S^i5i\ The Fanagement of the War By Francis Hare ■" ■ V U "N^ '% THE Management OF THE xV IX. I N A LETTER T O A Tory -Member. ^7 -' — BelU geri placuit nuHos hAbifura triumphos, LONDON: Printed for ^. Baldwin, near the Oxford-Jrms in Warwick-Lane. 171 1. { [ I ] •■»— r- SIR. Nov.i:^^ 1 710. 7 AS little as I love Scandal, whatever fide it comes from, 1 have prevailed with my fclf, m Obedience to your Commands, to run over the Bundle you fenc me j and knowing ^youtobea Pcrfun of that Integrity and llo- " nour, as to have more regard to Truth than Party, I will without more Ceremony give ^ vou my Thoughts as you defire, upon fuch "Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will (ind not to be the lefs true or juft for the I laftc they are writ in i for plain Truths need no Difguife ,• Fidti- ooon and Ornament are of no Advantage, but ^whcn they ferve a Caiife, that can't bear to tr be feen in its true Light. This I hope will be ^ Excufe enough, for the many Marks of Hafle Q and Negligence you will meet with in this "" long Letter. You won't cxped: I fliouldconfider each of thele Papers by themfelves, that would be gi- ving too much trouble to one, who, 1 know^ is too good a Judge to think them of fo much Confequencc ^ The Letter to the Examiner is 'JL ^: mere Declamation, and confider'd in that ^ View is a pretty (mart Performance, and you $ ipay read it to be entcrtain'd, but not to be inform'd j there is fome Fire and Imagination, B but ^Soti.;^;;^' but no Reafoning, Judgment or Experience, plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in tim« ripen into fomething confiderable, and come up to the Author of Arlus and Odolpbuf^. which ii the Fidion of a more able Writer, and has the Beauties of a tolerable Romance ; and to Ihew the Skill of the Author, is very happi- ly call'd a Secret Hifiory • which is a Cover for all the Lyes the Father of them can invent, fince that Name immediately forbids all ask- ing of Queftions^ for were the Proofs to be ; produc'd, where would be the Secret ? I can't fay, I was fo well plea^'d with Sir Thomas, which 1 found fo dull and tedious, *twas im- poflible to get thro' it, there is, by all I could fee, neither Decorum nor Argument, nor Life in it ; the Author fhews he wasfadly put to it for Matter, when he is forc'd, to make up his Invcdive, to take in the Compafs of iz Years, the fatal Period fome among us are fo angry with, that is iS more, than the prc- fent Change is concerned in \ for 'tis but • four Years at mofl, that his Principals pretend to think Cfor think they don't, as I fliall fhew you by and by) that the Management of Af- fairs has been wrong. In lhort,*cis aftupid un- natural Piece, and what made me more fick of it,I have been told,'ris as ungratefulas 'tisfenfe- lefs, writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to thofe, whom he has with fo much Venome drawn his Penagainft. I don*tknow whether you will agree with me, when I tell'you,! think the Letter from a Foreign Minifier the molt artful Performance of them all,- the reft feem to be the Works of under Agents, from Diredion? and Hints mark'd out for them j but this I take- ta [3 3 to "be the Work of the chief Opsrator himfelf ; whoj if he was not at leifure to write more largely, has in this fhort Piece fafficiently ihewn, what a Right he has to the Efteem the World have long had for him • there being in it fome quick and crafty Turns, and an af- fe<5ted Appearance of Fairnefs, with which he gilds over the blackeft Poifon of Malice and Invention. You'll fee I ufe that laft Word in the modern Senfe of it ; and in my Mind the whole Letter is well enough contriv'd, to an- fwer its Defign ,• which plainly is, to pleafe FriendSj take offEnemies, amufe and quiet all, who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor en- ter into Patties, but by the new Scheme might be apt to be alarm'd. Faults on both fides has, to my thinking, a good deal of plain common Senfe in it, which Experience has all along juftify'd, and I dare fay always will. And common Senfe at this time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to ^ Paper, and that this Writer feldom loofes fight of, except where his Caufe obliges him to quit it ^ which it does in feveral places, but no where more than where he fpeaks of Credit, all which is as mean, as the late Ejfay upon that Subjecf^: ; and that I take to be the moft affeded uncom- mon myfterious Piece of Nonfenfe_, even this wonderful Year has produced. Taking thefe Papers together, there is one thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Archite(5l, under whom they hive all been form'd; and that is the Difference of Spirit one fees in them, according to the feve- ral forts of Readers they are intended to im- pofeon. One makes great Court to the To- B 2 rigs. rksj another is to gain the TVhigs, or divide them at leaft , others pretend mightily to Moderati- on^ to catch the Men that have Honefty and Temper^ and have not engag'd fiir in either Party,- others Teem chiefly defign'd to impofe on Foreigners^ and make them believe, all we have been doing thefe fix Monthj^ is only a perfonal Bufmels, that can have no Influence on the Publick ; that therefore the Allies, par- ticularly the Dutch, and the Houfe of Hanm- wr, fliould not be alarm'd to fee thofe Men difgracd, who, whatever other Faults they may have^ never lay under the Sufpicion of favouring Popery and France; but have been ever true to the Revolution : have always gone into Meafures for a vigorous Profecution of the War, and have ccnftantly been ftruggling to gain new Securities for the Defence of the Proteftanc Succeflion. The various Shapes of this Pofture-Mafl:er in Politicks, make this Bundle of Papers, mci- thinks, if you will pardon the Comparifon, not much unlike a Pedler's Rare-Show, in which there is a great Number of very diffe- rent Figures, ail in Motion at once ; which the gaping Spedators think there is forae ftrange Magick in, and that the Spring of Adionisin themfelves; when in Truth they are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, mov'd all by one and the fame fecret Hand, and ail contriv'd for the fi^me End, to delude and cheat the Multitude. And what is ftill more furprifing, this great Mafter himfelf has in his own Perfon afted, and that at the fame time, jril the different Parts, w hich his Tools in their Writings have but cppy'd from him. But [5] whatever various JPigures thefe Engines of his AfFeA to move in, and whatever different ways they take, they all make to the fame End , and agree in thofe Parts, of which you delire my Opinion, I mean in cenluring the Manage- ment of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the Reputation of thofe, who have been hitherto th^ chief Diredors of it. Upon which Head all they fay, may be reduc'd.to thefe four Points. '1:'''^/^'' --'■ • i/. That a good Peace might havfe been had at the end of the RamelUes Campaign. zdly. That the War in Spi??« has been fliame- fully nQgle<5i:ed, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we proposed by entring into the War. 5^//. That pulhing the War in Flanders was pUHiing it in the wrong Place, France being cover'don that fide with fo ftrong a Frontier. ^thly. That it is many ways apparent, that the Duke oi Marlborough has unnecelfarily pro- long'd the War for his own Interefl. Now if it can be (hewn, that thefe terrible Accufatlons are not only falfe in themfelves, but certainly known to be fo by the Authors of them, I leave it to you, to confider, what Regard ought to be had to fuchMen, or what Treatment they deferve, who have fo groily impofed upon the Nation, to the apparent Ha- zard of its Safety, and of lofing all the Fruits we might hope for, from a War, that has J>een hitherto conduced with fo much Glory and Succefs. To clear thefe great Points, we are defir'd, it feems, to go no farther back than the four laft Years at jqnioft \ in truth 'tis not much a- bove [6] bove three that there is any Difpute about : Till then^ all is allow'd to have gone well for certain Reafons, that held good, till about the time, that the French King difmifs'd Mon- lieur Cbamillard from the Finances, for no o- ther Reafon, that I have ever heard, but to ihew us what we ought to have done here at the fame time ; and 'twas not the Fault of thofe, who have play'd their Game better fince, that we did not. This was in February, 170^, all the Complaints we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the be- ginning of that Year, but without much Noile till thefe lafk fix Months. Since then we have been told, every thing relating to the War is wrong, and are fiU'd wich loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went abroad in gen- tle Whifpers only, or were not at all heard of. And Firft, They tell us, a Good Peace might (lave been had at the End of the Ramelliet Campaign. Now to decide this Queflion, we muft firft fettle what a Good Peace is ; and in order to that muft confider, what it was we went into the War for. No body wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain thefe two Ends, the Reftitution of the Sfanijh Monarchy to the Houfeof ^«/ri<2, and the procuring of a good Barrier againft France on the fide of the Ne- therlands. Without which two Points there can be no Security for Great-Britain, that their beft Trade will not be loft, and with it their Reli- gion and Government, and every thing that is dear to them ; for we ftiould every Minute be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery and and Poverty of France forc'd upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that moft arbitrary Prince, if helhould be fufFer'd to ftrengthen himfetf with the Addition of that vaft Monarchy, who was before much too Great for his Neigh- bours ^ to fay nothing of the Safety of the Dutch, or the Liberty of Europe ; the laft of which moft of us, I fear, have little or no Senfeof ,* and for the Safety of the Dutch, fo fatal a Delufion has polTeft many of us, that one may every Day meet with Men, who are filly enough to wim againft it. Now the Spa^ nifl) Monarchy, the Reftitution of which is the firft Article of the Grand Alliance, is known by every body to confift, befides the Spanijh Netherlands, of thefe two great Parts, of Sfain and the Indies, and q{ Milan, Naples and Sicily, with Sardinia, and the adjacent Ifles. And a good Barrier againft France means at leaft a better than the Dutch had be- fore,- which by theExperienceof fifty Years has been found to be much too weak for fb large a Frontier ,• the Spaniflj Flanders and its Capital City Gand^ having in truth no Cover at all j and5r<i^^»fbutavery poorone,- while the French being intire Mafters of the Lys and Schelde, both Provinces lie expos'd to their Invafions. Look but on fome large Maps of thefe Provinces, fuch as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will prefently convince you of the Truth of this. But if this Reftitution and this Barrier were thought ne- peffary at our ent'ring into the War, nobody, 1 prefume, will fay, they are lefs neceffary now, when fo much more has been done to gain thefe Ends, than any body at the Begin- ning [8] ning could ever hope to fee. A nd if thefe two Points are necelTary, then, no Peace without them can be a Good Peace. Let us then com- pare this Good Peace with what the French ofFei:'d at the end of the Ramellies Campaign ; which is fo far from being a Secret, that the Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the JEledor of Bavaria^ who was employ'd by the King of France to make the firft Overture, were immediately communicated to' all. the Allies, and by their Confent made publick : And who-ever will be at the Pains to look back to the News Papers, and Monthly Accounts of that TimSj or will confult even the common Yearly Colle<5tionSj will fee there is no Myftery in the Whole of that Affair j which, in fhort, is no Jiiore than this, that the French offer'd to give up to the Allies, which of thefe two they lik'4 beft, either Sfain and the Indks ^ or Milati, Nap- pies and Sicily 3 &c. Which Offer was unanx- moufly reJ6<9:ed. I fuppofe, there is no need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either Part of this Alternative, it being fo fhort of what upon our Ent'rance into the War was thought neceffary. To have been content with a Moiety of what we went into the War for, after fo maijy Succeffes, and not a few furpri- zingly Great, would have rendered us inexcu- fabie to all Pofterity ; and fome body, who, we are now told, prolongs the War, would have been faid to have been well paid for fuch a Peace ; 't va^ ould have been in the Language pf the Fadion, a plain Cafe we were lold to ^ France^ and nothing lefs than his Head could " Tiave \ [9] have aton'd for it. But inftead of proving the Abfurdity of accepting fuch a Peace, I fliall ihewyou rather, what to every body is notfb plain ,• and that is, that the French were not fineere ^ they meant notliingby their Offer but to araufe the Allies, and knew, they could not all agree to accept either Part of the Alterna- tive, and that England and Holland without the Emperor could not take Sfa'm and the Indiesy were they never fo much inclined to it. For had the Allies hearken'd to this Propofal, it had been in the Power of the French to have elos'd with which they wou'd. Now 'tis eafy to fee what this muft have ended in : For in fuch a Partition, there is no doubt, but as the Dutch and we Ihould have been for Sfain and the Indies^ 'tis as plain, the Emperor would have made the other Part his Choice, which is evidently beft for him. Which Part now o£ the Allies in this Divifion would France bemoft willing to comply with? or in other Words, which Part of the Monarchy would they chofe of the two to quit ? A Man muft be blind not to fee, that the Part the Emperor would like beft to have, the fame France would like beft to part with: Behold then the he- celfary Confequence of heark'ning to fuch Terms ,• the Confederacy broken, and the Ma- ritime Powers left to fhift for themfelves, without being able to obtain either of the Parts, when they ought to be content, accor- ding to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, with nothing lefs than both. . Who now, I would fain know, have moft Reafon to complain thatthefe Offers were re- C je^ed. ]tded, the Pedple of London or Pl^gnrM? They who might have had the Part they had moft mind to, if they would have abandon'd thdJr Allies, or we, who 'tis certain, befides the Infamy of fo bafe an Action, could have had nothing-? Had the Writers, who are fo ablei at making Sortiething out of Nothing, had tfteir IJot in Aufirian Ground, ' What a Field had thei'e been for them? What rare Matter to fhew their Skill in ? What fpecious Pre- tence?, without thQ help oi' Secret fJi/loryy t6 give out, that the Emperor wa^ ill advis'd ^ What! rejecft fo advantageous an Oflfer, by which fo great an Addition of real Strength' would have been made to the Houfe of Aulhia^, and that at a Time, when they were fo unabi& to carry on the War, when the People have beenexhriufted with continual Wars for more than Thirty Years! When the Malecontents are at the Gates of the Capitol !• When the King of Sweden infults in' that outrageous manner, the Irnferial Dignity, and every Mintlts threatens an Invafion ! Is that ar Time to reject fo Good a Peace, and h^zarcf the Safety of the Empire in Comple- ment to the Maritime Powers ? What wicked' Ccunfellors muftthefebe, who can advifeat this rate ? Is it not plain they arefalfe, arid' in feme other Interetl, or that they mind no- thing elfe but making their own Fortunes, when they ?.di fo manifeftly againft the Wel- fare and Honour of the Jw^eri^/ Family, and flic w they have no Regard to the Safety even oi' the Empire"? Would not this be the Lan- guage of cheI-a<5tion,if the Scene were changed froni' [ " ] from JUndon to Vienna^ And yet We don't hearj that either the Emperor or his People, have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Mi- njfters, who would not hearken to thdle Terms ^ inftead ofthat^ all the World chink it much for their Honour, that chey have ap- |>ear'd true to themieU^es^ anc| ^ithful to their ilUies^ ■ ip rpje(9:ing fo pit^f^land infecure a •j?eace. And is not this a Reproach to us^ who fuf- •fer ourjelvesto be deluded by fuch vile Inipo* ■fters, who would pertwade us oat of our ^cfes, that Half the Sfanijh Monarchy is ,a^ good as the V/hoIe,and that Nothing is as goodi as Halif. for I have fliewnyouj that one Half only was pfFer'dj and that even that could not •be had. It mud fore, to all Thinking Men, be very (urprizing, that we only of all the Allies ihou'd complain that this ridiculous Offer of the French w^s rejeded, vvhen we of all or them have moft reafon to be pleas'd with it : There eiuft needs be fome Secret inic above the reach of common Senfe, that all of a fadden this fiiou'd be made a Capital Crime in our Mini- fters, their not doing Three Years ago that, which if they had done, we fnould all before now have thought theydefervd to lofe their Heads for. I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Ar- ticle, and would iDe content I ihould fay no more info plain a Cafe, after fuch a Difco- very^the Impudence of thefe State Mounte- banks, who would have perfwaded u , that we were dangeroully ill, vyhen we law and felt our felves to be very well j and that wp C 2 " were were all undone^ if we did not leave the skil- ful and able Hands we had long us'd with fo much Succefs, to try their bcrafted Medi- cines, when we were not in thfe leaft want of them. ISlo body, if you will believe them, have fuch univerfal Remedies for all the Evils of the State as they ; and under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation, they take all the Pains they can to poifon it ; of which I have already given you one Ex- ample ;; you ftiall have more in what follows. But before I difmifs this Subject, I muft Iseg leave to obferve ope thing farther, which is of too much moment to be paft over j and that is. That they who have done their Coun- try fo much Service in reje(5ting this Offer from the French, would have done it ftill much greater, could they have prevented any Re- gard being given to it. For tho' the refufing thefe Terms could do no harm, the hearkning to them I vvill fhew you did a great deal. The Inclination fomeJPeople of thefameCompler xion with the Author of the Secret Hiftoryj^ exprefs'd to come to a Treaty with the French upon the Terms offer'd, rais'd in the Imperial Court a great Jealoufy, that the Maritime Powers were tampering with France, and ma- king Terms for themfelves, to which the Inte- reft of the Houfe oiJuflria was to befacrific'd: This put that Court upon Meafures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and ioccafion'd the two moft unfortunate Events that have happened all this War, Firft, This feiifpicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the French for evacuating th6 ' ^ MiU- [15 ] Milamfe, wichout the Privity of England and Holland, who did not know one Word of the Matter. And what do you think was the Confequence of this ? Why^ it gave ih^Frencb an Opportunity of fending immediately intp Spain a great Body of good Veteran Troops j and 'tis to this Reinforcement fent the Duke of ^njou, that we owe the Lofs of the Bat- tle of Jlmanza, which prov'd fo fatal to our Affairs on that Side ; if thofe Troops had not joyn'd, we had been Superior to the Enemy, and that Battle had either not been fought, or it had been won, and Spain with it, confider- ing the ill Condition the Duke of Jnjou s Af- fairs were then in ; and the true Reafon we ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Jun- ftion, which we did not know, or at leaft did not believe, was made at the Time we fought ; a Miftake, we may think, very eafjiy made in Spainy when 'tis known, we owe the Victory of Ramellies to the French making the very fame Miftake in Flanders, where they thought the Englijl} had not at that Time joyn'd the Con- federate Army, and reckon'd for certain that the Danes at leaft, neither had, nor could .' And this Perfwafion made them venture a-Bat- tle, which the French have fo much reafon to remember, without waiting for a eonfidera- ble Body of Troops, that were coming to them from the Rhine, the Head of which were adually at Namur, when Monfieur Vil- kroy began his March towards the Confede- rates. But to return, 'tis plain the Fre»c/> had not gain'd the Battle of Almanz^a without that Reinforcement from Italy, and even with it, thp' [ '4] tho' the Battle was fought m [Aprils ani^otjir Army was in a manner ruin'd by that Blow, all they did that Year, w^s only to take L^ri;. da. But that Reinforcement pou Id not have been fent^, had not the Secret Treafty for the Evacuation of the MiUnefi been made ,• and the Treaty had not been .ipadc^ had not the Jealoufy rais'd in the Imperial Court, by the Inclination of fome Peor ple^ exprefs*d to hearken;. -to -the Q^t of the French y made therqi refolve upon fecuring fpmething for tliemfelves. i^d the fatne Jealoufy put theifl upon 'taking another Step, no lefs prpjudicial to th§^ poair monCaufe*, a,i^that was the Expedition ^tp Nayks, which they could nptbe preyail'd with- to defer upon the repealed and raoft preffing Inftances th^t the Maritime Powers made t<p^ them by their Minifters_, both at Vienna' iand Italy. And the Confequence of the Expedici*. on was, that it not only diverted a great part, of the Troops, that were to execute the Pro- Jed on Toulon, but retarded for a confiderable time the March of the reft ,• and this Lofs of Time, and lelTening of their Numbers, feem to have been the chief Occafions of the Mif- carriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court fo obftinately bent on thac unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they had, that Nafks as well as Milan, would at the H<^gt*e be given up to flicilitate a Peace, \A;hich they were refolv'd to prevent, by get- ting Poffeffion as foon as they could. This is all we have got by heark'ning to thofe Of- fers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime we mi we' did not clofe with^ the Lo(s of the Battlo o( Almanzui, and tlie Mifcarriage of thePro- je<a on Toulot), the greateft, moft important^ beft concerted Enterprize that was ever en- tred on. And both thefe Misfortunes had in all Probability been prevented^, had the Of- fers of the French b^en roundly rejected at the ftrft, and no Occaifion of Jealoufy had, by lift- ning to them, beeii given the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fad, which thefe Writers, or thofe at leaft that didrate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that two and two make four ; and if they have any Modefty, they will blufh when you let them fee their inventions thus expos'd. After faying fo much of that Part of the Of- fer the French made, which concerns the Par- tition they propos'd of the Spanijli Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted if we could, and could not if we would ,• there is no need of telling you, what Barrier was of- fered (or thQ Net her lands ^whichthQ Dutch WQTQ moft concern'd in, who don't ufe to negled good Offers to come at Peace, if we may be- lieve the Fadibn, who have for a long time pretended td fear nothing fo much, as their quitting the Alliance for their own feparate Intereft. Tha' now the noble Firmnefs they . have fhewn in adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfadion of all Parties, is by thefe ill defigning Politicians, who can take every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime ; a Crime perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer ; or if they are, 'tis not for want of foriie Mens^ taking the moit efil'dual Methods to cure them [ i6 ] them of a Fault, which I don't remember they were ever before blam'd for. That this is the whole Truth of this Mat^ ter, that thefe and no other, were the Offers the French made after the Ramellies Campaign ; I will give you, befides thofe already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thoufand Demonftrations, and that is a Letter of the French King to the Pope, on this Subjed, writ in the following Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an end^ and a new Campaign was entring upon. This Letter may be found in the Mercure Hi- fioricfue & Foliti(]m, Tom. 4.'^- pag. 3?. an4 here follows a Tranflation of it. Letter of the King of France to the Pope. Dated at Ver failles, ij Feb. 1707. THE Care "which your HoUnefs continues to take for procuring the Feace o/Europe is always tcjually agreeable to us. We have nothing more at Heart than to fecond your Endeavours^ and we 'wou'd even prevent you in any thing we eou^d do to make them effeBual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, fo we Jl^all feek Occafions to end it, by the mofi ready and eajy Methods. Tour HoUnefs has been informed, that we have already tnade frequent Advances to come to fo whole fome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that CathoUck Princes, ftruck with a Fear of diffleafmg their ARies., jhou^dyet refufe to hear ['7] bear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jefui Chrifi. When we left it to the Arbitration of your Holinefs tofatisfy the Rights and Demands of the Ewperor, by a valuable Compenfation, upon fame Farts of the Spanifh Monarchy : The Minifiry of your Holinefs were charg*d with the Care of making the Prcpofal of it to that Prince. But wit if what Haughtinefs did he rejeB it I Having faid Things exorbitant J and infoUntly demanded that our Grandfon jljoud be recalled. Who cou*d have thought y mofiholy Father y that he wnud have made fo arrogant a Return to an injulied Kingy to a Mi- nifier of your Holinefs ^ and to our Love of Teacd For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable t0 the Houfe of Auftria_, feem'd then to threaten ity by the Superiority of our Forces ^ and by eur gaining the Battle (^/Caffano. But God, who is the Ma- fier of Events, changed the Pofiure of our Affair S' Tet tho we were employ^ d with the Cares of repairing ourhDffes, we had (I ill in our Minds the Idea we had conceiv'd of Peace, at the time even of our greats e{l Trofperity. We renew'd to Holland the Of- fer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Se- curity demanded for their Trader referring it Hill to our felves to treat with the Emperor a- bout a Compenfation. Fropofiions fo reafonable were again rejeBed by the Intrigues of that Party, which had {hew'd it felf averfe to the Ad- vancement of our Grandfon : And then we em- ployed all our Thoughts to increafe our Vreparati-^ ons for a War, which had been violently and un- jujlly declared againfi us. Neverthelefs as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious Exhortations of your Holinefs: And to the End that ourEnemies may have no pretence to impute to us the jLofs offo muchChrifiian Bloody as is aU D ready [ x8] ready fpilty and now going to be let out, vfe "will give your Holinefs a plain and frank Account of the Diffofition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holinefs y that the King our Grand~ fen J has intrufied us with full Tower to convey the Arch-Duke a Part of thofe Eftates that compofe the Spanifli Monarchy. The Caiholick King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards ^ and is contenPto reign over them. It only depends therefore on the Emperor to ex- plain himfelf at this time, who may have, if he pleajesj for ever reunited to his Family, The Mi- innefcj Naples^ and Sicily, with the other I (lands belonging to Spain_, that are fituate in the Mediterranean Sea. We (hould cafly agree about a Barrier for the Republick of the united Provinces : -And the Two Pretences for the War, being thus removd^ it woudnot be difficult to put an End to thofe Mif- fortunes, which'EuroipQ has becnfo lotig opprefs*d with. JVe pray God that he will preferve your Holinefs a great many Tears in the Government of his Church. Your Devout Son, the King of France and NavsrrCy S. Louis. I fhall leave it to yonr felf to make the Refle- xions which naturally arife from tiiis Letter^ and having thus plainly (hewn you how ground- lefs [ '9 1 lefs the firit Complaint of thefe Writers is, I (hall endeavour to prove to you with the fame Glearnefs, that there is as little Ground for ths next, which is this : 2. That the War in Spain has been Ihame- fully neglected, tho* the Recovery of that King- dom was thechief thing v^e propos'd by entring into the War. This is the mofl; plaufible of all their Com- plaints, and yet I doubc not but I fliall eaiily convince you, that it has, ifpoflible, lefs Senfe in it than any of the reft. We that live at home have for the moft Part, no other Way to judge of Affairs abroad, but by Events ^ and things having fuccccded but ill on the Side of Spain^ or at leaft very fhorc of the Expectations we were fiU'd with, that a Revolution there might be compafs'd with as little Trouble as it was here, v/e readily give into any Infinuations or Surmifes, be they never fo groundlels or ex- travagant, that impute the Event we did not exped, to ill Conduct or Mifmanagtmsnt ^ 'tis the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be knowing, or judging at leafl, whether they know or not, which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reafon, to account for things, es- pecially when they don't go to their Mind ; they take for granted, wherever there is want of Si-iccefs, there is a Faulty and 'tis fome A- mends they fancy for a Difappointmenr, if they can firfl lay the Blame ibmewhcre, no matter where : ' Tis this Humour makes this Complaint fo popular • and when the Fadion has given out that the War in Spain has been negl^^ckd, 'tis cafily believ'd by thofe that know no becter : but a very little Examination will clear up this D 2 Matter Matter to the meaneft Underllanding, This Complaint mufl: mean one of thefe two Things, either that the Parliament has not been mov'd to make fufficient Provifion for the War in Spain^ or that the Provifion made by Parliament has been mifapply'd j and that either here at home, or by thofe who have commanded the Forces that have been fent thi- ther. If the Parliament was not moved to make fufficient Provifion for the War in Spain^ or there was any Neglcd here at home, it will concern thofe whom this Complaint comes from, to ihew they had no Part in the Manage- ment they now complain of^ or elfe they will come themfclves into fomc Part of the Blame ; unlefs it can be prov'd that they made pro- per Remonilrances againit the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the Neg- led was not here but in Spain^ it they mifap- ply'd the Mony, and return'd falfe Mufters, or did not manage the Troops they had to the beft Advantage_, let thofe who were entrufted with the Command there look to that. 'Tis a pret- ty great Prefumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at home, that they who in chat Cafe had moll Reafonto complain, have been fo filent, tho' it fo highly concerned them^ for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill SuccelTes from rhemfelves : But to come a little to Particulirs. This Complaint is dated with one Confent from the Battle of y^lmamc:^ ynd yet, in all Reafon, they ought to hove looK'd back at leaft one Year further : For *cis yet a Secret how themighty Advan- tage we had over the Enemy upon raifing the $iege oi Barcelona came to end as it did, when ws ; i A [51 ] we had fo fair a Profpedof making an entire Conqueft of the whole Kingdom : Why don't they ask. What was the true Reafon that ob- liged K. Charles to lofe fix Weeks at Barcelona^ when he Ihould have been haftening to Aladrid ? Why my Lord G. and the Portuguefe General who lay fo long in the Neighbourhood of Aia- drid, could have no Intelligence from thofe who commanded in Catalonia} Why, when K' Charles did at laft march to join the Portu- guefe, his Orders were not obey'd, when he defir'd that all the Troops thatcould be drawn together fhould be fent to reinforce thofe he had with him, which might have enabled him to give the French a Battle, and have ended the War on that fide at once ? And as to the whole Gonduft of the War in Catalonia^ to the End of that Year, why don't they ask, What Care was taken in tranfmitting Mufter-Rolls, and what became of the Money iflued for thac Service ? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay fome not five Men in them ; which made the ^pani/h Service fo beneficial to the Officers, that they return'd home full of Money, a Thing ve- ry uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among the inferiour Officers in the Flanders- Army ^ 'tis not eafie by all I have ever heard, to find a lingle Inflance? One would think whenfo much Complaint is made upon this Subjed, thefe were proper Points to be enquir'd into • which, as great a Secret as they are at prefent, may one Day belaid open, foas every body may be able to fee what Negledt there has been, and whofe Door it lies at : But to come to the Bat- tle of y^/w<?»^<«, from which their Complaints are [ 2^ ] are dated, what occafion'd the Lofs af that Bat- tle, or which comes to the fame thing, what gave the French that greatSuperioricy of Troops I have told you before, it was the Reinforce- ment which the French^ by the Evacuation of the Milanez.e^ were at Liberty to fend from Italy to S^ain ^ a Thing which in England we did not know till it was too late to fence a- gainft it. What Pains had been taken htire at home, to enable K. Charles to recover the Ground hi- liad lofl^upon his Retreat from Ma* dridj has been fo vyell fhewn in an Anfwer I have read to that Pavt of Faults on Both Sides which relates to this Matter, that I fliall beg Leave to refer the Reader to it. As to the general Scheme of the War on that Side, and the Provifton made for it, let thofe who clamour upon this Head fhew us that they difapprov'd it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think for once there is fome Sincerity in what they fay ; but till then I Ihall take Leave to fufpeA all they fay on this Head is only an Invention to infufe groundlefs Prejudices into the People againft their beft Friends : And for my own part, I am fully perfwaded that thefe Writers, or thofe at leaft whofe Tools they are, have been long convinced, from all the Experience we have hadof the Spani/h War ^ and particularly from the Battle of Almanz^a^ and what followed upon it, that the befl thing for England, is to draw the War on that Side into the leaft Compafs we conveniently can, and keep on the Defenfive only, contenting our felves with maintaining the Pooling we had got, without pretending to to more than to be in a Readinefs to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Aftion, which either the Weaknefs or Negligence, or ill Con- dud of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might be invited to by the Encouragement gi- ven us by thofe that are in the jiuftrian Intc- reft. This, I dare fay, thofe Gentlemen think is the true Foot we (hould put the Spani/h War upon: and that it fhould be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and not employing our own Men, which can't be done without the greateft Inconveniencies j be- fides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, be much more ufefully employed nearer home; and therefore I can think nothing to bejfarthcr from thefeMens Thoughts than what is fo much in their Mouths, that this War has been neg- ledied, and that greater Provifion ought to havq been made for it: My Reafon why I think them fo infincere^ is plainly this, that they can't but know the great Difference there is be- tween an Offenfive and Defeniive War, and that what they feem to contend for is impracticable, and the moft effedtual Way we can take, never to have what their Writers and their Friends pretend to be fo mightily concern'd for ; 'Tis fo evident to all that know any thing of thefe Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the French and we muft make an OfFenfive War in that Country ; But nothing can make this fo plain as to put a Cafe to you. Suppofe then, to humour thefe Men, we were to fend from hence an Augmentation of 20000 Men, or for our own Share lOooo, to Catalonia^ fliallwe not then have loooo lets in Flanders^ and may not the French lefTcn their Army [ H^ Army there by the fame Number ? Suppofe then the French and we both would fend an Aug» mentation of i oooo Men thither, les us (fee what will be the Confequence : The Men we fend will be tranfported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Gaels when they will come thither, and confequently can be fure of nothing, that depends upon their Ar* rival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark* and when Deductions are made for Sicknefs and Defer- tion, while they lie at Portfmoutb^ waiting for Ships and Winds ; and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in fo long a PafTage, ef- pecially if any malignant Diftemper get among them, when we coniider how unable thefe Men will be for Service, upon landing after fo long a Voyage, which will make it abfolutely necef- fary for them to go into Qparters of Refrelh- ment, before they take the Field • the Chance they have of arriving at the moft unwholfome Seafbn of the Year, the Difference of that Cli- mate from our own in all Seafons, the Numbers that will be fwept away by drinking immode- rately thQ Ri'oag Spani/h Wines, which 'tis im- poffible to keep Men from, when they are cafy to be come at, and the intemperate eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army i the many Men that will be loft by ma* Yoding in a ft range Country, before they know where they are, a Word Soldiers are well ac- quainted with, and by which an Army lofes more Men than can be eafily imagin'd by thofc who are Strangers to thefe Matters^ when all thefe things are confider'd, after fo much Ex- pence and Time, I believe our looop at the End [=5 ]. End of two Months after their Arrival, will^ upon a modeft Computation^ be found not to exceed 4000 EfFeftive. Let us now fee what will become of thofe Men France fends : They may be fetch'd from Dauphine and that Neigh- bourhood, and their Place may be fupply'd from the Rhinej and theirs again from Flanders : They may be fent at the moft proper Seafon of the Year ; their March may be made in a Montfi or fix Weeks ; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all things may be concerted againit the Time they Ihall be fit to enter upon Adion. Their Tranfportation cofts nothing, and when they arrive, they are what they fet out, icooo Men ; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, are fo little different from their own, that *ds very little they fuffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quar- ter from the Peafants of the Country, than He* rcticks can hope for, which makes no inconfide- rable Difference : So that to France 'tis in a manner the fame thing in all Refpects to fend Men to Spain as 'tis to Flmders ; but to us, 'tis not only a vaft Expence, but almoft all to no Purpofe. But this is not all • I would ask thefe Gentle- men, how thefe Troops when they come to Spain fhall fubfift ; how they Ihali get Horfes^ or find Forage, or be provided with fufficienE Magazines ? They that know any thing of Spain^' can tell them (but I know they don'c want to be told J that the Country is notable to fubfift its own Inhabitants, much lefs an Army of Foreign Troops, thofe Parts efpecially that are in our Hands : And I have heard that one great Reafon for venturing the Battle of z^/- E manz.it [16] tnayiz.a was, that as few Troops as *tis faid we had there, they were too many to fubfift, and= that they muft have ftarv'd if they had not fooi^hr. Now if the Country won't furnifh Necefldries, whence are they to be fetch'd ? Why, either from England or Italy -, except fome fraall Matter that ma/ be had from the Coafts o^. Jfiid. And is not this a pretty Method to fubfift an Array ? Aslc thofe who know any thing of our f/Wer^- Armies, what would be- come of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or JOG Leagues from them? Ask them, what Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad Weather has fpoilt the Roads , tho' their Ma- gazines be but four or five Leagues from them ? Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis for them, when they can't be fupply'd by Wa- ter with the Things they want, tho' Flanders bethe fineft Country in the World to fubfifl an Army in, 'cis fb fruitful in Corn, fo full of good Towns, and affords fo great a Qiiantity pf Wheel-Carriage. Ask but thefe Queftions, and you will be prefently convinc'd, how dif- ficult it mull be to fubfifb an Army in Cutalonia-^ when a great Part of their Subfiflance muft be brought by Sea, and from Places fo remote ^ and the little the Country it felf affords, muft be fetch'd often-times a great way, and overfuch Mountains, as no Carriages can pafs^ all muft jbe brought by Mules, which coft a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in fuch Num- bers, as a very moderate Army has occafion for. In fhort, to fublifl any Army in this Coun- try is very difficult ^ they mu'fl often be in great danger of flarving, while they depend on Winds and " . [ ^7 ] and Seas for their Provifions ,• and to fubfifl; a great one, which thefe Gentlemen would feem to argue for^ is abfolutely impoflible. Let us now fee how it ftands with f ranee m this Point : Even as well as they can wilh ; for 'tis a very fhort Paflage from Marfeilks and Tou- lon to Rofes and other Ports on that fide of Spain^ and the Provinces of Fr^Kc^ that lyenea- reft to their own Ports, are extreamly fruit- fulj fo that Magazines may be ereded in thern with all the cafe imaginable ; and when the Winds won't let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Re- ferve in Cafe of NecefTuy, and can fupply their Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advaij- tage has Frame over us in making War on that (ide, even upon Suppofition of maintaining bu^ a moderate Army there, that fhall ad OfT<;n- lively, and be to make great Marches in fo bar- ren a Country • and if we would fend a great one thither ,(not that I think any Army could be very great by the Time it was therej thefe In- conveniences would increafe in a double Pro- poi-tion at Icafl: • that is, fending t^;ice the Number would be attended with four limes the Difadvantages, thrice the Number with iiX times, and fo on ; but this is fo plain, that I can't think it needs any farther lUuftration: Need 1 add,how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service^ which one may be fure finds no Voluntiers •, and thofe the Law would give to ic, will of two Evils be glad tochoofe the leriR'',and to prevent being lent to Spain^vjiW lift them felves in any other Service. Befides, when thefe Recruits are rais'd,hGw fhall they be fent ? In fmall Num- bers by the Packet-boats ? But how often are E 2 they [ ^8 ] tfcey taken ? And when they come to Lisbon. how fhall they get on to Catalonia ? And it they are kept till they can have the Opportu- nity of a Convoy, how long will they be wan- ted, and how infenfibly will they moulder a- way, while they lie expeding the Time they fo little wifh for ? And is not this a blefled Place to pulhthe War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor fubfifted, nor recrui- ted, without the ucmoft Difficulties, the grea- tefl Flazards, and perpetual Difappointments? 1 know but one fure Effe<St cf fuch a War, and that is, that were it conftantly fed, it would fo'on eat up all our Men : For every twenty effedive Men in S^ain^ England lofes at leafl tfireefcore : And our Treafure ifTu'd for thac Service, we fhall have reafon to think, finks in the fame Proportion as our Men do, ifwecon- iider the Expences of Tranfportation, and of Supplies fent from hence, the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Pri« vateers, the Exchange of Money between En- gland and Cenoa^ the exceffive Price which Things will coil that are bought there for Ca- talonia by the time they get thither, the Charge we are at to get Horfes for our Ca- valry, which one with another, coft as much as five fent to Flanders. A flight View of thefe jijnd the other necefiary Articles, befides the standing vaft Expence of maintaining fo great a P^ft of our Fleet in .the Mediterranean, willea- ,filf (hew you, that to 'extend this War would "ferve to little elfe but to exhauft us of our Mo* Dey, as wtil a§ JVlen. In fhort, both Men and !^oney flirinkalmoft to nothing, when they |,9fne thither, in ccmparifonof what they were '^^' '■' ■' Vi'hen [^9l when they went from us : From all which I can't but conclude. That nothing can be greater Nonfenfe, or rather greater Villany, than what thefe Writers, or thofe that dire^ them, tell us upon this Head : For they know all this to be true,that there is no Pretence for theComplaints they make of the War on this fide having been negleded, but that on the contrary, nothing can be fo ruinous to England^^^ theMeafures they would hurry us into. We can't have a better View, with what a Difadvantage we make an OfFenfive War in Spain^ than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greateft Ad- vantages are lolt, thro' the utter Inability wc are in to fupport them ; for we can neither fend them timely Help, nor fo much as know what it is they want. Which, by the way, is another Circumftance, that ought to cure us of our Fondnefs for this War. The French King can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks ; and that regularly ; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at prefent fenfible of: The Impa- tience we have for thefe four Months and more been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every body feel the Want we have of Intelligence from thofe Pjrts • we know nothing but what the French are pleas'd to tell us, who won't lofe, we may be fure, the Opportunity to impofe upon us what they think raoft for their Purpofe; which makes ic impoiTible, even for the New M to take the proper Meafures to fupport our . Troops • tho' could we have known as much and as early as we would, all Relief from hence mult have come too late to enable our Men E 5° ] Men to keep the Ground they had with fo much Glory gain'd ; and thus it muft always be, unlefs we could tbrefee, foraeTime before, when a Battle will be loft or won, and provide accordingly •, otherwife every thing muft come out of Time ,• while the French^ in the meaa while, have it in their Power to fliape their Meafures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require ,♦ of which we have feen a melancholy Inftance in the Support they have given the D. of j4njou^ when his Affairs feem*d to be defperate and paft Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the Means to fupport him always near, and can concert things with that Exadnefs, as to make them all bear to a Point \ whereas we can nei- ther know nor do what we would, and the Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impoffible to depend on them, or to concert any Meafures againft fuch or fuch a Time, if they muft wait the Ar- rival of Succours or Supplies from England for their Execution. Ja a word, all things con- fpire to make Spain the leaft defirable of all Places to pufti the War in ; and one ought ra^ ther to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there fo well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what Neglefts to account for it : The thing is fo plain, it fpeaks it felf ; the Dutch are To convinc'd of it, that they hav€ never, for thefe three Years paft, been prevail'd with to fend any frefh Troops thither ; England only is to be perfwaded into thefe wife Meafures, as if we could not be ruin'd faft enough. V If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any thing I have (aid on this Head, I will put you C ?j 3 you into a Way how you may e^lily inform your felf : Get a Sight of the Accounts of the feveral Embarkations that have been made for Spain^ 'both before and fince the Battle of j4lmanz,a^ and obferve the Diftance of Time between the Encampments of the Troops to go on board, and their taking the Field in Catalonia : Inquire into the Numbers the Regiments confifted of when they march'd for thefe Encampments, and how ftrong they were when they joinMour Ar- my : Ask fome of the Officers of the fix Regi- ments that were broke into others, a little be- fore the Battle of Almanz^^ how many private iVlen they left when they came away, and fome of them will tell you, that their Regiments had not above 50 Men in them, and fome not fo many. I can't fuppofe you will pretend thefe Inconveniencies arife from any Negleft in the Admiralty, becaufe that is no Part of the Complaint thefe Gentlemen make, and you know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the fame Hands which we are at prefent fo much pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of en- larging the Scheme of the War in Spai-4, to no- thing but to Shake [pear's (irange Alacrity in Sink- hig-^ for finkwelhall, and that very fall, if the Advice of thefe Writers be purfu'd. But if this be the Cafe,you will fay^ Why then did we at firft begin a Warin Catalonia^ or have not long fmce quitted it ? This admits of a ve- ry eafie Anfwer, if we look back into the Po- fture of Affairs at that Time^ and confider what it was we proposM by making War on that Side, and what were the true Reafonsthat engag'd us in it; Such an Enquiry will (hew you it E 33 3 It was begun with the moft promiUng 'Appear- ances in Favour of it, could we but fucceed in the firll Step^ and tho' they have not anfwer'd our Expedations, yet when fo good Footing was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces which began that War were firft embarkM,'twas very difficult to determine at this diftance, which was mofl: for the Service of K. Charles and the Common Caufe, to land in Catalonia^ or attempt to give fome Relief to the D. of Sa- voy^ which he was at that time in the greatelt Want of ^ the Deciiion of this was left to the two Kings of Portugal and Spain, and their Mi- nifters, who were befl able to judge what Part was bed to take j and after the Matter had been thoroughly confider'd, 'twas refolv'd for Cata- ionia^ upon the preffing Inftances of K. Charles^ and the many and repeated AiTurances that had been given him.ot the good Difpolitions of the Spaniards to declare for him, as foon as he Ihould have any firm Fooling in Spain^ and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer Spain^ or to force a Revolt upon them, but to favour one, fuppofing them inclin'd to it ^ and what made the Experiment the more worth trying, was the defperate Con- dition of Affairs in Italy^whkh this was thought the likelieft Way to give fome Relief to^ by obliging the frenih to take off a Pari of that Weight of Troops with which the Duke of Sa- voy was fo violently prefs'd ; Befides, you may remember that at the Time this War in Catalonia was begun, we had not the leafl: Prof- pedt of making fuch mighty Conquefls in Flan- 4ersy which was every Inch of it in the French Hands, [ 33 ] Hands ; and 'twas more than any body cou'd tell, when it wou'd be otherwife, much lefs cou'd they hope to fee any poflibility of Pene- trating into France on that fide, which we have had fince the Ramdlies Campaign {o fair a Profped of. Thefe Gircumftances of Af- fairs^ the Appearance there was of lodag all in Italy^ and of getting nothing in Flanders, made It very reafonable for us to try the In- clinations of the Spaniards ^ and had they an- fwerM better the Aflurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for Once been carry'd thither, had doubtlefs been very well employ 'd, t.o give them Counte- nance. Thefe were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that fide, and nothing but Experience could have convinced People, that Spain might not have been had for going for ; e%ecialiy when thofe who were prefum'd to be the beft Judges, were fo fure of the Succefs^ fo that noching could have jaftify'd our not ma- king the Tryal *, whatever had been faid againfl it, would not have been belie v'd, while the In- conveniences of this War had not yet been felt^ and for that Reafon could not be fo certainly judg'dof. Thefe were great Inducements to try what might be done there, and the firffc Attempt met with Succefs *, for the Enemy not being pre- par'd for us, and the People on that fide being pretty much in our Interelt, Barcelona ^oonhW into our Hands, and all Catalonia with it^ and we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Re- vol: in the other Kingdoms, but not to force onCj unUfs they had been more difpos'd to ic F them- C 34 1 tfiiemfelves ,• in which Point no body warfts t^ be told, they failM : But tho' this Confequence, which we hop'd for from ourSuccefs, did noe follovY from it, the Advantage we had gain'd was too confiderable to be parted with ; for by being Maflers of B.melona^ we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were by this Situation of ours, oblig'd to lelTen considerably their Ar- my on the fide of Portugal^ which one might have expefted would have turn'd to a better Account than it did, and wou'd have enabl'd the Portuoucfe to have made fome Impreflion on Sp.iiyt. But that is not all, as long as we had fuch a Footing, and the Enemy could not de^ pendonthe Inclinations of the People to the Duke of Jiijiju^ which by what they had feent in Catilonia^ they had reafon to be very appre- henfive of, they were forc'd to employ an Ar- my, much fuperiour to ours, to obferve Our Mo- tions^ not knowing to which fide we might turn our felves, or where an Infurredion might break out in favour of us. And bcfides the Diflradion, llneafinefs, and great Expence this new War created the Duke oiAn\ou^ and his Adherents, itobligMhim to difcover his Diflruft of iht Spaniards movQ than he had done before ,• and to (hew, he thought himfelf fafc only in French Armies, as well as French Coun- cils^ which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, tlio' not fo much as might have been hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation* Thcfe, you will allow, were no flight Reafons for maintaining the Footing we had in Catalonia^ much more will you think fo, when you refleft, that this little Piece of Spain ha4 four Years a- [35] go let lis into a full PofTeflion of the Whole, had not a molt fatal and unaccountable Mifmanage- ment ruin'd all \ not to infifl on feveral other good EfFefts •, fuch as keeping his Holinefs, and the other Italim Princes in awe_, who difcovrer'd but too much Inclination to a League withf r^we, the alarming all the Southern Coalt oiFrmce^-^vA giving Encouragement to the Sevenmis^ and other New Converts, who had long (hewn they would ftir if they could i which created afrcfh Trouble and Expence to the French King, by obliging him to keep Troops on that fide, r.o no other end, but to obferve the Motions of his own Subjeds ,* and in the lift Place, had it fucceeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the VV hole of the Grand ProjeA againft Toulon. Thefe are fuch Advantages of the Spanijh War as will fufficiently juftify the beginning and purfning of it in the manner we have done, efpeciaily iince the Reduction of Minorca has made it fo fafe and eafy to keep a good Squadron all the Year in the Mediterraman. But thefe Purpofcs are all anfwer'd, while we confine that War within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the Defeiifive only. There is no need of enlarging the Scheme of the War, which in- flead of doing Service to the Common Cauf^^ would make us lofe feveral of the Advantages we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Com- pafs, and would endanger what we might maintain, while we extend our felves beyond our Strength, and grafp at mare than we can hold i befides the other great Inconveniences, which I have fhewn you, mult follow the ma- king an OfFenllve War on this fide, which can never poflibly fucceed, unlefs the Cajlilimi were F 2 more [ 36 ] more our Friends, or more were to be expe<fted from the Fortuguefe, And even a Detenfive War, Experience hasfhewnus, is much better carry'donby Foreign Troops, which not only fpares our Men, but faves a great deal of Mo- ney, and is much more convenient tor the Ser-^ vice, tbe Pallage being fo much fliorter from Italy than it is from EngUnd. And yet we all fee, rhat notwithftandmg the Endeavours to fupport King Charles upon his late Viftories, no Reinforcement has yet been fent him, even from thence, as feafable as it feeras, and as great Occafion as he has for them ^ and the Reinforce- ment that was hll fenr, 'tis known did not ar- rive till the middle of 5^M«e, tho' it was inten- ded and ordered, thac they fliould be there in January, Thus difficult it has been to main- tain this War on the Foot ie has been hitherto upon ^ and from Experience we may be fure, thus it will be, and worfe, proportionably worfe, as we enlarge it. And therefore I can't think, any body does in earneft mean more, than to do what we defign, without lofs of time, but not to deOgn more than is abfo- lutely neceflary, or to extend the Compafs Of the War. But they tell us, there is a Neceffity for it, and thar Spin is not otherwife to be had : But why ^0 ? Have they never heard in Pbyfick of fuch a Term, as Revulfion, which teaches to remivethe Evil from one part by proper Ap- plications, not to the Part it felf, bat to its Op5)ofite ? Or have they not fo much Me- chanitks, as Children can teach them, who if they would throw down ^, which is at the J'op of A, gnd out of their Reach, will prefent- [37 ] ly try if they c^n't pull down^: Thty know almoft by Initii>6,that 'tis all one whethtr you pvjll down ^ directly, or that which fupports it. And 'tis the fame thing with S^ain • if chat Kingdom be ever recover'd, it muft be, by proper Applications to France. France ^ all the World fees, is the Support of the Duke of Anjou^ and if this Support be forc'd from him, he will as furely tumble, as if you cou'd pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has ufurpM. Since therefore we can't reach him, we Ihould fet our felves with all our iMight to pull from him his Support, and ^hen he mufi: tall on courfe : How near wc have been fucceeding in this, you can'E want to be told. And how it came not to be quite done, your Frier ds know with- out being told ^ and how much foever they may like the Reafon of this, I'm perfwaded they don't much like to hear of it. And if S^ain be not gain'd this way, one may with- out the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will be gain'd at all. ReMnow again thefe admi'rd Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have a- mus'd you, and you begin to think there is fomething in them, then turn to this true State of the Cafe^ and theMift they have call before you will van'fh ; their Harangues will leave no more Impreffion upon you, th^n the famous Dodor's Speech does upon ihufe that look into his Sermon. But inllc?d of thofe Impreffions, I cinnot but think there will re- main upon your Mind, as theie does on mine, an utter Deieftation and Abhorrence of the black Viilany and Malice fome Men have us'd to [38] to ruin the Reputation of the ableft and moft faithful Mlnifters, and to hazard every thing that is dear to us as Englifh-tnen and Proteftants, rather than not compafs their own deftrudlive Ends. I remember, I have often thought, upon the late intended Invafion of the Pretender, that itwason his part a very foolifh Enterprise ,• for tho' ic might anfwer the Purpofes of France^ and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And I am of the fame Opinion with refped to our Domeftick Invaders, if I may ufe that Expreflion ; the Publick indeed may fuffer by them, as much as France can wifh, but if ic fhould have the good Fortune to efcape the Danger, it is threatned wich^ the Attempt that has been made upon it will, I am per- fwaded, fooner or later bring inevitable Ruin upon themfelves. But we are both, I dare fay, fufficiently tir'd for one time ; I fhall therefore take leave of you for [the prefent, with AfTurances that you Ihall, in a very while time, h«ar again from, SJR, Tour tnoft faithful, Humble Servant, Poji- [ 39 ] Poftfcript. Since thefe Papers were in the Prefs, the ill News is come of a Battle loft in Spain af- ter the Glorious Adions of jilmamra and Sara- gojfa; Two Viftories fo great in themfelves, and in the Confequence of them, that they might have been decifive of the War, if the Vortuguefe had join'd • which lam very forry they did not, for the fake of the common Caufe, and even of the young General him- felf, to juftly applauded for his fearlefs Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But tho' thisunfortunate.<Bat- tle has too much juftify'd what I have faid a- gainft enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country, I ftill hope we may be in a Conditi- on not much worfe than laft Year, and able to continue ading in the Defenfwe manner I have recommended. N. B. The Second Letter mil he publi/h'd next Saturday. FINIS. i UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below iK m s im I NO RfcU" JAi\Ri:c'OLW«J« U LO-URl .. JAM 1 6 1985 ''«^'N'f ANSI'S APR 2 lo-un Z 4 1987 .W' 27im OlSCHftRGE-URL " •^r^ 1 !V4 G 01 1S81 7 19771 . -.^•^ -^ S " 3 1158 00422 9935 281 22m