd. 121 N. Y. 700, 24 N. E. 1100, it is held that the "owner" to whom notice of intention to claim lien is to be given is the mortgagor and not the mortgagee, even after default. If a mortgagee agrees that the agistor shall have a lien, where the horse boarded was placed with the agistor by the mortgagor, the 695 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. 692 But if a mortgagee of a horse believes, or has reason to believe, that the owner is not keeping the horse, but is board- ing it at some livery stable, and the mortgagee makes no ob- jection, this shows his consent, though he does not know at what stable the horse is.^ § 692. Lien of stable keeper sometimes held superior to lien of mortgage. — On the other hand, some authorities hold that the lien of an agistor or livery stable keeper is para- mount to a previous mortgage of the animals.^ While it is conceded that no contract lien could be placed upon the prop- erty to take precedence of the prior chattel mortgage, a statutory lien which arises from the mere fact of the keeping of the cattle has such precedence. "The possession of the agistor was rightful, and the possession being rightful, the keeping gave rise to the lien; and such keeping was as much for the interest of the mortgagee as the mortgagor. The cattle were kept alive thereby; and the principle seems to be, agistor's lien is valid. Bowden v. Dugan, 91 Maine 141, 39 Atl. 467; Graham v. Winchell, 4 Ohio C. D. 139, 3 Ohio N. P. 106. 2Lynde v. Parker, 155 Mass. 481, 30 N. E. 74. 3Case V. Allen, 21 Kans. 217, 220, 30 Am. Rep. 425; Smith v. Stevens, 36 Minn. 303, 31 N. W. 55. In this case Berry, J., said: "A mortgagee, when he takes a mortgage, takes it, in legal contemplation, with full knotvledge of and subject to the right of a person keeping it at the request of the mortgagor or other lawful possessor to the statutory lien, as he would do to a common-law lien." In Meyer V. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513, 1 L. R. A. m, 12 Am. St. 663, the court, in referring to Smith v. Stevens, Ze Minn. 303, 31 N. W. 55, says: The opinion rests "upon the doctrine of agency, — authority, implied from the circumstances, from the mortgagee to the mort- gagor, to create a lien for such a purpose." It is to be observed that the statute of Minnesota express- ly provides that the keeping at the request of the legal possessor shall be sufficient to create the lien. See Colquitt v. Kirkman, 47 Ga. 555. A ranchman placed in possession of mortgaged cattle by the sheriff, to whom they were turned over for sale under the terms of the chattel mortgage, has a lien on the cattle. Vose v. Whitney, 7 Mont. 385, 16 Pac. 846; Willard v. Whinfield, 2 Kans. App. 53, 43 Pac. 314. § 692a LIENS. 696 that where the mortgagee does not take the possession, but leaves it with the mortgagor, he thereby assents to the cre- ation of a statutory lien for any expenditure reasonably necessary for the preservation or ordinary repair of the thing mortgaged. Such indebtedness really inures to his benefit. The entire value of his mortgage may rest upon the creation of such indebtedness and lien, as in the case at bar, where the thing mortgaged is live stock, and the lien for food. And while it seems essential that this should be the rule, to protect the mechanic or other person given by statute a lien upon chattels for labor or material, the rule, on the other hand, will seldom work any substantial wrong to the mortgagee. The amount due under such liens is generally small — a mere trifle compared with the value of the thing upon which the lien is claimed. The work or material en- hances or continues the value of that upon which the work is done or to which the material is furnished; and the mort- gagee can always protect himself against such liens, or, at least, any accumulation of debt thereon, by taking possession of the chattel mortgaged."^ § 692a. Lien cannot be made superior to prior mortgage. — It is clear that a lien cannot by statute be made superior to the lien of a mortgage executed before the statute was enacted.'' Thus, a statute which attempted to make a lien for seed-grain superior to the lien of a mortgage executed before the passage of the statute is repugnant to the pro- visions of the Federal Constitution, forbidding the impair- ment by any state of the obligations of a contract.^ 4Case V. Allen, 21 Kans. 217, per Ark. 231; McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Brewer, J. Tenn. 506, 11 S. W. 316; Ingalls v. ^Toledo, D. & B. R. Co Hamilton, 134 U. S. 296, 33 L. ed 905, 10 Sup. Ct. 546; Easter v Goyne, 51 Ark. 222, 11 S. W. 212 Brown v. Morrison, 5 Ark. 217; McCuUough V. Caldwell's Exr., 8 Vance, 61 Vt. 582, 18 Atl. 452; Wright V. Sherman, 3 S. Dak. 290, 52 N. W. 1093. ^Yeatman v. King, 2 N. Dak. 421, 51 N. W. 721, 33 Am. St. 797. 697 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 695 § 693. Lien of stallion keeper superior to subsequent mortgage. — A lien given by statute to the keeper of a stal- lion on the ojffspring is held to be superior to the right of a subsequent mortgagee to whom the mare is conveyed while in foal, though the mortgage is registered before the foal is dropped. The statute is regarded as giving the lien from the time of the performance of the service, to be enforced at any time after the birth of the colt.'^ As in the case of the analogous liens of landlords for rent and mechanics for work and materials, all persons must take notice of the lien at their peril. § ,694. Possession of keeper is constructive notice to a purchaser. — The possession of animals by a stable keeper or agistor entitled to a lien for keeping them is constructive notice to a purchaser of the right to the lien.^ He is not estopped from claiming a lien because he has not given notice of it previous to the purchase, or previous to payment by the purchaser, unless the stable keeper or agistor has done something to mislead the purchaser into making the purchase, or has done something to lead the purchaser to suppose that no lien is claimed. § 695. Mortgage by owner while in temporary possession. — A subsequent mortgage made by the owner while in tem- porary possession has priority. Where a livery stable keeper received a span of horses to feed and care for, but the owner was allowed to retain possession of the horses and use them daily, and while in possession he mortgaged them to secure a debt, it was held that the claim of the mortgagee was ■^Sims V. Bradford, 12 Lea of stock for value without notice (Tenn.) 434; Burr v. Graves, 4 of an agistor's lien takes the stock Lea (Tenn.) 552, 557. subject to such lien. Weber v. sLessells v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Whitestone, 53 Nebr. 371, 73 N. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 73, 364. But W. 695. it is held in Nebraska a purchaser § 696 LIENS. 698 superior to that of tlie livery stable keeper.^ Continuance of possession is indispensable to the existence of a lien at common law, and the abandonment of the custody of the property, over which the right extends, divests the lien. The lienholder in such case is deemed to surrender the security he has upon the property, and to rely on the per- sonal responsibility of the owner. If, however, a sale of the property be made by the owner while it is in the possession of the person holding it under the lien, the lien will not divest it. The purchaser in that case takes it subject to the in- cumbrance. ^° § 696. Lien by agreement will not hold against mortgage. — A lien for the keeping of a horse, created by agreement, will not hold against a mortgage subsequently executed and recorded, if the owner is afterwards permitted to use the horse at his pleasure. By the mortgage a good title to the property is given subject to the lien of the livery stable keeper. If afterwards the horse is repeatedly, with the con- sent of the livery stable keeper, suffered to be taken by the mortgagor into his possession, to be used by him at his pleasure in carrying on the particular business in which he is engaged, this, as against the mortgagee, is such a relinquish- ment of possession as extinguishes and discharges the pre- viously existing lien. The mortgage then becomes prior in right, and the incumbrance created by it continues without interruption, disturbance or discharge, from and after the time when this lien was lost; and the mortgagee thereby ac- quires a paramount right and title to the property.^^ § 697. Facts held to be waiver of keeper's lien. — If thte owner of a horse upon which there is a lien for board be ^Marseilles Manufacturing Co. v. Morgan, 12 Nebr. 66, 10 N. W. V. Morgan, 12 Nebr. 66, 10 N. W. 462, per Maxwell, C. J. 462. iiPerkins v. Boardman, 14 Gray 10 Marseilles Manufacturing Co. (Mass.) 481, 483. 699 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 698 allowed to use it in his business, and while it is away from the stable sells it without the knowledge of the stable keeper, the lien is lost, and the stable keeper cannot regain it by taking the horse from the possession of the purchaser. ^- The lien is created by statute. "But it gives no intimation that it uses the word 'lien' in any different sense from that which is known to the common law.^^ On the contrary, it in terms supposes that the animals in question have been placed in the care — that is to say, in the possession of the party to whom the lien is given. The provisions for sale would seem to imply the same thing. To admit that it was intended to create a tacit hypothecation like that enforced from necessity, but within narrow limits, in the admiralty, would be to go in the face of the whole policy of our statutes, which always strive to secure public registration when posses- sion is not given and retained, and which expressly provide for such registration when they in terms create a lien not depending on possession. It follows from what we have said that, even if the defendant had had a lien for the keep- ing of the horse after sale, or whatever might be the rule when the animal was voluntarily restored to his possession, he lost it by allowing the plaintiff to take possession, and could not revive his right by seizing the horse. "^* § 698. Lien not lost by delivery of horse temporarily to owner. — A livery stable keeper does not necessarily lose his lien by delivering a horse to the owner for use by him.^'' i-Vinal V. Spofiford, 139 Mass. places his cattle therein, the fact 126, 130, 29 N. E. 288; Fishell v. that the owner of the pasture un- Morris, 57 Conn. 547, 18 Atl. 717, der an arrangement with the ten- 6 L. R. A. 82. ant rendered some assistance in i3Fishell V. Morris, 57 Conn. caring for the cattle will give him 547, 18 Atl. 717, 6 L. R. A. 82. no lien thereon for his rent, for i4Vinal V. Spofiford, 139 Mass. the possession both of the land 126, 29 N. E. 288, per Holmes, J. and cattle is in the tenant. Cotton Where a tenant rents a pasture v. Arnold, 118 Mo. App. 596, 95 S. from the owner and thereunder W. 280. has control and possession and i^Walls v. Long, 2 Ind. App. § 699 LIENS. 700 Thus, if horses belonging to a mail contractor are used by him regularly in his business, the stable keeper does not lose his right to a lien for previous charges every time he allows the horses to be taken away from his stable. It is a neces- sary part of the contract in such a case that the horses should be delivered to the owner as they are needed, and this course of business is consistent with the right of lien that belongs to the stable keeper, and does not impair that lien.^*' A livery stable keeper does not lose his lien upon a horse for board by permitting the owner to ride the horse oc- casionally; and his lien is superior to the lien of an execution levied upon the horse while temporarily in the owner's pos- session. 17 § 699. Loss of possession will deprive keeper of lien. — The lien is waived or lost by allowing the owner to take and keep possession longer than for a temporary daily use. If one entitled to the lien voluntarily parts with the possession to the owner, unless for a temporary purpose, and under an agreement to return the property, the lien — the right of de- tention — is gone.^^ The owner of a horse had been in the 202. 28 N. E. 101. For owner to take horse from stable with- out consent constitutes larcency. Tumalty v. Parker. 100 111. App. 382. i6Young V. Kimball, 23 Pa. St. 193. Welsh V. Barnes, 5 N. Dak. 277, 65 N. W. 675. If the owner of live stock takes possession from his agistor without the lat- ter's consent, the lien will not be lost. Weber v. Whitstone, 53 Nebr. 371, 1Z N. W. 695; Willard v. Whin- f^eld, 2 Kans. App. 53, 43 Pac. 314. 1'? Caldwell v. Tutt, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 258, 260, 43 Am. Rep. 307. Per Freeman, J. : "Neither party- thought of terminating the con- tract, or of the one taking and the other yielding possession, so as to give an individual credit alone for the board, and release thereby the lien of the livery man." The agistor's lien for keep- ing a horse is not waived when he refuses to surrender possession to an officer holding an execution against the owner, where the offi- cer seizes the horse anyway. Shue V. Ingle, 87 111. App. 522. I'^Seebaum v. Handy, 46 Ohio St. 560, 22 N. E. 869; Ferriss v. Schreiner, 43 Minn. 148, 44 N. W. 1083. The agistor's lien is lost yOl LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS' AND AGISTORS' LIENS. § 699 habit of taking it from the stable where it was boarded, and using it each day in his business, and returning it to the stable at night. On one occasion he did not return the horse as usual, and the stable keeper some three weeks afterwards, finding it in the owner's possession, took possession of it under a claim of lien, and left it in charge of an agent at a stable where the owner kept it. The agent on the following day left the horse, and went with the owner to see the stable keeper who claimed the lien. The owner then made an offer of settlement, which was refused, and then promised to return the horse next day, but did not. It was held that there had been a waiver of the lien.^^ The owner of a horse, who lived out of the city, was in the habit of leaving it with a stable keeper in the city, to be fed and cared for as long as suited the owner's convenience. When called for, the horse would be delivered to the owmer, and not returned, except at such intervals as suited the own- er's convenience when again in the city. The last time the by the voluntary delivery of the cattle to their owner. First Nat. Bank v. George R. Barse Com. Co., 61 Mo. App. 143. As to loss of lien by surrender of posses- sion, see Gorman v. Williams, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 776, 56 N. Y. S. 1031. 19 Papineau v. Wentworth, 136 Mass. 543. And see Estey v. Cooke, 12 Nev. 276; Cardinal v. Edwards, 5 Nev. 36. The owner of a horse disputed the account of a livery-stable keeper, which was mostly a claim by a trainer for services, and in interview, af- ter the owner had taken the horse from the stable in the absence of the livery-stable keeper, the lat- ter said, "Let it go till the trainer gets home, and we will fix it up." It was held that the livery-stable keeper waived any lien he had by this agreement. He could not re- voke this agreement by after- wards going to the stable of the plaintiff and obtaining possession of the horse by the untruthful representation that he was sent there by Shea for the horse. Bray v. Wise, 82 Iowa 581, 48 N. W. 994. Under a contract to pasture cattle and to plow a field and sow grain to make more pasture and where it is agreed that the cattle are to be removed after the first pasture is used up until the new pasture is ready, the lien is waived dur- ing the interval. Bouvier v. Brass, 12 Ariz. 310, 100 Pac. 799. See also, Powers v. Botts, 63 Mo. App. 285. § 7^0 LIENS. 702 horse was called for and delivered to the owner, the charges for feed and care amounted to over $100. Shortly after- wards the owner was killed by being thrown from his car- riage, and some time after that the horse was driven to the city by a brother of the deceased, and left at another feed stable, from which it was taken by replevin suit by the first- mentioned stable keeper. It was held that the delivery of the horse was a voluntary one, and the lien waived."*^ § 700. Acts of ownership by lienholder. — The owner of a mare placed her in the possession of a stable keeper under an agreement that the latter should train her for the track, and should run her from time to time, and should divide the track-money and premiums with the owner. The mare was placed upon the track, but the owner received no share of the gains, if any were obtained. Subsequently the owner bor- rowed a sum of money of a third person, and gave a bill of sale of the mare as security. On the owner's failure to pay the loan it was paid by the stable keeper, and the bill of sale was transferred to him. Afterwards the stable keeper, continuing in possession of the mare, caused her to be gotten with foal, and later again placed her upon the track. The owner then went to the stable and took the mare away. The stable keeper brought an action of replevin to recover the mare on the ground that he had a lien upon her for her -'^ Seebaum v. Handy, 46 Ohio tion. In such case where the St. 560, 22 N. E. 869. Minshall, owner is allowed to use it, its J., delivering the judgment, said : voluntary delivery to him for such "What should be the rule in cases purpose, might be said to imply a where the animal is placed by the contract to return the animal, and owner with a person to be fed a failure to do so would be such and cared for, not temporarily, — a fraud as to estop the owner the horse being ordinarily kept at from setting up that the lien had home or somewhere else by the been lost by such voluntary deliv- owner, — but permanently, for ery. But this is not the case be- some time either definite or in- fore us, and we express no defi- definite, presents a different ques- nite opinion upon it at this time." 703 LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND AGISTORS LIENS. §701 keeping. It was held that he was entitled to recover inas- much as he had such a lien, as well as a lien for the money advanced upon the assignment of the bill of sale.-^ The action of the stable keeper in apparently assuming absolute ownership of the mare, by keeping all the premiums and causing the mare to be gotten with foal, was held not to destroy any lien which he had for keeping. § 701. Waiver by including in claim that for which keeper has no lien. — If one having a lien includes a claim to which the lien does not attach, he waives his lien. Thus, where a stable keeper, who had boarded a horse which had been mortgaged, gave notice to the mortgagee of his claim of a lien upon the horse, and afterwards rendered a bill for the board of the horse both before and after the notice, and demanded payment of this as a condition of surrendering possession of the horse, it was held that he rendered himself liable for a conversion of the horse, and that the mortgagee could maintain a suit for the conversion without a tender of the amount due for keeping the horse after notice for which a valid lien might have existed.^- "Had he claimed distinct liens for distinct debts for what occurred before and what occurred after the notice to the plaintiffs, it may be that he would not thereby have waived a valid lien for one of the debts only, without the refusal of a tender of that alone ; but the demand for the whole as one debt, and the refusal to deliver the property unless the whole was paid, was a refusal to deliver the property upon the payment of the -1 Hartman v. Keown, 101 Pa. is held in an action by the owner St. 338. for the possession of a horse 22 Hamilton v. McLaughlin, 145 which the keeper was boarding, Mass. 20, 12 N. E. 424. But see, that the keeper's claiming more Campbell v. Abbott, 60 Misc. (N. than the amount of his lien will Y.) 93, 111 N. Y. S. 782, where it not vitiate his lien. § yoi LIENS. 704 amount which had accrued after the notice, or to accept a tender of that, and rendered a tender of it unnecessary."^'^ A livery stable keeper waives his lien by transferring his stable to a purchaser, and delivering with the stable a cus- tomer's horse upon which he had a lien, under a new arrange- ment with the purchaser by which the further expense of keeping the horse was charged to the customer. The pur- chaser became the owner's agent,, and the purchaser's posses- sion the owner's possession; and this voluntary surrender was a relinquishment of the former stable keeper's lien, which could only be preserved by some understanding made at the time, by which the purchaser w^as to hold the prop- erty for the benefit of the lien claimant, and for the preserva- tion of his lien.-^ 23 Hamilton v. McLaughlin, 145 St. 531, 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 383, Mass. 20, 12 N. E. 424, per W. 14 N. Y. S. 479. See Geneva. I. Allen, J.; Viley v. Lockwood, 102 & S. R. Co. v. Sage, 35 Hun (N. Tenn. 426, 52 S. W. 138. Y.) 95; Bigelow v. Heaton, 4 24 Fitchett V. Canary, 38 N. Y. Denio (N. Y.) 496. CHAPTER XIV. LUMBERMEN'S LIENS. Sec. 702. No lien at common law for cutting and hauling timber. 703. Lien at common law where possession is retained. 704. Statutory liens in lumbering states. 704a. Alabama. 705. Alaska. 70Sa. Arizona. 705b. Arkansas. 706. California. 707. Florida. 708. Georgia. 709. Louisiana. 710. Maine. 711. Maine (continued.) Enforce- ment of the lien. 712. Michigan. 713. Minnesota. 713a. Mississippi. 713b. Missouri. 713c. Montana. 714. Nevada. 715. New Hampshire. 715a. New York. 715b. North Carolina. 716. Oregon. Sec. 717. Vermont. 718. Washington. 719. Wisconsin. 719a. Wyoming. 720. Liens for services or manual labor depend on statutes. 721. Rule by statutes in some states. 122. Contractor not agent of own- er to employ men. 723. Constitutionality of statutes. 724. The term "personal services." 725. Contractor has no lien for la- bor of servants. 726. What are logs or lumber. 727. Priority of lumberman's lien. 728. Property upon which lien at- taches must be identified. 729. Lien upon logs worked upon by laborer. 730. Enforcement of labor lien. 730a. Lien on different kinds of timber cut under one con- tract. 730b. Continuous service under contract. § 702. No lien at common law for cutting and hauling tim- ber. — At common law, laborers engaged in cutting, hauling, and driving timber had no lien thereon.^ It is indispensable lOakes v. Moore, 24 Maine 214, 41 Am. Dec. 379; Oliver v. Wood- man, 66 Maine 54, 56, per Virgin, J.; Arians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. 188, 56 Am. Rep. 611, per Orton, J.; Brackett v. Pier- son, 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 281, 99 N. Y. S. 770. See also, Rhodes V. Hines, 79 App. Div. (N. Y.) 379, 79 N. Y. S. 437. 705 45 § 7^3 LIENS. 706 to the continuance of such a lien that it should be accom- panied by possession. The moment that possesion is volun- tarily surrendered, the lien is gone. A laborer cutting, haul- ing and driving logs could retain possession only by placing them upon his own land, or upon the land of another under agreement that such other should hold possession of him. Practically the laborer cannot retain possession. If he parts v^ith the possession he can have a lien only by statute or by special contract. If it be agreed between the parties that the laborer or contractor shall cut timber and deliver it upon the owner's premises, and it be further stipulated that the laborer or contractor shall have a lien upon the logs un- til he is paid, he may resume possession and assert his lien. The owner, having made such an agreement and having failed to make payment, is not allowed to come into court and say that the claimant has parted with possession and thereby relinquished his lien.- Moreover, a laborer who does work for a contractor can have no lien at common law, even if the contractor has such a lien; for if any one has possession it is the contractor. The possession of the laborer is the possession of the contractor, with whom alone the owner deals, and to whom alone he gives possession of the property.^ A lien cannot be acquired through a possession unlawfully obtained ; and therefore a contractor cannot give his laborers a lien through possession, for he alone is entitled to possession as against the owner.'* § 703. Lien at common law where possession is retained. — One who has cut and hauled to his mill a quantity of tim- ber from the land of another, under a contract with him, has a lien at common law for his labor upon the lumber in his possession remaining manufactured from the timber, and 20akes v. Moore, 24 Maine 214, ^Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 41 Am. Dec. 379. 2 So. 6, per Raney, J.; Dresser v. sWright V. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 Lemma, 122 Wis. 387, 100 N. W. So. 6. 844. 707 lumbermen's liens. § 704a also upon the logs iinsawed.^ In like manner one who saws the logs of another into lumber and shingles has a common law lien thereon for the value of such work.^ § 704. Statutory liens in lumbering states. — In states in which lumbering is an important industry, liens are gener- ally given by statute to those engaged in the work. In some states the laborers alone are protected, and in others con- tractors as well as laborers are within the protection of the statute. The most characteristic feature of these statutes is that they generally make this lien paramount to all other liens or claims against the property, on the ground, doubt- less, that the labor of the lumberman in cutting, hauling, or driving logs greatly increases their value for the benefit of all persons who may have an interest in the property, whether such persons be claimants under other liens, or under mort- gages executed and recorded before the lumberman's lien attaches. A manufacturer who retains possession of lumber sawed by him has a common-law lien upon such lumber; but this fact does not prevent the application of the additional statu- tory one. The manufacturer does not waive his statutory lien by expressly reserving in his statement the lien which he has by virtue of his possession of the property.''' § 704a. Alabama.^ — Owners of land, or their assignees, shall have a lien upon timber sold therefrom for purposes of rafting, shipping, or manufacture, for the stipulated price or value thereof, commonly known as stumpage. ^Palmer v. Tucker, 45 Maine 254, 45 N. W. 81, following Shaw 316. V. Bradley, 59 Mich.- 199, 26 N. W. ^Arians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 331, overruling Kieldsen v. Wil- 26 N. W. 188, 56 Am. Rep. 611; son, 11 Mich. 45, 43 N. W. 1054. Bierly v. Royse, 25 Ind. App. 202, 8Civ. Code 1907, § 4814. Austill 57 N. E. 939; Walker v. Cassels, v. Hieronymus, 117 Ala. 620, 23 So. 70 S. Car. 271, 49 S. E. 862. 660. ^Phillips V. Freyer, 80 Mich. § 705 LIENS. 708 For the enforcement of such lien, the owners of such land, or their assignees, may have process of attachment from any court having jurisdiction of the amount claimed levyable upon the timber upon which the lien exists, when such claim is due, and the defendant, on demand, fails or refuses to pay the same, when not due, when the defendant has removed or is about to remove any part of the timber without pay- ing therefor, or without the consent of the owner or assignee. § 705. Alaska.^ — Every person performing labor upon, or who shall assist in obtaining or securing saw logs, spars, piles or other timber shall have a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or in obtaining or securing the same, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of the same or his agent. The cook in a logging camp and any and all others who may assist in or about a logging camp shall be regarded as a person who assists in obtaining or securing the saw-logs, spars, piles or other timber men- tioned herein. Every person performing labor upon or who shall assist in manufacturing saw logs or other timber into lumber, has a lien upon such lumber while the same remains at the yard wherein manufactured, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of such lumber or his agent. § 705a. Arizona.^*' — All persons who cut or cord wood, cut, saw or skid logs, cut, saw, hew or pile ties, at the request of the owner thereof or his agent, shall have a lien thereon for the amount due him for the labor performed. § 705b. Arkansas.^^ — Rafting and booming companies shall have a lien on the logs, timber, or other floatables driven, boomed, rafted or run, and such corporation shall be 9Carter's Ann. Code 1900, pp. n Kirby's Dig. of Stats. 1904, 413-415, §§ 280, 281. § 6524. lORev. Stats. 1901, § 2907. 709 lumbermen's liens. § 707 entitled to retain the possession of so much of such logs, timber, lumber, or other floatables as may be necessary to satisfy the amount of such boomage and reasonable charges for driving, rafting or running of logs, timber, lumber and other fioatables, § 706. California.^- — A person who labors at cutting, haul- ing, rafting or drawing logs, bolts, or other timber, has a lien thereon for the amount due for his personal services, which takes precedence of all other claims, to continue for thirty days after the logs, bolts or other timber arrive at the place of destination for sale or manufacture, while such logs, bolts, or other timber are in the county in which such labor was performed. The lien hereby created ceases and determines unless the claimant thereof, within twenty days from the time such labor is completed, brings suit to foreclose the same. The plaintiff in any such suit, at the time of issuing the summons or at any time afterwards, may have the logs, bolts, or other timber upon which such lien subsists attached, as provided in this code, upon delivering to the clerk an affidavit by or on behalf of the plaintiff, showing that defendant is in- debted to the plaintiff upon a demand for labor performed, either in the cutting, hauling, rafting, or drawing such logs, bolts, or other timber, and that the sum for which the at- tachment is asked is an actual bona fide existing debt, due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, and that the attachment is not sought, and the action is not brought, to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor or creditors of the de- fendant. § 707. Florida.^^ — A lien prior in dignity to all others ex- ists in favor of any person by himself or others cutting, raft- i2Civ. Code 1906, § 3065. owner contracts can have the iSGen. Stats. 1906, §§ 2197, 2202. benefit of this Hen. Wright v. Only laborers with whom the Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 So. 6. 7o8 LIENS. 710 ing, running, driving, or performing other labor upon logs or timber of any kind, on such logs and timber, and any ar- ticle manufactured therefrom; also in favor of any person who shall furnish any logs, lumber, clay, sand, stone, or other material whatsoever, crude or partially or wholly pre- pared for use, to any mill or other manufactory to be manu- factured into any article of value, upon all such articles fur- nished, and upon all articles manufactured therefrom. § 708. Georgia.^'* — All persons furnishing sawmills with timber, logs, provisions, or any other thing necessary to carry i4Code 1911, § 3358. As to the affidavit to forclose the lien, and as to the levy, see Bennett v. Gray, 82 Ga. 592, 9 S. E. 469. Un- der this statute one furnishing money for carrying on the busi- ness has no lien. The lien is derogatory to common rights, and gives an immediate and harsh remedy, and therefore should be strictly construed. While money is necessary to carry on the w^ork of a sawmill, by buying the things necessary for that work, still it is not primarily the thing neces- sary. It buys from others what is used to carry it on. Those who actually furnish the timber, or provisions, or other things necessary, have the lien; the money-lender does not. Dart v. Mayhew, 60 Ga. 104; and see Saulsbury v. Eason, 47 Ga. 617. A sale made on the foreclosure of a lien for logs furnished a sawmill, where there was a prior mortgage, conveyed only the equity of re- demption subject to the mortgage. Townsend Savings Bank v. Ep- ping. 3 Woods (U. S.) 390, Fed. Gas. No. 14120. A sale of standing timber to sawmill man will give no lien because standing timber is real estate. Balkcom v. Empire Lumber Co., 91 Ga. 651, 17 S. E. 1020, 44 Am. St. 58. Under Civ. Code 1895, §2816, one's lien on lumber only extends to that manufactured in the county where the mill is located, Weichselbaum Co. v. Pope, 119 Ga. 182, 45 S. E. 991 ; Weichselbaum Co. v. Farmers' Supply Co., 119 Ga. 183, 45 S. E. 991. When logs are cut and de- livered to a saw mill by one not the owner, he is entitled to a laborer's lien, but not for furnish- ing supplies. Trapp v. Watters, 6 Ga. App. 480, 65 S. E. 306. One who buys materials furnished to a sawmill in good faith and with- out notice prior to foreclosure takes the property freed from such lien. Consignees' Favorite Box Co. V. Speer, 5 Ga. App. 156, 62 S. E. 1000. A superintendent and general manager of a sawmill can not maintain a lien as a laborer. Cox V. Fletcher, 5 Ga. App. 297, 63 S. E. 61. No law allows a saw- mill lien for standing timber, money or family supplies. Slappey v. Charles. 7 Ga. App. 796, 68 S. E. 308. The statute creates a lien 711 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. § 709 on the work of sawmills, shall have liens on said mills and their products, which shall, as between themselves, rank ac- cording to date, and the date of each shall be from the time when the debt was created, and such liens shall be superior to all liens but liens for taxes, liens for labor, and to all general liens of which they have actual notice before their debt was created, to which excepted liens they shall be inferior. § 709. Louisiana.^^ — Any person advancing money or fur- nishing supplies to enable another to deaden, cut, haul, float or raft any logs or forest timber, shall have a privilege upon such logs or timber. Any person or persons who shall perform any labor or service in deadening, felling, cutting, hauling, banking, driv- ing, running, rafting or booming any logs, timber, or staves in this state, or any person cooking for persons engaged in said business, shall have a lien or privilege thereon for the amount due for such labor or services, which lien or privi- lege shall be concurrent with that of the furnisher of neces- sary supplies. in favor of one who hauls logs or lumber for another though he may have employed laborers to do the work. Bruton v. Beasley, 135 Ga. 412, 69 S. E. 561. Where it is de- nied by the pleading that the lienor made demand for payment before foreclosure of his lien, such lienor has the burden to show such demand. Shealey v. Living- ston, 8 Ga. App. 642, 70 S. E. 100. Where one who would have a lien at the completion of a sawmill under Code 1895, § 2816, is pre- vented from completing such mill by the other party, he has a lien to the extent of his own compliance with his contract. Haralson v. Speer, 1 Ga. App. 573, 58 S. E. 142. One merely selling standing trees to the owners of a sawmill has no lien upon the mill or its products. Loud v. Pritchett, 104 Ga. 648, 30 S. E. 870. Timber and logs in possession of the seller while in transit to the buyer are not subject to an execu- tion to foreclose lien for original purchase-price of the landowner, asserted for the first time subse- quent to the sale, where the buyer had no notice of any such lien. Ray V. Schmidt, 7 Ga. App. 380, 66 S. E. 1035. One who sells tim- ber by the acre has no lien on a sawmill and its products. Giles V. Gano, 102 Ga. 593, 27 S. E. 730. i^Wolflf's Const. & Rev. Laws 1904, p. 1331, as amended by Const. & Rev. Laws 1908, p. 642. § /lo LIENS. 712 All managers, mechanics or laborers employed or work- ing in saw-mills, planing mills, shingle mills and sash, door and blind factories, shall have a privilege on all lumber, shin- gles, and all material manufactured in the mills and factories, where the managers, mechanics and laborers are engaged, for the payment of their salaries or wages; provided that the privilege herein granted shall not exist for a longer period of time than thirty days after the maturity of the debt, and provided further, that this privilege shall have no effect against bona fide purchasers. § 710. Maine. ^*^ — Whoever labors at cutting, hauling, raft- ing, or driving logs or lumber, or at cooking for persons en- gaged in such labor, or in shoeing horses or oxen, or repair- ing property while thus employed, has a lien on the logs and lumber for the amount due for his personal services, and for the services performed by his team,^^ which takes prece- dence of all other claims except liens reserved to the state. ^® i6Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, §§ 46, 47. The lien is only for those who labor for wages. Mott v. Mott, 107 Maine 481, 78 Atl. 900. No lien is given for cutting and haul- ing manufactured lumber. Mit- chell V. Page, 107 Maine 388, 78 Atl. 570, partly overruling Hut- chins V. Blaisdell, 106 Maine 92, 75 Atl. 291. i"A lien given by a former stat- ute for "personal services" was held not to include services ren- dered by the laborer's team. Co- burn V. Kerswell, 35 Maine 126. Under the present statute, giving a lien not only for his "personal services," but for "the services performed by his team," it is held that the laborer is entitled to the earnings of a team rightfully in his possession and control, though he may not own it. Kelley v. Kel- ley, 11 Maine 135. But where one hires his team to perform hauling, performing no service himself or by servant, he has no lien. Rich- ardson V. Hoxie, 90 Maine 227, 38 Atl. 142. The foreman of laborers who does not perform actual labor is not entitled to a lien. Meands v. Park, 95 Maine 527, SO Atl. 706. A laborer within the meaning of the statute is one who performs manual labor for wages under di- rection of an employer. Littlefield V. Morrill, 97 Maine 505, 54 Atl. 1109. iSThis lien takes precedence of a prior mortgage. Oliver v. Wood- man, 66 Maine 54. The rule is the same under analogous statutes, — statutes, for instance, giving liens upon vessels. Deering v. Lord, 713 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. 710 Whoever both shores and runs logs by himself, his servants or agents, has a lien thereon for the price of such shoring and running; such liens continue for sixty days after the logs or lumber arrive at the place of destination for sale or manufacture,^^ and may be enforced by attachment. ^^ The officer making such attachment may pay the boomage thereon, not exceeding the rate per thousand on the quantity actually attached by him, and return the amount paid on the writ, w^hich shall be included in the damages recovered. The action or lien is not defeated by taking a note, unless it is taken in discharge of the amount due and of the lien. Such notice of the suit, as the court orders, shall be given to the owner of the logs or lumber, and he may be admitted to defend it.^^ 45 Maine 293; Perkins v. Pike, 42 Maine 141, 66 Am. Dec. 267; Don- nell V. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227; The Granite State, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 277, 278, Fed. Cas. No. 5687. i^The sixty days within which attachment must be made do not commence to run, as to any of the logs upon which the lien exists, until all the logs subject to the same lien have arrived at their destination, within the boom : provided the logs have been driven together, and the driving has not been suspended after a portion of them has reached the boom, but has been continuously kept up until all the logs have been driven in. Sheridan v. Ire- land, 66 Maine 65. A lien is given for services on spool timber and spool bars for sixty days after their arrival at place for sale. Chamberlain v. Wood, 100 Maine IZ, 60 Atl. 706. 20For provisions for enforce- ment of liens by attachment, see post, ch. xxii, § 1055. A laborer may enforce his lien by attach- ment against a nonresident con- tractor of a nonresident owner. Plurede v. Levasseur, 89 Maine 172, 36 Atl. 110. 21 Such notice of the suit is im- perative, and can not be disre- garded. It can not be dispensed with, though there be an appear- ance upon the docket of parties claiming to own the logs or lum- ber; for the court can not judicial- ly know whether such claimants are the owners, without giving a notice that shall be binding upon the owner, whoever he may be. The notice ordered should be a public notice by posting or publi- cation, as well as a specific notice to the supposed owners. Sheridan V. Ireland, 61 Maine 486; Parks v. Crockett, 61 Maine 489. These cases differ from Bean v. Soper, 56 Maine 297, inasmuch as it ap- pears in that case that the notice lO LIENS. 714 It is also provided-- that whoever labors at cutting, peel- ing, or hauling hemlock bark or cutting, yarding or hauling cordwood or pulpwood or any wood used in the manufac- ture of pulp-wood, or at cooking for persons engaged in such labor, has a lien thereon for the amount due for his per- sonal services, and the services performed by his team, which takes precedence of all other claims and continues for thirty days after the contract is completed, and may be enforced by attachment. Whoever labors at cutting, hauling or saw- ing of shingle, stave, lath, or dowel timber or in the manu- facture of shingle, stave, lath, or dowel timber into shin- gles, staves, laths, or dowels and the piling of such staves or laths and the bunching of such shingles or dowels, or at cooking for persons engaged in such labor, has a lien thereon for the amount due for his personal services and the services performed by his team, which takes prece- dence of all other claims, continues for sixty days after such required by statute was given. See also, Redington v. Frye, 43 Maine 578, 587, per Cutting, J. As to the form of proceeding and practice relative thereto, see Parks v. Crockett. 61 Maine 489. The ac- tion, as it comes through a con- tract, though not a part of it, should be against the employer, whether he be the owner of the logs or not. It should not be against the owner where there is no contract with him. Oliver v. Woodman, 66 Maine 54. The ac- tion does not inure to a tres- passer. Spofford V. True, 33 Maine 283, 54 Am. Dec. 621 ; Doe v. Mon- son, 33 Maine 430; Hamilton v. Buck, 36 Maine 536. It is not necessary to allege in the writ the ownership of the logs, or that the owner is unknown. Parker v. Williams, 77 Maine 418, 1 Atl. 138. Where several owners separately employ the same person to drive their logs, the laborer's lien is not upon the whole mass collectively, but is to be apportioned pro rata to each. Oliver v. Woodman, 66 Maine 54; Hamilton v. Buck, 36 Maine 536; Doyle v. True, 36 Maine 542. But where different owners severally employ sufficient laborers to drive their respective logs, the lien of each laborer is confined to the logs he is employed to drive, although all the logs be- come intermingled in driving, and are collectively driven by all the laborers. Doe v. Monson, 33 Maine 430. -2Rev. Stats. 1903, ch. 93, § 50, as amended by Laws 1907, p. 20. 715 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. § 7II timber, shingles, staves, laths and dowels are manufactured, provided the same have not been sold and shipped.-' Whoever labors in making shovel handle blocks, or cuts or furnishes w^ood for shovel handle blocks, or is engaged in cooking for such persons engaged in such labor, or fur- nishes a team for hauling said shovel handle blocks or the lumber from which they are made has a lien on said shovel handle blocks for the amount due him for his personal labor thereon, or the services of his team, and for the amount due for the wood so cut or furnished which takes precedence of all other claims except liens reserved to the state, continues for thirty days after said shovel handle blocks arrive at their destination either for shipment or to be turned, and may be enforced by attachment.-* § 711. Maine (continued). Enforcement of the lien.-' — Under this statute, one who contracts with the owner of the logs has a claim against him in personam, and a claim in rem against the logs. The proceeding by attachment oper- ates in both ways so far as the contractor is concerned. But a sub-contractor, or a laborer employed by the contractor, has no claim against the owner in personam, but only a claim against the property, and his proceedings must be strictly in rem. No other property of the owner is liable except that upon which the lien attaches. Therefore a sub- contractor or laborer must obtain a valid judgment in rem against the identical logs with reference to which the labor was done.^^ The identity of claim and of property must co- 23Laws 1907, p. 23, as amertded ent times. Ouelette v. Fluff, 93 by Laws 1909, p. 107. Maine 168, 44 Atl. 616. As to iden- 2-iLaws 1909, p. 106. tifying logs in the writ, see Brogan 25For provisions for enforcing v. McEachern. 103 Maine 198. 68 liens, see ch. xxii., § 1055. One Atl. 822. For sufficiency of who labors cutting cord wood declaration to foreclose lien see. and lumber may enforce his lien Copp v. Copp, 103 Maine 51, 68 by an action in rem against both Atl. 458. the wood and lumber even though -<^Bicknell v. Trickey, 34 Maine the lien attaches to each at differ- 273; Redington v. Frye, 43 Maine § 712 LIEKS. 716 exist, and must be traceable till the fruits of the judgment have been obtained by satisfaction of the execution. The identity of the property must be established, else the lien cannot attach; and the labor must be shown to have been done upon the specific property seized. The attachment must be of the thing upon v^hich the lien is claimed, and the lien must be established by a valid judgment.^''' The record of the judgment must show that the logs upon which the labor was expended are the same which the writ commands to be attached, and which were attached. The officer's re- turn of an attachment of logs having similar marks with those described in the plaintiff's writ and declaration does not sufficiently establish the identity;-^ but such identity is sufficiently established if, in addition, it appears that all the parties interested were summoned and appeared, and ad- mitted the truth of the facts set forth in the declaration, and that the logs described therein were attached. ^^ Moreover, a laborer's claim of lien, when the person with whom he contracted is other than the owner, must not be joined in the same suit with a claim for which he has no lien. If a judgment embracing both claims be rendered, the lien claim is regarded as waived or merged. The lien claim and the personal claim should in such case be enforced by separate suits, in each of which the plaintiff may recover costs. ^° § 712. Michigan.^^ — Any person or persons who perform any labor or services in manufacturing lumber or shingles in or about any lumber or shingle mill, or in cutting, skid- 578, 587. The lien can be enforced ^ogean v. Soper, 56 Maine 297. without personal service on a de- sogicknell v. Trickey, 34 Maine fendant who is a nonresident of 273. the state. Plurede v. Levasseur, siHowell's Stats. Ann. 1912, 89 Maine 172, 2>6 Atl. 110. § 13843. This act covers a claim 2"Annis v. Gilmore, 47 Maine for shingle-bands furnished to a 152. contractor. Bourgette v. Wil- -SThompson v. Gilmore, 50 liams. 7i Mich. 208, 41 N. Maine 428. W. 229. It does not cover a claim 717 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. § 712 ding, falling, hauling, scaling, banking, driving, running, rafting, or booming^- any logs, timber, cedar posts, telegraph poles, railroad ties, bark, shingle-bolts, stave-bolts, staves, cord-wood, pulp-wood, hop-poles, hoop-poles, veneering wood, or any other forest products in this state, or in haul- ing any manufactured forest products above enumerated from place of manufacture to place where deposited for ship- ment by railroad or by water, or to any other place of desti- nation, has a lien thereon, for the amount due for such labor or services, and the same shall take precedence of all other claims or liens thereon. ^^ The word person or persons shall for the use of a team sold on condition that the vendor should retain title until the price was paid, and that, upon default, he should be paid for its use. Mabie V. Sines, 92 Mich. 545, 52 N. W. 1007. It does not give a lien for hauling lumber from the mills after it is manufactured. Villenuve V. Sines, 92 Mich. 556, 52 N. W. 1007. The vendee of logs is bound by what the vendor has done in accepting work done under a con- tract with another and can not as against the workman's lien as- sert nonperformance of the con- tract. Kangas v. Boulton, 127 Mich. 539, 86 N. W. 1043. As to where action to foreclose lien must be begun, see Harris v. Doyle, 130 Mich. 470, 90 N. W. 293. See also, Kangas v. Boulton, 127 Mich. 539, 86 N. W. 1043. 32 A boom company's lien is ac- quired if the work is done by its agent, though the agent is paid a gross sum for the job. Hall v. Tittabawassee Boom Co., 51 Mich. Zn, 16 N. W. 770. These provi- sions cover labor performed "in cutting, skidding, hauling, chop- ping, sawing, swamping, loading, and falling." These services are in substance the services men- tioned in the statute. Grand Rapids Chair Co. v. Runnels, 11 Mich. 104, ^43 N. W. 1006. A jus- tice of the peace does not have jurisdiction of a suit to establish a suit by attachment under the law giving liens for logging, unless a statement of the lien is first filed. Eales V. Francis, 115 Mich. 636, n N. W. 894. 33A boom company has a lien for its services in breaking jams and driving logs whose owners have not put on a sufficient force of laborers to do the work. Hall V. Tittabawassee Boom Co., 51 Mich. Zll, 16 N. W. 770. Where the logs of an individual owner have become intermingled with those in charge of a boom com- pany without his consent, but without the fault of the company, the latter acquires a lien for its services in driving them, which it does not waive by refusing to deliver them to the owner unless he shall tender not only a reason- able compensation in driving them, ■12 LIENS. 718 be interpreted to include cooks, blacksmiths, artisans and all others usually employed in performing such labor and services. A statement in writing under oath must be filed in the of- fice of the clerk of the county where the drive terminates, setting forth the amount due and a description of the prop- erty, within thirty days from the completion of the labor or services. The lien is enforced by attachment. ^^ but also for separating his logs from the others. Hall v. Titta- wabassee Boom Co., 51 Mich. 377, 16 N. \V. 770. One buying lumber in the possession of sawyer has the burden to show that the saw- yer's lien for sawing had been discharged. German v. Central Lumber Co., 116 Mich. 245, 74 N. W. 644. The owner of lumber must be made a defendant in an attachment proceeding by a labor- er against a contractor. Brabant V. Lillie, 117 Mich. 167, 75 N. W. 440; Sheridan v. Colton, 113 Mich. 112, 71 N. W. 479; Newbauer v. Newbauer, 112 Mich. 562, 70 N. W. 1104. Where a sawyer has waived his lien on a part of lumber by giving the possession to the own- er, he may retain a lien on the remainder of the lumber for his whole bill. German v. Central Lumber Co., 116 Mich. 245, 78 N. E. 1007. The log lien statute giv- ing full costs in justice's court is not unconstitutional. Lagoo v. Seaman, 136 Mich. 418, 99 N. W. 393. 34The proceedings to enforce the lien must conform strictly to the statute. The affidavit for the attachment is jurisdictional, and if it omits material averments the writ affords no protection to the officer executing it. Woodruff v. Ives, 34 Mich. 320. Filing and dismissing proceedings does not constitute an estoppel. Dowd v. Dowd, 126 Mich. 649, 86 N. W. 128. The owner of logs legally attached, who takes them and con- verts them into lumber, is liable in an action on the case, or in trover, for the amount of the lien. Goodrow v. Buckley, 70 Mich. 513, 38 N. W. 454. The lien is lost if the conditions in regard to the filing of a statement of the lien, and commencing suit to enforce it, within limited periods, are not complied with. Haifley v. Haynes, 27 Mich. 535. A short layoff at employer's request will not pre- vent Hen for entire period. Ham- mond V. Pullman, 129 Mich. 567, 89 N. W. 358. Lien may be de- feated by intentionally overstat- ing claim. Golden v. McCabe, 121 Mich. 666, 80 N. W. 1133. See also, Eales V. Francis, 115 Mich. 636, 72, N. W. 894. As to lien and affidavit where several laborers join their claims for laborer per- formed for a contractor upon logs belonging to several owners, see Pack V. Circuit Judge of Iosco County, 70 Mich. 135, 38 N. W. 6; Wiggins V. Houghton, 89 Mich. 468, 50 N. W. 1005. In proceedings 719 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. § 713 § 713. Minnesota.^^ — Any person who performs manual labor or other personal service for hire, in or in aid of the cutting, hauling, banking, driving, rafting, tov^ing, cribbing, to enforce a lien by attachment it is not necessary that the lumber should be appraised. Ruggles v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 472, 83 N. W. 149. A statement is not invalid because an attempt is made to include claims of others. VanSlyck v. Arseneau, 140 Mich. 154, 103 N. W. 571. See Clark V. Adams, 33 Mich. 159, as to service of notice, and general interpretation of the lien law^ of 1873. See Grand Rapids Chair Co. V. Runnels, 77 Mich. 104, 43 N. W. 1006, as to the affidavit for attachment, the service of the writ of attachment, the sherifif's return, the procedure before the justice, and the levy of the excution. Also White V. Prior, 88 Mich. 647, SO N. W. 655. Where a contract for the manufacture of shingles was a continuing one, and the shingles were mingled and sold by the owner without regard to the fact of their being the first or last manufactured, the manufacturer would be entitled to a Hen. on shingles manufactured prior to the time up to which he had been paid, for work and labor there- after performed in such manufac- ture. The thirty days within which the statement of lien shall be filed did not commence to run from the time each statement of the amount due was rendered, as there was but one contract. Craddock v. Dwight, 85 Mich. 587, 48 N. W. 644. Under the provision that a proceeding to enforce a lien on logs shall be commenced in the county where the property or any part of it is situated, the petition is defective if it does not allege that the logs, or some part of them, are within the county where the suit is begun. The court can not take judicial notice that the boom is within the county so as to cure the omission of this aver- ment. The appearance and plea of a claimant is no waiver of the defect, for, the judgment sought being one against the logs, the court must have actual juris- diction. Pine Saw Logs v. Sias, 43 Mich. 356, 5 N. W. 414. 35 Gen. Stats. 1913, §§ 6265-6267; 7058-7076. Gen. Laws 1897, ch. 347 (repealed by Laws 1899, ch. 342), was held to give liens to con- tractors or sub-contractors for services in cutting, banking or hauling logs. Carver v. Bagley, 79 Minn. 114, 81 N. W. 757. A company sorting, hand- ling and collecting logs has a lien on such logs. International Boom Co. v. Rainy Lake River Boom Corp., 97 Minn. 513, 107 N. W. 735. One who labors in cutting and hauling logs has a lien also for labor performed by his ser- vants and teams under a monthly contract price for both. Breault V. Archamboult, 64 Minn. 420, 67 N. W. 348, 58 Am. St. 545. One who labors in taking timber out of the water and sorting and piling it for market is entitled to a lien therefor. Itasca Cedar & Tie Co. v. Brainerd Lumber & Mer- cantile Co., 109 Minn. 120, § 713 LIENS. 720 or booming any logs, cross-ties, poles, or other timber, shall have a lien thereon for the price or value of such labor or service, which shall be preferred to all other claims on the same except those of the state of Minnesota and of the ow^ner or occupant of the land from which the same may have been unlawfully removed, and no agreement to waive such lien shall be valid. A statement under oath by the claimant^*^ must be filed in the ofHce of the surveyor-general of the district, setting forth his postoffice address, the rate of compensation agreed upon or claim.ed, the sums, if any, paid thereon, the date of the commencement and termination of such labor, the amount or balance due, a description of the logs on which the lien is claimed, and the fact of such claim. For labor performed between the first day of October and first day of April the statement must be filed before the first day of May next thereafter; and for labor performed in any other part of the year the statement must be filed within thirty days after completion of same. The lien is enforced by an attachment against such logs or lumber. Before the attachment is issued, the claimant must make afBdavit as to the amount of indebtedness se- cured by the lien and then unpaid and give the name of the 123 N. W. 58. A seizure of logs Sojf the statement be not made on attachment to foreclose a by the claimant, it must be made laborer's lien is valid if made by some one with authority from by the sheriff of the county where him to make it, and the oath they are situated. Foley v. Mark- should state such authority. Grif- ham, 60 Minn. 216, 62 N. W. 125. fin v. Chadbourne, 32 Minn. 126, 19 An action for damages may be N. W. 647; Scott v. Holston Lum- maintained by one from whom ber Co. v. Sharvey, 62 Minn. 528, logs have been wrongfully taken, 64 N. W. 1132. As to what is a depriving him of his lien thereon. sufficient description in statement Breault v. Merrill & Ring Lum- of lien, see Carver v. Crookston ber Co., 12 Minn. 143, 75 N. W. Lumber Co., 84 Minn. 79, 86 N. W. 122. 871. 721 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. 713a debtor. A copy of the lien statement shall be attached there- to as an exhibit. ^^ It is further provided, that this act is intended only for the protection of laborers for hire, and shall not inure to the benefit of any person interested in contracting, cutting, haul- ing, banking, or driving logs by the thousand. ^^ § 713a. Mississippi.^^ — Every employe or laborer of a per- son, partnership, or a corporation engaged in operating a sawmill, planing mill, or in cutting and shipping (or rafting) timber, shall have a lien on all such lumber and timber of his employer, for his wages due by such employer, in preterence to all other debts due and owing from the owner thereof. But such lien shall take effect as to purchasers or incum- brances for a valuable consideration, without notice thereof, only from the time of commencing suit to enforce the lien. This lien may be enforced and trial and judgment had in the same manner as the lien for purchase-money of goods is enforced. This lien shall expire three months after the claim is due unless judicial proceedings have commenced to as- sert it. 3"The lien can only be enforced by attachment as provided. Griffin V. Chadbourne, 32 Minn. 126, 19 N. W. 647. As to evidence admissi- ble to show right to lien see Lind- say & Phelps Co. V. Mullen, 176 U. S. 126, 44 L. ed. 400, 20 Sup. Ct. 325. The lien of a person for boom charges on logs in his pos- session is superior to claims of a bona fide purchaser. Akeley v. Miss. & R. R. Boom Co., 64 Minn. 108, 69 N. W. 208. An extension of the time of payment will re- lease a lien. Clough v. Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co., 64 Minn. 87, 66 N. W. 200. .38 It was held that the provision of the law of 1876 (repealed Laws 1899, ch. 342) was intended to distinguish the contractor who employs others to do the work from a laborer who does the work himself, and should be interpreted as if it read that it "shall not inure to the benefit of any person interested in contract- ing for cutting, hauling, banking," etc. King v. Kelley, 25 Minn. 522. But see Carver v. Bagley, 79 Minn. 114, 81 N. W. 757. -oLaws 1908. ch. 131. 46 § 7^3^ LIENS, 722 § 713b. Missouri.^*^ — Corporations and persons are given liens on timber, logs and other floatables, driven, boomed, rafted or run and are entitled to retain the possession there- of, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the amount due for such booming and reasonable charges for driving, rafting or running of such logs, timber, lumber and other floatables and all expenses for caring for the same. § 713c. Montana.^^ — Every person performing labor upon, or who shall assist in obtaining or securing saw logs, piling, railroad ties, cord wood or other timber, has a lien upon the same, and upon all other saw logs, piling, railroad ties, cord wood or other timber which, at the time of the filing of the claim or lien hereinafter provided, belonged to the person or corporation for whom the labor was performed, for the work or labor done upon or in obtaining or securing the particular saw logs, piling, railroad ties, cord wood or other timber in said claim or lien described, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of the same or his agent, or a contractor or subcontractor or any person in behalf of such owner or his agent, or a contractor or subcontractor. The cook in a logging camp shall be regarded as a person who as- sists in obtaining or securing the timber herein mentioned. Every person performing work or labor or assisting in manufacturing saw logs and other timber into lumber and shingles, has a lien upon such lumber while the same remains at the mill where it was manufactured, or in the possession or under the control of the manufacturer, wdiether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of such logs or his agent or any contractor or subcontractor of such owner. Any person who shall permit another to go upon his tim- 40Rev. Stats. 1909, § 3467. 107 Pac. 898. As to enforcement 4iLaws 1899, p. 126, as amended of lien, see Logan v. Billings & N. by Laws 1909, p. 66; Lane v. Lane R. Co., 40 Mont. 467, 107 Pac. 415. Potter Lumber Co., 40 Mont. 541, 723 lumbermen's liens. § 714 ber land and cut thereon saw logs, piling, railroad ties, cord wood or other timber, has a lien upon the same for the price agreed to be paid for such privilege, or for the price such privilege w^ould be reasonably vv-orth in case there was no express agreement fixing the price. The liens herein provided for are preferred liens and prior to any other liens, and no sale or transfer of any saw logs, piling, railroad ties, cord wood or other timber or manufac- tured lumber or shingles shall divest the lien thereon as here- in provided, and as between liens provided for in this act those for work and labor shall be preferred; provided, that as between liens for work and labor claimed by several la- borers on the same logs or lot of logs the claim or claims for work or labor done or performed on the identical logs proceeded against to the extent that said logs can be identi- fied, shall be preferred as against the general claims of lien for work and labor provided for above. § 714. Nevada.^- — All persons who shall perform work or labor upon any tract or tracts of lands, by cutting or cording the wood or timber growing, or being thereon, shall have and may each, respectively, claim and hold a lien upon the wood or timber so cut or corded, for the amount in value of the work or labor so performed, by retaining possession of the same until the whole amount due for such work or labor shall have been paid; provided, that any lien claimed and held, as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be waived, unless an action be brought in some court of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of the amount for which such lien is claimed as security, within sixty days after such wood or timber shall have been taken into possession by the claimant; and the fact that such lien is claimed, shall be set out in the com- plaint, together with a description of, and the number of cords of wood, or feet of timber, retained in possession by 42 Rev. Laws 1912, art. 2230. § 7^5 LIENS. 724 the claimant. If the judgment be for the plaintiff in such action, the execution shall direct the same, with costs, to be satisfied out of the wood or timber so retained, if the same shall be sufficient ; if not, then the balance to be satisfied out of any other property of the defendant in the same manner provided by law. In all cases where two or more persons are jointly engaged under a contract or employment, in cutting or cording wood or timber, on any tract or tracts of land in this state, any one of such persons may claim, have, hold and enforce a lien, for all the work or labor performed, as in this section provided, and for the benefit of the other persons jointly interested with him; in such cases, in all actions brought under the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of the court, in case the judgment shall be for the plain- tiff, to designate in such judgment the amount due each of the persons interested. Possession of wood or timber within the meaning of this section shall be deemed to be in the person or persons cut- ting or cording wood or timber, for the purposes of this act, from the time of cutting or cording the same ; and shall not be deemed to have been released or yielded by the person or persons performing the work or labor as herein provided, except such person or persons, by word or act clearly and distinctly declare, or evidence his or their intention to so re- lease or yield possession; and in cases of a joint contract or employment, the possession of any part of the wood or tim- ber, cut or corded, shall not be deemed yielded or released without the assent of all the persons cutting or cording the same, manifested as in this section provided. Justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction of all actions under the provi- sions of this act, when the amount claimed does not exceed three hundred dollars. § 715. New Hampshire.*" — Any person who, by himself or others, or by teams, shall perform labor or furnish supplies -JsPub. Stats. & Sess. Laws 1901, pp. 452, 453, §§ 12, 13, 16, 17. 725 lumbermen's liens. § 715a to the amount of fifteen dollars or more toward rafting, driv- ing, cutting, hauling, sawing or drawing wood, bark, lumber, or logs, or toward cooking or hauling supplies in aid of such labor, by virtue of a contract with the owner of the wood, bark, lumber, or logs, shall have a lien thereon for such labor or supplies, which lien shall take precedence of all prior claims except liens on account of public taxes, to continue ninety days after the services are performed or supplies fur- nished, and may be secured by attachment. The officer making such attachment may pay the boomage thereon, if any, and return the amount so paid on the writ, which shall be included in the damages recovered. Any person who shall, by himself or others, perform labor or furnish materials to the amount of fifteen dollars or more for rafting, driving, cutting, hauling, [sawing] or drawing wood, bark, lumber, or logs, by virtue of a contract with an agent, contractor, or sub-contractor of the owner, shall have a lien thereon for such labor or supplies, provided he gave notice in writing to the owner or to the person having charge of the property that he should claim such lien before performing the labor or furnishing the materials for which it is claimed.^* §715a. New York.^^ — It is provided by statute that one who makes, alters, repairs, or in any w^ay by his labor adds to the value of personal property with the consent or at the request of the owner shall have a lien on such article, while lawfully in possession thereof for his reasonable charges -for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain pos- 44This last section was added kins v. Rays, 68 N. H. 164, 44 Atl. after the decision in Jacobs v. 102, 72i Am. St. 554. Knapp, SO N. H. 71. In an action 45Birdseye's C. & G. Consol. to enforce a lien on logs a gen- Laws 1909, p. 3228, § 180; O'Clair eral description of the logs hauled v. Hale, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 31, affd. is sufficiently definite, it only be- 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 77, 54 N. Y. ing necessary to identify the logs S. 388. as being the same hauled. Hop- § 715b LIENS. 726 session thereof until such charges are paid. It is hehl under this statute that it applies only to skilled labor and does not refer to common labor. § 715b. North Carolina.'**' — Every person doing the work of cutting or sawing logs into lumber, getting out wood pulp, acid wood or tan bark, shall have a lien upon the said lumber for the amount of wages due them, and the said lien shall have priority over all other claims or liens upon said lumber, except as against a purchaser for full value and without notice thereof: provided, any such laborer whose wages for thirty or less number of days performed are due and unpaid shall file notice of such claim before the nearest justice of the peace in the county in which said work has been done, stating the number of days of labor performed, the price per day, and the place where the lumber is situate, and the person for whom said labor was performed, which said statement shall be signed by the said laborer or his at- torney, and the said laborer shall also give to the owner thereof, within five days after the lien has been filed with the justice of the peace, as aforesaid, a copy of said notice as filed with the said justice of the peace: provided, that if the owner can not be located, that notice shall be given by attaching said notice on the logs or lumber, wood pulp, acid wood or tan bark upon which the labor sued for was performed, and any person buying said lumber or logs, wood pulp, acid wood or tan bark after such notice has been filed with the nearest justice of the peace, shall be deemed to have bought the same with notice thereof, but no action shall be maintained against the owner of said logs or lumber, wood pulp, acid wood or tan bark or the purchaser thereof under the provisions of this section unless same is com- menced within thirty days after notice is filed with the jus- tice of the peace by such laborer, as above provided. 46Pub. Laws 1913, p. 242. § 2023a. 727 lumbermen's liens. § 716 § 716. Oregon. — Every person performing labor upon or who shall assist in obtaining or securing saw logs, spars, piles, or other timber, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done upon or in obtaining or securing the same, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of the same or his agent. The cook in a logging- camp, and any and all others who may assist in or about a logging-camp, shall be regarded as a person who assists in obtaining or securing the saw logs, spars, piles, or other timber mentioned herein. Every person performing labor upon, or who shall assist in manufacturing saw logs or other timber into lumber, has a lien upon such lumber while the same remains at the yard wherein manufactured, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of such lumber or his agent. Any person who shall permit another to go upon his timber land and cut thereon saw logs, spars, piles, or other timber has a lien upon such logs, spars, piles, and timber for the price agreed to be paid for such privilege, or for the price such privilege or the stump- age thereon would be reasonably worth, in case there was no express agreement fixing the price. Persons entitled to such liens are only entitled to them during the six months next preceding the filing of the claims.*'^ 4"Bellinger & Cotton's Ann. does not carry the lien. Alderson Codes & Stats., §§ 5677-5692. As to v. Lee, 52 Ore. 92, 96 Pac. 234. As filing of claim and bringing of suit to the right of the owner of stand- and sale of property, see §§ 7-18 of ing timber to give a lien by agree- above act. One who renders logs ment on the lumber to be manu- impossible of identification upon factured from them, for advances which another has a lien is liable to aid him in manufacturing such to the lienholder for damages for lumber, see Goodnough Mercan- an amount equal to the sum se- tile & Stock Co. v. Galloway, 156 cured by the lien. Bellinger & Fed. 504. Laborer may have a lien Cotton's Ann. Codes and Stats., for a specified time without filing § 5692; Willett v. Kinney, 54 his claim. The assignment of the Ore. 594, 104 Pac. 719. The laborer's claim carries also the right to a laborer's lien is per- lien. Fischer v. G. W. Cone Lum- sonal and an assignment thereof ber Co., 49 Ore. 277, 89 Pac. IZl. prior to the recording of the lien § 71? LIENS. /-< §717. Vermont.^^ — A person cutting or drawing logs, acting under a contract with the owner thereof, shall have a lien thereon for his wages, which shall have precedence of other claims except public taxes, and continue sixty days after the services are performed. Such lien shall not at- tach until the person claiming it files in the town clerk's ofifice of the town where he performed the services, or, if the town is not organized, in the county clerk's office, a brief statement of the contract under which he claims a lien, and his purpose to enforce it against the property for the amount due for such service. Such lien shall have no validity against a subsequent pur- chaser unless a suit is brought and the logs attached thereon within thirty days from the time the plaintiff's right of ac- tion accrues against the person for whom he performed the services, and shall be vacated as to all persons, unless a suit is brought and the logs attached thereon within sixty days from such time. Such attachment shall be made by leaving a copy of the process in the town clerk's office of the town where the services were performed and also where the logs are, and, if either town is unorganized, in the county clerk's office. §718. Washington.^^ — Every person performing labor upon or who shall assist in obtaining or securing saw logs, ■isPub. Stats. 1906, §§ 2654-2656. Grimm v. Pacific Creosoting Co., 49Remington & Ballinger's Ann. 50 Wash. 415, 97 Pac. 297. No lien Codes & Stats. 1910, §§ 1162-1172. on logs for boom chains furnished Such lien is a primary claim on the for use in logging. Braeger v. property. Casey v. Ault, 4 Wash. Bolster, 60 Wash. 579, 111 Pac. 167, 29 Pac. 1048; Cross v. Dore, 20 797. Where ties are cut in Wash. 121, 54 Pac. 1003; Blu- the woods no lien thereon is se- mauer v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 cured under the statute giving a Pac. 844, 85 Am. St. 966. Loss of lien for labor upon the manufac- possession and dominion over ture of timber at a mill. Forsberg property w^aives a lien. Anderson v. Lundgren, 64 Wash. 427, 117 Pac. V. Tingley, 24 Wash. 537, 64 Pac. 244. One employed to cut timber 747, 85 Am. St. 959. See also, into logs has a lien for his v^rork. 729 LUMBERMEN S LIENS. 7i8 spars, piles, cordwood, shingle bolts, or other timber, and the owner or owners of any tugboat, or towboat, which shall tow or assist in towing, from one place to another within this state, any saw logs, spars, piles, cordwood, shingle bolts, or other timber, and the owner or owners of any team or any logging engine, which shall haul or assist in hauling from one place to another within this state, any saw logs, spars, piles, cord wood, shingle bolts, or other timber, and the owner or owners of any logging or other railroad over which saw logs, spars, piles, cordwood, shingle bolts, or other timber shall be transported and delivered, shall have a lien upon the same for the work or labor done upon, or in obtaining or securing, or for services rendered in towing, transporting, hauling, or driving, the particular saw logs, spars, cordwood, shingle bolts, or other timber in said claim O'Connor v. Burnham, 49 Wash. 443, 95 Pac. 1013; O'Brien v. Per- fection Pile Preserving Co., 49 Wash. 395, 95 Pac. 489. For evi- dence held sufificient to establish logging lien, see Cascade Boom Co. V. McNeeley Logging Co., Zl Wash. 203, 79 Pac. 793. A laborer who cuts and delivers logs to a saw^ mill has a lien on the logs that can be enforced. Remington & Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stat. 1910, § 1162; Graham v. Gardner, 45 Wash. 648, 89 Pac. 171. No lien can be enforced against logs not belonging to an employer or his vendee. Duggan v. Smith, 27 Wash. 702, 68 Pac. 356. No lien can be acquired on fence posts by merely hauling them from the factory to the vendee. Ryan v. Guilfoil, 13 Wash. 373, 43 Pac. 351. As to suffi- ciency of a lien notice, see Mc- Pherson v. Smith, 14 Wash. 226, 44 Pac. 255. An attorney fee may be allowed to plaintiff's attorney in foreclosing a lien. Ivall v. Willis, 17 Wash. 645, 50 Pac. 467. See also, Marlette v. Crawford, 17 Wash. 603, 50 Pac. 495. A partnership in possession of shingles can enforce its lien for manufacturing them. Munroe v. Sedro Lumber & Shin- gle Co., 16 Wash. 694, 48 Pac. 405. See also, Hadlock v. Shumway, 11 Wash. 690, 40 Pac. 346. A logger's lien is allowable for services in blasting rock to clear a passage for logs. Duggan v. Washougal Land & Logging Co., 10 Wash. 84, 38 Pac. 856. Lienholders may join in an action for damages for the destruction of logs subject to their liens. Peterson v. Sayward, 9 Wash. 503, Z1 Pac. 657. As to what is necessary to aver in a complaint for conversion of logs, see Liv- ingston V. Lovgren, 27 Wash. 102, 67 Pac. 599. As to awarding costs in a suit to foreclose a lien, see Fraser v. Rutherford, 26 Wash. 658, 67 Pac. Z(£. § 7l8 LIENS. . 730 of lien described, whether such work, labor or services was done, rendered or performed at the instance of the owner of the same or his agent. The cook in a logging-camp shall be regarded as a person who assists in obtaining or securing the timber herein mentioned. Every person performing work or labor upon or assisting in manufacturing saw logs and other timber into lumber and shingles, has a lien upon such lumber while the same remains at the mill where it was manufactured or in the possession or under the control of the manufacturer, whether such work or labor was done at the instance of the owner of such logs or his agent or any contractor or subcontractor of such owner. Any person who shall permit another to go upon his timber land and cut thereon saw logs, spars, piles or other timber, has a lien upon the same for the price agreed to be paid for such privilege, or for the price such privilege would be reasonably worth in case there was no e xpress agreement fixing the price. These liens are preferred liens, and are prior to any other liens, and no sale or transfer of any saw logs, spars, piles or other timber or manufactured lumber or shingles shall divest the lien thereon. The person rendering the service of [or] doing the work or labor named above is only entitled to the liens as provided herein for services, work or labor for the period of eight cal- endar months, or any part thereof next preceding the filing of the claim. The person granting the privilege to another to cut logs upon his land is only entitled to the lien as provided herein for saw logs, spars, piles and other timber cut during the eight months next preceding the filing of the claim as here- inafter provided. Every person within thirty days after the close of the rendition of the services, or after the close of the work or labor hereinbefore mentioned, claiming the benefit hereof, must file for record with the county auditor of the county in 731 lumbermen's liens. § 719 which such saw logs, spars, piles and other timber were cut, or in which such lumber or shingles were manufactured, a claim containing a statement of his demand, and the amount there- of, after deducting as nearly as possible all just credits and offsets, with the name of the person by whom he was em- ployed, with a statement of the terms and conditions of his contract, if any, and in case there is no express contract, the claim shall state what such service, work or labor is reason- ably worth ; and it shall also contain a description of the property to be charged with the lien sufificient for identifica- tion with reasonable certainty, which claim must be verified by the oath of himself or some other person to the effect that the affiant believes the same to be true.^*^ Every person claiming the benefit of the lien for the pur- chase-price of timber must file for record, with the county auditor of the county in which such saw logs, spars, piles or other timber were cut, a claim in substance the same as provided in the preceding paragraph, and verified as therein provided. No lien above provided for binds any saw logs, spars, piles or other timber, or lumber and shingles, for a longer period than eight calendar months after the claim has been filed, unless a civil action be commenced in a proper court within that time to enforce the same. § 719. Wisconsin.^^ — Any person who shall do or perform any labor or services in cutting, hauling, running, felling, 50 The form of the claim is given ment after such notice is filed, in the statute. As to sufficiency of Casey v. Ault, 4 Wash. 167, 29 Pac. description of the property, see 1048. Even if a part of the logs on Casey v. Ault, 4 Wash. 167, 29 Pac. vv^hich there is a lien are sawed be- 1048; Dexter v. Sparkman, 2 Wash. fore the commencement of the suit 165, 25 Pac. 1070; Dexter v. Wiley, to foreclose there may be a fore- 2 Wash. 171, 25 Pac. 1071; Doyle closure on the 1 >gs not sawed. V. McLeod, 4 Wash. 732, 31 Pac. Gray's Harbor Boom Co. v. Lytle 96. While the inchoate right of a Logging & Mercantile Co., 36 laborer's lien before the filing of Wash. 151, 78 Pac. 795. the notice cannot be assigned, the siStat. 1898, §§ 3329-3342b, as lien becomes the subject of assign- amended by Laws 1913, p. 255. As 719 LIENS. 732 piling, driving, rafting, booming, cribbing, towing, sawing, .peeling, or manufacturing into lumber or timber any logs. to service by publication, see Cox V. North Wisconsin Lumber Co., 81 Wis. 141, 51 X. W. 1130. As to the mode of enforcing such lien, see Stat. 1898, § 3331. As to the de- scription of the property in the judgment, see Paulsen v. Ingersoll, 62 Wis. 312, 22 N. W. 477. The lien attaches when the labor is performed and the failure to file the claim in the lifetime of claim- ant will not defeat the lien. Oiles V. Green, 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856. As to levy by officer upon logs not within his county, see Shafer v. Hogue, 70 Wis. 392, 35 N. W. 928. The petition for a lien may be amended. Stacy v. Bryant, 7i Wis. 14, 40 N. W. 632; Murphy v. Adams, 71 Maine 113, 2)6 Am. Rep. 299. A lien is also given for labor in cutting, peeling, or hauling bark. Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3329. As to time within which petition must be filed, see Cuer v. Ross, 49 Wis. 652, 6 N. W. 331. As to evidence of time when petition was filed, see Minton v. Underwood Lumber Co.. 79 Wis. 646, 48 N. W. 857. The statutes of 1898, § 3329, giving liens to laborers for services in manu- facturing lumber, give no lien for hauling lumber from the mill after it is sawed. McGeorge v. Stanton- DeLong Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 7, 110 N. W. 788. Where one hires his team to another to be used in hauling logs but does not accom- pany the team in person or by servant he can have no lien on the logs for the hire of his team. Ed- ward V. H. B. Waite Lumber Co., 108 Wis. 164, 84 N. W. 150, 81 Am. St. 884. One who works in build- ing and repairing a logging rail- road is not entitled to a lien on lumber manufactured from logs hauled thereon. Carpenter v. Bayfield Western Ry. Co., 107 W^is. 611, 83 X. W. 764. One may have a lien for incident- ally repairing machinery used in manufacturing lumber while engaged in the work of man- ufacturing logs into lumber. Engi V. Harden, 123 Wis. 407, 100 N. W. 1046. A prior statute gave a lien on logs and timber, but not upon lumber. "While the property re- mains in the form of logs or tim- ber, it can easily be traced, de- scribed, and identified by reference to location and marks; but after it is cut or sawed into lumber, it be- comes more portable, more liable to be scattered, and more difficult to describe or identify. It also then becomes more peculiarly an article of commerce, and more lia- ble to pass into the hands of inno- cent purchasers." Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189, 2 N. W. 102, 559. See also, Arians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. 288, 56 Am. Rep. 611. The word "timber," however, in- cludes railroad ties. These are usually made from the stems of small trees. They are as much timber as squared sticks of tim- ber. Kollock V. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393. 9 N. W. 67. If the jury find that part of the labor for which a lien is sought was done on logs other than defendant's, then they should find how much was done on other logs, and charge defendant's 7Z2> LUMBERMEN S LIENS. § 719 timber, stave bolts, heading, staves, pulp wood, cord wood, firewood, railroad ties, piling, telegraph poles, telephone logs only with the labor done on them. The lien attaches and can be enforced only on the logs on which it was performed, whether it be for cutting, hauling, running, driving, or rafting. It is a specific lien on the identical thing upon which the labor is performed. Minton v. Underwood Lumber Co., 79 Wis. 646, 48 N. W. 857; Losie v. Underwood Lumber Co., 79 Wis. 631, 48 N. W. 858. One holding a lien on logs may en- force his lien for all of his claim on a part only of the logs. Blonde V. Menominee Bay Shore Lumber Co., 106 Wis. 540, 82 N. W. 552. A creditor of a laborer has no lien on the property of the laborer's employer. Hyde v. German Nat. Bank, 115 Wis. 170, 91 N. W. 230. The owner of property against which a lien is enforced is not personally liable in damages. St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55, 124 N. W. 1049. As to sup- plies, see Stat. 1898, § 3342; Gar- land V. Hickey, 75 Wis. 178, 43 N. W. 832. Under a statute giving a lien to one furnishing any supplies in such business, one who cooks food for the men at work on the logs directly is entitled to a lien thereon for his wages. Young v. French, 35 Wis. Ill; Winslow v. Urquhart, 39 Wis. 260. The word "supplies" also includes the board of the men, even when furnished at a hotel in a city several miles from the place where they are at work, if the charges for such board are reasonable for men so en- gaged. Kollock V. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, 9 N. W. 67. Neither the resi- dence of the person furnishing the supplies, nor the place where they are delivered to the person who uses them, is material under this provision. Patten v. Northwestern Lumber Co., 72, Wis. 233, 41 N. W. 82. A vendor of supplies for a log- ging-camp, which were actually used by the purchasers in getting out logs, is entitled to a lien on the logs for the amount due, al- though the supplies, before being so used, were placed by the pur- chasers in their store to be sold to their employes and others at a profit. Stacy v. Bryant, 72) Wis. 14, 40 N. W. 632. Under Stat. 1898, § 3342, providing that no lien shall be had on logs for "supplies," there can be no lien for board furnished men employed in getting out, raft- ing, or running the logs. Section 3341, giving a lien to all persons performing services by cooking food for men performing labor on logs, does not give a lien to one who contracts to board the men. Where an action to enforce a lien is based on a contract for furnish- ing board to the men at a stipu- lated price, there can be no ap- portionment separating the value of the food from the labor in pre- paring it, and giving plaintiff a lien for his services as cook. Brad- ford v. Underwood Lumber Co., 80 Wis. 50, 48 N. W. 1105. See Abraham v. Agnew, 83 Wis. 246, 53 N. W. 504, as to liens for sup- plies under the above statute in Douglas County. No lien accrues under the logging statute in favor § 719a LiExs. 734 poles, fence posts, paving timber, tan or other barks or in preparing wood for or manufacturing charcoal, shall have a lien upon such material for the amount due or to become due for any such labor or services, which lien shall take precedence of all other claims, liens or incumbrances there- on or sales thereof, whether such claims, liens, incumbrances, or sales are made, created, or accrued before or after the time of doing such work, labor, and services. § 719a. Wyoming.^^ — All lien claims for labor performed in cutting or manufacturing railroad cross-ties, wood, poles, or lumber, or for doing any labor in reference thereto, shall be concurrent liens upon the same, and shall be paid, pro rata, out of the proceeds arising from the sale thereof, if the same be sold. Persons entitled to a lien for labor performed in cutting or manufacturing any railroad cross-ties, wood, poles, or lumber shall not be required to identify any particular tie or ties, or sticks, poles, or boards, but may maintain their lien against any or all of that class of property owned and held by the person or persons from whom their pay for such labor is due, and may seize and sell the same. § 720. Liens for services or manual labor depend on statutes. — Whether this lien be merely for the personal serv- ices or manual labor of the claimant, as is the case under of one for labor in constructing a logs for labor in their cutting may- mill and the appurtenances there- enforce collection of his entire to. Kendall v. Hynes Lumber Co.. claim out of any part of the logs 96 Wis. 659, 71 N. W. 1039. The subject to such lien. De Morris lien appertains to wages earned v. Wilbur Lumber Co., 98 Wis. and in no sense to damages sus- 465. 74 N. W. 105. tained by reason of breach ot con- 52Comp. Stat. 1910, §§ 3767, 3768. tract of the employer to employ As to manner of enforcing such labor. Kennedy v. South Shore liens, see Turner v. Horton, 18 Lumber Co.. 102 Wis. 284, 78 N. Wyo. 281, 106 Pac. 688. W. 567. One entitled to a lien on 735 lumbermen's liens. § 721 the statutes of Maine^^ and Vermont, ^^ or includes services performed by his servants and teams, as is the case under the statutes of New Hampshire'"'^''* and of Wisconsin, ^^ de- pends much upon the terms of the statutes, though statutes substantially in the same terms have received diverse inter- pretations in different states. In the latter state the Su- preme Court has declared that the words "labor and ser- vices" in a statute giving a lien should be construed as broadh^ as their common use will allow; and without other restrictive words this language would include labor and services performed by servants and agents, as well as per- sonally, just as, in the common coynt in assumpsit for work and labor done, recovery may be had for work and labor not personally and manually performed by the plaintiff.^''' § 721. Rule by statutes in some states. — In some states it is held that a laborer has a lien upon the logs and lumber benefited by his work, whether such work was performed under a contract with the owner or not; and that, where the labor in such case is not employed by the general owner of the logs, the latter is not required to be made a party to the action to enforce the lien. In Wisconsin it was de- clared that the owner in such a case is not deprived of his day in court, but that he may bring an action against the officer who has seized the logs at the suit of the lien claimant, and is entitled to show in such action that there was collu- sion between such lien claimant and his employer, or that the amount adjudged to be due the former, in his action against his employer, was not in fact due him.^^ This view ^3The present statute includes ^^Hogan v. Gushing, 49 Wis. 169, the amount due for services per- 5 N. W. 490. See post, § 724. formed by the laborer's team. See ^THogan v. Gushing, 49 Wis. 169, ante, § 710. 5 N. W. 490, per Orton, J. siSee ante, § 717. "^s Hunger v. Lenroot, 32 Wis. 541, ^^•See ante, § 715, expressly so Dixon, C. J., dissenting and ap- provided. proving of Jacobs v. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71. § 721 LIENS. 736 was adhered to in a later decision which affirmed the con- stitutionality of the statutes declaring such lien.''^ On the other hand, the authorities generally hold that the lien is limited to the party who contracts with the owner of the property upon which the labor of the contractor and all his subcontractors or servants is expended, unless the statute expressly or impliedly includes the latter.^*' At com- mon law, the lien belongs to the person with whom the owner contracts for the work or service, and not to the servants or others employed by him. A statute should not be regarded as changing this principle of the common law, unless its terms are such that the intention of the legislature to make such a change seems too apparent to be mistaken; for such a change would be likely to work much confusion by giving to various persons, having no connection with each other and none with the owner of the property, liens upon the whole property for labor expended upon different parts of it under different contracts. To give all the various workmen and servants each an independent lien, without preference, upon the same property, would be inconvenient and practically unjust to the owner. Liens are sometimes given to subcontractors, but when this is done some special provision is made for avoiding the embarrassment that would arise from giving a right of lien upon the same property to several persons at the same time; and this is usually done by providing that, when the work is done under a contract with the owner, no person shall have the benefit of a lien unless, within a prescribed time, he shall give notice to the owner that he is so employed and will claim the benefit of the lien.^^ 59Winslow V. Urquhart. 39 Wis. W. 9; Hoffa v. Person, 1 Pa. Super. 260. So in Michigan: Reilly v. Ct. 367. See post, § IZl. Stephenson, 62 Mich. 509, 29 N. W. siAfter the decision in Jacobs v. 99. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71, a section was 60Jacobs V. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71 ; added to the statute of New- Gross V. Eiden, 53 Wis. 543, 11 N. Hampshire, giving the lien to per- 737 lumbermen's liens. § ^22 Only laborers with whom the owner of logs or lumber contracts, and not employes of a person contracting with the owner who are not employes of the owner, can claim the benefit of this lien.^^ § 722. Contractor not agent of owner to employ men. — The contractor is not in general an agent of the owner to employ men, and bind the owner or his property. Where one contracted with the owner of logs to drive them to a certain place at a stipulated price, and the owner was to supply provisions and money to a limited amount to pay off men who might be discharged, "all other men to be paid by the owner at the end of the drive," it was held that the con- tract did not constitute the contractor the owner's agent to employ men, and that the men employed by the contractor were his own and not the owner's employes, and that the contract did not give the employes a lien on the logs for their wages. ^^ The purpose and legal effect of the provi- sion for the payment of the men "at the end of the drive" was to authorize the owner to pay them and charge the amount to the contractor, and thereby protect himself, if he so desired, from any annoyance that might arise from the contractor's not paying them, but it did not render the owner liable to such men for their pay. sons who performed labor under a hired help, or employes of the con- contract with an agent or con- tractor, are not contracting parties tractor of the owner. Pub. Stat. with the owner; they are not his & Sess. Laws 1901, p. 452, § 13. laborers." Per Raney, J. 62Wright V. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 63Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 So. 6. "The lien is given to the So. 6, citing Jacobs v. Knapp, 50 N. laborers or contractors with whom H. 71; Landry v. Blanchard, 16 La. the owner of the logs contracts. If Ann. 173, a case relating to an ar- he hires laborers, his laborers have tisan's lien; and Harlan v. Rand, a lien; if his agreement for raft- 27 Pa, St. 511, a case relating to a ing is with a contractor who is to mechanic's lien. Valley Pine Lum- raft the logs and employ his own ber Co. v. Hodgens, 80 Ark. 516, help, the 'contracting parties' are 97 S. W. 682. the owner and the contractor. The 47 § 7^1 LIENS. 738 § 723. Constitutionality of statutes. — Whether a statute, which allows a lien in favor of one not in privity of contract with the owner of the property, is unconstitutional, is a question upon which the cases are not in entire harmony. A statute providing for the enforcement of a laborer's lien, by an action against the person or property of a party be- tween whom and the plaintiff no privity of contract ever existed, without making the owner a party, is unconstitu- tional.®^ No person can be deprived of his property except by due process of law, or by the law of the land. The law of the land was defined by Mr. Webster, in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, as the law "which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and ren- ders judgment only after trial." The person whose property is to be affected by a judgment of court must have notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to defend. A statute which provided for enforcing a lien against property, with- out giving the owner an opportunity to come into court and be heard, is unconstitutional.®^ § 724. The term "personal services." — The term "personal services" in these statutes has been judicially considered in several cases. Under a former statute in Maine, it was held that the lien given for "personal services" did not in- clude the services rendered by the laborer's team, though the present statute expressly includes the services of his team.®® But in New Hampshire, under the present statute, it is held that the term "personal services" includes not only services accomplished by the laborer's own hands, but those aided by the use of such appliances of his own as are indispensable to the performance of his labor. "We have therefore" say the court in a recent case,®" "little 64Jacobs V. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71. 126; McCrillis v. Wilson, 34 Maine esQuimby v. Hazen, 54 Vt. 132; 286, 56 Am. Dec. 655. Redington v. Frye, 43 Maine 578, 67Hale v. Brown, 59 N. H. 551, 587. See contra, § 721, ante. 558, 47 Am. Rep. 224, per Foster, J. 66Coburn v. Kerswell, 35 Maine 739 lumbermen's liens. § 725 hesitation in holding that the personal services of the lum- bermen include the use and the earnings of his own oxen, chain, cant-hook, and his own team and sled, if these are actually used by him and are essential to the service ren- dered. We do not, in this case, go so far as to hold, that if the claimant did not labor himself, or if acting as a common laborer, he loaned the use of his team on the same work, he could successfully claim the benefit of the lien on account of his team."®^ Under the Minnesota statute the same construction is given to the term "manual labor," and the fact that, where a man and his team are employed at a gross price for both, the employer puts them to work separately on different parts of the work, is immaterial. ^^ Under the present statute of Maine, which expressly in- cludes services performed by the laborer's team, it is held that the latter are included, although he may not own the team, provided it is in his rightful possession and control.'^*' § 725. Contractor has no lien for labor of servants. — Under a statute giving a lumberman a lien for "personal services" in cutting and hauling lumber, a contractor has no lien for labor performed by his servants. ''^^ The object of the 6SThe court suggests that possi- in its objects, and calculated to bly this was the real question de- make certain the payment for the cided in the two cases cited from labor which has actually gone to Maine. Where one hires his team increase the value of the timber." to work in hauling logs, but does Per Foster, J. not accompany the team in person "^iHale v. Brown, 59 N. H. 551, or by servant he has no lien on the 47 Am. Rep. 224, per Foster, J. logs for the sum due him for team "Whether a person in the plain- hire. Edwards v. H. B. Waite tiff's position, a contractor, one Lumber Co., 108 Wis. 164, 84 N. W. who assumes the responsibility of 150, 81 Am. St. 884. performing a certain piece of work, 69Martin v. Wakefield, 42 Minn. and employs and superintends 176, 43 N. W. 966. others in the performance of it, TOKelley v. Kelley, 11 Maine 135, 'labors,' within the meaning of the 137. "To hold otherwise would be statute granting one a lien for his doing violence to the spirit, if not 'personal services,' might be a to the letter, of a statute remedial question of no little difficulty in § 725 LIENS. 740 statute was to protect the man whose subsistence depends on the wages earned by his manual labor, and not the con- tractor, who does no manual labor himself, but draws his compensation from the profits derived from the employment of others. "Most of the authorities that we examined," say the court, "support this view of the law, except in cases where, from the wording of the statutes, a different inten- tion clearly appeared. And we are not disposed to question the wisdom of those cases. "^^ Under a similar statute in Vermont, which gives a lien to "any person who labors at cutting, or drawing logs," it was held that the lien must be enforced by the person who actually cuts and hauls the logs ; and that it cannot be en- forced by a contractor who employs others to perform the labor. The statute is primarily designed to protect employes against employers. ''^^ the absence of any judicial con- struction of this or similar stat- utes. The stock-broker, the clergy- man, the student, the farmer, and the wood-chopper, all labor, but in different ways, requiring the exer- cise of different mental and physi- cal powers. From the original and comprehensive meaning of the word itself, no reason, perhaps, could be suggested why a person who accomplishes a certain amount of work by the exercise of his mental powers, in connection with the physical exertion of others, could not be said to labor. The two classes or kinds of labor are dependent, the one on the other, and without both nothing would be accomplished. But when we study the legislative intention in the en- actment of a law granting those who work chiefly through physical means certain privileges, it is pos- sible to see that the term 'labor' is used in a restricted sense and not in its broad and comprehensive meaning." See also, Wentroth's App., 82 Pa. St. 469; Kieldsen v. Wilson, n Mich. 45, 43 N. W. 1054. 72Hale v. Brown, 59 N. H. 551, 47 Am. Rep. 224, citing Weymouth v. Sanborn, 43 N. H. 171, 80 Am. Dec. 144; Balch v. N. Y. & O. M. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 521; Parker v. Bell, 7 Gray (Mass.) 429; Stryker v. Cas- sidy. 10 Hun (N. Y.) 18, revd. 1(> N. Y. 50, 32 Am. Rep. 262; Went- roth's Appeal, 82 Pa. St. 469; Jones V. Shawhan, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 257; Ericsson v. Brown, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 390; Aikin v. Wasson, 24 N. Y. 482; Sullivan's Appeal, 11 Pa. St 107; Winder v. Caldwell, 14 How. (U. S.) 434, 14 L. ed. 487; Hoatz V. Patterson, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 537, 538. 73Quimby v. Hazen, 54 Vt. 132. 741 lumbermen's liens. § 727 § 726. What are logs or lumber. — Under a statute giving a lien on logs or lumber for cutting and hauling, the sawing of logs into sticks four feet long for shingle rift does not destroy the lien/'* Railroad ties have been considered "logs and timber" under such a statute. '^^ A lien upon logs and timber does not include the lumber into which timber is manufactured.'^^ Such a lien does not include laths'^'^ or shingles. '^^ § 727. Priority of lumberman's lien. — A lumberman's lien has priority of a lien by contract and of a prior mortgage, though previously executed and recorded. "^^ It is declared to be the intention of the statute conferring such lien to give to the laborers mentioned an absolute lien, where they are employed to do the work by any one having competent authority, as against everybody, upon the principle that their labor enhances the value of the property of every one who has any interest in it. "It was designed to make it like the sailor's lien for wages. * * * Xhe labor of workmen in running and rafting logs, etc., is of a very similar nature, and the design of the statute was to give them a like lien. And whosoever makes such contract as the plaintiff made in this case, which contemplates the performance of this kind of labor for the benefit of both the contracting parties, must be held to intend that the lien of the laborers shall attach according to the law, and that his own shall be subject to it, precisely as one taking a bottomry bond or mortgage upon 74Sands v. Sands, 74 Maine 239. ^sGross v. Eiden, 53 Wis. 543, 11 ■^sKolloch V. Parcher, 52 Wis. N. W. 9. "It is an absurdity to say 393, 9 N. W. (H, 26 Alb. L. J. 402. that the laborer shall have a lien 76Gross V. Eiden, 53 Wis. 543, 11 upon logs and timber for work N. W. 9. done in manufacturing them into ■^■^Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189, lumber." Per Cole, C. J. 2 N. W. 102, 559. Slabs are not lum- 79See generally §§ 555, 691-697, ber within the statute which gives 727, 744, 971. The statutes gener- a lien on lumber for services in ally give this lien precedence over cutting logs. Engi v. Hardell, 123 all other liens or claims. Oliver v. Wis. 407, 100 N. W. 1046. Woodman, (£ Maine 54. § 7^8 LIENS. 742 a vessel must be held to contemplate that such vessel will continue subject to the lien for sailors' wages thereafter per- formed, which will take precedence of his own."^° An attachment upon logs or lumber under a general at- tachment act, though prior in time, is subordinate to an attachment for the enforcement of this lien.^^ § 728. Property upon which lien attaches must be identi- fied. — As a general rule, the property upon which the lien is claimed must be identified as the property upon which the labor was done. To entitle one to claim a lien, it must appear that his services, or those of his team, have been performed upon the logs upon which he seeks to enforce his lien.^- But these statutes should be liberally construed in the interests of labor. A strict construction as regards the identity of the property would in many instances defeat the lien. Accordingly, the lien of a teamster who has worked with several others in hauling and banking logs which are mixed together is not limited to the identical logs which he himself hauled and banked, but may be enforced against any portion of the lot of logs upon which he and the others worked. ^^ If the services are performed under one contract upon a single lot of logs, which are marked with different marks according to their quality, the laborer may enforce his lien for his entire services upon a portion of the logs bearing one of these marks. ^^ soPaine v. Woodworth, 15 Wis. 83jacubeck v. Hewitt, 61 Wis. 96, 298, 304, per Paine, J. And see 20 N. W. Zll. See also, Kline v. Paine v. Gill, 13 Wis. 561; Kline Comstock, 67 Wis. 473, 30 N. W. V. Comstock, 67 Wis. 473, 30 N. W. 920. 920; Reilly v. Stephenson, 62 Mich. s^Martin v. Wakefield. 42 Minn. 509, 29 N. W. 99. 176, 43 N. W. 966, 6 L. R. A. 362. siHalpin v. Hall, 42 Wis. 176. See Holderman v. Manier, 104 Ind. 82Kelley v. Kelley, 11 Maine 135; 118, 3 N. E. 811. Annis v. Gilmore, 47 Maine 152. See also, § 711, ante. 743 lumbermen's liens. § 730 If the owner has iiifermingled the logs upon which there is a lien with other logs of the same mark, so that the former cannot be distinguished, an attachment of the whole lot may be made to enforce the lien.^^ § 729. Lien upon logs worked upon by laborer. — If sev- eral owners of logs employ several laborers to drive their logs, the lien of each of the laborers is solely upon the logs he was employed to drive, although the logs of the several owners become intermixed in driving, and are driven col- lectively by all the laborers employed by all the owners. '^^ In like manner, if several owners contract with one person who employs the same drivers, and in the drive all the logs become intermixed, their respective liens are not collectively upon the whole mass of logs, but are distributed upon the logs of each owner according to the amount of the labor be- stowed thereon.®" If, however, logs belonging to the same owner, though cut under different contracts, are, with his consent, mingled together, the liens of the laborers attach to all the logs thus mingled together.^^ § 730. Enforcement of labor lien. — A person who per- forms services on the same logs for dif¥erent persons may enforce the entire lien by one action. The action bears some analogy to a libel in rem, and proceedings thereon in ad- miralty. It is the performance of the labor, and not the contract of employment, or other relation that the employer bears to the logs, that creates the lien. It saves a mul- tiplicity of suits to treat the lien as an entirety capable of 85 Parker v. Williams, 11 Maine 536; Oliver v. Woodman, 66 Maine 418, 1 Atl. 138. 54; Doyle v. True, 36 Maine 542; 86Doe V. Monson, ZZ Maine 430; Appleman v. Myre, 74 Mich. 359, Marsh v. Flint, 27 Maine 475, 478; 42 N. W. 48. See Pack v. Simpson, East Hoquiam Boom & Logging 70 Mich. 135, 38 N. W. 6. Co. V. Neeson, 20 Wash. 142, 54 ssSpofford v. True. Zl Maine 283, Pac. 1001. 54 Am. Dec. 621. 87Hamilton v. Buck, Zd Maine § 73^^ LIENS. 744 being enforced in one action. It gives each employer who may have the same interest in the logs an opportunity of contesting the amount and right of lien, not only under his employment, but also as to the others. It further saves the common property from being consumed by costs in several suits, w^hich seem unnecessary for the protection of any right. ^^ § 730a. Lien on different kinds of timber cut under one contract. — Where different kinds of timber are cut and hauled under one contract from the same land to the same mill, in the same season, though delivered in separate piles, and one kind is delivered several weeks before the rest is delivered, the suit to enforce the lien is seasonably com- menced when brought within the time limited after all the timber is delivered. The lienholder is not obliged to divide his claim and bring suit for each different kind of timber delivered by itself.^^ § 730b. Continuous service under a contract. — What is continuous service under a contract is an important ques- tion as regards the time within which a claim for lien may be filed. A log-driving company contracted to raft all the logs which a certain firm owned in a stream. All the logs but four were delivered, and the log-driving company sent the owners a bill for services rendered. Both parties treated the contract as fully performed. Two months afterwards the log-driving company delivered the four remaining logs. It was held that such later delivery did not keep alive the right to a lien for the services performed, under a statute providing that the claim for lien should be filed within thirty days after the last day of performing the service. ^^ 89Collins V. Cowan, 52 Wis. 634, 16 Atl. 463; Sheridan v. Ireland, 66 9 N. W. 787; Chevret v. Mechan- Maine 65. ics' Mill and Lumber Co., 4 Wash. aipish Creek Boom & Log-Driv- 721, 31 Pac. 24. ing Co. v. Weed, 80 Wis. 630, 50 »ophillips V. Vose, 81 Maine 134, N. W. 585. But see Cross v. Dore, 20 Wash. 121, 54 Pac. 1003. CHAPTER XV. MECHANICS', ARTISANS', AND LABORERS' LIENS UPON PERSONAL PROPERTY. Sec. 731. Lien for labor at common law. 732. Common-law lien a specific lien. 733. Necessity that work be done at owner's request. 734. Consent of owner may be im- plied. 735. Consent of owner may be in- ferred. 736. Lien of a city or town. 737. The lien belongs strictly to the person who has contract- ed with the owner to do the work. 738. Lien for work of agents. 739. Lien for all goods delivered under one contract. 740. Lien on part of the property for repair of all the prop- erty. 741. Time of delivery of articles to a workman. 742. Lien at common law only be- cause of added value of arti- cle. 743. Printer has no lien at com- mon law. 743a. Workman must observe the terms of his contract. 744. Precedence over mortgage de- pends on circumstances. 745. Possession is essential to the existence of this lien. 746. Possession of an officer is possession of his corpora- tion. Sec. 747. Delivery of property waives lien. 748. Mode of payment may be in- consistent with a lien. 749. Statutes of states providing liens. 750. Alabama. 750a. Alaska. 751. Arizona. 751a. Arkansas. 752. California. 753. Colorado. 753a. Connecticut. 753b. Delaware. 754. District of Columbia. 755. Florida. 756. Georgia. 757. Idaho. 758. Indiana. 759. Kansas. 759a. Kentucky. 760. Louisiana. 761. Maine. 761a. Maryland. 762. Massachusetts. 763. Michigan. 764. Minnesota. 765. Mississippi. 765a. Nebraska. 765b. Nevada. 765c. New Hampshire. 766. New Jersey. 767. New Mexico. 767a. New York. 768. North Carolina. 768a. North Dakota. 745 § 731 LIENS. 746 Sec. 768b. Oklahoma, 769. Oregon. 769a. Pennsylvania. 769b. Rhode Island. 770. South Carolina. 770a. South Dakota. 771. Tennessee. 172. Texas. 772a. Utah. 772b. Vermont. Ili. Virginia. 773a. Washington. 774. Wisconsin. 775. Wyoming. 776. No lien for farm laborers in the absence of statutes. in. Alabama. 778. Arkansas. 779. Arkansas (continued). Speci- fic liens in favor of em- ployers. § 731. Lien for labor at common law. — By the common law, a workman who by his skill and labor has enhanced the value of a chattel has a lien on it for his reasonable charges, provided the employment be with the consent, either express or implied, of the owner. ^ And it is imma- Sec. 779a. California. 779b. Colorado. 780. Florida. 781. Georgia. 781a. Idaho. 782. Louisiana. 782a. Michigan. 782b. Minnesota. 783. Mississippi. 784. North Carolina. 784a. North Dakota. 784b. Oregon. 784c. South Carolina. 785. South Dakota. 786. Tennessee. 786a. Texas. 786b. Washington. 786c. Wisconsin. iCowper V. Andrew^s, Hobart 39, 41; Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214; Close V. Waterhouse, 6 East 523n; Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270, per Baron Parke. Colorado: Hillsburg v. Harri- son, 2 Colo. App. 298, 30 Pac. 355. Connecticut: Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104, 105. Indiana: Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Dec. 410; East v. Ferguson, 59 Ind. 169. Iowa: Nevan v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207. Maine : Oakes v. Moore, 24 Maine 214, 41 Am. Dec. 379; Edge- comb V. Jenney, 108 Main 538, 81 Atl. 1091. New Hampshire : Wilson v. Martin, 40 N. H. 88. New Jersey: White v. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105, 43 Am. Rep. 347. New York: Morgan v. Cong- don, 4 N. Y. 552, 553, per Jewett, J.; McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 485, 491, 38 Am. Dec. 663; White v. Hoyt, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 2Z2; Hazard v. Manning, 8 Hun (N. Y.) 613; Myers v. Upte- grove, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 316. Pennsylvania: Hansel v. Noble, 95 Pa. St. 345, 40 Am. Rep. 659; Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. 486, 747 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABORERS LIENS. 731 terial whether there be an agreement to pay a stipulated price for such skill and labor, or there be only an implied agreement to pay a reasonable price. ^ Except as declared by modern statutes, this lien rests upon immemorial recognition, or, in other words, upon the com- mon law. It exists in favor of every bailee for hire who takes property in the way of his trade and occupation, and by his labor and skill imparts additional value to it.'" A tailor who has made a coat out of cloth delivered to him by 27 Am. Rep. 723; Mclntyre v. Car- ver, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 392, 37 Am. Dec. 519; Pierce v. Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 151. Vermont : Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 244, 23 Am. Dec. 206; Bur- diet V. Murray, 3 Vt. 302, 21 Am. Dec. 588. Wisconsin : Chappell v. Cady, 10 Wis. Ill; Arians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. 188, 56 Am. Rep. 611. 2 Morgan v. Congdon, 4 N. Y. 552; Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Dec. 410; Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254. SGreen v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 2221; Bevan v. Waters, Moody & M. 235; Scarf e v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270, 283; Trust v. Pirsson. 1 Hilton (N. Y.) 292; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 491, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Crommelin v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 4 Keyes (X. Y.) 90, per Hunt, C. J.; White v. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105, 43 Am. Rep. 347; Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. 486, 27 Am. Rep. 723; Oakes v. Moore, 24 Maine 214, 41 Am. Dec. 379. A specific lien for work done arises in favor of a dyer who dyes clothes: Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214; in favor of a carriage-maker who repairs carriages : Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East 224; Pin- nock v. Harrison, 3 M. & W. 532; in favor of a wagon-maker who makes a wagon out of materials furnished by another : Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 628; in favor of a carpenter who makes doors out of lumber furnished by another: Curtis v. Jones, How. App. Cas. (N. Y.) 137; Mclntyre v. Carver, 2 Watts & S. 392, Zl Am. Dec. 519; in favor of one to whom logs are delivered to be converted into boards or into shingles : Pierce v. Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 151; Comstock V. McCracken, 53 Mich. 123. 18 N. W. 583; Morgan v. Cong- don, 4 N. Y. 552; Arians v. Brick- ley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. 188, 56 Am. Rep. 611; in favor of a manu- facturer of starch : Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; in favor of one who manufactures brick in a brick- yard furnished bj^ another: Moore V. Hitchcock, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 292; King V. Indian Orchard Canal Co., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 231; in fav- or of a person engaged in rendering lard and barrelling § 73^ LIENS. 748 the owner, is not bound to deliver the coat until he is paid for his labor.* Neither is a shoemaker bound to restore a shoe which he has mended; nor a jeweler a gem which he has set; nor a wheelwright a wagon which he has repaired; nor a ship carpenter a ship which he has made seaworthy, until his services are paid for.^ § 732. Common-law lien a specific lien. — The lien which the common law gives to every one who bestows labor and expense upon a chattel in the way of his trade or occupa- tion is a particular or specific lien; or, in other words, it secures the payment of his services in respect to property upon which a lien is claimed.^ It does not secure a general balance of account, or any debt other than that created by labor upon the specific property detained. In particular trades there may perhaps be general usages which entitle them to claim a general balance for work done in the course of their trades;'^ or tradesmen in particular places may, by resolution or agreement among themselves, acquire a gen- eral lien, if such resolution or agreement be brought to the notice of their customers and assented to by them.^ the same: Hanna v. Phelps, bonds; Chappell v. Cady, 10 Wis. 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Dec. 410; in fa- 111. vor of a raftsman on lumber raft- ^Cowper v. Andrews, Hobart 39, ed: Farrington v. Meek, 30 Mo. 42; Blake v. Nicholson 3 M. & S. 578, n Am. Dec. 627; in favor of a 167, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. harnessmaker for oiling a harness: ^Story's Bailments (9th ed.), Wilson V. Martin, 40 N. H. 88; in § 440. favor of a farrier for shoeing 6Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214; horses: Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17; Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East 519, Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 244, 23 522; Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. Am. Dec. 206; Lord v. Jones, 24 486, 27 Am. Rep. 12Z; Moulton v. Maine 439, 41 Am. Dec. 391; in Greene, 10 R. L 330; Nevan v. favor of one who threshes Roup, 8 Iowa 207. grain: Nevan v. Roup, 8 Iowa TRose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499; 207; in favor of one who kills Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East 519, and packs hogs; East v. Ferguson, 522. 59 Ind. 169; in favor of one who SKirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. effects an exchange of stocks for 14; Weldon v. Gould, 3 Esp. 268. 749 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 733 But it would seem to be essential, except in the case of a general usage well known, that knowledge of the resolu- tion or agreement for a general lien should be brought home to the customer in such a way that there is practically an assent on his part that a general lien may be claimed and asserted against him. It is also said that the lien extends to a general balance of account in the case of such bailees as factors, calico- printers, packers, fullers, and others, to whom property is delivered, against the several parts of which it is imprac- ticable to keep separate and distinct charges. In analogy with such instances, it has been held that, where a mill- owner contracts to saw lumber for another at a stipulated price per thousand feet, his lien is not limited to any given lot of lumber for the price of sawing the same, but extends to the quantity in his possession for any general balance due him.^ § 733. Necessity that work be done at owner's request. — To entitle one to a lien for work done upon a chattel the work must be done at the owner's request, or with his con- sent. The fact that one has purchased a chattel in good faith, from a person claiming to be the owner, gives him no lien upon it from expenditures made in repairs before discovering that the property belonged to another.^" The employment must be by the owner whose property is affected by the lien, or by his consent, express or implied. Thus a coach maker, to whom a carriage had been delivered for repairs by the owner's servant, was denied a lien because the carriage had been broken by the negligence of the serv- ant, without the knowledge of the master, and had been taken by the servant to the coach maker for repairs without 9Holderman v. Manier, 104 Ind. 43 Am. Rep. 347, per Depue, J.; 118, 3 N. E. 811. Hill v. Burgess, 27 S. Car. 604, 15 10 Clark V. Hale, 34 Hale 398, S. E. 963. White V. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105, § 734 LIENS. 750 the master's orders.^ ^ And so where one having purchased a machine in an unfinished state contracted with the seller to finish it for a stipulated price, and the latter, without the purchaser's knowledge, employed a mechanic to do the work, it was held that the latter acquired no lien in his own right for the labor done on the machine, as against the owner, although, while the work was in progress, the owner knew that the mechanic was performing the work.^^ § 734. Consent of owner may be implied. — But the con- sent of the owner to a' bailment of a chattel for repairs may be implied. Such consent need not be given with such formalities or in such manner as would create a personal lia- bility on the part of the owner to pay the charges. If the property is improved and enhanced in value by the work- man's labor, the authority of the owner to have it done on the footing of a workman's lien may be implied from the relation of the parties, or from the circumstances of the case.^^ Accordingly, where a wagon owned by a wife was put in the husband's charge for use in a business which was carried on for the support of the family, and he took it to a wheelwright to be repaired, it was held that the latter had a lien upon it for his reasonable charges for the repairs, though the wheelwright, thinking that it belonged to the husband, had charged the bill for repairs to him.^^ "It was in the contemplation of all the parties," said Mr. Justice Depue, delivering the judgment of the court, "that the wagon could be made useful for the purpose for which it was designed to be used only by being kept in repair. The repairs were beneficial to the interests of both parties — to iiHiscox V. Greenwood, 4 Esp. i3 White v. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 174. 105, 110, 43 Am. Rep. 347, per De- i2Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 pue, J. Pick. (Mass.) 228. See Mclntyre v. i-iwhite v. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105, Carver, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 392, 43 Am. Rep. 347. 2)7 Am. Dec. 519, which is hardly- consistent. 751 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 735 the husband in fitting the wagon for use; to the wife in en- hancing the value of the property by the repairs put upon it. I think it clear, on the facts certified by the court below, that the husband had authority from the wife — implied from the manner in which she permitted the wagon to be used — to have the repairs done; and if so, the property became by law subject to a lien for the workman's charges." § 735. Consent of owner may be inferred. — Such consent may be inferred when the owner of property by his neglect gives some one else the right to incur labor and expense upon his property. A canal-boat loaded with stone was acci- dentally sunk in the harbor of BufYalo, and then deserted by her master and crew, who made no effort to raise the boat, and the wreck formed a serious objection and hin- drance to commerce and navigation. The common council of the city, in pursuance of the powers conferred by the charter, ordered the boat and cargo to be removed without delay, and decided that, if the owner did not do this in three days, the harbor master should remove the same at the ex- pense of the boat and cargo. In accordance with such order the harbor master caused the boat to be raised and the cargo saved, at a large expense. It was held that the city ac- quired a lien at common law upon the boat and cargo for the amount of such expense, and that this lien could be enforced in equity.^^ The very act of the owner in reclaim- i-^City of Buffalo v. Yattan, Shel- goods intrusted to them, in the one don (N. Y.) 483, 487, per Smith, J. case, or those which the guest car- "The common law right of lien in ries with him in the other, for the respect to personal property, in particular service rendered or en- many cases, rests upon the duty tertainment and necessaries sup- of the party upon whom it is con- plied. Cross on Lien, 16. Says Jus- ferred to render services or incur tice Bronson, in Grinnell v. Cook, 3 expenses. Thus, the legal obliga- Hill (N. Y.) 485, 491: 'The right tioii to exercise their trade when of lien has always been admitted re(|uested, as in the case of an inn- where the party was bound, by keeper to receive a guest, has law, to receive the goods.' So vested in them a lien upon the where goods have been taken un- § 7Z^ LIENS. 752 ing the property in its improved condition was regarded as a recognition of the city's right to indemnity, and conse- quently to a lien for its expenses in saving the property. § 736. Lien of a city or town. — A city or town or its agents may acquire a lien at common law for expenses in- curred upon property under statutory authority in the re- moval of nuisances, or in the preservation of the public health. Thus, under a regulation of the board of health of the city of Boston, made in pursuance of statutory au- der a legal right, and expenses have been necessarily incurred in their preservation, as in the case of the lord of a manor who had seized a horse as an estray. Henly V. Walsh, 2 Salk. 686. The right of lien has always been favored by courts, as consonant with every principle of equity and justice. Within a recent period, indeed, they have recognized and allowed, without restriction, the right of every bailee, whether voluntary or involuntary, to a lien on the goods bailed to hire, when he has con- ferred an additional value on the chattel, either directly by the ex- ercise of personal labor or skill, or indirectly, by the performance of any duty or the use of any means within his control. Upon these principles, I think it safe and just to establish and enforce the lien claimed by the plaintiff in this case. In the discharge of a duty which it could neither evade nor neglect, it has become the in- voluntary bailee of the boat, and has thus incurred large expenses. The plaintiff performed this duty, as it was bound to, in such a man- ner as to preserve, protect, and save the boat, rather than to suffer it to be destroyed or injured. It is now of more than sufficient value to yield indemnity for these expenses. The plaintiff waited ample time for the owner of the boat to remove and save his prop- erty, before taking any action, for that purpose. He does not, even now, claim the boat, or set up any right to have her restored to him. He rests simply upon a denial of the plaintiff's claim. If he has, indeed, abandoned the property, and intends never to reclaim it, no injury can result by him by the adjudication which equity will give the plaintiff. If, on the other hand, he asserts a right to have the property returned to him, he ought to pay the necessary ex- penses incurred in saving and pro- tecting his property. The very act of reclaiming the property, which he once abandoned for, at least, so long as to require the plaintiff to act, and receiving it in its im- proved and more valuable condi- tion, would be an implied recogni- tion of the plaintiff's right to in- demnity. If this be not so, then the defendants have not only the right to recover the property, but to demand, of the plaintiff, dam- ages for its detention. The law will permit no such injustice." /DO mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 736 thority, ordering rags imported into the city to be disin- fected at the expense of the owner, it was in a recent case held that a Hen arises for such expense; and that the work of disinfection may be delegated by the board of health to a third person, who is entitled to claim and enforce a lien upon the rags for his reasonable charges for the work done.^^ Mr. Justice Devens, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in this case, said: "It can not be important that, in this Commonwealth, the cred- itor has a right of attachment on mesne process. Such a remedy is very imperfect, as compared with that afforded by a lien, which is a usual and efficient remedy where work is done upon a chattel by a bailee, to whom it is confided under any agreement, either express or implied, with the owner thereof. Nor is it important that, while expenditures may be made upon real estate under the orders of the board of health, a lien can exist only upon personal property, and thus that this remedy is partial. There is no reason why a well-recognized remedy as to personal property should not be enforced, because there may be cases coming within the statute affecting real estate to which it would not be appli- cable. Even if a lien might exist in favor of the city, if it had done the work through its officers, agents, or servants, and the plaintiffs contend that this was the only mode in which it was authorized to do it, they further argue that no lien can exist in the case at bar; that there can be none in favor of the city, as it has done no work, and none in favor of the defendant, as it was an independent contractor with the city, and there was no debt due to such contractor from the plaintiffs as the owners of the goods. The board of health might certainly delegate the work to an independent contractor; it was not necessarily to be done by it or its ' immediate servants, and under its personal supervision ; it iSTrain v. Boston Disinfecting 929, 59 Am. Rep. 113. Co., 144 Mass. 523, 532, 11 N. E. 48 8 7^7 LIENS. 754 was sufficient if it prescribed the method, and this was com- plied with. The board, in the language of the statute, was to 'cause' the goods to be purified. It had a right to make a reasonable contract for the disinfection of the goods; the duty of paying for the expenses thus incurred was by the statute cast upon the plaintiffs, and their promise to pay therefor is one implied by law. Where a party is subjected to such a duty, this obligation is to be performed, and the law will, of its own force, imply a promise, even against his protestation and express declaration. Such a contract necessarily implies a lien in favor of the contractor into whose hands the goods are taken for disinfection, to secure him for the expenses properly incurred in his work." § 737. The lien belongs strictly to the person who has contracted with the owner to do the work. — A servant or journeyman or sub-contractor of such person has no lien.^'^ Where a physician rendered services to one member of a firm in consideration of the firm's agreement to repair his sleigh and charge the expense to that partner, the firm's assignee in insolvency has no possessory lien on the sleigh for the work done on it by the firm before the assignment, nor for that done by himself afterwards without the physi- cian's knowledge. There is no privity of contract between the assignee and the physician. ^^ § 738. Lien for work of agents. — A lien is acquired by virtue of the work done, and it is immaterial whether the work be done by the claimant or his agents. Thus the statu- tory lien of a boom company for driving logs is acquired by virtue of the work done under the contract of the par- ties; and it is immaterial that the work is done by the com- iTWhite V. Smith, 44 N. J. L. 105, is Morrill v. Merrill, 64 N. H. 43 Am. Rep. 347, per Depue, J.; 71, 6 Atl. 602. See ante, § 721. Quillian v. Central R. & Banking Co., 52 Ga. 374. 755 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 740 pany's agent who is paid a gross sum for the work. It is as competent for the company to employ an agent to do the whole labor for a specified sum, as it to do it through laborers employed by the day or the month. ^^ An artisan has a lien for work done in the way of his trade by another than himself outside his shop. Thus, where a chonometer was left with a watchmaker in Nova Scotia to be repaired, and the watchmaker, finding that he could not make the repairs, sent it to Boston to be repaired, it was held that the watchmaker had a lien for the charges paid by him for the repairs done in Boston.^^ § 739. Lien for all goods delivered under one contract. — The lien extends to every portion of the goods delivered under one contract, and attaches to every part for the whole service. Where a quantity of logs were delivered on dif- ferent days to the owner of a sawmill to be sawed into boards, and he sawed a part of them and delivered them to the bailor without receiving payment for the sawing, it was held that the mill-owner had a lien upon the logs remain- ing in his possession for his account. The sawing was an entire work, and the lien extended to every portion of the logs.^^ A delivery of a part of the articles received under one contract does not defeat the lien upon the remainder for the entire contract price. ^^ § 740. Lien on part of the property for repair of all the property. — Where an entire contract is made for making or repairing several articles for a gross sum, the mechanic or tradesman has a lien on any one or more of the articles in i^Hall V. Tittabawassee Boom 2iMorgan v. Congdon, 4 N. Y. Co., 51 Mich. 377, 16 N. W. 770. 552. See ante, §§724, 725. 22Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts 20Webber v. Cogswell, 2 Canada & S. 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254; Myers Sup. Ct. 15. V. Uptegrove, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 316. § 741 LIENS. 756 his possession, not only for their proportionate part of the sum agreed upon for making or repairing the whole, but for such amount as he may be entitled to for labor bestowed upon all the articles embraced in the contract.^'' Thus a tailor employed to make a suit of clothes has a lien for the whole and upon any part of the suit in his possession.-^ Thus also, under a special contract between the owner of a wagon and a blacksmith that the latter should re-tire two wheels for three dollars, the former left one wheel, and, after the tire was set, came and demanded that wheel upon a tender of half that sum, saying that he would not have the other wheel repaired. The blacksmith, however, had cut, bent, and welded the iron for the other wheel, and therefore refused to deliver the wheel that had been repaired. It was held that he had a right to retain that wheel for the work done upon both wheels under the contract.-^ § 741. Time of delivery of articles to a workman. — The fact that the chattels are delivered to a workman in different parcels, and at different times, does not interfere with his right to detain any part of them for the payment of the amount due upon all of them, provided all the work be done under one bargain.^^ Where a lien was claimed on car- riages repaired, not only for the work done on those car- riages but also upon other carriages, it was held that the carriages might be reclaimed upon payment of the charges for the repairs done upon the specific carriages, in the ab- sence of any proof that the other carriages were a part of an entire lot delivered at the same time, or at different times under one arrangement.^''^ 23Partridge v. Dartmouth Col- ^oChase v. Westmore, 5 M. & lege, 5 N. H. 286; McFarland v. S. 180; Myers v. Uptegrove, 3 Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467. How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 316. 24Blake v. Nicholson, 3 M. & S. 27Moulton v. Greene, 10 R. I. 167, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. 330. 2''HenseI v. Noble. 95 Pa. St. 345, 40 Am. Rep. 659. 757 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 743 If wheat be sent to a miller at different times to be ground, but it is all sent under one contract, he may detain the whole until he has received the price for grinding it.^^ § 742. Lien at common law only because o£ added value of article. — It is an essential element of an artisan's lien at common law that he has conferred additional value upon the chattel, either directly or by his own labor or skill, or in- directly by the use of some instrument or means within his control.^^ If additional value has not been conferred upon the chattel there is no lien, though labor and skill may have been expended upon it. An agistor, or one who takes charge of horses or cattle, has no lien for keeping and feeding them, because he does not confer any additional value on the ani- mal by taking charge of it and feeding it.^^ But on the other hand one has a lien on a mare covered by his stallion, because the mare is made more valuable by being in foal.^^ One who takes window sashes to get panes of glass put in them has a lien on the finished windows upon common-law principles.^^ § 743. Printer has no lien at common law. — A printer has no lien upon type set up by him and used for printing, for no additional value is imparted to the type by the use of it. On the contrary, the inference might well be that, by setting the type and printing from it, its value would be diminished. ^^ Neither has a printer any lien upon stereotype plates which have been furnished him to print from.^^ But 28Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & -^iScarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. S. 180. 270. 29Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. 32McMeekin v. Worcester, 99 271 ; Wallace v. Woodgate, 1 Car. Iowa 243, 68 N. W. 680. & P. 575; White v. Smith, 44 N. 33De Vinne v. Rianhard, 9 Daly J. L. 105, 43 Am. Rep. 347, per (N. Y.) 406, 11 Weekly Dig. 268. Depue, J. 34BIeaden v. Hancock, Mood. & 30Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & M. 465, 4 Car. & P. 152. A pub- W. 342. See ante, § 641. lisher may, it is said, under an § 743 LIENS. 758 the printer has a lien upon a book printed from the type or plate, for the book is the thing produced by his labor and skill. In the case of the book, the paper and other materials used in its manufacture are enhanced in value by the print- er's labor and skill.^^ An engraver has a lien on the plates, impressions, and prints in his possession for the work done upon them.^^ By virtue of a contract a printer's lien may attached to paper delivered to him for use in printing an entire book, though he has actually used but a little of it. A firm of paper makers contracted with a publisher to furnish paper for a certain book. The publisher contracted with printers for printing the book; but the latter had refused to make any contract until assured by the paper makers that they would furnish the paper. The paper makers delivered to the print- ers one hundred and fifty reams of paper for the book, the bill for which was made out and delivered to the publisher. On account of a forged note given by the publisher to the paper makers, the latter commenced an action to recover the paper. The printers claimed a lien upon the paper, though they had actually used only four reams of it. It was held that they had a lien upon all the paper for the work done. The court said that the lien "attached the moment the paper came into their possession for the purpose of hav- ing work done upon it, and remains good until discharged by payment, not only for labor literally expended upon the paper itself (as by printing), but for any act done, or labor performed, or money expended in the preparation of instru- agreement with an author to re- s^Blake v. Nicholson, 3 M. & S. ceive a share of the profits on a 167; De Vinne v. Rianhard, 9 Daly book to be published, have a lien (N. Y.) 406, per Daly, J.; Conrow on the copyright for his disburse- v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387, 22 N. E. ments. Brook v. Wentworth, 3 346, 5 L. R. A. 693, affd. 23 N. E. Anst. 881. But how can the pub- 1144. lisher have a lien upon a copyright seMarks v. Lahee, 3 Bing. N. Cas. unless it has been taken in his 408. name or assigned to him? 759 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 744 mentalities by which that labor was to be performed, as types, cuts, illustrations, electrotypes, and other things of like nature and object. "^^ § 743a. Workman must observe the terms of his con- tract. — It is an essential condition of an artisan's lien that he shall observe the terms of the contract, and perform the work within the time and in the manner agreed upon. If he has failed to perform his contract in either respect, he is not entitled to retain the property, but the owner may re- plevy it without making any tender or payment. The work- man can not refuse to perform his contract and insist on retaining possession as against the owner of the goods.^^ But, on the other hand, if the workman has fulfilled his contract within the time prescribed, or, if there was no limitation of time, then within a reasonable time, the owner can not recover the goods upon which the work was per- formed without making payment or tender of the amount due the workman.^^ § 744. Precedence over mortgage depends on circum- stances. — Whether this lien takes precedence of a chattel mortgage previously recorded or filed depends upon the cir- cumstances attending the creation of the lien. It is certain that the mortgagor can not by contract create any lien which STConrow v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387, 39HilIsburg v. Harrison, 2 Colo. 22 N. E. 346, 5 L. R. A. 693, affd. App. 298, 30 Pac. 355. In this case 23 N. E. 1144. it was held that coats made by a ssHillsburg v. Harrison, 2 Colo. tailor out of cloth furnished by App. 298, 30 Pac. 355, citing Hodg- a merchant for that purpose can don V. Waldron, 9 N. H. 66; Hilger not be replevied before comple- V. Edwards, 5 Nev. 84; Munson v. tion, where the evidence fails to Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290; show that defendant violated any Bloom V. McGehee, 38 Ark. 329; contract, express or implied, or Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & W. that plaintiff paid defendant's 270; Hall v. Tittabawassee Boom wages or made a tender. Co., 51 Mich. Zn, 16 N. W. 770. § 744 LIENS. 760 shall have priority over such mortgage.'**^* But the mort- gagee's authority for the creation of such a Hen may be im- plied, and the implication arises from the mortgagor's being allowed to remain in possession of the chattel, and to use it for profit.'*^ Thus, w^here the subject of a mortgage was a hack let for hire, and it was described as "now in use" at certain stables, and it was stipulated that the mortgagor might retain the possession and use of it, it was regarded as the manifest intention of the parties that the hack should continue to be driven for hire, and should be kept in a proper state of repair for that purpose, not merely for the benefit of the mortgagor, but for that of the mortgagee also, by pre- serving the value of the security and affording a means of earning wherewithal to pay ofT the mortgage debt."*- "Where property is to be retained and used by the mort- gagor for a long period of time, it will be presumed to have been the intention of the parties to the mortgage, where it is property liable to such repairs, that it is to be kept in repair; and when the property is machinery, or property of a character which renders it necessary to intrust it to a ■*"Jones on Chattel Mortgages, § 472; Bissell v. Pearce. 28 N. Y. 252; McGhee v. Edwards. 87 Tenn. 506, 11 S. W. 316; see ante, §§691- 697, 727, 971. 4iHammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294; Loss v. Fry, 1 City Ct. R. (N. Y.) 7. 42Hammond v. Danielson. 126 Mass. 294. "The case is analog- ous," says Gray, C. J., "to those in which courts of common law, as well as of admiralty, have held, upon general principles, independ- ently of any provision of statute, that liens for repairs made by me- chanics upon vessels in their pos- session take precedence of prior mortgages." Williams v. Allsup, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 417; The Scio, L. R. 1 Adm. & Eccl. 353, 355; The Granite State, 1 Sprague (U. S.) m. Fed Cas. No. 5687; Donnell v. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227, 22>Z; The St. Joseph, 1 Brown Adm. 202; Watts V. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680, 22 Am. St. 615. It may be stated as a rule that a mortgagor of a vessel who is al- lowed to remain m possession has an implied authority to create liens for repairs which will take priority of the mortgage. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, § 535; Beall V. White, 94 U. S. 382, 24 L. ed. 173; Scott v. Delahunt, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) Z12, affirmed 65 N. Y. 128. 761 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 744 mechanic or machinist to make such reairs, the mortgagor in possession will be constituted the agent of the mortgagee to procure the repairs to be made, and as such necessary repairs are for the betterment of the property, and add to its value to the gain of the mortgagee, the common-law lien in favor of the mechanic for the value of the repairs is para- mount and superior to the lien of the mortgagee. The mort- gagee is presumed in such a case to have contracted with a knowledge of the law giving to a mechanic a lien."^^ Thus a railroad company which has mortgaged a locomo- tive, the only one on the road, retaining possession under the terms of the mortgage, and also after forfeiture, will be presumed to be the mortgagee's agent to keep it in repair, and has the right to create a lien thereon for repairs made after the forfeiture, which is paramount to the mortgage.^* The court say: "The fair presumption is, that the engine thus mortgaged, but retained by the mortgagor, to be used by him in earning money to pay the mortgage debt, was to be kept in repair; and the further presumption follows that it being machinery requiring skilled mechanics and machin- ists to repair, it would be intrusted to machinists to make necessary repairs, and such being the understanding of the parties to the mortgage, as fairly inferred from the nature of the machinery and use to be made of it, and by permitting it to be retained and used by the mortgagor long after the mortgage debt matured and the conditions of the mortgage forfeited, the mortgagee was bound to know that such me- chanic or machinist would have a lien for the amount of the repairs." But the authority of the mortgagor to create lien was held not to be implied where one manufacturing engines for certain boats under a contract mortgaged them when they 43Watts V. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, Co. v. Mills, 54 Nebr. 417, 74 N. W. 26 N. E. 680, 22 Am. St. 615, per 966, 40 L. R. A. 761, 69 Am St. 719. Olds, C. J. ;Drummond Carriage 44Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680, 22 Am. St. 615. § 745 LIENS. 762 were only partly built, and afterwards proceeded with their construction under a verbal agreement with the mortgagee that he might go on with the work and finish the engines. This agreement did not give the mortgagor himself a lien against the mortgagee for the work afterwards done upon the engines, nor did it authorize him to employ any one else to work upon them in such a manner as to create a lien for such work.'*^ § 745. Possession is essential to the existence of this lien. If the mechanic deliver the chattel on which he has worked to the owner his lien is gone, and he has only a right of ac- tion against him for the value of the work done.^^ A black- smith ironed a sled and claimed a lien for his services, where- upon the owner agreed with him that the sled should be his till the charge should be paid. The owner took and kept possession of the sled, always recognizing the blacksmith's ownership. A creditor of the owner afterwards attached the sled and sold it upon execution. It was held that the black- smith lost his lien by his agreement with the owner for a conditional sale, and by delivering the sled to him, and that the sale was invalid as against the creditors of the latter.^''' 4oGlobe Works v. Wright, 106 62. A salt manufacturer contract- Mass. 207. One not in possession ed with a salt company to manu- can not have a lien on personalty facture salt at its salt-blocks, the as against the rights of a mort- manufacturer to deliver the salt gagee. Lighthouse v. Third Nat. piled on the dock, and the com- Bank, 162 N. Y. 336, 56 N. E. 738. pany to pay him thirty-five cents 4CStickney v. Allen, 10 Gray per barrel each month for the (Mass.) 352; King v. Indian Or- amount delivered during the pre- chard Canal Co., 11 Cush (Mass.) ceding month, the manufacturer to 231 ; Morse v. Androscoggin R. Co., "be responsible for the salt until 39 Maine 285; Nevan v. Roup, 8 it shall be delivered to the boats Iowa 207; Bailey v. Quint, 22 Vt. or vessels from the said dock," 474; McDougall v. Crapon, 95 N. and "that he will count the said Car. 292; Tucker v. Taylor, 53 salt, and deliver it only upon the Ind. 93; Holderman v. Manier, 104 written order" of the company. Ind. 118, 3 N. E. 811. Some time thereafter the com- 47Kitteridge v. Freeman, 48 Vt. pany gave a chattel mortgage on 763 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABORERS LIENS. 745 Moreover, if, after having' parted v;^ith the possession of the chattel, the mechanic again come into possession of it with- out the consent or agreement of the owner, his lien is not reinstated. ^^ He can not recover his lien by stopping the goods in transitu, after he has shipped them to the owner at the owner's risk and on his account. ^^ A mill-owner waives his lien for sawing logs if, knowing that the lumber to be sawed has been sold, he saws them according to the purchaser's directions, piles the lumber separately, marks it with the purchaser's initials, and accepts a seller's note for the price of the sawing.^^ A tailor does not lose his lien by allowing his customer to try on the clothes made for him, if this be done in the tailor's presence. ^^ all their personalty, including the salt in the salt-blocks, on the plat- form, and on the docks ; and a few days later a receiver was ap- pointed, who took possession of the salt, there being at that time several thousand barrels on the platform, in the blocks, and on the docks, on account of which the manufacturer had received as part payment drafts of the com- pany, which were protested. It was held that the manufacturer, not having surrendered possession of the salt, was entitled to a lien thereon for his account less the amount of drafts received. In re Merrick, 91 Mich. 342, 51 N. W. 890. "Appellants contend that peti- tioner is not entitled to the relief prayed, (1) because under his con- tract he was bound to deliver the salt to the company before pay- ment, and (2) because he had part- ed with possession. Docks were erected and used exclusively in connection with these salt-blocks. Petitioner had charge of the blocks and these docks. While he was to deliver the salt upon the docks, the contract contemplated that it should remain there for some time afterwards; and, by the terms of the contract petitioner was responsible for its custody and control, and it was not to be delivered to any one except upon the written order of the company. Petitioner simply delivered the salt from his own possession in the salt-block to his own custody upon the docks." Per McGrath, J. 48Hartley v. Hitchcock, 1 Stark, 408; Howes v. Ball, B. & C. 481, 1 M. & Ry. 288; Nevan v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207. 49Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4, per Lord Kenyon. soTyler v. Blodgett & Davis Lumber Co., 78 Mich. 81, 43 N. W. 1034. 51 Hughes V. Lenny, 5 M. & W. 183, 187, per Parke, B. § 746 LIENS. 764 § 746. Possession of an officer is possession of his cor- poration. — The possession of an officer of a corporation act- ing in its behalf is the possession of the corporation, and he can not by means of such possession acquire a lien as against the corporation. Thus, where the secretary of a railroad corporation bought a set of books with his own money and entered in them the minutes of the proceedings of the cor- poration, it was held that upon going out of office he had no lien on the books either for the purchase-money, or for his services as secretary, for his possession of the books was the possession of the company as soon as he began to enter in them the minutes and accounts of the company. By entering the records and accounts of the company in these books, he so mixed his own property with the prop- erty of the company that they could not be separated, and according to the well-established principle of law, the whole property thereby became the property of the company.^- § 747. Delivery of property waives lien. — One who is by contract bound to deliver property upon which he has ex- pended labor, before the stipulated time of payment, has no lien. One who contracts to haul and deliver lumber on board cars, at an agreed price to be paid when the lumber is sold in the market and the proceeds are received by the owner, has no lien thereon for his lumber. The obliga- tion to deliver the lumber before payment negatives the right to detain until payment. °^ He has waived the lien by his contract, and can not set it up in violation of his contract. A lien is waived by an unconditional refusal to deliver the property.^^ A tanner who contracts to tan hides furnished him by the owner, and to return the leather made from them in a reasonable time, at a price agreed upon for tanning 52State V. Goll, Z2 N. J. L. 285. s^Alabama Cotton Oil Co. v. 53Stillings V. Gibson, 63 N. H. Meeden, 150 Ala. 587. 1. 765 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 749 and transportation, payable after delivery, has no right to detain the leather after it is finished and ready for delivery.^'' A mechanic repaired a wagon under an agreement that he should receive payment in the use of the w^agon and the owner's horse for a journey. When the wagon was repaired, the mechanic, not being ready for his journey, allow^ed the owner to take it away. After some three weeks he was ready for his journey, and the owner delivered to him the wagon and a horse, which directly kicked the dash-board off the wagon and broke the shafts. The mechanic gave up his journey and asserted a lien on the wagon. It was held that he had no lien. If any lien ever existed, he lost it In- parting with the possession; and, moreover, the agreement of the parties seems to have contemplated payment at a future day, so that the lien was waived from the beginning. Detention of the wagon by the mechanic until he should find it convenient to take his journey would seem to have been inconsistent with the understanding of the parties. ^^ § 748. Mode of payment may be inconsistent with a lien. — The mode of payment agreed upon may be inconsistent with a lien, as where a carriage maker agrees to repair a physician's carriages, and to take payment in medical ser- vices. ^''^ § 749. Statutes of states providing liens. — In most of the states there are statutes giving to mechanics, artisans and others who bestow labor on personal property, a lien there- for. The purpose of these statutes is in general to extend the common-law lien in respect of the persons who can ac- quire such lien, and to give an efifectual remedy for its en-, forcement, either by sale after notice, or by attachment and sale under execution. In a few states the lien is extended so 55Lee V. Gould, 47 Pa. St. 398. sTMorriU v. Merrill, 64 N. H. 71. 56Tucker v. Taylor, 53 Ind. 93. 6 Atl. 602. § 75^ LIENS. 766 that it may be availed of within a limited time after the property has been delivered to the owner.^^ But generally these statutes in most respects are merely declaratory of the common lavvr, and must be interpreted in accordance with its principles. Especially is this so as regards the necessity of retaining possession of the property in order to retain a lien upon it.^^ "The lien under the statute is of the same nature that it formerly was, and the same circumstances must combine to create it. There must be a possession of the thing, otherwise there can not, without a special agree- ment to that effect, be any lien. The term lien as used in the statute means th*e same it ever did : the right to hold the thing until the payment of the reasonable charges for making, altering, repairing, or bestowing labor upon it. Pos- session of the article is a requisite essential."^*' § 750. Alabama.*'^ — Blacksmiths, wood-workmen, and all other mechanics who contribute their labor and material, or either, to the production, manufacture, or repair of any ve- hicle, implement, machine, or article of any kind, have a lien thereon in the hands of the party for whom such vehicle or implement, machine or article, was made, or repaired, or to whom sold, and in the hands of a purchaser with notice of such lien, for the agreed price, or the value if no price was agreed upon, of the labor and material, or either, contrib- 58As in Alabama, § 750; Louisi- Co., 188 Fed. 761. A plea to the ana, § 760. merits of an attachment suit to 59McDearmid v. Foster, 14 Ore. enforce a lien of a blacksmith 417, 12 Pac. 813; McDougall v. amounts to a waiver of a defense Crapon, 95 N. Car. 292. that the property attached is not 60McDearmid v. Foster, 14 Ore. burdened with the lien. The proper 417, 12 Pac. 813, per Thayer, J. mode to test whether the property eiCiv. Code 1907, §§ 4788-4789. A is subject to such lien is to move lien on personal property may be to dissolve the attachment. Mann transferred to the proceeds of its Lumber Co. v. Bailey Iron Works sale only by an order of the court. Co., 156 Ala. 598, 47 So. 325. In re Varley & Bauman Clothing 'j(i'] mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 750a uted to the production, manufacture, or repair of the same. Parties shall be entitled to process of attachment to en- force their rights, to be issued by the same of^cers and un- der the same conditions as required by law in other cases of attachments; and the affidavit shall set forth all the facts necessary to the creation of such lien under the section above quoted, and in addition thereto, one or the other of the fol- low^ing causes: 1. That the party for w^hom such article was made, sold, or repaired is the owner thereof, and that the price of the article, or for the repair thereof, or some part of either, is due and unpaid; 2. That the party for whom such article was made, sold, or repaired has trans- ferred the article to a purchaser with notice of such lien, and that the price of the article, or for the repair thereof, or some part of either, is due and unpaid. Such lien shall be enforced only within six months from the time when the account or claim becomes due. § 750a. Alaska. — Any person who shall make, alter, or bestow labor on any article of personal property at the re- quest of the owner or lawful possessor thereof shall have a lien upon such property so made, altered, or repaired, or upon which labor had been bestowed, for his just and rea- sonable charges for the labor he has performed and the ma- terial he has furnished, and such person may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and reasonable charges shall be paid.^^ If such just and reasonable charges be not paid within three months after the care, attention and labor shall have been performed or bestowed, or the materials or food shall have been furnished, the person having such lien may sell at public auction after giving notice of such sale, all of such property or any part sufScient to pay such just and reason- able charges. . 62 Carter's Ann. Code 1900, p. 413, §§ 276, 278. § 751 LIENS. 768 §751. Arizona. — Whenever any article, implement, uten- sil, or vehicle shall be repaired w^ith labor and material, or with labor and without furnishing material by any carpen- ter, mechanic, artisan, or other workman, such person is authorized to retain possession of the same until the amount due on the same for repairing shall be fully paid.^^ § 751a. Arkansas.*^^ — Laborers who perform work and labor on any object, thing, material or property, shall have 63 Rev. Stat. 1901, § 2923. As to enforcement, see post, § 1049a. A laborer may follow a crop which he has labored to raise and attach the same in a suit at law. Barrett V. Nichols, 85 Ark. 58. 107 S. W. 171. 6-iDig. of Stats. 1904. §§ 5011. 5012, 5014. For mode of enforce- ment see Dig-, of Stats. 1904. §§ 4983-4994. The remedy is sum- mary, and the statute should be strictly construed. Dano v. Mis- sissippi, O. & R. R. Co., 27 Ark. 564; Flournoy v. Shelton, 43 Ark. 168. Hay is the production of the laborer who cuts and rakes the grass, and he has a lien on it for the price or value of his labor. Emerson v. Hedrick, 42 Ark. 263. One who raises a crop on the land of another for an agreed share is a laborer and is entitled to a lien. Burgie v. Davis, 34 Ark. 179. The lien of the laborer is confined to the specific property on which his labor was bestowed; Russell v. Painter, 50 Ark. 244, 7 S. W. 35; and can not be extended to wages earned after the completion and delivery of the property in ques- tion. Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Low (Ark.), 17 S. W. 879. All per- sons engaged in the manufacture of shingles, whose labor contrib- utes directly to the value of the shingles by aiding in putting them in a marketable condition, are en- titled to a lien under this statute. Sawyers who run the saws, the engineer who runs the engine, per- sons who pile blocks into position to be made into shingles, one who runs a machine for trimming the shingles, and another for splitting the blocks to be made into shingles, are entitled to a lien. But the superintendent of the mill, who files the saws and occasionally does other work at the mill, and a watchman who watches the mill at night and cleans the machinery, and laborers who remove the saw- dust and waste from the mill, are not entitled to a lien on the shin- gles, because their work is not upon the shingles, and does not contribute directly to the making of the shingles. Van Etten v. Cook, 54 Ark. 522, 16 S. W. 477. One holding a lien on property purchased and converted by an- other who knows of the lien may have his Hen fastened to the pro- ceeds of such sale. Beebe Stave Co. V. Austin, 92 Ark. 248, 122 S. W. 482, 135 Am. St. 172. 769 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 752 an absolute lien on such object, thing, material or property for such labor done and performed, subject to prior liens and landlord's liens for rent and supplies, and such liens may be enforced within the same time, and in the same manner now provided for by law, in enforcing laborer's liens on the production of labor done and performed. A purchaser with notice is liable for such a lien as de- scribed above. Every person who has such lien, and wishes to avail himself of the same, shall file with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the debtor resides, a just and true account of the demand due, or becoming due after allowing all credits, and containing a description of the property to be charged with said lien, verified by afifidavit. Blacksmiths, wheelwrights and horseshoers have an abso- lute lien on the product of their labor and upon all wagons, carriages, implements and other articles repaired or horses or other animals shod, for money due for labor and ma- terials.*^^ § 752. California.^*"' — Every person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal property, renders any service to the owner thereof, by labor skill, employed for the protection, improvement, safe-keeping, or carriage thereof, has a special lien thereon, dependent on possession, for the compensation, if any, which is due to him from the owner for such service ; a person who makers, alters, or re- pairs any article of personal property, at the request of the •owner, or legal possessor of the property, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charges for the balance due for such work done and materials furnished, and may retain posses- sion of the same until the charges are paid,*^^ and livery or 63Castle's Supp. 1911, § 5013. cording to common law principles. 66Civ. Code 1906, §§ 3051, 3052, Quist v. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748, 99 as amended by Stats, and Amends. Pac. 204. to Codes 1911, p. 887. The right *^~Under this provision, a person to a lien must be interpreted ac- who under contract manufactures 49 § 753 LIENS. 770 boarding or feed stable proprietors, and persons pasturing horses or stock, have a Hen, dependent on possession, for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding or pas- turing such horses or stock; and laundry proprietors and persons conducting a laundry business have a general lien, dependent on possession, upon all personal property, in their hands belonging to a customer, for the balance due them from such customer for laundry work; and veterinary pro- prietors and veterinary surgeons shall have a lien, depend- ent on possession, for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding, and medical treatment of animals, and keepers of garages for automobiles shall have a lien, de- pendent on possession, for their compensation in caring for and safe-keeping such automobiles. § 753. Colorado.*'^ — Any mechanic or other person who shall make, alter, or bestow labor upon any article of per- sonal property, at the request of the owner of such personal property, shall have a lien upon such property for the amount due for such labor done or materials furnished, and for all costs incurred in enforcing such lien. § 753a. Connecticut.^^ — All persons and corporations en- gaged in the business of manufacturing, spinning, or throw- ing cotton, wool, or silk, into yard or other goods, shall be entitled to a lien upon the goods and property of others that may come into their possession for the purpose of being so manufactured, spun, or thrown into yarn or other goods for the amount of any debt that may be due them, or of any note or notes taken on account of such debt, from the owners of such cotton, wool, or silk, by reason of any work railroad ties for the owner on the owner. Douglass v. McFarland, latter's land has a lien thereon, 92 Cal. 656, 28 Pac. 687. and can recover the ties or the 68 Mills' Ann. Stats. 1912, § 4570; amount of his lien from a consta- Hillsburg v. Harrison, 2 Col. App. ble who, without his consent, takes 298, 30 Pac. 355. the ties on execution against the coQen. Stats. 1902, § 4168. 771 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 754 and labor performed and materials furnished in or about the manufacturing, spinning or throwing of the same, or other goods, of such owner or owners. Such lien shall not be waived or impaired by the taking of any note or notes, or recovery of any judgment for the moneys so due, or for the work and labor performed and materials furnished; and such lien may be enforced by levy and sale under execution upon such judgment. Such lien may also be enforced by a public sale of the goods or property on which the lien rests, upon such notice to all parties in interest, as to the time and place of the sale, as may be ordered by any judge of the superior court, or of any court of common pleas, upon ap- plication of the party holding the lien. § 753b. Delaware.'^^ — All debts or claims that may be- come due or growing due for labor or services rendered by any mechanic, laborer, clerk or other employe of any per- son or persons, chartered company or association employing laborers, clerks or mechanics in any manner whatsoever, shall be a first lien on all the real and personal property of such employer or employers, and shall be the first to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of such property. §754. District of Columbia.'^ ^ — Any mechanic or artisan who shall make, alter, or repair any article of personal prop- erty, at the request of the owner, shall have a lien thereon for his just and reasonable charges for his work done and materials furnished, and may retain the same in his posses- sion until such charges are paid; but if possession is parted with by his consent such lien shall cease, and if not paid at the end of a month after the amount is due, and the property bound by such lien does not exceed the sum of fifty dollars, the party entitled to such lien, after demand upon the debtor, if he be within the district, may proceed to sell the property TORev. Code 1893, p. 817. 7iCode 1901, §§ 1260, 1263. § 755 LIENS. 772 at public auction, by giving notice once a week for three consecutive weeks in some daily newspaper published in the District of Columbia; and the proceeds of such sale shall be applied first in the discharge of such lien, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner thereof. § 755. Florida.'- — A lien prior in dignity to all others ac- cruing thereafter exists in favor of any person by himself others performing any labor upon or with any engine, ma- chine, apparatus, fixture, implement, newspaper or printing material or other property, or doing work in any hotel, upon such engine, machine, apparatus, fixture, implement, news- paper or printing material, or other property, and upon the furniture, furnishings and belongings of said hotel. Also in favor of any person who shall manufacture, alter, or repair any article or thing of value, upon such article or thing of value. Also in favor of any person who shall furnish any locomotive or stationary engine, water engine, windmill, car or other machine or parts of a machine or instrument for any railroad, telegraph or telephone line, mill, distillery or other manufactory, upon the articles so furnished. Also in favor of bookkeepers, clerks, agents, porters, and other em- ployes of merchants and transportation companies and other corporations, upon the stock, fixtures, and other prop- erty of such merchants, companies, or corporations. There shall be no lien upon personal property, as against purchasers and creditors without notice, unless the person claiming the lien be in possession of the property upon which the lien is claimed, in which case the lien as against cred- itors and purchasers without notice shall continue as long 72Gen. Stats. 1906, §§ 2196, 2198, is held that a clerk, time keeper, 2201, 2203. A bookkeeper in a saw and a teamster driving his own mill can not have a lien on the team have a lien against lumber mill belonging to his employer for produced by an employing cor- his services. Warburton v. poration. First Nat. Bank v. Kirk- Coumbe, 34 Fla. 212, 15 So. 769. It by, 43 Fla. 276, 32 So. 881. 773 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABQRERS LIENS. 756 as the possession continues, but not for a period longer than three months after the performance of the labor or the furnishing of the material."^ § 756. Georgia^'* — All mechanics of every sort, for work done and material furnished in manufacturing or repairing personal property, shall have a special lien on the same, which must be asserted by retention of such property, or the mechanic may 'surrender such personal property and give credit, when the same shall be enforced as other liens on personal property, and shall be superior to all liens but liens for taxes and such other liens as the mechanic may have had actual notice of before the work was done or ma- terial furnished. When they surrender possession of the property to the debtor, such mechanics shall record their claim of lien, within ten days after such work is done and material furnished, in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the owner resides, which claim shall be in substance as follows: "A. B., mechanic, claims a lien on (here describe the property) of C. D., for work done and materials furnished in manufacturing or re- pairing (as the case may be), the same." 73Gen. Stats. 1906, § 2210, 2b. "4Code 1911. § 3354, as to general laborer's liens, see post, § 781. As to privity of lien see Houser v. Cooper, 102 Ga. 823, 30 S. E. 539. For enforcement, see post, ch. xxii., Georgia, § 1053. The failure to record a claim of lien for services rendered or mater- ials furnished in repairing or manufacturing personal property within the time required by the statute after the labor is complet- ed will prevent recovery upon such lien where the possession of the property is surrendered. Mulkey v. Thompson, 3 Ga. App. 522, 60 S. E. 223. Lien must be filed within ten days after work is done. No lien for open running account is allowed. Palim v. Cooke, 125 Ga. 442, 54 S. E. 90. A bartender may have lien though he also keeps the books. Lowen- stein v. Myer, 114 Ga. 709, 40 S. E. 726. A job printer is entitled to a lien. Georgia Loan Saving Co. V. Dunlop, 108 Ga. 218. The pro- prietor of a saw mill can not have a lien on lumber sawed at the mill, as a mechanic. Evans V. Beddingfield, 106 Ga. 755, Z2 S. E. 664. § 757 . LIENS. 774 § 757. Idaho.'^ — A person who makes, alters, or repairs any article of personal property, at the request of the owner, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charges for his work done and material furnished, and may retain posses- sion of the same until the charges are paid. If not paid within two months after the work is done, the person may proceed to sell the property at public auction, by giving ten days' public notice of the sale by advertising in some news- paper published in the county in which the work was done, or, if there is no such newspaper, then by posting up notices of such sale in three of the most public places in the town where such work was done, for ten days previous to the sale; and the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the discharge of the lien and the cost of keeping and selling the property, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner thereof. § 758. Indiana."*^ — Whenever any person shall intrust to any mechanic or tradesman materials to construct, alter, or 75Rev. Code (Civ.) 1908, § 3447. same subject to such lien and to The right to a special lien does the right of the ofificer to levy- not apply to property in custodia thereon, though he made the re- legis. Beck v. Lavin, IS Idaho 363, pairs without knowledge of the 97 Pac. 1028. execution. McCrisaken v. Os- "SBurns' Rev. Stats. 1914, weiler, 70 Ind. 131. Burns' Rev. §§ 8308-8313. Under a statute Stat. 1914, §§ 8288, 8289, gives whereby an execution operates as the employes of corporations do- a lien from the time it comes to ing business in the state a first the officer's hands on the property lien for unpaid wages on all of of the judgment debtor liable to the corporate property, and pro- be seized on it, which can only vide that any employe wishing to be divested in favor of some other acquire the lien shall file in the writ in the hands of another offi- recorder's office a notice of his in- cer which shall be first levied upon tention to do so, and, when re- the property, it is held that, if a corded, the lien shall date from wagon which is subject to the lien the time of his employment. Un- of an execution on a judgment der this provision a purchaser against the owner be left by the from a corporation takes subject execution debtor with a mechanic to this lien, even when the prop- for repairs, the latter takes the erty is sold to him before the 775 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABORERS LIENS. 758 repair any article of value,'^ such mechanic or tradesman, if the same be completed and not taken away, and his fair and reasonable charges not paid, may, after six months from the time such charges become due, sell the same; or, if the same be susceptible of division without injury, he may sell so much thereof as is necessary to pay such charges, and such sale shall be at public auction, for cash or on reasonable credit, taking sufficient sureties in case of a sale on time. Public notice of the time and place of sale must be given by advertisements set up for ten days in three public places in the city or township where he resides, one of which shall be in some conspicuous part of his shop, or place of business ; or, if the value of the article be ten dollars or more, by publishing the same three weeks successively in a news- paper in the county, if any."^ notice required in the statute has been filed. Aurora Nat. Bank v. Black, 129 Ind. 595, 29 N. E. 396. Where several parcels of prop- erty of a corporation are incum- bered by its employes' lien for un- paid wages and are sold by the corporation at different times, they must be exhausted to satisfy this lien in the inverse order of the sales. There is no contribu- tion in such case. Savings Bank V. Creswell, 100 U. S. 630; Aurora Nat. Bank v. Black, 129 Ind. 595, 29 N. E. 396; Jones on Mortgages, § 1092. The lien provided by § 6 of the act of March 9, 1889, to persons working on the con- struction of a railroad is to be measured by the reasonable value of the services rendered and not by the contract between employer and employed. Chapman v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 11 Ind. App. 632, 39 N. E. 289. "'i'This provision applies to a case where an engine was intrust- ed to a mechanic to alter or re- pair. Watts V. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680, 22 Am. St. 615. As to preferred claims of laborers after assignment of employer see, Raynes v. Kokomo Ladder & Fur- niture Co., 153 Ind. 315, 54 N. E. 1061; Pendergast v. Yandes, 124 Ind. 159, 24 N. E. 724, 8 L. R. A. 849. "^Notice of the sale of prop- erty by a liverystable keeper to satisfy his lien, if the value is ten dollars or more, is sufficient if given by publishing the same three weeks successively in a newspaper in the county. Shap- pendocia v. Spencer, TZ Ind. 128. A notice of a sale to be made "on the day of , 1877," is not a notice of the time and place of sale. Shappendocia v. Spencer, IZ Ind. 128. § 758 LIENS. •j'j6 The proceeds of such sale, after payment of charges for construction or repair, and for pnbhcation and notice afore- said, shall, if the owner be absent, be deposited with the treasurer of the proper county by the person making such sale, he taking the treasurer's receipt therefor, and shall be subject to the order of the person legally entitled thereto. These provisions shall apply to all cases of personal prop- erty on which the bailee or keeper has by law a lien for any feed or care by him bestowed on such property: provided that, in cases where the person liable shall die before the expiration of six months from the time such charges had ac- crued, such sale shall not be made until the expiration of six months from the time of his decease. In cases embraced in the preceding paragraph, if the prop- erty bailed or kept be horses, cattle, hogs, or other live stock, and in all cases embraced in this act where the property is of a perishable nature ^nd will be greatly injured by de- lay, the person to whom such charges may be due may, after the expiration of thirty days from the time when such charges shall have become due, proceed to dispose of so much of such property as may be necessary, as hereinbefore provided. Additional compensation for expenses in keeping and tak- ing care of such property, necessarily incurred, may be taken from the proceeds of sale, as part of the charges. Every person,'^'^ firm or corporation, or others engaged in storing, or furnishing supplies for or repairing an automobile or motor truck, or every person, firm or corporation or others maintaining automobile garages, shall have a lien upon any such automobile or motor truck stored, for storage charges for keeping any such automobile or motor truck, or for furnishing supplies for or repairs done on such auto- mobile or motor truck. Said lien may be foreclosed as equitable liens are now < 9 Burns' Rev. Stat. 1914, §§ 8294a, 8294b. 'j'j'j mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 759 foreclosed in the circuit court of the county where said auto- mobile or motor truck is located by the filing of a complaint at any time within one year from the failure or refusal of the owner of said automobile or motor truck to pay the stor- age charges or the charges done on or supplies furnished for any such automobile or motor truck as specified in the above paragraph. § 759. Kansas.^^ — Whenever any person shall intrust to any mechanic, artisan or tradesman materials to construct, alter or repair any article of value, or any article of value to be altered or repaired, such mechanic, artisan or tradesman shall have a lien on such article, and, if the same be complet- ed and not taken away, and his fair and reasonable or stipu- lated charges be not paid, may, after six months from the time such charges become due, sell the same ; or, if the same be susceptible of division without injury, he may sell so much thereof as is necessary to pay such charges, and the expenses of publication and sale, as provided by statute: provided, that on the completion of said repairs or alteration, at the request of the owner of said property so intrusted, or of his duly authorized agent, the said mechanic, artisan or tradesman may permit the same to be taken away without having been paid for, and shall be entitled to retain his lien on said property as aforesaid by filing in the office of the register of deeds of the county where said property was so altered or repaired, within three days after the said property is so taken aw^ay, a statement in w^riting, signed by the said mechanic, artisan, or tradesman, showing the name of the owner of the property, the name of the mechanic, artisan, or tradesman, the name of the article, the date of the charge for same, the amount due, and the said statement shall con- stitute a lien on property from the time of filing the same until the amount of the charges for so altering or repairing soDassler's Gen. Stats. 1909, Briesen, 1 Kans. App. 758, 41 Pac. §4808. Amazon Irrigating Co. v. 1116. § 759^ LIENS. 778 the property shall be paid; and if the same be not paid within six months from the time of filing said statement, the me- chanic, artisan or tradesman shall be entitled to the posses- sion of the property, and after obtaining such possession may proceed to sell the same as hereinbefore mentioned. A first and prior lien is created in favor of any blacksmith, horseshoer or wagon maker upon any goods, chattels, horses, mules, wagons, buggies or other vehicles or automobiles and any farm implements of whatsoever kinds, which shall have come into the possession of such blacksmith, horseshoer or wagon maker for the purpose of having work on said prop- erty, or repairs, or improvements in anywise appertaining thereto, and said lien shall amount to the full amount and reasonable value of the services performed. It shall extend to, and include the reasonable value of all materials used in the performance of such services.^" , § 759a. Kentucky.^" — When the effects of the estate of a manufacturing company are to be distributed, laborers have a first lien and their lien is superior to that of a mortgage. § 760. Louisiana.*^^ — The debts of a workman or artisan for the price of his labor are privileges on the movables which he has repaired or made, if the thing continues still in his possession. § 761. Maine.^^ — Whoever digs, hauls, or furnishes rock for the manufacture of lime, has a lien thereon for his per- 82 Laws 1913, p. 392. whom he has employed to work ssCarroll's Stats. 1909, § 24S7; under him. Landy v. Blanchard, Graham v. Magann Fawke Lumber 16 La. Ann. 173. Privileges are Co., 118 Ky. 192, 26 Ky. L. 70, 80 stricti juris, and the party claim- S. W. 799. ing a privilege must point to the s^Merrick's Rev. Civ. Code 1900, express law which gives him such art. 3217. This privilege exists right of preference on account of only in favor of him who has con- the nature of the debt. Landry v. tracted to do the work, and not to Blanchard, 16 La. Ann. 173. journeymen and other mechanics ssRev. Stat. 1903, ch. 93, §§ 27, 28. 779 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 761 sonal service, and on the rock so furnished, for thirty days after such rock is manufactured into lime, or until such lime is sold or shipped on board a vessel; whoever labors in quar- rying or cutting and dressing granite in any quarry, has a lien for his wages on all the granite quarried or cut and dressed in the quarry by him, or his colaborers, for thirty days after such granite is cut and dressed, or until such granite is sold or shipped on board a vessel; and whoever labors in mining, quarrying or manufacturing slate in any quarry, ^"^ has a lien for the wages of his labor on all slate mined, quarried, or manufactured in the quarry by him or his colaborers for thirty days after the slate arrives at the port of shipment, and until it has been shipped on board a vessel or laden in a car; such liens have precedence of all other claims, and may be enforced by attachment within the times aforesaid.*^ Whoever performs labor, or furnishes labor or wood for manufacturing and burning bricks has a lien on such bricks for such labor and wood, for thirty days after the same are burned, suitable for use, provided that said bricks remain in the yard where burnt ; such lien shall have precedence of all other claims and of all attachments and encumbrances not made to secure a similar lien and may be enforced by attach- ment within the time aforesaid. Suits to enforce liens shall have precedence of all attachments and encumbrances made after the lien attached and not made to enforce a lien; and such suit may be maintained although the employer or debtor is dead and his estate has been represented insolvent, and in 86The statute giving a lien for within the time named, it will wages on slate quarried and manu- have precedence of sales within factured "in the quarry" does not that time; and that after that time give a lien to one who labors in the lien may be enforced so long manufacturing slate at a place as the granite remains unsold and other than " in the quarry." Union not shipped on board a vessel. Slate Co. V. Tilton, Th Maine 207. Collins Granite Co. v. Devereux, 8"This statute is construed to 72 Maine 422. mean that, if tht. lien is enforced § y6iz LIENS. 780 that case his executor or administrator may be summoned to answer thereto. Whoever furnishes corn or other grain or fruit, for can- ning or preservation otherwise, has a lien on such preserved article, and all with which it may have been mingled, for its value when delivered, including the cans and other ves- sels containing the same, and the cases, for thirty days after the same has been delivered, and until it has been shipped on board a vessel or laden in a car, which lien may be enforced by attachment w-ithin that time.^^ Whoever performs labor by himself, or his employes in manufacturing, or repairing the ironwork or woodwork of wagons, carts, sleighs and other vehicles by direction or consent of the owner thereof, shall have a lien on such ve- hicle for his reasonable charges for said labor and materials used.*^^ § 761a. Maryland.*'^'' — Upon all articles left or given to jewelers or silversmiths for repairs or work on, the jewelers or silversmith shall have a lien on said article or articles for cost of repairs, work on and material put on or in such ar- ticles. And two years after the completion of repairs, work on or material put on or in such article, and the indebted- ness remains unpaid and owing, such jewelers or silversmiths may after one month's notice in writing to the owner of such article notifying such owner of the amount due, by mailing such notice directed to the owner's last known address, or if the owner be unknown, by written or printed notice set up at the court house door of the county or city of Baltimore and the bill remains unpaid, sell such article at public or pri- vate sale to satisfy such claim, and the proceeds after paying expenses of such sale, be applied in liquidation of such in- debtedness, and the balance, if any, be paid over to such debtor. 88 Rev. Stat. 1903, ch. 93, § 56, 61. soa Laws 1912, p. 957. 89 Laws 1905, p. 56. 781 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 763 § 762. Massachusetts.^" — Whoever has a Hen for money due to him on account of work and labor, care and diUgence, or money expended on or about personal property, by rea- son of any contract, express or implied, if such money is not paid within sixty days after a demand in writing delivered to the debtor, or left at his usual place of abode, if within this commonwealth, or made by letter addressed to him at his usual place of abode without the commonwealth, and deposited, postpaid, in the postofhce, may file a petition in the superior court, a police, district, or municipal court, or with a trial justice in the county where the petitioner resides, or has his usual place of business, for an order for the sale of the property in satisfaction of the debt. Persons maintaining public garages for the storage and care of automobiles and other motor vehicles which are brought to their premises or placed in their care by or with the consent of the ovv'ners thereof shall have a lien upon such automobiles or motor vehicles for proper care due them for the storage and care of the same.^^ § 763. Michigan.^- — Whenever any person shall deliver to any mechanic, artisan, or tradesman any materials or articles for the purpose of constructing, in whole or in part, or completing any furniture, jewelry, implement, untensil, clothing, or other article of value, or shall deliver to any person any horse, mule, neat cattle, sheep, or swine, to be kept or cared for, such mechanic, artisan, tradesman, or other person shall have a lien thereon for the just value of the labor and skill applied thereto by him, and for any materials which he may have furnished in the construction or completion thereof, and for the keeping and care of such animals, and may retain possession of the same until such charges are paid. 90 Rev. Laws 1902, p. 1711, § 23. ^2 Howeirs Stats. 1912, §§ 13804, 91 Acts and Resolves 1913, p. 230. 13805. 764 LIENS. 782 When any person shall deliver to any mechanic, artisan, or tradesman any watch, clock, article of furniture or jewelry, implement, clothing, or other article of value, to be altered, fitted, or repaired, such mechanic, artisan, or tradesman shall have a lien thereof for the just value of the labor and skill applied thereto by him, and may retain possession of the same until such charges are paid.^^ § 764. Minnesota."' — Whoever performs or contributes any labor or skill, or furnishes or contributes any machinery, supplies, materials or storage in making, altering, repairing, storing or otherwise caring for any motor vehicle, or at the instance or request of any agent of such owner, shall have a lien upon such motor vehicle for the price, or value, of the labor or skill performed, or machinery, supplies, material or storage furnished or contributed. If the labor is per- formed, or machinery, supplies, materials or storage is fur- nished pursuant to a contract, for an agreed price, the lien 93This lien is enforced by sum- mons and sale of the property upon judgment in the manner pre- sented in the statute given under the title Livery Stable Keepers, § 664. 94 Gen. Stats. 1913, §§ 7053-7057. The right to sell ceases when enough property has been sold to satisfy the charges that have been unpaid for three months. The provision as to satisfying the lien by sale applies also to the enforcement of a warehouseman's lien. A large number of articles were deposited by plaintiff witn defendant iof storage, the charge for storage to be two dollars per month. After the storage for the first month had been due more than three months, the defendant advertised and sold, article by article, all the goods. Enough was realized to more than pay the charges over- due for three months and expenses of sale. The actfon being for con- version, held, that the right to sell ceased as soon as the sale had produced enough to satisfy the charges overdue three months and expenses of sale, and all articles sold after that were illegally sold; that it was for defendant to show what articles were sold before the right to sell ceased, • and, there being no evidence to show that, plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of all the articles. Jesu- run V. Kent, 45 Minn. 222, 47 N. \Y. 784. y8^ mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 764 shall be for the sum so agreed upon; otherwise, it shall be for the reasonable value thereof. The lien shall cease at the end of sixty days after the furnishing of the last item of such labor, machinery, sup- plies, materials, and sixty (60) days after the termination of such storage, unless within such period a statement of the claim thereof be filed for record with the township clerk, city clerk or village recorder, as the case may be, in the township, village or city in which the owner of such motor vehicle resides. Such statement shall, by or at the instance of the lien claimant, be verified by the oath of some person, shown by such verification to have knowledge of the facts stated, and shall set forth: 1. The name of the person claiming the lien, and notice of intention to claim and hold a lien; 2. The name of the owner, or reputed owner, of such motor vehicle; 3. The license number of such motor vehicle, if licensed under the laws of the state of Minnesota; 4. The amount claimed to be due, and that such amount is due for labor performed, or machinery, materials, sup- plies, or storage furnished to the owner of the motor vehicle, or at the instance of an agent of such owner; 5. The dates when the first and last items of the labor, or other contributions were made. Such lien may be foreclosed by action within six (6) months after the statement is filed. The summons shall state that the complaint has been filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is commenced, and shall contain a notice that the action is brought to foreclose a lien, giving the amount thereof, and the license number of the motor vehicle affected. If the lien claimant recover judgment, the court shall order the sheriff or officer, to seize such motor vehicle forthwith, and sell the same at public vendue, in the manner provided by law for the sale of personal prop- § 765 LIENS. 784 erty on execution. Out of the proceeds of such sale, there shall be paid, first, the expenses thereof; the fees of the officers, and the court costs; second, to the claimant, the amount of his lien, with interest to date ; the remainder shall be paid to the owner of the motor vehicle sold, or other person entitled thereto. At or before posting the notice of sale, the sheriff shall serve a copy of said notice of sale on the judgment debtor. The term "motor vehicle," used herein, includes all vehi- cles of locomotion, except those propelled by muscular power, and except those which run on rails or tracks. The term "owner" shall include the conditional vendee or mort- gagor in possession. § 765. Mississippi.^' — All carriages, buggies, wagons, plows, or any other article constructed, manufactured or re- paired, shall be liable for the price of the labor and material employed in constructing, manufacturing the same; and the mechanic to whom the price of said labor and material may be due shall have the right to retain possession of such things so constructed, manufactured, or repaired, until the price be paid ; and if the same shall not be paid within thirty days, he may commence his suit in any court of competent juris- diction, and, upon proof of the value of the labor and mate- rials employed in such repairs, or manufacture or construc- tion, he shall be entitled to judgment against the party for whom such labor was done or materials furnished, with costs, as in other cases, and to a special order for the sale of the property retained in his possession for the payment thereof, with costs, and to an execution, as in other cases, for the residue of what remains unpaid after sale of the property. If the mechanic parts with possession he shall retain his lien as is provided in cases of lien for purchase Si-Code 1906, § 3075. A ginner a mortgagee to show the cotton has a lien on a part of the cotton was turned over. Irwin v. Miller, ginned for his services as against 12 Miss. 174, 16 So. 678. 785 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 765c money of goods, and the same may be enforced in like manner. § 765a. Nebraska.'^*' — Any person who makes, alters, re- pairs or in any way enhances the value of any vehicle, auto- mobile, machinery, farm implement or tool, or shoes a horse or horses, or mule or mules, at the request of or with the consent of the owner, or owners thereof, shall have a lien on such vehicle, automobile, machinery, farm imple- ment or tool, or horse or horses, mule or mules, while in his possession for his reasonable or agreed charges for the work done or material furnished, and shall have the right to retain said property until said charges are paid. Such lienholder must file in the office of the clerk of the county in which said work was done or material furnished, or in which said property is kept within sixty days after performing such work or furnishing said material, a verified statement and description of the work done or material furnished and a description of the article so repaired, altered or enhanced in value, or for which material was furnished or upon which said work was performed. § 765b. Nevada.^^ — All foundrymen and boilermakers, and all other persons performing labor, or furnishing ma- chinery, or boilers, or castings, or other materials for the construction, or repairing, or carrying on of any mill, manu- factory, or hoisting works, shall have a lien on such mill, manufactory, or hoisting works, for such work or labor done on such machinery, or boiler, or castings, or ther material furnished by each respectively. § 765c. New Hampshire.^^ — If a person shall- perform labor or furnish materials or fuel to the amount of fifteen 96 Laws 1913, p. 310. sspub. Stat, and Sess. Laws 1901, 97 Rev. Laws 1912, § 2231. pp. 452, 453, §§11, 17, as amended by Laws 1905, p. 468. 50 § "jGd LIENS. 786 dollars or more for the making of brick, by virtue of a con- tract with the owner thereof, he shall have a lien upon said materials and fuel and upon the brick with the kiln contain- ing said brick, for such labor, materials or fuel. Said lien shall continue for ninety days after said brick are burned, and may be secured by attachment at any time while the lien continues, — the writ and return thereon distinctly express- ing that purpose; and such attachment shall have precedence of all other attachments made after such lien accrued, un- less founded on a prior lien. § 766, New Jersey /^^^ — If the lien which any person may have upon any goods or chattels in his possession for labor or materials bestowed or employed in the repair or construc- tion thereof, and the amount due thereon, either in whole or in part, shall remain unpaid for the space of three months after the same became due and payable, it shall be lawful for the person having said lien to expose the same at public auction, upon a notice of said sale being first published for the space of two weeks preceding the day of sale in some newspaper published in the county in which said goods or chattels are located, and also five days' notice of said sale set up in five of the most public places in said city or township, and if the residence can be ascertained of the owner or owners of said goods or chattels, a copy of the printed notice be mailed to said owner or owners, at least five days before the day of sale ; and the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the payment of such lien and the expenses of such sale ; and no more of such goods or chattels shall be sold, if they are of such nature as to be easily separated or divided, than shall shall be necessary, as near as may be, to pay such lien and expenses, and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the owner of such goods or chattels when they shall be taken away or settled for in full. Persons or corporations engaged 99Comp. Laws 1910, pp. 3138-3140, §§ 61-63, 66, 68. 787 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 767a in the business of dyeing any cotton, woolen, or silk yarns or goods ; or in manufacturing, spinning, or throwing cotton, wool, or silk into yarn or other goods; or in finishing silk, or other goods of which silk is a component part, have a lien on the same for the work and labor performed thereon. The lien may be enforced by levy and sale under execution. The lien which any person may have upon any chattel in his pos- session, for labor or materials bestowed or employed in the repair or construction thereof, shall be in no wise waived, merged, or impaired by the recovery of any judgment for the moneys due for such labor or materials; and such lien may be enforced by levy and sale under execution upon such judgment. § 767. New Mexico.^ — All artisans and mechanics shall have a lien on things made or repaired by them, for the amount due for their work, and may retain possession there- of until said amount is paid; and a voluntary parting with the possession of the thing shall be deemed a waiver of the lien. § 767a. New York.- — A person who makes, alters, repairs or in any way enhances the value of an article of personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien on such articles, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such charges are paid. iComp. Laws 1897, § 2233. Rep. 479. Where one receives a 2Birdseye's C. & G. Consol. piano from the owner to have it Laws 1909, p. 3228, § 180. For evi- repaired and there is no proof to dence failing to show that a Hen deliver it to a third person, the for repairs is superior to a stor- latter can not enforce a lien there- age lien, see Gage v. Callanan, 113 on against the owner. Ludwick N. Y. S. 227, 128 App. Div. 752, re- v. Davenport-Treasy Piano Co., versing 109 N. Y. S. 844, 57 Misc. 112 N. Y. S. 1023. § 768 LIENS. 788 § 768. North Carolina.^ — Any mechanic or artisan who shall make, alter or repair any article of personal property, at the request of the owner or legal possessor of such prop- erty, shall have a lien on such property so made, or repaired for his just and reasonable charge for his work done and ma- terial furnished, and may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and reasonable charge shall be paid; and if not paid for within the space of thirty days, provided it does not exceed fifty dollars, if over fifty dollars, ninety days, after the work shall have been done, such mechanic or artisan may proceed to sell the property so made, altered, or repaired at public auction, by giving two weeks' public notice of such sale by advertising in some newspaper in the county in which the work may have been done, or, if there be no such newspaper, then by posting up notice of such sale in three of the most public places in the county, town, or city in which the work may have been done; and the proceeds of the said sale shall be applied first to the dis- charge of the said lien, and the expenses and costs of keep- ing and selling such property, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner thereof. SRevisal 1905, § 2017. This is a self-executing enactment, confer- ring upon the mechanic or artisan the means of making his claim out of the property by his own act, by sale without any judicial pro- ceeding. But possession is essen- tial to give him the right to en- force his claim by sale. If he has never had possession and can not get possession, he has no lien. If he repairs a wagon and surren- ders it to the owner, he loses his lien. McDougall v. Crapon, 95 N. Car. 292. The lien a workman has on a chattel repaired by him is lost by delivery of such chattel to the owner after the repairs are completed. Block v. David, 120 N. Car. 402, 27 S. E. 129. One cut- ting timber for a company before it gets into the hands of a receiv- er, can not be forced to give up the possession of the timber be- fore he is paid. Huntsman v. l^in- ville River Lumber Co., 122 N. Car. 583, 29 S. E. 838. For a suffi- cient labor claim to be filed see Cameron v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 118 N. Car. 266, 24 S. E. 7. A teamster hauling ties to a rail- road has no lien thereon tor his labor. Tedder v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 124 N. Car. 342, 32 S. E. 714. 789 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 768b § 768a. North Dakota.^ — A person who makes, ahers or repairs any article of personal property, at the request of the owner or legal possessor of the property, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charges for work done and mate- rials furnished, and may retain possession of the same until the charges are paid. Any blacksmith or machinist having an established place of business within the state, who majces, alters or repairs any engine, threshing machine or well machine at the re- quest of the owner or legal possessor of the property, shall have a lien upon the same for his reasonable charges for work done and materials furnished, until the charges are paid, and said lien shall have priority over all other liens, chattel mortgages or incumbrances against said personal property. § 768b. Oklahoma.^ — A person who makes, alters or re- pairs any article of personal property, at the request of the owner or legal possessor of the property, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charge for work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession of the same until the charges are paid. If not paid within two months after the work is done, the person may proceed to sell the property at public auction, by giving ten days' notice of the sale by advertising in some newspaper published in the county in which the work was done ; or, if there be no newspaper pub- lished in the county, then by posting up notices of the sale in three of the most public places in the town where the work was done, for ten days previous to the sale. The proceeds of the sale must be applied to the discharge of the lien, and the cost of keeping and selling the property; the remainder, if any, must be paid over to the owner thereof. 4Rev. Code 1905, § 6295, as Code 1905, § 6245, as amended by amended by Laws 1907, p. 268. For Laws 1913, p. 327. enforcement of this lien, see Rev. ^Comp. Laws 1909, p. 977, § 4151. § 769 LIENS. 790 A later statute" creates a lien in behalf of laborers who perform work and labor for any person under verbal or written contract, if unpaid for the same, on the production of their labor, provided that such lien shall attach only while the tifle to the property remains in the original owner. Blacksmiths," wdieelrights and horseshoers who perform work and labor for any person, if unpaid for same, shall have an absolute lien, subject to all prior liens, on the product of their labor and upon all wagons, carriages, automobiles, im- plements and other articles repaired or horses, or other other animals shod by them, for all sums of money due for such work or labor and for any material furnished by them and used in such product, repairs or shoeing. Any person having a lien under this act and desiring to avail himself of its provisions shall within sixty days after such work or labor is done or performed, or materials fur- nished, file with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the debtor resides, a just and true account of the de- mand due, or becoming due, allowing all credits, and con- taining a description of the property to be charged with said lien, verified by affidavit ; provided that said lien must in either event, be so filed with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the debtor resides, before the title to the property described therein, has passed from the original owner. § 769. Oregon.^ — Any person who shall make, alter, re- pair, or bestow labor on any article of personal property, at <5Sess. Laws 1910-1911, p. 254. port a lien at common law. A la- ■J^Sess. Laws 1913, p. 132. borer can not have a lien on a SBellinger & Cotton's Ann. crop of wheat for harvesting and Codes & Stat. 1902, §§ 5673, 5675. stacking it on the farmer's land. Possession of the thing claimed is McDearmid v. Foster, 14 Ore. 417, essential to support a lien under 12 Pac. 813. See general pro- this statute. This possession must visions for enforcement of liens, be actual and exclusive. It must ch. xxii., infra. be such a possession as would sup- 791 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 769a the request of the owner or lawful possessor thereof, shall have a lien on such property so made, altered, or repaired, or upon which labor has been bestowed, for his just and rea- sonable charges for the labor he has performed and the mate- rial he has furnished, and such person may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and reasonable charges shall be paid. The lien is enforced by sale or after notice. Every black- smith, wagon maker, automobile repairer, and machinist who has expended labor, skill, and materials on any chattel at the request of its owner, reputed owner, or authorized agent of the owner, shall have a lien upon said chattel for the contract price for such expenditure, or in the absence of such contract price, for the reasonable worth of such expenditure for the period of one year from and after such expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that the possession of such chattel has been surrendered to the owner thereof. Notice must be filed according to statute.^ § 769a. Pennsylvania. — A lien on ships and vessels for work done and materials and supplies furnished exists in in favor of all ship-builders, merchants, dealers, tradesmen and mechanics for all work done or materials and supplies furnished or provided in the building, repairing, fitting, fur- nishing, supplying or equipping of such ships or vessels. ^*^ All persons or corporations, engaged in the business of manufacturing, spinning, or throwing cotton, wool, or silk into yarn or other goods, shall be entitled to a lien upon the goods and property of others, that may come into their possession for the purpose of being so manufactured, spun or thrown into yarn or other goods, for the amount of any account that may be due them, or any note or notes taken on account of such account, from the owners of such cotton, oLaws 1909, p. 223, as amended lopurdon's Dig. (13th ed.) 1905, by Laws 1911, p. 213. p. 366, § 3. § 769b LIENS. 792 wool, or silk, by reason of any work and labor performed and the materials furnished in or about the manufacturing, spinning, or throwing of the same or other goods of such owner or owners. Such lien may be enforced by levy and sale under execution.^ ^ § 769b. Rhode Island.^- — Whoever has a lien at common law for money due him on account of work and labor, care and diligence, or money expended on or about personal property or for storage of personal property or has a lien therefore on such account by reason of any contract, expense or implied, if such money is not paid within thirty days after a demand in writing, delivered to the owner or some one of the owners, or left at his usual place of abode, if within state, with some person living there, or made by letter mailed to him at his usual postoffice address without the state, may apply, by petition in equity to the superior court for the county where the petitioner or some one of the peti- tioners resides, for an order for the sale of the property in satisfaction of the debt. § 770. South Carolina.^^ — It shall be lawful for any me- chanic, in this state, when property may be left at his shop for repair, to sell the same at public outcry, to the highest bidder, after the expiration of one year from the time such property shall have been repaired, and the same shall be sold by any magistrate of the county in which the work was done: provided, that the said magistrate shall, before selling such property, advertise the same, for at least ten days, by posting a notice in three of the most conspicuous places in his township. And he shall, after deducting all proper costs and commissions, pay to the claimant the money due to him, taking his receipt for the same, after which he iiPurdon's Dig. (13th ed.), i3Code of Laws (Civ.) 1912, Supp. 1909, p. 5638, §§ 1, 2. § 2614. 12 Gen. Laws 1909, p. 896, § 24. 793 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 771 shall deposit the said receipt, as well as the items of costs and commissions, with the remainder of money or proceeds of the sale, in the office of the clerk of the court, subject to the order of the owner thereof, or his legal representa- tives. I § 770a. South Dakota. ^^ — A person who makes, alters or repairs any article of personal property at the request of the owner or legal possessor of the property, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charges for work done and mate- rials furnished, and may retain possession of the same until the charges are paid. If not paid within two months after the work is done, the person may proceed to sell the property at public auction by giving ten days' public notice of the sale by advertising in some newspaper published in the coun- ty in which the work was done ; or, if there be no newspaper published in the county, then by posting up notices of the sale in three of the most public places in the town where the work w^as done, for ten days previous to the sale. The proceeds of the sale must be applied to the discharge of the lien and the cost of keeping and selling the property. The remainder, if any, must be paid over to the owner thereof. § 771. Tennessee.^^ — Silversmiths, lock and gunsmiths, blacksmiths, and artisans generally who do work for the public, shall have the power and right, at the expiration of one year from the time of the contract and leaving the mate- rial with them, or the article to be repaired, if not claimed or called for by the owner or owners, to sell the same at public outcry, after giving thirty days' notice, to be con- spicuously posted in three public places in the county wherein the sale is to be made, one notice to be posted at the court house door, if the value of the article or thing shall be of i4Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 2162. filing of a lien is not the corn- See Brown v. Smith, 24 S. Dak. mencement of an action. 231, 123 N. W. 689, holding that the i^Ann. Code 1896, § 3559. § ^^2 LIENS. 794 the value of five dollars or more, but articles of a less value than five dollars may be sold at the expiration of ninety days from the date of the contract, or leaving of the article or articles. There shall be a lien^'^' upon any vehicle, whether propelled by horse, steam, water, motor, electric, or muscular power, or otherwise, for any repair or improvements made or fix- tures or machinery furnished at the request of the owner or his agent in favor of the mechanic, contractor, founder, or machinist who undertakes the work or makes on any vehicle of the class or classes herein mentioned any repairs or puts therein any improvements, fixtures, machinery, or material, either wood, rubber, composition, or metal; pro- vided, the lien herein created shall not extend to, nor shall the provisions of this act be so construed as in any wav affecting the rights and title acquired by purchasers without notice. The lien shall be upon and include the vehicle and im- provements thereon, and continue for six months after the work is finished or repairs made or material furnished, and until the decision of any suit that may be brought within that time for the debt due said contractor or undertaker or furnisher, and binds said vehicle and the improvements thereon, provided the said vehicle and improvements thereon have not been transferred in good faith to purchasers with- out notice. Such lien for repairs, materials, furnishings, improvements, machinery and work upon any vehicle of the class or classes heretofore mentioned shall be enforced by attachment at law or in equity or by judgment at law and levy of the exe- cution upon the property subject to the lien. § 772. Texas.^''' — Whenever any article, implement, uten- sil, or vehicle shall be repaired with labor and material, or icActs 1909, p. 532. I'Rev. Civ. Stat. 1911. art. 5665 795 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABORERS' LIENS. § 772 with labor and without furnishing material, by any carpenter, mechanic, artisan, or other workman in this state, such car- penter, mechanic, artisan, or other workman is authorized to retain possession of said article, implement, utensil, or vehicle until the amount dile on the same for repairing by contract shall be fully paid off and discharged. In case no amount is agreed upon by contract, then said carpenter, mechanic, artisan, or other workman shall retain possession of such article, implement, utensil, or vehicle until all reasonable, customary, and usual compensation shall be paid in full. When possession of any of the property has continued for sixty days after the charges accrued, and the charges so due have not been paid, it shall be the duty of the persons so holding said property to notify the owner, if in the state and his residence be known, to come forward and pay the charges due ; and on his failure within ten days after such notice has been given him to pay said charges, the persons so holding said property, after twenty days' notice, are authorized to sell said property at public sale, and apply the proceeds to the payment of said charges, and shall pay over the balance to the person entitled to the same. If the owner's residence is beyond the state or is unknown, the person holding said property shall not be required to give the ten days' notice before proceeding to sell. If the person who is legally entitled to receive the balance is not known, or has removed from the state or from the county in which such repairing was done or such property was so held, it shall be the duty of the person so holding said property to pay the balance to the county treasurer of the county in which said property is held, and take his receipt therefor. 5671. The death of the owner of estate and its allowance does not personal property left for repair destroy the lien of the mechanic, and the filing of a claim by the Lithgow v. Sweedberg, (Tex.) 78 mechanic of a claim against the S. W. 246. § ']']22l liens. 796 Whenever any balance shall remain in the possession of the county treasurer for the period of two years unclaimed by the party legally entitled to the same, such balance shall become a part of the county fund of the county in which the property was so sold, and shall be applied as any other county fund or money of such county is applied or used. Nothing in this title shall be construed or considered as in any manner impairing or affecting the right of parties to create liens by special contract or agreement, nor shall it in any manner affect or impair other liens arising at common law or in equity, or by any statute of this state, or in any other lien not treated under this title. § 772a. Utah.^^ — Any mechanic or other person who shall make, alter, repair, or bestow labor upon any article of personal property, at the request of the owner of such prop- erty, shall in like manner have a lien upon such articles for his seasonable charges for the labor performed, and for any material furnished and used in making such alteration, repair, or improvement. It is also provided that all foundrymen and boilermakers, and all persons performing labor or furnishing machinery, or boilers or castings, or other material for the construction or repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory, or hoist- ing mill, manufactory, or hoisting works for such work or labor done on such machinery, or boiler, or castings or other material furnished by such respectively.^^ § 772b. Vermont."*^ — A person who makes, alters or re- pairs an article of personal property, at the request of the owner, shall have a lien thereon for his reasonable charges, and may retain possession of the property until the same are paid. A person having such lien may, if the debt secured thereby remains unpaid for three months and the value of the property affected does not exceed one hundred dollars. isComp. Laws 1907, § 1404. 20Pub. Stats. 1906, §§ 2651-2653. i9Comp. Laws 1907, § 1397. 797 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 774 sell such property at public auction in the town where he resides; notice of the time, place and purpose of such sale shall be posted in two or more public places in such town, at least ten days prior thereto, and he may apply the proceeds of such sale to the satisfaction of the debt due him and the expenses of such sale ; and the surplus remaining shall be paid to the proper owner thereof, within ten days thereafter, or deposited for his benefit in the treasury of the town where the sale occurs. § 733. Virginia.-^ — Every mechanic who shall alter or repair any article of personal property at the request of the owner of such property, shall have a lien thereon for his just and reasonable charges therefor, and may retain posses- sion of such property until such charges are paid. § 773a. Washington.-- — Every person, firm or corpora- tion who has expended labor, skill or material on any chattel, at the request of its owner, or authorized agent of its owner, shall have a lien upon such chattels for the contract price for such expenditure, or in the absence of such contract price, for the reasonable worth of such expenditure, for a period of one year from and after such expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that such chattel be surrendered to the owner thereof: provided, however, that no such lien shall continue after the delivery of such chattel to its owner as against the rights of third persons who may have acquired an interest in, or the title to, such chattel in good faith, for value, and with- out actual knowledge of the lien. § 774. Wisconsin.^^ — Every mechanic who shall make, alter, or repair any article of personal property, at the request 2iCode Ann. 1904, § 2488. A lien 22Laws 1909, p. 626. claim may be filed at any time 23 Stat. 1898, § 3343. As to en- within the term of credit extended, forcement, see § 373. Where a for supplies furnished. In re part of a labor claim filed is lien- West Norfolk Lumber Co., 112 able and a part is not and the Fed. 759. proof does not show that the one § 775 LIENS. 798 of the owner or legal possessor of such property, shall have a lien thereon for his just and reasonable charges therefor, and may retain possession of such property until such charges are paid. § 775. Wyoming.-'* — Any mechanic, artisan, civil engi- neer or laborer who shall make, alter, repair, or bestow labor upon any article of personal property, or upon the construc- tion of any ditch, canal or reservoir or appurtenances thereto, or who shall furnish materials from which the same is made or repaired at the request of the owner or his agent, shall have a lien upon such articles of personal property, ditch, canal or reservoir or appurtenances thereto for his reasonable charges for labor performed or materials furnished and used in such making, repair or improvement. § 776. No lien for farm laborers in the absence of statutes. — Laborers upon a farm have no lien for their wages upon the crops produced unless given by statute,-^ or by special contract. They have no possession of the crops so long as they are growing; and even after they are harvested they have no possession if they are gathered and stored on the farmer's land. Thus, a laborer employed to cut and stack wheat on the premises has no such possession of it as en- titles him to a lien upon it at common law.^*^ The laborer has only a qualified possession of the crops while he is labor- ing in gathering them. \\'hile they remain upon the farmer's can be separated from the other, livering judgment, said: "There the claim for a lien must be divid- could, to my mind, be no greater ed. McGeorge v. Stanton-De Long absurdity than to hold that an em- Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 7, 110 N. W. ploye of a farmer, to perform la- 788. bor upon the farm, would be en- 24Comp. Stats. 1910, § 3753, as titled to a lien for the work be- amended by Sess. Laws 1913, p. stowed in cultivating the land, or 109. harvesting the crop, in the absence 25Hunt V. Wing, 10 Heisk. of a special contract creating it, (Tenn.) 139. to be followed by an actual and 2CMcDearmid v. Foster, 14 Ore. physical change of possession in 417, 12 Pac. 813. Thayer, J., de- the nature of a pledge." 799 MECHANICS , ARTISANS , AND LABORERS LIENS. 711 premises, and are subject to his control, as they must neces- sarily be, unless he has by contract surrendered the control, he is in actual possession, and no one can have a lien at com- mon law upon them. These acts, providing as they general- ly do for a remedy summary in its character and contrary to the course of the common law, must receive a strict construc- tion. Claimants under them must bring themselves strictly within the terms of the acts.-^ § 777. Alabama.-'^ — A lien is created in favor of agricul- tural laborers and superintendents of plantations upon the crops grown during the current year in and about which they are employed, for the hire and wages due them for labor and services rendered by them in and about the cultiva- tion of the crops under any contract for such labor and serv- ices; which lien is subordinate to the landlord's lien for rent, and advances, and to any other lien for supplies furnished to make the crops.^^ The lien is held to be waived or abandoned at the expira- tion of six months after the work shall have been completed, STplournoy v. Shehon, 43 Ark. 168. 28 Civ. Code 1907, §§ 4795-4797, 4800. The statute does not require that the contract shall be express. Its words, "any contract," are comprehensive enough to include implied as well as express con- tracts. Giving to the words of the statute their fair and plain im- port and scope, any contract is suf- ficient to originate the lien, which if the labor is rendered, is suffi- cient to create a debt or liability. The lien may be based on an im- plied contract. Wilson v. Taylor, 89 Ala. 368, 8 So. 149, citing Neil- son V. Iowa East. R. Co., 51 Iowa 184, 1 N. W. 434; 2 Jones Liens, § 1236. See also, Farrow v. Wool- ey, 149 Ala. Zli, 43 So. 144. -'■^This lien prevails against any purchaser with notice, actual or constructive. In the case of a su- perintendent, if a purchaser has knowledge of his employment or relation to the owner, and of the fact that the crops were raised un- der his supervision during the year, he is chargeable with con- structive notice of the lien. Town- send V. Brooks, 76 Ala. 308; Lo- max V. Le Grand, 60 Ala. 537. A laborer for a tenant to enforce his Hen must show how much is due him under his contract with the tenant. Hodson v. Wright, 1 Ala. App. 433, 56 So. 258. See also, Amos V. Garvin, (Ala.) 39 So. 990. J-Jl LIENS. 800 unless proceedings are within that time commenced to en- force the lien. The lien is enforced by attachment. No greater portion of the crop than is sufficient to satisfy the claim, with costs of the suit, shall be attached. § 778. Arkansas.-^" — Laborers who perform work and labor on any object, thing, material or property, have an soDig. of Stat. 1904, §§ 5011, 5014. It is provided by § 4978, Dig. of Stat. 1904, that the owner of any land, houses, boats or ves- sel, shall have the right to vvrith- hold from the amount due any contractor the amount of money for w^hich a lien is filed. A labor- er's lien under a verbal contract for a period not more than one year, upon a crop of cotton raised by his labor is superior to the lien of a mortgage on the crop exe- cuted by the owner. Watson v. May, 62 Ark. 435, 35 S. W. 1108. The statute has reference solely to movable property, and the la- bor performed tnereon. "Thus, ordinary farm hands, employed in the cultivation of a crop, would have a lien on the crop produced by their labor. But it may well be doubted whether the laborer, who built fires whilst a man of gen- ius wrote a poem, would have a lien either upon the rhythm or the manuscript, although he may have contributed to the comfort and convenience of the poet. This word 'all,' as it is used in this act, is not to be construed literally as giving to every laborer a lien for his labor. The clerk of a mer- chant or banker, in one sense of the word, is a laborer, and so are ordinary house-servants; but they do not come within the purview of this act, because they produce nothing to which a lien could at- tach." Dano V. Miss., O. & R. R. Co., 27 Ark. 564, 567. A farm over- seer is not a laborer within the meaning of this act. Flournoy v. Shelton. 43 Ark. 168; Isbell v. Dun- lap. 17 S. Car. 581, 583; Whitaker V. Smith, 81 N. Car. 340, 31 Am. Rep. 503. The lien of a laborer on a crop he has helped to raise is superior to the lien of one who has advanced money to make the crop. Sheeks-Stephens Store Co. V. Richardson, 76 Ark. 282, 88 S. W. 983. For penalty for remov- ing property subject to such lien, see Dig. of Stat. 1904, § 2011. One who raises a crop upon the land of another for an agreed share is a laborer and not a tenant, and is entitled to a lien. Burgie v. Davis, 34 Ark. 179. The laborer's lien given by this act is personal and not assignable; it must arise out of contract ; and the laborer must bring himself strictly within the statute. The first nine sections apply only to movable property. The remedy is summary, and should be strictly construed. Dano V. Miss., O. & R. R. Co., TJ Ark. 564; Taylor v. Hathaway, 29 Ark. 597. Hay is the production of the laborer who cuts and rakes the grass, and he has a lien on it for the price or value of his labor. 8oi mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 779 absolute lien on such object, thing, material or property for such labor done and performed, subject to prior liens and landlord's liens for rent and supplies, and such liens may be enforced within the same time, and in the same manner now provided for by law, in enforcing laborers' liens on the pro- duction of labor done and performed. Any person having a lien under this act and desiring to avail himself of its provisions, shall within thirty days after such work or labor is done or performed, or materials fur- nished, file with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the debtor resides, a just and true account of the demand due, or becoming due after allowing all credits, and containing a description of the property to be charged with said lien, verified by affidavit. Such liens may be enforced at any time within four months after such accounts are filed by suits. Proceedings to enforce this lien must be commenced with- in eight months after the work is done.^^ The employer, however, may bring the laborer to settlement before a proper officer any time after the labor is performed, by giving the laborer or his agent ten days' notice. § 779. Arkansas^^ (continued). Specific liens in favor of employers. — Specific liens are reserved upon so much of the produce raised, and articles constructed or manufactured, by laborers during their contract as will secure all moneys and the value of all supplies furnished them by the employers, and all wages or shares due the laborer. Where no written contract is made, the employer shall Emerson v. Hedrick, 42 Ark. 263. digging a well. Guise v. Oliver, A laborer who cultivates land, or 51 Ark. 356, 11 S. W. 515. clears and prepares the same for si Dig. of Stats. 1904, § 5009. cultivation, is not entitled to a s2Dig. of Stats. 1904, §§ 5024, lien thereon for his wages. The 5031. Contracts for a longer per.'od statute only gives a lien upon the than one month must be signed, production of his labor. Taylor v. witnessed by two witnesses, or Hathaway, 29 Ark. 597. There is acknowledged. The contract does no lien for labor performed in not affect third persons unless a 51 § 779^ LIENS. 802 have a lien upon the portion of the crop going to the em- ploye for any debt incident to making and gathering the crop owing to such employer by such employe, without any necessity for recording any contract of writing giving such lien; and in such case no mortgage or conveyance of any part of the crop made by the person cultivating the land of another shall have a validity, unless made with the con- sent of the employer or owner of the land or crop, which consent must be indorsed upon such mortgage or convey- ance; provided, no such indorsement shall bind the party making it to pay the debt unless expressly so stipulated. § 779a. California.^^ — It is provided by statute that every person working in or about a threshing machine, while en- gaged in threshing grain, shall have a lien on such machine. § 779b. Colorado.^^ — All persons who shall do work or shall furnish materials or mining, milling or other machinery or other fixtures, for the working, preservation, prospecting or development of any mine, lode or mining claim, deposit yielding metals or minerals of any kind or for the working, preservation or development of any such mine, lode or deposit, in search of any such metals or minerals shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have rendered service or bestowed labor or for which they have furnished materials or mining or milling machinery or other fixtures for copy of it is filed in the recorder's s^Mills Ann. Stat. 1912, §§ 4583, office. 4612. This statute would come 33Civ. Code 1906, § 3061. The more appropriately in Vol. II, Ch. lien is valid where one person so 30. post. A workman, either under works under the employment of the common law or sec. 4570 of the one lawfully in possession and us- statutes, can not refuse to per- ing a threshing machine under form his contract and still insist contract with the owner. Lam- on retaining possession in the en- bert V. Davis, 116 Cal. 292, 48 Pac. forcement of his claimed lien as 123. An action to foreclose a against the right of the owner, thresher's lien will not bind any Hillsburg v. Harrison, 2 Colo, one not a party to it. Holt Mfg. App. 298, 30 Pac. 355. Co. V. Collins, 154 Cal. 265, 97 Pac. 516. 8o3 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 781 the value of such services rendered or labor done or material furnished, whether at the instance of the owner, or of any other person acting by his authority or under him, as agent, contractor or otherwise. Any person or persons, company or corporation, who per- form labor or furnish material or supplies for constructing, altering or repairing, or for the digging, drilling or boring, operating, completing or repairing of any gas well, oil well or any other well, by virtue of a contract with the owner or his authorized agent, shall have a lien to secure the payment of the same upon such gas well, oil well, or such other well, and upon the materials and machinery and equipment and supplies so furnished. § 780. Florida.^^ — A lien prior in dignity to all others accruing thereafter exists in favor of any person performing any labor in, or managing or overseeing the cultivation or harvesting of crops, upon the crops cultivated or harvested. § 781. Georgia.'^*^ — Laborers shall have a general lien upon the property of their employers, liable to levy and sale, for their labor, which is hereby declared to be superior to all other liens, except liens for taxes, the special liens of landlords on yearly crops, and such other liens as are declared by law to be superior to them.^^ 35Gen. Stat. 1906, § 2199. chanic, who performs actual man- seCode 1911, §§ 3334, 3335, 3339. ual labor for his employer, is en- The word laborer as used in the titled to a laborer's lien on the statute means one engaged in man- property of the latter. But though ual labor, and not one whose em- a contractor may be a mechanic, if ployment is associated with men- he does not perform manual labor, tal labor and skill, as a clerk for he is not entitled to a laborer's instance. Hinton v. Goode, IZ Ga. lien under this statute. Adams v. 233; Ricks v. Redwine, IZ Ga. 273; Goodrich, 55 Ga. 233; Savannah & Richardson v. Langston, 68 Ga. Charleston R. Co. v. Callahan, 49 658. Whether a clerk is a laborer Ga. 506. depends on the nature of his du- ^''General laborers' lien under ties. Oliver v. Macon Hardware this statute take precedence over Co., 98 Ga. 249, 25 S. E. 403, 58 Am. ordinary mortgages, although the St. 300. A laborer, though a me- mortgages were made prior to the 78i LIENS, 804 Laborers shall also have a special lien on the products of their abor, superior to all other liens, except for taxes and special liens of landlords on yearly crops, to which they shall be inferiors.'^^ Liens of laborers shall arise upon the completion of their contract of labor, but shall not exist against bona fide pur- chasers without notice, until the same are reduced to execu- tion and levied by an officer; and such liens in conflict with contracts for labor. Allred v. Hale, 84 Ga. 570, 10 S. E. 1095. A laborer may make claim for lien at any- time within one year after he is entitled to payment and he must make demand for payment. Fair- cloth V. Webb, 125 Ga. 230, 53 S. E. 592. In the relation of landlord and cropper after the payment of rent and advances the cropper may foreclose his special laborer's lien for a balance due him. Gar- rick V. Jones, 2 Ga. App. 382, 58 S. E. 543. Where a cropper has not completed his work under a contract with the landlord be- cause prevented by the act of the landlord, he may enforce his lien. Lewis V. Owens, 124 Ga. 228, 52 S. E. 333. 38A laborer has a special lien on particular property, and also a general lien on all the property of his employer, for work done, and, if properly asserted, it will date from the completion of the work. But in order to receive the advan- tage of this lien, it must be fore- closed as provided by law, and, as to realty, recorded. Where a la- borer neither recorded nor fore- closed his lien as such, but brought complaint on an open ac- count for the amount due him, and recovered judgment, his claim was postponed to judgments jun- ior to the performance of the work, but senior to the date of his judgment. That a laborer desires to claim a general lien on all the property of his employer, and is unable to describe such property specifically, does not relieve him from asserting his lien and. enforc- ing it as such. It does not matter that he might be compelled to en- force his lien on the personalty of his employer in one action and on the realty in another. Love v. Cox, 68 Ga. 269. The lien must be established by judgment, and pro- cess must issue upon the judgment, before he can claim money arising from the sale of property under an execution in favor of another party. Gumming v. Wright, 72 Ga. 767. One who furnishes labor for raising a crop on shares may re- cover his share by foreclosure of his lien as a laborer. His part of the crop is in the nature of wages. McElmurray v. Turner, 86 Ga. 215, 12 S. E. 359. A labor lien does not attach to property set apart as exempt. Watson v. Williams, 110 Ga. 321, 35 S. E. 344. As to what constitutes completion of contract for cutting timber, see Hawkins v. Chambliss, 120 Ga. 614, 48 S. E. 169. 8o5 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 781a each other shall rank according to date, dating each from the completion of the contract of labor.^^ § 781a. Idaho.^*^ — A farm laborer is given a lien for his labor in producing crops. This is a preferred and prior lien to any crop or chattel mortgage placed thereon, and any person taking a mortgage on such crops takes it subject to the farm laborer's lien as to a reasonable compensation for his labor, provided the interest in any crop of any lessor or lessors of land where the premises are leased in considera- tion of a share in the crop raised thereon is not subject to 39While these liens by the terms of the statute yield to bona fide purchasers without notice, yet it is held that they take precedence of mortgages, though the holders took them in good faith and with- out notice. Langston v. Anderson, 69 Ga. 65. A laborer's lien is held superior to the lien of a purchase- money mortgage. Bradley v. Cas- sels, 117 Ga. 517, 43 S. E. 857. A distress warrant, levied before the work for which the lien was claimed is completed, takes prece- dence. Hight V. Fleming, 74 Ga. 592. Upon a summary process to enforce a laborer's lien for wages, the defendant can not set up by way of set-off a negotiable note of the laborer, brought up by the employer after the contract of hir- ing, in the absence of any request or encouragement on the part of the laborer to make the purchase, or of any promise to allow the note as payment or as set-off. Where the claim in set-off arises out of transactions wholly discon- nected with the labor or the wages, it is thought to be a de- fense not contemplated by the pro- visions of the code relating to the enforcement of liens. Fuller v. Kitchens, 57 Ga. 265. If a labor- er be employed by his creditor the amount due him for his wages will be applied in payment of his debt, in the absence of any ex- press agreement that they shall not be so applied. If after the hir- ing the employer makes advances in money or property to the labor- er, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, such advances are applied to the payment of the claim for wages. Fuller v. Kitch- ens, 57 Ga. 265, per Bleckley, J. As to validity of affidavit of fore- closure, see Weischselbaum v. Pope, 119 Ga. 182, 45 S. E. 991. 40Rev. Code 1908, § 5141; Beck- stead V. Griffith, 11 Idaho 738, 83 Pac. 764. Where a debtor's infant son plows the land of his father's creditor to cultivate a crop there- on he is entitled to a lien for his own services, but he can have no lien for the services of the team used by him. Tuckey v. Lovell, 8 Idaho 731, 71 Pac. 122. § 782 LIENS. 806 such lien. It is held that this Hen extends to the entire crop. § 782. Louisiana.^ ^ — The following debts to agricultural laborers are privileged: — The appointments or salaries of the overseer for the cur- rent year, on the crops of the year and the proceeds thereof; the wages of laborers employed in working the same, on th6 crops of the year, and on everything which serves to the working of the farm.^^ The privileges granted to the overseer, the laborers, the furnishes of supplies, and the party advancing money neces- sary to carry on any farm or plantation, are concurrent, and shall not be divested by any prior mortgage, whether con- ventional, legal, or judicial, or by and seizure or sale of the land while the crop is on it. The privilege in favor of the laborer shall be ranked as the first privilege on the crop.^^ § 782a. Michigan.^^ — An owner of a threshing machine shall, upon filing a proper statement, have a lien for the value of his services in threshing grains or vegetable products for another. Such lien shall not attach where the grain shall •iiMerrick's Rev. Code 1900, art. 3217. 42The privilege, "on everything which serves to the working of the farm," is construed to apply only to such things as serve to the working of the farm but do not constitute a part of the farm it- self; that is, to movables by na- ture and destination, — movables serving to the working of the farm, but not belonging to the owner. Rogers v. Walker, 24 Fed. 344. Independent contractors are not laborers on a plantation, and are not entitled to a special privi- lege. Fortier v. Delgado, 59 C. C. A. 180, 122 Fed. 604. ^^In the distribution of the pro- ceeds of a plantation sold to sat- isfy a mortgage, upon the inter- vention of laborers claiming a lien, there may be two funds, a crop fund and a plantation fund. On the crop fund there is, first, the laborer's lien; and, second, the factor's lien. On the plantation fund, to the extent of the mules, etc., the maxim, qui prior est tem- pore, potior est jure, is applica- ble. Rogers v. Walker, 24 Fed. 344. 4i Howell's Stats. 1912, § 13817. 8o7 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § y^T) have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser or dealer in the usual course of trades. § 782b. Minnesota."*'' — The statute gives the owner or operator of a threshing machine a lien on grain threshed for the price or value of such service, w^hich shall be preferred to all other liens or incumbrances except those given for the seed from which said grain was grown. § 783. Mississippi.^^ — Every employer shall have a lien on the share or interest of his employe in any crop made under 45 Gen. Stats. 1913, §§ 7082, 7083. For a sufficient averment in a complaint to enforce a thresher's lien, see Phelan v. Terry, 101 Minn. 454, 112 N. W. 872. Where a thresher retains possession of a part of the grain threshed he may have a lien upon it w^ithout pro- ceeding as provided by Rev. Laws 1905, §§ 3546, 3547. Gordon v. Freeman, 112 Minn. 482, 128 N. VV. 834. Such lien is not lost by the thresher placing such grain in an elevator to be held for him. Gordon v. Freeman, 112 Minn. 482, 128 N. W. 834. 4GRev. Code 1906, §§ 3042, 3043. The statutes are intended only to give liens upon the crops, and to provide means for the enforce- ment of the same between the classes enumerated, namely, the employer and employe, the land- lord and his tenant, or the crop- per on shares and the supply-man and the party supplied. An over- seer is not within either of these classes, and is not entitled to a lien. Hester v. Allen, 52 Miss. 162. An overseer has a lien for wages under a contract of em- ployment. Langford v. Leggitt, 99 Miss. 266, 54 So. 856. As re- gards the nature of the indebted- ness for which the lien may be created, it is clear that there can be no lien for a debt which has no relation to agriculture or to sup- plies for the family. But where a farmer has in good faith taken up the goods on the faith of the lien, and it is questioned whether this article or that falls within the law, there ought to be evidence that the things were not needed for farm purposes, or that they are of such nature of themselves as to be unfit for that use, in or- der to defeat the lien. Where a planter pays his laborers for wages in goods obtained from a merchant, the latter would have a lien for them, whether they were of the class embraced in the pro- visions of the statute or not; for it would be the same as advancing money to pay the wages of the laborers, and the statute gives a lien for this. Herman v. Perkins, 52 Miss. 813. A person employed to do general work on a planta- tion, who assists in gathering a crop, is entitled to this Hen. Lumbley v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 97, § 783 LIENS. 808 such employment, for all advances of money, and for the fair market value of other things advanced by [to] him, or any one at his request, for supplies for himself, his family and business, during the existence of such employment, which lien such employer may offset, recoup, or otherwise assert and maintain, and every employe, laborer, cropper, part owner, overseer or manager, or other person who may aid by his labor to make, gather, or prepare for sale or market any crop, shall have a lien on the interest of the person who contracts with him for such labor, for his wages, or share or interest in such crop, whatever may be the kind of wages or the nature of such interest, which lien such employe, laborer, cropper, part owner, overseer or manager, or other person may offset, recoup or otherwise assert and maintain. And such liens shall be paramount to all liens or incum- brances or rights of any kind created by or against the per- son so contracting for such assistance, except the lien of the lessor of the land on which the crop is made, for rent, and supplies furnished.*^ 5 So. 823. When a manager of a plantation has shipped a crop to market, where it is sold and the plantation is credited with the price received, he can not assert a lien for his services on such crop. McCormick v. Blum, 75 Miss. 81, 21 So. 707. 47Such lien is superior to a mortgage of the crop executed after the passage of this act. The mortgagor in such case has the right to employ laborers, and thereby, by operation of law, to create the lien in their behalf, al- though such employment be sub- sequent to the execution of the mortgage. Buck v. Paine, 50 Miss. 648. The lien is also para- mount to a mortgage of the crop made for supplies furnished to en- able the farmer to make the crop, though the mortgage was made be- fore the laborer was employed and was duly recorded, and the contract with the laborer was ver- bal only. The lien is implied by law. It requires no writing, and rests upon no record to uphold it. Buck v. Payne, 52 Miss. 271; Leak v. Cooke, 52 Miss. 799; Herman v. Perkins, 52 Miss. 813. The labor- er may waive his implied lien in favor of the mortgagee, and thus make the mortgage paramount to the lien. Whether he has done so verbally or by his act, is a ques- tion for the jury. After such waiver, a sale by the laborer of his interest in the crop passes only such interest as the laborer had after his waiver, and his ven- 8o9 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 784a Said liens shall exist by virtue of the relation of the parties as employer and employe, and without any writing or record- ing. § 784. North Carolina.^^ — Personal property is subject to a lien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done on the same. The lien for work on crops is preferred to every other lien or incumbrance which attached upon the property subsequent to the time at which the work was com- menced.^^ Whenever servants and laborers in agriculture shall by their contracts, orally or in writing, be entitled for wages to a part of the crops cultivated by them, such part shall not be subject to sale under executions against their employers, or the owners of the land cultivated. § 784a. North Dakota.^" — Any person who performs services for another in the capacity of farm laborer between the first day of April and the first day of December in any dee can not protect himself from the waiver on the ground that he did not know of it. The purchas- er is bound to inform himself of the facts, and can claim no better right than the laborer himself. Buck V. Paine, 50 Miss. 648. A mortgage of the crop, made before the passage of the act creating liens in favor of laborers, is a vest- ed right, by contract, which is par- amount to any liens under such statute. Leak v. Cooke, 52 Miss. 799. Where a laborer is working for an agreed amount per month, he need not particularize the items of claim in his claim filed for lien. Baldwin v. Morgan, Ti Miss. 276, 18 So. 919. 48Revisal of 1905, §§ 1998, 2017, 2034. 49See Warren v. Woodard, 70 N. Car. 382. Thus it is preferred to a subsequent agricultural lien. Rouse V. Wooten, 104 N. Car. 229, 10 S. E. 190; see ante, § 457. An overseer is not entitled to a la- borer's lien for his wages upon the crop or land of his employer over which he has superintendence. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. Car. 340, 31 Am. Rep. 503. The claim must be in detail, specifying the labor, the time thereof, and the farm on which it was performed. Cook v. Cobb, 101 N. Car. 68, 7 S. E. 700. 50 Rev. Code 1905, §§ 6274, 6277. As to sufficient description of the land where the grain was threshed, see Mitchell v. Monarch Elevator Co., 15 N. Dak. 495, 107 N. W. 1085. § 784b LIENS. 810 year, shall have a lien on all crops of every kind grown, raised or harvested by the person for whom the services were per- formed during said time as security for the payment of any wages due or owing to such persons for services so per- formed, and said lien shall have priority over all other liens, chattel mortgages or incumbrances, excepting, however, seed grain and threshers' liens; provided, that the wages for which a lien may be obtained must be reasonable and not in excess of that which is usually charged for the same kind of work in the locality where the labor is performed; provided, further, that in case any such person without cause quits his employment before the expiration of the time for which he is employed, or if he shall be discharged for cause, then he shall not be entitled to a lien as herein provided. Any owner or lessee of a threshing machine who threshes grain for another therewith, shall upon filing the statement provided for in the statute, have a lien upon such grain for the value of his services in threshing the same from the date of the commencement of the threshing. § 784b. Oregon.^ ^ — Any person who shall by his own labor, or that of his live stock, or by using his machinery, do or perform any labor or service upon any farm or land in tilling the same or sowing or harvesting or heading or The lien is on all the grain Dak. 185, 112 N. W. 78. The fail- threshed for threshing any par- ure of the lienor to state in his ticular kind of grain where all the statement filed the quantity of grain is threshed under one con- grain threshed is fatal to his lien, tract. Mitchell v. Monarch Ele- Moher v. Rasmusson, 12 N. Dak. vator Co., 15 N. Dak. 495, 107 N. 71, 95 N. W. 152. The lienor seiz- W. 1085; Gorthy v. Jarvis, 15 N. ing grain under his lien must show Dak. 509, 108 N. W. 39. Where two that the grain was grown on the kinds of grain are described in the land he describes in his filed state- statement, stating the quantity of ment. Martin v. Hawthorne, 5 N. each and the price for each, the Dak. 66, 63 N. W. 895. See also, contract being divisable, there are Parker v. First Nat. Bank of Lis- two liens, one on each kind of bon, 3 N. Dak. 87. grain. Schlosser v. Moores, 16 N. -'iGen. Laws 1907, pp. 275, 277. 8ll mechanics', artisans', AND laborers' LIENS. § 784C threshing any grain, or in securing or assisting in securing or housing any crop or crops, sown, raised, headed, harvested or threshed thereon during the year in which said work or labor was done shall have a lien upon all such crop as shall have been raised upon all or any of such land for the con- tract price, or reasonable value if there be no contract for such work or labor, and said lien shall attach from the date of the commencement of such work or labor, and such lien shall be a preferred lien, and shall be prior to all other liens or incumbrances. The statute also gives a lien upon grain or other crops for the contract price or reasonable value of threshing or harvest- ing any grain, or other crop, and declares such a lien to be prior over all others except those of laborers. § 784c. South Carolina.^^ — Laborers who assist in mak- ing any crop on shares or for wages in money or other valu- able consideration, shall have a lien thereon to the extent of the amount due them for such labor next in priority to the lien of the landlord for rent; and as between such laborers there shall be no preference. Such portion of the crop to them belonging, or such amount of money or other valuable consideration as may be due them, shall be recoverable by an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The lien of the laborer shall rank next in priority to that of the landlord for rent. 52Code of Laws 1912, §§ 4163, not be in writing to create a lien 4164. An overseer is not an agri- under § 3058 of said statutes where cultural laborer. Isbell v. Dunlap, the contract is witnessed by dis- 17 S. Car. 581. Even where a interested witnesses. State v, plaintifif acts in good faith he is" Banier, 78 S. Car. 103, 60 S. E. 225. liable for acts of a constable in A lien may be allowed on a crop levying on crops under a void for the hire of a mule where such warrant. Forrest v. McBee, 78 S. hire is provided in a written con- Car. 105, 58 S. E. 955. A contract tract. McCasltn v. Nance, 46 S. under § 2715 Civ. Code 1902 need Car. 568, 24 S. E. 812. § 7^5 LIENS. 8l2 § 785. South Dakota.^^ — Every person or persons own- ing and operating a threshing machine shall have a lien from the date of threshing upon all grain threshed by him with such machine for the value of the services so rendered in doing such threshing; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the innocent purchasers of grain after the threshing unless the said lien be filed within ten days. Said liens shall have priority over all other liens and incumbrances upon said grain if filed within twenty days from the day on which said threshing was completed. § 786. Tennessee.^^ — Whenever any person shall perform any labor, or render service to another in accordance with a contract, written or verbal, for cultivating soil, and shall produce a crop, he shall have a lien upon the crop produced, which shall be the results of his labor, for the payment of such wages as were agreed upon in the contract. ^^ This lien shall exist three months from the fifteenth day of November of the year in which the labor is performed, and shall be enforced by execution or attachment, as land- lords' liens are enforced; provided, that an account of such labor rendered be kept and sworn to before some justice of the peace, or clerk of the court issuing the writ of dis- traint of attachment. This lien shall in nowise abridge or in- 53Rev. Code (Civ. Proc.) 1903, in lieu of wages, can not, as §§ in, 738. Hahn v. Sleepy Eye against third persons who have a Milling Co., 21 S. Dak. 324, 112 N. fixed lien, as by mortgage, upon a W. 843. A judgment for plaintiff portion of the crop, subject such is erroneous in a suit to enforce a portion to the payment of their thresher's lien when the proof claims against the entire crop, fails to show that the plaintiff's They must show that the portion assignor owned and operated the attempted to be subjected is the threshing machine used in thresh- product of their labor, and then ing the grain. Anderson v. Alseth, can only subject their stipulated 6 S. Dak. 566, 62 N. W. 435. part of such portion to their lien. '-■^Code 1896, §§ 3567-3569. Hunt v .Wing, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) •'•> Laborers upon a farm, who 139. stipulate for a share of the crop 8i3 mechanics', artisans', and laborers' liens. § 786b terfere with the landlords' lien for rent or supplies, as estab- lished by law, but the same shall be second to the landlord's lien, and none other. § 786a. Texas.^*^ — The statute provides that a farm hand is entitled to have a first lien, subject to the landlords' lien, on all the products of the farm that his labor helps to produce, but to secure his lien he must make duplicate accounts, one to be presented to his employer within 30 days after the debt accrues and the other within the same time he is re- quired to file with the county clerk. § 786b. Washington.^^ — Any person who shall do labor upon any farm or land, in tilling the same or in sowing or harvesting or threshing any grain, as laborer, contractor, or otherwise, or laboring upon, or securing or assisting in securing or housing any crop or crops sown, raised, or threshed thereon during the year in which said work or labor was done, such person shall have a lien upon all such 56Rev. Civ. Stats. 1911, art. 5644, Wash. 375, 38 Pac. 1130. A lien 5645. As to time for filing such for services of several farm hands account, see Cash v. First Nat. is good, even if not signed by all Bank, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 61 S. the claimants, where the body of W. 723. The account and notice the claim shows wno such claim- required by the statute need not ants are and a landlord is not a state the crops raised. Allen v. necessary party defendant in a Glover, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 483, 65 suit on such claims to enforce a S. W. 379. lien on the crops grown on his f>'Remington and Ballinger's land on the shares. Pain v. Isaacs, Ann. Codes, Stat. 1910, § 1188. For 10 Wash. 173, 38 Pac. 1038. There enforcement, see ante, § 639a. is no authority for amending a Hogue v. Sheriff, 1 Wash. T. 195. lien on farm products. Dexter v. An employer can not claim a lien Olsen, 40 Wash. 199, 82 Pac. 286. covering the labor of other per- A laborer's lien under Remington sons than himself. Mohr v. Clark, and Ballinger's Ann. Codes and 3 Wash. T. 440, 19 Pac. 28. There Stats., § 1188, is superior to the is no lien from the labor of a Hen of a chattel mortgage execut- team in tending crops when there ed even before the crop was is no contract for the labor of a raised. Sitton v. Dubois, 14 Wash, person. Essency v. Essency, 10 624, 45 Pac. 303. § 786c LIENS. 814 crops as shall have been raised upon all or any of such land, for such work or labor. § 786c. Wisconsin.^^ — Every person, w^ho, as owner or lessee of a threshing machine or corn sheller, threshes grain or shells corn for another therewith, shall have a lien upon the grain so threshed and corn so shelled for the value of his services in threshing and shelling the same, to the extent the person contracting such services has an interest therein, from the date of the commencement of such services; and in case the value of such services remains unpaid may seize and take possession of so much of such grain or corn as shall be neces- sary to pay for such services and the expenses of enforcing such lien, for the purpose of foreclosing said lien at any time within six months from the last charge for such threshing grain or shelling corn, and sell the same at public auction, upon notice of not less than ten, nor more than fifteen days from the date of such seizure, provided the same be not re- deemed before such sale, or be taken by proceedings at law. Notice of such sale to be given personally and by posting in at least three public places in the town where the owner of such grain or corn resides and also in the town where such sale is to be made, if in another town; and if such own- er is a nonresident of the state, in the town where such grain or corn, or some part thereof, was threshed or shelled, and apply the proceeds of such sale to the payment of the amount due for such service, together with the expense of such seiz- ure and sale, returning the residue, if any, to the party en- titled thereto. ssLaws 1899, p. 370. CHAPTER XVI. PARTNERSHIP LIENS. Sec. 787. Member of partnership has lien. 788. Creditor of partnership has no lien. 789. Quasi lien of joint creditors. 790. No equity of joint creditors in absence of joint property. 791. Conveyance by one partner to the other. 792. Transfer of one partner's in- terest to creditor. 793. Partners may pay debts of in- dividual member. Sec. 794. Dissolution of partnership by death of a partner. 795. Levy of execution by creditor of member. 796. Legal title of real estate con- veyed to partners, 797. Effect of notice on one deal- ing with individual member of firm, 798. Character of partnership property impressed upon real estate, 799. Sale of real estate by surviv- ing partner. § 787. Member of partnership has lien. — Each member of a partnership has an equitable hen on the partnership prop- erty for the balance of account between himself and his co- partners, which he may enforce as against them, and all per- sons claiming under them, in their individual capacity.^ The partnership property belongs to the partnership, and not to iGarbett v. Veale, 5 Q. B. 408; Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, 25 L. ed. 370, per Strong, J. ; Kirby V. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch, (N. Y.) 46, 49 Am. Dec. 160; Saunders V. Reilly, 6 N. Y. St. 452, 59 Am. Rep. 472; Evans v. Bryan, 95 N. Car. 174, 59 Am. Rep. 233; Free- man V. Stewart, 41 Miss. 138 Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242 Gibson v. Stevens, 7 N. H. 352 Christian v. Ellis, 1 Grat. (Va.) 396; Miller v. Price, 20 Wis. 117; Roop V, Herron, 15 Nebr. 73, 17 N. W. 353; Matlock v. Matlock, 5 Ind. 403; Dunham v. Hanna, 18 Ind. 270; Pilcher's Succession, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929; Duryea v. Burt, 28 Cal, 569; Hodges v. Hole- man, 1 Dana (Ky.) 50; Harris v. Tuttle, 114 Ky. 882, 24 Ky. L. 1668, 12 S. W. 16. California, North Da- kota and South Dakota: Each member of a partnership may re- 815 788 LIENS. 8i6 the individuals of whom the partnership is composed. It is the right of each individual member of the partnership to re- quire that the partnership property shall be applied to the payment of the partnership debts. The share of each mem- ber is his share of the surplus remaining after the settlement of all the firm's debts and accounts. The lien covers a part- ner's account as made up in the partnership dealings; but it does not cover an individual debt due from one partner to the other.^ § 788. Creditor of partnership has no lien. — A creditor of a partnership has no equitable lien upon its effects in the first instance to compel their application to the payment of partnership debts. Each member of a partnership has a right to require the application of the joint property to the payment of the joint debts, before any portion can be divert- ed to the individual debts of the separate partners.^ But a partnership creditor has no specific lien, legal or equitable, quire its property to be applied to the discharge of its debts, and has a lien upon the shares of the other partners for this purpose, and for the payment of the general bal- ance, if any, due to him. Property, whether real or personal, acquired with partnership funds, is pre- sumed to be partnership property. California : Civ. Code 1906, §§ 2405, 2406. Montana : Codes Ann. (Civ.) 1895, § 3194. North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, §§ 5825, 5826. South Da- kota : Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903. §§ 1734, 1735. Each member of a mining partnership has a lien on the partnership property for the debts due the creditors thereof, and for money advanced by him for its use. This lien exists not- withstanding there is an agree- ment among the partners that it must not. California: Civ. Code 1906, § 2514. Idaho: Rev. Codes 1908, § 3364. Montana : Codes Ann. (Civ.) 1895, § 3353. This lien may exist in favor of one partner, al- though the partnership property is in the actual possession of the other. Morganstern v. Thrift, 66 Cal. 577, 6 Pac. 689. In Nevada the amount of money expended or in- debtedness assumed by a partner for the necessary and actual work- ing and development of a mining claim shall be a lien on the inter- est of said copartner. Rev. Laws 1912, § 2481. 2 Evans v. Bryan, 95 N. Car. 174, 59 Am. Rep. 233. 3Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119; Taylor v. Fields, 4 Ves. 396; Ex parte King, 17 Ves. 115; Campbell V. Mullett, 2 Swanst. 551; Fitzpat- 8i7 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. 788 upon the joint funds, any more than any individual creditor has upon the private estate of his debtor. This has been the settled doctrine on this subject since Lord Eldon's deci- sion in 1801 of the case of Ex parte Ruffin.* A creditor of a partnership has, as a general rule, no direct lien upon the partnership property until he acquires it by legal process, that is, by the levy of an attachment or of an execution. His indirect or quasi lien is derived from the lien or equity of the individual partners. It is practically a subrogation to the lien of the individual partners. If the partners are not themselves in a condition to enforce an equitable lien upon the partner- ship property, the creditors of the partnership can not enforce a lien derived from them, or from one of them.^ The equity of the partnership creditor continues so long as the equity of the individual partner continues, and no longer. rick V. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369, per Mat- thews, J. Connecticut : Allen v. Center Valley Co., 21 Conn. 130, 54 Am. Dec. 333. Indiana: McDon- ald V. Beach, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 55. The equitable lien of creditors upon the assets of a partnership depends upon the liens of the partners, and such lien may be waived by the partners, and a sale by a partner of his interest in the partnership property in the ab- sence of fraud is a waiver of his lien on the partnership assets, and where a partnership is dissolved and one member assigned his in- terest therein to the other mem- bers who composed another firm, an agreement on the part of such members to pay the debts of the dissolved firm and to cancel an in- debtedness due from such retiring member constituted a sufficient consideration to support the as- signment. Selz V. Mayer, 151 Ind. 422, 51' N. E. 485. Mississippi: Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Miss. 138. Nebraska: Brown v. Sloan, 55 Nebr. 28, 75 N. W. 54; Murphy v. Warren, 55 Nebr. 215, 75 N. W. 573. New York: Saunders v. Reilly, 6 N. Y. St. 452, 25 Cent. L. J. 201 ; Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 522, reversed 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 611. North Carolina: Phil- lips v. Trezevant, 67 N. Car. 370. Ohio : Gwin v. Selby, 5 Ohio St. 96; Sigler v. Knox County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; Wilcox v. Kellogg, 11 Ohio 394. ^6 Ves. 119. ^Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119. 25 L. ed. 370; Bank of Ken- tucky V. Herndon, 1 Bush (Ky.) 359, 89 Am. Dec. 630. 52 § 789 LIENS. 818 § 789. Quasi lien of joint creditors. — It is only through the operation of administering the equities between the part- ners themselves that the joint creditors have the benefit of a quasi Hen upon the partnership property.*^ These equities can be asserted only through the action of the partners, or of one of them, or through the insolvency of the firm, which puts the property into the custody of the law, or through the death of one partner, which devolves the settlement of the partnership affairs upon the survivor. Simple contract creditors of the partnership have no lien upon its property until it is acquired by process of law, or the property has passed in custodia legis. The partnership creditors have what is termed a quasi lien upon the partnership property, but this does not exist independently of the partners. "The partners have the lien, and especially the salvent ones, and have a right to insist that the joint funds shall pay the joint debts, and in this way, and by enforcing the equities or lien of the partners, the creditors of the partnership come to their rights, whatever they are, and thus these rights are worked out, as the authorities say."''^ 6 Story Part. (7th ed.), § 360; 54; Wilcox v. Kellogg, 11 Ohio Case V. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, 394; Day v. Wetherby, 29 Wis. 101 U. S. 688, 25 L. ed. 1004; 363; Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 Miss. Fitzpatrick V. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530; White v. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; Parish, 20 Tex. 688, IZ Am. Dec. In re Lloyd, 22 Fed. 90; Wood- 204; Hawk Eye Woollen Mills v. mansie v. Holcomb, 34 Kans. 35, 7 Conklin, 26 Iowa 422; Poole v. Se- Pac. 603; Allen v. Grissom, 90 N. ney, 66 Iowa 502, 24 N. W. 27; Car. 90; Phillips v. Trezevant, 67 Jones v. Lusk, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 356; N. Car. 370; Burns v. Harris, 67 Whitehead v. Chadwell, 2 Duv. N. Car. 140; Gallagher's Appeal. (Ky.) 432; Bank of Kentucky v. 114 Pa. St. 353, 4 Sad. (Pa.) 297, 7 Herndon, 1 Bush (Ky.) 359, 89 Am. Atl. 237, 60 Am. Rep. 350; Coover's Dec. 630; Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 9, 70 Am. Dec. Miss. 138. See, however, Menagh 149; York County Bank's Appeal, v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. 32 Pa. St. 446; Baker's Appeal, 21 Rep. 683. Pa. St. 76, 59 Am. Dec. 752; McNutt 'Allen v. Center Valley Co., 21 V. Strayhorn, 39 Pa. St. 269; Rice v. Conn. 130, 135, 54 Am. Dec. ZZZ, per Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. Church, C. J. 8l9 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. § 780 A simple contract creditor of a partnership can enforce his equity only when the partnership property is within the control of the court, and, in the course of administration, brought there by proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency, or by an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or by the creation of a trust in some other way. Neither the partners nor the creditors of the partnership have any specific lien, nor is there any trust that can be enforced until the property has passed in custodiam legis.® § 790. No equity of joint creditors in absence of joint property. — If there be no joint property there can be no equity in favor of joint creditors.^ Thus, where two persons entered into partnership under an agreement that one should have the exclusive ownership of the property until the other should contribute a certain sum of money, and before he did this a seperate creditor of the other partner levied an execu- tion upon the property, and afterwards a joint creditor levied upon the same goods, it was held that the separate execution creditor was entitled to the preference acquired by priority of seizure. The property was individual property. The part- ner who had not become entitled to an interest in the prop- erty had no lien upon it, and the joint creditors could work out no equity through him.^^ If the contract of partnership be of such a nature that the partners can not, as between themselves, enforce a lien upon the partnership funds for the payment of partnership liabili- ties, as where there is a community of goods between them, and they and their families are supported from the joint prop- SFitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. ^Case v. Beauregard, Sf) U. S. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; 119, 25 L. ed. 370; Scull's Appeal, Case V. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, 115 Pa. St. 141, 7 Atl. 588. 25 L. ed. 370, per Strong, J.; Saun- lOYork County Bank's Appeal, ders V. Reilly, 6 N. Y. St. 52; Aus- 2>2 Pa. St. 446; Baker's Appeal, 21 tin V. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519, 21 Pa. St. Id, 59 Am. Dec. 752. Blatch. (U. S.) 506, 66 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 87. § 791 LIENS. 820 erty without any account being kept by one as against the other, the partnership creditors can not enforce any such pre- ference.^^ And so, if property which has once been property of the partnership has been in good faith transferred by the partner- ship to an individual member of the firm or to a third person, the equities of the partners are extinguished, and consequent- ly the equities of the creditors of the partnership are at the same time extinguished. ^- § 791. Conveyance by one partner to the other. — One of two partners may extinguish all partnership equities by transferring his interest to the other, provided the property has not previously passed in custodia legis, and provided the transfer be made in good faith. ^" This has been the recog- nized rule ever since it was declared by Lord Eldon at the beginning of this century.^'* Where one partner transfers all his interest in the partner- ship property to the other, and is content with his personal undertaking to pay the partnership debts, the retiring part- ner has no longer any lien in equity upon the effects of the partnership, but the continuing partner may dispose of them as he chooses, and may transfer them in trust for the pay- ment of his own debts; and the partnership creditors can not follow these effects, to subject them to the payment of partnership debts. ^^ iiRice V. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Cornwell, 48 111. 64, 95 Am. Dec. Am. Dec. 54. And see York Coun- 516; Robb v. Mudge, 14 Gray ty Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. St. 446; (Mass.) 534; Kimball v. Thomp- Case V. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, son, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 283. See 25 L. ed. 370. cases collected by Mr. Corliss, 34 i2McDonald v. Beach, 2 Blackf. Alb. L. J. 346. (Ind.) 55. UEx parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119. iSFitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 i^Rankin v. Jones, 2 Jones' Eq. U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. (N. Car.) 169; Potts v. Blackwell, 369; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 4 Jones' Eq. (N. Car.) 58; White 119, 25 L. ed. 370. affd. 101 U. S. v. Griffin, 2 Jones' L. (N. Car.) 688. 25 L. ed. 1004; Hapgood v. 3; Allen v. Grissom, 90 N. Car. 821 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. § 792 Of a firm consisting of five members two withdrew, as- signing their interests to the remaining three, who agreed to pay the debts of the firm. Some time afterwards one of the remaining three sold his interest to the remaining two partners. The latter, after contracting debts, made an assignment of their partnership property to pay the debts of the last partnership. It was held that the creditors of the first and second partnerships had no right to claim any portion of the property assigned for the benefit of the credi- tors of the last partnership.^^ § 792. Transfer of one partner's interest to creditor. — One member of a partnership may, with the concurrence of his copartner, transfer in good faith his interest in the firm to any individual creditor, and a simple contract creditor of the firm can not mantain a bill to subject the property to the payment of his debt, although both the firm and the individual members of it were insolvent at the time of such transfer.^^ The transfer converts the partnership property into property held in severalty, or at least operates to termi- nate the equity of any partner to require the application of the partnership property to the payment of the joint debts. 90; Flack v. Charron, 29 Md. 311; attached. Conroy v. Woods, 13 Griffith V. Buck, 13 Md. 102; Jones Cal. 626, 72, Am. Dec. 605; Sedara v. V. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 422, 451; Williams, 4 McLean (U. S.) 51, Goembel v. Arnett, 100 111. 34; An- Fed. Cas. No. 12609; Bowman v. drews v. Mann, 31 Miss. 322; Spalding, 8 Ky. L. (abstract) 691, White V. Parish, 20 Tex. 688, 7Z 2 S. W. 911. Am. Dec. 204. In a few cases, how- i^Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 76. ever, it has been held that if one ^''^Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. partner buys out his copartners, 119, 25 L. ed. 370, afifd. 101 U. S. agreeing to pay the debts of the 688, 25 L. ed. 1004; Fitzpatrick v. firm, the partnership property re- Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. mains bound for the firm debts; 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; Woodmansie v. and the lien of the firm creditors Holcomb, 34 Kans. 35, 7 Pac. 603; upon such property is preferred Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 Miss. 597, to the Hen of an individual cred- 30 Am. Rep. 530. Some authorities itor of such remaining partner, hold, however, that if the firm is though the lien of the latter first insolvent at the time of such pay- § 793 LIENS. 822 The partnership creditor can sustain such bill only upon proof that the transfer was fraudulent. He has no specific claim upon the property, and there is no trust in his behalf which a court of equity can enforce. But a sale and transfer by one partner, without the asset and concurrence of his copartner, of all his interest in the partnership property to a trustee, to pay all his individual and partnership debts, does not divest or defeat the implied lien of the other partner upon the partnership property; but such implied lien continues till the partnership debts have been paid, and upon the insolvency of the partnership may be enforced by the partnership creditor. ^^ § 793. Partners may pay debts of individual member. — The partnership may pay the debts of individual members although it has not in fact sufficient assets to pay its liabili- ties in full, provided it remains in the exclusive possession and control of its assets, and acts in good faith. The mere inability of a partnership to pay its debts does not deprive the partners of their legal control of their property, and their right to sell and dispose of it as may seem just and proper.^^ If proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency are afterwards instituted by or against the firm, the validity of the appro- priation must be tested by statutes and rules regulating such proceedings.^*^ ment or transfer, it is fraudulent Patterson v. Seaton, 70 Iowa 689, and void as to existing creditors 28 N. W. 598; Keith v. Fink, 47 of the firm, and will be set aside III. 272. tinder insolvency proceedings, or isBank of Kentucky v. Herndon, at the suit of a creditor who has 1 Bush (Ky.) 359, 89 Am. Dec. 630. obtained a judgment against the i^Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. firm. Goodbar v. Gary, 16 Fed. 119, 25 L. ed. 370; Sigler v. Knox 316, 4 Woods (U. S.) 663; Wilson Gounty Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511. And V. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587, 589, 19 see Wilcox v. Kellogg, 11 Ohio 394. How. Prac. (N. Y.) 350; Menagh 20Nat. Bank of Metropolis v. V. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. 13, revd. 21 Rep. 683; Ransom v. Van Deven- N. J. Eq. 530; Schaeffer v. Fithian, ter, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 307. See 17 Ind. 463; Jones v. Lusk, 2 Mete. Saunders v. Reilly, 6 N. Y. 452; (Ky.) 356. 823 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. § 794 If, upon a dissolution of a partnership by mutual agree- ment, the members, honestly believing that the outstanding accounts and notes due the firm are sufficient to pay all its debts, divide the merchandise betw^een them, the title to this vests in the individual members, and one partner can not afterwards rescind such division, and compel a restoration of the goods, or the proceeds thereof, from another partner or from his assignee in insolvency, except for fraud.^^ § 794. Dissolution of partnership by death of a partner. — Upon the dissolution of a partnership by the death of one of its members, the survivor may pay his individual debts out of the assets, unless the intervention of the court is sought to v^ind up its afTairs. If no bill is filed by the representa- tives of the deceased partner, or by the firm creditors, asking a court of equity to wind up the business, marshal its assets, and apply them to the firm debts, the surviving partner may, in the absence of an actual intent to defraud, pay his individ- ual indebtedness with such assets.-^ If, in good faith, with the acquiescence of the personal representatives of the de- ceased partner, he uses the firm proprty to continue the business on his own account and in his name, he does it with- out other liability than to be held accountable to the estate of the deceased partner for a share of the profits. ^^ If the surviving partner continues the business under a new firm, no lien attaches upon the property of the new firm in favor of the creditors of the old firm, although the representatives of the deceased partner do not sanction the continuance of the business. The creditors of the new firm have priority of payment out of the property of the new firm, if the equities are administered in court. To prevent the 2iWhitworth v. Benbow, 56 Ind. v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1, 26 Am. Rep. 194. 631. 22Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 23Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. U. S. 648, 27 L. ed. 211, 1 Sup. Ct. 369; Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 369. Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530; Locke § 795 LIENS. 824 attaching of such new equities, the representatives of the de- ceased partner or the creditors of the old firm must stop the carrying on of the business, and obtain a winding up of the old firm.24 § 795. Levy of execution by creditor of member. — If the creditor of an individual partner levies an execution upon the partnership property, he acquires no interest thereby in the property itself as against the partnership, but only a lien upon the interest of the judgment debtor in the surplus remaining after all partnership debts and liens should be paid.^^ The corpus of the partnership property can not be taken and held upon a levy of such execution. And so in a sale by one member of a firm, to a person not a member, of his interest in the firm property, the purchaser takes no part of the corpus of the firm property, but only such interest as remains after the equities between the partners have been ad- justed and the firm debts paid.^® Even if all the members of a firm severally convey to different persons each his interest in the firm property, the purchasers do not take any of the corpus of the firm property, but only the interest of each part- ner after the firm debts are paid, and the equities between the partners adjusted.^' § 796. Legal title of real estate conveyed to partners. — When real property is conveyed to partners for the benefit of the firm, the legal title, which at common law would vest in the grantees as joint tenants, under the statutes in this country relative to joint tenancies, vests in them as tenants 24Payne v. Hornby, 25 Beav. 100; Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 9, 280; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 70 Am. Dec. 149. 26 L. ed. 585. 26 Saunders v. Reilly, 6 N. Y. St. 25Donellan v. Hardy, 57 Ind. 393; 452, 25 Cent. L. J. 201. Conroy v. Woods, 13 Cal. 626, IZ 27AIenagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. Am. Dec. 605; Chase v. Steel, 9 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683. See exam- Cal. 64; Jones v. Parsons, 25 Cal. ination of this case by Mr. Corliss, 34 Alb. L. J. 364. 825 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. § 797 in common. A purchaser or mortgagee who obtains the legal title to an undivided portion of partnership lands, with- out notice of the equitable rights of other partners in the property as a part of the funds of the partnership, is entitled to protection in courts of equity as well as in courts of law. But as between the partners themselves, such real estate is to be treated as the property of the firm, and subject to the equitable rights of the partners. It is chargeable with the debts of the partnership, and with any balance that may be due from one copartner to another upon the winding up of the affairs of the firm.^^ It is immaterial whether the title to real property be taken in the name of one partner or in the names of all the partners; if the property be purchased with partnership funds for partnership uses, it is in equity treated as partnership property, so far as it is necessary for the payment of the debts of partnership and the adjustment of the equities of the partners. ^^ § 797. Effect of notice on one dealing with individual member of firm. — But a purchaser or mortgagee dealing with an individual partner may be affected with notice of the partnership equities, so that any title he acquires to such property will be subject to such equities. ^"^ He has such notice if he is apprised of facts sufficient to put him on in- quiry, and to lead him by such inquiry to a discovery of the truth. Thus, if, while a mining partnership is engaged in working its mining grounds, one partner sells his interest in the mine, the purchaser will be deemed to buy with notice 28Shanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, 29Shanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, 26 L. ed. 635; Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 26 L. ed. 635; Smith v. Jones, 18 (Mass.) 562, 39 Am. Dec. 697; Nebr. 481, 25 N. W. 624. Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. soDuryea v. Burt, 28 Cal. 569; Y.) 165, 47 Am. Dec. 305; Duryea Whitmore v. Shiverick, 3 Nev. 288. V. Burt, 28 Cal. 569; Smith v. Evans, 1>] Ind. 526. § ygS LIENS. 826 of any lien from the relation of the partners to each other, and to the creditors of the partnership.^^ § 798. Character of partnership property impressed upon real estate. — The character of partnership property may be impressed upon real estate which has not been purchased with partnership funds, but which has been purchased and paid for by individual members of the partnership; as where such property has been purchased with a view to the forma- tion of the partnership, and has been, by agreement of the partners or by their acts, brought into the firm and used for its purposes.^^ Land transferred to two attorneys at law who are part- ners, to secure a debt due to the firm for professional services, is partnership property, and can not be subjected to the claims of the individual creditors of one of the firm until the part- nership debts are paid.^^ It was urged that the land could not be used in or appropriated to the firm business, and hence could not be treated as partnership property. The authorities are conflicting as to what is requisite to convert real estate into personalty for the purpose of a partnership. It is really a question of intention to be gathered from all the attending circumstances; but unless a contrary intention appears, it is presumed that partnership real estate is to be be treated as partnership assets. "It is unnecessary to review the numerous cases. To do so we would have to begin with the opinions of Lord Thurlow upon one side and those of Lord Eldon upon the other; and we shall content our- selves with saying, that we think the true principle, deducible from all of them, is, that if real property has been purchased with the firm means, and is held in the joint names of the partners as partnership property, then, in the absence of 3iDuryea v. Burt, 28 Cal. 569. ^spianagan v. Shuck, 82 Ky. 617, 32Roberts v. McCarty, 9 Ind. 16, 6 Ky. L. 699. 68 Am. Dec. 604; Duryea v. Burt, 28 Cal. 569. 827 PARTNERSHIP LIENS. § 799 any agreement between them to the contrary, it should be regarded at law as held and owned by them as tenants in common; but that in equity it should be treated as held by them in trust for the firm, subject to the rules applicable to partnership personal property, and liable to the debts of the firm, and the claims of each partner upon the others; and after these claims are satisfied, the residue of it, if any be left, will belong both at law and in equity to the partners as tenants in common, unless they have, by an agreement, either express or implied, impressed upon it the character of per- sonal property for all purposes. "^^ § 799. Sale of real estate by surviving partner. — Upon the dissolution of a firm by the death of one partner, the survivor can sell the partnership real estate ; and, though he can not transfer the legal title which passed to the heirs or devisees of the deceased partner, the sale vests the equi- table ownership in the purchaser, who can in a court of equity compel the holders of the legal title to convey it to himself.^^ The surviving partner has something more than an equitable lien, such as belongs to the representatives of the deceased partner, to require the application of such real estate to the payment of the debts of the firm and the settle- ment of the partnership accounts. "It is," in the language of Mr. Justice Miller,^^ an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. It is an interest in th^ property which courts of chancery will recognize and support. What is that right? Not only that the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so situated is appropriated to the 34Flanagan v. Shuck, 82 Ky. 617, Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 366; Dupuy v. 6 Ky. L. 699, per Holt, J. Leavenworth, 17 Cal. 262; An- 35Shanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, drews' Heirs v. Brown's Admr., 21 22, 26 L. ed. 635; Dyer v. Clark, 5 Ala. 437, 56 Am. Dec. 252. Mete. (Mass.) 562, 39 Am. Dec. seshanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, 697; Delmonico v. Guillaume, 2 22, 26 L. ed. 635. § 799 LIENS. 828 satisfaction of the partnership debts, but that for that pur- pose, and to that extent, it shall be treated as personal prop- erty of the partnership, and, like other personal property pass under the control of the surviving partner. This control ex- tends to the right to sell it, or so much of it as may be neces- sary to pay the partnership debts, or to satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner." CHAPTER XVII. SELLER'S LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY. Sec. Sec. 800. Lien of seller on goods sold. 816. 801. Part payment will not divest seller of his lien. 817. 802. Lien amounts to a special in- terest. 818. 803. Seller not bomid to deliver 819. on receiving notes of a third person. 820. 804. Seller's lien only for the and for charges. 821. 805. Exercising right of lien does not rescind the contract. 822. 806. Seller's lien depends on his retaining possession. 823. 807. Constructive delivery will not divest seller's right to 824. a lien. 808. Marking and setting aside 825. goods is not a delivery. 809. Qualified delivery will not 826. divest lien. 810. Only actual delivery will di- 827. vest the seller's lien. 811. No lien after fair delivery. 828. 812. When ownership passes the lien is not reserved by a mere agreement. 829. 813. Sale contract divests lien when possession is already in purchaser. 830. 814. Condition of sale is waived by delivery. 831. 815. Not every delivery of goods without insisting upon the performance of such con- 832. dition is absolute. 829 Retaining lien by special con- tract. Lien by contract is good only between the parties. No lien except by mortgage. Contract to mortgage is equitable lien. Property will not pass under conditional sale. Difficulty to determine what is change of possession. Where character of property is changed by purchaser. Delivery by warehouse re- ceipt. Delivery order differs from bill of lading. Warehouse receipt differs from a delivery order. Wharfinger's certificate not a title document. Vendor estopped from set- ting up his lien. Rule where warehouseman enters goods in purchaser's name. Seller not deprived of lien by notice of sale to ware- houseman. Possession by purchaser by fraud will not divest lien. Vendor not bound by order to warehouseman given by vendee. Warehouseman's charge will not affect vendor's lien. § 8oo LIENS. 830 Sec. Sec. 833. Seller loses lien by holding 845. goods as bailee for pur- chaser. 834. Delivery of part of goods 846. sold is not delivery of whole. 835. Goods sold must be sepa- 847. rated. 836. Rule sometimes stated. 837. Intention to separate goods 848. from other goods. 849. 838. Delivery of part only of goods sold w^ill not divest seller's lien. 850. 839. Lien of seller not affected by the puchaser pledging the 851. goods to a third person. 852. 840. Vendor may retain the part of the goods not delivered for whole bill. 853. 841. Sale by purchaser out of pos- session will not affect sell- er's lien. 854. 842. Estoppel of seller to assert a lien. 843. Estoppel of seller to assert 855. lien — Illustrations. 844. Estoppel of seller. 856. Seller's estoppel by represen- tations to the sub-purchas- er. Seller estopped by permitting vendee to assume to be owner. Seller retains lien in case of sale by vendee when he has not assented to the sale. Waiver of seller's lien. Seller waives lien by attach- ing the goods as the prop- erty of the purchaser. Giving of credit by seller generally waives his lien. Admissibility of evidence. Allowing credit not a waiver when seller retains posses- sion. Taking note no waiver of lien where seller keeps pos- session of goods. Taking negotiable note from buyer no waiver of seller's lien. Lien waived by delivery of goods sold at auction. Parol evidence admissible to show that goods were sold on credit. § 800. Lien of seller on goods sold. — A seller of goods has a lien upon them for the price, so long as they remain in his possession and the purchaser neglects to pay the price ac- cording to the terms of sale.^ "A lien for the price is inci- iParks v. Hall, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 206; Morse v. Sherman, 106 Mass. 430, per Colt, J.; Ras- kins V. Warren, 115 Mass. 514, per Wells, J.; Ware Riv- er R. Co. V. Vibbard, 114 Mass. 447; Clark v. Draper, 19 N. H. 419; Milliken v. Warren, 57 Maine 46; White V. Welsh, 38 Pa. St. 396; Wanamaker v. Yerkes, 70 Pa. St. 443; Barr v. Logan, 5 Harr. (Del.) 52; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 124 N. Y. 148, 26 N. E. 348; Carlisle v. Kin- ney, 66 Barb (N. Y.) 363; Corn- wall V. Haight, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 327, revd. 21 N. Y. 462; Southwestern Freight & Cotton Press Co. v. Stanard, 44 Mo. 71, 100 Am. Dec. «3i SELLERS LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY. 800 dent to the contract of sale, when there is no stipulation therein to the contrary; because a man is not required to 255, -Bradley v. Michael, 1 Ind. 551; Owens V. Weedman, 82 111. 409; Welsh V. Bell, 32 Pa. St. 12; Bohn Mfg. Co. V. Haynes 83 Wis. 388, 53 N. W. 684; Cragin v. O'Connell, 169 N. Y. 573, 61 N. E. 1128; Meyers V. McAllister, 94 Minn. 510, 103 N. W. 564. In a few states there are stat- utes declaring the seller's lien. Thus, in California, Idaho, North and South Dakota, and Oklahoma, it is provided that one who sells personal property has a special lien thereon, dependent on posses- sion, for its price, if it is in his possession when the price becomes payable, and may enforce his lien in like manner as if the property was pledged to him for the price. California: Civ. Code 1906, §3049; Idaho: Rev. Codes 1908, § 3444; Montana: Codes Ann. (Civ.) 1895, § 3933; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, § 6284; Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909, § 4140; South Dakota: Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, §2151. In Louisiana, the seller of mov- ables has a preference over the other creditors of the purchaser, whether the sale was made on credit or without, if the property still remains in the possession of the purchaser. The seller of agri- cultural products of the United States in New Orleans has a lien for five days only after the day of delivery, and may seize the same in whatsoever hands or place they may be found. This lien may be waived by a written order for delivery without the vendor's privilege. Rev. Civ. Code 19(X), arts. 3227-3231. See Gumbel v. Beer, 36 La. Ann. 484; Scannell v. Beau- vais, 38 La. Ann. 217; State Trust Co. V. De La Vergne Refriger- ating Mach. Co., 105 Fed. 468, 44 C. C. A. 556; Monroe Building & Loan Asso. v. Johnston, 51 La. Ann. 470, 25 So. 383; Payne v. Bu- ford, 106 La. 83, 30 So. 263. Under this statute the lien of a vendor of cotton, when enforced in five days, is superior to that of the holder for value of a bill of lading of the cotton. Harris v. Nicolopulo, 38 La. Ann. 12; Allen V. Jones, 24 Fed. 11. The pref- erence given a seller over other creditors cannot be enforced against a receiver in another state. New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Han- son 188 Fed. 638, 110 C. C. A. 452. See also, Carroll v. Swift, 129 La. 43, 55 So. 703. In Mississippi, the vendor of personal property has a lien thereon for the purchase-money while it remains in his hands or in the hands of one deriving titl* or possession through him with notice that the purchase-money was unpaid. Code 1906, § 3079. In New Jersey, notwithstanding that the property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the un- paid seller has a lien on the goods and a right to retain them. Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 4659, § 53. Tennessee: When merchants, factors, or cotton-brokers sell cot- ton, a special lien in behalf of the vendors for the purchase-money § 80I LIENS. 832 part with his goods until he is paid for him."^ In a leading case before the King's Bench, Bayley, J., upon this point said:^ "Where goods are sold and nothing is said as to the time of the delivery, or the time of payment, and everything the seller has to do with them is complete, the property vests in the buyer, so as to subject him to the risk of any accident which may happen to the goods, and the seller is liable to de- liver them whenever they are demanded upon payment of the price; but the buyer has no right to have possession of the goods till he pays the price. * * * jf ^j-^^ seller has dispatched the goods to the buyer, and insolvency oc- curs, he has a right in virtue of his original ownership to stop them in transitu. Why? Because the property is vested in the buyer, so as to subject him. to the risk of any accident ; but he has not an indefeasible right to the possession, and his insolvency, without payment of the price, defeats that right. And if this be the case after he has dis- patched the goods, and whilst they are in transitu, a fortiori, is it when he has never parted with the goods, and when no transitus has begun. The buyer, or those who stand in his place, may still obtain the right of possession if they will pay or tender the price, or they may still act upon their right of property if anything unwarrantable is done to that right." § 801. Part pa5nTient will not divest seller of his lien. — Part payment of the purchase-money, for goods sold for cash or on credit, does not divest the seller of his lien so long as he retains possession.* But payment in full for a severed exists for five days from and after 255; Milliken v. Warren, 57 Maine the day of sale or delivery thereof, 46; Clark v. Draper, 19 N. H. 419. unless the purchase-money be sBloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. sooner paid. Code 1896, § 3557. 941. To like effect, see Leonard 2 Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush v. Davis, 1 Black (U. S.) 476, 17 ^Mass.) 33, 39, 50 Am. Dec. 754, L. ed. 222; Burke v. Dunn, 117 per Shaw, C. J.; Southwestern Mich. 430, 75 N. W. 931. Freight & Cotton Press Co. v. Z, 13 N. E. 292. 64 Lord Chancellor Cottenham, delivering judgment in McEwan v. Smith. 2 H. L. Cas. 309, said: "It is said, that though the delivery note does not pass the property as a bill of lading would have passed it, by being indorsed over from one party to another, still it operates as an estoppel upon the party giving it, so far, at all events, as a third party is con- cerned; and it is argued that it is a kind of fraud for a person to give a delivery note which the person receiving it may use so as to impose upon a third person, and then to deprive that third per- son of its benefit. But that argu- ment is merely putting the argu- ment as to the effect of a delivery note in another form, and it as- sumes that such a document has all the effect of a bill of lading. But, as the nature and effects of these two documents are quite different from each other, it seems to me that such an argument has no foundation at all, and can not be adopted without converting a delivery note into a bill of lad- ing." *j" Farmiloe v. Bain, 1 C. P. D. 445. The delivery order in this case was as follows : "We hereby undertake to deliver to your or- der indorsed herein twenty-five tons merchantable sheet zinc off your contract of this date." Lind- ley, J., said : "The document amounts to no more than this, — 'You have a contract with me for the sale of certain zinc; and I am willing to deliver twenty-five tons off that contract, on the terms of that contract.' That clearly does not amount to a representation that Burrs & Co. [the vendee] were at liberty to transfer to § 824 LIENS. 854 before the Common Pleas Division, where a sub-vendee claimed that the vendor was estopped from setting up his right, all the judges said the order obviously contained no representation of any fact, and the sub-vendee had no right to rely upon it as a representation, and consequently he did not bring himself within the conditions of an estoppel. § 824. Delivery order differs from bill of lading. — A deliv- ery order differs materially in its eft'ects from a bill of lad- jj-^g.Gc fQj.^ while a delivery order does not divest the seller of possession until the order is accepted or actual possession is taken under it, the transfer of a bill of lading immediately divests the seller of possession, and consequently of his right of lien. But in England, by the recent Factors' Act, the transfer of a delivery order by a vendor to his vendee seems to have the same effect as the transfer of a bill of lading in defeating any vendor's lien, or right of stoppage in tran- situ. ^^ A bill of lading is an instrument of title representing the property, and the delivery of it by the vendor to the vendee passes the title and the right of possession. It of course im- plies that the actual possession of the goods represented has passed from the vendor to the carrier who has issued the bill of lading. Moreover, the delivery of the instrument of title is a complete legal delivery of the goods themselves. The vendor is consequently divested of his lien by the delivery of the bill of lading; but, as will hereafter be noticed, the ven- dor may, until the goods have come to the actual possession of the vendee, or he has transferred the bill of lading to a third person for value, intercept the goods in case the buyer becomes insolvent before paying the price. their vendees a property in the ^' Factors' Act 1877, 40 & 41 zinc which he himself did not pos- Vict. ch. 39, §4; Benjamin on sess." Sales (4th ed.), § 1207. 66 Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490. 855 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 826 § 825. Warehouse receipt differs from a delivery order. — A warehouse receipt or dock-warrant also differs materially from a delivery order. It is so far a document of title that the indorsement or transfer of it for value amounts to a de- livery of the goods represented, and divests the vendor of his lien.^^ In the case of Spear v. Travers,^^ decided in 1815, the gentlemen of the special jury observed that in practice the indorsed dock-warrants and certificates are handed from seller to buyer as a complete transfer of the goods. A warehouseman who has issued his own receipt to a pur- chaser is himself estopped from denying his liability for the goods to the holder of the receipt; and he is estopped al- though the goods have not been separated from others of the same kind.'^° § 826. Wharfinger's certificate not a title document. — A wdiarfinger's certificate, that certain goods are at the ven- dor's works ready for shipment, is not a document of title, and therefore the delivery of it does not pass the goods and divest the vendor of his right of lien as against either the vendee or a purchaser from him.'^^ In a case before the Court of Appeal in Chancery, it appeared that an iron manu- facturer had contracted to sell a large quantity of iron rails for shipment to Russia, and that in pursuance of the contract he delivered to the purchaser wharfinger's certificates to the effect that a certain number of tons of such rails were lying 68 Whitlock V. Hay, 58 N. Y. 484; pass the property in the goods Second Nat. Bank v. Walbridge, therein mentioned, was left an un- 19 Ohio St. 419, 424, 2 Am. Rep. decided question in Lucas v. Dor- 408; Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320, rien. 7 Taunt. 278; though Dallas, 89 Am. Dec. 350; Merchants' J., said that he felt no doubt on Bank v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 118, 11 the question. N. W. 834; Cochran v. Ripy, 13 69 4 Camp. 251. Bush (Ky.) 495; Davis v. Russell, 70 Adams v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 68; 52 Cal. 611, 28 Am. Rep. 647; Allen Goodwin v. Scannell, 6 Cal. 541. V. Maury, 66 Ala. 10. Whether an 7i Gunn v. Bolckow, L. R. 10, indorsement of the warrants of ch. 491. the West India Docks Co. would § 826 LIENS. 856 at the works of the manufacturer ready for shipment under the contract. The purchaser obtained advances on the se- curity of such certificates, and became insolvent before his acceptances for the price became due. The person who ad- vanced the money claimed the rails, on the grounds that the wharfinger's certificates were equivalent to warrants or documents of title, and passed both the right of property and the right of possession. But this claim was repudiated by the court. "A document of title," said Mellish, L. J., "is some- thing which represents the goods, and from which, either immediately or at some future time, the possession of the goods may be obtained. In this way a bill of lading repre- sents the goods while they are at sea, and by which, when the goods arrive at the port of destination, the possession of the goods may be obtained. So, also, a delivery order is an order for a delivery of the goods either immediately or at some future time; generally, immediately on the presentation of the delivery order, the party is entitled to the goods. Therefore it represents the goods. * * * Then it is said that there is a custom of the trade to treat these certificates as warrants. Now, in the first place, there is no evidence of such a custom. That these certificates are often pledged, and that, as between the party who pledges them and the party who advances money, they would be evidence of an equitable charge, is. I think, very probable. The iron trade, we know, is a very speculative trade. I dare say those who are en- gaged in it raise money in that way. But if the custom were proved, I cannot understand how any practice of raising money in that w^ay can affect the vendor's rights. The ven- dor, having agreed by his contract that he would give the wharfinger's certificate in order that the purchaser may have evidence that the goods have been actually made, and now are actually ready to be shipped, can not help giving the cer- tificate ; and how the fact of his giving that certificate, which does not profess to be negotiable, and does not profess to 857 SELLERS LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY. 827 require the delivery of the goods to order or to bearer, or anything of the kind, can affect his lien as vendor, merely because the purchaser chooses to borrow money on the faith of it, I am at a loss to conceive." § 827. Vendor estopped from setting up his lien. — But, by usage of a particular trade, a delivery warrant, without any- thing more, may be sufficient to estop the vendor from set- ting up his lien as against an assignee for value of such war- rant. Thus, where it was proved to be the custom of the iron trade in England to treat such a warrant as giving to the holder thereof title to the iron described, free from any claim by the vendor who gave the warrant for the purchase- money, it was held that the vendor could not set up his lien as against a pledgee of such warrant. ^- "i^ Merchants' Banking Co. v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 5 Ch. Div. 205. The warrant in this case was as follows : "The under- mentioned rails will not be deliv- ered to any party but the holder of this warrant. Stacked at the works, etc. Warrant for these rails deliverable (f. o. b.) to (pur- chasers), or to their assigns, by indorsement hereon." The vendor had already given to the purchaser an invoice of the goods with a similar warrant attached. Jessell, M. R., referring to the terms of the warrant, and to the fact that an invoice and warrant had al- ready been delivered, said : "The very form of the warrant shews the purpose. In my opinion, con- sidering that they had already given a document of title which was quite clear and independent and satisfactory to the purchaser, this was something they were is- suing for a dififerent purpose. * * * On these two grounds I am in the plaintiff's favour, first, on account of the general custom of the trade, and, secondly, because I think you must impute to the Defendant company special notice and spe- cial knowledge that the warrant was intended to be used for some such purpose, and, having that knowledge they issued the docu- ment in this particular form, for it is inconceivable for what pur- pose it could have been used ex- cept that for which it was actu- ally used, including, of course, the selling as well as pledging the goods. I have in this case the distinction, that the company pur- posely issued a second document of title with a view of its being used for a special purpose. On those grounds I think the company are not entitled to set up in this case the vendor's lien at all against the plaintiffs." § 828 LIENS. 858 § 828. Rule where warehouseman enters goods in purchas- er's name. — There is an actual change of possession under a delivery order where the warehouseman has entered the goods in the name of the purchaser, though the goods them- selves are not moved from their place. When a delivery or- der has been lodged with the warehouse keeper in w^hose warehouse the goods lie, whether this be the vendor's ware- house or belongs to another, and the warehouseman has transferred the goods in his books into the name of the pur- chaser, the vendor's lien is gone. From that moment the warehouseman becomes the bailee of the purchaser, and the delivery is as complete as if the goods had been delivered into his hands. ^^ And so, if the warehouseman, on receiving an order from the vendor to hold the goods on account of the purchaser, gives a written acknowledgment that he so holds them, he cannot set up, as a defense for not delivering them to the purchaser, that by the usage of that particular trade the property in them is not transferred till it is remeas- ured, and that, before they were remeasured, the purchaser became insolvent. By the acknowledgment the warehouse- man attorned to the purchaser.'^ Even the verbal assent of the warehouseman to the order, upon the purchaser's communicating it to him, will effect a change of possession without an actual transfer of the goods in his books to the name of the purchaser.^^ § 829. Seller not deprived of lien by notice of sale to ware- houseman. — But a mere notice of a sale given to a ware- houseman, or other bailee in possession of the goods, does not generally deprive the seller of his lien; but the bailee must enter into some obligation with the vendee, or recog- 73 Harman V. Anderson, 2 Camp. "* Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 242; Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. 344; Hawes v. Watson, 2 B. & C. (Mass.) 33, 39, SO Am. Dec. 754, 540; Gosling v. Birnie, 7 Bing. 339; per Shaw, C. J.; Parker v. Byrnes, Holl v. Griffen, 10 Bing. 246. 1 Lowell 539, Fed. Cas. 10728. "5 Lucas v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278. 859 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 830 nize him in some way, so that he shall become his bailee in- stead of the vendor's baileeJ*^ "Notice may be enough to pnt him on his guard, and to render him liable to an action if* he does anything inconsistent with the notice; and a notice silently received may be evidence of acquiescence, and it may even be conclusive evidence thereof, by way of estoppel, if third persons have been misled; but, as between the vendor and vendee, I understand that the possession is not changed until the warehouseman has in some way acknowledged the change, and has become the agent of the vendee. In the analogous law of stoppage in transitu, the carrier who re- ceives goods very often has notice that the consignee has bought them, and is in fact their owner, and he is notified and directed to deliver to the vendee ; but until he has either delivered them, or changed his relation in some way so as to become the exclusive agent of the vendee, they may be stopped, if the occasion arises. In short, such an order is revocable in the case of the failure of the vendee, unless it has been acted on."'^''' § 830. Possession by purchaser by fraud will not divest lien.— Possession under a delivery order obtained by artifice or mistake does not divest the seller of his lien. Thus a seller of certain casks of oil directed the wharfinger to trans- fer them to the purchaser's name, and he accordingly did so, and gave to the seller a transfer order addressed to the pur- chaser, acknowledging that he held the goods for him. The seller thereupon, through his clerk, offered the transfer order to the buyer, and demanded payment, which he was entitled to upon delivery. The buyer refusd to make payment, but retained the transfer order. The seller immediately gave no- tice to the wharfinger not to deliver the oil. but the latter, in defiance of the order, afterward delivered it to the buyer. In "6 In re Batchelder, 2 Lowell "' In re Batchelder, 2 Lowell (U. S.) 245, 247, Fed. Cas. No. (U. S.) 245, Fed. Cas. No. 1099. per 1099. Lowell, J. § 831 LIENS. 860 trover by the seller for the oil, it was held that neither the property nor the right of possession passed to the buyer.'^^ "There is no doubt upon the authorities," said Williams, J., "that, if that transfer order had been delivered to the buyer, and he had carrier it to the wharfinger, and the latter had consented to hold the oil therein specified for him, or if, after the order had been left with the wharfinger by the seller's clerk, the wharfinger had communicated it to the buyer, and the latter had assented to it either tacitly or explicitly, that would have constituted a complete transfer, inasmuch as the transaction would amount to an arrangement between the three — the vendor, the wharfinger, and the vendee, — that the oil should remain in the wdiarfinger's hands as the agent of the vendee. It is impossible to say that the facts here show that any arrangement of that kind was come to. The per- son who took the order from the wharfinger to the vendee was induced to part with it by a species of force. I am clearly of opinion that the property in the oil, notwithstanding what took place, remains in the plaintiff." § 831. Vendor not bound by order to warehouseman given by vendee. — Of course a delivery order upon a warehouse- man, given, not by the owner in whose name the goods are stored, but by his vendee, does not make a constructive de- livery as between such vendee and a subvendee, so as to put an end to the first vendee's lien for the price.'^^ § 832. Warehouseman's charge will not affect vendor's lien. — A charge of warehouse rent by the seller upon the goods left in his possession, and stored in his own ware- house, does not affect his right of lien for the unpaid pur- chase-money ;^^ though a payment of such rent by a sub- 's Godts V. Rose, 17 C. B. 229. C. 941 ; Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. 79 Lackington v. Atherton, 7 M. Gas. 319; Winks v. Hassall, 9 B. & & G. 360. C. 2)12\ Hammond v. Anderson, 1 80 Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. B. & P. (N. R.) 69. 504; Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & 86 1 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 833 vendee for the whole of the goods, and acceptance of the same by the seller, would rightly be regarded as a delivery of the whole. ^^ But if the warehouse rent is not actually paid, but only charged, such charge amounts to a notification by the seller to the purchaser that he is not to have the goods until he has paid, not only the price of the goods, but also the rent.^'*^ And so, if a subvendee pays the worehouse rent upon part of the goods upon receiving such part, upon an order from the original vendee, the vendor's lien upon the remainder of the goods is not affected. His control and lien remain entire over the whole until the delivery of the part. It is, however, divisible, and, when part is taken away, the lien remains on the goods which were not delivered, and for which the warehouse rent has never been paid.^^ § 833. Seller loses lien by holding goods as bailee for pur- chaser, — A seller loses his lien by giving an acknowledgment that he holds the goods as bailee for the purchaser. In a case where a negotiable note was taken for the price of goods sold, the seller at the time gave the buyer a certificate that he held them for the seller upon storage. Afterwards the buyer verbally offered to cancel the sale if the seller would surrender the note. He agreed to this, but the note having been discounted at a bank, he did not tender the note till sev- eral days afterward. In the meantime the buyer had as- signed the goods to certain of his creditors, informing them, however, of the conversation in regard to cancelling the sale. These assignees brought an action of trover against the seller for the goods, whereupon it w^as held that the property vested in the buyer, and that the seller had no lien for the price of the goods. ^^ The contract to cancel the sale was 81 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. S3 Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 452. 504. 513, per Bayley, B. 82 Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 84 Chapman v. Searle, 3 Pick. 504, 514, per Bayley, B. (Mass.) 38. § 834 LIENS. 862 conditional; and, as a resale of the goods, it was void by the statute of frauds, the value of the goods being more than fifty dollars. ^ 834. Delivery of part of goods sold is not delivery of whole. — A delivery of a part of the goods sold does not oper- ate as a delivery of the whole, so as to destroy the vendor's lien, or right of stoppage in transitu, unless there be some- thing to show that the parties intended that such delivery of a part should be equivalent to a delivery of the whole.®^ Upon this point Willis, J., has well stated the modern doc- trine: "There have been different expressions of opinion at various times as to whether the delivery of a portion of the goods, the subject of an entire contract, operates as a con- structive delivery of the whole, so as to put an end to the right of stopping in transitu. It was supposed to have been thrown out by Taunton, J., that a delivery of part operated as a constructive delivery of the whole; but that doctrine has since been called in question and dissented from; and it is now held that the delivery of part operates as a constructive delivery of the whole only where the delivery of part takes place in the course of the delivery of the whole, and the tak- ing possession by the buyer of that part is the acceptance of constructive possession of the whole. "^^ § 835. Goods sold must be separated. — When part of a quantity of goods is sold, there can be no delivery until the part sold is separate or set apart for the purchaser. Thus, if a thousand bushels of corn, part of a larger quantity lying in bulk, be sold, no title passes until separation of this part is 85 Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. Div. Daly (N. Y.) 93; McElwee v. Met- 68, citing Bolton v. Lancashire & ropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302, Yorkshire R. Co., (L. R. 1 C. P. 16 C C. A. 232. 431) ; Bunney v. Poyntz. 4 B. & Ad. «« Bolton v. Lancashire & York- 568; Payne v. Shadbolt, 1 Camp. shire R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 431, 440. 427; Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 863 SELLERS LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY. 836 made in some form.^' But if in such case the grain be stored in an elevator, and the seller delivers to the buyer an order on the proprietor of the elevator or upon the v^arehouseman, and the buyer presents the order to the proprietor or w^are- houseman, and the latter agrees thenceforw^ard to hold that quantity for the buyer, a valid title with constructive posses- sion is acquired by the buyer, and the seller's lien is de- feated.^^ Trees lying on the land of a third person were sold, the purchaser having the privilege of removing them when he pleased. He marked the trees, ascertained their cubical con- tents, and removed some of them. It was held that the tiansfer of the whole was complete, and that, upon the bank- ruptcy of the purchaser, the vendor could not enforce any lien upon the portion not removed.^^ § 836. Rule sometimes stated. — The rule has sometimes been stated to be that the delivery of part of the goods sold on an entire contract is a virtual delivery of the whole, and vests in the purchaser the entire property;^*' so stated, sub- s' Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490. 88 Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490, per Wells, J.; Gushing v. Breed, 14 Allen (Mass.) Zn, 92 Am. Dec. 111. 89 Tansley v. Turner, 2 Bing. N. Gas. 151 ; and see Ex parte Gwynne, 12 Ves. 379; Gooper v. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722. 90 Slubey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504; Hammond v. Anderson, 1 B. & P. (N. R.) 69. Pollock, G. B., referring to these two cases in Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28, Zl, says they are the only ones, so far as he has observed, which bear the semblance of an authori- ty that a mere part delivery is sullicient to put an end to the ven- dor's lien, or his rights to stop- page in transitu. In Ex parte Gooper, 11 Gh. Div. 68, Brett, L. J., said, with reference to these two cases : "It seems to me that in the former case the ground of decision was that the captain of the ship had altered his position from that of a mere carrier, and had undertaken, with the consent of the assignees of the bill of lad- ing, to hold the whole of the car- go for them; and, in the latter case the wharfinger, who for a time had held for the persons who had put the goods into his hands, had altered his position, and, with the consent of the person to whom the goods were transferred, had agreed to hold them no longer 837 LIENS. 864 ject, however, to qualifications, depending upon the terms of the particular contracts and the intention of the parties. "As. for instance," says Judge Wilde,^^ "if goods are sold by weight or measure, and a part is weighed or measured and delivered, and a part not, the property in the goods not weighed or measured still remains in the vendor ;^^ or if any- thing remains to be done by the vendor before delivery as to the part not delivered;'^" or if a part is retained by the vendor until the price shall be paid; or if the goods are to be paid for on delivery, and a part only is paid for and delivered. In all these cases the property in the part not delivered will not vest in the vendee." § 837. Intention to separate goods from other goods. — The rule as above stated applies only where there was no in- tention to separate the particular part delivered from the re- mainder. In that case the incipient or inchoate delivery will amount to a determination of the vendor's lien. Chief Baron Pollock, reviewing the early cases upon this point, says of the leading case of Slubey v. Heyward,^"* that the part de- livery of the cargo was in truth a delivery of the whole cargo, for each part was taken away with the intention to take pos- session of the whole, and not to separate the part that was for the person who had put them into his hands, but for the vendee. In both cases there was an attorn- ment by the person who held the goods, and unless something- equivalent to an attornment is shown on the part of the carrier, so that he has altered his position from that of carrier, and holds them in another capacity, it seems to me the transitus can not be at an end." Parks v. Hall, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 206; Ex parte Gwynne, 12 Ves. 379. 01 Parks V. Hall, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 206. ^•2 Citing Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614. 93 Citing Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857; Young v. Austin, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 280; Merrill v. Hunnewell, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 213; Riddler v. \'arnum, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 280. 94 2H. Bl. 504. Lord Tenterden, referring to this case in Bunney V. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568, 571. says that that was "the delivery of part 865 SELLER S LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY. 837 delivered from the remainder. In Jones v. Jones,^^ also, the vendee, who was an assignee under a trust deed, took pos- session of part of a cargo, with the intention of obtaining possession of the whole, for the purposes of the trust, and therefore such taking possession of a part put an end to the transaction. In illustration of this rule may be mentioned a case which turned upon the legal effect of a partial delivery of a cargo of wheat. Bills of lading of the wheat were transmitted by the seller to the purchaser, whose assignee, upon the arrival of the ship, received delivery of part of the cargo, when the vendor ordered the master not to deliver the residue. The court held that the vendor had no authority to countermand his order of delivery, for a delivery of a part was the delivery of the whole, there appearing to be no intention, either previ- ous to or at the time of the delivery, to separate part of the cargo from the rest.^^ of the cargo, made in the prog- ress of, and with a view to, the delivery of the whole." 95 8 M. & W. 431; in Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. Div. 68, 11, Lord Justice Cotton, referring to this case, said: "It looks at first a little more like one which supports the general proposition which is put forward. But when it is examined it amounts only to this, that the court came to the conclusion as a matter of fact that there was an intention to take the whole when part only was actually taken; and, that being so, it is only an au- thority that where a purchaser taking part shows an intention, ac- quiesced in by the carrier, to re- ceive and take possession of the whole, that is a constructive pos- session of the whole by the acqui- 55 escence of both parties. It does not in any way support the propo- sition that the mere delivery of a part of the cargo, as in the pres- ent case, can be looked upon as a constructive delivery of the whole or as putting the consignee in con- structive possession of the whole so as to defeat the vendor's right to stop in transitu, or the right of the consignee, if he so desires un- der the circumstances, to put an end to the contract." 96 Slubey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504. In Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & El. 57, IZ, Taunton, J., in reply to counsel, who asserted that a delivery of a part amounted to a delivery of the whole only when the circumstances showed that it was meant as such, said : "No ; on the contrary, a partial delivery is a delivery of the whole, unless § 838 LIENS. 866 § 838. Delivery of part only of goods sold will not divest seller's lien.— A\'herever an intention appears to separate a part of the goods from the residue, delivery of a part only will not divest the seller's lien upon such residue.^^ If, for instance, goods be sold to be paid for on delivery, and the seller, as a favor, allows the purchaser to carry away part of them without payment, there is no waiver of the condition, but the seller is entitled at any time to assert his rights, and detained the remainder of the goods until payment is made according to the terms of the sale. Such a delivery of a part is a separation of that part from the whole bulk, and not an inchoate delivery of the whole.®® A vendee taking possession of a part of the goods sold, not meaning thereby to take possession of the whole, but to separate that part, and to take possession of that part only, puts an end to the vendor's lien only with respect to that part and no more; and the right of lien and the right of stop- page in transitu on the remainder still continue.®^ § 839. Lien of seller not affected by the purchaser pledg- ing the goods to a third person. — If during the delivery of goods sold, and before it is completed, the purchaser sells or pledges them to a third person, without the knowledge of the original vendor, the lien of the latter is not afifected. Thus, where a raft of lumber upon the Hudson River was sold to be paid for on delivery upon the dock of a lumber dealer at circumstances show that it is not Hams v. Moore, 5 N. H. 235; Buck- so meant." This dictum is ques- ley v. Furniss, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) tioned by Pollock, C. B., in Tan- 504; Haskell v. Rice, 11 Gray ner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28, Zl. 97 Valpy V. Oakley, 16 Q. B. 941 Griffiths V. Perry, 1 El. & El. 680 Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504: Leonard v. Sheard, 1 El. & El 667, per Crompton, J. ; Hanson v Meyer, 6 East 614; Bunney v Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568, 571; Wil- (Mass.) 240; Wanamaker v. Yerkes, 70 Pa. St. 443. 98 Dixon V. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313, per Parke, J. ; Townley v. Crump, 5 Nev. & M. 606. 99 Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28, 38, per Pollock, C. B. 867 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 841 Albany, after nearly all the lumber had been taken from the water and piled upon the dock, the seller, having learned that the buyer had absconded, forbade the piling of any more of it upon the dock. When part of the lumber had been piled upon the dock, the buyer obtained an advance upon it from the owner of the dock, and the latter claimed title to the lumber. But it was held that the vendor was entitled to the lumber by virtue of his lien. The court said that the sale was of the whole raft to be delivered upon the dock, that the vendor had no right to demand payment of any part until the whole was delivered, and that, being present to demand payment as soon as the whole should be placed upon the dock, he had not lost his lien.^ § 840. Vendor may retain the part of the goods not deliv- ered for whole bill. — The vendor may retain the goods still in his hands, not only for the price of such goods, but also for the price of any part of the goods already delivered.^ The insolvency of the purchaser does not put an end to the con- tract of sale, but, if the insolvent has any beneficial inter- est under it, it is the right of his assignee, in behalf of his creditors, to complete the contract by paying the remainder of the unpaid purchase-money. The assignee cannot, how- ever, claim damages for the nondelivery of an instalment of the goods sold, without tendering payment not only of the price of that, but also of the unpaid price of a prior instal- ment already delivered. § 841. Sale by purchaser out of possession will not affect seller's lien. — A purchaser who has not obtained possession cannot defeat the seller's lien by making a sale to another person.*^ The purchaser without possession can confer no better title than he has himself. An invoice of the goods 1 Palmer v. Hand, 13 Johns. (N. 289. Y.) 434, 7 Am. Dec. 392. 3 Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313. 2 Ex parte Chalmers, L. R. 8 Ch. § 842 LIENS. 868 without actual possession, or a delivery order which shows his right of possession, does not enable the purchaser to con- fer a title upon another as against the seller's lien.^ A resale of the goods to a third person by the first pur- chaser does not affect the rights of the unpaid vendor, unless he has in some way estopped himself from asserting them, as against the subpurchaser,^ A bill of lading in the hands of the purchaser enables him to sell and confer a title upon a purchaser from him. But a vendor may preserve his lien by consigning goods to an agent or bailee instead of the purchaser, and taking a bill of lading to the vendor's own order. Then, upon the arrival of the goods at their destination, the bailee may take possession of them and hold them until payment is made. If, in such case, the vendor draws against the goods and obtains a dis- count of his draft upon a pledge of the bill of lading, and, the purchaser having become insolvent, the pledgee attaches the goods, upon their arrival at their destination, as the pur- chaser's goods, such attachment will have no effect upon the lien of the vendor, but he may pay the draft, and by virtue of his lien replevy the goods from the attaching officer.^ § 842. Estoppel of seller to assert a lien. — The unpaid seller may by his acts or declarations estop himself from claiming his lien as against a subpurchaser.'^ Thus, timber lying at the owner's wharf was sold and marked with the initials of the buyer, who gave his acceptances on time for the price. Before the acceptances became due, the buyer 4 Dixon V. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; 58; Haskell v. Rice, 11 Gray Ware River R. Co. v. Vibbard, 114 (Mass.) 240; Hamburger v. Rod- Mass. 447; Hamburger v. Rodman, man, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 93. 9 Daly (N. Y.) 93; Vogelsang v Fisher, 128 Mo. 386, 28 S. W. 873 5 Craven v. Ryder, 6 Taunt. 433 Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504: Farmeloe v. Bain, 1 C. P. Div. 445 Townley v. Crump, 4 Ad. & El c Seymour v. Newton, 105 Mass. 272. 7 Stoveld v. Hughes, 14 East 308; Parker v. Crittenden, 2)7 Conn. 148; McElmee v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302, 16 C. C. A. 232. 869 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 843 sold all the timber except a small part which had been deliv- ered to him. The last purchaser notified the original vendor of his purchase, who answered, "Very well;" and the pur- chaser went with him to the wharf, and there marked the timber with his own initials, and directed the vendor to send no more of the timber to the original vendee. Upon the in- solvency of the latter, it was held that the vendor could not retain the lumber against the last purchaser.^ Lord El- lenborough, referring to the assent of the vendor to the last purchase in saying "Very well," and in making no objection to the marking of the timber in the name of the last pur- chaser, said: "If that be not an executed delivery, I know not what is so." The other judges also declared that there was an express assent to such transfer of the lumber, and that the seller could not retain it. § 843. Estoppel of seller to assert lien — Illustrations. — A purchaser of barley, which was in the seller's warehouse, re- sold a part of it, and gave to the purchaser a delivery order addressed to the station-master. The second purchaser sent this order to the station-master, saying, "Please confirm this transfer." The station-master showed the delivery order to the seller, who still had possession of the barley, and he said, "All right. When you get the forwarding note I will put the barley on the line." The first purchaser became bankrupt, and the seller refused to deliver the grain. The Court of Queen's Bench held that the seller was estopped by his state- ment to the station-master from denying that the property had passed to the second purchaser; for, by making such statement, he induced the plaintiff to rest satisfied under the belief that the property had passed, and so to alter his posi- tion by abstaining from demanding back the money which he had paid to his vendor.^ 8 Stoveld V. Hughes, 14 East 308. » Knights v. Wiffen, L. R. 5 Q. For a similar case, see Chapman B. 660. For similar cases, see V. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413. Woodley v. Coventry, 2 H. & C. § 844 LIENS. 870 A case not distinguishable from the foregoing was decided upon the same grounds by the Court of Appeals of New York. A purchaser of a quantity of cotton in store pledged the invoice, and gave to the pledgee an order upon the ware- houseman. The pledgee presented the order to the ware- houseman, who, with the consent of the vendor, gave to the pledgee the ordinary warehouse receipt for the cotton. Three days afterward the purchaser of the cotton failed, without having paid for it. It was held that the seller was estopped from claiming the cotton as against the pledgee, because the latter had a right to rely upon the warehouse receipt. Had the pledgee not obtained the warehouse receipt, he might have resorted to some process to recover the loan, or to se- cure some indemnity against loss.^^ § 844. Estoppel of seller. — A seller is estopped from set- ting up his lien, as against a purchaser from his vendee, by recognizing such purchaser's delivery order, and delivering several parcels to him without objection. Thus, sugar lying in the seller's warehouse was sold, and the buyer's accept- ances taken in payment. The buyer resold the sugar, and gave a delivery order to the purchaser, who handed it to the original vendor, and received from him a part of the sugar. Afterward this purchaser, on several occasions, gave his own delivery orders on the vendor for portions of the goods. Be- fore the acceptances became due, the first purchaser became insolvent, and the vendor refused to deliver the remainder of the goods to the last purchaser. It was held that he could not detain the goods; that, by accepting his buyer's delivery order without making claim to any lien upon the goods, he had recognized the second purchaser as having the right of property and of possession of the goods, and that he could not set up any lien upon the goods as against such pur- 164'; Pooley v. Great Eastern R. 113, citing and approving Knights Co., 34 L. T. (N. S.) 537. v. Wiffen, L. R. 5 Q. B. 660. lOVoorhis v. Olmstead, 66 N. Y. 871 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 845 chaser.^ ^ Lord Campbell, C. J., said: "The title of the pur- chaser being once acknowledged by the warehouseman, the purchaser has a right to treat the warehouseman as his agent ; and the latter cannot afterward set up a right in re- spect of a third party. The right claimed by the vendor is analogous to a right of stoppage in transitu; and, as to that, there are many cases in which it has been decided that, after the first vendor has parted with the possession of the goods to the second vendee, and acknowledged his title, he cannot afterward stop them in transitu on account of any claim against the first vendee." § 845. Seller's estoppel by representations to the subpur- chaser. — In such cases the result is the same, whether the jdbvendee has paid his purchase-money before or after the acts or representations of the vendor which estop him, as against such subvendee, from setting up his lien. If at the time of such acts or representations the subvendee has not paid the price of the goods, but in consequence of such acts or representations he alters his position by paying the price either wholly or in part, the vendor is held to be bound by his acts or declarations.^^ If at the time of such acts or declarations the subvendee has already paid the price of the goods, nevertheless his position may be altered thereby; for he may be induced to rest satisfied that the property had passed to him, and would take no steps to demand back the money he had paid to the first purchaser before he became bankrupt. If once the fact is established that the subvendee's position is altered by relying upon the acts or declarations of the vendor, and taking no further steps, the latter is es- topped, just as he is in the case first stated. ^^ 11 Pearson v. Dawson, EL, Bl. & i3 Knights v. Wiffen, L. R. 5 Q. El. 448. B. 660. See Stonard v. Dunkin, 12 Woodley v. Coventry, 2 H. & 2 Camp. 344; Hawes v. Watson, 2 C. 164. B. & C. 540. § 846 LIENS. 872 § 846. Seller estopped by permitting vendee to assume to be owner. — If the owner of goods in any way allows them to be so situated that a stranger has a right to assume that the title is in another, and on the faith of such indicia of owner- ship deals with the apparent owner, the true owner is es- topped from asserting his title. ^'^ But in such case it is an essential part of the estoppel that the third party dealt with the apparent owner on the faith of the indicia of ownership with which the owner has invested him. The owner is not estopped if he has not invested another with any indicia of ownership, and no third party has in consequence parted with his money or assumed any liability. Thus, where one sold wheat to be paid for on delivery on a car at a railroad station, and the buyer, before any wheat had been placed on board the car, by false representations obtained from the railroad company a bill of lading of the wheat, and afterward the seller of the wheat, without any knowledge of the fraudu- lent act of the buyer, put the wheat into the car, it was held that he had not delivered the wheat, but that he had the right to move it if the price were not paid, both as against the railroad company and as against the buyer.^^ If a seller remaining in possession of the goods shows them to a third person as the goods of the vendee without claiming any lien upon them, and such third person thereupon buys the goods of the vendee and pays for them, the seller may be 14 Marsh v. Titus, 3 Hun (N. Y.) his contract from record and can 550, 6 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 29. not enforce his reserved lien as Where a contract providing for the against creditors who extended sale of growing timber and reserv- the purchaser credit on the ing a lien thereon for purchase- strength of his ownership of such money is withheld from record so timber. Clark v. B. B. Richards as to give the purchaser credit and Lumber Co., 68 Minn. 282, 71 N. such purchaser thereafter becomes W. 389. indebted and insolvent, the seller ^^ Toledo, Wabash & Western acts fraudulently in withholding R. Co. v. Gilvin, 81 111. 511. 873 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 848 estopped as against him from asserting his lien upon the sub- sequent insolvency of the vendee.^'' § 847. Seller retains lien in case of sale by vendee when he has not assented to the sale. — But the seller retains his lien as against a subpurchaser if he has in no way assented to or induced the resale. Logs were sold on credit, with an agreement that they should remain in the seller's yard for a certain time, free of storage, the purchaser being free to send for them whenever he pleased. At the request of the pur- chaser, and to enable him to resell, an invoice containing an enumeration of the measurement of the logs was delivered to him by the seller. Subsequently the purchaser resold the logs to one who paid him the price in cash, without having seen the bill given by the original vendor, or having com- municated with the latter in any way respecting the owner- ship of the logs; although before such resale he was seen by one of the original vendors in the yard, engaged in an exami- nation of the logs, in company with the original purchaser. Part of the logs were delivered on a verbal order of the origi- nal purchaser, who shortly afterward failed. It was held that the lien of the vendor attached to the logs remaining in his possession; and as the resale did not appear to have been made with his knowledge or approval, nor in any way induced by him, the case did not come within the application of the rule that, where one of two innocent persons must sufTer by the act of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must himself bear it.^" § 848. Waiver of seller's lien. — A vendor's lien is waived when the parties make any agreement inconsistent with the i'5 Hunt! V. Bowne, 2 Caines (N. giving such privilege, if the ven- Y.) 38. dor permits it to be sold in a con- 1'^ Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly fused mass with other things. (N. Y.) 93, 9 Rep. 417. But the Payne v. Buford, 106 La. 83, 30 vendor will lose his privilege on So. 263. machinery sold under a statute § 849 LIENS. 874 existence of such lien, or from which a waiver may be fairly inferred. ^^ There may be an actual waiver of the lien, and yet the court may not be justified in finding a waiver as a matter of law. In ordinary cases, where the contract of sale and the agreement of the parties made in connection with it are merely verbal, the question should be submitted to the jury whether the lien was intended and understood by the parties to be waived or not. And so, if any agreement not in writing is made after the sale afifecting the lien, the jury should find, from this and all the attendant circumstances, what the understanding of the parties was concerning it.^^ § 849. Seller waives lien by attaching the goods as the property of the purchaser. — A seller of goods waives his lien by attaching them as the property of the purchaser, in a suit against him. The attachment is an affirmance of the sale and delivery under it.^^ But a suit by the seller against the pur- chaser for the price of the goods, where these have remained in the seller's possession, is no waiver of the lien.^^ An ad- mission or averment in the petition that the goods had been delivered is not conclusive against the seller when in fact he had retained possession, but was ready to deliver possession upon payment of the price.^^ § 850. Giving of credit by seller generally waives his lien. — The giving of credit by the seller generally defeats his right of lien; for, on a promise to pay at a future time, the buyer, in the absence of any special agreement to the contrary, is entitled to the immediate possession of the goods, and he may enforce this right by action. ^^ Accordingly, the taking 18 Pickett V. Bullock, 52 N. H. 21 Rhodes v. Mooney, 43 Ohio. 354. St. 421, 4 N. E. 233. 19 Pickett V. Bullock, 52 N. H. 22 Rhodes v. Mooney, 43 Ohio 354, per Sargent, C. J. St. 421, 4 N. E. 233. 20 Heller v. Elliott, 45 N. J. L. 23 Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C. B. 564; Leavy v. Kinsella, 39 Conn. 212; Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & 50. S. 180; Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 8/5 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 851 of a promissory note or bill of exchange payable at a future day, for the price of the goods sold, operates as a bar to the vendor's right of lien. The giving of a credit of any kind for the price of the goods sold implies the right of the buyer to take them away into his own actual possession; and when he exercises this right, the vendor's right of lien is gone, this being a right incident to the possession. "If goods are sold upon credit, and nothing is agreed upon as to the time of de- livering the goods, the vendee is immediately entitled to the possession, and the right of possession and the right of prop- erty vest at once in him; but his right of possession is not absolute, it is liable to be defeated if he becomes insolvent before he obtains possession."^* § 851. Admissibility of evidence. — Whether evidence is ad- missible of a usage in a particular trade, that the seller is not bound to deliver goods without payment, in case a term of credit is given by a written contract of sale not ambiguous in its language, is a question upon which there has been some diversity of opinion. Thus, where thirty bales of goats' wool were sold, "to be paid for by cash in one month, less five per cent, discount," it was held that the vendee was en- titled to have the goods delivered to him immediately, or within a reasonable time, but was not bound to pay for them B. & Aid. SO; Houlditch v. Desan- W. 560; Baker v. Dewey, IS Grant ges, 2 Stark. ZZ7 ; Feise v. Wray, Ch. (U. C.) 668. The seller does 3 East 93; Edwards v. Brewer, 2 not waive his lien or his right to M. & W. 375; Cowell v. Simpson, possession of goods by extending 16 Ves. 275; Jones v. Thurloe, 8 right to the property is to remain Mod. 172; Hewison v. Guthrie, 2 in the purchaser during such ex- Bing. N. Gas. 755, 759; Dempsey tension. Badham v. Brabham, 54 V. Carson, 11 U. C. C. P. 462; S. Car. 400, Z2 S. E. 444. As to Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black (U. S.) loss of lien by a sale on time, 476, 17 L. ed. 222; Arnold v. De- see Redenbaugh v. Kelton, 130 Mo. lano, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 33, 39, SO 558, 32 S. W. 67. Am. Dec. 754, per Shaw, G. J.; Mc- 24 Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & Nail V. Ziegler, 68 111. 224; Thomp- G. 941, per Bayley, J. son V. Wedge, 50 Wis. 642, 7 N. § 852 LIENS. 876 until the end of the month, and that evidence of a usage to the contrary was inadmissible.^^ "The objection to the ad- missibility of the evidence, is, that the incident sought to be annexed by such evidence is inconsistent with, and contra- dictory to, the express terms of the contract, and is by those terms, if not expressly, certainly by implication excluded."^*' But this decision was overruled by the Exchequer Cham- ber in Field v. Lelean.^" There a sale was made by one broker to another of shares in a mine, "payment half in two months, and a half in four months." It was held that evi- dence was admissible of a custom among brokers in mining shares, that, in contracts relating to the sale and purchase of such shares, the delivery takes place at the time appointed for payment. The usage was regarded as not varying the time of payment as fixed by the contract of sale, but as de- termining the time of delivery. § 852. Allowing credit not a waiver when seller retains possession. — But if the buyer allows the goods to remain in the seller's possession until the period of credit has elapsed and then fails to make payment, the seller's lien revives, and may be asserted in the same manner as it might have been had no credit been given, and he may hold the goods as se- curity for the price. Though the vendor waives his lien for the price by giving credit for it, this waiver is upon the im- plied condition that the vendee does not become bankrupt 25 Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C. B. against the admissibility of evi- 212. See also, Ford v. Yates, 2 dence of usage in this case ; but M. & G. 549. that decision proceeds on what ap- 26 Spartali v. Benecke, 10 B. C. pears to me to be the mistaken 212, per Wilde, C. J. ground, that the eflfect of the in- 2'? 6 H. & N. 617. Wightman, J., troduction of a custom as to the delivering the judgment of the time of delivery of the thing sold court of common pleas in the v/ould be to alter or vary the time case of Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C. fixed for payment by the written B. 212, in which the circumstances contract, whereas the time for were hardly distinguishable from payment would not be altered, and the present, is no doubt directly the custom would only affect the 8/7 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 853 or insolvent.^^ Thus, if the owner of a large quantity of wood, lying in a pile upon his own land, sell it on a credit of six months, with an agreement that the purchaser may re- move it within a year, and before the purchaser removes the wood he becomes insolvent, the vendor may retain the wood against the assignee in insolvency of the purchaser.^^ Where a sale was made of a number of bales of drillings, which were to be delivered to the purchaser as fast as he needed them, for manufacturing into bags, and it was agreed that the purchaser should store the manufactured bags and deliver the warehouse receipts to the seller in pledge, it was held that, upon the delivery of the goods to the purchaser the title vested in him, and that the seller had no lien there- on, and no lien on the manufactured bags, until the ware- house receipts were delivered to him. The agreement showed that the.seller was willing to trust the purchaser for a portion of the goods, and that, upon his pledging the bags manufactured from that portion, he was willing to trust him for another portion. If the seller delivered a second portion to the purchaser without requiring a delivery in pledge of the manufactured bags, this was a waiver of the condition, and the title to both vested absolutely in the purchaser.^*^ 853. Taking note no waiver of lien where seller keeps possession of goods. — The fact that the vendor has taken a time for delivery, with respect to Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) which the written contract is si- 33, 50 Am. Dec. 754, per Shaw, C. lent." J.; Milliken v. Warren, 57 Maine 28 Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. 46; Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly Cas. 319; Gunn v. Bolckow, L. R. (N. Y.) 93; In re Batchelder, 2 10 Ch. 491; McEwan v. Smith, 2 Lowell (U. S.) 245, Fed. Cas. No. H. L. Cas. 309; Martindale v. 1099; Owens v. Weedman, 82 111. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389, 395; Dixon v. 409; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83 Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; Castle v. Wis. 388, 53 N. W. 684. Sworder, 5 H, & N. 281; Miles 29 Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504; Ex (Mass.) 33; Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. parte Chalmers, L. R. 8 Ch. 289; & M. 504. Griffiths V. Perry, 1 El. & El. 680; 30 Hewlet v. Flint, 7 Cal. 264. Valpy V. Oakeley, 16 Q. B. 941; § 853 LIENS. 878 negotiable note or bill of exchange for the purchase-money does not defeat his lien upon the subsequent insolvency of the purchaser before he has taken actual possession of the goods. ^^ "When the bill is dishonored, there is no longer payment, or anything which can be considered as equivalent to payment; and it seems to me that the assignee of the bank- rupt cannot, after what has taken place, insist on delivery without actual payment."^- A bill of exchange, taken for the price of goods sold, is not absolute payment therefor, but conditional on its being honored at maturity. "No doubt, if the buyer does not become insolvent, that is to say, if he does not openly proclaim his insolvency, then credit is given by taking the bill ; and during the time that the bill is cur- rent there is no vendor's lien, and the vendor is bound to de- liver. But if the bill is dishonored before delivery has been made, then the vendor's lien revives; or if the purchaser be- comes openly insolvent before the delivery actually takes place, then the law does not compel the vendor to deliver to an insolvent purchaser."^^ The fact that the vendor has negotiated acceptances of the vendee for the price of the goods does not defeat the ven- dor's lien upon the goods, upon the subsequent insolvency of the vendee before meeting his acceptances.^'* This is cer- tainly the rule if the bills are not secured in any way, and do not bear the name of any third person. 31 Gunn V. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. 34 Gunn v. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. 491; Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 491. In Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. 504; Arnold v. Delano, 4 Gush. & Ad. 568, the fact that the ven- (Mass.) 33, 44, 50 Am. Dec. 754; dor had taken the vendee's prom- Thurston v. Blanchard, 22 Pick. issory note for the price of goods (Mass.) 18, 33 Am. Dec. 700; Milli- sold, and had negotiated it, and it ken V. Warren, 57 Maine 46. was still outstanding, was regard- 32 Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. ed as substantially a payment, and 504, per Bayley, J. it was consequently held that the 33 Gunn V. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. vendor had no lien. 491, 501, per Mellish, J. 8/9 seller's lien for purchase-money. § 856 § 854. Taking negotiable note from buyer no waiver of seller's lien. — The taking of the purchaser's negotiable note payable on demand for the price of goods does not divest the seller of his lien.^^ A purchase-money lien is of course waived or discharged by payment ;^*^ and the taking of the note of another^'^ than the purchaser constitutes payment, and not security, unless expressly taken as collateral for the price of the goods, v\rhen it is not a waiver of the lien.^^ § 855. Lien waived by delivery of goods sold at auction. — If property sold at auction be delivered to the purchaser on his promise to pay for it in a few days, without any reserva- tion of the title by the vendor, and the delivery is not ob- tained by fraud, the lien is waived, just as it is in any case of a sale and delivery of property on credit. Such sale and deHvery pass the title, and it is not divested merely because the purchaser fails to pay for the property.^® § 856. Parol evidence admissible to show that goods were sold on credit. — If goods be ordered by letter without men- tioning the time of payment, parol evidence is admissible to show that the goods were supplied on credit, the letter not being a valid contract within the statute of frauds. ^^ 35 Clark V. Draper, 19 N. H. 419. Dummer v. Smedley, 110 Mich. 466, The taking of judgment on a note 68 N. W. 260, 38 L. R. A. 490n. accepted by the vendor for goods Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. sold is not a waiver of his lien Citizens' St. R. Co., 24 Ky. L. 334, when the vendor holds possession 68 S. W. 463. of the goods. Woodland Co. v. ss Campbell Printing Press Co. Mendenhall, 82 Minn. 483, 85 N. v. Powell, 78 Tex. 53, 14 S. W. W. 164, 83 Am. St. 445. See also, 245; Vogelsang v. Fisher, 128 Mo. Clark V. Erwin, 72 Miss. 926, 18 386, 28 S. W. 873. So. 419; Vogelsang v. Fisher, 128 39 Thompson v. Wedge, 50 Wis. Mo. 386, 28 S. W. 873. 642, 7 N. W. 560; Singer Mfg. Co. 36 Cory V. Barnes, 63 Vt. 456, 21 v. Sammons, 49 Wis. 316, 5 N. W. Atl. 384. 788; Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. 37 Wisconsin Marine, &c.. Bank Texas State Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. v. Filer, 83 Mich. 496, 47 N. W. App.), ^ S. W. 1049. 321; Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243; 40 Lockett v. Nicklin, 2 Ex. 93. CHAPTER XVIII. THE SELLER'S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Sec. Sec. 857. Right of seller to stop goods 874. in transitu. 858. The right of stoppage in 875. transitu first equitable one. 859. Right of stoppage in transitu 876. not recognized by civil law. 860. Right of stoppage in transitu now a legal right. 877. 861. Effect of exercising the right. 862. Vendor holding goods by 878. virtue of lien. 863. Vendor's sale of the goods. 864. Proof of vendor's claim 879. made against vendee's in- solvent estate. 865. Resale or rescission by act 880. of vendee. 866. Resale or rescission of the contract. 881. 867. Rescission after right of stoppage ceases to exist. 868. Upon what property the right may be exercised. 882. 869. Who may exercise the right of stoppage in transitu. 870. Right only exercised by one 883. holding the relation of vendor to the consignee. 871. Stoppage of goods consigned 884. to factor. 872. Pledgee's exercise of the right. 885. 873. Lienor no right of stoppage after shipment of goods to 886. owner. Surety has no general right of stoppage. General agent's right in be- half of principal. Act of one stopping goods in transitu ratified b yven- dor. No right of stoppage where goods have been fully paid for. Right of stoppage not pre- vented by acceptance of vendee's note. Right cut off when note, or- der or bill of third person accepted as payment. Right of stoppage not pre- vented by indebtedness of vendor to vendee. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not affected by part payment of purchase- money. Contract of sale not re- scinded by bankruptcy of buyer. Vendor's right to recover where after notice goods are delivered to bankrupt. Right of stoppage in tran- situ exercised only in case of buyer's insolvency. Question of buyer's insolv- ency is for the jury. Vendor bound to deliver goods to solvent vendee. 88o THE SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Sec. Sec. 887. When insolvency at the time 905. of sale immaterial. 888. Notice of vendor to carrier. 906. 889. Demand by vendor. 890. Vendor may claim goods in 907. the hands of any person having their charge. 891. Notice to agent is notice to 908. the carrier. 892. Notice is sufficient when goods are still in a ware- 909. house. 893. Duty of shipowner to noti- fy ship's master of notice 910. of stoppage given him. 894. Vendor gains nothing by de- 911. manding goods from ven- dee. 912. 895. No proof necessary before demanding goods of a car- rier. 913. 896. Right of carrier to take time to investigate authority of vendor's agent. 914. 897. Carrier guilty of conversion by ignoring vendor's notice. 915. 898. Duty of the carrier to deter- mine which of two different claimants of goods had the 916. better right. 899. Liability for delivery after notice. 917. 900. Vendor must pay the car- rier's charges. 918. 901. Vendor's right of stoppage prevails against carrier's lien for general balance of 919. account. 902. When the right of stoppage 920. in transitu may be exer- cised. 921. 903. Goods shipped to seller's own order. 904. Different kinds of actual de- livery. Right of vendor when tran- sit has not commenced. Right not prevented by pro- curing warehouse receipt. Delivery to carrier not gen- erally constructive delivery to vendee. Not material that the car- rier has Deen designated by the vendee. Delivery to carrier sometimes is a constructive delivery to the purchaser. Delivery to carrier may be delivery to vendee. Delivery on board of the vendee's ship. Right exercised even where delivery is made on board vendee's ship. Effect where bill of lading requires delivery to ven- dor's order. Receipt that good? are shipped on seller's account. Bill of lading not conclusive proof that delivery has been made to vendee. Vendor may act as agent of vendee in taking bill of lading. Transit continues until goods arrive at destination. Transit not ended by the ar- rival of vessel at port of call. Vendee may take possession at any point en route. Mere demand by vendee not sufficient. Delivery before point of of destination may termin- ate transit. 56 THE SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Sec. Sec. 922. Transit continues while 937. goods are held by a for- warding agent. 923. Transit is not ended when 938. vendee repudiates the pur- chase. S'24. Refusal of insolvent vendee 939. to take the goods may de- termine the question of delivery. 940. 925. Rule in similar case. 926. Right of stoppage remains so long as carrier holds the goods not as vendee's 941. agent. 927. Necessity that carrier part 942. with possession of goods at transitus. 943. 928. Transit ends when consignee claims the goods and the 944. carrier wrongfully refuses to deliver them. 929. Goods still in transit when 945. on arrival they are in the hands of a local carrier. 930. Goods in quarantined vessel 946. after arrival are still in transit. 931. Effect of placing goods in a custom-house. 947. 932. Entry of goods at custom- house without the payment 948. of duties. 933. Transit not ended by stor- 949. age of goods in government warehouse. 950. 934. Customs officer is not a mid- dleman after consignee has 951. paid the duties. 952. 935. Goods placed in a ware- house by the carrier to await consignee's sending 953. for them are still in tran- sit. 936. Wharfinger a middleman. Goods in the carrier's car at destination are still in transit. Transit ends when the ven- dees take possession of the goods. Rule to determine what constitutes possession much discussed. Right of vendee to construc- tive possession while goods are in hands of car- rier. When carrier made agent of consignee transit ends. By agreement the carrier may become the buyer's agent. Carrier's consent necessary to be made agent of buyer. Transit ends when goods are put in warehouse used by the purchaser. Goods landed at wharf and freight paid usually ends transit. Assignment of bill of lading by vendee to third person for value defeats right of stoppage in transitu. Rule where instrument is not strictly a bill of lading. Assignee for creditors not a purchaser for value. Pre-existing debt a valuable consideration. Transfer of bill of lading af- ter stoppage in transitu. Pledge by a factor or agent. Fraudulent sale of the bill of lading will not affect right of stoppage. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not defeated by transfer of bill of lading as security. 883 SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 857 Sec. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. ElBfect of transfer of bill of lading in pledge on right to make sale that will defeat the vendor's right of stop- page in transitu. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading by vendee to his factor. Advances made on bill of lading. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading. Delivery order given by ven- dor to vendee. Difference between ware- house receipt and delivery order. Sec. 960. Sale of goods in transitu without indorsement of bill of lading. 961. Rule where original vendor has notice of resale of the goods by his vendee. 962. Delivery of part of cargo does not determine right of stoppage of whole cargo. 963. Effect of notice of stoppage after part of goods are de- livered. 964. By the resale by vendee and delivery of bill of lading right of stoppage ended. 965. The right of stoppage para- mount to all liens against the purchaser. § 857. Right of seller to stop goods in transitu. — This right is an equitable extension of the vendor's right of lien at common law for the unpaid purchase-money.^ These rights are not distinct and independent, but are, under dif- ferent names, the same right at different stages of the exe- cution of the contract of sale. The vendor's right of lien is his right to detain goods which he has sold until the price 1 Lord Romilly, M. R., in Fraser v. Witt, L. R. 7 Eq. 64; D'Aquila V. Lambert, 2 Eden 75, 11, note; Ellis V. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464, 469; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 307, 313, 23 Am. Dec. 607; Grout V. Hill, 4 Gray (Mass.) 361; White V. Welsh, 38 Pa. St. 396, 420, per Lowrie, C. J.; Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515; Bab- cock V. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244, 251 ; Blossom V. Champion, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 217, 223, per Sutherland. J.; Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 249, 35 Am. Rep. 17 ; Atkins v. Col- by, 20 N. H. 154, 155, per Gilchrist, C. J.; Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84, per Brewer, J.; Morris v. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590. 598. In California, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Oklahoma, it is declared by statute that a seller or consignor of prop- erty, whose claim for its price or proceeds has not been extinguished, may, upon the insolvency of the buyer or consignee becoming known to him after parting with the property, stop it while on its transit to the buyer or consignee, and resume possession thereof. California: Civ. Code 1906, § 3076; § 857 LIENS. 884 is paid, and it exists while the goods remain in his own pos- session or control.^ His right of stoppage in transitu is his right to retake the goods after they have passed out of his own possession and control, and exists so long as the goods are in the hands of a carrier for delivery to the purchaser. In one respect, however, the latter right differs from the former; for, while a vendor may retain the goods still in his possession for the payment of the price, whether the pur- chaser be insolvent or not, he can retake the goods while they are in the possession of a third person, in transit to the purchaser, only upon the insolvency of the latter. The ven- dor's possession is the essential condition of his right of lien, and possession by a third person is the essential con- dition of his right of stoppage in transitu. "The sale is not executed before delivery: and in the simplicity of former times, a delivery into the actual possession of the vendee or his servant was always supposed. In the variety and extent of dealing which the increase of commerce has introduced, the delivery may be presumed from circumstances, so as to vest a property in the vendee. A destination of the goods by the vendor to the use of the vendee; the marking them, or making them up to be delivered ; the removing them for the purpose of being delivered, may all entitle the vendee to act as owner, to assign, and to maintain an action against a third person into whose hands they have come. But the title of the vendor is never entirely devested, till the goods have come into the possession of the vendee. He has there- fore a complete right, for just cause, to retract the intended delivery, and to stop the goods in transitu."^ The right of stoppage in transitu, being based on an equi- table principle, is highly favored. Montana: Civ. Code 1895. § 3970; 2 Tuthill v. Skidmore. 124 N. Y. North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, 148, 26 N. E. 348. § 6298; Oklahoma: Comp. Laws -^ Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 H. Bl. 1909, § 4152; South Dakota: Rev. 357, 364, per Lord Loughborough. Code (Civ.) 1903, § 2163. 885 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 858 The exercise by a vendor of goods of the right of stoppage in transitu is not a rescission of the contract of sale, but a resumption of possession, which will enable him to insist upon the vendor's lien which he had waived by his delivery to the carrier.'* § 858. The right of stoppage in transitu first equitable one. — The right of stoppage in transitu was first asserted as an equitable right,^ though it has now become a legal possessory right, and is recognized and favored by courts of law. The earliest case in which this right is recognized is said to be 4 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ameri- can Oil Works, 126 Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. 671, 12 Am. St. 885; Patten's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 151, 84 Am. Dec. 479. 5 D'Aquila v. Lambert, 2 Eden 75, n, note, Amb. 399; Lickbar- row V. Mason, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 19T. In Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21, 27, note, Mr. Justice Buller upon this point said: "The right of stopping in transitu is founded wholly on equitable principles, which have been adopted in courts of law; and, as far as they have been aaopteci, I agree they will bind at law as well as in equity. So late as the year 1690, this right, or privilege, or whatever it may be called, was unknown to the law." The grounds on which the adoption of this equitable right by courts of law is justified are stated by the same eminent judge as follows. 'T have always thought it highly injur- ious to the public that dif- ferent rules should prevail in the different courts on the same mer- cantile case. My opinion has been uniform on that subject. It some- times indeed happens that, in questions of real property, courts of law find themselves fettered with rules, from which they can- not depart, because they are fixed and established rules; though equity may interpose, not to con- tradict, but to correct, the strict and rigid rules of law. But in mercantile questions no distinc- tion ought to prevail. The mer- cantile law of this country is founded on principles of equity; and when once a rule is estab- lished in that court as a rule of property, it ought to be adopted in a court of law. For this reason courts of law of late years have said that, even where the action is founded on a tort, they would discover some mode of defeating the plaintiff, unless his action were also founded on equity; and that, though the property might on legal grounds be with the plain- tiff, if there were any claim or charge by the defendant, they would not consider the retaining of the goods as a conversion." Tooke V. Hollingworth, 5 T. R. 215, 229. But the fact that stop- § 858 LIENS. 886 Wiseman v. Vandeputt,*' in the year 1690. Two Italians had consigned cases of silk to merchants in London; but before the ship set sail from Leghorn news came that the merchants had failed, and thereupon the Italians changed the consign- ment to another person, against whom the assignees in bank- ruptcy of the merchants brought their bill for discovery and relief. "The court declared the plaintiffs ought not to have had so much as a discovery, much less any relief in this court in regard that the silks were the proper goods of the two Florentines, and not of the Bonnells (the bankrupts), nor the produce of their effects; and therefore they having paid no money for the goods, if the Italians could by any means get their goods again into their hands, or prevent their com- ing into the hands of the bankrupts, it was but lawful for them to do so, and very allowable in equity." Lord Kenyon said:^ "The doctrine of stopping goods in transitu is bottomed on the case of Snee v. Prescot;^ * * * on this all the other cases are founded." In that case Lord Hardwicke, stating the case hypothetically, said: "Suppose such goods are actually delivered to a carrier to be delivered to A, and while the carrier is upon the road, and before actual delivery to A by the carrier, the consignor hears A, his consignee, is likely to become a bankrupt, or is actually one, and countermands the delivery, and gets them back into his own possession again, I am of opinion that no action of trover would lie for the assignees of A because the goods while they were in transitu, might be so countermanded. * * * Though goods are even delivered to the principal, I page in transitu is only a remedial next case was Ex parte Wilkin- proceeding doubtless had much to son (1755), cited in D'Aquila v. do with its early adopttion by the Lambert, 2 Eden 75 (1761). Adopt- courts of law. See further, Gibson ed into common-law courts by V. Carruthers, 8 M. & W. 321, per Lord Mansfield. Burghall v. How-. Lord Abinger. ard, 1 H. Bl. 366, n. « 2 Vern. 203. The next case 7 Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464. was Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245, 8 1 Atk. 246, 248 (1743). which occurred in 1743; and the 887 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 859 could never see any substantial reason why the original pro- prietor, who never received a farthing, should be obliged to quit all claim to them, and come in as a creditor only for a shilling perhaps in the pound, unless the law goes upon the general credit the bankrupt has gained by having them in his custody. But while goods remain in the hands of the orig- inal proprietor, I see no reason why he should not be said to have a lien upon them till he is paid, and reimbursed what he so advanced; and therefore I am of opinion the defend- ant Prescot had a right to retain them for himself and company." § 859. Right of stoppage in transitu not recognized by civil law. — The civil law did not recognize the right of stoppage in transitu.^ It was a rule of the ancient Roman law, as old as the Twelve Tables, that things sold and delivered were not acquired by the buyer until he had paid or secured the price. The unpaid vendor might pursue and retake the goods even in the hands of a third person who had in good faith bought and paid for them. If the sale was upon credit, the vendor by action might establish a claim to goods so long as they remained in the hands of the purchaser, though not against a bona fide purchaser from him for value. ^^ These rules were adopted by most of the nations of continental Europe, and continued in force till about the beginning of the present century, when the necessities of commerce de- manded greater security in the transfer of property, and grad- ually brought about a change in the law of sales and the adoption of a right of stoppage in transitu, substantially the same as that which had existed in England for a century or more.^^ 9 Domat, part 1, bk. 3, tit. 1, § 5, n In France the old rule of re- art. 4. vindication was rejected, and the 10 This right of the unpaid ven- principle of stoppage in transitu dor was called, in the civil law, re- adopted in the Code de Commerce vindication. In re Westzynthius, in 1807. The right was shown to 2 Nev. & M, 650 n. exist in Holland in a case tried by § 86o LIENS. 888 In Louisiana the code gives the seller a preference over other creditors of the purchaser for the price, whether the sale be on credit or not, so long as the property remains in the possession of the purchaser. If the sale be made with- out credit, the restitution must be made within eight days of the delivery. This privilege is not conditional, nor depend- ent upon the solvency or insolvency of the buyer. It is posi- tive without condition so long as the property remains in the possession of the purchaser. ^^ Stoppage in transitu is a right which does not exist in Louisiana; but the courts of Louisiana will recognize and enforce a right of stoppage in transitu arising from a sale in another state to an insolvent residing in Louisiana. ^^ § 860. Right of stoppage in transitu now a legal right. — This right, though originating in equity, has become alto- gether a legal right, so that a court of equity will not ordi- narily enforce it. Indeed, Lord Eldon has said:^^ "There is no instance, that I recollect, of stopping in transitu, by a bill in equity; there have been many cases where questions have arisen respecting the property in the ship itself, in which the court has interfered; but I do not remember one of stop- page in transitu." In the case then before the court it was held that a bill would not lie to restrain by injunction the Lord Loughborough in 1789; Ma- had fraudulently concealed his son V. Lickbarrow, 1 H. Bl. 357, 1)ankruptcy, and the vendor might 364; and it was formally introduced retake the goods. But in that year into that country with the Code the English doctrine of stoppage Napoleon in 1811. The doctrine in transitu was adopted. Jaffrey v. exists in Russia as a part of the Allan, 3 Paton 191. Code of Mercantile Navigation i- Converse v. Hill, 14 La. Ann. Laws (1781), as is shown in the 89; Payne v. Buford, 106 La. 83, case of Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 30 So. 263. 381, 386. In Scotland, down to t3 Blum v. Marks. 21 La. .Ann. 1790, it seems to have been pre- 268, 99 Am. Dec. 725. sumed that if the buyer became i4 Goodhart v. Lowe, 2 Jac. & bankrupt within three days after W. 349. delivery to him of goods sold, he 889 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 861 sailing of a vessel containing goods which a vendor wished to resume possession of on account of the insolvency of the con- signee, though the reason given was that this might be highly inconvenient to the other shippers. § 861. Effect of exercising the right. — The effect of the vendor's exercising this right is to restore the goods to his possession so that he can hold them by virtue of his lien,^^ In an early case Lord Kenyon remarked, ^"^ that "the right of the vendor to stop goods in transitu, in case of the in- solvency of the vendee was a kind of equitable lien adopted by the law for the purposes of substantial justice, and that it did not proceed, as the plaintiff's counsel supposed, on the ground of rescinding the contract." Notwithstanding this declaration, and other statements to like effect by other judges,^''' Lord Tenterden remarked in 1829 that there did not appear to be any case in which it had been expressly decided whether the effect of the stoppage was to rescind the con- tract or not. Even so late as 1842 Baron Parke said: "What the effect of stoppage in transitu is, whether entirely to re- scind the contract, or only to replace the vendor in the same position as if he had not parted with the possession, and en- title him to hold the goods until the price be paid down, is a point not fully decided, and there are dif^culties attending each construction." Since that time, however, the principle has become well es- tablished that the effect of the stoppage is not to revest the 15 Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 mans v. Lancashire & Yorkshire M. & W. 436. Since the case of R. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 332, 340, per Goodhart v. Lowe, 2 Jac. & W. Cairns, L. J. 349, decided in 1819, the courts have 16 Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T. R. 440, more clearly shown a disposition 445. to hold that stoppage in transitu i7 Ex parte Gwynne, 12 Ves. 379, does not rescind the contract, but per Erskine, L. C; Feise v. Wray, only gives or restores to the ven- 3 East 93. dor a lien for the price. Schots- 862 LIENS. 890 title in the vendor, but to reinstate him in his lien for the price. He is revested in his rights as an unpaid vendor.^^ § 862. Vendor holding goods by virtue of lien. — The ven- dor, after gaining possession of the goods, holds them by vir- tue of his lien. The right of stoppage in transitu being an enlargement of the common-law right of lien, it follows that the vendor, after exercising this right, must hold the prop- erty in the same manner that he would be required to hold it in case he had a lien upon it for the price. If the prop- is Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360; Valpy v. Oakeley, 16 Q. B. 941; Griffiths V. Perry, 1 El. & El. 680; Kemp V. Falk, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 573, 581, per Lord Blackburn: "It is pretty well settled now that it would not have rescinded the con- tract." And see Schotsmans v. Lan- cashire & Yorkshire R. Co., 2 Ch. 332, where Lord Cairns pointed out that, if the contract were regarded as rescinded, a court of equity would have no jurisdiction to en- force the right of stoppage in tran- situ. Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Maine 314, 33 Am. Dec. 617, 13 Maine 93, 29 Am. Dec. 489; Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 467, 475, per Shaw, C. J.; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 307, 313, 23 Am. Dec. 607, per Shaw, C. J.; Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33, 39; Rogers v. Thomas 20 Conn. S3; Inslee v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454, 458, per Fos- ter, C. J.; In re Patten's Ap- peal, 45 Pa. St. 151, 84 Am. Dec. 479; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Am. Oil Works Co., 126 Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. 671, 12 Am. St. 885; Cox v. Burns, 1 Iowa 64; Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188; Morris v. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590; White v. Solomonsky, 30 Md. 585; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio 88, 98; Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515; Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 665, 4 Am. Rep. 721, per Earl, C; Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249. In Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244, 251, Chief Justice Church said that the question had never been definitely decided in that state. "As an original question," he said, "the doctrine of rescission commends itself to my judgment as being more simple, and in most cases, more just to both parties than the notion that the act of stop- page is the exercise of a right of lien, but in deference to the pre- vailing current of authority, I should hesitate in attempting to oppose it by any opinion of my own." In California, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota, it is provided by code that stoppage in transit does not of itself rescind a sale, but it is a means of enforcing the lien of the seller. California: Civ. Code 1906, § 3080; Montana: Civ. Code 891 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 863 erty was sold upon credit, he must hold it until the expiration of the credit, so as to be able to deliver it upon the payment of the price. But if the purchaser does not pay the price at the time stipulated, the vendor may, as in case of a lien, sell the property upon giving notice. ^^ In the meantime the pur- chaser or his assignee may enforce his claim to the goods upon payment of the purchase-money, according to the terms of the original contract, provided he acts without unreason- able delay .""^ The vendor, by the exercise of his right of stoppage in transitu, can only recover the goods in the con- dition they are at the time he exercises the right. He can- not recover insurance upon them for loss or damage suffered in the transit.^^ The vendor may also, notwithstanding his exercise of the right of stoppage, maintain an action against the vendee for the price of the goods bargained and sold, provided he be ready and willing to surrender the goods according to the terms of the contract.^^ § 853. Vendor's sale of the goods. — The vendor, after rea- sonable notice to the vendee, may sell the goods, and the con- 1895, § 3974; North Dakota: Rev. St. 151, 84 Am. Dec. 479, per Codes 1905, § 6302; Oklahoma: Strong, J. Comp. Laws 1909, § 4155; South 21 Berndston v. Strang, L. R. 3 Dakota: Rev. Code (Civ.) 1903, Ch. 588. § 2166. 22 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 19 Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 21n, 27, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas., 8th 244, 249, per Church, C. J. "The Eng. ed. 789; Kymer v. Suwer- general rule upon the theory of a cropp, 1 Camp. 109; Rhodes v. lien, must be that the vendor hav- Mooney, 43 Ohio St. 421, 4 N. E. ing exercised the right of stoppage 233; Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Maine in transitu, is restored to his posi- 314, 326, 33 Am. Dec. 617. "This tion before he parted with the pos- absence of decided cases may partly session of the property. The prop- be accounted for by supposing, that erty is vested in the vendee, and the vendor usually obtaining all the the vendor holds possession as se- goods sold, finds he is fully paid; curity for the payment of the pur- or if not, that the object of pursu- chase-price." ing the insolvent vendee is not 20 In re Patten's Appeal, 45 Pa. worth the trouble and expense." § 864 LIENS. 892 tract of sale is then so far determined by the default of the vendee, and the action of the vendor thereupon, that the ven- dor may, after applying the proceeds of the sale to the pay- ment of the price of the goods, maintain an action for the balance remaining unpaid.^^ § 864. Proof of vendor's claim made against vendee's in- solvent estate. — The vendor may also make proof of his claim against the insolvent estate of the vendee; but whether he make proof of his entire claim for the price of the goods, or whether he must deduct from his whole claim the value of the goods in his hands, or the amount he has received from a sale of the goods, depends upon the statute or rule adopted with reference to the proof of claim for which the creditor holds security, or holds goods or money which is applicable to the claim against the insolvent's estate. In several states the vendor may in such case prove his whole claim due at the date of the assignment, though he has subsequently sold a portion or the whole of the goods stopped in transitu, and applied the proceeds to the payment of the debt for the price of the goods.^^ § 865. Resale or rescission by act of vendee. — There may be a resale or rescission of the contract, by the act of the vendee, which in its effect amounts to very much the same thing as a stoppage in transitu, and is sometimes spoken of as such.^-^ Thus, if the vendee, before he receives the goods 23 Kymer v. Suwercropp, 1 Camp. Sake v. Field, 5 T. R. 211; Smith 109; Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Maine v. Field, 5 T. R. 402; Neate v. Ball, 314, 326, 33 Am. Dec. 617, 13 Maine 2 East 117; Bartram v. Fare- 93, 29 Am. Dec. 489. brother, 4 Bing. 579; Nicholson v. 24 In re Patten's Appeal, 45 Pa. Bower, 1 El. & El. 172; Lane v. St. 151, 84 Am. Dec. 479, following Jackson, 5 Mass. 157; Scholfield v. the rule adopted in Keim's Appeal, Bell, 14 Mass. 40; Naylor v. Den- 27 Pa. St. 42, and in Miller's Ap- nie, 8 Pick (Mass.) 198, 19 Am. peal, 35 Pa. St. 481. Dec. 319; Grout v. Hill, 4 Gray 2-"> Atkin V. Barwick, 1 Stra. 165; (Mass.) 361; Lewis v. Mason, 36 U. 893 SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. 865 from the carrier, finds that he is insolvent, and he leaves the goods in the hands of the carrier or of a third person, for the use of the vendor, wdiom he notifies of his act, and the latter expressly or tacitly assents to it, there is a good resale or stoppage in transitu. And so, if the vendee, upon ascertain- ing that he is insolvent, before the arrival of the goods exe- cutes a bill of sale to the vendor, and delivers this to a third person for him, his act amounts to a resale or stoppage in transitu, and his assignee in insolvency cannot recover the goods or their value from the vendor, or from the third per- son to v^hom the bill of sale was made.^^ An insolvency messenger, before the appointment of an assignee, cannot cut off the seller's right by accepting the goods and paying the freight after the insolvent purchaser has refused to re- ceive them, in order that the seller might reclaim them. A messenger is a mere custodian who has no authority to ac- cept or reject, or to affirm or disaffirm, the act of the insolv- ent purchaser.-^ The assent of the purchaser to a resumption of possession C. Q. B. 590, 604; Mason v. Red- path, 39 U. C. Q. B. 157. In the leading- case of Atkin v. Barwick, 1 Stra. 165, the goods sold and sent by the vendors actually reached the hands of the vendees ; but the latter, being satisfied they could not pay, delivered them to one Penhallow, to be redelivered to the vendors. Shortly after the delivery to Penhallow^, the vendees wrote to their vendors, stating their inability, and expressing an unwillingness that the goods should go to pay their creditors. This letter was sent two days after they had become bankrupts, though the goods had been received and delivered to Penhallow some time before. The latter may have been a mere stranger to the vendors and not their agent. At any rate the vendors got no notice of the de- livery to him till after the vendee's bankruptcy. They then assented. Ail the judges held that the property in the goods revested in the vendors, from the time when they were delivered to Penhallow, subject to the dissent of the ven- dors; and that the precedent debt was a sufficient consideration. Al- though this case has been fre- quently questioned, it has never been overruled ; on the contrary, it has been many times approved. 26 Grout V. Hill, 4 Gray (Mass.) 361. 27 Tufts V. Sylvester, 79 Maine 213. 9 Atl. 357, 1 Am. St. 303. § 866 LIENS. 894 by the unpaid vendor does not make his possession illegal under the bankrupt law, because the vendor could exercise this right without the assent of the purchaser, and thereby gain the same preference over other creditors which he ac- quires with the voluntary assent of the purchaser. "It is not giving a preference to a creditor, when a debtor, peaceably and for convenience, assents to the doing by the creditor of what the creditor, if objection and collision arose, could law- fully do in spite of objection."-^ Therefore the vendor may retain the goods voluntarily surrendered by the purchaser under such circumstances, and may prove his claim against the estate of the purchaser in bankruptcy for any balance of account not satisfied by such surrender. ^^ § 866. Resale or rescission of the contract. — Perhaps in some cases of this nature it should be said that there is a re- sale or rescission of the contract rather than a stoppage in transitu, for the latter act is in its nature adverse to the vendee. ^^ Whether the transaction be called a resale or a rescission, the effect is the same; though, if the transaction be a resale, it follows that the property vested in the vendee, and was revested by his act in the vendor; while, if it be a rescission or refusal to accept, the vendor was never divested of the property.^^ If, on the other hand, the refusal of the vendee to receive the goods on account of his insolvency, 28 In re Foot, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) the right of stopping in transitu 530, 533, Fed. Cas. No. 4907, per cannot be exercised under a title Woodruff, J. derived from the consignee, nor 29 In re Foot, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) that it shall be exercisd in hostility 530, Fed. Cas. No. 4907. to him." Per Parker, C. J., in Nay- 30 Siffken v. Wray, 6 East 371, lor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 198, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J.; Ash 204, 19 Am. Dec. 319; quoted and V. Putnam, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 302; Cox approved in Cox v. Burns, 1 Iowa V. Burns, 1 Iowa 64. But in saying 64, 68. that stoppage in transitu is an ad- si Ash v. Putnam, 1 Hill (N. Y.) verse proceeding, and must be ex- 302, per Cowen, J.; Cox v. Burns, ercised adversely to the vendee, the 1 Iowa 64. A rescission or resale courts mean "no more than that is complete before the assent of 895 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 868 taken in connection with the vendor's assent to such refusal and his subsequent taking back the goods, be regarded as a species of stoppage in transitu, it must follow that the ven- dor, upon receiving them, has only a lien upon them for his purchase-money, and not an absolute title. § 867. Rescission after right of stoppage ceases to exist. — A rescission may take place after the right of stoppage has ceased to exist. But after the vendee has actually received the goods, intending to make them his own, he cannot re- scind the contract so as to defeat the claim of the general body of his creditors.^^ After the right of stoppage has once ended through a delivery to the vendee, it cannot be revived by a subsequent refusal of the consignee to accept a portion of the goods, by reason of their not being merchantable or salable, under the terms of the contract of purchase. § 868. Upon what property the right may be exercised. — This right is usually exercised upon merchandise or personal chattels, because these are more frequently the subject-mat- ter of sales and shipments by carriers. But there is no rea- son why the right should not exist as well under like cir- cumstances in respect to such property as specie, bank bills, or negotiable paper. Thus, if a person remits money on a particular account, or for a particular purpose, and the con- signee becomes insolvent, payment of the money may be stopped. ^^ the vendor is actually given or ex- -"^^ Barnes v. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80; pressed, provided he does subse- Neate v. Ball, 2 East 117; Smith quently assent; or, in other words, v. Field, 5 T. R. 402; Heinekey 'v. his subsequent assent relates back Earle, 8 El. & Bl. 410. See. in con- to the time of the vendee's act; nection w^ith the foregoing, Dixon and therefore an attachment of the v. Baldwen, 5 East 175; Byrnes goods made by a creditor of the v. Fuller, 1 Brev. (S. Car.) 316; vendee after the vendee's act of Wilds v. Smith, 2 Ont. App. 8. rescission, and before the vendor's 33 Smith v. Bowles, 2 Esp. 578; assent to it, is ineffectual. Sturte- Muller v. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325, 14 vant V. Orser, 24 N. Y. 538, 82 Am. Am. Rep. 259, affg. 6 Lans. (N. Y.) Dec. 321. 472. § 869 LIENS. 896 Property sold in violation of a statute, as, for instance, intoxicating liquors, may be stopped in transitu by notice to the carrier, or demand upon him. But under a statute which provides that no action shall be maintained for a recovery or possession of intoxicating liquors a right of stoppage in tran- situ of such property cannot be enforced by an action of replevin.^^ § 869. Who may exercise the right of stoppage in transitu. — Not only a vendor, but any person substantially in the po- sition of a vendor, may exercise this right.^° Thus a com- mission merchant, or factor, or consignor, or other agent who has bought goods on his own credit, though by order and on account of another, may exercise a vendor's right of stoppage. But the agent must pay for the goods, or render himself liable for them, in order to be entitled to stop them in transitu as a vendor.^^ The vendor may exercise this right even when he has con- signed goods to the joint account of himself and the con- signee, and a bill of lading has been sent to the latter making the goods deliverable to him or his assigns,'^''^ unless the ven- dor has indorsed the bill of lading in trust to secure drafts drawn against the consignment.^® § 870. Right only exercised by one holding the relation of vendor to the consignee. — The right can be exercised only by one who holds the relation of vendor to the consignee. If 34 Howe V Stewart, 40 Vt. 145. v. Vargas, 13 Maine, 93, 29 Am. 25 Feise v. Wray, 3 East 93; Ire- Dec. 489, IS Maine 314, 33 Am. land V. Livingston, L. R. 5 H. L. Dec. 617; Gossler v. Schepeler, 5 395; Ex parte Banner, 2 Ch. Div. Daly (N. Y.) 476. 278; Ex parte Miles, L. R. IS Q. B. 36 Oakford v. Drake 2 F. & F. Div. 39; Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 493. 7S9; Patten v. Thompson. 5 M. & 3" Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East S. 3S0; Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 17. Bing. 516; Turner v. Liverpool 38 Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & P. Dock Co., 6 Exch. 543; Ellershaw 563. v. Magniac, 6 Exch. 570; Newhall 897 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 872 one buys goods and directs his vendor to consign them to a customer of his own with whom the vendor has no privity, and the vendor accordingly ships the goods to such third per- son, he cannot stop them in transitu to him upon the insolv- ency of his immediate purchaser. Thus, a merchant at Dar- danelle, in Arkansas, ordered goods of merchants at St. Louis. They sent the order to merchants at New Orleans, with directions to ship the goods to the purchaser at Dar- danelle, which they did, and sent the bill and bill of lading to the St. Louis merchants, and charged the goods to them. During the transit from New Orleans to Dardanelle the St. Louis merchants failed, and the New Orleans merchants, claiming a right of stoppage in transitu, demanded the goods of the carrier and obtained possession of them. In a suit by the consignee against the carrier, it was held that the New Orleans merchants were not the vendors of the consignee ; that there was no right of privity between him and them; and that they had no right to stop the goods, and conse- quently the carrier was liable to the consignee for their value. ^^ § 87L Stoppage of goods consigned to factor. — A princi- pal may stop goods in transitu consigned to his factor upon the insolvency of the latter, though he has accepted bills upon the faith of the consignment, and paid a portion of the freight. A factor has no lien on goods for a general balance until they come into his possession, when he holds them in pledge, or has a lien upon them, neither of which can be en- forced except through possession. ^^ § 872. Pledgee's exercise of the right. — A pledgee of the bill of lading may exercise this right. "^^ To the extent of his 39 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. ■i'^ Kinloch v. Craig, 3 T. R. 119, Freed, 38 Ark. 614. And see also, 783, affirmed 4 Brown C. P. 47. Stubbs V. Lund, 7 Mass. 453, 5 Am. -ii Gossler v. Schepeler, 5 Daly Dec. 63; Eaton v. Cook, 32 Vt. 58. (N. Y.) 476. 57 § 873 LIENS. 898 interest in the property he is a quasi vendor, and is entitled to use all lawful means to protect his interest. § 873. Lienor no right o£ stoppage after shipment of goods to owner. — But one who has only a lien upon goods cannot stop them in transitu after he has shipped them to the general owner at the expense of the latter. ^^ Lord Kenyon said, upon this point :"*^ "The right of lien has never been carried further than while the goods continue in the posses- sion of the party claiming it. Here the goods were shipped by the order and on account of the bankrupt, and he was to pay the expense of the carriage of them to London; the cus- tody therefore was changed by the delivery to the captain." § 874. Surety has no general right of stoppage. — A surety for the price of goods has no right to stop them in transitu, upon the failure of the consignee, without authority from the vendor,^'* unless the circumstances of the case are such that the title to the goods, with the lien of the vendor, has passed to the surety, who is then not merely a surety, but occupies the position of the vendor himself.'*^ § 875. General agent's right in behalf of principal. — A gen- eral agent may exercise this right in behalf of his principal. The authority of an agent of the vendor to stop the goods in transitu need not be specified, that is, having reference to that particular measure, or to that particular transaction.^® The authority of an agent acting within the general scope of his principal's business is sufficient to enable him to exer- cise the right of stoppage in transitu. A merchant to whom ^~ Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4; Gwyn St. Katharine Docks Co., 5 Ch. Div. V. Richmond & Danville R. Co., 85 195. N. Car. 429, 39 Am. Rep. 708, 13 -ic Hutchings v. Nunes, 1 Moo. P. Rep. 473. C. CX. S.) 243; Reynolds v. Boston 43 Sweet V. Pym, 1 East 4. & M. R. Co., 43 N. H. 580; Bell v. 44 Sififken V. Wray, 6 East 371. Moss, 5 Whart. 189; Chandler v. ■io Imperial Bank v. London & Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188. 899 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 876 goods are sent to be forwarded to the purchaser may stop them in transitu for the benefit of the vendor, provided the latter affirms the act. A vendor's agent who is vested with the legal title to the property, by transfer of the bill of lading, may stop it in transitu in his own name ;^^ and may, moreover, in his own name, upon refusal of the person in possession to surrender it, sue for and recover it.^^ Of course the vendor may give notice to stop delivery by on authorized agent. ^^ He may also avail himself of the act of another in giving the notice in his behalf by ratifying and adopting such act, so that the notice will have the same ef- fect as if it had been specially authorized. ^^ But a ratification after the goods have reached the possession of the vendee is too late to give validity to an unauthorized demand.^^ § 876. Act of one stopping goods in transitu ratified by vendor. — The act of one who stops goods in transitu, with- out any previous general or special authority, may be ratified by the vendor, but it is said that the act of ratification must take place at a time and under circumstances when the ratify- ing party himself might have lawfully done the act which he ratifies. A merchant in New York sold and shipped goods to a merchant in Liverpool, who became bankrupt before the arrival of the goods at Liverpool. Another merchant at Liv- erpool, who was not the general agent of the seller, though he had purchased some of the bills drawn upon the purchaser for the goods, claimed to stop the goods in transitu in behalf of the seller upon their arrival at Liverpool and before the transitus was at an end. Soon afterwards, on the 11th day of May, the assignees in bankruptcy of the buyer made for- 47 Morison v. Gray, 2 Bing. 260, ^^ Wood v. Jones, 7 Dow. & Ry. 9 Moore 484; Jenkyns v. Usborne, 126; Hutchings v. Nunes, 1 Moo. 7 M. & G. 678. But see Waring v. P. C. (N. S.) 243; Bailey v. Culver- Cox, 1 Camp. 369. well, 8 B. & C. 448; Bartram v. 48 Morison v. Gray, 2 Bing. 260. Farebrother, 4 Bing. 579. 49 Hoist V. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240. &i Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786. § 8/7 LIENS. 900 mal demand for the goods of the master of the vessel and tendered the freight; but the master refused to deliver them, and delivered them to the merchant, claiming to act in be- half of the seller. The latter, having heard of the insolvency of the buyer, on the 29th day of the previous April, exe- cuted a power of attorney to another person in Liverpool authorizing him to stop the goods in transitu. This agent received the power on the 13th day of May, and on the same day confirmed the previous stoppage by the merchant who had assumed to act for the seller. Subsequently the seller adopted and ratified all that had been done in his behalf by both these agents. In trover for the goods by the assignees of the bankrupt, against the merchant holding them, it was held that the ratification of the stoppage by the seller had not the effect of altering retrospectively the ownership of the goods, which had already vested in the assignees. ^^ § 877. No right of stoppage where goods have been fully paid for. — There is no right of stoppage in case the goods have been paid for in full. Neither is there any such right in case the goods have been shipped to pay a precedent debt.-^2 If the state of accounts between the vendor and vendee is such that the former is indebted to the latter in a sum equal to or greater than the value of the goods consigned, there is no right of stoppage in transitu, for the goods are in fact 52 Bird V. Brown, 4 Exch. 786, for him to stop. The goods had 800. "In the present case, the stop- already become the property of the page could only be made during plaintiffs, free from all right of transitus. During that period the stoppage." Per Rolfe, B. This defendants, without authority from case referred to and distinguished Illins [the vendor], made the stop- from Hutchings v. Nunes, 1 Moo. page. After the transitus was P. C. (N. S.) 243; also in Durgy ended, but not before, Illins [the Cement & Umber Co. v. O'Brien, vendor), ratified what the defend- 123 Mass. 12. ants had done. From that time the ^.s Wood v. Roach, 2 Dall. (Pa.) stoppage was the act of Illins [the 180, 1 L. ed. 340, 1 Yeates (Fa.) vendor], but it was then too late 177, 1 Am. Dec. 276. 90I seller's right of stoppage in transitu. 878 paid for.^^ If payment has been made to the vendor's agent, though he has never paid over the money to the vendor, the right does not exist.^^ § 878. Right of stoppage not prevented by acceptance of vendee's note. — The fact that the vendee has given his note or acceptance for the price of the goods does not defeat the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu;^® and the vendor need not tender back the purchaser's note or acceptance before exercising this right.^" The rule appHes even in case the vendor has negotiated his vendee's note or draft. ^^ It also applies in case the vendor has taken the vendee's draft for the price of the goods, and the drafts have been accepted by the vendee's agent, to whom the bills of lading have been delivered. ^^ The vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is not taken away by the purchaser's acceptance of bills for the price of the goods, without tendering back the bills,®*^ for, though the bills may be proved against the estate of the purchaser in bankruptcy, and part payment attained by this means, this 5-1 Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 51. 55 Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. & Acl, 568. 5*5 Inglis V. Usher, 1 East 515; Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 381; Feise v. Wray, 3 East 93; Edwards V. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375; Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504, 4 Tyr. 295, 299; Lewis v. Mason, 36 U. C. Q. B. 590; Bell v. Moss. 5 Whart. (Pa.) 189, 203; Clapp v. Peck, 55 Iowa 270, 7 N. W. 587; Clapp v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa 273, 7 N. W. 639; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Ainis v. Ayres, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 376, 16 N. Y. S. 905, 42 N. Y. St. 827; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Maine 93. 108, 29 Am. Dec. 489, 15 Maine 314, 33 Am. Dec. 617; Descadillas V. Harris, 8 Greenl. (Maine) 298; Atkins V. Colby, 20 N. H. 154. 57 Hays V. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48. 58 Miles V. Gorton, 2 Cromp. & M. 504. 5» Ainis V. Ayres, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 376, 16 N. Y. S. 905, 42 N. Y. St. 827. The acceptance by the agent in this case was regarded as in substance an acceptance by the vendee. <^'J Feise v. Wray, 3 East 93; Ed- wards V. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375; Patten v. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350. But in Cowasjee v. Thompson, 5 Moore P. C. 165, where the vendor had the option of taking payment by bill or in cash, and he elected the former mode of payment, it was held that he had waived the right of stoppage. § 8/9 LIENS. 902 is no objection; for a part payment does not destroy the ven- dor's right of stopping in transitu, but only reduces the amount of his lien upon them after he has received them into his possession. § 879. Right cut off v^^hen note, order or bill of third per- son accepted as pa5nTient. — If, how^ever, the goods be paid for by the note, order, or accepted bill of a third person, without the indorsement or guaranty of the purchaser, the vendor has no right of stoppage in transitu;®^ for in such case the note, order, or bill is regarded as absolute payment. § 880. Right of stoppage not prevented by indebtedness of vendor to vendee. — The fact that the vendor is indebted to the vendee upon an unadjusted account does not defeat his right of stoppage in transitu. He is not bound to wait for the settlement of the mutual accounts to ascertain the fact or extent of his indebtedness to the vendee, but he may act , at once upon the insolvency of the vendee, and by the exercise of his right of stoppage make himself secure against loss.^^ But the right may often depend on the state of ac- counts between the parties. "^^ If the consignor is indebted to the consignee to the full amount of the value of the goods consigned, and they are expressly consigned on account of such indebtedness, the right of stoppage in transitu does not apply, for there can be no risk of loss to the consignor.^^ The circumstance that the shipment is made at the risk of the consignor does not in such case impair the consignee's claim to it.*^^ The fact that the consignment has been made 61 Eaton V. Cook, 32 Vt. 58. (Pa.) 1'06; Wood v. Roach, 1 Yeates 02 Wood V. Jones, 7 Dow. & Ry. (Pa.) 177, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 180, 1 L. 126; and see Masters v. Barreda, ed. 340, 1 Am. Dec. 276. 18 How. (U. S.) 489, 15 L. ed. 466. cs Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & P. C3 Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31. 563, 571 ; Clark v. Mauran, 3 Paige 64 Clark V. Mauran, 3 Paige (N. (N. Y.) Z72>. Y.) Z7Z; Summer il v. Elder, 1 Binn. 903 SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. S o5I by the debtor to his creditor at the request of the latter, or at least was made with notice to him, is material.^^ § 881. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not affected by part payment of purchase-money. — Part payment of the purchase-money does not affect the vendor's right of stop- page in transitu.®''' It has already been noticed that such pay- ment does not affect his right of lien.®^ In an early case re- specting the effect of such payment. Lord Kenyon®'' said "he did not think that this took the case out of the general rule, and that he should be sorry to let in such an exception because it would destroy the rule itself; since every payment however small, even the payment of a farthing by way of earnest, would, if such an exception were introduced, prevent the operation of the general rule of stopping in transitu." On this point, however, a second argument was ordered at the request of the other judges; but judgment was entered without further argument, because the judges finally had no doubt on the subject. Lord Kenyon then said: "When the distinction was first taken at the bar, I thought it not well founded; and on looking into the cases that were referred to in support of it, we are clearly of opinion that the circum- stance of the vendee having partly paid for the goods does not defeat the vendor's right to stop them in transitu, the vendee having become a bankrupt; and that the vendor has a right to retake them unless the whole price has been paid." But a composition by the vendor with his vendee for the price of undelivered goods operates as an abandonment of the right of stoppage, and the vendor is bound to deliver the GG Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. (U. W. 321; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 S.) 283, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 17122; Maine 93, 29 Am. Dec. 489. Clark V. Mauran, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 68 See ante, § 801. Z7Z. 69 Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T. R. 436, 67 McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. recognized in Feise v. Wray, 3 309; Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & East 93. § 882 LIENS. 904 goods on receiving payment agreed upon in the compo- sition.'^'^ § 882. Contract of sale not rescinded by bankruptcy of buyer. — The bankruptcy of the buyer does not of itself re- scind the contract of sale, and therefore, unless the goods are stopped by the seller, the buyer or his assignee may take possession of the goods, and put an end to the transit and to the vendor's right of stoppage.'^^ This rule does not ap- ply, however, to a consignment to a factor. As Lord Kenyon said :"^ "If the goods be sent to a factor to be disposed of, who afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and the goods remain distinguishable from the general mass of his property, the principal may recover the goods in specie and is not driven to the necessity of proving his debt under the commission of bankrupt ; nay, if the goods be sold and reduced to money, provided that money be in separate bags and distinguishable from the factor's other property, the law is the same." And so if goods are ordered by a merchant who is at the time insolvent, and they are sent to him by the vendor with- out knowledge of this fact, and afterwards the purchaser dies, his administrator is entitled to receive the goods upon their "•' Nichols V. Hart, 5 Car. & P. Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P. 469. But 179. this suggestion has never been fol- "1 Ellis V. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464, 467. lowed; and when an argument of In Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 249, this sort, supported by this quo- Lord Hardwicke said : "Though tation, was addressed to Judge goods are even delivered to the Story, he said: "Nothing is better principal, I could never see any settled, if an uninterrupted series substantial reason why the orig- of authorities can settle the law, inal proprietor, who never received than the doctrine, that the vendor a farthing, should be obliged to in cases of insolvency, can stop the quit all claim to them, and come property only while it is in its in as a creditor only for a shilling, transit." Conyers v. Ennis, 2 Ma- perhaps in the pound, unless the son (U. S.) 236, 238, Fed. Cas. No. law goes upon the general credit 3149. the bankrupt has gained by having "- Tooke v. HoUingworth, 5 T. them in his custody." And see R. 215, 226. 905 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 884 arrival, and the vendor, not having exercised his right of stoppage in transitu, cannot reclaim them upon the ground of the purchaser's insolvency."^ § 883. Vendor's right to recover where after notice goods are delivered to bankrupt. — But if the goods pass into the hands of the bankrupt vendee or of his assignee after a valid notice to stop them has been given to the carrier, as where the carrier after receiving such notice delivers the goods to such vendee by mistake, the vendor may recover the goods, or maintain trover therefor. In such case, inasmuch as the goods have not come into the possession of the bankrupt or of his assignee with the consent of the owner, they are not a part of the bankrupt's estate."^ The right of possession is revested in the vendor by his notice to the carrier, and the assignee has no other or greater right to the goods than the vendee himself would have. § 884. Right of stoppage in transitu exercised only in case of buyer's insolvency. — The right of stoppage in transitu can be exercised only in case the buyer becomes insolvent.'^^ But "3 Conyers v. Ennis, 2 Mason (U. or proceeds has not been extin- S.) 236, Fed. Cas. No. 3149. And guished, may, upon the insolvency see Scott v. Pettit, 3 Bos. & P. of the buyer or consignee becom- 469; Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East ing known to him after parting 381. with the property, stop it while on "■1 Litt V. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169. its transit to the buyer or con- "•"» The Constantia, 6 Rob. Adm. signee, and resume possession 321 ; Wilmhurst v. Bowker, 7 M. thereof. A person is insolvent & G. 882; Walley v. Montgomery, when he ceases to pay his debts in 3 East 585; O'Brien v. Norris, 16 the manner usual with persons of Md. 122, 77 Am. Dec. 284; In re his business, or when "he declares The St. Joze Indiano, 1 Wheat. (U. his inability or unwillingness to do S.) 208, 4 L. ed. 73; Farrell v. Rich- so. California: Civ. Code 1906, mond & D. R. Co., 102 N. Car. 390, §§ 3076, 3077; Montana: Civ. Code 9 S. E. 302, 3 L. R. A. 647, 11 Am. 1895, §§ 3970, 3971; North Dakota: St. 760. In California, Montana, Rev. Codes 1905, §§ 6298, 6299; North Dakota, Oklahoma and Oklahoma : Comp. Laws 1909, South Dakota it is provided by §§ 4152, 4153; South Dakota: Rev. code that a seller or consignor of Codes (Civ.), 1903, §§ 2163, 2164. property, whose claim for its price 885 LIENS, 906 it is not necessary that proceedings by or against him should have been commenced before the seller can stop the goods in transitu, and much less that he should have been adjudi- cated a bankrupt or insolvent debtor,'^'' but only that the buyer should have shown in some way a general inability to pay his debts in the usual course of business."'^ It is enough that the affairs of the vendee are so involved that he is un- able to pay for the goods; and it does not matter that his insolvency is not known or declared at the time of the stop- page, provided he becomes actually insolvent before he ob- tains possession of the goods."^ The vendor has the right to judge for himself of the danger of the vendee's insolvency, and to take measures to guard against itJ^ He, of course, acts at his peril, but he has the right so to act, subject to risk of being required to restore the goods to the consignee, or to respond in damages if the latter proves to be solvent at the time the goods should have been delivered to him and paid for. § 885. Question of buyer's insolvency is for the jury. — The question of the buyer's insolvency is one of fact to be deter- mined by the jury, and any evidence bearing upon this fact is competent.^*' The fact that the buyer has stopped pay- ■^G Ogle V. Atkinson, 1 Marsh. 323, 327; Durgy Cement & Umber Co. V. O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12, per Mor- ton, J. And see Parker v. Gossage, 2 Cr., M. & R. 617; Queen v. Sad- dlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404; Thompson v. Thompson. 4 Cush. (Mass.) 127. 77 O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. 122, 77 Am. Dec. 284; Secomb v. Nutt, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 324; James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 623; Edwards v. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375; Blooming- dale V. Memphis & Charleston R. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) 616; Inslee v. Lane. 57 N. H. 454, 458, per Foster, C. J.; Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515. "8 Gardner v. Tudor, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 206. "9 Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 467, 474, per Shaw, C. J.; Patten v. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350, 368, per Holroyd, J. 80 Hays v. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48; Reynolds v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 43 N. H. 580. As to evi- dence held to show that the buyer 907 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. meiit is of course sufficient evidence of his insolvency to war- rant a stoppage in transitu f^ and his failure to pay a single undisputed debt in the usual course of mercantile business may be sufficient for this purpose.^- If the vendee has, before the stoppage in transitu, afforded the ordinary apparent evidences of insolvency, he ought not to complain of the precautionary act of the vendor in exer- cising this right, though it should afterwards turn out that the vendee was ultimately able to pay; and, on the other hand, he ought not to complain in case the vendor exercised this right when no evidences of the vendee's insolvency had become manifest, if the fact of insolvency existed at the time the goods reached their destination.^^ A confession of judgment by the vendee, and a levy of execution upon his property, has been held to be sufficient evidence of his insolvency.^'* An admission by the vendee of the fact of his insolvency is sufficient evidence of it.^^ But was not insolvent see Rex Buggy Co. V. Ross, 80 Ark. 388, 97 S. W. 291. 81 Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; Dixon V. Yates, 5 B. & Aid. 313; Bird V. Brown, 4 Exch. 786; Dodsou V. Wentworth, 4 M. & G. 1080; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 508. s- Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515, 519, per Gholson, J.; O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. 122, 11 Am. Dec. 284. In Connecticut an exceptional rule on this point pre- vails. It is declared that an essen- tial requisite to the exercise of this right is the insolvency of the vendee, consisting not merely of a general inability to pay his debts, but in his having taken the benefit of an insolvent law, or in his hav- ing stopped payment, or in his hav- ing failed in business. His insolv- ency should consist of some vis- ible change in his pecuniary situa- tion, — some open, notorious act on his part, calculated to affect his credit, — some change in his appar- ent circumstances which would operate as a surprise on the ve«- dor. Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53. This case is now only cited to be criticised and disapproved. See Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515, 521, and many other cases. S3 Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515, 519. s-t Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 35 Am. Rep. 17. 85 Secomb v. Nutt. 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 324. § 886 LIENS. 908 the fact that a creditor of the vendee has attached the goods is not of itself sufficient evidence of his insolvency. ^° § 886. Vendor bound to deliver goods to solvent vendee. — The vendor is bound to deliver the goods if the vendee is solvent when they arrive at their destination; and he is also liable in damages to the vendee for any delay, loss, or ex- pense occasioned by the unwarranted stoppage. If the ven- dor has acted upon an apprehension of the consignee's in- solvency which proves to be without foundation, his stop- page of the goods is unlawful, and the property belongs to the consignee, and he is entitled to restitution, which may be specifically enforced in a court of admiralty.^'^ Where a merchant is Bahia ordered goods from a mer- chant in Pittsburg, with instructions to send them by sail- ing vessel direct or via Pernambuco, and the goods were shipped by the vendor to a forwarding agent in New York with instructions to ship them to Bahia, saying nothing of a shipment via Pernambuco, and the agent finding no vessel to Bahia, the vendor after some months ordered a sale of the goods in New York, without alleging the insolvency of the consignee or other equivalent cause, it was held, in a suit by the latter against the vendor, that the sale was illegal, and that the measure of damages was the price of the goods at Bahia when they should have arrived there, less the invoice price, expenses, costs, and charges of transportation.^^ § 887. When insolvency at the time of sale immaterial. — That the insolvency existed at the time of the sale is immate- rial if the vendor w^as ignorant of the fact.^'' The object in al- lowing the privilege of stoppage in transitu to the vendor be- 8« Gustine v. Phillips, 38 Mich. *>» Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. St. 674. 335; and see Eby v. Schumacher, S7 The Constantia, 6 Rob. Adm. 29 Pa. St. 40. R. 321 ; The Tigress, 32 L. J. Adm. S9 Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 97. 381; Litt v. Cowley, 1 Holt N. P. 909 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. 5 ing to protect him against the insolvency of the vendee, this privilege, unless waived by the vendor, should apply as vv^ell to cases of insolvency existing at the time of sale as to cases of insolvency occurring afterwards at any time before the actual delivery of the goods, the only exception being in case the insolvency was known to the vendor at the time of the sale, and the contract was made in view of this fact.'^'^ § 888. Notice of vendor to carrier. — To exercise this right it is only necessary for the vendor or his agent to give notice of his claim to the carrier or other person. It is not neces- sary that he should demand a delivery of the goods to him- self. ^^ Much less is it necessary that he should make an actual seizure of the goods. A demand for the goods of the person in possession, or a notice to him to stop the goods, or a claim of possession under his right of stoppage in transitu, and an endeavor to get possession, is suf^cient.^^ No par- ticular form of notice or demand is required. If the carrier 338; Inslee v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454; Peters. 63 Ala. 243, 248; Schwa- Reynolds V. Boston & Maine R. bacher v. Kane, 13 Mo. App. 126. Co.. 43 N. H. 580; Buckley v. Fur- oi Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; niss, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Loeb Reynolds v. Boston & Maine R. V. Peters, 63 Ala. 243; O'Brien v. Co.. 43 N. H. 580. 588; Bell v. Moss, Norris, 16 Md. 122, 11 Am. Dec. 284. 5 Whart. (Pa.) 189, 207. In Cali- co Reynolds v. Boston & Maine fornia, Montana, North Dakota, R. Co., 43 N. H. 580, 588; Benedict Oklahoma and South Dakota it is V. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515; Hays provided by code that stoppage in V. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48; Blum v. transit can be effected only by no- Marks, 21 La. Ann. 268, 99 Am. tice to the carrier or depositary of Dec. 725; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 the property, or by taking actual Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Schwabacher possession thereof. California: V. Kane, 13 Mo. App. 126; Newhall Civ. Code 1906, § 3079; Montana: V. Vargas, 13 Maine 93, 29 Am. Civ. Code 1895, § 3973; North Da- Dec. 489; Rucker v. Donovan, 13 kota : Rev. Codes 1905, § 6301; Kans. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84. The Oklahoma: Comp. Laws 1909. case of Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. § 4155; South Dakota: Rev. Code 53, to the contrary, is criticised and (Civ.) 1903, § 2166. repudiated in Benedict v. Schaet- S's Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. tie, 12 Ohio St. 515, 521 ; Loeb v. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84. § 889 LIENS. 910 is clearly informed that it is the intention and desire of the vendor to exercise his right of stoppage, the notice is suf- ficient. °^ It is not necessary that the vendor should take possession of the goods to complete the stoppage and revest the right of possession. "It was held formerly," said Chief Justice Gibbs,^'* ''that unless the vendor recovered back actual pos- session of the goods, by a corporeal seizure of them, he could not exercise his right of stoppage in transitu. Latterly it has been held that notice to the carrier is sufificient, and that if he deliver the goods after such notice, he is liable. That doctrine cannot be controverted; and it is supported by all modern decisions." § 889. Demand by vendor. — A demand by the vendor of the bills of lading which are in possession of the shipowner, having never been delivered to the consignee to whose order they are made out, because he had not paid the freight, is an effectual stoppage in transitu. Goods were shipped from England to Shanghai for the account of a merchant in Lon- don. Soon after the vessel sailed, the merchant committed an act of bankruptcy, and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Both the vendor and the bankrupt's trustee claimed the bills of lading, which were still in the hands of the shipowners in London; and it was finally arranged that the goods should be sold by the agent of the shipowners at Shanghai, and the proceeds paid to the person who should be entitled to them. It was held that the vendor's demand of the bills of lading was an effectual stoppage in transitu. ^^ James, L. J., deliver- ing the judgment, said: 'Tt so happens, luckily for the vendor, that the documents of title have never left the ship- 03 Jones V. Earl, Z7 Cal. 630, 99 o^ Ex parte Watson, L. R. 5 Ch. Am. Dec. 338; Bloomingdale v. Div. 35, 43. And see Inglis v. Ush- Alemphis & Charleston R. Co., 6 erwood, 1 East 515. Lea (Tenn.) 616. 94 Litt V. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169, 2 Marsh. 457. 911 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 891 owners' possession. * * * The vendor comes to the ship- owners and says, 'DeHver the goods to me,' and the shipown- ers have undertaken to sell the goods and hand over the proceeds of sale to the real owner. I am of opinion that the goods have been effectually stopped in transitu, because the shipow^ners are to sell them and deal with the proceeds ac- cording to the legal and equitable rights of the parties." § 890. Vendor may claim goods in the hands of any per- son having their charge. — The vendor may claim the goods in the hands of any person who may have charge of them be- fore the transit ends.^*^ Thus he may claim them not only while they are in the hands of the carrier, but also while they are in the hands of a depositary or warehouseman not act- ing for the vendee, or while in the possession of the col- lector of customs awaiting the payment of duties before the vendee has taken actual possession.^^ § 891. Notice to agent is notice to the carrier. — Notice to the carrier's agent, who has the actual custody of the goods in the regular course of his agency, is notice to the carrier.^^ A letter from the vendor, delivered to the carrier's agent in possession of the goods, stating that the purchaser's prop- erty had been attached, that the vendor desired to save the goods, of which he gave a bill of particulars, and directing the agent to deliver the goods to no one but to the vendor's own agent, was held to be a sufficient demand.^^ A station agent who has control of goods received by rail- road at that station is an agent upon wdiom notice of stop- page in transitu may be made.^ 96 Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613. dale v. Memphis & Charleston R. 97 Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Maine Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) 616; Poole v. 93, 109, 29 Am. Dec. 489, IS Maine The H. & T. C. R. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 314. 33 Am. Dec. 617. 139. 98 Bierce v. Red Blufif Hotel Co., 09 Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. 630, 99 31 Cal. 160; Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. Am. Dec. 338. 630, 99 Am. Dec. 338; Blooming- 1 Poole v. The H. & T. C. R. Co., 892 LIENS. 912 § 892. Notice is sufficient when goods are still in a ware- house. — If a railroad company has deposited goods in a cus- toms warehouse belonging to the company, to await the pay- ment of duties as well as the payment of the freight due the carrier, notice by the consignor to stop the goods given to the company is sufficient, though in such a case it may be advisable to give notice also to customs officers.^ Where imported goods are entered in bond by the importer, and are sold by him and sent in bond by railroad to a purchaser at an interior city, the railroad company is regarded as being in possession of the goods while they are in transit over the road, and notice to stop them should be given to the railroad company. Thus, where the goods go into a bonded ware- house belonging to the railroad company at their place of destination, it would seem that the goods are still in charge of the railroad company. § 893. Duty of shipowner to notify ship's master of notice of stoppage given him. — Notice of a stoppage in transitu given to a shipowner doubtless imposes a duty on him to communicate it with reasonable diligence to the master of the ship, though the notice, if so communicated, will not be 58 Tex. 134, 139. "The rule is ele- mentary, that where the principal holds out an agent in such manner as to induce the public to believe that the agent is authorized to transact business of any particular kind, the principal will be bound for the acts of the agent in that particular. Here the station agent was, to all appearances, held out to the public as the representative of the company at that point, in regard to freights either shipped to or from that station. And it would seem to follow that a notice to him of a stoppage in transitu of goods in transit to that point, upon the soundest principles of law and justice ought to be considered as notice to the company." Per Watts, J. 2 Ascher v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 36 U. C. Q. B. 609, 614. Chief Jus- tice Richards, delivering the judg- ment of the court, said: "We think it is not unreasonable to hold that notice may be given to the railway company when the goods, which have been sent forward by them, are in their own warehouse, and under their own charge, sub- ject to the directions of the gov- ernment as to being held for du- ties thereon." 913 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 893 effectual until it reaches the master. In the recent case of Ex parte Falk,^ Bramwell, L, J., remarked that he did not think that the giving of such notice to the shipowner imposed any duty upon him to stop the goods. But when this case came before the House of Lords,'* Lord Blackburn expressed a different view, saying: "I had always myself understood that the law was that when you became aware that a man to whom you had sold goods which had been shipped, had become insolvent, your best way, or at least a very good way, of stopping them in transitu was to give notice to the shipowner in order that he might send it on. He knew where his master was likely to be, and he might send it on; and I have always been under the belief that although such a notice, if sent, cast upon the shipowner who received it an obligation to send it on with reasonable diligence, yet if, though he used reasonable diligence, somehow or other the goods were delivered before it reached, he would not be re- sponsible. I have always thought that a stoppage, if effected thus, was a sufficient stoppage in transitu; I have always thought that when the shipowner, having received such a notice, used reasonable diligence and sent the notice on, and it arrived before the goods were delivered, that was a per- fect stoppage in transitu." But if the notice be given to the principal when the goods are in the custody of his agent or servant, the notice will not be effectual unless it be given at such a time and under such circumstances that the principal, by the exercise of reason- able diligence, may communicate it to his servant in time to prevent the delivery to the consignee. Baron Parke uses forcible language on this point, saying:^ "To hold that a notice to a principal at a distance is sufficient to revest the property in the unpaid vendor, and render the principal lia- 3 14 Ch. Div. 446, 455. 5 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & 4 Kemp V. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 573, W. 518. 585. 58 § 894 LIENS. 914 ble in trover for a subsequent delivery by his servants to the vendee, when it was impossible, from the distance and want of means of communication, to prevent that delivery, would be the height of injustice. The only duty that can be im- posed on the absent principal is, to use reasonable diligence to prevent the delivery." If the goods are on board a ship, the vendor may demand them of the master,® or give notice to him. ^ 894. Vendor gains nothing by demanding goods from vendee. — The vendor does not ordinarily demand the goods of the vendee; for, if the latter is in actual possession, the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is at an end, and he can only make demand of the person in actual possession at the time.'^ But if the vendee is not already in possession of the goods, a demand upon him may be effectual. Thus, in a Pennsylvania case. Chief Justice Gibson, discussing this point, said :® "A demand of the carrier is a countermand of the previous order to deliver; and where he is not accessible at the time, there is no reason why an equivalent for it should not be found in a countermand of the consignee's au- thority to receive. If there were a specific object to be ac- complished by a demand on the carrier, it would be to make him liable; but his responsibility is seldom looked to; the ob- ject being to prevent the consignee's ovv^nership from becom- ing absolute ; for which purpose, any act that warns him of an enforcement of the lien ought to be taken for a suf^cient protest against his possession." In the case under considera- tion, the vendor's agent wrote to the assignees of the in- 6 Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 381, liver to the consignee, which is the 397. usual act of stoppage, is so in- 7 Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. variably communicated to the mas- 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84. ter, or other person in possession, 8 Bell V. Moss, 5 Whart. (Pa.) that I have seen but one case in 189, 206. The learned chief justice which it was communicated to any also remarked that "the counter- one else." mand of the original order to de- 915 SELLER^S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 895 solvent purchaser, before the arrival of the vessel carrying the goods, proposing that the goods should either be deliv- ered to this agent, or that the assignees should receive them and keep a separate account of sales; and in the latter alter- native he demanded the proceeds as the property of the ven- dor. In consequence of this, the parties agreed that the goods should remain without being sold till the question of title should be determined by a competent tribunal, and that the rights of the parties should not be varied by the agree- ment. It was held that there was a sufficient exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu, and that a demand of, or notice to, the carrier was not necessary. § 895. No proof necessary before demanding goods of a carrier. — In demanding goods of the carrier, it is not requi- site that the vendor should prove that the conditions exist which give him the right of stoppage. Thus, he need not prove that the vendee has not negotiated the bill of lading delivered or indorsed to him. As Dr. Lushington has said:^ "Were it otherwise, were the vendor obliged formally to prove his title to exercise the right of stoppage in transitu, that right w^ould be worthless; for the validity of a stoppage in transitu depends upon several conditions. First, the ven- dor must be unpaid; secondly, the vendee must be insolvent; thirdly, the vendee must not have indorsed over for value. But the proof that these conditions have been fulfilled would always be difficult for the vendor — often impossible; for in- stance, whether the vendor is or is not unpaid may depend upon the balance of a current account; whether the vendee is insolvent may not transpire till afterwards, when the bill of exchange for the goods becomes due ; for it is, as I con- ceive, clear law, that the right to stop does not require the vendee to have been found insolvent. And, lastly, whether 9 The Tigress, 32 L. J. Adm. 97, 101. § 895 LIENS. 916 the vendee has or has not indorsed the bill of lading over, is a matter not within the cognizance of the vendor. He exer- cises his right of stoppage in transitu at his own peril, and it is incumbent upon the master to give effect to a claim as soon as he is satisfied it is made by the vendor, unless he is aware of a legal defeasance of the vendor's claim. Such, according to my opinion, is the law as laid down by Lord Campbell, in Gurney v. Behrend.^*^ Lord Campbell uses these words: 'Prima facie the defendants had a right to stop the wheat, for it was still in transitu, and they were unpaid vendors. The onus is on the plaintiffs to prove that they had become the owners, and that the right to stop in transitu was gone.' " It would seem, however, that the carrier, in a suit against him by the vendor for delivering the goods to the purchaser after receiving notice from the vendor to stop them, might show the fact that the purchaser was solvent after the de- livery, and that by due diligence the debt might have been collected, and therefore the vendor was not injured by the wrongful delivery of the goods. ^^ In Georgia the code declares that the carrier cannot dis- pute the title of the person delivering the goods to him by setting up adverse title in himself, or a title in third persons which is not being enforced against him.-^^ It is further declared that a stoppage iii transitu by the vendor relieves the carrier from his obligation to deliver, and he is not thenceforward responsible for more than ordinary diligence in the care of the goods. ^^ 10 3 El. & Bl. 622. & Western R. Co. v. Meador, 65 11 Bloomingdale v. Memphis & Ga. 705, it was said to be very- Charleston R. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) questionable whether, under this 616, per Freeman, J. And see Ros- provision, the carrier can buy the enfield v. Express Co., 1 Woods vendee's title, as against the ven- (U. S.) 131, Fed. Cas. No. 12060. dor's right of stoppage in transitu. 12 Code 1911, § 2740. In Macon i3 Code 1911, § 2738. 917 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 898 § 896. Right of carrier to take time to investigate author- ity of vendor's agent. — A carrier, when in doubt as to the au- thority of an agent to act for the vendor in stopping the goods, is entitled to reasonable time to make inquiry into the facts, and the agent is also entitled to reasonable time to produce his authority and to furnish indemnity. The carrier, having received notice from an agent, is bound to ascertain his authority, and he acts at his peril in delivering the goods after such notice.^* § 897. Carrier guilty of conversion by ignoring vendor's notice. — A carrier who, without good reason, refuses to de- liver the goods to the vendor w^hen he rightly exercises his right of stoppage in transitu, is guilty of a conversion of the goods, and is liable for their value. ^^ A vendor is not estopped from maintaining a suit against a carrier for a wrongful delivery to the purchaser after no- tice to stop the goods, by bringing suit upon the debt and re- covering judgment against the purchaser. On the contrary, the carrier, under some circumstances, might well set up the defense that the vendor could have recovered his debt by suit against the purchaser, and had failed in diligently prose- cuting such legal remedy.^^ § 898. Duty of the carrier to determine which of two dif- ferent claimants of goods had the better right. — If bills of 1-1 Reynolds v. Boston & Maine to the insolvent consignee, is not R. Co., 43 N. H. 580. liable to the vendor in trover, be- 1"' Thompson v. Trail, 2 Car. & cause, by the sale and delivery to P. 334, 6 B. & C. 36, 9 D. & R. 31 ; the carrier, the property passed to Bloomingdale v. Memphis & the purchaser, and the stoppage Charleston R. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) did not give the vendor the right 616. In Childs v. Northern R. Co., of property and possession neces- 25 U. C. Q. B. 165, it w^as held that sary to sustain such action, a railroad company which has re- "' Bloomingdale v. Memphis & ceived a valid and sufficient notice Charleston R. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) of stoppage in transitu, but has 616. nevertheless delivered the goods § 899 LIENS. 918 lading are presented to a shipowner by two different holders, and he delivers the goods to the one not entitled to them, the other who is entitled to them may hold the master accounta- ble for the value of the goods. ^' If bills of lading are presented to the master or other car- rier by two different holders, it is incumbent upon him to deliver to the rightful claimant, or to bring an action of in- terpleader. But he is entitled to deliver to the person first producing a bill of lading, no matter which part it is, so long as he has no notice nor knowledge of any dealing with the other parts. ^^ "Where the master has notice that there has been an assignment of another part of the bill of lading, the master must interplead or deliver to the one who he thinks has the better right, at his peril if he is wrong." If the bill of lading has been assigned for value to a bona fide assignee, and the vendor seizes the goods in an action of replevin, claiming a right to stop them in transitu, it is the duty of the carrier to intervene in the suit, and either inter- plead or contest the claim of the vendor; otherwise he will render himself liable to the indorsee of the bill of lading for the value of the goods. ^^ § 899. Liability for delivery after notice. — Both the carrier and the consignee, or his assignee, are liable in trover to the vendor if the carrier by mistake delivers the goods to the consignee after receiving a valid notice to stop them.^*^ Chief Justice Gibbs declared-^ it would be monstrous to say, after 17 The Tigress, 32 L. J. Adm. 97. 2 Marsh. 457; Poole v. Houston & 18 Glyn V. East West India Dock T. C. R. Co., 58 Tex. 134. Co., 7 App. Cas. 591, affirming 6 21 Litt v. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169. Q. B. Div. 475, reversing 5 Q. B. As the modern doctrine is that the Div. 129. effect of a stoppage is not to re- 19 The Schooner Mary Ann scind the contract, but only to put Guest, 1 Olc. Adm. 498, Fed. Cas. the vendor in possession so that he No. 9197, affd. 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) can enforce his lien, the assertion 358, Fed. Cas. No. 9196. of the learned judge that the prop- 20 Litt V. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169, erty is revested in the vendor is 919 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 899 such notice, that a transfer made by the carrier's mistake should be such as to bind the vendor, and to vest a complete title in the bankrupt purchaser or his representative. The bankrupt has no title to the goods except what he derived from the dry act of delivery, and that, being founded on a mistake, conveyed no property at all. "As soon as the notice was given, the property returned to the plaintiffs, and they were entitled to maintain trover, not only against the car- riers, but against the defendants or any other person. Until notice, the vendor can not sue the carrier, but the purchaser may; after notice, the case is reversed, because the property is divested out of the purchaser, and revested in the vendor. I cannot conceive a stronger case in which the property is in the vendor, and not in the vendee." In a recent case in Texas it appeared that after the carrier, a railroad company, had received a valid notice to stop in transitu a shipment of goods, and before the goods arrived at their destination, the purchaser assigned the bill of lading without consideration to his attorney, who intercepted the goods at an intermediate station, effaced the marks upon them, re-marked them with a fictitious name, and reshipped them to their original destination, where the agent of the railroad company, though suspecting that the goods were those of which notice of stoppage had been given, delivered them to the original purchaser. In a suit by the vendor against the railroad company and the attorney, it was held that the attorney, having assumed the apparent ownership of the goods with the intention of committing a fraud upon the creditor, could not be heard to deny his liability for the loss; and that, as to the railroad company, the question of the good faith of its agents should be submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions.-- not correct, but rather it should be -- Poole v. Houston & T. C. R. said that the possession is revested Co., 58 Tex. 134. in the vendor. ^ 900 LIENS. 920 § 900. Vendor must pay the carrier's charges. — The ven- dor, upon demanding possession of the carrier or seizing the goods by legal process, should pay the carrier's charges, for the latter has a lien upon the goods for such charges, and may insist upon retaining possession until such charges are paid. But the vendor, or other person acting in his behalf, upon paying these charges, is substituted to the carrier's right of lien and possession respecting the goods.^^ The vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is subject to the carrier's lien for the freight. If the goods be consigned to one person under one contract, the carrier has a lien upon the whole for the freight and charges on every part; and a delivery of a part of the goods does not discharge his lien upon the rest without proof of an intention so to do, even as against the right of the consignor to stop in transitu the goods not delivered; but the carrier may charge against those goods the freight on the whole consignment.^* § 901. Vendor's right of stoppage prevails against carrier's lien for general balance of account. — The vendor's right of stoppage in transitu prevails as against a carrier's lien for a general balance of account due from the consignee. A usage for carriers to retain goods for such a lien can not affect the vendor's right ; and it would seem that such a lien could not be established even by agreement between the carrier and the vendee.^^ The law gives the consignee a specific lien upon the goods, and he should not be allowed to engraft a new lien upon his own laches, especially as against the ven- dor. 'T think," said Heath, J., in the leading case,^® "that 23 Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. R.) 64; Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84. Bing. N. Cas. 99; Potts v. N. Y. & 24 Potts V. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., N. E. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. Rep. 247. Rep. 247; Macon & Western R. Co. 25 Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & v. Meador, 65 Ga. 705. P. 42; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. 26 Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & N. Cas. 508, 518, 7 Scott 577, 591 ; P. 42. Butler V. Woolcott. 2 B. & P. (N. 921 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 902 the right of seizing in transitu is a common law right ; * * * arising out of the ancient power and dominion of the consignor over his property, which at the time of dehvering his g6ods to the carrier he reserves to himself. * * * It is paramount to any sort of agreement as between the carrier and consignee." But the owners of a ship are not entitled to freight, as against the vendor who has stopped the goods in transitu, in case the goods were shipped on a vessel belonging to the vendee, and the master, with full authority so to do, issued bills of lading to the vendor, "freight for the said goods free on owners' account;" and it does not matter in such case that the ship had been sold and transferred before the shipment, no- notice of the transfer having reached the master or the vendor. The new owners of the ship were bound by the contract of the master entered into pursuant to his original instructions.^'^ § 902. When the right of stoppage in transitu may be ex- ercised. — In general the right of stoppage in transitu may be exercised at any time after the goods have been delivered to the carrier until they have come into the actual posses- sion of the buyer.^^ During this time the title is in the buyer. He may also have the right of possession, and even construc- tive possession. The vendor has parted with the title, the right of possession, and actual possession; but until the vendee has gained actual possession, upon his insolvency the vendor may stop the goods and resume the actual posses- sion. This right exists till the goods have been received into the hands of the purchaser, or of some one who receives 2" Mercantile and Exchange v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453, 5 Am. Dec. Bank v. Gladstone, L. R. 3 Ex. 233. 63; Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio 28 Ex parte Rosevear China Clay St. 281, 8 Am. Rep. 63; Aguirre v. Co., 11 Ch. Div. 560; James v. Grif- Parmelee, 22 Conn. 473; Lane v. fin, 2 M. & W. 623, 1 M. & W. 20; Robinson, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 623; White V. Welsh, 38 Pa. St. 396; At- Halft v. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278. kins V. Colby, 20 N. H. 154; Stubbs § 902 LIENS. 922 them in the character of his servant or agent, and not merely as carrier. A carrier, unless he be the purchaser himself, is a mere intermediary between the seller and the buyer. The possession of 'this intermediary is only the constructive possession of the buyer. The actual possession is in the third person, and such possession is a necessary condition to the exercise of this right. Lord Cranworth (then Baron Rolfe) expressed this view:"'* "1 consider it to be of the very essence of that doctrine, that during the transitus the goods should be in the custody of some third person inter- mediate between the seller who has parted with, and the buyer who has not yet acquired, actual possession." In Georgia^'' the code declares that the right of stoppage in transitu exists wherever the vendor in a sale on credit seeks to resume the possession of goods while they are in the hands of a carrier or middleman, in their transit to the vendee or consignee, on his becoming insolvent. It «on- tinues until the vendee obtains actual possession of the goods. If the goods are delivered before the price is paid, the seller cannot retake because of failure to pay; but, until actual re- ceipt by the purchaser, the seller may at any time arrest them on the way, and retain them until the price *is paid. If credit has been agreed to be given, but the insolvency of the pur- chaser is made known to the seller, he may still exercise the right of stoppage in transitu. In California, ^^ Montana,^- North Dakota,"^ Oklaho- 29 Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & -o Codes 1911, §§ 2739, 4132; Ma- W. 321, 328. His language has been con & Western R. Co. v. Meador, adopted by Lord Cains and Vice- 65 Ga. 705. In this case Jackson, Chancellor Wood, in Berndston v. C. J., said: "We think that our Strang, L. R. 4 Eq. 481, L. R. 3 code contemplates actual delivery Ch. 588, 590; by Lord Justice and possession, as distinguished James, in Ex parte Rosevear China from constructive possession." Clay Co., 11 Ch. Div. 560; and by 3i Civ. Code 1906, § 3078. Burton, J., in Wiley v. Smith, 1 32 Civ. Code 1895, § 3972. Ont. App. 179, 188. 33 Rev. Code 1905, § 6300. 923 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 904 ma,"^ and South Dakota/''' it is provided by code that the transit of property is at an end when it comes into the pos- session of the consignee, or into that of his agent, unless such agent is employed merely to forward the property to the consignee. § 903. Goods shipped to seller's own order, — Inasmuch as the right of stoppage in transitu presupposes the actual cus- tody of the goods by a third person intermediate between the seller and the buyer, it is as important to the existence of the right that the vendor should have parted with the actual pos- session as it is that the vendee should not have acquired it. Therefore the right does not exist in case the vendor has shipped goods to his own order, or to the order of his own exclusive agent, and the bill of lading has not been assigned to the purchaser or to any third person.^® § 904. Different kinds of actual delivery. — Actual delivery to the vendee may be made in various ways and under dif- ferent circumstances. Baron Parke enumerates four kinds of delivery, in the following passage :^" "The actual delivery to the vendee or his agent, which puts an end to the transi- tus, or state of passage, may be at the vendee's own ware- house, or at a place which he uses as his own, though belong- ing to another, for the deposit of goods ;^® or at a place where he means the goods to remain, until a fresh destination is communicated to them by orders from himself f^ or it may be by the vendee's taking possession by himself or agent at some point short of the original intended place of desti- nation." 34 Comp. Laws 1909, § 4154. 37 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 33 Rev. Codes (Civ.), § 2165. 623, 633. 36 In re The St. Joze Indiano, 1 38 Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P. 469; Wheat. (U. S.) 208, 210, 4 L. ed. Rowe v. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83. 73; Ilsley v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65, 39 Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175. 6 Am. Dec. 29; In re The St. Joze Indiano, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 268. § 9^5 LIENS. 924 Judge Woodruff states, as the result of the cases on this point: "That a merely constructive delivery, though suffi- cient to entitle the vendor to demand the price of the goods, and to place the goods at the vendee's risk, does not alone defeat the right of stoppage. That while the goods are in transportation to the place of destination, or are in the hands of an intermediate agent or warehouseman for the purpose of being forwarded, they are not subject to this right. That after their arrival at the place of destination, and while in the hands of the carrier, or a wharfinger, or a warehouseman for the mere purpose of delivery to the vendee, the vendor may resume the possession. That delivery to the vendee's spe- cial agent on board the vendee's own conveyance, or a con- veyance chartered by him, if the purpose of the delivery is transportation to the vendee, does not defeat the right. But that the right is lost if the vendee received actual possession; or if after their arrival at the place of destination he exercise acts of ownership over the goods; or if his agents, having authority and power of disposal, exercises like acts."^*^ There is, of course, no right of stoppage when the seller has put the buyer in possession of the goods before the tran- sit has commenced. ^^ § 905. Right of vendor when transit has not commenced. — Where the transit has not commenced, and the vendor is still in control of the goods, he may refuse to allow the tran- sit to commence under the same circumstances that would justify him in stopping the goods after the transit had com- menced.^- The question is then more often one of a ven- 40 Harris v. Hart, 6 Duer (N. Y.) distinguish between the retainder 606, 607, affd. 17 N. Y. 249. of goods by a vendor, and their 41 Loeb V. Blum, 25 La. Ann. 232; stoppage in transitu, on account of Lupin V. Marie, 2 Paige (N. Y.) the insolvency of the vendee; be- 169, afifd. 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 11, 21 cause these terms refer to the sam.e Am. Dec. 256. right, only at dififerent stages of 42 White V. Welsh, 38 Pa. St. perfection and execution of the 396, 420. "Judges do not ordinarily contract of sale. If a vendor has a 925 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 905 dor's lien; yet the question of stoppage may arise, especially where the goods are at the time of sale in the possession of a warehouseman or other agent, and the vendor transfers possession by a delivery order, which in itself does not amount to a constructive delivery, but requires acceptance by the warehouseman in order to confer such possession upon the holder. ^^ The transfer of a delivery order oper- ates differently in this respect from the transfer of a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt. The warehouseman upon whom a delivery order is given remains the agent of the vendor until the order is presented to him, and he becomes the agent of the purchaser by a transfer of the goods to the name of the purchaser, or by some other equivalent act. In the meantime, upon the happening of the purchaser's in- solvency, the vendor may stop the goods in the hands of the warehouseman, just as he might in the hands of a carrier; but after the order has been presented to the warehouseman, and he has transferred the goods to the name of the pur- chaser, the delivery to him is complete and the right of stop- page is gone.^^ right to stop in transitu, a fortiori he has a right of retainer before any transit has commenced." Per Lowrie, C. J. •13 Farina v. Home, 16 M. & W. 119, 123. "This warrant is no more than an engagement by the wharf- inger to deliver to the consignee, or any one he may appoint; and the wharfinger holds the goods as the agent of the consignor, (who is the vendor's agent) and his possession is that of the consignee, until an assignment has taken place, and the wharfinger has attorned, so to speak, to the assignee, and agreed with him to hold for him. Then, and not till then, the wharfinger is the agent or bailee of the assignee, and his possession that of the as- signee, and then only is there a constructive delivery to him. In the meantime, the warrant, and the indorsement of the warrant, is nothing more than an oflfer to hold the goods as the warehouseman of the assignee," per Parke, B. See Benjamin Sales (Corbin ed.), §§ 1244 et seq. ^4 Wood V. Tassell, 6 Q. B. 234; Lackington v. Atherton, 7 M. & Gr. 360; Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28; Swanwick v. Sothern, 9 Ad. & El. 895. § 906 LIENS. 926 § 906. Right not prevented by procuring warehouse re- ceipt, — The procuring of a warehouse certificate for goods as the propert}^ of the vendee prehminary to their transit, and not at the termination of it, does not deprive the vendor of his right to stop them in transitu. Thus, whiskey in a gov- ernment bonded warehouse in Indiana was sold to a pur- chaser in Boston. The storekeeper gave his certificate for the wdiiskey as the property of the purchaser, and the seller sent it to him. It was part of the terms of sale, that the seller should from time to time, as the buyer should request, ship the whiskey to Boston, and pay the storage charges, taxes, and insurance, and draw on the buyer for the amounts. The whiskey could not be taken from the warehouse until the taxes were paid. The whiskey was shipped by railroad in accordance with these terms, but while in the hands of the railroad company the buyer became insolvent and the seller stopped the goods. It was held that his right of stop- page in transitu was not lost. The transitus in such case would not be at an end until the goods reached Boston, and were taken into custody by the purchaser. It would be no answer to say that there was a constructive delivery of the whiskey to the buyer by virtue of the delivery of the ware- house receipt to him, and that he had the right to take pos- session of it and withdrew it from the warehouse, for the purchaser did not take possession of it at the warehouse, but left it in charge of the seller, and to be shipped by him. The seller therefore had the right to exercise his right of stop- page in transitu until the goods reached the purchaser at the place contemplated by the parties as the place of their desti- nation.*^ § 907. Delivery to carrier not generally constructive deliv- ery to vendee. — Ordinarily a delivery of goods to a carrier is not a constructive delivery to the purchaser to whom the 43 Mohr V. Boston & Albany R. Co., 106 Mass. 67. 927 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 908 carrier is to take them, so far as the right of stoppage in transitu is concerned; for the carrier is not the special agent of the purchaser, but a general agent for the carriage of the goods ; and this is the case even although the carrier may have been specially designated or appointed by the pur- chaser.^'^ But the terms of the contract and the circum- stances of the case may show that the parties intended the delivery to the carrier to be a complete delivery to the ven- dee, so that the vendor will not retain his right to stop the goods in their passage. Bills of lading or carriers' receipts sent to the consignee, making the goods deliverable to him, may be evidence of an intention on the part of the vendor to vest the property and the possession in the consignee. In such a case, Parke, B., giving judgment, observed i^"^ "If the intention of the parties to pass the property, whether abso- lute or special, in certain ascertained chattels, is established, and they are placed in the hands of a depositary, no matter whether such depositary be a common carrier or ship-master, employed by the consignor, or a third person, and the chat- tels are sd placed on account of the person who is to have that property; and the depositary assents; it is enough: and it matters not by what documents this is effected." § 908. Not material that the carrier has been designated by the vendee, — It is immaterial that the carrier has been designated by the purchaser or hired by him; for even in such case a delivery to the carrier is only a constructive de- livery to the purchaser, and not an actual delivery to him. "The delivery, by the vendor of goods sold to a carrier of any description, either expressly or by implication named by the vendee, and who is to carry on his account, is a con- structive delivery to the vendee ; but the vendor has a right, 46 In re Frances, 8 Cranch (U. S.) Scott (N. R.) 43; Cowasjee v. 418, 3 L. ed. 609. Thompson, 5 Moore P. C. 165; Mel- •t" Bryans v. Nix, 4 M. & W. 775, etopulo v. Ranking, 6 Jur. 1095. 791. And see Evans v. Nichol, 4 § 909 LIENS. 928 if unpaid, and the vendee be insolvent, to retake the goods before they are actually delivered to the vendee, or some one whom he means to be his agent, to take possession of and keep the goods for him, and thereby to replace the vendor in the same situation as if he had not parted with the actual possession. "^^ § 909. Delivery to carrier sometimes is a constructive de- livery to the purchaser, — When goods have been delivered to one who is only a carrier, though named by the purchaser, but not his agent for any other purpose, such delivery is only a constructive delivery to the purchaser.'*^ If goods are placed on board a ship chartered by the purchaser, ordinarily the transit is not over until the carriage is over. The distinction between a constructive delivery to a pur- chaser by delivery on board a vessel chartered by him, and an actual delivery to him, is well illustrated in the recent English case of the Rosevear China Clay Company. A con- tract was entered into for the sale of some china clay to be delivered free on board at a specified port. The^ purchaser chartered a ship, and the clay was delivered on board at the port agreed upon. The destination of the clay was not com- municated to the vendors. Before the ship left the harbor, the vendors heard of the insolvency of the purchaser, and gave notice to the master to stop the clay in transitu. It was held by the Court of Appeal in Chancery that, the clay being in the possession of the master of the ship only as carrier, the transit was not at an end and the notice to stop was given in time.^^ Lord Justice James said: "The principle is this — that when the vendor knows that he is delivering the 48 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 560; Ruck v. Hatfield, 5 B. & Aid. 623, 632, per Parke, B. 632; Lane v. Robinson, 18 B. Mon. 49 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 (Ky.) 623. Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 753; -J'^ Ex parte Rosevear China Clay Berndtson v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq. Co., L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 560. See post, 481, L. R. 3 Ch. 588; Ex parte Rose- S 911. vear China Clay Co., 11 Ch. Div. 929 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 910 goods to some one as carrier, who is receiving them in that character, he delivers them with the implied right which has been established by the law, of stopping them so long as they remain in the possession of the carrier as carrier. I am of opinion that in the present case, although the vendors' lia- bility was at an end when they had delivered the clay on board the ship, which indeed is the case in most instances of stoppage in transitu, that did not deprive them of the right to stop in transitu so long as the clay was in possession of the master of the ship as carrier." In the same case, Brett, L. J., said: "The clay was placed on board the ship for the purpose of being carried to Glasgow; it was in the actual pos- session of the shipowner, and only in the constructive pos- session of the purchaser. Therefore the right of stoppage in transitu existed. If the purchaser had been the owner of the ship, the vendors would have had no such right, unless they had reserved it by express stipulation. But, in the ac- tual state of things, I think that, both on principle and on the authorities, the transit was not over and the right to stop in transitu remained." Colton, L. J. : *T am of the same opin- ion. * * * ^\iQ contract with a carrier to carry goods does not make the carrier the agent or servant of the person who contracts with him, whether he be the vendor or the pur- chaser of the goods. Here the verbal agreemnt which the purchaser entered into to charter the ship did not make the captain the agent or servant of the purchaser; he was only a carrier." § 910. Delivery to carrier may be delivery to vendee. — A delivery to a carrier is under some circumstances a delivery to the vendee, and then there can be no stoppage in trantisu of the goods in the hands of the carrier.^^ Thus, if the goods 51 Fowler v. McTaggart, cited in Adams, 2 Marsh. 366. 1 East 522n, 3 East 388; Noble v. 59 ^ gii LIENS. 930 are delivered on board of a vessel appointed by the vendee to receive them, not for the purpose of transportation to hnn, or to a place appointed by him for his use, but to be shipped in his name from his ov^^n place of business to a third person at another port, there is a delivery to the vendee when the goods are put on board such vessel, and the vendor has no right afterw^ards to stop the goods to obtain payment of the price. ^- But w^hether a delivery on board the purchaser's own ship, or upon his own cart, is a delivery to him, is a question of fact, and depends upon the circumstances of the delivery, and particularly upon such circumstances as show the inten- tion of the parties in making such delivery. It is well said by Jessell, M. R.,'^^ that "it neither follows, as a proposition of law, that because a purchaser sends his carts for goods and they are given to him in the cart, the transit is at an end, nor does it follow it is not; it is to be considered as a question of what in law is called a question for the jury, that is, a ques- tion of inference from known facts as to what the real inten- tion of the parties was." § 911. Delivery on board of the vendee's ship. — A delivery on board the purchaser's own ship, or one chartered by him, is ordinarily a delivery to him so as to preclude a stoppage in transitu by the vendor before the delivery of the goods at 52 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. right of stoppage ceases on the Freed, 38 Ark. 614; Treadwell v. shipment if no transit is contem- Aydlett, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 388; plated; but that the right exists if Eaton V. Cook, 32 Vt. 58; Rowley the delivery to him is to be made V. Bigelow, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 307, after the termination of the voyage. 23 Am. Dec. 607; Stubbs v. Lund, This distinction is criticised in Bo- 7 Mass. 453, 5 Am. Dec. 63. In the lin v. Huffnagle, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 9, latter case. Parsons, C. J., said that a leading case. the distinction in such case de- ^3 Merchants' Banking Co. v. pends upon the terms of shipment Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., L. R. as shown by the bill of lading; the 5 Ch. Div. 205, 219. 931 SELLER''S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 91 1 the port of consignment.^'* In the words of Baron Parke,^^ "delivery on the vendee's own ship is a final delivery at the place of destination." In such case an essential condition to the exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu is wanting, namely, the custody of the goods by a third person interme- diate between the seller and the buyer after the former has parted with actual possession, and before the latter has ac- quired it.^^ But when goods are delivered absolutely and unconditionally on board the buyer's own ship, and the mas- ter signs bills of lading making the goods deliverable to the buyer or his assigns, without any reservation to the seller of control over them, there is no intermediate third person in custody of the goods; for the master being the servant or agent of the buyer, the delivery to the master is a delivery to the buyer.^"^ In this respect there is no well-founded distinction between the case of a ship of the vendee sent out expressly to receive the goods, and the case of a general ship belonging to him taking the goods without any previous arrangement for the purpose.^^ •^-t Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Ex. Yorkshire Ry., L. R. 2 Ch. 332, 336. 691; Turner v. Liverpool Docks Per Lord Chelmsford, L. C. : "If Co., 6 Ex. 543; Ogle v. Atkinson, the vendor desires to protect liim- 5 Taunt. 759; Inglis v. Usherwood, self under these circumstances, he 1 East 515; Blakey v. Dinsdale, 2 may restrain the efifect of such de- Cowp. 661, 664; Fowler v. McTag- livery, and preserve his right of gart, cited 1 East 522, and 7 T. R. stoppage in transitu by taking bills 442; Bolin v. Hufifnagle, 1 Rawle of lading, making the goods deliv- (Pa.) 9; Thompson v. Stewart, 7 erable to his order or assigns." Phila. (Pa.) 187; Pequeno v. Tay- ^8 Schotsman v. Lancashire & lor, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 375; Brooke Yorkshire R. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 332. Iron Co. V. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 442. per Lord Chelmsford, L. C. The 55 Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Ex. case of Mitchel v. Ede, 11 Ad. & 691, 708. El. 888, sometimes relied upon as 56 Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & creating such a distinction, was not W. 321, per Rolfe, B. See however, a case of stoppage in transitu, or ante, § 909. of vendor and purchaser. 57 Schotsmans v. Lancashire & § 913 LIENS. 932 § 912. Right exercised even where delivery is made on board vendee's ship. — But the right of stoppage may exist even when goods are shipped upon the buyer's own vessel, consigned to him at his place of residence. ^^ A vendor, after putting a cargo on board the vendee's ship, and taking bills of lading making the goods deliverable to the vendee, before the sailing of the ship heard of the vendee's insolvency, and thereupon prevailed upon the master to give up the bills of lading already signed, and to sign other bills of lading de- liverable to the vendor's own agent. The vendee had in the mean time executed a bill of sale of the cargo. In an action of replevin for the goods brought by the assignee, it was held that the vendor so far had control of goods, after the goods had been put on board, that he might rightfully alter their destination, or might stop them in transitu.^^ It seems also that a delivery on board the vendee's own ship should have the effect of a delivery to the vendee him- self, only when the vendor has full knowledge that the ven- dee is the owner; for it would be scarcely just that a vendor who has delivered goods to be carried to his vendee, under the belief that he could exercise the ordinary right of an un- paid vendor over them, should be deprived of that right be- cause he had ignorantly placed the goods on board the ven- dee's own ship, and must therefore be taken to have made an absolute delivery of them.^^ § 913. Effect where bill of lading requires delivery to ven- dor's order. — If the vendor takes a bill of lading making the goods deliverable to his own order, this goes to show that no 59 Brindley v. Cilgwyn Slate Co., Rawle (Pa.) 9; Pequeno v. Taylor, 55 L. J. Q. B. (H; Ex parte Rose- 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 375. vear China Clay Co., 11 Ch. Div. so Hsley v, Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65, 6 560; Ilsley v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65, Am. Dec. 29. And see Ex parte 6 Am. Dec. 29; Cross v. O'Donnell, Rosevear China Clay Co., L. R. 11 44 N. Y. 661, 666, 4 Am. Rep. 721. Ch. Div. 560. See, however, Bolin v. Huflfnagle, 1 6I Schotsmans v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 332. 933 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 914 property passes to the vendee, and that the vendor, though shipping the goods by the vendee's own vessel, intends to retain control of the goods till he should do some further act, such as indorsing the bill of lading to the vendee.^^ Mer- chants at Liverpool sent orders to merchants at Charleston to ship a quantity of cotton for the homeward voyage of a ship of theirs then at that port. The Charleston merchants ac- cordingly purchased cotton and shipped it on board this ves- sel. The master signed for the consignors a bill of lading making the cotton deliverable at Liverpool "to order or to our assigns, paying for freight for the cotton nothing, being owners' property;" and the consignors indorsed the bill of lading to order of their own agents at Liverpool, and drew upon the consignees for the consignment, and pledged the bill of lading for advances upon the draft. The consignees having become bankrupt before the arrival of the vessel at Liverpool, the consignors by their agent stopped the cargo in transitu. The assignees in bankruptcy of the consignees claimed the cotton; but it was held that the property did not vest absolutely in the consignees, notwithstanding the de- livery on board their ship; for, by the terms of the bill of lading, the consignors reserved to themselves a jus dispo- nendi of the goods, which the master acknowledged by sign- ing the bill of lading making the cotton deliverable to their order, although by so doing the master might have exceeded his authority.^^ § 914. Receipt that goods are shipped on seller's account. — If a vendor, upon delivering goods on board a vessel named by the vendee, takes a receipt from the person in charge, 62 Seymour v. Newton, 105 Mass. cumstances bore a close resem- 272. blance to the above case; but the 03 Turner v. Liverpool Docks, 6 case is distinguishable, because a Ex. 543. See, also, Ellershaw v. fraud was practised upon the mas- Magniac, 6 Ex. 570 n.; Wait v. ter of the vessel to induce him to Baker, 2 Ex. 1. In Ogle v. Atkin- sign a bill of lading with the name son, 5 Taunt. 759, the general cir- of the consignee in blank. § 915 LIENS. 934 stating that the goods are shipped on the seller's account, he preserves his right of stoppage until he exchanges his receipt for a bill of lading; and he does not lose his right though the shipmaster inadvertently gives the bill of lading to the pur- chaser or his assigns.*^^ "I take it," said Gibbs, C. J.,^^ "that the regular practice is, that the person who is in possession of the receipt is alone entitled to the bill of lading; and the captain, therefore, ought not to give the bill of lading, except to the person who can give the receipt in exchange; conse- quently the person holding the receipt has a control over the goods, till he has exchanged it for a bill of lading." § 915. Bill of lading not conclusive proof that delivery has been made to vendee. — Though the vendor takes a bill of lading by which the goods are to be delivered to the pur- chaser, this is not conclusive that the delivery on board the purchaser's own ship is a delivery to him. Thus, where a planter residing in Jamaica was indebted to a London mer- chant, and shipped sugars on board a vessel belonging to the latter, and received from the master a bill of lading by which the goods were to be delivered to the London merchant, he paying freight, the planter made an indorsement on the bill of lading that the goods were to be delivered to the merchant only upon his giving security for certain payments, and otherwise to the planter's agent. The planter then indorsed and delivered the bill to a third person, to whom he was in- debted in more than the value of the goods. It was held that the planter had a right to change the destination of the goods before the delivery of them or of the bill of lading to the merchant, and that the property had not passed to the latter, although the planter was indebted to him in a greater sum than the value of the sugars.^^ 64 Craven v. Ryder, 2 Marsh. 127, "^'J Mitchel v. Ede, 11 Ad. & El. 6 Taunt. 433; Cowasjee v. Thomp- 888. And see Moakes v. Nicolson, son. 5 Moore P. C. 165, is to be 19 C. B. (N. S.) 290; Inglis v. distinguished. Usherwood, 1 East 515. •55 Craven v. Ryder, 2 Marsh. 127. 935 SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 917 § 916. Vendor may act as agent of vendee in taking bill of lading. — Notwithstanding the form of the bill of lading, the vendor may have acted as agent for the vendee in taking it. If, therefore, the bill of lading be made "freight free," and the invoice shoves that the goods were shipped for and on account of the vendee, and it appears that both the bill of lading and invoice are immediately assigned to the vendee, it is a question for the jury whether the goods were not really delivered on board the vendee's ship, to be carried for and on his account, and, if so, the right of stoppage would end with the delivery of the goods on board the vendee's ship.^"^ § 917. Transit continues until goods arrive at destination. — As a general rule, the transit continues until the goods have arrived at the original destination contemplated by the purchaser and named to the vendor.^^ Such destination is the place to which the goods are to be conveyed by the car- rier, and where they will remain unless fresh orders be given for their subsequent disposition.^^ When the goods have arrived by vessel at their place of destination, and the purchaser has indorsed the bills of lad- ing, and delivered them to a railroad company, in order that the goods may be forwarded to the purchaser at another place, they cannot be stopped by the vendor while in posses- sion of the latter carrier, for the transitus prescribed by the 6" Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Ex. 6 B. & C. 422; Dixon v. Baldvven, 691. Also see Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 5 East 175; Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. 1 ; Turner v. Liverpool Docks Co., & P. 320; Rowe v. Pickford, 8 6 Ex. 543; Ellershaw v. Magniac, Taunt. 83; Coventry v. Gladstone, 6 Ex. 570; Brown v. North, 8 Ex. L. R. 6 Eq. 44, per Wood, V. C; 1; Jenkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496; Rodger v. The Comptoir d'Es- Browne v. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484; compte de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. 393; Ruck V. Hatfield, 5 B. & Aid. 632; Stokes v. La Riviere, cited 3 T. R. Joyce V. Swann, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466, and 3 East 397; Parker v. Mc- 84. Iver, 1 Des. (S. Car.) 274, 1 Am. 08 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. Dec. 656. & W. 518, 534; Coates v. Railton, 69 Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 § gi8 LIENS. 936 vendor is at an end, and the railroad company is the agent of the purchaserJ*^ § 918. Transit not ended by the arrival of vessel at port of call. — Where a port of call is named at which the vessel must touch for orders to proceed to the place of its final destina- tion, the arrival of the vessel at the port of call does not or- dinarily end the transitus. A merchant at Bahia shipped a cargo of sugar to a sugar-refining company at Glasgow by a ship chartered by the vendor. The charter-party provided that the ship should proceed "either direct or via Falmouth, Cowes, or Queenstown, for orders, to a port in the United Kingdom, or to a port on the continent (between certain limits)." The bill of lading, which was indorsed to the con- signee, and the invoice, specified the destination of the cargo in similar terms. The ship arrived at Falmouth, and the master, in pursuance of written instructions from the vendor, announced its arrival to his agents in London, and asked them for orders. The agents applied to the consignee for instructions as to the destination of the ship; but, before any instructions were given, the latter became insolvent, and thereupon the vendor's agents stopped the cargo. It was held that the cargo had not been constructively delivered to the vendee, that the transitus was not over, and that the stop- page was valid. '^^ Lord Romilly, M. R., delivering judgment, said :'^ "The question is, whether there was delivery at a place where the vendee meant the goods to remain until a fresh destination was communicated to them by orders from himself. If the ship had, under the direction of the company, proceeded to the Clyde, still the transitus would not have been over; but if, on its arrival, the company had determined M. & W. 436, 450, per Parke, B.; 'i Fraser v. Witt, L. R. 7 Eq. 64, Blackman v. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508; 71. Halff V. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278. '2 Fraser v. Witt, L. R. 7 Eq. 64, 70 Ex parte Gibbes, L. R. 1 Ch. 71. Div. 101. 937 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 919 to send the cargo to another port, not within the original charter-party, and had for that purpose chartered the vessel afresh, and thereby made the master their own agent, then the constructive delivery pointed out by Lord Wensleydale would have occurred, and it would have been the same thing in substance as if the cargo had been taken from the vessel and put on board another vessel under the direction and con- trol of the company. The purchaser must not only be the owner of the goods, but he must be the owner for the time being of the receptacle in which the goods are placed. This was not so in the present case; the company could not have sent the sugar to any port in the Mediterranean, or indeed, to any port except one within the limits specified in the char- ter-party effected by the defendant at Bahia and even if di- rections had been given by the company to proceed to one of the ports specified in the charter-party, still there would have been no delivery to the company until after the arrival of the cargo in that port, and some act done by which the possession and absolute control over the sugar had been vested in the company. But, in truth, not even this was done; for the agents did not desire the company to give the master directions whither he was to go, or put him under their control, but they wrote to the company and said, 'Give us instructions as to the port to which we are to send the vessel,' and even then instructions never came until after the delivery of the goods had been stopped by the agents of the defendant." § 919. Vendee may take possession at any point en route. — It is generally conceded that the vendee may anticipate the delivery at the place of consignment, and take possession at any place on the route where he may direct the carrier to deliver the goods, though he thereby shortens the transit and puts an end to the vendor's right of stoppage.*^^ Baron 73 Wright V. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82; Wood v. Yeatman, 15 B. Mon. § 919 LIENS. 938 Parke, in a case which did not directly involve this point, expressed this view strongly, saying :'^^ "The law is clearly settled, that the unpaid vendor has a right to retake the goods before they have arrived at the destination originally contemplated by the purchaser, unless in the meantime they have come to the actual or constructive possession of the vendee. If the vendee take them out of the possession of the carrier into his own before their arrival, with or without the consent of the carrier, there seems to be no doubt that the transit would be at an end: though in the case of the absence of the carrier's consent, it may be a wrong to him, for which he would have a right of action." (Ky.) 270; Muskegon Booming Co. V. Underbill, 43 Mich. 629, 5 N. W. 1073; Stevens v. Wheeler, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 658, 660. In this case goods consigned to the buyer in Brooklyn were taken possession of by him in New York. There are dicta and im- plications to this effect in several cases. Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 518; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. Cas. 508; James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 623; Mills v. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457; Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 107; Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175; Kendall v. Marshall, 48 L. T. (N. S.) 951, 16 Rep. 511; Secomb V. Nutt, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 324; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188. In Mohr v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 106 Mass. 67, 72, Morton, J., remarked: "In all cases of delivery of goods to a common carrier, for the purpose of transit, the vendee, acting in good faith, has the right to intercept the goods be- fore they reach their destination, and, by taking actual possession of them, to defeat the vendor's lien." In a modern case, which did not, however, involve the question of the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, it was held that the car- rier was not bound to deliver the goods at the place of consignment, but might deliver them at any place at which the consignee should order their delivery; and Bramwell, B., said: "It would probably create a smile anywhere but in a court of law, if it were said that a carrier could not deliver to the consignee at any place except that specified by the consignor. The goods are intended to reach the consignee, and, provided he receives them, it is immaterial at what place they are delivered. The contract is to de- liver the goods to the consignee at the place named by the consignor, unless the consignee directs them to be delivered at a different place." London & N. W. Ry. v. Bartlett, 7 H. & N. 400, 407. 74 Whitehead v. Anderson. 9 M. & W. 518. See, also, Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42, per Cham- bre. J. 939 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 921 § 920. Mere demand by vendee not sufficient. — But a mere demand by the consignee without a deHvery of the goods to him is not sufficient to intercept them on their passage, and determine the vendor's right of stoppage. Upon this point Chief Justice Tindal observed that, "although it might be conceded to be the better opinion, that if the vendee actually receives the possession of his woods on their passage to him, and before the voyage has completely terminated, that the delivery is complete, and the right of stoppage gone ; yet no authority has been cited for the position, and the principle seems the other way, that a mere demand by the vendee, without any delivery, before the voyage has completely ter- minated, deprives the consignor of his right of stoppage. "^^ § 921. Delivery before point of distination may terminate transit. — Whether an intermediate delivery before the goods have reached their ultimate destination terminates the tran- situs or not depends upon the authority of the person to whom the intermediate delivery is made. If he be merely an agent to forward the goods in accordance with the orig- inal directions, the vendor's right continues ;'^^ but if he has "•^ Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N Cas. 508. "0 Smith V. Goss, 1 Camp. 282 Coates V. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422 Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. Cas 508; Ex parte Watson, L. R. 5 Ch Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249, affirm- ing Harris v. Hart, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 606; Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 611, 613. In this case Wal- Div. 35; Nicholls v. Le Feuvre, 2 worth, Chancellor, said: "The law Bing. N. Cas. 81; Rodger v. Comp- appears to be well settled that the toir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 2 right of stoppage in transitu ex- P. C. 393; Markwald v. Creditors, ists so long as the goods re- 7 Cal. 213; Blackman v. Pierce, 23 main in the hands of a middleman Cal. 508; Atkins v. Colby, 20 N. H. on the way to the place of their 154; Lane v. Robinson, 18 B. Mon. destination, and that the right ter- (Ky.) 623; Secomb v. Nutt. 14 B. minates, whenever the goods are or Mon. (Ky.) 324; Wood v. Yeat- have been, either actually or con- man, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 270; Halfif structively delivered to the vendee; V. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278; Cabeen v. a delivery to the general agent of Campbell, 30 Pa. St. 254; Hays v. the vendee is of course tantamount 922 LIENS. 940 authority to receive the goods for the consignee, and to give them a new destination not originally intended, the transitus ends with the delivery to him. If the goods upon their inter- mediate delivery have so far reached the end of their jour- ney that they await new orders from the purchaser to put them in motion again, and give them another substantive destination, and if without such new orders they must re- main stationary, then the delivery is complete and the lien of the vendor has expired. '^'^ If the person into whose hands the goods come does not receive them for the purpose of expediting their further transportation, but simply as the agent of the purchaser for his use for general purposes un- connected with transportation, it is virtually the possession of the purchaser himself, and the transitus is at an end.'^^ § 922. Transit continuous while goods are held by a for- warding agent. — The transitus continues while the goods are to a delivery to himself. The time during which the right exists, there- fore, is during the whole period of the transit, from the vendor to the purchaser, or the place of ultimate destination, as designated to the vendor by the buyer; and this tran- sit continues so long as possession of the middleman, whether he be the carrier either by land or water, or the keeper of a warehouse or place of deposit connected with the transmission and delivery of the goods." 77 This is the doctrine of the leading case of Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175; and of Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. & P. 320; Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. 6 P. 469; Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837; Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436; Dodson v. Went- worth, 4 M. & G. 1080; James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 623, 631, per Parke, B.; Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431, per Cockburn, C. J.; Rowe V. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83; Cooper V. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722; Harman v. Anderson, 2 Camp. 243; Lucas v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278; Kendall v. Marshall, 48 L. T. (N. S.) 951, 16 Rep. 511; Guilford v. Smith, 30 Vt. 49, where the cases are reviewed at length; Biggs v. Barry, 2 Cur- tis (U. S.) 259, Fed. Cas. No. 1402; Pottinger v. Hecksher, 2 Grant Cas, (Pa.) 309; Hays v. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48; Brooke Iron Co. v. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 442. 78 Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249 Covell V. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. 611 Becker v. Hallgarten, 86 N. Y. 167 Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79; At- kins V. Colby, 20 N. H. 154; Inslee v. Lane. 57 N. H. 454, 459. per Fos- ter, C. J. 941 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 922 in the hands of an agent appointed by the purchaser for the purpose of forwarding the goods. Though the agent may be the agent of the purchaser, designated, paid, and employed by him, yet, if the purpose of his employment is to expedite the property toward its destination, or to aid those engaged in forwarding it, the seller's right to stay the final delivery continues.''^'' "When the seller attempts to claim the goods the question is whether they have arrived at the end of their transit, and this usually depends upon the further question whether the party in whose hands they are found is acting in the character of an agent for transportation, or as the agent of the purchaser, holding them simply for his use un- connected with the business of forwarding them. It some- times happens that the seller delivers goods sold on credit immediately to an agent of the purchaser, or that, as in the present case, he sends them a part of the way to their final destination, and they are delivered to such agent of the buyer. When they have been so delivered according to the vendee's direction, either immediately upon the sale or after being carried a part of the distance, the question arises whether the seller retains a right to stop them on account of the failure of the purchaser. Under certain circumstances the depositary in these cases is considered as the general agent of the purchaser, and the goods when in his hands are adjudged to be virtually in the possession of such purchaser and not in transitu ; while under a state of facts somewhat different the person into whose custody they thus came is regarded as an agent for expediting them, and the right of stoppage continues until they come to the purchaser's hands ^^9 Stokes V. La Riviere, reported 508; Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 Bing. in Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 381; 516; Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249, Coates V. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422; per Denio, J., who reviews at length Nichols V. Le Feuvre, 2 Bing. N. the earlier cases; Hays v. Mouille, C. 81; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. 14 Pa. St. 48. § 9^3 LIENS. 942 at his place of business, or at some other place where he has directed them to be sent."®^ Wool was purchased in New York by a manufacturing company located at Enfield, through their agent, to be paid for by the paper of this company when delivered at Enfield. The wool was delivered to the agent upon an order of the vendor to the storekeeper to deliver it to the company named or bearer. The agent of this company was also the agent of another manufacturing company located at Simsbury, and it was his usual course of business to divide between these two companies any large lots of wool purchased for either, each company giving its own notes for its respective share of the wool when received. The agent accordingly divided the wool purchased in this case, and forwarded a portion of it to the corporation located at Simsbury without the knowledge of the vendor. Before the wool was received both corporations became insolvent, and the portion of the wool forwarded to the Simsbury company was attached as its property while in the hands of the carrier. It was held that the transitus of the wool was not terminated by the delivery to the agent, nor by his act in sending a portion of it to the Simsbury company; and that the vendor might exercise his right of stoppage.®^ § 923. Transit is not ended when vendee repudiates the purchase. — If the vendee repudiates the purchase, and de- clines to receive the goods after they have arrived at their destination, the transitus is not at an end, and the unpaid vendor has the right to stop them.^^ "The property in these goods passed by the contract to the vendee. Unless the 80 Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249, 439; Nicholls v. Le Feuvre, 2 Bing. per Denio, J. N. Cas. 81 ; Mason v. Wilson, 43 81 Aguirre v. Parmelee, 22 Conn. Ark. 172; Greve v. Dunham, 60 473. Iowa 108, 14 N. W. 130, 15 Rep. 82 Bolton V. Lancashire & York- 232. shire R. Co.. L. R. 1 C. P. 431, 943 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 923 property passed, there would be no need of the right of stop- ping in transitu. The only effect of the property passing, is, that from that time the goods are at the risk of the buyer. But it by no means follows that the buyer is to have posses- sion unless he is prepared to pay for the goods. As long as the goods remain in the warehouse of the vendor, or in the hands of one who holds as his agent, his lien upon them for the unpaid price remains. But, when once they have got into the possession of an agent for the buyer, the vendor parts with his lien. The right to stop in transitu upon the bank- ruptcy of the buyer remains, even when the credit has not expired, until the goods have reached the hands of the ven- dee, or of one who is his agent, as a warehouseman, or a packer, or a shipping-agent, to give them a new destination. Until one of these events has happened, the vendor has a right to stop the goods in transitu. It must be observed that there is, besides the propositions I have stated, and which are quite familiar, one other proposition which follows as deducible from these, viz., that the arrival which is to divest the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu must be such as that the buyer has taken actual or constructive possession of the goods; and that can not be so long as he repudiates them. This is the alphabet of the doctrine of stoppage in transitu."*^ If after such refusal of the buyer to receive the goods, find- ing himself insolvent, they are attached by one of his cred- itors, the sheriff paying the freight, the seller may still assert his right of stoppage in transitu, though, upon taking the goods from the sheriff by replevin suit, he may be required to repay to the attaching creditor the amount advanced by him for payment of the freight. ^^ A purchaser of goods which had been shipped to him, and were stored in the freight-house of the railroad company, finding on the day of their arrival that he was insolvent, re- 83 Bolton V. Lancashire & York- s-* Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa 108, shire R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 431, 439. 14 N. W. 130, 15 Rep. 232. § 9-4 LIENS. . 944 marked the goods, and ordered the agent of the railroad company to return them to the seller. While for that pur- pose they were being transferred from the freight-house to the cars, a sheriff took possession of the goods, under in- solvency proceedings, as the property of the purchaser. The seller, upon hearing of the insolvency, wrote a letter for the return of the goods, which, however, was never received. It was held that there had been no effectual exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu.^^ § 924. Refusal of insolvent vendee to take the goods may determine the question of delivery. — The refusal of the buyer after his insolvency to take the goods upon their arrival may determine the question whether there has been a delivery or not, for it may show the intention with which the buyer has directed that they should be landed or stored.^^ Goods were consigned to a London merchant, and by the bill of lading were made deliverable to him in the river Thames. On the arrival of the vessel in the river, the master of the ship pressed the consignee to have them landed immediately, and the latter accordingly sent his son to the master with direc- tions to land them at a wharf where he was accustomed to have goods landed; but being then insolvent, he at the same time told his son not to meddle with the goods, that he did not intend to take them, and that the vendor ought to have them. The goods were accordingly landed at the wharf, and were then stopped in transitu by the vendor. In an action for the goods by the consignee's assignee in bankruptcy, it was held that the declarations so made by the consignee to his son were admissible in evidence, although they were not communicated to the vendor or to the wharfinger; and 85 Millard v. Webster, 54 Conn. Farebrother, 4 Bing. 579; Cox v. 415, 8 Atl. 470, Granger, J., dis- Burns, 1 Iowa 64; Mason v. Red- senting. path, 39 U. C. Q. B. 157. And see 86 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. Heinekey v. Earle, 8 El. & Bl. 410; 623, 1 M. & W. 20, 29; Bartram v. Mills v. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457. 945 SELLERS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 925 that they showed that the consignee had not taken posses- sion of the goods as owner, and therefore that the transitus was not determined. ^^ Baron Parke, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "If the order was given to land at the wharf, with intent to make it the place of deposit for the goods as the bankrupt's own property, at which place he meant to deal with them as his own, to sell to his customers, or to give them from thence a fresh destination, doubtless the transitus was at an end. The wharf became the ware- house of the vendee, and the landing there was a taking pos- session. =i^ * * On the other hand, if his intention in land- ing the goods had been to make the wharfinger an instrument of further conveyance to his own warehouse, then the tran- situs still continued; or, if the goods were placed there with the intention of preventing any liability on his part to the captain for demurrage, and that they might remain in medio, or that they might remain for the benefit of the owners, the transitus had not ended; they had not arrived at the end of their journey; they were not actually delivered to the vendee, or one who was an agent of his, for the purpose of keeping possession on his account. The whole question then is, with w4iat intent was the order to land given? Of that there is on the evidence no doubt, — the bankrupt did not mean to take possession as owner." § 925. Rule in similar case. — In another similar case it ap- peared that goods were sent by railway to the buyer, who gave notice to the seller before they arrived that he would not receive them on account of their alleged bad quality; and after their arrival he gave the railway company orders to take the goods back to the seller. The latter refused to receive them, and ordered them back to the buyer. The goods, being thus rejected by both the buyer and the seller, remained in the hands of the railway; and while they so re- 87 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. ing, 1 M. & W. 20. 623, Lord Abinger, C. B., dissent- 60 § 9^6 LIENS. 946 mained the buyer became bankrupt, and the vendor stopped the goods. In an action against the railway company by the assignees of the buyer, it was held that the transit was not at an end, and the vendor could exercise his right of stop- page. ^^ Erie, J., said: *'It was urged that, being repudiated by both parties to the contract, the goods remained in the hands of the railway company as warehousemen for the real owner, that is, for the buyer. There is no doubt but that the carrier may and often does become a warehouseman for the consignee; but that must be by virtue of some contract or course of dealing between them, that, when arrived at their destination the character of carrier shall cease, and that of warehouseman supervene." And Willes, J., said: "The right to stop in transitu upon the bankruptcy of the buyer remains, even when the credit has not expired, until the goods have reached the hands of the vendee, or of one who is his agent, as a warehouseman, or a packer, or a shipping- agent, to give them a new destination. Until one of these events has happened, the vendor has a right to stop the goods in transitu. It must be observed that there is, besides the propositions I have stated, and which are quite familiar, one other proposition which follows as deducible from these, viz., that the arrival which is to divest the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu must be such as that the buyer has taken actual or constructive possession of the goods; and that can- not be so long as he repudiates them." § 926. Right of stoppage remains so long as carrier holds the goods not as vendee's agent. — The right of stoppage in transitu remains so long as the carrier holds the goods as carrier, and not as the purchaser's agent by virtue of an agreement with him, though he has delivered a part. Of course the same principle will apply under like circumstances when the goods are in the hands of a warehouseman or 88 Bolton V. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 431. 947 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 926 wharfinger. A cargo of one hundred and fourteen tons of iron castings was consigned to the purchaser, he paying the freight, on board a ship chartered by the vendor. After thirty tons of the cargo had been delivered to the purchaser, the vendor gave notice to stop the deHvery. At this time, only part of the freight had been paid. The purchaser hav- ing become insolvent and a receiver having been appointed, he paid the balance of the freight, and claimed the remainder of the iron. It was held, that, inasmuch as it could not be supposed that the master of the ship intended to abandon his lien for the unpaid freight, the delivery of the thirty tons did not operate as a constructive delivery of the whole cargo, and that, consequently, the transitus was not at an end as to the remainder of the cargo, and the vendor's notice to stop in transitu was given in time.^^ Lord Justice James, deliver- ing judgment, said: "It seems to me quite clear there was nothing like a constructive delivery of the whole by the cap- tain, or a constructive acceptance of the whole by the vendee. How it might have been if the whole freight had been paid, so that the captain had no lien that he could exercise on behalf of the owners of the ship, and the delivery had begun, what difference that would have made it is not necessary now to say. It appears to me quite clear that, as there was not an actual delivery of the whole, there could not be a construc- tive delivery of the whole, because it must be assumed that the captain would not have delivered the whole until he had received the whole of the freight; and if the captain had not constructively delivered the whole, it would be impossible to say that the vendee had constructively accepted a delivery which was never made." Goods remain in transitu while the carrier holds them in actual possession, and has not wrong- fully refused to deliver them.^® 89 Ex parte Cooper, L. R. 11 Ch. oo Crawshay v. Eades, 1 B. & C. Div. 68, 72. 181; Hoist v. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240; § 9-7 LIENS. 948 § 927. Necessity that carrier part with possession of goods at transitus. — The transitus is not at an end until the carrier parts with the possession of the goods. ^^ The carrier has the right to retain possession until the freight due him is ten- dered or paid. Of course he may assent to the consignee's having possession of the goods without paying the freight, but such assent will not be presumed. Iron was sold and shipped by water to the purchaser. The carrier, upon reach- ing the purchaser's wharf, landed a part of the iron, but, finding that the purchaser had stopped payment, reloaded it on board his barge, and took the entire shipment to his own premises. The freight had not been paid nor tendered, and, there being nothing to show that the carrier intended to part with possession without the payment of his freight, it was held that he still had possession of the iron and that the con- signor had a right to stop it in transitu.^^ "When part of the iron was landed upon the wharf," said Bayley, J., " it might more properly be considered as in a course of delivery, than as actually delivered. By placing it upon the wharf, the car- rier did not mean to assent to the vendee's taking it away without paying the freight. Besides, a carrier has a lien on the entire cargo, for his whole freight; and, until the amount is either tendered or paid, the special property which he has in his character of carrier does not pass out of him to the vendee, unless, indeed, he does some act to shew that he assents to the vendee's taking possession of the property before the freight is paid. * * * In order to divest the consignor's right to stop in transitu, there ought to be such a delivery to the consignee, as to divest the carrier's lien upon the whole cargo." Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516; Marks, 21 La. Ann. 268, 99 Am. Lackington V. Atherton, 8 Scott (N. Dec. 725; Kitchen v. Spear, 30 Vt. R.) 38. 545; Tufts v. Sylvester, 79 Maine 91 McFetridge v. Piper, 40 Iowa 213, 9 Atl. 357, 1 Am. St. 303. 627; Alsberg v. Latta, 30 Iowa 442; 92 Crawshay v. Eades, 1 B. & C. Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa 108. 14 181, 2 D. & R. 288. N. W. 130, 15 Rep. 232; Blum v. 949 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 929 § 928. Transit ends when consignee claims the goods and the carrier wrongfully refuses to deliver them. — But the tran- situs is at an end when the consignee has claimed the goods, and the carrier has wrongfully refused to deliver them, and has thus rendered himself liable for them in trover.^^ In Bird V. Brown it appeared that, upon the arrival of the goods by vessel at their port of destination, the consignee formally demanded them of the master, and tendered the freight, but he delivered them to one who claimed to act for the vendor. The Court of Exchequer held that the master could not, by wrongfully detaining the goods, prolong the transitus, and so extend the period during which stoppage might be made. "The transitus," said Rolfe, B.,^^ "was at an end when the goods had reached the port of destination, and when the con- signees, having demanded the goods and tendered the amount of the freight, would have taken them into their possession but for a wrongful delivery of them to other parties." § 929. Goods still in transit when on arrival they are in the hands of a local carrier. — Goods are still in transitu after they have arrived at the place of their destination, but are in the hands of a local carrier for local delivery.^^ "The real and indeed the only question in all these cases is, whether the transitus is over; in other words, whether the goods have been delivered to the buyer: if they have, then the right to stop is gone, and the only remedy of the seller is by action at law, or by proof against the estate of the buyer."^^ The 93 Bird V. Brown, 4 Exch. 786; Co. v. Painter, 15 Nebr. 394, 19 N. Walley V. Montgomery, 3 East 585; W. 488; Mason v. Wilson, 43 Ark. Davis V. McWhirter, 40 U. C. Q. B. 172; O'Neil v. Garrett, 6 Iowa 480; 598; Reynolds v. B. & M. R. Co., Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio St. 43 N. H. 580. 281. 8 Am. Rep. 63; Reynolds v. B. 94 4 Exch. 786, 797. & M. R. Co., 43 N. H. 580. 95 White V. Mitchell, 38 Mich. 96 Eraser v. Witt, L. R. 7 Eq. 64, 390; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. 69, per Lord Romilly, M. R. Cas. 508; Chicago, B. & Q. R. § 930 LIENS. 950 vendor's right is terminated only by the passage of the goods into the actual or constructive possession of the vendee.^^ § 930. Goods in quarantined vessel after arrival are still in transit. — Goods are in transitu, and may be stopped by the vendor, although the ship has arrived at the port of destina- tion, but has been ordered out for quarantine, and it does not matter that the assignee of the bankrupt purchaser has taken possession of the goods on board the ship while she was in port.^^ In the case cited it was argued that the con- signee had a right to go out to sea to meet the ship; but Lord Kenyon declared that this argument could not be sup- ported, 'as it might go the length of saying that the consignee might meet the vessel coming out of the port from whence she had been consigned, and divest the consignor of the property and vest it in himself, — a position which could not be supported, as there would then be no possibility .of any stoppage in transitu at all.®^ In the case before the court it was held that the vendor stopped the goods in time because the voyage was not completed until the vessel had performed quarantine. § 931. Effect of placing goods in a custom-house. — Goods are in transitu after they have been placed by the carrier in the custom-house, or government storehouse, to await the payment of duties.^ In such case it does not matter that the assignee of the purchaser has demanded possession of the goods before the vendor has interposed to exercise his right 9" McFetridge v. Piper, 40 Iowa ^ Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; 627; Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa Burnham v. Winsor, 5 Law Rep. 108, 14 N. W. 130; Halff v. Allyn, 507; Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell 60 Tex. 278; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 539, Fed Cas. No. 10728; Burr v. Tex. 2, 13, 60 Am. Dec. 188. Wilson, 13 U. C. Q. B. 478; Lewis 98 Hoist V. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240. v. Mason, 36 U. C. Q. B. 590; 99 See, however, dictum of Lord Ascher v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 36 Alvanley, C. J., in Mills v. Ball, 2 U. C Q. B. 609; Wiley v. Smith, 1 B. & P. 457, 461, Ont. App. 179; Wilds v. Smith, 2 951 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 932 of stoppage in transitu,^ if the assignee has only made de- mand and has not taken actual possession; nor does it mat- ter that the vendee has paid the freight and given his note for the price of the goods, which, in consequence of the loss of the invoice, are stored in the custom-house, and there re- main until the dishonor of the note, for until the duties are paid the goods remain in custodia legis.^ The goods are still in transitu after the vessel has arrived at the place of destina- tion, but has been ordered out and placed in quarantine. § 932. Entry of goods at custom-house without the pay- ment of duties. — The goods are in the legal possession of the government or its ofBcers, and have not come to the posses- sion of the vendee so as to deprive the vendor of his right.* So, if imported goods are entered at a custom-house by the vendee at the port of entry for transportation to an interior city under bond to be delivered to the collector of customs at the latter place, the legal custody of the goods during the transit is in the government, but the actual pos- session is in the carriers, and neither the vendee nor his agent has such possession as will defeat the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. "We apprehend," said Woodruff, Ont. App. 8; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 76; Burnham v. Denio (N. Y.) 629, per Walworth, Winsor, 5 Law Rep. 507. Other- C; Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. (N. wise after the consignee has made Y.) 76, 104, per Woodruff, J.; In re a warehouse entry at the custom- Beams, 18 N. Bank Reg. 500, per house, and taken a warehouse re- Choate, J.; Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 ceipt and transferred this in pledge. Wis. 79; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. Maine 93, 29 Am. Dec. 489, 15 521; Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249; Maine 314, 33 Am. Dec. 617; Do- Fraschieris v. Henriques, 6 Abb. nath V. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. 301. Pr. (N. S.) 251. In the latter case, 2 Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; Judge Barrett, after reviewing the Hoist V. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240. cases, deduced from them the fol- 3 Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. lowing rules: "1. Where the goods 301. are removed under general orders, 4 Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249, in default of an entry, the right of 262; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio stoppage in transitu is not termi- (N. Y.) 629; Holbrook v. Vose, 6 nated. 2. Where a formal entry is § 933 LIENS. 952 J.,^ "that the true principle upon which it must be held that the entry of the goods and their being held by the govern- ment to secure the payment of duties, does not defeat the vendor's right to stop, is,^ that so long as the goods are in the custody of the government, there is not, and cannot be, any reduction of the goods by the vendee, to his own possession. They are kept, for the time being, from reaching such pos- session. By this, of course, we do not mean that enough was not done by the vendors to perfect tlie contract of sale, nor that the possession of the carriers was not for many pur- poses to be deemed the possession of the actual owners, (the vendees,) but the possession of the carriers was a possession for the purpose of transportation to the vendees, and was subject to the right of the vendors to stop the goods, if those events which create that right should happen while the goods were in course of such transportation. The goods had not come to the actual possession of any agent of the vendees, for the purpose of disposal. Nor did the carriers hold them subject to the directions of the vendees for disposal, nor as a deposit in a warehouse, subject to the order of the vendees for disposal. The only substantial change in the conditions of the goods was, that they were placed in a course of trans- mission to the vendees, and were in the actual possession of a middleman for that purpose ; and it may be stated, as a general proposition, that a delivery of goods to a carrier or other agent of the buyer for the purpose of being carried forward to the buyer, does not terminate the transit." § 933. Transit not ended by storage of goods in govern- ment warehouse. — For stronger reasons the right continues when they have been stored in a government warehouse in the name of the seller, so that it is impossible for the con- made, but is not followed up by regularly bonded and warehoused, proper bonding, the right continues. the right ceases." 3. But where there is a perfect en- ■> Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. (N. try, and the goods are thereupon Y.) 76. 953 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 933 signee to get them without the written consent of the former.^ The mere fact that goods imported from abroad upon the order of a buyer have come into the hands of the officers of the customs, and have been by them put into a warehouse, does not determine the transit though the buyer has paid freight and given his note for the price of the goodsJ It has been held, however, that a vendee has constructive possession of goods entered by him at a custom-house at the place of their destination to await the payment of duties.^ Whatever possession the government may have is said to be under the owner, and to be at most but a qualified or special possession for the purpose of securing a lien by way of pledge. The goods are at all times subject to the order of the owner upon payment of duties and expenses, and upon the payment of these he is entitled to actual possession. He can sell them subject to the duties and expenses. Although he has not paid the duties he has constructive possession. 6 In In re Beams, 18 N. Bank. 301; Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell (U. Reg. 500, 502, Judge Choate, deliv- S.) 539, Fed. Cas. No. 10728, per ering the judgment, said: "The Lowell, J.; Mottram v. Heyer, 1 right of stoppage in transitu de- Denio (N. Y.) 483, 5 Denio (N. pends upon the fact that the goods Y.) 629; Barrett v. Goddard, 3 have not come to the actual or con- Mason (U. S.) 107, Fed. Cas. No. structive possession of the vendee, 1046, doubted. and it is not necessary that the ob- s Guilford v. Smith, 30 Vt. 49, re- stacle which has prevented this viewing Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Denio should be one that was purposely (N. Y.) 483. In Guilford v. Smith, interposed by the vendor for this 30 Vt. 49, Bennett, J., remarks that, purpose, nor that it was one ere- in Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613, the ated by him directly or indirectly. possession of the carrier was still If the existing regulation of the continued; and that neither in this Treasury Department has pre- case nor in Donath v. Broomhead, vented that possession being con- 7 Pa. St. 301, had the consignees summated, the nature of that regu- themselves exercised anj^ owner- lation is of no more consequence on ship over the property by entering this question than the nature of any the goods at the custom-house. But other fact or accident that may in Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Denio (N. have led to the same result." Y.) 483, Walworth, C., remarks that 7 Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. the entry of the goods by the ven- § 934 LIENS. 954 § 934. Customs officer is not a middleman after consignee has paid the duties. — After the consignee has paid the duties, or given' a bond for their payment, the customs officer cannot be considered a middleman, so that the consignor could, by notice to him, stop the goods in transitu.^ "From the mo- ment the collector of customs receive the bond of the vendee, there was as complete a delivery as if the goods had been de- livered into his own hands. The collector has a lien on the goods, and would be justified in detaining them until it is satisfied; but as between vendor and vendee the goods were at home, and constructively in the possession of the pur- chasers; the customs authorities (subject to the payment of the duties) having by the acceptance of the bond under- taken to hold them for the use of the purchaser, and subject to such sales or dispositions as he might choose to make."-^° § 935. Goods placed in a warehouse by the carrier to' await consignee's sending for them are still in transit. — Goods placed by the carrier in a warehouse at the place of their destination, to await the consignee's sending for them and paying the freight, are still in transitu while in the ware- house, and may be stopped by the vendor.^^ And so goods placed by the carrier in the hands of any other depositary, if not designated by the purchaser as his agent, nor his agent dee without payment of the duties 375; Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend, is not a termination of the tran- (N. Y.) 611; Calahan v. Babcock, situs. 21 Ohio St. 281, 8 Am. Rep. 63; 9 Wiley V. Smith, 1 Ont. App. 179, Clapp v. Peck, 55 Iowa 270, 7 N. 191, overruling Graham v. Smith, 27 W. 587; Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa U. C. C. P. 1; and Howell V.Alport, 108, 14 N. W. 130, 15 Rep. 232; 12 U. C. C. P. 375. Wiley v. Smith, Morris v. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590; 1 Ont. App. 179, 191, is followed in Symns v. Schotten, 35 Kans. 310, Wilds v. Smith, 2 Ont. App. 8, 41 10 Pac. 828; HalfT v. Allyn, 60 Tex. Q. B. 136, 142. 278; More v. Lott, 13 Nev. 376, 384; 10 Wiley v. Smith, 1 Ont. App. McLean v. Breithaupt, 12 Ont. App. 179, per Burton, J. 383. 11 Edwards v. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 955 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 936 in fact to receive and hold the goods for him, are still in transitu. ^^ And even if the depositary be designated by the vendee, he may still be the agent of the carrier to hold the goods for the purpose of collecting freight and charges, and in that case the goods cannot be considered as in the hands of the vendee so as to defeat the right of the vendor to stop them. If in any case there is evidence to shov;^ that the ware- houseman received the goods as agent of the carrier, and held them as such at the time the vendor asserted his right to stop them, it is erroneous to instruct the jury that, if the vendee directed that the goods should be sent to that ware- houseman, and they were so sent in pursuance of that direc- tion, they had come into the possession of the vendee so as to deprive the vendor of the right of stoppage. The jury should be left free to determine, upon all the evidence, whether the warehouseman received the goods as the agent of the carrier, or as the agent of the vendee.*^ § 936. Wharfinger a middleman. — A wharfinger to whom a carrier has delivered goods to be forwarded to the con- signee at another place is a middleman, in whose hands the goods may be stopped by the vendor.^* A trader living in the country, about twenty-five miles from Exeter, ordered goods from London to be sent by ship via Exeter. On their arrival at Exeter a wharfinger received them on the trader's account, and paid the freight and charges; and, while they remained in the wharfinger's possession, the trader wrote to the vendor informing him of his insolvency, and that he should not take the goods. The vendor thereupon demanded the goods of the wharfinger; and it was held that he had a right to stop them in the wharfinger's hands. '^^ Lord Al- vanley, C. J., remarked that the only question was, whether 12 Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79. 783; Hoist v. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240; 13 Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79. Smith v. Goss, 1 Camp. 282; Hunt 14 Mills V. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457; v. Ward, cited 3 T. R. 467. Ex parte Barrow, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. i5 Mills v. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457. § 937 LIENS. 956 the goods are to be considered as having been in the hands of a middleman, or as having been taken in the possession of the person for v^hom they w^ere ultimately intended; and he was of opinion that the wharfinger, not having been par- ticularly employed by the vendee, was to be considered as a middleman. The other judges concurred; Brooke, J., say- ing that the consignee did nothing to take possession of the goods while they remained with the wharfinger before the vendor made his claim; and Charnbre saying, upon the ques- tion whether the goods were in transitu, that they were di- rected to be sent to the town where the purchaser lived, and, having been carried as far as they could go by water, they were delivered to a wharfinger to be forwarded to the pur- chaser. While they were with the wharfinger the demand was made, no act having been done to shorten the journey. We cannot, therefore, say the goods were not in transitu. § 937. Goods in the carrier's car at destination are still in transit. — Goods carried by railroad are in transitu while in a car at their place of destination awaiting delivery to the con- signee. Thus, a car containing the goods consigned was set out upon a side track, where, according to custom, the goods were to be taken from the car immediately by the consignee, or, if not so taken, were liable to be charged a certain sum daily for demurrage. There was no agreement or under- standing between the carrier and the consignee that the goods should be held by the former as warehouseman, or as agent of the consignee. A truckman, who had a standing order from the consignee to take any goods he might find at the railroad station to the consignee's store, was notified of the arrival of the goods by an agent of the carrier; but he did not remove them, the consignee having ab- sconded. The goods, while so situated, were attached by a creditor of the consignee; but it was held that the con- signor's right of stoppage was not then terminated, and that 957 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 938 he might maintain trover against the attaching officer for the goods. ^^ Goods carried by raih-oad were, upon arrival at their des- tination, set aside by the railroad company in its depot, un- der an agreement made by it with the consignee that the goods should be sold, and the proceeds used to pay past-due freights, the balance, if any, to go to the consignee. The consignee did not receive the goods and turn them over to the railroad company, nor did he assign it to the bill of lad- ing, nor pay the freight. While the goods were so situated, the consignor sought to stop them in transitu. It was held that no delivery had taken place so as to prevent a stoppage in transitu. ^'^ § 938. Transit ends when the vendees take possession of the goods. — After the vendee has once taken possession of the goods and exercised dominion over them, the transit is at an end, though for a special purpose they come again into the hands of the vendor. Thus, goods bought for exporta- tion were sent to the purchaser's agent to be forwarded, and were by him shipped on board a vessel, but were afterwards relanded and sent back to the vendor to be repacked. While the goods were in the vendor's possession for this purpose, the purchaser became bankrupt. It was held that the transit had been determined, and that the vendor acquired no new right by the redelivery to hini.^^ In delivering judgment, Wilde, J., said: "The goods being sold on credit, and the complete property and possession having vested in the ven- dee, they become his absolutely, without any lien or right of the vendors attaching to them, any more than on any other 16 Inslee v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454. i? Macon & Western R. Co. v. See, also, McFetridge v. Piper, 40 Meador, 65 Ga. 705. Iowa 627; Greve v. Dunham, 60 is Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837, Iowa 108, 14 N. W. 130; Seymour 865. V. Newton, 105 Mass. 272, 275. § 939 LIENS. 958 property of the vendee; and their delivery to the defendants to be repacked could not have the effect of creating- a lien for the price, without an agreement to that effect." A delivery of the goods by the carrier to a third person upon the order of the vendee is equivalent to a delivery to him, and terminates the right of the vendor to stop them.^^ § 939. Rule to determine what constitutes possession much discussed. — What constitutes such an actual or con- structive possession by the vendee as will put an end to the transitus, and with it to the vendor's right to stop the goods, has frequently been a matter of discussion in the courts. Lord Kenyon, in an early case, said:^*^ "There have indeed been cases where nice distinctions have been taken on the fact, whether the goods had or had not got into the posses- sion of the vendee; but they all profess to go on the ground of the goods being in transitu, when they were stopped. As to the necessity of the goods coming to the 'corporal touch' of the bankrupt; that is merely a figurative expression, and has never been literally adhered to. For there may be an actual delivery of the goods, without the bankrupt's seeing them; as a delivery of the key of the vendor's warehouse to the purchaser." In the case under consideration, goods were sent by wagon from Shef^eld to the buyer in London. Part of the goods were brought to an inn in London, and were 19 Stevens v. Wheeler, 27 Barb. to Lord Mansfield. And see Wright (N. Y.) 658. V. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82, 85, where Lord 20 Ellis V. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464, 467. Kenyon said: "I once said, that. In Hunter v. Beale, cited in the to confer a property on the con- above case at p. 466, Lord Mans- signee, a corporal touch was neces- field is said to have used the ex- sary. I wish the expression had pression, "they must have come to never been used, as it says too the corporal touch of the vendee, much; * * * i^^^ ^ij j-h^j. jg nec- otherwise they may be stopped in essary is, that the consignee exer- transitu." Lord EUenborough, in cise some act of ownership on the Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 184, also property consigned to him." disapproved of the ruling attributed 959 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 940 there attached by a creditor of the buyer, who had become a bankrupt. The assignee in bankruptcy went to the inn where the goods remained under attachment, and put his mark upon them, but did not take them away. It was held that when they were so marked they were delivered to the buyer so far as the circumstances of the case would permit, and that the vendor could not afterwards stop them. This decision is, however, called in question by Baron Parke,"^ who said it appeared very doubtful whether an act of marking, without any removal from the possession of the carrier, would amount to a constructive possession. In the case before the court, it appeared that a cargo of timber having arrived at its port of destination, the agent of the as- signees of the purchaser, who had become bankrupt, went on board the vessel and told the captain he had come to take possession of the cargo. He went into the cabin, into which the ends of timber projected, and saw and touched the tim- ber. He then went ashore, and the vendor shortly after- wards served a notice to stop the cargo in transitu. It was held that no actual possession was taken by the assignees, and that, as the master did not undertake to hold possession for them, they had not taken constructive possession. Al- though the master told the agent he would deliver the cargo when he was satisfied about the freight, this was no more than a promise to fulfil the original contract and deliver in due course to the consignee. His relation to the consignee was not changed. § 940. Right o£ vendee to constructive possession while goods are in hands of carrier. — The vendee may obtain con- structive possession of the goods while they still remain in the hands of the carrier.^^ But to effect such a possession the 21 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. Div. 68; Reynolds v. B. & M. R. & W. 518, 535. Co., 43 N. H. 580. 22 Ex parte Cooper, L. R. 11 Ch. § 940 LIENS. • 960 carrier must, by some agreement with the vendee, express or impHed, change his relation from that of carrier to that of agent for the vendee; he must expressly or impliedly enter into a nev^ agreement with the vendee, distinct from the original contract for carriage, to hold the goods in a new character as his agent, and subject to his order.^^ "A case of constructive possession," said Baron Parke,^^ "is, where the carrier enters expressly, or by implication, into a new agree- ment, distinct from the original contract for carriage, to hold the goods for the consignee as his agent, not for the purpose of expediting them to the place of original destination, pur- suant to that contract, but in a new character, for the pur- pose of custody on his account, and subject to some new or further order to be given to him." The carrier cannot be- come the buyer's agent without the buyer's consent. His in- tention to take possession, and to make the carrier his agent to hold the goods, is a material fact.^^ There is an exception to the rule that the transitus con- tinues until there is an actual delivery to the consignee, in case the carrier by agreement with him becomes his agent to keep the goods on storage for him f^ and such an agree- ment may be inferred where the consignee has been in the habit of using the warehouse of the carrier or wharfinger as his own.^"^ After a consignee has paid the freight on goods carried by 23 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 25 James v. Griffin, 2 M. & W. 623; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. 623; Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. C. 508; Bolton v. Lancashire & & W. 518, 529, per Parke, B. Yorkshire R. Co.. L. R. 1 C. P. 26 Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & P. 431; Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. 119, 127; Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P. St. 301; McFetridg-e v. Piper, 40 469; Rowe v. Pickford, 1 Moore Iowa 627; Alsberg v. Latta, 30 C. P. 526; Morley v. Hay, 3 M. & Iowa 442; O'Neil V. Garrett, 6 Iowa R. 396; Allan v. Gripper, 2 C. & 480; In re Foot, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) J. 218; Reynolds v. B. & M. R. Co., 530. 43 N. H. 580. 2-1 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. 27 Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 Bing. & W. 518, 535; Langstaff v. Stix, 64 516, 521; Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. Miss. 171, 1 So. 97, 60 Am. Rep. 49. & C. 107, 109. 961 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 941 railroad, has receipted for them, and left them at the depot to be called for, the right of stoppage in transitu is at an end, and the agent of the railroad company has no right to detain them upon afterwards discovering, upon opening his mail, that he had instructions not to deliver them. The railroad company, in holding the goods till they should be sent for, became the agent of the purchaser.^^ § 941. When carrier made agent of consignee transit ends. — The transitus is at an end when the goods have arrived at their destination, and the consignee has made the carrier his own agent to hold them upon storage, or to forward them to a new place of destination.^^ Thus, where a pur- chaser of several hogsheads of sugar, upon notice from the carrier of their arrival, took samples from them, and directed the carrier to let them remain in his warehouse until he should receive further instructions, it was held that the tran- situs was at an end. The purchaser made the carrier his agent, and used his warehouse as his own. The carrier ceased to be a carrier, and, at least by implication, entered into a new relation distinct from the contract for the car- riage.^*^ Baron Parke, referring to this, said there were cir- cumstances which indicated an agreement on the part of the carrier to hold the goods for the consignee as his agent. He remarked, however :^^ "It appears to us to be very doubt- ful, whether an act of marking or taking samples, or the like, without any removal from the possession of the carrier, though done with the intention to take possession, would 28 Langstafif v. Stix, 64 Miss. 171, -'^ Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 1 So. 97, 60 Am. Rep. 49. 107. It appeared, also, that the pur- 29 Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. & C. chaser was in the habit of leaving 107; Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & P. goods in the warehouse of the car- 119; Scott V. Pettit, 3 B. & P. 469; rier. Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 3i Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M., 518. 534; Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 &. W. 518. Bing. 516; Rowe v. Pickford, 1 Moore C. P. 526. 61 § 94^ LIENS. 962 amount to a constructive possession, unless accompanied with such circumstances as to denote that the carrier was intended to keep, and assented to keep, the goods in the na- ture of an agent for custody." § 942. By agreement the carrier may become the buyer's agent. — The carrier may by agreement become the buyer's agent to keep the goods, although at the same time he claims a lien upon them for freight and charges. Thus, where goods were conveyed by a carrier by water, and deposited in the carrier's warehouse for the convenience of the buyer, to be delivered out as he should want them, it was held that the transitus was at an end, and the vendor's right to stop the goods gone, although it appeared that the carrier claimed a lien on them.^- Under such circumstances it is immaterial wdiether the carrier has a lien or not. "The payment or the nonpayment of the charges and duties may have some bear- ing upon the character of the possession which a third per- son may have, but when it is found that such third person has the custody of the goods to keep for the vendee, and await a further order from him, the nonpayment of freight or duties becomes of no importance. The vendee has then a constructive possession, subject to all liens. "^^ In other words, although the fact that the carrier claims a lien upon the goods for unpaid freight raises a presumption that he continues to hold the goods as carrier, yet this presumption may be rebutted ; but, to overcome this presumption, proof should be adduced of an arrangement, express or implied, between the buyer and the carrier, whereby the latter be- comes the buyer's agent to keep the goods for him. In a case where the purchaser had absconded before the arrival of the goods at their destination, and the carrier 32 Allan V. Gripper, 2 Cr. & J. 33 Guilford v. Smith, 30 Vt. 49, 72, 218, 2 Tyrw. 217. And see Foster v. per Bennett, J. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 107; Oppen- heim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42. 963 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 944 stored them until they were stopped by the vendor, it was held that the transit was not ended, and that the carrier did not hold the goods as agent of the purchaser, because, from the circumstances of the case, he could never have consented to such an arrangement.^* § 943. Carrier's consent necessary to be made agent of buyer. — On the other hand the carrier cannot, without his own consent, be made the buyer's agent to hold the goods after their arrival. Thus, upon the arrival of a cargo of tim- ber at the port of destination, the assignee of the vendee, who had become bankrupt, went on board the vessel and told the captain he had come to take possession of the cargo. The captain told him he would deliver it when he was satis- fied about his freight. Shortly afterwards the vendor stopped the goods in transitu. It was held that, as there was no con- tract by the master to hold the goods as the agent of the pur- chaser's assignees, the latter had not obtained constructive possession of them, and the transitus was not at an end when the vendor exercised his right of stoppage.^^ § 944. Transit ends when goods are put in warehouse used by the purchaser. — When goods are placed in the warehouse of a third person, which the purchaser uses as his own, the transit is ordinarily at an end. This is the case although the warehouseman does not charge any rent, if he has previously been in the habit of receiving goods for the purchaser and holding them as his agent until he should take them away, or give further orders for their disposition.^^ The fact that 34 Ex parte Barrow, L. R. 6 Ch. G. 1080; Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & Div. 783. And see, also, a similar P. 119; Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P. case, Crawshay v. Edes, 1 B. & C. 469; Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. & P. 181. 320; Wiley v. Smith, 1 Ont. App. 35 Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. 179, 195, per Moss, J.; Hoover v. & W. 518. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79; Frazer v. Hill- 36 Dodson V. Wentworth, 4 M. & iard, 2 Strobh. (S. Car.) 309. § 945 LIENS. 9b4 the goods have reached their destination, and have been placed in a warehouse w^ith which the carriers have no con- nection, but is substantially the purchaser's warehouse, is conclusive that a delivery has been made to him. But, while the fact that the warehouse does not belong to the carrier makes it more certain that the carrier does not any longer hold them as carrier, yet, if it appear by an agreement, ex- press or implied, that the consignee has made the carrier's warehouse his own, the transit is equally at an end.^^ If the goods by the direction of the purchaser are for- warded to a particular warehouseman, who acts as the agent of the purchaser in receiving them, the transitus is at an end.^^ If goods are sold, and by agreement with the vendor are stored in his warehouse, rent free, the warehouse of the ven- dor becomes for the occasion the purchaser's warehouse, and, the delivery being complete, the transit is ended, and the vendor has no right of lien or stoppage.^^ § 945. Goods landed at wharf and freight paid usually ends transit. — Goods landed at a wharf belonging to a third per- son, at which the vendee usually receives goods without charge for wharfage, the carrier having no lien on them for freight or charges, are not subject to stoppage in transitu. In such case the possession of the carrier has ceased; the wharfinger has nothing to do with the goods, and, unless they are to be' considered as being in the possession of the vendor, no person has any possession of them.'*" 3" Smith V. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431. "When the goods were landed on 3S Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79, the wharf, the result of the orig- per Cole, J. inal impulse, impressed upon them 39 Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mason by the vendor in transmitting them (U. S.) 107/, Fed. Cas. No. 1046; to the vendee, was accomplished. Frazer v. Hilliard, 2 Strobh. (S. They would go no farther under Car.) 309. that impulse. They were not in the 40 Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 Vt. 172, hands of a middleman, to be for- 180, 49 Am. Dec. 768. Hall, J., said: warded by other carriers. The 965 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. 946 § 946. Assignment of bill of lading by vendee to third per- son for value defeats right of stoppage in transitu. — The as- signment of the bill of lading or other document of title by the vendee to a third person for value defeats or impairs the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. ^^ But if the assignee of the bill of lading takes it with notice of the vendee's in- wharfinger had no charge of them, and could not therefore be a mid- dleman; and there was no other person standing in that character. The wharf, in the language of the books, became the warehouse of the vendee for the reception of the goods, and must consequently be considered the place contemplated by the consignor, as that of their ultimate destination. The vendee could not have remained in his store, with his arms folded, ex- pecting the goods to be driven up to his door. He must have looked for them at the wharf, which, for the purposes of their reception, he had made his own; and when they arrived there, their transitus, so far as regarded the right of the vendor to stop them, must, I think, be considered as ended." 41 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 H. Bl. 357, 5 T. R. 683, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 753 ; Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El. & Bl. 622, 637; Castanola v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 24 Fed. 267; Sheppard v. New- hall, 47 Fed. 468; St. Paul Roller- Mill Co. V. Great Western De- spatch Co., 27 Fed. 434; The Schooner Mary Ann Guest. 1 Olc. Adm. 498, Fed. Cas. No. 9197, af- firmed 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 358, Fed. Cas. 9196; Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. S.) 386, 7 L. ed. 189; Audenreid v. Randall, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 99, Fed. Cas. No. 644; Hal- liday v. Hamilton, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 560; Lee v. Kimball, 45 Maine 172; Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 283, Fed. Cas. No. 17122; Ryberg v. Snell, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 294, Fed. Cas. No. 12189; Dows v. Greene, 24 N. Y. 638, affg. 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 490; Dows V. Perrin, 16 N. Y. 325; Rawls V. Deshler, 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 12, affg. 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 66; Blossom v. Champion, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 217; Becker v. Hall- garten, 86 N. Y. 167; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio 88; Curry v. Roul- stone, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 110, Fed. Cas. No. 3497; First Nat. Bank v. Pettit, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 447. In Georgia it is provided that a bona fide assignee of the bill of lading of goods for a valuable considera- tion, and without notice that the same were unpaid for and the pur- chaser insolvent, will be protected in his title against the seller's right of stoppage in transitu. Ga. Code 1911, § 4133. In California, Montana, North Dakota, Oklaho- ma and South Dakota, it is pro- vided that all the title which the first holder of a bill of lading had passes to every subsequent in- dorsee in good faith and for value in the ordinary course of business, with like effect and in like man- ner as in the case of a bill of ex- 946 LIENS. 966 solvency, the vendor has the same right of stoppage in tran- situ against the assignee that he had against the vendee him- self.^- Such knowdedge on the part of the vendee tends to show that he did not purchase in good faith. Mere knowl- edge by the indorsee that the goods have not been paid for does not defeat his rights, for one may have a perfect right to buy goods of one who has not paid for them. He is only defeated by knowledge of circumstances such as render the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable.*^ A transfer of the "duplicate" bill of lading, the original not being accounted for, does not carry with it necessarily the title to the goods ; and if the purchaser had notice which should have put him upon inquiry for the original, the trans- fer does not defeat the right of the seller to stop the goods in change. California: Civ. Code 1906, § 2127; see Newhall v. Cen- tral Pac. R. Co., 51 Cal. 345; Mon- tana: Civ. Code 1895, § 2831; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1905, § 5647; Oklahoma : Comp. Laws 1909, § 458; South Dakota: Rev. Codes (Civ.) 1903, § 1552; Sheppard v. Newhall, 47 Fed. 468, was replevin by the shipper of goods against one to whom the consignee had, before any attempt to stop them in transit, transferred the bill of lading as security for advances. Plaintiff, an English merchant, sold the goods to a San Francisco merchant, shipping them by three several consignments and bills of lading, in which they were con- signed to plaintiff's agent in New York, or his assigns, and to which were attached plaintiff's invoice, by which the goods were con- signed to the purchaser. To these papers the agent attached a no- tice to the purchaser of shipment to him, and a new bill of lading in which he was the assignee, all of which papers and bills of lading were delivered to the purchaser, and by him transferred by in- dorsement to defendants, except the first, which was not indorsed, but it and the goods described in it were put in defendant's posses- sion, upon the agreement that the proceeds of the sale of such goods should be applied by defendants toward the payment of their ad- vances made to the purchaser on these and other prior transfers o£ goods and bills of lading. It was held that defendants were the law- ful holders of the bills of lading, with such rights as the possession of them and of the goods might confer, and that the vendor could not stop the goods in transitu. ■12 Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31 ; Loeb V. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 35 Am. Rep. 17. 43 Cuming V. Brown, 9 East 506; Salomons v. Nissen, 2 T. R. 674, 681. 967 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 947 transitu.'*^ But mere notice to the indorsee that the con- signee has not paid for the goods does not prevent his hold- ing them under the bill of lading as against the consignor, unless the indorsee also knows that by the terms of the sale the vendor is entitled to receive payment from the consignee before he disposes of the goods or assigns the bill of lad- ing. ^'^ If, for instance, the goods have been sold on credit, and the consignee has given his note or acceptance for the price, and this is not due at the time he assigns the bill of lading for value, his knowledge of this fact does not make it unfair for him to accept an assignment of the bill of lading. In such a case. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said:^*' "If a bill of lading should be held by us not assignable under these circumstances, the consequence would be that no bill of lad- ing could be deemed safely assignable before the goods ar- rived, unless the assignee of the bill of lading was perfectly assured that the goods were paid for in money, or paid for in account between the parties, which is the same thing: a position which would tend to overturn the general practice and course of dealing of the commercial world on this sub- ject, and which is warranted as we conceive by no decided case on the subject." § 947. Rule where instrument is not strictly a bill of lading. ■ — It does not matter that the instrument is not strictly a bill 44 Castanola v. Missouri Pac. R. to stop them if the vendee be- Co., 24 Fed. 267. comes insolvent. It would not 45 Cuming v. Brow^n, 9 East 506. therefore be inequitable to hold This qualification of the rule has that, with such knowledge, and been criticised on the ground that knowledge also that the goods "where there has been no deliv- have not been paid for, he makes ery of the goods, and the trans- his advances subject to the ven- feree acts upon the faith of the dor's right, and does so volun- bill of lading, he necessarily tarily with knowledge of all the knows that the goods are in tran- facts." Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. sit, and that if not paid for they (N. Y.) Id, 109, per Woodruflf, J. are subject to the vendor's right 46 Cuming v. Brown, 9 East 506. § 94^ LIENS. 968 of lading, if it be substantially such.^''' But if the instrument signed by the carrier be a mere receipt acknowledging pos- session of the goods, but not making them deliverable to any one, it being madeiin this form because the goods were being transported in bond from the seaboard to the collector of customs at an interior city, the transfer of such receipt by the consignee does not have the effect to defeat the vendor's right of stoppage during such transit. ^^ Advances made on a promise to procure and deliver bills of lading are not made on the faith of such bills, and the lender is not protected as against the vendor.'*^ g 948. Assignee for creditors not a purchaser for value.- § If the bill of lading be assigned in trust for the creditors of the insolvent vendee, such assignee is not a purchaser for value, and consequently takes subject to the exercise of any right of stoppage in transitu which might exist against the vendee himeslf.^^ § 949. Pre-existing debt a valuable consideration. — A pre- existing debt is a valuable consideration for a transfer of a bill of lading, and will protect the transferee from a subse- quent stoppage in transitu.^^ There is no distinction in prin- ciple between cases relating to the consideration for a trans- fer of a bill of lading and cases relating to the consideration for a transfer of negotiable paper. 47 Rawls V. Deshler, 4 Abb. App. 467, 476; Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. Dec. (N. Y.) 12. afifg. 28 How. Pr. (Mass.) 33, 50 Am. Dec. 754. (N. Y.) 66. ''1 Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. 48 Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. Div. 376 (dissenting from Rodger (N. Y.) 76, 109. V. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, 49 Holbrook v. Vose. 6 Bosw. L. R. 2 P. C. 393) ; Clementson v. (N. Y.) 76, 104, 111; Barnard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 42 U. C. Q. Campbell. 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 286, B. 263; Lee v. Kimball, 45 Maine 292, afifd. 55 N. Y. 456, 14 Am. Rep. 172; Sheppard v. Newhall, 47 Fed. 289. 468. revd. 54 Fed. 306, 4 C. C. A. 50 Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249; 352. Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 969 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 950 But by some courts it is held that a transfer in security or in payment of an existing indebtedness, without anything ad- vanced, given up, or lost, on the part of the transferee, does not constitute such an assignment as will preclude the vendor from exercising the right of stoppage in transitu.^^ § 950. Transfer of bill of lading after stoppage in transitu. ■ — Whether a transfer of the bill of lading by the vendee, after a stoppage in transitu, has the same effect as such a transfer made before such stoppage, is a question which was for the first time decided by the Supreme Court of California. In that case the bill of lading which the vendor sent to the buyer was indorsed by the latter for advances made upon it in good faith, after the seller had given notice to the carrier to stop the goods in transitu; and it was held that the indorser of the bill of lading was entitled to the goods as against the seller. Mr. Justice Crockett, delivering the judgment of the court, stated very clearly the grounds of the decision, saying :^^ "The vendor has voluntarily placed in the hands of the ven- dee a muniment of title, clothing him with the apparent own- ership of the goods ; and a person dealing with him in the usual course of business, who takes an assignment for a valu- able consideration, without notice of such circumstances as render the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable, has a superior equity to that of the vendor asserting a recent lien, known, perhaps, only to himself and the vendee.""* These being the conditions which determine and control the rela- tive rights of the vendor and assignee, where the assignment is made before the notice of stoppage is given, precisely the same principles, in my opinion, are applicable when the as- 52 Lessasier v. The Southwest- only in states where bills of lad- ern, 2 Woods (U. S.) 35; Loeb v. ing are made negotiable, for, ordi- Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 35 Am. Rep. 17. narily. an indorser can give no 53 Newhall v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., better title than he himself has. 51 Cal. 345, 350. 21 Am. Rep. 713. ^4 Brewster v. Sime, 42 Cal. 139. This would seem to hold good § 951 LIENS. 970 signment is made after the carrier is notified by the vendor. Notwithstanding the notice to the carrier, the vendor's hen continues to be only a secret trust as to a person, who, in the language of Mr. Benjamin, in his work on Sales, section eight hundred and sixty-six, takes an assignment of a bill of lading 'without notice of such circumstances as render the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable.' The law provides no method by which third persons are to be afifected with constructive notice of acts transpiring between the ven- dor and the carrier; and in dealing with the vendee, whom the vendor has invested with the legal title and apparent ownership of the goods, a stranger, advancing his money on the faith of this apparently good title, is not bound, at his peril, to ascertain whether possibly, the vendor may not have notified a carrier — it may be on some remote portion of the route — that the goods are stopped in transitu. If a person, taking an assignment of a bill of lading, is to encounter these risks, and can take the assignment with safety only after he has inquired of the vendor, and of every carrier through whose hands the goods are to come, whether a notice of stoppage in transition has been given, it is quite certain that prudent persons will cease to advance money on such securi- ties, and a very important class of commercial transactions w^ll be practically abrogated." § 951. Pledge by a factor or agent. — By the common law, a consignee who was a mere factor or agent of the consignor could only defeat the latter's rights by a sale, and not by a pledge, of the bill of lading.-^^ But now% under the factors' acts, a factor or agent may make a valid pledge of a bill of lading or other document of title, which operates as an as- signment of the contract, and defeats the consignor's rights.^^ 55 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Sm. ''^ Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 753; Walter v. & W. 403; Howard v. Shepherd, 9 Ross, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 283, Fed. C. B. 297. Cas. No. 17122. 971 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 953 § 952. Fraudulent sale of the bill of lading will not affect right of stoppage. — An apparent sale of the bill of lading, fraudulently made, for goods not received, for the purpose of defeating the right of stoppage, will not have that effect. ^^ The fraudulent assignee, if he effectually aids the original vendee in obtaining possession of the goods, may make him- self personally liable for the loss sustained by the vendor.^* So, if the bill of lading has been obtained from the con- signor by fraud, his right of stoppage in transitu is not de- feated, either as against his immediate indorsee, or as against a subsequent indorser for value, for the latter can obtain no better title to the goods than his indorser had.^^ § 953. Vendor's right of stoppage in transitu not defeated by transfer of bill of lading as security. — The transfer of a bill of lading as security does not absolutely defeat the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, but he may resume possession of the goods upon satisfying the pledgee's claim. ^"^ When the vendor has done this, he stands exactly in the same po- sition as to everybody else, both the original purchaser and those claiming under him, as if there had never been any pledge of the bill of lading. His right of stoppage in transitu covers every interest in the goods which has not passed by the pledging of the bill of lading. The vendor, moreover, has in such case the equitable right of having the assets mar- shalled; that is, the pledgee may be called upon to exhaust 57 Rosenthal v. Dessau, 11 Hun 573, affg. L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 446; In (N. Y.) 49; Poole v. Houston & T. re Westzynthius, 5 B. & Ad. 817; C. R. Co., 58 Tex. 134. Berndtson v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq. 58 Poole V. Houston & T. C. R. 481, L. R. 3 Ch. 588; Spalding v. Co., 58 Tex. 134. Ruding, 6 Beav. 376; Turner v. 59 Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El. & Liverpool Docks, 6 Ex. 543; BI. 622; Dows v. Perrin, 16 N. Y. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 325; Decan v. Shipper, 35 Pa. St. Am. Dec. 188; and see Ex parte 239, 78 Am. Dec. 334. Golding, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 628. 60 Kemp V. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 8 954 LIENS. 972 any other securities he has for the same debt before pro- ceeding against the goods claimed by the unpaid pledgor.^^ But in an action of replevin the assignee of a bill of lading, after his right to possession of the goods has been estab- lished, cannot be recjuired to render an account of advances and of the proceeds of the sale of the goods, with a view of paying plaintiff the surplus, but plaintiff must seek his rem- edy in another action. If a plaintiff in such action fails to establish his right of possession, his action fails. He can ask for such an accounting only in an equitable proceeding.^^ § 954. Effect of transfer of bill of lading in pledge on right to make sale that will defeat the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. — After the purchaser has transferred the bill of lading in pledge, he can make no sale that will discharge the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu ; for he can transfer no greater or better title than he has; and the right which he has is a right subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, for the indorsement of the bill of lading transfers the title to the pledgee and not to any other person. ^^ A sub- purchaser in such case is like any subpurchaser without a document of title; he has no greater rights than the original purchaser. It has been suggested that in such case the sub- purchaser, having an equitable interest in the goods subject to the rights of the pledgee and of the vendor, might come in and satisfy the claim of the vendor who has stopped the goods in transitu, after paying off the claim of the pledgee. ^^ § 955. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading by vendee to his factor. — The fact that the vendee has indorsed the bill of lading to his factor does not impair 61 Aldrich v. Cooper, 1 White & ^'■'^ Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. Tudor's Lead. C. in Eq. (7th Eng. 573. ed.) (1897) 36. C4 Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 62 Sheppard v. Newhall, 47 Fed. 573, per Lord Selborne, L. C. 468, revd. 54 Fed. 306, 4 C. C. A. 352. 973 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 958 the vendor's right to stop the goods in transitu upon the in- solvency of the vendee, provided the indorsement w^as not in pledge, though the vendee is indebted to the factor on gen- eral account. ^'^ § 956. Advances made on bill of lading. — After a consignee has made advances to the consignor upon the bill of lading, the latter has no right to stop them in transitu.'''^ § 957. Vendor's right not defeated by indorsement of bill of lading. — The indorsement of the bill of lading by the ven- dor to the vendee does not affect the right of the former to stop the goods in transitu.*^" This does not amount to a ne- gotiation of the bill of lading, such as is ordinarily meant by the use of that term in this connection. The negotiation which puts an end to the right of stoppage in transitu is a ne- gotiation by the vendee to a third person for a valuable con- sideration. § 958. Delivery order given by vendor to vendee. — A de- livery order given by the vendor to his vendee, and trans- ferred by the latter to a purchaser from him, does not defeat the vendor's right of stoppage.''^ The delivery of a shipping note, with an order on a ware- houseman to deliver the goods to a third person, does not pass the property in the goods so as to prevent a stoppage in transitu. ®® So a delivery of the original bill of parcels, in which the vendor acknowledges he has received the price 65 Patten v. Thompson, 5 M. & S. ^^ The Tigress, 32 L. J. Adm. 97, 350. See Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. per Dr. Lushington. 31, where it is asserted that the cs Jenkyns v. Usborne, 7 M. & right of stoppage in transitu does G. 678, 680; McEwan v. Smith, 2 not exist in case the shipment is H. L. Cas. 309; Akerman v. made in payment of a balance of Humphrey, 1 Car. & P. 53; Ives account. v. Polak, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 411. 66 Burritt v. Rench, 4 McLean 69 Akerman v. Humphrey, 1 (U. S.) 325, Fed. Cas. No. 2201. Car. & P. 53. § 959 LIENS. 974 in the vendee's notes, secured by mortgage, together with an order for the delivery of the goods, does not protect the sub- purchaser in his title against the vendor, unless the subpur- chaser has obtained possession of the goods.'" § 959. Difference between warehouse receipt and delivery order. — A warehouse receipt differs in its legal effect from a delivery order, for the latter is not binding upon the ware- houseman until he has accepted it, while the former is in it- self a document of title. Of late years the factors' acts have generally placed such receipts upon the same footing as bills of lading, as being documents of title, conferring upon the holder who has received them from the true owner, for the purpose of enabling him to dispose of the property, full power to sell or pledge the property by transferring such documents of title. "^ A factor making a warehouse entry at a custom- house, and taking a warehouse-keeper's receipt, which en- ables him to withdraw the goods at his pleasure upon dis- charging the lien for government duties, is regarded as in possession, and so enabled to effectually pledge them.^- § 960. Sale of goods in transitu without indorsement of bill of lading. — A mere sale of goods in transitu, without in- dorsement of the bill of lading, does not determine the tran- situs."" It has even been said that a transfer of the bill of lading to the subpurchaser, or the making of a bill of lading in his name, does not of itself destroy the right of the vendor "0 Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. (N. worth v. Napier, 3 Caines (N. Y.) Y.) 76, 106. If the vendor has 182, 2 Am. Dec. 268. given a bill of parcels of the goods '^i Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 sold, together with an order on a N. Y. 521. warehouseman for their delivery, "i^ Cartwright v. Wilmerding. 24 and the vendee, on the strength of N. Y. 521. This he might do irre- these, sells the goods, and the pur- spective of the factor's act. chaser from him fairly obtains "2 Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. possession, the right of stoppage 573. in transitu is gone. Rollings- 975 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 960 to Stop the goods in transitu. It is only when the subpur- chaser has taken possession of the goods, or changed their destination, or paid value for them, that the right of stoppage in transitu is affected by the subsale. If the vendor has given notice to stop in transitu before his vendee has received the purchase-money from the subpurchaser, the vendor is entitled to have his purchase-money satisfied out of the un- paid purchase-money of the subpurchaser.'^^ But the proposition, that a right of stoppage in transitu can be exercised as against the purchase-money payable by a subpurchaser to his vendor, was called in question by Lord Selborne in the House of Lords. '^ ''I am bound to say that 74 Ex parte Golding, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 628, 638. Cotton L. J., in giv- ing his opinion, said: "Except so far as it is necessary to give ef- fect to interests which other per- sons have acquired for value, the vendor can exercise his right to stop in transitu. It has been de- cided that he can do so when the original purchaser has dealt with the goods by way of pledge. Here we have rather the converse of that case. There has been an absolute sale of the goods by the original purchaser, but the pur- chase-money has not been paid. Can the vendor make effectual his right of stoppage in transitu with- out defeating in any way the in- terest of the sub-purchaser? In my opinion he can. He san say, 'I claim a right to retain my ven- dor's lien. I will not defeat the right of the sub-purchaser, but what I can claim is to defeat the right of the purchaser from me, that is, to intercept the purchase- money which he will get, so far as is necessary to pay me.' That, in my opinion, he is entitled to do, not in any way thereby interfer- ing with the rights of the subpur- chaser, but only, as against his own vendee, asserting his right to resume his vendor's lien and to obtain payment by means of an exercise of that right; interfering only with what would have been a benefit to the vendee, who would otherwise have got his purchase- money without paying for the goods, but in no way interfering with any right acquired by the subpurchaser of the goods." See, also, Craven v. Ryder, 6 Taunt. 433; Dixon v. Yates. 5 B. & Ad. 313; Davis v. Reynolds, 4 Camp. 267; Seymour v. Newton, 105 Mass. 272. 275; Secomb v. Nutt, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 324; Macon & Western R. Co. v. Meador, 65 Ga. 705 ; Clapp v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa 273, 7 N. W. 639; Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind. 240, 5 Am. Rep. 199; Hol- brook V. Vose, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 76, 106. ■^5 Kemp V. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 573, 587. §'961 LIENS. 976 it is not consistent with my idea of the right of stoppage in transitu that it should apply to anything except to the goods which are in transitu. But when the right exists as against the goods which are in transitu, it is manifest that all other persons who have, subject to that right, any equitable inter- est in those goods by w'ay of contract with the original pur- chaser or otherwise, may come in, and if they satisfy the claim of the seller who has stopped the goods in transitu, they can of course have effect given to their rights; and I apprehend that a court of justice, in administering the rights which arise in actions of this description, would very often find that the rights of all parties w^ere properly given efifect to, if so much of the purchase-money payable by the sub- purchasers were paid to the original vendor as might be sufficient to discharge his claim; and, subject, of course, to that, the other contracts would take effect in their order and in their priorities." ^961. Rule where original vendor has notice of resale of the goods by his vendee. — But if the original vendor has no- tice of the resale of the goods by his vendee, and consigns them to the second vendee, his right of stoppage in transitu is gone.''^^ There is in such case a final and irrevocable de- livery from the time of the commencement of the carriage of the goods to the second purchaser. There is no right of stoppage in transitu of goods shipped in the name of the buyer to a third person as consignee. The seller, by shipping the goods in this way and taking a bill of lading in the buyer's name as consignor, recognizes his right to control the goods as owner, and to vest the title of the goods in the consignee.'^" § 962. Delivery of part of cargo does not determine right of stoppage of whole cargo. — The delivery of a part of a 70 Eaton v. Cook, 32 Vt. 58. ^7 Treadwell v. Aydlett, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 388. 977 seller's right of stoppage in transitu. § 962 cargo does not determine the right of stoppage in transitu of the whole cargo, unless the circumstances show that a de- livery of part was intended to have that effect.'^^ Lord Blackburn well expressed the law upon this point in a recent case before the House of Lords :^^ "It is said that the de- livery of a part is a delivery of the whole. It may be a de- livery of the whole. In agreeing for the delivery of goods with a person you are not bound to take an actual corporeal delivery of the whole in order to constitute such a delivery, and it may very well be that the delivery of a part of the goods is sufficient to afford strong evidence that it is in- tended as a delivery of the whole. If both parties intend it as a delivery of the whole, then it is a delivery of the whole; but if either of the parties does not intend it as a delivery of the whole, if either of them dissents, then it is not a de- livery of the whole. I had always understood the law upon that point to have been an agreed law, which nobody ever doubted since an elaborate judgment in Dixon v, Yates,^" by Lord Wensleydale, who was then Parke J. The rule I had always understood, from that time down to the present, to be that the delivery of a part may be a delivery of the whole if it is so intended, but that it is not such a delivery unless it is so intended, and I rather think that the onus is upon those who say that it was so intended." The same rule applies in case of a stoppage in transitu of a portion of the goods after the delivery of another portion. The vendor's lien on the part so stopped in transitu is re- 78 Turner V. Scovell, 14 M. & W. Furniss, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 504; 28; Slubey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. Secomb v. Nutt, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 504; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B. 324; Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly & P. 69; Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. (N. Y.), 93; In re Beams, 18 N. & E. 57, 72>; Miles v. Gorton, 2 Bank Reg. 500. Cr. & M. 504; Ex parte Gibbe, L. 79 Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. R. 1 Ch. Div. 101; Jones v. Jones, 573. 586, afifg. Ex parte Falk, L. R. 8 M. & W. 431; Crawshay v. 14 Ch. Div. 446. Eades, 1 B. & C. 181; Buckley v. so 5 B. & Ad. 313, 339. 62 § 9^3 LIENS. 978 Stored, and it covers not only the price of such part of the goods, but also the price of the portion already delivered.^^ § 963. Effect of notice of stoppage after part of goods delivered. — In case the goods are resold and a part delivered when the notice to stop in transitu is given by the vendor, though the vendor loses by the resale the right to stop the goods in transitu, he is entitled, if he gives that which would have been a valid notice of stoppage in transitu had there been no resale, to intercept, to the extent of his own unpaid purchase-money, so much of the subpurchaser's purchase- money as remains unpaid by him.^^ § 964. By the resale by vendee and delivery of bill of lad- ing right of stoppage ended. After a vendee has resold the goods and delivered the bill of lading to his vendee, the right of stoppage in transitu by the original vendor is gone, be- cause the last purchaser is entitled to rely upon the title and possession of his vendor as evidenced by his holding and in- dorsing the bill of lading.^-'' And in like manner one purchas- ing from a vendee, who has acquired actual possession from the carrier, may properly rely upon such possession, if the sale be made in good faith and without knowledge of any claim to their possession on the part of the original vendor. Thus, if goods at a railroad station at the place of their des- tination are received by the purchaser, who pays the freight and thereupon sells and delivers them to another while they are still at the station, the right of stoppage in transitu is gone.^'* 81 Wentworth v. Outwaite, 10 17, 43; Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, M. & W. 436, 452, per Parke, B. 35 Am. Rep. 17; Sheppard v. New- S2 Ex parte Falk, L. R. 14 Ch. hall, 47 Fed. 468, revd. 54 Fed. 306, Div. 446, following Ex parte Gold- 4 C. C. A. 352. ing, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 628. s-* United States Wind Engine 83 Newson v. Thornton, 6 East Co. v. Oliver, 16 Nebr. 612. 979 SELLER S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. § 965 § 965. The right of stoppage paramount to all liens against the purchaser. — An attachment or seizure upon execution of the goods while in the hands of the carrier by another cred- itor of the purchaser as his property does not defeat the sell- er's right of stoppage in transitu. ^^ Even an attachment by the holder of the draft drawn by the seller upon the buyer does not affect the seller's right to stop the goods in transitu upon the insolvency of the buyer. ^*^ But an attachment of the goods by the vendor as the property of the vendee, while they are in the course of transportation, destroys the vendor's right to stop them in transitu.^" The goods are subject to attachment at the suit of the con- 85 Smith V. Goss, 1 Camp. N. P. 282; Morley v. Hay, 3 M. & Ry. 396; Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. Cas. 508, 518, per Tindal, C. J. Massachusetts: Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 198. 19 Am. Dec. 319; Seymour v. New- ton, 105 Mass. 272; Durgy Cement & Umber Co. v. O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12. New York: Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Covell V. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 611. Connecticut: Aguirre V. Parmelee, 22 Conn. 473. Ne- braska: Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Painter, 15 Nebr. 394. New Hampshire : Ins- lee V. Lane, 57 N. H. 454. Kan- sas : Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kans. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84. Mississippi: Morris v. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590. Missouri : Schwabacher v. Kane, 13 Mo. App. 126. Texas: Chand- ler V. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188. Tennessee: Mississippi Mills V. Union & Planters' Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 314. Contra, Boyd V. Mosley, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 661. Pennsylvania: Hays v. Mouille, 14 Pa. St. 48; Pottinger v. Hecksher, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 309. Ohio: Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio St. 281, 8 Am. Rep. 63; Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515. Mary- land : O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. 122, n Am. Dec. 284. Iowa: Greve V. Dunham, 60 Iowa 108, 14 N. W. 130; O'Neil v. Garrett, 6 Iowa 480; Cox v. Burns, 1 Iowa 64. Cali- fornia: Blackman v. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508. Kentucky: Hause v. Jud- son, 4 Dana (Ky.) 7, 11, 29 Am. Dec. yil; Wood v. Yeatman, 15 B. Alon. (Ky.) 270. Louisiana: Blum v. Marks, 21 La. Ann. 268, 99 Am. Dec. 725. North Carolina : Farrell v. Richmond & Danville R. Co., 102 N. Car. 390, 9 S. E. 302, 3 L. R. A. 647, 11 Am. St. 760. Wis- consin : Sherman v. Rugee, 55 Wis. 346, 13 N. W. 241, 14 Rep. 640. so Seymour v. Newton, 1'05 Mass. 272. 8" Woodrufif v. Noyes, 15 Conn. 335; Fox v. Willis, 60 Tex. ZIZ; Ferguson v. Herring, 49 Tex. 126, 129. § 965 LIENS. 980 signer's creditors if the consignee sustains the relation of agent or factor of the consignor, so that the latter is the owner of the goods, and may dispose of them at his will.*^ The vendor's right of stoppage is paramount to a lien in favor of the carrier, v^'hen, by agreement or usage, the lien of the latter is extended to cover a general balance of account due from the consignee. ^^ 88 Dickman v. Williams, 50 Miss. ville R. Co., 102 N. Car. .390, 9 S. 500; Sproule v. McNulty, 7 Mo. 62. E. 302, 3 L. R. A. 647, 11 Am. St. 89 Farrell v. Richmond & Dan- 760. CHAPTER XIX. WAREHOUSEMEN'S AND WHARFINGER'S LIENS. Sec. Sec. 967. A warehouseman's lien is a 974. common-law lien. 968. Rule in some states as to lien on goods stored but not in 975. a warehouse. 969. Carrier may store goods re- fused by consignee. 970. Warehouseman's lien for 976. freight charges paid by him. 977. 971. Authority of mortgagor of chattels to charge them with lien for storage. 978. 972. Right of lienholder to add to claim amount for keeping 979. property. 973. Waiver by warehouseman of 980. his lien. 981. Delivery of part of the goods not defeating lien on the re- mainder for whole bill. Warehouseman's or wharfin- ger's lien not lost because the goods have a fraudulent trade-mark. Enforcement. Important distinction between the lien of a warehouserrian and that of a wharfinger. The lien of a wharfinger a general lien. Right of wharfinger to lien not inferred. Lien reduced to a specific lien. Statutes declaring lien. § 967. A warehouseman's lien is a common-law lien. — The duties of a warehouseman are similar to those of a car- rier. The latter receives goods to be delivered at a different place; the former receives them to deliver at a different time. Neither the carrier nor the warehouseman adds anything to the intrinsic value of the property; but the relative value to the owner is increased by the services rendered, either by the one or the other, else the owner would not have undertaken to pay for them.^ A warehouseman's lien at common law has generally been regarded as a specific lien for the charges due upon the par- ticular goods that have been stored,- and not for any indeb- 1 Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec' 254, per Gibson, C. J. 2 Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254. 981 § 96; LIENS. 982 tedness to the warehouseman from the owner disconnected with the charges for storage of the particular goods; or, in other words, that he has no Hen for a balance of accounts re- lating to different transactions of storage. His lien is gen- erally regarded as specific upon the goods stored for the par- ticular charges for such storage.^ A warehouseman's lien may, however, be made a general one by express agreement, and possibly by an agreement im- plied from a well-established custom, or from the circum- stances of a particular case."* A warehouseman's lien, as defined by statute in some states, is a general lien.^ Warehouseman cannot have lien for salvage for goods saved from a fire. Savannah Steam Rice Mill V. Hull, 103 Ga. 831'; Richie v. Brackett, 109 111. App. 631. 3 Scott V. Jester, 13 Ark. 437. 446. "Warehousemen certainly have not a general lien authorizing a detention of goods, not only for demands arising out of the article retained, but for a balance of ac- counts relating to dealings of a like nature." Per Scott, J. Shingleur-Johnson Co. v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 78 Miss. 875, 29 So. 770, 84 Am. St. 655; Kaufman v. Leonard, 139 Mich. 104, 102 N. W. 632 •i Holderness v. Collison, 1 Man. & R. 55, 7 B. & C. 212. 5 Stallman v. Kimberly, 121 N. Y. 393, 24 N. E. 939, 31 N. Y. St. 514, affg. 53 Hun (N. Y.) 531, 24 N. Y. St. 787, 23 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 241, 6 N. Y. Supp. 706. O'Brien, J., delivering the judg- ment in the Court of Appeals, said that at common law it seems to have been a matter of doubt whether the lien was specific or general ; and, in view of this con- dition of the common law, and having regard to the words of the statute, a warehouseman must be regarded as having a general lien. In the Supreme Court, Barrett, J., said : "The fact is, warehousing has become an immense industry in these days, and the act is noth- ing more than a fair recognition of the advance. Formerly the wharfinger was in the habit of keeping a warehouse on his wharf, and the warehousing business was a sort of subsidiary append- age thereto. Now, warehousing, as an independent institution, com- pletely dwarfs the wharfinger ; and it would be the height of absurdity to retain the general lien in the one case and deny it in the other." Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Stor- age Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. (N. Y.) 565, 127 N. Y. S. 306. The word "advances" used in the statute does not include loans to the owner on 983 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 969 § 968. Rule in some states as to lien on goods stored but not in a warehouse. — In some states a person not a ware- honseman, and not in the business of storing goods, has no lien on goods for his compensation for storing them, unless there be an express agreement for a lien, or it is the legal duty of one to receive and hold the goods. ^ A mere volun- teer, under no such ol)ligation, who accepts the temporary custody of goods, without any agreement for a lien, can claim none for his compensation." The statutes declaring this lien generally confer it upon any person who stores goods at the request of the owner. '^ § 969. Carrier may store goods refused by consignee. — As already stated, a carrier may store goods which tlie con- signee neglects or recuses to receive, and create a lien upon the goods for such storage, or he may himself hold them as warehouseman and claim a lien for his services in that ca- pacity. If the consignee does not receive the goods after the security of the goods. Schwab V. Oatman, 56 Misc. (N. Y.) 393, 106 N. Y. S. 741. One keeping a garage has no warehouse lien on an automobile kept at the garage but which the owner uses at his pleasure. Laws 1897, p. 533. Smith V. O'Brien, 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 325, 94 N. Y. S. 673, affg. judgment 103 App. Div. (N. Y.) 596, 92 N. Y. S. 1146. 6 New York: In re Kelly, 18 Fed. 528; Trust v. Pirsson. 1 Hilton (N. Y.) 292; Alt v. Weid- enberg, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) Yld; Ri- vara v. Ghio, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 264. So declared by statute. Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray (Mass.) 222; Whitlock Mach. Co. v. Hol- way, 92 Maine 414, 42 Atl. 799. "^ Rivara v. Ghio, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 264, per Woodruff, J. Mer- ritt V. Peirano, 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 563, 42 N. Y. S. 97, affd. 167 N. Y. 541, 60 N. E. 1116. 8 Where a bailee ends the bail- ment and places the bailed chattel in a storage warhouse, the ware- houseman has no lien as against the real owner. Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 610 The ostensi- ble owner of goods in Kentucky may create a lien on them in fa- vor of a warehouseman for ad- vances when the warehouseman has no notice that the consignor is not the owner. Sidwell v. Cin. Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co., 23 Ky. L. 1501, 65 S. W. 436. A land- lord giving notice can have a lien for storage of goods of tenant. Schneider v. Dayton, 111 Mich. 396, 69 N W. 829. § 97° LIENS. 984 notice of their arrival, the carrier may subject them to a warehouseman's hen without notifying either the consignor or consignee that he has stored the goods. "We are not aware," says Devens, ]., in a recent case," "that it has ever been held to be the duty of the carrier to notify the owner or consignor of goods of a refusal to accept them before he can terminate his own liability as a carrier, and thereafter hold them himself, or transfer them to another, to hold as a ware- houseman. It is for the owner or consignor of goods to have some one at the place of delivery, when their transit is com- pleted, to accept them. If he does not. the rule which im- poses a duty upon the carrier to hold them himself as ware- houseman, or to store them in some convenient place, suffi- ciently protects the goods he has shipped. It would be un- reasonable that the carrier should not 'be allowed to termi- nate his contract of carriage until after notice to the con- signor and subsequent assent by him to the storage of the goods. The assent of the owner or consignor of goods that a lien thereon for storage shall, under certain circumstances, be created, is one to be inferred from the contract of ship- ment he has made. If his consignee cannot be found, or, be- ing found, refuses to accept, he must be held to authorize the storage of the goods. If the carrier is authorized to store them, it does not require argument to show that he may sub- ject them to a lien for the necessary storage charges, and that the owner cannot thereafter sell or transfer them so as to divest the lien." § 970. Warehouseman's lien for freight charges paid by him. — A warehouseman may claim a lien for freight charges he has paid to a carrier upon goods which the carrier has placed in his warehouse upon the neglect or refusal of the consignee to receive the goods upon their arrival at their 9 Barker v. Brown, 138 Mass. 340, 343. 985 WAREHOUSEMEN S AND WHARFINGERS LIENS. 971 destination.^'^ In sncli case the warehouseman really acts as the agent of the carrier, both in holding possession of the goods and in collecting the freight charges. But a ware- houseman can maintain no lien for freight charges advanced by him when the carrier by his negligence has failed to ful- fil his contract. ^^ If the goods have been injured by the car- rier, and the warehouseman received them in apparent good order without knowledge of the injury, the consignee must look to the carrier for his damages, and cannot offset them in an action by the warehouseman for carrier's charges paid by him.^- § 971. Authority of mortgagor of chattels to charge them with lien for storage. — A mortgagor of chattels has no au- thority, implied from his being allowed to remain in posses- sion, to charge them with a lien for storage as against a mortgagee whose mortgage is recorded. ^^ The warehouse- man has notice of the mortgage from the record, and there- fore he is not at liberty to assume that the mortgagor has an absolute jus disponendi from his possession alone ; and, if storage is necessary, he is chargeable with notice that the mortgagee has a right to judge for himself where it should be, if his interest is to be charged wnth the cost.^^ If the 10 Alden v. Carver, 13 Iowa 253. 81 Am. Dec. 430; Bass v. Upton, 1 Minn. 408 (Gil. 292); Sage v. Gittner, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 120. 11 Bass V. Upton, 1 Minn. 408 (Gil. .292). 12 Sage V. Gittner, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 120. 13 Storms V. Smith, 137 Alass. 201. 14 Storms V. Smith, 137 Mass. 201, per Holmes, J. To like effect see Baumann v. Post, 12 N. Y. S. 213, 2(i Abb. N. Cas. 134, 16 Daly (N. Y.) 385, 34 N. Y. St. 308, in which Bookstaver, J., said: "Chat- tels are not like mercantile paper, bank-bills, money, etc. The mere possession of the former does not import assurance of title or au- thority to dispose of them, as is the case with the latter. There must be something more than mere possession; something giv- ing such possession a specific character, indicative of authority or control. The possession in this case imported no more to the ap- pellant than it would have done had the furniture been hired with the apartments, or loaned to the mortgagor. If the mortgagor, in- 972 LIENS. 986 mortgagee is afterwards informed of the storage of the mortgaged goods, but is not informed that any attempt would be made to charge him or the goods with the storage ex- penses, the fact that he expresses no disapproval does not render him liable for the charges for storage. § 972. Right of lienholder to add to claim amount for keeping property. — A person who has a lien upon a chattel cannot add to the amount a charge for keeping the chattel till the debt is paid; that is, in truth, a charge for keeping it for his owai benefit, not for the benefit of the owner of the chattel. ^-^ An artificer has no lien upon a chattel for taking care of it after he has completed his work upon it, and while he detains it to enforce his lien. "The owner of the chattel can hardly be supposed to have promised to pay for the keeping of it while, against his will, he is deprived of the use of it; and there seems no consideration for such a promise. Then the chattel can hardly be supposed to be wrongfully left in the possession of the artificer, when the owner has been pre- stead of storing the property af- ter default, had sold it, it could not be contended that the pur- chaser, although honest in his in- tentions, and ignorant of the mort- gage, would have acquired any title to the property as against the respondent. And why? Be- cause such a person would not have been a purchaser in good faith without notice. The law re- gards the filing of the mortgage as notice to all the world, and he who neglects to inquire at the proper office does so at his peril. If this is true of a purchaser for value, why should it not apply to warehousemen? . . Appellant con- tends that a warehouseman's lien is analogous to that of a common carrier or an innkeeper, but he is mistaken in this, because a ware- houseman is not bound to receive every article offered to him for storage. He has, as the carrier and innkeeper have not, a right of selection both of person and of property, and need take only those goods, and from such persons, as he chooses ; and hence there is no reason why he should not take the ordinary precautions that oth- ers having the same right of choice are bound to do." See also, Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Alurphy, 89 Miss. 264, 42 So. 288. See ante. §§ 691-697, 727, 744. 15 Somes v. British Empire Ship- ping Co., 8 H. L. Cases 338, 345. 987 warehousemen's and wharfingers^ liens. § 972 vented by the artificer from taking possession of it himself. If such a claim can be supported, it must constitute a debt from the owner to the artificer, for which an action might be maintained."-'*' The right of detaining goods on which there is a lien is a remedy which is to be enforced by the act of the party who claims the lien, and, having such remedy, he is not generally at common law allowed the costs of enforc- ing it. Where a purchaser delivers to his vendor other goods to be applied to the price, under an agreement which is after- wards rescinded by mutual consent, the vendor is not en- titled to a lien for storage of the goods delivered to him.^" Accordingly it was held by Lord Ellenborough that a coachmaker, after having repaired a coach, could not claim any lien for storage, unless there was an express contract to that effect, or unless the owner left the property on the premises beyond a reasonable time, and after notice had been given him to remove it.^- And so wdiere a shipwright re- paired a ship in his own dock, and after the repairs were completed the owner was not prepared to pay for them, and the shipwright gave him notice that he should detain the ship and claim a certain sum per day for the use of the dock during the detention, it was held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that the ship- wright had no lien for the use of the dock during the deten- tion.19 One claiming possession of goods adversely to the owner can not have a lien upon the goods for money paid by him 10 British Empire Shipping Co. 15 Daly (N. Y.) 532. 28 N. Y. St. V. Somes, El., Bl. & El. 353. 365, 884. 367, per Lord Campbell. C. J., af- ^^ Hartley v. Hitchcock, 1' Stark. firmed in House of Lords, 8 H. L. 408. Cas. 338. 19 British Empire Shipping Co. 17 Shepard v. Rice. 8 N. Y. S. 472. v. Somes. EL. Bl. & El. 353. 973 LIENS. 988 for their storage. The owner can recover in an action of trover without tendering the rent paid for their storage.-" But where the purchaser of swine returned them to the seller, claiming to rescind the contract, and the seller after- wards obtained a judgment for the price, it was held that he had a lien for the expense of keeping the swine, because he had been made a bailee by compulsion, though he had lost his lien as vendor by obtaining judgment for the price. ^^ § 973. Waiver by warehouseman of his lien. — A ware- houseman waives his lien bv claimins^ to hold the sfoods when demanded of him upon a different ground, as that they are his own property, without making mention of his lien.-- He waives his lien by stating to an officer, who is about to seize the goods upon legal process, that he has no charge against them.-^ He waives his lien by accepting a note for the amount due him for storage and delivering the goods ; and he cannot re- vive the lien by again taking possession of the goods.-'* And so, if by the course of trade the wharfage due upon goods is not due until Christmas following the importation, whether the goods are removed in the meantime or not, the course of business, which amounts to an agreement be- tween the parties, prevents the wharfinger from maintaining his lien.-^ 20 Allen V. Ogden, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 174, Fed. Cas. No. 233. 21 Leavy v. Kinsella, 39 Conn. 50. 22 Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, n. A warehouseman does not waive his lien when goods in his possession are sought to be levied upon and the warehouseman re- fuses to allow the goods to be re- moved, by merely offering to act himself as keeper. Robinson v. Columbia Spinning Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 238, 52 N. Y. S. 751, 28 Civ. Proc. R. 135, 6 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 112. 23 Blackman v. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508. 24 Hale V. Barrett, 26 111. 195, 79 Am. Dec. 367; Kaufman v. Leon- ard, 139 Mich. 104, 102 N. W. 632. 2j Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 B. & Aid. 50. See in this connection, as to the effect of a course of trade, Fisher v. Smith, 39 L. T. R. 430; Dunham v. Pettee, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 112, Seld. Notes 154. In Craw- 989 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens, § 974 A warehouseman does not lost his lien for grain actually stored by fraudulently issuing receipts for other grain not in store. -^ A warehouseman does not waive his lien for storage by giving a receipt which is expressly made subject to such lien and charge for storage ; but he waives it by permitting the purchaser or holder of such receipt to remove the goods with- out paying the charges for storage. He does not, however, forfeit his right to demand the amount of the storage charges as a personal debt of the holder of the receipt.-' The wrongful sale by a warehouseman to himself to foreclose a lien under the statute is no waiver of the lien.-^ § 974. Delivery of part of the goods not defeating lien on the remainder for whole bill. — A warehouseman may deliver a part of the goods and retain the residue for the price chargeable on all the goods received by him under the same bailment, provided the ownership of the whole is in the same person. The lien attaches to the whole and every part of the goods for the storage of the whole, if the goods were re- ceived tosrether under one transaction.-'-^ shay V. Homfray, 4 B. & Aid. 50, Holroyd, J., said: "The principle laid down in Chase V. Westmore, Selw. N. P. 1322, where all the cases came under the consideration of the court, was this, that a special agreement did not of itself destroy the right to retain; but that it did so only wher^ it contained some term in- consistent with that right. Now if by such agreement the party is entitled to have the goods im- mediately, and the payment in re- spect of them is to take place at a future time, that is inconsistent with the right to retain the goods till payment. That was the case here : the wharfage was not pay- able till Christmas, and by the sale the plaintiffs had a right to an immediate delivery of the goods." 2« Low V. Martin, 18 111. 286. A warehouseman has a lien as against the owner of stored goods even though the instrument is valueless as a statutory ware- house receipt. In re New Glen- wood Canning Co., 150 Iowa 696, 130 N. W. 800. 2T Cole V. Tyng, 24 111. 99, Id Am. Dec. 735. 28 Ceroid v. Guttle, 106 111. App. 630. 29 Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. § 975 LIENS. 990 § 975. Warehouseman's or wharfinger's lien not lost be- cause the goods have a fraudulent trade-mark. A wine merchant brought an action against another wine merchant to restrain an infringement of a trade-mark on the corks of champagne bottles. Some of the bottles with the pirated trade-mark were in the possession of wharfingers acting for a consignee, and the wharfingers were made defendants in the action. In their statement of defense they disclaimed all interest in the matter, and submitted to act as the court should direct upon the payment of their costs. They con- tended at the trial that the plaintiff, if he should establish his right, ought not to touch the bottles, for the purpose of re- moving the branded corks, without first paying their ware- house charges. It was held that the wharfingers had a prior lien upon the bottles for their charges, and that, if the plain- tiff had any lien for his costs, this must be postponed to the wdiarfingers' lien. There was nothing to deprive them of their lien as wharfingers because the corks in the champagne bottles had fraudulent 'marks which they knew nothing about. ^*^ "The lien of the wharfinger is, I assume," said Lord Justice Cotton, "only as against the bottles and wine when the fraudulent corks have been removed, but I can not see any possible ground, when those have been removed, for saying that their lien for warehouse expenses loses any pri- ority that it before had, and which was a first charge against these goods." § 976. Enforcement. — A warehoiiseman's lien, like other common-law liens, confers no right to sell the property to wdiich the lien attaches, but only a right to hold it till his (N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. Dec. 143; N. W. R. Co.. 108 111. App. 520, Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & affd. 207 111. 199, 69 N. E. 825. S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254. And ^o Moet v. Pickering, L. R. 8 see Blake v. Nicholson, 3 M. & Ch. Div. Z12, rev. L. R. 6 Ch. S. 167; Morgan v. Congdon, 4 N. Div. 770, where Mr. Justice Y. 552; Schumacher v. Chicago & Fry held that the plaintiff had a 991 WAREHOUSEMEN S AND WHARFINGERS LIENS. 976 charges are paid.''^^ In most of the states, however, a remedy by sale is provided by statute. Only in a few states are there any statutes expressly enacted for the purpose of providing a remedy for the enforcement of warehousemen's liens;'- but in quite a number of states there are statutes applicable to the enforcement of all common-law liens; and in other states the statutes which provide for the sale of unclaimed goods lien for the costs of his action in priority to the lien of the whar- finger for his charges. 31 Where an attachment against goods stored in a warehouse is re- leased, the owner cannot replevy them until he has paid reasonable storage charges. Case Plow Works V. Union Iron Works, 56 Mo. App. 1. See also, Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671, 57 L. R. A. 271, 90 Am. St. 285. The warehouseman cannot, in the ab- sence of a contract to that effect, sell goods stored with him until the maturity of the debt. Whig- ham V. Fountain, 132 Ga. 277, 63 S. E. 1115. Warehouseman is en- titled to hold possession of mort- gaged goods for his charges until he is paid. Industrial Loan Assn. V. Saul, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) 188, 68 N. Y. S. 837; Reidenback v. Tuck, 85 N. Y. S. 352. See ante, § 335. 32 In Alabama it is provided that warehousemen, to whom goods are delivered by a common carrier, may advertise and sell for the same purposes and in the same manner as common carriers are authorized to do. Civ. Code 1907, §§ 6138-6141. See ante, § 339. In the District of Columbia the warehouseman has a right to en- force his lien by sale, but to do so he must follow the provisions of the statute. Code 1901, § 1619. See also. Van Buren Storage & Van Co. V. Mann, 139 111. App. 652, as to rule in Illinois. In Indiana, any forwarding and commission merchant, having a lien upon goods which may have remained in store for one year or more, may proceed to advertise and sell, at public auction, so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the amount of the lien and expenses. Burns' Ann. Stat. 1914, § 8315. Property left in storage is only subject to a lien of the keeper for his charges. Pibble v. Kent, 10 Ind. 325, 71 Am. Dec. 327. In Kentucky, a warehouseman whose charges have not been paid for twelve months upon goods in his care may sell such property, or enough thereof to pay his charges, at public sale at the warehouse door. Stats. 1909, § 4778. As to Montana, see post, 981. In South Carolina, it is provid- ed that a warehouseman in pos- session of any property, by virtue of any agreement or warehouse receipt, having claims for storage, at least one year overdue, may proceed to sell the same at public auction, but no sale may be made imtil after the giving of a written or printed notice of such sale to § 977 LIENS. 992 are expressly made applicable to goods in the hands of ware- housemen.^^ § 977. Important distinction between the lien of a ware- houseman and that of a wharfinger. — The lien of a ware- houseman is a common-law lien; while that of a wharfinger is a commercial or customary lien. The lien of a warehouse- man is specific, not general. A wharfinger's lien, on the other hand, is general."^ "There is a well-known distinc- tion," says Chief Justice Gibson, ^'^ between a commercial lien, which is the creature of usage, and a common-law lien, wdiich is the creature of policy. The first gives a right to re- tain for a balance of accounts; the second, for services per- formed in relation to the particular property. Commercial or general liens, which have not been fastened on the law merchant by inveterate usage, are discountenanced by the courts as encroachments on the common law." Considered as a new question and upon general principles, there seems to be no reasonable foundation for this distinc- tion between the lien of a warehouseman and that of a whar- fi.nger. Upon general principles it would seem that in both cases the lien should be a specific lien on the goods for the storage or wharfage. The lien, perhaps, should not be based upon the ground that the property had been given an addi- the person or persons in whose sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne- name such goods were stored, re- vada, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, quiring him or them to pay the Washington, and Wisconsin. See amount due for storage. If not statutes referred to in note to paid the warehouseman may sell § 336. the same at the time and place ^'^ Rex v. Humphery, 1 McClel. specified in the notice. Code 1912, & Y. 173. § 2595. As to Wisconsin, see post, ^.j Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts § 1060c. As to Utah, see post, & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. Dec. 254. The § 981. learned chief justice criticises the 33 As in Alaska, California, Col- position taken by Baron Graham orado, Connecticut, Delaware, in Rex v. Humphery, 1 McClel. Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, & Y. 194, that a warehouseman Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minne- has a general lien. 993 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 978 tional value, though there is very much the same reason for saying that the property has been given an additional value, by keeping it in a warehouse, as there is in the case of a car- rier for saying that the goods have been improved by car- riage to a different place; but the lien may perhaps be placed upon the broader ground that care and labor have been ex- pended upon goods at the request of the owner. A wharfinger's lien is likened to that of a factor, and a warehouseman's lien to that of a carrier. The likeness in the former case may have arisen from the custom of wharfingers in earlier times to make advances upon the goods. § 978. The lien of a wharfinger a general lien. — That a wharfinger's lien is a general lien seems to have been an established rule since the cases at nisi prius in Espinasse's Reports. In the first of these, tried before Lord Kenyon in 1794,^® it appeared that a person having twenty-five hogs- heads of sugar stored with a wharfinger sold the sugar, but the wharfinger refused to deliver it to the purchaser, claim- ing to hold it for a balance of account due him from the seller on account of wharfage and advances not relating to this particular sugar. Lord Kenyon said : "A lien from usage was matter of evidence. The usage in the present case has been proved so often, it should be considered as a settled point, that wharfingers had the lien contended for." In a later case before the Court of Exchequer,^" the cases in Espi- 36 Naylor v. Mangles, 1 Esp. 109. subject, that he has such a lien Spears v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81, tried as is claimed in the present case." at nisi prius before Lord Eldon, ^7 Rex v. Humphery, 1 McClel. was a similar case. The distin- & Y. 173, 194. Graham, B., said guished judge said: "This point he had always considered the case has been ruled by Lord Kenyon, of a wharfinger and of a ware- that a wharfinger has a lien for houseman as standing on the the balance of a general account, same ground. The other judges and considered as a point com- intimated a doubt on this point, pletely at rest. I shall, therefore, which was afterwards held to be hold it as the settled law on the immaterial to the case. It is said 63 § 979 LIENS. 994 nasse's Reports are referred to as clearly establishing this lien. The court regarded the wharfinger's lien for a general balance of account as equally clear and decided as in the case of a factor who has by custom the same lien. Baron Graham, delivering the judgment, said: "After these cases it seems to me to be infinitely too much to be argued in a court of law, that this right of wharfingers is not perfectly clear, and gen- erally and universally admitted." § 979. Right of wharfinger to lien not inferred. — If it ap- pears that a wharfinger's right to a general lien is a matter in dispute at the port where it is claimed, the right can not be inferred. "The onus of making out a right of general lien lies upon the wharfinger. There may be an usage in one place varying from that which prevails in another. Where the usage is general, and prevails to such an extent that a party contracting with a wharfinger must be supposed conu- sant of it, then he will be bound by the terms of that usage. But then it should be generally known to prevail at that place. If there be any question as to the usage, the wharf- inger should protect himself by imposing special terms, and he should give notice to his employer of the extent to which he claims a lien. If he neglects to do so, he cannot insist upon a right of general lien for anything beyond the mere wharfage."^® In this case the court, while sustaining the wharfinger's claim of a general lien for his wharfage, refused to allow the lien for labor, such as landing, weighing, and delivering, and for warehouse rent, because the custom proved was not sufifi- ciently certain and uniform to found such a general lien upon to be to this intimation of a Reg. 465, 469. But this view as- doubt by a majority of the barons sumes that there was no differ- in this case that we owe the im- ence in the origin of these liens, pression of a difference between 38 Holderness v. Collison, 7 B. the lien of a warehouseman and & C. 212, 1 Man. & R. 55, per that of a wharfinger. 23 Am. Law Bayley, J. 995 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 980 for these matters. As to such charges his lien is specific, attaching only to the goods with respect to which the services were rendered. ^"^ § 980. Lien reduced to a specific lien. — The wharfinger's general lien may be reduced to a specific lien if the property does not vest in the consignee against whom the wharfinger claims a general balance. If the contract of sale to the con- signee be rescinded before the arrival of the goods, the wharf- inger, though he receives and stores the goods without hav- ing been informed of the determination of the contract, ac- quires no general lien upon the goods. Thus, where a mer- chant shipped goods to a customer who, before their arrival, wrote to say that he was in failing circumstances and would not apply for the goods on their arrival, and the merchant, as soon as possible, applied to the wharfinger, at whose wharf the goods had meanwhile arrived, and tendered the freight and charges upon the goods, but the wharfinger refused to deliver them except upon payment of a general balance due him from "the consignee, it was held that, the contract of sale having been rescinded previously to the ar- rival of the goods, the wharfinger had no right to detain them as the property of the consignee subject to a general lien.4« The result is the same if the consignee sells the goods be- fore their arrival. The wharfinger, though not informed of the sale before the arrival of the goods, can not hold them under a claim of lien for a general balance due him from the consignee. ^^ The lien does not attach until the goods are actually landed at the wharf.'*- 39 Holderness v. Collison, 7 B. •*! Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 B. & C. 212, per Bayley, J. & Aid. 50. 40 Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & P. 42 Stephen v. Coster, 1 W. Bl. 119. 413, 423, 3 Burr. 1408; Syeds v. Hay, 4 T. R. 260. § 98 1 LIENS. 996 § 981. Statutes declaring lien. — In several states the lien of the warehouseman is declared by statute. These statutes are generally merely declaratory of the common law. A uni- form warehousemen's law has been adopted in Colorado, ^^ Iowa,** Kansas,*^ Massachusetts, ^'^ Michigan,***^ Missouri,*^ Nebraska,*^ New Jersey,*^ New York,^^ Oregon, ^^ Pennsyl- vania,^^ Rhode Island, ^^ Tennessee,^* Utah,^^ and Ver- mont.^^ The sections declaring the warehousemen's lien follow : 43 Ann. Stat. 1912, §§ 7789-7792; as to notice and sale see Ann. Stat. 1912, § 7795. 44 Laws 1907, p. 161, §§ 27, 30; Supp. 1907, §§ 3138a27, 3138a30. For proceedings for sale of such goods, see Code 1897, §§ 3131- 3133, Supp. 1907, § 3131. See Jef- fries V. Snyder, 110 Iowa 359, 81 N. W. 678. 45 Gen. Stat. 1909, §§ 3392-3395. 46 Supp. 1908, p. 561, §§ 28, 31. 46a Howell's Stat. 1912, §§ 2995- 2998. 4TLaws 1911', p. 437; Ward v. Morr Transfer & Storage Co., 119 Mo. App. 83, 95 S. W. 964. 48 Ann. Stat. 1911, §§ 12176-12179. 49 Comp. Stat. 1910, p. 5781, §§ 27, 30. 50 2 Birdseye C. & G. Consol. Laws 1909, p. 1829, § 11'2, p. 1830, § 115. The law of 1885, ch. 526, is construed in Stallman v. Kimber- ly, 121 N. Y. 393, 24 N. E. 939, 6 N. Y. S. 706; Baumann v. Post, 12 N. Y. S. 213, 26 Abb. N. C. 134, 16 Daly (N. Y.) 385, 34 N. Y. St. 308. See also Industrial Loan Assn. v. Saul, 68 N. Y. S. 837, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) 188; Robinson v. Wappans, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) 199, 68 N. Y. S. 815. A warehouseman can- not have a lien on mort- gaged goods where it is agreed in the mortgage that the mortga- gor shall not remove the goods from the premises without the consent of the mortgagee. Allen V. Becket, 84 N. Y. S. 1007. See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. Becket, 85 N. Y. S. 391 ; Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storage Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. (N. Y.) 565, 127 N. Y. S. 306. See ante, §§ 967, 971. 51 Gen. Laws 1913, p. 587, §§ 27, 30. 52 Laws 1909, p. 24, § 27, p. 25, § 30. 53 Gen. Laws 1909, p. 939, § 20, p. 940, § 23. Reference is made in the Rhode Island statute to § 11 of chapter 269 which is Gen. Laws 1909, p. 944, § 11. This section states that the negotiation is not impaired by fraud, mistake, or duress, where value is paid and there is no notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mistake or duress. 54 Acts 1909, p. 1234, § 27, p. 1235, § 30. See subsequent paragraphs in this section. 55 Laws 1911, p. 276, §§ 27, 30. 56 Laws 1912, pp. 231, 232, §§ 27, 30. 997 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 981 A warehouseman shall have a lien on goods deposited or on the proceeds thereof in his hands, for all lawful charges for storage and preservation of the goods ; also for all lawful claims for money advanced, interest, insurance, transporta- tion, labor, coopering and other charges and expenses in re- lation to such goods; also for all reasonable charges and ex- penses for notice, and advertisements for sale, and for sale of the goods where default has been made in satisfying the warehousemen's lien. If a negotiable receipt is issued for goods, the ware- houseman shall have no lien thereon, except for charges for storage of those goods, subsequent to the date of the re- ceipt, unless the receipt expressly enumerates other charges for which a lien is claimed. In such case there shall be a lien for the charges enumerated so far as they are within the terms of the above paragraph, although the amount of the charges so enumerated is not stated in the receipt. In Alaska^^ any person who shall safely keep or store any grain, wares, merchandise, and personal property at the re- quest of the owner or lawful possessor thereof, shall have a lien upon such property for his just and reasonable charges for the labor, care and attention he has bestowed and the food he has furnished and he may retain possession of such property until such charges are paid. In Arkansas,®^ when any goods, merchandise or other property shall have been received by any warehouseman, commission merchant, or common carrier and shall not be claimed or received by the owner, consignee or other author- ized person for the period of six months from the time the same shall have been called for, it shall be lawful for such warehouseman, commission merchant or carrier to sell such goods, merchandise or other property to the highest bidder for cash, first having given twenty days' notice of the time and place of sale to the owner, consignee or consignor, whert 57 Ann. Code 1900, p. 414, § 277. ^s Dig. of Stat. 1904, § 8002. § 98 1 LIENS. 998 known, and by advertisement for two insertions in a daily or weekly newspaper published in the county where such sale is to take place, the proceeds of such sale to be applied to the payment of freight, storage and charges due, and the cost of advertising and making said sale, and if any surplus is left after paying freight, storage, cost of advertising and all other just and reasonable charges, the same shall be paid over to the rightful owner of said property at any time there- after, upon demand being made therefor. A record of such sale shall be kept, which shall be open to the inspection of all parties interested therein. In California a warehouseman agreeing to hold goods until a named time and deliver them to the order of the owner is a depository for hire under the statute."'^ A depositary for hire has a lien for storage charges and for advances and insurance incurred at the request of the bailor, and for money necessarily expended in and about the care, preservation and keeping of the property stored, and he also has a lien for money advanced at the request of the bailor, to discharge a prior lien, and for the expenses of a sale where default has been made in satisfying a valid lien. The rights of the depositary for hire to such lien are regu- lated by the title on liens. ®^ In Connecticut^^ every public warehouseman, or other person engaged in the warehouse or storage business or who shall have stored goods for another, who shall have in his possession any such property by virtue of an agreement for the storage thereof with the owner of such property or per- son having a legal right to store the same, shall have a lien for the agreed storage charges on such property, or, where no charges have been agreed on, for the reasonable storage 59 Civ. Code 1906, §§ 1856, 1857. v. Naud, 125 Cal. 596, 58 Pac. 186. 3002, 3003. Shedoudy v. Spreckels 60 Stat. & Amend, to Codes 1909, Bros. Commercial Co., 9 Cal. App. p. 1001. 398, 99 Pac. 535. See also Stewart ei Qen. Stat. 1902, § 4927. 999 warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 981 charges thereon, and, when there shall be due and unpaid six months' storage charges thereon, may sell such property at public auction ; but such sale shall not conflict with the provisions of the warehouse receipt or other written agree- ment under which such goods were stored. In the District of Columbia*'- every person, firm, associa- tion, or corporation lawfully engaged in the business of stor- ing goods, wares, merchandise, or personal property of any description shall have a lien first, except for taxes thereon, for the agreed charges for storing the same and for all moneys advanced for freight, cartage, labor, insurance, and other necessary expenses thereon. Said lien for such unpaid charges, upon at least one year's storage and for the afore- said advances in connection therewith, may be enforced by sale at public auction, after thirty days' notice in writing mailed to the last known address of the person or persons in whose name or names the said property so in default was stored, and said notice shall also be published for six days in a daily newspaper in the District of Columbia. And after deducting all storage charges, advances, and expenses of sale, any balance arising therefrom shall be paid by the bailee to the bailor of such goods, wares, merchandise, or personal property, his assigns or legal representatives. In Louisiana^^ he who, having in his possession the prop- erty of another, whether in deposit or on loan or otherwise, has been obliged to incur any expense for its preservation, acquires against the owner and his creditors a right in the nature of a pledge, by virtue of which he may retain the thing until the expenses which he has incurred are paid. 62 Code 1901, § 1619. tion, the charges of the warehouse 63 Rev. Civ. Code 1900, arts, keeper for storage forms a priv- 3224-3226. Under this provision ilege superior in rank to that of there is a privilege for storage. the carrier for freight. Powers Where a carrier stores goods in a v. Sixty Tons of Marble, 21 La. warehouse at the port of destina- Ann. 402. §981 LIENS. 1000 In Minnesota^^ whoever, at the request of the owner or legal possessor of any personal property, shall store or care for or contributed^* to its preservation, care, or to the en- hancement of its value, shall have a lien upon such property for the price or value of such storage, care or contribution, and for any legal charges against the same paid by such per- son to any other person, and the right to retain the property in his possession until such lien is lawfully discharged; but a voluntary surrender of possession shall extinguish the lien herein given. In Mississippi it is held under a statute^^ which declares a lien in favor of a person who helps to prepare a crop for market that a warehouseman is not entitled to a lien who stores cotton for the purpose of sale and shipment. In Montana^^ any storage or commission merchant who has received any goods for storage, after keeping them in store for ninety days, may, in default of the payment of the storage or freight on such goods, advertise and sell the same at public auction, first giving notice by publication at least once a week for four weeks before the sale. In North Carolina^^ every person, firm or corporation who shall furnish storage room for furniture, goods, wares or merchandise and make a charge for storing the same, shall have the right to retain possession of and a lien upon all fur- niture, goods, wares or merchandise until such storage charges are paid. In North Dakota^^ any storage company or warehouseman who stores, keeps, cares for, or advances money on, or in- sures personal property, shall have a lien thereon for his rea- sonable charges for storing, keeping, caring for, and insuring 64 Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7036. Warehouse Co., 78 Miss. 875, 29 64a See Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7037, So. 770, 84 Am. St. 655. for further details 66 Codes (Civ.) 1895, § 2495. 65 Code 1906, § 3042; Shingleur- 67 Pub. Laws 1913, p. 313. Johnson Co. v. Canton Cotton 68 Rev. Code 1905, § 2269. looi warehousemen's and wharfingers' liens. § 981 the same, and for the charges he may have advanced on the same and legal interest thereon. In Ohio^^ every person in whose name merchandise is shipped, or delivered to the keeper of a warehouse, or other factor or agent, to be shipped, shall be deemed the true owner thereof, so far as to entitle the consignee of such mer- chandise to a lien thereon: for any money advanced, or ne- gotiable security given by such consignee, to or for the use of the person in whose name such shipment, or delivery of merchandise to be shipped, has been made; for money or negotiable security received by the person in whose name such shipment, or delivery of merchandise to be shipped has been made to, or for the use of, such consignee. In Tennessee'''" the owners and proprietors of wharves and landings where wharfage is allowed by law, have a lien on all boats, rafts, and other water crafts, and their loading, for the payment of their wharfage fees, and the same may be enforced by attachment within three months after the lien accrued. Every warehouse company, firm, person, or persons engaged in the warehouse or storage business, who shall re- ceive in his or their possession any goods, wares, or mer- chandise in store for hire, shall have a lien thereon superior to unregistered liens or titles for the storage charges that may accrue thereon, together with any necessary expense in- curred in making the sale; provided, however, that where sale of goods or chattels are made and a lien retained by the seller for the purchase money, such lien, whether registered or not, shall be superior to the lien hereby created. ''^^ In Wisconsin'^- a warehouseman engaged only in the bus- iness of storage must enforce his lien as provided by the statutes. '^^ He can not claim and enforce his lien under the statute providing a means for common carriers to enforce their liens on unclaimed or perishable goods. The statute 69 Gen. Code 1910, § 8358. '^2 Devlin v. Wisconsin Storage TO Code 1896, § 3549. Co., 147 Wis. 518, 133 N. W. 578. 71 Acts 1909, p. 248. 73 Stat. 1898, § 3347. § 981 LIENS. 1002 provides that lienholders may, in case such debt remain un- paid for three months and the value of the property affected thereby does not exceed one hundred dollars, sell such prop- erty at public auction and apply the proceeds of such sale to the payment of the amount due him and the expenses of such sale. Notice, in w^riting, of the time and place of such sale and of the amount claimed to be due shall be given to the owner of such property personally or by leaving the same at his place of abode, if a resident of this state, and if not, by publication thereof once in each week, for three weeks suc- cessively, next before the time of sale in some newspaper published in the county in which such lien accrues, if there be one, and if not, by posting such notice in three public places in such county. If such property exceed in value one hundred dollars, then such lien may be enforced against the same by action in any court having jurisdiction. In Wyoming''^* any warehouseman or other person who shall safely keep or store any personal property at the re- quest of the owner or person lawfully in possession thereof, shall, in like manner, have a lien upon all such personal prop- erty, for his reasonable charges for the transportation, stor- age, or keeping thereof, and for all reasonable and proper advances made thereon by him in accordance with the usage and custom of warehousemen. "^Comp. Stat. 1910, § 3756; W.W. Kimball Co. v. Payne, 9 Wyo. 441, 64 Pac. 673. CHAPTER XX. ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. Sec. Sec. 982. Common-law lien not subject 989. Interest of lienholder not at- to sale or assignment. tachable. 983. Lien a personal privilege. 990. Assignment of statutory liens. 984. Transfer of possession. 991. Equitable lien passed by as- 985. Transfer of the lien debt, signment of debt. 986. Forfeit of lien by lienhold- 992. Attorney's lien assignable. er's sale of property. 993. Transfer of lien by subroga- 987. Right of wrong-doer to set up tion. lien. 994. The seller's lien passed to 988. Effect of a sale of the prop- surety paying the debt. erty by lienholder. 995. No subrogation to a lien un- til the debt is paid. § 982. Common-law lien not subject to sale or assign- ment. — A common-law lien is not a proper subject of sale or assignment, for it is neither property nor is it a debt, but a right to retain property as security for a debt.^ "A lien," says Mr. Juster Buller, "is a personal right, and can not be transferred to another."- It is a general rule that, in the absence of any statutory provision, the assignment of a demand for which the assignor may have by law a specific lien at common law destroys the right of lien; and a reassignment to him before action does not revive the lien.^ A lien can not be assigned while the assignor retains possession of the property charged there- 1 Lovett V. Brown, 40 N. H. 511; 604, 606. And see Holly v. Hug- Bradley V. Spofford, 23 N. H. 444, geford, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 73; Glas- 447, 55 Am. Dec. 205; Jacobs v. cock v. Lemp, 26 Ind. App. 175, Knapp, 50 N. H. 71; Roberts v. 59 N. E. 342. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597, 25 Am. Rep. 3 Tewksbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis. 584 581, 4 N. W. 749; Caldwell v. Law- 2 Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R. rence, 10 Wis. 331. 1003 § 983 LIENS. 1004 with.^ On the other hand, a transfer of the property, while the assignor retains the lien debt, destroys the lien, unless the transfer be merely to an agent of the assignor to hold for him subject to the lien. § 983. Lien a personal privilege. — A lien is a purely per- sonal privilege, and can only be set up by the person to whom it accrued.^ He can not assign his claim, so as to en- able the assignee to set up the lien as a ground of claim or defense to an action for the property or its value as against the general owner. ^^ A manufacturer of starch, having a lien for the price of manufacturing several tons for one who furnished the materials, and the latter not being ready to receive and pay for the starch when it was ready for deliv- ery, obtained from a third person the amount of his claim on the starch, and delivered the stock to him by placing it in another building near the factory, and marking it with the name of such third person. The latter notified the general owner of the starch that he had purchased the manufactur- er's claim, and that the owner could have his property by paying what he had agreed to pay the manufacturer. The owner, however, took possession of the starch without pay- ing the price for manufacturing, and the person who had made advances upon it brought suit against him, declaring in trespass and trover for taking and converting the starch to his own use. It was held that he could not maintain the suit, because the lien was a personal privilege which the original lienholder could not sell or transfer except with the consent of the general owner of the property.^ § 984. Transfer of possession. — A person having a lien upon goods may transfer the possession of them to a third 4 Wing V. Griffin, V E. D. Smith D. Smith (N. Y.) 162. (N. Y.) 162. 5* Quoted in Cincinnati Tobacco 5 Holly V. Huggeford, 8 Pick. Warehouse Co. v. Leslie. 117 Ky. (Mass.) 73; Ruggles v. Walker, 478, 25 Ky. L. 1570, 64 L. R. A. 219. 34 Vt. 468; Wing v. Griffin, 1 E. e Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468. I005 ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. § 985 person to hold subject to the lien as agent or bailee of the original lienholder, until the lien shall be satisfied. The lien is not affected in such case because the possession of the property really remains with the lienholder. If the lien debt be assigned to such third person with the possession of the property, for the purpose of collection, or otherwise to hold for the original lienholder as his agent, it would seem that the lien would not be destroyed by the transfer. But though the lienholder may, under some cir- cumstances, put the property into the hands of another per- son without forfeiting his lien, yet inasmuch as the general rule is that the lien is divested by a transfer of the posses- sion, the burden is upon the lienholder to show that the transfer was of such a nature as to make it lawful. "Al- though it may be, and no doubt is true, that the holder of goods or chattels subject to a lien may transfer them to third persons under special circumstances, and for purposes con- sistent with the continuance of the lien, yet it would seem equally plain that the burden of proof and allegation lies on those who aver that such a transfer is rightful, and seek to hold the goods under it against the owner. "'^ § 985. Transfer of the lien debt. — The lienholder may transfer the lien debt, and with it the possession of the thing as security for the debt, for this amounts merely to an ap- pointment of the assignee as his agent to keep possession and collect the claim in the name and for the account of the as- signor.^ The rights of the owner remain unchanged. He can de- mand and receive the property from the assignee on the same terms he could if it still remained in the hands of the original lienholder. "In the absence of fraud or removal of the property out of reach, or any other act of abuse of the ^ Bean v. Bolton, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 1 Am. Rep. 393. And see Buckner 87, 89, per Hare, J. v. Mcllroy, 31 Ark. 631, per Pin- 8 Davis V. Bigler, 62 Pa. St. 242, dall, J. § 9^6 LIENS. 1006 original relation of bailment, there seems to be no equity in permitting him to recover without doing equity by paying or tendering the charge which is a lien on the property."" An assignee of the lien debt, accomplished by possession of the property to which the lien attaches, is only an equit- able assignee. Fie can not enforce the lien in his own name, but must use the name of the original lienholder for that pur- pose, unless the assignee he authorized by statute to prose- cute the action in his own name. § 986. Forfeit of the lien by lienholder's sale of property. — An absolute sale of the property by the lienholder forfeits the lien, and neither he nor the purchaser can set up the lien as against the owner of the general title. A lienholder may assign his lien and deliver the property to another if the assignment be in strict subordination to the rights of the owner; but an absolute sale is in violation of the property rights of the owner, is tortious, and works a forfeiture of the lien.^^ And so, if the assignee of the lien having possession of the property sells it absolutely to a third person, the owner is remitted to his original rights freed from the lien, and may maintain trover against the assignee. ^^ The owner can not maintain trespass or replevin after such absolute sale, because the purchaser has come lawfully into possession of the property by delivery from a bailee in rightful posses- sion.^^ 9 Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. St. 27, note, per BuUer, J.; Coit v. 414, 419, per Agnew, J. The trans- Waples, 1 Minn. 134 (Gil. 110) ; fer in this case was an attempted Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) sale under a statute which was in- 382; Holly v. Huggeford, 8 Pick, effectual to pass the title to the (Mass.) 73; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 property as against the owner, Vt. 468. but was a transfer of the claim n Nash v. Mosher, 19 Wend. (N. and of the possession of the prop- Y.) 431. erty. 12 Nash v. Mosher, 19 Wend. (N. 10 Jones V. Pearle, 1 Str. 556; Y.) 431; Coit v. Waples, 1 Minn. Legg V. Evans, 6 M. & W. 36; 134 (Gil. 110). Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21, I007 ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. § 989 § 987. Right of wrongdoer to set up lien. — A wrong- doer can not set up the hen. A hen which a bailee has, for the price of labor done, can not be set up by a wrongdoer to defeat the action of the general owner.^^ A lien will not pass by a tortious act of the party claiming it, such as his selling or pledging the goods without author- ity.^^ Thus the lien of a master upon a cargo for freight may be asserted by his factor or agent; but if the master, without authority, directs the factor to sell the goods and the latter sells them, the purchaser can not set up the lien and require it to be discharged before the owner can properly demand possession of the goods or bring suit for them.^^ § 988. Effect of a sale of the property by lienholder. — If a lienholder sells the property on which he has a lien without due process of law, but subject to the lien, the owner may bring trover or replevin for it freed from the lien; but he can not bring trespass, as the transferee came lawfully into possession by delivery from a lienholder who was rightfully in possession. ^^ If the lienholder or his assignee wrongfully sells or pledges the property not in subordination to the rights of the general owner, the transfer puts an end to the possession under the lien and destroys it, and the owner may sue in trespass for the property.^'^ § 989. Interest of lienholder not attachable. — The inter- est of one having possession of a chattel by virtue of a lien is not attachable as personal property, or as a chose in ac- 13 Bradley v. Spofford, 23 N. H. i5 Everett v. Saltus, 15 Wend. 444, 55 Am. Dec. 205; Jones v. Sin- (N. Y.) 474. clair, 2 N. H. 319, 9 Am. Dec. 75. le Nash v. Mosher, 19 Wend. (N. 14 McCombie v. Davies, 7 East Y.) 431; Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. 5; Urquhart v. Mclver, 4 Johns. St. 242, 1 Am. Rep. 393. (N. Y.) 103; Everett v. Saltus, 15 i" Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. St. Wend. (N. Y.) 474; Bean v. Bol- 242, 1 Am. Rep. 393, per Shars- ton, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 87. wood, J.; Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 § 990 LIENS. 1008 tion.^^ The lien can not be set up by the attaching officer, or other person, in defence of an action by the owner. ^''' It is a personal privilege whiclf the person who is entitled to it may avail himself of or not, as he pleases.-*' § 990. Assignment of statutory liens. — Some statutory liens may be assigned. Statutory liens which are not merely declaratory of the common law do not generally require pos- session to support them.-^ Such liens without possession have generally the same operation and efficacy as common- law liens with possession, and the assignment of the claim may in such cases carry with it the right to the lien, equit- ably at least.-- But statutory liens, which are really com- mon-law liens declared by statute, and which depend upon possession for their existence in the same way that common- law liens depend upon possession, can be assigned only as common-law liens can be assigned: the assignment of such a lien debt without a transfer of the property does not carry with it the lien, but on the contrary destroys the lien.-" But Pa. St. 414; Ely v. Ehle, 3 N. Y. 506. 18 Lovett V. Brown, 40 N. H. 511'; Kittredge v. Sumner, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 50; Holly v. Huggeford, 8 Pick. (Mass.) Th. i*) Kittredge v. Sumner, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 50. 20 Holly V. Huggeford, 8 Pick. (Mass.) IZ; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468. 21 See ante, § 104. 22 Leslie v. Hinson, 83 Ala. 266, 3 So. 443; Westmoreland v. Fos- ter, 60 Ala. 448. Notes taken for purchase-money secured by a ven- dor's lien may be assigned and the assignee of such notes may recover the land on non-payment much the same as the original vendor could have done. Grain v. National Life Ins. Co. of U. S., 56 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 120 S. W. 1098. The assignment of a check carries v/ith it the vendor's lien. Majors v. Maxwell, 120 Mo. App. 281, 96 S. W. 731. See also, as to rights of assignee of executory contract for sale of land, Mid- land County Sav. Bank v. T. C. Prouty Co., 158 Mich. 656, 123 N. W. 549, 133 Am. St. 401. The as- signee of a vendor's lien note takes the -superior legal title. Hatton v. Bodan Lumber Co., 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 123 S. W. 163. See also Singletary v. Golman, (Tex. Civ. App.) 123 S. W. 436. 23 Caldwell v. Lawrence, 10 Wis. 331; Tewksbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis. 581, 4 N. W. 749. I009 ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. § 991 if the existence of the lien does not depend upon possession, it may be assigned.-^ A Hen, though created by statute, is not assignable at law so as to enable the assignee to maintain an action in his own name. Any assignment that can be made is only ec^uitable.-'' An action to enforce the lien may be maintained by the as- signee in the name of the assignor.-*^ § 991. Equitable lien passed by assignment of debt. — An equitable lien reserved by express agreement passes by an 2-i Pearsons v. Tincker, 36 Maine 384; Phillips v. Vose, 81 Maine 134, 16 Atl. 463; Murphy v. Adams, 71 Maine 113, 36 Am. Rep. 299. The statutory lien of the laborer, like that of the mechanic upon real property, is assignable, and the assignee may enforce the lien in the same manner and to the same extent as the laborer. Kerr v. Moore, 54 Miss. 286. In Georgia, all liens may be assigned in writing and the assignee has all the rights of the assignor. Code 1911, § 3372. In Minnesota, all liens for labor and material are assignable and may be enforced by the assignee or his personal representatives. Gen. Stats. 1913, § 7084. In Missouri, claims entitling the holders to liens may be as- signed, and the assignee may file a lien therefor, and bring suit in his own name, and may include in such suit all claims assigned to him, and enforce such liens as fully as if they had been filed by the original claimant. Rev. Stat. 1909, § 8266. In Nevada two or more creditors of the same class may assign their claims to any other creditor or person of the same class, and the assignee may prosecute an ac- tion upon them in his own name. Liens are assignable as any other choses in action. Rev. Laws 1912, art. 2229, § 17. In Texas, liens are assignable, and an assignee has the same rights and privileges as the original lienholder. Civ. Stat. 1911, § 5647. A judgment lien may be assigned by the hold- er to his attorneys as col- lateral security for their fees and they will have a lien thereon prior to the right of set-off which might exist against it. Stanley v. Bouck, 107 Wis. 225, 83 N. W. 298. The pur- chaser of vendor's lien notes before maturity for value with- out any notice of a dedication of a part of the land by the maker is an innocent purchaser and will be protected. Adone v. LaPorte, (Tex. Civ. App.) 124 S. W. 134. 2" Cairo & Vincennes R. Co. v. Fackney, 78 111. 116; Pearsons v. Tincker, 36 Maine 384. 2C Phillips V. Vose, 81 Maine 134, 16 Atl. 463. 64 99- LIENS. lOIO assignment of the debt it was created to secure. Such a lien does not depend upon possession as does a common-law Jien." An equitable lien not reserved by contract or declared by court will not pass by an assignment of the debt, as for in- stance by the transfer, in the ordinary course of business, of a note representing the lien debt.-^ § 992, Attorney's lien assignable. — An attorney's lien upon a judgment is assignable. ^^ In this regard there is no distinction between an attorney's lien and the lien of a me- chanic or materialman. There is nothing in public policy, nor in the policy or language of the statutes creating these liens, which forbids the assignment of them. To take away their assignability would be to take away part of their value. An attorney's lien upon a judgment is a lien of an equitable nature, though in many states it is declared by statute. § 993. Transfer of lien by subrogation. — A lien may be transferred by subrogation to one who pays the lien debt, not as a volunteer, but in the line of his duty. Thus one in 27 Ober V. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199, 23 L. ed. 829; Batesville In- stitute V. Kauffman, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 151, 154, 21 L. ed. 775 ; Pkyne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348, 354; Talie- ferro v. Barnett, 'il Ark. 511 ; Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401, overruling to the contrary Shep- pard V. Thomas, 26 Ark. 617, and Jones V. Doss, 27 Ark. 518. See ante, § 28. 28 Owen V. Reed. 21 Ark. 122; Rawls V. Moye, 98 Ga. 564, 25 S. E. 582. 29 Sibley v. County of Pine, 31 Minn. 201, 202, 17 N. W. ZZl, per Mitchell, J. "There being nothing in the lien-right in the nature of a personal trust, there is no dis- tinction in this regard between an attorney's lien upon a judg- ment and the lien of a mechanic or material-man. Where the lien- holder is intrusted, as a personal trust, with the property bound by the lien, as would be the case where the papers of a client have come into the possession of his attorney in the course of his pro- fessional employment, an entire- ly different case would be pre- sented, which we do not now con- sider. But no such element of personal trust existed in the pres- ent case." lOII ASSIGNMENT OF LIENS. § 993 charge of a horse, practically as a stablekeeper, upon paying a farrier's bill for shoeing, is entitled to stand in the farrier's shoes and enforce his lien. It being the duty of the keeper of the horse to see that the horse is cared for, he is not a mere volunteer in paying the farrier's bill ; and he can retain the horse for the payment of the bill if the farrier could re- tain him.^*' A surety upon a tenant's bond for rent may take up the bond, and have it assigned to him, so as to substitute him to all the rights and lien of the landlord. ^^ A surety upon the bond of a collector of taxes, upon an- swering for his default, is subrogated to a statutory lien of the state upon the collector's land ; and the fact that the surety has taken a mortgage to indemnify him against loss is no waiver of his right of subrogation.^- A release by such surety of part of the land mortgaged to the surety to indem- nify him against loss, without notice of the equitable right of a purchaser of land from the collector which was subject to such statutory lien, will not defeat his right to be subro- gated to the lien of the state, after he has paid judgments in a suit on the collector's bond. A surety upon such bond, against whom a judgment has been recovered, may, before paying the judgment, file a bill to require the lands of the collector, subject to the statutory lien, to be first sold for the payment of such judgment. If the surety pays the judgment he is subrogated to the lien of the state, and may have the lands sold for his reimbursement.^'^ The failure of the holder of a lien to enforce or preserve it does not of itself discharge a surety of the lien debt. It is 30 Hoover v. Epler. 52 Pa. St. assignee pays subsequent taxes on 522. the land he is subrogated to the 31 Smith V. Wells, 4 Bush (Ky.) lien of the state thereon. Lewis 92. Co. V. Knowlton, 84 Minn. 53, 86 32 Crawford v. Richeson. 101 111. N. W. 875. 351. Where a tax certificate reg- 3-3 Crawford v. Richeson, 101 111. ular in form but issued on a void 351. tax judgment, is assigned and the § 994 LIENS. IOI2 enough if the lienholder does nothing to impair the Hen, or to prevent the surety from being subrogated to his rights. ^^ § 994. The seller's lien passed to surety paying the debt. — A seller's unpaid lien passes to a surety who pays the pur- chase-money upon the default of the purchaser. Thus, if a broker who has bought goods for an undisclosed principal, and therefore stands in the relation of surety for his princi- pal, pays the purchase-money upon the insolvency of his principal, he acquires the vendor's lien upon the goods, and may hold them by virtue of such lien as against the pur- chaser's pledgee of a delivery order for the goods. ^^ § 995. No subrogation to a lien until the debt is paid. — But there can be no subrogation to a lien until the lien debt is fully satisfied. Therefore, where a groom gave his prom- issory note to a stable-keeper for the keeping of a horse which the groom had engaged to take charge of for a stipu- lated sum for a time specified, it was held that he could not claim the right to use the lien of the stable-keeper until he had actually paid the note, or had shown that the note was received as payment. ^^ 34 Variol v. Doherty, 1 McGloin 35 Imperial Bank v. London (La.) 118; Parker v. Alexander. 2 Docks Co., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 195. La. Ann. 188; Gordon v. Diggs, 36 Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 9 La. Ann. 422; Elmore v. Robin- 522. son, 18 La. Ann. 651, 652; Hill v. Bourcier, 29 La. Ann. 841, 844. CHAPTER XXI. WAIVER OF LIENS. Sec. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000. 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007. 1008. 1009. 1010. 1011. 1012. 1013. Introductory. Common-law Sec. 1014. founded lien upon possession. 1015. Contract lien not discharged by owner taking possession. 1016. Intention as effecting waiv- er. Lien once lost not regained. 1017. Delivery of part. No lien where parties make 1018. special contract inconsis- tent with a lien. 1019. Lien excluded by special contract for payment at a future time. 1020. Principle extended to cases where credit is claimed 1021. without special contract. Effect of express agreement 1022. to give credit. 1023. An agreement for credit by note conditional upon the 1024. giving of the note. Waiver of lien by condition- 1025. al agreement. Effect of agreement to pay 1026. in advance. Taking debtor's note not a waiver. 1027. Note taken as payment a waiver of right to lien. Taking security does not de- 1028. stroy lien. Equitable lien not waived by taking legal lien. 1029. Lien not displaced by mort- gage. IOI3 Waiver of lien by attach- ment by lienor. Waiver of lien by inconsis- tent agreement. Special contract giving the seller a lien not a waiver of statutory lien. Estoppel to set up lien by taking bill of sale. Waiver by claim of owner- ship by lienor. Refusal to deliver property on grounds inconsistent with a lien. Lien not waived by failure to assert it. Claim of general lien no waiver of special lien. Two liens for the same debt. Lien lost if the claim is mixed with other claims. Lien lost by merger into judgment. Tender of actual indebted- ness. Lien not extinguished by tender of performance of agreement. Lien not waived by giving receipt for property with- out reservation. Waiver from unintentional relinquishment of a right not known to exist. Nonperformance of con- tract. § 996 LIENS. IOI4 Sec. 1030. Use of property for its pres- ervation. 1031. Waiver of a lien a new^ con- sideration. 10.32. Effect of execution of con- Sec. tract on Sunday on right to lien. 1032a. Lien not ordinarily lost by obtaining a judgment for the debt. § 996, Introductory. — The .subject of the waiver of liens has been briefly considered in connection with the several kinds of liens treated of in the preceding chapters. In gen- eral it was intended to state only those grounds or modes of waiver which are peculiar to the lien under consideration, or which have peculiar application to such lien. Of course waiver by surrender of possession to the general owner has been repeatedly referred to in connection with all the com- mon-law liens; for possession is the foundation of such liens, and the necessity of retaining possession in order to preserve the lien has been repeatedly referred to. But there are many other circumstances under which liens are waived, and it has seemed best to treat in the present chapter of all matters of waiver of general application to all liens. § 997. Common-law lien founded upon possession. — A common-law lien is founded upon possession, and is dis- solved by a voluntary and unconditional surrender of the property to the owner. ^ If a mechanic surrenders an article made or repaired for another without payment, he loses his 1 King V. Indian Orchard Canal Co., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 231; Stlck- ney v. Allen, 10 Gray (Mass.) 352; Sears v. Wills, 4 Allen (Mass.) 212; Huckins v. Gushing, 36 Maine 423; McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467; Wingard v. Banning, 39 Gal. 543; Sensenbren- ner v. Mathews, 48 Wis. 250, 3 N. W. 599, 33 Am. Rep. 809; Smith v. Scott, 31 Wis. 420; Vane v. New- combe, 132 U. S. 220, 33 L. ed. 310. 10 Sup. Ct. 60. In Kansas, it is provided by statute that the voluntary delivery to the owner or claimant of any personal property, by any per- son claiming a lien thereon, shall be held to be an abandonment of such lien, and such lien may also be waived by special contract. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 4817. See ante, §§ 308, 466, 519, 699, 821. IOI5 M'AIVER OF LIENS. § 997 lien upon it at common law, and under the statutes also, un- less these expressly provide for the continuance of the lien for a limited time after delivery of the chattel to the owner.^ But the lien is not waived by returning the work to the owner of the goods for inspection before receiving payment, for, by so producing it, no unconditional surrender is made or intended. "If the employee was wrongfully refused the right to resume his possession after the inspection, in case the employer insisted the work was not according to con- tract, he would not be remediless, but his right of possession would be amply protected in a proper action therefor.^ If the owner of a sawmill permits boards sawed by him to be removed from his mill-yard by the owner to the bank of the canal, half a mile distant from the mill, he loses his lien as against third persons ; and it does not avail him that the owner expressly stipulated with him that the lien should con- tinue notwithstanding the removal.^ And so the millowner loses his lien for sawing by allowing the owner of the lum- ber to remove it to a shed belonging to a third person, and over which the millowner has no control.^ A blacksmith repaired a sled, and refused to give it up until his charges should be paid. Thereupon the owner agreed that the sled should be the property of the black- smith until the latter should be fully paid, and the owner was allowed to take and keep the sled. It was afterwards at- tached as his property. It was held that the blacksmith had 2 McDougall V. Crapon, 95 N. App. 298, 30 Pac. 355. A lienhold- Car. 292. The manager of a bus- er in possession does not lose his iness having a lien thereon for right to claim the property where advances does not lose possession it is seized under an execution so as to waive his lien by trans- against the owner, by purchasing ferring the property to a trus- it at execution sale. Brown v. tee to hold until the lien is paid Petersen, 25 App. D. C. 359. for the trustee's possession is his * McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 possession. Dewing v. Hutton, 40 Wend. (N. Y.) 467. W. Va. 521, 21 S. E. 780. 5 Bailey v. Quint, 22 Vt. 474. 3 Hillsburg v. Harrison, 2 Colo. § 99^ LIENS. IOI6 lost his lien by voluntarily parting with the possession of the sled.« A lien upon grain harvested and thrashed is not waived as against an attaching creditor of the owner with knowledge of the lien by leaving it on the premises of the owner in charge of a third person." § 998. Contract lien not discharged by owner taking pos- session. — A lien created by contract is not discharged by permitting the general owner to take possession of the prop- erty, if it may be done consistently with the contract, the course of business, and the intention of the parties.^ Thus, under a provision of a contract for sawing lumber, that the quantity should be determined by the sales, or by inspection at the place of shipment, some five miles from the mill, it was held that the removal of the lumber to the place of ship- ment, and such inchoate and conditional possession as might be taken by the purchaser as the inspection proceeded, would not cut off the lien.^ But if the conduct of the lienholder be inconsistent with the preservation of his lien, it will be presumed that he in- tended to waive it. Thus, if a person has a lien upon logs for driving them into a boom, and afterwards, with knowl- edge that the owner has sold them, assists the purchaser to take possession of the logs for the purpose of having them sawed and converted to his own use, without making known that he had any lien or claim upon them, he will be regarded as having waived or abandoned his lien.^° And so if a lien claimant acquiesces in the action of a third person in taking possession of the property on exception, <> Kitteridge v. Freeman, 48 Vt. ^ Chadwick v. Broadwell, 27 62. Mich. 6, Campbell, J., dissenting. "* Hogue V. Sheriff, 1 Wash. T. if Spaulding v. Adams, 32 Maine 172. 211. 8 Spaulding v. Adams, 32 Maine 211. I0I7 WAIVER OF LIENS. § lOOO without notifying him of his own adverse claim, he waives his lien.^^ § 999. Intention as effecting waiver. — A common-law lien is created by implication, and it may be waived by implica- tion. But it is always competent to negative an implied waiver by showing by other facts that no waiver was in- tended.^- An intention to waive a lien will not be pre- sumed, in the absence of evidence clearly tending to show such an intention. ^^ A lien which is not given by operation of law, but created by express contract, can be waived only by acts done with the intention of discharging the lien.^^ A lien expressly re- served is not impliedly waived by giving credit or taking other security.^^ An agreement to deliver up the property is not in this re- spect equivalent to an actual delivery of it, unless the agree- ment be based on a legal consideration, so as to be obliga- tory.^^ § 1000. Lien once lost not regained. — A lien once lost by parting with possession of the property can not be restored by regaining possession, unless this be with the consent or agreement of the owner. ^'^ Thus the lien of a seller is lost 11 McMaster v. Merrick, 41 i^ Montieth v. Great Western Mich. 505, 2 N. W. 895. Printing Co., 16 Mo. App. 450. 12 Pratt V. Eaton, 65 Mo. 157, i6 Danforth v. Pratt, 42 Maine 1'65 ; Montieth v. Great Western 50. "A lien must be regarded as Printing Co., 16 Mo. App. 450. The something of value. It may be burden rests on a vendee who re- given up without any valuable sists the enforcement of a ven- consideration. But an agreement dor's lien, to show that the lien to give it up, in order to be ob- was intentionally waived or re- ligatory, must be based on a legal linquished. Cook v. Atkins, 173 consideration." Sugg v. Farrar, Ala. 363, 56 So. 224. 107 N. Car. 123, 12 S. E. 236. 13 Muench v. Valley Nat. Bank, ^'' Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 11 Mo. App. 144. 275; Hewison v. Guthrie, 2 Bing. 14 Smith V. Scott, 31 Wis. 420. N. Cas. 755; Hartley v. Hitchcock, § lOOI LIENS, IO18 by delivering the goods to the purchaser; yet, if the posses- sion be afterwards redelivered to the seller for the express purpose of rendering it subject to the lien, this is revived from that time, and will continue so long as the vendor re- tains possession. ^^ § 1001. Delivery of part. — One who has a lien upon goods in his possession does not, by delivering to the owner a part of them, waive his lien for his whole demand upon the re- maining part.^^ § 1002. No lien where parties make special contract in- consistent with a lien. — There can be no lien, at common law or by usage, where the parties make a special agreement inconsistent with a lien, either for a particular mode of pay- ment, or for payment at a future particular time, although without such agreement the right to a lien would be implied or recognized. If such agreement is antecedent to the pos- session, no lien is created; if it is made afterwards, the lien is waived. ^*^ A contract whereby a sawmill was leased without rent for 1 Stark. 408; Holderness v. Shack- Chandler v. Belden, 16 Johns. 157, els, 3 M. & R. 25, 8 B. & C. 612; 9 Am. Dec. 193; Burdict v. Mur- Au Sable River Boom Co. v. San- ray, 3 Vt. 302, 21 Am. Dec. 588; born, 36 Mich. 358; Nevan V. Roup, Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104; 8 Iowa 207. See ante, §§ 310, 469. Darlington v. Chamberlain, 20 18 Huff V. Earl, 3 Ind. 306. 111. App. 443; Lee v. Gould, 47 19 Palmer v. Tucker, 45 Maine Pa. St. 398; Pulis v. Sanborn, 52 316; McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Pa. St. 368. A vendor who has Wend. (N. Y.) 467. See ante, §§ 320, agreed to waive his lien is es- 411. topped to assert it against a mort- 20 Raitt v. Mitchell, 4 Campb. gage thereafter executed. Wil- 146, 149; Crawshay v. Homfray, son v. Shocklee, 94 Ark. 301, 126 4 B. & Aid. 50; Blake v. Nichol- S. W. 832. For evidence held to son, 3 M. & S. 167, 168; Bailey v. show that a vendor did not agree Adams, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Dun- to waive his lien see Wittliff v. ham V. Pettee, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 112, Biscoe, (Tex. Civ. App.) 128 S. W. Seld. Notes 154; Trust v. Pirsson, 1 1153. See ante, §§ 322, 325, 522. Hilton (N. Y.) 292, per Daly, J.; IOI9 WAIVER OF LIENS. § I002 the sawing season, but the lessees were to saw all logs fur- nished by the lessor at certain prices, and were to season and ship the lumber as ordered, was held to be inconsistent with a lien for the sawing and other work done by the lessees ; for the prices at which the work was to be done could not be considered as independent of the use of the mill, and the rental value could not be apportioned on the price of sawing, because it could not be determined how much sawing was to be done. Moreover, the work was to continue until the end of the lease, when the lessees would be bound to quit, and could not remain on the premises to enforce the lien ; and the obligation to ship was unlimited, and might exhaust the whole of the lumber.-^ A provision in a contract for sawing lumber, that the bill for sawing should be paid "as often as once a month after the lumber is delivered out of the mill," was held not to be in- consistent with a lien. From the whole contract the manu- facturer was regarded as entitled to payment before any lumber could be taken from his possession, and as entitled to monthly payments on inspections to be made at the place of shipment, whether sales were actually made or not.-- And so an agreement by a woollen manufacturer to dress what flannels should be furnished him by the other party dur- ing the year, and to receive his pay quarterly, is a waiver of a lien upon the cloth ; and if some of the cloth remains in the manufacturer's hands at the end of the quarter, he is not en- titled to retain it for the price of dressing it.^^ 21 McAIaster v. Merrick, 41 operation of a lien is to place the Mich. 505, 2 N. W. 895. property in pledge for the pay- 22 Chadwick v. Broadwell, 27 ment of the debt; and where the Mich. 6, Campbell, J., dissenting. party agrees to give time of pay- See, also, Cardinal v. Edwards, 5 ment, or agrees to receive pay- Nev. 36. ment in a particular mode, incon- 23 Stoddard Woollen Manufac- sistent with the existence of such tory V. Huntley, 8 N. H. 441, 31 a pledge, it is evidence, if nothing Am. Dec. 198. Judge Parker, de- appears to the contrary, that he livering the judgment, said : "The did not intend to rely upon the § I003 LIENS. I020 In case of a statutory Hen which exists for only a definite period after it is acquired, unless proceedings be commenced within such period for its enforcement, it follows that if the person claiming a lien has taken his debtor's promissory note, which does not mature till the expiration of the time within which proceedings for enforcing the lien may be com- menced, the taking of the note is a waiver of the lien.-'* § 1003. Lien excluded by special contract for payment at a future time. — A special agreement for a lien, which pro- vides for payment at a future time or in a particular mode, generally excludes an implied lien. If such agreement is made before the claimant acquires possession, the common- law right of lien, which otherwise would be implied, does not attach; and if such agreement be made after the claimant has acquired possession, and this lien has attached, it is thereby waived. In such case there is no lien at all, unless it is expressly provided for by the contract. ^-^ Thus, by agree- ment one was to have the right to store, repair, and sell pianofortes in a store, without exclusive possession, but in common with the owner, and for the privilege he was to pay the owner a certain sum per month at the expiration of each month. In a suit to enforce a lien upon the pianos, this agreement was held to exclude any lien for the amount due. "The distinction," said Judge Daly,^^ "that there can be no lien where the day or time for payment is regulated and fixed by the parties, is as old as the year books, and it is manifest that the law could not be otherwise. The right to detain all the property to which the lien attaches, until the charge upon it is paid, is incident to the right of lien. When, then, did the lien in this case attach? Certainly not when pledge of the goods, in relation 25 Trust v. Pirsson, 1 Hilton (N. to which the debt arose, to secure Y.) 292, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 84. the payment." 20 Trust v. Pirsson, 1 Hilton (N. 24 Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. Y.) 292. (U. S.) 324, 8 L. ed. 700; Green v. Fox, 7 Allen (Mass.) 85. I02I WAIVER OF LIENS. § IOO4 the possession commenced, for no payment was to be made until a month after. During that time the defendant had a right, under the agreement, to sell any of his pianos that might be there, and of course to deliver them to the buyers, for the plaintiff could set up no claim to action then, nothing being due. The contract, therefore, went into operation with a recognition of rights on the part of the defendant wholly inconsistent with a reservation of a right of lien. It was nothing else but an agreement for the use of the store for a certain period, at so much per month, for the prosecu- tion of a particular business by the defendant, and gave the plaintiff no lien upon the property which the defendant had there in the prosecution of that business, but, by its nature and terms, was wholly inconsistent with the existence of such a right." § 1004. Principle extended to cases where credit is claimed without special contract. — This principle has been extended to cases where a credit might be claimed by cus- tom, without any special agreement for it. Thus, in a case where a ship was taken to a dock for repairs, and great ex- pense was incurred by the shipwright, and it was shown that by usage the shipowner might demand a credit, it was held that there was no lien for the repairs.-^ And so, where a wharfinger was in the habit of receiving goods, upon which he might have had a lien, but the course of business was that he parted with the goods from time to time, receiving pay- ment at the end of every six months, or every year, for all his dues, it was held that this course of business prevented him from maintaining his right of lien.-^ But where the course of business with an insurance broker was to make out monthly accounts, and to settle the amounts due for each month at the commencement of the following 2T Raitt V. Mitchell, 4 Camph. 28 Crawshay v. Homfray, 4 B. & 146. Aid. 50. § I005 LIENS. I022 month, the broker meanwhile retaining the policies, it was held that this course of business was not inconsistent with the retention of his lien.-^ Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor, remarked, in giving judgment, that "if it had been the course of business here for the insurance broker not merely to effect these policies, but from time to time to give them up as they were effected, and simply to stand upon his right to be paid at the end of the month, then I can understand that the case would be like that of Crawshay v. Homfra^^"^" § 1005. Effect of express agreement to give credit. — An express agreement to give credit has the same effect as a credit given by note or other obligation. Thus, where a me- chanic made repairs upon certain stage-coaches under an agreement to give four months' credit upon the bill from the time of completion of the repairs, it was held that he had no lien for the repairs though the owner became insolvent be- fore the coaches passed out of the possession of the me- chanics^ § 1006. An agreement for credit by note conditional upon the giving of the note. — An agreement to take the debtor's note, or the independent security of a third person, falling due at a day beyond the period within which the lien must be asserted, is no waiver of the lien, when the agreement is not 29 Fisher v. Smith, 39 L. T. 430. er. Neither the solvency nor in- 304 B. & Aid. 50. solvency of the latter can be 31 Fieldings v. Mills, 2 Bosw^. deemed an element in the crea- (N. Y.) 489, 498. "There is a tion of the right of lien which marked difiference, in some re- exists in favor of the mechanic, spects," said Bosw^orth, J., "be- No lien exists in favor of the lat- tween the right of stoppage in ter, v^^hen his services are per- transitu and that of a mechanic to formed upon an agreement that detain. Insolvency alone creates payment for them is not to be the right to stop, in transitu. The made until after the article which common-law right of the mechan- they have improved is to be de- ic to detain, arises as well against livered." a solvent as an insolvent employ- I023 WAIVER OF LIENS. § lOO/ performed by the debtor. To hold otherwise would be to say that the person entitled to a lien intended to waive it whether the debtor kept his agreement to give his note or collateral security or not. On the debtor's failure to keep his agreement the creditor ought not to be bound by it. but should be remitted to his rights, independently of the con- tract.^- Thus, an agreement to extend the time of payment of a claim beyond the time within which a mechanic's lien should be asserted, provided a mortgage should be given, will not defeat the lien if the mortgage be not given. The giving of the mortgage is a condition precedent. ^^ In like manner, if the parties agree to settle a claim for work upon a steamboat, for which there is a right of lien, by the debtor's note extending the time of payment beyond the time allowed for asserting the lien, the lien is not displaced if the note be not given in pursuance of the agreement. The credit is conditional upon the debtor's giving the note. On his neglecting or refusing to give the note, the credit ceases, and the demand becomes immediately due and payable. ^^ § 1007. Waiver of lien by conditional agreement. — An agreement by a mechanic to do certain labor, in considera- tion of being employed to do other labor, is inconsistent with a right of lien, and is a waiver of it. Thus, a printer who agreed to repair and alter certain stereotype plates, in con- sideration of being allowed to do the owner's printing for an indefinite time, has no lien on the plates, on account of the repairs and alterations, when, after several years, the owner withdraws the printing from him.^^ In such case it might properly be presumed that the pay received by the printer for the other work performed was a remuneration for his 32 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. 34 The Highlander, 4 Blatch. (U. Union Rolling Mill Co., 109 U. S.) 55, Fed. Cas. 6475. S. 702, 27 L. ed. 1081, 3 Sup. Ct. 35 Stickney v. Allen, 10 Gray 594. (Mass.) 352. 33 Gardner v. Hall, 29 HI. 277. $ I008 LIENS. 1024 labor done upon the plates; and at any rate, this is the re- muneration which the printer agreed to take. § 1008. Effect of agreement to pay in advance. — The fact that by a special agreement payment is to be made in ad- vance does not affect the right of lien where the debtor neg- lects or refuses to make such payment. ^^ § 1009. Taking debtor's note not a waiver. — The taking of a debtor's promissory note, or acceptance, for the amount of a debt secured by a lien, is not necessarily a waiver of the lien ; for, by the general commercial law, a promissory note or acceptance given for a precedent debt does not operate as payment, unless the parties agree that it shall have this effect.3^ If, however, the debtor's promissory note or acceptance be payable at a future day, the lien is generally regarded as waived; for it can not be presumed that the parties intended that the lien should be extended through any considerable period, but, on the contrary, that the goods or other prop- erty should be delivered up immediately.^^ Where a lien claimant knows that the property upon which he claims a lien has been sold, and assents to the sale by set- ting the property apart and marking it with the purchaser's initials, and takes the seller's note for the amount of the lien claim, he can not afterwards claim the lien as against 36 Ruggles V. Walker, 34 Vt. 468. 316; Butts v. Cuthbertson, 6 Ga. 3T De Wolf V. Holland, 2 Paine 166; First Nat. Bank v. Wm. R. (U. S.) 356, Fed. Cas. 3852; Kim- Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 56 S. E. ball V. Ship Anna Kimball, 2 Cliff. 158; Beall v. Hudson County Wa- (U. S.) 4, affd. 3 Wall. (U. S.) i7, ter Co., 185 Fed. 179. See ante, 18 L. ed. 50; The Skillinger. 1 Flip. § 324. (U. S.) 436, Fed. Cas. No. 12181 ; 38 Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. Lessels v. Farnsworth, 3 How. Pr. 275; East v. Ferguson, 59 Ind. 169; (N. S.) 7Z, affd. 3 How. Prac. (N. Au Sable River Boom Co. v. San- S.) (N. Y.) 364; Myers v. Upte- born, 36 Mich. 358; Murphy v. grove, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) Lippe. 3 J. & S. (N. Y.) 542. I025 WAIVER OF LIENS. lOIO the purchaser. Thus, where a millowner, knowing that the lumber to be sawed from the logs has been sold, saws them according to the purchaser's directions, separately piles the lumber, and marks it with his initials, and accepts the seller's note for the price of sawing, he thereby waives his right to a lien on the lumber. ^^ In pleading a waiver by taking the debtor's promissory note payable at a future day, it should be alleged that the note was taken in payment.'*'-* If the creditor gives a receipt in full upon taking the debt- or's note for the amount of a lien debt, while the receipt is prima facie evidence of payment and a discharge of the lien, it is not necessarily so; for the receipt is not an estoppel, but is open to explanation. It may be shown that there was no intention of surrendering the lien.^^ § 1010. Note taken as payment a waiver of right to lien. But where a note is regarded as payment, unless a contrary intention be shown, the acceptance of a promissory note for the amount for which a lien is claimed is a discharge of the lien.^^ The taking of a promissory note for the claim is such a manifestation of intention to rely upon the personal secur- ity of the maker of the note that a waiver of the lien is in- ferred, whether the note be payable on demand or at a future time, and whether negotiated or not.^^ The taking of a note will not have this effect if the parties agree that it shall not 39 Tyler v. Blodgett & Davis Lumber Co., 78 Mich. 81, 43 N. W. 1034. 40 East V. Ferguson, 59 Ind. 169. 41 Sutton V. The Albatross, 2 Wall. Jr. 327, Fed. Cas. No. 13645, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 423. Where a lien is released through fraud or mistake equity will restore it unless to do so will injuriously affect the rights of third persons. Seymour V. Alkire, 47 W. Va. 302, 34 S. E. 953. 42 Coburn v. Kerswell, 35 Maine 126; Gren v. Fox, 7 Allen (Mass.) 85; Hutchins v. Olcutt, 4 Vt. 549, 24 Am. Dec. 634; Kimball v. Ship Anna Kimball, 2 Cliff (U. S.) 4, affirmed 3 Wall. (U. S.) 37, 18 L. ed. 50. See ante, § 324. 43 Hutchins V. Olcutt, 4 Vt. 549, 24 Am. Dec. 634. 65 lOII LIENS. 1026 be a satisfaction of the debt. It is in such case a mere liqui- dation or adjustment of the original debt. But if the cred- itor indorses such note for value, he can not, while the note is outstanding, enforce his lien against the original debtor.^^ The taking of a note of a third person, for the amount of a debt secured by a lien, does not discharge the lien if it be expressly agreed, in a receipt for the note, that it should not be regarded as payment until paid. The note in such case is taken conditionally.^^ If, on the other hand, the note be taken in discharge of the lien debt, the lien is lost.^® § 1011. Taking security does not destroy lien. — The mere taking of security for the amount of a debt for which a lien is claimed does not ordinarily destroy the lien. To have this effect there must be something in the facts of the case, or in the nature of the security taken, which is inconsistent with the existence of the lien, and destructive of it.^''^ Some gen- eral expressions of Lord Eldon, in his judgment in the case of Cowell v. Simpson, ^^ seem to support the view that a spe- ■*4Morton v. Austin, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 389. 45 Prentiss v. Garland, 67 Maine 345. 40 Button V. New England Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 29 N. H. 153. 4' Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. Div. 330, per Kay, J.; Myers v. Humphries (Tex.), 47 S. W. 812; Ohio Falls Car Mfg. Co. v. Cen- tral Trust Co., 71 Fed. 916, 18 C. C. A. 386. One who accepts notes for his saw bill and agrees that the owner may sell the lumber and pay the notes from the pro- ceeds waives his lien. Germain v. Central Lumber Co., 120 Mich. 61, 78 N. W. 1007. See also, Darling V. Hunt, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 631, 61 N. Y. S. 278. Where it is held that where a livery stable keeper ac- cepts a cash payment and a chattel mortgage for the balance of his bill and allows the owner to take possession of his horse and buggy he waives his lien. Where the lienor does an act manifesting an intention not to rely on his lien, such as taking security therefor not reserving a right to still hold his lien he will be held to have lost his lien. Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 105 Pac. 740, 134 Am. St. 143. Taking collateral secur- ity will waive a lien. Buffalo Oolitic Limestone Quarries Co. v. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116, 90 N. E. 327; Spears v. Taylor, 149 Ala. 180, 42 So. 1016. 48 16 Ves. 275, 279. In another case, Balch v. Symes, T. & R. 87, 92, Lord Eldon says: "Notwith- 1027 WAIVER OF LIENS. § I0I2 cial agreement for security, or the taking of security, is of itself a waiver of a lien for the debt secured. "My opinion," he said, ''therefore is, that, where these special agreements are taken, the lien does not remain; and whether the securi- ties are due or not, makes no difference." But in the case before him the security was taken by a solicitor who had a lien on his client's paper, and the security was in the form of promissory notes which were payable in three years, and it was very properly held that the security was in its nature inconsistent with the retention of a lien. That was the case decided, and it must be presumed that the fact of the long credit given was the reason why Lord Eldon held the lien to have been lost, rather than the fact of the giving of se- curity.*^ In the case of Angus v. McLachlan above cited, an inn- keeper accepted from a guest, as security for his bill, a letter whereby he charged his interest in a certain ship with the payment of any account due or to become due. The inn- keeper subsequently locked up the guest's room and detained his goods. It was held that the taking of this security was no waiver of the innkeeper's lien. § 1012. Equitable lien not waived by taking legal lien. — When an equitable lien has once arisen and there is no ex- press waiver, it is not waived by the subsequent taking of a legal and perfected lien to the same extent and upon the same property, nor is the equitable merged in the legal lien. Thus, if there be an agreement to give a mortgage, and afterwards a mortgage be delivered which is void as against standing the Court of King's ■^^ That taking a security pay- Bench has expressed a doubt, able at a distant day is a waiver whether my decision was right in of a lien, see also, Hewison v. the case of Cowell v. Simpson, I Guthrie, 3 Scott 298, 2 Bing. N. C. still entertain the opinion, that an 755; Mason v. Morley, 34 Beav. attorney who takes a security 471 ; Cood v. Pollard, 10 Price, 109, abandons his lien." 9 Price 544. § IOI3 LIENS. 1028 a purchaser or incumbrancer because not properly executed, the creditor may rely upon the agreement which created an equitable lien, and this will prevail against a mechanic's lien which has intervened between the agreement and the exe- cuted mortgage. ^^ "The equitable lien has had, in the case in hand, an existence. There has been no express waiver of it. The law is not anxious to imply a waiver. Whether it has ceased to exist, depends upon the rules of equity, which determine whether a merger has taken place. It is a general rule that, where an equitable, and legal estate meet and vest in the same ownership, the former is merged in the latter. But the doctrine of merger, as applied to mortgages, is founded upon equitable principles, and is only applied where equity requires that it should be. Where the owner of the legal and equitable titles has an interest in keeping those titles distinct, as where there is an intervening incumbrance, he has a right so to keep them, and the equitable title will not be merged and thereby extinguished; so that, even if we should treat the right obtained by the mortgage, after its due acknowledgment and recording, as a legal one, the equitable lien would not have been extinguished thereby. Still less so, when we consider that both are liens of the same character, both equitable in their nature, one implied, the other express. "^^ § 1013. Lien not displaced by mortgage. — The taking of a mortgage upon the same property upon which the creditor claims a statutory lien may not displace the lien. The mort- gage is regarded as a cumulative security; and the creditor may enforce either the lien or the mortgage. ''- So, also, the taking of the collateral obligation of another person for the payment of the lien debt does not ordinarily 50 Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348, 52 Roberts v. Wilcoxson, 36 Ark. affg. 11 Hun (N. Y.) 302. 355; Franklin v. Meyer, 36 Ark. 96. 51 Folger, J., in Payne v. 'Wil- son, 74 N. Y. 348. 1029 WAIVER OF LIENS. IOI4 debar the lienholder from claiming the security of his Hen, unless the circumstances are such that an intention to waive the lien may reasonably be inferred. ^^ A futile efTort to accjuire a lien more specific and exclu- sive than that provided for by statute in no wise manifests an intention to release the property from the statutory lien, but it shows the very opposite intention, — an intention to hold the property, if possible, for the payment of the claim. ^^ § 1014. Waiver of lien by attachment by lienor. — An at- tachment of goods by one who claims a lien upon them, to secure the same debt for which the lien is claimed, is a waiver of the lien.^'^ The attachment is in efTect an assertion that the property attached belongs to the defendant. Having made the attachment, he is estopped from afterwards assert- ing the contrary by claiming a lien upon the property.^^ In like manner, a person having a lien on goods waives it by causing them to be taken on execution at his own suit, although he purchases the goods under the execution, and they are never removed from his premises; for, in order to sell, the sheriff must have had possession, and, after he had possession with the assent of the person claiming the lien, the subsequent possession of the latter must have been acquired 53 In New Mexico it is provided by statute that no person shall be entitled to a lien who has taken collateral security for the pay- ment of the sum due him. Comp. Laws 1897, § 2235; Fulton v. Har- rington, 7 Houst. (Del.) 182, 30 Atl. 856. See ante, §§ 587, 588. 54 Clark V. Moore, 64 111. 273. 55Legg V. Willard, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 140; Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 543. See, however, Roberts V. Wilcoxsen, 36 Ark. 355. See ante, § 328. The lien may, under some circumstances, be retained. Town- send V. Newell, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 332; City Nat. Bank of Marshall- town V. Crahan, 135 Iowa 230, 112 N. W. 793, one holding a claim secured by lien does not waive his lien by filing his claim against the estate of the party against whom the right to a lien existed. Waschow v. Waschow, 155 111. App. 167. •^c This is especially the case where an attachment can only be made upon afifidavit to the effect that the debt is not secured by lien or mortgage. Wingard v. Ban- ning, 39 Cal. 543. § I0I5 LIENS. 1030 under the sale, and not by virtue of his lien.^^ Property in the hands of a person having a lien thereon cannot be taken from him under an attachment against the general owner. He has a right to retain it until discharged of the onus; and if it be v^^rongfully taken av^ay, he may maintain an action against the seizing officer for the tort. But he may waive his right; and if he does, it does not lie in the mouth of the debtor himself to object. ^^ § 1015. Waiver of lien by inconsistent agreement. — A lien is waived by making any agreement inconsistent with its existence, though, if the new agreement be not in writing, it will ordinarily be a question of fact for the jury whether the lien was waived or not. Thus, one in possession of a cow belonging to another, and having a lien upon it for keeping it, purchased the cow of the owner, and agreed that the cow should be and remain the property of the seller until paid for. There was no change of possession of the cow. It was held that it was not for the court to decide as a matter of law whether the lien was waived or not, but that it was a question for the jury whether the lien was intended and understood by the parties to be waived. The jury is to con- sider the new contract with all its attendant circumstances; and if nothing was said about the lien, the jury must find from all the evidence what the understanding of the parties was concerning the lien.^^ 5" Jacobs V. Latour, 5 Bing. 130; is not waived. Dewing v. Hutton, Brown v. Petersen, 25 App. D. C. 40 W. Va. 521, 21 S. E. 780. 359. 59 Pickett v. Bullock, 52 N. H. 58 Meeker v. Wilson, 1 Gall. (U. 354. An attorney having a lien on S.) 419, 425, Fed. Cas. No. 9392, per a judgment for attorney's fees Story, J. Where the manager of does not waive his lien by con- a business has a lien on the prop- senting to the sale and assign- erty for advances and transfers ment of the judgment where the property to a trustee directing the assignee agrees to pay him to hold it until the lien is such lien. Hutchinson v. Worth- paid, the trustee's possession is ington, 7 App. D. C. 548. See, also, that of the manager and the lien In re V. & M. Lumber Co!, Inc., IO3I WAIVER OF LIENS. § 101/ § 1016. Special contract giving the seller a lien not a waiver of statutory lien. — A special contract that a seller shall have a lien on goods sold till payment, and that the pos- session of the purchaser shall be the possession of the seller, is not a waiver of a statutory lien. Thus, a statutory lien for rails furnished to a railroad company is not affected by a special agreement that the manufacturer should have a lien on the rails till pa3mient, and that the possession of the rail- road should be the possession of the manufacturer.*^*^ Such a stipulation shows no purpose on the part of the manufac- turer to waive his statutory lien. The evident purpose of such a stipulation is to secure a specific lien on the materials furnished, and to require them to be used in the construction of the railroad where they would become subject to the stat- utory lien. The contract, instead of showing a waiver of the statutory lien, shows a purpose to retain it. § 1017. Estoppel to set up lien by taking bill of sale. — If a lienholder purchases goods and takes a bill of sale from the general owner, and afterwards claims them solely under such purchase, he cannot, in a suit in regard to the title, set up his lien. Thus, a carrier who had a lien upon skins which he was currying purchased them of the owner, partly in pay- ment for the work done upon them, by a contract, though valid between the parties, yet void as against the seller's creditors. Proceedings in insolvency were commenced against the seller, and the messenger of the court of insolv- 182 Fed. 231; Harrington v. Union force a lien. W. W. Brown Const. Oil Co., 144 Fed. 235. When one Co. v. Central Illinois Const. Co., agrees not to assert a lien as fol- 234 111. 397, 84 N. E. 1038. See also, lows, "The completed work, when Perry v. Dowdell, 38 Tex. Civ. offered to the company for ac- App. 96, 84 S. W. 833; Anderson ceptance, shall be delivered free v. Perry, 98 Tex. 493, 85 S. W. 1138. from any and all liens, claims or 60 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. encumbrances of any description," Union Rolling Mill Co., 109 U. S. it is held not so definite in its 702, 27 L. ed. 1081, 3 Sup. Ct. 594. terms as to constitute a waiver of And see Clark v. Moore, 64 111. the statutory right to assert or en- 273. ioi8 LIENS. 1032 ency took possession of the goods. At the time the messen- ger took the goods away, the currier claimed them only as purchaser, and gave the messenger no notice of his lien, and made no demand for the amount of his lien. It was held that he could not set up his lien in a suit against the messenger for taking away the goods. ^^ § 1018. Waiver by claim of ownership by lienor. — A per- son having a lien waives it by claiming to own the property absolutely, and on that ground refusing to deliver it to the owner. A lien cannot be waived and resumed at pleasure. ^^ When one who has a lien sets up a claim to the property 01 Mexal v. Dearborn, 12 Gray (Mass.) 2,2,6, 227. Merrick, J., de- livering the judgment of the court, said: "A lien is an incum- brance upon property, a claim upon it which may be maintained against the general owner. But there is no foundation. upon which he owns the whole can create a special right in his own favor to a part. The inferior or partial title to a chattel necessarily merges in that whch is absolute and unconditional, when both are united and held by the same indi- vidual. This is a general conse- quence. But in the present in- stance, it is obvious that the par- ties extinguished, and intended to extinguish, the lien which had been previously created upon the calfskins; for the value of the work and labor which had previ- ously been bestowed upon them by the vendor was by their ex- press agreement made part of the consideration of the sale. After such a transaction the rights of the parties were wholly changed." Upon the point of the waiver of the lien by concealment, the learned judge said: "The law will not allow a party to insist upon and enforce in his own behalf a secret lien upon personal prop- erty after he has claimed it un- conditionally as his own, and has thereby induced another to act in relation to it, in some manner af- fecting his own interest, as he would, or might, not have done if he had been openly and fairly no- tified of the additional ground of claim. It would be fraudulent in him to practise such concealment to the injury of others; and, to prevent the possibility of attempts so unjust becoming successful, the law implies that an intended con- cealment of that kind is of itself a waiver of the lien." 02 Picquet v. McKay, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 465; Boardman v. Sill, 1 Campb. 410, n; Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290; Peo- ple's Bank v. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 179, 72 Pac. 949; Buffalo Oolitic Limestone Quarries Co. v. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116, 90 N. E. 327. I033 WAIVER OF LIENS. § IOI9 hostile to the right of the owner, and wrongfully sells it, he cannot afterwards set up the lien as a bar to an action against him for his illegal act.®^ A lien may be waived by setting up any claim of right of detention, instead of a claim under the lien.^'* If one having a lien does not disclose it when the owner demands the, property, but claims to be himself the owner, he is estopped from setting up a lien in defense to the owner's action to recover possession.*'^ But a factor does not waive his lien for advances on goods by declining to give information as to the amount of his ad- vances to one claiming the goods who is not the party who placed them in his hands.^^ The right to a common-law lien is waived by perfecting a claim for a lien under a statute. ^''^ § 1019. Refusal to deliver property on grounds inconsist- ent with a lien. — When property is demanded of a person who means to claim a lien upon it, but he refuses to sur- render it upon a ground which is inconsistent with a lien, he is not allowed afterwards to set up a claim of lien of which the plaintiff was ignorant at the time he brought the action.^* Retention on a ground inconsistent with a claim by virtue of a specific lien operates as a waiver of the lien. On the trial the claimant will not be permitted to rest his refusal to deliver the property to the general owner on a diiTerent 63 Andrews v. Wade, 3 Sad. ^^'> Maynard v. Anderson, 54 N. (Pa.) 133, 6 Atl. 48; Davis v. Big- Y. 641; De Bouverie v. Gillespie, ler, 62 Pa. St. 242, 251, 1 Am. Rep. 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 472; Leh- 393; Brown v. Truax, 58 Ore. 572, mann v. Schmidt, 87 Cal. 15, 25 115 Pac. 597; Mosteller v. Holborn, Pac. 161. 21 S. Dak. 547, 114 N. W. 693; ec Buckley v. Handy, 2 Miles Whitehead v. Jessup, 7 Colo. App. (Pa.) 449. 460, 43 Pac. 1042. C7 Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 64 Boardman v. Sill, 1 Campb. 220. 33 L. ed. 310, 10 Sup. Ct. 60. 410, n; Dirks v. Richards, Car. & 68 Boardman v. Sill, 1 Campb. M. 626. See, however. White v. 410, n; Judah v. Kemp, 2 Johns. Gainer, 2 Bing. 23. Cas. (N. Y.) 411; Weeks v. Goode, § I020 LIENS. 1034 and distinct ground from that on which he claimed to retain the property at the time of the demand and refusal. § 1020. Lien not waived by failure to assert it. — A lien may not be waived by the mere omission of the claimant to assert his lien as the ground of his refusal to deliver up the property on the demand of the owner.*^^ A general refusal to surrender the goods, without specify- ing the ground of the refusal, may not be inconsistent with a subsequent claim of a lien. It is not necessary for the per- son of whom the demand is made to speak and claim to hold the goods by reason of a lien, if the person making the de- mand knows, or has reason to know, that the other has a lien, or is doing an act which would entitle him to a lien. But it may be that if the lien, or the ground of the lien, is unknown to the person making the demand, and the person in posses- sion knows or has reason to know this, it is the duty of the latter to give the former notice of the lien, if he is going to rely upon it."^^ § 1021. Claim of general lien no waiver of special lien. — • The fact that a party claims a general lien when he is only entitled to a specific lien is no waiver of the latter lien. If, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 367; Jones v. Tarl- ley, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 407, 411, 22 L. ton, 9 M. & W. 675; Saltus v. ed. 385; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 32 Mass. 401, 9 N. E. 799, 803, per Am. Dec. 541; Everett v. Saltus, Field, J. Laches may be set up as 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 474, affd. 20 a defense in an action in equity Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. to enforce a lien without any spe- 541; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. cial pleading. Hughes v. Kershow, V. McGuire, 79 Ala. 395; Bean v. 42 Colo. 210, 93 Pac. 1116, 15 L. R. Bolton, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 87; Hanna A. (N. S.) 122,. See also, as to v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. Dec. waiver by laches Stieff Co. of Bal- 410; Picquet v. McKay, 2 Blackf. timore City v. Ullrich, 110 Md. (Ind.) 465. 629, 1Z Atl. 874; Worth v. Worth, 69 White V. Gainer, 9 Moore 41, 155 Cal. 599, 102 Pac. 663. 2 Bing. 23, 1 Car. & P. 324; Ever- 70 Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. ett V. Coffin, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 603, 401, 9 N. E. 799, 803. 22 Am. Dec. 551 ; Avery v. Hack- 1035 WAIVER OF LIENS. § I02I therefore, the general owner brings an action of trover for the property detained without tendering the amount of the specific Hen, lie can not recover. '''^ There are some cases, however, in which it is declared that, after one has refused to deliver up property on the ground of having a lien for a general balance of account, he can not afterwards set up a specific lien, because, it is said, if he holds possession by vir- tue of a specific lien, it is obligatory upon him to apprise the owner of this ground of his claim at the time of the owner's demand for the property, so that the owner may then have the opportunity of paying or tendering the amount for which the lien exists. But it is clear that one does not waive a specific lien by claiming not only this, but a general lien as well. Having a specific lien upon property, such as a lien for work upon it, he does not waive it if, at the time of the owner's demand for it, he mentions this ground to justify his right to detain the property, although he at the same time insists upon a right to detain it for a general balance of account, or for any other claim for which he has no right of lien. He need not, in such case, specify the amount of the particular charge for which a lien exists. All that is necessary is, that he should at the time of the demand apprise the owner of his claim to hold the property by virtue of a lien on which he had a legal right to detain it. It does not answer that he had a specific lien, but claimed to detain the property for a general bal- ance of account, or for another claim for which he had no lien. He waives his lien in such case by not insisting upon it as the ground of his right of possession.'''- ''^ Scarf e v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. ought to pay." Munson v. Porter, 270. Alderson, B., said: "It seems 63 Iowa 453, 19 N. W. 290. See to me you cannot say, that'because ante, § 334. the party claims more than it may "^^2 Thatcher v. Harlan, 2 Houst. be ultimately found he had a right (Del.) 178; Brown v. Holmes, 21 to, he would not have a right to a Kans. 687. tender of the sum which the other § I022 LIENS, 1036 A lienholder does not lose his lien by detaining more prop- erty subject to the lien than is necessary to preserve it.'^^ § 1022. Two liens for the same debt. — A creditor may have two liens for the same thing.'^ Thus, where the maker of a steam-engine reserved a lien upon it, and at the same time an express lien was created upon the real estate of the debtor upon which the engine was placed, it was held that the taking of the one was no waiver of the other. '^^ § 1023. Lien lost if the claim is mixed with other claims. — The lien is lost or waived if the claim for which there is a lien is so mingled and intermixed with other claims, for which the claimant is entitled to no lien, that it is impossi- ble to distinguish between the two."*^ By commingling privi- leged claims with those for which there is no lien, so that the amount of the lien is not kept ascertainable without restat- ing the accounts, the lien is impliedly waived.'^ But a lien is not waived by merely restating the account, and deducting three small items for which no lien is claimed. '^^ § 1024. Lien lost by merger into judgment. — A lien is lost when the claim is merged in a judgment with other claims for which no lien exists; but if a suit is brought upon such claims, the lien may be preserved by amending the writ be- fore judgment by striking out the items for which there is no lien, and taking judgment upon the items for which there is a lien."*^ '3 Hall V. Tittabawassee Boom 135. See Baker v. Fessenden, 71 Co., 51 Mich. 377, 16 N. W. 770. Maine 292. "-1 Lagow V. Badollet, 1 Blackf. "" Terry v. McClintock, 41 Alich. (Ind.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 258. Con- 492, 505, 2 N. W. 787. tra, McRae v. Creditors, 16 La. "S Comstock v. McCracken, 53 Ann. 305. Mich. 123, 18 N. W. 583. "5 Lagow V. Badollet 1 Blackf. "» Sands v. Sands, 74 Maine 239; (Ind.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 258. Spofford v. True, 33 Maine 283, 'G Kelley v. Kelley, 77 Maine 297, 54 Am. Dec. 621. 1037 WAIVER OF LIENS. § IO25 A statute exempting household furniture and working tools from execution provided that such exemption should not extend to any execution issued on a demand for the pur- chase-money of such furniture or tools. A judgment for an entire sum was recovered upon separate and distinct debts only, one of which was for the purchase-price of property exempt from execution, and the judgment creditor sought to levy this portion of the execution upon property exempt from execution. It was held that he could not levy the exe- cution in this manner. His right as against exempt property is in the nature of a particular lien on specific property, and must be enforced by itself upon that property. He moreover waived his right to follow the property sold by him by tak- ing a judgment wdiich included other debts. By taking such a judgment he is deemed to have elected to abandon his claim to follow the specific property.^" § 1025. Tender of actual indebtedness. — If the demand for which a lien is claimed is deemed excessive, the owner of the property, in order to dissolve it, should tender such a sum as he himself considers reasonable. ^^ If one wrongfully claims a lien for a larger indebtedness than that for which he has a lien, he may perhaps be deemed to have waived or forfeited his lien, especially if he fails to disclose the true amount of the lien, and this can not be presumed to be within the knowl- edge of the debtor, so that he could tender the true amount for which the lien attached. But if the claimant has rendered an itemized account which shows the nature of his demand and the time for which the charge was made, and if the debtor's knowledge of the true amount of the account for which there is a lien may be presumed, and it does not dis- tinctly appear that the claimant asserts a lien for the whole 80 Hickox V. Fay, 36 Barb, (N. Scarf e v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270; Y.) 9, revd. 25 How. Prac. 163. Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa 453, 19 81 Hall V. Tittabawassee Boom N. W. 290; Hillsburg v. Harrison, Co., 51 Mich. Zn, 16 N. W. 770; 2 Colo. App. 298, 30 Pac. 355. § I026 LIENS. 1038 balance of the account, or for a greater amount than he ac- tually had a lien for, he does not waive his lien. "If, under an}^ circumstances a lien could be deemed forfeited by the assertion of a claim for a lien for too large an amount, the assertion should be clear and distinct, and operate to inter- fere in the present with a claimed right on the part of the owner."^^ The mere demand of an excessive sum by a creditor hold- ing a lien does not dispense with a tender by the debtor of the sum really due, unless the demand be so made that it amounts to a declaration by the creditor that a tender of a smaller sum is useless; for in that case a tender is dispensed with,*^ although it appears that the debtor was unwilling to tender the amount really due.^^ The claim of a general lien may dis- pense with the tender of the amount of a specific lien to which the creditor is entitled, and the owner may maintain trover without a tender.^^ § 1026. Lien not extinguished by tender of performance of agreement. — Tender of performance of an agreement will not operate to extinguish the lien by which the agreement is secured, if it is not unequivocal, and reasonably capable of being understood by the other party as a bona fide tender of the requisite thing, act or service ;^*^ and the offer itself should be accompanied by circumstances fairly implying con- trol of the necessary means, and possession of the necessary ability, to fulfil it.^"^ § 1027. Lien not waived by giving receipt for property without reservation. — A lien is not waived by the lienholder's 82 Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa man v. All persons, etc., 16 Cal. 453, 19 N. W. 290, per Adams, J. App. 287, 117 Pac. 586. 83 Dirks V. Richards, 4 M. & G. §5 Jones v. Tarlton. 9 M. & W. 574, 5 Scot. N. R. 534; Kerford v. 675. Mondel, 28 L. J. Exch. 303. sc L'Hommedieu v. Dayton, 38 84 The Norway, 3 Moore P. C. Fed. 926. (N. S.) 245, V3 W. R. 1085; Kauf- S7 Selby v. Hurd, 51 Mich. 1, 16 N. W. 180, per Graves, C. J. I039 WAIVER OF LIENS. § IO29 giving of a receipt for the property without making a reserva- tion of the lien. The owner of certain barley pledged to a bank as collateral for a loan, washing to have the barley malted, arranged with the owner of a malthouse, with the concurrence of the bank, for converting the barley into malt. The maltster delivered to the bank a receipt for the barley, which he agreed to hold subject to the written order of the bank; nothing being said in the receipt about the charges for malting, or any lien therefor. It was held that the absence of a reservation of such lien did not deprive the malt man of his lien.^^ § 1028. Waiver from unintentional relinquishment of a right not known to exist. — One having a lien on certain cows, being in ignorance of the fact that his lien extends to their offspring, does not waive his lien by telling an attaching of- ficer that the latter did not belong to him.^^ To constitute a waiver, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a knowm right. § 1029. Nonperformance of contract. — One who has un- dertaken to perform certain labor and has failed to fulfil his contract, and performed only a part of the service, has no lien for what he has done. The other party is entitled, if he elects, to recover damages for the nonperformance of 'the contract; and, these damages being of uncertain amount, it is uncertain whether the person wdio has undertaken to per- form the labor will, on final adjustment, receive anything for the labor he has done. Under such circumstances he can not be permitted to hold possession by virtue of the lien until this matter is settled. ^° S8 Hazard v. Manning, 8 Hun 90 Hodgden v. Waldron, 9 N. H. (N. Y.) 613. 66. And see Hilgar v. Edwards, 5 89 Boynton v. Braley, 54 Vt. 92. Nev. 84. S 1030 LIENS. 1040 § 1030. Use of property for its preservation. — A creditor having a lien does not forfeit it by using the property so far as is necessary for its preservation. Thus, a Hverystable keeper may use a horse left in his care to the extent of giv- ing the horse proper exercise. If he should go beyond this and habitually let the horse to others, he might be guilty of a conversion of the horse to his own use, so that he would not afterwards be allowed to occupy the inconsistent position of claiming a lien upon the same thing. But even if the keeper uses the horse beyond the extent of giving it proper exercise, or lets it to others, if the ownier knows of such use, and at times when the horse is in use he accepts, without ob- jection, a substituted horse, the owner can not claim that there is such a conversion of the horse as will defeat the lien.^^ § 1031. Waiver of a lien a new consideration. — The waiver of a lien by agreement is a new and original consideration for a promise by a person not personally bound for the debt se- cured by the lien to pay that debt ; and such need not be in writing, as the promise is original and not collateral, and so not within the statute of frauds. ^^ A release of a lien under seal, executed on a promise to pay the money for which the lien was claimed, is void for failure of consideration.^^ § 1032. Effect of execution of contract on Sunday on right to lien. — The fact that the contract under which a lien is claimed was executed on Sunday does not defeat the lien after the contract has been executed, and the property upon which the lien is claimed has passed into the possession of the person claiming the lien. Both parties in such case are in pari delicto, and the party who has possession is in the 91 Munson v. Porter, 63 Iowa Koehler, 11 N. Y. 91 ; Mallory v. 453, 19 N. W. 290. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412. 92 Robinson v. Springfield Iron 93 Benson v. Mole, 9 Phila. Co., 39 Hun (N. Y.) 634; Prime v. (Pa.) 66. I04I WAIVER OF LIENS. § 1032a better position. The property must remain in the possessor's hands until the Hen is discharged by payment.^^ § 1032a. Lien not ordinarily lost by obtaining a judgment for the debt. — Though the debt is merged in the judgment, its nature is not destroyed or affected; and if the debt was one for which a lien was given at common law or by statute, the lien continues after judgment. Though it is provided that a statutory lien shall be enforced by attachment, the right is not taken away by a previous suit and judgment on the debt.^-' 94 Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 9^ Wilson v. Taylor, 89 Ala. 368, 270. 8 So. 149. 66 CHAPTER XXII. REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. Sec. 1033. A common-law lien defined. 1034. Conversion by lienor. 1035. Right of possession under lien. 1036. Lienholder's measure of damages in trover and trespass. 1'037. First step in enforcing lien. 1038. Jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce lien. 1039. Has jurisdiction when mat- ters of account are in- volved. 1040. Jurisdiction dependent on fact that accounts may re- quire adjustment after sale. 1041. In what states courts of equity have jurisdiction to enforce liens. 1042. Jurisdiction of courts of United States. 1043. Loss of lien by taking prop- erty to another state. 1044. Lien of partnership not lost by dissolution. 1045. Lien on two funds or two properties. 1046. Application of equitable principle as between cred- itors of different persons. 1047. Enforcement as to rights of other- lienholders or pur- chasers as dependent on nature of lien. Sec. 1048. Rights of bona fide purchas- ers for value. 1049. Statutes as to remedies by sale. 1049a. Alaska. 1049b. Arizona. 1049c. California. 1050. Colorado. 1051. Delaware. 1051a. District of Columbia. 1052. Florida. 1053. Georgia. 1053a. Idaho. 1054. Indiana. 1054a. Kentucky. 1055. Maine. 1056. Massachusetts. 1056a. Michigan. 1056b. Minnesota. 1057. New Hampshire. 1057a. New Mexico. 1057b. New York. 1057c. North Dakota. 1058. Oregon. 1059. Pennsylvania. 1059a. Rhode Island. 1059b. South Dakota. 1059c. Tennessee. 1060. Texas. 1060a. Utah. 1060b. Virginia. 1060c. Washington. 1060d. West Virginia. 1060e. Wisconsin. 1060f. Wyoming. 1042 I043 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. 1033 § 1033. A common-law lien defined. — A common-law lien, as has already been stated, is merely the right of a person in possession of the property of another to detain it until cer- tain demands, either specific or general, are satisfied. In general there is no remedy for enforcing the lien unless it is given by statute.^ In this respect a lien differs essentially from a pledge ; for a pledgee, when the debt has become due and remains unpaid, may, after due notice, sell the thing pledged and reimburse himself from the proceeds.^ A sale of the property by the person in possession and claiming a lien, without the consent of the owner, is a con- version of it. But if the person having a lien does dispose of 1 Pothonier v. Dawson, Holt (N. P.) 383; Jones v. Pearle, 1 Stra. 557; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 21, note; Thames Iron Works Co. V. Patent Derrick Co., 1' J. & H. 93; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) 382; Busfield v. Wheel- er, 14 Allen (Mass.) 139; Briggs v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. Dec. 626; Rod- gers'v. Grothe, 58 Pa. St. 414. See ante, § 335. In Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) 382, which arose be- fore the enactment in Massachu- setts of a statute for the enforce- ment of liens. Chief Justice Shaw observed with reference to the se- curity of a lienholder : "If it be said that a right to retain the goods, without the right to sell, is of little or no value; it may be answered that it is certainly not so adequate a security as a pledge with a power of sale; still, it is to be considered that both parties have rights which are to be re- garded by the law; and the rule must be adapted to general con- venience. In the greater number of cases, the lien for work is small in comparison with the value, to the owner, of the article subject to lien; and in most cases it would be for the interest of the owner to satisfy the lien and redeem the goods ; as in the case of the tailor, the coach-maker, the inn-keeper, the carrier and others. Whereas, many times, it would cause great loss to the general owner to sell the suit of clothes or other ar- ticles of personal property. But further, it is to be considered that the security of this lien, such as it is, is superadded to the holder's right to recover for his services by action." When a lien is pro- vided by statute as well as a provi- sion for foreclosure the remedy given is generally exclusive, but it may be enforced in chancery when entire justice can only be done to the parties. Wynn v. Tal- lapoosa County Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228. 2 Jones on Collateral Securities (3d ed.), §§ 2, 720-729. § I034 LIENS. 1044 it, though wrongfully, he may set up his lien as a defense to any action which the owner may bring against him for a con- version.^ § 1034. Conversion by lienor. — If one holding goods un- der a lien sells them without legal proceedings, the sale is a conversion and renders him liable to the owner in an action for such conversion, or the owner may resume possession of the goods wherever he may find them. The lien only gives the holder the right of possession until the debt is paid, and he can do nothing else to enforce payment except in pursu- ance of some statute providing for the enforcement of liens. In a suit by the owner of goods against a bailee who has converted the goods on which he has bestowed labor and acquired a lien, the latter may set up his lien claim in reduc- tion of damages.* If, however, he does not set up his claim in that suit, he may afterwards maintain a suit for the debt. In trover for the conversion of the goods, the owner would recover the full value of the goods at the time of the conversion, in case the defendant does not set up his lien claim in reduction of damages; and prima facie the value of the goods at the time of conversion is the measure of damages recovered.^ "It may be greatly against the interest of the defendant to present his claim in such action, and against his rights to compel him to do so. Cases may readily be supposed, where the value of work and material put upon plaintiff's property would greatly exceed the value of the property in its altered condi- tion. The article, with all the labor put upon it might en- tirely fail to meet the purposes which the owner designed it for, and be valueless for any other; if, being left upon the hands of the artisan, he should destroy [it], by carelessness 3 Briggs V. Boston & L. R. Co., 4 Longstreet v. Phile, 39 N. J. L. 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83 Am. Dec. 63. 626; Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. St. ^ Edmondson v. Nuttall, 17 C. B. 414. See ante, §§ 523, 525. Judge (N. S.) 280. V.' Curtis, 72 Ark. 132, 78 S. W. 746. 1045 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO36 or design, to rid himself of it, it would not be just to compel the defendant, in a suit for its conversion, to set up his claim, to be balanced and liquidated by the inferior value of the con- verted goods. He may prefer to pay the damages and bring suit for his debt, and he has, in his election, the right to do so."« § 1035. Right of possession under lien. — A lien confers a special property and the right of possession, and if the holder is unlawfully deprived of the possession he may maintain an action of replevin for the purpose of reclaiming it, or an ac- tion of trespass or trover for damages. The general owner can not maintain trespass either against the lienholder or a third person for the property subject to the lien, so long as the lienholder remains in either actual or constructive possession; for the gist of the action is an in- jury to the plaintiff's possession, and, the possession belong- ing to the lienholder, he alone can maintain trespass for the property."^ When articles subject to a lien are taken from the posses- sion of one entitled to a lien upon them, the general owner may maintain trover for them, and the lien can not be set up in bar except by the lienholder or by his express authority. The lien can not be set up by a wrongdoer to defeat the ac- tion of the general owner.^ § 1036. Lienholder's measure of damages in trover and trespass. — Lienholder's measure of damages in trover and trespass, in an action of trespass against the owner, or those claiming under him, for the removal or destruction of the goods, is compensation to the plaintiff for his loss, and con- sequently he can recover damages only to the extent of his 6 Longstreet v. Phile, 39 N. J. L. 8 Jones v. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 319, 63, per Knapp, J. 9 Am. Dec. 75; Bradley v. Spof- 7 Wilson V. Martin, 40 N. H. 88; ford, 23 N. H. 444, 55 Am. Dec. 205. Cowing V. Snow, 11 Mass. 415. § I037 LIENS. 1046 lien.^ There is a distinction to be observed between the measure of damages in an action against the general owner and in an action against a stranger; for, while in the former case he can recover only according to his special interest, in the latter case he may recover the full value, though exceed- ing the amount of his lien.^^ The amount recovered in ex- cess of the lien claim, or other special interest, he will hold in trust for the general owner. § 1037. First step in enforcing lien. — If the property upon which it is sought to enforce a lien be in the adverse posses- sion of a third person, the lien claimant should first recover possession of the property, or should sue for a wrongful con- version of it. If he brings an action to enforce the lien with- out making such third person a party defendant and obtains judgment, this is void as to such third person. ^^ § 1038. Jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce lien. — Generally a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enforce a common-law lien by sale merely because there is no remedy at law, or because the retaining of possession under a passive lien involves expense or inconvenience. Generally a lien at law or by statute can be enforced only under express statu- 9 Outcalt V. Durling, 25 N. J. L. property, and upon the evidence 443; Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin, 7 damages shall be mitigated; but Cow. (N. Y.) 670, revd. 5 Wend. clearly, the bailee, or he who hath (N. Y.) 315; Spoor v. Holland, 8 the general property, and upon the Wend. (N. Y.) 445, 24 Am. Dec. Zl ; evidence damages shall be miti- Burdict v. Murray, 3 Vt. 302, 21 gated; but clearly, the bailee, or Am. Dec. 588. he who hath a special property, 10 Lyle V. Barker, 5 Binn. (Pa.) shall have a general action of tres- 457, 460; Heydon and Smith's Case, pass against a stranger, and shall 13 Coke (>]. "So is the better opin- recover all in damages, because ion in 11 Hen. IV. 23, that he who that he is chargeable over." hath a special property of the 11 Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. goods at a certain time, shall have 543; Perkins v. Ogilvie, 140 Ky. a general action of trespass 412, 131 S. W. 200. against him who hath the general I047 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. 1038 tory provisions. An equitable form of procedure may be ex- pressly provided; but in the absence of such provision, a lien can not be enforced in equity unless jurisdiction is acquired under well-established rules. ^^ This subject was ably discussed by Vice-Chancellor Wood in the High Court of Chancery, where it was sought to en- force a shipbuilder's common-law lien by a bill in equity. ^^ "It was argued," he said, "that, to create a mere right of re- tainer, involving considerable expenditure, and rendering the subject of the lien utterly useless to both parties, would be absurd ; and, to a certain extent, there is authority to show that this is not the law. The case referred to, of a horse hav- ing eaten its full value, is one instance of a right of sale be- ing held to flow from a lien.^^ In one statement this is said to rest on the local customs of London and Exeter, but else- where it is treated as a general right. Whatever the law may be, as a matter of fact, it is certainly very common for such a right to be exercised; for advertisements, threatening to sell horses or other chattels unless removed by a given date, are constantly to be seen. The contention was, that, as 12 Wynn v. Tallapoosa County- Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228. See ante, §§ 94, 112. 13 Thames Iron Works Co. v. Patent Derrick Co., 1 J. & H. 93, 97. 14 In Bacon's Abr. (Inns D.) it is said that, "by the custom of London and Exeter, if a man com- mit a horse to an hostler and he eat out the price of his head, the hostler may take him as his own, upon the reasonable appraisement of four of his neighbors; which was, it seems, a custom arising from the abundance of traffic with strangers, that could not be known, to charge them with the action. But the innkeeper hath no power to sell the horse, by the general custom of the whole king- dom." He cites among the other cases Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 557, where, "in trover for three horses, the defendant pleaded, that he kept a public inn at Glastenbury, and that the plaintiff was a carrier and used to set up his horses there, and £36 being due to him for the keeping the horses, which was more than they were worth, he de- tained and sold them, prout ei bene licuit : and on demurrer judg- ment was given for the plaintiff, an innkeeper having no power to sell horses, except within the city of London." § 1039 LIENS. 1048 a corollary from the case I have referred to, there followed a general rule of law, that wherever the retaining of a chat- tel under a lien occasions considerable expense, there the right of sale must arise. But no such doctrine has ever been held, and the authorities, on the contrary, point to the con- clusion, that the right of sale can not be raised on the mere ground of the expense of retaining the chattel which is the subject of the lien. If it could, it would arise in every case of a lien on bulky goods, the retaining of which must involve warehousing expenses. It is not material to consider how far such a case as that put by Story, of notice being given that expense is being incurred, and that if the goods are not removed they will be sold, may hereafter be held to justify a sale, because the present case does not raise such a ques- tion. If it did, it would be necessary to analyze the right of lien, and consider whether it amounts to anything more than this — that a person who chooses to insist on the right of retainer which the law gives, and is willing to put up with any inconvenience which may be the consequence, is at lib- erty to do so, but has no further right. Even though such an arrangement should be most inconvenient for both parties, it does not follow that this is not the law." § 1039. Has jurisdiction when matters of account are in- volved. — A court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce a lien when matters of account are involved, although the lien may not in itself be an equitable lien.^^ Thus, where a landlord reserved in his lease a lien for rent upon the improvements made or to be made by the lessee on the demised premises, and upon the lessee's interest in the lease, and the lien is enforcible against those claiming under the lessee, and the lease has been assigned and the premises sublet, there is such 15 Story Eq. Jur. (13th ed.). ing in equity, see Pritchard v. §§ 506, 1217. As to facts held not Pritchard, 134 App. Div. (N. Y.) to be a showing of inadequacy of 301, ITS N. Y. S. 882. legal remedy justifying proceed- I049 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO4I necessity for taking an account as to bring the case within the equitable jurisdiction of the court. If, pending the bill in such case, rents coming to the assignee have been paid into court, on establishing the lien the court may require the money to be applied to the rent due from the assignee. The right to control the income follows as a sequence from the right to enforce the lien.^^ § 1040. Jurisdiction dependent on fact that accounts may require adjustment after sale. — But the mere fact that after the sale accounts may require adjustment by the court does not give jurisdiction to a court of equity to decree a sale.^^ There is no right to an account in equity where the debt for which a lien is claimed is a liquidated debt with interest which is a mere matter of calculation. "Even if the lien (in such case) were supposed to be equivalent to a pledge," said Wood. V. C, "it would be only a pledge for an ascertained sum, and no accounts would be necessary. Were this other- wise, I know of no authority for saying that where the pledgor makes no claim to redeem and the pledgee insists on selling hostilely, this court acquires jurisdiction in respect of the sale, because after a sale there may be some possi- bility of questions of account arising such as to require the aid of the Court. ... If such a jurisdiction existed, it would arise in all cases of pledges of chattels; and I am not aware of any case in which relief of this description has been asked." § 1041. In what states courts of equity have jurisdiction to enforce liens. — In a few states it is held that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce liens of personal property gen- erally. Thus, it was held in Kentucky that a court of equity ic Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. i' Thames Iron Works Co. v. 160; American Trading & Storage Patent Derrick Co., 1 J. & H. 93. Co. V. Gottstein, 123 Iowa 267, 98 N. W. 770, 101 Am. St. 319. § 1042 LIENS. 1050 may order the sale of a horse belonging to an innkeeper's guest, in satisfaction of the lien upon the horse. ^'^ In Illi- nois it is held that liens for the enforcement of which there is no special statutory provision are enforcible only in equity. This is true not only of equitable liens but also of all statu- tory liens, except when the lien is in the nature of a pledge, and possession accompanies the lien. A court of law does not possess the means of enforcing such liens. ^^ It is a general rule that all persons who claim an interest in property on which a lien is sought to be foreclosed should be made parties to the suit.-*^ If the lien be limited in dura- tion to a specified time, it must be shown affirmatively that the proceeding to enforce it was commenced within that time.^^ § 1042. Jurisdiction of courts of United States. — The courts of the United States have jurisdiction for the enforce- ment of statutory liens wherever the citizenship of the par- ties would give jurisdiction in other cases. This jurisdiction, whether at common law or in equity, is not derived from the power of the state, but from the laws of the United States. The United States courts are not necessarily confined to the remedy prescribed by the state law; but this remedy will be pursued if it be substantially consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding used on the chancery side of these courts.^^ § 1043. Loss of lien by taking property to another state. — A lien valid by the laws of one state is not lost by taking the 18 Black V. Brennan. 5 Dana wards, 35 Ind. 467; Ellison v. Bran- (Ky.) 310. strator, 45 Ind. App. 307, 88 N. E. 19 Cairo & V. R. Co. v. Fackney, 963, 89 N. E. 513. 78 111. 116. 21 Union Slate Co. v. Tilton, 11 20 Jones on Chattel Mortgages Maine 207. (5th ed.), § 783; Templeman v. 22 Fitch v. Creighton, 24 How. Gresham, 61 Tex. 50; Hall v. Hall, (U. S.) 159, 16 L. ed. 596. 11 Tex. 526, 547; Trippito v. Ed- I05I REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO45 property to another state. Although the holder of the lien can enforce it only in accordance with the laws of the state under which the lien accrued, yet the owner of the property can not take it away from the lienholder.-^ The lien is as perfect in the one state as in the other, so long as the lien- holder retains possession. The title and claim under the lien may be set up in defense of the possession wherever these may be assailed, just as the title under a mortgage may be shown in defense in any state to which the mortgaged prop- erty may be taken. ^'* Whether the lienholder could maintain an action in another state against one who had obtained pos- session of the property wrongfully, is another question. § 1044. Lien of partnership after dissolution. — A lien which has accrued to a partnership is not lost by the dissolu- tion of the firm, and the assignment by one partner to the other of his interest in the claim. All statutory proceedings for the enforcement of the claim must be had in the name of the partnership. It is a general principle that the continu- ing partner takes all the rights of the firm, and may exercise them in the name of the firm, for all purposes necessary for their enforcement and for closing up the joint business.-'^ A lien in behalf of a partnership may ordinarily be enforced by a petition made by one member of the firm for and in be- half of such firm.^^ § 1045. Lien on two funds or two properties. — A lien- holder who has a lien upon two funds or upon two pieces of property for his debt is not allowed to enforce his lien in such a way as to exclude the lien of another who has a lien upon only one of the funds or pieces of property; but he may be 23 Jaquith v. American Express (Mass.) 139; Vinson v. Cantrell Co., 60 N. H. 61. (Tenn.), 56 S. W. 1034. 24 Jones on Chattel Mortgages 26 Garland v. Hickey, 7h Wis. (5th ed.), § 260a. 178, 43 N. W. 832; Bennett v. Gray, 25 Busfield V. Wheeler, 14 Allen 82 Ga. 592, 9 S. E. 469. 1046 LIENS. 1052 compelled to resort in the first instance to the fund or prop- erty upon which the other has no lien, if that court be neces- sary for the satisfaction of the claims of both lienholders.^^ This principle, however, is only applicable where the lien- holder's right to resort to both funds is clear, and not seri- ously disputed, and where the remedies available for reach- ing and applying the funds are .reasonably prompt and efB- cient.^^ Thus, a lienholder will not be compelled in the first instance to resort to the personal obligation of a third per- son, who w^ould probably contest his liability and delay the collection of the lien debt.^^ § 1046. Application of equitable principle as between creditors of different persons. — This equitable principle has no application as between creditors of different persons. It is confined to cases where two or more persons are creditors of the same debtor, and have successive demands upon the same property, the creditor prior in right having other securities. Thus, a landlord having a statutory lien for his rent upon the crops raised upon the rented premises, whether raised by the tenant or subtenant, can not be compelled to so exer- cise his statutory right as to protect or benefit another person who may have a lien on the crop of the under tenant.^" A 27 Bruner's Appeal, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 269; Bryant v. Stephens, 58 Ala. 636; Goss v. Lester, 1 Wis. 43. A creditor holding a lien taking a whole fund on which several other creditors have liens must account to his fellow lienors in accord with their ratable shares. Stiles V. Galbreath, 69 N. J. Eq. 222, 60 Atl. 224. 28 Kidder v. Page, 48 N. H. 380. 29 Block V. Latham, 63 Tex. 414. 30 Ex parte Kendal, 17 Ves. 514, 520. "It was never said, that, if I have a demand against A and B, a creditor of B shall compel me to go against A; without more. * * * If I have a demand against both, the creditors of B have no right to compel me to seek payment from A; if not founded on some equity, giving B the right for his own sake, to com- pel me to seek payment from A. * * * Unless they can establish that it is just and equitable that Devaynes's estate should pay in the first instance, they have no equity to compel a man to go against that estate." Per Lord El- don. 1053 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO47 landlord having sued out an attachment to enforce such a lien on the crops, and having afterwards released the attach- ment on the crops of under tenants who had paid their rent to their immediate landlord, does not thereby forfeit or im- pair his right to subject other portions of the crop, or to proceed against a third person who, having notice of the landlord's lien, has received and sold a portion of the crop. The landlord having brought an action against a merchant who had received and sold some of the products raised by under tenants, on account of advances made to them, the merchant has no right to insist that the landlord's demand shall be credited with the value of the crops so released from attachment by the landlord. '^^ This sale has no application in a proceeding at law. It is enforced only in equity.^" § 1047. Enforcement as to rights of other lienholders or purchasers as dependent on nature of lien. — The effect of the enforcement of a lien upon the rights of other lienholders and of bona fide purchasers depends largely upon the nature of the lien. Possession under a common-law lien is notice of the rights of the person in possession, so that any sale of the property by the general owner, or any liens upon it created by him, must be subject to the rights of the Henholder in pos- session. Whether such liens take precedence of liens al- ready existing depends upon the circumstances attending the creation of the lien.'"^^ Equitable liens and liens by contract, where the possession of the property remains with the gen- eral owner, can not be enforced after a sale to a bona fide purchaser without notice."^ As between such liens and other liens upon the same property, much depends upon the prior- ity in time at which the liens come into existence.'^^ An at- torney who has obtained a judgment for his client has pri- 31 Robinson v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 33 See ante, § 744. 401. 34 See ante, § 95. 32 Hunter v. Whitfield, 89 111. 35 Where a junior Henholder is 229. not made a party to a foreclosure § 1048 LIENS. 1054 ority over an assignee of the judgment; for the attorney is regarded as an equitable assignee of the judgment from the time it was rendered; and under the statutes of many of the states, he is an equitable assignee of the cause of action, so that his lien attaches from the commencement of the suit. Any person taking an assignment of the cause of action, or of the judgment, from the client, must take notice of the at- torney's connection with the suit, and can acquire only the rights of the assignor.^^ The priority of statutory liens depends for the most part upon the terms of the statutes creating them. A landlord's statutory lien generally attaches from the beginning of the tenancy, and any person dealing with the tenant, with re- spect to the property subject to the lien, must take notice of the effect of the statute."'^ But the lien is generally defeated by a sale made by the tenant to a purchaser for value and in good faith. ^^ Priorities under statutory liens are also affected by notice arising from the possession of the lienholder. Thus^ the possession of animals by a stablekeeper or agistor is con- structive notice to a purchaser of his claim to a lien, just as possession under a common-law lien is constructive notice of the claim of such lienholder.^^ § 1048. Rights of bona fide purchasers for value. — A statu- tory lien may be given priority by the express terms of the statute. It is a characteristic feature of the statutes giving liens to lumbermen, that they are declared paramount to all other liens or claims against the property. ^° Whether such a statute gives a lumberman priority from the time the labor is of a senior lienholder, the junior 38 A purchaser at a foreclosure is not bound by a judgment ren- sale may be a bona fade purchaser. dered and may have the property East St. Louis v. 111. & St. Louis resold. Evans v. Borchard, 8 Tex. Bridge Co., 52 111. App. 436. See Civ. App. 276, 28 S. W. 258. See ante, §§ 577-582. ante, § 96. •'JO See ante, §§ 691-697. SGSee ante, §§ 226-228. 40 See ante, §§ 704, 727. 3T See ante, §§ 551-560. I055 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO48 performed, as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser as well as against the holders of other claims and liens, is a question which has been ably' discussed and determined in cases in Michigan and Wisconsin; and it is held that the lien does not prevail against a bona fide purchaser who has no notice of it through the claimant's possession of the property, or his filing a claim or petition under the statute, or through actual notice. ^^ The language of the statutes — "all other claims or liens" — is not regarded as broad enough, or suffi- ciently specific, to cover the claim of a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In the Wisconsin case, Mr. Justice Orton, delivering the opinion of the court, said :^- "The language would have to be forced beyond its natural meaning to embrace such a case; and we do not think that the legislature intended such a meaning, for it has omitted to use the language to express it as against the well-known policy of the law governing the transfer of personal property, for the protection of bona fide purchasers, in an open market for value without notice of prior claims thereon. . . . The paramount importance and incalculable value of personal property in these modern times makes its ready and easy transfer from hand to hand, and the protection of bona fide purchasers thereof, abso- lutely essential to our modern systems of trade and com- merce. Secret trusts, liens, and incumbrances, and unknown and concealed claims and interests, in and upon personal property, and especially that kind of personal property that enters so largely into the general commerce of a country, would, if enforced by law, work the greatest injustice and 41 Haifley v. Haynes, 2,1 Mich. Co., 68 Wis. 89, 31 N. W. 694. Mr. 535; Au Sable River Boom Co. v. Justice Taylor delivered a dissent- Sanborn, 36 Mich. 358; Smith v. ing opinion. The decision of the Shell Lake Lumber Co., 68 Wis. court, as delivered by Mr. Justice 89, 31 N. W. 694; Ashmore v. Orton, seems to be in accordance Whatley, 99 Ga. 150, 24 S. E. 941. with sound principles and the best 42 Smith V. Shell Lake Lumber precedents. § 1048 LIENS. 1056 be utterly destructive of the greatest financial interest that any country can have. * * * Logs, timber, lumber, in- cluding boards, shingle, and lath, constitute most valuable and important articles of our trade and commerce, and are readily and necessarily and almost constantly, being trans- ferred and sold in wholesale and retail in open market, and carried and scattered over vast distances by land and w^ater. This interest and trade are too vast and important to be clogged, impeded, and incumbered by secret liens, following them into all the distant markets of the land, to be enforced in violation of such a cardinal principle to facilitate and pro- tect the sale of personal property. "In view of these considerations and authorities, what is the true interpretation of our statutes giving to laborers thereon a lien upon logs, timber, and lumber? What is the object or purpose of filing a claim for such lien in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county unless it be for notice to somebody? In Sec. 3341, R. S., it is called the 'no- tice of such lien.'^^ This constructive notice would in most cases be the only notice a subsequent purchaser would be likely to have. If he has actual notice, or knowledge of such facts and circumstances as to imply it, or to put him on in- quiry of such liens, then he is not an innocent or bona fide purchaser as against them, and should not be protected, and will not be by a reasonable construction of the statute. The laborer, while he is working upon the logs, timber, or lum- ber, is protected by the notice inherent in this very act in connection with the article itself, equivalent to possession of it, as in common-law liens. After he has completed his la- bor upon it, he can at once file his claim and his protection will continue. It is not necessary that he should delay his remedy until the article has been removed and gone into the markets of the country and into the hands of many subse- 43 Wisconsin, Stats. 1898, §§ 3329- p. 655, § 39. 3342b, amended by Laws 1899, I057 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO49 quent purchasers for value and in good faith without any notice whatever of his claim. The proper meaning of the statute would seem to be that the laborer has a statutory lien for the value- of his labor upon the logs or lumber from the time of its commencement. But it is a lien that he must claim in the way provided for, or he will be held to have waived it. He has a lien, no doubt, against all the world having actual or constructive notice of it. * * * If this peculiar language of our statute can have force without vio- lating the great principle and clear public policy of the law that protects bona fide purchasers in the usual course of trade for value without notice of the lien, then such should be its construction. If one purchase, before the filing of the claim, with notice that a certain person has worked upon the article to produce it and the time has not expired for the filing of his claim, it would seem proper that he should take notice of such a laborer's lien upon it. Or if he had been in- formed that a lien existed, or had such knowledge as to put him on equity of it, and be bound to so inquire, he could scarcely be called a bona fide purchaser without notice. In this way the laborer can have ample protection of his lien without any infraction of, or violent exception to, the general law which protects subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice." § 1049. Statutes as to remedies by sale. — By legislation, remedies by sale have been very generally provided for the common-law liens and for those created by statute. In only a few states, hov/ever, has legislation reached the compre- hensive form of a general provision for enforcing all liens, or all similar liens. In the preceding chapters have been given the statutory provisions applicable to the enforcement of the different liens ; and reference has been made to the present chapter for the statutory provisions which are of general ap- plication. Much of the legislation on the subject of liens has been fragmentary, uncertain, and apparently experimental; 67 § 10493- LIENS. 1058 and it is to be hoped and expected that more comprehensive and better considered legislation will follow. § 1049a. Alaska.^^ — If the liens of carriers, storers of merchandise, and agistors of cattle are not paid within three months after the care, attention, and labor have been fur- nished, the lienholder may sell the property, or as much as is necessary, at public auction to pay his charges. He must give three weeks' notice of such sale in a newspaper pub- lished in the precinct, or by posting notice in three public places of the precinct, one of which shall be the post-office or adjacent thereto. The proceeds of such sale shall be applied first to the discharge of the lien, and the costs of keeping and selling such property, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid to the owner. § 1049b. Arizona.^^ — When possession of any property by one claiming an innkeeper's, liverystable keeper's or mechan- ic's lien thereon has continued for twenty days after the charges have accrued, and the charges so due have not been paid, it is the duty of the person so holding such property to notify the owner, if in the county where the property is to come forward and pay the same, and on his failure within ten days after such notice has been given him to pay said charges, the holders of said property after five days' notice, may sell said property at public auction and apply the pro- ceeds to the payment of said charges, and shall pay over the balance to the persons entitled to the same. § 1049c. California.'*''' — If any mechanic, livery stable pro- prietor, laundry proprietor, veterinary hospital proprietor, veterinary surgeon, or keeper of garage entitled to a lien for work or labor done or for caring for property be not paid the amount due and for which said lien is given, within <4 Carter's Ann. Code 1900, § 278. ^6 Stat. & Amend, to Codes 1907, *5Rev. Stat. 1901, § 2924. p. 86; 1911, p. 887. I059 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO5O twenty days after the same shall have become due, then such lienholder may proceed to sell said property, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy said lien and costs of sale, at public auction, and by giving-, at least ten days' pre- vious notice of such sale by advertising in some new^spaper published in the count}^ in which such property is situated; or, if there be no newspaper published in such county, then by posting notices of the sale in three of the most public places in the town or place where such property is to be sold, for ten days previous to the date of sale. The proceeds of the sale must be applied to the discharge of the lien and the cost of keeping and selling the property; the remainder, if any, must be paid over to the owner thereof. § 1050. Colorado.^^ — If any charges due any ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, or person to whom any animals shall have been entrusted for feeding, herding, pas- turing, keeping or ranching or livery-stable keeper, or to any keeper of a hotel or boarding-house or to any com- mon carrier or warehouseman, or to any mechanic for labor upon personal property for which a lien is given, be not paid within thirty days after the same becomes due and pay- able, the mechanic, innkeeper, agistor, or other person to whom such lien is given, may apply to any justice of the peace of the county wherein he resides to appoint appraisers to appraise the several articles of personal property whereon such lien is claimed. Such justice shall thereupon appoint, by warrant under his hand, three reputable householders of 47 Mills' Ann. Stat. 1912. §§ 4571- houseman to sell goods on which 4576. For a special statute author- he has made advances, see Mills' izing the sale of goods received by Ann. Stat. 1912, § 7624. A failure a common carrier, commission to give notice to an owner as re- merchant, or warehouseman, and quired by the statute makes a not called for by the consignee, see sale a trespass and the proceed- Mills' Ann. Stat. 1912, § 7620. And ing is void. Bailey v. Fallon, 30 for a special statute authorizing Colo. 419. any commission merchant or ware- § 1050 LIENS. 1060 the county, not interested in the matter, to appraise such personal property. The appraisers shall be sworn by the justice to well and faithfully appraise and value all such personal property, and shall thereupon proceed to view and appraise the same, and shall return their appraisement, wherein shall be set down each article separately, to the justice by whom they were appointed, within ten days after their appointment. After such appraisement is made, the person to whom such lien is given may, after giving ten days' prior notice of the time and place of such sale, with a description of the property to be sold, by publication in some newspaper pub- lished in the county where he resides (or if there be no such newspaper, then by posting in three public places within such county), and delivering to the owner of such personal property, or if he do not reside in the county, transmitting by mail to him at his usual place of abode, if known, a copy of such notice, proceed to sell all such personal property or so much thereof as may be necessary, at public auction, for cash in hand, at any public place within such county, be- tween the hours of ten a. m. and four p. m. of the day ap- pointed; and from the proceeds thereof may pay the reason- able costs of such appraisement, notice and sale, and his rea- sonable charges for which he has his lien, together with the reasonable cost of keeping such property up to the time of sale. The residue of the proceeds and of the property un- sold he shall render to the owner. No such sale shall be made for less than two-thirds of the appraised value of the article sold, nor except upon due no- tice, as required by the preceding paragraph. Every such sale made in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall be absolutely void. At such sale the person to whom such lien is given may become the purchaser. In any case where the property to be sold can not con- veniently be sold in one day the sale may be continued from I06l REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § I05ia day to day by public outcry at the place of sale. Upon the completion of such sale, the person to whom the lien is given hereby shall cause a sale bill thereof to be filed with the jus- tice of the peace before whom such appraisement was had, in which shall be set down the sum for which each separate article of property was sold, and the name of the purchaser. The justice shall record such sale bill in his docket, and pre- serve the original thereof together with the appraisement. § 1051. Delaware.*^ — In all cases in which commission merchants, factors, and all common carriers, or other per- sons, have a lien upon any goods, for or on account of the costs or expenses of carriage, storage, or labor bestowed thereon, if the owner or consignee shall fail or neglect or refuse to pay the charges upon the same within sixty days after demand thereof, made personally, or at his last known place of residence, it shall be lawful for the person having such lien to expose such goods, wares, merchandise, or other personal property, to sale at public auction, and to sell the same, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to discharge said lien, together with costs of saFe and advertising. No- tice of such sale, together with the name of the person or persons to whom such goods shall have been consigned, shall first be published for three successive weeks in a newspaper published in the county, and by six written or printed hand- bills, put up in the most public and conspicuous places in the vicinity of the depot where said goods may be. § 1051a. District of Columbia.^^ — If the amount due and for which a lien is given to a mechanic, artisan, innkeeper, boardinghouse keeper or liveryman is not paid after the end of a month after the same is due, and the property bound by said lien does not exceed the sttm of fifty dollars, then the 48 Rev. Code as Amended 1893, 49 Code 1901, § 1263. pp. 816, 817, §§ 1-3. § 1052 LIENS. 1062 party entitled to such lien, after demand of payment upon the debtor, if he be within the District, may proceed to sell the property so subject to lien at public auction, after giving notice once a week for three successive weeks in some daily newspaper published in the District, and the proceeds of such sale shall be applied, first, to the expenses of such sales and the discharge of such lien, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid over to the owner of the property. § 1052. Florida.''" — Liens upon real or personal property are enforcible by persons in privity with the owner, — 1. By a retention of possession, for a period not exceeding three months, of the property upon which the lien has attached, by the person entitled to such lien, if he were in such possession at the time the lien attached. 2. By a bill in equity. 3. By an ordinary suit at law, and the levy of the execution ob- tained therein on the property on which the lien is held. 4. By a suit at law, in which the declaration shall state the manner in which the lien arose, the amount for which the lien is held, the description of the property, and a prayer that the property be sold to satisfy the lien. In such suit the judg- ment for the plaintiff shall be a personal judgment against the defendant, as well as declare the lien upon the property, describing it; and shall direct execution against such prop- erty, as well as against the property generally of the de- fendant. If any person entitled to a lien under this act, upon personal property shall have reason to believe that the same is about to be removed from the county in which it may be, he may enjoin the removal of the same in the manner provided for enjoining the removal of property subject to a mortgage, or, if the lien shall have been perfected, may at- tach the same in the manner provided for attachment in aid of foreclosure of mortgages. Whenever any person shall entrust to any mechanic or la- 50 Gen. Stats. 1906, §§ 2212-2214. 1063 REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. § IO53 borer materials with which to construct, alter, or repair any article of value, or any article of value to be altered or re- paired, such mechanic or laborer, if such article be completed and not taken away, and the fair and reasonable charges not paid, may, after three months from the time such charges be- come due, sell the sam