NAPOLEON 
 
 AS A GENERAL 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 COUNT YORCK VON WARTENBURG 
 
 COLONKI. OK THE GENERAL STAKF OK THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 
 
 FORMING THE SEVENTH BOOK 
 
 OF 
 
 Series 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 MAJOR WALTER H. JAMES 
 
 VOL. I.
 
 SWF 
 
 URl 
 
 Gibraltar, April igth, 1897. 
 
 DEAR CAPTAIN JAMES, 
 
 I HAVE read with interest the list you have sent 
 me of the military works to be published as "The 
 Wolseley Series." 
 
 The subjects are wisely chosen, and the authors will 
 be generally accepted as soldiers who are competent to 
 express valuable opinions upon them. 
 
 I am much flattered by having my name associated 
 with an undertaking that is designed to improve the 
 professional knowledge of our officers, and I rejoice to 
 feel that under your able editorship its success is assured. 
 In some instances I see you are not only editor but also 
 translator, for which duty, if you will allow me to say so, 
 your intimate knowledge of the German idiom eminently 
 qualifies you. 
 
 I hope the officers of her Majesty's army may never 
 degenerate into bookworms. There is happily at present 
 no tendency in that direction, for I am glad to say that 
 this generation is as fond of danger, adventure, and all 
 manly out-of-door sports as its forefathers were. At the 
 same time, all now recognize that the officer who has not 
 studied war as an applied science, and who is ignorant 
 of modern military history, is of little use beyond the 
 rank of Captain. The principle of selection, pure and 
 simple, is gradually being applied to the promotion of all 
 officers, especially in the higher grades. As years go 
 on this system will be more and more rigidly enforced. 
 
 It is gratifying to know that a large proportion of our 
 young officers are ambitious, and without doubt there is 
 now many a subaltern who hopes to be a Field-Marshal 
 
 VOL. i. a
 
 VI 
 
 or to be shot in the attempt. Experience enables me to 
 warn all these determined men of how small their chance 
 is of ever reaching any great position in the army unless 
 they devote many of their spare hours every week to a 
 close study of tactics and strategy as dealt with in the 
 best books upon recent wars. 
 
 In this series of military works from the pens of 
 first-class writers, the military student will find ample 
 material to assist him in fitting himself for high com- 
 mand, and in the interest of the Empire and of the army 
 I earnestly hope he will avail himself of it. 
 ' I know how truly this work is undertaken as a labour 
 of love by you as editor and by all who are helping you. 
 But I also know that you and they will feel amply repaid 
 if it assists the young officer to learn the science of his 
 profession and, in doing this, to improve the fighting 
 value of the service, to the true interests of which we are 
 one and all sincerely devoted. 
 
 Believe me to be, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 WOLSELEY.
 
 THE WOLSELEY SERIES. 
 
 THE object of this series of books is to place before 
 British officers and others translations of the best foreign 
 military books in an English dress. It is also intended 
 to add original works on portions of our military history 
 which have, hitherto, been somewhat neglected. The 
 great part played in national life by the armies of con- 
 tinental nations, has given rise to a much larger military 
 literature than exists in England. The incessant struggle 
 for supremacy has led to the production by master-minds 
 of treatises on various parts of the art of war, which are 
 of the highest importance, but many of which have 
 hitherto only existed in their own language. It will be 
 the aim of this series to make them available to English 
 readers. 
 
 England has been engaged in no great war since the 
 beginning of the century. 1 It follows, therefore, that both 
 strategy and tactics have been more widely treated by 
 foreign authors than by our own?- not only for the 
 reason set forth above, but also because having usually 
 taken a personal part in them they are naturally more 
 interested therein 
 
 It is sometimes urged that lessons of continental 
 conflicts are in no wise useful to ourselves ; this is 
 ridiculous. The guiding principles of the operations of 
 war are the same, whether they are conducted against 
 civilized or savage foes. If our army were prepared 
 only to meet the latter it need scarcely be maintained in 
 its present form, but no one can say with our widespread 
 
 1 This was written in 1897. ED.
 
 Vlll 
 
 Empire that we shall not be called upon to meet civilized 
 opponents. If we are able to deal with them, we shall 
 certainly have no difficulty in defeating savages, for it is 
 by the training and discipline which render troops fit to 
 meet those of their own state of civilization that they 
 prove superior to the savage when they meet him in the 
 field. 
 
 Strategy is the same, whether used against Arabs or 
 Frenchmen. The tactics employed differ as the weapons 
 of the enemy differ. But the soldiers trained to meet 
 the highest class of opponents are, ipso Jacto, better quali- 
 fied to deal with the inferior. 
 
 This series, therefore, will contain translations of well- 
 known foreign writers, and it will also contain original 
 English works dealing with the kind of warfare in which 
 we are most frequently engaged, and with certain special 
 phases of British military experience which have hitherto 
 been somewhat inadequately dealt with. The history 
 of British arms is replete with interest and is second 
 to none in moving incidents of gallantry. Many of 
 these have already been recorded, but the actual lessons 
 to be learned from them have not always been systemati- 
 cally treated. It is hoped, as this series progresses, to do 
 so, and to secure for future generations the practical 
 deductions to be made from the deeds of British soldiers. 
 A list of the volumes already arranged for will be found at 
 the beginning of this book, and it will be the aim of the 
 editor to add from time to time such works only as seem 
 of the first importance in the theory and record of military 
 achievement. 
 
 WALTER H. JAMES.
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 MILITARY historians commencing the study of the deeds 
 of the great Corsican immediately after his fall, have 
 rightly acknowledged that the moment had not arrived to 
 collect together his strategical conceptions, to describe as 
 a whole his characteristics as a general. Since that period 
 numerous publications have thrown more and more light 
 on his military attainments, and the publication of the 
 Correspondance de Napoleon i er completed in 1869, permits a 
 complete judgment to be given on the great leader. But 
 new events captivate the attention of the world and 
 interest it more intimately, so that a proper estimate of 
 Napoleonic literature from a scientific and literary point 
 of view has been thrust somewhat into the background. 
 These considerations account for the appearance of this 
 book, and explain why it has not been attempted before 
 by a more able pen. 
 
 As no complete relation exists of the campaigns of 
 Napoleon of the nature of the publications issued by the 
 Head-Quarters' Staff, I have been led to compile this 
 account of the strategy of Napoleon, confining myself to 
 those points which influence the main decisions of the 
 General. I have in nowise attempted to write the history 
 of his wars, or to trace in detail all the movements of each 
 of the belligerents. Napoleon's own words as they are 
 recorded in his correspondence and in the numerous 
 works which have preserved them, have furnished the facts 
 needed for a proper judgment. In default of any other 
 merit, this work aims at contrasting the practice of 
 Napoleon with his theories on war which serve as com- 
 mentaries on the former, but which are somewhat widely 
 dispersed. 
 
 In conclusion, I can only admit that I undertook the 
 task because it has interested me so highly. Whether I 
 have succeeded or not, I leave to the reader.
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE 
 
 COLONEL CotiNT YORCK VON WARTENBURG of the . 
 Prussian General Staff was well known in his own 
 country as one of the most rising men in the German 
 Army. His untimely death in China from suffocation 
 due to a charcoal stove in an unventilated room has 
 deprived the service of which he was so brilliant a 
 member of one who was admittedly destined for a high 
 career. The work of which this translation is offered to 
 the British Army shows that he was a most capable 
 military historian, an able and penetrating critic. For 
 training in strategy no better field can be found than the 
 study of the campaigns of the Great Emperor. Count 
 Yorck von Wartenburg has produced a work which in a 
 comparatively small space deals in a comprehensive way 
 with them. No such -book existed in English, and I have 
 thought it well to include it in the Wolseley Series. 
 
 WALTER H. JAMES. 
 
 N.B. The only maps published with the original 
 work were those at the end of the second volume. I 
 recommend the atlas published with Thiers' works on 
 the French Republic and the Empire, as on the whole 
 the best available.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PACK 
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER i 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 1796-97. 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY ... 24 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 MANTUA. WCRMSER'S ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE IT . . .50 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 MANTUA. ALVINTZY'S ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE IT . . . 81 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 102 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 1798-99. 
 EGYPT 123 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 SYRIA 141 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 r8oo. 
 MARENGO .164
 
 xii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1805. 
 ULM 198 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 AUSTERLITZ 229 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 1806-1807. 
 JENA ....._*._.... . . 267 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 EYLAU .... 33 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 FRIEDLAND 343
 
 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER. 
 
 EVERY one desirous of studying war must do so from the 
 actual records ; war must be studied by war itself. For 
 "war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and 
 passionate drama." ' It is therefore only by examining 
 the history of former wars that we arrive at a just com- 
 prehension of what war really is. 
 
 Which part of this study is most valuable and improv- 
 ing to the soldier ? The fact of knowing accurately the 
 method in which some warlike operation was performed, 
 or of knowing the date of some historical event, cannot be 
 of much advantage to us, for no opportunity is likely to 
 arise to reproduce facts, so to speak, in duplicate ; what is 
 of value to the student is to see how things have come to 
 pass and thence to deduce the reasons for the results. 
 
 Now the actors in all these deeds were men, and the 
 history of the birth of events lies in these men's mode of 
 thinking. He who wishes to understand war must there- 
 fore learn to understand the men who waged it ; the key 
 to the history of war lies in the headquarters. The study 
 of the history of war cannot therefore be separated from 
 that of the generals, and this latter study must also 
 
 1 Jomini, Formation des troupes pour le combat, 27. 
 
 B
 
 2 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 embrace a knowledge of these generals as men, if it is to 
 be truly instructive. To penetrate as it were the brain of 
 a general for the purpose of finding out the origin of his 
 resolution, will, moreover, exercise our minds in a similar 
 way. For it will force us to follow, often laboriously, the 
 development of great thoughts. The enthusiasm for in- 
 dividual personalities in the annals of war arising from 
 this must inspire us to equally lofty aspirations, and en- 
 thusiasm is indeed the best result to be obtained from any 
 study. 
 
 But where could we find a richer source of grand 
 thoughts than in the mighty deeds of the man upon 
 whose shoulders the whole of modern strategy rests ? To 
 study Napoleon as a General will be the most valuable and 
 instructive work for a soldier, and it is our purpose to 
 make the attempt. 
 
 If in commencing the history of the life of this man we 
 wish, as our most natural starting-point, to begin with the 
 date of his birth, we are confronted at the very threshold 
 o^ our task by an insoluble difficulty ; the fact is that the 
 date of Napoleon's birth is by no means known with 
 certainty. Lieutenant-Colonel Jung's interesting work 
 gives all the documents referring to this matter, and these 
 seem to justify the doubt whether Napoleon was not 
 after all born at Corte on the 7th January, 1768 ; the 
 author, however, rightly adds at once, that the decision of 
 this matter is really unimportant, as we have to do with 
 Napoleon as a historical personage, and as such he was 
 and remains born at Ajaccio, on the i5th August, 1769. 
 
 About his childhood we have practically no authentic 
 data ; he spoke of himself as a restless, quarrelsome 
 child. We may or may not regret the want of further 
 evidence ; in any case a history of his childhood is not of 
 great value so far as a knowledge of the man is concerned. 
 Napoleon himself was of the opinion that the proper 
 development of our faculties begins in the time of sexual 
 maturity, and that before this no definite judgment can
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 3 
 
 be pronounced. As to any education or instruction, he 
 enjoyed only a minimum of these as a child ; his mother, 
 the beautiful and energetic Letitia, had the greatest 
 difficulty in keeping the household going, with insufficient 
 means and an ever-increasing family. His father, of a 
 yielding and sensitive temperament, was much away on 
 his travels, and engaged above all in gaining the interest 
 of influential patrons, in order to secure for himself 
 wealth, and for his children a future. One of the results 
 of these endeavours was the securing of a free scholarship 
 at the military academy at Brienne. 
 
 On the 23rd April, 1779, the boy Napoleon entered 
 this school. The small, thin Corsican boy with his 
 foreign ways, who had hardly begun to master the French 
 language, soon became the butt of his schoolfellows, and 
 he felt all the more antipathy to them, as he had up till 
 now, in his native isle, heard the name of France 
 mentioned only as that of a recent enemy and present 
 conqueror, and as yet he in no way felt himself a French- 
 man. Thus he remained isolated, and his position was 
 still more accentuated by his poverty, which formed a 
 striking contrast with the more fortunate circumstances 
 in which his schoolfellows, mostly sons of good and rich 
 families, lived. The first document we possess written by 
 himself, a letter to his father, dated the 5th April, 1781, 
 expresses his annoyance at these circumstances, and 
 shows in this boy of eleven a feeling of injured pride, rare 
 at such an early age. Thus while he made satisfactory 
 progress in his studies on the whole, there was developed 
 in him at Brienne a pride which, being constantly excited 
 by his surroundings, filled him with dissatisfaction with 
 existing circumstances, and a leaning to solitude and 
 taciturnity, as well as a wish to attain a position in which 
 he could prove how much he was worth in comparison 
 with his fellow pupils. Thus it does not seem as if 
 M. de Keralio, who gave him the testimonial, "obedient, 
 straightforward, and grateful," was an instructor gifted
 
 4 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 with great insight into the temperaments of his 
 pupils. 
 
 But how under the pressure of such circumstances 
 a precocious manliness may be developed in a powerfully 
 endowed character, is shown by a second document in 
 Napoleon's handwriting, the letter to his uncle Fesch, 
 dated the i5th July, 1784. It is the letter of a youth of not 
 quite fifteen, but who reasons in such an assured and firm 
 manner on the subject in question, Joseph's future, as 
 if the writer were not a younger brother, but the head of 
 the family. The same impression is created by two other 
 letters, which he wrote a year later to his mother and to his 
 great-uncle Lucien, and in which he speaks of the recent 
 death of his father (24th February, 1785) not without feel- 
 ing indeed, but with the calmness of a man of experience. 
 
 At this time he was at the Military Academy of Paris, 
 where he had been since the previous October, receiving 
 his last preparation for a lieutenancy, in the artillery, 
 as he had decided on this arm, having given up his first 
 intention of entering the navy. His career there, however, 
 forms no important chapter in his life, for he led a solitary 
 existence ; there also he met with the same circumstances 
 in his fellow-students, and a pamphlet which he wrote 
 there, and in which he rightly advocates a simpler educa- 
 tion for future soldiers, betrays, in the fragment of it which 
 has come down to us, the fact that he looked with secret 
 envy upon the more favoured circumstances of others. Still 
 urgent wish to reform is evidence of a creative mind, 
 which feels the capacity of constructing something new. 
 
 In the autumn of 1786 came the moment for his entry 
 on life's career. In August of that year he had passed 
 his examination, though without distinguishing himself in 
 any special way ; but the description of the young officer's 
 character, contained in his testimonial from the Military 
 Academy, and so well borne out by his future life, is of 
 interest to us : 
 
 " Retiring and diligent, he prefers study to amusements
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 5 
 
 of any kind, and delights in the reading of good authors ; 
 he is devoted to abstract sciences, with little leaning to 
 others, is well versed in mathematics and geography ; is 
 taciturn, loves solitude, is obstinate, proud, and excep- 
 tionally inclined to egotism ; speaks little, is energetic in 
 his answers, ready and severe in his refutations ; possesses 
 much love of self, is ambitious and hardworking. This 
 young man deserves to be pushed on." 
 
 His first garrison was Valence, and here the young 
 officer found for the first time congenial society and 
 showed himself sociable and communicative. Still he 
 continued to occupy himself with science and with read- 
 ing much in the most varied domains of thought, except ' 
 in a military direction, which he seems to have somewhat 
 neglected. But this peaceful state of mind did not last 
 long ; he had attacks of melancholy, partly attributable to 
 physical causes, but to a greater extent due to his tem- 
 perament, and these aggravated the feeling of hopeless 
 monotony which garrison life produced in him ; in this 
 frame of mind he wrote : " Life is a burden to me, 
 because the men, with whom I live and shall probably 
 always have to live, have manners and customs as different 
 from mine as moonlight is from sunlight. And since I 
 cannot pursue the only mode of life which would render 
 existence bearable to me, I feel a disgust for everything." 
 A change of garrison, with two periods of leave spent in 
 Corsica, a leave he got extended under various pretexts, 
 fill up the time until 1789. 
 
 The political changes and cataclysms which had their 
 beginning in this year opened to the capable and ambitious 
 young officer, unrestrained by any narrow principles, a wide 
 career. " Revolutions," said he at this time, " are a good 
 time for soldiers possessed of intellect and courage." ' 
 He however felt at this time so little bound up with the 
 fate of France, that he only took advantage of the new 
 condition of things to obtain at once fresh leave to go to 
 
 1 Victor, Mm., 149.
 
 6 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Corsica ; this island as yet formed the limits of his ambi- 
 tion ; to become its liberator from the French yoke, to be 
 its lawgiver, to carry to an end the part played by Paoli, 
 whether alone or as his fellow-Worker, but with more good 
 fortune and success, these were more or less the ideals of 
 his youthful imagination. Arrived in Corsica, he threw 
 himself eagerly into the political arena, and his address to 
 Matteo Buttafuoco is a characteristic evidence of this 
 activity. In it great keenness of logical reasoning is 
 united with much pathos, and the passionate expression 
 of an excitable temperament endowed with a full in- 
 sight into human nature and its weaknesses. 
 
 But whilst his pen in this document, written while he 
 was violently excited by the political circumstances, struck 
 a note, if exaggerated, still on the whole appropriate, 
 another of his pamphlets, which appeared soon afterwards, 
 showed how little he was affected by the feelings which 
 move the mass of mankind. The Academy of Lyons had 
 offered a public prize for the best answer to the question : 
 " What truths and what feelings is it most important to 
 inspire men with for their happiness ? " The little 
 pamphlet which Napoleon sent in to this is an astonish- 
 ingly feeble production ; its style is bad ; the development 
 of the most commonplace thoughts confused ; in short, 
 only the name of its author would induce anyone to read 
 it. It not only failed to gain the prize, but met with very 
 adverse criticism. We may mention here a secondary 
 circumstance which illustrates Napoleon's views about 
 mankind. The phrase with which he started was : " Food, 
 a dwelling, clothing, and a wife are of absolute necessity 
 for happiness." It is worthy of note that he here classes 
 a wife as a chattel, and looks upon her as created merely 
 for the happiness and requirements of man. This re- 
 minds us of Mme. de Remusat's words : " The emperor 
 despises women . . . their weaknesses appear to him an 
 irrefutable proof of their inferiority." ' 
 
 1 Mme. de Re'musat, Mem., I. 112.
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 7 
 
 In the midst of this occupation as an author his active 
 zeal in the political affairs of his native country did not 
 remain idle. A coup d'etat which he had planned failed, 
 it is true, in its very birth, but without any ill con- 
 sequences to him. And if we marvel, how in a European 
 state an officer of the army could cause civil troubles 
 so recklessly, and play so strange a political part, we 
 must remember the rdle we have seen General Skobelev 
 play of late, and reflect how very much the conditions of 
 France at this time resembled those of the republic of 
 Rome in the century before our era. There was the same 
 general feeling that the existing conditions were not 
 destined to be the eventual form of the state, there was 
 the same uncertainty as to who was eventually to rule, 
 and therefore also to punish ; and there were men who, 
 like Napoleon, had little to lose and everything to gain. 
 It is true, in Rome Catiline failed before Caesar 
 succeeded, while in Corsica Napoleon was fortunate 
 enough to escape Catiline's fate and finally himself 
 became Caesar. 
 
 For the moment indeed he considered it advisable to 
 leave his home and to return to his regiment in France, 
 where he resumed his varied studies. He often afterwards, 
 and not without pleasure apparently, recalled this time, 
 during which, in spite of his straitened circumstances, he 
 had his brother Louis living with him, who was nine years 
 younger than he, and for whom and for whose education 
 he made many sacrifices : " I lived like a bear, always 
 alone in my room with my books, then my only friends ; " 
 and he reproached the King of Holland, when the latter 
 laid down his crown, with the fact that he did not recall 
 that time with a similar feeling. 
 
 Whoever thinks the man Napoleon may be described 
 with the one word, " egotist," does not, though his judg- 
 ment may not be wrong, give due weight to the complica- 
 tions of the human mind ; Napoleon was ruled by egotism, it 
 is true, but no man is in everything and at all times an
 
 8 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 egotist ; no human life is quite so logically built up on 
 one principle alone. 
 
 During the year 1791, the flood of revolution rose from 
 day to day. Napoleon took with heart and soul the side 
 of the new political ideas, and felt a restless, burning 
 desire to take an active part in them. He wrote to his 
 great-uncle Lucien : " Send me three hundred francs ; 
 this sum will be sufficient to take me to Paris. There a 
 man can at least be up and doing and conquer obstacles. 
 Everything tells me I shall succeed." But since there 
 was as yet no place for him in the principal theatre 
 of action, he soon returned to his native island, pre- 
 ferring a participation in the development of events there 
 to garrison-service. " What man," he exclaimed at this 
 time, " would not wish to be assassinated, on condition of 
 having been Caesar ! One ray from his crown of glory 
 would indemnify one richly for an early death." 
 
 And here we must put to ourselves the question, What 
 was the mainspring of Napoleon's actions, the thirst for 
 fame or the longing for power ? The judgments of history 
 vary on this point* " We cannot say he really loved fame, 
 for he did not hesitate to prefer success to it." l " No con- 
 quest was in his opinion complete as long as the monu- 
 ment was absent which would hand down its remembrance 
 to posterity. Glory, and nothing but glory, he desired for 
 France and for himself." f 
 
 " Bonaparte is consumed by two devouring passions, the 
 desire of fame and war. . . . In all his actions the present 
 time was subordinate to the future ages." 3 Both these 
 judgments have had their day. Bourrienne lived in close 
 contact with the general and the consul ; Mme. de 
 R6musat only knew him in the last days of the consulate 
 and during the empire. 
 
 Was not Napoleon compelled, the longer he ruled over 
 
 1 Mme. de Re'musat, Me*m., I. 106. 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Me*m , IV. 53. * The same, III. 212, 215.
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 9 
 
 men, to become the more eager for an increase of his 
 power ; did not his own great deeds necessarily make it 
 more and more difficult for him to gain still greater 
 glory, and was not the very magnitude of the renown he 
 had gained calculated to render him indifferent to its 
 augmentation ? He himself said on his return from Tilsit : 
 " Military glory is soon used up in modern times. Fifty 
 battles scarcely produce more effect now than five or six 
 used to do. I am and ever shall be for the French the 
 man of Marengo much more than that of Jena and Fried- 
 land." ' How interesting to compare with this what he 
 said immediately after Marengo : " Well, well ! A few 
 more great deeds like this campaign and I may be spoken 
 of by posterity." 2 The same Marengo which appeared a 
 mere beginning to the young man, consumed by a thirst 
 for glory, which might at the most be worthy of half a 
 page in the annals of the world, this same Marengo the 
 emperor, grown colder after numberless successes, looked 
 upon as the apogee of his glory, never to be excelled in 
 the eyes of posterity, and the exercise of ever increasing 
 power seemed to him then the only thing worth striving 
 for and attaining. 
 
 Thus we must think of him as eager for glory and action 
 when he landed again in Corsica in September, 1791. 
 Not long after his arrival his great-uncle died, and 
 henceforth he looked upon himself as the head of the 
 family. "We could not argue with him," says Lucien, 
 " he was annoyed at the least opposition and angered 
 by the least resistance." 3 Thus he remained in Corsica 
 for a time, heedless of the fact that he was breaking 
 his Idave, that his regiment was being mobilized, and 
 that the Legislative Assembly ordered a return of the 
 entire army, and decreed that all absentees should be 
 looked upon as deserters. Napoleon was determined to 
 
 1 Mme. de Remusat, Mem., III. 65. 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Mlm., IV. 170. ' Lucien. Mem., 49.
 
 io NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 secure his election to a superior post in the volunteer 
 battalions with elective officers, which were at that time 
 formed in Corsica, and the violence, boldness, and law- 
 lessness with which he went to work is worthy of note. 
 The election was conducted at Ajaccio by three Govern- 
 ment commissaries, whose influence would necessarily be 
 decisive. Two of these were favourable to Napoleon's 
 claims ; as to the third, Murati, he had him brought to 
 his house on the eve of the election by a few armed men, 
 and received him there with the words : " I could wish that 
 you were free, entirely free. You were not so in Peraldi's 
 house," and prevented him appearing at the election the 
 next day. The result was his election as second lieu- 
 tenant-colonel of the second battalion. Scarcely was he 
 ifl possession of this post than he endeavoured to use it for 
 his further projects. 
 
 Again he planned to capture the citadel of Ajaccio 
 from the French garrison, in order to promote a national 
 rising, which might open a field of action for his ambition. 
 But again the enterprise failed, and he considered it wise 
 to leave Corsica once more and to return to France. 
 
 There he had, it is true, been not only struck off the 
 list of his regiment on account of his absence, but also 
 denounced to the secretary of war on account of the 
 troubles he had excited. Still he succeeded in obtaining 
 from the authorities of his native land testimonials of good 
 behaviour, and thus he set out (in May, 1792) to meet an 
 uncertain future with the unconcern which alone can lead 
 to great successes. Youth acts recklessly, and thus often 
 finds ways and means where a man who takes things more 
 seriously only sees difficulties. 
 
 He went to Paris, where he occupied himself at first in 
 vain efforts to procure his reinstatement in the army, made 
 the most varied plans, and had to live on very slender 
 means. The rising of the 2Oth June took place at this 
 time, and he was present as a spectator in the crowd con- 
 gregated around the Tuileries. However revolutionary his
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER i r 
 
 own behaviour had been in Corsica, his innate leaning to 
 orderand authority was disgusted at the action of thedregsof 
 the people, and he exclaimed indignantly : " Che coglione 
 (what fools). How could they admit this rabble ? Four or 
 five hundred of them should have been blown away by 
 cannon, and the rest would have run for their lives." * 
 The loth of August brought with the fall of Royalty a 
 favourable change in his own fate ; officers were wanted, 
 and, forgetting the past, he was reappointed to his old rank. 
 
 He immediately returned to Corsica under the pretext 
 of having to escort his sister home from the College of St. 
 Cyr, and resumed his appointment in the 2nd battalion of 
 volunteers. Along with it he was told off for an expedi- 
 tion to occupy Sardinia, which, however, came to nothing 
 on account of the small military qualifications of both 
 sailors and soldiers. 
 
 Meanwhile the " Convention " had seized the helm of 
 the State in France, and between its severe and rude 
 government and the actual ruler of Corsica, Paoli, dis- 
 putes soon arose. Napoleon took sides with the former, 
 represented in Corsica by Saliceti. The latter appointed 
 him inspector-general of the artillery on the island, and in 
 this capacity he again endeavoured to seize the citadel of 
 Ajaccio, but again unsuccessfully; the population, par- 
 tisans of Paoli, expelled the Bonaparte family and 
 destroyed their dwelling-house. Thereupon Napoleon 
 quitted Corsica with all his relations in June, 1793. 
 
 At last he joined his regiment at Nice. In Southern 
 France there broke out at this time a counter-revolu- 
 tionist and royalist movement, which found support 
 principally at Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon. To prevent 
 the junction of the reactionary parties, Colonel (afterwards 
 General) Carteaux was sent to Avignon. In front of this 
 town Captain Napoleon Bonaparte met him ; he had been 
 sent thither from Nice to fetch some guns from Avignon. 
 This town having been evacuated by the enemy, he 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Mem.
 
 12 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 remained in it, to organize a park of artillery, and during 
 this interval of leisure he wrote "The Supper of 
 Beaucaire," a pamphlet in every way differing from his 
 former ones. In this he took definitely the side of the 
 " Mountain," which was at that time in full power ; he 
 explained in a lucid and sober style the political and 
 military situation in the south, and predicted the certain 
 success of the arms of the republic. The pamphlet was 
 favourably received, and justly so, by the deputies Saliceti, 
 Gasparin, and the younger Robespierre, who had just 
 arrived at Avignon, and they ordered it to be printed at 
 the expense of the State. In this manner he became 
 known to the men then in power, and this fact was soon 
 to procure him quick promotion. 
 
 The most serious question of the moment was Toulon. 
 It was too late to prevent the occupation of this most im- 
 portant seaport by the English ; it had to be retaken, and 
 in this enterprise Napoleon's star for the first time shone 
 in the sky. 
 
 On the 28th August the English fleet had entered the 
 harbour ; on the 2gth the republican vanguard under 
 Mouret arrived in the defile of Ollioules, but was im- 
 mediately driven out again. The recapture of this point 
 was decided* upon and undertaken on the 7th Sep- 
 tember. Here a wound received by Dommartins led to 
 Napoleon succeeding him as commander of the -artillery, a 
 post he filled with the greatest energy. But at first, 
 Carteaux's corps could not, on account of insufficient 
 means, undertake anything against Toulon ; only when 
 the division Lapoype, ordered up from the army of 
 Italy, began gradually to arrive, was a regular siege begun. 
 Carteaux was soon recognized as incapable, and was 
 replaced by Doppet, the latter, on his own confession of 
 being unsuited to the work, giving place immediately 
 to Dugommier, a zealous and active officer and a straight- 
 forward and open soldierly character. He held, on the 
 25th November, a council of war, at which Napoleon
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 13 
 
 was present, he having on the i4th of the month already 
 forwarded to the minister of war a plan for the capture 
 of Toulon, which had been favourably received. There is 
 evidence that he laid down his views in this with as much 
 firmness and assurance as if he had been one of the best 
 known and most experienced of generals. In this council 
 of war the general plan of the siege, agreeing in its main 
 points with Napoleon's proposals, was determined upon 
 and put into execution without delay. 
 
 Dugommier had divided the army into two divisions : 
 the left under Lapoype and the right under Mouret ; the 
 younger Duteil commanded the whole artillery, Napoleon 
 that of one brigade of the division Mouret. He certainly 
 distinguished himself remarkably during the siege by 
 his activity and military insight, and his advice was 
 repeatedly listened to and followed ; his superior officer 
 Duteil allowed his young subordinate, whose capacities 
 he appreciated, a free hand with respect to the artillery ; 
 but the latter did not in any way occupy the position 
 at this time, or have the influence upon the conduct 
 of the siege as a whole, which he ascribed to him- 
 self at St. Helena. It is possible, however, that twenty 
 years of the most tremendous successes and absolute 
 command may have obscured the emperor's recollection 
 of the small importance of a battalion commander. 
 But whatever his real share in the capture of Toulon 
 may have been, one thing is certain, the young officer 
 made a considerable and extraordinary impression ; 
 the originality of his ideas, the power and vigour with 
 which he expressed them, astonished and interested ; 
 he already knew how to captivate men, and possessed an 
 eagle eye to detect capacity; Junot's, Marmont's, and 
 Victor's careers date from this period. 
 
 After the capture of Toulon (the igth December, 1793) 
 he was, on the recommendation of the deputies Saliceti 
 and Robespierre the younger, whose confidence he had fully 
 gained, rewarded with the rank of brigadier-general.
 
 14 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 His first appearance had, it is true, not given Napoleon 
 an opportunity for a full display of his abilities; but 
 if we examine it more closely, we shall find even here 
 the indications of the true general. In fixing upon the 
 plan to be followed, he did not enter into local considera- 
 tions, but picked out at once the point of most impor- 
 tance ; he determined this upon grounds of a military and 
 moral nature, such as the situation as a whole furnished, 
 his reasoning being as follows : The main point is, to 
 command the roadstead ; the moment the hostile fleet 
 can no longer hold this, the town will be abandoned, 
 for without a fleet the garrison has no means of retreat ; 
 now the English will abandon the town and destroy the 
 defences of the harbour rather than employ for its pro- 
 tection a garrison, the surrender of which must be only a 
 question of time. But if the garrison prefers to hold out, 
 then and only then the siege may be begun advantage- 
 ously. Thus having settled the main question, he pro- 
 ceeded to determine the points, the possession of which 
 must lead to the attainment of the main object, viz. the 
 command of the roadstead ; he therefore decided on the 
 occupation of the point PEguillette as the operation upon 
 which all efforts must, to begin with, be centred. This 
 once admitted, he pointed out how to carry it into 
 execution. 
 
 It is one of the surest marks of a true general, that he 
 knows in every situation how to set aside details and 
 matters of secondary importance, and to combine and 
 direct all the moral and physical forces at his disposal to 
 the principal aim ; once the latter fixed upon, the 
 necessary details follow almost as a matter of course, at 
 any rate any capable officer on the staff of the general can 
 determine them. Marmont says very justly : " I never 
 met with a single man of distinction, and capable of 
 the conduct of great affairs, who was not in the habit 
 of putting on one side all details and contenting him- 
 self with regarding the work he had entrusted to
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 15 
 
 others." No general of modern times exhibited this 
 freedom of judgment never unobscured by any concern 
 for details, in such a high degree, as Napoleon ; in this 
 alone lies the explanation of his splendid successes. 
 " The greater, the more active, the wider an intelligence, 
 the less it can linger over commonplace and trivial 
 details." * 
 
 At the close of the siege of Toulon Napoleon was 
 appointed to the army of Italy and proceeded accordingly 
 to Nice. This army made soon after this (April, 1794) a 
 forward movement and seized the entrances to the passes 
 of the -Alps. Under these circumstances a meeting of 
 the leaders took place on the 2Oth May, at which the 
 future plan of campaign was decided upon. Its frame- 
 work was due to Napoleon, and we may therefore assume, 
 broadly, that it represented his views ; it is therefore the 
 first document capable of throwing a light upon Napoleon's 
 views with regard to the conduct of an army in a cam- 
 paign, and shows us his ideas on this point. But before 
 we proceed farther, we must mention one important 
 consideration. 
 
 Napoleon, an upstart, was not in a position to carry out 
 fully his ideas as to the conduct of war at the head of 
 an army ; this reward of the soldier's career became his 
 only in the after course of events. We may divide into 
 three periods his career as a general. In the first he 
 acted as adviser and collaborator in plans of operations, 
 checked by considerations of things and persons ; in 
 the second he stood, it is true, at the head of an 
 army, independent on his own theatre of war and 
 free to develop his capabilities, but still only a link in 
 the war as a whole, provided with definite forces for 
 definite purposes ; and only in the third period did he 
 dispose absolutely of the whole army and State, and was 
 thus in a condition to exercise the highest art of the 
 general, viz., to determine where tind with what forces 
 
 1 Marmont M&n. * M6m. de Ste Hel., II. 193.
 
 1 6 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 
 
 the final issue of war is to be decided. Now, of these 
 three periods, the first, in which he merely planned 
 campaigns, comprises the time between the siege of Toulon 
 and his assumption of the command-in-chief in Italy ; the 
 second, in which he conducted campaigns, the period 
 from this to the i8th Brumaire ; and lastly, the third, in 
 which he conducted wars, includes the rest of his career 
 up to the moment when he stepped on board the 
 Bellerophon. 
 
 Not to be able to get beyond the first of these stages 
 was, among the generals of Napoleon's stamp, the fate of 
 Gneisenau, and bitterly did he feel it, as such a nature 
 must : "It is a hard fate never to be considered worthy 
 of an independent command, always to have to work for 
 another ! " l the second stage, which is the goal of the 
 ambition of every true soldier, but for which few only are 
 chosen by fate, was reached, among modern generals, by 
 Robert Lee; lastly, as to the third stage, Csssar and 
 Napoleon alone reached it of those not born on a throne. 
 It was Hannibal's ruin that he could not get beyond 
 the second stage. * 
 
 We are as yet only at the beginning of the first chapter 
 in our considerations, we must therefore not expect 
 to find in the plans of campaigns of which we are 
 now speaking, all that rendered the later strategy of 
 the emperor so magnificent. The above-mentioned plan * 
 began as follows : " We can only invade the plain of 
 Piedmont with forces superior in numbers to those of the 
 enemy ; in order to attain this superiority, the Army of 
 Italy must be united with that of the Alps." This 
 exordium showed already the man, who nineteen years 
 later wrote : " You must know that it is my principle to 
 advance in masses." 3 Having settled upon a junction of 
 forces, he determined the point at which this must take 
 
 1 To Hardenberg. Gonesse, soth June, 1815. 
 
 C. N. Colmars, 2nd Prairial, an. II. 
 
 3 C. N. To Eugene. Erfurt, 28th April, 1813.
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 17 
 
 place, and with regard to this he said : " The junction of 
 the two armies can only take place in the valley of the 
 Stura, if we are to profit by the positions and lines of 
 advance seized by the army of Italy." l Then he pointed 
 to the fact that the line of contact of the two armies ran 
 to the spot where the Stura valley debouched into the plain 
 of Lombardy, and that therefore their most natural point 
 of junction lay there. Then he proceeded to lay down 
 the details of execution. The army of the Alps was to 
 furnish two columns of observation (each of 4060 men) 
 and three columns of attack (4000, 5000, and 8000 men 
 respectively). The former were to watch the valleys of 
 the Varaita and the Maira, and to advance as the_ enemy 
 fell back. The latter were to push forward towards the 
 valley of the Stura, in order to take the enemy's positions 
 there at Argentera, Berzezio, and Sambuco, in flank ; 
 after this reinforcements were to be sent forward to 
 the Varaita, which, in conjunction with the columns of 
 observation there (altogether 11,000 men), were to capture 
 the position of Castel Delfino. In the Stura valley 
 Demonte was to be invested. 
 
 The army of Italy was to watch the passes from the 
 valley of the Tinea into that of the Stura, as well as the 
 country towards Mondovi on its right, and was to form 
 four columns of attack of 16,000, 6000, 4000, and 2000 
 men respectively. Of these the first two would push 
 forward towards Borgo San Dalmazzo, the other two were 
 to assist in the attack of the army of the Alps in the Stura 
 valley. The forward movement to Borgo was principally 
 intended to entice the enemy's forces thither, and thus to 
 facilitate the opening of the passes on the upper Stura. 
 
 If we examine the details of this plan, we shall, it is 
 true, be compelled to acknowledge the appropriateness of 
 the measures and the accuracy of all the calculations it 
 contains, but we shall feel somewhat surprised to catch 
 Napoleon in the act of conceiving so artificial a plan, 
 1 C. N. Colmars, 2nd Prairial, an. II. 
 
 C
 
 1 8 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 calculated upon tfie correct working together of such a 
 large number of different columns. For he was the very 
 man who, in his later strategy, never made plans depend- 
 ing for their success upon the fitting-in of everything ex- 
 actly as calculated, so that accidents beyond the control 
 of the general might spoil the whole. Of course among 
 mountains the temptation to split up a force into many 
 columns, as also the excuse for it, is greater than in a 
 plain, yet they must all finally emerge at one point only, 
 and thus the defensive position of the enemy is easily 
 rendered altogether untenable ; still we shall have to look 
 for other reasons in explanation of the case before us. It 
 will assuredly not be approved of as a general rule, that 
 each column should be told minutely what it is to do 
 every day in such or such a case ; this, however, must be 
 put down to the complete inexperience of the subordi- 
 nate officers of that time, and was therefore possibly a 
 matter of necessity. Above all, however, we must again 
 remember that Napoleon had not a free hand in the draw- 
 ing up of this plan, that he could not arrange everything 
 according to his own judgment, and thus we may explain 
 the matter in the most natural way by seeing in it a com- 
 promise between divergent views, and in this case we 
 must admire the skill with which after all an acceptable 
 plan of attack was worked out. 
 
 This plan, however, did not remain quite unaltered. 
 On the 2nd Messidor, at Nice, Napoleon put another 
 draft on paper, which showed a few alterations of "detail, 
 though it was the same in its main outlines. By it the 
 Army of the Alps was only to lend 16,000 men for the 
 common object, who were to push forward in two columns 
 against Castel Delfino (7000 men) and along the Stura 
 valley (9000 men). Should the former meet with resist- 
 ance, it was to be supported by the latter. We notice 
 here that Napoleon had given up the idea that the occu- 
 pation of the Stura valley was the main object, upon the 
 attaining of which the enemy would abandon Castel
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 19 
 
 Delfino of his own accord. This was no improvement ; 
 but in view of all he did later, we may assume with 
 certainty that we have to do here not with a modification 
 of his own views of the situation, but with a yielding to the 
 wishes of the Army of the Alps. 
 
 The Army of Italy was to form only three columns,* 
 of which the one destined to directly support the attack 
 of the Army of the Alps in the Stura valley was reduced 
 to 3000 men, whilst those which were to push on to Borgo, 
 close the pass, and ensure the success of the whole opera- 
 tion, now appeared as by far the larger portions, viz. 20,000 
 and 7000 men. Moreover, he says expressly : ".JThis is 
 really the corps which will afford support to the whole 
 army and the whole line from Castel Delfino to the 
 Tanaro." As to the details of this plan, the individual 
 inferior officers were allowed greater liberty of action, and 
 the whole had been simplified; in this respect the altera- 
 tion was a happy one. 
 
 However, this plan too was not put into execution. 
 The political changes of the gth Thermidor, which took 
 place not long after this in Paris, of course greatly in- 
 fluenced the state of affairs in the armies as well, and 
 Robespierre's fall more particularly affected Napoleon's 
 position most seriously. The confidential relations be-, 
 tween him and the younger Robespierre, and the favours 
 he had received from the latter, had excited envy against 
 him, and his enemies seized the opportunity to injure him. 
 A secret mission with a view to reconnoitring, on which 
 he had been sent to Genoa, served as a pretext to arrest 
 him on his return ; but, as no serious facts could be proved 
 against him, he was soon set at liberty again, and before 
 long appointed to the Army of the West. He went for 
 the present to Paris, and remained there, dissatisfied with 
 his employment on the scene of civil war, yet eager to be 
 on the spot should fresh political changes occur in the 
 capital. Being thus for the moment without any military 
 duties to speak of, he again took up his pen and wrote
 
 2O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 among other things a memorandum on the Army of Italy, 
 which he presented to the Committee of Public Safety. 1 
 
 In this memorandum we already discover the germ 
 of the whole of that ever memorable campaign of 1796. 
 The idea of advancing along the depression between the 
 'Alps and the Apennines, the anticipation that the diver- 
 gent interests of the Austrians and Piedmontese would 
 immediately make themselves felt, and that consequently 
 the former would take up a position for the protection of 
 Lombardy and the latter for that of Piedmont, as well as 
 driving the Austrians back to Alessandria, the quick flank 
 movement against the Piedmontese for the purpose of 
 compelling them, by the threat of a march to Turin, to 
 make peace all this was already set down in'detail. The 
 subsequent course of events also was already outlined. 
 With that sure confidence in the infallibility of his own 
 conceptions, with which only true genius or hopeless in- 
 capacity is endowed, he took success for granted, and de- 
 picted in a few bold strokes the results to which it might 
 lead. He showed here by the extent of his mental vision 
 that his assurance was that of genius, for incapacity is 
 ever timid ; true military genius alone is gifted with that 
 vivacity of imagination which immediately foresees the 
 remotest results that may ensue from a given state of 
 affairs. He proceeds to show how, after having forced a 
 peace on Piedmont, Lombardy would be conquered, the 
 Tyrol invaded, a junction effected with the army of the 
 Rhine, and how, by an irruption into the very heart of the 
 Austrian states, France would be in a position to dictate 
 peace. 
 
 But in another respect also this memorandum challenges 
 our attention. The soldier who studies the campaign of 
 1796 without being acquainted with the history of 
 Napoleon's life, is too much given to look upon this 
 general, 27 years old, as a dazzling meteor, improvis- 
 
 1 C. N. Memoire sur 1'arm^e d' Italic ; and M^moire militaire sur 
 1'arm^e d'ltalie. Paris premiers jours de thermidor, III.
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 21 
 
 ing, so to speak, unconsciously from his own natural 
 gifts one of the most brilliant of campaigns. But 
 wherever we examine historical events more narrowly, we 
 shall find in the end that the course of things in the 
 world is after all not quite spontaneous. We see, for 
 example, by this memoir, that these great successes were 
 preceded by a long and close study of the theatre of 
 war and a weighing of all the factors, and that when 
 Napoleon assumed the command-in-chief of the army in 
 Italy, he only found himself in a situation with which he 
 had long been most intimately acquainted ; indeed, we 
 venture to say that great results are only born of great 
 labours. We may remind the reader of what Bourrienne 
 says of Napoleon : " Whatever great deeds he did as 
 emperor were only the results of plans which he had 
 conceived long before, and at a time when his future rise 
 was only a dream, or rather a natural outcome of his 
 powers of imagination." 1 Only the man who is con- 
 stantly occupied with great thoughts will be able to form 
 a great resolve when the decisive moment appears. 
 
 Whether as a result of this memorandum or of the 
 recommendations of Barras and other patrons, the young 
 general, who was still putting off the moment of his depar- 
 ture for his post as commander of an infantry brigade with 
 the Army of the West, was appointed by the Committee 
 of Public Safety to the section of the staff for drawing up 
 plans of campaign. In this position he quickly gained 
 the approval of the members of the committee who super- 
 intended this branch, and soon orders were sent to the army 
 of Italy and the Alps, conveying Napolean's ideas without 
 modifications. It is true the reception these met with 
 shows that the plans of genius can only be put into execu- 
 tion by leaders of genius. Kellermann replied their author 
 was fit for a madhouse, and Scherer, unconsciously hitting 
 the right nail on the head, that whoever made these plans 
 should carry them out himself. 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Mem., IV. 279.
 
 22 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 In this post Napoleon remained, however, only for a 
 brief time ; shortly afterwards he was not only removed 
 from it, but struck off the active list of generals alto- 
 gether, because he had not considered it necessary to 
 enter upon his post in the Army of the West, at this time 
 engaged in quelling the royalist risings. Thus he re- 
 mained for the moment without any employment what- 
 ever, though he no longer suffered from straitened means. 
 At one time he had entertained the idea of going 
 to Turkey, in order to reorganize the army there ; he 
 now took up this plan again, but the events of the 
 1 3th Vendemiaire were already visibly brewing, and 
 when they came near, Napoleon, who had hitherto 
 always shown himself zealous for republican ideas, and 
 whose military capacity was acknowledged, and who, 
 being without employment, was ready to take advantage 
 of any turn of fortune's wheel, was the man whom Barras 
 chose to conduct he fight in the streets of Paris. The 
 result of this is too well known for us further to allude to 
 it in detail. 
 
 Overjoyed at the result, he wrote to Joseph on the 
 1 4th, " Fortune has declared for me," and Marmont, who 
 immediately after this became his aide-de-camp, says that 
 he noticed in him an extraordinary confidence and quite a 
 new air of greatness and importance. He sought in every 
 way to exploit the position thus gained, and one of its 
 consequences was his marriage. 
 
 It is perhaps difficult, as regards all human resolutions, 
 to fix upon any one motive as the decisive one, indeed the 
 causes of the origin of any resolution are generally very 
 complicated ; this was very likely the case here ; violent, 
 southern passion was undoubtedly to a great extent present, 
 and undoubtedly also the prospect of the chief command 
 in Italy, held out to him by Barras, had its share in it ; 
 at any rate we cannot and will not attempt to determine 
 to what his resolution was finally due. 
 
 But one thing we may mention : the interesting side-
 
 YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER 23 
 
 lights cast by Josephine upon her suitor show us how 
 Napoleon appeared to men at the moment when his 
 career as a general was about to begin. " I admire the 
 general's courage, and the extent of his knowledge of all 
 sorts of subjects, upon which he converses equally well, 
 and the vivacity of his mind, which makes him understand 
 the thoughts of others, almost before they are expressed in 
 words; but, I confess, I am frightened by the power 
 which he seems to wish to exert over all that surround 
 him. His searching glance has something strange and 
 inexplicable in it, which impresses even our Directors." He 
 himself says to Josephine : " Do they think I need their 
 favour in order to rise ? Some day they will all be only 
 too happy if I extend mine to them. My sword is at my 
 side, and with it I shall go far." And Josephine refers to 
 this as follows : "I do not know how it is, but sometimes 
 this ridiculous confidence captivates me so much, that 
 I believe everything possible which this odd fellow puts 
 into my head ; indeed, who can calculate what he 
 may not be capable of accomplishing with his powers of 
 imagination ? "
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 1796-97. 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY. 
 
 (1) ON the 2nd March Napoleon was appointed commander- 
 in-chief of the army of Italy, on the gth he married 
 Josephine, on the nth he left for the army, and on 
 the 27th he took command of it, issuing this celebrated 
 proclamation : 
 
 " Headquarters, Nice, 7th Germinal IV. 
 "SOLDIERS! You are naked and ill fed; the Govern- 
 ment owes you much but can give you nothing. Your 
 patience, your valour among these rocks have been admir- 
 able, but they bring you no glory ; not a ray falls upon 
 you. I will lead you into the most fertile plains on earth. 
 You will conquer rich provinces and large towns, there 
 you will find honour and glory and wealth. Soldiers 
 of Italy, will you be wanting in courage or endurance ? " 
 
 From this moment dates the historical importance of 
 Napoleon. Hitherto we have hurried with hasty steps 
 over events, endeavouring only to give a general picture of 
 the circumstances which had most influence upon the de- 
 velopment of the man ; now the study of him as a general 
 only begins to claim our attention exclusively, and with it 
 comes the necessity for a more detailed treatment. Here 
 we cannot refrain from expressing the regret, which the 
 military student must feel on entering upon the history of 
 Napoleon's wars, that the story of none of these ever memor-
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 25 
 
 able campaigns should have appeared in a comprehensive 
 form, based upon documentary evidence. It ought indeed to 
 be the business of the French staff, who alone have at their 
 disposal the most important documents on the subject, to 
 publish a really authentic delineation of this most glorious 
 chapter in French military annals ; may they soon realize 
 this obligation ! l 
 
 Now, how are we to picture to ourselves this young 
 general, whose youth we have described, in order to explain 
 both his early successes and his later empire ? Born in 
 revolutionary times, he began his career without recogniz- 
 ing any other authority than power and success, with a 
 character untamed by experience, hard and self-willed, of 
 a nervous temperament, easily roused, passionate, but withal 
 endowed with a mind that was never troubled by trivial 
 matters, ever looking forward to great things, and possess- 
 ing a power of will which nothing could daunt. But 
 exactly because this iron will found means to overcome 
 every obstacle, it changed into unyielding obstinacy, and 
 because his mind, led by such a will, acknowledged no 
 limits to his greatness, it changed gradually into a delight 
 in the gigantic. It was his nature to be unable to bear 
 any constraint either in small or great things ; while dress- 
 ing he tore and threw away whatever in the least annoyed 
 him, and in politics he never listened to the wise counsels 
 of Talleyrand, but always gave way to his mood of the 
 moment. Everything had always and immediately to 
 yield to his will ; his nature was that of a tyrant, if not 
 always that of a ruler. Neither men, nor facts, nor his 
 environment influenced him ; his irresistible impulses led 
 him to subdue men and things and to bend circumstances 
 to his own will; but as he never would conquer nor 
 
 1 Since the author wrote these lines an admirable account of the 
 Campaign of Prussia (1806-7) has appeared by Lettow Vorbeck, giving 
 the Prussian views, while Foucart in bis Campagne de Prusse, the 
 publication of which commenced about the time Count Yorck began 
 his, gives an excellent detail history from the French point of view. 
 ED.
 
 26 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 restrain himself, all his successes ended eventually in un- 
 success. 
 
 His personal appearance had at this time nothing of 
 dignity about it ; owing to his thinness, his features were 
 almost ugly in their sharpness ; his walk was unsteady, 
 his clothes neglected, his appearance produced on the 
 whole an unfavourable impression, and was in no way 
 imposing ; but in spite of his apparent bodily weakness he 
 was tough and sinewy, and from under his high forehead 
 there flashed, despite his sallow face, the eyes of genius, 
 deep-seated, large, and of a greyish-blue colour, and before 
 their glance and the words of authority that issued from 
 his thin pale lips, all bowed down. 
 
 The army to command which he was called, Napoleon 
 found in the following position. Of the main body 
 there stood on the left wing the division Gamier, 
 with its centre at the Colle di Finestre and its left 
 extended as far as Isola. Next came the division 
 Macquart along the road Sospel-Tenda, as far as the Col 
 di Tenda ; these two divisions served to keep up com- 
 munication with the Army of the Alps and were not to 
 take any immediate part in the offensive operations for the 
 present. Next came the division Serurier on the road 
 Pieve-Ormea-Garessio, and on the right behind this the 
 division Augereau with its right wing resting upon the 
 seashore at Laigueglia. The divisions of Laharpe and 
 Meynier in the van under the orders of Massena covered 
 th^ coast from Voltri up to the division of Augereau. The 
 cantonments of the troops covered a good deal of ground. 
 As to cavalry, in any case of little use in such country, 
 Napoleon had 2500 men, which he placed under the 
 command of General Steingel, forming them into two 
 divisions and stationing them along the coast road in 
 reserve behind the infantry ; the first in advance towards 
 Loano, the second in its rear. 
 
 On the other hand the Piedmontese army under Colli 
 stood in the valley of the Tanaro and the Upper Bormida ;
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 27 
 
 the Austrians under Beaulieu, an old man of seventy-one 
 years, nominally also commander-in-chief of the Piedmon- 
 tese, had their outposts advanced into the Northern 
 Apennines, whilst their main body was on the point of 
 concentrating in the plain near Alessandria. 
 
 Napoleon determined at once to take the offensive ; as 
 early as the 28th of March he wrote : l " Citizen directors ! 
 Your intentions shall be carried out ; I shall march 
 shortly." Before this could be done, however, some 
 questions of administration and organization had to be 
 attended to, so that the advance of the army might not 
 be arrested by such considerations as retarded MacMahon's 
 march to Mezieres so much in 1870, when the only chance 
 of its success lay in the rapidity of its execution. Here 
 also rapidity of execution had to justify the boldness of 
 the operations, and thus the general employed the first few 
 days in organizing his commissariat and the communica- 
 tions in the rear of his army. It is altogether wrong to 
 picture Napoleon as always pushing forward without 
 any thought of his commissariat ; he always kept his eye 
 on it, only it never obscured the clearness of his military 
 insight, nor did he permit it to interfere with the course 
 and directions of his operations, and with respect to it as 
 a rule, he always adhered to the phrase : " In the conduct 
 of our armies we must be guided by the principle that war 
 must support war." * 
 
 He had employed the few days following his arrival to 
 such good purpose, that he could, immediately after taking 
 up the chief command, write to Carnot : * " Our com- 
 missariat is secured for one month ; our communications 
 are assured," and he could now proceed to that concentra- 
 tion of the army on the right wing, which was to be the 
 second step before the commencement of operations, and 
 about which he said himself: 4 " The change from a defen- 
 
 1 C. N. Headquarters, Nice. 
 
 - * C. N. Mem. sur 1'arme'e d'ltalie, premiers jours de Therm. 
 1 C. N. Nice, 28th March. 
 4 C. N. Me"m. Campagnes d'ltalie, I. 101.
 
 28 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL* 
 
 sive to an offensive attitude is one of the most delicate of 
 operations." His plan was on the whole the same as that 
 which he had laid down in his report made in 1795 : An 
 advance against the centre of the allies, whose divergent 
 interests would induce them, once separated, to fall back 
 in different directions ; then a peace rapidly forced on 
 the Piedmontese, followed by a struggle with the Austrians, 
 who would then stand alone. As the most suitable point 
 for this advance against the centre, he had selected the 
 depression between the extremity of the Alps and the 
 Apennines, where the mountains were lowest ; this spot 
 was marked by the road Savona-Cadibona-Altare-Carcare. 
 
 At the head of his staff was General Berthier, forty- 
 three years old, the man who was to retain this post 
 thenceforward during all Napoleon's campaigns, only 
 to forsake his general, whose deeds covered him too 
 with immortal glory, and who heaped upon him more 
 honours and riches than upon any one else, in a 
 shameful manner, at the moment when his star was 
 setting. Indeed Napoleon at St. Helena called him con- 
 temptuously " one of the ganders, whom he had made 
 half eagles," and all that is handed down to us about him 
 by his comrades-in-arms confirms, what his short conduct 
 of the army in 1809 proved to the world, namely, that he 
 possessed an inexhaustible capacity for work, that he was 
 untiring both at the work-desk and in the field, and an 
 experienced master of all the details of military affairs, 
 but that he was entirely lacking in the gift of understanding 
 the great thoughts he had to convey to the army. Even 
 as the steam hammer, moved by the power of steam, can 
 crush everything and force it into the shape desired by 
 the master, but is an inert mass without him, so was 
 Berthier in Napoleon's hands, and moulded by his spirit. 
 Separated from him he sank back into nothingness. 
 
 Whilst the divisions of the army were thus engaged in 
 concentrating, and garrison troops were coming up from 
 the rear according to the commander-in-chief s orders, in
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 29 
 
 order to secure the line of retreat of the army by their 
 occupation of Nice, Albenga, and Savona, Napoleon's 
 headquarters left Nice on the 2nd April and advanced 
 along the coast by short stages. But the enemy also did 
 not remain idle. The vanguard of the French troops at 
 Voltri had aroused in Beaulieu apprehensions for Genoa, 
 and thus some forward movements of the Austrians in 
 that direction, beginning on the 3ist March, proved to 
 Napoleon that his intention to surprise them in their 
 winter quarters had failed. Meanwhile, Colli had been 
 concentrating his forces in close cantonments around 
 Mondovi and Ceva. At this moment l Napoleon over- 
 estimated the Piedmontese ; he put them at 45,000 men, 
 the Austrians correctly at 37,000, whilst he himself had 
 45,000. At the actual commencement of operations we 
 may fairly compute the active strength of the armies in 
 the field as follows : Colli 25,000, Beaulieu 35,000, 
 Napoleon 37,000 ; the allies, however, had a very con- 
 siderable superiority in artillery, the French being very 
 weak in this arm. 
 
 On the Qth April Beaulieu opened the campaign by 
 advancing in person on the left with 7000 men towards 
 Voltri, whilst Argenteau, disposing altogether of 9000 men, 
 which, however, were not all at hand, pushed forward in 
 the centre towards Sassello ; Colli remaining at Ceva. 
 Napoleon, who had been on the point of joining the 
 division Serurier, now hurried in person, surprised by 
 these movements, to Savona, in order to be on the scene 
 of action. The next day, the loth, Beaulieu advanced 
 against the brigade of Cervoni, stationed at Voltri, and 
 by nightfall the latter had to fall back upon its division 
 Laharpe, which it rejoined on the nth near Madonna di 
 Savona. On this same day Argenteau forced the French 
 posts back through Montenotte, but behind this village, 
 at some earthworks thrown up on Monte Legino, and 
 
 1 C. N. Headquarters, Albenga, 6th April.
 
 3O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 defended by the brave Colonel Rampon, met with a 
 resistance which he could not overcome. 
 
 The arrival of these reports rendered it clear to 
 Napoleon that the enemy were advancing on the west, 
 though he was not of course acquainted with the actual 
 distribution of their forces. At the same time he re- 
 cognized two things : first, that the columns advancing 
 upon Voltri and Savona could not support each other 
 directly ; and secondly, that he was at least equal to one 
 of these columns if he massed the greater portion of his 
 army against it ; he therefore resolved upon an immediate 
 attack on the Austrians advancing via Montenotte ; these 
 once beaten, he would stand on the inner line between 
 Beaulieu and Colli, who would then be separated from 
 each other, at Voltri and Ceva, by thirty-eight miles of 
 impassable mountainous country. Thus the French 
 general would be free to throw himself upon either of 
 them, before the other could come up. 
 
 Therefore he issued on the afternoon of the nth 
 April the following orders : * " Augereau will march with 
 6000 men to Mallare ; on the morning of the I2th at 
 five o'clock he will start thence for Cairo, where he will 
 wait for further orders. He will overthrow all opposition. 
 Massena will push forward along the road via Altare with 
 9000 men, as soon as he has collected these troops. 
 Laharpe will march at daybreak on the I2th with 7000 
 men to the Monte Legino to reinforce the corps stationed 
 there. Serurier will be informed of the intended attack 
 and demonstrate against Colli." This was, in fact, tac- 
 tically a combined attack in full fprce on the right wing 
 of the Austrian column advancing via Montenotte, and 
 strategically, a piercing of the enemy's centre. 
 
 Napoleon himself left Albenga at one o'clock in the 
 
 morning and accompanied Massena's column. The result 
 
 (2*) answered his expectations. Argenteau, who had collected 
 
 only 3000 men for his offensive movement, was turned by 
 
 1 C. N. Headquarters, Albenga.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 31 
 
 Massena near Montenotte-inferiore and completely driven 
 back with very heavy losses. Augereau had no chance of 
 joining in the fight, being forced by some movements of 
 Colli in the direction of the Bormida valley to keep his 
 eye upon the Piedmontese, in order to protect the left 
 flank of the French advance against any danger threaten- 
 ing it from them ; he therefore went back from Cairo to 
 Montefreddo. 
 
 Immediately after this success Napoleon turned his (2b) 
 attention to the Piedmontese, and as he found them 
 within reach, he decided to attack them. Augereau and 
 the larger portion of Massena's division, altogether 10,000 
 men, were to advance via Millesimo and Castelnuovo upon 
 Montezzemolo, whilst Serurier penetrated into Ceva, and 
 sought to turn the right wing of the enemy with his left, 
 his own right wing assisting in the attack upon Montez- 
 zemolo. Massena himself, with the remainder of his 
 division and Laharpe, advanced against the Austrians in 
 the direction of Dego, in order thereby to cover the attack 
 upon the Piedmontese on this side. 
 
 In executing these orders Augereau met the left wing of 
 the Piedmontese on the morning of the I3th at Millesimo. 
 General Provera, commanding here, threw himself, in face 
 of superior numbers, into the ruined castle of Cosseria, 
 and all efforts to wrest from him this position were un- 
 successful during that day. But the next morning Provera 
 was forced by want of water and ammunition to surrender 
 the castle to Augereau. Being now secure on this side, 
 Napoleon determined to take Dego, to which an Austrian 
 division had advanced, so as to secure his right flank 
 during his further operations against the Piedmontese. 
 Massena and Laharpe, who had the evening before arrived 
 in front of this position, attacked from the right, turning 
 the enemy, whilst Napoleon ordered a half-brigade of the 
 troops planted before Cosseria to assist. At one o'clock 
 in the afternoon the attack on the position, only occupied 
 by 4000 men, commenced.
 
 32 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Beaulieu, who had at the first news of Napoleon's 
 advance against Argenteau, hastened back to Acqui, was 
 as a matter of fact still busy with concentrating his army 
 at this place, and had planted the above-named post in 
 Dego to cover this operation. The latter was now entirely 
 destroyed by Napoleon's combined attack with superior 
 forces, and all the guns (eighteen) and almost all the men 
 fell into the French hands. 
 
 Thus on the evening of the I4th of April the separation 
 of Beaulieu's and Colli's forces was a. fait accompli, and 
 Napoleon, having returned to Carcare, resolved now to 
 direct his attacks against the latter, and thus to force the 
 Piedmontese to conclude peace. Accordingly he issued at 
 10 p.m. the following orders : Massena to collect his 
 forces at Dego and remain there; all the rest to start 
 at 8 a.m. and march upon Montezzemolo. The cavalry, 
 hitherto left behind in their old positions, were now moved 
 up to Carcare. 
 
 (2c) But on the I5th with the break of day an Austrian column 
 of 3000 men pushed forward to Dego, and by eleven 
 o'clock in the forenoon captured this village from the 
 French, who undoubtedly had neglected to take ordinary 
 measures for safety. This column consisted of five bat- 
 talions coming from Sassello, who ought really to have come 
 up in time for the fighting on the I4th. The French, 
 taken by surprise, were driven back in disorder; soon, 
 however, Napoleon himself hastened thither on Massena's 
 request for assistance. Indeed, before the beginning of the 
 attack information had already reached him that Beaulieu 
 himself intended to advance upon Dego, and he had in 
 consequence countermanded the advance of Laharpe's 
 division and halted it at Rochetta. About two o'clock in the 
 afternoon the French took the offensive again and threw 
 back the Austrians in disorder with heavy losses upon 
 Spigno. Meanwhile on the left wing Serurier had advanced 
 the same day in the Tanaro valley against Ceva, whilst 
 Augereau, forcing the opposing troops of Colli back on
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 33 
 
 his side, had reached the position of Montezzemolo, and 
 had thus come in touch with Serurier. 
 
 Thus Napoleon had once more definitely repulsed the 
 Austrians on his right wing and was doubly secure, 
 whilst his left was within striking distance of the 
 enemy, prepared to detain them until he could turn 
 their flank from Dego. The sum total of successes 
 against the Austrians was, a Joss of 10,000 men, and such 
 a strong moral effect, that Beaulieu, convinced of the 
 French superiority of numbers, now thought only of 
 concentrating his troops at Acqui and protecting Lonv 
 bardy. 
 
 On the 1 5th success seemed still more within 
 Napoleon's reach than on the evening of the I4th. It 
 was of no use whatever to advance against the Austrians. 
 He was not in touch with them ; they might evade him, 
 in which case he would have missed his stroke, whilst in 
 the meantime Colli could fall back upon Turin and place 
 both his army and the capital in safety. Then all chance 
 of forcing a peace upon one of his opponents, thus getting 
 rid of him, and having the advantage in regard to numbers 
 on his own side, would be lost. Now the whole plan 
 was based upon compelling the Piedmontese, after separa- 
 tion from the Austrians, to make peace, and thus gaining 
 a safe base for future operations against the other isolated 
 opponent. There are many examples in the annals of 
 war of a general being carried away by success in battle 
 and neglecting his general plan of operations, in order to 
 reap the direct advantage of his success. But Napoleon, 
 who was now at the turning-point of his movements, kept 
 his main object well in view, and accordingly moved 
 against the Piedmontese. 
 
 To begin with, it is true he took steps towards moving 
 the division of Laharpe to Sassello, and even told off 
 Massena to support it ; nor can we clearly understand 
 the aim of this movement. And here we may mention that 
 the " Correspondance de Napoleon I." is but an in- 
 
 D
 
 34 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 complete guide for the early part of the campaign of 1796 ; 
 probably much was settled by word of mouth, for Napoleon 
 constantly ^ndeavoured as far as possible to see to every- 
 thing personally. 1 " You cannot imagine my life here," 
 he wrote to the Directory, " I arrive tired, but have to 
 keep awake all night to settle questions of administration, 
 and be all over the place to restore order." 
 
 On the i6th April Augereau had proceeded to attack 
 
 the entrenched position of the Piedmontese at Ceva and 
 
 had driven them from it ; they fell back on the road to 
 
 Mondovi as far as Lesegno. On the iyth we find Laharpe 
 
 recalled to Dego, and Massena and Serurier sent forward 
 
 to Ceva ; the latter occupied this place the same evening. 
 
 The next day the whole cavalry was placed under 
 
 Serurier's orders and Napoleon himself moved his head- 
 
 (2d) quarters to Saliceto. On the igth the attack upon Colli 
 
 began. Serurier advanced upon San Michele by a flank 
 
 movement on the left, in order to cut off his road to 
 
 Mondovi, Augereau marched upon Castellino in order to 
 
 outflank him on the right, while Massena pushed on 
 
 straight to Ceva. Colli, wishing to retreat by Mondovi, 
 
 met Serurier and engaged him successfully, it is true, but 
 
 without any really decisive result. As to Napoleon, he 
 
 had proceeded to Ceva ; he fixed his headquarters for the 
 
 night at Lesegno, still further in advance, and from here 
 
 he ordered at one o'clock in the night a general attack 
 
 upon Colli. All further arrangements were to be made in 
 
 the course of the next day, for only then probably would 
 
 he become acquainted with the actual position of the 
 
 enemy. Accordingly Massena was to advance upon 
 
 Lesegno, and a part of Augereau's force was put under his 
 
 command. The rest of the latter took up positions, partly 
 
 at Castellino, in order to threaten the enemy's left flank, 
 
 and partly at Mombarcaro, in order to observe the 
 
 Bormida valley, along which the Austrians might approach. 
 
 For security against the latter, Laharpe also was to 
 
 1 C. N. Carna, 24th April.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 35 
 
 march to Mombarcaro, and to occupy the fortified position 
 of Ceva, leaving only one brigade as rearguard in Cairo. 
 
 At two o'clock in the morning of the 2ist, Massena 
 crossed the Tanaro and advanced upon Lesegno ; on the 
 same morning Serurier received orders to push forward 
 over the bridge of Torre and to attack the right wing of 
 the enemy posted behind the Cursaglia. The enemy, 
 however, did not wait for this attack, but retreated 
 viA Mondovi. Serurier encountered a division left 
 behind at Vico to cover this retreat, and defeated it 
 completely. In the evening Napoleon was at Mondovi, 
 but returned again to Lesegno. On the 22nd his army 
 took up a position along the line Mondovi-Niella-Castel- 
 lino, that is, generally speaking, remained in its place ; 
 probably because the quality of the republican troops was 
 such, that an interval of comparative rest was absolutely 
 necessary for the restoration of tactical order ; besides 
 Napoleon was not altogether sure whether Colli might not 
 advance again ; when no such advance occurred, he 
 ordered Serurier, on the 23rd, to move forward on the 
 road to Fossano, Massena on that to Cherasco, both as 
 far as the other side of the Pesio ; Augereau went to 
 Dogliani, and Laharpe was to follow on the 24th as far as 
 Niella. From Lesegno a General Order was issued on the 
 23rd, to stop the numerous excesses of his subordinate 
 officers, more particularly all looting. 
 
 It is true, Napoleon, like all great leaders, laid an 
 enemy's country under contribution for the benefit of his 
 army to the utmost extent, yet he always looked upon 
 looting as a cancer that must be rooted out, inasmuch as 
 it destroyed all discipline. He himself said : " I have 
 thought much on this subject ; I have often been tempted 
 to reward my soldiers by permitting it, and I should have 
 done so had I considered it of advantage. But nothing is 
 more calculated to disorganize an army and to ruin it 
 entirely ; " l and it was this conviction which made him 
 
 1 M&n. de Ste. H(H.
 
 36 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 write angrily to the Directoire : " I shall restore discipline or 
 cease to command these robbers ! " l Altogether plunder- 
 ing was distasteful to his nature. " Great men are never 
 cruel without necessity," 2 he justly said himself, and 
 though indeed he was inexorable when he met with 
 resistance, or when his policy demanded it, he was never 
 personally cruel. He ordered the plundering of Pavia to 
 cease after three hours, because he took pity on its inha- 
 bitants ; if, during his passage to Egypt, a man fell 
 overboard, he did not rest until he was saved, and all who 
 were intimately associated with him testify unanimously 
 that he was not without a certain kindness for individuals, 
 as long as his interests were not at stake, nor his anger 
 roused. General Foy, assuredly a trustworthy witness, 
 says : " Do not let us mistake a despot, whose anger 
 never overstepped the limits of what he considered his 
 interests, for a tyrant, passionate, blind and bloodthirsty. 
 Napoleon was not wicked by nature ; he always showed 
 himself full of leniency for his people ; even his enemies he 
 could not hate long or vehemently." 3 
 
 Whilst his columns were crossing the Pesio, Napoleon 
 received that same day, the 23rd, a letter from Colli 
 requesting an armistice. Napoleon declared himself 
 ready to grant it, on condition that two of the three 
 fortresses, Cuneo, Alessandria, and Tortona, were surren- 
 dered, and that definite negotiations for peace were begun 
 immediately. These conditions were accepted, and the 
 truce was signed on the 28th ; Cuneo and Tortona were 
 surrendered to the French. 
 
 Therewith the first chapter of Napoleon's first campaign 
 came to a successful end, and an examination of it gives 
 us the first (and that a valuable) insight into Napoleon's 
 methods. In the first place we are struck with the con- 
 fidence with which the youthful leader accepted his task 
 
 1 C. N. Carni, 24th April. Mme. de Rdmusat, Me"m. 
 
 * Hist, de la guerre de la peninsule.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 37 
 
 and carried it through ; no half-success, no failure forced 
 him into an irksome apprenticeship; from the first he 
 showed himself as a master of his art, as did Alexander, 
 Hannibal, and Charles XII. Doubtless physical and mental 
 qualities have to be combined to render such a result 
 possible, but still it is certain that there are, on the other 
 hand, things in the art of war which can be learned, and 
 must be learned, in order to achieve success. The greatest 
 elasticity of mind cannot dispense with the mechanical 
 side of the art of war. " Achilles was the son of a goddess 
 and a mortal ; this is a symbol of the spirit of the art of 
 war," ' says Napoleon. We have seen how fully prepared 
 he himself was in entering on his career, how Italy as the 
 scene of a probable war had been made by him the object 
 of especial and mature study, and as those qualities which 
 fortune alone can grant were present in him in a rich 
 measure, his success was both deserved and inevitable. 
 Gambetta on the other hand furnishes us, in our own 
 time, with a proof that even the highest energy, coupled 
 with undoubted genius, does not suffice to ensure victory, 
 if a knowledge of the mechanical part be lacking. 
 
 And if we examine Napoleon's work in detail, we shall 
 appreciate his plan and its execution at their full value 
 only after clearly understanding the danger of the strate- 
 gical conditions under which he assumed commancl of 
 the army. Widely scattered as it was over the narrow 
 belt of land between the Ligurian Alps and the sea, its 
 only line of communication in the rear, with Marseilles, 
 was extremely exposed, both on the side of the mountains, 
 where an enemy advancing over the Col di Tenda might 
 cut the French off completely, and also on the side of the 
 sea, on which the English fleet held undisputed sway. 
 Nor did this single line of communication lie in the exact 
 rear of the army and covered by it, but along the pro- 
 longation of its left flank, one of the most unfavourable 
 strategical positions imaginable, as Napoleon proved most 
 1 Precis des guerres du marshal de Turenne.
 
 38 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 strikingly to the Prussian army in 1806. And what did he 
 accomplish in this unfavourable position ? In three weeks 
 the French army was concentrated, one enemy beaten 
 and thrown back upon his communications, the other's 
 capital threatened, and the French army had its line of 
 communication in its rear and covering all the space from 
 Saluzzo to the sea. 
 
 In this opening of the campaign we immediately re- 
 cognize the characteristic stamp of Napoleon's whole 
 generalship : a clear perception of what masses can effect. 
 Jomini, whose admirable system is based on the deeds of 
 the greatest master of the practice of war, says in the 
 chapter on the fundamental principle of war, 1 that it con- 
 sists of the following : 
 
 1. To lead the bulk of the army by strategical combina- 
 tions successively to the decisive points of the theatre of 
 action, and as much as possible upon the enemy's lines of 
 communication without endangering one's own ; 
 
 2. To manoeuvre in such a manner that the bulk of one's 
 forces act only against detached portions of the hostile 
 army. 
 
 Napoleon was from the first fully alive to these principles. 
 As early as 1794 he says : " The same rules obtain in the 
 conduct of campaigns as in the siege of fortresses ; the fire 
 must be concentrated upon one point. The breach once 
 made, the equilibrium is disturbed, all the rest becomes 
 useless and the fortress is taken. . . . The attacks should 
 be concentrated,not scattered." z When in 1799 he met 
 Moreau for the first time and the two men discussed 
 strategy, the latter said : " It is always the greater numbers 
 that win ! " " You are right," broke in Napoleon eagerly, 
 "it is always the greater number that beats the lesser," 2 
 adding by way of explanation : " When with inferior forces 
 
 1 Precis de 1'art de la guerre. 
 
 * C. N. Rapport sur la position polit. et mil. des arme'es de Piemont 
 et d'Espagne. 
 
 Gohier, MeVn.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 39 
 
 I had a large army before me, I concentrated mine rapidly 
 and fell like lightning upon one of the enemy's wings and 
 routed it. Then I took advantage of the confusion which 
 this manoeuvre never failed to produce in the opposing 
 army, to attack it on another point, but always with my 
 whole force. Thus I beat it in detail, and the victory 
 which was the result, was always, as you see, the triumph 
 of the larger number over the lesser." 
 
 The carrying out of this principle was the secret of 
 Napoleon's strategy ; but it is necessary in addition to be 
 able always to distinguish readily the point at which the 
 concentrated attack should be delivered and to possess the 
 strength of mind to disregard all secondary matters, 
 however important they may seem to be, in order to 
 bring your whole force to bear at the decisive point. It is 
 above all this clearness and logical pursuit of strategical 
 plans that we admire in Napoleon, and which make the 
 study of him as a general profitable. When, after the con- 
 clusion of the whole campaign now under consideration, 
 he had marched victoriously through Italy into the heart 
 of Austria, he himself said with reference to his strategy : 
 " There are in Europe many good generals, but they see 
 too many things at once ; as for me, I see only one thing, 
 namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident 
 that secondary matters will then settle themselves. " * Thus 
 we see here how he calmly left the road to Genoa open to 
 Beaulieu, when the latter began the campaign, and how 
 he only watched Colli for the time being and threw himself 
 with superior forces upon Argenteau's force, the centre of 
 the allies ; between the nth and the I5th he defeated all the 
 Austrian divisions opposed to him. This is an example of 
 the employment of superior numbers at the decisive point, 
 for since his opponents were not united, and moreover were 
 drawn from several nations, the most effective course was 
 to separate them by pushing between them. If after the 
 first few .blows the principal enemy, the Austrians, fell 
 
 1 Berthez&ne, Souvenirs milit.
 
 4O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 back, Napoleon might reckon that the secondary force, the 
 Piedmontese, would only think of the immediate protection 
 of their own country, and would not consider that they 
 could best protect their country by joining Beaulieu, in 
 order to fight a pitched battle with their united forces. 
 This calculation, based upon a correct appreciation of 
 human motives, was justified by events. Indeed "the same 
 thing may be found often in the history of war, when allies 
 are engaged ; that the Prussians acted differently and in 
 accordance with the rules of war, in marching on the iyth 
 June, of 1815, to Wavre, and on the i8th to Belle-Alliance, 
 sacrificing all their communications, is a glorious testimony 
 to Gneisenau's judgment and Bliicher's decision. 
 
 Beaulieu being beaten and having fallen back, Colli's 
 army became the proper objective, and immediately the 
 French general turned with superior forces on him, merely 
 guarding against attack on the side of the Austrians. From 
 the i6th he operated solely against Colli, and after seven 
 days the latter asked for a truce. It is worthy of notice 
 also, that Napoleon ordered up troops who had stopped 
 behind in order to observe the Austrians, as soon 
 as he saw that the latter remained inactive, and 
 that the further he advanced, the further he left them 
 behind him. It was ever his aim to keep his forces to- 
 gether as much as circumstances permitted, while -any 
 fighting was anticipated, for, " We must separate to live, 
 but unite to fight ! " 4 
 
 He thus showed the clearest perception of what is essen- 
 tial in war and the most resolute adherence to what he 
 recognized as essential. 
 
 To this must be added his careful regulation of the com- 
 missariat, his care in securing his base, his indefatigable 
 personal energy, and his stern maintenance of discipline ; 
 and thus Napoleon, taken altogether, presents to us an 
 example, such as no other modern military leader has 
 
 1 C. N. Rapport sur la position, etc.; see p. 38 and footnote.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 41 
 
 shown in full perfection at the commencement of his 
 career. 1 
 
 Scarcely had Napoleon attained his first object, viz. the 
 removal of one of his opponents from the field, than he 
 directed his attention to the next point. It is significant 
 that it was just at the moment when he found himself in 
 front of numbers in a favourable position compared with 
 his opponent, that he began to ask the Directory for rein- 
 forcements and for the assistance of the Army of the Alps ; 
 for he was well aware of the great expenditure of forces 
 which an advance on a large scale, such as he had in view, 
 would entail. His first success had only increased his 
 appetite for further successes, and he wanted to set in 
 motion proportionately larger forces. This dissatisfaction 
 with the success achieved, this desire to place the goal 
 aimed at further and ever further ahead, is the stamp of 
 the true general. 
 
 After Colli's offer of a truce on the 23rd April, 
 Napoleon had at first continued his advance upon Turin, 
 in order to thoroughly impress the Piedmontese with 
 the necessity of yielding. The latter fell back without 
 resistance, and on the 27th Napoleon crossed the Stura. 
 As to the doings of the Austrians he had no accurate (3) 
 information, but as his advance into Lombardy would in 
 any case bring him in contact with them, he did not 
 trouble about this, and no sooner was the truce concluded 
 than he wrote: "To-morrow I shall march against 
 Beaulieu ; I shall force him to retreat behind the Po ; I 
 shall cross this river in his immediate rear, seize the whole 
 of Lombardy, and before a month is passed, I hope to be 
 among the mountains of the Tyrol, to meet the army of 
 
 1 Thus Wellington's Talavera campaign cannot be for one moment 
 compared with that of Vitoria, which was as brilliant as Napoleon's 
 Marengo campaign. On the other hand, Maryborough's first great 
 campaign, 1704, was assuredly his greatest master-piece. The 
 strategy of this was entirely due to the English commander, although 
 German authors, probably through ignorance, habitually ignore this 
 fact. ED.
 
 42 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the Rhine, and in conjunction with it carry the war into 
 Bavaria. 1 On the same day, the 28th April, he issued 
 orders regulating the garrisons of the places taken or 
 handed over, thus securing his base, and also for his 
 army to set itself in motion towards the East in the 
 general direction of Tortona. He ordered the divisions 
 Macquart and Garnier up from the Alps via Cuneo as 
 reinforcements, and had now, after deducting garrisons, 
 35,000 men at his disposal for his operations. Beaulieu's 
 force he correctly estimated at 26,000. 
 
 This latter general, having made a vain attempt to 
 capture Tortona and Alessandria and thus to secure some 
 points of support on the theatre of war on the right of the 
 Po, retreated before the approaching French, on the ist 
 May by Valenza behind the Po, on the 2nd behind 
 the Agogna. On this day Napoleon's headquarters were 
 at Bosco, Augereau had reached Frugarolo, Laharpe 
 Rivalta, and Massena Castellazzo ; Serurier had followed 
 at an interval of one day's march and was at Alba. 
 
 The French general had, as we have seen r determined 
 at the very moment of the conclusion of the truce with the 
 Piedmontese, to proceed immediately to the conquest of 
 the whole of Lombardy, and thus he had, in order to mis- 
 lead his enemy, inserted a clause in that convention, 
 permitting the French army to cross the Po at Valenza. 
 Now when Beaulieu fell into this trap and took up his 
 position behind the Agogna on the road to Pavia, 
 Napoleon was at once ready to take advantage of this 
 mistake, brought about by his action, and to effect a cross- 
 ing lower down, and thus not only become immediately 
 master of a larger extent of territory, but also place 
 himself on the flank and rear of the Austrians and turn 
 their posts of defence on the Agogna, the Terdoppio, the 
 Ticino, and the Lambro by a single movement ; besides, 
 the crossing would be a surprise, and therefore more likely 
 to succeed. 
 
 1 C. N. To the Directory. Cherasco, 28th April.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 43 
 
 On the 3rd May, accordingly, Napoleon ordered from 
 his headquarters at Tortona the formation of four 
 battalions of Grenadiers and two battalions of Carbineers 
 to be ready for the march on the 5th. This picked -body 
 was to surprise the point selected for crossing. Mean- 
 while he continued to hoodwink the Austrians. On the 
 4th he advanced vid Castelnuovo, Sale, and Bassignana 
 towards the Po ; on the preceding day he had written to 
 the governor of Alessandria, 1 that a division would with- 
 out delay appear before Valenza, to cross the Po there. 
 All communication with the left bank was interrupted and 
 an embargo laid on all boats, etc. But at the same time, 
 on the 4th, the newly formed picked body was assembled 
 at Casteggio and placed under the command of General 
 Dallemagne. To this same place, 1500 cavalry and six 
 guns were dispatched on the 5th, whilst the army 
 executed a movement to the right along the Po. 
 
 All these arrangements show how conscious Napoleon 
 was of his superiority in judgment and power of will 
 over his, opponent ; he dictated to him his course of 
 action, was quite sure that he would keep to it and commit 
 the mistakes on which he reckoned and which he had led 
 him on to do. This consciousness of mental superiority, 
 one of the strongest guarantees of victory, was always felt 
 by Napoleon. We shall see how at Austerlitz too he led 
 his enemy into errors through his own dispositions, and how 
 he predicted with certainty these errors and the manner 
 in which he himself would take advantage of them. 
 But we may well ask ourselves, whether this feeling of 
 superiority, naturally increased by success, must not in 
 the end lead to a complete contempt for any opponent, 
 and thus to fatal errors, which, though they are to those 
 of men like Beaulieu, Brunswick, Mack, and Massenbach 
 as dissipation is to impotence, yet lead to the same end ; 
 for as Napoleon himself said on his retreat from Moscow : 
 " To be too much accustomed to great successes often 
 
 1 C. N. To Chevalier Solar-Bosco.
 
 44 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 leads to great reverses." l Was it not indeed this same 
 contempt of the enemy arising from a consciousness of 
 superiority which induced Frederick the Great to 'attempt 
 a decisive battle at Kolin with 34,000 men against 53,000 ; 
 was it not this insolence of success which led Charles 
 XII. to the field of Pultawa, which probably affected 
 Alexander, which detained Napoleon so long in Mos- 
 cow, and which made him exclaim even on the I2th 
 October, 1813, with reference to the battle-field of 
 Leipzig: "I shall only fight if I like. They will never 
 dare to attack me there," * and which finally caused him, 
 on the i8th June, to reject obstinately the thought of 
 any possibility of the Prussians appearing on the field ? 
 
 But Frederick learned from experience. Immediately 
 after Kolin he abandoned the whole of Bohemia, and re- 
 nounced during all the subsequent years of the war the 
 thought of dictating a peace under the walls of Vienna ; 
 a king should act thus, because, as Napoleon says, A king 
 must not aim merely at victory, but at its consequences. 5 
 But just because a general should aim merely at victory, 
 Napoleon will be for us soldiers the greater example. 
 The " Halt," which Napoleon should have cried as 
 regards himself when he became a sovereign, will be 
 imposed upon us by the State ; for us the one guiding 
 principle of warfare must ever remain, a complete over- 
 throw of the enemy, and nothing more ; and therefore we 
 should continue to study the example of this man, who, a 
 soldier himself, was ever dominated by this principle, so 
 much so indeed, that even in 1814, forced back almost 
 under the walls of his capital by superior numbers, 
 he exclaimed after the successful engagement at 
 Champaubert : " If we gain such a success to-morrow 
 over Sacken as we gained to-day over Olssufiev, the 
 enemy will recross the Rhine more quickly than he 
 crossed it, and I shall find myself once more on the 
 
 1 S<*gur, Hist de Nap. et de la grande arm^e. At Orscha. 
 9 Marmont, M&n. M&n. de Ste. H6L
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 45 
 
 Vistula." l Such self-confidence, such powers of imagi- 
 nation, grasping the remotest bearings of every success, 
 well befits a general. 
 
 On the 6th May Napoleon commenced his march 
 upon Piacenza. Dallemagne reached Castello San 
 Giovanni, Augereau Broni, Laharpe and the cavalry 
 under Kilmaine Stradella ; Serurier remained in front of 
 Valenza, and Massena at Sale. Being so placed, Napoleon 
 said to himself: " Should my advance on Piacenza in- 
 duce Beaulieu to evacuate the Lomellina, I shall cross 
 quietly at Valenza. Should Beaulieu remain in ignorance of 
 our march to Piacenza for twenty-four hours, I shall cross 
 during the night if I can obtain boats and materials for 
 rafts in this town." 2 In any case this latter resolution 
 was the more likely for him to adopt, for, " I may be 
 accused of rashness, but never of slowness." 
 
 In order to receive as early as possible all intelligence 
 coming in from both wings, Napoleon had not yet removed 
 his headquarters from Tortona, though another circum- 
 stance also may have influenced him in this. Since a 
 crossing at Piacenza was more probable, and since this 
 crossing could only be successful as a surprise, he rightly 
 considered it advisable to allow his headquarters to remain 
 as long as possible in the vicinity of Valenza, so as to 
 confirm the Austrians all the more in their mistakes. 
 This was one of those precautions which he never lost 
 sight of when it was a question of concealing from the 
 enemy any movement begun. Of this we shall see a fine 
 example in 1805, when he remained quietly in Paris at 
 first and then betook himself to a forward position at 
 Strasburg, facing the passes in the Black Forest, whilst 
 his army made its preliminary movements for the magni- 
 ficent stroke of turning the flank of the Austrians posted 
 on the Iller. 
 
 The whole of the 6th May was spent in deciding what 
 
 1 Marmont, 
 
 8 C. N. To the Directory, Tortona, 6th May.
 
 46 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 was to be done ; therefore when his choice fell upon Pia- 
 cenza, the crossing could no longer be effected during the 
 night, but had to be postponed until the morning of the 7th. 
 In the evening of the 6th Napoleon at Tortona issued 
 the following orders : " Massena will on the 7th proceed 
 to Voghera, Laharpe will start at five o'clock and march 
 to Calendasco, Augereau at six o'clock to Castello San 
 Giovanni, Dallemagne at four o'clock to Borgo San Anto- 
 nio." Napoleon himself went to Castello San Giovanni, 
 and ordered on the same evening the banks of the Po to be 
 reconnoitred and a few boats to be collected. On the 7th, 
 (4) at four o'clock in the morning, Dallemagne started, and 
 his division, accompanied by the commander-in-chief, 
 arrived at Piacenza at nine o'clock. On the other bank of 
 the Po only some 150 Austrian cavalry were to be seen. 
 At this sight, Napoleon, now certain of being able to effect 
 his passage here, at once sent orders to all his subordinate 
 officers to push forward by forced marches. Dallemagne 
 immediately began to cross, and by two o'clock in the 
 afternoon his division stood on the left bank. The en- 
 terprise had succeeded, and Napoleon could say with a 
 sneer : " Beaulieu has lost his head ; he calculates very 
 badly; he falls continually into the traps prepared for 
 him." 1 Laharpe crossed next, his being the first entire 
 division to do so. 
 
 On the same day the French came in contact with 
 Beaulieu's outposts. The latter had on the 4th dispatched 
 General Liptay with 5000 men down the Po to protect its 
 banks, he himself following on the 6th vid Gropello. 
 General Liptay arrived at Guardamiglia on the 7th and 
 forced the French to fall back as far as the Po. But at one 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th, Napoleon, who had now 
 sufficient troops on the further side, pushed forward in his 
 turn, and the hostile division, which had taken up a position 
 at Fombia, was driven back to Pizzighettone, a portion of 
 it being utterly routed. In the evening Laharpe was at 
 1 C. N. To Carnot, Piacenza, gth May.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 47 
 
 Codogno, Dallemagne pushed forward as far as the neigh- 
 bourhood of Pizzighettone. About ten o'clock at night, a 
 fresh Austrian division, advancing along the road from 
 Casalpusterlengo, met with Laharpe's outposts and repulsed 
 them, but was subsequently driven back in its turn ; it had 
 hurriedly been sent out at noon from Belgipjoso by Beau- 
 lieu when he learnt that the French had crossed the Po. 
 During this encounter Laharpe fell, and was succeeded in 
 command by Menard. Napoleon being informed of these 
 events, was not alarmed at this advance of detached 
 bodies of troops, and merely remarked : " Perhaps Beau- 
 lieu means to fight a battle ; the man has the audacity of 
 madness, though not that of genius." l 
 
 Beaulieu did in fact intend to deliver a general attack, 
 and ordered it in the evening of the 8th ; but after re- 
 ceiving further news as to events, he recognized that his 
 forces were not sufficiently concentrated for a battle, and 
 he therefore countermanded his orders soon after mid- 
 night and began his retreat across the Adda. He now 
 took up a position near Lodi. Napoleon employed the 
 gth in allowing the divisions of Massena and Augereau, 
 the latter at Veratto, to complete the passage and pushing 
 them forward towards Lodi. Augereau reached Borghetto, (5) 
 Massena Casalpusterlengo, Dallemange, under the latter's 
 command, advanced to Zorlesco, and Menard took his 
 place at Maleo in front of Pizzighettone. Napoleon him- 
 self left Piacenza during the night and arrived at three 
 o'clock in the morning at Casalpusterlengo. He imme- 
 diately sent Dallemagne forward against Lodi, and when 
 the latter found this town occupied, he himself advanced 
 with the divisions of Massena and Augereau. 
 
 Beaulieu had immediately continued his retreat towards 
 Cremona, and Lodi was only covered by a division of 
 7000 men, who were to follow and form the rearguard. At 
 11.30 a.m. Napoleon arrived before the town, drove out 
 the Austrians, and in the afternoon, after six o'clock, formed 
 1 C. N. To Carnot, Piacenza, 9th May.
 
 48 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 a close column, which, when its advance had been to 
 some extent prepared by artillery fire, made about seven 
 o'clock the famous assault on the bridge with astonish- 
 ing rapidity and irresistible impetus. This performance, 
 which he himself described as the boldest of the campaign, 
 inspired him with unwavering confidence in his lucky star. 
 Even at St. Helena he said : " Vendemiaire, and even 
 Montenotte, had not yet led me to consider myself a being 
 apart. Not till after Lodi did I feel that I was destined in 
 any case to play a foremost part on our political stage : that 
 first kindled the spark of boundless ambition in me ? " l 
 
 We can understand why this feat should have inspired 
 him with such confidence, when we consider that he 
 expected to find the whole Austrian army defending the 
 passage at Lodi, and indeed may have imagined even on 
 the evening after the engagement that he had really beaten 
 its main body. Though we know now that this was not 
 the case, Lodi still teaches us the lesson, that in war a bold 
 resolve is often unexpectedly favoured by fortune. Mere 
 reasoning could scarcely have led him to expect success 
 there, still the enterprise was undertaken with determina- 
 tion. Yet at Lodi the main body of the Austrians was 
 not present, nor was any firm determination shown by 
 them to bar the passage at all costs. Napoleon was by no 
 means inclined to avoid the obstacle, as he might have 
 done ; he dreaded the loss of time, for he thought with 
 Gneisenau that " Strategy is the art of making use of time 
 and space. I am less chary of the latter than the former. 
 Space we can recover, lost time never." 3 
 
 On the nth May, Napoleon remained with the bulk of 
 his forces near Lodi, sending forward some detachments to 
 Crema and towards Milan ; his immediate intention was, 
 " to pursue Beaulieu and to take advantage of his being 
 stunned, to strike him another blow." 8 
 
 1 M&n. dc Ste. 
 
 * C. N. To Stein, Dammartin le St P&re, 7th January, 1814. 
 
 C. N. To Carnot, Lodi, nth May.
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY 49 
 
 Since the Austrians, as he had learnt, had fallen back 
 upon Pizzighettone,"he started in the early morning of the 
 1 2th in that direction ; Massena and Dallemagne pushed 
 forward along the left bank of the Adda ; Menard advanced 
 on the right, Serurier, still at Piacenza, was, if necessary, 
 to support Menard. Augereau received, in the course of the 
 I2th, orders to follow via, Crema towards Pizzighettone. 
 However, Beaulieu was no longer there; he had drawn 
 together his troops at Cremona, and then crossed the 
 Oglio. Pizzighettone surrendered on the I3th after a 
 short bombardment. 
 
 Being now convinced that, on the one hand, Beaulieu, 
 retreating towards Mantua, was no longer to be overtaken, 
 and on the other, that nothing further was to be feared 
 from him for the present, Napoleon determined to complete 
 the conquest of the country occupied by him, and sent 
 Massena to Milan, Augereau to Pavia, whilst Serurier 
 remained at Piacenza, and Menard at Codogno and 
 Pizzighettone. Napoleon himself entered Milan in triumph 
 on the I5th May ; and thus the second chapter of the 
 campaign, the conquest of Lombardy, came to an end 
 seventeen days after the beginning of operations against 
 Beaulieu.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MANTUA. WURMSER'S ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE IT. 
 
 (e) ON the I4th May, at the moment when all the plans of 
 Napoleon had been crowned with such complete success, 
 he received at Lodi from his Government the information 
 that he would in future, after the arrival of the army of 
 the Alps, have to share the chief command with Keller- 
 mann. The latter would conduct the campaign on the left 
 bank of the Po, and he, Napoleon, would have to march 
 in the first instance to Rome and Naples. 
 
 He immediately replied that, under these circum- 
 stances, he would give up the command of the army 
 altogether. All he said on this point is most perti- 
 nent : " I have conducted the campaign without asking 
 anybody's advice ; I should have done no good if I had 
 had to take anybody else's views into consideration. 
 Everyone has his own way of carrying on war. General 
 Kellermann has had more experience, and will no doubt 
 carry it on better than I ; but together we should ' do 
 very badly." l 
 
 " I may add that I am of opinion that it would be better 
 to have one bad general than two good ones. War is 
 like government, it is a question of tact ; " 2 and he was 
 convinced that the decision the Directory would now 
 come to with respect to the chief command, was more 
 important than the 15,000 men by whom Beaulieu would 
 probably be reinforced. 
 
 Every general will feel it his duty to act as Napoleon 
 acted here. Whoever is conscious of being fit to fill the 
 
 1 C. N. To the Directory, Lodi, I4th May. 
 1 C. N. To Carnot, Lodi, I4th May.
 
 MANTUA 51 
 
 office of commander-in-chief, must claim to be treated with 
 full confidence ; still, the history of war is not wanting in 
 examples of leaders who did not possess sufficient self- 
 control to refuse a great command, though coupled with 
 limitations ; but in such cases we may say with justice, 
 that any reverses suffered tarnish the rlputation of the 
 man, who, tempted by the glory of a high command, 
 accepted it, although deprived of full liberty of action. 
 Bazaine, on the I2th August, 1870, is an example of this ; 
 Blifcher, on the nth August, 1813, a glorious instance to 
 the contrary. Napoleon himself considered this matter 
 worthy to be discussed at some length in his Memoirs, 
 where he declared most emphatically, that a general at 
 the head of an army should only carry out such plans as 
 he himself approves of. He said distinctly : " Every 
 commander-in-chief who takes upon himself to execute a 
 plan which he considers bad or ruinous is culpable; he 
 ought to remonstrate, to insist upon alterations, and, if 
 necessary, rather resign, than become the means of the 
 defeat of the force entrusted to him." * 
 
 With what firmness in the midst of the most difficult 
 circumstances he had wielded this chief command, which 
 was now to be divided ! The army which he took over 
 was destitute in every way, and the means by which it 
 afterwards sought, as we have seen, to remedy this des- 
 titution, viz. plunder, was more dangerous than the 
 original disease. And yet it had won such victories, ac- 
 complished such marches ! This proves that a leader of 
 genius knows how to gain victories, whatever the con- 
 dition of his troops may be ; it proves also that Jomini is 
 right when he says : " I believe Napoleon would not have 
 done more even with the best equipped troops, nor 
 Frederick less, had the conditions been reversed." 5 
 
 More important still than the efficiency of the men is 
 that of the subordinate officers. " It is the officers who gain 
 
 1 Mem. de Ste. Hel., Observations sur les campagnes de 1796 et 1797. 
 J Traitl des grandes operations mil., I. p. 430, 4th edit.
 
 52 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 victories, or enable them to be gained." l In this respect 
 Napoleon was fortunately placed ; his subordinate com- 
 manders were young, ambitious, enterprising, and yet 
 already experienced in war. Still, he had to put up with 
 one evil. When Napoleon joined the army of Italy, he 
 found in its ranks men, who were to be his subordinates, 
 who thought they were in no way inferior to himself in 
 courage, talent, and capacity for the chief command ; his 
 appointment had excited astonishment and to some extent 
 envy as well. Massena, dissolute, rapacious, but ambi- 
 tious and unsurpassed as a leader ; Augereau, frivolous, 
 boastful, but brave and clever : Serurier, a tall, stern figure, 
 and of great experience ; Laharpe, simple and capable ; 
 Steingel, indefatigable, the model of a leader of advance- 
 guards ; all these were men already possessed of a wide 
 experience of war, though still in the prime of life ; for at 
 that time people thought what Napoleon soon expressed 
 in words : " The great art of government is not to let men 
 grow old." 2 
 
 And now there came among all these men, as their 
 commander-in-chief, this Bonaparte small, of delicate 
 appearance, and not yet twenty-seven years old, younger 
 than any, and barely known to a few among them as a 
 capable general of artillery. 
 
 But this youthful leader brought with him a strong 
 opinion as to the necessity of absolute command on the 
 one side and unconditional obedience on the other. It 
 was his conviction that "unless the limits of every man's 
 authority are well defined, the whole becomes confusion." 8 
 However much the party of opposition, Serurier, Kilmaine, 
 Vignolle, etc., grumbled, success was on his side, and he 
 contented himself with saying contemptuously : " The 
 position of a general after a battle is more awkward than 
 before it, for in the first instance he could take one resolu- 
 
 1 C. N. Rapport du Gn. Clarke au Directoire. Milan, 7 d6c., 1796. 
 * C. N. To Carnot. Verona, 9th August, 1796. 
 C. N. To Pille, Nice, i6th June, 1794.
 
 MANTUA 53 
 
 tion only, in the latter he may be criticized by all those who 
 would have taken another." l Still, if any objections had 
 reached him, he would have rejected them coldly, for " it 
 does not do for those who are not behind the scenes to pass 
 judgment on the way the strings are pulled." 2 Marmont, 
 who was at this time, together with Junot and Murat, with 
 him as aide-de-camp, says : " Bonaparte's bearing was, 
 from the moment of his arrival, that of a man born to rule. 
 Even the dullest saw clearly that he would know how to 
 enforce obedience," and Duroc told De Pradt, a relative of 
 his, that Napoleon even then kept as much aloof from his 
 generals and everyone else as he did later on in the midst 
 of his guards at the Louvre. He indeed knew how to 
 compel obedience to such a degree, that during the whole 
 course of this campaign not one instance is reported by 
 anyone of resistance to his authority or departure from 
 his orders : a sure sign of a true genera,!. 
 
 But if we compare his stern and assured manner as 
 commander, and the unconditional obedience which he 
 knew how to enforce, with his own rather insubordinate 
 behaviour as a lieutenant, we shall be compelled to say, 
 that the men most suited to command are often least in- 
 clined to obey; and in this respect Napoleon says himself: 
 
 " I do not believe in the proverb that in order to be 
 able to command one must know how to obey.* This 
 experience must assuredly render still more difficult the 
 task of those who are called upon to regulate the promo- 
 tion of officers in time of peace ; because obedience must 
 be exacted, and yet insubordination may be only the 
 evidence of a strong mind." 
 
 In consequence of Napoleon's representations the 
 Directory relinquished, as early as the 2ist May, their 
 mistaken idea of a division of the chief command. Mean- 
 while the French general, allowing his troops only a few 
 
 1 C. N. To Letourneur 6th May, 1796. 
 
 2 C. N. To Berlier, 2nd July, 1794- 
 
 3 C. N. To Joseph, Finkenstein, 5th May, 1807.
 
 54 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 days of urgently needed rest, was busy settling the 
 administration of the conquered districts, in order to secure 
 his rear with a view to a further advance. But on the igth 
 he issued orders for a fresh forward movement towards 
 the Adda ; and on the 23rd for another, towards the Oglio. 
 The vanguard, under Kilmaine (five battalions of grenadiers, 
 three of carbineers and 1600 horse), was to start at four 
 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, proceed as far as Soncino, 
 and occupy the passage of the Oglio ; the other divisions 
 were to start at five o'clock in the morning and march as 
 follows : Augereau from Cassano to Fontanella, Massena 
 from Lodi to Offanengo, Meriard from Codogno to 
 Soresina, and Serurier from Cremona to Casalbuttano. 
 The headquarters were moved to Crema. 
 
 Scarcely had Napoleon arrived at that place the next 
 day, the 24th, than he received news of a rising of the 
 country people of Lombardy, which had spread to Milan 
 andP&via. Immediately he wrote a note in pencil toBerthier, 
 ordering him to send three battalions, two regiments of 
 cavalry and four guns to Milan ; he himself hurried thither 
 in advance, arriving there that same evening ; meted out 
 punishment on the 25th, and marched immediately to 
 Pavia. Into this town about 8000 armed peasants had 
 forced their way and compelled the small French garrison 
 to surrender. On the 26th, Napoleon appeared before the 
 gates and, as some resistance was offered, forced an entry ; 
 he ordered a number of the rebels to be cut down, the 
 commander of the garrison, which had surrendered, to be 
 shot, and the town to be set on fire and plundered for a few 
 hours. This rapidity in arriving at and carrying out, and 
 his determination and want of scruple as to the means 
 employed, are among the reasons of his successes. That 
 done, he hastened after his army, which meanwhile had, 
 according to his orders, advanced further towards 
 Brescia. 
 
 By the 25th it had crossed the Oglio, and Kilmaine 
 had arrived at Brescia, Massena at Casaglio, Augereau
 
 MANTUA 55 
 
 at Baitella ; Serurier at * Quinzanello. In these posi 
 tions the army halted for the day. On the 27th, 
 Napoleon, arriving at Soncino, rejoined it, and advanced 
 early in the morning of the 28th to the Chiese, his van- 
 guard moving beyond it as far as Lonato ; this latter and 
 a demi-brigade sent to Salo were to lead the enemy to 
 suppose that Napoleon was turning northwards round 
 Lake Guarda towards the Tyrol ; and for this purpose also 
 the right wing, under Serurier, was left that day at Ghedi. 
 Not till the 29th did Serurier reach the Chiese at Mezanno ; 
 Augereau crossed this river and arrived at Desenzano ; 
 Massena was at Montechiaro ; Kilmaine marched to 
 Castiglione. On the 30th the entire force started at two 
 o'clock in the morning to force the passage of the Mincio 
 at Borghetto. Kilmaine was sent thither direct, the other 
 corps were stationed five to eight miles from it in 
 readiness. Napoleon himself accompanied the vanguard. 
 
 Beaulieu had determined to defend the line of the 
 Mincio. But though he had so repeatedly experienced the 
 effects of Napoleon's strategy, this had not sufficed to teach 
 him the secret of the phrase : " Separate to live, unite to 
 fight." 
 
 Having at first been alarmed for the Tyrol on account 
 of Napoleon's movements to the left, he had divided his 
 forces in such a manner that 9000 men were posted at 
 Peschiera, 6500 at Valeggio, 3500 at Goito, whilst in and 
 near Mantua there were 11,000 men. Afterwards, with 
 the intention of barring the passage of the JVfincio, he 
 distributed his 19,000 men, so far as they were not required 
 at Mantua, pretty equally along the nineteeen miles of 
 the course of the Mincio from this latter fortress as far as 
 Peschiera. Napoleon's effective force amounted to 28,000 
 men. 
 
 It was natural, considering the concentration of 
 Napoleon's forces and the distribution of Beaulieu's, that 
 the former should break the latter's line merely by marching 
 on Valeggio. He thus furnished a good illustration of the
 
 56 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 principle, that the art of strategy consists in assembling 
 the largest possible force at the most important points of 
 any line of operations." l In accordance with his disposi- 
 tions Kilmaine arrived with the vanguard at seven o'clock in 
 the morning in front of Borghetto, and drove the enemy's 
 outposts back, and at nine o'clock his grenadiers crossed 
 the river by a ford. At noon he drove the defenders of the 
 left bank, who were inferior to him in numbers, back 
 upon Valeggio, and then still farther, upon Castelnuovo. 
 Napoleon now determined to turn against the right wing 
 of the Austrians, which was nearest to him and was 
 concentrating at Castelnuovo, so as to head it off from 
 the Tyrol ; besides, he probably expected here to meet 
 Beaulieu's entire main body. 
 
 Accordingly Kilmaine stood fast for the present at 
 Valeggio to cover Massena's passage, whilst Augereau, 
 having crossed in the meantime, advanced along the Mincio 
 towards Peschiera. At five o'clock he arrived before 
 this town ; the Austrians fell back, and he occupied it, 
 but did not succeed in blocking the enemy's road to the 
 Tyrol. Kilmaine likewise had been ordered to advance on 
 the road to Castelnuovo, after Massena had completed his 
 crossing and had his whole force at Valeggio. Serurier 
 was in the rear at Guidizzolo on the right bank. The 
 headquarters were at Valeggio. 
 
 The next morning Augereau and Kilmaine pushed for- 
 ward towards Castelnuovo, in the hope of finding the 
 Austrians still there and being able' to attack them ; 
 Massena was sent to Villafranca with orders to attack 
 whatever forces he might find there ; Serurier was ordered 
 across the Mincio to Valeggio. But Beaulieu had retired 
 during the night over the Adige by the shortest route ; the 
 troops composing his left wing had also arrived there in 
 time, and thus the Austrians entered the Tyrol along that 
 river, and Napoleon was able, eight days after his start 
 from the banks of the Adda, to announce triumphantly : 
 ' Jomini, Trait^ des grandes operations mil., III. 337, 4th edit.
 
 MANTUA 57 
 
 " The Austrians are completely driven out of Italy. Our 
 outposts hold the line of the mountains of Germany." * 
 
 Napoleon's march to the Chiese via Brescia was in the 
 first place intended to create the impression that it was 
 his purpose to march to the left into the Tyrol, just as his 
 leaving Massena and Serurier before Valenza had been 
 intended to create the impression that it was not his 
 purpose to march to the right, to Piacenza. As he had 
 done on the Po, he turned rapidly to the point chosen for 
 his passage and crossed, before the scattered Austrians 
 had time to oppose him in sufficient force. The rapidity 
 with which he here again came to a decision, is 
 characteristic of the General, who said that in war he 
 only knew three things : "to march daily thirty miles, 
 give battle, and then bivouac in peace." It is true, one 
 must also know the most effective direction in which to 
 march the thirty miles a day, as Napoleon knew it ; 
 for " the secret of war never lies in the legs, it lies altogether 
 in the head, which sets those legs in motion ; an army may 
 make forced marches during a whole campaign and yet be 
 lost if these marches are in the wrong direction." * Here 
 on the Mincio, for example, the turning movement effected 
 on the Po could not be repeated, for the Austrians were 
 protected against any flank movement by the formidable 
 obstacle of Lake Guarda, and Napoleon could not there- 
 fore, as on the Po, choose his crossing-point elsewhere 
 than in front. Once across the Mincio, however, he 
 immediately attempted the most effective of all opera- 
 tions, viz. forcing the enemy from his line of retreat ; 
 he ordered Augereau to Peschiera, whilst he himself 
 endeavoured to hold the enemy by his attacks upon 
 Villafranca and Castelnuovo. The latter only escaped 
 by a complete retreat, which settled the issue of the 
 campaign. 
 
 The Austrians being for the present driven from the 
 
 ' C. N. To the Directory, Peschiera, 1st June 
 * Jomini, Traite". etc., I. 429, 4th edit.
 
 58 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 whole of Upper Italy, Napoleon proceeded with his further 
 operations .for securing his conquest. He had to keep his 
 eye upon three things : first, a continued observation of 
 the lines of approach of the Austrians, in order to oppose 
 at the right moment their return ; secondly, the capture of 
 Mantua, in order to obtain full and assured possession of 
 Upper Italy, and of the whole line of the Mincio as his 
 future base ; and thirdly, the wresting of as advantageous 
 a peace as possible from the States of Southern Italy, 
 especially Rome and Naples. This last point had indeed 
 been less one of the objects which Napoleon had in view, 
 than a wish of the Directory. As we have seen above, the 
 latter had even intended to make of this an operation of 
 equal importance with the campaign in Upper Italy. 
 However, Napoleon succeeded both in retaining the sole 
 chief command and also in reducing this operation to its 
 proper place as a secondary affair. The Directory was in 
 this matter on a par with those " many good generals in 
 Europe "; it saw " too many things at once ; " but Napoleon 
 saw only one thing, the enemy, that is the Austrians ; these 
 once beaten, secondary matters such as Rome and Naples 
 would come right as a matter of course. 
 
 But, the Austrians being beaten, Napoleon consi- 
 dered it feasible to satisfy his Government with regard to 
 these secondary matters, and proceeded therefore to a new 
 distribution of his army, now swelled by some reinforce- 
 ments from the army of the Alps. Massena received 18,000 
 men (including 5000 men of the division Sauret placed 
 under his command) with instructions to cover the 
 movement from the Austrians ; he was to post three demi- 
 brigades at Salo and three at Monte Baldo, to the west and 
 east of Lake Guarda, and as a reserve one at Peschiera, 
 one at Verona, and one in a camp between the Adige and 
 Lake Guarda. Serurier received 5009 men, with orders to 
 advance upon Mantua, and if possible to begin the invest- 
 ment of that place. The divisions of Augereau, Vaubois 
 (drawn from the army of the Alps) and Dallemagne's
 
 MANTUA 59 
 
 advance-guard (three grenadier battalions), in all 12,500 
 men, remained at the commander-in-chief's own disposal. 
 Finally, 9000 men were in garrison in various places in 
 Lombardy. 
 
 Napoleon gave orders in the first place for the fortifica- 
 tions of Peschiera to be rapidly repaired ; this place was to 
 be put in a state of defence as speedily as possible. Then 
 he joined Massena at Verona, and established his head- 
 quarters at Roverbella, whence he conducted the invest- 
 ment of Mantua. The first steps to be taken were as 
 follows : Augereau was to block the two high roads leading 
 to the right bank of the lake, Serurier the two leading to 
 its left bank ; Dallemagne remained at Roverbella in 
 reserve, but he soon relieved Augereau, and the latter was 
 sent to Bologna in order to co-operate with Napoleon in 
 his further operations against Tuscany and Rome. These 
 operations were soon brought to a close by negotiations 
 more or less advantageous, from a pecuniary point of view, 
 with the individual princes concerned ; in a military 
 sense they were of no interest. 
 
 On the 5th July Napoleon was back in his head- (7) 
 quarters at Roverbella, and proceeded with the siege of 
 Mantua in earnest. Meanwhile, however, news had been 
 constantly arriving about the reinforcements which were 
 reaching the Austrians in the Tyrol, and at this time 
 Napoleon estimated the forces assembled there under 
 Wiirmser at 59,000 men ; it is true he probably over- 
 estimated them purposely, in order to induce his Govern- 
 ment to accelerate the despatch of reinforcements to himself. 
 His own army consisted of 42,000 men. The garrison in 
 Mantua he estimated wrongly at 8000 men, it being in 
 reality 13,000. His plan at this moment was to capture 
 Mantua as quickly as possible ; as to Wiirmser, he would 
 only move against him should he approach too near the 
 line of the Adige, now occupied by Massena with 15,000 
 men and Augereau with 6000. On the west of Lake 
 Guarda stood the division of Sauret, 5000 men, under
 
 60 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Massena's chief command, as a corps of observation ; the 
 division of Despinoy, 5000 men, was on its march from 
 Milan to the Adige, and Serurier with 8000 was investing 
 Mantua. An attempt to seize this place by a coup de main 
 failed owing to ill-luck, for, as Napoleon himself predicted, 
 " All enterprises of this kind are entirely dependent on 
 luck ; a dog or a goose may wreck them." ' 3000 cavalry 
 under Kilmaine were at Valese ; and Napoleon, sharply 
 watching from Verona all the movements of the enemy 
 in the Tyrol, felt that the decisive moment was at hand, 
 and exclaimed, " Woe to him who is wrong in his calcula- 
 tions ! " 1 
 
 In the night of the i8th to the igth July the first 
 parallel before Mantua was begun and the following night 
 completed. The siege now proceeded rapidly. Napoleon 
 himself, who was present at the cutting of the trench, 
 soon departed again to join the troops in position facing 
 the Tyrol, in order to be at hand there during Wurmser's 
 attack, which, as he had been informed, was to take place 
 without delay. It was delivered on the 29th. Wiirmser 
 had divided his army into two columns ; the one under 
 Quosdanovich, 18,000 men, marched along the west shore 
 of Lake Guarda against Salo, drove back Sauret, pene- 
 trated as far as Gavardo, and occupied Brescia with one 
 corps, Sauret retiring upon Desenzano ; the other column 
 under Wiirmser himself, 24,000 strong, attacked at three 
 o'clock in the morning the positions of Massena's van- 
 guard at La Corona and turned it, forcing it back with 
 heavy losses; and one corps on the flank, 5000 men, 
 advanced along the valley of the Brenta with the intention 
 of misleading the French. On hearing this, Napoleon, 
 who was just then at Montechiaro, ordered a junction of 
 Massena, Despinoy, and Kilmaine that day, the 2gth, at 
 Castelnuovo, whilst Augereau was to concentrate at Zerpa 
 and advance via Villanuova upon Montebello, in order to 
 attack the enemy there the next day ; Napoleon seems 
 1 C. N. To the Directory, Verona, I2th July.
 
 MANTUA 61 
 
 therefore really to have taken the corps in the Brenta 
 valley for a main column. However, on further informa- 
 tion arriving, he was undeceived as to the strength of the 
 column advancing through the valley of the Adige, and 
 learned also, though without any further particulars, that 
 the division of Sauret had been attacked and had fallen 
 back. 
 
 And here we are confronted by an entirely new develop- 
 ment in Napoleon. Although he had long looked forward 
 to this attack, yet now it had come he seemed for the 
 moment extremely uneasy and inclined to be alarmed at 
 his situation. It is true he did not yet order the siege of 
 Mantua to be suspended, but all the baggage, all the 
 vehicles and State property in the rear of the army were 
 sent back to Milan, and the citadel of this town was ordered 
 to be placed in a state of defence. To Serurier he wrote : 
 " Perhaps we shall recover ourselves ; still, affairs force me 
 to take serious measures to secure a retreat." 1 Neither 
 this "perhaps" nor any mention of a probable retreat shall 
 we ever again find mentioned by Napoleon. The orders 
 to Augereau were immediately countermanded, and he was 
 ordered to retreat to Roverbella and Villafranca. The 
 next day Napoleon wrote to him : " The following is the 
 unfortunate position of our army. The enemy have broken 
 through our line in three places, they are masters of La 
 Corona and Rivoli, two important points. Massena and 
 Joubert J have been compelled to yield to superior forces, 
 Sauret has evacuated Salo and begun his retreat to Desen- 
 zano, and the enemy has captured Brescia and the bridge of 
 San Marco. You see that our communications with Milan 
 and Verona are cut off." * 
 
 In such situations it may happen that subordinate 
 officers, upon whom no such weighty responsibility rests, 
 remain more calm and judge more correctly ; still, we must 
 
 1 C. N. Montechiaro, zgth July. 
 
 9 Brig.-Gen. under Massena. He was at Rivoli. 
 
 1 (No place), 3Oth July.
 
 62 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 be careful not to put them on that account in the same 
 category with the commander-in-chief, whose mind, being 
 more active and more occupied, realizes the awkwardness 
 of a situation in all its bearings to the fullest extent. Thus 
 Massena wrote at this time : " I expect indeed to find that 
 the strength of the force which appeared yesterday ~in 
 Vicenza has been over-estimated. You will see, citizen- 
 general, it is after all merely a reconnaissance ; " l and 
 Sahuguet writes : " Up to now, in spite of the usual ex- 
 aggerations, nothing justifies the idea that the hostile 
 corps which has moved upon Brescia is of any great 
 strength." 2 The opinion of these two men was in this 
 case a more calm and correct view of the situation than 
 Napoleon's at the first moment ; still, each of these inferior 
 officers knew that their young, excitable and fiery 
 commander-in-chief alone could at the moment of action 
 lead the army to victory. However capable each felt in 
 his own domain as a corps leader, still it was fully felt that 
 the conduct in chief of the operations required a wider 
 view. This had been shown during those few days at the 
 end of May when Napoleon was absent in Milan and 
 Pavia for the purpose of quelling the revolt there ; a feel- 
 ing of insecurity had at that time seized the lower officers, 
 the nearer they approached the enemy without him, and 
 Berthier wrote to him : " The army ... is impatiently 
 longing for you." 3 So great is the ascendency of a really 
 great mind. 
 
 The fact is, as Jomini says, " War is not a science, but a 
 passionate drama," and the tremendous and sudden 
 vicissitudes of this drama tax all the powers of a man, and 
 not only his intellect. This explains why we may some- 
 times find hours of doubt, nay, moments of despair, coming 
 upon even the greatest generals ; but it also justifies the 
 glory which accrues to those exceptional minds who with- 
 
 1 C. N. To Napoleon, Pieveronp, 29th July. 
 
 2 C. N. To Napoleon, Milan, 3tst July. 
 
 3 C. N. Crema, 25th May.
 
 MANTUA 63 
 
 stand the storm of alternating emotions successfully and 
 thereby get the better of their enemy. Only phlegmatic 
 natures would remain untouched by some hesitation when 
 great decisions have to be formed, and such never achieve 
 any great deeds. 
 
 Napoleon was, like all great men, nervous, easily excited 
 and highly emotional ; a nervous twitching of the corner 
 of his mouth and his right shoulder betrayed this out- 
 wardly; he suffered from a constant restlessness, which 
 became most noticeable when the decisive moments in his 
 campaigns were at hand. He was easily roused to anger 
 or moved to tears. It is not rare to see him moved to 
 such a degree that he shed a few tears ; they seem to be 
 due to some kind of nervous excitement, and mark its 
 crisis. " I have very rebellious nerves," he says, " and 
 they would expose me to the danger of going mad, if my 
 pulse did not continue to beat slowly through it all." 
 That remarkable scene of his parting from Josephine and 
 Talleyrand at Mayence in 1806, when the Emperor was on 
 the point of beginning his campaign against Prussia, is 
 well known ; it shows how tremendously excited great men 
 are at decisive moments, even those whom history has 
 called specially cold and firm in their resolution ; and it 
 forms an interesting pendant to that other scene which 
 took place sixty years later at the council of war in Nikols- 
 burg, when the Prussian staff desired to carry the war 
 forward into Hungary, and which the principal actor in it 
 has himself described in the following words : " But they 
 remained unmoved, and I spoke in vain once more against 
 this plan. Then I left the apartment and went into my 
 own room, separated from the other only by a wooden 
 partition. I threw myself on my bed and wept from 
 nervous excitement. And after a while silence fell upon 
 them in the other apartment, and the plan was not carried 
 out." ' 
 
 1 Mme. de R&nusat, Mm., I. 124. 
 
 2 Die Grenzboten, 1879, III. 495.
 
 64 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 But if Napoleon for a moment considered his situa- 
 tion unfavourable, and wavered in his resolutions, yet 
 the final result was, that he judged clearly and acted 
 vigorously, and this it is that makes the great general. 
 Although at first he had said that the enemy's columns had 
 broken through his line, yet he now recognized the ad- 
 vantage which was his if he acted quickly from his 
 central position between the disunited advancing forces of 
 the Austrians, and he " feels that he must form a great 
 plan." 1 In the first place he went to Desenzano, and re- 
 solved to attack the column which was advancing on the 
 west of Lake Guarda, threatening his communications ; 
 he therefore ordered Sauret and Despinoy, of whom the 
 latter had been moved up to Desenzano on this very day, 
 the 30th July, to advance upon Salo on the morning of 
 the 3ist and to attack the enemy there. He himself started 
 for Castelnuovo and ordered Massena, who had been forced 
 back as far as this, to take up a position near Peschiera 
 behind the Mincio, and to occupy the bridge of Valeggio 
 with a detachment. 
 
 (8) Augereau's and Kilmaine's forces were at this moment 
 at Castellaro and Roverbella, to cover Mantua against 
 Wurmser's advance, but the siege could no longer be 
 continued, and Serurier was ordered to suspend it, to with- 
 draw the siege artillery as far as possible, and then to rein- 
 force Augereau. The same night Napoleon arrived on 
 this part of the theatre of war at Roverbella, and de- 
 spatched Augereau, Kilmaine and a part of Serurier's force 
 in all haste forward to Montechiaro via Goito. Serurier 
 himself, with the investing corps from the right bank of the 
 Mincio, was to fall back to the Oglio and take up a position 
 near the bridge of Marcaria, in order to secure the threat- 
 ened line of retreat, Cremona Pizzighettone Pavia. 
 Massena was to advance further upon Lonato. Thus 
 the whole army was withdrawn behind the Mincio, 
 and thereby secured from Wurmser's immediate attack ; 
 1 C. N. To the Directory, 6th August.
 
 MANTUA 65 
 
 while it fell with united forces upon Quosdanovich 
 alone. 
 
 The latter had meanwhile, after occupying Brescia, 
 advanced to Montechiaro on the 3Oth ; on the 3ist he 
 met Napoleon's forces. Napoleon himself had already 
 hastened thither ; his restless activity during these de- 
 cisive days is indeed worthy of admiration, and contributed 
 materially to the energetic execution of his plan ; indeed, 
 only leaders in the strength of their youth are able to be 
 so untiring and, so to speak, omnipresent ; in these days the 
 commander-in-chief rode five horses to death. 
 
 On the side of the French, Sauret now pushed forward on 
 the 3 ist to Salo, quite on the left flank of the Austrians, seized 
 this town, and released a French detachment there, which 
 had remained behind on the 2gth ; then he fell back again 
 upon Desenzano. Meanwhile Despinoy and Massena's ad- 
 vance guard had also repulsed an Austrian corps at Lonato ; 
 and Quosdanovich, recognizing their superiority in numbers, 
 and alarmed for his communications after the capture of 
 Salo, commenced at ten o'clock in the evening his retreat 
 to Gavardo. On the ist August Augereau arrived at 
 Brescia after a night march ; this advance reopened Napo- 
 leon's line of communication with Milan and restored his 
 magazines and other dep6ts in Brescia to him ; he was now 
 no longer reduced to his one line of retreat to Pavia. On 
 the same day Sauret was again sent forward to Salo, and 
 Despinoy advanced from Lonato ; Augereau was ordered 
 to support this movement, whilst Massena led his force 
 in all haste to Lonato. In the meantime Serurier had, 
 during the night of 3ist July ist August, suspended 
 the siege of Mantua, but being unable to remove the siege 
 train, he destroyed it as far as possible. 
 
 Wurmser, who on the 3 ist had reached Valeggio, now 
 resolved, knowing that Mantua was relieved, to cross the 
 Mincio and to attack the French, who were advancing 
 against Quosdanovich, in the rear ; however, during the 
 1st August he contented himself with sending an
 
 66 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 
 
 advance-guard to Goito and ordering one corps to cross at 
 (9) Borghetto. On the 2nd he commenced his advance across 
 the Mincio at Goito. On the same day Napoleon, who 
 duringthe preceding evening had himself arrived in Brescia, 
 recalled Augereau thence to Montechiaro; the divisions 
 of Sauret (now under the command of Guieu, Sauret 
 having been wounded) and Despinoy advanced upon Salo 
 and Gavardo, in order to drive Quosdanovich still further 
 back. Massena collected his trocps as a general reserve 
 at Lonato and 3an Marco bridge ; one of his corps had 
 been observing the Mincio and had then fallen back before 
 Wiirmser as far as Castiglione, which latter position it 
 now received orders to hold. But after a slight resistance 
 it allowed itself to be driven from it by the vanguard of 
 Wiirmser's forces, whereupon Napoleon immediately 
 cashiered its commander before his whole corps. 
 
 On the 3rd August the forces met. Napoleon him- 
 self advanced with Massena via Lonato, and encountered 
 one of Quosdanovich's corps, which was likewise advancing 
 towards this town. But when this corps deployed in order 
 to outflank the French, he at once recognized this move- 
 ment as " a sure pledge of victory," and pierced its centre 
 in column, routed it, forced it back upon Desenzano, and, 
 cutting off its retreat, compelled almost the whole of it to 
 surrender. A second division approaching was thrown 
 back with heavy losses. On the other hand, an attack by 
 Guieu upon Quosdanovich's divisions stationed at Gavardo 
 was repulsed, and the former was forced to retreat to Salo. 
 Despinoy's advance also failed, and in the evening he was 
 back at Brescia. 
 
 On the opposite front, that is against Wiirmser, Augereau 
 had been set in motion at two o'clock in the morning 
 towards Castiglione ; he drove Wiirmser's vanguard out 
 of this town and forced it back as far as Solferino, where 
 Wiirmser himself had taken up his position ; Augereau's 
 attacks upon this latter were continued until the evening, 
 but without success. In the evening, Napoleon himself
 
 MANTUA 67 
 
 joined Augereau, examined his position, and then returned 
 to his headquarters at Castelnedolo, to prepare for further 
 operations. On the morning of the 4th, Despinoy and (10) 
 Guieu received orders to advance again from Brescia and 
 Salo towards Gavardo. But Quosdanovich was already in 
 full retreat ; he had resolved on the preceding day to 
 attempt a junction with Wiirmser from the north, by 
 Lake Guarda. But a detached corps found this line 
 already barred by the French columns, which had pushed 
 forward, and in attempting to break through to Wiirmser 
 via Lonato, it naturally met with Massena's troops, and 
 was forced to lay down its arms at Napoleon's summons, 
 who had arrived in person in Lonato during the afternoon. 
 
 These events made it clear to Napoleon, that he had 
 nothing further to fear at present from Quosdanovich, and 
 he determined to throw himself upon Wiirmser on the 
 next day with all the troops at his disposal. 
 
 This latter general had made a few slight alterations in 
 his position on the 4th, but had done nothing to secure a 
 preponderance in numbers or a certain co-operation on 
 the part of Quosdanovich during the attack, which was 
 now inevitable. Napoleon on the other hand ordered, at 
 8 o'clock in the morning, the division Serurier (for the 
 moment commanded by General Fiorella, on account of 
 Serurier's illness) to march upon Guidizzolo ; Despinoy 
 also was to come up as speedily as possible ; Massena took 
 up a position to the left of Augereau ; and thus Napoleon 
 brilliantly acted up to his own principle : " If you wish 
 to, fight a battle, collect all your corps, do not neglect one 
 of them ; one battalion sometimes may decide the day." ' 
 And not only did he concentrate all his forces, but he 
 so determined the line of advance of his reinf^ce- 
 ments, that the enemy might not only be beaten 
 but annihilated. This trait is especially characteristic of 
 Napoleon's strategy. Fiorella's march on Guidizzolo 
 shows us "that a battle should not merely be fought, so 
 1 Precis des guerrcs de Frederic II.
 
 68 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 as to gain a victory, but so as to complete the annihila- 
 tion of the organized corps of the enemy." * 
 
 In order to occupy the enemy until the arrival of 
 Fiorella, who was following closely behind Napoleon, 
 the latter attacked on the morning of the 5th August. 
 Wiirmser moved to his right, in order to turn the French 
 left wing, and if possible to come in touch with Quosdanc- 
 vich. This movement rilled Napoleon with joy, for it 
 favoured his own better-laid plan of turning the Austrian 
 left wing. He allowed Wiirmser to proceed, and moved 
 also to the right ; but as soon as he observed Fiorella's 
 arrival he began the general attack. Wurmser could not 
 of course withstand this combined attack with superior 
 forces ; still, he succeeded in effecting his retreat to Bor- 
 ghetto, where he crossed the Mincio. The French pursued 
 him up to this river, and Napoleon, fully satisfied, said : 
 " Thus in five days another campaign has been brought to 
 a close." a 
 
 At first Wiirmser attempted to make a stand behind 
 the Mincio. Napoleon ordered Augereau to cross the 
 river at Valeggio, whilst Massena was to cross at Peschiera 
 and turn the Austrian right wing. These movements 
 commenced on the 6th. Early in the morning Massena 
 arrived at Peschiera at 8.30, whilst Augereau occupied the 
 enemy at Valeggio by a cannonade. The former threw 
 the Austrians before him back, and upon this Napoleon 
 sent Fiorella and Augereau after him, via Peschiera. 
 But in the evening Wiirmser ordered a general retreat 
 into the Tyrol, and escaped thereby all further pursuit. 
 Massena in the main took up his former positions again, 
 as did Sauret (who had resumed his command) to the 
 west of Lake Guarda, forcing the Austrians back ; in this 
 Augereau supported Massena and then took up a position 
 near Verona ; Fiorella led his troops back again to Mantua 
 and resumed the investment of this fortress. 
 
 1 Jomini, Hist. crit. des camp, de F. II. 468, 4th Edit. 
 * To the Directory, Castiglione, 6th August.
 
 MANTUA 69 
 
 The result of this nine days' compaign from the begin- 
 ning of Wiirmser's advance to his retreat behind the 
 Mincio was therefore that Napoleon drove him back again 
 and inflicted a loss of 16,000 men on the Austrians. But 
 this result had been purchased by the interruption of the 
 siege of Mantua and the sacrifice of the whole siege train, 
 so that now the town could only be taken by blockade, 
 necessarily a slow proceeding. Here we have a new phase 
 of Napoleon's strategy. Up till now he had advanced 
 without a check, turning or breaking through one line 
 after another of the Austrian defence, acting always on 
 the offensive. Thus he reached the Adige and therewith 
 the limit of every rapid advance far into an enemy's 
 country, namely the point where the natural or artificial 
 advantages attendant on fighting on one's own ground 
 counterbalance the strength of the invader, weakened as 
 he is by his own advance. The natural obstacle which 
 here caused him to pause was the Alps, which could only 
 be crossed after a further reinforcement of the French 
 troops ; the artificial obstacle was the fortress of Mantua, 
 which must be captured before any further advance could 
 take place. Napoleon himself had, before the beginning 
 of the war, pointed to the Adige as the best line of defence 
 against the Austrians, which must of necessity be occupied, 
 and thus he was from the ist June reduced to the 
 defensive, though there was, for the time, no opponent ir 
 the field. 
 
 And how did he interpret this defensive ? He formed a 
 siege corps to invest before Mantua and a corps of observa- 
 tion "facing the Tyrol; herein his guiding principle wa* 
 exemplified, for as soon as the Austrians left the mountains 
 with adequate forces, he would go to meet them and make 
 Mantua's fate dependent on a pitched battle. He has 
 been reproached with the fact that this solution of the 
 question could lead to his immediate aim, the capture of 
 Mantua, only by a round-about way, and therefore incur loss 
 of time. This is quite true ; but considering the proportion
 
 7o NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of strength of the two opponents, there was no other way. 
 If we consider the other alternative which has been put 
 forward as the better one, we can hardly believe that it 
 would have led to success in the end. This other alterna- 
 tive was that Napoleon should have drawn lines of investment 
 round Mantua, and held them with his whole army until 
 the fall of the fortress, which might certainly be expected 
 very soon. But what would have happened then ? The 
 advance in two bodies of the Austrians would have been 
 of no disadvantage to them, or, rather, they would have 
 derived from it all the advantages they expected, for their 
 opponent would then have done exactly what they counted 
 on his doing. Quosdanovich would have cut Napoleon's 
 communications with Lombardy with impunity, and then 
 the united Austrian army would have assembled before 
 the French lines. 42,000 French would in that case have 
 been placed between 13,000 Austrians in the fortress and 
 47,000 outside it, and the disparity of strength would have 
 made itself fully felt. Even if we suppose that the French 
 could with x the help of their intrenchments have resisted 
 the united efforts of the "two Austrian armies although 
 Napoleon was entirely convinced that "it is an axiom in 
 strategy that he who remains behind his intrenchments 
 is beaten ; experience and theory are at one on this point" * 
 even if we take for granted that the fortress soon sur- 
 rendered, still, what then ? Napoleon would in that case 
 only have become the besieged instead of the besieger, 
 and would have been invested with his 42,000 men, plus 
 13,000 prisoners, in a town which had already had some 
 difficulty in provisioning its own garrison. He would in 
 that case himself have stood in need of being relieved. Or 
 was he to leave a sufficient garrison in the place and break 
 through with some 32,000 men ? Even if he had succeeded 
 in this, he would again have been compelled to fight 
 in the open, and with only 32,000 men, against the united 
 47,000 Austrians he who at the commencement of the 
 
 Souper de Beaucaiie.
 
 MANTUA 71 
 
 operations, after relinquishing the siege, could march with 
 42,000 men against the enemy, who were as yet separated. 
 But would a sortie have been successful ? The history of war 
 shows us, since Marcellus broke out of Nola in 216 B.C., 
 not a single example of an army invested in a fortress 
 delivering itself by its own strength ; while, on the other 
 hand, it shows us many examples of such armies which 
 had to surrender along with the fortress. It is acknow- 
 ledged to be a difficult operation to emerge from a defile 
 in the face of an opponent ; and he who wishes to break 
 out from a fortress is always in that position, at whatever 
 point he may attempt it. 
 
 Since Napoleon was not strong enough to continue 
 the siege and at the same time face the relieving 
 army, to abandon the siege and put all his forces in the 
 field was not merely the best, it was the only judicious 
 plan. His immediate aim, it is true, was the capture of 
 Mantua, but his principal aim was, after all, to succeed in 
 holding the line of the Mincio and with it the whole of 
 Lombardy ; if he had shut himself up in Mantua, he would 
 have abandoned this dominating idea. In this very instance 
 we ought to admire the masterly way in which Napoleon 
 held fast to his main object and set aside secondary 
 objects. It was in this way alone that the division of his 
 opponent's forces could be utilized, thus only could he 
 make up for his inferiority in numbers by the rapidity of 
 his movements, and give a signal proof that the effective 
 strength of an army may, like " momentum " in mechanics, 
 be taken as mass multiplied by velocity. 1 
 
 How just was his decision becomes still more evident 
 if we compare this situation with that of another 
 beleaguered Austrian fortress, and with the final result in 
 that case a comparison suggested by Napoleon himself. 
 When in 1757 Frederick the Great stood before Prague, 
 and Daun was marching to its relief, the former could not 
 make up his mind to suspend the siege for the-moment, 
 
 1 Mlm. de Ste. Hel. Observations, etc , I. 392.
 
 7 a NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to leave only a weak corps of observation in front of the 
 fortress and to fall upon Daun with all his strength. He 
 " saw too many things at once ; " he did not bring the masses 
 to bear upon the decisive point, and was beaten, when with 
 34,000 men he attacked 53,000. And as a result he had 
 not only after all to give up the siege, but lost the whole 
 campaign as well. 
 
 To sum up : the characteristic feature of this first example 
 of Napoleon's defensive tactics is, that he succeeded in 
 avoiding the most common failing of such tactics, viz. 
 a want of initiative. It is contrary to the nature of a true 
 general to have his course of action imposed upon him by 
 the enemy, and it was Napoleon's instinctive determina- 
 tion to force his opponent to do as he wished, more than 
 any other consideration, that dictated to him his line of 
 action here, and this fact justifies him more than any 
 other argument. In this point Lee resembles him most of 
 more recent leaders, Lee, who being as a rule forced to act 
 on the defensive on account of his inferiority of numbers 
 and political circumstances, yet always managed to keep 
 the initiative to himself. 
 
 Wurmser having been thus forced back into the 
 mountains, Napoleon found it first of all necessary to 
 restore the discipline and see to the commissariat and the 
 equipment of his army, all of which had considerably 
 suffered. Besides, he wished, before assuming the 
 offensive in the Tyrol, to wait until his promised reinforce- 
 ments had arrived, and until the French army in Germany 
 had made some further progress, so that he might not be 
 likely to meet with too superior forces there. For those 
 who think they recognize in Napoleon's successes merely 
 audacity favoured by good luck, this pause of the youthful 
 and ever-victorious general in face of the Alps, this 
 recognition of the fact that his present inferiority of 
 numbers did not allow of any immediate pursuit of his 
 successes, are facts worth pondering over. The value of 
 numbers was fully appreciated, and by none more than
 
 MANTUA 73 
 
 himself. This was a distinctly new departure from the 
 method of conducting war in the eighteenth century. 
 
 After a few changes in the commanders, the position of (11) 
 the French army at the end of August was the following : 
 the division of Sahuguet, 8000 men, was investing Mantua, 
 which had received some reinforcements and now con- 
 tained 17,000 men (of whom, however, 4000 were sick) ; 
 Augereau with 9000 men was at Verona ; Massena with 
 13,000 at Rivoli ; Vaubois with 11,000 at Store, to the 
 west of Lake Guarda. On the 3ist August Napoleon 
 wrote from Brescia to Moreau, the commander-in-chief of 
 the army of Germany, that they were now in a position to 
 act in concert ; he was going to start for Trent with his 
 army on the 2nd September. 
 
 In this latter town Wiirmser had at this time his head- 
 quarters. He was at the head of 4ioor>men in the Tyrol, 
 and decided to divide them into an army of defence and an 
 army of attack. The former, under Davidovich, was to 
 hold the valley of the Adige, whilst he himself was to 
 advance with the other along the Brenta valley towards 
 Bassano, and from thence wheel round to the Adige at 
 Legnago. Accordingly he entrusted 20,000 men to 
 Davidovich, of which 8000 were stationed at Roveredo, 
 5000 behind these as a reserve at Trent, and the remainder 
 in the Grisons and the Vorarlberg; 21,000 men he de- 
 spatched to Bassano, and of these 11,000 arrived there 
 on the 3ist August, 4000 being then at Pergine, and 
 6000 still at Trent. On the 7th September the whole 
 force was to be assembled at Bassano. 
 
 While Wiirmser. had thus begun his advance to Bassano, 
 Napoleon also had given orders for the same purpose. On 
 the ist September, at 10.30 in the evening, he issued these 
 orders from Verona : " Massena will move forward on 
 the 2nd along the Adige valley as far as Ala ; Augereau 
 will follow in his right rear as far as Lugo-Rovere ; both 
 will start at noon. Kilmaine will remain behind with 
 2000 men for the protection of Verona." Vaubois had the
 
 74 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 day before already received orders to march round the 
 northern extremity of Lake Guarda on the 2nd Septem- 
 ber to Torbole. Sahuguet, who was before Mantua, was 
 informed that the army was about to enter the Tyrol. 
 Napoleon was aware of the presence of some hostile troops 
 at Bassano, but he supposed the main body to be at Trent : 
 as to any advance on the part of the latter via Bassano to 
 Verona, in order to relieve Mantua, he considered it 
 unlikely; " should the enemy, however, commit this folly," ' 
 Kilmaine was to avoid them by retiring behind the Mincio, 
 and Sahuguet to at once give up the investment of Mantua 
 and retire behind the Oglio. Peschiera was to be held 
 under any circumstances. The preliminary movements 
 thus ordered were not completed until the 3rd, some weak 
 Austrian outposts were driven in at Ala and Serravalle, and 
 the combined advance of all the three divisions upon 
 Roveredo was ordered for the 4th. 
 
 This opening of the operations was again characteristic 
 of Napoleon's strategy. According to his opinion, " it is 
 an axiom, that the junction of the different corps of an 
 army should never take place near the enemy." 8 Already 
 at the beginning of April he had given an example of this 
 in the Riviera by desiring to concentrate the army from its 
 extended positions to begin with on the right wing, before 
 crossing the mountains and commencing operations. In 
 other words he rejected all concentric operations which 
 had for their object the junction ofseparated offensive 
 columns on the battle-field itself, in presence of the enemy; 
 and thus we see here that he took care to effect a junction 
 of his columns in the neighbourhood of Serravalle-Mori, 
 before approaching the enemy's position at Roveredo. 
 But even this operation was not sufficiently secure in 
 Napoleon's eyes, and he afterwards criticized it thus : " It 
 cannot be said that this march was absolutely without 
 
 1 C.N. To Berthier, Verond, 2nd September, in the morning. 
 * Precis des guerres de Fred. II., IV. 218.
 
 MANTUA 75 
 
 danger, but it did not present much danger." ' So con- 
 vinced was he of the excellence of the great principle of an 
 " advance in one body." 
 
 And rightly so. There is, indeed, something alluring 
 about concentric operations ; they render the march of the 
 columns easier on account of their being separated ; and 
 they hold out a hope of surrounding the enemy entirely, if 
 they succeed ; only one too often forgets that, as General 
 Willisen says, this can only happen " if the enemy are 
 stupid enough to allow it." * Napoleon also alludes expressly 
 to this : " I see that you are wrong in a military sense j- I 
 see that you imagine two columns surrounding one and a 
 half must have an advantage ; but this is not so in war, 
 for the two columns will not act in concert, and the enemy 
 will beat them, one after the other. Certainly we should 
 surround the enemy, but first we must be united ourselves." ' 
 And he himself, the great master, proved often what 
 chances an enterprising leader has against separated hostile 
 columns, even though their total forces outnumber him con- 
 siderably. An army thus divided not only exposes itself 
 to accidents, which may hinder or delay the march of any 
 one of its columns, but also, instead of there being one 
 commander with a united force capable of conducting great 
 operations, there must be two, one for each of the indepen- 
 dent columns, because otherwise their appointed meeting 
 might be prevented by divergent views of the situation. 4 
 
 On the 4th September Davidovich's vanguard, which 
 on the preceding day had been forced to fall back, was 
 attacked at Marco and Mori by superior numbers, all three 
 French divisions advancing simultaneously, and driven 
 back to Roveredo with heavy loss. Indeed, the French 
 entered this town at the same time with it and forced it 
 
 1 Observations, etc., I. 401. * Der Feldzug von, 1866, 250. 
 
 C.N. To Jerdme, Finkenstein, i8th May, 1807. 
 
 4 This is as given in the German Text. The author would appear 
 to postulate that the two commanders had received like instructions ; 
 but yet their different views of the situation might lead to non- 
 junction of their columns. ED.
 
 76 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to retreat to Davidovich's main position at Caliano. 
 Napoleon drew his troops together near Roveredo, and, 
 having quickly restored tactical order, pushed forward 
 again. The narrow defile of La Pietra, very easy to de- 
 fend, was found to be occupied by one regiment only ; one 
 determined attack was sufficient to force it, and then 
 Davidovich's troops on the other side near Caliano, who 
 were encamped there in fancied security, were surprised 
 and entirely scattered. 
 
 Meanwhile Wurmser's corps had continued its march 
 through the Brenta valley according to the plan agreed 
 upon ; the Tearguard was on that day at Borgo, and 
 Wiirmser, who was still at Trent, even after he had at 5.30 
 in the evening been informed of what had happened at 
 Caliano, did not in any way alter -his plan. On the 
 contrary, he set himself in motion on the road to Bassano, 
 leaving orders behind for Davidovich to hold Trent. This, 
 however, the latter could no longer do, but was forced to 
 fall back as far as Lavis. 
 
 Consequently Massena entered Trent unopposed at eight 
 o'clock in the morning of the 5th, and Vaubois followed at 
 noon, but Augereau was still on the road. Here for the 
 first time Napoleon learnt that he had not hitherto had 
 Wiirmser's main body before him, and that the latter had 
 marched along the valley of the Brenta ; but he did not 
 consider this movement to be an advance for the relief of 
 Mantua, but an attempt at withdrawal brought about by his 
 own method of attack. He determined to follow him in 
 order to cut him off and so attack him, but first he wished 
 to settle with the opponent whom he had immediately 
 before him, so as not to have anything to fear in his own 
 (12) rear. Therefore Vaubois advanced in the afternoon, and 
 by the evening Davidovich was driven from his position 
 at Lavis and retired further up the Adige. In the mean- 
 time Massena was sent to Pergine, and Augereau likewise 
 from the Adige valley via Val Sorda to Levico in the valley 
 of the Brenta, in pursuit of Wurmser.
 
 MANTUA 77 
 
 On the 6th September Napoleon continued his move- 
 ments. Vaubois remained at.Lavisto protect the rear, 
 and only lent a detachment from the grenadiers of his force 
 as a reinforcement to the columns of attack. Massena 
 marched to Levico; Augereau with the headquarters to 
 Borgo, their outposts being pushed forward as far as 
 Ospedaletto ; they had driven a small Austrian force from 
 Levico in the morning. On the 7th Cismone was reached, 
 after another Austrian corps had been driven back from 
 Primolano. At two o'clock on the morning of the 8th', 
 Napoleon started, ordered Massena to cross to the right 
 bank of the Brenta at Carpane, and then advanced again 
 towards Bassano. At seven o'clock he came in sight of the 
 Austrians. Wflrmser had, it is true, still adhered to his 
 plan of a further march forward to Verona via Vicenza, and 
 therefore one half of his army was already at Montebello, 
 whilst he himself with the other was still at Bassano ; but 
 now the resolute advance of the French in his rear seemed 
 to make him lose his head altogether, and thus he accepted 
 battle here, although this was in no way in accordance 
 with his real plan of operations, and although he could not 
 have done worse than fight with only half his force at 
 hand. The result of course was a defeat and a retreat to 
 Vicenza which resembled a flight; many stragglers scat- (13) 
 tered in different directions and lost sight of the main 
 body altogether. After a junction with the other half of his 
 army at Montebello the retreat was hurriedly continued 
 to Legnago, which place was reached on the morning of 
 the loth. But Wurmser had now only 12,000 men under 
 his command. 
 
 Already on the 8th Napoleon had sent his divisions 
 in pursuit, Augereau to Padua, in order to cut off 
 the Austrians' retreat to Friaul ; whilst he himself with 
 Massena advanced to Vicenza, and reached this town during 
 the afternoon of the gth. He now received some more 
 reliable but still indefinite reports as to Wiirmser's move- 
 ments, which led him to see through the latter's intention
 
 78 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to escape to Mantua via Legnago, and while he there- 
 fore, with Massena, continued the pursuit via Monte- 
 bello, Augereau received orders to march to Legnago. At 
 10 p.m. Massena began to cross the Adige at Ronco, and 
 Augereau marched upon Montagnana ; Wurmser's forces, 
 as a whole, remaining stationary at Legnago. Napoleon, 
 faithful to his principles, while sacrificing all matters of 
 secondary importance, hastened to draw all his troops 
 together for a decisive blow against Wiirmser. Kilmaine, 
 with the garrison of Verona, was to march to I sola della 
 Scala ; Sahuguet was to assemble his forces at Goito. On 
 the nth the two met at Castellaro, Augereau's vanguard 
 arrived before Legnago in the evening, and Massena 
 reached Roverchiara. On this same day Wiirmser con- 
 tinued his march to Mantua and arrived late at night at 
 Nogara, after having had to fight his way through at Cerea, 
 where he fell in with the head of Massena's column. After 
 a short halt, he continued his march on the I2th very early 
 in the morning ; hearing of Sahuguet's presence at Castel- 
 laro, he left the main road, and, striking to the left, reached 
 Mantua unmolested at noon, by a detour via Villempenta. 
 Hereupon Napoleon hurried up with all the men he could 
 collect, and proceeded to force Wiirmser to throw himself 
 with his whole force into Mantua ; and resumed the invest- 
 ment of this town. It was entrusted to Kilmaine with 9000 
 men ; Vaubois with 10,000 was still at Trent ; Massena with 
 9000 was sent to Bassano and Treviso ; while Augereau 
 with 9000 men took up a position near Verona. The divi- 
 sion of Macquart, 3000 men, was ordered up from the rear 
 as a general reserve, and stationed at Villafranca. Napo- 
 leon himself went for the present to Milan. . By the begin- 
 ning of October the above positions were finally taken up, 
 and the effectives of the various bodies reached the figures 
 above mentioned, the ranks being filled by drafts from 
 the rear. To oppose them, Wiirmser was in Mantua with 
 28,000 men (5000 being sick), Davidovich in the Tyrol 
 with 14,000, and scattered about the Vorarlberg there
 
 MANTUA 79 
 
 were 3000 more, and on the Isonzo and among the passes 
 into Carinthia 4000 men. 
 
 What more especially strikes us in Napoleon's strategy 
 during this time is the rajj[dity of his movements ; that 
 rapidity which Jomini has more than once compared to 
 lightning, and which led the French soldiers to remark in 
 1805 : " The Emperor has invented a new method of 
 waging war ; he makes use of our legs instead of our 
 bayonets." ! In the afternoon of the 5th September 
 Napoleon's columns began to enter the valley of the 
 Brenta, and by 7 a.m. on the 8th he came in contact with 
 the Austrians in position at Bassano ; that is in about 60 
 hours he had marched about 57 miles and had moreover en- 
 gaged the enemy at Levico and Primolano. Having beaten 
 Wiirmser at Bassano, he sent his divisions without delay 
 in pursuit, and Massena, reached Vicenzain the afternoon 
 of the gth, that is, in 36 hours he had fought a battle and 
 marched 21 miles ; and during the next 24 hours he 
 again moved 21$ miles and, besides, crossed the Adige. 
 Augereau, who after the battle of Bassano had been sent 
 to Padua, but subsequently ordered up to Legnago, arrived 
 in front of this place on the evening of the nth, and had 
 thus, counting from the morning of the 8th, marched over 
 60 miles and fought a battle within 84 hours. Altogether 
 Napoleon's troops had, between the 5th and the nth 
 September, that is within 6 days, fought two engagements 
 and one battle and covered the following distances : 
 Massena, 100 miles, including the passage of one river by 
 a ferry ; Augereau, 114 miles. It is only genius who can 
 compel ordinary human beings to perform such feats. 
 
 Theoretically, nothing appears easier than to pursue a 
 fugitive enemy vigorously after a victory, and yet nothing 
 is rarer in the history of war than a really effective 
 pursuit ; and many a general has been able to gain a 
 victory on the field of battle by his great endurance and 
 by great efforts, and yet not known how to reap all the 
 1 6* bull, de la grande arm^e. Elchingen, i8th Oct., 1805.
 
 8o NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 advantages possible to be gained from it. The great 
 results which a vigorous pursuit secures by no means 
 follow as a matter of course. This is owing to the 
 constitution of human nature ; for after a victory the 
 soldiers are exhausted, and long for that rest which they 
 think they have earned, and this exhaustion has to be over- 
 come. Besides and this is still more important the 
 commander-m-chief will have to conquer the same feelings 
 within himself, though he is less to be a prey to them. 
 The tremendous tension of all the moral and physical 
 forces which is necessary to gain a victory, relaxes as soon 
 as the end to which it was to lead, and for which these 
 forces were exerted, is attained. The human mind is but 
 little inclined to rouse itself immediately to fresh efforts, 
 and so to speak to pile up new difficulties, and as after the 
 victory there is no longer an enemy present to render such 
 efforts imperative, any mind that does not stand out far 
 above the common level, yields easily to the temptation of 
 indulging in what Miiffling appositely calls " the neces- 
 sary digestion of one's joy over a victory." ' Whoever in 
 such a situation overcomes not only the exhaustion and 
 the passive resistance of his men and subordinate officers, 
 but also rouses himself to immediate fresh efforts, whoever, 
 like Gneisanau after Belle-Alliance and like Napoleon 
 almost invariably, engages in vigorous pursuit after a 
 victory, has by such an exhibition of mental power justified 
 his title to a place among the greatest generals. 
 
 1 Aus meinem Leben, 76.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 MANTUA. ALVINTZY'S ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE IT. 
 
 ON the 24th September the command of a fresh army (14) 
 of relief was entrusted to Alvintzy, and vigorous measures 
 were taken to enable it to take the field. One month 
 later it was considered ready to do so, and Alvintzy issued 
 orders that the troops collected at Friaul, 29,000 men, 
 were to start on the 22nd October, concentrate at 
 Pordenone, cross the Piave, and take Bassano on the 3rd 
 November. On the same day the troops in the Tyrol 
 under Davidovich were to take Trent. Immediately 
 afterwards the two columns were to advance and unite on 
 the Adige. In pursuance of this plan, the column from 
 Friaul under Alvintzy himself arrived on the soth October 
 on the Piave, a little beyond Conegliano. 
 
 By the 25th Napoleon was informed of the enemy's 
 advance in the direction of the Brenta. It was his in- 
 tention to let Vaubois attack the troops in the Tyrol, 
 and drive them beyond Neumarkt, and then to with- 
 draw 3000 men from Vaubois' force, in order to rein- 
 force his own main body. Meanwhile Massena was to 
 fall back on Vicenza, in case the enemy advanced in 
 force on Bassano. Later on, after the arrival of Vaubois' 
 reinforcements, Napoleon intended to throw himself with 
 his whole strength upon the enemy, thoroughly exhausted 
 by a long march in continuous rain and by bad roads. 
 
 On the 2Qth Massena pushed forward to the Piave with 
 a small force to reconnoitre, and had ascertained the 
 presence of the enemy on the other bank. He accordingly 
 
 G
 
 82 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 collected his division at Bassano and continued to watch 
 the Piave. On the 2nd November Alvintzy crossed 
 this river ; a fact which Massena immediately reported to 
 Napoleon, then at Verona. On the 3rd Alvintzy reached 
 Barcon, Massena still standing fast at Bassano. Napoleon 
 still watched calmly from Verona the approach of the 
 enemy ; he had sent Berthier to Vaubois, in order to have 
 someone there who would carry out his wishes implicitly. 
 On the morning of the 4th, Alvintzy advanced against 
 Bassano and occupied this town without resistance, as 
 Massena had evacuated it at 5 a.m. and fallen back 
 on the road to Vicenza. On the same day Augereau, 
 whom Napoleon now sent forward, reached Montebello, 
 followed in person by his leader. On the 5th Massena 
 and Augereau joined forces at Vicenza, whilst Alvintzy 
 remained at Bassano. 
 
 In the meantime Vaubois had advanced along the 
 valley of the Adige against Davidovich in accordance with 
 his orders. On the 2nd November he moved off at three 
 o'clock in the morning and attacked the Austrians' 
 advanced positions at San Michele and Segonzano ; he did 
 not, however, succeed in capturing them, and fell back to 
 Lavis in the evening. On the 3rd Davidovich in his turn 
 advanced and assembled his troops at Sevignano. facing 
 the French right wing. Vaubois, fearing to be cut off, 
 withdrew his left wing to Trent. On the 4th Davidovich 
 began the attack, and drove Vaubois back so effectually, 
 that the latter evacuated Trent during the night and took 
 up his position in the defile of La Pietra with his whole 
 force. Against this position Davidovich advanced on the 
 5th, with the view of attacking, at the same time sending 
 a column to the right to Nomi and Torbole, in order to 
 turn the French. 
 
 On the 6th an encounter took place on the Brenta. 
 Napoleon had started in the early morning and pushed 
 forward ; Augereau towards Bassano, and Massena towards 
 Cittadella ; but at both places all his attacks, incessantly
 
 MANTUA 83 
 
 repeated from 7.30 in the morning until nightfall, failed to 
 force the passage of the Brenta, defended by the Austrians. 
 On the same day Davidovich had assailed the position of La 
 Pietra, though without success, in front ; but the turning- 
 column had taken the villages of Norm and Torbole and 
 threatened Vaubois' retreat. Thus Napoleon's plan of 
 driving back Alvintzy behind the Brenta and then march- 
 ing along the valley of this river to place himself in 
 Davidovich's rear, had failed, and when in addition he 
 received news from Vaubois during the night, confirming 
 the latter's retreat to Caliano and anticipating further 
 retrograde movements, he saw the necessity of abandoning 
 the offensive for the present and of preventing Davidovich's 
 threatened appearance in his rear at Verona, near where 
 the Adige emerges into the plain. Accordingly he ordered 
 the same night Augereau and Massena to begin their 
 retreat to Vicenza ; he himself betook himself to that 
 town on the 7th, and, after giving his troops a short rest, 
 continued his retreat at nightfall to Verona, which he 
 reached in the forenoon of the 8th. 
 
 Meanwhile Vaubois had on the 7th again been attacked 
 at Caliano, but this time his position was captured soon 
 after four o'clock in the afternoon, and by the evening he 
 saw himself forced back as far as the line La Corona- 
 Rivoli. Alvintzy also had on the 7th approached within 
 five miles of Vicenza with his outposts, and on the 8th 
 his main body reached this town, whilst Davidovicb on 
 the same day arrived at Rival ta. 
 
 This period is one of especial interest to the student of 
 Napoleon's genius as a strategist. We see that he was by 
 no means uniformly lucky in what he undertook, but was 
 now and then thrown into dangerous and disadvantageous 
 situations, when running great risks ; and if victory 
 ended by returning to his standard, it was not owing to 
 Fortune's favour, but his own perseverance and skill. On 
 the whole we shall find, when we study historical events more 
 closely, that luck is generally fairly evenly divided between
 
 84 NAPOLEON AS A GENKRAL 
 
 two combatants; even the one who is vanquished in the end 
 has had moments, hours and days when fortune smiled on 
 him, and when he could have gained the victory had he 
 resolutely taken advantage of the favouring circumstances ; 
 but letting the chance slip, and then subsequently acting too 
 late or unskilfully and meeting with ill success, he puts it 
 down to circumstances beyond his own control. Napoleon, 
 on the other hand, was always true to the principle : " Take 
 advantage of all your opportunities. Fortune is a woman ; 
 if you let her slip one day, you must not expect to find 
 her again the next." l And thus we readily forget, seeing 
 his eventual success, that errors and even failures were 
 not absent from his strategy, and that a change of fortune 
 was brought about only by his energy and skill. 
 
 In the case before us, used to victory as he was, he had 
 conceived a plan, which certainly was not without danger. 
 Although on the whole the weaker, he wished to take the 
 offensive against both the advancing Austrian columns; 
 so that, having forced back Alvintzy behind the Brenta, 
 he might, by marching along the valley of that 
 river against Davidovich from the south, repeat the 
 manoeuvre that had been so successful in the beginning 
 of September against Wiirmser from the north. But 
 when Vaubois was seriously defeated and he himself 
 could not force the passage of the Brenta, he saw that 
 only the most rapid change of plan could free him from 
 his awkward position. And it is the readiness with which 
 he abandoned his first plan and formed a fresh one that 
 here excites our admiration. Luck had not attended 
 his first somewhat risky projects, and he was immediately 
 prepared to make the best of the circumstances, such as 
 they were, though so unlike what he hoped for. " A great 
 general must say several times a day to himself, ' What 
 should I do if the enemy appeared in my front, on my 
 right or on my left flank ? ' If he finds it difficult to 
 
 1 Dix-huit notes sur 1'ouvrage intit Coniid. sur 1'art de la guerre, 
 Mem. Ste. Hel.
 
 MANTUA 85 
 
 answer such questions, he is not in a good position, or all 
 is not as it should be, and he must alter it." * As he 
 said, so he acted, and therefore every vicissitude found 
 him ready to turn the changed conditions to his advan- 
 tage. 
 
 One of the hardest yet most important things for a 
 general is to possess the firmness to keep his aim steadfastly 
 in mind, and at the same time the versatility to choose the 
 means necessary for his end, so as to suit varying circum- 
 stances. " He who does not hold life fast like a wrestler, 
 alive to its lightest movement, as if he had a thousand 
 limbs, to every turn of the fray, and on the watch for every 
 forward or backward sway, will not have his way even in 
 conversation, much less in battle." 8 
 
 But must not this quality be inborn ? Assuredly, and 
 especially must it be possessed by a great general to a very 
 high degree, for the colour-blind cannot become painter. 
 Still, this gift of nature must, like any other, be cultivated ; 
 and here I think the study of military history will be of the 
 greatest use. Whoever endeavours to understand the varying 
 fortunes of bygone campaigns and the generals that took 
 part in them, and constantly practises himself in considering 
 what resolutions led in the one case to victory, in the other 
 to defeat, what happened and what might have happened, 
 will thereby strengthen the capacity of his own mind for 
 rapidly taking in and judging of new conditions. At any 
 rate, no less a man than Napoleon himself recommends 
 the study of the campaigns of all great masters, and goes 
 so far as to say : " This is the only way to become a great 
 general, and to grasp the secrets of the art;" 3 while 
 Jomini says: " The military history rightly interpreted is 
 the true school of war." 4 
 
 In their estimate of the advantages to be derived directly 
 
 ., Observations, etc., I. 405. 
 8 H. v. Kleist, Von der Ueberlegung. 
 ' Observations, etc., III. 497. 
 4 Precis, etc.
 
 86 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 from the study of military history, some great leaders have 
 placed them very high indeed. General Skobelev, for 
 example, as bold and energetic a soldier as ever was, liked 
 during battles to quote from his extensive reading similar 
 instances and to demonstrate to what in those former 
 instances success or failure had been due ; nay, Napoleon 
 himself wrote to Marmont on the I4th October, 1813, 
 when he arrived at Breitenfeld, and there was every like- 
 lihood of a battle being fought there : " I send you an 
 account of Gustavus Adolphus's battle, treating of the 
 positions you are occupying." 1 Still, it would be erroneous 
 to suppose that a knowledge of the history of war consists 
 in a mere collection of examples, to which one has only to 
 refer in order to find a model which may be imitated 
 without modification, although there is no doubt but that 
 practice in such studies must facilitate the forming 
 of a correct opinion, and that what originally was 
 an incomplete natural talent, will thereby be changed into 
 a firmly-seated and self-reliant quality. Of Napoleon it is 
 said : " As long as passion urged him on, he saw only his 
 aim, but once this was reached, lie examined the 
 obstacles which he might have met with ; " and so we 
 also may learn by study how obstacles' are to be overcome, 
 so as to go straight to the point when we are called upon 
 to act, and to do it with confidence, convinced that the 
 result will depend, not on good luck, but on our own 
 capacity. We also can then say : " There are no great 
 and memorable events which are merely the work of 
 chance and luck; they are always due to forethought 
 and genius. Great men are rarely seen to fail, even in 
 their most hazardous undertakings. Look at Alexander, 
 Caesar, Hannibal, the great Gustavus, and others; they 
 always succeeded. Did they become great only by good 
 luck ? No ; but because they were great, they knew how 
 to bend Fortune to their will. If we study the causes of 
 
 1 C.N. Headquarters, Reudnitz.
 
 MANTUA 87 
 
 their successes, we are astounded to see all they did in 
 order to gain them." * 
 
 To resume, on the 8th November, Napoleon himself 
 stood with 21,000 men at Verona, Vaubois with 8000 at 
 La Corona. Opposed to them in the neighbourhood of 
 Rival ta was Davidovich with 16,000 men, and Alvintzy 
 with 27,000 near Vicenza. On the gth the latter advanced 
 to Montebello, whilst Davidovich, influenced by the 
 rumours of reinforcements, which were said to have reached 
 Vaubois under Massena, remained idle. On the loth 
 nothing was done, except that Alvintzy pushed his van- 
 guard of 8000 men forward beyond Caldiero. The next 
 day he himself followed to Villanuova. During these 
 days Napoleon had not stirred. His first thought had 
 naturally been, that Davidovich, taking advantage of these 
 propitious circumstances, would push forward resolutely, 
 in which case he himself would have been between two 
 fires, and he therefore resolved to keep Davidovich at any 
 cost at a distance, in order not to lose his line of retreat 
 behind the Mincio, should he require it. Therefore Massena 
 was to join Vaubois. But when Massena, who had been 
 sent on in advance to La Corona, returned on the evening 
 of the 8th with somewhat reassuring news as to Vaubois' 
 position, and when a second report the next day proved 
 to Napoleon that Davidovich had for the present no 
 intention of taking the offensive, Massena's division was 
 kept where it was, and Napoleon, allowing his troops a few 
 days of rest, awaited, during the gth and loth, the further 
 development of the enemy's plans. It was not until about 
 three o'clock in the afternoon of the nth, that the approach 
 of hostile forces to Verona, on the road from Vicenza, was 
 reported to him. 
 
 He immediately resolved upon a counter offensive. He 
 repulsed the foremost bodies, a part of the Austrian van- 
 guard, with ease, and they, continuing their retreat during 
 the night, reached the position of Caldiero, where the (15) 
 M<Stn. de Ste. Hdlfene, VII. 236.
 
 88 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 vanguard determined to make a stand on the I2th. In 
 the early morning of this day, Napoleon advanced 
 agains^ it, and soon after eight o'clock the attack com- 
 menced. At first he gained some partial successes, 
 Augereau advancing along the road against the front 
 of Caldiero, while Massena turned the right wing at 
 Colognolo ; but by four o'clock in the afternoon the troops 
 of Alvintzy's main body began to come up. Now the 
 French were repulsed along the whole line, and retired 
 during the night upon Verona. Alvintzy followed on the 
 I3th as far as Vago, his cavalry even approaching the 
 gates of Verona. During this time Davidovich had 
 again done nothing ; still, Napoleon's situation had now 
 become exceedingly precarious. It is true he could still 
 fall back either upon the force that was besieging Mantua, 
 or behind the Mincio, but in either case he would be 
 immediately followed by the Austrian superior forces after 
 their junction on the Adige, and he would no longer have 
 had any chance of investing Mantua or holding the plain 
 of Lombardy. But whilst almost any other general 
 would have saved his army from its dangerous position 
 by retreating, regardless of the loss of ground, Napoleon's 
 keen glance still saw a way of striking at the enemy, while 
 yet separated. Alvintzy alone, it is true, was superior in 
 numbers to him, and he must avoid any too direct attack, 
 but he determined to go completely round him, capture his 
 transport and reserve artillery, and then attack him in the 
 rear. 
 
 But even his great and bold spirit required time to 
 mature such a resolution under the pressure of constantly 
 changing and often conflicting news, and to complete the 
 material preparations for it, and thus it was not till the 
 evening of the I4th that Napoleon set his troops in motion 
 for this turning movement, by which he intended to entirely 
 (16) alter the situation. In Verona he left Kilmaine with 3000 
 men, whom he had for this purpose recalled from the invest- 
 ing corps before Mantua. Napoleon himself marched upon
 
 MANTUA 89 
 
 Ronco, where, having thrown a bridge across, he passed 
 the Adige on the morning of the I5th. Here he found him- 
 self on the marshy ground which formed the angle between 
 the Adige and the Alpone, and could only be traversed 
 by the dykes which led on the left to Belfiore di Porcile, 
 on the right to Albaredo, and in the centre to Arcola. Thus 
 Massena advanced on the morning of the I5th along the 
 dam to Belfiore, Augereau along that to Arcola. 
 
 The Austrians intended on this day to push forward on 
 the one side direct to Verona, and on the other side 
 to cross the Adige at Zevio with the same purpose, 
 so as to surround the enemy supposed to be near 
 Verona ; but it was with this concentric movement 
 as it often is in such cases : the enemy " was not 
 stupid enough to allow it to be carried out ; " he had 
 not stood still, and his advance now took the Austrians 
 altogether by surprise. It was only about noon that 
 Alvintzy set his troops in motion towards the points 
 threatened. But now the nature of the ground was in 
 favour of the Austrians, forced to act on the defensive. 
 Massena was stopped even before reaching Belfiore ; 
 Augereau's repeated furious attacks on the bridge of 
 Arcola over the Alpone failed ; even Napoleon's personal 
 example could not command success, nay, in the con- 
 fusion of falling back the commander-in-chief was himself 
 forced from the dam into the marsh, and was for a few 
 moments in the most imminent danger of being made 
 prisoner by the pursuing Austrians. And although about 
 seven o'clock in the evening a small column, which had 
 been sent out via Albaredo under Guieu to turn the 
 position, impregnable in the front, arrived before Arcola 
 and forced the Austrians to evacuate it during the 
 night, still Napoleon's plan of advancing quickly to 
 surprise Villanuova in the rear of the enemy, had 
 failed. Alvintzy's troops now lay partly to the east 
 of the Alpone, partly near Caldiero and facing Massena, 
 whilst Napoleon, thus threatened on both sides by forces
 
 9O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 conjointly superior to his in numbers, considered it wiser 
 to retreat behind the Adige during the night, all the more 
 as he could not be sure whether Vaubois also was not 
 repulsed. 
 
 In the course of that night he learnt with certainty that 
 Vaubois had not yet been attacked, and thereupon he re- 
 solved to resume his attacks against Alvintzy on the i6th 
 
 (17a) Augereau therefore again moved forward to Arcola on the 
 morning of that day, and Massena to Belfiore ; in both 
 directions the Austrians were forced to fall back, but 
 the bridge of Arcola remained" in their possession, and 
 again Napoleon considered it advisable in the evening not 
 to pass the night in this region of dams and marshes, but 
 to put the Adige between himself and the enemy, and thus 
 at the same time ensure the possibility of a march to 
 
 (17b) join Vaubois. He now resolved to give up his proposed 
 front attack upon Arcola on the I7th and to cross 
 the Alpone lower down, and therefore gave orders the 
 same night, to begin throwing a bridge across. In the 
 morning of the I7th, having been informed that Vaubois 
 had on the i6th still not been attacked, he attempted for 
 the third time to advance across the Adige with the 
 division of Massena, ordering Augereau to pass the 
 Alpone on the new bridge. Massena's attack upon Arcola 
 failed, but when the Austrians pushed forward on the dam 
 behind the retreating French ^as far as Ronco, this isolated 
 column was surrounded on all sides and entirely routed. 
 Augereau, at first engaged in this encounter, now imme- 
 diately began to cross the bridge over the Alpone just 
 completed and to attack Arcola on the left bank ; but this 
 attack also the defenders once more repulsed. 
 
 However, the strength of the Austrians was almost 
 exhausted. Already in the morning Alvintzy had written 
 to Davidovich that he could, it is true, resist one more 
 attack, but was unable to assume the offensive. Both 
 leader and men had come to the turning-point, where 
 the balance between success and failure being even, the
 
 MANTUA 91 
 
 , least push would suffice to incline it to the one side or the 
 other, and thus prove the truth of Napoleon's dictum : 
 " The fate of a battle is a question of a single moment, a 
 single thought; . . . the decisive moment arrives, the 
 moral spark is kindled and the smallest reserve force settles 
 the matter ; " ' and in another place also he expresses the 
 same conviction, saying : " There is a moment in engage- 
 ments when the least manoeuvre is decisive and gives the 
 victory ; it is the one drop of water which makes the 
 vessel run over." 2 Alvintzy, who was of opinion that he 
 could resist one more attack, but not gain a complete 
 victory, could not command that spark, but in Napoleon 
 it flashed out and gave him the victory. Thus the 
 apparently insignificant decisive factor must not be put 
 down to good luck in such a case. One energetic push 
 forward nay, the mere semblance of such is at such 
 times sufficient to throw the necessary weight into the scale. 
 Here also it was the mere semblance of an attack which 
 turned the scale. Some fifty horsemen, sent by Napoleon 
 to the rear of the Austrians, with orders to load them to 
 expect a great cavalry charge by sounding numerous 
 trumpets and riding boldly forward, actually caused the 
 enemy to waver and led them to leave the approach to 
 Arcola open. This happened at three o'clock in the 
 afternoon. At the same time Massena and Augereau 
 charged again, and a division called up from the garrison 
 of Legnano advanced by Albaredo. A general attack upon 
 Arcola now began on both banks of the Alpone, and at five 
 o'clock the position was in the hands of the French. The 
 Austrians fell back to Villanuova and San Bonifacio ; 
 indeed, the troops retreating from Caldiero had to fight 
 their way through the French who were pursuing from 
 Arcola. On the i8th Alvintzy continued his retreat via 
 Montebello as far as Olmo. Thus Napoleon's greater (14) 
 persistency had secured victory, and he was well aware of 
 
 . deSte. H^ne, II. 15. 
 1 Precis des guerres de J. C6sar, XXXII. 104.
 
 92 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 this when he said : ." Never yet has a battle-field been so 
 hotly disputed as that of Arcola." l 
 
 Meanwhile Davidovich too had begun to move. On 
 the .lyth November he commenced his turning attack upon 
 Vaubois' position at Rivoli, at seven o'clock in the morning. 
 The result could not be long in doubt, considering his 
 superior numbers, and by two o'clock in the afternoon 
 Vaubois, compelled to abandon his position, was in full 
 retreat upon Verona. After a short halt in Bussolengo, 
 he continued his retreat to Castelnuovo during the night, 
 and on the morning of the i8th withdrew behind the 
 Mincio at Peschiera. Davidovich remained on the battle- 
 field on the evening of the lyth ; on the i8th he advanced 
 as far as Pastrengo. 
 
 When Napoleon was informed of Vaubois' defeat, and 
 saw at the same time on the morning of the i8th that 
 Alvintzy had no longer any intention of making a standing 
 at Villanuova, he only sent his cavalry in pursuit of the 
 latter, and ordered Massena to march forward along the 
 right bank of the Adige to Villafranca, and Augereau by 
 the left bank to Verona. On the igth Davidovich received 
 news of Alvintzy's retreat and Napoleon's advance against 
 himself, and he therefore began his own movement to the 
 rear on the 2oth. In the meantime, however, Alvintzy, 
 perceiving that he was not pursued, had decided to turn 
 back and to advance again upon Verona, in order to relieve 
 Davidovich, and, while the latter retreated, Alvintzy 
 advanced on the 2Oth as far as Villanuova. Meanwhile 
 Napoleon had effected a junction between the corps of 
 Massena and Vaubois, and ordered their joint advance 
 against Davidovich ; at the same time Augereau pushed 
 forward across the mountains from Verona to Dolce in 
 the valley of the Adige, in order to cut off the enemy's 
 retreat. 
 
 On the 2 ist Alvintzy reached the position of Caldiero, 
 after having driven out some weak French divisions left 
 1 To Carnot, Verona, igth November.
 
 MANTUA 93 
 
 behind there, his vanguard being in the vicinity of 
 Verona. On the same day, in the morning, Davidovich 
 was just evacuating his position at Rivoli on the approach 
 ^of Vaubois and Massena, when he received news of 
 Alvintzy's fresh advance. He immediately wished to re- 
 occupy the position just evacuated, and gave orders to this 
 effect, but finally changed his mind and determined to 
 continue his retreat. This vacillation was of course bound 
 to cause mistakes and disorder. Therefore, when the French 
 attacked, the fight immediately took an unfavourable turn 
 for the Austrians ; they were repulsed with heavy loss, and 
 when in addition news of Augereau's advance via Lugo to 
 Peri, threatening their rear, arrived, a general retreat as 
 far as Ala was ordered. But Augereau had already reached 
 Peri, and thus the way had to be cleared there by further 
 fighting. In this unfavourable position Davidovich's 
 troops were utterly routed, and only escaped by flight, 
 incurring heavy losses. 
 
 During the next few days no movements of importance 
 took place. On the 23rd Alvintzy received information of 
 Davidovich's defeat, and saw himself forced to retreat 
 behind the Brenta, which he. did during the night before 
 the 24th. A sortie on the part of Wiirmser from Mantua 
 on the 23rd was repulsed, for Napoleon had now had time 
 to send the troops, drawn from the investment corps, 
 back to it. Thus on the 24th this campaign too was 
 finished ; again Napoleon had victoriously solved the 
 problem of acting on the defensive, he had maintained 
 his position. 
 
 The French army now occupied the following positions, 
 and by the end of December reached the figures given 
 below : Serurier (who had taken the place of Kilmaine, 
 who was sick) was investing Mantua with 8000 men ; 
 Massena lay at Verona with 9000 ; Joubert (who had 
 succeeded Vaubois in his command) lay at Rivoli with 
 10,000 men ; Augereau at Legnago with 9000 ; and as 
 reserves there were the division of Rey, 4000 men, near and
 
 94 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 in front of Brescia, for the observation of the valley of the 
 Chiese, and Victor's brigade, 2000 men, at Castelnuovo 
 and Goito. There came now a pause in the active opera- 
 tions, for Napoleon had of course no reason for reassuming 
 the offensive before the capture of Mantua, and the Austrians 
 were compelled to reform and reinforce their army first. 
 This was completed by the beginning of 1797 ; and 
 Alvintzy now projected a second attempt to relieve Mantua. 
 He had at present 9000 men under Provera near Padua ; 
 these were to start from there on the 7th January, and 
 to seize Legnago on the gih. Bajalich had 6000 men 
 at Bassano ; these were also to start on the 7th and 
 take Verona on the I2th. The main army, under Alvintzy 
 himself, 28,000 men, was to advance against the position 
 of Rivoli and attack and capture it on the I3th January. 
 Accordingly, Ba-jalich and Provera started on the 7th ; 
 the former reached Villanuova on the gth, and the 
 latter Montagnana after an encounter with Augereau's 
 advanced guard on the preceding day. Augereau reported 
 this to Napoleon on the same day, though he did not as 
 yet credit the enemy with any serious intentions against 
 Legnago, and he therefore assembled only a portion of 
 his troops there, keeping the rest at Ronco under 
 Guieu. 
 
 Napoleon received the news at Bologna on the loth. 
 He immediately sent the 2000 men stationed there to 
 Rovigo under Lannes, to support Augereau, whilst he 
 himself, for the present, joined Serurier. On this day 
 Bajalich advanced but a little way ; his vanguard reached 
 Caldiero ; Provera remained stationary ; Alvintzy's main 
 body was still engaged in concentrating. But on the 
 nth January, Bajalich arrived before Verona; Provera 
 again remained stationary at Montagnana, and Alvintzy's 
 columns were beginning to reach the Monte Baldo. 
 Meanwhile nothing was altered, generally speaking, in 
 the French positions, although, both on the Adige and at 
 Rivoli, all were standing to their arms because the
 
 MANTUA 95 
 
 advance of the enemy along the whole line rendered 
 the direction of their main attack still a matter of doubt. 
 
 On the I2th Bajalich attacked Verona unsuccessfully, 
 for he had sent the larger part of his troops to Alvintzy 
 along the Val Pantena ; and in the afternoon he re- 
 treated to Caldiero. The first troops of Alvintzy arrived 
 before Joubert's outposts at La Corona; their attack, 
 however, was wanting in unanimity, and the position 
 remained in the hands of the French. Provera 
 again remained inactive. On the same day Napoleon 
 arrived in Verona. His first impression, after Augereau's 
 message, was that the enemy intended to reach Mantua 
 by the lower Adige, and he had therefore sent orders 
 from Roverbella to Massena to hold himself ready for 
 a march to Legnago. But when he came to Verona 
 and noted Bajalich's attack there, he kept Massena back, 
 although as yet without any clear conception of the 
 situation. However, Joubert's report of the advance 
 against La Corona now arrived, and Napoleon began to 
 doubt whether the enemy's main force was after all facing 
 Augereau. He said to himself on the morning of the 
 1 3th : " Here at Verona I have about 6000 men before 
 me, whom I shall attack to-day. Joubert must be able 
 to report to-day also, whether the force before him exceeds 
 9000 men ; if this is the case, there cannot be more than 
 10,000 men at the most facing Augereau. The enemy is 
 therefore nowhere in full strength, and I can, on whatever 
 wing he wishes to cross the Adige, throw myself upon him 
 with superior numbers." However, in any case Napoleon 
 must find out with certainty on which wing the larger 
 portion of the Austrians were, if he did not wish to make a 
 thrust at random ; once aware of this, the quickest move- 
 ment of the army in that direction would be necessary, and 
 every moment would be precious. Therefore his carriage 
 .had been standing ready, with the horses put to, since the 
 evening before, so as to take him immediately to the 
 threatened point ; meanwhile he was awaiting the solution 
 
 1 The Val Pantena is one of the minor valleys between the Brenta 
 and Adige valleys.
 
 96 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of the state of affairs with the greatest anxiety. It came 
 that very day. 
 
 Joubert had already recognized that the enemy had 
 resolved to force him from his strong position, and had 
 therefore his main forces there; he consequently evacu-. 
 ated his outlying positions at La Corona in the early 
 morning of the I3th and collected his troops on the plateau 
 of Rivoli. The Austrian columns, now advancing un- 
 disturbed, threatened however to turn this position during 
 the afternoon. In the meantime Napoleon had recognized 
 Alvintzy's plan from Joubert's reports, and resolved at 
 once to act, as he had always done hitherto, in the way 
 which, in imitation of his example, the theory ot strategy 
 now lays down as an invariable principle ; namely, to 
 throw himself in full strength upon the enemy's main 
 column, without for the time troubling about the advance 
 of any minor columns. He therefore issued the following 
 orders at three o'clock in the afternoon : " Victor will at 
 once march to Villafranca," and at five o'clock : " Rey will 
 advance to Castelnuovo, where he will wait for further 
 orders as to his march to the battle-field; Massena will 
 leave Verona with a small garrison and march immediately, 
 so as to take up a position to the left of Joubert." He 
 himself hastened thither in advance. Joubert received 
 orders to hold the position of Rivoli. 
 
 (19) This latter general, at ten o'clock in the evening, 
 before the threatened turning movement of the Austrians, 
 had already begun to evacuate the position of Rivoli, when 
 Napoleon's above-mentioned orders arrived just in time to 
 keep him in this position. The Austrians, pushing 
 forward in six columns, reached the line from Caprino to 
 the chapel of San Marco with four of these in the evening, 
 the fifth being at Rivalta.the sixth on the other side of the 
 
 (18) Adige at Dolce. Provera had collected his troops at 
 Minerbe with the intention of crossing the Adige by night 
 at Anghiari; Bajalich, having been attacked in the morning 
 by Massena's vanguard, retired at nightfall to Villanuova.
 
 MANTUA 97 
 
 At two o'clock in the morning Napoleon joined Joubert. (19) 
 In the bright moonlight he distinctly saw the Austrians in 
 position in a semicircle around him, and resolved to break 
 through their turning attack by making an offensive move 
 against their extended line. Before daybreak he therefore 
 ordered Joubert to force back the enemy's outlying troops, 
 and to advance as far as the position near the chapel of 
 San Marco; the left wing of the French stood at 
 Trombalora, whilst their right blocked the hollow way 
 leading to the plateau near the inn Delia Dogana. At 
 daybreak the Austrian columns commenced the attack. 
 That on their extreme right, the first, was to turn the 
 position of Rivoli completely and then attack it in 
 the rear from the heights of Mt. Pipolo. The sixth, near 
 Ceradino, was to occupy the defile of Chiusa on 
 
 the left bank of the Adige and cannonade Rivoli. In 
 the front, the columns second, third and fourth were 
 to attack the position of Rivoli, whilst the fifth was 
 to await at Incanale the result of this attack, and then 
 to storm the hollow way near the inn. Napoleon, on his 
 side, decided to leave only a very small force on his flanks, 
 thrown back towards Trombalora and the inn, because he 
 expected Massena and Rey to come up in a very short 
 time. (The latter had received orders at Castelnuovo to 
 continue his march at once.) With Joubert's main body 
 he intended to take the offensive against the attack of the 
 three central Austrian columns ; these, forming the main 
 body, once beaten, he would be able to cut off the isolated 
 columns and the two wings and capture or destroy them. 
 ^ To begin with, however, the Austrians were advancing, 
 and the second column, pushing forward over Caprino, even 
 threatened for a moment to force Joubert altogether away 
 from Rivoli, by turning his left wing, and to throw him 
 back upon the Adige. But this danger was averted, for 
 already the head of Massena's column was coming up on 
 Joubert's left at Trombalora. Nevertheless, the Austrians 
 continued their main advance. The position of the 
 
 H
 
 98 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 chapel of San Marco was captured, that near the inn was 
 being attacked in the rear by their fourth column, whilst 
 the fifth Was forcing its way in front up the hollow way, 
 and the defenders of this important ascent were giving 
 way, towards the plain of Rivoli. It was noon. 
 (20) But however threatening matters looked for the moment, 
 Napoleon did not yet feel any apprehension, for he was 
 too conscious of his superiority over his opponents, not 
 only of his actual superiority in numbers for after the 
 arrival of Massena and Rey he could bring a larger number 
 of troops to the battle-field but still more of his personal 
 superiority in generalship. He remained perfectly calm, 
 and with that marvellously clear insight which was one of 
 his greatest attributes, recognizing the point at which the 
 decisive attack would be delivered, he now sent all the 
 forces he had at his disposal against the fifth column, 
 just then ascending the plateau from the inn. This 
 column, met by his attack, before it was in a position to 
 deploy, was thrown back down the hollow road in utter 
 
 (21) disorder. At the same time the three other Austrian 
 columns in the centre fell back before the French, who 
 now advanced along the whole line, and their retreat 
 soon degenerated into a rout. Thus the first Austrian 
 column, which, as we mentioned, had marched to the rear 
 of the position of Rivoli, was now completely cut off from 
 its fellows, and when in addition Rey appeared in its rear 
 during the afternoon, it was so hard pressed and surrounded, 
 that all order was lost, and by noon of the next day all 
 the troops of this column had fallen into the enemy's 
 hands. 
 
 Napoleon was on the point of advancing past the inn, al- 
 though night was already falling, in order to annihilate the 
 
 (22) fifth column also, when he received the news that Provera 
 had during the preceding night crossed the Adige at 
 Anghiari. He resolved immediately to hasten to cover 
 Mantua, and therefore ordered Joubert, with Rey under 
 him, to resume his pursuit vigorously the next morning
 
 MANTUA 99 
 
 early. He kept Massena back at Rivoli and ordered him 
 to leave on the I5th at break of day for Villafranca. 
 As soon as Joubert no longer needed Rey, he was to 
 despatch him also to that place. 
 
 As we have seen, Provera had got his troops in readi- 
 ness during the evening of the 13th January at Minerbe 
 to cross the Adige during the night. This he did success- 
 fairy, although Guieu hurried up with that part of Auge- 
 reau's forces which stood at Ronco and attacked the head 
 of Provera's column. The latter then continued his march 
 towards Mantua, and reached Nogara. But Guieu and 
 Augereau (whom Lannes had joined the evening before) 
 marched immediately from two sides against Provera's 
 column, and though they did not succeed in blocking its 
 way, yet they delayed its advance and even cut oif its 
 rearguard entirely at Cerea. 
 
 On the I5th one more encounter took place before (21) 
 Rivoli, for both Joubert and Alvintzy were advancing, the 
 latter in order thereby to relieve his isolated first column 
 and also to free Provera. But he was soon forced to fall 
 back, and Joubert, noticing this, ordered his wings to be 
 turned, while keeping the centre engaged. The Austrian 
 soldiers, having for some days past suffered from want of 
 provisions and ammunition, and being disheartened by 
 their defeat the day before, fell back in disorder, and left 
 a large number of prisoners in Joubert's hands. Altogether 
 these two days at Rivoli, the I4th and I5th, gave to the 
 French 13,000 prisoners of war. 
 
 Provera had meanwhile continued his march tp Mantua, (22) 
 and arrived at noon before the suburb San Giorgio, which 
 had been occupied and fortified by the French. After 
 having succeeded in informing Wurmser of his arrival, the 
 two resolved upon a combined attack on La Favorita and 
 San Antonio on the morning of the i6th. Napoleon 
 reached Roverbella on the evening of the isth with the 
 troops of Massena and Victor, whom he had taken with 
 him from Villafranca. At Roverbella he learnt that Pro-
 
 TOO NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 vera had arrived at noon before San Giorgio, but that this 
 suburb was still in the hands of the French. He now 
 ordered Augereau to press vigorously from the rear, and 
 Semrier to take up a position at La Favorita, in order to 
 oppose any sortie from the fortress ; he himself decided to 
 approach from the north with Massena and Victor, and 
 thus to complete the circle around Provera. It is true, 
 Augereau had not immediately followed the Austrians on 
 the I5th, but had occupied himself with blocking their re- 
 treat to the Adige ; he received his orders for an advance 
 to La Favorita, however, in time to assist there actively 
 the next day. 
 
 On the i6th, in the morning, Provera began his attack 
 upon La Favorita. Soon, however, he saw himself sur- 
 rounded on all sides through Napoleon's dispositions, 
 described above, and about noon he resigned himself to 
 having to lay down his arms. Thus this attempt failed, 
 even more disastrously than all the previous operations 
 of the Austrians for the relief of Mantua, nine days after 
 its commencement ; it was destined to be the last. Of the 
 43,000 men with whom Alvintzy had opened the campaign, 
 he scarcely brought 25,000 men back. Mantua's fate was 
 now sealed, and on the 3rd February the fortress sur- 
 rendered to the French, and its garrison became prisoners 
 of war. 
 
 For eight months the place had been a bone of contention, 
 and four relieving armies had been defeated and partly 
 annihilated by Napoleon. And herein also he proved of 
 what different material he was made, compared to ordinary 
 generals. The latter are liable to lose their energy for new 
 enterprises by long protracted operations, even though they 
 be successful ; to them the glory already gained seems not 
 only well earned, but an entirely satisfactory consummation 
 of their lives ; they have no desire to increase it, they only 
 wish to preserve it, forgetful of the great saying, " He 
 who fears to lose his fame, is sure to do so." l Only a 
 1 Napoleon to the Directory, Leobon, i6th April, 1797.
 
 MANTUA 101 
 
 genius of the first rank will aim so high, that every success 
 appears only a step to higher successes, and therefore in- 
 spires him with energy to pursue new aims. This is the 
 same mental operation as the one we spoke of above, when 
 treating of the question of pursuit. Therefore we are 
 forced to admire the freshness with which Napoleon pre- 
 pared to face each of these four successive armies as well 
 as the boldness with which he dealt with them ; his great 
 deeds had not exhausted, but rather fortified his energy.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797. 
 
 (22) THE last attempt to relieve Mantua having failed, and -the 
 town having surrendered, the Austrians had retreated into 
 the mountains of the Tyrol and of Friaul. They immedi- 
 ately went to work again, however, to collect large reinforce- 
 ments, in order to have a fresh army ready, capable of 
 carrying on the war ; but it was no longer possible for 
 them to re-enter Italy or to assume the offensive ; their 
 reconstructed army was only intended for the defence of 
 their own borders. Indeed, for the present there were 
 only 7000 men in the Tyrol and 24,000 on the Brenta 
 to withstand a first attack. 
 
 With the fall of Mantua, Napoleon of course at once 
 resumed the idea of taking the offensive, but he too was 
 waiting for reinforcements, without which, indeed, no 
 vigorous advance, no crossing of the Alps or invasion of 
 the heart of Austria would be possible. He therefore only 
 ordered Massena aud Augereau for the present to move 
 forward to Bassano and Cittadella, and in consequence of 
 this movement the Austrians quitted the Brenta and 
 retired behind the Piave. They likewise fell back behind 
 the Avicio before Joubert, who was also advancing. But 
 after this the French remained stationary, and Napoleon 
 proceeded with one corps of 8000 men to Rome, for both 
 his Government and he himself had resolved to come to an 
 immediate definite settlement with this State, which had 
 shown animosity during the struggle with the Austrians and 
 while the fate of Italy was still undecided. As the Austrians
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 103 
 
 \vere too weak for a resumption of the contest at present, 
 there was a pause in hostilities. Napoleon's march 
 against the few and indifferent Roman troops is without 
 any strategical interest for us, and on the igth February 
 the conditions of peace, dictated by Napoleon, were signed 
 at Tolentino on behalf of the Papal Government. 
 
 Meanwhile the French general had been receiving con- 
 tinuous reports about the massing of ever-increasing 
 numbers of Austrian troops, and on the I7th he wrote : 
 *' In a few days I shall return to the army, where, as I 
 notice, my presence is becoming necessary ; " * and among 
 the reasons which he quoted to the Directory as influenc- 
 ing his conclusion of peace with Rome, he mentioned : 
 " (4) Because my presence with the army is indis- 
 pensable." * 
 
 In the meantime the Archduke Charles had been (23) 
 appointed commander-in-chief in the place of Alvintzy. 
 He joined the army in the beginning of March, and on 
 the loth it was stationed as follows : In the van ro,ooo 
 men on the Piave ; behind the Tagliamento from Gemona 
 down stream 17,000 men ; in the Tyrol, at Salurn and in 
 the valleys of the Avicio and the Nos, 14,000 men, besides 
 10,000 Tyrolese volunteer rifleman. 
 
 Napoleon also had returned to his army, and was at 
 this date (loth March) atBassano; his army consisted, 
 after the arrival of reinforcements, of the follow- 
 ing forces : Bernadotte, with 10,000 men, at Padua ; 
 Serurier, 9000, at Asolo ; Massena, 12,000, at Bassano ; 
 Guieu, 10,000 (Augereau's late division), at Castelfranco. 
 Joubert stood in the Tyrol on the Adige with his own 
 division of 10,000 men, Baraguey d' Hilliershad 6000, and 
 Delmas 5000. In Verona and Mantua there were respec- 
 tively 2000 and 1500 men as garrisons. 
 
 The disposition of the Austrians in two bodies was well 
 known to Napoleon, and his plan consisted of throwing 
 himself with the larger portion of his army, 41,000 men, 
 1 To Joubert, Tolentino. * Tolentino i9th February.
 
 iO4 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 upon the enemy's main body, probably not more than 
 30,000 men, under the personal command of the com- 
 mander-in-chief and in position on the direct road to 
 Vienna. He moreover intended to advance in such a 
 manner as to place the French army between the two 
 Austrian forces, thus separating them, as he had done 
 Beaulieu and Colli in the previous April ; then to attack 
 the main body when it had no hope of any assistance from 
 the corps in the Tyrol. Accordingly he ordered Massena 
 to turn the archduke's right wing by advancing via 
 Feltre and Belluno, and cut his communications with 
 the Tyrolese corps. Napoleon himself intended to attack 
 the Austrian front with Serurier, Guieu and Bernadotte, 
 with Massena on his left, meaning to push forward 
 with his whole strength against the pass of Tarvis. 
 Baraguey would be sent to Primiero, to cover Massena's 
 turning movement against the Tyrol, and to render the 
 separation of the Friaul corps from that of the Tyrol more 
 effectual. Should Joubert be attacked by superior forces, 
 a* thing scarcely to be expected, he was to retreat slowly 
 along the Adige towards Castelnuovo, continually facing 
 about, and occupy the excellent positions that the valley 
 afforded. But should Joubert, as was likely, considering 
 his large force, also advance and reach Botzen, Napoleon 
 would order him up through the Puster valley, during his 
 own advance against Villach. Then he would be with 
 his united forces on the shortest road to Vienna. 
 
 On the loth March Napoleon opened the campaign 
 by ordering Massena to Feltre. The Austrian vanguard 
 on the Piave immediately fell back and assembled behind 
 the Livenza, only observing the Piave. 
 
 On the nth Guieu and Serurier advanced nearer to the 
 much swollen stream, and Massena pushed forward a 
 little beyond Feltre. On the I2th, at daybreak, Napoleon 
 ordered the passage of the Piave to be begun, and there- 
 fore Guieu crossed at Nervesa to the south of the wood of 
 Montello, and Serurier to the north of this wood at Ciano,
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 105 
 
 the cavalry reserve preceding him. Guieu reached 
 Conegliano on the same day, with Serurier a little in his 
 rear, Bernadotte followed in support to Castelfranco, and 
 Massena arrived at Belluno. Baraguey occupied Primiero 
 on this day ; the weak Austrian advanced troops falling 
 back along the whole line as far as the Livenza. 
 
 On the I3th the Austrians, about 10,000 strong, who had 
 retreated from the Piave, assembled near Pordenone on 
 tne high road to Udine ; their rear guard, however, was 
 compelled on the evening of this day by Guieu to evacuate 
 Sacile. Serurier reached Conegliano and Bernadotte 
 Treviso. Massena remained with his main body at 
 Belluno, but seized the pass of La Fossa, further up the 
 Piave. Napoleon, now at Conegliano, was, from what had 
 happened hitherto, convinced that he would succeed in 
 arresting the enemy on the Tagliamento and force him to 
 accept battle. But he intended to fight only after having 
 been joined by Massena, and therefore sent orders to the 
 latter to hasten up via Aviano, and if this was not possible, 
 to march to Sacile. Therefore Massena set his troops in 
 motion on the I4th towards Serravalle, Serurier arrived 
 at Porto Buffole, Bernadotte at Conegliano, Guiea 
 collected his forces at Sacile, and to this latter town the 
 headquarters also were moved. We see distinctly from 
 these dispositions how Napoleon was endeavouring to 
 mass his forces, so as to have all his troops in hand, before 
 advancing across the Tagliamento to attack the enemy's 
 position. The Austrians drew all their outlying corps on 
 this day to the Tagliamento ; their main body was posted 
 behind this river, with its centre at Codroipo and its wings 
 extending to San Daniele and Latisana. The archduke 
 himself was at Udine. 
 
 On the I5th Napoleon did not advance far. He himself 
 with Guieu reached Pordenone ; Bernadotte, Sacile ; 
 Serurier crossed the Livenza and arrived at Belvedere. As 
 to Massena, Napoleon expected he would reach Serravalle 
 on this day, and sent him orders at nine o'clock to march
 
 io6 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 via Sacile and Pordenone to Cordenons, where he was to 
 arrive, if possible, by the i6th. The Austrians now with- 
 drew their outposts behind the Tagliamento, but otherwise 
 scarcely changed their positions. On this same day Napo- 
 leon wrote a very remarkable letter to Joubert on the situa- 
 tion. 1 First he informed him of his intention to effect the 
 junction of his two army corps in the valley of the Drave, 
 to turn to the north after crossing the Tagliamento, and to 
 take the pass of Pontafel ; Joubert was to drive the enemy 
 beyond Brixen. Having thus pointed out his main object, 
 Napoleon proceeded to a consideration of the following 
 eventualities : 
 
 1. If Joubert should be beaten and driven back as far as 
 Mantua ; 
 
 2. If hostile bodies of troops advanced via Feltre to 
 Primolano into the valley of the Brenta, in order to cut 
 off Joubert from Napoleon ; 
 
 3. If a hostile column turned one of Napoleon's wings 
 and made its appearance on the Piave or the Brenta, 
 before he could change front. 
 
 Now in this there were two things characteristic of 
 Napoleon. First, the perfect calm with which he viewed 
 the possibility of his first assumption coming to pass. 
 Let the enemy advance in his direct rear and drive back 
 Joubert to the Po, this general would be able to hold out 
 with his base in Mantua, and using the Po as his line of 
 supply until the decisive blow had been struck on the 
 Tagliamento ; then Napoleon, returning, would on his side 
 cut off and annihilate the hostile corps, which had advanced 
 so boldly and interrupted his communications with his 
 base for a moment. Secondly, we must notice that he, 
 although taking three different possibilities of the enemy's 
 movements into consideration, still did not continue 
 enumerating in detail all he expected his subordinate 
 general to do in each case, but, after having given him 
 general advice as to the most probable eventuality, the 
 1 From Sacile.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 107 
 
 first, he dismissed the second as unlikely, and did not 
 consider the third at all. It is indeed generally conceded 
 to be a mistake to attempt to give a distant corps minute 
 instructions for all and every eventuality, and thus this 
 letter of Napoleon's is a fresh proof of the natural gifts 
 as a strategist with which he was born. Of course an 
 energetic, enterprising and youthful subordinate officer 
 like Joubert, a contemporary of Napoleon, was necessary 
 before the commander-in-chief could view with calmness 
 such movements between himself and his base, which are 
 always liable to make a great impression on both the 
 leader and the troops. 
 
 On the morning of the l6th, Napoleon set his divisions 
 in motion against Valvasone, in order to cross the Taglia- 
 mento that day. Guieu arrived first, and was ordered against 
 the right wing of the Austrian lines which extended from 
 Codroipo as far as Torrida ; while Bernadotte, who arrived 
 about noon, was sent against their left wing. Serurier 
 followed later in the right rear to Codroipo as a reserve. 
 About three o'clock in the afternoon the French columns 
 began crossing, whilst the Austrians kept up a desultory 
 fight until the evening, in order to cover their retreat 
 towards Palma, which had already begun. In the course 
 of the night the Austrian troops assembled at Palma, 
 leaving a rearguard on the Connor. Massena had not 
 been able, as we have seen, to assist actively in this day's 
 preparations for the crossing of the Tagliamento, though 
 it had been Napoleon's intention that he should do so, 
 the mountain roads by which he had to march having 
 delayed his advance too much. But now Napoleon ordered 
 him to start at eleven o'clock in the evening, and to march 
 as quickly as possible to Spilimbergo. 
 
 The Archduke Charles wanted to wait for his expected 
 reinforcements to come up before engaging in a decisive 
 battle ; he therefore continued his retrograde movement on 
 the 1 7th to Gradisca. The French advanced but a short 
 distance on this day; Napoleon seemed to consider it
 
 loS NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 necessary to be thoroughly clear as to whether the enemy 
 had really evaded him to the southward, or was still 
 on the road to Tarvis with his main force. The successes 
 which the archduke, a young man of twenty-five years, had 
 gained during the preceding year in Germany, had secured 
 him a sufficient reputation for his opponent, himself only 
 twenty-seven years old, to be on his guard, for Napoleon 
 never omitted to take the personal qualities of the leaders 
 opposed to him into consideration in his strategical 
 plans. 
 
 However, every day Napoleon's apprehensions as to the 
 archduke's powers as a general vanished more and more, 
 and by the 25th of March he was in a position to say : 
 " Up to this hour Prince Charles has manoeuvred worse 
 than Beaulieu and Wiirmser ; step by step he has com- 
 mitted blunders, and very gross ones too ; he has had to 
 pay dearly for them, and he would have had to pay far 
 more dearly for them if his reputation had not deceived 
 me up to a certain point and prevented me from 
 being sure about certain mistakes which I perceived 
 indeed, but considered to have been caused by inten- 
 tions, which afterwards proved to have had no exis- 
 tence/' l 
 
 This shows us moreover what a great effect the reputation 
 of a general, when once gained, has on his subsequent 
 deeds. The most striking instance of this is Napoleon 
 himself; for when, in the year 1814, with scarcely a hand- 
 ful of raw levies he had to face the allies, who outnumbered 
 him three to one, the weight of his name alone had such 
 a tremendous effect upon them, that no superiority of 
 numbers seemed sufficient to render them sure of a 
 victory wherever Napoleon appeared in person. And if 
 from the before-mentioned example we see that even a 
 Napoleon was, for a time, influenced in the same way, we 
 shall, on the one hand, understand how those who were 
 infinitely his inferiors succumbed to it altogether; but 
 1 C.N. To the Directory, Goritz.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 109 
 
 * 
 on the other we shall be moved to a just admiration 
 
 for the steadfastness of Bliicher, whom no such considera- 
 tions ever affected. 
 
 For the rest we must say, in considering this first 
 occasion on which Napoleon and the Archduke Charles 
 measured swords, that the annals of war could probably 
 not furnish the names of two leaders who, both as 
 generals and as men, differed so widely from each other. 
 Napoleon, violent, intractable, full of an unbridled desire 
 of glory and power ; the archduke, cold, calculating and 
 ever awake to the call of duty in all his actions. Napoleon, 
 the son of an insignificant Corsican lawyer, only lately 
 ennobled, breaking through all the legal restrictions of his 
 adopted country in arbitrary fashion for his own aggrand- 
 izement ; the archduke, the first prince of the blood, 
 acquiescing in all the commands of his Government, with- 
 out any idea of opposition. Napoleon, as in his own life, 
 ever grasping at the highest, so in his strategy ever 
 resolutely choosing the boldest course and pursuing it 
 unflinchingly; the archduke, as in his own life, always 
 retiring, so in his mode of waging war, never seeking 
 for personal glory, though often dilatory when the greatest 
 haste was necessary, shrinking from the risk of staking 
 the whole weal of his army and country on one cast of 
 the dice. So, too, Napoleon ever growing in greatness, 
 though but in one direction, the highest ideal of every 
 soldier, yet the terror of every sovereign who looked to 
 the future; while the archduke, no great conqueror of 
 nations or destroyer of States, was a pattern to every 
 subject, placed in the highest and most responsible 
 position, not thinking for himself. The archduke acknow- 
 ledged his opponent's military superiority unreservedly 
 and ungrudgingly, and openly expressed his admiration 
 for him ; whilst Napoleon, who had not, and could not 
 have any conception of such a noble nature, which was 
 ncapable of being tempted by any bait from the 
 path of duty, exclaimed angrily and characteristically,
 
 1 10 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 " He is a blockhead ! " ' when in the year 1805 he for the 
 first tkne became personally acquainted with the arch- 
 duke. These two instances suffice to show the wide gulf 
 which separated the two men. 
 
 On the i8th March, the archduke withdrew his army 
 wholly behind the Isonzo, and took up his position to the 
 east of Gorz. Napoleon had, at seven o'clock on the 
 evening before, issued the following orders from Valva- 
 sone : " Bernadotte will start at 3.30 in the morning and 
 proceed to Palma ; Serurier will follow him, and be 
 followed in his turn by Guieu. Massena will push forward 
 by San Daniele and Gemona and seize the Chiusa at the 
 entrance to the Pontafel pass (Chiusa veneta)." Joubert 
 also received orders to advance to Brixen. Palma was 
 found evacuated and was occupied, after which Napoleon 
 formed his army on the right bank of the Torre. In the 
 early morning of the igth, Napoleon's army was ready to 
 cross the Torre. Bernadotte crossed first and marched 
 to Medea, Napoleon accompanying" this column. The 
 Austrians offered no resistance whatever. Serurier then 
 marched across the river and pushed forward to Villesse, 
 and both divisions proceeded to Gradisca. This town 
 was invested, and its garrison surrendered at nine o'clock 
 in the evening. 
 
 The archduke determined to continue his retreat, and 
 did so during the same night. He intended to effect a 
 junction at Villach with the reinforcements that were on 
 the way to him. For this purpose he divided his army 
 into two columns; the larger of these he sent in the 
 direction of Laibach, so as to move it up afterwards via 
 Krainburg to Tarvfs ; the other he ordered to march to 
 the same point by ascending the Isonzo valley. He him- 
 self hastened in advance to Villach. Massena, having by 
 forced marches recovered the lead he had lost, and 
 having entered the pass of Pontafel, stormed the bridge 
 of Casasola that day, the igth, which had been occupied by 
 1 Mme. de R&nusat, M6m., II. 235,
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 in 
 
 a weak detachment, and formed one of the defences of the 
 pass. The Austrians retreated to Pontafel. 
 
 On the 20th Napoleon pushed forward up the Isonzo, 
 as far as Gorz, with Bernadotte on the right bank 
 and Serurier on the left ; Guieu marched in the direc- 
 tion of Cormons. But during the course of the day 
 Napoleon was miornied that a somewhat considerable 
 portion of the enemy's forces had retreated to Laibach, and 
 although he had no intention of following them there with 
 his main body, still he sent Bernadotte on the 2ist to 
 Czernitza, to keep watch on that road ; indeed, the latter 
 came in touch with the enemy's rearguard. Guieu 
 marched that day to Cividale, and Serurier pushed farther 
 up the Isonzo valley. Massena had meanwhile continued 
 his forward movement through Pontafel on the 20th, and 
 reached Tarvis with a portion of his troops; a small 
 Austrian detachment stationed here-for the protection of the 
 pass fell back before him to Wurzen. Thus on the 2ist 
 Massena was already at Tarvis with part of his force when 
 the Austrians, retreating by the Isonzo valley, started for the 
 same place from Caporetto ; they reached Predil on that 
 day. They had been informed of the presence of the 
 enemy at Tarvis, and determined to force their way 
 through them. To facilitate this movement, the force 
 which had retreated before Massena to Wurzen was 
 ordered to advance from there in the direction of 
 Tarvis. 
 
 On the 22nd the Austrians actually succeeded in captur- 
 ing Tarvis again ; Massena's troops, which had arrived 
 there, fell back upon their, division at Malborghetto, and the 
 Austrians occupied the position at Tarvis, collecting all 
 their forces ; they sent one corps forward to Saifnitz against 
 Massena and left a rearguard in the Predil pass to hold 
 the hermitage of Flitschl. On the same day Guieu had 
 pushed forward from Cividale to Caporetto, driving an 
 Austrian detachment out of Stupizza. The Serurier's 
 division (under the command of Chabot, Serurier being ill
 
 1 1 2 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 since the evening before) remained stationary, as a general 
 reserve. On the 23rd, in the morning, Guieu took the 
 Flitschl hermitage by storm, whilst on the other side 
 Massena advanced and captured the position of Saifnitz 
 and then Tarvis also; thus all that remained of the 
 Austrians in the Predil pass, some 2000 men, were cut off 
 and surrendered to the French. Meanwhile Bernadotte 
 had advanced on that day on the road to Laibach as far as 
 Prawald ; Chabot was likewise ordered thither, and reached 
 Czernitza. 
 
 It was the archduke's intention to assemble his whole 
 force for the present near Klagenfurt ; a part of his 
 expected reinforcements had already arrived in Villach, 
 about 5000 men, and these were ordered to await the troops 
 retreating from Tarvis. Napoleon, on his side, ordered 
 Massena and Guieu to advance upon Villach ; Chabot, 
 who, as we have seen, had been sent along to the road to 
 Laibach, received counter orders, and marched up the 
 Isonzo valley. Bernadotte remained for the present at 
 Prawald. Villach was evacuated before the approach of 
 the French, and in this situation Napoleon awaited news 
 of the events in the Tyrol. 
 
 There operations had meanwhile begun. At first Joubert 
 had, of course, waited until he received information 
 about Napoleon's advance. Then he immediately opened 
 the campaign by crossing the Avicio on the 2oth March. 
 Everywhere the Austrians were surprised and thrown back 
 upon Neumarkt with the loss of numerous prisoners. 
 Joubert reached Salurn. During the next few days the 
 Austrians continued their retreat. Joubert followed, and 
 on the 22nd reached Botzen. Here the main body of the 
 enemy, some 8000 men, had taken the road into the 
 Eisack valley, but their right wing, finding this road 
 already blocked, had retreated to Meran. Joubert, on his 
 side, left Delmas behind at Botzen to cover his rear, and 
 with the remainder of his troops followed in the track of 
 the Austrians into the Eisack valley. The latter had
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 113 
 
 stationed their rearguard in the defile near Klausen, and 
 their main body in a position near Brixen. 
 
 On the 23rd Joubert reached Teutschen. On the 24th 
 he advanced against Klausen, stormed the pass, and then 
 pushed on to Brixen ; the Austrians, however, made no 
 stand there, but fell back to Muhlbach, so that Joubert 
 in the evening reached Brixen. The next day the 
 Austrians continued their retreat to Sterzing, leaving 
 only a rearguard of 1500 men behind at Muhlbach to 
 protect the pass entrance into the Puster valley ; but this 
 detachment was attacked by Joubert on the 26th and 
 driven out. But having no fresh news of Napoleon, the 
 latter stood fast at Brixen. 
 
 In the meantime, on the 28th, the Austrians had effected 
 their junction near Klagenfurt, and numbered 13,000 men, 
 only one corps of 5000 remaining in the neighbourhood of 
 Laibach on the left bank of the Save. The archduke had 
 been informed of the events in the Tyrol. Napoleon, as 
 we have seen, united Massena's and Guieu's corps in the 
 first place at Villach, whilst Chabot was still on the march 
 from the rear. On the 2gth he started, forced the Austrian 
 vanguard back, and occupied Klagenfurt, the archduke 
 having retreated to St. Veit on this day. But again 
 Napoleon had to wait, partly in order to bring up Chabot, 
 before advancing further, and partly in order to obtain 
 definite information as to Joubert's situation and as to the 
 enemy's forces facing Bernadotte. 
 
 On the 3ist March Napoleon advanced from Klagenfurt 
 to St. Veit, whilst Bernadotte marched upon Laibach. 
 The Austrians retreated again, and took up a position 
 behind the Gurk. But when, on the ist April, the 
 French appeared before this position, the archduke, still 
 resolved to wait for further reinforcements before accepting 
 battle, determined to retreat still farther. But Napoleon 
 followed him closely in this retreat, which began early in 
 the morning of the 2nd April, came up with the rear- 
 guard, and defeated it with heavy loss. His troops reached 
 
 I
 
 1 14 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Neumarkt that day, and Bernadotte received orders at 
 once to come up by forced marches via Klagenfurt. 
 The enemy's capital was now the objective, and the only 
 thing worthy of consideration for the moment was the 
 enemy's force which blocked the road to that capital. This 
 was now the decisive point, and therefore it was here that 
 Napoleon collected all his forces, not caring whether the 
 road via Laibach to Trieste and Udine remained open or 
 not. Thus he again obeyed "the principles of concentra- 
 tion, which are the true principles of strategy." l With 
 respect to Joubert he said : " At this moment we have not 
 assumed the offensive in a sufficiently marked manner, 
 and Vienna is not yet so directly threatened that the 
 enemy can have really given up all thought of resuming 
 the offensive in the Tyrol, but within forty-eight hours 
 everything will be changed." J And therefore he wrote to 
 Joubert : it was certainly possible that he might order him 
 up, but for the present he should only endeavour to keep 
 the road open to him in the Drave valley towards Lienz. 
 
 The Austrians continued their retreat in the night from 
 the 2nd to the 3rd April ; and the detachment left 
 behind before Laibach also received orders to fall back 
 with all speed to Bruck via Graz. Here we may see again 
 how effective is the plan of massing your troops on 
 the decisive point. It is true, Napoleon left the road to 
 Laibach open by ordering Bernadotte up; but the 
 enemy, threatened by the French full strength it his most 
 vulnerable point, was unable to take advantage of it, being 
 himself compelled to order the detached force to fall 
 back as quickly as possible. In the early morning of the 
 3rd, Napoleon pushed on after the archduke, and again 
 overtook his rearguard at Unzmarkt. This headlong and 
 untiring advance of Napoleon was not only due to his 
 natural desire to keep his retreating opponent in sight, it 
 vas partly also due to his hope of capturing one of the 
 
 1 Mem., Observations, etc., I. 414. 
 ' To Joubert, Friesach, 3rd April.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 115 
 
 latter's columns, which, as he was informed, had been 
 separated from the Tyrolese army corps and was en- 
 deavouring to join the archduke by the valley of the Mur. 
 This news was inaccurate, but its result was the eager 
 pursuit of the archduke ; and this furnishes a proof that 
 'with a generally correct appreciation of what is really 
 important in warfare, even mistakes, which must frequently 
 occur, may do no great harm. 
 
 During the next few days the Austrians continued their 
 retreat, and reached Bruck on the 6th, their rearguard 
 being at Leoben. That day plenipotentiaries from the 
 emperor arrived in Napoleon's headquarters at Judenburg, 
 and the negotiations, which began now, put an end to 
 the campaign. By the 7th a truce was concluded. But 
 Massena, foremost in the pursuit of the Austrians, arrived 
 in the evening of this day before Leoben and demanded 
 and obtained the evacuation of this town. Joubert, having 
 in Brixen received news and orders from Napoleon, had on 
 the 4th ordered Delmas to leave Botzen and join him, and 
 had then begun his march to the Puster valley, and had 
 arrived in Lienz. 
 
 Thus the head of Napoleon's columns was at Leoben, 
 only ninety-five miles from Vienna, twenty-eight days after 
 they were set in motion against the archduke, and one 
 year, to the very day, from the beginning of the operations 
 from the Genoese littoral against Beaulieu. 
 
 This last campaign assuredly furnishes food for much 
 reflection, and to us who desire to investigate Napoleon's 
 idea as a strategist, it teaches one lesson in particular. 
 We have already pointed out that it was his great funda- 
 mental axiom to mass his troops before coming in touch 
 with the enemy. Does not this campaign, however, 
 exhibit a violation of that principle, and can we, in view 
 of this violation, still consider the above as his guiding 
 axiom ? On this very question he himself wrote at St. 
 Helena, and argued with much show of reason that there 
 was in this campaign no instance of columns joining only
 
 1 1 6 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 in the presence of the enemy, nor of concentric operations. 
 But his argument is immaterial for our purpose. Even 
 if no one were convinced by it, the very circumstance that 
 Napoleon considered it necessary to defend himself against 
 the imputation that he had employed any concentric 
 operations, would be sufficient. The fact remains that 
 he did look upon such strategy as radically wrong, and 
 considered the principle of an advance by a single line 
 the only correct one; and it is this conviction of the 
 great strategist which is of importance for us, and not 
 whether he did or did not, in any given case, adhere 
 strictly to his own principle. " To operate in divergent 
 directions without any lines of communications is a 
 mistake, and it generally entails another. The detached 
 column has orders only for the first day; its operations 
 on the second depend on what the main column has done ; 
 the former therefore loses time in waiting for orders, or it 
 must depend on good luck." l 
 
 And here we must again emphatically point out that 
 Napoleon did recognize the existence and necessity for cer- 
 tain rules and principles in the art of war, for the tendency 
 of our days is to say that no such exist, that every case in 
 war is something new, which must and can be considered 
 only by itself, and that practical experience and not theory 
 is the key of the art. To such men Napoleon, who 
 certainly cannot be accused of following in the beaten 
 track of theory, answers : " The art of war is an art with 
 principles, which should never be violated," * and again, 
 " All the great generals of antiquity, as well as those who 
 have since worthily followed in their footsteps, accomplished 
 their great deeds only by obeying the rules and principles 
 of the art, i.e. by the correctness of their combinations 
 and a careful balancing of means and results, efforts and 
 obstacles. They have been successful only by adapting 
 
 1 Mem., Observations, etc., I. 396. 
 
 2 Memorandum for the King of Spain, Chalons-sur-Marne, 22nd 
 Sept., 1808.
 
 themselves to these rules, whatever in other ways the 
 boldness of their undertakings and the extent of their 
 operations may have been. They never ceased to make 
 of war a real science. To this extent are they our great 
 examples, and only by imitating them in this manner can 
 we hope to emulate them ; " ' and the same general replied 
 angrily, when the word " a methodical campaign " annoyed 
 him :" Every well-conducted war is a methodical war. . . . 
 The principles of the whole art of war are those which 
 guided the great generals whose grand exploits history has 
 handed down to us." * Of what value, indeed, would it be 
 for us to study the deeds of those men if no universal truths 
 were to be deduced from them ? The work of selecting 
 What was common to all the deeds of great generals and 
 welding it into a science was done in the camp of this 
 great strategical genius, whose deeds form its best illustra- 
 tion. It was under the influence of Napoleon's successes 
 that Jomini recognized the fundamental axiom of strategy 
 " to direct the bulk of the forces at the disposal of the 
 commander upon the decisive point, whether of the theatre 
 of war or of a battle-field ; " * it was during Napoleon's wars 
 that Jomini wrote his most important works, and to the 
 experience gained in them his " Precis of the Art of War " 
 owes its origin ; it is their ripest fruit and the clearest 
 exposition of how the art should be practically taught. 
 
 And now, if we turn to the consideration of the Italian 
 campaign as a whole, the first thing assuredly that strikes 
 every eye is the inborn genius for war of this youthful 
 leader. There was now, indeed, but one opinion about 
 him : " Here there is no one but looks upon him as a 
 man of genius. He has great power over the men who 
 form the Republican army. . . . His judgment is sure ; 
 his resolutions are carried out with all his powers. His 
 calmness amid the most exciting scenes is as remarkable 
 
 1 Me"m. de Ste. Hellene, VII. 238. 
 
 * Mdm., Dix-huit notes, etc., Ill 415. 
 
 * Introduction to the Study of great Combinations in Strategy and 
 Tactics, 8.
 
 1 1 8 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 as his extraordinary rapidity in changing his plans, if 
 forced to do so by unexpected circumstances." ' It is true 
 people noticed, also, that he never spared his men, that he 
 was hard, impatient, masterful ; but his bearing, his look, 
 his manner of speaking were those of a man born to 
 command ; everyone felt this and submitted. And yet his 
 companions in arms at that time speak with praise 
 of his easy and vivacious ways, his sparkling, brilliant 
 conversation, his jokes and good humour, where duty 
 was not in question : in one word, of that singular charm 
 which surrounded this genius in the freshness of his 
 youth. 
 
 And how striking, how original, his first appearance 
 had been ! It is true, the revolution, with its gigantic 
 levies, had already led up to the abandonment of the 
 eighteenth-century strategy, which we may call that of 
 Frederick, after its greatest exponent ; but as yet the new 
 departure was incomplete, as yet the leaders, men of 
 talent, but not of the first rank, had not freed themselves 
 wholly from old traditional methods, nor realized all the 
 logical conclusions to be deduced from the new state of 
 affairs ; they did not possess creative genius. It was 
 Napoleon who threw aside completely and without 
 distinction all and every tradition, and became, by his 
 victorious march from Nice to Leoben, at once the creator 
 and greatest representative of modern strategy, personify- 
 ing in himself all its ideas. This is the real significance of 
 the campaign of 1796. The leaders of the revolution also 
 had begun to cast aside the hindering chains of the maga- 
 zine system of Frederick's school ; they had, however, 
 looked on this emancipation not as a means of giving their 
 powers free play, but rather as an element which often led 
 to confusion. It is true, Napoleon found the old methods 
 already broken down, but it was the great work of his genius 
 that he put new ones in their place, and " assuredly the 
 greatest creative effort of the human mind is that which 
 1 Rapport du Gn. Clarke au Directoire. Milan, 7 d6c, 1796.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 119 
 
 makes real what was not so before." * The fact is, he had 
 original thoughts ; and this is rarer than people think, for 
 original thought creates new things, and " wherever there 
 is the creation of new things, there must be genius." * 
 
 Originality, then, is the most salient feature of this 
 campaign. But even if we admit this, there is still wide 
 room for admiration of the manner in which the original 
 conception was carried out. In the first place, it is the 
 planning of the individual movements which strikes us by 
 its simple grandeur. One guiding principle is always 
 present: "Strategy consists in always having, in spite 
 of an army of inferior strength, a larger force than the 
 enemy at the point attacked, or at the point which the 
 opponent attacks."* Keeping this always in view, and 
 having once made his plans, it seemed henceforth as if 
 Napoleon saw through the enemy's intentions, as if he 
 were guiding their movements himself ; accidents occurred 
 without interfering with the course of the campaign nay, 
 without being much noticed by the spectator, so clear an4 
 all-embracing was Napoleon's glance. 
 
 " Military science," he said, " consists in carefully 
 weighing all possible eventualities, and then, almost 
 mathematically, eliminating chance. It is here that no 
 error must be made, for a decimal more or less may 
 change everything. But this discrimination between skill 
 and chance can only be exercised by a real genius." * 
 
 This enlistment of chance, which " must ever remain 
 a mystery for mediocre minds, and which becomes of 
 importance to men of mark," * goes hand in hand with 
 a full command of all one's mental powers, such as 
 Napoleon possessed at all times and in every situation. 
 This is what has been called "two-o'clock-in-the-morning 
 courage, i.e. spontaneous courage, which, in spite of the 
 most unexpected occurrences, leaves us always the same 
 
 1 Mme. de Remusat, Me*m., I. 333. f The same. 
 
 1 Bourienne, Me*m. Napoleon's dictation, I. 180. 
 4 Mme. de Remusat, Mem., I. 333.
 
 I2O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 freedom of mind and judgment and decision ; " ! and with 
 respect to this, Napoleon added, he had found that he 
 himself possessed this kind of courage in an eminent 
 degree, and that he had seen but few individuals who 
 were not much inferior to himself in this point. His 
 contemporaries were indeed struck by the extraordinary 
 rapidity with which Napoleon was able to judge correctly 
 of any question. " The habit," says a writer in addressing 
 him, " which I recognized in you of seeing correctly, yet 
 very rapidly." * 
 
 And one other phase of moral courage must be alluded 
 to here, namely, the urgent desire to bring about a decision 
 by battle. This desire also is characteristic of great 
 generals ; it was this that raised Frederick the Great so 
 high above the other commanders of his time ; for it is 
 always a sign of self-confident mental power. Napoleon, 
 looking back upon more victorious battles than any 
 general in the annals of war, says : " People have a 
 mistaken idea of the strength of mind necessary to engage, 
 with full consideration of its consequences, in one of those 
 great pitched battles on which may depend the fate of an 
 army or a country and the possession of a throne," * and 
 he adds, that but few generals were eager to fight 
 battles. 
 
 The fact is, he possessed in the highest degree what he 
 himself considered as most desirable, namely, the quality 
 of " being foursquare, that is, of being as broad as one is 
 long," s as he called it. He meant by this, a complete 
 balance of perception and character or courage. " If 
 courage," he continued in his observations on this point, 
 " preponderates too much, a general will undertake things 
 above his grasp and commit errors, and on the other hand, 
 if his character or courage i much inferior to his percep- 
 tion, he will not dare to execute what he has conceived." * 
 
 Me"m. de Ste. He*lene, If. 17. 
 
 1 Comeyras to Napoleon, Milan, i$th July, 1796. 
 
 * Mem. de Ste. H&ene, II. iS.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797 121 
 
 Suppose Napoleon had fallen in the midst of his 
 undertakings, would not any one of his subordinates, 
 whichever of them we may imagine at the head of the 
 army, have shown a want of one or the other ? Would 
 Bernadotte or Serurier in his place have had moral 
 courage enough to carry out what Napoleon's foresight 
 had planned ; would Massena or Augereau have been able 
 to carry those bold enterprises with equal skill to a 
 successful issue ? Indeed, in Napoleon the clearest per- 
 ception of what was best was combined with the utmost 
 daring in carrying it out, however rash it might be. 
 
 And finally, all these qualities were inspired and set in 
 motion by an extraordinary ambition. Only this con- 
 stant keen desire to excel all others can call forth an 
 indefatigable activity, and thereby enable a soldier to 
 bring all the talents given him by nature into play, and to 
 gain ultimate success. Ambition is the fire, without 
 which no machine, however well put together and pro- 
 vided with material, can begin its work ; without ambition 
 a soldier resembles that horse of Roland's which was 
 possessed of every perfection, only, alas 1 he was dead. 
 How was it that Napoleon was at Leoben whilst Moreau 
 and Hoche had barely crossed the Rhine? It had been 
 his personal ambition, ever urging him fonvard, ever 
 thirsty for glory and conquest, which had carried him on ; 
 and just for this reason Napoleon's name is rightly placed 
 far above those of his contemporaries. Had Moreau and 
 Hoche been inspired by an equal ambition, they would 
 never have awaited on the Rhine the good pleasure of the 
 Directory. In his wrath, Napoleon wrote at that time : 
 " The armies of the Rhine can have no blood in their 
 veins. . . -. If you mean to enter on a campaign, nothing 
 ought to stop you ! " ' 
 
 But such an ambition must not be mean ; it must not 
 seek to rise by humiliating others ; it must be an 
 ambition like that which made young Caesar weep before 
 1 To tke Directoire, Leoben, i6th April.
 
 122 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the statue of Alexander, because the latter at his age had 
 already conquered the world ; an ambition like that, 
 which caused Napoleon to say : " I hold the immortality 
 of the soul to be the remembrance which we leave behind 
 in the minds of men. This thought is an inspiring one ; 
 it were better not to have lived at all than to leave no 
 trace of one's existence behind." l 
 
 Indeed, if we consider collectively the many-sidedness 
 and the great qualities necessary for a great general, and 
 recognize in what . a happy manner they were combined 
 in this one youthful soldier, we shall agree with wjiat 
 Desaix said, when Marmont spoke to him of Napoleon's 
 genius, at that time as yet unknown to the world : 
 " The chief-command of an army is the most difficult 
 thing on earth ; it is the one work of all others which 
 requires the display of the greatest number of qualities in 
 a given time." * 
 
 1 Bourienne, M&n., IV. 280. * Marmont, M&n., I. 80.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 EGYPT. 
 1798-99. 
 
 NAPOLEON'S many victories, Leoben, the i8th Fructidor, 
 and Campo Formio had raised him above the rank of 
 a mere general ; he was henceforth for his own and foreign 
 Governments a power which had to be reckoned with. 
 After having played the sovereign in Italy, to return to 
 Paris and become a simple citizen again was impossible ; 
 he felt this himself, and the Directory understood it ; hence 
 the expedition to Egypt. 
 
 To begin with, it is true he engaged in some political 
 intrigues, in order to gain a position worthy of his ambi- 
 tion and capacities ; but on the one hand his passionate 
 soldier nature was not yet experienced enough in those 
 mazes, and on the other the whole political situation was 
 not yet suitable, the pear, as he said himself, was not 
 yet ripe. Thus he was between two dangers, that of 
 ruining himself by precipitation, or of disappearing in the 
 crowd. He feared the latter himself: " In Paris all is soon 
 forgotten. If I remain here long without doing some- 
 thing or other, I am lost." ' Thus, to help himself out of 
 the difficulty, he chose what of old had led Caesar to Gaul, 
 a foreign expedition' at the head of an army. 
 
 At first the command of an army to invade England 
 was entrusted to him, but a personal examination of the 
 position of affairs soon caused him to reject this project 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Mem., II. 32.
 
 124 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 entirely, and his unquenchable desire for action sought 
 another outlet. " My glory is already at an .end ; there is 
 not enough of it in this little Europe. I must go to the 
 East ; all great glory comes from there." Indeed, to the 
 East his looks had long been directed ; to that land which 
 inflamed his imagination with its wonders. Already 
 during the negotiations with Austria at Passeriano he had 
 said : " Europe is a mole-heap ; only in the East have 
 there ever been great empires and great cataclysms ; in 
 the East there are six hundred millions of human beings." 1 
 The Directory, which had long since begun to mistrust 
 and fear him, and yet could not make up its mind to remove 
 him, was glad to get rid of him, even at the cost of a good 
 army, which France might very soon want again. "He 
 gets all he asks for. It seems as if the Directory wanted 
 to get rid of such a dangerous warrior at any cost." 1 
 
 Pepple have admired Napoleon very much at this 
 juncture for having, as they say, forecast the future so 
 truly, and having realized that he must give the Directory 
 time to work out its fate, while he himself kept at a 
 distance and acquired new glory, in order to be hailed 
 hereafter the saviour by all parties. True, so it turned 
 out, and some such calculation probably was in part at the 
 bottom of his Egyptian plan ; still, if we assume for 
 example that a revolution had taken place and another 
 man had seized the political power in France during his 
 absence, a thing which might any day have happened as 
 things then were, in that case would not the judgment of 
 history condemn a man like Napoleon, who considered 
 himself called upon to some day be the head of the State, 
 for leaving France for the sake of an expedition to Egypt 
 at a moment when everything at home was still in an 
 unsettled state ? The English ministry undoubtedly read 
 his scheming .mind correctly, when it mentioned in the 
 preface to the " Intercepted Correspondence of the French 
 Army in Egypt," that Napoleon certainly reckoned only 
 1 Bourrienne, M^m., II. 34, 44. Gohier, Mem., I. 29.
 
 EGYPT 125 
 
 upon a short stay there, as far as he himself was concerned, 
 and meant to return, accompanied by a few faithful 
 followers and covered with glory, so as to be feted as the 
 conqueror of Egypt. Aboukir ruined that well-devised 
 plan. 
 
 Still we shall have to confess, that in the uncertainty of 
 human life no definite plans can be based upon such far- 
 reaching calculations. One thing we may be sure of, that 
 Napoleon was even then aiming at becoming the master 
 of France ; but the means to that end were not yet quite 
 clear to him. He could not remain quietly at home. 
 Egypt lay ready to satisfy his impetuous desire for action ; 
 he seized the opportunity, and, as is so often the -case, 
 Fortune favoured the brave. He expected much of Fortune, 
 and it gave him even more than he asked. It was his very 
 absence that paved the way for the realization of his highest 
 ambition. A shrewd observer of things human said : 
 " I am certainly of opinion, that it is better to be too 
 impetuous than too cautious, for Fortune is a woman, and 
 whoever wishes to render her subservient to himself, must 
 beat and buffet her; indeed, we see that she lets herself be 
 mastered by such men, rather than by those who take her 
 coolly. And for this reason Fortune, like a woman, 
 always favours youth, because it is more inconsiderate 
 and passionate and orders her about with more free- 
 dom." ' 
 
 On the igth May, 1798, Napoleon set sail from Toulon 
 on board the Orient, and on the ist July he arrived 
 before Alexandria. Here he was informed that Nelson, 
 who was eagerly searching the Mediterranean for him, 
 had likewise been off this town on the 28th June, but 
 having, contrary to his expectations, not found the French 
 there, had departed immediately for Syria. Astonished at 
 his good luck, Napoleon determined to commence the 
 landing of his troops at once, in spite of the high sea and 
 the distance they lay from the shore. Bruey's advice to 
 1 Machiavelli : The Prince, 55.
 
 126 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the contrary he set aside with the words : " Admiral, we 
 have no time to lose. Fortune gives me only three days ; 
 if I do not make the most of them, we are lost." 1 The 
 landing commenced in the evening and continued during 
 the whole night without any particular mishap, and by 
 the morning about 4000 men of the divisions of Menou, 
 Kleber and Bon were on shore in the Bay of Marabout. 
 With these troops Napoleon himself set off immediately, 
 at three o'clock in the morning, Reynier having orders to 
 see to the landing of the rest of the troops. 
 
 The army at this time was thus constituted : 
 Chief of the staff : Berthier. 
 
 Kleber's Division : 2nd Light Infantry, 25th, 75th demi- 
 brigades of the line. 
 
 Desaix's Division: 2ist Light Infantry, 6 1st, 88th 
 demi -brigades of the line. 
 
 Bon's Division : 4th Light Infantry, i8th, 32nd demi- 
 brigades of the line. 
 
 Menou's Division: 22nd Light Infantry, I3th, 6gth 
 demi-brigades of the line. 
 
 Reynier's Division : Qth, 85th demi-brigades of the 
 
 line. 
 
 Each division numbered about 4500 men ; the cavalry 
 under Dumas 4000 men ; the artillery reserve 3000 men. 
 
 Besides the above-mentioned commanders, there were 
 also with him in various capacities many officers whose 
 ability Napoleon had recognized, and thus we find here 
 under his orders a large number of the men who after- 
 wards acquired the highest military glory under the 
 Empire : Murat, Lannes, Rampon, Junot, Marmont, 
 Davont, Friant, Belliard, Lanusse, Vial, Caffarelli, Duroc, 
 Bessieres, Rapp : all men worthy to accompany such a 
 commander-in-chief with such great deeds before him. 
 
 By nightfall on the 3rd July the landing of the French 
 troops was virtually completed. In the meantime Napoleon 
 had reached Alexandria on the 2nd. The Arabs tried at 
 1 Bourrierme, M&n, II. 86.
 
 EGYPT 127 
 
 first to resist, but when the French, attacking and turning 
 them, forced the Rosetta Gate, envoys were soon sent to 
 the camp announcing the surrender of the town. The 
 transports were now brought into the roads of Alexandria 
 and the fleet anchored in the bay of Aboukir. Napoleon 
 collected his army in Alexandria, but Desaix was sent 
 straight from the landing-place to Al Beda on the road to 
 Damanhur, and ordered to advance upon that town. 
 Napoleon's first move would be to seize Cairo. But the 
 army remained for the next few days in Alexandria to 
 wait till all the baggage and transport were landed. 
 Napoleon formulated the following rule to guide his 
 strategy under these new conditions : " My task will here 
 consist in keeping all my extraordinary resources hidden, 
 an3 using them only when I have to engage great masses ; 
 they will then be all the more telling." * 
 
 On the 5th the divisions of the army were set in motion. 
 In the assault upon Alexandria, Kleber and Menou had 
 been wounded ; the former therefore was made comman- 
 dant of that place, and the latter was destined for the same 
 post at Rosetta. Consequently Kleber's division was led by 
 Dugua, and Menou's by Vial. Reynier reached Al Beda on 
 the 5th, whilst Desaix was already on the march from that 
 place to Damanhur ; Vial followed in Reynier's rear, and 
 behind Vial came Bon, night marches being of course 
 common in this climate. Dugua was sent to Rosetta on 
 the evening of the 5th. On the afternoon of the 7th 
 Napoleon himself followed the army on the road to 
 Damanhur, which town Desaix had reached on the 6th. 
 
 This first march had given the French soldiers a suffi- 
 cient foretaste of those exertions, privations and sufferings 
 which this enterprise was to entail on them in such rich 
 measure, that soon there was no one, with the exception of 
 the commander-in-chief, but longed with all his soul to 
 quit the country, and cursed the campaign. He alone re- 
 mained unmoved by all the terrors of the climate, being only 
 1 To Desaix, Alexandria, jrd July.
 
 ia8 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 concerned about the glory he would gain ; and at a time 
 when men had begun to commit suicide to escape from 
 their present misery, he tapped the chief of his staff con- 
 tentedly on the shoulder and said : " Well, Berthier, here 
 we are at last." 1 And how tremendously his powers of im- 
 agination were excited by the grandeur of scenes around 
 him ! "In Egypt I saw myself freed from the fetters and 
 constraints of civilization ; I dreamt all sorts of things, 
 and saw the means of carrying out what I had dreamt. I 
 established a new religion ; I pictured myself on the road to 
 Asia on an elephant, a turban on my head, and holding in 
 my hand a new Koran, which I had written myself from 
 my own inspiration. I should have combined in my enter- 
 prises the traditions of the two worlds, putting under 
 contribution for my own advantage the whole domain* of 
 history; I should have attacked the British Empire in 
 India, and restored my connection with old Europe by 
 that conquest. The time spent in Egypt was indeed the 
 happiest of my life, for it was the most ideal." * 
 
 At Damanhur Napoleon assembled his army and con- 
 tinued on the gth his march to the Nile towards Rama- 
 nieh, to which place Dugua also received orders to march 
 from Rosetta. On the loth the army reached Ramanieh. 
 During this march the enemy was encountered for the first 
 time. Egypt stood at that time nominally under the 
 suzerainty of Turkey, but it was actually ruled by the war- 
 like caste of Mamalukes, whose capital was Cairo. In 
 this town Murad, universally acknowledged as the most 
 powerful of their beys, collected, upon the news of the 
 landing of the French, an army consisting, according to the 
 custom of the country, mostly of cavalry. Some flying 
 columns, sent out by him to reconnoitre, met Desaix's divi- 
 sion on the ioth.; but the superiority of European arms 
 and tactics immediately became evident, and the Mama- 
 lukes were soon repulsed by Desaix's fire. 
 
 1 Miot, Mm , 33. J Mme. de R^musat, Mdm., I. 274.
 
 EGYPT 129 
 
 On the I2th, after Dugua had also come up, the French 
 left Ramanieh once more, and, advancing along the Nile, 
 reached Minieh Salameh. Murad, who had started from 
 Cairo on the 6th, had meanwhile taken up a position near 
 Schebreket and entrenched himself there. On the I3th 
 the encounter took place. An armed flotilla on the Nile 
 accompanied the march of the French army. This flotilla, 
 being in advance of the army, met in the neighbourhood 
 of Schebreket a similar armament of the Mamalukes, and 
 had at first a hard tussle ; but finally, thanks to the 
 superiority of the French arms, victory rested with them. 
 On land meanwhile the army also came up, forming divi- 
 sional squares. The Mamalukes, about 5000 men, having 
 several times tried to find a point where their cavalry might 
 penetrate, but in vain, retreated to Cairo, with but little 
 loss. Napoleon, who had been satisfied with a passive 
 resistance, as he wished on this day only to familiarize 
 himself with his enemy's mode of fighting, christened 
 this insignificant skirmish " the battle of Schebrel'ss." 
 
 'On the 2ist he continued his march up the Nile, and in 
 sight of Cairo met the main force of the Mamalukes, near 
 Embabeh, with its left wing resting on the Pyramids, in 
 position for the defence of the capital. The French army 
 formed in the same order of battle as at Schebreket, the 
 divisions being posted chequer-wise in large squares, sup- 
 porting each other. But Napoleon, being now acquainted 
 with the effectiveness of this formation, and also with the 
 enemy's mode of attack, did rot intend merely to await 
 their attack, but to advance as well. In advancing he 
 brought his right wing more and more forward, so as to 
 force the enemy from his line of retreat and to hem him in 
 with his back to the Nile. A great cavalry charge of the 
 Mamalukes' left wing against the turning divisions of 
 Desaix and Reynier having failed on account of the heavy 
 fire of the latter, their right wing in the entrenched camp 
 of Embabeh was now attacked by Bon and Vial. This 
 camp was taken by storm, and the greater portion of its 
 
 K
 
 130 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 defenders perished in the waters of the Nile, The re- 
 mainder of the Mamalukes took flight, partly under Murad 
 into Upper Egypt, and partly under Ibrahim toBelbeiss and 
 Salahieh on the road to Syria. The French army halted 
 in the evening at Embabeh and round Gizeh. 
 
 On the 22nd the citadel of Cairo was occupied by Bon : 
 on the 23rd Desaix marched by Gizeh up the Nile and 
 took up a position commanding the road to Upper Egypt ; 
 on the 24th Napoleon moved his headquarters to Cairo, and 
 his divisions encamped in and around this town. From 
 here various arrangements were made to secure the 
 country conquered. Vial occupied Damietta with a small 
 detachment, Lannes taking his place at the head of 
 Menou's division. War contributions were levied, arms 
 confiscated, punishments decreed and mercilessly enforced, 
 for " the Turks can only be ruled by the greatest severity ; 
 every day five or six heads are cut off in the streets of 
 Cairo by my orders. Up till now we have been forced to 
 be lenient with them, in order to wipe out the reputation 
 of terror which preceded us ; but now, on the contrary, we 
 must make these tribes obey, and they only obey where 
 they fear." l 
 
 It was now Napoleon's intention to hunt Ibrahim 
 altogether out of Egypt into Syria, in order to secure what 
 he had conquered ; with Murad he attempted at first to 
 enter into negotiations. As a commencement of his 
 operations against Ibrahim he sent a vanguard on the 2nd 
 of August to Kanka, where it arrived on the 3rd. But on 
 the 5th it was driven out of this town by Ibrahim and 
 retired along the road to Cairo, where it met with Reynier, 
 whom Napoleon had likewise sent thither ; and on the morn- 
 ing of the 6th the French returned to the position of Kanka. 
 Napoleon had on the evening of the 5th already learnt what 
 had happened, and now considered the moment propitious 
 to execute his plan of defeating Ibrahim and driving him 
 from Egypt. Therefore he started himself oh the 7th 
 1 To Menou, Cairo, 3ist July.
 
 EGYPT i 3 i 
 
 tvith Lannes for Kanka, after having entrusted to Desaix 
 the chief command at Cairo and its safety against attacks 
 from Upper Egypt. 
 
 With the commencement of this new enterprise the 
 general dissatisfaction, the enormous disillusion and 
 dejection, which had come over leaders and men from the 
 moment of landing at Alexandria, for the first time broke 
 out and showed itself in grumbling and mutinous words. 
 But it did not go any further; for, before any actual 
 disobedience occurred, without any punishments or violent 
 measures, Napoleon managed to reconcile the men to 
 their duty by the mere force of his words and his person- 
 ality, and, as Savary says : " So great was the confidence 
 General Bonaparte had in himself, that he left Cairo in 
 spite of what had happened." l 
 
 On the 7th he arrived at Kanka, followed on the same 
 day as far as Matarieh by Dugua, who was also to take part 
 in the expedition against Ibrahim. On the gth Napoleon 
 reached Belbeiss, Ibrahim retreating before him to Salahieh. 
 On the loth the headquarters were at Korem, and on the 
 nth, Napoleon, hurrying forward in front of his infantry, 
 with his cavalry, only some 300 strong, came up with 
 Ibrahim at Salahieh. But the latter had already begun 
 his retreat into Syria, and all the French attacks on his 
 rearguard failed to induce him to make a stand. The 
 cavalry of the Mamalukes outnumbered the French, and 
 when the infantry came up, the enemy had already 
 disappeared into the desert. Napoleon now determined 
 to make Salahieh a depdt, and ordered it therefore to be 
 fortified as an earnest of his intended campaign in Syria. 
 Reynier was left behind there, and Dugua sent to 
 Manssurah on the I3th. The commander-in-chief himself 
 hastened back immediately to Cairo with the rest of the 
 troops. 
 
 Scarcely had he left Salahieh, when an aide-de-camp 
 arrived with a despatch from Kleber ; it contained the 
 1 M&n., I. 89.
 
 132 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 news of the destruction of the French fleet by Nelson at 
 Aboukir. Whatever may have passed at this moment 
 through Napoleon's mind, his companions read no sign ot 
 it in his face. Of course he understood what a terrible 
 impression this stroke must make upon his army, already 
 so disheartened ; but he only felt the increased necessity 
 of meeting the frowns of Fate and the dejection of his 
 men with firmness, and the classical phrase, " Si fractus 
 illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae," might well have 
 been applied to his conduct at this juncture. Both 
 leaders and men felt now more than ever that the future 
 safety of the army depended solely on this man of genius, 
 who set Fate at defiance. 
 
 This Egyptian enterprise is indeed less suited to serve 
 as a distinct military lesson than his other campaigns, for 
 the climate as well as the enemy were too much unlike 
 those to be met with in Europe. Still, the great principles 
 of warfare, true under all circumstances, were here, too, 
 acted on, and may here also be studied. For instance, 
 we see how Napoleon, after having once planned the 
 move against Ibrahim, collected all the forces at his 
 disposal, although he would have been sure of victory even 
 with inferior numbers ; but he adhered to the maxim that 
 all available troops should be collected whenever it is 
 intended to give battle. 
 
 And when afterwards, as we shall see presently, Desaix 
 was sent to Upper Egypt against Murad Bey, and issued 
 orders for concentric advance movements, in order not 
 only to defeat but also surround the enemy, Napoleon 
 immediately gave fresh evidence of the dislike he had 
 already shown in Italy for such complicated manosuvres, 
 dependent for their success upon the punctual arrival of 
 several columns ; and he hastened to write to his subordin- 
 ate officer : " You know that, as a rule, I dislike laboriously- 
 planned attacks. Seek to meet Murad, wherever you 
 can, but do so with your collected forces. If he then, on 
 the battle-field, makes a stand, you will take measures to
 
 EGYPT 133 
 
 inflict as severe a defeat upon him as possible." ! And on 
 this occasion he also thought it advisable to impress the 
 same lesson upon the chief of his staff ; indeed, he wished 
 to see his whole army as convinced as he was himself of 
 the efficiency of an advance in full strength, so that 
 even in his absence this great principle might be followed ; 
 and he therefore wrote to Berthier : " You will order 
 General Desaix to attack Murad Bey whenever and 
 wherever he may find him, but always to keep his troops 
 together ; it is not my wish that he should divide his forces 
 in order to turn him." * This simple lesson, always to 
 keep one's forces massed, reminds us of Jomini's words, 
 which he calls an indisputable truth, namely, that " the 
 simpler an important manoeuvre, the more certain its 
 success." 8 We may therefore, even in Egypt, learn 
 some lessons in warfare ; still, this campaign outside of 
 Europe is more important on the whole as bearing on the 
 character of Napoleon than on his strategy. 
 
 The news of Aboukir brought about an immediate 
 change of feeling in Egypt ; the whole population, besides 
 the Mamaluke beys Murad and Ibrahim, were inspired 
 with new hopes of being able to get rid of the French ; 
 and the Porte also determined to declare against France. 
 Still, for the present, a time of comparative rest began for 
 the French, of which they took advantage to establish a 
 civil administration and secure their conquest. Desaix 
 only was sent to Upper Egypt. His troops were em- 
 barked on Nile boats on the 25th August, and reached 
 Siut on the I4th September ; but here he was in- 
 formed that Murad, having eluded him by marching 
 through the Great Desert to the right, was advancing 
 upon Cairo. Desaix therefore immediately descended 
 the river again on the iQth ; he met Murad on the 7th 
 October at Sediman, and defeated him. After this, he 
 remained in the neighbourhood of Benissuoff, and busied 
 himself with the subjugation of the country. 
 1 Cairo, 4th September. ' Cairo, 4th September. Pre'cis, etc., 228.
 
 134 NAPOLEON' AS A GENERAL 
 
 We may say that this period- proves Napoleon's un- 
 flinching firmness of mind in carrying out any enterprise 
 once entered on, even more than his imperturbability after 
 Aboukir, and this I consider the most significant 
 characteristic of him as a general. A weak man may 
 indeed withstand the shock of a great misfortune ; it is the 
 continued daily renewed struggle against misfortune, 
 never allowing any relaxation, which ends by exhausting 
 the energy of strong men. And what desperate difficulties 
 of various kinds Napoleon had to encounter day by 
 day, let us gather from eye- witnesses, and most of all 
 himself. 
 
 The whole population around him was hostile ; the 
 people of the country, though defeated, were not sub- 
 jugated, nor would they be so for a long time.* The 
 smallest transport, every messenger had to be escorted by 
 troops ; resistance was always cropping up in all quarters ; 
 Frenchmen were murdered. " Faith, it is a war, worse 
 than that of La Vendee." a Such orders as the follow- 
 ing were constantly being issued by Napoleon : 
 " Citizen-general, you must utilize the days during 
 which the division of General Dugua can remain in 
 Damietta, to disarm the town, to imprison the suspects, 
 and to send them to Cairo, to disarm the villages, and 
 take hostages." 3 "I am annoyed, citizen-general, to learn 
 that the five villages, which have behaved so badly, have 
 not yet been disarmed." 4 " You will order General Lannes 
 to march to-morrow at daybreak with 400 men to the 
 village of El Katah, on the Rosetta arm, in order to 
 punish its inhabitants for having stopped two dschermes 
 (Nile boats) loaded with artillery, this morning." 5 . Again 
 and again such punitive measures had to be taken, and we 
 
 1 Correspondence de 1'arme'e francaise. Girey to Ramcy. Rosetta, 
 28th July, 1798. 
 
 2 The same. Damas to Kleber. Bulak, 27th July. 
 s To Vial, Cairo, 26th September. 
 
 4 To Dugua, Cairo, 6th October. 
 ' To Berthier, Cairo, ist November.
 
 EGYPT 135 
 
 may judge from the strength- of the above-mentioned 
 detachment how unsafe the country was. 
 
 And yet with what severity resistance was punished ! 
 " You will have the kindness, citizen-general, to give 
 orders to the commandant of the place to cut off the heads 
 of all who are caught red-handed. Let them be led this 
 night to the banks of the Nile, between Bulak and Old 
 Cairo, let their headless trunks be thrown into the river. 1 
 Every night we cut off some thirty heads, especially of 
 the ringleaders ; this will, I think, be a lesson to them.* 
 The stage-coach of Damietta has been attacked, citizen- 
 general, and the officials have been murdered, as, I fancy, 
 by the villagers of Ramleh, etc. Try to capture the 
 ringleaders, and have their heads cut off." * 
 
 Above all, the French did not forget, in the meantime, 
 to levy indemnities, and to confiscate private property. 
 The orders to this effect were very numerous, for the 
 army was in urgent need of funds, so much so, indeed, 
 that as Bourrienne, one of those immediately about 
 Napoleon's person, admits, it was customary at this time 
 to resort to shooting men in order to get their money ; 
 and the following order of Napoleon confirms this dis- 
 closure : " Enclosed, citizen-general, you will find an 
 order, which you will communicate to Korai'm ; according 
 to the usual course of these matters in this country, I 
 give him this day to redeem his life by handing over 
 30,000 talars to the military chest." 4 By such stringent 
 measures, order and security were gradually restored to 
 some extent. " 
 
 But another enemy had to be dealt with day by day, 
 namely, the state of the army itself. Want of discipline 
 and habits of plunder on the part of the soldiers, as well 
 as embezzlements on the part ot the officials, had, even in 
 
 1 To Berthier, Cairo, 23rd October. 
 1 To Reynier, Cairo, 27th October. 
 1 To Lanusse, Cairo, 27th October. 
 4 To Dupuy, Cairo, 5th September
 
 136 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Italy, been the order of the day. All these evils were 
 repeated here : "'We loot the villages, ruin the natives and 
 violate their women." l 
 
 But a new element was here added to those evils. In 
 Italy officers and privates were enthusiastic in doing their 
 duty, they hailed the continuance of the war with delight ; 
 here the very opposite of this was the case. Egypt had 
 been painted to them as a promised land, but the first step 
 on its soil brought bitter disappointment. . " This is a 
 land of misery. The inhabitants are savages, who have in 
 every way incurred the curse of nature ; they have not 
 one thing in their favour. In every village of Lower Egypt 
 one is, so to speak, in the midst of a band of murderers." J 
 No sooner did the troops enter the first town, than they 
 came to the following conclusion : " There is nothing on 
 earth so wretched, so miserable, so unhealthy as Alexan- 
 dria; the houses are mud hovels, with holes instead of 
 windows ... in a word, imagine the ugliest and worst-built 
 pigeon-cotes, and you will have a correct idea of Alexan- 
 dria." * Nor did Cairo please them any better. " This 
 town is horrible ; the streets breathe the plague on account 
 of the filth, the people are disgusting and brutalized." 4 
 " This abominable hole of a Cairo is inhabited by lazy 
 vagabonds, squatting all day long before their disreputable 
 hovels." * 
 
 Every march, every movement of the army, entailed the 
 greatest sufferings. " Since *we have been in Egypt, the 
 army has not ceased to suffer. The tremendous exertions 
 we have had to make in the desert ; the great heat, which 
 seemed to make the soil red-hot ; the necessity of being con- 
 stantly on the march, though entirely without provisions : 
 all this has l*d to many volunteers dying, falling suddenly 
 
 1 Correspondence de Tarmac fran^aise, 2 e partie, IV., Cairo, 25th July. 
 1 The same. 
 
 3 The same, I* partie, Rosetta, 27th July. 
 
 4 Dupuis to Carlo, Cairo, 29th July. 
 
 * Damas to Kleber, Bulak, 27th July.
 
 EGYPT 137 
 
 down from sheer exhaustion." * On all sides an intense 
 longing showed itself to get away from this country. " I 
 assure you, that if I ever have the happiness to set foot on 
 my native soil once more, it will be never to leave it again. 
 There are not four Frenchmen among the forty thousand 
 here but think the same." * " It is almost impossible 
 for me to convey any idea to you of what we have suffered ; 
 sufferings upon sufferings, privations, misery, fatigues, we 
 have gone through them ail to the utmost." * " We are 
 living in a country of which everyone is sick to death. If 
 the army had known it before leaving France, not one of 
 us would have embarked; we should all have preferred 
 death a million times to exposing ourselves to the 
 wretchedness in which we are here." 4 
 
 Not a few indeed confirmed the truth of these last words 
 by their suicide. " Several soldiers have blown out their 
 brains, others have cast themselves into the Nile ; some 
 dreadful things have happened." * " We have had men 
 here, who committed suicide in the very presence of the 
 commander-in-chief, saying to him, ' This is your 
 work ! ' " r Thus the army was not far from mutinying. 
 " Some soldiers have been overheard to remark, on seeing 
 their generals pass, ' There they are, the butchers of the 
 French,' and a thousand other expressions of the same 
 kind." 7 
 
 But whenever the dissatisfaction with the Egyptian 
 campaign went so far as to induce officers to send in their 
 resignation, Napoleon resorted to severe censure. " The 
 commander-in-chief acknowledges the letter of resignation 
 sent in by citizen Beauvais, adjutant-general. An officer 
 who quits the service in good health in the middle of a 
 
 1 Dezirard to Adeline, Cairo, I7th August. 
 
 Tatlieu to his wife, Rosetta, 4th August. 
 
 Colbert to Collasse, Tersi, 25th July. 
 
 Rozis to Grivet, Alexandria, 9th September. 
 
 Gay to his parents, Cairo, I4th October. 
 
 Rozis to Grivet, Alexandria, 9th September. 
 * Boyer to his parents, Cairo, a8th July.
 
 138 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 campaign cannot have entered on it with the intention of 
 gaining glory and assisting in the establishment of universal 
 peace ; he must have been induced to join by some other 
 motive, and is therefore not worthy of the men whom I 
 command." ' And when this public disgrace was not 
 sufficient to overcome in officers their disgust for Egypt, 
 Napoleon wrote in answer to a request for leave to return 
 to France on the part of another officer : " The com- 
 mander-in-chiefs reply to this request is, that it is his 
 desire that you should employ this officer constantly in 
 outpost duties, since he gained his rank as major-general 
 in Paris and without seeing a shot fired." * 
 
 And to crown all, sickness appeared, as might have been 
 expected considering the climate and the efforts made. 
 " The greater part of the army suffer from diarrhoea, and 
 although victorious, will perish miserably after all." 4 
 "About 200 blind are starting this day, citizen-general, 
 for Rosetta; it is my desire that they should be sent 
 home to France." 4 At the beginning of 1799 the plague, 
 that scourge of the East, broke out. 
 
 But is it not, considering all these circumstances, a most 
 convincing proof of the greatness of this general, only 
 twenty-nine years old, that in spite of all this, the restraints 
 of discipline still held good, and that the army, in spite of 
 all, remained manageable ? The fact is, there was, in all 
 these men, outweighing even their sense of suffering, the 
 consciousness that Napoleon alone was able to cope with 
 the situation ; indeed, the very circumstances which would 
 have destroyed the influence of an ordinary nature, gave 
 to his genius its incontestable" dominion over his men. 
 " When the officers and men saw Alexandria and the 
 deserts surrounding it, they were stupefied with amazement. 
 Bonaparte put new life into them." 5 " Our confidence in 
 
 1 Ordre du jour, Cairo, i4th October. 
 
 * To Dommartin, Cairo, loth December. 
 
 3 Pistre to Pistre, Cairo, i6th August. 
 
 4 To Berthier, Cairo, 28th January, 1799. 
 
 * Jaubert to Bruix, anchorage of Aboukir, 9th July.
 
 EGYPT i 39 
 
 Bonaparte is unlimited." ' " You may easily imagine how 
 difficult our situation in this country has become through 
 this event ( Aboukir) , which would rob the army of all hope 
 were we not aware of the commander-in-chief s genius. 
 Therefore we confidently lay upon him the burden of 
 extricating us' from the difficulties in which we find our- 
 selves." ' 
 
 In studying such a campaign ihe question forces itself 
 upon us whether, under similar circumstances, we should 
 have done more than those men or borne everything with 
 greater fortitude than they did ; and there may be moments 
 when we might hesitate to answer in the affirmative. At 
 such moments we admire Napoleon, as he deserves. He 
 never forgot 'that Menou, half-deranged as he was, was at 
 this time one of the few who did not give up hope of an 
 ultimate happy issue to the enterprise. And his later 
 career was a proof that Napoleon so remembered it. It 
 would be a mistake to suppose that the egotism, which 
 was apparently such a marked characteristic of his, was 
 of a narrow kind ; on the contrary, he ever held services 
 rendered in faithful memory, most of all those rendered to 
 him at the time when his career had not as yet reached 
 its climax; and he knew how to reward them lavishly. 
 " Bonaparte," as Marmont testifies, " never forgot any 
 proofs of attachment he received." 8 
 
 The positions of the French army in the autumn and 
 winter of 1798 were as follows : 
 
 Headquarters : Cairo. 
 
 Dugua at Manssurah, afterwards at Damietta. 
 
 Reynier at Salahieh. 
 
 Desaix near Benissuof. 
 
 Lannes and Bon at Cairo. 
 
 This latter town was, according to Napoleon's order of 
 the 9th October, put in a state of defence and forts erected 
 
 1 Le Pre to Beytz, Alexandria, 5th August. 
 1 Miot to Miot, Cairo, 15:11 August 
 ' M&n., I. 412.
 
 140 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 round it. A rising of the populace, which broke out on 
 the 22nd October, was quickly and sternly quelled the 
 very day after its outbreak. 
 
 The 6gth demi-brigade of the line, forming part of 
 Lannes' division, was sent to Alexandria, where Kleber 
 commanded, whilst the 4th Light Infantry, of Bon's 
 division, was sent to Rosetta, where Menou was inr 
 command.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SYRIA. 
 
 (24) ALTHOUGH no regular news had been received since 
 Aboukir and the blockade of Alexandria by the English 
 immediately after that battle, Napoleon managed in 
 various ways to get some general information as to the 
 plans of his enemies. . England and Turkey were to make 
 common cause against him, and the attack was to be 
 made by their combined forces. One Turkish army was 
 collecting in Syria, under the chief command of Achmed 
 Pasha, surnamed Djezzar (butcher) on account of his 
 cruelty ; another Turkish army was assembling at Rhodes, 
 to land in Lower Egypt ; and the operations were to be 
 supported by an English fleet. 
 
 But Napoleon resolved, as he had already done so often 
 in Italy, not to give time to his opponents to carry this 
 combined plan into effect, but to throw himself quickly 
 upon one of them. This could of course only be done 
 against Djezzar. No landing had as yet been effected in 
 Lower Egypt, therefore there was as yet no enemy there 
 to fight against ; but the army in Syria was already fully 
 formed, it had occupied Gaza, and pushed its vanguard 
 forward as far as El Arish. Here then there was 
 an opponent, and a march to Syria was therefore 
 determined on. On the 2nd December, Bon was sent 
 to Suez with a small detachment, to establish a dep6t 
 there. On the 26th, Napoleon arrived there in person and 
 stayed three days, in order to examine the locality and 
 mak* various arrangements. On the 2nd January, 1799,
 
 142 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Reynier advanced as far as Katieh, and on the last 
 lay of this month Napoleon gave orders for the general 
 advance. 
 
 The army of operations in Syria consisted of the 
 divisions of Kleber, Reynier, Bon and Lannes ; each of 
 these, however, being obliged to leave detachments 
 behind to garrison Egypt, only numbered 2500 men ; of 
 cavalry, artillery and engineers there were about 3000 men 
 with them. In Alexandria, Marmont held the chief 
 command in the place of Kleber ; that of Cairo w"as 
 entrusted to Dugua. The whole army moved in the first 
 place on El Arish : Napoleon himself left Cairo on the 
 loth February at 10 p.m. Lannes was at Belbeis on 
 the same day, and Bon at Salahieh. 
 
 Meanwhile, Reynier had arrived in front of El Arish the 
 day before, had taken this village by storm, though it was 
 obstinately defended by about 2000 men, and had thrown 
 its defenders, still numbering 1500 men after their losses 
 in the fight, back into the fort. And now the French 
 were forced to open trenches against the latter, though it 
 possessed no guns, and to place field artillery in position 
 so as to effect a breach, for they could not with their 
 small numbers afford the losses which an assault would 
 entail. On the I2th, Kleber also arrived in front of El 
 Arish. But, meanwhile, hostile troops were approaching 
 from Gaza as well, and their numbers increasing daily, 
 until they reached several thousands, they encamped on 
 the I3th behind a dried-up watercourse in the face of the 
 French. During the night of the I4th-I5th, they were, 
 however, surprised by Reynier, who had turned their 
 position, and utterly routed. On the I7th, Napoleon 
 himself arrived here, and on the i8th he could say: 
 "The four divisions of infantry and the cavalry are 
 assembled before El Arish, citizen-general, after having 
 crossed the desert with ease, thanks to the measures 
 which had been taken/' * In the afternoon of the 20th, 
 1 To Dugua, before El Arish.
 
 SYRIA 143 
 
 El Arish surrendered, after a breach had been effected ; 
 but the resoluteness of the defenders in resisting to the 
 utmost procured thwn very favourable conditions. 
 
 On the 2ist February, Kleber was sent on in advance 
 along the road to Gaza, and on the next day Bon and 
 Lannes followed, Reynier remaining near El Arish until 
 the 25th. Napoleon himself started on the 23rd, but 
 when he arrived in Chan Junes, he ascertained that his 
 divisions had lost their way, and did not succeed till the 
 next day in concentrating them near this place. There 
 was some hostile cavalry in front of him, but it fell back 
 upon Gaza, and the French army, continuing its march, 
 arrived before this town on the 25th. Here a corps of 
 several thousand men was in position under Abdallah ; but 
 when Napoleon ordered his army to deploy and advance, 
 they fell back without any serious resistance. 
 
 The army remained only two days in the neighbourhood 
 of Gaza. Both the fort there and that 'of El Arish were 
 placed in a proper state of defence, a precaution Napoleon 
 never neglected for the security of his communications, 
 for this bold and victorious general always took the 
 possibility of a reverse into account in his plans of opera- 
 tion. Herein his art of war differed from his methods in 
 politics. " You will understand that events may happen 
 which would make El Arish the most advartced post of 
 our line of operations, and, as this fort can hold out for a 
 fortnight or even a month, it may be of incalculable value 
 to us." ' 
 
 On the 28th, the army, with Reynier's division as rear- 
 guard, started once more from Gaza, and on the 3rd 
 March it arrived before Jaffa, Reynier following two days 
 later. The capture of this town would give Napoleon 
 access to the sea, and he was expecting supplies, as well 
 as portions of a siege train from Alexandria by sea. Here 
 again trenches were opened, the field guns placed in posi- 
 tion, and Bon and Lannes began regular siege operations ; 
 1 To Caffarelli, Jaffa, loth March.
 
 144 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Kleber being ordered forward on the road to Acre, to cover 
 the siege. The garrison offered a determined resistance, 
 and even ventured upon two sorties, which, however, were 
 easily repulsed. On the 7th March, in the afternoon, 
 the place was taken by storm, after a breach had been 
 made, and the garrison, having refused to surrender, 
 " were put to the sword, the town was given over to 
 plunder, and suffered all the horrors of a place taken by 
 assault." l 
 
 Indeed, it was not merely the fury of the soldiers, 
 infuriated by resistance, that proved fatal to the defenders 
 of Jaffa, but also the deliberate calculation of the com- 
 mander-in- chief. About 2000 Turks had been taken 
 prisoners. It was impossible for the French to carry them 
 with them, for already the difficulties of the commissariat 
 were exceedingly great ; to liberate them on parole would 
 have been a measure which, even among civilized nations, 
 has often proved ineffective with respect to private soldiers, 
 and, indeed, instances of officers of high rank could be 
 quoted who broke their parole ; to send them to Egypt 
 would have required an escort which Napoleon could not 
 spare, as well as provisions and stores which, could not be 
 procured or conveyed. For two days Napoleon thought 
 about the matter, then issued this order : " You willt>rder 
 the adjutant-general on service to convey all the gunners 
 and other Turks who were captured in Jaffa with arms in 
 their hands to the sea-shore, and have them shot, taking 
 care that none escape." * 
 
 In the eyes of mere didactic historical writers, this deed 
 may appear horrible and revolting, but practical military 
 history must not consider it as such. The safety of one's 
 own army, on which the possibility depends of ultimately 
 gaining the victory, must outweigh all other con- 
 siderations. If such an act is necessary for the safety 
 of one's army, it is not only justified, but its repetition in 
 
 1 Napoleon, Mem., Camp. d'Egypte et de Syrie, II. 32. 
 J To Berthier, Jaffa, 9th March.
 
 SYRIA 145 
 
 any future war would be advisable, and no convention 
 could alter this fact. In the exceptional circumstances 
 of warfare, no other motto is permissible but this, " Salus 
 publica summa lex ! " and any conclusion of conven- 
 tions can, and is meant to be, binding only as far as 
 the above principle allows. Cases will indeed occur in 
 every war where the combatants are forced to violate the 
 literal text of conventional laws for their own safety, 
 and in such cases recriminations may indeed be 
 defensible for political purposes, but are, for all that, 
 untenable. Napoleon himself considered his action at 
 Jaffa as quite natural, and spoke of it as such to his 
 subordinate officers ; it did not enter his head to discuss 
 the necessity for his resolution. He wrote to Marmont : 
 " The capture of Jaifa has been a brilliant affair ; 4000 of 
 the best troops of Djezzar and the best gunners of 
 Constantinople had to be put to the sword ; " l and to 
 Kleber : " The garrison of Jaffa consisted of nearly 4000 
 men ; 2000 were killed in the town, and nearly 2000 were 
 shot between yesterday and to-day." l We mentioned 
 some time ago that Napoleon could not really be said to 
 have been cruel, but he did possess the strength of mind 
 to be hard and to look on men at certain times as mere 
 counters ; and this strength of mind a general must 
 possess. 
 
 Jaffa was now again placed in a state of defence, and 
 three frigates received orders to set sail from Alexandria 
 to that place; Reynier was left behind there for the 
 present, whilst on the I4th March the army started 
 upon its march to Acre. On the next morning Napoleon 
 met a hostile corps at Korssum ; it was forced to fall back, 
 it is true, but owing to the broken ground, where the 
 agility and local knowledge of the natives were of special 
 advantage against the tactics of the French, it inflicted 
 some losses upon Lannes' division which was pressing it 
 too close ; a fact which brought upon this general a 
 1 Jaffa, 9th March. Ibid. 
 
 L
 
 146 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 reprimand from Napoleon : " We are not in a position to 
 indulge in such feats of daring.*' * On the I7th the army 
 entered the plain of Acre. 
 
 Napoleon took up his position on the reverse slope of a 
 ridge, which stretched towards the north as far as the sea, 
 and the occupation of which cut oif Acre from the land, as 
 this town lies on a sort of peninsula. Kleber was on the 
 right wing, Lannes and Bon in the centre, Reynier, who 
 had followed at an interval of .two days' march, on the 
 left wing. On the igth the town fortifications were 
 reconnoitred, and their appearance gave hopes that this 
 town would fall no less speedily than Jaffa; a slight 
 wound, however, which the reconnoitring engineer-officer 
 sustained in his hand, induced him to give up any further 
 attempt to gain a nearer view, and on his return he reported 
 that the place had no counterscarp. The attack was 
 begun on the aoth by opening trenches ; it was directed 
 against the eastern front. This front was formed by two 
 sides meeting at a right angle ; at the apex of this project- 
 ing angle there was a strong tower, commanding the other 
 works of defence, and enfilading the two sides of the angle, 
 and it was against this projecting tower that the attack 
 was more especially directed. 
 
 To cover the siege from any attack from the outside, 
 Napoleon watched the line of the Jordan, and stationed 
 for this purpose four corps of observation at Haifa, 
 Nazareth, Safed, and before Tyre. Having, done this, he 
 impressed upon their commanders the necessity of seeing 
 that nothing crossed this line without their knowledge. 
 " We shall feel secure, convinced that you will allow no 
 enemy to cross this line between the mills of Daud and 
 Sherdahm, without letting us know at once." 8 
 
 On the 28th March the works had advanced so far 
 that the breaching batteries could open fire against the 
 tower, and in the afternoon, at three o'clock, the breach 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Me*m., II. 229. 
 
 To Murat, before Acre, loth April.
 
 SYRIA 147 
 
 was considered practicable and orders were given for an 
 assault. This, however, was foiled by the counterscarp of 
 the ditch, an obstacle the existence of which was only 
 now perceived. It is true, under the assumption that 
 some counterscarp was probably in existence, a mine had 
 been sunk, but it had not taken effect. Meanwhile, the 
 town had received, about the beginning of March, a most 
 valuable reinforcement in the shape of an English squadron 
 under Sidney Smith ; no complete investment was thus 
 possible, and the road remained open for the arrival of war 
 materials and provisions, besides which the fleet captured 
 the vessels which were bringing up the heavy siege guns 
 to Napoleon, and thus the latter was reduced to a great 
 extent to mining for the further continuation of the siege ; 
 and we know what that means for the besiegers. Djezzar, 
 aided by a late French officer of artillery and former 
 comrade of Napoleon at the Paris Academy, Picard de 
 Phelippeaux (he had left it number forty-firs^ on the list. 
 Napoleon being forty-second, next), as well as by some 
 English officers and gunners, offered a resistance, of which 
 the annals of Turkish warfare furnish so many examples 
 in the defence of places open to assault or having 
 practicable breaches in their walls ; still, the various 
 vigorous sorties he made were repulsed. 
 
 Meanwhile a relieving army was beginning to assemble 
 in the neighbourhood of Damascus, and in the first 
 week of April Napoleon received news that hostile bodies 
 of troops were crossing the Jordan, both to the north 
 and the south of Lake Tiberias, and also that depots 
 were being formed at Tiberias. A strong reconnaissance, 
 conducted by Junot, met with superior forces no further 
 off than Lubi, halfway between Nazareth and Tiberias, and 
 fell back fighting to Nazareth. 
 
 To guard against these movements Napoleon sent 
 Kleber to Nazareth, and on the nth April the latter 
 effected a junction with Junot. Advancing thence to 
 Lubi, he met on the further side of Kana about 4000 men,
 
 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 mostly cavalry, and threw them back upon the Jordan ; 
 then, however, he retired to Nazareth, for he was justly 
 afraid of being compelled, if he advanced immediately, to 
 engage the whole relieving army. 
 
 The latter now crossed the Jordan in full strength by 
 the Medschamia bridge to the south of Lake Tiberias; 
 a detached corps crossing the bridge of Jakub on the 
 north of the lake, invested Safed. Napoleon, in order 
 to block the retreat of the latter, sent Murat early in 
 the morning of the I4th, to the bridge of Jakub, order- 
 ing Kleber at the same time to continue to watch the 
 relieving army and to prevent it moving on Acre. 
 However, it was not at present advancing directly on 
 Acre, but moved on the I4th to the left to the plain of 
 Esdrelon, where it received reinforcements from Samaria 
 and Nablus ; its total strength possibly amounted at this 
 time to 15,000 men. 
 
 Kleber noticed this movement and remembered 
 Napoleon's injunction : " If, in the varied movements 
 which may occur, you can find means to put yourself 
 between the enemy and the Jordan, do so, without being 
 deterred by the thought, that this might cause them to 
 march against us," l he therefore resolved now to carry 
 out this manoeuvre, and reported that he would start 
 on the I4th. Thereupon Napoleon conceived the plan 
 of acting according to the principle which he followed 
 before Mantua, namely, first to deal with the relieving 
 army and to employ as many troops as possible from 
 the besieging army for this purpose ; of course the great 
 tactical superiority of his army permitted him in this case 
 to keep up the siege at the same time. 
 
 Consequently he started on the I5th with Bon's division 
 viA Nazareth, in order to come in touch with Kleber. 
 The latter had meanwhile gained the line pi retreat of the 
 Turkish army to the Jordan, and resolved to attack it 
 during the night of the I5th-i6th, again acting on Napo- 
 " Before Acre, I3th April.
 
 SYRIA 149 
 
 Icon's directions : " Should the enemy dare to pitch his 
 camp close to yours, the commander-in-chief is sure you 
 will make a night attack on him, which will have the same 
 result as that of El Arish." l However, this plan failed. 
 The morning of the i6th came before Kleber reached 
 the enemy, and in the plain, bounded on the north-east by 
 Mount Tabor, he saw himself soon surrounded on all sides 
 and attacked by superior fortes. He formed his troops 
 into two squares, and in this formation he was successful 
 in repulsing all attacks, until Napoleon appeared, who in 
 the meantime had quite turned the enemy and shut him 
 in between himself and Kleber. The Turks succumbed 
 entirely to the combined attack and fled with great losses, 
 partly beyond the Jordan and partly into the mountains. 
 Then Napoleon returned with Bon to the army before 
 Acre ; Kleber resumed his position near Nazareth, after 
 having first pursued the fugitive enemy on the 17 th as far 
 as the Jordan. 
 
 Meanwhile, at Acre a mine had been constructed, in 
 order to open a breach in the large tower, and Napoleon 
 reckoned with full confidence upon success ; in a letter 
 to Dugua he already anticipated the surrender of the 
 town on 25th April. Besides, nine heavy guns had been 
 landed safely at Tantura by three frigates coming from 
 Alexandria, and these were now on the road to the 
 besieging force. 
 
 On the 24th Napoleon ordered the great mine to be 
 fired, but the result was insufficient, part of its effect being 
 lost in a subterranean chamber, and the breach was not 
 sufficiently practicable to begin the assault. Consequently 
 the bombardment continued for a few days in order to 
 complete the breach, and on the 30th April the first heavy 
 guns were placed in position. 
 
 In addition to the breach in the great tower, Napoleon 
 now gave orders to direct the guns, so as to open a breach 
 in the curtain to the east of it, and pushed forward mines in 
 1 Before Acre, i^th April.
 
 150 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 order to destroy the counterscarp opposite the proposed 
 second breach. In the meantime, however, the enemy 
 began a counter attack, and ran counter approaches along 
 the front of attack from two places d'armes ; an attempt 
 to eject them from these works had only a temporary 
 success ; whilst they on their side succeeded in reaching 
 and destroying the mine in front of the curtain opposite 
 the counterscarp. Now Napoleon's efforts were again 
 directed against the big tower and the enemy's outworks. 
 After a fruitless attempt on the 6th, he.,succeeded in the 
 evening of the 7th May in taking the enemy's places 
 d'armes and the works on the glacis, and also in occupying 
 the large tower. On the gth, the batteries resumed their 
 fire, after want of powder had silenced them for a few 
 days ; the main fire was now directed against the curtain, 
 for, being masters of the ditch, the French were now able 
 to make use of the breach there ; but there was as yet no 
 access to the town from the tower, and the besieged had 
 thrown up new defences inside the inner wall. 
 
 Early in the morning of the loth, the French army 
 prepared for the assault ; Kleber also had been ordered up 
 for , it ; the breach in the curtain appeared practicable ; 
 the principal storming column indeed reached it, but the 
 defenders were successful in recovering their places d'armes, 
 and from them, advancing along the ditch, they attacked 
 this column in the rear, whilst the breach itself was mean- 
 while so effectually enfiladed from the traverses and a 
 tower on the wall, that the storming party could not 
 stand their ground in it, The men fell back, and the 
 assault had failed. 
 
 This was the first real check Napoleon met with, for 
 the repulse of this assault meant the loss of the 
 campaign ; the number of days which he could still stop 
 before Acre were very few. He could not repeat the 
 assault ; in his army the plague was raging ; from Egypt 
 news was continually arriving of fresh troubles having 
 broken out, and the landing of a Turkish army in Lower
 
 SYRIA 151 
 
 Egypt was now impending. And what hopes had he not 
 built upon the fall of Acre, whilst lying before the place 
 with 10,000 men and 3000 sick and wounded ! He had 
 intended to call up the nations of the Orient, take posses- 
 sion of Constantinople, overthrow the Turkish empire, 
 found a new empire under his own rule, and return 
 victorious through Vienna to Paris. And this whole 
 tremendous edifice of his imagination had now crumbled 
 at a blow. 
 
 Here already we may see in his mind some premonitory 
 symptoms of his ultimate fate, which indeed, it would 
 almost seem, are inseparable from the nature of the greatest 
 soldiers, namely, a want of control of the imagination. He 
 who restrains himself will do deeds that will live, and in 
 this respect the poet's address to the Great Elector is 
 profoundly true : l 
 
 " The dullard's aim, not thine it is, 
 To try to win Fate's brightest crown." 
 
 Tis true, the highest success, though we can grasp it 
 in imagination, will always be beyond our realization, for 
 our means, finite, like all human things, militate against 
 the infinity of our aims. But the general who at all times 
 cultivates self-restraint, risks stopping short also of what 
 is possible, and lessens his chances of success, and therefore 
 he will satisfy our highest expectations only by never being 
 satisfied himself, and aiming, after each success, at some- 
 thing still higher. " A general has only one aim, a general 
 who is also a sovereign must have two. His actions as a 
 soldier will always be subordinate to politics." J But only 
 he who devotes himself fully and wholly to one thing is 
 able to attain perfection, and therefore the ideal sovereign 
 will never be an ideal general ; politics lay restraints upon 
 a sovereign in his career as a general, and if he be a great 
 sovereign he submits to these restraints, but just because 
 
 1 Kleist, Prinz von Homburg, II. 293. 
 
 * Muffling, Die Feld?iige der Schlesischen Arme'e, 5.
 
 152 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL- 
 
 he restrains himself and does not seek for the highest 
 success, he cannot be considered the highest ideal of a 
 general. A shrewd student of biography said of Charle- 
 magne : " He was a military leader greater than most, but 
 he was not ambitious of glory gained in battle, still less did 
 he envy his generals such glory, and in this also he differed 
 from the most eminent heroes of ancient and modern times. 
 For actual war was ever, with him, only a means to an 
 -end. He himself gained several decisive victories as leader 
 of his army ; but he conducted many campaigns by proxy, 
 for he felt that his task was a higher one, and this, the 
 highest virtue of a king, he showed not only in his more 
 advanced age, but even in his youth." l Had Napoleon 
 acted thus, he would have died on his throne as one of 
 the most admired founders of a state and dynasty ; but he 
 would never have marched in triumph into Vienna, Berlin, 
 Madrid, or Moscow, and military history would have lost 
 its highest exemplar. 
 
 On the I7th May, Napoleon issued a proclamation to his 
 army, in which he announced its approaching return to 
 Egypt, and veiled as much as possible of his defeat. All 
 preparations were made for the start, all stores were 
 destroyed, the guns, which could not be transported, were 
 blown up or sunk in the sea, and on the i8th and igth all 
 the wounded, sick, and non-combatants were sent on in 
 advance, whilst all the time the fire against Acre was kept 
 up vigorously. At -last, on the 2Oth May, at nine o'clock 
 in the evening, the army itself began its retreat. Lannes 
 was at the head, followed by Bon and then Reynier, Kleber 
 for the present remaining in position to cover the departure, 
 and then acting as rear-guard with his division. In this 
 order the army retreated, suffering the most severe hard- 
 ships, in forced marches, moving by Tantura and Caesarea, 
 yet overtaken by the enemy, whose effective pursuit wag 
 rendered difficult by a complete devastation of the country. 
 
 On the 24th Jaffa was reached, where the exhausted 
 1 Freytag, Aus dem Mittelalter, 321.
 
 SYRIA 153 
 
 army was granted a few days of rest ; these days were 
 employed in blowing up the fortifications of this town and 
 -destroying its means of defence. On the 28th, the army 
 continued its march to Egypt ; at El-Arish, Napoleon left 
 a small garrison, and from Katieh, which also received a 
 garrison, he sent Kleber to Damietta, he himself marching 
 towards Cairo with the other three divisions. He entered 
 this town in state on the I4th June, that is, on the twenty- 
 sixth day after his start from Acre. The distance traversed 
 during this time by his army amounted to over 300 
 miles, without reckoning devours, a performance which 
 if executed on a European theatre of war would be 
 mentioned with respect, but which is really nothing less 
 than marvellous under the circumstances, after a severe 
 siege, in such a climate, without proper roads, and 
 considering the continual struggle with want of water and 
 stores, with sickness and with the desert. 
 
 Once more at Cairo, Napoleon again occupied himself 
 with the administration of the country and the organiza- 
 tion of his army ; he more particularly endeavoured to 
 devise means to raise the numerical strength of the latter. 
 His losses up to that time he computed at 5344 men, and 
 this number, although not very high, considering the 
 circumstances, may probably be taken as accurate, for he 
 reported it to the Directory in a despatch in which he 
 asks for reinforcements, in which, therefore, he had no 
 reason for underrating his losses ; though, on the other 
 hand, he was desirous, for obvious reasons, of making the 
 best of his position. Meanwhile he wrote to Desaix : " I 
 should like, citizen-general, to purchase 2000 or 3000 
 negroes, above sixteen years, and put about 100 of them 
 into each battalion." 1 This indeed points to ominous 
 gaps, and therefore we may assume, that to the above- 
 mentioned number of losses must be added a considerable 
 number of sick and wounded, on whose recovery Napoleon 
 reckoned, and whom he therefore did not include in his 
 1 Cairo, 22nd June
 
 154 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 losses. In the course of the coming year, Napoleon 
 anticipated a further loss of 6000 men, and estimated the 
 eventual active strength of his army at 15,000 men ; thus 
 he was at that moment at the head of about 21,000. But 
 this computation was probably intentionally low, as he 
 based upon it his demand for reinforcements. If we 
 deduct from the original number of 30,000 men a loss of 
 5000, he ought still to have had 25,000 at his disposal, 
 that is, 4000 more than above reckoned ; and, assuming 
 that about one half of these 4000 were unfit for active 
 service, from wounds or sickness, there would remain in 
 June, 1799, an effective force of 23,000 men ; a very favour- 
 able result, indeed, and one which was of course owing to 
 the fact that his losses in battle against such opponents 
 were infinitesimal. 
 
 Napoleon's plan of incorporating 3000 negroes in his 
 army shows, moreover, very distinctly how little he cared 
 about the quality of his instruments in the consciousness 
 of his innate genius ; he counts by heads ; it is the value of 
 numbers in warfare, which becomes evident here ; indeed 
 Napoleon's strategy introduced this value as the decisive 
 factor in the modern art of war; the strategy of 
 Frederick's day did not recognize it. This new element in 
 strategy and its importance was at first, as is always the 
 case with anything new, scarcely acknowledged and in no 
 way utilized ; and thus it came to pass that Napoleon in 
 1805, and again in 1807, appeared in the field against two 
 great military powers with an overwhelming superiority of 
 numbers. Of the few voices which at that time already- 
 advocated the principle of masses, one of the most 
 notable was that of Billow, a man of the highest abilities r 
 " The superiority of the larger number of combatants 
 over the lesser is very evident in modern strategy, if only 
 on account of the necessity of preventing turning move- 
 ments, and the advantage which turning movements 
 afford. If you have more men than the enemy and 
 know how to use them properly, the greater ability
 
 SYRIA 155 
 
 and bravery of the soldiers of your opponent is of no 
 account." l 
 
 Napoleon found Egypt on the whole in a peaceful state. 
 Dugua had managed to maintain order and to nip a few 
 attempts at revolt in the bud. Desaix had meanwhile 
 traversed Upper Egypt, and had arrived at Assuan on the 
 cataracts of the Nile on the ist February, 1799, forcing 
 Murad Bey back into ^Ethiopia (the Soudan). This latter 
 chief now retired into the desert, and numerous incursions 
 of the Arabs into the Nile valley from the desert on both 
 sides of the stream compelled Desaix's troops to make 
 incessant marches and counter-marches. Murad even 
 attempted in the beginning of July to reach Cairo by 
 advancing through the province of Fayoum; but Napoleon, 
 informed of this plan by Desaix, sent Murat to meet him, 
 and Murad immediately fell back into the desert, but 
 pushed fonvard at once again towards Gizeh. Murat 
 followed him, and Napoleon sent a small detachment 
 towards the Pyramids on July I4th to reconnoitre. He 
 was intending to join this detachment himself, when he 
 received news from Marmont that a Turkish fleet, 
 apparently with land forces on board, had appeared in 
 the roadstead of Aboukir. 
 
 He now determined to evacuate the whole of Upper 
 Egypt and to bring up Desaix to Cairo, whilst he himself 
 would go to meet the invading army, as soon as he was 
 convinced that the object of the fleet was to land troops 
 to any serious extent. For the present he sent orders to 
 Desaix to move towards Benissuof. Napoleon himself 
 proceeded on the morning of the I5th to the Pyramids of 
 Gizeh, but Murad had already begun his retreat, and only 
 a few shots were exchanged with his skirmishers. But 
 now fresh news arrived from Marmont, announcing a 
 reinforcement of the hostile fleet by some twenty ships, 
 and reporting a landing of troops as imminent. With 
 characteristic rapidity of resolve, Napoleon now formed the 
 1 Spirit of Modern Strategy, 209.
 
 156 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 plan of throwing himself on the invading army, and carried 
 this project into execution without delay. He handed over 
 the chief command in Cairo to Dugua, sent orders to 
 Kleber to march to Rosetta, ordered Desaix up to Cairo, 
 whilst Lannes and Rampon (the latter of whom had taken 
 the place of Bon, who had died of the wound received in 
 Syria) at once began their march towards Ramanieh on 
 the i6th at one o'clock in the morning ; Murat was tc 
 precede them with his advance-guard, accompanied also 
 by the detachment collected at Gizeh against Murad. 
 Napoleon started for Lower Egypt with 6000 men in 
 all. 
 
 Here, meanwhile, the Turkish army, 12,000 men, had 
 effected their landing at Aboukir and seized this fortified 
 place on the I5th ; it entrenched itself immediately on the 
 peninsula. Marmont, who had at first marched with 
 the garrison at Alexandria, 1200 men, on the morning 
 of the i5th, in order to resist the landing, wheeled about 
 upon hearing that this had already been effected, and 
 resolved to hold out in Alexandria until Napoleon's 
 arrival. The latter had arrived in Ramanieh on the 
 igth July, and remained there until the 22nd, in order to 
 collect his army. 
 
 The following was now his view of the situation, as he 
 explained it in a letter to Kleber : " It seems as if the 
 enemy had really landed at Aboukir and was at this 
 moment in possession of the works there." 1 
 
 " My line of operations is Alexandria, Birket, Rosetta. 
 I shall remain at Birket with the main body of the army." 
 (In a letter to Menou, he said : " Birket is the centre 
 of all my operations.") 2 "General Marmont is at Alex- 
 andria, you are at Rosetta, with about equal forces ; you, 
 therefore, form the right wing, General Marmont the left, 
 and I the centre. If the enemy is in strength, I shall 
 give battle on favourable ground/ by joining either my 
 right or my left wing, and* I will try to arrange that 
 1 El Ramanieh, 2oth July. f El Ramanieh, 2ist July.
 
 SYRIA 157 
 
 whichever of you cannot be present with me may be able 
 to come up in support so as to form a reserve." 
 
 The whole plan of operations in Lower Egypt thus 
 again illustrated the two great principles which we have 
 recognized so clearly in his strategy hitherto : 
 
 1. Not to advance against the enemy in separate 
 columns, but to form mass first. 
 
 2. To collect all possible forces to the last man for the 
 delivery of a battle. 
 
 The former was shown first by the fact that Napoleon 
 collected the troops, which he intended to lead against 
 the Turks, from their different quarters in the country, 
 at Ramanieh, that is, at a point which he was sure of 
 reaching before the enemy. But here one might have 
 expected him to operate by separate columns, for the 
 purpose of turning the enemy : Marmont from Alexandria, 
 Kleber from Rosetta, Napoleon from Birket, all marching 
 simultaneously to Aboukir ; they stood, so to speak, ready 
 for some such movement. But no, the conviction, that 
 his forces must be united before coming in contact with 
 the enemy, was too deeply rooted in Napoleon, and 
 he therefore determined, first to effect a junction with one 
 of his wings, since it was no longer possible to call in 
 both, and then to give battle. The other wing, moreover, 
 he did not send to Aboukir, in which movement it might 
 perhaps, if the Turks advanced, have met, unsupported, 
 their superior forces, but he ordered it up to join him as 
 a reserve. 
 
 Kleber accordingly received orders to keep himself in 
 readiness for a 'start at a moment's notice, either for 
 Birket or for Etko ; meanwhile he was to remain in 
 continual touch with Napoleon ; Dugua was ordered to 
 send up whatever troops he could possibly spare, for " the 
 commander-in-chief requires all his forces in order to 
 attack the enemy." 1 Murat was sent forward on the 
 zoth to Besselntuan and Birket, to reconnoitre and opea 
 1 El Ramanieh, 2oth July, 8 o'clock in the evening.
 
 158 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 communications with Marmont. The latter was advised 
 to keep a good look-out ; should the enemy offer him a 
 capitulation, he was to hint that, if he really saw himself 
 shut in, he would not be disinclined to consider it, 
 "for I should look: upon it as a great stroke of luck, if 
 the ease with which they have taken Aboukir induced 
 them to invest you, for in that case they would be 
 lost." 1 
 
 But on the 22nd Napoleon was forced to realize that 
 the enemy had no intention of undertaking anything 
 against Alexandria, but had intrenched themselves at 
 Aboukir ; he therefore resolved to march against them to 
 see whether it would be possible to attack them ; and 
 ordered, on this day, Lannes to Birket, and Lanusse (who 
 had replaced Bon) to Besse'intuan. On the 23rd the 
 army was accordingly at Birket, during the night it 
 advanced further towards Alexandria and encamped ten 
 miles from that town. Napoleon himself, hastening on 
 in front of the army, arrived, in the evening of the 23rd, 
 at Alexandria to join Marmont ; he inspected his works, 
 which he found in good condition, and learned that the 
 enemy numbered about 15,000, and were still engaged in 
 intrenching themselves at Aboukir ; he now selected a 
 small detachment from the garrison and occupied with it 
 a position important on account of its wells, about half- 
 way between Alexandria and the enemy. He immediately 
 sent orders to his army to join him, and in the night 
 between the 24th and 25th, about midnight, it was 
 assembled there ; Kleber had sent news that he was at 
 Fuah on the Nile. 
 
 Napoleon now issued the following orders : " Murat 
 with the whole vanguard" (together with the detachment 
 brought from Alexandria to be added also) will start at 
 two o'clock and make straight for the enemy ; the army 
 will follow Lannes on the right, Lanusse on the left 
 Kleber will follow as quickly as possible to Aboukir as a 
 1 El Kamanieh, 2ist July.
 
 SYRIA 159 
 
 reserve. Menou will make a sortie from Rosetta with a few 
 hundred men, so as to harass the enemy and engage his 
 attention in that quarter." 
 
 Thus in the early morning the army marched upon 
 Aboukir. There the Turkish army had placed itself in 
 battle array in front of the fortress in two imperfectly 
 intrenched lines, with its wings resting on the sea. The 
 infantry of Napoleon's van-guard began the attack on the 
 right wing of the enemy's first line, whilst Lannes faced 
 the left wing; Murat with all his cavalry formed the 
 centre ; Lanusse was in the second line behind the left 
 wing. The enemy's right wing immediately relin- 
 quished its position and fell back upon their second 
 line; their left wing, now quite isolated, was entirely 
 turned by Lannes' attack, and cut down or forced into the 
 sea to the last man. Some bodies of troops from the 
 second Turkish line advancing to its support, were thrown 
 back upon their comrades, part being driven into the sea. 
 And now the French army reformed, before proceeding to 
 the attack of the second line. 
 
 This line, situated in front of the fort of Aboukir, con- 
 sisted of a strong earthwork in the centre, from which to 
 the right and left there ran trenches. Napoleon now 
 ordered the infantry of the van-guard to attack the earth- 
 work in front, whilst the whole cavalry was to keep the 
 enemy's left wing in check ; Lanusse, who had by this 
 time marched in position on the left wing, was ordered to 
 turn the enemy's right wing completely, by engaging it 
 in front with the 32nd demi-brigade l and interposing with 
 the i8th between it and the sea. This attack, however, 
 undertaken under the enfilading fire from the earthwork, 
 failed ; Lanusse did not succeed in either driving the 
 Turks from their trenches or turning their right flank, and 
 had to fall back. But now Lannes delivered with two 
 battalions an assault upon the earthwork itself, whilst at 
 
 1 As is well known, this is equivalent to " regiment," a term 
 abandoned on political grounds. TR.
 
 160 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 fh'e same time Murat overthrew the cavalry on the 
 enemy's left wing, and Lanusse led the i8th demi- 
 brigade once more to the attack of the enemy's right 
 wing. The assault on the earthwork was successful ; 
 Lannes entered it by the gorge and from the right, and as 
 one of Murat^squadrons, breaking through the enemy's 
 lines, got behind the work, its defenders lost all chance of 
 retreat and were partly cut down, partly taken prisoners. 
 From the earthwork the whole right wing of the enemy 
 was rolled up and driven into the sea, the Turkich army 
 was entirely shattered, some weak remnants only taking 
 refuge in the fortress. 
 
 It was a regular Napoleonic battle, a battle which an- 
 nihilated the enemy, and he wrote triumphantly to Dugua : 
 " The general staff will have informed you of the result of 
 the battle of Aboukir ; it was one of the finest I ever saw, 
 not a man escaped of the army landed." l 
 
 On the next day Napoleon summoned the fortress of 
 Aboukir to surrender; this was however refused. The 
 bombardment which began immediately was resisted a? 
 well as was possible under the circumstances ; but on. 
 the 2nd August the garrison had at last to surrender. 
 
 Having waited for the fall of this fortress, Napoleon 
 left Alexandria on the 5th and arrived on the loth again in 
 Cairo. But his resolution to leave Egypt without delay 
 was already taken. It is probably impossible to determine 
 definitely when it became matured ; very likely it had 
 always been secretly entertained by him. He could 
 scarcely have conceived it for the first time after an 
 envoy, sent to the English fleet in consequence of Aboukir, 
 returned with the latest news from Europe. He probably 
 was not so completely cut off from all news as he and his 
 suite afterwards pretended ; too many people in France, 
 more especially his brothers, were anxious to keep him 
 posted in current affairs, nor had he himself ever lost sight 
 of that country in all his plans. 
 
 1 In front of Aboukir, 27th July,
 
 SYRIA 161 
 
 Be this however as it may, being now fully informed of 
 the unfortunate position of affairs in France, and of the 
 successes of the allies against that country, he considered 
 the time had come to throw his sword there into the 
 scale and to take a decisive position in the Government. 
 "What is the use of those incapable men at the head -of 
 affairs ? With them there is nothing but ignorance, 
 stupidity, and venality. I, I alone, have borne the burden 
 and have given stability to this Government by my uninter- 
 rupted successes, for without me it could never have come 
 into existence nor have lasted." l In spite of the exag- 
 geration contained in these utterances, Napoleon was more 
 or less justified in speaking thus, for the great majority of 
 Frenchmen looked upon matters in exactly the same way 
 as he did, and saw in him the only possible saviour. And 
 now his new laurels of Aboukir allowed him to appear in 
 France with all the ascendency of a victor ; after Acre 
 he could not have left Egypt ; this victory rendered it 
 possible, and it was for this that he had this enigmatical 
 utterance to Murat on the night before the battle : " This 
 battle will decide the fate of the world." 2 
 
 For the present he occupied himself with administrative 
 duties, ever desirous of discrediting by his actions all 
 rumours of his departure, which kept arising in spite of all 
 his attempts to secure secrecy ; for he was well aware that 
 his army, seeing in him their sole salvation, would never let 
 him leave them without opposition. 
 
 It is true the great principle of the effect of masses is 
 the most important factor in strategy, but it is the work of 
 the master mind to set these masses in motion and to 
 employ them at the decisive point, and therefore victory is 
 due to the master mind, that is, to the general himself; the 
 thousands who are drowned in the sea, shot down or 
 surrender helplessly as prisoners of war, succumb to the 
 physical power of the enemy who outnumber them in that 
 one place, but it was the brain of the general that brought 
 1 Marmont, Mdm. II. 32. 2 Miot, M6m. 258. 
 
 M
 
 1 62 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 those superior numbers there. The greater the mass the 
 larger its resistance from inertia or obstinacy, and 
 consequently the more comprehensive and energetic 
 the mind of him who sets it in motion must be. There- 
 fore, in his very fondness for employing masses, lies the 
 proof of Napoleon's genius as a strategist. In this sense 
 his march to Russia, which condemned him as a states- 
 man, was his greatest achievement as a strategist. 
 
 In the middle of August Marmont, whom Napoleon 
 had entrusted with this mission, sent news that the 
 moment seemed favourable. Sydney Smith, who had 
 been watching the coast of Alexandria, had just sailed for 
 Cyprus in order to replenish his water supplies. Imme- 
 diately, on the i8th of the month, Napoleon left Cairo, 
 went to Alexandria, sent from there orders to Kleber to 
 assume chief command of the army, and set sail on the 
 23rd, at five o'clock in the morning, on board the frigate 
 " Muiron," accompanied byBerthier, Murat, Lannes, and 
 Marmont. In the morning of the Qth October he landed 
 at Frejus, and was received by the populace with joyful 
 acclamations. 
 
 The marvellous good luck which allowed him during 
 the forty-seven days of this passage to escape again and 
 again from the most imminent danger, made no less an 
 impression upon his companions than his victories. 
 " We felt that we owed it to the intervention of Provi- 
 dence. If ever a human being had reason to believe in 
 the protection of a divine hand, in a guiding power 
 watching over him and preparing all things necessary for 
 the success of his enterprises, it was Bonaparte." ' In- 
 deed, the occurrences of life prove so often the insuffi- 
 ciency of human foresight, that surely almost every man 
 has had reason to exclaim : " I entered upon this enter- 
 prise, though it seemed to me sufficiently foolhardy ; in 
 this as in a thousand other circumstances the want of 
 prudence will assuredly be compensated for by boldness 
 1 Marmont, M&n. II. 41.
 
 SYRIA 163 
 
 of execution, and Fortune will probably once more 
 crown with success endeavours which cool reason would 
 never have dreamed of." l Indeed it is exactly courage 
 in conceiving assurance of success, and resolution in 
 execution, which ensure the happy issue of a project. 
 Those very persons who looked upon Napoleon's good 
 luck with an astonishment akin to superstition, used to 
 say : " It is true, he knew when to run risks, and this 
 quality is the most necessary of all in the accomplishment 
 of great deeds. He risked much, but he risked at the 
 right moment, and if circumstances never left him in 
 the lurch, it was because he was always equal to the 
 occasion." 2 
 
 1 Kleber to the Countess of ... Toulon, 8th May, 1798. 
 
 2 Marmont, Me*m. II. 41.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 MARENGO. 
 I8OO. 
 
 THE i8th Brumaire had, in fact, invested Napoleon with 
 the full powers of an autocratic sovereign. The first 
 appearance of the modern representative system of 
 government on the continent had furnished ample 
 evidence of the vacillating and constantly changing nature 
 of such governments, and shown at the same time that 
 such a system must, in the exposed position of a con- 
 tinental state, lead quite logically to constant disaster. 
 Therefore the whole nation greeted Napoleon with accla- 
 mation when he seized the sceptre in accordance with 
 the principle : " If a man feels within himself the strength 
 and capacity for government, he should, if possible, seize 
 the rudder of the state, if it is in incapable hands." l 
 
 We shall not dwell here on how he wielded his power 
 as a statesman. We will only say one thing, and that 
 briefly. We have spoken of his strategy as the most 
 perfect of modern times, and in this point even Frederick 
 must yield him the palm. But his acts as a sovereign are 
 a different matter. Frederick's conquests were acquisi- 
 tions, which, being soon absorbed by his own people, 
 augmented the strength of the latter, and made it capable 
 of greater extension and development. Napolepn's con- 
 quests remained alien incorporations, which did not open 
 up any new sources of strength, but rather required ever 
 1 Billow, Campaign of 1805, II. 138.
 
 MARENGO 165 
 
 fresh exertions of strength for their retention. The form 
 of Frederick's despotism soon came to nothing, but the 
 training it had afforded his nation continued to influence, 
 and is still influencing it ; the forms created by Napoleon's 
 despotism are still in power in France, but whatever this 
 country may possess of lasting political ideas and real 
 strength, it owes to another despot, a greater statesman, 
 Richelieu. In comparing the statecraft of a Richelieu, a 
 Frederick, a Bismarck, with that of Napoleon, we recognize 
 in the former a positive, limited fixed goal, something 
 attainable, as distinguished by something indefinite in the 
 latter. 
 
 Napoleon inaugurated his reign by negotiations for 
 peace. But the whole situation of Europe was at that 
 time too unsettled to allow of the possibility of a lasting 
 peace. On both sides the negotiations were carried on 
 with a want of sincerity, and could not therefore lead to 
 any decisive issue. They were therefore soon broken off, 
 and it was decided to resume hostilities. 
 
 In the beginning of 1800, the military situation on the (25) 
 frontiers of France was the following : 
 
 In Italy, Massena was posted with 30,000 men on the 
 line Genoa Savona Col di Tenda ; some 10,000 more 
 occupied the passes of the Alps. Opposed to these was 
 Melas, with 80,000 men in Piedmont, whilst some 20,000 
 of his troops were distributed as garrisons throughout 
 Upper Italy, Tuscany, and the Romagna. 
 
 In Germany, Moreau had 120,000 men facing Alsace 
 and Switzerland ; in front of him was Kray,'on the other 
 side of the Rhine, with 120,000 men at Donaueschingen, 
 with his right wing on the Kinzig and his left at Schaff- 
 hausen. If the French Republic wished to retrieve the 
 situation created by its unfortunate campaigns in 1799, 
 and deal its adversaries some great blow, it would have 
 to put very large forces in the field. Napoleon, of course, 
 was of this mind, and therefore he gave orders to Berthier, 
 who was at that time secretary, to organize a reserve
 
 1 66 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 army, the chief command of which he reserved for himself. 
 It was to consist of a right wing, with its depdt at Lyons, 
 a centre, with Dijon as dep6t, and a left wing with its 
 depdt at Chalons-sur-Marne, each of these corps of a 
 strength of 18,000 to 20,000 men. His orders concluded 
 with these words : " You will keep the formation of this 
 army in every way secret, even from your assistants, from 
 whom you will ask for only the most indispensable infor- 
 mation." l 
 
 Here, then, we see Napoleon for the first time acting 
 independently in the initiation of a war as a whole. The 
 question he had to decide was what to do with the new 
 army, to use it in Italy or in Germany, against Melas or 
 Kray. The map will show us that Germany was the 
 decisive point. Kray once beaten, the French would be 
 able to march without resistance to Vienna, or take Melas 
 in rear with superior numbers in Italy. Napoleon 
 himself explained this with perfect clearness : "In this 
 campaign, the frontier of Germany is the decisive point, 
 the littoral of Genoa a secondary one. Indeed, any 
 events which might occur in Italy would not have any 
 direct or immediate effect upon the state of affairs on the 
 Rhine, whilst all the events which would happen in 
 Germany would have a necessary and immediate effect 
 upon Italy." J " As a matter of fact, should the army of 
 the Republic be defeated on the Rhine, though it were 
 victorious in Italy, the Austrian army could penetrate 
 Alsace, Franche-Comte, or Belgium, and complete their 
 success without the French army being in a position to 
 create any diversion, or arrest its course. But if the 
 French army at the decisive point were successful, even 
 though that of Italy were beaten, all that would have to 
 be feared would be the capture of Genoa, an invasion of 
 Provence, or perhaps the siege of Toulon, but in that case, 
 a portion of the army of Germany would, by descending 
 
 1 C. N. Paris, 25th January. 
 
 8 M&n. de Ste. HA. Ulm Moreau, II. 485.
 
 MARENGO 167 
 
 from Switzerland into the valley of the Po, immediately 
 arrest the victorious enemy in Italy or Provence." ' 
 
 Therefore, Napoleon turned first to Germany, to strike 
 the decisive blow of the war, and it was his inten- 
 tion to unite the reserve army with that of Moreau, in 
 order, thus, to have a decided superiority of numbers as 
 against Kray. His plan was to concentrate his whole 
 army, covered by the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of 
 Schaffhausen and Stein, then to cross the Rhine at 
 Schaffhausen, and appear at the very commencement of 
 the campaign with superior forces on Kray's left flank and 
 rear, to cut him off from all his communications, and to 
 force him towards the Rhine, then his army would be 
 destroyed, and the road to Vienna would be perfectly 
 open. 
 
 It is this method of opening campaigns which shows 
 the Napoleonic strategy in all its inspired simplicity, in 
 all its directness, aiming at a complete annihilation of the 
 enemy. He planned his operations against Kray's left 
 wing, just as he did those against Melas' right wing, and 
 he carried out the same methods in 1805 against the 
 Austrian right, and in 1806 against the Prussian left wing ; 
 the same plan was also formed for his advance over the 
 Saale in April, 1813. The principles, few but great, which 
 he thereby formulated and obeyed, are the following : 
 ^Mrst, the principle of having only one line of opera- 
 tions. Napoleon always kept the mass of his army 
 massed in one direction ; any other method, such, for 
 example, as that of Frederick in 1757, when he advanced 
 into Bohemia along four lines of operation, at a con- 
 siderable distance from each other, he rejected as false, 
 since it gave the enemy the chance of attacking one 
 column with his whole strength. 
 
 Secondly, the principle of making the main body of the 
 enemy's army the objective. 
 
 1 M6m. de Ste. H6I. Notes sur le precis des vnements mil., 
 &c. (M. Dumas), II. 592.
 
 1 68 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 . Thirdly, the principle of choosing the line of operation 
 in such a manner as to place oneself on one flank, or, if 
 possible, on the rear of the enemy, and thus cut his 
 communications. 
 
 Fourthly, the principle, which follows logically upon 
 the third, of turning, what Willisen calls the enemy's 
 strategical wing, that is, the one, the turning of which 
 will most effectually drive him off his lines of communi- 
 cation. Had Napoleon, for instance, in the case before 
 us, planned to turn Kray's right wing, the most he could 
 have hoped to do was to drive him into the Tyrol, and 
 one line of communications would still have remained 
 open to him. 
 
 Fifthly, the principle of keeping one's own commu- 
 nications open. 
 
 But personal considerations forced Napoleon to alter 
 his magnificent plan to some extent. He had of course 
 intended to take into his own hands the supreme com- 
 mand of the reserve army united with Moreau's ; but it 
 now became evident that Moreau refused to serve under 
 him, and Napoleon's position was not yet sufficiently 
 assured, either to remove this general without further ado, 
 or to entrust Moreau with the chief command of both 
 armies ; the latter might easily have gained too much 
 political influence thereby. Moreover7 as soon became 
 evident, the plan of a genius, simple though it be, requires 
 the genius of its originator to carry it out properly. For 
 when Napoleon proposed to Moreau the execution of this 
 very plan, for which indeed the latter's army was strong 
 enough by itself, Moreau was unable to agree with 
 Napoleon's ideas. Strange to say, he considered such a 
 concentrated advance dangerous, and would rather have 
 seen the crossing of the Rhine effected at various points 
 along the line from Strasburg to Schaffhausen ; a glance at 
 the map will show that he would thus meet Kray front- 
 ally, and thereby the kernel of the whole plan, namely, 
 placing the enemy at the very commencement of the
 
 MARENGO 169 
 
 campaign in the most unfavourable position, and striking 
 at his weakest point, would be lost. When Napoleon, 
 therefore, commanded him on the ist March to con- 
 centrate between Bale and Constance, and to send his 
 chief of the staff immediately to Paris, where the general 
 plan of operations would be communicated to him, this 
 officer brought such entirely divergent views about the 
 method of opening the campaign with him, that Napoleon 
 soon saw he could never have his ideas carried out by 
 Moreau. 
 
 And he was all the more ready to leave it to Moreau to 
 cross the Rhine and open the campaign in whatever 
 manner he thought fit, as this theatre of war and the 
 operations upon it would no longer play the decisive 
 part from the moment when he relinquished the idea of 
 using the reserve army in Germany. The army of 
 Germany was, therefore, directed on the 22nd March to 
 cross the Rhine between the loth and 2oth April, to push 
 forward to Stockach, and to throw the enemy behind 
 the Lech ; one division under Lecourbe was to remaiii in 
 Switzerland as a reserve. As soon as the above was 
 done, this division and the three first divisions of the 
 reserve army were to cross the St. Gothard into Italy, 
 whilst the three remaining divisions, consisting of troops 
 of inferior quality, were to follow as a . reserve to Zurich 
 at the end of April. It was therefore in Italy that the 
 decisive blow was now to be struck, and it was left for 
 Moreau to cover the rear and left flank of this army while 
 invading Italy, by an advance to the south of the 
 Danube. 
 
 Let us now glance at Italy. As early as the 5th 
 March Napoleon had communicated his views to Massena, 
 as to the latter's situation. It was his advice to concen- 
 trate four-fifths of all his forces at Genoa, and to push on 
 from that place, always with his force well in hand against 
 one point only of the Austrian line of advance ; this plan 
 would undoubtedly bring about some secondary results,
 
 1 70 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 for the Austrians were sure to indulge again in concentric 
 operations of separated columns : " the enemy is sure to 
 make three attacks in the Austrian manner, along the 
 Levante, viA Novi and vid Montenotte ; you will avoid 
 two of these attacks and meet the third with your 
 full strength." The eternal principle: "A division of 
 forces against several objects at the same time results in 
 the inability to act with proper effect against any one of 
 them. One weakens oneself thereby, and affords the 
 enemy an opportunity of annihilating his opponent in 
 detail. One can only expect to be successful, where one 
 can bring larger numbers to bear than the enemy. It is 
 the masses which decide. Union is strength, division 
 weakness." ' BUlow preached this doctrine, Jomini and 
 Willisen concur in it, Napoleon's actions demonstrate it, 
 and his words confirm it. 
 
 On the 8th March official orders were issued, that a 
 reserve army of 60,000 men was to be formed and was to 
 assemble at Dijon ; the First Consul himself would assume 
 the chief command. But one of the articles of the 
 constitution forbade the First Consul to take the 
 command of any army in person, and therefore Berthier 
 was appointed to the chief command of the reserve army 
 on the 2nd April. Marmont observes with justice, 
 " this was the same thing as keeping him under another 
 name as chief of the staff." Napoleon was used to him 
 and his methods of doing business : we have indeed 
 evidence that he was not, generally speaking, fond of 
 changing his men, he " was a creature of habit, and 
 disliked nothing more than change, and, as he himself 
 said, new faces." * 
 
 The Reserve Army was, according to the official notice, 
 to concentrate at Dijon, but in reality the various troops 
 forming it were all immediately set in motion for Switz- 
 erland ; the public notification of Dijon as the point of 
 
 1 Billow, Geist des neueren Kriegssysteros, 57. 
 1 Bourrienne, Mem. III. 119.
 
 MARENGO 171 
 
 concentration was intended to mislead the enemy, and the 
 news which the Austrians obtained as to the importance 
 of the forces at Dijon, soon had the effect of destroying 
 their, belief in the existence of any real reserve army. 
 
 On the i8th March Napoleon, presuming it to have 
 arrived at Zurich, drew up the line of march to be 
 followed from thence to Bergamo vid the Spliigen. We 
 shall see presently how, in accordance with events, the 
 point of crossing was gradually shifted westward. On the 
 gth April he wrote to Massena and communicated to him 
 the plan agreed upon for the operations of the Army of the 
 Rhine ; he enjoined him to keep strictly on the defensive 
 until the army, falling from Switzerland upon the enemy's 
 rear, either by the Gothard or the Simplon, had appeared 
 in Italy, when he was immediately to attempt a junction 
 with its right wing vid Turin. In the meantime, how- 
 ever, Melas had, on the 6th April, already assumed the 
 offensive against Massena with 60,000 men, and exactly 
 as Napoleon's keen military insight had anticipated, 
 namely by advancing concentrically from three directions, 
 Massena opposed a resistance to these superior numbers, 
 which showed his military capacity in the most brilliant 
 light. Taking the utmost advantage of the mountainous 
 nature of the country, and being always prepared to 
 reassume the offensive, he exhibited a splendid example of 
 the way to conduct a retreat, yielding step by step, and a 
 magnificent illustration of Napoleon's words : " To act 
 otherwise would no longer be called waging war ; for the 
 art of war consists only in gaining time, if one's forces are 
 inferior." ' By the igth April, Massena was forced back 
 upon Genoa and surrounded in his position there. 
 
 Napoleon had only very uncertain news about these 
 events ; the turning movement of Melas and his superior 
 forces had soon cut off all Massena's communications with 
 France, and therefore Napoleon knew even on the 24th 
 April, nothing more than that " the Army of Italy is 
 1 C. N. Tq Joubert. I7th February, 1797.
 
 172 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 engaging the Austrians ; " l for the rest, he continued : 
 " but whether it win or lose, it is absolutely necessary that 
 the Reserve Army should not waste an hour." Berth ier 
 therefore received orders to lead the army to Geneva, and 
 thence to invade Italy either by the Great St. Bernard 
 or the Simplon ; his army Napoleon estimated at this 
 time at 40,000 men. Now Moreau had, with his usual 
 caution, in spite of all his promises, not yet opened the 
 campaign ; therefore Napoleon wrote : " Do repeat to 
 Moreau the command to attack the enemy. Try to make 
 him understand that his constant delay endangers the 
 safety of the Republic materially." The fact was, Moreau's 
 advance was to render possible the march across the Alps, 
 for otherwise the army so employed would have exposed 
 its left wing, nay, possibly even its rear, to Kray's attack. 
 
 Here for the first time we find the St. Bernard 
 mentioned ; that is to say, the point of crossing the Alps 
 has been changed from the Spliigen to the St. Bernard, 
 some 140 miles off, and the point of entrance into Italy 
 from Bergamo to Ivrea, or some go miles further west. 
 When, through Moreau's inaction, the speedy and 
 final decision with Kray appeared less and less likely, 
 the more extensive operation over the Spliigen was given 
 'up, and the Gothard or Simplon taken into considera- 
 tion. Then, when Melas took the offensive, it became 
 necessary to act speedily and effectually ; so the point of 
 crossing had to be fixed on still nearer home, so as to 
 expedite the operation. 
 
 Indeed, it will usually happen, if the enemy's army itself 
 is the objective, that the originally chosen line of opera- 
 tions is gradually altered, for the enemy rarely remains 
 on the same spot ; it is like aiming at a moving target. 
 The movement against Ulm in 1805 was of the same 
 nature. Thus the Napoleonic principle, to assemble 
 the mass of troops on one line of operations only, 
 becomes of all the greater importance ; for if a general 
 1 C. N. To Carnot. Paris.
 
 MARENGO 1 73 
 
 has been deceived, as often happens, with respect to the 
 enemy's position or movements, he will then be at least 
 able to bring his whole force to bear, in accordance with 
 the changed conditions. But in Frederick's march with 
 four separate columns into Bohemia, a march we men- 
 tioned as an example of the opposite principle, it was no 
 longer possible for him, if the Austrians did not happen 
 to be at the expected point, or if their army made any 
 unexpected movements, to change the direction of all the 
 four columns at a given moment, or adapt their four 
 several movements to altered circumstances. 
 
 On the 24th April Napoleon had, as we have seen, 
 left the choice between the Simplon and the Great St. 
 Bernard to Berthier, and the latter wrote at that time : 
 " According to circumstances, I shall start from Geneva 
 on the 1 3th or I4th May, in order to cross into Italy 
 either over the St. Bernard or the Simplon or the Gothard. 
 I shall only decide at the last moment. The Simplon is 
 impassable for sledges. The St. Bernard and St. Gothard 
 are the most suitable points to cross at." l But the news 
 which arrived of the state of affairs near Genoa neces- 
 sitated a very prompt decision, and thus Napoleon wrote 
 on the 27th : " I am no longer disposed to cross by the 
 St. Gothard ; I consider this operation would be possible 
 and prudent only if General Moreau had gained a great 
 success over the enemy. 
 
 " For the rest, it is possible that we shall no longer be 
 able to go to Milan, but shall have to march in all haste 
 to Tortona, in order to relieve Massena, who, if he be 
 defeated, will have shut himself up in Genoa, where he 
 has provisions for thirty days. I desire therefore that the 
 St. Bernard be chosen as the point of crossing." * 
 
 In the meantime the organization of the Reserve Army 
 at Geneva had been carried on with great vigour, yet the 
 originally intended strength was not reached; by the 
 
 1 C. N. To Napoleon. Dijon, 25th April. 
 1 C. N. To Berthier. Pans, April, 4 p.m.
 
 174 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 middle of April about 25,000 men were assembled, and 
 consequently Berthier expressed the opinion in a letter to 
 Napoleon, that he would cross the Alps with at most 
 30,000 infantry, adding : " As a general reckons, not as 
 clerks do, a difference you will be able to appreciate more 
 than any one else." ' And therefore he requested that 
 Moreau should receive urgent orders to send him Lecourbe 
 with 15,000 men. Napoleon wrote almost daily to his 
 general, entering most minutely upon all the details of 
 organization, constantly stirring him up. For he had 
 resolved, now that this Reserve Army was to play the 
 principal part, to raise it to the highest strength possible, 
 and he therefore issued a decree on the 5th May, that 
 the Army of the Rhine was immediately to despatch 
 25,000 men to reinforce it, by the Gothard and the 
 Simplon. 
 
 (26) On the ist May, Berthier arrived at Geneva. On the 
 6th, at two a.m., Napoleon left Paris and reached Geneva 
 during the night of the 8th gth. The Reserve Army was 
 now, by an order of the loth May, divided as follows : 
 
 Advance Guard : Lannes ... ... 8000 men. 
 
 Duhesme's Corps : Loison's Division ... 7000 
 
 Boudet's Division ... 8000 
 
 Victor's Corps : Monnier's Division . . . 4000 
 
 Chambarlhac's Division 6000 
 
 Chabran's Division ... 5000 
 
 Cavalry Reserve : Murat 4000 
 
 Having here put the last touch with indefatigable zeal 
 to the state of preparation of the army, Napoleon went 
 on the I2th to Lausanne. The troops, which he had 
 assembled for the invasion of Italy, were now disposed of 
 as follows : Lannes was in advance at Martigny in the 
 valley of the Rhone ; the divisions of Boudet, Loison, 
 Chambarlhac, and Monnier were behind him along the 
 lake of Geneva from Villeneuve to Lausanne. The 
 1 C. N. Dijon, 25th April.
 
 MARENGO 175 
 
 division of Chabran lay in Savoy, and had orders to cross 
 the Little St. Bernard. To the right of the army 
 Thurreau, who had originally formed the extreme left wing 
 of Massena's army, held the Mont Cenis pass ; he was to 
 march later towards Susa and then move to Ivrea. The 
 left of the Reserve Army was formed by Mjoncey, who with 
 15,000 men (sent by Moreau) was marching towards the 
 St. Gothard. Thus the whole force stood at the foot of 
 the St. Bernard perfectly ready to cross, and Napoleon 
 resolved to do so without delay. " I shall personally go 
 to Italy. Events will succeed each other with great 
 rapidity." * 
 
 The enemy stood at this time in the following positions : 
 On the 2ist April the investment proper of Massena 
 in the fortress of Genoa had begun ; the latter had 
 here 12,000 men capable of bearing arms, and 16,000 sick 
 and wounded. Melas had entrusted General Ott, who was 
 at the head of 24,000 men, with the siege of this town. 
 He himself turned with 28,000 men to the Riviera against 
 Suchet, who had with 10,000 men formed Massena's left 
 wing in the Alps, but who now, by the united advance 
 of the Austrians upon Genoa, had been forced to retire 
 from that town. Melas drove him along the coast 
 and back over the French frontier, and reached the Var on 
 the i4th May. The remainder of the Austrian army was 
 thus placed : at Bellinzona 8000 men to watch the St. 
 Gothard 2 ; in the valley of the Dora Baltea 3000 men ; in 
 that of the Dora Riparia 5000 men ; in the Stura valley 
 looo men. Besides these there were 20,000 men in 
 garrison throughout Upper Italy ; 3000 in Tuscany and 
 the Romagna; and 3000 in Istria. Melas had also 
 ordered up 6000 men from the Romagna, and their van 
 joined his forces at this moment. 
 
 On the I4th May, Napoleon ordered Lannes to 
 advance towards St. Pierre, while Boudet marched to 
 Bex, Loison to Aigle, and Chambarlhac to Villeneuve. 
 
 1 C. N. To Brune. Geneva, nth May. 
 
 2 and Simplon.
 
 1 76 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Monnier's division forming the rearguard. On the 15th 
 Lannes began to cross the pass and reached Etroubles 
 with his first columns, forcing a weak Austrian outpost 
 back from this village upon Aosta. On the i6th Lannes - 
 occupied Aosta. Behind him th^ main body of the army 
 began to cross the highest point of the pass in the above 
 order. Napoleon himself, according to his habit, remained 
 behind in Lausanne for the present, so as not to give the 
 enemy by his personal presence the certainty that the 
 whole army was advancing. He urged upon Berthier to 
 seize the fort of Bard as soon as possible, which, being 
 situated in a narrow part of the Dora Baltea valley, was 
 likely to offer a most serious obstacle to the success of the 
 enterprise ; apart from this, he advised him to push 
 Lannes quickly forward to Ivrea, even though the rest of 
 the army could not immediately follow ; for it was, he 
 said, of the utmost importance to obtain as soon as 
 possible possession of this town, lying at the entrance to 
 the plain. 
 
 At the same time as Lannes crossed the Great St. 
 Bernard, Chabran had passed the Little St. Bernard, and 
 on the i6th the heads of the columns joined at Aosta. 
 On the i7th, according to Napoleon's plan, the French 
 vanguard continued to descend the valley of the Dora 
 Baltea, and on the i8th it drove the Austrians from their 
 position at Chatillon. On the previous day Napoleon 
 had arrived at Martigny. On the igth Lannes reached 
 the fortress of Bard, on which so much depended, and 
 soon had the conviction forced on him that its garrison 
 was fully determined to hold out, and also that it entirely 
 blocked the valley. The moment was certainly critical. 
 " Put it very plainly to General Lannes," wrote Berthier, 
 who was at this time at Aosta, " that the fate of Italy, and 
 possibly of the Republic, depends on the fortress of 
 Bard." * But in view of the firm resolution of the 
 Austrian commander and of the strength of the position 
 1 To Dupont, 1 8th May.
 
 MARENGO 177 
 
 of the fortress, it was not possible to capture it, and 
 Lannes was obliged, in order to proceed on his way, to 
 take a side-road to the left across Mount Albaredo, over 
 which, however, no guns could be transported. 
 
 Napoleon himself crossed the pass on the 20th, and 
 arrived in Etroubles. He was annoyed to find Bard not 
 yet captured, and that consequently the vanguard, which 
 had advanced beyond it, had to remain unsupported ; he 
 said to Berthier : " Be on your guard, Lannes will in 
 three or four days have from 7000 to 8000 men upon 
 him." l Otherwise, he saw in the resistance of Fort Bard 
 a cause of delay, but no serious danger. He thought over 
 other ways and means, and said to himself: " If the St. 
 Bernard did not stop us, a mountain of the second rank 
 will surely form no invincible obstacle in ouj march." * 
 He therefore immediately gave orders to have the road 
 over Mount Albaredo repaired : " It must indeed be very 
 bad if it is worse than the St. Bernard, over which we 
 transported our artillery ; time and care overcome all sorts 
 of obstacles." 1 The news which he had received from 
 Suchet was that Melas was still on the Var on the I3th 
 May ; he reckoned, therefore, that he would not be able 
 to attack his army in force before the 26th or 27th, and 
 therefore was not alarmed by the state of affairs. 
 
 Lannes having successfully found his way round Bard 
 and thrown the Austrian troops, destined for the defence 
 of the valley, back upon Ivrea, attacked this town on the 
 22nd, but without success. But meanwhile some artillery 
 began to arrive. Marmont, chief of the artillery of the 
 army, had conceived the bold plan of getting some guns 
 by night through the village of Bard, situated below the 
 fortress. He had the village street covered with litter, 
 and ordered the wheels and other movable parts of the 
 guns to be wrapped in hay, and thus a large portion of 
 
 1 C. N. Etroubles, aoth May, 9 p.m. ^ 
 
 1 C. N. To Berthier. Etroubles, zoth May, 9 p.m. 
 1 Ibid. 
 
 N
 
 178 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the cannon were actually dragged past the fortress by the 
 soldiers in the course of several nights. And although its 
 defenders soon became aware of the enterprise and opened 
 fire upon it, yet the fortress rose too perpendicularly from 
 the valley for the fire to have much effect. With the 
 assistance of these guns Lannes succeeded on the 23rd in 
 taking the castle of Ivrea, and on the 24th he captured 
 the town by assault, upon which Napoleon remarked : 
 " It was time, for later on a regular siege would have 
 been necessary." ' In the meantime the other divisions 
 of the army had likewise crossed the St. Bernard behind 
 Lannes, and on the 22nd the passage was completed. 
 
 Now with respect to this crossing of the Alps, Napoleon 
 has been reproached with not having made sufficiently 
 careful preparations for it ; it has been said that it was 
 undertaken in too light-hearted a spirit, the whole affair 
 might easily have failed, and that not only on account of 
 Fort Bard ; in fact, the happy success was entirely due to 
 good luck. But this is not so. We have already seen 
 that the quite unexpected resistance of this fortress did 
 not in any way cause Napoleon to doubt the success of 
 his plan ; indeed, the event proved that though this fortress 
 did not surrender, yet the passage of the Alps was entirely 
 successful. And on the occasion of the ultimate fall of 
 Bard, the Austrian account remarked : " Moreover, it had 
 not been in any way expected that the enemy would cross 
 the mountains of the St. Bernard with artillery, and use 
 guns against a fortress which was only meant to resist 
 musketry fire." * 
 
 That is just it ; with Napoleon, on the other hand, 
 nothing was ever left out of account, and more par- 
 ticularly nothing that might possibly be to his advantage ; 
 of course, he was far from thinking over every possible 
 event in all its details beforehand, but he prepared his 
 
 91 C. N. Rapport sur les prem. op^r. de Parmde de r6s. Chivasso, 
 28th May. 
 3 Oesterr. Mil. Zeitschrift, 1822, IV. 252.
 
 MARENGO 1 79 
 
 plans on a comprehensive scale, feeling sure that his skill 
 and energy would, in the course of events, be able to take 
 advantage of all the details or render them harmless. 
 This neglect of details is indeed a quality inseparable 
 from a great genius, for it is just because men of genius 
 do not regard trivial things, but keep their eyes fixed 
 upon the main object, the decisive point, that their 
 success becomes so tremendous. It is said of Lee : " Lee 
 never interfered as commander-in-chief in any of the 
 details which lay outside his special province, but turned 
 his whole power to the duty which was his ; " l and of 
 Gneisenau it is said : " Gneisenau passed lightly over 
 details, confident of his presence of mind, his genius. 
 It wearied him to weigh beforehand all eventualities, of 
 which, indeed (as he used to remark), only one could 
 happen, and that one never exactly as it was anticipated ; 
 he felt sure that he would know how to act if the right 
 moment came ; he credited all others with the same gift, 
 and disregarded questions of time and space, the more 
 so that he loved risk, and trusted to his own daring to 
 overcome them." * A distinct example of the fact that 
 he took tactical and topographical difficulties but little 
 into consideration, once he had resolved upon a great 
 strategical combination, is the case of Wartenburg ; this 
 was a sort of second edition of Bard, and yet here, as 
 there, the great strategical plan was carried through in 
 spite of all obstacles. " Genius is more a product of the 
 heat of will than of the light of intellect," * says Billow, 
 who has been so unjustly accused of sterile theorizing. 
 
 On the 24th May Boudet lay near Ivrea, Lannes had (27) 
 captured that town, Loison was near Bard, Monnier 
 at Chatillon, Chambarlhac at Aosta ; Chabran had 
 received orders to take the investment of Fort Bard in 
 hand. Napoleon was at Aosta, and passed the following 
 
 1 Scheibert : Der Biirgerkrieg in den Nordamerik-Staaten, 180. 
 J Muffling. Aus meineirf Leben, 29. 
 1 Feldzug von 1805, I. 203.
 
 180 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 judgment upon the whole situation : "The enemy seems 
 very surprised at our movement. He does not know what 
 to do ; as yet, he scarcely credits it. The following were 
 the Austrian positions on the i8th May : 12,000 men at 
 Nice, 6000 in Savona and in the littoral of Genoa, 25,000 
 men before Genoa, 8000 near Susa, Pignerol, &c., 3000 
 in the valley of Aosta, 8000 facing the Simplon and the 
 St. Gothard." l It will thus be seen that he was most 
 accurately informed of the Austrians' positions. Then he 
 proceeded to state what had probably taken place mean- 
 while : " The enemy has remained in the above positions 
 until the moment of our arrival at Ivrea. The 3000 men 
 who were in this valley have been beaten and scattered. 
 The whole corps, which lay towards Susa and Pignerol, 
 has meantime taken up its position between Turin and 
 Ivrea. Nice is probably evacuated by this time. I have 
 information from Ivrea that Melas is said to have arrived 
 in Turin, but this is not certain." In fact, the passage 
 of the Alps bad been entirely successful, the enemy had 
 been surprised, he had no forces at hand to oppose the 
 columns that issued from the mountains, and Napoleon 
 was in a position to open the campaign in the plain in full 
 security. On this point, he said : " I reckon upon having 
 my whole army collected at Ivrea by the 26th or 27th ; 
 it will amount to about 33,000 men. I shall be master 
 of the whole country between the Dora Baltea and the 
 Sesia. By that day, Moncey will have crossed the St. 
 Gothard with 15,000 men, Suchet and Massena will 
 follow the enemy as soon as they are informed of our 
 movement, and see that, in front of them, his force is 
 diminishing." 
 
 Melas had at first, after his arrival on the Var, been led 
 to believe that the Army of Reserve intended to march to 
 Provence, in order to face him as he advanced along the 
 Riviera. When, therefore, on the morning of the i8th 
 May he received information from the general command- 
 1 C. N. To Brune.
 
 MARENGO 181 
 
 ing in Piedmont that Napoleon had crossed the Alps, he 
 was entirely surprised by this movement, and lacked the 
 forces necessary to oppose it immediately and effectively. 
 He now left a corps of 17,000 men in position on the Var, 
 for he did not like to resign all hopes of the speedy fall of 
 Genoa, nor to evacuate the Riviera, and he himself 
 hastened to Turin. Of his troops in the Riviera, he had 
 sent about 9000 men back to Piedmont. On the 25th 
 May he himself arrived in Turin, where he collected 
 about 5000 men from the garrison and the troops who had 
 retreated from the mountains. As to the siege of Genoa, 
 he persisted in it, but he had also to face the enemy in 
 the open ; if we compare his action with that of Napoleon 
 in 1796 before Mantua, and the ultimate results in each 
 case, we shall again see that what Napolepn did then was 
 the only right course. 
 
 Napoleon arrived in Ivrea in the evening of the 26th, 
 full of confidence, elated by the rapid and successful issue 
 of his passage of the Alps. " Within ten days," he said, 
 " much will have happened." ' But, as is characteristic of 
 great generals, the success of a first enterprise only in- 
 creased his aspirations, and though he had at first intended 
 upon his entrance in the plain vid Tortona to turn 
 against Melas, and thus catch him between two fires, 
 while relieving Massena, now that he was at Ivrea he 
 formed a more ambitious plan. " It is possible," he said 
 to himself, " that I may abandon this line of operations 
 on the 2gth or soth." 2 Massena was still holding out in 
 Genoa ; why should not Napoleon take advantage of this 
 fact and, marching to Milan, make himself master of 
 Lombardy, and then crossing the Po, cut off completely 
 all Melas' lines of retreat ? 
 
 It is at" such moments that the paths of an ordinary 
 capable general of an army and those of a really 
 great commander diverge. The former would have 
 
 1 C. N. To the Consuls, 2 7th May. 
 
 * C. N. To Petiet and Dejean, 2;th May.
 
 1 82 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 marched from Ivrea to Turin, would have defeated Melas, 
 relieved Genoa, and would then have entered on the con- 
 quest of Lombardy, only to meet the enemy again behind 
 the Po or the Ticino. The latter cut off all the enemy's 
 communications and offered him battle, which, if lost, 
 must mean absolute ruin to him. The enemy succumbed 
 and the one battle gave Napoleon possession of the 
 whole of Upper Italy. A similar decision will be seen in 
 1809, when Archduke Charles was advancing victoriously 
 between the corps of Davout and Napoleon, separated 
 from each other through Berthier's fault. There also the 
 commonplace general would have chosen the safer way, 
 and turned aside to Ingolstadt, but the great commander 
 took a bolder course ; he operated against the enemy's 
 communications, annihilated him, and won at one stroke 
 the whole of Austria to the gates of its capital. And a 
 third time, in October, 1813, we shall see Napoleon at 
 Diiben having to choose between turning aside behind the 
 Saale, or advancing boldly across the Elbe, but, unlike 
 himself, standing irresolute, until the advance of his 
 opponent in his rear upon Leipzic dictated to him his 
 course of action. 
 
 On the 26th Lannes and Boudet attacked the Austrians, 
 who opposed them once more at Romano, and, having 
 thrown them back behind the Oreo, reached Chivasso on 
 (28) the 27th. On the same day Murat with his cavalry and a 
 part of Monnier's division took Vercelli ; then, protected 
 by these advanced corps, the rest of the army collected 
 during these and the following days in and beyond Ivrea. 
 Meanwhile also the divisions to the right and left of the 
 army had pushed onward as ordered. Thurreau had 
 begun his forward movement from Mont Cenis and Mont 
 Genevre towards Susa on the 2Oth ; he had driven back 
 the Austrians posted at Susa, and then taken up a position 
 at Bussoleno. Moncey crossed the St. Gothard on the 
 26th and 27th, and stood ready for an advance to 
 Bellinzona on the 28th; he was in command of the
 
 MARENGO 183 
 
 divisions Lapoype, Lorge, and Gilly ; a detached column 
 had crossed the Simplon and was on the march to Domo 
 d'Ossola. 
 
 Napoleon now, in accordance with his project of 
 marching to Milan, left Lannes behind at Chivasso, to 
 protect this flank movement to the left from Turin, 
 and ordered the army behind him to advance towards the 
 Ticino. Murat, who was now in front, arrived on the 
 2gth on the banks of the Sesia, where he drove back some 
 weak Austrian detachments and reached Novara. He 
 was immediately followed by Boudet and Loison, and 
 later by Monnier and Chambarlhac ; Moncey advanced 
 on the same day as far as Bellinzona. 
 
 On the 3Oth all the French columns continued their 
 advance towards the Ticino. On this river stood about 
 5000 of the Austrians, consisting partly of troops driven out 
 of Piedmont, but for the greater part ordered up from 
 Bellinzona; the division which had been watching the 
 Simplon was also there. On the 3ist Murat and Monnier 
 reached the Ticino near Turbigo ; they forced a passage, 
 but were then prevented from any further advance by the 
 enemy being still in possession of the great canal. How- 
 ever, during the night of the ist June the Austrians retired 
 to Milan ; and the corps which had remained at Bellin- 
 zona to watch the Gothard route, fell back upon Como. 
 Murat, Monnier and Boudet were occupied the same 
 day in preparing for a passage of the Ticino at Turbigo 
 and Buffalora, and crossed that river successfully during 
 it. In the afternoon, at two o'clock, the vanguard reached 
 Milan, whilst the Austrians retreated to Lodi. Napoleon, 
 who had just been informed that Fort Bard had surren- 
 dered the day before, entered Milan in state three hours 
 after the arrival of his vanguard. In the meantime, 
 Lannes had also, on the ist June, left his position near 
 Chivasso and reached Vercelli on the same day, where he 
 received orders to march to Pavia ; he arrived there on 
 the 3rd, whilst the other divisions assembled at Milan,
 
 184 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 and Chabran followed from Bard. The pursuit of the 
 Austrians retreating towards Lodi had immediately been 
 entrusted to Loison, and he reached Lodi on the 4th ; 
 but the Austrians had fallen back towards Crema during 
 the night. 
 
 Moncey had at first been ordered to pursue the Austrian 
 column retreating from Bellinzona vid Como, but was 
 now commanded to move up as fast as possible to Milan. 
 After the capture of this capital, the next operation for 
 Napoleon was to cross the Po, so as to cut all the enemy's 
 communications. But if this was not to lead to his own 
 defeat, it had to be done with sufficient forces, therefore 
 it was necessary to await Moncey's arrival in Milan. 
 
 Napoleon had been informed as to the enemy's position 
 on the 4th by a spy who told him that their main body 
 was, in the last few days of May, still on the Genoese coast ; 
 he consequently wrote : " I do not think the enemy has at 
 this moment on the Tanaro more than 10,000 infantry, 
 nor do I think he can possibly have 20,000 there before 
 the 9th or loth." l As therefore no immediate serious 
 danger was to be apprehended from the enemy, he re- 
 solved, on the one hand, to push forward troops quickly 
 over the Po, in order to secure the points of crossing, and, 
 on the other hand, to force back the Austrian columns, 
 with whom he had been in touch as far as Milan, so far 
 that they would be unable to interfere any further. Murat 
 was consequently ordered forward to Piacenza, and the 
 corps of Victor started on its march to Pavia ; whilst on 
 the other side Loison was commanded to pursue the re- 
 treating enemy beyond Crema and, if possible, to occupy 
 Orzinovi as well. 
 
 Melas had on his arrival in Turin expected that Napo- 
 leon would march first upon that town. But learning as 
 time went on of his march on Milan, he resolved on the 
 2gth to take him in rear vid Vercelli. Scarcely, however, 
 had he set the weak forces at his disposal in motion for 
 1 C. N. To Lannes. Milan, 6th June.
 
 MARENGO 185 
 
 this purpose, than he received on the 3ist the news that 
 the troops posted on the Ticino had been compelled to 
 fall back before greatly superior forces, and that consider- 
 able bodies also were descending from the St. Gothard. 
 He now first recognized his critical situation, and there- 
 with the necessity of giving up Genoa and the Riviera. 
 He therefore settled upon Alessandria as the point of con- 
 centration of his whole army, and sent orders to Ott, as 
 well as to the column standing on the Var, to march to 
 that place. This latter force had however meanwhile been 
 compelled to fall back, before it received this order on 
 the ist June, for Suchet had been reinforced and had 
 attacked and driven it back, and on its further retreat 
 Suchet remained within striking distance, and inflicted 
 such repeated losses on it that when it reached Ceva and 
 Montenotte on the 7th, it only numbered some 8000 
 men. 
 
 Ott received also orders to march on the ist June, 
 but negotiations had already been entered upon, and the 
 fall of Genoa was only a matter of a day or two. He 
 therefore stopped a few days longer, and on the 4th Genoa 
 surrendered. Massena had prolonged his resistance with 
 admirable endurance and energy to the utmost, and then 
 secured permission for the garrison to march out with the 
 honours of war. His defence of Genoa is one of the most 
 brilliant on record. On the 5th and 6th Ott's troops 
 withdrew towards Alessandria. 
 
 Thus on the 5th June the situation was the following : 
 Napoleon was at Milan, as yet unaware of the fall of 
 Genoa ; Moncey at only one day's march from that city : 
 Murat and Boudet had arrived before the tete-de-pont of 
 Piacenza, and had driven an insignificant force, a couple 
 of hundred men, thence, at 10 p.m. Loison had reached 
 Orzinovi ; Lannes was at Pavia and Belgiojoso, towards 
 which places Victor's corps the divisions of Chambarlhac 
 and Gardanne (who had 4000 men of the Reserve 
 Army, lately ordered up) and Monnier] was on the
 
 1 86 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 march. Chabran was still on the Oreo, Thurreau in the 
 valley of the Dora Riparia. On the enemy's side Melas 
 was still at Turin, but was becoming more and more 
 aware of the danger he was in, if the French army crossed 
 the Po in full strength. The tete-de-pont of Piacenza 
 was, as has been remarked above, only very feebly occu- 
 pied, therefore no serious obstacles could be placed in 
 the way of the enemy's crossing. At Turin lay 14,000 
 men ; 8000 were on the march hither from the Riviera and 
 approaching Ceva; Ott, with 12,000, was on the way 
 from Genoa ; and finally the column which had retreated 
 before Loison, about 4000 men, had reached Cremona. 
 Ott now received orders to march, not upon Alessandria, 
 but with forced marches to Piacenza. The troops in 
 Turin were to start on the 8th and take the road to 
 Alessandria, to which place the troops on the march 
 from Ceva were also to proceed. 
 
 On the 6th Loison pushed forward on the one side to- 
 wards Brescia, on the other towards Pizzighettone, and at 
 both places the enemy retired before him ; after this, how- 
 ever, Loison set his whole force in motion in the direction 
 of Cremona. Murat had not been able to cross at Pia- 
 cenza, as this town was still occupied and the bridge partly 
 destroyed. He had therefore turned a little down-stream, 
 and began to cross early in the morning at Noceto. Ad- 
 vancing from this place, he seized the town. On the 
 same day Lannes also had, according to Napoleon's in- 
 structions, begun to cross the Po, starting from Belgiojoso ; 
 and Monnier did the same a li tt le lower down. One more 
 engagement took place with the rearguard of the Austrians 
 retreating vid Stradella. Moncey on the same date 
 reached Milan with his first column, where Napoleon 
 himself still was. 
 
 The latter indeed knew of the successful crossing of 
 the leading corps of Murat and Lannes, but as to what 
 forces were opposed to them on the right bank he knew 
 nothing, though he suspected that the resistance would be
 
 MARENGO '187 
 
 but feeble. On the 7th the army continued the passage of 
 the Po, and concentrated at Stradella and Piaceifea. As 
 Napoleon was not yet informed of what had taken place at 
 the latter town, he ordered Lannes to assist, if necessary, in 
 its capture, but at the same time warned Berthier, who had 
 gone to Pavia the day before, not to employ the whole of 
 Lannes' force in that enterprise, for he might expect to be 
 attacked at Stradella by some 20,000 men on the gth at 
 the latest. To Murat he sent an aide-de-camp in all haste 
 to find out how things were with him. He intended 
 himself to remain in Milan until he was quite clear as to 
 the whole situation. 
 
 This he soon learned. Murat had captured a 
 courier sent by Melas on the 5th from Turin to Vienna, 
 and at 4 a.m. on the 8th Napoleon had a transla- 
 tion of his despatches in his hands, from which he 
 learnt the surrender of Genoa and the movements and 
 forces of the Austrians. He calculated from these, that 
 they could not concentrate their whole strength at 
 Alessandria before the I2th or i3th, and even then would 
 not have more than 22,000 men there. Accordingly his 
 instructions to Berthier, so cautious the day before, 
 were now all in the opposite strain : " See to it, that the 
 divisions advance vigorously and destroy all the troops 
 they may encounter. The vanguard may push forward as 
 far as Voghera." ' " Should a corps present itself to- 
 morrow before Stradella, as is possible, it must be 
 attacked vigorously, so that we may make from 2000 to 
 3000 prisoners. It is certain it can only be a weak one." 
 In a word, he resolved to defeat the enemy in detail. 
 
 In accordance with this command, Lannes started at 
 9 a.m. for Voghera, followed by Chambarlhac's div- 
 ision of Victor's corps ; Gardanne being still engaged 
 in crossing the Po. Meanwhile, Ott arrived at Casteggio 
 about noon. Lannes immediately deployed for the 
 attack, in conformity with Napoleon's reiterated order : 
 1 C. N. To Berthier, Milan, 8th June.
 
 1 88 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 *' If any troops are seen between Voghera and Stradella, 
 they are to be attacked without hesitation ; they are 
 certain to number less than 10,000 men." l Though 
 at first successful, Lannes was soon attacked on his left 
 flank and repulsed by reinforcements which reached 
 the enemy, but he also was now reinforced by the 
 arrival of Chambarlhac ; the latter advanced in his turn 
 against the Austrian right flank, and, Lannes receiving 
 his frontal, attack at the same time, forced the enemy to 
 yield, and to fall back as far as the Scrivia. 
 (29) Napoleon remained at Milan during the forenoon, 
 awaiting Moncey, who arrived there during the day 
 with his last troops. The latter was instructed to 
 employ Lorge in clearing the country between the 
 Oglio and the Chiese, to order Gilly to hold Milan 
 occupied, to invest the citadel, and to send Lapoype 
 forward along the Po, keeping pace with the army on the 
 left bank. Then Napoleon went to Pavia, where he met 
 Berthier. He found Murat and Boudet at Piacenza, 
 Monnier, who had crossed the Po during the day, on the 
 march to Stradella, Loison at Cremona. He resolved 
 to keep the first two at Piacenza for this day and to move 
 the latter up to the same place as a reserve; the day 
 before he had already given orders to set Chabran in 
 motion towards Vercelli. Then Napoleon rode forward 
 as far as the scene of Lannes' engagement and inspected 
 it in person, whereupon he moved his headquarters to 
 Stradella. He acted on the same principle here as else- 
 where ; first he always remained behind the army at some 
 great centre, where he calmly directed the march of his 
 columns, preparing everything and hindering the enemy 
 from judging of the real point of attack by his personal 
 presence. But as soon as he had come in real touch with 
 the enemy, he hastened from the rear in the shortest time 
 possible, and, joining the foremost portion of his army, 
 surveved the situation personally. 
 
 1 C. N. To Berthier, Milan, 8th Tune.
 
 MARENGO 1 89 
 
 Of the Austrians, Ott, who had lost 4000 men in the 
 engagement at Montebello, lay at Castelnuovo ; Melas 
 was still one or two days' march behind Alessandria. 
 The situation was such as to excite our astonishment in 
 no small degree. We cannot but recognize that Napoleon 
 sinned here against one of those great principles which 
 may rarely be violated with impunity. At this time, when 
 everything pointed to a decisive battle within a few days, 
 he did not concentrate all his forces for it, but employed 
 no inconsiderable portions of them in enterprises of 
 secondary importance. He had at his immediate disposal 
 the divisions of Lannes, Victor, Monnier, Boudet, Murat, 
 Loison in all, 34,000 men ; Moncey, Chabran, Thurreau, 
 with 23,000 men in all, were too far away to be of any 
 immediate use. In view of these figures we cannot but 
 agree with Jomini, when he says : " Still by some extra- 
 ordinary chance the campaign of Marengo, which ended 
 so brilliantly, was the one in which he departed most from 
 his principles, at least in the measures he adopted." ' The 
 great mistakes which his opponent had already com- 
 mitted in the course of the campaign, did not admit of his 
 concentrating his whole force against the 34,000 men of 
 Napoleon, and proving to the latter by a defeat the risky, 
 nay, we must use the word, the bungling nature of his 
 proceedings. 
 
 But what was it that caused Napoleon to be thus 
 untrue to himself, and neglect his great principle of 
 concentrating for battle? It seems almost as if it had 
 been the same that caused Frederick to commit a similar 
 mistake at Kolin, namely, a self-confidence, rendered 
 excessive by constant victories and a contempt for the 
 enemy. But the former, who after all gained the victory, 
 as well as the latter, who paid for his too great daring with 
 defeat, recognized the strategical mistake and never 
 repeated it. Still, the different result of these two battles 
 had its effect upon the two generals. Who can say 
 
 1 Hist. crit. et mil. des guerres de la ReV. VIII. 192. 
 2 Wartenburg frequently uses the expression "the divisions or* 
 meaning "the divisions comprising the command of". Here he 
 means the corps of Lannes, Victor, and Murat, and the divisions 
 of Monnier. Boudet, and Loison.
 
 190 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 whether Frederick, had the venture of Kolin succeeded, 
 might not have been led to undertake as stupendous 
 enterprises as Napoleon was ; or whether this latter, had 
 Marengo been a defeat, would not have been taught 
 moderation ? As a general, Frederick, after Kolin, nar- 
 rowed his aims ; to him that battle may have appeared 
 a blot on his fame, but I believe that defeat had at least as 
 much to do with the enduring prosperity of the state he 
 ruled as his most brilliant victories. Napoleon reached 
 the highest summit of military glory, but we may possibly 
 perceive in the victory of Marengo the source of those 
 defeats, which later laid the edifice of Napoleon's empire 
 of the world in the dust. 
 
 On the loth June Ott retreated behind the Scrivia, and 
 Melas' first columns arrived in Alessandria. Napoleon's 
 troops remained on the whole stationary, but Murat and 
 Boudet were brought a little nearer in ; Loison, however, 
 remained at Cremona and Piacenza, and his 6000 men 
 were not destined to take part in the battle of Marengo. 
 On the nth Desaix, having returned from Egypt by 
 Napoleon's orders, arrived in the headquarters at Stradella, 
 and Napoleon immediately gave him the command of the 
 divisions of Monnier and Boudet. On this day the 
 French completed their concentration between Casteggio 
 and Voghera, and on the morning of the I2th Napoleon 
 started on his continued advance ; in the evening of this 
 day his troops stood in the following positions : Lannes 
 at Castelnuovo, Desaix at Pontecurone, Murat in advance 
 towards Tortona, Victor pushing forward in the same 
 direction, forming the left wing. By the I2th Mejas also 
 had collected his army near Alessandria ; moreover, Ott 
 retreated at nightfall behind the Bormida, leaving only a 
 rear-guard at Marengo. 
 
 On the morning of the I3th Napoleon crossed the Scrivia, 
 Victor being in advance on the high road to Alessandria. 
 However, contrary to his expectations, he did not meet 
 with the Austrian army in the open plain between this
 
 MARENGO 191 
 
 river and the Bormida, where its best arm, the cavalry, 
 would have found a good field for its evolutions, as 
 Kellermann was to prove next day. Napoleon had for 
 some days constantly contemplated the possibility that 
 Melas might intend to avoid a battle, by turning aside, 
 either towards Genoa or the left bank of the Po ; and 
 now this possibility bade fair to become a certainty ; he 
 therefore at once sent Desaix with the division of Boudet 
 to the high road to Novi to block the Austrians' retreat to 
 Genoa, whilst, in the other event, Lapoype and Chabran, 
 the latter posted between Chivasso and Vercelli, were to 
 stop Melas on the left bank of the Po. The detaching of 
 Desaix was again a dangerous division of forces, and the 
 army indeed was astonished at this action ; the remark was 
 made that Napoleon, contrary to his usual custom, " was 
 busy catching the enemy, by occupying all his lines of 
 retreat, before having defeated him. It would have been 
 wiser, first to secure the means of defeating him, before 
 making him prisoner." ' 
 
 The advance guard, under Victor, came about five (30) 
 o'clock in the afternoon on the Austrian rear-guard, left 
 behind at Marengo, and drove it, after a short resistance, 
 from its position back to the tete-de-pont on the Bormida, 
 a circumstance which was naturally calculated to confirm 
 Napoleon in his -suspicion of the enemy's retreat. He 
 therefore allowed his army, without massing it to its front, 
 to remain for the night at the points just reached ; Victor 
 thus lay at Marengo, Lannes and Murat at San Giuliano, 
 Desaix at Rivalta, Monnier at Torre di Garofoli, at which 
 latter place Napoleon also passed the night ; a false report 
 moreover assured him that the Austrians had no bridge 
 over the Bormida. In the meantime, however, Melas 
 had resolved to attack the French army and to re-open 
 his communications by a battle. 
 
 The Austrians began, therefore, to cross the Bormida 
 in the early morning of the I4th June ; their van-guard, 
 1 Marmont, M&n. II. 126.
 
 192 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 attacking Victor's position, drove Gardanne from 
 Pietrabuona and threw him back upon Marengo. 
 Napoleon had, as we have seen, not expected this attack ; 
 he now sent in all haste orders to Desaix to rejoin the 
 army at San Giuliano. The ground being cleared by the 
 success of its van-guard, the Austrian army now deployed 
 its lines on the eastern bank of the* Bormida. As regards 
 the 'French, Victor was commanded to hold Marengo to 
 the last, for as the army was not in the necessary state of 
 concentration for a battle, the most important point was to 
 gain time. Lannes was to come up to the right of Victor, 
 and Murat to place two of his cavalry brigades behind the 
 wings of the line ; his third was posted at Sale, to oppose 
 any attempted turning movement along the Tanaro. 
 
 (31) The first attacks of the Austrians upon Marengo failed, 
 and Lannes gained time to take up his appointed position 
 in the line ; on his left Gardanne defended Marengo, 
 whilst Chambarlhac occupied the space from this place to 
 the Bormida near the farm of Stortigliona. Meanwhile, 
 General Ott had arrived in Castel Ceriolo with a strong 
 column, without having met with any resistance ; seeing 
 no enemy there, he turned to the right and advanced 
 against Lannes' right flank. At this time, ten o'clock, 
 Monnier alone was at Napoleon's disposal at Torre di 
 Garofoli. Desaix sent word that he would arrive with 
 Boudet's division about four o'clock in the afternoon. All 
 Napoleon's eiforts had therefore to be directed to holding 
 out until that hour. 
 
 (32) He now sent Monnier forward with orders to occupy 
 Castel Ceriolo with two of his demi-brigades, but Ott 
 opposed to these his second line. In the front Lannes 
 and Victor could no longer resist the continued Austrian 
 attack, Marengo was captured from them, and their whole 
 force retreated along the high road. By this retreat the 
 defenders of Castel Ceriolo saw themselves isolated ; they 
 therefore also abandoned their position and retreated on 
 Torre di Garofoli. It was now noon.
 
 MARENGO 193 
 
 Napoleon then hurled the last fresh troops still at his 
 disposal, the 800 men of his Consular guard, upon Ott, 
 but while these were engaged in front by infantry, they were 
 attacked in the flank and rear by some Austrian cavalry 
 and entirely dispersed. It was now about one o'clock, and 
 this last disaster had made the French retreat inevitable, 
 and on the left wing, where Victor was, it soon degenerated 
 into utter rout. One more combined effort of the Austrian 
 army and their victory would have been secure. But 
 Melas was not equal to the situation ; a man of seventy, he 
 was exhausted by the efforts of the forenoon, and when he 
 saw the French in flight he thought it sufficient to order 
 the pursuit, whilst he himself rode back to Alessandria. 
 His chief of the staff now formed the bulk of the army in (33) 
 one great column, and advanced along the road to San 
 Giuliano, Ott marching to the left of it vid Villanova 
 towards the castle of La Ghilina. The head of the troops 
 arrived about five o'clock in the afternoon before San 
 Giuliano, whilst the French continued their flight past 
 this town towards Torre di Garofoli. 
 
 But at this juncture Desaix came up with Boudet's 
 division, and all the troops that still had any leaders 
 joined him, whilst Napoleon sent his aides-de-camp 
 over the battle-field, calling on all the fugitives to rally, 
 and telling them that the army was again showing front 
 and would advance afresh. Marmont assembled on 
 Desaix's right wing a battery of eighteen guns to support 
 his attack, and Kellermann's brigade (the same cavalry 
 brigade which had covered Victor's left wing during the 
 battle), moving round behind Desaix, appeared on the 
 right flank of Marmont's artillery, and then advanced 
 together with Desaix along the high road. 
 
 Desaix now flung his whole division impetuously upon 
 the great Austrian column, and whilst this latter was thus 
 checked, Kellermann fell with the first line of his cavalry 
 upon its left flank, while his second line went to meet the 
 Austrian cavalry advancing in the plain on one side of the 
 
 o
 
 194 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 road to protect this flank. The latter evaded the shock, 
 and Kellermann then threw this second line. also upon 
 the Austrian .infantry column. The effect of these com- 
 bined attacks of Desaix and Kellermann was decisive ; 
 the front half of the column was entirely scattered, cut 
 down or taken prisoners, and the remainder, thrown into 
 confusion by its own fugitives, succumbed also to the 
 French, who were now advancing again on all sides. 
 This decided the battle, the Austrians fled beyond the 
 Bormida, but their rear-guard held the bridge-head until 
 Ott came up again from Castel Ceriolo. The French 
 van-guard encamped for the niglit near Pietrabuona, the 
 main body at Marengo. 
 
 The next morning an officer bearing a flag of truce 
 from Melas appeared, and on the same day an agreement 
 was come to, in accordance with which the Austrian army 
 evacuated the whole of Upper Italy with all the fortified 
 places as far as the Mincio. On the 15th May Napoleon 
 commenced crossing the Great St. Bernard, by the i5th 
 June the campaign was at an end, the strategical idea 
 which formed its foundation having been completely 
 carried out. 
 
 Here we see the justification of the speech which 
 Napoleon made to Jomini at the beginning of the cam- 
 paign of 1806 : " The secret of war lies in the secret of 
 (29) the lines of communications." l He who can determine 
 the roads which will bring him most quickly and in full 
 force upon the enemy's lines of communications without 
 endangering his own, has foun.d out the secret of success 
 in strategy. And it is quite possible to acquire this 
 power by study ; therein lies the chief practical gain to be 
 derived from reading military history. 
 
 Of course, study alone does not make a strategist. 
 
 for that clear recognition of what is right in warfare, 
 
 which may thus be gained, does not imply the 
 
 capacity for carrying out what has been decided on,. 
 
 1 Trait6, etc.. III. 18.
 
 MARENGO 195 
 
 though it is one of the first conditions for doing so. 
 Willisen says very justly : " There is always a great 
 difference between knowing how a thing ought to be done, 
 and being able to do it, still, you must begin by having 
 that knowledge, and not with complete ignorance." 
 And Jomini amplifies the same thought: "'All those 
 brilliant conceptions, which threatened the very existence 
 of the armies of Wurmser, Melas, Mack, and Brunswick, 
 were in themselves clever manoeuvres ; they would alone 
 have entailed the defeat of the enemy, but they would only 
 have threatened the existence of those armies, they would 
 not have anniliilated them "but for their splendid execution 
 that energy and rapidity, which amazed the world." 
 In another place also he emphasizes the fact that the 
 best plan only becomes valuable by the act of its execu- 
 tion, for he says : " Strategy does not consist in making 
 half-hearted dashes at the enemy's communications, it 
 consists in really mastering those communications, and 
 then proceeding to give battle." * 
 
 This was done at Marengo, and therefore the great 
 critic of those times says : * " These events were the 
 natural outcome of the cleverly conceived plan of cam- 
 paign, namely, to attack the enemy's lines of communica- 
 tions, without exposing one's own. Had Bonaparte been 
 beaten at Marengo, we do not believe that, as many have 
 maintained, he would, shut in as he was within narrow 
 limits, have of necessity been annihilated" * It can-not be 
 denied that his line of retreat on the r.oad to Stradella 
 and then across the Po was perfectly open, and the 
 same circumstance, which had made him appear too 
 weak on the field of Marengo, viz., the wide dispersion of 
 his force of troops, would then have allowed him to resume 
 the fight with fresh troops. Indeed, he himself speaks 
 
 1 Theore des grossen Krieges. I. 23. 
 
 * Trait^, etc. 111. 215. 
 
 1 Ibid., IV. 34 
 
 4 Jomini, Hist. crit. et mil., etc .XIII. 301. 
 
 *.Jhese words are found in Dumas, Pi&ris, etc., III. 303.
 
 196 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 thus of his situation : " I was in an exceptional position, 
 and I risked a little on the chance of gaining much. Had 
 I been beaten, I should have retreated to my fortified camp 
 at Stradella, crossed the Po on my five bridges, covered 
 by my batteries, without the enemy's army being able to 
 stop me ; I should have united my first corps with the 
 divisions of Moncey, Lecchi and Thurreau ; I should have 
 allowed one of Melas' corps to cross the Po (and that was 
 exactly what he wished it would do) ; and then I could 
 have attacked him with superior numbers. Being vic- 
 torious, I gained the same results. Melas' army, shut in 
 between us and the river, was forced to lay down its arms 
 and to surrender all the fortresses. Had I been beaten, 
 which I believe would have been impossible, I should have 
 resumed operations according to the ordinary rules, and 
 called Switzerland to my aid." l 
 
 We have already drawn attention to the vast importance 
 of Marengo to Napoleon, as well as to the contrast 
 between his subsequent strategy and that of Frederick 
 after Kolin ; we must now consider the question under a 
 different aspect. The final tactical aim of every war is 
 the annihilation of the enemy, and therefore the offensive 
 alone is, properly speaking, the way to attain it. We 
 need therefore not be astonished to see that wherever the 
 greatest results are achieved, the offensive is the pre- 
 dominating course. And here we may note a significant 
 difference between the generals of Kolin and Marengo. 
 Frederick's subsequent strategy was, in spite of apparent 
 exceptions, necessarily defensive in its essence and based 
 upon self-preservation ; that of Napoleon became more 
 and more pronouncedly offensive, aiming at the conquest 
 of the world. Thus even in 1813 he did not conduct the 
 war with a view to preserve himself, but to destroy his 
 enemies ; the fact that this was then no longer possible, 
 Napoleon as a sovereign ought to have recognized, but 
 since as a statesman he would not impose this self- 
 1 Antommarchi, M&n. I. 184.
 
 MARENGO 197 
 
 restraint upon himself, nay, fettered by his former actions, 
 possibly could no longer do so, as a general he was right 
 not to alter his manner of waging war, but to adhere to 
 it, as he did ; and we are right in admiring him for acting 
 thus, though we may also confess that the final result 
 could only be utter defeat.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ULM. 
 1805. 
 
 WITH the peace of Luneville the war on the continent 
 had come to an end. Order had, during those first lew 
 years of the nineteenth century, been restored with a 
 strong hand at home ; indeed the country, exhausted by 
 successive revolutions, was in need of it ; the power and 
 influence of the First Consul had grown more and more, 
 to the exclusion of all others, until his work found at last 
 its natural consummation, and the government of the 
 country the stability it needed, in the establishment of the 
 Empire on the i8th May, 1804. Napoleon could indeed 
 afterwards say with justice : " I did not presume to claim 
 the crown ; I picked it up from the gutter, and the people 
 put it on my head." * 
 
 The treaty of Amiens had only caused a short interval 
 in the war with England. With the resumption of 
 hostilities in May, 1803, Napoleon had, however, de- 
 termined to deal that great rival of France a decisive 
 blow ; he intended to land his army in England and to 
 subjugate the country altogether. This plan shows his 
 genius at its full height. The idea, which underlay this 
 landing, was perfectly correct, it was a "putting into 
 practice of the highest rule of war, namely : Try to put 
 your strong points as to time and space against the 
 enemy's weak points." 2 Napoleon's strength lay in his 
 
 1 Mdm. de Ste. H&ene, I. 233. 
 
 3 Willisen, Die Feldziige der Jahre 1859 und 1866. Dedication.
 
 ULM 199 
 
 army and in war. on land, England's strength consisted 
 in its fleet and in war at sea ; to attack her in such a way 
 that his strength might be brought to bear, was therefore 
 assuredly good strategy. Napoleon has been condemned, 
 because the execution of this plan is said Jo have been 
 impossible. But if we remember all that has been declared 
 impossible in the history of the world by contemporaries, 
 and yet was achieved by the power of genius, who can 
 say, that a landing of his army in England would have 
 been an impossibility for Napoleon. Hannibal's great 
 plan of crossing the Alps and attacking Rome in Italy 
 and conquering it there, would perhaps be considered 
 impossible now, if it had remained a plan only. 
 
 The fact that this landing was not effected and England 
 not conquered, is generally considered by historians as 
 the salvation of Europe, for one country at least escaped 
 Napoleon's domination. I do not share this opinion. 
 The states of the continent suffered at that time too severely 
 and directly from Napoleon's tyranny for them to realize 
 that England had no less exclusively, though in a more 
 practical and more enduring manner, its own interests in 
 view during that time, and by no means those of Europe. 
 Had Napoleon entered England at the head of his army, 
 his strength would on the one hand have been weakened 
 thereby, and the continent would have preserved greater 
 freedom of action, and on the other hand England, shaken 
 to its very foundations at home, would not have been able 
 to concentrate, as it did, almost the whole colonial posses- 
 sions of the world in* its own hands, and the continental 
 powers would nowadays have a more equal share of them. 
 
 Napoleon directed all the powers of his^ mind to the 
 execution of this plan of landing ; he exerted all his inde- 
 fatigable energy and keen and versatile understanding in 
 the creation of the fleet of transports and the army necessary 
 for it. The former, calculated by him at a total number of 
 2008 vessels, was to be capable of crossing the channel 
 with 150,000 men and all the necessary equipment for
 
 2oo NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 (34) such an army; the narrowest part, the neighbourhood" 
 of Boulogne, was chosen for the point of departure ; the 
 coast was covered with numerous batteries as a protection 
 against any attempts of the English fleet, and enormous 
 basins, moles, and fortifications were constructed. At 
 the same time the army of invasion was organized. On 
 the I4th June, 1803, orders, were issued to form six 
 corps, each of which was to be collected in a camp and 
 drilled there. Five of these camps were placed along the 
 coasts of the North Sea and the- English Channel, at 
 Ghent in the Netherlands, at St. Omer, Compiegne, and 
 St. Malo. The collection and formation of these corps 
 proceeded gradually in these camps. In July, Napoleon 
 himself visited the north-eastern parts of France and 
 Belgium, inspected the coast from the mouth of the 
 Somme as far as Dunkirk, and studied the natural features 
 which might affect the execution of his plan. The visit 
 was repeated in November, and the troops in Soult's camp 
 at St. Omer were then inspected. Soon after this, on the 
 1 2th December, a general order was issued, which divided 
 the " Grand Army " into four corps, three at the camps of 
 St. Omer, Bruges, and Montreuil, and the fourth in reserve. 
 Once more, in J anuary, 1804, the troops were reviewed 
 by Napoleon. The army was now distributed as follows : 
 Bernadotte was in occupation of Hanover, Marmont lay 
 at the camp of Utrecht, Davout at that of Bruges, Soult 
 at that of St. Omer, and Ney at that of Montreuil. Be 
 hind these, as a second line, all the regiments of dra' 6 oous 
 collected in divisions, lay in cantonments. There was 
 in addition the camp at Brest under Augereau, the troops 
 there being destined for a landing in Ireland. On the 
 i6th August the new emperor assembled Soult's and 
 Ney's troops at Boulogne, in order to inflame their en- 
 thusiasm for his person by a formal distribution of crosses 
 of the Legion of Honour, fqr " the soul of every army is 
 an honest attachment of all its parts to their leader." ' 
 1 C. N. N. to Gauteaume, St. Cloud, 23rd June, 1803.
 
 ULM 20 1 
 
 These great preparations of Napoleon against England 
 had, however, raised fears as well as hopes on the con- 
 tinent, and Austria more particularly, too much restricted 
 in its legitimate influence on the fate of Europe in con- 
 sequence of the peace ,of Luneville, was preparing to take 
 advantage of the chances of the future. In October, 1804, 
 this power established along the frontiers of Switzerland 
 and Italy a so-called sanitary cordon, under the pretext of 
 yellow fever being rife in .Spain, and in January, 1805, 
 matters came to such a pass, that Napoleon saw himself 
 compelled for the moment to issue orders to his army to 
 prepare to march. Moreover the Austrians had taken 
 advantage of a concentration of French troops in Italy on 
 the. occasion of Napoleon's coronation as king of this 
 country (26th May, 1805) to augment their own army in 
 Carinthia and Venetia to 40,000 men. 
 
 Soon after this the Court of Vienna received from the 
 Court of St. Petersburg proposals for combined action 
 against France, and in July, 1805, Wjnzingerode arrived 
 in Vienna to confer about their operations ; on the i6th a 
 convention was signed, in accordance with which Russia 
 was to put two armies in the field ; the first of which, 
 55,000 men, was to start from Brody on the 2Oth 
 August, and, marching in six columns, was to reach 
 Braunau on the Inn by the 2oth October : the second, 
 40,000 men, was to start from Brest-Litovsk and proceed 
 to Bohemia. Should the emperor or one of the arch- 
 dukes command the Austrian army, the Russians were to be 
 under his commands. Besides this, two corps, of 25,000 
 men each, were to be sent by sea, one to Naples, and the 
 other to Pomerania, the latter in order to join hands 
 with the Swedes and occupy Hanover. 
 
 The Austrian plan of campaign, drawn up by Archduke 
 Charles, was based on the idea of taking the offensive 
 with the bulk of the army in Upper Italy, and remaining 
 on the defensive in Germany, until a decisive battle should 
 have been won in Italy, or until the Russian army had
 
 2O2 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 arrived. In Italy 95,000 men were to be collected in 
 the Tyrol, but to act with the Italian army, 33,000 men ; 
 in Germany 59,000. 
 
 Napoleon, who had been again at the camp of Boulogne 
 since the 3rd August, now began more and more to 
 see that he must for the present abandon crossing to 
 England, and on the 23rd August he said to himself: 
 " My mind is made up. My fleet set sail from Ferrol on 
 the I4th August with thirty-four ships ; it had no enemy 
 in sight. If it obeys its orders and joins that of Brest, it 
 will stifl be in time, I shall yet be master of England." ' 
 If this should not turn out so, " I shall attend to what is 
 most urgent, strike my camp here, and order my third 
 battalions to replace my field battalions ; this will still give 
 me a sufficiently strong force at Boulogne, and on the 23rd 
 September I shall be in Germany with 200,000 men, and 
 in the Kingdom of Naples with 25,000 men. I shall march 
 to Vienna and shall not hold my hand till I am master of 
 Naples and Venice, and have so increased the dominions 
 of the Elector of Bavaria as to leave me nothing further 
 to fear from Austria." 
 
 From this day he began to issue the preparatory orders 
 for a concentration of the French army in Germany. Its 
 distribution in the camps at this time was as follows-: 
 Bernadotte at Hanover, Marmont at Utrecht, Davout at 
 Ambleteuse, Soult and the cavalry reserve under Murat at 
 Boulogne, Mortierat Etaples, Ney at Wimereux, Augereau 
 at Brest. Lombardy was held by Jourdan, whose place was 
 however soon afterwards taken by Massena. Within two 
 days the Emperor had taken his final resolution, and said : " I 
 am resolved. My movements have begun, I shall be in Ger- 
 many on the 1 7th September with 200,000 men." * The 
 same day indeed he sent Murat and Bertrand to Germany, 
 in order carefully to inspect the country in which the 
 campaign was to be conducted ; they were to reconnoitre 
 minutely the fortresses, the roads, the tributaries of the 
 1 C. N. To Talleyrand. * Ibid
 
 ULM 203 
 
 Danube, as well as the banks of this stream itself, and 
 gain all the information possible as to the passes leading 
 into the Tyrol and into Bohemia, as well as those of the 
 Black Forest. 
 
 On the 28th August Savary also was despatched 
 thither, but by this time the Emperor's pian of campaign 
 had assumed a more definite form, and the orders which 
 he gave to this officer were more detailed. He was to re- 
 connoitre the roads, which, starting from Philippsburg, 
 Bruchsal, and Durlach, crossed the Neckar at Heilbronn, 
 Cannstadt and, Esslingen, and led thence to the Danube, 
 Dillingen, Gundelfingen and Ulm, as well as the cross-roads 
 between them. In these orders the Emperor's whole plan 
 of campaign is revealed, and we should pay the greatest 
 attention to them ; for Napoleon, standing as he did at 
 the head of the State, invested with absolute power and no 
 longer fettered by any personal considerations, had now 
 free play for his genius* and could put his ideas fully into 
 practice. 
 
 To begin with, we note that he resolved to bring matters 
 to an issue in Germany ; we have already, when treating of 
 the campaign of 1800, pointed to the fact that the de- 
 cisive point lay there. He now placed the bulk of his army, 
 200,000 men, there, opposing only 50,000 men to the 
 Austrian main army in Italy. Thus we have a more 
 markedly admirable illustration than at any other time of 
 his principle of appearing at the decisive point with over- 
 whelming forces, neglecting all considerations of secondary 
 importance. And just as in 1800, against Kray's left wing, 
 these overwhelming forces were now set in motion against 
 the right wing of the Austrian army in Germany, as indeed 
 fhe reconnaissance of the roads by Savary led us to expect. 
 This wing was the right one to attack, for it was the one 
 first met with from the North- West and indeed from the 
 North, whence two corps, those of Bernadotte and Mar- 
 mont, were marching. Therefore, by attacking and turn- 
 ing this wing with superior strength, the Emperor would
 
 2O4 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 cut the Austrians entirely off from their communications 
 with Vienna, and consequently annihilate them. 
 
 Here we must point out the difference which is shown 
 between Napoleon's strategy and that in vogue nowadays. 
 Napoleon, as appeared from his first plan in 1800, and 
 as now may be more particularly noted here, effected the 
 strategical concentration of his army in the first place on the 
 enemy's flank, so that with a simple forward movement for 
 battle he gained the latter's communications; hence the first 
 encounter could not fail to prove an Ulm or a Jena. Now- 
 adays this can no longer be done. Inasmuch as we must 
 endeavour now to employ all the railway lines for our con- 
 centration, and inasmuch as the enemy also has to make 
 use of all his railway lines leading towards the frontier, 
 there will be in the main a frontal concentration on the part 
 of both combatants, and it will no longer be possible to 
 gain such an enormous advantage with respect to space in 
 the first massing of forces, as Napoleon gained here by his 
 strategical marches on the enemy's flank ; it will only be 
 possible to gain an advantage in point of time. 
 
 In Napoleon's day there was plenty of time during the 
 march of the armies to the field (for then they had to 
 march) to become acquainted with the enemy's formation 
 and to direct one's own concentration to his flank, assuming 
 of course a correct strategical perception of the situation. 
 The modern rapidity of mobilization and of the strategical 
 deployment by means of railways, have made the latter 
 a task which must be arranged in all its details during 
 peace ; it is therefore impossible to alter it according 
 to the position of the enemy's flank. Only after the 
 armies have been massed and operations have begun, can 
 a superiority of strategical calculation be displayed as to 
 placing oneself on the flank or the rear of the enemy ; 
 hence the manreuvres with which Napoleon was in the 
 habit of opening his campaigns, will only be possible after 
 the first few encounters. We can no longer begin 
 immediately with a Jena, but we can still, after a Worth
 
 ULM 205 
 
 or a Spicheren, choose our lines of operation in such a 
 manner that we may force the enemy to a Gravelotte. 
 
 Whilst the Emperor's confidential officers were thus, 
 as ordered, examining the country to be traversed, he gave 
 his chief of the staff, Berthier, the necessary instructions 
 for the " counter-march of his whole army," l and on the 
 3ist August he exclaimed gleefully : " The Grand Army 
 is in full march, it will have arrived entire on the Rhine 
 by the 24th September." 1 In extenso, these marching 
 orders ran as follows : " Bernadotte will collect his corps 
 at Gottingen and arrive at Wiirzburg by the 23rd and 
 24th September. Marmont will march to Mainz, collect 
 his troops there between the 20th and 25th September, 
 and then join Bernadotte at Wiirzburg. Of the troops on 
 the English Channel, the first divisions of the corps of 
 Davout (left wing), Soult (centre), and Key (right wing), 
 will start on the 28th August ; the next divisions will 
 follow at an interval of two days' march, and the last in 
 their turn at an interval of one day's march." The 
 Emperor himself remained for the present at Boulogne, 
 in order to divert the enemy's attention from this move- 
 ment, but he appointed Murat his representative with the 
 army, and ordered him to reach Strasburg by the nth 
 September. The Guards also, under Bessieres, started 
 for this latter place from Boulogne on the 3ist August. 
 
 On the 2gth August the Emperor- arranged the following 
 distribution of the " Grand Army of 1805 " : 
 
 In command : The Emperor. 
 
 Chief of the Staff: Berthier. 
 
 The Guards. Bessieres 6,000 men 
 
 Inf. Di-vs. Cav. Divs. 
 
 I. Corps. Bernadotte: Drouet Kellermann 18,000 men 
 
 Rivaud 
 
 II. Corps. Marmont: Boudet Lacoste 
 
 Grouchy 
 
 Dumonceau 21,000 men 
 
 1 C. N., 25th August. J C. N. To Eugene, Camp of Boulogne.
 
 206 
 
 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 III. Corps. Davout: 
 
 IV. Corps. Soult ; 
 
 Cuirassier division : 
 Dragoon division : 
 
 Inf. Divs. 4*Jf*' ^ av> D' vs - 
 
 Bisson Vialannes 
 
 Friant 
 
 Gudin 27,000 men 
 
 St. Hilaire Margaron 
 
 Van damme 
 
 Legrand 
 
 Suchet 41,000 men 
 
 V. Corps. Lannes : Oudinot Treilhard 
 
 Gazan 18,000 men 
 
 VI. Corps Ney: Dupont Tilly 
 
 Loison 
 
 Malher 24,000 men 
 
 Cavalry Reserve : Murat. 
 Nansouty. 
 d'Hautpoul. 
 Klein. 
 Walther. 
 
 ,, Beaumont 
 
 Bourcier. 
 
 Dismounted dragoons : Baraguey d'Hilliers 22,000 men 
 
 As a reserve there were still in the rear and in process 
 of formation : 
 
 VII. Corps. Augereau. Inf. div. : Desjardins 
 
 M. Mathieu 14,000 men 
 
 In Germany he was joined by the following in addition : 
 
 Bavarian Corps : Deroy 20,000 men 
 
 Wiirttemburg contingent : Seeger 5,000 men 
 
 Baden contingent : Harrant 3,ooo men 
 
 So that the grand total of the active army amounted to 
 219,000 men. 
 
 Of this army the Emperor proudly declared at that time : 
 "Assuredly there is no finer army in Europe than mine 
 is to-day ; " l and even at the close of his life he called it 
 " the best army that ever existed." * And indeed it was 
 so constituted as to justify his praise. The men were, it 
 is true, only to a small extent soldiers of long service, most 
 of them belonged to the levy of the year before, but they 
 had been uninterruptedly in camp for a year and a half, 
 and had been drilled assiduously. One of their leaders 
 at that time said : " The troops very rapidly reached a 
 degree of perfection, which can hardly be imagined. I 
 
 1 C. N. To Cambace'res. Camp of Boulogne. 1 3th August. 
 Me-m.de Ste. Hfl. II. 319.
 
 ULM 207 
 
 have never seen it attained in a like manner by any French 
 troops." 1 Well drilled, well organized troops, whose 
 powers of endurance are not yet weakened by their own 
 personal experience of the sufferings, dangers, and hard- 
 ships of war, are assuredly the best material. 
 
 But, above all, their commanders were excellent. Of 
 the seven corps-leaders in the army destined for Germany 
 only two, Augereau and Bernadotte had passed their 
 fortieth year; three, Soult, Lannes and Ney, were con- 
 temporaries of the Emperor, then thirty-six years old ; 
 Davout was one year younger, and Marmont was not yet 
 thirty-two. Of the commanders of divisions half were 
 still in the thirties, and of the others d'Hautpoul alone had 
 reached fifty. Thus all the men who commanded in the 
 most important posts were still in their prime. All still 
 had a future before them, and were therefore filled with an 
 eager thirst for action, full of initiative and enterprise. 
 And all moreover were well versed in war, most of them 
 familiar with Napoleon's methods of strategy, and each 
 accustomed to unconditional obedience. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Austrians. also had set their forces in 
 motion against the Bavarian frontier. The Archduke 
 Ferdinand was entrusted with the chief command of this 
 army, though the Emperor Francis reserved to himself 
 the supreme direction of operations, and appointed for 
 this purpose General Mack as his quartermaster-general. 
 Napoleon had become acquainted with Mack in the year 
 1800, as a prisoner of war, and had at that time said of 
 him : " Mack is one of the most mediocre men I ever met 
 in my life. Full of conceit and vanity, he considers 
 himself fit to do anything. He is nothing now, but 
 I should like to .see him some day opposed to one of 
 our good generals, he would see fine things ; he is very 
 self-confident, and that is all; he is one of the most 
 incapable men possible, and, in addition, he is unlucky." ' 
 It was this man, then, who was to be the Emperor's 
 1 Marmont, M&n. II. 231. * $ourrienne, Mem. III. 275.
 
 208 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 special adviser, and the real conductor of the opera- 
 tions. 
 
 On the 2nd September, Mack arrived in Wels, and 
 immediately gave orders for the army to advance into 
 Bavaria. It was, as a matter of fact, not yet massed 
 on the frontier, but as the French were still at a 
 distance, Bavaria might, by prompt action, be forced 
 to become an ally, or be disarmed before Napoleon's 
 arrival. Here it could be said with justice : " Time 
 presses and days are months." ' But scarcely had the 
 Austrians entered Bavaria, than they allowed themselves 
 to be delayed by evasive negotiations on the part of the 
 Elector, during which the Bavarian army, taking 
 advantage of these, retreated behind the Danube, 
 and only concentrated again at Amberg, and then at 
 Bamberg. The Austrians marched, meanwhile, uncon- 
 cernedly on along the south bank of the Danube, and on 
 the 2ist their front reached Memmingen. Mack inspected 
 Ulm, and then reconnoitred the Iller, which river he had 
 chosen as his line of defence. It is true the Archduke 
 Ferdinand, who had arrived at Alt-Oetting on the igth 
 September, endeavpured to stop the forward march of 
 the army, so as not to be forced to give battle in such an 
 advanced and isolated position before the arrival of the 
 Russians, but the Emperor Francis, who had reached 
 Munich on the 2Oth, countermanded his orders, full of 
 confidence in Mack, and the Austrians continued massing 
 along the Iller. But on the 23rd September, Kienmaier 
 was appointed to keep watch with one corps upon the 
 Bavarians and Bernadotte, whose arrival at Mainz had 
 become known ; this corps was to take up a position 
 along the line Neuburg Ingolstadt. 
 
 In the meantime, Napoleon himself had, after having 
 
 set his army in motion towards the Rhine, returned to 
 
 St. Cloud, in order to conceal as long as possible the 
 
 great offensive movement which he had set on foot. 
 
 1 C. N. N. to Daru. Camp of Boulogne, 3Oth August
 
 ULM 209 
 
 With this same intention, he wrote to Fouch6 : " Pro- 
 hibit all mention, in the newspapers, of the army on the 
 banks of the Rhine ; let it be as if it did not exist 
 at all," ' and although the influence of the press at that 
 time was far different from what it is nowadays, yet this 
 precaution will surely be pronounced to have been very 
 advisable, especially if we remember how greatly the 
 French and Belgian newspapers hindered the chances of 
 success of MacMahon's march in August, 1870. And 
 whilst the Emperor thus took good care to hide his 
 movements from the enemy, he himself received from 
 Murat at Strasburg a preliminary notification, dated the 
 loth September, as to the result of the latter's recon- 
 naissance. According to this, some 60,000 Austrians 
 were then at Wels, 10,000 to 12,000 at Braunau, and 
 about 15,000 near the lake of Constance ; at Braunau a 
 camp was being planned for 30,000 men, and enormous 
 depots established ; finally, some 80,000 Russians were on 
 the frontiers of Galicia. 
 
 On the 7th September, the Emperor had already issued 
 orders for forming reserve camps. One of these was 
 to be near Strasburg, under Kellermann, and another 
 near Mainz, under Lefebvre. In addition, Mainz, Stras- 
 burg, Neu-Breisach, and Hiiningen were to be placed 
 in a state of defence. This method of ensuring the 
 reinforcement of his army by the establishment of direct 
 reserves, and of securing his base by fortifying the strong 
 places near it, is one of those precautionary measures 
 which this audacious but careful general always took. 
 
 Meanwhile, he continued to keep a watchful eye upon 
 the Austrians. " It seems," he wrote on the I3th 
 September, "the Austrians crossed the Inn on the loth 
 September." 3 But his own troops also were now ap- 
 proaching the Rhine, and accordingly the Emperor sent, 
 on the i7th September, orders for the,, regulation of the 
 passage of this river, and of the further lines of march 
 1 C. N. St. Cloud, I2th September. * C. N. To Eugene, St. Cloud. 
 
 P
 
 2io NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of the individual corps. These orders form one of those 
 documents which reveal Napoleon's strategical insight in 
 the clearest light ; the simplicity, clearness, and practical 
 nature of all the insuiictions render them one of the most 
 valuable lessons in studying, map in hand, how to arrange 
 broadly the movements of an army. 
 
 And how did these orders come into existence, how 
 did he work in order to obtain such a firm grip of the 
 strategical situation ? Let us inquire of one of those 
 who saw him at work : " The Emperor was himself really 
 his own chief of the staff; holding in his hand a pair of 
 compasses, opened for a distance, by scale, of seven to eight 
 leagues in a straight line (a distance which, reckoning 
 the turnings of the roads, generally covers nine to ten 
 leagues of march, at least), bent, nay, often lying over his 
 map, on which the positions of his army corps and the 
 supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of 
 different colours, he arranged his own movements with a 
 certainty of which we can scarcely form a just idea. 
 Moving his compasses vigorously over his chart, he judged 
 in a moment of the number of marches for each of his 
 corps, which would be necessary so as to reach any point 
 he wished it to reach on a fixed day, and then, sticking 
 his pins into these fresh positions, and calculating the 
 speed at which each column could move, he dictated 
 those orders, which if they stood alone would entitle him 
 -to glory." l 
 
 It was only very rarely that the Emperor issued any 
 orders dealing with his army as a whole. For he not only 
 tried to avoid the possibility of the enemy getting wind of 
 his intentions, in case they should capture an individual 
 order, but he also shrank from making them known to his 
 own army, as he was convinced that a secret known to 
 many is sure to leak out somehow or other ; whilst it was 
 always a part of his plan to surprise the enemy as to space 
 and time. In most cases, therefore, every corps leader re- 
 
 1 Jomini, Pr&ii, etc., 289.
 
 ULM 211 
 
 ceived instructions only upon what he himself had to do, 
 whilst, with respect to the general position of the army, 
 he received additional information only concerning the 
 corps next to his own. It is the careful study of these 
 personal Orders of the Emperor which is of the highest 
 value for every officer ; they contain the secrets of what the 
 old school called "logistics," and what the modern 
 school calls " staff duties." The Emperor referred in an 
 incisive and definite manner to the movements as a 
 whole, which he desired to see carried out ; he did not 
 indeed follow any fixed rule of sequence, but dictated, 
 just as a thought occurred to him, and the originality and 
 force of his diction, weakened by no formulae, invested 
 the orders he issued with a special emphasis, so that it 
 was felt to be a simple impossibility not to execute an order 
 couched in such terms. " Do not go to sleep before 
 having sent me all these details." l "I congratulate you 
 upon the successes you have gained. But do not give 
 yourself any rest ; pursue the enemy, with your sword at 
 his ribs, and cut all his communications." * " Should the 
 enemy not be in Memmingen, you will come down like 
 lightning to our level." * "I recommend you to make 
 your aides-de-camp and assistants ride their horses to 
 death. Distribute them in relays upon the road to 
 Weissenhorn, so that I may get your news as quickly as 
 possible." 4 As to details, he only mentions them, if they 
 have any special bearing upon the execution of the general 
 plan, but in such cases he never fails to do so. It was 
 Berthier's business to elaborate the orders, to regulate all 
 particulars, to give to the whole the customary shape and 
 to communicate them to the army. 8 
 
 The above mentioned orders for the crossing of the 
 
 C. N. To Bernadotte, Augsburg, nth October, 1805, 3 p.m. 
 C. N. To Murat, Abbey of Elchingen, i;th October, 1805, 2 p.m. 
 C. N. To Soult, Augsburg, I2th October, 1805, 10.30 pm. 
 C. N To Soult, Augsburg, I2th October, 1805, 10.30 a.m. 
 Berthier was chief of the staff in all Napoleon's campaigns from 
 1800 to 1814. ED.
 
 212 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Rhine conveyed briefly the following instructions : In the 
 first place the independent divisions of cavalry will cross. 
 (35) On the 25th September. Nansouty will reach Heidelberg, 
 and Klein Bruchsal. The latter will advance to Bretten as 
 soon as Soult's first division has Crossed. Bourcier will cross 
 at Kehl on the 25th, and then turn to the north, in order 
 to cover Ney's passage, on the 26th he will proceed to 
 Durlach. Beaumont and d'Hautpoul will cross at Kehl 
 early in the morning of the 25th, the former will then 
 march to Offenburg, the latter to Oberkirch. Baraguey 
 d'Hilliers, with Walther under him, will cross at Neu 
 Breisach on the 25th, and then proceed to Freiburg, 
 clearing the country from this place towards Donaues- 
 chingen. 
 
 The army will follow in rear of the main body of the 
 cavalry. Davout's first division will cross on the 26th at 
 Mannheim, where he will establish his headquarters on 
 this day ; his other divisions will press on to Mannheim, 
 his cavalry will advance as far as Sinsheim. 
 
 Soult's first division will cross at Germersheim on 
 the 25th ; it will then march to Bruchsal, where Soult 
 will establish his headquarters on the 26th. 
 
 Ney's first division will cross at Selz on the 25th and 
 proceed to Rastadt, where his headquarters will be 
 established on the 26th. 
 
 Finally Lannes' first division will cross the Rhine at 
 Kehl on the 25th. 
 
 The Rhine having been crossed, the army will execute 
 the following movements : 
 
 Lannes will advance on the Kniebis road through 
 Sand, Oberkirch, Freudenstadt, Rottenburg, Reutlingen, 
 Urach to Ulm, where he will have to arrive on the gth 
 October. His march will begin on the 29th September. 
 
 Ney will also proceed via Durlach, Pforzheim, 
 Stuttgart, Esslingen, Goppingen and Geisslingen to 
 Ulm. His march will begin* on the 27th September, 
 and by the 7th October he must reach Ulm.
 
 ULM 213 
 
 Soult will push forward on the road through Bruchsal, 
 Bretten, Vaihingen, Ludwigsburg, Schorndorf, Gmiind to 
 Aalen, which latter place he is to reach on the gth 
 October. 
 
 Davout will march on the 2Qth September and take 
 the road via Mannheim, Heidelburg, Sinsheim, Heilbronn, 
 Oehringen, Hall, Ellwangen, and is to reach Nordlingen 
 on the loth October. 
 
 Bernadotte and Marmont will start from Wiirzburg on 
 the 30th September or ist October, so as to reach Weissen- 
 burg by the gth October. 
 
 On this latter day the Guards, the Reserve Cavalry 
 and the Great Artillery Park will be at Gmiind. 
 
 In short, therefore, the main body of the army was, 
 according to the above orders, to cross the Rhine along a 
 line from Mannheim to Kehl, seventy miles in extent, 
 on the 26th September, the independent divisions of 
 cavalry having preceded it on the 2$th by the same roads. 
 The latter would arrive before the entrances to the 
 denies of the Black Forest and penetrate some way into 
 them. Thus they would not only cover their own army 
 during the passage of the Rhine, but also create in the 
 enemy a mistaken impression as to the real direction of the 
 Emperor's advance. For, as we see, the mass of the army 
 was not to cross the Black Forest frontally, but turn to 
 the left, so as to avoid its passes, and to stand by the gth 
 October on the line Weissenburg Nordlingen Aalen 
 Ulm. 
 
 This employment of the cavalry may be called masterly. 
 It is indeed a characteristic, uniformly noticeable in the 
 strategy of all the greatest generals, that they knew how 
 to utilize their cavalry to the best advantage. For it is 
 this arm, designed for a wide field and rapidity of move- 
 ment, which requires superior officers of exceptionally 
 large grasp and quick resolution, who, keeping only the 
 great aims of a war in view, are able to set aside objects 
 of secondary importance and to put up with heavy losses
 
 214 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 also, for cavalry employed over a large area must often get 
 into situations from which it cannot withdraw without 
 suffering them. Napoleon himself said : " The use of 
 cavalry demands boldness and ability, above all it should 
 not be handled with any miserly desire to keep it intact," l 
 and again, as we shall note in this very campaign : " I do 
 not wish the horses to be spared, if they can catch men." * 
 " Take no heed of the complaints of the cavalry, for if 
 such great objects may be attained as the destruction of a 
 whole hostile army, the state can afford to lose a few 
 hundred horses from exhaustion." * This was Gneisenau's 
 conviction, and as to what was effected by the cavalry of 
 Lee's army, we need only mention the-name of Stuart. 
 
 The above orders did not, however, include the final 
 turning manoeuvre, which was to place the army in full 
 force upon the enemy's rear ; they rather pointed to a 
 direct advance en masse, for the Emperor did not yet know 
 that the Austrians were going to push forward so far by 
 themselves without waiting for the Russians ; still the 
 general idea of attacking the enemy's right wing in full 
 strength appears clearly in them. 
 
 But twenty-four hours after the despatch of those orders, 
 the Emperor learnt by telegraph that the Austrians had 
 crossed the Lech, and on the 20th he received a letter 
 from Murat, dated the i8th, informing him that the 
 enemy was approaching Ulm. He therefore ordered a 
 slight alteration in the lines of operation. Davout was 
 now to march from Mannheim vid Heidelberg, Neckarelz, 
 Ilshofen, and Dinkelsbiihl to Nordlingen. Soult was to 
 cross the Rhine at Spires and proceed to Aalen through 
 Sinsheim, Heilbronn, Oehringen and Hall; Ney was to 
 cross at Pforz and take the high-road past Durlach, 
 Pforzheim, Stuttgart and Gmiind to Giengen, and finally 
 Lannes was to leave the Kniebis road at Rottenburg and 
 
 1 Mem. dc Ste. Hel Notes sur 1'introduction k I'hist. de la guerre 
 &C., par Lloyd, III. 509. 
 
 * C. N. To Lannes, Znaym, i8th November, li p.m. 
 ' Blucherto Yorck, H oh 1 stein, 3 1st August, 1813.
 
 ULM 215 
 
 march to Goppingen vtd Tubingen, Grotzingen and 
 Niirtingen. We see thus, that the corps were on the 
 whole closer together, and that the general direction 
 tended more to the left, that is, the idea of the turning 
 movement is more apparent, and as the enemy was now at 
 a less distance, the ability to quickly mass the whole 
 army became the first consideration. 
 
 But still more definitely did the Emperor's plan become 
 revealed in a short memorandum in his own hand, which 
 he wrote down at that time for his own use ; it is only to 
 be regretted that it is not dated, but it must have been 
 written shortly before the crossing of the Rhine, that is, 
 between the 22nd and 24th September. It is as follows : 
 
 Bernadotte 
 
 Marmont 
 Davoqt 
 Ney 
 Lannes 
 Soult 
 
 28th Sept. 
 . Wiirzburg 
 
 
 . Mannheim 
 .Selz 
 . Strasburg 
 . Landau 
 
 6th Oct. 
 Ansbach 
 
 Mergentheim 
 
 Crailsheim 
 Gmiind 
 Aalen 
 
 9th Oct. 
 Niirnberg 
 
 > 
 Ansbach 
 Weissenburg 
 Nordlingen 
 Donauworth 
 
 1 6th Oct 
 Regensburg 
 
 Dietfurt 
 Ingolstadt 
 Neuburg 
 
 The above shows that Napoleon had for a time a more 
 extensive turning-movement in his mind, undoubtedly 
 under the supposition that the Austrians would not, on 
 hearing of his forward march, remain stationary, but would 
 fall back, and that he consequently must make a further 
 sweep to turn their flank and cut them off. For the 
 present, however, the orders given were not altered. 
 
 But when he saw that, contrary to his expectation, 
 the Austrians remained stationary, he issued the final 
 orders for turning them by a still shorter line, and on 
 the 28th September Berthier despatched these to 
 the army. 
 
 Davout was now to march through Heidelberg, 
 Obrigheim, Mockmiihl, Ingelfingen, Ilshofen, Dinkelsbiihl, 
 Oettingen and Monheim, and reach Neuburg on the 8th 
 October. 
 
 Soult was to march vid Heilbronn, Oehringen, Hall, 
 Ellwangen and Nordlingen, and reach Donauworth on the 
 8th.
 
 216 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Lannes was to take the road through Ludwigsburg, 
 Schorndorf, Gmiind and Aalen, and arrive on the 8th in 
 Neresheim. 
 
 Ney was to march along the road through Stuttgart, 
 Esslingen and Weilheim, so as to reach Heidenheim on 
 the 7th. 
 
 The cavalry, after having made a feint on the passes 
 through the Black Forest, was to march through Stuttgart, 
 Goppingen and Heidenheim, and be in Donauworth on 
 the 8th October. 
 
 Bernadotte received orders to march from Ansbach to 
 Eichstadt, where he was to arrive on the 8th, and from 
 which he was to operate towards Ingolstadt. 
 
 Marmont was to advance on Bernadotte's right vid 
 Rothenburg, Feuchtwangen and Wassertriidingen, and to 
 reach Treuchtlingen -on the yth, whence he was to take 
 the direction towards Nassenfels. 
 
 And all these movements were executed with such 
 precision and fidelity to the plan, that Napoleon could, 
 three weeks after the passage of the Rhine, say : " I have, 
 attained my object ; I have destroyed the Austrian army 
 by sheer marching." l 
 
 The main body of the Grand Army crossed the Rhine 
 on the 26th September. On the same day the Emperor 
 having left Paris on the 24th, arrived in Strasburg. 
 The corps took the road assigned to them, and no 
 sooner had the Emperor set these movements going 
 than he anticipated their full success. "Woe to the 
 Austrians," he exclaimed, " if they allow me to gain 
 a few marches upon them, I hope to have turned them 
 and to find myself with my whole army between the Lech 
 and the Iser," 2 and to Eugene he wrote : " The enemy 
 seems entirely dumfounded by the direction, rapidity and 
 vigour of our movements." 3 
 
 1 C. N. To Josephine, Elchingen, I9th October. 
 * C. N. To Augereau, Strasburg, 3oth December. 
 1 C. N. Strasburg, 3oth September.
 
 ULM 2 1 7 
 
 Whilst the French army was thus on the march to the 
 Danube, Mack was still flattering himself that he was 
 perfectly secure. In the middle of September he had, as 
 mentioned above, inspected the line of the Iller and given 
 orders to extend the fortifications in the neighbourhood 
 of Ulm, with the intention of either awaiting there in 
 a strong position the approach of the Russians, or of 
 throwing himself upon one of the French columns as it 
 advanced. But this idea was not justified either by 
 the rapidity of his concentration or the numbers 
 of the force he could collect. On the 3rd October 
 the Austrian army stood in the following positions : 
 General Jellacic, with 14,000 men, in the Vorarlberg; 
 Generals Riesch, with 19,000 men, and Schwarzenberg, 
 with 11,500 men, along the Iller and the Danube from 
 Kempten as far as Giinzburg. General Kienmaier's 6000 
 men were split up into small bodies in the north for pur- 
 poses of observation round Neuberg, Ingolstadt, Eichstadt, 
 Ellwangen and Amberg. From the rear and the Tyrol, 
 reinforcements of some 18,000 men were on the march to 
 join Mack. 
 
 The execution of Mack's plan of a concentration at Ulm 
 was about to commence. On the 5th October Jellacic 
 received orders to draw nearer to the Danube ; in order to 
 cover the district between this river and the lake of 
 Constance, he was to arrive in Biberach on the 7th and 
 8th. The other corps had orders to march to Ulm, and 
 on the 6th the main body of Schwarzenberg and Riesch 
 stood near this town ; on the right the front of the army ex- 
 tended to Giinzburg, on the left to Illereichen. Kienmaier 
 had collected his men at Neuburg. This concentration 
 at Ulm did not escape the Emperor's attention, and on 
 the evening of the 5th he said to himself: " The enemy 
 is only becoming aware of our movement to-day, and is 
 concentrating at Ulm." ' 
 
 During the night of the 5th 6th the Emperor had slept 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Soult, Gmiind, 10 p.m.
 
 2i8 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 at Gmiind. On the morning of the 6th he moved his 
 headquarters first to Aalen, but on the afternoon of the 
 same day he reached Nordlingen. The more he advanced 
 the more he saw his hopes realized. On the 2nd 
 October he wrote : " The enemy is making marches and 
 counter-marches, and seems to be in a state of embarrass- 
 ment." 1 But he fully recognized that the enemy had not 
 yet made up his mind to retreat. " It seems the enemy 
 has already set some part of his forces in motion towards 
 Donauworth and Ingolstadt ; but his movements are feeble 
 and I do not think general. He still holds Stockach, 
 Memmingen and the Tyrol." 2 However, he did not 
 neglect warning his corps-leaders to support each other 
 at once, if the enemy's army should take the offensive 
 against either his right or left wing, and this support 
 was certain to be effective and timely, considering the close 
 order in which the Emperor's army advanced. For, as he 
 himself said, with satisfaction : " Never has such a large 
 mass of troops manoeuvred in so small a space." 3 
 
 He himself had during the advance moved his head- 
 quarters more and more towards the right wing of the 
 army, for if the enemy took the offensive they must come 
 in contact with this wing ; but now that he recognized 
 their inactivity and perceived that his own great flank- 
 movement over the Danube would probably be effected 
 without interruption, he went back to Nordlingen, to his 
 centre. The various corps were in the following positions 
 on the 6th October : 
 
 On the left wing Bernadotte (whom the Bavarians had 
 joined at Wiirzburg on the 2nd) had reached Weissenburg 
 and Marmont Wassertriidingen ; in the centre stood 
 Davout at Oettingen, Soult at Nordlingen; the latter's 
 advanced guard, under Vandamme, captured the bridge 
 of Miinster in the evening. Behind Soult stood 
 
 1 C. N. To Joseph, Ettlingen. 
 
 2 C. N. To Bernadotte, Ludwigsbirg, 4th October. 
 
 3 C. N. To Otto, Ludwigsburg, 5th October.
 
 ULM 219 
 
 Lannes at Neresheim, and Bessieres at Aalen. On the 
 right wing Ney near Heidenheim protected the whole 
 movement, as well as the communications of the army 
 towards Ulm. Murat, with the divisions of Walther, Klein 
 and Beaumont, was in a forward position near the Danube ; 
 Baraguey and Bourcier stood at Geisslingen to protect 
 the right wing, and as rear-guards d'Hautpoul followed 
 behind Bessieres and Nansouty behind Soult. 
 
 Early on the 7th Murat first crossed the Danube at (36) 
 Donauworth and then turned towards Rain ; Soult 
 followed, taking the direction of Augsburg. The other 
 corps marching in their respective directions, reached : 
 Bernadotte, Eichstadt; Marmont, Treuchtlingen ; Lannes, 
 Nordlingen ; Davout, Monheim ; d'Hautpoul now closed 
 up to Nordlingen, Nansouty was ordered up quickly and 
 arrived in front of Donauworth. Ney, who had at first also 
 had orders to march to Donauworth, was now to remain 
 stationary in the neighbourhood of Ulm, to cover the 
 operation of crossing the river, and reached Giengen on 
 the same day, Bourcier and Baraguey taking post at 
 Heidenheim in support. But as soon as the army should 
 have safely crossed the Danube, Ney was also, on his way 
 to Ulm, to come nearer to the river, for the Emperor, 
 ever anxious to have all his forces present for any possible 
 battle, wished to be able to send Ney across the Danube, 
 if necessary. 
 
 Mack had resolved to collect his army at Giinzburg, as 
 soon as he heard, on the afternoon of the 7th, that the 
 French had begun to cross the Danube. He immediately 
 sent Riesch there, Schwarzenberg was to follow as soon 
 as Jellacic, who had been ordered up, should have reached 
 Ulm. Of the reinforcements, which had meanwhile 
 arrived in Giinzburg, one corps of 5000 men was sent to 
 Wertingen, to hold in the first place such French forces 
 as had already crossed. 
 
 Early on the 8th October Murat started from Rain 
 and, turning westward, marched to Wertingen ; in this
 
 22o NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 movement Lannes and Nansouty, coming from Donau- 
 worth, joined him. Soon after midday they reached 
 Wertingen and there met the Austrian corps, which had 
 just arrived ; they advanced, moving round on both sides, 
 against this place, which the Austrians defended, and the 
 latter were entirely dispersed, cut down, or made prisoners. 
 Murat pursued them and reached Zusmarshausen on the 
 morning of the gth. On the 8th Bernadotte began to 
 cross the river at Ingolstadt, Soult drew near to Augsburg, 
 Davout crossed at Neuburg and marched towards 
 Aichach ; behind him Marmont reached Neuburg, 
 Bessieres was in Etanauworth, where d'Hautpoul had 
 already crossed, and Ney was on the march in two columns 
 towards Ulm via Langenau and towards Giinzburg vid 
 Gundelfingen ; but an attempt to capture the bridge of 
 Elchingen during the night of the 8th gth failed. The 
 Emperor arrived at Donauworth and sent out orders upon 
 order from here, to urge on his subordinate commanders 
 to move forward as quickly as possible. " The least you 
 can send me," he wrote to Soult, " is 3000 or 4000 
 prisoners ; " and to Davout : " Do not lose an hour, and 
 let me hear without delay that you are in possession of 
 Aichach." 
 
 Kienmaier had avoided the enemy's combined forward 
 movement by marching to Dachau, and on the gth 
 Davout reached Aichach, Bernadotte crossed the Danube 
 at Ingolstadt and Marmont at Neuburg ; Murat and 
 Lannes reached Zusmarshausen ; and Soult, advancing 
 along both banks of the Lech, arrived in Augsburg and 
 Friedberg about noon, closely followed by d'Hautpoul and 
 Bessieres. 
 
 Mack had, by the gth, assembled the greater part 
 of his army near Giinzburg. The news now reached 
 him of the disastrous fighting at Wertingen and the 
 enemy's appearance at Augsburg ,and Zusmarshausen. 
 but did not induce him to take any resolution ; at last, in 
 the evening, he determined to cross to the left bank
 
 ULM 22 1 
 
 of the Danube. In the meantime, Ney had arrived 
 opposite Giinzburg, in accordance with the Emperor's 
 orders, and had taken possession of the bridge. Mack 
 now abandoned his plan; and resolved to march back to 
 Ulm, which resolve he carried out during the night, the 
 gth-ioth, his army arriving there during the latter day. 
 Kienmaier meanwhile continued his retrograde movement 
 to the Inn, according to the orders he had received. 
 
 The Emperor, who had spent the night among Murat's (37) 
 troops at Zusmarshausen, remained there during the 
 forenoon of the loth October. He was now of opinion 
 the enemy would not remain in Ulm, but endeavour to 
 escape from the threatened investment, and the most 
 probable direction of their retreat he considered to be 
 towards Memmingen. " His Majesty does not think the 
 enemy will be mad enough to cross to the left bank of the 
 Danube, since all their magazines are at Memmingen, and 
 they have every reason to remain in communication with 
 the Tyrol." ' He therefore ordered Ney to push forward 
 quickly to Ulm, to take possession of that town, and then 
 immediately start in pursuit of the Austrians. He himself 
 intended to go to Munich, in order to oppose the 
 Russians, whose advance across the Inn, for the purpose 
 of relieving the Austrians, he now expected. In the first 
 place, he fixed upon Davout, Bernadotte, and Marmont 
 for this movement, holding Ney, Lannes, and the cavalry, 
 all under the chief command of Murat, in readiness against 
 Mack. 
 
 On the loth Murat arrived in Burgau, Lannes was still 
 at Zusmarshausen, Souk was collecting his corps at 
 Augsburg, Marmont stood at Pottmes, Davout was 
 approaching Dachau, and Bernadotte was on the march 
 to Munich. But in the evening, the Emperor, having 
 arrived in Augsburg at nine o'clock, recognized from the 
 news which reached him that the main body of the 
 Austrians was still near Ulm, and that the Russians, on 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Ney, 8th October.
 
 222 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 their part, seemed to have no intention of taking the 
 offensive, and he now resolved to have these latter watched 
 by Bernadotte and Davout only, whilst he himself would 
 advance with the remainder of the army towards Ulm, 
 taking care at the same time to block the Austrian retreat to 
 the Tyrol. Consequently, Soult was ordered to march to 
 Landsberg, and Lannes to follow Murat to Burgau, 
 Marmont was to move up to Augsburg, and Davout and 
 Bernadotte, whom d'Hautpoul's cavalry division was to 
 join, were to march on Dachau, and eventually Munich, 
 with all possible speed. " I desire that you should clear 
 all the country between the Iser and the Lech of the 
 enemy." l 
 
 On the loth Ney stood near Gunzburg, Loison had 
 been despatched to the right bank of the Danube, and 
 Dupont and Bourcier, forming the right wing, were at 
 Albeck. In accordance with the Emperor's commands 
 Ney prepared for a general advance upon Ulm next day. 
 Therefore Dupont started at n a.m. from Albeck, but 
 met the bulk of the Austrian army drawn up near Ulm, and 
 was repulsed by it with heavy losses to Albeck ; Baraguey, 
 who was to have come up to his support vid Langenau, not 
 having received his orders in time, and the rest of Ney's 
 troops crossed to the right bank of the Danube in 
 obedience to Murat's orders. Lannes approached 
 Burgau, Soult reached Landsberg during the afternoon, 
 the Emperor, with the Guards, remained in Augsburg, 
 and Marmont arrived before this latter town ; these 
 corps could from here, according to the development of 
 affairs on " this large theatre of war, which is changing 
 every moment," 8 be thrown into the scale either against 
 Mack or against the Russians. Davout reached Dachau, 
 and Bernadotte was in Freising. Kienmaier retreated 
 hurriedly towards the Inn, and there received news that 
 8000 Russians had arrived in Braunau. 
 
 1 C. N. To Bernadotte, Augsburg, nth October, 3 p.m. 
 1 Ibid.
 
 ULM . 223 
 
 Mack had fought an engagement on this day with 
 Dupont, and learnt that Ney had crossed to the right 
 bank of the Danube. He now hit upon the idea that 
 Napoleon had turned against the Russians with the bulk 
 of his army ; he therefore projected an advance to 
 Heidenheim, thus attacking Napoleon's lines of com- 
 munication. However, before he could obtain the 
 consent of the archduke Ferdinand, who was nominally 
 commander-in-chief, the I2th October passed, and the 
 execution of his plan could not begin until the I3th. 
 
 Now the Emperor was convinced that his opponent 
 could no longer escape him. " The decisive moment has 
 come," l he said, but he wished his success to be a com- 
 plete and crushing one, therefore he would not deliver 
 his decisive blow until he had assembled his whole forces 
 against Mack. " It is my intention," he said, in the 
 morning of the i2th, " should the enemy continue in his 
 present positions, and be ready to accept battle, to fight, 
 not to-morrow, but the day after, so that Marshal Soult 
 and his 30,000 men may take part in it ; he will march to 
 the enemy's right flank, and attack when he has turned 
 it, a manoeuvre which will assure us a decisive result." * 
 Thus carefully did the Emperor always prepare for battle, 
 so as to have beforehand every advantage on his side. 
 For which reason he always kept the direction of the main 
 outlines of his plan in his own hands to avoid untoward 
 incidents from the independent action of his subordinates. 
 " Everything," says Biilow, " with this extraordinary 
 general is directed to the annihilation of the enemy." ; 
 
 On the I2th, Bernadotte entered Munich as early as 
 six o'clock a.m. Davout and d'Hautpoul stood fast at 
 Dachau to watch the Russians. Soult reached Mindel- 
 heim, and Marmont's vanguard, closely followed by his 
 whole corps, arrived atTannhausen. Murat, with Lannes 
 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Augsburg, I2th October, 10.30 a.ro. 
 
 * C. N. To Murat, Augsburg, 9 o'clock. 
 
 * Der Feldzug von 1805, I. 213.
 
 224 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 and his cavalry, was on the Rothbach on the line Wissen- 
 horn Pfaffenhofen Fahlheim ; on their right was Ney, 
 of whose corps Dupont's and Bourcier's divisions were, 
 however, still on the left bank of the Danube ; these fell 
 back that day to the east behind the Brenz, where they 
 took up a position. Bessieres was at Zusmarshausen. 
 Thus the semicircle, which was to enclose Mack, was 
 already closing in, two more marches, and it would be 
 completed. " On the I4th, the day of the battle, the 
 enemy will be annihilated, for he is hemmed in on all 
 sides." ' 
 
 Anticipating a certain victory, the emperor announced 
 to his army that " Never will so much have been decided 
 in so short a time " ; J proudly he referred more than once 
 to the resemblance between Mack's present situation and 
 that of Melas at Marengo, and alluded to the lightning 
 stroke which was to strike down the enemy. It is of 
 advantage to show such confidence of victory to one's 
 army, and thus to awaken the same in the men, but this 
 will only be effected if the general is really con- 
 fident in himself, for an army is exceedingly alive to the 
 frame of mind of its leader. Certainly, modesty as to 
 results would be out of place in warfare. Ever 
 restless, the Emperor's thoughts already travelled beyond 
 this success which he now held to be assured, " on the 
 completion of this affair, his Majesty will return, so as to 
 cross the Inn immediately." 3 
 
 In the evening of the I2th October, at io.*3o p.m., the 
 Emperor left Augsburg. At the moment of entering his 
 carriage, he received a despatch from Murat, that the 
 enemy was still at Ulm ; Soult also now received orders 
 to march to Ulm, though he had been up till then on the 
 march towards Memmingen, with the intention of block- 
 ing Mack's escape to the Tyrol. Then the Emperor drove 
 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Davout, Augsburg, I2h October, 8.30 p.m. 
 
 3 Fifth bulletin, Augsburg, I2th October. 
 
 8 C. N. Berthier to Davout, Augsburg, i2th October, 8.30 p.m.
 
 ULM 225 
 
 through the night and the pouring rain, which had 
 been continuous since the 8th, thirty miles to Pfaffen- 
 hofen. 
 
 On the 13th, Mack commenced his projected advance 
 to Heidenheim ; he marched part of his troops in 
 that direction, part towards Gundelfingen, while send- 
 ing Jellacic back into the Vorarlberg. The vanguard of 
 the former column reached Heidenheim, but the other 
 column met with a French detachment near the bridge of 
 Elchingen, which it repulsed, occupying this village ; the 
 enemy, however^ destroyed the bridge, and the Austrians 
 could not advance any further. Mack now fell into the 
 most egregious errors ; he even went so far as to assume that 
 Napoleon was endeavouring to force a return to France, 
 as a rebellion had broken out in Paris and the English 
 had landed in France ! In consequence of this opinion, 
 he retained half of his army, which was still at Ulm, in 
 that town and did not send it after the other half, which 
 had advanced towards Heidenheim and Elchingen. 
 Napoleon said afterwards about him : "His arrangements 
 have constantly been wrong, nor has he ever guessed my 
 plans correctly." * 
 
 Whilst the Emperor had hitherto inclined to the (38) 
 opinion that the enemy would try to escape to the Tyrol, 
 by what was still the most open road, he now heard at 
 Pfaffenhofen, on the morning of the I3th, of Dupont's 
 defeat at Albeck, and immediately went to Ney's head- 
 quarters at Kussendorf, for he perceived that the enemy 
 was endeavouring to break out towards the north, and 
 sent Ney to Dupont's assistance across the bridge of 
 Elchingen to the left bank of the Danube. On the I4th, 
 therefore, Ney advanced towards Elchingen and Dupont 
 towards Albeck ; the former defeated the Austrians, who 
 tried to defend Elchingen, took the town by assault, and 
 drove the enemy back towards Ulm. Lannes approached 
 Ulm and took up a position on the heights of Pfuhl ; 
 1 C.N. To Talleyrand, Abbey of Elchingen, i;th October. 
 
 Q
 
 226 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 whilst Marmont reached the Iller at Lower and Upper 
 Kirchberg. During the night of the I3th, Soult appeared 
 before Memmingen and summoned its garrison, a little 
 over 4000 men, to surrender, which it did on the evening 
 of the I4th. But the Emperor's attention was now fully 
 directed to the northern bankj of the Danube ; he 
 established his headquarters in, the evening of the I4th 
 at the abbey of Elchingen, and sent orders to Lannes, 
 Bessieres, and the greater part of the cavalry, to move up 
 to that place before break of day ; for on this bank of the 
 Danube the main attack was to be delivered, whilst on 
 the other, Marmont, in position at Pfuhl, was to endeavour, 
 in conjunction with Beaumont and Baraguey, merely to 
 hold the enemy in check. 
 
 Towards noon on the 15th, Ney also moved forward to 
 Ulm, and occupied the Michelsberg, which commanded 
 that town, but he could make no impression on the 
 fortifications, though there were only 27,000 men there 
 now. On the same day Soult reached Biberach. Ney 
 sent a flag of truce into the town at six o'clock, summoning 
 Mack to surrender, but for the present without success. 
 After one hour's bombardment on the i6th the Emperor 
 himself opened negotiations again, and in the afternoon 
 of the iyth these were concluded. " My plan," he could 
 now say with satisfaction, " was carried out exactly as I 
 conceived it. I deceived the enemy completely, and of 
 this army of 100,000 men more than half are prisoners, 
 killed, wounded, or stragglers." l Mack had given his 
 word to surrender if by midnight on the 25th no relief 
 should have arrived. But he was induced to withdraw 
 this reservation, and on the 2oth, at 3 p.m., the Austrian 
 army shut up in Ulm laid down its arms. 
 
 The column, which, as we have seen, had marched 
 
 towards Heidenheim on the I3th, had safely reached 
 
 Herbrechtingen on the I4th. But although no longer 
 
 directly involved in the events at Ulm, it did not escape 
 
 1 To Talleyrand, Abbey of Elchingen, I7th October.
 
 ULM 227 
 
 the same fate. It had attempted at first to operate on 
 the I5th against Napoleon's rear, and had marched 
 towards Albeck, but there received orders from the Arch- 
 duke Ferdinand, who had luckily escaped the investment 
 with some cavalry, to march back to Aalen. It how- 
 ever attracted the notice of the Emperor on the morning 
 of the i6th, and he at once despatched Dupont, Oudinot, 
 and Murat's cavalry to pursue and cut it off. It was 
 half annihilated, and the remnant laid down their arms at 
 Trochtelfingen on the i8th. 
 
 Thus the Austrian army, which had invaded Bavaria, 
 was entirely destroyed three weeks after Napoleon crossed 
 the Rhine, and the first campaign of the war of 1805 was 
 at an end. 
 
 It is only very rarely that a campaign can be conducted 
 so exactly in accordance with the originally conceived plan, 
 just like well-ordered manoeuvres in peace time, and in 
 such a manner, that we see clearly before us the birth of 
 the resolution and its development and execution step by 
 step. This campaign, therefore, is all the more instructive 
 and an admirable testimony to the clearness, logic and 
 force of Napoleon's strategy. His plan was framed, as 
 every good plan of campaign ought to be, in such a manner, 
 that in the main its execution was independent of chance 
 occurrences. Whatever happened, Napoleon's great turn- 
 ing-movement with his whole massed forces was beyond 
 the influence of circumstances. 
 
 Napoleon's strategy has been called " one-sided " ; 
 people have said : " He was really in his element only 
 where the course of events allowed an unrestricted 
 offensive, that is, strictly speaking, only at the head 
 of superiors numbers." ' But Bulow very justly points 
 out, that he did not open this campaign with larger forces 
 than Frederick did his, and 1796, as well as 1814, the begin- 
 ning and end of his career, prove irrefutably that he was 
 also able to vanquish an enemy much superior in numbers 
 1 Bernhardi, Fredrich de Grosse als Feldherr, II. 645.
 
 228 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 by means of his superior strategy. But even if he had 
 always acted on the offensive and always been at the head 
 of superior numbers, this would, far from telling against 
 him, be the best proof of the greatness of his genius. 
 The Archduke Charles said : " People wanted to lessen 
 Bonaparte's glory by the remark, that he owed most of his 
 successes to his superior forces. Could there be indeed 
 any greater praise of a statesman, than that he never 
 began any war or campaign, without being sure of such 
 superiority ? Even where his active forces were roughly 
 equal to or perhaps weaker than the enemy's, as for 
 example in the campaigns of 1796 and 1814, he knew how 
 to ensure his superiority at decisive points and at the de- 
 cisive moment." 1 Indeed 1805 is a proof of this, for the 
 total strength of the Austrians and Russians was in n_o 
 way inferior in numbers to Napoleon's forces, and yet the 
 latter appeared at the decisive moment at the decisive 
 point with an overwhelming superiority of numbers. 
 
 1 Oesterr. Mil. Zeitschrift, 1865, I. 121.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 AUSTERLITZ. 
 
 SCARCELY was the first portion of the campaign at an (39) 
 end and the surrender of Mack's army an accomplished 
 fact, than the Emperor started on his advance to the Inn 
 with a view to improving his success. On the 2ist 
 October he left his headquarters in Elchingen at noon and 
 went to Augsburg. His first care here was to establish a 
 new base for his further advance, and he fixed upon the 
 line of the Lech for this. Augsburg was chosen as his 
 central magazine and dep6t, and consequently, according 
 to Napoleon's invariable custom, fortified and rendered safe 
 against any hostile attack. 
 
 During the decisive days of the war, consisting mostly 
 of marches, the Emperor replied to the complaints as to the 
 commissariat : " In all his letters, General Marmont is 
 always referring to the commissariat. I repeat that in 
 the war of invasion and of rapid movements which the Em- 
 peror is waging there can be no depots, and the command- 
 ing generals have themselves to see to it that they pro- 
 cure the necessary supplies from the countries which they 
 traverse." l But scarcely was the pressure of circumstances 
 over, scarcely was the" immediate base," as Jomini calls it, 
 which had been chosen forthe new chapter of the campaign, 
 reached, than the commander-in-chief again allowed the 
 question of his commissariat to be freely discussed, and ex- 
 pressed himself thus : " We have marched without depots, 
 circumstances have compelled us to do so. The season 
 1 C. N. Berthicr to Marmont, Augsburg, nth October, a.m.
 
 230 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 has been extraordinarily favourable for this, but though 
 we were always victorious and could feed on the fruits of 
 the earth, yet we have suffered much. At a season where 
 there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army had 
 been beaten, the want of depots would have been a most 
 serious misfortune ; " * he therefore gave immediate orders 
 for the collection of stores. 
 
 In the meantime his corps had started so as to concen- 
 trate in the first place on the Iser. Marmont, who was 
 collecting his troops at Weissenhorn on the 20th, received 
 orders to march upon Munich, and Davout was to leave 
 Dachau for Freising ; Lannes, accompanied by Nansouty, 
 started from Nordlingen for Landshut, Soult marched on 
 the 2ist from Memmingen towards Landsberg. Berna- 
 dotte, who was already at Munich, now collected his corps 
 in that town. Ney remained for the present near Ulm. 
 Augereau also was now ordered up from France and was 
 to march to Kempten. 
 
 Little had meanwhile been done by the enemy. The 
 Russian troops were assembling at Braunau, where the 
 whole of their infantry had already arrived. The Austrians 
 under Kienmaier were entrenching themselves at Miihl- 
 dorf, in order to dispute the passage of the Inn at that 
 point. As during the decisive events before Ulm, the 
 French corps of Davout and Bernadotte, who faced them 
 here, could naturally only play a defensive part, and since 
 Kutusov, who had now assumed the chief-command over 
 the united forces, Austrians, 22,000 men, Russians, 30,000 
 men, showed no desire to advance, there was nothing of 
 any importance done here, until he received, in the evening 
 of the 23rd, from Mack himself, who was passing through 
 on his way to Vienna, official confirmation of the rumours 
 current concerning events at Ulm. Kutusov now resolved 
 to fall back to the Enns. On the 25th and 26th the whole 
 force retreated behind the Inn ; all the bridges were burnt, 
 but the right bank was still held. 
 
 1 C. N. To Petiet, Augsburg, 24th October.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 231 
 
 On this last day the Emperor, who had arrived in 
 Munich at 6 p.m. on the 24th, was with Lannes' corps at 
 Landshut, Davout was in the neighbourhood of Dorfen, 
 Bernadotte in front of Wasserburg ; Marmont had reached 
 Munich, where the Guards also were ; Soult had already 
 passed through this town and was on the road to Mtihl- 
 dorf ; Augereau had just crossed the Rhine, and Key was 
 starting from Ulm for Landsberg. Of the cavalry, Walther, 
 Beaumont and d'Hautpoul were at Hohenlinden under 
 Murat ; Nansouty under Lannes at Landshut, whither 
 Klein also was on the march from Ingolstadt. In the rear, 
 Bourcier and Baraguey were still standing at Augsburg and 
 Ingolstadt ; and the infantry divisions of Dumonceau and 
 Dupont also had remained behind in these towns to cover 
 the left flank of the general forward movement ; they were 
 to go to Passau during the further advance ; thus Dupont 
 ceased to form part of Ney's corps. 
 
 But on the 27th, whilst the Austrians were on the point 
 of evacuating the line of the Inn, orders arrived from the 
 Imperial Council of War in Vienna commanding this river 
 to be defended ; consequently they stood fast, the Russians 
 assembling at Wels on the same day. 
 
 Of the French, Lannes advanced beyond Vilsbiburg, 
 Murat marched vid Ampfing to Muhldorf, where Davout 
 joined him ; they proceeded to restore the bridge there, 
 Bernadotte doing the same at Wasserburg and Rosenheim. 
 Marmont followed behind Bernadotte, and Soult behind 
 Murat. A little resistance was met with at Muhldorf, it 
 is true, but it was already clear that no real defence of 
 the line of the Inn was contemplated. In the course of 
 the night and on the morning of the 28th the bridge was 
 completely restored, and at noon Murat began to cross ; 
 after which he turned towards Burghausen, which place 
 he reached in the evening; at the same time giving orders 
 to begin the restoration of the bridges at Neu-Oetting and 
 Marktl. Davout crossed immediately after him by the 
 bridge of Muhldorf. At the same time Bernadotte also
 
 232 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 commenced the passage of the river, and, in the second 
 line, Lannes approached Braunau, Soult advanced to near 
 Miihldorf, and Marmont to near Wasserburg. The head- 
 quarters were this day moved to Haag, where the Emperor 
 arrived at n p.m. 
 
 Before daybreak on the 2gth he proceeded to Miihldorf, 
 and arrived there in time to see the last troops of Davout 
 crossing ; news had moreover come in that the enemy 
 was in full retreat. As to his further forward movement 
 towards the line of the Traun, where he anticipated rind- 
 ing the Russians and Austrians, his plan was to advance 
 to his front towards the Traun to Wels and Lambach, 
 with Murat in the van, followed by Lannes, Soult and 
 Davout ; whilst Marmont received orders to turn the 
 enemy's left wing via Strasswalchen and Vocklaburg in 
 the direction of Steyer. Bernadotte was ordered to 
 Salzburg, and Ney to Innsbruck, to cover the right flank 
 of the combined advance against any forces that might be 
 detached from the Austrian army in Italy, by occupying 
 Salzburg and the Tyrol, and clearing them of all Austrian 
 troops who might have taken refuge there ; Augereau from 
 Kempten was to help him. Should the Emperor meet 
 with very considerable resistance in front, and only in 
 that case, he would throw Bernadotte also upon the 
 enemy's left flank. 
 
 On this day, the 29th, Lannes appeared before Braunau, 
 occupied this fortress and the important bridge over the 
 Inn without opposition. On the same evening, at five 
 o'clock, the Emperor arrived at this town " charmed," as 
 he himself said, " at the capture of Braunau, a fortress 
 which I found full of stores, gunpowder and ammunition 
 of all kinds. The enemy here have no longer any com- 
 mander ; they are seized with a panic." ' He immediately 
 constituted this town his principal depot instead of 
 Augsburg, thus pushing his " immediate base " forward 
 from the Lech to the Inn. Murat had advanced beyond 
 1 C. N. To Talleyrand, Braunau, 3Oth October.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 233 
 
 Braunau as far as the neighbourhood of Altheim. Davout 
 crossed at Burghausen to the right bank of the SeLzach, 
 Marmont reached Tittmoning, Soult passed the Inn at 
 Miihldorf, and Bernadotte entered Salzburg. Whilst the 
 Emperor remained for a few days at Braunau, these corps 
 continued their forward movement uninterruptedly, so 
 that on the 3ist October Murat was in advance at 
 Lambach on the Traun, Lannes on the left wing near 
 Scharding in the direction of Linz, on his right Soult at 
 Obernberg in the direction of Wels ; then Davout further 
 away at Haag in the direction of Lambach, and finally 
 Marmont at Strasswalchen, in the direction of Vock- 
 laburg. 
 
 We see therefore that the Emperor utilized these days 
 to " separate in order to live," but was ever desirous of 
 " uniting in order to fight." He now impressed upon the 
 commander of his vanguard, that it was necessary " to 
 give time to every one to make his movements, therefore 
 you must not advance too quickly ; " ! and furthermore, 
 " you must be cautious in your advance. The Russians 
 have not suffered yet and they know how to attack."* 
 Thus he, who was so overbearing in his political successes, 
 knew eminently how to combine in purely military matters 
 caution and boldness. In this instance the Emperor had 
 become aware of the need of caution by the fact, that on 
 the preceding day, the soth, Murat had again come in 
 contact with the enemy ; he had met the Austrian rear- 
 guard at Ried, and had thrown it into the defile there. 
 
 The Austrians had in the meantime withdrawn their 
 troops, which had been in position along the Inn and the 
 Selzach. in small scattered detachments, their rear-guard 
 holding the bridge of Lambach, whilst their main body 
 stood behind Wimsbach ; one division having been dis- 
 patched to Gmunden. The Russians were at Wels. On 
 the 3ist October Murat pushed with the leading corps of 
 
 1 C. N. To Murat, Braunau, 3ist October, n a.m. 
 1 Ibid.
 
 234 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Davout's division forward towards Lambach, and drove 
 the Austrians about noon beyond the Traun ; the latter, 
 however, destroyed the bridge and maintained themselves 
 on the right bank, supported by a few Russian battalions 
 which had come up, until evening. But the allied army 
 immediately continued its retreat, and by the 2nd 
 November the Russians stood behind the Enns at Stren- 
 berg with their rear-guard at Enns, the Austrians being at 
 Steyer with their rear-guard on the Krems. Repeated 
 orders arrived from Vienna to defend the Enns. 
 
 On the ist November the Emperor himself arrived in 
 Ried ; the wretched wet weather which had continued 
 since the taking of Ulm now changed to a dry cold. 
 Once again he utilized the halt on the Traun to order his 
 army to close up, and thus on the 2nd Lannes concen- 
 trated his corps at Linz, Soult at Wels, Davout at 
 Lambach with the vanguard in front of Kremsmiinster ; 
 Murat was on the far side of Wels ; he was to support 
 Lannes in his capture of the passage of the Traun at 
 Ebelsberg ; but he was again warned to await the con- 
 centration of the army, in the event of the enemy offering 
 any serious opposition at Ebelsberg. As the Emperor had 
 become convinced that the enemy would make one more 
 stand before Vienna, Marmont, at Vocklaburg, and Berna- 
 dotte, still at Salzburg, received orders to move up to 
 Lambach and join the army. The headquarters were 
 established at Haag. 
 
 The further advance was carried on by Murat, followed 
 at about one day's march by Lannes and then by Soult, 
 vid Enns to Amstetten ; Davout, meanwhile, followed at 
 equal distances by Marmont and Bernadotte, marched by 
 Kremsmiinster to Steyer. This crowding of the whole 
 army on two roads, necessitated by the absence of any 
 others fit for use, was of course very unfavourable to 
 massing the troops when required, and caused the 
 Emperor considerable annoyance. " There is no road. 
 Marshal Soult must come along the high-road. You must
 
 AUSTERLITZ 235 
 
 therefore close up, so that the tail may come to the 
 assistance of the head." l " Close up, as much as you 
 can, towards Marshal Lannes, for the nature of the soil 
 allows us only to form one column ; therefore, close up as 
 much as possible, so that you may support each other 
 from the front to the rear." 2 
 
 On the 3rd Kutusov evacuated the left bank of the 
 Enns and continued his retreat. Murat's cavalry quickly 
 pursuing, came up with his rear-guard on the 5th near 
 Amstetten, but was unable, although supported by 
 Oudinot's division, to defeat the Russian rear-guard, posted 
 there to cover the retreat. On the 7th Kutusov arrived 
 at St. Polten, and resolved to allow a day's rest to his 
 army, considerately exhausted by the retreat. But with 
 the evacuation of the line of the Enns, a large portion of 
 the Austrians, 12,000 men, had left him in order to 
 threaten the further advance of the French on their flank, 
 by retracing their steps from Steyer up the Enns. 
 
 Between the 4th and gth the Emperor remained at Linz, 
 ready to halt the army and concentrate it, in case the 
 enemy should offer any resistance before Vienna. "It is 
 expected that the enemy will make a stand and entrench 
 himself behind the heights of St. Polten, ten hours from 
 Vienna," 3 he wrote on the 5th. He now began to take 
 into consideration the left bank of the Danube, to note 
 in time any crosing of the Russians to this bank, to 
 watch the passes from Bohemia, and also to facilitate 
 the advance. First he gave orders to form a flotilla 
 on the Danube, " so that the Danube may cease to exist 
 for me and I may be able to cross at a moment's 
 notice ; " * secondly, the divisions of Gazan and Klein 
 were, on the 5th, ordered to cross to the left bank at 
 Linz, and lastly, on the 6th, a new corps was formed 
 under Mortier destined to operate on the left bank of the 
 
 1 C. N. To Murat, Linz, 6th November. 
 
 * C. N. To Soult, Linz, 7th November, u p.m. 
 
 8 1 8th Bulletin. 
 
 4 C. N. To Marat, Linz, 7th November, 1 1 p.m.
 
 236 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Danube, he being always kept somewhat in rear of 
 Lannes' position on the right bank. To his corps were 
 attached the divisions of Gazan, Dupont and Dumonceau 
 the last two being on the march up from Passau as 
 well as the cavalry division of Klein, the command of 
 which he took over on the morning of the 7th. Gazan 
 and Klein reached Grein that day, the other two Linz. 
 
 On the yth Lannes arrived on the Ips in the neighbour- 
 hood of Neumarkt ; Soult was at Amstetten, Bernadotte 
 at Steyer. This latter town Davout had reached on the 
 4th and Marmont on the 5th ; they had immediately con- 
 tinued their march to Waidhofen, but had then received 
 counter-orders. Davout was now to march vid Gaming 
 to Lilienfeld, not only to turn the enemy on the left, in 
 case they should make a stand near St. Polten, but also 
 in order to relieve the straight road to St. Polten to some 
 extent, for on this road the whole of the rest of the army 
 was pushing forward. Marmont, who had got a little 
 beyond Steyer, received orders to make forced marches from 
 Steyer to Leoben, to rout whatever forces he might meet 
 with, and cover the army on its right flank. Thus on 
 the yth Davout was at Gaming, Marmont at Weyer, and 
 Murat's cavalry were scouting on the same day up to 
 Molk. During the 8th and gth all kept advancing in the 
 same directions as hitherto, so that the head of the main 
 column Murat's appeared in front of St. Polten. The 
 Emperor himself left Linz on the gth, hurried past all the 
 columns of his army, and established his headquarters in 
 the convent of Molk. 
 
 Meanwhile the Austrian column, which, as we have 
 seen, had separated from the main body since crossing 
 the Enns at Steyer, had been forced back up that river 
 by Marmont, and was now endeavouring to regain touch 
 with the Russians at St. Polten by a march vid Mariazell 
 and Annaberg, but found itself, through Davout's advance 
 to Lilienfeld on the one hand and Marmont's march to 
 Leoben on the other, between these two corps, and could
 
 AUSTERLITZ 237 
 
 only escape in a dispersed condition and with most heavy 
 losses vid Bruck to Graz. 
 
 , Kutusov had no intention of fighting a frontal battle at 
 St. Polten in defence of Vienna against the superior forces 
 of the French ; he was for avoiding the threatening attack, 
 and therefore moved his army during the night before the 
 gth to Mautern on the Danube, where he crossed to the 
 northern bank, occupying a position near Krems and 
 burning the bridge behind him. The Austrian cavalry 
 remained at St. Polten for the purpose of concealing this 
 movement and then fell back to Vienna. 
 
 The Emperor had, it. is true, anticipated Kutusov's 
 crossing to the left bank of the Danube, but did not 
 alter his plans after this had taken place. " Push your 
 outposts forward as far as the Vienna Forest, provided 
 the enemy does not offer too much resistance. Keep 
 ready and massed. Warn Soult to keep close up. 
 Bernadotte will be in Amstetten to-morrow," he wrote to 
 Murat in the evening of the 8th. Arrived in Molk, 
 he heard of the passage of the Russians, and in his con- 
 fidence of victory he considered this movement to be 
 merely a retreat to Moravia to join hands with the second 
 Russian army. He therefore did not in any way interfere 
 during the 8th with the advance of his own army, and 
 consequently Murat- reached Sieghartskirchen, followed by 
 Lannes, and stood beyond St. Polten ; Soult occupied a 
 position on the Traisen, with one division in Mautern ; 
 Bernadotte arrived at Amstetten. Mortier had dispersed 
 some weak Austrian outposts during the morning from 
 Lower- Loiben, and taken up a position with Gazan in 
 the defile of Diirrenstein ; Dupont and Dumonceau being 
 still a day's march behind at Mahrbach. 
 
 But in the course of this day Napoleon gained a 
 more correct appreciation of the state of affairs ; he now 
 perceived that Kutusov had the option of defeating 
 Mortier, who was at present isolated, or marching down 
 the stream, seizing the bridge over the Danube in Vienna,
 
 238 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 and opposing the crossing of the French army there in a 
 favourable position, and he therefore began to issue orders 
 on the morning of the nth to arrest the too rapid 
 advance of the army to Vienna, and to place some forces 
 at his own disposal in the neighbourhood of St. Polten. 
 Murat, to whom he addressed some very unjust 
 reproaches on account of his too hasty advance to Vienna, 
 was not to proceed beyond Purkersdorf, but to occupy 
 Tulln and reconnoitre in the direction of Korneuburg. 
 Soult, who had, at Murat's orders, commenced his further 
 advance to Vienna, received counter-orders in the after- 
 noon from the Emperor, who proceeded in person to St. 
 Polten, in order to be nearer to the scene of action ; it 
 was, however, only possible to stop one of his divisions at 
 Mautern. Davout was not to go beyond Modling, indeed 
 he only completed one day's march beyond Lilienfeld ; 
 Marmont had reached Leoben on the preceding day. 
 But the Emperor's measures did not come in time to 
 avert from Mortier the danger he realized too late. 
 
 Kutusov, rendered anxious as to the safety of his own 
 movement to the rear by Mortier's close approach, 
 determined to get rid of him by attacking him. For this 
 purpose he sent a division to Egelsee before daybreak, 
 which was to advance thence to Weissenkirchen, and thus 
 turning Mortier, entirely block his road back from the 
 defile of Diirrenstein ; another division was to attack 
 him in the meantime in front from the direction of Stein. 
 Mortier, however, not only resisted this latter attack, 
 which began in the morning, but advancing in his turn, 
 forced the Russians back again beyond Loiben, which 
 they had already captured. For their turning column, 
 starting only at noon from Egelsee, did not, as had been 
 planned, attack the French in the rear. But when about 
 four o'clock in the afternoon this turning column at last 
 appeared in his rear at Diirrenstein and began to attack, 
 Mortier had no alternative but to attempt to break 
 through ; in this only he himself and a few dtbris of the
 
 AUSTERLITZ 239 
 
 troops, who had been engaged, succeeded; Gazan's 
 division was annihilated. Mortier met Dupont during the 
 evening near Spitz ; he had in the morning, recognizing 
 the danger of his situation, sent orders to him to hasten 
 his march, but Dupont had not come up in time to take 
 any effective part in the engagement. 
 
 This was the first occasion on which the Emperor's 
 foresight was at fault, and on which he did not, with his 
 customary clearness and rapidity, grasp all the possibilities 
 of a given situation, and one of his corps had to pay for it 
 with a most serious defeat. We cannot but refer in this 
 connection to another corps of Napoleon, namely that of 
 Vandamme at Kulm, which also, being isolated, found 
 itself exposed to being surrounded by a superior enemy 
 and was annihilated, separated as it was from the army 
 by the Erz-gebirge, even as Mortier was here by the 
 Danube. There, as here, the Emperor, careless and 
 confident of success, left the pursuit of the beaten enemy 
 to the zeal of his army ; there, as here, he had set a single 
 corps, separated from the army by a great natural obstacle, 
 in motion against the enemy's line of retreat. But 
 whilst the army of 1805 under its young leaders, eager for 
 action, hastened too quickly past him in its pursuit of the 
 enemy, that of 1813 under its veteran leaders, weary of 
 war, delayed too much in its march. Thus Mortier in 
 1805 and Vandamme in 1813 were exposed unsupported 
 to the attack of the whole hostile army and both were 
 annihilated. In each case the great player had for a 
 moment taken his eyes off a part of the chess-board, and 
 in each case the penalty was the loss of an important 
 piece. 
 
 But the fatality of 1805, due as it was to a super- 
 abundant confidence of victory in the general, and a thirst 
 for action in his subordinate commanders, was soon 
 retrieved by unwearying activity, whilst the same occur- 
 rence in 1813, caused as it was by a want of energy, had 
 much more fatal consequences. If we then see here on
 
 240 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the one hand, that a want of strategical foresight carries 
 its penalty, and that, therefore, such foresight is a neces- 
 sary qualification of a general, we see also, on the other 
 hand, that it is not the highest requirement, for resolution 
 and energy can retrieve its mistakes, whilst any want in 
 these latter qualities cannot be made up for by greater 
 strategical ability, " war must be carried on with vigour, 
 resolution, and a firm will." ' 
 
 We must in any case allow that a great military 
 genius will contrive to gain victories even with the 
 most imperfect tools, and that it therefore is the best 
 guarantee of victory, for " in war men are nothing, one 
 man is everything." 3 Yet such a genius is rare and, 
 moreover, gets blunted by old age or is lost by death. 
 Hence sound military institutions are better guarantees of 
 lasting success. Where these exist, there the troops will 
 always be officered, if not by exceptional men, still by 
 capable, resolute, energetic leaders, and in the above 
 examples we have just seen that this is, if not the 
 whole, yet the most important primary condition of 
 victory. 
 
 A year later it was to be demonstrated in a terrible 
 manner what may become of an army, which, while its 
 leader is devoid of genius, fails to cultivate sound military 
 traditions. In these days particularly, when armies 
 are so large, much depends on a general diffusion of 
 excellence among the minor leaders ; indeed, the annals 
 of Napoleon's wars give a fresh proof of this assertion in 
 1813. At that time, when 400,000 men were in the field 
 on either side, and these had to be divided into several 
 smaller armies, the Emperor's plan failed in its execution 
 through the faults of his marshals, whose energy and 
 resolution were not equal to their tasks ; Oudinot, 
 Macdonald, and Ney were beaten, whilst Davout 
 remained idle. On the other hand, Bliicher and Gneisenau 
 
 1 C. N. To Bertrand, Liegnitz, 6th June, 1813. 
 
 1 C. N. Note on the Spanish affairs, St. Cloud, 3Oth August, 1808.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 241 
 
 showed conspicuous ability, while Billow rendered even 
 Bernadotte's want of activity harmless by his own energy. 
 
 Moreover, sound military institutions will bring forth 
 such leaders, and will not fail, as long as the whole 
 nation is sound, and military service is an honour and 
 not a burden ; where this is no longer the case, the nation 
 will fall and give place to a stronger and therefore better 
 one, for in the relations between states might makes right, 
 and " military authors teach the use of might for the 
 maintenance of right." ' 
 
 The Emperor was informed during the night of the 
 disastrous result of the engagement of Diirrenstein, though 
 at first without details ; but he immediately perceived the 
 advantage he could derive from it, if the Russians delayed 
 at Krems in consequence; "At this moment our great (40) 
 business is to cross the Danube and to drive the Russians 
 from Krems by getting into their rear." Therefore the 
 speedy capture of the great bridge over the Danube at 
 Vienna, before it could be destroyed, became of the 
 utmost importance to him, " This alone can force the 
 Emperor to take refuge in Vienna." 2 Murat was con- 
 sequently to advance immediately, seize if possible, the 
 bridge ov6r the Danube, and cross without delay ; for 
 which purpose Lannes and Davout were told off to his 
 assistance. Bernadotte, on the other hand, received 
 orders to remain stationary at Molk ; Soult also was not 
 to advance any further; for in this direction also the 
 Emperor wished to be in readiness to cross the Danube, 
 in case the attempt on the Vienna bridge should fail, 
 and with the object either of attacking Kutusov on two 
 sides, or of lending a hand to Mortier, whom the Emperor 
 believed to be still on the left bank of the Danube. How- 
 ever, the latter crossed again to the southern bank of this 
 stream the same day, leaving Klein's cavalry division to 
 reconnoitre towards the Bohemian frontier. 
 
 1 Biilow, Campaign of 1805, II. 1 8. 
 
 C. N. To Murat, St. Pblten, izth November, 6 a.m. 
 
 R
 
 242 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 In the meantime, an officer, sent by the Emperor 
 Francis to open negotiations for a truce, arrived at 
 Napoleon's headquarters, and while he was delivering 
 his message, Murat's advance was postponed, but the 
 negotiations were soon broken off without any result. 
 Napoleon never doubted but that Kutusov would retire 
 either to Bohemia or Moravia, " Everything leads me to 
 believe that the Russians will start this very night ; " l the 
 third possibility, namely, their remaining stationary at 
 Krems, he himself called " so senseless that it has only 
 been mentioned as a remote -possibility." 2 He therefore 
 resolved upon a speedy advance, in order, if possible, to 
 prevent Kutusov's junction with the second Russian 
 army. He consequently sent his aide-de-camp, General 
 Bertrand, to Murat, with instructions as to the capture of 
 Vienna, and at n p.m. he gave him orders to occupy the 
 bridge at day-break the following morning, and then 
 immediately to push forward with his cavalry on the road 
 to Briinn and Weikersdorf, that is to Moravia and 
 Bohemia ; the two nearest divisions of Soult were to 
 follow without delay on the former road, and Lannes in 
 the latter direction ; whilst Soult's two other divisions, 
 which were still in the rear, were to take up a position in 
 reserve on the Vienna road. 
 
 In the early morning of the I3th Murat entered Vienna 
 according to his orders at the head of his cavalry, closely 
 followed by the divisions of Oudinot. Murat, Lannes and 
 Bertrand now proceeded in person to the great bridge 
 over the Danube, for the blowing up of which all prepara- 
 tions had been made, and succeeded by their bold front 
 and assurances that a truce had been concluded, in so 
 completely fooling the general, Prince Auersperg, who 
 was in charge of the demolition of the bridge, that he 
 allowed the French troops to approach without offering 
 any resistance ; they seized the bridge, demolished all the 
 
 1 C. N. To Bernadotte, St. Polten, i.3th November. 
 - Ibid.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 243 
 
 arrangements for blowing it up, and Auersperg retired. 
 Thus lightly this important means of crossing was won. 
 The Emperor was immediately informed of it. General 
 Bertrand, who carried the news to him, met him at 
 Purkersdorf, whither he had gone as soon as the informa- 
 tion of the Russians' withdrawal from Krems reached 
 him. Before this, Bernadotte had already received orders 
 to cross at Krems, to occupy the position there, and then 
 follow the Russians closely, as soon as they started. 
 Mortier, of whose crossing to the right bank of the 
 Danube the Emperor was still unaware, was to act as his 
 reserve. In the evening, at eleven o'clock, the Emperor 
 himself went to the bridge over the Danube, inspected it and 
 crossed, in order to overtake his troops, who had hurried 
 on in front. Catching them up, he established his out- 
 posts during the first few hours after midnight, and passed 
 some severe strictures on the neglect which he dis- 
 covered in this respect, for " one must always assume 
 that the enemy has made movements during the night, 
 in order to attack at daybreak." l 
 
 Thus the Emperor had, without in any way manoeuvring, 
 pushed along the straightest road from Ulm to the capital, 
 " because a superior force should proceed straight to 
 the goal. . . . He acted according to the law of least 
 expenditure," * and his enemy had done nothing but 
 retreat still more hurriedly straight on Vienna. It was 
 not till the Allies reached Krems, in retiring behind the 
 Danube, that they deviated somewhat from their direct 
 course, and this flank position immediately produced its 
 effect. Napoleon had to consider the question of an 
 attack on his left flank, and was forced to arrest his march, 
 for " it is not the Emperor's intention to leave the 
 Russians on his flank." 8 He immediately hastened 
 forward to Vienna. We may note that the corps 
 
 1 C. N. Order of the day of the I4th November. 
 
 * Billow, Campaign of 1805, II. 3. 
 
 * C. N. Berthier to boult, St. Pollen, nth November, 4 p.m.
 
 244 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Lannes and Soult, which had left the line of the Inn on 
 the ist November, and arrived at Vienna on the i3th 
 November, had marched in thirteen days 152 miles, and 
 that not on a modern smooth high-road, but along country 
 roads and without reckoning the detours. Davout, who 
 reached the enemy's capital on the I4th, had marched 
 vid Gaming and Lilienfeld, 150 miles, as the crow flies, in 
 sixteen days, and partly by most difficult mountain roads. 
 Thus Napoleon did not, after all, vanquish his enemies 
 so much by the battles ot Ulm and Jena, however 
 disastrous these were, as by his incredible marches. 1 
 
 In the evening of the I3th Murat had reached 
 Stockerau, and his cavalry had pushed forward on the road 
 to Briinn. Lannes and Suchet's division of Soult's corps 
 had crossed the bridge over the Danube on this day, and 
 were half a day's march behind him. The Austrian 
 garrison of Vienna, 13,000 strong, had, after the surrender 
 of the bridge, retreated as far as Wolkersdorf, on the road 
 to Briinn. On the same day Kutusov started from Krems, 
 and reached Ebersbrunn. On the I4th Murat continued 
 his march in the direction of Znaym, in order to cut 
 Kutusov off, and arrived at Weikersdorf. Lannes 
 immediately followed, but Soult fell further behind, as he 
 could not leave Vienna before Davout's arrival there. 
 The latter, however, entered this town in the afternoon, 
 and the Emperor established his headquarters in the 
 castle of Schonbrunn, assembling his Guards around him. 
 
 At the moment of crossing the Danube he once more 
 surveyed the entire theatre of war ; he saw his com- 
 munications covered by Ney and Augereau, whilst Mar- 
 mont, at Leoben, had hitherto secured the right flank oif 
 his advance against the army of the Archduke Charles in 
 Italy. But now, by crossing the Danube, the Emperor 
 exposed his direct rear to this latter army, and his right 
 flank could now be turned from the side of Hungary. Once 
 more, therefore, he was compelled to tell off a corps for 
 1 Willisen, Theorie des grossen Krieges, I. loo.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 245 
 
 the protection of his line of operations, and consequently 
 Davout received orders to hold the road to Pressburg on 
 the right bank of the Danube with Friant's division, while 
 Caffarelli's l was to cover the road to Briinn, and Gudin 
 at Neustadt to keep touch with Marmont. The latter was 
 cautioned to remain strictly on the defensive. " You will 
 have played your part satisfactorily if you prevent the 
 enemy from seizing the Sommering, and descending 
 into the valley of the Danube." * Thus we see once 
 more how lengthening the line of operations weakens 
 the strength of the army, and for this reason the Emperor 
 sent orders to Ney on this same day to leave the Bavarians 
 to hold the Tyrol, and to march to Salzburg, where further 
 orders would await him. 
 
 As the task of securing Vienna and the bridge over the 
 Danube lay now in Davout's hands, the Emperor ordered 
 Soult to advance that evening in the direction of Stockerau. 
 Kutusov had reached Meissau on the same day, but 
 Bernadotte had not yet succeeded in completing his bridge 
 and crossing the Danube, a delay which caused the 
 Emperor to reprimand him severely on the following 
 day. 
 
 On the 1 5th Murat also kept pushing forward, urged 
 on most earnestly by Napoleon, who felt sure of inter- 
 cepting the Russian army, or at least inflicting heavy 
 losses upon it. Since Soult's last division, that of St. 
 Hilaire, could not reach Vienna before the afternoon of 
 this day, he ordered Caffarelli to advance along the 
 Stockerau road, to reinforce Murat in case of necessity. 
 For a moment this was the decisive point, for here a 
 battle might have to be fought, and therefore the 
 Emperor did not h'esitate to send all the forces he could 
 in any way spare to this point : " All my troops are 
 despatched against the Russians. I have not many, 
 
 1 Until now under Bisson ; the latter had been wounded at 
 Lambach. 
 5 C. N. To Marmont, Scho'nbrunn, isth November, 4 p.m.
 
 246 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 because I am forced to hold Vienna, and, as I intend to 
 turn them in order to attack them effectually, I require 
 more men than if I wanted simply to beat them." ' It was 
 ever his especial care to order up all his strength for 
 battle, and he always emphasized the fact that nothing 
 could excuse a breach of this rule. " People ascribe to 
 me a little more talent than to others, " and yet I never 
 think I have enough troops to fight a battle with an 
 enemy, whom I am accustomed to beat. I call up all the 
 troops I can collect." * 
 
 In the meantime Kutusov had in the evening of 
 the i4th set his army again in motion, and reached 
 Schrattenthal on the morning of the isth after an ex- 
 hausting night march. Here he was forced to give some 
 rest to his troops. He had sent Bagration with 6000 
 men to Hollabrunn to cover his further movements ; the 
 latter was to take up a position there, and block the road 
 so as to give Kutusov time, by marching round behind 
 him, to reach the great Znaym road at Jetzelsdorf before 
 Murat. Now when Murat met Bagration in position at 
 Schongrabern, behind Hollabrunn, in the afternoon, he 
 had besides his cavalry only Lannes with one division 
 with him, since Gazan's had been detached, and he 
 believed he had the whole Russian army before him. In 
 order to gain time and to allow the rest of his forces 
 to come up, he again tried the device which had delivered 
 the Danube bridge into his hands ; he amused the enemy 
 with talk of a truce. But on "this ground the wily Russian 
 proved himself undoubtedly the master of the excitable 
 Gascon. As nothing could be more welcome to Kutusov 
 in his situation than to arrest Murat's progress in any 
 way whatever, he not only immediately entered into a 
 parley, but pretended to be fully aware that something 
 of the sort was really pending between the combatants, 
 
 and that he was entrusted with the further negotiations. 
 
 % 
 
 1 C. N. To Marmont, Schonbrunn, ijth November, 4 p.m. 
 * C. N. To Savary, Me'm. IV. 231.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 247 
 
 He consequently sent an aide-de-camp of the Russian 
 Emperor to Murat, for there was never a want of such 
 officers at the Russian headquarters, and this envoy con- 
 cluded an armistice with the French commander ; Murat 
 was not to advance any further, and Kutusov was im- 
 mediately to begin his withdrawal from Germany as soon 
 as the armistice was confirmed by Napoleon. Whilst, 
 however, Murat forwarded this document to the Emperor, 
 Bagration prepared for the defence of his position, and 
 Kutusov immediately concentrated his troops upon 
 Jetzelsdorf, and made preparations to continue his retreat 
 next morning early vid Znaym. 
 
 The messenger announcing the armistice, which had been 
 concluded, only reached Schonbrunn about eight o'clock 
 in the morning of the i6th. On receipt of this news the 
 Emperor flew into a tremendous rage ; he immediately per- 
 ceived clearly that Kutusov was already on the road, and 
 that a rear-guard only lay in front of Murat ; with the most 
 violent expressions of anger he therefore sent immediate 
 orders to him to attack without delay. A few hours later 
 he himself was on his way to him, after having set his 
 Guards in motion towards Hollabrunn, and having ordered 
 Davout to call up Gudin to Vienna, so as to be able to 
 employ Caffarelli entirely against the Russians. 
 
 When Murat received the order to attack in the after- 
 noon, Soult also joined him with three divisions, and Murat 
 now advanced against Bagration with greatly superior 
 forces, Oudinot attacked in front with Vandamme in re- 
 serve behind him, whilst Suchet turned the enemy's right 
 and Legrand his left wing. Bagration offered a de- 
 termined resistance until eleven o'clock at night, when he 
 formed one column of all the men he could collect after 
 his heavy losses, and broke through the French divisions 
 that were trying to surround him. The Emperor arrived 
 in Hollabrunn during the evening, and Kutusov reached 
 Lechwitz in the course of the night. 
 
 On the 1 7th the French army, now urged on by the
 
 248 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 ,S 
 
 Emperor in person, pushed forward in haste to Znaym ; 
 Murat reached this town, where the Emperor also arrived 
 at 3 p.m., whilst Lannes, Soult, the division of Caffarelli 
 and the Guards came up, partly during this day 
 and partly during the night, after some very rapid 
 forced marches. Bernadotte, who had at last crossed 
 the Danube on the I5th, was still a day's march behind. 
 Mortier, once more on the northern bank of the 
 Danube, was at Krems. Of the cavalry divisions, at first 
 left behind at Augsburg and Ingolstadt, Bourcier was on 
 the march to Vienna, whilst Baraguey was scouting 
 beyond Waldmunchen, as far as Pilsen. Beaumont had 
 remained in Vienna with Davout and was keeping the 
 road to Briinn clear. Klein continued to watch the 
 south-eastern frontier of Bohemia. This distribution of 
 the cavalry, as well as its whole handling up to this time, 
 showed clearly that the Emperor, when forming a large 
 " Cavalry Reserve," by no means intended to drag it 
 along with him as a closed-up mass, in order to use 
 it on the day of battle only, but that he expected 
 from it the most far-reaching reconnaissances, whilst the 
 rest of the cavalry, which had remained under Murat's 
 immediate orders with the army, had uninterruptedly 
 formed his vanguard since his departure from the Inn. 
 
 The Russians retreating further and further, reached on 
 the 1 7th respectively : Bagration, Frainspitz and Kutusov, 
 Pohrlitz ; here the Austrian corps, which had evacuated 
 Vienna, effected a junction with them, so that their 
 strength now amounted to 45,000 men. Thus the 
 Emperor's plan to cut off Kutusov had certainly failed, 
 and his reproach to Murat : " You have made me lose the 
 fruits of the whole campaign," 1 proved true. Still he in- 
 tended to push forward without delay to Briinn, "which 
 is necessary to us, in order to secure our positions, for we 
 cannot remain on outpost duty in a town like Vienna." ' 
 
 1 C. N. Schonbrunn, i6th November, 8 a.m. 
 
 2 C. N. To Lannes, Znaym i8th November, 9 p.m.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 249 
 
 Nevertheless he was compelled to grant his entirely ex- 
 hausted troops a day's rest. He took advantage of this 
 circumstance to inform them that, "he was induced to 
 <io so by the thought, that it would be better to gain a less 
 complete victory, rather than expose such brave men to 
 illness ; " l and the world in general, that : " the Russians 
 have retreated to Briinn, and our vanguard have pursued 
 them halfway ; but the Emperor, learning that the 
 Emperor of Austria was there, wished to furnish a proof 
 of his consideration for that monarch and arrested his 
 march during the i8th." * Bernadotte received orders to 
 march to Budwitz; Mortier was to leave Dumonceau 
 behind at Krems, and occupy Vienna with the other two 
 divisions, for Davout was now to take possession of 
 Pressburg. The allied Russo-Austrian army went into 
 camp near Schlappanitz on this day. 
 
 On the io,th November the French advance was re- 
 sumed. Murat reached Briinn in the afternoon, Lannes 
 Pohrlitz, to which the imperial headquarters also were 
 transferred ; Soult marched on the right of the Pohrlitz 
 road to Niemtschitz Bernadotte was at Znaym. 
 Kutusov reached Wischau, and there effected a junction 
 with the first portion, 14,000 men, of the second Russian 
 army marching hither under Buxhowden ; falling back to 
 Prossnitz on the next day, he met the second part of it, 
 some 10,000 men. On this same date, the 2oth November, 
 at 10 a.m., Napoleon arrived in Briinn. Here he intended 
 for the present to make a halt, for he was in need of a 
 little breathing time, both in order to examine for himself 
 the situation as a whole, and also to allow his army to 
 gain strength and to get into good order, before the 
 decisive battle, which he now considered inevitable, since 
 Kutusov and Buxhowden had joined forces, and the 
 Emperor Alexander had, according to Napoleon's in- 
 
 1 C. N. To Lannes, Znaym, i8th November, 9 p.m. 
 26th Bulletin, Znaym, i8th November.
 
 250 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 
 
 formation, arrived in the camp and joined the Emperor 
 Francis. 
 
 (41) During the next few days we find the French army 
 posted as follows : In Moravia the Emperor himself, 
 his headquarters at Brtinn, with the Guards 5300 men, 
 and Lannes with Oudinot's and Suchet's divisions, 
 12,000 men ; to the right of him, at Austerlitz : Soult, 
 26,000 men (divisions of St. Hilaire, Vandamme and 
 Legrand) ; to the left Bernadotte, 19,000 men, with his 
 two French divisions at Znaym and Budwitz, and with 
 the Bavarian division of Wrede at Iglau. In front of this 
 line Murat's cavalry, 4500 men (Nansouty, d'Hautpoul, 
 Walther) , were at Wischau, while behind were Caffarelli with 
 6000 men, at Pohrlitz, and Friant, 6000 men, at Nikols- 
 burg. Baraguey, 4500 men, and Klein, noo, were still on 
 the way to Bohemia ; the latter, however, was now sent 
 to Pressburg, in order to replace the 2000 men of Bourcier, 
 who was ordered to the front. Near Pressburg stood 
 Davout with the division of Gudin, 8006 men, on the 
 Danube ; and Mortier, 6000 men (Dupont and Gazan's 
 weak division), together with the cavalry division of Beau- 
 mont, 2000 men, occupied Vienna. Dumonceau, 4500 
 men, posted at Neustadt, formed the connecting link with 
 Marmont, 9000 men, whose divisions, under Boudet and 
 Grouchy, held the Mur valley at Leoben and Graz. The 
 Army of Italy, under Massena, had advanced as far as 
 Krain, and reached Laibach on the 2gth November. 
 From here an enterprising officer, pushing through the 
 mountains of Carinthia and Styria with a patrol of 
 dragoons, succeeded in opening communications with 
 Marmont at Bruck. The Archduke Charles, compelled 
 by events in Germany, had fallen back before Massena 
 from the banks of the Adige ; he was now in the 
 lowlands on the Drave near Marburg; at which latter 
 place the Archduke John also, having been driven from 
 the Tyrol by Ney, arrived on the 26th ; their collective 
 forces numbered 80,000 men. Ney had cleared the
 
 AUSTERLITZ 2 5 I 
 
 Tyrol of the enemy, and was now, having left the Bavarian 
 division of Deroy, 9000 men, in it as a. garrison, marching 
 with the divisions Loison and Malher, 13,000 men, 
 through the Puster valley, following upon the heels 
 of the Archduke John ; he started from Botzen in pursuit 
 on the 2ist November. The main army of the allies, 
 which the Emperor Alexander had now also joined, 
 occupied on the 22nd a camp near Ollschann'in front of 
 Olmiitz ; it amounted to 89,000 men, having received some 
 further reinforcements. 
 
 If we examine the situation, we shall find that the Emperor 
 could have at Brtinn or Austerlitz in twenty-four hours 
 53,800 men, within three days 74,800 men, and within four 
 days, by calling up Wrede from Iglau and Baraguey's 
 cavalry, 85,300 men. The enemy was forty-three miles to 
 his front at Ollschann, and could only attack him on the 
 morning of the fourth day, though he could then muster 
 89,000 men ; still Napoleon could in that case begin a safe 
 retreat with 74,800 men, after having, as doubtless he 
 would, ordered up Davout, Mortier, and Klein, in case of 
 the ertemy's advance, so as to show front again after forty- 
 eight hours with 102,400 men, thus ensuring victory. 
 The allies, on the other hand, could not in any case effect 
 a junction in time ; if Kutusov wished to wait for the 
 Archduke Charles' arrival, the latter could reach him 
 safely only by a march through Hungary, as he had to 
 reckon with Massena, Ney, and Marmont ; moreover, such 
 a march would not escape the attention of Davout at 
 Pressburg, and the Emperor could throw himself upon 
 Kutusov long before a junction could be effected. 
 Montenotte, Castiglione and Arcola furnish proofs of this. 
 Even if Kutusov and the Archduke had advanced simulta- 
 neously and concentrically upon Vienna, Napoleon would 
 have stood on interior lines, and under any circumstances 
 he could have assembled his whole forces, 172,000 men, 
 long before the 169,000 men of his divided opponents 
 could have arrived there ; irrespective altogether of the
 
 252 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 fact that, during this divided advance, the Emperor could 
 have stood on the defensive with a small force against one 
 of his opponents, while attacking the other with his main 
 body, thus repeating the lessons he had given Wiirmser 
 and Quosdanovitch in 1796. 
 
 Thus we see that the Emperor, although covering in 
 extended order a front of nearly 240 miles, yet stood 
 in a more concentrated position than the enemy with his 
 two masses, for the very reason that the latter had formed 
 two isolated masses upon exterior lines of operation. If 
 we compare this situation with that of the Prussian and 
 Austrian armies in the middle of June, 1866, the former, 
 with its two great bodies, separated by the Iser mountains 
 on the Neisse and near Gorlitz, if we reflect how easily a 
 resolute commander might have assembled superior forces 
 against either of them, and remember that there was no 
 reason for considering Benedek incapable of the execution 
 of such a plan, because little was known about the 
 Austrian movements, we shall, it is true, have to pro- 
 nounce the conduct of 1866 correct on the part of the 
 Prussians, for political circumstances compelled them to 
 act as they did, but we shall still hesitate to accept the 
 Prussian system of concentric advanuce in separate bodies 
 as one to be universally adopted. Napoleon indeed 
 avoided such movements on principle. 
 
 The calm posture of defence which the Emperor assumed 
 for the moment at Brunn, was intended partly to lead the 
 enemy on to attack him, for nothing could be more favour- 
 able to Napoleon than to fight a battle soon, both before 
 the Archduke Charles approached through Hungary, and 
 also before- the Cabinet of Berlin, which had also mobi- 
 lized its army, could make up its mind to act. But since 
 his line of communications was already very extended, it 
 must have been a matter of congratulation to the Emperor 
 that the allies came to him, rather than that he should be 
 compelled to advance against their position at Ollschann. 
 For the same reasons also, which made it desirable for
 
 AUSTERLITZ 253 
 
 Napoleon to fight soon and to let the enemy attack him, 
 the allies ought to have avoided this ; but in their camp a 
 forward policy prevailed, and thus it was determined on 
 the 24th November to turn the enemy's right wing, and to 
 force him by this pressure upon his communications to 
 retreat to the Danube ; should he, however, not fall back 
 as expected, they would immediately proceed to attack 
 his right wing. 
 
 For this purpose the army was set in motion on the 
 27th at 8 a.m., and reached the neighbourhood of Prossnitz. 
 On the 28th the forward movement was continued ; 
 Murat's cavalry immediately evacuated Wischau before 
 the enemy's advance-guard; Bagration and Kutusov on 
 the same day were near this town and in front of it. 
 Towards evening the Emperor was informed by his cavalry 
 of the enemy's approach and expected their attack on the 
 next day ; he therefore issued the following orders at 
 eight o'clock : " Caffarelli, Bourcier and Klein (the latter 
 being still on the march to Pressburg) are to reach Briinn 
 by 7 a.m. on the 2gth ; Davout, Bernadotte and Mortier 
 are to hurry up by forced marches." An hour later he 
 mounted his horse and rode to Soult's position at the 
 posthouse of Posorzitz. He watched from the heights of (42) 
 Austerlitz the movements of the enemy ; but as only some 
 small advance columns were to be seen, and as nothing 
 indicated any immediate attack; he decided to remain 
 stationary for the present. But late the same evening his 
 aide-de-camp Savary, whom he had sent to Olmiitz with 
 an unimportant letter to the Emperor Alexander, but who 
 was principally intended to gain information as to the state 
 of affairs in the enemy's camp, returned and confirmed 
 the news that the entire hostile army was on the march 
 *to attack him. 
 
 Consequently the Emperor drew back Soult at dawn 
 on the 2Qth into the line Sokolnitz Schlappanitz, 
 evacuating Austerlitz. Caffarelli was in reserve near 
 Latain, Suchet to the north of the Olmttt* road behind
 
 254 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the hill of Bosenitz, called by the French soldiers the 
 " S ant on," in memory of a similar hill in Egypt ; behind 
 Suchet were the Guards and Oudinot at Kritschen. The 
 cavalry occupied Welatitz, Bosenitz, Girschkowitz and 
 the plateau of Pratzen. The Emperor, having imme- 
 diately sent Savary back again to the enemy's camp, 
 established his bivouac on a hill affording an extensive 
 view to the south of the road to Briin.n, in front of 
 Bellowitz. Dumonceau received orders to occupy Vienna, 
 and Marmont in his turn was to move closer up to that 
 capital. During the 2gth Kutusov did nothing beyond 
 moving his army to the left under cover of his advance- 
 guard, for the purpose of turning the enemy's right wing 
 more easily. From all this the Emperor perceived that 
 the battle was after all not quite so imminent as he had 
 expected at first, and predicted it now for the ist of 
 December. About noon Savary returned and informed 
 him that one of the Emperor Alexander's aides was 
 waiting for him near the outposts ; for, more cautious 
 than the Russians, Napoleon did not allow such messen- 
 gers to penetrate without any ado to his presence in the 
 middle of the army. He now rode as far as the outposts, 
 and received the aide-de-camp's communication ; but the 
 negotiations had no result. 
 
 On the soth Kutusov ordered his outposts forward to 
 the line Schumitz Walspitz Satschan Pond ; the army 
 again advanced by its left, and was now on both sides of 
 the river Littawa, with its front to the west, its last column 
 at Butschowitz, and its leading one at Hodjegitz. This 
 fresh respite led the Emperor to hope that he might still 
 be able to accept battle on the heights of Pratzen. Up 
 to now he had intended to fall back behind the Schwarz- 
 awa in case of a determined attack on the 2gth or soth, 
 for his expected reinforcements, Bernadotte and Davout, 
 could not come up before the ist of December. But now 
 he saw that the issue would not be decided before the 2nd 
 of December, and he therefore prepared, on the 3oth
 
 AUSTERLITZ 255 
 
 November, the whole of the ground to the right of the 
 Littawa, saying to himself: " If I occupy the plateau of 
 Pratzen with my right wing on the Littawa, I shall 
 frustrate the enemy's intention of turning this wing. But 
 if I advance as far as that, the encounter might easily 
 take place on the ist, whilst the gain of one day renders 
 the arrival of my reinforcements in time more certain. 
 Besides, I can, it is true, repulse the enemy in the ex- 
 cellent safe position of Pratzen (" I can fight an ordinary 
 battle," ' as he said) ; but if I do not occupy that position 
 I shall probably induce him to attempt to turn my right 
 wing, which will then not be so well in touch with the 
 rest of the army ; and while the enemy is engaged in this 
 too extended movement, I shall advance in close order 
 and inflict a complete defeat upon him." 
 
 And here we find again in the province of tactics the 
 same truth which we noted in the province of strategy 
 in 1800 on the occasion of Napoleon's march to Milan, 
 namely, the difference of the procedure between a capable 
 general of the ordinary type and a general of genius. 
 The former would undoubtedly have taken up the safe 
 position afforded by the plateau of Pratzen, and would, by 
 forcing the enemy to a frontal attack, have won " an 
 ordinary battle," to use the Emperor's words. The 
 latter, however, took up a position which, if taken up in 
 a " war game," would assuredly be found fault with ; indeed 
 all the principles of simple common-sense tactics are 
 opposed to it, and only a full consciousness of superiority 
 in tactics could excuse any general for taking it up. 
 But Napoleon anticipated with the eye of genius what 
 mistakes the enemy would commit, and how quickly he 
 himself would be able to develop his forces, closely con- 
 centrated as they were between Schlappanitz and the 
 road to Briinn, towards the plateau of Pratzen, and 
 what delays the crossing at Sokolnitz and Tellnitz would 
 occasion in the turning manoeuvre of his enemy ; he 
 
 1 Hist, des campagnes de 1'Emp. N. en 1805-6 and 1807-9, ! Ml-
 
 256 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 did not desire any " ordinary battle," but a decisive 
 victory. 
 
 Therefore he posted his army on the ist December 
 in the following manner : Suchet from the " Santon " to 
 near Girschkowitz, with one regiment as a firm point of 
 support for the left wing entrenched on the Santon, and 
 Caffarelli behind Suchet ; Bernadotte, who arrived during 
 the afternoon, took up a position behind Caffarelli on 
 both sides of the Briinn road. Wrede was left behind at 
 Iglau to keep off the Archduke Ferdinand, who had 
 collected about 18,000- men near Prague. Oudinot stood 
 to the right of the Briinn road, in front of the imperial 
 bivouac, and the Guards behind the latter. Murat, with 
 his cavalry, was behind the lines of Caifarelli and 
 Oudinot. Of Soult's corps, Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's 
 divisions stood to the west of the Bosenitz hill, facing 
 Puntowitz ; Legrand was behind Kobelnitz, holding 
 Sokolnitz and Tellnitz. During the night Davout also 
 reached Raigern with Friant and Bourcier. 
 
 On this day the enemy again advanced wheeling to the 
 left ; their army was, as it had been on the whole march 
 from Olmutz, divided into five columns, which now took 
 up the following positions : The ist, Docturov, 8500 
 men, along the line: Klein Hostjeradek Augezd; the 
 and, Langeron, 11,600 men, on -its right, on the heights 
 of Pratzen ; the 3rd, Prschibitschewski, 13,800 men, 
 between Krzenowitz and Pratzen; the 4th, Kollovrat, 
 25,400 men, behind the latter in front of Krzenowitz ; and 
 the 5th, the cavalry under Lichtenstein, 4600 men, 
 between the second and third columns at the foot of the 
 plateau of Pratzen. As a reserve the Guards, under the 
 Grand Duke Constantine, 8500 men, stood at Krzenowitz, 
 where the headquarters were. The vanguard, 13,000 men, 
 under Bagration r stood in front of Raussnitz on the 
 Twaroschna. They had the intention of doing exactly 
 what Napoleon had anticipated, namely, to take pos- 
 session, by a movement to the left, of the passes at
 
 AUSTERLITZ 257 
 
 Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and then to outflank the French 
 altogether. 
 
 The Emperor had contented himself with ordering his 
 troops to take up their respective positions, and carefully 
 observing the enemy's movements ; " with unspeakable 
 joy " he saw them enter the trap he had laid for them and 
 begin their turning manoeuvre. Later in the afternoon, 
 whilst he was eating his dinner, he called his corps leaders 
 around him and discussed with them the situation and 
 his own intentions for the morrow's battle, assigning to 
 each his part in it. Soult was to have Vandamme and 
 St. Hilaire ready at 7 a.m. ofl the other side of the 
 Bosenitz brook, to begin " the day's manoeuvre, namely 
 an advance in echelons, right shoulders forward ; " in the 
 meantime Legrand was to hold the crossings at Sokolnitz 
 and Tellnitz. Murat, with Beaumont, was to form the 
 centre to the right of Soult ; Caffarelli was likewise to 
 have crossed the Bosenitz brook by seven o'clock, and was 
 to march into position to the right of Suchet, the latter 
 making room for him by taking a deeper formation ; the 
 two divisions under the command of Lannes were to 
 remain under cover of the heights. Bernadotte was to 
 advance behind Lannes and form his second line ; on his 
 right Oudinot, and behind both, the Guards. Davout was 
 to start as early as 5 a.m. from Raigern and come up on 
 Soult's right ; in this way he would come direct on the 
 flank of whatever troops might force the passes of 
 Sokolnitz and Tellnitz. 
 
 Having given these orders, the Emperor strolled in the 
 falling darkness through the bivouacs of his troops, 
 inspiring them by his words and presence. Already 
 confident of victory, he announced to them what the 
 enemy would do : " Whilst they march to my right wing, 
 they will expose their flank to me." Meanwhile 
 musketry fire had become audible on his right wing in 
 the neighbourhood of Sokolnitz ; this rendered the 
 Emperor somewhat uneasy, for, as a matter of fact, if the 
 
 s
 
 258 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 enemy by a resolute advance had seized the passes of 
 Sokolnitz and Tellnitz that evening, the Emperor's right 
 wing would have been really endangered, and his whole 
 position as well. This, indeed, was one of those risks 
 to which the plans of genius are always open ; but to 
 take such risks and to judge how far the enemy was 
 capable of profiting by his situation, was exactly what 
 Napoleon called the divine side of the art of war. 
 However, the Emperor retired to rest, after having sent his 
 aide-de-catop, Savary, to the threatened point, to see what 
 was going on there. Upon his report, that the Russians 
 were concentrating there, but did not seem to have any 
 i ntention of proceeding to an attack during the night, the 
 Emperor rode thither with Soult, about i a.m., in order to 
 inspect, as far as the darkness permitted, the enemy's dis- 
 positions, after which he slept for a few hours. 
 (43) At five in the morning Napoleon began to occupy his 
 positions ; he himself took post on the hill where he had 
 bivouacked, surrounded by his corps leaders. As yet 
 a thick fog covered the ground before them, which, 
 however, began gradually to lift ; by seven o'clock the 
 outlook over the more elevated parts was tolerably clear, 
 but in the valley the fog was still thick. At this moment 
 the allies began their march. Docturov moved towards 
 Tellnitz, with Langeron on his right, Prschibitschewski 
 advanced towards the castle of Sokolnitz, and Kollowrat 
 towards the low-lying ground between Sokolnitz and 
 Kobelnitz. As soon as these columns should have crossed 
 the Goldbach and approached the wood of Turas, Bagra- 
 tion also, covered on his left flank by the 5th column, the 
 cavalry, and supported by the reserve, the Guards, was 
 to advance along the Briinn road, for the decisive onslaught 
 against the position of the enemy, who was suspected to be 
 behind Schlappanitz and Bellowitz, and consequently to be 
 completely turned. Thus, to begin with, the whole left 
 wing of the allies was set in motion towards -the Goldbach. 
 From the heights the Emperor noticed about 7.30 that
 
 AUSTERLITZ 259 
 
 the plateau of Pratzen was becoming more and more 
 denuded of troops, and turned to Soult, and asked : " How 
 long will it take you to reach the heights of Pratzen with 
 your divisions ? " " Less than twenty minutes," was the 
 marshal's reply. " In that case," said the Emperor, " we 
 will wait another quarter of an hour." In a short time 
 the sustained infantry fire on the right wing announced 
 that the fighting near the passage over 'the Goldbach had 
 begun; indeed, shortly after eight o'clock Docturov's 
 column broke out from Augezd, and an hour later it had 
 succeeded in seising the . crossing at Tellnitz. Now, 
 whilst this column established itself in the village just 
 won, Langeron appeared in front of Sokolnitz, and 
 captured this place also. Prschibitschewski followed 
 him, but could no longer find room enough to develop 
 his lines. Whilst, therefore, the heads of the two first 
 columns began to cross the Goldbach at these points, 
 Davout appeared about nine o'clock before Tellnitz, having 
 marched from Raigern, and immediately threw himself 
 upon the enemy's columns, in support of Legrand. 
 Thus at nine o'clock nearly half the allied army was 
 engaged here. 
 
 In the meantime, however, Soult, in the centre, had 
 commenced his forward movement, and the divisions of 
 Vandamme and St. Hilaire were ascending the plateau 
 of Pratzen. At this moment the head of Kollow- 
 rat's column, with which was Kutusov, reached 
 Pratzen. The commander-in-chief* surprised by Napo- 
 leon's attack, now for the first time recognized the 
 danger in which his army would be if the French should 
 succeed in taking possession of the plateau of Pratzen. 
 He therefore quickly threw two .battalions into this 
 village, and turned to the right with his column, but the 
 forces at his disposal were inferior to those of the enemy. 
 Still, for the time being, Kutusov offered a determined 
 resistance. 
 
 Meanwhile, on the groun^l to the south of the Briinn
 
 260 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 road, the fight had also begun. When Soult moved 
 forward, Bernadotte crossed over the Bosenitz brook 
 at Girschkowitz, whilst on his left Murat advanced 
 upon Blasowitz. These were opposed by the Grand Duke 
 Constantine, who was also on the march to the latter 
 village, and who now encountered Rivaud's division on 
 Bernadotte's left wing. On the Grand Duke's right, the 
 cavalry under Lichtenstein now came up, and imme- 
 diately attacked Murat, and one of those cavalry fights 
 began which end indecisively, and in which each side 
 claims the victory. In the meantime the combat 
 between Rivaud and the Grand-Duke had also begun. 
 Rivaud captured Blasowitz under the eyes of the Emperor, 
 who had ridden forward to the heights above this village, 
 and in spite of very determined efforts, the Russian 
 Guards could not recapture it. The Emperor hurled the 
 cavalry of his Guards against them, and at the same time 
 Caffarelli attacked them in the right flank, so that they 
 were soon after eleven o'clock forced definitely to fall back 
 upon Krzenowitz. 
 
 Only a very short time after the Grand Duke Constan- 
 tine, Bagration had come on the field, between nine and ten 
 o'clock, and now, advancing towards Bosenitz, he met 
 Lannes, who was also moving forward full in front. Whilst 
 (44) the allies' entire right wing was thus under fire, the day 
 was decided, about noon, at Pratzen. Kutusov, who had 
 made a last desperate effort to gain possession of the 
 heights, was completely repulsed by Soult, and his troops 
 retreated in confusion down the slope to Krzenowitz and 
 Great Hostjeradek. Drouet also assisted from the left, by 
 the Emperor's orders, driving back the reserves, which 
 were hastening up to Kutusov's support. By these move- 
 ments the line of the allied army was broken through, all 
 the forces fighting on the Goldbach were cut off from their 
 line of retreat, and shut in in the angle formed by the 
 Littawa and Goldbach at the pond of Satschan. 
 
 Shortly before this decisive turn of affairs the Grand
 
 AUSTERLITZ 26l 
 
 Duke Constantine also had, as we have seen, begun his 
 retreat and now Lannes, with Suchet and Caffarelli, 
 advanced to the attack of Bagration, who- had meanwhile 
 pushed forward as far as Bosenitz and taken possession 
 of this village ; on the left the cuirassier division of 
 d'Hautpoul came into action and the right wing of the 
 allies was also overthrown ; Bagration fell back to 
 Raussnitz, whence, between five and six o'clock, he turned 
 towards Austerlitz. 
 
 The Emperor, having been present at the repulse of the 
 Russian Guards at Blasowitz, and being convinced that 
 his decisive movement against the enemy's centre had 
 nothing further to apprehend on this side, now betook 
 himself to Soult. The latter was at that moment 
 near the Chapel of St. Anthony. He had, after the final 
 occupation of the plateau of Pratzen, moving more and 
 more towards the right, pushed forward with St. Hilaire 
 upon Sokolnitz and with Vandamme upon Augezd, thus 
 completing the isolation of the enemy's left wing. Drouet 
 followed across the heights of Pratzen. Vandamme 
 captured Augezd about two o'clock, whilst Davout, who had 
 since nine o'clock, on the heights on the other bank of the 
 Goldbach, prevented the enemy's advance from the low 
 ground, now also pushed forward to the attack upon 
 Sokolnitz and Tellnitz. With this the battle was decided. 
 At two o'clock in the afternoon, the columns of Doc- 
 turov, Langeron, and Prschibitschewski were completely 
 surrounded and only some shattered remnants escaped, 
 partly over the ice of thepondof Satschan,and partly along 
 the embankment between this pond and that of Menitz. 
 
 The Emperor,. who had witnessed from the chapel of 
 St. Anthony the destruction of the enemy's whole left 
 wing, rode with the beginning of dusk over the entire 
 battle-field, as was always his custom after larger engage- 
 ments, taking stock of the masses of dead and wounded 
 with a kind of curiosity, which struck his suite as very 
 strange ; after midnight he established his headquarters
 
 262 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 in the posthouse of Posorzitz. Here an officer, des- 
 patched by the Emperor of Austria, arrived at four o'clock 
 in the morning with proposals for an armistice and a 
 personal interview between the two emperors. Neither 
 in the French camp nor in that of the allies could the whole 
 bearing of the victory and defeat respectively be clearly 
 grasped at the time, but this message proved to Napoleon 
 that his opponent acknowledged a complete beating. All 
 the more he determined to use the 3rd December to 
 prosecute his victory, and to increase the confusion and 
 disintegration of the enemy's forces to such a degree, 
 that no resumption of resistance should be possible ; he 
 therefore rejected the armistice, but consented to an 
 interview with the Emperor Francis on the 4th. The 
 officer was sent back with this decision, and Napoleon 
 immediately, it being then 8 a.m., gave orders to all his 
 corps to pursue the enemy vigorously. " The Emperor 
 will personally follow close on the enemy's heels. It is 
 his opinion, that in warfare nothing is done, as long as 
 anything remains to be done ; no victory is complete, as 
 long as there is an enemy in the field. ... In the position 
 in which we are, there is only one order to be issued, viz. 
 to inflict as great losses upon the enemy as possible and 
 to improve our victory in every way." l This, in a few 
 words, from the lips of the best of judges, is the whole 
 theory of pursuit. 
 
 But the direction which the enemy had taken in their 
 retreat was as yet unknown to the Emperor, and therefore 
 (41) Murat was sent in haste along the Olmiitz road as far as 
 Prossnitz, and Lannes and Soult followed him; Ber- 
 nadotte and Davout alone pursuing in a south-easterly 
 direction. The division of Gudin, which had not 
 succeeded in reaching the battle-field of Austerlitz in time, 
 and was at Nikolsburg on the 2nd December, was now 
 sent by Davout towards Coding. In the course of the day 
 the Emperor gathered from his reports, that no enemy was 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Austerlitz, 3rd Decemoer, 10 p.m.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 263 
 
 to be found on the Olmtltz road, but that they had seem- 
 ingly retreated vid Urschitz, that is, towards Hungary. 
 Accordingly Soult and Lannes were instructed to push 
 forward in this direction, vid Hradish or Coding. As a 
 matter of fact the allies had collected their troops in the 
 evening of the 2nd, as well as was possible at the time, 
 near Hodjegitz ; they had then fallen back to Tscheitsch 
 during the night, and arrived at this place during the 
 forenoon of the 3rd. On the 4th they crossed the March at 
 Coding and reached Holitsch. In the afternoon of this 
 day the Emperor Francis visited Napoleon in his tent, 
 which had been erected near the mill of Saroschitz, and 
 this interview resulted in an agreement which put an end 
 to the hostilities. 
 
 Thus Austerlitz brought the war of 1805 to a close ; 
 Napoleon had for the first time conducted a great pitched 
 battle ; for even Marengo had, after all, only consisted of 
 two minor engagements, judging by modern standards, 
 and therefore Jomini says : " The great pitched battles of 
 our days date from 1805." l And he is right. In this 
 first Napoleonic battle we may at once note all those 
 characteristic points which distinguish modern battles 
 from those of Frederick the Great. Under the latter the 
 entire army was set in motion as one body, and had, 
 during the whole course of the battle, to remain ready 
 to manoeuvre at the will of the leader ; if its solidity 
 were broken in one place, it was beaten. But in 
 a modern battle the centre may be broken through, 
 and yet the wings, turning the enemy, may gain 
 the victory. One wing may be destroyed, and yet the 
 other may crush the enemy ; nay, in a well-conducted 
 battle some such success will always be allowed to be 
 gained by the opponent in one part of the battle-field, 
 to enable the victor, in his turn, to appear at the 
 decisive point with superior strength. Thus Napoleon (43) 
 sacrificed at Austerlitz his right wing, Legrand and Davout, 
 1 Oesterr. mil. zeitschrift, 1830, I. 113.
 
 264 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to the enemy's superior numbers, in order to appear at 
 Pratzen in his full strength, though, on the whole, a little 
 weaker than the enemy. In the same way he at Rivoli 
 sacrificed his wings, in order to decide the issue in the 
 centre. But, on the other hand, while no longer fearing 
 any partial failure, the leader cannot direct all the varying 
 phases of a battle. In modern battles the commander-in- 
 chief has only two lines of action available the direction 
 in which to introduce fresh troops, and the moment at 
 which he may do so. Once in action, the troops march 
 straight forward, they may, indeed, leave the field again, 
 but cannot be withdrawn at will. Thus Napoleon could 
 here introduce Drouet on Soult's left wing, but he could 
 not have withdrawn him again and employed him on 
 Bernadotte's right wing. Drouet had to move on in the 
 direction once given, vid Pratzen. 
 
 The more the battles of modern times confirm this 
 experience, the more it must be the endeavour of the 
 commander-in-chief on a battle-field to secure to himself 
 the mastery, of these two points by which alone he can 
 exert any influence upon the course of a battle once 
 begun. In a word, he must keep his reserves in hand, so 
 as to be able to bring them up where and when his plan 
 demands it. If he has no fresh troops to send forward at 
 the decisive moment or to the decisive point, he can no 
 longer turn a doubtful battle into a victory ; in that case 
 the more or less able conduct of his subordinate officers, 
 or the more or less favourable situation created by 
 previous good strategy, will bring about the decision. Let 
 us remember that the past-master of our art has said : 
 " Battles are only won by reinforcing a line at the critical 
 moment." ' But in order to be able to do this, one must 
 avoid playing one's last card too. soon, one must act as 
 Napoleon did, who, " when the first corps had become 
 engaged, allowed them calmly to fight on, without 
 troubling himself about their good or bad positions, and 
 1 C. N. To Murat, Ditben, I3th October, 1813.
 
 AUSTERLITZ 265 
 
 
 
 only took good care not to yield too lightly to any requests 
 for support on the part of their leaders." * Only when 
 he saw "the decisive moment, which lies between the 
 winning and losing of a battle " * appear, did he employ 
 his carefully husbanded reserve. And how well he knew 
 how to husband it, which is the first principle of the con- 
 duct of a battle, Austerlitz above all battles showed ; 
 even in the evening Oudinot and the Guards were 
 untouched, they had not fired a shot, for Soult, Berna- 
 dotte and Lannes had been sufficient. Thus this 
 Napoleonic battle, really his first, became at once a 
 pattern for the conduct of battles in general, and illustrated 
 Napoleon's words : " The task which the leader of an 
 army has to fulfil is more difficult in modern armies than 
 it was in those of antiquity. On the other hand, how- 
 ever, its influence upon the issue of the battle is greater." 8 
 In the domain of strategy Austerlitz gives rise to the 
 question : What would the Emperor'have done, if he had 
 been beaten ? His line of operations was already, even (41) 
 if we consider the Lech only as his base, of ominous 
 length, and had taken a dangerous direction with his 
 entry into Moravia. Would he not have been lost if he 
 had met with a reverse in such a position ? Of course it 
 has been said : " Did Alexander, Hannibal, or Caesar 
 trouble about their lines of retreat, when the moment 
 appeared to dispute the empire of the world ? " 4 This 
 remark is indeed justified in the sense that no anxiety 
 about any lines of retreat should cause any secondary 
 movements to be undertaken at the momenfof a decisive 
 battle, for victory will make all that good again. Still, 
 the whole strategical position must, after all, have occupied 
 the general's mind in the event of any tactical disaster. 
 And of Napoleon above all others we are told : " Before 
 
 1 Gouvion St. Cyr, Me"m. 
 
 2 Bulletin of the Grand Army, Liitzen, 2nd May, 1813. 
 * Notes sur 1'art de la guerre. III. 397. 
 
 4 Fain, Manuscrit de, 1813.
 
 266 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 he fought a battle, Bonaparte never troubled much about 
 what he would do in the event of success, but very much 
 about what he would have to do in the event of failure." l 
 In the case before us he had resolved not to do what the 
 enemy would expect him to do, namely, to return to 
 Vienna, but to alter his line of operations and proceed 
 through Bohemia to Passau or Regensburg ; this Billow's 
 keen military judgment had indeed divined. For in 
 1806 the latter said : " Here I will venture to surmise : 
 I believe he would have retired upon Znaym, or per- 
 haps rather thrown himself into Bohemia, and crushed 
 the Archduke Ferdinand there. He would then have 
 been in the neighbourhood of Wiirzburg." 2 Indeed, 
 Napoleon had always some such sudden inspiration in 
 reserve as a surprise during his brilliant campaigns, and 
 he himself said : "A change of the line of communica- 
 tions may be considered the most skilful manoeuvre that 
 strategy teaches." * 
 
 1 Bourrienne, Mdm. III. 215. * Campaign of 1805, II. 54. 
 
 Precis des guerres de F., II. IV. 233.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 1806-1807. 
 
 JENA. 
 
 WE may look upon the Emperor's return after the peace 
 of Pressburg as the beginning of a new chapter in his 
 personal development and therefore in his history. His 
 power in Europe had been great, but Austerlitz secured 
 his undisputed supremacy. It was now that he began to 
 create around him vassal princes; it was now that he 
 began to heap upon his generals those magnificent rewards 
 and princely titles, which served only to increase their 
 desire for more, as was indeed the master's intention, who 
 always took men's weaknesses into account and beheld the 
 great qualities of his subordinate officers without appre- 
 hension, only when they were held in check by some 
 weakness, which assured to himself his dominion over 
 them. " He considered hjmself very much superior to the 
 rest of the world, and yet dreaded all superiority in others. 
 Who among those that were brought into close contact 
 with him has not heard him say, that he preferred 
 mediocrities ? " ' 
 
 More and more sharply did he define the distance 
 between his imperial dignity and the rest of the world, and 
 surrounded his person with a severe and rigid ceremonial ; 
 though personally simple in his tastes, he yet loved to see 
 around him the greatest pomp as evidence of his power 
 and of the dependence of others. " Napoleon's tastes were 
 
 1 M&n. Mme. de R&nusat, III. 46.
 
 268 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 simple and modest, but he loved glitter and pomp in his 
 surroundings." ' And he was marvellously skilled in 
 letting everyone feel his own superiority. Already, as is 
 also reported of Attila, no one dared to address him ; not 
 even Murat his brother-in-law, who was soon himself to be a 
 king. No man ever was more skilful in employing " the 
 two levers which move men, viz. fear and self-interest." 2 
 
 With every new success his belief in his future became 
 more firm, but the more he relied upon his star, the more 
 he became prone to neglect the means by which success is 
 reached. He had left far behind him the time when he 
 said : " It is only by caution, wisdom, and much skill, 
 that one reaches great ends and conquers all obstacles ; 
 there is no other road to success. One step only separates 
 triumph from ruin. ... It is characteristic of our nation 
 to be too elated in time of prosperity. If we take for the 
 basis of all our operations true policy, which is nothing 
 else than the weighing of all combinations and possibilities, 
 we shall for a long time be the Great Nation and the 
 arbiter of Europe. I will go further and say, we hold the 
 balance of Europe, we will let it rise or fall as we please. 
 Indeed, if it be the will of Fate, I see no impossibility 
 of our attaining those great results, which are the creations 
 of an excited imagination, and which only an abnormally 
 cool, logical, and reasoning man can attain." * 
 
 Now his confidence in his star was unwavering ; when 
 Fesch assailed his policy and would not give way to the 
 Emperor's views, the latter led him out on to a balcony 
 and said : " Look up, do you see anything there ? " and 
 when Fesch answered in the negative, he added : " Well, 
 then you ought to be silent ; as for me I see my star there 
 and it guides me. Do not any longer compare your weak 
 and imperfect faculties with my superior intelligence ; " 4 
 and he even went so far as to say : " It is truly a proof of 
 
 1 Bausset, Me'm. I. 12. 2 Bourrienne, Me'm. III. 217. 
 
 3 C. N. To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Passeriano, 7th October, 
 1797. * Marmont, Mem. III. 340.
 
 JENA 269 
 
 the weakness of the human mind, that people think them- 
 selves able to resist me. " ' 
 
 Thus the notion grew more and more, that nothing was 
 impossible to him. Up.to now he had always seen things 
 as they were, however much he endeavoured to represent 
 them to others as he wished them to appear. But this 
 constant effort to deceive his contemporaries and posterity 
 with respect to himself and his work, had left their mark 
 upon his own mind, and gradually he, who had acknow- 
 ledged only facts and realities, whose successes even in 
 military matters had been due to the fact that he always 
 reckoned from correct data and saw things in their true 
 proportions, even he reached the point at which people 
 said : " that they thought he used now against himself 
 that power of deceiving others, a power which he knew so 
 well how to wield." 2 Marmont said of Napoleon after 
 Tilsit, that he only believed in truth, when it agreed with 
 his passions, his self-interest, or his humours. 
 
 As he continually persuaded himself more and more of 
 the infallibility of his own views, and as his ever-increasing 
 success seemed to justify this conviction, he soon would 
 not listen to any divergent opinions, and all contradiction 
 ceased. On the other hand, his soul, thirsting after glory, 
 showed itself keenly alive to the applause of his contem- 
 poraries ; flattery approached him with ease, since even in 
 its most extravagant expressions it seemed scarcely to 
 come near the truth as he saw it ; "he could not resist 
 believing everything that flatterers told him. A certain 
 credulity may easily exist in a man's mind side by side 
 with mistrust." 3 
 
 With respect to military matters, this development of 
 his character showed itself to begin with only in the fact 
 that his plans, growing with his means, became more and 
 more magnificent and comprehensive, and that his mode 
 
 1 de Pradt, Ambassade, 54. 
 
 8 Sgur, Hist, de N. ct de la grande armee en 1812, I. 252. 
 
 3 Mme. de RStnusat, Mem. II. 309.
 
 270 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of waging war became more and more the standard and 
 pattern for others. It became ever more evident that the 
 conception of the whole plan, the correct employment of 
 masses renders victory so certain that mistakes in 
 detail are of little moment, and, of course, the more 
 armies increase, the less will the commander-in-chief be 
 able to watch and control details, yet the more frequent 
 also will be the occasions for mistakes in the execution. 
 But in the control and conduct of the plan as a whole the 
 Emperor's military genius had naturally grown in the same 
 measure, as he rose in the world, and all seemed small 
 compared with him. " What do I care for a million 
 men ? " he said in 1813 to Metternich, and de Pradt 
 observed that it was one of the most striking traits of his 
 haracter, that he was able to concentrate in an instant 
 all his faculties upon any object which occupied his 
 thoughts at the moment, " upon an individual as well as 
 upon a whole hostile army." 
 
 But the more he concentrated his glance upon the 
 whole, the more the details were neglected. Hitherto 
 success had always come at his call ; nobody ventured any 
 longer to contradict him, and thus it came about that 
 " the ready obedience he had ever met with finally made 
 him believe that his own task consisted merely in com- 
 manding, and that his word must without fail be carried 
 out." ' " It is true he thus judged of many a movement 
 only as a whole, and, without heeding the difficulties with 
 which he was unacquainted, he gave .orders for enter- 
 prises, which, on account of their minutely punctual 
 execution by his generals, entailed great sacrifices of 
 human life." J Of course, it is not the leader's business to 
 look after secondary matters and details, for his mind has 
 to be ever directed only to the great whole, the main 
 points, as indeed the Emperor's always was ; but in that 
 case the education of the subordinate officers must ensure 
 
 1 de Pradt, Ambassade, etc., XIV. 
 
 2 O. von O., Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen im Jahre 1813, 193.
 
 JENA 271 
 
 a correct execution of the details, and in this respect 
 Napoleon's army was deficient. 
 
 Since the Emperor, as we have remarked above, loved 
 an active, diligent, and blindly devoted mediocrity in those 
 immediately about him, he had, it is true, at the head 
 of his corps a series of brave and capable tacticians, but 
 few thinking leaders, who could have conducted enter- 
 prises demanding more or less independent strategy. 
 The campaign of 1806 will furnish an illustration of this 
 truth, for Bernadotte showed himself incapable at Naum- 
 burg of grasping the strategical situation correctly. Ad- 
 hering blindly to the orders once received, he marched 
 towards Dornburg, thus exposing Davout unsupported to 
 the onslaughts of the Prussian main army, while holding 
 his own corps aloof during the whole of the 14^ 
 October. And as moreover the Emperor exacted more and 
 more an unconditional subservience, and would listen to 
 no contradiction, there was soon no possibility whatever 
 of any objections reaching him with respect to orders, 
 which were impossible to execute or fatal if executed. 
 " People contented themselves with listening to him and 
 obeying him without drawing his attention to anything, 
 which a man as busy as he always was might have been for- 
 given for overlooking." ' " His orders had to be executed, 
 whatever the means at command. This habit of under- 
 taking everything with insufficient means, this determina- 
 tion not to recognize any impossibilities, this boundless 
 assurance of success, which in the beginning were the 
 cause of our triumphs, in the end became fatal to us." 
 
 Add to this, that the Emperor's personal energy began 
 to diminish. The campaign against Prussia, indeed, he 
 entered upon " with a kind of repugnance. The luxury 
 and comfort around him began to affect him. The hard- 
 ships of camp life alarmed his imagination." He began 
 at this time to become stout, and to be " occupied with 
 
 1 Savary, Mm. V. 273. * F&temac, Souvenirs militaires, 1 18. 
 
 3 Mme. de Rrfmusat, M6n. III. 59.
 
 272 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 his comforts to such a degree that he looked upon them 
 as essentials ; he became careless, shunning all hardships, 
 blunted, and indifferent in every respect/' l 
 
 Of course, all these weaknesses were not fully developed 
 in 1806, indeed, they only became thoroughly evident 
 much later, in 1812 and 1813, but already they had begun 
 to spring up and become noticeable. 
 
 (45) After the conclusion of the peace of Pressburg, the 
 French army had by no means immediately returned 
 home. Taking advantage of political difficulties, and espe- 
 cially of the pending affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, 
 the Emperor kept it stationed in Southern Germany, and 
 partly even on Austrian soil, thus burthening other 
 countries with its maintenance, while it was a constant 
 fienace to Austria and Prussia. " My position is excellent, 
 nay splendid, but the extent of my interests is such that 
 I have to be most careful to keep my forces collected, 
 and derive every possible advantage from them." 2 He 
 therefore busied himself most assiduously in the com- 
 pletion of all his corps, and was constantly calculating 
 what strength they had reached. " The muster-rolls of 
 armies are for me the most agreeable literary works in my 
 library, and I read them with the greatest satisfaction in 
 my leisure hours." * We therefore see even in August, 
 1806, Bernadotte in Ansbach and Nuremberg, Soult on 
 the Inn, Davout in the neighbourhood of Nordlingen, 
 Lefebvre on the Lower Main, Ney on the Iller and the 
 Upper Danube, and Augereau around Frankfort. Berthier 
 in Munich had the chief command. At this period- the 
 Emperor computed his whole force in Germany at about 
 192,000 men. 
 
 (46) This is not the place to dwell on the political events 
 which drove Prussia to war, nor to examine into the 
 remoter causes of the disaster ; the Prussian Govern- 
 ment of that time showed indecision and weakness in its 
 
 1 Marmont, Me"m. VI. 275. 2 C. N. To Joseph, St. Cloud, I2th July. 
 8 C. N. To Joseph, Paris, 9th February.
 
 JENA 273 
 
 foreign affairs, and yet wished to derive benefit from 
 the fluctuating condition "of Europe. At home they 
 attempted what Napoleon said Milan- did : " in this 
 country the impossible is attempted, namely to pay few 
 taxes and have few troops and yet be a great nation ; all 
 this is nonsense." 7 
 
 During the first few days of September the Emperor 
 began to seriously contemplate war. As in 1805, 
 his first measure was to despatch officers, who were to 
 examine carefully the roads from Bamberg to Berlin, as 
 well as the rivers Saale, Elster, Pleisse, Mulde and Elbe. 
 For his base he chose} to begin with, the line of the 
 Rhine, Strasburg, Mannheim, and Mainz, and intended 
 to direct his line of operation from it on Wiirzburg, then a 
 fortified town. For his further advance he searched eagerly 
 for a point of support, situated conveniently in the 
 neighbourhood of the Upper Main ; nay, he even des- 
 patched officers to look out for additional fortified places 
 on his line of march from Bamberg to Berlin, which he 
 might make use of during the progress of operations after 
 the choice of his immediate base ; just as he had done 
 with Augsburg and Braunau in 1805 ; indeed he hinted 
 expressly at these latter eventualities. 
 
 Then he issued orders for the massing of his corps. 
 On the 2rd and 3rd October Augereau was to reach 
 Frankfort ; Lefebvre, Kbnigshofen ; Davout and Berna- 
 dotte, Bamberg ; Ney, Ansbach ; and Soult, who was 
 at first to have remained on the Inn to keep Austria in 
 check, Amberg; the Guards were set in motion from 
 Paris to Mainz ; at the latter place a reserve-corps 
 was formed under Kellermann. On the 28th Septem- 
 ber Berthier moved his headquarters to Wiirzburg, and 
 in the morning of the same day the Emperor arrived in 
 Mainz. During his stay in this town he moved the 
 centre of gravity of his army more and more towards the 
 right wing ; Bernadotte received instructions to advance 
 7 C. N. To Eugene, St. Cloud, I4th April. 
 
 T
 
 274 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to Kronach ; Ney was to march to Nuremberg ; Murat 
 was to collect the divisions of the cavalry reserve between 
 Schweinfurt and Kronach ; Lefebvre was given the direc- 
 tion of the highroad from Wiirzburg to Coburg ; Soult 
 received orders to march uponBayreuth. with instructions 
 to continue his march later on to Hof; one Bavarian 
 auxiliary corps under Wrede was to move up to Nurem- 
 berg, and the Emperor concluded by saying : " It is my 
 intention to be at Saalfeld before the enemy can appear 
 there in any considerable force." ' 
 
 Besides Wiirzburg, Forchheim also was fortified as &point 
 d'appui, and on the 3Oth September the Emperor's plan 
 was fully matured : " I intend to mass all my forces upon 
 my extreme right, leaving the space between the Rhine 
 and Bamberg entirely denuded of troops, so as to have 
 about 200,000 men massed on one and the same line. 
 Should the enemy send forward raiding parties between 
 Mainz and Bamberg, it will not render me at all un- 
 easy, because my lines of communication will have been 
 changed to Forchheim, a small fortified place, and 
 subsequently to Wiirzburg." 2 We see thus, how the 
 Emperor massed his troops ; he was going to collect his 
 whole army between Bamberg and Bayreuth, and this 
 mass he intended to bring to bear at the decisive point. 
 For, advancing thence vid Saalfeld and Hof round the left 
 Prussian wing, he would fall upon the communications of 
 the Prussian army which had the Elbe for its base, in the 
 same way as he had in the preceding year cut Mack's com- 
 munications by moving round the Austrian right wing. 
 
 But in order to appear there in full force, he had to 
 sacrifice something in another direction, and that was, 
 in this case, keeping in touch with Mainz, the most 
 important point in his own base. He was obliged to do 
 this, for the moment he concentrated towards his right 
 wing, this line of communication lay to his left, and 
 
 1 C. N. To Berthier, Mayence, 3<Dth September. 
 s C. N. To Louis, Mayence.
 
 JENA 277 
 
 with certainty that he would, in case the Prussians stood 
 fast in the Thuringian Forest, choose their left wing as the 
 object of his operations ; " the left wing of the allies would 
 then become the goal of all our movements, the main 
 object of which would be to gain the road from Bayreuth 
 to Hof with superior forces, to crush this wing, then to 
 pursue the remainder in detail, and always to hold the 
 road on which the Russians might move up to their 
 assistance." * 
 
 Here we may see the use of an intelligent study of 
 the history of war. Jomini had not been content with 
 watching how the Emperor had each time gained the 
 victory, but he had deduced from his operations as a 
 whole the general principles which equally underlay 
 them all, and this qualified him now to predict the 
 means by which the victor of 1805 would gain the victory 
 in 1806, " for every war must follow certain lines, because 
 it must be conducted in accordance with the principles and 
 rules of the art and of common sense, and must have a 
 definite object." 8 
 
 Of the dispositions of the Prussians the Emperor had 
 only a very imperfect knowledge. An advance-guard had 
 appeared at Hof ; some movements of troops were taking 
 place in Westphalia, but on which wing his opponent was 
 massing his main strength he did not know, and indeed 
 did not care much. For he was determined to advance in 
 the direction which most threatened the enemy's com- 
 munications, and therefore the latter would either have 
 to fall back quickly or to accept a battle, and as 
 he intended to advance with concentrated forces "in 
 a battalion square of 200,000 men," he would in any case 
 be equal to his opponent in strength. " My first marches 
 will menace the heart of the Prussian monarchy, and 
 my forces will be massed in such an imposing and 
 rapid manner, that probably all the Prussian army in 
 
 1 Corresp. entre le Gen. Jomini et le G6n. Sarrazin, 44. 
 
 2 Dix-huit notes, c., III. 497.
 
 278 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Westphalia will fall back upon Magdeburg, and that the 
 whole of it will set off by forced marches to defend the 
 capital." 1 
 
 At 9 p.m. on the 1st October the Emperor left 
 Mainz, and arrived in Wiirzburg in the evening of the 
 following day. He had no clear idea as yet of the state 
 of affairs in the enemy's army ; " the Prussian army is 
 performing marches and countermarches ; it seems as if 
 their main point of concentration in front was to be 
 Erfurt. The Emperor's armies are in position." * His 
 corps received orders to occupy the following positions : 
 Bernadotte was to take post at Lichtenfels, with detach- 
 ments at Kronach and Coburg ; Davout at Bamberg ; 
 Ney at Nuremberg; Lefebvre in front of Schweinfurt, 
 with his advance guard at Konigshofen ; Augereau and the 
 Guards at Wiirzburg ; Murat's cavalry between Wiirz- 
 burg and Kronach ; Soult at Amberg. After the Emperor 
 had seen most carefully to the transport service during the 
 3rd and 4th October, and at the same time had allowed 
 his corps time to move into the above-mentioned positions, 
 he issued orders for a definite forward movement, and 
 commenced operations. 
 
 His army was divided as follows : 
 
 The Emperor. 
 Chief of the Staff: Berthier. 
 
 The Guards. Infantry : Lefebvre .... 
 Cavalry : Bessieres .... 
 
 4,000 men 
 5,000 men 
 
 
 
 Inf. Divs. 
 
 Light Cavalry. 
 
 I. Corps. 
 
 Bernadotte : 
 
 Rivaud 
 
 Tilly 
 
 
 
 
 Drouet 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 Dupont 3 
 
 
 25,000 men 
 
 III. Corps. 
 
 Davout : 
 
 Morand 
 
 Vialannes 
 
 
 
 
 Friant 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gudin 
 
 
 33,000 men 
 
 IV. Corps. 
 
 Soult : 
 
 St. Hilaire 
 
 Margaron 
 
 
 
 
 Leval 
 
 
 
 
 
 Legrand 
 
 
 35,000 men 
 
 1 C. N. To Louis, Mayence, 3Oth September. 
 
 2 C. N. Berthier to the King of Bavaria, Wiirzburg, 2nd October 
 
 3 Detached from Ney's corps.
 
 JENA 279 
 
 V. Corps. Lannes : l Gazan Treilhard 
 
 Suchet 23,000 men 
 
 VI. Corps. Ney: Marchand Colbert 
 
 Malher 21,000 men 
 
 VII. Corps. Augereau: Desjardins Durosnel 
 
 Heudelet 16,000 men 
 
 Cavalry Reserve : Murat. 
 
 Heavy Divisions. Dragoon Divisions. Light Cavalry brigades. 
 Nansouty Klein Lasalle 
 
 d'Hautpoul Beaumont Milhaud 
 
 Grouchy 
 Sahuc 20,000 men 
 
 Departmental troops 8,000 men 
 
 Bavarian Auxiliary Corps under Wrede . . . 8,000 men 
 
 Grand Total 198,000 men 
 
 Add the VIII. Corps, Mot-tier's, at Mainz . . 15,000 men 
 
 The army was directed to advance by three roads ; the 
 left wing, Lannes, was to reach Coburg early on the 8th 
 October with Augereau, one day's march behind him, on 
 the Bam berg road. In the centre Bernadotte was to march 
 vid Kronach on Lobenstein, and be on the 8th within a 
 day's march of this latter place, whilst behind him Davout 
 was to be before Kronach on the same day. Davout was 
 to be followed by the Guards. On the right wing Soult 
 had orders to be on the 8th at Miinchberg, ready to con- 
 tinue his advance to Hof ; one day's march behind him 
 Ney was to move forward, with Wrede in rear ; the latter 
 was to reach Bayreuth on the gth. The headquarters 
 would be at Lichtenfels on the 8th. In their further 
 advance the right wing 'would proceed vid Hof, the centre 
 vid Lobenstein, and the left wing vid Grafenthal and 
 Saalfeld. 
 
 Even if already dangerous features begun to develop 
 in the Emperor's way of thinking, yet we recognize 
 one thing in this strategical deployment, which is, 
 that the great principles which guided his strategy 
 were ever more closely followed and more marked and 
 definite. The masses became more and more " in the 
 1 Vice Lefebvre.
 
 280 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Emperor's hands like a battalion in the hands of a good 
 commander, ready for anything/' 1 Thus he advanced here 
 along a front which extended, from Munchberg to Coburg, 
 no more than thirty-eight miles, as the crow flies, 
 whilst as to its depths, the army only covered two days' 
 march, and was thus in close order, which would enable 
 him to have within forty-eight hours his whole strength 
 concentrated upon any given point. " You will understand, 
 that with this enormous superiority of numbers, concen- 
 trated upon such a small space, I have no intention to 
 leave anything to chance, but to attack the enemy, where- 
 ever he wants to make a stand, with double the strength 
 he can dispose of." 2 
 
 Here we may with advantage take a look at the Emperor's 
 staff, and see the nature and working of the machine 
 which moved such masses. 
 
 The entire personnel of the Emperor's headquarter staff 
 stood under the direction of the Grand Marshal Duroc, 
 who, as well as the Grand Master of the Horse, Caulain- 
 court, was present, wherever the Emperor rode or drove, in 
 close attendance on him ; the latter, moreover, always had 
 the map of the district, in which he was at the time being, 
 with him, ready for Napoleon's immediate use. The 
 imperial carriage was so arranged that Napoleon, travelling 
 as he often did all night, could lie down in it ; next to him 
 sat generally Berthier or Murat, and close to the carriage 
 door rode Caulaincourt. Behind the carriage thronged 
 the suite, each eager to be as near as possible, for it was 
 well known with what impatience the Emperor always 
 wished to see his desires, when made known, at once 
 carried out. This suite consisted of the aides-de-camp 
 and orderly officers, whose business it was to carry the 
 Emperor's orders ; in 1807 he had of the former seven and 
 of the latter fourteen ; besides these were four pages for 
 
 1 Observations of a French officer on the official account of the 
 battle of Austeriitz by Kutusov. Moniteur 2ist April, 1806. 
 8 C. N. To Soult, Wurzburg, 5th October, n a.m.
 
 JENA 281 
 
 the necessary personal service, as well as his Mamaluke 
 attendant, Rustum, to wait on him. Two mounted 
 chasseurs carried the most necessary maps and papers 
 in leather portfolios, and a detachment of Chasseurs of the 
 Guard acted as escort, of whom, if the Emperor for any 
 reason left his carriage or dismounted, four immediately dis- 
 mounted, fixed bayonets, and formed the four corners of a 
 square round him ; this square moved imperceptibly as the 
 Emperor did, always leaving him a free view. Finally there 
 followed equerries and grooms with led horses and all kinds 
 of requisites for the escort ; the Emperor himself always 
 took eight or nine riding-horses with him on a campaign. 
 It was only in 1813, when the inconvenience of such a 
 large retinue, always close behind the Emperor, often made 
 itself felt, that an order was issued, which settled once for 
 all that only the following should personally attend 
 the Emperor : Berthier, Caulaincourt (Duroc was dead), 
 the field-marshal on duty, the commander of the escort, 
 two aides, two orderly officers, two officers acquainted with 
 the language of the country, one page, one groom, and 
 Rustum. For the rapid performance of long distances, 
 all the riding-horses were divided into relays of nine 
 each, of which two were destined for the Emperor and 
 seven for his most immediate suite. These relays were 
 then distributed in advance along the road to be traversed 
 in such a manner, that the Emperor found fresh horses 
 every eight or ten miles. In like manner the carriage 
 horses were divided into relays of three teams each, 
 and held ready in the same way. Thus the Emperor 
 travelled, for example, during a sharp frost from Valladolid 
 to Burgos, eighty-six miles, in five hours and a half on 
 horseback. 
 
 The staff proper was under Berthier; he had during 
 this war 13 aides-de-camp, and, in addition, under 
 3 heads of departments, with 5 secretaries, 31 staff- 
 officers and 30 belonging to the Survey Department. 
 Songis, the artillery commander, had in 1807 a staff of
 
 282 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 1 8 ; Chasseloup, the commanding engineer, one of 19 
 officers, and lastly, Daru, then quarter-master-general, had 
 43 officials at his disposal. However, these officers were 
 not always all present at headquarters. On the contrary, 
 all branches were so fully represented so that the chief 
 might be able to order many away ; more especially did 
 the Emperor constantly despatch his orderly officers to his 
 various corps, not only with orders, but also for the 
 purpose of collecting news, so that he might not be com- 
 pelled to wait until any corps sent the desired report; 
 but might obtain information of anything which at the 
 moment seemed most important to him. 
 
 When the Emperor arrived at the place selected for his 
 headquarters, the first care was to arrange a study for 
 him to work in ; indeed he generally found one ready 
 for him, as soon as he dismounted. In the middle of the 
 room there would be a table, on which the best and 
 largest available map of the scene of operations was spread 
 out and marked by the director of the Survey Department, 
 Colonel Bacler d'Albe,.with the positions of the troops 
 indicated by coloured pins. In the four corners of the 
 room stood tables for his four private secretaries ; these 
 were the real transmitters of his orders, which he dictated 
 to them, walking up and down in the room and speaking 
 with incredible rapidity. These became the basis of 
 Berthier's orders to the army, and of his instructions to 
 che ministers of the various branches of the Government. 
 Adjoining was the Emperor's bed-room, at the door of 
 which Rustum always slept, and near it the apartment 
 of the officers on duty. The rest of the escort had to shift 
 for therifselves. Only for Berthier a bed-room and office 
 had always to be procured in the same house. If the 
 headquarters bivouacked, five tents were erected, the 
 Emperor's work-room, his living-room, one tent for Berthier 
 and two for the suite. 
 
 Napoleon, who in times of peace generally went to sleep 
 about eleven o'clock, rarely later than midnight, and rose
 
 JENA 283 
 
 between seven and eight o'clock, thus sleeping rather long, 
 altered his habits during a campaign. Shortly after his 
 dinner, which never lasted more than a quarter of an hour, 
 as he was very frugal and ate little and very quickly, he 
 usually lay down, about six or seven o'clock in the 
 evening, and rose again about one o'clock to issue his 
 orders for the coming day. This method had great 
 practical advantages. If the general gives his orders for 
 the next day during the evening before he retires to rest, 
 his troops receive them in the middle of the night, and the 
 rest of which they stand in need is interrupted. In 
 Napoleon's method of sending out his orders, these reached 
 the troops, it is true, only in the morning shortly before 
 the time for marching, but this is, in by far the greater 
 number of cases, quite soon enough, because it is after all 
 the exception that preparations can be made during the 
 night for the coming day's task. But another thing is 
 still more important. In issuing his orders as early as 
 eight or nine o'clock in the evening, the general will in 
 most cases not be well posted in the details of the 
 state of affairs. The corps will scarcely have finished 
 their day's tasks, and probably from the more distant 
 ones no reports will have been received as to how 
 far they have marched during the day, and what the 
 enemy has done during the latter part of it, in short all 
 those details upon which the plan for the next day must 
 be based. In consequence the evening's orders will 
 frequently have to be altered on account of reports that 
 come in during the night, and thus the troops, which have 
 received one order during the night, may not receive their 
 final orders till the morning. Napoleon, who issued his 
 orders after midnight, was, on the other hand, then in 
 possession of all the reports, and therefore of a sure basis 
 on which to frame his instructions. 
 
 We saw how the French army began its advance in 
 obedience to the orders of the 5th October. On the side of 
 the enemy the state of affairs on this day was as follows.
 
 284 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 In a council of war, held at Naumburg on the 24th and 
 25th September, it had been resolved to take the offen- 
 sive and advance through the Thuringian Forest towards 
 Schweinfurt. This advance had begun, and on the 5th 
 of October Hohenlohe lay in the triangle Jena-Erfurt- 
 Rudolstadt, with his outposts pushed forward towards 
 Grafenthal and Schleusingen and Eisfeld ; Brunswick stood 
 on the line Langensalza-Erfurt, with his van towards 
 Gotha; Ruchel was near Eisenach, but one part of his 
 corps, marching up from Westphalia under Bliicher, had 
 only reached Cassel. The reserve corps still stood at 
 Magdeburg. If we measure on the map, to the north of 
 the Thuringian Forest, the distances from Jena and Rudol- 
 stadt to Cassel, and to the south of it those from Miinch- 
 berg to Coberg and Bamberg, if we in addition consider 
 that on the former space there stood 106,000 men 
 disunited, and on the latter 190,000 men concentrated, 
 we shall have an arithmetical proof of the superiority of 
 Napoleon's strategy. 
 
 At Erfurt long debates were again held during the 4th 
 5th, and 6th, but they remained ineffectual ; the head- 
 quarters were indeed, as Napoleon said, " always hold- 
 ing councils, never agreed," * for he knew very well how 
 matters stood with his opponent. In the end, however, 
 it was- resolved to remain stationary on the northern slope 
 of the Thuringian Forest, with the main army at Erfurt, 
 Ruchel at Eisenach, Hohenlohe at Blankenhain ; to send 
 forward, into the mountain-passes, only some outposts and 
 to await for the present the further developments of the 
 enemy's plans. 
 
 Now the Emperor was well aware of the fact that some 
 sort of concentration of the enemy's army was taking 
 place ; he considered that it threatened his left wing, and 
 wrote therefore on the 5th : " From all the reports, which 
 reach me to-day, it seems, that, if the enemy is moving at 
 all, he is doing so towards my left flank, as his main forces 
 1 Second Bulletin of the Grand Army, Auma, I2th October.
 
 JENA 285 
 
 appear to be near Erfurt." l At 10 p.m. on the same day 
 he left Wiirzburg and went to Bamberg. His army now (47) 
 -Jvanced during the next few days, as ordered, and on 
 the 8th Lannes stood at Coburg, Augereau*a day's march 
 behind him, Murat at Saalburg, Bernadotte at Lobenstein, 
 Davout at Nordhalben, the Guards at Kronach, Soult 
 near Miinchberg, Key a good day's march behind him 
 near Bayreuth. Only Murat had encountered the enemy, 
 some weak outposts, at Saalburg, which, however, soon 
 evacuated this town. 
 
 The Emperor had quitted Bamberg at 3 a.m., and 
 arrived in Kronach at nine o'clock ; as was always the case 
 in such moments, he was very anxious to receive news 
 about the enemy. " Before the expected reports arrived 
 from his generals, especially when a probable engagement 
 was impending, he was always tortured by restlessness ; " s 
 indeed he wrote to Soult, who was sure, as a matter of 
 fact, to be the first to hit the most vulnerable point of 
 the enemy's lines : " Do send me more frequent reports ; 
 in a war of combination, like this, we can only arrive at 
 satisfactory results by frequent communications among 
 ourselves ; let this be your first care. This moment is the 
 most important of the campaign ; the enemy does not 
 suspect what we intend to do, woe to him, if he 
 hesitate or lose a single day." ' 
 
 On the gth the French columns continued their advance. 
 In the centre Bernadotte met the enemy near Schleiz, 
 a division of Hohenlohe's corps, some 7000 men, which 
 had originally been posted at Hof, but had fallen back 
 to Schleiz on the advance of the French right wing 
 column. It was now attacked there and driven from its 
 position. It retreated to Middle- Pollnitz during the 
 night. Behind Bernadotte, Davout arrived at Lobenstein. 
 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Wiirzburg, u a.m. 
 
 1 O. von O., Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachscn im Jahrc 1813 
 
 1 C. N. Kronach, 8th October, 3.30 p.m.
 
 286 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 On the left wing Lannes reached Grafenthal ; Augereau 
 was at Neustadt, whilst on the right wing Soult had 
 arrived at Hof, and behind him Key at Munchberg. 
 
 The Emperor had reached Nordhalben during the early 
 morning hours ; he left his joffice here for the present, 
 and mounted his horse to personally head the centre 
 column. He was present at the engagement of SchleLz, and 
 then moved his headquarters to Ebersdorf, a part of his 
 Guards also reaching this place. He was still ignorant 
 whether to expect the main body of the enemy on his 
 right or his left wing, though the latter seemed more 
 likely to him. In the morning he sent a message to 
 Lannes, that Saalfeld was probably strongly occupied, in 
 which case he was not to attack before he was joined by 
 Augereau ; should, however, the enemy's main body be there, 
 he was to remain on the defensive at Grafenthal, for the 
 emperor would attack the left flank of the enemy vid 
 Saalburg ; this he would do, even if the enemy advanced ; 
 in this event Lannes was to fall back ; should, however, the 
 enemy retire, he was to occupy Saalfield as quickly as 
 possible. " What is most important at this juncture, is to 
 send news three times daily to the Emperor about yourself 
 and the enemy." l 
 
 As a matter of fact, no definite plan had as yet been 
 adopted by the Prussians. Rtichel stood at Eisenach and 
 Gotha ; the main army at Erfurt ; the advanced guard at 
 Meiningen ; their further operations were independent 
 of each other ; Hohenlohe was at Middle-Pollnitz and in 
 the neighbourhood of Saalfeld lay a considerable advance- 
 (48) guard. On the loth Lannes advanced towards Saalfeld 
 and met Hohenlohe's vanguard at ten o'clock, which had 
 taken post there for the defence of the defile. Holding 
 . the enemy frontally by vigorous attacks, he turned their 
 left flank, and finally, the enemy having been misled into 
 holding Saalfeld too long and toe obstinately, Lannes 
 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Lannes, Nordhalben, Qth October.
 
 JENA 287 
 
 brought his superior numbers fully to bear upon this 
 Prussian advance-guard, which was completely dispersed. 
 
 The engagement of the day before at Schleiz, as well 
 as the troops, which had come into action at Saalfeld, 
 confirmed the Emperor in his opinion that his right 
 wing had probably no considerable forces in front of it. 
 He therefore sent orders to Ney to move up to Tanna, 
 whilst Murat was to reconnoitre carefully in the direction 
 of Auma and Saalfeld, in order to ascertain whether the 
 enemy's main body was in front of Lannes or of the central 
 column. Napoleon himself thought : "It seems as if the 
 Prussians are minded to attack, and that their left wing 
 intended to advance vid Jena, Saalfeld and Coburg, and 
 that Prince Hohenlohe's headquarters are at Jena and 
 those of Prince Louis at Saalfeld ; the other column seems 
 to have advanced vid Meiningen on Fulda." ' Since he 
 therefore believed the main force of the enemy to be facing 
 himself and Lannes, he considered that the first thing was 
 to be in sure communication with the latter. " As soon 
 as our junction is effected I shall push forward as far as 
 Neustadt and Triptis, and then I shall be delighted with 
 whatever the enemy does ; whether he attacks me or allows 
 me to attack him ; in any case I shall not miss him ; should 
 he retreat vid Magdeburg, you (Soult) will be in Dresden 
 before him. I greatly desire a battle," * and as he was sure 
 of interposing between the Elbe and the enemy, owing to 
 the movements ol his own right wing, he added : " After 
 this battle I shall be in Dresden or Berlin before him." A 
 despatch from Soult rendered it certain, that the Prussian 
 army intended to concentrate near Gera, but the Emperor 
 was of opinion that "it is doubtful, whether it can 
 concentrate there, before my own arrival." * 
 
 Of the various corps, Soult reached Plauen on the loth, 
 but then received orders to change the direction of his 
 march more to the left vid Weida towards Gera ; Ney, 
 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Ebeisdorf, loth October, 8 a.m. 
 8 The samr. ' The same.
 
 288 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 turning off to the left, according to his orders, reached 
 Gefell ; Bernadotte was near Auma ; Davout, who had 
 been ordered to hasten his march, reached Schleiz ; and 
 Augereau Grafenthal. The Emperor now established his 
 headquarters at Schleiz ; late in the evening he received 
 news of the capture of Saalfeld, though he had already 
 judged from the distant artillery fire that Lannes was in 
 possession of that place, and he now sent orders to him to 
 march towards Neustadt the next morning. Thus all the 
 columns of the army had been so directed as to converge 
 upon Gera, " in Gera matters will be cleared up." l 
 
 In view of the general advance of the French, Hohenlohe 
 had fallen back upon Kahla, moreover the main army now 
 began, in consequence of the French advance upon Schleiz, 
 to be alarmed for its communications with the Elbe, and 
 therefore retreated towards Blankenhain. In the evening, 
 however, it was decided, after the arrival of the news of 
 the engagement near Saalfeld, to collect the whole army 
 at Weimar. Riichel had on the loth closed up more 
 towards Erfurt. We see, therefore, that although the 
 Emperor was unacquainted with the enemy's positions in 
 detail, yet his general view of the situation was correct, 
 for the Prussian army retreating towards its communica- 
 tions, sought to concentrate towards the east, and 
 Napoleon's advance on Gera would therefore hit the right 
 point. 
 
 ( 49 > On the nth October the Emperor at first accompanied 
 the central column. Of this Murat, with the light cavalry, 
 and Bernadotte reached Gera, the latter being followed 
 by the remainder of the cavalry reserve. Nothing was 
 seen there of the enemy, and Murat therefore immediately 
 ordered the cavalry forward to reconnoitre further in the 
 direction of Zeitz and Jena. Davout reached Middle- 
 Pollnitz, Ney Schleiz, Soult was in the neighbourhood of 
 Langen-Wetzendorf. Lannes on the left wing arrived in 
 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Schleiz, loth October, 6 p.m.
 
 JENA 289 
 
 Neustadt, and Augereau in Saalfeld. The facts that Gera 
 was unoccupied and that no considerable force of the 
 enemy was visible in the district to the west of the Elster, 
 had already aroused the Emperor's suspicion that the hostile 
 army was still further to the west than he had originally 
 believed. He rode back to Auma in the night, whither he 
 had moved his headquarters, and became there convinced 
 by the reports which reached him that the enemy's army 
 still stood at Erfurt, or at any rate had not yet crossed 
 the Saale. In consequence of this conviction he now 
 resolved ta turn to the left towards the Saale with his 
 entire army, and to block all the enemy's lines of retreat 
 towards the Elbe. 
 
 Orders to this effect were despatched to the army 
 in the morning of the I2th ; Murat was to advance to 
 Zeitz, and if the enemy was still found to be really 
 at Erfurt, to Naumburg ; Bernadotte was to follow him ; 
 Soult was to march to Gera, Ney to Auma, Davout 
 to Naumburg, Lannes to Jena, and Augereau to Kahla. 
 On the side of the Prussians, Hohenlohe had retreated to 
 Jena on the nth, whilst the main army took up a posi- 
 tion near Weimar, to which place Ruchel also moved 
 forward. 
 
 On the I2th, therefore, the French corps advanced 
 towards the points respectively -fixed on. The Emperor 
 returned to Gera in the morning, Bernadotte reached 
 Zeitz, with Murat in advance of him ; Soult arrived at 
 Gera, Ney at Auma, Augereau at Kahla ; Davout reached 
 Naumburg on the same evening with his advance-guard, 
 his main body being in the neighbourhood of Schkolen. 
 Lannes arrived in front of Jena, and drove the enemy's 
 outposts into that town. Here Hohenlohe's advance- 
 guard now stood, whilst he himself had pitched his 
 camp further in the rear, fronting the south-west, with 
 his right wing at Kapellendorf and his left on the 
 Schnecke. 
 
 In the course of the night the Emperor gathered from (49) 
 
 u
 
 290 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the reports from his different corps, that the enemy was 
 still on the other side of the Saale, and he therefore still 
 believed him near Erfurt. He now drew up in his own 
 handwriting a memorandum of the general aspect of the 
 situation, and fixed on the points at which he would direct 
 his corps to cross the Saale during a general advance. 
 In the first place he reviewed the preceding movements of 
 his Guards, who -had to a great extent remained rather 
 far in the rear during the march, in order to ascertain at 
 what date they could reach him. He then did the same 
 with respect to the cavalry divisions of d'Hautpoul and 
 Klein ; in this latter case, however, his process of reason- 
 ing can now no longer be clearly traced. Finally he 
 measured on the map the distances between the localities 
 in question, and fixed the limits of the marches of all his 
 corps. I 
 
 The following is the text of this memorandum 1 : 
 Guards : loth Oct., in the evening, Bamberg ; nth, Lich- 
 
 tenfels ; I2th, beyond Kronach ; I3th, Lobenstein. 
 d'Hautpoul : nth, two hours beyond Kronach ; I4th, 
 
 Auma ; I5th Jena. 
 Klein : on the nth, two hours beyond Kronach ; I3th 
 
 in Jena : i4th in Jena ; I5th in Auma, 
 Klein : i2th in Lobenstein. 
 Jena to Weimar, four hours' Reserve Cavalry, I4th in 
 
 march. Jena. 
 
 Naumburg to Weimar, Guards, isth in Jena. 
 
 seven hours. Park, I5th in Auma. 
 
 Kahla to Weimar, five Davout, I4th in Apolda. 
 
 hours. Lannes, isth in Weimar. 
 
 Neustadt to Jena, five Augereau, I4th in Mellingen. 
 
 hours. Bernadotte, I4th in Dorn- 
 
 Gera to Jena, seven hours. burg. 
 From Zeitz to Jena, seven Soult, I4th in Jena. 
 
 hours. Ney, I4th in Kahla. 
 
 1 C. N. Vol. 23, page 330. A footnote suggests it was written on 
 the loth October. ED.
 
 JENA 291 
 
 We see, therefore, that he ordered his corps to close up 
 in their advance, so as to proceed to the attack upon 
 Erfurt with his whole army in close order; this, indeed, 
 agrees with what he wrote to Murat : " If the enemy is 
 at Erfurt, it is my plan to take my army to Weimar and 
 to attack him on the i6th." l It is, moreover, invariably 
 characteristic of Napoleon's strategy, that he, in his 
 advance to a battle, always fixed the point of junction of 
 his columns short of the anticipated battle-field, and 
 never on the battle-field itself. 
 
 In agreement with the above memorandum, according 
 to which the Saale was to be crossed on the I4th, he sent 
 to tell his various corps that the army might rest on 
 the I3th, only Ney was to proceed to Roda. However, (50) 
 as yet no news had come in from Lannes, and as he was 
 the one who would be first to come in contact with the 
 enemy, the Emperor sent one of his aides-de-camp to 
 him at 7 a.m. in the morning of the I3th to ascertain how 
 matters stood with him. A short time later, however, 
 his report of his arrival in front of Jena, and of the 
 troops observed there, came in, and the Emperor ex- 
 claimed : "At last the veil is rent, and the enemy is 
 beginning his retreat towards Magdeburg." 2 He now 
 ordered Murat to march as quickly as possible to 
 Dornburg with the light cavalry and Bernadotte ; he 
 himself proceeded to Jena, to which place he also sent 
 the rest of the cavalry-reserve. On the road, at 
 Kostritz, he received news that Lannes had gained the 
 left bank of the Saale, and immediately sent orders to 
 Soult to come up as far as this place ; then he continued 
 his rapid march to Jena. A short distance from this 
 town he heard that Lannes had about 50,000 men in front (51) 
 of him and expected to be attacked that very day. 
 Without delay Davout and Bernadotte received instruc- 
 tions to move on to Jena, as soon as they heard firing 
 
 1 C. N. Cera, I3th October, 7 a.m. 
 
 C. N. To Murat, Gera, i3th October, 9 a.m.
 
 292 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 ^ 
 
 there, otherwise they would receive further instructions 
 during the night from the Emperor for the I4th. Arriv 
 ing in Jena, Napoleon found Lannes in possession of this 
 town and of the steep heights of the Landgrafenberg 
 lying behind it on the left bank of the Saale. For in the 
 early morning Hohenlohe's vanguard had moved from 
 Jena to the rear, to the high ground on the left bank of 
 the Saale, as far as the line Lutzeroda-Closwitz, Lannes 
 immediately following him and occupying the heights. 
 
 The Emperor himself immediately went to the top of 
 the Landgrafenberg, where he arrived at four o'clock in 
 the afternoon ; he dismounted and approached the hostile 
 lines within range, having now a view of Hohenlohe's 
 position near Kapellendorf, and Lutzeroda in front of him. 
 It was one of the qualities which stamped him a born 
 general, to take in at a glance the whole state of affairs 
 and to form a correct judgment on it. " One look 
 through his telescope and he had with incredible rapidity 
 gained an insight into the position of a whole army. 
 Thus, from some height, he would judge of a whole corps 
 of 50,000 or 60,000 men according to space and posi- 
 tion." l In this case he immediately estimated the army 
 opposite to him, at 40,000 or 50,000 men, but thought it 
 was the enemy's main body which was ready for battle ; 
 he also saw at once that the battle would take place here 
 on the 1 4th, which he had believed would occur near 
 Erfurt and on the i6th. 
 
 His first care now was to bring up that same day 
 Lannes's entire corps on the heights, in order thus to 
 keep the approaches to the fords of the Saale open for 
 his army and to keep the enemy from them. With the 
 fiery zeal peculiar to him, he was personally present 
 everywhere, urging on his men and assigning to each 
 corps its position. It was of such paramount importance 
 to him, to remain in possession of the heights on the 
 
 1 O. von O., Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen itn Jahre 1813, 192.
 
 JENA 293 
 
 left bank of the Saale, that he assumed the enemy would 
 likewise be aware of their importance, and attempt in the 
 evening of the same day to dislodge Lannes again from 
 them. He therefore sent orders to Lefebvre and Soult 
 to come up with all speed: " Let an aide-de-camp ride 
 his horse to death if necessary." To Ney and Augereau 
 also he sent orders to be at Jena by the I4th. 
 
 However, no attack was made. Hohenlohe remained 
 quietly in his camp. The main army had indeed at last 
 resolved during the evening of the preceding day to with- 
 draw, and Hohenlohe was to cover this retreat, which ex- 
 posed its flank to the enemy. But some further delays 
 interfered with the execution of this plan and in the 
 evening the main army stood at Auerstadt. 
 
 Ruchel had collected his troops around Weimar. On 
 the side of the French, Davout and Bernadotte were in 
 the evening of this day at Naumburg, the former held the 
 pass of Kosen, Murat stood between Naumburg and Kam- 
 burg, whilst Lannes occupied, as mentioned above, the. 
 Landgrafenberg. Augereau arrived in Jena in the course 
 of the night, resting on the Muhlbach, which flows into the 
 Saale there from the left ; the greater part of the Guards 
 also reached Jena in the evening. Soult was on the 
 march hither frorr Gera, Ney from Roda ; the former 
 brought up his cavalry and St. Hilaire's division during 
 the same night, but Ney only reached the field with his 
 advance-guard just before the beginning of the battle. 
 
 The expected evening attack was, however, not deliv- 
 ered, and at last the Emperor returned very late in the 
 night to his bivouack on the Landgrafenberg. From 
 here he issued after midnight his orders for the attack the 
 next day. Augereau was to march into position on the 
 plateau to the left of Lannes; Soult was to ascend the 
 heights with daybreak by the valley of the Rau and form 
 the right wing ; Ney was to move into position on his left 
 as soon as Lannes should have captured Closwitz, whereby 
 room would be gained for deploying on the Landgrafen-
 
 294 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 berg ; the Guards were to be in reserve at the beginning 
 of the ascent of this height. All the corps were told that, 
 to begin with, it would only be a question of gaining 
 the plateau ; all further measures for the attack would 
 have to be postponed, and would depend on the move- 
 ments and strength of the enemy. Lannes was to pro- 
 vide the space necessary for the deployment of the army 
 by opening the battle with an attack upon Cospeda and 
 Closwitz. 
 
 At four o'clock in the morning the Emperor proceeded to 
 this latter corps, addressed the men, informed them that 
 the enemy's army was entirely cut off, and recalled to them 
 the similar position of Mack on the same day a year before ; 
 at six o'clock the corps formed up and advanced in the 
 thick fog of the cold October morning towards the enemy's 
 position at Closwitz-Liitzeroda. After a protracted ar- 
 tillery fire the fog began gradually to clear about eight 
 o'clock, and the corps, which till now had been unable to 
 distinguish the objects of attack, advanced against the 
 much weaker vanguard of Hohenlohe, the right wing 
 leading, drove it from Closwitz and forced it back with 
 heavy losses, about nine o'clock, towards the Dornburg. 
 Lannes immediately followed up the enemy's vanguard 
 and dispersed it entirely ; about ten o'clock he took up 
 position on the line Closwitz- Lutzeroda. 
 
 Thus sufficient room was won on the heights, and " the 
 Emperor would now have preferred to delay two hours 
 before corning to hand-to-hand righting, in order to wait, 
 in the position just occupied, for the troops, which were 
 still to come up, and more particularly his cavalry ; " ' but 
 he had to experience the truth of the observation, which 
 we before ventured to dwell on in the case of Austerlitz, 
 namely, that only the moment and direction of the open- 
 ing movements of an attack lie in the general's hands, 
 but that any stopping and resuming of the fighting at 
 will is, as a rule, impossible. 
 
 1 Fifth Bulletin, Jena, I5th October.
 
 JENA 295 
 
 During the last efforts of Lannes, Soult also had (52) 
 ascended the plateau, and stood at ten o'clock on the 
 further side of Zwatzen. Here a hostile detachment 
 advanced from Rodingen to attack him. This latter had 
 been despatched by Hohenlohe on the evening before to 
 Dornburg, to occupy the passage over the Saale there, and 
 had now, in consequence of the artillery-fire, collected 
 again at Rodingen. It did not succeed however in re- 
 gaining its contact with the army, for Soult soon repulsed 
 its attack and forced it back by Nerkwitz behind the brook 
 there. It subsequently retired towards Apolda. 
 
 At the same time however, Hohenlohe had set 
 
 himself in motion, and his army had advanced into the 
 line Vierzehnheiligen-Isserstadt. Meanwhile some addi- 
 tional French troops had arrived on the plateau. Ney 
 pushed forward with his vanguard south of Lannes's two 
 divisions, towards Vierzehnheiligen, and occupied this 
 village before the Prussians ; the Guards marched into 
 position as a reserve behind Lannes ; Augereau de- 
 ployed his lines on*the Flohberg between Cospeda and 
 the Schnecke. Now Hohenlohe advanced with his lines 
 fully deployed against the French first line, composed of 
 Ney at Vierzehnheiligen, Augereau on his left towards 
 Isserstadt and Lannes to the right of Vierzehnheiligen As 
 to the Guards, the Emperor kept them where they were 
 near the Dornburg, since he had for the present no other 
 reserve. 
 
 Before the advancing line of Hohenlohe the French 
 skirmishers retreated, and Isserstadt, only feebly occupied, 
 was evacuated, but in front of Vierzehnheiligen the attack 
 was checked, the batteries directed their fire against this 
 village, and the Prussian infantry exchanged volleys in line 
 with the enemy without advancing. Thus matters stood 
 until about midday, the French defending themselves and (53) 
 maintaining Vierzehnheiligen, and the Prussians hesitating 
 to advance to a decisive attack. But at this time there 
 arrived on the left bank of the Saale the divisions of Leval
 
 296 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 and Legrand of Soult's corps, and Marchand's division of 
 Ney's,and the emperor, beingat length in possession of fresh 
 reserves, ordered the part of his army, already in action, 
 to advance to a general attack upon the enemy's line. 
 Soult turned towards their left wing ; the Guards ad- 
 vanced towards Vierzehnheiligen, and Augereau moved 
 towards Isserstadt and the Schnecke, where Hohenlohe's 
 right wing, the Saxons, stood. The combined attack of 
 such masses was too much for the Prussian line, already 
 shaken by its two hours' exposure to the French artillery- 
 lire ; it fell back, and the retreat was soon changed into a 
 complete rout by the French pressing after them. It was 
 now two o'clock. 
 
 At this moment Riichel arrived on the battle-field, but 
 his weak corps could no longer turn the issue of the day ; 
 advancing vid Kapellendorf towards Great- Romstadt, he 
 compelled the foremost French division to fall back at 
 
 (54) first, but was soon attacked by superior forces and com- 
 pletely routed after a short struggle. The resistance 
 also which the Saxons on the Prussian right on the 
 Schnecke continued to offer, was now overcome. Whilst 
 Augereau attacked them in front, the Emperor sent Mar- 
 chand vid Isserstadt against their flank, and thus they 
 were cut off and a portion of them made prisoners. At four 
 o'clock all was over ; the Emperor was on all points com- 
 pletely master of the battle-field, and urged his columns 
 forward to the pursuit in the direction of Weimar, towards 
 which town the beaten enemy had retreated. The cavalry- 
 reserve, which had just come up, and Key's corps, now com- 
 pletely assembled, penetrated as far as Weimar, and, 
 drove the enemy, who had wished to halt there, out of it. 
 Lannes reached Umpferstadt and Soult Schwabdorf. The 
 Emperor returned to Jena in the evening, still convinced 
 that he had beaten the main army. 
 
 The latter had this day, however, been face to face 
 with Davout. We have seen, that it had started on 
 
 (51) the I3th from Weimar to Freiburg and had reached
 
 JENA 297 
 
 Auerstadt ; the Prussians thought the pass of Kosen was 
 only feebly occupied, and they would easily clear it and 
 occupy it themselves during their further march. How- 
 ever, as we said, not only had Davout already reachedNaum- 
 burg with his whole corps, but Bernadotte was in support 
 of him near this town on the evening of the I3th. At three 
 o'clock in the morning on the I4th, the former marshal 
 received an order from the Emperor, dated " Bivouack near 
 Jena, I3th October, 10 p.m.," in which he, thinking that 
 he himself had the whole enemy's army in front of him, 
 and that Davout would not meet with any considerable 
 resistance, instructed the latter to march to Apolda and 
 thus to attack the enemy's army, which the emperor him- 
 self would engage on the I4th, in the rear. In addition, 
 the order contained the following : " If the Prince of 
 Ponte-Corvo is with you, you can march together. But 
 the Emperor hopes he is in the position which he had in- 
 structions to occupy near Dornburg." Bernadotte did not 
 consider this to beany justification for his departing from 
 the order issued to him from Gera on the morning of the 
 I3th, to march to Dornburg, and immediately started upon 
 his march to that place. Thus Davout was destined to 
 meet the whole Prussian main army by himself, in carry- 
 ing out the orders he had received for an advance. 
 
 At six o'clock he started for Hassenhausen in the 
 midst of a thick fog, and at the same time the enemy also 
 began his movement. But at Hassenhausen the Prussian 
 cavalry, which was in advance, met the enemy's van- 
 guard, which hastened to take up a position there. The 
 Duke of Brunswick was obliged to deploy his infantry 
 against it. Davout in his turn ordered his infantry, as it 
 came up, to prolong the line to the right, in order to 
 lengthen this wing threatened by a turning movement of 
 the Prussian cavalry. Soon after eight o'clock a general 
 cavalry attack began under the leadership of General 
 Bliicher, and actually threatened to envelop the right flank 
 of the French infantry. But the cavalry was repulsed by
 
 298 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the calmly delivered fire of the latter, and thrown into 
 such confusion that they spurred back in full flight vid 
 Spielberg. 
 
 (52) At this moment Friant also began to come into position 
 on the flank of Gudin's division, which had up till now 
 stood alone near Hassenhausen ; thus the line was 
 lengthened as far as Spielberg, whilst the Prussian line, 
 also lengthening out towards the right in its turn, began 
 at nine o'clock an attack in force on Gudin's left wing, 
 which stood near Hassenhausen. The Prussian line, as it 
 advanced, drove all that it encountered in the open, back 
 into the village, but Hassenhausen itself resisted all their 
 attacks in line, as Vierzehnheiligen had done fifteen miles 
 away. 
 
 The Prussian infantry became engaged in a stationary 
 exchange of musketry, and suffered the severest losses, 
 until at last, between eleven and twelve o'clock, the last 
 division of Davout, Morand's, had crossed the Saale, and 
 was led forward by the marshal himself, at the double, 
 
 (53) against the Prussians surrounding Gudin. The Prussian 
 line, already seriously shaken by heavy losses, could not 
 resist the attack of this fresh body ; it was thrown back 
 and retreated vtd Poppel and Tauchwitz upon its reserve, 
 standing near Gernstadt. Now, however, the king 
 ordered the general retreat of the army to Weimar, and 
 
 (54) therefore the movement was continued through Auerstadt 
 under the incessant pressure of the pursuing French, who 
 desisted from the pursuit only about five o'clock. 
 
 Bernadotte had reached Dornburg very late, and there 
 the difficulties of the ground offered such obstacles to his 
 crossing the Saale that his vanguard only reached Apolda 
 as night fell. 
 
 Once more the Emperor had thus illustrated in the 
 most magnificent manner his great principle of seizing the 
 enemy's communications by a concentrated advance of 
 his entire army in one direction. His successes against 
 Melas and Mack had already led some military men to
 
 JENA 299 
 
 recognize that these manoeuvres were not adopted merely 
 on account of local circumstances, but that there lay in 
 them a principle based upon the nature of things, and there- 
 fore universally true, and it was Bulow who first expressed 
 it distinctly : " The lines of supply are the muscles, and to 
 sever them paralyses themilitary body. Now, since these 
 lie on the flank and in the rear, it follows that the flanks 
 and the rear must be the objects of the enemy's opera- 
 tions." l But even he did not arrive at a full knowledge of 
 what constitutes the effectiveness of these operations ; he 
 was still of opinion that the mere advance against the 
 enemy's communications would have the effect of causing 
 him to retreat, and that actual fighting could and must 
 be avoided during such operations. It was reserved for 
 Jomini to lay it down definitely, that the strategical turn- 
 ing movements only had their full effect if, after having 
 reached the enemy's lines of communication, battle was 
 offered. " It is not sufficient for the successful conduct ot 
 war to lead one's masses to the most important points ; 
 one must also know how to bring them into play. If 
 one has arrived at those points and remains inactive, the 
 principle has been forgotten ; the enemy can make counter- 
 manoeuvres, and in order to deprive him of this expedient, 
 one must immediately, after having reached his com- 
 munications or one of his flanks, make for him and give 
 battle." ' 
 
 It is of course only battle which lends effect to the 
 turning movement. Up to the battle, it will easily be 
 seen on looking at the map, that whoever turns the enemy 
 exposes himself more or less to be turned also. A 
 successful engagement alone averts this danger, and 
 therefore we note how Napoleon always hastens, and 
 especially in the case before us, with almost breathless 
 eagerness, to give battle ; indeed he was aware that this 
 was one of his distinctive features as compared with his 
 
 1 Geist des neueren Kriegssystems, 101 . 
 
 f Trait6 desgrandes operations militaires, IV. 281.
 
 3OO NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 enemies, for he said: "While they are debating the 
 French army marches." l 
 
 On the other hand, moreover, we must note that 
 Napoleon always guarded most carefully in all his turning- 
 movements against the danger of being cut off in turn, 
 by the choice of the direction of his lines of operation. 
 And yet we cannot but acknowledge, that there was a 
 possibility of his communications being temporarily cut in 
 1805. It is true such isolation would not have had any 
 very serious consequences for him, inasmuch as his great 
 superiority in numbers would have permitted him at any 
 moment to bring matters to an issue by a battle, which 
 would have cleared his rear again. Still we can note in 
 1806 an increase of precaution in his choice of base, 
 although he again possessed great superiority of forces. 
 
 We know, that in case of an unfavourable turn of 
 events, he intended to make the Danube the base of 
 his main army, while retaining his base on the Rhine. 
 Here Jomini already drew attention to the safety which 
 such a command of two of the boundaries of the arena of 
 war affords. He says : " And even if the Prussians had 
 dreamed of cutting off this line of retreat (Saalfeld-Schleiz- 
 Hof) by throwing themselves between Gera and Bayreuth, 
 they would thereby only have opened out to him his most 
 natural line, the fine road from Leipzic to Frankfort, 
 besides the ten roads which lead from Saxony vid Cassel 
 to Coblenz, Cologne and Wesel." 2 
 
 This indeed was the real reason for the instructions 
 given on the 3oth September to Louis, and why the army 
 of Holland was posted at Wesel and Mortier at Mainz. 
 Thus on the eve of Jena the Emperor's strategical position, 
 considering his choice of a twofold retreat, seems to have 
 been as carefully secured as is possible in the uncertainty 
 of human affairs. 
 
 It is true he did not know, as is mostly the case in war, 
 
 1 Third Bulletin, Gera, isth October. 
 
 2 Precis de 1'art de la guerre, 133.
 
 JENA 301 
 
 where the enemy was at the moment, indeed we have 
 seen that he was mistaken and believed him to be further 
 off than he really was. It was therefore quite possible, 
 that in his continued advance over the Saale one of his 
 corps should have unexpectedly met with the main force 
 of the enemy and suffered defeat ; but in that case Napo- 
 leon would have gained the necessary knowledge of where 
 the enemy's army lay ; he could then immediately have 
 led his corps against him, and the close order of his whole 
 advance warranted him in thinking he could have con- 
 centrated them all in time. More than the defeat of one 
 French corps the Prussian army could not hope for nor 
 Napoleon fear. 
 
 It will be seen from this that Jena was quite an unex- 
 pected encounter, at least as regards the Emperor ; it 
 was only on the eve of this battle, that he became aware 
 of the fact that the enemy's army lay there and that the 
 very next day must witness the meeting. Then he im- 
 mediately did, what is needed in such a situation, i.e. 
 he sent orders to all his corps to march up as speedily as 
 possible. Undoubtedly there might now have happened 
 what we mentioned above as possible : Lannes's isolated 
 corps might, on the I3th, have suffered a reverse, 
 but with that the whole campaign would neither have 
 been won by the Prussian army nor lost for Napoleon. 
 The Emperor had advanced in such close order, that he 
 could be sure of having by noon on the I4th a force 
 assembled, which would at least be equal to the Prussian 
 army. 
 
 During the battle Napoleon again showed his desire, to 
 keep its conduct in his own hands, by not employing all 
 his troops before the supreme moment had come. Thus 
 he left Ney's advance-guard and Lannes for two hours 
 to their own resources, in spite of the very threatening 
 look of Hohenlohe's attack ; and when during these 
 anxious moments he heard from the ranks of his Guards 
 the cry of " Forward ! " he said : " What does this mean ?
 
 3<D2 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 It can only be a young, beardless man, who wishes to 
 anticipate what I am going to do. Let him wait, until 
 he has commanded in twenty battles, before he ventures 
 to give me advice ; " ' and, watching the battle calmly, he 
 waited until, by the arrival of fresh troops, the reserve 
 was set free and he could use it for that general, decisive 
 attack, which no one knew better than he how to 
 deliver. 
 
 1 Hist des campagnes de 1'emp. Nap. en 1805, 1806 et 1807- 
 1809, II. 77-
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 EYLAU. 
 
 The consequences, which were sure to follow the battle (55) 
 of Jena, were immediately fully recognized by the 
 Emperor. Indeed it was characteristic of him to rate a 
 victory once gained too high, rather than too low ; it was 
 to this conviction that he owed the determination to aim at 
 the greatest results which a victory could bring him, and the 
 history of war proves that he attained them. On the very 
 next day after the battle he already announced : " Consider- 
 ing that the result of yesterday's battle is the conquest of all 
 the country this side of the Vistula, belonging to the King 
 of Prussia, etc." ' He must indeed have been far-sighted to 
 use such words, while still on the banks of the Saale, but 
 they were justified, for he felt that his untiring activity 
 would not allow the beaten army to rest short of that 
 point, and that he, who had gained the victory in a great 
 pitched battle, had nothing further to fear, beyond not 
 reaping its fruits. 
 
 On the morning of the I5th October he gave his corps 
 orders for the pursuit : Bernadotte was to advance towards 
 Neustadt and bar the road to Querfurt ; Davout was to 
 take up a position at Naumburg ; Soult to march to But- 
 telstadt, Murat to Erfurt, and Ney to follow the latter. 
 Lannes and Augereau were to remain near Weimar. The 
 Prussian main army had proceeded northward past 
 Weimar to Erfurt, and had then, on receipt of the news 
 of Jena, changed its course towards Sommerda, where it 
 
 1 Decree, Jena, 15th October.
 
 304 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 arrived on the morning of the I5th, much diminished in 
 numbers through the night march. For not only had indi- 
 vidual soldiers in great numbers left the ranks, but owing 
 to the changes in the direction of the march, various 
 bodies of troops had proceeded to Frankenhausen and 
 Erfurt. For Hohenlohe also, Sommerda was appointed 
 as the place of concentration, but his troops had become 
 fully disorganized ; the retreat was to be continued to 
 Magdeburg, where a junction was to be effected with 
 the Reserve-Corps. 
 
 Soon after two o'clock in the afternoon, Murat arrived in 
 front of Erfurt ; immediately negotiations were begun, and 
 in the course of the same night the town and citadel, and 
 all the troops who had taken refuge there, surrendered ; 
 " this is a valuable acquisition, which will serve as our 
 point (fappui during our future operations ; " l was the 
 Emperor's remark when he heard of it. Soult in his pur- 
 suit came up with the enemy's main column on the i6th 
 near Greussen, attacked its rear-guard and inflicted some 
 losses on it, whilst the main column continued its march 
 to Nordhausen, reaching this town on the I7th. Here 
 some 10,000 men of Hohenlohe's column also had 
 assembled. 
 
 Napoleon immediately ordered Murat, Soult and Ney 
 to go in pursuit of these troops to Nordhausen, whilst 
 he himself, with the rest of the army, took the direct road 
 to the Elbe, in order to block the road there to the re- 
 treating Prussians, and to force them northward and away 
 from their capital and the direction to the Oder. Conse- 
 quently Bernadotte was to march to Querfurt and Lannes 
 vid Naumburg to Merseburg ; the latter was to be followed 
 on the same road by the Guards and Augereau. Davout 
 received the direction towards Leipzic. Mortier was now 
 to move up to Fulda. The Emperor himself went on the 
 i6th to Weimar. 
 
 Bernadotte, having reached Querfurt on the i6th, 
 1 Ninth Bulletin, Weimar, i;th October.
 
 EYLAU 
 
 305 
 
 heard that the Prussian Reserve-Corps had advanced from 
 Magdeburg to Halle. He therefore started on the lyth, 
 at 2 a.m., found it near Halle in position, attacked it, 
 captured the bridges over the Saale, as well as the town, 
 and then defeated the enemy completely. The latter, pur- 
 sued by the French and half annihilated, fell back upon 
 Dessau. On the 2Oth October the armies stood in the 
 following positions : Murat had arrived in front of Mag- 
 deburg, Soult was close behind him at Great-Wauzleben, 
 Ney had reached Halberstadt. The right wing of the 
 army was disposed as follows : Bernadotte at Calbe, 
 Lannes crossing the Elbe at Dessau, with Augereau close 
 behind him ; Davout was crossing the same river at 
 Wittenberg and occupied that town, which was now to 
 form the main depot and point of support for the future 
 operations, and was accordingly immediately fortified 
 against any hostile attack. The headquarters and the 
 Guards were at Halle. 
 
 As to the Prussians, the original main column, now 
 under the command of Hohenlohe, had on this day 
 reached Magdeburg, where the greatest disorder and 
 confusion reigned. A second column, under Bliicher, 
 which had, on leaving Nordhausen, during the march 
 through the Harz, taken a divergent direction, had after- 
 wards been compelled, by fche advance of the French, to 
 give up its march to Magdeburg and had made for the 
 mouth of the Havel ; on the 2Oth it was five miles from 
 Brunswick. Here Bliicher effected a junction with a 
 third column under the Duke of Weimar. This had 
 originally been the vanguard of the main army, and had, 
 on the gth October, been ordered forward as far as the 
 Werra, but had afterwards been recalled in time. The 
 Duke had, after receipt of the news of Jena, reached the 
 neighbourhood of Goslar on the 2Oth, by a considerable 
 detour viA Erfurt, Miihlhausen and Heiligenstadt, avoid- 
 ing the Harz. Bliicher and Weimar now resolved to 
 continue their march in company, and on the 24th 
 
 x
 
 306 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 the former, on the 26th the latter, crossed the Elbe at 
 Sandau* 
 
 Soult, who was investing Magdeburg in conjunction 
 with Ney, had been informed of the march of these troops, 
 on the preceding day, and started immediately, on the 
 25th, to cut them off, but only came up on the 26th with 
 the Prussian rear-guard at Altenzaun, where it had been 
 placed to cover the passage of the Elbe, nor could he 
 force it to yield. 
 
 In the meantime Hohenlohe had started from Magde- 
 burg on the 2ist, and reached the neighbourhood of 
 Wusterhausen and Neustadt on the 24th, to the north 
 of the Rhin-bruch. On the same day the Emperor 
 arrived at Potsdam with Murat, Lannes and the Guards, 
 Davout was near Tempelhof, at the gates of Berlin, 
 only Bernadotte, who had been delayed in crossing the 
 Elbe, was behind at Ziesar. This time the Emperor's 
 anger against him broke out, and he reproached him in 
 harsh terms, not only with the present delay, but also 
 with remaining inactive between the two parts of the 
 army engaged in fighting on the I4th. If we wish to 
 have one more example of the marching, which was 
 expected as a general rule from Napoleon's army, we 
 have only to measure the distance which Davout traversed 
 from Schleiz, where he arrived on the loth October, to 
 Berlin, which he entered on the 25th. We shall find that 
 it amounted to 166 miles, as the crow flies, and was done 
 in fourteen days, including the fighting of a battle. 
 
 At Potsdam, the Emperor received news of the march 
 of Hohenlohe's corps towards the north-east, and gave 
 orders to Murat in the night of the 24th, to despatch 
 the light brigade of Lasalle to Oranienburg, from which 
 place it was, by sending out strong patrols in all direc- 
 tions, to ascertain the actual direction of Hohenlohe's 
 march. Murat and Lannes arrived on the 25th before 
 Spandau, which place immediately surrendered, the same 
 Spandau of which the Emperor, when it was in his own
 
 EYLAU 307 
 
 hands, said : " Spandau is a fortress, which the enemy will 
 never be able to take." 1 On the same day Napoleon 
 received a report from Bernadotte, informing him that 
 Hohenlohe was marching in the direction of Stettin, and 
 as he at the same time heard of the fall of Spandau, 
 Murat and Lannes were immediately set in motion 
 towards Oranienburg. Bernadotte, who arrived in 
 Brandenburg on that day, was likewise to follow on the 
 tracks of the enemy, and Soult received carte-blanche 
 to assist in this operation according to his own judg- 
 ment. 
 
 On the 26th Lasalle's cavalry came up with and 
 defeated a division of the enemy near Zehdenick, which 
 was to have covered Hohenlohe's right flank during his 
 march viA Prenzlau to Stettin, a march which had not 
 been sufficiently rapid. For on the 28th Murat arrived 
 at Prenzlau at the same time as Hohenlohe's column. 
 The latter, it is true, managed to march through the town 
 and to take up a position on the road to Pasewalk, but in 
 this situation, which in any case was precarious, his chief- 
 of-the-staff, Colonel Massenbach, whom he had sent to 
 the enemy, and who had altogether lost his head, brought 
 news that the enemy were advancing along the right bank 
 of the Ucker on the Pasewalk road, 100,000 strong, and 
 that they themselves would soon be completely out- 
 flanked. In reality, only Murat's cavalry was there, and 
 no other troops were on the left bank of the Ucker \ 
 Massenbach had mistaken a small brook, which he had 
 crossed, for the Ucker. Hohenlohe saw no further way 
 of escape and laid down his arms. Two days later the 
 fortress of Stettin was surrendered to Lasalle's light 
 cavalry, which appeared unsupported before it. 
 
 Blucher's column had followed Hohenlohe, and received 
 
 early in the morning of the 2Qth at Boitzenburg the news 
 
 of the affair of Prenzlau. Bliicher at once resolved to 
 
 retreat towards the lower Elbe, and having been joined 
 
 1 C. N. To Daru, Charlottenburg, 26th. October.
 
 308 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 by the division Weimar, now under the command of 
 General Winning, he reached Waren on the 3ist with 
 these troops. Bernadotte had heard at the same time of 
 both Hohenlohe's surrender and BlUcher's march towards 
 Strelitz ; suspecting Stralsund to be the latter's goal, and 
 intending to cut him off, he marched against him and 
 reached Stargard on the 3ist. On this day Soult was 
 near Zechlin, where he heard of the situation of affairs. 
 He now sent his cavalry alone in direct pursuit of Blucher, 
 whilst resolving to move his infantry between him and 
 the Elbe. On the ist November Bernadotte came in 
 touch with BlUcher's rear-guard, and pursued it fighting as 
 far as Old-Schwerin. Murat also was approaching from 
 Stettin vid Demmin. 
 
 Thus Blucher, closely pursued by Bernadotte and 
 Soult, hurried towards the Elbe, intending to cross it at 
 Boitzenburg. He soon deemed even this impossible, and 
 on the 4th November he moved by Gadebush towards 
 Liibeck, where he arrived at noon on the 5th ; but the 
 very next day this town was taken by storm by the 
 French, and Blucher was obliged, considerably weakened, 
 to fall back upon Ratkau. He wished to seek shelter 
 in the works of Travemiinde, but on the next day 
 had to lay down his arms, in face of the considerably 
 superior numbers of the French troops, who had followed 
 him closely and threatened to attack at once. This 
 made an end of all the Prussian troops still between the 
 Elbe and Oder, as various other smaller and isolated 
 bodies had also surrendered. 
 
 1 After the capture of Liibeck, the French soldiers made 
 the most unheard-of use of their victory ; the town was 
 plundered and its inhabitants were subjected to the 
 most licentious excesses and cruelties. Their prayers for 
 mercy were answered by the French leaders with shrugs 
 of the shoulders and indifference ; they said they could 
 do nothing, the town had been taken by assault, and in 
 such a case " it was the custom of war." In this respect
 
 EYLAU 309 
 
 also it was a fatal thing for the army that their commander- 
 in-chief had begun to care less and less about means, as 
 long as he attained his ends. 
 
 Still, we cannot deny that the general only acted logi- 
 cally in this, and therefore was in the right. Whether his 
 final aim was just or possible, is another question ; but 
 having once set up this aim, the means adopted were 
 assuredly correct. His whole soul was set upon gaining 
 the empire of the world, as Caesar had done ; this 
 condemns his foresight as a statesman, but as a general 
 he could only reach his highest aims by demanding 
 enormous efforts, and could exact these only by fanning all 
 the passions of his soldiers and permitting them to satisfy 
 them ; he could only conquer the world by abandoning 
 its constituent parts to his instruments as their booty. 
 " From the moment that Napoleon grasped supreme 
 power, the morals of the army degenerated rapidly ; the 
 union of hearts disappeared with poverty, and the liking 
 for material well-being and for the comforts of life found 
 its way into our camps . . . The Emperor considered it 
 advantageous to his policy to favour this degeneration. 
 He considered it useful for his purposes as conducive to 
 the total dependence of the army on himself." ' This was 
 the opinion of an officer of his army at the time, an 
 officer very partial to Napoleon. 
 
 Men were bound to become thereby more and more a 
 matter of indifference to him, not only in the sense that 
 the fate of the vanquished became of less and less 
 importance for him, but also in the sense, that he looked 
 upon his own army only as an instrument to the inner 
 moral qualities of which he was altogether indifferent. As 
 long as they peformed the required tasks of marching and 
 fought bravely upon the battle-fields, the soldiers might 
 plunder, and the leaders steal, for ought he cared. What 
 did he care, even if the effective strength of his army 
 diminished more quickly than would have been the case 
 1 Berthezne, Souvenirs milit I. 328.
 
 3io NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 with more severe discipline ? This was very soon remedied 
 by reinforcements, and by drawing more freely upon the 
 rising generation. ' Thus he levied in the December of 
 1806 80,000 men who were not liable for military service 
 until September, 1807. If he had had any intention of 
 educating his army or his nation, he would have needed 
 peace, but he desired war, and by war the dominion of 
 the world. 
 
 Thus we must repeat that, judging from the standpoint 
 of the aim he wished to reach, he acted logically and was 
 right, for : 
 
 " Every individual mind is right 
 That is at one within itself ; there is 
 No fault, but inconsistency." 
 
 Indeed, every leader who purposes to do great things 
 must possess this callousness as to his means, this firmness 
 of mind, which looks with indifference upon the evils 
 inseparable from extraordinary efforts.' " No ridiculous 
 leniency; we shall always have time enough to be 
 generous." l " We wage war in all its severity," 2 this was 
 the Emperor's principle, and assuredly if only his final 
 ends had been desirable for France, politically speaking, 
 all those sacrifices which the callousness of his method of 
 waging war exacted would have been worth making. 
 
 Thus the Emperor's army soon took to plundering the 
 conquered country wholesale, and to considering the 
 vanquished as having no rights worth mentioning. " The 
 soldiers used to dine with their hosts, and it may be 
 imagined what pretensions they put forward, if we 
 consider the temperament of the French, their greed and 
 voracity, which did not exclude daintiness, their liking 
 for wine, and the contempt which they have always shown 
 for foreigners ; " 3 and here they were quartered in peace 
 time on an allied country ; in the enemy's country they 
 
 1 C. N. To Lannes, Schonbrunn, I4th November, 1805. 
 1 C. N. To Joseph, Osterode, ist March, 1807. 
 * Fe'zensac, Souvenirs milit. 84, 1 10.
 
 EYLAU 3 1 1 
 
 behaved with still less ceremony : " Nor was looting ever 
 carried on to a greater extent than during these marches ; 
 the want of discipline fell little short of insubordination." ! 
 The officers could not put a stop to it, for they themselves 
 generally set a bad example. "The officers, too far 
 separated from the common soldiers, could not suppress 
 their excesses ; especially as most of them set an example 
 of insolence and rapacity. If they wished to take a drive 
 they demanded horses and a carriage without ever paying 
 for them. They received visits, gave dinners to their 
 friends, and all at the expense of the country." 
 
 The Emperor himself encouraged the leaders in their 
 want of consideration. He was pleased if their excesses 
 put them constantly in the wrong with respect to himself, 
 it increased his power over them, and thus he condoned 
 things, for which even the most able leader in any other 
 army would have been cashiered. As early as 1805 we 
 read : " The conquered countries saw themselves exposed 
 to the rapacity of the conqueror, and many Austrian 
 magnates and princes paid with the complete plunder of 
 their castles for the obligation, forced upon them, of 
 entertaining a general for a single night,, aye, even for a 
 few hours. . . . They could not prevent this or that 
 marshal taking what he liked with him at his departure 
 from the castle. I heard, after the return from this 
 campaign, the wife of Marshal - - relate laughingly 
 that her husband, knowing her taste for music, had sent 
 her an enormous collection, which he had found at the 
 castle of, I forget what German prince ; and in the same 
 ingenuous manner she related to us that he had 
 forwarded to her such a number of boxes full of Viennese 
 candelabra and glass ware, which he had laid violent 
 hands on in all sorts of quarters, that she did not know 
 what to do with them all." ' 
 
 * ' Fe'zensac, Souvenirs milit. 84, 1 10. 
 
 Ibid, 85. 
 Mme. de R^musat, M6m. II. 210.
 
 312 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Of Massena the Emperor said : " He is a good soldier, 
 but entirely a slave to his love of money; this is the 
 only motive of his actions, and this alone will make him 
 move, even under my own eyes. At first it was small 
 sums, now milliards would not content him." l When he 
 had entrusted Marmont in 1806 with the administration 
 of Dalmatia, he was compelled to write soon afterwards : 
 "Tell Marmont in confidence that all accounts are ex- 
 amined here with the greatest severity, that any irregu- 
 larity might ruin him, and his friends too, that he will 
 have all he can wish for when the members of the Grand 
 Army get their share, and that he has to keep up a 
 reputation for honesty." 2 And even Berthezene, ever 
 anxious to publish the glory of the French army, relates 
 quite calmly of Bernadotte : " On this retreat he lost a 
 baggage- waggon, which contained the booty from Liibeck 
 and the fruits of his campaign. However disagreeable 
 this occurrence was to him, yet he pretended that he only 
 regretted it because it prevented him giving his men 
 gratuities ; " 3 and Berthezene had no other remark to 
 offer upon this except : " This witticism excited much 
 hilarity." 
 
 To this rapacity insolence towards the vanquished was 
 soon added. "In Wolborsh, de Pradt met the secretary 
 of the bishop, Canon von Kujawien, wearing the riband 
 and cross of his chapter, who showed me his cheek, 
 considerably injured by the violent blows which General 
 Vandamme had dealt him the day before, on account 
 of his refusal to supply Tokay wine, demanded in an 
 insolent tone by the general, and which the canon 
 only refused because, as he said, the King of West- 
 phalia, who had spent the preceding day in the 
 castle, had loaded his carts with all their store of that 
 
 1 C. N. To Joseph, St Cloud, 3rd June, 1806. 
 
 2 C. N. To Eugene, St. Cloud, gih August. 
 8 Souvenirs militaires, I. 120.
 
 EYLAU 313 
 
 wine ; " ' of Vandamme he moreover related that " thou- 
 sands of traits of violence and rapacity were related of 
 Vandamme ; his name is still execrated in Poland ; " 
 and of Davout, that he " had filled Poland with terror. 
 I have heard some terrible stories told about him, which 
 -created much prejudice against the French." 
 
 Now we do not wish to deny that all this was a matter 
 of indifference as to the personal capacity of each as a 
 general, for Massena above all, who in this respect laid 
 himself open to the severest reproaches, was undoubtedly 
 the most capable of Napoleon's generals, and whenever 
 there was any question of employing him the Emperor's 
 opinion was : " Massena has great military gifts, before 
 which we must bow down ; we must forget his faults, for 
 everyone has them." 2 Very often indeed rapacity and 
 violence go hand in hand with enterprise and boldness ; 
 still, in the whole army this generally spreading eagerness 
 to acquire soon changed into an eagerness to enjoy the 
 things acquired, and this latter, at any rate, is ruinous to 
 a general. " The truth of the matter was that, generally 
 speaking, the higher officers were tired of it all. I had 
 loaded them with too many dignities, too many honours, 
 too much riches. They had drunk of the cup of enjoy- 
 ment, and now all they demanded was rest; this they 
 were ready to purchase at any price ; at any price, do you 
 hear, marshals of the empire ? at any price whatever. 
 The sacred fire was extinct." 8 In this respect we certainly 
 cannot deny that the insatiable Napoleon, as compared 
 with his over satiated companions in arms, was the more 
 ideal soldier. 
 
 The Emperor had from Charlottenburg, and afterwards 
 from Berlin, followed and directed with great attention 
 the movements of his corps, to cut off Hohenlohe, Blucher, 
 and Weimar. " If military events do no longer offer the 
 
 1 Ambassade, etc. 73, So, 142. 
 
 * C. N. To Eugfcne, Burgbausen, 3Oth April, 1809. 
 
 * Gohier, Mtoi. II. 239.
 
 314 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 interest of uncertainty in their development, they still 
 offer the interest of combinations, marches and manoeu- 
 vres," l said he, contemplating the situation of affairs with 
 the eye of a connoisseur. For the rest he occupied him- 
 self with putting administrative affairs in order, as far as 
 he always did in conquered countries, in such a way, 
 namely, that they might be suited for collecting the 
 requisitions and war contributions he imposed. "It is 
 my wish that Berlin should furnish me in abundance with 
 all my army requires, and that nothing should be spared* 
 so that my soldiers may enjov abundance in every 
 respect." * 
 
 In the meantime Key continued his siege of Magde- 
 burg, and on the 8th November this fortress also sur- 
 rendered. Augereau and the Guards had remained in 
 Berlin, Davout had been s^nt forward from there to 
 Frankfort, where he arrived on the 3ist October. On 
 the following day Kiistrin was surrendered to the division 
 of Gudin, sent thither by Davout ; thus one after another 
 the fortresses fell, which, according to Willisen's 
 expression, might have been the " breakwaters " of the 
 invasion, and indeed without any defence or even the 
 attempt at any. In the presence of the young and 
 reckless French leaders, the old, weak and irresolute 
 Prussian commandants showed themselves simply in- 
 capable of resistance ; when the framework of the military 
 system, which had alone lent them some sort of stability, 
 had been once broken, they had no longer the strength 
 to stand. The Emperor was more careful in dismissing 
 his officers as soon as they became old; "the third 
 battalions are full of officers, who have a right to be 
 pensioned off, and who on account of physical incapacity 
 can no longer serve ; the body of officers must be 
 rejuvenated." 8 And here we must note, that the. 
 
 1 Twentieth Bulletin, Charlottenburg, 27th October. 
 
 * C. N. To Daru, Berlin, 28th October. 
 
 * C. N. To Lacue'e, Mayence, 29th September, 1806.
 
 EYLAU 315 
 
 rapacious Massena and the uncouth Davout were far 
 more attractive personalities to the soldier, than men 
 like Kleist and Ingersleben. 
 
 Thus Prussia lay entirely prostrate at the victor's feet,, 
 and was obliged to accept any conditions which .he was 
 pleased to impose. For a moment, it seemed as if some 
 sort of agreement would be come to between Napoleon 
 and Prussia, and Frederic William had already, on his 
 side, signed the Emperor's hard conditions, when the latter, 
 who in the meantime had received news of the fall of 
 Prenzlau, Liibeck, Stettin and Kiistrin, broke off all 
 negotiations. He already looked beyond Prussia, saw the 
 Russians approaching, and thus a vista of new successes 
 opening, which must break even the last resistance in 
 Europe. 
 
 And again we must say that, judged from the standpoint 
 of a conquering general, he was right. It was better not to 
 allow the Russians any time for further preparations, but 
 to continue the war with his strong victorious army, which 
 could now take the Oder as its base, by immediately 
 following up the tremendous results just achieved, so that 
 the opening of the new campaign would at the same time 
 include the last realization of the advantages gained during 
 the one just completed. A purely military situation is 
 always spoilt by moderation ; a general may, if necessary, 
 be commanded to stop in the midst of a successful career, 
 but it is never advisable to do so. A statesman, indeed, 
 might have based a permanent political system upon the 
 victory of Jena, and would have commanded his general to 
 stop. Bismarck, who signed peace at Nikolsburg and 
 arrested the leaders of his victorious army at the gates of 
 Vienna, would have concluded a lasting peace at Berlin, 
 but the man, we are treating of, was only a general. 
 
 In the first place the Emperor had no certain news as (56) 
 to how far the Russians had already advanced and in what 
 strength. He therefore ordered Davout to march in the 
 direction of Posen, in order to find out how matters really
 
 316 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 stood ; he was however to avoid any serious engagement. 
 Somewhat in his rear, to the left and the right of 
 Davout, followed Augereau and the newly formed IX. 
 corps of Bavarians and Wurttembergers, under Jerome. 
 Then news came that the Russians were, on the gth 
 October, still at Kamene^ Podolsk, and on the 5th 
 November the emperor calculated, that in this case, they 
 could not reach Warsaw before the 20th November. 
 He therefore sent orders to Davout to continue his march 
 to Posen, and on the 7th the Emperor resolved to assemble 
 his whole army near there, " for at that place I intend 
 to fight a battle with the Russians, if they desire to 
 advance." l 
 
 . But on this same day definite reports came in, that the 
 Russians, under Bennigsen, 56,000 men, forming four 
 columns, were between Jurburg and Grodno, on the 23rd 
 October, and that they would be able to cross the eastern 
 frontier of Prussia, and reach Thorn with their first troops 
 on the 7th or 8th, and with their last on the i8th or 2Oth 
 November. In this case the Emperor did not wish to 
 march beyond Posen, and was in hopes of being able 
 to concentrate there Augereau, Lannes, Davout, Jerdme, 
 the Guards and some cavalry before the i8th. " If, on the 
 contrary, the Russians have delayed their movements, 
 things would be diiferent, and I should determine upon 
 some other plan." 8 
 
 On the gth Davout had arrived in Posen, and as there 
 was no sign of any Russian advance visible as yet, he 
 received orders to continue his march immediately 
 towards Warsaw, whilst Augereau was to march to Thorn, 
 and Jer6me to Kalisch. Lannes had been ordered to move 
 up to Thorn vid Bromberg. The corps of the second 
 line, Ney, Soult, Bernadotte and Murat, which were now 
 likewise free to advance, approached Berlin, and were 
 then to follow across the Oder. It is true, the fore- 
 
 1 C. N. To Berthier, Berlin. 
 
 * C. N. To Davout, Berlin, 7th November, 3 p.m.
 
 EYLAU 3 i 7 
 
 most corps had to spread out, since their principal aim 
 was at this moment to gain information as to the enemy, 
 and they could safely do so, for the enemy was still at a 
 distance. Yet the thought of a possible junction at the 
 right time never left the Emperor ; it was too much the 
 Alpha and Omega of his strategy. " In all this there is 
 only one really important thing, and that is, that my three 
 corps and my cavalry should be able to effect a junction in a 
 short time, whenever the movements of the Russians render 
 it necessary." l He now estimated his forces in the first 
 line at 80,400 men, and placed them under the chief- 
 command of Murat, who had personally hastened on in 
 advance to Posen. 
 
 At 2 a.m. on the 25th November the Emperor also 
 left Berlin, and arrived in Posen at 10 p.m. on the 27th. 
 He found his corps in the following positions. The 
 vanguard of Murat's cavalry met some hostile cavalry al 
 Blonje on the 27th, and drove it back to Warsaw. 
 Davout followed a day's march behind ; Lannes was at 
 Lowitsch, Augereau at Gostynin, the Guards and Ney 
 were at Posen; Soult'had advanced beyond Frankfort, 
 Bernadotte was still near Berlin. Finally, Jer6me was 
 at Kalisch, but now received orders to proceed into 
 Silesia, in order to occupy the fortresses in this province, 
 and thus still further to secure and extend the base of the 
 Oder. In Mecklenburg and Hither- Pomerania Mortier 
 was left behind. On the 28th Warsaw was evacuated 
 by the Russians, who only retained the suburb Praga on 
 the right bank of the Vistula. On the same day Murat 
 entered the town with the cavalry, followed on the 3Oth 
 by Davout. 
 
 The Russians now had two armies in the field, of (57a) 
 which the first, 55,000 men under Bennigsen, had been 
 posted near Pultusk since the middle of November, the 
 second, 36,000 men under Buxhowden, being still on the 
 march and as yet far behind. At Thorn there stood a 
 1 C. N. To Davout, Berlin, ijth November, 4 p.m.
 
 318 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Prussian corps of 15,000 men under Lestocq. But, n 
 view of Napoleon's offensive and of his own relative 
 weakness, Bennigsen had good reason to fear that the 
 Emperor might turn his left wing and bring about a 
 second Jena. He therefore evacuated Praga on the ist 
 December, and withdrew his whole army to the Narev. 
 Lestocq was now put under his orders and retreated to 
 Strasburg. 
 
 Napoleon wanted to go in immediate pursuit. " Should 
 the enemy commit the stupid mistake of evacuating 
 Praha, you must occupy that suburb. .... I should be 
 very pleased if you crossed the Vistula there. You will 
 at once endeavour to cross the Bug as well." * Ac- 
 cordingly Murat and Davout crossed the Vistula during 
 the early days of December, and advanced towards the 
 lower Bug, whilst Lannes arrived in Warsaw and Ney 
 occupied Thorn. 
 
 Still uncertain as to the actual position of the Russians, 
 the Emperor, at Posen, kept urging Murat to throw 
 bridges over the Bug and the Narev, and then to establish 
 a strong tete-de-pont at the confluence of the Narev and 
 the Vistula, at the spot where in our days the Russians 
 have built Novogeorgievsk ; after that he was to occupy 
 positions at Pultusk with his cavalry and at Scherozk 
 with Davout. But Bennigsen soon advanced again. He 
 had in the first place fallen back upon Ostrolenka, but 
 now, when Buxhowden came up, he advanced again to 
 Pultusk and despatched Lestocq to Thorn. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Emperor was still in doubt as to the 
 enemy's intentions, whether he meant to avoid any 
 serious attack or make a stand ; on the I3th he resolved 
 to bring matters to a head by sending his corps across the 
 Vistula, thus compelling the enemy to declare his inten- 
 tions. He formed a second corps from the cavalry-reserve 
 under Bessieres, which was to advance from Thorn to 
 Rypin, and establish communication between Ney and 
 1 C. N. To Murat, Posen, ist December, 10 a.m.
 
 EYLAU 319 
 
 Soult, and, moreover, reconnoitre tbe whole country to 
 the north of the Vistula; Murat was to do the same 
 on his side ; the infantry corps were then to follow 
 across the-^Vistula, Davout at Novy-Dwor, Augereau at 
 Sakrotschin, Soult at Vlozlavk; Ney was to advance to 
 Strasburg, Bernadotte and the Guards replacing him at 
 Thorn. 
 
 Thus advancing, on a front of eighty miles, against 
 the line of the Wkra, he thought he must gain certainty 
 as to the enemy's plans ; if the latter should remain sta- 
 tionary at Pultusk, he would turn ' him with his advanced 
 left wing, Ney, Soult and Bernadotte, and force him to the 
 Austrian frontier, " but our greatest difficulty will be the 
 question of supplies." * These words show how the 
 circumstances on the Polish theatre of war, as contrasted 
 with those of Italy and Germany, were already beginning 
 to make themselves felt. In those countries the Emperor 
 had never considered the commissariat his main difficulty ; 
 but they show also that the general recognized this differ- 
 ence and took it into consideration. " Circumstances 
 have forced me to return to the system of dep6ts." 8 
 In the second half of the month of December, 
 therefore, Ney proceeded to Strasburg, Bernadotte 
 advanced to Thorn ; Augereau prepared for crossing the 
 Vistula at Sakrotschin, and Soult at Wvschogrod; 
 Davout was to throw a bridge across the Narev at 
 Okunin. In the evening of the 15th the Emperor left 
 Posen and arrived in Warsaw at midnight of the i8th 
 igth December. Bennigsen was at Pultusk, with his 
 troops forward as far as the Wkra; Buxhowden had 
 reached Ostrolenka ; Lestocq had, as already mentioned, 
 
 1 We must remember that at that time the Austrian frontier ran 
 along the Piliza and then along the Vistula ; about five miles above 
 Warsaw it turned aside from this river and ran to the confluence of 
 the Bug and Narev 
 
 1 C. N. General directions for the campaign beyond the Vistula, 
 Posen, 1 3th December. 
 
 1 C. N. To Daru, \Villenberg, 2nd February, 1807.
 
 32O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 been despatched forward to Thorn, had met Ney there, 
 and had fallen back upon Lautenburg. 
 
 This advance of the Russians upon Pultusk had not 
 remained unnoticed by the Emperor, and he now ordered 
 all his corps to march in that direction, so as to attack the 
 enemy. On the 22nd Augereau advanced towards Plonsk, 
 Soult crossed the Vistula at Dobrshykov ; Bessieres and 
 Bernadotte were in the neighbourhood of Byeshun, Ney 
 at Strasburg, Lannes in Warsaw ; Davout was collecting 
 his troops by the bridge which he had thrown over the 
 Narev at Okunin, and crossed towards evening. Here 
 the Emperor also arrived on the 23rd at 9 a.m. and 
 reconnoitred in person the river Wkra. Behind the 
 latter stood a division of the enemy in the line Tscharnovo- 
 Pomyechovo, between the Narev and the Wkra. 
 (57b) The Emperor examined this position most carefully, he 
 ascended by a ladder to the roof of a house on the little 
 island at the confluence of the Wkra and the Narev, 
 after which he dictated his orders for the attack. The 
 bridges for the crossing were to be thrown across the 
 entrance of the Wkra, from the little island ; Morand 
 was then to cross first and attack the enemy's left wing at 
 Tscharnovo, one part of Gudin's division was to follow 
 him and turn towards Pomyechowo, whilst the larger 
 portipn of this division would remain as a reserve at the 
 t&te~de-pont of the Narev. Towards evening the French 
 began to cross the Wkra in the manner ordered, and 
 during a night attack they forced the Russians from their 
 position ; the latter retreated to Nassielsk. Lannes had 
 been moved up closer to the Narev bridge. 
 
 For the 24th the Emperor, having now the enemy before 
 him, but not being able as yet to ascertain his strength, 
 ordered Lannes to cross the Narev and the Guards to 
 move up to the bridge from Warsaw. Augereau was to 
 advance to Novemyesto, and Soult to follow him to Plonsk. 
 Davout was to pursue the enemy towards Nassielsk. 
 
 The Russian armies were at this time, nominally at
 
 EYLAU 321 
 
 least, under the chief command of Kamenski, an old man 
 of seventy-six, mentally and physically weak. The latter 
 ordered, upon the news of the French crossing the 
 Wkra, a portion of the troops at Novemyesto to join the 
 division at Nassielsk. When, on the 24th, about noon, 
 Davout's vanguard arrived before this place, the Russians 
 resisted until evening and then retreated towards 
 Strshegozin. The Emperor established his headquarters 
 in Nassielsk, and ordered Lannes, who had crossed the 
 Wkra on this day, to join him as early as possible the 
 next morning. During the engagement which ensued at 
 Nassielsk, Kamenski had withdrawn the troops stationed 
 along the river at Novemyesto and Koloshomb to Pultusk ; 
 but here Augereau encountered them and forced the 
 passage of the stream. 
 
 On the 25th early Davout continued his march in 
 pursuit of the Russians towards Strshegozin. The 
 Emperor, who had gone to Schlostovo, in order to be 
 equidistant from his two wings, Davout and Augereau, and 
 to be able to hasten to whichever most needed him, now 
 saw that he had broken the enemy's line on the Wkra, 
 and that the latter had not concentrated his forces ; but 
 he was still ignorant of all details as to where the 
 various hostile corps lay. In this situation he resolved 
 not to allow Lannes, as he had at first ordered, to follow 
 Davout by Nassielsk, but to send him to Pultusk, in 
 order to bar the enemy's line of retreat at that important 
 passage over the Narev. 
 
 When, a few days later, this phase of the campaign was 
 finished, and the Russians had retreated, without, however, 
 having suffered any actual defeat, or still less lost a great 
 battle, we shall see how in Napoleon's letters and bulletins 
 one sentence is continually recurring, namely that, had the 
 days not been so short, and above all, had the roads not 
 been so impassable, not a man of the Russian army would 
 have escaped. This is as much as to confess that, after 
 all, the general had not been successful in all he attempted
 
 322 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 and the world had expected. But we shall not be able to- 
 accept without hesitation the reasons he mentions ; for, 
 were not the days just as short, and the road just as im- 
 passable for the Russians, and did not the general know 
 that he was manoeuvring in the month of December 
 and in Poland, and could he not have calculated and 
 taken into consideration these circumstances as well as 
 others ? And such indeed was the case. These same 
 impassable roads, which afterwards had to excuse the 
 absence of success, had to serve in the beginning as a 
 pretext to demand from his subordinate leader the infliction 
 of double loss upon the enemy. " Since the roads are 
 bad, their artillery and baggage ought to fall into your 
 hands." ' 
 
 I hold that the decisive moment, which was the reason 
 why this campaign of Pultusk, in striking contrast with 
 those of Aboukir, Ulm and Jena, ended without any 
 great decisive blow, though such a blow was designed, 
 was the despatch of Lannes to Pultusk. Here the 
 Emperor forsook his great principle, which he elsewhere 
 always followed. In the campaign of Jena also the 
 Emperor did not know where he had to look for the 
 enemy's main body ; but he kept his columns close 
 together and was, therefore, ready for any encounter, wher- 
 ever it might take place. Here, however, he attempted 
 to surround the enemy on all sides, even before he could 
 be sure where the tactical issue would be decided. But 
 for this purpose he had to separate his corps and could 
 not therefore effect a junction as he usually did with the 
 wings of his army, which were advancing on two separate 
 lines of operation from Thorn and Warsaw, before the 
 enemy was met with, that is, to the west of Wkra. 
 But he separated them still more, after having crossed that 
 river and come in touch with the enemy. For he sent, 
 as we have seen, Lannes to Pultusk, and in addition, as we 
 shall see presently, Soult through Zechanov to Makov. 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Murat, Lopatschin, 26th December.
 
 EYLAU 323 
 
 As happens so easily in such extensive concentric 
 turning-movements, the enemy's main body is not found 
 where it is expected. One corps meets no enemy at all, 
 another does not arrive in time at the appointed spot, 
 and a third sees itself suddenly opposed by superior forces. 
 Thus it happened here, the enemy broke through the 
 too widely-spread net at one point and, had the leader and 
 armies been equally matched, the campaign might easily 
 have been lost. In these operations to the north of the 
 Vistula, we no longer recognize the general of 1796, of 
 Ulm, and of Jena. 
 
 The Emperor felt convinced that the main mass of the 
 Russians had retreated to Golymin ; he therefore ordered, 
 on the 25th, Davout to follow them on this road. The 
 latter reached Strshegozin, and Murat Schlubova. Lannes 
 advanced as far as Sbroschki, Augereau to Schonsk, and 
 Soult as far as Schochotschin ; Bessieres and Bernadotte 
 were still in the neighbourhood of Bieshun. Key, who 
 had continued pressing Lestocq back, reached Soldau and 
 Mlava on this day, in close touch with his enemy. As to 
 the Russians, Bennigsen's troops effected a junction with 
 a portion of those of Buxhowden at Pultusk on the 25th, 
 whilst the remainder of Buxhowden's divisions were at 
 Makov and Golymin. 
 
 In the morning of the 26th Lannes started to continue 
 his march to Pultusk. Arriving in front of this place 
 about ten o'clock, he saw the enemy in position there and 
 resolved to attack him. With heavy losses on both sides 
 the fighting continued into the afternoon, when, about two 
 o'clock, Gudin's division, which had been sent in the morn- 
 ing from Strshegozin to Pultusk, and now hastened up on 
 hearing the sound of the guns, arrived at Moschin, and 
 immediately came into action against the Russian right 
 wing. Bennigsen withdrew the latter, it is true, at first, 
 but his superiority in numbers had permitted him to keep 
 on this very wing some untouched reserves, in spite of the 
 fighting having lasted over four hours with great violence.
 
 324 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 He threw these reserves against Gudin, penetrated 
 between him and Lannes, and drove him, with heavy 
 losses, by the evening, back to Moschin. In the meantime 
 Lannes attempted a second attack towards evening, 
 but was repulsed, after a short success, and retreated as 
 night fell. 
 
 On the same day Davout advanced to Golymin. The 
 Emperor had moved his headquarters on the preceding 
 day to Lopatschin, and now sent Augereau also towards 
 Golymin, for at this place he still expected to meet with 
 the Russian main body. Murat was still to stand fast at 
 Schlubova, but he soon received orders to support Davout's 
 advance. Soult was to push forward to Zechanov, in 
 order to gain from there the enemy's line of retreat towards 
 Ostrolenka, and Bernadotte, going still further round, was 
 to march to Koschevb on the Omulev. All this confirms 
 the view, just expressed, as to the Emperor's plan of 
 operations on this occasion. 
 
 At Golymin the Russians only kept up a rear-guard 
 engagement against Murat, Davout and Augereau, whose 
 troops arrived gradually; after which they retired, un- 
 pursued, to Makov. Soult reached Zechanov only with 
 the greatest difficulty on this day. On the left wing 
 Lestocq had fallen back before Ney as far as Neidenburg; 
 Ney remained stationary during the 26th. The Emperor 
 had gone to Paluki for the night ; when he saw the 
 Russians retreating, and received the news of Pultusk, he 
 resolved to look upon the campaign as over, and indeed 
 it would have been impossible, considering the condition 
 of the roads, the lateness of the season and the exhausted 
 state of the army, to undertake any effective pursuit of the 
 enemy. 
 
 The study of the annals of war furnishes us with two 
 reasons for the discontinuation of the pursuit. The first 
 made itself felt more particularly in the days of Frederick, 
 namely an insufficient recognition of the value and im- 
 portance of effective pursuit, due to the impossibility, as it
 
 EYLAU 325 
 
 was considered at that time, of departing from the principle 
 of having short lines of operations, so as not to move far 
 from the base of supplies ; even Frederick was unable to 
 shake off this idea. The second reason is that the general 
 himself succumbs to his own exhaustion and the effects of 
 the over-fatigue of his troops. That the first reason had 
 very little influence upon Napoleon, his whole mode of 
 carrying on war has taught us ; but may not the second 
 for once have had some effect even upon his determined 
 character ? 
 
 It is true we must look with some suspicion upon the 
 assertion, that his troops were really too exhausted to 
 carry on the pursuit. It has been made again and again 
 in the history of war, and yet we find again and again 
 that where a man of extraordinary energy was in command 
 it was still possible to accomplish the unexpected. " In 
 the pursuit of a flying enemy, who every hour suffers IQSS 
 in prisoners or stragglers, it is of no importance whatever 
 to march in close brigades or even in close battalions and 
 squadrons. What remains behind, remains behind and 
 must follow later on ; as soon as the battalions become 
 weaker, one can dispense even with officers, and leave them 
 behind for that purpose." ' 
 
 But here there seems for once, and as an exception, 
 to have been a case of impossibility. The tremendous 
 exertions which he demanded in 1796, and after Ulm 
 and Jena, from his soldiers, show too clearly. that the 
 Emperor's mind was inaccessible to all ideas of sparing 
 them. But here he found such quagmires of roads, that 
 he had not been able to bring his artillery into action even 
 in the fight at Golymin. The days were short ; the 
 weather was extremely unfavourable, cold and wet. More- 
 over the country, drained as it was already by the 
 Russians, offered scarcely anything in the way of supplies. 
 Thus he was forced to confess, that even if it had still 
 been possible to send troops in pursuit of the Russians, 
 1 Bliicher to York, Holstein, jist August, 1813.
 
 326 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 his army would thereby have been split up and fatally 
 weakened, besides being compelled to advance further and 
 further into Russia. On the other hand, the pursuit 
 could not, and this was the most important point, in any 
 way increase the sum total of his success. The mere 
 fact of having to retreat was bound to entail great 
 losses on the Russians, just because nature was so 
 unpropitious. The kind of pursuit, which alone would 
 have been possible in the morasses of Poland, could 
 hardly add to these. The momentum of the blow 
 dealt at Jena had here lost its. effect, and his army was 
 absolutely forced to collect new strength for new exertions. 
 Besides, in the ranks of the French army, that grumbling 
 which Caesar's legions indulged in at the prospect of every 
 fresh campaign, began to be audible. "You cannot be 
 quite right in -your head," they cried to the Emperor 
 as he rode by, " to lead us about on such roads without 
 any food." ' But he felt what lay behind this half-playful 
 criticism on the part of his men, and therefore he allowed 
 them to go into winter quarters. 
 
 During the last few days of December he issued the 
 preliminary orders, and followed them up from Warsaw, 
 on the 7th January, by definite regulations as to the 
 quarters. 
 
 (38 a) Bernadotte was sent to the Drevenz to cover the 
 Lower Vistula ; he was to station himself at Osterode and 
 extend his lines as far as the neighbourhood of Elbing, 
 with his magazines at Marienwerder ; Ney was to cover 
 Thorn and the siege of Graudenz, and to take up his 
 position at Soldau-Mlava-Chorshele, with his stores at 
 Thorn. Soult was near Zechanov, Prassnych and Makov f 
 depdt at Plock ; behind him on the Vistula Augereau, in 
 the neighbourhood of Novemyesto, depot at Wyschogrod. 
 Davout stood in the angle between the Bug and the 
 Narev, extending in front as far as Ostrolenka, and on the 
 left beyond the Narev as far as Pultusk and Golymin, 
 1 Savary, Mm. III. 23.
 
 EYLAU 327 
 
 with Pultusk as his depdt. Schyerozk and the ground 
 between the Bug and the Vistula were assigned to Lannes, 
 who occupied Praga also and had his dep6t in Warsaw. 
 At the latter town the Guards were stationed, and the 
 Emperor himself returned there on the ist January, 1807. 
 Should the enemy resume the offensive the various corps 
 were to concentrate at the following places : Bernadotte 
 at Osterode, Key at Mlava, Soult at Golymin, Augereau at 
 Plonsk, Davout at Pultusk, and Lannes at Schyerozk. 
 
 In this extended formation, the army was thoroughly 
 to enjoy the rest of which it stood in such need, so as to 
 be all the sooner ready for operations when the cadres were 
 completed as far -as possible. The Emperor now devoted 
 himself to the urgent business of regulating the supply of 
 the army, calling up reinforcements, taking steps for the 
 administration of Poland, and especially with organizing the 
 auxiliaries put in the field by that country. At the moment 
 of the resumption of operations we may calculate Berna- 
 dotte at 18,000, Ney at 16,000, Soult at 28,000, Augereau 
 at 16,000, Davout at 20,000, Lannes at 18,000, the Guards 
 at 15,000, and Murat at 14,000 men. The Emperor, 
 anxious, in accordance wkh his usual custom, to receive 
 news as soon as possible of the first movements of the 
 enemy, ordered one of his higher staff officers, with two 
 gallopers and two aides-de-camp, to remain permanently 
 with the advanced cavalry, who were doing outpost duty. 
 In addition to this, .to ensure the concentration of his 
 corps in time, he gave orders for the erection and 
 fortifying of bridge-heads at the bridges at Schyerozk, 
 Modlin, Pultusk and Praga. He also cautioned his corps 
 expressly, not to incite the enemy by any offensive 
 movement to an attack, but only to observe them. For 
 since the army was to rest, it was to do so thoroughly. 
 
 Bennigsen had in the first place retreated, after the 
 battle of Pultusk, over the Narev in the direction of 
 Bielostok, whilst Buxhowden had fallen back on the north 
 of the Narev towards Grodno. Afterwards, however, the
 
 328 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 two armies effected a junction in the neighbourhood of 
 Schtschutschin, and Bennigsen was entrusted with the 
 chief command. Lestocq had withdrawn to Angerburg. 
 
 This position of the Prussians, which left the direct 
 road to Konigsberg open, suggested to- Ney the~ idea 
 of attempting to surprise this town, and make for 
 himself an opportunity of special distinction. He con- 
 sequently started in the beginning of January from 
 Neidenburg and advanced vid Wartenberg, Gutstadt and 
 Bartenstein, but here, on the Alle, Lestocq, who had just 
 arrived, opposed him with 13,000 men. After some 
 skirmishing : between the nth and the i6th, however, Ney 
 became convinced that he would have to give the enter- 
 prise up, and, rightly apprehensive as to the Emperor's 
 reception of his acting without orders, he sent an officer to 
 him from Bartenstein on the I5th to explain matters. 
 
 In the meantime, however, Bennigsen had set his army, 
 63,000 men, in motion toward Prussia ; his plan was to 
 surprise Ney and annihilate him, and then to repulse 
 Bernadotte also behind the Vistula ; after which he would, 
 based upon Danzig, pass the winter in East Prussia. On 
 the I7th and i8th his army arrived in the neighbourhood 
 of Rhein. 
 
 Meanwhile the Emperor had received information of 
 Ney's advance, and was extremely angry at this departure 
 from his instructions. " The Emperor, Marshal, has, in 
 forming his plans, no need either of advice, or of any one 
 acting on his own responsibility; no one knows his 
 thoughts, it is our duty to obey." l In addition to a sharp 
 letter, in which he ordered him to return to the quarters 
 assigned to him, the Emperor sent Jomini to him, to 
 convey his displeasure by word of mouth. Ney now 
 retreated slowly in accordance with his orders, and arrived 
 on the 23rd in the neighbourhood of Neidenburg. 
 (58b) On this day Bennigsen was at Bischofstein, Lestocq 
 being again under his command ; he then continued his 
 * C. N. Berthier to Ney, Warsaw, 8th January.
 
 EYLAU 329 
 
 advance through Heilsberg, and on the 25th January his 
 vanguard met the enemy at Mohrungen. This was 
 Bernaaotte, who, upon the news of Key's retreat after the 
 Russians' advance, had collected his forces on the sea line, 
 Osterode, Prussisch-Holland, and who now repulsed the 
 Russian vanguard at Mohrungen. During the next few 
 days, however, Bernadotte, being well aware that he had 
 superior numbers in front of him, fell back upon Lobau. 
 Bennigsen did not go in pursuit, but allowed his army, 
 around Mohrungen, to go into winter quarters cantoned 
 over a line of some length. 
 
 The Emperor had in the first place, in connection with 
 Key's unauthorized movement, once more sharply enjoined 
 his subordinate leaders to allow the troops a thorough 
 rest, nor did he consider the movements, which were 
 observed on the part of the enemy, to indicate any 
 general offensive at present. " His Majesty believes the 
 extraordinary position of the enemy to be due to the rash 
 manoeuvre made by Marshal Key." 1 On the 23rd he issued 
 orders for the formation of a Xth corps, 22,000 men, 
 under Lefebvre, which was to besiege Danzig . But two 
 days later he began to feel alarmed. " Various reports, 
 Marshal, lead me to believe, that the different movements 
 which the enemy is making, are preparatory to an 
 advance." * The corps therefore received orders to 
 prepare to march, and Lefebvre . was ordered to leave 
 Dantzig alone for the present and to cover Thorn. 
 
 The value which the Emperor henceforth attaches to 
 Thorn is remarkable. We have already pointed out, 
 after Jena, with what anxious care he looked after his 
 communications. Kow also he considered that he 
 would be unable, during an advance into Eastern 
 Prussia (which might possibly become necessary) to keep 
 up his direct line of communication with Warsaw. For it 
 was exposed to a flank attack from Russia; and the 
 
 1 C. N. Berthier to Soult, Warsaw, 24th January. 
 1 N. Berthier to Lefebvre, Warsaw.
 
 330 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 further his line of operations extended, the more would 
 this danger increase. The Emperor determined therefore, 
 while there was yet time to choose the shorter and safer 
 line to Thorn, and for this purpose he determined to hold 
 this latter fortress at any cost. The positions of his lines 
 of operation were here exactly the same as in 1805 before 
 Vienna. At first the direct, natural line, Berlin- Warsaw, as 
 in 1805 Augsburg- Vienna, so that his communications 
 were directly in rear of the army and covered by it. 
 Then while pursuing the enemy, the line turned at right 
 angles to the north, and was dangerously exposed to the 
 east of Warsaw-Bartenstein, as in 1805 that of Vienna- 
 Briinn had been. Hence, in both cases, the determination 
 to abandon this line in case of disaster and to adopt a new 
 one, which was not exposed and led directly to the base. 
 
 On the 27th January the Emperor determined 
 definitely to resume operations ; he therefore ordered his 
 army to take the field, and the corps to concentrate. 
 "The enemy seems to intend to make a stand at 
 Elbing, in order to defend his communications with 
 Dan zig. This being so, I shall leave my winter quarters 
 and make a counter-march." * Murat and Soult were to 
 assemble at Willenberg, Ney at Neidenburg, Augereau at 
 Mlava, Davout at Pultusk, Lannes at Brok. The Emperor 
 reckoned that this concentration would be completed 
 within three or four days. Bernadotte was to fall back 
 upon Thorn, if he could not hold Osterode, so as to cover 
 the former place. 
 
 On the following day Davout and Augereau received 
 instructions to concentrate further to the front ; the former 
 was to take post at Myschinez, the latter at Neidenburg, 
 whilst Ney was to proceed to Gilgenburg, Murat was to 
 advance a little, to Ortelsburg, so as to make room, 
 but he was to be very careful "that no movement is 
 observed. You must fly before the Cossacks, and avoid 
 
 1 C. N. To Clarke, Warsaw, 27th January.
 
 EYLAU 331 
 
 everything that might render the enemy suspicious." * 
 The enemy was to be delayed another three days, and 
 then " the Emperor will be on the ist February before 
 daybreak with his vanguard beyond Willenberg, and take 
 the offensive against the enemy with all his forces. . . . 
 It is the Emperor's .intention to pierce the enemy's centre, 
 and to drive back right and left all his forces which have 
 not retreated in time." 2 
 
 After having in addition during the 28th and 2Qth 
 regulated the commissariat and settled a number of ques- 
 tions of administration, the Emperor left Warsaw on the 
 3oth at 6 a.m. At Pultusk he met Marshal Lannes, who 
 had fallen sick and was unable to continue in command of 
 his corps ; he gave orders for his removal to Warsaw, and 
 then continued his drive to Prassnych, where he arrived 
 during the night. Here he sent for Savary and entrusted 
 him with the command of Lannes' corps, which was 
 intended to secure at Brok the offensive operations of the 
 army on the right flank against a hostile corps, 18,000 
 men, which lay at Briansk under General Essen. The 
 Emperor impressed upon Savary that this was his only 
 task, and that he was not to allow himself to be tempted to 
 attack, in the hope of any tactical success, if he was not 
 altogether sure of his position. His principal aim would 
 be to cover the Narev line from Schyerozk as far as the 
 Omulev. 
 
 If we examine the situation with which the Emperor 
 was confronted at Prassnych, we shall again recognize and 
 admire the great master in the art of moving and concen- 
 trating masses. On the fourth day after giving orders 
 for the advance, he stood with 100,000 men assembled 
 and ready for action on the line Myschinez-Willenberg- 
 Gilgenburg-Mlava-Prassnych, whilst 18,000 men pro- 
 tected his right flank, and 40,000 on his left flank were in 
 position, either to support his advance or, if necessary, to 
 
 1 C. N. To Murat, Warsaw, a8th January. 
 
 * C N. Berthier to Beraadotte, Warsaw, 28th January.
 
 33 2 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 hold the line of the Vistula from Bromberg to Thorn, and 
 in particular this latter important place. And what could 
 Bennigsen do to resist the onslaught with superior num- 
 bers on his flank, or to protect his threatened line of 
 operations ? If he accepted battle and went to meet the 
 Emperor with his own 76,000 men, which besides were not 
 yet fully assembled, his defeat was as good as certain ; and 
 if he retreated in hot haste, he gave up the campaign just 
 begun as lost. The Emperor might thus be said to be the 
 undoubted victor from the very outset. 
 
 He had decided upon the ist February as the day to 
 begin the advance, and on the 3ist January the final 
 orders for it were issued from Willenberg. Qne of these 
 orders, addressed to Bernadotte, and explaining in 
 detail the whole situation of the army to that marshal, 
 who was still in a manner separated from the rest, fell into 
 the enemy's hands, and was handed to Bennigsen on the 
 ist February. Bernadotte thus failed to receive the 
 orders, contained in this letter, to move up to Gilgen- 
 burg and to take part in the general advance. On the 
 other hand, Bennigsen obtained information as to the 
 danger threatening him, and immediately ordered the 
 concentration of his army in the position of Jonkendorf. 
 (59a) On the same day, the ist February, the Emperor 
 began his advance. Murat and Soult drove some Russian 
 outposts from Passenheim. Davout remained near Mys- 
 chinez, Ney moved to Hohenstein, Augereau was at 
 Neidenburg. The next day Murat and Soult reached 
 Allenstein, the Russian vanguard falling back before them 
 to Gettkendorf: Ney came up within half a day's march 
 of Allenstein, Augereau to Demben Ofen, Davout to 
 Ortelsburg. Bennigsen had assembled the main body of 
 the Russian corps at Jonkendorf. On the second the 
 Emperor had gone to Passenheim ; he thought the enemy 
 was on the retreat to Gutstadt. " It is easy to see that 
 our manoeuvre does not suit him, and he would like to 
 prevent it, which leads me to think that he has come to a
 
 EYLAIT 333 
 
 dead-lock. It is rumoured everywhere that he is retreating 
 on all sides, so as to try and avoid the impending blow." ! 
 The Emperor considered that the enemy would run 
 enormous risks if he stayed where he was; "it is 
 impossible to assume he will allow his left flank to be 
 turned ; " though of course " it is possible that the enemy 
 will fight to-day with the 30,000 or 40,000 men he has, so 
 as to gain time." * 
 
 On the morning of the 3rd he received from Murat, 
 who, together with Soult, had advanced in that direction, 
 a report of the enemy's massing at Jonkendorf. He 
 immediately hurried thither, reconnoitred the position, 
 and then issued his orders for the attack. Murat and 
 Ney, of whom the latter had arrived in Allenstein, were to 
 attack frontally; Soult 'received orders to capture the 
 bridge over the Alle at Bergfried and to advance on the 
 enemy's rear. Davout also was ordered to march for the 
 same purpose to Spiegelberg. While waiting for Soult's 
 turning movement, the Emperor contented himself with a 
 cannonade in the front, but Soult did not succeed in 
 occupying the point of crossing at Bergfried until nightfall. 
 Augereau reached Allenstein on that day, and Davout lay 
 to the south of Waftenberg. The Emperor, who had 
 bivouacked at Gettkendorf, thought Bennigsen would 
 accept battle the next day, and made every preparation 
 for it. 
 
 But when he advanced the next morning, he soon (59b) 
 became aware that Bennigsen had only left a rear-guard 
 there, and had withdrawn during the night ; he therefore 
 immediately ordered a rapid pursuit in order to ascertain 
 the direction of his retreat. Murat reached Deppen, 
 Ney Schlitt, Soult Heiligenthal, Davout's advance- 
 guard Rosengarten, and Augereau Pupkeim. The 
 Emperor's headquarters were removed to Schlitt. 
 
 1 C. N. To Talleyrand, Passenheim, jrd February. 
 
 2 C. N. To Murat, Passenheim, 3rd February, 6 a.m. 
 
 3 C. N. To Davout, Passenheim, 3rd February, 6 a.m.
 
 334 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Bennigsen had retreated to Arensdorf, and had ordered 
 Lestocq thither also. The latter had at the commencement 
 of the Emperor's advance been at Freistadt, and arrived 
 now, on the 4th February, at Mohrungen. Napoleon 
 saw through these movements : " The Emperor is of 
 opinion, Prince, that the enemy's aim is to reach 
 Landsberg before us, it is therefore likely that he made 
 his escape between Liebstadt and Gutstadt. . . . The 
 Emperor hopes you will get news of the enemy near the 
 village of Arensdorf, a large place situated at the inter- 
 section of the roads from Gutstadt to Landsberg. His 
 Majesty would not be astonished if the enemy were to 
 concentrate there to-day." l 
 
 On the 5th Lestocq, now aware ol the threatening 
 proximity of the enemy, withdrew vid Pfarrersfelden, in 
 order to reach the crossing of the Passarge at Spanden. 
 The Emperor, sent in the first place Murat and Ney in 
 pursuit of the enemy towards Arensdorf, whilst Soult and 
 Davout threatened his left flank from the direction of 
 Gutstadt ; Augereau followed as a reserve towards Arens- 
 dorf. These movements had just begun when the 
 Emperor received news of Lestocq's march towards the 
 Passarge. He now ordered Ney, with whose corps he 
 was then, to change his direction at once towards 
 Liebstadt and to intercept this column. Should the latter, 
 however, for greater safety have kept far to the west, he 
 was not to follow him a long way, " because the Emperor 
 wishes to have his whole army together to give battle to 
 the Russians, in case he succeeds in outflanking them." f 
 
 Ney came across at Waltersdorf a detachment sent 
 thither by Lestocq for the protection of his march, and 
 drove it back completely upon Mohrungen ; then he him- 
 self reached Liebstadt, whilst Lestocq, continuing his 
 march behind the above-mentioned detachment, succeeded 
 in crossing the Passarge at Spanden and reaching Wusen. 
 
 1 C N. Berthier to Murat, Schlitt, 5th February. 
 
 2 C. N. Berthier to Ney. In bivouac, $th February.
 
 EYLAU 335 
 
 Murat and Soult arrived at Freimarkt, as well as one of 
 Davout's divisions (Friant's) ; the remainder of the latter's 
 corps was around Gutstadt and Augereau at Lauterwalde. 
 The Emperor established his headquarters in Arensdorf. 
 As to Bernadotte, touch with him had been lost, as indeed 
 this is usually the case in such movements ; but the 
 Emperor presumed he was somewhere near Osterode, and 
 hoped he was also pushing forward to Liebstadt. Ben- 
 nigsen had retreated to Drevenz on the road from Mehl- 
 sack to Heilsberg ; but during the night he continued his 
 march, and in the morning of the 6th was at Landsberg. 
 
 Napoleon was, with good reason, extremely satisfied 
 with the situation. " Our affairs are going on splendidly. 
 One corps of 20,000 men is cut off. The Russian army is 
 flying without knowing whither, and in the greatest 
 disorder." l This was not altogether the case, but such 
 confidence is of advantage to a general. Indeed, generally 
 speaking, we may remark that the Emperor at this time 
 was taking good care of his full physical comforts. The 
 sensual part of his nature, which the young general of 
 1796 suppressed, as he had to be carefully on his guard 
 before his older subordinates, had in the meantime come 
 more into evidence. Even in Egypt it was known 
 that the young wife of Lieutenant Four6s was his mistress. 
 Afterwards the First Consul put less and less restraint 
 upon his passions, and at this time, since his arrival in 
 Warsaw, the Emperor was in the enjoyment of the love of 
 a noble Polish lady, who indeed kept up her connection 
 with him later and visited him even at Elba. 1 
 
 Josephine complained bitterly of these amours of her 
 husband ; she went so far as to accuse him of seducing 
 his own sisters; " did he not indeed consider himself of 
 such exalted position in the world, that he could satisfy all 
 his whims ? " ' And it was to no purpose that Napoleon 
 
 1 C. N. To Talleyrand. Arensdorf, 6th February. 
 
 2 Mme. Walewska. ED. 
 
 9 Mme. de R&nusat, Me*m. I. 104, 114.
 
 336 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 
 
 answered angrily : " You must submit to all my whims, 
 and look upon it as quite natural, that I should permit 
 myself such amusements. I have a right to reply to all 
 your complaints with an invariable ' Je le veux.' I am 
 different from others and do not accept anyone's con- 
 ditions." 1 The short letters which he wrote in great 
 number to Josephine during this campaign, show how little 
 she was able to suppress her complaints. 
 
 As all excitement of the senses is followed in the first 
 place by an increase of physical and mental well-being, 
 the Emperor felt indeed in excellent health during this 
 campaign. " My health has never been better, so that I 
 have become more gallant than I was formerly." a " In 
 the midst of these great hardships every one has been 
 more or less ill. As to myself, I never felt stronger, and 
 I have become stouter." 3 Physical health is of the 
 greatest importance to a general. For although the 
 energy of a strong mind can often conquer physical suffer- 
 ing, yet one can never be sure that it may not occur 
 just at the moment when the situation may demand from 
 the general the endurance of great hardships. Charms 
 points to the fact, that in the decisive days of 1815 the 
 Emperor's illness greatly interfered with his work, and 
 the latter himself, when speaking about Massena having 
 lost his reputation in Portugal, added that this was to be 
 ascribed to the state of his health, " which did not allow 
 him to ride, or to look to things himself. A general who 
 has to see things through other people's eyes, will never 
 be in a condition to command an army in the way it 
 ought to be commanded." * But more important still is 
 the influence of the physical condition upon the mind. 
 Bodily comfort will ever induce us to look at things 
 in a more favourable light, whilst suffering will have 
 
 1 Mme. de R&nusat, M&n. I 204, 114. 
 
 2 C. N. To Joseph, Warsaw, 29th January. 
 
 3 C. N. To Joseph, Osterode, ist March. 
 
 4 CXM^ara, Nap. en exil, II. 377.
 
 EYLAU 337 
 
 the opposite effect, and even though a strong spirit 
 will overcome this, yet it will in the act of conquering 
 lose a part of its energy. The Emperor possessed a 
 healthy and strong constitution, and, with the exception 
 of the above mentioned indulgences, he lived very frugally. 
 Even a skin disease of an eruptive nature, which he had 
 contracted at Toulon, and which returned from time to 
 time, only seems to have served to provide some kind of 
 outlet to the humours of his blood. 
 
 On the 6th February, at 2 a.m., orders were issued 
 for the continuation of the pursuit ; Murat and Soult 
 were to advance by Freimarkt, Davout by Heilsberg, 
 Augereau was to follow them, and Ney to push forward to 
 Wormditt, in order to complete Lestocq's separation from 
 the Russians. Bernadotte was also to assist in this, but 
 did not reach Osterode till this date, having only on the 
 4th received news of the army. Bennigsen had, in the 
 morning of the 6th, already taken the preparatory measures 
 for the continuation of his retreat to Prussisch-Eylau, and 
 placed a rear-guard beyond Hof to cover the same ; 
 Heilsberg also was still held. At both places, however, 
 the Russians were compelled to fall back before the 
 advancing French columns. 
 
 In the morning the Emperor had gone to Freimarkt, 
 where he awaited Augereau's corps ; he then advanced at 
 the head of the latter; his centre encamped for the 
 night in the neighbourhood of Hof ; Davout was at Heils- 
 berg, his vanguard near Schwelmen ; Ney at Wormditt. 
 Bennigsen continued his retreat, during the night, and 
 reached Prussisch-Eylau in the morning of the 7th. 
 Lestocq had arrived at Engelswalde on the 6th. The 
 Emperor had at first expected Bennigsen would make a 
 stand at Landsberg, but as soon as he became aware of 
 his continued retreat, he ordered Ney to march in the 
 direction of Kreuzburg, and Davout along the road from 
 Bartenstein to Prussisch-Eylau. 
 
 Early on the 7th Murat encountered the Russian rear- 
 
 I
 
 338 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 guard, left behind at Landsberg, and compelled it to 
 fall back though still fighting ; about 2 p.m. Murat 
 appeared before Prussisch-Eylau. The Russian rear-guard 
 made a stand this side of the town, but was gradually 
 forced into the town, and defended itself there obstinately. 
 Soult, it is true, entered it, but was soon thrown out again 
 by the reinforcements, which Bennigsen, who had placed 
 his army in position in the line Serpallen-Schloditten, 
 had sent up. But at 6.30 p.m. the Russians voluntarily 
 evacuated it at Bennigsen's orders, and the French 
 occupied the town. Thus the Emperor had, in and 
 near this town, on the evening of the 7th, Murat, Soult, 
 Augereau and the Guards; Ney stood at Orschen, 
 Davout on the road from Bartenstein to Prussisch-Eylau, 
 a little beyond the first named place. The Emperor 
 himself was in bivouac behind Prussisch-Eylau, on the 
 heights near the brickfields. Lestocq reached Rositten 
 in the night, where he received orders from Bennigsen 
 to move up the next day to Althof, in readiness for 
 battle. 
 
 (60) With the early morning of the 8th February Bennig- 
 sen commenced the battle by a cannonade. The Emperor 
 seeing him thus determined to fight, sent a messenger in 
 haste to Ney to come up to Althof. He himself ascended 
 the hill near the church at the south-east end of Eylau, 
 and ordered, to begin with, numerous batteries to be 
 placed in position, to reply to the enemy's artillery. 
 In the meantime the Guards marched into line behind the 
 hill, Augereau to the right of them, Soult to the left and in 
 front beyond Eylau as far as the windmill, with the cavalry 
 on the two wings. One of Soult's divisions, St. Hilaire's, 
 was, however, on Augereau's right wing. This wing was 
 to strike the decisive blow, according to the Emperor's 
 intention, as soon as Davout's arrival should have 
 threatened the enemy's line of retreat. Accordingly the 
 French left wing, against which the Russians advanced 
 about nine o'clock, was withdrawn to Eylau, without
 
 EYLAU 339 
 
 having offered any serious resistance, but on the right 
 wing St. Hilaire and Augereau received orders to attack 
 the Russian left wing, taking Eylau as their pivot and 
 wheeling to the left as they advanced. 
 
 In the midst of a violent snow-storm, however, the 
 direction was lost, St. Hilaire and Augereau became 
 more and more separated, and the former, marching in 
 the direction of Serpallen, was attacked in his isolated 
 position by some Russian cavalry and driven back. 
 Augereau chanced upon the enemy's centre, was attacked 
 by superior numbers, repulsed after a desperate resistance, 
 and, half annihilated, pursued by the Russian cavalry 
 straight to the point where the Emperor himself stood, 
 causing great uneasiness to be felt in his vicinity. 
 Berthier ordered the horses to be led up ; Bessieres, still 
 more excited, brought up the Chasseurs of the Guard, 
 exclaiming : " Save the Emperor ! " But the latter 
 remained quite unmoved, and rejected all these measures 
 with some show of annoyance, for his practised eye had 
 judged correctly that the enemy's cavalry would not 
 have enough breath or cohesion left to charge up the 
 Cemetery Hill, and he therefore calmly posted a battalion 
 of his Guards in front of him, and said only several times, 
 looking at the approaching Russians : " What boldness 1 
 What boldness ! " And indeed the latter, tired out by 
 the long pursuit, were startled by the appearance of the 
 infantry of the Guards and fell back. 
 
 Thereupon, however, the Emperor ordered Murat to 
 advance to the counter-attack with the collected cavalry 
 of the right wing, to stop up the gap between St. Hilaire 
 and Augereau, and to arrest the retrograde movement of the 
 right wing. This end was in the main accomplisned, the 
 Russian and French cavalry forces being alternately 
 successful. Exhaustion and most heavy losses, how- 
 ever, forced both sides to resume the artillery duel. 
 But at this moment, about noon, Davout's corps put in 
 an appearance on the battle-field, and advanced against (61)
 
 340 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Serpallen ; the Russians evacuated this village and fell 
 back upon Little Sausgarten. Now St. Hilaire also 
 resumed his forward movement, inclining towards Davout 
 on his right. These two forced the left wing of the 
 Russian line further and further back. Kutschitten in its 
 rear was occupied, and heavy fighting was in progress 
 around the key of the position, the farm of Anklappen, 
 when, about four o'clock, Lestocq appeared on the scene. 
 (62) The latter had started in the morning, in order to march 
 to Althof as ordered. In this march, Ney, who was 
 advancing in the same direction, met his vanguard at 
 Wackern. But whilst this latter made front against Ney, 
 Lestocq himself made a detour to the north vid Graventin, 
 and although forced to detach a few troops to protect his 
 right flank against Ney's attack, he was on the whole 
 successful in reaching Bennigsen's battle-field without being 
 stopped. He moved on Kutschitten, drove the enemy from 
 this village and forced him, in conjunction with the left 
 wing, which again advanced back upon Little Sausgarten. 
 Darkness now came on, however, and put an end to 
 the combat here, when Ney, who had not" received his. 
 orders to come up until 2 p.m., arrived at Schloditten. 
 But Bennigsen sent late in the evening to dislodge him 
 from that place, as he saw his communications with 
 Konigsberg endangered by Ney's stay there, and then 
 began his retreat at midnight. * 
 
 The Emperor had returned to his bivouac for the 
 night, but his troops rested wherever the darkness found 
 them. He was at first rather anxious about his position, 
 his expressions immediately after the battle were much less 
 confident than usual, and to his intimate companion 
 Duroc he expressed himself thus : " Yesterday a very 
 severe battle took place at Eylau. We remained masters 
 of the battle-field, but although the losses on both sides 
 were very heavy, yet my distance from my base renders 
 mine more serious to me. ... It is possible that I may 
 return to the left bank of the Vistula, so as to go into quiet
 
 EYLAU 341 
 
 winter quarters, protected from these Cossacks and this 
 swarm of light troops." l Accordingly, his next measures 
 were extremely cautious ones, aiming at his own* safety 
 only. Lefebvre was ordered up to Osterode as a general 
 reserve, and the line of communications of the army was 
 shifted from Warsaw to Thorn, and thence along the left 
 bank of the Vistula. 
 
 But when it was observed with the break of day that the 
 Russians had withdrawn, and that only swarms of Cossacks 
 were to be seen in front of the French line, the Emperor 
 immediately determined to act as if he was the undoubted 
 victor, although of course the tremendously thinned ranks 
 of his completely exhausted troops rendered any energetic 
 pursuit out of the question. He therefore remained 
 stationary during the gth, but his descriptions of the victory 
 of Eylau in his various despatches on the evening of this 
 day, already bore a very different colouring. 
 
 On the loth Murat received orders to march along the 
 road to Konigsberg behind the enemy, whilst the corps 
 around Eylau were ordered to separate somewhat more, so 
 as to recuperate more at their ease ; at the same time Ney 
 was to push on along the Konigsberg road behind Murat. 
 On the nth Murat advanced across the Frisching to 
 Wittenberg, and continued during the next few days in 
 touch with Bennigsen, who had now taken up a position in 
 front of Konigsberg. This induced the Emperor to send 
 successively Davout, Ney, and Bernadotte, who had now 
 also joined the army, towards the Frisching as supports 
 the cavalry. Nevertheless it was not his intention to 
 resume operations, but to allow some rest to his troops 
 in quarters on the Passarge, and on the i6th February he 
 issued orders for the beginning of the retrograde move- 
 ment. 
 
 What is most remarkable in this campaign on the part 
 of the Emperor, is the way in which he immediately re- 
 assumed the initiative, after Bennigsen had for a moment 
 1 C. N. Eylau, 9th February.
 
 342 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 deprived him of it by his advance. The advantage which 
 the possession of the initiative gives a general in his move- 
 ments is rightly considered very great ; here we can note 
 that it is only preserved by persistence in the execution of 
 a resolve once taken, and we feel the truth of Napoleon's 
 dictum : " In the beginning of a campaign one ought 
 carefully to weigh, whether to advance or not, but once 
 the offensive is assumed, it must be persisted in as long as 
 possible." ' Bennigsen's resolution, quite correct in itself, 
 slackened at Mohrungen ; he had conceived a great plan, 
 a plan which in the hands of a Napoleon opposed to a 
 Beaulieu would have had great results. But the Emperor 
 opposed his own resolution to it, and never hesitated, but 
 carried it through with increasing obstinacy; indeed, it 
 may be said that Bennigsen fell back even more before 
 the strength of Napoleon's intelligence than before his 
 superiority in numbers. " The most important qualities 
 for the leader of an army will ever be, great character or 
 moral courage, which allows mighty resolves to be formed, 
 and then coolness or physical courage, which triumphs 
 over all dangers. Actual military science only comes in 
 the third place, but it will be a very strong auxiliary ; one 
 must indeed be blind not to recognize this." 2 
 
 > Precis des guerrcs de Fr.II. XXXII. 263. 
 2 Jomini, Precis, etc., 69.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 \ 
 
 FRIEDLAND. 
 
 AFTER having proceeded to carry out his resolution of (63a) 
 retiring to the Passarge, the Emperor distributed his 
 corps in the following manner : Bernadotte at Prussisch- 
 Holland, his vanguard at Braunsberg, his transport at 
 Saalfeld ; Soult at Mohrungen, vanguard at Wormditt, 
 transport at Liebemiihl ; Davout at Hohenstein, transport 
 at Gilgenburg. In front of these corps, as a kind of out- 
 post, stood Ney along the Alle on the line Gutstadt- 
 Allenstein ; the cavalry reserve was distributed along the 
 whole line. " There will be no serious action undertaken, 
 and the moment the enemy appears in mass, every marshal 
 can by himself concentrate his corps upon his reserves, 
 in order to be ready to march thence at the first warning to 
 any chosen point." * The corps of Augereau, which had 
 suffered most severely of all, and with the leader of which 
 the Emperor was somewhat dissatisfied for having left the 
 battle-field when wounded, was broken up on the 2ist 
 February and distributed among the other corps. 
 
 The Emperor went to Osterode on the 22nd, where he 
 established his headquarters for a considerable period. 
 He now gave orders that all the administrative branches 
 of the Headquarter Staff were to be transferred from 
 Warsaw to Thorn, and thus he abandoned Warsaw alto- 
 gether as a base, and adopted the line through Thorn 
 
 1 C. N. Orden, issued the 2Oth February, 1807, with respect to the 
 position of the army.
 
 344 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 to Posen, the most prudent course to pursue. His Guards 
 likewise were encamped around Osterode, which place, 
 should occasion arise, would be the general point of 
 concentration of the army. 
 
 The Emperor's first thoughts after his retreat to the 
 Passarge were of a defensive nature ; should the enemy 
 advance, he was " determined to make a stand on the 
 plateau of Osterode, where I can concentrate in a day 
 and a half more than 95,000 men." * It was, indeed, only 
 a principle laid down by himself as essential, which he 
 thus obeyed in concentrating to his rear. " The point of 
 concentration of an army in case of a surprise must 
 always be fixed in its rear, so that all the corps may be 
 able to reach it before the enemy." * Still less enterprising 
 was the state of mind of the men near him, indeed, they 
 desired a retreat to the Vistula, and Berthier himself is 
 said to have put before the Emperor proposals to that 
 effect. Of course, Napoleon was obliged, for the sake of 
 France and Europe, to avoid such a step, as long as there 
 was any possibility of doing so. His first and most 
 urgent care was again, as must always be the case in any 
 defensive position occupied for any length of time, the 
 commissariat. " Our position will be excellent here, as 
 soon as our provisions are absolutely safe." * ' ' My position 
 would be excellent, if I only had provisions ; the want of 
 which renders it but moderately good." 4 
 
 On the Narev the Vth corps was to continue safeguard- 
 ing the Emperor's extreme right flank, which had already 
 been, as we know, the task of this corps during the month 
 of February under Savkry. It is true, at that time 
 General Essen, who lay facing it, had, in the middle of the 
 month, endeavoured to threaten the Emperor's flank. This 
 movement, however, had been observed by Savary ; he went 
 
 1 C. N. To Soult, Osterode, 26th February, 11.30 p.m. 
 
 3 Precis des guenes du*Mare*chal de Turenne, XXXII. 149. 
 * C. N. To Soult, Osterode, 26th February, 5 p.m. 
 
 4 C. N. To Talleyrand, Osterode, 2;th February.
 
 FRIEDLAND 345 
 
 out to meet the Russians, and defeated them on the i6th 
 February at Ostrolenka. But Savary, who was one of 
 the Emperor's favourite mouthpieces, was now recalled to 
 personal attendance, and the command of the Vth 
 corps, which had been reinforced by a Bavarian division 
 under Wrede, was handed over to Massena on the 24th 
 February. It was to remain on the defensive as before. 
 
 The Emperor's chief concern was now the siege of 
 Danzig ; on the i7th Lefebvre received orders to proceed 
 to the investment of this place. In this connection we 
 can no longer avoid one question, the reply to which, 
 of whatever nature it be, must in any case be of impor- 
 tance in estimating the qualities of a general, namely, 
 what was this general's attitude with respect to the 
 art of fortification, what did he expect from it, what 
 use did he make of it ? And the more the nature of 
 Napoleon's method of waging war was offensive in 
 principle, the more will what he thought of the value of 
 fortifications, and what use he made of them, be of decisive 
 weight, according to the axiom, just in itself, but easily 
 misunderstood, that, "All fortification borrows its im- 
 portance only from its close connection with strategical 
 movements." ! 
 
 Napoleon had a high opinion of the value of the art of 
 fortification ; he called it " a difficult science, in which the 
 least mistakes may have a great influence upon the success 
 of a campaign and the fate of a nation ; " * he said : 
 " There are some military men who ask, what is the use 
 of fortresses, entrenched camps, and all the science of 
 engineering ? I, in my turn, should like to ask these men, 
 how it is possible to manoeuvre with inferior or equal 
 forces without the assistance of positions, fortifications, 
 and all such accessories of our art ? " ' One feature is 
 more especially to be noted in his opinion on all questions 
 
 1 Willisen, " Uebergrosse Landesvertheidigung," II. 343- 
 
 1 C. N. To the Directory, Alexandria, 28th July, 1799- 
 
 1 Pre'cis des gucrres du Marechal de Turenne, XXXII. 155.
 
 346 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of fortification, and that is the one which constituted his 
 great strength even in the field, namely, a uniformly 
 correct appreciation of the true nature of things and a 
 disregard for all minor considerations. He drew a sharp 
 distinction between what the art of fortification could 
 perform in each individual case and what it could not, and 
 never expected from one of its branches, or from it as a 
 whole, what it could not in fact perform. 
 
 As to the art of field-fortification, he himself wrote a 
 treatise of some length, 1 in which he accurately determined 
 its scope, distinguishing definitely between its various 
 tasks. He refers to works which may be thrown up in 
 five, fifteen, thirty minutes with the ordinary pioneer tools 
 every soldier should carry with him, and which, generally 
 speaking, are merely shelter-trenches; and he refers to 
 works which may, it is true, afford some kind of resistance 
 after an hour's labour, but which must be planned in such a 
 manner, that the labour of twenty hours more, developing 
 the original plan, may increase their strength to such an 
 extent, that under their protection an effective resistance 
 may be offered to an army twice as numerous as the 
 defenders, and in this respect he adds his opinion that : 
 " The natural positions, which one usually finds, cannot 
 protect an army in face of a superior army, without the 
 assistance of art." 2 
 
 On the other hand, as a class altogether different 
 from field-fortifications, he mentions temporary works, 
 which are to be resorted to along the line of com- 
 munications for the protection of important places. 
 In this case a heavier form of fortifications is to be em- 
 ployed, and regular engineers, not the troops themselves, 
 should throw them up. Their completion may occupy 
 some days, and it is specially mentioned that wood and 
 light masonry should be employed. The engineers are 
 reproached with the fact that they use the latter too little, 
 
 1 Essai sur la fortification de campagne, XXXI. 562. 
 
 8 Precis des guerresdu Marechal de Turenne, XXXII. 155.
 
 FRIEDLAND 347 
 
 and are advised to become familiar with this idea. As to 
 the employment of wood, we read : " Wooden-revetments 
 were used with the best effect during the 1807 campaign 
 in Poland, at Praga, and at Modlin, and during that of 1809 
 at Passau." * We have seen how during all his campaigns 
 he immediately ordered the places which he chose for 
 his depots, to be put in a state of defence against a coup- 
 de-main ; how the important bridges over the rivers, which 
 he took as his bases, were provided with strong bridge- 
 heads, and how, for this very reason, he could lengthen out 
 his lines of operations with impunity. The opinion is still 
 too much in vogue, though often vaguely expressed, that 
 the employment of fortification is necessarily incompatible 
 with the offensive. 
 
 The Emperor had a great idea that much could be 
 effected by improvised works: "With wood, tools, and 
 arms, a fortress can be created where there was not one 
 before." 2 But in spite of this favourable opinion of 
 the capability for defence of temporary fortifications, he 
 yet never forgot that they require defenders far more 
 numerous and reliable than are needed for permanent 
 ones. " It is my opinion, that an earthwork occasionally 
 has some advantages over a work in masonry, because 
 cannon balls occasionally bury themselves in it ; but 
 masonry has the advantage of allowing of economy with 
 respect to the garrison required." * " Magdeburg," he 
 said- in 1813, " is a large, beautiful and strongly fortified 
 place, which can be left to itself, as often and as long as 
 may be necessary, without any fear that it will be captured 
 by a sudden attack, however vigorous, as might have 
 happened to Dresden during the three days that the allies 
 remained before it, if they had been commanded by a 
 man of any ability." * 
 
 1 Essai sur la fortification de campagne, XXXI. 562. 
 : C. N. To Berthier, St. Cloud, joih September, 1806. Note on 
 the defence of the Inn and the occupation of Brandau. 
 ' C. N. Notes on the defence of Italy, Valladolid, uth January, 1808. 
 4 Gouvion, St.Cyr, Mem.
 
 348 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Now in what light did Napoleon view permanent 
 fortifications, what part did fortresses play in his opinion ? 
 In a most valuable letter to Dejean, 1 which in itself is a 
 complete treatise on the theory of fortresses, he explains 
 his views on this point : " We must here," he said, " set 
 down clearly our thoughts as to the use of fortified 
 places," and he then laid down three distinct instances : 
 (i.) a fort blocking a mountain pass, (ii.) a fortress, 
 and (iii.) a complete system of frontier -defence. These 
 remarks were occasioned by the question of the fortifica- 
 tion of Peschiera, and he examines under which of those 
 three heads this place would come. It is not a fort 
 blocking a pass, nor is it a bridge-head, for the Mincio 
 is not sufficiently important for this ; as a fortress it was 
 inferior to Mantua, and one such was sufficient for 
 every frontier; finally, it could not be looked upon as 
 a link in the system of frontier defence, for no system 
 existed apart from the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, 
 and so the enemy would simply avoid these places, or 
 mask them. 
 
 Consequently-he asks the questions, " Is then this place 
 Peschiera of no use ? Must we therefore have no 
 Peschiera ? " * And, with his inborn appreciation of facts 
 as they are, he replies at once : " If it were possible to 
 move Peschiera to S. Giorgio, or to any other point 
 commanded by Mantua, that is, if a place of the value of 
 Peschiera could be found in any other position, so that its 
 communication with Mantua could not be cut, I should 
 not hesitate a moment. But Peschiera stands where it 
 stands." * Thus he emphasizes the fact, that the impor- 
 tance of possessing a place may in itself be of sufficient 
 weight to compel the establishment of a fortress there, 
 even if it could affect the campaign in no other way than 
 by keeping out the enemy. 
 
 Moreover, in another document, when Osoppo was in 
 
 1 C. N. St. Cloud, 27th June, 1806. ' Ibid. 3 Ibid.
 
 FRIEDLAND 349 
 
 question, 1 he laid down two conditions as indispensable in 
 a fortress, first that it should be capable of defence by a 
 minimum of men, and secondly that a whole division 
 should be able to find shelter in it ; but he denies any real 
 connection between fortresses and field armies. " There- 
 fore I do not desire an entrenched camp, because, even if 
 we assume that it could fulfil the second condition, it 
 would not fulfil the first." * Indeed it was part of his 
 experience as a general, that it must be one of the necessary 
 qualifications of permanent fortresses that they should 
 lend themselves to a defence by few or inferior troops. 
 Even as a young officer he had said : " Only old troops are 
 able to face successfully the chances of a siege ; " * and at 
 the end of his career the experienced general knew that 
 it was the essential task of fortresses to set armies free for 
 the decisive campaign, and not swallow them up as 
 garrisons, and he said : " The garrisons of fortresses must 
 be recruited from the population, and not from the armies 
 in the field. This is the duty of the Local Militia regi- 
 ments, and the most honourable privilege of the National 
 Guard." 4 
 
 Thus, generally speaking, he expected nothing from his 
 fortresses, beyond securing certain important towns for 
 him ; he looked for no effective assistance from them, nor 
 for any immediate support of the field army in the latter's 
 task, i.e. the gaining victories. When for example, in 
 1807, the question of a retreat to Thorn had to be included 
 in the Emperor's considerations, he continued to advise 
 Lefebvre and Bernadotte, the two corps within reach of 
 that place, that they were only to cover Thorn, and not 
 to seek or find any protection or reinforcement there. 
 And yet "fortified places are as useful in defensive 
 as in offensive warfare. Doubtlessly they cannot by 
 themselves take the place of an army, but they are the 
 
 1 C N. To Eugene, Warsaw, I9th January, 1807. 
 
 * Ibid. * Sou per de Beaucaire. 
 
 4 Dixhuit, notes sur 1'art de la guerre, etc., xxxi. 499.
 
 35O NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 only possible means of stopping a victorious enemy, to 
 disturb, weaken and harass him ; " l and he declares the 
 real part a fortress should play is : "to allow a small body 
 of men, protected by its fortifications, to defend them- 
 selves ; to stop the enemy and preserve the magazines in 
 their charge against the attacks of considerably superior 
 numbers." * 
 
 But though the Emperor considered the defence of a 
 town as the first and most important task of a fortress, he 
 did not fail to recognize also, that, as a matter of fac^, the 
 influence of a fortress may extend beyond the range of the 
 guns on its walls. This influence he describes when 
 treating of the system of frontier fortification, i.e. national 
 defence on a large scale. As an example, in dealing with 
 the effectiveness of the line of the Rhine, he supposes that 
 a Prussian army desires to make its way to Brussels, in 
 order to effect a junction there with an English army. 
 The first obstacle would in this case be the line of 
 fortresses Wesel, Venloo, Maestricht and Stevensworth. 
 " If on the other hand," he continues, " this army crossed 
 the Rhine at Cologne, in order to be less within the reach 
 of Wesel, it would have to invest Jiilich ; " he therefore 
 ascribes to Wesel a certain sphere of influence, to use the 
 modern technical term. This is still further confirmed 
 by his continuing thus : '* An enemy crossing the Rhine 
 at Coblenz, would in the first place approach the sphere 
 of Mainz, would meet with obstacles in all the narrow 
 Moselle valleys ; he could not penetrate to Jiilich without 
 passing Bonn, because there is no other road, and he would 
 therefore again come within the reach of the ' system ' 
 of which we have already spoken (namely Wesel)." 
 Thus he considered himself safe along the whole extent 
 of the Rhine by the " systems " of Mainz and of Wesel 
 and the territory they command. On the other hand he 
 rejects the idea of a complete frontier blockade, such 
 
 1 Dixhuit, notes, etc., xxxi. 499. 
 
 3 Pre'cis des guerres de Fre*d. II. xxxii. 265.
 
 FRIEDLAND 351 
 
 as modern French engineering has established on the 
 Eastern Frontier. " It is no use trying to seal hermetically 
 a territory like that of France." 
 
 But indeed the condition of the fortification of France 
 itself up to the year 1870 was not altogether in con- 
 sonance with the principles which the Emperor held. 
 Thus he emphasized the fact, that, considering the great 
 number of French fortresses, France ought to employ her 
 money only in bringing the most important ones up to 
 the standard of modern requirements and leave the others 
 alone. " Here the principle must be laid down, that 
 every fortress is valuable. I should like to have one at 
 Orleans as the central point, which would contain all the 
 depots of France. But it is not a question of writing 
 romances, and what we have to consider is this: the 
 Government has only 1,200,000 or 1,500,000 francs to 
 spend on keeping up its fortresses ; is it better to use this 
 money to keep up carefully the fortresses of the first line, 
 or to distribute it over a number of places, leaving the 
 frontier in a bad condition ? " l And how little did the 
 condition of Strasburg in the August of 1870 correspond 
 to Napoleon's principle, that " the defence of a fortress is 
 not complete unless all military buildings are bomb-proof. 
 ... At the moment of investment it is too late to erect 
 bomb-proofs." 1 "You know my views as to buildings 
 and barracks that are not bomb-proof; they are always a 
 pretext for the surrender of a place." ' 
 
 It is true, the system of detached forts round a fortress 
 of the first rank was not yet fully developed in Napoleon's 
 time, yet he frequently wrote in terms which point to his 
 approval of it, and speaks of the advantages it offers. 
 Thus he said in a " Note on the defence of Corfu," 4 if one 
 had a fortified camp near the fortress, it might happen 
 
 1 C. N. To Clarke, Paris, I3th February, i8ia 
 1 C N. Orders with respect to the fortresses of Italy, Compi&gne, 
 1 9th April, 1810. 
 
 * C. N. To Clarke, Trianon, ;th August, 1810. 
 4 C. N. St. Cloud, 2ist June, 1810.
 
 352 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 that 5000 or 6000 Frenchmen would beat the enemy and 
 compel them as the result of that victory to embark again, 
 but if one were shut up in a fortress, one could no longer 
 take the offensive, and there would be no possibility of 
 further success. He therefore advised that five or six earth- 
 works should be constructed, and " care should be taken 
 that the sides exposed to the enemy's attack should have a 
 siege profile" that is, should be secure against assault ; " the 
 tracing should be so arranged that the works flank each 
 other mutually." He was further of opinion that this 
 would compel the enemy to open trenches against one or 
 two of those earthworks, but then the garrison would 
 proceed to construct counter-approaches and establish 
 batteries in these, which " will prevent the besieged from 
 being reduced to a passive part. Thus a commander and 
 good officers could bring to bear all the resources of war. 
 In a siege so conducted, the time necessary for mastering 
 such works cannot be accurately calculated." If any great 
 naval arsenal is in question, containing numerous and 
 irreplaceable war material, he added as a reason for the 
 construction of detached works : "To keep the bombard- 
 ment at a distance by means of these works ; " * and 
 also he said with respect to their defence : " If, as soon as 
 the enemy is discovered opening trenches against a fort, 
 counter-approaches are begun from the two nearest forts, 
 the resistance will become much enhanced, and the time 
 during which the first fort would be able to resist will be 
 indefinitely prolonged." But the question pf the fortifica- 
 tion of any great naval base had for him another side also. 
 On the 27th July, 1810, he dictated in a meeting of the 
 administrative council of the navy, a note * in which he 
 demonstrated that a mere bombardment would not be 
 sufficient for the enemy's purposes ; it must rather be their 
 intention to actually enter the area of the fortress, in order 
 to thoroughly destroy its war materials, its basins, etc. ; in 
 
 1 C. N. Note on Cherbourg, Rambouillet, 8th July, 1810. 
 C. N. St. Cloud.
 
 FRIEDLAND 353 
 
 this case only, they could inflict a really great loss, and, 
 therefore, he concluded, that the place must be not only 
 surrounded by outlying forts, but must also be provided 
 with a closed enceinte. For the rest, he was convinced 
 that land artillery is much superior to sea artillery : " at 
 sea the artillery is of but little account, on land its 
 superiority is immense ; the difference is in the proportion 
 of one to seven ; i.e. ten mortars on land are as effective as 
 seventy at sea." * 
 
 Bennigsen had set out on the 20th February and had 
 followed the retreating French corps, and when these 
 took up their positions, he posted himself in front of them 
 in the neighbourhood of Prussisch Eylau, the outposts 
 on both sides being in close contact. But Bennigsen 
 was of opinion that the Emperor would fall back behind 
 the Vistula, he would then immediately follow, whilst 
 Lestocq, at present near Heilsberg, was to march towards 
 Elbing. This view remained no secret to the Emperor. 
 " There is no doubt but that the enemy wish us to retire 
 behind the Vistula, but it is also probable that they 
 do not wish as yet to run the risk of a battle." * 
 Consequently Lestocq advanced by Wormditt and occu- 
 pied Braunsberg on the 24th, which place the French 
 evacuated. On the 26th, however, Bernadotte ordered, at 
 the Emperor's command, this place to be taken again, and 
 the Prussians were driven back behind the Passarge. Thus 
 secure on his left wing, the Emperor now turned his 
 attention to his right. 
 
 Here he saw the enemy very active owing to Bennig- 
 sen's recent arrival, but still remained convinced that 
 no general advance was intended. " I am of opinion 
 that the enemy is not ready, and that he is playing the 
 fool." * Should he, however, seriously advance towards 
 Mohrungen vid Gutstadt, the Emperor intended to fall 
 
 1 C. N. To Clarke, 2ist October, 1809. 
 * C. N. Berthier to Ney, Osterode, 26th February. 
 C. N. To Soult, Osterode, 2?th February, 4-3 P-m. 
 
 A a
 
 354 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 upon his right flank, through Mehlsack. In the meantime, 
 however, he enjoined Ney to hold Gutstadt, and thus to 
 cover the Passarge line, or, if he had evacuated that place, 
 to reoccupy it. Ney had in fact evacuated Gutstadt 
 during the night of the 26th-27th February, in view of 
 the threatening approach of Bennigsen, and had retreated 
 to Allenstein. Accordingly the Emperor, determining to 
 recover his outpost-line on the Alle in order to cover the 
 right flank of the line of the Passarge, sent orders to Ney 
 to recapture Gutstadt. But as there was a possibility of 
 strong resistance, the following corps were placed so as 
 to afford support, if needed : Bernadotte at Spanden, 
 Soult at Liebstadt, Davout at Mohrungen. 
 
 This forward movement was moreover to serve the 
 purpose of " capturing^ the enemy's cannon, frightening 
 them, routing their infantry, and giving them a hint not 
 to bring their artillery so close again, but to content them- 
 selves with observing us with their cavalry," l or, as the 
 Emperor very appositely expressed it in one sentence : 
 " This enterprise may be considered in the same light as 
 a sortie from a fortress ; " s this moreover confirms the 
 fact that he looked upon the position he held as a mere 
 defensive one. 
 
 Ney therefore occupied Gutstadt on the 3rd March 
 without any particular difficulty, and then the corps went 
 back into their former positions. Now began that period 
 of defence for the protection of the siege of Danzig, about 
 which the Emperor said at St. Helena, " Nothing was 
 more correctly planned . . . than the defensive position 
 on the Passarge in 1807, to cover the siege of Danzig." * 
 
 This period, during which, it is true, a few movements 
 and occasional concentrations, but no real change in the 
 positions, took place, is best characterized by the Emperor's 
 own words : " We have here a few marches and counter- 
 
 1 C. N. Orders and movements for the and and 3rd, Osterode, ist 
 March, 10 p.m. * Ibid. 
 
 ' Dixhuit, notes, etc., xxxi. 430.
 
 FRIEDLAND 355 
 
 marches, a little artillery-firing, but nothing of importance. 
 I have given orders to drive the enemy from Gutstadt. As 
 their outposts had taken up their position on the Passarge, 
 I had them swept away to a distance often hours' march." ' 
 Still he thought, if only his commissariat were safer and 
 the weather more favourable, he would be able to take the 
 offensive, beat the enemy in detail and reach Konigsberg, 
 for " the enemy have committed many blunders." * 
 
 As it was, however, he was determined to keep on the 
 defensive, though not quite passively. " A river or any line 
 can only be defended by occupying some offensive points, 
 for if one has done nothing but defend oneself, one has run 
 risks without having gained any results whatever ; but if one 
 can combine with the defence a few offensive movements, 
 the enemy will have run greater risks than the corps 
 attacked." s Therefore he gave urgent orders for bridge- 
 heads to be constructed along the Passarge, so that he might 
 be in a position to push forward whenever and wherever 
 the necessity should arise. This opinion of the Emperor 
 as to the defence of a river remained unchanged ; in 1808 
 he said : " No river, though it be as wide as the Vistula, 
 or as rapid as the Danube near its mouth, is any obstacle, 
 provided one has free access to the opposite bank and is 
 always ready to resume the offensive ; " * and even in 
 1813 he expresses himself in exactly the same manner as 
 regards the Elbe : " No river has ever yet been looked 
 upon as an obstacle which could stop an advance more 
 than a few days, and its passage can only be defended by 
 placing troops in large numbers in bridge-heads on the 
 opposite bank, ready to assume the offensive as soon as 
 the enemy begins crossing. 
 
 " Nothing is more dangerous than to try to defend a river 
 seriously by occupying the near bank in force, for as soon 
 
 1 C. N. To Talleyrand, Osterode, 6th March. 
 
 * C. N. To Bernadotte, Osterode, 6th March, midnight 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 4 C. N. Note on the Spanish affairs, St. Cloud, 3Oth August.
 
 356 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 as the enemy has forced a passage by a surprise and he 
 always does force it he finds the army in a very much 
 extended defensive position, and can prevent it concen- 
 trating." * If one be determined, as the Emperor resolved 
 to do behind the Passarge, to limit oneself altogether to 
 the defensive, "there is no other means than to place 
 one's troops in such positions that one can concentrate 
 them in mass and fall upon the enemy before he can com- 
 plete his passage." * This concentration in mass had, 
 in this instance, as we know already, been planned at 
 Osterode, in case Bennigsen should resume the offensive 
 with his whole army. Against any partial offensive, how- 
 ever, an active defence by forward movements from the 
 ttes-de-pont was to suffice. 
 
 But the manner in which the engineer here protected his 
 immediate base and possible line of defence, the Vistula, 
 by bridge-heads, did not meet with the Emperor's approval. 
 For these, being constructed too close to the river 1 , did 
 not seem to him to offer the necessary space for affording 
 shelter to the troops during the protracted operation 
 of crossing the river in case of a forced retreat. At St. 
 Helena he said on this subject : " They (the engineers) 
 ought to leave room between the works and the river, so 
 that an army without having to enter them, a move- 
 ment which might endanger its safety, can form into line 
 and assemble between the works and the bridge. . . . The 
 bridge-heads which the engineers constructed in front of 
 Marienwerder were quite close to the Vistula, and would 
 have been of but little use to the army if it had been forced 
 to cross that river in its retreat." * 
 
 The Emperor's untiring activity soon succeeded in 
 regulating the difficult questions of commissariat and 
 putting the army in a secure position. The reinforcements 
 also and the transport of the wounded to the rear were 
 
 1 C. N. To Eugene, Trianon, iqth March. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 8 Precis des guerres du Mare'chal de Turenne.
 
 FRIEDLAND 357 
 
 seen to very carefully, and the Emperor again ordered 
 a levy of 80,000 fresh recruits, who, by law, were not 
 liable until 1808. His activity indeed was extraordinary 
 during these weeks, he dictated as many as twenty letters 
 in one day. On the ist April he moved his head- 
 quarters to the castle of Finkenstein, " a very handsome 
 chateau in the style of that of Bessieres, where I have 
 many open fireplaces, which is very pleasant for me, for, 
 as I often get up in the night, I like to see a fire." The 
 Guards also were moved to the neighbourhood of Finken- 
 stein. 
 
 The only military action of any importance during this 
 period was the siege of Danzig, which was prosecuted 
 most vigorously This town had been invested since 
 the I2th March, and only after its surrender were the 
 operations in the field to be resumed. " I am waiting 
 until the season is more favourable, until Danzig is taken 
 and until all my provisional regiments have come up, in 
 order to deal a knock-down blow."' To secure his com- 
 munications with the besieging corps, the Emperor 
 also ordered bridges to be thrown across at Marienwerder 
 and Marienburg, and bridge-heads to be constructed 
 there. 
 
 Then he turned his attention to his extreme right wing, 
 where Massena lay, and sent him instructions as to the 
 manner in which he might best place his corps in position. 
 This corps, he said, had three purposes to serve : first, 
 to cover Warsaw ; secondly, to form the right wing of the 
 army ; and thirdly, to assume art offensive attitude, in 
 order to occupy the enemy. Now, which would be the 
 best position to answer all three purposes ? The enemy 
 might advance against Warsaw either along the Bug or 
 along the Narev. Accordingly Massena's best position 
 for the first purpose would be at Schyerozk, for the higher 
 up the Narev his position was the less he could cover 
 Warsaw. The second purpose, on the other hand, would 
 1 C. N. To Kellcrman, Elbing. 8th May
 
 358 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 demand a position on the Omulev, near Willenberg and 
 near Ostrolenka, whilst the third would be best answered 
 by a position at Ostrolenka. For this latter would either 
 invite the enemy in this direction, in which case its natural 
 strength would become a great factor, or from it an 
 attack could be made upon the flank and rear of the 
 enemy, should he advance along the Bug. Therefore 
 Massena was advised to place one division in a fortified 
 camp at Ostrolenka and the other at Willenberg. 
 
 In the meantime the siege of Danzig had been energeti- 
 cally prosecuted, though the Emperor saw himself com- 
 pelled to spur on Lefebvre's energy by frequent and 
 resolute exhortations. For this Marshal exhibited too 
 much care and caution, and listened to every sugges- 
 tion. The Emperor admonished him repeatedly to 
 adhere to the plan once adopted, and advised him 
 " to get rid of all these little critics by kicking them 
 out." 1 At last on the 26th May this bravely defended 
 place had to be surrendered. With this event the main 
 condition was fulfilled, which the Emperor had fixed for 
 leaving the defensive, and he settled upon the loth June 
 for the resumption of operations ; but Bennigsen once 
 more anticipated him. 
 
 (63b) The situation of the two armies was at this time 
 as follows. In consequence of the orders of the 
 5th May, the French corps had left their cantonments 
 and gone into huts; Bernadotte, with 27,000 men, 
 lay on the Lower Passarge; Soult, with 31,000 men, 
 around Liebstadt on the Middle Passarge ; Davout, with 
 29,000 men, on the upper course of this little river. Ney, 
 with 17,000 men, was still in his advanced position near 
 Gutstadt on the Alle ; the Guards, as already mentioned, 
 8000 strong, lay at Finkenstein ; Murat's cavalry, 21,000 
 men, were divided up. Finally, on the right flank, stood 
 Massena, with 26,000 men, on the Omulev and the 
 Narev; the latter had, however, not fully carried out 
 1 C. N. Finkenstein, i8th May, u a.m.
 
 FRIEDLAND 
 
 359 
 
 Napoleon's instructions, and was, therefore, neither in 
 possession of Ostrolenka, nor in command of the Narev. 
 In addition, there had been formed, on the 5th May, 
 a reserve corps, 15,000 men, under Lannes, consisting of 
 the divisions of OudinoJ and Verdier, which now stood 
 at Marienburg, and lastly Mortier, with 14,000 men, had 
 been moved up to Danzig. The Xth Corps, Lefebvre's, 
 however, which had besieged Danzig, was ' broken up 
 and partly employed as a garrison of this place, and 
 partly incorporated in the other corps. Finally, in the 
 rear of the army, there was a corps of observation, newly 
 formed on the 2gth April, 32,000 men, under Brune, for 
 the protection of the North Sea coast and the North 
 German lowlands. Facing them stood Bennigsen at 
 Heilsberg and Bartenstein with 74,000 men, Lestocq with 
 18,000 men at Heiligenbeil in front of the Lower Passarge, 
 and Tolstoi with 15,000 men, at Ostrolenka and on the 
 Narev. 
 
 In the execution of his offensive plan Bennigsen 
 intended thus to march forward against Ney, on the 
 5th June, in five columns, attacking him on every side, 
 whilst 10,000 men were to take up a position at Elditten 
 so as to occupy Soult, and Lestocq was to hold 
 Bernadotte. Accordingly Ney saw himself on the 5th 
 from 6 a.m., continually forced back upon Gutstadt by 
 increasing forces of the enemy, and reported this attack 
 immediately to the Emperor. The latter was loth, it is true, 
 to believe as yet in a general offensive movement on the part 
 of the enemy, still he informed the other marshals of the 
 news, as soon as it reached him, at 2 p.m., and ordered 
 Murat to assemble his cavalry divisions, namely, Lasalle 
 and Latour-Maubourg at Elbing, Espagne at Marienburg, 
 Nansouty at Christburg, St. Sulpice at Bischofswerder, 
 Grouchy at Strasburg, and Milhaud at Soldau. 
 
 Meanwhile Ney had assembled his corps at Gutstadt, 
 and had, in view of the superior forces threatening him, 
 begun his retreat to Ankendorf. Soult also had been
 
 360 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 attacked by the column sent against him, and Bernadotte 
 by Lestocq. They had, however, held the bridges over the 
 Passarge at Lomitten and Spanden. Further reports 
 from Ney had, meanwhile, convinced the Emperor that 
 the Russians were really in earnest with their offensive, 
 and he therefore gave Lannes orders to start on the 
 6th as early as possible and to march to Christburg ; 
 Mortier, who had reached Dirschau, was to follow close 
 upon his heels. At the same time the Emperor sent an 
 aide-de-camp to Deppen, who was personally to examine 
 the situation of affairs on this portion of the field of 
 operations. 
 
 During the night the report of Ney's retreat came in, 
 and in the morning of the 6th the Emperor sent to 
 Ney to make a stand at Ankendorf, if possible; if not, 
 he was to fall back towards the South of the Narien 
 Lake. Soult he ordered to Mohrungen, and Bernadotte to 
 Prussisch-Holland. The latter marshal, who had been 
 wounded on the 5th, was on the 6th replaced in 
 his command by Victor. Davout was to move up to 
 the Passarge towards Alt-Ramten, and the cavalry 
 divisions of Grouchy and Milhaud to Osterode; finally, 
 the Guards were set in motion towards Saalfeld. As 
 usual, the Emperor wished, if the enemy continued his 
 offensive, to concentrate his army before beginning 
 operations. He thus drew back his more advanced corps 
 and advanced those in the rear, all in the general direction 
 of Saalfeld ; here was to be the central point of concen- 
 tration of the army, and to this place he also betook 
 himself. In this way he had, it is true, set the concen- 
 tration of all his forces going by noon on the 6th June, 
 but how and in what direction he would advance with 
 them, he left for the present to depend on the further 
 reports which would come in about the enemy, until 
 the moment when he himself would be ready to move. 
 He calculated that the whole of the 7th June would pass 
 before this would be the case.
 
 FRIEDLAND 361 
 
 Ney continued his retreat on the 6th, before Bennigsen, 
 who was still advancing, and crossed the Passarge un- 
 molested at Deppen, taking up a position there. No 
 further attacks had been made upon the other marshals. 
 Thus the Emperor, on his arrival in Saalfeld, about 10 
 o'clock in the evening, found himself still in possession of 
 the Passarge, while Bennigsen's offensive seemed to 
 him to have come to a stop. He credited the latter 
 for the moment with the project of turning the French 
 right wing vid Allenstein, thereby cutting the French off 
 from their base on the Vistula at Thorn. The Emperor, 
 however, laid stress upon the fact that this was a mistake, 
 and that his base was the Lower Vistula, and that he 
 had adopted the line of communication Marienwerder- 
 Marienburg- Danzig ; consequently his plan was still 
 to use Davout, who was to move up as quickly as possible 
 to Osterode, as a pivot, and thus to force the enemy away 
 from Konigsberg, turning his right wing. Therefore the 
 Emperor had in the evening of the 6th June : Victor (64a) 
 at Spanden, Braunsberg remaining in the occupation of 
 the division of Dupont ; Soult at Liebstadt ; Ney at 
 Deppen, Davout at Allenstein ; Lannes and Mortier in 
 the neighbourhood of Christburg; the cavalry concen- 
 trated on the different points mentioned. In front of him* 
 stood Bennigsen at Heiligenthal with his outposts on the 
 Passarge; Lestocq at Mehlsack and Heiligenbeil, with 
 his outposts likewise forward as far as the Passarge. 
 
 On the 7th this situation underwent a change. 
 Bennigsen became convinted that his purpose of attack- 
 ing one of the enemy's corps in an isolated position had 
 failed, and that he now stood with inferior numbers 
 before the Emperor's army, which would soon be 
 fully assembled ; he therefore resolved to fall back 
 into a favourable defensive position, and to begin with, he 
 retreated in the evening of that day to Queetz. The 
 Emperor on his side, however, recognized that the 
 enemy's offensive had come to an end against the bridge-
 
 362 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 heads on the Passarge, and he resolved in his turn to 
 take the offensive as soon as he had all his corps 
 at hand. The 7th was, therefore, utilized, to order 
 Lannes and Mortier up to Mohrungen, at which place 
 and at Deppen Murat's divisions were also concentrated, 
 whilst Soult and Victor were at the same time instructed 
 to advance across the Passarge, in order to find out the 
 enemy's intentions. " I am still trying to guess what the 
 enemy really intends to do ; the whole affair looks to me 
 very much like an ill-considered stroke. I am this day 
 assembling my infantry and cavalry reserves near 
 Mohrungen and shall try to discover the enemy, so as to 
 force him to a pitched battle and make an end of it all." l 
 He himself went towards evening to join Ney, and 
 established his headquarters at Alt-Reichau. 
 
 Early on the 8th Soult advanced vid Elditten towards 
 Wolfsdorf and forced some hostile troops, without any 
 particular difficulty, to evacuate this place, whilst Victor 
 engaged Lestocq's attention by various feints ; in front 
 the Emperor allowed only reconnoitring parties to cross 
 the Passarge at Deppen on this day. In the meantime the 
 enemy's main army retreated to Glottau, and then during 
 the night as far'as Gutstadt. On the next morning the 
 (64b) Emperor set off at 3 o'clock and advanced with his whole 
 army towards Gutstadt ; the enemy's rearguard, stationed 
 at Queetz, was thrown back, and in the evening the main 
 mass of his army stood in and behind Gutstadt, Davout 
 at Ankendorf, Soult at Altkirch, Mortier being still a 
 day's march behind on the other side of the Passarge. 
 Bennigsen had continued his retreat and reached Heils- 
 berg, where he occupied a position he had prepared and 
 entrenched some time before, on the two sides of the 
 Gutstadt road, with his right wing on the Alle and his left 
 resting on a marshy brook, the Sims. 
 
 But the Emperor did not- intend to follow him on the 
 right bank of the Alle ; but rather to turn the enemy's 
 1 C. N. To Bemadotte, Saalfeld, 7th June, 1 1 a.m.
 
 FRIEDLAXD 363 
 
 right wing entirely, so as to cut him off from his communi- 
 cation with Konigsberg. He therefore ordered Soult and 
 Lannes, with Murat in advance of them, to march along 
 the left bank of the Alle and to move towards Heilsberg, 
 in order to arrest the enemy there, whilst Davout and 
 Mortier were to proceed with the turning movement. 
 Ney and the Guards were kept in reserve. Victor was 
 to continue occupying Lestocq's attention. 
 
 In executing these orders Murat encountered at 8 o'clock 
 on the morning of the loth at Launau, a weak Russian 
 vanguard, stationed there, on the left bank of the Alle, and 
 threw it back upon Bewernicken ; thereupon Soult came 
 up and captured the village of Lavden, in spite of the fact 
 that the Russians brought up more and more troops from 
 the right bank, whilst Murat continued his advance viA 
 Langwiese. Though Bennigsen now kept ordering up 
 troops from the right bank of the Alle to the left, the 
 French continued their advance and the Russians had to 
 fall back upon Heilsberg. About 10 o'clock the Emperor 
 arrived on the field of battle, and when he observed 
 that the Russians were falling back upon Heilsberg, with- 
 out having offered any particularly obstinate resistance, he 
 immediately ordered Murat and Soult in vigorous pursuit, 
 though he had no other forces at hand. For it was part 
 of his plan to arrest and occupy his enemy here as much 
 as ever possible. 
 
 However, close before Heilsberg he met at 6 p.m. with (65a) 
 a determined resistance at the earthworks thrown up 
 there, and the enemy soon mustered courage to make a 
 counter attack and threw the French with heavy loss back 
 behind the Spui brook. But soon after 9 o'clock Lannes 
 arrived on the battle-field, and. the Emperor, annoyed 
 at seeing the day end with failure, immediately ordered 
 him to attack the Russians, but Lannes also was soon 
 forced back again and with most severe loss. It was now 
 past ii o'clock, and night put an end to the fighting, 
 very opportunely for the French, as one of the combatants,
 
 364 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 Savary, confesses. Of the other corps, Davout had reached 
 Altkirch, Ney and the Guards were within reach of 
 Gutstadt, and Mortier was in the neighbourhood of 
 Heiligenthal. The Emperor bivouacked for the night on 
 the hills to the north-west of Bewernicken ; the final 
 failure of the day had put him in a bad humour ; still he 
 expected to see the enemy retreat the next morning, and 
 hoped thus to pose as a victor after all. 
 
 But the morning of the nth June showed this expec- 
 tation to have been altogether false ; the Russian army 
 had remained in its position at Heilsberg, and the 
 Emperor, enlightened by his severe losses of the preceding 
 day as to their powers of resistance, now resolved first to 
 order up the whole mass of his army and to initiate his 
 turning movement before risking a fresh appeal to arms. 
 Accordingly Ney and the Guards were ordered up to 
 Launau and Mortier to Altkirch, whilst Davout was to 
 march towards Grossendorf, and thus gain Bennigsen's 
 right flank. This latter movement rendered the position 
 at Heilsberg untenable, and the Russian General therefore 
 withdrew his army with the fall of night to the right bank 
 of the Alle and marched to Bartenstein, where he arrived 
 during the afternoon of the I2th. 
 
 On the morning of the I2th the Emperor also, observing 
 the position of Heilsberg to be evacuated, started, but not 
 in pursuit of the Russian army ; on the contrary, he took 
 the direction of Prussisch-Eylau, so as to intercept 
 Bennigsen from Konigsberg ; only some cavalry was 
 sent in pursuit of the Russians. Consequently Davout 
 marched to Prussisch-Eylau, Murat, Soult, and Lannes 
 following him on the road to this place ; Ney marched to 
 Eichhorn and Mortier to Heilsberg ; to this latter place 
 the Imperial Headquarters also were moved. Victor also 
 received orders to come up to Prussisch-Eylau ; he had on 
 the morning of the loth been ordered to repulse Lestocq 
 beyond Mehlsack. On this wing the adversaries tran- 
 quilly remained face to face until the evening of the nth,
 
 FRIEDLAND 365 
 
 but then Victor started, according to his orders, during 
 the night, -viA Spanden, and marched upon Mehlsack. 
 Lestocq, who had captured the first officer sent to Victor 
 with this order, had thereby gained information of his 
 intentions, and retreated before daybreak on the I2th to 
 Zinten. 
 
 During the night from the I2th to the I3th, Bennigsen (65b) 
 again started, reached Schippenbeil in the morning and 
 took up a position behind this town ; but being in- 
 formed of the presence of the French at Domnau, he 
 immediately continued his retreat to Friedland, where his 
 army arrived in the course of the evening. Lestocq had 
 fallen back upon Konigsberg thai day, and taken up a 
 position in front of this town at Gollau during the after- 
 noon. The Emperor, who had arrived at Prussisch-Eylau 
 in the early morning of the I3th, was in doubt as to the 
 direction of Bennigsen's march. He therefore sent, at n 
 o'clock, orders to Murat to advance towards Kbnigsberg, 
 in order to clear up the situation, Soult and Davout having 
 before this already been set in motion in the same direc- 
 tion, the former towards Konigsberg, the latter towards 
 Wittenberg, whilst Lannes advanced on the right flank to 
 Lampasch and his cavalry reconnoitred in the direction 
 of Domnau. Ney, Mortier and Victor were all to come 
 up to Prussisch-Eylau, and then the Emperor intended to 
 wait in the centre of all these movements, to see at what 
 point he should finally throw the force massed at Eylau 
 into the scale. 
 
 In the afternoon he received news of Bennigsen's 
 march to Schippenbeil, and at once instructed Lannes to 
 go-to Domnau. Meanwhile Murat had met with Lestocq 
 at Gollau, but could not engage him seriously with his 
 cavalry. But from Lannes there came news during the 
 evening, that the enemy appeared to be at Friedland, 
 though the Emperor did not think it could be his main 
 body there. He therefore ordered- Lannes to advance to 
 Friedland, and contented himself with sending only the
 
 366 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 cavalry division of Grouchy after the Russians. Murat, 
 Soult and Davout were to continue their march towards 
 Konigsberg and to try to reach this town with all 
 speed. Thus, in the evening of the I3th, Murat stood at 
 Wittenberg, with Davout behind him on the Frisching ; 
 Soult at Kreuzburg, Ney at Schmoditten, and Mortier at 
 Lampasch ; the latter, however, started in the same 
 night to follow Lannes ; the Guards and Victor were at 
 Prussisch-Eylau, and Lannes on the march vid Domnau 
 to Friedland. 
 
 (66a) About 3 a.m. on the I4th June the leading column of 
 Lannes' corps, Oudinot's division, appeared in front of 
 Friedland, and took ug a position at Posthenen near the 
 mill-dam. Bennigsen, who still persisted in his plan of 
 continuing his march to Wehlau, determined, however, 
 first to attack Lannes, whom he thought to encounter by 
 himself, and thus to gain a partial success. He therefore 
 began to move his army through Friedland, to the left 
 bank of the Alle, and to place it in position there ; this 
 was done at 9 o'clock in such a manner that Hein- 
 richsdorf lay in front of his right wing, whilst his left 
 leant upon the forest of Sortlack. 
 
 Bennigsen now wished to advance, and to capture 
 Heinrichsdorf with his right wing, for Lannes had 
 occupied this village also by extending his line. At 
 the same time, however, the head of Mortier's corps, 
 the division of Dupas, arrived ; the Russians were 
 repulsed and retreated to their former position, where 
 they remained stationary for a few hours, without under- 
 taking anything of importance ; only the artillery duel 
 continued with varying intensity. During this time there 
 
 (66b) arrived there in succession the rest of Lannes' corps, 
 Ney, the Guards, and Victor, who had been hurriedly 
 despatched thither by the Emperor after the receipt of 
 the repeated reports from Lannes as to the state of 
 affairs. The Emperor himself, hastening on in front, 
 reached the battle-field about noon, and, taking advantage
 
 FRIEDLAND 367 
 
 of Bennigsen's inactivity, made his preparations and 
 reconnoitred the enemy minutely. At three o'clock 
 he issued from his bivouac at Posthenen the orders 
 for the attack, when all his corps had come up ; 
 these orders we quote here verbatim, as an example ot 
 the simple and clear wording of his commands, and as an 
 example of how he addressed only the officers im- 
 mediately under him, and left to these all the details of 
 execution, merely indicating the movement as a whole in 
 firm and bold outlines : 
 
 " Marshal Ney will form the right wing from Pos- 
 thenen as far as Sortlack and rest upon General Oudinot's 
 previous position. Marshal Lannes will form the centre, 
 taking up the line on the left of Marshal Ney at Heinrichs- 
 dorf, and extending to about opposite the village of 
 Posthenen. Oudinot's Grenadiers, which at present form 
 Marshal Lannes' right wing, will gradually move to the 
 left, in order to attract the enemy's attention to them. 
 Marshal Lannes will withdraw his divisions as much as 
 possible, so as to have the chance of forming them 
 into two lines. Marshal Mortier will form the left 
 wing, and draw up his lines facing the Russian right 
 wing, whilst keeping a hold on Heinrichsdorf and the 
 Konigsberg road. Marshal Mortier will not advance at 
 all, as the movement is to be executed by our right wing, 
 which will wheel round on the left as a pivot. 
 
 "General Espagne's cavalry and General Grouchy's 
 dragoons, joining the cavalry of the left wing, will 
 manoeuvre in such a manner as to inflict the greatest 
 possible loss upon the enemy, as soon as the vigorous 
 attack of our right wing forces him to see the necessity 
 of retreating. 
 
 " General Victor and the Imperial Guards, horse and 
 foot, will form the reserve and be stationed at Griinhof, 
 Bothkeim, and behind Posthenen. 
 
 " Lahoussaye's division of dragoons will receive its 
 orders from General Victor; Latour-Maubourg's division
 
 368 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 of dragoons will look to Marshal Ney for its orders; 
 General Nansouty's heavy cavalry division will place 
 itself at Marshal Lannes' disposal and take part in the 
 battle along with the cavalry of the reserve corps in the 
 centre. 
 
 " I shall be with the reserve. 
 
 " The advance is to be made from the right and the 
 initiative is to be left to Marshal Ney, who will wait for 
 my orders before starting. 
 
 ""At the moment when the right wing advances against 
 the enemy, all the cannon along the whole line will 
 redouble their fire in the given direction, so as to support 
 the attack of that wing." 
 
 This order contained everything essential ; every officer 
 knew what was expected of him, and what his position 
 was to be in the line of battle ; a force was told off as a 
 reserve ; the place where the commander-in-chief was to 
 be found fixed, and Napoleon reserved to himself the 
 beginning of the attack. On the other hand, the 
 Emperor avoided giving instructions or fixing positions 
 by the map so exactly that the troops would after- 
 wards, when on the spot, either endeavour to execute 
 the orders too literally, and thereby encounter un- 
 dreamed-of difficulties, or be compelled after all to depart 
 from them, a proceeding which would have a bad effect 
 in proportion to the minuteness of the details given. He 
 who gives too minute orders, and weighs all chances in 
 advance, only accustoms his subordinates to a want of 
 self-reliance, without ensuring that his instructions will 
 be any better carried out. We see thus, that it was 
 the Emperor's general idea, only to engage the enemy's 
 attention with his left wing, whilst making an attack upon 
 Friedland with his right wing, supported by the fire of 
 his combined artillery, capturing the bridges, thus block- 
 ing the Russian retreat and exposing them to utter 
 destruction. 
 
 At 5 o'clock the Emperor gave the signal for the
 
 FRIEDLAND 369 
 
 attack. Bennigsen had already taken steps for a retreat 
 behind the Alle, when his troops were by the enemy's 
 attack compelled to show front again. In accordance 
 with the orders, Ney began the movement by advancing 
 vigorously along the Alle towards Friedland. He came (66c) 
 indeed close to this town, but was here received by the 
 Russian left wing, which had fallen back as far as this, 
 with such an overwhelming fire, that his corps wavered and 
 began to fall into confusion : the Russians took advantage 
 of this, and Ney was completely routed. 
 
 But in the meantime the Emperor had already moved 
 up Victor through Posthenen, and his foremost division, 
 Dupont's, made its way through the midst of Ney's 
 disorganized troops and threw the Russians back again 
 on Friedland. Immediately after this General Senarmont 
 brought the entire artillery of Victor's corps, thirty-six 
 guns, which he had collected under his command, in one 
 mass close up to the Russian line, and the fire of these 
 enormously increased the confusion of the Russians, 
 crowded together near Friedland. The latter retreated (66d) 
 now as fast as they possibly could, through Friedland and 
 across the Alle, whilst Ney, who had reorganized his 
 troops somewhat, went in pursuit, and Dupont, crossing 
 the mill-stream, entered the town along the Konigsberg 
 road. At 8 o'clock Friedland was in the hands of the 
 French. In the centre and on the left wing, Lannes and 
 Mortier had, according to the Emperor's plan, remained 
 stationary to begin with, and had then contented them- 
 selves with repulsing an attack of the Russian right wing ; 
 this latter now also began, in consequence of the events 
 described above, its retreat to Friedland, in order to 
 escape over the lower Alle bridge. But Lannes went in 
 pursuit ; the bridge was burnt down prematurely, before 
 the Russians had all crossed, and their right wing, thus 
 cut off, was annihilated by the artillery-fire of the French. 
 By this time night had completely come on, and in the 
 course of it Bennigsen fell back upon Wehlau. 
 
 B b
 
 370 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 (67a) Whilst the Emperor fought a battle at Friedland, 
 Murat, Soult and Davout had, on the I4th, advanced 
 further towards Konigsberg; they forced Lestocq into 
 that place and invested it from the left bank of the Pregel. 
 
 (67b) With Friedland the war was at an end. During the 
 next few days Bennigsen, having crossed the Pregel in 
 the forenoon of the I5th at Wehlau, retreated to Tilsit, 
 whither Lestocq also moved, having given up Konigsberg. 
 On the i8th the army crossed the Niemen. The Emperor 
 had followed Bennigsen on the right bank of the Alle with 
 some cavalry only ; but with the mass of his army he 
 proceeded along the left bank to Wehlau, where he 
 crossed the Pregel on the i6th and I7th ; on the i8th he lay 
 beyond Great Schrannau and established his headquarters 
 in Great Skaisgirren. He was determined " to march to 
 Tilsit and fight a battle with the enemy, if he should have 
 the audacity to make a show of awaiting us " ; l but should 
 the enemy, without concluding peace, retreat into the 
 interior-of Russia, he would not follow, but, resuming the 
 defensive, give his troops some rest, and await, on the 
 Niemen, the renewed appearance of the enemy. The 
 next day, the igth, Murat entered Tilsit. On the same 
 day, however, proposals for an armistice, on the part 
 of Bennigsen, were accepted by the Emperor, and the 
 hostilities came herewith to an end. 
 
 The battle of Friedland had, it is true, like Jena, come 
 about through the Emperor's encountering the enemy 
 where he did not expect him, yet it does not in any way 
 bear the stamp of an accidental battle, but was, just like 
 Ansterlitz, prepared for and led up to according to a fixed 
 plan. Two circumstances were of importance for the 
 tactical decision of this battle : the direction of the 
 various corps and the full utilization of the fighting 
 strength of the troops. But the fighting strength in 
 modern tactics is equivalent to the firing strength, for 
 "battles are nowadays decided by fire and not by 
 1 C. N. To Murat.
 
 FRIEDLAND 371 
 
 shock." The direction of the troops is the business oi the 
 leader, and we saw at Austerlitz how much the Emperor 
 was master of this art. But the value of the other factor 
 rests upon the organization and education of the armies 
 themselves, namely, upon the possession of a practical 
 method of fighting and upon a thorough excellence of the 
 individual soldiers in shooting. If the troops have not 
 proper tactical methods, so as to render their excellence in 
 shooting of effect, they may, like the English lately in 
 Africa, fail even against savages;* and if, on the other 
 hand, the individual soldier is not thoroughly drilled in 
 shooting, the best weapon and the best tactical methods 
 will fail to render their fire effective. The Emperor knew 
 this very well. " It is not sufficient that the soldier 
 should shoot, he must shoot well ; " 3 and the right 
 tactical form he had found to lie in those close swarms 
 of sharpshooters which preceded his attacks, led up to 
 them, nay, often decided them. The importance of 
 artillery-fire also he recognized and dwelt on. " A good 
 infantry is without doubt the backbone of the army, 
 but if it had to fight long against superior artillery, it 
 would be discouraged and disorganized ; " 4 and as to the 
 employment of artillery, his principle was : " The artillery, 
 like the other arms, must be collected in mass, if one 
 wishes to attain a decisive result." 5 Of the manner in 
 which he applied this principle, Senarmont's action gives 
 us an example here. 
 
 With respect to its strategy, the campaign of Friedland 
 is one of the most interesting fought by the Emperor, and 
 furnishes food for much reflection. The great critic of 
 this epoch does not approve of the conduct of the cam- 
 paign in question. Arrived at Gutstadt, two ways were (64b) 
 open to the Emperor, either to advance along the right 
 
 1 Me"m.de Ste. Hel Essai sur la fortification de la campagne, xxxi. 551. 
 
 1 The author is alluding to Zululand. ED. 
 
 C. N. To Eugene. Posen, 5th December, 1806. 
 
 4 Dixhuit, Notes, &c., xxxi. 395. 
 
 1 C. N. To Eugene. Schonbrunn, i6th June, 1809, 5 p.m.
 
 372 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL 
 
 bank of the Alle, with his right wing forward, and to throw 
 the enemy back upon Konigsberg and towards the sea ; 
 strategy, according to Jomini, should have prompted this 
 course ; or, to advance on the left bank of the Alle, left 
 wing forward, cut off the enemy from Konigsberg, throw 
 him back completely, but still in the direction of his own 
 frontiers ; this is what the Emperor did. Abstract 
 criticisms and the study of the campaign on the map will 
 always compel us to agree with Jomini. With the operation 
 against the left wing of the enemy the war itself would 
 have been decided, whether Bennigsen were driven into 
 Konigsberg or forced back towards the sea. What was 
 it then that induced the Emperor to march with his left 
 forward ? 
 
 In contradiction to his whole procedure hitherto, it was 
 his consideration of secondary circumstances, though 
 these were very weighty in themselves. He had selected 
 his line of communication with Danzig through a very 
 fertile country, for he had just had some experience of the 
 misery arising from want of food. It was difficult now to 
 change his base once more to Thorn, and by a line passing 
 through an exhausted country ; the army already trended 
 more towards the left than the right ; the enemy was not 
 at all unwilling, as it seemed, to go to Konigsberg, and it 
 is, as a rule, advisable to act contrary to the enemy's 
 intentions. All these were good and practical reasons, 
 which led the Emperor to act as he did. 
 
 Still we must say that what is characteristic of a 
 general of genius as contrasted with the merely able 
 general, is to put aside all such difficulties or to overcome 
 them, where it is a question of fixing on the point which 
 will decide the whole campaign irrevocably. For a 
 Bennigsen, a Soult, the campaign of Friedland would 
 have been a glorious one, on account of its vigorous and 
 excellent strategy, but the Emperor had accustomed us 
 to greater things ; he had accustomed us to find from the 
 first in his plan of operations the strategical thought, which
 
 FRIEDLAND 373 
 
 must necessarily lead to the ultimate decision ; it was by 
 so acting that he has become our ideal. But here it was 
 different, and the result proves the correctness of Jomini's 
 criticism. In spite of a brilliant carrying out of his plan, (67b) 
 in spite of a complete victory, the Emperor, having 
 arrived on the Niemen, was forced to acknowledge that 
 he was not yet the absolute master of his opponent's 
 movements, nor of the situation, and that his opponent, 
 by a mere retreat within his own frontiers, could, though 
 beaten, force him to resume his defensive. Such had 
 not been the case after Marengo, after Ulm, after Jena, 
 nor could it have become so. What would have 
 happened if Bennigsen had retreated into Russia, perhaps 
 even, as might have happened, without having been 
 beaten at all, if the Emperor Alexander had not concluded 
 peace ? It would have been impossible to follow him ; 
 this would only have led to a kind of preliminary rehearsal 
 of 1812, indeed, to remain stationary on the defensive on 
 the Niemen was the only thing left to the Emperor, and. 
 as we have seen, this was what he resolved to do ; but 
 what a miserable ending to a campaign ! Thus, it is true, 
 the campaign of Friedland proved once more that resolu- 
 tion and energy are the principal factors in the conduct 
 of war. But although the Emperor did gain the victory, 
 and assuredly it was well deserved, we no longer find a 
 conception which must inevitably bring the whole war 
 to an issue, and that a successful one. 
 
 The Emperor's military genius had reached high-water 
 mark, and its waves were beginning to fluctuate. It 
 was still capable of great things, but although the ebb 
 had not yet commenced, there were no longer any 
 indications of a rising tide. 
 
 END OF VOL. I. 
 
 GILBERT ANO HIVIwtfTOM, LTD., T. JOHN'S HOUSK, CLMKBNWBUt, LONDON, K.C.
 
 A 001 291 817
 
 TITLES OF NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS AND OF HIS MOST 
 PROMINENT GENERALS AND MINISTERS. 
 
 As many of Napoleon's marshals and most prominent generals and 
 ministers are frequently mentioned by their titles of nobility, which are 
 less known than their proper names, the reader will find the following 
 lists convenient for reference. 
 
 MARSHALS. 
 
 Augereau, appointed 1804, 
 
 Bernadotte, ' 1804, 
 
 Berthier, ' 1804, 
 
 Brune, " 1804, 
 
 Bessieres, 1804, 
 
 Davout, " 1804, 
 
 Grouchy, " 1815, 
 
 Jourdan, " 1804, 
 
 Kellerman, 1804, 
 
 Lannes, " 1804, 
 
 Lefebvre, " 1804, 
 
 Macdonald, 1809, 
 
 Marmont, 1809, 
 
 Massena, " 1804, 
 
 Moncey, 1804, 
 
 Mortier, 1804, 
 
 Murat, " 1804, { 
 
 Ney, " 1804, { 
 
 Oudinot, " 1809, 
 
 Perignon, 1804, 
 
 Poniatowski, 1813, 
 
 Serrurier, 1804, 
 
 Soult, u 1804, 
 
 Saint-Cyr, " 1812, 
 
 Suchefc 1811, 
 
 Victor, " 1807, 
 
 Duke of Castiglionc. 
 Prince of Ponte Corvo. 
 Crown Prince of Sweden, 
 King of Sweden. 
 Duke of Neufchatel, 
 Prince of Wagram. 
 Count Brune. 
 Duke of Istria. 
 Duke of Auerstadt, 
 Prince of Eggmiihl. 
 Count Grouchy. 
 Count Jourdan. 
 Duke of Valmy. 
 Duke of Montebello. 
 Duke of Danzig. 
 Duke of Tarentum. 
 Duke of Ragusa. 
 Duke of Rivoli, 
 Prince of Essling. 
 Duke of Conegliano. 
 Duke of Treviso. 
 Grand Duke of Berg, 
 King of Naples. 
 Duke of Elchingen, 
 Prince of Moskwa. 
 Duke of Reggio. 
 Count Perignon. 
 Prince of Poland. 
 Count Serrurier. 
 Duke of Dalmatia. 
 Marquis Gouvion-Saint-Cyr. 
 Duke of Albufera. 
 Duke of Belluno. 
 
 MOST PROMINENT GENERALS AND MINISTERS. 
 
 Arrighi, 
 
 Bonaparte, Jerome, 
 
 Bonaparte, Joseph, 
 
 Bonaparte, Louis, 
 
 Cambaceres, 
 
 Caulain court, 
 
 Champagny, 
 
 Clarke, 
 
 Drouet, 
 
 Eugene, Beauharnais, 
 
 FouchS, 
 
 Junot, 
 
 Lebrun, ^ 
 
 Maret, 
 
 Moutpn, 
 
 Reynier, 
 
 Savary, 
 
 Talleyrand, 
 
 Van damme, 
 
 Duke of Padua. 
 
 King of Westphalia. 
 
 King of Naples and King of Spain. 
 
 King of Holland. 
 
 Prince of Parma. 
 
 Duke of Vicensa. 
 
 Duke of Cadore. 
 
 Duke of Feltre. 
 
 Count Erlon. 
 
 Prince of Venice and Viceroy of Italy. 
 
 Duke of Otranto. 
 
 Duke of Abrantea. 
 
 Duke of Piacenca. 
 
 Duke of Baaaano. 
 
 Count Lobau. 
 
 Duke of Maasa. 
 
 Duke of Rovigo. 
 
 Prince of Benevento. 
 
 Count Uncbourg.