^ RUSSIA '•^^■■u:-i-:'-i't^::-^n:iit::- AND THE GREAT WAR j'Tiivi,.'. '■:•■.■"■:-■■••' •!Vijift*i'''ttiii* GREGOR ALEXIN SKY V-' . . 1-1-.' 'iyvfimpm^^ ^ 0' 9 /96* RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR BY GREGOR ALEXINSKY Ex-Deputy to the Duma Translated by BERNARD MIALL NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 1915 (AH rights resen'ed) 'KL " Petrograd, 12 January. — At Lcmberg the con- valescent Russian soldiers, blinded by vitriol, which was flung in their faces by the Germans, offer a pitiful spectacle. With bandaged features, they move in Indian file, holding on to a cord, and led by a guide " (Telegram published in the journal L Humanite, January 13, 1915). TO THESE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS, AND TO OTHER VICTIMS OF THE WAR, WHICH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE DID NOT DESIRE, I RESPECTFULLY DEDICATE THE PHESENT VOLUME THE AUTHOR PREFACE The success obtained with the British public by my work on " Modern Russia," of which the second edition followed the first in the space of ten months, has inspired me with courage once more to address my readers in a book devoted to my country. The subject of this new book is " Russia and the Great War." But in writing it I wished not merely to write a book for the moment ex- clusively, of value only for to-day, and of no interest to-morrow. It is not the external and dramatic aspect of the great war waged by Russia and her Allies that interests me the most. On the contrary, my readers will find in my pages neither descriptions of battles nor tragic or picturesque narratives of the incidents of battle. My aim has been something quite different from this, I wish to inform my English readers con- cerning the principal phenomena of Russian life before the war, and to explain the relations be- tween these phenomena and the war itself. 8 PREFACE What were the events of international poli- tics which preceded the war, and what causes forced Russia to take part in it? What was the internal situation of Russia on the eve of the war? Can we say that the Russian people, or its Government, or both together, desired tnis war? How was the war received by society, and by the popular masses in Russia, and what was the attitude of the various nationalities and political parties of my country toward the world- war ? Why did certain of the Russian " revo- lutionaries ■■ and Socialists experience a strange dread of the victor>- of Russia, and even express a desire that she should meet with defeat? In what manner did the Governments of the countries at war with Russia seek to exploit, to their own proht, the hatred of the Russian revolutionaries for Tsarism ? Why does the Russian soldier fight better when opposed to the Austrians. Germans, and Turks, than he fought during the war with Japan? What prospects will lie open before Russia at the end of the war? What may Europe expect from Russia, and Russia trom Europe, after the demolition of the Prussian militarism which threatens both Russia and Europe ? Here are the numerous questions which I deal with m the present volimie, and which I seek PREFACE 9 to answer. In my arguments and expositions I have sought always to remain objective and impartial, so far as that is possible in the phase of the human tragedy through which we are passing. Each of my assertions is based on facts and supported by documents. I do not wish to trouble the minds of my readers by clamorous indignation ; I prefer to convince their minds by an objective analysis. For, in the words of a Russian writer — Words and illusions perish ; facts remain. G. A. April 1915. CONTENTS PART I BEFORE THE WAR CHAPTER I PAGE I, The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War. The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the " Asiatic policy." The confidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist . . 19 CHAPTER II I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or de- fensive ? — II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Germany and England. The Anglo-Franco- Russian enitnte and its political character . . • Z^ CHAPTER III I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League. — II. The Turco- German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- stantinople and the Dardanelles . . . -47 11 12 CONTENTS CHAPTER IV PAGE I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The commercial exchange between these two countries. The success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. Why was not the Russo-Gcrman economic entente realized ? ....... 59 CHAPTER V I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic progress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. The policy of the Government. Recent success of the liberative movement. The political strike and the popular demonstrations of July 1914 in Petersburg . . -74 CHAPTER VI I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan of 1914. Its strategical and military destination . . 82 CHAPTER VII I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the nineteenth century. — II. Tiie military forces of Russia compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The Russian Navy . . . . . . -95 CHAPTER VIII I. Did Russia desire the war ? The two Russias, popular and governmental. The pacific tendencies of the Russian peasants and working-men. — II. Official Russia and its CONTENTS 13 PAGE attitude towards the Austro-German coalition. The political, military, and ideological recoil of the Russian Government from the Austro-German expansion. — III. The war and the Revolution. Tlie Russian reaction and the Prussian . 105 PART II IN THE BLOODY FRAY CHAPTER I I. The diplomatic documents and the political reality. The opinion of a little Chinese scholar and a great European scientist. — II. The international tension in July 1914 and the question of responsibility. The Austro-German aggres- sion and the part played by Russia. Could Russia have anticipated the war ? . . . . . -123 CHAPTER II I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted with an unexpected war. — II. The session of the Duma. The agreement between the majority of the parties and representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote for the military credits ..... 134 CHAPTER III I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures; the new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the war . . , . . . . .155 14 CONTENTS CHAPTER IV PAGE I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nation- alities of the Russian Empire before the international war. — II. The Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles become Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — IV. The Ukraine.— V. Finland.— VI. The position of the Jews. Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist problem in the Baltic Provinces . . . -179 CHAPTER V I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries and Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this dread. The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. Why is the propaganda resulting from this apprehension erroneous and harmful ? — II. The German, Austrian, and Turkish Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian revolutionaries. The noble reply of certain of these latter to the agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. Russian revolutionaries in the French Army . . 229 CHAPTER VI I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. The " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." — II. The rural communes and co-operative associations in the campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. — III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — IV. The Press in Russia during the war . . . 258 CHAPTER VII I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he fought against Japan. The " liberation idea " and the war . 277 CONTENTS 15 PART III AFTER THE WAR CHAPTER I PACK I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. The possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Are they necessary to Russia ? . . . . 297 CHAPTER II I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and the destruction of Prussian Imperialism. — II. The defeat of Germany is to the advantage of the German revolu- tionaries and the Socialists of Germany and of all Europe ........ 306 CHAPTER III I. Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian monarchies? — II, The intrigues of the Russian reaction- aries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these intrigues are to be disarmed . . . . -312 CHAPTER IV I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national question after the war. — III. The role of the French and English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? . 322 16 CONTENTS CHAPTER V PAGE I. Russia and England. Their economic relations. The neces- sity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — II. The intellectual relations between Russia and England. Con- cerning certain "deviations" of English sympathies . 343 PART I BEFORE THE WAR Russia and the Great War CHAPTER I The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War. The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The con- fidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist. The war with little Japan marked a decisive moment in the contemporary history of the ex- ternal policy of the great Russian Empire. To be more precise, it constituted first a check and then a change in the direction of this policy. Before the war the Russian eagle had hovered in full liberty above the Asiatic Orient, continu- ally extending its wings over new territories, until at length the Pacific Ocean was attained. But the Rising Sun of the young Japanese Empire was to scorch its pinions. Its flight toward the Far East was suddenly arrested, and as early as 1906, at a secret meeting of the leaders of the Russian Government, one of these latter declared 19 20 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR that after the debacle occasioned by the Russo- Japanese War, the Empire of the Tsars must per- force renounce the old aggressive energy of its customary external policy, in order to " assume a more prudent and more conciliatory attitude." Thus there ensued a period of arrest in the march of Russia toward the Far East, and the Muscovite bear found himself at the parting of the v^ays, like the hero of a popular Russian legend. Which was the road to follow ? Should he continue to tread the ancient track? But the yellow sun of Japan was still visible on the Eastern horizon. Or would it be better to return toward the West ? Behold the black eagle of Germany, with its beak of steel, and always on the alert ! Doubtless the best and simplest policy would have been to remain at home, to seek no new adventures, whether to East or to West. But unhappily man does not always adhere to the best or the simplest solution. And the historical past had left Russia a heavy burden in the shape of an inheritance of military and diplomatic ties^ and alliances and counter-alliances, whose auto- matic action might well result in dragging Russia into an external conflict, or in forcing her to involve both friends and enemies in such a con- flict. Moreover, there were forces in the interior of the country which would not willingly bow BEFORE THE WAR 21 to the necessity of modifying the tone of the State's external policy. There were several groups among the higher ranks of the aristocracy and the Army for whom the lesson of the Russo- Japanese War passed almost unperceived, and who were eager to take their revenge upon the field of battle— but on what field was a matter of in- difference. There were groups of capitalists, moreover, who would not be content with a patient and peaceable effort to regenerate the great home market, which was nevertheless capable of yield- ing them a greater revenue than all the Man- churias and Persias of the world together. They hankered after foreign markets, which were to be conquered by brute force. " The East China railway should have created new markets for us, and have connected Europe and the East by a trade route. The Russo- Japanese War destroyed these hopes. The railway has lost 700 versts of its best and most pro- ductive portion ; we have lost the port of Dalny (Talienwan), which was equipped to perfection. We cannot hope great things from the exporta- tion of our merchandise to Southern Manchuria, where the Japanese are the masters. Our trade with Mongolia is equally in a stagnant condi- tion. . . . Our position in the Far East being compromised as a result of the war, the eye naturally returns toward the West, and above all to the Near East. A series of Chambers of 22 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Commerce has been established— Anglo-Russian, Russo-Belgian, and so forth. At the same time companies have been formed for the exporta- tion of general merchandise, and especially for export to the Balkans. . . . But, notwithstand- ing the simultaneous efforts of the Government, and the commercial and industrial circles, the exportation of manufactured articles is increasing far too slowly. Our position in the Near East is weak. In the West there is nothing to hope for. ' Friendly ' Germany is pushing us toward Asia, but in Persia our affairs are in a bad way, and threaten to grow still worse in the future- thanks to the German competition. We have lost the market of the rich southern portion of Manchuria, and the market offered by its northern portion is poor and unstable. Foreign compe- tition is successfully driving us out of Mongolia. Hence the tendencies which are now apparent among us, which demand the employment of armed force, that we may retain possession of these markets ; so that we find ourselves on the eve of new colonial adventures. ... In a word, the historical phase which was passed through before the Revolution is about to be renewed." Such is the description of the political situa- tion of Russia in Eastern Asia after the Russo- Japanese War, in respect of the economical basis of that policy, as it appeared to a worthy BEFORE THE WAR 23 Russian economist whose book was published in 191 1 .' But while a few small political and economic circles hoped for a continuation of the old orien- tation of the foreign politics of Russia— that is, the continuation of the march toward the Far East— there were others— and among them were many Liberals— who insisted that Russia should concentrate her attention and her energies on regions less remote, notably on Asia Minor, the shores of the Black Sea, and the Balkans. It must be admitted that this tendency is founded on interests and considerations of an important nature. Russia is one of the " granaries of the world." Her foreign trade consists above all in the exportation of cereals. " A glance at the statistics of our cereal exports will show that their centre of gravity since the year 1896 lies in the ports of the south. During the last twelve years the part played by the regions of the south, south-east, and south-west in the foreign trade of Russia has been still further enlarged. In 1909, 76 per cent, of all the wheat, 91 per cent, of all the barley, 53 per cent, of all the rye, and 83 per cent, of all the maize exported from Russia was exported from the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov." = ' See the great economic work of M. A. Finn-Yenotaevsky Sovremenno'ie Khoziaistvo Rossiyi ("The Modern Economy of Russia"), Petersburg, 191 1, pp. 408-12. ^ Ibid. pp. 425-6. 24 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Cereals are the principal article of Russia's foreign trade. The ports of the Black Sea are the chief outlets for the foreign export of Russian grain. From this you can judge the importance of the Eastern Question, the question of the Dardanelles, etc., for the whole of Russia, from the point of view of her economic interests. Add to these the problem of the commercial relations existing between Russia and Germany, which are connected by a highly developed com- mercial exchange, the nature of which I shall presently explain. Finally, consider the position of Germany and Russia on the Baltic, which is the second great route of the foreign trade of Russia, and which is really in the possession of the powerful German Nav^, and you will readily perceive that the economic interests of Russia in the West are far greater than in the Far East, and that Russia cannot completely ignore what is passing in Asia Minor, in the Balkans, and on her western frontiers. II Certain Russian politicians were even of opinion that Russia ought resolutely to abandon the old direction of her military and diplomatic policy, which looked toward the Asiatic Orient, and that this policy should confine itself to Europe and the Balkans. This opinion was dis- puted by the supporters of the Asiatic policy. BEFORE THE WAR 25 One of these latter, Baron Rosen, who had been Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Tokio, and Washington, and who was a colleague of M. Witte at the time of the negotiations with Japan which took place at Portsmouth, published, in 1913, a very interesting confidential memoir dealing with this subject, of which the issue was withdrawn from circulation — it is said by order of the Government. I believe my readers will feel grateful to me for quoting the essential por- tion of this memoir.' " After the check occasioned by the last war," writes M. Rosen, " and the defeat of our entire policy in the Far East— a policy qualified as a mere adventure by people who did not realize the vast importance to Russia of her interests in those regions, a policy which deserved that epithet only because it was not in time supported by all the forces of the State— the idea seems firmly to have rooted itself in the mind of the public that Russia should once more seek the centre of her political interests in Europe." M. Rosen does not share this opinion. He does not believe that Russia has any historic mission in the Near East ; he does not consider the " Slav idea " to have any real basis ; he is not of opinion that it corresponds with the real ' A detailed account of this memoir, with many quotations, was published in the French review Le Correspo?idatit, Septem- ber 1913. 26 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR interests of Russia. So far the defence of the " Slav idea " has had none but negative and harmful results for Russia. It dragged the coun- try into the war of 1877-8, which cleared the ground for the Revolution ; it was the cause of the estrangement between Germany and Russia in the time of Bismarck, and the dissolution of the alliance of " Three Emperors " which guaran- teed the western frontier of Russia. Finally, says M. Rosen, it " also pushed us to the conclusion of an alliance with France which has involved us in interests entirely foreign to Russia : namely, the French desire to be revenged for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and, of late years, the Anglo-German antagonism, which will be the ground on which the coming European war will be fought." For M. Rosen " the great Slav ideal " is merely the " verbal gymnastics of writers and orators of the Slavophile camp "... devoid of any real foundation. " All undertakings inspired by this idea— as, for example, the Slav Bank, the exhibitions of Russian products, the Russian libraries in Slav countries, etc., either remain in the condition of mere projects, or drag themselves through a miserable existence. ... In the domain of material civilization, Russia has no need of the Slav world, nor the Slav world of Russia. In the Slav States of the Balkans our industry, which BEFORE THE WAR 27 has at its disposal a vast home market defended by extremely high protective tariffs, could only at a loss compete with the Austro-German indus- tries ; as for the Slavs of the south, their com- mercial relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, their neighbour, will always be more advantageous than their relations with distant Russia. " From the intellectual standpoint, the Slavs of the Balkans (and still more those of Austria), despite a somewhat factitious Germanophobia, evidently prefer— and this is very natural — to tap directly and at first hand the Western sources, and principally those of Germany. ... As for the sympathies of the Austrian Slavs, which we are told are irresistibly pro-Russian, it is only too obvious that their flirtations with us have one sole object, and that essentially a selfish one : it is, to flaunt before the Austrian Government the bogy of Pan-Slavism under Russian hege- mony, in order to obtain from it the desired con- cessions. . . . Our continual advances, in the press and in the speeches of certain amateur poli- ticians, toward the Austrian Slavs, have in the end impelled Austria to retort by very undesir- able and even dangerous advances to our own ' Mazeppists,' ' Ukrainophiles, and other ele- ments hostile to the Russian Empire, which enter- ' The supporters of the pohcy inaugurated by the famous Cossack hetnian Mazeppa. 28 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR tain treacherous dreams of the dismemberment of Russia." Baron Rosen pronounces in favour of an understanding with Austria. " The only cause of armed conflict with Austria that can be foreseen is precisely the opposition which we are offering to her Balkan policy. . . . This antagonism is the cause of a state of affairs very dangerous for us, thanks to which, every time any disturbance occurs in the Balkan Peninsula, arises the possibility that Austria will intervene as the Power chiefly interested by reason of her geographical position, and for us the possi- bility of a conflict with her, and therefore of a European conflagration." Russia, M. Rosen holds, ought to reconcile herself to the Austrian penetration of the Balkans. " Austria, like Germany, is passing through a period of growth. . . . The only possible outlet is indicated by her geographical position ; rejected by the Germanic Confederation, she has turned her eyes toward the Slav south. The movement of Austria toward the Slav south does not clash with the real interests of Russia. On the other hand, Austria will meet with complications which should sufficiently make her aware of the value of amicable relations with Russia." An alliance between Russia and Germany ap- peared to M. Rosen to be even more necessary. BEFORE THE WAR 29 Allied with France and England, Russia finds herself in a camp hostile to Germany. M. Rosen believes that the entire responsibility of this hostility falls, not upon Russia but upon Fjrance and England. " In the forefront of the causes of this reciprocal hostility we see the irreconcil- able antagonism between France and Germany, founded on the French idea of revenge for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. To this cause has been added, of late years, another, which is the Anglo-Germanic antagonism founded on com- mercial, industrial, and colonial competition, and rivalry in the matter of naval armaments. These two motives are absolutely alien to the vital interests of Russia." During the first twenty years which followed the war of 1870-71, France was so weak and Germany so powerful, that, " thanks to the enormous disproportion of the forces at their disposal, war was for one of the parties a super- fluity and for the other an impossibility." Such a situation M. Rosen regards as ideal, and he is greatly disturbed by the fact than an alliance with Russia has re-established the equilibrium of forces. It is true that during those twenty years Germany enjoyed a hegemony in Europe, and that to-day she wishes once more to achieve that hegemony. But this tendency of Germany toward hegemony is dangerous only to Western Europe, not to Russia, says M. Rosen, who finds 30 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it " absolutely impossible to comprehend " how the German domination in Europe can be opposed to the interests of Russia, which is rather an Asiatic Power. " By abandoning to Germany supremacy in the Western portion of Europe, and by dissociating herself completely from all rival- ries between European Powers based on interests purely European, Russia would assure herself of the security of her western frontier, and would have her hands free for the accomplishment of her mission in Asia." To yield Europe to the Prussian Moloch and to take Asia in exchange — such, according to M. Rosen's opinion, is the supreme national duty of Russia. Such an alliance with Germany would be the more profitable to Russia in that it would enable Germany to undermine the naval supre- macy of England, and such a decrease of power is in the interests of Russia— so Baron Rosen believes. Russia's confidence in France and England rests " on fragile bases," he says, and " the confi- dence of Germany is incommensurably more precious to us." Commenting upon the ideas expressed in M. Rosen's memoir, of which we have given a detailed summary, a French review remarked that these ideas revealed '' an atavistic German- ism,'" and that "' if it had amused Herr Bethmann- Holweg to give his advice to the Russian BEFORE THE WAR 31 Ambassador in Berlin, this is the advice he would have given." Let us now analyse the actual international position of Russia before the war, so that we may judge whether the Germanophile counsels of Baron Rosen did really constitute good advice, and whether they corresponded with the true interests of the country. CHAPTER II I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or defensive ? II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Ger- many and England. The Anglo-Franco-Russian entente and its political character. Despite the lamentations of the supporters of her " Asiatic orientation," the recoil of Russia from the Far East and her " return " to the West was an accomplished fact. This fact confronted the Russian State, with the complex problem of its attitude toward the other European States, and its position in the famous " Concert " of Great Powers. To a very appreciable extent this position was no doubt determined by the recent history of Russia's foreign policy, which has been characterized by the Franco -Russian Alliance and the Anglo-Franco-Russian entente. The Franco-Russian Alliance is of a double character — financial and politico-military. Doubt- less the economic and financial element was pre- ponderant at the birth of this strange union of the republican democracy of France and the 33 BEFORE THE WAR 33 monarchical autocracy of Russia. Yet we cannot deny the importance of the political and military considerations which have pushed France into the arms of Tsarism, These considerations have made themselves felt more especially of late years. After Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, after the ruin of almost her entire navy, and the heavy losses in men and material suffered by the army, the military power of Russia was gravely compromised. Germany immediately profited by this breach of equilibrium, consoli- dating her international position, both economic and political. One may say, without exaggera- tion, that the great misfortunes suffered by Russia during the war of 1904-5 brought prosperity to Germany, In the first place, Germany succeeded in ex- ploiting the very embarrassing situation of her eastern neighbour in the year 1904, by securing from Russia a Customs Treaty highly profitable to German trade and industry. At the same time Germany was redoubling her efforts to increase her military forces, and this increase became most rapid immediately upon the enfeeblement of the Russian army at the close of the war. In the year 1905 the German Empire took a gigantic stride in this direction ; for in that year the Reichstag voted a Military Law which increased the armed forces of the Kaiser, not merely from the numerical point of view, but also from that 3 34 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of the technical material of war. During the seven years that followed the efforts of Germany in the direction of preparing for war became continually more and more intensive, and France was left far behind in the matter of military expenditure. During these seven years Germany expended £300,000,000 on her military forces, while France spent only £236,000,000. This repre- sents a surplus of £64,000,000 for the period of seven years, or more than £9,000,000 annu- ally. The use which Prussian militarism has made of its supremacy is well known. By exploiting the weakness of Russia the Kaiser's Government has on several occasions, since the year 1904, systematically provoked France. The culminating point of this provocation was the famous coup d'Agadir of 191 1, when the Kaiser threw into the scales of a diplomatic con- versation the weight of a warship, and, by means of this cunning stroke of blackmail, obtained, without a shot being fired, a consider- able portion of the French possessions in the Congo. In speaking thus of the systematic provoca- tion practised by Germany, I do not in the least intend to represent France as an inoffensive white lamb devoured by a ferocious wolf. Modern France is a country like other capitalist nations— an armed nation, a nation with a colonial BEFORE THE WAR 35 policy, etc. But in the social and economic structure of France there are characteristics which render her more pacific and, if I may so express myself, more defensive than aggressive Germany, France is a country of great financiers on the one hand, and of small hoarders on the other. It is a country of large and small investors. But the investor, the stock-holder, is the most pacific type of the modern bourgeois ; which is easily comprehensible, for in case of armed conflict the investor is the worst sufYerer, by reason of the fall of securities of all descriptions. The pre- dominance of the investor in the bourgeois society of France explains the fact that in spite of the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by the Germans — in spite of "the wound in her side which France," to quote M. Viviani, " has for half a century silently endured " — the idea of a war against Germany was not really attractive to the French mind. The Germans were perfectly well aware of this fact. In 1909 the well-known German professor and patriot, Herr Delbriick, published an article ' in which he demonstrated that it was beyond a doubt that the majority of the French people did not desire war with Germany, and that the idea of la revanche had lost a great measure of its power. France is the banker of Europe, says Professor Delbriick, and a European war might result in the stoppage of the payments ' Freussischc Jahrl'lic/ier, January 1909, vol. T34. 36 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of interest on her loans, which would be a terrible blow to the nation. The majority of the bourgeois democrats of France were not only opposed to an aggressive policy towards Germany, but were even inclined to entertain the idea of a Franco-German entente. This pacific tendency was supported also by the Socialist workers of France, who did their utmost to avert the melancholy possibility of an armed conflict between their country and Germany, and who, as a class, offered the life of that noble tribune of the French people, Jean Jaures, as a tragic proof of their sincere devotion to the propaganda of peace. Finally, it is easy to realize that a republican State is in general far less adapted to an offensive and warlike policy than an absolute or semi- absolute monarchy. At all events, M. Marcel Sembat, a notable Socialist, and a member of the Ministry of National Defence, asserts in cate- gorical fashion, in a volume published by him shortly before the war, and which created a con- siderable sensation, that there is an almost natural opposition between the republican ideal and offensive warfare. " The militarist republic, the Nationalist re- public, the warlike republic — we have here not a doctrine but a blunder," he writes. ^ ' Marcel Sembat, Faites tin Roi, sinon ^aiies la Faix, Paris, 1914. BEFORE THE WAR 37 This is not to say that a democratic republic is incapable of defending itself— the experience of the First Republic revealed its defensive capa- cities — but the bureaucratic and democratic system is undoubtedly less adapted to a policy of aggres- sion and international brigandage than an auto- cratic and absolutist system. And this is merely another argument in favour of democracy. The perpetual peril of an armed conflict with Germany forced France to seek the surest pos- sible of guarantees against this peril. Many politicians saw such a guarantee in a Franco- German entente. The conferences of Members of Parliament held at Basle and Berne were the praiseworthy achievement of these men. But these very conferences proved that although in France the majority of the true democrats sin- cerely desired peace and an understanding with Germany, public opinion in the latter country was not so pacific, and the attitude of the German members in respect of their French colleagues was somewhat reserved. This explains why the French democracy could not risk a radical change of foreign policy, or withdraw its diplomatic and military contract with Russia. This contract, in spite of all its weak and obscure points, represented, for France, a certain guarantee in the event of German aggression. Even those Frenchmen who were opposed on principle to the alliance with Russia were obliged to accept 38 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it in practice, at all events pending the realiza- tion of a Franco-German entente. This contra- diction between the theoretical negation of the Russian alliance and its practical acceptation is mentioned, we shall find, in the same work of M. Sembat's of which we have spoken. "Russia? Russia is of no use to us," writes M. Sembat, "and we are no manner of use to Russia, save to supply her with money. The three weeks of mobilization and the counter- attack of Austro-Hungary, favoured by the Polish revolt, forbid us to count on her at the beginning of the war." ^ But a few pages farther on M. Sembat says : " The Russian alliance has incontestably amelio- rated, to the profit of France . . . the ratio of the [French and German] military forces." ^ So, with considerable reserve, and almost against its will, the French democracy was obliged to accept, for the time being, the con- tinuation of the policy of the Franco - Russian alliance, as a feeble yet necessary guarantee against a German invasion. II The German peril also gave rise to the Anglo- French alliance, the basis of which was laid down by the Convention concluded in 1904— that is, at ' Marcel Sembat, Faites tin Roi, sinon faites la Paix, Paris, 1914. ^ Ibid. BEFORE THE WAR 39 a time when the Russian forces were absorbed by the conflict with Japan, so that Germany had her hands free on her eastern frontier. The de- fensive character of the Anglo-French alliance is, I consider, beyond all doubt. It was defensive at its birth, and it was still defensive several months before the outbreak of the war, as we cannot fail to see from the correspondence between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, in November 19 12. " If either Government," wrote Sir Edward Grey, " has serious reasons for fearing an un- provoked attack on the part of a third Power, or any other event which should jeopardize the general peace, that Government should immedi- ately consult with the other, to determine whether they should not take concerted action in order to prevent aggression and to maintain peace." In reply to this letter, M. Cambon wrote : "I am authorized to declare to you that in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reason to apprehend either the aggression of a third Power or any event threatening to the general peace, that Government would imme- diately consult with the other as to whether the two Governments should take concerted action with a view to preventing aggression or pre- serving peace." ' ^ See the Livre Jaune of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 1914. 40 KUS8IA AND THE GREAT WAR It follows from these documents, which re- mained secret until the declaration of war, and were published by M. Viviani only during the session of the French Parliament of the 4th of August, 1 9 14, that the Anglo-French alliance was formed by the two contracting Powers, not with a view to " hemming in Germany," as the latter believed (perhaps quite sincerely), but in order to obtain a mutual guarantee against Kaiserism. For England such a guarantee was even more necessary than for France, because Germany regarded England as her principal rival. " Our future is on the sea," declared W-ilhelm II at Stettin in his speech of the 23rd September, 1890. Hence his preoccupation concerning the augmen- tation of the German Navy. A French writer who has taken it upon himself to comment upon the thoughts expressed by the German Emperor on this subject states that " in considering the Emperor Wilhelm's ideas relating to the navy one must distinguish between two points of view : one commercial, the other military. In the first place, the Emperor has a very clear conception of the great part which sea power plays in the com- mercial and industrial development of a people. It is by sea that one sets forth to conquer the markets of the world ; hence the necessity of a great mercantile marine, and the importance of the old Hansa Towns, Bremen, Hamburg, BEFORE THE WAR 41 Liibeck, and Stettin, and the capital part played by the great steamship companies. But secondly, those various parts of the globe in which the German Empire gains a footing by means of its trade are vulnerable points. ... Its fresh triumphs, its pacific conquests, excite jealousy, create inevitable rivalry, and necessarily provoke conflicts. . . . Only one arm will enable a country to triumph in struggles of this nature— namely, a powerful battle-fleet." ' But both forms of German expansi-on by sea- commercial expansion and naval and military expansion— result in placing her in competition with England. From the commercial point of view this competition may be expressed in the following figures : Exports. In 1907. In 1913. Germany ... ^345,000,000 ... ^^505, 000,000 England ... ^435,000,000 ... ^535,000,000 France ... ;!^2 2 5,000,000 ... ;^275,ooo,ooo United States... ^^405, 000,000 ... ;^525,ooo,ooo Although England still maintains her supre- macy in absolute figures, the German exports are increasing much more rapidly relatively speaking. It is true that the German exports are artificially stimulated by means of premiums paid by the State to the exporters. Be that as it may, the prevailing idea of the German Govern- ment is to ensure that German capitalism shall ' Jules Arren, Guillau?ne II, Ce quHl dit, ce quHl pense, Paris, 191 1, pp. 159-60. 42 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR have its " place in the sun." But where is this place to be found ? Germany can do no other than wrest it away from her neighbours. This was done in 191 i, when a large slice of the French Congo was obtained for nothing. But much more might be obtained from England. The attempt must be made. But first of all England's naval supremacy must be wrested from her. And here Germany sets herself feverishly to build battleships and cruisers. England is forced to note this move and reply to it, and the Anglo - German commercial rivalry becomes a military rivalry. And, as I have already stated in my book " Modern Russia," " this rivalry appears to be the axis of European world-politics." The present war has absolutely confirmed this idea. The Germans themselves say that England is their principal adversary. In 1908 the German patriot Professor Delbriick wrote that the lesser questions of international politics are not solved in and by themselves, but in respect of greater antagonisms, and that the Austro- Serbian disputes must be adjudged, in the long run, in the light of the Anglo-German an- tagonism. And now, since the declaration of war, another well - known German publicist, Maximilian Harden, writes in Zukunft (Octo- ber 17, 1 9 14) that the annexation of Belgium by Germany is necessary so that she may crush England. " Is it not there [in Belgium] that BEFORE THE WAR 43 all German hearts to-day are longing, impetu- ously, and in a spirit at times too insulting, for a victory over England ? " England is even more bitterly hated by the German Jingoes than is Russia. In December, 1914, a Social-Demo- cratic ( ! ) German journal admitted, with un- heard-of cynicism : " The conflict with Tsarism is popular, but what was the meaning of the ancient battle-cry? Never that we were to make war with the purely ideological and political object of defeating Tsarism. . . . Our political enemy is our economic enemy— England." Herr Lenard, Professor of Physics in the Uni- versity of Heidelberg, delivers himself as follows, in a pamphlet published some two or three months after the declaration of war :— " Away with all considerations relating to what is termed English culture. The principal nest, the chief academy of all hypocrisy on the banks of the Thames, must be demolished to its foun- dations, if we would obtain a favourable result." Even the German poets expend their lyrical fire in hatred of England. The most popular of the modern poets in Germany is Ernst Lissauer. Why? Because he wrote the " Song of Hatred of England." Our hatred we will ne'er abate, Who know the one and only hate : We love as one, we hate as one. We have one foe, and one alone — England ! 44 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR In this connection a German critic, speaking of the lyric poetry to which the present war has given birth, has written : " It is worthy of remark that the warhke poetry of Germany knows nothing of national hatred of France and Russia. France and Russia are adversaries, while Eng- land is the enemy.'' The aggressive and threatening attitude of Germany during the last few years has pushed England and France alike toward an understand- ing with Russia. But my English readers are well aware that the idea of this understanding was much debated, and even opposed, by the demo- cratic elements in England, which were shocked by the concubinage of their free country with the despotism of the Tsars. In Russia, too, the understanding with England has not everywhere been welcomed. The Conservatives and the parties of the Right in particular pronounced themselves resolutely as against the entente. Remember, for instance, the sentiments ex- pressed in respect of England by the Russian reactionaries during the visit of the French Premier to Petersburg, in the summer of 19 12. Prince Meschersky, the editor of the ultra-Con- servative GrazJidanin, wrote that " close friend- ship between Russia and Germany is a more advantageous and lasting blessing for France than dependence on ever capricious, ever selfish, and ever insincere England." And the organ of BEFORE THE WAR 45 the " Black Bands," Zemschina, spoke as follows : " In short, England wants to egg us on, and to weaken Germany through us, though we may have to undergo another war like that of 1 8 i 2 as a result. But Heaven preserve us from the privilege ! It is time for us to give up playing the part of the saviours of Europe, and especi- ally of England." And M. Menshikov declared, in the Novoe V re my a : " I do not see the advan- tage to the French and ourselves to be obtained by averting war between England and Germany. On the contrary, such a war could only be bene- ficial both to France and to ourselves. With the present preponderance of England's Navy and the difficulty of a large descent on her shores, such a war is likely to end in the destruction of the whole German and half the English Navy. Neither France nor Russia would have much reason to grieve on that account." And another journal— an organ of the " True Russians," the Russkoe Znamia, was even more candid in its expressions : " Every misfortune sufi'ered by England, every weakening of her power, only causes joy to Russia ( ! ?) and to pull her chest- nuts out of the fire for her is unworthy of the Russian people." ' ' I quote from Darkest Russia (the issue for the 21st of August, 191 2). As for the antipathy of the Russian reactionaries for France, it is so well known that I need not enlarge upon it here. 46 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The Russian Liberals, on the contrary, favoured an entente with England. Generally speaking, the idea of an x\nglo-Franco-Russian alliance is supported in Russia by the Liberal and Democratic bourgeoisie, while the Right opposes to this the ideal of a " Holy Alliance " of the three monarchies— the Romanoff, Hapsburg and Hohenzollern. But, happily, perhaps, for the progress and the democracy of Europe, this alliance could not be realized, and the Austro- German alliance, which has caused so much misery to humanity, was not transformed into the Austro-Russo-German alliance, which would have caused even more, and would have been far more dangerous to Europe. CHAPTER III I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League. — II. The Turco- German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- stantinople and the Dardanelles. I The tragic and awful symphony of the world- war, now being executed by the formidable orchestra of millions of rifles and thousands of cannon, had for its prelude the Balkan War, or rather the two wars in the Balkans. The economic causes of the first Balkan War are well known. The Christian nations of the Balkans, whose development toward the north and west was cut short by the proximity of the great European Powers, had only one object : to procure outlets on the south and south-east of the Balkan Peninsula, through provinces occu- pied by the Turks. Among the democratic elements of the Balkan States there were those who proposed to solve the problem, not by the sanguinary means of a war against Turkey, but by the creation of a " Republican Federation of 47 48 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the peoples of the Balkans and the Near East," which would have comprised Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey, both European and Asiatic. Two consecutive conferences convoked by all the Socialist parties of the Balkans declared themselv^es of this opinion. But this noble dream, whose realization would have assured the Balkan States against a war among themselves on the one liand and the aggression of Austria or Russia on the other, was not realized, because of the egoism of the Governments of the Balkan States and the brutal and erroneous policy of the Young Turks. The manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey and the Balkan States, published at the end of the year 1 9 1 2, gives the following description of this policy : — "If we emphasize the grave responsibility of the Balkan States in the . . . war, as well as in the past, when they hindered the internal trans- formation of Turkey — if we accuse European diplomacy, which has never desired serious re- forms in Turkey, of duplicity — we do not in any way wish to belittle the responsibility of the Turkish Governments. We denounce them to the civilized world, to the people of the Empire, and particularly to the Mohammedan masses, without whose help they would not have been able to uphold their domination. We reproach the Turkish regime with the complete absence of real BEFORE THE WAR 49 liberty and equality for the nations— an absolute lack of security and of any guarantee of the life or the rights and property of the citizens— the non- existence of justice and of a well-organized and impartial administration. It has upheld a system of the most harassing taxation. It has turned a deaf ear to all demands of reform that might benefit Mohammedan and other peasants and workers. It has supported only its feudal sub- jects or nomadic tribes armed against the de- fenceless agriculturists. By their proverbial inertia the Turkish Governments have done nothing but provoke and maintain poverty, ignor- ance, emigration and brigandage, and massacres without number in Anatolia and Rumelia— in a word, anarchy, which serves to-day as a pretext for intervention and for war. " The hope that the new regime would put an end to the past by inaugurating a new policy has been disappointed. The successive ' Young Turk ' Governments have not only continued the errors of the past ; they have used the authority and the prestige of an apparent parliamentary system in order to apply a policy of denationali- zation and oppression, together with an exces- sive bureaucratic centralization, which has ignored the rights of nationalities and the demands of the working classes. The members of the new regime have in some respects even outdone those of the old, which had raised the systematic 4 50 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR assassination of political opponents to the height of a governmental policy." ' There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Governments of four Balkan States desired, and were able, profiting by the crimes and errors of the Turkish Government, to form a military league against the latter and to declare war upon it. Neither is it surprising that the Russian Government lent its aid to the enterprise, per- ceiving in it an efficacious means of sapping the power of Turkey and opposing to Austria the coalized forces of the Balkan League. But if Russia assisted in the creation of the Balkan League and the first Balkan War, Austria in her turn contributed toward the dissolution of this League, and to the declaration of the second Balkan War, by pushing Bulgaria into a conflict with Greece and Serbia, which enabled Turkey to recapture Adrianople, and in some degree to recoup herself for her losses. The rapid disso- lution of the Balkan League was a piece of very successful policy on the part of Austria, who thenceforward no longer had to face a coalition of four Balkan States, but was able profitably to exploit the disagreements created between Bulgaria and her recent allies. ^ See the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey and the Balkans. To the Working People of the Balkans and Asia Minor. To the Labour International. To Public Opinion." igi2. BEFORE THE WAR 51 II Another factor greatly making for the success of the Austro-German policy was the enormous and exclusive influence of Germany in Turkey. The stages by which this influence was evolved are well known. The point of departure was the year 1895, when all Europe was thrilled by the massacres of the Armenians in Turkey, and when the Government of Wilhelm II, alone among the Governments of Europe, took the part of Turkey, and the German Emperor came forward for the first time as the supporter of the old Turkish regime. This service was well paid by Turkey, who made several important concessions to Ger- man capital. The same story was repeated in 1905, in con- nection with the Macedonian question, when Germany refused to take part in a naval demon- stration against Turkey, which was designed to put pressure on the Sultan's Government in order to force it to put into effect the reforms promised to Macedonia. Jean Jaures wrote at the time that the German Emperor wished to spare the Sultan, firstly, because he wished Germany's assistance to Turkey to be paid for by various privileges afforded to German capital, and secondly, because the Sultan was one of the representatives of the monarchical idea and of absolute power in 52 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Europe.' The quays of Constantinople, exploited by German concessionaires, the railways of Turkey in Asia, built and exploited by German capital, together with other concessions and com- mercial or undustrial imdertakings — such was the payment in kind which the Germans received at the price of the innocent and unavenged blood of Armenia and Macedonia. The concession to build the Bagdad Railway marked the climax of German influence in Turkey, for it opened wide the door for German emigration into Asia Minor. The activities of Marshal Von der Goltz Pasha marked the climax of her political and military penetration of Turkey. The abolition of the Old Turk regime and the beginning of the Young Turk era, which made practically no change in the internal life of Turkey, left its foreign policy also unchanged : German influence continued to be predominant. The dispatch of a military Mission, with General Liman von Sanders at its head, securqd the Turkish Army as a docile weapon in German hands. Germany regarded Turkey as her "private game-preserve," and on the i6th of January, 1913, t"he German Ambassador in Con- stantinople, Baron von Wagenheim, publicly de- livered a speech threatening Russia, in which he said : " Germany will never allow Russia to exert pressure on Turkey. Neither now nor in the ' See his article in BHunianite, November 27, 1905. BEFORE THE WAR 53 future shall we permit any one to lay hands on Anatolia." ' As for the Germans themselves, they have laid their hands, not only on Anatolia but on many other Turkish provinces. Posing as the champion of Turkish indepen- dence, Germany in reality deprived the country of any independence whatever. And when the hour struck Germany cast Turkey to the flames without even asking her consent or what was her will. For it is a well-established fact that the German mercenaries in the service of the Turkish Government began hostilities against the non- fortified towns of Russia without even warning the Turkish Government, which found itself confronted by the accomplished fact, and had not sufficient courage to refuse to follow down the path by which the German officers were dragging it. Ill , Before effecting the penetration of the Balkans, Germany pushed Austria thither. This is already an old story. Having excluded Austria from the Federation of the Germanic States, having closed all outlets toward the north, the Prussian monarchy pointed out the way to the south, toward Salonica and other ports of the Balkans. ' There was a question of reforms in Armenia. The speech was delivered by Herr von Wagenheim at the German Teutonia Club, in Constantinople. 54 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR According to the ideas of the German Imperial- ists, the march of Austria toward the south, and her penetration of the Balkans^ was to be the prelude to the complete and final triumph of German domination over the Balkan Peninsula. But in her penetration of the Balkans Austria encountered the resistance of the Slav States in general, and of the Serbs in particular. The legitimate nature of this resistance was not denied even by certain elements of Austrian society. For instance, the Social-Democratic party (German) in Austria, in its manifesto of the i 8th of October, 1 9 1 2, accusing both Italy and Russia of " pre- paring for war," at the same time declared : — " Austria-Hungary, placed between Russia and Italy, is guilty in a high degree. This Empire, incapable of relieving its people, suffering the most terrible want during the rise in the price of bread, powerless to stop civil war among its own peoples, governing Hungary with the brutal violence of a Tisza and a Lucacs, burdening Croatian Slavonia with the dictatorship of Cuvaj, failing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to redeem the promise made thirty-four years ago to emancipate the Christian peasants from Turkish feudal serfdom—this Empire now poses, as if it had not enough to do in its own country, as judge and arbitrator over the distant Balkan States. " The Austrian people have only one interest in the Balkans : the peaceful exchange of BEFORE THE WAR 55 merchandise with the Balkan peoples. Our manufacturers wish to sell their products in Serbia and Bulgaria, In exchange we want from the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry their cattle and their cereals. The fact that this exchange of products has been made onerous, and has for many years been obstructed, is due to no fault of the Serbians or the Bulgarians. It is the fault of the agrarian party of Austria-Hungary. In order to raise the price of cattle throughout Austria-Hungary by avoiding foreign competi- tion, the rich agrarians caused our frontiers to be closed to Serbian and Bulgarian cattle. If we do not buy cattle in the agricultural countries of the Balkans, these countries will naturally eliminate our products from their markets. This is the obstacle to our commerce in the Balkans. But to remove this obstacle it is not necessary to send our soldiers to the frontier. The barrier will fall if we break the power of the agrarian party in Austria-Hungary, and if we pull down the custom-houses. " We do not want war against Serbia, we want war against the famine policy of our agrarians. That is the Balkan policy we need. . , . Neither do we want to spill the blood of our soldiers in order to prop up the rotten feudalism of Turkey, and assure it of the subserviency of the Slav populations. And little Serbia, which has no mor^ inhabitants than the city of Vienna, will 56 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR certainly not become a danger to Austria by taking a few miserable villages ! . . . Austria - Hungary has committed enough crimes against the poor southern Slav populations. Only by military dictatorship will she be able to govern the Slavs of the south, who are under her domination. By her economic and agrarian policy she has reduced the peasants of Serbia to despair. She would even drive the wSlavs of the south into the arms of Russian Tsarism, were she to shed Serbian blood at this junc- ture in order to uphold the Turkish suzerainty over a Serbian peasantry ; were she to pre- vent the Serbian peasants, whose products she will not accept, from finding access to other markets. Precisely because we are the enemies of Russian Tsarism, whose expansion represents the greatest danger to European civilization, we ask Austria-Hungary not to take the aggressive by opposing the interests of the southern Slavs." ' Unhappily the Austro - Hungarian agrarians were stronger than the pacifist elements of their country. Directly the Balkan League was dis- solved the Austrian Government began to seek a pretext to strangle Serbia, and to clear a road to the ports in the south and south-west of the Balkan Peninsula, across the political and mili- ^ See the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Social- Democratic Party of Austria," October 1912. BEFORE THE WAR 57 tary ruin of the Serb State. Such a plan was bound to involve Austria-Hungary in a conflict with Russia, above all as Germany desired that conflict even more than did Austria herself. As we shall presently see, Russia's policy toward the Austro-German alliance was in no manner provocative. On the contrary, it was a rather weak and amiable policy. But Russia, despite her weakness and the sympathies of her ruling classes for their German colleagues, could not remain completely impassive before Austria's attempt to strangle Serbia. The German patriot and professor Herr Delbriick wrote in 1909 that " Italy and Russia could not permit the continual penetration by Austria of the Balkan Peninsula," and the Serbian people " could not remain tranquil while enclosed on two sides by Austro- Hungary and, having no outlet to the sea, it saw before it the inevitable prospect of fall- ing into a complete dependence upon that Power." I To realize plainly what might be the result to Russia of the German and Austrian domination of the Balkans, we must once more remember that the greater part of Russia's exports of grain passes by way of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. On this export trade depends, not only the agricultural economy of Russia but also the Budget of the State. If Turkish rule on - See Freussische Jahrbiicher, January, 1909, vol. 134. 58 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the banks of the Bosphorus is not always agree- able to Russia, a German and Austrian domina- tion of a military character would be extremely dangerous to her, and not to Russia alone, but to Italy, France, and England. As for Russia herself, her economic and political situation on the shores of the Black Sea might become abso- lutely insupportable and untenable, in the event of the Balkans and Constantinople being con- quered by Germany and Austria. The Baltic is already closed by a powerful German fleet. If the Black Sea were closed also Russia would find herself in a cul-de-sac and would become the economic and political vassal of the Austro- German bloc. CHAPTER IV I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The commercial exchange between these two countries. The success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. Why was not the Russo-German economic enfe?ite realized ? I In addition to the general political questions which divide Germany and Russia, there are also certain special problems which result in the oppo- sition of the two nations. The economic relations between Russia and Germany were markedly intensive and well de- veloped before the war. To characterize these, it will suffice to say that according to the date communicated to the First Russian Export Con- gress (which met at Kiev in the early part of 1914), 50 per cent, of the total Russian imports come from Germany. Germany and Russia, therefore mutually satisfy the half of their several economic needs and their demands on external markets. In 1901 GeiTnany imported from Russia 1 8 7- 6 million roubles worth of merchan- 59 60 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR dise, while Russia took from Germany goods to the value of 216-9 million roubles. In the same year England imported from Russia goods to the value of 1 45" 5 million roubles, and exported to Russia goods to the value of izyi million roubles. In 1909 the German goods imported into Russia amounted to 3 63' 3 million roubles, and the Russian export to Germany 387' i millions, while for England the corresponding figures were 1279 ^.nd 2 2 8" 9 million roubles. As for the other European countries, their com- mercial exchange with Russia is of little value compared with the German trade.' But the most important factor in this problem is the qualitative aspect of the commercial rela- tions between Germany and Russia. Many Russian economists assert that, thanks to the fiscal and commercial policy of Germany, Russia is economically dependent on the former country. This opinion is expressed, not only by those economists who support the interests of the great capitalists but also by the democratic and inde- pendent economists, whose view -point is that of the great masses of the people. For instance, one of the most notable students of Russian economics, M. Oganovsky, a representative of the " populist " (narodnik) movement, states that the world does not contain any great independent ^ The figures are cited from the Annual of the journal JietcA for the year 191 2. BEFORE THE WAR 61 Power which could possibly find itself in the position of the colony of another Power, and that Russia alone constitutes an exception to this rule. I " Russia was gradually becoming more and more of a German colony— in this sense notably, that the Russian people were becoming an object of exploitation by the upper classes of the German people. In 1904, profiting by our embarrassing situation, the German Government managed, at the moment of concluding the Customs Treaty with Russia, to assure itself of immense advan- tages, which cost our agricultural producers over a thousand million roubles. The extremely high customs duties which were imposed on Russian agricultural products imported into Germany by the treaty of 1904 protected the German Junkers from the competition of the Russian wheat- growers, and forced the latter to lower the price of their products in order to sell them in the German market. As for the compensation re- ceived by Russia in the form of the increase of the customs duties on the products of German industry, this compensation, according to the report of the Russian Council of State, ' could not be otherwise than burdensome to the rural economy, which consumed foreign articles (such as agricultural machinery, etc.), as well as to ' "One of the Causes of the War," an article in the Yejeme- siatchny Journal, Petrograd, October 19 14. 62 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Russian industry, which needs articles of foreign production for its technical equipment.' " ^ We may judge how far the commercial treaty of 1904 facilitated the economic conquest of Russia by Germany by the following fact : Ger- many exported to Russia, an agricultural country par excellence, not only industrial products but a large quantity of corn. In 1902 Germany ex- ported to Russia only 106,000 cwt. of rye; in 1905 (a year after the conclusion of the Customs Treaty of 1904) the amount had risen to 603,000 cwt., and in 191 i to 2,105,000 cwt. "During the last few years the importation of German rye has attained figures more or less re- markable, and it is said that the principal cause of this phenomenon is the fiscal policy of Germany during the last twenty years." 2 During the period 1907- 11 the quantity of rye imported from Germany into Russia amounted to some I 5 per cent, of the total exports of rye from Russia to foreign countries. During the same period Germany exported to Russia more than 16 per cent, of her total export of rye. And here I must remark that the success of German competition was facilitated, not only by the mistaken Customs Treaty but also by the ' Cited from the article by M. Finn-Yenotaevsky, " The Causes of the World War," in the review Sovremenny Mir, Petro- grad, October 19 14. '^ M. L. Litochenko, " German Rye in the Russian Market," an article in the review Viestnik F^z^w/j', Petersburg, January 1913. BEFORE THE WAR 63 errors of the domestic policy of tfie Russian auto- cracy, and above all by an absurd anti-Semitism. In 1 9 1 3 I published, in articles appearing in the English weekly journal Darkest Russia, a whole series of facts which demonstrate only too clearly the complete absurdity of this policy from the standpoint of national economy. I can but repeat what I said in these articles :— " If, for instance, we turn to the position of affairs in the commercial ports on the Baltic, we shall find here, too, the ruinous traces of the Government's anti-Semitic policy. -We may take as an example Libau, which also plays an im- portant part in Russian trade. Through Libau corn, timber, etc., are exported, and herrings and other articles imported. During the last few years it has been noticed that Libau has been falling behind the German port of Konigsberg in the progressive development of its trade, and that the German port has been growing more and more successful in its competition with the Russian. At the beginning of 191 1 the com- mittee of the Libau Exchange investigated the causes of this phenomenon, and came to the con- clusion that the chief cause of the success of Konigsberg and of the backwardness of Libau was the restriction of Jewish rights in the latter. If the herring trade is passing from Libau to Konigsberg, it is because at Konigsberg the Russian Jews, who act as middlemen between 64 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the importer and the consumer, are allowed free- dom of residence and of trade, and may possess warehouses, and so on, whereas at Libau, which is outside the Jewish Pale of Settlement, the Jews are deprived of these privileges, and therefore prefer to carry on their trade at Konigsberg. In the same way other branches of trade, such as the export of timber, suffer because the Jews, who are the chief middlemen, are not permitted freely to perform all those operations which are necessary for selling and delivering the exported goods. The Retch, in recording this statement, added at the time that ' the revival of trade in the other neighbouring German towns, such as Memel, Tilsit, etc., is also due to the emigration of Russian Jews who had no right to reside in their own country outside the Rale of Settlement. In Prussia the Jews are allowed to move from place to place, and to trade with freedom. It is a fact that Russian Jews are found at the head of all the big export firms.' Such are the fruits of the anti-Semitic policy, which, according to its inspirers and agents, seeks to benefit ' national ' interests. The Government declares that it restricts the activity of the Jewish mer- chants with the object of handicapping them in the competition with Russian merchants, and with a view to regenerating ' national ' trade. But in reality the persecution of the Jews has merely promoted the d^cay of Russian centres of foreign BEFORE THE WAR 65 trade and the prosperity of German towns at their expense. "^ II The term of the commercial treaty concluded in 1904 was to have expired at the end of 191 5. The problem of the renewal of this treaty was already being discussed many months before the war, and this discussion contributed not a little to the cooling of the relations between the two neighbouring countries. This is noted as far back as the beginning of 1914 by the Parisian review La Courrler Europeen, which states, in this connection, that " the approaching expira- tion of the Russo-German commercial treaty is the occasion of much bluff, menace, and compro- mise." To this observation I replied in one of my articles which appeared in the English press that " if there is a certain amount of ' bluff ' in the controversy between the journalists of the two nations, it must not be forgotten that the economic interests of the directing parties are at the bottom of this unfriendly ' discussion ' be- tween the Russian and German Nationalists. ' We are aware,' says the Lokal-Anzeiger of Berlin, ' how passionately the Russians are pre- paring for the discussion of the renewal of the treaty. . . . They are searching for weapons to • Darkest Russia^ August 13, 19 13, "The Economics of Anti- Semitism." 5 66 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR use against the German negotiators.' To this the Den of Petersburg repUes : ' The Germans are blackmailing us in order to frighten us and to secure all the advantages of the new commercial treaty.' The very fact that material and economic interests are involved in the Russo-German con- flict renders it most dangerous to the peace of Europe ; for if men to - day no longer go crusading for religious matters^ they are ready enough to wage war for the sake of increasing their export of wheat, or pigs, or mineral produce." ' •What was the attitude of the various ele- ments of Russian society in respect of this serious problem of the economic relations with Germany and the renewal of the treaty of 1904? The simplest attitude was that of the Govern- ment. From the point of view of the Russian bureaucracy a customs tariff ought to be erected in such a fashion as to yield large revenues for the State Treasury. Fiscal necessities were more than satisfied by the Protectionism extant in Russia. In 1901 the customs duties yielded the Russian Treasury 197 million roubles; in 1904, 2285 million; in 1908, 278'5 million; and in 19 1 2, 326 million. In Russia, as a rule, indirect taxation is far ' See my article " Russia's Tariff Wall " in Darkest Russia, March 15, 1914. BEFORE THE WAR 67 more highly developed than direct taxation. High customs duties are perfectly consistent with the financial system of Russia ; in 1904 all the direct taxes together yielded only 135 million roubles, while the customs dues alone poured 228 millions into the treasury. In 19 14, according to the budgetary estimates, the direct taxes should have yielded 264 millions, and the customs due 350 millions. In 1904 the customs dues formed only one-ninth of the total of the indirect taxes, but in 1 9 1 4, according to the estimates, they would have formed one-sixth part. The customs dues, therefore, are a precious morsel in the eyes of the high Russian bureaucracy, and the latter are well content with them. Protectionism is also a gratifying policy to certain groups of large industrial capitalists. High import duties, by eliminating foreign com- petition, and artificially disturbing the equilibrium between supply and demand, allow them to in- crease the prices of their goods and' to monopolize the home market for their own selfish profit. Such monopolization is all the easier because in many cases the customs duties which are imposed on articles imported into Russia are so high that they result, not merely in the " protection " of the national industries but in the prohibition of foreign imports. Often the duties imposed are greater than the value of the object taxed ; for example, a pood of cast-iron costs 40 to 42 68 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR kopecks in Russia, and the import duty on cast- iron is 45 kopecks per pood.' In addition to yielding large revenues to cer- tain groups of wealthy manufacturers, the customs tariff also enriches certain financial groups, as an artificial increase of the " surplus value " of industrial enterprises results in an inflation of stock, and shares at a premium result in stock- jobbing and speculation. As for the masses of the people, and the national economy, in the truer and wider sense of the term, the present Protectionist system is in no way profitable to them. In the first place, an artificial inflation of prices causes a decreased consumption. And in Russia, we find, prices are hig'h, while consumption is lower than in other European countries. In 1910 the annual consumption of cast-iron was 14 poods per head in the United States, 1 1 poods in England, i o poods in Germany, and only 1^ poods in Russia. It is the same with other products. The de- velopment of consumption is impossible in Russia without a lowering of prices, and this is impos- sible failing the demolition of the high tariff wall which surrounds the Russian market, transform- ing it into a " preserve " in the hands of a few monopolists. These monopolists, in search of gain, sometimes create an artificial want of this or that article — an " industrial famine." Thus, ' About lo'oSd. and loSd per 36 lb. BEFORE THE WAR 69 of late years Russia has known " famines " of coal, cast-iron, etc., by which the State itself has suffered very considerably, as State undertakings such as railways, etc., have lacked the materials or products which they required. More than once the Government has been forced to suspend the import duties on such products, and allow them a free entrance from abroad, since there was no other means of holding in check the greed of the monopolists. Could a better proof be found of the absurdity of the modern Protectionist system? Protection by means of import duties is harm- ful to the interests of the national economy because it fetters the foreign trade of Russia. In preventing the free entry of foreign merchan- dise Russia finds the doors of other countries closed against her products. And so far the total value of her foreign trade is less than the total of the State Budget, while in England (a Eree Trade country) the value of the foreign trade is many times greater than the State Budget. And it may be affirmed that Protection is in the long run harmful to the true interests of Russian industry itself. This is not a paradox. By eliminating foreign competition it deprives the Russian capitalist of energy and initiative, and transforms our industrial monarchs into pre- tenders, too insufficiently preoccupied with the technique and the perfecting of the means of production of their undertakings. 70 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Finally, the political consequences of Protec- tion are extremely negativ^e, because it corrupts the industrial bourgeoisie, subjects it to a Govern- mental tutelage, and deprives it of the spirit of opposition to and independence of a reactionary Tsarism. Unhappily, not all the ideologists of the capi- talist bourgeoisie have a clear comprehension of the disadvantages of the Protectionist system, and among them there are some who would still further expand and reinforce this lamentable system. Peter Struve, for example, the ideo- logical father of the Russian Liberal Party, insists that our Protectionism ought to be developed in all its " logical consequences," which include " the exportation of Russian products at low prices." Russian produce, in fact, says M. Struve, ought to be cheaper to the foreigner than to the Russian. To make this possible, the State ought to repay to the Russian exporters the customs duties which they pay on importing merchandise from other countries. But M. Struve himself realizes that this " logical conse- quence " cannot be welcomed by public opinion, which, in his own words, " is inspired with senti- ments hostile to Protectionism," and he fails to understand that the repayment of import duties does not constitute an abatement of Protection, but, on the contrary, an aggravation. The whole Liberal section of Russian society, says M. Struve BEFORE THE WAR 71 regretfully, would pronounce against such a measure. The true democracy of Russia is opposed to Protectionism, for reasons which I have already expounded. But we must not forget that Russia can play a large part in the foreign markets only as a grain-exporting country. " -We must permit ourselves no illusions as to the possibility of such a development of our industry as would enable us to organize a considerable exportation of its products," says Professor Migulin, a member of the superior committee of the Ministry of Finance. On the contrary, the exportation of the products of the rural economy of Russia is already well developed, and has a great future before it. In 191 3 the total value of the Russian export trade was 1,427 million roubles, which was made up as follows : Cereals, 546 million roubles ; eggs, 87 millions ; butter, 68 millions ; linen, 107-6 millions; timber, 152-5 millions; grain other than cereals, 47 millions, etc. Agri- cultural produce forms the principal clement of the Russian export trade. But the exportation of agricultural produce into Germany and other countries will be free only if the importation of foreign merchandise into Russia is also free. The opening of the commercial frontiers presents no danger to Russian agriculture from the standpoint of the possibility of foreign competition, because the natural wealth of Russia is so great and the 72 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR cost of production of cereals relatively so low that Russian grain can easily overcome all com- petition from abroad — if only the changing social and political conditions of Russian life will give the liberty necessary for the manifestation of economic energy and initiative. The idea of the abolition of Protectionism and the institution of Free Trade with Germany would be welcomed, not only by the Russian but also by the German democracy. The working classes of Germany had long been discontented with the Protectionist system of their own country, ex- ploited as it was by the agrarians, who en- deavoured to obtain a monopoly of the home market, and to draw enormous revenues from the increased prices of articles of prime necessity. Of late years the increase in the cost of neces- saries has become so great that the German Government has been forced to open a free passage for the importation of Russian meat, and this temporary measure was acclaimed by the working classes. One might imagine, too, that the industrial circles of Germany would have consented to the revision of the commercial treaty with Russia in the direction of an abatement, or even the complete suppression, of import duties, as the immense Russian market would then have been open to them. But the German Agrarians, the Prussian Junkers, violently opposed any idea BEFORE THE WAR 73 of revising the treaty in this direction. On them rests, as far as Germany is concerned, the chief responsibihty for the political and economic con- flict with Russia, as the German Democratic Press has stated. Vor^^^arts, on April lo, 1914, de- clared that " it is the egotistical obstinacy of the German Agrarians alone which explains the gene- sis of economic and political discord between Germany and Russia." CHAPTER V I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic pro- gress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. The policy of the Government. Recent success of the libera- tive movement. The political strike and the popular demonstrations of July 19 14 in Petersburg. I The better to comprehend the situation created for Russia by the war, we must briefly glance at the condition of the internal life of the nation before the war. We will commence with an analysis of the economic development of Russia, because the economic factor is to the social and political life of a people what matter is to the biological life of the organism. After the years of the great crisis and the subsequent stagnation, the industrial and com- mercial activity of Russia resumed its course, and from 1909 onwards the country was again traversing a period of economic progress. Here are some significant figures : — In 1909 there were in Russia 14,733 industrial establisliments subject to the control of the 74 BEFORE THE WAR 75 Inspection of Factories (without counting mining enterprises). The number of workers employed in these estabhshments was 1,832,783. In 1910 the number of estabhshments had risen to i 5,721, and that of the workers to 1,951,955; for the year 191 i the figures were 16,600 and 2,051,198; for the year 191 2 they were 17,356 and 2,151,191. So for a period of four years we have an increase in the number of factories and workshops representing 2,623 new estabhshments, and an increase of 3 18,408 in the number of workers. In 1908 all the industrial undertakings of Russia, mines included, produced merchandise to the value of 4,707 million roubles ; in 1 9 1 2 this sum had increased to 5,134 million roubles. In 191 i, 19 12, and the first eight months of 1913, no less than 856 shareholders' companies for purposes of indus- trial exploitation were founded in Russia, their capital amounting to a total of 1,088 million roubles. This economic revival came after a long and painful crisis and depression, and brought with it a revival of political life. The workers in the factories and workshops, who in all modern countries constitute the principal revolutionary power, do so in Russia also. The economic crisis, and the diminution in the number of workers, enfeebled not only their material forces but also their moral resistance. But with the 76 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR increasing economic activity of the country, their power began to revive. The demand for labour increased, and the workers once more feU that they formed a necessary element of the economic and social life of their country. They wished to profit by the increasing demand for labour by demanding an increase of wages, which were very low during the period of the crisis, and improved conditions of labour, which were more than unsatisfactory. The workers' organizations, the trades unions, broken by the years of the industrial crisis and political reaction, began to spring up once more in spite of all the adminis- trative restrictions and police persecutions. The co-operative movement also began to de- velop, especially among the peasants. Towards the middle of 1914 the total number of co-opera- tive societies in Russia increased to 19,325, with more than 9 million members, and an annual balance-sheet of 800,000 million roubles. A Russian economist asserts that " in the co-opera- tive movement at least two-thirds of all the peasants' savings of Russia have already been absorbed." ' But although the Tsar's Government tolerates co-operation to a certain extent, it opposes the trades unions with all its might, as it opposes the tendency to strike, and all political organization of the working-classes. And during the last few ^ See the Rousskija Viedomosti, 19 14, No. 271. BEFORE THE WAR 77 years we have seen in Russia what we saw before the year 1905. The development of industry is inevitably giving rise to the labour movement, but the archaic legislation of the autocratic regime and the reactionary administration will not allow the movement to develop in a legal form. Every demand on the part of the workers, even the most limited and modest, is regarded by the Government as a " revolt " which must be piti- lessly suppressed. From this policy resulted the ghastly " tragedy of the Lena." On the 4/1 7th of April, 191 2, the striking miners of the gold- mines of the Lena (in Siberia) were shot down like ferocious beasts simply because they dared peaceably to ask of their employers and the local administration that the conditions of their labour should be bettered, that their wages should be paid more regularly, that their wives should not be employed in rough and dirty tasks, that they should not be given spoiled and putrid food, etc. Five hundred killed and wounded were left on the desert banks of the great Siberian river- innocent victims of the Tsarist regime. But their hot blood melted the snow and ice of that dead silence and depression which had overtaken Russian society during the years of the reaction. A great popular movement sprang from the graves of these unknown workers. While in 1 9 1 o the official statistics recorded only 222 cases of strikes, in which 46,000 workers 78 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR were involved, in 1 9 1 2 the number of strikers in Russia had risen to 1^070,000, of whom 821,000 were " pohtical strikers." To appreciate this movement we must remember that in Russia, where the law allows the people hardly any legal possibility of expressing its demands, where the press has practically no freedom, and liberty of assemblage is all but unknown, the " political strike " is the sole means of efificacious public protest which remains to the workers. The elections to the Duma at the end of 191 2, which took place in an atmosphere of open ad- ministrative pressure and political falsification, proved that Russian society had not lost the spirit of opposition, and that the attitude of the popular masses was still resolutely opposed to that of the Government. Despite all difficulties and per- secutions, the Independent, Democratic, and Socialist Press is coming to life again, and the years 191 3-14 saw the appearance in Petersburg of three daily papers of the Extreme Left— one Socialist - Revolutionary in tendency and two Socialist-Democratic — not to speak of a great Radical daily (ostensibly " without party "), and a few monthly or bi-monthly reviews of the same complexion. When the Censorship, the police, and the judiciary suppress one of these organs it is at once re-issued under another name ; when one of the editors is arrested, his BEFORE THE WAR 79 place is filled by the following day, and the difficult work of propaganda is continued. The " educational movement " also underwent a rapid development— that is, the action of the popular universities, libraries, and public confer- ences and classes, most of which were organized by the workers themselves. But instead of making concessions to the public consciousness, which had awakened from its " social slumber," Tsarism continued its negative policy of reaction and repression. It undertook a regular campaign of persecution against acade- mic autonomy and the Liberal professors (most of whom are more than moderate in their political opinions). M. Kasso, Minister of Public Instruc- tion, disported himself among the superior, secondary, and inferior schools " like a hippo- potamus m a china-shop " in the words of a Russian publicist. The Government was also conducting an active anti-Semitic propaganda, which consisted not only of words, but of actions also, setting on the stage the spectacle of a " ritual murder " — the Beiliss affair— arranged by the " Black Bands," the police, and the judiciary. Arrests and deportations of members of the political organizations belonging to the Left continued uninterruptedly. But all these measures were in vain. It became evident that although the Government possessed material power, it had no true social^ moral, and 80' RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR political power. And since 191 2 we have witnessed in Russia a self-exhaustive process which has seemed to deprive the reaction of all dominating ideas, of any positive programme, while the popular movement has continually in- creased in force, until in 19 14, finding before it the mechanical obstacles of repressive police measures, it overflowed them and rushed through the streets— in the literal sense of the word. In the middle of July 19 14 the workers of Peters- burg and many other industrial centres proclaimed a political strike in order to protest against the innumerable arrests of the leaders of the Labour Movement and the editors of journals, the severe penalties inflicted on strikers, etc. The number of workers who took part in this strike amounted to 250,000 in Petersburg alone. Directly the general strike was declared, meetings were held in the yards of the factories and in the streets. Great public demonstrations took place in the streets and squares of the capital, followed by bloody collisions between the workers and the police, and the inhabitants of Petersburg saw barricades thrown up as in 1905. The situation of the Government had become all the more critical in that even before the strike and its popular manifestations it had found itself all but isolated. The very moderate elements even were ill content with it. M. Gutshkov, ex- President of the Duma and leader of the " Octo- BEFORE THE WAR 81 brists," openly predicted the inevitability of a revolution in Russia. Other leaders of the moderate parties declared that no organized and positive action was possible as long as the existing Government remained in power. The leader of the right wing of the Constitutionalists (the Cadets), M. Maklakov, invited the Duma to " perish with honour," because it was then " living in dishonour." In such a political atmosphere the revolutionary uprising of the people was extremely dangerous to the Government. It was on the brink of an inevitable fall. But then came the war, and the situation was suddenly transformed. The danger of foreign aggression forced the masses of the Russian people to check the remarkable impetus of its struggle for liberty and to occupy itself with the problems of national defence. 6 CHAPTER VI I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan of 1914. Its strategical and military destination. I What was the material power of the Russian State before the commencement of the great European war — that is to say, what were its financial and military resources ? The year 19 14 was marked in the history of Russian finances by a change of Ministers ; M. Kokovtsov was replaced by M. Bark, after twelve years at the head of the Ministry of Einances. What was the outcome of these ten years of work ? In 1904, at the moment of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the Budget of the Russian Empire amounted to 2,063 millions of roubles. In 1914 it was 3,558 millions; an increase of 1,500 millions, or 75 per cent, in ten years. The increase in the Budget was greater and more speedy than the increase in the population; in 1904 the burden or incidence of the Russian Budget was expressed by a figure of 13 to 14 roubles per head of 82 BEFORE THE WAR 83 population, while in 19 14 it had risen to 21 roubles per head— so that it was one and a half times as heavy as it was ten years earlier. And as the average of our national revenue amounts only to 50 or 60 roubles per head, the Russian people pays the State 30 to 40 per cent, of its annual income. We may therefore say that in Russia the State exhausts the material forces of the people by its bad financial system. But de- spite this fact, or indeed because of it, the State coffers always suffer from a chronic deficit, like the lean kine seen by Joseph in his sleep, which ate the fat kine, but were themselves no fatter by so doing. In 1904 the budgetary deficit of the Russian Empire was 80 million roubles; in 1905 it was 15 millions; in 1906, 481 millions; in 1907, 295 millions; in 1908, 181 millions; and in 1909, 131 millions. So for a period of six years only the total of the annual deficits amounted to 1,183 millions. This huge deficiency was filled by two colossal loans which were negotiated in Paris— a loan of 2,250 million francs in 1906 and one of 1,400 millions in 1909. In addition to these two great financial operations the Russian Government concluded several smaller loans. Two good harvests, those of 1,909 and 19 10, and the forced exportation of grain, slightly ameliorated the commercial balance-sheet of the country, and the Minister of Einances already 84 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR began to boast of the absence of a deficit. But as the Russian Budget has no solid social and economic base beneath it, the deficit soon ap- peared again, and in 1 9 1 4, according to the esti- mates, the deficit would have been 23 millions of roubles. The Minister of Finances hoped to cover this by the aid of the " free reserves ''' of the Treasury. But the " free reserves " them- selves are in reality merely the product of pre- ceding loans, and represent, not the net revenue of the State, but its anterior indebtedness. During the years 1904-14 the National Debt rose from 7,000 million roubles to 10,000 millions. This is an increase of 3,000 millions, or 43 per cent, in ten years. As for the annual payments into the sinking fund and interest, these were 403 million roubles in 19 14, while in 1904 they were 299 millions — an increase of 25 per cent. Let us now consider the internal structure of the Russian Budget since 1904. Here we have the tabulated revenues :— 1904. Million roubles. 1914. Million roubles. Direct taxes ... .. 134-9 264 Indirect taxes ... 418-6 709-2 Customs, etc.... ... 104-2 232-4 State railways .. 454-5 858-3 State properties .. 117 259-7 Alcohol monopoly .. 543-5 935-9 Other monopolies .. 70-9 133-7 Payments made by peasants to redeem their ho dings ... 88-8 Other sources... » • • • • • 85-9 128-2 BEFORE THE WAR 85 Comparing these two columns of figures, you will see that the sources of revenue have re- mained much what they were. In 1914, as ten years ago, Tsarism obtained the money which it needed principally by means of indirect taxes. While the direct taxes have increased only by 130 millions, and amounted in 191 4 to 264 millions, the indirect taxes have increased by 291 millions, and their total amounted to 709 million roubles. But the indirect taxation of the people is not confined to indirect taxes properly so called. The import duties, the alcohol mono- poly, etc., must also be regarded as indirect taxes on the various articles of consumption and pro- ducts. And if we add up the total of all these indirect taxes in their various forms we get a sum of 1,136 millions of roubles for 1904, and 2,010 for 19 1 4, the absolute increase being 874 million roubles ; but the relative increase is also great; in 1904 the indirect taxes constituted 54 per cent, of the total Budget, and in 19 14 they had risen to 60 per cent. Erom this point of view the evolution of the Russian Budget pre- sents a spectacle very different to that which we behold in the other European States, in which we find a tendency toward the increase of indirect taxes and the diminution of direct taxes. 86 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR II A few words as to the partition of the expendi- ture. The greater portion of the budget of expenditure is swallowed up by the abyss of unproductive expenditure. For example, the " costs of administration " increased in seven years (1907-14) from 282 millions to 480 millions, while the expenditure on the arts and public instruction increased from 84 to 176 millions. The expenditure in respect of the de- velopment of agriculture, which in 1907 was 46 millions, was 88 millions in 191 4. One rouble per head per annum for education and half a rouble per head for agriculture— such is the ex- penditure on these items in the most illiterate and the most largely agricultural country of Europe ! As a contrast, the unproductive ex- penses are extremely high; their total in 19 14 attained the colossal sum of 2,000 million roubles, or four-sevenths of the whole Budget. As for the military expenditure, which more especially concerns us here, it is to-day one and a half times as great as in 1907 ; in place of 500 millions spent in that year, Russia spent more than 750 million roubles on her Army and Navy in 1 91 3. The distribution of the military expenditure in 1 9 1 3 was as follows : Payment of officers of the Army and Navy, 138 million roubles; payment BEFORE THE WAR 87 of soldiers and sailors, 348 million roubles ; pro- visioning of the Army with flour, 3 08 million roubles ; with meat, butter, vegetables, salt, etc., 72 million roubles. Forage (oats, hay, etc.) for horses, 2 8' 6 million roubles ; equipment of the Army, 47 million roubles ; purchase of horses, 5 million roubles. Artillery material and arma- ments of infantry and cavalry, 3 5- 5 million roubles of the ordinary Budget plus 42 millions of the extraordinary Budget; total, 7 7' 5 millions. Material for the engineering arm, 2' 9 million roubles of the ordinary Budget plus ID'S millions of the extraordinary Budget. Con- struction and reparation of fortresses, etc., and other defensive works, 2 4' 4 millions of the ordi- nary plus 199 of the extraordinary Budget. Construction and maintenance of non-defensive works, 44' 6 millions. Maintenance of barracks and buildings of the military administration, etc., 34-9 millions. Medicines and surgical material, etc., I million of the ordinary and 13 of the extraordinary Budget. These figures refer to the budgetary estimates for 19 1 3. As for the expenditure of the Navy, we quote the figures relating to the Budget of 1 9 I 2 :— The construction of battleships for the Baltic Squadron, 29 millions ; construction of battle- ships, torpedo-boats, and submarines for the Black Sea Fleet, 239 millions ; repairing vessels of 88 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR \ war, etc., i8 million roubles ; total, 716 million roubles. Naval artillery, 256 millions; tor- pedoes and wireless telegraphy, 5 millions. Fuel (coal, petroleum, etc.) for the Navy and naval ports, I 5-8 millions ; works of naval ports, dock- yards, and slips and repairs to same, 6-2 millions. Ill In addition to the sums destined for the annual expenditure, the Russian Treasury has at its dis- posal a floating balance or " free reserve." In the Report on the Budget for 191 3, the Minister of Finances stated that this reserve amounted, in January 1913, to 450 million roubles. Accord- ing to the Report for the following year, this reserve had increased, and on January i, 19 14, amounted to 550 millions. The Minister of Fiaances naturally explained the existence of this floating balance as being the result of the wise economy of his prudent administration, but in reality it was only a result of the State's indebted- ness. In the Minister's Report on the Budget for 1 9 1 3 we find the proof ; the total balance- sheet of the State revenues for the five preceding years (1908-12) showed a figure of 14,275 million roubles, while the expenditures were 13,825 millions. The difference between these two sums forms the 425 millions of the floating balance or " free reserve." But if we recall the fact tliat 350 millions of revenue were produced BEFORE THE WAR 89 during these five years by loans, we shall find that the true "free reserve" consists of loo millions only, while the remainder (350 millions) represents the debit account of the Russian Empire during those years. The floating balance of the Treasury was re- garded by the Russian Government more particu- larly as the reserve necessitated by the possibility of war. At the end of his Report on the Budget of 19 1 4 M. Kokovtsov emphasized " the neces- sity of preserving intact the free reserves of the Treasury " because " the possession of this free balance, while fortifying the financial position of Russia, and eliminating the necessity of State loans, seems to be particularly important in the present state of the political interests of the various Powers." These words were spoken at the end of the year 1913. At the same time the question of a new Russian loan, to be floated in Paris, was mooted. On the 14th of December, 19 13, the well- informed financial contributor to the Parisian Journal, M. Monthoron, expressed himself as follows :— " We must hold ourselves ready for every eventuality. One of the first cares of every Government that is solicitous for the defence of this country must be to ensure that defence in such a manner that we in France should not be 90 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR called upon, in the event of a conflict, to support alone the first onslaught of the Triplice. For this purpose it is necessary at all costs to assist our friend and ally to carry out a rapid mobili- zation on his western frontier. This is the im- portant task which M. Delcasse has pursued in Petersburg. It is with a view to its realization that engagements were entered into in high quarters before the rise of M. Doumergue to power, with the object of securing the speedy completion of the Russian railway loan by January 15th at the latest." Another organ of the Parisian press, the Correspondant, a Clerical review, gave the history of the negotiations for this loan in its issue of the 25th of December, 1913: — " A Parisian financier, very much in the public eye, employed his leisure by going to Russia in a purely private capacity in order to seek an opportunity for some large stroke of business. " France was about to vote the Three Years' Bill— in other words, was about to reach the limit of the military burden which she could assume. Germany, on the other hand, was still able to increase the numbers and the might of her Army. 'Hence the urgent necessity of demanding from the Russian Alliance a really effectual assistance, which would guarantee peace by making a con- flict a priori dangerous to our eastern neighbours. But this assistance could be ' serious ' only if it BEFORE THE WAR 91 would realize without delay the entire programme indicated by the French General Staff, and would permit, by the creation of strategic railways, of the preparation of the means of transport and circulation indispensable to the mobilization of the Western Army of Russia. " In the fulfilment of this programme the crea- tion of railways seemed to be of the greatest importance. It was only necessary for our eminent financier to go to M. Kokovtsov and say to him, more or less in the following words : ' You have a pressing and imperious need of money ; railways are indispensable to you. Now we are able to build them and guarantee their success ; and we are ready once again to place our enormous reserves of capital at your service. But we impose on you the construction of strategic lines which can be utilized in the event of conflict.' " The manner in which all this was said gave the implicit impression that the man who spoke with such assurance was at least invested with an official mission. " The Minister was extremely reserved. But it seemed to him, reasonably enough, impossible that a proposition so definite should be put forward merely as a private matter. Neverthe- less, he did not think it necessary to conceal the fact that a simple agreement did not appear inacceptable. 92 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " A few days later our Minister of Finances received in his turn a visit from this ' private ' negotiator. ' I believe I can apprise you, M. le Ministre, having last week seen M. Kokovtsov, of an opportunity of constructing strategic rail- ways in Russia on condition that the French market will be open, for a term of five years, to 500 million francs of Russian bonds per annum.' " Meanwhile the Petersburg Government dis- creetly inquired through its Ambassador whether an agreement on the basis indicated was possible. The French Government made the same inquiries through M. Delcasse. " Finally the agreement was negotiated." ' A syndicate of five great Parisian banks under- took to organize the issue of the new loan, whose total, made up by annual instalments, was to con- sist of 51 milliards of francs— £220,000,000. The first instalment of £20,000,000 was issued early in 19 14. The same journal has explained the motives which determined France to risk this colossal financial operation. If, in the event of a Franco-German war, " Russia did not enlist herself heart and soul from the very first days of the war^ and if by misfortune we [the French] were to meet with serious re- verses at the outset, who would venture so far to * Le Corresponda?it, September 25, 1913. BEFORE THE WAR 93 rely on the chivalry of our ally as to feel assured that he would engage himself, the game once being lost, in a struggle which would be without issue as without profit to him ? Who could guarantee that Russia would not act with oppor- tune weakness ? On every count it is therefore in our interests to ensure that Russia shall assume, from the first moment of the war, an offensive which would furnish the proof of her absolute fidelity to our case. . . . Now it is obvious that in the present condition of the Russian railway system it would not be possible for her to succeed in such a task." I must add that the heads of the Russian Army themselves indicated the scanty development of the railway system of Western Russia as the chief cause of the military superiority of the Austro- German bloc over Russia. General Kuro- patkin, in his confidential report of 1900, stated that Russia at that time had only nine lines of railroad running toward the Austro - German frontier, while Austria and Germany had twenty- five lines running toward the Russian frontiers. During the fourteen years which have elapsed since that report was written the superiority of Germany and Austria in this particular has con- siderably increased. But the railway problem is of primordial im- portance in modern warfare. As was very justly said by one of the characters in a novel by 94 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Anatole F.rance, " In the event of a war the real generals will be the station-masters." The experience of the present war, with its rapid and extensive transport of great masses of troops from one frontier to another, has proved that M. Anatole Erance's creation was perfectly- correct in his statement. If I 1^ CHAPTER VII I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the nineteenth century. — II. The military forces of Russia compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The Russian Navy. I In the middle of the nineteenth century, before the Crimean War, the mihtary forces of Russia were already of considerable importance from the point of view of numbers. In January 1853 there were in Russia 532 battalions of infantry, 225 squadrons of cavalry, 105 batteries of field artillery, 30 mounted batteries, 4 mountain batteries, and 9 battalions of engineers. This was the active army, properly speaking. There were also reserve units : i 6 battalions of infantry, 24 squadrons of cavalry, 10 batteries of field artillery, 3 batteries of mounted artillery, and 2 battalions of engineers. To these we must add 53 battalions of the "home guard" and a large number of special corps and " commands." In all, the total number of soldiers was 968,000, and the number of generals and officers was 27,700. The muskets and cannon were very poor. 95 96 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The soldiers were recruited among the peasants (serfs) and the meshtshanie (small townsfolk), the duration of service being twenty years ! The officers were badly trained. The Crimean War demonstrated the bad con- dition of the Russian forces and the necessity of reform. The term of military service was diminished, and the level of the corps of officers was raised by the establishment of compulsory examinations for those who wished to attain the rank of officer. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 contributed greatly to the technique of artillery fire, and Russia followed the example of Prussia in all that concerns the construction of cannon and small arms, and replaced the old muskets, first by Carl^ rifles and then by the Berdan model. The war of 1870-71 once more gave an impulse to the development of the armed forces of Russia : rifled cannon were introduced in the artillery and the Government established universal military service, which was not, as a matter of fact, particularly universal, as there were numerous exceptions or privileges in the case of this or that category of persons. It must be admitted that the Minister of War of those days— M. Milutin— did not, in his en- deavours to improve the state of the Russian Army, attribute much importance to the quanti- tative factor, and in 1876 the Russian Army BEFORE THE WAR 97 numbered only 73 i,ooo men— a lower figure than that of 1853. But the famous European system of " armed peace " impelled Russia, together with all the other great European States, to increase her military forces, which, in 1880, after the Russo-Turkish War, numbered 894,000 men, with 32,000 generals and officers, and in 19 13, 1,224,000 men (not counting the Cossacks) and 57,700 generals and officers. At the same time the technique of artillery and infantry fire was perfected by the introduction of repeating rifles and quick-firing guns. The reactionary period of Alexander III has left its mark on the life of the Army as on the general life of the people. The liberal measures of Milutin, who wished to improve the education —not merely professional but general— of the officers, were suppressed, and the military schools were reorganized in such a manner that the officers whom they gave to the Army could not be over-intelligent. The condition of the troops was very bad. As a result the great army of the great Russian Empire was beaten by little Japan . " The debacle of the war against Japan proved emphatically the weakness of our armed force and the necessity of urgent reforms," said a Rus- sian writer on military subjects. " But, as a matter of fact, all the reforms after the war consisted of some changes of uniform. In addi- 7 98 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR tion to this, the Minister of War has of late years persistently applied himself to the increase of the effective of the Army, the number of generals and officers and military officials, and the bureaucracy of the central administration of the Army." It is true that the term of compulsory service has been reduced from four to three years. " However, this was done, not because the Ministry of War considered it necessary, but in response to the pressure of the revolutionary demands of the soldiers," says the same author. In 1910 the effective of the Army was re- organized by suppressing the units of the permanent reserves and replacing them by skeleton units or cadres, on which the units were to be formed on mobilization. Finally, in the spring of 19 13, the increase of the armies of other European Powers was followed by an increase in the strength of the Russian Army, and a considerable addition to the number of guns, etc. But we know nothing precisely con- cerning the dimensions of this increase, and it was determined on during the secret sessions of the Duma. Of late years also much money has been expended on military aviation, II According to the figures relating to the end of 1913, the total strength of the military forces BEFORE THE WAR 99 of Russia before the present war was as follows ' : — Armies. In Europe — Petersburg Vilna Warsaw Kiev Odessa Moscow Kazan Caucasus Total In Asia — Turkestan Omsk Irkutsk ... The Amur Frontier Guards of the Trans- Amur Total a o 144 160 168 72 160 80 118 1,038 44 16 64 96 24 244 c o •c 3 cr C/3 60 60 180 118 36 49 30 92 48 6 20 17 36 244 -r- ui .Si « &" S cii Sa e o< 51 51 60 63 27 60 30 27 12 6 24 30 5 4 13 6 2 4 2 6 17 72 5 I 4 14 4 28 ^5 10 10 4 10 4 6 625 369 42 26 60 I 4 9 3 3 2 6 15 3 6 14 My readers will understand that not all these forces could immediately be utilized on the western frontier in case of a war against the Austro-German hloc. Part of the corps would have to remain on the other frontiers as observing forces, and another portion could be utilized only a long time after the declaration of war on account of the slowness of mobilization and concentration in Russia. Consequently, according to the cal- culations of a competent specialist, the numerical ' I borrow these figures from the well-informed contributor to Le CorrespOTidant (see the issue for December 25, 1915). 100 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR situation of the belligerents, in the event of a war between Russia and the Austro-German bloc, should be as follows :— i 1 IN THE BLOODY FRAY 131 Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, wrote to his Government : " Certain organs of the Viennese press, discussing the military organiza- tion of France and Russia, represent these two countries as being in no condition to have their say In European affairs, which would make it appreciably easier for the Dual Monarchy, sup- ported by Germany, to subject Serbia to any treatment it chooses to impose on her. The Milltarische Rundschau ' admits as much without hesitation : ' The moment is still favourable for us. . . .At the present moment the Initiative belongs to us; Russia Is not ready; the moral factors ( !) and justice (!!!) are on our side, as well as force.' " - In another document — a Consu- lar report submitted to the French Government on the 2 1st of July— we read: "There is here [in Vienna], and also in Berlin, a clan which accepts the idea of a general conflict ; in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be best to act before Russia has completed her extensive improvements of her army and railroads, and before France can complete the details of her military organiza- tion." 3 It is thus proved that the Austro- German coalition desired the war independently of whatever attitude might be assumed by Russia, ' The most influential military organ in Austria. =" Quoted from the Yellow Book published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 19 14, p. 28. 3 Ibid., p. 30. 132 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR France, or England. What could Russia, under these circumstances, have done to avoid war? Cast Serbia into the jaws of German militarism? But this would have been an action of incredible cowardice and treachery. This the German Government understood very well, as we see from the dispatch sent by Wilhelm II to Nicholas II on the 24th of July, in which the German Emperor, speaking to the Tsar of the impression produced in Russia by the Austro - German aggression against Serbia, said : " I do not by any means attempt to conceal from myself the difhculty which you and your Government are experiencing in resisting the manifestations of public opinion." Wilhelm II himself admits that public opinion in Russia had reason to feel uncomfortable at the idea of looking on at the ignoble attempt on the part of two great States, both armed to the teeth, to strangle a little nation. Those who think that Russia may thus have been responsible for the outbreak of the present war often make the following objection : How, they ask, can you suppose that Russian Tsarism, which has oppressed and now oppresses so many peoples in its own Empire, was sincerely anxious to defend Serbia? To this question I frankly reply : I am not a friend of the Russian Govern- ment. I do not believe in the "sincerity" of the intentions of the autocratic Government. 1 know that it oppresses many peoples. But IN THE BLOODY FRAY 133 this is no reason why it should commit a final act of cowardice, and abandon Serbia to the Austro-German sword. And if the Russian Government dared to oppose the brutal violence to which Serbia was to be subjected by the armed forces of the Russian army, it performed a good action independently of its " inward intentions." Autocratic Tsarism is not a good thing, but would it have been any better had it been guilty of an act of treason towards the little Serbian nation, which looked to Russia for its salvation? Do you consider that one should expiate the sins one may have committed by a fresh crime, the dishonour which has stained one by a new infamy ? I do not believe it. And even among the Germans there were those who did not believe it— at least, there were before the war— who believed that Russia not only had the right to support Serbia against Austria, but that she was obliged to do so. A few days before the declara- tion of war the Social - Democratic journal Vorivdrts, expressing the thoughts of the labour- ing classes of Germany, made a frank declaration of this opinion, saying that Russia could not renounce her duty to defend Serbia against the pressure of Austria. CHAPTER II I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted with an unexpected war. — 11. The session of the Duma. The agreement between the majority of the parties and representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote for the mihtary credits. I Not only was the present war not desired by- Russia— it was entirely unexpected by that country, as was emphasized by the Russian press as well as by the declaration of the Government in the Imperial Duma. " On the 2 0th of July (old style) was published the Imperial ukase relating to the resumption of your interrupted labours a month ago in the midst of what seemed to be profound peace." In such words the President of the Council of Ministers addressed the members of the Duma. " During this month events of the greatest historical importance have occurred. One after another, like claps of thunder, they have burst over the life of Russia and Europe, long prepared by the invisible course of history, yet sudden in their happening." 134 IN THE BLOODY FRAY 135 How far not only the members of the great public, but even those persons who made it their special business to study the problems of foreign politics, were from entertaining any supposition of the possibility of an imminent outbreak of war, we may judge from the following fact :— Two and a half years ago one of my friends, M. Pavlovitsh, who is one of the most assiduous students of international relations, wished to publish a French pamphlet, in which he demon- strated that the eventuality of armed conflict between Germany and England was incredible. During a private interview he told me that he had intended to entitle his pamphlet " The War Impossible." " There is no need to exag- gerate," I said ; "we have no guarantee of the impossibility of this war." M. Pavlovitsh gave in and entitled his pamphlet " The Improbable War." I This was in 1 9 i 2 . In i 9 1 4, two or three months before the outbreak of the present war, the same writer (who is, I repeat, one of the best-informed and profoundest students of these questions in Russia) delivered a lecture in which he attacked the " alarmists " who circulated false rumours as to the possibility of a conflict between Russia and Germany, and these attacks were repeated by him in an article published almost on ' Michel Pavlovitsh : Le Coniiit Angio-Allemand. La guerre improbable, Paris, 191 2. 136 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the eve of the declaration of war. Thus m Russia the war was completely unexpected, even by persons well informed as to international ques- tions. As for the " simple profane," the masses of the population, to them the war was truly like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. And this is a circumstance we must always take into con- sideration if we would appreciate the events which followed the declaration of war and the attitude of official and popular Russia in respect of this national and international disaster. On the 20th of July 19 14 (old style), that is, on the 2nd of August by European reckoning, the following manifesto was issued, relative to the declaration of war by Germany upon Russia : — "We, Nicholas II, by the grace of God Emperor and autocrat of all the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc. " Declare to all our faithful subjects : " Following her historic traditions, Russia, who in faith and in blood is one with the Slav peoples, has never regarded their fate with indifference. The brotherly feelings of the Russian people for the Slavs have reawakened with unanimous impulse and peculiar force during these last few days, at the moment when Austria-Hungary pre- sented to Servia demands which were manifestly such as a sovereign State could not accept. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 137 " Despising the conciliatory and pacific reply of the Serbian Government and refusing the benevolent mediation of Russia, Austria hastily resorted to an armed attack, which she opened by the bombardment of the undefended city of Belgrade. " Forced, by these new conditions, to take necessary measures of precaution, we gave the order that the Army and the Navy should be placed on a war footing ; but, careful of the blood and the wealth of our subjects, we employed all our efforts to secure a pacific issue of the negotiations then proceeding. " In the midst of these friendly relations the ally of Austria, Germany, despite our hopes that we should always remain good neighbours, and shutting her ears to the assurances which we gave her that the measures taken were taken without any hostile intention towards her — Ger- many proceeded to demand that these measures should be revoked, and, having received a refusal, suddenly declared war upon Russia. " Now it is no longer a matter only of taking the part of a sister nation unjustly wronged ; but of defending the honour, the dignity, and the integrity of Russia and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that in order to defend the Russian soil our faithful subjects will rise all as one man, filled with abnegation. " In the dread hour of trial, let intestine dis- 138 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR senslons be forgotten, that the union of the Tsar with his people may be yet more firmly consoli- dated, and that Russia, rising as a single man, may repulse the insolent attack of the enemy. " With a profound faith in the righteousness of our cause and a humble confidence in Almighty Providence, we invoke in our prayers the Divine benediction upon Holy Russia and our valiant troops. "At St. Petersburg, the 20th of July (old style) of the year 19 14 in the era of Jesus Christ, and the twentieth year of our reign. " Nicholas." I will call the attention of my readers to the phrase which I have italicized in this manifesto, the phrase calling the subjects of the Tsar to forget "intestine dissensions." As we shall presently see, the Government itself did not respond to this appeal. While issuing the proclamation here quoted on the 2nd of August, the Russian Government also issued on the same day a ukase of the Tsar concerning the convocation of the legislative assemblies. " In the midst of the heavy trials sent upon our country," says the ukase, " and wishing to be in perfect union with our people, we have thought it well to convoke the Council and the Imperial Duma." The Prime Minister explained verbally to the Duma that the Govern- IN THE BLOODY FRAY 139 merit proposed in future to address itself also to the Legislative Assembly. " The legislative insti- tutions must understand that in the future they too will be convoked to sit in extraordinary ses- sion if circumstances necessitate such a step." The members of the Duma welcomed this con- stitutional promise with applause, which is easily comprehensible if we remember that in Russia the autocratic Government ordinarily regards the legislative body as a negligible factor. But while appreciating the " constitutionalism " for once manifested by Tsarism we must not exaggerate its degree, and we must not forget that the Government itself has explained its constitu- tionalism by very mercenary reasons. " War being declared against us," said the Prime Minister in the Duma, " the Government could not occupy itself with the means of meeting the military expenditure. . . . The Minister of Finances will make you acquainted with the measures which are proposed in the first place. The necessity of these measures is one of the reasons for the convocation of the legislative institutions." It is true that the Premier added that " this is only an external reason and not the most important," and that the Duma ought at such a moment "to be the expression of the popular thoughts and feelings." But here a question of principle arises : for this very Duma to which 140 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Tsarism addressed its " constitutional appeal " was created by Tsarism to assist in a coup d'etat, which was accomplished in 1907, at the time of the brutal dissolution of the second Duma ; it was by no means created by Tsarism to be the expression of the thoughts and feelings of the people, but to be a docile instrument of reaction. None the less, I am ready to admit that the Convocation of this Duma, the result of a coup d'etat, was an act of greater constitutionalism than the convocation of no Duma at all— a very possible proceeding. 11 The extraordinary session of the Duma for the 8th of August 1 9 1 4 was opened by a speech delivered by the President, M. Rodzianko, from which I will quote the more important state- ments : — " We all know very well that Russia did not desire the war, that ambitions of conquest are foreign to the Russian people, but that destiny itself has seen fit to involve us in an act of justice. . . . The die is cast. . . . Calmly, without anger, we can say to those who are attacking us : Lay down your arms. . . . Our people is good and pacific, but terrible when forced to defend itself. . . . The Russian hero will not hang his head in dejection, whatever trials he may experience ; his stalwart shoulders IN THE BLOODY FRAY 141 will support everything. ... At this hour our thoughts and our hopes are yonder on the fron- tiers, where our valiant Army and our valiant and courageous Fleet ' go forth fearlessly to battle. ... As for us who remain at home, let us accept our duty, the duty of labouring without ceasing to assure bread to those families which are deprived of their heads ; let the Army know, not by our words alone but by our actions, that we shall not allow their families to suffer poverty." At the close of the President's speech the official declarations were made, in the name of the Government, by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. " Russia did not desire the war," said M. Gore- mykin. "The Government has conscientiously sought some means of extricating itself peacefully from the complicated situation which has over- taken it, seizing upon even the faintest hope of averting the rain of blood which threatened us. But there are limits even to the pacific spirit of Russia. Fully conscious of the heavy responsi- bility which weighed upon it, for the Imperial Government to have continued humbly to with- draw from the challenge flung down before it would have meant the renunciation of our position as a Great Power ; it would have been a fatal error ; it would have humiliated us without in any ' Unhappily, almost non-existent. 142 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR way modifying the course of events, which was not decided by us. " The war has opened, and it only remains for us to repeat the words which have resounded throughout the world : We shall prosecute this war, whatever its character, until the end. In all the many centuries of Russian history there has been perhaps but one national conflict, that of 1 8 1 2, which could for importance be com- pared with the events now imminent. The Government is in no way blinded by presump- tion ; it clearly realizes the fact that this war will demand an extreme effort of all its forces, many victims, and a courage equal to all the blows of Fate. But the Government cherishes an immovable faith in its final success, for it has an illimitable faith in the great historic mission of Russia." The Minister of Foreign Affairs then gave the deputies a long explanation of the international situation on the eve of the war, and the part played by Russia. " In these difficult hours, in which resolutions heavy with responsibilities have been taken, the Government has derived strength from the feeling that it is in perfect agreement with the popular conscience." Thus M. Sazonov. " When the moment comes for history to pronounce its impar- tial verdict, I have the firm conviction that this verdict will be in our favour. . . . Our IN THE BLOODY FRAY 143 enemies are striving to cast upon us the responsi- bility for the scourge now desolating Europe, but their calumnies cannot lead into error any- one who will with conscientious attention follow the Russian policy of these last few years and these last few days. ... It was not the policy of Russia that threatened the peace of the world. . . . You know what has been the occasion of the war ; torn by intestine disorders, Austria resolved to escape from them by striking a blow which, while impressing the world with her power, should humiliate us . To that effect Serbia was chosen. . . . You are not ignorant of the conditions under which the ultimatum was pre- sented to Serbia. By submitting to them she would have become the vassal of Austria. It is clear that non-intervention on our part would have been equivalent to the abandonment of our ancient character of defender of the Balkan peoples. And at the same time it would have involved the admission that the will of Austria, and that of Germany, who stands behind her, is the law of Europe, and that neither we, nor France, nor England can admit. (Prolonged applause.) " No less than we, our valiant Allies sought with all their might to preserve peace. Our enemies blundered : they took these efforts for signs of weakness. Even after the provocation given by Austria, Russia declined no attempt at 144 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR a peaceful solution of the conflict. In this direc- tion all efforts that could be made were made honestly and prosecuted to the end by us and by our Allies. . . . We held firmly to one condition only : ready to accept any compromise that could have been admitted by Austria without diminish- ing her prestige, we excluded all that might have attacked the sovereignty and the independence of Serbia. " From the outset we did not conceal our point of view from Germany. There is no doubt that, had it wished, the Cabinet of Berlin might, with a single imperious word, have checked its ally, as it did during the Balkan crisis. But in reality Germany, who until the last few days never ceased to assert in so many words her desire to influence Vienna, rejected one by one all the propositions put forward, and replied by mere empty assurances. " Time was passing ; the negotiations did not advance. Austria savagely bombarded Belgrade. . . . The obvious object was to gain time by means of negotiations and to confront Europe and ourselves with the accomplished fact : the humiliation and annihilation of the Serbian State. Under these conditions we could not abstain from taking natural measures of precaution, all the more as Austria had already mobilized the half of her Army. When the mobilization was ordered in Russia our Emperor gave his Imperial word IN THE BLOODY FRAY 145 to the Emperor of Germany that Russia would not resort to the employment of force so long as a hope existed of arriving at a pacific solu- tion under the conditions, full of moderation, which I have already indicated. " This voice was not heard. Germany declared war, first upon us, then upon our Allies. Losing all self-control, she trampled on the sacred rights of two States whose neutrality she had solemnly guaranteed by her own signature, in agreement with the other Powers." (Cries from all the benches of " Shame ! Shame ! ") " We can only bow our heads before the heroism of the Belgian people, which did not fear to struggle against the huge German Army." (Thunders of applause. The deputies persis- tently acclaimed the representative of Belgium, who was in the Diplomatic box.) " The procedure of Germany has not failed to arouse the profound indignation of the vvTiole civilized world, and, above all, that of chivalrous France, who, with ourselves, has risen in the defence of right and justice." (A fresh outburst of applause. Cries from deputies of " Long live France ! " The deputies rose to their feet and the French Ambassador received a long ovation.) " Need I add that England shares the same feelings ? She also responded as one man, and saw that it was necessary to shatter the preten- sions of Germany to impose her burdensome 10 146 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR hegemony upon the whole of Europe." (Another outburst of applause. Great enthusiasm. This time the British Ambassador received the ovations of the Duma.) " We are fighting for our Fatherland ; we are fighting for its prestige and its position as a Great Power. We will not accept the yoke of Germany and her ally in Europe." (Violent shouts, "bravoes," frantic applause.) "The same motives are guiding our Allies." After the declarations of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duma listened to a long series of speeches from dele- gates belonging to various parties of the Duma. These speeches proved that a perfect agreement prevailed among the great majority of the members of the Duma in all that related to their attitude in respect of the war. But it must be admitted that the declarations of the parties of the Right were very insignificant in their con- tents. The representative of the Centre confined himself to exclaiming : " Long live the Tsar, the People, and victory ! " The representative of the Nationalists expressed his opinion that " in the difficult and glorious moment through which we are passing Russia is called upon to repair some of her historic faults." (One may read into these words a reproach addressed to the Russian Government for its policy of " recoil " before the Austro-German bloc in 1909, etc.) The IN THE BLOODY FRAY 147 representative of the Octobrists declared : " My political friends have sent me here to express their firm conviction that, before the invasion now threatening, we shall all be united ; we are all equally ready to sacrifice our goods, our lives, and those of our nearest and dearest, in order to struggle against the enemy which is striving to ruin the strength and liberty of our great country." The situation was highly embarrassing to the Extreme Right, which had long defended in its press the idea of a union between the Russian autocracy and the German monarchy. The spokesman of the Extreme Right was M . Markov, who, as was later established, had as recently as April 1 9 1 4 published articles in which he insisted on the necessity of replacing the alliance with France (impious and republican) and the entente with England (perfidious and Free-Masonic ( ! ) ) by a worthy union of the Russian reaction with the Prussian reaction. None the less, M. Markov was under the necessity of declaring that his party " awaited the victory " of Russia over Germany . The declaration of the Democratic Constitu- tionalists (the Cadets) was made in their name by the deputy Milukov. " The parliamentary group of the Liberal Party," he said, " has more than once raised in the Duma the questions which have been touched 148 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR upon by the two first speakers who ascended this tribune." He referred to the representatives of the Labourites and the Social-Democrats, whose declarations will presently be cited. " Its opinion on these questions is well known to all. It is needless to say that no external circumstances can modify it. When the moment has come our party will once more attack these questions, and will once again point out the only path that can lead to the eternal regeneration of Russia. It hopes that in passing through the severe trials which await us our country will draw nearer to its sacred object. But at the present moment other questions confront us, affecting us all too profoundly, and another task is before us, a terrible and august duty, a task which im- periously calls for an immediate solution. We must concentrate all our forces in the defence of the State, against an external enemy, who pretends to sweep us from his path in order that he may establish a world-wide supremacy. " Our cause is a just cause. We are struggling to liberate our country from a foreign invasion, to liberate Europe and the Slav world from the Germanic Hegemony, to liberate the entire world from the intolerable yoke of armaments which never fail to increase, ruining peaceful workers and perpetually provoking fresh armed con- flicts. " In this struggle we are all one ; we make no IN THE BLOODY FRAY U9 conditions, we put forward no claims, we simply throw into the balance of conflict our firm will to vanquish the aggressor." I believe— and many Russian citizens are of the mind— that the Democratic Constitutionalists have committed a grave blunder in declaring that they " put forward no claim's," for there were ques- tions (for example, that of a political amnesty) which should not have been set aside even at such a moment. And this political blunder on the part of the Cadets was imme- diately emphasized by the declaration of the Labour Party. But before speaking of this declaration I must cite the resolution voted by the Duma at the close of the session : — " Having heard the explanations of the Govern- ment, and being convinced, not without a feeling of satisfaction, that it has exhausted every means of maintaining peace compatible with the pres- tige of Russia as a Great Power, the Imperial Duma expresses the firm conviction that in the present hour of trial, before the advancing threat of war, all the peoples of Russia, united in a common sentiment of love for their country, and convinced of the justice of their cause, are ready to rise at the appeal of their Sovereign, in order to defend their country, its honour, and its riches. The Duma derives from this sentiment a calm assurance in the invisible strength and glorious future of Russia. f 150 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " Proceeding to the order of the day and ex- pressing the desire to collaborate in the defence of the country and the protection of the families of the reservists, the Duma sends its brotherly greeting to the valiant defenders of our country who, with abnegation, are accomplishing their heroic task." This resolution, and the projected legislation introduced by the Government, were voted by the Duma unanimously, but in the absence of two parties of the Extreme Left, who, not wishing to participate in the vote, left the hall of the Duma before it was taken. Ill Before leaving the hall of session the Trudo- vlki, who represented the peasant democracy, and the Social-Democrats, who represented the in- dustrial workers, made declarations in which they expounded their point of view in all that con- cerned the war. •The party of the Trudoviki had responded to the appeal of the Government and the Cadets concerning the propriety of ignoring all intestine dissensions in the following words : — " Citizens of Russia, let us remember that you have no enemies among the working- classes of the belligerent countries. While defending to the uttermost all that is dear to us against the attempts at conquest made by the IN THE BLOODY FRAY 151 hostile Governments of Germany and Austria, remember that this horrible war would not have taken place if the great ideals of democracy- liberty, equality, and fraternity— had inspired the activities of ruling Russia and the Governments of all countries. And now, even in this terrible hour, the authorities do not forget the internal dissensions of the country ; they do not amnesty those who have striven for the liberty and happi- ness of their country ; they will not make peace with the non-Russian peoples who have pardoned everything and are fighting with enthusiasm at our side for the common Fatherland. And in place of alleviating the situation of the labouring- classes, the Government imposes on them pre- cisely the chief weight of military expenditure by the augmentation of the indirect taxes." But while throwing the responsibility for the war on all the Governments, the Social- Democrats proclaimed that it was the duty of the Socialists to defend their country against a foreign invasion. " The proletariat, the perpetual champion of liberty and the interests of the people, will always defend the treasure of civilization amassed by the people against all attempts, no matter from whence they come," said the spokesman of the Social-Democrats in the Duma. And in speaking thus the representative of Russian Social-Democracy in the Duma was but 152 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR following the tradition established by the Social- Democratic sections of preceding Dumas : notably the Social-Democratic section of the second Duma, whose members were sent to penal servitude for supposed implication in a " military conspiracy " invented by the police, declared through one of its spokesmen that " if the foreign oppressors declare war on Russia the proletarian youth would seize their rifles and resist them as they resisted their oppressors at home." The same idea was expressed by the repre- sentative of the Trudovlki, who made use of lan- guage so simple and affecting as to produce a profound impression on that very majority of the Duma which in general and on the same day had been more than chilly in its attitude toward the Extreme Left. " -We have the immovable conviction," said the Labour deputy, " that the great Russian democracy, united to all the other forces of the country, will offer a decisive resistance to the enemy who shall attack us, and will defend its native soil and the culture created by the sweat and blood of the generations. We believe that on the field of battle, in the hour of suffering, the brotherhood of all the peoples of Russia will be cemented. A single will shall be born of them which at home will deliver the people from its terrible chains. . . . IN THE BLOODY FRAY 153 " Peasants and workers, and all you who desire the happiness and prosperity of Russia, in these days of heavy trials temper your spirits ! Gather up all your strength, and, having defended the country, set it free ! " To you, our brothers, who are shedding your blood for the Fatherland, our deep respect and our fraternal greeting ! " However, while admitting that the working- classes in field and factory should energetically participate in the defence of the country, the Labour group and the Social-Democratic section took no part in the vote on the resolution or the projected legislation referring to military credits. To understand this attitude we must in the first place remember that the position of the repre- sentatives of the peasants and industrial workers in the present Duma is quite peouHar, and unlike that of any other parties in the Duma. While all the other parties accept the existing " Con- stitution," and act as legal components of the latter, the Labour group and the Social-Demo- crats deny the Constitution on principle. For them the Duma is not a " national representa- tion," but the result of a brutal coup d'etat. This is why they cannot, from the political and moral point of view, associate themselves with the acts of a Government which violated its constitutional promises in 1907, or with the declarations of a Duma created as a result of 154 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR political violence committed against the people ; they believe they have no right to take the slightest part in the doings of the present Govern- ment, or of the Duma, which is the instrument of that Government. In acting thus they consider that they are accomplishing their sacred duty to the people. This is one reason why the Extreme Left refused to take part in the voting of the Duma. Another reason is found in the desire of the Labour deputies and the Social-Democrats to remain faithful to their Socialist principles, and the obligations assumed by the Socialist Parties of the whole world at the international Socialist Congresses, which advised the Socialist repre- sentatives in all Parliaments not to vote for mili- tary credits, in order thus to express their per- petual protest against militarism and warfare. Can we reproach the Russian Socialist deputies because they honestly obeyed the resolutions of their Congress, and have observed their obliga- tions even in face of a foreign invasion ? All we can say of them is that they acted like honest men— perhaps even too honest if we compare their attitude with the miserable conduct of their German " comrades," who have followed the battle-car of their Kaiser like docile slaves. CHAPTER III I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures ; the new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the war. I War-TIME, when a foreign invasion threatens the country, is not a very favourable moment for internal reforms— above all, when the Government of the country at war is not, as a rule, disposed to progressive and reformative action. However, even from the measures relating to the immediate task in hand in time of war one can always form an opinion of the general character of the policy of the central power. Immediately war was declared a " state of war " was proclaimed throughout the whole Empire, and the power was transferred from the hands of the civil administration to the hands of the military governors. But this measure in reality changed little or nothing in the life of the people, for even in times of peace the Russian citizen lived under a system of various " excep- 155 156 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR tional regulations." None the less, as we shall presently see, the proclamation of a state of war was followed by certain fresh restrictive measures, in many cases sensible enough in view of those meagre " rights of man " which already existed in Russia. But before speaking of the negative side of the domestic policy of Tsarism during the war I must, in order to be impartial, draw the atten- tion of my readers to its more or less positive side. Any Government, in any war, is confronted with two principal tasks : firstly, it must place the armed forces of the country on a war footing and " organize victory " ; in the second, it must organize the rearguard of the army and ensure its solidity. In the rearguard of the Russian Army two points were especially vulnerable— the frontier regions of Poland and the Transcaucasian region, which would receive the first blows from the enemy, and whose fidelity to the Russian cause ought as promptly as possible to be assured. And here Tsarism, which has wasted much time over useless and harmful national persecutions, found it necessary to renounce altogether its old policy, and to assume the attitude of a " liberator " of the Poles and Armenians, whose sympathies appeared so precious on the outbreak of the war. On the 9th of August the Commander-in-Chief IN THE BLOODY FRAY 157 of the Russian Army, the Grand Duke Nicholas, pubhshed his famous Proclamation to the Poles : — " Poles I " The hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and your grandfathers may be realized. A century and a half has passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead. It con- tinues to live, inspired by the hope that there will come for the Polish people an hour of resurrection and of fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia. The Russian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation, which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peopleSj'^which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar. Under this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and her language and her autonomy. Russia only expects from you the same respect for the rights of those nationalities to which history has bound you. " With open heart and brotherly hand Great Russia advances to meet you. She believes that the sword with which she struck down her enemies at Griinwald is not yet rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian armies are on the march. The dawn of a new life is beginning for you, and in this 158 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross, the symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples." Six weeks later (on the 1 7th of September) the Tsar addressed the following manifesto to the Armenians : — " Armenians I " In one sublime impulse all the peoples of our great Russia, from east to west, have risen to my call. Armenians, after five centuries of the tyrannical yoke beneath which so many of your blood have succumbed, while others are yet suffering the most abominable outrages, the hour of liberty has at last sounded for you. The Russian people recalls, not without pride, its illustrious Armenian children. The Lazarevs, the Melikovs,! and others besides, have fought by the side of their Slav brothers for the glory of their country. " Your ancient fidelity is to me a pledge that you will succeed, in these solemn days, in per- forming your whole duty in a spirit of unshake- able faith in the final success of our armies and our just cause. " Armenians, united with your brothers in blood under the sceptre of the Tsars, you will at last know the benefits of liberty and justice." ' Armenian Generals who fought in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 159 Referring to these proclamations, many sceptics have spoken of an " august demagogy," of the insincerity of the intentions of Tsarism, etc. But I beheve we ought to accept the fact, such as it is. And it is a fact, and a very important fact, that the danger of war has compelled Tsarism to make before the whole world promises of liberation to two oppressed peoples. The per- formance of these promises will depend on the efforts of the Russian democracy and the demo- cracies of the allied nations, but it is a great moral and political victory that the Russian Government should have made a solemn admis- sion that its ancient policy of oppression was completely erroneous — that it is not by means of the knout, but of a liberal policy, that the sympathies of nations are to be won.' ^ As for the reproach of "august demagogy," it must be admitted that the German Emperor has no rivals in this respect. Here is the text of a proclamation addressed by William II to the Poles of Russia after the outbreak of the war : — • " Poles, you will certainly recollect that one night the bells of the holy convent of Swati Gori (The Sacred Hills) began to ring although no human hand had touched the bell ropes. All pious persons then understood that a great event had come to pass, which was announced by this very miracle. This event was my decision to fight against Russia, to restore to Poland all her sacred things, and to unite her to Germany, the most cultured nation. " I have dreamed a prodigious dream. I saw the Holy Virgin, who commanded me to save her holy habitation, which was threatened with a great danger. She gazed at me with tears in her eyes, and I have accomplished her will. May this be 160 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Another victory— this time not moral only, but actual — concerns the relations between the Government and the organs of local self- government and private societies. In order to safeguard the rearguard of the Army, the Government had to organize assistance for the families of the reservists, by inviting the muni- cipal organizations, etc., to take part in the work. On the other hand, the assistance of these organi- zations and of societies and associations of many kinds was necessary to the work of evacuating sick and wounded soldiers, the creation of hospital trains, hospitals, centres of supply, etc. To satisfy all these urgent and complex needs the local government bodies and private associ- ations required a complete liberty of action. But this liberty of action was non-existent, as the actions of the municipalities and zemstvos were hampered by various bureaucratic regulations ; the members of their executive organizations might exercise their functions only after receiving a special " confirmation " from the Ministry, which could always oppose its veto to the inclusion of this or that person ; and even the persons employed by the municipalities and done by your agency, O Poles ! And come forth to meet my soldiers as one goes to meet brothers and saviours ! Poles ! know that those who will be on my side will be largely rewarded. Those who set themselves against me will perish. God and the Holy Virgin are with me. She Herself has raised the sword to aid Poland." IN THE BLOODY FRAY 161 zemstvos had first to be submitted to the approval and authorization of the local Gover- nor, who could dismiss them " without explana- tion of motives." All these regulations, harmful enough in time of peace, were especially intoler- able in time of war, when the work of public bodies and private associations had to be quickly and freely organized. The Government, there- fore, was obliged to remove these restrictions— if not de jure, then de facto. The central authority declared that all public and private organizations assisting the State to give aid to sick and wounded soldiers should be considered Governmental institutions. " All attempts to hinder in any way whatsoever the labours of these public and private organizations may destroy.jJieir keen and creative spirit and initi- ative, and merely hamper the great and holy work," wrote the Minister of the Interior in his circular letter to the Governors. And when the municipalities began to invite the services of doctors and administrative officials for their hospitals and hospital trains, together with female nurses and other employees, without the previous authorization of the Governors, neither the latter nor the Ministry dared to protest. And, as we shall see in a later chapter, thanks to the with- drawal of these restrictions, a remarkable task has been performed by Russian society. After a while, unhappily, the Government once 11 162 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR more began to limit the activities of the social organizations ; for example, it dissolved the " Free Society for Economic Studies " of Petrograd, which had done much to alleviate the misery caused by the v^ar. It was closed by the Minister of the Interior, who found that the little libraries organized by the said society for sick and wounded soldiers contained books and pamphlets which, although approved by the Censor, were none the less " too Liberal " in tendency. II Where was the money for the war to be found ? We have seen that the financial situation of the Russian State before the war was by no means brilliant. The war could only make it still more difficult. " The war which broke out during the latter half of the year— the greatest and most difficult, in respect of the mobilized means and forces, of all the wars that Russia has ever waged— calls for an unprecedented strain on the resources of the State Treasury," said the Minister of Finances, describing the situation in his report on the Budget Estimates of 191 5. At the same time the war forced the Government to prohibit the sale of alcohol, thereby depriving it of its greatest source of revenue. To fill the enormous deficiency in the Budget and to cover the cost of the war the Government took the following measures :— IN THE BLOODY FRAY 163 In the first place, it sought to limit the ordi- nary expenditure already settled by the Budget of 19 14. This limit was fixed at 300 million roubles. Then it issued various internal and foreign loans, for a short term : notably the loan of July 23rd (old style) which amounted to 40 million roubles ; the loan of August 22nd, of 300 million roubles ; the loan of October 3rd, of 400 million roubles ; the loan of October 6th, of 400 million roubles, plus 114 millions placed in England : making a total of 1,714 millions in two and a half months. To this sum we must add 500 millions of "floating reserves" and a balance of 180 millions not expended by the Ministers of War and the Marine (referring to the Budget of the preceding year), and we have a total of 2,500 million roubles, placed at the dis- posal of the State during the first two and a half months of the war. As for the monetary circulation, it was, accord- ing to the Minister of Finances, in no immediate danger. The legislation voted by the Duma on the 8th of August, 19 14, enabled the State Bank to issue notes not covered by the metallic funds to the amount of 1,500 million roubles. The reserve gold at the moment when war was declared was 1,700 million roubles, and — so stated the Minister of Finances in the Duma — the total issue of the Bank was thereby more than half covered. " In Germany," continued the 164 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 'i 1 V Minister, " the legal metallic guarantee in time of peace is only one-third. Our guarantee is therefore superior even in time of war." In saying this the Russian Minister of Finances doubtless fell into an exaggeration ; we cannot deny that the financial and monetary system of Germany is more solid than that of Russia, as this solidity is not guaranteed merely by the " floating reserves " of the Treasury, but by the entire wealth of the country. We cannot even approximately calculate what the war will cost Russia. The specialists do not always agree in their solutions of this problem. The Petrograd professor M. Friedmann states that the war is costing 20 to 30 million roubles per diem, or 600 to 8 00 million roubles per month, and that in six months Russia would spend 3,500 to 5,000 million roubles. Another Russian expert calculates the mamtenance of the Army, during the war, to cost 3 roubles per soldier per diem. For an army of 7 million men this would mean 21 million roubles per diem, or 630 million roubles per month. In his report on the Budget Estimates for 191 5 the Minister of Finances stated that "it is extremely difficult to form an opinion as to the general extent of the extraordinary expenditure in time of war, as one cannot tell how long the war will last, and I do not consider that I have the right to divulge any approximate calculations of the necessary expenditure." ;V IN THE BLOODY FRAY 165 But one thing we can affirm : the ordinary resources of the Russian Treasury cannot cover this expenditure — above all, when we consider that many of these resources are diminished by the war, which has checked the commercial ex- change of Russia and the outer world, depriving the State of its customs, revenues, etc. To cover the deficit the Government has taken the measure familiar to it : has commenced to increase the burden of taxation. The augmenta- tion of the direct taxes should yield, in 191 5, a surplus of 87 million roubles in comparison with previous years ; the augmentation of the indirect taxes (taxes on sugar, matches, petroleum, tobacco, etc.) should yield 95 million roubles; the increased railway tariffs are expected to pro- vide 228 million roubles ; and so on. The total increase in all taxes, etc., may in 191 5 yield a surplus of 500 million roubles of extra revenue. But as the mere prohibition of the sale of alcohol will occasion a loss of 650 million roubles, it will be understood that the Government has to seek fresh sources of revenue. If Russia had possessed a popular and democratic Government, the latter might no doubt have found the necessary resources for the prosecution of the war ; it might, for instance, have confiscated the useless properties and funds of convents and churches, have monopolized the mines and oil- wells, and established a progressive and pro- 166 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR portional tax on private property, etc. But Tsarism, the friend of the rich and the privileged, is not willing to take such simple measures as these. It prefers to increase the indirect taxes, which are taxes on poverty, and it appeals to the allied nations for money. And I must con- fess that the form of the requests which Russia has addressed to France and England is not always precisely . . . correct. For example, the two well-known Russian economists Profes- sors Migulin and Goldstein^ demonstrating that it was the duty of France and England to provide money for the war, employed arguments which might almost be regarded as a species of skilful blackmail. " Our objects in this war do not coincide with the objects of our Allies," argued one of these professors in his articles. " For France and England the principal enemy is Germany, while for us it is Austria. After the occupation of Galicia we can confine ourselves to defensive tactics, while for our Allies it is necessary that we should continue an offensive against Germany. But an offensive war costs far more than a defensive war, and if our Allies wish our army to continue the offensive war they must give us the money for the organization of such a war." Such arguments as these I find extremely dis- gusting ; the reader might suppose that the Russian Army is a horde of mercenaries which IN THE BLOODY FRAY 167 will fight in this or that fashion, according to the amount of money which the Russian Govern- ment may receive for its services. Such a sup- position would be an unthinkable insult to the Russian people, and no Russian democrat would accept responsibility for the professors' argu- ments. In the far from reassuring picture of the financial situation of Russia during the war there is yet one bright spot. I refer to the prohibition of the sale of vodka. And it must be understood that the initiative of this measure came from the people itself. E.or a long time the more thoughtful elements of the population have demanded the cessation of the sale of alcohol by the State. But the Government ignored these demands, and continued to draw hundreds of millions of roubles from the intoxica- tion and brutalization of the masses of the people, taking no notice of the resolutions forwarded by the municipalities and rural communes concern- ing the abolition of the vodka trafific. The only means of action remaining to those who strove to combat alcoholism was a moral propaganda. And in this connection we have of late years witnessed an interesting phenomenon : in the various Russian cities " abstainers' clubs " have been formed, managed by bratzy, or " little brothers," whose members give a solemn promise to abstain from the consmnption of alcoholic 168 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR drinks. " This movement had a slightly mystical or sectarian character," writes a Russian pub- licist.' And for some years the moral impulse of this propaganda has opposed itself to the policy of popular alcoholization practised by Tsarism for many years past. The criticism of the Democratic press, the protests of labour organi- zations, medical societies, etc., have finally over- come the resistance of the Government, and on the 3 I St of J anuary, 1 9 1 4, a rescript of the Tsar was published which ordered local administrators to take into consideration the will of the people as expressed in the resolutions concerning the suppression of the vodka traffic, and to close the vodka shops where the population so demanded. After the publication of this Imperial rescript a wave of anti -alcoholic propaganda swept through all Russia. Between February and July of 1 9 1 4 one-tenth of the total number of vodka- shops maintained by the State were closed by the wish of the local population. In certain districts the movement was remarkable in its dimensions ; in the Government of Riazan no less than 309 vodka-shops out of a total of 391 were closed, or 79 per cent. On the I 7th and 1 8th of J uly (old style), when the Russian Army was being mobilized, the sale of alcoholic drinks was discontinued over practi- ' A Borissov, in the review Rousskiya Zapiski^ Petrograd, November, 19 14. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 169 cally the entire territory of the Empire. But this was only a temporary measure, and the Government had the intention of recommencing its disastrous trade after a brief period of delay. However, the people, seizing a favourable moment and pretext, expressed its desire to see the sale of vodka completely discontinued. Labour associations, municipalities, zemstvos, rural communes, and co-operative societies de- manded that the sale of alcohol should be pro- hibited " for the whole duration of the war, and if possible for ever." The Government was once more forced to give way before the popular pressure. On the 1 6th of August the Russian journals published an official communication according to which the Enxperor " indicated to the Minister of Finances that the existing situation demanded a change in the point of view concerning the means tending to the diminution of alcoholism, and that in place of palliatives the question of more decisive measures must be confronted — notably the ques- tion of a reconstruction of the whole Budget on the basis of a gradual elimination therefrom of the enormous revenues derived from the monopoly of alcohol." The Ministry of Finances conducted an inquiry into the results of the temporary suppression of the sale of alcohol. In Moscow, according to the data of the examining magistrates, " the 170 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR number of crimes and misdemeanours in common law for the period included between the 17th of July and the 13th of August had diminished by 47 per cent, compared with the normal." In the city of Simbirsk " the criminality diminished by one-half ; in Orel by 80 per cent. ; in Odessa by 75 per cent. ; and in Kostroma by 95 per cent." Industrial employers stated that " the suppres- sion of wine-shops has increased the productivity of labour." This fact is verified by one of the contributors to the Journal des Debuts. " In the Russian factories and foundries," he writes, " the returns of labour very sensibly increased [after the suppression of the sale of alcohol]. In this respect figures are cited which we have not the courage to reproduce, so great is the difference between the two sets of figures. But in a coal- mine with which we are well acquainted the verified increase in the yield is fifteen per cent. The figures for Monday's work, which used to be bad in the extreme, are now normal." In spite of all these facts the superior financial bureaucrats were ill -pleased by the suppression of the drink traffic, which had yielded them ample revenues. A member of the Einance Committee, M. Migulin, asserted in his articles that " the absolute suppression of the sale of alcoholic drinks will probably not be successful if it is long persisted in," etc. But the people continued IN THE BLOODY FRAY 171 its protests against alcoholism. The jury of one of the provincial Courts of Assizes inserted in one of its verdicts the declaration that alcoholism is one of the principal causes of crime. " Drink- ing," it said, " is worse than the present war. The devastation of war can be repaired, but nothing can be expected of alcoholism save a general peril." On the 22nd of August an ordinance of the Tsar was published relating to the suppression of the sale of alcohol and alcoholic drinks " until the end of the war." A month later — on the 28th of September — at a meeting of the " Union of Christian Abstainers of Russia " a telegram from the Tsar to the president of the Union was read in which Nicholas II made the declara- tiom. " I have already decided to suppress for ever the sale of vodka by the State in Russia." A few groups of manufacturers — distillers, wine- merchants, etc.— attempted to protest against the suppression of the drink traffic. But the press put them in their place. " No compromises, no half -measures. . . . The ruin of whole branches of industry ? So be it ! What else can be done ? Ought we to poison the people in order to benefit the revenues of 3,000 distillers of vodka and a few thousand owners of vineyards and breweries ? Can we compare the losses of the distillers, owners of vineyards, and breweries, with the 172 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR great and net profit which will accrue to Russia from her complete sobriety? "^ Drawing up the general profit and loss account of the abolition movement, a Russian publicist wrote as follows :— " One of the melancholy peculiarities of Russian life consists of the extreme contrast between the interests and opinions of the laborious population on the one hand and those of the ruling classes on the other. . . . And here, suddenly, instead of contrasts we see an unlooked-for harmony. In their opinions con- cerning alcoholism, in their aspirations towards the purifying of their daily existence of bruta- lizing drunkenness, the masses of the labouring people are at one with the obvious and over- whelming majority of the propertied classes. And this agreement gives birth to an imposing power. . . . The forces of the Government appear to form a solidarity with the forces of society and of the people ... it would seem that there is no room for doubt . . . this time the war against alcoholism must be victorious." - " Unhappily," adds the same writer, " the Government programme includes no creative measures." To consummate the renascence of the life and energies of the Russian people, it ' In the review Gorodskoie Dielo (" Municipal Work "), Petrograd, 1914, No. 18. ' A. Borissov, in the article already cited. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 173 is not enough to forbid the consumption of vodka ; to accomphsh this the whole system of the State must be reformed, and all the conditions of popular existence. Ill Having granted certain concessions to society, having abolished the drink traffic, which had so long poisoned the body and soul of the people, Tsarism doubtless believed that all its political and moral obligations were fulfilled. It even began to reward itself for making these con- cessions by reinforcing the restrictive measures affecting other domains of the life of its sub- jects. Ijnmediately after war was declared the Government suppressed the entire opposition press — even the very moderate section thereof. For instance, the journal Retch, the organ of moderate Liberalism, was suppressed, and its editors were compelled to humiliate themselves by a " repentance " and a promise to obey the Government, in order to redeem the right to publish their journal. All the Labour journals, and the majority of the " alien " journals (Ukrainian, Lettish, etc.) were suppressed. Many labour associations, trades unions, work- ing-men's clubs, and other societies were broken up. Searches were made in the houses of persons who were " suspect " (not as spies, 174 RUSSIA AND THE GKEAT WAR but on account of their political convictions), while numerous arrests and deportations com- pleted the picture. The Russian Government was not willing to follow the good example afforded by the Govern- ments of the other belligerent countries, all of which proclaimed an amnesty for political offenders. While inviting the citizens to for- get the " intestine discords " of the country, the Russian Government itself forgot nothing, but left the prisons and penal establishments full of prisoners at the very moment when the brothers of those prisoners were marching to the front to die for their country. If the moral of the army is to be strong and healthy, the moral of the whole people should be so. But by continuing its political persecutions the Russian Government, instead of facilitating the heavy task of the Army, rendered it more difffcult. The story of the arrest of M, Bourtzev, the famous writer on provocation, shows us how destitute is the Russian Government of elemen- tary tact. Bourtzev, after the declaration of war and the pubhcation of the proclamation to the Poles, believed in the " liberalism " of the Government, and began to preach to the revolu- tionaries and political emigres the necessity of a reconciliation with Tsarism. To prove the sincerity of his ideas and his confidence in the Government, he left the foreign country in which IN THE BLOODY FRAY 175 he had for some years been living as a political refugee, and went to Russia^ hoping to be of use to his country during the difficult period of the war. Directly he reached the Russian frontier Bourtzev was arrested and thrown into prison, and after some months' confinement he was tried and condemned to deportation for life to Siberia for the crime of lese-majeste — that is, for writing a few articles in which he expressed his opinion of the Tsar with insufficient respect. A still more painful impression was produced upon the entire Russian democracy by the arrest of five working-men deputies of the Social - Democratic Party. The pretext given for this arrest was that the police had discovered in the rooms of one of these deputies the manuscript of a proposed resolution concerning the revolu- tionary propaganda in the Army. But this pretext was completely futile, for the mere possession by a deputy of a proposed resolution, which might have been sent to him by goodness knows whom, cannot in general be regarded as a crime ; and in this particular case this anti-militarist docu- ment was sent to the deputies from across the frontier, by a small, irresponsible group of men who did not represent any party organization, and who had distributed this manuscript resolution among the Russian Socialist emigres long before the arrest of the deputies. Moreover, the tenor of the document, whose irresponsible authors 176 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR spoke of the necessity of transferring the revo- lutionary propaganda to the field of battle, was so inoffensive in its complete stupidity that every- body readily realized that no serious politician could possibly have taken it seriously. The absurdity of the arrest of these five depu- ties was so obvious tha.t it gave rise to discontent even among the Octobrists, who justly reproached the Government with disturbing, by its own actions, the " national imion " to which it was summoning the people. At first the Government wished to hand the five deputies to the military authorities and to cause them to be tried by court martial (for high treason, etc.), but the President of the Duma, according to the journal Nache Slovo,^ was able to prevent this act of stupidity. None the less the deputies remain in prison, and will be cited before the ordinary courts, which will no doubt condemn them, although they are " guilty " of nothing. 2 I need not here enumerate other arbitrary ' A Russian daily published in Paris, No. 3, 1915. = After these lines were written the news came from Russia that the five deputies were condemned to deportation to Siberia. And why? Not on account of "treason," of which the Public Prosecutor accused them, but because they were members of the Social-Democratic Party. Here is a proof of the absurdity of the present political system of Russia. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma is lawful, but the party to which it belongs is illegal ! Social- Democratic deputies cannot be arrested and deported as such, but they may be deported as members of an illegal party ! IN THE BLOODY FRAY 177 actions on the part of the Government which have been committed since the declaration of war. One such action is like another ; there is nothing new about them. But I should like to draw my readers' attention to one particular circum- stance. The Russian journal Golos (' The Voice "), published in Paris, stated, in its Petro- grad letter, that there was a moment at the begin- ning of the war when Tsarism was ready to make great concessions in its domestic policy. This was the moment when Germany had already declared war upon Russia, but when the final decision of England was not yet known. The Russian Government was afraid to face Germany alone, and was conscious of its weakness ; it was anxious to win the sympathies of its people. With this object in view it was actually on the -p©int of issuing a constitutional manifesto more comprehensive than that of October 30th, 1905, but at the very last moment it received the assurance that England would join in the war, and, its external situation being strengthened, Tsarism no longer thought it necessary to make concessions to the people, and the manifesto was not issued. It is the greatest pity that the French and English Governments have not brought pressure to bear upon the Russian Government, with a view to compelling it to cease its reactionary policy. Such pressure would be justified, not only 12 178 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR from the humanitarian point of view, but also from the point of view of our Allies' own in- terests ; for all that weakens the Russian people during the war also weakens our Allies. CHAPTER IV I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nationalities of the Russian Empire before the international war. — II. The Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles become Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — IV. The Ukraine. — V. Finland. — VI. The position of the Jews. Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist problem in the Baltic Provinces. I More than twenty different nations and races inhabit the territory of the Russian Empire. The complexity of the national composition of the Russian populace gives rise to serious difficul- ties, even in time of peace. In times of inter- national tension, and especially in time of war, it is a hundred times more embarrassing. This fact was officially stated by the ex-Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, who wrote in his con- fidential report for 1900 that " the extension of the frontiers of Russia in all directions has led Russia to occupy territories inhabited by various foreign and hostile nationalities. To-day the frontiers of the inner Russia are surroimded by populations which are only distantly allied to 179 180 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the Russian people ; and in this sense the frontiers of Russia were in 1900 less advan- tageous from a military point of view than they were in i 700." ' The political blindness of Tsarism and its Governmental incapacity still further complicated the dangerous situation in the frontier districts, whose populations, oppressed by the Russian reaction, manifested a great and well-justified discontent. Yet although the General Staffs of Germany and Austria counted on this discontent as a support to their strategical operations, they were completely disappointed and disillusioned. The great majority of the " alien " populations of Russia remained faithful to her, and their loyalty was so great and so sincere that the Russian Government itself must have been astonished thereby. II In the Duma, during the session of the 8th of August 19 1 4, the leaders of the various national groups, one by one, ascended the tribune to proclaim their fidelity to Russia. Among all these henceforth historical declara- tions that which produced the greatest impression was that of the Polish kolo (circle), in whose name the deputy Yaronski declared : — ^ Cited from my "Modern Russia," second edition, p. 214. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 181 " At this historic moment, when Slavism and the Germanic world, led by our ancient enemy, Prussia, meet in a fatal shock, the situation of the Polish people, deprived of its independence and the possibility of freely manifesting its will, appears a tragic one. This tragedy resides, not only in the fact that our country is the theatre of the war and all its horrors, but also in this : that the Polish people, torn into three parts, will see its sons in each of the hostile camps. " Although territorially divided, we must, with our Slav sentiments and sympathies, form a single whole. This policy is not only dictated by the justice of the cause in which Russia has intervened, but also by our political reason. The world-wide importance of the events through which we are passing should relegate to the second place all domestic matters. " Please God, Slavism, under the supremacy of Russia, will deal the Teutons such a blow as was dealt them at Griinwalden five hundred years ago by Poland and Lithuania. May the blood we shall spill and the horrors of a war which for us is fratricidal lead to the reunion of the three portions of the sundered Polish people." In connection with this declaration of the Polish representatives in the Duma, we must in the first place lay stress on the fact that it was made when the proclamation of the Russian 182 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR generalissimo had not yet been issued. Secondly, we must note that the ideas expressed in the declaration of the Polish deputies are shared by the majority of the nobles and the bourgeoisie, and a great part of the peasantry of Russian Poland. It was not merely an expression of the opinion of politicians and parliamentarians, but the true sentiment of the propertied classes of Poland. This " Russo-Polish " patriotism and this hatred of the Germans manifest themselves in the most unexpected ways. The Polish public, in the theatres of Warsaw, demanded the performance of the Russian National Anthem by the orchestra, and the Polish ladies offered flowers to the Russian soldiers leaving Warsaw for the front. It is said that the greatest of Polish writers, Sienkievicz, expressed his feelings concerning the present war in a distinctly " Russophile " manner ; and the best known of the Polish poets, modem, M. Micinski, went to Moscow especially for the purpose of promoting a Russo- Polish propaganda in that city. Russian society was amazed by all these facts, and one of the leading Russian poets, M . Brusov, expressed the feelings which arose within him at the sight of this astonishing spectacle in a little poem entitled " Warsaw " :— For the first time I solitary tread, Joyful of heart, the streets of Warsaw town ; The bloody dream, the dreadful fame, are dead : The fatal years no longer weigh me down. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 183 They were ! But no ! — they have not passed away : The centuries' work one moment may not mine. And yet, may be, the work begins to-day : To-day the sun in heaven is for a sign. Oh, may it shine indeed to mark this day Whereon our voices found a brother's speech ; All that till now our tongues refused to say, All that we cherished dumbly out of reach. Not on a strait and narrow path we meet As poet meeting poet ; I have come Down the broad highway on these Russian feet, And as a Russian I was welcomed home ! And in the streets the shouts about me ring Like verses of a poem chiming true. And Polish women autumn's blossoms bring To Russia's joyous warriors marching through ! Another well-known Russian poet, M. Bal- "mont, has written, on the same subject, a poem entitled " The Carnival of Blood " :— Soil of Russia, soil of Poland, Land of Poland, land of Russia ! I behold you, visions so familiar ! Yonder blows the wind and drives the snow ! O forests, marshes, meadows, plains ! The storm whistles; the rumbling of falling grenades, The shrill of the shrapnel, the rumble and clamour Roaring death's carnival song, prolonging his hour ! Oh, how long is his hour ! What a world of blood Destiny yet has to drink, ere at length The goblet of ruddy wine is drained to the lees ! Yet not for ever shall her brows be knit : One day a Spring undreamed of shall come to us, Russia with Poland ; oh, holy, virgin lands ! 184 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR But, to tell the truth, what appeared to poets remote from political life as a " day of be- ginning " and "an undreamed-of spring" was really no more than a day of reckoning, of drawing up a historical balance-sheet, and those who have attentively analysed the economic and social evolution of Russian Poland will not be surprised by all these phenomena. The process of capitalistic development has united Poland to Russia by the indestructible bonds of commercial exchange. The annual produce of the factories and workshops of Poland represents a value of I, coo million roubles, and two-thirds of this is consumed by the Russian market. And in spite of all the errors and horrors of the policy of reactionary Tsarism, the forces of economic evolution have cleared the ground for a new ideology, as far as the propertied classes in Poland are concerned. This new ideology manifests itself to-day in this " Russo-Polish " patriotism, which at times perhaps seems even too Russophile and too enthusiastic. As for the poorer classes of Polish society, as for the proletariat, the political tendencies of this, the most revolutionary element of modern Poland, are of another kind. For a long time now the more thoughtful of the Polish workers have abandoned the idea of a Polish war of independence, and have dreamed rather of a conflict of classes. There is only one very IN THE BLOODY FRAY 185 small group of Polish Socialists which holds a different opinion ; this group, even before the war, vas conducting a propaganda inciting to a national insurrection of the Poles against Russia. But this propaganda had no success among the populace— firstly, because its Utopian character was too obvious, and secondly, because the propaganda was supported by the Austrian Government. Here is the proof of the latter assertion. In the month of October 19 12 the committee at the head of this little group of Socialists pub- lished, in Warsaw, a secret proclamation, in which the possibility of a coming war between Austria and Russia was referred to, and which offered advice to all Polish patriots in Russia to be followed in the event of war. This advice was as follows : — 1 . In the event of the mobilization of the Russian Army, " the appeal to the citizens [relative to the mobilization^ will be distri- buted as generally as possible. 2. "As to all those comrades who have suffered the misfortune of being mobilized, or who are incorporated in the Russian Army, we recommend them above all to conduct a propa- ganda in favour of revolutionary ideas among the troops. We do not recommend them to provoke a revolt, because under these circum- stances the revolt would be useless. Should 186 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR war break out, no matter with whom, we advise you to injure Russia by all possible means. For instance, all kinds of weapons of war, instru- ments, means of transport, munitions of war, telegraphs, telephones, etc., must be destroyed. Fulfil your duty as a soldier deliberately and at your ease, so that you may at length desert and allow yourself to be taken prisoner, so that you may give the enemy's army full information concerning the Russian Army." ' When I tell you that the " Socialist " Com- mittee which gave such advice to the Polish " patriots " in Russia performed its functions under the benevolent protection of the Austrian Government, and that the armed " legions " which it organized were organized with the authorization of the Austrian police, you will understand that we are dealing, not with Polish socialism, but simply with the interests of the Hapsburg dynasty, which were mistaken for the interests of " Polish independence " by a few naive individuals who dreamed of the liberty of Poland, but could not realize that dream by their own action, and therefore decided to become the tools of the Austrian policy. But this " Austrian orientation " of Polish patriotism did not enjoy any success among the ^ See the circular of the Polish Socialist Party published in Warsaw in October 191 2. Quoted from the Bidleiifi periodique du Bureau Socialiste International, third year, No. 9, pp. 18-19. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 187 masses of the people in Russian Poland. The great majority of the Polish working-men Socialists understood that such a propaganda, which really favoured the organization of a " patriotic " military espionage in the Russian Army for the benefit of the Austrian Army, had nothing in common with the aims and strivings of the Socialists. To the appeal of the Austro- Polish patriots the most influential labour organizations of Russian Poland — those of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Jewish Bund— replied that they did not accept the idea of an " Austrian orientation " and that " the " proletariat of Poland conformed, in its revolutionary policy, with that of the Russian proletariat." ' I happened to obtain an interview with a well- known Polish Socialist who remained in Poland during the first months of the war. He described the mood of the Polish working-classes in the following terms : " When the workers in Poland hear rumours of a labour movement in Petro- grad or elsewhere in Russia they are greatly interested— as much so as if had been in Poland —while if they are told anything about the Polish ^ See the declarations of the " Labour Council " of Warsaw and of the Central Committees of the four principal Socialist organizations in Poland published since the beginning of the war. Cited from the Russian edition of the Bulletin of the Bund, January 191 5, No. 7, p. 11. 188 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR workers in Cracow they remain almost indifferent." This is a manifestation of the results of that historic process which has welded Russia and Poland into one economic organism and has created a solid basis for the community of interests of the Polish and Russian proletariats. And by one of the ironies of history the very Socialist labour movement which was always so persecuted by Tsarism is at present, objectively speaking, playing a part which is extremely use- ful in preserving the integrity and unity of the Russian State. Naturally, the revolutionary proletariat of Poland, as well as that of Russia, does not wish to preserve the Russian State in its present form, with an autocracy, a system of government by police, etc. It desires to transform it into a democratic State, but by means of its own efforts, and not by the help of the German and Austrian monarchies. Not with Austria and Germany against Russia, but with the Russian people against the Russian reaction— such is the creed of the best and most thoughtful elements of the popular masses in Poland. Ill If we now turn our attention from Poland to the Caucasus — or rather to the Trans-Causasian region— we shall there find a political situation IN THE BLOODY FRAY 189 analogous in many ways txD that existing in Poland. In the Trans -Caucasian country there is a people as unfortunate as the Polish, or perhaps even more unfortunate ; for while Poland has been divided among three European States, all more or less civilized, Armenia has been divided between three States, of which one— Russia— is half-Europeanized, while the other two— Persia and Turkey—were and still are almost completely barbarous. Every one remembers the horrors of the Armenian massacres organized by the Turks— not only by the Old Turks in the days of the Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, but more recently also by the Young Turks, the friends of the German Emperor. Read the works of Armenian writers, and your heart will be filled with mortal anguish before these terrible visions of death and devastation which haunt the echoing palace in which the poetic Muse of Armenian letters dwells :— " The demons play at ball with the skulls of men of genius ; children devour the grass which has grown from their fathers' ashes ; maidens wear on their opulent bosoms the roses which have blossomed above the earth of the grave ; and the monstrous bats of Death fan with their wings the parchment visage of humanity. The rapacious vultures tear with fury the quivering heart of the peasant, and greedily drink his warm 190 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR blood ; the iron shoes of the horses sink into bleeding trunks or crush the skulls of the wounded." Such is the grisly aspect under which the world appears in the eyes of one of the best- known Armenian writers, M. Avetis Aharonian.' " Who does not weep in our country? " he cries in another of his tragic tales. " My heart is wounded, mangled, rent. There is no room for another knife, another arrow : to make fresh wounds in it is no longer possible. ... Its blood is a boiling sea upon the brazier of my sorrow ! " It is thus that an old Armenian woman, one of whose sons was " torn in pieces " by the Turks, while the other perished in fight, laments before the image of the Mother of God. All the history of Armenia, all her sorrows and sufferings, speak to us in the prayers of this old woman. After the dethronement of Abdul Hamid and the Young Turk " revolution " the Armenians of Turkey looked for an amelioration of their pain- ful situation, but their hopes were disappointed, and it is not surprising that the advent of a great international conflict and the beginning of the Russo-Turkish hostilities was welcomed by the Armenian people as the dawn of freedom. ' A. Aharonian, " Towards Liberty." A French translation was published in Paris in 191 2 \ IN THE BLOODY FRAY 191 It is true that in Russia the Armenians are not yet free, any more than the other peoples of the Tsar's Empire, the Russian included. But in spite of the Tsarist reaction, the conditions of the Armenians in Turkish Russia were not so terrible as those of their brothers in Turkey, especially of late years, since the Tsar's lieu- tenant in the Caucasus, Count Vorontzov- Dachkov, has endeavoured to win the sympathies of the Armenian middle classes, in order to oppose them to the separatist movement on the one hand and the Turcophile propaganda on the other. The Armenian bourgeoisie was very willing to conclude a pact with the Russian Government, as its economic interests pushed it towards union with Russia. As the coal of Dombrova, the stuffs of Lodz, and other Polish products sold in the Russian market prepared the ground for Russophile sentiments among the propertied classes of Poland, so the petroleum of Baku and the products of the Caucasian mines exploited by the Armenian bourgeoisie have drawn them into contact with the economic organism of the Russian State and have made them almost Russophile. But I will make way for an Armenian patriot and democrat publicist, M. Varandian, who in December 19 14 wrote the following lines con- cerning the Russo -Armenian relations and the hopes of his people :— 192 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " The ancient Armenian race, which for many centuries was in the vanguard of civiHzation in Asia, and which, after losing its pohtical mdependence in the fourteenth century, was, like Poland, divided among three powerful monarchies, must now recover its autonomy in order the better to accomplish its traditional mission, that of an intermediary agent between the East and the West." So reason the publicists favourable to the cause of Armenia. Has not the Tsar himself, in his recent manifesto, promised his " dear Armenians " to restore their liberties? And now —great event !— Nicholas II himself visits the Caucasus, for the first time since his corona- tion (in 1894). He goes to the Armenian cathedral in Tiflis, addresses the aged patriarchs, and exhorts his subjects of whatever nationality faithfully to serve the great Russian fatherland. Then he turns toward the frontier, traversing the great centres of Russian Armenia, until he reaches Sarykamich. Never has the Tzar journeyed so far in these domains ; the curiosity and surprise are general. At ordinary times the Autocrat of All the Russias would not have dared to approach these formidable centres of Caucasian Carbonarism. . . . A wave of enthusiasm swept Russian Armenia from end to end ; the Armenian volunteers came forward by thousands ; among them were IN THE BLOODY FRAY 193 hundreds of students at the Universities of Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev. Corps were organized in the University towns of France and Switzerland. While their co-religionists on the other side of the frontier were loyally doing their duty by the Russian State, the Armenians of the Caucasus lent their aid to the Russian troops, in order to free their country from the Ottoman yoke. For a moment they had put their hopes in Young Turkey, in the internal regeneration of the Turkish Empire ; but the ultranationalist policy of Enver Bey and Talaat Bey, and, above all, the terrible tragedy of Adana, plainly demon- strated to the blindest that Old and Young Turkey were much the same, and that there could be no safety for a Christian people under Turkish rule. At the same time there was a reversal of the Armenian policy towards Russia, thanks to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Count Vorontzov- Dachkov. The old policy of violent Russi- fication was abandoned ; it had never met with success, and only ended in an Armenian revolu- tion (1903). An able and intelligent man, the aged Vorontzov-Dachkov understood the great importance of Armenia to Russia— Armenia, " that sole oasis in the vast Mussulman desert." Will this new orientation of the Russian policy in Armenia be lasting? Will the promises of 13 194 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR liberty be kept? Sceptics refer to the lament- able precedents; neither in 1826, at the time of the Russo -Persian War, in which the whole population of Armenia took part, with the Arch- bishop of Tiflis at its head, nor in 1878, at the time of the Russo-Turkish War, which was conducted by Armenian generals (the com- mander-in-chief himself, Loris-Melikov, being an Armenian, and later on Minister and dictator of Russia), were the hopes of Armenia fully realized. This distrust, which is very natural, was swept away by the enthusiasm engendered by the war against Turkey, and the Armenian democracy is morally and materially giving its support to Russia in this great conflict. IV We must now deal with the Jewish problem as it affects the present war. The situation of the Russian Jews is extremely painful, even at ordinary times, for among all the oppressed and unfortunate elements of the Russian population the Jewish race is the most unfortunate and most severely oppressed. " In Russia the domination of the aristocracy and the absolute monarchy has survived more completely than in any other capitalist country ; and this feudal and absolutist domination, as we IN THE BLOODY FRAY 195 know, finds its chief point of support in a policy of religious intolerance, racial hatred, and oppression of racial minorities : a policy which weighs more heavily on the Jews than on any other of the subject peoples of the Empire. Tied hand and foot by various ' laws of exception ' and by the arbitrary rule of the bureaucracy, the Jew, who is subject to educa- tional restrictions which make it impossible for him to receive the same instruction as that received by other members of the Empire, and for whom the famous ' line of residence ' or Pale was instituted, which prevents him from moving about in search of livelihood — the Jew is more closely acquainted than any . with poverty and ruin." I Add to this the pogroms organized by the " Black Bands " and encouraged by the superior bureaucracy ; remember the famous " ritual murders " invented by the Russian reaction and stage-managed, as far as the law is concerned, by the Ministry of Justice itself, and you will be of the same opinion as the author just quoted, and will repeat with him : — " The position of the Jews in Russia is altogether exceptional . The contemporary history of the European peoples knows nothing like it." Yet when war was declared the Jewish popu- lation of Russia showed, for the most part, that ^ L. Hersch, Le Juif Erra7it d'aujourdhui^ Paris, 1913. 196 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it was greatly attached to its country, although Russia is but a cruel stepmother to her Jewish children. In all the towns and cities of the " zone of residence " or Jewish Pale there were great patriotic demonstrations : the Jews march- ing through the streets with the rolls of the sacred Torah and the national flag, and even the portrait of the Tsar. The superior Jewish bourgeoisie contributed largely to the collections made for the victims of the war, and among the young Jews a propaganda was carried out in favour of voluntary enlistment in the Russian Army. This attitude on the part of the Jews astonished even the Russian anti-Semites, whose too notorious leader, M. Purishkevitch, expressed this astonishment in the following phrase : — " I never thought the Jews were so amiable ! " Some of the anti-Semites tried to compromise this strange patriotism by explaining it by the fear of pogroms. But this miserable explana- tion does not tally with the facts. The truth is that the economic interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie are one factor, and the psychological effect of the war upon the Jewish intellectuals is another. What are the economic interests which give rise to Russian patriotism among the Russian Jews in spite of all the sufferings of the Jews in Russia? We shall find a reliable answer to this question in an article from the pen of a IN THE BLOODY FRAY 197 Jewish publicist which appeared in a Russian journal : — " The very motives which determine the patriotic and warlike feeling of the middle classes of the various nationalities in Russia apply absolutely to the Jewish bourgeoisie. An advantageous commercial treaty with Germany, the possession of the Dardanelles, or at least their neutralization, the supremacy of Russian exports in the markets of Western Asia and the Balkans, and, finally, the economic development of the whole Empire— all that the Russian bourgeoisie hopes to win from the war— is also the subject of the ' patriotic hopes ' of the Jewish bourgeoisie in Russia. For the latter, although the racial stnjggle, thanks to economic compe- tition, is increasingly bitter in middle-class circles, is none the less of one flesh with the Pan-Russian bourgeoisie, and is bound to it by a community of economic interests and aspira- tions. Especially in the industrial regions of the Pale, where the Jewish bourgeoisie plays a very considerable part, does this co -unity of interests manifest itself most fully. In the south and south-west of Russia in particular the Jewish bourgeoisie plays a very important part in the corn trade with Germany, and desires victory over the latter in order that after the war a Russo -German treaty may be concluded in the interests of the grain exporters. 198 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The committees of the Exchanges at Ekatermo- slav, Nikolaev, and Odessa express these aspira- tions . Still greater are the hopes of the industrial and commercial employers of the south, and there are many Jews among them ; these antici- pate victory in the Near East. In another great industrial region— Poland— the Jewish bourgeoisie plays a considerable part in a highly developed commercial exchange with Germany, and the question of a commercial treaty with the latter country is of vital interest to it. On the other hand^ in its industrial and commercial activities the Jewish bourgeoisie of this region, as well as the Polish bourgeoisie, has relations with the markets of the whole of Russia. A Zionist organ, the Razsviet, which is by no means inclined to exaggerate the economic ties binding the Jews to Russia, states in this connection : ' The economic interests of the Jews in Poland have of late bound the Jews more and more closely to Russia, and the prospect of the separation of Poland from Russia, or of its annexation to this or that neigh- bouring State, would for them mean complete impoverishment .' " We perceive the very motives at work here which compel the Polish bourgeoisie to assume a negative position in respect of what is known as the ' Austrian orientation.' " ' ^ See the Russian journal Golos, 1914. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 199 Such is the present mentahty of the mass of the Jewish bourgeoisie in Russia. As for the lower middle-class Jews, who constitute the majority of the Jewish population of Russia, they will be found— so asserts the publicist already cited— to be under the ideological influence of their wealthier brothers, on whom they are economically dependent. But the Jewish author I have quoted, while he justly estimates the economic factors of the patriotic attitude of the Jews in Russia, is almost silent as to the psychological aspect of the ques- tion. But it is essential to understand this aspect, above all, if we wish to understand the mental state of the intellectual Jews, many of whom believe that the present war was forced upon Russia, and that it is Russia's duty to defend herself against the brutal aggression of Germany. Unhappily, the stupid policy of the Government is damping the enthusiasm of these Jewish " patriots," and has created a psycho- logical tragedy which is well defined by the following private letter, which was published in the Russian press. The letter was written by a Jewish lady living in Petrograd :— " We are passing through a terrible time. Just think : it is human blood that is being shed ! It is horrible. We all of us felt so enthusiastic, and we are all cursing Wilhelm. Only one man— and so much blood, so many 200 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR tears on his account ! When the war was first declared we Jews were extraordinarily sincere in what we felt : all of us, literally, were ready to give everything— life and all— for our country. For each one of us, in some strange fashion, is attached to Russia and loves his native country. There were many volunteers : every- body wanted to volunteer in the Army, to sacri- fice himself and to give what he could, with a single heart. I personally often felt ashamed to think that I could so soon forget the Beiliss affair and all the humiliations and outrages- forget them so completely that I felt as if they had happened a long time ago, in other times. . . . But to-day we are being gradually brought back to a sense of reality, and we feel nothing but shame and sorrow after our enthusiasm. " It is true that the blood rushes to our hearts when we see our dear soldiers passing, or when we hear about them, or think of them ; but we are not left to dream ; they are forcing us to wake to a sense of reality. Already there is nothing left of our dreams ! We have awaked to the same injustice, the same humiliations and outrages, although there are nearly 400,000 Jews in the Russian Army, and among them many heroes who have already merited the Military Cross for their brave deeds. " All is as it was before ; the situation is even growing worse. ... It is terrible! At this IN THE BLOODY FRAY 201 moment, when one and all have their hearts full of feeling and their hands full of work, these cowards are nevertheless continually inventing fresh humiliations for the Jews. . . . No, if even now, in these terrible times, these gentry are capable of such a base and cowardly atti- tude, one cannot expect any decency from them. " S. made preparations to leave for the front, for the firing-line ; he wanted to enlist as a volunteer, to fight the Germans ; they refused him because he was a Jew. Then he entered for a course of instruction at the Samaritans' College, in order to go to the front as a nurse or ambulance-assistant ; he wished particularly to go right to the front, where the danger is greatest, where men can perhaps be of use who are willing to sacrifice their lives. But he is a Jew, and as a Jew it was impossible for him to go. At the present moment he and X. are organizing a military hospital and revictualling- station for soldiers at the extreme front ; he is working twenty hours a day, and when I call him back to reality by reading what the papers have to say of the new pleasantries, the new administrative measures affecting us Jews, he scolds us, telling us that we oughtn't to think of such things just now (but how can they humiliate us so at such a time ! ), and he afhrms, on his word of honour, that if he is not killed, and if the situation is the same after the war, 202 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR that he will leave Russia for ever ; but to-day he anticipates a better future and is ready to give his life. God grant that S. may be right, but at present our life is painful in the extreme. With all our hearts we desire to be patriots, but they won't let us ; they repulse us. Well, let God judge them ! " ^ While the Jewish " intellectuals " living in the interior of Russia are subjected to much moral suffering, the Jewish population of the famous Pale are the victims of indescribable physical suffering as well. On the i6th of January the Parisian journal L Humanlte published a remark- able appeal from the Jewish Labour Party in Russia. In this appeal of the Bund, entitled " To the Civilized World," we find an affecting description of their incredible sufferings :— " The theatre of war in Russia includes more particularly Poland and certain provinces of Lithuania, which form part of the Jewish Pale. The Jewish population of these regions is com- pletely ruined by the war, and a great portion of it is literally starving. " Thousands of Jews are forced to fly from destitution and the invaders. And here the solicitude of the Government gets to work. The Government allows no Jew to cross the limits of the Ghetto ; those who have succeeded in finding shelter in towns outside the Ghetto are ' See the journal Golos for the 26th of November, 19 14. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 203 arrested, punished, and sent back to their ruined homes. There are few exceptions to this rule, even for Jewish soldiers wounded on the battle- field, once they have left hospital. " European countries will learn with amaze- ment that while France, England, and Switzer- land are welcoming the Belgian refugees . . . the Russian Government refuses its own subjects the right of migration. . . . " But this is not all. . . . Soldiers de- moralized by the anti-Semite propaganda have in Poland organized a series of pogroms. The Jews are massacred and their property pillaged. Even in Lodz, that " Russian Manchester," boasting half a million inhabitants, there was during the Russian occupation a pogrom which lasted several days. The Jews of Poland are literally beyond the pale of the law. " In other localities . . . the forced exodus of Jews is accomplished under the most inhuman conditions. Thousands of wretched beings, men, women, and children, sick and well, drag them- selves on foot, sometimes for whole weeks, over the relatively short distance which divides them from the only town in which they can count on shelter— Warsaw. Children die on the road, women give birth to premature children . . . mothers lose their nurselings, and suddenly dis- cover, to their horror, that they are clasping empty shawls to their bosoms. . . . 204 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " Here is a quotation from a Petrograd journal : ' At two o'clock the road to Warsaw was covered by the Jewish population of Grodzisk. There were about 1,500 families, and of these nearly 300 were the families of soldiers with the Army. . . . Between five and six o'clock we came to Blone, twelve versts from Grodzisk. But they would not let us enter the village ... we had to go round it, across a flooded plain. W^e made litters, and so carried the women and children as far as the highway. . . . The night fell, cold and wet, the sticky mud retarding our steps, and we went painfully forward, insulted and sometimes searched by the soldiers. . . . One woman gave birth to a child ; another had a miscarriage ; another died by the roadside. . . .' " This is typical. LHumanite quotes another and similar account. And " directly the exiles have abandoned their belongings they are looted by soldiers and thieves ; not only shops, but private houses are sacked. " Such was the fate of the Jews of Grodzisk, Skemevitz, Sochatchov, Lovitch, Gura-Calvary, Novo-Alexandrovno, Cosennitz, Ivangorod, and many other towns. More than 100,000 refugees have sought an asylum in Warsaw. " The least pretext suffices to bring a Jew before a Council of War, which condemns him to death or hard labour ... if there is abso- IN THE BLOODY FRAY 205 lutely no proof . . . he is condemned to corporal punishment, and forbidden to live in the town during the period of the war. " And to explain these atrocities the authori- ties have invented a fresh calumny worthy of the famous Beiliss affair : the Jews would assist the Germans ! What amazing hypocrisy ! The Government has called more than 250,000 Jews to the colours. It awards medals to Jewish soldiers who have distinguished themselves in battle. The patriotic press. . . has often emphasized the patriotism of the Jewish people, its generous gifts, the number of Jewish volun- teers, etc. In a number of towns the Tsar has received Jewish delegates and has thanked the Jews for their ' devoted attachment.' . . . The object of the manoeuvre is obvious. The legend of ' Jewish treason,' created at a moment of supreme national excitement, a more effectual legend than that of the ' ritual murders,' ought to inspire the great masses of the Russian people with an implacable hatred and a thirst for vengeance. And in case of necessity this will serve as a means for diverting the popular wrath and directing it against the Jews." In the Duma, on the 8th of February, 191 5, M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, reply- ing to the revelations concerning the persecution 206 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of the Jews in the theatre of war, stated that these revelations " were merely the inventions of German calumniators," and that he " categoric- ally gave the lie to the calumny " that " the Russian troops had organized pogroms against the Jews." As to this ministerial denial, I may say, in the first place, that the troops are not accused of these barbarous actions ; the soldiers are not responsible, but the men who lead the troops, and the representatives of the anti-Semitic policy. Secondly, if the Russian Government sincerely wishes to cleanse itself of the stain of these shameful accusations it can do so very simply : it need only abolish immediately all restrictions affecting the unhappy Jewish popula- tion . So long as it does not do so the accusation lies against it, despite all the verbal denials of the Ministers. The terrible responsibility which rests on the Government and the commanders of the Russian Army is unhappily shared by the Polish Nationalist politicians. For years they have conducted an anti-Semitic propaganda in Poland, of the most barbarous nature, terrorizing the Jewish population by threats and organizing boycots of Jewish merchants and artisans. Even the group of Revolutionary Nationalists— the Polish Socialist Party— which at present represents the " Austrian orientation " in Polish society— has supported this ignoble propaganda. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 207 During the discussion in the Duma of the pro- posal for municipal self-government in Poland, the Polish deputies made a pact with the Russian anti-Semites for the purpose of limiting the elec- toral rights of the Jews in Poland at municipal elections. Anti-Semitism has in Poland assumed such brutal forms that a Jewish Nationalist, who is also a well-known Zionist writer, M. Jabotinsky, declared that the Polish politicians had, by their policy towards the Jews, proved that they were not yet ripe for Polish autonomy, and that they were in need, " not of autonomy but of a wise Russian Governor." This declaration, however, was only an exaggeration provoked by the heat of the Polo-Jewish conflict. In reality, the Jews in Poland have completely thrown in their lot with that of the Poles, and regard Poland as their mother-country. But it is easily under- stood that to see conflict between the Poles and the Jews pleases the Russian Government, as it hopes to exploit that conflict in its own interests, according to the old principle : Divide et impera ! During the war, unhappily, the Polo-Jewish conflict has by no means been appeased, and the Polish Nationalist press has greatly contri- buted to the propagation of the legend of the " treason " of the Jews and their relations with the Germans. 208 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR V While in Poland the racial problem is com- plicated by the conflict between the Poles and the Jews, in the Baltic Provinces it is aggravated by the conflict between the Germans on the one hand and the Letts and Esthonians on the other. This conflict is not purely racial in character, as it also is based on a social and economic struggle. The Germans of the Baltic Provinces are in the numerical minority, but the entire nobility of the region is German, and holds in its hands, not only the landed property but also all the political influence, furnishing the Russian reaction with many of its most notorious leaders ; while the Esthonians, and, above all, the Letts, constitute the lower middle -classes and the peasantry of the country, are noted for their democratic ideas, and have given to the Russian revolution many of its noblest supporters, and martyrs who have died for the liberty of the people. In order to comprehend the attitude assumed in respect of the war by the German aristocracy of the Baltic Provinces and the lower middle- class democracy, compare the tone and the sub- stance of the two folloAving declarations, which were made before the Duma on the 8th of August, 1914:— The representative of the Germans, a Baltic noble, stated : IN THE BLOODY FRAY 209 " In the name of my political friends, I have the honour to declare that the German popula- tion of the Baltic Provinces, which has always been composed of faithful subjects, is ready always to rise in defence of the throne and the Fatherland. We shall not content ourselves with voting for the military measures proposed to us, but, following the example of our ancestors, we are ready to sacrifice our lives and our property for the unity and the greatness of Russia." The delegate of the Estho-Lettish group ex- pressed the latter's attitude as follows : " One of the first blows struck by the enemy was struck at part of the country which I repre- sent. This was at Libau. But the German sovereign was greatly mistaken if he believed that this blow would find any echo in the hearts of the inhabitants, or incite them to demonstra- tions hostile to Russia. On the contrary, the population of the Baltic Provinces, in which Letts and Esthonians form the vast majority, replied to the German fire by a deafening shout : ' Long live Russia ! ' And it will be the same in future, amid the severest trials. There is not a man among the Letts who does not understand that all we have realized could have been realized only under the aegis of the Russian eagle, and that the accomplishment of all we still hope for is possible only if the Baltic Provinces, in the future as in the past, form an integral part of 14 210 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR our great Russia. This is why we see, at the present moment, in our country, such mental enthusiasm, and such a desire to take part in the defence of our dear country. These great days have proved that neither race, nor language, nor creed can prevent us, Letts and Esthonians, from being ardent Russian patriots and from standing side by side with the great Russian people to encounter the insolent enemy. " Into the sea of blood in which the tyrant of Europe, the tyrant who has his home in Berlin, wished to bathe, the Letts and the Esthonians will if need be shed the last drop of their blood, so that this man, the perpetual menace of peace, may not only bathe himself in that sea, but be drowned therein. " In these great days we shall prove that we are capable, not only of enthusiastic patriotism, but also, in domestic affairs, of that self-control which is indispensable to the success of our arms on the field of battle. We have many accounts to settle with the Germans of the Baltic Provinces, but we shall not choose this moment for settling them. When we have passed through these terrible times we shall present these accounts for your examination, and I am pro- foundly convinced that in the new radiance of the sun of peace the prejudices which some of you may still entertain will be dissipated. At the present moment there is for us Letts and IN THE BLOODY FRAY 211 Esthonians one object which surpasses all others : it is to repulse the attack of the common enemy. " At this historic moment I declare in the name of the Lettish and Esthonian deputies that we shall march shoulder to shoulder with the Russian people until the termination of the present conflict, which is a just and holy conflict. Not only our sons, our fathers, and our brothers will fight in the ranks of the Army, but at home also, under every roof, at every step, the enemy will encounter a desperate adversary ; he may deprive us of life, but from the dying themselves he will hear but one cry : ' Long live Russia ! ' " The celebrated French novelist, M. Romain Rolland, has published in the Swiss press an interesting letter sent him by a Lettish revolu- tionary, which deals with the question of the existing relations between the Germans, the Russians, and the Letts in the Baltic Provinces. I believe such " human documents " help us to comprehend the truth better than any abstract dissertations. For this reason I make way for the writer of this letter. He says : — " It would be interesting to know what those German writers and professors who speak of a holy war against barbarous Russia mean by that in practice. Would they wish to come to the assistance of the revolutionary parties to dethrone the Tsar ? But these parties would proudly refuse to accept the aid of militarist Prussia. Would 212 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR they liberate the neighbouring peoples oppressed by Russia — the Poles, for instance— by incorporat- ing them in the German Empire ? But every one knows that those Poles who are German subjects have suffered at the hands of the German Government a treatment far worse than that of which the Russian Poles complain with reason. " There remain the Baltic Provinces. Here for centuries the Germans have had their pioneers among the great landlords and the merchants of the cities. Although Russian subjects, they will doubtless welcome the German armies with open arms. But the majority of the population, of the Lettish and Esthonian peoples, would regard the annexation of these provinces by Germany as the worst of calamities. . . . The geographical situation of our country has brought upon the Letts the singular misfortune of suffer- ing the German yoke before the Russian. And, as compared with the Germans, the Russians appeared to us as liberators. For centuries the Germans kept us by brute force in a state com- parable to slavery. Only fifty years ago the Rus- sian Government gave us our freedom, but at the same time committed the grave injustice of leaving all our land in the hands of German pro- prietors. In spite of all, we have managed in twenty or thirty years to redeem from the Germans a portion of our soil, and to attain a certain level of culture, thanks to which we are IN THE BLOODY FRAY 213 regarded, with the Fmns and the Esthonians, as the most advanced nation of the Russian Empire. " The German journals call us ungrateful . . . for the benefits of that culture which they boast of having brought us. . . . We follow the word KuUurtrdger ( ! ) with a mark of exclamation, for the actions of the Germans have made the word a term of derision. We acquired our cul- ture in spite of them, against their will. Even to-day it is the German representatives in the Duma who oppose the rare intentions of the Russian Government to introduce a few reforms in the Baltic Provinces. . . . We are subject to laws and regulations unknown elsewhere in Europe, which, established during the life of the feudal system, have been maintained among us by the efforts of the great German land- lords. . . . " Formerly, not knowing how to reconcile our admiration for the thought and art of Germany with the narrow, cruel, and haughty spirit of its representatives in the Baltic Provinces, we invented the explanation that the Germans we knew were a peculiar species, having little in common with other Germans. But the crimes committed in France and Belgium have proved us wrong. The Germans are the same every- where when it becomes a matter of overruling and suppressing all humanitarian scruples. . . . " It is utterly unjust always to speak of the 214 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Russians as barbarians. Above all, the Ger- mans, who always employ this term in speaking of them, have less right than any to use it. The intellectual world of Russia is not inferior to that of Germany ; it is different, that is all . . . . But what makes the intellectual world of Russia more sympathetic than that of Germany is the fact that it would be incapable of justify- ing or approving of the barbarities of its own Government as do the intellectuals of Germany. It has often been forced to keep silent, but never has it excused a guilty Government. . . . " I do not idealize the Russians, nor has my people been privileged by them. On the con- trary, I personally have suffered more from the Russians than from the Germans, and my people know only too well the heavy fist of the Russian Government and the stifling breath of Pan- slavism. In 1906 it was the Lettish peasants and intellectuals who had the privilege of being flogged the most ; and it was they who furnished the greatest proportion of unfortunates to be shot, hanged, or imprisoned for life. And since that terrible year there are in the chief cities of Western Europe Lettish colonies of refugees who succeeded in escaping from the atrocities of the penal expedition sent into our country by the Russian Government. But ... at the head of the majority of the military detachments sent to chastise the country were officers of German IN THE BLOODY FRAY 215 nationality who had asked for this employment, and who displayed such zeal in shooting down men and burning houses that they surpassed even the intentions of the Russian Government. . . . In cases where Russian officers inflicted the lash the Germans gave the order for execution. " If we had the choice, we should prefer a Russian Government as the lesser ill. Our soldiers have left for the front filled with enthu- siasm . . . not to defend those who send us to Siberia . . . but because the war is against Germany, and we are capable of any sacrifice to prevent her annexation of the Baltic Provinces. . . . Panslavism is less dangerous to the inde- pendence of small nations than pan-Germanism, "... The Germans are systematic oppres- sors. . . . The Russians are less consistent; they strike at times cruel and painful blows, but from time to time they are capable of assuaging the hurts they inflict ; . . . they are at heart more human than the Germans, who often con- ceal a ferocious animosity beneath an aspect of perfect courtesy. In 1906, when there were executions en masse in Russia, many officers committed suicide . . . but the officers of German blood took a joy in the performance of their duty. " I rejoice at the news of Russian victories . . . yet I dread a victorious Russia. . . . What have we to expect of victorious Tsarism but 216 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR a frantic reawakening of the crushing ideals of Panslavism ? . . . All our hopes go out toward France and England ; we should like to think that in one way or another they will see that their ally is in future worthy of them, and of the ideals for which they are fighting. . . . We do not aspire to a political autonomy ; we desire only the possibility of a free development of our intellectual, artistic^ and economic forces, with- out the eternal threat of Russification or Germanization." ' There are, perhaps, exaggerations in that part of this letter which compares the German with the Russian reactionaries. All reactionaries are equally detestable. But I quote from this letter because it describes the feelings of the non- German inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces in respect of the German nobility. VI Among the greatest blunders of Tsarism during the war we must emphasize its Finnish policy. In November 1 9 1 4, three and a half months after the beginning of the war, the Russian Government issued an Imperial ukase relating to the Finnish problem, the tenor of which was as follows : — ^ Letter to Romain RoUand in the Journal de Geneve, 12th of October, 1914. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 217 " His Imperial Majesty has sanctioned a pro- gramme of legal measures relating to Finland, a programme which has been drawn up by a Commission specially appointed by his Majesty to that effect. The Commission finds that the programme in question includes two principal groups of measures. " I . Measures designed to fortify the authority of the Government in Finland, so that the law may be executed and order maintained. " 2. Measures designed to establish closer political relations and economic unity in respect of Finland and the rest of the Empire. " The measures which follow are enumerated in the first group :— " Revision of the laws relating to the discip- linary responsibility of the authorities in Finland. Removal to the Imperial Courts of all causes dealing with offences committed by Finnish civil functionaries in the exercise of their duties ; revision of the Finnish law relating to the status of civil functionaries, in particular those which relate to their immovability, the modification of their oath, and their right to attach themselves to political parties ; the training of a staff of officials destined to fill vacancies in the adminis- tration of Finland and in particular the institu- tion of Chairs of Finnish Law in the Universities of the Empire ; the introduction of the teaching of Finnish and Swedish in the schools of the 218 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Empire, and the addition of Russian to the sub- jects of the matriculation examination at Helsing- fors University ; the promulgation of a law touching the application to Finland of the measure known as the Exceptional Law ; the revision of the regulations of the police and gendarmerie in Finland ; the promulgation of laws applicable conjointly to the Empire and Finland relating to the Press, assemblies, and societies ; the extension of the control of the Minister of Public Instruction (Russian) over Finnish educational institutions ; the adoption of measures prohibiting the introduction of arms and ammunition into Finland, etc., etc. " In the second group are enumerated the following measures : — " The settlement of questions relating to reli- gion and the Orthodox Church in Finland and the placing of Orthodox Church schools under the authority of the Holy Synod ; the extension to Finland of import duties equal to those imposed throughout the rest of the Empire and special measures designed to ensure to goods, such as sugar, meat, etc., produced in Russia, privileges in the Finnish market ; the promulga- tion of a law common to Finland and the Empire concerning the acquisition and loss of Russian nationality ; the extension to Finland of the activities of the Rural Peasants' Bank (Rus- sian)," etc., etc. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 219 The reader will realize that this amounts to a veritable political and economic conquest of Finland, by the Russian police and officials on the one hand and by Russian merchandise on the other. The pubUcation of such a " programme " of " legal " measures is a provocation unheard of even in the history of the Finnish Constitution, which has already had to bear many an unlawful blow. This provocation— above all, in time of war— shows an absolute lack of the most elemen- tary tact on the part of the Russian Government. One of the moderate Russian journals, expressing its profound amazement at this programme, stated that it belonged to the past rather than to the future. It is needless to say that the Finnish people, loyal during the present war as they were during the Japanese War, have done nothing whatever to merit such treatment, and that public opinion, not only in Finland but also in the neighbouring States of Sweden and Norway, was revolted by these reactionary measures . " This programme of Russification," exclaimed the Stockholm Dagblad, " is the very opposite of the fine promises of liberty and autonomy made in the form of a manifesto to the Poles and Galicians by the Grand Duke Nicholas." 220 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR VII The Ukrainian problem is perhaps the least well known, as far as the European public is concerned, of all the nationalist or racial problems existing in modern Russia. The ex- planation is that until recently the Nationalist movement of the Ukrainians was cultural rather than political. In the domain of their national culture the Ukrainians have accomplished much. Their literature is flourishing, and some of their ancient poets (for example, Shevtshenko) and certain of their modern authors (Ivan Franko, Vasil Stefanik, etc.) would adorn the literature of any country. Ukrainian philology and history, the Ukrainian arts, and other manifestations of the national genius of this talented people, have undergone a rapid development of late. Unfortunately, the erroneous policy of re- actionary Tsarism weighed heavily on the intel- lectual movements of the Ukrainians. The Russian Government opposed it by every possible means. Even the terms "Ukraine" and " Ukrainian " were prohibited, being replaced by " Little Russia " and " Little Russian." To justify this persecution Tsarism accused the Ukrainians of " separatist " tendencies. This accusation was false, for the separatist policy has not and could not have any hold upon Ukrainian society. From the economic point of IN THE BLOODY FRAY 221 view the Ukraine, which covers ten Governments of southern and south-western Russia, is closely bound up with the economic organism of all Russia— more closely even than Poland and the Caucasus. The cities and industrial centres of the Ukraine are denationalized, or rather inter- nationalized, for their population represents a great admixture of races and languages, the Russian language being sensibly predominant in current usage and in the press. A large pro- portion of the Ukrainian " intellectuals " have been profoundly influenced by Russian culture. The most eminent poet of the Ukraine, Tarass Shevtshenko, who was deported to the Far East by the Russian Government for his " subversive ideas," was not only a Ukrainian patriot, but a Russian patriot also, and his dream was to facili- tate the ties of friendship between the two peoples, which are brothers by birth, and to compose a common Russo-Ukrainian tongue which could be understood by both peoples. The Austrian Government has of late years shown itself wiser than the Russian. It abated its persecution of the Ukrainians living on Austrian territory, in Bukovina, and Eastern Galicia, granting them certain concessions in the sphere of public instruction and political rights, and the Ukrainian Nationalist movement de- veloped more freely in Austria than in Russia. The Austrian Ukrainians (the " Russiny " or 222 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Ruthenians) founded primary and secondary schools, in which the teaching was in the Ukrainian tongue, while in Russia the Ukrainian children are taught in Russian, which is not their mother-tongue. This policy of the Austrian Government, which was designed to attract Ukrainian sympathies, was based upon political calculations. Austria wished to create a separatist movement among the Russian Ukrainians and an Austrian " orien- tation " of that movement. But the great mass of Russian Ukrainians failed to be seduced by Austria, and, in spite of all the injustice which they suffered at the hands of Tsarism, they refused the idea of separatism, hoping that a true national liberation of the Ukraine would come simultaneously with the liberation of all Russia and the abolition of the old state of affairs throughout the Empire. After the declaration of war the Government and the General Staff of Austria created a special organization known as the " Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," whose object was : ( I ) to inform European opinion concern- ing the Ukrainian question, and ( 2 ) to provoke a " revolution " in Russian Ukraine which should " absorb " the forces of the Tsar. This Union, which announced itself as being in favour of an independent Ukraine, is in reality merely an ignoble agency of the Hapsburg monarchy and IN THE BLOODY FRAY 223 its army and police. Here are some extracts from proclamations issued by the said Union, in various European languages (German, Italian, English, etc . ) :— " The unexampled provocative politics of Russia have plunged the whole world into a catastrophe which is unequalled in history. . . . The Union for the freeing of the Ukraine is to represent the national, political, social, and economic interests of the Ukrainian people in Russia. . . . Historical necessity demands as a sine qua noti that an independent Ukrainian State should arise between Russia and Europe. . . . The foundation of this State is necessary and indispensable to the vital interests of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and for the con- tinuous and undisturbed development of the German people in the monarchy and the German Empire. . . . The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine foresees the realization of its endeavours in the defeat of the Russian Empire by the United Monarchies." ^ From these few quotations it will be seen that what is really at stake is, not the independence of Ukraine but simply the interests of Austria and Germany. One of the inspiring forces of the Union, Herr Lewicki, a deputy to the Vienna Reichsrat, openly declared as much, in an article ' See the proclamations of the Union for the Uberation of Ukraine, in the Ukramische Nachrichten^ Vienna. 224 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR published on the ist of October, 19 14, in the Berliner Tdgeblatt, in which he described the brilliant prospects open to Austro-German capital in Southern Russia in the event of its separation from the Russian State. These Ukrainian " patriots " merely wish to sell their beloved country to the German capitalists. But before selling their country they sell themselves. In the Ukrainian Social-Democratic journal Borotha (" The Struggle "), published in Geneva, were published scandalous revelations concerning the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine. It appears from these revelations that this " Union," domiciled in Vienna, is composed of a few men who were some years ago excluded from one of the political parties of Russian Ukraine. Among them there was also an agent of the Viennese secret police. The Union, which calls itself an organization of the Russian Ukrainians, is supported financially by the Austrian Government, and is merely " a lackey of that Government, on which it is entirely and shamefully dependent." ^ " It is only for purposes of advertisement that this Union calls itself a Russian organization ; it is really Austrian." In order to gain an influence over the popular masses in Ukraine and Russia this Union created two affiliated societies and baptized them ' ?ni& Boroiba, February 1915- IN THE BLOODY FRAY 225 by names which might attract the Russian and Ukrainian peasants and industrial workers. One of these, operating from Constantinople ( ! ), is known as the " Social-Democratic Ukrainian Labour Party," and is composed of a few Austrian agents. The other is known as the " Ukrainian Union of Revolutionary Socialists," and operates from Vienna. Its character may be judged from the following : " The new-born revolutionist and man of action, Herr Z. "—here follows the name of the leader of the Union — " gathered round himself, and his Austrian money, in Vienna, half a score of crooks, drunkards, and vagabonds, of Bukovinian or Galician origin, who gladly consented to play, in Austria, the agreeable, care-free, amusing, and profitable role of the Emperor's own revolu- tionists. . . . The Austrian Government pays through the nose. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialist Party in Vienna— that is to say Herr Z. and Company— draws the money, flourishes, and grows rich. It drinks heartily, keeps its mistresses, goes on the spree. People talk of two million crowns. For one small party that will suffice for a lifetime." ^ It is superfluous to add that the genuine Ukrainian revolutionists have indignantly re- jected the infamous proposals of the Austrian ' See the article " A Shameful Affair," published in the journal Borotba, February 1915. • 15 226 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Government, and, so far from joining these Viennese " Unions," have unmasked their repul- sive features. But here, as my readers will see, we are dealing, not with a political association, but merely an offence against the common law, a simple fraud sheltering behind a " national flag," As for the political side of the question, it is in- contestable that the whole Austro-Turco -German propaganda in Ukraine — a movement designed to give rise to a separatist movement among the Ukrainians— has ended in a complete fiasco. The Ukrainian Social-Democrats have resolutely set their faces against the Separatist policy, pre- ferring the idea of the common struggle of the popular masses of Russia and the Ukraine against Tsarism and for democracy. As for the Ukrainian Liberals and Radicals in Russia, they published, at the moment of the declaration of war, special declarations in which they explained their political situation in the following terms :— " Owing to the dismemberment of our national organism between Russia and Austro-Hungary, certain elements of Russian society were induced to believe in the possibility of a so-called ' Austrian orientation ' among the Ukrainians in Russia— that is, a sympathetic feeling in respect of the Hapsburg monarchy— and to regard them as an unstable element in time of international conflicts such as the present war. We need not IN THE BLOODY FRAY 227 say that such suppositions had no basis ; no real fact, no solid argument can be adduced in their support. In the ideals of the Ukrainian people, in their practical aspirations, and in the national development of that portion of the Ukrainian race which forms a part of the popu- lation of Russia, they have always imagined themselves as remaining within the frontiers of Russia and in close union with the people of Russia. . . . The manifestation of the national will of the Russian Ukrainians has never found its expression in hazardous political combinations, and temptations of this kind have never found any echo among the wider strata of Ukrainian society. . . . Ukrainian separatism ... is a myth. . . . The ' Austrian orientation ' of the Russian Ukrainians was invented by Viennese politicians as a bogey. ... In the hour of un- paralleled trials to which our sentiment of nationality is now being subjected we ought to display an understanding of historical events corresponding with our national development, a sane political spirit and an organized national will, and to realize that the nation is bound by a thousand ties — of blood, kinship, commerce, and history — to a nation which is to-day fighting against Austro-Hungary and the German Empire. On crossing the frontiers the enemies of Russia will doubtless endeavour to win the Ukrainian people to their side, and, by means 228 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of various political promises, to sow disturbance among them. The Ukrainians will not allow themselves to be tempted by this policy of provo- cation, and will accomplish their duties as citizens of Russia, in these difficult times, to the end : not only on the field of battle, in the ranks of the warlike troops, will they fight against the infringers of peace and the laws of humanity, but also as simple citizens, inhabitants of the country, who should, in proportion to their strength and opportunities, contribute to the accomplishment by the Russian Army of the task of unparalleled gravity which awaits it." ' ' See the declaration of the staff of the Ukrainskdia Jizn, a review which counts among its editors and contributors the chief representatives of Liberal and Radical thought in Ukraine. CHAPTER V I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries and Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this dread. The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. Why is the propaganda resulting from this apprehension erroneous and harmful? — II. The German, Austrian, and Turkish Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian revolution- aries. The noble reply of certain of these latter to the agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. Russian revolutionaries in the French Army. I The last lines of the letter of a Lettish revolu- tionary quoted in the last chapter, which express the hope that Germany will be defeated, but, at the same time, anxiety as to the possible effect of a Russian victory on the domestic life of Russia, suggest a very serious and interesting problem. It is the problem of that " dread of victory '* which is to be observed among certain circles of the Russian revolutionaries and Socialists. The leader of a small Russian Social-Demo- cratic group, M. Lenin, who has assumed a task of doubtful honour and utility, the propaga- tion of this " dread of victory," formulates his point of view as follows : — 230 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR In the actual state of affairs it is im- possible, from the point of view of the Inter- national proletariat, to say which would be the lesser evil for Socialism— an Austro-German defeat, or a Franco-Russo-English defeat. But for us, Russian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that, from the point of view of the working-classes and of the toiling mass of all the Russian peoples, the lesser evil would be a defeat of the Tsarist monarchy, which is the most reactionary and the most barbarous of Governments, and which oppresses the largest number of nationalities and the largest mass of population in Europe and Asia." ^ " We cannot ignore the fact," says the same writer in another article, " that this or that issue of the military operations will facilitate or render more difficult our work of liberation in Russia. And we say : Yes, we hope for the defeat of Russia because it will facilitate the internal victory of Russia— the abolition of her slavery, her liberation from the chains of Tsarism."^ Another Social-Democrat and Russian pub- licist, M. L". Martov, expresses almost the same opinion, but in a much more prudent form— in the form of a supposition :— ' See the small non-periodical sheet, the Sozial-Demokrat^ published in Russian at Geneva, which is the personal organ of M. Lenin, October 19 14, No. 33. =^ Ibid., No. 38, February 19 15. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 231 " The failure of Russian Tsarism in the present war . . . would only once more aggravate the contradictions of Russian life and would once more make immediate the problem of a radical reconstitution of the ancleii regime ^ ' As will be seen, the Lettish revolutionary whose letter we reproduced expressed merely the dread of victory, while M. Lenin expresses the hope that Russia will be defeated. This nefarious idea was expressed in the draft of a resolution of which I have already spoken as having been found in the rooms of one of five Social-Democratic deputies who were arrested at Petrograd. The anonymous and irresponsible authors of this draft state therein that " the defeat of the Tsarist monarchy and the Tsar's troops " in the present war " would be the lesser evil " from the point of view of the Russian proletariat. ■Happily, the Russian workers in whose name these irresponsible persons profess to speak are not of the same opinion. On the contrary, it may be asserted that the Russian working-classes are resolutely in favour of the defence of Russia and her victory. Here are the proofs of this assertion : — The prominent German journal the Leipziger Volkszeitung, a Socialist organ, published the following letter describing the internal situation in Russia in the middle of October 1914:— ' See Golos, 1914, No. 41. 232 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " A great majority of Russian citizens, and among them many Social-Democrats, are con- vinced that Germany is waging an aggressive war, while Russia is defending herself against a German invasion. . . . The war is becoming more and more popular in Russia. . . . The present situation bears no resemblance to that which existed ten years ago. The war was then a d>Tiastic war, while to-day we are witnessing a people's war. . . . The leader of the Social- Democratic faction in the Duma, M. Tshkeidze, has given expression to the following opinion : ' Russian culture is but a small and weakly tree, while German culture is a mighty oak. We must defend the weak little tree of our culture from the peril that threatens it.' The attitude towards the war adopted by the German Social- Democratic Party has made a profound impres- sion on the Russian Socialists. The Petrograd Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Party had intended to publish a manifesto against the war, but immediately following upon the news that the German Social-Democrats had declared for the war, the feeling of the Russian Social-Democrats was considerably modified. To-day the mass of the Russian workers are saying : ' We cannot abandon the defensive and allow the Germans to kill us ; we are obliged to defend ourselves.' The tactics of the German Social-Democrats have prevented IN THE BLOODY FRAY 233 many opponents of the war from raising their voices in protest. . . . The news of the fate of Louvain and Reims and other similar facts have still further strengthened the state of mind we have described. The working-classes in Russia are tranquil. The news given in the German newspapers concerning revolts, strikes, etc., is not in accordance with the facts. On the contrary, since the beginning of the war we have had no serious strike, although before the war broke out an implacable economic struggle was being waged, as your readers know, by the workers. A great movement was developing in Petrograd, and barricades had even been seen in the streets." In the report presented by the Organizing Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Party at the conference of the Socialists of the neutral countries held at Copenhagen, we fmd the same statement, that, " unlike the Russo- Japanese War, the present war has become popular among the masses." In a letter from Russia, published in the Russian Social-Demo- cratic journal Nache Slovo (in Paris), we read that " the masses of the working-men of Russia are not of a Jingoist temper, but the hope for a ' Russian defeat ' . . . would meet with no sympathy from them." And in the Bulletin of the Organizing Committee of the Russian Social- Democratic Party a communication from Russia 234 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR is included, according to which " there is no desire that Russia should be defeated to be observed among the working-classes." And here is a trifling fact which may con- vince you as to the feeling of the Russian workers during the war. The Government gave an urgent order to a factory in Petrograd whose " hands " were noted for their revolutionary sentiments. The managers of the factory informed the workers that this order was of great importance to the Russian Army, and that it could, according to their calculations, be completed in the space of one month if the men would work as hard as possible. The men set to and completed the work in the space of twelve days— that is, two and a half times more rapidly than was asked of them. Compare this generous attitude on the part of the workers with the hysterical conduct of those few irresponsible intellectuals who are ready to rejoice in the defeat of their country when attacked by a cowardly and brutal enemy, and you will understand that their appeal could find no response among the masses, whose political conscience and healthy instinct has pre- served them from the " revolutionary " hysteria which has attacked the minds of a few intellectuals. But it must be said that even among the revo- lutionary " intellectuals " the hysterical desire IN THE BLOODY FRAY 235 for a Russian defeat has not encountered much sympathy. For example, the ideological leader of modern Russian Anarchism, M. Kropotkin, insisted on the necessity of victory over Germany. In a letter, published in the Russklya Viedomosti (Moscow), M. Kropotkin, while attributing the whole immediate responsibility for the war to the Austro -German alliance, adds :— " As for the consequences which a victory of the Germans would have for us Russians, one refuses even to think of them, so terrible would they be. What would become of the progress of Russia if Germany had her fortresses on the Niemen, at Riga, at Reval— a whole series of Metzes, destined not to protect the conquered territory, but to facilitate fresh aggression, and which would directly threaten Petrograd ? " From the point of view of the progress of the whole of Europe, the prospect of German domination is still more ghastly : " No one who does not deliberately close his eyes can fail to understand why no man who has the progress of humanity at heart, and who does not allow his ideas to be obscured by interest, habit, or sophistry, could possibly hesitate. We cannot but desire the final defeat of Germany. We cannot even remain neutral ; under the present circumstances neu- trality means complicity." The eminent writer Georges Plechanov, the founder of the Social-Democratic Labour Party 236 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR in Russia, issued a public protest against the obnoxious propaganda of the " dread of victory " which had a great influence with the Russian democracy and proletariat. On the 15th of October 1914, the organ of English Social- Democracy, Justice, published the following letter from Plechanov : — " Dear Comrades,— For some time past there has been a good deal said in your journal about the Franco-Russian Alliance. " If I am not mistaken there are those of our comrades in England who take quite seriously the statements of the German General Staff, that in beginning this war, they desired to fight against Russian barbarism. " This argument cannot be upheld. Russian barbarism is the despotism of the Tsar. But how is it possible to believe that the Emperor of the Junkers has any intention of destroying the power of the Emperor of the ' Black Hundreds' ? "Since our Revolution of 1905-6 Wilhelm II has been the strongest support of his brother Nicholas II. In Russia everybody knows it, and so true is it that even at the present time- even during the war itself — the extreme re- actionary party leans toward Wilhelm . The organ of this party, the Russian Flag (which is known in Russia as the Prussian Flag), is doing its best IN THE BLOODY FRAY 237 to exonerate the Germans from the atrocities which have called forth the just indignation of the entire civilized world. " It is not for freedom that Germany has declared war. No, comrades ; she made war for the conquest of economic supremacy. That is the Imperialist programme which she strives to realize. " And, so far as my country is concerned, once vanquished by Germany it would become her economic vassal. Germany would impose upon Russia such onerous conditions as would render her further economic evolution terribly difficult. But as economic evolution is the basis of social and political evolution, Russia would thus lose all, or nearly all, the chances of bringing Tsarism to an end. " That is why there is among us only the extreme reactionary party which can reasonably hope for the triumph of Germany. " The Socialist world must not be led astray by the phraseology of the German General Staff. The victory of Germany means the setback of progress in Western Europe, and the definite, or almost definite, triumph of Russian despotism." i In this letter— brief, but remarkable for its clearness— Plechanov overturns the principal ' See the issues for the 14th of November and 26th of December 19 14. 238 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR argument of the " partisans of defeat " among the Russian Socialists and demonstrates that this defeat, from the standpoint of those who hope for the internal liberation of Russia, is more than undesirable. I too have had to take upon myself the duty of combating the propaganda of the " dread of victory " and the desire for a Russian defeat. Having observed that this propaganda found a certain number of supporters among political emigres, I have delivered half a score of lectures before the Russian colonies in the principal towns of Switzerland, which contain large numbers of Russian emigres. I also expounded my argu- ments in the Nation, which I cannot do better than quote : — " From the psychological point of view a desire for a Russian defeat is intelligible and almost warrantable. The present system of government in Russia is so harsh and so severe, it excites so much hatred, so much indignation among Russian democrats, that one can understand and explain the psychological causes of that fear of a Russian victory, that desire for a defeat of Tsarism, which one finds in some of our revo- lutionists at the present moment. But while it is intelligible from the psychological point of view, this attitude may be refuted from the point of view of logic and politics. " First of all, those who believe that Tsarism IN THE BLOODY FRAY 239 would be crushed by a German victory forget a very simple and indisputable fact — that the present war, which is a war of the masses, of millions and millions of men, touches directly on the interests of the people, and, in case of defeat, not only the Government, but also the people would suffer from that defeat. I believe that the people would suffer much more than Tsarism. Secondly, I hold that, from the point of view of the interests of the movement for the liberation of the Russian people, this propaganda of ' the fear of victory ' is extremely injurious. It is injurious because a Russian defeat would also be a defeat of the French, Belgian, and English democracies. Russian revolutionists ought always to be guided, not merely by the interests of their own people and their own liberty, but also by those of other peoples and by the liberty of all Europe. Otherwise they would run the risk of falling into a ' revolutionary nationalism,' con- cerned only with its own country, and ignoring the interests of democracy in general and the political progress of other peoples. The propa- ganda of ' a fear of victory ' seems to me to be also injurious because it is addressed, not to the active sentiments of our soul, but to passive sentiments, and, as it were, to a ' revolutionary despair.' Those who favour this propaganda are not persons who have the moral force necessary for a struggle against Tsarism ; they are those 240 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR who do not believe in the possibility of a victory of the people over Tsarism— a victory realized by efforts of the Russian masses themselves ; they are those who trust to external assistance, to a measure of liberty imported from without. That is why I believe that this propaganda might be damaging to our revolution ; instead of rousing the people to activity, it might inspire them with despair and moral weakness. " I say it ' might,' because, in reality, it is un- able to do this. As I have shown in the pre- ceding quotations, the mass of the people and the Socialist workmen in Russia do not share the erroneous opinion of the representatives of ' revolutionary despair ' — and if this erroneous opinion still exists it is only among some small groups of Russian political exiles. But even among these latter there is a strong current of feeling in the opposite direction, which is repre- sented, for example, by a Social-Democratic writer well known in Russia, M. Georges Plecha- nov. " Those of us who do not share the desperate desire for a German victory (in the name of the Russian Revolution !) are often accused by our friendly critics of opportunism in the face of Tsarism. This accusation has been recently formulated by an English Socialist, Mr. Bruce Glasier, the editor of the Socialist Review. He mentions the abominable crimes of the IN THE BLOODY FRAY 241 Russian reaction, and the profound wounds with which it has covered the mutilated body of our unhappy people. You may set your mind at rest, Mr. Bruce Glasier ! We do not forget those crimes and those wounds. They are our wounds and they still torture as to-day. But we wish to cure them ourselves. We do notl^elieve that it is possible to cure an evil by another and still greater evil, that the wounds caused by Tsarism can be cured by the blows of German Im- perialism. Even if one admits, as the German Government affirms, that the Russian Government has desired the present war, one cannot desire a German victory. Suppose, my English colleague, that you were living on the sixth floor of a house, the first floor of which was occupied by the land- lord. That landlord behaves badly to you, and you hate him. But a fire breaks out in the house. You even believe that the landlord himself has caused the fire in order to obtain the insurance money. Would you not, in these circumstances^ use all your efforts to fight the fire which may destroy, not only the first floor but your own flat as well ? You must first deal with the fire, and afterwards settle accounts with the land- lord. " These are the simple arguments that prevent me from trusting to a military defeat of Russia as a means of winning our liberty." 16 242 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR II The propaganda of the " dread of victory " was compromised in the eyes of the working- classes of our country by the stupidities com- mitted by those who conducted it, and by the machinations of the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Turkey. Certain of those irresponsible politicians who declared themselves in favour of the defeat of their country went as far as to insist on the neces- sity of boycotting all work and all institutions having any connection with the war. The ridiculous question was actually asked, whether a " revolutionary " has the right to participate in the struggle against the misfortunes occasioned by the war — whether a Socialist has the right, for example, to sew shirts or knit socks for the wounded, etc. When the Socialist deputy from the Caucasus, M. Skobelev, commenced to par- ticipate in the organization of revictualling stations for the refugees in the frontier regions and the troops, M. Lenin wrote in his journal that M. Skobelev was devoid of " an elementary Socialist sense of honour," that he was the friend of Tsarism and the reaction, etc. These absurdi- ties being printed in the name of Socialism provoked a feeling of displeasure even among the firmest supporters of M. Lenin, and revealed to all the danger of his quasi -revolutionary IN THE BLOODY FRAY 243 hysteria. It is needless to say that the working- classes could not and would not respond to these hysterical appeals, for although an exiled poli- tician living in a neutral country (he publishes his journal in Geneva) may risk uttering such absurdities, the working man living in Russia can not only not adopt them— he cannot even understand them. And the Russian workers, as far as possible, endeavoured to aid their comrades who were called to the colours and the families of the latter. Moreover, the propaganda in question was soon discredited among the Russian revolutionaries by the incontestable fact that the Governments of the hostile countries made attempts to utilize the revolutionary movement in general and its hysteri- cal manifestations— that is, the desire to see Russia defeated— for the advantage of the Turco-Austro- Germanic Alliance. In the same journal — the Sozlal-Demokrat—m which M. Lenin expressed his desire to see Russia defeated, the following letter was published from a Social-Democratic workman of Petrograd : — " We could not have believed that the German Social-Democrats could fall so low as to associate themselves with their Kaiser . . . even under the pretext of fighting against Russian Tsarism. The Russian Revolution neither sought nor de- sired such support. The news has been circu- lated in Petrograd and throughout the country 244 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR that Wilhelm II counts chiefly on the Russian revolution. The attitude of the German Socialists, or to speak more precisely, their treason against the international solidarity of labour, as well as the whole political situation, made it impossible for us to make any active protest against the war during the first days of mobilization." ' As my readers have already seen, the rumour of which this writer speaks, to the efifect that the German Government hoped to profit by the revolutionary movement in Russia in its conflict with the Russian Army, was by no means without foundation, for this very eventuality was fore- seen by the secret report of the German General Staff. But this is not all. There are many docu- ments which prove that the German, Austrian, and Turkish Governments have been taking practical measures to attain their ignoble end. In certain cases the Austrian police, which after the declaration of war arrested numbers of Russian subjects domiciled in Austria, released those whom they knew to be revolutionaries. Here is a highly characteristic case, narrated by the correspondent of the New York Vorwdrts (a Jewish Social-Democratic journal) and repro- duced in the Russian Social-Democratic journal Golos : — " In a small village of the Austrian Tyrol lived a comrade (a Russian emigre) who had no pass- ' Sozial-Demokrat, Geneva, 19 14, No. t^2>- IN THE BLOODY FRAY 245 port. He was arrested, among others. During the interrogation he declared that he was a poUtical refugee, and had been obUged to leave Russia. " ' To what section of the Russian Social-Demo- cratic Party do you belong ? ' demanded the police commissary. ' To an extreme section or a moderate section ? ' " The comrade replied : ' I belong to the Ex- treme Left ; I am a supporter of L'enin.' " Thereupon the commissary became amiable and gave him a safe conduct through for Switzer- land." ' Another instance of the same kind was related to me by M. Felix Kon, a well-known Polish Socialist. When war was declared he was in Lemberg. The local police arrested three Russian Social-Democrats who were passing through Lemberg on their way to Russia. M. Kon applied to the prefect of police, in the hope of obtaining their liberation. What was his astonishment when he learned from the prefect that the latter had not only of his own accord released the three Socialists arrested by his agents, but had given them railway tickets and told them of the route by which they would reach Russia most speedily. In other cases the Governments of the countries at war with Russia did not confine themselves ^ See Vorwdrts of New York, iSth of September 1914, and Golos, Paris, T3th of October 19 14. 246 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR to a similar amiable treatment of the revolu- tionaries, whose sincere and disinterested activi- ties they hoped to utilize, but even attempted direct corruption. Here is an instance. The Social-Democratic Russian journal Novy Mir, published in New York, inserted in its columns the following communication from Con- stantinople, where there were numerous political refugees, especially from the Caucasus. " In Constantinople there are people who call themselves Ukrainian and Georgian Nationalist- Separatists, who have entered into relations with the Turkish and German Governments with the object of effecting a so-called liberation of Ukraine and Georgia. These gentry introduce themselves to the Russian emigres living in Con- stantinople in the name of democracy and the revolution, and in the name of Socialism even, and attempt to involve even our Social -Demo- cratic comrades in a dirty and hazardous affair. The means which these individuals employ for the realization of their desires are various, but are always inadmissible from the point of view of simple honesty, to say no more. We cannot say more for the moment. The time will come when the true character of these individuals will be revealed, as happened in the case of similar ' nationalists ' at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and we will then return to the matter. Our IN THE BLOODY FRAY 247 Social -Democratic comrades in Constantinople, directly the idea was mooted — the idea of the so-called liberation of Ukraine and Georgia by means of Turkish and German aid — declared in sweeping terms, that they were opposed to unions of this kind, and regarded the attitude and the actions of these persons as shameful and treasonable." The Russian Social-Democratic emigres even voted a special resolution in respect of the ignoble propositions made to them by the German and Turkish agents. " The group of the Social-Democratic Labour Party at Constantinople declare that, being con- cerned with the struggle of the proletariat, on taking into consideration the present situation it absolutely rejects all proposals having as their aim the so - called liberation of Ukraine and Georgia and emanating from any of the Govern- ments to - day existing. — Constantinople, the 15/28 September 19 14." The Russian political refugees who voted for this resolution gave it as moderate a form as possible, in order to permit of its publication in the local press. " But," relates the Novy Mir, " being far from numerous, and terrorized by the ' Nationalists,' who were supported by the hidden forces of the agents of the Turkish Government," they were not able to publish even this. Later on the Austro-Turco-German agents 248 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR renewed their ignoble proposals to the political emigres from the Caucasus residing in Constanti- nople, and the latter replied that *' Turkey is one of the least civilized and most backward of the monarchies of Asia. The masses of the people are in Turkey more oppressed and more humili- ated than in any other country. . . . To enter into negotiations or to conclude an agreement with the Government of a country thus oppressed . . . would be a criminal error, unfitting the dignity of a Social-Democrat, or of a mere democrat and progressive. . . . Turkish policy seeks to profit by the popular movement against, and the discontent felt in re- spect of, the Russian Government in the Caucasus, and particularly in Georgia ... it seeks to ensure the profit of its egoistical and aggressive interests. ... At the present time a policy of separatism would be worse than harmful to the Caucasian peoples, and particularly to the Georgians. ... A modification of the existing state of affairs in the Caucasus, and in Georgia in particular, is possible only through the united efforts of the population and the revolutionary Russian people." Such was the noble reply of the Georgian Socialists to the Austro - Turco - German tempters and agents-provocateurs . But this is not all. The " Union for the Libe- ration of the Ukraine," organized under the auspices of the Viennese police and the Austrian IN THE BLOODY FRAY 249 General Staff, sent " delegates " to some of the Swiss towns in which Russian political emigres are domiciled, with the object of corrupting them and of obtaining their assistance in the organiza- tion of an insurrection in Russia during the war. In particular they approached a group of Caucasian (Georgian) Social Democrats, and offered them money if they would work to pro- duce an insurrection. But the Caucasian exiles in Switzerland did as did their comrades in Con- stantinople — refused to become the tools of the Hapsburg monarchy or to organize a revolt in Russia with the aid of Austrian or German money. " We, the Georgian Social-Democrats, mem- bers of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia, have struggled, and shall always continue to strive, with all our party, against the Russian Government, which stifles all democratic move- ments in the Russian State and tramples on the natural aspirations of the peoples inhabiting that State. ... In this conflict we support all revo- lutionary movements, all oppositions, and, amongst others, the Nationalist movement when it is directed against the Russian Government and makes for liberty— if it is directed by the local progressive democracy and is not in any way contrary to the ideals and interests of the proletariat. But as to the proposal of an organization which operates by the material 250 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR assistance and under the guidance of the Hohen- zollerns and the Hapsburgs and their kin, we declare pubhcly and openly that we do not know what peoples are likely to be liberated by them. On the contrary, one of them has destroyed a nation as free and progressive as Belgium ; and as for the history of the Hapsburgs, it is, like that of Tsarism, a history of continual subjection and enslavement of many peoples. And their new ally, Turkey, as all the world knows, is noted for a barbarous and treacherous policy in all that concerns the small nations. Taking all these facts into consideration, we firmly reject the proposal to form such an organization as that described." In some cases the delegates of the " Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine " were simply shown to the door by the Russian revolutionaries whom they dared to approach. Once, however, they nearly caught in their net a Caucasian revo- lutionary, who, after the declaration of war, was living in Switzerland. The agents of the Union provided this Russian revolutionary with a false Austrian (sic) passport and gave him money. He was then sent to Vienna, where the members of the Union explained to him the necessity of organizing an insurrection in Russia, in the interests of the " Russian revolution," or to put the matter more plainly, in the interests of the Austro-German General Staff. From Vienna he IN THE BLOODY FRAY 251 was sent to Constantinople, where Herr Parvus, a German Socialist journalist, gave him yet further instruction.' Finally the agents of the Ukrainian (and also Austro-Turco-German) Union invited the Russian to enter a " Georgian Legion " organized by the Turkish Minister of War with the object of provoking an insurrection against Russian rule in the Caucasus. Fortunately, the Russian, although these gentry had caught him in their treacherous net, perfectly understood their intentions and succeeded in escaping. He returned to Switzerland, where he revealed their ignoble machinations. To conclude the narration of these examples of political baseness, I will quote a passage from a letter sent me by a well-known Ukrainian patriot and Social-Democrat (a patriot in the best sense of the word), who, during the first five months of the war, was living in Austria. " A month ago," he writes, " I arrived in X " (here follows the name of a Swiss town), " but until then was in Vienna, from which I escaped with much difficulty. " Living in Vienna just now is a painful busi- ness. The Ukrainian politicians have nearly all ^ The part played by Herr Parvus in this affair is even more disgusting than that of Herr Sudekum, who undertook the un- grateful task of giving treacherous instructions to a French soldier imprisoned in Germany, and released by the German military authorities, so that he might return to France and there conduct a "peace propaganda." 252 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR been corrupted. As for the Ukrainian and Rus- sian political refugees, the Austrian Government gave them a great deal of money for the purpose of organizing a revolution in Russia, thereby creating such depravation among my compatriots that my nerves could hardly support the atmo- sphere of Vienna." To complete the picture I will add that a Russian Social -Democrat published in the press a letter (over his own signature) in which he stated that one of the principal leaders of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was attached to the Viennese police service as a secret agent. This accusation has not been contradicted. On the 2nd of March 1 9 1 5 the Genevese journal La Suisse published the following, which gives some idea of the degree of baseness and stupidity of which the agents of the Austrian Government are capable in their fruitless endeavours to corrupt the Russian revolu- tionaries :— " On the Tuesday of last week one of the leaders of the Socialist Party of Geneva received a visit from an individual who stated that he was delegated by a Socialist Party in the East. A meeting was arranged for the same evening at the Cafe Grutli. But . . . the Genevese Socialist insisted on receiving further information as to the identity of his visitor. The latter was IN THE BLOODY FRAY 253 therefore forced to show his cards — or rather his card. " He was none other than an official personage, Captain B., the attache of a beUigerent Power, residing not far from Geneva. Without further preamble he asked to be put in touch with persons of influence in the Russian Socialist Party. " Foreseeing his mission, the Genevese Socialist resolved to see the end of the matter. A second interview was fixed . . . two ' persons of in- fluence ' in the advanced Russian party being present. " ' I am ordered,' commenced the Captain, ' to put myself in touch with influential members of the Russian Socialist Party in order to get into communication with the interior of Russia . These persons have only to establish relations with our confidential agents, our mercantile [sic] attache at Berne. But all this is absolutely secret.' . . . But what do you want us to do with your commercial attache ? -We are not merchants ! ' " He is called a commercial attache, but he really deals with political questions, and can put you into touch with Count . But when you meet him you must not seem to know him. But this is how you will recognize them : they are both clean-shaven, and Count B. has fair hair.' . . . " Then he concluded : 254 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The enemies of the Russian Government are our friends, our Karneraden, and we are fighting together for civilization.' " The emissary had emptied his bag. He was not kept waiting for his reply. " ' 1/ said one of the Russians, ' am a political exile. I have lived in Geneva, where I took refuge, for ten years. Before the war I passed through very difficult times. Your Government never thought of me then. Why does it display such solicitude now concerning the Russian political refugees in Switzerland ? ' " And as he received no reply, the political refugee continued : " ' You say you are fighting for civilization ? But there is one State which is certainly most highly civilized, and which you have invaded — Belgium ! There is another and more demo- cratic State, of which you occupy ten depart- ments. On the other hand, you are allies of Mohammed V, whose Government has persecuted the Armenians for more than three hundred years. In that case, how should you make use of us in order to overthrow our Government to the profit of your alliance? If we form an alliance it would be with the proletariat of your country, to institute a social State which would rid us of our tyrants and of yours.' " The reply of the Genevese Socialist was not less peremptory : IN THE BLOODY FRAY 255 " . . . ' You insult the Swiss Socialists by thinking them capable of acting the go-between for your Government in respect of our Russian comrades ; you insult them by supposing that they would place themselves at your disposal for cash. Before the war you dissolved the Reichsrath in order to prevent the working- classes of your country from protesting against your machinations. When at Budapest the pro- letariat showed itself in favour of universal suffrage, you had it shot down by the troops. It is very imprudent of you to ask the brothers of those same workers to conspire in favour of your Government. *' ' Tell your superiors that they have made a grave mistake in supposing that we should place ourselves at their disposal, and warn them not to try such tricks again.' " Piteously Captain B. excused himself : ' You understand, I was ordered to do this. ... I am a man of straw. I am forty-seven years of age . . .' " But the Genevese and the Russians left the cafe, leaving the Captain to his reflec- tions." Such are the facts. In the history of modern political infamy they will doubtless occupy a place worthy of them. It is very natural that the Russian Socialist organizations to whom the Austro-Turco-German 256 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR agents made their ignoble propositions should have declined them. Even if we ignore the shameful nature of these proposals, they were unacceptable, not only because their revolutionary sense of honour and their political conscience would not permit them to form an alliance with the monarchies of Austria, Germany, and Turkey against Tsarism. They wished to free them- selves by their own efforts, not by the aid of Austro -German and Turkish officers. Again, the majority of the Russian democrats regard the cause of the Triple Entente in the present war as a more righteous cause than that of the Turco- German alliance. Not to speak of the Russian democrats, moreover, many of the Austrian democrats are of the same opinion. In La Suisse (Geneve, 2nd of February 191 5) I read the following tragic story :— "At Saint-Imier [Switzerland] dwelt a work- ing-class family whose head was a young Austrian, Franz Fingust (born, in 1882, at Mar- burg, in Styria). On the 31st of January 19 14 he killed himself, having previously killed his wife, aged 29 years, and his two children, aged 7 and 20 months. " It was by agreement with his wife that he took this fatal step. Fingust, who was a thought- ful man and a good worker, had been called to the colours in Austria. In a letter addressed to one of his friends, the unfortunate man stated IN THE BLOODY FRAY 257 that he would rather die with his family than go to be killed in an unjust cause.'" How little the great majority of Russian Socia- lists and revolutionaries heeded the propaganda of the hysterical desire for a Russian defeat the reader may judge by the fact that a considerable number of the Russian political refugees in foreign countries enlisted, as volunteers, in the French Army, in order to help France to fight the Germans. In order to emphasize their feel- ings they formed, in one of the " foreign regi- ments " in the service of France a " Russian Republican company." And the soil of France is already red with the blood of the soldiers of this company. 17 CHAPTER VI I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. The " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." — II. The rural communes and co-operative associations in the campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. — III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — IV. The press in Russia during the war. I While the military authorities were mobiHzing the mihtary forces of Russia against the foreign invasion, the mobilization of the social forces of the country was spontaneously effected, and those forces prepared for a great campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. To support the wives and children of reservists called to the colours, to combat the economic disorder occasioned by a sudden dearth of labour, to help in the evacuation of sick and wounded, to organize medical relief for them, to organize relief for the refugees of regions invaded by the enemy, to assist the military authorities in the difficult work of revictualling the troops and fur- nishing them with clothing, etc.— such are the tasks assumed by public institutions and private 258 IN THE BLOODY FRAY 259 associations, some of which already existed before the war, while others were created ad hoc. The most important of these organizations are the " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." Ten days after the declaration of war a Congress of all the Russian Zemstvos was convoked in Moscow— that is, a Congress of all the local self - governing bodies of Governments and districts. Thirty-five Govern- ments of European Russia were represented by their delegates at this Congress, which elected a Central Committee, composed of two delegates from each Government, The duty of this Committee was to arrange for the evacuation and transport of sick and wounded soldiers, the organization of central depots of equipment and medicaments, the creation of medical and nursing staffs, the creation of large hospitals, etc. The same duties were assumed by the Central Committee of the Union of the Cities, whose Congress also was convoked after the declara- tion of war. This Committee is composed of delegates from the municipalities, in the pro- portion of ten delegates for each city having more than a million inhabitants, five from each city having more than 750,000 inhabitants, three from each city of 500-750,000 inhabitants, two from each city of 100-500,000 inhabitants, and one from each city having less than 100,000 inhabitants . 260 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR To give some idea of the amount of work accomplished by these two great organizations, it is enough to say that the Union of the Zemstovs organized, in the space of three weeks, hospitals for 64,000 sick and wounded. The forms of activity of the public institu- tions and the private associations which have evolved during the campaign against the miseries of warfare are extremely varied and numerous. The Universities, the scientific societies, work- shops and factories, the secondary schools, the various corporations (those of the advocates, school-teachers, engineers, etc.), organized their own hospitals, ambulance - trains, etc. Collec- tions of money and of gifts in kind (clothing, tobacco for the troops, etc.) were made every day with unfailing success. By the middle of October the Union of the Zemstvos alone was already maintaining 130,661 beds for wounded soldiers, thirty-five ambulance-trains, three ambulance corps to care for the wounded at the extreme front, a great linen depot, a depot of surgical material, a central pharmaceutical depot, etc. I The same energy was manifested by the Union of the Cities. n But the most remarkable fact in the reassuring picture of social activity in Russia during the ' See the Sovremenny Mir, Petrograd, December 19 14. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 261 Great War is the fact of the efforts made by the people themselves. The war broke out just when the work of the peasants in their fields was at its heaviest. The call for reservists deprived the countryside of hundreds of thousands, nay, millions, of workers, who were so necessary to the gathering of the harvest, the thrashing of corn, and the autumn sowings. Grain being the greatest wealth of Russia, the situation might have been extremely difficult had not the Russian peasantry proved itself equal to the occasion. Immediately after the departure of the reservists those who were not called to the colours took upon their shoulders the heavy agricultural tasks abandoned by those who had left for the front. In those regions of Russia where the rural commune, or mir, still exists the latter replaced by its collective forces the individual forces of the reservists who had been forced suddenly to leave their peaceful labours for the labours of war and the harvest of death. The mirskle skhody (the assemblies of the members of the rural commune) in many villages voted special resolutions concerning the relief and assistance of families whose members were called to the Army. The skhod of the village of Lipnitza (in the district of Sevsk) unanimously decides that the 262 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR agricultural work in progress in the fields of the reservists shall be terminated by the mir, as well as the work of the autumn sowing ; neces- sitous families will receive from the mir wood for fuel, and this wood is to be delivered at their houses by the m//--— that is, the peasants who have not gone to the war will cut the wood and haul it from the forest to the izbas in which the families of reservists dwell ; and the poorest families will receive gratuitously grain sufficient for their needs, provided by other members of the commune by means of a special collection. The skhod of one of the communes of the Government of Riazan decided to take all neces- sary measures to ensure that " not a single strip of land belonging to a reservist shall remain untilled." In the district of Saratov the corn belonging to reservists was harvested and carried into their barns by the mirs, which also undertook the work of sowing their lands. In the Government of Oufa the inhabitants of forty-three villages— Russian and Bashkir villages— founded a " confraternity " to assist the families of the soldiers in their agricultural labours and also with pecuniary support. It is the same in those regions where the rural commune does not now exist. The peasants of many of the villages of the Government of Vitebsk took upon themselves all IN THE BLOODY FRAY 263 work not terminated by the reservists. The same in the Governments of Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Moghilev, Kherson, etc. In one volost (canton) of the Government of Poltava the peasants not called to the colours assembled on the day appointed in the fields belonging to the families of soldiers and com- pleted the necessary labours there and then. The skhod of the village of Alexandrovka, in the district of Ackermann (Bessarabia), decided to leave its own tasks then and there in order first to complete the work remaining to be done on the fields of reservists. And so that the latter should not worry about their aban- doned fields the same skhod sent them the following letter : " Identifying itself with the destinies of the dear defenders of our country, the commune of Alexandrovka has decided to gather the harvest in the fields of the reservists called to the colours, and to beg them to accept the assurance that their families will not be left without support." According to the calculations made by a statistician, the labour gratuitously furnished by the peasants in aid of the families of their fellow- villagers who have left for the front may be expressed in money, approximately, by a figure of 1 6 millions of roubles. " This was," he says, " the greatest material sacrifice of all those which were made by the various groups of the Russian 264 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR society and people during the first weeks of the war." I To appreciate this sacrifice at its true worth we must remember that the rural popula- tion is the most indigent portion of the Russian population. In addition to this assistance " in kind," in the form of agricultural labour, the populations of the Russian countrysides organized relief and assistance for the families of soldiers. The skhod of the village of Fominki, in the Government of Vladimir, decided to distribute gratuitously seed-corn to necessitous families of soldiers. The skhod of the Shungenskaia Volost, in the Government of Kostroma, imposed on all the inhabitants of that volost a tax of one rouble per head in order to organize a relief fund for the benefit of wives and children of reservists. Similar cases were reported from every corner of the Russian Empire. The mutual credit organizations and the co- operative societies also participated in the work of relief and assistance. In the district of Moghilev the skhods placed at the disposal of the relief committees the entire revenue of the credit deposits and deposited savings for the year 19 1 3, and also 1,300 roubles in cash. In the ' See the review Yejemessiafshny Jourital, Petrograd, Sep- tember 1914 ; this number contains an article describing the activities of the peasants during the war, from which I cite the above facts. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 265 district of Lipetsk the assembly of the repre- sentatives of the " credit confraternities " decided to provide the families of soldiers with the sums necessary to purchase corn. In one of the districts of the Government of Kharkov the " credit confraternities " gratuitously lent agri- cultural machinery to the families of reservists. The local union of the co-operative societies of Kuban recommended its members to estab- lish special groups of " guardians " for those households deprived of their workers by the mobi- lization, these guardians replacing the reservists in the fields. In some regions the co-operative societies not only lent agricultural machinery to the families of soldiers, and the necessary implements for the tilling of the soil, but even bought these machines especially for employment in the fields of reservists. Many co-operative societies have perfectly organized the agricultural labour of the district, with the assistance of their non -mobilized members. Sometimes the co-operative societies created hospitals for the wounded, workshops for pre- paring linen, etc. The Federative Union of the Co-operative Societies of Russia and the People's Co-opera- tive Credit Bank in Moscow addressed the Presi- dent and deputies of the Duma in a message expressing their hope that " in the organization of relief for the families of reservists mobilized 266 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the Zemstovs will accept, as their useful col- laborators, the 30,000 co-operative societies existing in Russia, as these are the popular economic organizations with which the people is most familiar." In citing these facts the Russian publicist who published them in one of the Petrograd reviews continues : — " War gives rise to brutality, hatred, and dis- cord ; but it also unites mankind. . . . All for each, each for all — in this memorable year of miseries that touch the whole people — this call is heard as loudly as the clarion calling to battle. The cities and the new forces of the country- side are awakening. On the field of battle yonder, where the great conflict is developing, the struggle for the safety of our country and of European liberty, for their salvation from the yoke, from the ' mailed fist ' of the haughty Prussian Junkers ; and here, behind the army, the peaceful struggle goes forward for the preservation of the economy of labour. Every- where men who yesterday lived and acted in a state of separation are beginning to under- stand that their destiny is closely bound up with the destinies of their neighbours, of their village, their province : of Russia, Europe, and finally, of the entire world ! " ' ' Yejemessiatshny Journal^ Petrograd, September 19 14. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 267 III The war has had a great influence on the mtel- lectual youth of Russia. And of this influence we must distinguish two aspects. On the one hand, the war has diverted the interest and attention of our Russian youth from the questions which were vital to them before the war. Questions relating to economics, to matters of professional and corporative interest, or affecting university life, are forgotten and re- placed by other problems concerning the war and external politics. A great proportion of the Russian students were drawn into the whirlwind of patriotism which swept across all Russia during the first days of the war. The force of this whirlwind appeared sometimes even too much for the youth- ful minds of these students, and some of them were for some time poisoned by a kind of intel- lectual chauvinism. For example, a large group of students of the University of Petrograd voted a protest against the document signed by German scientists which treated Russian culture as a " base " form of culture. But in this protest the students fell into another exaggeration, in- serting in the text of the resolution an assertion devoid of meaning, to the effect that " the Russian people is humiliated in that which con- cerns its national situation, even on its own soil." 268 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR This assertion may be interpreted to mean that the " True Russians " are humihated in Russia itself by " ahens "—that is, Jews, Poles, etc.— which is untrue. A group of students of the University of Moscow organized a " patriotic " demonstration in the streets of the city, with national flags, the portrait of the Tsar, and the singing of the National Anthem. This demon- stration was terminated in a pogrom of the German shops and warehouses in Moscow. But these excesses of " patriotism " at once provoked numerous protests from the majority of the students. The representatives of the University students of Moscow published in the city Press an open letter, in which they con- demned these so-called " patriotic " manifesta- tions, declaring, with indignation, that " for the first time the word ' pogrom ' has been coupled with that of student." But it is by no means astonishing that there are, at this moment, individuals among the University youth of Russia capable of expressing their " patriotism " by the pillage of German goods ; this is merely the result of the policy of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which during the years of reaction made every possible effort to plant in the grow- ing minds of the students reactionary ideas which have favoured the creation of " True Russian " organizations among the students. But we may believe that the majority of the IN THE BLOODY FRAY 269 intellectual youth of Russia is free from such " patriotism." Immediately after the anti- German pogroms in Moscow dozens of students' organizations in that city declared that " the organized youth of the University has always been and will always be the representa- tive and the guardian of pan-human ideals and will remain faithful to the teaching of the best minds of Russian society." ' At the University of Petrograd also were found students who protested against the baser mani- festations of chauvinistic " patriotism," and who reminded their colleagues that the external enemy must not make them forget " the enemies within " whom Russian democracy has to fear. This is one aspect of the attitude assumed by the intellectual youth of Russia during and in respect of the war. Another aspect of the problem is the practical activity of the students during the war. On the 8/21 October an Imperial ukase was issued which gave the Minister of War the right to call to the colours those students who had a legal dispensation from military service during the term of their University studies. The Government created special military schools (the course of study being abbreviated) which a ' See the interesting article by M. Kleinbort, " Youth and the War," published in the great Russian review, Sovremenny Mir, in November 1914, p. 74 (Petrograd). 270 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR portion of the students called to the colours were obliged to enter, in order to pass the examina- tion for the grade of officer after six months' study. Others might be called up as soldiers. " The first impression produced by this ukase was that three-quarters of the entire mass of students would be called to serve, mostly as simple soldiers. But not a shadow of discon- tent or depression was visible : the whole youth of Russia had but one wish, that the orders of the ukase should be accomplished as soon as possible. At Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Kazan, Riga— everywhere the students marched through the streets, proclaiming that they would not hold back when the people, the Russian people, was shedding its blood on the field of battle for the future of Russia." ' But more remarkable still and more touching is the part which the students of both sexes are playing in the campaign against the suffering caused by the war. The students, most of whom are themselves extremely poor, give all they can from their slender resources towards the work of relief for the families of reservists, aid to the wounded, and the creation of hospitals, etc. But both male and female students give even more in the shape of their own personal services. The students of the Technological Institute at Petro- ' "Youth and the War," Sovrefnenny Mir, November 19 14, p. 72 (Petrograd). IN THE BLOODY FRAY 271 grad pass whole days in the work of repairing mihtary motor-cars, etc. The students of the Polytechnic Institute at Riga prepare chemical products and various articles required by the mili- tary hospitals. A very large number of students of both sexes are employed as nurses and bearers and dressers, working at the extreme front and at the various forwarding stations. There are cities where the whole work of unloading the hospital trains is done by the University students, who show themselves, not only adequate to a very heavy task, but full of devotion and ten- derness towards the poor wounded soldiers. IV A few words as to the Russian Press and the literature of the war. From the literary point of view we observe in Russia what was remarked in other belligerent countries, notably, that the poets and novelists are not proving themselves equal to their task, and the best of their poetical production appears miserably inadequate in comparison with the grandeur of events. A dozen or two theatrical pieces were written by Russian dramatists on warlike subjects a short time after the declara- tion of war, but these plays, all full of a false patriotism and chauvinism, do not reveal much talent in their authors, being commonplace and 272 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR insignificant productions. The drama of Belgian life during the war entitled " King, Law, and Liberty," written by the well-known writer Leonid Andreev, was no exception to these literary platitudes. A far greater service has been rendered to Russian letters by those of our writers who have confined their efforts to those of the simple mili- tary correspondent and have gone to the front, there to observe and describe the bloody task of the troops. Among its military correspondents the Russian Press includes several names well known to the public. Unhappily, the Government, as we know, suppressed at one blow the whole of the " Left " press, as it existed on the outbreak of war, while the " Right " and reactionary press was free to continue its disastrous work of poisoning the mind of the people. Special enterprises were created by the reactionaries, often with assistance from the authorities, for the purpose of providing the people with " national and patriotic " litera- ture during the war. What this " literature " is you may judge by the following quotation from a " popular broadsheet " on the war, distributed gratuitously by the reactionaries. Explaining the causes of the war, the author of this sheet finds them in the fact that Germany possesses a Constitution ! Wilhelm II, he says, is good, extremely good. "' He always wished to become IN THE BLOODY FRAY 273 an autocrat, and if he were an absolute monarch he . . . would make Germany glorious in the domain of peaceful work." But in Germany there is a Constitution and a Parliament, and the Constitution and parliamentarianism are the cause of the war, which " once again shows the disadvantages of a constitutional and republican government." Citing all these imbecilities, and stating that they are distributed in great quantities (by the hands of the priests, who distribute them in the churches, etc.), a Russian scholastic review declares that " such a manner of informing the people as to the war can serve no useful purpose and may do much harm." ' I cannot pass over in silence the propaganda which during the war has been conducted by the chief and official organ of the Russian reaction, the Russkole Znamia ("The Russian Flag"), published by the Central Committee of the Union of the Russian People, otherwise known as the "Black Bands." In the middle of October— that is, ten weeks after the outbreak of war— 4his " True Russian " organ published an article full of praises of the German system of government and the Hohen- zollern monarchy. " Germany is the incarnation of a national * See the Russkaya Shkola (" The Russian School"), Petrograd, December 1914, p. 21. 18 274 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR power, thanks to these sane and healthy prin- ciples on which the administration of the States is based," says the Russkoie Znamia. " The monarchist principle has found in Germany a brilliant exemplification." The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns " incarnates in itself and propa- gates lofty principles which are precious to humanity." Its enemies do not love it because they regard it as " the most capable of the realization of the monarchical principle as an ideal." " May these principles remain wholly intact, for they are sane and healthy and make for the welfare of the world." The Russkoie Znamia not only does not wish to see the power of the Hohenzollerns destroyed, but declares, on the contrary, that " if Germany changes the government of one of her neighbours from a republic to a monarchy, such a change will be by no means regrettable from the point of view of humanity, order, and tranquillity in Europe and the successful life of nations." Such " True Russian " ideas were expressed by the organ of the Extreme Right on the morrow of the occupation and devastation of Belgium and the invasion of a portion of France by the German troops, and at a moment when Russian soldiers were dying in defending Russian soil against the German invader. Comment is superfluous. This reactionary propaganda is the more harm- IN THE BLOODY FRAY 275 ful in that the interest felt by the populace in the " printed word " has enormously increased during the war. "Every village to-day has its 'political club.' If you go to the office of the communal adminis- tration at nine o'clock in the evening you will find there a crowd of moujiks, old and young, and of boys. The clerk or some old soldier who can read will be reading aloud from the news- paper, which the schoolmaster has given him. He reads loudly and distinctly. . . . Everybody listens attentively. . . . After the reading . . . a most animated conversation ensues, which often leads to the most impassioned discussions." " The number of journals printed is increasing. Despite the obstacles offered by the censorship and the police, new journals are springing up where none as yet existed. . . . Some perish ingloriously— the martyrology of the Russian Press is long — but others occupy the place of their deceased brothers and continue the work for the Fatherland. Already it is impossible to check this powerful impulse in the direction of the printed word. ... At the railway-stations men and women and children push their way into the carriages and beg the passengers to give them their newspapers. Who are these people? They are the men employed on the railways and the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages." ^ ' See " The War and the Press " in the Riisskiya Viedomosii, 4th of December 1914 (Moscow). *,j,<; RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The aged peasants who cannot read borrow the school-books of then children and grand- children and try to teach themselves. '* The peasants read the newspapers every evening and on every holiday. They meet in groups in the house of one or another of their number, and try to project their minds, unaccus- tomed to the printed idea, into distant parts and foreign countries. That portion of the map which represents the seat of war is quite black now ; every day the horny fingers travel from Lemberg to Cracow, from Warsaw to Berlin and back." I So the war, we realize, has given a great impulse to the intellectual life of the people. ^ Rnsskaya Shkola, December 19 14, p. 15. CHAPTER VII ' I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he fought against Japan. — The " liberation idea " and the war. I All the facts presented in the preceding chapters of this book will enable the reader already to feel something of the profound difference between the moral condition and the military valour of the Russian Army in the present war and the condition of our Army in the war against Japan. All observers and students of Russian life unanimously declare that the manner in which the people regards the present war has nothing in common with its conception of the war of 1904. The Russo-Japanese War was a distant war, which did not affect the vital interests of the popular masses, while the war against Austria, Germany, and Turkey is close at hand. The Russo-Japanese War was regarded as an 277 278 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR adventure on the part of the upper classes, an offensive war, and an unjust war ; while the present war, in the eyes of the masses, is a just, defensive war . This difference was perceptible from the begin- ning of the mobilization. When the recruits of 1914 were called up for medical examination there were among them no malingerers attempt- ing to escape military service. " All have become fit," says a provincial journal, the Zaouralsky Kray, describing the medical examination of the class of 1914 from the region of Ural. " Formerly, when a youth was exempted from service he ran off at the top of his speed and got drunk to express his delight. To-day he is exempted, but he grumbles : ' Why am I not good enough for the war? I am no worse than others. They have taken Peter and Ivan—am I less fit than they ? ' Formerly he fled like a goat ; to-day one has to explain to him why he will be of no use to the Army." Another provincial paper describes the depar- ture of the troops from a village in the Golvern- ment of Yaroslavl : — " This year the departure of the recruits from the villages has been effected in an extraordinary atmosphere. . . . There was not a single drunken man among the recruits, and no painful scenes took place when the new soldiers took leave of their relatives. They marched off in IN THE BLOODY FRAY 279 orderly ranks, accompanied to the outskirts of the villages by the whole of the inhabitants. ' Bear yourselves well, for Russia and the world of peasants ! ' cry the old men. ' Come back heroes — we will cover you with flowers ! ' cry the young girls." The mobilization and concentration of the Russian Army was effected much more rapidly than was expected, which is explained, not only by the suppression of the sale of vodka but also by the attitude of the people, who understood the gravity of the moment and the necessity of making the greatest possible effort against so powerful and dangerous an enemy. The condition of complete sobriety observed during the mobilization has continued during the war. Here is a reference to the state of tem- perance which prevails even among the higher officers on the field of battle, a description from the pen of M. Ludovic Naudeau, military corre- spondent of the Journal. This description is the more interesting as M. Naudeau was with the Russian Army in Manchuria in 1904-5 and was able to make a comparison between what he saw then and what he saw in 1 9 1 4 : — " Ah ! Where is it, that uproarious restaurant- car which formerly, at the time of the Manchurian War, used to stop near the place where the General Staff was to be found? Where is this travelling restaurant, from which a pleasant 280 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR gaiety emanated even in the darkest hours, while more than once feminine voices mingled with the talk of the warriors ? . . . Where are those bottles, capped with gold or silver, which were opened so joyfully, so merrily, yonder in the land of the yellow men, while the Japanese guns were raging? Gone is the copious drinking, the libations, and the ingenuous gaiety." However, the suppression of alcohol and the sobriety of the troops were not enough to ensure the victory of Russia over a powerful adversary. The composition of the higher command of the Russian Army was somewhat defective, as the promotion of generals and lesser officers in Russia depends too often, not on their military capacities but on their relations and their political convictions. For instance, during the first inva- sion of Prussia by the Russian Army the com- mand of the left wing of that army was confided to General Rennenkampf, a " True Russian " of German origin, who was famous, not for his military talents but for the cruelty with which he suppressed the revolutionary movement of 1905 in Siberia, where he shot down the " suspects " by dozens without trial, took " hostages," and in general behaved like ... a German officer in a conquered country ! And this is what a Swiss journal (the Geneva Tribune) has to say of the Russian defeats in Eastern Prussia : — " The first Russian invasion threw two armies IN THE BLOODY FRAY 281 on to Prussian soil, which numbered together 650,000 men. General Hindenburg defeated them in a series of rapid actions. ... Of the two splendid armies of Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf nothing was left but shapeless ruin . The jealousy of Rennenkampf in respect of his colleague assisted the strategy of Hindenburg : General Tiger, as the Japanese nicknamed Rennenkampf, could ill support the intellectual superiority of Samsonov. He left him alone at grips with the Germans, although they were not far apart and he must have known that Samsonov's army had to deal with a powerful enemy. Samsonov died a glorious death at the head of his troops." ' Another prominent Swiss Journal, La Gazette de Lausanne, discussing the causes of the second defeat of the Russians in Eastern Prussia, made a statement to which I would direct the most serious attention of my readers : — " The most plausible explanation of the rela- tive weakness revealed by the stafif of the Com- mander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, is probably to be found in the intrigues of the German party in Petrograd. It is by no means impossible that the German General Stafif should be secretly informed of the strength and weakness of the positions of the enemy, the dis- tribution of his troops, and his plans of action. ' La Tribune, Geneva, 20th of February 1915. 282 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR " To those who feel amazement at the idea that treason could exist in Russia, where no war has ever been more popular, let us recall the fact that a certain number of high officials detest the liberalism of the Western nations, in whose triumph they see a menace to their privileges ; that Prussia and Prussian ' order ' is their ideal, and that they dread a Prussian defeat as a catastrophe. " When we form opinions on things Russian we must never lose sight of the abyss which divides the great Slav nation from the interests of certain of those who govern it." ' II How far the supposition expressed by the Gazette de Lausanne was well founded we may judge by the following official statement, issued by the General Staff of the Russian Commander- in-Chief on the 3rd of April 1 9 1 5 :— " As a result of information respecting the actions of Lieutenant-Colonel Miassoiedov^ inter- preter to the staff of the loth Army, this officer was placed under observation. " Directly this observation had confirmed the suspicions entertained as to the criminal character of the actions of the said officer, who was in touch with the agents of a hostile Power, Lieutenant-Colonel Miassoiedov was arrested, ' Gazette de Laitsatmcy 1 6th of February 19 15. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 283 and at the same time other persons were arrested, not belonging to the Army but suspected of the same criminal activities. " The preliminary examination established the guilt of Lieutenant -Colonel Miassoiedov in a most positive manner ; he was therefore sent before a court-martial to reply to an accusation of espionage. The court found him guilty and he was hanged. " The examination in respect of his accom- plices is proceeding, and as the guilt of each prisoner is established he will be sent before the competent tribunal." To complete the picture, I may add that Colonel Miassoiedov (of the gendarmerie) was one of the chief officers of the Russian political police, an organizer of provocation, one of the " Russifiers " of Finland, and, in general, one of the " pillars " of the Russian reaction. As for his accomplices, it is said that they were mostly agents or ex-agents of the political pohce. There is nothing surprising' in this. On the contrary, it is very natural that the unclean trade of an agent-provocateur , who betrays and sells the revolutionists of his own country, should be doubled by the unclean trade of a spy, who betrays and sells his own country. One of the members of the Duma, M. Kerensky, addressed the following courageous 284 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR declaration, in respect of the Miassoiedov affair, to the President of the Duma :— " M. LE President,— " By order of the miHtary authorities some officers of the gendarmes and officials of the Department of the Police have been arrested.' They are accused of high treason and of relations with the enemy. Treason has made itself a nest in the Ministry of the Interior, Russian society had already, for some considerable time, uneasily fol- lowed the activities of this department, based as it is on a system of provocation which is in- evitably sapping the Governmental organism and corrupting the powers of the State. The Duma also had more than once drawn attention to the serious danger which arises out of this system, and had expressed its suspicion of the Ministry of the Interior, at the same time condemning the entire domestic policy of the Cabinet, " Then the war broke out. All Russia, in a supreme effort of its popular forces, has risen to accomplish one common aim— to repulse the aggression of the enemy. Only the Ministry of the Interior, acting in agreement with the Ministry of Justice, is continuing its destructive activities with unusual energy, and is irritating and loosening the bonds of society. By the " The Department of Police is occupied principally in the persecution of revolutionaries, and, in general, persons whose political opinions are "suspect " or "subversive." IN THE BLOODY FRAY 285 arrest of Bourtzev the Government at one blow extinguished the enthusiasm of large numbers of persons, and also betrayed its manner of in- terpreting its own declaration concerning ' the forgetting of internal dissensions.' And it was with very good reason that the members of the Duma, during the session of the Budgetary Com- mittee of that body— recalling the arrest of Bourtzev and of the Social-Democratic Labour deputies, the campaign against the Press, and the policy of the Government in Poland, Finland, and Galicia — hinted that these acts of the Govern- mental authorities visibly revealed the character of a hostile obstruction which was calculated to militate against a happy termination of the external conflict. The most startling manifesta- tion of the destructive action of the Government was the publication of a lying official declaration that a portion of the members of the Duma desired the defeat of the Russian armues. Mean- while, in the very heart of the Ministry of the Interior, calmly and confidently, a solid organiza- tion of the real traitors is at work. The suspicion involuntarily presents itself that the Ministry of the Interior is consciously endeavour- ing to divert the attention of Russian society to a false trail. Russian society is well aware that the directing circles of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice are deeply involved in that considerable political movement 286 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR which regards it as imperiously necessary that a close union with the Berlin Government should be re-established as speedily as possible, that Government being the most powerful ally of our internal reaction. For this reason Russian society finds it hard to believe that these adminis- trative departments can possibly disclose in its full extent this organization of traitors, whose traces were — by chance— discovered by the mili- tary authorities. The intervention of Russian society itself is necessary, and it alone can claim the needful authority. The State Duma must do its utmost to protect the nation from a hideous stab in the back. In the name of my electors I beg you, M. le President, as the official repre- sentative of the Duma, to insist on the immediate convocation of the State Duma in order that it may address to the Government an interpellation concerning the existence of high treason in one of the central administrations of the Government, and also accomplish its duty, which is to exercise an unrelaxing control over the actions of the Executive at a moment so exceptional. " A. Kerensky, " Member of the Duma., "The 25th of February (nth of March, new style) 1915." Unfortunately, M. Kerensky's demands were without result. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 287 The Miassoiedov affair reveals a few more characteristic details. In the first place, Colonel Miassoiedov was once before accused of military espionage — two years earlier, by M. Gutshkov, sometime President of the Duma. But the Government, with which Miassoiedov was a persona grata, was not willing to risk the con- sequences of the charge brought by M. Gutshkov, who was even challenged to a duel by Miassoiedov, who declared his honour to be attainted. Investigation established the fact that Miassoiedov enjoyed intimate and personal rela- tions with W'ilhelm II. The latter, during his visits to his estate of Rominten, in Eastern Prussia, used to invite Colonel Miassoiedov, then the chief officer of the Frontier Guard at Wir- ballen, a few miles distant from Rominten, to visit him. And we need not suppose that the German Emperor disdained to direct the activities of the traitor who sold his Government and his country. We have here yet another interesting fact for the biographers of WilheJm II. Ill As for the troops, they have shown themselves in this war, as I have already said, equal to the greatness of their task. The German Social- Democratic " comrades " who have so quickly forgotten the hymns of praise which they sang 288 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR in 1905-6 in honour of the "noble" Russian people who were ready to die for liberty, and who have now plunged the dagger of treason into the back of European democracy and the Russian revolution, are to-day writing that the Russian Army is merely a mob of " stolid brutes " (the expression is that used by Vorwdrts). But this amiable appreciation— especially on the part of the " comrades "— has no correspondence with the reality. It is true that the Russian soldier is not so well educated as the German soldier, who " carries in his knapsack " — as Herr Gerhardt Hauptmann informs us — " the works of Goethe, Nietzsche, the Bible, etc." There are certainly illiterates in the Russian Army. None the less we may assert that in the present war the Russian soldier appears to us, not as a beast of burden but as a man who understands for what cause he is fighting and dying, and who believes that cause is a just cause. And here I must say a few words of a very important and very interesting trait observed by many witnesses who have been in contact with the Russian troops during the war. It is that the " idea of liberation " is very prevalent among the Russian troops. For many the present war is not only a just war and a defensive war, it is also a war of " liberation." The impression produced by the brutal aggression of great IN THE BLOODY FRAY 289 Austria against little Serbia, by the crushing of neutral Belgium by the German Army, by the cruelties committed by German officers upon the civil populations of Belgium, IvrancCj and Poland, by the treacherous attack of Turkey, which is re- garded in Russia as the hangman among nations —all this has greatly contributed to this mental state of the Russian soldiers, who believe sincerely that they are dying for an ideal of liberation. And here is a touching story which illustrates this simple faith : — In one of the hospitals of the Caucasian Army a Russian non-commissioned officer lay in the next bed to some Bagdad Arabs, prisoners. " . . . He writes verses. I will not" — says the military correspondent who tells the story— " speak of the literary quality of these verses. They are very defective in form and very ordinary as to substance. . . . But one half -stanza is notable for its curious simplicity : — Here is Mount Ararat. It has a brooding look. . . . One would think it was waiting to be set free. " What do you think of that? It is very delightful. A non-commissioned officer, coming from the Russian plains, feels a need of setting Mount Ararat free ! Poor, feeble Ararat, sixteen thousand feet in height ! . . . When I explained to the hospital doctor the poetical dream of his sympathetic patient, the doctor remarked : ' Oh, 19 290 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the idea of a liberation is widely diffused among our soldiers.' " ' Another soldier of the Caucasian Army ex- plained the necessity of abstaining from vodka and the suppression of the drink traffic in the following manner : " A drunken man can't set anybody free ! " While stating that the Russian soldier is fighting in the present war far better than he fought ten years ago, I ought at the same time to state that the errors of the domestic policy of Tsarism are shackling his heroic impulse. By not proclaiming a political amnesty Tsarism has retained in the backgroimd of the Army which is marching against the enemy the prisons and penal settlements, which are very living tombs, in which are suffering the noblest of Russia's sons. By failing to suppress the racial and religious restrictions the Government continues to poison the moral atmosphere in which the country is living during the war and which the army is breathing as it fights. These errors diminish the successes of the Army by weakening the moral of the Army. We have seen also that the German Socialists are mistaken in regarding the Russian soldier as " stolid." On the contrary, in this war they are animated by feelings which are perhaps ingenuous, but which are generous in the ' See the Russkoic Slovo, January 191 5, Moscow. IN THE BLOODY FRAY 291 extreme. Are they indeed " brutes," as Vorwdrts asserted? I have searched the news- papers (Austrian and German amongst others) for information as to the attitude of the Russian soldier in the presence of civil populations. I have, I do not deny, found a few cases— very few, but very disgusting— of violence committed upon civilians by the Cossacks. But I must add that such actions happily are few and ex- ceptional, as is proved even by the enemy's press . Thus, for instance, the Danzers Armeezeltung, a paper edited entirely by Austrian officers, pro- tests, in its issue of the 15th of October 19 14, against the false accusations brought against the Russian soldiers by the Austrian press, and stated :— " The ' Muscovite hordes ' are in reality armies of brave and valiant soldiers. ... In isolated cases the Red Cross has not beei:i respected, and we sometimes hear of pillage, but on the whole we have before us an honest and chivalrous enemy." Alas ! the populations of Belgium, France, and Poland cannot say of the Prussian officers and soldiers what this Austrian military journal finds itself compelled to say of the Russian Army. The declaration of the Danzers Armeezeitunor is all the more precious in that it may be re- garded as confirming the testimony of a well- informed observer, M. R., a Ukrainian patriot 292 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR and writer. M. R., who has no Russophile ten- dencies and does not conceal his dislike of the Russian occupation of Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, lived in Austria during the first five months of the war. • , " Generally speaking," he tells us, " the Russian troops have behaved better, in Buko- vina and Galicia, than the Austrian soldiery. The Russians did not drink (with very rare exceptions), and paid for what they took to supply their needs from the local population, while the Austrians did drink and did not pay." According to a statement published in the French and Swiss press, the German journals found themselves obliged to contradict the rumours relating to Russian atrocities. Notably, Vorwarts on the 23rd of March declared that the official inquiry opened in Eastern Prussia established the non-existence of the atrocities of which the Russians were accused. These accusations were based merely on the gossip of soldiers published in a Konigsberg newspaper. I explain this relatively correct attitude on the part of our soldiers by attributing it to the effects of the generous and humanitarian propaganda which the democratic parties have for so long conducted among the Russian peasants and industrial workers. It is incontestable that the German soldier has a better general education, IN THE BLOODY FRAY 293 and that he has passed through the Public Schools. But the Russian soldier has passed through the school of the Revolution. I believe the influence of the latter is perhaps more pro- found. PART III AFTER THE WAR -54 CHAPTER I I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. The possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Are they necessary to Russia? I WRITE these words " after the war " at a moment when the war is not only not finished, but when no one can say how long it will last. None the less, I will try to reply to this ques- tion : What shall we find after the war ? What will its effects and results be on the life of the Russian State and the Russian people, or rather the Russian peoples? Let us begin by considering the possible territorial changes. Let us venture on a very likely supposition— that the war will end in a complete victory of the Allied troops over the armies of Germany and Austria and Turkey. What territorial acqui- sitions will in that case be possible and desirable for Russia ? To reply to this important question we will refer to an official document of not too recent 297 298 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR origin, but which has lost none of its actuaUty. This is the report of General Kuropatkin, which was presented by him to the Tsar in 1900, and was reproduced in his " Memoirs " on the Russo- Japanese War. There we find an interesting analysis of the Russian frontiers from the strate- gical and political point of view, and a review of the possible modifications of these frontiers. The present frontier between Russia and Turkey was established after the Russian victories of 1877-8. It coincides with the natural boundaries, and " not only protects our possessions against the attempts of Turkey but constitutes an advantageous point of departure for our march towards the principal point of Asia Minor and the only fortress of serious value on the whole of the route until Scutari is reached —the fortress of Erzeroum. Thus the existing frontier between Russia and Turkey may be considered as being fully satisfactory and demands no modifications." ' The political frontier between Russia and Austria does not coincide with a natural frontier, and from a strategical point of view it would be perhaps desirable for Russia to push it back to the Carpathians, towards the west, incor- porating the whole of Galicia in the Russian Empire. But first of all we must consider whether such an addition of territory and of ' Memoirs, Russian edition, p. 57. AFTER THE WAR 299 population is necessary for Russia ; whether we should be stronger after this addition, or whether we should perhaps create for ourselves a source of weakness and anxiety ? To this question General Kuropatkin replies in the negative. " The separation of Galicia from Austria when Galicia has for so long lived her own life isolated from us can only be effected by violent and therefore unhealthy means. Not only the Polish population but also the Russian (the Russiny or Ruthenes) is without any desire to be incor- porated in the Russian State. . . . Despite the painful economic situation of the population of Galicia, despite the monopolization of land by the Jews, despite the taxes, which are heavier than in Russia, despite the relative inequality of the rights of Poles and Ruthenians, the popu- lation of Galicia is justified in considering the level of its culture as higher than that of the neighbouring populations of Russia. The Slav population of Galicia believes that its incorpora- tion in the Russian State would be a retro- grade step, not a step in advance. ... If we allow ourselves to be tempted by the idea of enlarging our possessions as far as the natural frontier of Galicia, we should without doubt create an unending source of anxiety for our- selves. . . . Galicia occupied by us might become a new Alsace-Lorraine." » ' Memoirs Russian edition, pp. 54-5. 300 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR General Kuropatkin applies these considera- tions also to the idea of the conquest of Eastern Prussia. " Possessing the two banks and the mouths of the Vistula and the mouth of the Niemen, we should occupy a highly threatening position towards Germany and should consider- ably improve our frontier from a military point of view. But these advantages would be far from compensating for all the disadvantages of such an enlargement of the frontiers of Russia. We should be confronted by a new Alsace- Lorraine problem, but in an aggravated form. . . . The population of Eastern Prussia will always be hostile to us on account of the superiority of its culture and its ties with the population and the historical past of Germany." ' Moreover, the violent occupation of Galicia and Eastern Prussia by Russia would involve a perpetual menace of a fresh conflict with Austria and Germany, who would never reconcile them- selves to the loss of these provinces. All these considerations led General Kuropat- kin absolutely to negative the idea of any augmentation of Russian territory at the expense of Germany and Austria. I can but agree with his attitude, adding a few more reasons for so doing. As far as the interests of the great masses of the Russian people are concerned the enlarge- ' Memoirs, Russian edition, p. 51- AFTER THE WAR 301 merit of the frontiers would represent no advan- tages. The territories of Galicia, Bukovina, and Eastern Prussia cannot constitute a " basis of colonization " for the peasants of Russia, because these provinces are more thickly populated than Russia itself. Asia Minor, again, would not constitute a possible colony, firstly because it has a fairly dense population, and secondly because its soil and climate are not such as are familiar to Russian agriculturists. The Russian people has nothing to gain from these countries, and would gain nothing save the hatred of the natives, who would greatly object to their violent sub- jection by Russia. The annexation of Galicia and Eastern Prussia might even create diffi- culties for the Russian agriculturists, as these two countries are agricultural par excellence and would compete against the rural economy of the rest of the Empire. As for Russian industry, it has no need of Eastern Prussia or Galicia or Anatolia. It has before it the vast home market of the Empire, which is by no means supersatu- rated—it is not even saturated— from the point of view of consumption. What the masses of the Russian peoples need is^ not the conquest of new territories but a pro- found transformation of the internal government of the life of the people and of the political and economic conditions of its existence. 302 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR II But there is one special factor in the jprospect of a victory of the Allies which is of great importance to Russia and to all the other Powers. This is the question of the possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. In discussing this question we must reject all arguments of a religious and historic order, which are merely the verbal and metaphysical em- broidery of the economic and political aspirations of the Russian Nationalists. The sacred duty of planting the Orthodox Cross on the dome of St. Sophia at Constantinople, of re-taking from the Turk the heritage of the Byzantine Emperors, etc.— all this is merely a stringing together of words that have no concrete meaning. If the Orthodox Russian Church has been able to do without St. Sophia for so many centuries, it can do without it in the future ; and the Russian monarchy can very well do without Byzantium. If, rejecting all these empty words, we address ourselves to the analysis of the true interests of Russia, we shall see that the possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople is not necessary to her. Turkey is not necessary as a market for Russian produce, which is exported thither in far smaller quantities than English, Austrian, German, Greek and Bulgarian goods. In demanding possession AFTER THE WAR 303 of Constantinople Russia cannot base her claim on the possession of the Turkish market by Russian commerce, which occupies one of the lowest places in that market. But the problem of the Dardanelles has for Russia a great im- portance in another sense : the Straits form the principal outlet for Russian cereals. From this point of view Russia is bound to take an interest in the question of the possession of the Straits and of Constantinople. But we must not forget that there are many other Powers and States whose economic interests are as closely bound up in this question as those of Russia. In 1909-10, for example, of the total tonnage of vessels enter- ing the port of Constantinople, 41' 7 flew the British flag, 177 the Greek, 92 the Austrian, and only 7 per cent, the Russian. The unde- niable fact that the commercial interests of many States are involved is a sufficient argument to oppose the possession of the Straits and of Con- stantinople by Russia by the idea of neutraliza- tion, which would be the more advantageous as it would cause the minimum prejudice to Turkey. Needless to say, the Balkan States— Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia— ought to share, with the Great Powers, in the administration of the neutralized Straits and capital. Such a solution would possess the further ad- vantage that it would eliminate one of the objects of disagreement between Russia and England, 304 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR who cannot permit that Russia, possessing the Dardanelles, should threaten the Mediterranean, the Balkan States, and Asia. The neutralization of the Dardanelles might solve the difficult and complicated problem without disagreement be- tween the Allies and in the interests of all. Professor Migulin, one of the leaders of economic Imperialism in Russia, is of opinion that " the territorial acquisitions in the West [Galicia and Prussia] will not greatly enrich Russia," as these regions are well populated, con- siderably in debt, and so far developed, from an economic point of view, that they might com- pete with Russian trade and production. But the same writer considers that Russia should appropriate " the German heritage in Turkey," taking, not only the Dardanelles and Constanti- nople but also all Asia Minor. In the Duma, in January 191 5, the leader of the " Cadets," M. Milukov, insisted that Russia must gain possession of the Straits and Constanti- nople. He repeated his words during a public speech made at Moscow on the 31st of January, in which he declared even that Russia " must make haste and take the Dardanelles as soon as possible, so as not to be behind-hand." ' The same declaration was repeated in the Duma by the representative of the Nationalists, who ' Quoted from the Russkoie Slovo of the 19th of January ( I St of February) 191 5. AFTER THE WAR 305 declared: "The Straits and Tsargrad [Con- stantinople] must belong to us and to us only." M. Milukov supported him, saying that " the acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople should be assured by the aid of both diplomatic and military measures." In this case, as in so many others, the leader of the Russian Liberals does not express the true feelings and aspirations of our democracy during the present war, for whom the present war is not a war of conquest and usurpation, but simply a war to defend Russia and Europe against the brutal aggression and domination of Germany. 20 CHAPTER II I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and the destruction of Prussian Imperialism. — II. The defeat of Germany is to the advantage of the German revolutionaries and the Socialists of Germany and of all Europe. I In denying the necessity of an enlargement of the territory of Russia at the expense of her enemies, I wish to lay stress on the advantages which the victory of the Allies over Germany, Austria, and Turkey would signify for the economic and political progress of all Europe. But if Germany were victorious Europe would lie prostrate under the heavy boot of Prussian Imperialism. The great development of German industry would enable Germany to complete her military victory by monopolizing the European market and a great part of the world-market. German capitalism would flourish to the detriment of the industries of other countries, and the German people would grow wealthy at the ex- pense of other peoples. The economic progress of Europe, crushed under the boot of Prussia, would be arrested, and would assume unhealthy forms under the pressure of the monopolization and parasitism of German capital. 306 AFTER THE WAR 307 To save the economic life of Europe from the disastrous effect of this monopolization and para- sitism is the first task of the Allies now fighting against Germany. But Russia ? Perhaps some Germanophile or Russophobe will ask me whether the victory of Russia would not be as disastrous to the economic progress of Europe. By no means. Russia is a semi-capitalist, agricultural country, and has not the technical advantages which would permit her to monopolize the European market, much less the world-market, as her industry and her capital are still too undeveloped and too weak for such a task, while Germany is the most highly industrialized country of Europe. Erom the social and political point of view the German domination of Europe would, I think, be equally perilous. We can well imagine what results this domination would have in annexed Belgium or crushed and humiliated France. It would be the triumph of Prussian absolutism over the democratic regimes of other nations. It would also involve a great set-back to the labour move- ment in the conquered States, for instead of find- ing occupation in the conflict of classes, and the social, professional, and political aspects of that conflict, the intellectual forces of the proletariat of the three capitalist countries— England, France, and Belgium— would be absorbed by the idea of revenge, of national defence, and of libera- tion from the German yoke. Nationalism and 308 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR chauvinism would supplant international Social- ism in the labour movement of a great part of Europe. II The defeat of Germany, on the other hand, is necessary, not only to the progress and democracy of Europe, but to Germany herself. It would shatter the omnipotent influence of the Prussian Junkers, and the HohenzoUern monarchy, which relies on their support. It would force the German people to understand that it must recon- struct its political system and free itself from the absolutist militarism of which it seems at the present moment to be the timid and faithful tool. Even now I can detect symptoms of the awaken- ing of the German people. While at the beginning of the war the most popular of the political parties of Germany, the Social -Democratic Party, was absolutely obedient to the Government, after six months of warfare it is already beginning to pro- test. The Socialist deputies of the Prussian Landtag proclaim the necessity of concluding peace as speedily as possible. Karl Liebknecht, deputy to the Reichstag, refuses to associate him- self with the Prussian Government, and openly declares that the military cliques of Austria and Germany are responsible for the outbreak of the war. In certain important Social-Democratic organizations in the provinces secession has oc- curred owing to the attitude of the central official AFTER THE WAR 309 centres. The labour organization of Charlotten- burg, the great suburb of Berlin, voted a protest against the war, and declared that the principal responsibility for the war rested with the Govern- ments of Austria and Germany. This popular discontent will increase as the Germans meet with failure on the field of battle. The German people, whose Government promised to take Paris in a month and conquer Russia before Christmas of 19 1 4, begins to see tTiat it is deceived. And, in spite of all its dislike of revolutionary measures, the German people will rid themselves of abso- lutism by a revolution if that absolutism is defeated in the war. But this is not all. I should wish to draw the attention of all European Socialists to a point of special interest and importance to the Socialist movement. I regard Germany as the country which objec- tively and technically is the most highly developed in its industrial and capitalist organization of all the countries of Europe. We may even say that it is too highly developed, that it suffers from a permanent superproduction and is suffocating itself under the weight of this superproduction. There were only two possible issues before the economic organism of Germany : suffering from a plethora of capitalism, she had either to effect a radical reconstruction of her whole domestic fabric, on a new basis, or she had to endeavour to hack her way toward the domination of the 310 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR world over the corpses of other economic and poHtical organisms. The working-classes of Germany preferred the first issue before the war_, and even prudent writers like Karl Kautsky pre- dicted the not very remote possibility of a com- plete transformation of the economic life of Germany, the abolition of the capitalist system, and the beginning of a social revolution. The propertied classes and the Government would doubtless prefer another issue : instead of a change of the economic and social system of the country, they intended to combat its capitalist plethora by means of a military conquest of new outlets. Instead of withdrawing into itself, capitalist Germany breaks out upon Europe, rifle in hand. These, I think, are the economic and socio- logical factors which induced Germany to pro- voke the present war. And this explanation permits me to warn all European Socialists that they ought to desire the defeat of Germany, for that defeat is in the interests of Socialism in Germany and in all Europe. German capitalism, guided by the military caste of Prussia, endeavoured to avoid the prospect of a labour revolution and a Socialist transformation of society, and sought an issue in the international war and the German domination of Europe. Socialists everywhere ought to make every possible effort to bar the way to Germany and to compel her to return home. Then the AFTER THE WAR 311 problem of the reconstruction of the entire economic structure of Germany, of a renewal of all its social bases, will once more confront the German people, and the German Social- Democratic working-men will be forced to repent of their treachery towards their inter- national comrades, and to conduct a revolution at home instead of going forth to kill the Erench, Russian, English, and Belgian workers. But there is only one means of bringing capitalist and working-class Germany to this point : the Allied armies must bar the way before German Imperialism on its errand of stupendous military brigandage. And this is why I believe the Allied armies are fulfilling a positive and pro- gressive role, not merely from the standpoint of national defence, but also from the standpoint of international Socialism. ' ^ I will quote an observation made by George Plechanov in his pamphlet on the war : " Under the present conditions the defeat of German Imperialism will contribute considerably to the propagation of the revolutionary movement in the interior of Germany, and this will weaken the position of Russian Tsarism. The defeat of German Imperialism will at the same time be the defeat of the Right wing of the German Social-Democratic Party. So we cannot but say that an issue of the war which shall be unfavourable to Germany is extremely desirable, as regards the interest of revolutionary Socialism all the world over." I only hope this defeat of opportunism in Social-Democratic Germany may prove to be the only punishment its leaders will suffer for the abominable treachery with which it thrust the poisoned dagger of betrayal into the back of international labour and the Russian revolution. CHAPTER III I. Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian monarchies ? — II. The intrigues of the Russian reaction- aries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these intrigues are to be disarmed. I I HAVE already said, in a preceding chapter, that the present mihtary and pohtical grouping of the European Powers is far more advantageous to Russia than the aUiance with the Hohen- zoUern and Hapsburg monarchies which the reactionaries in Russia so desire. Imagine that in place of the alliance of Russia with republican France and democratic England we were to have a Holy ( ! ) Alliance of the three Emperors- Russian, German, and Austrian ! What damage they could do to the liberty and democracy of Europe ! What bonds might they not impose upon them ! And how the Russian reactionaries would rejoice the friends of the Prussian reac- 31'2 AFTER THE WAR 313 tion ! r In 1904, at the time of the Russo- German " friendship," the Russian bureaucracy sacrificed to Germany the interests of the agri- cukural, population and the rural economy of its own country by accepting the conditions of the Customs Treaty imposed by Germany. We can- not doubt that the same story would be repeated in 1 9 1 6 on the conclusion of the new Russo- German treaty. As far as the economic interests of Russia are ' In order once more to give the reader some conception of the hatred of the Russian reactionaries for republican and demo- cratic ideas, I quote the following passage : " On the 3rd of December 1909 the deputy Markov, a member of the Union of the Russian People, declared in the Duma, to the applause of the Right, and without being called to order by the President, Prince Volkonsky : " The French Revolution is the most odious and contemptible act of modern history. . . . The Republic means the reign of public men and public women" (see La Verite stir La Russie, by Rene de Chavagnes, Paris, 19 10, p. 10). And of the amiability of the Russian reactionaries to their German and Austrian friends, the reader may judge from the following extract from M. Milukov's book, " The Balkan Crisis and the Policy of M. Izvolsky," Petersburg, 1900. In speaking of the tactlessness of Russian and the skill of Austrian diplomacy, in the Balkan affairs of 1907-8, M. Milukov says: "Baron von Aerenthal, an old friend of the late P. X. Schwanebach, who gave him, when at Petersburg, the most precise information as to the internal weakness of Russia, had calculated very exactly. Russia could not at that period occupy herself seriously with Balkan affairs. And Baron von Aerenthal hastened to profit by our weakness." M. V. Schwanebach, a State Comptroller, was one of the highest of Russian oiScials, and a member of the Council of Ministers, so that the reader will understand that this is a very grave accusation. 314 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR concerned, the victory of Germany might be fol- lowed by lamentable results. It would increase the economic dependence of Russia upon Germany. A Marxist writer well known in Russia, M. P. Maslov, author of a great work on " The Agrarian Problem in Russia," ex- presses the supposition that in the event of a German victory Russia might become merely the colony of Germany and lose all possibility of independent economic development. He makes the deduction that all classes of the Russian population — peasants and artisans included— have much to fear from the victory of Germany. Another Marxist writer, Georges Plechanov, whose letter to Justice I have already quoted, wrote an interesting pamphlet on the war, which was published in Paris :— " We have reason for believing that the defeat of Russia in the present war would be injurious to the future economic development of the country. Wliy? Simply because the nature of the Imperialist policy involves the economic ex- ploitation of the conquered people by the con- queror. As a result of such exploitation the economic development of the conquering people is accelerated and that of the conquered people is hampered. " And as the principal forces of the liberative movement in Russia are born of its economic progress, which has destroyed the old social AFTER THE WAR 315 relation and has created new classes— the working-class in particular— it is easy to under- stand that the defeat of Russia would retard her economic development and be injurious to the work of popular liberty and favourable to the ancien regime— that is, to the very Tsarism whose abolition we desire. All that hampers our economic development and upholds Tsarism, which is merely the inevitable political con- sequence of the fact that the Russian State is still undeveloped from the economic point of view." I On the other hand, as I have already said, the German reaction has many political interests and sentiments in common with the Russian reaction. " Everybody knows," writes Plechanov, " that the German Emperor was the faithful defender of our ancien regime. He knew well what he was doing in supporting it. He understood that the existence of this regime was profitable, not to the Russian people but to the German Junkers and Imperialists, because it facilitated the victory of Germany over Russia." 2 The crushing of Prussian militarism is there- fore, for Russian democracy, the crushing of a friend and the giving of support to the autocracy and reaction of Russia. ' Georges Plechanov, O voim'e, " Concerning the War," Paris, 1914, pp. 25-7. ^ Ibid., p. 30. 316 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR II The Russian reactionaries well understand the situation created by the present war, and they endeavour to modify it in the direction desirable to them. I have already quoted extracts from articles in the organ of the Union of the Russian People, Russkoie Znamia, which, even during the war against Germany, is conducting a propa- ganda in favour of Germany by representing her as the symbol of order and the monarchical prin- ciple and by expressing the hope that she will crush France, and there restore an absolutist government. The Russkoie Znamia, in its sym- pathy for Germany, even went so far as to justify the execution of Russian students in Belgium (at Liege) by the Germans, for the sole reason that these students were of the Jewish faith. " These Jews had themselves fired on the Germans and provoked the latter to shoot them down," wrote this cannibalistic Russian journalist of the innocent death of a few youths who were Russian subjects. "Why did they fire on the Germans ? Simply to provoke the Germans to massacre as large a number as possible of Belgian Christians, so that the Zionists might the more readily replace these Christians and trans- form Belgium into a Palestine ! " ' These filthy imbecilities are published openly ' In ikxt Rzisskoii y.naniia, gth of December 19 14, Petrograd. AFTER THE WAR 317 in Petrograd, under the eye of the benevolent Russian censor, the very censor who has pitilessly suppressed the whole of the "Left " press. But the intrigues of the Russian reactionaries go farther than the mere verbal expression of sympathy for Germany. They have undertaken a whole propaganda in favour of the separation of Russia from her present Allies and the con- clusion of a separate peace with Germany, or, to put it more simply, in favour of international treason and perfidy. The task of directing this treacherous cam- paign was assumed by Count Witte, creator of the monopoly of alcohol which so long poisoned the Russian people, and the breaker of the great political strike in 1905. This gentleman, in December 19 14, delivered a speech before the Assembly of the representatives of Russian industries convoked to deliberate concerning the war tax. In this speech he developed the idea that Russia is far less interested in defeating Germany than is England, who alone will be enriched by the war. The ideas expressed in his speech were reproduced and repeated by several organs of the press. The supporters of M. Witte accused England of inciting Russia, with the egotistical object of imposing the heavier burden of military effort on her while economizing her own resources. The propaganda against England and against 318 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR France, conducted by the Russian Germano- philes, coincided (and this must not be over- looked) with an analogous and " parallel " propa- ganda conducted in Germany by certain journals, which, ceasing their call to the conflict with reactionary Tsarism, began to assure their readers that the principal enemy of Germany is not Russia but England, who incited both Russia and France to make war. The propaganda of treason conducted by these Russian Germanophiles was in obvious contra- diction to the public declaration of the three Allied Governments, whose text, signed on the 4th of September 19 14, states that "the British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the present war, and agree that when there shall be occasion to discuss the terms of peace no one of the Allied Powers can propose conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies." So the French and English Governments have an incontestable right to protest against the intrigues of the Russian Germanophiles and to demand explana- tions from the Tsar's Government. Early in January 1 9 1 5 the Petrograd Coiirrier published the following communication : — " We are informed, from an authorized and well-informed source, that the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain have lately complained AFTER THE WAR 319 to M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the disagreeable and altogether ' undesirable ' tone of certain organs of the press — few in number, it is true— and also of certain isolated politicians, men well known in Europe and America, who have declared themselves inimical to England. M. Paleologue and Sir George Buchanan observed to M. Sazonov, amongst other matters, that the speech of Count Witte before the Assembly of the representatives of Russian industries had produced the most painful impression upon British statesmen and the British press. The Ambassadors declared that these criticisms, which have no foundation in fact and are expressed only because it is not possible to publish all the agreements existing between Russia, France, and England touching the common conduct of the war, are utilized by our enemies, and allow them to spread, by means of their agents in all parts of the world, reports of dissension between the Allies, whose cause is said to be our excessive confidence in England. More, these criticisms injure our common cause. The Ambassadors begged M. Sazonov to take action in order to dissipate these regrettable and absolutely gratuitous suspicions, which tend to represent England as preoccupied exclu- sively with herself. On his side Sir George seized the occasion to declare, in the name of Great Britain, that the latter is prepared to fulfil 320 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR to the end, worthily and nobly, her obligations towards her Allies, without recoiling from any sacrifice either in material or in men. To this protest the British Ambassador added another and a public protest in his speech at the English Club (on New Year's Eve), when he spoke scathingly of " certain notorious Germano- philes who are preaching a crusade against England and a little band of their supporters who are making every effort to sow discord between Russia and her Allies." After this the Russian Government published an official declaration in which it stated that " the co-ordination of all the operations of the Allied armies had been perfect," and that " each of the parties was free from all reproach." But as this declaration contained no precise reply to the propaganda of a separate peace between Russia and Germany, the question was raised at a sitting of one of the Commissions of the Duma, whose members demanded to know, of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether there was any foundation to the rumours concerning the possibility of a separate peace. M. Sazonov on this occasion replied by a non-equivocal denial . From all this strange and perhaps not yet com- pleted story we may make this deduction, that France and England should not repose too much confidence in the ruling classes of Russia, for AFTER THE WAR 321 they contain in their midst many enemies of the French and English democracies and friends of the Prussian reaction. But in order to safeguard themselves against the intrigues of these reac- tionary Germanophiles, the democratic elements of France and England and Belgium should count, above all, on the sympathies of the demo- cratic elements in Russia and should hold out the hand of friendship offered them. Such an alliance of the democracies of the three countries would facilitate a solution of those varied and com- plicated problems which confront us to-day, and will confront us even more urgently at the close of the war, in a truly democratic sense and in the interests of the people. 21 CHAPTER IV I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national question after the war. — III. The role of the French and English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? I The eminent Russian historian M. Nicolas Rojkov, sometime Professor of the University of Moscow/ contributed to the Sovremenny Mir for October 19 14 an article dealing with the analogy between the present war and the campaign of 1 8 1 2- 1 4 . " Any war," he writes, " is a terrible misfor- tune, more especially a ' world-war.' It is the duty of all to whom the interests of the great popular masses are dear to seek to prevent war. . . . But when we are already confronted by the reality of war we should endeavour to grasp its entire significance. A war is a vast shock, ' I may remark, in passing, that M. Rojkov is at present in Siberia, having been sentenced to "perpetual deportation, with deprivation of all civil and personal rights." He was condemned to this punishment in 1908 for participation in the revolutionary movement of the Russian people. 332 AFTER THE WAR 323 a huge upheaval. The objective action of the war gives a final impulse to those forces of social development which are ripening, and to those which have already arrived at maturity, and accelerates the processes which were developing in the bosom of society before the war. We know that before the war a fresh and encouraging wind, a breeze of springtide, was blowing across Russia. It is very evident that after the war these springtide forces will not disappear, that, on the contrary, they will develop into a warm summer, a season of great activity of independent social forces. A defeat of the ruling classes of Germany . . . holds out the promise to our country of the prospect of a wide economic, social, and political development." But the various elements of Russian society are not agreed as to what constitute the most desirable forms of such development. Take, for example, the question of the economic emancipa- tion of Russia from German influence. The great capitalist-monopolists and their theoreticians are preaching the forced and artificial elimination of German competition, and foreign competition in general, from the Russian market, by means of an even stronger Protectionism than that which exists in Russia to-day. The Russian democracy, on the other hand, is against Protectionism, and believes that its abolition would be beneficial to the economic development of Russia, because Jt 324 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it would impel Russian capitalism toward more energetic and more enlightened activities. We find the same disagreement in respect of the problem of foreign markets. The great capitalists wish the Government to seize this or that market by aid of military force, so that they may exploit it as their personal property, guarded by bayonet and cannon. The demo- cratic elements of Russian society consider, on the other hand, that Russian capital has no need of an external market conquered by force, because it is confronted with many possibilities of development in the interior of the country, and the forcible seizure of an external market into which Russian manufacturers could pour products of bad quality and very high price would play only a negative part in the permanent development of Russian industry. One of the causes of the present war, and one of the principal points of the Russo-German con- flict, is the question of the renewal of the Customs Treaty. And this is how the Council of the Congress of Trade and Industry (the directive centre of all the unions of Russian manu- facturers) wishes to solve this problem : " Vic- torious Russia," it says in its official declaration, " must dictate her economic programme to van- quished Germany." To this economic canni- balism the Russian democracy replies that even after the completest victory of Russia over Ger- AFTER THE WAR 325 many there can be no question of the dictation of a one-sided economic programme by the victor at the bayonet's point. There can only be a reciprocal arrangement which would conciliate the vital interests of the popular masses of Russia and Germany. There must be no exploitation of the German people by the Russian capitalists, but an economic collaboration of the two countries. Here is a case in point. At the last session of the Duma the peasant deputies put forward a proposal as to the necessity of introducing as soon as possible a progressive tax upon income. The majority of the Duma rejected the proposi- tion, although it was thoroughly justified by the eeconomic situation of the population and even by the necessities of the war. " We are paying a tax in blood," say the poor Russian peasants to the rich nobles and monopolists. " It is only fair that you should pay a tax in money." But the wealthy nobles and capitalists will not put aside their egoism even during the difficulties of a time of war, when a powerful enemy is invading the country. II In other domains of Russian life we find many similar contradictions and disagreements. What, for instance, do we find in respect of the racial or nationalist problem? Early in September 19 14 the Commander-in- 326 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Chief of the Russian Army addressed the popula- tion of Austria-Hungary in a proclamation wherein he solemnly declared " in the name of the great Russian Tsar " that " Russia, which has already on more than one occasion shed her blood for the liberation of the peoples from a foreign yoke, seeks nothing but the re-establish- ment of law and justice. " To you, peoples of Austria-Hungary, also, Russia to-day brings liberty and the fulfilment of your national aspirations. . . . Russia has but one object : that each of you may develop and live in prosperity, preserving the precious heritage of his fathers— his language and his religion." Such were the words used ; but what were the facts? I will quote from the Journal le Geneve, a moderate and Russophile journal, in which we find a description of the policy of " Russification " pursued by the Russian bureau- cracy in Bukovina and Galicia after the Russian troops had entered those countries : — " Despite the criticisms of the Liberal Russian journals, such as the Retch, the Russkiya Viedo- mostl, etc., and even of some of the Conservative organs, such as the Golos Moskvy and the Kolokol, the new Russian administration, under the influence of the Nationalist and Clerical Party, has inaugurated in Galicia an extremely irritating policy of Russification. AFTER THE WAR 327 " Eastern Galicia, inhabited by four millions of Ruthenians and a million and a half of Poles and Jews, has become the field of action of the Nationalist Party, which now reigns there as a master. ... " Despite the proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas, who promised the free exercise of their language and their religion to the Slav peoples of Austria, here are the measures which the Governor-General, Count Bobrinsky, has taken in Galicia : " All the Ruthenian and Ukrainian journals are suspended ; all the bookshops closed, as well as the co-operative societies and intellectual associations, among others Prosvlta, which boasted 150,000 members, 3,000 libraries, and 1,000 savings-banks. The Ukrainian National Museum is closed and its collections have been transported into Russia. " The University and all the schools are closed, until the professors and school-teachers have learned Russian. [This news is official and was published in the Voennole Slovo of Lemberg, and all the Russian journals, together with the following ] : — " By an order of the 30th September 1914 all the Ruthenian books printed in Galicia, and even books of prayers, must be taken to the police-stations, there to be destroyed, under penalty of three months' imprisonment or a fine 328 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of 3,000 roubles. Correspondence, even private, in the Ruthenian language is forbidden. " Under the pretext that the Ruthenians are Russians [but if they are, why Russify them?] and were Orthodox three centuries ago, an ener- getic propaganda has been organized, at the bayonet's point, in favour of ' Holy Orthodoxy.' The Galician peasants are forced to attend ' plebiscites ' under the vigilant eye of the Cossacks, in order to choose between the Orthodox faith and that which has been theirs for three hundred years. "In September . . . the ' Russo - Galician ' Clerical and Nationalist Society at Petrograd discussed the methods to be employed to ' con- vert ' Galicia. " It decreed the necessity of removing the Uniat Metropolitan, expelling the Basilian monks, confiscating their property, and replacing them by Orthodox popes. "... While assuring the correspondent of the journal Kiev that it is false that violent means have been employed, the Archbishop Euloge has already transported from Lemberg to Kharkov more than 300 children in order to educate them in his religion. . . . The Ruthenian metropolitan of Lemberg was arrested and deported to Nijni-Novgorod, then to Koursk, for having protested. He is the head of the Ruthenian Uniat Church, which numbers 2,325 AFTER THE WAR 329 priests and 3,540,000 faithful in Galicia, to say nothing of Bukovina and America, where there are nearly a million Ruthenians. " The fate of the Uniat religion seems decided : the Governor-General, Bobrinsky, has declared that he recognizes only three religions — Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish. " Twenty thousand officials employed by the posts, railways, etc., of the Austrian administra- tion, all Galicians, are to-day without employ- ment, plunged into the deepest poverty ; they have been replaced by Russians, who do not even know the language. The Nationalist deputy, Tshihatshov, demands the colonization of Galicia by Russian peasants, and announces that 300,000 Muscovite colonists have already been dispatched. " The Russian journals of the Left and Right, and even some Nationalist journals, criticize these regrettable measures." ' Another Swiss journal, the Lausanne Gazette," equally moderate and sympathizing equally with the Allies, recalling the fact that Russia was to act the part of a " steam-roller " in the present war, remarks, a propos of the Russian policy in Galicia :— " There was generosity and grandeur even in the pose of Russia drawing the sword in favour ' See thQ Journal de Geneve for the i6th of February 19 15. ' La Gazette de Lausanne^ ist of March 19 15. 330 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of threatened Serbia ; but is Russia then only capable of generosity towards countries which do not belong to her?"' In replying to this question I will say that we must first of all decide which Russia we are discussing, because there are two Russias— the Russia of Tsarism, Nationalism, and the re- action, and the Russia of democracy, toleration, and progress . The latter is in no way responsible for the deeds of the former. The Russian democracy deplores the brutal actions of an arbitrary Tsarism and extends a brotherly hand toward all the oppressed, whose fate it can well comprehend, being itself oppressed. The present war proves that the union of all ^ The present work was already written when the Swiss journal, the Berner Tagzvacht, and others, published information as to the conduct of the Germans in Russian Poland. Compared with their actions, the Russian policy in Galicia might be called " tolerant," for while the Russian authorities practise Russification, the Germans in Poland prefer to exterminate the population ; while the Russians suppress newspapers, the Germans suppress whole villages and towns. Or, as a Polish publicist has remarked, they destroy with far more "system " and "organization." As for the Austrians, they have established a true reign of terror in the Slav provinces of their State. They hang and imprison en masse those Slavs who are suspected of Russian sympathies, leaving the bodies hanging for weeks. . . . The population of Austrian Bukovina fled into Russia to escape the "administrative psychosis" (the expression of an eye-witness from whom I received a private letter) which seized the Austrian authorities in the Austrian provinces reoccupied by the Austrian troops after the temporary retreat of Russia. AFTER THE WAR 331 the peoples inhabiting Russia is an actual fact ; and it is extremely regrettable that the Govern- ment should shatter this union by its measures of oppression and " Russification." And there is no doubt that when the present system of government has been done away with the peoples dwelling on Russian soil will succeed in estab- lishing such forms of political cohabitation and co-existence as will assure to all of them the widest possibilities of national development. Ill But that all this may be realized more readily the effectual assistance of the democracies of the Allied nations would not only be of great utility, but is even a necessity. My readers will recall the last few lines of the letter from a Lettish revolutionary which I quoted in a pre- ceding chapter. The writer of the letter fears the triumph of Tsarism, and does not con- ceal the fact. But he relies on the French and English democracies, who will not — he hopes- allow Tsarism to oppress the lesser peoples. The same hopes are expressed by the press of other nationalities. The Armenian publicist M. Varandian, when the Novoie Vremla, the organ of Russian Nationalism, pronounced in favour of " an annexation pure and simple of Turkish Armenia ' and its incorporation into the Russian 332 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR State, replied that " England and France will also have their word to say as to the final settle- ment," and asked, in the name of " the great majority of the Armenian people," that Turkish Armenia shall be constituted as "an autonomous State under the collective protectorate of France, Russia, and England." The Polish democrats, who are justified in distrusting the promises of Tsarism, also appeal to the democracies of France and England. The Lausanne Cazette, in the article lately cited, condemns the reactionary policy of Tsarism as regards the Poles and Ruthenians, and ex- presses the conviction that " if the last word of settlement rests with the Triple Entente its diplomatists will have the right to speak plainly in the Congress which will establish peace. It is to be hoped that the delegates of France and England will bring pressure to bear on their Muscovite ally, and that their own Liberalism will to some extent affect their Eastern partner. It would be reassuring for the future should the present war draw Russia into the orbit of the great civilizing Powers of the West ; but for the moment, we must admit, Russian policy continues to draw its inspiration from Prussian and Austro- Hungarian methods far more than from French and English principles." ^ Personally I do not put my trust in diplo- ' La Gazette de Lausanne, ist of March 191 5. AFTER THE WAR 333 matists or members of Governments. I put it rather in the democratic masses of the AlHes of Russia. Before the war the union of Russia, France, and England was of a diplomatic, military, and, in general, governmental character. The French and English Governments were con- cerned with the aspirations and interests of the Russian Government rather than with those of the Russian people. Thus we have witnessed things as strange as the systematic support of the Russian reaction by means of the money of French republicans ; or as the arrest of a Russian political refugee (M. Adamovitsh) by Anglo-Egyptian authorities, and his extradition by the Tsar's Government. France was giving asylum to Russian political refugees, and at the same time the Government of republican France tolerated the existence in Paris of a bureau of the Russian secret police, who operated unashamed and unhindered in the French capital. All these obvious contradictions are explained by the fact that France and England, in the persons of their Governments, regarded their alliance with Russia as an alliance with ofhcial and governmental Russia^ which was yet at war with her own people. But then the " world-war " came, and the union of the three Governments became a union of peoples, sealed by the red seal of their blood. 334 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR shed in terrible abundance on common battle- fields. And I will not, I cannot, believe that all this blood will be shed for nothing, that after the war we shall return to the bad old state of things. The Russian people did not accept the present war for egoistical reasons. It had no need of conquests, of new territories, of the subjection of other peoples, of brigandage or booty. It accepted the war as a war for the defence of its own country and the defence of Europe against a brutal oppressor and invader. It accepted it because it sincerely believes that it ought to save Serbia, France, and Belgium ; because the advanced democracies of France and England are fighting by its side against the same enemy. But it hopes and desires that they will be beside it, not only on the battlefields of the war against Germany but also on the battle- fields of its painful campaign against the Russian reaction, the fight for liberty. A first step towards this true union— a Holy Alliance of the popular masses of the Allied countries— was taken by the Socialist Conference in London, at which were present Socialist members of the French and Belgian Govern- ments, who passed a vote of protest against the reactionary policy of Tsarism. Some of the French Conservative journals expressed their intense disapproval of this step. But of what AFTER THE WAR 335 did they disapprove ? Do they not understand that the attitude assumed by the London Confer- ence is consistent with the interests of France and England ? Do they not understand that even from a purely military point of view Russia, their ally, would be stronger and more capable of resist- ance against the common enemy were the moral of the Russian soldiers not depressed by the sad and terrible news reaching the trenches from the interior of the country? Can a soldier fight well when he knows that in the interior of the country which he is defending the people is in chains, that the most elementary rights of man are being violated, and that the prisons are over- flowing with his brothers ? No, I assert that even from the most strictly Nationalist and Con- servative point of view, from the point of view of those who desire nothing from this war but the immediate object of crushing Germany, the action of the Socialist Conference was useful and beneficial. As for the democratic elements of France and England, they should understand that the demo- cratization of the political system of Russia is in their own interests. If the Germanophile party in Russia wish to bring pressure to bear upon the Russian Government in order to persuade it to commit an act of treachery against its present Allies, who could save Russia from this infamy, or France, England, Belgium, and 336 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Serbia from this perfidious and possibly mortal blow? Who but the Russian democracy? On the other hand, the solution of the problems involved in the termination of the war will be greatly facilitated by the triumph of a democratic regime in Russia. The more thoughtful portion of the Russian people does not desire a policy of conquest. It does not desire the forcible annexation of Galicia, Prussia, Asia Minor, the Dardanelles, and Constanti- nople. With the Conference of London, it " wishes to see Belgium liberated and indemni- fied. It trusts that the Polish question will be solved conformably with the will of the Polish people, in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another people, or complete independence. It wishes all annexed populations, from Alsace- Lorraine to the Balkans, to recover the right to dispose of themselves in freedom." If the present war does not realize these desiderata, it will not be merely a " great illu- sion," to use the phrase of Mr. Norman Angell ; it will be a vast " bluff," a world-wide fraud, an abominable outrage and insult to all the millions of dead who will have given their lives for a cause which they believed to be just and noble. But if the realization of the great object of the war is to be possible the establishment of a democratic government in Russia is a necessity. AFTER THE WAR 337 It is a practical necessity because the Russian democracy, if it finds itself possessed of power, will be able to form an agreement with the democracies of the Allied countries in respect of all the problems of the moment. Between Tsarism and the British Government a conflict in respect of the possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople is a possibility ; but it would not be possible between the Russian democracy and the English democracy, as the Russian people has no interest in demanding the military posses- sion of the Dardanelles. And so with all the dangerous and litigious problems of international relations. IV The more thoughtful elements of the Russian people agree entirely with the declaration of the Conference of London, which states that the labouring classes of the Allied countries " do not desire the political and economic destruction of Germany," that they are making war, not against the German people but against its Government. The more thoughtful elements of the Russian people believe sincerely that " the victory of the Allies should be the victory of national liberty, of the unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the World." I regard the Russian people— in its lower social 2ii 338 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR strata — as one of the most pacific and non-mili- tary — or rather anti-miUtarist— peoples of modern Europe. I explain this, not by this or that " psychological " peculiarity of the Russian people but by the economic conditions of its life. The agricultural peoples are, in general, pacific, because they have already passed through the disturbed period of the warlike existence of hunters and nomads, and have not yet reached the period of insatiable and capitalistic Im- perialism, which busies itself with international brigandage. The only motive which can engender the desire of conquest and expansion in the case of an agricultural people is " land hunger," the lack of soil. But this motive could not impel the Russian people to go to war. In the first place, they know that it is already too late to satisfy this hunger at the expense of neighbouring States, these being for the most part more thickly peopled than Russia ; secondly, they know that they already possess in Russia great territorial wealth which has been monopolized by a small number of nobles and great landlords, and that to obtain the soil which is necessary to them they must make their demands, not of foreign peoples and Governments but of their own masters. In place of an international war of aggression they must fight for " land and liberty " in their own country. This is why the greatest of Russian writers, AFTER THE WAR 339 Leo Tolstoy, who tried in his philosophy to express the " truth of the moujiks," is the greatest pacifist of the modern world. This is why the only remarkable Russian painter of battle-scenes, M. Verestschagin, represented the tragic and mournful aspect of war in his pictures. This is why in the works of the best Russian writers you will never find hymns of praise to the ferocious God of Battles, but a unanimous condemnation of warfare. This is why the idea of a protest against war against " murder," and the propa- ganda in favour of peace, occupy so large a place in the religious movements of the rural masses of Great Russia and her sister— Ukraine. As for the workers of the towns, their pacificism is so great that their parliamentary representa- tives have voted against the war credits even in time of war, as my readers will remember. This instinctive aversion to war and aggression does not, it is true, exclude a great capacity for defence. But I believe that people which is least aggressive is most capable of defence. We know that the most docile animals defend themselves often the most valiantly. A comparison between the attitude of the Russian people in the war against Japan and its attitude during the present war is the best proof of what I have said of the mentality of the popular masses of Russia : the war against Japan was for the Russian people a war of "other people," an aggressive and use- 340 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR less and detestable war. The present war is a defensive war — disagreeable but necessary. It is a painful but salutary task, a heavy but inevitable burden ; the labour of sweeping aside a large and dangerous obstacle which might obstruct the broad highway of historic evolution. And we may be sure that as soon as this task is finished, as soon as the Russian people, with its Allies, has torn the bloodstained sword of Prussian mili- tarism from the hands of the German people, the Russian people will be the first to offer its sincere friendship to its former enemy. We may be sure that after the end of the present war the Russian people will contribute largely to the establish- ment of peace in Europe and the realization of all those measures which might ensure that peace. But this is not the only service that the Russian democracy may render to the world. Russia is a revolutionary country— that must not be for- gotten. Having lit the great torch of the libera- tive movement in its own country, the Russian people— or rather the peoples o'f Russia— have hurled it beyond their frontiers. The Russian revolution of 1905 was a signal, an impulse to many other peoples. In Austria the working- classes obtained from their Government a measure of universal suffrage, thanks to the impression produced on that Government by the revolutionary movement in Russia. "If you do AFTER THE WAR 341 not give us electoral rights we shall speak Russian." Such was the expression employed by one of the leaders of the labour movement in Austria during the struggle for universal suffrage in that country. The Russian revolution awoke from their secular slumber the peoples of the East— Turkey, Persia, and even mysterious China. The Russian people, which has not yet, alas ! been able to liberate itself, has yet rendered a remarkable service to the liberation of other peoples. And it is with much gratitude, and not without pride, that I have recently read in the work of Marcel Sembat, one of the organizers of the national defence in France, and one of the scepti- cal minds of that country, the following lines concerning Russia. " Russia does not appear to me as a bogey," writes Sembat. " On the contrary, at this dis- tance from Russia the Slav appears charming to me. . . . What, for me, is Russia? Russia, to me, is a revolutionary comrade ... a scien- tist, a scholar, with nothing of the barbarian about him ! Russia is a whole impassioned literature ; it means the heroes of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Gorky. I count on Russia enormously. I tell myself that there are in Russia the Slav soul, buried treasures of fraternal enthusiasm, of generous devotion, a great need of and a great capacity for loving pity. I count secretly on 342 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the Russian people as on one of the chief peoples of the Socialist Period."' Russia is a country of great revolutionary and democratic possibilities. But for these possibili- ties to be realized the European democracies who are marching side by side with the Russian people against German Imperialism, to fight for the liberty of the world, must not leave the masses of Russia alone and unsupported when they march to another war— against their own oppres- sors, to win the liberty of their own country. May the sacred union, the Holy Alliance of the democratic elements and the popular masses of Russia and the most advanced coimtries of Europe endure after the war, the end of the present war ! May it endure into the future ! ^ Marcel Sembat, Faites un Rot, sino?i faites la Paix, pp. 80-82. CHAPTER V I. Russia and England. Their economic relations. The neces- sity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — II. The intellectual relations between Russia and England. — Con- cerning certain " deviations " of English sympathies. I Finally, a few brief words as to the relations between England and Russia.' According to my custom, I will begin with the material and economic side of these rela- tions. The beginnings of Anglo -Russian commercial exchange go back to a period already remote. In the middle of the sixteenth century English merchants came to Russia for purposes of trade. In 1566 the Government of Ivan Grozny— the Terrible — ^addressed itself to the Government of Elizabeth through the mediumship of the English ' I may permit myself to be brief in this chapter, because I am at present preparing a large work on " Russia and Europe," which will be published in English by Mr. Fisher Unwin, to whom I am profoundly grateful for affording me the opportunity to inform the English public concerning the life and history of my country. In this work I shall speak at length of the relations between Russia and England. 343 344 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Ambassador in Moscow, Jenkinson, begging her to send from England good artisans and crafts- men to assist in the development of trades and industries. In 1569 the English traders re- ceived from the Russian Government a " privi- lege " allowing them to establish a metallurgical workshop in the north of Russia (at Vytshegda, in the province of Vologda). In the commercial town of Shuia the English traders had at this period their own warehouses and offices. The general census of the population of the Russian Empire in 1897 numbered 7,481 British subjects residing in Russia at the moment of the census — of whom 3,602 were men and 3,879 women ; 80 per cent, of these British immigrants were living in the cities and only 20 per cent, in the rural districts. A third of the whole were living in the capital (the same census gave 2,527 English as living in Petersburg). The remain- ing two -thirds inhabited principally the great maritime ports.' The majority of English subjects residing in Russia are employed in wholesale trade and industry. According to the figures given by M. Isch- chanian, the Armenian economist (whose work on the foreign elements in the economic life of ^ The same census numbered 158,103 German subjects in Russia, 121,599 Austrians, and only 9,421 French subjects. See M. Ischchanian's book, Die ausldndischen Ekmente in der russis- chen Volkswirtscha/t, BerUn, 191 3, pp. 62-3. AFTER THE WAR 345 Russia was published in German in 19 13), the total amount of English capital in the industrial undertakings and various securities in Russia was, at the beginning of the twentieth century, about £37,000,000. Taking into consideration that the total amount of British capital abroad is £3,000,000,000, we perceive that only 12 per cent, of this sum was placed in Russia. As for the commercial exchange between Russia and Great Britain, it is expressed by the following figures : — In 1900 the importation of Russian products into England attained the value of 146 million roubles, and the exports of British products to Russia attained a value of 127 million roubles. In 1909 the Russian imports entering England had already increased to 289 million roubles, while the British exports to Russia remained at almost the same level as in 1900, being valued at 128 million roubles. So the balance-sheet of Anglo-Russian trade is active for Russia and passive for England, while the Russo -German commercial exchange presents a very different picture and is balanced in favour of Germany. From this point of view the greatest possible development of trade between England and Russia is very desirable for the former, especi- ally after the war, when the relations between Russia and her immediate neighbours— Germany 346 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR and Austria — will necessarily be diminished for a shorter or longer period. But we may invoke a more general reason than this to demonstrate the utility of wider economic relations between Russia and England. Eng- land is a Free Trade country, an enemy of Pro- tectionism. Germany — after Russia- is the most Protectionist country in Europe, and it is easily comprehensible that Russia cannot dispense with Protectionism in her commercial relations with Germany until the latter abolishes her Customs Tariff. But in her relations with England Russia can and should pursue the policy of Free Trade, and the abolition of Customs Tariffs. In this case the vast Russian market will be open to the products of British industry, whose competition will stimulate the energy and initiative of the Russian capitalists. At the same time, the pro- ducts of Russian agriculture — wheat, sugar, etc.— as well as the products of the petroleum industry, will have larger access to the British market, above all after the neutralization of the Dardanelles and the re-establishment of traffic on the Baltic. I have read Lately that certain English pub- licists—Mr. Wells among others— are undertak- ing a campaign in favour of the establishment of a Protectionist system in England. I do not believe the English people will wish to repeat the error of the Russian Government. Our ex- AFTER THE WAR 347 perience suffices to show that the Protectionist system is harmful to the economic development of modern countries, and that it constitutes a menace to international peace. The abolition of customs, the victory of Free Trade between the nations of the world— such must be our common programme in future. II The intellectual relations between Russia and Great Britain are far more highly developed than their material and economic relations. But I cannot in this case tell you on which side the balance-sheet is active ! In the domain of com- mercial exchange we can measure the results attained by tons of merchandise and by pounds sterling, but in the intellectual domain an evalu- ation and appreciation of the balance-sheet can only be relative. But I do know that in Russia the intellectual influence of England is already considerable. Certain currents of English literature have pro- duced a great impression on Russian letters. Shakespeare is no less known and loved by Russian readers than the classical writers of their own country. Children and young people are familiar with the heroes of Walter Scott, smile at the adventures of Swift's Gulliver, and weep over the pathetic pages of Dickens. " Byronism " 348 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR played an enormous part in the evolution of Russian literature, and the two great lights of Russian poetry, Pushkin and Lermontov, are the intellectual children of Byron. Modern English literature is equally familiar and equally loved in Russia. Nearly all the works of the best English authors are published in Russia— sometimes going through many edi- tions. The names of Wells, Kipling, Jerome, and many others are very familiar to Russian readers. English science has also a great influence in Russia. Darwinism is the predominating ten- dency in Russian naturalism, and several gene- rations, not only of naturalists, scientists, and University teachers, but the bulk of the intel- lectual youth of Russia, have shaped their mental equipment by the aid of Darwinian studies and theories. As for the political system of Great Britain, it is admired above all by the Russian Liberals. As for the Radical and Democratic elements of Russian society, their attention is drawn and their sympathies captured rather by the republican regime of France than by the monarchical constitutionalism of England. This is explained by the fact that in Russia one cannot count on the possibility of transforming the Tsarist auto- cracy into a constitutional monarchism of the English type. The clash between the reaction and the democracy is too violent, the social and AFTER THE WAR 349 political conflict too profound, to permit one to count on such a possibility. Among the thinking members of the working- classes— that is, the Socialists— a great interest is felt in the English Labour movement. The political and economic theories of Robert Owen and of Chartism are necessary subjects of study in the classes organized by the Russian workers. Many books and pamphlets published by the Socialist bookshops are devoted to the history of the Socialist movement in England. In Russian Marxism, which forms the prevailing current in the Socialism of our country, the study of the economic evolution of England occupies a great place, and the Russian Marxists are fond of saying that the true revolutionary Marxism constitutes a synthesis of three elements : the German dialectical philosophy, French revolu- tionary practice, and English economic evolution. The Russian press follows the principal events of English national life with great attention, most of the larger Russian journals having their special correspondents in England. The Labour press in Russia always has reliable information as to the struggles and the situation of the proletarian class in England, and I believe an English artisan would be greatly astonished if he could realize the great and sincere interest with which his Russian comrades follow all that affects the pro- letariat of England. 350 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR In attempting a brief analysis of Russian influ- ence in England^ I may begin by asserting that the literary aspect of that influence is by no means negligible. Not Tolstoy alone, who has left his visible imprint on the English thought of our time, but many of the classics of Russian literature are known and appreciated in England, where the modern Russian writers also are widely read — for example, Gorky and Tchekov. English interest in Russia has increased more particularly during the last ten years, since the Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905. The appearance of organs of the English press devoted especially to Russian affairs proves that this interest is profound and serious. It is true that some of these publications give a somewhat partial view of Russian affairs (this criticism is true, for example, of the Russian Supplement published by the Times), but others are more objective and are inspired, not by the views of the Russian Government but by the aspirations of the Russian masses. Such are Free Russia and Darkest Russia. Finally I may cite the Russian Review, devoted to the study of various problems of Russian life, two weeklies, and a monthly review published in English and devoted particularly to Russia : this is at least a be- ginning. But what is still more remarkable than the literary and informative interest felt for Russia AFTER THE WAR 351 in England, is the active and practical sympa- thy displayed in certain English circles for the Russian people and its revolutionary struggles. The existence of a " Union of the Friends of Russian Liberty " in England, the agitation in respect of the arrest of the old revolutionist Tchaikowsky, who was literally torn from the hands of his jailers, thanks to the intervention of British public opinion, and again, the inter- vention of English society in the affair of Miss Malitzky, the propaganda directed against the persecution of Jews in Russia, the protests of the British Labour Party against the arrest and extradition of M. Adamovitsh in Egypt, and a long series of similar actions, prove that the British democracy sympathises with the sufferings of the masses in Russia, and in their great struggle for the destruction of the autocracy and the establishment of a democratic system of government. I may here recall a personal impression. In 1907 I was among the delegates sent from Russia to the Congress of the Social -Democratic Labour Party of Russia, which cannot meet in Russia, being an " illegal " Congress. We went to Den- mark, to Copenhagen, to open our Congress. The constitutional Danish Government expelled us as though we had been dangerous beasts. We went to Stockholm in Sweden. The constitu- tional Swedish Government expelled us as though 352 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR we had been dangerous beasts. We then sailed for London, where no one disturbed us during the four or five weeks of our labours. And when the Congress lacked money to terminate its labours and to send its three hundred delegates back to Russia, Englishmen were foimd to come to the aid of the Russian Social-Democratic Party and to lend it the necessary and very considerable sum of money. Expelled from two European countries, the Russian Socialists, delegates to the Congress, were well qualified to appreciate the warm welcome which they found in the capital of Great Britain. The sympathies of the advanced and demo- cratic elements of English society for the cause of Russian liberty is deep and sincere. We can only express the hope that this sympathy will have lost none of its strength after the war. I must here warn the democratic opinion of England against a change in the attitude observ- able of the English democracy toward Russia. For instance, I read, in a Russian journal, an extract from an article which had appeared in the English review published by Mr. and Mrs. Sydney Webb. In this article a revision was proposed of the opinions held by enlightened and democratic circles in England concerning the present political regime in Russia. The author of the article endeavoured to convince the Eng- AFTER THE WAR 333 lish democrats that they must not be more revo- lutionary than the Russian revolutionists them- selves ; that they must not judge Tsarism as severely as of old, because — so says the author of the article— the oppressed nations, particularly the Jews, and the democratic elements in Russia, are reconciled to their Government on account of the war. This argument is false ; no " reconcilia- tion " has taken place between the revolution and the reaction, and none could have taken place, for the simple reason that Tsarism is continuing, even during the war, its policy of oppression and violence in the interior of the country. Tsarism has not changed during the war, and the atti- tude of the English democracy ought not to change. Another possible modification of public opinion may have its source in a too great respect which some of its representatives entertain for the so- called " historic traditions " of the life of the Rus- sian people. An example of this kind of error is to be found in the interesting pamphlet by Mr. G. K. Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin." There is in this pamphlet a just appreciation of the mentality of the Russians as compared with that of the Prussians : — " The Russian institutions are, in many cases, left in the rear of the Russian people, and many of the Russian people know this. But the Prussian institutions are supposed to be in ad- 23 354 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR vance of the Prussian people, and most Prussians believe it." ' But the same author, who so justly appreciates the institutions of Russia as outgrown by the Russian people, falls, a few lines farther on, into an archaeological sentimentalism, and sings a hymn of praise to these same institutions :-- " If the Russian institutions are old-fashioned, they exhibit honestly the good as well as the bad that can be found in old-fashioned things. In their police system they have an inequality which is against our ideas of law. But in their com- mune system they have an equality that is older than the law itself. Even when they flogged each other like barbarians they called upon each other by their Christian names like children. At their worst they retained all the best of a rude society. At their best, they are simply good, like good children, or good nuns." Concerning this too sentimental and sugary estimate, I will confine myself to the remark that it would be far better if the Russians described by Mr. Chesterton were to call upon each other by their Christian names like children without accompanying this infantile amiability by blows of the whip. I am ready to agree with Mr. Chesterton when, in speaking of the barbarian influence experienced by the Russians during their history, he wittily remarks :— ' G.K.Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin," London, 1915. AFTER THE WAR 355 " Whether Jonah did or did not spend three days inside a fish, that did not turn him into a merman." ' I am of the same opinion. But I beheve that if Jonah could have dispensed with a somewhat disagreeable detention in the belly of the whale he would gladly have done so. And I am sure that the experience was neither salutary nor use- ful from a hygienic point of view, and that on issuing from the whale Jonah had, probably, any- thing but the look of a well-groomed and immaculate gentleman of fashion. The Russian people is anxious to emerge from the belly of the whale of Tsarism and reaction as speedily as may be. May the English demo- cracy aid it in its efforts ! ' G. K. Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin," London, 1915. ■^ CONCLUSION I HAVE completed my work, and on reading once more the manuscript of this hook, I myself am struck by the contradiction of sentiments which fills and runs through it. But what would you have? I have tried to be sincere in what I have written. And the contradictory sentiments which are expressed in the present work are only a reflection of the real contradictions of Russian life and its situation during the present war. The young Russian armies are defending the cause of European democracy and the world's progress. But they are commanded by an auto- cratic and timeworn power. It is a misfortune for us, the democrats of Russia, that the military forces of our country are in the hands of auto- cratic Tsarism ! But for the European demo- cracy, for the peoples of Belgium, Serbia, France, and England, it is none the less a lucky chance that the millions of Russian soldiers are obsti- nately and to the death resisting the aggression of Germany and her Allies. How are we to conciliate our own misfortune with the " lucky chance " so necessary to our Allies? 356 CONCLUSION 357 I find a good and simple reply to this question in the words of a Russian mother, whose letter to her son, fallen on the field of battle, I en- countered in the press : — " We shall not live for ever in this world. What is the life of a human being? A drop of water in the life of glorious Russia. We shall not live for ever, but Russia must have a long and pros- perous life. I know we shall be forgotten and our happy descendants will not remember those who sleep in the graves of soldiers ; but what matter ! " And enlarging this generous thought, I would say : The interests of the atom must be sub- ordinated to the superior interests of the whole. In the first place the interests of the entire democracy of Europe, the progress of the whole world ; then the individual interests of Russia. First the interests of all Russia, then the interests of this or that group ! It is the one rule, the one maxim, possible and applicable in these tragic hours of human history. But we may be sure that in yielding the first place to the interests of the whole we shall also gain our own portion. The triumph of the common cause of European democracy will at the same time be the triumph of our own ! Ttbc <3tc8bam picas tTNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED WOKINO AND LONDON ■i^ UC SOUTHERN REGIOrjAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 000 487 423 6