S^i5i\ 
 
 The Fanagement of the War 
 
 By 
 Francis Hare 
 
 ■" ■ V 
 
 U
 
 "N^ 
 
 
 '%

 
 THE 
 
 Management 
 
 OF THE 
 
 xV IX. 
 
 I N A 
 
 LETTER 
 
 T O 
 
 A Tory -Member. 
 
 ^7 -' — 
 
 BelU geri placuit nuHos hAbifura triumphos, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for ^. Baldwin, near the Oxford-Jrms 
 in Warwick-Lane. 171 1.
 
 {
 
 [ I ] 
 
 
 •■»— r- 
 
 SIR. 
 
 Nov.i:^^ 1 710. 
 
 7 
 
 AS little as I love Scandal, whatever 
 fide it comes from, 1 have prevailed 
 with my fclf, m Obedience to 
 your Commands, to run over the 
 Bundle you fenc me j and knowing 
 ^youtobea Pcrfun of that Integrity and llo- 
 " nour, as to have more regard to Truth than 
 Party, I will without more Ceremony give 
 ^ vou my Thoughts as you defire, upon fuch 
 "Parts of them as relate to the Management of 
 the War, which I hope you will (ind not to be 
 the lefs true or juft for the I laftc they are writ 
 in i for plain Truths need no Difguife ,• Fidti- 
 ooon and Ornament are of no Advantage, but 
 ^whcn they ferve a Caiife, that can't bear to 
 tr be feen in its true Light. This I hope will be 
 ^ Excufe enough, for the many Marks of Hafle 
 Q and Negligence you will meet with in this 
 "" long Letter. 
 
 You won't cxped: I fliouldconfider each of 
 thele Papers by themfelves, that would be gi- 
 ving too much trouble to one, who, 1 know^ 
 is too good a Judge to think them of fo much 
 Confequencc ^ The Letter to the Examiner is 'JL 
 ^: mere Declamation, and confider'd in that 
 ^ View is a pretty (mart Performance, and you 
 $ ipay read it to be entcrtain'd, but not to be 
 inform'd j there is fome Fire and Imagination, 
 B but 
 
 ^Soti.;^;;^'
 
 but no Reafoning, Judgment or Experience, 
 plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in 
 tim« ripen into fomething confiderable, and 
 come up to the Author of Arlus and Odolpbuf^. 
 which ii the Fidion of a more able Writer, and 
 has the Beauties of a tolerable Romance ; and 
 to Ihew the Skill of the Author, is very happi- 
 ly call'd a Secret Hifiory • which is a Cover for 
 all the Lyes the Father of them can invent, 
 fince that Name immediately forbids all ask- 
 ing of Queftions^ for were the Proofs to be ; 
 produc'd, where would be the Secret ? I can't 
 fay, I was fo well plea^'d with Sir Thomas, 
 which 1 found fo dull and tedious, *twas im- 
 poflible to get thro' it, there is, by all I could 
 fee, neither Decorum nor Argument, nor Life 
 in it ; the Author fhews he wasfadly put to it 
 for Matter, when he is forc'd, to make up 
 his Invcdive, to take in the Compafs of 
 iz Years, the fatal Period fome among us are 
 fo angry with, that is iS more, than the prc- 
 fent Change is concerned in \ for 'tis but • 
 four Years at mofl, that his Principals pretend 
 to think Cfor think they don't, as I fliall fhew 
 you by and by) that the Management of Af- 
 fairs has been wrong. In lhort,*cis aftupid un- 
 natural Piece, and what made me more fick of 
 it,I have been told,'ris as ungratefulas 'tisfenfe- 
 lefs, writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to 
 thofe, whom he has with fo much Venome 
 drawn his Penagainft. I don*tknow whether 
 you will agree with me, when I tell'you,! think 
 the Letter from a Foreign Minifier the molt artful 
 Performance of them all,- the reft feem to be 
 the Works of under Agents, from Diredion? 
 and Hints mark'd out for them j but this I take- 
 
 ta
 
 [3 3 
 
 to "be the Work of the chief Opsrator himfelf ; 
 whoj if he was not at leifure to write more 
 largely, has in this fhort Piece fafficiently 
 ihewn, what a Right he has to the Efteem the 
 World have long had for him • there being in 
 it fome quick and crafty Turns, and an af- 
 fe<5ted Appearance of Fairnefs, with which he 
 gilds over the blackeft Poifon of Malice and 
 Invention. You'll fee I ufe that laft Word in 
 the modern Senfe of it ; and in my Mind the 
 whole Letter is well enough contriv'd, to an- 
 fwer its Defign ,• which plainly is, to pleafe 
 FriendSj take offEnemies, amufe and quiet all, 
 who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor en- 
 ter into Patties, but by the new Scheme might 
 be apt to be alarm'd. Faults on both fides has, to 
 my thinking, a good deal of plain common 
 Senfe in it, which Experience has all along 
 juftify'd, and I dare fay always will. And 
 common Senfe at this time of Day, I take to 
 be a great Commendation to ^ Paper, and 
 that this Writer feldom loofes fight of, except 
 where his Caufe obliges him to quit it ^ which 
 it does in feveral places, but no where more 
 than where he fpeaks of Credit, all which is 
 as mean, as the late Ejfay upon that Subjecf^: ; 
 and that I take to be the moft affeded uncom- 
 mon myfterious Piece of Nonfenfe_, even this 
 wonderful Year has produced. 
 
 Taking thefe Papers together, there is one 
 thing in them, for which I mightily admire 
 the able Archite(5l, under whom they hive all 
 been form'd; and that is the Difference of 
 Spirit one fees in them, according to the feve- 
 ral forts of Readers they are intended to im- 
 pofeon. One makes great Court to the To- 
 B 2 rigs.
 
 rksj another is to gain the TVhigs, or divide them 
 at leaft , others pretend mightily to Moderati- 
 on^ to catch the Men that have Honefty and 
 Temper^ and have not engag'd fiir in either 
 Party,- others Teem chiefly defign'd to impofe 
 on Foreigners^ and make them believe, all we 
 have been doing thefe fix Monthj^ is only a 
 perfonal Bufmels, that can have no Influence 
 on the Publick ; that therefore the Allies, par- 
 ticularly the Dutch, and the Houfe of Hanm- 
 wr, fliould not be alarm'd to fee thofe Men 
 difgracd, who, whatever other Faults they 
 may have^ never lay under the Sufpicion of 
 favouring Popery and France; but have been 
 ever true to the Revolution : have always gone 
 into Meafures for a vigorous Profecution of 
 the War, and have ccnftantly been ftruggling 
 to gain new Securities for the Defence of the 
 Proteftanc Succeflion. 
 
 The various Shapes of this Pofture-Mafl:er 
 in Politicks, make this Bundle of Papers, mci- 
 thinks, if you will pardon the Comparifon, 
 not much unlike a Pedler's Rare-Show, in 
 which there is a great Number of very diffe- 
 rent Figures, ail in Motion at once ; which 
 the gaping Spedators think there is forae 
 ftrange Magick in, and that the Spring of 
 Adionisin themfelves; when in Truth they 
 are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, mov'd 
 all by one and the fame fecret Hand, and ail 
 contriv'd for the fi^me End, to delude and 
 cheat the Multitude. And what is ftill more 
 furprifing, this great Mafter himfelf has in his 
 own Perfon afted, and that at the fame time, 
 jril the different Parts, w hich his Tools in their 
 Writings have but cppy'd from him. But
 
 [5] 
 
 whatever various JPigures thefe Engines of his 
 AfFeA to move in, and whatever different 
 ways they take, they all make to the fame End , 
 and agree in thofe Parts, of which you delire 
 my Opinion, I mean in cenluring the Manage- 
 ment of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the 
 Reputation of thofe, who have been hitherto 
 th^ chief Diredors of it. Upon which Head 
 all they fay, may be reduc'd.to thefe four 
 Points. '1:'''^/^'' --'■ • 
 
 i/. That a good Peace might havfe been had 
 at the end of the RamelUes Campaign. 
 
 zdly. That the War in Spi??« has been fliame- 
 fully nQgle<5i:ed, tho' the Recovery of that 
 Kingdom was the chief thing we proposed by 
 entring into the War. 
 
 5^//. That pulhing the War in Flanders was 
 pUHiing it in the wrong Place, France being 
 cover'don that fide with fo ftrong a Frontier. 
 
 ^thly. That it is many ways apparent, that 
 the Duke oi Marlborough has unnecelfarily pro- 
 long'd the War for his own Interefl. 
 
 Now if it can be (hewn, that thefe terrible 
 Accufatlons are not only falfe in themfelves, 
 but certainly known to be fo by the Authors 
 of them, I leave it to you, to confider, what 
 Regard ought to be had to fuchMen, or what 
 Treatment they deferve, who have fo groily 
 impofed upon the Nation, to the apparent Ha- 
 zard of its Safety, and of lofing all the Fruits 
 we might hope for, from a War, that has 
 J>een hitherto conduced with fo much Glory 
 and Succefs. 
 
 To clear thefe great Points, we are defir'd, 
 it feems, to go no farther back than the four 
 laft Years at jqnioft \ in truth 'tis not much a- 
 
 bove
 
 [6] 
 
 bove three that there is any Difpute about : 
 Till then^ all is allow'd to have gone well for 
 certain Reafons, that held good, till about 
 the time, that the French King difmifs'd Mon- 
 lieur Cbamillard from the Finances, for no o- 
 ther Reafon, that I have ever heard, but to 
 ihew us what we ought to have done here at 
 the fame time ; and 'twas not the Fault of 
 thofe, who have play'd their Game better 
 fince, that we did not. This was in February, 
 170^, all the Complaints we have heard of 
 the Management of the War, are from the be- 
 ginning of that Year, but without much Noile 
 till thefe lafk fix Months. Since then we have 
 been told, every thing relating to the War is 
 wrong, and are fiU'd wich loud Clamours of 
 Grievances, which before went abroad in gen- 
 tle Whifpers only, or were not at all heard 
 of. And 
 
 Firft, They tell us, a Good Peace might 
 (lave been had at the End of the Ramelliet 
 Campaign. 
 
 Now to decide this Queflion, we muft firft 
 fettle what a Good Peace is ; and in order to 
 that muft confider, what it was we went into 
 the War for. No body wants to be told, that 
 this was chiefly to obtain thefe two Ends, the 
 Reftitution of the Sfanijh Monarchy to the 
 Houfeof ^«/ri<2, and the procuring of a good 
 Barrier againft France on the fide of the Ne- 
 therlands. Without which two Points there can 
 be no Security for Great-Britain, that their beft 
 Trade will not be loft, and with it their Reli- 
 gion and Government, and every thing that 
 is dear to them ; for we ftiould every Minute 
 be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery 
 
 and
 
 and Poverty of France forc'd upon us, by the 
 exorbitant Power of that moft arbitrary Prince, 
 if helhould be fufFer'd to ftrengthen himfetf 
 with the Addition of that vaft Monarchy, who 
 was before much too Great for his Neigh- 
 bours ^ to fay nothing of the Safety of the 
 Dutch, or the Liberty of Europe ; the laft of 
 which moft of us, I fear, have little or no 
 Senfeof ,* and for the Safety of the Dutch, fo 
 fatal a Delufion has polTeft many of us, that 
 one may every Day meet with Men, who are 
 filly enough to wim againft it. Now the Spa^ 
 nifl) Monarchy, the Reftitution of which is 
 the firft Article of the Grand Alliance, is 
 known by every body to confift, befides the 
 Spanijh Netherlands, of thefe two great Parts, 
 of Sfain and the Indies, and q{ Milan, Naples 
 and Sicily, with Sardinia, and the adjacent 
 Ifles. And a good Barrier againft France 
 means at leaft a better than the Dutch had be- 
 fore,- which by theExperienceof fifty Years 
 has been found to be much too weak for fb 
 large a Frontier ,• the Spaniflj Flanders and its 
 Capital City Gand^ having in truth no Cover 
 at all j and5r<i^^»fbutavery poorone,- while 
 the French being intire Mafters of the Lys and 
 Schelde, both Provinces lie expos'd to their 
 Invafions. Look but on fome large Maps of 
 thefe Provinces, fuch as have been printed of 
 late Years, and your own Eyes will prefently 
 convince you of the Truth of this. But if this 
 Reftitution and this Barrier were thought ne- 
 peffary at our ent'ring into the War, nobody, 
 1 prefume, will fay, they are lefs neceffary 
 now, when fo much more has been done to 
 gain thefe Ends, than any body at the Begin- 
 ning
 
 [8] 
 
 ning could ever hope to fee. A nd if thefe two 
 Points are necelTary, then, no Peace without 
 them can be a Good Peace. Let us then com- 
 pare this Good Peace with what the French 
 ofFei:'d at the end of the Ramellies Campaign ; 
 which is fo far from being a Secret, that the 
 Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the 
 JEledor of Bavaria^ who was employ'd by the 
 King of France to make the firft Overture, 
 were immediately communicated to' all. the 
 Allies, and by their Confent made publick : 
 And who-ever will be at the Pains to look 
 back to the News Papers, and Monthly 
 Accounts of that TimSj or will confult 
 even the common Yearly Colle<5tionSj will 
 fee there is no Myftery in the Whole of 
 that Affair j which, in fhort, is no Jiiore 
 than this, that the French offer'd to give up 
 to the Allies, which of thefe two they lik'4 
 beft, either Sfain and the Indks ^ or Milati, Nap- 
 pies and Sicily 3 &c. Which Offer was unanx- 
 moufly reJ6<9:ed. 
 
 I fuppofe, there is no need of proving, that 
 the Allies ought not to have accepted either 
 Part of this Alternative, it being fo fhort of 
 what upon our Ent'rance into the War was 
 thought neceffary. To have been content with 
 a Moiety of what we went into the War for, 
 after fo maijy Succeffes, and not a few furpri- 
 zingly Great, would have rendered us inexcu- 
 fabie to all Pofterity ; and fome body, who, 
 we are now told, prolongs the War, would 
 have been faid to have been well paid for fuch 
 a Peace ; 't va^ ould have been in the Language 
 pf the Fadion, a plain Cafe we were lold to ^ 
 France^ and nothing lefs than his Head could " 
 
 Tiave 
 
 \
 
 [9] 
 
 have aton'd for it. But inftead of proving the 
 Abfurdity of accepting fuch a Peace, I fliall 
 ihewyou rather, what to every body is notfb 
 plain ,• and that is, that the French were not 
 fineere ^ they meant notliingby their Offer but 
 to araufe the Allies, and knew, they could not 
 all agree to accept either Part of the Alterna- 
 tive, and that England and Holland without the 
 Emperor could not take Sfa'm and the Indiesy 
 were they never fo much inclined to it. For 
 had the Allies hearken'd to this Propofal, it 
 had been in the Power of the French to have 
 elos'd with which they wou'd. Now 'tis eafy 
 to fee what this muft have ended in : For in 
 fuch a Partition, there is no doubt, but as the 
 Dutch and we Ihould have been for Sfain and 
 the Indies^ 'tis as plain, the Emperor would 
 have made the other Part his Choice, which is 
 evidently beft for him. Which Part now o£ 
 the Allies in this Divifion would France bemoft 
 willing to comply with? or in other Words, 
 which Part of the Monarchy would they 
 chofe of the two to quit ? A Man muft be 
 blind not to fee, that the Part the Emperor 
 would like beft to have, the fame France would 
 like beft to part with: Behold then the he- 
 celfary Confequence of heark'ning to fuch 
 Terms ,• the Confederacy broken, and the Ma- 
 ritime Powers left to fhift for themfelves, 
 without being able to obtain either of the 
 Parts, when they ought to be content, accor- 
 ding to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, 
 with nothing lefs than both. 
 
 . Who now, I would fain know, have moft 
 Reafon to complain thatthefe Offers were re- 
 
 C je^ed.
 
 ]tded, the Pedple of London or Pl^gnrM? They 
 who might have had the Part they had moft 
 mind to, if they would have abandon'd thdJr 
 Allies, or we, who 'tis certain, befides the 
 Infamy of fo bafe an Action, could have had 
 nothing-? Had the Writers, who are fo ablei 
 at making Sortiething out of Nothing, had 
 tfteir IJot in Aufirian Ground, ' What a Field 
 had thei'e been for them? What rare Matter 
 to fhew their Skill in ? What fpecious Pre- 
 tence?, without thQ help oi' Secret fJi/loryy t6 
 give out, that the Emperor wa^ ill advis'd ^ 
 What! rejecft fo advantageous an Oflfer, by 
 which fo great an Addition of real Strength' 
 would have been made to the Houfe of Aulhia^, 
 and that at a Time, when they were fo unabi& 
 to carry on the War, when the People have 
 beenexhriufted with continual Wars for more 
 than Thirty Years! When the Malecontents 
 are at the Gates of the Capitol !• When the 
 King of Sweden infults in' that outrageous 
 manner, the Irnferial Dignity, and every 
 Mintlts threatens an Invafion ! Is that ar 
 Time to reject fo Good a Peace, and 
 h^zarcf the Safety of the Empire in Comple- 
 ment to the Maritime Powers ? What wicked' 
 Ccunfellors muftthefebe, who can advifeat 
 this rate ? Is it not plain they arefalfe, arid' 
 in feme other Interetl, or that they mind no- 
 thing elfe but making their own Fortunes, 
 when they ?.di fo manifeftly againft the Wel- 
 fare and Honour of the Jw^eri^/ Family, and 
 flic w they have no Regard to the Safety even 
 oi' the Empire"? Would not this be the Lan- 
 guage of cheI-a<5tion,if the Scene were changed 
 
 froni'
 
 [ " ] 
 
 from JUndon to Vienna^ And yet We don't 
 hearj that either the Emperor or his People, 
 have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Mi- 
 njfters, who would not hearken to thdle 
 Terms ^ inftead ofthat^ all the World chink it 
 much for their Honour, that chey have ap- 
 |>ear'd true to themieU^es^ anc| ^ithful to their 
 ilUies^ ■ ip rpje(9:ing fo pit^f^land infecure a 
 •j?eace. 
 
 And is not this a Reproach to us^ who fuf- 
 •fer ourjelvesto be deluded by fuch vile Inipo* 
 ■fters, who would pertwade us oat of our 
 ^cfes, that Half the Sfanijh Monarchy is ,a^ 
 good as the V/hoIe,and that Nothing is as goodi 
 as Halif. for I have fliewnyouj that one Half 
 only was pfFer'dj and that even that could not 
 •be had. It mud fore, to all Thinking Men, be 
 very (urprizing, that we only of all the Allies 
 ihou'd complain that this ridiculous Offer of 
 the French w^s rejeded, vvhen we of all or them 
 have moft reafon to be pleas'd with it : There 
 eiuft needs be fome Secret inic above the reach 
 of common Senfe, that all of a fadden this 
 fiiou'd be made a Capital Crime in our Mini- 
 fters, their not doing Three Years ago that, 
 which if they had done, we fnould all before 
 now have thought theydefervd to lofe their 
 Heads for. 
 
 I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Ar- 
 ticle, and would iDe content I ihould fay no 
 more info plain a Cafe, after fuch a Difco- 
 very^the Impudence of thefe State Mounte- 
 banks, who would have perfwaded u , that 
 we were dangeroully ill, vyhen we law and 
 felt our felves to be very well j and that wp 
 C 2 " were
 
 were all undone^ if we did not leave the skil- 
 ful and able Hands we had long us'd with fo 
 much Succefs, to try their bcrafted Medi- 
 cines, when we were not in thfe leaft want of 
 them. ISlo body, if you will believe them, 
 have fuch univerfal Remedies for all the Evils 
 of the State as they ; and under this popular 
 Pretence of curing the Nation, they take 
 all the Pains they can to poifon it ; of 
 which I have already given you one Ex- 
 ample ;; you ftiall have more in what follows. 
 But before I difmifs this Subject, I muft 
 Iseg leave to obferve ope thing farther, which 
 is of too much moment to be paft over j and 
 that is. That they who have done their Coun- 
 try fo much Service in reje(5ting this Offer 
 from the French, would have done it ftill much 
 greater, could they have prevented any Re- 
 gard being given to it. For tho' the refufing 
 thefe Terms could do no harm, the hearkning 
 to them I vvill fhew you did a great deal. The 
 Inclination fomeJPeople of thefameCompler 
 xion with the Author of the Secret Hiftoryj^ 
 exprefs'd to come to a Treaty with the French 
 upon the Terms offer'd, rais'd in the Imperial 
 Court a great Jealoufy, that the Maritime 
 Powers were tampering with France, and ma- 
 king Terms for themfelves, to which the Inte- 
 reft of the Houfe oiJuflria was to befacrific'd: 
 This put that Court upon Meafures that had a 
 fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and 
 ioccafion'd the two moft unfortunate Events 
 that have happened all this War, Firft, This 
 feiifpicion made them begin and conclude a 
 Treaty with the French for evacuating th6 
 
 ' ^ MiU-
 
 [15 ] 
 
 Milamfe, wichout the Privity of England and 
 Holland, who did not know one Word of the 
 Matter. And what do you think was the 
 Confequence of this ? Why^ it gave ih^Frencb 
 an Opportunity of fending immediately intp 
 Spain a great Body of good Veteran Troops j 
 and 'tis to this Reinforcement fent the Duke 
 of ^njou, that we owe the Lofs of the Bat- 
 tle of Jlmanza, which prov'd fo fatal to our 
 Affairs on that Side ; if thofe Troops had not 
 joyn'd, we had been Superior to the Enemy, 
 and that Battle had either not been fought, or 
 it had been won, and Spain with it, confider- 
 ing the ill Condition the Duke of Jnjou s Af- 
 fairs were then in ; and the true Reafon we 
 ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Jun- 
 ftion, which we did not know, or at leaft did 
 not believe, was made at the Time we fought ; 
 a Miftake, we may think, very eafjiy made in 
 Spainy when 'tis known, we owe the Victory 
 of Ramellies to the French making the very fame 
 Miftake in Flanders, where they thought the 
 Englijl} had not at that Time joyn'd the Con- 
 federate Army, and reckon'd for certain that 
 the Danes at leaft, neither had, nor could .' 
 And this Perfwafion made them venture a-Bat- 
 tle, which the French have fo much reafon to 
 remember, without waiting for a eonfidera- 
 ble Body of Troops, that were coming to 
 them from the Rhine, the Head of which 
 were adually at Namur, when Monfieur Vil- 
 kroy began his March towards the Confede- 
 rates. But to return, 'tis plain the Fre»c/> had 
 not gain'd the Battle of Almanz^a without that 
 Reinforcement from Italy, and even with it, 
 
 thp'
 
 [ '4] 
 
 tho' the Battle was fought m [Aprils ani^otjir 
 Army was in a manner ruin'd by that Blow, 
 all they did that Year, w^s only to take L^ri;. 
 da. But that Reinforcement pou Id not have 
 been fent^, had not the Secret Treafty 
 for the Evacuation of the MiUnefi been 
 made ,• and the Treaty had not been .ipadc^ 
 had not the Jealoufy rais'd in the Imperial 
 Court, by the Inclination of fome Peor 
 ple^ exprefs*d to hearken;. -to -the Q^t 
 of the French y made therqi refolve upon 
 fecuring fpmething for tliemfelves. i^d 
 the fatne Jealoufy put theifl upon 'taking 
 another Step, no lefs prpjudicial to th§^ poair 
 monCaufe*, a,i^that was the Expedition ^tp 
 Nayks, which they could nptbe preyail'd with- 
 to defer upon the repealed and raoft preffing 
 Inftances th^t the Maritime Powers made t<p^ 
 them by their Minifters_, both at Vienna' iand 
 Italy. And the Confequence of the Expedici*. 
 on was, that it not only diverted a great part, 
 of the Troops, that were to execute the Pro- 
 Jed on Toulon, but retarded for a confiderable 
 time the March of the reft ,• and this Lofs of 
 Time, and lelTening of their Numbers, feem 
 to have been the chief Occafions of the Mif- 
 carriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing 
 made the Imperial Court fo obftinately bent on 
 thac unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they 
 had, that Nafks as well as Milan, would at 
 the H<^gt*e be given up to flicilitate a Peace, 
 \A;hich they were refolv'd to prevent, by get- 
 ting Poffeffion as foon as they could. This 
 is all we have got by heark'ning to thofe Of- 
 fers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime 
 
 we
 
 mi 
 
 we' did not clofe with^ the Lo(s of the Battlo 
 o( Almanzui, and tlie Mifcarriage of thePro- 
 je<a on Toulot), the greateft, moft important^ 
 beft concerted Enterprize that was ever en- 
 tred on. And both thefe Misfortunes had in 
 all Probability been prevented^, had the Of- 
 fers of the French b^en roundly rejected at the 
 ftrft, and no Occaifion of Jealoufy had, by lift- 
 ning to them, beeii given the Imperial Court. 
 This is all plain naked Truth and Fad, which 
 thefe Writers, or thofe at leaft that didrate 
 to them, know as certainly, as they do, that 
 two and two make four ; and if they have any 
 Modefty, they will blufh when you let them 
 fee their inventions thus expos'd. 
 
 After faying fo much of that Part of the Of- 
 fer the French made, which concerns the Par- 
 tition they propos'd of the Spanijli Monarchy, 
 which we ought not to have accepted if we 
 could, and could not if we would ,• there is 
 no need of telling you, what Barrier was of- 
 fered (or thQ Net her lands ^whichthQ Dutch WQTQ 
 moft concern'd in, who don't ufe to negled 
 good Offers to come at Peace, if we may be- 
 lieve the Fadibn, who have for a long time 
 pretended td fear nothing fo much, as their 
 quitting the Alliance for their own feparate 
 Intereft. Tha' now the noble Firmnefs they . 
 have fhewn in adhering to it, till Terms may 
 be had to the Satisfadion of all Parties, is by 
 thefe ill defigning Politicians, who can take 
 every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed 
 to them for a Crime ; a Crime perhaps, that 
 they may not be guilty of much longer ; or 
 if they are, 'tis not for want of foriie Mens^ 
 taking the moit efil'dual Methods to cure 
 
 them
 
 [ i6 ] 
 
 them of a Fault, which I don't remember 
 they were ever before blam'd for. 
 
 That this is the whole Truth of this Mat^ 
 ter, that thefe and no other, were the Offers 
 the French made after the Ramellies Campaign ; 
 I will give you, befides thofe already hinted 
 at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as 
 good as a thoufand Demonftrations, and that 
 is a Letter of the French King to the Pope, 
 on this Subjed, writ in the following Spring, 
 when all Thoughts of Peace were at an end^ 
 and a new Campaign was entring upon. 
 
 This Letter may be found in the Mercure Hi- 
 fioricfue & Foliti(]m, Tom. 4.'^- pag. 3?. an4 
 here follows a Tranflation of it. 
 
 Letter of the King of France to 
 the Pope. 
 
 Dated at Ver failles, ij Feb. 1707. 
 
 THE Care "which your HoUnefs continues to take 
 for procuring the Feace o/Europe is always 
 tcjually agreeable to us. We have nothing more at 
 Heart than to fecond your Endeavours^ and we 
 'wou'd even prevent you in any thing we eou^d do to 
 make them effeBual. As it was not our Fault that 
 the War was begun, fo we Jl^all feek Occafions to 
 end it, by the mofi ready and eajy Methods. Tour 
 HoUnefs has been informed, that we have already 
 tnade frequent Advances to come to fo whole fome an 
 End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of 
 the Times, that CathoUck Princes, ftruck with a 
 Fear of diffleafmg their ARies., jhou^dyet refufe to 
 
 hear
 
 ['7] 
 
 bear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jefui 
 Chrifi. When we left it to the Arbitration of your 
 Holinefs tofatisfy the Rights and Demands of the 
 Ewperor, by a valuable Compenfation, upon fame 
 Farts of the Spanifh Monarchy : The Minifiry of 
 your Holinefs were charg*d with the Care of 
 making the Prcpofal of it to that Prince. But wit if 
 what Haughtinefs did he rejeB it I Having faid 
 Things exorbitant J and infoUntly demanded that our 
 Grandfon jljoud be recalled. Who cou*d have 
 thought y mofiholy Father y that he wnud have made 
 fo arrogant a Return to an injulied Kingy to a Mi- 
 nifier of your Holinefs ^ and to our Love of Teacd 
 For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable t0 
 the Houfe of Auftria_, feem'd then to threaten ity 
 by the Superiority of our Forces ^ and by eur gaining 
 the Battle (^/Caffano. But God, who is the Ma- 
 fier of Events, changed the Pofiure of our Affair S' 
 Tet tho we were employ^ d with the Cares of repairing 
 ourhDffes, we had (I ill in our Minds the Idea we 
 had conceiv'd of Peace, at the time even of our greats 
 e{l Trofperity. We renew'd to Holland the Of- 
 fer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Se- 
 curity demanded for their Trader referring it 
 Hill to our felves to treat with the Emperor a- 
 bout a Compenfation. Fropofiions fo reafonable 
 were again rejeBed by the Intrigues of that Party, 
 which had {hew'd it felf averfe to the Ad- 
 vancement of our Grandfon : And then we em- 
 ployed all our Thoughts to increafe our Vreparati-^ 
 ons for a War, which had been violently and un- 
 jujlly declared againfi us. 
 
 Neverthelefs as it becomes us to be obedient to the 
 
 pious Exhortations of your Holinefs: And to the 
 
 End that ourEnemies may have no pretence to impute 
 
 to us the jLofs offo muchChrifiian Bloody as is aU 
 
 D ready
 
 [ x8] 
 
 ready fpilty and now going to be let out, vfe "will 
 give your Holinefs a plain and frank Account of the 
 Diffofition we are in for Peace. We will therefore 
 acquaint your Holinefs y that the King our Grand~ 
 fen J has intrufied us with full Tower to convey 
 the Arch-Duke a Part of thofe Eftates that 
 compofe the Spanifli Monarchy. The Caiholick 
 King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards ^ and is 
 contenPto reign over them. 
 
 It only depends therefore on the Emperor to ex- 
 plain himfelf at this time, who may have, if he 
 pleajesj for ever reunited to his Family, The Mi- 
 innefcj Naples^ and Sicily, with the other 
 I (lands belonging to Spain_, that are fituate in the 
 Mediterranean Sea. 
 
 We (hould cafly agree about a Barrier for the 
 Republick of the united Provinces : -And the 
 Two Pretences for the War, being thus removd^ it 
 woudnot be difficult to put an End to thofe Mif- 
 fortunes, which'EuroipQ has becnfo lotig opprefs*d 
 with. 
 
 JVe pray God that he will preferve your Holinefs 
 a great many Tears in the Government of his 
 Church. 
 
 Your Devout Son, 
 
 the King of France 
 and NavsrrCy 
 
 S. Louis. 
 
 I fhall leave it to yonr felf to make the Refle- 
 xions which naturally arife from tiiis Letter^ 
 and having thus plainly (hewn you how ground- 
 
 lefs
 
 [ '9 1 
 
 lefs the firit Complaint of thefe Writers is, I 
 (hall endeavour to prove to you with the fame 
 Glearnefs, that there is as little Ground for ths 
 next, which is this : 
 
 2. That the War in Spain has been Ihame- 
 fully neglected, tho* the Recovery of that King- 
 dom was thechief thing v^e propos'd by entring 
 into the War. 
 
 This is the mofl; plaufible of all their Com- 
 plaints, and yet I doubc not but I fliall eaiily 
 convince you, that it has, ifpoflible, lefs Senfe 
 in it than any of the reft. We that live at home 
 have for the moft Part, no other Way to judge 
 of Affairs abroad, but by Events ^ and things 
 having fuccccded but ill on the Side of Spain^ 
 or at leaft very fhorc of the Expectations we 
 were fiU'd with, that a Revolution there might 
 be compafs'd with as little Trouble as it was 
 here, v/e readily give into any Infinuations 
 or Surmifes, be they never fo groundlels or ex- 
 travagant, that impute the Event we did not 
 exped, to ill Conduct or Mifmanagtmsnt ^ 'tis 
 the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be 
 knowing, or judging at leafl, whether they 
 know or not, which makes them catch at every 
 Shadow of a Reafon, to account for things, es- 
 pecially when they don't go to their Mind ; 
 they take for granted, wherever there is want 
 of Si-iccefs, there is a Faulty and 'tis fome A- 
 mends they fancy for a Difappointmenr, if they 
 can firfl lay the Blame ibmewhcre, no matter 
 where : ' Tis this Humour makes this Complaint 
 fo popular • and when the Fadion has given 
 out that the War in Spain has been negl^^ckd, 
 'tis cafily believ'd by thofe that know no becter : 
 but a very little Examination will clear up this 
 
 D 2 Matter
 
 Matter to the meaneft Underllanding, 
 
 This Complaint mufl: mean one of thefe 
 two Things, either that the Parliament has 
 not been mov'd to make fufficient Provifion for 
 the War in Spain^ or that the Provifion made 
 by Parliament has been mifapply'd j and that 
 either here at home, or by thofe who have 
 commanded the Forces that have been fent thi- 
 ther. If the Parliament was not moved to make 
 fufficient Provifion for the War in Spain^ or 
 there was any Neglcd here at home, it will 
 concern thofe whom this Complaint comes 
 from, to ihew they had no Part in the Manage- 
 ment they now complain of^ or elfe they will 
 come themfclves into fomc Part of the Blame ; 
 unlefs it can be prov'd that they made pro- 
 per Remonilrances againit the Manner in 
 which this War was carried on. If the Neg- 
 led was not here but in Spain^ it they mifap- 
 ply'd the Mony, and return'd falfe Mufters, or 
 did not manage the Troops they had to the beft 
 Advantage_, let thofe who were entrufted with 
 the Command there look to that. 'Tis a pret- 
 ty great Prefumption, there was no Fault in 
 what was to be done here at home, that they 
 who in chat Cafe had moll Reafonto complain, 
 have been fo filent, tho' it fo highly concerned 
 them^ for their own Honour, to remove the 
 Blame of our ill SuccelTes from rhemfelves : But 
 to come a little to Particulirs. This Complaint 
 is dated with one Confent from the Battle of 
 y^lmamc:^ ynd yet, in all Reafon, they ought 
 to hove looK'd back at leaft one Year further : 
 For *cis yet a Secret how themighty Advan- 
 tage we had over the Enemy upon raifing the 
 $iege oi Barcelona came to end as it did, when 
 
 ws 
 
 ; i A
 
 [51 ] 
 
 we had fo fair a Profpedof making an entire 
 Conqueft of the whole Kingdom : Why don't 
 they ask. What was the true Reafon that ob- 
 liged K. Charles to lofe fix Weeks at Barcelona^ 
 when he Ihould have been haftening to Aladrid ? 
 Why my Lord G. and the Portuguefe General 
 who lay fo long in the Neighbourhood of Aia- 
 drid, could have no Intelligence from thofe 
 who commanded in Catalonia} Why, when 
 K' Charles did at laft march to join the Portu- 
 guefe, his Orders were not obey'd, when he 
 defir'd that all the Troops thatcould be drawn 
 together fhould be fent to reinforce thofe he 
 had with him, which might have enabled him 
 to give the French a Battle, and have ended the 
 War on that fide at once ? And as to the 
 whole Gonduft of the War in Catalonia^ to the 
 End of that Year, why don't they ask, What 
 Care was taken in tranfmitting Mufter-Rolls, 
 and what became of the Money iflued for thac 
 Service ? Why the Pay for full Companies was 
 given to the Captains, when they had not ten, 
 nay fome not five Men in them ; which made the 
 ^pani/h Service fo beneficial to the Officers, that 
 they return'd home full of Money, a Thing ve- 
 ry uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among 
 the inferiour Officers in the Flanders- Army ^ 
 'tis not eafie by all I have ever heard, to find a 
 lingle Inflance? One would think whenfo 
 much Complaint is made upon this Subjed, 
 thefe were proper Points to be enquir'd into • 
 which, as great a Secret as they are at prefent, 
 may one Day belaid open, foas every body may 
 be able to fee what Negledt there has been, and 
 whofe Door it lies at : But to come to the Bat- 
 tle of y^/w<?»^<«, from which their Complaints 
 
 are
 
 [ 2^ ] 
 
 are dated, what occafion'd the Lofs af that Bat- 
 tle, or which comes to the fame thing, what 
 gave the French that greatSuperioricy of Troops 
 I have told you before, it was the Reinforce- 
 ment which the French^ by the Evacuation of 
 the Milanez.e^ were at Liberty to fend from 
 Italy to S^ain ^ a Thing which in England we 
 did not know till it was too late to fence a- 
 gainft it. What Pains had been taken htire at 
 home, to enable K. Charles to recover the 
 Ground hi- liad lofl^upon his Retreat from Ma* 
 dridj has been fo vyell fhewn in an Anfwer I have 
 read to that Pavt of Faults on Both Sides which 
 relates to this Matter, that I fliall beg Leave to 
 refer the Reader to it. 
 
 As to the general Scheme of the War on 
 that Side, and the Provifton made for it, let 
 thofe who clamour upon this Head fhew us that 
 they difapprov'd it, and let them tell us what 
 they thought wrong, and how they would have 
 had it mended, and then we may think for once 
 there is fome Sincerity in what they fay ; but 
 till then I Ihall take Leave to fufpeA all they 
 fay on this Head is only an Invention to infufe 
 groundlefs Prejudices into the People againft 
 their beft Friends : And for my own part, I 
 am fully perfwaded that thefe Writers, or thofe 
 at leaft whofe Tools they are, have been long 
 convinced, from all the Experience we have 
 hadof the Spani/h War ^ and particularly from 
 the Battle of Almanz^a^ and what followed upon 
 it, that the befl thing for England, is to draw 
 the War on that Side into the leaft Compafs we 
 conveniently can, and keep on the Defenfive 
 only, contenting our felves with maintaining 
 the Pooling we had got, without pretending 
 
 to
 
 to more than to be in a Readinefs to lay hold of 
 any favourable Opportunity of Aftion, which 
 either the Weaknefs or Negligence, or ill Con- 
 dud of the Enemy, might offer, or which we 
 might be invited to by the Encouragement gi- 
 ven us by thofe that are in the jiuftrian Intc- 
 reft. This, I dare fay, thofe Gentlemen think 
 is the true Foot we (hould put the Spani/h War 
 upon: and that it fhould be chiefly carried on 
 by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and 
 not employing our own Men, which can't be 
 done without the greateft Inconveniencies j be- 
 fides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, 
 be much more ufefully employed nearer home; 
 and therefore I can think nothing to bejfarthcr 
 from thefeMens Thoughts than what is fo much 
 in their Mouths, that this War has been neg- 
 ledied, and that greater Provifion ought to havq 
 been made for it: My Reafon why I think 
 them fo infincere^ is plainly this, that they 
 can't but know the great Difference there is be- 
 tween an Offenfive and Defeniive War, and that 
 what they feem to contend for is impracticable, 
 and the moft effedtual Way we can take, never 
 to have what their Writers and their Friends 
 pretend to be fo mightily concern'd for ; 'Tis 
 fo evident to all that know any thing of thefe 
 Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the French 
 and we muft make an OfFenfive War in that 
 Country ; But nothing can make this fo plain 
 as to put a Cafe to you. 
 
 Suppofe then, to humour thefe Men, we 
 were to fend from hence an Augmentation of 
 20000 Men, or for our own Share lOooo, to 
 Catalonia^ fliallwe not then have loooo lets in 
 Flanders^ and may not the French lefTcn their 
 
 Army
 
 [ H^ 
 
 Army there by the fame Number ? Suppofe 
 then the French and we both would fend an Aug» 
 mentation of i oooo Men thither, les us (fee what 
 will be the Confequence : The Men we fend 
 will be tranfported at a very great Charge, and 
 we can never make any tolerable Gaels when 
 they will come thither, and confequently can 
 be fure of nothing, that depends upon their Ar* 
 rival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from 
 the Time they lay ready to embark* and when 
 Deductions are made for Sicknefs and Defer- 
 tion, while they lie at Portfmoutb^ waiting for 
 Ships and Winds ; and for what Numbers of 
 them may die at Sea, in fo long a PafTage, ef- 
 pecially if any malignant Diftemper get among 
 them, when we coniider how unable thefe Men 
 will be for Service, upon landing after fo long 
 a Voyage, which will make it abfolutely necef- 
 fary for them to go into Qparters of Refrelh- 
 ment, before they take the Field • the Chance 
 they have of arriving at the moft unwholfome 
 Seafbn of the Year, the Difference of that Cli- 
 mate from our own in all Seafons, the Numbers 
 that will be fwept away by drinking immode- 
 rately thQ Ri'oag Spani/h Wines, which 'tis im- 
 poffible to keep Men from, when they are cafy 
 to be come at, and the intemperate eating of 
 rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an 
 Army i the many Men that will be loft by ma* 
 Yoding in a ft range Country, before they know 
 where they are, a Word Soldiers are well ac- 
 quainted with, and by which an Army lofes 
 more Men than can be eafily imagin'd by thofc 
 who are Strangers to thefe Matters^ when all 
 thefe things are confider'd, after fo much Ex- 
 pence and Time, I believe our looop at the 
 
 End
 
 [=5 ]. 
 
 End of two Months after their Arrival, will^ 
 upon a modeft Computation^ be found not to 
 exceed 4000 EfFeftive. Let us now fee what 
 will become of thofe Men France fends : They 
 may be fetch'd from Dauphine and that Neigh- 
 bourhood, and their Place may be fupply'd 
 from the Rhinej and theirs again from Flanders : 
 They may be fent at the moft proper Seafon of 
 the Year ; their March may be made in a Montfi 
 or fix Weeks ; their Arrival may be known to 
 a Day, and all things may be concerted againit 
 the Time they Ihall be fit to enter upon Adion. 
 Their Tranfportation cofts nothing, and when 
 they arrive, they are what they fet out, icooo 
 Men ; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, 
 are fo little different from their own, that *ds 
 very little they fuffer from them. I may add, 
 that their Religion procures them better Quar- 
 ter from the Peafants of the Country, than He* 
 rcticks can hope for, which makes no inconfide- 
 rable Difference : So that to France 'tis in a 
 manner the fame thing in all Refpects to fend 
 Men to Spain as 'tis to Flmders ; but to us, 'tis 
 not only a vaft Expence, but almoft all to no 
 Purpofe. 
 
 But this is not all • I would ask thefe Gentle- 
 men, how thefe Troops when they come to 
 Spain fhall fubfift ; how they Ihali get Horfes^ 
 or find Forage, or be provided with fufficienE 
 Magazines ? They that know any thing of 
 Spain^' can tell them (but I know they don'c 
 want to be told J that the Country is notable to 
 fubfift its own Inhabitants, much lefs an Army 
 of Foreign Troops, thofe Parts efpecially that 
 are in our Hands : And I have heard that one 
 great Reafon for venturing the Battle of z^/- 
 E manz.it
 
 [16] 
 
 tnayiz.a was, that as few Troops as *tis faid we 
 had there, they were too many to fubfift, and= 
 that they muft have ftarv'd if they had not 
 fooi^hr. Now if the Country won't furnifh 
 Necefldries, whence are they to be fetch'd ? 
 Why, either from England or Italy -, except fome 
 fraall Matter that ma/ be had from the Coafts 
 o^. Jfiid. And is not this a pretty Method to 
 fubfift an Array ? Aslc thofe who know any 
 thing of our f/Wer^- Armies, what would be- 
 come of them, if Bread and Forage were to be 
 brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 
 JOG Leagues from them? Ask them, what 
 Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad 
 Weather has fpoilt the Roads , tho' their Ma- 
 gazines be but four or five Leagues from them ? 
 Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis 
 for them, when they can't be fupply'd by Wa- 
 ter with the Things they want, tho' Flanders 
 bethe fineft Country in the World to fubfifl an 
 Army in, 'cis fb fruitful in Corn, fo full of 
 good Towns, and affords fo great a Qiiantity 
 pf Wheel-Carriage. Ask but thefe Queftions, 
 and you will be prefently convinc'd, how dif- 
 ficult it mull be to fubfifb an Army in Cutalonia-^ 
 when a great Part of their Subfiflance muft be 
 brought by Sea, and from Places fo remote ^ and 
 the little the Country it felf affords, muft be 
 fetch'd often-times a great way, and overfuch 
 Mountains, as no Carriages can pafs^ all muft 
 jbe brought by Mules, which coft a great deal, 
 and are not to be had for Money, in fuch Num- 
 bers, as a very moderate Army has occafion 
 for. In fhort, to fublifl any Army in this Coun- 
 try is very difficult ^ they mu'fl often be in great 
 danger of flarving, while they depend on Winds 
 
 and
 
 " . [ ^7 ] 
 
 and Seas for their Provifions ,• and to fubfifl; a 
 great one, which thefe Gentlemen would feem 
 to argue for^ is abfolutely impoflible. 
 
 Let us now fee how it ftands with f ranee m 
 this Point : Even as well as they can wilh ; for 
 'tis a very fhort Paflage from Marfeilks and Tou- 
 lon to Rofes and other Ports on that fide of 
 Spain^ and the Provinces of Fr^Kc^ that lyenea- 
 reft to their own Ports, are extreamly fruit- 
 fulj fo that Magazines may be ereded in thern 
 with all the cafe imaginable ; and when the 
 Winds won't let their Ships come out, which 
 does not happen very often, they have a Re- 
 ferve in Cafe of NecefTuy, and can fupply their 
 Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advaij- 
 tage has Frame over us in making War on that 
 (ide, even upon Suppofition of maintaining bu^ 
 a moderate Army there, that fhall ad OfT<;n- 
 lively, and be to make great Marches in fo bar- 
 ren a Country • and if we would fend a great 
 one thither ,(not that I think any Army could be 
 very great by the Time it was therej thefe In- 
 conveniences would increafe in a double Pro- 
 poi-tion at Icafl: • that is, fending t^;ice the 
 Number would be attended with four limes the 
 Difadvantages, thrice the Number with iiX 
 times, and fo on ; but this is fo plain, that I 
 can't think it needs any farther lUuftration: 
 Need 1 add,how hard it is to recruit the Troops 
 in this Service^ which one may be fure finds no 
 Voluntiers •, and thofe the Law would give to ic, 
 will of two Evils be glad tochoofe the leriR'',and to 
 prevent being lent to Spain^vjiW lift them felves in 
 any other Service. Befides, when thefe Recruits 
 are rais'd,hGw fhall they be fent ? In fmall Num- 
 bers by the Packet-boats ? But how often are 
 E 2 they
 
 [ ^8 ] 
 
 tfcey taken ? And when they come to Lisbon. 
 how fhall they get on to Catalonia ? And it 
 they are kept till they can have the Opportu- 
 nity of a Convoy, how long will they be wan- 
 ted, and how infenfibly will they moulder a- 
 way, while they lie expeding the Time they fo 
 little wifh for ? And is not this a blefled 
 Place to pulhthe War in, where a great Army 
 can neither be had, nor fubfifted, nor recrui- 
 ted, without the ucmoft Difficulties, the grea- 
 tefl Flazards, and perpetual Difappointments? 
 1 know but one fure Effe<St cf fuch a War, and 
 that is, that were it conftantly fed, it would 
 fo'on eat up all our Men : For every twenty 
 effedive Men in S^ain^ England lofes at leafl 
 tfireefcore : And our Treafure ifTu'd for thac 
 Service, we fhall have reafon to think, finks in 
 the fame Proportion as our Men do, ifwecon- 
 iider the Expences of Tranfportation, and of 
 Supplies fent from hence, the Danger they go 
 in from the Enemies Ships of War and Pri« 
 vateers, the Exchange of Money between En- 
 gland and Cenoa^ the exceffive Price which 
 Things will coil that are bought there for Ca- 
 talonia by the time they get thither, the 
 Charge we are at to get Horfes for our Ca- 
 valry, which one with another, coft as much 
 as five fent to Flanders. A flight View of thefe 
 jijnd the other necefiary Articles, befides the 
 standing vaft Expence of maintaining fo great a 
 P^ft of our Fleet in .the Mediterranean, willea- 
 ,filf (hew you, that to 'extend this War would 
 "ferve to little elfe but to exhauft us of our Mo* 
 Dey, as wtil a§ JVlen. In fhort, both Men and 
 !^oney flirinkalmoft to nothing, when they 
 |,9fne thither, in ccmparifonof what they were 
 '^^' '■' ■' Vi'hen
 
 [^9l 
 
 when they went from us : From all which I 
 can't but conclude. That nothing can be greater 
 Nonfenfe, or rather greater Villany, than what 
 thefe Writers, or thofe that dire^ them, tell us 
 upon this Head : For they know all this to be 
 true,that there is no Pretence for theComplaints 
 they make of the War on this fide having been 
 negleded, but that on the contrary, nothing 
 can be fo ruinous to England^^^ theMeafures they 
 would hurry us into. We can't have a better 
 View, with what a Difadvantage we make an 
 OfFenfive War in Spain^ than our Affairs there 
 give us at this Time, when the greateft Ad- 
 vantages are lolt, thro' the utter Inability wc 
 are in to fupport them ; for we can neither 
 fend them timely Help, nor fo much as know 
 what it is they want. Which, by the way, is 
 another Circumftance, that ought to cure us of 
 our Fondnefs for this War. The French King 
 can hear from thence in as few Days as we 
 commonly do in Weeks ; and that regularly ; 
 whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This 
 we are all at prefent fenfible of: The Impa- 
 tience we have for thefe four Months and 
 more been in, to know what our Friends are 
 doing there, makes every body feel the Want 
 we have of Intelligence from thofe Pjrts • we 
 know nothing but what the French are pleas'd 
 to tell us, who won't lofe, we may be fure, 
 the Opportunity to impofe upon us what they 
 think raoft for their Purpofe; which makes ic 
 
 impoiTible, even for the New M to 
 
 take the proper Meafures to fupport our 
 
 . Troops • tho' could we have known as much 
 
 and as early as we would, all Relief from 
 
 hence mult have come too late to enable our 
 
 Men
 
 E 5° ] 
 
 Men to keep the Ground they had with fo 
 much Glory gain'd ; and thus it muft always 
 be, unlefs we could tbrefee, foraeTime before, 
 when a Battle will be loft or won, and provide 
 accordingly •, otherwife every thing muft come 
 out of Time ,• while the French^ in the meaa 
 while, have it in their Power to fliape their 
 Meafures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require ,♦ 
 of which we have feen a melancholy Inftance in 
 the Support they have given the D. of j4njou^ 
 when his Affairs feem*d to be defperate and 
 paft Remedy. They can hear quickly, have 
 the Means to fupport him always near, and can 
 concert things with that Exadnefs, as to make 
 them all bear to a Point \ whereas we can nei- 
 ther know nor do what we would, and the 
 Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably 
 attended with, makes it impoffible to depend 
 on them, or to concert any Meafures againft 
 fuch or fuch a Time, if they muft wait the Ar- 
 rival of Succours or Supplies from England for 
 their Execution. Ja a word, all things con- 
 fpire to make Spain the leaft defirable of all 
 Places to pufti the War in ; and one ought ra^ 
 ther to wonder we have been able to maintain 
 our Ground there fo well, than complain that 
 more has not been done, or pretend I know 
 not what Neglefts to account for it : The 
 thing is fo plain, it fpeaks it felf ; the Dutch are 
 To convinc'd of it, that they hav€ never, for 
 thefe three Years paft, been prevail'd with to 
 fend any frefh Troops thither ; England only is 
 to be perfwaded into thefe wife Meafures, as 
 if we could not be ruin'd faft enough. 
 V If you have any Doubts about the Truth of 
 any thing I have (aid on this Head, I will put 
 
 you
 
 C ?j 3 
 
 you into a Way how you may e^lily inform your 
 felf : Get a Sight of the Accounts of the feveral 
 Embarkations that have been made for Spain^ 
 'both before and fince the Battle of j4lmanz,a^ 
 and obferve the Diftance of Time between the 
 Encampments of the Troops to go on board, 
 and their taking the Field in Catalonia : Inquire 
 into the Numbers the Regiments confifted of 
 when they march'd for thefe Encampments, and 
 how ftrong they were when they joinMour Ar- 
 my : Ask fome of the Officers of the fix Regi- 
 ments that were broke into others, a little be- 
 fore the Battle of Almanz^^ how many private 
 iVlen they left when they came away, and fome 
 of them will tell you, that their Regiments had 
 not above 50 Men in them, and fome not fo 
 many. I can't fuppofe you will pretend thefe 
 Inconveniencies arife from any Negleft in the 
 Admiralty, becaufe that is no Part of the 
 Complaint thefe Gentlemen make, and you 
 know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the 
 fame Hands which we are at prefent fo much 
 pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this 
 Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of en- 
 larging the Scheme of the War in Spai-4, to no- 
 thing but to Shake [pear's (irange Alacrity in Sink- 
 hig-^ for finkwelhall, and that very fall, if the 
 Advice of thefe Writers be purfu'd. 
 
 But if this be the Cafe,you will fay^ Why then 
 did we at firft begin a Warin Catalonia^ or have 
 not long fmce quitted it ? This admits of a ve- 
 ry eafie Anfwer, if we look back into the Po- 
 fture of Affairs at that Time^ and confider 
 what it was we proposM by making War on 
 that Side, and what were the true Reafonsthat 
 engag'd us in it; Such an Enquiry will (hew you 
 
 it
 
 E 33 3 
 
 It was begun with the moft promiUng 'Appear- 
 ances in Favour of it, could we but fucceed 
 in the firll Step^ and tho' they have not anfwer'd 
 our Expedations, yet when fo good Footing 
 was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to 
 have quitted our Ground. When the Forces 
 which began that War were firft embarkM,'twas 
 very difficult to determine at this diftance, 
 which was mofl: for the Service of K. Charles 
 and the Common Caufe, to land in Catalonia^ 
 or attempt to give fome Relief to the D. of Sa- 
 voy^ which he was at that time in the greatelt 
 Want of ^ the Deciiion of this was left to the 
 two Kings of Portugal and Spain, and their Mi- 
 nifters, who were befl able to judge what Part 
 was bed to take j and after the Matter had been 
 thoroughly confider'd, 'twas refolv'd for Cata- 
 ionia^ upon the preffing Inftances of K. Charles^ 
 and the many and repeated AiTurances that had 
 been given him.ot the good Difpolitions of the 
 Spaniards to declare for him, as foon as he Ihould 
 have any firm Fooling in Spain^ and be in a 
 Condition to protect them. For we did not 
 pretend to conquer Spain^ or to force a Revolt 
 upon them, but to favour one, fuppofing them 
 inclin'd to it ^ and what made the Experiment 
 the more worth trying, was the defperate Con- 
 dition of Affairs in Italy^whkh this was thought 
 the likelieft Way to give fome Relief to^ by 
 obliging the frenih to take off a Pari of that 
 Weight of Troops with which the Duke of Sa- 
 voy was fo violently prefs'd ; Befides, you 
 may remember that at the Time this War in 
 Catalonia was begun, we had not the leafl: Prof- 
 pedt of making fuch mighty Conquefls in Flan- 
 4ersy which was every Inch of it in the French 
 
 Hands,
 
 [ 33 ] 
 
 Hands ; and 'twas more than any body cou'd 
 tell, when it wou'd be otherwife, much lefs 
 cou'd they hope to fee any poflibility of Pene- 
 trating into France on that fide, which we 
 have had fince the Ramdlies Campaign {o fair 
 a Profped of. Thefe Gircumftances of Af- 
 fairs^ the Appearance there was of lodag all 
 in Italy^ and of getting nothing in Flanders, 
 made It very reafonable for us to try the In- 
 clinations of the Spaniards ^ and had they an- 
 fwerM better the Aflurances that had been 
 given, whatever Body of Troops had for 
 Once been carry'd thither, had doubtlefs been 
 very well employ 'd, t.o give them Counte- 
 nance. 
 
 Thefe were the Motives, upon which the 
 War was begun on that fide, and nothing but 
 Experience could have convinced People, that 
 Spain might not have been had for going for ; 
 e%ecialiy when thofe who were prefum'd to 
 be the beft Judges, were fo fure of the Succefs^ 
 fo that noching could have jaftify'd our not ma- 
 king the Tryal *, whatever had been faid againfl 
 it, would not have been belie v'd, while the In- 
 conveniences of this War had not yet been felt^ 
 and for that Reafon could not be fo certainly 
 judg'dof. 
 
 Thefe were great Inducements to try what 
 might be done there, and the firffc Attempt met 
 with Succefs *, for the Enemy not being pre- 
 par'd for us, and the People on that fide being 
 pretty much in our Interelt, Barcelona ^oonhW 
 into our Hands, and all Catalonia with it^ and 
 we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Re- 
 vol: in the other Kingdoms, but not to force 
 onCj unUfs they had been more difpos'd to ic 
 
 F them-
 
 C 34 1 
 
 tfiiemfelves ,• in which Point no body warfts t^ 
 be told, they failM : But tho' this Confequence, 
 which we hop'd for from ourSuccefs, did noe 
 follovY from it, the Advantage we had gain'd 
 was too confiderable to be parted with ; for by 
 being Maflers of B.melona^ we kept up Life in 
 our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to 
 our Enemies, who were by this Situation of 
 ours, oblig'd to lelTen considerably their Ar- 
 my on the fide of Portugal^ which one might 
 have expefted would have turn'd to a better 
 Account than it did, and wou'd have enabl'd 
 the Portuoucfe to have made fome Impreflion on 
 Sp.iiyt. But that is not all, as long as we had 
 fuch a Footing, and the Enemy could not de^ 
 pendonthe Inclinations of the People to the 
 Duke of Jiijiju^ which by what they had feent 
 in Catilonia^ they had reafon to be very appre- 
 henfive of, they were forc'd to employ an Ar- 
 my, much fuperiour to ours, to obferve Our Mo- 
 tions^ not knowing to which fide we might turn 
 our felves, or where an Infurredion might 
 break out in favour of us. And bcfides the 
 Diflradion, llneafinefs, and great Expence 
 this new War created the Duke oiAn\ou^ and 
 his Adherents, itobligMhim to difcover his 
 Diflruft of iht Spaniards movQ than he had done 
 before ,• and to (hew, he thought himfelf fafc 
 only in French Armies, as well as French Coun- 
 cils^ which could not but make a great deal of 
 ill Blood, tlio' not fo much as might have been 
 hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation* 
 Thcfe, you will allow, were no flight Reafons 
 for maintaining the Footing we had in Catalonia^ 
 much more will you think fo, when you refleft, 
 that this little Piece of Spain ha4 four Years a-
 
 [35] 
 
 go let lis into a full PofTeflion of the Whole, had 
 not a molt fatal and unaccountable Mifmanage- 
 ment ruin'd all \ not to infifl on feveral other 
 good EfFefts •, fuch as keeping his Holinefs, and 
 the other Italim Princes in awe_, who difcovrer'd 
 but too much Inclination to a League withf r^we, 
 the alarming all the Southern Coalt oiFrmce^-^vA 
 giving Encouragement to the Sevenmis^ and 
 other New Converts, who had long (hewn they 
 would ftir if they could i which created afrcfh 
 Trouble and Expence to the French King, by 
 obliging him to keep Troops on that fide, r.o no 
 other end, but to obferve the Motions of his 
 own Subjeds ,* and in the lift Place, had it 
 fucceeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the VV hole 
 of the Grand ProjeA againft Toulon. Thefe 
 are fuch Advantages of the Spanijh War as will 
 fufficiently juftify the beginning and purfning 
 of it in the manner we have done, efpeciaily 
 iince the Reduction of Minorca has made it fo 
 fafe and eafy to keep a good Squadron all the 
 Year in the Mediterraman. But thefe Purpofcs 
 are all anfwer'd, while we confine that War 
 within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep 
 on the Defeiifive only. There is no need of 
 enlarging the Scheme of the War, which in- 
 flead of doing Service to the Common Cauf^^ 
 would make us lofe feveral of the Advantages 
 we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Com- 
 pafs, and would endanger what we might 
 maintain, while we extend our felves beyond 
 our Strength, and grafp at mare than we can 
 hold i befides the other great Inconveniences, 
 which I have fhewn you, mult follow the ma- 
 king an OfFenllve War on this fide, which can 
 never poflibly fucceed, unlefs the Cajlilimi were 
 F 2 more
 
 [ 36 ] 
 
 more our Friends, or more were to be expe<fted 
 from the Fortuguefe, And even a Detenfive 
 War, Experience hasfhewnus, is much better 
 carry'donby Foreign Troops, which not only 
 fpares our Men, but faves a great deal of Mo- 
 ney, and is much more convenient tor the Ser-^ 
 vice, tbe Pallage being fo much fliorter from 
 Italy than it is from EngUnd. And yet we all 
 fee, rhat notwithftandmg the Endeavours to 
 fupport King Charles upon his late Viftories, no 
 Reinforcement has yet been fent him, even from 
 thence, as feafable as it feeras, and as great 
 Occafion as he has for them ^ and the Reinforce- 
 ment that was hll fenr, 'tis known did not ar- 
 rive till the middle of 5^M«e, tho' it was inten- 
 ded and ordered, thac they fliould be there in 
 January, Thus difficult it has been to main- 
 tain this War on the Foot ie has been hitherto 
 upon ^ and from Experience we may be fure, 
 thus it will be, and worfe, proportionably 
 worfe, as we enlarge it. And therefore I can't 
 think, any body does in earneft mean more, 
 than to do what we defign, without lofs of 
 time, but not to deOgn more than is abfo- 
 lutely neceflary, or to extend the Compafs 
 Of the War. 
 
 But they tell us, there is a Neceffity for it, 
 and thar Spin is not otherwife to be had : But 
 why ^0 ? Have they never heard in Pbyfick of 
 fuch a Term, as Revulfion, which teaches to 
 remivethe Evil from one part by proper Ap- 
 plications, not to the Part it felf, bat to its 
 Op5)ofite ? Or have they not fo much Me- 
 chanitks, as Children can teach them, who if 
 they would throw down ^, which is at the 
 J'op of A, gnd out of their Reach, will prefent-
 
 [37 ] 
 
 ly try if they c^n't pull down^: Thty know 
 almoft by Initii>6,that 'tis all one whethtr you 
 pvjll down ^ directly, or that which fupports 
 it. And 'tis the fame thing with S^ain • if chat 
 Kingdom be ever recover'd, it muft be, by 
 proper Applications to France. France ^ all the 
 World fees, is the Support of the Duke of 
 Anjou^ and if this Support be forc'd from him, 
 he will as furely tumble, as if you cou'd pull 
 him with your Hands from the Throne he has 
 ufurpM. Since therefore we can't reach him, 
 we Ihould fet our felves with all our iMight 
 to pull from him his Support, and ^hen 
 he mufi: tall on courfe : How near wc 
 have been fucceeding in this, you can'E 
 want to be told. And how it came not to 
 be quite done, your Frier ds know with- 
 out being told ^ and how much foever they 
 may like the Reafon of this, I'm perfwaded 
 they don't much like to hear of it. And if 
 S^ain be not gain'd this way, one may with- 
 out the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will 
 be gain'd at all. 
 
 ReMnow again thefe admi'rd Pamphlets, 
 and when their general Declamations have a- 
 mus'd you, and you begin to think there is 
 fomething in them, then turn to this true 
 State of the Cafe^ and theMift they have call 
 before you will van'fh ; their Harangues will 
 leave no more Impreffion upon you, th^n the 
 famous Dodor's Speech does upon ihufe that 
 look into his Sermon. But inllc?d of thofe 
 Impreffions, I cinnot but think there will re- 
 main upon your Mind, as theie does on mine, 
 an utter Deieftation and Abhorrence of the 
 black Viilany and Malice fome Men have us'd 
 
 to 

 
 [38] 
 
 to ruin the Reputation of the ableft and moft 
 faithful Mlnifters, and to hazard every thing 
 that is dear to us as Englifh-tnen and Proteftants, 
 rather than not compafs their own deftrudlive 
 Ends. 
 
 I remember, I have often thought, upon the 
 late intended Invafion of the Pretender, that 
 itwason his part a very foolifh Enterprise ,• for 
 tho' ic might anfwer the Purpofes of France^ 
 and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail 
 to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And 
 I am of the fame Opinion with refped to our 
 Domeftick Invaders, if I may ufe that 
 Expreflion ; the Publick indeed may fuffer by 
 them, as much as France can wifh, but if ic 
 fhould have the good Fortune to efcape the 
 Danger, it is threatned wich^ the Attempt 
 that has been made upon it will, I am per- 
 fwaded, fooner or later bring inevitable Ruin 
 upon themfelves. 
 
 But we are both, I dare fay, fufficiently 
 tir'd for one time ; I fhall therefore take leave 
 of you for [the prefent, with AfTurances that 
 you Ihall, in a very while time, h«ar again 
 from, 
 
 SJR, 
 
 Tour tnoft faithful, 
 Humble Servant, 
 
 Poji-
 
 [ 39 ] 
 
 Poftfcript. 
 
 Since thefe Papers were in the Prefs, the ill 
 News is come of a Battle loft in Spain af- 
 ter the Glorious Adions of jilmamra and Sara- 
 gojfa; Two Viftories fo great in themfelves, 
 and in the Confequence of them, that they 
 might have been decifive of the War, if the 
 Vortuguefe had join'd • which lam very forry 
 they did not, for the fake of the common 
 Caufe, and even of the young General him- 
 felf, to juftly applauded for his fearlefs Zeal 
 both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service 
 of his Country. But tho' thisunfortunate.<Bat- 
 tle has too much juftify'd what I have faid a- 
 gainft enlarging the Scheme of the War in that 
 Country, I ftill hope we may be in a Conditi- 
 on not much worfe than laft Year, and able to 
 continue ading in the Defenfwe manner I have 
 recommended. 
 
 N. B. The Second Letter mil he publi/h'd 
 next Saturday. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 i
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below 
 
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 27im 
 
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