GIFT OF 
 ALB1K r*UTZKER 
 
 

 
^ ;' 
 
 /h *^c^\jc. 
 
 /T 
 
THE MEDITATIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE EMPEROR 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
THE .MEDITATIONS . 
 
 THE EMPEROR 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS 
 
 TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG 
 
 NEW YORK 
 LOVELL, CORYELL & COMPANY 
 
 43, 45 AND 47 EAST lOrn STREET 
 
: L 
 
 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . , . l 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS ... 37 
 
 THE MEDITATIONS ..... 89 
 
 INDEX OF TERMS 299 
 
 GENERAL INDEX 305 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 I HAVE carefully revised the Life and Philos- 
 ophy of ANTONINUS, in which I have made a few 
 corrections, and added a few notes. 
 
 I have also made a few alterations in the trans- 
 lation where I thought that I could approach 
 nearer to the author's meaning ; and I have added 
 a few notes and references. 
 
 There still remain difficulties which I cannot 
 remove, because the text is sometimes too cor- 
 rupt to be understood, and no attempt to restore 
 the true readings could be successful. 
 
 GEORGE LONG. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 M. ANTONINUS was born at Rome, A. D. 121, on 
 the 26th of April. His father, Annius Verus, died 
 while he was praetor. His mother was Domitia 
 Calvilla, also named Lucilla. The Emperor T. 
 Antoninus Pius married Annia Galeria Faustina, 
 the sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently 
 the uncle of M. Antoninus. When Hadrian 
 adopted Antoninus Pius and declared him his suc- 
 cessor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both 
 L. Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, 
 &nd M. Antoninus, whose original name was M- 
 Annius Verus. Antoninus then took the name of 
 M. Aelius Aurelius Verus, to which was added the 
 title of Caesar in A. D. 139: the name Aelius 
 belonged to Hadrian's family, and Aurelius was 
 the name of Antoninus Pius. When M. Antoninus 
 became Augustus, he dropped the name of Verus 
 
2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 and took the name of Antoninus. Accordingly 
 he is generally named M. Aurelius Antoninus or 
 simply M. Antoninus. 
 
 The youth was most carefully brought up. He 
 thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- 
 fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, 
 good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly 
 everything good. He had the happy fortune to 
 witness the example of his uncle and adoptive 
 father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his 
 work (i. 16 ; vi. 30) the virtues of this excellent 
 man and prudent ruler. Like many young Romans 
 he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric. 
 Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius Fronto were his 
 teachers in eloquence. There are extant letters 
 between Fronto and Marcus, 1 which show the great 
 affection of the pupil for the master, and the mas- 
 ter's great hopes of his industrious pupil. M. An- 
 toninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among those to 
 whom he was indebted for his education. 
 
 When he was eleven years old, he assumed the 
 dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, 
 became a hard student, and lived a most laborious, 
 abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. 
 Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhetoric for phil- 
 osophy, and he attached himself to the sect of the 
 Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, 
 
 1 M. Cornelii Frontonis Reliquiae, Berlin, 181G. There are 
 a few letters between Froiito and Antoninus Pius. 
 
 I 
 
MAE C US ATJBELIUS ANTONINUS. 3 
 
 which was a useful preparation for the high place 
 which he was designed to fill. His teacher was 
 L. Volusianus Maecianus, a distinguished jurist. 
 We must suppose that he learned the Roman 
 discipline of arms, which was a necessary part of 
 the education of a man who afterwards led his 
 troops to battle against a warlike race. 
 
 Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
 .names of his teachers, and the obligations which 
 he owed to each of them. The way in which he 
 speaks of what he learned from them might seem 
 to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look care- 
 lessly at the way in which he has expressed him- 
 self ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will 
 be mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate 
 the merits of his several teachers, what they 
 taught, and what a pupil might learn from them. 
 Besides, this book, like the eleven other books, 
 was for his own use ; and if we may trust the 
 note at the end of the first book, it was written 
 during one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against 
 the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of 
 the virtues of his illustrious teachers might re- 
 mind him of their lessons and the practical uses 
 which he might derive from them. 
 
 Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of 
 Chaeroneia, a grandson of Plutarch. What he 
 learned from this excellent man is told by himself 
 (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius Rus- 
 
4 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 ticus (i. 7), a philosopher, and also a man of 
 practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus 
 was the adviser of Antoninus after he became 
 emperor. Young men who are destined for high 
 places are not often fortunate in those who are 
 about them, their companions and teachers; and 
 I do not know any example of a young prince 
 having had an education which can be compared 
 with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of 
 teachers distinguished by their acquirements and 
 their character will hardly be collected again ; and 
 as to the pupil, we have not had one like him 
 since. 
 
 Hadrian died in July A. D. 138, and was suc- 
 ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- 
 ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, 
 probably about A. D. 146, for he had a daughter 
 born in 147. He received from his adoptive 
 father the title of Caesar, and was associated with 
 him in the administration of the state. The father 
 and the adopted son lived together in perfect 
 friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a duti- 
 ful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed 
 him. 
 
 Antoninus Pius died in March, A. D. 161. The 
 Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take the 
 sole administration of the empire, but he associated 
 with himself the other adopted son of Pius, 
 L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. O 
 
 L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time had two 
 emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, 
 and unworthy of his station. Antoninus however 
 bore with him, and it is said that Verus had sense 
 enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to 
 his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose 
 partner lived together in peace, and their alliance 
 was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus 
 for wife his daughter Lucilla. 
 
 The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a 
 Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
 mand ; but he did nothing, and the success that 
 was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on 
 the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. 
 This Parthian war ended in A. D. 165. Aurelius 
 and Verus had a triumph (A. D. 166) for the vic- 
 tories in the East. A pestilence followed, which 
 carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy, and 
 spread to the west of Europe. 
 
 The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
 rude people beyond the Alps from the borders of 
 Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. These 
 barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the 
 Germanic nations had attempted near three hun- 
 dred years before ; and the rest of the life of An- 
 toninus, with some intervals, was employed in 
 driving back the invaders. In 169 Verus sud- 
 denly died, and Antoninus administered the state 
 alone. 
 
6 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 During the German wars Antoninus resided for 
 three years on the Danube at Camuntum. The 
 Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and 
 almost destroyed in their retreat across the 
 Danube ; and in A. D. 174 the emperor gained a 
 great victory over the Quadi. 
 
 In A. D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skil- 
 ful Roman commander who was at the head of the 
 troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself 
 Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some 
 of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an end. 
 Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment 
 of the family and the partisans of Cassius ; and 
 his letter to the Senate, in which he recommends 
 mercy, is extant. (Vulcatius, Avidius Cassius, 
 c. 12.) 
 
 Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of 
 Cassius' revolt. Though he appears to have re- 
 turned to Rome in A. D. 174, he went back to 
 prosecute the war against the Germans, and it is 
 probable that he marched direct to the East from 
 the German war. His wife Faustina, who accom- 
 panied him into Asia, died suddenly at the foot of 
 the Taurus, to the great grief of her husband. 
 Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoni- 
 nus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of 
 scandalous infidelity to her husband and of abom- 
 inable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Anto- 
 ninus either knew it not or pretended not to know 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 1 
 
 it. Nothing is so common as such malicious 
 reports in all ages, and the history of imperial 
 Rome is full of them. Antoninus loved his wife, 
 and he says that she was " obedient, affectionate, 
 and simple." The same scandal had been spread 
 about Faustina's mother, the wife of Antoninus 
 Pius, and yet he too was perfectly satisfied with 
 his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death in 
 a letter to Fronto that he would rather have lived 
 in exile with his wife than in his palace at Rome 
 without her. There are not many men who would 
 give their wives a better character than these two 
 emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time of Dio- 
 cletian. He may have intended to tell the truth, 
 but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, 
 the most malignant of historians, always reports 
 and perhaps he believed any scandal against any- 
 body. 
 
 Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and 
 Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens 
 he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It 
 was the practice of the emperor to conform to the 
 established rites of the age, and to perform 
 religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We 
 cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- 
 tious man, though we might perhaps do so if his 
 book did not show that he was not. But this is 
 only one among many instances that a ruler's 
 public acts do not always prove his real opinions. 
 
8 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even 
 the superstitions of his people ; and though he 
 may wish that they were wiser, he will know that 
 he cannot make them so by offending their 
 prejudices. 
 
 Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome 
 in triumph, perhaps for some German victories, on 
 the 23d of December, A. D. 176. In the following 
 year Commodus was associated with his father in 
 the empire, and took the name of Augustus. This 
 year A. D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical 
 history. Attains and others were put to death at 
 Lyon for their adherence to the Christian religion. 
 The evidence of this persecution is a letter pre- 
 served by Eusebius (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in 
 Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I. with notes). The 
 letter is from the Christians of Vienna and Lug- 
 dunum in Gallia (Vienne and Lyon) to their 
 Christian brethren in Asia and Phrygia ; and it is 
 preserved perhaps nearly entire. It contains a 
 very particular description of the tortures inflicted 
 on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that 
 while the persecution was going on, Attains, a 
 Christian and a Roman citizen, was loudly de- 
 manded by the populace and brought into the 
 amphitheatre ; but the governor ordered him to be 
 reserved, with the rest who were in prison, until 
 he had received instructions from the emperor. 
 Many had been tortured before the governor 
 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 thought of applying to Antoninus. The imperial 
 rescript, says the letter, was that the Christians 
 should be punished, but if they would deny their 
 faith, they must be released. On this the work 
 began again. The Christians who were Roman 
 citizens were beheaded ; the rest were exposed to 
 the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern 
 writers on ecclesiastical history, when they use 
 this letter, say nothing of the wonderful stories of 
 the martyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter 
 says, was burnt with plates of hot iron till his body 
 was one sore and had lost all human form ; but on 
 being put to the rack he recovered his former 
 appearance under the torture, which was thus a 
 cure instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
 torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
 roasted. He died at last. 
 
 The letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, 
 whoever he was that wrote in the name of the 
 Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for the or- 
 dinary and the extraordinary circumstances of the 
 story, and we cannot accept his evidence for one 
 part and reject the other. We often receive small 
 evidence as a proof of a thing which we believe to 
 be within the limits of probability or possibility, 
 and we reject exactly the same evidence, when the 
 thing to which it refers, appears very improbable 
 or impossible. But this is a false method of in- 
 quiry, though it is _ folio wed by some modern 
 
10 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 writers, who select what they like from a story 
 and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if they do 
 not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. A man 
 can only act consistently by accepting all this 
 letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him 
 for either. But he who rejects it may still admit 
 that such a letter may be founded on real facts ; 
 and he would make this admission as the most 
 probable way of accounting for the existence of the 
 letter : but if, as he would suppose, the writer has 
 stated some things falsely, he cannot tell what 
 part of his story is worthy of credit. 
 
 The war on the northern frontier appears to 
 have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- 
 ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor 
 again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The 
 Germanic people were defeated in a great battle 
 A. D. 179. During this campaign the emperor 
 was seized with some contagious malady, of which 
 he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on 
 the Save, in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona 
 (Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 
 17th of March, A. D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of 
 his age. His son Com modus was with him. The 
 body or the ashes probably of the emperor were 
 carried to Rome, and he received the honor of 
 deification. Those who could afford it had his 
 statue or bust ; and when Capitolinus wrote, many 
 people still had statues of Antoninus among the 
 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 11 
 
 Dei Penates or household deities. He was in a 
 manner made a saint. Commodus erected to the 
 memory of his father the Antonine column which 
 is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi 
 rilievi which are placed in a spiral line round the 
 shaft commemorate the victories of Antoninus 
 over the Marcomanni and the Quadi, and the 
 miraculous shower of rain which refreshed the 
 Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. 
 The statue of Antoninus was placed on the capital 
 of the column, but it was removed at some time 
 unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put 
 in the place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 
 
 The historical evidence for the times of Anto- 
 ninus is very defective, and some of that which 
 remains is not credible. The most curious is the 
 story about the miracle which happened in A. D. 
 174, during the war with the Quadi. The Roman 
 army was in danger of perishing by thirst ; but a 
 sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it 
 discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and the 
 Romans gained a great victory. All the author- 
 ities which speak of the battle speak also of the 
 miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their 
 gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the 
 Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- 
 firm the Christian statement it is added that the 
 emperor gave the title of Thundering to this 
 legion ; but Dacier and others who maintain the 
 
12 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 Christian report of the miracle, admit that this 
 title of Thundering or Lightning was not given 
 to this legion because there was a figure of light- 
 ning on their shields, and that this title of the 
 legion existed in the time of Augustus. 
 
 Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
 called Thundering (/cepawo^oXos, or Kepawo^opo?) 
 before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this 
 from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note of 
 Reimarus), who enumerates all the legions of 
 Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- 
 ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of 
 Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius 
 (v. 5), when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- 
 narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this 
 name being given to the legion Melitene by the 
 emperor in consequence of the success which he 
 obtained through their prayers ; from which we 
 may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. 
 Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- 
 rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the 
 Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in 
 the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes 
 that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum 
 there is mentioned under the commander of 
 Armenia the Praefectura of the twelfth legion 
 named " Thundering Melitene ; " and this position 
 in Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its 
 position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesii 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. IB 
 
 concludes that Melitene was not the name of the 
 legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. 
 Melitene was also the name of the district in 
 which this town was situated. The legions did 
 not, he says, take their name from the place where 
 they were on duty, but from the country in which 
 they were raised, and therefore what Eusebius 
 says about the Melitene does not seem probable to 
 him. Yet Valesius, on the authority of Apolina- 
 rius and Tertullian, believed that the miracle was 
 worked through the prayers of the Christian 
 soldiers in the emperor's army. Rufinus does not 
 give the name of Melitene to this legion, says 
 Valesius, and probably he purposely omitted it, 
 because he knew that Melitene was the name of a 
 town in Armenia Minor, where the legion was 
 stationed in his time. 
 
 The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
 victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for 
 such was the practice ; but we do not know what 
 he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier 
 assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely 
 destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Christi- 
 anity, that so honorable a testimony to the Chris- 
 tians and their religion might not be perpetuated. 
 The critic has however not seen that he contra- 
 dicts himself when he tells us the purport of the 
 letter, for he says that it was destroyed, and even 
 Eusebius could not find it. But there does exist 
 
14 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 a letter in Greek addressed by Antoninus to the 
 Roman people and the sacred Senate after this 
 memorable victory. It is sometimes printed after 
 Justin's first Apology, but it is totally uncon- 
 nected with the apologies. This letter is one of 
 the most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, 
 and it cannot be possibly founded even on the 
 genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it 
 were genuine, it would free the emperor from the 
 charge of persecuting men because they were 
 Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a 
 man accuse another only of being a Christian, and 
 the accused confess, and there is nothing else 
 against him, he must be set free ; with this 
 monstrous addition, made by a man inconceivably 
 ignorant, that the informer must be burnt alive. 1 
 
 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Marcus 
 Antoninus there appeared the first Apology of 
 Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of 
 
 1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman 
 Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, he says, 
 writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in which he 
 declares that his army was saved by the prayers of the 
 Christians ; and that he ' ' threatened to punish with death 
 those who ventured to accuse us." It is possible that the 
 forged letter which is now extant may be one of those which 
 Tertullian had seen, for he uses the plural number, "letters." 
 A great deal has been written about this miracle of the 
 Thundering Legion, and more than is worth reading. There 
 is a dissertation on this supposed miracle in Moyle's Works, 
 London, 1726. 
 
MAR C US A UEELIUS ANTONINUS. 15 
 
 Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce 
 attack on the established religions ; the address 
 of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the 
 Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of 
 Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that of 
 Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is 
 addressed to T. Antoninus Pius and his two 
 adopted sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we 
 do not know whether they read it. 1 The second 
 Apology of Justinus is entitled "to the Roman 
 Senate ; " but this superscription is from some 
 copyist. In the first chapter Justinus addresses 
 the Romans. In the second chapter he speaks of 
 an affair that had recently happened in the time 
 of M. Antoninus and L. Verus, as it seems ; and 
 he also directly addresses the emperor, saying of a 
 certain woman, " she addressed a petition to thee 
 the emperor, and thou didst grant the peti- 
 tion." In other passages the writer addresses the 
 two emperors, from which we must conclude that 
 the Apology was directed to them. Eusebius 
 (E. H. iv. 18) states that the second Apology was 
 addressed to the successor of Antoninus Pius, and 
 he names him Antoninus Verus, meaning M. An- 
 toninus. In one passage of this second Apol- 
 ogy (c. 8), Justinus, or the writer, whoever he 
 
 1 Orosius, vii. 14, says that "Justinus the philosopher pre- 
 sented to Antoninus Pius his work in defence of the Chris- 
 tian religion, and made him merciful to the Christians. 
 
16 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 may be, says that even men who followed the 
 Stoic doctrines, when they ordered their lives 
 according to ethical reason, were hated and mur- 
 dered, such as Heraclitus, Musonius in his own 
 times, and others; for all those who in any way 
 labored to live according to reason and avoided 
 wickedness were always hated ; and this was the 
 effect of the work of daemons. 
 
 Justinus himself is said to have been put to 
 death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice 
 to the gods. It cannot have been in the reign of 
 Hadrian, as one authority states ; nor in the time 
 of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology was 
 written in the time of M. Antoninus ; and there 
 is evidence that this event took place under 
 M. Antoninus and L. Verus, when Rusticus was 
 praefect of the city. 1 
 
 1 See the Martyrium Sanctorum Justini, &c. , in the works 
 of Justinus, ed. Otto, vol. II. 559. " Junius Rusticus Prae- 
 fectus Urbi erat sub imperatoribus M. Aurelio et L. Vero, id 
 quod liquet ex Themistii Orat. xxxiv. Dindorf. p. 451, et ex 
 quodam illorum rescripto, Dig. 49. i. 1, 2 " (Otto). The 
 rescript contains the words " Junium Rusticum amicum 
 nostrum Praefectum Urbi." The Martyrium of Justinus and 
 others is written in Greek. It begins, "In the time of the 
 wicked defenders of idolatry impious edicts were published 
 against the pious Christians both in cities and country places, 
 for the purpose of compelling them to make offerings to vain 
 idols. Accordingly the holy men (Justinus, Chariton, a 
 woman Charito, Paeon, Liberianus, and others) were brought 
 before Rusticus, the praefect of Rome." 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 17 
 
 The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at 
 Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. 
 The evidence for it is the letter of the church of 
 Smyrna to the churches of Philomelium and the 
 other Christian churches, and it is preserved by 
 Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But the critics do not 
 agree about the time of Poly carp's death, differ- 
 ing in the two extremes to the amount of twelve 
 years. The circumstances of Polycarp's martyr- 
 dom were accompanied by miracles, one of which 
 Eusebius (iv. 15) has omitted, but it appears in 
 the oldest Latin version of the letter, which 
 Usher published, and it is supposed that this 
 version was made not long after the time of 
 Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter 
 states that it was transcribed by Caius from the 
 copy of Irenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then 
 transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which 
 
 The Martyrium gives the examination of the accused by 
 Rusticus. All of them professed to be Christians. Justinus 
 was asked if he expected to ascend into heaven and to 
 receive a reward for his sufferings, if he was condemned to 
 death. He answered that he did not expect : he was certain 
 of it. Finally, the test of obedience was proposed to the 
 prisoners ; they were required to sacrifice to the gods. All 
 refused, and Rusticus pronounced the sentence, which was 
 that those who refused to sacrifice to the gods and obey the 
 emperor's order should be whipped and beheaded according 
 to the law. The martyrs were then led to the usual place of 
 execution and beheaded. Some of the faithful secretly 
 carried off the bodies and deposited them in a fit place. 
 
18 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above 
 mentioned, having searched it out by the revelation 
 of Polycarp, who directed me to it," &c. The story 
 of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with mirac- 
 ulous circumstances which some modern writers on 
 ecclesiastical history take the liberty of omitting. 1 
 In order to form a proper notion of the condi- 
 tion of the Christians under M. Antoninus we 
 must go back to Trajan's time. When the 
 younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
 Christians were numerous in those parts, and the 
 worshippers of the old religion were falling off. 
 The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, 
 and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- 
 fice. Those who were interested in the mainte- 
 nance of the old religion thus found that their 
 profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes 
 and of all ages were brought before the governor, 
 who did not know what to do with them. He 
 could come to no other conclusion than this, that 
 
 1 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miraculous Pow- 
 ers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted to 
 mention the dove, which flew out of Polycarp's body, and 
 Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have done the same. Wake 
 says, " I am so little a friend to such miracles that I thought 
 it better with Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to 
 mention it from Bp. Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript 
 however, says Middleton, he afterwards declares to be so 
 well attested that we need not any further assurance of the 
 truth of it. 
 
MAECUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 19 
 
 those who confessed to be Christians and perse- 
 vered in their religion ought to be punished; if 
 for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. 
 He found no crimes proved against the Christians, 
 and he could only characterize their religion as a 
 depraved and extravagant superstition, which 
 might be stopped if the people were allowed the 
 opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a 
 letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for 
 the emperor's directions, because he did not know 
 what to do. He remarks that he had never been 
 engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, 
 and that accordingly he did not know what to 
 inquire about or how far to inquire and punish. 
 This proves that it was not a new thing to ex- 
 amine into a man's profession of Christianity and 
 to punish him for it.J Trajan's rescript is extant. 
 He approved of the governor's judgment in the 
 matter, but he said that no search must be made 
 after the Christians ; if a man was charged with 
 the new religion and convicted, he must not be 
 punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian 
 
 1 Orosius (vii. 12) speaks of Trajan's persecution of the 
 Christians, and of Pliny's application to him having led the 
 emperor to mitigate his severity. The punishment by the 
 Mosaic law for those who attempted to seduce the Jews to 
 follow new gods was death. If a man was secretly enticed 
 to such new worship, he must kill the seducer, even if the 
 seducer were brother, son, daughter, wife or friend. (Deut. 
 xiii.) 
 
20 BIOGEAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 and confirmed his denial by showing his reverence 
 to the heathen gods. He added that no notice 
 must be taken of anonymous informations, for 
 such things were of bad example. Trajan was a 
 mild and sensible man; and both motives of 
 mercy and policy probably also induced him to 
 take as little notice of the Christians as he could, 
 to let them live in quiet if it were possible. 
 Trajan's rescript is the first legislative act of the 
 head of the Roman state with reference to Chris- 
 tianity, which is known to us. It does not appear 
 that the Christians were further disturbed under 
 his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the 
 order of Trajan himself is not universally admitted 
 to be an historical fact. 1 
 
 In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- 
 ble for the Roman government to overlook the 
 great increase of the Christians and the hostility 
 of the common sort to them. If the governors in 
 the provinces were willing to let them alone, they 
 could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen 
 community, who looked on the Christians as 
 atheists. The Jews too, who were- settled all 
 over the Roman Empire, were as hostile to the 
 Christians as the Gentiles were. 2 With the time 
 
 1 The Martyrium Ignatii, first published in Latin by Arch- 
 bishop Usher, is the chief evidence for the circumstances of 
 Ignatius' death. 
 
 2 We have the evidence of Justinus (ad Dioguetum, c. 5) 
 
MARCUS AURELIVS ANTONINUS. 21 
 
 of Hadrian begin the Christian Apologies, which 
 show plainly what the popular feeling towards the 
 Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to 
 Minucius Fundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which 
 stands at the end of Justin's first Apology, 1 in- 
 structs the governor that innocent people must not 
 be troubled, and false accusers must not be allowed 
 to extort money from them ; the charges against 
 the Christians must be made in due form, and no 
 attention must be paid to popular clamors ; when 
 Christians were regularly prosecuted and con- 
 victed of illegal acts, they must be punished 
 according to their deserts ; and false accusers also 
 must be punished. Antoninus Pius is said to 
 have published rescripts to the same effect. The 
 terms of Hadrian's rescript seem very favorable to 
 
 to this effect : ' ' The Christians are attacked by the Jews as 
 if they were men of a different race, and are persecuted by 
 the Greeks ; and those who hate them cannot give the reason 
 of their enmity." 
 
 1 And in Eusebius (E. H. iv. 8, 9). Orosius (vii. 13) says 
 that Hadrian sent this rescript to Minucius Fundanus, pro- 
 consul of Asia, after being instructed in books written on the 
 Christian religion by Quadratus a disciple of the Apostles, 
 and Aristides an Athenian, an honest and wise man, and 
 Serenus Granius. In the Greek text of Hadrian's rescript 
 there is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the predecessor of 
 Minucius Fundanus in the government of Asia. 
 
 This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to the 
 Apology by some editor. The Apology ends with the words : 
 
22 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 the Christians ; but if we understand it in this 
 ^ sense, that they were only to be punished like 
 other people for illegal acts, it would have had 
 no meaning, for that could have been done with- 
 out asking the emperor's advice. The real pur- 
 pose of the rescript is that Christians must be 
 punished if they persisted in their belief, and 
 would not prove their renunciation of it by ac- 
 knowledging the heathen religion. This was 
 Trajan's rule, and we have no reason for suppos- 
 ing that Hadrian granted more to the Christians 
 than Trajan did. There is also printed at the 
 end of Justin's first Apology a rescript of Anto- 
 ninus Pius to the Commune of Asia (TO KOLVOV r^s 
 'Ao-ias), and it is also in Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13). 
 The date of the rescript is the third consulship 
 of Antoninus Pius. 1 The rescript declares that 
 
 1 Eusebius (E. H. iv. 12), after giving the beginning of 
 Justinus' first Apology, which contains the address to T. Ai 
 toninus and his two adopted sons, adds : " The same empei 
 being addressed by other brethren in Asia honored the Coi 
 mune of Asia with the following rescript." This rescri] 
 which is in the next chapter of Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13), is 
 the sole name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus August 
 Armenius, though Eusebius had just before said that he wz 
 going to give us a rescript of Antoninus Pius. There 
 some material variations between the two copies of the 
 script besides the difference in the title, which differem 
 makes it impossible to say whether the forger intended 
 assign this rescript to Pius or to M. Antoninus. 
 
 The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum savs that 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 23 
 
 the Christians for they are meant, though the 
 name Christians does not occur in the rescript 
 were not to be disturbed unless they were attempt- 
 ing something against the Roman rule ; and no 
 man was to be punished simply for being a 
 Christian. But this rescript is spurious. Any 
 man moderately acquainted with Roman history 
 will see by the style and tenor that it is a clumsy 
 forgery. 
 
 In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition be- 
 tween the old and the new belief was still stronger, 
 and the adherents of the heathen religion urged 
 those in authority to a more regular resistance to 
 the invasions of the Christian faith. Melito in his 
 Apology to M. Antoninus represents the Christians 
 of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. 
 Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy 
 after the property of others, used these orders as 
 a means of robbing those who were doing no harm. 
 He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered 
 anything so unjust; and if the last order was 
 
 cus, being moved by the entreaties of Melito and other heads 
 of the church, wrote an Epistle to the Commune of Asia in 
 which he forbade the Christians to be troubled on account of 
 their religion. Valesius supposes this to be the letter or 
 rescript which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13) , and to be 
 the answer to the Apology of Melito, of which I shall soon 
 give the substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this 
 letter which is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer 
 he made to Melito. 
 
24 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 really not from the emperor, the Christians entreat 
 him not to give them up to their enemies. 1 We 
 conclude from this that there were at least im- 
 perial rescripts or constitutions of M. Antoninus 
 which were made the foundations of these perse- 
 
 1 Eusebius, iv. 26; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I. 
 and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not 
 easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as to 
 affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who denounced 
 the Christians; an interpretation which is entirely false. 
 Melito calls the Christian religion " our philosophy," which 
 began among barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among 
 the Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great 
 advantage of the empire, for from that time the power of 
 the Romans grew great and glorious. He says that the 
 emperor has and will have as the successor to Augustus' 
 power the good wishes of men, if he will protect that 
 philosophy which grew up with the empire and began with 
 Augustus, which philosophy the predecessors of Antoninus 
 honored in addition to the other religions. He further says 
 that the Christian religion had suffered no harm since the 
 time of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor 
 and respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domitian, 
 he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious men to 
 calumniate the Christian religion, and this was the origin of 
 the false charges against the Christians. But this was 
 corrected by the emperors who immediately preceded Antoni- 
 nus, who often by their rescripts reproved those who at- 
 tempted to trouble the Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' 
 grandfather, wrote to many, and among them to Fundanus 
 the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius, when Marcus was 
 associated with him in the empire, wrote to the cities that 
 they must not trouble the Christians ; among others, to the 
 people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians, and all the 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 25 
 
 cutions. The fact of being a Christian was now a 
 crime and punished, unless the accused denied 
 their religion. Then come the persecutions at 
 Smyrna, which some modern critics place in A. D. 
 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. 
 The governors of the provinces under M. Anto- 
 ninus might have found enough even in Trajan's 
 rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, 
 and the fanaticism of the people would drive 
 them to persecution, even if they were unwilling. 
 But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all 
 the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that 
 they plainly maintained that all the heathen 
 religions were false. The Christians thus declared 
 war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly 
 necessary to observe that this was a declaration of 
 
 Greeks. Melito concluded thus: "We are persuaded that 
 thou who hast about these things the same mind that they 
 had, nay rather one much more humane and philosophical, 
 wilt do all that we ask thee." This Apology was written 
 after A.D. 169, the year in which Verus died, for it speaks of 
 Marcus only and his son Commodus. According to Melito's 
 testimony, Christians had only been punished for their 
 religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and the persecu- 
 tions began again in the time of M. Antoninus, and were 
 founded on his orders, which were abused, as he seems to 
 mean. He distinctly affirms " that the race of the godly is 
 now persecuted and harassed by fresh imperial orders in 
 Asia, a thing which had never happened before." But we 
 know that all this is not true, and that Christians had 
 punished in Trajan's time. 
 
26 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 hostility against the Roman government, which 
 tolerated all the various forms of superstition that 
 existed in the empire, and could not consistently 
 tolerate another religion, which declared that all 
 the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies 
 of the empire only a worship of devils. 
 
 If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we 
 should know how the Roman emperors attempted 
 to check the new religion ; how they enforced 
 their principle of finally punishing Christians, 
 simply as Christians, which Justin in his Apology 
 affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he 
 tells the truth ; how far popular clamor and riots 
 went in this matter, and how far many fanatical 
 and ignorant Christians for there were many 
 such contributed to excite the fanaticism on 
 the other side and to imbitter the quarrel between 
 the Roman government and the new religion. 
 Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly 
 falsified, and what truth they contain is grossly 
 exaggerated ; but the fact is certain that in the 
 time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations 
 were in open hostility to the Christians, and that 
 under Antoninus' rule men were put' to death 
 because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the 
 preface to his fifth book, remarks that in the 
 seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in some 
 parts of the world, the persecution of the Chris- 
 tians became more violent, and that it proceeded 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 27 
 
 from the populace in the cities ; and he adds, in 
 his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer 
 from what took place in a single nation that 
 myriads of martyrs were made in the habitable 
 earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia ; 
 and he then proceeds to give the letter of the 
 churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is proba- 
 ble that he has assigned the true cause of the 
 persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and 
 that both governors and emperor had a great deal 
 of trouble with these disturbances. How far 
 Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceedings 
 we do not know, for the historical records of his 
 reign are very defective. He did not make the 
 rule against the Christians, for Trajan did that; 
 and if we admit that he would have been willing 
 to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm that 
 it was in his power, for it would be a great mis- 
 take to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited 
 authority which some modern soverigns have had. 
 His power was limited by certain constitutional 
 forms, by the Senate, arid by the precedents of his 
 predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man 
 was an active persecutor, for there is no evidence 
 that he was, 1 though it is certain that he had no 
 1 Except that of Orosius (vii. 15), who says that during 
 the Parthian war there were grievous persecutions of the 
 Christiana in Asia and Gallia under the orders of Marcus 
 (praecepto ejus), and " many were crowned with the martyr- 
 dom of sainta." 
 
28 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 good opinion of the Christians, as appears from 
 his own words. 1 But he knew nothing of them 
 except their hostility to the Roman religion, and 
 he probably thought that they were dangerous to 
 
 1 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanatics 
 as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. 
 The rational Christians admitted no fellowship with them, 
 "Some of these heretics," says Clemens, "show their im- 
 piety and cowardice by loving their lives, saying that the 
 knowledge of the really existing God is true testimony 
 (martyrdom) , but that a man is a self-murderer who bears 
 witness by his death. We also blame those who rush to 
 death; for there are some, not of us, but only bearing the 
 same name, who give themselves up. We say of them that 
 they die without being martyrs, even if they are publicly 
 punished; and they give themselves up to a death which 
 avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists give themselves 
 up foolishly to fire." Cave, in his primitive Christianity 
 (ii. c. 7), Bays of the Christians: "They did flock to the 
 place of torment faster than droves of beasts that are driven 
 to the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms of 
 suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in 
 order to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not 
 but vent his passionate desire of it : ' Oh that I might come 
 to those wild beasts that are prepared for me; I heartily 
 wish that I may presently meet with them ; I would invite 
 and encourage them speedily to devour me, and not be afraid 
 to set upon me as they have been to others ; nay, should they 
 refuse it, I would even force them to it ; ' " and more to the 
 same purpose from Eusebius. Cave, an honest and good 
 man, says all this in praise of the Christians; but I think 
 that he mistook the matter. We admire a man who holds to 
 his principles even to death ; but these fanatical Christians 
 are the Gyranosophists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 
 
MAECUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 29 
 
 the state, notwithstanding the professions false or 
 true of some of the Apologists. So much I have 
 said, because it would be unfair not to state all 
 that can be urged against a man whom his con- 
 temporaries and subsequent ages venerated as a 
 model of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted 
 the genuineness of some documents, he would be 
 altogether clear from the charge of even allowing 
 any persecutions ; but as I seek the truth and am 
 sure that they are false, I leave him to bear what- 
 ever blame is his due. 1 I add that it is quite cer- 
 tain that Antoninus did not derive any of his 
 ethical principles from a religion of which he knew 
 nothing. 2 
 
 There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec- 
 tions or his Meditations, as they are generally 
 named is a genuine work. In the first book he 
 speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; 
 and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas 
 (v. Mct/oKos) notices a work of Antoninus in twelve 
 books, which he names the " conduct of his own 
 
 1 Dr. F. C. Baur, in his work entitled " Das Christenthum 
 und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte," 
 &c., has examined this question with great good sense and 
 fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near as our 
 authorities enable us to reach it. 
 
 2 In the Digest, 48, 19, 3Q, there is the following excerpt 
 from Modestinus : " Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo leves homi- 
 num animi superstitione numinis terrerentur, divus Marcus 
 hujusmodi homines in insulam relegari rescripsit." 
 
30 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 life ; " and he cites the book under several words 
 in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but 
 not the title of the work. There are also passages 
 cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention 
 of the emperor's name. The true title of the 
 work is unknown. Xy lander, who published the 
 first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo, with 
 a Latin version), used a manuscript which con- 
 tained the twelve books, but it is not known 
 where the manuscript is now. The only other 
 complete manuscript which is known to exist is in 
 the Vatican library, but it has no title and no 
 inscriptions of the several books : the eleventh 
 only has the inscription Ma/a/<ov avroKparopo? marked 
 with an asterisk. The other Vatican manuscripts 
 and the three Florentine contain only excerpts 
 from the emperor's book. All the titles of the ex- 
 cerpts nearly agree with that which Xylander pre- 
 fixed to his edition, Map/cov 'AvTaWvov Avro/cparopos 
 
 TCOI/ eis eavrov /fySAia ifi. This title has been used 
 by all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether 
 Antoninus divided his work into books or some- 
 body else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of 
 the first and second books are genuine, he may 
 have made the division himself. 
 
 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
 thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose ; and 
 since they were intended for his own use, it is no 
 improbable conjecture that he left a complete 
 
MAE C US AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 31 
 
 copy behind him written with his own hand ; for 
 it is not likely that so diligent a man would use 
 the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and 
 expose his most secret thoughts to any other eye. 
 He may have also intended the book for his son 
 Commodus, who however had no taste for his 
 father's philosophy. Some careful hand preserved 
 the precious volume ; and a work by Antoninus 
 is mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 
 Many critics have labored on the text of An- 
 toninus. The most complete edition is that by 
 Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition 
 of Gataker was superintended by George Stan- 
 hope, 1697, 4to. There is also an edition of 1704. 
 Gataker made and suggested many good cor- 
 rections, and he also made a new Latin version, 
 which is not a very good specimen of Latin, but 
 it generally expresses the sense of the original, 
 and often better than some of the more recent 
 translations. He added in the margin opposite 
 to each paragraph references to the other paral- 
 lel passages ; and he wrote a commentary, one 
 of the most complete that has been written 
 on any ancient author. This commentary con- 
 tains the editor's exposition of the more diffi- 
 cult passages, and quotations from all the Greek 
 and Roman writers for the illustration of the text. 
 It is a wonderful monument of learning and labor, 
 and certainly no Englishman has yet done any- 
 
32 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 thing like it. At the end of his preface the 
 editor says that he wrote it at Rotherhithe near 
 London in a severe winter, when he was in the 
 seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651, a time 
 when Milton, Selden, and other great men of the 
 Commonwealth time were living; and the great 
 French scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with whom 
 Gataker corresponded and received help from him 
 for his edition of Antoninus. The Greek text 
 has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 
 1802, 8vo ; and by the learned Greek Adaman- 
 tinus Cora'is, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text of 
 Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 
 
 There are English, German, French, Italian, 
 and Spanish translations of M. Antoninus, and 
 there may be others. I have not seen all the 
 English translations. There is one by Jeremy 
 Collier, 1702, 8vo, a most coarse and vulgar copy 
 of the original. The latest French translation by 
 Alexis Pierron in the collection of Charpentier is 
 better that Dacier's, which has been honored with 
 an Italian version (Udine, 1772). There is an 
 Italian version (1675) which I have not seen. It 
 is by a cardinal. "A man illustrious in the 
 church, the Cardinal Francis Barberini the el- 
 der, nephew of Pope Urban VIII., occupied the 
 last years of his life in translating into his native 
 language the thoughts of the Roman emperor, in 
 order to diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing 
 
MARCUS AUEELIU8 ANTONINUS. 33 
 
 and vivifying seeds. He dedicated this trans- 
 lation to his soul, to make it, as he says in his 
 energetic style, redder than his purple at the sight 
 of the virtues of this Gentile " (Pierron, Preface). 
 I have made this translation at intervals after 
 having used the book for many years. It is made 
 from the Greek, but I have not always followed 
 one text ; and I have occasionally compared other 
 versions with my own. I made this translation 
 for my own use, because I found that it was 
 worth the labor ; but it may be useful to others 
 also, and therefore I determined to print it. As 
 the original is sometimes very difficult to under- 
 stand and still more difficult to translate, it is not 
 possible that I have always avoided error. But I 
 believe that I have not often missed the meaning, 
 and those who will take the trouble to compare 
 the translation with the original should not hastily 
 conclude that I am wrong, if they do not agree 
 with me. Some passages do give the meaning, 
 though at first sight they may not appear to do so ; 
 and when I differ from the translators, I think 
 that in some places they are wrong, and in other 
 places I am sure that they are. I have placed in 
 some passages a f, which indicates corruption in 
 the text or great uncertainty in the meaning. I 
 could have made the language more easy and flow- 
 ing, but I have preferred a ruder style as being bet- 
 ter suited to express the character of the original ; 
 
34 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 and sometimes the obscurity which may appear in 
 the version is a fair copy of the obscurity of the 
 Greek. If I should ever revise this version, I would 
 gladly make use of any corrections which may be 
 suggested. I have added an index of some of the 
 Greek terms with the corresponding English. If I 
 have not given the best words for the Greek, I have 
 done the best that I could ; and in the text I have 
 always given the same translation of the same word. 
 The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I 
 have observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on the 
 Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not a 
 Christian, and such a man was not likely to be 
 converted at a time when Christianity was grossly 
 corrupted. But he was a really religious man, and 
 he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the 
 Deity which no Christian could improve. From 
 the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about 
 nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed 
 the characters of some of the best and greatest men. 
 Finally it became extinct, and we hear no more of 
 it till the revival of letters in Italy. Angelo Poli- 
 ziano met with two very inaccurate and incomplete 
 manuscripts of Epictetus' Enchiridion, which he 
 translated into Latin and dedicated to his great 
 patron Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose collection he 
 had found the book. Poliziano's version was 
 printed in the first Bale edition of the Enchiridion, 
 A. D. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). Poliziano 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 35 
 
 recommends the Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work 
 well suited to his temper, and useful in the diffi- 
 culties by which he was surrounded. 
 
 Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever 
 since they were first printed. The little book of 
 Antoninus has been the companion of some great 
 men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus Anto- 
 ninus were the two books which were used when 
 he was a young man by Captain John Smith, and 
 he could not have found two writers better fitted 
 to form the character of a soldier and a man. 
 Smith is almost unknown and forgotten in England, 
 his native country, but not in America, where he 
 saved the young colony of Virginia. He was great 
 in his heroic mind and his deeds in arms, but 
 greater still in the nobleness of his character. For 
 a man's greatness lies not in wealth and station, as 
 the vulgar believe, nor yet in his intellectual capac- 
 ity, which is often associated with the meanest moral 
 character, the most abject servility to those in high 
 places, and arrogance to the poor and lowly ; but a 
 man's true greatness lies in the consciousness of an 
 honest purpose in life, founded on a just estimate 
 of himself and everything else, on frequent self- 
 examination, and a steady obedience to the rule 
 which he knows to be right, without troubling him- 
 self, as the emperor says he should not, about what 
 others may think or say, or whether they do or do 
 not do that which he thinks and says and does. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS ATJRELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 IT has been said that the Stoic philosophy first 
 showed its real value when it passed from Greece 
 to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his successors 
 were well suited to the gravity and practical good 
 sense of the Romans ; and even in the Republican 
 period we have an example of a man, M. Cato 
 Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died 
 consistently with the opinions which he professed. 
 He was a man, says Cicero, who embraced the Stoic 
 philosophy from conviction ; not for the purpose of 
 vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make 
 his life conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the 
 wretched times from the death of Augustus to the 
 murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the 
 Stoic philosophy which could console and support 
 the followers of the old religion under imperial 
 tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There 
 
38 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 were even then noble minds that could dare and 
 endure, sustained by a good conscience and an 
 elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence. 
 Such were Paetus Thrasea, Helvidius Priscus, Cor- 
 nutus, C. Musonius Rufus, 1 and the poets Persius 
 and Juvenal, whose energetic language and manly 
 thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they 
 might have been to their contemporaries. Persius 
 died under Nero's bloody reign ; but Juvenal had 
 the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian 
 and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and 
 Hadrian. 2 His best precepts are derived from the 
 Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest 
 verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language. 
 The best two expounders of the later Stoical phi- 
 losophy were a Greek slave and a Roman emperor. 
 Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to Rome, 
 
 1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a 
 sense a Stoic, and he has said many good things in a very 
 fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius (xii. 2) on Seneca, 
 or rather a statement of what some people thought of his 
 philosophy, and it is not favorable. His writings and his 
 life must be taken together, and I have nothing more to say 
 of him here. The reader will find a notice "of Seneca and 
 his philosophy in " Seekers after God," by the Rev. F. W. 
 Farrar. Macmillan and Co. 
 
 2 Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, which 
 contain philosophical precepts, are not the work of the real, 
 but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. Still the verses exist, 
 and were written by somebody who was acquainted with the 
 Stoic doctrines. 
 
MAECUS A UEELIUS ANTONINUS. 39 
 
 we know not how, but he was there the slave and 
 afterwards the freedman of an unworthy master, 
 Epaphroditus by name, himself a freedman and a 
 favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a 
 hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he was still a 
 slave, but he could hardly have been a teacher 
 before he was made free. He was one of the phi- 
 losophers whom Domitian's order banished from 
 Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and he 
 may have died there. Like other great teachers 
 he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grate- 
 ful pupil Arrian for what we have of Epictetus' 
 discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the dis- 
 courses of Epictetus, of which only four remain 
 and some fragments. We have also from Arrian's 
 hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief 
 precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable com- 
 mentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who 
 lived in the time of the emperor Justinian. 1 
 
 Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he 
 gratefully commemorates his obligations to his 
 teachers, says that he was made acquainted by 
 Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, 
 whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41 ; 
 xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus 
 
 1 There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with 
 the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. 
 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of 
 Epictetus by Mrs. Carter. 
 
40 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the 
 best authority for the explanation of the philosoph- 
 ical language of Antoninus and the exposition of 
 his opinions. But the method of the two philoso- 
 phers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed 
 himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse 
 and in a familiar and simple manner. Antoninus 
 wrote down his reflections for his own use only, 
 in short, unconnected paragraphs, which are often 
 obscure. 
 
 The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, 
 Physic (<voWi/), Ethic (^IKOI/), and Logic (AoyiKov) 
 (viii. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, 
 was made by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the 
 Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus ; but these philoso- 
 phers placed the three divisions in the following 
 order, Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, how- 
 ever, that this division was made before Zeno's 
 time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero re- 
 marks (Acad. Post. i. 5.). Logic is not synony- 
 mous with our term Logic in the narrower sense 
 of that word. 
 
 Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, 
 and made six, Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised 
 in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; Physic and Theology. 
 This division was merely for practical use, for all 
 Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics 
 Logic, or Dialectic, does not occupy the same place 
 as in Plato : it is considered only as an instrument 
 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 41 
 
 which is to be used for the other divisions of Phi- 
 losophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic doc- 
 trines and of their modifications would require a 
 volume. My object is to explain only the opinions 
 of Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from 
 his book. 
 
 According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, 
 Physic and Theology go together, or the study 
 of the nature of Things, and the study of the 
 nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand 
 the Deity, and of his government of the universe. 
 This division or subdivision is not formally adopted 
 by Antoninus, for, as already observed, there is 
 no method in his book ; but it is virtually con- 
 tained in it. 
 
 Cleauthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the 
 study of the principles of morals and the study of the 
 constitution of civil society ; and undoubtedly he 
 did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts, Ethic 
 in the narrower sense and Politic ; for though the 
 two are intimately connected, they are also very 
 distinct, and many questions can only be properly 
 discussed by carefully observing the distinction. 
 Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject 
 is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to 
 his own conduct in life as a man and as a governor. 
 His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's 
 nature, the Universal Nature, and the relation of 
 every man to everything else. It is therefore 
 
42 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, 
 or the nature of Things, and with Theology, or the 
 Nature of the Deity. He advises us to examine 
 well all the impressions on our minds (<ai>Ta0-t'cu) 
 and to form a right judgment of them, to make just 
 conclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of 
 words, and so far to apply Dialetic ; but he has no 
 'attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his 
 philosophy is in substance purely moral and prac- 
 tical. He says (viii. 13), "Constantly and, if it 
 be possible, on the occasion of every impression on 
 the soul, 1 apply to it the principles of Physic, of 
 Ethic, and of Dialectic : " which is only another 
 way of telling us to examine the impression in 
 every possible way. In another passage (iii. 11) 
 he says, "To the aids which have been mentioned, 
 let this one still be added: make for thyself a 
 definition or description of the object (TO </>avrao-ToV) 
 which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly 
 what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its 
 
 1 The original is tiri irdvys <t>a.vTa.<ria.s. We have no word 
 which expresses <t>aiv curia, for it is not only the sensuous ap- 
 pearance which comes from an external object, which object 
 is called rb <t>a.vTa<TTt>v, but it is also the thought or feeling 
 or opinion which is produced even when there is no corre- 
 ponding external object before us. Accordingly everything 
 which moves the soul is <f>avraffr6v f and produces a ^avraaia. 
 
 In this extract Antoninus says <t>v(r<.o\oye'ii>, iradoXoyeiv, 5ia- 
 \fKTiKefa<r6ai. I have translated 7ra0o\o7e?i' by using the word 
 Moral (Ethic) , and that is the meaning here. 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 43 
 
 nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself 
 its proper name, and the names of the things of 
 which it has been compounded, and into which it 
 will be resolved." Such an examination implies a 
 use of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly 
 employed as a means towards establishing his 
 Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles. 
 
 There are several expositions of the Physical, 
 Theological, and Ethical principles, which are con- 
 tained in the work of Antoninus ; and more exposi- 
 tions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte der 
 Philosophic, iv. 241), after explaining the doctrines 
 of Epictetus, treats very briefly and insufficiently 
 those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short essay, 
 in which the work is done better. 1 There is also 
 an essay on the Philosophical Principles of M. Au- 
 relius Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, placed at the 
 end of his German translation of Antoninus 
 (Schleswig, 1799). With the assistance of these 
 two useful essays and his own diligent study a 
 man may form a sufficient notion of the principles 
 of Antoninus ; but he will find it more difficult to 
 expound them to others. Besides the want of 
 arrangement in the original and of connection 
 among the numerous paragraphs, the corruption of 
 the text, the obscurity of the language and the 
 
 1 De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Comraen- 
 tariis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, 
 Lipsiae, 1826. 
 
44 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the 
 writer's own ideas, besides all this, there is 
 occasionally an apparent contradiction in the em- 
 peror's thoughts, as if his principles were sometimes 
 unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. 
 A man who leads a life of tranquillity and reflec- 
 Jion, who is not disturbed at home and meddles 
 not with the affairs of the world, may keep his 
 mind at ease and his thoughts in one even course. 
 But such a man has not been tried. All his Ethical 
 philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out 
 to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the 
 rude realities of human existence. Fine thoughts 
 and moral dissertations from men who have not 
 worked and suffered may be read, but they will be 
 forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is 
 worth anything, if the teacher has not lived the 
 " life of an apostle," and been ready to die " the 
 death of a martyr." " Not in passivity (the passive 
 affects) but in activity lie the evil and the good 
 of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and 
 his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity " (ix. 
 16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical mor- 
 alist. From his youth he followed a laborious dis- 
 cipline, and though his high station placed him 
 above all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally 
 and temperately as the poorest philosopher. Epic- 
 tetus wanted little, and it seems that he always 
 had the little that he wanted and he was content 
 
 Mill 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 45 
 
 with it, as he had been with his servile station. 
 But Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat 
 on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of 
 an empire which extended from the Euphrates to 
 the Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland 
 to the hot sands of Africa ; and we may imagine, 
 though we cannot know it by experience, what 
 must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety, and 
 the sorrows of him who has the world's business 
 on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he 
 can, and the certain knowledge that he can do very 
 little of the good which he wishes. 
 
 In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, gen- 
 eral corruption, and with the weight of so unwieldy 
 an empire upon him, we may easily comprehend 
 that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude 
 to support him. The best and bravest men have 
 moments of doubt and of weakness ; but if they 
 are the best and the bravest, they rise again from 
 their depression by recurring to first principles, as 
 Antoninus does. The emperor says that life is 
 smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle is of 
 the same mind ; that the world is full of envious, 
 jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well 
 content to get out of it. He has doubts perhaps 
 sometimes even about that to which he holds most 
 firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, 
 but they are evidence of the struggles which even 
 the noblest of the sons of men had to maintain 
 
46 PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor 
 remark it is which I have seen somewhere, and 
 made in a disparaging way, that the emperor's re- 
 flections show that he had need of consolation and 
 comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet 
 his death. True that he did need comfort and sup- 
 port, and we see how he found it. He constantly 
 recurs to his fundamental principle that the uni- 
 verse is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of 
 it and must conform to that order which he cannot 
 change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, 
 that all mankind are a man's brethren, that he must 
 : love arid cherish them and try to make them bet- 
 ter, even those who would do him harm. This is 
 his conclusion (ii. 17) : " What then is that which 
 is able to conduct a man ? One thing and only 
 one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the 
 divinity within a man free from violence and un- 
 harmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing noth- 
 ing without a purpose nor yet falsely and with 
 hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's 
 doing or not doing anything ; and besides, accept- 
 ing all that happens and all that is allotted, as 
 corning from thence, wherever it is, from whence 
 he himself came ; and finally waiting for death 
 with a cheerful mind as being nothing else than a 
 dissolution of the elements of which every living 
 being is compounded. But if there is no harm to 
 the elements themselves in each continually chang- 
 
MAECUS AURELIU8 ANTONINUS. 47 
 
 ing into another, why should a man have any appre- 
 hension about the change and dissolution of all the 
 elements [himself] ? for it is according to nature ; 
 and nothing is evil that is according to nature." 
 
 The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of 
 the Nature of the Universe, of its government, 
 and of the relation of man's nature to both. He 
 names the universe (17 TWV oA.au/ <wna, vi. I), 1 " the 
 universal substance," and he adds that " reason " 
 (Ko'yos) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) uses 
 the terms " universal nature " or " nature of the 
 universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe "the 
 one and all, which we name Cosmos or Order " 
 
 1 As to the word ofoia, the reader may sea the Index. I 
 add here a few examples of the use of the word ; Antoninus 
 has (v. 24), TI ffvfj.Tra.a-a otoia, "the universal substance." He 
 says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), "there is one common substance"- 
 (ovffta), distributed among countless bodies. In Stobaeus 
 (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this definition, otolav 5t <j>a<ru> 
 T(av 6v7b}i> dwdyruv TTJV TrpuTTjv 'iXyv. In viii. 11, Antoninus 
 speaks of rb ownwSes Kal v\ti<6v, " the substantial and the ma- 
 terial;" and (vii. 10) he says that "everything material" 
 (cj/uXov) disappears in the substance of the whole (ry rS>v S\uv 
 owl?) . The ofiffia is the generic name of that existence which 
 we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive 
 no existence which can be co-ordinated with it and none 
 above it. It is the philosopher's " substance : " it is the 
 ultimate expression for that which we conceive or suppose 
 to be the basis, the being of a thing. "From the Divine, 
 which is substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, 
 all and everything that is created exists" (Swedenborg, 
 Angelic Wisdom, 198). 
 
48 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (KOO-/XOS). If he ever seems to use these general 
 terms as significant of the All, of all that man can 
 in any way conceive to exist, he still on other 
 occasions plainly distinguishes between Matter, 
 Material things (v\rj, vXiKoV), and Cause, Origin, 
 Reason (ama amwSes, Aoyos). 1 This is conformable 
 to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original 
 principles (px a O of a ll things, that which acts 
 
 1 I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, 
 that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The 
 " one and all," and the like, and "the whole," imply limita- 
 tion. "One "is limited; "all" is limited; the "whole "is 
 limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find words to ex- 
 press that which we cannot fully conceive. The addition of 
 "absolute" or any other such word does not mend the 
 matter. Even the word God is used by most people, often 
 unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is implied, and 
 yet at the same time words are added which are intended to 
 deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was asked 
 what God was, is said to have answered that God has no 
 name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6), 
 " the names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not 
 names, but appellations derived from benefactions and acts." 
 (Compare Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the 
 existence of a thing, or rather we may have the idea of an 
 existence, without an adequate notion of it, "adequate" 
 meaning coextensive and coequal with the thing. We have 
 a notion of limited space derived from the dimensions of 
 what we call a material thing, though of space absolute, if I 
 may use the term, we have no notion at all ; and of infinite 
 space the notion is the same, no notion at all; and yet we 
 conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and we 
 believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive it to be 
 finite, 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 49 
 
 (TO TTOIOW) and that which is acted upon (TO 
 TTCUTXOV). That which is acted on is the formless 
 batter (^): that which acts is the reason 
 l(Ao'yos), God, who is eternal and operates through 
 all matter, and produces all things. So Antoninus 
 (v. 32) speaks of the reason (Aoyos) which per- 
 vades all substance (ova-fa) 9 and through all time 
 by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the uni- 
 verse (TO TTO.V). God is eternal, and Matter is 
 eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but 
 he is not said to have created matter. According 
 to this view, whicITTs as olcTas'Tlhaxagoras, God 
 and matter exist independently, but God governs 
 matter. This doctrine is simply the expression of 
 the fact of the existence both of matter and of 
 God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with 
 the insoluble question of the origin and nature of 
 matter. 1 Antoninus also assumes a beginning of 
 
 1 The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We 
 derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we 
 have no adequate conception either of matter or of space. 
 Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what 
 men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other name they may 
 express the power which makes itself known by acts. Anax- 
 agoras laid down the distinction between intelligence (voOs) 
 and matter, and he said that intelligence impressed motion 
 on matter, and so separated the elements of matter and gave 
 them order; but he probably "only assumed a beginning, as 
 Simplicius says, as a foundation of his philosophical teach- 
 ing. Empedocles said, " The universe always existed." He 
 had no idea of what is called creation. Ocellus Lucanus 
 
50 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 things, as we now know them ; but his language 
 is sometimes very obscure. I have endeavored to 
 explain the meaning of one difficult passage (vii. 
 75, and the note). 
 
 Matter consists of elemental parts (cn-oc^etd) of 
 which all material objects are made. But nothing 
 is permanent in form. The nature of the uni- 
 verse, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), 
 "loves nothing so much as to change the things 
 which are, and to make new things like them. 
 For everything that exists is in a manner the seed 
 of that which will be. But thou art thinking 
 only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into 
 a womb ; but this is a very vulgar notion." All 
 things then are in a constant flux and change: 
 some things are dissolved into the elements, others 
 come in their places ; and so the " whole universe 
 continues ever young and perfect " (xii. 23). 
 
 Antoninus has some obscure expressions about 
 
 (1, 2) maintained that the Universe (TO TTCIJ/) was imperish- 
 able and uncreated. Consequently it is eternal. He admitted 
 the existence of God ; but his theology would require some 
 discussion. On the contrary, the Brachmans, according to 
 Strabo (p, 713, ed. Gas.), taught that the. universe was 
 created and perishable; and the creator and administrator 
 of it pervades the whole. The author of the book of 
 Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17) : " Thy Almighty hand 
 made the world of matter without form," which may mean 
 that matter existed already. 
 
 The common Greek word which we translate "matter "is 
 v\-rj. It is the stuff that things are made of. 
 
M MIC US AURELIUS ANTOXINUS. 51 
 
 what he calls " seminal principles " 
 Xoyoi). He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms 
 (vi. 24), and consequently his " seminal princi- 
 ples " are not material atoms which wander about 
 at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In 
 one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, 
 souls (^at) after the dissolution of their bodies 
 being received into the " seminal principle of the 
 universe." Schultz thinks that by " seminal prin- 
 ciples Antoninus means the relations of the 
 various elemental principles, which relations are 
 determined by the Deity and by which alone 
 the production of organized beings is possible." 
 This may be the meaning ; but if it is, nothing of 
 any value can be derived from it. 1 Antoninus 
 often uses the word " Nature " (Averts), and we 
 must attempt to fix its meaning. The simple 
 etymological sense of <vVi? is " production," the 
 birth of what we call Things. The Romans used 
 Natura, which also means "birth" originally. But 
 neither the Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this 
 simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says 
 
 1 Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words Kara <nrep[j.a.TiKov \6yov 
 t^pos, where he is speaking of the Stoics ; but he uses this 
 expression in a peculiar sense (note 11). The early Chris- 
 tian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, and their 
 Avritings show that the contest was begun between the 
 Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in 
 the second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. 1, v. 4) we flnd a Stoic 
 expression, tva 5ta TOI/TWJ/ ytmivOc Of Las 
 
o2 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (x. 6) : " Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
 atoms or Nature [is a system], let this first be 
 established, that I am a part of the whole which is 
 governed by nature." Here it might seem as if 
 nature were personified and viewed as an active, 
 efficient power ; as something which, if not inde- 
 pendent of the Deity, acts by a power which is 
 given to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand 
 the expression right, is the way in which the word 
 Nature is often used now, though it is plain that 
 many writers use the word without fixing any 
 exact meaning to it. It is the same with the 
 expression Laws of Nature, which some writers 
 may use in an intelligible sense, but others as 
 clearly use in no definite sense at all. There is no 
 meaning in this word Nature, except that which 
 Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, " The 
 only distinct meaning of that word Natural is 
 Stated, Fixed, or Settled ; since what is natural 
 as much requires and presupposes an intelligent 
 agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually 
 or at stated times, as what is supernatural or 
 miraculous does to effect it at once." This is 
 Plato's meaning (De Leg. iv. 715) when he says 
 that God holds the beginning and end and middle 
 of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his 
 course, making his circuit according to nature 
 (that is, by a fixed order) ; and he is continually 
 accompanied by justice, who punishes those who 
 
MAliCUS AURELW8 ANTONINUS. 53 
 
 deviate from the divine law, that is, from the 
 order or course which God observes. 
 
 When we look at the motions of the planets, 
 the action of what we call gravitation, the ele- 
 mental combination of unorganized bodies and 
 their resolution, the production of plants and of 
 living bodies, their generation, growth, and their 
 dissolution, which we call their death, we observe 
 a regular sequence of phenomena, which within 
 the limits of experience present and past, so far as 
 we know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if 
 this is not so, if the order and sequence of phe- 
 nomena, as known to us, are subject to change in 
 the course of an infinite progression, and such 
 change is conceivable, we have not discovered, 
 nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order 
 and sequence of phenomena, in which sequence 
 there may be involved according to its very 
 nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some 
 variation of what we now call the Order or Nature 
 of Things. It is also conceivable that such 
 changes have taken place, changes in the order 
 of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection 
 of language to call them, but which are no 
 changes ; and further it is certain that our knowl- 
 edge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, 
 as for instance the phenomena of generation, 
 growth, and dissolution, is and ever must be im- 
 perfect. 
 
54 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We do not fare much better when we speak of 
 Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. 
 For the practical purposes of life we may use the 
 terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may 
 fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at 
 least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the 
 case is different when we speak of causes and 
 effects as of Things. All that we know is phe- 
 nomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances 
 which follow one another in a regular order, as we 
 conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon 
 should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
 must either be an interruption of the series, or 
 that something else will appear after the phenom- 
 enon which has failed to appear, and will occupy 
 the vacant place; and so the series in its pro- 
 gression may be modified or totally changed. 
 Cause and effect then mean nothing in the se- 
 quence of natural phenomena beyond what I have 
 said ; and the real cause, or the transcendent 
 cause, as some would call it, of each successive 
 phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all 
 things which are, which have been, and which will 
 be forever. Thus the word Creation may have a 
 real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can 
 conceive a first, in the present order of natural 
 phenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation of 
 all things at a certain time, followed by a quies- 
 cence of the first cause and an abandonment of 
 
MAECUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 5t> 
 
 all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, 
 or to the other words that people may use, is 
 absolutely absurd. 1 
 
 Now, though there is great difficulty in under- 
 standing all the passages of Antoninus, in which 
 he speaks of Nature, of the changes of things and 
 of the economy of the universe, I am convinced 
 that his sense of Nature and Natural is the same 
 as that which I have stated ; and as he was a man 
 who knew how to use words in a clear way and 
 with strict consistency, we ought to assume, even 
 if his meaning in some passages is doubtful, that 
 his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed 
 belief in the all-pervading, ever present, and ever 
 active energy of God. (ii. 4 ; iv. 40 ; x. 1 ; vi. 40 ; 
 and other passages. Compare Seneca, De Benef. 
 iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349 - 357.) 
 
 1 Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; but 
 time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of thought, 
 except in a very imperfect way. Time and space must not 
 in any way be thought of when we think of the Deity. 
 Swedenborg says, " The natural man may believe that he 
 would have no thought, if the ideas of time, of space, and 
 of things material were taken away; for upon those is 
 founded all the thought that man has. But let him know 
 that the thoughts are limited and confined in proportion as 
 they partake of time, of space, and of what is material ; and 
 that they are not limited and are extended, in proportion as 
 they do not partake of those things ; since the mind is so far 
 elevated above the things corporeal and worldly'' (Concern- 
 ing Heaven and Hell, 169). 
 
56 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
 understand, and it might be said that he did not 
 fully comprehend all that he wrote ; which would 
 however be in no way remarkable, for it happens 
 now that a man may write what neither he nor 
 anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us 
 (xii. 10) to look at things and see what they are, 
 resolving them into the material (^77), the casual 
 (OUTIOV), and the relation (ava<j>opd), or the purpose, 
 by which he seems to mean something in the 
 nature of what we call effect, or end. The word 
 Cause (ama) is the difficulty. There is the same 
 word in the Sanscrit (htu) ; and the subtle phil- 
 osophers of India and of Greece, and the less 
 subtle philosophers of modern times, have all 
 used this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague 
 way. Yet the confusion sometimes may be in the 
 inevitable ambiguity of language rather than in 
 the mind of the writer, for I cannot think that 
 some of the wisest of men did not know what they 
 intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), 
 "that everything that exists is in a manner the 
 seed of that which will be," he might be supposed 
 to say what some of the Indian philosophers have 
 said, and thus a profound truth might be con- 
 verted into a gross absurdity. But he says, " in 
 a manner," and in a manner he said true ; and in 
 another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he 
 said false. When Plato said, "Nothing ever is, 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 57 
 
 but is always becoming " (ad ytyvcrat), he delivered 
 a text, out of which we may derive something ; 
 for he destroys by it not all practical, but all 
 speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
 whole series of things, as they appear to us, must 
 be contemplated in time, that is in succession, 
 and we conceive or suppose intervals between 
 one state of things and another state of things, 
 so that there is priority and sequence, and inter- 
 val, and Being, and a ceasing to Be, and begin- 
 ing and ending. But there is nothing of the 
 kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlast- 
 ing continuity (iv. 45 ; vii. 75). When Antoninus 
 speaks of generation (x. 26), he speaks of one 
 cause ( ama) acting, and then another cause taking 
 up the work, which the former left in a certain 
 state, and so on ; and we might perhaps conceive 
 that he had some notion like what has been 
 called "the self -evolving power of nature ; " a fine 
 phrase indeed, the full import of which I believe 
 that the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid 
 himself open to the imputation of being a follower 
 of one of the Hindu sects, which makes all 
 things come by evolution out of nature or matter, 
 or out of something which takes the place of 
 Deity, but is not Deity. I would have all men 
 think as they please, or as they can, and I only 
 claim the same freedom which I give. When a 
 man writes anything, we may fairly try to find out 
 
58 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 all that his words must mean, even if the result is 
 that they mean what he did not mean ; and if 
 we find this contradiction, it is not our fault, but 
 his misfortune. Now Antoninus is perhaps some- 
 what in this condition in what he says (x. 26), 
 though he speaks at the end of the paragraph of 
 the power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still 
 no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 
 26) he means that the power is conceived to be in 
 the different successive causes (CUTMU), or in some- 
 thing else, nobody can tell. From other passages, 
 however, I do collect that his notion of the phe- 
 nomena of the universe is what I have stated. 
 The Deity works unseen, if we may use such 
 language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he 
 who wrote the book of Job. "In him we live 
 and move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians; 
 and to show his hearers that this was no new doc- 
 trine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of these 
 poets was the Stoic Cleanthes, whose noble hymn 
 to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of de- 
 votion and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her 
 power, and puts her under the immediate govern- 
 ment of the Deity. 
 
 " Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
 Obeys and willing follows where thou leadest. 
 Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
 Nor hi the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
 Save what the wicked through their folly do." 
 Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a di- 
 
MARCUS A UEELIUS ANTONINUS. 59 
 
 vine power and government was founded on his 
 perception of the order of the universe. Like 
 Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3, 13, &c.), he says that 
 though we cannot see the forms of divine powers, 
 we know that they exist because we see their 
 works. 
 
 " To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the 
 gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they ex- 
 ist and so worshippest them ? I answer, in the first 
 place, that they may be seen even with the eyes ; 
 in the second place, neither have I seen my own 
 soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect 
 to the gods, from what I constantly experience of 
 their power, from this I comprehend that they ex- 
 ist, arid I venerate them." (xii. 28, and the note. 
 Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6 ; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 
 9 ; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29 ; St. Paul's Epistle to 
 the Romans, i. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology 
 for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is a very 
 old argument, which has always had great weight 
 with most people, and has appeared sufficient. 
 It does not acquire the least additional strength 
 by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as 
 intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be 
 made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with 
 him who rejects it: and if it is worked out 
 into innumerable particulars, the value of the 
 evidence runs the risk of being buried under a 
 mass of words. 
 
60 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power 
 or an intellectual power, or that he has such a 
 power, in whatever way he conceives that he has 
 it, for I wish simply to state a fact, from this 
 power which he has in himself, he is led, as Anto- 
 ninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, 
 which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole 
 universe as the intellect 1 (vos) pervades man. 
 
 1 I have always translated the word vovs, " intelligence" or 
 "intellect." It appears to be the word used by the oldest 
 Greek philosophers to express the notion of "intelligence" 
 as opposed to the notion of " matter." I have always trans- 
 lated the word X67os by "reason," and Xoyixh by the word 
 "rational," or perhaps sometimes "reasonable," as I have 
 translated voep6s by the word " intellectual." Every man who 
 has thought and has read any philosophical writings knows 
 the difficulty of finding words to express certain notions, 
 how imperfectly words express these notions, and how care, 
 lessly the words are often used. The various senses of the 
 word X67os are enough to perplex any man. Our translators 
 of the New Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply trans- 
 lated 6 \67os by " the word," as the Germans translated it by 
 "das Wort;" but in their theological writings they some- 
 times retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a 
 term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to our word 
 Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we can- 
 not conceive as being other than what they are. Such are 
 what some people have called the laws of thought, the con- 
 ceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first principles, 
 which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Ac- 
 cordingly the Germans can say, " Gott ist die hochste Ver- 
 nunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a 
 word Verstand, which seems to represent our word "under- 
 standing," "intelligence," ''intellect," not as a thing abso- 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 61 
 
 (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, i. 14 ; and Vol- 
 taire a Mad e . Necker, vol. Ixvii. p. 278, ed. Lequien.) 
 God exists then, but what do we know of his 
 nature? Antoninus says that the soul of man is 
 an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like 
 animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the 
 gods. Animals have life (^x 7 ?)? an( i what we call 
 
 lute which exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an 
 individual being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity 
 of receiving impressions (Vorsteliungen, <f>avra.(rlai), and 
 forming from them distinct ideas (Begriffe) , and perceiving 
 differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the 
 reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the 
 words wOj and \&yos. The emperor's meaning must be got 
 from his own words, and if it does not agree altogether 
 with modern notions, it is not our business to force it into 
 agreement, but simply to find out what his meaning is, if we 
 can. 
 
 Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the omnipotent, 
 all-creating, and invisible God has fixed truth and the holy, 
 incomprehensible Logos in men's hearts; and this Logos 
 is the architect and creator of the Universe. Iii the first 
 Apology (c. xxxli.) he says that the seed (cnr^/za) from God 
 is the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So 
 it appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in 
 such believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he speaks 
 of the seed of the Logos being implanted in all mankind ; but 
 those who order their lives according to Logos, such as the 
 Stoics, have only a portion of the Logos (/card ffirepfMTiKov 
 \6yov /^pos), and have not the knowledge and contemplation 
 of the entire Logos, which is. Christ. Swedenborg's remarks 
 (Angelic Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. 
 The modern philosopher in substance agrees with the an- 
 cient , but, he is more precise. 
 
62 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 instincts or natural principles of action : but the 
 rational animal man alone has a rational, intelli- 
 gent soul (/^x^ ^oytAoj, vocpa). Antoninus insists 
 on this continually: God is in man, 1 and so we 
 must constantly attend to the divinity within us, 
 for it is only in this way that we can have any 
 knowledge of the nature of God. The human 
 soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the 
 soul alone has any communication with the Deity ; 
 for as he says (xii. 2) : " With his intellectual part 
 alone God touches the intelligence only which has 
 flowed and been derived from himself into these 
 bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden with- 
 in a man is life, that is, the man himself. All the 
 rest is vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which 
 the living man, the real 2 man, uses for the purpose 
 of his present existence. The air is universally 
 diffused for him who is able to respire ; and so for 
 him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent 
 power, which holds within it all things, is diffused 
 as wide and free as the air (viii. 54). It is by liv- 
 ing a divine life that man approaches to a knowl- 
 
 1 Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3. 17, and James iv. 8, 
 " Draw nigh to God and he will draw nigh to you." 
 
 2 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As to 
 what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live 
 after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives 
 in the body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts 
 in the world and from whom the body itself lives " (quoted 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 63 
 
 edge of the divinity. 1 It is by following the 
 divinity within, ufuy or 0eos, as Antoninus calls it, 
 that man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme 
 good ; for man can never attain to perfect agree- 
 ment with his internal guide (TO ^ye/Aw/coV). " Live 
 
 by Clissold, p. 456 of " The Practical Nature of the Theo- 
 logical Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the 
 Archbishop of Dublin (Whately)," second edition, 1859; a 
 book which theologians might read with profit). This is an 
 old doctrine of the soul, which has been often proclaimed, 
 but never better expressed than by the " Auctor de Mundo." 
 c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his "Antoninus," p. 436. The 
 soul by which we live and have cities and houses is invisible, 
 but it is seen by its works; for the whole method of life 
 has been devised by it and ordered, and by it is held to- 
 gether. In like manner we must think also about the Deity, 
 who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely, in life 
 immortal, and in virtue supreme : wherefore though he is 
 invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works.'' 
 Other passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker 
 (p. 382). Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul : " Up- 
 on the whole, then, our organs of sense and our limbs are 
 certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, 
 make use of to perceive and move with." If this is not 
 plain enough, he also says: "It follows that our organized 
 bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any 
 other matter around us." (Compare Anton, x. 38). 
 
 1 The reader may consult Discourse V. "Of the existence 
 and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select Discourses." 
 He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking pas- 
 sage of Agapetus, Paraenes. 3 : "He who knows himself 
 will know God ; and he who knows God will be made like to 
 God; and he will be made like to God, who has become 
 worthy God; and he becomes worthy of God, who does 
 
64 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with the gods. And he does live with the gods 
 who constantly shows to them that his own soul is 
 satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and 
 that it does all the daemon (Sai/xcov) wishes, which 
 Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and 
 guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is 
 every man's understanding and reason" (v. 27). 
 
 There is in man, that is in the reason, the intel- 
 ligence, a superior faculty which if it is exercised 
 rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty (TO 
 lyye/xoviKoV) , which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii. 11) 
 renders by the Latin word Principatus, " to which 
 nothing can or ought to be superior." Antoninus 
 often uses this term and others which are equiv- 
 alent. He names it (vii. 64) "the governing intel- 
 ligence." The governing faculty is the master of 
 the soul (v. 26). A man must reverence only his 
 ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we 
 must reverence that which is supreme in the uni- 
 verse, so we must reverence that which is supreme 
 in ourselves ; and this is that which is of like kind 
 with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). 
 So, as Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know 
 
 nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the tilings that are his, 
 and speaks what he thinks, and does what he speaks." I 
 suppose that the old saying, " Knew thyself," which is attrib- 
 uted to Socrates and others, had a larger meaning than the 
 narrow sense which is generally given to it. (Agapetus, ed. 
 Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume contains 
 also the Paraeneses of Nilus.) 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 65 
 
 the divine so far as it knows itself. In one passage 
 (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation 
 of himself when the diviner part within him has 
 been overpowered and yields to the less honorable 
 and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross 
 pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on 
 this matter, however his expressions may vary, are 
 exactly what Bishop Butler expresses when he 
 speaks of " the natural supremacy of reflection or 
 conscience," of the faculty " which surveys, ap- 
 proves, or disapproves the several affections of 
 ou*: mind and actions of our lives." 
 
 Much matter might be collected from Antoni- 
 nus on the notion of the Universe being one 
 animated Being. But all that he says amounts to 
 no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the soul 
 of man is most intimately united to his body, and 
 together they make one animal, which we call 
 man ; so the Deity is most intimately united to 
 the world, or the material universe, and together 
 they form one whole. But Antoninus did not 
 view God and the material universe as the same, 
 any more than he viewed the body and soul of 
 man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on 
 the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his 
 fashion to waste his time on -what man cannot 
 understand. 1 He was satisfied that God exists, 
 
 1 " God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow 
 capacities " (Locke, Essay concerning the Human Under- 
 standing, ii. chap. 17), 
 
66 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that he governs all things, that man can only have 
 an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he 
 must attain this imperfect knowledge by rever- 
 encing the divinity which is within him, and keep- 
 ing it pure. 
 
 From all that has been said, it follows that the 
 universe is administered by the Providence of 
 God (77y>oVota), and that all things are wisely 
 ordered. There are passages in which Antoni- 
 nus expresses doubts, or states different possible 
 theories of the constitution and government of 
 the universe ; but he always recurs to his funda- 
 mental principle, that if we admit the existence 
 of a deity, we must also admit that he orders all 
 tilings wisely and well (iv. 27 ; vi. 1 ; ix. 28 ; xii. 
 5; and many other passages). Epic.tetus says 
 (i. 6) that we can discern the providence which 
 rules the world, if we possess two things, the 
 power of seeing all that happens with respect to 
 each thing, and a grateful disposition. 
 
 But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the 
 world so full of what we call evil, physical and 
 moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in 
 the world, we use the expression which I have 
 used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- 
 pated the emperor's answer. We see and feel and 
 know imperfectly very few things in the few 
 years that we live, and all the knowledge and all 
 the experience of all the human race is positive 
 
MAE C US AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 67 
 
 ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now. 
 as our reason teaches us that everything is in 
 some way related to and connected with every 
 other thing, all notion of evil as being in the 
 universe of things is a contradiction; for if the 
 whole comes from and is governed by an intelli- 
 gent being, it is impossible to conceive anything 
 in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the 
 whole (viii. 55; x. 6). Everything is in constant 
 mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might 
 imagine the solar system resolved into its elemen- 
 tal parts, and yet the whole would still subsist 
 " ever young and perfect." 
 
 All things, all forms, are dissolved and new 
 forms appear. All living things undergo the 
 change which we call death. If we call death an 
 evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings 
 also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for 
 he suffers both in and by his body and by his 
 intelligent part. Men suffer also from one an- 
 other, and perhaps the largest part of human 
 suffering comes to man from those whom he calls 
 his brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), " Gen- 
 erally, wickedness does no harm at all to the uni- 
 verse; and particularly, the wickedness [of one 
 man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful 
 to him who has it in his" power to be released from 
 it as soon as he shall choose." The first part of 
 this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that 
 
68 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second 
 part must be explained by the Stoic principle that 
 there is no evil in anything which is not in our 
 power. What wrong we suffer from another is his 
 evil, not ours. But this is an admission that there 
 is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, 
 arid if others can endure the wrong, still there is 
 evil in the wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives 
 many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs 
 and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He 
 teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his 
 lessons may be just as useful to him who denies 
 the being and the government of God as to him 
 who believes in both. There is no direct answer 
 in Antoninus to the objections which may be 
 made to the existence and providence of God 
 because of the moral disorder and suffering which 
 are in the world, except this answer which he 
 makes in reply to the supposition that even the 
 best men may be extinguished by death. He 
 says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought 
 to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
 ordered it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of 
 the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- 
 ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed 
 by any apparent irregularities in the order of 
 things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and 
 those who would conclude from them against the 
 being and government of God conclude too has- 
 
MAR CUP! AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 69 
 
 tily. We all admit that there is an order in the 
 material world, a Nature, in the sense in which 
 that word has been explained, a constitution 
 (Karao-Kevi;), what we call a system, a relation of 
 parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for 
 something. So in the constitution of plants and of 
 animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. 
 Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is inter- 
 rupted and the end, as we conceive it, is not 
 attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal 
 sometimes perishes before it has passed through 
 all its changes and done all its uses. It is accord- 
 ing to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to 
 perish early and for others to do all their uses and 
 leave successors to take their place. So man has 
 a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution 
 fit for certain uses, and on the whole man per- 
 forms these uses, dies, and leaves other men in his 
 place. So society exists, and a social state is 
 manifestly the natural state of man, the state for 
 which his nature fits him, and society amidst in- 
 numerable irregularities and disorders still sub- 
 sists ; and perhaps we may say that the history of 
 the past and our present knowledge give us a 
 reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish, 
 and that order, its governing principle, may be 
 more firmly established. As order then, a fixed or- 
 der, we may say, subject to deviations real or appar- 
 ent, must be admitted to exist in the whole nature 
 
70 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it 
 seems to us, does not in any way alter the fact of 
 the general constitution of things having a nature 
 or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the 
 existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for 
 the existence of order both physical and moral is 
 proved by daily experience and all past experience. 
 We cannot conceive how the order of the universe 
 is maintained : we cannot even conceive how our 
 own life from day to day is continued, nor how 
 we perform the simplest movements of the body, 
 nor how we grow and think and act, though we 
 know many of the conditions which are necessary 
 for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of 
 the unseen power which acts in ourselves except by 
 what is done, we know nothing of the power which 
 acts through what we call all time and all space ; 
 but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in 
 all things known to us, it is conformable to the na- 
 ture of our minds to believe that this universal 
 Nature has a cause which operates continually, and 
 that we are totally unable to speculate on the rea- 
 son of any of those disorders or evils which we per- 
 ceive. This I believe is the answer which may be 
 collected from all that Antoninus has said. 1 
 1 Cleauthes says in his Hymn : 
 
 " For all things good and bad to One thou formest, 
 So that One everlasting reason governs all." 
 
 See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV., "Upon the 
 Ignorance of Man." 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 71 
 
 The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles 
 tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two 
 casks, one filled with good things, and the other 
 with bad, and that he gives to men out of each 
 according to his pleasure ; and so we must be 
 content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. 
 One of the Greek commentators asks how must 
 we reconcile this doctrine with what we find in 
 the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of 
 the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them 
 from us, but they bring it on themselves through 
 their own folly. The answer is plain enough even 
 to the Greek commentator. The poets make both 
 Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately to their 
 several characters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that 
 men do attribute their sufferings to the gods, but 
 they do it falsely, for they are the cause of their 
 own sorrows. 
 
 Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short 
 work of the question of evil. He says, " As a 
 mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so 
 neither does the nature of evil exist in the uni- 
 verse." This will appear obscure enough to those 
 who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he 
 always knows what he is talking about. We do 
 not set up a mark in order to miss it, though we 
 may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus 
 assumes, has not ordered all things so that his 
 purpose shall fail. Whatever there may be of 
 
|2 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 what we call evil, the nature of evil, as he 
 expresses it, does not exist ; that is, evil is not a 
 part of the constitution or nature of things. If 
 there were a principle of evil (a-pxyi) in the consti- 
 tution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as 
 Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Sim- 
 plicius (c. 34, [27]) has a long and curious dis- 
 course on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing 
 and instructive. 
 
 One passage more will conclude this matter. It 
 contains all that the emperor could say (ii. 11) : 
 " To go from among men, if there are gods, is not 
 a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not 
 involve thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not 
 exist, or if they have no concern about human 
 affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe 
 devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in 
 truth they do exist, and they do care for human 
 things, and they have put all the means in man's 
 power to enable him not to fall into real evils. 
 And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, 
 they would have provided for this also, that it 
 should be altogether in a man's power not to fall 
 into it. But that which does not make a man 
 worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But 
 neither through ignorance, nor having the knowl- 
 edge but not the power to guard against or correct 
 these things, is it possible that the nature of the 
 universe has overlooked them ; nor is it possible 
 
MAE C US AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 73 
 
 that it has made so great a mistake, either through 
 want of power or want of skill, that good and evil 
 should happen indiscriminately to the good and 
 the bad. But death certainly and life, honor and 
 dishonor, pain and pleasure, all these things 
 equally happen to good and bad men, being things 
 which make us neither better nor worse. There- 
 fore they are neither good nor evil." 
 "fc The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy 
 follows from his general principles. The end of 
 all his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, 
 both a man's own nature and the nature of the 
 universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the 
 Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of 
 living according to Nature, and he says that when 
 it is explained, as he has explained it and as they 
 understood it, it is "a manner of speaking not 
 loose and undeterrninate, but clear and distinct, 
 strictly just and true." To live according to 
 Nature is to live according to a man's whole 
 nature, not according to a part of it, and to 
 reverence the divinity within him as the governor 
 of all his actions. "To the rational animal the 
 same act is according to nature and according to 
 reason " l (vii. 11). That which is done contrary 
 to reason is also an act contrary to nature, to the 
 whole nature, though it is certainly conformable 
 
 1 This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321), 
 " Nunquam aliud Natnra aliud Sapieutia elicit." 
 
74 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to some part of man's nature, or it could not be 
 done. Man is made for action, not for idleness or 
 pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses of 
 their nature, so man must do his (v. 1). 
 
 Man must also live conformably to the uni- 
 versal nature, conformably to the nature of all 
 things of which he is one ; and as a citizen of a 
 political community he must direct his life and 
 actions .with reference to those among whom, and 
 for whom, among other purposes, he lives. 1 A 
 man must not retire into solitude and cut himself 
 off from his fellow-men. He must be ever active 
 to do his part in the great whole. All men are 
 his kin, not only in blood, but still more by par- 
 ticipating in the same intelligence and by being a 
 portion of the same divinity. A man cannot 
 really be injured by his brethren, for no act of 
 theirs can make him bad, and he must not be 
 angry with them nor hate them : " For we are 
 made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like 
 eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower 
 teeth. To act against one another then is con- 
 trary to nature ; and it is acting- against one 
 another to be vexed and to turn away'" (ii. 1). 
 
 Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing 
 and rest in it in passing from one social act to 
 another social act, thinking of God " (vi. 7). 
 Again : " Love mankind. Follow God " (vii. 31). 
 
 1 See viii. 52 ; and Persius iii. 66. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. T5 
 
 It is the characteristic of the rational soul for a 
 man to love his neighbor (xi. 1). Antoninus 
 teaches in various passages the forgiveness of 
 injuries, and we know that he also practised what 
 he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that "this 
 divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our 
 enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moral- 
 ists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Chris- 
 tianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it 
 than on any other single virtue." The practice 
 of this precept is the most difficult of all virtues. 
 Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid 
 towards following it. When we are injured, we 
 feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is 
 natural, just, and useful for the conservation of 
 society. It is useful that wrong-doers should 
 feel the natural consequences of their actions, 
 among which is the disapprobation of society and 
 the resentment of him who is wronged. But 
 revenge, in the proper sense of that word, must 
 not be practised. " The best way of avenging 
 thyself," says the emperor, " is not to become like 
 the wrong-doer." It is plain by this that he does 
 not mean that we should in any case practise 
 revenge ; but he says to those who talk of reveng- 
 ing wrongs, Be not like him who has done the 
 wrong. Socrates in the Crito (c. 10) says the 
 same in other words, arid St. Paul (Ep. to the 
 Romans, xii, 17). " When a man has done thee 
 
76 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 any wrong, immediately consider with what opin- 
 ion about good or evil he has done wrong. For 
 when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him and 
 wilt neither wonder nor be angry " (vii. 26). 
 Antoninus would not deny that wrong naturally 
 produces the feeling of anger and resentment, for 
 this is implied in the recommendation to reflect 
 on the nature of the man's mind who has done 
 the wrong, and then you will have pity instead of 
 resentment ; and so it comes to the same as St. 
 Paul's advice to be angry and sin not ; which, as 
 Butler well explains it, is not a recommendation 
 to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a 
 natural passion, but it is a warning against allow- 
 ing anger to lead us into sin. In short the em- 
 peror's doctrine about wrongful acts is this : 
 wrong-doers do not know what good and bad 
 are : they offend out of ignorance, and in the 
 sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this 
 kind of ignorance will never be admitted as a 
 legal excuse, and ought not to be admitted as a 
 full excuse in any way by society, there may be 
 grievous injuries, such as it is in a man's power to 
 forgive without harm to society ; and if he for- 
 gives because he sees that his enemies know not 
 what they do, he is acting in the spirit of th 
 sublime prayer, "Father, forgive them, for they 
 know not what they do." 
 
 The emperor's moral philosophy was not a 
 
 >t 
 
 : 
 
 a 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 1 7 
 
 feeble, narrow system, which teaches a man to 
 look directly to his own happiness, though a man's 
 happiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by 
 living as he ought to do. A man must live con- 
 formably to the universal nature, which means, as 
 the emperor explains it in many passages, that a 
 man's actions must be conformable to his true 
 relations to all other human beings, both as a 
 citizen of a political community and as a member 
 of the whole human family. This implies, and he 
 often expresses it in the most forcible language, 
 that a man's words and action, so far as they 
 affect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, 
 which is their consistency with the conservation 
 and the interests of the particular society of 
 which he is a member, and of the whole human 
 race. To live conformably to such a rule, a man 
 must use his rational faculties in order to discern 
 clearly the consequences and full effect of all his 
 actions and of the actions of others : he must not 
 live a life of contemplation and reflection only, 
 though he must often retire within himself to 
 calm and purify his soul by thought, 1 but he must 
 mingle in the work of man and be a fellow laborer 
 for the general good. 
 
 A man should have an object or purpose in life, 
 that he may direct all his energies to it ; of course 
 
 1 Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo. Persius, 
 iv. 21. 
 
78 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a good object (ii. 7). He who has not one object 
 or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life (xi. 21). Bacon has a remark to 
 the same effect, on the best means of " reducing 
 of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which 
 is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self 
 good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be 
 in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." 
 He is a happy man who has been wise enough to 
 do this when he was young and has had the oppor- 
 tunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a man 
 cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages 
 himself to do it when he can, and not to let life 
 slip away before he has begun. He who can pro- 
 pose to himself good and virtuous ends of life^ 
 and be true to them, cannot fail to live conform- 
 ably to his own interest and the universal interest, 
 for in the nature of things they are one. If a 
 thing is not good for the hive, it is not good for 
 the bee (vi. 54). 
 
 One passage may end this matter. "If the 
 gods have determined about me and about the 
 things which must happen to me,- they have 
 determined well, for it is not easy even 'to imagine 
 a deity without forethought; and as to doing 
 me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that ? For what advantage would re- 
 sult to them from this or to the whole, which is 
 the special object of their providence ? But if 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 79 
 
 they have not determined about me individually, 
 they have certainly determined about the whole at 
 least ; and the things which happen by way of 
 sequence in this general arrangement I ought to 
 accept with pleasure and to be content with them. 
 But if they determine about nothing which it 
 is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us 
 neithsr sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor 
 do anything else which we do as if the gods were 
 present and lived with us ; but if however the 
 gods determine about none of the things which 
 concern us, I am able to determine about myself, 
 and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and 
 that is useful to every man which is conformable 
 to his own constitution (Karao-Kcv^) and nature. 
 But my nature is rational and social ; and my city 
 and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; 
 but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The 
 things then which are useful to these cities are 
 alone useful to me " (viL 44). 
 
 It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to 
 state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in 
 which a man may profitably use his understanding 
 towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. 
 The passages to this purpose are in all parts of his 
 book, but as they are in no order or connection, a 
 man must use the book a" long time before he will 
 find out all that is in it. A few words may be 
 added here. If we analyze all other things, we 
 
80 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 find how insufficient they are for human life, and 
 how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue 
 alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. 
 The notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague 
 or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult 
 to explain the notion fully to himself, or to ex- 
 pound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
 cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more con- 
 sists of parts than man's intelligence does ; and 
 yet we speak of various intellectual faculties as a 
 convenient way of expressing the various powers 
 which man's intellect shows by his works. In the 
 same way we may speak of various virtues or parts 
 of virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of 
 showing what particular virtues we ought to 
 practice in order to the exercise of the whole of 
 virtue, that is, as much as man's nature is capable 
 of. 
 
 The prime principle in man's constitution is 
 social. The next in order is not to yield to the 
 persuasions of the body, when they are not con- 
 formable to the rational principle, which must 
 govern. The third is freedom from error and 
 from deception. " Let then the ruling principle 
 holding fast to these things go straight on and it 
 has what is its own " (vii. 55). The emperor selects 
 justice as the virtue which is the basis of all the 
 rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before 
 his time. 
 
MAKCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 81 
 
 It is true that all people have some notion of 
 what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
 mind, and some notion about acting in conformity 
 to this disposition ; but experience shows that 
 men's notions about justice are as confused as 
 their actions are inconsistent with the true notion 
 of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is 
 clear enough, but not practical enough for all 
 mankind. " Let there be freedom from perturb- 
 ations with respect to the things which come 
 from the external cause ; and let there be justice 
 in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, 
 that is, let there be movement and action termina- 
 ting in this, in social acts, for this is according to 
 thy nature " (ix. 31). In another place (ix. 1) 
 he says that " he who acts unjustly acts impiously," 
 which follows of course from all that he says in 
 various places. He insists on the practice of 
 truth as a virtue and as a means to virtue, which 
 no doubt it is : for lying even in indifferent things 
 weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously 
 is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty 
 of, viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, 
 and viewed with respect to consequences. He 
 couples the notion of justice with action. A man 
 must not pride himself on having some fine notion 
 of justice in his head,- but he must exhibit his 
 justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. 
 But this is enough. 
 
: 
 
 82 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call 
 some things beautiful (/<a/\a) and some ugly (aurxpa), 
 and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as 
 they are ugly so they are evil, or bad (ii. 1). All 
 these things, good and evil, are in our power, ab- 
 solutely some of the stricter Stoics would say; in 
 a manner only, as those who would not depart 
 altogether from common sense would say ; practi- 
 cally they are to a great degree in the power of 
 some persons and in some circumstances, but in a 
 small degree only in other persons and in other 
 circumstances. The Stoics maintain man's free 
 will as to the things which are in his power; for 
 as to the things which are out of his power, free 
 will terminating in action is of course excluded by 
 the very terms of the expression. I hardly know 
 if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of the 
 free will of man, nor is the question worth the 
 inquiry. What he does mean and does say is 
 X intelligible. All the things which are not in our 
 power (dTrpoaipeTa) are indifferent : they are neither 
 good nor bad, morally. Such are life, health, 
 wealth, power, disease, poverty, and death. Life 
 and death are all men's portion. Health, wealth, 
 power, disease, and poverty happen to men, indif- 
 ferently to the good and to the bad ; to those who 
 live according to nature and to those who do not. 1 
 
 1 "All events come alike to all: there is one event to the 
 righteous and to the wicked : to the good and to the clean 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 83 
 
 " Life," says the emperor, " is a warfare and a 
 stranger's sojourn, and after fame is oblivion " 
 (ii. 17). After speaking of those men who have 
 disturbed the world and then died, and of the 
 death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and 
 Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of 
 Socrates whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, 
 he says, " What means all this ? Thou hast em- 
 barked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come 
 to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life, there 
 is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a 
 state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held 
 by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the 
 vessel which is as much inferior as that which 
 serves it is superior : for the one is intelligence 
 and Deity ; the other is earth and corruption " (iii. 
 3). It is not death that a man should fear, but he 
 should fear never beginning to live according to 
 nature (xii. 1). Every man should live in such a 
 way as to discharge his duty, and to trouble him- 
 self about nothing else. He should live such a 
 life that he shall always be ready for death, and 
 
 and to the unclean," &c. (Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2) ; and (v. 3), 
 " This is an evil among all things that are done under the 
 sun, that there is one event unto all." In what sense " evil" 
 is meant here seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt 
 about the emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiri- 
 dion, c. i., &c. ; and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo. 
 p. 713, ed. Cas.) : dyaObv dt q Ka.nbv w$tv elvat rwv <rvfj.pait>6vrwv 
 
84 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 shall depart content when the summons comes. 
 For what is death? "A cessation of the impres- 
 sions through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
 strings which move the appetites, and of the dis- 
 cursive movements of the thoughts, and of the ser- 
 vice to the flesh" (vi. 28). Death is such as gen- 
 ei atiori is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another 
 passage, the exact meaning of which is perhaps 
 doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child which 
 leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death 
 leaves its envelope. As the child is born or comes 
 into life by leaving the womb, so the soul may on 
 leaving the body pass into another existence which 
 is perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's 
 meaning. Butler compares it with a passage in 
 Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans' notion of 
 death being the birth into real life and a happy 
 life, to those who have philosophized ; and he thinks 
 Antoninus may allude to this opinion. 1 
 
 Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere 
 clearly expressed^ ~~"His doctrine of the nature of 
 
 1 Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expression of 
 his own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others employed 
 to embellish his writings, I know not. After speaking of 
 the child being prepared in the womb to live this life, he 
 adds, " Sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senec- 
 tutem, in alium naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos 
 expectat, alius rerum status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; and 
 Lucan, i. 457 : 
 
 " Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae 
 Mors media est." 
 
S AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 85 
 
 the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish 
 absolutely, for aTpbftion of the divinity cannot 
 perish. The opinion is at least as old as the time 
 of Epicharmus and Euripides; what comes from 
 earth goes back to earth, and what comes from 
 heaven, the divinity, returns to him wlio gave it. ( 
 But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the 
 notion of the man existing after death so as to be 
 conscious of his sameness with that soul which 
 occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be per- 
 plexed on this matter, and finally to have rested 
 in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is 
 best, and consistent with the university of things. 
 Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on an- 
 other Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics practised, 
 the anticipating the regular course of nature 
 by a man's own act. The reader will find some 
 passages in which this is touched on, and he may 
 make of them what he can. But there are pas- 
 sages in which the emperor encourages himself to 
 wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity ; 
 and certainly it is consistent with all his best 
 teaching that a man should bear all that falls to 
 his lot and do useful acts as long as he lives. He 
 should not therefore abridge the time of his use- 
 fulness by his own act. .Whether he contemplates 
 any possible cases in which a man should die by 
 his own hand, I cannot tell ; and the matter is not 
 worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not 
 
86 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lead to any certain result as to his opinion on this 
 point. I do not think that Antoninus, who never 
 mentions Seneca, though he must have known all 
 about him, would have agreed with Seneca when 
 he gives as a reason for suicide, that the eternal 
 law, whatever he means, has made nothing better 
 for us than this, that it has given us only one way 
 of entering into life and many ways of going out 
 of it. The ways of going out indeed are many, 
 and that is a good reason for a man taking care of 
 himself. 1 
 
 Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's 
 life. There is no rule of life contained in the pre- 
 cept that a man should pursue his own happiness. 
 Many men think that they are seeking happiness 
 when they are only seeking the gratification of 
 some particular passion, the strongest that they 
 have. The end of a man is, as already explained, 
 to live conformably to nature, and he will thus 
 obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind, and con- 
 tentment (iii. 12 ; viii. 1, and other places). As a 
 means of living conformably to nature he must 
 study the four chief virtues, each of which has its 
 proper sphere : wisdom, or the knowledge of good 
 and evil ; justice, or the giving to every man his 
 due ; fortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain ; 
 and temperance, which is moderation in all things. 
 
 1 See Plinius H. N. 11., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6; and 
 Ep. 70 : " Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c. 
 
MABCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 87 
 
 By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic 
 obtained all that he wished or expected. His re- 
 ward was in his virtuous life, and he was satisfied 
 with that. Some Greek poet long ago wrote : 
 
 " For virtue only of all human things 
 Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
 Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue." 
 
 Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves 
 in very arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise 
 man's self-sufficiency ; they elevated him to the 
 rank of a deity. 1 But these were only talkers and 
 lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter fine 
 words, know little of human affairs, and care only 
 for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by 
 precept and example labored to improve them- 
 selves and others ; and if we discover imperfections 
 in their teaching, we must still honor these great 
 men who attempted to show that there is in man's 
 nature and in the constitution of things sufficient 
 reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult 
 enough to live as we ought to live, difficult even 
 for any man to live in such a way as to satisfy him- 
 self, if he exercises only in a moderate degree the 
 
 1 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on " the Excellency and 
 Nobleness of True Religion " "(c. vi.) has remarked on this 
 Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. In 
 Seneca certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus ; 
 but it is not in Antoninus. 
 
88 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own 
 conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought to the 
 same opinions in morals and religion, it is at least 
 worth while to give them good reasons for as 
 much as they can be persuaded to accept. 
 
THE MEDITATIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 I. 
 
 1. FROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I learned] 
 good morals and the government of my temper. 
 
 2. From the reputation and remembrance of my 
 father, 2 modesty and a manly character. 
 
 i Annius Vcrus was his grandfather's name. There is no 
 verb in this section connected with the word " from," nor in 
 the following sections of this book ; and it is not quite cer- 
 tain what verb should be supplied. What I have added may 
 express the meaning here, though there are sections which 
 it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that he learned 
 all these good things from the several persons whom he 
 mentions, he means that he observed certain good qualities 
 in them, or received certain benefits from them, and it is 
 implied that he was the better for it, or at least might have 
 been; for It would be a mistake to understand Marcus as 
 saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed in 
 his kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 * His father's name was Annius Wrus. 
 
90 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 3. From my mother, 1 piety and beneficence, and 
 abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from 
 evil thoughts ; and further, simplicity in my way 
 of living, far removed from the habits of the rich. 
 
 4. From my great-grandfather, 2 not to have fre- 
 quented public schools, and to have had good 
 teachers at home, and to know that on such things 
 a man should spend liberally. 
 
 5. From my governor, to be neither of the green 
 nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus, 
 nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the 
 Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ; from him too I 
 learned endurance of labor, and to want little, and 
 to work with my own hands, and not to meddle 
 with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to 
 listen to slander. 
 
 6. From Diognetus, 3 not to busy myself about 
 
 1 His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla. 
 
 1 Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
 3 In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one 
 Diognetus, whom the writer names "most excellent." He 
 was a Gentile, but he wished very much to know what the 
 religion of the Christians was, what God they worshipped, 
 and how this worship made them despise the world and 
 death, and neither believe in the gods of the Greeks nor 
 observe the superstition of the Jews; and what was this 
 love to one another which they had, and why this new kind 
 of religion was introduced now and not before. My friend 
 Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge in Kent, has suggested to 
 me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor of M. 
 Antoninus. 
 
MAE C US AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 91 
 
 trifling things, and not to give credit to what was 
 said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incan- 
 tations and the driving away of demons and such 
 things ; and not to breed quails [for fighting], nor 
 to give myself up passionately to such things; 
 and to endure freedom of speech; and to have 
 become intimate with philosophy; and to have 
 been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis 
 and Marcianus ; and to have written dialogues in 
 my youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and 
 skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the 
 Grecian discipline. 
 
 7. From Rusticus 1 I received the impression 
 that my character required improvement and disci- 
 pline ; and from him I learned not to be led astray 
 to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on specula- 
 tive matters, nor to delivering little hortatory 
 orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who 
 practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts 
 in order to make a display ; and to abstain from 
 rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and not to 
 walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor 
 
 1 Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Anto- 
 ninus valued highly, and often took his advice (Capitol. M. 
 Antonin. iii.)- 
 
 Antoninus says, TOIJ 'EiriKTTjretois {nro}j.rfifjia<riv, which must 
 not be translated, "the writings of Epictetus," for Epictetus 
 wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has preserved for us 
 all that we know of Epictetus, says, ravra tireipdO-rjv vro/i^aTo 
 i/Xdcu TT/J ixclvov Btavoias (Ep. ad Gell.}. 
 
92 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 to do other things of the kind ; and to write 
 my letters with simplicity, like the letter which 
 Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother ; and 
 with respect to those who have offended me 
 by words, or done me wrong, to be easily dis- 
 posed to be pacified and reconciled, as,, soon as 
 they have shown a readiness to be reconciled ; 
 and to read carefully, and not to be satisfied 
 with a superficial understanding of a book ; nor 
 hastily to give my assent to those who talk over- 
 much ; and I am indebted to him for being ac- 
 quainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which 
 he communicated to me out of his own collec- 
 tion. 
 
 8. From Apollonius l I learned freedom of will 
 and undeviating steadiness of purpose ; and to 
 look to nothing else, not even for a moment, 
 except to reason ; and to be always the same, in 
 sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, 
 and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living 
 example that the same man can be both most 
 resolute and yielding, and not peevish in giving 
 his instruction ; and to have had before my eyes 
 a man who clearly considered his expedience and 
 his skill in expounding philosophical principles as 
 the smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned 
 how to receive from friends what are esteemed 
 
 1 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius 
 to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 
 
MARCU& AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 93 
 
 favors, without being either humbled by them or 
 letting them pass unnoticed. 
 
 9. From Sextus, 1 a benevolent disposition, and 
 the example of a family governed in a fatherly 
 manner, and the idea of living conformably to 
 nature; and gravity without affectation, and to 
 look carefully after the interests of friends, and to 
 tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form 
 opinions without consideration : f he had the 
 power of readily accommodating himself to all, 
 so that intercourse with him was more agreeable 
 than any flattery; and at the same time he was 
 most highly venerated by those who associated 
 with him : and he had the faculty both of dis- 
 covering and ordering, in an intelligent and 
 methodical way, the principles necessary for life ; 
 and he never showed anger or any other passion, 
 but was entirely free from passion, and also most 
 affectionate ; and he could express approbation 
 without noisy display, and he possessed much 
 knowledge without ostentation. 
 
 10. From Alexander 2 the grammarian, to re- 
 frain from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful 
 way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or 
 
 1 Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, 
 as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 
 
 * Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He 
 wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician Aristide^ 
 wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a fummil oration. 
 
94 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dex- 
 terously to introduce the very expression which 
 ought to have been used, and in the way of answer 
 or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry 
 about the thing itself, not about the word, or by 
 some other fit suggestion. 
 
 11. From Fronto 1 I learned to observe what 
 envy and duplicity and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, 
 and that generally those among us who are called 
 Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. 
 
 12. From Alexander the Platonic, not fre- 
 quently nor without necessity to say to any one, 
 or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure ; nor 
 continually to excuse the neglect of duties re- 
 quired by our relation to those with whom we 
 live, by alleging urgent occupations. 
 
 13. From Catulus, 2 not to be indifferent when 
 a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault 
 without reason, but to try to restore him to his 
 usual disposition ; and to be ready to speak well 
 of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
 Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 
 
 14. From my brother 3 Severus, to love my kin, 
 
 1 M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favor 
 with Marcus. There are extant various letters between 
 Marcus and Pronto. 
 
 2 Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
 3 The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had 
 no brother. It has been supposed that he may mean some 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 95 
 
 and to love truth, and to love justice; and through 
 him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, 
 Dion, Brutus ; l ana from him I received the idea 
 of a polity in which there is the same law for all, 
 a polity administered -vith regard to equal rights 
 and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a 
 kingly government whict respects most of all the 
 freedom of the governed ; I learned from him 
 also f consistency and undeviating steadiness in 
 my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do 
 good, and to give to others readilv, and to cherish 
 good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by my 
 friends; and in him I observed no concealment of 
 his opinions with respect to those whom he con- 
 demned, and that his friends had no need to con- 
 jecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was 
 quite plain. 
 
 15. From Maximus 2 I learned self-government, 
 and not to be led aside by anything ; and cheer- 
 cousin. Sclmltz in his translation omits " brother," and 
 says that this Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peri- 
 patetic. 
 
 1 We know, from Tacitus (Annal. xiii., xvi. 21 ; and other 
 passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has 
 written the lives of the two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. 
 Antoninus probably alludes to Cato of Utica, who was a 
 Stoic. 
 
 8 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was 
 highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predeces- 
 sor. The character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. 
 (See viii. 25.) 
 
96 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 fulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness ; 
 and a just admixture in the moral character of 
 sweetness and dignity, and tj do what was set 
 before me without complaining. I observed that 
 everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, 
 and that in all that he did he never had any bad 
 intention; and he never showed amazement and 
 surprise, and was nev-jr in a hurry, and never 
 put off doing a thidg, nor was perplexed nor 
 dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his 
 vexation, nor, ou the other hand, was he ever 
 passionate or suspicious. He was accustomed to 
 do acts /:f beneficence, and was ready to forgive, 
 and was free from all falsehood ; and he presented 
 the appearance of a man who could not be diverted 
 from right, rather than of a man who had been 
 improved. I observed, too, that no man could 
 ever think that he was despised by Maximus, or 
 ever venture to think himself a better man. He 
 had also the art of being humorous in an agree- 
 able way.f 
 
 16. In my father l I observed mildness of tem- 
 per, and unchangeable resolution in the things 
 which he had determined after due deliberation ; 
 and no vainglory in those things which men call 
 honors; and a love of labor and perseverance ; and 
 a readiness to listen to those who had anything to 
 
 1 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Em- 
 peror Antoninus Pius. Compare vi. 30. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 97 
 
 propose for the common weal; and undeviating 
 firmness in giving to every man according to his 
 deserts ; and a knowledge derived from experience 
 of the occasions for vigorous action and for remis- 
 sion. And I observed that he had overcome all 
 passion for boys ; and he considered himself no more 
 than any other citizen ; l and he released his friends 
 from all obligation to sup with him or to attend 
 him of necessity when he went abroad, and those 
 who had failed to accompany him, by reason of any 
 urgent circumstances, always found him the same. 
 I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all 
 matters of deliberation, and his persistency, and 
 that he never stopped his investigation through 
 being satisfied with appearances which first pre- 
 sent themselves; and that his disposition was to 
 keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, 
 nor yet to be extravagant in his affection ; and to 
 be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; and to 
 foresee things a long way off, and to provide for 
 the smallest without display ; and to check imme- 
 diately popular applause and all flattery ; and to 
 be ever watchful over the things which were nec- 
 essary for the administration of the empire, and to 
 be a good manager of the expenditure, and patiently 
 to endure the blame which he got for such conduct; 
 and he was neither superstitious with respect to the 
 gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying 
 1 He uses the word Koivovo-ntuxrtvr). See Gatakcr's note. 
 
98 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 to please them, or by flattering the populace ; but 
 he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and 
 never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of 
 novelty. And the things which conduce in any 
 way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune 
 gives an abundant supply, he used without arro- 
 gance and without excusing himself; so that when 
 he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, 
 and when he had them not, he did not want them. 
 No one could ever say of him that he was either a 
 sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; 
 but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, 
 perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and 
 other men's affairs. Besides this, he honored those 
 who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach 
 those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet 
 was he easily led by them. He was also easy in 
 conversation, and he made himself agreeable with- 
 out any offensive affectation. He took a reason- 
 able care of his body's health, not as one who was 
 greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to per- 
 sonal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so 
 that through his own attention he very seldom 
 stood in need of the physician's art or of medicine 
 or external applications. He was most ready to 
 give without envy to those who possessed any par- 
 ticular faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowl- 
 edge of the law or of morals, or of anything else ; 
 and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 99 
 
 reputation according to his deserts ; and he always 
 acted conformably to the institutions of his coun- 
 try, without showing any affectation of doing so. 
 Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, 
 but he loved to stay in the same places, and to 
 employ himself about the same things ; and after 
 his paroxysms of headache he came immediately 
 fresh and vigorous to his usual occupations. His 
 secrets were not many, but very few and very rare, 
 and these only about public matters; and he 
 showed prudence and economy in the exhibition of 
 the public spectacles and the construction of public 
 buildings, his donations to the people, and in such 
 things, for he was a man who looked to what 
 ought to be done, not to the reputation which is 
 got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath at 
 unseasonable hours ; he was not fond of building 
 houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about 
 the texture and color of his clothes, nor about the 
 beauty of his slaves. 1 His dress came from Lorium, 
 his villa on the coast, arid from Lanuvium gener- 
 ally. 2 We know how he behaved to the toll- 
 collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon ; and 
 such was all his behavior. There was in him noth- 
 
 1 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is un- 
 certain. 
 
 1 Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Borne, and 
 there Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This 
 also is corrupt. 
 
100 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 ing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one 
 may say, anything carried to the sweating point ; 
 but he examined all things severally, as if he had 
 abundance of time, and without confusion, in an 
 orderly way, vigorously and consistently. And 
 that might be applied to him which is recorded of 
 Socrates, 1 that he was able both to abstain from, 
 and to enjoy, those things which many are too 
 weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without 
 excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the 
 one and to be sober in the other is the mark of a 
 man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as 
 he showed in the illness of Maxim us. 
 
 17. To the gods I am indebted for having good 
 grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
 teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, 
 nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the 
 gods that I was not hurried into any offence against 
 any of them, though I had a disposition which, if 
 opportunity had offered, might have led me to do 
 something of this kind ; but, through their favor, 
 there never was such a concurrence of circumstances 
 as put me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to 
 the gods that I was not longer brought up with 
 my grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved 
 the flower of my youth, and that I did not make 
 proof of my virility before the proper season, but 
 even deferred the time ; that I was subjected to a 
 1 Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3. 15. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 101 
 
 ruler and a father who was able to take away all 
 pride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge 
 that it is possible for a man to live in a palace 
 without wanting either guards or embroidered 
 dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like show ; 
 but that it is in such a man's power to bring him- 
 self very near to the fashion of a private person, 
 without being for this reason either meaner in 
 thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to 
 the things which must be done for the public 
 interest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank 
 the gods for giving me such a brother, 1 who was 
 able by his moral character to rouse me to vigi- 
 lance over myself, and who at the same time 
 pleased me by his respect and affection ; that my 
 children have not been stupid nor deformed in 
 body; that I did not make more proficiency in 
 rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which I 
 should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I 
 had seen that I was making progress in them ; that 
 I made haste to place those who brought me up in 
 the station of honor, which they seemed to desire, 
 without putting them off with hope of my doing it 
 some other time after, because they were then still 
 young ; that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Max- 
 imus ; that I received clear and frequent impres- 
 sions about living according to nature, and what 
 
 1 The emperor had no brother except L. Verus, his brother 
 by adoption. 
 
102 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 kind of a life that is, so that, so far as depended 
 on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspira- 
 tions, nothing hindered me from forthwith living 
 according to nature, though I still fall short of it 
 through my own fault, and through not observing 
 the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost 
 say, their direct instructions ; that my body has 
 held out so long in such a kind of life; that 1 
 never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and 
 that, after having fallen into amatory passions, 1 
 was cured, and, though I was often out of humor 
 with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I 
 had occasion to repent ; that, though it was my 
 mother's fate to die young, she spent the last 
 years of her life with me ; that, whenever I wished 
 to help any man in his need, or on any other 
 occasion, I was never told that I had not the 
 means of doing it ; and that to myself the same 
 necessity never happened, to receive anything 
 from another ; that I have such a wife, 1 so obedi- 
 ent, and so affectionate, and so simple ; that I had 
 abundance of good masters for my children ; and 
 that remedies have been shown to me by dreams, 
 both others, and against bloodspitting and giddi- 
 ness 2 . . . ; and that, when I had an inclination 
 to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any 
 sophist, and that I did not waste my time on 
 
 1 See the Life of Antoninus. 
 9 This is corrupt. 
 
MAE C US AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 103 
 
 writers [of histories], or in the resolution of 
 syllogisms, or occupy myself about the investi- 
 gation of appearances in the heavens ; for all these 
 things require the help of the gods and fortune. 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua. 1 
 
 1 The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and 
 Moravia; and Antoninus made a campaign against them. 
 (See the Life.} Granua is probably the river Graan, which 
 flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written 
 this first book during the war with the Quadi. In the first 
 edition of Antoninus, and in the older editions, the first 
 three sections of the second book make the conclusion of 
 the first book. Gataker placed them at the beginning of the 
 second book. 
 
n. 
 
 / 1. BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I 
 / shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, 
 I arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these 
 \ things happen to them by reason of their igno- 
 \rance of what is good and evil. But I who have 
 seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, 
 and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him 
 who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] 
 of the same blood or seed, but that it participates 
 in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion 
 of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of 
 them, for no one can fix on me what isugly, ; nor 
 can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
 we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
 hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and 
 lower teeth. 1 To act against one another, then, is 
 contrary to nature ; and it is acting against one 
 another to be vexed and to turn away. 
 
 2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh 
 and breath, and the ruling part. Throw away thy 
 1 Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. 18. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 105 
 
 books ; no longer distract thyself : it is not allowed ; 
 but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh ; it 
 is blood and bones and a network, a contexture of 
 nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, 
 what kind of a thing it is ; air, and not always the 
 same, but every moment sent out and again 
 sucked in. The third, then, is the ruling part; 
 consider thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let 
 this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings 
 like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be 
 either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink 
 from the future. 
 
 3. All that is from the gods is full of provi- 
 dence. That which is from fortune is not separa- 
 ted from nature or without an interweaving and 
 involution with the things which are ordered by 
 providence. From thence all things flow; and 
 there is besides necessity, and that which is for 
 the advantage of the whole universe, of which 
 thoir art a part. But that is good for every part 
 of nature which the nature of the whole brings, 
 and what serves to maintain this nature. Now 
 the universe is preserved, as by the changes of 
 the elements so by the changes of things com- 
 pounded of the elements. Let these principles be 
 enough for thee ; let them always be fixed opin- 
 ions. But cast away the thirst after books, that 
 thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, 
 truly, and from thy heart thankful to the gods. 
 
106 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 4. Remember how long thou hast been putting 
 off these things, and how often thou hast received 
 an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not 
 use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what 
 universe thou art a part, arid of what adminis- 
 trator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, 
 and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if 
 thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds 
 from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it 
 will never return. 
 
 5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman 
 and a man to do what thou hast in hand with 
 perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affec- 
 tion, and freedom, and justice, and to give thyself 
 relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
 give thyself relief if thou doest every act of thy 
 life as if it were the last, laying aside all careless- 
 ness and passionate aversion from the commands 
 of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and 
 discontent with the portion which has been given 
 to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the 
 which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a 
 life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence 
 of the gods ; for the gods on their part will re- 
 quire nothing more from him who observes these 
 things. 
 
 6. Do wrong l to thyself, do wrong to thyself, 
 
 1 Perhaps it should be, " thou art doing violence to thy- 
 self," bpftlfra not 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 107 
 
 my soul ; but thou wilt no longer have the oppor- 
 tunity of honoring thyself. Every man's life is 
 sufficient.! But thine is nearly finished, though 
 thy soul reverences not itself, but places thy 
 felicity in the souls of others. 
 
 7. Do the things external which fall upon thee 
 distract thee? Give thyself time to learn some- 
 thing new and good, and cease to be whirled 
 around. But then thou must also avoid being 
 carried about the other way; for those too are 
 triflers who have wearied themselves in life by 
 their activity, and yet have no object to which to 
 direct every movement, and, in a word, all their 
 thoughts. 
 
 8. Through not observing what is in the mind of 
 another a man has seldom been seen to be un- 
 happy ; but those who do not observe the move- 
 ments of their own minds must of necessity be 
 
 ^nhappy. 
 
 9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is 
 the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, 
 and how this is related to that, and what kind of 
 a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that 
 there is no one who hinders thee from always do- 
 ing and saying the things which are according to 
 the nature of which thou art a part. 
 
 10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts 
 such a comparison as one would make in accord- 
 ance with the common notions of mankind 
 
108 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 says, like a true philosopher, that the offences 
 which are committed through desire are more 
 blamable than those which are committed through 
 anger. For he who is excited by anger seems to 
 turn away from reason with a certain pain and 
 unconscious contraction ; but he who offen'ds 
 through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, 
 seems to be in a manner more intemperate and 
 more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, 
 and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that 
 the offence which is committed with pleasure is 
 more blamable than that which is committed with 
 pain ; and on the whole the one is more like a 
 person who has been first wronged and through 
 pain is compelled to be angry ; but the other is 
 moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being car- 
 ried towards doing something by desire. 
 
 11. Since it is possible 1 that thou mayest depart 
 from life this very moment, regulate every act and 
 thought accordingly. 2 But to go away from" 
 among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to 
 be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in 
 evil ; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they 
 have no concern about human affairs 1 , what is it 
 to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or 
 devoid of providence ? But in truth they *"do~ 
 
 Or it may mean, " since it is in thy power to depart;" 
 which gives a meaning somewhat different. 
 2 See Cicero, Tuscul. i. 49. 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 109 
 
 exist, and they do care for human things, and they 
 have put all the means in man's power to enable 
 him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if 
 there was anything evil, they would have provided 
 for this also, that it should be altogether in a 
 man's power not to fall into it. Now that which 
 does not make a man worse, how can it make a 
 man's life worse ? But neither through ignorance, 
 nor having the knowledge but not the power to 
 guard against or correct these things, is it possible 
 that the nature of the universe has overlooked 
 them ; nor is it possible that it has made so great 
 a mistake, either through want of power or want 
 of skill, that good and evil should happen indis- 
 criminately to the good and the bad. But death 
 certainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and 
 pleasure, all these things equally happen to 
 good men and bad, being things which make us 
 neither better nor worse. Therefore they are 
 neither good nor evil. 
 
 12. How quickly all things disappear, in the 
 universe the bodies themselves, but in time the 
 remembrance of them. What is the nature of all 
 sensible things, and particularly those which attract 
 with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are 
 noised abroad by vapory fame ; how worthless, and 
 contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead 
 they are, all this it is the part of the intellectual 
 faculty to observe. To observe too who these are 
 
110 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 whose opinions and voices give reputation ; what 
 death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in 
 itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection 
 resolves into their parts all the things which pre- 
 sent themselves to the imagination in it, he will 
 then consider it to be nothing else than an opera- 
 tion of nature; and if any one is afraid of an 
 operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, 
 is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a 
 thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. 
 To observe too how man comes near to the Deity, 
 and by what part of him, and when this part of man 
 is so disposed f (vi. 28). 
 
 13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who 
 traverses everything in a round, and pries into the 
 things beneath the earth, as the poet l says, and 
 seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his 
 neighbors, without perceiving that it is sufficient 
 to attend to the daemon within him, and to rev- 
 erence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon 
 consists in keeping it pure from passion and thought- 
 lessness, and dissatisfaction with what comes from 
 gods and men. For the things from the gods 
 merit veneration for their excellence;- and the 
 things from men should be dear to us by reason of 
 kinship ; and sometimes even, in a manner, they 
 move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of 
 good and bad ; this defect being not less than that 
 1 Pindar, in the Theaetetus of Plato. See xi. 1. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Ill 
 
 which deprives us of the power of distinguishing 
 things that are white and black. 
 
 14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three j /^) 
 thousand years, and as many times ten thousand 
 years, still remember that no man loses any other 
 
 life than this which he now lives, nor lives any 
 other than this which he now loses. The longest 
 and shortest are thus brought to the same. For 
 the present is the same to all, though that whic 
 perishes is not the same; f l and so that which 
 lost appears to be a mere moment. For a man c 
 not lose either the past or the future : for what 
 man has not, how can any one take this from hi 
 These two things then thou must bear in mind 
 the one, that all things from eternity are of like 
 forms and come round in a circle, and that it 
 makes no difference whether a man shall see the 
 same things during a hundred years, or two hun- 
 dred, or an infinite time ; and the second, that the 
 longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just 
 the same. For the present is the only thing of 
 which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this 
 is the only thing which he has, and that a man can- 
 not lose a thing if he has it not. 
 
 15. Remember that all is opinion. For what 
 was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : and 
 manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man 
 receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true. 
 
 1 See Gataker's note. 
 
112 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first 
 of all, when it becomes an abscess, and, as it were, 
 a tumor on the universe, so far as it can. For to 
 be vexed at anything which happens is a separation 
 of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the 
 natures of all other things are contained. In the 
 next place, the soul does violence to itself when it 
 turns away from any man, or even moves towards 
 him with the intention of injuring, such as are the 
 souls of those who are angry. In the third place, 
 the soul does violence to itself when it is over- 
 powered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when 
 it plays a part, and does or says anything insin- 
 cerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any 
 act of its own and any movement to be without an 
 aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without 
 considering what it is, it being right that even the 
 smallest things be done with reference to an end ; 
 and the end of rational animals is to follow the 
 reason and the law of the most ancient city and 
 polity. 
 
 17. Of human life the time is a point, and the 
 substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and 
 the composition of the whole body subject to putre- 
 faction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to 
 divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. 
 And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs 
 to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the 
 soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 113 
 
 stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. 
 rWhat then is that which is able to conduct a man ? 
 One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this 
 consists in keeping the daemon within a man free 
 from violence and unharmed, superior to pains arid 
 pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor 
 yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need 
 of another man's doing or not doing anything ; and 
 besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is 
 allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, 
 from whence he himself came ; and, finally, waiting 
 for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing 
 else than a dissolution of the elements of which 
 every living being is compounded. But if there 
 is no harm to the elements themselves in each con- 
 tinually changing into another, why should a man 
 have any apprehension about the change and dis- 
 solution of all the elements ? For it is according to 
 nature, and nothing is evil which is according to 
 nature. 
 
 This in Carnuntum. 1 
 
 1 Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of 
 the Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona (Vienna). 
 Orosius (vii. 15) and Eutropius (viii. 13) say that Antoninus 
 remained three years at Carnuntum during his war with the 
 Marcomanni. 
 
III. 
 
 1. WE ought to consider not only that our life is 
 daily wasting away and a smaller part of it is left, 
 but another thing also must be taken into the ac- 
 count, that if a man should live longer, it is quite 
 uncertain whether the understanding will still con- 
 tinue sufficient for the comprehension of things, 
 and retain the power of contemplation which 
 strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and 
 the human. For if he shall begin to fall into 
 dotage, perspiration and nutrition and imagination 
 and appetite, and whatever else there is of the 
 kind, will not fail ; but the power of making use 
 of ourselves, and filling up the measure of our 
 duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and 
 considering whether a man should now depart 
 from life, and whatever else of the kind' absolutely 
 requires a disciplined reason, all this is already 
 extinguished. We must make haste, then, not 
 only because we are daily nearer to death, but 
 also because the conception of things and the 
 understanding of them cease first. 
 
MAR C US A UEELIUS ANTONINUS. H 5 
 
 2. We ought to observe also that even the 
 things which follow after the things which are 
 produced according to nature contain something 
 pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread 
 is baked some parts are split at the surface, and 
 these parts which thus open, and have a certain 
 fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, 
 are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way 
 excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, when 
 they are quite ripe, gape open ; and in the ripe 
 olives the very circumstance of their being near to 
 rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And 
 the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eye- 
 brows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of 
 wild boars, and many other things, though they 
 are far from being beautiful if a man should examine 
 them severally, still, because they are conse- 
 quent upon the things which are formed by nature, 
 help to adorn them, and they please the mind ; so 
 that if a man should have a feeling and deeper 
 insight with respect to the things which are pro- 
 duced in the universe, there is hardly one of those 
 which follow by way of consequence which will 
 not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as 
 to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real 
 gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure 
 than those which painters and sculptors show by 
 imitation ; and in an old woman and an old man 
 he will be able to see a certain maturity and 
 
116 MED IT A TIOX8. 
 
 comeliness ; and the attractive loveliness of young 
 persons he will be able to look on with chaste 
 eyes ; and many such things will present them- 
 selves, not pleasing to every man, but to him only 
 who has become truly familiar with Nature and 
 her works. 
 
 3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, him- 
 self fell sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold the 
 deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. 
 Alexander and Pompeius and Caius Caesar, after 
 so often completely destroying whole cities, and in 
 battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of 
 cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last de- 
 parted from life. Heraclitus, after so many spec- 
 ulations on the conflagration of the universe, was 
 rilled with water internally and died smeared all 
 over with mud. And lice destroyed Deir.ocritus; 
 and other lice killed Socrates. What means all 
 this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the 
 voyage, thou art come to shore ; get out. If 
 indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, 
 not even there ; but if to a state without sensation, 
 thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, 
 and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much 
 inferior as that which serves it is superior : f for 
 the one is intelligence and deity ; the other is 
 earth and corruption. 
 
 4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in 
 thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer 
 
MARCUS AVBELWS AtfTONINlS. 117 
 
 thy thoughts to some object of common utility. 
 For thou losest the opportunity of doing something 
 else when thou hast such thoughts as these, 
 What is such a person doing, and why, and what 
 is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what 
 is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes 
 us wander away from the observation of our own 
 ruling power. We ought then to check in the 
 series of our thoughts everything that is without 
 a purpose and useless, but most of all the over- 
 curious feeling and the malignant ; and a man 
 should use himself to think of those things only 
 about which if one should suddenly ask, What 
 hast thou now in thy thoughts ? with perfect open- 
 ness thou mightest immediately answer, This or 
 That ; so that from thy words it should be plain 
 that everything in thee is simple and benevolent, 
 and such as befits a social animal, and one that 
 cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual 
 enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and 
 suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst 
 blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in 
 thy mind. For the man who is such, and no 
 longer delays being among the number of the 
 best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, 
 using too the [deity] which is planted within him, 
 which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, 
 unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, 
 feeling no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, 
 
118 MEDITA TIONS 
 
 one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, 
 dyed deep with justice, accepting with all his soul 
 everything which happens and is assigned to him 
 as his portion ; and not often, nor yet without 
 great necessity and for the general interest, im- 
 agining what another says, or does, or thinks. 
 For it is only what belongs to himself that he 
 makes the matter for his activity ; and he con- 
 stantly thinks of that which is allotted to himself 
 out of the sum total of things, and he makes his 
 own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own 
 portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to 
 each man is carried along with him and carries 
 him along with it.f And he remembers also that! 
 every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to j 
 care for all men is according to man's nature ; and i 
 a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, 1 
 but of those only who confessedly live according 
 to nature. But as to those who live not so, he 
 always bears in mind what kind of men they are 
 both at home and from home, both by night and 
 by day, and what they are, and with what men 
 they live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not 
 value at all the praise which comes from such men, 
 since they are not even satisfied with themselves. 
 5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to 
 the common interest, nor without due considera- 
 tion, nor with distraction ; nor let studied orna- 
 ment set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 119 
 
 of many words, or busy about too many things 
 And further, let the deity which is in thee be the 
 guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, 
 and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and 
 a ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting 
 for the signal which summons him from life, and 
 ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any 
 man's testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not 
 external help nor the tranquillity which others 
 give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept 
 erect by others. 
 
 6. If thou findest in human life anything better 
 than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a 
 word, anything better than thy own mind's self- 
 satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to 
 do according to right reason, and in the condition 
 that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; 
 if, I say, thou seest anything better than this, turn 
 to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou 
 hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears 
 to be better than the Deity which is planted in 
 thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, 
 and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as 
 Socrates said, has detached itself from the persua- 
 sions of sense, and has submitted itself to the gods, 
 and cares for mankind ; if thou findest everything 
 else smaller and of less value than this, give place 
 to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and 
 incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction 
 
120 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 be able to give the preference to that good thing 
 which is thy proper possession and thy own ; for it 
 is not right that anything of any other kind, such 
 as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment 
 of pleasure, should come into competition with that 
 which is rationally and politically [or, practically] 
 good. All these things, even though they may 
 seem to adapt themselves [to the better things] in 
 a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once, 
 and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and 
 freely choose the better, and hold to it. But that 
 which is useful is the better. Well, then, if it is 
 useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it ; but 
 if it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and 
 maintain thy judgment without arrogance : only 
 take care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure 
 method. 
 
 / 7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself 
 which shall compel thee to break thy promise, to 
 lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to suspect, 
 to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything 
 which needs walls and curtains: for he who has 
 preferred to everything else his own intelligence 
 and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts 
 no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either 
 solitude or much company ; and, what is chief of 
 , he will live without either pursuing or flying 
 rom [death] ; 1 but whether for a longer or a 
 1 Comp. ix. 3. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 121 
 
 / shorter time he shall have the soul enclosed in the 
 
 / body, he cares not at all: for even if he must de- 
 
 / part immediately, he will go as readily as if he were 
 
 / gi n g t do anything else which can be done with 
 
 decency and order ; taking care of this only all 
 
 through life, that his thoughts turn not away from 
 
 I anything which belongs to an intelligent animal 
 
 \ and a member of a civil community. 
 
 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 
 purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor im- 
 purity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life 
 incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may 
 say of an actor who leaves the stage before ending 
 and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him 
 nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound 
 [to other things], nor yet detached l [from other 
 things], nothing worthy of blame, nothing which 
 seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. 
 On this faculty it entirely depends whether there 
 shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion incon- 
 sistent with nature and the constitution of the 
 rational animal. And this faculty promises free- 
 dom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards 
 men, and obedience to the gods. 
 
 10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these 
 only which are few ; and besides, bear in mind that 
 every man lives only this present time, which is an 
 
 1 viii. 34. 
 
122 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is 
 either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the 
 time which every man lives, and small the nook 
 of the earth where he lives ; and short too the long- 
 est posthumous fame, and even this only continued 
 by a succession of poor human beings, who will 
 very soon die, and who know not even themselves, 
 much less him who died long ago. 
 
 11. To the aids which have been mentioned let 
 this one still be added : Make for thyself a definition 
 or description of the thing which is presented to 
 thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it 
 is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete 
 entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
 names of the things of which it has been com- 
 pounded, and into which it will be resolved. For 
 nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to 
 be able to examine methodically and truly every 
 object which is presented to thee in life, and always 
 to look at things so as to see at the same time what 
 kind of universe this is, and what kind of use 
 everything performs in it, and what value every- 
 thing has with reference to the whole, and what 
 with reference to man, who is a citizen of the high- 
 est city, of which all other cities are like families ; 
 what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and 
 how long it is the nature of this thing to endure 
 which now makes an impression on me, and what 
 virtue I have need of with respect to it, such as 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 123 
 
 gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, 
 contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every 
 occasion a man should say : This comes from god ; 
 and this is according to the apportionment f and 
 spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like 
 coincidence and chance ; and this is from one of 
 the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one 
 who knows not, however, what is according to his 
 nature. But I know; for this reason I behave 
 towards him according to the natural law of fellow- 
 ship with benevolence and justice. At the same 
 time, however, in things indifferent 1 I attempt to 
 ascertain the value of each. 
 
 12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, 
 folio wing right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, 
 without allowing anything else to distract thee, 
 but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst 
 be bound to give it back immediately ; if thou hold- 
 est to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but 
 satisfied with thy present activity according to 
 nature, and with heroic truth in every word and 
 sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. 
 And there is no man who is able to prevent this.^ 
 
 13. As physicians have always their instruments 
 and knives ready for cases which suddenly require^ 
 their skill, sojicrthou have principles ready for th( 
 understanding of HbnTngs divine and humaiyandfor 
 
 1 Est et horum quae media appeilamus grande discrimen. 
 Seneca, Ep. 82. 
 
124 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 doing everything, even the smallest, with a recol- 
 lection of the bond which unites the divine and 
 human to one another. For neither wilt thou do 
 anything well which pertains to man without at the 
 same time having a reference to things divine ; nor 
 the contrary. 
 
 14. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither wilt 
 thou read thy own memoirs, 1 nor the acts of the 
 ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections 
 from books which thou wast reserving for thy old 
 age. 2 Hasten then to the end which thou hast be- 
 fore thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come to 
 thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while 
 it is in thy power. 
 
 15. They know not how many things are signified 
 by the words stealing, sowing, buying, keeping 
 quiet, seeing what ought to be done ; for this is not 
 effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision. 
 
 16. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body belong 
 sensations, to the soul appetites, to the intelligence 
 principles. To receive the impressions of forms by 
 means of appearances belongs even to animals ; to 
 be pulled by the strings 3 of desire belongs both to 
 
 1 inro^fMTa : or memoranda, notes, and the like. See i. 17. 
 
 8 Compare Fronto, ii. 9 ; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who 
 was then consul : " Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex 
 libris sexaginta in quinque tomis." But he says some of 
 them were small books. 
 
 3 Compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 644, 6'n ravra rd 
 etc. ; and Antoninus, ii. 2 ; vii. 8 ; xii. 19. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 125 
 
 wild beasts and to men who have made themselves 
 into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to 
 have the intelligence that guides to the things which 
 appear suitable belongs also to those who do not be- 
 lieve in the gods, and who betray their country, and 
 do their impure deeds when they have shut the 
 doors. If then everything else is common to all 
 that I have mentioned, there remains that which 
 is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and con- 
 tent with what happens, and with the thread which 
 is spun for him ; and not to defile the divinity 
 which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a 
 crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, follow- 
 ing it obediently as a god, neither saying anything 
 contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary 
 to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he 
 lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is 
 neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate 
 from the way which leads to the end of life, to 
 which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready 
 to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly 
 reconciled to his lot. 
 
IV. 
 
 1. THAT which rules within, when it is accord- 
 ing to nature, is so affected with respect to the 
 events which happen, that it always easily adapts 
 itself to that which is possible and is presented 
 to it. For it requires no definite material, but it 
 moves towards its purpose, l under certain condi- 
 tions, however ; and it makes a material for itself 
 out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of 
 what falls into it, by which a small light would 
 have been extinguished: but when the fire is strong, 
 it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is 
 heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by 
 means of this very material. 
 
 2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor 
 otherwise than according to the perfect principles 
 of art. 
 
 jf 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the 
 j country, sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou too 
 j art wont to desire such things very much. But 
 
 1 Trpoj TOL i)yoijfj.eva, literally "towards that which leads." 
 The exact translation is doubtful. See Gataker's note. 
 
i 
 
 V; 
 
 MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 127 
 
 this is altogether a mark of the most common sort 
 of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou shalt 
 choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either 
 with more quiet or more freedom from trouble 
 does a man retire than into his own soul, particu- 
 larly when he has within him such thoughts that 
 by looking into them he is immediately in perfect 
 tranquillity ; and I affirm that tranquillity is noth- 
 ing else than the good ordering of the mind. Con- 
 stantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew 
 thyself ; and let thy principles be brief and funda- 
 mental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, 
 will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, 
 and to send thee back free from alljiiscontent with 
 the things to which thou returnestTvFor with what 
 art thou discontented? With the tmdness of men? 
 Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational 
 animals exist for one another, and that to endure 
 is a part of justice, and that men do wrong invol- 
 untarily ; and consider how many already, after 
 mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, 
 have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes ; and 
 be quiet at last. But perhaps thou art dissatisfied 
 with that which is assigned to thee out of the 
 universe. Recall to thy recollection this alterna- 
 tive ; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous 
 concurrence of things] ; or remember the arguments 
 by which it has been proved that the world is a 
 kind of political community [and be quiet at last]. 
 
128 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon 
 thee. Consider then further that the mind min- 
 gles not with the breath, whether moving gently 
 or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart 
 and discovered its own power, and think also of all 
 that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and 
 pleasure [and be quiet at last]. But perhaps the 
 desire of the thing called fame will torment thee. 
 See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at 
 the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the pres- 
 ent], and the emptiness of applause, and the chang- 
 ableness and want of judgment in those who pre- 
 tend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space 
 within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at 
 last]. For the whole earth is a point, and how 
 small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how 
 few are there in it, and what kind of people are 
 they who will praise thee. 
 
 This then remains : Remember to retire into this 
 little territory of thy own, 1 and above all do not 
 distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at 
 things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, 
 as a mortal. But among the things readiest to thy 
 hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, 
 which are two. One is that things do not touch 
 the soul, for they are external and remain immov- 
 t able ; but our perturbations come only from the 
 
 1 Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. Per- 
 sitis, iv. 52. 
 
MAECUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 129 
 
 opinion which is within. The other is that all these 
 things, which thou seest, change immediately and 
 will no longer be ; and constantly bear in mind how 
 many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. 
 The universe is transformation; life is opinion. 
 
 4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason 
 also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is 
 common : if this is so, common also is the reason 
 which commands us what to do, and what not to 
 do ; if this is so, there is a common law also ; if 
 this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we 
 are members of some political community, if this 
 is so, the world is in a manner a state. 1 For of 
 what other common political community will any 
 one say that the whole human race are members ? 
 And from thence, from this common political com- 
 munity comes also our very intellectual faculty and 
 reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or 
 whence do they come ? For as my earthly part is 
 a portion given to me from certain earth, and that 
 which is watery from another element, and that 
 which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source 
 (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, 
 as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also 
 the intellectual part comes from some source. 
 
 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of 
 nature ; composition out of the same elements, and 
 a decomposition into the same ; and altogether 
 
 ' Compare Cicero De Legibus, i. 7. 
 
130 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, 
 for it is not contrary to [the nature of] a reason- 
 able animal, and not contrary to the reason of our 
 constitution. 
 
 6. It is natural that these things should be done 
 by such persons, it is a matter of necessity ; and if 
 a man will not have it so, he will not allow the 
 fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this 
 in mind, that within a very short time both thou 
 and he will be dead ; and soon not even your 
 names will be left behind. 
 
 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is 
 taken away the complaint, " I have been harmed." 
 Take away the complaint, " I have been harmed," 
 and the harm is taken away. 
 
 8. That which does not make a man worse than 
 he was, also does not make his life worse, nor 
 does it harm him either from without or from 
 within. 
 
 9. The nature of that which is [universally] 
 useful has been compelled to do this. 
 
 10. Consider that everything which happens, 
 happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, 
 
 tjiou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with 
 respect to the continuity of the series of things, 
 but with respect to what is just, and as if it were 
 done by one who assigns to each thing its value. 
 Observe then as thou hast begun ; and whatever 
 thou doest, do it in conjunction with this, the 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 131 
 
 being good, and in the sense in which a man is 
 properly understood to be good. Keep to this in 
 every action. 
 
 11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he 
 has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes 
 thee to have, but look at them as they are in 
 truth. 
 
 12. A man should always have these two rules 
 in readiness; the one to do only whatever the 
 reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may 
 suggest for the use of men ; the other, to change 
 thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who 
 sets thee right and moves thee from any opin- 
 ion. But this change of opinion must pro- 
 ceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what 
 is just or of common advantage, and the like, not 
 because it appears pleasant or brings reputation. 
 
 13. Hast thou reason ? I have. Why then 
 dost not thou use it? For if this does its own 
 work, what else dost thou wish ? 
 
 14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt 
 disappear in that which produced thee ; but 
 rather thou shalt be received back into its semi- 
 nal principle by transmutation. 
 
 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
 'altar: one falls before, another falls after; but it 
 makes no difference. 
 
 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to 
 those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if 
 
132 MEDITA TION8. 
 
 thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship 
 of reason. 
 
 17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten 
 thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While 
 thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good. 
 
 18. How much trouble he avoids who does not 
 look to see what his neighbor says or does or 
 thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it 
 may be just and pure ; or, as Agathon f says, 
 look not round at the depraved morals of others, 
 but run straight along the line without deviating 
 from it. 
 
 19. He who has a vehement desire for posthu- 
 mous fame does not consider that every one of 
 those who remember him will himself also die 
 very soon ; then again also they who have succeeded 
 them, until the whole remembrance shall have been 
 extinguished as it is transmitted through men who 
 foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that 
 those who will remember are even immortal, and 
 that the remembrance will be immortal, what then 
 is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the 
 dead, but what is it to the living. What is praise, 
 except f indeed so far as it hasf a certain utility? 
 For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of 
 nature, clinging to something else . . . f . 
 
 20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is 
 beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not 
 having praise as part of itself./ Neither worse 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 133 
 
 then nor better is a thing made by being praised. 
 I affirm this also of the things which are called 
 beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material 
 things and works of art. That which is really 
 beautiful has no need of anything ; not more than 
 law, not more than truth, not more than benevo- 
 lence or modesty. Which of these things is beau- 
 tiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being 
 blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald made 
 worse than it was, if it is not praised? or gold, 
 ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a 
 shrub ? 
 
 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air 
 contain them from eternity ? But how does the 
 earth contain the bodies of those who have been 
 buried from time so remote? For as here the 
 mutation of these bodies after a certain continu- 
 ance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution 
 make room for other dead bodies, so the souls 
 which are removed into the air after subsisting for 
 some time are transmuted ami diffused, and as- 
 sume a fiery nature by being received into the 
 seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this 
 way make room for the fresh souls which come to 
 dwell there. And this is the answer which a man 
 might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing 
 to exist. But we must not only think of the num- 
 ber of bodies which are thus buried, but also of 
 the number of animals which are daily eaten by 
 
1 34 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 us and the other animals. For what a number is 
 consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bod- 
 ies of those who feed on them ! And nevertheless 
 this earth receives them by reason of the changes 
 [of these bodies] into blood, and the transforma- 
 tions into the aerial or the fiery element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in this 
 matter ? The division into that which is material 
 and that which is the cause of form [the formal], 
 (vii. 29.) 
 
 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every move- 
 ment have respect to justice, and on the occasion 
 of every impression maintain the faculty of com- 
 prehension [or understanding]. 
 
 23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is 
 harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me 
 is too early nor too late, which is in due time for 
 thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons 
 bring, O Nature : from thee are all things, in thee 
 are all things, to thee all things return. The poet 
 says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not thou say, 
 Dear city of Zeus ? 
 
 24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the 
 philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. But 
 consider if it would not be better to say, Do what 
 is necessary, and whatever the reason of the 
 animal which is naturally social requires, and as it 
 requires. For this brings not only the tranquillity 
 which comes from doing well, but also that which 
 
MARCUS AUREL1US ANTONINUS. 
 
 135 
 
 comes from doing few things. For the greatest 
 part of what we say and do being unnecessary, 
 if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure 
 and less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occa- 
 sion a man should ask himself, Is this one of 
 the unnecessary things? Now a man should take 
 away not only unnecessary acts, but also unneces- 
 sary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts will not 
 follow after. 
 
 25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, 
 the life of him who is satisfied with his portion out 
 of the whole, and satisfied with his own just acts 
 and benevolent disposition. 
 
 26. Hast thou seen those things ? Look also at 
 these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself all 
 simplicity. Does anyonejdo_wrongj_ 
 
 self that his does the wrong. Has anything^ 
 TTappened""'to"~thee ?Well ; out of the universe 
 Beginning everything which happens has 
 out to thee. In a 
 Thou must turn to profit 
 the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be 
 sober in thy relaxation. 
 
 27. Either it is a well-arranged universe l or a 
 chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But 
 can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder in 
 
 1 Antoninus here uses the word 6<r/xos both in the sense of 
 the Universe and of Order ; and it is difficult to express his 
 neaning. 
 
 been apportioned and spun 
 Vord, thy liie is short. 
 
1 86 SfEDIT. 1 770.V& 
 
 the 'All? And this too when all things are so 
 separated and diffused and sympathetic. 
 
 28. A black character, a womanish characters 
 stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, 
 stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyran- 
 nical. 
 
 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does 
 not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger who 
 does not know what is going on in it. He is a 
 runaway, who flies from social reason ; he is blind, 
 who shuts the eyes of the understanding; he is 
 poor, who has need of another, and has not from 
 himself all things which are useful for life. He is 
 an abscess on the universe who withdraws and 
 separates himself from the reason of our common 
 nature through being displeased with the things 
 which happen, for the same nature produces this, 
 and has produced thee too : he is a piece rent 
 asunder from the state, who tears his own soul 
 from that of reasonable animals, which is one. 
 
 30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
 and the other without a book : here is another 
 half naked : Bread I have not, he says, and I abide 
 by reason and I do not get the means of living 
 out of my learning,! and I abide [by my reason]. 
 
 31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou 
 hast learned, and be content with it ; and pass 
 through the rest of life like one who has intrusted 
 to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 137 
 
 making thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of 
 any man. 
 
 32. Consider, for example, the times of Vespa- 
 sian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
 marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, war- 
 ring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, 
 flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot- 
 ting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the 
 present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring con- 
 sulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of 
 these people no longer exists at all. Again, re- 
 move to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the 
 same. Their life too is gone. In like manner 
 view also the other epochs of time and of whole 
 nations, and see how many after great efforts soon 
 fell and were resolved into the elements. But 
 chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou 
 hast thyself known distracting themselves about 
 idle things, neglecting to do what was in accord- 
 ance with their proper constitution, and to hold 
 firmly to this and to be content with it. And 
 herein it is necessary to remember that the atten- 
 tion given to everything has its proper value and 
 proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, 
 if thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no 
 further than is fit. 
 
 33. The words which were formerly familiar are 
 now antiquated : so also the names of those who 
 were famed of old, are now in a manner anti- 
 
138 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 quated, Camillas, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and 
 a little after also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, 
 then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all 
 I things soon pass away and become a mere tale, arid 
 I complete oblivion soon buries them. And I say 
 a i this of those who have shone in a wondrous way. 
 For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out 
 their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of 
 them. And, to conclude the matter, what is even 
 an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What 
 then is that about which we ought to employ our 
 serious pains ? This one thing, thoughts just, and 
 acts social, and words which never lie, and a dis- 
 position which gladly accepts all that happens, as 
 necessary, as usual, as flowing from a principle and 
 spurce of the same kind. 
 
 34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of 
 the fates], allowing her to spin thy thread f into 
 whatever things she pleases. 
 
 35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
 which remembers and that which is remem- 
 bered. 
 
 36. Observe constantly that all things take place 
 by change, and accustom thyself to consider that 
 the nature of the universe loves nothing so much 
 as to change the things which are and to make 
 new things like them. For everything that exists 
 is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But 
 thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 139 
 
 into the earth or into a womb : but this is a very 
 vulgar notion. 
 
 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet 
 simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without 
 suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor 
 kindly disposed towards all ; nor dost thou yet 
 place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
 38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those 
 of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, and 
 what kind they pursue. 
 
 39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the 
 ruling principle of another ; nor yet in any turn- 
 ing and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where 
 is it then ? It is in that part of thee in which sub- 
 sists the power of forming opinions about evils. 
 Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and 
 all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the 
 poor body, is cut, burnt, rilled with matter and 
 rottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms 
 opinions about these things be quiet ; that is, let 
 it judge that nothing is either bad or good which 
 can happen equally to the bad man and the good,- 
 For that which happens equally to him who lives 
 contrary to nature and to him who lives according 
 to nature, is neither according to nature nor con- 
 trary to nature. 
 
 40. Constantly regard the universe as one living 
 being, having one substance and one soul ; and 
 observe how all things have reference to one per- 
 
140 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 ception, the perception of this one living being; 
 \ and how all things act with one movement ; and 
 Cj how all things are the co-operating causes of all 
 r things which exist; observe too the continuous spin- 
 ning of the thread and the contexture of the web. 
 
 41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, . 
 as Epictetus used to say (i. c. 19). ' 
 
 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
 and no good for things to subsist in consequence 
 of change. 
 
 43. (T^neA is like a river made up of the events 
 which happen, and a violent stream ; for as soon 
 as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and 
 
 Kjx another comes in its place, and this will be carried 
 f away too. 
 
 / 44. Everything which happens is as familiar and 
 /well known as the rose in spring and the fruit in 
 /summer; for such is disease, and death, and cal- 
 *c/ umny, and treachery, and whatever else delights 
 s. fools or vexes them. 
 
 ^- 45. In the series of things, those which follow 
 are always- aptly fitted to those which have gone 
 before : for this series is not like a mere enumera- 
 tion of disjointed things, which has only a neces- 
 sary sequence, but it is a rational connection : and 
 as all existing things are arranged together harmo- 
 niously, so the things which come into existence 
 exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful 
 relationship (vi. 38 ; vii, 9; vii. 75, note). 
 
MARC 'ffo AUBELIU8 ANTONINUS. 141 
 
 46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, 
 that the death of earth is to become' water, and the 
 death of water is to become air, and the death of 
 air is to become fire, and reversely. And think 
 too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and 
 that men quarrel with that with which they are 
 most constantly in communion, the reason which 
 governs the universe ; and the things which they 
 daily meet with seem to them strange : and con- 
 sider that we ought not to act and speak as if we 
 were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and 
 speak ; and that f we ought not, like children who 
 learn from their parents, simply to act and speak 
 as we have been taught, f 
 
 47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to- 
 morrow, or certainly on the day after to-morrow, 
 thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the 
 third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in 
 the highest degree mean-spirited ; for how small is 
 the difference. So think it no great thing to die 
 after as many years as thou canst name rather than 
 to-morrow. 
 
 48. Think continually how many physicians are 
 dead after often contracting their eyebrows over 
 the sick ; and how many astrologers after predict- 
 ing with great pretensions the deaths of others ; and 
 how many philosophers after endless discourses on 
 death or immortality ; how many heroes after kill- 
 ing thousands ; and how many tyrants who have 
 
142 MED IT A TIONS, 
 
 used their power over men's lives with terrible 
 insolence, as if they were immortal ; and how many 
 cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice l and 
 Pompeii and Herculanum, and others innumerable. 
 Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast known, 
 one after another. One man after burying another 
 has been laid out dead, and another buries him ; 
 and all this in a short time. To conclude, always 
 observe how ephemeral and worthless human things 
 are, and what was yesterday a little mucus, to- 
 morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then 
 through this little space of time conformably to 
 nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an 
 olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who 
 produced it, and thanking the tree on which it 
 grew. 
 
 49. Be like the promontory against which the 
 waves continually break, but it stands firm and 
 tames the fury of the water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I because this has happened to me ? 
 Not so, but happy am I, though this has happened 
 to me, because I continue free from pain, neither 
 crushed by the present nor fearing the future. 
 For such a thing as this might have happened to 
 every man ; but every man would not have con- 
 tinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why 
 
 1 Ovid, Met. xv. 293 : 
 
 " Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes, 
 Invenies ub aquis." 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 143 
 
 then is that rather a misfortune than this a good 
 fortune ? And dost thou in all cases call that a 
 man's misfortune which is not a deviation from 
 man's nature ? And does a thing seem to thee to 
 be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not 
 contrary to the will of man's nature ? Well, thou 
 knowest the will of nature. Will then this which 
 has happened prevent thee from being just, mag- 
 nanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against in- 
 considerate opinions and falsehood ; will it prevent 
 thee from having modesty, freedom, and everything 
 else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains 
 all that is its own ? Remember too on every occa- 
 sion which leads thee to vexation to apply this 
 principle : not that this is a misfortune, but that 
 to bear it nobly is good fortune. 
 
 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards 
 contempt of death, to pass in review those who have 
 tenaciously stuck to life. What more then have 
 they gained than those who have died early ? 
 Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at last, 
 Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one 
 else like them, who have carried out many to be 
 buried, and then were carried out themselves. 
 Altogether the interval is small [between birth and 
 death] ; and consider with how much trouble, and 
 in company with what sort of people, and in what 
 a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. 
 Do not then consider life a thing of any value.f 
 
144 MEDITATIONS. ^ 
 
 For look to the immensity of time behind thee, 
 and to the time which is before thee, another 
 boundless space. In this infinity then what is the 
 difference between him who lives three days and 
 him who lives three generations? 1 
 
 51. Always run to the short way ; and the short 
 way is the natural : accordingly say and do every- 
 thing in conformity with the soundest reason. 
 For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,! and 
 warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious display. 
 
 1 An allusion to Homer's Nestor, who was living at the war 
 of Troy among the third generation, like old Parr with his 
 hundred and fifty-two years, and some others in modern 
 times who have beaten Parr by twenty or thirty years if it is 
 true ; and yet they died at last. The word is rpiyep-rjviov in 
 Antoninus. Nestor is named rptytpwv by some writers ; but 
 here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's 
 
V. 
 
 1. IN the morning when thou risest unwillingly, 
 let this thought be present, I am rising to the 
 work of a human being. Why then am I dissatis- 
 fied if I am going to do the things for which I 
 exist and for which I was brought into the world ? 
 Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bed- 
 clothes and keep myself warm ? But this is more 
 ^ pleasant. Dost thou exist then to take thy pleas- 
 ure, and not at all for action or exertion? Dost 
 thou not see the little plants, the little birds, the 
 ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put 
 in order their several parts of the universe ? And 
 art thou unwilling to do the work of a human 
 being, and dost thou not make haste to do that 
 which is according to thy nature? But it is 
 necessary to take rest also. It is necessary. 
 However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too : 
 she has fixed bounds to eating and drinking, and 
 yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what 
 is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou 
 stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou 
 
ME BIT A TIONS. 
 
 lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst 
 love thy nature and her will. But those who love 
 their several arts exhaust themselves in working 
 at them unwashed and without food; but thou 
 valuest thy own nature less than the turner values 
 the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or 
 the lover of money values his money, or the vain- 
 glorious man his little glory. And such men, 
 when they have a violent affection to a thing, 
 choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to 
 perfect the things which they care for. But are 
 the acts which concern society more vile in thy 
 eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 
 
 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
 every impression which is troublesome or unsuit- 
 able, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. 
 
 3. Judge every word and deed which are ac- 
 cording to nature to be fit for thee ; and be not 
 diverted by the blame which follows from any 
 people nor by their words, but if a thing is good 
 to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy of 
 thee. For those persons have their peculiar lead- 
 ing principle and follow their peculiar, movement ; 
 which things do not thou regard, but go straight 
 on, following thy own nature and the common 
 nature ; and the way of both is one. 
 
 4. I go through the things which happen accord- 
 ing to nature until I shall fall and rest, breathing 
 out my breath into that element out of which I 
 
MARCUS AUKELIUS ANTONINUS. 147 
 
 daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of 
 which my father collected the seed, and my mother V 
 the blood, and my nurse the milk ; out of which 
 during so many years I have been supplied with 
 food and drink ; which bears me when I tread on 
 it and abuse it for so many purposes. 
 
 5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharp- 
 ness of thy wits. Be it so : but there are many 
 other things of which thou canst not say, I am not 
 formed for them by nature. Show those qualities 
 then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, 
 gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, 
 contentment with thy portion and with few things, 
 benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, 
 freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou 
 not see how many qualities thou art immediately 
 able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of 
 natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still 
 remainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou 
 compelled through being defectively furnished by 
 nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, 
 and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try to 
 please men, and to make great display, and to be so 
 restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou 
 mightest have been delivered from these things 
 long ago. /Only if in truth thou canst be charged 
 with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, /^ 
 thou must exert thyself about this also, not neg- ^^ 
 lecting it n m> yfit *ak"ig pleasure in thy dulness. V 
 
 \VfiJ? 
 
148 MEDITA TIONS. 
 
 6. One man, when he has done a service to 
 another, is ready to set it down to his account as 
 a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do this, 
 but still in his v own mind he thinks of the man as 
 his debtor, and he knows what he has done. A 
 third in a manner does not even know what he has 
 done, but he is like a vine which has produced 
 grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has 
 once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when 
 he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, 
 a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when 
 he has done a good act, does not call out for 
 others to come and see, but he goes on to another 
 act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
 in season. Must a man then be one of these, 
 who in a manner act thus without observing it ? 
 Yes. But this very thing is necessary, the obser- 
 vation of what a man is doing : for, it may be 
 said, it is characteristic of the social animal to per- 
 ceive that he is working in a social manner, and 
 indeed to wish that his social partner also should 
 perceive it. It is true what thou sayest, but thou 
 dost not rightly understand what is now said : and 
 for this reason thou wilt become one of those of 
 whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by 
 a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose 
 to understand the meaning of what is said, do not 
 fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social 
 act. 
 
\ 
 
 MARCUS AUK E LIU S ANTONINUS. 149 
 
 7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O 
 dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
 Athenians and on the plains. In truth we ought 
 riot to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this 
 simple and noble fashion. 
 
 8. Just as we must understand when it is 
 said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man 
 horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or going 
 without shoes, so we must understand it when it 
 is said, That the nature of the universe prescribed 
 to this man disease, or mutilation, or loss, or any- 
 thing else of the kind. For in the first case Pre- 
 scribed means something like this : he prescribed 
 this for this man as a thing adapted to procure 
 health; and in the second case it means, That 
 which happens 1 to [or suits] every man is fixed in 
 a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this 
 is what we mean when we say that things are suit- 
 able to us, as the workmen say of squared stones 
 in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, 
 when they fit them to one another in some kind of 
 connection. For there is altogether one fitness 
 [harmony]. And as the universe is made up out 
 of all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of 
 all existing causes necessit}' [destiny] is made up 
 to be such a cause as it is. And even those who 
 are completely ignorant-understand what I mean ; 
 
 1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of o-u/u- 
 ftubmv. 
 
150 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought this 
 to such a person. This then was brought and 
 this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive 
 these things, as well as those which Aesculapius 
 prescribes. Many as a matter of course even 
 among his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we 
 accept them in the hope of health. Let the per- 
 fecting and accomplishment of the things which 
 the common nature judges to be good, be judged 
 by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. 
 And so accept everything which happens, even if 
 it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the 
 health of the universe and to the prosperity and 
 felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For he would 
 not have brought on any man what he has brought, 
 if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does 
 the nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause 
 anything which is not suitable to that which is 
 directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to 
 be content with that which happens to thee ; the 
 one, because it was done for thee and prescribed 
 for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, 
 originally from the most ancient causes spun with 
 thy destiny; and the other, because even that 
 which comes severally to every man is to the power 
 which administers the universe a cause of felicity 
 and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. 
 For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if 
 thou cuttest off anything whatever from the con- 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 151 
 
 junction and the continuit}' either of the parts or 
 of the causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it 
 is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in 
 a manner triest to put anything out of the way. 
 
 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dis- 
 satisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing every- 
 thing according to right principles, but when thou 
 hast failed, return back again, and be content if 
 the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
 with man's nature, and love this to which thou 
 returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if 
 she were a master, but act like those who have 
 sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as 
 another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. 
 For thus thou wilt not fail to f obey reason, and 
 thou wilt repose in it. And remember that 
 philosophy requires only the things which thy 
 nature requires ; but thou wouldst have something 
 else which is not according to nature. It may be 
 objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this 
 [which I am doing] ? But is not this the very 
 reason why pleasure deceives us ? Arid consider 
 if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, equanimity, 
 piety, are not more agreeable. Fur what is more 
 agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest 
 of the security and the happy course of all things 
 which depend on the faculty of understanding and 
 knowledge ? 
 
 10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment 
 
152 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few 
 nor those common philosophers, altogether unin- 
 telligible ; nay even to the Stoics themselves they 
 seem difficult to understand. And all our assent 
 is changeable ; for where is the man who never 
 changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects 
 themselves, and consider how short-lived they are 
 and worthless, and that they may be in the pos- 
 session of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. 
 Then turn to the morals of those who live with 
 thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
 most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
 being hardly able to endure himself. In such 
 darkness then and dirt, and in so constant a flux 
 both of substance and of time, and of motion and 
 of things moved, what there is worth being highly 
 prized, or even an object of serious pursuit, I 
 cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's 
 duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the 
 natural dissolution, and not to be vexed at the 
 delay, but to rest in these principles only : the one, 
 that nothing will happen to me which is not con- 
 formable to the nature of the universe ; and the 
 other, that it is in my power never to act contrary 
 to my god and daemon : for there is no man who 
 will compel me to this. 
 
 11. About what am I now employing my own 
 soul ? On every occasion I must ask myself this 
 question, and inquire, What have I now in this 
 
MAS C US AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 158 
 
 part of me which they call the ruling principle ? 
 and whose soul have I now, that of a child, or 
 of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a 
 tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast? 
 
 12. What kind of things those are which appear 
 good to the many, we may learn even from this. 
 For if any man should conceive certain things as 
 being really good, such as prudence, temperance, 
 justice, fortitude, he would not after having first 
 conceived these endure to listen to anything f 
 which should not be in harmony with what is really 
 good.f But if a man has first conceived as good 
 the things which appear to the many to be good, 
 he will listen and readily receive as very applicable 
 that which was said by the comic writer, f Thus 
 even the many perceive the difference.! For 
 were it not so, this saying would not offend and 
 would not be rejected [in the first case], while we 
 receive it when it is said of wealth, and of the 
 means which further luxury and fame, as said 
 fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should 
 value and think those things to be good, to which 
 after their first conception in the mind the words 
 of the comic writer might be aptly applied, 
 that he who has them, through pure abundance 
 has not a place to ease himself in. 
 
 13. I am composed of the formal and the mate- 
 rial ; and neither of them will perish into non- . 
 existence, as neither of them came into existence 
 
154 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 out of non-existence. Every part of me then will 
 be reduced by change into some part of the uni- 
 verse, and that again will change into another 
 part of the universe, and so on forever. And by 
 consequence of such a change I too exist, and 
 those who begot me, and so on forever in the 
 other direction. For nothing hinders us from 
 saying so, even if the universe is administered 
 according to definite periods [of revolution]. 
 
 14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] 
 are powers which are sufficient for themselves and 
 for their own works. They move then from a 
 first principle which is their own, and they make 
 their way to the end which is proposed to them ; 
 and this is the reason why such acts are named 
 Catorth<5seis or right acts, which word signifies 
 that they proceed by the right road. 
 
 15. None of these things ought to be called a 
 man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
 They are not required of a man, nor does man's 
 nature promise them, nor are they the means of 
 man's nature attaining its end. Neither then 
 does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet 
 that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, 
 and that which aids towards this end is that which 
 is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong 
 to man, it would not be right for a man to despise 
 them and to set himself against them ; nor would 
 a man be worthy of praise who showed that he 
 
MARCUS AUKELIUS ANTONINUS. 155 
 
 did not want these things, nor would he who 
 stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed 
 these things were good. But now the more of 
 these things a man deprives himself of, or of other 
 things like them, or even when he is deprived of 
 any of them, the more patiently he endures the 
 loss, just in the same degree he is a better man. 
 
 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also 
 will be the character of thy mind ; for the soul is 
 dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a contin- 
 uous series of such thoughts as these : for instance, 
 that where a man can live, there he can also live 
 well. But he must live in a palace ; well then, he 
 can also live well in a palace. And again, consider 
 that for whatever purpose each thing has been 
 constituted, for this it has been constituted, and 
 towards this it is carried ; and its end is in that 
 towards which it is carried ; and where the end is, 
 there also is the advantage and the good of each 
 thing. Now the good for the reasonable animal is 
 society ; for that we are made for society has been 
 shown above. 1 Is it not plain that the inferior 
 exist for the sake of the superior ? But the things 
 which have life are superior to those which have 
 not life, and of those which have life the superior 
 are those which have reason. 
 
 17. To seek what is "impossible is madness: and 
 it is impossible that the bad should not do some- 
 thing of this kind. 
 
 1 ii. i. 
 
156 &y MEDITATIONS. 
 
 18. Nothing happens to any man which he is 
 not formed by nature to bear. The same things 
 
 Tiappen to another, and either because he does not 
 see that they have happened, or because he would 
 show a great spirit, he is firm and remains un- 
 harmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and 
 conceit should be stronger than wisdom. 
 
 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in 
 the least degree ; nor have they admission to the 
 soul, nor can they turn or move the soul : but the 
 soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever 
 judgments it may think proper to make, such it 
 makes for itself the things which present them- 
 selves to it. 
 
 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to 
 me, so far as I must do good to men and endure 
 them. But so far as some men make themselves 
 obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me 
 one of the things which are indifferent, no less than 
 the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true 
 that these may impede my action, but they are no 
 impediments to my affects and disposition, which 
 have the power of acting conditionally and chang- 
 ing : for the mind converts and changes every hin- 
 drance to its activity into an aid; and so that 
 which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an 
 act ; and that which is an obstacle on the road 
 helps us on this road. 
 
 21. Reverence that which is best in the universe ; 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 157 
 
 and this is that which makes use of all things and 
 directs all things. And in like manner also rev- 
 erence that which is best in thyself ; and this is of 
 the same kind as that. For in thyself also, that 
 which makes use of everything else is this, and thy 
 life is directed by this. 
 
 22. That which does no harm to the state, does 
 no harm to the citizen. In the case of every 
 appearance of harm apply this rule : if the state is 
 not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if 
 the state is harmed, thou must not be angry with 
 him who does harm to the state. Show him where 
 his error is. 
 
 23. Often think of the rapidity with which things 
 pass by and disappear, both the things which are 
 and the things which are produced. For substance 
 is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities 
 of things are in constant change, and the causes 
 work in infinite varieties ; and there is hardly 
 anything which stands still. And consider this 
 which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the 
 past and of the future in which all things disappear. 
 How then is he not a fool who is puffed up with 
 such things or plagued about them and makes him- 
 self miserable ? for they vex him only for a time, 
 and a short time. 
 
 24. Think of the universal substance, of which 
 thou hast a very small portion ; and of universal 
 time, of which a short and indivisible interval lias 
 
158 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 been assigned to thee ; and of that which is fixed 
 by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. 
 
 25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look 
 to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity. 
 I now have what the universal nature wills me to 
 have ; and I do what my nature now wills me to 
 do. 
 
 26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
 governs be undisturbed by the movements in the 
 flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain ; and let it not 
 unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and 
 limit those affects to their parts. But when these 
 affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other 
 sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is 
 all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sen- 
 sation, for it is natural : but let not the ruling part 
 of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is 
 either good or bad. 
 
 27. Live with the gods. And he does live with 
 the gods who constantly shows to them that his 
 own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to 
 him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, 
 which Zeus hath given to every man for his guar- 
 dian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is 
 every man's understanding and reason. 
 
 28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits 
 stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth smells 
 foul ? What good will this anger do thee ? He has 
 such a mouth, he has such armpits : it is necessary 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 159 
 
 that such an emanation must come from such 
 things ; but the man has reason, it will be said, and 
 he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he 
 offends ; I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well 
 then, and thou hast reason : by thy rational faculty 
 stir up his rational faculty ; show him his error, ad- 
 monish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, 
 and there is no need of anger, [f Neither tragic 
 actor nor whore.f] 1 
 
 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
 gone out, ... so it is in thy power to live here. 
 But if men do not permit thee, then get away out 
 of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. 
 The house is smoky, and I quit it. 2 Why dost 
 thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long 
 as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am 
 free, and no man shall hinder me from doing what 
 I choose ; and I choose to do what is according to 
 the nature of the rational and social animal. 
 
 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
 Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
 the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- 
 
 1 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also 
 something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of S 29, 
 where he says us &-c\6uv I'^v Siavo^, which Gataker translates 
 "as if thou wast about to quit life ; " but we cannot trans- 
 late t$e\d<bv in that way. Other translations are not much 
 more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and left it 
 imperfect. 
 
 8 Epictetus, i. 26, 18. 
 
160 MED IT A TION8. 
 
 perior to one another. Thou seest how it has sub- 
 ordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to everything 
 its proper portion, and has brought together into 
 concord with one another the things which are the 
 best. 
 
 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
 gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to 
 those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, 
 kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast 
 hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this 
 may be said of thee, 
 
 " Never has wronged a man in deed or word." 
 
 Arid call to recollection both how many things 
 thou hast passed through, and how many things 
 thou hast been able to endure and that the history 
 of thy life is now complete and thy service is 
 ended ; and how many beautiful things thou hast 
 seen ; and how many pleasures and pains thou hast 
 despised; and how man} r things called honorable 
 thou hast spurned ; and to how many ill-minded 
 folks thou hast shown a kind disposition. 
 
 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb 
 him who has skill and knowledge ? What soul 
 then has skill and knowledge ? That which knows 
 beginning and end, and knows the reason which 
 pervades all substance, and through all time by 
 fixed periods [revolutions] administers the uni- 
 verse. 
 
I 
 
 MAE C U8 A UBELIUS ANTONINUS. 161 
 
 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a 
 skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; 
 but name is sound and echo. And the things which 
 are much valued in life are empty and rotten and 
 trifling, and [like] little dogs biting one another, 
 and little children quarrelling, laughing, and then 
 straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty 
 and justice and truth are fled 
 
 Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 
 
 HESIOD, Works, etc. v. 197, 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee here, 
 if the objects of sense are easily changed and 
 never stand still, and the organs of perception are 
 dull and easily receive false impressions, and the 
 poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood ? But 
 to have good repute amid such a world as this is 
 an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in 
 tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction 
 or removal to another state ? And until that time 
 comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else than 
 to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do 
 good to men, and to practise tolerance and self-re- 
 straint ; l but as to everything which is beyond the 
 limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember 
 that this is neither thine nor in thy power. 
 
 1 This is the Stoic precept d^ X oi> xal av^ov- The first part / 
 teaches us to be content with men and things as they are. 
 The second part teaches us the virtue of self-restraint, or 
 the government of our passions. 
 
162 
 
 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow 
 of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, 
 and think and act in the right way. These two 
 things are common both to the soul of God and to 
 the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational 
 being: not to be hindered by another; and to 
 hold good to consist in the disposition to justice 
 and the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire 
 find its termination. 
 
 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an 
 effect of my own badness, and the common weal is 
 not injured, why am I troubled about it, and what 
 is the harm to the common weal ? 
 
 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by 
 the appearance of things, but give help [to all] 
 according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if 
 they should have sustained loss in matters which 
 are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a 
 damage ; for it is a bad habit. But as the old 
 man, when he went away, asked back his foster- 
 child's top, remembering that it was a top, so do 
 thou in this case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast 
 thou forgotten, man, what these things are? 
 Yes; but they are objects of great concern to 
 these people wilt thou too then be made a fool 
 for these things ? I was once a fortunate man, 
 but I lost it, I know not how. But fortunate 
 means that a man has assigned to himself a good 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 163 
 
 fortune : and a good fortune is good disposition of 
 the soul, good emotions, good actions. 1 
 
 1 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may 
 be corrupt, and the general purport of the section cannot be 
 discovered. Perhaps several things have been improperly 
 joined in one section. I have translated it nearly literally. 
 Different translators give the section a different turn, and 
 the critics have tried to mend what they cannot understand. 
 
u 
 
 VI. 
 
 1. THE substance of the universe is obedient 
 and compliant ; and the reason which governs it 
 has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no 
 malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is any- 
 thing harmed by it. But all things are made and 
 perfected according to this reason. 
 
 2. Let it make no difference to thee whethe 
 thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty 
 and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with 
 sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and 
 whether dying or doing something else. For it is 
 one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : 
 it is sufficient then in this act also to do well 
 what we have in hand (vi. 22, 28). 
 
 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality 
 of anything nor its value escape thee. 
 
 4. All existing things soon change, and they will 
 either be reduced to vapor, if indeed all substance 
 is one, or they will be dispersed. 
 
 5. The reason which governs knows what its 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 165 
 
 own disposition is, and what it does, and on what 
 material it works. 
 
 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to 
 become like [the wrong-doer]. 
 
 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in 
 passing from one social act to another social act, 
 thinking of God. 
 
 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and 
 turns itself, and while it makes itself such as it is 
 and such as it wills to be, it also makes everything 
 which happens appear to itself to be such as it 
 wills. 
 
 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe 
 every single thing is accomplished ; for certainly 
 it is not in conformity to any other nature that 
 each thing is accomplished, either a nature which 
 externally comprehends this, or a nature which is 
 comprehended within this nature, or a nature ex- 
 ternal and independent of this (xi. 1 ; vi. 40 ; 
 viii. 50). 
 
 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a 
 mutual involution of things, and a dispersion, or 
 it is unity and order and providence. If then it is 
 the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortu- 
 itous combination of things and such a disorder? 
 and why do I care about anything else than how 
 I shall at last become -earth ? and why am I dis- 
 turbed, for the dispersion of my elements will 
 happen whatever I do ? But if the other supposi- 
 
166 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 ^tion is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust 
 \in him w .o governs (iv. 27). 
 v 11. When thou hast been compelled by circum- 
 stances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly 
 return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune 
 longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wilt 
 have more mastery over the harmony by contin- 
 ually recurring to it. 
 
 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at 
 the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy 
 step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- 
 turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy 
 now be to thee step-mother and mother : return to 
 philosophy frequently and repose in her, through 
 whom what thou meetest with in the court appears 
 to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in 
 the court. 
 
 13. When we have meat before us and such eat- 
 ables, we receive the impression that this is the 
 dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a 
 bird or of a pig ; and again, that this Falernian is 
 only a little grape-juice, and this purple robe some 
 sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish : 
 such then are these impressions, and they reach 
 the things themselves and penetrate them, and so 
 we see what kind of things they are. Just in the 
 same way ought we to act all through life, and 
 where there are things which appear most worthy 
 of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 167 
 
 look at their worthlessness and strip them of all 
 the words by which they are exalted. For out- 
 ward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, 
 and when thou art most sure that thou art em- 
 ployed about things worth thy pains, it is then 
 that it cheats thee most. Consider then what 
 Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 
 
 14. Most of the things which the multitude 
 admire are referred to objects of the most general 
 kind, those which are held together by cohesion 
 or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- 
 trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired 
 by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- 
 ferred to the things which are held together by a 
 living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are 
 admired by men who are still more instructed are 
 the things which are held together by a rational 
 soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so 
 far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in 
 some other way, or simply rational so far as it 
 possesses a number of slaves. But he who values 
 a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for 
 political life, regards nothing else except this ; and 
 above all things he keeps his soul in a condition 
 and in an activity conformable to reason and social 
 life, and he co-operates to this end with those who 
 are of the same kind as. himself. 
 
 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and 
 others are hurrying out of it ; and of that which is 
 
168 MEDITA T10N8. 
 
 coming into existence part is already extinguished. 
 Motions and changes are continually renewing the 
 world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is 
 always renewing the infinite duration of ages. In 
 this flowing stream then, on which there is no 
 abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by 
 on which a man would set a high price ? It would 
 be just as if a man should fall in love with one of 
 the sparrows which fly by, but it has already 
 passed out of sight. Something of this kind is the 
 very life of every man, like the exhalation of the 
 blood and the respiration of the air. For such as 
 it is to have once drawn in the air and to have 
 given it back, which we do every moment, just 
 the same is it with the whole respiratory power, 
 which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday 
 and the day before, to give it back to the element 
 from which thou didst first draw it. 
 
 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
 thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- 
 cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving 
 of impressions by the appearances of things, nor 
 being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor 
 assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; 
 for this is just like the act of separating and 
 parting with the useless part of our food. What 
 then is worth being valued ? To be received with 
 clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value 
 the clapping of tongues; for the praise which 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 169 
 
 comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. 
 Suppose then that thou hast given up this worth- 
 less thing called fame, what remains that is worth 
 valuing ? This, in my opinion : to move thyself 
 and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper 
 constitution, to which end both all employments 
 and arts lead. For every art aims at this, that 
 the thing which has been made should be adapted 
 to the work for which it has been made ; and both 
 the vine-planter who looks after the vine, arid the 
 horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek 
 this end. But the education and the teaching of 
 youth aim at something. In this then is the value 
 of the education and the teaching. And if this is 
 well, thou wilt not seek anything else. Wilt thou 
 not cease to value many other things too ? Then 
 thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy 
 own happiness, nor without passion. For of 
 necessity thou must be, envious, jealous, and 
 suspicious of those who can take away those 
 things, and plot against those who have that 
 which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man 
 must be altogether in a state of perturbation who 
 wants any of these things ; and besides, he must 
 often find fault with the gods. But to reverence 
 and honor thy own mind will make thee content 
 with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in 
 agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that 
 they give and have ordered. 
 
170 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 17. Above, below, all around are the move- 
 ments of the elements. But the motion of virtue 
 is in none of these : it is something more divine, 
 and advancing by a way hardly observed, it goes 
 happily on its road. 
 
 18. How strangely men act ! They will not 
 praise those who are living at the same time and 
 living with themselves; but to be themselves 
 praised by posterity, by those whom they have 
 never seen or ever will see, this they set much 
 value on. But this is very much the same as if 
 thou shouldst be grieved because those who have 
 lived before thee did not praise thee. 
 
 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by 
 thyself, do not think that it is impossible for man: 
 but if anything is possible for man and conform- 
 able to his nature, think that this can be attained 
 by thyself too. 
 
 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a 
 man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing 
 against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, 
 we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we 
 offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a 
 treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
 against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet 
 with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. 
 Something like this let thy behavior be in all the 
 other parts of life ; let us overlook many things in 
 those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, 171 
 
 For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the 
 way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 
 
 21. If any man is able to convince me and show 
 me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly 
 change ; for I seek the truth, by which no man 
 was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in 
 his error and ignorance. 
 
 22. I do my duty : other things trouble me not ; 
 for they are either things without life, or things 
 without reason, or things that have rambled and 
 know not the way. 
 
 23. As to the animals which have no reason, 
 and generally all things and objects, do thou, since 
 thou hast reason and they have none, make use of 
 them with a generous and liberal spirit. But 
 towards human beings, as they have reason, 
 behave in a social spirit. And on all occasions 
 call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about 
 the length of time in which thou shalt do this ; 
 for even three hours so spent are sufficient. 
 
 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
 by death were brought to the same state ; for 
 either they were received among the same seminal 
 principles of the universe, or they were alike dis- 
 persed among the atoms. 
 
 25. Consider how many things in the same 
 indivisible time take place in each of us, things 
 which concern the body and things which concern 
 the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many 
 
172 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 more things, or rather all things which come into 
 existence in that which is the one and all, which 
 we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 
 
 26. If any man should propose to thee the 
 question, how the name Antoninus is written,, 
 wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
 each letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt 
 thou be angry too ? Wilt thou not go on with 
 composure and number every letter? Just so 
 then in this life also remember that every duty is 
 made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to 
 observe, and without being disturbed or showing 
 anger towards those who are angry with thee to go 
 on thy way and finish that which is set before thee. 
 
 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
 after the things which appear to them to be 
 suitable to their nature and profitable ! And yet 
 in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, 
 when thou art vexed because they do wrong. 
 For they are certainly moved towards things 
 because they suppose them to be suitable to their 
 nature and profitable to them. But it is not so. 
 Teach them then, and show them without 
 being angry. 
 
 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
 strings which move the appetites, and of the dis- 
 cursive movements of the thoughts, and of the 
 service to the flesh (ii. 12). 
 
MARCUS AURELIU8 ANTONINUS. 173 
 
 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give J 
 way in this life, when thy body does not give way. 
 
 30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
 Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for 
 such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, 
 good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend 
 of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affection- 
 ate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to con- 
 tinue to be such as philosophy wished to make 
 thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short 
 is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene 
 life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do 
 everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember 
 his constancy in every act which was conformable 
 to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his 
 piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his 
 sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, and 
 his efforts to understand things; and how he 
 would never let anything pass without having 
 first most carefully examined it and clearly under- 
 stood it ; and how he bore with those who blamed 
 him unjustly without blaming them in return ; 
 how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he 
 listened not to calumnies, and how exact an ex- 
 aminer of manners and actions he was ; and not 
 given to reproach people, nor timid, nor sus- 
 picious, nor a sophist; and with how little he 
 was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, 
 servants ; and how laborious and patient ; and 
 
174 MEDFTA TIONS. 
 
 how he was able on account of his sparing diet to 
 hold out to the evening, not even requiring to 
 relieve himself by any evacuations except at the 
 usual hour ; and his firmness and uniformity in 
 his friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of 
 speech in those who opposed his opinions; and 
 the pleasure that he had when any man showed 
 him anything better ; and how religious he was 
 without superstition. Imitate all this, that thou 
 inayest have as good a conscience, when thy last 
 hour comes, as he had (i. 16). 
 
 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself 
 back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from 
 sleep and hast perceived that they were only 
 dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking 
 hours look at these [the things about thee] as 
 thou didst look at those [the dreams]. 
 
 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now 
 to this little body all things are indifferent, for it 
 is not able to perceive differences. But to the 
 understanding those things only are indifferent 
 which are not the works of its own activity. But 
 whatever things are the works of its own activity, 
 all these are in its power. And of these 'however 
 only those which are done with reference to the 
 present; for as to the future and the past activities 
 of the mind, even these are for the present in- 
 different. 
 
 33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 175 
 
 that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as 
 the foot does the foot's work and the hand the 
 hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his 
 labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the 
 things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary 
 to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 
 
 34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by 
 robbers, patricides, tyrants. 
 
 35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen 
 accommodate themselves up to a certain point to 
 those who are not skilled in their craft, never- 
 theless they cling to the reason [the principles] of 
 their art, and do not endure to depart from it? 
 Is it not strange if the architect and the physi- 
 cian shall have more respect to the reason [the 
 principles] of their own arts than man to his 
 own reason, which is common to him and the 
 gods? 
 
 36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe ; 
 all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little 
 clod of the universe : all the present time is a 
 point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, 
 perishable. All things come from thence, from 
 that universal ruling power either directly pro- 
 ceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly 
 the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is poi- 
 sonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as 
 mud, are after-products of the grand and beau- 
 tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of 
 
176 MEDITA TION8. 
 
 another kind from that which thou dost vener- 
 ate, but form a just opinion of the source of all 
 (vii. 75). 
 
 37. He who has seen present things has seen 
 all, both everything which has taken place from 
 all eternity and everything which will be for time 
 without end ; for all things are of one kin and of 
 one form. 
 
 38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
 things in the universe and their relation to one 
 another. For in a manner all things are impli- 
 cated with one another, and all in this way are 
 friendly to one another ; for one thing conies in 
 order after another, and this is by virtue of the f 
 active movement and mutual conspiration and the 
 unity of the substance (ix. 1). 
 
 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy 
 lot has been cast : and the men among whom thou 
 hast received thy portion, love them, but do it 
 truly [sincerely]. 
 
 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does 
 that for which it has been made, is well, and yet 
 he who made it is not there. But in the things 
 which are held together by nature there is within, 
 and there abides in, them the power which made 
 them ; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence 
 this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live 
 and act according to its will, everything in thee is 
 in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in 
 
MABCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 177 
 
 the universe the things which belong to it are in 
 conformity to intelligence. 
 
 41. Whatever of the things which are not within 
 thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee 
 or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad 
 thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, 
 thou wilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, 
 those who are the cause of the misfortune or the 
 loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to 
 be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice 
 because we make a difference between these things 
 [because we do not regard these things as indif- 
 ferent f]. 1 But if we judge only those things 
 which are in our power to be good or bad, there 
 remains no reason either for finding fault with 
 God or standing in a hostile attitude to man. 2 
 
 42. We are all working together to one end, 
 some with knowledge and design, and others with- 
 out knowing what they do ; as men also when they 
 are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who 
 says that they are laborers and co-operators in the 
 things which take place in the universe. But men 
 co-operate after different fashions : and even those 
 co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what 
 
 1 Gataker translates this "because we strive to get these 
 things," comparing the use of 5ia<f>tp<rdai in v. 1, and x. 27, 
 and ix. 88, where it appears that his reference should be xi. 
 10. He may be right in the interpretation, but I doubt. 
 
 8 Cicero, De Natura Deorum. iii. 32. 
 
ITS MEDITATIONS. 
 
 happens and those who try to oppose it and to 
 hinder it ; for the universe had need even of such 
 men as these. It remains then for thee to under- 
 stand among what kind of workmen thou placest 
 thyself ; for he who rules all things will certainly 
 make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee 
 among some part of the co-operators and of those 
 whose labors conduce to one end. But be not 
 thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse 
 in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of. 1 
 
 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of 
 the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- 
 bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with respect 
 to each of the stars, are they not different and vet 
 they work together to the same end? 
 
 44. If the gods have determined about me and 
 about the things which must happen to me, they 
 have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
 imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to 
 doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that? for what advantage would result 
 to them from this or to the whole, which is the 
 special object of their providence ? But if they 
 have not determined about me individually, they 
 have certainly determined about the whole at 
 least, and the things which happen by way of se- 
 quence in this general arrangement I ought to 
 accept with pleasure and to be content with them. 
 
 1 Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ASTONIXUS. 179 
 
 But if they determine about nothing, which it 
 is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us 
 neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor 
 do anything else which we do as if the gods were 
 present and lived with us, but if however the 
 gods determine about none of the things which 
 concern us, I am able to determine about myself, 
 and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and 
 that is useful to every man which is conformable 
 to his own constitution and nature. But my 
 nature is rational and social ; and my city and 
 country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so 
 far as I am a man, it is the world. The things 
 then which are useful to these cities are alone use- 
 ful to me. 
 
 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for 
 the interest of the universal : this might be suffi- 
 cient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a 
 general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever 
 is profitable to any man is profitable also to other 
 men. But let the word profitable be taken here 
 in the common sense as said of things of the middle 
 kind [neither good nor bad]. 
 
 I 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
 ,- and such places, that the continual sight of the 
 same things, and the uniformity make the specta- 
 cle wearisome, so it is in. the whole of life ; for all 
 things above, below, are the same and from the 
 same. How long then ? 
 
1 80 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and 
 of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, 
 so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion 
 and Phoebus and Origariion. Now turn thy 
 thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To that 
 place then we must remove, where there are so 
 many great orators, and so many noble philoso- 
 phers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many 
 heroes of former days, and so many generals after 
 them, and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hip- 
 parchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute 
 natural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, ver- 
 satile, confident, mockers even of the perishable 
 and ephemeral life of man, as Meriippus and such 
 as are like him. As to all these consider that 
 they have long been in the dust. What harm 
 then is this to them ; and what to those whose 
 names are altogether unknown ? One thing here 
 is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and 
 justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars 
 and unjust men. 
 
 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think 
 of the virtues of those who live with thee; for 
 instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of 
 another, and the liberality of a third, and some 
 other good quality of a fourth. For nothing 
 delights so much as the examples of the virtues, 
 when they are exhibited in the morals of those 
 who live with us and present themselves in abun- 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 181 
 
 dance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must 
 keep them before us. 
 
 49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because 
 thou weighest only so many litrae and not three 
 hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou must 
 live only so many years and not more ; for as thou 
 art satisfied with the amount of substance which 
 has been assigned to thee, so be content with the 
 time. 
 
 50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But 
 act even against their will, when the principles of 
 justice lead that way. If however any man by 
 using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to 
 contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time 
 employ the hindrance towards the exercise of 
 some other virtue ; and remember that thy at- 
 tempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that 
 thou didst not desire to do impossibilities. What 
 then didst thou desire? Some such effort as 
 this. But thou attainest thy object, if the things 
 to which thou wast moved are [not] accom- 
 plished, f 
 
 51. He who loves fame considers another man's 
 activity to be his own good ; and he who loves 
 pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has 
 understanding considers his own acts to be his 
 own good. 
 
 52. It is in our power to have no opinion about 
 a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for 
 
182 MED IT A TIONS. 
 
 things themselves have no natural power to form 
 our judgments. 
 
 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to 
 what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- 
 sible, be in the speaker's mind. 
 
 ]j 54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
 neither is it good for the bee. 
 
 55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick 
 the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or 
 how could the helmsman secure the safety of those 
 in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom 
 he attends ? 
 
 56. How many together with whom I came into 
 the world are already gone out of it. 
 
 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to 
 those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear ; and 
 to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why 
 then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a false 
 opinion has less power than the bile in the jaun- 
 diced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad 
 dog? 
 
 58. No man will hinder thee from living accord- 
 ing to the reason of thy own nature : nothing will 
 happen to thee contrary to the reason of the uni- 
 versal nature. 
 
 59. What kind of people are those whom men 
 wish to please, and for what objects, and by what 
 kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all things, 
 and how many it has covered already. 
 
VII. 
 
 1. WHAT is badness? It is that which thou 
 hast often seen. And on the occasion of every- 
 thing which happens keep this in mind, that it is 
 that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up 
 and down thou wilt find the same things, with 
 which the old histories are filled, those of the 
 middle ages and those of our own day ; with which 
 cities and houses are filled now. There is nothing 
 new : all things are both familiar and short-lived. 
 
 2. How can our principles become dead, unless 
 the impressions [thoughts] which correspond to 
 them are extinguished? But it is in thy power 
 continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I 
 can have that opinion about anything which I 
 ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed? 
 The things which are external to my mind have 
 no relation at all to my mind. Let this be the 
 state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To 
 recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things 
 again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in 
 this consists the recovery of thy life. 
 
184 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, 
 flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone 
 cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fishponds, 
 laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings 
 about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by 
 strings [all alike]. It is thy duty then in the 
 midst of such things to show good humor and not 
 a proud air ; to understand however that every 
 man is worth just so much as the things are worth 
 about which he busies himself. 
 
 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
 said, and in every movement thou must observe 
 what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see 
 immediately to what end it refers, but in the other 
 watch carefully what is the thing signified. 
 
 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or 
 not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as an 
 instrument given by the universal nature. But if 
 it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the 
 work and give way to him who is able to do it 
 better, unless there be some reason why I ought 
 not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to 
 help me the man who with the aid of my ruling 
 principle can do what is now fit and -useful for 
 the general good. For whatsoever either by my- 
 self or with another I can do, ought to be directed 
 to this only, to that which is useful and well 
 suited to society. 
 
 6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
 
MABCUS A UBELIUS ANTONINUS. 185 
 
 have been given up to oblivion ; and how many J 
 who have celebrated the fame of others have long 
 been dead. 
 
 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy 
 business to do thy duty like a soldier in the 
 assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou 
 canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but 
 with the help of another it is possible ? 
 
 8. Let not future things disturb ,thee, for thou 
 wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having 
 with thee the same reason which now thou usest 
 for present things. 
 
 9. All things are implicated with one another, 
 and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly any- 
 thing unconnected with any other thing. For 
 things have been co-ordinated, and they combine 
 to form the same universe [order]. For there is 
 one universe made up of all things, and one god 
 who pervades all things, and one substance, 1 and 
 one law, [one] common reason in all intelligent 
 animals, and one truth ; if indeed there is also one 
 perfection for all animals which are of the same 
 stock and participate in the same reason. 
 
 10. Everything material soon disappears in the 
 substance of the whole; and everything formal 
 [causal] is very soon taken back into the univer- 
 sal reason ; and the memory of everything is very 
 soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 1 " One substance," p. 42, note 1. 
 
186 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 11. To the rational animal the same act is 
 according to nature and according to reason. 
 
 12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (iii. 5). 
 
 13. Just as it is with the members in those 
 bodies which are united in one, so it is with 
 rational beings which exist separate, for they have 
 been constituted for one co-operation. And the 
 perception of this will be more apparent to thee if 
 thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member 
 [juAos] of the system of rational beings. But if 
 [using the letter r~\ thou sayest that thou art a 
 part [/upos], thou dost not yet love men from thy 
 heart; beneficence does not yet delight thee for 
 its own sake ; 1 thou still doest it barely as a thing 
 of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 14. Let there fall externally what will on the 
 parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For 
 those parts which have felt will complain, if they 
 choose. But I, unless I think that what has 
 happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in 
 my power not to think so. 
 
 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be 
 good ; just as if the gold, or the emerald, or the 
 purple were always saying this, Whatever any one 
 does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color. 
 
 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself ; I 
 mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself pain.f 
 
 1 I have used Gataker's conjecture /caTaX^Taocws instead of 
 the common reading KaTaXyirriKus : compare iv. 20 ; ix. 42. 
 
MA3CUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 187 
 
 But if any one else can frighten or pain it, let him 
 do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own 
 opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body 
 itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, 
 and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, 
 that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has 
 completely the power of forming an opinion about 
 these things, will suffer nothing, for it will never 
 deviate f into such a judgment. The leading prin- 
 ciple in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a 
 want for itself; and therefore it is both free from 
 perturbation and unimpeded, if it does not dis- 
 turb and impede itself. 
 
 17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, 
 or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, 
 
 imagination ? Go away, I entreat thee by the 
 gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. 
 But thou art come according to thy old fashion. 
 
 1 am not angry with thee : only go away. 
 
 18. Is any man afraid of change ? Why, what 
 can take place without change? What then is 
 more pleasing or more suitable to the universal 
 nature ? And canst thou take a bath unless the 
 wood undergoes a change ? and canst thou be 
 nourished, unless the food undergoes a change ? 
 And can anything else that is useful be accom- 
 plished without change ? Dost thou not see then 
 that for thyself also to change is just the same, and 
 equally necessary for the universal nature ? 
 
188 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 19. Through the universal substance as through 
 a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by 
 their nature united with and co-operating with 
 the whole, as the parts of our body with one 
 another. How many a Chrysippus, how many a 
 Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already 
 swallowed up ! And let the same thought occur 
 to thee with reference to every man and thing 
 (v. 23; vi. 15). 
 
 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
 do something which the constitution of man does 
 not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, 
 or what it does not allow now. 
 
 21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; and 
 near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 
 
 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
 who do wrong. And this happens, if when they 
 do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, 
 and that they do wrong through ignorance and 
 unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
 die ; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done 
 thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fac- 
 ulty worse than it was before. 
 
 23. The universal nature out of the universal 
 substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a, horse, 
 and when it has broken this up, it uses the mate- 
 rial for a tree, then for a man, then for some- 
 thing else ; and each of these things subsists for a 
 very short time- But it is no hardship for the 
 
MAECUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 189 
 
 vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in 
 its being fastened together (viii. 50). 
 
 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; 
 when it is often assumed, 1 the result is that all 
 comeliness dies away, and at last is so com- 
 pletely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted 
 up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact 
 that it is contrary to reason. For if even the per- 
 ception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason 
 is there for living any longer ? 
 
 25. Nature which governs the whole will soon 
 change all things which thou seest, and out of I 
 their substance will make other things, and again J 
 other things from the substance of them, in order 
 that the world may be ever new (xii. 23). 
 
 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, im- 
 mediately consider with what opinion about good 
 or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast 
 seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither 
 wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself 
 thinkest the same thing to be good that he does 
 or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty 
 then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think 
 such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more 
 readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 
 
 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not 
 as of what thou hast : but of the things which thou 
 hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly 
 
 1 This is corrupt. 
 
190 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 they would have been sought, if thou hadst them 
 not. At the same time, however, take care that 
 thou dost not through being so pleased with them 
 accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be 
 disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them. 
 
 28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle 
 which rules has this nature, that it is content with 
 itself when it does what is just, and so secures 
 tranquillity. 
 
 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling 
 of the strings. Confine thyself to the present. 
 Understand well what happens either to thee or 
 to another. Divide and distribute every object 
 into the causal [formal] arid the material. Think 
 of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by 
 a man stay there where the wrong was done 
 (viii. 29). 
 
 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let 
 thy understanding enter into the things that are 
 doing and the things which do them (vii. 4). 
 
 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, 
 and with indifference towards the things which lie 
 between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow 
 God. The poet says that law rules all f And 
 it is enough to remember that law rules all.f 1 
 
 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or 
 a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either 
 extinction or change. 
 
 1 The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 191 
 
 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable 
 carries us off; but that which lasts a long time is tol- 
 erable ; and the mind maintains its own tranquillity 
 by retiring into itself,! and the ruling faculty is not 
 made worse. But the parts which are harmed by 
 pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion about it. 
 
 34. About fame : look at the minds [of those 
 who seek fame], observe what they are, and what 
 kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things 
 they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of 
 sand piled on one another hide the former sands, 
 so in life the events which go before are soon 
 covered by those which come after. 
 
 35. From Plato : l The man who has an ele- 
 vated mind and takes a view of all time and of all 
 substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to 
 think that human life is anything great ? It is not 
 possible, he said. Such a man then will think 
 that death also is no evil. Certainly not. 
 
 36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good 
 and to be abused. 
 
 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be 
 obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the 
 mind commands, and for the mind not to be regu- 
 lated and composed by itself. 
 
 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
 For they care nought about it. 2 
 
 1 Plato, Pol, vi. 486. 
 
 1 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 
 
192 MEDITA TIONS. 
 
 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of 
 
 corn. 
 One man is born ; another dies. 1 
 
 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 42. For the good is with me, and the just. 2 
 
 43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent 
 
 emotion. 
 
 44. From Plato : 3 But I would make this man 
 a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest not 
 well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for 
 anything at all ought to compute the hazard of 
 life or death, and should not rather look to this 
 only in all that he does, whether he is doing what 
 is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad 
 man. 
 
 45. 3 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: 
 wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the 
 best place for him, or has been placed by a com- 
 mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and 
 to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the 
 
 1 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 
 25) has translated six lines from Euripides, and among them 
 are these two lines, 
 
 " Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas." 
 
 2 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661. 
 
 3 From the Apologia, c. 16. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 198 
 
 reckoning, either death or anything else, before 
 the baseness [of deserting his post], 
 
 46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that 
 which is noble and good is not something different 
 from saving and being saved ; for f as to a man 
 living such or such a time, at least one who is 
 really a man, consider if this is not a thing to be 
 dismissed from the thoughts : f and there must be 
 no love of life : but as to these matters a man 
 must intrust them to the Deity and believe what 
 the women say, that no man can escape his des- 
 tiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live 
 the time that he has to live. 1 
 
 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if 
 thou wert going along with them; and constantly 
 consider the changes of the elements into one 
 another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of 
 the terrene life. 
 
 48. This is a fine saying of Plato : 2 That he 
 who is discoursing about men should look also at 
 earthly things as if he viewed them from some 
 higher place ; should look at them in their assem- 
 blies, armies, agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, 
 
 1 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of 
 Antoninus has iartov, which is perhaps right ; but there is a 
 difficulty in the words ^ 7<ip TOVTO fdv, rb ftv bTro<rov8r) XP^WF 
 r6vye ws dXrjflwj Avdpa tartov tarrl, /cai oi5, &c. The conjecture 
 fi>KTtov for tartov does not mend the matter. 
 
 * It is said that this is not in the extant writings of Plato. 
 
194 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert 
 places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamen- 
 tations, markets, a mixture of all things and an 
 orderly combination of contraries. 
 
 49. Consider the past, such great changes of 
 political supremacies ; thou mayest foresee also the 
 things which will be. For they will certainly be of 
 like form, and it is not possible that they should 
 deviate from the order of the things which take 
 place now ; accordingly to have contemplated 
 human life for forty years is the same as to have 
 contemplated it for ten thousand years. For 
 what more wilt thou see ? 
 
 50. That which has grown from the earth to the 
 
 earth, 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly 
 
 seed, 
 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns. 1 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual invo- 
 lution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the 
 unsentient elements. 
 
 51. With food and drinks and cunning magic arts 
 Turning the channel's course to 'scape from 
 
 death. 2 
 
 The breeze which heaven has sent 
 We must endure, and toil without com- 
 plaining. 
 
 1 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 2 The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, 
 v. 1110. 
 
MAE C US AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 195 
 
 52. Another may be more expert in casting his 
 opponent; but he is not more social, nor more 
 modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that J 
 happens, nor more considerate with respect to the 
 faults of his neighbors. 
 
 53. Where any work can be done conformably 
 to the reason which is common to gods and men, 
 there we have nothing to fear ; for where we are 
 able to get profit by means of the activity which is 
 successful and proceeds according to our constitu- 
 tion, there no harm is to be suspected. 
 
 54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
 power piously to acquiesce in thy present con- 
 dition, and to behave justly to those who are about 
 thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present 
 thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them with- 
 out being well examined. 
 
 55. Do not look around thee to discover other 
 men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, 
 to what nature leads thee, both the universal 
 nature through the things which happen to thee, 
 and thy own nature through the acts which must 
 be done by thee. But every being ought to do 
 that which is according to its constitution ; and all 
 other things have been constituted for the sake of 
 rational beings, just as among irrational things the 
 inferior for the sake of the superior, but the 
 rational for the sake of one another. 
 
 The prime principle then in man's constitution 
 
196 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 is the social. And the second is not to yield 
 to the persuasions of the body, for it is the 
 peculiar office of the rational and intelligent 
 motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be 
 overpowered either by the motion of the senses or 
 of the appetites, for both &re animal ; but the in- 
 telligent motion claims superiority, and does not 
 permit itself to be overpowered by the others. And 
 with good reason, for it is formed by nature to 
 use all of them. The third thing in the rational 
 constitution is freedom from error and from decep- 
 tion. Let then the ruling principle holding fast 
 to these things go straight on, and it has what is 
 its own. 
 
 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
 completed thy life up to the present time; and 
 live according to nature the remainder which is 
 allowed thee. 
 
 57. Love that only which happens to thee and 
 is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what 
 is more suitable ? 
 
 58. In everything which happens keep before 
 thy eyes those to whom the same things happened, 
 and how they were vexed, and treated them as 
 strange things, and found fault with them : and 
 now where are they ? Nowhere. Why then dost 
 thou too choose to act in the same way; and 
 why dost thou not leave these agitations which are 
 foreign to nature to those who cause them and 
 
MAECUS AUKELIUS ANTONINUS. 197 
 
 those who are moved by them ; and why art thou 
 not altogether intent upon the right way of mak- 
 ing use of the things which happen to thee ? For 
 then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a 
 material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to 
 thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every act 
 which thou doest : and remember . . . 1 
 
 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
 good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever 
 dig. 
 
 60. The body ought to be compact, and to show 
 no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For 
 what the mind shows in the face by maintaining 
 in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, 
 that ought to be required also in the whole body. 
 But all these things should be observed without 
 affectation. 
 
 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art 
 than the dancer's, in respect of this, that it should 
 stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are 
 sudden and unexpected. 
 
 62. Constantly observe who those are whose ap- 
 probation thou wishest to have, and what ruling 
 principles they possess. For then thou wilt 
 neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor 
 
 1 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt 
 that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It 
 is better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some 
 critics and translators have done. 
 
198 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest 
 to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 
 
 63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is invol- 
 untarily deprived of truth; consequently in the 
 same way it is deprived of justice and temper- 
 ance and benevolence and everything of the 
 kind. It is most necessary to bear this con- 
 stantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle 
 towards all. 
 
 64. In every pain let this thought be present, 
 that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make 
 the governing intelligence worse, for it does not 
 damage the intelligence either so far as the intelli- 
 gence is rational l or so far as it is social. Indeed 
 in the case of most pains let this remark of Epi- 
 curus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor 
 everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its 
 limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imagi- 
 nation : and remember this too, that we do not 
 perceive that many things which are disagreeable 
 to us are the same as pain, such as excessive drow- 
 siness, and the being scorched by heat, and the 
 having no appetite. When then thou art discon- 
 tented about any of these things, say to thyself 
 that thou art yielding to pain. 
 
 1 The text has vyiK^, which it has been proposed to alter to 
 \oyiK-/i, and this change is necessary. We shall then have in 
 this section Xo7tK^ and KoivuvtKJ associated, as we have in 
 s. 68 \oyiKiri and iroXm/nJ, and in s. 72. 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 199 
 
 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman 
 as they feel towards men. 1 
 
 66. How do we know if Telauges was not 
 superior in character to Socrates ? For it is not 
 enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and 
 disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and 
 passed the night in the cold with more endurance, 
 and that when he was bid to arrest Leon 2 of 
 Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and 
 that he walked in a swaggering way in the 
 streets 3 though as to this fact one may have 
 great doubts if it was true. But we ought to in- 
 quire what kind of a soul it was that Socrates 
 possessed, and if he was able to be content with 
 being just towards men and pious towards the 
 gods, neither idly vexed on account of men's 
 villany, nor yet making himself a slave to any 
 man's ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything 
 that fell to his share out of the universal, nor en- 
 during it as intolerable, nor allowing his under- 
 standing to sympathize with the affects of the 
 miserable flesh. 
 
 67. Nature has not so mingled f [the intelli- 
 
 1 I have followed Gataker's conjecture of 
 of the MSS. reading ol Avepw-jroi. 
 
 2 Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7; Apolog. c. 20: 
 Epictetus, iv. 1, 160; iv. 7, 3ol 
 
 3 Aristophan. Nub. 362. 8ri /3pei>0i*i r tv raiaiv 65ots Kal TW 
 
 irapo/3dX\ct. 
 
200 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 gence] with the composition of the body, as not to 
 have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thy- 
 self and of bringing under subjection to thyself all 
 that is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a 
 divine man and to be recognized as such by no 
 one. Always bear this in mind ; and another 
 thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for 
 living a happy life. And because thou hast des- 
 paired of becoming a dialectician arid skilled in the 
 knowledge of nature, do not for this reason re- 
 nounce the hope of being both free and modest, 
 and social and obedient to God. 
 
 68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- 
 pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even 
 if all the world cry out against thee as much as 
 they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces 
 the members of this kneaded matter which has 
 grown around thee. For what hinders the mind 
 in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in 
 tranquillity and in a just judgment of all surround- 
 ing things and in a ready use of the objects which 
 are presented to it, so that the judgment may say 
 to the thing which falls under its observation : This 
 thou art in substance [reality], though in men's 
 opinion thou mayest appear to be of a different 
 kind; and the use shall say to that which falls 
 under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was 
 seeking; for to me that which presents itself is 
 always a material for virtue both rational and 
 
MARCUS AVRELIUS ANTONINUS. 201 
 
 political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, 
 which belongs to man or God. For everything 
 which happens has a relationship either to God or 
 man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but 
 usual and apt matter to work on. 
 
 69. The perfection of moral character consists 
 in this, in passing every day as the last, and in 
 being neither violently excited nor torpid nor play- 
 ing the hypocrite. 
 
 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed 
 because during so .long a time they must tolerate 
 continually men such as they are and so many of 
 them bad ; and besides this, they also take care 
 of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined 
 to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the 
 bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 
 
 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly 
 from his own badness, which is indeed possible, 
 but to fly from other men's badness, which is im- 
 possible. 
 
 72. Whatever the rational and political [social] 
 faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it 
 properly judges to be inferior to itself. 
 
 73. When thou hast done a good act and an- 
 other has received it, why dost thou still look for a ./ 
 third thing besides these, as fools do, either to 
 have the reputation of having done a good act or 
 
 to. obtain a return? 
 
 74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. 
 
MEDITATIONS. 
 
 But it is useful to act according to nature. Do 
 not then be tired of receiving what is useful by 
 doing it to others. 
 
 75. The nature of the All moved to make the 
 universe. But now either everything that takes 
 place comes by way of consequence or [contin- 
 uity] ; or even the chief things towards which the 
 ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
 ment are governed by no rational principle. If 
 this is remembered, it will make thee more tran- 
 quil in many things (vi. 44 ; ix. 28). l 
 
 1 It is not easy to understand this section. It has been 
 suggested that there is some error in 7} a\6yi<rTa, &c. Some 
 of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and 
 they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposi- 
 tion is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. 
 A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which 
 framed an order. The next question is, How are things pro- 
 duced now? Or, in other words, by what power do forms 
 appear in continuous succession? The answer, according to 
 Antoninus, may be this : It is by virtue of the original con- 
 stitution of things that all change and succession have been 
 effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a sense, 
 if we admit that the universe is always one and the same, a 
 continuity of identity; as much one and the same, as man is 
 one and the same, which he believes himself 'to be, though 
 he also believes and cannot help believing that both in his 
 body and in his thoughts there is change and succession. 
 There is no real discontinuity then in the universe ; and if 
 we say that there was an order framed in the beginning and 
 that the t things which are now produced are a consequence 
 of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we are 
 compelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; 
 
MAE C US A UBELIUS ANTONINUS. 208 
 
 just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the 
 sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals, 
 not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed 
 states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even 
 infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any 
 other thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or 
 following it. What we call time is an idea derived from our 
 notion of a succession of things or events, an idea which is 
 a part of our constitution, but not an idea which we can sup- 
 pose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. The 
 conclusion then is certain that the present and the past, the 
 production of present things and the supposed original 
 order, out of which we say that present things now come, 
 are one ; and the present productive power and the so-called 
 past arrangement are only different names for one thing. I 
 suppose then that Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes 
 talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed 
 by his words. There are certainly other passages from which 
 I think that we may collect that he had notions of produc- 
 tion something like what I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternative : "or even the chief 
 things . . . principle." I do not exactly know what he 
 means by TO. KvpidraTa, "the chief," or "the most excellent," 
 or whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of inferior 
 and superior things, and of the inferior being for the use of 
 the superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he 
 may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative 
 assumes a governing power of the universe, and that it acts 
 by directing its power towards these chief objects, or 
 making its special, proper motion towards them. And here 
 he uses the noun (oppty " movement," which contains the 
 same notion as the verb (w/j/urjo-e) "moved," which he used 
 at the beginning of the paragraph, when he was speaking of 
 the making of the universe. If we do not accept the first 
 hypothesis, he says, we must take the conclusion of the 
 second, that the " chief things towards which the ruling 
 
204 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 power of the universe directs its own movement are 
 governed by no rational principle." The meaning then is, if 
 there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing 
 power which strives to give effect to its efforts, we must con- 
 clude that there is no rational direction of anything, if the 
 power which first made the universe does not in some way 
 govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now 
 produced or now exists without the action of the supreme 
 intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to 
 act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with 
 the nature of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus 
 always assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from 
 these reflections must result from his rejecting the second 
 hypothesis, and accepting the first, whatever may be the 
 exact sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, 
 as he says elsewhere, if there is no Providence which governs 
 the world, man has at least the power of governing himself 
 according to the constitution of his nature ; and so he may 
 be tranquil, if he does the best that he can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to 
 discover the writer's exact meaning for I think that he had 
 a meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Com- 
 pare ix. 28.) If I have rightly explained the emperor's 
 meaning in this and other passages, he has touched the solu- 
 tion of a great question. 
 
VIII. 
 
 1. THIS reflection also tends to the removal of the 
 desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy 
 power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at 
 least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a phi- 
 losopher ; but both to many others and to thyself 
 it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou 
 hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no 
 longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a phi- 
 losopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If 
 then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, 
 throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem 
 [to others], and be content if thou shalt live the 
 rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. 
 Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else 
 distract thee ; for thou hast had experience of many 
 wanderings without having found happiness any- 
 where, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in 
 reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. 
 Where is it then? In doing what man's nature 
 requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he 
 has principles from which come his affects and his 
 
 
206 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 acts. What principles ? Those which relate to 
 good and bad : the belief that there is nothing good 
 for man which does not make him just, temperate, 
 manly, free ; and that there is nothing bad which 
 does not do the contrary to what has been 
 mentioned. 
 
 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How 
 is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent of it ? 
 A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. 
 What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is 
 the work of an intelligent living being, and a 
 social being, and one who is under the same law 
 with God? 
 
 3. Alexander and Caius l and Pompeius, what 
 are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- 
 clitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted 
 with things, and their causes [forms], and their 
 matter, and the ruling principles of these men were 
 the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. But 
 as to the others, how many things had they to care 
 for, and to how many things were they slaves ! 
 
 4. [Consider] that men will do the same things 
 nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. 
 
 5. This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, 
 for all things are according to the nature of the 
 universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody 
 and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In 
 
 1 Caius is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator ; and Pompeius is 
 Cn. Pompeius, named Magnus. 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 207 
 
 the next place, having fixed thy eyes steadily on 
 thy business look at it, and at the same time re- 
 membering that it is thy duty to be a good man, 
 and what man's nature demands, do that without 
 turning aside ; and speak as it seems to thee most 
 just, only let it be with a good disposition and with 
 modesty and without hypocrisy. 
 
 6. The nature of the universal has this work to 
 do, to remove to that place the things which are 
 in this, to change them, to take them away hence, 
 and to carry them there. / All things are change, 
 yet we need not fear anything new. All things 
 are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution of them 
 still remains the same. 
 
 7. Every nature is contented with itself when it 
 goes on its way well ; and a rational nature goes 
 on its way well when in its thoughts it assents to 
 nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its 
 movements to social acts only, and when it confines 
 its desires and aversions to the things which are 
 in its power, arid when it is satisfied with every- 
 thing that is assigned to it by the common nature. 
 For of this common nature every particular nature 
 is a part, as the nature of the leaf is a part of the 
 nature of the plant ; except that in the plant the 
 nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not 
 perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; 
 but the nature of man is part of a nature which is 
 not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and 
 
 ^vC 
 
208 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 just, since it gives to everything in equal portions 
 and according to its worth, times, substance, cause 
 [form], activity, and incident. But examine, not 
 to discover that any one thing compared with any 
 other single thing is equal in all respects, but by 
 taking all the parts together of one thing and com- 
 paring them with all the parts together of another. 
 
 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. 
 But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- 
 gance : thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure 
 and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior to love 
 of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrate- 
 ful people, nay even to care for them. 
 
 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault 
 with the court life or with thy own (v. 16). 
 
 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for hav- 
 ing neglected something useful ; but that which is 
 good must be something useful, and the perfect 
 good man should look after it. But no such man 
 would ever repent of having refused any sensual 
 pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor 
 useful. 
 
 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
 constitution? What is its substance and material? 
 And what its casual nature [or form] ? And what 
 is it doing in the world ? And how long does it 
 subsist ? 
 
 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, 
 remember that it is according to thy constitution 
 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 209 
 
 and according to human nature to perform social 
 acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational 
 animals. But that which is according to each in- 
 dividual's nature is also more peculiarly its own, 
 and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also 
 more agreeable (v. 1). 
 
 13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, 'on the 
 occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to 
 it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialec- 
 tic. 
 
 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immedi- 
 ately say to thyself: What opinions has this man 
 about good and bad ? For if with respect to 
 pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with 
 respect to fame and ignominy, death and life, he 
 has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing 
 wonderful or strange to me if he does such and 
 such things ; and I shall bear in mind that he is 
 compelled to do so. 1 
 
 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- 
 prised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be 
 surprised if the world produces such and such / 
 things of which it is productive ; and for the phy- 
 sician and the helmsman it is a shame to be sur- 
 prised if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfav- 
 orable. 
 
 16. Remember that to change thy opinion and 
 
 1 Antoninus v. 16. Thucydides, iii. 10 ; t* yfy T<? 5ia\X4<r- 
 roiTi TTJS yvufJLTjs Kal al Siafiopai rdv Zpywv KaOlffravrcu. 
 
, 
 \J 
 
 210 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 to follow him who corrects thy error is as consis- 
 tent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. 
 For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted 
 according to thy own movement and judgment, 
 and indeed according to thy own understanding 
 too. 
 
 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost 
 thou do it ? but if it is in the power of another, 
 whom dost thou blame, the atoms [chance] or 
 the gods ? Both are foolish. Thou must blame 
 nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which is 
 the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct 
 at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do 
 even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault ? 
 for nothing should be done without a purpose. 
 
 18. That which has ^died falls not out of the 
 universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
 and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are 
 elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
 these too change, and they murmur not. 
 
 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, 
 a vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun 
 will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of 
 the gods will say the same. For what purpose 
 then art thou, to enjoy pleasure ? See if com- 
 mon sense allows this. 
 
 20. Nature has had regard in everything no less 
 to the end than to the beginning and the contin- 
 uance, just like the man who throws up a ball. 
 
 
MAKCUS AUSELIUS ANTONINUS. 211 
 
 What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, 
 or harm for it to come down, or even to have J 
 fallen ? and what good is it to the bubble while it 
 holds together, or what harm when it is burst? 
 The same may be said of a light also. 
 
 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what 
 kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown old, 
 what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is 
 diseased. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, 
 and the rememberer and the remembered : and all / 
 this in a nook of this part of the world ; and not J 
 even here do all agree, no, not any one with him- 
 self : and the whole earth too is a point. 
 
 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, / 
 whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 
 rather to become good to-morrow than to be good 
 to-day. 
 
 23. Am I doing anything ? I do it with refer- 
 ence to the good of mankind. Does anything 
 happen to me ? I receive it and refer it to the 
 'gods, and the source of all things, from which all 
 that happens is derived. 
 
 24. Such as bathing appears to thee, oil, sweat, 
 dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, so is \J 
 every part of life and everything. 
 
 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla 
 died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then Se- V 
 
V 
 
 
 212 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 cunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and 
 then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faus- 
 tina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is every- 
 thing. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer 
 died. And those sharp-witted men, either seers or 
 men inflated with pride, where are they, for 
 instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Deme- 
 trius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one 
 else like them? All ephemeral, dead long ago. 
 Some indeed have not been remembered even for 
 a short time, and others have become the heroes of 
 fables, and again others have disappeared even 
 from fables. Remember this then, that this little 
 compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or 
 thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be re- 
 moved and placed elsewhere. 
 
 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper 
 works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a man 
 to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise the 
 movement of the senses, to form a just judgment 
 of plausible appearances, and to take a survey of 
 the nature of the universe and of the things which 
 happen in it. 
 
 27. There are three relations [betweep thee and 
 other things] : the one to the body l which sur- 
 
 1 The text has atriov, which in Antoninus means " form," 
 " formal." Accordingly Schultz recommends either Valken- 
 aer's emendation dyyciov, "body," or Corais' ffupdriov. Com- 
 pare xii. 13 ; x. 38. 
 
MAfiCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 213 
 
 rounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from 
 which all things come to all ; and the third to 
 those who live with thee. 
 
 28. Pain is either an evil to the body then let 
 the body say what it thinks of it or to the soul ; 
 but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its 
 own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think 
 that pain is an evil. For every judgment and 
 movement and desire and aversion is within, and 
 no evil ascends so high. 
 
 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying 
 to thyself: Now it is in my power to let no bad- 
 ness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any perturba- 
 tion at all ; but looking at all things I see what is 
 their nature, and I use each according to its value. 
 Remember this power which thou hast from 
 nature. 
 
 30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, 
 whoever he may be, appropriately, not with any 
 affectation : use plain discourse. 
 
 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descend- 
 ants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- 
 mates, friends, Areius, 1 Maecenas, physicians, and 
 sacrificing priests, the whole court is dead. 
 Then turn to the rest, not considering the death 
 of a single man [but of a whole race], as of the 
 
 1 Areius ("Apeios) was a philosopher, who was intimate 
 with Augustus ; Sueton. Augustus, c. 89 ; Plutarch, Antoni- 
 nus, 80; Dion Cassius, 51, c. 16. 
 
214 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the 
 tomb, The last of his race. Then consider what 
 trouble those before them have had that they 
 might leave a successor ; and then, that of neces- 
 sity some one must be the last. Again, here con- 
 sider the death of a whole race. 
 
 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every 
 single act ; and if every act does its duty as far as 
 is possible, be content; and no one is able to 
 hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty. 
 But something external will stand in the way. 
 Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly 
 and soberly and considerately. But perhaps 
 some other active power will be hindered. Well, 
 but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being 
 content to transfer thy efforts to that which is 
 allowed, another opportunity of action is immedi- 
 ately put before thee in place of that which was 
 hindered, and one which will adapt itself to this 
 ordering of which we are speaking. 
 
 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arro- 
 gance ; and be ready to let it go. 
 
 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a 
 foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest 
 of the body, such does a man make himself, as far 
 as he can, who is not content with what happens, 
 and separates himself from others* or does any- 
 thing unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached 
 thyself from the natural unity, for thou wast 
 
MARCUS AUKELIUS ANTONINUS. 215 
 
 made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thy- 
 self off, yet here there is this beautiful provi- 
 sion, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. 
 God has allowed this to no other part, after it has 
 been separated and cut asunder, to come together 
 again. But consider the kindness by which he 
 has distinguished man, for he has put it in his 
 power not to be separated at all from the uni- 
 versal ; and when he has been separated, he has 
 allowed him to return and to be united and to re- 
 sume his place as a part. 
 
 35. As the nature of the universal has given to \J 
 every rational being all the other powers that it 
 has,f so we have received from it this power also. 
 For as the universal nature converts and fixes in 
 
 its predestined place everything which stands in 
 the way and opposes it, and makes such things a 
 part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to 
 make every hindrance its own material, and to use 
 it for such purposes as it may have designed. 1 
 
 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the 
 whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once 
 embrace all the various troubles which thou / 
 mayest expect to befall thee : but on every occa- 
 sion ask thyself, What is there in this which is in- 
 
 1 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, 
 but the meaning will appear if the second \oyucuv is changed 
 into 8\<av: though this change alone will not establish the 
 completeness of the text. 
 
216 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 tolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be 
 ashamed to confess. In the next place remember 
 that neither the future nor the past pains thee, but 
 only the present. But this is reduced to a very lit- 
 tle, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy 
 mind if it is unable to hold out against even this. 
 
 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the 
 tomb of Verus ? l Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit 
 by the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridic- 
 ulous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would 
 the dead be conscious of it ? and if the dead were 
 conscious, would they be pleased ? and if they 
 were pleased, would that make them immortal? 
 Was it not in the order of destiny that these 
 persons too should first become old women and 
 old men and then die ? What then would those 
 do after these were dead ? All this is foul smell 
 and blood in a bag. 
 
 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
 wisely,! says the philosopher. 
 
 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I 
 see no virtue which is opposed to justice ; but I 
 see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, 
 and that is temperance. 
 
 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that 
 which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself 
 standest in perfect security. Who is this self? 
 
 1 "Verus" is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the 
 true reading. 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 217 
 
 The reason. But I am not reason. Be it so. 
 Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But 
 if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own 
 opinion about itself (vii. 16). 
 
 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an 
 evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the move- 
 ments [desires] is equally an evil to the animal 
 nature. And something else also is equally an im- 
 pediment and an evil to the constitution of plants. 
 So then that which is a hindrance to the intelli- 
 gence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply 
 all these things then to thyself. Does pain or 
 sensuous pleasure affect thee? The senses will 
 look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in 
 thy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou 
 wast making this effort absolutely [uncondition- 
 ally, or without any reservation], certainly this 
 obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational 
 animal. But if thou takest [into consideration] 
 the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been 
 injured nor even impeded. The things however 
 which are proper to the understanding no other 
 man is used to impede, for neither fire, nor iron, 
 nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way. 
 When it has been made a sphere, it continues a 
 sphere (xi. 12). 
 
 42. It is not fit that I" should give myself pain, 
 for I have never intentionally given pain even to 
 another. 
 
21 8 MEDITA TIONS. 
 
 43. Different things delight different people; 
 but it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
 sound without turning away either from any man 
 or from any of the things which happen to men, 
 but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes 
 and using everything according to its value. 
 
 44. See that thou secure this present time to 
 thyself, for those who rather pursue posthumous 
 fame do not consider that the men of after time 
 will be exactly such as these whom they cannot 
 bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it 
 in any way to thee if these men of after time utter 
 this or that sound, or have this or that opinion 
 about thee ? 
 
 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for 
 there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, 
 content, if it can feel and act conformably to its 
 proper constitution. Is this [change of place] suf- 
 ficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and 
 worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrinking, 
 affrighted ? and what wilt thou find which is suffi- 
 cient reason for this ? 1 
 
 46. Nothing can happen to any man which is 
 not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not 
 according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine 
 
 in this passage seems to have a passive sense. 
 It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and some of the 
 other words. A comparison with xi. 12, will help to explain 
 the meaning. 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 219 
 
 which is not according to the nature of a vine, 
 nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If 
 then there happens to each thing both what is 
 usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? 
 For the common nature brings nothing which may 
 not be borne by thee. 
 
 47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it 
 is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own 
 judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe 
 out this judgment now. But if anything in thy 
 own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee 
 from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou art 
 pained because thou art not doing some particular 
 thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost 
 thou not rather act than complain? But some 
 insuperable obstacle is in the way ? Do not be 
 grieved then, for the cause of its not being done 
 depends not on thee. But it is not worth while 
 to live, if this cannot be done. Take thy depar- 
 ture then from life contentedly, just as he dies who 
 is in full activity, and well pleased too with the 
 things which are obstacles. 
 
 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invinci- 
 ble, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if 
 it does nothing which it does not choose to do, 
 even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then 
 will it be when it forms a- judgment about anything 
 aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the 
 mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for 
 

 220 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 man has nothing more secure to which he can fly 
 for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He 
 then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; but 
 he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge 
 is unhappy. 
 
 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the 
 first appearances report. Suppose that it has been 
 reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of 
 thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast 
 been injured, that has not been reported. I see 
 that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in 
 
 \J danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by 
 the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from 
 within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or 
 rather add something like a man who knows every- 
 thing that happens in the world. 
 
 50. A cucumber is bitter Throw it away. 
 There are briers in the road Turn aside from 
 them. This is enough. Do not add, And why 
 were such things made in the world? For thou 
 wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with 
 nature, as thou wouldstbe ridiculed by a carpenter 
 and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because 
 thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings 
 from the things which they make. And yet they 
 have places into which they can throw these shav- 
 ings and cuttings, and the universal nature has no 
 external space ; but the wondrous part of her art 
 is that though she has circumscribed herself, every- 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 221 
 
 thing within her which appears to decay and to 
 grow old and to be useless she changes into her- 
 self, and again makes other new things from these 
 very same, so that she requires neither substance 
 from without nor wants a place into which she may 
 cast that which decays. She is content then with 
 her own space, and her own matter, and her own 
 art. 
 
 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy 
 conversation without method, nor wandering in 
 thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul inward 
 contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so 
 busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, 
 curse thee. What then can these things do to pre- 
 vent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, 
 just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a 
 limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never 
 ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should 
 cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse 
 them and wash them out, and will not be at all 
 polluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual 
 fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming f 
 thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with content- 
 ment, simplicity, and modesty. 
 
 52. He who does not know what the world is, 
 does not know where he is. And he who does not 
 know for what purpose the world exists, does not 
 know who he is, nor what the world is. But he 
 
222 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 who has failed in any one of these things could not 
 even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
 What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] 
 seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who 
 know not either where they are or who they are ? 
 
 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who 
 curses himself thrice every hour? wouldst thou 
 wish to please a man who does not please himself? 
 Does a man please himself who repents of nearly 
 everything that he does ? 
 
 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in con- 
 cert with the air which surrounds thee, but let thy 
 intelligence also now be in harmony with the intel- 
 ligence which embraces all things. For the intel- 
 ligent power is no less diffused in all parts and 
 pervades all things for him who is willing to draw 
 it to him than the aerial power for him who is able 
 to respire it. 
 
 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all 
 to the universe ; and particularly the wickedness 
 [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only 
 harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- 
 leased from it as soon as he shall choose. 
 
 56. To my own free will the free will of my 
 neighbor is just as indifferent as his poor breath 
 and flesh. For though we are made especially for 
 the sake of one another, still the ruling power of 
 each of us has its own office, for otherwise my 
 neighbor's wickedness would be my harm, which 
 
MABCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 223 
 
 God has not willed in order that my unhappiness 
 may not depend on another. 
 
 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in 
 all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not 
 effused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- 
 ingly its rays are called Extensions [d/crtves] be- 
 cause they are extended [d TOV cKretW&u]. 1 But 
 one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he 
 looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow 
 opening into a darkened room, for it is extended 
 in a right line, and as it were is divided when it 
 meets with any solid body which stands in the 
 way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there the 
 light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. 
 Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffu- 
 sion of the understanding, and it should in no way 
 be an effusion, but an extension, and it should 
 make no violent or impetuous collision with the 
 obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, 
 but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. 
 For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, 
 if it does not admit it. 
 
 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of 
 sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if 
 thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thoufeel 
 any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind 
 of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living 
 being and thou wilt not cease to live. 
 
 1 A piece of bad etymology. 
 
224 MEDITATIONS 
 
 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
 Teach them then or bear with them. 
 
 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way 
 the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exer- 
 cises caution and when it is employed about 
 inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and 
 to its object. 
 
 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and 
 also let every other man enter into thine. 1 
 
 1 Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12. 
 
 

 IX. 
 
 1. HE who acts unjustly acts impiously. For 
 since the universal nature has made rational ani- 
 mals for the sake of one another to help one 
 another according to their deserts, but in no way 
 to injure one another, he who transgresses her will 
 is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest 
 divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety 
 to the same divinity; for the universal nature is 
 the nature of things that are ; and things that are 
 have a relation to all things that come into ex- 
 istence. 1 And further, this universal nature is 
 
 1 " As there is not any action or natural event, which we 
 are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to 
 have a respect to some other actions and events, so possibly 
 each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a 
 remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much 
 beyond the compass of this present world." Again : " Things 
 seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetually 
 observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the 
 greatest importance ; so that any one thing whatever may, 
 for aught we know to the contrary , be a necessary condition 
 to any other." Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the 
 chapter. Some critics take rd inrdpxorra in this passage of 
 
226 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 named truth, and is the prime cause of all things 
 that are true. He then who lies intentionally is 
 guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by 
 deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, 
 inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal 
 nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by 
 fighting against the nature of the world ; for he 
 fights against it, who is moved of himself to that 
 which is contrary to truth, for he had received 
 powers from nature through the neglect of which 
 he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from 
 truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as 
 good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. 
 For of necessity such a man must often find fault 
 with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns 
 things to the bad and the good contrary to their 
 deserts, because frequently the bad are in the en- 
 joyment of pleasure and possess the things which 
 procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their 
 share and the things which cause pain. And 
 further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes 
 also be afraid of some of the things which will 
 happen in the world, and even this is impiety. 
 And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from 
 
 Antoninus to be the same as TO, 8vra : but if that were so, he 
 might have said irpbs &\\T)\a instead of irpbs ra vTra.p-x.ovra. 
 Perhaps the meaning of irpbs ra v-n-dpxovra may be "to all 
 prior things." If so, the translation is still correct. See 
 vi. 38. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 227 
 
 injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with 
 respect to the things towards which the universal 
 nature is equally affected, for it would not have 
 made both, unless it was equally affected towards 
 both, towards these they who wish to follow 
 nature should be of the same mind with it, and 
 equally affected. With respect to pain, then, 
 and pleasure, or death and life, or honor and 
 dishonor, which the universal nature employs 
 equally, whoever is not equally affected is mani- 
 festly acting impiously. And I say that the uni- 
 versal nature employs them equally, instead of 
 saying that they happen alike to those who are 
 produced in continuous series and to those who 
 come after them by virtue of a certain original 
 movement of Providence, according to which it 
 moved from a certain beginning to this ordering 
 of things, having conceived certain principles of 
 the things which were to be, and having deter- 
 mined powers productive of beings and of changes 
 and of such like successions (vii. 75). 
 
 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart 
 from mankind without having had any taste of ly- 
 ing and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. However, 
 to breathe out one's life when a man has had 
 enough of these things is the next best voyage, as 
 the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide 
 with vice, and has not experience yet induced 
 thee to fly from this pestilence? For the destruc- 
 
228 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 tion of the understanding is a pestilence, much 
 more indeed than any such corruption and change 
 of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this 
 corruption is a pestilence of animals so far as they 
 are animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men 
 so far as they are men. 
 
 3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
 with it, since this too is one of those things which 
 nature wills. For such as it is to be young and 
 to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, 
 and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to 
 beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and 
 all the other natural operations which the seasons 
 of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, 
 then, is consistent with the character of a reflect- 
 ing man, to be neither careless nor impatient nor 
 contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait 
 for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou 
 now waitest for the time when the child shall come 
 out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time 
 when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. 1 But 
 if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort 
 which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made 
 best reconciled to death by observing - the objects 
 from which thou art going to be removed, and the 
 morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer 
 be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended 
 with men, but it is thy duty to care for them and 
 1 Note 1 of the Philosophy, p. 84. 
 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 229 
 
 to bear with them gently; and yet to remember 
 that thy departure will not be from men who have 
 the same principles as thyself. For this is the only 
 thing, if there be any, which could draw us the 
 contrary way and attach us to life, to be per- 
 mitted to live with those who have the same prin- 
 ciples as ourselves. But now thou seest how great 
 is the trouble arising from the discordance of those 
 who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come 
 quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget 
 myself. 
 
 4. He who does wrong does wrong against him- 
 self. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to him- 
 self, because he makes himself bad. 
 
 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a cer- 
 tain thing ; not only he who does a certain thing. 
 
 6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- 
 ing, and thy present conduct directed to social 
 good, and thy present disposition of content- 
 ment with everything which happens f that is 
 
 tough. 
 
 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : extin- 
 guish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its own 
 power. 
 
 8. Among the animals which have not reason 
 one life is distributed ; but among reasonable ani- 
 mals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as 
 there is one earth of all things which are of an 
 earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe 
 
230 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision 
 and all that have life. 
 
 9. All things which participate in anything 
 which is common to them all move towards that 
 which is of the same kind with themselves. Every- 
 thing which is earthy turns towards the earth, 
 everything which is liquid flows together, and 
 everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, 
 so that they require something to keep them asun- 
 der, and the application of force. Fire indeed 
 moves upwards on account of the elemental fire, 
 but it is so ready to be kindled together with all 
 the fire which is here, that even every substance 
 which is somewhat dry is easily ignited, because 
 there is less mingled with it of that which is a hin- 
 drance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything 
 also which participates in the common intelligent 
 nature moves in like manner towards that which 
 is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. 
 For so much as it is superior in comparison with 
 all other things, in the same degree also is it more 
 ready to mingle with and to be fused with that 
 which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals 
 devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds 
 of cattle, arid the nurture of young birds, and in 
 a manner, loves ; for even in animals there are 
 souls, and that power which brings them together 
 is seen to exert itself in the superior degree, and 
 in such a way as never has been observed in plants 
 
MAECUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 231 
 
 nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals 
 there are political communities and friendships, 
 and families and meetings of people; and in wars, 
 treaties, and armistices. But in the things which 
 are still superior, even though they are separated 
 from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in 
 the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree 
 is able to produce a sympathy even in things which 
 are separated. See, then, what now takes place ; 
 for only intelligent animals have now forgotten 
 this mutual desire and inclination, and in them 
 alone the property of flowing together is not seen. 
 But still, though men strive to avoid [this union], 
 they are caught and held by it, for their nature is 
 too strong for them ; and thou wilt see what I say, 
 if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find 
 anything earthy which comes in contact with no" 
 earthy thing, than a man altogether separated from 
 other men. 
 
 10. Both man and God and the universe produce 
 fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces it. But 
 and if usage has especially fixed these terms to the 
 vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason pro- 
 duces fruit both for all and for itself, and there are 
 produced from it other things of the same kind as 
 reason itself. 
 
 11. If thou art able, .correct by teaching those 
 who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember 
 that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. 
 
232 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons , 
 and for some purposes they even help them to get 
 health, wealth, reputation ; so kind they are. And 
 it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders thee ? 
 
 12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet 
 as one who would be pitied or admired : but direct 
 thy will to one thing only, to put thyself in 
 motion and to check thyself, as the social reason 
 requires. 
 
 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
 rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
 outside, but within and in my opinions. 
 
 14. All things are the same, familiar in expe- 
 rience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless in 
 the matter. Everything now is just as it was in 
 the time of those whom we have buried. 
 
 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by 
 themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, 
 nor expressing any judgment. What is it, then, 
 which does judge about them ? The ruling faculty. 
 
 16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil 
 and the good of the rational social animal, just as 
 his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity but in 
 activity. 1 
 
 17. For the stone which has been thrown up it 
 is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good to 
 have been carried up (viii. 20). 
 
 1 Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit. Cicero, De Off. 
 i. 6. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 233 
 
 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading princi- 
 ples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid 
 of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves. 
 
 19. All things are changing: and thou thyself 
 art in continuous mutation and in a manner in 
 continuous destruction, and the whole universe 
 too. 
 
 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrong- 
 ful act there where it is (vii. 29 ; ix. 38). 
 
 21. Termination of activity, cessation from 
 movement and opinion, and in a sense their death, 
 is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consid- 
 eration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, 
 thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also every 
 change was a death. Is this anything to fear? 
 Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy 
 grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then 
 to thy life under thy father ; and as thou findest 
 many other differences and changes and termina- 
 tions, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In 
 like manner, then, neither are the termination and 
 cessation and change of thy whole life a thing to 
 be afraid of. 
 
 22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty 
 and that of the universe and that of thy neighbor : 
 thy own that thou mayst make it just: and that of 
 the universe, that thou" mayst remember of what 
 thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbor, that thou 
 mayst know whether he has acted ignorantlj or 
 
234 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider 
 that his ruling faculty is akin to thine. 
 
 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a 
 social system, so let every act of thine be a com- 
 ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine 
 then has no reference either immediately or re- 
 motely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life, 
 and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the 
 nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular 
 assembly a man acting by himself stands apart 
 from the general agreement. 
 
 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, 
 and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such 
 is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the 
 representation of the mansions of the dead l strikes 
 our eyes more clearly. 
 
 25. Examine into the quality of the form of an 
 object, and detach it altogether from its material 
 part, and then contemplate it ; then determine the 
 time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar 
 form is naturally made to endure. 
 
 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through 
 not being contented with thy ruling faculty when 
 it does the things which it is constituted by nature 
 to do. But enough f [of this]. 
 
 1 T& Trjs New/as may be, as Gataker conjectures, a dramatic 
 representation of the state of the dead. Schultz supposes 
 that it may be also a reference to the Newte of the Odyssey 
 (lib. xi.). 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 235 
 
 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, 
 or when men say about thee anything injurious, 
 approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and 
 see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt dis- 
 cover that there is no reason to take any trouble 
 that these men may have this or that opinion 
 about thee. However, thou must be well disposed 
 towards them, for by nature they are friends. 
 And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, 
 by signs, towards the attainment of those things on 
 which they set a value.f 
 
 28. The periodic movements of the universe are 
 the same, up and down from age to age. And 
 either the universal intelligence puts itself in 
 motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, 
 be thou content with that which is the result of its 
 activity; or it puts itself in motion once, and 
 everything else comes by way of sequence l in a 
 manner ; or indivisible elements are the origin of 
 all things. In a word, if there is a god, all is 
 well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also be 
 governed by it (vi. 44 ; vii. 75). 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth, 
 too, will change, and the things also which result 
 from change will continue to change forever, and 
 these again forever. For if a man reflects on the 
 
 1 The words which immediately follow KO.T tiraKo\oMT)ffiv are 
 corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. (Compare 
 vii. 75.) 
 
236 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 changes and transformations which follow one 
 another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he 
 will despise everything which is perishable (xii. 21). 
 
 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: 
 it carries everything along with it. But how 
 worthless are all these poor people who are en- 
 gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, 
 are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. Well 
 then, man : do what nature now requires. Set 
 thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not 
 look about thee to see if any one will observe it ; 
 nor yet expect Plato's Republic : l but be content 
 if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider 
 such an event to be no small matter. For who 
 can change men's opinions ? and without a change 
 of opinions what else is there than the slavery of 
 men who groan while they pretend to obey? 
 Come now and tell me of Alexander and Philip- 
 pus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves 
 shall judge whether they discovered what the 
 common nature required, and trained themselves 
 accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, 
 no one has condemned me to imitate them. 
 Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. 
 Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. 
 
 30. Look down from above on the countless 
 
 1 Those who wish to know what Plato's Republic is, may 
 now study it in the accurate translation of Davies and 
 Vaughan. 
 
MABCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 237 
 
 herds of men and their countless solemnities, and 
 the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and 
 calms, and the differences among those who are 
 born, who live together, and die. And consider, 
 too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the 
 life of those who will live after thee, and the life 
 now lived among barbarous nations, and how 
 many know not even thy name, and how many 
 will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now 
 are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and 
 that neither a posthumous name is of any value, 
 nor reputation, nor anything else. 
 
 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations 
 with respect to the things which come from the 
 external cause ; and let there be justice in the 
 things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, 
 let there be movement and action terminating in 
 this, in social acts, for this is according to thy 
 nature. 
 
 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
 useless things among those which disturb thee, for 
 they lie entirely in thy opinion ; and thou wilt 
 then gain for thyself ample space by comprehend- 
 ing the whole universe in thy mind, and by con- 
 templating the eternity of time, and observing the 
 rapid change of every several thing, how short is 
 the time from birth to dissolution, and the illimit- 
 able time before birth as well as the equally 
 boundless time after dissolution I 
 
238 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and 
 those who have been spectators of its dissolution 
 will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the 
 extremest old age will be brought into the same 
 condition with him who died prematurely. 
 
 34. What are these men's leading principles, 
 and about what kind of things are they busy, and 
 for what kind of reasons do they love and honor ? 
 Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. 
 When they think that they do harm by their 
 blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 
 
 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the 
 universal nature delights in change, and in obedi- 
 ence to her all things are now done well, and from 
 eternity have been done in like form, and will be 
 such to time without end. What, then, dost thou 
 say, that all things have been and all things 
 always will be bad, and that no power has ever 
 been found in so many gods to rectify these 
 things, but the world has been condemned to be 
 bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 18) ? 
 
 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the 
 foundation of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : 
 or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; 
 and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, 
 only bits of hair ; and purple dye, blood ; and 
 everything else is of the same kind. And that 
 which is of the nature of breath is also another 
 thing of the same kind, changing from this to that. 
 
MAECUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 239 
 
 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- 
 ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? 
 What is there new in this ? What unsettles thee? 
 Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it 
 the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there 
 is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become 
 at last more simple and better. It is the same 
 whether we examine these things for a hundred 
 years or three. 
 
 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is 
 his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 39. Either all things proceed from one inteH^ 
 gent source and come together as in one body, and 
 the part ought not to find fault with what is done 
 for the benefit of the whole ; or there are only 
 atoms, and nothing else than mixture and disper- 
 sion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? Say to the 
 ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, 
 art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a 
 beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? l 
 
 40. Either the gods have no power or they have 
 power. If, then, they have no power, why dost 
 thou pray to them ? But if they have power, why 
 dost thou not pray for them to give thee the 
 
 1 There is some corruption at the end of this section ; but 
 I think that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. 
 Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man 
 must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has, 
 and be tranquil. 
 
240 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou 
 fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which 
 thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, 
 rather than pray that any of these things should 
 not happen or happen ? for certainly if they can 
 co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these 
 purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say the gods 
 have placed them in thy power. Well, then, is it 
 not better to use what is in thy power like a free 
 man than to desire in a slavish and abject way 
 what is not in thy power ? And who has told thee 
 that the gods do not aid us even in the things 
 which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for 
 such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays 
 thus : How shall I be able to lie with that woman? 
 Do thou pray thus : How shall I not desire to lie 
 with her ? Another prays thus : How shall I be 
 released from this? Another prays: How shall I 
 not desire to be released? Another thus: How 
 shall I not lose my little son ? Thou thus : How 
 shall I not be afraid to lose him ? In fine, turn 
 thy prayers this way, and see what comes. 
 
 41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversa- 
 tion was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says 
 he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited 
 me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of 
 things as before, keeping to this main point, how 
 the mind, while participating in such movements 
 as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from per- 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 241 
 
 turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did 
 I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of 
 putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
 something great, but my life went on well and 
 happily. Do, then, the same that he did both in 
 sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
 stances ; for never to desert philosophy in any 
 events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk 
 either with an ignorant man or with one unac- 
 quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools 
 of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that which 
 thou art now doing and on the instrument by 
 which thou doest it. 
 
 42. When thou art offended with any man's 
 shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it 
 possible, then, that shameless men should not be 
 in the world ? It is not possible. Do not, then, 
 require what is impossible. For this man also is 
 one of those shameless men who must of necessity 
 be in the world. Let the same considerations be 
 present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and 
 the faithless man, and of every man who does 
 wrong in any way. For at the same time that 
 thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that 
 such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt be- 
 come more kindly disposed towards every one 
 individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, 
 immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue 
 nature has given to man to oppose to every wrong- 
 
242 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 ful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote 
 against the stupid man, mildness, and against 
 another kind of man some other power. And in 
 all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teach- 
 ing the man who is gone astray ; for every man 
 who errs misses his object and is gone astray. 
 Besides, wherein hast thou been injured? For 
 thou wilt find that no one among those against 
 whom thou art irritated has done anything by 
 which thy mind could be made worse ; but that 
 which is evil to thee and harmful has its founda- 
 tion only in the mind. And what harm is done or 
 what is there strange, if the man who has not been 
 instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man ? 
 Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame 
 thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man 
 to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given 
 thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely 
 that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast 
 forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But 
 most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless 
 or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is 
 manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that 
 a man who had such a disposition would keep his 
 promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou 
 didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such 
 way as to have received from thy very act all the 
 profit. For what more dost thou want when thou 
 hast done a man a service ? art thou not content 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 243 
 
 that them hast done something conformable to thy 
 nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? just 
 as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or 
 the feet for walking. For as these members are 
 formed for a particular purpose, and by working 
 according to their several constitutions obtain 
 what is their own ; 1 so also as man is formed by 
 nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done 
 anything benevolent or in any other way condu- 
 cive to the common interest, he has acted conform- 
 ably to his constitution, and he gets what is his 
 own. 
 
 rb tdiov. This sense of dTr^xeti' occurs in xi. 1, and 
 iv. 49 ; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2, a.irtyov<Ti rbv fuff66v, and in 
 Epictetus. 
 
X. 
 
 1. WILT them, then, my soul, never be good 
 and simple and one and naked, more manifest 
 than the body which surrounds thee ? Wilt thou 
 never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposi- 
 tion ? Wilt thou never be full and without a want 
 of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring 
 anything, either animate or inanimate, for the en- 
 joyment of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time 
 wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or 
 place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with 
 whom thou mayst live in harmony ? but wilt thou 
 be satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased 
 with all that is about thee, and wilt thou con- 
 vince thyself that thou hast everything, and that it 
 comes from the gods, that everything is well for 
 thee, and will be well whatever shall please them, 
 and whatever they shall give for the conservation 
 of the perfect living being, 1 the good and just and 
 beautiful, which generates and holds together all 
 
 1 That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. But the 
 confusion between gods and God is strange. 
 
 
MARCUS AURELIU8 ANTONINUS. 245 
 
 things, and contains and embraces all things which 
 are dissolved for the production of other like 
 things ? Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt 
 so dwell in community with gods and men as 
 neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be 
 condemned by them ? 
 
 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as 
 thou art governed by nature only : then do it and 
 accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living 
 being, shall not be made worse by it. And next 
 thou must observe what thy nature requires so far 
 as thou art a living being. And all this thou 
 mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou 
 art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by 
 it. But the rational animal is consequently also a 
 political [social] animal. Use these rules, then, 
 and trouble thyself about nothing else. 
 
 3. Everything which happens either happens in 
 such wise as thou art formed by nature to bear it, 
 or as thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If, 
 then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art 
 formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, but 
 bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. 
 But if it happens in such wise as thou art not 
 formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for 
 it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remem- 
 ber, however, that thou art formed by nature to 
 bear everything, with respect to which it depends 
 on thy own opinion to make it endurable and 
 
246 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy interest 
 or thy duty to do this. 
 
 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
 and show him his error. But if thou art not able, 
 blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 
 
 5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
 pared for thee from all eternity ; and the implica- 
 tion of causes was from eternity spinning the 
 thread of thy being, and of that which is incident 
 to it (iii. 11 ; iv. 26). 
 
 6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
 atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be es- 
 tablished, that I am a part of the whole which is 
 governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner inti- 
 mately related to the parts which are of the same 
 kind with myself. For remembering this, inas- 
 much as I am a part, I shall be discontented with 
 none of the things which are assigned to me out 
 of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the part 
 if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the 
 whole contains nothing which is not for its advan- 
 tage ; and all natures indeed have this common 
 principle, but the nature of the universe has this 
 principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even 
 by any external cause to generate anything harm- 
 ful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am a 
 part of such a whole, I shall be content with 
 everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am 
 in a manner intimately related to the parts which 
 
MABCUS AUKELIUS ANTONINUS. 247 
 
 are of the same kind with myself, I shall do noth- 
 ing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the 
 things which are of the same kind with myself, and 
 I shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, 
 and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these 
 things are done so, life must flow on happily, just 
 as thou mayst observe that the life of a citizen is 
 happy, who continues a course of action which is 
 advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content 
 with whatever the state may assign to him. 
 
 7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, 
 which is naturally comprehended in the universe, 
 must of necessity perish ; but let this be under- 
 stood in this sense, that they must undergo 
 change. But if this is naturally both an evil and 
 a necessity for the parts, the whole would not 
 continue to exist in a good condition, the parts 
 being subject to change and constituted so as to 
 perish in various ways. For whether did Nature 
 herself design to do evil to the things which are 
 parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil 
 and of necessity fall into evil, or have such results 
 happened without her knowing it? Both these 
 suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man 
 should even drop the term Nature [as an efficient 
 power], and should speak of these things as 
 natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm 
 at the same time that the parts of the whole are in 
 their nature subject to change, and at the same 
 
248 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 time to be surprised or vexed as if something were 
 happening contrary to nature, particularly as the 
 dissolution of things is into those things of which 
 each thing is composed. For there is either a dis- 
 persion of the elements out of which everything 
 has been compounded, or a change from the solid 
 to the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so 
 that these parts are taken back into the universal 
 reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed 
 by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do 
 not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong 
 to thee from the time of generation. For all this 
 received its accretion only yesterday and the day 
 before, as one may say, from the food and the air 
 which is inspired. This, then, which has received 
 [the accretion], changes, not that which thy 
 mother brought forth. But suppose that this 
 [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee 
 very much with that other part, which has the 
 peculiar quality [of change], this is nothing in 
 fact in the way of objection to what is said. 1 
 
 1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The mean- 
 ing is very obscure. I have given that, meaning which 
 appears to be consistent with the whole argument. The 
 emperor here maintains that the essential part of man is un- 
 changeable, and that the other parts, if they change or 
 perish, do not affect that which really constitutes the man. 
 See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 62, note 2. Schultz 
 supposed "thy mother" to mean nature, TJ 0tf<m. But I doubt 
 about that. 
 
MAHCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 249 
 
 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, 
 modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and 
 magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change 
 these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, 
 quickly return to them. And remember that the 
 term Rational was intended to signify a discriminat- 
 ing attention to every several thing, and freedom 
 from negligence ; and that Equanimity is the vol- 
 untary acceptance of the things which are assigned 
 to thee by the common nature ; and that Magna- 
 nimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
 above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the 
 flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, and 
 death, and all such things. If, then, thou main- 
 tainest thyself in the possession of these names, 
 without desiring to be called by these names by 
 others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter 
 on another life. For to continue to be such as 
 thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces 
 and defiled in such a life, is the character of a 
 very stupid man and one over-fond of his life, and 
 like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, 
 who though covered with wounds and gore, still 
 entreat to be kept to the following day, though 
 they will be exposed in the same state to the same 
 claws and bites. 1 Therefore fix thyself in the pos- 
 
 1 See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused 
 the people of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarri, 
 some of whom may have been criminals; but even if they 
 
250 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 session of these few names : and if thou art able 
 to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to 
 certain islands of the Happy. 1 But if thou shalt 
 perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost 
 not maintain thy hold, go courageously into some 
 nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even 
 depart at once from life, not in passion, but with 
 simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing 
 this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to 
 have gone out of it thus. In order, however, to 
 the remembrance of these names, it will greatly 
 help thee if thou rememberest the gods, and that 
 
 were, the exhibition was equally characteristic of the de- 
 praved habits of the spectators. 
 
 1 The islands of the Happy, or the Fortunatae Insulae, are 
 spoken of by the Greek and Koman writers. They were the 
 abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in 
 the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Sertorius heard 
 of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors who had been 
 there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest from 
 his troubles (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8). In the Odyssey, 
 Proteus told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but 
 be removed to & place at the boundary of the earth where 
 Ehadamanthus dwelt (Odyssey, iv. 565) : 
 
 " For there in sooth man's life is easiest : 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man." 
 
 It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows 
 some old legend, without having any knowledge of any 
 place which corresponds to his description. The two islands 
 which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira and the adjacent 
 island. Compare Pindar, 01. ii. 129. 
 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 251 
 
 they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reason- 
 able beings to be made like themselves; and if 
 thou rememberest that what does the work of a 
 fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work 
 of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work of 
 a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a 
 man is a man. 
 
 9. Mimi, 1 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, 
 will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine, 
 f How many things without studying nature dost 
 thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? 2 
 But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do 
 everything, that at the same time the power of 
 dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the 
 contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- 
 fidence which comes from the knowledge of each 
 several thing is maintained without showing it, 
 but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy 
 simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
 of every several thing, both what it is in sub- 
 stance, and what place it has in^ the universe, 
 and how long it is formed to exist, and of what 
 things it is compounded, and to whom it can be- 
 long, and who are able both to give it and take it 
 away ? 
 
 1 Corals conjectured /wiros "hatred" in place of Mimi, Ro- 
 man plays in which action and gesticulation were all or 
 nearly all. 
 
 1 This is corrupt. See the edition of Schultz. 
 
252 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, 
 and another when he has caught a poor hare, and 
 another when he has taken a little fish in a net, 
 and another when he has taken wild boars, and 
 another when he has taken bears, and another 
 when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these 
 robbers, if thou examinest their opinions ? 1 
 
 11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
 how all things change into one another, and con- 
 stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about 
 this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so 
 much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a 
 man has put off the body, and as he sees that he 
 must, no one knows how soon, go away from 
 among men and leave everything here, he gives 
 himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions, 
 and in everything else that happens he resigns 
 himself to the universal nature. But as to what 
 any man shall say or think about him or do 
 against him, he never even thinks of it, being him- 
 self contented with these two things, with act- 
 ing justly in what he now does, and being satisfied 
 with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays 
 aside all distracting and busy pursuits, .and desires 
 nothing else than to accomplish the straight 
 
 1 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He 
 himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he 
 says, like the rest. But compare the life of Avidius Cassius, 
 c. 4, by Vulcatius. 
 
 sius, 
 
MAECUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 253 
 
 course through the law, 1 and by accomplishing 
 the straight course to follow God. 
 
 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since 
 it is in thy power to inquire what ought to be 
 done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way 
 content, without turning back : but if thou dost 
 not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. 
 But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- 
 ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping 
 to that which appears to be just. For it is best 
 to reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let 
 thy failure be in attempting this. He who fol- 
 lows reason in all .things is both tranquil and 
 active at the same time, and also cheerful and col- 
 lected. 
 
 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
 from sleep whether it will make any difference to 
 thee if another does what is just and right. It 
 will make no difference (vi. 32; viii. 55). 
 
 Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those 
 who assume arrogant airs in bestowing their praise 
 or blame on others are such as they are at bed and 
 at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, 
 and what they avoid, and what they pursue, and 
 how they steal and how they rob, not with hands 
 arid feet, but with their most valuable part, by 
 means of which there is produced, when a man 
 
 1 By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will 
 of God. 
 
254 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good dae- 
 mon [happiness] (vii. 17) ? 
 
 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
 nature, the man who is instructed and modest 
 says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou 
 wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obedi- 
 ently, and well pleased with her. 
 
 15. Short is the little which remains to thee of 
 life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no 
 difference whether a man lives there or here, if he 
 lives everywhere in the world as in a state [polit- 
 ical community]. Let men see, let them know a 
 real man who lives according to nature. If they 
 cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that 
 is better than to live thus [as men do]. 
 
 16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man 
 that a good man ought to be, but be such. 
 
 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
 and the whole of substance, and consider that all 
 individual things as to substance are a grain of a 
 fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet. 
 
 18. Look at everything that exists, and observe 
 that it is already in dissolution and in change, and 
 as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- 
 thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 
 
 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
 ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves, and 
 so forth. Then what kind of men they are when 
 they are imperious f and arrogant, or angry and 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 255 
 
 scolding from their elevated place. But a short 
 time ago to how many they were slaves and for 
 what things; and after a little time consider in 
 what a condition they will be. 
 
 20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
 the universal nature brings to each. And it is for 
 its good at the time when nature brings it. 
 
 21. " The earth loves the shower ; " and " the 
 solemn ether loves ; " and the universe loves to 
 make whatever is about to be. I say then to the 
 universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not 
 this too said, that " this or that loves [is wont] to 
 be produced ? " 1 
 
 22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
 accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, 
 and this was thy own will ; or thou art dying and 
 hast discharged thy duty. But besides these 
 things there is nothing. Be of good cheer, then. 
 
 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this 
 
 1 These words are from Euripides. They are cited by Aris- 
 totle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 296) and Sto- 
 baeus quote seven complete lines beginning epq. ptv 6(j.fipov 
 yaia. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus, Danaides, 
 also quoted by Athenaeus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings 
 of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb <t\t, "loves," 
 which has also the sense of "is wont," " uses," and the like. 
 He finds in the common language of mankind a philosophical 
 truth, and most great truths are expressed in the common 
 language of life ; some understand them, but most people 
 utter them without knowing how much they mean. 
 
256 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 piece of land is like any other ; and that all things 
 here are the same with things on the top of a 
 mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou 
 choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what 
 Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as 
 in a shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three 
 last words are omitted in the translation.] l 
 
 24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and 
 of what nature am I now making it ? and for what 
 purpose am I now using it ? is it void of under- 
 standing ? is it loosed and rent asunder from social 
 life? is it melted into and mixed with the poor 
 flesh so as to move together with it ? 
 
 25. He who flies from his master is a runaway ; 
 but the law is master, and he who breaks the law 
 is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or 
 angry or afraid,f is dissatisfied because something 
 has been or is or shall be of the things which are 
 appointed by him who rules all things, and he is 
 Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He 
 then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a 
 runaway. 2 
 
 26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
 away, and then another cause takes it, and labors 
 
 1 Plato, Theaet. 174 D. E. But compare the original with 
 the use that Antoninus has made of it. 
 
 8 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology, of wfyios, 
 law, assignment, that which assigns (^Met) to every man his 
 portion. 
 
 
MAECUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 257 
 
 on it and makes a child. What a thing from such 
 a material ! Again, the child passes food down 
 through the throat, and then another cause takes 
 it and makes perception and motion, and in fine, 
 life and strength and other things ; how many and 
 how strange ! Observe then the things which are 
 produced in such a hidden way, and see the power 
 just as we see the power which carries things 
 downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but 
 still no less plainly (vii. 75). 
 
 27. Constantly consider how all things such as 
 they now are, in time 'past also were ; and con- 
 sider that they will be the same again. And 
 place before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of 
 the same form, whatever thou hast learned from 
 thy experience or from older history ; for example, 
 the whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court 
 of Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, 
 Alexander, Croesus ; for all those were such 
 dramas as we see now, only with different actors. 
 
 28. Imagine every man who is grieved at any- 
 thing or discontented to be like a pig which is sac- 
 rificed and kicks and screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence 
 laments the bonds in which we are held. And 
 consider that only to the rational animal is it 
 given to follow voluntarily what happens ; but 
 simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 
 
 29. Severally on the occasion of everything that 
 
258 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 thou doest, pause and ask thyself if death is a 
 dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this. 
 
 30. When thou art offended at any man's fault, 
 forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what like 
 manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in 
 thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, 
 or a bit of reputation, and the like. For by at- 
 tending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, 
 if this consideration also is added, that the man is 
 compelled : for what else could he do ? or, if thou 
 art able, take away from him the compulsion. 
 
 31. When thou hast seen Satyron l the Soc- 
 ratic,f think of either Eutyches or Hymen, and 
 when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Euty- 
 chion or Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alci- 
 phron think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou 
 hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito 2 or Severus, 
 and when thou hast looked on thyself, think of 
 any other Caesar, and in the case of every one do 
 in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy 
 mind, Where then are those men ? Nowhere, or 
 
 1 Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion ; nor, I believe, 
 of Eutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honorably mentioned 
 by Epictetus (iii. 15, 8; iv. 8, 17). Pliny (Epp, i. 10) speaks 
 very highly of him. He obtained the permission of the Em- 
 peror Hadrian to drink poison, because he was old and in bad 
 health (Dion Cassius, 69, c. 8). 
 
 2 Crito is the friend of Socrates; and he was, it appears, 
 also a friend of Xenophon. When the emperor says " seen" 
 (t'Scij/), he does not mean with the eyes. 
 
MABCUS AUEELIU8 ANTONINUS. 259 
 
 nobody knows where. For thus continuously 
 thou wilt look at human things as smoke and 
 nothing at all ; especially if thou reflectest at the 
 same time that what has once changed will never 
 exist again in the infinite duration of time. But 
 thou, in what a brief space of time is thy exist- 
 ence ? And why art thou not content to pass 
 through this short time in an orderly way ? What 
 matter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou 
 avoiding? For what else are all these things, 
 except exercises for the reason, when it has viewed 
 carefully and by examination into their nature the 
 things which happen in life ? Persevere then 
 until thou shalt have made these things thy own, 
 as the stomach which is strengthened makes all 
 things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame 
 and brightness out of everything that is thrown 
 into it. 
 
 32. Let it not be in any man's power to say 
 truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou 
 art not good ; but let him be a liar whoever shall 
 think anything of this kind about thee ; and this 
 is altogether in thy power. For who is he that 
 shall hinder thee from being good and simple? 
 Do thou only determine to live no longer unless 
 thou shalt be such. For neither does reason allow 
 [thee to live], if thou art not such. 1 
 
 33. What is that which as to this material [our 
 
 1 Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28. 
 
260 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 life] can be done or said in the way most conform- 
 able to reason ? For whatever this may be, it is 
 in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not 
 make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt 
 not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a con- 
 dition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy 
 pleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter 
 which is subjected and presented to thee, the 
 doing of the things which are conformable to 
 man's constitution; for a man ought to consider 
 as an enjoyment everything which it is in his 
 power to do according to his own nature. And it 
 is in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given 
 to a cylinder to move everywhere by its own 
 motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to any- 
 thing else which is governed by nature or an 
 irrational soul, for the things which check them 
 and stand in the way are many. But intelligence 
 and reason are able to go through everything that 
 opposes them, and in such manner as they are 
 formed by nature and as they choose. Place 
 before thy eyes this facility with which the reason 
 will be carried through all things, as fire upwards, 
 as a stone downwards, as a cylinder .down an in- 
 clined surface, and seek for nothing further. For 
 all other obstacles either affect the body only, 
 which is a dead thing ; or, except through opinion 
 and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not 
 crush nor do any harm of any kind ; for if they 
 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 261 
 
 4 
 
 did, he who felt it would immediately become bad. 
 Now, in the case of all things which have a certain 
 constitution, whatever harm may happen to any of 
 them, that which is so affected becomes conse- 
 quently worse ; but in the like case, a man be- 
 comes both better, if one may say so, and more 
 worthy of praise by making a right use of these 
 accidents. And finally remember that nothing 
 harms him who is really a citizen, which does not 
 harm the state ; nor yet does anything harm the 
 state, which does not harm law [order] ; and of 
 these things which are called misfortunes not one 
 harms law. What then does not harm law does 
 not harm either state or citizen. 
 
 34. To him who is penetrated by true princi- 
 ples even the briefest precept is sufficient, and any 
 common precept, to remind him that he should be 
 free from grief and fear. For example, - 
 
 " Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground 
 So is the race of men." ' 
 
 Leaves, also, are thy children ; and leaves, too, are 
 they who cry out as if they were worthy of credit 
 and bestow their praise, or on the contrary curse, 
 or secretly blame and sneer ; and leaves, in like 
 manner, are those who shall receive and transmit 
 a man's fame to after-times. For all such things as 
 these " are produced in. the season of spring," as 
 the poet says; then the wind casts them down; 
 1 Homer, II. vi. 146. 
 
262 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 then the forest produces other leaves in their 
 places. But a brief existence is common to all 
 things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all 
 things as if they would be eternal. A little time, 
 and thou shalt close thy eyes ; and him who has 
 attended thee to thy grave another soon will lament. 
 
 35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
 things and not to say, I wish for green things ; for 
 this is the condition of a diseased eye. And the 
 healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to 
 perceive all that can be heard and smelled. And 
 the healthy stomach ought to be with respect to 
 all food just as the mill with respect to all things 
 which it is formed to grind. And accordingly the 
 healthy understanding ought to be prepared for 
 everything which happens ; but that which says, 
 Let my dear children live, and let all men praise 
 whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for 
 green things, or teeth which seek for soft things. 
 
 36. There is no man so fortunate that there 
 shall not be by him when he is dying some who 
 are pleased with what is going to happen. 1 Sup- 
 pose that he was a good and wise man, will there 
 not be at last some one to say to himself, Let us 
 at last breathe freely, being relieved from this 
 schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to 
 
 1 He says *a.K6v, but as he affirms in other places that death 
 is no evil, he must mean what others may call an evil, and he 
 means only " what is going to happen." 
 
MARCUS AUBELIUS ANTONINUS. 263 
 
 none of us, but I perceived that he tacitly con- 
 demns us. This is what is said of a good man. 
 But in our own case how many other things are 
 there for which there are many who wish to get 
 rid of us. Thou wilt consider this, then, when 
 thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more con- 
 tentedly by reflecting thus : I am going away from 
 such a life, in which even my associates in behalf 
 of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and 
 cared, themselves wish me to depart, hoping per- 
 chance to get some little advantage by it. Why 
 then should a man cling to a longer stay here? 
 Do not however for this reason go away less 
 kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own 
 character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, 
 and on the other hand not as if thou wast torn 
 away ; but as when a man dies a quiet death, the 
 poor soul is easily separated from the body, such 
 also ought thy departure from men to be, for 
 nature united thee to them and associated thee. 
 But does she now dissolve the union ? Well, I am 
 separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged 
 resisting, but without compulsion ; for this, too, is 
 one of the things according to nature. 
 
 37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on 
 the occasion of anything being done by any per- 
 son to inquire with thyself, For what object is this 
 man doing this? But begin with thyself, and 
 examine thyself first. 
 
264 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 38. Remember that this which pulls the strings 
 is the thing which is hidden within : this is the 
 power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may so 
 say, is man. In contemplating thyself never in- 
 clude the vessel which surrounds thee and these 
 instruments which are attached about it. For 
 they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that 
 they grow to the body. For indeed there is no 
 more use in these parts without the cause which 
 moves and checks them than in the weaver's 
 shuttle, and the writer's pen, and the driver's 
 whip. 1 
 
 1 See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 62, n. 2. 
 
XI. 
 
 1. THESE are the properties of the rational soul : 
 it sees itself, analyzes itself, and makes itself such 
 as it chooses ; the fruit which it bears itself enjoys, 
 for the fruits of plants and that in animals 
 which corresponds to fruits others enjoy, it 
 obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life may 
 be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in 
 such like things, where the whole action is incom- 
 plete if anything cuts it short ; but in every part, 
 and wherever it may be stopped, it makes what 
 has been set before it full and complete, so that it 
 can say, I have what is my own. And further it 
 traverses the whole universe, and the surrounding 
 vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends 
 itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and 
 comprehends the l periodical renovation of all 
 things, and it comprehends that those who come 
 after us will see nothing new, nor have those 
 before us seen anything more, but in a manner he 
 who is forty years old, if- he has any understanding 
 at all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that 
 TaXtrywtoi'. See v, 13, 32 ; x. 7. 
 
266 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 prevails all things which have been and all that 
 will be. This too is a property of the rational 
 soul, love of one's neighbor, and truth and mod- 
 esty, and to value nothing more than itself, which 
 is also the property of Law. 1 Thus then right 
 reason differs not at all from the reason of justice. 
 
 2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song 
 and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt dis- 
 tribute the melody of the voice into its several 
 sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art 
 mastered by this ; for thou wilt be prevented by 
 shame from confessing it : and in the matter of 
 dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou 
 wilt do the same ; and the like also in the matter 
 of the pancratium. In all things, then, except 
 virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
 thyself to their several parts, and by this division 
 to come to value them little : and apply this rule 
 also to thy whole life. 
 
 3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any 
 moment it must be separated from the body, and 
 ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or 
 continue to exist ; but so that this readiness 
 comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere 
 obstinacy, as with the Christians, 2 but consider- 
 
 1 Law is the order by which all things are governed. 
 
 2 See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only passage in 
 which the emperor speaks of the Christians. Epictetus (iv. 
 7, 6) names them Galilaei. 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 267 
 
 ately and with dignity and in a way to persuade 
 another, without tragic show. 
 
 4. Have I done something for the general in- 
 terest? Well then I have had my reward. Let 
 this always be present to thy mind, and never 
 stop [doing such good]. 
 
 5. What is thy art? To be good. And how 
 is this accomplished well except by general prin- 
 ciples, some about the nature of the universe, and 
 others about the proper constitution of man ? 
 
 6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage 
 as means of reminding men of the things which 
 happen to them, and that it is according to nature 
 for things to happen so, and that, if you are de- 
 lighted with what is shown on the stage, you 
 should not be troubled with that which takes 
 place on the larger stage. For you see that these 
 things must be accomplished thus, and that even 
 they bear them who cry out, 1 " O Cithaeron." And, 
 indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic 
 writers, of which kind is the following especially : 
 
 " Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
 This has its reason too." 2 
 
 And again, 
 
 " We must not chafe and fret at that which happens." 
 And, 
 
 " Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear." 
 And other things of the -same kind. 
 
 1 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. 
 * See vii. 41, 38, 40. 
 
268 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, 
 which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and by 
 its very plainness of speaking was useful in re- 
 minding men to beware of insolence ; and for this 
 purpose too Diogenes used to take from these 
 writers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy, which came next, 
 observe what it was, and again, for what object the 
 new comedy was introduced, which gradually sank 
 down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good 
 things are said even by these writers, everybody 
 knows : but the whole plan of such poetry and 
 dramaturgy, to what end does it look? 
 
 7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
 another condition of life so well suited for philoso- 
 phizing as this in which thou now happenest to be. 
 
 8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
 must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree 
 also. So too a man when he is separated from 
 another man has fallen off from the whole social 
 community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it 
 off; but a man by his own act separates himself 
 from his neighbor when he hates him and turns 
 away from him, and he does not know that he has 
 at the same time cut himself off from the whole 
 social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly 
 from Zeus, who framed society, for it is in em- 
 power to grow again to that which is near to us, 
 and again to become a part which helps to make 
 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINU8. 269 
 
 up the whole. However, if it often happens, this 
 kind of separation, it makes it difficult for that 
 which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to 
 be restored to its former condition. Finally, the 
 branch, which from the first grew together with 
 the tree, and has continued to have one life with 
 it, is not like that which after being cut off is then 
 ingrafted, for this is something like what the 
 gardeners mean when they say that it grows with 
 the rest of the tree, but f that it has not the same 
 mind with it. 
 
 9. As those who try to stand in thy way when 
 thou art proceeding according to right reason will 
 not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper 
 action, so neither let them drive thee from thy 
 benevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy 
 guard equally in both matters, not only in the 
 matter of steady judgment and action, but also in 
 the matter of gentleness to those who try to 
 hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this also is 
 a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to be 
 diverted from thy course of action and to give 
 way through fear ; for both are equally deserters 
 from their post, the man who does it through 
 fear, and the man who is alienated from him who 
 is by nature a kinsman and a friend. 
 
 10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, 
 for the arts imitate the natures of things. But if 
 this is so, that nature which is the most perfect 
 
270 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot 
 fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the 
 inferior things for the sake of the superior ; there- 
 fore the universal nature does so too. And, in- 
 deed, hence is the origin of justice, and in justice 
 the other virtues have their foundation : for justice 
 will not be observed, if we either care for middle 
 things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived 
 arid careless and changeable (v. 16, 30 ; vii. 55). 
 
 11. If the things do not come to thee, the pur- 
 suits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still in 
 a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy judg- 
 ment about them be at rest, and they will remain 
 quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursuing 
 or avoiding. 
 
 12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its 
 figure when it is neither extended towards any 
 object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor 
 sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which 
 it sees the truth, the truth of all things and the 
 truth that is in itself (viii. 41, 45 ; xii. 3). 
 
 13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
 him look to that himself. But I will look to this, 
 that I be not discovered doing or saying anything 
 deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? 
 Let him look to it. But I will be mild and benev- 
 olent towards every man, and ready to show even 
 him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as 
 making a display of my endurance, but nobly and 
 
 
MAE C US AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 271 
 
 honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he 
 only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought 
 to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods 
 neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. 
 For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing 
 what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satis- 
 fied with that which at this moment is suitable to 
 the nature of the universe, since thou art a human 
 being placed at thy post in order that what is 
 for the common advantage may be done in some 
 way? 
 
 14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
 another; and men wish to raise themselves above 
 one another, and crouch before one another. 
 
 15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, 
 I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way ! 
 What art thou doing, man ? There is no occa- 
 sion to give this notice. It will soon show itself 
 by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written 
 on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,f he 
 immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is 
 beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of 
 lovers. The man who is honest and good ought 
 to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that 
 the bystander as soon as he comes near him must 
 smell whether he choose or not. But the affecta- 
 tion of simplicity is like a crooked stick. 1 Nothing 
 
 \ Instead of <r/cd\/7 Saumaise reads cvca^. There is a 
 Greek proverb, <TK*np!>v &\ov otStiror' dpOfo: "You cannot 
 
272 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false 
 friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The good 
 and simple and benevolent show all these things 
 in the eyes, and there is no mistaking. 
 
 16. As to living in the best way, this power is 
 in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are 
 indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks 
 on each of these things separately and all to- 
 gether, and if it remembers that not one of them 
 produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes 
 to us ; but these things remain immovable, and it 
 is we ourselves who produce the judgments about 
 them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, 
 it being in our power not to write them, and it 
 being in our power, if perchance these judgments 
 have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to 
 wipe them out; and if we remember also that 
 such attention will only be for a short time, and 
 then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble 
 is there at all in doing this ? For if these things 
 are according to nature, rejoice in them and they 
 will be easy to thee : but if contrary to nature, 
 seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and 
 strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation ; 
 for every man is allowed to seek his own good. 
 
 17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of 
 what it consists,! and into what it changes, and 
 
 make a crooked stick straight." The wolfish friendship is 
 an allusion to the fable of the sheep and the wolves. 
 
MAECU8 AUEELIU8 ANTONINUS. 273 
 
 what kind of a thing it will be when it has 
 changed, and that it will sustain no harm. 
 
 18. [If any have offended against thee, consider 
 first] : What is my relation to men, and that we 
 are made for one another ; and in another respect 
 I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the 
 flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the 
 matter from first principles, from this : If all 
 things are not mere atoms, it is nature which 
 orders all things : if this is so, the inferior things 
 exist for the sake of the superior, and these for the 
 sake of one another (ii. 1; ix. 39; v. 16 ; iii. 4). 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are at 
 table, in bed, and so forth : and particularly, under 
 what compulsions in respect of opinions they are ; 
 and as to their acts, consider with what pride they 
 do what they do (viii. 14 ; ix. 34). 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we 
 ought not to be displeased : but if they do not 
 right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and 
 in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly 
 deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly de- 
 prived of the power of behaving to each man 
 according to his deserts. Accordingly men are 
 pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, 
 and greedy, and in a word wrong-doers to their 
 neighbors (vii. 62, 63 ; ii. 1 ; vii. 26 ; viii. 29). 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest many 
 things wrong, and that thou art a man like others ; 
 
274 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, 
 still thou hast the disposition to commit them, 
 though either through cowardice, or concern about 
 reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost 
 abstain from such faults (i. 17). 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even under- 
 stand whether men are doing wrong or not, for 
 many things are done with a certain reference to 
 circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a 
 great deal to enable him to pass a correct judg- 
 ment on another man's acts (ix. 38; iv. 51). 
 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or 
 grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and after 
 a short time we are all laid out dead (vii. 58 ; iv. 
 48). 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb 
 us, for those acts have their foundation in men's 
 ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which 
 disturb us-flake away these opinions then, and 
 resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if 
 it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. 
 How then shall I take away these opinions ? By 
 reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings 
 shame on thee : for unless that which is shameful 
 is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many 
 things wrong, and become a robber and everything 
 else (v. 25; vii. 16). 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought 
 on u by the anger and vexation caused by such 
 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 275 
 
 acts than by the acts themselves, at-whiciTWe' are 
 angry and vexed (iv. 39, 49 ; vii. 24). 
 
 Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invin- 
 cible if it be genuine, and not an affected smile 
 and acting a part. Iflmi m\u\( will the most violent 
 man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind 
 disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity 
 offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly 
 correctest his errors at the very time when he is 
 trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child : 
 we are constituted by nature for something else : 
 I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injur- 
 ing thyself, my child. And show him with 
 gentle tact and by general principles that this is 
 so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor 
 any animals which are formed by nature to be 
 gregarious. And thou must do this neither with 
 any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, 
 but affectionately and without any rancor in thy 
 soul ; and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor 
 yet that any bystander may admire, but either 
 when he is alone, and if others are present . . - 1 
 
 Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst re- 
 ceived them as a gift from the Muses, and begin 
 at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou 
 must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed 
 at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. 
 And let this truth be present to thee in the excite- 
 1 It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 
 
276 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 ment of anger, that to be moved by passion is not 
 manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they 
 are more agreeable to human nature, so also are 
 they more manly ; and he who possesses these 
 qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, 
 and not the man who is subject to fits of passion 
 and discontent. For in the same degree in which 
 a man's mind is nearer to freedom from all 
 passion, in the same degree also is it nearer to 
 strength : and as the sense of pain is a character- 
 istic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who 
 yields to pain and he who yields to anger, both are 
 wounded and both submit. 
 
 But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present 
 from the leader of the [Muses, Apollo], and it is 
 this, that to expect bad men not to do wrong is 
 madness, for ho who expect^ this 1 desire^ an im- 
 possibility. But to allow men to behave so to 
 others, and to expect them not to do thee any 
 wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. 
 
 19. There are four principal aberrations of the 
 superior faculty against which thou shouldst be 
 constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast 
 detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and 
 say on each occasion thus: This thought is not 
 necessary : this tends to destroy social union : this 
 which thou art going to sa}*- comes not from the 
 real thoughts ; for thou shouldst consider it among 
 the most absurd of things for a man not to speak 
 
 
MAECUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 277 
 
 from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when 
 thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this 
 is an evidence of the diviner part within thee 
 being overpowered and yielding to the less hon- 
 orable and to the perishable part, the body, and 
 to its gross pleasures (iv. 24 ; ii. 16). 
 
 20. Thy aerial part and all, the fiery parts which 
 are mingled in thee, though by nature they have 
 an upward tendency, still in obedience to the 
 disposition of the universe they are overpowered 
 here in the compound mass [the body]. And also 
 the whole of the earthy part in thee and the 
 watery, though their tendency is downward, still 
 are raised up and occupy a position which is not 
 their natural one. In this manner then the ele- 
 mental parts obey the universal ; for when they 
 have been fixed in any place, perforce they re- 
 main there until again the universal shall sound 
 the signal for dissolution. It is not then strange 
 that thy intelligent part only should be disobe- 
 dient and discontented with its own place? And 
 yet no force is imposed on it, but only those 
 things which are conformable to its nature : still 
 it does not submit, but is carried in the opposite 
 direction. For the movement towards injustice 
 and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear 
 is nothing else than the act of one who deviates 
 from nature. And also when the ruling faculty 
 is discontented with anything that happens, then 
 
278 MEDl TA TIONS. 
 
 too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for 
 piety and reverence towards the gods no less than 
 for justice. For these qualities also are compre- 
 hended under the generic term of contentment 
 with the constitution of things, and indeed they 
 are prior l to acts of justice. 
 
 21. He who has not one and always the same 
 object in life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life. But what I have said is not 
 enough, unless this also is added, what this ob- 
 ject ought to be. For as there is not the same 
 opinion about all the things which in some way 
 or other are considered by the majority to be 
 
 1 The word irpea-fivTepa, which is here translated "prior," 
 may also mean " superior; " but Antoninus seems to say that 
 piety and reverence of the gods precede all virtues, and that 
 other virtues are derived from them, even justice, which in 
 another passage (xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all 
 virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving to 
 every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have 
 supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all cases en- 
 force. Besides, law has its own rules, which are sometimes 
 moral and sometimes immoral; but it enforces them all 
 simply because they are general rules, and if it did not or 
 could not enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Jus- 
 tice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule and 
 obedience to it; and as we all live under universal Law, 
 which commands both our body and our intelligence, and is 
 the law of our nature, that is, the law of the whole constitu- 
 tion of man, we must endeavor to discover what this su- 
 preme Law is. It is the will of the power that rules all. 
 By acting in obedience to this will, we do justice, and by 
 consequence everything else that we ought to do. 
 
 
MA B C US A UEELIUS ANTONINUS. 279 
 
 good, but only about some certain things, that is, 
 things which concern the common interest, so 
 also ought we to propose to ourselves an object 
 which shall be of a common kind [social] and 
 political. For he who directs all his own efforts 
 to this object, will make all his acts alike, and 
 thus will always be the same. 
 
 22. Think of the country mouse and of the 
 town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of 
 the town mouse. 1 
 
 23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
 many by the name of Lamiae, bugbears to 
 frighten children. 
 
 24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spec- 
 tacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, 
 but themselves sat down anywhere. 
 
 25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas 2 for 
 not going to him, saying, It is because I would 
 not perish by the worst of all ends ; that is, I 
 would not receive a favor and then be unable to 
 return it. 
 
 26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] 3 there 
 was this precept, constantly to think of some one 
 of the men of former times who practised virtue. 
 
 1 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), and by 
 others since, but not better. 
 
 2 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other 
 writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who 
 invited Socrates to Macedonia. 
 
 3 Gataker suggested 'ETriKovpciuv for ' 
 
280 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
 look to the heavens that we may be reminded of 
 those bodies which continually do the same things 
 and in the same manner perform their work, and 
 also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For 
 there is no veil over a star. 
 
 28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he 
 dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had 
 taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates 
 said to his friends who were ashamed of him and 
 drew back from him when they saw him dressed 
 thus. 
 
 29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou 
 be able to lay down rules for others before thou 
 shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. 
 Much more is this so in life. 
 
 30. A slave thou art : free speech is not for thee. 
 
 31. And my heart laughed within. 
 
 ix. 413. 
 
 32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words. 
 
 HESIOD, Works and Days, 184. 
 
 33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman's 
 act : such is he who looks for his child when it 
 is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 24, 7). 
 
 34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, 
 he should whisper to himself, " To-morrow per- 
 chance thou wilt die." But those are words of 
 bad omen. " No word is a word of bad omen," 
 said Epictetus, " which expresses any work of 
 
 
MAE C US AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 281 
 
 nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen 
 to speak of the ears of corn being reaped " (Epic- 
 tetus, iii. 24, 88). 
 
 35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried 
 grape all are changes, not into nothing, but into 
 something which exists not yet (Epictetus, iii. 24). 
 
 36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epic- 
 tetus, iii. 22, 105). 
 
 37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an 
 art [or rules] with respect to giving his assent ; 
 and in respect to his movements he must be 
 careful that they be made with regard to cir- 
 cumstances, that they be consistent with social 
 interests, that they have regard to the value of 
 the object; and as to sensual desire, he should 
 altogether keep away from it ; and as to avoid- 
 ance [aversion], he should not show it with 
 respect to any of the things which are not in our 
 power. 
 
 38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any 
 common matter, but about being mad or not. 
 
 39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, 
 souls of rational men or irrational ? Souls of 
 rational men. Of what rational men, sound 
 or unsound ? Sound. Why then do you not 
 seek for them ? Because we have them. Why 
 then do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
XII. 
 
 1. ALL those things at which thou wishest to ar- 
 rive by a circuitous road thou canst have now, if 
 thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this 
 means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, 
 and trust the future to providence, and direct the 
 present only conformably to piety and justice. 
 Conformably to piety, that thou mayst be con- 
 tent with the lot which is assigned to thee, for 
 nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Con- 
 formably to justice, that thou mayst always speak 
 the truth freely and without disguise, and do the 
 things which are agreeable to law and according 
 to the worth of each. And let neither another 
 man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor 
 voice, nor yet the sensations of the poor flesh 
 which has grown about thee ; for the passive part 
 will look to this. If, then, whatever the time 
 may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, 
 neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only 
 thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, 
 and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 283 
 
 some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear 
 never to have begun to live according to nature, 
 then thou wilt be a man worthy of the uni- 
 verse which has produced thee, and thou wilt 
 cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to 
 wonder at things which happen daily as if they 
 were something unexpected, and to be dependent 
 on this or that. 
 
 2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all 
 men bared of the material vesture and rind and 
 impurities. For with his intellectual part alone 
 he touches the intelligence only which has flowed 
 and been derived from himself into these bodies. 
 And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou 
 wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who 
 regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, 
 surely will not trouble himself by looking after 
 raiment and dwelling and fame and such like 
 externals and show. 
 
 3. The things are three of which thou art com- 
 posed : a little body, a little breath [life], intelli- 
 gence. Of these the first two are thine, so far as 
 it is thy duty to take care of them ; but the third 
 alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt 
 separate from thyself, that is, from thy under- 
 standing, whatever others do or say, and whatever 
 thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever 
 future things trouble thee because they may hap- 
 pen, and whatever in the body which envelops 
 
284 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature 
 associated with the body, is attached to thee 
 independent of thy will, and whatever the ex- 
 ternal circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that 
 the intellectual power exempt from the things of 
 fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what 
 is just and accepting what happens and saying the 
 truth : if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling 
 faculty the things which are attached to it by the 
 impressions of sense, and the things of time to 
 come and of time that is past, and wilt make thy- 
 self like Empedocles' sphere, 
 
 " All round and in its joyous rest reposing; " * 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really 
 thy life, that is, the present, then thou wilt be 
 able to pass that portion of life which remains for 
 thee up to the time of thy death free from per- 
 turbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon 
 [to the god that is within thee] (ii. 13, 17 ; iii. 5, 
 6 ; xi. 12). 
 
 f 4. I have often wondered how it is that every 
 
 I man loves himself more than all the rest of men, 
 
 but yet sets less value on his own opinion of him- 
 
 \ self than on the opinion of others. If then a god 
 
 lor a wise teacher should present himself to a man 
 
 \and bid him to think of nothing and to design 
 
 V ! The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has 
 been restored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus : 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 285 
 
 nothing which he would not express as soon as he 
 conceived it, he could not endure it even for a 
 single day. 1 So much more respect have we to 
 what our neighbors shall think of us than to what 
 we shall think of ourselves. 
 
 5. How can it be that the gods, after having 
 arranged all things well and benevolently for 
 mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some 
 men, and very good men, and men who, as we 
 may say, have had most communion with the 
 divinity, and through pious acts and religious 
 observances have been most intimate with the 
 divinity, when they have once died should never 
 exist again, but should be completely extinguished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to 
 have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. 
 For if it were just, it would also be possible ; and 
 if it were according to nature, nature would have 
 had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not 
 so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
 been so : for thou seest even of thyself that in 
 this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity ; 
 and we should not thus dispute with the gods, 
 unless they were most excellent and most just ; 
 but if this is so, they would not have allowed 
 anything in the ordering of the universe to be 
 neglected unjustly and irrationally. 
 
 6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou 
 
 1 iii. 4. 
 
286 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 despairest of accomplishing. For even the left 
 hand, which is ineffectual for all other things for 
 want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously 
 than the right hand ; for it has been practised in 
 this. 
 
 7. Consider in what condition both in body and 
 soul a man should be when he is overtaken by 
 death; and consider the shortness of life, the 
 boundless abyss of time past and future, the 
 feebleness of all matter. 
 
 8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] 
 of things bare of their coverings ; the purposes of 
 actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, 
 and death, and fame ; who is to himself the cause 
 of his uneasiness; how no man is hindered by 
 another ; that everything is opinion. 
 
 9. In the application of thy principles thou 
 must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladi- 
 ator ; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he 
 uses and is killed ; but the other always has his 
 hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it. 
 
 10. See what things are in themselves, dividing 
 them into matter, form, and purpose. 
 
 11. What a power man has to do nothing except 
 what God will approve, and to accept all that God 
 may give him. 
 
 12. With respect to that which happens con- 
 formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
 gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily 
 
MARCUS AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 287 
 
 or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing 
 wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
 should blame nobody (ii. 11, 12, 13; vii. 62; 
 viii. 17). 
 
 13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is 
 who is surprised at anything which happens in life. 
 
 14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invinci- 
 ble order, or a kind providence, or a confusion 
 without a purpose and without a director (iv. 27)- 
 If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost 
 thou resist? But if there is a providence which 
 allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy 
 of the help of the divinity. But if there is a con- 
 fusion without a governor, be content that in such 
 a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling in- 
 telligence. And even if the tempest carry thee 
 away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor 
 breath, everything else ; for the intelligence at 
 least it will not carry away. 
 
 15. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
 losing its splendor until it is extinguished; and 
 shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
 temperance be extinguished [before thy death] ? 
 
 16. When a man has presented the appearance 
 of having done wrong [say], How then do I know 
 if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has 
 done wrong, how do I know that he has not con- 
 demned himself ? And so this is like tearing his 
 own face. Consider that he who would not have 
 
288 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would 
 not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs, and 
 infants to cry, and the horse to neigh, and what- 
 ever else must of necessity be. For what must a 
 man do who has such a character? If then thou 
 art irritable,! cure this man's disposition. 1 
 
 17. If it is not right, do not do it : if it is not 
 true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be ] 2 
 
 18. In everything always observe what the thing 
 is which produces for thee an appearance, and 
 resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the 
 material, the purpose, and the time within which 
 it must end. 
 
 19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee some- 
 thing better and more divine than the things 
 which cause the various affects, and as it were pull 
 thee by the strings. What is there now in my 
 mind, is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or any- 
 thing of the kind (v. 11) ? 
 
 20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor with- 
 out a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to 
 nothing else than to a social end. 
 
 21. Consider that before long thou wilt be no- 
 body and nowhere, nor will any of the things exist 
 
 1 The interpreters translate yopyfa by the words "acer, 
 validusque," and " skilful." But in Epictetus (ii. 16, 20; iii. 
 12, 10) 70/376* means "vehement," "prone to anger," "irri- 
 table." 
 
 2 There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
MARCUS AURELIU8 ANTONINUS. 289 
 
 which thou now seest, nor any of those who are 
 now living. For all things are formed by nature 
 to change and be turned and to perish, in order 
 that other things in continuous succession may 
 exist (ix. 28). 
 
 22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
 opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when 
 thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who 
 has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, 
 everything stable, and a waveless bay. 
 
 23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when 
 it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil be- 
 cause it has ceased ; nor he who has done this act, 
 does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act 
 has ceased. In like manner then the whole which 
 consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it cease 
 at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason, 
 that it has ceased ; nor he who has terminated this 
 series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. 
 But the proper time and the limit nature fixes, 
 sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of 
 man, but always the universal nature, by the 
 change of whose parts the whole universe con- 
 tinues ever young and perfect. 1 And everything 
 which is useful to the universal is always good and 
 in season. Therefore the termination of life for 
 every man is no evil, because neither is it shame, 
 ful, since it is both independent of the will and 
 
 1 vii. 25. 
 
290 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 not opposed to the general interest, but it is good, 
 since it is seasonable, and profitable to and con- 
 gruent with the universal. For thus too he is 
 moved by the Deity who is moved in the same 
 manner with the Deity, and moved towards the 
 same things in his mind. 
 
 24. These three principles thou must have in 
 readiness: In the things which thou doest do 
 nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as 
 justice herself would act ; but with respect to what 
 may happen to thee from without, consider that it 
 happens either by chance or according to provi- 
 dence, and thou must neither blame chance nor 
 accuse providence. Second, consider what every 
 being is from the seed to the time of its receiving a 
 soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving 
 back of the same, and of what things every being 
 is compounded, and into what things it is resolved. 
 Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above 
 the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, 
 and observe the variety of them how great it is, 
 and at the same time also shouldst see at a glance 
 how great is the number of beings who dwell all 
 around in the air and the ether, consider that as 
 often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst 
 see the same things, sameness of form and short- 
 ness of duration. Are these things to be proud of ? 
 
 25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who 
 then hinders thee from casting it away ? 
 
MABCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 291 
 
 26. When thou art troubled about anything, 
 thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
 according to the universal nature ; and forgotten 
 this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee ; 
 and further thou hast forgotten this, that every- 
 thing which happens, always happened so and will 
 happen so, and now happens so everywhere ; for- 
 gotten this too, how close is the kinship between 
 a man and the whole human race, for it is a com- 
 munity, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelli- 
 gence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that 
 every man's intelligence is a god and is an efflux 
 of the Deity ; l and forgotten this, that nothing is a 
 man's own, but that his child and his body and his 
 very soul came from the Deity ; forgotten this, 
 that everything is opinion ; and lastly thou hast 
 forgotten that every man lives the present time 
 only, and loses only this. 
 
 27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those 
 who have complained greatly about anything, 
 those who have been most conspicuous by the 
 greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or for- 
 tunes of any kind : then think where are they all 
 now ? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a 
 tale And let there be present to thy mind also 
 everything of this sort, how Fabius Catullinus 
 lived in the countryj and Lucius Lupus in his 
 gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at 
 
 1 See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc. 
 
292 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 Capreae, and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; 
 and in fine think of the eager pursuit of anything 
 conjoined with pride ; l and how worthless every- 
 thing is after which men violently strain ; and 
 how much more philosophical it is for a man in 
 the opportunities presented to him to show himself 
 just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do 
 this with all simplicity : for the pride which is 
 proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable 
 of all. 
 
 28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
 the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they 
 exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the 
 first place, they may be seen even with the eyes ; 2 
 
 1 fAer' o^o-ews. Ofyo-w ical rO</>os, Epict. i. 8, 6. 
 
 2 " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may 
 be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a 
 god or living being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are 
 gods (viii. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know 
 that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because we 
 see what they do; as we know that man has intellectual 
 powers, because we see what he does, and in no other way 
 do we know it. This passage then will agree with the 
 passage in the Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and with the 
 Epistle to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which Jesus Christ is 
 named "the image of the invisible god; " and with the 
 passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. v. 9.) ' 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learn- 
 ing, and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin 
 which is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. v. 20) : 
 "God by creating the universe [or world, mundum], being 
 himself invisible, has presented himself to our eyes con- 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 293 
 
 in the second place, neither have I seen even my 
 own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with 
 respect to the gods, from what I constantly ex- 
 perience of their power, from this I comprehend 
 that they exist, and I venerate them. 
 
 29. The safety of life is this, to examine every- 
 thing all through, what it is itself, that is its 
 material, what the formal part ; with all thy soul 
 to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, 
 except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to 
 another so as not to leave even the smallest inter- 
 vals between ? 
 
 30. There is one light of the sun, though it is 
 interrupted by walls, mountains, and other things 
 infinite. There is one common substance, 1 though 
 it is distributed among countless bodies which 
 have their several qualities. There is one soul, 
 though it is distributed among infinite natures and 
 individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There 
 is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be 
 divided. Now in the things which have been 
 mentioned, all the other parts, such as those which 
 
 spicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca 
 (De Benef. iv. c. 8) : " Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium 
 videbis occurrentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse 
 implet." Compare also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xeno- 
 phon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7) , and Mem. iv. 3 ; also Epictetus, 
 i. 6, de Providentia. I think that my interpretation of An- 
 toninus is right. 
 
 1 iv. 40. 
 
294 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 are air and matter, are without sensation and have 
 no fellowship : and yet even these parts the intel- 
 ligent principle holds together and the gravitation 
 towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar 
 manner tends to that which is of the same kin, 
 and combines with it, and the feeling for com- 
 munion is not interrupted. 
 
 31. What dost thou wish, to continue to 
 exist? Well, dost thou wish to have sensation, 
 movement, growth, and then again to cease to 
 grow, to use thy speech, to think ? What is there of 
 all these things which seems to thee worth desiring? 
 But if it is easy to set little value on all these 
 things, turn to that which remains, which is to 
 follow reason and God. But it is inconsistent 
 with honoring reason and God to be troubled 
 because by death a man will be deprived of the 
 other things. 
 
 32. How small a part of the boundless and 
 unfathomable time is assigned to every man, for it 
 is very soon swallowed up in the eternal ! And 
 how small a part of the whole substance ; and 
 how small a part of the universal soul ; and on 
 what a small clod of the whole earth thou creep- 
 est ! Reflecting on all this, consider, nothing to 
 be great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, 
 and to endure that which the common nature 
 brings. 
 
 33. How does the ruling faculty make use of 
 
MAE C US AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 295 
 
 itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, 
 whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is 
 only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 34. This reflection is most adapted to move us 
 to contempt of death, that even those who think 
 pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have 
 despised it. 
 
 35. The man to whom that only is good which 
 comes in due season, and to whom it is the same 
 thing whether he has done more or fewer acts 
 conformable to right reason, and to whom it 
 makes no difference whether he contemplates the 
 world for a longer or a shorter time, for this 
 man neither is death a terrible thing (iii. 7 ; vi. 
 23 ;x. 20;xii. 23). 
 
 36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great 
 state [the world] ; 1 what difference does it make 
 to thee whether for five years [or three] ? for 
 that which is conformable to the laws is just for 
 all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor 
 yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the 
 state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the 
 same as if a praetor who has employed an actor 
 dismisses him from the stage. 2 " But I have not 
 finished the five acts, but only three of them." 
 Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are 
 the whole drama ; for what shall be a complete 
 
 Mi. 16; -iii. 11; iv. 29. 
 Mii. 8; xi. 1. 
 
296 MEDITATIONS. 
 
 drama is determined by him who was once the 
 cause of its composition, and now of its disso- 
 lution: but thou art the cause of neither. De- 
 part then satisfied, for he also who releases thee 
 is satisfied. 
 
INDEXES 
 
INDEX OF TERMS. 
 
 d5id<j>opa (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, Epp. 82) ; things in- 
 different, neither good nor bad ; the same as ^<ra. 
 O.IVXP&S (turpis, Cic.), ugly; morally ugly. 
 airta, cause. 
 
 , afriov, r6, the formal or formative principle, the cause. 
 
 s, unsocial. 
 dva<f)opd, reference, relation to a purpose. 
 dj/u7recu/>7-ws, unconditionally. 
 dir6ppoia, efflux. 
 
 dirpoalpera, rd, the things which are not in our will or power. 
 dpx"f), a first principle. 
 Arofjioi (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms. 
 avrdptceia, est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 
 
 abundat (Cic.) ; contentment. 
 avrdpitris, sufficient in itself ; contented. 
 
 d0o/o/xaf, means, principles. The word has also other signifi- 
 cations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig. 
 
 , rd, things which are produced, come into existence, 
 god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 
 s, disposition, affection of the mind. 
 s, division of things into their parts, dissection, resolu- 
 tion, analysis. 
 SiaXe/cTwci}, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi 
 
 (Cic.). 
 $td\vffu t dissolution, the opposite of <nJ>/c/>wtf. 
 
300 INDEX. 
 
 Stdvoia, understanding; sometimes, the mind generally, the 
 whole intellectual power. 
 
 (decreta, Cic.), principles. 
 
 , intellectual faculty. 
 , temperance, self-restraint. 
 etSoy in divisione f ormae sunt, quas Graeci etSrj vocant ; nostri, 
 si qul haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic.). But 
 5os is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less exactly and as 
 a general term, like genus. Index Epict. ed. Schweig. 
 '(2s S4 ye al irpurrcu oti<rla.i irp6s TO, fiXXo UXOVGIV, ovr<*> Kal rb ctSos 
 irpbt ri> 7^05 2x* 4 ' inroKfirai yap rb 3os TV ytvci. (Aristot. 
 Cat. c. 5.) 
 
 (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny, necessity. 
 , aversions, avoidance, the turning away from things ; 
 the opposite of <5/>^ew. 
 
 , rd, things which have life. 
 , action, activity. 
 
 Ht>voiai, notio, notiones (Cic.), or " notitiae rerum;" 
 notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci turn 
 twoiav, tnmirp&X^tv, Cic.). 
 ), the unity. 
 
 , attention to an object, 
 animi tranquillitas (Cic.). 
 
 T&, ctfjxvcla, benevolence; ctnevjs sometimes means 
 well-contented, 
 benevolence. 
 , power, faculty. 
 
 , KOTO, by way of sequence. 
 }jyefu>vuc6v, r6, the ruling faculty or part; principatus (Cic.). 
 eewpjiMTa, percepta (Cic.), things perceived, .general prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 KaO^Keiv, r6, duty, " ofRcium." 
 *ca\6$, beautiful. 
 
 xardX^is, comprehension ; cognitio, perceptio, comprehensio 
 (Cic.). 
 
 constitution. 
 
INDEX. 301 
 
 KciTop66ffis, KaropOtifMTa ; recta, recte facta (Cic.) ; right acts, 
 those acts to which we proceed by the right or straight 
 road. 
 
 , order, world, universe. 
 
 s, b flXos, the universe, that which is the One and the All 
 (vi. 25). 
 
 , a judgment. 
 
 rb HvSov, that which rules within (iv. 1), the same as 
 rb ijyiM)vtK6v. Diogenes Laertius, vii., Zeno. -rjyefMfiK^v Se 
 tlvai rb Kvpi&rarov T^S '/'t'X'? 5 ' 
 \oyiKd, rd, the things which have reason. 
 
 s, rational, 
 s, reason. 
 Xityoj <rirep[JMTiK6s, seminal principle. 
 
 AtAra, rd, things indifferent, viewed with respect to virtue. 
 voepts, intellectual. 
 s, law. 
 s, intelligence, understanding. 
 
 , arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Antoninus 
 the same as r00os; but it also means " opinion." 
 olKovo^la (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the peculiar 
 sense of artifice, or doing something with an apparent 
 purpose different from the real purpose. 
 SKov, r6, the universe, the whole : ij T&V \tiwv 0tf<ns. 
 6vra, T<, things which exist ; existence, being. 
 6peis, desire of a thing, which is opposed to K/cXrts, aversion. 
 , movement towards an object, appetite; appetitio, natu- 
 ralis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic.). 
 
 , substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes incor- 
 rectly translate it " essentia." It is often used by Epicte- 
 tus in the same sense as v\rj. Aristotle (Cat. c. 5) defines 
 otota, and it is properly translated "substantia" (ed. Jul. 
 Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2) : ^ otoLa. fourd ov<ra r$ 
 Hijdtv elvcLi irpb avrrjs ytvos rjv rb yeviK&TaTov. 
 Tra.paKo\ov6tjTiKTj 56va.fj.is, TJ, "the power which enables us to 
 observe and understand. 
 
302 INDEX. 
 
 eTcru, passivity, opposed to tvtpycia ; also, affect. 
 
 s, circumstances, the things which surround us; 
 troubles, difficulties. 
 
 ], destiny. 
 
 ns, purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13). 
 irpoatperd, rd, things which are within our will or power. 
 irpocuperiKbv, r6, free will. 
 irp6ee<ris, a purpose, proposition. 
 7rp6oia (providentia, Cic.), providence. 
 s, object, purpose. 
 v, element. 
 
 (assensio, approbatio, Cic.), assent; <rvyKaTa0Ams 
 (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1). 
 ffvyKplfjMTa, things compounded (ii. 3). 
 
 <rvyKpi<ns, the act of combining elements out of which a body 
 is produced, combination. 
 
 , ordering, arrangement (compositio). 
 , system, a thing compounded of parts which have a 
 certain relation to one another. 
 V\T), matter, material. 
 v\iic6v, 7-6, the material principle. 
 vTrefrlpeffis, exception, reservation; ne0' vrefripfoews, condi- 
 
 tionally. 
 
 Mee, material to work on ; thing to employ the reason on; 
 proposition, thing assumed as matter for argument and to 
 lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum duo sunt genera; 
 alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Deflnitum est, quod 
 virbdeviv Graeci, nos causam : infinitum, quod Ofotv illi appel- 
 lant, nos propositum possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. 
 Anal. Post, i. c. 2). 
 inroKel/jva, rd, things present or existing, vi. 4^ or things 
 
 which are a basis or foundation. 
 vir6\-r)\f/is, opinion. 
 
 V7r6<rra(m, basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). Epic- 
 tetus has rb u7ro<rrartK6v Kal ofotQSes. (Justinus ad Diogn. 
 c. 2.) 
 
INDEX. 303 
 
 v(f>l<TTa<rdai, to subsist, to be. 
 
 <j>avra<rlai (visus, Cic.) ; appearances, thoughts, impressions 
 
 (visa animi, Gellius, xix. 1) : <j>a.vra<rla fori TI/TTOXTIS tv \f/vxv- 
 <pdvrafffM t seems to be used by Antoninus in the same sense 
 
 as <f>avraa-la. Epictetus uses only <f>avraffla. 
 <t>avraffT6v, that which produces a ^avraffta : <t>o.vro.<TT*>v rb 
 
 rrjv <t>avra<riav aiffd-ryrov. 
 nature. 
 
 s, ij T&V fiXcoy, the nature of the universe. 
 i, soul, life, living principle. 
 \oytK^, voepd, a rational soul, an intelligent soul. 
 
GENEEAL INDEX. 
 
 ^* The paragraphs (par.) and lines (1.) are those of the sections. 
 
 Active, man is by nature, ix. 16. 
 
 Advice from the good to be taken, vi. 21 ; viii. 16. 
 
 Affectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 10. 
 
 Anger discouraged, vi. 26, 27 ; xi. 18. 
 
 Anger, offences of, ii. 10. 
 
 Anger, uselessness of, v. 28 ; viii. 4. 
 
 Appearances not to be regarded, v. 36 ; vi. 3, 13. 
 
 Astonishment should not be felt at anything that happens, 
 
 viii. 15; xii. 1 (sub fine), 13. 
 
 Attainment, what is within everyone's, vii. 67 ; viii. 8. 
 Attention to what is said or done, vi. 53 ; vii. 4, 30 ; viii. 22. 
 
 Bad, the, ii. 1. 
 Beautiful, the, ii. 1. 
 
 Causal. See Formal. 
 
 Change keeps the world ever new, vii. 25 ; viii. 50 (1. 13) ; 
 
 xii. 23 (1. 10). 
 Change, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36; v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 36; 
 
 vii. 18; viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; xii. 21. 
 Change, no evil in, iv. 42. 
 Christians, the, xi. 3. 
 Circle, things come round in a, ii. 14. 
 
306 INDEX. 
 
 Comedy, new, xi. 6. 
 
 Comedy, old, xi. 6. 
 
 Complaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50. 
 
 Connection. See Universe. 
 
 Conquerors are robbers, x. 10. 
 
 Contentment. See Resignation. 
 
 Co-operation. See Mankind and Universe. 
 
 Daemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (1. 8), 7, 16 (1. 14); v. 10 
 
 (sub f.), 27; xii. 3 (sub f.). 
 Death, ii. 11, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5 ; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; vii. 
 
 32; viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 6; xii. 23, 34, 35. 
 Death inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (1. 19), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 33; vi. 
 
 47; viii. 25, 31. 
 Desire, offences of, ii. 10. 
 Destiny, iii. 11 (1. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (1. 8, etc.), 24; vii. 57; 
 
 x. 5. 
 
 Discontent. See Eesignation. 
 
 Doubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14. 
 Duty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22 ; x. 22. 
 
 Earth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.) ; vi. 
 
 36; viii. 21; xii. 32. 
 Earthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 33, 35, 
 
 48; v. 23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; x. 18, 31; 
 
 xii. 27. 
 Earthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 15; 
 
 vii. 3; ix. 24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27. 
 Equanimity, x. 8. 
 
 Example, we should not follow bad, vi. 6 ; vii. 65. 
 Existence, meanness of, viii. 24. 
 Existence, the object of, v. 1 ; viii. 19. 
 External things cannot really harm a man, or affect the soul, 
 
 ii. 11 (1. 12) ; iv. 3 (sub. f.), 8, 39, 49 (par. 2) ; v. 35; vii. 
 
 64; viii. 1 (sub f.), 32, 51 (par. 2) ; ix. 31; x. 33. 
 
 Failure, x. 12. 
 
INDEX. 307 
 
 Fame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (1. 34), 19, 33 (1. 10) ; v. 
 
 33; vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. 1, 44; ix. 30. 
 Fear, what we ought to, xii. 1 (1. 18). 
 Fellowship. See Mankind. 
 Few things necessary for a virtuous and happy life, ii. 5 ; iii. 
 
 10; vii. 67; x. 8 (1. 22). 
 Flattery, xi. 18 (par. 10). 
 Formal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2) ; v. 13 ; vii. 10, 
 
 29; viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18. 
 Future, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8 ; viii. 36 ; 
 
 xii. 1. 
 
 Gods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2). 
 Gods, the, vi. 44 ; xii. 28. 
 Gods, the, cannot be evil, ii. 11 ; vi. 44. 
 Good, the, ii. 1. 
 
 Habit of thought, v. 16. 
 
 Happiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. 1; x. 33. 
 
 Help to be accepted from others, vii. 7. 
 
 Heroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10). 
 
 Ignorance. See Wrong-doing. 
 
 Independence. See Self-reliance. 
 
 Indifferent things, ii. 11 (sub f.) ; iv. 39; vi. 32; ix. 1 (1. 
 
 30). 
 
 Individual, the. See Interests. 
 Infinity. See Time. 
 Ingratitude. See Mankind. 
 Injustice, ix. 1. 
 Intelligent soul, rational beings participate in the same, iv. 
 
 40 ; ix. 8, 9 ; x. 1 (1. 15) ; xii. 26, 30. 
 Interests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 23; 
 
 v. 8 (1. 29) ; vi. 45, 54; x. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.) ; xii. 23 (1. 12). 
 
 Justice, v. 34; x. 11; xi. 10. 
 
 Justice and reason identical, xi. 1 (sub f.). 
 
 Justice prevails everywhere, iv. 10. 
 
308 INDEX. 
 
 Leisure, we ought to have some, viii. 61. 
 
 Life, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16. 
 
 Life can only be lived once, ii. 14 ; x. 31 (1. 11). 
 
 Life, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17,48 (subf.), 
 
 50; vi. 15,36, 56; x. 31, 34. 
 Life to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; iii. 1, 
 
 14; iv. 17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (1. 14); xii. 1 (1.18). 
 Life, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; 
 
 xii. 36. 
 
 Magnanimjty, x. 8. 
 
 Mankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with another, 
 ii. 1 (1. 11), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.), 11 (sub f.); iv. 4, 33 (sub 
 f.) ; v. 16 (1. 11), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 23, 39; vii. 5, 13, 
 22, 55; viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. 1, 9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 
 (sub f.) ; x. 36 (1. 16) ; xi. 8, 21 ; xii. 20. 
 
 Mankind, folly and baseness of, v. 10 (1. 9) ; ix. 2, 3 (1. 13), 
 29; x. 15, 19. 
 
 Mankind, ingratitude of, x. 36. 
 
 Material, the. See Formal. 
 
 Nature, after products of, iii. 2 ; vi. 36. 
 
 Nature, bounds fixed by, v. 1. 
 
 Nature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to him, 
 
 v. 18 ; viii. 46. 
 Nature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub f.) , 
 
 vi. 33. 
 Nature of the universe. See Universe, nothing that happens 
 
 is contrary to the nature of the. 
 Nature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2 ; vi. 36. 
 Nature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub f.), 51 ; v. 3, 
 
 25; vi. 16 (1. 12) ; vii. 15, 55; viii. 1, 54; x. 33. 
 New, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (1. 11) ; iv. 44; vi. 37, 46; 
 
 vii. 1, 49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. 1. 
 
 Object, we should always act with a view to some, ii. 7, 16 
 (1. 12); iii. 4 ; iv. 2 ; viii. 17 ; x. 37; xi. 21; xii. 20. 
 
INDEX. 309 
 
 Obsolete, all things become, iv. 33. 
 
 Omissions, sins of, ix. 5. 
 
 Opinion, iv. 3 (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; vii. 2, 14, 16, 26, 
 
 68; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49; ix. 13, 29 (1. 9), 32, 42 (1. 21) ; 
 
 x. 3 ; xi. 16, 18 ; xii. 22, 25. 
 
 Others' conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4 ; iv. 18 ; v. 25. 
 Others, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. 1 (1. 9); x. 8 
 
 (1. 12), 11; xi. 13; xii. 4. 
 Others, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.) ; iii. 11 
 
 (sub f .) ; iv. 3 (1. 16) ; v. 33 (1. 17) ; vi. 20, 27 ; vii. 26, 62, 
 
 63, 70; ix. 11, 27; x. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; xii. 16. 
 Others, we should examine the ruling principles of, iv. 38; 
 
 ix. 18, 22, 27, 34. 
 Ourselves often to blame, for expecting men to act contrary 
 
 to their nature, ix. 42 (1. 25). 
 Ourselves, reformation should begin with, xi. 29. 
 Ourselves, we should judge, x. 30; xi. 18 (par. 4). 
 
 Pain, vii. 33, 64 ; viii. 28. 
 
 Perfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 (1. 7). 
 
 Perseverance, v. 9 ; x. 12. 
 
 Persuasion, to be used, vi. 50. 
 
 Perturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.) ; vii. 58; ix. 31. 
 
 Pessimism, ix. 35. 
 
 Philosophy, v. 9; vi. 12; ix. 41 (1. 12). 
 
 Pleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. 1 (1. 19). 
 
 Pleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34; ix. 1 (1. 23). 
 
 Power, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f .) ; vi. 32, 41, 52, 58 ; 
 vii. 2, 14, 54, 68 ; x. 32, 33. 
 
 Power, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.) ; vi. 41. 
 
 Practice is good, even in things which we despair of accom- 
 plishing, xii. 6. 
 
 Praise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub f .) ; iv. 20; vi. 16, 59; 
 vii. 62; viii. 52,53; ix. 84. 
 
 Prayer, the right sort of, v. 7 ; ix. 40. 
 
 Present time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 14 ; iii. 
 10; viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f.). 
 
310 INDEX. 
 
 Procrastination. See Life to be made a proper use of, etc. 
 Puppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 2; iii. 16; vi. 16, 28; 
 vii. 3, 29 ; xii. 19. 
 
 Kational soul. See Ruling part. 
 
 Rational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.) ; xi. 12; 
 
 xii. 3 (and see Ruling part). 
 Reason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. 1, 40. 
 Reason and nature identical, vii. 11. 
 Reason, the, can adapt everything that happens to its own 
 
 use, v. 20; vi. 8; vii. 68 (1. 13) ; viii. 35; x. 31 (sub f.). 
 Reason, we should live according to. See Nature. 
 Repentance does not follow renouncement of pleasure, viii. 
 
 10. 
 Resignation and contentment, iii. 4 (1. 27, etc.), 16 (1. 10, 
 
 etc.); iv. 23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34; v. 8, 33 (1. 16); vi. 16 
 
 (sub f.), 44, 4J); vii. 27, 57; ix. 37; x. 1, 11, 14, 25, 28, 35. 
 Revenge, best kind of, vi. 6. 
 Rising from bed, v. 1 ; viii. 12. 
 Ruling part, the, ii. 2; iv. 1; v. 11, 19, 21, 26; vi, 14, 35; vii. 
 
 16, 55 (par. 2) ; viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61; ix. 15, 26; x. 24, 
 
 33 (1. 16), 38; xi. 1, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14. 
 
 Self-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 12; iv. 
 
 11, 29 (1. 5), 49 (par. 1) ; v. 3, 34 (1. 5) ; vi. 44 (1. 15) ; vii. 
 
 12, 15; ix. 28 (1. 8), 29 (sub f.) ; xii. 14. 
 Self-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.). 
 
 Self, we should retire into, iv. 3 (1. 4 and par. 2) ; vii. 28, 33, 
 
 59 ; viii. 48. 
 Senses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 (1. 10) ; 
 
 vii. 55 (par. 2); viii. 26, 39; x. 8 (1. 9) ; xi. 19; xii. 1 
 
 (1. 11). 
 
 Sickness, behavior in, ix. 41. 
 Social. See Mankind. 
 Steadfastness of soul. See Self-reliance. 
 Substance, the universal, iv. 40; v. 24; vii. 19, 23; xii. 30. 
 Suicide, v. 29; viii. 47 (sub f.) ; x. 8 (1. 27). 
 
INDEX. 311 
 
 Time compared to a river, iv. 43. 
 
 Time, infinity of, iv. 3 (1. 35), 50 (sub f.) ; v. 24; ix. 32; xii. 
 
 7, 32. 
 
 Tragedy, xi. 6. 
 Tranquillity of soul, iv. 3; vi. 11; vii. 68; viii. 28. 
 
 Ugly, the, ii. 1. 
 
 Unintelligible things, v. 10. 
 
 Universe, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45; v. 8 (1. 14). 
 
 Universe, intimate connection and co-operation of all things 
 
 in the, one with another, ii. 3, 9; iv. 29; v. 8, 30; vi. 38, 
 
 42, 43; vii. 9, 19, 68 (sub f.) ; viii. 7 ; ix. 1 ; x. 1. 
 Universe, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii. 18, 50 
 
 (1.9); x. 7(1. 18). 
 Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the nature of 
 
 the, v. 8, 10 (sub f.) ; vi. 9, 58; viii. 5 ; xii. 26. 
 Unnecessary things, v. 15. 
 Unnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4; iv. 24. 
 
 Vain professions, x. 16 ; xi. 15. 
 
 Virtue, vi. 17. 
 
 Virtue its own reward, v. 6; vii. 73; ix. 42 (1. 36) ; xi. 4. 
 
 Virtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16. 
 
 Virtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48. 
 
 Whole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f.). 
 
 Whole, the. See Interests. 
 
 Wickedness has always existed, vii. 1. 
 
 Wickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50 ; ix. 42 ; xi. 
 
 18 (par. 11) ; xii. 16. 
 Worst evil, the, ix. 2 (1. 7). 
 Worth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.) ; v. 10 
 
 (1. 16) ; vi. 16, 30 (1. 7), 47 (sub f.) ; vii. 20, 44, 46, 58, 66; 
 
 viii. 2, 3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x, 8 (1. 22), 11; xii. 1, 27, 31, 33. 
 Wrong-doing cannot really harm anyone, vii. 22 ; viii. 55 ; ix. 
 
 42 (1. 19) ; x. 13 (par. 1) ; xi. 18 (par. 7). 
 
312 INDEX. 
 
 Wrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38; xi. 18 
 
 (par. 3). 
 Wrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. 1, 13; vi. 27; vii. 22, 
 
 26, 62, 63 ; xi. 18 ; xii. 12. 
 Wrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29 ; ix. 20. 
 
 THE END. 
 

SEVEN 
 
 iVE HOOK 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 BERKELEY 
 
 Return to desk from which borrowed. 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 
 
 357. 
 
 USe' 
 
 D LD 
 
 5 1951 
 
 31May'59Mj 
 
 !EC U LD 
 
 IEC19 196J 
 
 U) 21-100m-H,'49(B7146sl6)476 
 
YB 2356! 
 
 / s/ 
 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY