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ESSAYS
ON THE PLATONIC ETHICS.
CAMBRIDGE:
Printed by William Metcalfe, Green Street.
ESSAYS
ON
THE PLATONIC ETHICS.-
BY
THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL.D.,
EX S.T.C.D.,
PROFESSOR OF LATIN, QUEEN's COLLEGE, GALWAV.
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RIVINGTONS
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W. M^GEE, DUBLIN
1870
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INTRODUCTION.
The following essays on the Republic, Pro-
tagoras, Meno, Gorgias, and Philebus, are taken
altogether from the text of Plato. They develop
views diametrically opposed to those of Mr. Grote.
But, as the opinions of the great historian are
identical with the tenets, which Plato spent his
life in opposing, and as they exhibit modern
Positivism in its most improved form, the admirer
of Plato will not regret Mr. Grote's critique:
One stroke he aims,
That may determine, and not need repeat
As not of power.
And we may be tolerably certain, that if Mr,
Grote's exposition, which is professedly deriv^dd
from the text of Plato, pure and simple, can be
answered without exceeding the same limits, the
Academy need fear no new assault. It has been
thought advisable to limit the discussion to the
Dialogues specified, as they contain all that is
necessary for understanding tlic Ethics of Plato.
IV INTRODUCTION.
Some repetitions, which are essential to the logical
coherence of the discussion, have been found
unavoidable. Lawyers and Mathematicians repeat
their formulae, as often as is necessary, because
they address a specially educated audience only.
Metaphysicians would do the same, were it not
for a notion, somewhat prevalent, that every one,
who can read, is a metaphysician. But, to suppose
that anyone, without some natural capacity and
special training, can understand a metaphysical
treatise, is as absurd as to imagine him mastering
Fearne's Remainders in a railway carriage.
I have to thank the Board of Trinity College
for their liberality in assisting the publication of
these essays, and the President of this College
for the interest he has taken in the work*
Queen's College, Galway.
August, 1870.
THE PLATONIC ETHICS.
I.
THE REPUBLIC.
Judging from the brief notice in the History of
Greece, Mr. Grote's detailed examination of Plato's
Republic was not likely to exhibit much sympathy
with Platonic teaching. As a contribution to scientific
ethics, Mr. Grote had pronounced that incomparable
Dialogue a failure. Plato had not proved his main
point, that Justice was intrinsically desirable; and as
he only answered his opponents by constructing an
imaginary Republic, he virtually confessed his defeat.
{HisL Vol. VIII., p. 534).
In his more recent work, Mr. Grote, still constant
to his earlier views, has examined the main thesis of
the Republic at considerable length, and a doctrine
in professed opposition to that of Plato, is expounded
with much force. But whatever be the merits of the
exposition taken by itself — and they are great — it is
utterly irrelevant as a critique on the Republic. And
to prove its irrelevancy is the object of this Section.
The student of Plato is doubtless familiar with the
Republic; but the following outlines of its general
argument may be found useful in duly arranging
Mr. Grote's objections, and the answers thereto. More-
over, the best refutation of Mr. Grote's rival doctrine
is furnished by the Dialogue itself, if we only keep
B
2 THE REPUBLIC.
before us the subject of the discussion and Plato's
conduct of the argument.
I^<^ The subject of the Dialogue is Justice. Glauco,
who opposes Socrates, begins with the postulate,
Certain things are desirable. These he divides into
three classes. The first class contains those things,
^ which are desirable in themselves, without considering
their consequences. The second contains those things
which are desirable, both in themselves and in their
consequences. And the third contains those things
I which are desirable in their consequences, but not in
themselves. Now Justice has certain consequences,
and these consequences are admitted to be desirable.
I Is Justice then to be placed in the second class, or in
the third ?
Undesirable things may be similarly classified. The
first class contains those things, which are undesirable
in themselves, without considering their consequences.
The second contains those things, which are undesirable
both in themselves and in their consequences. And the
third class contains those things, which are desirable
in themselves but undesirable in their consequences.
Now Injustice has certain consequences ; and these are
admitted to be undesirable. Is Injustice, then, to be
placed in the second class or in the third ?
i Socrates stands alone in the opinion that Justice
belongs to the second class of desirable things, and that
Injustice belongs to the second class of undesirable
things. Glauco and his brother Adimantus, though
anxious to agree with their great opponent, support the
view held by every body except Socrates — a view
universally taught as both important and true — that
Justice is desirable for its consequences only, but that
these consequences are cheaply purchased by the
antecedent sacrifice which they require. So, vtce-vcrsa,
Injustice. " Our pleasant vices" cost us far too much.
To clear the question of irrevelant matter — to prevent
THE REPUBLIC. 3
confusion between Justice considered on the one hand
as an i ntrin^ ^guajjtvj^dged within the breast of the
right-doer, and Justice considered on the other as
productive of certain overt consequences — Glauco sup-
poses that the intrinsically just man incurs, because
of his justice, the very worst effects of detected injustice ;
while all the honours and emoluments of sterling justice
are heaped upon its counterfeit. His brother Adimantus,
to set the question in a still stronger light, supposes
that the popular doctrine has been reduced to system,
and put in practice by an able and unscrupulous man.
Adimantus then brings forward the following extreme
case : — It is admitted that the effects only of Justice are
desirable. The wise man will, therefore, secure them
more easily by pretending to be just; and as he is
successful in his pretences — for he is wise — ^he will
escape detection, and secretly indulge in the pleasant
iniquities, which, on the showing of the popular creed,
are desirable in themselves, and will leave all the
trouble of being really just to the righteous fool. Now
the wise man is a consummate artist ; he will therefore
appear most just, when, in reality, he is most unjust.
On the other hand the just man, who does not see all
this, must be a bungling fool, who will therefore appear
unjust, while he is really just. Both will be treated
according to outward show and not according to their
inward deserts. Socrates is now called on to make
good his point, and shew that even in this extreme
case, where the usual consequences of Justice and
Injustice are transposed. Justice is preferable to Injustice,
and that it is regarded in this light by the martyr himself.
Socrates is aware of the difficulties of the task ; he
however accepts the challenge, and finally claims the
victory, which is acknowledged by his opponents in the
Dialogue — the brothers of Plato. Plato consequently
seems to wish us to believe that his argument in behalf
of intrinsic Justice is conclusive.
' ' B 2
4 THE REPUBLIC.
Plato's argument to prove that Justice under any
circumstances is preferable to Injustice under any
circumstances is three-fold. The first argument occu-
pies by far the larger portion of the Dialogue, extending
from p. 368, to p. 580. c, and against certain points in
this Mr. Grote directs his main attack. The second
extends from p. 580 c, to 583 c, and the third and last
argument, which Plato looks on as the strongest, from
p. 583 c, to 588. The two last are briefly criticised by
Mr. Grote in connection with the point suggested by
the first. The remaining thirty-odd pages of the
Dialogue are mainly devoted to the outward conse-
quences of Justice and Injustice, here and hereafter.
With these however — the second thesis of the Republic
— we are not now concerned.
^ I. The first argument deserves careful consideration.
It gives us Plato's Psychology in relation to his Ethics.
The argument is founded on the radical differences
between the three elements of the human soul, which
are the objects of ethical science, viz. the Rational, the
Irascible, and the Concupiscible. The terms Irascible
and Concupiscible, which are by no means accurate
renderings of the Greek, in accordance with Plato's
habit of calling a class after its most marked species,
denote two much wider genera. The Rational element
contains the Intuitive and Discursive faculties — Rea-
son and Understanding. The Irascible contains the
Emotional moiety of the will, and the Sentimental and
Moral feelings of our Psychology. The Concupiscible
contains not only the primary Appetites, but also our
acquired likings for the means of indulging them —
Wealth and Power considered as ministering to luxury.
These three elements are the raw materials of the Four
Virtues, as will be seen.
Now, objects are more easily studied on a larger,
than on a smaller scale ; and Socrates holding that
Justice in a community differs, for the purpose in hand,
THE REPUBLIC. 5
in no respect from Justice in an individual, proceeds to
observe it in the larger specimen. For this purpose he
traces the growth of an imaginary Commonwealth, so
far as its rudimentary development is analogous to the
inner life of the individual, whose capabilities have
received due culture. The typical form — which is the
same in both individual and community — is then set up
as the model, which shows us the short-comings of
actual polities and of living men.
The analogy between the terms Community and Man
rests on the Division of Labour. This is the point on
which the stress is laid. The individual displays the
Division of Labour on a small scale, the Community on
a large. But the statement of the analogy runs thus : —
as Division of Labour is to the Community, so is
Division of Labour to the Individual : not vice-versa.
The Community is brought in for the sake of the
Individual, and not the Individual for the sake of the
Community. Unless we keep this in mind, the whole
of the first argument, that is nearly the whole of the
Dialogue, becomes a chaos.
The Division of Labour being the foundation of the
analogy, the Division of Labour requires that both in
the larger and smaller unit, each class and each faculty
be exclusively confined to its special functions. For
the purport of the analogy, each class is thus the
analogous faculty magnified, and each faculty is the
class diminished. Such Division of Labour Socrates
considers the only means of insuring complete Justice
in either sphere. But in order to give free play to the
inherent tendencies of Faculty and Class, we require a
field perfectly free from all antagonistic influences.
But such a state of things has never yet been seen on
earth ; it may however come into being, as Time is
fertile in possibilities. And until the New Common-
wealth come, the solitary Seer must content himself
with contemplating the ideal Exemplar, and strive to
C
O THE REPUBLIC.
realise, as best he may, the Division of Labour within
the realms of Self. That Division cannot however be
completely" realised until the Fair City glitters in the
sun. Typical Justice requires a typical sphere.
The foundation of the analogy — Division of Labour —
requires that Class should be distinct from Class, and
Faculty from Faculty. How are we to insure distinct-
ness in the latter set ? Psychology supplies the means.
Q The ground-principle of Plato's Psychology is that, if
Q the objects of our faculties be radically different, and if
the results of attaining those objects be radically
^ different, the several faculties to which those objects are
adjusted are distinct in kind, at least for the purposes
'^ of Ethics.
To apply this : — A hungry man wants food : he has
therefore one feeling appetite. But whether it is better
to indulge the appetite in the particular case or not is
a question reserved for the Reason to decide and not
for the Appetite. Had we no feeling, save Appetite,
we should rush blindly on its object, but the critical
and calculating faculty — Reason — tells us that in
certain cases the gratification will be too dearly bought.
Whether we hearken to the dictates of Reason or not,
is quite immaterial to the purpose which Plato has
in view. The dictate of the Reason does not take the
categorical form Thou Shalt, Thou Shalt Not — it
employs the conditional If. From these facts, namely,
that Appetite seeks relief only, knowing nothing of
consequences at all, while Reason recounts to us the
consequences of every kind, which are completely
ignored by Appetite, we infer that Reason is intrinsically
fitted to direct Appetite, while Appetite shows no
fitness for directing Reason.
But Psychology presents us with a second set of
facts, which confirm this inference* Under peculiar
circumstances, when we indulge an appetite, we are
angry with ourselves for so doing; while we do not
THE REPUBLIC. 7
find that any regret follows the exercise of self-controul
as such. Consequently, self-disapprobation is in favour
of self-controul, and not in favour of indulgence.
Therefore, both the Rational and Emotional elements
are fitted to direct Appetite, but Appetite is not fitted
to direct them.
Now Reason points out certain cases in which
Emotion may, like Appetite, be productive of harm.
Consequently, by parity of reasoning, Reason is fitted
to direct Emotion also. Reason, therefore, is the sole
Casuist and supreme Director whose dictates may be
disobeyed, but from whose judgment there is no
appeal.
But Reason does something more than dissuade ;
Reason points out the cases in which both Emotion
and Appetite may be indulged with advantage, but
always within certain limits, and always with regard
foj consequences, 571. e. 589. b.
From this set of facts — part of every one's experience
— Plato deduces his Four Virtues. His names for these
are in English, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and
Justice. Our terms are all inadequate, and besides,
are positively misleading, but Plato's meaning is clearly
seen in the account which he gives of the several
qualities. The Four Virtues are deduced as follows : —
we, in the first instance, proceed to gratify our appetites : '
we, in the first instance, shrink from pain and danger.^
But Reason points out certain cases, in which it is
better not to follow our primary inclinations. Reason,
in certain cases, tells us it is better not to indulge
Appetite, and that it is better not to shirk danger.
And with these dictates of Reason, Emotion sympathises
and visits with its displeasure the Appetite which has
not been guided by the advice of its well-wisher. We
.have here in these few facts, the Four Platonic Virtues.
The Rational Faculty distinguishes the several cases
of conduct one from the other, and reckons up the cost
8 THE REPUBLIC.
of every kind incurred in each particular case. Dis-
tinguishing, foreseeing, and computation, are all of the
essence of the Platonic Prudence.
The frame of mind, which keeps steadily before us
the dictates of Reason, as to when it is better to curb
appetite and when it is better to face danger, is
Fortitude. Our word is more than half too narrow,
being only equivalent to the smaller moiety of the
Greek term, expressing as it does, only Steadiness in
facing danger.
Our " Fortitude" leaves out altogether the larger half
of Plato's notion ; namely, cool judgment in estimating
the several kinds of pleasure. The word ^AvSpela was
probably suggested to Plato by the common metaphor —
7]TT(i)v — applied to one, who is " overcome" by pleasure
or pain, and so does not exhibit 'AvSpela in the fight.
Legg. 863. d. Fortitude, understood as not only
suppressing fear in obedience to Reason, but curbing
Appetite as well, gives rise to a certain relation
between the Faculties, as directing and directed.
When this mutual relation is thoroughly established
and carried into the whole of the inner life, we have
^(ocppoavvT) — Temperance — the permanent relation of
the Faculties as directing and directed. Our word is
miserably inadequate, as the Greek term denotes
conscious self-direction according to Reason — self-
direction moreover not by way of repression, but of
guidance. Fortitude and Temperance are each the
complement of the other : Fortitude from without and
Temperance from within. Fortitude must confront all
dangers and all pleasures— all that affects the sense ;
and Temperance convert iFortitude into self-direction,
*• Until endurance grow
Sinewed with action, and the full-grown will
Circled thro' all experiences, pure law,
Commeasure perfect freedom."
Now, since Temperance establishes the relative
THE REPUBLIC. 9
Direction between Prudence and Appetite; and since
such Direction is carried on in conformity to Fortitude,
which in turn observes the dictates of Reason ; and
since Reason dictates always what will be on the whole
the best, it follows that the supremacy of Temperance
growing out of Fortitude, will place Reason, Emotion,
and Appetite each in its proper position, and thereby
allow each to devote itself to its special function. But
when the Faculties perform each its special function,
the Division of Labour is perfected, and that too in the
inmost life. And the Division of Labour when thus
organised, perfected, and secured, whether in the com-
munity or in the individual, is the Platonic Justice.'
Our word Justice is calculated to mislead, pointing
as it does, to certain transactions between man and
man. To us, to apply the same word to civic dealings
and to a certain state of the inner life, appears rather
forced. Etymology and usage however show that in
the Greek, no such chasm separates the two applica-
tions. Likeness : Rule adapted to a particular case :
Judicial decision : Rule in general : Law and Morality :
such are the several transitions which may be traced in
the meaning of the parent-word down from Homer to
Plato. Hence the abstract term ALKatoavvrj may be
much better expressed by Regularity, if we take care
not to exclude from the latter notiaa some reference to
particular cases and circumstances "and proportionate
modification. So understood, the word exactly expresses
analogous states of Commonwealth and Individual ; but
it also possibly called up in the minds of Plato's pupils
some of his favourite metaphors, which were intended
to suggest some of his most important doctrines. His
metaphors are often taken from athletic training and
diet ; Vice is " bad condition" from over feeding, and
Virtue is "proper form" resulting from moderation.
Rep. 444. d. e. We find the ethical and gymnastical
notions combined in the punning reference to the
lO THE REPUBLIC.
Champion Pulydamas, Rep. i. 338. c. d., and the
just man in the Republic is the victorious wrestler at
the grand meeting. Moreover all the Virtues except
Prudence are the effect of habit and training, Rep, 7.518
c. d., Leg. 963. e., and so, the kindred notions Vigour,
Moderation, Measure, would recall the cardinal doctrine
of the Limit and its Opposite, the two factors of Plato's
most abstruse Metaphysics. Were it not out of place,
it would be easy to show how the Four Virtues may be
evolved from these two elements, the Limit and the
Opposite. We may however see how the term rendered
Justice is, without being strained, applicable to both
polities and individuals.
^ ] The Four Virtues thus embody in its highest perfec-
tion the Division of Labour ; and the Intellect observing
the adaptation between the Faculties and their Objects,
and between the Faculties themselves all united in
one systematic whole and working to one end, will
contemplate the spectacle with deep exultation — an
exultation which once felt it would not exchange for
any outward prosperity, and this is the first phase of
intrinsic Justice considered exclusively in relation to
the Faculties themselves.
Vice, by parity of reasoning, consists in the undue
preponderance of some one or more of the lower motives
in the internal system. Its worst phase is the habitual
supremacy of the most useless and violent animal
cravings. Rep. 575. a. In this last state, the patient
is utterly insensible to all the higher pleasures ; he is
delivered up, bound hand and foot, to an appetite at
once capricious and despotic, and utterly reckless of
consequence. Why the just man would prefer his own
condition, though in the midst of the worst possible
surroundings to that of the slave of appetite in the
midst of the best possible surroundings, will be seen
from the Second and Third arguments. And here
closes the first argument in behalf of intrinsic Justice.
THE R^UBLIC. II
It is in brief: — Division of Labour in the individual
gives rise to intrinsic Regularity, i.e. Justice, an4
intrinsic Justice awakens a vivid sense of systematic
inner life. To this Vice is dead. In the former case,
each faculty works in subordination to the vital whole,
and thereby secures the highest functional regularity.
In the latter the system is almost completely paralysed,
and the partial vitality is spasmodic and abnormal.
Here, we witness
"The crime of Sense avenged by Sense." ^
One characteristic of the Four Platonic Virtues i
deserves notice. They are essentially non-social ; they ^
do not contemplate in the first instance man in contact \
with man. Fortitude, it is true, deals with the objects
of the senses : and the objects of the senses are
likewise the objects of Legal Right and Obligation.
Phsed. 66. b. d. Rep. 373, d. e., 580, d. e. But the
coincidence is accidental. Fortitude regards the ob-
jects of the senses, as provocatives of Desire and of
Fear; but it is a Desire and a Fear which call us to
self-discipline and not to outward social movement.
From the Platonic point of view, the Temptation in the
Desert was in the highest degree an exercise of the
Four Platonic Virtues ; and a life so spent is at least,
conceivable. Platonic Justice — "Self-reverence, self-
knowledge, self-controul'' — is in one sense self-regarding,
and must necessarily be so. But the associations
connected with the word self, are so inveterate, that
the notion sought to be conveyed is more clearly
marked out by the negative — fton-soczal.
II. The Second argument is based on the immediate
differences of the several Pleasures attached to the
three faculties ; — that is Pleasures regarded as pleasures
simply without reference either to their ethical value,
or to their metaphysical properties. The pleasures of
the Rational element are derived, not only from abstract
science in its modern sense, but also from knowledge in
12 THE REPUBLIC.
its high Platonic meaning, viz. the contemplative study
of Real Existence, and the gradual approach to ethical
Perfection, which Justice ensures. The pleasures of
Emotion are derived from Emulation, Ambition, and
Admiration both active and passive : while the pleasures
of Appetite flow from attaining the objects of the
Senses, and in the second instance from the means of
indulging them — Wealth and Power devoted to luxury.
Now as we have three pleasures, we have three kinds
of pleasure-hunters, the Lover of Truth, the Lover of
Honour, and the Lover of Means or Money. Who is
to decide between the three, as each of the three stands
up for his own pursuit? The Lover of Truth — the
Philosopher only. He alone has tried all three ; he
alone has tasted the pleasures of satisfied Intelligence,
of satisfied Emotion, and of satisfied Sense: while the
Lover of Honour only knows the two last, and the
Lover of Luxury the last only. The Lover of Truth
having compared all three as pleasures simply, gives
the first place to the pleasures of Reason, the second to
the pleasures of Emotion, and the third to the pleasures
of Sense. To prefer one pleasure to another requires a
knowledge of both. This principle, which is of the
greatest importance in the Platonic Ethics, is the
second argument on behalf of Justice.
III. The Third Argument is built on the differences
in pleasures, scientifically analysed and ranged ac-
cording to their objective properties. The pleasures of
the rational faculties differ from the others in being
both Real and Pure; each word having a technical
meaning. They are Real, because they are derived
from Real Existence, and from Supreme Perfection ;
they are real likewise, because they do not owe their
brilliancy to contrast, but shine with their own light.
They are Pure, i.e. unmixed with pain, because, neither
in their beginning nor in their consequences are they
connected with pain. On the other hand, the pleasures
THE REPUBLIC. 1 3
of Emotion and of Sense are essentially alleviations of
a painful want, and owe much of their piquancy to
Contrast. So great is the force of Contrast, that the
bare Cessation of pain appears positively pleasant and
the reaction from excitement, positively irksome, when
each is contrasted with the preceding condition. We
have, moreover, an experiment (by way of Variation)
which is in favour of the pleasures of the higher organ.
The pleasures of Ambition and the pleasures of Sense,
are better secured the more they are pursued under the
guidance of Reason and Calculation. Rational pleasure
is therefore adjudged the Prize, by the only competent
tribunal, and by the admission of adversaries. And this
is the third argument in support of Justice pitted against
Injustice — the heaviest of the three falls which Plato's
champion gives his opponent. There only remains to
see him the crowned and honoured of man and God.
But with his subsequent career we have nothing to do.
It will be seen that the threefold argument in behalf
of Justice, forms one systematic whole. The first is
from the nature of the Faculties. The third is from the
nature of the Objects of the faculties, and the second is
from the Results of union between faculties and objects.
Now, as we only know a faculty in relation to its
object, and in the results arising froni the union of
both. Rep. 5. 477. d., it is plain that each argument
implies the other two. The threefold argument conse-
quently exhibits Justice complete in all its parts,
Faculty, Object, and Result. And Platonic Justice as
we have seen is, in the first instance, essentially
non-social. It is intrinsic in its structure, its material,
and always, though not exclusively, in its purpose. In
its course it comes in contact with a social atmosphere,
but its limb only is immersed.
But it will also be seen that the more Justice in the
Platonic sense is realised, the more completely will
Justice in the common sense be carried into practice.
14 THE REPUBLIC.
Fortitude, the first step to inner Justice, deals with the
objects of the senses — Bodily States. Rep. ^. 429. c. d.,
442. c. The Platonic equivalents comprehend also
Wealth and Power. Now, these are the baits which
lure men to infringe the rights of others, and give rise
to wars and seditions. PhcBdo. 66. c. Rep. II. 373. d. e.,
IX. 586. a. b. It follows therefore that Fortitude, in pro-
portion to its efficacy, will insure a due regard for the
duties we owe to others. Consequently, Platonic Justice
will secure civic Justice, but always accidentally.
Plato's account of the origin of certain of the virtues
tends in the same direction. Fortitude, Temperance,
and Justice are in some respects analogous to bodily
; qualities ; they are the creatures of training and of
j habit. Rep. 7. 518. d. e. On the other hand, every
human soul possesses the faculty of intellectual intuition,
(f)p6v7j(TL<^ — Prudence. The intuitive power is equal in
all men, and at all times. Rep. 7. 518. c. e., the strength
of the instrument is always unimpaired, but the field of
vision may be more or less obstructed. Hence the
I object of ethical discipline is to minimise obstruction,
and allow the prudential organ full range. But this is
done by Fortitude, which reduces to the lowest point,
the influence of the various bodily states. And
Fortitude is the first step to the other virtues. That
discipline therefore which maximises Fortitude, Tem-
perance and Justice, will minimise the attractions of
sensual pleasure, and the allurements of Wealth and
Power. Such discipline therefore will ensure a regard
for our social duties. Plato's view of Prudence, as
contrasted with the other Virtues, finds expression in
his doctrines, "No one is willingly bad;" "Virtue is
Science." It also gives his answer to the famous
question. Is virtue teachable? Prudence is not: the
other virtues are.
Now the word Justice, — Regularity par excellence —
expresses a certain condition of the inner man, which
THE REPUBLIC. 15
accidentally may be one of the antecedents to the overt
observance of the rights of others, and Plato thinks it
the best and most effectual. Rep. 465, b. And this
antecedent — Regularity par excellence — he calls "real'*
Justice. But the observance of social duties may
proceed from other motives beside such Regularity.
And the observance of social duties from any other
motive except Regularity, he calls Seeming, as opposed
to Real. But it would be a mistake to suppose that
" Seeming" must mean sham. " Seeming" in Plato —
noun and verb — expresses the whole Material Creation ;
everything subject to the law of Cause and Effect, in
short all the objects of sensible perception. Rep, V. 476,
to end; VI. 510, a. 534, a. In this way "Seeming" is
opposed to "Being" — invisible intelligible Reality,
which is not subject to the law of Antecedence and
Consequence. So we find the Antithesis, — Being and
Seeming — in Plato's Ethics, as well as in his Meta
physics. Hence Real Justice is a certain invisible
condition of the inner life, and "Seeming Justice
comprehends all the overt acts and consequences to
which the invisible condition may, in its turn, among
other antecedents, give rise. But Seeming Justice is
not necessarily hypocrisy. Hypocrisy, it is true, is the
crowning accomplishment of Glauco's client; for it is
the worst case of seeming. Rep. II. 361, a. But although
the hypocrite assumes the trappings of the just man,
the just man has, notwithstanding, the better right
to wear them. Glauco's client — the accomplished
hypocrite — would scrupulously discharge the duties
necessary to sustain his part ; the typical Guardian in
the Fair City would discharge all his duties. The
former would " seem" just ; the latter would both "be"
and "seem" just. In fact, the tenth book of the
i.epublic recounts the " seeming" effects of Justice,
he Just man holds office : he marries and gives in
—
h
1 6 THE REPUBLIC.
effects of Justice. Rep. lo. 612, d— 613, c. There is,
therefore, nothing contemptuous in Plato's use of the
term Seeming Justice, as Mr. Grote imagines. Vol. III.,
p. 137. In fact, the passage in the Laws, which he
quotes as contradicting the views of " seeming" Justice
in the Republic, exactly confirms what is contended
for here. Correct estimate from others is to be prized
on account of its connection with Stirling worth, " but
not otherwise," says Plato. Legg. 12, 950, c. Mr. Grote's
critique totally ignores the real meaning of " seeming"
and " being" ; an Antithesis w^hich we know from
Aristotle gave birth to Platonism. Metaphys. A. 6. M. 4.
Mr. Grote was probably misled by Glauco's case, where
hypocrisy is introduced as the crowning vice. But
Plato as usual makes the most marked species stand
for the genus. At all events, to ignore the proper force
of "seeming," is in a Platonic critic, an error in
digestione prima.
It appears, then, that the term rendered Justice,
properly expresses Regularity, and is in this sense
strictly applicable to analogous conditions of Polities
and of Individuals. It also appears that a certain
particular polity — the typical Fair City — is introduced
to illustrate the condition of the typical individual, and
not vice versa. It also appears that the particular
condition of the individual is a certain invisible
arrangement of the inmost faculties, which is called
by Plato Real Justice, and opposed to Seeming Justice.
It also appears that Seeming Justice comprehends
every overt observance of social duties of which Law
and Ethics take cognisance ; and that Real and Seeming
Justice may co-exist in the same individual. And,
finally, it appears that Platonic Justice guarantees civic
Justice most effectually, but always accidentally. When
we come to consider Mr. Grote's criticisms, these con-
conclusions will, it is hoped, bear fruit.
/'Tlie question in debate between Glauco and Socrates
THE REPUBLIC. 1 7
may now be re-stated with advantage. "The overt \
consequences of Justice are desirable and nothing else/' 3
says Vox Populi. " If so/' says Glauco, " the condition of
the just-doer, which is the antecedent to these desirable
consequences, must be undesirable.'' " Not so," replies
Socrates, "laying out of count all the overt consequences
you mention, the antecedent may, under certain con-
ditions, evolve certain other consequences, which are
invisible and uncommunicable, and these fresh conse-
quences may be preeminently desirable." "If so,"
says Glauco, " Vox Populi is wrong. Justice is de-
sirable in itself and in its consequences ; Justice is
good both in Being and in Seeming, intus et in cute.
How may we generate this new set of consequents ?"
Let us now hear Mr. Grote : — ^* The opponents, i
whom the Platonic Socrates seeks to confute, held I
that Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the ( C-
Agent, but indispensable in order to ensure him just
dealing and estimation from others — that injustice is a,
path in itself easy and inviting to the Agent, but
necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance
of securing Justice from others, and draws upon himself
hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine
(argues Plato) represents the advantages of Justice to
the just Agent, as arising, not from his being actually
just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reported
by others to be so ; in like manner it represents the
misery of injustice to the unjust Agent as arising, not
from his being actually unjust, but from his being
reputed so by others. The inference which a man will
naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, that he must M,
aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in
reality (Rep. IL, 366. c.) ; that he must seek to avoid
the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality ; that
the mode of life most enviable is to be unjust in reality,
but just in seeming ; to study the means of decoying
others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing
c
V
1 8 THE REPUBLIC.
/ Others into submission to your injustice. This indeed
/ cannot be done, unless you are strong or artful ; if you
/ are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you
/ can do is to be just. The weak alone are gainers
I by Justice, the strong are losers by it, and gainers by
I Injustice.
These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and
Adeimantus are made to argue) from the doctrine
. preached by fathers to their children that the obliga-
tions of Justice are in themselves onerous to the just
Agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine
just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato
means not that fathers, in exhorting their children
actually drew these corollaries, but that if they had
followed out their doctrine consistently, they would
have drawn them ; and that there is no way of escaping
them except by adopting the doctrine of the Platoni c
Socratesj^That Justice is in itself a source of happiness
to the just Agent, and Injustice a source of misery
to the unjust Agent, however each of them may be
esteemed or treated by others.
Now upon this we may observe, that Plato from
anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially
I true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be
' obviated by precautions, has endeavoured to accredit
a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and
standing conditions of social life. Among these con-
ditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most
fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches
to the services which a man renders, called duties or
obligations, and the services which he receives from
others, called his rights, is alike obvious and unde-
niable. Each individual has both duties and rights ;
'■ each individual is both an Agent towards others,
[ and a Patient or Sentient from others. He is
required to be just towards others, they are required
to be just towards him ; he, in his actions, must have
THE REPUBLIC. 1 9
regard (within certain limits) to their comfort and
security; they in their actions must have regard to
his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also
rights towards them ; or (which is the same thing) they
have obligations towards him. Ifpunishment is requisite
to deter him from doing wrong towards them, it is
equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to
him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating
it as a connected system including different individual
agents, must accept this Reciprocity as a fundamental
condition. The rights and obligations of each towards
the rest must form inseparable and correlative parts of
the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by us
according to his works, and must be able to reckon
beforehand on being so dealt with : — on escaping injury
and hurt, and securing Justice from others, if he behave
justly towards them. The theory supposes that whether
just or unjust, he will appear to others as he really is,
and will be appreciated accordingly.
The fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures,
adopted this doctrine of Reciprocity, and built upon it
their exhortations to their children, " Be just to others ;
without that condition you cannot expect that they will
be just to you." Plato objects to their doctrine, on the
ground that it assumed Justice to be onerous to the just
Agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the evading
of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of
extorting or stealing the valuable consequent without
earning it fairly. Persons acting thus unfairly would
efface Reciprocity by taking away the antecedent.
Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up a counter-
doctrine which effaces Reciprocity by removing the
Consequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that
if I am just towards others, I shall be happy in and
through that single circumstance, and that I ought not
to care whether they behave justly or not towards me.
Reciprocity thus disappears. The authoritative terms
c 2
20 THE REPUBLIC.
right and obligation lose all their specific meaning."
Vol. III., p. 135-7. ^
Considered as a stricture on the main thesis of the
Republic, Mr. Grote's objections amount to this ; first,
that the mode, in which Plato brings on the question,
misrepresents the popular belief; and second, that the
popular belief, unlike Plato's counter-doctrine, embodies
a matter of fact, which is the fundamental condition of
society, and which Plato's doctrine completely effaces.
As to the way in which Plato states the question, it
would be hard to find one better fitted to put the point
at issue in the strongest light. In this way: — The
subject of the Dialogue is Justice. What is Justice ?
In the first Book, various definitions are rejected, not
only because they are inadequate, but mainly because
the method employed is vicious. We were inquiring
into the accidents and consequences of Justice before
we found out what Justice was in itself. Let us begin
again. Let us insulate Justice ; let us cut off all
communication between it and the outer world, and
watch the effects which it, when thus insulated, produces
on the inner life of the Agent. Rep. 358, b. ; 366, e. ;
367, e. ; 368, c. ; 612, b. ; 614, a. Justice is now insulated,
and Socrates is ready to begin, but Adimantus is not
satisfied, so he deduces from the popular belief the most
extreme possible consequences, puts them together as the
legitimate result of its real, though covert, tendencies,
and in this shape the subject is brought forward.
Is not the experiment crucial ? A is generally found
along with a set of circumstances, B. X, which is the
opposite of A, is generally found along with another
set, Y. B is always pleasant ; Y is always unpleasant.
We want to know what A is like without B. Now if
A is known, X is likewise known : since A and X
are opposites. We therefore insulate A from B, and
plunge it, so prepared, into a new set of conditions.
Now, of new conditions the most novel possible is Y,
THE REPUBLIC. 21
for Y being unpleasant is the opposite of the old set,
B, which is pleasant. Unless we do this, we cannot
tell if A by itself is pleasant or not. And if A, when
in contact with Y, still manifests pleasant properties,
we may be certain that it is pleasant in itself. At the
same time, this is by no means saying that A would
not be better if accompanied by its old attendant, B.
But it is precisely because B is pleasant that we
require the experiment. We must disguise the Princess
to test the disinterestedness of her suitors.
So, when fathers exhort their children to pursue A
solely on account of B, and to shun X solely on
account of Y, teaching at the same time that X is
as pleasant as A is unpleasant (if not more so), young
Athens may naturally argue, to the astonishment of
his father. Rep. 2. 365, "Your old-fashioned drug is,
you admit, nauseous in the extreme, but my new specific
has all the effects of yours, and is besides remarkably
pleasant to the palate ; with your permission I shall
use the new." Glaucous client accordingly — incarnate
Injustice — typifies the extreme case of the popular
theory. And an extreme case is the logician's proof
charge.
A word as to Plato's two types. All writers on
abstract subjects put out of consideration, for the time
being, all counteracting agencies. They state tendencies
only. Ethical writers accordingly, to shew what a
given motive is taken singly, assume that a man is
actuated by no other ; the hungry man is all hunger,
and the benevolent man all benevolence, like Dickens's
oddities with a single point. Now, Plato does what all
ethical writers do, but he does it in a livelier way. As
an ethical speculator, he wishes to contrast the best
motive with all other motives. As an artist, he
personifies the best motive, and presents us with the
Guardian of Callipolis. Rep. VII. 549, b. Other motives
are not the best. They may, therefore, be the worst.
22 THE REPUBLIC.
Accordingly, Plato selects the worst, clothes it with
flesh and blood, and introduces us to the client of
GlauGO. — Tyranny in little — Injustice incarnate. Now
in real life, men act from mixed motives ; no one is as
bad as Glauco's proteg^. Rep. I., 352. c, and the Fair
City is not yet on Earth. But the mixture of motives
in practice is no reason why an ethical writer should
not separate motives in theory. On the contrary, the
mixture of motives in practice is just the reason why
they must be separated in theory. And such a separa-
tion, when personified, is a type.
Plato, therefore, does not, as Mr. Grote appears to
convey, tender us his two types as practical alternatives.
As a practical moralist he does not say "Be Hyperion,
if not, you must be the Satyr." No, as a practical
moralist he teaches us to maximise Hyperion, and
minimise the Satyr. But as an ethical experimenter,
he wishes to study the two types in their fullest perfec-
tion, and under new conditions. He therefore transposes
the usual concomitants of each. He joins the best
inward motives to the worst outward circumstances,
and the worst inward motives to the best outward
circumstances, and Glauco and his brother are his
assistants in the Inversion of the Experiment. The
question, therefore, owes its alternative form, not to
Plato's "anxiety to escape consequences," but to
Plato's anxiety to elicit conclusions ; to the skill of
the Analyst, and not to the one-sided rhetoric of the
preacher. Grote III., 158., vid. e. contra. Rep. X. 612 ;
b. c. ; V, 472, c. ; II. p. 361, a. b ; 363, a. ; 367, b.
Mr. Grote's next charge is that Plato endeavours to
accredit a fiction which misrepresents the constant
/ phenomena and standing conditions of social life.
Glauco's client and Plato's Guardian are both wrong,
and the popular creed is right. Society depends on
Reciprocity. Reciprocity expresses the correlation of
^ Payment and Receipt as antecedent and consequent.
THE REPUBLIC. 23
Plato's parody of the popular creed effaces Reciprocity
by taking away the Antecedent : Glauco's^feend will
not pay, but insists on being paid; cui^^^er pays
himself. Plato in correcting him sets up a counter-
doctrine, which effaces Reciprocity by removing the
Consequent. Plato affects to derive such pleasure from
Payment that he can afford to dispense with Receipt.
In either case one of the two props is removed, and
society comes to the ground.
The answer is obvious. Platonic Justice, the subject
of the main thesis of the Republic, has, in the first
instance, nothing to do with Reciprocity, and therefore!
cannot efface it. But in the second instance, so far as I
Platonic Justice deals with Reciprocity, Platonic Justice I
is its strongest support, as far as such security can be \
unilateral. The two cases must be separately considered, j
I. Justice in the first instance^ as it regards the agent.
Platonic Justice — Typical Virtue — is essentially one.
This requires explanation. Prudence, Fortitude, Tem-
perance, and Justice, are Qualities, which co-exist so
inseparably, that we cannot apprehend any One,
without at the same time apprehending the other |
Three. This can be proved. The proof rests on the ' 1
complex fact, that while Reason on the one hand is
fitted to direct Appetite, Appetite on the other is not
fitted to direct Reason. This is all we want. This
single fact contains the four inseparable Qualities.
Because ; a thing directing implies a thing directed,
and both together a relation between them, as directing
and directed. The three moments are therefore in-
separable, any given One implying the other Two.
In the present case, the thing directing is Reason,
and the thing directed is Appetite. Now Reason, di-
recting Appetite, is the ethical Quality, PRUDENCE.
But Appetite looks two opposite ways. On the one
side, it regards outer objects ; on the other, the Agent's
self. Now, Appetite directed by Reason, and lookingf ^
24 THE REPUBLIC.
outwards, is the ethical Quality, FORTITUDE ; and
; so directed and looking inwards, the ethical Quality,
' TEMPERANCE. That is, the directing Reason is
Prudence, and the directed Appetite, both Fortitude
and Temperance.
Consequently, Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance
discharge each their special functions. But, since the
three qualities are inseparable, and since the three —
each and all — discharge their special functions, we
have the three Qualities uniting in the one ethical
Quality, JUSTICE, and the one Quality Justice coin-
■^ciding with the ethical Total, VIRTUE. The three
just Qualities converge to Virtue ; Virtue diverges to the
three just Qualities. Virtue is a "Whole as opposed to
a Sum of Parts. Justice is a Sum of Parts as opposed
to a Whole. Justice, in a word, is Virtue in parts, and
Virtue is Justice complete. The notions are equivalent,
but not identical.
But since Justice is Division of Labour, and since
Virtue is Justice as a whole. Virtue must be some
Quality by which the Agent discharges his special
function [Rep. IV., 433. d-). Now to discharge a special
function implies some fitness, as a matter of fact. And
such fitness may, according to Plato, be discerned in
everything, whether it be an organic whole, such as a
man, or a horse, or an organic part, such as an eye or
a limb ; or an inorganic implement, such as a pruning-
hook, or the like [Rep. I., 352. e.). Consequently Virtue
-is the Efiiciency of Fitness. Human Virtue is therefore
the Efiiciency which results from the fitness of the
Agent for his special function. But the special function
indicated by the relation of Reason and Appetite, is
Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance.
Justice, thus being a relation between Reason and
Appetite, must be intrinsic. And likewise its opposite.
Injustice. This may be seen in the eighth and ninth
books. The four types of Injustice — the four Unjust
THE REPUBLIC. 25
Men — have a family likeness. In each of the four some
motive, which is not wholly rational, has gained, more
or less, the upper hand. Either Sentiment or Sense
has acquired ascendancy. And the political sketches
which accompany the portraits illustrate disunion at
home and not intervention from abroad, (cf. Rep. VIII.
547. c, with 550, b. ; 552, a., with 553, d. e; 557, a.,
with 561, c. d. ; 567, d., with 573, c). Therefore Platonic .
Justice and Platonic Injustice are relations between /
Reason and Appetite; and as such they must be
intrinsic.
Now Reciprocity means the correlation of Duty and
Right — of Payment and Receipt. This has been ad-
mirably set forth by Mr. Grote. But Duty is merely
one man's Liability to penalty at the hands of another ; \
and Right is the Power which exacts it. Therefore
Plato's Justice and Mr. Grote's Reciprocity have nothing
in common.
II. Justice in the second instance as regarding society.
Here we have two cases : Platonic justice in the ideal
Society ; and Platonic justice in a Society which recog-
nises Private Rights. Rep. 464. c. ' \
The ideal Society required is one in which no '
antagonistic elements appear, all such having been
previously either utilised or nullified. We cannot
therefore argue against such a society, because some
other exhibits the elements of antagonism in full play.
But, although Mr. Grote elsewhere (p. 219.) vindicates
the Republic against such objections, yet he falls into
them himself when he argues, from the actual efficacy
of Reciprocity, against Platonic justice.
Now Plato recognizes Reciprocity even in his ideal
Cityo He did not therefore intend his own justice to
act in place of Reciprocity.
His Guardians are supported by the State, and have \
no private property. They are therefore placed above '
the wants and temptations of ordinary life. They have
26 • THE REPUBLIC.
finoreover undergone a long and special training for
■ office, and are duly honoured in their own Republic.
But, even so, the Guardian is reluctant to take part
in politics, and submits to the necessity. Rep. 7. 540. b.,
only because his private happiness must yield to that of
the community. Rep. 420, b. He knows, moreover, that
the very existence of his caste is identified with that of
the Fair City. Rep. 499, b. 540, b. And the Guardian,
who from selfish motives deserts his order, will soon
find reason to bewail his short-sightedness. 466, a. b.
Plato, therefore, did not wish his Justice should even in
the Republic supersede the ordinary motives to Outlay.
And the fact, that some of the receipts come in at once,
does not annihilate the real unpleasantness of Outlay
in itself. But, so far as Platonic Justice supplies an
additional motive to outlay, so far it lessens the un-
pleasantness of the sacrifice. The ordinary motive to
outlay is the hope of receipt; and Platonic justice is a
pressure in the same direction.
In an ordinary society, where private rights are
established, and Reciprocity consequently covers all
the dealings between man and man, it is obvious that
Platonic Justice is a new motive towards Payment. So
far, therefore, as Payment is likely to attract Receipt,
and so keep up Reciprocity, Platonic Justice strengthens
that prop of society which rests on the agent's private '
interest. Platonic Justice ensures the doing unto others
what they ought to do in return, but the prospect of
return is neither its sole nor chief motive.
Plato, it is true, speaks of the uselessness in actual
life of the Searcher after truth, and the Searcher after
truth is the only man who has any notion of scientific
Justice. But his uselessness is not his fault, the blame
rests with those who do not see his value, and will not
listen to his counsels. Rep. 489. b. Now the admitted
uselessness to Society of the Searcher after truth
suggests the question, "What value did Plato set on
THE REPUBLIC. 27
the man who acted up to his lights, but knew nothing
of scientific justice ?
Mr. Mill, following Mr. Grote, puts the following
case as an ad ahsurdu7n of the Platonic doctrine : —
" In the Republic, the excellence and inherent felicity
of the just life are as impressively insisted on and
enforced by arguments of greater substance. But, as
Mr. Grote justly remarks, those arguments, even if
conclusive, are addressed to the wrong point; for the
life they suppose is not that of the simply just man,
but of the philosopher. They are not applicable to the
typical just man, to such a person as Aristeides, who is
no dialectician, soars to no speculative heights, and is
no nearer than other people to a Vision of the Self-
existent Ideas, but who, at every personal sacrifice,
persistently acts up to the rules of virtue acknowledged
by the worthiest of his countrymen. It is not obvious,
what place there was for Aristeides in the Platonic
theory of Virtue, nor how he was to be adjusted to the
doctrine of Plato and of the historical Sokrates that
Virtue is a branch of knowledge, and that no one is
Tuijust willingly. Aristeides probably had the same
notions of justice as his contemporaries, and could as
little as any of them have answered Sokratic interro-
gatories by a definition of it, which would have been
proof against all objections. The conformity of his
will to it, the never being unjust willingly, was probably
the chief moral difference between him and ordinary
men. Plato might indeed have said that Aristeides
had the most indispensable point of knowledge — he
knew that the just man must be the happiest. But
Aristeides was not the kind of man of whom Plato M^^
more or less successfully, proved this ; and the true )
Platonic doctrine is that it is impossible to be just, /
without knowing (in the high Platonic meaning of/
knowledge) what Justice is." — Essays, Vol. III., 340-1.
Now, in actual life, motives are mixed. Rep. 500. c. d.
y
2^ THE REPUBLIC.
I We do not generally act from one single motive, and
most motives are not the best. The man who falls
seven times a day is not as perfect as the faultless
type who does not fall once. He is not, therefore,
typically just, but he has fewer falls than he who falls
seventy-seven times. To call Aristides the justest man
in Athens meant that Aristides was more sure-footed
than the rest of the Athenians, not that he never
stumbled.
Now the case of a man like Aristides must have
presented itself to Plato. The noble line of Aeschylus,
which the full theatre applied to Aristides, is referred
to in the Republic, and serves as the text of the
discourse. It embodies the Platonic antithesis of
"being and seeming" in a single verse. Aristides,
therefore, in the technical language of the treatise
would be represented by the Timocratic man — the best
man under existing circumstances. He is elsewhere
specially alluded to.
The motives of such a man are golden in the main :
there is, however, an ingredient of silver, but nothing
base. 550. b. He is guided by Reason, but Reason is
alloyed with Sentiment, and so far he falls short of the
purity of the standard type. Rep. 8. 548 — 9.
In the Laws, Plato, when discussing the rationale of
a Penal Code, and therefore aiming at practical objects,
adheres to the views expounded in the Republic. Justice
does not consist in benefits conferred, nor does Injustice
consist in damage inflicted, but in the settled character
of the Agent and in the modus operandi, as opposed to
the consequences of his actions. Even though he cause
damage, his Justice is saved whole, provided he acts
from regard to what he judges will be best. Legg. 9,
864. a. Aristides, then, was just in the popular sense,
but not in the ideal. Although he fell short of the ideal
Type, he indefinitely approached it, and was so far
just.
THE REPUBLIC. 29
Like other ethical writers Plato formed an ideal oF~
Justice and Happiness. From this ideal every human
being deviates more or less. Rep. 500. d., 546. a.
Between the Extremes — the least and the greatest
deviation — there are infinite degrees, 445, c. Of these
Plato selects Four which he describes at length, — the
Four great Epochs in the Decline and Fall. To this
description he devotes the whole of his eighth book
and the half of his ninth ; besides warning us of his
intentions at the close of his fourth. We are constantly
told of Plato's artistic skill ; in the eyes of many, the
only merit he possesses. Yet according to Mr. Grote
and Mr. Mill, Plato devoted nearly a fifth of his master-
piece to describing what on his own showing could
possibly have no existence — namely. Degrees in practical
Justice. According to Mr. Grote and Mr. Mill, Plato
was bound in consistency to bracket Aristides with
Archelaus.
We may illustrate the working of Platonic Justice \
in actual life by an example from la petite morale, \
suggested by a passage in the Republic, 484. d. A man \
by being polite generally secures civility in return ; 1
and this is the motive expressed by the proverb
"civility costs nothing," implying that it brings in a 1
great deal. But in addition to the Vulgar Motive, some
people are polite, because politeness comes from within ; /
because they could not be otherwise without forfeiting
self-respect. Now the latter motive is the more efficient
of the two. But are the two motives incompatible ?
And if the truly well-bred man does not always receive
a return in kind for his civility, is he thereby precluded
from reminding his inferior of Reciprocity by a quid
pro quo ? And may not, what is true of the smaller, be
likewise true of the greater Code r 425. a.
The Just man will, in Plato's opinion, regard Reci-
procity as the means of satisfying such necessary wants
as are not deleterious, 559. b., but when his payments/
30 THE REPUBLIC.
are all made, and his receipts all gathered in, he has
another account to look to, one in which he is both his
own Debtor and his own Creditor, and of which the
items are Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice.
And even supposing the worst comes to the worst,
that his income is interrupted, he can still contemplate
with satisfaction the balance in his favour in the Grand
Account.
If this estimate of the Platonic Ethics be correct, it
is obvious that Reciprocity — the Seeming Justice of the
Dialogue — is but the occasion, the accidental occasion,
of the Platonic Fortitude, the most outward of the
Platonic Quality. Fortitude, the peculiar meaning of
which in Plato must not be forgotten, will fully insure
the observance on our part of our duty to others. But
this is not its sole office. Fortitude gives occasion to
Temperance, and Temperance in its turn gives Justice
room to work, each and all being organised by directing
Prudence. Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and
Justice on the one hand, may be considered as overt
modes of Reciprocity. Phcedo, 69. a. Prudence, Forti-
tude, Temperance, and Justice, on the other hand may
be considered as inward principles of action, and
permanent objects of reflex thought. The relation
betw^ them, when so distinguished, is slight, and
slight as it is, accidental only. "We cannot therefore
argue from one sphere to the other — from tfee Mutual
relation of the constituents of the former, to the Mutual
relation of the constituents of the latter. But this is
what Mr. Grote does. We may, however, see that the
principle of Reciprocity does not, in the first instance,
come in contact with Platonic justice at all, while so
far as they are related in the second instance. Reci-
procity is strengthened by Platonic justice, which
supports itself. So much for the fiction which Plato
is so anxious to accredit.
Some points about Plato's ethical champion — the
THE REPUBLIC. 3 1
just man — deserve notice and bring out most strongly
the Platonic view of Morality. A modern writers
describing the virtuous man struggling with misfortune \
and worsted in the strife, would be sure to dwell on I
the consolation he derived from the approval of his
conscience. He was beaten, it was true, but he had ■
fought a good fight, and that consoled him. Of this,
there is not a word in the Republic, unless, which is
possible, it is included in the sense of internal harmony,
which the just man feels. But the point on which - —
Plato dwells is, not that the just man having acted
justly, consoles himself with the thought that he did
act justly. On the contrary, although the just man acts
in the first instance proprio motu, he yet thereby secures
his retreat to a distinct class of positive pleasures, which
make up his mental pabulum, and which cannot be cut
off. Had he acted unjustly, these pleasures would have
been intercepted. Just conduct is the price — the paltry
price — of the internal harmony, and of the spectacle to
which it admits him — the intuition of Reality.
Neither is the Platonic Morality emotional or senti-
mental. Both Emotion and Sentiment are some of the
raw materials of Morality in the hands of Prudence,
but Plato holds that to be ruled by sentiment is one
evil only, second to being ruled by the Senses.
Rep. 586., c. d.
/In one sense therefore — and that in the strictest —
''^Plato's Morality is one of Calculation. In the Republic,
the name given to the Moral Faculty, at least thirteen
^ times, is that which calculates, reckons, adds up. Nor
is this metaphorical. That which counts is closely
connected with Number and Measure, which are not
only as with us, conditions of scientific exactness, but
also, in Plato's eyes, the Real Elements of Supreme
Perfection.
r But although the Platonic Morality is essentially
'one of calculation, it cannot be called either selfish or
32 THE REPUBLIC.
even self-regarding in the modern sense of the term.
Before we can employ the word self in the Platonic
ethics, we must free it from two notions, with which
modern speculation has connected it. These two
notions are the exclusion of the good of others, and
the modification of the Object by the Subject in
the relation Knowledge. As was before observed,
Platonic Justice is, in the first instance, non-social, but
in the second instance we have seen how Fortitude
ensures the good of others. And in the higher cogni-
tions, Plato held that the cognitive faculty sees (for
such is his favourite metaphor) the Object as it is, the
faculty itself remaining unchanged ; and, that the
Object continues unchanged in and during the process
of cognition. The unchangeableness of both Object
and Subject in the higher cognitions was his counter-
doctrine to the all-pervading Mutability of Heraclitus.
And the unchangeableness of both Terms in cognition
was carried through the Platonic Ethics. We are
consequently freed from some questions which perplex
modern speculation, as to the nature of the Moral
Faculty, and its mode of procedure. These two ques-
tions are obviated by Plato's doctrine of cognition.
The Subject, knowing the Object as it is, cannot but
know it, as it is : and the Subject knows the Object as
it is, because the Object continues unchanged. And
this is true, as well in the ethics as in the metaphysics
of Plato.
We have seen that Plato refuses to acknowledge
either the Emotions or the Senses as directors of
conduct. The Reason is therefore left in undisturbed
authority. When we act according to Reason ourselves,
or estimate from that point the conduct of others, the
question is narrowed to this : — What is the Criterion
of Morality ? In the words of Mr. Grote, " What is
the common property or point of similarity between
Prudence, Courage, Temperance, and Justice, by reason
THE REPUBLIC. 33
of which each is termed Virtue ? What are the
characteristic points of difference, by reason of which
Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, some-
times another ?''
Mr. Grote answers : — " Courage, Prudence, Temper-
ance, Justice — all of them mental attributes of rational
voluntary agents — have also the common property of
being absolutely essential to the life of the agent and
the maintenance of society ; and of being above that
degree tutelary against the sufferings, and beneficial
to the happiness of both. This tutelary or beneficent
tendency is the common objective property signified
by the general term Virtue, and is implicated with
the subjective property the sentiment of appro-
bation. The four opposite qualities are designated
by the general term Vice or Defect, connoting both
the maleficent tendency and the sentiment of dis-
approbation." Vol. 3. p. 455 — 7.
The tendencies, which Mr. Grote points out, would
not have been questioned by Plato. They are in fact
the subject of the second thesis of the Republic. Some
of them belong to the province of overt or " Seeming"
Justice, and some of them to the outward effects of
Fortitude. For, it is obvious that Fortitude, if perfectly
carried out, would supersede the sanctions of Positive
Law, Rep, 442, b. c; 429, b — ^d.; 430, a. b., and the minor
ofiices — la petite morale — would be fully observed.
Rep. 425. a. But the Platonic ethics do not regard
.these tendencies as the whole of ethics.
/ That happiness — satisfaction of some kind — is our
'being's end and aim, Plato, like other writers, certainly
holds. Rep. 505, d — e. But whose happiness ? Un-
doubtedly, in the first instance, that of the Agent f]
himself: the happiness of the Agent is the basis of
the structure. In what does the Agent's happiness
consist ? In the pleasure resulting from systematic
development of all the Agent's faculties. Rep. 402, d.
D
/
34 THE REPUBLIC.
441, e — 442, a. 443, d. e. How is such development to
be ensured ? By Division of Labour — by confining each
faculty to its special function. Rep, 433, c. d. How
is that function to be ascertained ? By studying each
faculty in relation to its appropriate object — in a word,
by Psychology. 436, b — e. And the preliminary investi-
gation completed, the ethical calculator will arrange
the several items according to their scientific value, his
Organon being Experience and Reasoning. He will
make use of that test which every system of ethics must
make use of, — which every one who judges another's
conduct must make use of — the difference of pleasures
in kind.
Human conduct has two aspects with each of which
ethical science is bound to deal. Modern Utilitarianism
dwells on that common tendency of the four ethical
qualities, which is overt and more obvious. Plato
dwells mainly, as his argument required, but not ex-
clusively, on that common tendency, which is unseen
but more important. With the modern, the Motive
does not affect the ethical quality of the Action ; wdth \
\ Plato the Motive is everything — the Motive considered, ;
not as the antecedent of Action, but as the index of th^
condition of the Agent. The Greek, filled with a
higher sense of individual dignity, regarded conduct in
its immediate relation to the all-important unit — the
full member of the polity founded by the Gods and
Heroes whose blood he claimed ; the modern, in a more
amiable but less lofty spirit, merges his individuality in
the aggregate of sentient existence. Plato regarded the
action without overlooking the act, the modern regards
the act only. The inner antecedent to all action — the
living force which sets it in motion — the permanent
condition of the inmost self as dependent on the mutual
adjustment of Reason, Emotion and Sense — this is
what Plato points to, as of infinitely greater importance
than any social results however extensive. The inner
1^
THE REPUBLIC. 35
state of Reason, Emotion, and Sense, is not only, as
with the modern, a means to the general good, it is \
also something more. The state of Reason, Emotion,
and Sense is the only means whereby the Agent himself
secures his own incommunicable good. And as that
good is inseparably combined with the particular state
of Reason, Emotion, and Sense, that state is likewise
an End. Both systems — the Greek and the English —
are agreed as to the End of human Action ; they are j
likewise agreed as to its overt and more palpable
results, but Plato points out other Results which are
more permanent and infinitely more important. Each
Philosophy points to the same End ; which of the two ^^^
is fitted to produce the nobler Type, and therefore the /iT
surer Means ?
Mr. Grote has told us, how the Platonic view of
Justice, is contradicted by fact. We are now to see
Plato divided against himself, and witness the usual
catastrophe. The Platonic doctrine, we are told, effaces
Reciprocity, and in thus eliminating Reciprocity, Plato
contradicts his own theory respecting the genesis and
foundation of society. "What is the explanation,' ' asks
Mr. Grote, " he himself gives (in this very Republic) of
the primary origin of a City ? It arises (he says) from
the fact, that each individual among us is not self-
sufficing, but full of wants. All having many wants,
each takes to himself others as fellows, and auxiliaries
to supply them.'' Vol. III., p. 137. He thus recognises
the mutual dependence of need and service, and so, the
principle of Reciprocity which his doctrine of Justice
effaces. The answer is, Mr. Grote has failed to see the
real purport of the Typical City, as well as the point on
which the stress of the analogy rests. The object of
the Typical Commonwealth is not to throw light upon
the natural growth of society, but to illustrate the
ethics of the individual. The Typical City is brought
forward only as a model on a larger scale of the
D2
36 THE REPUBLIC.
structure of the smaller specimen. Rep. 368, d. e.
420, b. c. 434, d. The object of the treatise is the
ethics of the individual, and the only reason why this
is ever overlooked seems to be the long and earnest
discussion of certain social topics. We should, however,
recollect that in Plato's time notes and excursus were
unknown, but above all, keep in view the Greek notion
that Man was the Political Animal, who required social
union as the means of developing even his individual
powers. But lest he should forget the real subject of
the treatise, Plato even in his political sketches reminds
us of his hero, the Just individual, as Homer recalls
Achilles, by continual allusions, scattered through the
whole of the first argument. Rep. V. 472, b. — e. instar
omnium.
^"Mr. Grote has fallen into other misconceptions, by not
always keeping in mind that the subject of the treatise
is individual and not Social Ethics. He charges Plato
with overlooking our liability to injury at each other's
hands, notey p. 139 , and with neglecting to provide
security against such possibilities. Against these,
however, Plato amply provides. The Guardians, them-
selves above suspicion, will see that the state receive
no detriment from the subject Many, who will not
be allowed to violate their legal and social duties.
Rep. 4. 465, b. cf. 414, a. b., 433, e.
Mr. Grote also reproaches Plato with not providing
a special education for the subject Many. But since
the treatise is properly ethical, and not social in its
main object, the subject Many is intended to illustrate
the subject Appetite — the seat of the Heraclitan Many —
which in Plato's eyes must be ruled even for its own
good, but whose necessary wants are to be attended to.
Rep. 9. 589, b. As the treatise is not political, the
purpose of the Fair City is subsidiary only, and its
structure is consequently displayed in its most rudi-
mentary form.
THE REPUBLIC. 37
The object of the treatise is individual Ethics, and
the Typical City is to be used in teaching the science.
The model displays on a larger scale that Division of
Labour, which Plato wishes us to copy on a smaller.
And to show the universality of the principle, he points
out that the Division of Labour is ethnical also : we have
the fighting Scythian, the money-loving Phoenician,
and the thinking Greek. Rep. 435, e. We thus have
an ascending series — Faculty, Class, City, Race, all
united in the Civitas Dei, each and all carrying out the
Division of Labour ordained by the Grand Task-master.
But to object to Plato's view of individual Justice,
because Reciprocity exists in certain societies, is as
absurd as to say, that Platonic Justice would not work
in Scythia or Tyre. We might as well object that
Plato's psychology must be wrong, because the many-
headed hybrid, to which he compares the soul, is
anatomically impossible. Rep. 9, 588.
But Plato, according to Mr. Grote, has stultified
himself still further. Mr. Grote denies the pertinence
of the analogy between the city and individual man.
" To a certain extent the analogy is real, but it fails in a
main point which Plato's inference requires as a basis.
From the happiness of a community all composed of just
men, you cannot draw any fair inference to that of one
just man in an unjust community." Vol. III., p. 14 1-2.
But this is again to overlook the real purport of the
Typical City. To illustrate intrinsic Justice in the
individual, we study civic Justice in the model, and we
find that in each case it consists essentially of Division
of Labour. This is the point of resemblance on which
the analogy rests.
. Now, Justice is Division of Labour. By following
out this principle perfectly, both City and Individual
will be perfectly happy; and short of perfect happiness,
they will be more l;iappy, the nearer they approach it ;
less happy the further each recedes. In this sense the
/
38 THE REPUBLIC.
Fair City is an ideal or perfect type — a supposition per-
fectly legitimate in Ethics where the type is assumed to
be without flaw, both for scientific treatment, and practical
purposes. But although the Fair City has not yet seen
the Sun, and may never come into being save under
extraordinary circumstances, Rep. 499, b. c. 592., the
ideal City still answers one of its ends. The conception
serves as the perfect standard to which, in Plato's
opinion, our conduct ought to approximate ; and for this
high purpose it matters little whether the Platonic
Republic ever exists on earth or not. The solitary
pilgrim can still dimly discern the inscription on its
gate — Justice is of Divided Labour. This he can
apply to himself and realise, at least in part. Rep.
9-592.
r^l^^y^^ow although the typical individual would be per-
/ fectly happy in the typical Society, Plato does not
/ mean that Socrates in prison actually realised that
\ consummate felicity. What he means is that Justice
under any circumstances is preferable to Injustice
Lender any circumstances — that the just man, suffering
for Justice's sake, would not, if offered, change places
with the wrong-doer. " I would like," says Socrates in
the Gorgias, " neither to inflict nor to sufler wrong, but
if I must choose one of the two, I prefer to suffer
wrong." Gorg. 469, b. c. And the reason he gives is
remarkable. He prefers to suffer wrong, because he
fears, lest, if he do wrong, his soul should become
incuraWy diseased.
Now this metaphor disease, occurs in the argument
for. Immortality in this very Republic. And on this
metaphor Mr. Grote in his notice of the Gorgias founds
an objection which deserves consideration ; it is, more-
over, answered in the Republic : — Archelaus, king of
Macedonia, obtains supreme power by the very worst
means. Most people envy his condition, but Socrates
does not. His soul is incurably diseased by the crimes
THE REPUBLIC. 39
by which he obtained his power. "Plato," says Mr.
Grote, " is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between
bodily health and mental health ; real in some respects,
not real in others. When a man is in bad bodily health,
his sensations warn him of it Conversely, in the
absence of any such warnings, and in the presence of
certain positive sensations, he knows himself to be in
tolerable or good health. If Socrates or Archelaus
were both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily
health, each would be made aware of the fact by
analogous evidences. But by what measure are we
to determine when a man is in a good or bad mental
state ? By his own feelings ? In that case, Archelaus
and Socrates are in a mental state equally good ; each
is satisfied with his own. By the judgment of the by-
stander ? Archelaus will then be the better off of the
two ; at least his admirers and enviers will out-number
those of Socrates." Vol. II., pp. iii, 112.
The Republic furnishes the answer. Taking Socrates
and Archelaus by themselves, the opinion of Socrates
is decisive. Archelaus does not know the whole of the
feelings of Socrates : he is therefore blind to the
difference between himself and Socrates. On the other
hand, Socrates can compare the condition of both, and
he deliberately prefers his own. Rep. 409. e. Socrates
is alone the judge, as he has some experience of both ;
Archelaus knows only his own. Rep. 582, a — d.
That Plato was aware of the difference between
bodily and mental health pointed out by Mr. Grote is
certain, for he says expressly that Archelaus is not
aware of his condition. Gorg. 471, b. Moreover, Plato
constantly compares the life of the man who believes
sensible perception to be ultimate reality, to that state
of dreaming in which our fancies are most wild, and all
regard for waking reality is lost. Rep. 476, c. Insensi-
bility is therefore the worst symptom of the case. But,
metaphor apart, the test is valid ; no one can prefer
40 THE REPUBLIC.
any given pleasure to another, unless he has either
tried both, or witnessed their effects when tried on
others. Granting that there is a pleasure in being
mad, who would exchange sanity for madness ? And
why not ? Because, we would answer, with Plato, sane
persons have experience of the effects of sanity in
themselves, and witness them in others : sane persons
can also witness the effects of madness in others : they
compare both and prefer sanity. So, also, persons who
recover from insanity prefer to continue sane. On the
other hand, no one would appeal to the lunatic himself.
And unless Plato is right, why not r Similarly, in a
minor degree, of drunkenness and violent anger. A
pig can form no notion of the mental resources of
Socrates, but Socrates can form a notion more or less
vivid of the entire resources of the pig. Rep. 535. e.
Yet Socrates would prefer his own. Is he wrong ?
And if he is not wrong, Plato's point is proved —
Pleasures differ in kind, cf Mill. Utilitarianism, 10 — 16.
Our word happiness is calculated to mislead us by
its associations. Happiness is generally regarded as
something permanently distinct from the antecedents
which lead to it — something w^hich a man retires to
and enjoys, when his toils are past. There is, too, in
our word a strong infusion of material comforts and
belongings. To call a man engaged in an arduous
task happy, before its close, seems out of place, and
contentment, not happiness, is the word we apply to a
disregard of comfort. But Plato's notion is different.
The highest satisfaction he compares to seeing; the
born philosopher is " fond of gazing on Truth" [Rep.
V. 475. e.) calmly, but not without awe,
daixfirjo-a^ Kara Ovjjlov otaaaTO ryap Oeov elvai.
Plato's main thesis, that Intrinsic Regularity under
the most adverse circumstances is preferable to Intrinsic
Irregularity under the most favourable circumstances,
Mr. Grote meets with a dilemma; and this dilemma
THE REPUBLIC. 4 1
Mr. Mill considers irrefragable, as may be seen from
the extract given above.
The Dilemma is : — The word Justice must be takeiii
in either the ordinary, or in the Platonic Sense. \
If we take Justice in the ordinary sense, Plato ha$
not proved his point, for he only proves, if his premisses
be true, the happiness of the man, who is just in th^
Platonic sense : which was not the point to be proved.
The point to be proved was, the happiness, say, of
Socrates in adversity.
If we take Justice in the Platonic sense, Plato's
premisses are not true. For, the platonically just man
is not completely self-sufficing, nor can any human
being be so. But Plato's conclusion implies that the
just man is completely self-sufiicing. Plato's premisses
are therefore not true. p. 14.7.
Now Plato undertook to prove, as was shown, the
effects of Intrinsic Justice of the purest type on the
Agent himself. But Intrinsic Justice can only exist in
the intrinsically just man : no one else can know it or
appreciate it. Justice, like Sanity, proves itself; while
Injustice, like Insanity, is no proof that the opposite state
is not better. Platonic happiness is the consequence of
Platonic Justice, and implies a recipient : and the sole re-
cipient and percipient is the just man in the Platonic
sense. But this was what Plato undertook to prove as
the theoretic or typical conclusion of the piece.
As to the other horn, Mr. Grote and Mr. Mill, because
Plato's typical Justice and Happiness do not admit of
qualification, because they are types, argue that Plato's
conclusion is wrong. Now Platonic Justice, so far as
it depends on <^p6v7;<rt9. Prudence, which is always at
par, admits of no degrees. But Emotion and Sense are,
in Plato's Psychology, forces which, more or less,
counteract Prudence. The Agent consequently may
so far deviate from the line of Prudence, and, so, of
Justice, and, so, of Happiness. But the deviations of
42 THE REPUBLIC.
the Agent are due, not to any variations in Prudence,
which is constant, but to variations in Emotion and
Sense, which are variables. Their intensity may be
indefinitely diminished, but they cannot be completely
nullified in this world, and accordingly every human
being must deviate more or less from Justice and
Happiness. Therefore Justice, and its consequence,
Happiness, will be inversely as the deviations. And
this is what Plato undertook to prove, as a practical
conclusion.
Mr. Grote having failed to keep steadily in view the
real purport of the typical City, and the real point on
which the stress of the analogy rests, sees nothing but
inconsistency in the Republic. He, consequently comes
to the conclusion, that Plato, though unable to reconcile
his cherished sentiments with fact, was at the same
time unwilling to abandon them, and that, thus divided
in his allegiance, he confounded the offices of the
Preacher and the Searcher after truth. The Searcher
brings forward all facts indifferently without regard to
their moral value ; the Preacher, whose object is the
improvement of his hearers, dwells on those tendencies
which induce us to do good, well knowing that the
opposite side is quite strong enough already ; he bends
the crooked stick in one direction, until he gives it
proper straightness. But Plato is not merely one-sided,
like the Preacher, he runs counter to obvious matters
of fact, and moreover contradicts himself. His doctrine
of Justice is subverted by the principle of Reciprocity
— the very principle which he makes the basis of his
model Republic. He is thus at once inconsistent with
himself and with Fact. Such is Mr. Grote's view of the
Republic from " his own point " of observation.
One question only then remains. Is Mr. Grote's
point of view the proper one or not ? An illustration
from a field which the Anti-Platonist regards as sacred
— the field of Physical research — is the best reply.
THE REPUBLIC. 43
There, Similarities and Dissimilarities are blended in
apparently inextricable confusion. The investigator
may begin with either the Similarities or the Dissimi-
larities. The History of Philosophy is in favour of
commencing with the former. Had Newton devoted
his attention, in the first instance, to the differences
between an apple and the heavenly bodies, we should
not probably have had the Law of Gravitation. Reason,
moreover, is in favour of commencing with Similarities.
If we commence with differences, we may become
unable to discern any thing but differences; if we
commence with agreements, we may become able to
see that, what once appeared differences, are no longer
such. So it is with Plato. If we are anxious to find
out inconsistencies in appearance — in "seeming" but
not in " being" — we shall find them in abundance. But
the student of Plato will perhaps discover, that it is
more fruitful, because more philosophical, to com-
mence with the points of agreement. And of the
sincerity of Plato the best warrant, if such were needed,
is, the declaration which in this very Republic, he
puts into the mouth of his Master, " Through error of
judgment, to destroy life is, in my belief, less culpable,
than to mislead those who ask me how Institutions
may be built on what is Noble, Good, and Just."
11.
THE PROTAGORAS.
Can Virtue be taught ? Such is the question which
occupies the greater portion of the Protagoras. To it
Plato gives no explicit answer, but a proposition is laid
down which is a step in that direction. That Virtue is
Science is asserted by Socrates, and reluctantly admitted
by Protagoras ; but that Virtue is teachable is not
expressly decided. Socrates, in concluding, points
out in words, which he puts into the mouth of an
imaginary critic, the seeming inconsistency of himself
and Protagoras. He, Socrates, had asserted that
Virtue was Science, but he had denied that Virtue can
be taught. Protagoras had asserted that Virtue is not
only teachable, but actually taught ; while he had
denied that Virtue was Science. And the imaginary
critic, likewise, tells us, that if Virtue is not Science,
Virtue cannot be taught. Plato thus seemingly lays
down the principle, that Whatever is teachable is
Science : but he abstains from asserting that all Science
is teachable. At the same time he intimates that the
presumption is, that if Virtue be Science, Virtue is
teachable.
The express and positive result of the dialogue, is
that Virtue is Science. And this result is arrived at in
the following manner : —
Protagoras asserts that the proper study of mankind
is that which fits him for the discharge of his social
and political duties, and not any special branch of
knowledge such as Logic, Astronomy or Mathematics.
And this proper study he professes to teach.
THE PROTAGORAS. 45
Socrates, on the other hand, maintains that neither
Protagoras nor any other man can teach Virtue. And
his opinion is founded on the well known facts, that
the sovereign assembly, on all points, save general
policy, takes the advice of trained experts, such as
engineers, architects, and the like ; but on a question
of general policy, they listen to everybody indifferently
whether rich or poor, gentle or simple. And this
Socrates argues would not be the case if there were
professors of Virtue — the Art and Science of Human
Conduct in its most general aspect.
The same conclusion is also evidenced by the fact, that
eminent men, like Pericles and others, neither them-
selves teach, nor procure any one else to teach, their
children, the principles of that wise conduct by which
they themselves rose to eminence ; while they have
them carefully instructed in the various accomplish-
ments of men of their rank. Protagoras replies by
relating a mythe which is meant to serve the double
purpose of answering Socrates, and of accounting for
the fact on which the counter-argument is founded.
The mythe, ornamentation apart, asserts that all
men are virtuous, more or less, and that, because Virtue
is not only teachable, but is actually taught — taught
too at every moment of a man's life from the cradle to
the grave. Now Virtue (in other words the several
qualities, Holiness, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and
Fortitude) is taught because of its tutelary and beneficent
qualities — because unless men shewed in their conduct
some regard for each other, society could not keep
together. Such regard moreover is sanctioned by the
right, which every society exercises of inflicting the
extreme penalty, death, on all who do not exhibit the
required minimum of regard for others. And the
penalty death, or in less aggravated cases, expulsion
from society, fully insures on the part of parents and
others, the constant teaching of virtue not indeed by
46 THE PROTAGORAS.
technical rules, but by the still more potent means of
example, and precept founded thereon. For these
reasons, Protagoras asserts that Virtue is both teachable
and actually taught, and that there are no experts or
public professors of the Science of Conduct, because in
fact every one is perpetually teaching and perpetually
taught, virtuous conduct : and that too, with the heaviest
penalties attaching to negligence in learning, and to
error in practice.
Socrates opens his argument rather cautiously, after
expressing his admiration for his opponent's eloquence.
Protagoras had, says he, alluded to Holiness, Justice,
Temperance and Desire of Esteem, as if they were all
one single quality covered by the one word, Virtue :
Are then Holiness, Justice, Temperance, and Desire of
Esteem, are these severally convertible with Virtue, or is
Virtue a Whole, of which Holiness, Justice, Temperance
and Desire of Esteem are the Parts or Fractions ? Virtue,
replies Protagoras, is a "Whole, and its parts are
Holiness, Temperance, Justice, and Desire of Esteem.
Now these parts he continues, are related to the whole
Virtue, as fractions to an integer, for example, as
features to a face, and not as mere additions to an
aggregate, not as any one piece of gold is related to all
the gold in creation.
If so, asks Socrates, can a man possess one virtue,
or rather one fraction of virtue, without possessing the
rest ? For, if the fractions are severally unique, what is
to prevent it ; and if so, how are we to reconcile this
with the statement, that Virtue is essentially and
integrally one — a totality and not an aggregate.
Certainly, says Protagoras, a man may possess any
one fraction without the rest : he may be both brave
and unjust ; and he may be both just and foolish. Each
of the fractions is not only unique, but all the virtues
are of different values ; and of these the most valuable
is Prudence or Wisdom.
THE PROTAGORAS. 47
Here, then, it may be objected, that, if the fractional
parts are vseverally distinct, and if their abstract names
express certain corresponding qualities, the following
consequences follow : — Justice is not Holiness ; Justice
is therefore an unholy thing. Similarly, Holiness is
not Justice, is therefore Holiness an unjust thing ? 331.
Socrates replies, on his own behoof, that Justice is a
holy quality, and Holiness a just quality. Now we
have seen it laid down, that the abstract terms denote
really existing qualities. If therefore the real quality
denoted by the word Holiness be just, and if the real
quality denoted by the word Justice be holy, it follows
that Justice and Holiness are convertible. This Socrates
declares to be his own view of the case. On behalf of
Protagoras, he wishes to say, that either Justice and
Holiness, are alike in all respects, or at least that they
are similar in a remarkable degree. 331. b.
Protagoras qualifies the latter proposition, by saying
that there is a certain amount of likeness between any
two given things. Blackness, for example, seems most
unlike whiteness, and yet they are alike in being both
colours. The mere existence, therefore, of a certain
amount of similarity or dissimilarity will not warrant
us in founding any scientific classification thereon.
Have then Justice and Holiness anything more than an
average affinity r Justice and Holiness, says Protagoras,
have more than the average affinity, but they are not
so closely related as Socrates supposes.
Here the point is left ; but the question it involves,
as to the meaning and force of negation, is fully dis-
cussed in the Sophistes. The latter dialogue carefully
distinguishes the proposition which simply nullifies —
the negative proper — from the Contradictory, which is
incompatible with its opposite. Of contradictories, both
cannot be true, but two bare negatives both may be
true or not, according to circumstances. In other
words, the contradictory is that negative proposition,
48 THE PROTAGORAS.
which bears a certain definite relation to another
definite proposition, which is its opposite, while the
bare negative asserts more generally, that the alleged
connection between subject and predicate does not
hold. In the present case, Injustice is the opposite of
Justice, and is consequently not Justice. Holiness, is
also distinct in certain respects from Justice, hence
Holiness is not Justice. Consequently Holiness and
Injustice agree in not being Justice, but it does not
follow that Holiness and Injustice are convertible.
This logical exercise Plato leaves his reader to work
out, and various passages in other dialogues turn on
this logical distinction.
Socrates proceeds. Imprudence, a^pocruvT;, is the op-
posite of Prudence, cppovija-L^j and Imprudence, dcjypoavvijy
is likewise the opposite of Temperance, crcocfypoo-vvr].
Therefore, Prudence and Temperance, which are the
opposites of Imprudence, are but one single quality,
or have but one single quality in common, so far as
they are opposed to Imprudence, for every opposite
must be one, and one only. 332. e.
But we had before seen, that Justice, and Holiness,
if not identical, are nearly alike, as Justice is a holy
quality, and Holiness a just quality. Hence results an
apparent inconsistency between the doctrine, that the
fractional parts of Virtue are severally distinct, and the
doctrine, that a negative proposition has only one
single contrary. For if Imprudence is single, its binary
opposite, Prudence and Temperance, must be single too ;
and this also militates against the distinctness of the
virtues. But the solution of the difficulty, how opposites
may converge to unity, is given in the Philehus^ 18., of
which more anon.
Socrates proceeds to examine the position of Pro-
tagoras. According to his opponent, some unjust men
possess Temperance, and, therefore, so far aim at what
is good. Men, consequently, who are unjust, but
THE PROTAGORAS. 49
temperate, aim at what is good, and act so as to attain
it. That is, their object and conduct are good to
some extent. ^^^. b. d.
Now good things, certainly exist; that is, things
exist which are good. As to what is good, Socrates
is inclined to define Goodness as Utility to Man, while
Protagoras widens the definition, so as to include,
besides things usefiil to man, things useful to the
animal and vegetable kingdoms. Now, says Protagoras,
Goodness is ultimately manifold, and exhibits infinite
variety. 331. 334. This doctrine is of course at direct
variance with Plato's theory that The Good is essentially
one. And he tells us in the Phsedrus, that the essence
of any thing consists in its intrinsic Unity or Multiety.
271, a.
This logical notion of essence is founded on his
revolt from the Heraclitan doctrine of Flux or Multiety.
But it is not a mere logical subtlety. Did the Good
admit of diversity, did it exist as a plurality, or
Multiety, morality in Plato's opinion would be reduced
to the Protagorean standard. Man — that is the
individual recipient — would be the measure of all
things. And the Protagorean theory is a case of the
Heraclitan Flux — a doctrine thus corrected in the Laws,
that God, not man, is the measure of all things. 716, c.
Socrates, after a lengthy digression, reverts to the
original question: Are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude,
Justice, and Holiness, five different names for the one
thing ? Or does each of the five names express a
separate or distinct quality or specific property ? Pro-
tagoras admits that the four qualities. Prudence,
Temperance, Justice, and Holiness, are nearly alike ;
but Fortitude stands on a different footing. Many men
have no good quality, save courage, 349, and have
every vice, save cowardice.
Socrates, in reply, shows by an induction, that
Ceteris paribus, the most skilful artist in each department
E
50 THE PROTAGORAS.
is the most courageous : for example, the most skilful
diver dives most courageously. Wisdom therefore is
courage, and if so, courage does not stand on a different
footing from the other virtues.
This inference is somewhat modified by Protagoras.
In this way : — All courageous men display boldness,
but on the other hand all boldness is not courage.
Boldness may come from skill, from anger, from
sentiment, and from madness. While courage comes
from natural disposition and proper training.
Socrates replies : Some men live badly, others well.
Men w^ho live well, live pleasantly, and pleasure if not
followed by evil is good. Now Fortitude enables
a man to live pleasantly, and without annoyance.
Fortitude, in a word, is both beneficent and tutelary.
Fortitude is therefore good, and so far resembles the
four other fractional parts. Now men attain what is
good by wisdom or prudence ; Fortitude, consequently
is of the nature of wisdom.
Protagoras, after dividing pleasures into good, bad,
and indifferent, a division adopted by Plato himself in
the Republic and elsewhere, points to the notorious
fact, that men act contrary to their knowledge of what
is good : that they are induced by passion, pleasure,
pain, love, and fear, to do what they know will be
injurious. Their knowledge, in place of directing and
controlling their actions, is made the slave of any
feeling or impulse which may be uppermost for the
time being. Such is the notorious fact.
Socrates, accordingly considers what is the meaning
of being *^ overcome" by passion, or pleasure, or pain, or
fear, or appetite. Being overcome by pleasure — a
common Greek expression — means acting so as to incur
certain disadvantages, which more than counterbalance
the advantages of indulgence. But in determining how
far advantages and disadvantages counterbalance and
outweigh each other in each particular case, the under-
THE PROTAGORAS. 5 1
standing must be called in, dealing as we do, with
questions of Equal, Greater, and Less. But questions
which involve the notions Equal, Greater, and Less,
belong to the science of Measure and Quantity. Con-
sequently, in pursuing that course to which the balance
of advantages inclines, we follow the dictates of Science,
or Knowledge. In acting in opposition to the balance
of advantages, we act in opposition to Science or
Knowledge. But to act in opposition to knowledge is
to act through a state of mind which ignores the
dictates of knowledge, and therefore to act as Ignorance
would prompt. For no one, save in error, chooses eviL
in place of good, as the final end and scope of action :
nor will any one (and this is a Variation of the Experi-
ment) with his eyes open, deliberately prefer a greater
to a less evil. 358. d.
Now acting through ig^iorance does not mean in Plato
merely acting 171 the absence of knowledge : acting through
Ignorance, is, as explained by Socrates, acting under
the influence of any opinion or impression, which is at
variance with the ultimate reality. Hence Ignorance - —
denotes in Plato something positive ; viz. the presence
of disturbing influences, which tend to weaken the force
of ulterior interests. In other words. Ignorance ex-
presses all sentiments, passions, and emotions, which
lead us to put out of sight the consideration of our
permanent interest, whether that interest be sought for
in ourselves, or outside ourselves. Ignorance, in short,
denotes the presence of temporary inducements, which
may be, and generally are, in opposition to our ulterior
and permanent advantages. Plato would class under tj
the head of Ignorance, all the Laws of Emotion, both \^
primary and secondary, which Brown has so well ex-
plained on psychological principles. Lect. 31, sq. In the
vivifying power of emotion, we must seek for the
explanation of the fact alleged by Protagoras that
unfortunately for us, in moments of temptation, know-
E 2
52 THE PROTAGORAS.
ledge is not the master but the slave of impulse and
passion. The phenomenon, as explained by Brown, is
referred to a well-known psychological law that, when
of several notions, any one becomes peculiarly vivid,
the rest fade both relatively and absolutely. Plato
himself in the Philebus, and the second book of the
Laws, gives an explanation of the phenomenon, sub-
stantially similar. Just as in estimating distance, we
are deceived in the case of very distant objects, so in
judging of pleasures and pains we are liable to be
deceived in two ways. All future pleasures and future
pains appear diminished ; and present pleasures dwarf
the future pains with which they are contrasted. It is
therefore evident, that Plato both saw and provided for
the obvious objection from matter of fact to his theory
of the rational nature of Virtue. In other words, no
objection from experience can be urged against the
doctrine. No one is willingly bad. But as exception
has been taken to this doctrine by anti-Platonists, from
Aristotle to Mr. Grote, it is worth while to consider
Plato's explicit statements on the point.
In the Republic, III, 413., we are told that men
change their views either eKova[w<i or aKovalw^j and
all changes of opinion which involve any sacrifice of
truth come under the latter category. Sir James
Mackintosh states the doctrine thus, "every soul is
unwillingly deprived of truth.'' That " unwillingly"
is a most inadequate rendering will clearly appear, if
we study the list of causes which, in Plato's opinion,
impede truth. These causes are Persuasion, Forgetful-
ness, Pain, Grief, Pleasure, and Fear. Now every act,
done under the influence of any of these six causes, is
said by Plato to be done aKovaiw^. The man who
yields to persuasion, " against his better judgment not
convinced," acts aKovaiw^;. The man who from any cause
forgets his duty, acts aKovaL(o<;. The man on the rack,
who utters what is true or false, acts in each case
THE PROTAGORAS. 53
aKova-io)^. The man, who in an agony of grief, commits
suicide, acts clkovglo)^. The man, who begs for mercy,
acts cLKovaloifi. And, finally, the man who is led astray
by the inducements of pleasure, acts aKovaloxi.
To generalise : — the word uKovaicof; denotes any and
all of the disturbing causes, which induce us to act
differently from what we should have done on a calm
review of the whole of the case. The opposite state —
acting 6/cov(TLQ)fi — is keeping steadily in view all the
circumstances which serve as the final justification of
our conduct.
The distinction between the Motive, and the Justifi-
cation of conduct has not been sufficiently attended to.
In fact to understand any system of Ethics we ought i
to distinguish between three things, the Motive, the i
Criterion, and the final Justification, the ExcusatiOy \
or ^AiToXoyia of the agent to himself. For example, I
see a man in distress : pity prompts me to relieve him.
Pity is the Motive. Have I acted right in so relieving
him ? I have, for I have increased the sum of happiness
in the universe. This is the Criterion. But, why should
I increase the sum of happiness r Because, says Plato,
you thereby help to develope Intrinsic Justice : Intrinsic
Justice is the justification. In other words, when we
act eKovGiw^, Motive, Criterion, and Justification are in
harmony, though not identical. When we act atcovalta^y
they are incompatible.
In the Laws, 860, sq., the same doctrine is presented
to us, but from a different point of view. There, Plato
is discussing the relation of Conduct to Legal Punish-
ment. How does the doctrine, that men are "unwillingly''
bad, cohere with the right of the state to inflict punish-
ment on them — Punishment, too, which varies according
to circumstaiices, although all forbidden acts are all
done equally aKouaiax; ? In this way : — The Legislator
regards conduct merely in its overt manifestations, and
not in its intrinsic springs. From the Ethical or inner
54 THE PROTAGORAS.
point of view, all actions are, in Platonic language,
just or unjust. The just bring their own reward : the
unjust bring their own punishment. From the Legal or
outward standing point, actions are regarded solely as
producing damage or benefit. The division is a cross
one, since an unjust act may produce benefit, and a
just act may work damage. And Plato in specifying
the motives, which ma/ animate the damage-feasor,
and which may consequently subject him to incon-
venience at the hands of the Law, mentions Anger and
Fear, Pleasure and Appetite, and Ignorance. But '
Ignorance is, as we have seen, either the absence of
knowledge or the presence of positive delusion. Acts
done from these motives, because they work harm, are
punishable, but they are also unjust, because the
inferior motives domineer over the higher ; while acts
done from the higher motives, though they may
produce damage, are always just. And so far as they
are unjust, they are all done aKovalw^. This is the
explanation of the so-called paradoxes of the Gorgias,
over which the anti-Platonist imagines he gains such
an easy victory. It is an easy victory, but it is not
over Plato. ^
One objection brought by Mr. Grote elsewhere
remains to be considered with reference to the desire
for Good. "A man sometimes desires what is good
for others, sometimes what is evil for others, as the
case may be. Plato's observation cannot be admitted
— that as to the will or desire all men are alike — one
man is no better than another." II. p. 13.
Now, Plato is not considering what may be good for
others, or the reverse, but insists that the ultimate end
of all action must be either good or the lesser of two
evils. Taking the most extreme case — Suicide in
despair — even here the suicide proposes to himself a
change of state, as he thinks that any thing is better
than the present. He proposes to himself the lesser
THE PROTAGORAS. 55
evil and "jumps the life to come." Whether he may
injure himself or others, is a question of Means, but
certainly not of End.
But to apply the Law of Emotions to the question in
dispute between Socrates and Protagoras : — The four
ethical qualities, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and
Holiness, are in their essence Knowledge or Science.
The point is therefore narrowed to this ; Is Fortitude
Knowledge or Science? 360. B. Now the fact is, that
both the coward and the brave man feel fear, but each
is afraid of a different thing. The brave man dreads
dishonour ; he is afraid of being afraid : but the coward
is so overcome by present danger, that the dread of
subsequent dishonour fades away. Cowardice is there-
fore essentially of the nature of Ignorance, as previously
described, that is the presence of an impression at
variance with ultimate reality. But if Ignorance, so
understood, is of the essence of Cowardice, its opposite
Knowledge must be of the essence of Fortitude.
Fortitude, therefore, is not of a different essence from
that of the other virtues.
But if Knowledge is of the essence of the fractional
parts of Virtue, Knowledge must be of the essence
of the integral whole — Virtue. And that Virtue is
Knowledge is the positive result of the Protagoras.
But if Virtue be Knowledge, Virtue in Platonic
phrase is essentially one. The meaning of this propo-
sition requires some attention.
Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice (one
aspect of which is Holiness) are qualities co-existing
so inseparably that we cannot apprehend any one
without apprehending the rest. This can be proved.
Before, however, we proceed to the proof, it may be
observed that Holiness bears the same relation to God
that Justice does to man. Hence to prevent unnecessary
complication, the term Justice will be used as a geniiSy
which includes both Justice Proper and Holiness.
\
56 THE PROTAGORAS.
The proof, that the four ethical qualities coexist
inseparably, rests on a fact which is the foundation
of Plato's Ethics. The fact is complex, namely that
Reason foresees consequences, while Appetite altogether
ignores them. From this fact, which is part of every-
body's experience, Plato concludes that, while it is the
function of reason to direct appetite, by pointing out
consequences, it is not the function of appetite to direct
Reason, as it can point out no consequences. This is
all we require. Plato makes no assumption of Final
Causes, nor any appeal to the obnoxious "ought,"
which so provoked Bentham. Plato insists only on a
single fact which every human being admits more or
less in practice, and which no one attempts to deny in
theory. And this fact yields on analysis the four
inseparable qualities.
Because; — a thing directing implies a thing directed,
and a relation between the two as directing and directed.
The three moments are therefore inseparable, any given
one implying the other two.
In the present case, the thing directing is Reason,
and the thing directed is Appetite. Now, Reason
directing Appetite is the ethical quality Prudence.
But Appetite looks two ways. On the one side, it
regards outer objects ; on the other, the Agent's self.
Now Appetite directed by reason and looking outw^ards
is the ethical quality Fortitude ; and Appetite directed
by Reason and looking inward is the ethical quality
Temperance.
If the reader will recollect that the object-matter of
Fortitude is, in Plato, not merely danger, but pleasure,
in a word, all bodily states, and that these latter
comprehend not merely the actual objects of the
senses, but the whole aggregate of rights and duties
founded thereon, he will see that Directed Appetite
covers all the duties we owe to Man. That is
to say the Directing Reason is Prudence, and the
THE PROTAGORAS. 57
directed Appetite is, at once, Fortitude on the outside,
or Temperance on the inside. That Fortitude has for
its object not merely pain but pleasure, is expressly
taught in the Laches, the Republic and the Laws, while
legal and social rights and duties are classed with
bodily states in the Republic and the Phsedo. Ph. 66, i.
Now, in the Republic, as we have seen. Justice i!i[
defined as the Due Division of Energy or Labour. But\j
if reason directs and if appetite iS' directed thereby,
each portion of the microcosm discharges its special
function. Hence in such a state of things, the man
acts in accordance with the Division of Labour. Justice
therefore is but another name for the organisation and
interdependence of Prudence, Temperance, and Forti-
tude. And any one of these implies the rest.
The only difference between Justice and Virtue is
that Virtue expresses Prudence, Temperance, and
Fortitude, in their convergence to unity, while Justice
expresses the same qualities in their divergence to
triplicity. The notions are equivalent, but not identical ;
Virtue is a Whole, and Justice is the Sum of Parts.
Plato's use of the term Fortitude must be attended
to. In the Laws, his latest composition, not only is
his extension of the term repeated, but the superior
importance of steadiness in the face of pleasure to
steadiness in the face of danger insisted on by the
Athenian and admitted by his Spartan and Cretan
friends. Legg. 63.3, d. e.
It will be also seen, that Protagoras draws the same
distinction between true courage and mere animal
dash, which is insisted on in the Republic and the
Laws. He admits that science conduces to courage,
but denies their identity. Now Plato in making know-
ledge the essence of courage, implicitly asserts that, in
that case, courage must consist in being able to balance
advantages and disadvantages in the midst of disturbing
influences ; and, as in his opinion, pleasure is a much
58 THE PROTAGORAS.
more fruitful source of aberration than pain, Courage
if scientific, must be able to compute the value of the
various items of pleasure as well as of pain, and the
fact, urged by Protagoras that many men have every
vice save cowardice, need not cause any embarrassment.
^ Protagoras to use a convenient distinction is talking of
material virtue — of acts done from every motive but the
best. Plato is talking oi formal virtue — of acts done
from no motive, but the best; and done with full
consciousness of what we are about, that is, in his
technical language, done scientifically — on grounds
which we can and do set before ourselves, and, at least,
defend in the eyes of others. But such scientific and
formal virtue must be in one sense utilitarian : it must
deal with consequences and effects of various kinds.
And if we once admit the consideration of any conse-
quences, we must in reason admit all. In this way
again, utilitarian virtue must be one. It can be hardly
necessary to point out that utilitarianism means the
consideration of consequences, and must be carefully
distinguished from the Greatest Happiness Principle,
with which its connexion is purely accidental.
These considerations give us the key to the classifi-
cation of the modes of virtue in the Laws. First comes
Prudence, the directing reason. Second, a temperate
habit of soul. Temperance, the directed appetite in its
inner relation to the directing Reason. Third, Justice
not without Fortitude — appetite on its two sides
harmonised with the directing reason. And, fourthly.
Courage — Fortitude — directed appetite looking out-
wards. The minor dialogue, the Laches, will be found
in harmony with this account of Platonic Virtue,
Fortitude, and does not require separate consideration.
/^ The original question started in the Protagoras of
the teachableness of Virtue has been touched on in
the chapter on the Republic. But, before leaving the
Protagoras, it may be as well to point out the harmony
THE PROTAGORAS. 59
of its digressions with the main body of Platonic
teaching.
The introduction insists on two points familiar to
the student of Plato. First, that the sophist must aim
at some specific or definite end. That is, every art or /
science aims at something definite, there being no such ?
thing 171 rerum naturd as an art or science abstracted |
from particular matter, although sciences may have
different values. 311, 312. cf. 318.
The second point insisted on in the introduction, is
the paramount importance of all that relates to soul,
the final recipient and assimilator of doctrine, whether ^,
for good or ill. 312 — 314. This point is identical with t
the main thesis of the Gorgias. \
In the mythe related by Protagoras, we find three
Platonic points. First, the priority, both substantiveSl
and logical, of the divine to the human element : Second, .^
the affinity of man to God : and Third, the right of^.
society, coeval with its structure and necessary to its ,
preservation, of visiting with the extreme penalty all ^\
open and avowed teaching which tends to subvert it.
This last is the more remarkable, as the two ends of
human punishment are clearly pointed out in this
dialogue, namely the reformation of the offender and
the example to others. There is therefore no anta-
gonism between the doctrine of the Protagoras as to
the uses of Punishment and the tenth book of the Laws.
In the exposition of the Verses of Simonides, besides
the obvious use of the digression as ad absurdum of the
way, in which books are quoted without the slightest .
notice of the context, or obvious drift of the composition, y
the following points occur. The affinity of Like to /\
Like, the importance of which principle in the Platonic
Metaphysics and Ethics is evident both in the Platonic
Dialogues and in Aristotle's criticisms. The Principle V
of Contradiction is applied (340) according to its proper ^
function, as set forth in the Sophistes. Vice is identi-
6o THE PROTAGORAS.
fied with Ignorance, that is, in other words, No one is
willingly bad. 345.
It is interesting too to observe, that Crete and
Lacedaemon are, as usual, accredited with superior
wisdom ; and the eminence of women in philosophy is
pointed out. 340 — 342. d.
But with the artistic excellencies or defects of the
Protagoras, we are not at all concerned. The object
of this chapter was to prove the unity, in Plato's
opinion, of Virtue, and to shew how far matter-of-fact
was any real objection to the great principle not only
true in speculation, but fruitful in Charity — No one is
willingly bad.
III.
THE MENO.
The ethical question discussed in the Meno is, in
part, similar to that which occupies the Protagoras.
Meno asks, Is Virtue the result of Teaching ? If not,
is it the result of Practice ? Or, does it come by Nature ?
Or, in what other way ? The Dialogue shall, accordingly,
be considered in its obvious relation to the Protagoras,
without touching on the metaphysical portion, which
deals with the Immortality of the Soul, and the famous
doctrine of Reminiscence. Both topics have, however,
an ethical significance.
Socrates commences by saying, just as he does in
the Symposium, 199, e., the Gorgias, 448, e., the Re-
public, 354, b., and the Phsedrus, 237, c. d., that we
must first see what a thing is, before we trace out its
consequences. For, unless we know what a thing is
by itself, we cannot possibly know if any given predi-
cate applies to it, or not.
Meno then declares that all human beings — man,
woman and child, old and young, bond and free — have,
each and all, their own peculiar Virtue. That, con-
sequently. Virtue in general is relative to the several
different objects, which the several differences in the
respective modes of life point out, as suited to each
individual. Thus, the Virtue of a freeman consists in ")
serving the state, and in being able to protect himself /
and his friends, and to keep down his opponents. The
Virtue of a woman consists in looking after the house,
and in obedience to her husband. And so, of the other
positions in life.
Socrates replies by showing, that although the
62 THE MENO.
occasions, which call for the exercise of Virtue, may,
and do, vary from case to case, and from calling to
calling, yet that in every exercise of Virtue we find
two qualities at work. By the one, the Agent regulates
his own conduct in relation to himself This quality
is Temperance. By the other, the Agent regulates his
conduct towards others. This quality is Justice. Now,
if Temperance and Justice are found universally present
in Virtuous conduct, and if Virtuous conduct is of the
essence of Goodness, all human beings are good in
and through Temperance and Justice. Since, then,
all human beings are good in and through the same
qualities, it is not correct to distinguish the Virtue,
say, of a woman from the Virtue of a man. And from
the discussion, as far as it has gone, we may infer that
Virtue implies, in every case, a certain regulation of
conduct, in regard to ourselves and others.
Meno, then, offers the following definition : — ^Virtue
is the desire for what is good, coupled with the ability
to secure it. 77.
To this Socrates objects, that no one desires Evil
for its own sake : that, in a word, no one is willingly
bad. The definition, then, must be modified in this
way : the desire for what is good being equal and con-
stant in all men, men can only differ in their ability to
secure what is good. If then the ability to secure what
is good be the variable in each case, and if the faculties
by which Virtue works be Temperance and Justice,
and if Temperance and Justice be fractions of Virtue,
we must conclude that Virtue is the ability to secure
good by means of Temperance and Justice — by means
of Temperance, as regards ourselves, and by means of
Justice, as regards others. But, as Temperance and
Justice are each a fraction of Virtue, the conclusion
amounts to this, that if we have the fraction Temper-
ance, we have the integer Virtue ; and that if, on the
other hand, we have the other fraction, Justice, we
THE MENO. 63
have the same integer, Virtue. Thus, in each case,
the Part is the Whole. The apparent absurdity is
obviated by the previous account of the convergence of
the ethical qualities to Virtue, and the divergence of
Virtue to these same qualities, ante. pp. 23-4.
Socrates repeats his apothegm, that we ought to
know What Virtue is, before we enquire, if it admits
of being taught. But in the absence of anything better,
he proceeds to deal with the question by the following
provisional method.
If Virtue be a psychical quality. Virtue must either "^^
admit of being taught, or not. Now all Science admits
of being taught. If, then. Virtue is Science, Virtue
admits of being taught ; and, if Virtue is not Science,
Virtue, says Plato, does not admit of being taught.
Science, therefore, and whatever is teachable are, in
Plato's opinion, convertible. Afeno. 87, c. But, as the
major is admitted, the question is narrowed to this. Is
Virtue Science? And this question is determined in
the affirmative in the Protagoras.
The argument in favour of this conclusion is given
in the Meno, 87, c. — 89, a., much more briefly, but
more generally. As follows : — ^Virtue is a good thing,
and what is good, is beneficent. Now, nothing is in
itself either beneficent or maleficent, but attracts either
predicate, according as it is used rightly or wrongly.
But the right use of anything involves Knowledge —
Prudence — (^povrjcn^ — as its prerequisite. Hence, Virtue
is, either partially or totally, Knowledge — Prudence —
<j)p6v7)at<;. But this gives us the negative result, that
Virtue does not come by Nature, that is, in the ordinary
course of the untutored development of the human
being.
The question. What is the Genesis of the Moral
Notions, has engrossed a large portion of modern
speculation. It is the mode of stating the great
problem of ethical psychology most familiar to the
64 THE MENO.
modern reader. And, yet, this mode of stating the
question exactly inverts Plato's conception of the
problem.
In this way : — According to Plato, the ethical
faculty, (jypovrjcri^, is one whose working is automatic —
for it is intuitive Reason — and whose inherent activity
is always at par^ although its movements may be
impeded by certain obstructions. The tendency of
modern speculation — which has received its impetus
from Aristotle, rather than from Plato — is to regard
the moral principle as a resultant of counteracting
pressures, one of which can only gain in force what
the other loses. The preponderant habit, whether
virtuous or vicious, grows gradually stronger, until
the counteracting force is reduced practically to zero.
Now, Plato would admit that the disturbing force may
vary in intensity, from complete preponderance to
practical non-entity; he would likewise admit that
the various perturbations owe their strength to habit ;
but he would at the same time maintain that the
mischief is altogether due to the obstacles which
impede the working of the moral faculty, and not to
any weakness either natural or acquired in the faculty
itself. The strong man is there in all his strength, but
he is bound hand and foot. Ethical training is, conse-
quently, according to Plato, a process of removing the
obstacles to the working of the moral faculty. Ethical
training, therefore, must consist in minimizing the
influence of the Senses — including in the latter term,
not only their immediate objects, but also the mental
notions attached thereto, such as Property, &c., and all
other Rights and Duties, legal, social, and political.
Ethical efliciency is, consequently, in the present state
of things, at its height, when ethical training has
reduced to a minimum the effect of all sensuous objects.
And so, conversely, the worst state of the ethical
subject is when habits of indulgence have maximized
THE MENO. 65
sensual influences. In either case, the terms body or
senses must, as has been observed, be understood to
comprehend, not only all the objects of the appetites,
but also all the rights and duties, to which they give
rise — in a word, all things in relation to the senses.
The objections to the doctrine, that Virtue is Science,
raised in the end of the Meno, need not detain us long.
It will be observed, that they consist in the statement
of what is a pure matter of fact — a matter of fact too,
which may be easily prevented. The matter of fact is—
this, that if Virtue admitted of being taught, there
would be professors and students of Virtue-^the very
objection urged against Protagoras by Socrates. Now
Protagoras, as we have seen, denies the alleged fact ;
and even granting its truth, it amounts merely to this,
that no expert in ethical training had as yet appeared.
But the author of the Republic and the Laws would be
the last man to be hampered by the favourite argument
of the foes to improvement in all ages — that what has
never been, can, therefore, never be. And the splendid
'contributions to civilization made by Plato, Aristotle,
Zeno, and Epicurus, and their illustrious and zealous
successors — contributions to which we owe nearly all
that redeems modern thought from what is abject and
sentimental — have happily enabled us to see that the
objection no longer holds.
IV.
THE GORGIAS.
The Gorgias is divided into three parts :
I. The argument with Gorgias. 447 — 460.
II. The argument with Polus. 460 — 481 and
III. The argument with Callicles. 481 — 523.
I. The argument with Gorgias is to this effect: —
The question proposed is, What is Rhetoric ? 448. Now
every art deals more or less with words ; and words in
turn deal with the subject-matter of the particular art
in question. 450. Rhetoric, consequently, deals with
words, but what is its object ? To produce persuasion,
and that, too, in the most important matters, Justice,
and its opposite. Injustice. But, as the Rhetorician is
a skilled expert, his business must be about what he
thoroughly understands, and so he must know what
Justice is. He will then do no injustice ; he will not
make injustice the ultimate end of his Rhetoric, 460, e.
But this conclusion is at variance with a previous
statement made by Gorgias, that Rhetoric sometimes
produces injustice, 456, c. d. These two statements
Socrates is unable to reconcile, for according to him,
the Rhetorician, if he knows what justice is, cannot
but do justice. 461. This is of course in other words
the famous doctrine. No one is willingly bad .
II. Polus then takes up the argument, and eulogises
Rhetoric as a means of obtaining power. In answer,
Socrates draws a distinction between arts which do
permanent good, and those which produce temporary
pleasure. Man consists of body and soul, and there
are arts especially adapted to the requirements of each.
THE GORGIAS. 67
Now the arts, which do the body permanent good, are
Gymnastic and Medicine, the former increasing its
strength, and the latter removing disease. The art,
which ameliorates the soul is Legislation, or the art
of positive morality. All these do permanent good,
but unhappily each is attended by a base counterfeit.
Thus, Gymnastic and Medicine, which do permanent
good, are counterfeited by Cosmetique and Gastronomy,
which produce only temporary pleasure, while Sophistic,
to which Rhetoric is an ancillary, apes Legislation, as
a teacher of morality. Now things relatively to our
volitions are either good, bad, or indiiferent ; and it is
obvious that what is good only can be the ultimate
End or scope of human action ; whilst the bad or the
indifferent is only sought as a step or Means to what
is good. 468. To the statement, therefore, of Polus,
that Rhetoricians, like despots, can do wliat they
please, Socrates demurs. Rhetoricians do, indeed,
what they like, but not what they will, since no one is
willingly bad. Mere power, as such, therefore, cannot
be praised ; on the contrary an unjust use of power is
the object, not of envy, as Plato asserts, but of com-
passion. 469. That is, as Socrates explains, of the
two, the doer of wrong is more truly deserving of
compassion than the sufferer of wrong, and if it were
necessary for him, Socrates, to choose between doing
and suffering wrong, he would prefer the latter. He
also points out, that the wrong doer, the proper object
of compassion, may be quite unaware of his wretched
state. 464. 471.
Polus, on the contrary, attributes the unenviable lot
of the wrong-doer solely to his liability to punishment
at the hands of his fellow-men, who would eagerly
commit the very act for which they punish him, if sure
of impunity, and who all envy his conduct while they
visit it with punishment. " The usurer hangs the
cozener."
F 2
68 THE GORGIAS.
In Other words, according to Socrates, if we do harmi
to others, we do thereby greater harm to ourselves^
even if we be guaranteed complete impunity. According^
to Polus, if we do harm to others, the only possible!
harm to ourselves is our liability to retaliation at theJ
hands of others. It is obvious, the question between
Socrates and Polus is that, which is the Main Thesis of
the Republic, that Injustice is undesirable, principally
because of its effects, in the first instance, on the Agent
himself. Socrates thus lays down a proposition, which
Polus accepts as a fair statement of the point at issue,
namely, that Wrong-doers are wretched ; but that
Wrong-doers, who are punished are still less wretched
than those who are not. As a logical test of argument,
Socrates likewise insists, that no inconsistency can
follow from Truth. But if inconsistency does not follow
from truth, consistency cannot follow from falsehood.
Consequently, inconsistency is a proof of the falsehood
of the doctrine from which it flows. The inconsistency
in the present case Socrates elicits as follows :
To suffer wrong, is, according to Polus, worse than
to do wrong; but to do wrong, involves more Dispro-
portion. If so, says Socrates, doing wrong must surpass
suffering wrong, either in positive temporary pain ; or
in permanent evil; or in both, 475, b. c. But doing
wrong does not surpass suffering wrong in positive
pain, and so does not surpass it in both. Therefore, to
do wrong surpasses suffering wrong in some kind of
undesirable quality, since it involves more Disproportion.
475, c. So far is the first point proved.
The notion Disproportion will be at once understood
by the student of Butler. "The nature of man is
adapted to some course of action or other. Upon
comparing some actions with this nature, they appear
suitable and correspondent to it : from comparison of
other actions with the same nature, there arises to
our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The
THE GORGIAS. 69
correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent,
renders them natural ; their disproportion to it, un-
natural. That an action is correspondent to the nature
of the agent, does not arise from its being agreeable
to th^ principle, which happens to be the strongest ;
for it may be so, and yet be quite disproportionate to
the nature of the agent. The correspondence, therefore,
or disproportion, arises from somewhat else. This can be
nothing but a difference in nature and kind (altogether;;
distinct from strength) between the inward principles.!
Some, then, are in nature and kind superior to others.|
And the correspondence arises from the action being
conformable to the higher principle; and the un-
suitableness, from its being contrary to it." That is,
suffering wrong is contrary to man's sensibility ; doing
wrong is contrary to man's nature considered as a
whole — the sum of parts, in mutual correlation and
in subordination to the whole. This notion of a whole,
at once profound and exact, is one of the many forms
of ancient thought, which Butler has the merit of
appreciating. A Whole is not a bundle of parts, it is
an arrangement of parts, according to their fitness to
one another, and to the end or function of the whole.
The second branch of the question is then discussed.
Socrates maintains, that if you are guilty of wrong, it
is better to suffer punishment than not ; and this Polus
denies. Socrates argues, it is better to suffer punish^
menty because the patient may thereby be reformed,-
and so far receive benefit ; and the test of the efficacy \
of the punishment is the reformation of the offender, 1
477. a. This reformation is brought about by the
removal of Injustice, ahiKla, and Injustice is the pre-
ponderance of the lower elements in the inner life —
the Disproportion of Butler. Hence, then, just as with
regard to the body, the best thing is never to be sick
at all, and, if sick, the best thing is, to get well as soon
as possible ; so the most happy man is he, who neither
70 THE GORGIAS.
commits injustice, nor suffers it ; but, if he is unhappy
enough to commit injustice, the next best thing is to be
reformed, 478. e. Hence, then, as has been pointed
out in the section on the Republic, it is most unfair to
represent Plato as teaching that the just man, say in
prison, is absolutely happy. All Plato says, is, that
the just man, in suffering wrong, is better off in his
own opinion than in inflicting it — than the successful
criminal — that Socrates in prison would not, if he had
the chance, change places with Archelaus, the murderer
and tyrant. 469. 473. 478. e. This is virtually admitted
by Mr. Mill when he points out that most people would
prefer being Socrates to being a pig, though the pig
has fewer troubles. Utilitariaiiism. Plato asserts, that
the state of the good man in trouble is comparative.
Plato's critics insist, that the just man's happiness is
absolute, that he is rex denique reguiUy without reserva-
tion. And to put his conclusion in a clear though
paradoxical form, Plato declares that a revengeful
enemy will, if wise, endeavour to prevent his foe from
making atonement, and thus exclude him from all the
benefits of Reformation, 481, b. ; just as Hamlet will
not kill his uncle at his prayers, for fear he would be
the meails of sending to heaven the murderer of his
father. And here closes the argument with Polus.
It is evident that the point upheld by Socrates
against Polus, when stated in modern language, will
be admitted at once — that a wrong action is wrong,
not only for its overt consequences upon others, but
still more for its intrinsic effects on the wrong-doer
himself. In metaphorical language, as the agent is
the producer of conduct, and as his inner organisation
is the only machinery for the production of conduct,
any thing, that impairs the working-efficiency of the
machine, stops pro tanto all further production. A
couple of quotations will make Plato's meaning plain.
" Formed character is valued, because in feelings and
THE GORGIAS. 7^
in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts
certainty ; and it is, because of the importance to others
of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and
; conduct, and to one's self of being able to rely on one's
; own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated
I into habitual independence. In other words the state
of the will is a means to good." Utilitarianismy p. 60.
This view will not be denied by the disciples of one
* school of Ethics, nor the following by, perhaps, those
of any : " The light of the body is the eye ; if, therefore,
thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of
light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall
be full of darkness. If, therefore, the light that is in
thee be darkness, how great is that darkness ?"
The darkness of the eye, the depraved will, Plato
describes by the metaphorical term disease. Mr. Grote,
as cited before, argues that if there be disease, there
must be pain. That there is no pain, is expressly
stated by Plato ; and its absence is, he says.
The flattering unction
Which will but skin and film the ulcerous place,
While rank corruption, mining all within,
Infects unseen.
III. Plato is quite aware of the consequences in-
volved in his paradox, that Punishment is desirable:
that life, if his theory is true, is turned upside down.
^Now, it may be observed, that punishment, from his
point of view, is only desirable, if it produces refor-
r mation in the wrong-doer — if, like medicine, it is the
ileast of evils. Upon this point, the Gorgias and the
•jprotagoras and the Laws (728) are at one.
But Callicles professes to discover a verbal fallacy
in the argument : when we say, it is worse to do wrong
than to suffer it, worse is used in two different senses.
Worse sometimes means What is Worse in a state of
Nature; and sometimes What is Worse by positive
Law, because it involves punishment. Law and Nature
72 THE GORGIAS.
are thus opposed, 482, as Law is devised to protect
the weak ^,^^^xi^t Nature^ i.e. the Prudence and Courage
of the strong. P^or Nature, that is Impulse unrestrained
by Law, leads the strong to oppress ttte weak, "the
better the worse." What then, says Socrates, do we
mean by The Better ? If we mean superior in force,
then the assertion of Callicles is not true, for then, in
respect of strength, the Many are superior to the Few.
This Callicles will not allow to be his meaning. But
if the Few are to rule the Many, it must be because the
Few are more prudent or more wise. Callicles is
inclined to give as a definition of superiority. Wisdom
and Courage in political life 491 ; and those, who have
an excess of these qualities, ought to be paramount.
Socrates then asks. Over whom are they to be para-
mount r over themselves, or over others r over others,
certainly, and not themselves, says Callicles. Over
themselves certainly, rejoins Socrates, over th^ir own
pleasures and desires 491, d. e. No, says Callicles,
Prudence and Courage enable a man to advance him-
self and his friends, and are thus good to himself and
them. But Justice and Temperance are good to others
only, and are esteemed by them, because they com-
pensate for their own Imprudence and Cowardice,
492. This, substantially, is the view of the moral
qualities which is so clearly set forth by Mr. James
Mill. " The actions from which men derive advantage
have all been classed under four titles — Prudence,
Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. When those names
are applied to our own acts, the first two. Prudent and
Brave, express acts which are useful to ourselves in the
first instance, the latter two. Just and Beneficent, express
acts which are useful to others in the first instance. It
is further to be remarked, that those acts of ours, Avhich
are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily useful
to others ; and those which are primarily useful to
others, are secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus it
THE GORGIAS. 73
is by our own Prudence and Fortitude that we are best
enabled to do acts of Justice and Beneficence to others.
And it is by acts of Justice and Beneficence to others,
that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us/'
James Mill, Analysis^ XXIII. 2nd Ed.
Callicles continues : — If Prudence and Wisdom be
the means, pointed out by the light of nature, for securing
our own good, and ff Temperance and Justice be not
means to our own good, but means to the good of
others, it follows that Happiness consists in our
attaining the objects indicated by Prudence and.^
Courage, as suited to our wants. Happiness as iti
consists in satisfying wants, implies, in other wordsJ
an antecedent uneasiness and a consequent gratification/^
And here the question discussed in the Protagoras cropsf
up again. Is Good anything more than the allaying
of uneasiness ? Is there any pleasure which is not
good ? This is the issue between Socrates and Callicles.
If, then. Pleasure and Good are identical, and
if Pleasure and Good consist in satisfying wants.
Prudence, Knowledge, and Courage, not being actual
gratifications of antecedent wants, are not good. That
Prudence, Knowledge, and Courage, are not good,
Socrates denies, and then proceeds to make out his
case by the foUow^ing arguments : —
Good and Evil are contraries, 495, e., and we cannot
have two contraries at the same time. Consequently,
if we can find things, which we can both possess and
get rid of, in the same time, it is evident that the things,
we thus simultaneously have and lose^ cannot be
Good and Evil, respectively, 496, c.
Now% it is possible to feel pleasure and pain at the
same time — to feel, for example, the pangs of hunger,
and the satisfaction of allaying them with food ; and
so of our other bodily w^ants. It is obvious, therefore,
that the pains of Vacuity, and the pleasures of Repletion
are not Evil and Good, respectively. 496. d
74 THE GORGIAS.
This argument will perhaps appear to the modern
reader a mere verbal subtlety ; but the distinction, on
which Socrates insists, lies at the root of the Platonic
Metaphysics. It involves the point discussed in the
present day, Whether the Ego is anything more than
a case of the universal law of Causation — Whether " the
restless whirling mass of cares, anxieties, affections,
hopes and griefs, that make up the living man,'' are
the results, and the results only — of organisation, or
Whether they centre in something, which is unchanged
amidst the turmoil, which surrounds it : Whether we are,
with Hume, to extend Berkeley's argument against
Matter to Mind ; or to admit, with Mr. Mill, that mind
is something more than a series, that it is a series
which can take cognisance of itself.
With large discourse
Looking before and after.
For, if the formula of our higher life be Pleasure
and Pain, and if Pleasure and Pain be Vacuity and
Repletion, then the Heraclitan Flux — the causation of
Hume, Brown, and Mill — is the law of entire being.
And against this law in its application to mind, Plato's
whole philosophy. Ethical and Metaphysical, was one
persistent protest.
But, if there be anything in our individuality, which
is permanent and unchanged, and so contrasted with
the ever changing succession of bodily states, it is
probable, that the objects of the non-transient element
are non-transient likewise. Hence, the argument of
Socrates amounts to this : — If there be any thing
non-transient, the philosophy of the Transient — that
philosophy which in the present day resolves Psy-
chology into Physiology — is not true, for it is not
thorough-going, as it claims to be. For, as Socrates
argues. Pleasure and Pain are processes of Vacuity
and Repletion, and these not only may, but must,
co-exist in Time. On the other hand, Good and Evil
THE GORGIAS. 75
are not processes, but states of mind in its ulterior
development ; and these are incompatible at the same
moment. The ulterior states, then, Moral Good and
Evil, are not of the same order as Vacuity and Reple-
tion. There is, therefore, something for which the Law
of Vacuity and Repletion does not account.
What, then, is the relation of Physiology to Psy-
chology r Dr. Maudsley says, "Few, if any, will now
be found to deny, that with each display of mental
power, there are correlative changes in the material
substratum ; that every phenomenon of mind is the
result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular,
chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain.**
The Physiology and Pathology of Mindy p. 42. 2nd Ed.
But, granting that every step, in the correlative changes
of the nervous elements, were so exactly ascertained,
that, given any one set of nervous antecedents, we could
infallibly predict the corresponding mental consequents,
the Materialist could not, on the principles of the most
advanced physical Philosophy, make good his case.
^In Physics, at all events, Hume's view of causation is
Wadmitted — we can never, in the absence of positive
Experience, argue that a Cause is like its Effect, or that
fan Effect is like its Cause. We can never argue, that
.{he mental consequent is a mode of molecular or
chemical, or vital change. We can, in Mr. Mill's
language, prove only invariable, and not, as is required,
unconditional, sequence between mind and nervous
change. To prove the latter, we should first isolate
the mental consequent and the nervous antecedent,
and, even then, we should have to try every possible
antecedent, until we had exhausted creation. Then,
if nothing but nervous change was followed by mental
products, we could say, that nervous change is the
cause of the Ego, but not till then. But, even then,
to infer that, because the nervous change was the cause,,
its effect therefore resembled it, would be contrary to
76 THE GORGIAS.
all modern thought. There is, moreover, another objec-
tion. The Physiologist proceeds by observation and
experiment. Experiment, obviously, is only a more
delicate and rigorous mode of observation. The micro-
scope appeals to the eye, and so of other instruments.
They all appeal to the various senses, that is, to the
sensations of the Experimenter. But, that the greater
portion of the sensations, which make up the so-called
External World, is produced by subjective modifications
is admitted by the majority of educated people ; and
the Berkeleian insists that the whole is due to the action
of mind, or minds. Moreover, if we could construct a
Frankenstein, and, at a particular moment, the lifeless
structure were animated with the individuality and
genius of Shakespeare or of Plato, we could not be sure
that we had excluded that, which one school alleges to
be invisible and incorporeal, and which no physical test
has been hitherto able to detect. For, some one given
state of the organism, and no other, may, for anything
we can tell to the contrary, attract the Ego, and the
most ultra-spiritualist may, without danger to his
system, admit Dr. IMaudsley's proposition in its fullest
extent.
The same misapprehension of the true bearing of
Physiology embittered recent discussions on the Origin
of Man. On both sides, it was apparently conceded,
that the existence of a Soul, peculiar to man, was
incompatible with his development from species, less
highly organized. But, surely, as far as mere Logic,
apart from evidence, is concerned, both sides were
wrong. There is no more 'peculiar difficulty in conceiving
the spiritual being housed in the more developed Gorilla,
than in postulating the special creation of entirely new
tenements for the Souls of Men. For, the union of
Soul and Body is equally incomprehensible, on either
hypothesis. Of course, the logic of the discussion has
nothing to do with the evidciice alleged on either side.
THE GORGIAS. 77
The argument against Materialism is, so far, negative
only. It may be alleged that, for all that, the Ego or
Mind may be a result of organism. True. But, then
comes in the positive evidence furnished by Introspec-
tion, by what is commonly called Consciousness. "What
I perceive, I perceive as visible and solid. I, who
perceive, am presented to myself, as non-visible and
non-solid. I sum the first set of predicates, and call the
whole Material. I sum the latter, and call, with at least
equal grounds, the whole non-material, or Immaterial.
Mind is, therefore, immaterial, as far as Consciousness
testifies, and no Physiology can prove it the reverse.
It must be recollected, that, to call the Ego immaterial,
does not of necessity attribute nobler qualities to mind
than to body, nor does it imply immortality. At the
same time, the immateriality of Mind is a strong
argument against all modes of destruction, which act
by decomposition.
But against the method of self-observation, M. Comte
directs a dilemma : " In order to observe, your intellect
must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity
you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause,
you cannot observe ; if you do effect it, there is nothing
to observe." But this Dilemma, like most others, can
be very easily evaded. It quite ignores the existence
of such a faculty as Memory. How do I know that the
food I enjoy to-day is more palatable than what I had
yesterday? By Memory. Does M. Comte's dilemma
induce a physician to reject the description of sensations,
which his patient felt the night before ? And why not ?
Simply because the Physician trusts in introspection,
as registered by Memory, and whatever incredulity he
feels is due to distrust, not of consciousness, but of the
patient's powers of observation. That the results of
Introspection differ, renders Psychology more difficult,
but certainly not chimerical.
And now to apply these considerations : — If, as
78 THE GORGIAS.
Plato thinks, we can discover a non-transient element
in the Ego, the reality of that permanence is as
much a fact as the reality of the nervous organism, by
which the Materialist explains it away. Nay, an
Idealist would add, that there is more evidence for the
former than the latter.
To resume : — Good things are good by the presence
of Goodness ; and in the same way. Pleasure is caused
by the presence of Pleasant qualities : now, as both
the prudent and the imprudent man, the brave man
and the coward, are susceptible of pleasure and of
pain, it would follow, that if pleasure and good are
identical, these people, so far as they receive pleasure
y)r pain in equal degrees, are equally good or bad,
499. b. We must, then, draw a distinction between
pleasures, which are beneficial and those, which are not
— that is between those, which, produce some permanent
advantage, and those, which produce mere temporary
gratification — a distinction insisted on in the Republic,
the Protagoras and the Philebus. But if pleasures
differ thus in kind, we require Science to discover
their properties and to tabulate them, according to
their respective utilities. And the relation of Science
to Virtue has been already discussed in the Pro-
tagoras.
We have now, says Socrates, established an incon-
sistency between the doctrine that it is good to satisfy
all our desires, and the doctrine that it is good to
satisfy some only. And the inconsistency thus evolved
from the thorough-going doctrine of Callicles, shows
that is not true. But if we are to gratify some desires
only, w^e must put in requisition the ascetic qualities,
Temperance and Justice, to temper the outward ten-
dencies of the non-ascetic qualities. Courage and
Wisdom. Hence, then, the task of the Ethical Expert,
whether private or public — the virtuous individual, or
the wise politician — is to produce Harmony and Order
THE GORGIAS. 79
in the body ethical or politic ; and thus bring the)/
Microcosm into harmony with the all-pervading law
of Order, which rules the Universe. Nay more, even
in the non-ascetic Virtues, whose direct tendency is
outwards — Wisdom [(f)p6v'n<Tis;) and Courage — we can
detect ascetic elements : in Wisdom, as it embraces in
its comprehensive ken all consequences whatsoever;
and in Courage, for that enables us not merely to
confront danger and pain, but to combat the pleasures
which "war against the soul." 504 — 507. But, if this
is so, Socrates has proved his point, that, next to being
completely happy, in and through abstinence from
injustice and exemption from suffering wrong, the
second best thing is to undergo chastisement
That must be cruel, only to be kind,
provided it be the necessary step to the rehabiliation of
the wrong-doer.
The positive result of the Gorgias is, to borrow
a metaphor from modern physics, that, as in the
Macrocosm, the centrifugal force is tempered by the
centripetal, so, in the Microcosm, the impulsive qualities,
Wisdom and Courage, must be harmonised by the
repressive qualities, Temperance and Justice. And we
have seen, in the preceding sections, that Wisdom and
Courage, Temperance and Justice, are the fractional
parts of the one integer. Virtue.
The main conclusion of the Gorgias is condemned
by Mr. Grote as inexact. Mr. Grote objects, that the
Platonic Ideal exacts as Good, order, system, or
discipline ; and that, granting this, Plato does not
tell us in what particular order, good, system, or
discipline consists. Now, as Plato is arguing, through-t /
out the dialogue, against the exertion of the egoistic /l
forces at the expense of the altruistic tendencies, and j
as the egoistic forces do not require to be strengthened,
it is surely to the point, to show that Excellence in \
Conduct involves a certain amount of self-repression.
So \ THE GORGIAS.
When Rhetoric is recommended as a mere instrument
of power, quite independent of its use or abuse, when
the possible Means of doing evil is exalted to an End,
when the Anti-social Qualities are praised just so far
as they override the social tendencies, it is surely no
small contribution to Ethical science, to enunciate
that these doctrines, so far as they regard self alone,
are wrong — wrong in theory and wrong in practice. It
is, surely, something, to show that the man, w^ho has
never done wrong, must repress Self, in order to keep
clear of wrong, and to show, that he, who has actually
done wrong, requires to have Self still further repressed.
And the two conclusions of the Gorgias may be nearly
given in the words of the only English Moralist, who
approaches Greek Ethics in dignity of purpose and
masculine severity of thought ; upright creatures may
want to he improved ; depraved creatures zvafit to be
renewed.
The alleged inconsistencies between the Protagoras
and the Gorgias will be considered in the closing
section.
THE PHILEBUS.
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL.
The following section deals with the Philebus so
far only as that Dialogue is ethical. To justify Plato's
classification of the various objects of the human
faculties, would involve an examination of the Platonic
metaphysics. Without entering upon that field of
speculation, suffici^ent may be gathered from the Phi-
lebus to complement the partial, but not incompatible,
doctrines of the Protagoras and the Gorgias.
One metaphysical distinction must be insisted on
here. Plato divides the objects of cognition into two
classes — The Transient and the Non-Transient. The'
Transient element is equivalent to the province of
Causation as set forth by Hume, Brown, and Mill.
An antecedent A is followed by a consequent B, and
B in turn is the antecedent to a new consequent C,
and so on to infinity. To this class belong the ex-
ternal world, and our organism. The other class, the
Non-Transient, is not subject to Antecedence and Con-
sequence, but is permanent and non-temporal. To
this second class belong the higher faculties of the
mind, and the Divine Causal Energy, Grod. In the first
class, Plato sets the objects of the bodily appetites,
and all such pleasures as are reliefs of an antecedent
want. As a want is more or less painful, Plato calls
all pleasures that act by stimulation mixedy that is,
mixed with pain. The pleasures which are not mere
reliefs, he calls unmixed or pure. These words have
no ethical significance ; they do not connote praise or
G
82 THE PHILEBUS.
blame, but signify merely the presence or absence of
want. But as the second class — the non-transient —
are the objects of certain mental faculties, Plato confers
upon these objects the name Good, Now Good has no
contrary of equal rank. To cognise Good, we must
be free from certain bodily states, and the presence of
such bodily states is Evil. Hence the state of a man
may be good, as well as pleasant. - His state may be,
likewise, evil and pleasant. But his state cannot be
good and evil at the same time. Evil, as far as
it extends, effectually excludes Good. Consequently,
Pleasure and Pain — Good and Evil — are in Plato's
philosophy cross-divisions. This will be seen from
the Philebus.
Pleasures are divided into two classes : First, plea-
sures, mixed with either physical or mental pain; Second,
pleasures, unmixed with either physical or mental pain.
This classification is obviously psychological.
The Mixed Pleasures are subdivided into three
species : Those in which both sensations are corporeal ;
those in which one sensation is corporeal, and the
other mental ; and those in which both sensations are
mental. But, in each of these three species, some
pleasures are good, some bad, and some indifferent.
That is to say, the good man will choose the good,
eschew the bad, and submit to the indifferent, when
necessity compels. What renders them good or bad
is the influence which they exert upon the higher
faculty — that which confronts Good. It is evident,
then, that this division of pleasures is ethical.
On the other hand, the Unmixed Pleasures are all
good. They are also subdivided into three species :
those belonging to the sense of Smell ; those of Sight
and Hearing ; and those of Intellect. And the latter
species includes the objects of the Platonic Dialectic,
Being in its highest essence, so far as it can be cog-
nised by human beings.
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 8^
The pleasures of Smell are wholly corporeal, but
are not preceded by Want. The pleasures of Ear
and Eye are partly corporeal and partly mental ; and
the third species is purely mental in all its varieties.
But neither the second nor the third species is preceded
by Want.
It is plain, that the pleasures of the mass of man-
kind belong psychologically to the class of Mixed
Pleasures. To such an extent is this true, that Mr.
Grote and Professor Bain wish to reduce most of the
Unmixed Pleasures, which they admit to be. real, to the
class of Mixed. Of this, more anon. But it is like-
wise evident that an ethical treatise will class de-
sirable things according to their ethical qualities.
Goodness or Badness, and not according to their
psychological aspects. This is the solution of the diffi-
culties which Mr. Grote sees in the Protagoras and
the Gorgias.
The Protagoras tells us to choose the balance of
advantages : the Gorgias, looking to the psychological
aspect, tells us that the Transient element is generi-
cally opposed to the Non-Transient, and as the Non-
Transient is Good, the Transient is generically bad.
For, the good man regards the Mixed pleasures as
necessary evils, and the Unmixed pleasures, which
depend wholly on sense, are those of smell only ; for
one component of visual and audible pleasure is in-
tellectual : such are the pleasures of Proportion and
Harmony. But the pleasures of eye and ear are ethi-
cally valuable only for their educational uses, since
they are only good, so far as they are means to Good.
Hence, the conclusion of the Gorgias, that the Tran-
scient element, when pursued as an end, is not good,
and therefore may be positively bad. The student of
Butler will recollect his distinction between Self-love
considered as an active principle, and Self-love con-
sidered as a passive feeling. In the latter case "./
G 2
84 THE PHILEBUS.
may he questioned^ whether Self-love, considered merely
as the desire of our own interest or happi^iess, can, from
its nature, he absolutely and uniformly coincident with
the Will of God any more than particular affections can ;
coincide7tt in such sort, as not to he liable to he excited
upon occasions and in degrees, impossible to he gratified
co7isistently with the nature of thi^igs, or the divijze
appointment'' Analogy I. 5. In this passage, the Will
of God is the objective element of morality, which
corresponds to The Good of Ancient Ethics. If the
transient or pleasurable element be substituted for Self-
love, and The Good for the Will of God, we have in
modern language the exact relation of the elements
which are distinct, and possibly, but not actually, anta-
gonistic in the Platonic Ethics. Again, to quote Butler,
" all things, which are distinct from each other, are equally
so." The Transient element — Pleasure — is not the non-
transient element Good ; Pleasure is, therefore, distinct
from Good, and so far opposed to it. And this is the
conclusion of the Gorgias.
The positive conclusion of the Protagoras is that
Virtue, of which Fortitude is a phase, is Science, and
so One. That is. Virtue is a state of the non-transient,
and not of the transient element in the Ego. Now
Fortitude deals with Pains and Pleasures ; and of the
two. Pain is the least important object of the Virtup.
Legg. 633, e. If, therefore. Fortitude, when it deals
with pain, has to take into consideration what is
Honourable and Good, if it has to weigh against the
pleasures of safety the pain of dishonour, and the
consequent deterioration of the Ego, it is plain that
Fortitude weighs Pain against Pain, the fear of the
present against the fear of the future. But Protagoras
had admitted that the other ethical qualities were
nearly alike, but maintained that Fortitude was of
separate kind. If Socrates proves that Fortitude has
the same essence as the rest, namely Rational Self-
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 85
Command, then the doctrine of Protagoras is over-
thrown. But Fortitude, in the ordinary sense, as used
in the Protagoras, deals with pains only. Hence then
in the case of Fortitude, as its evil is Pain, its Good
must be the reverse, of Pain — Pleasure — and its Evil
the reverse of Pleasure — Pain. So that if we set the
uses of Fortitude on the lowest ground, we find that
it is of the nature of Science; and this conclusion
Socrates sets up against the general view.
On the other hand, as against Gorgias, Protagoras,
and Prodicus, he establishes the further conclusion,
that being Scientific, because it deals with Measure,
it is of the same nature as the other ethical qualities.
But although in the purview of Fortitude, Evil is pri-
marily Pain, it does not follow that the other "Virtues
deal primarily with Pain. Nay, even Fortitude itself,
when it deals with Pain, and weighs the future against
the present, has to set in one scale considerations
of what is Honourable and Good, because these are
sources of future pain. In a word, the Good and Evil
of the Protagoras are the Good and Evil of Fortitude,
and so of the transient element, with which that
Virtue deals. But in the sphere of the transient. Good
and Evil must be Pleasure and Pain, and nothing
more. There is thus no antagonism, but complete
harmony between the Protagoras and the Gorgias.
The Protagoras discusses the Good and Evil of the
Transient, and that Good is identical with Pleasure,
and that Evil is Pain. The Gorgias discusses the
Good of the Non-Transient, and that Good is not
transient, and so distinct from Pleasure, which is
transient.
To establish the distinctness of the Transient and
Non-Transient elements, would involve an examination
of Plato's metaphysics. Such an investigation would
be obviously out of place in an ethical treatise. The
Reader will, however, find in the appendix the leading
86 THE PHILEBUS.
passages in Plato on the subject. But the psycholo-
gical distinction between Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures
rests on what is part of every body's experience. In-
tellectual pleasure, according to Plato, is not preceded
by any Want : the particular instance, Mathematics,
is questioned by Mr. Grote, and the general principle
by Mr. Bain, at least as far as scientific studies are
concerned.
Mr. Grote, criticising Aristotle, who agrees with
Plato, observes that " if he had examined the lives of
Mathematicians, especially that of Kepler, he would
hardly have imagined that Mathematical investiga-
tions have no pains attached to them," Vol. ii. p. 607,
Note X. Mr. Grote, immediately gives as Aristotle's
probable meaning, the very explanation, which Plato
gives explicitly on the point : " He probably means,"
says Mr. Grote, " that they are not preceded by painful
appetites such as hunger and thirst." ib. But, Plato
in asserting that intellectual pleasure is not preceded
by pain, declares that he is speaking of these pleasures
in their natural development, stripped of all intellectual
associations, PhiL 52, b. ; and he expressly recognises
some of the annoyances incidental to the study, ib. a. b.
Professor Bain, besides adopting Mr. Grote's ob-
jection, brings a new one of his own. " The highest
charms of knowledge are a reaction from the pains of
ignorance." Macmillan, Vol. xil., p. 468. But Plato
would reply as before. He is talking of natural de-
velopment, and not of intellectual associations. We
may feel humiliated by coming in contact with a better
informed man; but the pain of humiliation is not a
pain of ignorance. Where such a pain is evoked, it
arises either from envy or from shame. Envy may
be caused by any superiority at all in size, strength,
beauty, dress, rank, wealth; and when we do feel
ashamed of ignorance, it is because either our pre-
tensions have been exposed, or because we feel that
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 87
we have wasted the opportunities of acquiring the
knowledge, which reminds us of our deficiency. On
the contrary, accidental associations apart, the better
any intellectual object is known the better it is liked.
A man of taste may hate the ^neid, because he was
forced to learn it as a task, or because he has been
compelled to teach it. But, compulsion apart, are not
Music and Poetry better liked just in proportion as
they are better known ? If so, it is an Experiment by
way of Variation in favour of Plato's views. Complete
knowledge must exclude all antecedent want. If I
know a favourite piece of poetry by heart, I cannot
surely want to know it, and yet I can receive the
highest pleasure from either reading or hearing it.
It is surely far fetched to say, that the pleasure a
mature man derives from something he learns when
a child is a "reaction from the pains of ignorance."
The same facts justify Aristotle in assigning the plea-
sures of knowledge to more perfect beings.
The distinction, then, between Mixed and Unmixed
Pleasures is founded on fact, and as the former merely
cancel a want, while the latter are a direct source of
positive pleasure. Psychology is on the side of Plato's
Ethics. The preceding pages are an attempt to evolve
from Psychology a justification of Plato, but the writer
is fully aware how imperfect every such attempt must
be, if any one portion of Platonism be divorced from
its complement. It is one of Plato's pre-eminent
merits, that he never allows himself to become the
slave of abstraction. The ultimate object of man is
good ; philosophy is therefore ethical in its final phase,
but before it has taken that final phase, it has subsumed
the most minute Psychology, and the most profound
Metaphysics.
For the Ethics of Plato, the following merits,
theoretical and practical, are confidently claimed.
Theoretically, the system is perfect ; resting as it does
oo THE PHILEBUS.
on a statement, like an axiom in simplicity, but unlike
in fruitfulness — Reason reckons Consequences; Appetite
does 7iot. Practically, the system points to the state of
the Agent, as the main factor of the ethical product.
The Platonic Ethics are, moreover, rational, and not
sentimental, as they are founded upon the widest
and most minute calculation of consequences, without
ignoring the emotive element, as an important item
in the sum.
As regarding ConsequeiK^es, the system subsumes,
and places in its due position the Principle of the
Greatest Happiness to the Greatest Number; for it
justifies that Motive by its relation to the Agent ; not
the Agent by his relation to the Motive. And lastly,
as making Emotion the servant, and not the master of
Reason, it overthrows the prevalent veneration for
mere Will, which has degraded history to Hero-
worship, and which fosters the vulgar delusion, that
restlessness is energy, and insensibility to argument
firmness of mind.
APPENDIX A.
0U/XOS— TO OvfioiiSi^,
In an Essay on the Platonic Idea, published in 1866, I stated
that the emotional fraction of the Soul, dv/jiocf contains the
emotive or impulsive moiety of the Will, as well as the sentimental
feelings of Modern Psychology, p. 113. This view, I am happy
to say, is confirmed by Dr. W. H. Thompson, in his Phaedrus,
App. I. pp. 164 — 7. To the passages there cited, add to
dvfjioei^eg ov irpog to KparCiv fjiiyroi fpajuey Kot viKciv Kal evdoKifjely
del 6\ov cjpurjffdaL; Kot jjidXa. Ei olv (piXovetKOV avro Kal ^iX6~
TifAoy TrpoaayopEvoiixeVf ^ fjUjueXwc dv e^oi ; 'E/ijueXeorrara fiiy ovv.
Rep. 9. 581, a. b. As to the abuse of Qv^ioc,, irtpX to Ovfioeidig
oi;)( ETepa TOinvTa dvdyKry yiyviadai, og av avTO tovto BianpaT'
TTjTai rj (pdoyto ^td <bCkoTip.iav y j3iq. ^id ipCKovuKiav T] Ovfitp 3ia
dvcTKoXiaVf irXr]<Tiiovriv TifxrtQ re koI vIk^iq Koi Ovfiov ditJKtijy iivev
XoyiafjLov T£ Kal vov ; Pep. 586. c. d. Ovfiog is, besides, the in-
strument and executioner of penal Justice, Legg. 5, 731, b. e,
and in this sense corresponds to Butler's Resentment. In the
Phaedrus, 253 e. 254 e. the effect of sentiment on animal desire
is described at length. The immortal Steed, Qviioq, feels aXlioq
in presence of the beloved object, 254 a. ; he submits to
restraint IviovTay ib. c, and the result is, ware ^vfij3aiyet tot ij^rj
TTiv tov ipacTTOv ^p^X^^ ™^^ TraihtKeig alZovjiivrfy te koX ^E^iviav
ETreadai, 254 6. In the same dialogue, the immortal Steed,
Gv/iog, is described as dXrjdLyrjg do^rjg EToipog, 253 d., and the
words present some difficulty. 'EraTpog is that which is in
sequence with something else, either as concomitant or ante-
cedent. So, the mortal Steed, eViOvjwm, is v^pttog KaX dXai^oyeiag
EToipog, id. e. that is, has for its object v mt a. In Rep. 4. 439, d.,
TO ETTLdvixrjTLKoy is irXrjpioffEojy rtvwy Kal i^^oyuiv eTalpog, i.e. has for
its object TT. fc.T/. ; and in Gorg. 510 a., the alternative is ^ r^c
vTtapy(ivaag TToXiTEiag ETalpoy El.vai., i.e. to put oneself en rapport
with the establishment. Retaining, then, the ordinary sense of
aXjidivfjg, and comparing Rep. 58 1, b, where the Cognitive Faculty
90 APPENDIX A.
is said to disregard xPVf^<^T<*>y re kuI U^rjg, which are the objects
of the other two Faculties, we may render dXrjdivrjg dolrjQ EToipog,
which has for its object, true glory, i.e. the pleasures of the
Timocratic man, Rep. 8. 550, b, as opposed to the respect
paid to mere wealth, /cat yap 6 irXouaios viro ttoXXwv rtjuarai.
jRep. 582, c.
With regard to the exhaustiveness of Plato's tripartition,
excepted to by Mr. Grote, 3. 177, note 7, and in a less degree,
by Dr. Thompson, 166, we must recollect that Plato is pro-
fessedly writing on Ethics, and not Psychology. He, therefore,
deals with Psychology, only so far as it supplies Principles and
Springs of Action, just as Economy appeals to the same
science for its complex mental facts, without requiring any
further analysis. For example, it does not enquire whether the
Desire of wealth is connate or acquired. Surely an Ethical
writer would be warranted in referring the wooing and murder
of Desdemona to the same passion, love, although a Psycho-
logist would not. For the former considers any given feeling
only so far as modifies Conduct for good or ill. But, further,
BvfiOQ is in its Ethical function repressive, and not *'protreptic,"
being evoked whenever the dictates of Reason are disobeyed
by the unruly eViOv/im. In the absence of anger, that is, when
the Reason is hearkened to, the softer feelings come into play.
So the watch-dog, of a good breed, when not angry, is gentle,
Rep. 2. 375, e — 6, a; and the judge, save in cases of absolute
necessity, tempers severity with the reflexion, that every wrong-
doer is the proper object of compassion, as he wrongs himself
more than anybody else. Zegg. 731, b — d. dvfxoeidij — yap Toy
dyadov. cf. Gorg. 469, a. b. tv<p'qfxu, w UuiXs — /cat ^rror ^ 6
diKaiioQ diroOvrjcTKuv. It may be observed that these views of
Plato are not expressions of sympathy, but consequences of his
premisses. And as to the exhaustiveness of the tripartition for
ethical purposes, the result may be best given in Dr. Thompson's
words: *'We shall therefore, I conceive, be justified in enlarging
the term Ovfiog, so as to include, not merely anger, but all the
passions and sentiments which prompt to energetic action,
and which are thus the natural counterpoise to the appetites,
of which either sensual pleasure or mere bodily repletion
{TTXrjfffxovi}) is the object." p. 166.
One of the objects of Ovuoe is Injury, Rep. 440, c. d., and,
APPENDIX A. 91
SO, it is the emotive portion of the Moral faculty. This will be
better seen in App. B.
The opposition between Qvfxdg and Appetite may have been
suggested by the Hymn to Mercury;
£V0' oairiQ Kpedojv ripdaaaTO Kv^ijioe 'E|0/i)Je»
odfjiT] yap fxiv erEipey Koi dddvaTOV irep eovTay
rj^ei' a'XX' ovS' wg ol I-keLQeto Qv^ioq dyrjviopf
Kai T£ jitaX' IfielpovTi, irepuv leprjg icard hiprig.
APPENDIX B.
Plato's alleged inconsistencies^
The four Ethical qualities.
I. Fortitude.. As to Fortitude, Mr. Grote says, "in the
Laches, one of the several definitions of Courage, tendered to
Sokrates and refuted by him, is the very definition of Courage
determined by him in the Republic as complete and satis-
factory." 3. 164 — 5. Mr. Grote refers to Rep. 429, c. 430, b.
433, c. as compared with Laches 195, a^ tyjv tujv ceivuiy kuI
OappaXeiov iTnari\jxr]v, 196, c — 199, a — e. Now, the question
in the Laches, What is dvhpeia, is framed in such a way, as
exactly to fit the answer in the Republic. The object-matter
of the virtue is the same both in the question in the Laches and
in its answer,, i^n the Republic, and the Laws. Not only
Danger and Pain are comprehended, but also Appetite and
Pleasure. BovXojUfroc ydp aov TrvOsadai firj fiurov tovq kv t^
oirXiTiK^ drdpeiovQ, aXXct Koi tovq ev t^ wtttijcw koi iy ^vfiiravTi rw
TlokEfXLKio s'ictLj Kal jJiYl jJiOVOV TOVQ Iv TIO TToXe'^^, a'XXct UaX TOVQ iv TO~lQ
irpoQ TTi/V ddXaTTav KivdvyoiQ dvZptiovQ ovTUQy koi octoi ye TrpoQ voaovQ
Kal 6<T0L TTpOQ TTeviaQ T] Kui TrpoQ Tu TToXirtfca dv^peloi elat, kul eti av
fjirj fjLovor 0<TOi TrpoQ XviruQ dvdpEloi Etffiv ^ <p6(iovQy dXXd koi Trpog
iTTLOvfiiag 17 -qlovag ^ewol fxdyEaQai^ koX fxivovTEg rj dvaaTpi<povTEQ —
eWl ydp 'Kov TLVSQj (3 Aa^r/c, /cat eV to~iq tolovtolq dvhpeloi .... AA.
Kat <fip6^paf <ty 1,u)KpaTEQ» 2^. Ovkovv dvdpEloi fxiv irdvTEQ ovroi
eIolv, dXX' ol fxtv Ev jidovaiQ, 01 K iv XvVate, 01 K iv iTTiOvfiiaig, 01 ^*
iv <^o'/5otc T^v dv^pEiav KEKTTjvTai' ol ^£ y*^, dcfxai, lEiKiav iv toIq
avTOtQ TOVTOLQ. AA. IlaVv ye. SO, Ti irore ov iicoTEpov TovTOJVf tovto
iTrvvd<tv6fjir]v. 191. What, then, is the answer in the Republic ?
Kat di'^pE~iov ^^, oif^aif tovt<^ ry fiepEi KaXovfXEV Eva EKatnoVf OTav
avTOv to dvfjLOEidsQ ^laffw^rj ^id te XvttCjv Kal -qZoviov to vtto tov
Xoyov irapayjEXOiv Ielvov te Ka\ /ir}. Rep. 442, a. b. That is,
Fortitude is that temper of mind which keeps appetite under
the control of Reason. It is obvious that the definitions
APPENDIX B. 93
rejected in the Laches dwell upon the rational directive
element only, and leave out its emotive auxiliary.
2. Tempe?ance. As to Temperance, Mr. Grote says: "in the
Charmides, one of the definitions of Temperance refuted, and
even treated as scarcely intelligible, by Sokrates {ro Trpdrreiv rd
iavTov) is the same as that which Sokrates in the Republic
relies on as a valid definition of Justice." 3, 165. To Trpdrreiv
rd iavTov is, of course, the definition of Justice in the Republic,
and so, is verbally identical with the definition rejected in the
Charmides. But the identity is verbal only. For, waiving the
objection that the definition belongs to distinct qualities —
Temperance and Justice — the definition in the Charmides^ rd
TTpdrrEiy rd edvTov is explained to be, not only different from the
definition in the Republic, but its exact opposite. That in the
/Republic means the Division of Labour; that in the Charmides ^
the Concentration of Labour, i. e. that every man for example,
•like Hippias, should make his own shoes and clothes, IokeI
av aoL TToXte ev oiKeiadai i/Vo rovrov tov vofjov rov keXevovtoq to eavTov
ifxaTiov tKavTov v^alvtiv kol irXvveiv, koX vTrod^fiara aicvTorofjiuy, kuI
Xi^Kvdov Kol (TTXeyyiBa Kai rdWa TraVra *c. e. Charm. 161, e. — 1 62, a.
It is, surely, legitimate to reject one, and accept another, expla-
nation of the same words. If not, what becomes of argument ?
3. Prudence. As to Prudence, <j>p6yr](ng, there is no such
contradiction, as Mr. Grote alleges, between the ThecBtetus and
the Republic. The question of the The(2tetus is What is Science,
iTnaTtjfjLT}, that is. Knowledge considered from the objective
side; while the Republic deals with Prudence, <f>p6vri<rte, the
intellectual faculty in contact with Moral Good. For, <pp6vrj(ng
is not only the directing faculty, but it is also the faculty which
cognises KaWog, Symp. 203, c. d. ("Ejowc ^vau ipaaTrjg Zv rrepl
TO KaXov, and he is also (ppovriaeiog i7rL6vfir]TriQ» cf. 'icrri yap ^r) ruJv
KaWiffTwv 77 ffo^/a, "Ejowe iafiy ipioq Trepl to KoXoy, wore uKayKdloy
"Epwra (pikoaofoy eiyai. ib. 204, b.,) and God, Theoet. 176, a. c,
where {ofioitoffig 6eS Kara ro ^vyaroy is defined to be ^Uaioy Kal
offioy fxerd ^poyqaetjjQ ykvsadai.
Nor is the account in the PhcBdo. 69, a. b., different, for
the difference is pointed out between the Philosophic or
Ethical Expert, and the ordinary man. The former acts from
(pporriaig, which is thus a Means, and thereby secures still
further ^pori^ace, which is thus an End, and so is rightly com-
94- APPENDIX B.
pared to coin, which is both valuable in itself, and is moreover
the medium of exchange. The ordinary man, on the contrary,
does not regard pleasure and pain as mere occasions for the
action of (pp6vr\aiQ, (which is both tke paramount Hem as well as
the standard of Ethical Utility, Phced. 69, a. b.), and so he is
said to change token for token, cf. Lack. 192, e.
In a critical point of view, the Laches is interesting, as
there are at least three coincidences between it and the Phcedo,
First, the comparison of the ethical qualities to coin ; cf. Phced,
69, a. b., with Lack. 192, e. Second, the use in both of the
phrase yu?) Trpoaijiiaraffdai, PhcBd. 85, c. Lach. 194, a. And third,
as to the ethical value of Death, Lach. 195, d., and Phced. 62, a.
But, as the last passage has been much disputed, and, as I
think, erroneously interpreted, I offer the following explanation.
One passage runs thus : cv iraaL <pyQ afieipoy elpai i^rjv KUL ov
iroWoig KpeiTTOv redravai ; OifxaL eyioye tovto ye. Olg ovv TeQvdvaL
Xvarirekeif ravrd oUl ^eivd eivai Kal oig ^ijv ; Ovk eyioye. Lach^
195, d. The meaning of this is certain, there are persons^ for
whom it is better to he dead ; and there are persons, for whom it is
better to live.
The passage in the PhcEdo is, "laioq fievroL BavfiaaTov aoi ^avelTai,
el TOVTO, fjLOvov T(jjv dX\(t)v diravTiop, dirXovv iffTL Kal ovheiroTe Tvyyavei
ra> dvdpwTTUf (oairep Kal raAAa, taTiv ore Kal olg (^eXtlov reOvdvai rj
tl^v, cuQ de ^eXTLOV TeQvdvai, davfxaaTOU 'iaojQ aoL <f)aiveTai, el
TovTOiQ To7g dvdpojTTOig fjr) oatov Iotlv avTOvg el TroielVy dXX dXXov
del 7r.epifiiv£iv evepytTr)v, 62, a. // will, perhaps, appear strange if
the question, to be or not to be, lies, contrary to all analogy, in
Necessary Matter, and not in Contingent, [but analogy is against
this supposition, and so the question, like all others, lies in
Contingent Matter; therefore not to he is sometimes better
than to be.']. If so, why not in these cases, commit suicide ?
TovTo means the whole question at issue, the case Life against
Death. That tovto refers to the general question appears from
the words immediately preceding, ^3»y yap eywye {orrep vvv drj av
ypov,) Kal i^iXoXdov rjKovffa, {oTe irap ijjiuv dirjTaTo), rj^r] de Kal dXXujv
TLvuiv, (og ov heoi tovto [sc. to avTOv edvTOP aTroKTiPvvvae] ttouIv' aa<peg
de irepl aurwv ovlevog TrwVore ov^ev aKrJKoa: I got no precise
views on the subject avVaJv, either from Philolaus or the rest.
Socrates rejoins : aWd irpodviJ.e7crdaL yjpri, e<pr]' ra^a ydp o.v Kal
aKovaaigy sc. 7r£pt avTuiv aacpig tl» Two passages fix the logical
APPENDIX B. 95
sense of aTrXov*'. Oo irdw jioi ^ofctt, £0?/, Z SwVparfC* ovTiog dirXovv
elyai, , aXXa Tt /uoi doKei iv avru ^ia.<popov tivat. Prot.
331. b. C. ofjo' ovv ciTrXovv iari Xeyeiv, otl ol uvdptoTroi rdyadov
tpwaiv^ Na/. Symp. 206, a. 'AttXovv, then, is any proposition
without qualification as to either Quantity, and so Universal,
or, as to Matter, and so Necessary. Ouoe'xorc rvyxdveL is merely
the negative form of aTrXovv, as the Greeks were fond of
expressing a notion positively, and then negatively, as in
yj'wra KovK dyviord. I remember noting, with a qucere in the
margin of EuthydemuSy 278, a. that ^anv ore, and such forms,
were used in preference to iviore to denote the minority of
instances, while the shorter form Iviorz merely states that there
are cases. At least, the fuller form must be more emphatic.
I have not since verified the notion. But ThecBt. 150, a. b.
bears out my view, ov yap irpoaeaTL yvvail^iv irloT£ fxev eidwXa
TiKTeiv, tan h' ore dXrjdivd. Now, the philosophic births are
few. 151, b.
APPENDIX C.
IMMATERIALITY.
Sir Charles Bell, by experiments instituted on the roots of
the spinal nerves, professed to show —
1°. That the functions of Sensation exclusively belong to the
filaments ascending by the posterior roots.
2°. That the sole vehicles of Motion are the filaments
descending by the anterior roots.
These two propositions are, I believe, admitted by most
physiologists. Now, generalizing Sir C. Bell's results, we may
safely say, that the last known antecedent to sensation and to
voluntary motion is a modification of nerve. But we can never,
in the absence of experience, argue from Antecedent to
Consequent ; in more popular, and, therefore, more vague
language, from Cause to Effect. Applying this principle, we
cannot tell anything whatsoever of the nature of the Ego from
any possible observations or experiments on the antecedents to
the main constituents of that Ego, namely sensation and
motion. For, all such observations and experiments can only
be taken cognisance of by the senses, and that which takes
cognisance of anything is always posterior to
1°. the thing cognised ; and
2°. the medium of cognition, if any.
Now, that which feels the final consequent — the sensation,
is neither heavy, nor blue, nor loud, nor bitter, nor fetid, nor
their several opposites ; in a word, the Ego has none of the
properties of the Non-ego. Even granting, as is quite possible,
if not probable, that further research will point out several
steps between the facts observed by Sir C. Bell, and the final
sensation, yet such facts can never be more than a new set of
Antecedents as before, presenting either colour, smell, etc.,
while the final consequent, the Ego, is characterised by a total
absence of these qualities. Whatever then is afiirmed of the
one must be denied of the other. Hence, if we call the final
Antecedent, visible tangible, in a word, material, we must
likewise call the Ego invisible and intangible, in a word,
immaterial, or in a positive term spiritual. Of course, these
APPENDIX C. 97
words, save as denoting complete antithesis, are not used to
indicate any opinion as to the final destinies either of the Ego
or of the Non-Ego. In other words, the immateriality of the
soul is not necessarily connected ' with its immortality, two
questions which have been pertinaciously confounded. But
as death, as far as we can see^ deals with the final and the
more remote antecedents only, no one can prove that death
is the final destruction of the Ego. This argument admits,
for argument's sake, the position of the sensualist, that the
senses (including of course nerves and brain) are the sole
apparatus of human experience. This position has been
denied by some of the greatest thinkers. As, however, such
denial is not required hy the argument, it is not called in.
Generalising the argument, the result is, that as Physiology
can, in no conceivable degree of cultivation, throw the
slightest light on the existence of the Ego, so Physiology
can determine nothing as to the non-existence of the Ego.
In a word, Physiology deals with aon-egoistical antecedents
only.
H
APPENDIX D.
THE HIERARCHY OF GOOD.
PhilEBUS 66, a — C. 'Hdoy^ Ktrjfia ovk eari TrpiZrov otd' av
devTspoVf dWd TrpoJTOv fxiv iry Trept jjerpov Kul to fxerpLOv kol Kaipiov
Kai TTUVTa OTTOcra roiaura ^p/} vofiii^ELV Trjp dt^iov ^prjadai ^vaiv.
n. ^atVerai yovv ek t<j)V vvv XeyojjLsvwv, 2. Aevrepov fir/v irepl ro
(rvjifjierpov Koi icaXdy Kal ro teXeov koX iKavov koI iravQ'' oiroaa rrJQ
yEVEag av ravrrfg iariy, H. "Eoifce yovv, S. To roivvv rpiror, ojg
1] efi^ fiavTELa, vovv koX (ppovqaiv ridEig ovk av fxiya tl rrjg dXTjOEiag
TrapE^EXdoig, TL. 'Icrojg. 2. Ap' ovv ov TETapra^ d rrjg \pv)(rjg avrrjg
eOejiev, ETTLaTrifxag te Ka\ TE')(yag Ka\ lol^ag opdcig Xe^Qe/ffag, ravr eIvul
TO. Trpog Tolg rpial TETaprUf e'Lttep tov dyadov iarl fiaXXov rfjg rjhovrjg
^vyyEvrj. 11. Ta)(' dv. 2. Ile/LiTrrae roivvv, dg rj^ovctc EdEfiEv
aXvTTovg opiaa^Evoi, Kadapdg iwovofxdaavrEg rrjg \pv)(rjg avrrjg, iirLarrj-
fiaig, ralg Be aladijarEaLv, eTTOfiivag.
In this passage, the hierarchy of Good is delineated as
follows : — Fi'rs/, all things which are immediately connected
with the Limit, and in this way participate in the absolute and
superessential Good. That is, in the order of objectivity, the
Idea relatively to its elements stands next to The Good, of
which our notion is negative. Second, the Symmetrical, the
Beautiful, the Complete, the Adequate. That is, The Idea
considered as the result of combination is logically consequent
to The Idea considered relatively to its elements. Third, the
Intuitive Faculty and Prudence. That is, the psychic principle,
as saturated with self-cognition, is at once subject and object,
and accordingly logically consequent to The Idea, which is
wholly an object. Fourth, speculative and practical branches
of knowledge, and also professional skill, not consciously
grounded on scientific principles. That is, these branches
contain a purely subjective, as well as a noetic element, and
are therefore logically consequent to both the psychic principle,
the subject-object, and to The Idea. And, fifth and last. Pure
Pleasures, that is, the law of antecedence and consequence,
so far as it does not obstruct noetic efficiency. In brief, the
meaning of the passage is. The Good constitutes an Idea.
APPENDIX D. 99
The one Extreme is the most objective of objects — The Idea
in immediate reaction to the superessential, and as yet unknown
Absolute. The other Extreme is the most subjective of objects
which can be called Good — sensuous pleasure, which does not
interfere with noetic efficiency. The Indifference of the two
Extremes is the psychic principle, which, being self-cognitive,
is both subject and object, and which as noetic power confronts
the Idea, and as emotive susceptibility is in contact with
pleasure. The second grade of the hierarchy is The Idea —
The Idea regarded as the result of its elements, in relation to
the subject. And the fourth grade contains a noetic element
which has an affinity to the noetic faculty, and an empirical
element which savours of the Indefinite.
The opinions of Ast, Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg, and
Stallbaum, may be found in Dr. Badham's Philebus, together
with his own view of the passage, Prsef. pp. xiv. — xviii. In
opposition to these authorities, the writer rests his interpreta-
tion, firsty on the simplicity of the antithesis between the
objective and subjective ; and second^ on the text itself. The
word KTr\\ia denotes a thing to be held by some one ; and the
two first grades of Kni/iara are said to be irepl, while the three
last are said to be identical with, certain things specified ; that
is, the act of acquisition in grades i and 2 is distinct from the
thing acquired ; but in 3, 4, and 5, is identical with it, or rather,
is another phase of the acquirer. But this is precisely the
distinction between an objectivo-object and a subjectivo-object.
The words xp^ vofxli^eiv, as is evident from the reply of Pro-
tarchus, ^atVerat yovv ek t<jjv vvv XEyojxiviJv, refer to the previous
discussion of the nature and affinities of^povriffig and'H^ov^, Phil.
65 — 66 ; so that the passage is really equivalent to oiroaa Toiavra
rrjp cllBlov ypnTai ^vciv, and may therefore be rendered, al/ such
things as have taken on themselves the eternal Nature ^ i. e., are such,
because they have taken on themselves, the eternal Nature. This
rendering agrees with Trendelenburg's translation, **quidquid
ejusmodi seternam naturam suscepisse credendum est," save that
Toiavra is taken as a predicate and the interpretation is different.
Dr. Badham's objections apply to both renderings, and are as
follows : — " In the first place, oiroaa xp>) Toiavra vo^i^eiv k. e.
cannot be taken thus ; for this would be expressed by oTroaa,
roiavT ovTUf "xpri vop'^ctv — and though the order might be
H 2
lOO APPENDIX D.
changed, the participle would be indispensable. But, even
if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of
Trpwroj/ fiey Trrj Trspl fierpov ? It is obvious that, in such a case,
irtpL has no meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an
expression as, "to have adopted (or received) the eternal
nature," is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For
if the Good is to be sought for in these, it must be because
they are emanations or productions of it ; whereas, according
to this view, the Good is superadded to them, and that through
their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will
understand yprjcrOai in the sense of 7rapEt\rj(j)evai, or still less
of eiXrixivai. And then, again, why have we the perfect ? In
speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular
time, the proper tense would have been iXeadai. Those who
feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by
a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted
from them ; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable,
because it would amount to this — that Plato, having sought by
a laborious argument for that which had most affinity with the
Good, at last found it — in the Idea of the Good." Now, ovra
would spoil the sense, as it would imply that, already being
so and so, they had taken on the eternal Nature ; as in the
same dialogue, we have TrpoaayopEveig avr dvofioi ovO* irsp^
ovo^aTL, Phil. 13, a.; that is, you call things which are already
dissimilar by a distinct name ; whereas the meaning is, that
they are so and so, because they have taken. With regard to
irpuJTov fjLEv TTT) TTEpl fiETpov, why caunot 7r£joi havc the same
construction and meaning as in the next clause and in Symp.
203, c, and Epist. ii. 312, e., Pol. 258, d., 297, c. and else-
where passim^ viz. : to denote the id circa quod of anything.
The full construction is izpCiTov KTrJixd iarL Tvepl fierpov kcu to
fxerpiov Koi Kaipiov, the words being ranged in their logical order.
The most valuable acquisition deals with ^erpoy, Measure, Limit,
and the Limited, and (therefore, because Limited) the suitable
for some end or other. That is, suitableness comes from prior
adaptation, and adaptation comes from the adapting principle
fiETpoVf TTEpag. With regard to the order of the words, irapd*
oTToaa Toiavra occur in this order, Phileb. 54, b., 19, c, 42, d.,
and the full construction is Trdvd, oiroaa itrn roiavTa, d k. r. \., as
in Polit. TTEpl rd IvfifioXaia irdyd\ OTroaa keItui vo'/j(/ia, TrapaXaf^ovtra,
APPENDIX D. 1 01
305, b. ; and see on the omission of the copula, Prof. Campbell's
note on Polit. 281, c. p. 92. As to the position of yj^r\ with the
infinitive, any one who cares to investigate the matter, will
see that Plato places x9r\ both before and after the infinitive,
apparently guided merely by sound. The word ■^pr\aQai expresses
exactly, choice determined hy proper grounds^ in which case the
thing chosen is logically prior to the chooser. Besides, jprJffdaL
need not, and must not, be taken in the sense of either
TrapEikrjcpevaL or el\r)xevai. If we recollect Plato's use of Ojoc'yt <70at,
F/iced. 65, c. ; 75, a.; J^ep. syz, a.; I^pist. ii. 312, E.; and
Aristotle's objection to Plato's applying icpUadai and opelig to
the Numbers, Ethic. Eud. i. 8, we shall see, not only no
difficulty, but perfect propriety in the use of the word to express
the complete distinctness and harmony of the elements of the
Idea. We have a phrase of a similar kind in the Philehus
itself, faJc dyadd jiev ovk ovra, iviore ^i Koi evia Bcj^d/zeva rrjv t<jjv
dyaddiy eariy ote (pvaiv 32, d. Ae^fadai is, as the sense
requires less strong, but the general notion is the same — of
two things, and of a relation between them. Then, again, as
the perfect tense signifies past and present time, it is the
proper one to denote the non-transient nature of The Idea.
The reading suggested by Dr. Badham and by Professor W. H.
Thompson, evpijaOai, would refer to the process of search, rather
than to the nature of the thing sought; but the previous
discussion turned altogether on the latter point, Fhit. 66.
Finally, Plato finds the Bonuvi most akin to Good in The Idea ;
for the Good is unknowable ; which is the doctrine of the
Republic, vi. 509, a; vii. 517, be. The meaning oi tcrr^^a is
illustrated by ih^Laws, 5, 726, irdvTiov yap rwv avrov KTTi^aTijJv
fjitTU Oeovq 4'^x^ deiorarov*
APPENDIX E.
THE PLATONIC NUMBER. Rep, 8, 546, b— e.
Fries, PlatorCs Zahl, Heidelberg, 1823, cited by Goettling,
Aristot. Pol. pp. 411 — ^413, has shown that this number is
5,040; the number to which Plato in the Laws, 5. 737 e. 6,
771 a, limits the lots of land. This number, Aristotle Pol.
5. 10, I. calls (TTEpeoQ, I.e. a solid figure. For, as two factors
generated the plane figure, the rectangle, so three factors
generated the solid figure. These modes of thinking are
preserved in our words Square, and Cube. The factors of the
Platonic Solid, which represents the perfect human animal,
are according to Fries 3' x 4* x 5.7 = 5,040. Now, if we attach
Pythagorean values to the several figures, the significance of
the mysterious Number becomes apparent. According to the
Pythagoreans, 3 is the symbol of the Definitive and For-
mative Principle ; 4 of the Inert and Material principle ; 5 is
the symbol of Colour or Quality ; and 7 of Life, Health, and
Intelligence. To apply this to the passage in the Republic,
the human Solid is at its best, when it combines, in due proportion,
Motivity, Solidity, Colour, Vitality and Intelligence ; and the first
downward step in the Ideal Republic is, when its citizens
produce children, who fail in maintaining this proportion.
The Platonic number has become the proverbial representation
of something mysterious and unintelligible, but it may be seen
that Aristotle rejects it, not because it is mystical, but because
it is untrue, Pol. 5, 10, i. To see why a truism is presented
to us in such a formidable guise, we must recollect the Platonic
fashion, derived from Pythagoras, of attaching a specific Number
to a specific Quality ; as for example, to the Tyrannic Soul,
Rep. 9, 587 b e, and to the Structural Solids of the Timaeus.
This, in Platonic Language means, that without the One — the
Limit — every thing is indefinite and incogitable ; a proposi-
tion worked out in the Parmenides : 157 b — 159 b, 164 b to end,
and in the Philebus the Limit, to Trepag is defined to be every
relation and degree of Number and Quality. This doctrine.
APPENDIX E. 103
Verification apart, even when applied to the extended universe,
is not more startling than the chemical doctrine of Definite
Proportions. In fact, Plato would have revelled in Chemistry ;
we would have had a Dialogue, The Chemist^ enforcing the
propositions, where there is quality to ttoIov, there there is Numbery
TO irepag ; where there is Number^ there there is Intelligence Noyg :
and where there is Noi/g, theu there is Soul xj^xn- Phil. 30 c,
Tim. 30 a. Nor would the higher doctrines of Modern Physics
be rejected by the Academy. If light be motion, if heat be
motion, if sound be motion, and if they all be Modes of
one and the same force, we would have the same Sorites,
Motion, Force, Energy, Number, Intelligence, and Soul, in a
word, Spiritual Physics.
APPENDIX F.
THE HARMONY OF THE REPUBLIC, THE LAWS, AND THE
POLITICUS.
It is proposed to shew the general harmony on all important
points of the Republic, the Laws, and the Politicus ; and
also to point out, that whatever differences exist, arise neces-
sarily out of the special purpose of each dialogue.
1. As to the End or Scope of Polity. In the Laws, the
End or Scope of Polity is Aper?? — to apiaroy. Legg. 628 c,
692 a. b., 693 a. In the Republic, the Scope is Atfcaioavv?? = to
aptaroy from the subjective side. As to the Politicus, the
Scope is that the ruler, by means of science and justice, should
improve the morale of his subjects. Polit. 293 d. e.
2. As to the Means of attaining the Scope or End. The
Means are in themselves indifferent, provided the End is
actually attained. Rep. 7, 540 d., Polit. 292 c, that is, it is
indifferent whether the Sovereign be one or many, or whether
wealth or poverty is made the test of constitutional efficiency.
Now the Means are of three kinds.
1. The Means put into requisition by pure Science, as
set forth in the Republic.
2. The Means put into requisition by Time or circum-
stances. Legg. 3, 676 a b.
3. The Means put into requisition by the Scientific Ruler,
who adapts circumstances to the great End. This third case
is embodied in the Philosophic King, the Royal Weaver of
the Politicus, 294 a, 305 e.
In the first case. Polity fit^ in the second, Nascitur; in the
third, Nascitur et fit.
4. With regard to the object of each treatise. The Republic
discusses what is AiKaioavyri, i.e. Virtue in the individual.
Rep. ii. 369 a, 372 e. Rep. iv. 420 b c, 430 c, 431 a b, 432 a,
433 d> 434 d e, 435 e, 441 a c, 442 d e, 443 b c, 445 a c, Rep.
V. 449 a d, 462 b c, 472 b d. Rep. vi. 484 b, Rep. vii. 541 b.
Rep. viii. 543 d, 545 a b c, 548 d, 550 c d, 553 e, 554 b, 555 a b,
APPENDIX F. 105
558 c, 559 d e, 561 e, 564 a, 566 d, Rep. ix. 571 a, 574 e, 576 c,
577 c, 578 a, 579 c, 580 c d, 588 b, 592 a, Rep, x. 605 b, 612 c.
The Laws deals with the province of Legislation opOoVr/ro'c re
jcat a/uaprmc Trcpi vo'/xwv, ^nc Tore eort ^vo-et I, 627 d; and the
Politicus sets before us the Master of Statecraft, who combines
the comprehensiveness of a Code with the power of scrupu-
lously adjusting it to the specialities of Cases, 294 a b, 295
b — 296 a.
One would imagine that a disciple of the Positive School
would bear in mind the distinctness of the provinces of Ethics
and Legislation, yet Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his anxiety to point
out the inconsistencies of Plato, confounds Law and Morality
in the following passage : ** Even the Socratic view of Virtue
being identical with Knowledge, consequently of Vice being
Ignorance, and therefore involuntary — even this idea he learned
in his old age to repudiate, as we see in the Laws (v. p. 385),
where he calls incontinence no less than ignorance (^ cC dfia-
6iav 7) ^i' aKpareiav) the cause of Vice. In the same sense
(iv. p. 138), after speaking of anger and pleasure as causes of
error, he says, " There is a third cause of our faults, and that
is ignorance {rpirov Qyvoiav tQv dfiapTrifidTtJv airUiy). So that
here he places Ignorance only as a third Cause ; and by so
doing, destroys the whole Socratic argument respecting the
identity of Virtue and knowledge." — History of Philosophy, i.
214- — 3, 3rd edition. Whatever destruction there is, does not
come of Plato. I do not know to what edition Mr. Lewes
refers, but the passage in the fifth book occurs in 734 b. Steph.
The second I am unable to find, except in the ninth, 863 b c.
Now, in the ninth book, Plato expressly raises the question,
How is Legal Responsibility compatible with his doctrine that
Vice — Injustice — dlLda — is involuntary ? Legg. 9, 860 b. — 861 e.
Plato resolves the difficulty by pointing out, that though Vice —
dlida — is involuntary, yet that p\d(3r} — damnum — damage in the
legal sense, may be caused either purposely or not. Now,
as was shown before. Justice — individual Virtue — tliKaioavvr) —
is the ascendancy in action of the higher principles, and
Injustice — d^ida — of the lower. But the Legislator is mainly
concerned with dfictpTtinara, i.e. Delicts, and with the motives
which lead to them — in Roman language their Causce — namely,
Passion or Anger — Qv^xo^ ; Pleasure or Sensuality — »/^ov/f ; and
106 APPENDIX F.
Ignorance, either mere absence of Knowledge, or positive
Delusion, ayvoia, 863 b c. Hence, Plato quite consistently
tells us that, an act may be just, but at the same time damnific,
and that another may be unjust, but beneficent, 863 e, 864 a.
T7?V yap Tov dvjjLov — TT^v TOLavTr}y (3XdPr]v. In modern words,
the question. Is A liable to an action in tort ? has nothing to
do with the question. Is A in a state of Grace ?
In the first passage quoted by Mr. Lewes, Plato is talking
of the causes which make a man fall short of ffwcppoavvr], tov
(7(i)([)pove~ty ivhriQ a>V, 5, 734 b, and he puts down as causes,
djxaQia and a'lCjOaVtia, i.e. a want of ^poprjmg and of dpdpeia.
But in tracing the historical growth of states, in Legg. 3, 4, he
tells us that he is talking of every day ffwippoavvi], 710 a, and not
of abxppoavvt] in its high sense ; and he also insists that a Law
should not be merely a command or prohibition, but should
have a prooemium or preamble containing the reasons which
induce the Legislator to make the Law, 4, 721 — 723 b. The
Legislator should also give his subjects a catalogue of divine
and human things in their order of desirability. The student
of Bentham will remember two similar suggestions. Now
amongst these desirable objects are the various kinds of
moral life suited to the individual ; and one of these is the
temperate, aiocpp^v, in the popular sense ; and the two causes
which impede aw(ppoavv7] are uKpareia and dfiadia, that is, in the
popular sense, for he had shown in the Protagoras, that
dfxaOia was the essence of all Vice. Here then the Legislator
is obviously dealing with the motives of Delict and its opposite.
In brief. Ethical Wrong — Vice — is involuntary dKovaiovy and is
the result of ignorance dfxadia : but Legal Wrong — Delict — dfidp-
rr?jua, is the result of dfxaQia, as well as of other causes, and
is both aKovaiov and EKovaiov. Besides, the Laws, all through,
is conceived in a popular spirit : Plato's assistants are from
Sparta and Crete, intellectually the least cultivated of Greek
states. Plato, on a remarkable occasion, claims to manage
the discussion all his own way, 10, 892 d e, and the Cretan
thinks Homer a clever fellow, though he has not read much of
him, 3, 860 c. The treatise, too, opens with the statement
that the author of Laws is Gfoe, 624 ; and Qeoq and deioQ are
always in Plato opposed to rf'x*"^* science, Ion. 542 a b, Mem.
99 c, io end. On the whole, we may pronounce the Laws
APPENDIX F. 107
to be an adaptation of Platonism to popular intelligence and
sympathies, although even here, Plato maintains that the
peculiarities of the Republic are theoretically better than the
compromises of the Laws, 5, 739 b. e.
The different arrangements of the several polities in the
Republic^ the Politicus, and the Laws, which are set forth by
Professor Lewis Campbell in his introduction to the Politicus,
pp. XLi. — XLV., can be easily accounted for by differences in
the Principium Divisionis in each Treatise. Thus, the third
Laws deals with the historical growth of Polity, 3, 676 a.
The Republic deals with the various Polities in the order of
their deviation from the ideal State, Rep. 543 e — 544 a ; that
which deviates least, being least bad. There is only one Ideal
or perfect state, either Monarchy or Polyarchy, which governs
the Whole for the good of the Whole. All others are devia-
tions, and govern only for the good of a part. These deviations
are infinite in number. Rep, 445 e; cf. Polit. 291 a b; but in
this infinity of deviation, we find the four well marked types,
Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny. From the
point of view of the Republic, Oligarchy takes precedence of
Democracy, because Oligarchy governs on principle — the good
of the Oligarchy ; whereas Democracy has no principle at all,
^^/- 8, 557 d c, and as the state is, so is the democrat, 561 c d.
Everything by starts, and nothing long,
and so the Democracy is a very pleasant and genial place to live
in, a.^ ov deffTTEffla Kal jj^cla rj TOiavrrj Staywyj? iv rw TrapavTiKa ;
558 a. Now the standard in the Politicus is imffTrJiJiri — science —
on the part of the Sovereign, be it one or many, and the
deviations are judged of by their pleasantness as constitutions
to live under, rig ovv Zri tSv ovk opduiv TroXireiuiv tovtojv rjfcicrTa
■^aXEirrj (TV^fjv, Tracwi/ ^aXcTro/v ovatov, Koi rig f^apvTciTr}. Pol.
302 b. In this way, Democracy is more genial, and therefore
preferable to Oligarchy, which, judging from small towns in
general, must have been excessively unpleasant.
As to the Minos, the following points of resemblance be-
tween it and acknowledged dialogues must be admitted, what-
ever views be held as to its authorship. Mr. Grote and
Mr. Lewes have done good service to criticism in general, by
their protest against the German test of authenticity, the
Platonisches Gefiihl, which proves any thing.
08 APPENDIX F.
1. AiKaioavPT] makes men dkaioi 314 c, it is also of para-
mount excellence, td. d.
2. 1] dXr]d7ig do^a deals with existence, 315 a.
3. Real existence is changeless, 316 b.
4. Laws are for the good of subjects, 318 a b.
5. Crete and Lacedasmon are praised as usual, 318 c d.
6. The good man resembles God, 319 a.
7. Zeus is a o-o^to-T-TJc, and has re'xv?/, 319 c.
8. Law is based on Morality, 320 a.
9. Law, in its effects, is compared to Gymnastic, 321 c d.
10. The definition of Law — Eoyfia TroXeivg — the will of the
State, is accepted with qualifiea-tion in both Minos, 314 d e,
and Laws, i, 644 d.
APPENDIX G.
TRUE AND FALSE PLEASURE AND PAIN.
Few of Plato's modes of expression have been more vehe-
mently assailed than his application of the predicates true
and false to Pleasure and Pain. It has been condemned by
Mr. Grote, Professor Bain, and Mr. Poste. Whether the terms
are appropriate or not is a question of taste ; but the question
for the metaphysician is whether the explanation given by
Plato is sound or not.
Reserving the question of propriety of language, Plato's
explanation of the offensive terms is clear, and, I believe,
justifiable ; and it is somewhat odd that he carefully provides
against the very objection, which is urged against him. As
follows : an empirical judgment, Zolsx^ is true or false according
as it is verified or falsified by further experience. Thus I see
what I imagine to be a man under a tree : I approach nearer
and find it to be a wooden figure. My judgment, ?d^a, is
accordingly false. Phil, 38, c d. Falsity, accordingly, exists
only in the reference to future experience. But the subjective
impression, whether ultimately verified or falsified by further
experience, is never in itself false, ovkovv to do^d^op, av re opduiQ
ay re firj 6pdu)Q do^darjy to ye ^o^d^eiv ovtcjq ovdeiror ciTroXXufftv,
37 a b. In the same way, the pleasure, as actually experienced,
cannot be false, but may attract that predicate, when ex-
amined by the light of further experience, ovkovv koi to i^dofievov,
av re opduie dv re firj rjhriTaif to ye 6vT<i)g rjhadai hrjXov w'c ovdeiroTE
aVoXet, 37, b, c/. 37, e ; 38, a. In other words. Pleasure, as
a subject admits of the predicate, true or false, according as it
is followed by good or evil effects, 39, e. Pleasure and Pain
may be also termed true or false in relation to the Law of
Contrast, and the effects of the latter on the vividness of our
feelings.
no APPENDIX G.
As to the appropriateness of the terms : Plato's Ethics are
rational and not sentimental ; it is, therefore,, not inappropriate
to apply such terms to Pleasure and Pain, and thus force us
to see that the Reason or Intellect is the ultimate judge of
human feeling and conduct. If Plato had used the terms
repented and unrepented^ no modern would have excepted, but
his terminology in that case would be sentimental and not
rational. I do not press his argument, that Pleasure and Pain
are Trotw nre, that is, as subjects admit of predicates of quality.
To discuss this fully belongs to the Metaphysics of Logic.
But it fully answers Mr. Poste's objection that " Pleasure can
never be an imaginary predicate, but always an immediate
sensation." Philebus^ p. 179.
APPENDIX H.
Wordsworth's ode on immortality.
Mr. Mill tells us that the celebrated line,
" Our life is but a sleep and a forgetting,"
is not Platonic, because we are capable of dydfiviKng. But,
surely, the process, which dvdfivrjffic counteracts, is Xrjdrj ; and
therefore, where there is no dvd^vnaiQ, our life is a forgetting.
Nay, more, the majority of men are not, in Plato's opinion,
(})i\6<To<poi, and therefore never go through the process of
dydjjLvriffiQ at all. I had intended adding an appendix on
Real Existence, but shall reserve it for a more fitting occasion.
In p. 36, sixth line from foot y a reference to Laws was omitted,
TO yap XvTTOVfiEvov fcat rihofxevov avrrjc (sc. \l'V)(rJQ) OTrep cijjJiog te
Kal TrXijdoQ Tro'Xeo/g eanv. 3, 689 a b.
FINIS.
Erratum,
p. 58, Sz'xfh line from foot, insert the before Platottic Virtue.
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