-5 ' 3«' - i / ! 3 THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES raan | 94c I c ff-t/i4y^/{JCKyi4^.CMyt^ y ■'^^njt QlA 5)art, §>cI)a£Encr & iJtarj; Pd^e Economic (Edsaps THE CAUSE AND EXTENT OF THE RECENT INDUS- TRIAL PROGRESS OF GERMANY. By Earl D. Howard. THE CAUSES OF THE PANIC OF 1893. By William J. Lauck. INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION. By Harlow Stafford Person, Ph.D. FEDERAL REGULATION OF RAILWAY RATES. By Al- bert N. Merritt, Ph.D. SHIP SUBSIDIES. An Economic Study of the Policy of Sub- sidizing Merchant Marines. By Walter T. Dunmore. SOCIALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. By O. D. Skelton. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND THEIR COMPENSATION. By Gilbert L. Campbell, B. S. THE STANDARD OF LIVING AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL PEOPLE OF AMERICA. By Frank H. Streightoff. THE NAVIGABLE RHINE. By Edwin J. Oapp. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF CRIMINAL STATIS- TICS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Louis Newton Robinson. SOCIAL VALUE. By B. M. Anderson, Jr. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION. By J. F. Strombeck. V/ATERWAYS VERSUS RAILV^'AYS. By Harold Glenn Moulton. THE VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION. By Harri- son H. Brace. INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION: ITS PROBLEMS, METHODS AND DANGERS. By Albert H. Leake. THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM I 86 1 TO I 87 I . By Harry Edwin Smith. WELFARE AS AN ECONOMIC QUANTITY. By G. P. Watkins. CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Arthur E. SufEern. THE CANADIAN IRON AND STEEL I NDUSTr^Y. By W.J. A. Donald. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY Boston and Nbw York ^ar^, ^c^affrtet: & QUatx ^x'n^t <^00a^0 XVIII CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY OF AMERICA CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY OF AMERICA BY ARTHUR E. SUFFERN, M.A. Sometime Lecturer in Economics, Columbia University BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 1915 COPYRIGHT, :9I5, BY HART, SCHAFFNER * MARX ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Published February iqis jbst. Indus. . Rel. i 5 60^ A3 S7 PREFACE This series of books owes its existence to the generosity of *^ Messrs. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, of Chicago, who have s^ shown a special interest in trying to draw the attention of y American youth to the study of economic and commercial subjects. For this purpose they have delegated to the un- ^ dersigned committee the task of selecting or approving of ^ topics, making announcements, and awarding prizes annu- „ ally for those who wish to compete. 'i: For the year ending June 1, 1913, there were of- f fered : — V In Class A, which included any American without I restriction, a first prize of $1000, and a second prize of ;^ $500. v^ In Class B, which included any who were at the time undergraduates of an American college, a first prize of $300, and a second prize of $200. Any essay submitted in Class B, if deemed of sufficient I~^ merit, could receive a prize in Class A. ^ '" The present volume, submitted in Class A, was awarded '' the first prize in that class. J. Laurence Laughlin, Chairman, University of Chicago. •^j J. B. Clark, * i> ' Columbia University. Henry C. Adams, University of Michigan. i/*'*^ Horace White, i ; New York City. -J^ K^ Edwin F. Gay, ^^ Harvard University. ^ < ^^ " I - - o> a p 0) U; O OJ eg 1 «3 a o PS ^1 "3 o M fa te 3 t CQ © V bg .u O tf' m Pi tf plant the unskilled and rapidly to acquire the places of the skilled men. Perhaps the enumeration of the Reading mine employees is as good a criterion as any. There we * Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., p. viii. 240 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY find 6839 Slavs and Italians out of a total 24,734 mine employees.^ 6. THE STRIKE OF 1900 From the time of the struggle in 1887-88 until 1900, we hear of no further attempts to unite for better work- ing conditions. In the mean time the momentum of the forces of concentrated wealth and immigration which had broken up unionism in the seventies and eighties was in- creasing. The natural evolution from local to national organization found no chance for expression because there was not enough local solidarity to build on. In fact the regime of individual bargaining which was in full sway was aggravated to such an extent by the introduction of an ever-increasing foreign element with different lan- guages, customs, and ideals, that even the common sym- pathy necessary to local organization was wanting. Not until adverse working conditions had forced the recogni- tion of a common lot and made the many nationalities receptive to the teachings of the United Mine Workers did there appear sufficient unity to warrant a struggle. A. The Work of the United Mine Workers When we consider the factors that have entered into the situation since 1875, the wonder is that anything ef- fective was accomplished in the strike of 1900. That suf- ficient homogeneity was attained to enable the men to stand together for any length of time points to a stronger influence than a common feeling attained as the result of social contact or through political or educational institu- tions. The United Mine Workers of the bituminous field had felt the effects of the anthracite coming into their mar- kets during their early struggles, and this, without doubt, was one impelling force which drove them to organize the ^ Wame, The Slav Invasion, p. 63. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 241 anthracite miners. During the early and middle nineties, however, their desultory efforts had brought only ninety- four locals into the fold. In 1899 the problem was at- tacked with greater vim. National organizers and mem- bers of the executive board were permanently stationed in the anthracite field, and the region was organized into three districts with the regular local officials to direct the work. In spite of this well-laid campaign only 8000 out of the 142,000 workers were brought into the organization before the strike.^ B. Disrupting Factors There were many factors which made greater results impossible. In the first place there were fourteen nation- alities with different languages and different standards of living, different customs, and different religious. The distrust and jealousies that accompany such factors were almost insurmountable. The living participants in past strikes sounded the warning of past failures. The fear of arousing the wrath of the employer and the relentless blacklist made the bravest hesitate, especially those who had family obligations and permanent domiciles. The ghost of surplus labor stalked near and brought distrust among fellow workmen even of the same nationality, for there is no force so disrupting as the dread of hunger and starvation. C. Economic Pressure That 142,000 men did respond when the strike order was given shows the pressure of adverse working con- ditions. This pressure was strong enough to overbalance the disruptive factors which would naturally make united action impossible in a heterogeneous population. In the middle and southern fields, where the sliding scale was in operation, out of 153 drawings ^ since January 1, 1888, 1 Mitchell, The Independent, toI. 52, p. 2G14. " See ante, p. 230. 242 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY to establish wages, " 8 resulted in payment of basis wages, 44 in advance upon that rate, and 101 in a reduction therefrom." ^ The miners, having no voice in making the scale, had lost all confidence in its working justice, and they demanded its abolition. The items in the miners' de- mands point to other pressing factors. An increase of twenty per cent was asked for those laborers receiving less than fl.50 per day; fifteen per cent for those receiving $1.50 to $1.75 per day; and ten per cent for those receiving more than $1.75. Besides the necessity for this increase in money wages and adjustment to meet increased cost of living, there were other factors affecting real wages which needed attention. It was of considerable importance to them that 2240 pounds instead of 3360 pounds should be considered a ton. To see that this was brought about, it was necessary for them to employ a checkweighman who was also to see that the amount of " dockage " for impuri- ties was fair. 2 A reduction in the price of powder from $2.75 to $1.50 a keg was demanded. This would enable the operator to supply the men and obtain a proper return on his investment, since it only cost from 90 cents to $1 per keg. The existence of the company store, deductions for the company doctor,^ and compliance with the state law which required semimonthly payment in cash, all affected real wages. Here was the driving force which acted upon all nationalities. It only needed harnessing. D. Negotiations for Settlement In 1900 the miners of the northern field petitioned President Mitchell to call a strike. After conferring with leaders of the other districts he decided that the time was ^ Virtue, Journal of Political Economy^ vol. 9, p. 7. 2 The miners were still suffering from the -want of such regulations in the face of the fact that the state laws permitted them. 8 One firm is quoted as making $16,000 profit a year through de- ductions for the company doctor. Mitchell, The Independent, vol. 52, p. 2014. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 243 not opportune. A convention of delegates from all three districts was caUed on August 13 which formulated the miners' grievances and invited the operators to meet them in joint conference on August 27. The operators paid no attention to this request, and the convention sought per- mission of the national executive board to strike if the leaders were not able to negotiate a settlement within ten days. From the time of the convention till September 12, every honorable means, including an offer to arbitrate, was used to effect a settlement. Pressure from political sources and the expressions of the press were without avail. The operators thought that not more than ten per cent of the men would respond to a strike order. On September 17, the day the strike went into effect, 112,000 employees struck, and at the time of the settlement, October 29, 140,000 men were idle. The operators refused to recog- nize the United Mine Workers as an organization, claim- ing that it was a bituminous organization whose officers were not acquainted with the anthracite industry and whose superior number shoidd not be allowed to control the an- thracite policy. But President Mitchell pointed out to them that the anthracite members had become numerically stronger than the bituminous membership, and further offered to let the negotiations take place between the operators and committees of their own men, provided that they met in the same city, at the same time, so that general conditions could be established.^ E. Settlement of the Strike The operators did not take advantage of any such ar- rangement. They did not propose to recognize the union. Notices were posted at all the most important collieries stating that an increase of ten per cent would be granted and powder would be reduced from $2.75 to $1.50 per ^ United Mine Workers^ Journal, September 27, 1900. Reprint of state- ment to the public. 244 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY keg in the northern and middle fields.^ Since 1,372,691 kegs were used in 1899, this was rather an important con- cession. The sliding scale was abolished in the middle and southern districts,^ but the other abuses that affected real wages remained. Since the state laws were ineffective, the concerted action of the union was necessary to bring about the abolition of the abuses. 7. THE STRIKE OF 1902 A. Preparation for Another Struggle The settlement of the strike of 1900 had left both par- ties with the feeling that a truce had been declared on the real issues. The operators, in anticipation of another strug- gle, began the erection of stockades, storage houses for coal, and washeries. They felt that the " union was nothing but a fighting machine to be fought, and the demands of the union nothing but an increase in wages and a reduction in dividends. . . . They understood the art of obtaining low wages, but they utterly failed to comprehend the new spirit which would resist oppression at no matter what cost in suffering and privations." ^ In some cases the companies who had a large number of non-union men who remained at work, blacklisted union men after the strike, and those who had few non-unionists discharged them. Agents in the employ of the companies circulated among the unionists and kept their employers informed. A cam- paign was on foot to bring the United Mine Workers to the same fate which the previous unions had met. In 1901, through the mediation of Senator Hanna, sev- eral of the railroad presidents, Mr. Mitchell, and the dis- trict presidents were brought together. In this conference 1 Powder had been reduced to $1.50 by the Reading Company shortly after the congressional investigation of 1887-88. ^ The sliding scale had never been used in the northern field. ^ Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 369. IN THE ANTHIL^.CITE FIELD 245 it was agreed that the settlement of 1900 should continue for another year, and the union leaders left the meeting hoping that another year would find the operators in a frame of mind to grant recognition to the union and nego- tiate with its leaders. B. Negotiations of 1902 A. operators' attitude toward a joint CONFERENCE In response to an invitation to take part in a joint con- ference at Scranton, March 12, the operators declined by formal letters. The burden of the replies centered around their unwillingness to do more than adjust grievances with committees of their own employees. They thought it im- practicable to form a wage scale for the whole anthracite region because of variability in working conditions and costs of mining. Furthermore they objected to having their relations with their employees disturbed every year for, so far as they were aware, their employees were " well satis- fied with their present rates of wages, their hours of work, and the general conditions under which they perform their work for us." ^ Neither could there be " two masters in the management of business," and the adjustment of wages and working conditions did " not call for the intervention of the organization which you, Mr. Mitchell, represent." These statements show how far the operators were from an understanding of the principles of conciliation and the place it has in industry. B. MEETINGS ARRANGED BY THE CIVIC FEDERATION From March 18 to 24 the miners hold a convention at Shamokin, Pennsylvania, and formulated their demands. They asked for recognition of the union, an increase in ^ Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 46, p. 21'J. 246 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY wages, tbo weighing of coal, and a uniform scale, and they appealed to the National Civic Federation for its mediation. At a conference arranged by the Civic Federa- tion the operators stated their position in three proposi- tions. They promised not to discriminate against unionists, and insisted that union men should not refuse to work with non-unionists. There should be no deterioration in quality of work or restriction in quantity of product. Since varying conditions rendered uniformity impossible, each mine should " arrange either individually or through its committees with the superintendents or managers any questions affecting wages or grievances." ^ After discuss- ing at great length the general relations of labor and cap- ital, the conference adjourned for thirty days, and another meeting at the end of that time brought no further re- sults. A subcommittee consisting of the presidents of the Lehigh, Lackawanna, and Reading companies, the three anthracite district presidents, and Mr. Mitchell, debated the question further for two full days, but reached no settlement. C. THE FIRST OFFER TO ARBITRATE The union officials during these conferences, as a last resort, and to avert the suffering attendant upon a strike, had offered to reduce their demands to a ten per cent in- crease in wages and a nine-hour instead of an eight-hour day. But this was mistaken for weakness and cowardice, and " one of the railway presidents predicted that, come what might, the men would not strike, but would submit to any rebuff." ^ This idea was probably encouraged by the offer to arbitrate which was extended by the union officials. They offered to accept a board of live selected by the National Civic Federation to settle upon the questions in dispute, or to trust the fairness of their demands to a ^ Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, op. cit., p. 33. 2 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 373. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 247 committee consisting of Archbisliop Ireland, Bishop Potter, and the two to select a third. If the committee should de- cide " that the average annual wages received by anthra- cite mine workers are sufficient to enable them to live, maintain and educate their families in a manner conform- able to established American standards and consistent with American citizenship, we agree to withdraw our claims for higher wages and more equitable conditions of employment, providing that the anthracite mine operators agree to comply with any recommendations the above committee may make affecting the earnings and con- ditions of labor of their employees." ^ In reply most of the operators stated that they had posted notices promis- ing to continue to pay the wages granted in 1900, and one operator reminded the union leaders that " anthracite mining is a business, and not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition." Furthermore, since the business management of the company was supposed to be in the hands of the president and directors, " I could not if I would delegate this business management to even so highly respectable a body as the Civic Federation, nor can I call to my aid as experts in the mixed problem of busi- ness and philanthropy the eminent prelates you have named." ^ D. ORDER FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION When the union officers saw that peaceful overtures had failed, an order for a temporary suspension was issued to take effect on May 12. A convention was called for May 15, and at that meeting the delegates voted to con- tinue the suspension in spite of the advice of their presi- dent to wait till autumn, which would save the miners and the public from the hardships of a protracted conflict.^ ^ Rf.pr/rt of Anlhracite Strike, Commission^ op. cit., p. 34. ^ //jjc/., p. 35, ^ Mitchell, op. cit., p. ;!7.'>. Ho " was even in hopes tliat by that time tlie opuratorB wuuld see the folly of their course and luuke concessions." 218 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY In obedience to the strike order 147,000 employees ceased work. The engineers, firemen, and pumpmen who keep the mines iu working order were not called out. But by June 2, they had not been able to get any modification of their wages or long working day ^ and they were called out at their own request. Efforts at mediation were continued by the Civic Fed- eration, and in June, with the rise in prices and the com- plaints of the public, Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, was delegated by President Roosevelt to inquire into the situation. His report justified the demands of the men in part, but no action was taken, nor was it made public until much later. C. The Speciai, Bituminous Convention The anthracite miners had expected help from the bitu- minous field, and as the strike held on into July a consider- able demand for a sympathetic strike was heard. With a request from five districts, President Mitchell was obliged to call a national convention, and in response to the call a special convention assembled at Indianapolis July 17 to consider the anthracite situation. With the increasing dis- tress in the anthracite field and the knowledge that a gen- eral coal strike would deprive the railroads of fuel and soon bring them to terms, the union officials had no small task on their hands to thwart the movement for a sympa- thetic strike. The wiser and stronger officials saw in the contractual system that they had been building up in the bituminous field something which should not be thrown aside lightly. They had just made a contract which ex- tended till April, 1903, and both operators and miners had preached the inviolability of contracts to tlieir follow- ers. Over against this the argument of self-preservation was placed, and its adherents predicted the destruction of the organization in the bituminous field if failure was met ^ Twelve hours and on alternate Sundays twenty-four hours. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 249 with in the anthracite regions. President Mitchell in his address to the convention answered this argument by re- minding his followers that " a disregard of the sacredness of contracts strikes at the very vitals of organized labor. The effect of such action would be to destroy confidence, to array in open hostility to our cause all forces of society, and to crystallize public sentiment in opposition to our movement." ^ Instead of entering upon a questionable policy, the miners decided to do the practical thing. From an au- thorized appropriation out of the national treasury and gifts from state organizations, $110,000 was put into the hands of the anthracite district presidents for immediate relief work. The districts, subdistricts, and locals were asked for donations from their treasuries. An assessment of ten per cent of the gross earnings of all members who were working and twenty-five per cent of the officers' sal- aries was levied. Local committees were appointed to aid the anthracite men to get work and solicit local contribu- tions. An address was issued to the public setting forth the inviolability of contracts, appealing for aid, and re- minding the people of the power of public opinion. " No class of men realizes more than we do the great power of public opinion. Its influence is potent for good or evil in accordance with the manner in which it is used. No right can be secured and maintained without its support, and no wrong can long exist that meets with its concentrated opposition." D. Misunderstanding and Discontent Through an overestimate by the newspapers of the amount of money that would be contributed by the vote of the convention and the time of its payment, a basis was laid for discontent and brought about a very critical situ- ation in the month of August. The miners received their * Minutes of Special Convention to consider the Anthracite Strike, p. 39. 250 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY pay semimonthly and the money earned in the last half of July would not be paid until August 15. These circum- stances led the anthracite miners to believe they would get more than they did per week, made the public slow in contributing, and gave the agents of the operators a chance to sow discontent by intimating that the money was with- held. ^ Mr. Mitchell has expressed the opinion that the strike would have collapsed at that time if the operators had opened the mines. But explanation of the circum- stances from the ojSicials, accompanied by advice to main- tain the peace, held the men in line till the contributions began to come in. E. Conference called by President Koosevelt As the strike held on through September, and the suf- fering of the poor through the rise of prices became more apparent, every influence was brought to bear to effect a settlement. The operators maintained that they had noth- ing to arbitrate and that they were prevented from con- ducting their business by the terrorism and violence of the miners. No effort seemed to be effective until Presi- dent Roosevelt invited both parties to a conference at the White House on October 3. The President placed before the miners and operators a statement that a third party, the public, was deeply concerned with the situation. He disclaimed legal right to call them together, but appealed to their patriotism and their sense of responsibility to the public. This was met on the part of the miners by an offer to submit their claims to a tribunal named by the President and abide by the award even if it went against them. The operators reiterated their claim that the violence and terrorism practiced by the miners made it impossible to mine coal. They reminded the President that "the constitution of Pennsylvania guarantees protection to life * Mitchell, op. cit., p. 380. m THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 251 and property. In express terms it declares the right of acquiring, possessing, and defending property to be in- alienable." Furthermore, it was the duty of the President " to reestablish the reign of law " and " to suppress do- mestic violence. You see there is a lawful way to secure coal for the public. The duty of the hour is not to waste time negotiating with the fomenters of this anarchy and insolent defiance of law, but to do as was done in the war of the rebellion, restore the majesty of law, the only guard- ian of a free people, and to reestablish order and peace at any cost.''^ Furthermore, the civil branch of the United States Government should " institute proceedings against the illegal organization known as the United Mine Work- ers' Association," and prosecute it under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.^ F. The President appoints a Commission The attitude of the operators called forth a storm of indignation which they had not foreseen. It was further encouraged by the fact that a few days after the confer- ence the miners assembled in mass meeting to vote on the question of returning to work, and although the Governor of Pennsylvania had thrown 10,000 soldiers into the an- thracite region to make it possible for those who wished to return to work to do so, 150,000 voted to continue the strike until their demands were considered.^ On October 6, President Roosevelt, through the Hon- orable C. D. Wright, asked Mr. Mitchell to induce the men to return to work, promising that a commission should be appointed to investigate conditions and that every influ- ence should be brought to induce the operators to accept its findings.^ Mr. Mitchell concluded that this course 1 Report of Conference between the President, the Anthracite Operators, and the Representatives of the United Mine Workers, p. G. Reprint of written BtatenriPnts. 2 Ibid., pp. 11, 15. 8 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 389. * Ibid. 252 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY would be inadvisable, since the operators had not promised to accept the findings and the President had no legal authority to enforce them. JSIeanwhile efforts were made to bring the operators to terms. Mr. Hoot, Secretary of War, was sent to inter- view Mr. J. P. Morgan, and as a result of tliis interview Mr. Morgan called on the President on October 13 and submitted the following proposition. The President should appoint a commission of five to be composed of an officer of the United States Engineering Corps, an expert min- ing engineer, one of the judges of the United States Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a sociol- ogist, and a man who had engaged in mining and selling coal. As soon as the commission was appointed the men were to return to work pending the award. This proved acceptable to the miners except that they insisted that labor be recognized and asked to have the number on the commission increased to seven. This would afford an op- portunity to give labor recognition and appoint a Catholic prelate as a member. The addition of the latter would in- crease the confidence of the men (most of whom were Catholics) in the award. With these preliminaries agreed on, the proposition was submitted to the miners' conven- tion, and ratified, and the men reported for work Octo- ber 23. G. The Award of the Commission After an extended investigation of actual working con- ditions and examination of 558 witnesses the commission rendered the following award. The contract miners were granted a ten per cent in- crease in the rates for " cutting coal, yardage, and other work for which standard rates or allowances existed." The men had asked for a twenty per cent increase. Cor- responding to this the union had asked for a decrease from ten to eight working hours, which would be equiva- IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 253 lent to a twenty per cent increase to men employed by the day. In response to this request the day men were given a nine-hour day with the same pay, which was equivalent to ten per cent increase. The commission found that the state laws providing for payment by weight had been ineffective, and it declined to impose this method of payment or to fix a uniform number of pounds to the ton. In some mines payment was made by the yard and in others by the wagon or car. Payment by weight was to be effective only by mutual agreement. But in examining the statistics from certain mines the commission discovered that the presence of checkweighmen and check docking bosses had saved the miners fifty per cent in dockage.^ Accordingly it awarded contract miners the right to elect and pay checkweighmen and check docking bosses to look after their interests. The commission recommended that the distribution of cars be equitable, and that discrimination, lawlessness, boycotting, and blacklisting be done away with. It de- cided that payment to contract miners' helpers should be directed to the helper and not through the miner. Fixing the wages paid under the award as a minimum, the com- mission reestablished the sliding scale. The basis price of coal was fixed at $4.50 at tidewater. When the average price increased five cents above this basis, the employees were to get an increase of one per cent in wages, and so on with every increase of five cents. The average prices were to be computed by an accountant who was to be named and have his compensation fixed by one of the cir- cuit judges of the Third Judicial Circuit. His salary was to be apportioned among the operators in proportion to their tonnage. The operators refused from the beginning of the inves- tigation to recognize the United Mine Workers as an organization, and insisted that Mr. Mitchell appeared as a * Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, op. cit., p. 09. 254 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY representative of their employees and not in his official capacity. The operators claimed that they objected to the miners' organization chieliy because the majority of the members of the union were employed in the bituminous field which they considered a rival industry. They be- lieved that it was to the interest of the bituminous oper- ators and miners alike to encourage strife in the anthra- cite field. To this Mr. Mitchell responded : — That this objection is neither valid nor consistent is clearly demonstrated by the fact that many of the railroads officered by the same men who control the anthracite coal mines enter into agreements with railroad organizations, a majority of whose members are employed upon other and competing roads. It would be as logical to refuse recognition of the brotherhoods of locomotive engineers, firemen, conductors, or brakemen because a majority of the membership of these organizations is not em- ployed directly by the anthracite-carrying railroads as it is to refuse to make an agreement with the United Mine Workers of America because a part of the membership is employed in the bituminous fields.^ The operators objected to boys over sixteen years of age being allowed one half of a vote, and the commission agreed that this was " unwise and impolitic." Further, the commission thought that strikes should be declared only by a two-thirds vote. In spite of these objections the commission felt called upon to include in its award some method of peaceful adjustment of disputes. Accordingly it created an arbi- tration board of six members, to settle disputes that could not be adjusted by mine officials " and the miner or min- ers directly interested." Three of the board were to be appointed by the operators and three by the employees. An award made by a majority vote was to be final. In case the board could not agree, the disputed questions were ^ United Mine Workers^ Journal, November 20, 1902. Reprint of open- ing address to the commission. EN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 255 to be referred to an arbiter who should be selected by one of the circuit judges of the Third Judicial Circuit of the United States. The membership of the board was at all times to be kept complete and there was to be no suspen- sion of work pending a decision. The award of the com- mission continued in force until March 31, 1906. 8. ADJUSTMENTS SINCE 1902 A. Formation of the Conciliation and Arbitration Board Hardly had the men returned to their work when there arose plenty of cases which needed the attention of the board. Discrimination, blacklisting, refusal to make de- ductions from wages to pay checkweighmen and docking bosses, the reckoning of increase of wages on the basis of gross or net earnings, were all fruitful sources of dispute. Shortly after the award was rendered, a dispute arose among the Reading employees over the interpretation of the statement regarding hours. A strike involving 30,000 men demanded immediate attention. President Mitchell ordered the men back to work to await the decision of the board. This trouble occurred the latter part of April, but the board was not ready for work until June 25 because of the refusal of the operators' representatives to meet the representatives of the miners till they had been duly appointed by a convention. The three district presidents of the United Mine Workers had been appointed as a matter of course, but recognizing them without the sanc- tion of a convention looked too much like recognizing the union. The miners pertinently reminded the operators' representatives that they had not been appointed by the stockholders. In the mean time feeling ran high and the leaders had difficulty in keeping the men from another strike.^ 1 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 390. i56 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY A. RULES OF THE BOARD These circumstances did not give the board a very pro- pitious inauguration, but the board proceeded at once to the formation of a set of rules to govern the consideration of cases. If a dispute arose, the person or persons " di- rectly interested or a committee of the same " were to at- tempt to settle matters with the mine officials. In case of failure to agree or to get an interview, the causes of the dispute were to be put in writing and referred to the members of the conciliation board from that district. The board members were then to try to settle the trouble or obtain an interview for the workers. If there was a fail- ure to reach an adjustment, the board was then to require a statement from the employer or summon him to appear in person. Complaints by the employers regarding em- ployees were to follow the same course. Furthermore, the board was to consider no case unless work was continued while awaiting a decision.^ This latter rule was supple- mented by making the decision retroactive, i.e., the award went into effect from the time the complaint was made and not from the time of the board's decision. B. The Cases before the Board From 1903 to 1912 two hundred cases were brought before the board for action. One hundred and fifty arose in the first three years of the board's existence, twenty- three in the years 1906-09, and twenty-nine from 1909 to 1912. Two cases were still before the board in the early part of 1912 when Mr. Shelby M. Harrison made an extended investigation of the cases that had come be- fore the board.2 Out of a classification of 193 cases it was found that 181 had been brought by the workers against * United Mine Workers^ Journal, July 2, 1903. Reprint of the rules. 2 Harrison, The Survey, April 20, 1912. These figures are taken from his report. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 257 the employers. Of these " 15 were sustained, 34 were not sustained, 32 were settled by mutual agreement, 32 were partly sustained, 53 were withdrawn, 9 were held to be beyond the board's jurisdiction, 4 resulted in a tie vote with no further action, and 2 [were] still pending. Of the 11 grievances brought by the employers 2 were sus- tained, 2 were settled, 6 withdrawn, and 1 was decided to be beyond the board's jurisdiction." In these figures the comparatively large number of cases that were withdrawn or settled by mutual agreement is worthy of note. More- over, " it is reliably estimated that from two to three times as many cases have been settled by the district members of the board as have formally come before the whole body." The board could not agree on 25 cases and they were submitted to an umpire. C. Attitude of Both Parties toward the Board A. the operators' position From the attitude taken by the operators in 1902 toward conciliation and arbitration we are justified in inferring that they did not look upon the project with any great favor. Strangely enough they are now strongly for the board, and they have resisted every effort made by the miners to supplement the activities of the board by arrangements which the miners feel will facilitate the work of the board and come nearer to rendering justice. The operators have found that the system they now have tends to prevent in- terruptions of work, brings the men back to work when a local strike occurs, and protects them from extravagant and impossible demands. The services of the union lead- ers have been very welcome in settling disputes in in- stances where the men were unorganized and in cases where a spontaneous strike has occurred in protest against abuses. A service of this kind was rendered in August, 1911, when 13,000 employees of the Pennsylvania Coal 258 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY Company (mostly Italians) went on a strike. It is said that the Industrial Workers of the World stirred the men to action, but the union leaders went among them, held meet- ings, and explained to them the necessity of formulating their demands before they could get them before the arbi- tration board. Out of the sixty grievances formulated all but two were settled by^ the district representatives of the board. ^ Among these 13,000 there were not 100 union men, yet it is said there is some restlessness among the operators because " the unions do not in all cases hold the men in line, pending the settlement of grievances, but this is doubtless regarded as a lesser evil than a super-power- ful union." 2 The mine officials recognize that a settlement of disputes must be on a broader basis than in the days of purely individual bargaining. Some of them take pride in not having any grievances before the board, and others are learning that it hurts their standing with corporation officials if they have to be called before the board often to answer complaints of their men. In answer to the min- ers' demands in 1912 that " a more convenient and uni- form system of adjusting local grievances within a reason- able time limit " be granted, the operators replied that " of all the arrangements effected by the Strike Commis- sion, none has worked out better results than the concilia- tion board." ^ They maintained further that it furnished a means of "prompt and free adjustment"; that its deci- sions were rendered more promptly than those of civil courts and were retroactive ; and that the eases coming before it had steadily diminished from 107 cases in 1907 to 5 in 1911. B. THE miners' POSITION In reply to this praise of the board the miners declared flatly that as a method of adjusting grievances it was very unsatisfactory. ^ Harrison, ap. cit.,-p. 145. ^ Ibid., p. 145. 8 Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 5. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 259 You lay stress upon the fact that the number of complaints submitted to the board has steadily diminished. . . . Instead of this proving its value, it strikingly illustrates its failure as a practical working method for the adjustment of disputes. In 1903 the miners hoped it would prove to be of real value, so they submitted thereto their grievances. They soon discovered that they were wrong. The red tape and technicalities incident to the handling and consideration of disputes make it impracti- cal. This accounts for the decrease. The number of grievances among the men have increased rather than decreased, but they suffer under these wrongs rather than submit them to the board. It is not a working arrangement ; it exists in name only. There are several circumstances which should be con- sidered in connection with this strong position which the miners have taken. Upon the miners' organization rests the responsibility for keeping strikes in check and yet their organization receives no recognition by the opera- tors. The employers treat with men who are known sim- ply as representatives of the employees of the anthracite region. Moreover, the whole plan of conciliation and arbi- tration is predicated upon effective organization which will enable the enforcement of agreements. The union bears one half of the expense of the board, although only 29,225 out of 170,000 employees were paid-up members of the or- ganization in 1912. The great mass of the workers appre- ciate the benefits of organization when a new agreement is to be negotiated and they lay off to a man. But the spirit of tax-dodging exists here as elsewhere, and it is only by the introduction of proper administrative machinery that taxes can be collected and agreements and contracts en- forced after they are made. The non-union man gets the benefit of general betterment of conditions without con- tributing anything to maintain them. Again, the individual worker is at a disadvantage in dealing with the mine officials. The board up to 1912 received complaints only from " interested " persons, and 2G0 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY without a pit committee backed by the entire organization the worker is on the basis of iudividiuil bargaining when it comes to performing the various classes of work which the changing conditions in the mines are constantly requir- ing. In such cases he must accept whatever the official imposes upon him or quit, and his financial condition is generally too precarious to warrant his surrendering his job lightly. These conditions were further supplemented by the absolute right of discharge which was rendered in a decision of Arbiter Wright, and this right was easily used to root out the men who dared to express their griev- ances. The organizers or board members could not go to a mine to protect a union man from retaliation, and the whole situation militated against organized labor and made membership a very questionable proposition to the average worker. Also the miners were not satisfied with the powers dele- gated to the board for dealing with vital questions, nor the scope over which it might extend those powers. In the first place, the award of the commission has been set up as a sort of constitution which will bear interpretation but not radical revision. For example, in the matter of wages they are still founded on custom and the reported wage schedules of the operators to the commission. The com- mission did not attempt to formulate a wage schedule clas- sified on the basis of varying conditions and the nature of the work done, but contented itself merely by add- ing on ten per cent to the existing schedules. Cases have arisen where the employers claimed that they were not parties in the disputes submitted to the commission and did not promise to abide by the award. The board decided that disputes with such parties had no standing before the board. Again, Mr. Wright as umpire said that "the anthracite commission did not undertake to deal with the character of the work performed, this being left to adjustment in IN THE ANTHILVCITE FIELD 261 each colliery in accordance with the prevailing conditions." Where satisfactory adjustments have not been made in the collieries, the complainants have carried their griev- ances to the board only to find that the board claimed to have no jurisdiction. These are some of the conditions which prompted the miners to call the board an ineffective instrument in dealing with the real problems of concilia- tion and in keeping pace with changing conditions. 9. THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912 A. Peeliminaet Negotiations in 1906 and 1909 In 1906 the miners signed an agreement to continue under the award of 1903, with the feeling that, if they had accomplished nothing more, they had at least got the operators to do a little negotiating. The miners hoped that by 1909 the operators would be ready to meet them frankly in joint conference and discuss the real conditions of the industry. But again, in 1909, they got no further than signing an agreement to work under the award of 1903 till 1912, and adding a few clauses providing that pay- ment for new work should not be less than the rates paid under the award; that the arrangements and decisions of the conciliation board permitting of dues on company property should continue ; and that an employee dis- charo^ed for beins: a unionist should have the ric;ht of appeal to the board for final adjustment.^ B. The Miners' Demands On November 8, 1911, the Tri-District Convention of the anthracite miners met and formulated the following demands. The most important was the demand for recog- nition of the United Mine Workers as a party in nego- tiating a wage contract for one year, with the right to provide a suitable method for collecting revenue for the * Report of Htcretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1909, p. 277. 2C2 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY organization. An advance of twenty per cent in wages, an eight-hour working day, and a better system of adjusting local grievances were next in importance. It was further demanded " that the rights of checkweighmen and check- docking bosses shall be recognized ; that they shall not be interfered with in the proper performance of their work ; that all coal shall be mined and paid for by the ton of 2240 pounds wherever practicable " ; and that the system of allowing contract miners to have more than one work- ing place and employing more than two laborers should be abolished. C. The Joint Confeeence A. THE operators' REPLY These demands were presented to the operators Febru- ary 27, at a joint conference which was adjourned till March 13, 1912, to give the operators a chance to consider them. On the latter date the conference met and the oper- ators presented a written statement in reply to the de- mands. Harking back to the award of the commission, they reminded the miners that " the award they rendered stands recognized as the most just and sound solution of labor difficulties ever secured in the country. ... It should be conclusive as to all facts and issues which it covered and these have not since been changed." All the old argu- ments against recognition of the union were advanced, and the operators concluded that the demand for " check-off " for collecting dues would lead to the " closed shop." They also called to mind that it would be impossible to grant this because there was a state statute requiring that the full amount of wages be paid in cash.^ In response to the request to establish equal opportunity among contract miners they refused " to limit the ability and ambition of industrious men by arbitrarily agreeing to restrict their ^ This law had been aimed at the company store. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 263 opportunities to earn increased remuneration." Further- more, they disclaimed any interference with checkweigh- men and check-docking bosses. For them to grant the eight-hour day would be seriously to curtail production, and to concede an advance of twenty per cent was not to be thought of because, by the ten per cent advances of 1900 and 1902 and the 4.6 per cent increase as the result of the sliding scale, the miners had received a total ad- vance of 24,6 per cent. Since the sliding scale went into effect the miners had received a total bonus of $30,000,000. If the twenty per cent increase were granted, it would mean an increase in wages of $28,000,000, annually, which would have to be borne by the domestic sizes of coal and would increase the price of coal sixty-seven cents per ton. The estimate was " based upon the cost sheets of a num- ber of collieries in all three regions." Furthermore, coal was being produced at an increasing cost, and since the cost of fuel was " such an important element" to individ- ual and industrial consumers it would not be fair to ad- vance the cost of mining and thus advance the price of coal. The operators hoped that the prosperity which had 80 long obtained in the industry would not " be arbitrarily and unnecessarily disturbed." If it were, the responsibility would be with the miners.^ B. THE miners' REBUTTAL After the statement of the operators was read the miners were informed that it was final, and the confer- ence adjourned for two days, when the miners made the following reply. They regretted the " positive position " the operators had taken and had hoped that they would recognize the change in conditions that had taken place since the commission made its award. Further, the com- mission had not intended that the award should "con- tinue in effect for all time." Also, the increased cost of ^ Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 9. 2G1 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY living had reduced the purchasing power of wages, and in the matter of working hours there was no reason why the anthracite miner should have to work longer hours than the bituminous miner. Unless the union were recog- nized, they were thoroughly convinced that they could not " protect their interests " under the terms of any con- tract. They thought their demands were worthy of the most serious consideration, and felt that the answer to them should have " at least permitted the fullest and freest discussion." They had renewed the award twice in nine years and had complied with its provisions, and felt that " as public-spirited citizens " they had done their full duty. Since the operators had enjoyed "unprec- edented prosperity" during this time, a "discriminating public" would be able to place the responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement in the light of the present conditions.^ This reply seems rather tame, but the miners felt that it was useless " to submit their testimony to a jury that had already rendered a verdict." With the adjournment of the conference both parties issued statements to the public in order to win support if trouble arose. An auto- matic suspension of work took place April 1 with the expiration of the contract, and approximately 170,000 employees ceased work. The miners requested another meeting, and the conference met in Philadelphia, April 10. At this meeting the miners were most aggressive in their statements. In regard to the finality of the com- mission's award, the miners frankly stated that there could be no genuine and lasting peace until the operators recognized the miners' organization and entered into a direct joint agreement. Following this came their flat statement regarding the conciliation board quoted on page 259. They then analyzed the 130,000,000 bonus paid ^ Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 11. m THE ANTHEACITE FIELD 265 in the nine years, and showed that it averaged but $17.60 per year for each employee. At the same time the miners were getting this munificent sum, the operators were get- ting prices that ranged as high as forty cents per ton above the basis price of i4.50. They felt justified in con- cluding that the operators were making a good profit at $4.50, at which point the miners got nothing. Added to this was the increased profit that had come whenever any of the 600,000,000 tons (mined during the nine years) had sold above the basis price. The operators offered to submit the issues to the strike commission, but the miners wanted " no more of the Anthracite Strike Commission or its award." The demands were then submitted to a joint subcommittee of four members on each side. C. THE AGREEMENT This subcommittee continued its sessions until April 24 and brought forth the following agreement : The agree- ment was to extend four years, ending March 31, 1916. This will bring the contracts to an end simultaneously in the bituminous and anthracite fields. Contract rates and wage scales for all employees were increased ten per cent, and the sliding scale was abolished. It was agreed that there should be an equitable division of mine cars, and contract miners should elect checkweighmeu and check- docking bosses in formal meeting. The mine foreman should be informed of the results of that election. At each mine should be a grievance committee of not more than three persons. This committee, it was agreed, should settle grievances with the mine officials and it should be allowed the services of the district member of the board of conciliation " elected by the Mine Workers' Associa- tion." In case of failure to agree, the dispute should go before the miners' and operators' district representatives of the conciliation board. If they failed to agree, the case should go before the board. As an aid in carrying into 260 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY effect the ten per cent increase and " facilitating the ad- justment of grievances, company officials at each mine shall meet with the grievance committee of employees and prepare a statement setting forth the rates of compensa- tion paid for each item of work April 1, 1902, together with the rates paid under the provisions of the agreement, and certify the same to the Board of Conciliation within sixty days after the date of this agreement." ^ The miners are well pleased with the new features for settling disputes, but they regard the system as incomplete until the organization is recognized and they are per- mitted to use the "check-off." On the other hand, the operators look upon the check-off as preliminary to the " closed shop," a huge fund in the union treasury, and future encroachments. They are afraid of the ignorant, heterogeneous masses and the great danger to the trade if " ' this heterogeneous mass were to secure a strength that would come with a larger membership and treasury.' On this point the answer of the mine workers' leaders is clearly put : that conservatism comes with strength ; that experience in organization is the surest safeguard against sporadic action on the part of massed men ; and that the insurrection of the 12,000 employees of the Pennsylvania Company . . . was provoked by the speakers of an out- side organization which stands for neither collective bar- gaining nor time agreements — the Industrial Workers of the World." ^ However, the new features will encourage the growth of the union because the men will be made to feel that the organization is able to do effective work in other ways than merely the making of an agreement. The miners also felt that they had made a good bargain in abol- ishing the sliding scale and obtaining a flat increase of 10 per cent. Under the sliding scale the highest increase had ^ Negotiations of the Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 29. 2 Harrison, op. cit., p. 150. IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 267 been 8 per cent and the average was 4.17 per cent. Further- more, they had not been satisfied that they were getting all that the sliding scale was supposed to guarantee. The statistician who figured the average prices had told one of the leaders that to obtain the average price, he took the total receipts for coal at tidewater reported by the operators and divided it by the total number of tons. The union leaders pertinently asked, " What assurance have we that the operators reported all the dollars they received ? " ^ Comparison in percentages of total tuages to total value of coal at the mine prodticed in the following years in Pennsylvania and Ohio? Tear. Pennsylvania. Anthracite. Bituminous. 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1909 1911 57.2 51.4 65.7 61.6 61.8 59.3 59.9 59.9 61.1 71.9 73.8 53.2 68.2 71.6 66.1 67.9 75.7 75.5 72.4 76.4 75.9 The miners' contention that they were not profiting by the general prosperity of the industry seems to be sup- ported by the table above. When we compare the per- centages of total wages to the total value of coal at the mines, the miners in the anthracite fields certainly had not benefited to the same extent as had the miners in the bituminous fields, where collective bargaining was effective. This comparison is as fair for one field as for another and eliminates the element of monopoly control. The authra- ' Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 60. - Ohio was the only ytiito having collective bargainiu^f in which the figures of total wages wore available for comparison with Pennsylvania. 268 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY cite field compares unfavorably even with the bituminous fields of Pennsylvania, a large portion of which are still subjected to individual bargaining. Another factor worthy of note is the immediate drop in the percentages in the bituminous fields with the break-up of the joint confer- ence in 1906. In Ohio and Illinois, where the union is stronger than in the bituminous fields of Pennsylvania, the percentages were held up pretty well. In Illinois, in 1899, the percentage of the total wages to the total value of the coal at mine was 79.4. In the other years the total wages for Illinois were not obtainable, but the available figures show that the wages of the miners, exclusive of the wages for day labor, ranged from 46.7 to 61.1 per cent. The total wages would bring the percentage up as high as or higher than the Ohio percentages. There seems good ground for the hope that this first step in real conciliation in the anthracite field will lead to a better understanding between capital and labor and to a real democratization of this important branch of the coal industry. Time should bring about a greater elaboration of the system, and under it both parties must develop a clearer perception of what is demanded by fairness to each other and by consideration for the public. Before we turn our attention to a consideration of the relation of this system of conciliation and arbitration to the whole coal industry, the part it has in a constructive public policy, and the developments that are likely to take place in regard to legal enactment and political action by the unions, we may profitably consider the developments that have taken place in the British coal industry. CHAPTER VIII CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION If we desire to profit by the experience of others, we can- not do better than to turn to Great Britain from whence sprang most of the ideas and methods that have been utilized in effective industrial adjustments in the mining industry of this country. We have adapted them to suit our needs and in some respects improved upon them, per- haps, but we certainly owe the initial impulse toward practical adjustment to the British workers who had been trained in an industrial environment where the folly of strikes and the futility of strong-arm methods had been learned by hard experience. Industrial development, ho- mogeneity of population, and the growth of unity among the workers have brought developments in the British coal trade that we have not as yet approached. A consid- eration of these developments is full of suggestions for the students of American problems. They are of interest not merely as showing the evolution in methods of volun- tary conciliation and arbitration, but we see there the im- portant part that government has had to take in smoothing out the process of obtaining industrial democracy. With the growing ability of the unions to bring economic and political pressure, the necessity has been shown for le- gal enactment and governmental interference and par- ticipation in the industrial struggle. The evolution of labor representation in Parliament to supplement the ef- forts made for peaceful adjustment in conciliation boards 970 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY points to a development which we shall see has made a good beginning in the United States. The struggle for the minimum wage involving both economic and political pressure is suggestive of the situation we may have to meet in this country if both anthracite and bituminous miners make a united stand. The nationalization of mines, which will be the next big move in the British mining in- dustry, has already found influential advocates here. 1. THE RISE OF THE MINERS' UNIONS A. Early Conditions "When we remember that it was not until 1799 ^ that the Scottish miners were freed from a condition of semi- serfdom, we gain some perspective for considering the full import of the remarkable developments of industrial de- mocracy that have since taken place in the British coal industry. Moreover, a "yearly bond" system kept the miners of England practically in a state of peonage much beyond that date. In spite of forceful measures taken to maintain these conditions the industry was subject to vio- lent strikes, and in the great strike of 1810 in the north of England we first hear of " an oath-bound confederacy recruited by the practice of ' brothering,' so named be- cause the members of the union bound themselves by a most solemn oath to obey the orders of the brotherhood, under penalty of being stabbed through the heart or of having their bowels ripped up." ^ The turbulence and attempts at unity seem to have made small progress in competition with the existing arbitrari- ness of individual ownership, the respect for aristocracy, and a government controlled by, and solely for the benefit of, the ruling classes. In 1844, Lord Londonderry, " in ^ The act which provided for gradual emancipation was passed in 1775. See Jeans, Conciliation and Arbitration, p. 56. 2 Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 79. IN GREAT BRITAIN 271 his dual capacity as mine owner and Lord Lieutenant of Durham County," was not only able to answer a demand for better wages by evictions and the replacement of the strikers by Irishmen, but " he peremptorily orders the resident traders in ' his town of Seaham,' on pain of for- feiting his custom and protection, to refuse to supply pro- visions to the workmen engaged in what he deems ' an unjust and senseless warfare against their proprietors and masters.^ " ^ B. Formation of the Mesters' Association of Great Britain and Ireland, 1841 The county unions which had grown up in Northumber- land, Durham, Lancashire, and Yorkshire had entered into a federation in 1841 and employed a solicitor to represent their organization in the numerous prosecutions to which they were subjected under the law of master and servant. W. P. Roberts, the " miners' attorney-general " was so active on behalf of the miners that he was " soon retained in all Trade Union cases." ^ * Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 150. 2- Ibid., p. 165. The recital of his experience as a pioneer advocate of the -workingmen before the courts has a modern note in it. " After explaining' the law, as he understood it (when writing to the Flint Glass Makers' Friendly So- ciety), he proceeds as follows : ' But it is exceedingly difficult to induce those of the class opposed to you to take this view of things. I do not say this sarcastically, but as a fact learned by long and observant experience. There are, indeed, men on the bench who are honest enough, and desirous of doing their duty, but all their tendencies and circumstances are against you. They listen to your opponents, not only often, but cheerfully — so they know more fully the case against you than in your favour. To you they listen too — but in a sort of temper of Prisoner at the Bar, you are entitled to make any statement you think fit, and the Court is bound to hear you ; but mind, whatever you say, etc., etc. In the one case you ob- serve the hearty smile of good will ; in the other the derisive sneer, though sometimes a ghastly sort of kindliness in it. Then there is the knowledge of your overwhelming power when acting unitedly, and this begets natu- rally a corresponding desire to resist you at all hazards. And there are hun- dreds of other considerations all acting the same way — meetings, political 272 .VRBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY In their national conference held at Glasgow in 1844 the miners voted to go on a strike. The men demanded a six months' engagement instead of a yearly " bond " ; five days' work a week with at least three shillings per day ; a rec- ord of their earnings and the deductions made therefrom ; an eight-hour day ; a benefit of ten shillings per week in case of accident; provision for arbitration; and "a week's prior notice with the specification of the charges to be brought against them in case of being summoned before the magistrate." ^ The Federation is said to have had a membership of 100,000, and this conference expressed the sentiments of 70,000. It is little wonder that the strike came to a disas- trous end after several months of fighting when we remem- ber that they had to contend with conditions of which Lord Londonderry's treatment was representative. The loss of this strike was a large factor in breaking up the federation, and by 1848 it had ceased to exist. C. The Miners' National Union, 1863 In the next seven years even local unions had almost died out, but in 1856 a man came to the front as an ad- vocate of the miners, "Alexander Macdonald, to whose lifelong devotion the miners owe their present position in the Trade Union world." ^ While working as a miner he prepared himself for Glasgow University and partially supported himself during his residence at the univer- sity by summer work in the mines. He started a cam- conncils, intermarriages, hopes from wills, etc. I do not say that all occu- pants of the bench are thus influenced, nor to the same extent ; but it cer- tainly is at the best an uphUJ game to contend in favour of a workingman in a question which admits of any doubt against him. It never happened to me to meet a magistrate who considered that an agreement among mas- ters not to employ any particular " troublesome fellow " was an unlawful act ; reverse the case, however, and it immediately becomes a formidable conspiracy which must be put down by the strong arm of the law.' " 1 Jeans, Conciliation and Arbitration, p. 59. 2 Webb, op. cit., p. 285. IN GREAT BRITAIN 273 paign for legal enactments to provide for mine inspec- tion, proper weighing, restriction of the age of child workers in the mines to twelve years, an eight-hour day, weekly payment of wages, abolition of payment in truck, and the correction of various other abuses. By an effective system of correspondence with local pit clubs the growth of district organizations was encouraged, and by 1863 they were welded into a Miners' National Union. At a conference held the same year Macdonald was able to organize the meeting into sections on law, grievances, and social organization, and to secure the adoption of his programme of measures which were essential to the better- ment of the miners' working and living conditions. "In contradistinction to the view which would make wages depend upon prices, the principle of controlling industry in such a way as to prevent encroachments on the work- man's standard of maintenance is clearly foreshadowed. * Overtoil,' says the report [of the conference] , ' produces oversupply ; low prices and low wages follow ; bad habits and bad health follow, of course ; and then diminished production and profits are inevitable. Reduction of toil and consequent improved bodily health increases produc- tion in the sense of profit; and limits it so as to avoid overstocking ; better wages induce better habits and econ- omy of working follows. . . . The evil of overtoil and oversupply upon wages, and ujDon the labourer, is there- fore a fair subject of complaint ; we submit, as far as these are human by conventional arrangements, [they] are a fair and proper subject of regulation. Regulation must of course be twofold. Part can be legislated for by compul- sory laws ; but the principle \_sic'\ must be the subject of voluntary agreements.' " ^ * Webb, op. cit., p. 288. Quotation from report. 271 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY A. REGULATORY MEASURES The advocacy of an eight-hour day was limited (for the time) to boys, but this demand immediately brought a line of cleavage between Durham and Northumberland and the other districts. Durham and Northumberland wished to keep the boys working ten hours and the men in two shifts of six hours each. The first shift of men went to work two hours before the boys, and thus mined enough coal to keep the boys busy loading. The second shift by working six hours brought the working day of the boys u]) to ten hours. This diversity of opinion and opposition within the ranks of the miners was the chief cause that deferred the passage of an eight-hour act till 1908. By a series of struggles beginning in 1859 the miners succeeded in getting permission to have checkweighmen at the scales in a few collieries. But the attempt to insert such a provision in the Mines Regulation Act of 1860 was severely contested in Parliament, and, although finally in- corporated, it was evaded by refusing the checkweighman access to the mouth of the pit and hampering him in his work by fencing up the weights or disputing his calcula- tions. The Act of 1860 had to be strengthened by the Acts of 1872 and 1889 before it was clearly established that a checkweighman had a legal right to keep a record of each man's work, and that though elected by a majority of the miners all the men had to contribute to his salary .^ The leaders of the miners were active with other trade union leaders from 1864 to 1867 in obtaining the Master and Servant Act of the latter year. The old master and servant acts had permitted an official armed with a war- rant from a justice of the peace to drag a workman out of his bed in the middle of the night and subject him to three months' imprisonment if it could be shown that he 1 Webb, op. cit., p. 291. In the Americau antliracite field this expense has to be met by the contract miners. IN GREAT BRITAIN 275 had broken his contract of service or absented himself from his work without leave from his employer. Nor could the worker testif}'^ in his own favor, or pay a fine in lieu of imprisonment. The justice of the peace was often an employer of labor and in full sympathy with harsh pro- cedure. No matter how arbitrary his decision, the workman was allowed no appeal. The extent of the abuses under this law was finally realized when it was discovered that " 10,339 cases of breach of contract of service came be- fore the courts in a single year." ^ The Act of 1867 rem- edied the worst features of the old laws, and the Webbs regard it as " the first positive success of the Trade Unions in the legislative field," and believe that it " did much to increase their confidence in parliamentary agitation." But it was not until the passage of the Employers' and Work- men's Act of 1875 that imprisonment for breach of con- tract was finally abolished and the unions given legal recog- nition. D. Formation of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1889 Another fact, besides the disagreement about legal regu- lation of hours of labor, that caused further dissension in the ranks of the miners during the later sixties and the seventies, was a divergence of opinion over the use of the sliding scale. Durham and Northumberland favored the sliding scale and the attending dependence of wages on prices. But in the Midland counties there grew up a feel- ing that the miner, who had no control over prices and competition, ought not to bear the brunt of depression brought on by the mismanagement of the owners. The Midland unions either abolished the sliding scale or in- sisted that it be accompanied by a minimum below which wages should not fall. Furthermore, they were ready to supplement this action by the regulation of production. 1 Webb, op. cit., p. 235. 276 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY During the early and middle eighties the contests in miners' conferences and in Parliament grew more bitter, until in 1889 the climax was reached with the withdrawal of the Mid- land associations and their organization into the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. While the National Union gradually fell off in membership until it included merely Durham and Northumberland, the Federation grew until it took in all the federations and associations in the other counties of England, North and South Wales, and Scot- land. In spite of the fact that Durham and Northum- berland kept persistently by themselves, they responded to invitations to special conferences which affected the industry as a whole. Finally, in 1908-09, we find them both in the Federation and presenting a united front with the other fields in obtaining and enforcing the Eight-Hour Act of 1908. In the annual conference of the Federation in 1911, a membership of 608,200 was represented and stood united in their determination to secure a minimum ■wage.^ The Federation leaves local and district matters under the control of local and district organizations. The dis- tricts, which are also a federation of smaller units, are held responsible for the financial support of the Federa- tion, and these unite in lending moral support and ma- terial aid in all matters which are of national importance to the industry. But the federation of federated districts would not present a strong industrial unity equal to the solidarity of the United Mine Workers of America, were it not for the homogeneity within the British industry and the hard lessons that the various district federations learned of the futility of independent sectional fighting. Although these two factors of homogeneity and experience are strong in their welding force, yet the federation of federations would easily permit of independent action and withdrawal ^ Report of Annual Conference of the Miners^ Federation of Great Britain, 1911, p. 182. IN GREAT BRITAIN 277 with the rise of factional strife. From the standpoint of enabling the organization to keep a heterogeneous mem- bership loyal and to deal with complex conditions such as we have in this country, the United Mine Workers would seem to be superior. 2. METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT A. Aebitration The period from the early forties to the early seventies was one of evolution in the acceptance of trade unions, the formation of employers' associations to meet their grow- ing power, and the development of irregular negotiations carried on largely by means of strikes. These negotiations finally led to formal arbitration proceedings. The current ideas that lay in the background of arbitration proceed- ings, and probably constituted a large element among the causes which led later to a more satisfactory method of adjustment, are illustrated by a Northumberland arbitra- tion case of 1875. The case was argued by means of written statements which were discussed by the representatives of both par- ties in the presence of the arbitrator. On the submission of the case to the arbitrator each party was allowed to file written statements to strengthen its side, but was not per- mitted to introduce new evidence. Accountants submitted information reduced to percentages, drawn from the books of the operators. The labor costs and selling prices of 1871 were accepted as a basis of comparison to decide whether the operators' demand for a reduction of twenty per cent was justifiable. The miners pointed out that the operators wanted them to bear the full effects of adverse conditions in assuming that profits were fair in 1871 and that the price of coal had to rise " in exactly the same ratio with wages in order that the profits of coal owners may remain the same " ; 278 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY and, further, " it is also assumed that the great increased percentage, mentioned in the owners' case, has been paid in the shape of increased wages." The umpire in his decision set forth factors which had increased the cost of production, such as the increase of fifty per cent in wages between 1871 and 1875, the shortening of hours without proportionate increase in the per hour output, and certain requirements of the Mines Regulation Act of 1872 which interfered with economical production. But the umpire thought that the chief reason why wages should be reduced lay in the fact that the number of men in the industry had increased, and he gives us an interesting sidelight on the influence of the wages fund doctrine. Where there had been formerly ten men there were in 1875 fourteen men, and therefore from " the total wages fund " each man could only expect one four- teenth instead of one tenth. And he concludes " that the restoration of economy in production cannot be brought about by abating the rate of wages only, or indeed, mainly, but must be accomplished by reducing the num- ber of men." The men were awarded a reduction which varied from ten to twelve and a half per cent.^ B. The Era of Sliding Scales It was not long before both parties found themselves dissatisfied with arbitration and looked upon it only as a measure of last resort. With the acceptance by both par- ties of the principle that wages should be determined by prices, the sliding scale was utilized to accomplish this end. The sliding scale was first introduced in the South Staf- fordshii-e field in 1874, and by 1880 had spread to most of the other fields. The question of a proper basis and the ratio of increase and decrease in wages according to the rise and fall in prices occasioned many revisions and nu- ^ Miners' National Record, vol. 1, no. 7, pp. 107-09. Reprint of the Northumberland proceedings. IN GREAT BRITAIN 279 merous resorts to arbitration. The demand for changes came from both parties. Another factor which caused much dissatisfaction was the failure in most instances to incorporate a minimum in the scales. Again, the slow- ness in response of wages to changes in prices was an aggravation to both parties, according to whether or not it was a period of depression or prosperity. With the rise of the Miners' Federation in 1888-89, the principle of a living or minimum wage found advo- cates, and the demand was advanced that wages should be considered a first charge on the industry .^ Nor did the advocates of these policies see any reason why prices should not be adjusted to wages instead of wages follow- ing prices. The Federation rapidly gained a following for its new doctrine, and by 1893 the sliding scale remained in operation only in South Wales, South Staffordshire, and the Forest of Dean.^ C. The Big Strikes of the Nineties Following the abandonment of the sliding scale, there took place a series of struggles which were to inaugurate a new era in the British coal industry. The strike in the Midland counties in 1890, which involved 151 collieries and 107,484 mine workers, was the largest ever recorded in the United Kingdom up to that time.^ It brought the men an advance of five per cent instead of the ten per cent they had asked for. In 1892 the Federation of Durham County was involved in a strike to resist a reduction of ten per cent. It affected 150 mining establishments and 75,000 mine workers, and was finally settled, through the mediation of the Bishop of Durham, by the acceptance of the reduction and an agreement to submit future disputes to a conciliation committee. 1 Ashley, The Adjustment of Wages, p. 40. ^ 'Webb, op. cit., p. 486. ^ Special Report of Commission of Labor, Coal Mine Labor in Europe, 1905, p. 476. 280 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY A. THE STRIKE OF 1893 The next year was the most momentous which had been known in the British coal industry. There were 139 strikes and lockouts involving 503,061 mine workers.^ Of these the strike of the Miners' Federation, involving 1500 es- tablishments and 300,000 men, occupied the center of the stasre. This strike was called to resist a demand for a twenty-five per cent reduction in wages and lasted from July 28 to November 17. Between 1888 and 1893 the miners had succeeded in advancing their wages forty per cent, and the owners claimed that they must now reduce wages to be able to compete with the other districts in which the men had ac- cepted reductions. At a joint conference the union leaders stuck to their principle of a living wage and denied that their present wage allowed any margin for reduction. Their request for a month's time to put the owners' de- mands before the men and return an answer was met by a refusal and by the posting of notices which terminated contracts within a month. The men had refused to accept arbitration, but they concluded from this action that the owners were bent upon forcing a reduction in violation of the terms of the last agreement, which had provided that " before any public action is taken with respect to notices the men's case shall be laid before a committee of the col- liery owners . . . and that the results be made known to the workmen." During August negotiations continued, but with no results other than a referendum vote (September 1) on the question of the acceptance of the twenty-five per cent reduction, the owners' offer to arbitrate, and the resump- tion of work by those who could do so at the old rate of wages. There was practically a unanimous vote against the ^ Special Report of Commission of Labor, Coal Mine Labor in Europe^ 1905, p. 482. IN GREAT BRITAIN 281 first two propositions and a majority o£ 30,750 against the last. The great demand for coal by October 2 prompted the mayors of six cities to arrange a joint conference which was attended by both parties. The mayors' propo- sition that the men be allowed to return to work at the old wages, but submit to a reduction of ten per cent six weeks later, was acceptable to neither party. By October 25 the owners expi-essed their willingness to meet the miners "to discuss the whole question, with- out prejudice to the position of either party." Accordingly at a meeting on November 3 and 4, the owners advanced the offer to form a board of conciliation to settle the whole question of reductions and to start the mines at once. While their offer was being submitted to the miners, Mr. Gladstone invited both parties to a joint meeting under the chairmanship of Lord Rosebery, who was to act as an adviser and not as an umpire or arbiter. This invitation was promptly accepted, and on November 17 a conference of a few hours resulted in the following agreement : (1) A board of conciliation to consist of fourteen representa- tives of each side should, before the first meeting, elect a chairman, who should have a casting vote. If they could not agree on a chairman, he should be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons. The board should meet on December 13, 1893, and should have the power to determine the rate of wages, beginning with February 1, 1894. (2) In the mean time the men should resume work at once and continue at the old rate of wages until February 1, 1894. All collieries shoidd be opened and " no impediment be placed in the way of a return of the men to work." The Speaker had to appoint a chairman. The prelimi- nary meetings brought forth nothing other than the refusal of the chairman to allow the incorporation of a provision for a minimum wage in the constitution of the board, and no action was taken on the proposal to reduce wages. lu 2S^ ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY July, 1894, the board came to an agreement which re- duced wages ten per cent until January 1, 1896, estab- lished a niiuimum of thirty per cent, and a maximum of forty-five per cent, above the rates of 1888, and gave the board the privilege of establishing wages within these limits from January 1, 1896, to August 1, 1896.^ In 1894 the Scotch miners were engaged in a struggle which involved 500 establishments and 70,000 employees, while a strike in South AVales in 1898 involved 100,000 men. All of these struggles arose through disputes over wages. Three were settled by conciliation boards, and in two the miners failed to obtain any concessions. D. The Koyal Commission on Labour These industrial struggles convinced the Government that it needed to inaugurate preventive and conciliatory measures. It was during the unrest of the early nineties that the Royal Commission on Labour was making its in- vestigations, and its final report in 1894 embodied recom- mendations for the functioning of the local and central governments in connection with labor disputes. The ma- jority report suggested that municipal and county councils be empowered to establish industrial courts to decide ques- tions arising out of existing contracts, and that the central government should have power to obtain and circulate in- formation regarding conciliation boards. The central gov- ernment should also have the power to advise and to pro- mote their establishment by appointing chairmen to boards or arbiters upon application of the parties. The minority were willing to go a step further on the publicity side and empower the central government to obtain the fullest pos- sible information concerning each dispute, the net wages, the cost of living, prices, cost of production, salaries, in- terest, profits, etc. ^ Special Report of Commissioner of Labor, op. cit., p. 489. IN GREAT BRIT.UN 283 E. The Conciliation Act of 1896 In 1893 the Board of Trade began an inquiry which sought to determine the legislation necessary to meet modern social and industrial conditions. As a result of this investigation the Conciliation Act of 1896 was en- acted. The Master and Workmen Arbitration Act of 1824, which authorized justices of the peace to appoint arbiters with extensive powers, the Councils of Concilia- tion Act of 1867, which confirmed the Act of 1824 and added provisions for conciliation councils, and the Arbi- tration Act of 1872, which enlarged upon the provisions of the two former acts, were repealed as so much useless timber. Their only recognized virtue was that they were harmless when not enforced. The act provided further for registration of conciliation boards and gave the Board of Trade power (a) to inquire into the causes of the trouble, (6) to take steps to bring the parties together under a chairman mutually agreed upon or nominated by the board, (c) upon application of either party to appoint a conciliator or board of concilia- tion, ((7) and upon application of both parties to appoint an arbitrator. Furthermore, if it appeared to the Board of Trade that in any district or trade adequate provisions for conciliation did not exist, it was empowered to inquire into the conditions of the trade or district, confer with the employees, employers, and local authorities, and seek to establish a conciliation board. A. RESULTS UNDER THE ACT That this enactment has proved an effective measure is shown by the work of the Board of Trade between 1896 and 1910. In that time the board intervened directly in 432 cases, 201 of which involved stoppage of work and 231 of which did not. In the earlier years there were few applications, and they came mainly from the workingmen ; 284 ARBITRATION IN THE CO.VL INDUSTRY but in the later years, beginning witb 1907, a year of de- pression, a marked increase in the number of cases took place. Along with the increase in the number of cases has gone a distinct expression of confidence in the board indi- cated by the great increase in joint applications for the services of the board, there being 278 such instances out of the total of 432 cases.^ A further expression of appre- ciation of the board's services is the increasing number of cases wherein the parties do not wait for an open breach, but apply to the board to prevent strikes. It has also been a strong factor in encouraging voluntary conciliation boards and lending dignity and importance to the whole concilia- tory movement. B. THE COURT OF ARBITRATION Further to supplement its activities the board has added two devices. In 1908 it established a permanent court of arbitration consisting of three panels : *' persons of emi- nence and impartiality," employers, and labor leaders. A court may consist of three or five members, according to the importance of the case, and an award is made upon a majority vote. In 1909 and 1910 the court handled six- teen cases, eight of which were settled before a rupture had occurred and eight not until after a strike.^ C. THE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL The labor troubles of 1911 led the board to add another device to enable it to meet the increasing demands for its services. An " Industrial Council," consisting of thirteen representative employers and thirteen labor leaders, was created. In advocating this addition the president of the Board of Trade pointed out that one disadvantage of the existing system had been to bring into prominence the par- liamentary head of the Board of Trade in matters which 1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 133. 2 Ibid., p. 124. IN GREAT BRITAIN 285 should be purely industrial, and expressed the opinion that if the action of the department was still further re- moved from politics the parties would more willingly seek the assistance of the board. Furthermore, with the in- creasing concentration in industry and the federation of labor, a national conciliation council, which might have been considered premature a few years ago, "is really now essential so that these matters can be considered as a whole."! Regular meetings are held in February, June, and No- vember and special meetings may be called at any time by the chairman. The members are supposed to act in a judi- cial capacity, not as advocates, and may consider the fol- lowing classes of cases: (1) Cases in connection with which the parties are merely asking for an impartial opinion concerning the facts about which there is no dispute; (2) cases in which the parties desire the facts to be im- partially ascertained and submitted with recommendations which shall not be binding or made public ; (3) cases in which the parties agree beforehand that the recommenda- tions shall be made public ; (4) cases in which the parties decide to accept a decision of the council as final ; (5) spe- cial cases submitted by the Board of Trade ; (6) matters apart from disputes upon which the board may want a representative opinion.^ Thus the board will be able to allow the council to take over a large part of its activities. F. Modern Conciliation Boards in the Coal Industry Of the 432 cases dealt with by the Board of Trade, only 54 were among the mining and quarrying industries. This is due to the fact that in the coal mining industry there are nineteen permanent voluntary conciliation boards which have complete automatic machinery for settling disputes. 1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 120. 2 Ibid., p. 127. 28G AKBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY There are two classes of conciliation boards in the coal industry. The first deals with the adjustmeut of wages and working conditions which are applicable to a district or a federation of districts. The second is termed a joint committee and concerns itself with all local matters which do not conHict with the county or district agreement and which do not demand the attention of the conciliation board. The Board of Conciliation for the Coal Trade of the Federated Districts, which includes representatives from Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Warwick- shire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, North Wales, Can- nock Chase, etc., may be taken as representative of the first type. The board must settle upon wages for these districts, but " the rate of wages shall not be below 37^ per cent above the rate of wages of 1888 nor more than 60 per cent above the rate of wages of 1888, and no altera- tion in the rate of wages exceeding 5 per cent shall be made at any one time."^ The board agrees " upon a selling price of coal as being proportionate to a certain rate of wages," but the selling price is not the only determining factor. It is considered as " one factor only, and either side shall be entitled to bring forward any reason why, notwithstanding an altera- tion in the selling price, there should be no alteration in the rate of wages." Not merely the present state of trade is considered, but the indications which point to the future trend in prices are strong factors in determining an agree- ment. For instance, in reply to a demand for a reduction in 1909 the miners refused to lower their rates, but prom- ised not to ask for a raise until a certain time in order that on the rising market the owners might recoup themselves for adverse conditions during a period of falling prices.^ ^ Second Report of the Board of Trade, 1910, on Bules of Voluntary Con- ciliation and Arbitration Boards and Joint Committees, p. 114. 2 Proceedings of Federated Coal Owners and Miners^ Federation, Septem- ber 3, 1909, p. 8. IN GREAT BRITAIN 287 The board consists of an equal number of representa- tives elected by the Federated Coal Owners and the Miners' Federation, and a neutral chairman who has a casting vote. In case the parties cannot agree on a chair- man he is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons. The board has four stated meetings during a year and as many more as may be necessary. All questions are sub- mitted in writing, but they may be supplemented by such verbal and documentary evidence as the parties may de- sire, subject to the approval of the board. If the parties cannot agree, the board is adjourned for a period not ex- ceeding twenty-one days, which gives each side time for further discussion with its constituents. The chairman is then called in, and after hearing both sides of the case may give his casting vote or subsequently communicate his decision to the secretaries of both federations. He is not allowed to render decisions which split the difference. He may also refer questions back to the board for re- consideration without expressing his opinion upon them. This process goes on till the parties have reached a work- ing agreement, and in the mean time the men remain at work. Each party pays the expenses of its own officials and representatives, and the common costs, such as the ex- penses of the chairman and the general expenses of the board, the parties bear in equal shares. In the Durham, Northumberland, and Cumberland dis- tricts, besides a general conciliation board, joint commit- tees are appointed to look after local disputes and adjust rates of payment for altered methods of working. In the other districts of England, Wales, and Scotland joint committees are formed for special occasions. Also there are local " agents " of the miners, who, if they cannot settle local disputes, carry the cases to the joint commit- tees or the general conciliation board. 288 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY The joint committee in Durham consists of six members on each side with an impartial chainuan chosen annually. The county is divided into three districts, " and the de- cisions of the committee in all cases shall be such as to bring practices, hours, or wages as nearly as may be into accord with the recognized county standards." ^ Both par- ties before the committee are represented by their agents and bring such witnesses as they deem necessary. During the hearing of the case argumentation and discussion are not allowed, " the examination of witnesses being confined to putting the committee into possession of the facts bear- ing on the case." When the evidence is all in, the com- mittee discusses it and endeavors to arrive at a decision. Unless they reach a unanimous decision, individual mem- bers are allowed to introduce motions which they think will settle the case justly. When the votes are equal, the chairman may himself decide the question or submit it to arbitration, but " the committee shall in all cases, where it is possible, determine the questions submitted to its consideration without calling upon the chairman for his casting vote." While the committee is arriving at a set- tlement the men continue at work and the decision is re- troactive. 3. THE POLICY OF LEGAL ENACTMENT A. Labor Representation As we have seen,^ the miners early became aware of the necessity for and the superiority of legal enactment to at- tain certain fundamental regulations which could not be got by conciliation and arbitration. However, the adher- ents of conciliation and arbitration expected to bring about universality more and more as unionism spread and 1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 147. Reprint of revised rules of the Durham Joint Committee, June, 1911. 2 See supra, p. 274. IN GREAT BRITAIN 289 as the conciliation boards grew in representation and in- fluence. Undoubtedly this has been accomplished in re- spect to many minor working conditions, and such a fun- damental and universal regulation as the eight-hour day was not thought to be too great an accomplishment. It is natural that this should not have been regarded as too hard a task, since it had already been accomplished in America. But, as was the case in America, it would prob- ably necessitate a general strike, and with increasing strength and realization of power came a healthy conserv- atism that led to peaceful measures to obtain the eight- hour day. In the middle seventies trade unionism in general be- came aware that the old Liberal and Tory parties were not deeply concerned about furthering the laborers' inter- ests, and consequently they determined to have their own men in Parliament. In 1874 the miners, ironworkers, and other societies voted money for parliamentary candida- tures, and in the general election that followed, Alexander Macdonald and Thomas Burt, who were officials of the National Union of Miners, became the first " Labour mem- bers " in Parliament.! A. THE "labour REPRESENTATION SCHEME" Almost at the beginning of labor representation the miners' representatives from Durham and Northumber- land in Parliament were found on the side opposite to the representatives of the miners from the other coal fields in the matter of a legal enactment of an eight-hour day. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the Labor men held to old party affiliations, tended to lessen their force as distinctly labor representatives. In 1893 a group of labor delegates formed the "In- dependent Labour Party," with the hope of establishing a connecting link between the Socialists and the labor 1 Webb, op. cU., p. 273. 290 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY unions. Of the twenty-nine candidates put in the race for parliamentary membership in that year, only five were elected. By 1899 it was found necessary to seek closer relationship with the trade unions in order to increase the labor representation in Parliament. This was to be ac- complished by the formation of a " Labour Representa- tive Committee." The Liberal and Conservative labor representatives of the Trade-Union Congress were out- voted on the question of the formation of this committee, and when it was submitted to the vote of the unions the affirmative vote was only 546,000 as against a negative vote of 434,000.1 xhe action of the Taff Vale Railway Company, brought against the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, resulted in a decision (in 1901) sub- jecting the unions to the payment of damages for engag- ing in picketing which caused the railway employees to break their contractual relations. This aroused all the unions to political action to obtain a law that would se- cure their funds from such attacks. By 1901 the sense of the importance of the functions of labor representatives had assumed proportions which warranted the executive committee of the Miners' Federation in drawing up a scheme for the further encouragement of the policy of electing and supporting Labor members in Parliament. The plan for the purpose was known as the " Miners* Federation of Great Britain Labour Fund Scheme." The fund was built up by the payment of threepence per quar- ter per member or one shilling per year. A district which failed to pay this amount per member was not eligible to nominate candidates at " Bye and General Elections" and could not receive returning officers' fees or other election costs. All districts which had a membership under 10,000 were allowed one candidate, and those having more than 10,000 were allowed another candidate for every 10,000 " fiuaucial " members- ^ Orth, Socialism and Democracy in Europe, p. 223. IN GREAT BRITAIN 291 There were several qualifications necessary before a man could be eligible as a " Federation Candidate." He bad to be adopted by the Federation and Federation executive board, which decided whether there was a " reasonable hope " of the seat being won. Furthermore, the candidate had to be a " financial " member of the Federation, and either "working in or about the mines or [be] a Miners' Kepresentative [official] within the Federation area." ^ Nor could officials from other districts be selected, but a candidate must be "selected by and in his own District." When elected, the representative was paid X350 per year and given a first-class railway pass " covering the sitting of Parliament in each year." The scheme was not established " for the purpose of wrecking any political party," nor did it prevent a can- didate from running under any name he wished, provided he was adopted by the executive board as a candidate. Furthermore, the board rendered a final decision on " all questions arising out of payments into and out of the Labour Election Fund." So the board was in a position to compel honest representation of labor as a primary requisite. B. MEMBERSHIP IN THE " LABOUR PARTY " The scheme was adopted by the Annual Conference in 1902, and two years later the miners' annual conference, in the following resolution, instructed its representative in Parliament to join the labor group : — We hereby express our belief in the principle of political independence of all Labour Members in Parliament, and that those members who may be returned under the auspices of the Federation be instructed to do everything possible to initiate or 8U])port a movement for the formation of a Labour Group in the House of Commons. 1 Proceedings of the Miners^ Federation of Great Britain, 1001. 292 ARBITRATION IN THE CO^VL INDUSTRY The " Labour Representative Committee," after the Taff Vale decision in 1901, adopted the name of " Labour Party," and the thirty-two Labor members in the House of Commons constituted themselves as a separate organ- ization. In 1909 the affiliation fees, and contributions were paid by the Miners' Federation, and its representatives in Parliament became members of the Labor party.^ We must remember that the forty-two votes of the Labor members in Parliament are far more significant than their number would naturally indicate. They represent a vast economical as well as political pressure. Moreover, there are hundreds of thousands of labor votes outside of the Labor party upon which other party representatives in Parliament are dependent, and which may easily throw their influence for policies which are distinctly favorable to labor. We shall see the force of this in 1911 during the struggle for the minimum wage. C. THE STEELE CASE, 1907 The year 1907 brought about developments which threatened seriously to disturb the whole labor representa- tion scheme. A Welsh miner brought suit to recover four shillings which had been levied upon him for the labor representation fund, and he sought an injunction which should restrain the Federation from making further con- tributions from its funds to support labor members.^ The miner had joined the Federation in 1900, and in 1901 the rules had been altered so as to provide funds for returning and maintaining representatives in Parliament. The plain- tiff held that he was compelled to pay contributions to sup- port members of Parliament who held views entirely op- posite to his own. The plaintiff was not successful in the ^ Proceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1909, p. 10. ' Steele v. The South Wales Miners' Federation and Others. Reprint in Pro- ceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1907. IN GREAT BRITAIN 293 county court nor upon appeal to the King's Bench Divi- vision of the High Court of Justice, for the court held that " It was intended by these miners, when they associated, that there should be a power, amongst others, if it was thought fit, to raise by levy sums of money to support and maintain a Representative in Parliament, and that all the organs of the body have agreed that this should be done." D. THE OSBORNE CASE, 1909 The next year a similar case was started which affected the whole trade-union world. It found its way finally to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice and there met a different fate from the Steele case. W. V. Os- borne,^ a foreman porter and a member of the Amalga- mated Society of Railway Servants, brought suit to recover his contributions to the parliamentary fund and to obtain an injunction against further use of the society's funds to support the Labor party representatives. He entered his plea on the same grounds as in the case of Steele, i.e., against compulsion to support representatives with oppo- site political views. The lower court decided for the society, and the Justice based his decision on previous decisions of the High Court of Justice. When it came before the Chancery Division, the court held that the rules of the society providing for labor representation were outside the scope of trade-union activi- ties as defined in the Trade-Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. A further objection was expressed that " rules designed to procure the election of members of Parliament who should be bound to vote in a prescribed manner, and the expendi- ture of funds for their maintenance in consideration of a pledge to vote in that manner, were contrary to public policy." The society appealed to the House of Lords, and the * Osborne v. Amalyamated Society uf Railway Servants (1910, A. C 87). 294 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY Law Lords unanimously upheld the High Court of Justice. This decision was rendered in December, 1909, and by July, 1911, only 200,000 of the 600,000 members of the Federa- tion were free from injunction. Tlie Annual Conference of the Miners' Federation in 1910 passed a resolution strongly protesting against the decision, commanding the parliamentary members to " support all possible legislation with a view to giving relief in this direction " and urging cooperation on the part of all the various executive com- mittees having the matter in charge. In the mean time every effort was made to keep up the parliamentary fund by voluntary arrangements. We might conclude from this peaceful way of dealing with the matter that the Federa- tion did not realize the full force of the decision on the trade-union future. In fact, this sort of procedure was far from the liking of the radical members, who were dis- gusted with the " lying-down " way in which the Federa- tion had taken it, and thought the Labor members ought to have walked out of Parliament, gone back to their con- stituencies, and started a revolution. E. GOVERNMENT PAYMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS, 1911 But the wiser heads in the Federation had learned to work through the ordinary channels and, finding response in the political mechanism, were able to reach a better solution of the problem than had existed under the old regime. By a bill passed in August, 1911, payment of members of the House of Commons by the Government was inaugurated, each member (except officers of the House, ministers, and officers of the King's household) recei^ang X400 a year. Although the Act of 1911 assured the trade-unionists of parliamentary representation, the Osborne decision still governed the use of union funds for political purposes. To offset this handicap the Labor members succeeded in IN GREAT BRITAIN 295 getting an act passed in 1913^ which permits the unions to use their funds for paying the expenses of their can- didates, for holding political meetings, for distributing campaign literature, and for the support of their mem- bers holding any public office. Any trade-unionist who objects to contributing to a political fund may be ex- empted by giving notice of his objection. Such a member is protected from persecution and discrimination by his privilege of appeal to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, who has full power to remedy such a breach of trade- union rules. B. The Eight-Hour Law, 1908 A. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING THE ACT In connection with the way the miners obtained the eight-hour law we have a good illustration of the interplay of conciliatory methods with the method of legal enact- ment. We have seen that Alexander Macdonald had the eight-hour law on his programme in the sixties. Moreover, we saw that the opposition on the part of Durham and Northumberland was the disrupting force among the miners which prevented unity of action on this measure in Parliament. In 1901, we find Durham still holding tenaciously to her position that " there must be some men — if the work is to be carried on safely and regularly — who must work more than eight hours ; there are men who must go down before the hewers [miners] go down, and there are men who must remain after the hewers come up — we cannot make a rigid rule all round." ^ The bill before Parliament failed to pass and a special conference of the Federation in July, 1902, resolved to use trade-union action to force the measure, " seeing the 1 Trade-Union Act, 1013, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, chap. 30. 2 Mines Eight-Hour Bill in Committee, 3 nnG 12, 1911, p. 7. Reprint in Proceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain^ lUll. 29G ARBITILVTION IN TIIE COAL INDUSTRY Government will not allow a legal eiglit-liours day, and also that the coal owners urge on every occasion that the eight-hours day be got by Trade-Union effort." The con- ference accordingly resolved to have a meeting with the coal owners. But instead of devising means by which the regulations could be made universal, the owners spent their time in framing objections. In the first place, they considered such a measure as "an unjustifiable interference with the freedom of the subject." They were convinced from the statistics they had collected that the output would be reduced from eleven to fifty per cent, according as the mine was favorably or unfavorably situated. An increased cost ranging from Qd. to Is. Qd. per ton would accompany this reduced output and necessarily raise the selling price of coal. The hewers who mine coal at a cer- tain price per ton could not expect increased rates, and shorter hours would lessen their wages. The men who were working by the day certainly could not expect to receive the same wage, since " it would be unfair to the employer that he should be required to pay the same wages for less work." Moreover, decreased output and increased cost of fuel would seriously handicap the more important industries which were subject to keen compe- tition from other countries. Finally, it would work great hardship on the older men, and the increased hurry would increase the number of accidents. These were the stock arguments which the miners had heard from the time the subject of the eight-hour day was first broached, but on previous occasions they had not been advanced in a national conference nor so im- pressively presented. Evidently there were hard facts in the everyday life of the rank and file that required stronger arguments than these to offset them satisfac- torily. AVhen the miners saw that they could not obtain the eight-hour day peacefully through conciliation, they again turned to legal enactment. IN GREAT BRITAIN 297 Northumberland had experienced a change of heart in 1907 and Durham in 1908, and during the struggle for the eight-hour bill of the latter year they were within the Federation and were fighting for the measure. The bill met with strong opposition at every stage in its passage. On the committee that considered the bill were twelve Labor members, eight of whom were miners, yet it in- volved a fight of twelve days before the committee could bring the bill forth. The opposition consumed as much time as possible, and as the end of the session was draw- ing near, "the Federation did all they could to sup- port the Government to carry the bill. Their members in the House of Commons sat for hours like dumb dogs, almost bursting to speak, as the temptation to reply to the opposition was very great at times." ^ B. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT The act ^ provides that no " workman shall be below ground in a mine for the purpose of his work, and of going to and from his work, for more than eight hours during any consecutive twenty-four hours." But it is not considered a contravention of the act when a workman is below ground for a longer period to render assistance in the case of accident, to meet any danger or apprehended danger, or to deal " with any emergency work uncom- pleted through unforeseen circumstances which requires to be dealt with without interruption in order to avoid seri- ous interference with ordinary work in the mine, etc." The owner or manager may fix the time at which the lowering of the men into the mine shall begin and end for each shift, also for raising the men. These regula- tions must be embodied in a notice which shall be posted in a conspicuous place, and they are subject to a revision ^ Quarterly Report of International Miners^ Federation, March, 1909, P.O. 2 Coal Mines Regulation Act, October, 1908. 298 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY by the government mine inspector, if a reasonable time is not allowed. Furthermore, the owner or manager is re- quired to keep a register containing particulars regarding the i-aising and lowering of men " and the cases in which any man is below ground for more than the time fixed by the Act, and the cause thereof, and the register shall be open to inspection by the inspector." The workmen may appoint their checkweigher or any official to see that these regulations are carried out, and false entries in the register subject the ofifender to a fine of five pounds for each offense. The owner or manager may extend the working hours " on not more than sixty days in any calendar year by not more than one hour a day, and on any day in which an extension of time is made in accordance with the sec- tion as respects any mine, the time as so extended must be kept in a register as directed by the Secretary of State and subject to inspection by the inspector." The King may " in the event of war or of imminent national dan- ger or great emergency, or in the event of any grave economic disturbance due to the demand of coal exceed- ing the supply available at the time, by Order in Council suspend the operation of this Act to such extent and for such period as may be named in the Order, either as re- spects all coal mines or any class of coal mines." In the event of contravention of or non-compliance with the act, the owner is subject to a fine of two pounds and a workman to a fine of ten shillings. The owner is not subject to the penalty if he can prove " that he has taken all reasonable means by making, publishing, and to the best of his ability enforcing, regulations for se- curing compliance " with the act. The workman is not guilty of an offense if he can prove that he was pre- vented from returning to the surface within the time limit " owing to means not being available for the pur- pose." IN GREAT BRITAIN C. AMENDMENTS In 1909 the law was amended so as to provide that an eight-hour period of work should be " during any period of twenty-four hours, reckoned from midnight to mid- night," and in 1910 further provision was made to re- strict the hours of surface workmen, who have to work seven days a week, to eight hours. When the act went into effect considerable friction arose over reduction of wages, the sixty-hour clause, the num- ber of shafts to be worked, and the number of workmen in a working " place." But the miners showed a disposi- tion to bring a national stoppage rather than to yield any of the important benefits from the act, and the minor ones were adjusted by conciliation. The difficulty of ob- taining this act and its detailed regulations stand in great contrast to the inauguration and enforcement of the eight-hour day in America by strikes or conciliatory methods. The only advantage of the British law is that it compels universal compliance and places all on an equality that is much harder to obtain by conciliation. Legal enactment with all its rigidity will naturally fol- low where it is impossible to obtain regulations by agree- ment between the industrial parties. C. The Minimum Wage Act, 1912 A. GROWTH OF THE MINIMUM WAGE DEMAND Before the eight-hour regulation had been attained a movement had already been started which was to lead to the struggle for the minimum wage. In February of 1907, at a special miners' conference held to discuss the proposed export tax on coal, a resolution was introduced "having for its object the raising of the basis rate of wages in all coa]-j)roducing districts of the United King- dom." In the same year the miners ajiproachcd the 300 ARBITRATION IN TIIE COAL INDUSTRY owners " with a view to substituting for the 1879 or 1888 rate of wages, a basis rate iuchiding not less than thirty per cent of the present percentages, upon which all fu- ture advances in wages shall be calculated." They failed to gain any satisfaction from the owners, but they ap- pointed a joint committee to "collect information and watch developments with a view of assistance being ren- dered to any district, in order to secure this object." The following year was taken up with the struggle for the eight-hour law, but in 1909 the district of Yorkshire introduced a resolution which should provide measures to obtain a minimum wage of eight shillings per day and the resolution was carried by the conference. During the same year the Scottish coal owners sought to reduce the wages of the Scottish federation twelve and a half per cent, but the miners served notice upon them that " they would re- sist any attempt to reduce miners' wages below an average of six shillings per day, or in other words, fifty per cent on the average standard rate of 1888." The miners of the other districts expressed their determination, by a major- ity of over 400,000, to support the Scots in their struggle, but special conferences aided by mediation from the Gov- ernment narrowly averted a national strike. A new con- ciliation board was formed for Scotland, the rules of which incorporated the new basis and conceded the minimum wage. B. ABNOEMAL " PLACES " In 1910 the miners made their resolution more specific and I'esolved to meet the owners in each district in order to seek " an individual minimum day wage for all men and boys who are now paid by the ton, yard, etc." How much the day wage should be was left to the district. The impelling force behind this resolution was a sense of injustice in connection with the treatment of men who had to work in abnormal places. The miners had proved IN GREAT BRITAIN 301 to their satisfaction that the excessively low wages some men were getting were due to the unfavorable conditions under which they were working. When first-class miners who earned high wages under normal conditions were placed at work in abnormal places, their wages fell to the level of the other unfortunates. The practice of the owners in the past had been to dole out a few extra shillings to men who were working in such abnormal places. But this was a discouraging, unsatisfactory, and degrading process, and the miners' officials were constantly called upon to go to the owner or manager and plead for a few shillings for such men. Moreover, failure to get aid from the owner in many cases made the unfortunate a serious burden on the local miners' federation. The miners concluded that the individual worker should not be made to suffer for una- voidable conditions in the industry, but rather that losses due to abnormal places should be a charge upon the en- tire production of coal. The only way to accomplish this was through a minimum wage to the man who did a fair day's work under difficult conditions. Supplementary to the abnormal working conditions which caused dissatisfaction were the overcrowding of the mines with men, the forcing of extra timbering on the men, and various other duties which took their time and lessened the wages of the piece-workers. C. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS The miners sought to settle these matters with the owners by districts, but were met by the argument that the varying capacity of the men, the necessity which it would involve of discharging the old men, and the indis- position of some men to earn what they could would make a minimum wage impossible. " It is always the men who are abnormal, not the places," said one miner. Some of the owners were willing to grant the minimum wage (but they were looked upon as " blacklegs " among the owners in 802 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY general), and others stated that it was a national question and should be settled on a national basis. Accordingly the miners sought a national meeting of coal owners and miners. At a national joint conference on September 29, 1911, the ownei's showed that they were not ready for national action, and submitted a statement in which they recognized the right of workmen working in abnormal places " to receive wages commensurate with the work performed "; but they concluded that conditions between districts varied too greatly to permit of their set- tling the matter on a national basis. Therefore they sug- gested district settlements. The miners again attempted to settle by districts, and the owners in the districts associated with the English Conciliation Board (the Midland counties) agreed to the principle of the minimum wage,^ but the other district owners had not changed their attitude. The miners again sought a national conference, but by this time the repre- sentative owners in the Midland counties had changed their attitude, as their constituencies in " their own dis- tricts had repudiated their suggestions [and] they were without authority " to put the minimum wage into effect. D. THE STRIKE BALLOT At a special conference on December 20, 1911, the min- ers decided, as a last resort, to take a ballot, and, in case the vote was favorable, to give notice of their inten- tion to strike so that agreements should terminate by the end of February, 1912. The results of the ballot on Jan- uary 10-12, 1912, showed a majority of 330,080 votes in favor of a strike, and by February 26 upwards of 800,000 miners were idle.^ In the mean time there had been no relaxation of the effort to settle the dispute before the agreements should * Miners^ Special Conference, November 14, 1911, p. 46. 2 HazelVs Annual, 1913, p. 568. IN GREAT BRITAIN 303 terminate. In the further negotiations carried on by the miners and owners the miners had framed a schedule of minimum wages which ranged from 4s. 10c?. for the For- est of Dean to 7s. 6d. for Yorkshire. It was uudei-stood by the public in general that the miners demanded a min- imum of five shillings for men and of two shillings for boys. E. INTERVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT The prolonged negotiations of the miners and owners having met with no success, the Prime Minister intervened. He brought about a joint conference of the parties at the Foreign Office on March 8, which was without results, and on the 15th he announced in the House of Commons the introduction of a Minimum Wage Bill. When the owners became aware that wages were to be made a subject of legislation, they protested vigorously. " It was confiscation. It was flying in the face of economic laws." And the owners persisted so long in their opposition that the Prime Minister revealed to them that the King was in favor of the proposition. "The coal magnates of South Wales were dumbfounded. They had supposed, as the Paris * Matin ' says, that a king is always on the side of vested interests. The coal owners who held out were told that if their attitude remained unmodified, they might be sum- moned to Buckingham Palace, there to be confronted by the spokesman for the miners. This seems to have brought the most obstinate to terms." ^ It is estimated that by March 8 a million and a half of workers were idle and many industries had suspended operations through lack of coal. The extent of the strike was greater than that of the big strike of 1893, and the rapidity with which other industries were affected caused the gravity of the situation to be quickly realized by the whole nation. A coal famine came about in spite of tho ^ Current Literature, vol. 52, p. 386. not ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY fact that the owners had anticipated the strike and had a hirge amount of coal in storage. F. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT As soon as it was evident that the Minimum Wage Bill would be jjassed, the strike was declared off and the men returned to work. On March 29 a Minimum Wage Bill with the following provisions was enacted : — The rates of five shillings for men and two shillings for boys which the Prime Minister considered " obviously just " were not inserted in the bill, although the Govern- ment had offered to include them during the early stages of the negotiations. Attached to this offer was a provision that " the 5s. and 2s. rates should be settled by arbitration on a national basis. If the arbitrators found that the 5s. and 2s. were, to use Mr. Asquith's words, ' obviously just,' then these rates would have applied to every mine in the United Kingdom. Incredible though it may seem, the min- ers' leaders positively refused to entertain this proposal."^ It would not seem so incredible if this provision carried with it the possibility of having the minimum which had been obtained by conciliation, and which was higher than five shillings in most districts, reduced to a lower level. However, the law provided that settlement of the minimum wage should be made by districts and by district boards, with the further provision " that the employer shall pay to that workman [any workman under ground] wages at not less than the minimum rate settled under this Act and applicable to that workman." ^ This would seem to have simply insured a certain minimum which might be settled upon for work in abnormal places. But it did not necessa- rily include any provision for a basic minimum wage which would apply all over the United Kingdom and insure every underground worker a certain standard of living. On the 1 Markham, Quarterly Review, vol. 216, p. 570. 2 Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act, 1912. IN GREAT BRITAIN 305 contrary, the principle was maintained of permitting the districts with superior advantages and resources to con- tinue to profit by these circumstances. The joint district board may lay down rules providing for the exckision of aged, infirm, and disabled workmen from their right to wages at the minimum rate, and it may " lay down conditions with respect to the regularity and efficiency of the work to be performed by the workmen, and with respect to the time for which a workman is to be paid in the event of any interruption of work due to an emergency." If the workman does not comply with these rules he forfeits the right to wages at the minimum rate, " except in cases where the failure to comply with the con- ditions is due to some cause over which he has no control." The rules shall state also the persons by whom and the method by which applicability is to be determined, and under what conditions a workman shall be judged as not having complied with them. The act went into effect immediately, and a workman could recover his wages at whatever rate was settled upon, but the operation of the regulations under the act must not interfere with any other customs or agreements by which the workmen were paid a rate higher than the mini- mum. In settling the minimum rate the board must "have regard to the average daily rate of wages in the district paid to the workmen of the class for which the minimum rate is settled." The Board of Trade is empowered to recognize the joint district boards that are already in existence, or any body of persons with an independent chairman which the Board of Trade believes fairly and adequately represents both parties. If any board does not provide for equality of vot- ing power, the Board of Trade can require it to readjust such a rule as a condition of gaining recognition. The Board of Trade can appoint a person or persons to settle upon a minimum wage if within two weeks the regular 30G ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY district boards have not been recognized through failure on the part of either party to appoint its representatives. If within three weeks after the joint board has been rec- ognized, it fails to settle upon a minimum wage, the chair- man of the board may adjust the rates and make the rules, provided that the members agree or the chairman of the joint board directs that a period longer than three weeks is necessary. The joint district board settles upon general minimum rates and general rules for the whole district. In case a certain class or group of mines requires different regida- tious, the board may divide the district into subdistricts and treat these separately. Or for the purpose of settling district rules, two or more joint district boards may com- bine. The rates and rules may be readjusted at any time if both parties agree, or after one year has elapsed if there seems to be any considerable demand for readjustment from either side. G. SETTLEMENT UNDER THE ACT The act expires in three years unless Parliament shall determine otherwise. The minimum wages settled under the act vary from 4s. lOd. to 7s. 6d. for men, and the wages for boys are graduated from 2s. at the age of four- teen to as high as 5s. 6d. at the age of twenty-one.^ The rules which have been established by the joint Yorkshire district boards are typical and include the fol- lowing provisions : Aged and infirm men are not entitled to the minimum wage, and aged workmen are those over sixty-five " and workmen over sixty who in the opinion of the board are unable to do a fair day's work. Infirm work- men are those who from bodily infirmity or illness, or ac- cident, or disease, are unable to do a fair day's work." Unless a man works eighty per cent of the time the mines 1 Minimum Rates and District Rules of the Joint District Boards under the Minimum Wage Act. IN GREAT BRITAIN S07 are operated, he forfeits the right to the minimum wage except in cases of sickness or accident, of which proper notice must be given to the management. If a workman becomes a party to any arrangement for limiting outjsut, he forfeits the minimum wage. Nor is he entitled to the wage if when he presents himseK for work he is informed that something has happened which prevents the working of the mine. In case of accident or any cause which neces- sitates the closing of the mine during the regular working hours, the workman is entitled to only the percentage of the minimum wage corresponding to the time worked. In case a dispute arises as to whether the minimum wage is to apply to a workman or as to whether he has failed to comply with the regulations, the question may be decided by agreement between the workman and the officials of the mine. Failure to reach an agreement brings the case before the manager of the mine and a person working in or about the mine who may be nominated by the work- man. If these two fail to agree, the case is brought before a committee appointed by the secretaries of the joint dis- trict. When the committee cannot agree, the case is de- cided by a chairman selected by the parties, or, if they cannot agree on a chairman, by a chairman selected by the chairman of the joint district board. The decision shall not be delayed more than twenty-one days and during that time the workman's right to receive the minimum wage is reserved. When decisions have been rendered under this system, a certificate must be given to the parties which shall be binding, except in cases where the workman in dealing directly with mine officials shall give notice within sixty days after the signing "that such certificate has been obtained from him by threats, undue pressure, or other unfair means." Under such circumstances the case is opened anew and goes before the committee, who may cancel the certificate. 308 ARBITRATION IN TIIE COAL INDUSTRY H. EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE It will be seen from the provisions of the act and the working of the same that there is no minimum wage in the industry as a whole, but simply a minimum for each mine, group of mines, or district, as the case may be. It has been prophesied that a real minimum wage on a na- tional scale would necessarily close the poorest mines and encourage more efficient management. But the act protects the owners of the poorest mines and yields to their claim that " they must have cheap labour irrespective of the cost of living." This lowers the standard of living and gives a subsidy to the owners of poorly managed mines. In the words of one who, though a coal owner, is first of all a public-minded citizen and interested in the wisest public policy : " The special minimum rate provided for in the act is, moreover, fair neither to owners nor to men, for an owner who starves his property and spends all his profits is permitted to pay a lower minimum rate of wage than another who may spend half his income on improving and maintaining his mine in a high state of efficiency. Espe- cially is this an injustice on the workman, for in a well- managed mine the men get good clearance [for their coal] . In the badly equipped mine the reverse is the case ; and low wages are paid because the men are unable, through bad roads, shortness of tubs, out-of-date haulage, etc., to get clearance ; for it must always be remembered that hewers of coal are invariably paid on the tonnage of coal gotten." 1 He was further convinced that if a universal minimum wage was not sufficient incentive to increased efficiency in management which would enable the owner to keep his mine open, the men would readily find occu- pation in the better mines, and there working under better conditions would produce a larger output than before. ^ Markham, op. cit., p. 566. IN GREAT BRITAIN 309 I. POSSIBILITIES OF THE INDUSTRY BEARING A MINIMUM WAGE To those who questioned the ability of the industry to bear a minimum wage the miners had a ready answer. For five years one of their own number and a firm of chartered accountants had been busy in making a study of profits and wages in the British coal trade.^ Their study included ninety-two public companies which represent one third of the British coal trade in production and profits, and they make no pretense that their figures include more thau " the minimum (not maximum) results of the trade in the country." The conclusions are based on average dividends paid on ordinary capital over a period of thir- teen years, and the data are not drawn from " a selected set of companies." Among these were six companies who paid no dividends at all and many others whose failure to pay dividends every year brings their average very low. Even on this basis the average return on capital in the form of dividends is 9.6 per cent, and the shareholders have re- ceived their capital back one and one fourth times in the thirteen years " in addition to which the original capital not only remains intact, but has been added to by various appropriations from profits in some of the many forms of reserves — visible or otherwise." ^ In comparing amounts received in wages and in dividends (which the authors do not consider a fair comparison because the full amount received by labor is visible while only a portion of the benefits accruing to capital is evident), a basis of 19s. 9|(Z. per week for miners is used as contrasted with a three per cent return on capital. The 19s. 9|r?. is based on the earnings of the highest paid labor in the Durham coal trade, which may be considered as approaching the average of the better paid labor over the industry as a 1 Richardson and Walbrook, Pnifits and Wages in the British Coal Trade. 2 Ibid., p. 19. 310 ARBITILYTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY whole and leaves out of account the great mass of work- men who are receiving much less. Three per cent is con- sidered a fair basis for capital, since it is the " recognized economic return of interest on capital." From this com- parison it is found that, while wages average 45 per cent over the basis taken, ordinary dividends average 220 per cent over the basis, or, in other words, capital benefits in the ratio of 5 to 1. In analyzing the comparison of wages and dividends of a firm which balanced ,£631,000 paid in wages over against £39,086 paid in dividends, it was found that after including "debenture interest," ^ " visible re- serves," "capital expenditure" written off out of the year's profits, and the income tax which had already been de- ducted, " the total known profits of this concern . . . ex- ceeded X80,000." Comparing the returns on this basis, "the average amount received by each employee is £QQ 15s. lOc?., while the profits for the year for each share- holder average X68 19s. 3c?." But when a comparison is made (for the whole indus- try) between wages and total profits, which include pref- erence dividends and debenture interest besides ordinary dividends, it is found that capital profits in the ratio of 6 to 1, or 293 per cent as against 45 per cent. The in- vestigators are confident that the total profits are the minimum profits, for they were not able to obtain the total profits of all the concerns and are not sure that they got the total profits of those firms which are supposed to have rendered a full report. But even on this basis the average percentage of total profits on total capital is 11.88 per cent. From this investigation the authors concluded that "an average of about five shillings per week [could] be added to the miners' wages all around, and still leave an average return on the total capital sunk in the coal trade for the whole period of thirteen years of at least three per cent per annum." ^ Or 2s. 6 J. could be added and still ^ The same as our interest on bonds. ^ This is exclusive of the income tax at the source. m GREAT BRITAIN 311 give capital an average 9.6 per cent dividend, " merely by utilizing undivided profit and without affecting the divi- dends which have been paid by the various companies in the past thirteen years." The developments in the British coal industry, which we have briefly described, should enable us to anticipate, to some extent at least, the trend of evolution which lies before the coal industry of America. Up to the present time trade unionism in the British coal industry has not had to face a united body of capitalists with a national organization, yet it has had a very severe struggle to ob- tain concessions by peaceful means. The growing realiza- tion of the power of the miners' national organization may cause British owners to unite to meet the men with a simi- lai'ly unified front. In fact, the miners were anxious to have the owners make a settlement on a national scale of the minimum wage. But concentration of ownership and control has not progressed in Great Britain to the degree that it has in our anthracite field and in some portions of our richest bituminous field, and the force of competition is still a disrupting factor among the owners. The next big issue in the mining industry of Great Britain will undoubtedly be the nationalization of mines. This movement has been on foot for some years, and the miners have already taken definite parliamentary action looking to its accomplishment. The " way leaves," ^ mine royalties, and large profits of the owners stand as a con- stant challenge to the men who mine the coal. National ownership, if it comes, will probably come peacefully be- cause the British already have at hand the social and po- litical machinery with which to make it effective. In the process of working out peaceful adjustments, the average individual develops to the point where he is fitted ^ The cbarg'e made upon every ton of coal by a property owner where entrance to a mine lias been g-ained tbroug'h hia property. It ia looked upon as legal " blackmail " by owners and miners. 812 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY to carry out bis part under new conditions. In the anthra- cite negotiations of 1912, utterance was given to ideas that will probably evolve in time into a frank demand for national ownership of coal mines. As yet we have hardly begun to take measures to encourage orderly development and sanity on the part of the workers in the working-out of industrial adjustments. Lack of public policy or re- pression causes the labor unrest to take the form of syn- dicalism and the Industrial Workers of the World. With the development of a greater solidarity among the workers and with the increasing economic pressure due to the ex- haustion of our free land, we may expect a demand for social and political action which will put a severe strain on our rigid constitutional system. Even in Britain, where political institutions are more elastic and where pressing demands can be met more readily by legislative action, it is only after a struggle that adjustments are made to fit the needs resulting from economic and social pressure. There the workers are now met by a frank, conciliatory policy that ramifies through all industry. But what of the future in this country if in 1916, when the present agree- ments in both the bituminous and anthracite fields expire simultaneously, either party assumes an arbitrary and un- yielding position ? CHAPTER IX OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONCILIATORY SYSTEM, PRICES OF COAL, AND A REGULATORY POLICY When we ask, " What of the public ? " it would seem that this question has at least two aspects. The public has been made to feel that there is very close connection between a system of conciliation and arbitration and the price it pays for coal. Furthermore, we have seen that on several occasions the public has found its whole supply of coal cut off because of the lack of a system of peaceful settle- ment which would permit the parties producing coal to come to an honorable and fair adjustment of their diffi- culties. Shortly after the last anthracite agreement in 1912, consumers were informed that they must pay a higher price for their coal because wages had been raised. This seemed a fairly reasonable explanation, but it did not satisfy everybody that the wage-earners were getting all the increase. A resolution passed by the House of Repre- sentatives on July 29, 1912, directed the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to obtain information which would show how much "the coal miners were benefited by the recent strike agreement, and how much and for what rea- sons and by what means the cost of coal to the general consumers was at the same time increased." ^ As a result of this investigation it was shown that seven companies, ^ Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Doc. no. l-i42, p. U. 314 ARBITILVTION IN TIIE COAL INDUSTRY which produced about seventy per cent of the total sales, had obtained about 813,450,000 " more than they would have received for the same tonnage at the prices previously existing." ^ Of this amount the miners received about $4,000,000. Since the cost of labor constitutes between seventy-five and eighty per cent of the total colliery cost, the consumers may well question the extent to which the employers are to be allowed to raise prices every time the miners are granted an increase in wages. Nor are the con- sumers protected by anything other than the privilege of substituting some other kind of fuel when the prices of coal become prohibitive. This is not possible without a great deal of trouble and expense, and there are compara- tively few substitutes to be had. Consumers will pay al- most extortion prices for anthracite rather than substitute soft coal with Its disagreeable qualities, and this fact, in connection with the expense involved, gives us a concep- tion of the margin the operators have to play upon before they reach the maximum which the traffic will bear. Since the domestic consumers have to pay for the greater part of this increase (the average increase on domestic sizes was 81.23 cents per ton, while the pea coal and steam sizes were increased only 16.14 cents per ton),^ it becomes evident that protection from such a burden must come from the Government. Thus far under our governmental policy of laissez-faire in industry, the organized and pow- erful have been able to gain their purposes and the dis- organized consumers are left to express their protests at election times. Before we can be in a position to appreci- ate the complexity of the problem before us we shall have to look back upon the efforts that have been made and the recommendations suggested for dealing with the growing coal monopoly. In conjunction with a constructive policy which would prohibit the operators from shifting upon the ^ Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Doc. no. 1442, p. 11. 2 jj,j. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 315 public an Increase greater than that granted to the wage- earners, plus legitimate profits, we must have a further ex- tension of the activities of the Government into the realm of industrial agreements which shall encourage within the parties a feeling of greater responsibility to the public. In our efforts to prevent the growth of a monopoly con- trol and the fixing of prices of coal, our public policy has gone through an evolution based on common law, state statutes and constitutions, national laws in restraint of trade with court interpretations, with barely a beginning at a policy of regulation under the Interstate Commerce Commission. We have clung tenaciously to the theory that law 'per se is quite sufficient and needs but little coopera- tion on the part of the administrative branch of the Gov- ernment. We have expected that the mere existence of law would be sufficient to counteract the influence of fun- damental economic forces. But these, as they were bound to, have worked themselves out without the guidance and cooperation of the Government. A. Kecommendations of Investigating Committees A. THE committee OF 1888 With the prevalence of abuses in freight rates, increas- ing concentration of ownership of coal lands, and the growth of labor struggles involving large numbers, we have appointed our investigating committees, but their recommendations we have accepted slowly if at all. As early as 1878, the Legislature of Pennsylvania recognized the power of the railroads to force concentrated ownership by discrimination in freight rates, and a joint resolution was passed petitioning Congress to legislate " for equity in the rates of freight." ^ The congressional committee of 1888 which investigated theanthracite troubles found prac- tically the same conditions we have now except that they * Lloyd, Lords of Industry, p. 237. 31G ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY were not developed quite so far. Under state remedies for dealing with the situation they suggested, first, that the state tax " idle anthracite lands on the basis of their full market value," which would foi'ce the holders to work, sell, or lease them.^ By the exercise of the right of eminent domain the State could take possession of the lands at a fair valuation and then " throw them open to free com- petition in mining at a reasonable royalty, sufficient to pay the interest on the debt she would thereby contract." Through the exercise of the police power the State could fix a minimum freight rate and a maximum royalty. On the side of national remedies the committee suggested that Congress could prohibit interstate carriers from engaging in mining and manufacturing. And further, Congress could prohibit the consolidation of parallel or competing lines which tap the anthracite region. B. THE COMMITTEE OF 1893 The congressional committee of 1893 concluded that the railroad companies had entered into a combination to control output and fix prices. They were fortified in this conclusion by evidence of monthly meetings of railroad representatives in whicli, as the result of tacit understand- ing, the industry was regulated. The railroads forced re- calcitrant operators to limit their output by withholding cars from them. These monthly meetings explained why the annual output of coal was about 10,000,000 tons less than the capacity of the mines would warrant. The manip- ulation of freight rates was also used to hold the inde- pendent operator in line. The Interstate Commerce Com- mission had determined, in the case of Coxe Brothers and Company versus the Lehigh Valley Railroad, in 1888, that the railroad was charging fifty cents per ton above what the commission regarded as a fair rate. Yet the commis- ^ Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887-88, op. ci'f., p. xri. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 317 sion had at that time no power to fix rates. Because of these conditions the committee centered their recommen- dations about features which would give the Interstate Commerce Commission adequate powers to deal with the situation, and suggested that state and national Govern- ments take united action in divorcing the business of transportation from mining and manufacturing.^ C. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION, 1907 The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1907, after in- quiring into the ownership of coal lands, stock ownership in coal companies by railroads, and other factors which might give monopoly control of the bituminous coal in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, set forth the following facts which it regarded as contributory to discrimination and monopoly power. The first great factor which permitted unfair car dis- tribution was "want of publicity on the part of the car- riers in their dealings with shippers." If there was any system to the car distribution it was hard for the shipper to find out what it was and whether it was faithfully carried out. The method of rating mines for the purpose of deter- mining proper distribution of cars was another important factor. "If capacity of mines is to govern in the rating for car distribution, the persons or companies owning the mines should be fairly represented when such a rating is made." The importance of this factor is exemplified by the practice of companies (which own several mines) in utilizing their entire car allotment to alternately run up the capacity of their mines. This is accomplished by the way they distribute their cars to certain mines and shut down others. The Commission was of the opinion also that the ^ Report on Alleged Coal Combination, 1893, op. cit., p. viii. 818 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY ownership by the Pennsylvania and the New York Central Railroads of stock in other roads tended to eliminate com- petition in rates, although the railroads justified this own- ership by pointing to it as " the real cause for the cessation in rebates." Another important element entering into the situation was the ownership of " individual cars " which made it possible for the large operators to get a greater amount of coal to market and have greater regularity of service. These cars were sold or leased to the individual operator by the railroad, and the owner was allowed a reduction of six mills per mile on freight rates for their use. Since this allowance was insufficient to pay interest on the in- vestment, the amount of coal marketed and regularity of service were the important factors. Analogous to this abuse of individual cars was the as- signment of fuel cars for railroad coal to certain mines or mining companies without counting them in the regular allotment. This practice is " frequently used by the rail- road company to enable it to get its coal supply at less than the market price of coal." To rectify these conditions the Commission recom- mended that common carriers be required to make public their systems of car distribution. They should be required to publish them at stated periods, show their effect on the different divisions, and, when the supply did not equal the demand, explain how the cars were divided among the mines along the road. If " capacity of mines " were used as the basis of distribution, owners of mines should be represented at the rating thereof. The Commission fur- ther recommended that " after [a] reasonable time " in- dividual or private cars should be prohibited, and that carriers or their officers be forbidden to own either di- rectly or indirectly any operated coal properties.^ 1 Report 0/ Interstate Commerce Commission on Discriminations and Mo- nopolies in Coal and Oil, 1907, p. 81. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 819 These conditions in the bituminous fields and the re- commendations for correcting abuses show that we have the same influences, working toward the same results, as have been noted in the anthracite field. Many unique suggestions have been offered for dealing with our coal monopoly. We shall see to what extremes advocates of the common law are willing to go. B. The Common Law Remedies Supplementary to the principle permitting the State to compel an owner of purely private real estate to conform to state regulations is the doctrine that the owner of prop- erty which has a quasi-public character is further obligated to conform to public needs and policy. This doctrine has received the support of the United States Supreme Court in the case known as Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, de- cided in 1876. In this case a firm owning and operating a grain elevator refused to conform to a state statute requir- ing grain-elevator owners to take out a license which would insure the faithful performance of their duties as public warehousemen. It was decided that the State had the right to require the owners of property on which the public good depended to conform to regulations necessary for accom- plishing this end. Furthermore, this common-law principle of early origin stood in support of any constitutional or statutory provisions. Not only had the State a right to regulate, but also to fix, prices. If there is no statute in existence, and representative people dependent on the public services of the property complain that the owner refuses to give the services which the nature of his public ownership requires, the courts commonly appoint agents or receivers to operate the property and see that all par- ties are rendered justice. In 1902, when the railroads were refusing to arbitrate and thus make possible the operation of tlieir proper- ties, one advocate of common-law procedure summed up S20 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY his argument and citation of authorities with this state- ment : — It follows that since the public have a right in the mines — a right to have coal forthwith mined for immediate consumption — and have a right to have that coal immediately transported out of the mine regions by the coal-carrying roads — a court of equity, if no other solution of the difficulty is open, has the au- thority to, and, upon the application of a representative portion of the public, undoubtedly would, appoint a receiver or receiv- ers to take into his or their hands the whole business now in the hands of the anthracite coal combine, and to run it in their place. This would be neither nationalism nor socialism, and would introduce no unfamihar principle of law or of practice, and would not extend one whit the magnitude of the powers heretofore lately exercised by the courts of justice in great en- terprises.^ But so long as the owners continued to serve the public there would be no remedy from this source. Furthermore, in the matter of combination and restraint of trade the common law operates merely in a negative way. It pro- vides that covenants in restraint of trade are not operative or effective, " but it can do little if all within the combi- nation are satisfied." ^ Then it is that affirmative statutes are needed. C. The Inadequacy of Decisions based on Laws IN Restraint of Trade A. THE RECENT ANTHRACITE DECISION Even when we have the affirmative statutes in the form of the Sherman Law and the commodity clause of the Hepburn Act, the extent to which they are prohibitory and really effective in preventing restraint of trade and monopoly control is well exemplified by the results of the commodities case and of the recent decision of the Su- ^ Chaplin, The Coal Mines and the Public, p. 37. 2 Wyman, Control of the Market, p. 138. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 321 preme Court dealing with the anthracite situation. In this latter decision the government attoi-neys were informed that they had failed to establish the fact that there was any general combination which entered into a pooling ar- rangement to apportion tonnage. Yet the court took cog- nizance of the Temple Iron Company, which as a holding company was operating in restraint of trade and was de- clared illegal. The very antecedents of the holding com- pany,^ the way it was formed, the percentages of holdings in the company, and the voting trust which it entailed all point to the power to control production, allot tonnage, and fix prices. The court admitted that the thwarting of the projected New York, Wyoming, and Western Rail- road, in order to prevent the competition of independents in the market, was an illegal act in restraint of trade and that it was accomplished by the Temple Iron Company as a holding company. But it found no general combination in restraint of trade. Furthermore, " its board of directors, composed as it is of men representing the defendants, sup- plies time, place, and occasion for the expression of plans or combinations requiring or inviting concert of action. Though as a board it may not dictate the activities of the owning corporations, still, in view of the relation of the Temple Iron Company to the defendant carriers and their respective coal mining companies, and of the constitution of its directors, the attitude of its board, as indicated by the proceedings spread upon the corporate minutes, is of significance upon the question of the existence of any con- certed purpose to unite the activities of its corporate own- ers to suppress competition. There are to be found on the minutes of the Temple Iron Company a number of entries which point strongly to combinations between the defend- ants. Thus, on June 27, 1899, a committee was appointed to consider the establishment of a statistical bureau ' to keep a record of all matters of interest to the anthracite ^ We have already described these on pp. 226-227, atite. 322 ARBITRATION IN THE CO.VL INDUSTRY companies.' " ^ The evidence was sufficient to warrant the dissolution of the Temple Iron Company, but not to es- tablish a general combination in restraint of trade. The court considered it sufficient to break up the combination into its elements, for "each group in the absence of any agreement or combination j^ossesses the poioer to compete with every other in the production, sale, and transporta- tion of coal." 2 Following the consummation of the Temple Iron Com- pany deal, the independents were given sixty-five per cent contracts in order to mollify them. This meant that they would get sixty-five per cent of the selling price of coal at tidewater, be relieved of the expense of selling agencies, and pay fluctuating freight rates with the varying price in coal. These contracts were declared illegal and void. On what grounds can such a decision be justified as helping either the public by a fall in prices or as aiding the inde- pendents in making them freer and able to get better prices for their coal ? The usual argument is that it will reestablish a certain amount of competition. Up to the present, at least, the independent has been practically at the mercy of the carriers as to freight rates, allotment of cars, and discrimination. The railroad can justify freight rates by pointing to the rates they charge their own min- ing companies, even though they are " robbing Peter to pay Paul." The independents will also be put to the ex- pense of establishing selling agencies, which certainly will not help to reduce the selling price to the consumer. Last, and more important than all, the comparatively small ton- nage and control of unmined coal points to one of the ele- ments that make it " seem a little mystifying that President Baer and Attorney-General Wickersham express equal satisfaction with the opinion." The general understand- ^ United States vs. Beading Company^ 33 Supreme Court Reporter, no. 4, p. 97. ^ Ibid., p. 93. Italics mine. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 323 ing developed by the Temple Iron Company will con- tinue, and the railroads are quite sui-e that the independ- ents received enough benefit by their sixty -five per cent contracts, so that they will seek to save themselves trou- ble and expense by selling the railroads their coal. As for the Attorney-General, he was probably deluded into thinking the decision would accomplish more than it will. So far as the absorption of the Pennsylvania Coal Company and the New York, Susquehanna, and Western Railroad by the Erie, and the acquisition by the Reading of the majority stock ownership in the Jersey Central is concerned, these deals are still open to action by the Government. However we may look upon the interpreta- tion of the facts, it should be pointed out that the decision does not mean that such a combination did not exist, but that it has not been proved to exist. There is hardly need to raise the question of the efficacy of the courts in dealing with the situation. B. THE " COMMODITIES CASE " The commodities clause of the Hepburn Act,* which prohibits the common carrier from transporting any arti- cle or commodity which it has manufactured, mined, or produced, "or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect," was inoperative in this case for two reasons. Action in the anthracite case was begun in 1907 before the Hepburn Act became effective (May 1, 1908), and on that score the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad, whose charter permitted it to engage in mining, was not subject to action in this case. But relief against a continuance of the mining operations can be sought in another proceed- ing. On the basis of priority of action the other roads ^ " An Act to regulate commerce," 34 Statutes at Large, 584, chap. 3591. 354 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY were also immune in this case, but one may wonder why they are not also subject to proceedings under the com- modities clause, since they own and have " an interest, direct or indirect," in subsidiary coal companies. In 1908 a decision ^ was rendered on this same commodities clause which ruled that " the provision of the commodities clause relating to interest, direct or indirect, does not em- brace an interest which a carrier may have in a producing corporation as the result of ownership by the carrier of stock in such corporation." C. UNITED STATES VS. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY But the Supreme Court was soon called upon to amplify its decision in the United States vs. the Delaware and Hudson Company and interpret still further the mean- ing it attached to the commodities clause. In fact, the case of the United States vs. the Lehigh Valley Rail- road Company (1910) ^ is a sequel to the former case de- cided in 1908. The court had held that the prohibitions of the commodities clause had but a common purpose, to disassociate the "railroad companies prior to transporta- tion from articles or commodities, whether the association resulted from manufacture, mining, production or own- ership, or interest, direct or indirect," and these provisions were applicable to a " legal or equitable interest " which could be satisfied by the coal company being a " distinct corporation " from the railroad. " Thus construed," the clause was held to be "within the power of Congress to enact." The clause, bearing this interpretation, was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. The Lehigh Valley Coal Company was charged with not being a bona ^ United States ex rel. The Attorney-General of the United States vs. Del- aware and Hudson Company, 213 U.S. 36G. 2 220 U.S. 257. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 325 Jide mining company, but merely a department of the railroad company. Further, the railroad used its stock ownership in the coal company to "buy up all the coal produced by other mining companies in the area tributary to the railroad and fix the price at which such coal was bought." By this means and by the control of transpor- tation facilities it was able to determine prices at sea- board. The lower court had refused to allow the Government to file an amended bill and had dismissed the suit. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. In reply to a technical objection of the railroad company, which claimed that the action of the lower court was not susceptible to review, " however germane that amendment may have been . . . because the allowance of amendments to pro- ceedings is discretionary with a trial court . . . unless a gross abuse of discretion was committed," the Supreme Court decided that " an absolute abuse of discretion " had been committed in refusing to allow the amendment. The railroads had interpreted the former commodities decision to permit unlimited commingling of the affairs of coal and railroad companies, but the court decreed that they must be bona fide separate corporations, and insisted that the abuses of " such a situation could not have ex- isted had the fact that the two corporations were separate and distinct legal entities been regarded in the adminis- tration of the affairs of the coal company." As it now stands the railroads can continue to be interested in coal companies, provided they keep up the appearance of bona fide legal entities. D. The Lack of Public Policy If we can learn nothing else from this resume of recom- mendations by committees, common-law principles, and court decisions under affirmative statutes on restraint of trade, one fact should stand out plainly — the weakness 32G ARBITRATION IN THE CO.VL INDUSTRY and inadequacy of our public policy in dealing with the growing control of such an important commodity as coal. Here we have a natural resource which can be made avail- able to the public only by the use of transportation facili- ties. The development of the mines and the railroads have necessarily gone hand in hand. Competition, glutted mar- kets, and interruption of traffic early prompted the rail- roads to seek control of the whole industry. As so many units, the railroads found that they were not in a much better position to regulate the industry than before they acquired ownership of the coal lands. Responding to im- mutable economic pressure as well as to any desire for monopoly which may be attributed to them, they learned to develop a community of interests in spite of legal ob- stacles. Their problem has been to curb the individual or company which proposed to carry free competition to ex- tremes, just exactly as the labor union finds it necessary to curb the individual who is willing to work for very low wages. In the mean time the consumer, as long as he got his coal at a price somewhere within proportion to the prevailing regime of prices, paid what he had to pay, and grumbled. The level of monopoly prices would have been higher than it is had we been dependent solely on the effectiveness of our public policy. The competition from bituminous coal and the limits set by the possibility of substitution and by ability to consume have been the only regulatory factors of the anthracite monopoly. With the rise of a labor organization and a system of conciliation and arbitration which will extend itself over the whole coal industry, it becomes a matter of vital con- cern to the public that the prices charged for coal shall give a just recompense to both labor and capital and at the same time not reach an extortionate level. In this connection one naturally wonders why the administrative and regulatory powers of Government, through the activi- ties of the Interstate Commerce Commission and other OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 327 commissions, have not evolved to a point which would permit more effective governmental protection of con- sumers. To understand this we have but to turn to a consideration of the factors which have prevented the In- terstate Commerce Commission from adequately regulating interstate commerce through the adjustment of "reason- able " freight rates. Then we shall understand why further extension of regulatory powers which would permit a com- mission to deal with the more difficult problem of con- centrated ownership of coal lands and railroads and the adjustment of freight rates and prices of coal has not taken place. E. The Work of the Interstate Cosimerce Commission A. COXE brothers CASE Until recently the Interstate Commerce Commission has been greatly handicapped in its work. In its first attempt to deal with anthracite rates it learned that where rail- roads own mining companies the only regulation practica- ble is the requirement making rates reasonable. In 1888, Coxe Brothers and Company brought action against the Lehigh Valley Railroad for charging unreasonable rates. After an investigation in which the other railroads refused to avail themselves " of the liberty to appear and join in the defense," the Commission established rates varying from $1.05 to il.50 per ton, according to the sizes of coal. The Lehigh refused to conform to the rates, and when haled into court by the Commission denied that it had vio- lated any provision of the act regulating commerce or that its rates were unreasonable. Furthermore, if the act per- mitted the Commission to set up what it regarded as rea- sonable rates, the company held it to be unconstitutional because it interfered " with the common-law rights of com- mon carriers " and violated the companies' charter rights 328 .ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY which permitted a charge of three cents per ton per mile for " tolls " and " transportation." ^ The case was brought before the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1891, but the decision was not handed down till 1896. In the mean time the at- tempted merger in 1892-93 had taken place, and the Commission says rather bitterly that the interests of the complainants were probably " better served by the present high prices enforced through the ' combine ' than they would be by the lower transportation rates " which were ordered for the public good.^ In 1896 the court informed the Commission that it declined to enforce its orders in the matter of freight rates because of " an erroneous esti- mate of cost to the company " and the inability of the Com- mission to " itself fix rates." The estimate of cost by the Commission had been " made upon the company's report of earnings and expenses on coal transportation and was somewhat lower than an estimate stated by counsel for the carrier." The case was appealed, but in 1897 the Supreme Court decision on the Freight Bureau Cases,^ which denied the authority of the Commission to require carriers not to ex- ceed charges found reasonable and just, caused the Com- mission to drop the case. The Commission had expected that the courts would compel obedience to the orders of the Commission "unless the record of the investigation which resulted in that order disclosed some plain error of fact or conclusion sufficient to justify the court in refusing to take such action." After the Commission had made its investigation, issued its orders, and appealed to the court to enforce them, it was often found that the carrier had withheld evidence, and the courts were required to pass on evidence very dif- ferent from that submitted to the Commission. ^ Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1891, p. 288. 2 Ibid., 1892, p. 27. 3 167 u.S. 479. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 329 The Commission summed up the conditions thus : — The special weakness of the law as it now stands is the want of finality and binding force to the decisions of the Commission though made upon facts ascertained after notice to the carriers and full opportunity for all interested parties to be heard. The absence of any conclusive character to our determinations de- prives them of the weight and vigor which they ought to pos- sess, and prevents the exercise of that authority which is essential to effective regulation.^ B. THE BAIRD CASE The next case worthy of note that arose in the anthra- cite field was the result of a complaint concerning legality of rates brought by William R. Hearst in 1903 against the Readiug and other railroads. During the investigation David S. Baird, Secretary of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, refused to produce the contracts entered into between the company and independent producers. The officials of the other coal and railroad companies also re- fused to produce similar contracts. These contracts had been entered into after January 1, 1901, and are now popularly known as the " sixty-five per cent contracts." Information regarding the fixing of prices of coal at tide- water, the cost of producing coal, and the items entering into company reports under the heading "general ex- penses " was also refused. The Commission brought action in the United States Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York to compel the parties ^ to answer questions and produce in- formation. The court compelled the president of the Lack- awanna to answer the specific question regarding the items under general expenses, "inasnuich as the documents containing that item were in evidence before the Com- mission," But the court held tliat the other information ^ Ileport of Interstate Commerce Commissioti, 189'), p. 11. 2 Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Baird et al., 1^4 U.S. 25. 330 ARBITRATION IN THE CO.VL INDUSTRY asked and the contracts called for were not relevant to the question of reasonable rates. The Commission be- lieved that this evidence had direct bearing upon rea- sonable rates, whether or not there were discriminating charges and wliether or not the fixing of tidewater prices was in violation of the anti-pooling section of the act to regulate commerce. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the lower court. The railroads tried to have the appeal dismissed on a technicality and " insisted that the language of the proviso [in the Elkins Act of 1903 providing for the expediting of cases] applied only to cases in equity, and did not include those of the character of an action to compel the production of books and papers and the giving of testimony by witnesses called before the Commission." But the court refused to inter- pret the proviso narrowly, and took into consideration other sections of the act which permitted the Commission to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers and keep itself informed "as to the man- ner and method in which the same is conducted, with the right to obtain from such common carriers full and com- plete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties and carry out the objects for which it was created." ^ This decision was handed down in 1904, but it was not till March 8, 1906, that it was reopened for argument. It was reargued on March 29, 1906, " and since that time the case has been placed on the suspense calendar." ^ Whether or not this action was encouraged by the ex- pected passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906, which gave the Commission enlarged powers, or the expected govern- mental prosecution of the roads under the Sherman Law (begun in 1907), we can only conjecture. At any rate, the ^ Heport of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1904, p. 33. ^ Official correspondence. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 331 courts monopolized the field of action from 1907 to 1912 with very ineffective results. C. THE POWER TO FIX MAXIMUM RATES The Hepburn Act gave the Commission power to fix maximum rates, and this function was upheld by the Cir- cuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1909.1 -pi^e decision also supported the Commission's con- tention that since the passage of the Hepburn Act the courts have no right to review or set aside its orders " in 80 far as they involved the exercise of discretion or judg- ment," but that " the courts might inquire whether the formalities required by the statute had been complied with ; whether a proper complaint had been presented, a full hearing had, an order made in due form and properly served upon the defendant ; but if these formalities had been followed, then the order of the Commission could only be attacked upon the ground that it violated some constitutional right of the defendants." D. THE COMMISSION HANDICAPPED BY THE COURTS The powers now secured are those that the Commission has needed all the time. Without them its efforts to func- tion as it was intended to have been handicapped on every side. The courts have been concerned about teclmicalities and have quibbled over minor matters to the exclusion of important ones. This is well exemplified in the Chesa- peake and Ohio coal case, in which the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad was restrained from granting discrimina- tory rates to the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Company, but " the court declined, however, to enjoin the Chesapeake and Ohio from further departing from its tariff rates in the transportation of coal or of in- terstate traffic generally, and that was, of course, the ob- ject of the preceding commission." ^ ^ Eeport of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1909, p. 29. 2 Ibid., 1904, p. 78. 332 ARBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY F. The Need for an Accounting System In fact, before the Commission can really get at the rate problem, where railroads own the coal mines, it will be necessary to make a thorough investigation of the costs of mining. In spite of the varying conditions in mining and the great differences in productivity between fields, an effective system of obtaining costs is possible. That it can be accomplished is demonstrated by the results of work done in the mining industry of Germany.^ The work done by the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1913 in investigating costs and prices of anthra- cite coal is a good beginning. One of the first difficulties the bureau which had charge of this investigation encoun- tered was the " widely different methods of accounting." Thus a policy of regulation would involve a uniform sys- tem of accounting in mining similar to the requirements placed upon the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Com- mission. In spite of this handicap the bureau obtained informa- tion from the records of " railroad interests " which own their own mines or are affiliated through holding com- panies and produce seventy-five per cent of the anthracite coal.^ The information given was checked against the books of the companies or their published records by cer- tified public accountants, and no discrepancies were found except in the case of one company whose records were not included in the report of the bureau. Other information was obtained from annual reports, " sworn statements in- troduced in judicial hearings," and by " personal visits of agents of the bureau to the retailers of the cities covered by the investigation." The bureau was able to arrive at a figure which repre- * Walker, Monopolistic Combinations in the German Coal Industry. Pub- lications of American Economic Association, 3d series, vol. 5, pp. 145-59. 2 Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, op, cit., p. 10. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 333 sented at least the maximum increase in labor cost per ton (9.75 cents), operating costs, fixed charges, and the extent of depletion funds which, compounded at four per cent for forty years, would repay the companies for the ac- tual costs of their coal lands. The causes which tend to increase and decrease cost of production can also be ascer- tained, and computations can be made which will allow for both influences. In this investigation the benefit of the doubt would seem to have been given the companies in every instance, and yet the Government was able to show the dispropor- tionate share that capital was getting out of the increased charges. Furthermore, we must remember that this esti- mate of $13,450,000 increase is a minimum, for ability to sell coal at " premiums " for quick delivery during periods of shortage makes a substantial addition. Out of this in- crease the operators had to pay the -f 4,000,000 increase in wages and the expenses attached to the six weeks' sus- pension of mine operation. Since the market can be sup- plied by operating the mines about 225 days during the year, the charge for six weeks' suspension reduces itself to expenses attached to keeping the mines free from water and deterioration of working equipment. If the Government used its powers to require effective publicity, it ought not to have to go to the extent of actu- ally fixing prices. But to make publicity effective it must require a uniform system of accounting, separate account- ing for the mining industry, physical valuation of mining equipment, and other regulations which will enable it to arrive at a fair approximation of the cost of mining a ton of coal. The public should have this information from an authoritative source along with the earnings of mining companies and railroad companies combined. The In- terstate Commerce Commission should possess such in- formation as wouhl enable it to adjust railroad rates on coal in relation purely to tlie cost of transportation. This 834 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY information should be in the hands of labor and capital when they meet for collective bargaining, and it would be a powerful factor in preventing arbitrary action on the part of either party. These recommendations are particularly applicable to the anthracite region, and are suggested by the thought that it will be impossible to undo the work of concentra- tion of ownership which has taken place or to counteract the impelling economic factors which have forced the cooperation necessary to put the industry on a profitable basis. G. The "Work of Concentrated Capital We cannot neglect the actual services which combina- tion and concentration of capital have rendered in the coal industry. It is estimated that the large aggregation of capital has reduced the waste of coal from one aud a half tons to one-half ton for every ton mined,^ by making it possible to use better methods and equipment in mining. As it has been necessary to penetrate the earth more deeply, a greater amount of capital has been required to open mines. When such mines are opened there is a greater cost connected with keeping them open. A greater amount of refuse has to be hoisted and a greater amount of water pumped. The concentrated ownership of many collieries has made it possible to shut down the exjjensive mines and keep the profitable mines running more con- stantly. The better systematization and regularity of trans- portation that comes with large equipment and general control has enabled the common carrier to move freight much more cheaply, regardless of whether or not the pub- lic has profited by this in the reduction of anthracite coal rates. A similar saving is accomplished by the reduction ^ Mitchell, " Our Coal Supply Today," Review of Reviews, vol. 41, pp. 193-204. Mr. Mitchell is Secretary to the Director of the U.S. Geologi- cal Survey. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 335 and concentration of selling agencies. That centralized control is necessary to keep the markets and tlie industry healthy is recognized by capital and labor and by the economists who have made a study of the industry. That the public did not profit sufficiently by the good results of concentrated ownership and unified policy, and that labor did not enter into its own until it enforced collective bar- gaining, does not disprove the beneficial features which have gone hand in hand with this development. It rests with constructive public policy to see that the public par- ticipates in the fruits of control and organization. H. The Operators ask for a Comiviission In the bituminous field, although the process of com- bination is progressing fast, competition is still the con- trolling factor. The field is too vast and varied and the individual operators and companies too many for one to expect that a gentlemen's agreement could fix the price of coal in spite of legal restraints. But we hear certain operators In both the central field and in West Virginia frankly advocate the inauguration of a commission which shall have the power to say whether the prices fixed by the operators are reasonable.^ They are undoubtedly im- pelled by other motives than would move those who advo- cate regulation for the anthracite field. The competitive race between fields in the bituminous regions and the crowding to the wall of the smaller men by the large com- binations of capital make certain ones cry out for some degree of protection. If their cry is not heard it may not be long before the necessity for regulation will be for the sake of the public, as it is in the anthracite field. At any rate, the same policy of effective publicity as ap- plied to the anthracite field would not be a detriment to the public. In fact, the same necessity for authoritative ^ Ixeport of Joint Conference of Central Field, 1912, p. 331 ; also Report of Senate Committee Hearings in West Virginia, op. cit., part 2, p. 1GG4. 336 ARBITRATION IN THE CO/\L INDUSTRY information is present, both from the standpoint of the pub- lic and for purposes of collective bargaining. With greater imity among the laborers and greater combination of the capitalists, we shall approach deadlocks over fundamental questions just as the English did over the minimum wage. In England we have seen that the miners took the initia- tive in determining whether the coal industry was able to pay a minimum wage that would put the loss, which came to the individual miner from working in abnormal places, upon the industry as a whole. Conclusions which are based upon a thorough and authoritative system of investigation and publicity will result in greater justice to both labor and capital and give the public a safe basis for placing the force of its sympathy with the party which is in the right. The general benefits to the public that come from actual and potential competition will be just as great, and by publicity and regulatory measures the evils and abuses of " cut-throat " competition may be thwarted or corrected. Under the conditions which exist in the bituminous field the operators who ask for a commission to regulate prices cannot expect by this means to be relieved entirely of competition. A commission which fixed maximum prices might protect the public from extortion, but it would have to fix and enforce minimum prices in order to protect the operators in the fields which are producing under the most adverse circumstances. In connection with the fixing of maximum prices the commission would have the coopera- tion of the public because nobody is going to pay more for coal than he has to ; but with the attempt to fix mini- mum prices there would be every incentive for consumers to connive with the producer who wished to sell his product lower than the minimum in order to gain the market. Unless the minimum prices could be enforced, the in- dependent operators would still be subjected to the bane- ful competition of concentrated capital. Besides our policy OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 337 of effective publicity we must inaugurate measures that will leave room for healthy competition and yet rob the powerful operator or company of the ability to exploit labor, utilize cut-throat competition against the independ- ent, or entirely absorb his holdings. The cheaper the rail- road and guerrilla operators in West Virginia and Penn- sylvania get their labor, the greater will be their profits, and the more effective the power which they will possess to continue their labor exploitation, force the independent to the wall, and create social and political problems. I. Regulatory Measures The growth of the industry in the bituminous field may require capital to concentrate to obtain the greatest effi- ciency ; nevertheless, there are certain fundamental condi- tions in the industry which can be established by legal enact- ment and which will put the large and the small operator on an equal footing to a certain extent. Then evolution iu the industry may take its course, work more slowly, and entail less hardship. The advocacy of effective publicity and regulation pre- supposes that the industry is to be regarded from a na- tional standpoint. The same is true of the measures which follow. Perhaps the reader is immediately struck with all the difficulties of constitutionality, of judicial interpreta- tion, and of obtaining legislative enactment that eternally rise before the minds of Americans when they attempt to approach new problems. Let us grant that they are ever present, still we shall never get very far toward a solution of problems so long as we can see nothing but difficulties. Besides, there are new forces at work in our industrial, political, and social life which will make old things new and compel us to exert ourselves to keep up with progress rather than spend our energies lamenting inaction. SS8 AllBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY A. THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY First among the measures of a general regulatory nature is the legal eight-hour day. This would be one of the most effective regulations with which to bring up the level of working conditions and competition between the organized and unorganized fields. The unorganized fields would then have to inaugurate the eight-hour day. In this respect we should simply be following the line of evolution which has been found necessary in England. We remember that the British miners were unable to obtain such a regulation by conciliatory means. Nor have the American miners met with better success in our richest bituminous field where large concentration of mining and railroad capital has fought it. Furthermore, since our United States Supreme Court in the case of Holden vs. Hardy (169 U.S. 366) has shown itself liberal enough to uphold a state law pro- viding for an eight-hour day, we may expect that our evolution in this respect will not be such a remote possi- bility. B. A LEGAL TON Analogous to the eight-hour day in its effects would be a national regulation and enforcement of a legal and uni- form ton. The miner, even though an unorganized worker, should not be subjected to an abuse which permits an em- ployer to regard considerably over 3000 pounds as a ton when he is paying his workmen and consider 2240 pounds as a ton when he sells his coal. National legislation should be able to excel state legislation by the elimination of provisos or " jokers " which make the effectiveness of the act dependent upon the agreement of the employer and employees, for in unorganized fields there can be no fair agreement. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 339 C. REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION We must take more effective measures than we have taken as yet to stop the manifestly untrammeled exploi- tation of labor made possible by our lax immigration policy and the use of arbitrary and barbarous practices to defeat collective bargaining. While capital has had pro- tection by the tariff, labor has been compelled to compete with southern European peoples in wages and standard of living. As a result of this the unions have been disrupted, bargaining power has been destroyed, and the homogeneity and cohesion necessary for sane development through col- lective action is absent. The system of armed guards and peonage shown in the recent West Virginia troubles and the control of judicial and administrative machinery in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, during the strike of 1911, point to the extremes we may expect when con- centrated capital is given unlimited opportunity to con- trol natural resources and exploit ignorant labor. D. THE MINIMUM WAGE A minimum wage equal to the wage paid in the organ- ized districts would greatly supplement a policy of effec- tive restriction of immigration. It certainly would reduce the incentive the employer has to cast off his old workmen inconsiderately when he knows he has a ready supply of men with which to break strikes and carry on indefinitely a series of exploitations until the workmen rise in discon- tent. If capital in the fields which are unionized can afford to pay the higher wages which go with collective bargain- ing, the operators in the richer and unorganized fields of West Virginia and Pennsylvania not only can afford to pay a minimum wage equal to the wages in the organized dis- tricts, but tliey should be forced to pay it. Even then their superior natural resources and concentration of capital would give them sufficient advantage in competition. 340 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY In an attempt to equalize competition between coal fields (or States), differences in rates of wages are made to offset the difference in distance from the market and tlie attending extra expense in getting coal to market. But as between two mines within the same field, an at- tempt is made to equalize wages by paying higher rates in the thin-vein mines than in thick veins where working conditions are easier. Thus the operator with the richest mine profits by his superior natural resources and is in a more advantageous position competitively than the opera- tor with a thin-vein mine. These same principles should stand in dealing with the " West Virginia problem," but the differential which the field should have as compared with the other fields ought to be proportionately smaller because of its superior natural advantages. In such an adjustment a minimum wage and a compulsory eight-hour day would be other elements which could be utilized in connection with a proper regulation of freight rates so as to reduce destructive competition from the unorganized fields. The minimum wage may be considered a measin^e of last resortj though it may not be more difficult to in- augurate than the other measures advocated after consti- tutional and legislative difficulties have been surmounted. J. Possible Rise and Influence of a Labor Party Although attainment of such regulatory measures may seem impossible, beginnings have already been made which will aid adjustments of this kind and lead us along the same line of development that has taken place in Great Britain. We must remember that of some years we have been electing labor men to Congress and the state legis- latures, who, although they nominally ran as Democrats or Republicans, would undoubtedly stand for labor on questions which would vitally affect its welfare. The Labor party in Great Bi-itain passed through this same stage of development. With the increase of economic pressure and OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 341 inability to make the existing political machinery respon- sive enough, new means necessarily develop by which the I'ising discontent can find expression through peaceful adjustment. We now have fourteen labor men in the House of Rep- resentatives and one in the United States Senate. These men represent twelve different unions. Besides, we have a labor man in the Cabinet, and this may well be con- sidered quite as significant of a new era as the entrance of John Burns into the British Cabinet. These men are, of course, among the most conservative in regard to any measures which would encourage the development of class struggle, but we may expect to find them on the side of those who see the necessity for making our political ma- chinery more responsive to changing industrial and social needs. Furthermore, since we have hardly begun our social legislation, with the advent of definite issues we may ex- pect party adjustments on new lines. The same economic pressure which has brought the for- mation of a Labor party in France, Germany, and Eng- land, has already found expression in the form of resolu- tions for a similar party in the United States. At the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor in November, 1913, the following resolution was sub- mitted to the Committee on Resolutions : — Resolved, That the president of the Amevican Federation of Labor select nine members of the Thirty- third Animal Conven- tion, with cards of their respective unions in good standing, to draft a pohtical platform to be known as the platform of the American Labor Party, such platform to be adopted by this con- vention. Another more extended resolution with the same pur- port contained a provision for sidimitting the proposition to a vote of the; rank and file of labor unionists. The com- mittee on resolutions was of the opinion that the time was S42 ARBITRATION IN THE CO.AL INDUSTRY not ripe for a " distinct labor political party," but that with further maturity in political activity a " new politi- cal party [would] be the logical result." In the mean time they felt that labor should be more fully organized and that the Federation should maintain its " non-partisan political position." ^ The recommendations of the commit- tee were sustained, but during the course of the debate it was fully brought out " that it was useless to organize in- dustrially without a strong political organization back of the industrial organizations, and that it was useless to se- cure labor legislation unless there was a strong industrial organization to see that it was enforced." Although it is evident by a vote of 193 to 15 that the conservative element was in the saddle, the radicals may prove to have the keener sense of the real attitude of the rank and file at present. In January, 1914, the United Mine Workers' Convention passed resolutions favoring the formation of a labor party and government owner- ship of all public utilities, especially of coal mines. Even though the resolutions contained no preparations for a new party, the formal expression of intention is signifi- cant. If the United States Supreme Court should decide, in connection with the Danbury Hatters' Case, that trade- union funds are open to attack under the Sherman Anti- Trust Law, events may move faster than we anticipate, in quite the same way as they did in England. Not less sig- nificant is the resolution in respect to the nationalization of mines, especially so since two United States Senators ^ have advocated a similar policy as the solution of labor problems in the mining industry. All this, it would seem, is indicative that we are enter- ing upon an era of new adjustments which would make 1 Report of Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, No- vember, 1913, p. 315. 2 Report of Senate Committee on the Investigation of the Paint Creek Coal Fields of West Virginia, pp. 19 and 21. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 343 effective publicity and regulation, an eight-hour law, and a minimum wage less remote possibilities. With the de- velopment of greater homogeneity and common sympathy among our manual workers there must come the develop- ment of a new elasticity in our constitutional, political, and governmental machinery that will allow the masses to give voice to their needs and permit the accomplishment of certain ends which can be gained only through legal enactment. Furthermore, the Government must function more readily when voluntary conciliation and arbitration have failed to function. This leads us to a consideration of the role the Government should play in a situation like the anthracite strike of 1902, or of a general coal strike which may come with the simultaneous expiration of contracts in both the anthracite and bituminous fields in 1916. 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONCILIATORY SYSTEM, THE SUPPLY OF COAL, AND GOVERNMENTAL ACTION Although the United States Government showed itself impotent in dealing with the serious anthracite strike of 1902, and in spite of the fact that the "suspensions" which have taken place during the formation of a new agreement could easily have developed into a protracted struggle, we still have no legal provision which would enable the Government to function more effectively on such a momentous occasion. That the Government could use its good offices at such times without interfering with a system of conciliation and arbitration or taking away the laborer's right to strike or the employer's right to lock out, is demonstrated for us by the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. By such an act we can give the force of public opinion a thorough trial and exert a most salutary educational influence on capital, labor, and the public. To be an effective educational influence the 344 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY measure should insure authoritative information. With this placed before them the people should be able to ren- der a verdict on the immediate struggle. But a still greater asset is the leaven within the measure for the encourage- ment of further evolution of public policy. A. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Act (1) Application for a hoard When industrial disputes have developed to a point where trouble is imminent, either party to the dispute may make application to the Minister of Labour asking him to appoint a board of conciliation and investigation. The written application sets forth the nature and cause of the trouble, the demands made by the parties, the num- ber of persons involved, and the efforts made to adjust the dispute. The party making the aj)plication transmits a copy to the opposing party. At least ten employees must be affected by the dispute if the application is to receive consideration. These provisions could be adapted so that a voluntary system of conciliation for the formation of contracts and the adjustment of disputes thereunder would not be interfered with. By refusing to grant an application for a board except when one of the parties arbitrarily re- fuses to meet the opposing party, plenty of free play could be given all voluntary conciliatory systems. But it is when either party is arbitrary that the Government can use its power most effectively to force publicity. (2) Composition of the hoard A board consists of three members, and they are ap- pointed by the Minister of Labour from the recommenda- tions of the contending parties. Each party recommends its representative and these two recommend a third. If either party tries to block proceedings by neglecting or re- fusing to appoint a representative, the Minister of Labour OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 345 selects a suitable person to fill the place. The third party selected by the representatives is the chairman of the board. The members of the board are not to have any pecuniary interest in the dispute and are bound by an oath to secrecy and faithful performance of their duties. The remuneration received by each member of the board is twenty dollars per day for each day the board sits and for each day they are necessarily engaged in traveling. Besides this, their traveling exj)enses are paid. (3) Conciliation y investigation, and publicity The primary function of the board is to bring the parties together and induce them to come to a fair and amicable settlement. In cases where a settlement is not reached, the board makes a report to the Minister of Labour which " sets forth the various proceedings and steps taken by the Board for the purpose of fully and carefully ascertaining all the facts and circumstances, and shall set forth such facts and circumstances, and its findings therefrom, in- cluding the cause of the dispute and the Board's recom- mendation for the settlement of the dispute according to the merits and substantial justice of the case." ^ This re- port shall avoid " as far as possible all technicalities " and set forth " what in the Board's opinion ought or ought not to be done by the respective parties concerned." The Minister of Labour files the report, sends copies of it to the parties, the newspapers, and "may distribute copies of the report, and of any minority report, in such a man- ner as to him seems most desirable as a means of securing a compliance with the Board's recommendation." (4) Powers of the hoard To make the report as effective and authoritative as possible the board has the power to summon witnesses and compel testimony and the production of documents. The ^ Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, section 25. 2iG AEBITILVTION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY board is allowed clerical assistance and may employ ex- perts to whom it may delegate its powers. These experts may inspect and interrogate, and any person who hinders them is guilty of an offense and liable to a penalty of $100. But the information obtained from documents "shall not, except in so far as the Board deems it expedient, be made public, and such parts of the books, papers, or other documents as in the opinion of the Board do not relate to the matter at issue may be sealed up." The proceedings of the board are public, unless other- wise ordered, and " No proceeding . . . shall be deemed invalid by reason of any defect of form or technical ir- regularity." All expenses, including payment of witnesses, experts and salaries, are borne by the State. (5) Penalties for strikes and lockouts during investigation The investigation begins before a strike or lockout has taken place, and the relation of the parties must remain unchanged during the proceedings of the board. The em- ployer is liable to a fine of from -f 100 to ilOOO per day fur each day of a lockout, and the workman to a fine of from $10 to §50 per day for striking. Furthermore, a per- son who incites or encourages the parties to declare a lock- out or continue a strike is liable to a fine of from $50 to $1000. These penalties are enforced under the criminal code. After the investigation has been made and the report made known, either party may refuse to accept the rec- ommendations, and declare hostilities. The chief purpose of the act is to discourage strikes and lockouts, relieve the public of the trouble and suffering that result from un- warranted acts by either party, and to inform the people on how just grounds they are deprived of a service or a commodity. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 347 (6) Mesults from the act That the act has been worth while is shown by the re- sults obtained under it during the five years it has been in operation. Out of the 124 cases of dispute, in only 14 have the parties refused to accept the recommendation of the board and declared hostilities. In 8 out of the 14 cases the parties finally resumed work on the basis recommended by the board. In 4 of the remaining cases settlement was brought about through negotiation and intervention of a citizens' committee and government agents. Two cases re- mained unsettled at the time of the last report.-' This act presupposes the right of the men to organize, and their right of recognition and representation. An in- vestigations act in this country would have to incorporate these rights, for they are far from recognized rights among a large class of employers. If we had such an act as this the public would be able to find out whether in a situation like the Westmoreland County strike and the West Vir- ginia troubles the operators had " nothing to arbitrate." It is a sad reflection on our public policy that we allow the barbarous methods of force to continue in industry. We have learned in civil matters that it is conducive to peace and justice to compel parties to settle their differ- ences in court. The same principle operates in industrial matters where it has been tried. There would seem to be no right of either party denied in this act except that of a sudden strike or lockout. With the development of voluntary conciliation and the appointing of stated times for changes in wage contracts, such tactics ought not to be used as were used in the days when there was little understanding between the parties and when they sought to take quick advantage of each other. If we can accept the evolution in feeling in the ^ Report of Canadian Registrar of Boards of Conciliation and Investiga- tion, 1012, p. 12. 348 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY coal industry of Great Britain as any criterion, we might expect the Government to be looked upon simply as a willing intermediary. It would stand ready to function in case of a crisis which had driven the parties so far asunder that the occasion required the overwhelming force of pub- lic sentiment to decide which party was in the right, after a fair and impartial investigation. Moreover, the mere existence of a remedy would lessen the tendency to drift so far apart as to necessitate public action. B. Conclusion In conclusion we should recall the economic and indus- trial conditions which brought about the rise and extension of the system of conciliation and arbitration in the bitu- minous field. The elaborate machinery of the interstate joint conference, state conferences, and the arrangements for settling disputes that arise under agreements are only made possible by the effective organization of the United Mine Workers and the operators' associations. It is evident that the methods utilized in the bitumi- nous field have reached a very high stage of development. When it was once recognized that the old order had changed and that labor had the right of representation in adjusting its affairs, the parties were ready for collective bargaining. But we have seen that a realization of this came only after much strife and bitterness of feeling. As an industry develops to a stage where it is possible by ill- adjusted production and exploitation to reduce the level of wages and profits to a bare subsistence for labor and small earnings for capital, the rise of a workers' organi- zation to better these conditions must be expected. When this occurs, the employers should organize to meet the workers, and the result should be an adjustment of pro- duction and of working conditions making both for higher industrial efficiency and greater regard for the interests of the workers. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 349 When trade agreements are first inaugurated, the par- ties must not expect that everything will run smoothly at once. It requires a certain amount of experience and edu- cation to use this piece of social machinery, just as training is necessary to the efficient utilization of a new mechanical device. The important thing is to profit as much as pos- sible by the experience gained in industries in which an elaborate system of conciliation has slowly evolved. Au- thorities who have investigated the workings of peaceful adjustment in various industries are convinced that the highest types of conciliatory methods are those which fur- nish a series of opportunities for arriving at a settlement. Such a system requires officials from both sides who have a wide outlook upon the industry as a whole to give con- sideration to fundamental and deep-seated grievances. When the same honest effort is made to solve the labor problem that is commonly expended on the selling of products or the improvement of methods of production, we shall be on the highroad to a solution of our diffi- culties. Moreover, we have seen that collective bargaining soft- ens class antagonism and encourages friendly relations between employers and workers, while at the same time each party becomes aware of the difficulties with which the other has to contend. The employers have shown a willingness to democratize their industry, and the work- ers, as their power has increased, have demonstrated a sense of larger responsibility to the public. Those who are afraid that they will surrender some of their prerogatives, and because of their fear fail to see the opportunity for utilizing the cooperative force of rising intelligence, are in reality a hindrance to themselves and to society. Rising intelligence and increasing efficiency properly directed should bring greater prosperity to wage- worker and to capitalist alike. It goes without saying that at least approximate justice must be granted in order to 350 ARBITRATION IN THE CO.\L INDUSTRY bring coiiperation and good feeling. Whenever capital is ready to demonstrate by authenticated figures its desire to do justice, it lays the basis for a cooperative spirit on the part of labor, and one cause of suspicion is eradicated. If the worker could possess a confidence (born of past expe- rience) that the employer was giving him all the wages possible without depriving himself of a legitimate profit, he might be expected patiently to await the evolution of his standard of living and strive to build up the industry to the best of his ability, just as the employer works and waits for the growth of his industry. A system of concili- ation founded on authentic figures should bring such a result. As yet conciliation has not been put on a frank business basis, but is still in the barter stage. It should be supplemented by an efficient system of accounting that will enable labor and its representatives to know the exact status of the industry. In the anthracite field we have gained some conception of the disrupting factors which have deferred the devel- opment of a satisfactory system of industrial adjustment. There conciliation is just making a beginning. The large corporate ownership and the heterogeneous population may prove such powerful and disintegrating factors that organized labor will be unable to deal adequately with the situation. It certainly could not if the movement were solely dependent upon the small band of faithful unionists in the anthracite field. But the support and encourage- ment which they receive from the unionists in the bitu- minous fields enable them to array a sufficient fighting force at the termination of contracts to compel the opera- tors to give some consideration to their demands. Before they can have effective conciliation and settle wages on an equitable basis the anthracite miners should be in a position to know the costs of producing coal and the ex- tent of the operators' earnings. An authoritative cost and accounting system is also of OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 351 vital concern to the public in permitting an understand- ing of the justice of the rise in prices of coal. The ad- ditional profits of $9,450,000 which the operators obtained after the last wage agreement has led the public to think that strikes may develop into a profitable business. The ability to control prices brings a frank statement from some quarters that the only solution of the problem is government ownership. The Boston " Journal " says : " In the climax of hopelessness and measure of futility against the outrage, it writes down the plainest demand for government ownership of coal mines which has been made. If the great coal interest is so intrenched that it can violate with impunity a principle supposed to be writ- ten into the federal statutes, the need for government ownership becomes exigent and imperative." If a combined demand is made by the miners and the public for government ownership, we shall be plunged into the midst of a struggle for which the workers in the an- thracite region have received no adequate preparation either in peaceful adjustment or in attempts to ameliorate their condition through legal enactment. Over against this situation the experience of the British miners stands in striking contrast, and thoroughly illustrates the folly of a system of government and social adjustment which per- mits grievances to accumulate without providing effective devices by which they can be adjusted. If the anthracite workers were a homogeneous population which had come through a process of evolution in conciliatory adjustment and had had practice in redressing their grievances through legal enactment, the situation could be viewed in a differ- ent light. We should remember that we have a situation before us likely to prove more conducive to class struggle than if our constitutional system were less rigid and permitted us to deal with our problems on a national basis when tliey demand such treatment. Moreover, if the miners felt that 852 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY they could go to Congress with the same assurance which the British niiuer has in approaching Parliament to obtain an eight-hour day or a minimum wage (which could not be obtained by conciliation), and there present by legiti- mate argument and persuasion the necessity for ameliora- tive measures, the whole industrial situation would have a different outlook. In contrast to British affairs it is with great difficulty that labor in the United States can obtain betterment of conditions through congressional action, and when a law is once enacted, it may easily be quashed as it runs the gauntlet of the courts. Nor can the American miner turn again to Congress and obtain an enactment that will su- persede the court decision with the same facility that an act of pai'liament overrides British court decisions. This contrast is well illustrated by the readiness with which the attempt to tie up union funds and cut off parliamen- tary representation of labor was thwarted by bringing about government payment of parliamentary members. Again, we have seen that the British miner has taken a first step toward an investigation of wages and profits in the coal trade. This will probably lead to a demand for an efficient governmental system of accounting which will ultimately redound to the benefit of the miners, the operators, and the public. We are beginning to recognize that such matters as hours of labor, sanitary and safe working conditions, child labor, workmen's compensation, old-age pensions, and oc- cupational diseases are proper matters for state regulation. When we consider the magnitude of the trade-union prob- lem of limiting the hours of labor in the many States of our Union, we are struck with the manifest unfairness of leaving the task to them. " If the objects of trade unions could find quiet and orderly expression in legislation and enactment, and if their measures could be submitted to the examination and judgment of the whole [people] witji- OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 353 out a sense of division or warfare, we should have ideal development of the democratic state." ^ The preoccupation of legislatures and courts with the enactment and enforcement of laws that primarily pertain to property rights as opposed to other human rights has been alienating the mass of workers from that sense of patriotic citizenship which is so essential to a republic. The speed with which governmental functions are applied to thwart labor's attempts to obtain rights through col- lective action is bitterly contrasted with the slowness with which the Government acts in upholding laws that are intended to improve the conditions of labor. The workingman sees the club of the officer, the bayonet of the militia directed against him in defense of property, and he believes that the hand of the law, strong in the protection of property, often drops listless whenever measures are proposed to lighten labor's heavy burden. Occasional and imperfect ex- pressions of the underlying feeling reach the surface. Those who dismiss them as sporadic assaults upon the judiciary have no appreciation of the depth and breadth of the social situation. There is profound restlessness among large groups of labor who feel that there are no organic ways open through which they can act collectively with respect to the things that most concern them . . . that they are thwarted when they get together for common strength and when, not as mutual benefit societies, but as aggregations of men they set out to mind their business. . . . We hold that the criminal court is not a sufficient instrument through which the democracy can address itself to the economic struggle. The federal grand juries may well concern themselves with those who have carried dynamite across state boundaries. We want light along a more crucial boundary line — the bor- derland between industry and democracy. We want light on that larger lawlessness which is beyond the view of the criminal court. This is a matter of public defense in which we, as a peo- ])le, should if necessary invest as much money as we put into a battleship. We appeal to tlie Federal Government to create a 1 Jane Addams, America/i Journal of Sociology, vol. 4, p. ■109. 354 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY commission, with as great scientific competence, staff resources, and power to compel testimony as the Interstate Commerce Commission.^ This address, signed by people from many walks in life, is a protest against a public policy which allows conditions to exist in industry that encourage violence. Whether it comes as a result of the employers' attempts to " smash " the union, as in the McNamara case, or the sporadic up- rising of a disorganized mass in protest against grinding economic necessity, as in the Lawrence strike, matters lit- tle in its jeopardizing effect upon society. The essential thinof is to have enouoch interest in the facts of the case to encourage the development of devices which shall keep the public sufficiently informed to enable it to take action and bring about adjustments for the prevention of similar occurrences. Wherever capital is closely organized and la- bor entirely unorganized there exists a fruitful field for almost any kind of industrial and social catastrophe. Add to this situation the ability of capital to play off one race against another in competition for work and there is hardly a limit to the depths to which labor may sink. Throw in the elements of absentee ownership, which knows little, and in many cases cares less, how it gets its dividends, and a political corruption which feeds on ignorance and distress, and we lay a basis for continued depression which must end only in a volcanic outburst against degraded human rights. That there is no necessity for such conditions is proved by the many examples in industries where conciliation has been given a fair trial. Where the parties fail to bring about a voluntary conciliation, the Government should be able to take them through the preliminary stages and thus show them the benefits of peaceful adjustment. The near- est approach to such a provision is the Canadian Indus- 1 Address presented to President Taft, December 30, 1911, requesting the appointment of an industrial commission. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 355 trial Disputes Investigation Act. Moreover, the public learns which side deserves its sympathy and cultivates an intelligent interest in the problems that affect the dispu- tants and the general body politic. Thus we may seek to anticipate our problems by effective publicity and the in- auguration of measures that will supplement the efforts of the parties to reach a settlement and give them a chance to express and adjust their grievances when they come to a deadlock. It is hoped that this sketch of conciliation and arbitration in the coal industry of America and Great Britain will demonstrate the benefits of voluntary concil- iation and the necessity for an effective, constructive, pub- lic policy. 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(1) ■^ g 3 a 1.1 2 ° — "H."* a „; c; 0) o "o| gH« J'^ 4) S64 APPENDIX TABLE V Comparison op Wages, Working Days, Hours per Year, Rates per Hour, of Pick-Miners Year. 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Illinois .... Ohio ..... Pennsylvania West Virginia Total Yearly Working Hours per Wages.' Days.i Year.2 $565.30 213 1704 444.50 175 1400 442.56 204 1632 484.96 209 2090 492.32 198 1584 468.05 185 1480 491.29 225 1800 508.01 213 2130 480.86 186 1512 504.14 182 1456 519.30 205 1640 599.37 231 2310 549.39 209 1672 555.75 195 1560 601.91 268 2144 643.05 234 2340 546.97 188 1504 402.48 156 1248 447.00 238 1904 503.84 211 2110 510.66 180 1440 483.60 186 1488 524.33 261 2088 481.17 192 1920 497.71 168 1344 486.50 175 1400 588.36 264 2112 573.94 229 2290 498.09 167 1336 556.80 192 1536 572.98 248 1984 570.48 194 1940 Cents per Hour. .33 .32 .27 .23 .31 .32 .27 .24 .32 .35 .32 .26 .33 .36 .28 .27 .36 .31 .23 .24 .35 .35 .25 .25 .37 .35 .28 .25 .37 .36 .29 .29 ' Obtained from State Reports. 2 Obtained by multiplying the working days by eight or ten hours according to length of worldng day in each state. APPENDIX 365 TABLE VI Average Production per Mine and per Employee from 1850-1902 1 Average Product. Per mine — tons Per employee — tons . . . . 1902 50,383 565 1S89 53,578 476 1880 21,701 422 IS'O 20,986 347 1S60 23,045 393 1850 12,539 426 » U.S. Census Report, 1902, Mines and Quarries, p. 669. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. SOURCE MATERIAL Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907. Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act, 1912, of Great Britain. Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908 (eight hours), of Great Britain. Constitution of the Illinois Coal Operators Association, 1907. Constitution of the United Mine Workers of America, 1912. Illinois Coal Operators' Association Bulletins. Justi, H. (writings), in the Illinois Coal Operators' Publications. McBride, J., in " The Labor Movement," edited by G. E. McNeill, 1886. Miners' National Record, 1875-76. Negotiations of the Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Min- ers, 1912. Proceedings of the Interstate Joint Conferences of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Proceedings of the Federated Coal Owners and Miners of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Interstate Joint Conferences of the South- west Field. Reports of the State Bureaus of Labor Statistics. Report of the Special Commission on the Northern Illinois Coal Strike, 1889. Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Report of the United States Immigration Commission, 1911. Reports of the Proceedings of the United Mine Workers' Annual Conventions. Reports of State Inspectors of Mines. Report of the United States Industrial Commission, 1902. Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the Inves- tigation of the Eastern Bituminous Coal Situation, 1907. 59Lh Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. no. 501. Report on the Miners' Strike in Westmoreland County, Penn- sylvania, 1910-11. 02d Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. no. 847. 370 BIBLIOGRAPHY Report of the Proceedings of the Special United Mine Workers' Conventions in 1902 and 1906. Reports of the Illinois State Joint Conferences. Report of the Illinois Employers' Liability Commission, 1910. Report of the Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887- 88, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., House Rept. no. 4147. Report on the Alleged. Coal Combination, 1893, o2d Cong., 2d Sess., House Rept. no. 2278. Reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration. Report of the Anthracite Strike Commission, 1902. Report of the Conference between the President, the Anthra- cite Operators, and Representatives of the United Mine Work- ers, 1902. Reports of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. Report of the Board of Trade of Great Britain, 1910, on Rules of Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Boards and Joint Committees. Reports of the Canadian Registrar of Boards of Conciliation and Investigation. Report of the British Royal Commission on Labour, 1894. Report of Subcommittee on Education and Labor of the United States Senate on " Conditions in the Paint Creek District, West Virginia," 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to Senate Resolution 37. Report of Commissioner of Labor on " Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal," 62d Cong., 3d Sess., House Doc. no. 1442. Special Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on Coal Mine Labor in Europe, 1905. State Laws. United Mine Workers' Journal. United States Bulletins of the Bureau of Labor. United States Census Reports. United States Statutes at Large. 2. SECONDARY MATERIAL Ashley, W. J. The Adjustment of Wages, 1903. BiGELOW, M. M. The Law of Torts, 1907. Chaplln-, H. W. The Coal Mines and the Public, 1902. Crompton, H. Industrial Conciliation, 1876. BIBLIOGRAPHY 371 Drinker, H. S. The Interstate Commerce Act, 2 vols., 1907. Hall, P. F. Immigration, 1906. Hexdersox, F. The Labor Unrest, 1911. Jeaks, J. S. Co7iciliation and Arbitration, 1894. Kxoop, D. Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, 1905. Lloyd, H. D. A Strike of Millionaires, 1890. Lloyd, H. D. The Lords of Ind^istry, 1910. Mitchell, J. Organized Labor, 1903. Moore, H. L. Laws of Wages, 1911. Nearixg, S. Wages in the United States, 1911. Price, L. L., F. R. Industrial Peace, 1887. Richardson, T., and Walbank, A. Profits and Wages in the British Coal Trade, 1911. Roberts, P. The Anthracite Coal Industry, 1901. Roberts, P. Anthracite Coal Commtmities, 1904. Roy, a. History of the Coal Miners, 1903. Saliers, E. a. The Coal Miner, 1912. Smith, J. A. The Sjnrit of American Government, 1907. Stimsox, F. J. Labor and its Relatioii to Law, 1895. Warxe, F. J. The Slav Invasion, 1904. Warne, F. J. The Immigrant Invasion, 1913. Warxe, F. J. The Coal Miners, 1905. Webb, S. and B. The History of Trade Unionism, 1911. Webb, S. and B. Industrial Democracy, 1902. Wyman B., Control of the 3Iarket, 1911. INDEX INDEX Absentee ownership, 74. American Miners' Association, 5. Anthracite Board of Trade, 204!. Arbitration, 203, 209; inauguration of, 10; in Ohio, IG; in western Pennsylvania, 17; under state laws, 21; in England, 277. Armed guards, 75. Athens local union, case of, 189. Baird, case, 329. Bates's Union, 202. Canadian Industrial Disputes Act, 344. Capital, earnings of, 42. Causes of conciliation and arbitra- tion, 1 f. Closed shop, 193. Coal lands, 211; ownership of, 80; concentration of ownership of, 220. Coal operators' associations, rise of, 128; American Federation of, 129; Illinois Coal Operators' Association, 134. Collective bargaining, results of, 170/. Colorado struggle, 60. Commodities case, 323. Common-law remedies, 319. Company stores, 27. Conciliation Act (England, 1896), 283, Conciliation and Arbitration in the anthracite field, 2Q1 /._ Conciliation and Arbitration Board, RGE-URL |\PR 3\9Tf 2 1978 V^i- ' RECD LD-UK R MAY e ' - 'JAN 1 7 'i935 Form I/J-Series 444 THE LIBRARY UNiyEl:-; OF CATJFQRNIA LOS ANGELAS ■r 3 1158 00165 3111 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 153 161 3