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ESSAYS 
 ON THE PLATONIC ETHICS. 
 
CAMBRIDGE: 
 Printed by William Metcalfe, Green Street. 
 
ESSAYS 
 
 ON 
 
 THE PLATONIC ETHICS.- 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL.D., 
 
 EX S.T.C.D., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LATIN, QUEEN's COLLEGE, GALWAV. 
 
 £1/ ovpavM KTvos irapaoiiyfia avuKturai. 
 
 RIVINGTONS 
 
 ^onboit^ ^xlox'ii, anb (S^ambribge 
 
 W. M^GEE, DUBLIN 
 1870 
 
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<MAOnAATaN 
 <t»IAOnAATIISI 
 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The following essays on the Republic, Pro- 
 tagoras, Meno, Gorgias, and Philebus, are taken 
 altogether from the text of Plato. They develop 
 views diametrically opposed to those of Mr. Grote. 
 But, as the opinions of the great historian are 
 identical with the tenets, which Plato spent his 
 life in opposing, and as they exhibit modern 
 Positivism in its most improved form, the admirer 
 of Plato will not regret Mr. Grote's critique: 
 
 One stroke he aims, 
 That may determine, and not need repeat 
 As not of power. 
 
 And we may be tolerably certain, that if Mr, 
 Grote's exposition, which is professedly deriv^dd 
 from the text of Plato, pure and simple, can be 
 answered without exceeding the same limits, the 
 Academy need fear no new assault. It has been 
 thought advisable to limit the discussion to the 
 Dialogues specified, as they contain all that is 
 necessary for understanding tlic Ethics of Plato. 
 
IV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Some repetitions, which are essential to the logical 
 coherence of the discussion, have been found 
 unavoidable. Lawyers and Mathematicians repeat 
 their formulae, as often as is necessary, because 
 they address a specially educated audience only. 
 Metaphysicians would do the same, were it not 
 for a notion, somewhat prevalent, that every one, 
 who can read, is a metaphysician. But, to suppose 
 that anyone, without some natural capacity and 
 special training, can understand a metaphysical 
 treatise, is as absurd as to imagine him mastering 
 Fearne's Remainders in a railway carriage. 
 
 I have to thank the Board of Trinity College 
 for their liberality in assisting the publication of 
 these essays, and the President of this College 
 for the interest he has taken in the work* 
 
 Queen's College, Galway. 
 August, 1870. 
 
THE PLATONIC ETHICS. 
 
 I. 
 
 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Judging from the brief notice in the History of 
 Greece, Mr. Grote's detailed examination of Plato's 
 Republic was not likely to exhibit much sympathy 
 with Platonic teaching. As a contribution to scientific 
 ethics, Mr. Grote had pronounced that incomparable 
 Dialogue a failure. Plato had not proved his main 
 point, that Justice was intrinsically desirable; and as 
 he only answered his opponents by constructing an 
 imaginary Republic, he virtually confessed his defeat. 
 {HisL Vol. VIII., p. 534). 
 
 In his more recent work, Mr. Grote, still constant 
 to his earlier views, has examined the main thesis of 
 the Republic at considerable length, and a doctrine 
 in professed opposition to that of Plato, is expounded 
 with much force. But whatever be the merits of the 
 exposition taken by itself — and they are great — it is 
 utterly irrelevant as a critique on the Republic. And 
 to prove its irrelevancy is the object of this Section. 
 
 The student of Plato is doubtless familiar with the 
 Republic; but the following outlines of its general 
 argument may be found useful in duly arranging 
 Mr. Grote's objections, and the answers thereto. More- 
 over, the best refutation of Mr. Grote's rival doctrine 
 is furnished by the Dialogue itself, if we only keep 
 
 B 
 
2 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 before us the subject of the discussion and Plato's 
 
 conduct of the argument. 
 
 I^<^ The subject of the Dialogue is Justice. Glauco, 
 
 who opposes Socrates, begins with the postulate, 
 
 Certain things are desirable. These he divides into 
 
 three classes. The first class contains those things, 
 
 ^ which are desirable in themselves, without considering 
 
 their consequences. The second contains those things 
 
 which are desirable, both in themselves and in their 
 
 consequences. And the third contains those things 
 
 I which are desirable in their consequences, but not in 
 
 themselves. Now Justice has certain consequences, 
 
 and these consequences are admitted to be desirable. 
 
 I Is Justice then to be placed in the second class, or in 
 
 the third ? 
 
 Undesirable things may be similarly classified. The 
 first class contains those things, which are undesirable 
 in themselves, without considering their consequences. 
 The second contains those things, which are undesirable 
 both in themselves and in their consequences. And the 
 third class contains those things, which are desirable 
 in themselves but undesirable in their consequences. 
 Now Injustice has certain consequences ; and these are 
 admitted to be undesirable. Is Injustice, then, to be 
 placed in the second class or in the third ? 
 i Socrates stands alone in the opinion that Justice 
 
 belongs to the second class of desirable things, and that 
 Injustice belongs to the second class of undesirable 
 things. Glauco and his brother Adimantus, though 
 anxious to agree with their great opponent, support the 
 view held by every body except Socrates — a view 
 universally taught as both important and true — that 
 Justice is desirable for its consequences only, but that 
 these consequences are cheaply purchased by the 
 antecedent sacrifice which they require. So, vtce-vcrsa, 
 Injustice. " Our pleasant vices" cost us far too much. 
 
 To clear the question of irrevelant matter — to prevent 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 3 
 
 confusion between Justice considered on the one hand 
 as an i ntrin^ ^guajjtvj^dged within the breast of the 
 right-doer, and Justice considered on the other as 
 productive of certain overt consequences — Glauco sup- 
 poses that the intrinsically just man incurs, because 
 of his justice, the very worst effects of detected injustice ; 
 while all the honours and emoluments of sterling justice 
 are heaped upon its counterfeit. His brother Adimantus, 
 to set the question in a still stronger light, supposes 
 that the popular doctrine has been reduced to system, 
 and put in practice by an able and unscrupulous man. 
 Adimantus then brings forward the following extreme 
 case : — It is admitted that the effects only of Justice are 
 desirable. The wise man will, therefore, secure them 
 more easily by pretending to be just; and as he is 
 successful in his pretences — for he is wise — ^he will 
 escape detection, and secretly indulge in the pleasant 
 iniquities, which, on the showing of the popular creed, 
 are desirable in themselves, and will leave all the 
 trouble of being really just to the righteous fool. Now 
 the wise man is a consummate artist ; he will therefore 
 appear most just, when, in reality, he is most unjust. 
 On the other hand the just man, who does not see all 
 this, must be a bungling fool, who will therefore appear 
 unjust, while he is really just. Both will be treated 
 according to outward show and not according to their 
 inward deserts. Socrates is now called on to make 
 good his point, and shew that even in this extreme 
 case, where the usual consequences of Justice and 
 Injustice are transposed. Justice is preferable to Injustice, 
 and that it is regarded in this light by the martyr himself. 
 
 Socrates is aware of the difficulties of the task ; he 
 however accepts the challenge, and finally claims the 
 victory, which is acknowledged by his opponents in the 
 Dialogue — the brothers of Plato. Plato consequently 
 seems to wish us to believe that his argument in behalf 
 of intrinsic Justice is conclusive. 
 
 ' ' B 2 
 
4 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Plato's argument to prove that Justice under any 
 circumstances is preferable to Injustice under any 
 circumstances is three-fold. The first argument occu- 
 pies by far the larger portion of the Dialogue, extending 
 from p. 368, to p. 580. c, and against certain points in 
 this Mr. Grote directs his main attack. The second 
 extends from p. 580 c, to 583 c, and the third and last 
 argument, which Plato looks on as the strongest, from 
 p. 583 c, to 588. The two last are briefly criticised by 
 Mr. Grote in connection with the point suggested by 
 the first. The remaining thirty-odd pages of the 
 Dialogue are mainly devoted to the outward conse- 
 quences of Justice and Injustice, here and hereafter. 
 With these however — the second thesis of the Republic 
 — we are not now concerned. 
 ^ I. The first argument deserves careful consideration. 
 It gives us Plato's Psychology in relation to his Ethics. 
 The argument is founded on the radical differences 
 between the three elements of the human soul, which 
 are the objects of ethical science, viz. the Rational, the 
 Irascible, and the Concupiscible. The terms Irascible 
 and Concupiscible, which are by no means accurate 
 renderings of the Greek, in accordance with Plato's 
 habit of calling a class after its most marked species, 
 denote two much wider genera. The Rational element 
 contains the Intuitive and Discursive faculties — Rea- 
 son and Understanding. The Irascible contains the 
 Emotional moiety of the will, and the Sentimental and 
 Moral feelings of our Psychology. The Concupiscible 
 contains not only the primary Appetites, but also our 
 acquired likings for the means of indulging them — 
 Wealth and Power considered as ministering to luxury. 
 These three elements are the raw materials of the Four 
 Virtues, as will be seen. 
 
 Now, objects are more easily studied on a larger, 
 than on a smaller scale ; and Socrates holding that 
 Justice in a community differs, for the purpose in hand, 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 5 
 
 in no respect from Justice in an individual, proceeds to 
 observe it in the larger specimen. For this purpose he 
 traces the growth of an imaginary Commonwealth, so 
 far as its rudimentary development is analogous to the 
 inner life of the individual, whose capabilities have 
 received due culture. The typical form — which is the 
 same in both individual and community — is then set up 
 as the model, which shows us the short-comings of 
 actual polities and of living men. 
 
 The analogy between the terms Community and Man 
 rests on the Division of Labour. This is the point on 
 which the stress is laid. The individual displays the 
 Division of Labour on a small scale, the Community on 
 a large. But the statement of the analogy runs thus : — 
 as Division of Labour is to the Community, so is 
 Division of Labour to the Individual : not vice-versa. 
 The Community is brought in for the sake of the 
 Individual, and not the Individual for the sake of the 
 Community. Unless we keep this in mind, the whole 
 of the first argument, that is nearly the whole of the 
 Dialogue, becomes a chaos. 
 
 The Division of Labour being the foundation of the 
 analogy, the Division of Labour requires that both in 
 the larger and smaller unit, each class and each faculty 
 be exclusively confined to its special functions. For 
 the purport of the analogy, each class is thus the 
 analogous faculty magnified, and each faculty is the 
 class diminished. Such Division of Labour Socrates 
 considers the only means of insuring complete Justice 
 in either sphere. But in order to give free play to the 
 inherent tendencies of Faculty and Class, we require a 
 field perfectly free from all antagonistic influences. 
 But such a state of things has never yet been seen on 
 earth ; it may however come into being, as Time is 
 fertile in possibilities. And until the New Common- 
 wealth come, the solitary Seer must content himself 
 with contemplating the ideal Exemplar, and strive to 
 
 C 
 
O THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 realise, as best he may, the Division of Labour within 
 the realms of Self. That Division cannot however be 
 completely" realised until the Fair City glitters in the 
 sun. Typical Justice requires a typical sphere. 
 
 The foundation of the analogy — Division of Labour — 
 requires that Class should be distinct from Class, and 
 Faculty from Faculty. How are we to insure distinct- 
 ness in the latter set ? Psychology supplies the means. 
 Q The ground-principle of Plato's Psychology is that, if 
 Q the objects of our faculties be radically different, and if 
 the results of attaining those objects be radically 
 ^ different, the several faculties to which those objects are 
 adjusted are distinct in kind, at least for the purposes 
 '^ of Ethics. 
 
 To apply this : — A hungry man wants food : he has 
 therefore one feeling appetite. But whether it is better 
 to indulge the appetite in the particular case or not is 
 a question reserved for the Reason to decide and not 
 for the Appetite. Had we no feeling, save Appetite, 
 we should rush blindly on its object, but the critical 
 and calculating faculty — Reason — tells us that in 
 certain cases the gratification will be too dearly bought. 
 Whether we hearken to the dictates of Reason or not, 
 is quite immaterial to the purpose which Plato has 
 in view. The dictate of the Reason does not take the 
 categorical form Thou Shalt, Thou Shalt Not — it 
 employs the conditional If. From these facts, namely, 
 that Appetite seeks relief only, knowing nothing of 
 consequences at all, while Reason recounts to us the 
 consequences of every kind, which are completely 
 ignored by Appetite, we infer that Reason is intrinsically 
 fitted to direct Appetite, while Appetite shows no 
 fitness for directing Reason. 
 
 But Psychology presents us with a second set of 
 facts, which confirm this inference* Under peculiar 
 circumstances, when we indulge an appetite, we are 
 angry with ourselves for so doing; while we do not 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 7 
 
 find that any regret follows the exercise of self-controul 
 as such. Consequently, self-disapprobation is in favour 
 of self-controul, and not in favour of indulgence. 
 Therefore, both the Rational and Emotional elements 
 are fitted to direct Appetite, but Appetite is not fitted 
 to direct them. 
 
 Now Reason points out certain cases in which 
 Emotion may, like Appetite, be productive of harm. 
 Consequently, by parity of reasoning, Reason is fitted 
 to direct Emotion also. Reason, therefore, is the sole 
 Casuist and supreme Director whose dictates may be 
 disobeyed, but from whose judgment there is no 
 appeal. 
 
 But Reason does something more than dissuade ; 
 Reason points out the cases in which both Emotion 
 and Appetite may be indulged with advantage, but 
 always within certain limits, and always with regard 
 foj consequences, 571. e. 589. b. 
 
 From this set of facts — part of every one's experience 
 — Plato deduces his Four Virtues. His names for these 
 are in English, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and 
 Justice. Our terms are all inadequate, and besides, 
 are positively misleading, but Plato's meaning is clearly 
 seen in the account which he gives of the several 
 qualities. The Four Virtues are deduced as follows : — 
 we, in the first instance, proceed to gratify our appetites : ' 
 we, in the first instance, shrink from pain and danger.^ 
 But Reason points out certain cases, in which it is 
 better not to follow our primary inclinations. Reason, 
 in certain cases, tells us it is better not to indulge 
 Appetite, and that it is better not to shirk danger. 
 And with these dictates of Reason, Emotion sympathises 
 and visits with its displeasure the Appetite which has 
 not been guided by the advice of its well-wisher. We 
 .have here in these few facts, the Four Platonic Virtues. 
 
 The Rational Faculty distinguishes the several cases 
 of conduct one from the other, and reckons up the cost 
 
8 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 of every kind incurred in each particular case. Dis- 
 tinguishing, foreseeing, and computation, are all of the 
 essence of the Platonic Prudence. 
 
 The frame of mind, which keeps steadily before us 
 the dictates of Reason, as to when it is better to curb 
 appetite and when it is better to face danger, is 
 Fortitude. Our word is more than half too narrow, 
 being only equivalent to the smaller moiety of the 
 Greek term, expressing as it does, only Steadiness in 
 facing danger. 
 
 Our " Fortitude" leaves out altogether the larger half 
 of Plato's notion ; namely, cool judgment in estimating 
 the several kinds of pleasure. The word ^AvSpela was 
 probably suggested to Plato by the common metaphor — 
 7]TT(i)v — applied to one, who is " overcome" by pleasure 
 or pain, and so does not exhibit 'AvSpela in the fight. 
 Legg. 863. d. Fortitude, understood as not only 
 suppressing fear in obedience to Reason, but curbing 
 Appetite as well, gives rise to a certain relation 
 between the Faculties, as directing and directed. 
 
 When this mutual relation is thoroughly established 
 and carried into the whole of the inner life, we have 
 ^(ocppoavvT) — Temperance — the permanent relation of 
 the Faculties as directing and directed. Our word is 
 miserably inadequate, as the Greek term denotes 
 conscious self-direction according to Reason — self- 
 direction moreover not by way of repression, but of 
 guidance. Fortitude and Temperance are each the 
 complement of the other : Fortitude from without and 
 Temperance from within. Fortitude must confront all 
 dangers and all pleasures— all that affects the sense ; 
 and Temperance convert iFortitude into self-direction, 
 *• Until endurance grow 
 Sinewed with action, and the full-grown will 
 Circled thro' all experiences, pure law, 
 Commeasure perfect freedom." 
 
 Now, since Temperance establishes the relative 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 9 
 
 Direction between Prudence and Appetite; and since 
 such Direction is carried on in conformity to Fortitude, 
 which in turn observes the dictates of Reason ; and 
 since Reason dictates always what will be on the whole 
 the best, it follows that the supremacy of Temperance 
 growing out of Fortitude, will place Reason, Emotion, 
 and Appetite each in its proper position, and thereby 
 allow each to devote itself to its special function. But 
 when the Faculties perform each its special function, 
 the Division of Labour is perfected, and that too in the 
 inmost life. And the Division of Labour when thus 
 organised, perfected, and secured, whether in the com- 
 munity or in the individual, is the Platonic Justice.' 
 
 Our word Justice is calculated to mislead, pointing 
 as it does, to certain transactions between man and 
 man. To us, to apply the same word to civic dealings 
 and to a certain state of the inner life, appears rather 
 forced. Etymology and usage however show that in 
 the Greek, no such chasm separates the two applica- 
 tions. Likeness : Rule adapted to a particular case : 
 Judicial decision : Rule in general : Law and Morality : 
 such are the several transitions which may be traced in 
 the meaning of the parent-word down from Homer to 
 Plato. Hence the abstract term ALKatoavvrj may be 
 much better expressed by Regularity, if we take care 
 not to exclude from the latter notiaa some reference to 
 particular cases and circumstances "and proportionate 
 modification. So understood, the word exactly expresses 
 analogous states of Commonwealth and Individual ; but 
 it also possibly called up in the minds of Plato's pupils 
 some of his favourite metaphors, which were intended 
 to suggest some of his most important doctrines. His 
 metaphors are often taken from athletic training and 
 diet ; Vice is " bad condition" from over feeding, and 
 Virtue is "proper form" resulting from moderation. 
 Rep. 444. d. e. We find the ethical and gymnastical 
 notions combined in the punning reference to the 
 
lO THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Champion Pulydamas, Rep. i. 338. c. d., and the 
 just man in the Republic is the victorious wrestler at 
 the grand meeting. Moreover all the Virtues except 
 Prudence are the effect of habit and training, Rep, 7.518 
 c. d., Leg. 963. e., and so, the kindred notions Vigour, 
 Moderation, Measure, would recall the cardinal doctrine 
 of the Limit and its Opposite, the two factors of Plato's 
 most abstruse Metaphysics. Were it not out of place, 
 it would be easy to show how the Four Virtues may be 
 evolved from these two elements, the Limit and the 
 Opposite. We may however see how the term rendered 
 Justice is, without being strained, applicable to both 
 polities and individuals. 
 ^ ] The Four Virtues thus embody in its highest perfec- 
 tion the Division of Labour ; and the Intellect observing 
 the adaptation between the Faculties and their Objects, 
 and between the Faculties themselves all united in 
 one systematic whole and working to one end, will 
 contemplate the spectacle with deep exultation — an 
 exultation which once felt it would not exchange for 
 any outward prosperity, and this is the first phase of 
 intrinsic Justice considered exclusively in relation to 
 the Faculties themselves. 
 
 Vice, by parity of reasoning, consists in the undue 
 preponderance of some one or more of the lower motives 
 in the internal system. Its worst phase is the habitual 
 supremacy of the most useless and violent animal 
 cravings. Rep. 575. a. In this last state, the patient 
 is utterly insensible to all the higher pleasures ; he is 
 delivered up, bound hand and foot, to an appetite at 
 once capricious and despotic, and utterly reckless of 
 consequence. Why the just man would prefer his own 
 condition, though in the midst of the worst possible 
 surroundings to that of the slave of appetite in the 
 midst of the best possible surroundings, will be seen 
 from the Second and Third arguments. And here 
 closes the first argument in behalf of intrinsic Justice. 
 
THE R^UBLIC. II 
 
 It is in brief: — Division of Labour in the individual 
 gives rise to intrinsic Regularity, i.e. Justice, an4 
 intrinsic Justice awakens a vivid sense of systematic 
 inner life. To this Vice is dead. In the former case, 
 each faculty works in subordination to the vital whole, 
 and thereby secures the highest functional regularity. 
 In the latter the system is almost completely paralysed, 
 and the partial vitality is spasmodic and abnormal. 
 Here, we witness 
 
 "The crime of Sense avenged by Sense." ^ 
 
 One characteristic of the Four Platonic Virtues i 
 deserves notice. They are essentially non-social ; they ^ 
 do not contemplate in the first instance man in contact \ 
 with man. Fortitude, it is true, deals with the objects 
 of the senses : and the objects of the senses are 
 likewise the objects of Legal Right and Obligation. 
 Phsed. 66. b. d. Rep. 373, d. e., 580, d. e. But the 
 coincidence is accidental. Fortitude regards the ob- 
 jects of the senses, as provocatives of Desire and of 
 Fear; but it is a Desire and a Fear which call us to 
 self-discipline and not to outward social movement. 
 From the Platonic point of view, the Temptation in the 
 Desert was in the highest degree an exercise of the 
 Four Platonic Virtues ; and a life so spent is at least, 
 conceivable. Platonic Justice — "Self-reverence, self- 
 knowledge, self-controul'' — is in one sense self-regarding, 
 and must necessarily be so. But the associations 
 connected with the word self, are so inveterate, that 
 the notion sought to be conveyed is more clearly 
 marked out by the negative — fton-soczal. 
 
 II. The Second argument is based on the immediate 
 differences of the several Pleasures attached to the 
 three faculties ; — that is Pleasures regarded as pleasures 
 simply without reference either to their ethical value, 
 or to their metaphysical properties. The pleasures of 
 the Rational element are derived, not only from abstract 
 science in its modern sense, but also from knowledge in 
 
12 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 its high Platonic meaning, viz. the contemplative study 
 of Real Existence, and the gradual approach to ethical 
 Perfection, which Justice ensures. The pleasures of 
 Emotion are derived from Emulation, Ambition, and 
 Admiration both active and passive : while the pleasures 
 of Appetite flow from attaining the objects of the 
 Senses, and in the second instance from the means of 
 indulging them — Wealth and Power devoted to luxury. 
 Now as we have three pleasures, we have three kinds 
 of pleasure-hunters, the Lover of Truth, the Lover of 
 Honour, and the Lover of Means or Money. Who is 
 to decide between the three, as each of the three stands 
 up for his own pursuit? The Lover of Truth — the 
 Philosopher only. He alone has tried all three ; he 
 alone has tasted the pleasures of satisfied Intelligence, 
 of satisfied Emotion, and of satisfied Sense: while the 
 Lover of Honour only knows the two last, and the 
 Lover of Luxury the last only. The Lover of Truth 
 having compared all three as pleasures simply, gives 
 the first place to the pleasures of Reason, the second to 
 the pleasures of Emotion, and the third to the pleasures 
 of Sense. To prefer one pleasure to another requires a 
 knowledge of both. This principle, which is of the 
 greatest importance in the Platonic Ethics, is the 
 second argument on behalf of Justice. 
 
 III. The Third Argument is built on the differences 
 in pleasures, scientifically analysed and ranged ac- 
 cording to their objective properties. The pleasures of 
 the rational faculties differ from the others in being 
 both Real and Pure; each word having a technical 
 meaning. They are Real, because they are derived 
 from Real Existence, and from Supreme Perfection ; 
 they are real likewise, because they do not owe their 
 brilliancy to contrast, but shine with their own light. 
 They are Pure, i.e. unmixed with pain, because, neither 
 in their beginning nor in their consequences are they 
 connected with pain. On the other hand, the pleasures 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 1 3 
 
 of Emotion and of Sense are essentially alleviations of 
 a painful want, and owe much of their piquancy to 
 Contrast. So great is the force of Contrast, that the 
 bare Cessation of pain appears positively pleasant and 
 the reaction from excitement, positively irksome, when 
 each is contrasted with the preceding condition. We 
 have, moreover, an experiment (by way of Variation) 
 which is in favour of the pleasures of the higher organ. 
 The pleasures of Ambition and the pleasures of Sense, 
 are better secured the more they are pursued under the 
 guidance of Reason and Calculation. Rational pleasure 
 is therefore adjudged the Prize, by the only competent 
 tribunal, and by the admission of adversaries. And this 
 is the third argument in support of Justice pitted against 
 Injustice — the heaviest of the three falls which Plato's 
 champion gives his opponent. There only remains to 
 see him the crowned and honoured of man and God. 
 But with his subsequent career we have nothing to do. 
 
 It will be seen that the threefold argument in behalf 
 of Justice, forms one systematic whole. The first is 
 from the nature of the Faculties. The third is from the 
 nature of the Objects of the faculties, and the second is 
 from the Results of union between faculties and objects. 
 Now, as we only know a faculty in relation to its 
 object, and in the results arising froni the union of 
 both. Rep. 5. 477. d., it is plain that each argument 
 implies the other two. The threefold argument conse- 
 quently exhibits Justice complete in all its parts, 
 Faculty, Object, and Result. And Platonic Justice as 
 we have seen is, in the first instance, essentially 
 non-social. It is intrinsic in its structure, its material, 
 and always, though not exclusively, in its purpose. In 
 its course it comes in contact with a social atmosphere, 
 but its limb only is immersed. 
 
 But it will also be seen that the more Justice in the 
 Platonic sense is realised, the more completely will 
 Justice in the common sense be carried into practice. 
 
14 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Fortitude, the first step to inner Justice, deals with the 
 objects of the senses — Bodily States. Rep. ^. 429. c. d., 
 442. c. The Platonic equivalents comprehend also 
 Wealth and Power. Now, these are the baits which 
 lure men to infringe the rights of others, and give rise 
 to wars and seditions. PhcBdo. 66. c. Rep. II. 373. d. e., 
 IX. 586. a. b. It follows therefore that Fortitude, in pro- 
 portion to its efficacy, will insure a due regard for the 
 duties we owe to others. Consequently, Platonic Justice 
 will secure civic Justice, but always accidentally. 
 
 Plato's account of the origin of certain of the virtues 
 tends in the same direction. Fortitude, Temperance, 
 and Justice are in some respects analogous to bodily 
 ; qualities ; they are the creatures of training and of 
 j habit. Rep. 7. 518. d. e. On the other hand, every 
 human soul possesses the faculty of intellectual intuition, 
 (f)p6v7j(TL<^ — Prudence. The intuitive power is equal in 
 all men, and at all times. Rep. 7. 518. c. e., the strength 
 of the instrument is always unimpaired, but the field of 
 vision may be more or less obstructed. Hence the 
 I object of ethical discipline is to minimise obstruction, 
 and allow the prudential organ full range. But this is 
 done by Fortitude, which reduces to the lowest point, 
 the influence of the various bodily states. And 
 Fortitude is the first step to the other virtues. That 
 discipline therefore which maximises Fortitude, Tem- 
 perance and Justice, will minimise the attractions of 
 sensual pleasure, and the allurements of Wealth and 
 Power. Such discipline therefore will ensure a regard 
 for our social duties. Plato's view of Prudence, as 
 contrasted with the other Virtues, finds expression in 
 his doctrines, "No one is willingly bad;" "Virtue is 
 Science." It also gives his answer to the famous 
 question. Is virtue teachable? Prudence is not: the 
 other virtues are. 
 
 Now the word Justice, — Regularity par excellence — 
 expresses a certain condition of the inner man, which 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 15 
 
 accidentally may be one of the antecedents to the overt 
 observance of the rights of others, and Plato thinks it 
 the best and most effectual. Rep. 465, b. And this 
 antecedent — Regularity par excellence — he calls "real'* 
 Justice. But the observance of social duties may 
 proceed from other motives beside such Regularity. 
 And the observance of social duties from any other 
 motive except Regularity, he calls Seeming, as opposed 
 to Real. But it would be a mistake to suppose that 
 " Seeming" must mean sham. " Seeming" in Plato — 
 noun and verb — expresses the whole Material Creation ; 
 everything subject to the law of Cause and Effect, in 
 short all the objects of sensible perception. Rep, V. 476, 
 to end; VI. 510, a. 534, a. In this way "Seeming" is 
 opposed to "Being" — invisible intelligible Reality, 
 which is not subject to the law of Antecedence and 
 Consequence. So we find the Antithesis, — Being and 
 Seeming — in Plato's Ethics, as well as in his Meta 
 physics. Hence Real Justice is a certain invisible 
 condition of the inner life, and "Seeming Justice 
 comprehends all the overt acts and consequences to 
 which the invisible condition may, in its turn, among 
 other antecedents, give rise. But Seeming Justice is 
 not necessarily hypocrisy. Hypocrisy, it is true, is the 
 crowning accomplishment of Glauco's client; for it is 
 the worst case of seeming. Rep. II. 361, a. But although 
 the hypocrite assumes the trappings of the just man, 
 the just man has, notwithstanding, the better right 
 to wear them. Glauco's client — the accomplished 
 hypocrite — would scrupulously discharge the duties 
 necessary to sustain his part ; the typical Guardian in 
 the Fair City would discharge all his duties. The 
 former would " seem" just ; the latter would both "be" 
 and "seem" just. In fact, the tenth book of the 
 
 i.epublic recounts the " seeming" effects of Justice, 
 he Just man holds office : he marries and gives in 
 — 
 
 h 
 
1 6 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 effects of Justice. Rep. lo. 612, d— 613, c. There is, 
 therefore, nothing contemptuous in Plato's use of the 
 term Seeming Justice, as Mr. Grote imagines. Vol. III., 
 p. 137. In fact, the passage in the Laws, which he 
 quotes as contradicting the views of " seeming" Justice 
 in the Republic, exactly confirms what is contended 
 for here. Correct estimate from others is to be prized 
 on account of its connection with Stirling worth, " but 
 not otherwise," says Plato. Legg. 12, 950, c. Mr. Grote's 
 critique totally ignores the real meaning of " seeming" 
 and " being" ; an Antithesis w^hich we know from 
 Aristotle gave birth to Platonism. Metaphys. A. 6. M. 4. 
 Mr. Grote was probably misled by Glauco's case, where 
 hypocrisy is introduced as the crowning vice. But 
 Plato as usual makes the most marked species stand 
 for the genus. At all events, to ignore the proper force 
 of "seeming," is in a Platonic critic, an error in 
 digestione prima. 
 
 It appears, then, that the term rendered Justice, 
 properly expresses Regularity, and is in this sense 
 strictly applicable to analogous conditions of Polities 
 and of Individuals. It also appears that a certain 
 particular polity — the typical Fair City — is introduced 
 to illustrate the condition of the typical individual, and 
 not vice versa. It also appears that the particular 
 condition of the individual is a certain invisible 
 arrangement of the inmost faculties, which is called 
 by Plato Real Justice, and opposed to Seeming Justice. 
 It also appears that Seeming Justice comprehends 
 every overt observance of social duties of which Law 
 and Ethics take cognisance ; and that Real and Seeming 
 Justice may co-exist in the same individual. And, 
 finally, it appears that Platonic Justice guarantees civic 
 Justice most effectually, but always accidentally. When 
 we come to consider Mr. Grote's criticisms, these con- 
 conclusions will, it is hoped, bear fruit. 
 /'Tlie question in debate between Glauco and Socrates 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 1 7 
 
 may now be re-stated with advantage. "The overt \ 
 consequences of Justice are desirable and nothing else/' 3 
 says Vox Populi. " If so/' says Glauco, " the condition of 
 the just-doer, which is the antecedent to these desirable 
 consequences, must be undesirable.'' " Not so," replies 
 Socrates, "laying out of count all the overt consequences 
 you mention, the antecedent may, under certain con- 
 ditions, evolve certain other consequences, which are 
 invisible and uncommunicable, and these fresh conse- 
 quences may be preeminently desirable." "If so," 
 says Glauco, " Vox Populi is wrong. Justice is de- 
 sirable in itself and in its consequences ; Justice is 
 good both in Being and in Seeming, intus et in cute. 
 How may we generate this new set of consequents ?" 
 
 Let us now hear Mr. Grote : — ^* The opponents, i 
 whom the Platonic Socrates seeks to confute, held I 
 that Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the ( C- 
 Agent, but indispensable in order to ensure him just 
 dealing and estimation from others — that injustice is a, 
 path in itself easy and inviting to the Agent, but 
 necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance 
 of securing Justice from others, and draws upon himself 
 hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine 
 (argues Plato) represents the advantages of Justice to 
 the just Agent, as arising, not from his being actually 
 just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reported 
 by others to be so ; in like manner it represents the 
 misery of injustice to the unjust Agent as arising, not 
 from his being actually unjust, but from his being 
 reputed so by others. The inference which a man will 
 naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, that he must M, 
 aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in 
 reality (Rep. IL, 366. c.) ; that he must seek to avoid 
 the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality ; that 
 the mode of life most enviable is to be unjust in reality, 
 but just in seeming ; to study the means of decoying 
 others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing 
 
 c 
 
V 
 
 1 8 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 / Others into submission to your injustice. This indeed 
 / cannot be done, unless you are strong or artful ; if you 
 / are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you 
 / can do is to be just. The weak alone are gainers 
 I by Justice, the strong are losers by it, and gainers by 
 I Injustice. 
 
 These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and 
 Adeimantus are made to argue) from the doctrine 
 . preached by fathers to their children that the obliga- 
 tions of Justice are in themselves onerous to the just 
 Agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine 
 just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato 
 means not that fathers, in exhorting their children 
 actually drew these corollaries, but that if they had 
 followed out their doctrine consistently, they would 
 have drawn them ; and that there is no way of escaping 
 them except by adopting the doctrine of the Platoni c 
 Socratesj^That Justice is in itself a source of happiness 
 to the just Agent, and Injustice a source of misery 
 to the unjust Agent, however each of them may be 
 esteemed or treated by others. 
 
 Now upon this we may observe, that Plato from 
 anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially 
 I true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be 
 ' obviated by precautions, has endeavoured to accredit 
 a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and 
 standing conditions of social life. Among these con- 
 ditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most 
 fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches 
 to the services which a man renders, called duties or 
 obligations, and the services which he receives from 
 others, called his rights, is alike obvious and unde- 
 niable. Each individual has both duties and rights ; 
 '■ each individual is both an Agent towards others, 
 [ and a Patient or Sentient from others. He is 
 required to be just towards others, they are required 
 to be just towards him ; he, in his actions, must have 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 1 9 
 
 regard (within certain limits) to their comfort and 
 security; they in their actions must have regard to 
 his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also 
 rights towards them ; or (which is the same thing) they 
 have obligations towards him. Ifpunishment is requisite 
 to deter him from doing wrong towards them, it is 
 equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to 
 him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating 
 it as a connected system including different individual 
 agents, must accept this Reciprocity as a fundamental 
 condition. The rights and obligations of each towards 
 the rest must form inseparable and correlative parts of 
 the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by us 
 according to his works, and must be able to reckon 
 beforehand on being so dealt with : — on escaping injury 
 and hurt, and securing Justice from others, if he behave 
 justly towards them. The theory supposes that whether 
 just or unjust, he will appear to others as he really is, 
 and will be appreciated accordingly. 
 
 The fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures, 
 adopted this doctrine of Reciprocity, and built upon it 
 their exhortations to their children, " Be just to others ; 
 without that condition you cannot expect that they will 
 be just to you." Plato objects to their doctrine, on the 
 ground that it assumed Justice to be onerous to the just 
 Agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the evading 
 of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of 
 extorting or stealing the valuable consequent without 
 earning it fairly. Persons acting thus unfairly would 
 efface Reciprocity by taking away the antecedent. 
 Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up a counter- 
 doctrine which effaces Reciprocity by removing the 
 Consequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that 
 if I am just towards others, I shall be happy in and 
 through that single circumstance, and that I ought not 
 to care whether they behave justly or not towards me. 
 Reciprocity thus disappears. The authoritative terms 
 
 c 2 
 
20 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 right and obligation lose all their specific meaning." 
 Vol. III., p. 135-7. ^ 
 
 Considered as a stricture on the main thesis of the 
 Republic, Mr. Grote's objections amount to this ; first, 
 that the mode, in which Plato brings on the question, 
 misrepresents the popular belief; and second, that the 
 popular belief, unlike Plato's counter-doctrine, embodies 
 a matter of fact, which is the fundamental condition of 
 society, and which Plato's doctrine completely effaces. 
 
 As to the way in which Plato states the question, it 
 would be hard to find one better fitted to put the point 
 at issue in the strongest light. In this way: — The 
 subject of the Dialogue is Justice. What is Justice ? 
 In the first Book, various definitions are rejected, not 
 only because they are inadequate, but mainly because 
 the method employed is vicious. We were inquiring 
 into the accidents and consequences of Justice before 
 we found out what Justice was in itself. Let us begin 
 again. Let us insulate Justice ; let us cut off all 
 communication between it and the outer world, and 
 watch the effects which it, when thus insulated, produces 
 on the inner life of the Agent. Rep. 358, b. ; 366, e. ; 
 367, e. ; 368, c. ; 612, b. ; 614, a. Justice is now insulated, 
 and Socrates is ready to begin, but Adimantus is not 
 satisfied, so he deduces from the popular belief the most 
 extreme possible consequences, puts them together as the 
 legitimate result of its real, though covert, tendencies, 
 and in this shape the subject is brought forward. 
 
 Is not the experiment crucial ? A is generally found 
 along with a set of circumstances, B. X, which is the 
 opposite of A, is generally found along with another 
 set, Y. B is always pleasant ; Y is always unpleasant. 
 We want to know what A is like without B. Now if 
 A is known, X is likewise known : since A and X 
 are opposites. We therefore insulate A from B, and 
 plunge it, so prepared, into a new set of conditions. 
 Now, of new conditions the most novel possible is Y, 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 21 
 
 for Y being unpleasant is the opposite of the old set, 
 B, which is pleasant. Unless we do this, we cannot 
 tell if A by itself is pleasant or not. And if A, when 
 in contact with Y, still manifests pleasant properties, 
 we may be certain that it is pleasant in itself. At the 
 same time, this is by no means saying that A would 
 not be better if accompanied by its old attendant, B. 
 But it is precisely because B is pleasant that we 
 require the experiment. We must disguise the Princess 
 to test the disinterestedness of her suitors. 
 
 So, when fathers exhort their children to pursue A 
 solely on account of B, and to shun X solely on 
 account of Y, teaching at the same time that X is 
 as pleasant as A is unpleasant (if not more so), young 
 Athens may naturally argue, to the astonishment of 
 his father. Rep. 2. 365, "Your old-fashioned drug is, 
 you admit, nauseous in the extreme, but my new specific 
 has all the effects of yours, and is besides remarkably 
 pleasant to the palate ; with your permission I shall 
 use the new." Glaucous client accordingly — incarnate 
 Injustice — typifies the extreme case of the popular 
 theory. And an extreme case is the logician's proof 
 charge. 
 
 A word as to Plato's two types. All writers on 
 abstract subjects put out of consideration, for the time 
 being, all counteracting agencies. They state tendencies 
 only. Ethical writers accordingly, to shew what a 
 given motive is taken singly, assume that a man is 
 actuated by no other ; the hungry man is all hunger, 
 and the benevolent man all benevolence, like Dickens's 
 oddities with a single point. Now, Plato does what all 
 ethical writers do, but he does it in a livelier way. As 
 an ethical speculator, he wishes to contrast the best 
 motive with all other motives. As an artist, he 
 personifies the best motive, and presents us with the 
 Guardian of Callipolis. Rep. VII. 549, b. Other motives 
 are not the best. They may, therefore, be the worst. 
 
22 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Accordingly, Plato selects the worst, clothes it with 
 flesh and blood, and introduces us to the client of 
 GlauGO. — Tyranny in little — Injustice incarnate. Now 
 in real life, men act from mixed motives ; no one is as 
 bad as Glauco's proteg^. Rep. I., 352. c, and the Fair 
 City is not yet on Earth. But the mixture of motives 
 in practice is no reason why an ethical writer should 
 not separate motives in theory. On the contrary, the 
 mixture of motives in practice is just the reason why 
 they must be separated in theory. And such a separa- 
 tion, when personified, is a type. 
 
 Plato, therefore, does not, as Mr. Grote appears to 
 convey, tender us his two types as practical alternatives. 
 As a practical moralist he does not say "Be Hyperion, 
 if not, you must be the Satyr." No, as a practical 
 moralist he teaches us to maximise Hyperion, and 
 minimise the Satyr. But as an ethical experimenter, 
 he wishes to study the two types in their fullest perfec- 
 tion, and under new conditions. He therefore transposes 
 the usual concomitants of each. He joins the best 
 inward motives to the worst outward circumstances, 
 and the worst inward motives to the best outward 
 circumstances, and Glauco and his brother are his 
 assistants in the Inversion of the Experiment. The 
 question, therefore, owes its alternative form, not to 
 Plato's "anxiety to escape consequences," but to 
 Plato's anxiety to elicit conclusions ; to the skill of 
 the Analyst, and not to the one-sided rhetoric of the 
 preacher. Grote III., 158., vid. e. contra. Rep. X. 612 ; 
 b. c. ; V, 472, c. ; II. p. 361, a. b ; 363, a. ; 367, b. 
 
 Mr. Grote's next charge is that Plato endeavours to 
 accredit a fiction which misrepresents the constant 
 
 / phenomena and standing conditions of social life. 
 Glauco's client and Plato's Guardian are both wrong, 
 and the popular creed is right. Society depends on 
 Reciprocity. Reciprocity expresses the correlation of 
 
 ^ Payment and Receipt as antecedent and consequent. 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 23 
 
 Plato's parody of the popular creed effaces Reciprocity 
 by taking away the Antecedent : Glauco's^feend will 
 not pay, but insists on being paid; cui^^^er pays 
 himself. Plato in correcting him sets up a counter- 
 doctrine, which effaces Reciprocity by removing the 
 Consequent. Plato affects to derive such pleasure from 
 Payment that he can afford to dispense with Receipt. 
 In either case one of the two props is removed, and 
 society comes to the ground. 
 
 The answer is obvious. Platonic Justice, the subject 
 of the main thesis of the Republic, has, in the first 
 instance, nothing to do with Reciprocity, and therefore! 
 cannot efface it. But in the second instance, so far as I 
 Platonic Justice deals with Reciprocity, Platonic Justice I 
 is its strongest support, as far as such security can be \ 
 unilateral. The two cases must be separately considered, j 
 
 I. Justice in the first instance^ as it regards the agent. 
 Platonic Justice — Typical Virtue — is essentially one. 
 This requires explanation. Prudence, Fortitude, Tem- 
 perance, and Justice, are Qualities, which co-exist so 
 inseparably, that we cannot apprehend any One, 
 without at the same time apprehending the other | 
 Three. This can be proved. The proof rests on the ' 1 
 complex fact, that while Reason on the one hand is 
 fitted to direct Appetite, Appetite on the other is not 
 fitted to direct Reason. This is all we want. This 
 single fact contains the four inseparable Qualities. 
 
 Because ; a thing directing implies a thing directed, 
 and both together a relation between them, as directing 
 and directed. The three moments are therefore in- 
 separable, any given One implying the other Two. 
 
 In the present case, the thing directing is Reason, 
 and the thing directed is Appetite. Now Reason, di- 
 recting Appetite, is the ethical Quality, PRUDENCE. 
 
 But Appetite looks two opposite ways. On the one 
 side, it regards outer objects ; on the other, the Agent's 
 self. Now, Appetite directed by Reason, and lookingf ^ 
 
24 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 outwards, is the ethical Quality, FORTITUDE ; and 
 
 ; so directed and looking inwards, the ethical Quality, 
 
 ' TEMPERANCE. That is, the directing Reason is 
 
 Prudence, and the directed Appetite, both Fortitude 
 
 and Temperance. 
 
 Consequently, Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance 
 discharge each their special functions. But, since the 
 three qualities are inseparable, and since the three — 
 each and all — discharge their special functions, we 
 have the three Qualities uniting in the one ethical 
 Quality, JUSTICE, and the one Quality Justice coin- 
 ■^ciding with the ethical Total, VIRTUE. The three 
 just Qualities converge to Virtue ; Virtue diverges to the 
 three just Qualities. Virtue is a "Whole as opposed to 
 a Sum of Parts. Justice is a Sum of Parts as opposed 
 to a Whole. Justice, in a word, is Virtue in parts, and 
 Virtue is Justice complete. The notions are equivalent, 
 but not identical. 
 
 But since Justice is Division of Labour, and since 
 Virtue is Justice as a whole. Virtue must be some 
 Quality by which the Agent discharges his special 
 function [Rep. IV., 433. d-). Now to discharge a special 
 function implies some fitness, as a matter of fact. And 
 such fitness may, according to Plato, be discerned in 
 everything, whether it be an organic whole, such as a 
 man, or a horse, or an organic part, such as an eye or 
 a limb ; or an inorganic implement, such as a pruning- 
 hook, or the like [Rep. I., 352. e.). Consequently Virtue 
 -is the Efiiciency of Fitness. Human Virtue is therefore 
 the Efiiciency which results from the fitness of the 
 Agent for his special function. But the special function 
 indicated by the relation of Reason and Appetite, is 
 Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance. 
 
 Justice, thus being a relation between Reason and 
 Appetite, must be intrinsic. And likewise its opposite. 
 Injustice. This may be seen in the eighth and ninth 
 books. The four types of Injustice — the four Unjust 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 25 
 
 Men — have a family likeness. In each of the four some 
 motive, which is not wholly rational, has gained, more 
 or less, the upper hand. Either Sentiment or Sense 
 has acquired ascendancy. And the political sketches 
 which accompany the portraits illustrate disunion at 
 home and not intervention from abroad, (cf. Rep. VIII. 
 547. c, with 550, b. ; 552, a., with 553, d. e; 557, a., 
 with 561, c. d. ; 567, d., with 573, c). Therefore Platonic . 
 Justice and Platonic Injustice are relations between / 
 Reason and Appetite; and as such they must be 
 intrinsic. 
 
 Now Reciprocity means the correlation of Duty and 
 Right — of Payment and Receipt. This has been ad- 
 mirably set forth by Mr. Grote. But Duty is merely 
 one man's Liability to penalty at the hands of another ; \ 
 and Right is the Power which exacts it. Therefore 
 Plato's Justice and Mr. Grote's Reciprocity have nothing 
 in common. 
 
 II. Justice in the second instance as regarding society. 
 Here we have two cases : Platonic justice in the ideal 
 Society ; and Platonic justice in a Society which recog- 
 nises Private Rights. Rep. 464. c. ' \ 
 
 The ideal Society required is one in which no ' 
 antagonistic elements appear, all such having been 
 previously either utilised or nullified. We cannot 
 therefore argue against such a society, because some 
 other exhibits the elements of antagonism in full play. 
 But, although Mr. Grote elsewhere (p. 219.) vindicates 
 the Republic against such objections, yet he falls into 
 them himself when he argues, from the actual efficacy 
 of Reciprocity, against Platonic justice. 
 
 Now Plato recognizes Reciprocity even in his ideal 
 Cityo He did not therefore intend his own justice to 
 act in place of Reciprocity. 
 
 His Guardians are supported by the State, and have \ 
 no private property. They are therefore placed above ' 
 the wants and temptations of ordinary life. They have 
 
26 • THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 finoreover undergone a long and special training for 
 ■ office, and are duly honoured in their own Republic. 
 
 But, even so, the Guardian is reluctant to take part 
 in politics, and submits to the necessity. Rep. 7. 540. b., 
 only because his private happiness must yield to that of 
 the community. Rep. 420, b. He knows, moreover, that 
 the very existence of his caste is identified with that of 
 the Fair City. Rep. 499, b. 540, b. And the Guardian, 
 who from selfish motives deserts his order, will soon 
 find reason to bewail his short-sightedness. 466, a. b. 
 Plato, therefore, did not wish his Justice should even in 
 the Republic supersede the ordinary motives to Outlay. 
 And the fact, that some of the receipts come in at once, 
 does not annihilate the real unpleasantness of Outlay 
 in itself. But, so far as Platonic Justice supplies an 
 additional motive to outlay, so far it lessens the un- 
 pleasantness of the sacrifice. The ordinary motive to 
 outlay is the hope of receipt; and Platonic justice is a 
 pressure in the same direction. 
 
 In an ordinary society, where private rights are 
 established, and Reciprocity consequently covers all 
 the dealings between man and man, it is obvious that 
 Platonic Justice is a new motive towards Payment. So 
 far, therefore, as Payment is likely to attract Receipt, 
 and so keep up Reciprocity, Platonic Justice strengthens 
 that prop of society which rests on the agent's private ' 
 interest. Platonic Justice ensures the doing unto others 
 what they ought to do in return, but the prospect of 
 return is neither its sole nor chief motive. 
 
 Plato, it is true, speaks of the uselessness in actual 
 life of the Searcher after truth, and the Searcher after 
 truth is the only man who has any notion of scientific 
 Justice. But his uselessness is not his fault, the blame 
 rests with those who do not see his value, and will not 
 listen to his counsels. Rep. 489. b. Now the admitted 
 uselessness to Society of the Searcher after truth 
 suggests the question, "What value did Plato set on 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 27 
 
 the man who acted up to his lights, but knew nothing 
 of scientific justice ? 
 
 Mr. Mill, following Mr. Grote, puts the following 
 case as an ad ahsurdu7n of the Platonic doctrine : — 
 " In the Republic, the excellence and inherent felicity 
 of the just life are as impressively insisted on and 
 enforced by arguments of greater substance. But, as 
 Mr. Grote justly remarks, those arguments, even if 
 conclusive, are addressed to the wrong point; for the 
 life they suppose is not that of the simply just man, 
 but of the philosopher. They are not applicable to the 
 typical just man, to such a person as Aristeides, who is 
 no dialectician, soars to no speculative heights, and is 
 no nearer than other people to a Vision of the Self- 
 existent Ideas, but who, at every personal sacrifice, 
 persistently acts up to the rules of virtue acknowledged 
 by the worthiest of his countrymen. It is not obvious, 
 what place there was for Aristeides in the Platonic 
 theory of Virtue, nor how he was to be adjusted to the 
 doctrine of Plato and of the historical Sokrates that 
 Virtue is a branch of knowledge, and that no one is 
 Tuijust willingly. Aristeides probably had the same 
 notions of justice as his contemporaries, and could as 
 little as any of them have answered Sokratic interro- 
 gatories by a definition of it, which would have been 
 proof against all objections. The conformity of his 
 will to it, the never being unjust willingly, was probably 
 the chief moral difference between him and ordinary 
 men. Plato might indeed have said that Aristeides 
 had the most indispensable point of knowledge — he 
 knew that the just man must be the happiest. But 
 Aristeides was not the kind of man of whom Plato M^^ 
 more or less successfully, proved this ; and the true ) 
 Platonic doctrine is that it is impossible to be just, / 
 without knowing (in the high Platonic meaning of/ 
 knowledge) what Justice is." — Essays, Vol. III., 340-1. 
 
 Now, in actual life, motives are mixed. Rep. 500. c. d. 
 
y 
 
 2^ THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 I We do not generally act from one single motive, and 
 most motives are not the best. The man who falls 
 seven times a day is not as perfect as the faultless 
 type who does not fall once. He is not, therefore, 
 typically just, but he has fewer falls than he who falls 
 seventy-seven times. To call Aristides the justest man 
 in Athens meant that Aristides was more sure-footed 
 than the rest of the Athenians, not that he never 
 stumbled. 
 
 Now the case of a man like Aristides must have 
 presented itself to Plato. The noble line of Aeschylus, 
 which the full theatre applied to Aristides, is referred 
 to in the Republic, and serves as the text of the 
 discourse. It embodies the Platonic antithesis of 
 "being and seeming" in a single verse. Aristides, 
 therefore, in the technical language of the treatise 
 would be represented by the Timocratic man — the best 
 man under existing circumstances. He is elsewhere 
 specially alluded to. 
 
 The motives of such a man are golden in the main : 
 there is, however, an ingredient of silver, but nothing 
 base. 550. b. He is guided by Reason, but Reason is 
 alloyed with Sentiment, and so far he falls short of the 
 purity of the standard type. Rep. 8. 548 — 9. 
 
 In the Laws, Plato, when discussing the rationale of 
 a Penal Code, and therefore aiming at practical objects, 
 adheres to the views expounded in the Republic. Justice 
 does not consist in benefits conferred, nor does Injustice 
 consist in damage inflicted, but in the settled character 
 of the Agent and in the modus operandi, as opposed to 
 the consequences of his actions. Even though he cause 
 damage, his Justice is saved whole, provided he acts 
 from regard to what he judges will be best. Legg. 9, 
 864. a. Aristides, then, was just in the popular sense, 
 but not in the ideal. Although he fell short of the ideal 
 Type, he indefinitely approached it, and was so far 
 just. 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 29 
 
 Like other ethical writers Plato formed an ideal oF~ 
 
 Justice and Happiness. From this ideal every human 
 being deviates more or less. Rep. 500. d., 546. a. 
 Between the Extremes — the least and the greatest 
 deviation — there are infinite degrees, 445, c. Of these 
 Plato selects Four which he describes at length, — the 
 Four great Epochs in the Decline and Fall. To this 
 description he devotes the whole of his eighth book 
 and the half of his ninth ; besides warning us of his 
 intentions at the close of his fourth. We are constantly 
 told of Plato's artistic skill ; in the eyes of many, the 
 only merit he possesses. Yet according to Mr. Grote 
 and Mr. Mill, Plato devoted nearly a fifth of his master- 
 piece to describing what on his own showing could 
 possibly have no existence — namely. Degrees in practical 
 Justice. According to Mr. Grote and Mr. Mill, Plato 
 was bound in consistency to bracket Aristides with 
 Archelaus. 
 
 We may illustrate the working of Platonic Justice \ 
 in actual life by an example from la petite morale, \ 
 suggested by a passage in the Republic, 484. d. A man \ 
 by being polite generally secures civility in return ; 1 
 and this is the motive expressed by the proverb 
 "civility costs nothing," implying that it brings in a 1 
 great deal. But in addition to the Vulgar Motive, some 
 people are polite, because politeness comes from within ; / 
 because they could not be otherwise without forfeiting 
 self-respect. Now the latter motive is the more efficient 
 of the two. But are the two motives incompatible ? 
 And if the truly well-bred man does not always receive 
 a return in kind for his civility, is he thereby precluded 
 from reminding his inferior of Reciprocity by a quid 
 pro quo ? And may not, what is true of the smaller, be 
 likewise true of the greater Code r 425. a. 
 
 The Just man will, in Plato's opinion, regard Reci- 
 procity as the means of satisfying such necessary wants 
 as are not deleterious, 559. b., but when his payments/ 
 
30 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 are all made, and his receipts all gathered in, he has 
 another account to look to, one in which he is both his 
 own Debtor and his own Creditor, and of which the 
 items are Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice. 
 And even supposing the worst comes to the worst, 
 that his income is interrupted, he can still contemplate 
 with satisfaction the balance in his favour in the Grand 
 Account. 
 
 If this estimate of the Platonic Ethics be correct, it 
 is obvious that Reciprocity — the Seeming Justice of the 
 Dialogue — is but the occasion, the accidental occasion, 
 of the Platonic Fortitude, the most outward of the 
 Platonic Quality. Fortitude, the peculiar meaning of 
 which in Plato must not be forgotten, will fully insure 
 the observance on our part of our duty to others. But 
 this is not its sole office. Fortitude gives occasion to 
 Temperance, and Temperance in its turn gives Justice 
 room to work, each and all being organised by directing 
 Prudence. Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and 
 Justice on the one hand, may be considered as overt 
 modes of Reciprocity. Phcedo, 69. a. Prudence, Forti- 
 tude, Temperance, and Justice, on the other hand may 
 be considered as inward principles of action, and 
 permanent objects of reflex thought. The relation 
 betw^ them, when so distinguished, is slight, and 
 slight as it is, accidental only. "We cannot therefore 
 argue from one sphere to the other — from tfee Mutual 
 relation of the constituents of the former, to the Mutual 
 relation of the constituents of the latter. But this is 
 what Mr. Grote does. We may, however, see that the 
 principle of Reciprocity does not, in the first instance, 
 come in contact with Platonic justice at all, while so 
 far as they are related in the second instance. Reci- 
 procity is strengthened by Platonic justice, which 
 supports itself. So much for the fiction which Plato 
 is so anxious to accredit. 
 
 Some points about Plato's ethical champion — the 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 3 1 
 
 just man — deserve notice and bring out most strongly 
 the Platonic view of Morality. A modern writers 
 describing the virtuous man struggling with misfortune \ 
 and worsted in the strife, would be sure to dwell on I 
 the consolation he derived from the approval of his 
 conscience. He was beaten, it was true, but he had ■ 
 fought a good fight, and that consoled him. Of this, 
 there is not a word in the Republic, unless, which is 
 possible, it is included in the sense of internal harmony, 
 which the just man feels. But the point on which - — 
 Plato dwells is, not that the just man having acted 
 justly, consoles himself with the thought that he did 
 act justly. On the contrary, although the just man acts 
 in the first instance proprio motu, he yet thereby secures 
 his retreat to a distinct class of positive pleasures, which 
 make up his mental pabulum, and which cannot be cut 
 off. Had he acted unjustly, these pleasures would have 
 been intercepted. Just conduct is the price — the paltry 
 price — of the internal harmony, and of the spectacle to 
 which it admits him — the intuition of Reality. 
 
 Neither is the Platonic Morality emotional or senti- 
 mental. Both Emotion and Sentiment are some of the 
 raw materials of Morality in the hands of Prudence, 
 but Plato holds that to be ruled by sentiment is one 
 evil only, second to being ruled by the Senses. 
 Rep. 586., c. d. 
 
 /In one sense therefore — and that in the strictest — 
 ''^Plato's Morality is one of Calculation. In the Republic, 
 the name given to the Moral Faculty, at least thirteen 
 ^ times, is that which calculates, reckons, adds up. Nor 
 is this metaphorical. That which counts is closely 
 connected with Number and Measure, which are not 
 only as with us, conditions of scientific exactness, but 
 also, in Plato's eyes, the Real Elements of Supreme 
 Perfection. 
 
 r But although the Platonic Morality is essentially 
 'one of calculation, it cannot be called either selfish or 
 
32 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 even self-regarding in the modern sense of the term. 
 Before we can employ the word self in the Platonic 
 ethics, we must free it from two notions, with which 
 modern speculation has connected it. These two 
 notions are the exclusion of the good of others, and 
 the modification of the Object by the Subject in 
 the relation Knowledge. As was before observed, 
 Platonic Justice is, in the first instance, non-social, but 
 in the second instance we have seen how Fortitude 
 ensures the good of others. And in the higher cogni- 
 tions, Plato held that the cognitive faculty sees (for 
 such is his favourite metaphor) the Object as it is, the 
 faculty itself remaining unchanged ; and, that the 
 Object continues unchanged in and during the process 
 of cognition. The unchangeableness of both Object 
 and Subject in the higher cognitions was his counter- 
 doctrine to the all-pervading Mutability of Heraclitus. 
 And the unchangeableness of both Terms in cognition 
 was carried through the Platonic Ethics. We are 
 consequently freed from some questions which perplex 
 modern speculation, as to the nature of the Moral 
 Faculty, and its mode of procedure. These two ques- 
 tions are obviated by Plato's doctrine of cognition. 
 The Subject, knowing the Object as it is, cannot but 
 know it, as it is : and the Subject knows the Object as 
 it is, because the Object continues unchanged. And 
 this is true, as well in the ethics as in the metaphysics 
 of Plato. 
 
 We have seen that Plato refuses to acknowledge 
 either the Emotions or the Senses as directors of 
 conduct. The Reason is therefore left in undisturbed 
 authority. When we act according to Reason ourselves, 
 or estimate from that point the conduct of others, the 
 question is narrowed to this : — What is the Criterion 
 of Morality ? In the words of Mr. Grote, " What is 
 the common property or point of similarity between 
 Prudence, Courage, Temperance, and Justice, by reason 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 33 
 
 of which each is termed Virtue ? What are the 
 characteristic points of difference, by reason of which 
 Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, some- 
 times another ?'' 
 
 Mr. Grote answers : — " Courage, Prudence, Temper- 
 ance, Justice — all of them mental attributes of rational 
 voluntary agents — have also the common property of 
 being absolutely essential to the life of the agent and 
 the maintenance of society ; and of being above that 
 degree tutelary against the sufferings, and beneficial 
 to the happiness of both. This tutelary or beneficent 
 tendency is the common objective property signified 
 by the general term Virtue, and is implicated with 
 the subjective property the sentiment of appro- 
 bation. The four opposite qualities are designated 
 by the general term Vice or Defect, connoting both 
 the maleficent tendency and the sentiment of dis- 
 approbation." Vol. 3. p. 455 — 7. 
 
 The tendencies, which Mr. Grote points out, would 
 not have been questioned by Plato. They are in fact 
 the subject of the second thesis of the Republic. Some 
 of them belong to the province of overt or " Seeming" 
 Justice, and some of them to the outward effects of 
 Fortitude. For, it is obvious that Fortitude, if perfectly 
 carried out, would supersede the sanctions of Positive 
 Law, Rep, 442, b. c; 429, b — ^d.; 430, a. b., and the minor 
 ofiices — la petite morale — would be fully observed. 
 Rep. 425. a. But the Platonic ethics do not regard 
 .these tendencies as the whole of ethics. 
 / That happiness — satisfaction of some kind — is our 
 'being's end and aim, Plato, like other writers, certainly 
 holds. Rep. 505, d — e. But whose happiness ? Un- 
 doubtedly, in the first instance, that of the Agent f] 
 himself: the happiness of the Agent is the basis of 
 the structure. In what does the Agent's happiness 
 consist ? In the pleasure resulting from systematic 
 development of all the Agent's faculties. Rep. 402, d. 
 
 D 
 
 / 
 
34 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 441, e — 442, a. 443, d. e. How is such development to 
 be ensured ? By Division of Labour — by confining each 
 faculty to its special function. Rep, 433, c. d. How 
 is that function to be ascertained ? By studying each 
 faculty in relation to its appropriate object — in a word, 
 by Psychology. 436, b — e. And the preliminary investi- 
 gation completed, the ethical calculator will arrange 
 the several items according to their scientific value, his 
 Organon being Experience and Reasoning. He will 
 make use of that test which every system of ethics must 
 make use of, — which every one who judges another's 
 conduct must make use of — the difference of pleasures 
 in kind. 
 
 Human conduct has two aspects with each of which 
 ethical science is bound to deal. Modern Utilitarianism 
 dwells on that common tendency of the four ethical 
 qualities, which is overt and more obvious. Plato 
 dwells mainly, as his argument required, but not ex- 
 clusively, on that common tendency, which is unseen 
 but more important. With the modern, the Motive 
 does not affect the ethical quality of the Action ; wdth \ 
 \ Plato the Motive is everything — the Motive considered, ; 
 not as the antecedent of Action, but as the index of th^ 
 condition of the Agent. The Greek, filled with a 
 higher sense of individual dignity, regarded conduct in 
 its immediate relation to the all-important unit — the 
 full member of the polity founded by the Gods and 
 Heroes whose blood he claimed ; the modern, in a more 
 amiable but less lofty spirit, merges his individuality in 
 the aggregate of sentient existence. Plato regarded the 
 action without overlooking the act, the modern regards 
 the act only. The inner antecedent to all action — the 
 living force which sets it in motion — the permanent 
 condition of the inmost self as dependent on the mutual 
 adjustment of Reason, Emotion and Sense — this is 
 what Plato points to, as of infinitely greater importance 
 than any social results however extensive. The inner 
 
1^ 
 
 THE REPUBLIC. 35 
 
 state of Reason, Emotion, and Sense, is not only, as 
 with the modern, a means to the general good, it is \ 
 also something more. The state of Reason, Emotion, 
 and Sense is the only means whereby the Agent himself 
 secures his own incommunicable good. And as that 
 good is inseparably combined with the particular state 
 of Reason, Emotion, and Sense, that state is likewise 
 an End. Both systems — the Greek and the English — 
 are agreed as to the End of human Action ; they are j 
 likewise agreed as to its overt and more palpable 
 results, but Plato points out other Results which are 
 more permanent and infinitely more important. Each 
 Philosophy points to the same End ; which of the two ^^^ 
 is fitted to produce the nobler Type, and therefore the /iT 
 surer Means ? 
 
 Mr. Grote has told us, how the Platonic view of 
 Justice, is contradicted by fact. We are now to see 
 Plato divided against himself, and witness the usual 
 catastrophe. The Platonic doctrine, we are told, effaces 
 Reciprocity, and in thus eliminating Reciprocity, Plato 
 contradicts his own theory respecting the genesis and 
 foundation of society. "What is the explanation,' ' asks 
 Mr. Grote, " he himself gives (in this very Republic) of 
 the primary origin of a City ? It arises (he says) from 
 the fact, that each individual among us is not self- 
 sufficing, but full of wants. All having many wants, 
 each takes to himself others as fellows, and auxiliaries 
 to supply them.'' Vol. III., p. 137. He thus recognises 
 the mutual dependence of need and service, and so, the 
 principle of Reciprocity which his doctrine of Justice 
 effaces. The answer is, Mr. Grote has failed to see the 
 real purport of the Typical City, as well as the point on 
 which the stress of the analogy rests. The object of 
 the Typical Commonwealth is not to throw light upon 
 the natural growth of society, but to illustrate the 
 ethics of the individual. The Typical City is brought 
 forward only as a model on a larger scale of the 
 
 D2 
 
36 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 structure of the smaller specimen. Rep. 368, d. e. 
 420, b. c. 434, d. The object of the treatise is the 
 ethics of the individual, and the only reason why this 
 is ever overlooked seems to be the long and earnest 
 discussion of certain social topics. We should, however, 
 recollect that in Plato's time notes and excursus were 
 unknown, but above all, keep in view the Greek notion 
 that Man was the Political Animal, who required social 
 union as the means of developing even his individual 
 powers. But lest he should forget the real subject of 
 the treatise, Plato even in his political sketches reminds 
 us of his hero, the Just individual, as Homer recalls 
 Achilles, by continual allusions, scattered through the 
 whole of the first argument. Rep. V. 472, b. — e. instar 
 omnium. 
 
 ^"Mr. Grote has fallen into other misconceptions, by not 
 always keeping in mind that the subject of the treatise 
 is individual and not Social Ethics. He charges Plato 
 with overlooking our liability to injury at each other's 
 hands, notey p. 139 , and with neglecting to provide 
 security against such possibilities. Against these, 
 however, Plato amply provides. The Guardians, them- 
 selves above suspicion, will see that the state receive 
 no detriment from the subject Many, who will not 
 be allowed to violate their legal and social duties. 
 Rep. 4. 465, b. cf. 414, a. b., 433, e. 
 
 Mr. Grote also reproaches Plato with not providing 
 a special education for the subject Many. But since 
 the treatise is properly ethical, and not social in its 
 main object, the subject Many is intended to illustrate 
 the subject Appetite — the seat of the Heraclitan Many — 
 which in Plato's eyes must be ruled even for its own 
 good, but whose necessary wants are to be attended to. 
 Rep. 9. 589, b. As the treatise is not political, the 
 purpose of the Fair City is subsidiary only, and its 
 structure is consequently displayed in its most rudi- 
 mentary form. 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 37 
 
 The object of the treatise is individual Ethics, and 
 the Typical City is to be used in teaching the science. 
 The model displays on a larger scale that Division of 
 Labour, which Plato wishes us to copy on a smaller. 
 And to show the universality of the principle, he points 
 out that the Division of Labour is ethnical also : we have 
 the fighting Scythian, the money-loving Phoenician, 
 and the thinking Greek. Rep. 435, e. We thus have 
 an ascending series — Faculty, Class, City, Race, all 
 united in the Civitas Dei, each and all carrying out the 
 Division of Labour ordained by the Grand Task-master. 
 But to object to Plato's view of individual Justice, 
 because Reciprocity exists in certain societies, is as 
 absurd as to say, that Platonic Justice would not work 
 in Scythia or Tyre. We might as well object that 
 Plato's psychology must be wrong, because the many- 
 headed hybrid, to which he compares the soul, is 
 anatomically impossible. Rep. 9, 588. 
 
 But Plato, according to Mr. Grote, has stultified 
 himself still further. Mr. Grote denies the pertinence 
 of the analogy between the city and individual man. 
 " To a certain extent the analogy is real, but it fails in a 
 main point which Plato's inference requires as a basis. 
 From the happiness of a community all composed of just 
 men, you cannot draw any fair inference to that of one 
 just man in an unjust community." Vol. III., p. 14 1-2. 
 But this is again to overlook the real purport of the 
 Typical City. To illustrate intrinsic Justice in the 
 individual, we study civic Justice in the model, and we 
 find that in each case it consists essentially of Division 
 of Labour. This is the point of resemblance on which 
 the analogy rests. 
 
 . Now, Justice is Division of Labour. By following 
 out this principle perfectly, both City and Individual 
 will be perfectly happy; and short of perfect happiness, 
 they will be more l;iappy, the nearer they approach it ; 
 less happy the further each recedes. In this sense the 
 
 / 
 
38 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Fair City is an ideal or perfect type — a supposition per- 
 fectly legitimate in Ethics where the type is assumed to 
 be without flaw, both for scientific treatment, and practical 
 purposes. But although the Fair City has not yet seen 
 the Sun, and may never come into being save under 
 extraordinary circumstances, Rep. 499, b. c. 592., the 
 ideal City still answers one of its ends. The conception 
 serves as the perfect standard to which, in Plato's 
 opinion, our conduct ought to approximate ; and for this 
 high purpose it matters little whether the Platonic 
 Republic ever exists on earth or not. The solitary 
 pilgrim can still dimly discern the inscription on its 
 gate — Justice is of Divided Labour. This he can 
 apply to himself and realise, at least in part. Rep. 
 9-592. 
 r^l^^y^^ow although the typical individual would be per- 
 / fectly happy in the typical Society, Plato does not 
 / mean that Socrates in prison actually realised that 
 \ consummate felicity. What he means is that Justice 
 under any circumstances is preferable to Injustice 
 Lender any circumstances — that the just man, suffering 
 for Justice's sake, would not, if offered, change places 
 with the wrong-doer. " I would like," says Socrates in 
 the Gorgias, " neither to inflict nor to sufler wrong, but 
 if I must choose one of the two, I prefer to suffer 
 wrong." Gorg. 469, b. c. And the reason he gives is 
 remarkable. He prefers to suffer wrong, because he 
 fears, lest, if he do wrong, his soul should become 
 incuraWy diseased. 
 
 Now this metaphor disease, occurs in the argument 
 for. Immortality in this very Republic. And on this 
 metaphor Mr. Grote in his notice of the Gorgias founds 
 an objection which deserves consideration ; it is, more- 
 over, answered in the Republic : — Archelaus, king of 
 Macedonia, obtains supreme power by the very worst 
 means. Most people envy his condition, but Socrates 
 does not. His soul is incurably diseased by the crimes 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 39 
 
 by which he obtained his power. "Plato," says Mr. 
 Grote, " is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between 
 bodily health and mental health ; real in some respects, 
 not real in others. When a man is in bad bodily health, 
 
 his sensations warn him of it Conversely, in the 
 
 absence of any such warnings, and in the presence of 
 certain positive sensations, he knows himself to be in 
 tolerable or good health. If Socrates or Archelaus 
 were both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily 
 health, each would be made aware of the fact by 
 analogous evidences. But by what measure are we 
 to determine when a man is in a good or bad mental 
 state ? By his own feelings ? In that case, Archelaus 
 and Socrates are in a mental state equally good ; each 
 is satisfied with his own. By the judgment of the by- 
 stander ? Archelaus will then be the better off of the 
 two ; at least his admirers and enviers will out-number 
 those of Socrates." Vol. II., pp. iii, 112. 
 
 The Republic furnishes the answer. Taking Socrates 
 and Archelaus by themselves, the opinion of Socrates 
 is decisive. Archelaus does not know the whole of the 
 feelings of Socrates : he is therefore blind to the 
 difference between himself and Socrates. On the other 
 hand, Socrates can compare the condition of both, and 
 he deliberately prefers his own. Rep. 409. e. Socrates 
 is alone the judge, as he has some experience of both ; 
 Archelaus knows only his own. Rep. 582, a — d. 
 
 That Plato was aware of the difference between 
 bodily and mental health pointed out by Mr. Grote is 
 certain, for he says expressly that Archelaus is not 
 aware of his condition. Gorg. 471, b. Moreover, Plato 
 constantly compares the life of the man who believes 
 sensible perception to be ultimate reality, to that state 
 of dreaming in which our fancies are most wild, and all 
 regard for waking reality is lost. Rep. 476, c. Insensi- 
 bility is therefore the worst symptom of the case. But, 
 metaphor apart, the test is valid ; no one can prefer 
 
40 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 any given pleasure to another, unless he has either 
 tried both, or witnessed their effects when tried on 
 others. Granting that there is a pleasure in being 
 mad, who would exchange sanity for madness ? And 
 why not ? Because, we would answer, with Plato, sane 
 persons have experience of the effects of sanity in 
 themselves, and witness them in others : sane persons 
 can also witness the effects of madness in others : they 
 compare both and prefer sanity. So, also, persons who 
 recover from insanity prefer to continue sane. On the 
 other hand, no one would appeal to the lunatic himself. 
 And unless Plato is right, why not r Similarly, in a 
 minor degree, of drunkenness and violent anger. A 
 pig can form no notion of the mental resources of 
 Socrates, but Socrates can form a notion more or less 
 vivid of the entire resources of the pig. Rep. 535. e. 
 Yet Socrates would prefer his own. Is he wrong ? 
 And if he is not wrong, Plato's point is proved — 
 Pleasures differ in kind, cf Mill. Utilitarianism, 10 — 16. 
 
 Our word happiness is calculated to mislead us by 
 its associations. Happiness is generally regarded as 
 something permanently distinct from the antecedents 
 which lead to it — something w^hich a man retires to 
 and enjoys, when his toils are past. There is, too, in 
 our word a strong infusion of material comforts and 
 belongings. To call a man engaged in an arduous 
 task happy, before its close, seems out of place, and 
 contentment, not happiness, is the word we apply to a 
 disregard of comfort. But Plato's notion is different. 
 The highest satisfaction he compares to seeing; the 
 born philosopher is " fond of gazing on Truth" [Rep. 
 V. 475. e.) calmly, but not without awe, 
 
 daixfirjo-a^ Kara Ovjjlov otaaaTO ryap Oeov elvai. 
 
 Plato's main thesis, that Intrinsic Regularity under 
 the most adverse circumstances is preferable to Intrinsic 
 Irregularity under the most favourable circumstances, 
 Mr. Grote meets with a dilemma; and this dilemma 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 4 1 
 
 Mr. Mill considers irrefragable, as may be seen from 
 the extract given above. 
 
 The Dilemma is : — The word Justice must be takeiii 
 in either the ordinary, or in the Platonic Sense. \ 
 
 If we take Justice in the ordinary sense, Plato ha$ 
 not proved his point, for he only proves, if his premisses 
 be true, the happiness of the man, who is just in th^ 
 Platonic sense : which was not the point to be proved. 
 The point to be proved was, the happiness, say, of 
 Socrates in adversity. 
 
 If we take Justice in the Platonic sense, Plato's 
 premisses are not true. For, the platonically just man 
 is not completely self-sufficing, nor can any human 
 being be so. But Plato's conclusion implies that the 
 just man is completely self-sufiicing. Plato's premisses 
 are therefore not true. p. 14.7. 
 
 Now Plato undertook to prove, as was shown, the 
 effects of Intrinsic Justice of the purest type on the 
 Agent himself. But Intrinsic Justice can only exist in 
 the intrinsically just man : no one else can know it or 
 appreciate it. Justice, like Sanity, proves itself; while 
 Injustice, like Insanity, is no proof that the opposite state 
 is not better. Platonic happiness is the consequence of 
 Platonic Justice, and implies a recipient : and the sole re- 
 cipient and percipient is the just man in the Platonic 
 sense. But this was what Plato undertook to prove as 
 the theoretic or typical conclusion of the piece. 
 
 As to the other horn, Mr. Grote and Mr. Mill, because 
 Plato's typical Justice and Happiness do not admit of 
 qualification, because they are types, argue that Plato's 
 conclusion is wrong. Now Platonic Justice, so far as 
 it depends on <^p6v7;<rt9. Prudence, which is always at 
 par, admits of no degrees. But Emotion and Sense are, 
 in Plato's Psychology, forces which, more or less, 
 counteract Prudence. The Agent consequently may 
 so far deviate from the line of Prudence, and, so, of 
 Justice, and, so, of Happiness. But the deviations of 
 
42 THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 the Agent are due, not to any variations in Prudence, 
 which is constant, but to variations in Emotion and 
 Sense, which are variables. Their intensity may be 
 indefinitely diminished, but they cannot be completely 
 nullified in this world, and accordingly every human 
 being must deviate more or less from Justice and 
 Happiness. Therefore Justice, and its consequence, 
 Happiness, will be inversely as the deviations. And 
 this is what Plato undertook to prove, as a practical 
 conclusion. 
 
 Mr. Grote having failed to keep steadily in view the 
 real purport of the typical City, and the real point on 
 which the stress of the analogy rests, sees nothing but 
 inconsistency in the Republic. He, consequently comes 
 to the conclusion, that Plato, though unable to reconcile 
 his cherished sentiments with fact, was at the same 
 time unwilling to abandon them, and that, thus divided 
 in his allegiance, he confounded the offices of the 
 Preacher and the Searcher after truth. The Searcher 
 brings forward all facts indifferently without regard to 
 their moral value ; the Preacher, whose object is the 
 improvement of his hearers, dwells on those tendencies 
 which induce us to do good, well knowing that the 
 opposite side is quite strong enough already ; he bends 
 the crooked stick in one direction, until he gives it 
 proper straightness. But Plato is not merely one-sided, 
 like the Preacher, he runs counter to obvious matters 
 of fact, and moreover contradicts himself. His doctrine 
 of Justice is subverted by the principle of Reciprocity 
 — the very principle which he makes the basis of his 
 model Republic. He is thus at once inconsistent with 
 himself and with Fact. Such is Mr. Grote's view of the 
 Republic from " his own point " of observation. 
 
 One question only then remains. Is Mr. Grote's 
 point of view the proper one or not ? An illustration 
 from a field which the Anti-Platonist regards as sacred 
 — the field of Physical research — is the best reply. 
 
THE REPUBLIC. 43 
 
 There, Similarities and Dissimilarities are blended in 
 apparently inextricable confusion. The investigator 
 may begin with either the Similarities or the Dissimi- 
 larities. The History of Philosophy is in favour of 
 commencing with the former. Had Newton devoted 
 his attention, in the first instance, to the differences 
 between an apple and the heavenly bodies, we should 
 not probably have had the Law of Gravitation. Reason, 
 moreover, is in favour of commencing with Similarities. 
 If we commence with differences, we may become 
 unable to discern any thing but differences; if we 
 commence with agreements, we may become able to 
 see that, what once appeared differences, are no longer 
 such. So it is with Plato. If we are anxious to find 
 out inconsistencies in appearance — in "seeming" but 
 not in " being" — we shall find them in abundance. But 
 the student of Plato will perhaps discover, that it is 
 more fruitful, because more philosophical, to com- 
 mence with the points of agreement. And of the 
 sincerity of Plato the best warrant, if such were needed, 
 is, the declaration which in this very Republic, he 
 puts into the mouth of his Master, " Through error of 
 judgment, to destroy life is, in my belief, less culpable, 
 than to mislead those who ask me how Institutions 
 may be built on what is Noble, Good, and Just." 
 
11. 
 
 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 Can Virtue be taught ? Such is the question which 
 occupies the greater portion of the Protagoras. To it 
 Plato gives no explicit answer, but a proposition is laid 
 down which is a step in that direction. That Virtue is 
 Science is asserted by Socrates, and reluctantly admitted 
 by Protagoras ; but that Virtue is teachable is not 
 expressly decided. Socrates, in concluding, points 
 out in words, which he puts into the mouth of an 
 imaginary critic, the seeming inconsistency of himself 
 and Protagoras. He, Socrates, had asserted that 
 Virtue was Science, but he had denied that Virtue can 
 be taught. Protagoras had asserted that Virtue is not 
 only teachable, but actually taught ; while he had 
 denied that Virtue was Science. And the imaginary 
 critic, likewise, tells us, that if Virtue is not Science, 
 Virtue cannot be taught. Plato thus seemingly lays 
 down the principle, that Whatever is teachable is 
 Science : but he abstains from asserting that all Science 
 is teachable. At the same time he intimates that the 
 presumption is, that if Virtue be Science, Virtue is 
 teachable. 
 
 The express and positive result of the dialogue, is 
 that Virtue is Science. And this result is arrived at in 
 the following manner : — 
 
 Protagoras asserts that the proper study of mankind 
 is that which fits him for the discharge of his social 
 and political duties, and not any special branch of 
 knowledge such as Logic, Astronomy or Mathematics. 
 And this proper study he professes to teach. 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 45 
 
 Socrates, on the other hand, maintains that neither 
 Protagoras nor any other man can teach Virtue. And 
 his opinion is founded on the well known facts, that 
 the sovereign assembly, on all points, save general 
 policy, takes the advice of trained experts, such as 
 engineers, architects, and the like ; but on a question 
 of general policy, they listen to everybody indifferently 
 whether rich or poor, gentle or simple. And this 
 Socrates argues would not be the case if there were 
 professors of Virtue — the Art and Science of Human 
 Conduct in its most general aspect. 
 
 The same conclusion is also evidenced by the fact, that 
 eminent men, like Pericles and others, neither them- 
 selves teach, nor procure any one else to teach, their 
 children, the principles of that wise conduct by which 
 they themselves rose to eminence ; while they have 
 them carefully instructed in the various accomplish- 
 ments of men of their rank. Protagoras replies by 
 relating a mythe which is meant to serve the double 
 purpose of answering Socrates, and of accounting for 
 the fact on which the counter-argument is founded. 
 
 The mythe, ornamentation apart, asserts that all 
 men are virtuous, more or less, and that, because Virtue 
 is not only teachable, but is actually taught — taught 
 too at every moment of a man's life from the cradle to 
 the grave. Now Virtue (in other words the several 
 qualities, Holiness, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and 
 Fortitude) is taught because of its tutelary and beneficent 
 qualities — because unless men shewed in their conduct 
 some regard for each other, society could not keep 
 together. Such regard moreover is sanctioned by the 
 right, which every society exercises of inflicting the 
 extreme penalty, death, on all who do not exhibit the 
 required minimum of regard for others. And the 
 penalty death, or in less aggravated cases, expulsion 
 from society, fully insures on the part of parents and 
 others, the constant teaching of virtue not indeed by 
 
46 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 technical rules, but by the still more potent means of 
 example, and precept founded thereon. For these 
 reasons, Protagoras asserts that Virtue is both teachable 
 and actually taught, and that there are no experts or 
 public professors of the Science of Conduct, because in 
 fact every one is perpetually teaching and perpetually 
 taught, virtuous conduct : and that too, with the heaviest 
 penalties attaching to negligence in learning, and to 
 error in practice. 
 
 Socrates opens his argument rather cautiously, after 
 expressing his admiration for his opponent's eloquence. 
 Protagoras had, says he, alluded to Holiness, Justice, 
 Temperance and Desire of Esteem, as if they were all 
 one single quality covered by the one word, Virtue : 
 Are then Holiness, Justice, Temperance, and Desire of 
 Esteem, are these severally convertible with Virtue, or is 
 Virtue a Whole, of which Holiness, Justice, Temperance 
 and Desire of Esteem are the Parts or Fractions ? Virtue, 
 replies Protagoras, is a "Whole, and its parts are 
 Holiness, Temperance, Justice, and Desire of Esteem. 
 Now these parts he continues, are related to the whole 
 Virtue, as fractions to an integer, for example, as 
 features to a face, and not as mere additions to an 
 aggregate, not as any one piece of gold is related to all 
 the gold in creation. 
 
 If so, asks Socrates, can a man possess one virtue, 
 or rather one fraction of virtue, without possessing the 
 rest ? For, if the fractions are severally unique, what is 
 to prevent it ; and if so, how are we to reconcile this 
 with the statement, that Virtue is essentially and 
 integrally one — a totality and not an aggregate. 
 
 Certainly, says Protagoras, a man may possess any 
 one fraction without the rest : he may be both brave 
 and unjust ; and he may be both just and foolish. Each 
 of the fractions is not only unique, but all the virtues 
 are of different values ; and of these the most valuable 
 is Prudence or Wisdom. 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 47 
 
 Here, then, it may be objected, that, if the fractional 
 parts are vseverally distinct, and if their abstract names 
 express certain corresponding qualities, the following 
 consequences follow : — Justice is not Holiness ; Justice 
 is therefore an unholy thing. Similarly, Holiness is 
 not Justice, is therefore Holiness an unjust thing ? 331. 
 Socrates replies, on his own behoof, that Justice is a 
 holy quality, and Holiness a just quality. Now we 
 have seen it laid down, that the abstract terms denote 
 really existing qualities. If therefore the real quality 
 denoted by the word Holiness be just, and if the real 
 quality denoted by the word Justice be holy, it follows 
 that Justice and Holiness are convertible. This Socrates 
 declares to be his own view of the case. On behalf of 
 Protagoras, he wishes to say, that either Justice and 
 Holiness, are alike in all respects, or at least that they 
 are similar in a remarkable degree. 331. b. 
 
 Protagoras qualifies the latter proposition, by saying 
 that there is a certain amount of likeness between any 
 two given things. Blackness, for example, seems most 
 unlike whiteness, and yet they are alike in being both 
 colours. The mere existence, therefore, of a certain 
 amount of similarity or dissimilarity will not warrant 
 us in founding any scientific classification thereon. 
 Have then Justice and Holiness anything more than an 
 average affinity r Justice and Holiness, says Protagoras, 
 have more than the average affinity, but they are not 
 so closely related as Socrates supposes. 
 
 Here the point is left ; but the question it involves, 
 as to the meaning and force of negation, is fully dis- 
 cussed in the Sophistes. The latter dialogue carefully 
 distinguishes the proposition which simply nullifies — 
 the negative proper — from the Contradictory, which is 
 incompatible with its opposite. Of contradictories, both 
 cannot be true, but two bare negatives both may be 
 true or not, according to circumstances. In other 
 words, the contradictory is that negative proposition, 
 
48 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 which bears a certain definite relation to another 
 definite proposition, which is its opposite, while the 
 bare negative asserts more generally, that the alleged 
 connection between subject and predicate does not 
 hold. In the present case, Injustice is the opposite of 
 Justice, and is consequently not Justice. Holiness, is 
 also distinct in certain respects from Justice, hence 
 Holiness is not Justice. Consequently Holiness and 
 Injustice agree in not being Justice, but it does not 
 follow that Holiness and Injustice are convertible. 
 This logical exercise Plato leaves his reader to work 
 out, and various passages in other dialogues turn on 
 this logical distinction. 
 
 Socrates proceeds. Imprudence, a^pocruvT;, is the op- 
 posite of Prudence, cppovija-L^j and Imprudence, dcjypoavvijy 
 is likewise the opposite of Temperance, crcocfypoo-vvr]. 
 Therefore, Prudence and Temperance, which are the 
 opposites of Imprudence, are but one single quality, 
 or have but one single quality in common, so far as 
 they are opposed to Imprudence, for every opposite 
 must be one, and one only. 332. e. 
 
 But we had before seen, that Justice, and Holiness, 
 if not identical, are nearly alike, as Justice is a holy 
 quality, and Holiness a just quality. Hence results an 
 apparent inconsistency between the doctrine, that the 
 fractional parts of Virtue are severally distinct, and the 
 doctrine, that a negative proposition has only one 
 single contrary. For if Imprudence is single, its binary 
 opposite, Prudence and Temperance, must be single too ; 
 and this also militates against the distinctness of the 
 virtues. But the solution of the difficulty, how opposites 
 may converge to unity, is given in the Philehus^ 18., of 
 which more anon. 
 
 Socrates proceeds to examine the position of Pro- 
 tagoras. According to his opponent, some unjust men 
 possess Temperance, and, therefore, so far aim at what 
 is good. Men, consequently, who are unjust, but 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 49 
 
 temperate, aim at what is good, and act so as to attain 
 it. That is, their object and conduct are good to 
 some extent. ^^^. b. d. 
 
 Now good things, certainly exist; that is, things 
 exist which are good. As to what is good, Socrates 
 is inclined to define Goodness as Utility to Man, while 
 Protagoras widens the definition, so as to include, 
 besides things usefiil to man, things useful to the 
 animal and vegetable kingdoms. Now, says Protagoras, 
 Goodness is ultimately manifold, and exhibits infinite 
 variety. 331. 334. This doctrine is of course at direct 
 variance with Plato's theory that The Good is essentially 
 one. And he tells us in the Phsedrus, that the essence 
 of any thing consists in its intrinsic Unity or Multiety. 
 271, a. 
 
 This logical notion of essence is founded on his 
 revolt from the Heraclitan doctrine of Flux or Multiety. 
 But it is not a mere logical subtlety. Did the Good 
 admit of diversity, did it exist as a plurality, or 
 Multiety, morality in Plato's opinion would be reduced 
 to the Protagorean standard. Man — that is the 
 individual recipient — would be the measure of all 
 things. And the Protagorean theory is a case of the 
 Heraclitan Flux — a doctrine thus corrected in the Laws, 
 that God, not man, is the measure of all things. 716, c. 
 
 Socrates, after a lengthy digression, reverts to the 
 original question: Are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, 
 Justice, and Holiness, five different names for the one 
 thing ? Or does each of the five names express a 
 separate or distinct quality or specific property ? Pro- 
 tagoras admits that the four qualities. Prudence, 
 Temperance, Justice, and Holiness, are nearly alike ; 
 but Fortitude stands on a different footing. Many men 
 have no good quality, save courage, 349, and have 
 every vice, save cowardice. 
 
 Socrates, in reply, shows by an induction, that 
 Ceteris paribus, the most skilful artist in each department 
 
 E 
 
50 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 is the most courageous : for example, the most skilful 
 diver dives most courageously. Wisdom therefore is 
 courage, and if so, courage does not stand on a different 
 footing from the other virtues. 
 
 This inference is somewhat modified by Protagoras. 
 In this way : — All courageous men display boldness, 
 but on the other hand all boldness is not courage. 
 Boldness may come from skill, from anger, from 
 sentiment, and from madness. While courage comes 
 from natural disposition and proper training. 
 
 Socrates replies : Some men live badly, others well. 
 Men w^ho live well, live pleasantly, and pleasure if not 
 followed by evil is good. Now Fortitude enables 
 a man to live pleasantly, and without annoyance. 
 Fortitude, in a word, is both beneficent and tutelary. 
 Fortitude is therefore good, and so far resembles the 
 four other fractional parts. Now men attain what is 
 good by wisdom or prudence ; Fortitude, consequently 
 is of the nature of wisdom. 
 
 Protagoras, after dividing pleasures into good, bad, 
 and indifferent, a division adopted by Plato himself in 
 the Republic and elsewhere, points to the notorious 
 fact, that men act contrary to their knowledge of what 
 is good : that they are induced by passion, pleasure, 
 pain, love, and fear, to do what they know will be 
 injurious. Their knowledge, in place of directing and 
 controlling their actions, is made the slave of any 
 feeling or impulse which may be uppermost for the 
 time being. Such is the notorious fact. 
 
 Socrates, accordingly considers what is the meaning 
 of being *^ overcome" by passion, or pleasure, or pain, or 
 fear, or appetite. Being overcome by pleasure — a 
 common Greek expression — means acting so as to incur 
 certain disadvantages, which more than counterbalance 
 the advantages of indulgence. But in determining how 
 far advantages and disadvantages counterbalance and 
 outweigh each other in each particular case, the under- 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 5 1 
 
 standing must be called in, dealing as we do, with 
 questions of Equal, Greater, and Less. But questions 
 which involve the notions Equal, Greater, and Less, 
 belong to the science of Measure and Quantity. Con- 
 sequently, in pursuing that course to which the balance 
 of advantages inclines, we follow the dictates of Science, 
 or Knowledge. In acting in opposition to the balance 
 of advantages, we act in opposition to Science or 
 Knowledge. But to act in opposition to knowledge is 
 to act through a state of mind which ignores the 
 dictates of knowledge, and therefore to act as Ignorance 
 would prompt. For no one, save in error, chooses eviL 
 
 in place of good, as the final end and scope of action : 
 nor will any one (and this is a Variation of the Experi- 
 ment) with his eyes open, deliberately prefer a greater 
 to a less evil. 358. d. 
 
 Now acting through ig^iorance does not mean in Plato 
 merely acting 171 the absence of knowledge : acting through 
 Ignorance, is, as explained by Socrates, acting under 
 the influence of any opinion or impression, which is at 
 variance with the ultimate reality. Hence Ignorance - — 
 denotes in Plato something positive ; viz. the presence 
 of disturbing influences, which tend to weaken the force 
 of ulterior interests. In other words. Ignorance ex- 
 presses all sentiments, passions, and emotions, which 
 lead us to put out of sight the consideration of our 
 permanent interest, whether that interest be sought for 
 in ourselves, or outside ourselves. Ignorance, in short, 
 denotes the presence of temporary inducements, which 
 may be, and generally are, in opposition to our ulterior 
 and permanent advantages. Plato would class under tj 
 the head of Ignorance, all the Laws of Emotion, both \^ 
 primary and secondary, which Brown has so well ex- 
 plained on psychological principles. Lect. 31, sq. In the 
 vivifying power of emotion, we must seek for the 
 explanation of the fact alleged by Protagoras that 
 unfortunately for us, in moments of temptation, know- 
 
 E 2 
 
52 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 ledge is not the master but the slave of impulse and 
 passion. The phenomenon, as explained by Brown, is 
 referred to a well-known psychological law that, when 
 of several notions, any one becomes peculiarly vivid, 
 the rest fade both relatively and absolutely. Plato 
 himself in the Philebus, and the second book of the 
 Laws, gives an explanation of the phenomenon, sub- 
 stantially similar. Just as in estimating distance, we 
 are deceived in the case of very distant objects, so in 
 judging of pleasures and pains we are liable to be 
 deceived in two ways. All future pleasures and future 
 pains appear diminished ; and present pleasures dwarf 
 the future pains with which they are contrasted. It is 
 therefore evident, that Plato both saw and provided for 
 the obvious objection from matter of fact to his theory 
 of the rational nature of Virtue. In other words, no 
 objection from experience can be urged against the 
 doctrine. No one is willingly bad. But as exception 
 has been taken to this doctrine by anti-Platonists, from 
 Aristotle to Mr. Grote, it is worth while to consider 
 Plato's explicit statements on the point. 
 
 In the Republic, III, 413., we are told that men 
 change their views either eKova[w<i or aKovalw^j and 
 all changes of opinion which involve any sacrifice of 
 truth come under the latter category. Sir James 
 Mackintosh states the doctrine thus, "every soul is 
 unwillingly deprived of truth.'' That " unwillingly" 
 is a most inadequate rendering will clearly appear, if 
 we study the list of causes which, in Plato's opinion, 
 impede truth. These causes are Persuasion, Forgetful- 
 ness, Pain, Grief, Pleasure, and Fear. Now every act, 
 done under the influence of any of these six causes, is 
 said by Plato to be done aKovaiw^. The man who 
 yields to persuasion, " against his better judgment not 
 convinced," acts aKovaiw^;. The man who from any cause 
 forgets his duty, acts aKovaL(o<;. The man on the rack, 
 who utters what is true or false, acts in each case 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 53 
 
 aKova-io)^. The man, who in an agony of grief, commits 
 suicide, acts clkovglo)^. The man, who begs for mercy, 
 acts cLKovaloifi. And, finally, the man who is led astray 
 by the inducements of pleasure, acts aKovaloxi. 
 
 To generalise : — the word uKovaicof; denotes any and 
 all of the disturbing causes, which induce us to act 
 differently from what we should have done on a calm 
 review of the whole of the case. The opposite state — 
 acting 6/cov(TLQ)fi — is keeping steadily in view all the 
 circumstances which serve as the final justification of 
 our conduct. 
 
 The distinction between the Motive, and the Justifi- 
 cation of conduct has not been sufficiently attended to. 
 In fact to understand any system of Ethics we ought i 
 to distinguish between three things, the Motive, the i 
 Criterion, and the final Justification, the ExcusatiOy \ 
 or ^AiToXoyia of the agent to himself. For example, I 
 see a man in distress : pity prompts me to relieve him. 
 Pity is the Motive. Have I acted right in so relieving 
 him ? I have, for I have increased the sum of happiness 
 in the universe. This is the Criterion. But, why should 
 I increase the sum of happiness r Because, says Plato, 
 you thereby help to develope Intrinsic Justice : Intrinsic 
 Justice is the justification. In other words, when we 
 act eKovGiw^, Motive, Criterion, and Justification are in 
 harmony, though not identical. When we act atcovalta^y 
 they are incompatible. 
 
 In the Laws, 860, sq., the same doctrine is presented 
 to us, but from a different point of view. There, Plato 
 is discussing the relation of Conduct to Legal Punish- 
 ment. How does the doctrine, that men are "unwillingly'' 
 bad, cohere with the right of the state to inflict punish- 
 ment on them — Punishment, too, which varies according 
 to circumstaiices, although all forbidden acts are all 
 done equally aKouaiax; ? In this way : — The Legislator 
 regards conduct merely in its overt manifestations, and 
 not in its intrinsic springs. From the Ethical or inner 
 
54 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 point of view, all actions are, in Platonic language, 
 just or unjust. The just bring their own reward : the 
 unjust bring their own punishment. From the Legal or 
 outward standing point, actions are regarded solely as 
 producing damage or benefit. The division is a cross 
 one, since an unjust act may produce benefit, and a 
 just act may work damage. And Plato in specifying 
 the motives, which ma/ animate the damage-feasor, 
 and which may consequently subject him to incon- 
 venience at the hands of the Law, mentions Anger and 
 Fear, Pleasure and Appetite, and Ignorance. But ' 
 Ignorance is, as we have seen, either the absence of 
 knowledge or the presence of positive delusion. Acts 
 done from these motives, because they work harm, are 
 punishable, but they are also unjust, because the 
 inferior motives domineer over the higher ; while acts 
 done from the higher motives, though they may 
 produce damage, are always just. And so far as they 
 are unjust, they are all done aKovalw^. This is the 
 explanation of the so-called paradoxes of the Gorgias, 
 over which the anti-Platonist imagines he gains such 
 an easy victory. It is an easy victory, but it is not 
 over Plato. ^ 
 
 One objection brought by Mr. Grote elsewhere 
 remains to be considered with reference to the desire 
 for Good. "A man sometimes desires what is good 
 for others, sometimes what is evil for others, as the 
 case may be. Plato's observation cannot be admitted 
 — that as to the will or desire all men are alike — one 
 man is no better than another." II. p. 13. 
 
 Now, Plato is not considering what may be good for 
 others, or the reverse, but insists that the ultimate end 
 of all action must be either good or the lesser of two 
 evils. Taking the most extreme case — Suicide in 
 despair — even here the suicide proposes to himself a 
 change of state, as he thinks that any thing is better 
 than the present. He proposes to himself the lesser 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 55 
 
 evil and "jumps the life to come." Whether he may 
 injure himself or others, is a question of Means, but 
 certainly not of End. 
 
 But to apply the Law of Emotions to the question in 
 dispute between Socrates and Protagoras : — The four 
 ethical qualities, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and 
 Holiness, are in their essence Knowledge or Science. 
 The point is therefore narrowed to this ; Is Fortitude 
 Knowledge or Science? 360. B. Now the fact is, that 
 both the coward and the brave man feel fear, but each 
 is afraid of a different thing. The brave man dreads 
 dishonour ; he is afraid of being afraid : but the coward 
 is so overcome by present danger, that the dread of 
 subsequent dishonour fades away. Cowardice is there- 
 fore essentially of the nature of Ignorance, as previously 
 described, that is the presence of an impression at 
 variance with ultimate reality. But if Ignorance, so 
 understood, is of the essence of Cowardice, its opposite 
 Knowledge must be of the essence of Fortitude. 
 Fortitude, therefore, is not of a different essence from 
 that of the other virtues. 
 
 But if Knowledge is of the essence of the fractional 
 parts of Virtue, Knowledge must be of the essence 
 of the integral whole — Virtue. And that Virtue is 
 Knowledge is the positive result of the Protagoras. 
 
 But if Virtue be Knowledge, Virtue in Platonic 
 phrase is essentially one. The meaning of this propo- 
 sition requires some attention. 
 
 Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice (one 
 aspect of which is Holiness) are qualities co-existing 
 so inseparably that we cannot apprehend any one 
 without apprehending the rest. This can be proved. 
 Before, however, we proceed to the proof, it may be 
 observed that Holiness bears the same relation to God 
 that Justice does to man. Hence to prevent unnecessary 
 complication, the term Justice will be used as a geniiSy 
 which includes both Justice Proper and Holiness. 
 
\ 
 
 56 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 The proof, that the four ethical qualities coexist 
 inseparably, rests on a fact which is the foundation 
 of Plato's Ethics. The fact is complex, namely that 
 Reason foresees consequences, while Appetite altogether 
 ignores them. From this fact, which is part of every- 
 body's experience, Plato concludes that, while it is the 
 function of reason to direct appetite, by pointing out 
 consequences, it is not the function of appetite to direct 
 Reason, as it can point out no consequences. This is 
 all we require. Plato makes no assumption of Final 
 Causes, nor any appeal to the obnoxious "ought," 
 which so provoked Bentham. Plato insists only on a 
 single fact which every human being admits more or 
 less in practice, and which no one attempts to deny in 
 theory. And this fact yields on analysis the four 
 inseparable qualities. 
 
 Because; — a thing directing implies a thing directed, 
 and a relation between the two as directing and directed. 
 The three moments are therefore inseparable, any given 
 one implying the other two. 
 
 In the present case, the thing directing is Reason, 
 and the thing directed is Appetite. Now, Reason 
 directing Appetite is the ethical quality Prudence. 
 
 But Appetite looks two ways. On the one side, it 
 regards outer objects ; on the other, the Agent's self. 
 Now Appetite directed by reason and looking outw^ards 
 is the ethical quality Fortitude ; and Appetite directed 
 by Reason and looking inward is the ethical quality 
 Temperance. 
 
 If the reader will recollect that the object-matter of 
 Fortitude is, in Plato, not merely danger, but pleasure, 
 in a word, all bodily states, and that these latter 
 comprehend not merely the actual objects of the 
 senses, but the whole aggregate of rights and duties 
 founded thereon, he will see that Directed Appetite 
 covers all the duties we owe to Man. That is 
 to say the Directing Reason is Prudence, and the 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 57 
 
 directed Appetite is, at once, Fortitude on the outside, 
 or Temperance on the inside. That Fortitude has for 
 its object not merely pain but pleasure, is expressly 
 taught in the Laches, the Republic and the Laws, while 
 legal and social rights and duties are classed with 
 bodily states in the Republic and the Phsedo. Ph. 66, i. 
 
 Now, in the Republic, as we have seen. Justice i!i[ 
 defined as the Due Division of Energy or Labour. But\j 
 if reason directs and if appetite iS' directed thereby, 
 each portion of the microcosm discharges its special 
 function. Hence in such a state of things, the man 
 acts in accordance with the Division of Labour. Justice 
 therefore is but another name for the organisation and 
 interdependence of Prudence, Temperance, and Forti- 
 tude. And any one of these implies the rest. 
 
 The only difference between Justice and Virtue is 
 that Virtue expresses Prudence, Temperance, and 
 Fortitude, in their convergence to unity, while Justice 
 expresses the same qualities in their divergence to 
 triplicity. The notions are equivalent, but not identical ; 
 Virtue is a Whole, and Justice is the Sum of Parts. 
 
 Plato's use of the term Fortitude must be attended 
 to. In the Laws, his latest composition, not only is 
 his extension of the term repeated, but the superior 
 importance of steadiness in the face of pleasure to 
 steadiness in the face of danger insisted on by the 
 Athenian and admitted by his Spartan and Cretan 
 friends. Legg. 63.3, d. e. 
 
 It will be also seen, that Protagoras draws the same 
 distinction between true courage and mere animal 
 dash, which is insisted on in the Republic and the 
 Laws. He admits that science conduces to courage, 
 but denies their identity. Now Plato in making know- 
 ledge the essence of courage, implicitly asserts that, in 
 that case, courage must consist in being able to balance 
 advantages and disadvantages in the midst of disturbing 
 influences ; and, as in his opinion, pleasure is a much 
 
58 THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 more fruitful source of aberration than pain, Courage 
 if scientific, must be able to compute the value of the 
 various items of pleasure as well as of pain, and the 
 fact, urged by Protagoras that many men have every 
 vice save cowardice, need not cause any embarrassment. 
 
 ^ Protagoras to use a convenient distinction is talking of 
 material virtue — of acts done from every motive but the 
 best. Plato is talking oi formal virtue — of acts done 
 from no motive, but the best; and done with full 
 consciousness of what we are about, that is, in his 
 technical language, done scientifically — on grounds 
 which we can and do set before ourselves, and, at least, 
 defend in the eyes of others. But such scientific and 
 formal virtue must be in one sense utilitarian : it must 
 deal with consequences and effects of various kinds. 
 And if we once admit the consideration of any conse- 
 quences, we must in reason admit all. In this way 
 again, utilitarian virtue must be one. It can be hardly 
 necessary to point out that utilitarianism means the 
 consideration of consequences, and must be carefully 
 distinguished from the Greatest Happiness Principle, 
 with which its connexion is purely accidental. 
 
 These considerations give us the key to the classifi- 
 cation of the modes of virtue in the Laws. First comes 
 Prudence, the directing reason. Second, a temperate 
 habit of soul. Temperance, the directed appetite in its 
 inner relation to the directing Reason. Third, Justice 
 not without Fortitude — appetite on its two sides 
 harmonised with the directing reason. And, fourthly. 
 Courage — Fortitude — directed appetite looking out- 
 wards. The minor dialogue, the Laches, will be found 
 in harmony with this account of Platonic Virtue, 
 Fortitude, and does not require separate consideration. 
 
 /^ The original question started in the Protagoras of 
 the teachableness of Virtue has been touched on in 
 the chapter on the Republic. But, before leaving the 
 Protagoras, it may be as well to point out the harmony 
 
THE PROTAGORAS. 59 
 
 of its digressions with the main body of Platonic 
 teaching. 
 
 The introduction insists on two points familiar to 
 the student of Plato. First, that the sophist must aim 
 at some specific or definite end. That is, every art or / 
 science aims at something definite, there being no such ? 
 thing 171 rerum naturd as an art or science abstracted | 
 from particular matter, although sciences may have 
 different values. 311, 312. cf. 318. 
 
 The second point insisted on in the introduction, is 
 the paramount importance of all that relates to soul, 
 the final recipient and assimilator of doctrine, whether ^, 
 for good or ill. 312 — 314. This point is identical with t 
 the main thesis of the Gorgias. \ 
 
 In the mythe related by Protagoras, we find three 
 Platonic points. First, the priority, both substantiveSl 
 and logical, of the divine to the human element : Second, .^ 
 the affinity of man to God : and Third, the right of^. 
 society, coeval with its structure and necessary to its , 
 preservation, of visiting with the extreme penalty all ^\ 
 open and avowed teaching which tends to subvert it. 
 This last is the more remarkable, as the two ends of 
 human punishment are clearly pointed out in this 
 dialogue, namely the reformation of the offender and 
 the example to others. There is therefore no anta- 
 gonism between the doctrine of the Protagoras as to 
 the uses of Punishment and the tenth book of the Laws. 
 
 In the exposition of the Verses of Simonides, besides 
 the obvious use of the digression as ad absurdum of the 
 way, in which books are quoted without the slightest . 
 notice of the context, or obvious drift of the composition, y 
 the following points occur. The affinity of Like to /\ 
 Like, the importance of which principle in the Platonic 
 Metaphysics and Ethics is evident both in the Platonic 
 Dialogues and in Aristotle's criticisms. The Principle V 
 of Contradiction is applied (340) according to its proper ^ 
 function, as set forth in the Sophistes. Vice is identi- 
 
6o THE PROTAGORAS. 
 
 fied with Ignorance, that is, in other words, No one is 
 willingly bad. 345. 
 
 It is interesting too to observe, that Crete and 
 Lacedaemon are, as usual, accredited with superior 
 wisdom ; and the eminence of women in philosophy is 
 pointed out. 340 — 342. d. 
 
 But with the artistic excellencies or defects of the 
 Protagoras, we are not at all concerned. The object 
 of this chapter was to prove the unity, in Plato's 
 opinion, of Virtue, and to shew how far matter-of-fact 
 was any real objection to the great principle not only 
 true in speculation, but fruitful in Charity — No one is 
 willingly bad. 
 
III. 
 
 THE MENO. 
 
 The ethical question discussed in the Meno is, in 
 part, similar to that which occupies the Protagoras. 
 Meno asks, Is Virtue the result of Teaching ? If not, 
 is it the result of Practice ? Or, does it come by Nature ? 
 Or, in what other way ? The Dialogue shall, accordingly, 
 be considered in its obvious relation to the Protagoras, 
 without touching on the metaphysical portion, which 
 deals with the Immortality of the Soul, and the famous 
 doctrine of Reminiscence. Both topics have, however, 
 an ethical significance. 
 
 Socrates commences by saying, just as he does in 
 the Symposium, 199, e., the Gorgias, 448, e., the Re- 
 public, 354, b., and the Phsedrus, 237, c. d., that we 
 must first see what a thing is, before we trace out its 
 consequences. For, unless we know what a thing is 
 by itself, we cannot possibly know if any given predi- 
 cate applies to it, or not. 
 
 Meno then declares that all human beings — man, 
 woman and child, old and young, bond and free — have, 
 each and all, their own peculiar Virtue. That, con- 
 sequently. Virtue in general is relative to the several 
 different objects, which the several differences in the 
 respective modes of life point out, as suited to each 
 individual. Thus, the Virtue of a freeman consists in ") 
 serving the state, and in being able to protect himself / 
 and his friends, and to keep down his opponents. The 
 Virtue of a woman consists in looking after the house, 
 and in obedience to her husband. And so, of the other 
 positions in life. 
 
 Socrates replies by showing, that although the 
 
62 THE MENO. 
 
 occasions, which call for the exercise of Virtue, may, 
 and do, vary from case to case, and from calling to 
 calling, yet that in every exercise of Virtue we find 
 two qualities at work. By the one, the Agent regulates 
 his own conduct in relation to himself This quality 
 is Temperance. By the other, the Agent regulates his 
 conduct towards others. This quality is Justice. Now, 
 if Temperance and Justice are found universally present 
 in Virtuous conduct, and if Virtuous conduct is of the 
 essence of Goodness, all human beings are good in 
 and through Temperance and Justice. Since, then, 
 all human beings are good in and through the same 
 qualities, it is not correct to distinguish the Virtue, 
 say, of a woman from the Virtue of a man. And from 
 the discussion, as far as it has gone, we may infer that 
 Virtue implies, in every case, a certain regulation of 
 conduct, in regard to ourselves and others. 
 
 Meno, then, offers the following definition : — ^Virtue 
 is the desire for what is good, coupled with the ability 
 to secure it. 77. 
 
 To this Socrates objects, that no one desires Evil 
 for its own sake : that, in a word, no one is willingly 
 bad. The definition, then, must be modified in this 
 way : the desire for what is good being equal and con- 
 stant in all men, men can only differ in their ability to 
 secure what is good. If then the ability to secure what 
 is good be the variable in each case, and if the faculties 
 by which Virtue works be Temperance and Justice, 
 and if Temperance and Justice be fractions of Virtue, 
 we must conclude that Virtue is the ability to secure 
 good by means of Temperance and Justice — by means 
 of Temperance, as regards ourselves, and by means of 
 Justice, as regards others. But, as Temperance and 
 Justice are each a fraction of Virtue, the conclusion 
 amounts to this, that if we have the fraction Temper- 
 ance, we have the integer Virtue ; and that if, on the 
 other hand, we have the other fraction, Justice, we 
 
THE MENO. 63 
 
 have the same integer, Virtue. Thus, in each case, 
 the Part is the Whole. The apparent absurdity is 
 obviated by the previous account of the convergence of 
 the ethical qualities to Virtue, and the divergence of 
 Virtue to these same qualities, ante. pp. 23-4. 
 
 Socrates repeats his apothegm, that we ought to 
 know What Virtue is, before we enquire, if it admits 
 of being taught. But in the absence of anything better, 
 he proceeds to deal with the question by the following 
 provisional method. 
 
 If Virtue be a psychical quality. Virtue must either "^^ 
 admit of being taught, or not. Now all Science admits 
 of being taught. If, then. Virtue is Science, Virtue 
 admits of being taught ; and, if Virtue is not Science, 
 Virtue, says Plato, does not admit of being taught. 
 Science, therefore, and whatever is teachable are, in 
 Plato's opinion, convertible. Afeno. 87, c. But, as the 
 major is admitted, the question is narrowed to this. Is 
 Virtue Science? And this question is determined in 
 the affirmative in the Protagoras. 
 
 The argument in favour of this conclusion is given 
 in the Meno, 87, c. — 89, a., much more briefly, but 
 more generally. As follows : — ^Virtue is a good thing, 
 and what is good, is beneficent. Now, nothing is in 
 itself either beneficent or maleficent, but attracts either 
 predicate, according as it is used rightly or wrongly. 
 But the right use of anything involves Knowledge — 
 Prudence — (^povrjcn^ — as its prerequisite. Hence, Virtue 
 is, either partially or totally, Knowledge — Prudence — 
 <j)p6v7)at<;. But this gives us the negative result, that 
 Virtue does not come by Nature, that is, in the ordinary 
 course of the untutored development of the human 
 being. 
 
 The question. What is the Genesis of the Moral 
 Notions, has engrossed a large portion of modern 
 speculation. It is the mode of stating the great 
 problem of ethical psychology most familiar to the 
 
64 THE MENO. 
 
 modern reader. And, yet, this mode of stating the 
 question exactly inverts Plato's conception of the 
 problem. 
 
 In this way : — According to Plato, the ethical 
 faculty, (jypovrjcri^, is one whose working is automatic — 
 for it is intuitive Reason — and whose inherent activity 
 is always at par^ although its movements may be 
 impeded by certain obstructions. The tendency of 
 modern speculation — which has received its impetus 
 from Aristotle, rather than from Plato — is to regard 
 the moral principle as a resultant of counteracting 
 pressures, one of which can only gain in force what 
 the other loses. The preponderant habit, whether 
 virtuous or vicious, grows gradually stronger, until 
 the counteracting force is reduced practically to zero. 
 Now, Plato would admit that the disturbing force may 
 vary in intensity, from complete preponderance to 
 practical non-entity; he would likewise admit that 
 the various perturbations owe their strength to habit ; 
 but he would at the same time maintain that the 
 mischief is altogether due to the obstacles which 
 impede the working of the moral faculty, and not to 
 any weakness either natural or acquired in the faculty 
 itself. The strong man is there in all his strength, but 
 he is bound hand and foot. Ethical training is, conse- 
 quently, according to Plato, a process of removing the 
 obstacles to the working of the moral faculty. Ethical 
 training, therefore, must consist in minimizing the 
 influence of the Senses — including in the latter term, 
 not only their immediate objects, but also the mental 
 notions attached thereto, such as Property, &c., and all 
 other Rights and Duties, legal, social, and political. 
 Ethical efliciency is, consequently, in the present state 
 of things, at its height, when ethical training has 
 reduced to a minimum the effect of all sensuous objects. 
 And so, conversely, the worst state of the ethical 
 subject is when habits of indulgence have maximized 
 
THE MENO. 65 
 
 sensual influences. In either case, the terms body or 
 senses must, as has been observed, be understood to 
 comprehend, not only all the objects of the appetites, 
 but also all the rights and duties, to which they give 
 rise — in a word, all things in relation to the senses. 
 
 The objections to the doctrine, that Virtue is Science, 
 raised in the end of the Meno, need not detain us long. 
 It will be observed, that they consist in the statement 
 of what is a pure matter of fact — a matter of fact too, 
 which may be easily prevented. The matter of fact is— 
 this, that if Virtue admitted of being taught, there 
 would be professors and students of Virtue-^the very 
 objection urged against Protagoras by Socrates. Now 
 Protagoras, as we have seen, denies the alleged fact ; 
 and even granting its truth, it amounts merely to this, 
 that no expert in ethical training had as yet appeared. 
 But the author of the Republic and the Laws would be 
 the last man to be hampered by the favourite argument 
 of the foes to improvement in all ages — that what has 
 never been, can, therefore, never be. And the splendid 
 'contributions to civilization made by Plato, Aristotle, 
 Zeno, and Epicurus, and their illustrious and zealous 
 successors — contributions to which we owe nearly all 
 that redeems modern thought from what is abject and 
 sentimental — have happily enabled us to see that the 
 objection no longer holds. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 The Gorgias is divided into three parts : 
 
 I. The argument with Gorgias. 447 — 460. 
 
 II. The argument with Polus. 460 — 481 and 
 
 III. The argument with Callicles. 481 — 523. 
 
 I. The argument with Gorgias is to this effect: — 
 The question proposed is, What is Rhetoric ? 448. Now 
 every art deals more or less with words ; and words in 
 turn deal with the subject-matter of the particular art 
 in question. 450. Rhetoric, consequently, deals with 
 words, but what is its object ? To produce persuasion, 
 and that, too, in the most important matters, Justice, 
 and its opposite. Injustice. But, as the Rhetorician is 
 a skilled expert, his business must be about what he 
 thoroughly understands, and so he must know what 
 Justice is. He will then do no injustice ; he will not 
 make injustice the ultimate end of his Rhetoric, 460, e. 
 But this conclusion is at variance with a previous 
 statement made by Gorgias, that Rhetoric sometimes 
 produces injustice, 456, c. d. These two statements 
 Socrates is unable to reconcile, for according to him, 
 the Rhetorician, if he knows what justice is, cannot 
 but do justice. 461. This is of course in other words 
 the famous doctrine. No one is willingly bad . 
 
 II. Polus then takes up the argument, and eulogises 
 Rhetoric as a means of obtaining power. In answer, 
 Socrates draws a distinction between arts which do 
 permanent good, and those which produce temporary 
 pleasure. Man consists of body and soul, and there 
 are arts especially adapted to the requirements of each. 
 
THE GORGIAS. 67 
 
 Now the arts, which do the body permanent good, are 
 Gymnastic and Medicine, the former increasing its 
 strength, and the latter removing disease. The art, 
 which ameliorates the soul is Legislation, or the art 
 of positive morality. All these do permanent good, 
 but unhappily each is attended by a base counterfeit. 
 Thus, Gymnastic and Medicine, which do permanent 
 good, are counterfeited by Cosmetique and Gastronomy, 
 which produce only temporary pleasure, while Sophistic, 
 to which Rhetoric is an ancillary, apes Legislation, as 
 a teacher of morality. Now things relatively to our 
 volitions are either good, bad, or indiiferent ; and it is 
 obvious that what is good only can be the ultimate 
 End or scope of human action ; whilst the bad or the 
 indifferent is only sought as a step or Means to what 
 is good. 468. To the statement, therefore, of Polus, 
 that Rhetoricians, like despots, can do wliat they 
 please, Socrates demurs. Rhetoricians do, indeed, 
 what they like, but not what they will, since no one is 
 willingly bad. Mere power, as such, therefore, cannot 
 be praised ; on the contrary an unjust use of power is 
 the object, not of envy, as Plato asserts, but of com- 
 passion. 469. That is, as Socrates explains, of the 
 two, the doer of wrong is more truly deserving of 
 compassion than the sufferer of wrong, and if it were 
 necessary for him, Socrates, to choose between doing 
 and suffering wrong, he would prefer the latter. He 
 also points out, that the wrong doer, the proper object 
 of compassion, may be quite unaware of his wretched 
 state. 464. 471. 
 
 Polus, on the contrary, attributes the unenviable lot 
 of the wrong-doer solely to his liability to punishment 
 at the hands of his fellow-men, who would eagerly 
 commit the very act for which they punish him, if sure 
 of impunity, and who all envy his conduct while they 
 visit it with punishment. " The usurer hangs the 
 cozener." 
 
 F 2 
 
68 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 In Other words, according to Socrates, if we do harmi 
 to others, we do thereby greater harm to ourselves^ 
 even if we be guaranteed complete impunity. According^ 
 to Polus, if we do harm to others, the only possible! 
 harm to ourselves is our liability to retaliation at theJ 
 hands of others. It is obvious, the question between 
 Socrates and Polus is that, which is the Main Thesis of 
 the Republic, that Injustice is undesirable, principally 
 because of its effects, in the first instance, on the Agent 
 himself. Socrates thus lays down a proposition, which 
 Polus accepts as a fair statement of the point at issue, 
 namely, that Wrong-doers are wretched ; but that 
 Wrong-doers, who are punished are still less wretched 
 than those who are not. As a logical test of argument, 
 Socrates likewise insists, that no inconsistency can 
 follow from Truth. But if inconsistency does not follow 
 from truth, consistency cannot follow from falsehood. 
 Consequently, inconsistency is a proof of the falsehood 
 of the doctrine from which it flows. The inconsistency 
 in the present case Socrates elicits as follows : 
 
 To suffer wrong, is, according to Polus, worse than 
 to do wrong; but to do wrong, involves more Dispro- 
 portion. If so, says Socrates, doing wrong must surpass 
 suffering wrong, either in positive temporary pain ; or 
 in permanent evil; or in both, 475, b. c. But doing 
 wrong does not surpass suffering wrong in positive 
 pain, and so does not surpass it in both. Therefore, to 
 do wrong surpasses suffering wrong in some kind of 
 undesirable quality, since it involves more Disproportion. 
 475, c. So far is the first point proved. 
 
 The notion Disproportion will be at once understood 
 by the student of Butler. "The nature of man is 
 adapted to some course of action or other. Upon 
 comparing some actions with this nature, they appear 
 suitable and correspondent to it : from comparison of 
 other actions with the same nature, there arises to 
 our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The 
 
THE GORGIAS. 69 
 
 correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent, 
 renders them natural ; their disproportion to it, un- 
 natural. That an action is correspondent to the nature 
 of the agent, does not arise from its being agreeable 
 to th^ principle, which happens to be the strongest ; 
 for it may be so, and yet be quite disproportionate to 
 the nature of the agent. The correspondence, therefore, 
 or disproportion, arises from somewhat else. This can be 
 nothing but a difference in nature and kind (altogether;; 
 distinct from strength) between the inward principles.! 
 Some, then, are in nature and kind superior to others.| 
 And the correspondence arises from the action being 
 conformable to the higher principle; and the un- 
 suitableness, from its being contrary to it." That is, 
 suffering wrong is contrary to man's sensibility ; doing 
 wrong is contrary to man's nature considered as a 
 whole — the sum of parts, in mutual correlation and 
 in subordination to the whole. This notion of a whole, 
 at once profound and exact, is one of the many forms 
 of ancient thought, which Butler has the merit of 
 appreciating. A Whole is not a bundle of parts, it is 
 an arrangement of parts, according to their fitness to 
 one another, and to the end or function of the whole. 
 
 The second branch of the question is then discussed. 
 Socrates maintains, that if you are guilty of wrong, it 
 is better to suffer punishment than not ; and this Polus 
 denies. Socrates argues, it is better to suffer punish^ 
 menty because the patient may thereby be reformed,- 
 and so far receive benefit ; and the test of the efficacy \ 
 of the punishment is the reformation of the offender, 1 
 477. a. This reformation is brought about by the 
 removal of Injustice, ahiKla, and Injustice is the pre- 
 ponderance of the lower elements in the inner life — 
 the Disproportion of Butler. Hence, then, just as with 
 regard to the body, the best thing is never to be sick 
 at all, and, if sick, the best thing is, to get well as soon 
 as possible ; so the most happy man is he, who neither 
 
70 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 commits injustice, nor suffers it ; but, if he is unhappy 
 enough to commit injustice, the next best thing is to be 
 reformed, 478. e. Hence, then, as has been pointed 
 out in the section on the Republic, it is most unfair to 
 represent Plato as teaching that the just man, say in 
 prison, is absolutely happy. All Plato says, is, that 
 the just man, in suffering wrong, is better off in his 
 own opinion than in inflicting it — than the successful 
 criminal — that Socrates in prison would not, if he had 
 the chance, change places with Archelaus, the murderer 
 and tyrant. 469. 473. 478. e. This is virtually admitted 
 by Mr. Mill when he points out that most people would 
 prefer being Socrates to being a pig, though the pig 
 has fewer troubles. Utilitariaiiism. Plato asserts, that 
 the state of the good man in trouble is comparative. 
 Plato's critics insist, that the just man's happiness is 
 absolute, that he is rex denique reguiUy without reserva- 
 tion. And to put his conclusion in a clear though 
 paradoxical form, Plato declares that a revengeful 
 enemy will, if wise, endeavour to prevent his foe from 
 making atonement, and thus exclude him from all the 
 benefits of Reformation, 481, b. ; just as Hamlet will 
 not kill his uncle at his prayers, for fear he would be 
 the meails of sending to heaven the murderer of his 
 father. And here closes the argument with Polus. 
 
 It is evident that the point upheld by Socrates 
 against Polus, when stated in modern language, will 
 be admitted at once — that a wrong action is wrong, 
 not only for its overt consequences upon others, but 
 still more for its intrinsic effects on the wrong-doer 
 himself. In metaphorical language, as the agent is 
 the producer of conduct, and as his inner organisation 
 is the only machinery for the production of conduct, 
 any thing, that impairs the working-efficiency of the 
 machine, stops pro tanto all further production. A 
 couple of quotations will make Plato's meaning plain. 
 " Formed character is valued, because in feelings and 
 
THE GORGIAS. 7^ 
 
 in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts 
 
 certainty ; and it is, because of the importance to others 
 
 of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and 
 
 ; conduct, and to one's self of being able to rely on one's 
 
 ; own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated 
 
 I into habitual independence. In other words the state 
 
 of the will is a means to good." Utilitarianismy p. 60. 
 
 This view will not be denied by the disciples of one 
 
 * school of Ethics, nor the following by, perhaps, those 
 
 of any : " The light of the body is the eye ; if, therefore, 
 
 thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of 
 
 light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall 
 
 be full of darkness. If, therefore, the light that is in 
 
 thee be darkness, how great is that darkness ?" 
 
 The darkness of the eye, the depraved will, Plato 
 describes by the metaphorical term disease. Mr. Grote, 
 as cited before, argues that if there be disease, there 
 must be pain. That there is no pain, is expressly 
 stated by Plato ; and its absence is, he says. 
 The flattering unction 
 Which will but skin and film the ulcerous place, 
 While rank corruption, mining all within, 
 Infects unseen. 
 III. Plato is quite aware of the consequences in- 
 volved in his paradox, that Punishment is desirable: 
 that life, if his theory is true, is turned upside down. 
 ^Now, it may be observed, that punishment, from his 
 point of view, is only desirable, if it produces refor- 
 r mation in the wrong-doer — if, like medicine, it is the 
 ileast of evils. Upon this point, the Gorgias and the 
 •jprotagoras and the Laws (728) are at one. 
 
 But Callicles professes to discover a verbal fallacy 
 in the argument : when we say, it is worse to do wrong 
 than to suffer it, worse is used in two different senses. 
 Worse sometimes means What is Worse in a state of 
 Nature; and sometimes What is Worse by positive 
 Law, because it involves punishment. Law and Nature 
 
72 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 are thus opposed, 482, as Law is devised to protect 
 the weak ^,^^^xi^t Nature^ i.e. the Prudence and Courage 
 of the strong. P^or Nature, that is Impulse unrestrained 
 by Law, leads the strong to oppress ttte weak, "the 
 better the worse." What then, says Socrates, do we 
 mean by The Better ? If we mean superior in force, 
 then the assertion of Callicles is not true, for then, in 
 respect of strength, the Many are superior to the Few. 
 This Callicles will not allow to be his meaning. But 
 if the Few are to rule the Many, it must be because the 
 Few are more prudent or more wise. Callicles is 
 inclined to give as a definition of superiority. Wisdom 
 and Courage in political life 491 ; and those, who have 
 an excess of these qualities, ought to be paramount. 
 Socrates then asks. Over whom are they to be para- 
 mount r over themselves, or over others r over others, 
 certainly, and not themselves, says Callicles. Over 
 themselves certainly, rejoins Socrates, over th^ir own 
 pleasures and desires 491, d. e. No, says Callicles, 
 Prudence and Courage enable a man to advance him- 
 self and his friends, and are thus good to himself and 
 them. But Justice and Temperance are good to others 
 only, and are esteemed by them, because they com- 
 pensate for their own Imprudence and Cowardice, 
 492. This, substantially, is the view of the moral 
 qualities which is so clearly set forth by Mr. James 
 Mill. " The actions from which men derive advantage 
 have all been classed under four titles — Prudence, 
 Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. When those names 
 are applied to our own acts, the first two. Prudent and 
 Brave, express acts which are useful to ourselves in the 
 first instance, the latter two. Just and Beneficent, express 
 acts which are useful to others in the first instance. It 
 is further to be remarked, that those acts of ours, Avhich 
 are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily useful 
 to others ; and those which are primarily useful to 
 others, are secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus it 
 
THE GORGIAS. 73 
 
 is by our own Prudence and Fortitude that we are best 
 enabled to do acts of Justice and Beneficence to others. 
 And it is by acts of Justice and Beneficence to others, 
 that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us/' 
 James Mill, Analysis^ XXIII. 2nd Ed. 
 
 Callicles continues : — If Prudence and Wisdom be 
 the means, pointed out by the light of nature, for securing 
 our own good, and ff Temperance and Justice be not 
 means to our own good, but means to the good of 
 others, it follows that Happiness consists in our 
 attaining the objects indicated by Prudence and.^ 
 Courage, as suited to our wants. Happiness as iti 
 consists in satisfying wants, implies, in other wordsJ 
 an antecedent uneasiness and a consequent gratification/^ 
 And here the question discussed in the Protagoras cropsf 
 up again. Is Good anything more than the allaying 
 of uneasiness ? Is there any pleasure which is not 
 good ? This is the issue between Socrates and Callicles. 
 
 If, then. Pleasure and Good are identical, and 
 if Pleasure and Good consist in satisfying wants. 
 Prudence, Knowledge, and Courage, not being actual 
 gratifications of antecedent wants, are not good. That 
 Prudence, Knowledge, and Courage, are not good, 
 Socrates denies, and then proceeds to make out his 
 case by the foUow^ing arguments : — 
 
 Good and Evil are contraries, 495, e., and we cannot 
 have two contraries at the same time. Consequently, 
 if we can find things, which we can both possess and 
 get rid of, in the same time, it is evident that the things, 
 we thus simultaneously have and lose^ cannot be 
 Good and Evil, respectively, 496, c. 
 
 Now% it is possible to feel pleasure and pain at the 
 same time — to feel, for example, the pangs of hunger, 
 and the satisfaction of allaying them with food ; and 
 so of our other bodily w^ants. It is obvious, therefore, 
 that the pains of Vacuity, and the pleasures of Repletion 
 are not Evil and Good, respectively. 496. d 
 
74 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 This argument will perhaps appear to the modern 
 reader a mere verbal subtlety ; but the distinction, on 
 which Socrates insists, lies at the root of the Platonic 
 Metaphysics. It involves the point discussed in the 
 present day, Whether the Ego is anything more than 
 a case of the universal law of Causation — Whether " the 
 restless whirling mass of cares, anxieties, affections, 
 hopes and griefs, that make up the living man,'' are 
 the results, and the results only — of organisation, or 
 Whether they centre in something, which is unchanged 
 amidst the turmoil, which surrounds it : Whether we are, 
 with Hume, to extend Berkeley's argument against 
 Matter to Mind ; or to admit, with Mr. Mill, that mind 
 is something more than a series, that it is a series 
 which can take cognisance of itself. 
 
 With large discourse 
 Looking before and after. 
 
 For, if the formula of our higher life be Pleasure 
 and Pain, and if Pleasure and Pain be Vacuity and 
 Repletion, then the Heraclitan Flux — the causation of 
 Hume, Brown, and Mill — is the law of entire being. 
 And against this law in its application to mind, Plato's 
 whole philosophy. Ethical and Metaphysical, was one 
 persistent protest. 
 
 But, if there be anything in our individuality, which 
 is permanent and unchanged, and so contrasted with 
 the ever changing succession of bodily states, it is 
 probable, that the objects of the non-transient element 
 are non-transient likewise. Hence, the argument of 
 Socrates amounts to this : — If there be any thing 
 non-transient, the philosophy of the Transient — that 
 philosophy which in the present day resolves Psy- 
 chology into Physiology — is not true, for it is not 
 thorough-going, as it claims to be. For, as Socrates 
 argues. Pleasure and Pain are processes of Vacuity 
 and Repletion, and these not only may, but must, 
 co-exist in Time. On the other hand, Good and Evil 
 
THE GORGIAS. 75 
 
 are not processes, but states of mind in its ulterior 
 development ; and these are incompatible at the same 
 moment. The ulterior states, then, Moral Good and 
 Evil, are not of the same order as Vacuity and Reple- 
 tion. There is, therefore, something for which the Law 
 of Vacuity and Repletion does not account. 
 
 What, then, is the relation of Physiology to Psy- 
 chology r Dr. Maudsley says, "Few, if any, will now 
 be found to deny, that with each display of mental 
 power, there are correlative changes in the material 
 substratum ; that every phenomenon of mind is the 
 result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular, 
 chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain.** 
 The Physiology and Pathology of Mindy p. 42. 2nd Ed. 
 But, granting that every step, in the correlative changes 
 of the nervous elements, were so exactly ascertained, 
 that, given any one set of nervous antecedents, we could 
 infallibly predict the corresponding mental consequents, 
 the Materialist could not, on the principles of the most 
 advanced physical Philosophy, make good his case. 
 ^In Physics, at all events, Hume's view of causation is 
 Wadmitted — we can never, in the absence of positive 
 Experience, argue that a Cause is like its Effect, or that 
 fan Effect is like its Cause. We can never argue, that 
 .{he mental consequent is a mode of molecular or 
 chemical, or vital change. We can, in Mr. Mill's 
 language, prove only invariable, and not, as is required, 
 unconditional, sequence between mind and nervous 
 change. To prove the latter, we should first isolate 
 the mental consequent and the nervous antecedent, 
 and, even then, we should have to try every possible 
 antecedent, until we had exhausted creation. Then, 
 if nothing but nervous change was followed by mental 
 products, we could say, that nervous change is the 
 cause of the Ego, but not till then. But, even then, 
 to infer that, because the nervous change was the cause,, 
 its effect therefore resembled it, would be contrary to 
 
76 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 all modern thought. There is, moreover, another objec- 
 tion. The Physiologist proceeds by observation and 
 experiment. Experiment, obviously, is only a more 
 delicate and rigorous mode of observation. The micro- 
 scope appeals to the eye, and so of other instruments. 
 They all appeal to the various senses, that is, to the 
 sensations of the Experimenter. But, that the greater 
 portion of the sensations, which make up the so-called 
 External World, is produced by subjective modifications 
 is admitted by the majority of educated people ; and 
 the Berkeleian insists that the whole is due to the action 
 of mind, or minds. Moreover, if we could construct a 
 Frankenstein, and, at a particular moment, the lifeless 
 structure were animated with the individuality and 
 genius of Shakespeare or of Plato, we could not be sure 
 that we had excluded that, which one school alleges to 
 be invisible and incorporeal, and which no physical test 
 has been hitherto able to detect. For, some one given 
 state of the organism, and no other, may, for anything 
 we can tell to the contrary, attract the Ego, and the 
 most ultra-spiritualist may, without danger to his 
 system, admit Dr. IMaudsley's proposition in its fullest 
 extent. 
 
 The same misapprehension of the true bearing of 
 Physiology embittered recent discussions on the Origin 
 of Man. On both sides, it was apparently conceded, 
 that the existence of a Soul, peculiar to man, was 
 incompatible with his development from species, less 
 highly organized. But, surely, as far as mere Logic, 
 apart from evidence, is concerned, both sides were 
 wrong. There is no more 'peculiar difficulty in conceiving 
 the spiritual being housed in the more developed Gorilla, 
 than in postulating the special creation of entirely new 
 tenements for the Souls of Men. For, the union of 
 Soul and Body is equally incomprehensible, on either 
 hypothesis. Of course, the logic of the discussion has 
 nothing to do with the evidciice alleged on either side. 
 
THE GORGIAS. 77 
 
 The argument against Materialism is, so far, negative 
 only. It may be alleged that, for all that, the Ego or 
 Mind may be a result of organism. True. But, then 
 comes in the positive evidence furnished by Introspec- 
 tion, by what is commonly called Consciousness. "What 
 I perceive, I perceive as visible and solid. I, who 
 perceive, am presented to myself, as non-visible and 
 non-solid. I sum the first set of predicates, and call the 
 whole Material. I sum the latter, and call, with at least 
 equal grounds, the whole non-material, or Immaterial. 
 Mind is, therefore, immaterial, as far as Consciousness 
 testifies, and no Physiology can prove it the reverse. 
 It must be recollected, that, to call the Ego immaterial, 
 does not of necessity attribute nobler qualities to mind 
 than to body, nor does it imply immortality. At the 
 same time, the immateriality of Mind is a strong 
 argument against all modes of destruction, which act 
 by decomposition. 
 
 But against the method of self-observation, M. Comte 
 directs a dilemma : " In order to observe, your intellect 
 must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity 
 you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, 
 you cannot observe ; if you do effect it, there is nothing 
 to observe." But this Dilemma, like most others, can 
 be very easily evaded. It quite ignores the existence 
 of such a faculty as Memory. How do I know that the 
 food I enjoy to-day is more palatable than what I had 
 yesterday? By Memory. Does M. Comte's dilemma 
 induce a physician to reject the description of sensations, 
 which his patient felt the night before ? And why not ? 
 Simply because the Physician trusts in introspection, 
 as registered by Memory, and whatever incredulity he 
 feels is due to distrust, not of consciousness, but of the 
 patient's powers of observation. That the results of 
 Introspection differ, renders Psychology more difficult, 
 but certainly not chimerical. 
 
 And now to apply these considerations : — If, as 
 
78 THE GORGIAS. 
 
 Plato thinks, we can discover a non-transient element 
 in the Ego, the reality of that permanence is as 
 much a fact as the reality of the nervous organism, by 
 which the Materialist explains it away. Nay, an 
 Idealist would add, that there is more evidence for the 
 former than the latter. 
 
 To resume : — Good things are good by the presence 
 of Goodness ; and in the same way. Pleasure is caused 
 by the presence of Pleasant qualities : now, as both 
 the prudent and the imprudent man, the brave man 
 and the coward, are susceptible of pleasure and of 
 pain, it would follow, that if pleasure and good are 
 identical, these people, so far as they receive pleasure 
 y)r pain in equal degrees, are equally good or bad, 
 499. b. We must, then, draw a distinction between 
 pleasures, which are beneficial and those, which are not 
 — that is between those, which, produce some permanent 
 advantage, and those, which produce mere temporary 
 gratification — a distinction insisted on in the Republic, 
 the Protagoras and the Philebus. But if pleasures 
 differ thus in kind, we require Science to discover 
 their properties and to tabulate them, according to 
 their respective utilities. And the relation of Science 
 to Virtue has been already discussed in the Pro- 
 tagoras. 
 
 We have now, says Socrates, established an incon- 
 sistency between the doctrine that it is good to satisfy 
 all our desires, and the doctrine that it is good to 
 satisfy some only. And the inconsistency thus evolved 
 from the thorough-going doctrine of Callicles, shows 
 that is not true. But if we are to gratify some desires 
 only, w^e must put in requisition the ascetic qualities, 
 Temperance and Justice, to temper the outward ten- 
 dencies of the non-ascetic qualities. Courage and 
 Wisdom. Hence, then, the task of the Ethical Expert, 
 whether private or public — the virtuous individual, or 
 the wise politician — is to produce Harmony and Order 
 
THE GORGIAS. 79 
 
 in the body ethical or politic ; and thus bring the)/ 
 Microcosm into harmony with the all-pervading law 
 of Order, which rules the Universe. Nay more, even 
 in the non-ascetic Virtues, whose direct tendency is 
 outwards — Wisdom [(f)p6v'n<Tis;) and Courage — we can 
 detect ascetic elements : in Wisdom, as it embraces in 
 its comprehensive ken all consequences whatsoever; 
 and in Courage, for that enables us not merely to 
 confront danger and pain, but to combat the pleasures 
 which "war against the soul." 504 — 507. But, if this 
 is so, Socrates has proved his point, that, next to being 
 completely happy, in and through abstinence from 
 injustice and exemption from suffering wrong, the 
 second best thing is to undergo chastisement 
 That must be cruel, only to be kind, 
 provided it be the necessary step to the rehabiliation of 
 the wrong-doer. 
 
 The positive result of the Gorgias is, to borrow 
 a metaphor from modern physics, that, as in the 
 Macrocosm, the centrifugal force is tempered by the 
 centripetal, so, in the Microcosm, the impulsive qualities, 
 Wisdom and Courage, must be harmonised by the 
 repressive qualities, Temperance and Justice. And we 
 have seen, in the preceding sections, that Wisdom and 
 Courage, Temperance and Justice, are the fractional 
 parts of the one integer. Virtue. 
 
 The main conclusion of the Gorgias is condemned 
 by Mr. Grote as inexact. Mr. Grote objects, that the 
 Platonic Ideal exacts as Good, order, system, or 
 discipline ; and that, granting this, Plato does not 
 tell us in what particular order, good, system, or 
 discipline consists. Now, as Plato is arguing, through-t / 
 out the dialogue, against the exertion of the egoistic /l 
 forces at the expense of the altruistic tendencies, and j 
 as the egoistic forces do not require to be strengthened, 
 it is surely to the point, to show that Excellence in \ 
 Conduct involves a certain amount of self-repression. 
 
So \ THE GORGIAS. 
 
 When Rhetoric is recommended as a mere instrument 
 of power, quite independent of its use or abuse, when 
 the possible Means of doing evil is exalted to an End, 
 when the Anti-social Qualities are praised just so far 
 as they override the social tendencies, it is surely no 
 small contribution to Ethical science, to enunciate 
 that these doctrines, so far as they regard self alone, 
 are wrong — wrong in theory and wrong in practice. It 
 is, surely, something, to show that the man, w^ho has 
 never done wrong, must repress Self, in order to keep 
 clear of wrong, and to show, that he, who has actually 
 done wrong, requires to have Self still further repressed. 
 And the two conclusions of the Gorgias may be nearly 
 given in the words of the only English Moralist, who 
 approaches Greek Ethics in dignity of purpose and 
 masculine severity of thought ; upright creatures may 
 want to he improved ; depraved creatures zvafit to be 
 renewed. 
 
 The alleged inconsistencies between the Protagoras 
 and the Gorgias will be considered in the closing 
 section. 
 
THE PHILEBUS. 
 PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 
 
 The following section deals with the Philebus so 
 far only as that Dialogue is ethical. To justify Plato's 
 classification of the various objects of the human 
 faculties, would involve an examination of the Platonic 
 metaphysics. Without entering upon that field of 
 speculation, suffici^ent may be gathered from the Phi- 
 lebus to complement the partial, but not incompatible, 
 doctrines of the Protagoras and the Gorgias. 
 
 One metaphysical distinction must be insisted on 
 here. Plato divides the objects of cognition into two 
 classes — The Transient and the Non-Transient. The' 
 Transient element is equivalent to the province of 
 Causation as set forth by Hume, Brown, and Mill. 
 An antecedent A is followed by a consequent B, and 
 B in turn is the antecedent to a new consequent C, 
 and so on to infinity. To this class belong the ex- 
 ternal world, and our organism. The other class, the 
 Non-Transient, is not subject to Antecedence and Con- 
 sequence, but is permanent and non-temporal. To 
 this second class belong the higher faculties of the 
 mind, and the Divine Causal Energy, Grod. In the first 
 class, Plato sets the objects of the bodily appetites, 
 and all such pleasures as are reliefs of an antecedent 
 want. As a want is more or less painful, Plato calls 
 all pleasures that act by stimulation mixedy that is, 
 mixed with pain. The pleasures which are not mere 
 reliefs, he calls unmixed or pure. These words have 
 no ethical significance ; they do not connote praise or 
 
 G 
 
82 THE PHILEBUS. 
 
 blame, but signify merely the presence or absence of 
 want. But as the second class — the non-transient — 
 are the objects of certain mental faculties, Plato confers 
 upon these objects the name Good, Now Good has no 
 contrary of equal rank. To cognise Good, we must 
 be free from certain bodily states, and the presence of 
 such bodily states is Evil. Hence the state of a man 
 may be good, as well as pleasant. - His state may be, 
 likewise, evil and pleasant. But his state cannot be 
 good and evil at the same time. Evil, as far as 
 it extends, effectually excludes Good. Consequently, 
 Pleasure and Pain — Good and Evil — are in Plato's 
 philosophy cross-divisions. This will be seen from 
 the Philebus. 
 
 Pleasures are divided into two classes : First, plea- 
 sures, mixed with either physical or mental pain; Second, 
 pleasures, unmixed with either physical or mental pain. 
 This classification is obviously psychological. 
 
 The Mixed Pleasures are subdivided into three 
 species : Those in which both sensations are corporeal ; 
 those in which one sensation is corporeal, and the 
 other mental ; and those in which both sensations are 
 mental. But, in each of these three species, some 
 pleasures are good, some bad, and some indifferent. 
 That is to say, the good man will choose the good, 
 eschew the bad, and submit to the indifferent, when 
 necessity compels. What renders them good or bad 
 is the influence which they exert upon the higher 
 faculty — that which confronts Good. It is evident, 
 then, that this division of pleasures is ethical. 
 
 On the other hand, the Unmixed Pleasures are all 
 good. They are also subdivided into three species : 
 those belonging to the sense of Smell ; those of Sight 
 and Hearing ; and those of Intellect. And the latter 
 species includes the objects of the Platonic Dialectic, 
 Being in its highest essence, so far as it can be cog- 
 nised by human beings. 
 
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 8^ 
 
 The pleasures of Smell are wholly corporeal, but 
 are not preceded by Want. The pleasures of Ear 
 and Eye are partly corporeal and partly mental ; and 
 the third species is purely mental in all its varieties. 
 But neither the second nor the third species is preceded 
 by Want. 
 
 It is plain, that the pleasures of the mass of man- 
 kind belong psychologically to the class of Mixed 
 Pleasures. To such an extent is this true, that Mr. 
 Grote and Professor Bain wish to reduce most of the 
 Unmixed Pleasures, which they admit to be. real, to the 
 class of Mixed. Of this, more anon. But it is like- 
 wise evident that an ethical treatise will class de- 
 sirable things according to their ethical qualities. 
 Goodness or Badness, and not according to their 
 psychological aspects. This is the solution of the diffi- 
 culties which Mr. Grote sees in the Protagoras and 
 the Gorgias. 
 
 The Protagoras tells us to choose the balance of 
 advantages : the Gorgias, looking to the psychological 
 aspect, tells us that the Transient element is generi- 
 cally opposed to the Non-Transient, and as the Non- 
 Transient is Good, the Transient is generically bad. 
 For, the good man regards the Mixed pleasures as 
 necessary evils, and the Unmixed pleasures, which 
 depend wholly on sense, are those of smell only ; for 
 one component of visual and audible pleasure is in- 
 tellectual : such are the pleasures of Proportion and 
 Harmony. But the pleasures of eye and ear are ethi- 
 cally valuable only for their educational uses, since 
 they are only good, so far as they are means to Good. 
 Hence, the conclusion of the Gorgias, that the Tran- 
 scient element, when pursued as an end, is not good, 
 and therefore may be positively bad. The student of 
 Butler will recollect his distinction between Self-love 
 considered as an active principle, and Self-love con- 
 sidered as a passive feeling. In the latter case "./ 
 
 G 2 
 
84 THE PHILEBUS. 
 
 may he questioned^ whether Self-love, considered merely 
 as the desire of our own interest or happi^iess, can, from 
 its nature, he absolutely and uniformly coincident with 
 the Will of God any more than particular affections can ; 
 coincide7tt in such sort, as not to he liable to he excited 
 upon occasions and in degrees, impossible to he gratified 
 co7isistently with the nature of thi^igs, or the divijze 
 appointment'' Analogy I. 5. In this passage, the Will 
 of God is the objective element of morality, which 
 corresponds to The Good of Ancient Ethics. If the 
 transient or pleasurable element be substituted for Self- 
 love, and The Good for the Will of God, we have in 
 modern language the exact relation of the elements 
 which are distinct, and possibly, but not actually, anta- 
 gonistic in the Platonic Ethics. Again, to quote Butler, 
 " all things, which are distinct from each other, are equally 
 so." The Transient element — Pleasure — is not the non- 
 transient element Good ; Pleasure is, therefore, distinct 
 from Good, and so far opposed to it. And this is the 
 conclusion of the Gorgias. 
 
 The positive conclusion of the Protagoras is that 
 Virtue, of which Fortitude is a phase, is Science, and 
 so One. That is. Virtue is a state of the non-transient, 
 and not of the transient element in the Ego. Now 
 Fortitude deals with Pains and Pleasures ; and of the 
 two. Pain is the least important object of the Virtup. 
 Legg. 633, e. If, therefore. Fortitude, when it deals 
 with pain, has to take into consideration what is 
 Honourable and Good, if it has to weigh against the 
 pleasures of safety the pain of dishonour, and the 
 consequent deterioration of the Ego, it is plain that 
 Fortitude weighs Pain against Pain, the fear of the 
 present against the fear of the future. But Protagoras 
 had admitted that the other ethical qualities were 
 nearly alike, but maintained that Fortitude was of 
 separate kind. If Socrates proves that Fortitude has 
 the same essence as the rest, namely Rational Self- 
 
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 85 
 
 Command, then the doctrine of Protagoras is over- 
 thrown. But Fortitude, in the ordinary sense, as used 
 in the Protagoras, deals with pains only. Hence then 
 in the case of Fortitude, as its evil is Pain, its Good 
 must be the reverse, of Pain — Pleasure — and its Evil 
 the reverse of Pleasure — Pain. So that if we set the 
 uses of Fortitude on the lowest ground, we find that 
 it is of the nature of Science; and this conclusion 
 Socrates sets up against the general view. 
 
 On the other hand, as against Gorgias, Protagoras, 
 and Prodicus, he establishes the further conclusion, 
 that being Scientific, because it deals with Measure, 
 it is of the same nature as the other ethical qualities. 
 But although in the purview of Fortitude, Evil is pri- 
 marily Pain, it does not follow that the other "Virtues 
 deal primarily with Pain. Nay, even Fortitude itself, 
 when it deals with Pain, and weighs the future against 
 the present, has to set in one scale considerations 
 of what is Honourable and Good, because these are 
 sources of future pain. In a word, the Good and Evil 
 of the Protagoras are the Good and Evil of Fortitude, 
 and so of the transient element, with which that 
 Virtue deals. But in the sphere of the transient. Good 
 and Evil must be Pleasure and Pain, and nothing 
 more. There is thus no antagonism, but complete 
 harmony between the Protagoras and the Gorgias. 
 The Protagoras discusses the Good and Evil of the 
 Transient, and that Good is identical with Pleasure, 
 and that Evil is Pain. The Gorgias discusses the 
 Good of the Non-Transient, and that Good is not 
 transient, and so distinct from Pleasure, which is 
 transient. 
 
 To establish the distinctness of the Transient and 
 Non-Transient elements, would involve an examination 
 of Plato's metaphysics. Such an investigation would 
 be obviously out of place in an ethical treatise. The 
 Reader will, however, find in the appendix the leading 
 
86 THE PHILEBUS. 
 
 passages in Plato on the subject. But the psycholo- 
 gical distinction between Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures 
 rests on what is part of every body's experience. In- 
 tellectual pleasure, according to Plato, is not preceded 
 by any Want : the particular instance, Mathematics, 
 is questioned by Mr. Grote, and the general principle 
 by Mr. Bain, at least as far as scientific studies are 
 concerned. 
 
 Mr. Grote, criticising Aristotle, who agrees with 
 Plato, observes that " if he had examined the lives of 
 Mathematicians, especially that of Kepler, he would 
 hardly have imagined that Mathematical investiga- 
 tions have no pains attached to them," Vol. ii. p. 607, 
 Note X. Mr. Grote, immediately gives as Aristotle's 
 probable meaning, the very explanation, which Plato 
 gives explicitly on the point : " He probably means," 
 says Mr. Grote, " that they are not preceded by painful 
 appetites such as hunger and thirst." ib. But, Plato 
 in asserting that intellectual pleasure is not preceded 
 by pain, declares that he is speaking of these pleasures 
 in their natural development, stripped of all intellectual 
 associations, PhiL 52, b. ; and he expressly recognises 
 some of the annoyances incidental to the study, ib. a. b. 
 
 Professor Bain, besides adopting Mr. Grote's ob- 
 jection, brings a new one of his own. " The highest 
 charms of knowledge are a reaction from the pains of 
 ignorance." Macmillan, Vol. xil., p. 468. But Plato 
 would reply as before. He is talking of natural de- 
 velopment, and not of intellectual associations. We 
 may feel humiliated by coming in contact with a better 
 informed man; but the pain of humiliation is not a 
 pain of ignorance. Where such a pain is evoked, it 
 arises either from envy or from shame. Envy may 
 be caused by any superiority at all in size, strength, 
 beauty, dress, rank, wealth; and when we do feel 
 ashamed of ignorance, it is because either our pre- 
 tensions have been exposed, or because we feel that 
 
PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL. 87 
 
 we have wasted the opportunities of acquiring the 
 knowledge, which reminds us of our deficiency. On 
 the contrary, accidental associations apart, the better 
 any intellectual object is known the better it is liked. 
 A man of taste may hate the ^neid, because he was 
 forced to learn it as a task, or because he has been 
 compelled to teach it. But, compulsion apart, are not 
 Music and Poetry better liked just in proportion as 
 they are better known ? If so, it is an Experiment by 
 way of Variation in favour of Plato's views. Complete 
 knowledge must exclude all antecedent want. If I 
 know a favourite piece of poetry by heart, I cannot 
 surely want to know it, and yet I can receive the 
 highest pleasure from either reading or hearing it. 
 It is surely far fetched to say, that the pleasure a 
 mature man derives from something he learns when 
 a child is a "reaction from the pains of ignorance." 
 The same facts justify Aristotle in assigning the plea- 
 sures of knowledge to more perfect beings. 
 
 The distinction, then, between Mixed and Unmixed 
 Pleasures is founded on fact, and as the former merely 
 cancel a want, while the latter are a direct source of 
 positive pleasure. Psychology is on the side of Plato's 
 Ethics. The preceding pages are an attempt to evolve 
 from Psychology a justification of Plato, but the writer 
 is fully aware how imperfect every such attempt must 
 be, if any one portion of Platonism be divorced from 
 its complement. It is one of Plato's pre-eminent 
 merits, that he never allows himself to become the 
 slave of abstraction. The ultimate object of man is 
 good ; philosophy is therefore ethical in its final phase, 
 but before it has taken that final phase, it has subsumed 
 the most minute Psychology, and the most profound 
 Metaphysics. 
 
 For the Ethics of Plato, the following merits, 
 theoretical and practical, are confidently claimed. 
 Theoretically, the system is perfect ; resting as it does 
 
oo THE PHILEBUS. 
 
 on a statement, like an axiom in simplicity, but unlike 
 in fruitfulness — Reason reckons Consequences; Appetite 
 does 7iot. Practically, the system points to the state of 
 the Agent, as the main factor of the ethical product. 
 
 The Platonic Ethics are, moreover, rational, and not 
 sentimental, as they are founded upon the widest 
 and most minute calculation of consequences, without 
 ignoring the emotive element, as an important item 
 in the sum. 
 
 As regarding ConsequeiK^es, the system subsumes, 
 and places in its due position the Principle of the 
 Greatest Happiness to the Greatest Number; for it 
 justifies that Motive by its relation to the Agent ; not 
 the Agent by his relation to the Motive. And lastly, 
 as making Emotion the servant, and not the master of 
 Reason, it overthrows the prevalent veneration for 
 mere Will, which has degraded history to Hero- 
 worship, and which fosters the vulgar delusion, that 
 restlessness is energy, and insensibility to argument 
 firmness of mind. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 0U/XOS— TO OvfioiiSi^, 
 
 In an Essay on the Platonic Idea, published in 1866, I stated 
 that the emotional fraction of the Soul, dv/jiocf contains the 
 emotive or impulsive moiety of the Will, as well as the sentimental 
 feelings of Modern Psychology, p. 113. This view, I am happy 
 to say, is confirmed by Dr. W. H. Thompson, in his Phaedrus, 
 App. I. pp. 164 — 7. To the passages there cited, add to 
 dvfjioei^eg ov irpog to KparCiv fjiiyroi fpajuey Kot viKciv Kal evdoKifjely 
 del 6\ov cjpurjffdaL; Kot jjidXa. Ei olv (piXovetKOV avro Kal ^iX6~ 
 TifAoy TrpoaayopEvoiixeVf ^ fjUjueXwc dv e^oi ; 'E/ijueXeorrara fiiy ovv. 
 Rep. 9. 581, a. b. As to the abuse of Qv^ioc,, irtpX to Ovfioeidig 
 oi;)( ETepa TOinvTa dvdyKry yiyviadai, og av avTO tovto BianpaT' 
 TTjTai rj (pdoyto ^td <bCkoTip.iav y j3iq. ^id ipCKovuKiav T] Ovfitp 3ia 
 dvcTKoXiaVf irXr]<Tiiovriv TifxrtQ re koI vIk^iq Koi Ovfiov ditJKtijy iivev 
 XoyiafjLov T£ Kal vov ; Pep. 586. c. d. Ovfiog is, besides, the in- 
 strument and executioner of penal Justice, Legg. 5, 731, b. e, 
 and in this sense corresponds to Butler's Resentment. In the 
 Phaedrus, 253 e. 254 e. the effect of sentiment on animal desire 
 is described at length. The immortal Steed, Qviioq, feels aXlioq 
 in presence of the beloved object, 254 a. ; he submits to 
 restraint IviovTay ib. c, and the result is, ware ^vfij3aiyet tot ij^rj 
 TTiv tov ipacTTOv ^p^X^^ ™^^ TraihtKeig alZovjiivrfy te koX ^E^iviav 
 ETreadai, 254 6. In the same dialogue, the immortal Steed, 
 Gv/iog, is described as dXrjdLyrjg do^rjg EToipog, 253 d., and the 
 words present some difficulty. 'EraTpog is that which is in 
 sequence with something else, either as concomitant or ante- 
 cedent. So, the mortal Steed, eViOvjwm, is v^pttog KaX dXai^oyeiag 
 EToipog, id. e. that is, has for its object v mt a. In Rep. 4. 439, d., 
 TO ETTLdvixrjTLKoy is irXrjpioffEojy rtvwy Kal i^^oyuiv eTalpog, i.e. has for 
 its object TT. fc.T/. ; and in Gorg. 510 a., the alternative is ^ r^c 
 vTtapy(ivaag TToXiTEiag ETalpoy El.vai., i.e. to put oneself en rapport 
 with the establishment. Retaining, then, the ordinary sense of 
 aXjidivfjg, and comparing Rep. 58 1, b, where the Cognitive Faculty 
 
90 APPENDIX A. 
 
 is said to disregard xPVf^<^T<*>y re kuI U^rjg, which are the objects 
 of the other two Faculties, we may render dXrjdivrjg dolrjQ EToipog, 
 which has for its object, true glory, i.e. the pleasures of the 
 Timocratic man, Rep. 8. 550, b, as opposed to the respect 
 paid to mere wealth, /cat yap 6 irXouaios viro ttoXXwv rtjuarai. 
 jRep. 582, c. 
 
 With regard to the exhaustiveness of Plato's tripartition, 
 excepted to by Mr. Grote, 3. 177, note 7, and in a less degree, 
 by Dr. Thompson, 166, we must recollect that Plato is pro- 
 fessedly writing on Ethics, and not Psychology. He, therefore, 
 deals with Psychology, only so far as it supplies Principles and 
 Springs of Action, just as Economy appeals to the same 
 science for its complex mental facts, without requiring any 
 further analysis. For example, it does not enquire whether the 
 Desire of wealth is connate or acquired. Surely an Ethical 
 writer would be warranted in referring the wooing and murder 
 of Desdemona to the same passion, love, although a Psycho- 
 logist would not. For the former considers any given feeling 
 only so far as modifies Conduct for good or ill. But, further, 
 BvfiOQ is in its Ethical function repressive, and not *'protreptic," 
 being evoked whenever the dictates of Reason are disobeyed 
 by the unruly eViOv/im. In the absence of anger, that is, when 
 the Reason is hearkened to, the softer feelings come into play. 
 So the watch-dog, of a good breed, when not angry, is gentle, 
 Rep. 2. 375, e — 6, a; and the judge, save in cases of absolute 
 necessity, tempers severity with the reflexion, that every wrong- 
 doer is the proper object of compassion, as he wrongs himself 
 more than anybody else. Zegg. 731, b — d. dvfxoeidij — yap Toy 
 dyadov. cf. Gorg. 469, a. b. tv<p'qfxu, w UuiXs — /cat ^rror ^ 6 
 diKaiioQ diroOvrjcTKuv. It may be observed that these views of 
 Plato are not expressions of sympathy, but consequences of his 
 premisses. And as to the exhaustiveness of the tripartition for 
 ethical purposes, the result may be best given in Dr. Thompson's 
 words: *'We shall therefore, I conceive, be justified in enlarging 
 the term Ovfiog, so as to include, not merely anger, but all the 
 passions and sentiments which prompt to energetic action, 
 and which are thus the natural counterpoise to the appetites, 
 of which either sensual pleasure or mere bodily repletion 
 {TTXrjfffxovi}) is the object." p. 166. 
 
 One of the objects of Ovuoe is Injury, Rep. 440, c. d., and, 
 
APPENDIX A. 91 
 
 SO, it is the emotive portion of the Moral faculty. This will be 
 better seen in App. B. 
 
 The opposition between Qvfxdg and Appetite may have been 
 suggested by the Hymn to Mercury; 
 
 £V0' oairiQ Kpedojv ripdaaaTO Kv^ijioe 'E|0/i)Je» 
 odfjiT] yap fxiv erEipey Koi dddvaTOV irep eovTay 
 rj^ei' a'XX' ovS' wg ol I-keLQeto Qv^ioq dyrjviopf 
 Kai T£ jitaX' IfielpovTi, irepuv leprjg icard hiprig. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 Plato's alleged inconsistencies^ 
 
 The four Ethical qualities. 
 
 I. Fortitude.. As to Fortitude, Mr. Grote says, "in the 
 Laches, one of the several definitions of Courage, tendered to 
 Sokrates and refuted by him, is the very definition of Courage 
 determined by him in the Republic as complete and satis- 
 factory." 3. 164 — 5. Mr. Grote refers to Rep. 429, c. 430, b. 
 433, c. as compared with Laches 195, a^ tyjv tujv ceivuiy kuI 
 OappaXeiov iTnari\jxr]v, 196, c — 199, a — e. Now, the question 
 in the Laches, What is dvhpeia, is framed in such a way, as 
 exactly to fit the answer in the Republic. The object-matter 
 of the virtue is the same both in the question in the Laches and 
 in its answer,, i^n the Republic, and the Laws. Not only 
 Danger and Pain are comprehended, but also Appetite and 
 Pleasure. BovXojUfroc ydp aov TrvOsadai firj fiurov tovq kv t^ 
 oirXiTiK^ drdpeiovQ, aXXct Koi tovq ev t^ wtttijcw koi iy ^vfiiravTi rw 
 
 TlokEfXLKio s'ictLj Kal jJiYl jJiOVOV TOVQ Iv TIO TToXe'^^, a'XXct UaX TOVQ iv TO~lQ 
 
 irpoQ TTi/V ddXaTTav KivdvyoiQ dvZptiovQ ovTUQy koi octoi ye TrpoQ voaovQ 
 Kal 6<T0L TTpOQ TTeviaQ T] Kui TrpoQ Tu TToXirtfca dv^peloi elat, kul eti av 
 fjirj fjLovor 0<TOi TrpoQ XviruQ dvdpEloi Etffiv ^ <p6(iovQy dXXd koi Trpog 
 iTTLOvfiiag 17 -qlovag ^ewol fxdyEaQai^ koX fxivovTEg rj dvaaTpi<povTEQ — 
 eWl ydp 'Kov TLVSQj (3 Aa^r/c, /cat eV to~iq tolovtolq dvhpeloi .... AA. 
 Kat <fip6^paf <ty 1,u)KpaTEQ» 2^. Ovkovv dvdpEloi fxiv irdvTEQ ovroi 
 eIolv, dXX' ol fxtv Ev jidovaiQ, 01 K iv XvVate, 01 K iv iTTiOvfiiaig, 01 ^* 
 iv <^o'/5otc T^v dv^pEiav KEKTTjvTai' ol ^£ y*^, dcfxai, lEiKiav iv toIq 
 avTOtQ TOVTOLQ. AA. IlaVv ye. SO, Ti irore ov iicoTEpov TovTOJVf tovto 
 iTrvvd<tv6fjir]v. 191. What, then, is the answer in the Republic ? 
 Kat di'^pE~iov ^^, oif^aif tovt<^ ry fiepEi KaXovfXEV Eva EKatnoVf OTav 
 avTOv to dvfjLOEidsQ ^laffw^rj ^id te XvttCjv Kal -qZoviov to vtto tov 
 Xoyov irapayjEXOiv Ielvov te Ka\ /ir}. Rep. 442, a. b. That is, 
 Fortitude is that temper of mind which keeps appetite under 
 the control of Reason. It is obvious that the definitions 
 
APPENDIX B. 93 
 
 rejected in the Laches dwell upon the rational directive 
 element only, and leave out its emotive auxiliary. 
 
 2. Tempe?ance. As to Temperance, Mr. Grote says: "in the 
 Charmides, one of the definitions of Temperance refuted, and 
 even treated as scarcely intelligible, by Sokrates {ro Trpdrreiv rd 
 iavTov) is the same as that which Sokrates in the Republic 
 relies on as a valid definition of Justice." 3, 165. To Trpdrreiv 
 rd iavTov is, of course, the definition of Justice in the Republic, 
 and so, is verbally identical with the definition rejected in the 
 Charmides. But the identity is verbal only. For, waiving the 
 objection that the definition belongs to distinct qualities — 
 Temperance and Justice — the definition in the Charmides^ rd 
 TTpdrrEiy rd edvTov is explained to be, not only different from the 
 definition in the Republic, but its exact opposite. That in the 
 /Republic means the Division of Labour; that in the Charmides ^ 
 the Concentration of Labour, i. e. that every man for example, 
 •like Hippias, should make his own shoes and clothes, IokeI 
 av aoL TToXte ev oiKeiadai i/Vo rovrov tov vofjov rov keXevovtoq to eavTov 
 ifxaTiov tKavTov v^alvtiv kol irXvveiv, koX vTrod^fiara aicvTorofjiuy, kuI 
 Xi^Kvdov Kol (TTXeyyiBa Kai rdWa TraVra *c. e. Charm. 161, e. — 1 62, a. 
 It is, surely, legitimate to reject one, and accept another, expla- 
 nation of the same words. If not, what becomes of argument ? 
 
 3. Prudence. As to Prudence, <j>p6yr](ng, there is no such 
 contradiction, as Mr. Grote alleges, between the ThecBtetus and 
 the Republic. The question of the The(2tetus is What is Science, 
 iTnaTtjfjLT}, that is. Knowledge considered from the objective 
 side; while the Republic deals with Prudence, <f>p6vri<rte, the 
 intellectual faculty in contact with Moral Good. For, <pp6vrj(ng 
 is not only the directing faculty, but it is also the faculty which 
 cognises KaWog, Symp. 203, c. d. ("Ejowc ^vau ipaaTrjg Zv rrepl 
 TO KaXov, and he is also (ppovriaeiog i7rL6vfir]TriQ» cf. 'icrri yap ^r) ruJv 
 KaWiffTwv 77 ffo^/a, "Ejowe iafiy ipioq Trepl to KoXoy, wore uKayKdloy 
 "Epwra (pikoaofoy eiyai. ib. 204, b.,) and God, Theoet. 176, a. c, 
 where {ofioitoffig 6eS Kara ro ^vyaroy is defined to be ^Uaioy Kal 
 offioy fxerd ^poyqaetjjQ ykvsadai. 
 
 Nor is the account in the PhcBdo. 69, a. b., different, for 
 the difference is pointed out between the Philosophic or 
 Ethical Expert, and the ordinary man. The former acts from 
 (pporriaig, which is thus a Means, and thereby secures still 
 further ^pori^ace, which is thus an End, and so is rightly com- 
 
94- APPENDIX B. 
 
 pared to coin, which is both valuable in itself, and is moreover 
 the medium of exchange. The ordinary man, on the contrary, 
 does not regard pleasure and pain as mere occasions for the 
 action of (pp6vr\aiQ, (which is both tke paramount Hem as well as 
 the standard of Ethical Utility, Phced. 69, a. b.), and so he is 
 said to change token for token, cf. Lack. 192, e. 
 
 In a critical point of view, the Laches is interesting, as 
 there are at least three coincidences between it and the Phcedo, 
 First, the comparison of the ethical qualities to coin ; cf. Phced, 
 69, a. b., with Lack. 192, e. Second, the use in both of the 
 phrase yu?) Trpoaijiiaraffdai, PhcBd. 85, c. Lach. 194, a. And third, 
 as to the ethical value of Death, Lach. 195, d., and Phced. 62, a. 
 But, as the last passage has been much disputed, and, as I 
 think, erroneously interpreted, I offer the following explanation. 
 
 One passage runs thus : cv iraaL <pyQ afieipoy elpai i^rjv KUL ov 
 iroWoig KpeiTTOv redravai ; OifxaL eyioye tovto ye. Olg ovv TeQvdvaL 
 Xvarirekeif ravrd oUl ^eivd eivai Kal oig ^ijv ; Ovk eyioye. Lach^ 
 195, d. The meaning of this is certain, there are persons^ for 
 whom it is better to he dead ; and there are persons, for whom it is 
 better to live. 
 
 The passage in the PhcEdo is, "laioq fievroL BavfiaaTov aoi ^avelTai, 
 el TOVTO, fjLOvov T(jjv dX\(t)v diravTiop, dirXovv iffTL Kal ovheiroTe Tvyyavei 
 ra> dvdpwTTUf (oairep Kal raAAa, taTiv ore Kal olg (^eXtlov reOvdvai rj 
 tl^v, cuQ de ^eXTLOV TeQvdvai, davfxaaTOU 'iaojQ aoL <f)aiveTai, el 
 TovTOiQ To7g dvdpojTTOig fjr) oatov Iotlv avTOvg el TroielVy dXX dXXov 
 del 7r.epifiiv£iv evepytTr)v, 62, a. // will, perhaps, appear strange if 
 the question, to be or not to be, lies, contrary to all analogy, in 
 Necessary Matter, and not in Contingent, [but analogy is against 
 this supposition, and so the question, like all others, lies in 
 Contingent Matter; therefore not to he is sometimes better 
 than to be.']. If so, why not in these cases, commit suicide ? 
 
 TovTo means the whole question at issue, the case Life against 
 Death. That tovto refers to the general question appears from 
 the words immediately preceding, ^3»y yap eywye {orrep vvv drj av 
 ypov,) Kal i^iXoXdov rjKovffa, {oTe irap ijjiuv dirjTaTo), rj^r] de Kal dXXujv 
 TLvuiv, (og ov heoi tovto [sc. to avTOv edvTOP aTroKTiPvvvae] ttouIv' aa<peg 
 de irepl aurwv ovlevog TrwVore ov^ev aKrJKoa: I got no precise 
 views on the subject avVaJv, either from Philolaus or the rest. 
 Socrates rejoins : aWd irpodviJ.e7crdaL yjpri, e<pr]' ra^a ydp o.v Kal 
 aKovaaigy sc. 7r£pt avTuiv aacpig tl» Two passages fix the logical 
 
APPENDIX B. 95 
 
 sense of aTrXov*'. Oo irdw jioi ^ofctt, £0?/, Z SwVparfC* ovTiog dirXovv 
 
 elyai, , aXXa Tt /uoi doKei iv avru ^ia.<popov tivat. Prot. 
 
 331. b. C. ofjo' ovv ciTrXovv iari Xeyeiv, otl ol uvdptoTroi rdyadov 
 tpwaiv^ Na/. Symp. 206, a. 'AttXovv, then, is any proposition 
 without qualification as to either Quantity, and so Universal, 
 or, as to Matter, and so Necessary. Ouoe'xorc rvyxdveL is merely 
 the negative form of aTrXovv, as the Greeks were fond of 
 expressing a notion positively, and then negatively, as in 
 yj'wra KovK dyviord. I remember noting, with a qucere in the 
 margin of EuthydemuSy 278, a. that ^anv ore, and such forms, 
 were used in preference to iviore to denote the minority of 
 instances, while the shorter form Iviorz merely states that there 
 are cases. At least, the fuller form must be more emphatic. 
 I have not since verified the notion. But ThecBt. 150, a. b. 
 bears out my view, ov yap irpoaeaTL yvvail^iv irloT£ fxev eidwXa 
 TiKTeiv, tan h' ore dXrjdivd. Now, the philosophic births are 
 few. 151, b. 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 IMMATERIALITY. 
 
 Sir Charles Bell, by experiments instituted on the roots of 
 the spinal nerves, professed to show — 
 
 1°. That the functions of Sensation exclusively belong to the 
 filaments ascending by the posterior roots. 
 
 2°. That the sole vehicles of Motion are the filaments 
 descending by the anterior roots. 
 
 These two propositions are, I believe, admitted by most 
 physiologists. Now, generalizing Sir C. Bell's results, we may 
 safely say, that the last known antecedent to sensation and to 
 voluntary motion is a modification of nerve. But we can never, 
 in the absence of experience, argue from Antecedent to 
 Consequent ; in more popular, and, therefore, more vague 
 language, from Cause to Effect. Applying this principle, we 
 cannot tell anything whatsoever of the nature of the Ego from 
 any possible observations or experiments on the antecedents to 
 the main constituents of that Ego, namely sensation and 
 motion. For, all such observations and experiments can only 
 be taken cognisance of by the senses, and that which takes 
 cognisance of anything is always posterior to 
 
 1°. the thing cognised ; and 
 
 2°. the medium of cognition, if any. 
 
 Now, that which feels the final consequent — the sensation, 
 is neither heavy, nor blue, nor loud, nor bitter, nor fetid, nor 
 their several opposites ; in a word, the Ego has none of the 
 properties of the Non-ego. Even granting, as is quite possible, 
 if not probable, that further research will point out several 
 steps between the facts observed by Sir C. Bell, and the final 
 sensation, yet such facts can never be more than a new set of 
 Antecedents as before, presenting either colour, smell, etc., 
 while the final consequent, the Ego, is characterised by a total 
 absence of these qualities. Whatever then is afiirmed of the 
 one must be denied of the other. Hence, if we call the final 
 Antecedent, visible tangible, in a word, material, we must 
 likewise call the Ego invisible and intangible, in a word, 
 immaterial, or in a positive term spiritual. Of course, these 
 
APPENDIX C. 97 
 
 words, save as denoting complete antithesis, are not used to 
 indicate any opinion as to the final destinies either of the Ego 
 or of the Non-Ego. In other words, the immateriality of the 
 soul is not necessarily connected ' with its immortality, two 
 questions which have been pertinaciously confounded. But 
 as death, as far as we can see^ deals with the final and the 
 more remote antecedents only, no one can prove that death 
 is the final destruction of the Ego. This argument admits, 
 for argument's sake, the position of the sensualist, that the 
 senses (including of course nerves and brain) are the sole 
 apparatus of human experience. This position has been 
 denied by some of the greatest thinkers. As, however, such 
 denial is not required hy the argument, it is not called in. 
 Generalising the argument, the result is, that as Physiology 
 can, in no conceivable degree of cultivation, throw the 
 slightest light on the existence of the Ego, so Physiology 
 can determine nothing as to the non-existence of the Ego. 
 In a word, Physiology deals with aon-egoistical antecedents 
 only. 
 
 H 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 THE HIERARCHY OF GOOD. 
 
 PhilEBUS 66, a — C. 'Hdoy^ Ktrjfia ovk eari TrpiZrov otd' av 
 devTspoVf dWd TrpoJTOv fxiv iry Trept jjerpov Kul to fxerpLOv kol Kaipiov 
 Kai TTUVTa OTTOcra roiaura ^p/} vofiii^ELV Trjp dt^iov ^prjadai ^vaiv. 
 n. ^atVerai yovv ek t<j)V vvv XeyojjLsvwv, 2. Aevrepov fir/v irepl ro 
 (rvjifjierpov Koi icaXdy Kal ro teXeov koX iKavov koI iravQ'' oiroaa rrJQ 
 yEVEag av ravrrfg iariy, H. "Eoifce yovv, S. To roivvv rpiror, ojg 
 1] efi^ fiavTELa, vovv koX (ppovqaiv ridEig ovk av fxiya tl rrjg dXTjOEiag 
 TrapE^EXdoig, TL. 'Icrojg. 2. Ap' ovv ov TETapra^ d rrjg \pv)(rjg avrrjg 
 eOejiev, ETTLaTrifxag te Ka\ TE')(yag Ka\ lol^ag opdcig Xe^Qe/ffag, ravr eIvul 
 TO. Trpog Tolg rpial TETaprUf e'Lttep tov dyadov iarl fiaXXov rfjg rjhovrjg 
 ^vyyEvrj. 11. Ta)(' dv. 2. Ile/LiTrrae roivvv, dg rj^ovctc EdEfiEv 
 aXvTTovg opiaa^Evoi, Kadapdg iwovofxdaavrEg rrjg \pv)(rjg avrrjg, iirLarrj- 
 fiaig, ralg Be aladijarEaLv, eTTOfiivag. 
 
 In this passage, the hierarchy of Good is delineated as 
 follows : — Fi'rs/, all things which are immediately connected 
 with the Limit, and in this way participate in the absolute and 
 superessential Good. That is, in the order of objectivity, the 
 Idea relatively to its elements stands next to The Good, of 
 which our notion is negative. Second, the Symmetrical, the 
 Beautiful, the Complete, the Adequate. That is, The Idea 
 considered as the result of combination is logically consequent 
 to The Idea considered relatively to its elements. Third, the 
 Intuitive Faculty and Prudence. That is, the psychic principle, 
 as saturated with self-cognition, is at once subject and object, 
 and accordingly logically consequent to The Idea, which is 
 wholly an object. Fourth, speculative and practical branches 
 of knowledge, and also professional skill, not consciously 
 grounded on scientific principles. That is, these branches 
 contain a purely subjective, as well as a noetic element, and 
 are therefore logically consequent to both the psychic principle, 
 the subject-object, and to The Idea. And, fifth and last. Pure 
 Pleasures, that is, the law of antecedence and consequence, 
 so far as it does not obstruct noetic efficiency. In brief, the 
 meaning of the passage is. The Good constitutes an Idea. 
 
APPENDIX D. 99 
 
 The one Extreme is the most objective of objects — The Idea 
 in immediate reaction to the superessential, and as yet unknown 
 Absolute. The other Extreme is the most subjective of objects 
 which can be called Good — sensuous pleasure, which does not 
 interfere with noetic efficiency. The Indifference of the two 
 Extremes is the psychic principle, which, being self-cognitive, 
 is both subject and object, and which as noetic power confronts 
 the Idea, and as emotive susceptibility is in contact with 
 pleasure. The second grade of the hierarchy is The Idea — 
 The Idea regarded as the result of its elements, in relation to 
 the subject. And the fourth grade contains a noetic element 
 which has an affinity to the noetic faculty, and an empirical 
 element which savours of the Indefinite. 
 
 The opinions of Ast, Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg, and 
 Stallbaum, may be found in Dr. Badham's Philebus, together 
 with his own view of the passage, Prsef. pp. xiv. — xviii. In 
 opposition to these authorities, the writer rests his interpreta- 
 tion, firsty on the simplicity of the antithesis between the 
 objective and subjective ; and second^ on the text itself. The 
 word KTr\\ia denotes a thing to be held by some one ; and the 
 two first grades of Kni/iara are said to be irepl, while the three 
 last are said to be identical with, certain things specified ; that 
 is, the act of acquisition in grades i and 2 is distinct from the 
 thing acquired ; but in 3, 4, and 5, is identical with it, or rather, 
 is another phase of the acquirer. But this is precisely the 
 distinction between an objectivo-object and a subjectivo-object. 
 The words xp^ vofxli^eiv, as is evident from the reply of Pro- 
 tarchus, ^atVerat yovv ek t<jjv vvv XEyojxiviJv, refer to the previous 
 discussion of the nature and affinities of^povriffig and'H^ov^, Phil. 
 65 — 66 ; so that the passage is really equivalent to oiroaa Toiavra 
 rrjp cllBlov ypnTai ^vciv, and may therefore be rendered, al/ such 
 things as have taken on themselves the eternal Nature ^ i. e., are such, 
 because they have taken on themselves, the eternal Nature. This 
 rendering agrees with Trendelenburg's translation, **quidquid 
 ejusmodi seternam naturam suscepisse credendum est," save that 
 Toiavra is taken as a predicate and the interpretation is different. 
 Dr. Badham's objections apply to both renderings, and are as 
 follows : — " In the first place, oiroaa xp>) Toiavra vo^i^eiv k. e. 
 cannot be taken thus ; for this would be expressed by oTroaa, 
 roiavT ovTUf "xpri vop'^ctv — and though the order might be 
 
 H 2 
 
lOO APPENDIX D. 
 
 changed, the participle would be indispensable. But, even 
 if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of 
 Trpwroj/ fiey Trrj Trspl fierpov ? It is obvious that, in such a case, 
 irtpL has no meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an 
 expression as, "to have adopted (or received) the eternal 
 nature," is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For 
 if the Good is to be sought for in these, it must be because 
 they are emanations or productions of it ; whereas, according 
 to this view, the Good is superadded to them, and that through 
 their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will 
 understand yprjcrOai in the sense of 7rapEt\rj(j)evai, or still less 
 of eiXrixivai. And then, again, why have we the perfect ? In 
 speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular 
 time, the proper tense would have been iXeadai. Those who 
 feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by 
 a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted 
 from them ; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, 
 because it would amount to this — that Plato, having sought by 
 a laborious argument for that which had most affinity with the 
 Good, at last found it — in the Idea of the Good." Now, ovra 
 would spoil the sense, as it would imply that, already being 
 so and so, they had taken on the eternal Nature ; as in the 
 same dialogue, we have TrpoaayopEveig avr dvofioi ovO* irsp^ 
 ovo^aTL, Phil. 13, a.; that is, you call things which are already 
 dissimilar by a distinct name ; whereas the meaning is, that 
 they are so and so, because they have taken. With regard to 
 irpuJTov fjLEv TTT) TTEpl fiETpov, why caunot 7r£joi havc the same 
 construction and meaning as in the next clause and in Symp. 
 203, c, and Epist. ii. 312, e., Pol. 258, d., 297, c. and else- 
 where passim^ viz. : to denote the id circa quod of anything. 
 The full construction is izpCiTov KTrJixd iarL Tvepl fierpov kcu to 
 fxerpiov Koi Kaipiov, the words being ranged in their logical order. 
 The most valuable acquisition deals with ^erpoy, Measure, Limit, 
 and the Limited, and (therefore, because Limited) the suitable 
 for some end or other. That is, suitableness comes from prior 
 adaptation, and adaptation comes from the adapting principle 
 fiETpoVf TTEpag. With regard to the order of the words, irapd* 
 oTToaa Toiavra occur in this order, Phileb. 54, b., 19, c, 42, d., 
 and the full construction is Trdvd, oiroaa itrn roiavTa, d k. r. \., as 
 in Polit. TTEpl rd IvfifioXaia irdyd\ OTroaa keItui vo'/j(/ia, TrapaXaf^ovtra, 
 
APPENDIX D. 1 01 
 
 305, b. ; and see on the omission of the copula, Prof. Campbell's 
 note on Polit. 281, c. p. 92. As to the position of yj^r\ with the 
 infinitive, any one who cares to investigate the matter, will 
 see that Plato places x9r\ both before and after the infinitive, 
 apparently guided merely by sound. The word ■^pr\aQai expresses 
 exactly, choice determined hy proper grounds^ in which case the 
 thing chosen is logically prior to the chooser. Besides, jprJffdaL 
 need not, and must not, be taken in the sense of either 
 TrapEikrjcpevaL or el\r)xevai. If we recollect Plato's use of Ojoc'yt <70at, 
 F/iced. 65, c. ; 75, a.; J^ep. syz, a.; I^pist. ii. 312, E.; and 
 Aristotle's objection to Plato's applying icpUadai and opelig to 
 the Numbers, Ethic. Eud. i. 8, we shall see, not only no 
 difficulty, but perfect propriety in the use of the word to express 
 the complete distinctness and harmony of the elements of the 
 Idea. We have a phrase of a similar kind in the Philehus 
 itself, faJc dyadd jiev ovk ovra, iviore ^i Koi evia Bcj^d/zeva rrjv t<jjv 
 dyaddiy eariy ote (pvaiv 32, d. Ae^fadai is, as the sense 
 requires less strong, but the general notion is the same — of 
 two things, and of a relation between them. Then, again, as 
 the perfect tense signifies past and present time, it is the 
 proper one to denote the non-transient nature of The Idea. 
 The reading suggested by Dr. Badham and by Professor W. H. 
 Thompson, evpijaOai, would refer to the process of search, rather 
 than to the nature of the thing sought; but the previous 
 discussion turned altogether on the latter point, Fhit. 66. 
 Finally, Plato finds the Bonuvi most akin to Good in The Idea ; 
 for the Good is unknowable ; which is the doctrine of the 
 Republic, vi. 509, a; vii. 517, be. The meaning oi tcrr^^a is 
 illustrated by ih^Laws, 5, 726, irdvTiov yap rwv avrov KTTi^aTijJv 
 fjitTU Oeovq 4'^x^ deiorarov* 
 
APPENDIX E. 
 
 THE PLATONIC NUMBER. Rep, 8, 546, b— e. 
 
 Fries, PlatorCs Zahl, Heidelberg, 1823, cited by Goettling, 
 Aristot. Pol. pp. 411 — ^413, has shown that this number is 
 5,040; the number to which Plato in the Laws, 5. 737 e. 6, 
 771 a, limits the lots of land. This number, Aristotle Pol. 
 5. 10, I. calls (TTEpeoQ, I.e. a solid figure. For, as two factors 
 generated the plane figure, the rectangle, so three factors 
 generated the solid figure. These modes of thinking are 
 preserved in our words Square, and Cube. The factors of the 
 Platonic Solid, which represents the perfect human animal, 
 are according to Fries 3' x 4* x 5.7 = 5,040. Now, if we attach 
 Pythagorean values to the several figures, the significance of 
 the mysterious Number becomes apparent. According to the 
 Pythagoreans, 3 is the symbol of the Definitive and For- 
 mative Principle ; 4 of the Inert and Material principle ; 5 is 
 the symbol of Colour or Quality ; and 7 of Life, Health, and 
 Intelligence. To apply this to the passage in the Republic, 
 the human Solid is at its best, when it combines, in due proportion, 
 Motivity, Solidity, Colour, Vitality and Intelligence ; and the first 
 downward step in the Ideal Republic is, when its citizens 
 produce children, who fail in maintaining this proportion. 
 The Platonic number has become the proverbial representation 
 of something mysterious and unintelligible, but it may be seen 
 that Aristotle rejects it, not because it is mystical, but because 
 it is untrue, Pol. 5, 10, i. To see why a truism is presented 
 to us in such a formidable guise, we must recollect the Platonic 
 fashion, derived from Pythagoras, of attaching a specific Number 
 to a specific Quality ; as for example, to the Tyrannic Soul, 
 Rep. 9, 587 b e, and to the Structural Solids of the Timaeus. 
 This, in Platonic Language means, that without the One — the 
 Limit — every thing is indefinite and incogitable ; a proposi- 
 tion worked out in the Parmenides : 157 b — 159 b, 164 b to end, 
 and in the Philebus the Limit, to Trepag is defined to be every 
 relation and degree of Number and Quality. This doctrine. 
 
APPENDIX E. 103 
 
 Verification apart, even when applied to the extended universe, 
 is not more startling than the chemical doctrine of Definite 
 Proportions. In fact, Plato would have revelled in Chemistry ; 
 we would have had a Dialogue, The Chemist^ enforcing the 
 propositions, where there is quality to ttoIov, there there is Numbery 
 TO irepag ; where there is Number^ there there is Intelligence Noyg : 
 and where there is Noi/g, theu there is Soul xj^xn- Phil. 30 c, 
 Tim. 30 a. Nor would the higher doctrines of Modern Physics 
 be rejected by the Academy. If light be motion, if heat be 
 motion, if sound be motion, and if they all be Modes of 
 one and the same force, we would have the same Sorites, 
 Motion, Force, Energy, Number, Intelligence, and Soul, in a 
 word, Spiritual Physics. 
 
APPENDIX F. 
 
 THE HARMONY OF THE REPUBLIC, THE LAWS, AND THE 
 POLITICUS. 
 
 It is proposed to shew the general harmony on all important 
 points of the Republic, the Laws, and the Politicus ; and 
 also to point out, that whatever differences exist, arise neces- 
 sarily out of the special purpose of each dialogue. 
 
 1. As to the End or Scope of Polity. In the Laws, the 
 End or Scope of Polity is Aper?? — to apiaroy. Legg. 628 c, 
 692 a. b., 693 a. In the Republic, the Scope is Atfcaioavv?? = to 
 aptaroy from the subjective side. As to the Politicus, the 
 Scope is that the ruler, by means of science and justice, should 
 improve the morale of his subjects. Polit. 293 d. e. 
 
 2. As to the Means of attaining the Scope or End. The 
 Means are in themselves indifferent, provided the End is 
 actually attained. Rep. 7, 540 d., Polit. 292 c, that is, it is 
 indifferent whether the Sovereign be one or many, or whether 
 wealth or poverty is made the test of constitutional efficiency. 
 
 Now the Means are of three kinds. 
 
 1. The Means put into requisition by pure Science, as 
 set forth in the Republic. 
 
 2. The Means put into requisition by Time or circum- 
 stances. Legg. 3, 676 a b. 
 
 3. The Means put into requisition by the Scientific Ruler, 
 who adapts circumstances to the great End. This third case 
 is embodied in the Philosophic King, the Royal Weaver of 
 the Politicus, 294 a, 305 e. 
 
 In the first case. Polity fit^ in the second, Nascitur; in the 
 third, Nascitur et fit. 
 
 4. With regard to the object of each treatise. The Republic 
 discusses what is AiKaioavyri, i.e. Virtue in the individual. 
 Rep. ii. 369 a, 372 e. Rep. iv. 420 b c, 430 c, 431 a b, 432 a, 
 433 d> 434 d e, 435 e, 441 a c, 442 d e, 443 b c, 445 a c, Rep. 
 V. 449 a d, 462 b c, 472 b d. Rep. vi. 484 b, Rep. vii. 541 b. 
 Rep. viii. 543 d, 545 a b c, 548 d, 550 c d, 553 e, 554 b, 555 a b, 
 
APPENDIX F. 105 
 
 558 c, 559 d e, 561 e, 564 a, 566 d, Rep. ix. 571 a, 574 e, 576 c, 
 577 c, 578 a, 579 c, 580 c d, 588 b, 592 a, Rep, x. 605 b, 612 c. 
 The Laws deals with the province of Legislation opOoVr/ro'c re 
 jcat a/uaprmc Trcpi vo'/xwv, ^nc Tore eort ^vo-et I, 627 d; and the 
 Politicus sets before us the Master of Statecraft, who combines 
 the comprehensiveness of a Code with the power of scrupu- 
 lously adjusting it to the specialities of Cases, 294 a b, 295 
 b — 296 a. 
 
 One would imagine that a disciple of the Positive School 
 would bear in mind the distinctness of the provinces of Ethics 
 and Legislation, yet Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his anxiety to point 
 out the inconsistencies of Plato, confounds Law and Morality 
 in the following passage : ** Even the Socratic view of Virtue 
 being identical with Knowledge, consequently of Vice being 
 Ignorance, and therefore involuntary — even this idea he learned 
 in his old age to repudiate, as we see in the Laws (v. p. 385), 
 where he calls incontinence no less than ignorance (^ cC dfia- 
 6iav 7) ^i' aKpareiav) the cause of Vice. In the same sense 
 (iv. p. 138), after speaking of anger and pleasure as causes of 
 error, he says, " There is a third cause of our faults, and that 
 is ignorance {rpirov Qyvoiav tQv dfiapTrifidTtJv airUiy). So that 
 here he places Ignorance only as a third Cause ; and by so 
 doing, destroys the whole Socratic argument respecting the 
 identity of Virtue and knowledge." — History of Philosophy, i. 
 214- — 3, 3rd edition. Whatever destruction there is, does not 
 come of Plato. I do not know to what edition Mr. Lewes 
 refers, but the passage in the fifth book occurs in 734 b. Steph. 
 The second I am unable to find, except in the ninth, 863 b c. 
 Now, in the ninth book, Plato expressly raises the question, 
 How is Legal Responsibility compatible with his doctrine that 
 Vice — Injustice — dlLda — is involuntary ? Legg. 9, 860 b. — 861 e. 
 Plato resolves the difficulty by pointing out, that though Vice — 
 dlida — is involuntary, yet that p\d(3r} — damnum — damage in the 
 legal sense, may be caused either purposely or not. Now, 
 as was shown before. Justice — individual Virtue — tliKaioavvr) — 
 is the ascendancy in action of the higher principles, and 
 Injustice — d^ida — of the lower. But the Legislator is mainly 
 concerned with dfictpTtinara, i.e. Delicts, and with the motives 
 which lead to them — in Roman language their Causce — namely, 
 Passion or Anger — Qv^xo^ ; Pleasure or Sensuality — »/^ov/f ; and 
 
106 APPENDIX F. 
 
 Ignorance, either mere absence of Knowledge, or positive 
 Delusion, ayvoia, 863 b c. Hence, Plato quite consistently 
 tells us that, an act may be just, but at the same time damnific, 
 and that another may be unjust, but beneficent, 863 e, 864 a. 
 T7?V yap Tov dvjjLov — TT^v TOLavTr}y (3XdPr]v. In modern words, 
 the question. Is A liable to an action in tort ? has nothing to 
 do with the question. Is A in a state of Grace ? 
 
 In the first passage quoted by Mr. Lewes, Plato is talking 
 of the causes which make a man fall short of ffwcppoavvr], tov 
 (7(i)([)pove~ty ivhriQ a>V, 5, 734 b, and he puts down as causes, 
 djxaQia and a'lCjOaVtia, i.e. a want of ^poprjmg and of dpdpeia. 
 But in tracing the historical growth of states, in Legg. 3, 4, he 
 tells us that he is talking of every day ffwippoavvi], 710 a, and not 
 of abxppoavvt] in its high sense ; and he also insists that a Law 
 should not be merely a command or prohibition, but should 
 have a prooemium or preamble containing the reasons which 
 induce the Legislator to make the Law, 4, 721 — 723 b. The 
 Legislator should also give his subjects a catalogue of divine 
 and human things in their order of desirability. The student 
 of Bentham will remember two similar suggestions. Now 
 amongst these desirable objects are the various kinds of 
 moral life suited to the individual ; and one of these is the 
 temperate, aiocpp^v, in the popular sense ; and the two causes 
 which impede aw(ppoavv7] are uKpareia and dfiadia, that is, in the 
 popular sense, for he had shown in the Protagoras, that 
 dfxaOia was the essence of all Vice. Here then the Legislator 
 is obviously dealing with the motives of Delict and its opposite. 
 In brief. Ethical Wrong — Vice — is involuntary dKovaiovy and is 
 the result of ignorance dfxadia : but Legal Wrong — Delict — dfidp- 
 rr?jua, is the result of dfxaQia, as well as of other causes, and 
 is both aKovaiov and EKovaiov. Besides, the Laws, all through, 
 is conceived in a popular spirit : Plato's assistants are from 
 Sparta and Crete, intellectually the least cultivated of Greek 
 states. Plato, on a remarkable occasion, claims to manage 
 the discussion all his own way, 10, 892 d e, and the Cretan 
 thinks Homer a clever fellow, though he has not read much of 
 him, 3, 860 c. The treatise, too, opens with the statement 
 that the author of Laws is Gfoe, 624 ; and Qeoq and deioQ are 
 always in Plato opposed to rf'x*"^* science, Ion. 542 a b, Mem. 
 99 c, io end. On the whole, we may pronounce the Laws 
 
APPENDIX F. 107 
 
 to be an adaptation of Platonism to popular intelligence and 
 sympathies, although even here, Plato maintains that the 
 peculiarities of the Republic are theoretically better than the 
 compromises of the Laws, 5, 739 b. e. 
 
 The different arrangements of the several polities in the 
 Republic^ the Politicus, and the Laws, which are set forth by 
 Professor Lewis Campbell in his introduction to the Politicus, 
 pp. XLi. — XLV., can be easily accounted for by differences in 
 the Principium Divisionis in each Treatise. Thus, the third 
 Laws deals with the historical growth of Polity, 3, 676 a. 
 The Republic deals with the various Polities in the order of 
 their deviation from the ideal State, Rep. 543 e — 544 a ; that 
 which deviates least, being least bad. There is only one Ideal 
 or perfect state, either Monarchy or Polyarchy, which governs 
 the Whole for the good of the Whole. All others are devia- 
 tions, and govern only for the good of a part. These deviations 
 are infinite in number. Rep, 445 e; cf. Polit. 291 a b; but in 
 this infinity of deviation, we find the four well marked types, 
 Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny. From the 
 point of view of the Republic, Oligarchy takes precedence of 
 Democracy, because Oligarchy governs on principle — the good 
 of the Oligarchy ; whereas Democracy has no principle at all, 
 ^^/- 8, 557 d c, and as the state is, so is the democrat, 561 c d. 
 
 Everything by starts, and nothing long, 
 and so the Democracy is a very pleasant and genial place to live 
 in, a.^ ov deffTTEffla Kal jj^cla rj TOiavrrj Staywyj? iv rw TrapavTiKa ; 
 558 a. Now the standard in the Politicus is imffTrJiJiri — science — 
 on the part of the Sovereign, be it one or many, and the 
 deviations are judged of by their pleasantness as constitutions 
 to live under, rig ovv Zri tSv ovk opduiv TroXireiuiv tovtojv rjfcicrTa 
 ■^aXEirrj (TV^fjv, Tracwi/ ^aXcTro/v ovatov, Koi rig f^apvTciTr}. Pol. 
 302 b. In this way, Democracy is more genial, and therefore 
 preferable to Oligarchy, which, judging from small towns in 
 general, must have been excessively unpleasant. 
 
 As to the Minos, the following points of resemblance be- 
 tween it and acknowledged dialogues must be admitted, what- 
 ever views be held as to its authorship. Mr. Grote and 
 Mr. Lewes have done good service to criticism in general, by 
 their protest against the German test of authenticity, the 
 Platonisches Gefiihl, which proves any thing. 
 
08 APPENDIX F. 
 
 1. AiKaioavPT] makes men dkaioi 314 c, it is also of para- 
 mount excellence, td. d. 
 
 2. 1] dXr]d7ig do^a deals with existence, 315 a. 
 
 3. Real existence is changeless, 316 b. 
 
 4. Laws are for the good of subjects, 318 a b. 
 
 5. Crete and Lacedasmon are praised as usual, 318 c d. 
 
 6. The good man resembles God, 319 a. 
 
 7. Zeus is a o-o^to-T-TJc, and has re'xv?/, 319 c. 
 
 8. Law is based on Morality, 320 a. 
 
 9. Law, in its effects, is compared to Gymnastic, 321 c d. 
 10. The definition of Law — Eoyfia TroXeivg — the will of the 
 
 State, is accepted with qualifiea-tion in both Minos, 314 d e, 
 and Laws, i, 644 d. 
 
APPENDIX G. 
 
 TRUE AND FALSE PLEASURE AND PAIN. 
 
 Few of Plato's modes of expression have been more vehe- 
 mently assailed than his application of the predicates true 
 and false to Pleasure and Pain. It has been condemned by 
 Mr. Grote, Professor Bain, and Mr. Poste. Whether the terms 
 are appropriate or not is a question of taste ; but the question 
 for the metaphysician is whether the explanation given by 
 Plato is sound or not. 
 
 Reserving the question of propriety of language, Plato's 
 explanation of the offensive terms is clear, and, I believe, 
 justifiable ; and it is somewhat odd that he carefully provides 
 against the very objection, which is urged against him. As 
 follows : an empirical judgment, Zolsx^ is true or false according 
 as it is verified or falsified by further experience. Thus I see 
 what I imagine to be a man under a tree : I approach nearer 
 and find it to be a wooden figure. My judgment, ?d^a, is 
 accordingly false. Phil, 38, c d. Falsity, accordingly, exists 
 only in the reference to future experience. But the subjective 
 impression, whether ultimately verified or falsified by further 
 experience, is never in itself false, ovkovv to do^d^op, av re opduiQ 
 ay re firj 6pdu)Q do^darjy to ye ^o^d^eiv ovtcjq ovdeiror ciTroXXufftv, 
 37 a b. In the same way, the pleasure, as actually experienced, 
 cannot be false, but may attract that predicate, when ex- 
 amined by the light of further experience, ovkovv koi to i^dofievov, 
 av re opduie dv re firj rjhriTaif to ye 6vT<i)g rjhadai hrjXov w'c ovdeiroTE 
 aVoXet, 37, b, c/. 37, e ; 38, a. In other words. Pleasure, as 
 a subject admits of the predicate, true or false, according as it 
 is followed by good or evil effects, 39, e. Pleasure and Pain 
 may be also termed true or false in relation to the Law of 
 Contrast, and the effects of the latter on the vividness of our 
 feelings. 
 
no APPENDIX G. 
 
 As to the appropriateness of the terms : Plato's Ethics are 
 rational and not sentimental ; it is, therefore,, not inappropriate 
 to apply such terms to Pleasure and Pain, and thus force us 
 to see that the Reason or Intellect is the ultimate judge of 
 human feeling and conduct. If Plato had used the terms 
 repented and unrepented^ no modern would have excepted, but 
 his terminology in that case would be sentimental and not 
 rational. I do not press his argument, that Pleasure and Pain 
 are Trotw nre, that is, as subjects admit of predicates of quality. 
 To discuss this fully belongs to the Metaphysics of Logic. 
 But it fully answers Mr. Poste's objection that " Pleasure can 
 never be an imaginary predicate, but always an immediate 
 sensation." Philebus^ p. 179. 
 
APPENDIX H. 
 
 Wordsworth's ode on immortality. 
 
 Mr. Mill tells us that the celebrated line, 
 
 " Our life is but a sleep and a forgetting," 
 is not Platonic, because we are capable of dydfiviKng. But, 
 surely, the process, which dvdfivrjffic counteracts, is Xrjdrj ; and 
 therefore, where there is no dvd^vnaiQ, our life is a forgetting. 
 Nay, more, the majority of men are not, in Plato's opinion, 
 (})i\6<To<poi, and therefore never go through the process of 
 dydjjLvriffiQ at all. I had intended adding an appendix on 
 Real Existence, but shall reserve it for a more fitting occasion. 
 In p. 36, sixth line from foot y a reference to Laws was omitted, 
 TO yap XvTTOVfiEvov fcat rihofxevov avrrjc (sc. \l'V)(rJQ) OTrep cijjJiog te 
 Kal TrXijdoQ Tro'Xeo/g eanv. 3, 689 a b. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 Erratum, 
 p. 58, Sz'xfh line from foot, insert the before Platottic Virtue. 
 
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