A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF 
 A FEDERAL LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 BY 
 
 RALEIGH C. MINOR 
 
 Professor of Constitutional and International Law at the 
 University of Virginia 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 AMERICAN BRANCH 35 WEST 32ND STREET 
 LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY 
 
 1918 
 

 
 COPYRIGHT 1918 
 
 BT THK 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 AMERICAN BRANCH 
 
PREFACE 
 
 No discussion of international relations during the 
 progress of a great war such as is now raging can be 
 expected to be altogether accurate in respect of mere 
 details. Not only the geographical boundaries of 
 states, but forms of government and important na- 
 tional policies, are shifting from day to day. Even 
 a discussion limited to fundamental principles like that 
 contained in the following pages cannot be entirely 
 free from the influence of these sudden and far-reach- 
 ing changes. 
 
 For example, Russia is treated throughout this 
 work as a great empire under one government, indeed 
 as one of the Great Powers. As these words are 
 written this is far from the fact, but who can tell what 
 will transpire in that wide unknown region before the 
 war is ended or within a limited period afterwards? 
 She may reappear a great despotic empire as before, 
 or a united limited monarchy, or a magnificent federal- 
 ized republic of many states; or she may ultimately 
 be divided into many small states or groups of states, 
 thus forfeiting her claim to be one of the Great 
 Powers. 
 
 In view of these uncertainties it has not been deemed 
 wise to make any modification of the tentative plan 
 of international government herein proposed, which 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 supposes the continued existence of Russia under a 
 single government as one of the Great Powers. 
 
 In other respects also it has been found necessary 
 to base this discussion upon facts as they were known 
 to exist before the war, without heeding alterations 
 that may have resulted, or may in the future result, 
 from the conflict. Thus, in estimating the populations 
 of the various states engaged, no regard has been 
 paid to possible reductions due to the casualties of 
 war, or to the conquest and temporary occupation of 
 territory. 
 
 These things, however, are not of the essence of our 
 theme. The fundamental principles of an interna- 
 tional government would be much the same whether 
 Russia constitutes one great nation or many small in- 
 dependent states; whether or not there be a shift of 
 population from the control of one state to that of 
 another; whether or not forms of government shall 
 have changed from monarchy to republic. 
 
 But there are certain principles, for the establish- 
 ment of which this war is now being waged, which 
 are essential to the foundation of any league of na- 
 tions leading to an international control of the causes 
 of war. Among these are the inviolability of treaties 
 and the dominance of international good faith; the 
 abolition of militarism; the right settlement of great 
 war-breeding political issues now pending, such as the 
 self-determination of nationalities and the rectification 
 of ancient wrongs; and the substitution of a spirit of 
 justice and equality among the nations in the place of 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 the selfish and oppressive policies too prevalent in the 
 past. 
 
 All these results may reasonably be hoped for in 
 the event of a complete victory for the United States 
 and their Allies, and with their advent it would not 
 be so great a step to an adoption by the nations of some 
 such form of international government as that advo- 
 cated in the pages to follow. 
 
 As the thirteen American Colonies were prepared 
 through their joint labors and sufferings during the 
 American Revolution for the Articles of Confedera- 
 tion, and later for their closer union under the Consti- 
 tution, so the Allied Nations at least, having passed 
 through years of co-operation, trial, and suffering to- 
 gether, seem now ready to accept some form of per- 
 manent league or alliance which, while guaranteeing 
 to each its rightful and proper independence in the 
 control of its internal affairs, will also adequately 
 guarantee each against oppressive and unjust viola- 
 tions of that independence by neighbors stronger or 
 better prepared to utilize their strength. 
 
 The author will indeed be glad if the book shall 
 contribute in any degree to the solution of the many 
 profound problems of statecraft that must be settled 
 satisfactorily before there can be assurance that never 
 again shall humanity be subjected to such an ordeal 
 as it will have passed through during the terrible years 
 of this war. R. c. M. 
 
 University of Virginia, 
 May, 1918, 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The human race has with greater or less success 
 worked out many difficult governmental, political and 
 sociological problems, but all would doubtless agree 
 that it has never set for itself a more serious task than 
 the discovery and application of a feasible and prac- 
 ticable plan that will abrogate the necessity of war as 
 a method of redressing disputes between nations. 
 
 Of late years considerable progress has been made 
 in the organization and establishment of " arbitral 
 courts," to which the nations may submit their disputes, 
 and " commissions of inquiry " whose duty it is to 
 ascertain the facts in an international controversy. 
 Steps have also been taken to encourage and facilitate 
 the effectual use of the " good offices " of mutual 
 friends, and the use of mediation and conciliation. 
 And the time seems to be near when the nations may 
 establish an international court, with judicial, instead 
 of merely arbitral, authority and jurisdiction, which 
 will perhaps be able to deal with certain cases with 
 which courts of arbitration could not satisfactorily 
 cope. 
 
 The judicial court differs from a court of arbitration 
 in the manner of its organization, in the mode of reach- 
 ing its decision, in the decision itself, and in the value 
 
 ix 
 
x INTRODUCTION 
 
 of the decision as an authoritative precedent upon the 
 matter with which it deals. 
 
 A judicial court is created, and fully organized in 
 advance of litigation, so that its members are not se- 
 lected by the parties to the controversy and are able to 
 decide impartially between the contentions of the liti- 
 gants. On the other hand, an arbitral court is com- 
 posed of members selected by the parties after the dis- 
 pute has arisen (usually two by each who, themselves, 
 select an umpire). From this circumstance there usu- 
 ally results more or less of a tendency on the part of 
 the arbitrators to regard themselves, not as impartial 
 judges, but as advocates or representatives or personal 
 friends of the party selecting them. 
 
 While therefore a judicial court will attempt to ar- 
 rive at the facts and the law governing the case, and 
 thus reach a decision, the tendency of an arbitral 
 court is in many cases to conciliate, mediate or com- 
 promise the claims of the litigants, so that its decision 
 is quite likely to be unsatisfactory to both parties. The 
 decision of the judicial court, on the other hand, will 
 generally be favorable to one party or the other, and 
 while of course eminently satisfactory to the successful 
 litigant, will often, if fair and just, be less objection- 
 able to the unsuccessful party than would be a mere 
 compromise. 
 
 Finally, the mode of organization of the judicial 
 court, the greater learning and distinction of its mem- 
 bers, and the fact that it seeks impartially to construe 
 the law and apply it to the facts of the case, all tend 
 
INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 to give it a greater dignity and its opinion greater au- 
 thority than an arbitral court can claim. 
 
 In cases susceptible of these modes of trial, if each 
 party to the dispute is sure of his rights and bona fide 
 desires and designs a peaceable settlement) he would 
 prefer usually to submit his case to a judicial court 
 which would decide the questions involved without 
 compromise, rather than submit it to an arbitral court 
 in whose decision each litigant will perhaps find only 
 part of the redress to which he deems himself entitled. 
 But if each is more or less doubtful of his claims, or 
 suspects that he is claiming more than he is really 
 entitled to, both would probably welcome a resort to 
 an arbitral, in preference to a judicial court, since each 
 would be sanguine of securing something. Finally, a 
 third case might arise wherein one of the parties feels 
 sure of his rights, while the other is very uncertain 
 of his. In such case, the tendency of the former would 
 be toward the judicial court, while that of the latter 
 would be toward the court of arbitration, and, should 
 neither yield, a settlement by court procedure would 
 become impossible. Such a situation might well be 
 fraught with grave perils. 
 
 It seems to be the belief of many that the mere es- 
 tablishment of a judicial court to which the nations 
 may resort for a settlement of their disputes will in 
 itself go far to solve the problem of international wars. 
 But this can scarcely be said to be the conviction of 
 those who have given the most profound thought and 
 study to the subject. They realize that the field of 
 
xii INTRODUCTION 
 
 usefulness of such a court is limited, as is that of the 
 court of arbitration, the commission of inquiry, con- 
 ciliation and mediation, the good offices of mutually 
 friendly nations and diplomatic correspondence. Each 
 has its appropriate function in settling or helping to 
 settle certain sorts of international controversies; but 
 despite all, there is a large and important field of dis- 
 putes, for the settlement of which none of these is in 
 the least adequate. 
 
 Even an incomplete analysis of the various sorts of 
 controversies that may arise between nations will suf- 
 fice to show how many and how constantly recurring 
 are the disputes in which none of the modes of re- 
 dress above mentioned is of great value. 
 
 If we classify all international controversies into 
 two great classes, first, disputes behind which, on one 
 side or both, lie ulterior evil or illegitimate designs of 
 aggression or attack upon the rights of other nations, 
 and second, disputes arising spontaneously and without 
 ulterior designs, it is obvious that none of those of the 
 first class would be subject to treatment in any of the 
 modes already considered, and indeed that under pres- 
 ent conditions nothing but war or the fear of war would 
 prove adequate to prevent the threatened attack. The 
 offender in such case would doubtless put forward 
 untenable claims as an excuse for his oppressive and 
 tyrannical conduct, but such claims would not be justi- 
 ciable, that is, capable of settlement in a court of justice 
 or arbitration, because the offender does not intend, 
 and would not allow, them to be thus settled. For the 
 
INTRODUCTION xiii 
 
 like reason, commissions of inquiry, conciliation, medi- 
 ation, good offices, and diplomatic protests would all 
 alike be of no avail. His design is to use force or 
 fraud against his neighbor and under existing condi- 
 tions nothing but force or the fear of it will deter 
 him. 
 
 Suppose, for example, a nation urged by dynastic, 
 military, or territorial ambitions bent on taking the 
 territory of its neighbor; or suppose it, influenced by 
 cupidity and greed of wealth, determined to capture 
 forcibly or fraudulently, and without regard to the 
 rights of its neighbors, certain trade routes or seats of 
 commercial influence, or resolved, by the use of tariffs 
 or the unfair use of a favorable geographical position, 
 to engage in unfair competition against other nations; 
 or suppose it, influenced by the spirit of nationalism, 
 to contemplate a union of those of its race who are the 
 subjects of neighboring powers through the use of 
 force; or suppose it is filled with a desire to overawe 
 and bully its neighbors, so that it indulges to a dan- 
 gerous extent in militarism and jingoism. These are 
 not uncommon manifestations among the nations, and 
 none of them are justiciable or remediable in any way 
 except by war or the threat of it. 
 
 But this is not the only class of disputes whjerein 
 the remedies before mentioned would be often inade- 
 quate to prevent war. Even in the case of honest dis- 
 putes behind which lurks no evil design of aggression, 
 many, indeed, most, would not be justiciable, and could 
 only be adjusted, short of war, through diplomacy, 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 the good offices of mutual friends, mediation, compro- 
 mise, or possibly arbitration. Whether they would 
 actually be settled in any of these modes or would lead 
 to war would depend, as such matters always have 
 depended, on the self-restraint of the nations involved 
 and the earnestness of their desire to reach a peaceful 
 settlement. 
 
 Among this group of controversies may be classed: 
 
 1. Misunderstandings and wrongs committed un- 
 intentionally, or by accident or mistake. 
 
 Such disputes as these lose all their importance after 
 the facts are understood and usually are readily ad- 
 justed by diplomatic correspondence. They need no 
 special consideration. 
 
 2. Disputes arising from invasions of national 
 pride, honor, or prestige. 
 
 If these invasions result from mere accident, mis- 
 take, or innocent misunderstanding, they belong prop- 
 erly to the first class, and involve little danger of war. 
 They are dismissed with a diplomatic explanation or 
 apology. 
 
 But if they are intentional, the result of a bona 
 fide insistence upon its rights by each nation, confident 
 in the rightfulness of its attitude and assured that it 
 would be injurious to its honor, dignity, interest, or 
 safety to recede, then the controversy becomes danger- 
 ous and carries the seeds of international complica- 
 tions. 
 
 Such disputes, involving as they do national honor 
 or national prestige, the position of the nation among 
 
INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 its fellows, are not easily justiciable, but must ordi- 
 narily be adjusted, short of war, by the good offices 
 of mutual friends, mediation, suggestions, or offers of 
 compromise, and the like, only occasionally, if turn- 
 ing on questions of fact or of law, by arbitral or judi- 
 cial action. 
 
 3. The next class of bona fide international dis- 
 putes consists of those which arise from clashes of 
 sincere and honest national policies, such as the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, the Balance of Power, national and 
 racial sympathies, military preparedness, commercial 
 policies, etc. 
 
 Such disputes are neither justiciable nor arbitrable. 
 We cannot, for instance, conceive, under existing con^ 
 ditions, of the American people agreeing to submit 
 to a judicial or arbitral court the question whether a 
 strong foreign power shall be permitted to seize terri- 
 tory in Central or South America or in Canada. It 
 is not a question of law or justice at all, but one of 
 policy, of self-preservation, the decision of which 
 would never willingly be left to an alien body, be it a 
 judicial court or a court of arbitration or concilia- 
 tion. 
 
 And what is true of the Monroe Doctrine, as it ap- 
 plies to America, is equally true of the great principle 
 of the Balance of Power in Europe, of the open door 
 to trade in China, of the right of a nation to prepare 
 itself in a military way against dreaded attacks, of 
 great nationalistic and racial movements like Pan- 
 Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and others. Disputes like 
 
xvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 these, arising from sources of profound national in- 
 stinct or policy cannot be settled or checked by judi- 
 cial or arbitral decrees. 
 
 Aside from conciliatory and persuasive measures, 
 there is at present no recourse save to war or the threat 
 of it, if the execution of such national policies results 
 in the invasion of the rights and liberties of other 
 States. The establishment of international judicial 
 or arbitral courts would be of no avail. 
 
 4. Another class of disputes between nations would 
 consist of those of long standing, arising from some 
 long past act of gross injustice, such as the annexation 
 of territory formerly belonging to another nation, or 
 the robbery of a nation's liberty or independence. 
 That these unjust acts of the distant past are not al- 
 ways forgotten is sufficiently proved by the French 
 yearning for Alsace and Lorraine, the Italian call to 
 " Italy Unredeemed," and the Polish vision of a re- 
 united Poland. 
 
 Such festering sores as these upon the international 
 body are not curable by judicial or arbitral treatment. 
 They can only be healed, if at all, by the slow lapse of 
 time or by the bleeding process of war. 
 
 5. Another class of disputes consists of those aris- 
 ing from breach of treaty. 
 
 These may often be adjusted without resort to war. 
 The breach may be regarded as an abrogation of the 
 treaty, justifying the other party in regarding it as 
 void. In many cases, doubtless, the breach would pre- 
 sent an arbitral or justiciable question, in the settle- 
 
INTRODUCTION xvii 
 
 ment of which the international courts might take a 
 prominent part. But in other cases the breach would 
 present political and not justiciable questions, and for 
 the decision of these courts would be useless. Thus, 
 many writers on International Law lay down the doc- 
 trine that a nation is justified in violating, and is bound 
 to violate, a treaty, if its execution becomes morally 
 impossible by reason of the destructive damage such 
 execution would inflict on itself or on another nation. 
 It is evident that the question raised by the violation 
 of a treaty, when based upon this ground, is much 
 more of a political than a legal nature, one which it 
 would be impossible to expect any nation to leave to a 
 judicial or arbitral tribunal to decide. 
 
 6. The last class of international controversies to 
 which reference will be made would embrace those aris- 
 ing from disputed facts or from disputed principles 
 of law applicable to the facts. Given both litigants 
 willing to rest upon their legal rights, these constitute 
 clearly and distinctly justiciable questions, to the de- 
 cision of which an international court would be fully 
 competent. 
 
 While a considerable proportion of the disputes 
 likely to arise between nations may be expected to 
 partake more or less of the character of this class of 
 controversies, not so many would be entirely of this 
 sort, but rather partly of this class and partly belonging 
 to one of the other classes before mentioned. And the 
 more the characteristics of other sorts of disputes 
 enter into the case, the less the chance of the questions 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 raised being justiciable and capable of decision by 
 judicial or arbitral process. 
 
 While the enumeration above given is perhaps not 
 exhaustive of all the various sorts of dispute that may 
 arise between nations, it is sufficiently complete to 
 demonstrate how few of such cases would be suscep- 
 tible of settlement through an international court. 
 Under existing conditions, therefore, it cannot be ex- 
 pected that the establishment of international judicial 
 courts or courts of arbitration will go very far to 
 prevent wars between nations. 
 
 The fact is that these, as well as all the other reme- 
 dies that have been mentioned, have for their object 
 the redress of grievances after they have arisen. They 
 do not propose or attempt to prevent the original rise 
 of the grievance. The international doctor has habitu- 
 ally treated the symptoms and effects of the disease, 
 but has not attempted to go to the root of the trouble, 
 find the cause of the disease and prevent the occurrence 
 of that cause. Not until this is recognized as the 
 scientific method of dealing with the problem will 
 its solution be near. 
 
 If it were possible today to erect a world court, with 
 the widest judicial jurisdiction conceivable, and to gain 
 or compel the consent of every nation to submit to 
 that court every international dispute of a justiciable 
 character, the world would be but little better off, so 
 far as the actual danger of war is concerned. While 
 human nature remains as it is, with no other restraint 
 than that of an international court, there would be the 
 
INTRODUCTION xix 
 
 same national ambitions and greed, the same use or 
 dread of force or fraud, the same need of preparedness 
 against attack, the same fear of the stronger by the 
 weaker and smaller States, and often the same con- 
 quest and destruction of the liberties of the less pow- 
 erful of the family of nations. Only justiciable dis- 
 putes could be settled by the court and wars grow far 
 more frequently out of political, than out of justiciable 
 or legal, controversies. 
 
 But, it will be said, if the experience of the United 
 States be examined, it will be found that the Supreme 
 Court has habitually exercised the jurisdiction to de- 
 cide disputes arising between the sovereign States of 
 the American Union, as the British Judicial Committee 
 of the Privy Council has also determined controversies 
 between British colonies and provinces. It will be 
 pointed out that, in all the many interstate controver- 
 sies so far brought before the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, that court has never yet failed to find 
 that the dispute was justiciable nor declined jurisdic- 
 tion on the ground that the question was political. The 
 consequence has been that all these disputes have been 
 amicably settled, and neither war nor the threat of it 
 has arisen out of any of them. Why then, it may be 
 asked, would not the analogy hold in the case of an 
 international court, if the nations will agree to submit 
 their disputes to its cognizance? 
 
 If it could be shown that the happy results apparent 
 in the American system were due solely or even chiefly 
 to the establishment of a court with jurisdiction to de- 
 
xx INTRODUCTION 
 
 cide interstate disputes, the analogy between it and a 
 world court would indeed be striking, and the presump- 
 tion strong that similar results would follow as between 
 the nations upon the establishment of a world court. 
 But when we carefully contrast the circumstances that 
 would surround the two courts, we find that there is 
 no real, at least no close, analogy between them. 
 
 The powers and rights that may be exercised by 
 one nation towards another may with accuracy be 
 divided into two classes, first, political powers, and 
 second, legal rights. Out of the exercise of political 
 powers would arise for the most part political or non- 
 justiciable disputes; out of the exercise or invasion of 
 legal rights would arise the legal or justiciable con- 
 troversies. The only way, therefore, to eliminate the 
 possibility of any disputes between nations or States 
 other than those which are justiciable or susceptible 
 of judicial or arbitral determination, would be to elimi- 
 nate the international or interstate political powers, 
 which are the war-breeding powers. 
 
 This elimination, as between the States of the Amer- 
 ican Union, the Constitution of the United States has 
 accomplished, as has also the constitution of every 
 federal republic or empire in the world today, as be- 
 tween its component States. It is because of this great 
 accomplishment, not because of the mere establish- 
 ment of a court with jurisdiction to determine disputes 
 between the component States, that such disputes are 
 always justiciable and are always susceptible of judi- 
 cial settlement. 
 

 INTRODUCTION xxl 
 
 An examination of the Constitution of the United 
 States, for example, will reveal that each of the United 
 States has surrendered either entirely or to the States 
 United, to be exercised by them all jointly, and not by 
 each separately, the following powers : ( i ) to declare 
 war; (2) to keep troops (exclusive of militia) and 
 ships of war; (3) to acquire the territory of another 
 State, except by consent of the legislatures of the 
 States concerned as well as of Congress; (4) to levy 
 duties on imports or exports; (5) to regulate inter- 
 state or foreign commerce; (6) to make treaties or 
 alliances with foreign States; (7) to make agreements 
 or compacts with other States except with the consent 
 of Congress; and (8) to deny to citizens of sister 
 States the rights and immunities of citizens. The sur- 
 render of these political and military powers has at 
 one stroke removed from the realm of interstate re- 
 lations the right and the ability of each State to exert 
 political power or influence as against sister States 
 of the Union. It follows that no dispute thenceforth 
 arising between two of the United States could be 
 political in character, but must always be within the 
 limit of legal and justiciable questions. 
 
 How different the existing situation of the. nations 
 of the world! They have not only not surrendered 
 to the whole jointly their individual power to declare 
 war and to keep troops and war vessels, but have been 
 steadily and persistently increasing their armaments 
 year by year. They therefore not only possess in- 
 herently the force to compel other States to do their 
 
 
xxll INTRODUCTION 
 
 will, but their ability to use it promptly and efficiently 
 constantly increases. 
 
 Possessing this inherent and constantly augmenting 
 power, they are more and more subjected to the temp- 
 tation to exert it unlawfully and tyrannically against 
 weaker sister nations, since they have never surrend- 
 ered, as have the American States, the power to acquire 
 the territory of another State without its consent or to 
 maltreat its citizens or subjects, or the right to levy 
 heavy tariff duties on international commerce or to 
 secure control, as far as might be within their power, 
 of international trade, trade routes and seats of com- 
 merce, regardless of the just and equal rights of other 
 nations. None of these powers, nor the right to 
 make alliances, whether for aggressive or defensive 
 purposes, nor the right to make (or break) treaties 
 with other nations have they surrendered. And out 
 of the exercise of these powers arise the so-called 
 " political " questions, which are usually non-justiciable, 
 having no relation to abstract justice, but based on 
 theories of policy, self-interest, or self-preservation. 
 
 If therefore we would have an international court 
 serve the same purpose as between the nations as a 
 supreme federal court among the component States 
 of a federal union, some device must be utilized that 
 will eliminate " political " controversies between them, 
 arising out of the exercise of interstate " political " 
 powers, and reduce their disputes to those of a legal 
 or justiciable character. 
 
 That the only effective device by which this may 
 
INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 be accomplished is the creation of some sort of federal 
 union of nations and a surrender by each to all jointly 
 of its right to exercise individually those of its po- 
 litical powers (and no other) the exercise of which 
 would tend to breed war, is the conclusion to which the 
 writer's reflections and study have led him, and his 
 efforts will be devoted in the following pages to es- 
 tablish this contention and to work out feasible and 
 practicable international agreements as to the respec- 
 tive powers of the league and its component nations, 
 together with such checks as will effectively safeguard 
 the real rights and liberties of the States and peoples 
 concerned. These agreements, for the sake of con- 
 venience, have been phrased in the language of a 
 tentative written constitution, which will be found in 
 the Appendix, and which will form the basis or frame- 
 work of the future discussion, though it would be pos- 
 sible perhaps to arrive at fairly similar results in some 
 other form. 
 
 It may be said also in this connection that while^in 
 form the Constitution herein proposed bears some 
 resemblance to that of the United States, it differs 
 widely from it in many, it might perhaps with truth 
 be said in most, substantial respects. 
 
 Before entering upon that discussion, however, it 
 may be well to inquire whether any device might be 
 suggested, short of a surrender by the nations of the 
 right individually to exercise the " political " powers 
 above mentioned, which would attain the end desired, 
 and whether the attainment of that end wou!4 be 
 
xxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 worth the sacrifice of national political independence 
 involved. 
 
 Taking the last point first, it presents a question, the 
 answer to which would obviously depend upon how 
 desirable is the end to be attained and upon the 
 amount of sacrifice involved. These values in turn 
 must be measured by the yardstick of the individual 
 reader's convictions and judgment. 
 
 Certainly, prior to the great European War, few of 
 this generation would have been found of an imagi- 
 nation so vivid as to possess a real vision of war's 
 horrors, or so impressed by them as to advocate the 
 slightest surrender of the sovereignty and independ- 
 ence of the individual nation in order to secure the 
 blessings of a rightful and abiding peace. 
 
 But that war has searched the hearts of many, es- 
 pecially in the bleeding countries of Europe. The 
 world is prepared to examine realities and discard an- 
 cient illusions and shibboleths which would formerly 
 have presented impassable barriers to freedom of 
 thought. 
 
 Has not the general conception of the sovereignty 
 and independence of nations hitherto been somewhat 
 of an illusion somewhat of form without substance, 
 somewhat of a mental confusion between an un- 
 bridled license and a true liberty and independence? 
 Is any nation in the world today absolutely sovereign 
 and independent? Are they not all bound in chains 
 by inviolable treaties and by national necessities of 
 policy, greed, jealousy, dread of attack? Even 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 XXV 
 
 prior to the great war, despite their boasted inde- 
 pendence, have not the nations groaned under the 
 burden of armaments, and will not their groans be 
 doubled and redoubled when they feel the full weight 
 of the burdens added by the war? Are they not con- 
 stantly haunted by fears and suspicions? Are these 
 the indications of national freedom and independ- 
 ence, or of an international license that usurps the 
 name. 
 
 Would it then, after all, be such a violent break with 
 the past realities (not illusions) if the nations should 
 come to an agreement whereby each would surrender 
 to the joint exercise of all that portion only of its 
 so-called independence which is susceptible of use to 
 the injury of its sister nations? Would not its own 
 feeling of peaceful security from the attacks of others 
 compensate each for the surrender of the right to in- 
 flict injustice and harm on others? It is not suggested 
 that any part of its rightful and just independence 
 shall be sacrificed but only that portion which would 
 be either itself wrongful and unjust, or which is sus- 
 ceptible of such exercise as to inspire sister nations 
 with suspicion and fear of unjust and oppressive con- 
 sequences. 
 
 The rights each nation would be called upon to 
 resign would be the power to regulate or control com- 
 merce between the component nations; to acquire the 
 territory of other States; to mistreat their citizens; 
 to lay burdens upon imports or exports; to keep more 
 than a certain proportion of troops or war vessels; 
 
xxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 to make treaties of alliance or confederation with other 
 States; and to declare war, except when invaded or in 
 such imminent danger thereof as not to admit of 
 delay. 
 
 Since almost all wars grow out of the desire to 
 seize international trade or keep other nations from 
 seizing it, out of the desire to acquire territory, or out 
 of the mistreatment by one State of the citizens of 
 another, or out of a suspicion that these things are 
 being attempted or contemplated, if the power of the 
 individual nations to exercise these functions were sur- 
 rendered to the joint action of all, there would be no 
 need of larger armies or navies than would be de- 
 manded by the internal conditions of each country, nor 
 of alliances, nor of the power to declare war. There 
 would thus be only three real surrenders, the surrender 
 of the power to regulate international commerce to the 
 injury of other nations, of the power to acquire their 
 territory, and of the power to treat unjustly or oppres- 
 sively the citizens of other States. This would surely 
 seem not an onerous price to pay for national security 
 and insurance against future wars, provided such 
 checks are supplied as would effectually induce the 
 international league to whom some of these powers 
 would be confided to exercise them impartially for the 
 best interests of all the component nations, freeing 
 those nations from all fear that they might be exer- 
 cised to their destruction or oppression. 
 
 Let us consider briefly, in the last place, whether 
 there is any other practicable device than that just 
 
INTRODUCTION xxvii 
 
 mentioned which might effectually secure the nations 
 against the unlawful, unjust or tyrannical abuse by sis- 
 ter nations of the " political " powers. 
 
 No other restraint suggests itself except the vague 
 and tardy influence of public opinion. The past ex- 
 perience of humanity has not encouraged us to repose 
 much confidence in the mere power of opinion to pre- 
 vent that class of political dispute which so often 
 leads to war. Nor is this surprising when we re- 
 member that to the effective operation of public opin- 
 ion two conditions are essential, knowledge of the 
 fundamental facts of the controversy and time for the 
 crystallization of sentiment upon the merits of it. 
 These conditions, difficult enough of attainment in na- 
 tional affairs, are in most cases impossible of fulfill- 
 ment in the more complex international controver- 
 sies, at least until too late to avert disastrous conse- 
 quences, however potent they might be in bringing 
 the rupture to a conclusion, in influencing the final 
 adjustment between the combatants, or in compelling 
 them to find or to invent plausible excuses for breaking 
 the peace. 
 
 Nor can popular opinion within the disputant States 
 themselves be expected to exert much of an inhibitive 
 power. The people as a whole are accustomed to fol- 
 low their leaders and know too little of the details of 
 international relations to be able to judge for them- 
 selves of the real merits of such controversies. It is 
 easy for the national leaders, if they are so disposed, 
 to give out, keep back or distort information so as to 
 
xxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 make the worse appear the better reason and to mis- 
 guide the nation. The atmosphere of international 
 intercourse is that of secrecy. No real security can 
 be hoped for from this quarter. 
 
 There remains then only some form of international 
 organization whereby the mischievous exercise of these 
 interstate political powers shall be controlled or else 
 machinery provided for the peaceful solution of the 
 political disputes sure to result from their uncon- 
 trolled exercise. If the nations choose the former 
 alternative, by controlling the causes of war they se- 
 cure themselves against war itself. If they adopt the 
 latter, the causes of controversy are left to flourish 
 in full vigor, while the effort is expended on the at- 
 tempt to check the evil consequences. 
 
 So far as the surrender of sovereignty and independ- 
 ence is concerned, there would seem to be little to 
 choose between them. An international league for 
 the enforcement of compulsory arbitration or concilia- 
 tion, with a covenant by all to unite in war or other 
 forcible measures against any nation declining to en- 
 gage in either form of settlement, however sacred and 
 dear to it the matter involved, can hardly, if success- 
 ful, be looked upon as a conservator of the sovereignty 
 and independence of the nations. True it would leave 
 the nations free as at present, to exercise their po- 
 litical powers to the injury and oppression of their 
 neighbors, but if the plan were successful they would 
 be held to so strict an accountability for the result- 
 ing injuries that they would in effect cease to enjoy 
 
INTRODUCTION xxix 
 
 the sovereign independence they how possess to 
 bully, oppress and defraud other nations as they 
 please. 
 
 Such a league might prove a more or less efficient 
 safeguard against international wars; but it would 
 certainly not leave the independence of the nations un- 
 touched. 
 
 But it is submitted that, aside from the inherent 
 difficulty of securing the consent of the nations to any 
 plan effective to prevent war, there are practical ob- 
 stacles in the way of the successful operation of a plan 
 of this nature arising out of the difficulty that would 
 manifest itself among the nations of the league of se- 
 curing concert of action in compelling a recalcitrant 
 nation to resort to compulsory arbitration or concilia- 
 tion. How would each leaguer's proportion of troops, 
 ships, and expense be ascertained? Who would com- 
 mand? How induce the people of the several nations 
 of the league to look with favor upon a war waged 
 to compel a sister and perhaps distant nation to adjudi- 
 cate questions that to them will often appear to involve 
 mere abstract, technical matters of national policy or 
 international law, about which most of them would 
 know little and care less? Or if a nation be jealous 
 or suspicious of the superior strength, military or com- 
 mercial, of the State threatened with attack, how shall 
 its zealous support be secured of a concerted action 
 that would prevent such attack? Who would settle 
 the terms of peace? Would not the situation be 
 equally difficult if the nation called on to intervene 
 
xxx INTRODUCTION 
 
 were commercially or diplomatically on peculiarly 
 friendly terms with the aggressor? 
 
 These are some of the reasons (and others will 
 appear in subsequent chapters) why the plea is made 
 in the following pages that the league take the form 
 of the establishment of a federal international govern- 
 ment, by which the nations will either agree, under 
 proper safeguards, to surrender to the government 
 of all jointly their power to injure or work injustice 
 upon their sister States or agree that they shall not be 
 exercised at all. The powers that need be thus sur- 
 rendered are very few, but very important to the at- 
 tainment of the end desired. They may be briefly 
 enumerated as follows : ( i ) The grant on the one 
 hand to the league of the power to regulate interna- 
 tional commerce and communication by special legisla- 
 tion for the purpose and, on the other, the surrender 
 by the component nations of the right to tax imports, 
 exports, or the instrumentalities of international com- 
 merce; (2) the right to acquire any part of the terri- 
 tory of another nation without the consent both of the 
 latter nation and of the international government; 
 
 (3) the right to treat tyrannically or oppressively the 
 citizens of other States while within their borders; 
 
 (4) the right to keep more than a reasonable propor- 
 tion of troops and war vessels, adequate to the task of 
 internal police, while granting to the joint government 
 the right to keep sufficient troops and ships to guaran- 
 tee the protection of all; (5) the right to make treaties 
 of alliance and confederation individually with any 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxi 
 
 nation, or any treaty that would violate the compact 
 of union, while granting to the joint government the 
 power to make treaties with any nation, not a member 
 of the union, concerning matters to which the powers 
 granted to the joint government shall extend; and (6) 
 the right to declare or make war, unless in case of 
 invasion or imminent danger thereof, while granting to 
 the league the right to declare war against States with- 
 out the union. 
 
 It has been said before, but it may well be re- 
 peated, indeed too much emphasis cannot be laid 
 upon the statement, that, conceding the surrender by 
 the nations of the first three of the powers above 
 enumerated, there weuld be little or no need of the 
 exercise of the last three, so that under the plan pres- 
 ently to be considered, the nations would in reality 
 only be called upon to surrender three items of their 
 present independence, namely: the right to control or 
 regulate international commerce generally, but only to 
 an extent that would be considered by the joint 
 judgment of all as essential to the general interest, 
 (though as to the right to tax or burden imports, ex- 
 ports, or the instrumentalities of international com- 
 merce, the surrender should be absolute) ; the right to 
 acquire the territory of another State to the detriment 
 of that State or to the detriment of the joint interests 
 of all; and lastly, the right to treat unjustly or oppres- 
 sively, according to certain designated standards, the 
 citizens of other States while within their borders. 
 
 Gone would be the dread of economic bondage, the 
 
 
xxxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 fear of territorial conquest, the danger of injustice to 
 citizens in foreign lands. When these shackles are 
 struck from the limbs of the nations, the causes of 
 international war are practically swept away, and with 
 them war itself. 
 
 But the nations would rightly prefer to bear the ills 
 they have rather than fly to others they know not of, 
 and unless they can be assured that in the destruction 
 of these age-long chains they do not find other and 
 stronger fetters, they would be justified in declining 
 to try the experiment. Even though it be granted 
 that the general principles above enunciated are sound, 
 yet there remains the great task of devising such auto- 
 matic checks and balances as will* render it impossible 
 that this joint government shall encroach upon the just 
 liberties of the component States or their people. Due 
 care must be taken that a majority of the component 
 States shall not engage in oppressive conduct toward 
 a minority or even toward a single State; that a ma- 
 jority composed of the small States, shall not override 
 the united will of the fewer, but more influential, 
 " Great Powers," and that the more influential shall 
 not override the wishes of a majority composed of the 
 smaller States; that the international government, 
 both in its legislative and executive departments, be 
 at all times subject to the joint control of the com- 
 ponent States; that a small minority on the one hand 
 shall not be permitted to block the legitimate will of 
 the majority of the States in the ordinary conduct of 
 business, while on the other, in regard to matters of 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxiii 
 
 vital importance, a bare majority of States shall not be 
 permitted complete control; that the internal affairs 
 of a State be not interfered with at all by other States 
 acting jointly or separately; that a constituent State do 
 not persistently neglect or disregard its pledged obliga- 
 tions to the union or its sister States, in short, that 
 all needful precautions be taken to insure an adminis- 
 tration of the international government in the common 
 interest of all, as evidenced by the free and untram- 
 meled voice of each in the international legislature. 
 
 It is hoped that the following study, while doubtless 
 imperfect and inadequate in details, may at least serve 
 to suggest a basic foundation upon which to rear an 
 international organization which will remove the great 
 subjects already mentioned, the breeders of interna- 
 tional strife, from the baneful influence of secret and 
 often sinister diplomacy, and deliver them to the open 
 and public debate of an international legislative body, 
 wherein every nation will be fairly represented. 
 
 NOTE. The reader's attention is specially called to the index- 
 heading, " Checks and Balances," wherein will be found a complete 
 analysis of the many safeguards against invasions of national and 
 individual independence contained in the constitution proposed. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ix 
 
 Utility of arbitral tribunals in preventing wars. Judicial 
 and arbitral courts contrasted. Many sorts of disputes can- 
 not be settled by either tribunal. International disputes 
 classified. Justiciable and political questions contrasted. 
 Why the Supreme Court of the United States can deter- 
 mine all disputes between the States of the American 
 Union. Political war-breeding powers of States surren- 
 dered to United States. No such surrender by independent 
 nations. Conceptions of sovereignty illusory. Feasibility 
 of a federal league of nations. Federal union of nations 
 and league merely to enforce peace contrasted. Note to 
 the reader touching the checks and balances of the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 <FEDERAL UNIONS PREVENT WARS BETWEEN THE COMPONENT 
 STATES , 
 
 Foundations of social morality among men. Social 
 morality among the nations. Law between nations supplied, 
 and wars averted, by federal unions. Some distinctions 
 between ordinary federal unions and a federal league of 
 independent nations. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 PEACE-MAKING ELEMENTS OF A FEDERAL UNION .... 
 
 The war-checking powers of a federal union. The causes 
 of war enumerated. National immorality. National cupid- 
 ity. National ambition. National pride or honor. Na- 
 tional prejudice and ignorance. National jealousies and 
 suspicions. Lack of adequate peaceable modes of redress. 
 
 10 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 FEDERAL UNION OF INDEPENDENT NATIONS PROPOSED 
 
 XXXV 
 
xxxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT .... 30 
 
 Distribution of powers. Legislative department of one 
 or two chambers? Appointment of representatives Terms 
 of office. Sessions of the International Congress Recesses 
 and adjournments. Compensation of representatives. 
 Privileges of representatives. Limited life of revenue and 
 commercial measures. National veto of international legis- 
 lation. Power of impeachment or removal. Other de- 
 tails of organization. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 POWERS TO BE CONFERRED ON INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ... 66 
 
 Preliminary observations. Power to raise revenue. 
 Power to borrow money. To issue paper currency. To 
 coin money. To punish counterfeiting. To fix standards 
 of weights and measures. To regulate international com- 
 merce. To regulate postal and other international com- 
 munication. To provide for international copyrights and 
 patent rights. To constitute inferior international courts. 
 To define, punish and redress wrongs on the high seas 
 and offences against the Law of Nations. The war pow- 
 ers. The seat of the international government. Ancillary 
 powers. Citizenship. Power of naturalization. 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT . 100 
 
 Dependence of the executive upon the legislative depart- 
 ment. Selection of a prime minister. The nominating 
 committee, its organization and functions. Eligibility of 
 ministers. Selection of subordinate ministers. The number 
 of ministers. Their terms of office. Their compensation. 
 Distribution of executive functions among the ministers. 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 POWERS TO BE CONFERRED ON THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT . . 115 
 
 The pardoning power. The treaty-making power. 
 Appointment and removal of officers. Recognition of am- 
 bassadors and public ministers. The execution of inter- 
 national laws, treaties and judicial decisions. Official com- 
 missions. Interpellations and interrogations. The sum- 
 moning and proroguing of the Congress. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxvii 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT . . . . 125 
 
 Appointment of international judiciary. Independence of 
 the judiciary. Inferior international tribunals. The in- 
 ternational Supreme Court. Equality of national repre- 
 sentation upon the Supreme Court. Division of the Su- 
 preme Court into sections. Appeals from the sections to 
 the Supreme Court as a whole. 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS 136 
 
 Scope of the international judicial power. Interpreta- 
 tion of the constitution, laws and treaties. Power to ad- 
 judge laws and treaties unconstitutional and void. Check 
 upon the power. Cases affecting ambassadors, public min- 
 isters and consuls. Offences and wrongs committed on 
 the high seas. The United Nations a party. Controversies 
 between component nations. Controversies between com- 
 ponent and other nations. Controversies between nations 
 not members of the league. Cases between citizens of dif- 
 ferent States. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
 Its appellate jurisdiction. Limitations upon the inter- 
 national judicial power. Suits by individuals against com- 
 ponent nations. Suits against the sovereign, chief executive 
 or ministers of a component nation. 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: (I) 
 
 POLITICAL LIMITATIONS 156 
 
 Preliminary observations. Territorial acquisitions. 
 " Citizenship of the United Nations." " Treason against the 
 United Nations." Power of taxation. Appropriations of 
 public money. Purposes of appropriations. Bounties and 
 pensions. Commercial preferences as between the com- 
 ponent nations. Titles of nobility and privileged orders. 
 Grants of titles or emoluments by other States. 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: (II) 
 
 GUARANTEES OF CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL . .168 
 
 Prompt discharge from illegal imprisonment. Religious 
 liberty. Freedom of speech and press. Rights of assembly 
 and of petition. The keeping and bearing of arms. Quar- 
 tering of soldiers on the people. Jury trial in civil cases. 
 Power of eminent domain. Due process of law. Equal 
 protection of the laws. 
 
xxxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: (III) 
 GUARANTEES OF RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS IN CRIMINAL 
 CASES . . . 181 
 
 Due process of law. Equal protection of the laws. Bills 
 of attainder. Ex post facto laws. General warrants of 
 arrest and search. Double jeopardy. Self-incrimination. 
 The grand jury. Speedy and public trial. Jury trial in 
 criminal cases. Other guarantees in criminal cases. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE COMPONENT NATIONS . .190 
 
 General limitations of a non-political nature. Political 
 powers haying no bearing on war. Treaties, alliances and 
 confederations. Taxation of international commerce. 
 War powers of component nations. Territorial acquisitions 
 by component nations. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 RELATIONS OF COMPONENT NATIONS TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE 
 
 UNION 212 
 
 Protection of fundamental rights of citizens of one State 
 while in another. Protection to citizens of component States 
 while in foreign countries. Protection of component States 
 against invasion. Internal dissensions in component States. 
 Admission of new States to the league. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 RESERVED RIGHTS OF THE COMPONENT NATIONS 222 
 
 General reservation of sovereignty and of all rights not 
 surrendered. Right of component nation to withdraw from 
 the league. Rights of seceding State in the common prop- 
 erty of the league. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 SUPREMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION, LAWS AND TREATIES 229 
 
 The declaration of supremacy. Official oath to support 
 the Constitution. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxix 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 232 
 
 General considerations. Proposal of amendments. 
 Enactment of amendments. Limitations upon the power of 
 amendment. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 DISCIPLINE OF A COMPONENT NATION , 242 
 
 Violations of constitutional obligations by a component 
 nation. Modes of discipline proposed. Embargo on trade. 
 Expulsion from the league. Check upon disciplinary 
 power of the Congress. Requirement of a three-fourths vote 
 in each chamber. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 248 
 
 Number of assenting nations required to establish the 
 Constitution. Number of the Great Powers. Method of 
 ratification of the Constitution. 
 
 APPENDIX 257 
 
 INDEX 299 
 
A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 FEDERAL UNIONS PREVENT WARS BE- 
 TWEEN THE COMPONENT STATES 
 
 I 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL OR Civic MORALITY 
 AMONG MEN 
 
 In the first stages of every primitive society there is 
 a period during which the laws protecting individual 
 rights are but vaguely defined and weakly enforced. 
 Each man's ability to hold his own depends upon his 
 strength or cunning or upon the alliances he can form 
 with others for common protection. 
 
 But as the society becomes more stable and civilized, 
 influences begin to work which materially improve the 
 condition of mankind. A spirit of co-operation and of 
 mutual aid and dependence takes the place of the 
 former spirit of rapacity; common interests make men 
 more friendly; suspicion and distrust give way to mu- 
 tual confidence; selfish ambition and cupidity yield 
 more or less to an appreciation of the rights of others ; 
 
2 'A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 and violence surrenders dominion to the gentler arts 
 of reason and peace. 
 
 What is the cause of this great change in the gen- 
 eral attitude of men? It is the rise and development 
 of LAW, divine and human, and the proper enforce- 
 ment of justice and right. This marks the birth of a 
 social or civic morality among men, unknown to the 
 era of lawlessness and of the personal application of 
 the maxim that might makes right. 
 
 All individual morality is based upon four broad 
 foundations: The fear of consequences, the hope of 
 reward, hereditary predispositions, and environment. 
 All these are directly or indirectly supplied and built 
 up by the operation, as between man and man, of just 
 and wise law, firmly enforced by a superior power. 
 
 So long, therefore, as we suppose men born without 
 hereditary predispositions to justice and respect 
 for the rights of others; surrounded by others with 
 as little conception of these ideals as themselves, and 
 with as little understanding or appreciation of them; 
 owing such ease, comfort and happiness as they enjoy 
 to violence and the unjust disregard of other's rights; 
 and strong enough to be devoid of much fear of conse- 
 quences; we have a condition in which ordinary 
 morality, and the dictates of reason and justice, can 
 find but little root. 
 
 But with the advent of Law, properly enforced, pro- 
 tecting the weak against violence and punishing the 
 oppressor, all this is changed. The teachings of divine 
 law arouse the conscience, while the fear of certain 
 
MORALITY AMONG NATIONS 3 
 
 punishment under human law suffices to deter most 
 men from its ruthless violation. The hope of reward 
 ceases to lie in the violent or fraudulent taking of the 
 property of others, but finds its source in the acquisi- 
 tion of goods by the honest labor of men secure in the 
 peaceful possession of their own, or in their desire 
 to obtain and to deserve the good opinion and plaudit 
 of their fellows and the approval of their own con- 
 sciences. It is soon discovered that these constitute 
 much greater rewards than could be attained under 
 the old system of lawlessness and license. And as these 
 influences spread amongst men, they speedily become 
 reinforced by those of hereditary predisposition to 
 just dealings and peaceful conduct, and of an environ- 
 ment of the like kind. 
 
 Thus it is that the advent of Law brings about 
 condition among men in every civilized society, by 
 reason of which violence and private wars among them 
 are rare. 
 
 II 
 
 SOCIAL MORALITY AMONG THE NATIONS 
 
 There is a family or society of nations, but its 
 condition is closely akin to that of the primitive so- 
 cieties of men, to which allusion has been made. As 
 yet, the nations, in their dealings with each other, have 
 by no means advanced along the road of moral con- 
 ceptions as far as has the individual unit of society. 
 
 Nor is this surprising when we remember that the 
 
4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 nations generally have not been subjected to the in- 
 fluences that make so strongly for the development 
 of the morality of the individual. 
 
 The laws governing international relations have not 
 the sanction of a superior power. They are vaguely 
 outlined, and are obligatory only so long as the na- 
 tions' self-interests demand their recognition. The 
 only well-recognized law controlling them in the past 
 has been that might makes right. Accordingly much 
 the same phenomena have presented themselves in this 
 society of nations as in that primitive society of men 
 already referred to. 
 
 The strong nation, unafraid of consequences, de- 
 spoils the weaker of its territory, its independence, or 
 its wealth, and finds its highest reward in the violent 
 or fraudulent acquisition of the liberty or property of 
 its neighbors. Its environment has not been such as 
 to improve these tendencies, since all the rest of the so- 
 ciety of nations would think and act like itself under 
 the same circumstances. Nor has there been, any 
 influence operating upon the nations analogous to the 
 hereditary predispositions to just and right dealings, 
 which operate so powerfully to create and keep alive 
 individual morality. 
 
 Hence in the society of nations, as in that of primi- 
 tive men, we find the same tendencies to violence, 
 rapacity, cupidity, ruthless ambition, suspicion, and dis- 
 trust, constant injustice, constant conflicts. 
 
 That the absence of social morality among nations 
 is due to the absence of Law and a superior power 
 
EFFECT OF FEDERAL UNION 5 
 
 adequate to enforce it, is seen from the fact that within 
 the last century there has been a considerable develop- 
 ment of it, synchronizing with the many international 
 congresses and conferences that have from time to time 
 been held for the purpose of discussing and adopting 
 laws to regulate international relations, and this, de- 
 spite the fact that but very inadequate and imperfect 
 instrumentalities have been as yet created for the en- 
 forcement of the laws made. 
 
 Ill 
 
 LAW BETWEEN NATIONS SUPPLIED AND WARS 
 AVERTED BY FEDERAL UNIONS 
 
 Important and valuable testimony to the fact just al- 
 luded to, that an international morality, which will 
 put an end to international abuses and the wars result- 
 ing from them, will always be developed in the pres- 
 ence of effectual and enforceable international law, 
 is to be found in the practically complete success with 
 which the various federal unions of the world have not 
 only averted wars between their component States, but 
 have substituted, in the place of the vindictive na- 
 tional passions that would soon engender war between 
 them if left to themselves, a spirit of co-operation and 
 friendly emulation for the common weal entirely un- 
 known as between separate nations. The advent of 
 law among nations is thus seen to produce much the 
 same effects as among individuals. 
 
6 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The German Empire, Switzerland, the Dominion of 
 Canada, the Australian Commonwealth, the Argentine 
 and Brazilian Republics, all speak a common language 
 on this point. 
 
 The only exception is the United States, whose rec- 
 ord in this respect has been dimmed by the War of 
 1 86 1 between the States. But upon due examination 
 it will be found that this exception is apparent rather 
 than real, since that war was due to an irreconcilable, 
 but none the less sincere, difference of opinion upon 
 the point of the constitutional right of a State to secede 
 from the Union ; a point which the Constitution had 
 not expressly provided for. No one acquainted with 
 the American people would believe that a war would 
 ever have occurred upon this point if the Constitution 
 had explicitly declared either for or against the right 
 of secession. That war therefore cannot justly be 
 said to have resulted on either side from a want of 
 social morality or from lawlessness, but rather from 
 the desire of each party to the quarrel to enforce the 
 law as each saw it. 
 
 With respect to the United States, however, it can 
 certainly be said that, with the exception of this war, 
 her experience has been the same as that of all the 
 other federal unions. The component States have 
 exercised toward each other that courtesy, self-restraint 
 and consideration which take the place in such federa- 
 tions of the rapacity, greed, ambition, and mutual 
 jealousy and distrust, characteristic of the relations 
 existing between distinct nations. 
 
FEDERAL UNIONS CONTRASTED 7 
 
 The British Empire, too, should be mentioned in this 
 connection. For though it is not in form strictly a 
 federal union, it is actuated in the government of its 
 colonies and territories by much the same principles 
 that regulate the relations between a federal union and 
 its component States, the principles of freedom and 
 independence in all local matters and protection 
 against invasion, in return for the more or less cen- 
 tralized control of interests common to the whole Em- 
 pire. And here, once more, we find the operation of 
 the same law, the component States actuated by good 
 will towards each other and a desire to serve the com- 
 mon good of all, instead of a constant striving for 
 unfair advantages, with the corresponding jealousies 
 it engenders. 
 
 Is it not then a just and reasonable conclusion that 
 there are elements in every federal union that tend 
 to destroy the grounds of ordinary international quar- 
 rel and to insure peace among the component nations? 
 That such has been the result in the actual experience 
 of all federal unions, with the qualification mentioned 
 as to the United States, there is no doubt. 
 
 IV 
 
 SOME DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ORDINARY FEDERAL 
 UNIONS AND A FEDERAL UNION OF INDEPEND- 
 ENT NATIONS 
 
 In considering whether the conclusion just reached 
 would apply in like manner or degree to a general 
 
8 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 union of nations, it is important to observe that all 
 existing federal unions are composed of States, all 
 of which have much the same institutions, language, 
 and nationality. It might be questioned whether quite 
 the same successful results would follow upon a federal 
 union of nations speaking different languages, possess- 
 ing different institutions and racial characteristics, and 
 accustomed to different modes of thought. 
 
 There is another point of distinction to be noted 
 between a federal international union and the federal 
 national unions with which the world is familiar. 
 The latter have always been designed for two pur- 
 poses; first, to substitute, as between the component 
 States, the co-operative and friendly for the rapacious 
 and militaristic spirit; and, second, to create to a 
 greater or less degree out of the component States a 
 single nation. For the purpose last mentioned it has 
 always been necessary to bind the States together by a 
 close union, they surrendering to the federal govern- 
 ment a considerable number of sovereign rights they 
 might have exercised as independent States, even 
 though no danger of war might result from the exer- 
 cise of them. The federal international union, on the 
 other hand, being designed mainly to preserve the 
 peace between the component nations, and to create a 
 new State only in a very limited sense, need not, and 
 indeed could not, be so close a union as the others 
 nor require the surrender of so many important sov- 
 ereign powers. 
 
 In the case of an international federation, these two 
 
FEDERAL UNIONS CONTRASTED 9 
 
 grounds of distinction would perhaps operate in some 
 degree to diminish the salutary operation of that law 
 underlying federal unions, which makes them very com- 
 plete conservers of the peace between the component 
 States; but it by no means follows that this influence 
 would be seriously impaired either in kind or degree. 
 If we remember that, in case of such a union, the com- 
 ponent States, through the federal legislative and ex- 
 ecutive departments, would be co-operating much more 
 constantly than now, and would thus come better to 
 understand each other's view points; that the war pow- 
 ers, and others calculated to cause conflicts between 
 them would be surrendered to the federal government, 
 with a corresponding disarmament of the nations them- 
 selves; and that actual disagreements between them 
 would be determined by the decrees of the federal 
 judiciary, backed if need be by the influence of the en- 
 tire union; there is little reason to doubt that the 
 causes of war between the nations would be effectually 
 abolished or robbed of their harmful qualities, and 
 that a reign of international law would be established 
 in the place of the existing dominion of a universal 
 international license; ushering in peace and concord 
 where now prevail violence and war. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE PEACE-MAKING ELEMENTS OF A 
 FEDERAL UNION 
 
 I 
 
 THE WAR-CHECKING POWERS OF A FEDERAL 
 
 UNION 
 
 In the preceding chapter it has been pointed out 
 that the political experience of mankind clearly teaches 
 the lesson that groups of independent States may suc- 
 cessfully avoid war amongst themselves by entering 
 into a federal union; and that this is true even when 
 the number of component States is large, as in the case 
 of the United States, composed now of nearly fifty 
 great commonwealths. 
 
 Why do these federal unions possess this universal 
 attribute, for it is much more than a tendency, the 
 elimination of wars among its members? 
 
 The answer is found in the nature of a federal union 
 and its inherent qualities, which naturally and in- 
 evitably destroy the germs of war as between the com- 
 ponent nations, and without attempting any direct al- 
 terations of human nature, divert the war-breeding 
 passions of men into safer and saner channels. 
 
 10 
 
FEDERAL UNION CHECKS WAR 1 1 
 
 What then are these fundamental and inherent quali- 
 ties of the federal union? If we turn to the existing 
 federations for an answer and examine them to dis- 
 cover those attributes that are common to them all, 
 we must find among these the particular principles ne- 
 cessitating this like effect. 
 
 The most important of these common phenomena 
 which would strike the attention of the observer is the 
 fact that all such unions have adopted the principle of 
 a surrender to the federal government of certain pow- 
 ers, the exercise of which would be of common interest 
 to all the component States, with a correlative reser- 
 vation of independence to those States in all matters 
 of local concern only. 
 
 And always among the POWERS SURREN- 
 DERED by the nations severally we find the power 
 to control war; the power to control commerce between 
 the component States and with foreign nations; the 
 power to impose duties on goods imported or exported, 
 or to expand their territories without the consent of 
 the federal government; the power to make at least 
 certain kinds of treaties; the power to keep armaments, 
 unless subject to the control of the federal government; 
 and the power to determine for themselves the mode 
 and measure of redress for alleged wrongs committed 
 by sister States, such disputes being made justiciable 
 by a tribunal constituted for the purpose, whose de- 
 crees may be backed by the combined influence of the 
 States in union. 
 
 Other powers also, having no special relation to the 
 
12 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 preservation of peace between the component nations, 
 are usually conferred upon the federal government, 
 such as the control of the currency, banking, copyrights, 
 and other national, but not war-breeding, powers, and 
 varying in number and degree with the grade of na- 
 tional strength and centralized power it is desired to 
 create in the federal government. But the purpose 
 of granting such powers as these, with a corresponding 
 weakening of the component States, is in the main 
 to create a single nation of the composite group, and 
 not merely to prevent war between the States con- 
 cerned. 
 
 It is among the first class of powers, therefore, 
 rather than the second, we must look to find the reason 
 for the fact that by federation nations save themselves 
 from the horrors of war. Reviewing these powers as 
 they have been enumerated, it is difficult to select any 
 as not fulfilling an important part in the accomplish- 
 ment of this result. 
 
 May we not justly conclude, then, that in the forma- 
 tion of a federal union for the preservation of peace 
 among the component nations, it would be unsafe, to 
 say the least, to omit any of these from the powers 
 to be granted to the proposed federation? It may, or 
 it may not, be found convenient to include other pow- 
 ers also, but these at least should certainly be included. 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 13 
 
 II 
 
 THE CAUSES OF WAR ENUMERATED 
 
 It may be asked, how is it certain that the surrender 
 of all the powers above mentioned are essential to 
 preserve the peace of nations? Is there any other rea- 
 son to believe so than the fact that all existing fed- 
 erations have provided for the surrender of these 
 powers on the part of the nations entering into 
 them? 
 
 A careful analysis of the causes or motives that 
 induce wars between nations, omitting from consid- 
 eration civil wars and wars bona fide waged for 
 self-preservation or in behalf of another oppressed na- 
 tion (neither of which could occur if the other party 
 to the war were not unjustified in the conduct leading 
 to it) will show that all wars other than those just 
 mentioned spring from one or more of the following 
 sources : 
 
 1. The lack of a proper international morality; so 
 that nations scarcely hesitate to engage in conduct to- 
 wards other nations which men of ordinary civic moral- 
 ity would be ashamed to stoop to with reference to 
 each other; 
 
 2. National cupidity, with reference to territory or 
 trade; 
 
 3. National ambitions, military or political; 
 
 4. National pride or honor; 
 
 5. National prejudices and ignorance or misunder- 
 
14 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 standing of the ideals and characteristics of other na- 
 tions; 
 
 6. National jealousies and suspicions; and 
 
 7. The absence of an assured method of determin- 
 ing bona fide disputes between nations otherwise than 
 by a resort to force. 
 
 Ill 
 
 NATIONAL IMMORALITY 
 
 As to the first of these, national immorality, as 
 shown in the existing conditions of international law- 
 lessness or license, it has been attempted to explain in 
 the first chapter how a federal union operates to check 
 it, as between the component States, substituting a 
 spirit among them of co-operation and friendly emula- 
 tion for the common good in the place of the spirit 
 of disintegration and potential hostility that normally 
 prevails between separate independent nations. Refer- 
 ence to that explanation will suffice. 
 
 IV 
 
 NATIONAL CUPIDITY 
 
 National cupidity, or the undue desire for na- 
 tional aggrandizement either in the direction of terri- 
 tory or of trade or both, is a fruitful source of inter- 
 national strife. 
 
 This desire for territory may arise from the wish to 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 15 
 
 exploit its resources or trade to the enrichment of cer- 
 tain classes in the State, or from the wish to secure 
 other supposed advantages in commerce, such as con- 
 venient shipping ports or monopolies of trade with 
 the people inhabiting or adjacent to the territory; or 
 it may spring from the assumed military advantages 
 to accrue to the nation from its possession, or from 
 the supposed political strengthening of the nation 
 arising therefrom, such, for example, as the chance 
 it affords to have the nation's surplus population 
 migrate thither, remaining under the original flag 
 and allegiance, rather than lose all future benefits 
 of that population through emigration to other 
 countries. 
 
 This national yearning for increased territory is 
 neither improper nor calculated to stir up strife be- 
 tween nations so long as it is confined to territory not 
 in the present possession of any other nation. But 
 unfortunately in modern times all the desirable terri- 
 tory of the world's surface is possessed and occupied; 
 and hence any present national desire of this sort must 
 content itself with the acquisition of undesirable terri- 
 tory, or else must look to the forcible or fraudulent 
 acquisition of the territory of another nation, to which 
 the former has no right save that of predominant 
 might. The consequence is that in proportion to the 
 desirability of the territory upon which a nation has 
 fixed the eyes of its affection is the danger of war to 
 obtain it. And whether, as an economic or military 
 question, the territory when obtained is worth the cost 
 
1 6 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 of securing it is a matter generally lost sight of in the 
 final outcome. 
 
 It is to be observed that if component nations were 
 to surrender to a federal government their right to 
 impose duties on imports and exports and other re- 
 strictions upon international trade and commerce, and 
 also their war powers, all need, and the corresponding 
 desire, for increased territory would at once vanish, 
 and this cause of war, as between such nations, would 
 be abolished. This has been the experience of all 
 existing federal unions as between their component 
 States. 
 
 The same principle would also apply, under similar 
 conditions, to abolish wars between such nations result- 
 ing from national desire for increase of trade. By 
 giving the control of the international commerce of the 
 nations concerned to the combiried nations as repre- 
 sented in a properly organized federal government, as 
 every existing federal constitution does, the temptation 
 is removed from the several nations to use unfair 
 and unjust means to promote their own commerce at 
 the expense of their neighbors, so that justice and right 
 will on the whole prevail in such regulations rather 
 than injustice and greed; and thus another fruitful 
 cause of war has, as between those nations, been abol- 
 ished, and trust and confidence between them has to 
 that extent replaced suspicion and jealousy. 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 17 
 
 V 
 
 NATIONAL AMBITION 
 
 In the next place, national ambition either for mili- 
 tary or political greatness is a constant source of ag- 
 gression and war. These are indeed, in the last analy- 
 sis, one and the same. For while it is possible that 
 national political aggrandizement may be attained by 
 other methods than the military, it is always true that 
 the ultimate purpose of national military success is 
 a political, and usually a territorial or commercial, 
 aggrandizement. 
 
 But if the effect of a federal union is to abolish, as 
 between the component nations, the temptation to ac- 
 quire territory or to augment the national commerce by 
 violent or unjust means, the national desire for po- 
 litical predominance is thus deprived of all its noxious 
 consequences, and nothing of it is left but the benefi- 
 cent ambition to shine in ability and usefulness to the 
 common weal among the sister stars of the same con- 
 stellation. 
 
 VI 
 
 NATIONAL PRIDE OR HONOR 
 
 The same results follow in the case of national 
 pride as a cause of war. As between independent 
 nations, there is no surer way of bringing on \ar than 
 to offer an affront to national pride or national honor, 
 
1 8 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 because each nation is jealous and suspicious of the 
 other, and fearful that, should it show the least sign 
 of weakness or fear, other nations are ready to pounce 
 upon it, or at least ready to entertain doubts of its 
 courage and to impose unjust and improper demands. 
 It is because of this quickness to resent insults or of- 
 fensive conduct (real or supposed), even at a cost 
 perhaps ruinous to itself, that the nations are so 
 punctilious in their dealings with each other. Slight 
 departures from established international customs with 
 regard to these matters may produce serious conse- 
 quences. 
 
 The federal union, as between the nations compos- 
 ing it, supplies the remedy for this, not by destroying 
 national pride, honor, and patriotism, but by removing 
 the necessity for a prompt resentment of an affront 
 offered by another component nation. Just as a man, 
 living in a civilized community and knowing that the 
 law protects him from unprovoked violence, can af- 
 ford to overlook an affront to his dignity rather than 
 go to the extreme length of killing the offender to 
 avenge it, so a nation which is a member of such a 
 union, aware that neither the offending nation nor 
 others would be permitted to use force against it, can 
 afford to overlook the offense. But as a matter of fact 
 such affronts would never be likely to occur, unless by 
 accident or misunderstanding, for all temptation to of- 
 fer them would be lacking. 
 
 Again, a people's sense of national pride or honor is 
 sometimes invoked to support a war of aggression, 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 19 
 
 the real design being to secure territory or trade while 
 the people themselves are led to believe that it is waged 
 to avenge an insult or to preserve the nation's integrity. 
 Here too the existence of a federal union would serve 
 as a check. 
 
 VII 
 
 NATIONAL PREJUDICE AND IGNORANCE 
 
 Our next cause of war arises from national preju- 
 dices and ignorance of the aims, ideals, virtues, and 
 characteristics of other nations. Not that this, of it- 
 self, often forms a motive for war, but it sometimes 
 powerfully co-operates with other influences in produc- 
 ing wars, wars which would never occur, if the na- 
 tions involved understood each other's motives. 
 
 As between its component States, a federal union 
 presents more or less of a relief from these national 
 prejudices and misconceptions. The representatives 
 of these nations are constantly thrown together in the 
 conduct of the federal government, and the nations 
 themselves are continually co-operating in various ways 
 under the common laws and policies, and are neces- 
 sarily thrown into much more intimate relations than 
 would be probable had they remained entirely inde- 
 pendent. The freedom of trade, the absence of fric- 
 tion in the mutual intercourse of their citizens, com- 
 mon interests and co-operation, and a hundred other 
 influences are constantly at work to lead thefm to a 
 better understanding of one another. 
 
20 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 It is true that this tendency, strongly marked in all 
 of the existing federal unions, composed as they are of 
 States whose people are usually of the same nation- 
 ality, speaking the same language, possessed of much 
 the same laws and political institutions, might not 
 be actually so pronounced in a union composed of 
 nations differing radically in these respects; but there 
 can be little doubt that the beneficial effects in the lat- 
 ter case would be proportionately as great, and prob- 
 ably much greater, as the prejudices and misconcep- 
 tions to be removed would be so much the more ex- 
 tensive. 
 
 VIII 
 NATIONAL JEALOUSIES AND SUSPICIONS 
 
 Next in our enumeration of the causes of war 
 come national jealousies and suspicions. To es- 
 tablish that these, perhaps with no sound basis for 
 them, suffice sometimes to cause war, we need look 
 no further than to the titanic European struggle. It 
 might be that the national and popular suspicions and 
 jealousies on all sides that caused this war were not 
 based on real facts. That the convictions and as- 
 sumptions of the several nations concerned were er- 
 roneous is entirely immaterial if those nations held and 
 believed them. The war would certainly have fol- 
 lowed, whether or not the various assumptions were 
 correct. 
 
 The immediate causes of the war were that Austria 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 21 
 
 truly or falsely suspected Serbia of designs upon her 
 territory; Russia suspected Austria, despite her dis- 
 claimer, of ultimate designs upon Serbian sovereignty 
 and territory; Austria and Germany suspected that 
 Russia's racial sympathies for Serbia were a mere blind 
 to conceal her desire for territorial acquisitions or in- 
 fluence in Austria or the Balkans; Germany suspected 
 that France was encouraging Russia in order that she 
 might seize the opportunity to recover Alsace and Lor- 
 raine; France suspected that Germany was stirring up 
 the strife because the present was the best time to 
 conquer arid weaken France; England suspected that 
 Germany would, if victorious, seize the Belgian and 
 French coasts in order the better to attack her at a 
 convenient season; while Germany suspected England 
 of being the deus ex machina who inaugurated the 
 whole turmoil in order to seize the opportunity to 
 humble Germany, destroy her naval power, and thus 
 secure her own superiority on the high seas and her 
 predominance in commerce. 
 
 It is not material to the present discussion which, 
 if any, of these suspicions were based on real facts, 
 since the nations involved, especially the peoples, acted 
 on their convictions that their respective suspicions 
 were well founded. What this stupendous calamity 
 does prove is, in the first place, that wars may originate 
 in international suspicions and distrust, whether based 
 on true or false premises; and, in the second, that if 
 these nations had been united by an effectual compact 
 of federal union, by virtue of which they would have 
 
22 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 been under no temptation to rob each other of territory 
 or to extend their commerce by forcible, fraudulent 
 or unfair means at each other's expense, it would have 
 been impossible for their peoples to have entertained 
 these suspicions, and there would have been no war. 
 Indeed, without this concrete illustration, the con- 
 clusion is a necessary one that if a federal union has 
 the effect, as between the component nations, of abol- 
 ishing all the other causes of war heretofore discussed, 
 it must also destroy that which grows out of interna- 
 tional jealousies and suspicions, since such distrust can 
 only subsist upon the fear of unjust and aggressive at- 
 tack for some of the reasons before mentioned. There 
 are no others that have been revealed in history except 
 the last one of our enumeration, which we are now 
 briefly to consider. 
 
 IX 
 
 ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE PEACEABLE MODES OF 
 REDRESS 
 
 The seventh and last of the enumerated causes 
 of war is the absence of any assured method of peace- 
 ably and finally determining bona fide international 
 disputes. 
 
 In the existing conditions of international relations, 
 it is true, attempts have been made to supply means 
 of settling such disputes by the establishment, through 
 international agreement, of the Hague Courts of Ar- 
 bitration. These have been quite successful in a cer- 
 
CAUSES OF WAR 23 
 
 tain class of cases, cases wherein the differences of 
 the contending nations are due to their respective 
 interpretations of disputed facts or disputed principles 
 of law, not involving important political consequences. 
 But these tribunals have proved themselves totally 
 inadequate to deal with cases of such character that 
 either contending nation is unwilling to surrender the 
 decision of the question out of its own hands, or is 
 suspicious that the antagonist might be unwilling to 
 abide by the decision reached. 
 
 Less successful attempts have also been made by the 
 Hague Conference to establish a real international 
 court for the settlement of justiciable disputes, but 
 the plan has broken down under the double obstacles 
 of inability to organize the court upon lines satisfac- 
 tory to the nations, and to provide any properly or- 
 ganized international force to execute its mandates. 
 So far as concerns this class of disputes, it is mani- 
 festly essential to establish some device for their final 
 settlement, or else war, as the final arbiter, is not only 
 always possible, but may sometimes become necessary. 
 
 No existing federal union has found it a matter 
 of very great difficulty to establish such a court and 
 clothe it with the power to pronounce final decrees 
 which, if necessary, may be enforced through the exer- 
 cise of the combined influence of the States in union. 
 The federal constitutions having already removed all 
 the political causes of war between the component 
 States, no potential conflicts remain except^those aris- 
 ing in respect to matters of strict legal right, and 
 
24 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 these may readily be solved through judicial proceed- 
 ings. 
 
 Thus, whether we view the success of federal unions 
 as preventives of war from the standpoint of human 
 experience, or, as has been attempted in this chapter, 
 from the a 'priori standpoint of natural cause and ef- 
 fect, the conclusion is the same. Political science can 
 point to few principles more firmly established than 
 that such unions prevent wars between the component 
 nations, not through the application of actual force 
 or the invasion of the just and proper independence 
 of the States concerned, but by substituting interna- 
 tional law for international license in the regulation 
 of their conduct towards each other, thus diverting the 
 riotous and tumultuous tide of human passions into 
 the calm and deep-flowing streams of human reason- 
 ableness and justice. And all this may be accomplished 
 without the sacrifice of the real independence, the wel- 
 fare or the prosperity of the nations concerned, but 
 always, as experience has proved, greatly to their 
 advancement. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 FEDERAL UNION OF INDEPENDENT 
 NATIONS PROPOSED 
 
 A serious proposal of the adoption by the nations 
 of the world, or by the leading nations, of a federal 
 form of international government would be doubtless 
 met by the nations themselves with fear, jealousy, sus- 
 picion, doubt, and perhaps ridicule. However it might 
 be regarded by the peoples who must bear the burden 
 of armaments and war, crowned heads and ruling pow- 
 ers might resent the idea of any international power 
 which could in any sense be said to be superior to their 
 own; and rulers and peoples alike would fear that in 
 surrendering the necessary powers to the federal gov- 
 ernment they might sacrifice the proper independence 
 of the nation; that the federal government might be- 
 come a Frankenstein, a monster of usurped and 
 colossal powers, threatening to destroy its creators; 
 that other component nations or combinations of them 
 might obtain control of this great machine and use it 
 to their own aggrandizement and to the detriment of 
 the helpless minority; that the larger and more power- 
 ful nations might combine to tyrannize over ,the weaker, 
 though perhaps the more numerous members; or on 
 the other hand that a majority of the weaker nations 
 
26 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 might override the wishes or threaten the rights of 
 the minority of stronger members. 
 
 But all such arguments lose much of their force 
 when it is remembered that the same objections have 
 actually been made to the organization of every exist- 
 ing federal union, yet in each case the fears were 
 proved by actual experience to have been without 
 foundation; in each case it has been found that the 
 checks and balances provided in the organization of the 
 federal government have sufficed to avert the dangers 
 anticipated. 
 
 Before the nations will be induced to assent to any 
 plan of union, it must be shown that it contains within 
 itself such checks and balances as will fully protect 
 them against the unjust and unconstitutional aggres- 
 sions of federal power; the minority of the nations 
 in the union against the improper action of the ma- 
 jority; the more numerous, but weaker, nations against 
 the acts of the stronger, and vice versa; and even the 
 reserved rights of a single nation when invaded by the 
 unanimous aggression of all the rest. These, and 
 many other safeguards must be provided in any plan 
 that would prove acceptable. 
 
 The difficulties in devising such a plan are admit- 
 tedly great, but in the light of experience afforded by 
 the constitutions of existing federal unions and a care- 
 ful analysis of existing international conditions, it 
 would seem possible to propose a plan which might 
 at least serve as a basis for discussion, however far 
 removed it may be from the final practical form such a 
 
FEDERATION OF NATIONS 27 
 
 solemn and important compact would be likely to 
 take. 
 
 The succeeding chapters of this book, therefore, 
 will be devoted to the consideration of some of the 
 very difficult and delicate problems presented in the 
 organization of a federal league of nations, the pow- 
 ers to be granted to it or surrendered by the nations 
 concerned, and the powers to be reserved by them; 
 the proper limitations upon the powers granted; the 
 constitutional relations of the component nations to 
 each other and to the Union; the modes of amending 
 and establishing the compact as an instrument of gov- 
 ernment; and the many checks and balances needful to 
 secure, on the one side, the effective operation of the 
 federal government, and on the other, the just and 
 proper independence of the component nations, and the 
 absence of friction as between themselves or as be- 
 tween them and the federal government. 
 
 For the sake of convenience of discussion, arbitrary 
 terms have been used in designating the union, the 
 compact, and the officials supposed to act under it. 
 Thus the union is spoken of as " The United Na- 
 tions"; the compact of government, as the "Consti- 
 tution" of the United Nations; the legislative body 
 as " the Congress "; its two houses, as the " Senate " 
 and the " House of Delegates," respectively; the chief 
 executive officer, as " the prime minister "; the Cabinet, 
 as the " Council of Ministers " ; the highest interna- 
 tional court, as the " Supreme Court," with a " Chief 
 Justice" at its head; and the constituent units of the 
 
28 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 Union as " component nations " or " component 
 States." 
 
 It is to be observed also that since this union of 
 nations is designed for the purpose of abolishing wars 
 between them, and not to establish a single new na- 
 tion, the union must necessarily be less close than are 
 any of the existing federal unions (the purposes of 
 which are to create single nations out of their com- 
 ponent States, as well as to prevent war between their 
 members) ; and especially so since, in our case, the 
 members would differ so radically in language and 
 political and legal institutions and ideals. 
 
 For these and other reasons, the Constitution of the 
 United States, as creating the least centralized and 
 nationalized of these unions, has been selected as the 
 starting point and the fundamental foundation of our 
 study, which will follow in the main the order of treat- 
 ment laid down in that instrument, but with many im- 
 portant and substantial additions, omissions, and modi- 
 fications, all of which will be examined as briefly as 
 possible. 
 
 The tentative Constitution will be found set out in 
 extenso in the Appendix, together with the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States, in parallel columns, so that 
 the divergences may be seen at a glance. 
 
 Upon reference to the Appendix it will be noted that 
 the proposed international Constitution is divided into 
 eleven Articles, as follows : 
 
 Article I. The Legislative Department, its Organi- 
 zation and Powers; 
 
OUTLINE OF COMPACT 29 
 
 Article II. The Executive Department, its Or- 
 ganization and Powers; 
 
 Article III. The Judiciary Department, its Or- 
 ganization and Powers; 
 
 Article IV. The Limitations upon the Powers of 
 the United Nations; 
 
 Article V. The Limitations upon the Powers of the 
 Component Nations; 
 
 Article VI. The Relations of the Component Na- 
 tions to Each Other, and to the Union; 
 
 Article VII. The Reserved Rights of the Com- 
 ponent Nations; 
 
 Article VIII. The Supremacy of the International 
 Constitution, Laws, and Treaties; 
 
 Article IX. Amendments to the Constitution. 
 
 Article X. The Discipline of a Component Nation ; 
 
 Article XI. The Establishment of the Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 It will conduce to clearness if the same general order 
 be followed in the investigation of the problems in- 
 volved in this study. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
 DEPARTMENT 
 
 I 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
 
 In devising a plan for the organization of a federal 
 league of the nations, the first problem that presents 
 itself is the fundamental question, how shall the pow- 
 ers of government be distributed. It would be quite 
 a radical departure from the previous practice of the 
 nations if, following the example of the American and 
 other federal unions, three departments of govern- 
 ment be created, the legislative, the executive, and 
 the judicial. 
 
 And yet it would not really be quite so radical as at 
 first glance it appears, even omitting from considera- 
 tion the established examples of existing federal unions. 
 The germs of all three of these departments may be 
 said to have been already planted as between the in- 
 dependent nations. 
 
 In the Hague Conference we see in embryo an 
 international legislative assembly, though much ham- 
 pered in its work by lack of organization and by inter- 
 so 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 31 
 
 national suspicions and jealousies. In the Hague 
 Courts we behold the beginnings of an international 
 judiciary, also sadly handicapped by the lack of organi- 
 zation and of an international executive force to aid 
 in the execution of its decrees. And it is not too much 
 to affirm that the nucleus of an international executive 
 power lies in the various bureaus which have been from 
 time to time established for the administration of inter- 
 national projects and agreements. 
 
 It may at least be said that the establishment of 
 these world agencies effectually proves the need already 
 felt for them, and indicates the great benefits that 
 might result from their development upon a self-sus- 
 taining and self-executing basis. 
 
 And if, in addition to these considerations, we re- 
 view the experience of the federal unions now exist- 
 ing, the conclusion seems to be forced upon us that, 
 in order to create a federal government adequate to 
 keep the peace of the world, it is essential that the 
 limited powers granted to it shall include the legisla- 
 tive and executive, as well as the judicial. 
 
 It is, therefore, assumed as a starting point that the 
 proposed Constitution must grant to this federal union 
 of nations all three sorts of powers, and that the fed- 
 eral government must be organized into the corre- 
 sponding legislative, executive, and judiciary depart- 
 ments. 
 
32 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 II 
 
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF ONE OR Two HOUSES? 
 
 The international conferences and congresses 
 hitherto called have always been organized on the 
 basis of a single chamber, in which each nation repre- 
 sented would have an equal voice, each having a veto 
 upon the acts of the conference and bound by them 
 only if it assent thereto. While some good results 
 have been attained, the fact remains that this is an 
 impracticable basis upon which to rest a truly legisla- 
 tive body from which may be expected that prompt 
 and detailed legislation which would be necessary to 
 the operation of a federal union of nations. There 
 must be to a certain extent the rule of the majority, 
 and should each nation insist upon the right to veto 
 any and all measures that do not meet with its ap- 
 proval, no legislation of importance would be likely to 
 be enacted. The union would be doomed to failure 
 from the beginning. 
 
 But it does not follow that a nation should, in no 
 case, possess the right of veto upon the legislation of 
 the central body. On the contrary, there is every 
 reason why a single nation or group of nations should 
 be authorized to exercise this right in cases where, 
 in their judgments, the federal legislature is exceeding 
 the powers conferred upon it and is seeking to infringe 
 the reserved sovereign rights of the component nations. 
 The details of this veto power, however, will be re- 
 
LEGISLATURE ORGANIZATION 33 
 
 served for future examination at a more appropriate 
 place. It is only sought here to point out that the 
 nature of the legislative power to be granted under 
 the proposed international Constitution should be of 
 a kind different from that hitherto exercised in in- 
 ternational conferences and congresses. In a federal 
 union of nations, in regard to legislation clearly within 
 the powers granted, the majority must rule. Bearing 
 in mind this very material change in conditions, we 
 are in a better position to consider the problem to 
 be investigated. 
 
 Until now the custom of nations has been to claim 
 equal representation in international conferences in 
 virtue of their equal sovereignty. Should this con- 
 tinue to be the rule in our proposed international legis- 
 lature, or should the nations, by virtue of the superior 
 population, influence, or wealth of some of them, be 
 represented in proportion to such population or influ- 
 ence, in the family of nations; or ought there to be a 
 combination of the two forms of representation, so that 
 both sovereignty and population (or other measure 
 of national influence and importance) be taken into 
 account? 
 
 We must pause here to inquire what, for purposes 
 of representation in an international legislature, would 
 constitute the best and most available measure of the 
 relative influence and importance of nations. 
 
 Many elements enter into the influence a^State may 
 exert in international affairs. Its population, its mili- 
 tary or naval strength, its commerce, domestic and 
 
34 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 foreign, and its resources, the state of its arts and 
 sciences, all these and other things besides may enter 
 into the equation, though those mentioned would cer- 
 tainly constitute the most obvious and the most impor- 
 tant elements. 
 
 In the organization of an international government, 
 the main purpose of which is to do away with war and 
 the necessity for large armaments, it would seem plain 
 that the present military or naval strength of a nation 
 ought to play no part in the question of the voice it 
 should have in the management of the affairs of com- 
 mon interest committed to the international govern- 
 ment. To make these a basis of representation in the 
 international legislature would be to base a perma- 
 nent arrangement on an evanescent quality, for if the 
 international organization were successful, all very 
 great differences in military or naval strength would 
 soon disappear. These considerations would seem 
 sufficient to eliminate this element from the prob- 
 lem. 
 
 Nor, because of its extreme indefiniteness, does it 
 seem possible to make the condition of civilization 
 within a State, that is, the condition of the arts and 
 sciences there, a basis of representation. Different 
 nations have different ideals of civilization, of art, 
 literature, music, labor conditions, law, criminology, 
 trades, and manufactures. Who is to judge between 
 them? Who could establish a common standard? 
 This also, it would seem must be eliminated as a basis 
 of representation in the international government. 
 
LEGISLATURE ORGANIZATION 35 
 
 There remain to be considered a nation's commerce 
 and resources, and its population, as practical meas- 
 ures of its influence and importance in international 
 affairs. 
 
 To make use of the commerce and resources of a 
 nation rather than population as a measure of its in- 
 fluence would appear in the first place to be setting up 
 wealth above humanity, the desire for riches above 
 human rights and liberties. This would not seem to 
 be a sound basis upon which to rest any government, 
 national or international. But if this objection be 
 swept aside as theoretical only, others may be presented 
 of a practical sort. How is the commerce of a coun- 
 try to be determined? Would the domestic as well as 
 the foreign commerce of a State be taken into account, 
 or only the foreign commerce? Should its potential 
 and undeveloped natural resources be counted as part 
 of its wealth, and if so how would their value be as- 
 certained? How would the amount of the domestic 
 trade, all the little daily transactions in every part 
 of the country, i be determined? If foreign trade 
 alone be considered, how much is the country itself 
 responsible for, and how much is due to the enter- 
 prise of other countries? Is the country which ex- 
 ports mainly raw materials, and imports highly fin- 
 ished goods on a par with the country which does the 
 reverse, even though the money value of the total 
 foreign trade of each be the same? 
 
 Such questions as these throw grave suspicion upon 
 this as a practicable measure of a nation's influence in 
 
36 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 world affairs and of the voice it should have in the 
 proposed international government. 
 
 Indeed, all things considered, it seems that popula- 
 tion is at once the most convenient and the most prac- 
 ticable measure of such representation. It is the most 
 convenient, because it can be more easily and more 
 definitely ascertained than any other. It is the most 
 practicable, because on the whole, it stands in large 
 measure collectively for what each of the others repre- 
 sents individually. As a rule the total wealth of a 
 State holds some relation to its population; so does 
 its commerce, domestic and foreign; as population in- 
 creases land becomes more valuable; as commerce in- 
 creases there is greater development of arts and sci- 
 ences, wages tend to increase, the standard of living be- 
 comes higher; even the potential military strength of a 
 nation bears a relation to its population. 
 
 Population therefore would seem to be the proper, 
 indeed the only feasible, measure of the influence, 
 wealth, and importance of a nation in international af- 
 fairs, so that wherever in the plan herein discussed, 
 it becomes necessary to weigh a nation in the scale of 
 these qualities, population is taken as representing 
 them. 
 
 There yet remains, however, an important question. 
 There are populations and populations. The popula- 
 tion of one State, while as numerous as that of an- 
 other, may in whole or in part consist of backward peo- 
 ples, who themselves possess but a dim or shadowy 
 conception of civilization as Europe and America view 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 37 
 
 it. For example, the population of the British Empire 
 in 1913 amounted to about 396,000,000, of whom 
 about two-thirds were Hindoos; perhaps 63,000,000 
 were Anglo-Saxons. For purposes of representation 
 (according to population) in the international legisla- 
 ture, ought the 63,000,000 Anglo-Saxons to be counted 
 on the same basis as the remaining 333,000,000 back- 
 ward peoples? 
 
 From the standpoint of the ideal, at least the Eu- 
 ropean and American ideal, the Anglo-Saxon popu- 
 lation (in the case of the British Empire) ought to 
 count several times more per man than the rest. But 
 the practical difficulties in the way of measuring the 
 proportion of " backward peoples " within each State, 
 as well as of measuring the various degrees of back- 
 wardness and ascertaining the boundary line between 
 those that are " backward " and those that are not, 
 seem to present insurmountable obstacles to the appli- 
 cation of any logical and general rule for the estimate 
 of population for purposes of international represen- 
 tation based upon the distinction between the compara- 
 tive " progressiveness " or " backwardness " of peo- 
 ples or races. 
 
 With exceptions or qualifications presently to be 
 noted, we would approach the truth very nearly if we 
 assume that the white nations and peoples of the world 
 are progressive, while the colored peoples .and races 
 are in the main backward. It would also be true that 
 it is the aggressiveness and enterprise of the white na- 
 tions that necessitate the organization of an inter- 
 
38 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 national government to preserve the peace of the 
 world, and it is the warfare between them that is so 
 disastrous. The international organization would be 
 primarily an instrumentality of self-government among 
 the white nations, devised to permit them to substitute 
 international freedom and order in the place of the 
 international license that now prevails between them. 
 Incidentally, the colored nations and peoples would 
 profit by the exchange, and ought to be permitted to 
 enter into the organization and thus secure a guarantee 
 of their national rights and liberties also. But they 
 would in general have no right to expect the same 
 representation and the same voice in the affairs of 
 the international government as the white nations and 
 peoples would possess. 
 
 At least one exception, however, should be made to 
 this general rule. Japan is one of the Great Powers, 
 and has shown herself as progressive as the western 
 nations themselves. She ought to be admitted into the 
 international organization on the same basis as the 
 white nations. 
 
 Listing the Japanese, therefore, for purposes of in- 
 ternational representation as " white, " let us adopt ten- 
 tatively and arbitrarily the proportion of one to three 
 as the relative values of " white " and " colored " or 
 " mixed " populations for this purpose, which, for the 
 sake of convenience, we shall hereafter designate as 
 the "federal population." 
 
 Thus, if we suppose the actual population of the 
 British Empire to be 396,000,000, of whom 63,000,- 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 39 
 
 ooo are white and 333,000,000 are colored or of mixed 
 blood, the " federal population " would be arrived at 
 by dividing the latter numbers by three and adding the 
 quotient to the numbers of the whites so that the fed- 
 eral population of the British Empire would amount 
 to 174,000,000. On these numbers, not on the 396,- 
 000,000 of actual population, would be based any 
 voice that the British Empire would have in the inter- 
 national government, so far as that voice might de- 
 pend upon international influence. 
 
 Again, the French Republic, according to the figures 
 of 1913, within all its territories possessed a population 
 of about 92,000,000 persons, of whom about 40,000,- 
 ooo are white and 52,000,000 are colored. Her fed- 
 eral population therefore would be approximately 
 58,000,000. 
 
 Similarly, the population of the German Empire in 
 Europe was in the same year 65,000,000, while the 
 population of its African possessions was 15,000,000. 
 The federal population of the German Empire then 
 (should she become a member of the league) would be 
 approximately 70,000,000. 
 
 The total population of the Russian Empire in 1913 
 amounted to 160,000,000, of whom perhaps 30,000,- 
 ooo are colored, so that her federal population would 
 have approximated 140,000,000. 
 
 Treating the Japanese, for the purposes ^f this dis- 
 cussion as " white," the federal population of the 
 Japanese Empire in 1913 would number about 54,000,- 
 ooo. If Korea, with 15,000,000 colored population 
 
40 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 be included, her federal population would amount to 
 59,000,000. 
 
 Italy, within all her territories, in 1913, had a popu- 
 lation of some 32,000,000 whites and 6,000,000 col- 
 ored, so that her federal population would approxi- 
 mate 34,000,000. 
 
 Austria-Hungary in 1913 possessed a population of 
 about 50,000,000, all of whom practically are white, 
 so that the total numbers and the federal numbers 
 would correspond. 
 
 The United States possessed a population of some 
 84,000,000 white and 20,000,000 colored in 1913 
 (including amongst the "colored" negroes and in- 
 habitants of the Philippine Isjands and Hawaii). 
 Their federal population therefore would approxi- 
 mate 90,000,000. 
 
 The Netherlands in 1913 had a white population of 
 about 7,000,000, and a colored population in her col- 
 onies of some 34,000,000, so that her federal popula- 
 tion would approximate 18,000,000. 
 
 Portugal, with a white population of about 6,000,- 
 ooo, has a colored population of some 9,000,000. 
 Her federal numbers would aggregate about 9,000,000. 
 
 None of the other white European States have any 
 colored populations worthy of consideration, so that 
 we may assume their federal populations to be identical 
 with their actual populations. In 1913 these were esti- 
 mated approximately as follows: 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 41 
 
 Spain 20,000,000 
 
 Norway 2,500,000 
 
 Sweden . ,. 5,500,000 
 
 * Belgium . ... 7,000,000 
 
 Switzerland 3,750,000 
 
 Greece 2,500,000 
 
 Denmark . . ...... 2,700,000 
 
 Rumania 6,000,000 
 
 Serbia 2,500,000 
 
 Bulgaria 4,200,000 
 
 Montenegro 225,000 
 
 The Chinese Republic, with its wholly colored pop- 
 ulation of 420,000,000, would be able to claim a fed- 
 eral population of 140,000,000, not far below that of 
 Great Britain, about the same as that of Russia, and 
 more than twice as great as that of the French Re- 
 public or of the German or Japanese Empires. 
 
 It is difficult to conceive that the Great Powers of 
 the world would permit to China in the international 
 councils a voice greater than their own. Her vast size, 
 population, and resources, taken in connection with the 
 backwardness of her civilization and commerce, would 
 constitute her an exception to almost arty rule of 
 representation in the international Congress that might 
 be suggested. The probability is that she must be 
 treated separately, and admitted to the pinion upon 
 
 * Statistics as to the population of the Belgian Congo are not at 
 hand for 1913, but in 1916 it amounted to about 15,000,000, which 
 would give Belgium a federal population of about 12,000,000. 
 
42 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 special conditions as to the representation and influ- 
 ence to which she shall be entitled. 
 
 Passing to the States in America, other than the 
 United States, we are again confronted to no small 
 extent with the problem of colored or mixed races. 
 In some of the Central and South American countries, 
 the great mass of the populations are either colored or 
 of mixed blood, and comparatively few full-blooded 
 whites are to be found. In Haiti and San Domingo 
 the people are practically all negroes. In Mexico, 
 Brazil, Chile, Peru and other of these countries large 
 portions of the population are Indian or of mixed 
 race. Statistics are not at present available to show 
 what proportion of these populations are respectively 
 white and colored or mixed, so that it would not be pos- 
 sible to reproduce here the federal populations of each 
 of these States. The total populations in 1913 were 
 estimated as follows: 
 
 Brazil 20,500,000 
 
 Mexico 15,500,000 
 
 Argentina 7,500,000 
 
 Colombia 4,500,000 
 
 Peru 4,500,000 
 
 Chile 4,250,000 
 
 Venezuela 2,600,000 
 
 Bolivia . 2,270,000 
 
 Cuba 2,050,000 
 
 Guatemala , 1,800,000 
 
 Salvador 1,700,000 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 43 
 
 Ecuador 1,500,000 
 
 Haiti 1,400,000 
 
 Uruguay 1,1 10,000 
 
 Paraguay 635,000 
 
 Dominican Republic 610,000 
 
 Nicaragua 600,000 
 
 Honduras 550,000 
 
 Panama 360,000 
 
 Costa Rica 350,000 
 
 We are now in a position to resume our dis- 
 cussion of the proper organization of the proposed in- 
 ternational legislature or Congress. 
 
 In view of the jealousy and distrust now existing 
 between the nations, it may be fairly assumed that the 
 smaller ones would never, in the place of a conference 
 whose conclusions would be binding on no State until 
 ratified, consent to the creation of a legislative body, 
 with binding power, which might be dominated by a 
 combination of the Great Powers, as would be likely 
 in a body wherein representation would be based upon 
 population; and, on the other hand, it is still less 
 probable that the Great Powers would consent to a 
 Union which might be dominated by a majority com- 
 posed of the smaller States, as would be likely if in 
 the international legislative body the representation 
 of all the States were equal, in virtue ofr equal sov- 
 ereignty. 
 
 These considerations suffice to eliminate the possi- 
 bility of either of the two first mentioned forms of 
 
44 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 representation in the supposed single legislative cham- 
 ber, and demand either that the idea of a single cham- 
 ber be abandoned or that the form of representation 
 be some combination of sovereignty and population, 
 that is, that each nation be entitled to a representation 
 in the federal legislature made up in part of an equal 
 sovereignty equally represented, and in part of an 
 unequal population unequally represented. 
 
 For example, suppose it agreed that the represen- 
 tation of the sovereignty of each State shall be six 
 votes from each State, and the representation of popu- 
 lation shall be one vote for each four millions of popu- 
 lation or fraction thereof. Belgium, with a federal 
 population of 12,000,000, would then be represented 
 in the federal legislature by six votes, representing 
 sovereignty, and three, representing population. Ger- 
 many, with a federal population of 70,000,000, would 
 have six votes representing sovereignty and eighteen 
 representing population. France, with a federal popu- 
 lation of 58,000,000, would have six and fifteen votes, 
 respectively. Italy, with 34,000,000 (federal), six 
 and nine votes; Japan, with 59,000,000 (federal), six 
 and fifteen votes; The Netherlands, with 18,000,000 
 (federal), six and five votes; Austria-Hungary, with 
 50,000,000, six and thirteen votes; Norway, with 
 3,000,000, six and one votes; Sweden, with 6,000,000, 
 six and two votes; Serbia, with 3,000,000, six and one 
 votes; Brazil, with perhaps 9,000,000 (federal), six 
 and three votes; Argentina, with nearly 8,000,000 
 (federal), six and two votes; Chile, with 3,000,000 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 45 
 
 (federal), six and one votes; the United States, with 
 90,000,000 (in federal numbers), six and twenty- 
 three votes; Russia, with 140,000,000 (federal), six 
 and thirty-five votes; and the British Empire, with 
 174,000,000 (in federal numbers), six and forty-four 
 votes. 
 
 Thus, Norway's representation would be increased 
 seven times by the representation of her equal sov- 
 ereignty; Sweden's would be quadrupled; and Bel- 
 gium's trebled; while Great Britain's or Russia's would 
 be increased scarcely at all. It is possible that the na- 
 tions last mentioned might be willing to accept these 
 or similar conditions, but it is hardly conceivable that 
 proud States like Germany or France, occupying inter- 
 mediate positions in such a ratio of representation 
 would consent on the one hand to so great a propor- 
 tionate voice in the conduct of the common affairs as 
 Norway's or Belgium's, or so great an actual voice as 
 the British Empire's. 
 
 The example above given supposes a ratio between 
 sovereignty and population chosen at random, but 
 the apparently insuperable objections to this ratio 
 would seem to apply as strongly to any other similar 
 ratio that might be selected. 
 
 On the whole therefore the conclusion must be 
 reached that no plan of federal government will ob- 
 tain the approval of the nations which qmbraces the 
 idea of a single legislative chamber (with a qualifica- 
 tion to be noted later) . 
 
 Discarding this, then, we come next to the examina- 
 
46 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 tion of the possibility of a legislative body composed 
 of two chambers. 
 
 Attention is at once arrested by the fact that it now 
 becomes possible thus to retain, in part at least, the 
 existing international practice as to conferences and 
 congresses, that is, the equal representation of eaih 
 State. Such representation may be given in the upper 
 chamber or Senate, while at the same time in the 
 lower chamber, or House of Delegates, the other ele- 
 ment may be represented, the element of national 
 population and influence. 
 
 Since no law could be passed without the consent of 
 both houses, every law would have to receive the 
 assent of a majority of all the component nations (in 
 the Senate) and also the assent of the majority of the 
 populous and influential nations (in the House of Dele- 
 gates). A combination of a few populous States might 
 carry a measure detrimental to the majority of the 
 States through the lower chamber, but it would be 
 checked in the Senate; and, on the other hand, a ma- 
 jority of the States, which might pass measures in the 
 Senate that would be injurious to the fewer, but more 
 populous, nations would be halted in the lower cham- 
 ber. 
 
 Thus by the adoption of the bicameral system ad- 
 vantage can be taken of the great principle of concur-, 
 rent majorities. These would undoubtedly be the two 
 great contending forces in our international union, 
 population and influence on the one side and equality 
 of sovereignty, dignity, and rights on the other. The 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 47 
 
 only way to reconcile them is to give each a veto upon 
 the other, which may be successfully accomplished by 
 the creation of two legislative chambers, the consent 
 of both being necessary for legislation, one of which 
 shall represent by equality of votes the equal sov- 
 ereignty of the nations, and the other by votes in pro- 
 portion to federal population shall represent their un- 
 equal influence and importance in human affairs. 
 
 To illustrate: Let us suppose that the equal sov- 
 ereignty of the nations in the Senate is represented by 
 two votes from each State, while the ratio of votes to 
 population for purposes of representation in the House 
 of Delegates shall be one vote for every four millions 
 of federal population, or a fraction thereof. Refer- 
 ring to the figures already given as to the federal popu- 
 lations of some of the nations, while in the lower 
 chamber Belgium, with its 12,000,00 of federal popu- 
 lation, would have three votes; Germany, with its 
 70,000,000, eighteen votes; France, with 58,000,000, 
 fifteen votes; the United States, twenty-three votes; 
 Russia, thirty-five votes; and Great Britain, forty-four 
 votes; yet in the Senate each nation would be equally 
 represented, and the consent of a majority of the Sen- 
 ate would be essential to the passage of all legislation. 
 
 It is upon this principle that the United States Con- 
 stitution has organized the federal legislature, and 
 the experience of more than a century and a quarter 
 proclaims that this distribution of the legislative powers 
 has, in critical periods of American history, admirably 
 fulfilled its purpose. 
 
48 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The proposed federal legislature then, we shall as- 
 sume, ought to be composed of two chambers, one of 
 which should represent the equal sovereignty of the 
 component nations, while the other represents their re- 
 spective populations (in federal numbers). 1 
 
 It is to be noted that while we have spoken above of 
 two chambers of the legislature, which we have desig- 
 nated respectively the Senate and the House of Dele- 
 gates, and while we have assumed throughout the crea- 
 tion of two separate chambers, very much the same re- 
 sults may be accomplished with a single chamber, if 
 it is provided that no measure shall be deemed to have 
 been passed or to have become a law, unless it pass the 
 chamber twice, once by a majority of all the States, 
 voting equally in virtue of equal sovereignty, and once 
 by a majority of the votes of the States, voting un- 
 equally in proportion to federal population (giving, for 
 example, to each State, upon one passage of the meas- 
 ure, a voting capacity equal to one vote for every 
 four millions of federal population, or a fraction 
 thereof). 
 
 This would constitute in effect two chambers, the 
 main difference between the single chamber thus or- 
 ganized and two actual chambers, being that in the 
 latter case there would be two separate sets of dele- 
 gates, while in the former the delegates would be 
 actually the same, but would .possess a different vot- 
 ing capacity on each passage of the measure. 
 
 Thus, if we were to suppose the rules now govern- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sees, i, 2, 3. 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 49 
 
 ing an ordinary international conference to be altered 
 so as to make the action of the conference binding 
 upon the nations therein represented and at the same 
 time require that any measure, to be binding upon 
 them, must pass the conference twice by a majority 
 of votes, the votes of all the nations upon the first 
 passage to be equal, while on the second passage each 
 nation shall have a vote proportionate to its federal 
 population, the conference would then be transformed 
 into just such a legislative body as we are now dis- 
 cussing. The requirement that a measure, to be bind- 
 ing as a law upon the nations, must have passed the 
 conference by a majority of votes cast upon these two 
 different principles, would have much the same effect 
 as if the conference were itself made up of two sepa- 
 rate chambers, organized upon these same principles. 
 
 But although the organization of a single chamber 
 after this fashion might be simpler than that of two 
 legislative houses, yet there would seem to be some 
 very practical advantages incident to the actual 
 bicameral system. 
 
 In the first place, it is important for the success of 
 an international government that the representatives 
 of the different nations should learn to know and un- 
 derstand each other, as well as the conditions, ideals, 
 and needs prevailing in countries other than their own; 
 and (within reasonable limits) the larger ^he number 
 of these representatives thus thrown into each other's 
 company, the more widespread would this broadening 
 process become. 
 
50 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 In the next place (again within reasonable limits) 
 the larger the number of a nation's representatives 
 present at such gatherings, the wiser will be its gov- 
 ernment's final action upon questions arising for set- 
 tlement. 
 
 The mere physical limitations of space would stand 
 in the way perhaps of the best interests of the nations 
 in these particulars, if the plan of a single chamber be 
 adopted. 
 
 Another important practical argument in behalf of 
 a bicameral legislature consists in the fact that it would 
 in the end probably save time, since one measure might 
 be under debate in one chamber while another was 
 being debated or voted upon in the other, and in any 
 event it would insure a more thorough consideration 
 of each measure both in the legislature itself and by 
 the government of each nation. 
 
 Our tentative form of constitution will therefore 
 treat the international congress as actually consisting 
 of two houses or chambers. 
 
 Ill 
 
 APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES TERMS 
 OF OFFICE 
 
 In the existing federal unions, such as the United 
 States, the German Empire or the Australian Com- 
 monwealth, the rule has been to provide for the elec- 
 tion of the members of the lower house of the federal 
 legislature by the people of the several component 
 
CONGRESS SELECTION TERMS 5 1 
 
 States, and for the selection of members of the upper 
 house either by some branch of the government of 
 each State or by the people thereof. 
 
 Thus in the United States the members of the House 
 of Representatives are elected by the people in the 
 several States by districts, while the Senators (it was 
 originally provided) were chosen by the legislature in 
 each State, but by Amendment XVII are now elected 
 by the people of the respective States acting as one 
 electorate. In Germany, the members of the Reichstag 
 are elected by the people as in the United States, while 
 the members of the Bundesrath are chosen by the ex- 
 ecutives of the several component States, and possess 
 the status of ambassadors. In Australia the States 
 are equally represented in the Senate, but the members 
 of both houses are elected by the people, as now in the 
 United States. In Canada the Senators are appointed 
 from each Province by the governor-general, the mem- 
 bers of the House of Commons elected by the people. 
 In Brazil the Senators are elected by the people of each 
 State, as are the members of the House of Deputies. 
 In the Argentine Republic, the Senators are elected by 
 the legislatures of the several Provinces, while the 
 Deputies are elected by the people. In Switzerland 
 the members of the Council of States (Senate) are 
 chosen by the cantons, and the members of the National 
 Council by the people in each canton. In a>ll, the com- 
 ponent States or provinces are represented in the lower 
 chamber in proportion to population, and (except in 
 Germany) in the upper chamber equally. 
 
52 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 But in our federal union of nations it would be ob- 
 viously impracticable, even if it were desirable, to adopt 
 the universal principle of popular election of members 
 of either house by the people of the respective States. 
 Some even of the most advanced nations have terri- 
 torial possessions, the inhabitants of which, while they 
 ought to be taken into account for purposes of repre- 
 sentation, know nothing of popular government. 
 
 On the other hand, some governments would per- 
 haps be in a position in which they would be unable to 
 obtain the consent of their people to the organization 
 of such a federation unless the nation's delegations 
 in the federal legislature might be made directly re- 
 sponsive to the popular will. 
 
 A proper compromise therefore would seem to be 
 a provision that the delegates in both chambers be 
 chosen in such numbers and in such manner as the 
 laws of each component nation shall direct; and shall 
 be subject to recall at the pleasure of the State they 
 represent, in accordance with its laws. 
 
 Thus the federal government would be placed di- 
 rectly under the control of the component nations, 
 since their control over their representatives in both 
 chambers will be as plenary and absolute as each na- 
 tion by its own laws may choose to make it. 
 
 This principle of appointment and recall would also 
 do away with the necessity of fixing any particular term 
 of office for the delegations in either house, the entire 
 matter being left to the discretion of each nation. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sees. 2, 3, 4. 
 
CONGRESS COMPENSATION 53 
 
 IV 
 
 SESSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
 RECESSES AND ADJOURNMENTS 
 
 In the existing federal unions the rule is to require 
 that the legislative body shall meet at least once a 
 year, adjourning when their business is completed, and 
 subject to be called in extraordinary session by the 
 chief executive whenever exigencies may demand it. 
 
 But the complexity and importance of the mat- 
 ters to be debated and determined by this international 
 congress, and the modes of appointment and removal 
 of the legislators, would seem to require that the rule 
 in our proposed constitution should assume rather the 
 opposite form, providing that the Congress remain in 
 perpetual session, subject to such reasonable rests and 
 recesses as the two chambers may agree upon, with 
 the right given to each chamber independently to ad- 
 journ for a limited period without the consent of the 
 other. 1 
 
 COMPENSATION OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 That the members of the international congress 
 ought to receive compensation for their services can- 
 not admit of doubt. The important question is whether 
 that compensation should be fixed and paid by the 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 4, cl. 2, 3. 
 
54 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 component States or fixed by the federal congress it- 
 self and paid out of the treasury of the United Na- 
 tions. 
 
 This point was earnestly and ably debated in the 
 convention that framed the Constitution of the United 
 States, and the wise conclusion reached that a matter 
 so vital to the very existence of the federal government 
 ought not to be left dependent on the liberality and 
 good will of the component States. 
 
 This principle has been adopted in our international 
 constitution, but with this necessary qualification: 
 That since the number of delegates in the delegations 
 from each State has been left to the discretion of that 
 State, the compensation must be proportioned to the 
 number of votes the delegation is entitled to cast, not 
 to the number of delegates. 1 
 
 VI 
 
 PRIVILEGES OF DELEGATES 
 
 Existing federal constitutions accord to the mem- 
 bers of their legislatures the ordinary parliamentary 
 privileges of freedom from arrest for trifling offenses 
 and freedom of speech in debate. 
 
 These provisions ought to be contained in the inter- 
 national constitution also, with certain modifications. 
 
 Following to its logical conclusion the principle 
 adopted, that the component nations shall retain com- 
 plete control over their respective delegations, each in 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 6, cl. i. 
 
REVENUE AND COMMERCE 55 
 
 accordance with its own laws, the general rule that a 
 legislator's remarks and votes in either legislative 
 chamber are privileged communications, from legal re- 
 sponsibility for which he is exempt elsewhere, must be 
 modified to the extent that, while exempt everywhere 
 else, he is not to be exempt from the consequences of 
 such remarks or votes in the State he represents, except 
 in accordance with its laws. 1 
 
 Again, it will be necessary for the representatives 
 of the component nations to pass through other coun- 
 tries, either members or not members of the union, on 
 their way to and from the seat of the federal govern- 
 ment. There is no reason why they should not occupy 
 the same position and possess the same status as any 
 other representatives of their country on the way to 
 or from any international conference or congress. 
 They are in effect ambassadors, and in all foreign coun- 
 tries ought to be accorded the privileges and immuni- 
 ties of ambassadors; and the international constitution 
 should provide that in the territories of all component 
 nations at least they must be so regarded. 2 
 
 VII 
 
 LIMITED LIFE OF REVENUE AND COMMERCIAL 
 MEASURES 
 
 It is a principle of many popular constitutions that 
 revenue measures must originate in the lower house 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 2. 
 8 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 2. 
 
56 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 of the legislature as most closely representing the peo- 
 ple themselves who elect its members directly, upon the 
 theory that the people, through their own immediate 
 representatives, have a better right to tax themselves 
 and a better knowledge of how and how much to 
 burden themselves than is likely to be possessed by 
 others. 
 
 But when this principle is applied to our interna- 
 tional government, we are confronted by the circum- 
 stance that the members of neither house of our fed- 
 eral legislature need directly represent the people of 
 any component State, but may be appointed by its 
 government, the mode of their selection being left to 
 the discretion of each nation. There is no reason 
 therefore why revenue measures should originate in 
 the one house rather than the other. 
 
 But there may be a danger in respect to such meas- 
 ures which it would be well to guard against, namely, 
 the chance that such a law passed by a majority in 
 both houses may prove later to be unjust and detri- 
 mental to one or the other of the two great interests 
 represented respectively in the two houses of the Con- 
 gress either to the majority of the States or to the 
 majority of the populous and influential States. Were 
 this condition recognized before the passage of the 
 law, it would of course be defeated in that chamber in 
 which the interest injured by it has control. 
 
 But let us suppose that, after its adoption, it is 
 ascertained that the measure is hurtful to one of these 
 great interests, while correspondingly beneficial to the 
 
CONGRESS NATIONAL VETO 57 
 
 other; and that the law once passed cannot be re- 
 pealed save by the consent of both houses. The injus- 
 tice would then be perpetuated until the consent of both 
 houses could be obtained to the substitution of a new 
 and juster measure. Such a condition would tend to 
 breed ill will between the component nations, and 
 would constitute a departure from the principles of 
 justice and concord on which our international union 
 should be founded. 
 
 The same principle would apply in equal degree to 
 laws regulating or controlling international commerce. 
 
 It would seem to be a proper check upon this pos- 
 sible condition to insert a constitutional provision to 
 the effect that no revenue law nor law regulating 
 international commerce should have a life of more 
 than (say) ten years, after which it would expire by 
 limitation, and a new measure (or, if it be desired, 
 the same measure) shall be passed by both houses of 
 the Congress. Thus every ten years each of these two 
 great interests would be given the opportunity to veto 
 any revenue or commercial law that is proved to have 
 operated disastrously to either. 1 
 
 VIII 
 
 NATIONAL VETO OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
 \ 
 
 The organization of the two legislative chambers, 
 so that one represents the equal sovereignty, and the 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 7. 
 
58 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 other the federal populations, of the respective com- 
 ponent nations, sufficiently guarantees the fewer more 
 populous and influential States (the Great Powers) 
 against a majority of the less populous, and vice versa. 
 
 We have now to consider the possibility of impos- 
 ing an adequate check in behalf of a single nation or 
 a small group of nations upon the legislative action 
 of a majority in both houses, in other words, the 
 grant of a veto power to each component nation upon 
 legislative action which it may deem seriously inimical 
 to its best interests. 
 
 It may be assumed that the grant of an absolute veto 
 as to all legislation, even that most clearly within 
 the constitutional powers of the international con- 
 gress, would be utterly impracticable because it would 
 introduce anarchy and chaos into the legislative delib- 
 erations, and would effectually prevent any serious or 
 valuable legislation. 
 
 But it by no means follows that the component na- 
 tions should possess no veto power at all or that, in- 
 dividually, they should have no guarantee that the sov- 
 ereign rights reserved by them and not granted to the 
 international government shall be preserved inviolate. 
 Even without a veto, it is true, they would under our 
 proposed plan (as will appear later) have the protec- 
 tion afforded by the power of the international courts 
 to declare unconstitutional and void an act of the 
 Congress thus infringing their reserved rights; but a 
 decree of the courts would possess only a moral sanc- 
 tion unless reinforced by the international power, 
 
CONGRESS NATIONAL VETO 59 
 
 and this would be under the control of the Congress. 
 
 Furthermore, the same influences that would induce 
 in the two houses of the Congress tyrannical and uncon- 
 stitutional invasions of the reserved rights of a single 
 nation or a small group of nations, would perhaps in 
 time make themselves felt also within the judicial de- 
 partment of the government, which might thus be led 
 to perpetuate the injustice. 
 
 It would be highly desirable therefore, if practicable, 
 to devise an additional check that might be used by a 
 component nation against tyrannical and oppressive 
 exercise by the international legislature of usurped 
 functions. 
 
 Such a check is found in the constitutional provision 
 that a component nation shall have the power, under 
 reasonable conditions of notice and time, to veto a 
 legislative act which, in its judgment, violates the in- 
 ternational constitution by trespassing upon the re- 
 served rights of the nations forming the union. 
 
 But, on the other hand, to permit this veto to be 
 absolute, without reference to the opinions and inter- 
 pretations of the constitution held by perhaps the great 
 majority of the component nations, would enable a 
 single nation or a few nations permanently to hold up 
 enterprises which might be of great international con- 
 cern. ^ 
 
 A fair and reasonable compromise between these 
 conflicting policies would seem to be found in allowing 
 the veto to each State under the conditions above men- 
 tioned, but permitting it to be overcome by such a vote 
 
6o A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 in both houses of the Congress as would suffice to 
 amend the constitution, that is (according to the plan 
 proposed, as will later appear) by the assent of three- 
 fourths of all the votes of each house. 
 
 Thus if more than one-fourth of all the component 
 States, or if States representing more than one-fourth 
 of the entire federal populations of all the States in 
 union, are opposed to any legislative action threaten- 
 ing the reserved rights of the nations, their opposition 
 to the measure would put an absolute and irretrievable 
 quietus upon it; but the opposition of less than that 
 number, or of a single nation, would but serve to cause 
 such delay as would be allowed by the constitution be- 
 fore a veto might be overriden by the requisite ma- 
 jority. 1 
 
 IX 
 
 POWER OF IMPEACHMENT OR REMOVAL 
 
 Article I, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the United 
 States provides that the House of Representatives 
 
 " shall have the sole power of impeachment," 
 and Article I, Sec. 3, that 
 
 " The Senate shall have the sole power to try 
 all impeachments. When sitting for the purpose, 
 they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the 
 President of the United States is tried, the Chief 
 Justice shall preside; and no person shall be con- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 8. 
 
CONGRESS IMPEACHMENT, ETC. 61 
 
 victed without the concurrence of two-thirds of 
 the members present." 
 
 The same section also declares that 
 
 " Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not 
 extend further than to removal from office, and 
 disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of 
 honor, trust, or profit under the United States; 
 but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable 
 and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and 
 punishment, according to law." 
 
 Lastly, Article II, Sec. 4, of the same instrument 
 discloses what officials of the United States are subject 
 to the process of impeachment. It provides that 
 
 " The President, Vice-President, and all civil 
 officers of the United States shall be removed 
 from office on impeachment for, and conviction 
 of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mis- 
 demeanors." 
 
 The phrase " civil officers," of course excludes mili- 
 tary and naval officers and is not considered as em- 
 bracing legislative officers, that is, the members of 
 either house of the Congress (provision for whose ex- 
 pulsion from the house of which they are respectively 
 members is elsewhere made). 
 
 Hence the officers subject to impeachment uncler this 
 clause of the American Constitution are the President, 
 the Vice-President, and all civil executive and judicial 
 officers of the United States. 
 
 Since under that Constitution the President and 
 
62 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 Vice-President are elected more or less indirectly by the 
 people of the States and not by the Congress, and since 
 they are not otherwise responsible to that body, it 
 would seem to have been prudent to give to the legis- 
 lative body this check upon the conduct of these highest 
 executive officers. And since the inferior executive 
 officials were to be appointed by the President and 
 removable by him, and not by the Congress, and the 
 judicial officials were to be likewise appointed by him 
 and to hold office during good behavior, it is plain that 
 the check of impeachment by the Congress would be 
 desirable as to them too; the essential principle being 
 that Congress ought to have the power to impeach 
 all those officials over whose appointment and removal 
 it would have no other control. 
 
 Applying this principle to our international consti- 
 tution, since it is proposed, as will appear later, to 
 make the executive arm of the new government fully 
 responsive to the wishes and desires of* the Congress 
 through ministers responsible to, and selected and re- 
 movable by, that body, there would seem to be no need 
 of a process of impeachment as to any executive offi- 
 cers of the international government. 
 
 But in the case of judicial officers the case would be 
 quite different. The plan proposed, as will be seen 
 hereafter, calls for the appointment of the international 
 judiciary by the executive authority of the several 
 component nations, to hold office during good behavior. 
 
 It would be undesirable to leave with the component 
 nations the right to remove the judicial officers ap- 
 
CONGRESS IMPEACHMENT, ETC. 63 
 
 pointed by them respectively, since that would tend 
 to subordinate the will and opinion of the judge in 
 the matter of the interpretation of the international 
 constitution and laws and in other matters in which 
 other component States might be interested to the will 
 of the particular State appointing him, and would 
 therefore tend to remove him from the strictly judicial 
 and impartial atmosphere that should surround him. 
 
 On the other hand, it would be equally undesirable 
 to leave the international judge, once appointed, with- 
 out responsibility to, or check by, any other power. 
 The judge who is guilty of extortion, bribery, corrup- 
 tion, or other high crime or misdemeanor ought to be 
 removed from office. To whom can this power be 
 intrusted more safely than to the whole body of com- 
 ponent nations sitting in the two houses of the inter- 
 national congress? This would in effect require that, 
 to remove a judge of an international court, it would 
 be necessary to secure the consent of a majority of the 
 more populous States in the House of Delegates, while 
 also securing the consent of a majority of all the com- 
 ponent States in the Senate. 
 
 As the component States themselves are represented 
 directly in both houses, it would seem needless to pro- 
 vide that the proceedings for such removal originate in 
 one of the houses and be tried out in the other, as is 
 required in the Constitution of the United States 
 (which declares that the House of Representatives 
 shall have the sole power of impeachment and the Sen- 
 ate the sole power to try impeachments). Under the 
 
64 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 proposed plan, the proceeding for the removal of an 
 international judge would be the same as the procedure 
 for the passage of a law; it might originate in either 
 house, and if passed by that house, upon concurrence 
 by the other, the removal would be effected. 
 
 Nor is any reason perceived why the procedure 
 should call for more than the ordinary majority of 
 votes in each house. The requirement in the Ameri- 
 can Constitution of a majority of two-thirds in the 
 Senate to convict upon impeachment was made neces- 
 sary because the President of the United States was 
 made subject to the process, and to permit him to be 
 impeached and removed from office by the vote of a 
 bare majority in either house would have destroyed his 
 independence as a co-ordinate department of the gov- 
 ernment and would have made his office the football of 
 party politics. If the impeachment process had been 
 confined to federal judges, it may well be doubted 
 whether the framers of that instrument would have 
 deemed it necessary to require a vote of two-thirds 
 of the Senate to convict. Be that as it may, experience 
 in the United States has proved that under the im- 
 peachment process the removal of a judge is so diffi- 
 cult as to be rarely attempted. 
 
 On the whole it is believed that better results would 
 be attained if the removal of international judges be 
 permitted by the concurrent action of the two houses 
 of the Congress assented to by a majority of the votes 
 in each house. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 2, cl. 2. 
 
CONGRESS ORGANIZATION 65' 
 
 X 
 
 OTHER DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION 
 
 The problems above examined are the chief ones to 
 be confronted in the organization of the legislative 
 department of our international government. 
 
 There are of course other details to be considered, 
 but they would appear to raise no question of impor- 
 tant principle and, in the suggested form of the inter- 
 national constitution appearing in the Appendix, are 
 adopted mainly from the corresponding details of the 
 Constitution of the United States. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sees. 2, 3, 5. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 POWERS TO BE CONFERRED ON THE 
 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
 
 I 
 
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
 No portion of a compact for an international union 
 can be of greater importance than the selection of the 
 powers, especially the legislative powers, to be con- 
 ferred upon the federal government. It is essential 
 that these powers be as limited as possible in order that 
 the nations, seeing that their sovereign powers are 
 surrendered only to an extent necessary to abolish war 
 among them, may the more readily assent to the com- 
 pact. 
 
 But at the same time it is possible that international 
 convenience may demand that a few other powers be 
 also granted to the Congress, such as the power to con- 
 trol international coinage, currency and banking, or 
 international copyrights and patent rights. These hav- 
 ing little or no bearing on the causation of wars be- 
 tween the component nations, would have no place in 
 our plan if we adhere strictly to the design merely to 
 eliminate war between the nations. But it is conceiv- 
 
 66 
 
CONGRESS POWERS 67 
 
 able that international convenience would be subserved 
 by placing these matters too under the control of a 
 central legislative body rather than by leaving them 
 as now to be regulated by mere treaty stipulations 
 among the component nations. It would at least be 
 worth while to consider the wisdom of including them 
 among the powers to be granted to the Congress, and 
 thus at one stroke achieve the permanent neutraliza- 
 tion of them. 
 
 It may also be remarked once more, as preliminary 
 to the discussion of the many problems involved in this 
 great topic, that one who takes the trouble to compare 
 the various existing constitutions of federal union 
 will at once see that the Constitution of the United 
 States approaches much more nearly the model we are 
 searching for than any of the others; for at the time 
 of its adoption the American States regarded them- 
 selves as independent and sovereign States, and were 
 almost as jealous of their sovereign rights as the 
 proudest European nation of today. 
 
 The consequence is that the American Constitution 
 confers much more limited powers upon the general 
 government than do those of other federal unions, 
 and is correspondingly cautious as to the powers ^ur- 
 rendered by the component States. Yet this constitu- 
 tion has stood the test of one hundred and twenty-five 
 years of active operation and, with the exception of the 
 War of 1 86 1 (an explanation of which has already 
 been given) has effectually prevented the occurrence 
 of war between the States. Indeed, the question of 
 
68 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 secession being settled, about which the War of 1861 
 was fought, it is difficult to conceive of another war 
 between them, so closely and ever more closely are 
 free trade, common interstate laws, and the ties of 
 business and social intimacy drawing them together. 
 
 One more preliminary observation ought to be made. 
 It is a well-established rule of construction of the 
 United States Constitution that a power granted to 
 the federal congress is not exclusively vested in that 
 body, but may be concurrently exercised by the com- 
 ponent States, except in the three following classes of 
 cases : 
 
 1. Where it is expressly stated that Congress shall 
 have the exclusive power to act in the matter; 
 
 2. Where the power is conferred upon the Congress, 
 and the States are prohibited to exercise the power; 
 
 3. Where the power is of such a nature that it can 
 only be properly exercised under one uniform rule, 
 and the right to exercise it has been conferred upon 
 Congress. In such case, by implication, the power is 
 presumed to have been granted to the Congress exclu- 
 sively, and the States cannot exercise it concurrently. 
 
 But when the States have the right to exercise a 
 power concurrently with Congress, this means that they 
 may exercise it only so long as, and to the extent that, 
 Congress does not exercise it. For the Constitution, 
 and laws of the United States are expressly declared to 
 be the supreme law of the land, and a State law con- 
 flicting with a constitutional law of Congress is of no 
 effect. 
 
CONGRESS TAXING POWER 69 
 
 These principles are to be applied as freely in the 
 construction of our proposed constitution as in that 
 of the American document, with one qualification, 
 namely, that no opportunity ought to be permitted to 
 the international government to assume exclusive power 
 by implication only, nor on the other hand ought there 
 to be under any circumstances a presumption of the 
 surrender of powers by the component nations by im- 
 plication only. In every case the claim of such a grant 
 or such a surrender ought to be sustained only by some 
 express provision of the international compact. 
 
 Hence, the third rule, above mentioned, for the con- 
 struction of the American Constitution, that where 
 the power is of such a nature that it can only be prop- 
 erly exercised under one uniform rule, and the right 
 to exercise it has been conferred upon Congress, the 
 power is presumed to have been granted to the Con- 
 gress exclusively, and the States cannot exercise it con- 
 currently, ought to have no place in the rules adopted 
 for the interpretation of the international compact. 
 
 II 
 
 POWER TO RAISE REVENUE 
 
 \ 
 
 That the international government ought to be self- 
 sustaining, with power to raise its own revenues by its 
 own tax measures, is a proposition needing no argu- 
 ment. If proof were necessary, it might be sought 
 in the fact that all federal unions have found it essen- 
 
70 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 tial to possess this power; indeed, without it, the 
 union would not be a true government, but a mere 
 league or alliance, dependent upon the charity or lib- 
 erality of the component States for its continued ex- 
 istence. 
 
 The constitutional history of the United States pre- 
 sents an actual illustration of this condition, before the 
 establishment of the present Constitution, and while 
 yet the States were leagued together under the Articles 
 of Confederation which provided that the States should 
 contribute ratably to the expenses of the Union. It was 
 then notorious that some of the States failed utterly 
 to pay their quotas, while others paid only part. It 
 was, indeed, the weakness of the union under this 
 system that finally induced the States to accede to the 
 present Constitution. 
 
 Assuming that the Congress ought to be granted the 
 power to raise its revenue through its own powers of 
 taxation, the next branch of the problem relates to the 
 sorts of tax it should be permitted to lay. 
 
 In examining this very important question, it is 
 hardly necessary to remind the reader that the power 
 of taxation, while it is an essential power of govern- 
 ment, is perhaps the most dangerous of all the pow- 
 ers, and more liable to abuse by a dominant majority; 
 nor does the exercise of any other demand so inti- 
 mate an acquaintance with the domestic concerns and 
 business affairs of each small portion of an extensive 
 territory. Taxation, especially by means of duties on 
 imports and exports, that may make for great pros- 
 
CONGRESS TAXING POWER 71 
 
 perity in one section of such territory or in one class 
 of the population may impoverish another, and thus 
 may operate indirectly to make one section or one 
 class tributary to another. 
 
 In the organization of a world government, in view 
 of the widespread diversity of conditions among the 
 several nations, the ignorance of the conditions in 
 each State on the part of others than its own repre- 
 sentatives, and perhaps even the ignorance among those 
 representatives themselves (remembering that they 
 would respectively represent some millions of people), 
 it would seem the part of wisdom to confine the in- 
 ternational taxing power within the simplest possible 
 limits, and to permit its application to those subjects 
 only which may be found in every State in uniform 
 proportion. 
 
 The subject best answering this description would 
 seem to be land. This is found in every country, and 
 is valuable in proportion to the population and wealth 
 of the country itself, affording thus an approximate 
 measure of the ability of each nation to pay the ex- 
 pense of a world government, with its insurance against 
 violence and war. 
 
 And while primarily this tax upon land is a tax upon 
 the single class of landowners, the burden, extending as 
 it would over so large a portion of the earth's surface, 
 would speedily be distributed among all classes of the 
 world's population. Nor would the tax thus uniformly 
 distributed be a heavy burden upon the several na- 
 tions, when we consider the annual savings in arma* 
 
72 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ments and equipment for war, not to mention the sav- 
 ing of the expense of actual warfare, resulting from 
 the establishment of such a government. 
 
 It must also be remembered that the suggested gov- 
 ernment would be one of strictly limited powers and 
 functions, the annual expenditures of which ought not 
 to be great when compared with the benefits to accrue; 
 and that the component nations, through their abso- 
 lute control of their representatives in the Congress and 
 their consequent control of the expenditures of the 
 government, would always possess the power to put 
 a stop to any unnecessary extravagance. 
 
 The other alternative, that of granting to the in- 
 ternational government the power to lay indirect taxes 
 such as taxes on production, business, imports, or ex* 
 ports, would surrender to that government an un- 
 told power for harm and injustice, and would permit 
 a majority of the nations, through their federal agency, 
 to meddle in the domestic concerns of the respective 
 nations in what might prove ruinous fashion. 
 
 The plan proposed then would confine the power of 
 the Congress to raise its revenue to the taxation of 
 land alone at a uniform rate throughout the terri- 
 tories of the component nations. 
 
 The last phase of the problem relates to the proper 
 limitations upon the purposes for which the Congress 
 may exercise the power of taxation. 
 
 Shall it be permitted to raise money for any pur- 
 poses that to it seem to be for the general interna- 
 tional welfare, even though that welfare be confined to 
 
CONGRESS TAXING POWER 73 
 
 improvements and public enterprises undertaken within 
 a few only of the component States; or shall it be 
 limited in its right to raise money to those matters, 
 as to which it is expressly authorized to legislate? 
 
 This question has for years divided the people and 
 the political parties of the United States. It arises 
 under the corresponding clause of the American Con- 
 stitution providing that 
 
 " The Congress shall have power to lay and 
 collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises [in or- 
 der] to pay the debts and provide for the com- 
 mon defense and general welfare of the United 
 States." 
 
 One party has claimed that this gives Congress the 
 power to raise money to provide for anything which 
 it may consider as for " the general welfare of the 
 United States," regardless of whether it falls within 
 the granted powers and control of the federal govern- 
 ment. The other claims that " the general welfare of 
 the United States " has all been provided for in the 
 powers conferred upon the federal government; that 
 nothing beyond or outside of those powers can be 
 properly said to pertain to "the general welfare of 
 the United States"; and that Congress therefore has 
 no power to raise money for other purposes than those 
 appearing in the Constitution itself. 
 
 But whatever the proper view of such a question in 
 the case of a single nation like the United States, it 
 would seem very undesirable to permit the international 
 
74 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 government to exercise any such paternal care over the 
 interests of the component nations, which are fully 
 able to take care of themselves and their own enter- 
 prises and improvements without aid from the rest 
 of the world. 
 
 The powers of the international congress in this 
 regard ought to be strictly limited to the raising of 
 money for the sole purpose of carrying out the func- 
 tions imposed upon the federal government by the 
 constitution. 1 
 
 Ill 
 POWER TO BORROW MONEY PAPER CURRENCY 
 
 The Constitution of the United States has provided 
 that the Congress shall have power 
 
 " to borrow money on the credit of the United 
 States." 
 
 This has been construed to mean not only that Con- 
 gress may from time to time authorize the issuance and 
 sale of bonds of the United States, but also that it 
 may authorize the issuance of treasury notes and other 
 paper currency as legal tender in the payment of pri- 
 vate debts. 
 
 That the international government should be given 
 the power to borrow money on its own credit through 
 the issuance and sale on the public markets of bonds 
 not intended as currency would seem indisputable. Not 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. i. 
 
CONGRESS MONEY POWERS 75 
 
 only might unforeseen events occur that would render 
 such a course necessary or else would entail great em- 
 barrassment to the government, but the widespread 
 distribution of such bonds among the component na- 
 tions would constitute a conservative influence tending 
 to increase its political stability. 
 
 But the question becomes much more complex when 
 we consider the express or implied grant to the inter- 
 national government of the power to issue a world-wide 
 paper currency either on the sole credit of the govern- 
 ment or through a bank or banks instituted by it. This 
 is a matter of international convenience only, and has 
 no special bearing on the question of war or peace; so 
 that the grant of such a power is not in the least es- 
 sential to the plan of international federation. 
 
 It is to be remembered that every unnecessary grant 
 of power to the international government involves to a 
 correlative extent an actual or potential surrender of 
 power by the component nations, and tends to greater 
 centralization of power, which, should it become too 
 great, would defeat the very purpose of the union per- 
 haps by causing war on the part of the component na- 
 tions to regain the liberty and independence they have 
 too rashly surrendered. These observations apply nob 
 only to the particular power now under discussion but 
 to some others that are to be mentioned later. 
 
 While all powers ought to be surrendered by the 
 component nations, the exercise of which by them 
 would lead, or tend to lead, to wars between them, it 
 cannot be fairly said that the power to issue paper 
 
76 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 currency is one of these. The only justification of such 
 a grant, if there be any, would be found in the in- 
 ternational convenience resulting from the abolition of 
 the cost of exchange and in other ways. Only experts 
 in international finance could determine how great 
 the advantages of this change would be, or properly 
 weigh its financial advantages against the financial 
 dangers incurred; but the benefits ought to be clearly 
 shown to be very great before the power is granted. 
 
 Should the power be granted at all, it ought to be 
 express, not left to implication from the mere power 
 to borrow money on the credit of the United Nations. 
 On the other hand, if it is not intended to be granted, 
 care should be taken so to word the grant of the power 
 to borrow as to exclude the implication that it embraces 
 also the power to issue paper currency. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 POWER TO COIN MONEY 
 
 The Constitution of the United States grants to the 
 Congress the power 
 
 " to coin money, and regulate the value thereof, 
 and of foreign coin." 
 
 This is another instance wherein the question is pre- 
 sented whether a power, which has no relation to the 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2. The power to 
 issue paper currency is placed in brackets as indicative of the doubt 
 as to its inclusion among the powers granted. 
 
CONGRESS MONEY POWERS 77 
 
 causation of war between the component nations, ought 
 to be granted by them to the international government, 
 merely because it might subserve international conven- 
 ience in commercial dealings or otherwise. 
 
 It is to be borne in mind that while the mere grant 
 of such a power to the federal government would not 
 of itself, without an express prohibition upon the 
 States, operate as a negation of their right to exercise 
 the same power, it would operate to give the complete 
 control of the subject into the hands of the Congress, 
 who might, if they should choose to do so, make their 
 own exercise of the power exclusive, and deprive the 
 nations of their concurrent control of it. 
 
 The same considerations that should induce caution 
 in granting to the United Nations the power to issue pa- 
 per currency apply in this case. Unless the advantages 
 to international finance and commerce would be very 
 great, the wisdom of augmenting the powers of the 
 international government beyond the limits necessary 
 to prevent war between the nations would admit of 
 doubt. 1 
 
 POWER TO PUNISH COUNTERFEITING 
 
 It has been assumed that the international congress 
 would be given the power to borrow money on the 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. The power to 
 coin money, etc., is placed in brackets, to indicate the doubt of the 
 propriety of its inclusion among the powers granted. 
 
78 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 credit of the United Nations through the issuance of 
 bonds. Perhaps also the power to issue paper cur- 
 rency and to coin money would be granted. 
 
 These grants would very possibly imply a power to 
 provide for the punishment of the counterfeiting of 
 these securities and money; but it would be wiser to 
 leave as little as possible to implication and to grant 
 the power expressly to the Congress. 
 
 While the component nations would also doubtless 
 possess the power to punish the counterfeiting or ut- 
 terance of counterfeited securities or currency of the 
 United Nations on the ground of the fraud thereby 
 worked upon their own citizens, it would be imprudent 
 to leave the prevention and punishment of these crimes 
 entirely to the several States, which might punish them 
 very differently. 1 
 
 VI 
 
 POWER TO Fix STANDARDS OF WEIGHTS AND 
 MEASURES 
 
 The remarks made in connection with the grant of 
 the powers to issue paper currency and to coin money 
 apply here also, and perhaps with even more force, 
 since the benefits likely to accrue from the grant of 
 this power to the international government would not 
 be so great. It has no connection with war, and its 
 admission among the powers granted could only be 
 justified on the ground of great international conven- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 4. 
 
REGULATION OF COMMERCE 79 
 
 ience. It is very questionable whether it should be 
 included. 1 
 
 VII 
 
 POWER TO REGULATE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
 
 Much light will be thrown upon the investigation of 
 this interesting and important topic by a brief review 
 not only of the corresponding clause in the American 
 Constitution but of the interpretation given it in the 
 United States. 
 
 That Constitution declares that Congress shall have 
 power 
 
 " to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
 among the several States, and with the Indian 
 tribes." 
 
 This clause has received a very liberal construction, 
 the constant tendency being to transfer to Congress the 
 almost complete control of interstate and foreign com- 
 merce, while leaving to the States, respectively, the 
 absolute control of all commerce conducted entirely 
 within the limits of each State. The construction of 
 the clause comprehends a vast field, and no more wift- 
 be attempted here than to outline some of its salient 
 features. 
 
 At first it was decided by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States that the clause only gave to Congress 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. This power 
 is placed in brackets, as indicative of the doubt of the propriety of its 
 inclusion among the powers granted. 
 
8o A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 the power to pass laws regulating foreign and inter- 
 state commerce, so that until Congress should act 
 upon a particular matter connected with such com- 
 merce, the several States might pass laws dealing with 
 it. 
 
 But in more recent times the Court has receded from 
 this position, and has held that the purpose of the 
 clause for the most part is to place the entire control 
 of such commerce within the power of Congress, so 
 that if it has not acted in respect to some particular of 
 such commerce, it is an indication that Congress de- 
 sires to leave the matter undisturbed by legal restric- 
 tions, and the States are not to regulate it. 
 
 To this general rule, however, there are important 
 exceptions, of some of which persons extensively en- 
 gaged in interstate commerce loudly complain, prefer- 
 ring the single regulation of the Congress or the ab- 
 sence of regulation to the multiform rules of the sev- 
 eral States. 
 
 One of these exceptions is to be found in the ad- 
 mitted right of the respective States to exercise the 
 so-called " police power " for the preservation of the 
 safety, health, morals, or order of the community. 
 Such laws are sustained even when burdensome to com- 
 merce, if their design be not to restrict or regulate 
 interstate or foreign commerce, but bona fide to execute 
 the purposes above mentioned by methods that are not 
 unreasonable, such as quarantine regulations. 
 
 Another exception relates to the regulation of ports, 
 harbors, and pilots. In such cases it is held that the 
 
REGULATION OF COMMERCE 81 
 
 several States may control until Congress chooses to 
 act, since each State is in a better position to regulate 
 these local matters than Congress, and uniform rules 
 covering a great extent of territory would not be likely 
 to meet the local needs. 
 
 It is also important to observe that the term u com- 
 merce " is held not to include the manufacturing, agri- 
 cultural, or mining production of goods, but only mat- 
 ters or things connected with their distribution and the 
 transportation of persons. 
 
 Thus it includes immigration, and the control of 
 Congress over that subject is based upon this clause. 
 It also includes trade in goods by sale, barter, or ex- 
 change; the articles traded in; the rules of navigation; 
 the highways of commerce, such as harbors, navigable 
 waters, and interstate lines of railway or telegraph; 
 the vehicles of commerce, as ships, railway trains, and 
 telegraph lines; and the persons engaged in commerce 
 such as the engineers and firemen on railway or steam- 
 ship lines engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. 
 As to all these subjects and persons, if the commerce 
 be foreign or interstate, the States are without control 
 and (with the exception previously alluded to) can 
 lay no taxes or burdens upon them as such, and can 
 make no regulations affecting commerce through them, 
 even though the State regulations be not inconsistent 
 with acts of Congress. 
 
 Such in brief are some of the political and economic 
 results in the United States of the construction placed 
 upon this constitutional provision. 
 
82 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 In considering whether a similar power ought to be 
 granted to the international congress, the first ques- 
 tion would be, shall the Congress be given any control 
 whatever over commerce? If so, it would naturally 
 be confined to the commerce between the several com- 
 ponent nations, and between them and nations not 
 parties to the compact of union. Either of these would 
 fall within the designation " international commerce." 
 The purely domestic commerce, on the other hand, 
 would be left under the complete control of the several 
 constituent States. 
 
 International jealousy and suspicion would prob- 
 ably prove obstacles to the grant of this power to the 
 proposed government, and doubtless certain precau- 
 tions ought to be taken to define more clearly the pre- 
 cise limits of it than the American Constitution does. 
 But that it would be wise, and indeed necessary, to 
 confer a portion at least of this great power upon 
 the international congress is sufficiently apparent, when 
 we remember that perhaps most of the wars that have 
 plagued mankind have had their origin in national de- 
 sire to promote trade by devious paths. If, then, the 
 chief design in establishing this union is to eliminate 
 wars between the component nations, the compact 
 would be irreparably defective, did it omit to extend 
 the international power to one of the principal mo- 
 tives for war. 
 
 Assuming, then, that some degree of control over 
 international commerce must be granted to the Con- 
 gress, the next question is as to the limitations, if 
 
REGULATION OF COMMERCE 83 
 
 any, which ought to be imposed upon the exercise of 
 the power. Shall it be complete and absolute, as under 
 the American Constitution, reserving to the component 
 nations only the right to pass inspection or quarantine 
 laws or other " police " regulations, and the right to 
 regulate purely local matters such as harbors, pilots, 
 bridges, and dams across navigable waters? If not, to 
 what extent should it be limited? 
 
 It is clear that the power ought not to be extended 
 so as to give the international congress control over 
 the production as well as the distribution of goods, 
 even though the goods be intended for export. Not 
 only would such an extension increase enormously the 
 powers of the central government, but it would consti- 
 tute a direct invasion of that plenary control of affairs 
 domestic that each nation ought to reserve to itself. 
 
 Confining ourselves therefore to the control of in- 
 ternational commerce (in contradistinction to produc- 
 tion of the factory, the farm, or the mine), it may be 
 observed that in the prevailing mental attitude of the 
 nations toward one another, it is unlikely they could 
 be induced, even were it desirable, to grant more of 
 this power than would permit the Congress by special 
 and express legislation to regulate international com- 
 merce, not allowing, as in the United States, the mere 
 silence of the Congress in respect to a given matter to 
 operate as an inhibition upon national action. 
 
 Again, since the Congress, under the guise of regula- 
 tions, might easily pass laws touching international 
 commerce which would operate unequally and unjustly 
 
8 4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 upon different nations, thus putting one or more na- 
 tions at a disadvantage in the prosecution of its trade, 
 the compact ought to require that all regulations of 
 such commerce passed by the Congress be uniform in 
 their operation. 
 
 It would also seem advisable to provide, as in the 
 case of bills for raising revenue, that no law regulat- 
 ing international commerce shall have a life of more 
 than (say) ten years, so that at the end of that period, 
 if it is to survive, it must once more run the gauntlet 
 of both houses of the Congress and of the divergent 
 interests represented therein. 
 
 So far from any nation being permanently injured in 
 its trade relations by the grant of this power, thus 
 guarded, to the international government, it is sub- 
 mitted that it would be a great boon to international 
 commerce, which would prosper as never before. 
 While the respective nations might still regulate their 
 own trade, even international trade, conflicting and 
 burdensome as the regulations might be, these latter 
 could at any time be superseded as to particular mat- 
 ters by the action of the Congress, whenever the con- 
 flicts, restrictions, or other evils might become so bur- 
 densome as to arouse the majority of the States to 
 action. 
 
 " Commerce," as the term has been construed in the 
 United States, includes the control of immigration, 
 emigration, and the migration of persons from one 
 State to another. But it can scarcely be supposed, at 
 this stage of international intercourse, that the several 
 

 POSTAL OTHER COMMUNICATION 85 
 
 nations composing an international union would consent 
 to surrender the control of these subjects to the federal 
 government. Hence a clause has been inserted ex- 
 pressly excepting them from inclusion in this federal 
 power. 1 
 
 VIII 
 
 POWER TO REGULATE POSTAL AND OTHER 
 COMMUNICATION 
 
 The Constitution of the United States grants to 
 Congress the power 
 
 " to establish postoffices and post roads." 
 
 As construed in America, this has sufficed not only 
 to enable the federal government to establish and con- 
 trol the whole postoffice system of the country, includ- 
 ing the appointment of postmasters, but also to make 
 appropriations of money and public lands for the build- 
 ing of railroads, and to declare any road it may choose, 
 over which the mails may be carried, a " post road," 
 and on that account more or less subject to the con- 
 trol of Congress. 
 
 But it has never been held that the above clause em- 
 braces telephones, telegraphs, cables, or wireless. It 
 is confined to the single mode of communication by 
 post. The power of Congress has nevertheless been 
 extended to these other subjects through the extension 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 5. 
 
86 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 of the power to regulate foreign and interstate com- 
 merce. Thus Congress has the power to " establish " 
 postoffices, while it has power to " regulate " the other 
 modes of foreign or interstate communication. 
 
 International postal, telephonic, telegraphic, wire- 
 less, and cable communications must be considered in 
 certain aspects as instrumentalities of war, and there- 
 fore should be under the control of the international 
 congress. 
 
 Indeed, as agencies of international commerce, it is 
 possible that the clause conferring upon the Congress 
 control over that subject would suffice, by implication 
 at least, as a grant of the power to regulate all of 
 these modes of communication (including the postal). 
 And the many international conventions touching these 
 matters would seem to indicate that there is a real 
 need for the exercise of a centralized authority over 
 them. 
 
 When, however, we come to consider the extent of 
 the power thus to be conferred, we are confronted with 
 some important and difficult problems. 
 
 To make the power complete in degree, including the 
 establishment of post, telegraph, telephone, wireless, 
 and cable offices, and the appointment of postmasters 
 and operators, but limiting it in kind to international 
 communications only, leaving the intra-national com- 
 munications, as now, under the control of the respective 
 nations, would seem to involve a divided responsibility 
 and control that would be likely to have ill results; 
 and would enormously increase the patronage to be 
 
COPYRIGHTS PATENT RIGHTS 87 
 
 bestowed by the international government. On the 
 other hand, to make the control of the Congress over 
 these subjects complete in kind as well as in degree, 
 confounding the domestic with the international com- 
 munications, would produce even a worse situation, 
 and is not to be thought of. 
 
 But it would be possible to grant to the Congress the 
 power to pass laws regulating these means of com- 
 munications, so far as they are international, without 
 giving it the power to establish or fill the offices, just 
 as the power of the Congress of the United States to 
 regulate foreign and interstate commerce has never 
 been construed to confer upon that body the power 
 to establish business houses and to fill them with gov- 
 ernmental employees. 
 
 A clause therefore has been inserted in our pro- 
 posed constitution granting to the Congress the power 
 to regulate by uniform laws these means of interna- 
 tional communication. 1 
 
 IX 
 
 POWER TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTS 
 AND PATENT RIGHTS 
 
 This is another of those powers, the grant of which 
 to the international congress is not to be justified on 
 the ground that it would especially tend to prevent mis- 
 understandings or wars between the component na- 
 tions. If to be justified at all, it must be on the 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art I, Sec. 9, cl. 6. 
 
88 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ground of international convenience as in other in- 
 stances we have seen. 
 
 It may be worth while to observe that the corre- 
 sponding clause of the American Constitution has been 
 construed not to include the power to regulate trade- 
 marks. But under the clause giving power to regulate 
 foreign and interstate commerce, Congress may regu- 
 late and protect trade-marks to the extent that they 
 are used in such commerce, but not with respect to 
 purely intra-state commerce. Doubtless, the same rule 
 would be applied in the interpretation to be placed 
 upon the international compact. 1 
 
 X 
 
 POWER TO CONSTITUTE INFERIOR INTERNATIONAL 
 
 COURTS 
 
 One of the powers conferred upon the Congress of 
 
 o TTfii4-/-l Qf'oi-^o ic 
 
 the United States is 
 
 " to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
 Court." 
 
 And the third Article of the American Constitution 
 provides that 
 
 " the judicial power of the United States shall be 
 vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7- This power 
 is placed in brackets, to indicate the doubt of the propriety of its 
 inclusion among the powers granted. 
 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 89 
 
 courts as the Congress may from time to time or- 
 dain and establish." 
 
 It will be noted that these provisions do not im- 
 peratively demand that Congress create any inferior 
 federal courts. It is given a discretion in respect to 
 the matter, and it is conceivable that Congress might 
 have omitted to create such courts, vesting the " judi- 
 cial power of the United States," in such cases as it 
 might determine, in the courts of the several States. 
 Indeed, as to certain classes of cases, it has actually 
 allowed the State courts to exercise concurrent juris- 
 diction with the inferior federal courts, while in other 
 cases to which " the judicial power of the United 
 States " extends, the inferior federal courts are given 
 no jurisdiction at all, the State courts possessing exclu- 
 sive jurisdiction with regard to them. 
 
 It is seen therefore that there is no inherent neces- 
 sity to constitute any lower federal courts. Were 
 there enough State courts, it would be possible to have 
 left to them all the cases now tried in the inferior fed- 
 eral tribunals. In such event, however, appeals to 
 the Supreme Court of the United States from the State 
 courts would have been necessary in a large number of 
 cases, especially in cases arising under the Constitu- 
 tion, laws, or treaties of the United States, since other- 
 wise there would result different holdings in the sev- 
 eral States touching the construction of those laws 
 which ought to possess a uniform meaning throughout 
 the country. 
 
90 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 Whether the same or a similar power should be 
 granted to the international congress would turn upon 
 the important point whether there need be any inter- 
 national courts inferior to the Supreme Court, for if 
 they are to be created, it cannot be doubted that the 
 constitution of them and their jurisdictions must be 
 left to the international congress. Arguments of 
 weight may be adduced on either side. 
 
 On the one hand, it may be urged that the establish- 
 ment of inferior international courts throughout the 
 territories of the component nations might impose a 
 heavy expense on the federal government, as well as 
 on litigants who might be far distant from the seat of 
 the court, a burden particularly heavy in criminal 
 cases; that the exercise by such courts of jurisdiction 
 within the limits of the several States might be re- 
 garded by them with jealous disapproval, not tending 
 to strengthen the international government in their eyes 
 but rather to produce friction, and that, with the judges 
 of each nation under obligation to enforce the inter- 
 national constitution and the laws and treaties made in 
 pursuance thereof, an adequate number of such judges, 
 and appeals from their decisions to the Supreme Court 
 of the United Nations, there would be no sufficient rea- 
 son for the establishment of any inferior international 
 courts. 
 
 On the other hand, it might be argued that it would 
 be impracticable, without a very considerable increase 
 of the number of courts in each State, to expect those 
 courts to deal with the numerous cases that would be 
 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 91 
 
 likely to arise under the judicial power of the United 
 Nations; that as the expense of this increase ought not 
 to be borne by the component nations, severally, it 
 would be a difficult matter to apportion the expense 
 properly between the international and the national 
 governments; that if " the judicial power of the United 
 Nations " were left to be enforced entirely by the courts 
 of the several nations, there would often be grave 
 danger of lapses from the impartial and unprejudiced 
 attitude that befits a court, since many of the cases 
 would arise between citizens of nationalities different 
 from that of the judge, or in the form of criminal pro- 
 secutions by the United Nations, or in the form of pass- 
 ing upon the validity of national acts alleged to violate 
 the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United Nations. 
 Such questions would often compel the national courts 
 to choose between the national and the international 
 law, between the rights of a fellow citizen and those 
 of an alien or those of the international government. 
 There would thus perhaps be a tendency to decide such 
 questions in the interest of the State in which the court 
 is sitting rather than to give to the national and the 
 international law each its true weight. 
 
 On the whole it would appear wise to give to the 
 Congress the power to constitute inferior international 
 courts within the component States, leaving to that 
 body the discretion to establish them or not as it may 
 see fit, and to apportion " the judicial power of the 
 United Nations " between them and the national courts 
 as it may think best. 
 
92 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 But the grant of the power to constitute these inter- 
 national courts is entirely distinct from the mode of 
 selecting the judges of such courts, should they be 
 created. The latter question properly belongs to the 
 organization of the judiciary department, and will be 
 discussed in that connection. 1 
 
 XI 
 
 POWER TO DEFINE AND PUNISH WRONGS ON THE 
 HIGH SEAS, AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE LAW OF 
 NATIONS 
 
 At present all independent nations exercise the right 
 to punish piracies committed on the high seas and of- 
 fenses against the Law of Nations. It is, indeed, a 
 high sovereign prerogative, inasmuch as both the of- 
 fenses themselves and the exercise of the jurisdiction 
 to punish them may sometimes involve the nation in 
 misunderstandings with other nations, or even in war. 
 
 No principle of public international law is more 
 clearly recognized than that a nation must at all haz- 
 ards protect the persons of the ambassadors accredited 
 to it from violence or insult, and a patent failure to 
 do so may easily lead to war. 
 
 Misunderstandings have also arisen sometimes be- 
 tween nations by reason of the attempt of one to pun- 
 ish the citizens of another for alleged crimes committed 
 on the high seas beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. 
 
 1 See post, pp. 125 et seq.; Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, 
 Sec. 2, cl. i. 
 
CONGRESS WAR POWERS 93 
 
 In view of the possibility that such questions might 
 cause trouble not only as between the component na- 
 tions themselves but as between them and nations not 
 members of the union, it would seem eminently appro- 
 priate that the power should be conferred upon the 
 international congress to define and punish offenses 
 committed on the high seas and against the Law of Na- 
 tions. 
 
 And since it is possible, though perhaps not prob- 
 able, that troubles of this sort may also arise because 
 of civil or private wrongs committed on the high seas 
 outside the actual jurisdiction of any State, the power 
 to define and redress such wrongs should likewise be 
 granted to the Congress. 
 
 Another reason for conferring this power upon the 
 Congress is that it is proposed (as will appear here- 
 after) to extend the judicial power of the United Na- 
 tions to all cases of crimes and private wrongs (other 
 than breaches of contract) arising on the high seas, 
 and the legislative power of the United Nations ought 
 to be equally extensive. 1 
 
 XII 
 
 THE WAR POWERS 
 
 That the war powers of the component nations must 
 be substantially surrendered by them severally and 
 granted to the nations in union is the crux and axio- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 9. 
 
94 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 matic foundation of the federation, the entire purpose 
 of which would be defeated without such a grant. 
 
 It is not, however, essential to the design, nor would 
 it be wise, that the nations surrender absolutely all 
 right to possess and use armed forces upon occasion. 
 Domestic insurrections or sudden invasions of their 
 territory may occur, and it is necessary to their safety 
 that they reserve the right to keep certain forces for 
 these uses. 
 
 The essential point is that they surrender the right to 
 keep more than a certain small proportion of the troops 
 and ships of war that are in the service of the interna- 
 tional government (say ten per centum) so that no 
 single nation or small group even of the more power- 
 ful nations, may easily resist the international force, 
 or be tempted by the militaristic spirit engendered by 
 large armaments to engage in war with peaceful neigh- 
 bors either within or without the union. 
 
 This surrender of great powers on the part of the 
 component nations must necessarily suppose a corre- 
 sponding guarantee of protection by the international 
 government against invasions and aggressions of all 
 sorts by other nations. With such a guarantee no 
 component nation would have need of great arma- 
 ments, unless it harbor illegal designs against its neigh- 
 bors. 
 
 It is a wise provision of the Constitution of the 
 United States, based upon English precedent, that ap- 
 propriations for military uses shall be effective only 
 for a limited term, thus making it necessary at short 
 
CONGRESS SEAT OF GOVERNMENT 95^ 
 
 intervals to refer to both Houses of the Congress, rep- 
 resenting different interests, all matters relating to the 
 size and character of the army. It is even more de- 
 sirable that such a provision be included in the in- 
 ternational constitution, since the interests represented 
 in the two chambers of the Congress would be more 
 divergent than in the United States; the House of 
 Delegates representing peculiarly the Great Powers, 
 and the Senate the equal rights of all nations/ 
 
 XIII 
 
 THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 It would obviously be impracticable that the inter- 
 national government should have its capital and public 
 buildings in territory subject to the jurisdiction of any 
 of the component nations. An imperium in imperio of 
 this sort would present many difficult problems. It is 
 necessary that it possess a situs of its own, over which 
 it shall have exclusive jurisdiction in every respect, in 
 order that it may move freely in its appointed sphere. 
 It may readily be assumed that any of the component 
 nations would willingly cede to it such territory as 
 might be needed for this purpose, the maximum amount 
 reasonably necessary being stipulated in the compact 
 itself. 
 
 Upon the same principle our proposed government 
 should possess similiar jurisdiction over all land ac- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 10-15. 
 
96 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 quired by it in the several States, with their consent, 
 for purposes of public buildings, such as offices, ar- 
 senals, forts, dock yards, etc. If, however, the prop- 
 erty be acquired without the consent of the States 
 wherein the same may be, there can be no ground upon 
 which it can be assumed that jurisdiction has been ceded 
 to the international government, which must then be 
 regarded as an ordinary proprietor whose land is sub- 
 ject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State wherein 
 it lies. 1 
 
 XIV 
 
 ANCILLARY POWERS 
 
 It would be an impossible task to foresee and enu- 
 merate all the specific powers the international con- 
 gress might find occasion to exercise as incidental to 
 the great powers granted to the federal government. 
 The broad limits of its proper jurisdiction have been 
 outlined in the preceding discussion, but in order to 
 the full and complete exercise of this jurisdiction, it 
 will be often necessary to exercise subordinate and 
 ancillary powers. The right to do this would doubtless 
 be implied upon the general principle of law that 
 everything is included in a grant which is necessary 
 to the proper enjoyment of the thing granted. 
 
 But it would probably be safer to follow the example 
 of the American Constitution in this respect, and ex- 
 pressly provide for the exercise of such ancillary pow- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 16. 
 
CITIZENSHIP NATURALIZATION 97 
 
 ers of legislation as may be found to be reasonably 
 necessary and proper to execute the powers expressly 
 granted to the Congress or vested in other departments 
 of the government. 1 
 
 XV 
 POWER OF NATURALIZATION CITIZENSHIP 
 
 The American Constitution, in declaring who shall 
 be eligible to be President of the United States, or a 
 Representative or Senator, recognizes the existence of 
 such a legal status as that of " citizen of the United 
 States," both native born and naturalized. Moreover, 
 that Constitution has included among the powers 
 granted to the Congress that of establishing " an uni- 
 form rule of naturalization " ; and in the Fourteenth 
 Amendment has declared that 
 
 " All persons born or naturalized in the United 
 States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
 shall be citizens of the United States, and of the 
 State wherein they reside." 
 
 Indeed, all the existing federal unions recognize that 
 there may be a citizenship of the union distinct from 
 citizenship of the component States; that all citizens 
 of the States are ipso facto citizens of the union and as 
 such entitled to its protection against the aggressions 
 of foreign countries wherein they may happen to be. 
 
 This is the logical consequence of the fact that one 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 17. 
 
98 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 of the chief designs of all existing federal constitutions 
 is to weld the component States into a single nation 
 occupying the joint territories of all the States, in 
 which is vested the exclusive power to deal with other 
 members of the family of nations. 
 
 The framers of the international constitution would 
 be confronted with the like question* whether the 
 status of " citizenship of the United Nations " shall be 
 recognized in law, and whether the power of naturali- 
 zation shall be conferred upon the Congress of the 
 United Nations. While, under this constitution, as will 
 presently appear, the component nations would not be 
 expected to yield to the federal government exclusive 
 control of all foreign relations, it is unquestionably 
 true that they must yield all power to compel the re- 
 dress of international wrongs by armed force; and in 
 return for this concession, the federal government must 
 guarantee protection to the citizens of each component 
 nation while in other countries. 
 
 But all this can be accomplished without the assump- 
 tion that the citizens of the component nations are also 
 " citizens of the United Nations." Indeed, the very 
 nature of this proposed international union is such as 
 to forbid logically and theoretically the conception of 
 a " citizenship " thereof. For the union would be a 
 mere political abstraction, a form of government re- 
 sulting from a compact between nations, possessing 
 no territory of its own (except the seat of government 
 and the land held by it for the purpose of public 
 buildings). The concept of citizenship is based upon 
 

 CITIZENSHIP NATURALIZATION 99 
 
 the notion of country or territory rather than upon 
 that of mere government or political combination. It 
 would be absurd to speak of one as a citizen of an 
 alliance or compact or government; one can only be a 
 citizen of a country. A Frenchman is not a citizen of 
 the republican form of government in France; he is a 
 citizen of France. 
 
 The only persons therefore who may logically be 
 termed " citizens of the United Nations " would be 
 those who, being citizens of no other country, are born 
 and reside permanently in the seat of the government 
 of the United Nations, which would be subject to their 
 exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
 It follows also that if there are to be no " citizens 
 of the United Nations " (except in the very limited 
 instance just mentioned), neither should any power 
 of naturalization be conferred upon the international 
 government. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
 DEPARTMENT 
 
 DEPENDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE UPON THE 
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
 
 In the examination of a proper organization of the 
 executive department of the international government, 
 a preliminary question presents itself whether, fol- 
 lowing our general model the American Constitu- 
 tion, the entire executive power ought to be conferred 
 upon a single man, who in his own person shall con- 
 stitute a separate and co-ordinate department of the 
 government, entirely independent of, and without re- 
 sponsibility to, the Congress, or whether the exigencies 
 of the case demand another form of organization. 
 
 In the United States the President, who is vested 
 with practically all of the federal executive power, is 
 chosen by an " electoral college," the members of which 
 are selected in the several States in such manner as 
 each State shall provide by law. The number of 
 " electors " to which each State is entitled equals the 
 combined number of its representatives in both houses 
 
 100 
 
EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION 
 
 of the Congress. As a matter of fact, each State has 
 now enacted that the electors to which it is entitled in 
 the electoral college shall be elected by the people of 
 the State, who know in advance what candidate for the 
 presidency the electors, if chosen, will respectively 
 vote for. The candidates themselves are nominated 
 by national conventions of the several political parties 
 in the country. 
 
 Thus the President is in effect elected by the States, 
 acting through a vote of their respective peoples; and 
 he is responsible to them alone for the proper exercise 
 of his powers as chief executive during his term of 
 office, which is four years. With these constitutional 
 powers Congress cannot interfere, nor can they during 
 his term of office either increase or diminish his salary, 
 nor recall him nor demand his resignation. The House 
 of Representatives may impeach him for " treason, 
 bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," but 
 the impeachment must be tried by the Senate, of whom 
 two-thirds must concur to secure a conviction. Be- 
 yond this, he is entirely independent of the legislative 
 department. 
 
 This absolute independence of the executive carries 
 with it the result that the government of the United 
 States is not so quickly responsive to the wishes of 
 the people as are some other forms of government. 
 The Lower House of Congress is elected every two 
 years, the President every four years, and the Senate 
 every six years (though one-third of the Senate 
 changes every two years) . Hence if complete political 
 
:o2 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 control has been given to one party at an election, 
 the earliest possible time wherein the opposite party 
 can gain complete control is four years later, 
 more probably, six years, even though the political 
 complexion of the country has changed some years 
 earlier. 
 
 This system has its advantages, but it also has dis- 
 advantages, especially in cases in which it might be 
 desirable that the governmental agents do not commit 
 their constituents too far before they have had an 
 opportunity to be heard from effectually. 
 
 Another consequence of the system is that it often 
 happens that the executive and legislative departments 
 are antagonistic rather than of mutual assistance. 
 While this possesses the advantage that harmful meas- 
 ures are sometimes prevented, it frequently prevents 
 also action that would be beneficial, and diminishes 
 the power of the constituents to fix the political re- 
 sponsibility where it properly belongs. 
 
 Comparing this with the English and other parlia- 
 mentary governments of European countries, it is seen 
 that they possess a certain mobility and capacity for 
 quick response to public opinion that can scarcely be 
 said to exist in the United States. This is chiefly due 
 to the fact that the executive power in these European 
 systems is responsible direetly to the legislative de- 
 partment, and is subject at any time to recall by that 
 department through a vote of want of confidence or 
 otherwise. The executive of the moment remains in 
 power only so long as he retains control in the legisla- 
 
EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION 103 
 
 tive halls. He must resign, failing such control, and 
 give way to others who may command the confidence 
 of the legislative majority. 
 
 Applying these well-known principles to the problem 
 confronting us in the organization of an international 
 executive, it may be observed that the mutual jealousies 
 and suspicions of the nations, especially the Great 
 Powers, would probably veto at once a plan similar to 
 that adopted in the Constitution of the United States, 
 whereby the complete control of all international execu- 
 tive functions would be vested in one man for a fixed 
 term, without imposing on him any responsibility to 
 the Congress or to the component nations. 
 
 Particularly would this result be likely to follow, 
 should it be made possible for the chief executive to 
 be a citizen of, or dominated by, one of the Great 
 Powers. It would seem probable that the only con- 
 dition upon which the nations might be induced to agree 
 to such an organization of the executive would be the 
 requirement that " the President " be always a citi- 
 zen of one of the weaker Powers. 
 
 But, as applied to an international government, the 
 disadvantages of the American system would outweigh 
 its benefits. Most of the nations would be accustomed 
 to a different and in many respects a more convenient 
 system in their own governments, it would be difficult 
 to avoid international suspicions and jealousies, and it 
 would seem peculiarly essential in an international 
 government, frequently called upon to deal with mat- 
 ters of great complexity and importance, that its or- 
 
104 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ganization be such as to respond quickly to the views 
 and sentiments of the component nations. 
 
 Let us turn then to the consideration of the general 
 principles underlying the parliamentary systems in 
 England and other European States. 
 
 In broad outline they call for a legislative body of 
 two chambers, the more numerous representing, and 
 elected by, the people; the less numerous usually rep- 
 resenting some other interest, or selected otherwise 
 than by direct popular vote. The king, president, or 
 other titular chief executive selects a prime minister 
 from the members of either legislative chamber, call- 
 ing upon him to choose a cabinet of ministers likewise 
 members usually of one or the other chamber, all of 
 whom are directly responsible to the legislative cham- 
 bers, and subject to recall by them or one of them at 
 any time. If the ministers fail to retain the support 
 of these bodies, especially that of the chamber repre- 
 senting the people, they resign or are recalled, and 
 a new ministry is created in the same manner as 
 before. 
 
 This bare outline of the general European plan of 
 organization of the executive department of govern- 
 ment is necessary in order that we may see clearly what 
 is needed for the adoption of a similar plan in the pro- 
 posed international constitution. 
 
 It will be remembered that our first Article provides 
 for a legislative department, composed of two cham- 
 bers. It might be arranged that the international ex- 
 ecutive power shall be exercised by a ministry respon- 
 
EXECUTIVE PRIME MINISTER 105 
 
 sible to, and removable by, either or both of these 
 chambers. 
 
 We shall assume therefore for the purposes of our 
 proposed constitution that some such form of execu- 
 tive organization ought to be adopted, if possible, since 
 the existing international bureaus would be entirely 
 inadequate both in existing powers and in modes of 
 organization. 
 
 II 
 
 SELECTION OF A PRIME MINISTER 
 
 In European countries, as has been said, the prime 
 minister is chosen by the sovereign, president, or other 
 irresponsible head of the State. But in our federal 
 league there would be no such authority, and it would 
 appear unwise to attempt to create one, though he 
 were clothed with no other important power than to 
 select a premier upon occasion. Resort ought not to 
 be had to such an expedient if there be a feasible way 
 to utilize for the purpose the instrumentalities al- 
 ready created. 
 
 It would appear practicable to leave this function of 
 the selection of a prime minister to the two chambers 
 of the international congress upon nomination by a 
 committee composed of members of both chambers; 
 the prime minister to select his subordinate ministers, 
 and to remove them at his pleasure; the prime minister 
 to be subject to recall at any time upon resolution to 
 that effect passed by either chamber; and in case of 
 
106 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 failure to choose one of the nominees of the committee, 
 or his resignation, or recall, another nominating com- 
 mittee to be selected who may nominate other persons 
 from whom the Congress may choose a new premier. 
 The plan thus outlined demands further examination 
 as to details. 
 
 Ill 
 
 THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE, ITS ORGANIZATION 
 AND FUNCTIONS 
 
 Since, under the plan suggested, this committee 
 would exercise the function of the sovereign in some 
 European countries, in nominating the prime minister 
 and chief executive official of the international gov- 
 ernment for the time being, it is proper and necessary 
 that its organization, powers, and duties be carefully 
 worked out. 
 
 It must be remembered that the populous and 
 wealthy nations would have a preponderating influ- 
 ence in the lower house of the Congress, while the sov- 
 ereignty of each nation would be equally represented 
 in the Senate, so that in that house a combination of 
 smaller nations might predominate over a less nu- 
 merous combination of powerful ones. 
 
 Hence to permit a majority of this nominating com- 
 mittee to be chosen by either house would tend to place 
 the control of the executive power in the hands of the 
 element predominating in that house. To avoid this, 
 the nominating committee ought to be composed, in 
 
EXECUTIVE PRIME MINISTER 107 
 
 equal numbers, of the members of each house, chosen 
 respectively by the houses to which they belong. 
 
 The result would be, or tend to be, that no person 
 would be nominated for the office of prime minister 
 who would not be fairly acceptable at least to both 
 the majority of the component nations and to the ma- 
 jority of the Great Powers. But to make this result 
 even more certain it ought to be further provided that 
 no one thus nominated shall become the prime minister 
 unless he be elected in each house by the majority of 
 the votes therein. 
 
 In a matter of such importance as the mode of nomi- 
 nating a premier and temporary executive head of the 
 international government, it would be prudent to ar- 
 range even the details in the constitution, which should 
 declare the number to constitute the committee, the 
 manner of selecting its members, the number of names 
 to be presented by it to the consideration of the Con- 
 gress, and the course to be pursued in case no one of its 
 nominees is chosen by the Congress. 
 
 With respect to the number to constitute the com- 
 mittee, the possibility of the selection of several dele- 
 gates from the same State suggests the necessity, as a 
 safeguard against the possible evil effects of this, that 
 the committee be composed of sufficient numbers to 
 minimize the importance of an accident of this kind. 
 
 As to the mode in which each house shall select 
 its members of the committee, it is an interesting 
 question whether they ought to be elected by ballot in 
 each house, appointed by the presiding officer of each 
 
io8 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 house, or selected in such manner in either house as its 
 rules may provide. Experience in legislative bodies 
 generally as to the conduct of such matters would 
 seem to point to the first method as preferable; but 
 if a discretion be given to each house in respect to the 
 matter, its own experience will in the end doubtless 
 teach it the best method. The prudent course would 
 seem to be to permit each house to choose its portion 
 of this committee in such manner as may be prescribed 
 by its rules. 
 
 With regard to the number of names to be presented 
 by the committee from which to select the prime min- 
 ister, it may be observed that time, an important ele- 
 ment in this matter, would often be saved, were the 
 committee required to present more than one name. 
 The number has been placed tentatively at three in 
 our proposed constitution. 
 
 Provision should also be made for the case where 
 none of the three named by the committee receives a 
 majority of the votes of both houses of the Congress. 
 A question is here presented, whether the same com- 
 mittee should then name a second list of three or 
 whether that committee ought to be discharged, and a 
 new one selected representing a new group of States 
 or at least of representatives. The latter would appear 
 to be the better plan, since the objections to the first 
 nominees might sometimes be not so much personal 
 to themselves as due to the combination of interests 
 that nominated them. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. 3. 
 
EXECUTIVE MINISTRY 109 
 
 IV 
 
 WHO ELIGIBLE TO BE A MINISTER 
 
 Following to its legitimate conclusion the principle 
 adopted in the organization of the international execu- 
 tive department, that it co-operate with, and be de- 
 pendent upon, the legislature, it would seem clear 
 that the prime minister, as well as the subordinate 
 members of the ministry, ought themselves to be mem- 
 bers of one or the other legislative chamber. 
 
 To accept any other rule would be to adopt, in some 
 measure at least, the weaknesses of the American sys- 
 tem without its compensating advantages. The execu- 
 tive officials should occupy seats in the Congress, sub- 
 ject at any time to interrogation by other members 
 of that body upon the state of international affairs. 1 
 
 V 
 
 SELECTION OF THE SUBORDINATE MINISTERS 
 
 According to the theory already outlined, the prime 
 minister would be the responsible agent of the Congress 
 for the administration of the executive affairs of the 
 international government, his responsibility to either 
 house being fixed by the power to recall him by reso- 
 lution. 
 
 The question is next presented, should the other 
 
 1 See Appendix, Corvst'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. i. 
 
no A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ministers also be appointed and removable by the legis- 
 lative chambers, or by the prime minister alone ? 
 
 Were the first alternative adopted, we would have 
 authority and responsibility divided between the prime 
 minister and other members of the cabinet. If the 
 premier is to be held solely responsible for the entire 
 conduct of executive affairs, his should also be the 
 sole authority. Sound principles of government dic- 
 tate that the Congress select the premier alone r hold- 
 ing him to a strict accountability for the selection of 
 proper subordinate ministers and for their proper per- 
 formance of the duties allotted to them. 1 
 
 VI 
 
 THE NUMBER OF MINISTERS 
 
 In determining the number of ministers to be in the 
 cabinet, it would be desirable, if it were practicable, 
 that each component nation be represented therein, 
 while, on the other hand, no nation should be per- 
 mitted to have an excess of representatives in the min- 
 istry at one time. Making due allowance for the ac- 
 cident that the delegation from a particular State may 
 possess more, than its fair proportion of able men 
 peculiarly fitted for the administration of international 
 affairs, a provision might be inserted that no compon- 
 ent nation may have more than two representatives 
 in the ministry at one time. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. i. 
 
EXECUTIVE MINISTRY 1 1 1 
 
 But in examining the suggestion that each nation be 
 represented in the administration by at least one min- 
 ister, several practical objections would at once present 
 themselves. 
 
 If the number of component nations were large, such 
 a provision might entail the creation of a ministry 
 too unwieldy for the prompt action that would fre- 
 quently be necessary. And it would often be difficult 
 for a prime minister to find among delegations from 
 particular States, especially minority States, men who 
 would be in sympathy with his views and policies. 
 
 In this matter therefore it would seem necessary 
 to rely upon the discretion of the Congress, and to pro- 
 vide in the constitution that the number, as well as the 
 duties, of the ministers be regulated by law. 1 
 
 VII 
 
 TERMS OF OFFICE OF MINISTERS 
 
 In order to insure the absolute and prompt respon- 
 sibility of the prime minister to the legislature, it is 
 essential that the Congress possess the power to recall 
 or remove him at any time. And when we remember 
 the two elements represented in the two chambers, 
 respectively, the predominance of the populous States 
 in the House of Delegates and that of the greater num- 
 ber of States in the Senate, it would seem necessary 
 to go further and provide that he be subject to recall 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. x. 
 
ii2 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 or removal at any time by resolution of either chamber. 
 
 In like manner, if the prime minister is to be held 
 responsible, perhaps removed, because of the acts or 
 omissions of the subordinate ministers, he must be 
 given the same right to remove them, or any of them, 
 that is given to either house of the Congress respect- 
 ing himself. 
 
 Furthermore, since the whole ministry, the premier 
 included, are members of the Congress they would be 
 one and all subject to recall from the Congress at any 
 time by their respective home governments, in accord- 
 ance with the laws of the several nations. Such a re- 
 call would of course terminate their offices as minis- 
 ters, as they would at once cease to be members of the 
 Congress. 
 
 Usually also a minister might be counted upon to 
 save himself from actual removal by a timely resigna- 
 tion of his office; and the resignation of the prime 
 minister would be likely to carry with it, ultimately at 
 least, that of his entire ministry. 1 
 
 VIII 
 
 COMPENSATION OF MINISTERS 
 
 The prime minister, as well as the other ministers, 
 ought to receive not only the compensation paid to 
 other members of the Congress, but a further stipend 
 in recognition of the additional important and re- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. i, 2. 
 
EXECUTIVE MINISTRY 1 13 
 
 sponsible work they are called upon to perform as 
 ministers. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States prescribes 
 that the compensation of the President shall neither 
 be increased nor diminished during the period for 
 which he shall have been elected, a provision neces- 
 sary to secure the desired independence of the execu- 
 tive department and its freedom from all responsibility 
 to the legislature. 
 
 But in our international constitution the design is 
 just the reverse of this, to secure a full and complete 
 responsibility of the executive to the legislative depart- 
 ment. Hence it would be neither necessary nor in har- 
 mony with the general plan to lay restrictions upon the 
 Congress with regard to the compensation to be paid 
 the ministers. 1 
 
 IX 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF EXECUTIVE POWERS AMONG THE 
 MINISTERS 
 
 The plan already indicated calls for the number of 
 ministers to be determined by the Congress. But it also 
 calls for a sole executive authority and responsibility 
 in a prime minister. Between these two principles an 
 important question is presented, whether the Congress 
 or the prime minister ought to be given the power to 
 apportion the executive functions among the minis- 
 ters. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 2. 
 
ii4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The principle of a sole responsibility and authority 
 on the part of the premier in international administra- 
 tion would not be impaired by leaving to the Congress 
 the apportionment of the executive duties amongst the 
 ministers, since his authority over them is secured 
 by his power to appoint them and to remove them at 
 pleasure. 
 
 And since it is often essential to the success of legis- 
 lation that it also include measures and instrumentali- 
 ties for its proper administration, it is appropriate 
 that the Congress be given the power not only to fix the 
 number of ministers, but to assign to particular minis- 
 ters the executive functions it is desirable for them 
 severally to perform. 
 
 Thus in legislation touching war or commerce, the 
 Congress would probably desire also to create port- 
 folios in the cabinet for the proper administration of 
 these great departments. Surely it ought not to be 
 left to the discretion of the prime minister whether or 
 not there shall be such ministers. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. i, cl. I. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 POWERS TO BE CONFERRED ON THE 
 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
 
 THE PARDONING POWER 
 
 This power is generally recognized as a preroga- 
 tive of sovereignty to be exercised by the executive de- 
 partment. There can be no question that, so far as 
 offenses against the United Nations are concerned, the 
 power to pardon them, or remit the punishment for 
 them, together with the power to reprieve and com- 
 mute sentence, should be vested in the ministry. 1 
 
 II 
 
 THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 
 
 In all governments the treaty-making power is justly 
 regarded as one of the highest prerogatives of sov- 
 ereignty, to be exercised by the sovereign himself, 
 or by those officials constitutionally authorized to ex- 
 ercise it in his stead. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 3, cl. i. 
 1 "5 
 
n6 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 But in many even of the more advanced nations it is 
 admitted to be more or less an irresponsible power, 
 one that may be exercised secretly and without the 
 knowledge of the legislative branches of the govern- 
 ment. Indeed, the facility with which many national 
 governments may enter into these secret agreements 
 and understandings with each other has been one 
 prominent cause of the mutual suspicion and distrust so 
 prevalent among the nations of the world. It is 
 scarcely too much to say that it is one of the indirect 
 causes of the great European War. 
 
 The American Constitution has to a very consider- 
 able extent guarded against this evil by requiring that 
 all treaties of the United States which may be made by 
 the President must be ratified by two-thirds of the 
 Senate; and while the Senate usually goes into execu- 
 tive or secret session for the discussion of treaties, 
 this is merely for the purpose of insuring freedom of 
 debate. The fact that a treaty is being considered, 
 and the terms of it, are not kept secret. 
 
 Another valuable lesson is to be drawn from the 
 requirement of the American Constitution that treaties 
 shall only take effect when ratified by two-thirds of 
 the Senate. When it is remembered that this body 
 represents the equal sovereignty of the States, it will 
 be seen that this constitutional provision to a consider- 
 able extent places in the hands of the States them- 
 selves the treaty-making power of the Union, the re- 
 quired two-thirds majority of the Senate being at least 
 sufficient to present an effective check on any attempt 
 
EXECUTIVE POWERS TREATIES 117 
 
 to undermine the reserved rights of the States through 
 the agency of treaties. 
 
 It would be desirable to incorporate into our in- 
 ternational compact a similar check upon both of these 
 possible evils, secret diplomacy and treaties which 
 might affect the reserved rights of the nations. Per- 
 haps all that would be needful for this purpose would 
 be to require that all treaties made by the ministry 
 should receive the assent of two-thirds of the votes in 
 the international Senate. But to guard against the 
 possibility of a treaty which might secure the assent 
 of two-thirds of the Senate and yet meet with the dis- 
 approval of most of the Great Powers, it would per- 
 haps be safer to add the requirement that treaties, to 
 be valid, shall receive the assent of two-thirds of the 
 votes in the House of Delegates also. 
 
 There is still another limitation that ought to be 
 placed upon the treaty-making power, a limitation 
 that does not clearly appear in the American Consti- 
 tution, a doubt as to the existence of which has already 
 caused some trouble in the United States, that is, a 
 provision limiting the treaty-making power to those 
 matters, control of which has been surrendered to the 
 federal government. 
 
 For example, after limiting the powers of the in- 
 ternational congress to the regulation of international 
 commerce only, and excluding it from the domain of 
 intra-national or domestic commerce, and from the 
 right to regulate immigration, it would be highly un- 
 desirable to permit the ministry and the Congress by 
 
ii8 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 treaty to regulate these matters that have been so 
 carefully excluded from the control of the Congress as 
 a legislative body. 
 
 The treaty-making power of the United Nations 
 therefore ought to be confined to those subjects, the 
 control of which has been conferred on the Congress 
 or other departments of the international government, 
 excluding from its operation those subjects reserved to 
 the exclusive control of the several component nations. 
 
 This necessarily supposes that as to the latter sub- 
 jects, the power to make treaties is reserved to the 
 component nations, respectively, in all cases wherein 
 for the proper regulation of the matter treaties are 
 necessary either between the component nations them- 
 selves or between them and nations not members of 
 the union. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF OFFICERS 
 
 The Constitution of the United States provides that 
 the President himself shall be the commander-in-chief 
 of the army and navy of the United States, and of the 
 militia of the States when in the actual service of the 
 United States; and that he shall appoint governmental 
 officials whose appointments are not otherwise pro- 
 vided for, subject to the advice and consent of the 
 Senate. 
 
 In our plan of international government, all such 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 2. 
 
APPOINTMENTS REMOVALS 1 19 
 
 offices, military, and civil, would be filled through ap- 
 pointments by the ministry. But it would seem un- 
 necessary to insert the check upon such appointments 
 that they be ratified by the Senate or the Congress, 
 since the ministers would not, like the President of the 
 United States, be independent of the Congress, but on 
 the contrary directly responsible to it, through the 
 power of recall which either house may at any time 
 exercise. 
 
 But while the Constitution of the United States has 
 thus given the President the power of appointment, 
 by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, it 
 has failed to provide expressly for the power of re- 
 moval from office, otherwise than by impeachment. 
 
 For many years the question was debated, whether 
 this power of removal was vested in the President 
 alone or whether, like the power of appointment, it 
 could be exercised by the President only by and with 
 the advice and consent of the Senate. This contro- 
 versy has now been settled, temporarily at least, 
 by the Act of Congress of 1887, repealing the act 
 known as the " Tenure of Office Act " of 1867, which 
 had in effect denied to the President the power to re- 
 move public officers without the Senate's consent. The 
 repealing act of 1887 seems practically to concede that 
 the power of removal in such cases rests in the Presi- 
 dent alone. 
 
 In the case of our international constitution the 
 embarrassment is to a large extent removed by the fact 
 that it is not proposed to submit executive appointments 
 
120 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 to the international Senate for ratification, and hence 
 there would be no reason to suppose that removals 
 must be submitted to their approval. But it would be 
 more prudent to include specifically the power of re- 
 moval with that of appointment as vested in the min- 
 istry alone. 
 
 Appointees may be sufficiently protected against 
 wholesale and arbitrary removals, as upon a change of 
 ministry, by laws of the Congress regulating the civil 
 service. 
 
 There ought, however, to be an exception to this 
 ministerial power of appointment in the case of clerks 
 of court and other inferior court officers who may more 
 fitly be appointed by the courts themselves. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 RECOGNITION OF AMBASSADORS AND PUBLIC 
 MINISTERS 
 
 The power to receive ambassadors or other public 
 ministers from foreign States is one of the ordinary 
 executive functions. It embraces also the right to 
 refuse to receive such ambassadors or ministers, either 
 because they are personae non gratae, because they rep- 
 resent a government not recognized by the executive 
 as a de facto government, or for other reasons that 
 may be deemed sufficient. It also embraces the right 
 to dismiss a minister or demand his recall for satis- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 3. 
 
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS 121 
 
 factory reasons. All these are important functions, 
 relating as they do to the governmental intercourse 
 with foreign nations. 
 
 In the United States all that has been found neces- 
 sary in order to clothe the President with these powers 
 is the simple constitutional provision that " he shall 
 receive ambassadors and other public ministers.'* 
 
 In our international constitution a similar provision 
 would doubtless suffice. 1 
 
 V 
 THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS OF THE UNION 
 
 This is so obviously the chief function of the execu- 
 tive department of every government that it is scarcely 
 necessary to do more than mention it in the enumera- 
 tion of the executive powers to be conferred on the 
 international government. 
 
 Every declaration of war by the Congress, every law 
 regulating international commerce,, every treaty of the 
 United Nations, and every decision of an international 
 court not susceptible of enforcement by the court's 
 own officials must be executed and enforced by the ex- 
 ecutive arm of the government; and every criminal 
 prosecution must be conducted by it. 2 
 
 1 Sec Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 4. 
 *See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 5. 
 
122 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 VI 
 OFFICIAL COMMISSIONS 
 
 The commissioning of officers duly appointed is an 
 executive function which should of course pertain to 
 the international ministry so far as relates to officials 
 appointed by them. And since all executive officers 
 are to be thus appointed, the power ought to be vested 
 in them to commission such officials. 
 
 But it is otherwise, under the proposed plan, with 
 respect to the legislative and the judicial officers of 
 the United Nations, who are to be appointed by the 
 component nations themselves, and who therefore 
 ought to be commissioned as the laws of the several 
 nations shall provide. 1 
 
 VII 
 
 INTERPELLATIONS AND INTERROGATIONS 
 
 The government of the United States, by reason of 
 its constitutional structure and the total separation of 
 the legislative and executive departments, knows noth- 
 ing of the parliamentary interpellations and interroga- 
 tories so often addressed to the ministerial benches in 
 European parliaments. Indeed, the members of the 
 American cabinet, that is, the heads of departments 
 appointed by the President and, under his control, in 
 charge of the various executive portfolios, are not even 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art II, Sec. 3, cl. 6. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY INTERPELLATIONS 123 
 
 given seats in the Congress ; so that communication be- 
 tween these high executive officials and the lawmakers 
 is confined to formal reports or to official testimony 
 before Congressional committees. 
 
 The Constitution, it is true, seeks to supply the place 
 of these interrogatories by providing that the Presi- 
 dent 
 
 " Shall from time to time give to the Congress 
 information of the state of the Union, and recom- 
 mend to their consideration such measures as he 
 shall judge necessary and expedient." 
 
 Accordingly, the President sends messages from 
 time to time to the Congress, or appears before them 
 in person and addresses them, upon these subjects. 
 But this is a formal function, closely analogous to " the 
 address from the throne " upon the opening of the 
 British parliament, and is far removed, in nature and 
 effect, from the rough and ready interrogatories ad- 
 dressed to ministers in European parliaments. 
 
 Under our proposed plan of international govern- 
 ment, the analogy would be much closer to the Eu- 
 ropean than to the American system. The ministers 
 would themselves be members of the Congress, re- 
 sponsible to, and subject to recall by, either chamber, 
 so that there is no need of any express constitutional 
 provision for such interpellations, which would follow 
 automatically from the structure of the ministry. 
 
i2 4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 VIII 
 THE SUMMONING AND PROROGUING OF THE CONGRESS 
 
 In the United States, the Constitution requires that 
 the Congress shall assemble at least once a year, though 
 its session does not usually last throughout the year. 
 The President is given the power 
 
 " on extraordinary occasions to convene both 
 houses, or either of them, and in case of disagree- 
 ment between them with respect to the time of 
 adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as 
 he shall think proper." 
 
 It has been assumed that the international congress 
 would be in perpetual session, with such reasonable re- 
 cesses as the two houses might agree upon. 1 This 
 clause dispenses with the need of any special provision 
 either for summoning or proroguing the Congress. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 4, cl. 2. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY 
 DEPARTMENT 
 
 I 
 
 APPOINTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 
 
 Assuming the necessity for the creation of an inter- 
 national judiciary department, the first point to engage 
 our attention would be the proper method of appoint- 
 ing the judges. 
 
 The American Constitution provides that the federal 
 judges of the United States shall be appointed by the 
 President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
 Senate. This involves the consequence that the fed- 
 eral judges are in all respects officers of the United 
 States, not of the States, severally, wherein they per- 
 form their functions; and gives rise to that esprit de 
 corps amongst them which is likely to develop where 
 men are conscious that they are parts of one great 
 organization. 
 
 The result has been that the federal courts from the 
 beginning have shown perhaps too great a tendency 
 to emphasize and enhance the powers granted to the 
 United States at the expense of the reserved powers of 
 
 125 
 
126 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 the States. Nor are the judges to be blamed for this 
 tendency. It arises from a trait honorable to human 
 nature, demanding loyal and faithful guardianship of 
 the interests committed to his keeping by the agent's 
 employer or by the organization of which he forms 
 a part. It is then not to be wondered at that, in cases 
 of honest doubt whether a certain power has been 
 granted to the United States or has been reserved to 
 the States, the tendency has been on the whole to re- 
 solve the doubt in favor of the powers of the United 
 States. Thus, step by step, the authority of the fed- 
 eral government has been gradually extended, while 
 rights once supposed by all to have been reserved to 
 the States have been correspondingly reduced. 
 
 From this experience in the United States it seems 
 possible to affirm the general proposition that a ju- 
 diciary appointed by federal authority will demon- 
 strate a tendency to enlarge the federal powers by 
 judicial construction at the expense of rights reserved 
 by the component States. 
 
 In the organization of our proposed union of nations 
 the chances of such a tendency ought to be minimized 
 as much as possible, for the grave danger of such a 
 result would be a serious obstacle to its formation. 
 The cause producing this tendency, namely, the ap- 
 pointment of the judges by federal authority, would, if 
 reversed and the appointments were made by the com- 
 ponent nations, produce more or less of an opposite 
 tendency, constituting an additional safeguard against 
 federal usurpation of power. 
 
JUDICIARYORGANIZATION 127 
 
 It is believed therefore that prudence would dictate 
 that the international judges of every degree be ap- 
 pointed by the several component nations, acting 
 through their executives, in accordance with a general 
 plan that will develop as the discussion proceeds. 
 
 Practical considerations also, no less than the theo- 
 retical, demand this method of appointment, for how- 
 ever familiar a prime minister might be with the ma- 
 terial of his own country suitable for international 
 judgeships, it could hardly be supposed that he, even 
 with the aid and advice of his council of ministers, 
 would be in a position to make the most suitable ap- 
 pointments from distant parts of the world, or to learn 
 of the comparative fitness of men of other nationalities 
 for such important posts. Certainly these appoint- 
 ments might most properly be made by the executives 
 of the States wherein the courts are to sit and perform 
 their functions, and whose agents they are, in accord- 
 ance with regulations prescribed by the laws of the 
 several component States. 
 
 Peculiarly would this principle apply in the appoint- 
 ment of the judges of the international Supreme Court, 
 upon whom would rest some of the most important 
 duties and responsibilities involved in the adminis- 
 tration of the international government. It is they 
 who must decide the great controversies that would 
 arise from time to time between the nations, who must 
 finally pass upon the validity of the various exercises 
 of legislative power by the international congress, and 
 who must adjudicate cases wherein the component na- 
 
128 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 tions shall have exercised powers alleged to be in vio- 
 lation of the international constitution, laws, and 
 treaties. Surely here, if anywhere, the component na- 
 tions have the most direct concern in the appointment 
 of the strongest and most learned constitutional law- 
 yers and statesmen to be found within their dominions. 1 
 
 II 
 
 INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
 
 Although, in accordance with the conclusion just 
 reached, the international judges ought to be appointed 
 by the executives of the component nations, it by no 
 means follows that they ought to be paid by them also. 
 On the contrary, it would seem eminently proper that, 
 once appointed by the respective States, they should be 
 paid an equal compensation out of the federal treasury. 
 Otherwise States paying liberal salaries to their repre- 
 sentatives on the bench, and thus securing their best 
 men, might sometimes find their rights determined by 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 2, cl. i. It would not 
 seem proper that the international compact should confer upon the 
 executive of each component State, acting alone, the authority to ap- 
 point the international judges, since some of the nations (for example, 
 the United States) do not permit the appointment of their own national 
 judges or ambassadors by their executives alone, without ratification 
 by their Senates or legislative assemblies. Hence while the proposed 
 plan calls for the appointment of the international judges by the ex- 
 ecutive of each component State, it also provides that the appointment 
 shall be made in accordance with such regulations as may be pre- 
 scribed by the laws of each State, including a ratification by its Senate 
 or legislative body, if a State shall see fit to require it. 
 
JUDICIARY INFERIOR COURTS 129 
 
 the judicial representatives of other nations more nig- 
 gardly in their allowances, who would be of inferior 
 ability, learning, or character. 
 
 There ought also to be a prohibition upon the reduc- 
 tion of the compensation of any judge during his term 
 of office. This is an obvious and necessary check upon 
 the undue influence that might otherwise be brought to 
 bear upon the judiciary by the legislative department. 
 
 As a further means of securing the independence of 
 the judiciary, our constitution ought to contain the pro- 
 vision that they shall hold office during good behavior, 
 subject to removal only by the action of the Congress, 
 for bribery or other misfeasance. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 INFERIOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
 In dealing with the powers to be conferred on the 
 international congress, and more particularly with the 
 grant to the Congress of the power " to constitute in- 
 ternational courts inferior to the Supreme Court," the 
 conclusion was reached that this power ought to be 
 granted. But in the same connection it was pointed 
 out that the Congress might not need to exercise it, 
 since possibly the courts of the several nations might be 
 deemed adequate to determine all the controversies 
 likely to arise in inferior tribunals under the constitu- 
 tion, laws, and treaties of the United Nations. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N. f Art. Ill, Sec. 2, cl. i. 
 
130 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 Assuming, however, that it may be found necessary 
 to create these international courts, the organization of 
 them in detail must be left to the discretion of the Con- 
 gress. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL SUPREME COURT 
 
 It has already been indicated, both on theoretical 
 and practical grounds, that it would be desirable that 
 the international judges be appointed by the executives 
 of the component nations. But in the case of the Su- 
 preme Court this would be impracticable unless each 
 nation be given at least one representative upon that 
 court. 
 
 /. Equality of National Representation Upon 
 the Court 
 
 The first important question is whether this repre- 
 sentation on the Supreme Court should be equal for 
 all the component nations, or whether each should be 
 represented in proportion to importance and influence, 
 as measured by population or otherwise. 
 
 When it is remembered that the court is established 
 for the adjudication of national rights wherein all the 
 nations are equal; that the questions it is to decide 
 ought not to be determined by the weight of influence 
 and wealth, but by the weight of justice and reason 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sees, i, 2. 
 
SUPREME COURT EQUALITY 131 
 
 only, in which respects the component nations are 
 equal; that the custom of nations in arbitration pro- 
 ceedings has been to submit their disputes to tribunals 
 consisting of an equal number of representatives of 
 the contending nations (regardless of their respective 
 influence and populations), with an impartial umpire; 
 that the judges of the court would not be partisans 
 chosen for the purpose of advocating and establishing 
 certain claims, but impartial judges, independent of 
 outside influence, and sworn to hold the scales of jus- 
 tice evenly balanced between the federal government 
 and the component nations, and between the litigants 
 before it, whether nations or individuals; that in every 
 contest between two of the nations or between the 
 federal government and a nation or its citizens, each of 
 the nations, though not an actual party to the litiga- 
 tion, would be deeply interested in the precedents set 
 by the decision; and that in cases involving the inter- 
 pretation of the international constitution, laws, and 
 treaties, or the constitutionality of laws or treaties of 
 the component nations, every nation would have an 
 interest in the decision almost equal to that of the liti- 
 gants themselves; when all these points are consid- 
 ered, it would seem eminently proper to adopt the prin- 
 ciple that each component nation be equally represented 
 upon the Supreme Court. 
 
 To the objection that a representation of one judge 
 from each nation would make the court too large and 
 unwieldy, it may be replied, that with the addition of 
 each new nation to the union, the work of the court 
 
132 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 would be increased to an amount that would surely 
 demand the labors of one additional judge, and that 
 even should every nation in the world join the union, 
 there would be ample work for the forty or forty-five 
 judges of the court to perform, divided into sections 
 as they would be according to the plan presently to be 
 suggested. 
 
 The real danger would be not that one representa- 
 tive on the court from each component nation would 
 make the court too large, but that the number of com- 
 ponent States might not be great enough to enable a 
 court composed of only one such representative of each 
 nation properly to perform its functions. 
 
 The essential principle is that all the States con- 
 cerned be equally represented upon the court. 
 Whether this be accomplished through the medium of 
 one or two or more representatives of each nation is 
 a detail depending upon the number of the component 
 nations, and ought to be left within the discretion of 
 the Congress. 1 
 
 2. Division of the Court into Sections 
 
 The Supreme Court would be called upon to decide 
 three classes of cases enumerated, in the order of 
 their dignity, as follows : ( i ) disputes between nations ; 
 (2) civil cases involving the interpretation of the in- 
 ternational constitution, laws, or treaties, the constitu- 
 tionality of the laws or treaties of the United Nations, 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 3, cl. i. 
 
SUPREME COURT SECTIONS 133 
 
 or the constitutionality or validity of the laws and 
 treaties of the component nations; and (3) criminal 
 cases involving similar questions. 
 
 It would seem proper, therefore, to divide the court, 
 as nearly as may be, into three equal sections; the 
 first section to try cases of the first order, and the 
 second and third to try cases arising under the second 
 and third of the above heads, respectively. The judges 
 first to compose the several sections might be deter- 
 mined at the initial meeting of the court by the draw- 
 ing of lots. 
 
 A second drawing of lots might determine the rela- 
 tive rank each judge would occupy in his section, the 
 first in position being the presiding judge of his section, 
 with the next in rank as his successor, the presiding 
 judge in each section to be promoted to the last place 
 in the section immediately above, in case of a vacancy 
 in that section; and upon every vacancy, each judge 
 holding rank below the vacant position to advance one 
 degree. The presiding judge of the first section would 
 be the chief justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
 Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the representa- 
 tion of any component nation, the new appointee of 
 that nation would begin at the lowest rank in the third 
 section. 
 
 To illustrate : If the chief justice die, the judge in the 
 first section who is second in rank would at once be- 
 come chief justice; the third in position would become 
 second; and so on until the last position in that section 
 is reached, which would thus be left vacant.^ This 
 
134 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 vacancy would be filled by the promotion of the pre- 
 siding judge of the second section. Thereupon the 
 second judge of the second section would become the 
 presiding judge of that section, the third in position 
 would become second, and so on until the last position 
 of that section is reached, which would be vacant. 
 This vacancy would be filled by the promotion thereto 
 of the presiding judge of the third section, whose posi- 
 tion in turn would be taken by the second judge of the 
 third section, and so on until, each of the remaining 
 judges moving up one degree, the last position of the 
 third section is left vacant. This would be filled by 
 the new appointee of the State, the death of whose 
 former representative (the former chief justice, we 
 have supposed) inaugurated the series of vacancies. 
 
 Thus no nation would be preferred over another, 
 and the representatives of each would have an equal 
 chance to interpret the international constitution, laws, 
 and treaties, and to decide cases in the various forms in 
 which they may arise in the several sections. Expe- 
 rience and length of service would be the sole measures 
 of the official rank of the representatives of the several 
 nations. 1 
 
 5. Appeals from the Sections to the Supreme Court 
 as a Whole 
 
 There would arise two classes of cases wher.ein the 
 final decision of the questions involved ought not to be 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 3, cl. 2, 4, 5. 
 
SUPREME COURT SECTIONS 135 
 
 left to the particular sections, but should be determined 
 by the court as a whole, all the sections sitting to- 
 gether, in order to avoid a confusion that would other- 
 wise result. 
 
 The first case is that of uncertainty whether the par- 
 ticular cause falls within the jurisdiction of the section 
 to which it has been brought by the parties appealing. 
 If the point be raised before the section that the case 
 ought to go to another section, either party dissatisfied 
 with the decision upon this preliminary question ought 
 to be allowed to appeal to the court as a whole to de- 
 termine the proper section in which to try the case. 
 
 The second instance is where the several sections, 
 in adjudicating the cases of different sorts brought be- 
 fore them, respectively, have rendered conflicting de- 
 cisions interpreting the same provisions of the inter- 
 national constitution, laws, or treaties, or passing upon 
 the constitutionality or validity of the laws or treaties 
 of the United Nations or the component States. Great 
 confusion would result, if no means of ultimately recon- 
 ciling these conflicting decisions were provided. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 3, cl. 3. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
 COURTS 
 
 I 
 
 SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL POWER 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to point out that it is as es- 
 sential to grant judicial, as legislative and executive, 
 powers to the international government, or to remind 
 the reader how important is the careful selection of 
 those powers, so that the federal government, while on 
 the one hand clothed with all the authority needful to 
 the successful performance of its functions, shall not 
 on the other be in a position to invade the proper pro- 
 vince of the several component nations. 
 
 We shall begin the study of the jurisdiction of the 
 international courts with a brief examination of the 
 subjects to which it would seem that the judicial power 
 of the United Nations ought to be extended. 
 
 /. Interpretation of the Constitution, Laws, and 
 Treaties 
 
 No argument will be needed to convince the thought- 
 ful reader that it is essential to place in judicial hands 
 
 136 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 137 
 
 the power of authoritative interpretation of the inter- 
 national constitution, laws, and treaties, whenever such 
 interpretation becomes necessary to the decision of a 
 question suitable for judicial cognizance. The rights 
 of litigants, both civil and criminal, would often turn 
 upon the proper construction of these instruments. 
 
 To leave them entirely to the jurisdiction of the 
 courts of the component nations would be to invite 
 confusion and variety of interpretation. The interna- 
 tional constitution or an act of the Congress or a treaty 
 of the United Nations might then mean one thing in one 
 State and a very different thing in another, with no 
 power in any single court or system of courts to 
 straighten out the tangle. 
 
 Again, if the proposed international constitution is 
 to protect the citizens of one component nation against 
 the improper acts of another State wherein such citi- 
 zens may be, as is later suggested, the best and safest 
 mode of protection would be to give such citizens the 
 opportunity to have their rights determined by some 
 tribunal more likely to be impartial than the courts 
 of the nation complained of. 
 
 For these and other reasons not needful to mention, 
 it would be imperative that our international compact 
 provide that the judicial power of the proposed govern- 
 ment shall extend to controversies arising under the 
 constitution, laws, and treaties of the United Nations. 1 
 
 1 Sec Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, See. 4, cl. i. 
 
i 3 B A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 2. Power to Adjudge Laws and Treaties 
 Unconstitutional and Void 
 
 In the adjudication of the legal and constitutional 
 rights of litigants, it would often be necessary for the 
 court having jurisdiction of the case to compare a 
 law of the Congress or a federal treaty with the consti- 
 tution, or a law or treaty of a component nation with 
 the international constitution or the laws or treaties 
 made in pursuance thereof touching the same subject, 
 and it might sometimes happen that such examination 
 would reveal the particular law or treaty to be in 
 contravention of a higher law. 
 
 In such an event, what should be the measure of the 
 court's duty? Is it to accept the particular law or 
 treaty as furnishing the rule for its guidance, on the 
 presumption that the legislature or treaty-making 
 power has investigated the constitutionality of its work, 
 and act upon the theory that they, and not the court, 
 are the proper arbiters of that question? This is the 
 rule generally adopted in European countries, even 
 those possessing written constitutions. 
 
 Or ought the principle to be, as in the United States, 
 that the judiciary, as a co-ordinate department of the 
 government, is under the duty to determine the proper 
 law to be applied to the case before it; and that as 
 between the constitution, which is the higher law, and 
 the inconsistent law or treaty of the United Nations, 
 which is the subordinate, or as between the constitu- 
 tion of the United Nations or the laws or treaties of 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 139 
 
 the union made in pursuance thereof and the inconsist- 
 ent law or treaty of a component nation, it must en- 
 force the higher, and refuse to recognize the subordi- 
 nate as a valid act? 
 
 This principle, as it is theoretically applied in the 
 United States, forbids the court to take this radical 
 step if there is any doubt of the constitutionality of the 
 act, upon the theory that the legislature is a co-ordinate 
 branch of the government, and must be supposed to 
 have at heart the preservation of the constitution, and 
 that it would never have passed the law had it not been 
 satisfied of its constitutionality. But this theoretical 
 attitude has in large measure been neutralized by the 
 practical fact that in many of its most important 
 decisions upon constitutional questions the Supreme 
 Court has been nearly equally divided, and has de- 
 clared laws unconstitutional by bare majorities of 
 the court. If there were ever to be a doubt as to 
 the unconstitutionality of a law, this would seem 
 to be the case where it is most certainly proved to 
 exist. 
 
 No attempt will be made here to give the argu- 
 ments for or against the European and American 
 theories, respectively, on this point. Suffice it to say 
 that it is believed on the whole that the peculiar na- 
 ture of our proposed federation would make accept- 
 able to the nations another check upon the powers of 
 the international congress and treaty-making power, 
 such as would be contained in the judicial power to 
 adjudge their acts unconstitutional and void. And if, 
 
140 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 by granting this judicial power, each nation may secure 
 itself and its citizens against similar unconstitutional 
 laws and treaties made by its sister nations, it ought 
 to be willing, in its turn, to permit its own laws and 
 treaties to be examined in the same way and with the 
 same authority. 
 
 Hence, in our proposed constitution, it is assumed 
 that the nations would consent to grant to the judiciary 
 department the power, in cases where such a course 
 would be necessary, to declare unconstitutional and 
 void any law or -treaty of the United Nations which 
 clearly violates any provision of the international 
 constitution, or any law or treaty of a component 
 nation in contravention of the constitution or of 
 the constitutional laws or treaties of the United 
 Nations. 
 
 But, profiting by the experience in the United States 
 above referred to, a proviso should be added that 
 when such a case is before the Supreme Court, it shall 
 not pronounce any law or treaty unconstitutional and 
 void unless three-fourths of the judges agree to it. 
 The majority of three-fourths is selected, because it is 
 that majority of the two houses of the Congress that 
 would be necessary in order to change the constitution, 
 or override the court's decision. It should take as 
 large a majority of the court to override the decision 
 by the Congress that its action is constitutional, as it 
 would of the Congress to override the decision of the 
 court and amend the constitution. In the one case 
 the component nations are acting through the judicial, 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 141 
 
 in the other through the legislative, organ of the in- 
 ternational body. 1 
 
 5. Check Upon the Judicial Power to Declare Laws 
 Unconstitutional 
 
 As the principle is applied in the United States, no 
 check is found upon the power of the Supreme Court 
 to declare a law unconstitutional and void save in the 
 power to amend the Constitution, and thus override, 
 as it were, the court's decision. Indeed, the constitu- 
 tional history of the United States, reveals at least one 
 case wherein this very consequence followed. In the 
 great case of Chisholm v. Georgia the Supreme Court 
 decided that under the Constitution a private citizen 
 of one State might sue another State in the federal 
 courts. No sooner was the decision announced than 
 a great outcry arose throughout the country against 
 such an interpretation of the Constitution, and the 
 decision was speedily followed by the adoption of the 
 Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution declaring that 
 
 " The judicial power of the United States shall 
 not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
 equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
 the United States by citizens of another State, or 
 by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." 
 
 But under the American Constitution it is exceed- 
 ingly difficult to obtain amendments, so that the evil 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. i. 
 
H2 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 must be a very pronounced one before it is likely to be 
 remedied in this manner. 
 
 Under our international constitution, as herein pro- 
 posed, amendments may be had by a three-fourths vote 
 in each house of the Congress. If therefore the Su- 
 preme Court should at any time declare an act of the 
 Congress unconstitutional, and that opinion is dis- 
 sented from by a sufficient number of the component 
 nations, it would be a comparatively easy matter to 
 secure an amendment to the constitution that would 
 correct the error made by the court. To this end the 
 assent of at least three-fourths of the States, as repre- 
 sented in each house of the Congress, must be secured. 
 
 4. Cases Affecting Ambassadors, Public Ministers, 
 and Consuls 
 
 Under existing international conditions so great is 
 the danger of ill feeling, or even war, resulting from 
 an affront offered to the public representative of an- 
 other nation, that it is manifestly proper that the ju- 
 dicial power of the international government be ex- 
 tended to all cases affecting them. Otherwise it would 
 be easily possible for the union to become involved in 
 war or at least in trouble with nations not members 
 of it by reason of the improper or illegal determination 
 of a case affecting such representatives by a court of 
 one of the component nations. 
 
 For somewhat similar reasons this power should be 
 extended also to cases affecting ambassadors, public 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 143 
 
 ministers, and consuls accredited to any of the com- 
 ponent nations by other nations, whether members or 
 not members of the union. Since (as we have sup- 
 posed) the war power has been surrendered by the 
 members of the union and granted by them to the in- 
 ternational government, it devolves upon the latter 
 to see that, as between the component nations, their 
 ambassadors are not subjected to affront or injury, 
 and that, as between these and nations not members 
 of the union, the peace of all be not jeopardized by 
 the misconduct or bad management of one of their 
 own number. These results may be best accomplished 
 by extending to all such cases the international judicial 
 power. 1 
 
 5. Offenses and Wrongs Committed on the High Seas 
 
 The Constitution of the United States extends the 
 federal judicial power, inter alia, 
 
 " to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris- 
 diction." 
 
 The jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts, to 
 which this clause refers, was threefold (exclusive of 
 the jurisdiction of prize cases in time of war under 
 the rules of international law). This threefold juris- 
 diction consisted of the powers following: 
 
 i. To try and sentence persons accused of crimes 
 committed on the high seas or on navigable waters 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 2. 
 
144 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 wherein the tide ebbs and flows, if not within the body 
 of any county; 
 
 2. To try all cases of " maritime torts," that is, 
 private wrongs (other than breaches of contract) aris- 
 ing upon the high seas or upon tidal waters, whether 
 or not within the body of a county; 
 
 3. To try cases of " maritime contracts," that is, 
 contracts wherever made, if concerning maritime af- 
 fairs. 
 
 In the United States an Act of Congress has pro- 
 vided that jurisdiction of crimes in admiralty shall ex- 
 tend to crimes committed on the high seas or on navi- 
 gable waters not within the body of any State; leaving 
 crimes committed within a State, though on navigable 
 waters, to be punished by the State courts. 
 
 With respect to " maritime torts," it has been de- 
 cided in the United States that the admiralty jurisdic- 
 tion is even more extensive than in England, because 
 of the greatness of the American rivers, many of which 
 are readily navigable far above tide water. Hence the 
 rule has been established that the admiralty has juris- 
 diction of torts committed on the high seas or on any 
 waters navigable in fact by ships that may be used in 
 commerce, regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 
 
 The third subject of admiralty jurisdiction remains 
 in the United States, as in England, dependent upon the 
 nature of the contract, not upon the locality. 
 
 The question now presents itself whether the judicial 
 power of the United Nations ought to be extended to 
 these cases and, if so, within what limits. 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 145 
 
 Following the general principle that matters of local 
 concern shall be left entirely to the regulation of the 
 component nations, and only matters of common in- 
 terest, the regulation of which by the several com- 
 ponent nations might engender misunderstandings or 
 ill will, shall be given into the control of the interna- 
 tional government, it would result that at least those 
 parts of the admiralty jurisdiction above described, 
 which involve the occurrence of events upon navigable 
 waters within the territorial boundaries of a particular 
 nation, should remain as now subject to the exclusive 
 jurisdiction of that nation. 
 
 The application of this principle would eliminate 
 from international cognizance all crimes and torts 
 committed on navigable waters within the limits of any 
 nation, and all cases of maritime contract, while it 
 would extend that cognizance to offenses and torts (or 
 private wrongs other than breaches of contract) com- 
 mitted on the high seas. 1 
 
 6. The United Nations a Party 
 
 Controversies would often arise to which the United 
 Nations would be party, such as prosecutions of in- 
 dividuals for violations of the laws of the union, suits 
 by the United Nations against component nations or 
 other proceedings wherein they might be complainants. 
 To all such cases the international judicial power ought 
 certainly to be extended. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 3. 
 
146 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 It would seem equally clear, if the principle of the 
 judicial settlement of international disputes is to pre- 
 vail, that the judicial power of the United Nations 
 ought to extend to all suits against the United Nations 
 in which component nations or nations not members of 
 the union are the complainants. 
 
 But it does not necessarily follow that the interna- 
 tional courts should be given jurisdiction of suits insti- 
 tuted against the United Nations by private individuals. 
 Here is to be applied that principle of government 
 demanding that no sovereign be sued even in his 
 own courts without his consent. In such cases, there- 
 fore, while the judicial power of the United Nations 
 should be extended to such cases, it must be left to the 
 discretion of the Congress to determine whether, and to 
 what extent, the power shall be exercised. 1 
 
 7. Controversies Between Component Nations 
 
 There is no need to tarry upon the grant of this 
 power. It is obviously essential that the international 
 judicial power extend to cases of this sort, if the chief 
 purpose of the union is to be carried out, the avoid- 
 ance of war between the component nations. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 4. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 5. 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 147 
 
 8. Controversies Between Component and Other 
 Nations 
 
 The same reasons that necessitate the extension of 
 the international judicial power to controversies be- 
 tween the component nations themselves would demand 
 its further extension to controversies between com- 
 ponent nations on the one side and nations not mem- 
 bers of the union on the other. 1 
 
 9. Controversies Between Nations Not Members of 
 the Union 
 
 All existing federations have provided for the exten- 
 sion of their judicial power to controversies between 
 their component States, or between those States and 
 foreign nations. But they have all stopped at that 
 point. Not one has undertaken, in an altruistic spirit 
 and in the interest of general peace, to place its courts 
 at the disposal of two or more nations not within 
 the union for the judicial settlement of their disputes. 
 Indeed, in the case of an ordinary federation, such 
 a proposal would appear preposterous and ridic- 
 ulous. 
 
 But in the case of a federal union such as we are 
 examining, established, if it is to exist at all, by the 
 most powerful nations of the world, for the very pur- 
 pose of keeping the peace between them, which might 
 be jeopardized by a local war in a distant part of the 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 6. 
 
i4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 earth, it is at least debatable whether the international 
 constitution should not offer the services of its Su- 
 preme Court for the judicial settlement of disputes 
 between nations not members of the union, thus giv- 
 ing them the benefit of an impartial court already or- 
 ganized and accustomed to hear such causes, whose 
 arbitrament might prove an acceptable substitute 
 for that of a war the final outcome of which upon 
 the peace of the component nations no man might 
 foresee. 
 
 If, however, such a provision were inserted, care 
 ought to be taken to declare expressly that the sub- 
 mission by outside nations of their controversies to 
 the international courts shall furnish no reason or 
 excuse for the use of the international force to execute 
 the courts' decree. That must be left to the honor of 
 the nations concerned, or else the entire purpose of- 
 the clause is defeated. 1 
 
 JO. Controversies Between Citizens of Different 
 States 
 
 The Constitution of the United States extends the 
 judicial power of the Union to cases arising between 
 citizens of different States or between citizens of a 
 State and aliens. 
 
 The power was extended to these cases upon the 
 theory that the courts of a particular State would not 
 be so likely as would the federal courts to adjudge 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 4, cl. 7. 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 149 
 
 impartially the rights of its own citizens when weighed 
 against those of aliens or the citizens of other States. 
 But Congress has never adopted this theory to the 
 extent of making the federal jurisdiction exclusive of 
 the State courts in such cases. Under the Act of Con- 
 gress, if the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, the 
 suit may be brought in, or removed to, the federal 
 court, but it may also be tried in the State court if 
 neither party objects. If the amount involved be less 
 than $3,000, the federal courts are given no jurisdic- 
 tion at all. 
 
 This last condition is in itself an admission by Con- 
 gress that there is nothing to fear from the injustice, 
 prejudice, or partiality of the State courts in cases 
 of this character. And experience in the United States 
 points to the same conclusion. In the vast number of 
 such controversies that have not involved $3,000, and 
 have therefore been left entirely to the disposal of the 
 State courts, their decisions have been as satisfactory to 
 the litigants, whether citizens or aliens, as the deci- 
 sions of the federal courts have been. There has been 
 little evidence of the local partiality and prejudice, 
 the fear of which led to the extension of the federal 
 judicial power to those cases. 
 
 On the other hand, the possession of this jurisdiction 
 (where the amount is more than $3,000) has enor- 
 mously augmented the business of the federal courts in 
 the United States; and, more serious still, has given 
 those courts increased opportunity, sometimes availed 
 of, to advance the power and prestige of the federal 
 
1 50 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 government at the expense of the powers reserved to 
 the States. 
 
 In the international constitution, 1 as will appear 
 later, the rights of aliens or of citizens of one com- 
 ponent State, while in another, are adequately secured 
 against invasion, and whenever a suit involves the law 
 of a component nation alleged to violate these rights, 
 it would constitute " a controversy arising under the 
 constitution of the United Nations," to which the inter- 
 national judicial power would extend. It would seem 
 unnecessary and unwise to extend it further to contro- 
 versies between citizens of different States or aliens, 
 merely because the parties are of different nationali- 
 ties, where no unfair or prejudicial governmental ac- 
 tion has been alleged. 
 
 For these reasons it is believed that the international 
 judicial power ought not to extend to any litigation 
 between private parties, except in cases arising under 
 the constitution and laws of the United Nations or 
 under treaties made by their authority or by authority 
 of the several component nations. 
 
 II 
 
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
 
 By u original " jurisdiction is meant that the court 
 has jurisdiction to try the case immediately and in the 
 first instance, without the previous institution of any 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. i. 
 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 151 
 
 suit in an inferior court. The term is used in contra- 
 distinction to " appellate " jurisdiction, which supposes 
 a suit first instituted in a lower court, and then brought 
 to the higher court upon appeal. 
 
 Our exemplar, the Constitution of the United States, 
 upon this point has provided as follows : 
 
 " In all cases affecting ambassadors, other pub- 
 lic ministers and consuls, and those in which a 
 State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have 
 original jurisdiction. In all other cases before 
 mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
 jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such 
 exceptions and under such regulations as the Con- 
 gress shall make." 
 
 In the United States it is settled that the original 
 jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, having been con- 
 ferred by the Constitution itself, can neither be en- 
 larged nor diminished by the action of Congress. But 
 while the Constitution has given the court original 
 jurisdiction in the cases mentioned, it has not declared 
 that jurisdiction to be also exclusive; and hence it is 
 competent for Congress to enact that suits of this kind 
 may be originally instituted in a lower court as well 
 as in the Supreme Court. 
 
 The reasons for granting the court original jurisdic- 
 tion in these cases is quite apparent. Reference has 
 already been made to the jealousy with which nations 
 are accustomed to regard the treatment of their diplo- 
 matic representatives abroad. Their relations to the 
 
152 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 people around them are to a great extent regulated by 
 the Law of Nations, and they are not ordinarily sub- 
 ject to local jurisdiction. It is not only essential that, 
 as between the federal government and the component 
 States, the protection of these foreign representatives 
 should belong to the former, but in the exercise of the 
 judicial power of the federal government in cases af- 
 fecting them it is important that such cases may be at 
 once instituted in the highest and most responsible 
 federal court rather than drag through the tedious 
 processes of the lower courts, reaching the Supreme 
 Court only on appeal. 
 
 Analogous reasons led to the inclusion within this 
 original jurisdiction of controversies " in which a State 
 shall be party." Not only the dignity of the State, 
 but the prevention of tedious and exasperating delays 
 and other grounds for the development of ill-will be- 
 tween the States, dictated that such controversies be 
 instituted originally and in the first instance in the Su- 
 preme Court. 
 
 In the case of the international constitution these 
 reasons would be no less effectual than in the Ameri- 
 can Constitution. No less in the former than in the 
 latter case would the necessity arise to avoid or 
 promptly redress affronts to ambassadors or ministers 
 accredited to the United Nations or to any component 
 nation, and to consult the dignity and convenience of 
 the component or other nations litigating their rights 
 in the international courts. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 5, cl. i. 
 
JUDICIAL POWER LIMITATIONS 153 
 III 
 
 APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
 
 Unlike the Supreme Court's " original " jurisdiction, 
 it is neither necessary nor desirable that its " appel- 
 late " jurisdiction be fixed in the international consti- 
 tution. It ought to be left entirely to the discretion of 
 the Congress. 
 
 The constitution, following its American prototype, 
 should do no more than provide that the court shall 
 possess such appellate jurisdiction from inferior in- 
 ternational courts, and from the courts of the compo- 
 nent nations when exercising the judicial power of the 
 United Nations, both as to law and fact, as the Con- 
 gress shall think proper. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL 
 
 POWER 
 
 Before concluding our examination of the judicial 
 power that ought to be conferred on the international 
 government, it is necessary to call the reader's atten- 
 tion to several important limitations that should be im- 
 posed upon the exercise of it. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 5, cl. 2. 
 
154 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 /. Suits by Individuals Against Component Nations 
 
 Allusion has already been made to the governmental 
 principle that no sovereign State may be sued without 
 its own consent. Nations might be willing to surrender 
 to an international federal government the judicial 
 power to determine controversies between themselves 
 and other nations as a means of avoiding war, and yet 
 may properly refuse to yield to a quasi-alien author- 
 ity the power to determine suits instituted against them 
 by private individuals without their assent. To permit 
 this would be to impair their dignity as sovereigns 
 without adequate reason. 
 
 But this principle would not apply to appeals taken 
 to the Supreme Court from inferior courts in suits, 
 civil or criminal, instituted originally by a component 
 nation against an individual, where the decision in the 
 lower court has been against the individual (he being 
 accordingly the appellant and the nation the appellee) 
 and the individual's rights or immunities under the 
 international constitution, laws, or treaties are in- 
 volved. 
 
 Hence there ought to be a provision in our constitu- 
 tion to the effect that the judicial power of the United 
 Nations shall not be construed to extend to any original 
 suit brought by a private person against a component 
 nation. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 6. 
 
JUDICIAL POWER LIMITATIONS 155 
 
 2. Suits Against the Sovereign, Chief Executive, or 
 Ministers of a Component Nation 
 
 It is certain that no nation would give its assent to 
 a compact which did not clearly provide against the 
 possibility of any action of the international federal 
 government whereby its sovereign, president, or other 
 chief executive, or the members of its ministry, could 
 be brought before the international courts on charges 
 of the violation of the federal laws or treaties. No 
 nation would put itself in a position where such af- 
 fronts to its sovereignty and dignity would be pos- 
 sible, or where such foreign influences could be brought 
 to bear upon its governmental policies. 
 
 There must be inserted therefore in the proposed 
 constitution still another limitation upon the inter- 
 national judicial power to the effect that it shall not 
 extend to any personal proceeding against the sov- 
 ereign, chief executive, or any member of the ministry 
 of any component nation. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. Ill, Sec. 6. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE 
 
 UNITED NATIONS (I) POLITICAL 
 
 LIMITATIONS 
 
 I 
 
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
 As preliminary to an examination of the limitations 
 that ought to be imposed upon the international govern- 
 ment, it is proper to observe that the corresponding 
 limitations upon the federal government of the United 
 States, contained in the American Constitution, so 
 completely and so effectually cover the ground, es- 
 pecially in respect to the guarantees and protection they 
 afford to the rights of the individual against the en- 
 croachments of the government in the exercise of its 
 granted powers, that they need but few modifications 
 or additions to suit them to our purposes. 
 
 It may also be observed that so far as concerns the 
 guarantees of the individual's civil rights, and the pro- 
 tection afforded him in criminal prosecutions, by the 
 international constitution, no nation would be likely 
 to raise serious objection to its adoption on account of 
 their presence, since the tendency and effect of all of 
 
 156 
 
NO TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS 157 
 
 them would be to protect the citizens of each nation 
 from unjust, oppressive, or tyrannical action on the 
 part of the international government alone, and 
 would not in the slightest degree affect the exercise 
 of their customary rights by the governments of 
 the several component nations within their own 
 limits. 
 
 The limitations to be considered may be best classi- 
 fied under three heads : ( i ) Limitations of a political 
 nature; (2) Guarantees of the individual's civil rights, 
 and (3) Guarantees of the individual's rights in crim- 
 inal cases. The present chapter will be devoted to 
 the political limitations upon the powers of the inter- 
 national government. 
 
 II 
 
 TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS 
 
 Inasmuch as the national craving for territorial ex- 
 pansion is one of the most pronounced causes of war, it 
 would be anomalous to establish a federal union of 
 nations with the purpose of preserving the peace of 
 the world, and yet grant to that international govern- 
 ment the power to acquire territory, thus inviting the 
 control of it by the very passions and temptations, an 
 escape from which is the reason for its establish- 
 ment. 
 
 Yet this government must be given the power to 
 declare and wage war if necessary with nations not 
 members of the union ; and this cannot be accomplished 
 
i 5 8 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 without invading and occupying, temporarily at least, 
 the territory of the enemy. Sometimes also the funda- 
 mental cause of the war may lie in the fact that terri- 
 tory thus occupied has been in the possession of the 
 wrong nation from the racial, political, geographical, 
 or religious point of view, so that to insure future 
 peace it may become necessary to unite the conquered 
 territory to some other nation better fitted in these re- 
 spects to govern it; or it may be found advisable to es- 
 tablish it as an independent State. 
 
 But whether such occupied territory be returned 
 after the war to the nation from which it has been 
 taken, or be surrendered to one or more of the com- 
 ponent nations or to a nation not a member of the 
 union, or be raised to the dignity of an independent 
 State, in no event ought the principle to be admitted 
 that the international government itself shall retain 
 control of the territory. 
 
 Moreover, the possibility of the surrender of such 
 conquered territory to one or more of the component 
 nations after a war, unless carefully safeguarded, might 
 itself tend to encourage war in two ways : either, first, 
 by inciting some of the component nations to try to 
 involve the international government in war, with the 
 hope that they themselves may ultimately obtain some 
 of the conquered territory; or, second, by arousing 
 jealousies and suspicions among the component nations 
 in the division of the spoils. 
 
 It is possible to avoid both of these dangers by pro- 
 viding that in all cases the conquered territory shall 
 
LIMITED CITIZENSHIP 159 
 
 be restored to the nation from which it has during the 
 war been taken, unless a certain large majority of the 
 nations, as represented in each house of the Congress, 
 shall agree in assigning it to one or more of themselves, 
 or to a nation not a member of the union, or in erect- 
 ing it into an independent State. It may be safely 
 assumed that should three-fourths of the Congress (the 
 majority needed to amend the constitution) be re- 
 quired to agree upon one of these destinations, the 
 temptation would be lacking to particular nations to 
 bring on war for the possession of such territory, and 
 should the allotment thereof to a component nation be- 
 come an accomplished fact, it would then leave behind 
 it no serious sting of distrust or jealousy. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 " CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS " 
 
 In dealing with the powers to be granted to the in- 
 ternational congress, the power to make rules touch- 
 ing naturalization was considered, and the conclusion 
 reached that the power ought to be denied because 
 theoretically and practically it would be unwise to 
 recognize the existence of such a legal status as that 
 of a " citizenship of the United Nations." It is un- 
 necessary to repeat that discussion. 
 
 Indeed, so far should the constitution be from recog- 
 nizing such a status that it ought expressly to disclaim 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. i. 
 
160 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 the existence of it, except in the case of persons born or 
 permanently resident in the seat of government. 1 
 
 IV 
 " TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS " 
 
 A corollary of the proposition just presented, that 
 there is no such general legal conception as that of 
 " citizenship of the United Nations," is that there 
 could be no such general crime as " treason against the 
 United Nations," for treason is peculiarly a crime 
 growing out of and connected with the relation of citi- 
 zenship. 
 
 No citizen of a component nation would owe alle- 
 giance to the government of the United Nations except 
 by and through the adhesion of his nation to that gov- 
 ernment which becomes part of his national govern- 
 ment by virtue of that adhesion. His levying of war 
 against the international government, or his attempt 
 to subvert it, would be treason against his national 
 government and punishable by it. 2 
 
 V 
 
 POWER OF TAXATION 
 
 It will be remembered that the first power granted 
 to the international congress in our proposed constitu- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 2. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 3. 
 
TAXING POWER LIMITED 161 
 
 tion is that of laying and collecting taxes upon land 
 for purposes of revenue. 1 
 
 In our examination of that grant of power, it was 
 pointed out that the extension of the taxing power to 
 the laying of duties on imports or exports, or upon 
 business, trade or occupations of any kind, would 
 place a most dangerous power in the hands of the in- 
 ternational government, in case a majority of the com- 
 ponent nations were disposed to use it to the injury of 
 a minority; a power, the exercise of which might 
 cause suspicion and ill feeling between the nations 
 instead of the confidence and good will it is desirable 
 to cultivate. There is no easier way to enact prefer- 
 ential legislation in favor of particular classes or sec- 
 tions than through the exercise of the taxing power, 
 especially through tariff and excise laws. 
 
 The express grant to the Congress of the power to 
 tax land, accompanied by silence with respect to other 
 forms of taxation, in the case of a government of 
 enumerated powers like the one we are considering, 
 might very possibly carry a sufficient implication that 
 other forms of taxation are inadmissible. But in a 
 matter of such first rate importance, it would be impru- 
 dent to leave the question to be determined by implica- 
 tions. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. i. 
 3 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 4. 
 
1 62 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 VI 
 APPROPRIATIONS OF PUBLIC MONEY 
 
 The next of these political limitations upon the 
 powers of the international government, suggested by 
 considerations of ordinary business and governmental 
 precaution, is to the effect that no money be drawn from 
 the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made 
 by law; and that statements of all public receipts and 
 expenditures be published from time to time. 1 
 
 VII 
 
 PURPOSES OF APPROPRIATIONS BOUNTIES AND 
 PENSIONS 
 
 In dealing with the purposes for which the inter- 
 national congress should be permitted to raise revenue 
 by taxation upon land, the conclusion was reached that 
 the constitution ought clearly to provide that it be con- 
 fined to those purposes for which the union is to be 
 formed. 
 
 The same principle, of course, should apply to the 
 appropriations of the public money after it has been 
 raised by taxation; and it is so provided in the clause 
 of our tentative constitution referred to below. 2 
 
 Allusion has already been made to the necessity of 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 5. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 6. 
 
LIMITED CONTROL OP COMMERCE 163 
 
 depriving the Congress of the power unduly to dis- 
 criminate for or against the trade and occupations of 
 particular nations through tariff or excise legislation. 
 But this would be of little use, if the Congress be al- 
 lowed to reverse the process, and by bounty legislation 
 encourage unduly the trade of particular nations. It 
 is as necessary to prohibit the Congress to legislate for 
 or against trade in this form as under the guise of tax- 
 ation. 
 
 But there is one sort of bounty legislation not sub- 
 ject to these objections, namely, laws providing for 
 pensions to superannuated or disabled public servants, 
 civil and military. The power to legislate on this sub- 
 ject should be left to the discretion of the Congress. 1 
 / 
 
 VIII 
 
 COMMERCIAL PREFERENCES AS BETWEEN THE 
 COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 It has before been pointed out that in order to ac- 
 complish the end aimed at by our international com- 
 pact, the preservation of peace between the compo- 
 nent nations, it is essential that the power to regu- 
 late international commerce be granted to the federal 
 government, and accordingly this is one of the powers 
 granted to the Congress in our constitution. 
 
 But instead of preserving peace, it would hasten war 
 between the nations if it were possible for a combina- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 6. 
 
1 64 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 tion of them, by obtaining control in both houses of 
 the Congress, to use that power for the purpose of dis- 
 criminating in commercial regulations in favor of their 
 own trade and against that of the minority. It is as 
 necessary to the peace of the nations to guard against 
 such preferential legislation as it is, in the first in- 
 stance, to grant to the Congress the power to regulate 
 such commerce. 
 
 The most usual instrumentalities for the accomplish- 
 ment of this sort of preferential legislation are the gov- 
 ernmental powers to impose taxes, especially import 
 and excise duties, and to grant bounties. These pow- 
 ers, as we have just seen, have been denied absolutely 
 to the international government by our proposed con- 
 stitution. 
 
 It remains to impose such direct limitations upon 
 the power to regulate international commerce as may 
 in like manner prevent serious discriminations for or 
 against particular nations by means of the exercise of 
 it. With the powers to tax trade and grant bounties 
 eliminated, it would seem that the principal other meth- 
 ods whereby the international government might effect 
 discriminations of this sort would be by means of 
 regulations giving preferences to the ports or trading 
 centers, to the ships or other vehicles of commerce, to 
 the navigable waters or other highways of commerce, 
 or to the persons engaged in international commerce, be- 
 longing to one nation over those belonging to another. 
 
 For example, by harbor, pilotage, or lighthouse 
 regulations it might be possible to discriminate in favor 
 
NO TITLES OF NOBILITY 165 
 
 of or against the ports and trading centers of a particu- 
 lar nation; by clearance regulations, by laws regulating 
 the wages or qualifications of seamen engaged in in- 
 ternational commerce, or by laws regulating the con- 
 struction or equipment of ships or railroad cars, real 
 advantages or disadvantages may be created with re- 
 spect to the trade of particular nations; and the same 
 result might be accomplished by the appropriations of 
 money for the deepening of the navigable waters or 
 improvement of commercial routes in one or a few 
 countries, while denying such advantages to others. 
 
 Of course absolute equality in the operation of com- 
 mercial regulations is not to be expected, and the mere 
 fact that a law does not operate everywhere with en- 
 tire equality and uniformity is no reason for declaring 
 it preferential. 
 
 But this is not to say that a regulation of commerce, 
 the very design and purpose of which is to create pref- 
 erences, may be justly supported as constitutional; and 
 glaring inequalities and lack of uniformity in its opera- 
 tion may well be taken as indications that the law is 
 designed to be a preferential regulation. 1 
 
 IX 
 
 TITLES OF NOBILITY AND PRIVILEGED ORDERS 
 
 In view of the fact that our proposed government 
 is one of enumerated powers, among which has not 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 7. 
 
1 66 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 been included the power to grant titles of nobility or 
 establish privileged orders, it might perhaps be re- 
 garded as unnecessary expressly to negative the exist- 
 ence of such a power. 
 
 That the power ought not to be granted to the in- 
 ternational government is very evident. Not only 
 would it be of no assistance in furthering the purpose 
 of the union, the prevention of war between the 
 component nations, but it would have the opposite 
 tendency of exciting discord and jealousies amongst 
 them. Indeed, the existence of such a power might of 
 itself suffice to prevent some republics from joining 
 the union. It might even have a like effect upon some 
 monarchies which might fear the establishment of or- 
 ders superior to their own. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that the proposed gov- 
 ernment, while some of its component States would be 
 monarchies, would yet itself be in essence republican 
 in form, a republic of nations, so that the creation of 
 such orders would be inconsistent as well as inappro- 
 priate. 
 
 It would appear the safer course not to trust to the 
 presumption, arising from the absence of a grant, that 
 the power does not exist, but expressly to deny its ex- 
 istence. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 8. 
 
TITLES OF OTHER STATES 167 
 X 
 
 GRANTS OF TITLES OR EMOLUMENTS BY OTHER 
 STATES 
 
 Another precautionary limitation upon the powers 
 of the officials of the international government, upon 
 which comment seems needless, appears in our pro- 
 posed constitution in the following form : 
 
 " No person, while holding any office of profit 
 or trust under the United Nations, shall, without 
 the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
 emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever 
 from any king, ruler, or State." 1 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. i, cl. 9. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE 
 UNITED NATIONS (II) GUARANTEES 
 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE INDI- 
 VIDUAL 
 
 I 
 
 PROMPT DISCHARGE FROM ILLEGAL IMPRISONMENT 
 
 The Constitution of the United States declares that 
 
 " The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
 shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of re- 
 bellion or invasion the public safety may require 
 it." 
 
 The writ of habeas corpus is a technical remedy for 
 the violation of the constitutional right of the indi- 
 vidual to personal liberty, and is well known to the 
 English and American law. It is a proceeding whereby 
 a person confined may have an immediate judicial in- 
 quiry into the legality of his imprisonment, and if it 
 be found illegal, he is entitled to an order of the court 
 that he be at once released. Upon this writ there can 
 usually be no investigation of the justice of the im- 
 prisonment, that is, of the prisoner's guilt or innocence 
 
 168 
 
GUARANTEES CIVIL RIGHTS 169 
 
 of the offense charged, but only of the legality of the 
 confinement. 
 
 This right is recognized also in other than English- 
 speaking nations, but not under the technical designa- 
 tion of the right to a habeas corpus, and in some coun- 
 tries it is not recognized at all. 
 
 Not even the last mentioned nations, however, could 
 have any just ground of objection to our proposed con- 
 stitution, should it contain a clause guaranteeing this 
 right to its citizens as against illegal arrests made by 
 the government of the United Nations. The clause 
 would in no way operate to limit the powers of any 
 national government. 
 
 But the non-existence of such a right in some t coun- 
 tries and the designation of it by different names in 
 others, demands that the privilege be defined in the 
 international constitution as well as secured thereby. 1 
 
 In defining it, our constitution would limit its appli- 
 cation to illegal imprisonments occuring under or by 
 authority of the international government, real, or pre- 
 tended, or contrary to the international laws or treaties, 
 or because of the alleged exercise of a right or omis- 
 sion of a duty claimed to exist under the constitution, 
 laws, or treaties of the United Nations, or contrary to 
 the Law of Nations. It is not to be extended to illegal 
 imprisonments of other sorts. 
 
 Having defined the right, it may be secured in much 
 the same words as those of the American Constitution. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. i. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. i. 
 
170 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 II 
 
 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
 It is needless to argue the importance of a clause 
 limiting the power of the international government to 
 infringe in any way the religious liberty of the individ- 
 ual. 
 
 In this, as in many of these guarantees, the proposed 
 constitution has followed in the main the language of 
 the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of the 
 United States, which in a period of more than a cen- 
 tury have proved entirely effectual to safeguard these 
 rights against governmental invasion. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS 
 
 The nations differ widely in their conceptions of the 
 extent to which freedom of speech, oral or written, 
 may justly be accorded to individuals. In some coun- 
 tries the censorship of writings, in advance of publica- 
 tion, is a recognized, right of the government, and the 
 publication of matter reflecting upon the rulers may 
 be punished as Use majeste. In others, as in England 
 and the United States, except in times of war, censor- 
 ship in advance of publication is unknown; criticism 
 of officials or candidates for office, if bona fide and 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 2. 
 
GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF SPEECH 171 
 
 not malicious, are privileged communications and go 
 unpunished, even though untrue; and the speaker, 
 writer, or publisher is in no case punishable otherwise 
 than under the common law. 
 
 Hence, should our proposed constitution merely pro- 
 hibit any law abridging freedom of speech and of the 
 press, the question would at once present itself as to 
 what is meant by these phrases. They would mean 
 one thing in one country and a different thing else- 
 where. It is necessary therefore to define them. 
 
 One mode of defining them would be to adopt arbi- 
 trarily the legal principles, prevalent in a single country 
 touching the subject, and use those as the standard 
 of freedom in these respects. But if a low standard 
 were adopted this would certainly be unsatisfactory in 
 those countries possessing higher standards of such 
 freedom; and if a high standard were adopted, it would 
 be likely to cause trouble in those countries wherein 
 lower standards are enforced. 
 
 Perhaps at once the most natural and the most satis- 
 factory standard of freedom of speech for the inter- 
 national constitution is to be found in accepting for 
 each separate nation the standard it recognizes in its 
 own dealings with its citizens. 
 
 Hence, the limitation, as it appears in our pro- 
 posed constitution, is in effect that no law shall be 
 passed by the Congress abridging freedom of speech 
 or of the press in any of the component States to a 
 greater extent than as the laws of each State permit. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2. cl. 3. 
 
172 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 IV 
 
 RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION 
 
 Two civil rights that ought to be protected from in- 
 fringement by the international government, what- 
 ever the view any particular national government may 
 take of them, are the rights of the people, first, peace- 
 ably to assemble for any lawful purpose, whether re- 
 ligious, charitable, educational, social, or political, pro- 
 vided only that the assembly be peaceable and not dis- 
 orderly or calculated to excite disorders, and, second, 
 to petition the international government in a proper 
 and respectful manner for a redress of such grievances 
 as they may have experienced. 
 
 The exercise of these rights should forever be placed 
 beyond the power of the international government to 
 prohibit or punish. 1 
 
 V 
 THE KEEPING AND BEARING OF ARMS 
 
 While, under the plan proposed, the war powers are 
 to be conferred upon the international government, it 
 is also proposed that the component States shall retain 
 a certain proportion of regular armed forces, and in 
 addition such militia as they may severally see fit to 
 employ. On this account, if on no other, it would be 
 proper to insert in our constitution a limitation upon 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 4. 
 
QUARTERING OF SOLDIERS 173 
 
 the power of the international government to prohibit 
 the keeping and bearing of military arms. 
 
 But the limitation is as important when applied to 
 the people generally as when applied to the armed 
 forces and militia. While the international constitu- 
 tion must not attempt to control the component na- 
 tions in their respective attitudes to their own people 
 in this matter, it ought carefully to provide that the 
 international government at least be permitted to take 
 no step which would deprive the people of any State 
 of such rights as their State may give them to keep and 
 carry arms, learn the use of them, and be prepared to 
 employ them when necessary to defend their liberties 
 against unjust attacks. 
 
 The component States and their people, in entering 
 the international union and surrendering in large meas- 
 ure their own war powers, would do so to preserve an 
 honorable peace, not to become the helpless and sub- 
 servient victims of the agency they have created. 1 
 
 VI 
 
 QUARTERING OF SOLDIERS ON THE PEOPLE 
 
 Past experience has taught that governments may 
 sorely oppress their people through an unequal dis- 
 tribution of governmental burdens, whether in the 
 form of taxation, of laws lacking uniformity, or other- 
 wise. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 5. 
 
174 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 One way in which this has sometimes been done is 
 by quartering soldiers upon the homes of the people, 
 thus not only imposing unequal burdens, but very se- 
 riously impairing and interfering with the privacy and 
 freedom of the home. 
 
 In times of peace the international government 
 ought to be prohibited to do this altogether, and in time 
 of war except in the mode prescribed by law. 1 
 
 VII 
 
 JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES 
 
 The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States declares that 
 
 " In suits at common law where the value in 
 controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
 of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact 
 tried by a jury shall be otherwise examined in any 
 court of the United States than according to the 
 rules of the common law." 
 
 This suggests the question whether a similar provi- 
 sion ought to be contained in the proposed international 
 constitution. 
 
 The jury system, while adopted from the English 
 common law into the jurisprudence of many of the most 
 advanced nations for service in criminal cases, has not 
 been widely adopted as it applies to civil suits. This 
 fact is some evidence at least that the jury system, as 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 6. 
 
GUARANTEES EMINENT DOMAIN 175 
 
 applied in civil cases in England and America, is not 
 suited to the needs or habits of many of the other na- 
 tions. Nor indeed does it go entirely unchallenged in 
 America itself, for there is a growing sentiment among 
 American lawyers and jurists that in civil cases conclu- 
 sions as to disputed facts are more satisfactory when 
 reached by the judge than by the jury. 
 
 These considerations point to the total exclusion of 
 this clause from the list of limitations upon the powers 
 of the international government, leaving the Congress 
 free to adopt such system as it may deem best for the 
 determination of facts in civil cases litigated in the 
 international courts. 
 
 VIII 
 POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
 
 It is universally recognized that every man holds his 
 property subject to the public needs of the State, which 
 has the power to demand it of him for the public use 
 and benefit. 
 
 But to require him to surrender it for the public use 
 would be to impose upon him an unequal burden, unless 
 it were equalized by paying him a just compensation 
 for his loss out of the proceeds of taxes levied ratably 
 upon all members of the community. And to take the 
 property of one for the mere private use of another 
 cannot be justified upon any sound principle. It would 
 be mere confiscation, a taking of his property " with- 
 out due process of law," 
 
176 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The American Constitution has recognized this prin- 
 ciple, and has imposed a limitation upon the powers of 
 the federal government by a provision that 
 
 " private property shall not be taken for public 
 use without just compensation." 
 
 In the United States this has been construed to 
 mean that the owner of property which has been 
 physically and corporeally taken or invaded by the 
 government for the public use must be adequately com- 
 pensated; but it does not apply to those mere inci- 
 dental damages to property rights that result from 
 the progress and growth of communities, or from the 
 enactment of legislation restricting business, trades, 
 occupations, or a person's use of his own property, 
 within reasonable limits. These may create restric- 
 tions upon the legitimate uses the owner may make of 
 his own, but they do not take the property from 
 him, and therefore are held not to fall within the 
 requirement that just compensation must be made 
 him. 
 
 Indeed, no general law can well be passed that would 
 not injuriously affect someone in his business or prop- 
 erty rights. For such losses the government ought not 
 to be required to make compensation. Thus, by the 
 enactment of a law reducing the tariff rates upon cer- 
 tain goods or prohibiting the manufacture or sale of 
 intoxicating liquors, the State does not actually take 
 anyone's property from him for public use, and cannot 
 
GUARANTEES DUE PROCESS 177 
 
 be required to pay for the losses incidental to the execu- 
 tion of the new regulations. 
 
 A similar provision, similarly construed, would not 
 come amiss in our tentative constitution. 1 
 
 IX 
 
 DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
 
 It is a principle of justice, written in indelible char- 
 acters upon the human heart, that no man shall be 
 condemned unheard and without a proper and rea- 
 sonable opportunity to defend himself before an ap- 
 propriate impartial tribunal and upon regular and 
 orderly proceedings. Any other procedure is mere an- 
 archy and the execution of the tyrannical and lawless 
 will of the mob, whether or not accomplished under 
 the forms of law. 
 
 This principle is expressed in English and American 
 law by the phrase " due process of law " or " the 
 law of the land," and in other countries is recognized 
 under other names. 
 
 It would be as illegal for government, in any of its 
 departments, legislative, executive, or judicial, to 
 attempt to deprive a person of his rights without " due 
 process of law " as for a mob or a private person to 
 attempt it; and the fact that the attempt is clothed 
 in the attire of a legislative or executive act or a judicial 
 mandate does not make it any the less inherently il- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art IV, Sec. 2, cl. 7. 
 
178 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 legal, if suitable opportunity be not given the victim 
 to defend himself or his property in a regular and or- 
 derly procedure. 
 
 Thus it would be as illegal, under this principle, for 
 the legislature to declare by law that A's property shall 
 be taken from him and given to B for his private use, 
 or that A is a criminal whose life is forfeited, as it 
 would be if these things were done by a mere party of 
 rioters; and the same is true of the judgment of a 
 court wherein the defendant has never appeared or 
 been notified of the existence of the complaint against 
 him, or of a court which has no legal jurisdiction to 
 adjudge the question at issue. If these may be justi- 
 fied, then so may lynch law. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States has aptly 
 and tersely expressed this limitation upon the federal 
 power by providing that no person 
 
 " shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
 without due process of law." 
 
 It should be observed that the term " liberty" as 
 construed in the United States, embraces far more 
 than the mere freedom from physical confinement. It 
 extends also to freedom of contract, freedom of occu- 
 pation and employment, and freedom in the use of all 
 those faculties that contribute to human happiness, con- 
 tent, and comfort. 
 
 And the term " property " applies to vested rights 
 in subjects of ownership, not to mere contingent or 
 expectant rights such as the expectancy a sole child 
 
GUARANTEES EQUAL PROTECTION 179 
 
 may have that he will receive all his father's property 
 at the latter's death. 
 
 In the proposed international constitution, in the ab- 
 sence of a phrase suitable to convey this idea common 
 to all the nations, it would perhaps be unwise to use 
 the technical phrase of the English and American law. 
 It thus becomes necessary, in the place of the term 
 " due process of law," to use language that will de- 
 scribe the principle as tersely as possible. 1 
 
 X 
 
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
 
 The governmental power to pass discriminatory and 
 preferential legislation, as has been indicated in sev- 
 eral connections, is often a source of grievous injustice 
 and oppression whether it be aimed at the component 
 States of a federal union or at the persons subject to 
 the governmental regulations. 
 
 Instances have already appeared in which our pro- 
 posed international constitution has prohibited the fed- 
 eral government to enact legislation that might discrim- 
 inate in favor of or against certain of the component 
 nations. 
 
 It ought equally to be prohibited to use the inter- 
 national power in such manner as to discriminate un- 
 reasonably in favor of or against particular persons 
 or classes. Hence a clause has been inserted in our 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 8. 
 
i8o A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 constitution providing that no person shall be denied 
 by the United Nations " the equal protection of the 
 laws," a phrase which is found in the Fourteenth 
 Amendment to the American Constitution. 
 
 As construed in the United States, this does not mean 
 that governmental action shall be absolutely uniform 
 in its application to all persons. It permits classifi- 
 cations of persons upon reasonable lines, and author- 
 izes the application of different legislation to the dif- 
 ferent classes. But the classifications must not be 
 purely arbitrary or based upon grounds for which no 
 sound reason can be given. Subject to these limita- 
 tions, the classifications may be as minute as the legis- 
 lature may choose to make them. 
 
 When, however, the classifications have once been 
 made, it would be a denial of the equal protection of 
 the laws to single out individuals of the class, and make 
 laws applicable to them which would not apply to other 
 members of the same class who cannot be differentiated 
 from the former upon any line that would justify the 
 difference in the laws applicable to them, respectively. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 8. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE 
 UNITED NATIONS (III) GUARANTEES 
 OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL 
 CASES 
 
 I 
 
 DUE PROCESS OF LAW EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
 THE LAWS 
 
 The two limitations last examined in the preceding 
 chapter apply equally to guarantee one's rights in civil 
 and in criminal cases, and belong as much to this as to 
 the preceding chapter. 
 
 There is no need to repeat the discussion, and they 
 will be passed over. 
 
 II 
 
 BILLS OF ATTAINDER Ex POST FACTO LAWS 
 
 Our model, the American Constitution, provides as 
 a limitation upon the federal powers that 
 
 " no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be 
 passed." 
 
 These two phrases are technical terms of the Eng- 
 lish and American law, and not only demand some ex- 
 
 181 
 
182 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 planation, but also necessitate the use of periphrasis 
 in the wording of the corresponding limitation in our 
 international constitution, since the terms would be un- 
 known in other countries, though the principles them- 
 selves might be recognized. 
 
 A bill of attainder is a legislative (instead of a ju- 
 dicial) adjudication of the criminal guilt of a per- 
 son and a legislative sentence of the person convicted 
 to execution, imprisonment, fine, or other punish- 
 ment. 
 
 An ex post facto law, as defined in America, is a 
 law which makes an act punishable criminally to a 
 greater extent than when committed, or which alters 
 the rules of evidence to the disadvantage of the ac- 
 cused, so as to require less or different evidence to 
 convict him. It applies only to crimes, and not to 
 civil rights, remedies or procedure. 
 
 These two provisions afford very important safe- 
 guards to the personal security of the individual 
 against governmental oppression, and ought not to fail 
 of insertion in the list of limitations upon the powers 
 of the international government. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 GENERAL WARRANTS OF ARREST AND SEARCH 
 
 Still another limitation imposed by the Constitution 
 of the United States upon the federal power is found 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. i. 
 
GUARANTEES GENERAL WARRANTS 183 
 
 in the Fourth Amendment to that instrument, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 :t The right of the people to be secure in their 
 persons, houses, papers, and effects against un- 
 reasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio- 
 lated, and no warrants shall issue but upon prob- 
 able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
 particularly describing the place to be searched 
 and the persons or things to be seized." 
 
 Thus has been imbedded in the fundamental law 
 of the United States that great principle of liberty ex- 
 pressed in the phrase, " One's house is one's castle," 
 and which Lord Chatham so eloquently proclaimed in 
 his speech on General Warrants, in the famous pas- 
 sage : 
 
 ' The poorest man may in his cottage bid de- 
 fiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be 
 frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
 through it; the storm may enter; the rain may 
 enter. But the king of England may not enter. 
 All his force dares not cross the threshold of the 
 ruined tenement." 
 
 Whatever the domestic laws of the several States 
 with respect to such matters, no nation in joining the 
 proposed union could have other than a feeling of relief 
 that the international government would be prohibited 
 to exercise such arbitrary powers within its borders. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. 
 
1 84 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 IV 
 DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
 Another limitation upon the powers of the federal 
 government of the United States is found in the con- 
 stitutional provision that no person shall 
 
 " be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
 in jeopardy of life or limb." 
 
 This is the English and American legal expression 
 of a principle of justice that probably prevails in one 
 form or another in every civilized country, that is, that 
 an accused person, having once been tried for an of- 
 fense and either acquitted, or convicted and punished, 
 shall not be subject to another trial for that particular 
 offense. 
 
 This is a principle which should certainly be applied 
 in all prosecutions by the international government for 
 violations of its laws. 
 
 But in its technical application in the United States, 
 the rule has sometimes been carried further than strict 
 justice demands; for it is held that a person has been 
 in jeopardy as soon as his trial commences, that is, as 
 soon as the jury has been sworn and charged with his 
 deliverance, and that therefore the right to try him 
 again ceases, however guilty he may be, whether a ver- 
 dict is reached or not, unless the trial is terminated by 
 some inevitable necessity, such as the illness or death 
 of the judge or a juror, or a divided jury, or unless 
 
GUARANTEES SELF-INCRIMINATION 1 85 
 
 the prisoner himself asks or consents that he be placed 
 again on trial (as he might do if he were convicted and 
 desires a new trial). 
 
 Some of these technicalities and refinements would 
 perhaps be unknown in other countries, nor do they 
 appear specially called for by the general principles 
 of justice. 
 
 It would therefore seem preferable to depart in 
 this respect from the precise language of the American 
 Constitution, while yet recognizing the principle. 1 
 
 V 
 
 SELF-INCRIMINATION 
 
 That no one should be required to give evidence that 
 would tend to convict him of a criminal offense has 
 .long been a deep-rooted principle of English and Amer- 
 ican law; but in its completeness at least, it can hardly 
 be said to prevail generally or even usually in other 
 systems of law. 
 
 The question then is presented whether this should 
 be included as one of the limitations upon the powers 
 of the international government for the protection of 
 the individual. 
 
 The insertion of it would probably be strongly urged 
 by the English-speaking nations, whose people are ac- 
 customed to regard it as a fundamental personal right; 
 and no other nation would be likely to object seriously 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 3. 
 
1 86 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 to its insertion, since the prohibition would decrease 
 the chances of the oppression of its own citizens by the 
 international government. 1 
 
 VI 
 THE GRAND JURY 
 
 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States declares that 
 
 " No person shall be held to answer for a capi- 
 tal or otherwise infamous crime unless upon a pre- 
 sentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in 
 cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
 militia when in actual service in time of war or 
 public danger." 
 
 The institution of the grand jury, the function of 
 which is not to try the guilt of the accused but only to 
 determine whether the evidence against him is suffi- 
 cient to justify his trial, is well known in England and 
 the United States; but it is unknown in most of the 
 countries of the world, in many of which other methods 
 just as efficient are used to prevent frivolous or mali- 
 cious accusations of crime. 
 
 It would seem prudent therefore to leave this mat- 
 ter to the discretion of the Congress. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 3. 
 
GUARANTEES JURY TRIAL 187 
 VII 
 
 SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to comment upon the impor- 
 tance of a constitutional guarantee of a speedy and 
 public trial to one accused of crime. 
 
 In the absence of such guarantee, not only may an 
 accused person be left to languish indefinitely in prison 
 awaiting a trial that does not come, and thus in effect 
 be punished for an alleged crime without a trial, but 
 he might be tried secretly and convicted by an inimical 
 or corrupt tribunal, regardless of the evidence of his 
 innocence or by a procedure which, if public, would not 
 be tolerated by general opinion. 1 
 
 VIII 
 
 JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti- 
 tution provides that in criminal cases the trial shall 
 be 
 
 " by an impartial jury of the State and district 
 wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
 which district shall have been previously ascer- 
 tained by law." 
 
 This clause is construed as demanding, in all crim- 
 inal prosecutions instituted by the United States, that 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 4. 
 
1 88 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 the guilt or innocence of the prisoner shall be deter- 
 mined, in accordance with the principles of the English 
 common law, by an impartial jury of twelve men 
 (neither more nor less), whose unanimous verdict, 
 after hearing the legal evidence adduced, shall be neces- 
 sary to convict or acquit. If any juror dissents from 
 the verdict of his fellows, there is a mistrial, and the 
 prisoner may be tried again by another jury; but if all 
 the jurors agree that he is innocent or that no sufficient 
 evidence of his guilt has been adduced, the verdict is 
 " not guilty," and he cannot be again tried for that 
 offense. 
 
 The jury system in criminal cases, at one time con- 
 fined to English-speaking nations, has now been 
 adopted with more or less modification in many of the 
 European countries and elsewhere, and may be said 
 to have fully proved its usefulness in those cases. 
 
 From the standpoint of a constitutional protection to 
 the accused, its advantage lies in the fact that it tempers 
 the severity of the abstract law and the possible malice 
 of prosecutors and government officials with the public 
 opinion of the community as represented by the jury. 
 
 It is not essential, however, for these results that 
 the jury should, as in England and in the United States, 
 consist of twelve men, or that they should be unanimous 
 in their verdict. 
 
 While it would seem wise to insert in the proposed 
 constitution a requirement of trial by jury in criminal 
 cases prosecuted before the international courts, such 
 matters as the number of the jurors and the majority 
 
OTHER GUARANTEES 189 
 
 necessary to find a verdict might well be left to the dis- 
 cretion of the Congress. 1 
 
 IX 
 OTHER GUARANTEES IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
 Every sentiment of justice and fairness demands that 
 an accused person should be informed of the nature 
 and cause of the accusation against him; that he be 
 confronted with his accusers and the witnesses against 
 him, with the right to cross-examine them and elicit the 
 truth; that for the purposes of his defense he be placed 
 upon an equal plane with his powerful antagonist, the 
 government, and be given the right to obtain the com- 
 pulsory attendance of witnesses in his favor; that he be 
 not denied the aid and comfort of legal counsel in 
 his defense; and that he be allowed his freedom while 
 awaiting trial for a crime not too serious, upon 
 giving bail or proper security that he will appear to 
 answer the charge at the time and place appointed 
 for the trial. 
 
 As in the other cases heretofore considered, no na- 
 tion would be likely to object to the imposition of these 
 limitations upon the international government, since 
 they would all constitute valuable safeguards of life 
 and liberty to its own citizens against possible tyran- 
 nical encroachments of the federal government. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N.,. Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 4. 
 3 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 5. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE 
 COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 I 
 
 GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF A NON-POLITICAL NATURE 
 
 As preliminary to an examination of the limitations 
 which must be imposed upon the powers of the com- 
 ponent nations in order to the success of an interna- 
 tional union, it is proper to observe that, in a looser 
 confederation of the kind here proposed, the fewer 
 these limitations are, consistent with a suitable degree 
 of power in the international government, the safer the 
 constituent nations and the greater the probability 
 that they may assent to the experiment. The burden 
 then is on him who maintains the necessity of a par- 
 ticular limitation of this sort to show that the success 
 of the union would be jeopardized by the failure of the 
 component States to surrender all right to exercise the 
 given power. This should be the one and only test of 
 the propriety of the limitation. 
 
 The reader must also remember that a mere grant 
 of power to the international government does not 
 
 190 
 
LIMITATIONS ON COMPONENT STATES 191 
 
 necessarily imply the exclusion of the component States 
 from the exercise of the same power. In order that 
 the States be thus excluded, it is necessary either that 
 they be actually prohibited by the compact to exercise 
 it, or else that the international government shall have 
 been granted the power and shall have already occu- 
 pied the field, so that an exercise of the same power 
 by the several States would be inconsistent with the 
 superior right of the international government to regu- 
 late the matter. 
 
 Our model, the Constitution of the United States, 
 contains a considerable number of limitations upon 
 the powers of the States, only some of which, however, 
 were imposed by the framers of the original Consti- 
 tution. These are set forth in the tenth section of the 
 first Article of that instrument. They were augmented 
 by certain others to be found in the Thirteenth, Four- 
 teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments passed as a con- 
 sequence of the great conflict of 1861 between the 
 States. 
 
 Some of the limitations thus imposed upon the 
 State powers relate to the internal and domestic insti- 
 tutions, policies, and affairs of the States, or their rela- 
 tions to their own citizens as well as to other persons, 
 tending in their operation to consolidate the States 
 and their people into a single nation, but having little 
 or no bearing upon that other great purpose of a fed- 
 eral union, and the chief purpose of the union we are 
 considering, the elimination of war between the com- 
 ponent nations. To the extent that they do not aid 
 
192 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 this chief design of our international compact, they 
 ought to be eliminated from the discussion. 
 
 Thus the Thirteenth Amendment abolishes slavery 
 within the United States and all places subject to their 
 jurisdiction. It is obvious that this provision deals 
 with an institution of an internal or domestic charac- 
 ter which, while now obsolete in the most progressive 
 countries, still prevails in one form or another in some 
 countries less advanced. And though the majority of 
 the nations would doubtless welcome the abolition of 
 such institutions throughout the world, it must be 
 remembered that this is one of those internal reforms 
 that of itself has no bearing upon war or peace, 
 and hence should theoretically have no place among 
 the powers to be surrendered by the component 
 nations. 
 
 But with respect to the slave trade, so far as it 
 might be carried on between the component nations a 
 different result would follow because of the grant to 
 the Congress of the power to regulate international 
 commerce. True, the Congress is forbidden under this 
 clause to meddle with " immigration, emigration, or the 
 migration of citizens of a component State from one 
 such State to another." Slaves, however, would not 
 be citizens of a State, though resident therein, but, as 
 mere articles of merchandise, would fall within the 
 power of the Congress to control international com- 
 merce. That body therefore might constitutionally en- 
 act laws making international traffic in slaves illegal 
 as between the component nations or as between them 
 
LIMITATIONS ON COMPONENT STATES 193 
 
 and nations not members of the union. Such laws, how- 
 ever, could not properly be extended into the borders 
 of a component State, and made to apply either to 
 the domestic institution of slavery or peonage existing 
 there or to the domestic traffic in slaves. Such matters 
 must be left, as they now are, subject to the exclusive 
 control of the several States. 
 
 The success of an international union such as we are 
 considering will depend upon the absolute observance 
 of the principle that the proposed government shall 
 possess no power to interfere in the local and domestic 
 concerns of any nation except to the extent necessary 
 to prevent war (or possibly in those cases wherein 
 the general convenience of all nations would be greatly 
 subserved by the exercise of a central authority, as per- 
 haps in case of international coinage, currency, copy- 
 right, etc.). 
 
 Again, some of the limitations imposed upon the 
 States by the American Constitution have for their 
 object the protection of individuals against the pos- 
 sibility of aggression by the States. This is true 
 even of a few of the limitations contained in the 
 original Constitution, and is eminently true of those 
 contained in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- 
 ments. 
 
 Thus in Article I, Sec. 10, cl. i, the original Consti- 
 tution provides that no State 
 
 " shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto 
 law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, 
 or grant any title of nobility." 
 
194 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The Fourteenth Amendment declares that 
 
 " All persons born or naturalized in the United 
 States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are 
 citizens of the United States and of the State 
 wherein they reside. 
 
 " No State shall make or enforce any law that 
 shall abridge the privileges or immunities of a 
 citizen of the United States; nor shall any State 
 deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
 without due process of law; nor deny to any per- 
 son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
 the laws." 
 
 And the Fifteenth Amendment provides that 
 
 " The right of citizens of the United States to 
 vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
 States or by any State on account of race, color, 
 or previous condition of servitude." 
 
 With respect to all these limitations upon the powers 
 of the States, the general observation may be made 
 that they are not imposed upon those broad political 
 powers (the exercise of which by the States might 
 imperil the union's existence or interfere with its proper 
 functions) such as the power to make treaties or 
 to levy duties on imports or to declare war. They 
 constitute limitations upon the power of the States 
 to deal with individuals within their boundaries which, 
 however essential in a constitution, one of the prime 
 purposes of which is to create of the composite States 
 a single nation would be inappropriate in a constitu- 
 tion creating a looser confederation between independ- 
 
LIMITATIONS ON COMPONENT STATES 195 
 
 ent nations, the main design of which is the suppression 
 of wars between them. 
 
 It may also be remarked that the experience of the 
 United States proves that certain of these clauses, 
 notably those prohibiting the States to pass laws im- 
 pairing the obligation of contracts, to deprive any per- 
 son of life, liberty, or property without due process 
 of law, or to deny to any person within their jurisdic- 
 tion the equal protection of the laws, have furnished 
 perhaps more grounds of litigation in the federal courts 
 than any other clauses in the constitution; and have 
 thus afforded greater opportunities to the federal au- 
 thorities to interfere in the domestic affairs of the sev- 
 eral States, and to expand the power and influence 
 of the federal government at the expense of the sov- 
 ereignty and reserved powers of the States. It is open 
 to doubt whether a strong tendency in this direction is 
 desirable even in the United States; it is very certain 
 that it would be disastrous in the international federa- 
 tion. 
 
 All of these constitute reasons why these limitations 
 upon the powers of the component nations should be 
 omitted from our compact, and the several nations be 
 left free as at present to deal with their own citizens 
 within their borders as their own constitutions, laws 
 and customs shall dictate. But it by no means follows 
 that such limitations as we are discussing should not be 
 imposed upon them with respect to their treatment of 
 the citizens of other States. 
 
 On the contrary, when it is remembered that each 
 
196 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 component nation will have surrendered its rights to 
 use force against its sister nations, it is no more than 
 fair and just, and indeed it would be necessary, that 
 each nation in return should have a guarantee through 
 the international constitution, to be enforced by the 
 courts both national and international, that its citizens 
 when in other States shall be treated with proper con- 
 sideration; that their lives and liberty shall not be en- 
 dangered by bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, or 
 taken from them without due process of law; and that 
 their property rights shall not be taken without like 
 process, or by the enactment of laws impairing the ob- 
 ligation of contracts and the like. 
 
 This point, however, belongs more appropriately 
 under another head, and will be examined again when 
 we come to consider the relations of the component na- 
 tions to each other in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 II 
 
 POLITICAL POWERS HAVING No BEARING ON WAR 
 
 In the previous investigation of the powers to be 
 granted to the international congress, the conclusion 
 was tentatively reached that possibly international con- 
 venience would be so greatly subserved by a grant to 
 the Congress of the powers to coin money, issue cur- 
 rency, regulate copyrights and patent rights of an 
 international character, and fix standards of weights 
 and measures for purposes of international trade, as 
 
TREATIES BY COMPONENT STATES 197 
 
 to demand their inclusion amongst the powers granted, 
 despite the fact that it would constitute a departure 
 from the principle that only such powers ought to be 
 granted as would aid in the suppression of war be- 
 tween the component nations. 
 
 It is now to be observed that even should these pow- 
 ers, or some of them, be granted to the Congress, this 
 would not involve the necessity of the surrender by the 
 nations of the concurrent powers to control and regu- 
 late them, provided their regulations be not incon- 
 sistent with those made by the Congress. It would seem 
 eminently unwise to impose a total prohibition upon the 
 States to exercise these powers. 
 
 Ill 
 
 TREATIES, ALLIANCES, AND CONFEDERATIONS 
 
 We next turn to those powers, essentially of a po- 
 litical character, the exercise of which by the compo- 
 nent nations would jeopardize the existence or func- 
 tions of the international government. Here again 
 the subject may be best developed by reference to the 
 limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United 
 States upon the exercise of such political powers by 
 the American States. 
 
 With respect to the treaty-making power the Ameri- 
 can Constitution provides that 
 
 " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
 or confederation." 
 
198 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 That the word " treaty," as here used, means treaty 
 of a political character is shown by the further provi- 
 sion that 
 
 " No State shall, without the consent of Con- 
 gress, enter into any agreement or compact with 
 another State or with a foreign power." 
 
 It thus appears that a State is absolutely prohibited 
 to enter into any " treaty, alliance, or confederation," 
 with or without the consent of Congress, while it is 
 permitted, with such consent, to enter into " agreements 
 and compacts " other than those just mentioned. 
 
 It is not difficult to discern the purpose of these limi- 
 tations. The Constitution had elsewhere bestowed the 
 entire treaty-making power upon the federal govern- 
 ment, as representing with respect to foreign relations 
 a single nation. Had the States been permitted to 
 make treaties with foreign countries, great embarrass- 
 ments might result to the federal and State govern- 
 ments alike, whose treaty obligations might conflict. 
 And should these State treaties take the form of al- 
 liances or confederations with foreign countries, the 
 conflict of duties might be even sharper and graver. 
 
 On the other hand, since it was the aim of the Con- 
 stitution to grant to the United States the general con- 
 trol of interstate relations, the making of treaties, 
 alliances, or confederations between the several States 
 would be ineffectual, save as instrumentalities of dis- 
 union; and if, by reason of omissions in the Constitu- 
 tion, a question should arise between the States or with 
 
TREATIES BY COMPONENT STATES 199 
 
 foreign countries for the settlement of which some 
 agreement between them might become necessary, this 
 was provided for by the recognition of their power 
 to enter into such agreement with the consent of Con- 
 gress. There have not been many instances, however, 
 wherein there has been need to invoke the power, 
 agreements for the settlement of boundary disputes 
 between the States constituting the most important ex- 
 amples. 
 
 In considering whether such a limitation ought to be 
 inserted in our international constitution and, if so, 
 the scope of it, we must remember that the conditions 
 are not the same that confronted the American States 
 when they established their Constitution. 
 
 They proposed to create to a certain extent a new 
 nation amongst nations, whereas it is proposed here 
 merely to create a political corporation or combination 
 of nations possessing certain delegated powers, but 
 not itself a nation; the international government being 
 nothing more than the agent of the combined nations, 
 with powers not inherent, but only emanations of the 
 joint sovereignty of the nations which have created 
 it through their compact. 
 
 It was necessary to grant to the United States, 
 viewed as one nation, the exclusive power to deal with 
 other nations on equal terms, and hence it was needful 
 to give them a complete and plenary treaty-making 
 power. This involved in turn the necessity of denying 
 to the States all power to make treaties, alliances, or 
 confederations. 
 
200 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 The international union, however, would be of nar- 
 rower scope, so far as its powers are concerned. It 
 must be recognized that some nations might not be- 
 come members of it, and as to these it would be neces- 
 sary to confer upon the international government a cer- 
 tain treaty-making power commensurate with its war 
 powers, its control of international commerce and com- 
 munication and the other powers granted to it. 
 
 But to go beyond this, and grant to it the complete 
 and plenary power to make treaties of all sorts with 
 nations not members of the union, would necessarily 
 involve a total surrender by the component nations of 
 the treaty-making power even in respect to matters 
 over which the international government would have, 
 and ought to have, no control. Moreover, if the 
 United Nations were given this general treaty-making 
 power, these treaties must be regarded as laws of a 
 dignity superior to the laws and policies of the sev- 
 eral nations, thus involving a surrender of internal sov- 
 ereignty which few nations would consent to make, and 
 which, it is believed, would be unnecessary. 
 
 It would seem sufficient to grant to the international 
 government the exclusive power to make all treaties 
 with nations not members of the union which are 
 proper and necessary to carry out the powers granted 
 it, making it plenary and complete so far as relates to 
 those powers. 
 
 On the other hand, while the component nations, like 
 the American States, ought to surrender absolutely the 
 right to enter into alliances and confederations with 
 
TAXATION OF COMMERCE BY STATES 201 
 
 other nations and into treaties dealing with subjects 
 committed to the control of the international govern- 
 ment, there would seem to be no good reason why they 
 should not retain the power to enter into treaties of 
 other sorts, provided the consent of the Congress be 
 first obtained, and provided that it be made essential 
 to the validity of treaties between component nations 
 and those not members of the union that they contain 
 provisions for the peaceable settlement of all disputes 
 arising under them. The latter proviso would be un- 
 necessary in case of treaties between two or more com- 
 ponent nations because the constitution itself provides 
 for the settlement of all disputes between them by the 
 international courts. 1 
 
 IV 
 TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
 
 The student of history needs no reminder that per- 
 haps most of the modern wars that have devastated the 
 world have had their roots in the desire to extend the 
 commerce of one nation at the unfair expense of others; 
 and the student of politics will readily recognize that 
 one of the favorite instrumentalities of this extension, 
 and therefore one of the great destroyers of good will 
 and harmony, as well as one of the great breeders of 
 distrust and jealousy, between nations is to be found in 
 tariff legislation and other forms of the taxation of 
 international commerce. 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art V, Sec. i. 
 
202 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 It is a prime essential to any union formed for the 
 purpose of creating and preserving mutual concord 
 among its component nations, that there should be 
 freedom of trade among them. This principle has been 
 recognized in the constitution of every federal union 
 thus far created, and is supported by every considera- 
 tion of theory as well as of practical experience. 1 
 
 The same general principle has been applied in the 
 previous pages of this study to the international gov- 
 ernment itself not only by the grant to that govern- 
 ment of the control of international commerce, but 
 also by the restriction of it to a single form of taxa- 
 
 1 If the British Empire be adduced as an instance to the contrary, 
 it may be replied that, while it is true the British Colonies and 
 Dominions have possessed and exercised the right to levy tariff duties 
 even on imports from the British Isles, yet none of those colonies are 
 in the position of being forced to receive or send imported or exported 
 goods through the ports and custom houses of independent colonies or 
 foreign countries, dependent upon their good will for the conduct of 
 their trade. 
 
 Where such possibilities have existed, as in the case of the interior 
 colonies or provinces of Canada, they have been met by the estab- 
 lishment of a federal constitution and the adoption, as between the 
 colonies concerned, of absolute free trade. 
 
 Hence nowhere in the world is there important British territory 
 without free access to the sea or dependent upon any outside authority 
 for the security of its commerce, while other countries like Russia, 
 Poland, Hungary, Serbia, and Rumania have sunk more or less into 
 economic bondage because of the want of such access. 
 
 Nor is it only for this reason that freedom of trade would seem 
 to be necessary between the component States of a federal government 
 Jealousy and ill-will are sooner or later the certain fruits of restric- 
 tions imposed by one sister State upon the trade of another. Even 
 in the favorable position occupied by the British Empire, as just 
 pointed out, it cannot be denied that there have been heard from time 
 to time significant notes of discord resulting from the imposition of 
 tariffs as between its parts. 
 
TAXATION OF COMMERCE BY STATES 203 
 
 tion, that upon land. The grant to the federal gov- 
 ernment of the power to regulate international com- 
 merce, as a preventive of discord between the compo- 
 nent nations, would be idle and useless, if it were not 
 accompanied by a corresponding surrender on the part 
 of the nations of the right to burden and restrict it 
 through the exercise of the taxing power. By the exer- 
 cise of such power one nation having an extensive 
 seaboard might hold at its mercy a neighboring nation 
 with little or none. 
 
 But it may be asked, How then shall the nations se- 
 cure the revenues adequate for their purposes, if they 
 cannot levy duties on imports ? 
 
 One sufficient reply would be to point to England as 
 having secured revenue sufficient for the conduct of her 
 great empire not only without a tariff (except on a few 
 luxuries) but at the same time under the burden of hav- 
 ing to meet in her commerce the high tariffs of other 
 nations. Yet she has survived and prospered exceed- 
 ingly. 
 
 Or we might point to the component States of any of 
 the existing federal unions to establish the fact that the 
 right to tax imports is not essential to the existence 
 or prosperity of a State. Indeed, the wider the extent 
 of territory occupied by a federal union, and the 
 greater the scope of the freedom of trade among its 
 component States, the greater is this prosperity, other 
 things being equal. 
 
 Again, to meet this question, it may be observed that 
 in most countries the revenues from the tariffs do not 
 
204 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 more than suffice to pay the great expenditures for the 
 armaments which the constant dread of war makes 
 necessary. Let each nation set off against the loss 
 of revenue through its surrender of the right to levy 
 duties on imports or exports the gain in the saving of 
 armaments no longer needed, and the balance in most 
 cases w'ould be on the credit side of the account. 
 
 Furthermore, one must not overlook the great finan- 
 cial gain to the people of each State because of econ- 
 omies of expenditure that would be forced upon 
 governments dependent for their revenue upon pay- 
 ments of taxes directly by the people. 
 
 The proposition would doubtless be antagonized by 
 the privileged classes in every State, whose business is 
 protected by the high tariffs, and many prophecies 
 and threats of dire disaster would be heard. It would 
 be argued that freedom of trade would be followed 
 by the gravitation of manufactures to the point of 
 cheapest production, and that thus each country would 
 become less independent and self-sufficient. In reply it 
 may be said that it is now considered desirable that a 
 country produce all it needs chiefly because of the pos- 
 sibilities of war in cutting off its supplies from other 
 countries. Once eliminate the chance of war, and the 
 question would soon solve itself, and trade would fol- 
 low the freer lines of least resistance. 
 
 It must also be remembered that all such arguments 
 have been pressed with great vigor against the estab- 
 lishment of every federal union now extant, from the 
 United States of America to the German Empire; yet 
 
TAXATION OF COMMERCE BY STATES 205 
 
 as between the component States of each union the free- 
 dom of trade established has never resulted disas- 
 trously to the States concerned, but on the contrary 
 has given an augmented impetus to their industrial 
 development. 
 
 There is another way, besides the laying of duties 
 on imports and exports, wherein the component na- 
 tions, if unrestricted, might impose taxes upon inter- 
 national commerce, that is, by laying duties on vessels 
 or other vehicles of such commerce in proportion to 
 their carrying capacity, not in proportion merely to 
 their value as property. Through tonnage taxes of 
 this description it would be possible for a component 
 nation, if so disposed, to lay very considerable bur- 
 dens upon international commerce or to pass preferen- 
 tial legislation in favor of or against the commerce of 
 particular nations. This sort of legislation also ought 
 to be prohibited by the international compact. 
 
 These do not exhaust the means that might be used 
 by a nation for the purpose of aiding its own com- 
 merce at the unfair expense of other nations, but they 
 would constitute the most usual means. Should others 
 develop from time to time, exercises of the power 
 granted to the Congress to regulate international com- 
 merce by uniform laws would suffice to put an end to 
 such evil practices. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. V, Sec. 2. 
 
206 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 V 
 THE WAR POWERS OF THE COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 It has already been indicated that the success of an 
 international union such as is here contemplated would 
 be hopeless without a surrender by the component na- 
 tions of the principal part of their war powers. Nor 
 would it suffice for this purpose merely to grant to the 
 federal government the power to keep troops and bat- 
 tleships and to declare war. There must also be an 
 actual surrender by the component nations of a large 
 portion of these powers. 
 
 But it can hardly be supposed that the nations, ac- 
 customed as they are to rely upon their own strong 
 arms to enforce their rights and defend themselves 
 against aggression, would consent to yield themselves 
 bound hand and foot to the mercies of a federal gov- 
 ernment wherein other nations would have as great a 
 voice as themselves, or even greater. 
 
 It is necessary, and indeed eminently desirable, that 
 they should not surrender their right to organize and 
 train militia, or citizen soldiery, not only because mili- 
 tary force of this kind will sometimes be needed to 
 quell internal disorders, but because it is possible that 
 a nation may be called upon to repel attacks upon it 
 from without, or even from within, the union; and 
 while the federal government would be bound to aid a 
 component nation against such attacks, its aid could 
 be given only after an appreciable interval during 
 
WAR POWERS OF STATES 207 
 
 which the State ought not to be left without means of 
 defense. 
 
 The real issue is not whether the component nations 
 should reserve the right to organize and train militia, 
 but whether they ought not also to reserve the right to 
 keep a certain proportion of trained troops and ships 
 of war. 
 
 The American Constitution forbids the States in 
 time of peace to keep troops (other than militia) or 
 war vessels. But there is one very important difference 
 between the present conditions in which the nations find 
 themselves and those confronting the American States 
 when they formed their Constitution. Then none of 
 the States had been accustomed to act independently 
 as sovereign nations, waging war and making peace, 
 or entering into international relations with foreign 
 States; and none of them possessed either standing 
 armies or ships of war. Thus they were not called 
 upon to resign costly and much prized possessions, as 
 would be many of the nations of today were they 
 asked to enter an int'ernational union upon the condi- 
 tion that they at once surrender their armies and 
 navies. International distrust and jealousy would 
 doubtless forbid any sudden holocaust of arma- 
 ments. 
 
 Not only then would it seem essential to provide in 
 our international constitution for some plan of gradual 
 disarmament of the component nations, but it is im- 
 probable that they would consent to any compact which 
 would not permit them to keep a certain proportion of 
 
208 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 regular troops and war vessels, say, ten per centum of 
 the number kept by the United Nations. 
 
 These would serve as a nucleus for a regular army 
 and navy, should a State find it needful to defend itself 
 against unjust aggression, and yet would not suffice 
 to encourage aggression on its part, especially towards 
 another component nation aided in its work of self- 
 defense not only by the tenfold regular forces of the 
 union itself, but also by the forces of the majority of 
 the States composing the union. 1 
 
 But even yet the component nations might not regard 
 themselves as absolutely secured by these provisions, 
 since it would be possible that the international govern- 
 ment, lulled into inaction or neglect by a sense of 
 false security, might not itself keep a sufficient force of 
 troops or ships of war to justify the nations with great 
 territories and large subject or backward populations 
 in regarding ten per centum of such force as sufficient 
 to preserve internal order and peace within their limits. 
 
 Under the ten per centum rule the international 
 government must keep an army of one million men in 
 order that a component nation might possess one of 
 one hundred thousand. An army of one hundred thou- 
 sand would hardly suffice to police adequately the great 
 territories of the Russian or British Empires, or even 
 the United States. 
 
 But it is very doubtful if the international govern- 
 ment, especially if it were to embrace among its mem- 
 bers most or all of the Great Powers, would keep an 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. V, Sec. 3, cl. i, 2. 
 
ACQUISITIONS BY STATES 209 
 
 army of a million men. More probably it would reduce 
 the number by half or perhaps more. A correspond- 
 ing compulsory reduction on the ten per centum basis 
 of the domestic armies of the component nations might 
 in some cases reduce their forces below the safety 
 point in the control of their internal affairs, 
 
 It would seem prudent therefore to name a minimum 
 below which no nation might be compelled to reduce 
 its armies or navies. The minimum of troops ought 
 to be expressed in terms of percentage of population 
 since the main purpose of the domestic armies of each 
 State would be to preserve peace and order among its 
 population, while the minimum of ships of war ought 
 to be expressed in terms of percentage of the merchant 
 marine tonnage of each nation, since the main function 
 of the naval force of each State would be to safeguard 
 its ocean carried commerce. 
 
 The minimum percentage of troops has tentatively 
 been placed at one-tenth of one per centum of the popu- 
 
 (lation in each State, and the minimum percentage of 
 ships of war of each nation at a tonnage of one per 
 centum of the tonnage of its merchant marine. 1 
 
 VI 
 
 TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS BY COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 With freedom of trade established between the com- 
 ponent nations, with the surrender by them of the right 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. V, Sec. 3, cl. 3. 
 
210 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 to impose burdensome taxes or other restrictions upon 
 international commerce, and with the passing of the 
 need for great armies, navies, military bases and coal- 
 ing stations, many of the reasons for the national desire 
 to acquire territory would also disappear. 
 
 But if we would abolish war it is necessary to re- 
 move all temptations to acquire territory at the expense 
 of other nations. Occasionally the acquisition is actu- 
 ated by a blind and unintelligent desire for increased 
 possessions, there being no particular national design 
 in view. Mere pride of possession is the ruling motive. 
 Much more usually, however, there is a definite purpose 
 in such territorial acquisitions. This motive is one of 
 three : either national sympathy with the people occu- 
 pying the territory, resulting in a desire to make them 
 independent or in a mutual desire to blend into a 
 single nation; or the wish to expand the national com- 
 merce by unfair or forcible means; or to secure by 
 like means military or political advantages. Of these 
 only the first mentioned is ever justifiable, and that is 
 often used as a cloak to conceal one of the others. 
 Without one or the other of these motives there would 
 be little or no temptation to any State to acquire the 
 territory of another. 
 
 It ought, then, to be the aim of our international 
 constitution so to limit the powers of the component 
 nations in this matter as to eliminate the temptations 
 to the unjust and forcible acquisition of a neighbor's 
 territory. 
 
 A long step in this direction will have been taken 
 
ACQUISITIONS BY STATES 211 
 
 when the component nations agree to surrender their 
 control of, and their right to burden, international com- 
 merce; and another, when they give up their general 
 war powers. But the surrender of these does not 
 exclude all possibility of an acquisition of territory in 
 war or in peace that may cause the old fires of jealousy 
 and suspicion to break out afresh among them. 
 
 There ought therefore to be additional limitations 
 prohibiting them to acquire territory belonging to an- 
 other nation except, first, in time of pease, with the 
 consent of the nations concerned, and, second, in time 
 of peace or war, only with the consent of such a ma- 
 jority of the international congress as may suffice to 
 convince all the component nations that there can be 
 no ulterior harmful design lurking behind the acquisi- 
 tion. That majority has been placed tentatively at 
 three-fourths of the members of each house of the 
 Congress, upon the theory that such an alteration of the 
 territorial boundaries of a component State may consti- 
 tute as important a change in the relative status of the 
 nations as would the passage of a constitutional amend- 
 ment, and should therefore require the assent of the 
 same majority of the nations represented in the Con- 
 gress. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. V, Sec. 4. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 RELATIONS OF COMPONENT NATIONS TO 
 EACH OTHER AND TO THE UNION 
 
 We are next to examine the provisions to be inserted 
 in the proposed constitution with reference to the rela- 
 tions between the component nations themselves on 
 the one side and between them and the union on the 
 other. 
 
 The right of the nations to make treaties with one 
 another touching all matters not surrendered to the con- 
 trol of the international government has been already 
 considered, and the conclusion reached that this power, 
 so limited, should be reserved by them. Thus, such 
 matters as the extradition of criminals, or the personal 
 or civil rights of the citizens of one State in another, 
 might always be adequately provided for by treaty 
 between the respective nations, as their wishes or policy 
 might dictate. 
 
 The topic now to be discussed relates to matters 
 more fundamental and far-reaching. 
 
 I 
 
 PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE 
 CITIZENS OF ONE STATE WHILE IN ANOTHER 
 
 Reference has just been made to the fact that by 
 treaty one nation within or without the union may se- 
 
 212 
 
CITIZENS OF ONE STATE IN ANOTHER 213 
 
 cure to its citizens in any component State such personal 
 or civil rights as may be agreed upon. 
 
 But there are certain fundamental rights of which 
 the citizens of a State^ even in the absence of treaty, 
 could not be deprived by a component nation without 
 the gravest danger of resulting discord and retaliation, 
 leading direct to disunion or to war. 
 
 The violation of such rights is always caused by 
 intentional or unintentional acts of gross injustice to 
 the citizens of other States, and can never be justified 
 by any proper view of necessary public policy. The 
 component nations ought to find no difficulty in sur- 
 rendering the right to enact such unjust laws or to 
 commit such acts against citizens of another State, 
 whatever attitude they may assume with respect to the 
 sort of treatment they have the right to accord to their 
 own citizens. 
 
 Thus if a nation, by means of legislative convictions 
 of crime (bills of attainder) , or the enactment of retro- 
 active laws punishing crime (ex post facto laws), or 
 laws impairing the obligation of contracts, all of which 
 are oppressive and unjustifiable, should deprive the 
 citizen of another State of his life, liberty, or property, 
 such action would at once give rise to serious grounds 
 of complaint on the part of the State whose citizen has 
 been so treated, and would lead to grave dissensions, 
 if nothing worse. How much better to check such ten- 
 dencies in their inception by prohibiting the sort of ac- 
 tion that would give cause for the complaint, and to 
 allow the foreigner thus threatened the opportunity of 
 
2i 4 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 testing the validity of the law, if necessary, in the in- 
 ternational courts. Such a course would give the ag- 
 grieved party a sure judicial investigation of the 
 grounds of his complaint and an impartial judicial 
 remedy against such invasions of his rights, so that 
 his own country would be relieved of all responsibility 
 for the enforcement or recognition of his claims. 
 
 The same result would follow, were a like judicial in- 
 quiry and remedy afforded, if needed, by the interna- 
 tional courts in cases wherein a component nation is al- 
 leged to have attempted unjustly to deprive a citizen of 
 another State (within or without the union) by legisla- 
 tive, executive, or judicial action of his life, liberty, or 
 property without giving him opportunity to be heard 
 in his own defense, or where it is alleged to have been 
 guilty of unjust discriminations against such foreigner 
 with regard to his personal or property rights; or 
 where it is alleged that the treaty rights of the for- 
 eigner have been violated. 
 
 The component nations, whatever their jealousy of 
 an inquiry into the customary treatment of their own 
 citizens, ought to be willing to unite in a compact pro- 
 hibiting them to engage in such conduct towards the 
 citizens of other countries. And this being done, the 
 Congress should see to it that, in case of alleged viola- 
 tions of these provisions, the complaining party be 
 given the right to have the validity of the law, or other 
 governmental act complained of, investigated and ad- 
 judged by the international courts. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. i. 
 
CITIZENS IN FOREIGN STATES 215 
 II 
 
 PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO 
 
 CITIZENS OF COMPONENT STATES WHILE IN 
 
 FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
 
 The clause just examined would adequately protect 
 the citizens of a State (either a member or not a 
 member of the union) while in another State which is 
 a member of the union. But it would have no appli- 
 cation to instances of oppressive conduct by a State 
 not a member of the union towards citizens of compo- 
 nent States who might be within its limits. 
 
 All existing federal unions, as has been indicated 
 more than once, have been formed with the design not 
 only to avert war between its members, but to create in 
 many respects one single new nation, with the rights 
 and privileges of a distinct member of the family of 
 nations; and to that end the individual States compos- 
 ing the union have invariably surrendered their right 
 to deal with foreign countries except through the union 
 itself. This creation of a single nation possessing the 
 right to engage in international relations and in war, 
 involves the consequence that each citizen of a compo- 
 nent State shall also be a citizen of the union, and as 
 such shall look to the federal government, not to his 
 State government, for that protection when abroad 
 that each nation is bound to afford to its citizens. 
 
 But with respect to our international union the 
 conditions are materially different. It is not the intent 
 
A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 in this case to create a new State except in a very 
 limited sense and for very limited purposes; nor is it 
 proposed that the component nations surrender their 
 right, save to a limited extent, to enter into relations 
 with other nations. The international union would 
 be a purely political conception, would possess no ter- 
 ritory of its own (except the seat of government) and 
 would have no citizens of its own (except citizens of 
 the seat of government) . If, however, the component 
 nations shall have surrendered their war powers, the 
 relinquishment implies a guarantee that the interna- 
 tional government will take upon itself the duty of 
 granting that protection in foreign countries to the 
 citizens of each nation which, by reason of such sur- 
 render, the nation itself can no longer give. 
 
 While this responsibility of the federal government 
 would perhaps be implied from the context of the pro- 
 posed constitution, the matter is of too great impor- 
 tance to be left to implication; a guarantee should be 
 expressly inserted to the effect that the international 
 government shall protect the citizens of each compo- 
 nent nation, when in foreign countries, in all such 
 rights and privileges as they may there claim under the 
 Law of Nations or under particular treaties. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. 2. 
 
INTERNAL DISSENSIONS 217 
 
 III 
 
 PROTECTION OF COMPONENT NATIONS AGAINST 
 INVASION 
 
 It is evident that a guarantee that the international 
 government will protect each component nation against 
 the hostile invasion of its territories is a condition sine 
 qua non to the surrender by the nations of their war 
 pow,ers, indeed the condition of the establishment of 
 the union. No existing federal constitution is without 
 such a guarantee. 1 
 
 IV 
 INTERNAL DISSENSIONS IN COMPONENT STATES 
 
 The American Constitution guarantees that the 
 United States will afford protection to the several 
 States not only against invasion, but also against do- 
 mestic violence on application of the State authorities. 
 
 To a proper understanding of the conditions under 
 which this clause was inserted in the American Consti- 
 tution, it must be remembered that the several States 
 had surrendered all their war powers (except the 
 keeping of militia), that the State governments were 
 all republican in character, and that the Constitution 
 had guaranteed that they should ever so remain. The 
 State governments being already entirely in the hands 
 of the people, internal dissensions and armed resistance 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. 3. 
 
218 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 to authority could never assume the form of a strug- 
 gle by the people against an oppressive or tyrannical 
 government for political freedom, but would always 
 represent the efforts of a factious minority to over- 
 come by force of arms the will of the majority. 
 
 There would be no reason in principle therefore why 
 the majority, as represented by their chosen legislatures 
 or executives, should not call to their aid the forces of 
 the United States, in the absence of a sufficient militia 
 force to quell the disturbances, especially since by 
 reason of the lack of such aid the factious minority 
 might obtain control, and thus the republican and popu- 
 lar character of the State government be overthrown, 
 contrary to the express guarantee of the Constitution. 
 
 But a far different situation confronts the nations in 
 the establishment of our international union. Each of 
 them has its own form of government; some monarchi- 
 cal, some republican, some federal; some under popular 
 control, some with governments more or less arbitrary. 
 
 Should internal dissensions occur, and especially 
 should they advance so far that several governments 
 are established within a State, each claiming to be 
 the de facto government and each calling upon the 
 international government for aid in suppressing the 
 other, questions of great delicacy would arise, 
 fraught with danger to the entire union, according 
 as the sympathies of the component nations would be 
 severally extended to the one or the other party. 
 
 If, in a particular State, the civil war would take 
 the form of an uprising of the people against an arbi- 
 
INTERNAL DISSENSIONS 219 
 
 trary government, those component nations possessing 
 republican forms of government and popular institu- 
 tions would vigorously object to the use of the forces 
 of the United Nations for the purpose of suppressing 
 the political aspirations of the people in the distracted 
 State, while those possessing monarchical institutions 
 might be no less vigorous in their demand for the sup- 
 pression of such popular aspirations. 
 
 Such conditions would make for a rapid and luxu- 
 riant growth of discord and jealousy among the com- 
 ponent nations, if not for a speedy disintegration of the 
 union itself. Yet they would seem to be sooner or 
 later the certain consequences of any guarantee on 
 the part of the international government to render aid 
 to the governments of the several component nations 
 in quelling domestic disturbances. 
 
 If we are to consider the preservation and continued 
 usefulness of the union, there can be little doubt that 
 it ought to leave such domestic dissensions severely 
 alone, and that both the international government and 
 the governments of the other component nations ought 
 to preserve an attitude of strict neutrality between the 
 contending factions until the contest is settled by the 
 final overthrow of one or the other party or by the 
 establishment of part of the original territory as a new 
 and independent State. 
 
 In the meanwhile, however, as both parties obviously 
 cannot be represented in the international congress or 
 appoint judges to the international courts, and as it 
 would be eminently undesirable for the reasons above 
 
220 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 mentioned that the international government be given a 
 discretion as to which faction it may recognize as the 
 lawful government, the constitution ought to provide 
 for the continued recognition of the original govern- 
 ment, so far as relates to the national rights and func- 
 tions under the international compact, until such gov- 
 ernment is completely overthrown and a new one sub- 
 stituted therefor, in which event the latter should at 
 once become entitled to enjoy such rights and functions. 
 
 These are merely applications to political conditions 
 of the two equitajble maxims, " first in time, first in 
 right," and " as between equal equities the legal title 
 shall prevail." They preserve the strict attitude of 
 neutrality that should be assumed by the international 
 government and by the other component nations, and 
 neither faction would have any just cause of complaint. 
 Thus only can the union be secured against the disin- 
 tegrating forces that would lurk in the internal dis- 
 sensions that may be expected to arise from time to 
 time within the several States. 
 
 Should such a civil war as we have supposed result 
 in the dismemberment of the State, so that the original 
 government would continue to control part of it while 
 the remainder is erected into a new and independent 
 State, the latter would of course at once drop out of 
 the union, and could only be admitted thereto on the 
 same terms as other outside nations, terms to be 
 presently examined. But that portion of the State left 
 under its original government would remain in the 
 union, though, since its population would be reduced 
 
ADMISSION OF NEW STATES 221 
 
 by the dismemberment, it would become necessary to 
 readjust its proportion of representation in the House 
 of Delegates. 1 
 
 V 
 
 ADMISSION OF NEW STATES INTO THE UNION 
 
 The international union once organized, the admis- 
 sion of new States to it from time to time might some- 
 times present important questions to the consideration 
 of the component nations, for it would be possible 
 that the admission of a particular State might, under 
 certain circumstances, be distasteful to some of the 
 nations concerned, might be more likely to create dis- 
 cord than harmony among them, and hence might be 
 more apt to weaken than to strengthen the union. 
 
 The admission of a new State might materially 
 alter the existing relations of every nation in the 
 union, as much as would many an amendment to 
 the constitution, and, if capable of accomplishment 
 by the consent of a bare majority of the component 
 States through their representatives in the Congress, it 
 might easily do the cause of peace more harm than 
 good. 
 
 It would appear to be reasonable to demand for such 
 admission the consent of the same number of compo- 
 nent nations as would be required to pass an amend- 
 ment to the constitution itself, that is, three-fourths of 
 each house of the Congress. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. 4. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VI, Sec. 5. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 RESERVED RIGHTS OF THE COMPONENT 
 NATIONS 
 
 GENERAL RESERVATION OF ALL POWERS NOT 
 SURRENDERED 
 
 While it might readily be implied from the general 
 tenor of our supposed international compact, and from 
 the fact that the proposed federal government is one 
 of enumerated powers only, that the component na- 
 tions have reserved all powers not granted to that 
 government nor prohibited by it to the nations them- 
 selves, yet, as in other cases of important rights, it 
 would be unwise to leave the matter to conjecture and 
 implication. 
 
 A clause is therefore inserted expressly declaring 
 that the powers not delegated to the United Nations by 
 the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the component 
 nations, as well as the sovereignty and independence of 
 the latter, are reserved to those nations, respectively. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VII, Sec. i. 
 
 222 
 
RIGHT OF SECESSION 223^ 
 
 II 
 
 RIGHT OF A COMPONENT NATION TO WITHDRAW 
 FROM THE UNION 
 
 Here we are confronted with a difficult problem, the 
 importance of which will be realized when it is recalled 
 that this is the identical question over which the great 
 American War of 1861 was fought. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States had not ex- 
 pressly determined in one way or the other the right 
 of a State to secede from the Union after it had once 
 acceded to the Constitution. 
 
 Without undertaking to discuss the merits of that 
 great controversy, suffice it to remind the reader that 
 certain of the Southern States, convinced that their re- 
 served rights and liberties were endangered, exercised 
 what they believed to be their constitutional right to 
 secede and establish a new union of their own. This 
 right the Northern and Western States, which consti- 
 tuted the majority of the States and controlled the 
 federal government, declined to recognize. In the 
 absence of any clause in the Constitution providing 
 expressly for the case, the difference of opinion with 
 respect to the proper interpretation of that instrument 
 led directly to the war. 
 
 The one lesson to be learned from this chapter of 
 American history is that, whatever other provisions the 
 nations may make in contemplation of an international 
 union, they ought not to leave this point ambiguous or 
 
224 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 undetermined. Their league or compact must declare 
 either for or against a reservation of the right of the 
 several States to secede. 
 
 Should this declaration be opposed to a right of se- 
 cession, it would be difficult to secure the assent of 
 any nation to surrender irrevocably some of its high 
 sovereign rights merely for the sake of an untried 
 experiment, which might possibly operate injuriously 
 to the liberties of some at least of the nations con- 
 cerned, however carefully those liberties may have been 
 safeguarded. Experience alone can disclose the ulti- 
 mate success or failure of so grand an experiment. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that if secession were for- 
 bidden and yet a nation or a combination of nations 
 were resolved to withdraw despite their agreements, 
 nothing but force could restrain them; but the use of 
 force is the very thing the union would be established 
 to prevent. A union formed to eliminate war, yet held 
 together permanently only by force, would savor 
 strongly of absurdity. 
 
 On the other hand, if the right be reserved to each 
 nation to withdraw at will, there would be grave danger 
 of the total failure of the experiment and the speedy 
 dissolution of the union, due to the unwillingness of the 
 several nations to make concessions of their own selfish 
 interests for the common good of all. This danger 
 would be likely to arise especially in the earlier years 
 of the new government's existence, before the nations 
 had begun to realize fully its advantages, or before 
 they had rid themselves of their old attitudes of mutual 
 
RIGHT OF SECESSION 225 
 
 suspicion and jealousy and had substituted therefor the 
 spirit of good will and concord that would follow upon 
 continued co-operation and the successful results of 
 their joint labors. 
 
 A just and proper compromise between these ex- 
 tremes would seem to be to reserve to each component 
 nation the right to withdraw from the union after 
 (say) twenty-five years from the date of its accession. 
 
 This, coupled with the checks afforded by the power 
 of a State to veto the legislation of the Congress, the 
 power of the international Supreme Court to pass upon 
 the constitutionality of such legislation, the division 
 of power between the two houses of the Congress rep- 
 resenting respectively the equal rights and the unequal 
 populations of the component States, and the limited 
 scope of the powers conferred upon the international 
 government, would seem to constitute sufficient guaran- 
 tees of the reserved rights of the component nations. 
 
 At the same time such a provision would obviate 
 the danger of the hasty or passionate withdrawal of a 
 State from the union merely upon vague suspicion of 
 unjust aggression on the part of sister nations, a 
 course which might result in a speedy destruction of 
 the entire edifice. 
 
 After a nation has been a member of the union for 
 twenty-five years a new generation will have come upon 
 the scene, better able to weigh the relative advantages 
 and disadvantages of the union, and having forgotten 
 the political rancors that might be engendered by the 
 enactment of the first measures of general relief. The 
 
226 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 second or a succeeding generation of citizenship in 
 each State would be in a better position to determine 
 whether the blessings of the union would not outweigh 
 its burdens. 
 
 Even during the first twenty-five years the fact that 
 any nation at the end of that period would have the 
 right peaceably to withdraw if its interests were not 
 being protected by the union would operate as a con- 
 servative influence and a useful restraint upon harsh or 
 unjust legislation. The spirit of compromise and con- 
 sideration for the rights of all in the conduct of the 
 international government would take the place of the 
 obstinate disregard of the majority for the minority 
 of the nations that would be more likely to characterize 
 the government if the component nations were without 
 the right to secede. 
 
 But a nation proposing to secede from the union 
 ought to be required to give due notice (say for one 
 year) to the Congress of its intention. Not only would 
 the nation itself thus pay a proper and decent respect 
 to comity and to the rights of the union and the other 
 component nations, which might suffer by the hasty 
 execution of such a purpose, but it would give time for 
 sober reflection on all sides and an opportunity for 
 each by mutual concessions so to modify the general 
 conditions as to make it possible for the seceding State 
 to reconsider its decision. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VII, Sec. 2, cl. i. 
 
RIGHT OF SECESSION 227 
 
 III 
 
 RIGHTS OF SECEDING STATE IN THE COMMON 
 PROPERTY OF THE UNION 
 
 One more question remains to be discussed in this 
 connection. That question relates to the respective 
 rights of seceding and non-seceding States in the com- 
 mon property of the union, such as the ships of war, the 
 money in the treasury, the forts, arsenals, public build- 
 ings, and other improvements belonging to the federal 
 government, the benefits of much of which would be 
 lost by a seceding State, though paid for by it in pro- 
 portion to its wealth. 
 
 Should the seceding nation be entitled to its propor- 
 tionate share of the common property in kind or in 
 money commutation therefor, and if 'so how should 
 that proportion be ascertained? Or ought the rule to 
 be that a nation entering the union does so upon condi- 
 tion that it shall lay no claim to the common property 
 (outside the limits of its own territory) in case it 
 should later determine to withdraw? 
 
 There can be scant room to doubt that the juster 
 is also the wiser course. To proclaim that a seceding 
 nation shall not be entitled to any share of the partner- 
 ship property acquired by joint expenditure of treas- 
 ure and labor, except such as may happen to be located 
 within its own boundaries, would probably repel many 
 a nation that might otherwise join the union, and 
 would be likely to inspire the seceding nation or nations 
 
228 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 with sentiments of ill will and resentment that might 
 forebode evil to the general peace. 
 
 True, the difficulties in the way of a fair adjustment 
 of the respective rights would often be great, but the 
 value of the share of a seceding nation in the common 
 property, after deducting its share of the common 
 debts and the value of forts, arsenals, and other public 
 buildings erected by the federal government within its 
 territory, may be determined, approximately at least, 
 upon equitable principles by the Supreme Court, whose 
 decision would doubtless constitute the most satisfac- 
 tory mode of disposing of the matter. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VII, Sec. 2, cl. 2. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 SUPREMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
 
 CONSTITUTION, LAWS, AND 
 
 TREATIES 
 
 I 
 
 THE DECLARATION OF SUPREMACY 
 
 Although it is proposed to grant to the interna- 
 tional government only very limited powers, it is yet 
 essential that so far as its powers do extend, its exer- 
 cise of them should be of an authority paramount to 
 a conflicting exercise of similar powers by the several 
 component nations. Otherwise there would follow 
 anarchy, confusion and possibly the very evils the fed- 
 eral government would be organized to avert. 
 
 So manifest is this conclusion that it might almost be 
 left with safety to be implied from the nature and con- 
 text of the constitution. But in a matter of such pro- 
 found importance it would be imprudent to leave to 
 mere implication what may be readily and clearly ex- 
 pressed in few words. 
 
 This principle of supremacy would apply not only 
 to the international constitution itself, but to all the 
 laws and treaties made by the international govern- 
 
 229 
 
230 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ment in pursuance of that constitution. But it would 
 have no application to such of the laws or treaties 
 of the international government as might be in viola- 
 tion of that instrument; they would be mere exercises 
 of usurped powers, void and of no effect. 
 
 It must follow therefore that in any matter of judi- 
 cial' cognizance arising within any component State or 
 in the seat of the government, it would be the duty 
 of any judge, whether of a national or an international 
 court, in choosing between conflicting national and in- 
 ternational laws or treaties as controlling the case be- 
 fore him, to select and enforce that law which his 
 own country has itself in the most solemn manner pos- 
 sible declared to be supreme within its borders, the 
 constitution of the United Nations, and the laws and 
 treaties of the international government made in pur- 
 suance thereof. 1 
 
 II 
 
 OFFICIAL OATH TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 It would of course be proper and necessary that all 
 officials of the international government be required to 
 make oath or affirmation that they will support the 
 international constitution. 
 
 But it is necessary to go further than this. In order 
 that the legislative, executive, and judicial officers of 
 the several component nations may feel and realize at 
 all times the obligation resting upon them also to rec- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VIII, Sec. i. 
 
OFFICIAL OATH 231 
 
 ognize and uphold the international compact as the su- 
 preme law and as part of their own constitution and 
 laws, it would be right and proper to require of them, 
 upon their assumption of office, an oath or affirmation 
 that they will support the constitution of the United Na- 
 tions. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. VIII, Sec. 2. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 I 
 
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 That no plan of government devised by the wit of 
 man can escape the need of amendment from time to 
 time, as defects in its organization or powers develop, 
 is too plain for argument; and prudence dictates that 
 any plan proposed should contain a prearranged 
 method of amending it. Especially would this be 
 true in case of an experiment in government on a scale 
 so vast as that here contemplated. 
 
 Much might be said for the proposition that no 
 power of amendment should be given save by the unani- 
 mous consent of all the component nations. So far 
 as the original compact is concerned, the nations would 
 know exactly what they are assenting to, and it might 
 be plausibly argued that the same principle ought to 
 apply to the subsequent insertion of new matter into 
 the constitution by means of amendments. 
 
 But when we consider the experimental nature of the 
 compact, and that experience may prove that too much, 
 as well as too little, power has been surrendered by the 
 
 23* 
 
AMENDMENTS 233 
 
 component nations, when we recall the extreme diffi- 
 culty of securing unanimous assent to the adoption of 
 any measures, especially of such complex character 
 as would be here involved, and when we consider 
 that a requirement of the assent of a large majority 
 of the nations to any amendment would be nearly as 
 secure a guarantee that the reserved sovereign rights 
 of each will be protected against invasion, while yet 
 making it more possible to secure desirable amend- 
 ments, it would seem the more prudent part to make 
 provision for amendments through the assent of less 
 than the entire membership of the union, but neverthe- 
 less requiring the consent of so large a majority as in 
 effect to protect the minority against changes adopted 
 merely for the political advantage of the majority. 
 
 Much the same problem presented itself to the fram- 
 ers of the American Constitution, who solved it by 
 requiring the assent of three-fourths of the States for 
 the adoption of an amendment. In actual practice in 
 the United States this requirement has been found to 
 work well. It has prevented from time to time the 
 passage of many ill-considered and unwise amend- 
 ments urged by zealous reformers, and yet has admit- 
 ted of sufficient freedom to permit the enactment of 
 seventeen amendments within the period of one hun- 
 dred and thirty-five years. 
 
 Twelve of these received the assent of the requisite 
 majority of the States within the first twenty-five years 
 of our constitutional history; indeed, the enactment 
 of the first ten practically constituted the condition upon 
 
234 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 which many of the States ratified the Constitution. 
 The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth were passed 
 in consequence of the War of 1861 ; and within the last 
 few years the Sixteenth and Seventeenth have been en- 
 acted. 
 
 It is not too much to claim that the American system 
 of constitutional amendment has well fulfilled its func- 
 tions of making possible such changes in the Constitu- 
 tion as are desirable and earnestly desired by the 
 States. 
 
 It may also be remarked that, with the exception of 
 the three u war amendments " which were passed un- 
 der abnormal and peculiar circumstances, the almost 
 universal tendency of the amendments has been to cur- 
 tail the powers of the federal government, not to dimin- 
 ish the powers of the States. Most of the curtailment 
 of the latter powers that has occurred has been effected 
 through construction of the Constitution by the judicial 
 and executive departments of the federal government, 
 not by actual constitutional amendment. 
 
 Experience in the United States therefore would 
 seem to teach the lesson that members of our inter- 
 national union would have more to fear, so far as con- 
 cerns the protection of their reserved rights, from 
 the departmental constructions of the proposed consti- 
 tution than from any actual amendments receiving the 
 assent of a large majority of the component nations. 
 
 But even the dangers arising from departmental 
 constructions, usages and practices have been met in 
 the proposed international compact by checks and bal- 
 
AMENDMENTS 235 
 
 ances unknown to the American Constitution, which 
 would suffice, if not to eliminate, at least to disarm 
 them of most of their power to hurt. 
 
 Thus the members of the international congress are 
 made the direct agents and servants of their respective 
 nations, appointed as they see fit and subject to recall 
 by them at their pleasure ; each component nation may 
 veto any law of the Congress on the ground that it im- 
 pairs the reserved rights of the nations, in which case 
 the law can be passed only by the assent of such a 
 majority in each house of the Congress as would suf- 
 fice to amend the constitution; each State, after twenty- 
 five years of membership, has the right to withdraw in 
 peace from the union; the executive department is en- 
 tirely responsible to the Congress, and subject to recall 
 at the will of either house, the members of which in 
 turn are made sensitively responsive to the wishes 
 of their respective nations; the international judges are 
 to be appointed by the executive heads of the several 
 nations, not by the authority of the United Nations; 
 and a three-fourths majority of the Supreme Court 
 or of any section thereof is required to declare any 
 legislation or treaty of a component nation violative 
 of the international constitution or laws. 
 
 These governmental checks and balances appear to 
 be sufficient guarantees that the reserved rights of the 
 component nations cannot be seriously affected by de- 
 partmental constructions; while actual experience in 
 the United States, no less than theoretical considera- 
 tions, would attest that little danger to the reserved 
 
236 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 powers is likely to arise from actual amendments for 
 the passage of which the assent of a sufficiently large 
 majority of the component nations is required. The 
 three-fourths majority of the States demanded for this 
 purpose by the American Constitution has worked 
 admirably in practice, and the nations could scarcely 
 do better than follow this example. 1 
 
 II 
 
 PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS 
 
 . The clause in the Constitution of the United States 
 dealing with the modes of proposing amendments, 
 reads as follows: 
 
 " The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both 
 houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
 amendments to this Constitution, or, on the ap- 
 plication of the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
 several States, shall call a convention [of the 
 States] for proposing amendments." 
 
 It will be seen that this clause provides for two 
 methods of proposing amendments ( I ) by a two-thirds 
 vote of both houses of the Congress; (2) by a conven- 
 tion of the States, upon the application of the legisla- 
 tures of two-thirds of the States. In practice no 
 amendment has ever been proposed by the second 
 method. 
 
 Under our international constitution, with its organi- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IX. 
 
AMENDMENTS 237 
 
 zation of the Congress composed of members appointed 
 and removable by the several States at their pleasure, 
 these two methods would become practically identical, 
 since two-thirds of the component nations might at 
 any time instruct their delegates in both houses of the 
 Congress to propose or support a given amendment. 
 
 That a two-thirds majority in each house of the 
 Congress, rather than a bare majority, ought to be re- 
 quired for this purpose is indicated by the fact that if a 
 two-thirds majority of the component nations cannot 
 be secured for the proposal of an amendment, it would 
 be idle and useless to attempt to obtain a three-fourths 
 majority for its final passage. 
 
 On the other hand, the possibility of the later conver- 
 sion of some of the nations to the amendment would 
 dictate that the majority required for the proposal of 
 it be not so large as that demanded for its ultimate 
 enactment. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 ENACTMENT OF AMENDMENTS 
 
 After providing for the two methods of proposing 
 amendments, as above described, the American Consti- 
 tution declares that when an amendment has been duly 
 proposed, it shall 
 
 " be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of 
 this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures 
 of three-fourths of the several States, or by con- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IX, Sec. i. 
 
A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 ventions [of the people] in three-fourths thereof, 
 as the one or the other mode of ratification may 
 be proposed by the Congress." 
 
 The American States being republican in form and 
 the ultimate sovereignty resting in the people thereof,. 
 it is eminently proper that such fundamental legislation 
 as would be comprised in an amendment to the federal 
 Constitution should receive, as essential to its validity, 
 the assent of the people themselves in each State, either 
 through their chosen representatives in the respective 
 State legislatures, or through their still more specially 
 chosen representatives in conventions of the people 
 held in each State and called for the purpose. 
 
 To have left the enactment of an amendment to 
 Congress would not have been in the least consistent 
 either in theory or practice with the real foundation 
 upon which the American Constitution rests, the free 
 consent of the people of the several States. 
 
 But in the case of our international compact the cir- 
 cumstances are very different. The constitution of the 
 United Nations would not necessarily rest upon the con- 
 sent of the people of the several nations or their repre- 
 sentatives, whether it would or not in case of a par- 
 ticular nation would depend on the form of its own 
 constitution. Theoretically in each case, since the 
 constitution would be an international compact or 
 treaty, its validity would depend upon the valid exer- 
 cise of the constitutional treaty-making power by the 
 government of each component nation; or if the treaty- 
 making power has not the constitutional right to make 
 
AMENDMENTS 239 
 
 such a treaty, then by an appeal to the constitution- 
 making power. 
 
 In our case therefore it would be impracticable to 
 insert a clause such as that in the American Constitu- 
 tion providing that amendments receive the assent of 
 the people of the several component nations. Indeed 
 it would be needless to refer the matter formally to 
 the component nations at all, the assent of their repre- 
 sentatives in the Congress (who would be entirely sub- 
 ject to the will of their governments) being a sufficient 
 guarantee of the assent of each nation to the proposed 
 amendment. 
 
 But a certain period of notice ought to be required 
 after the proposal of an amendment by the Congress 
 before its final passage by that body, so that ample 
 time may be given the several national govern- 
 ments to determine the position they ought to take with 
 respect to it, or, if the national constitution so re- 
 quires, to obtain the desires of their people on the sub- 
 ject. 
 
 For instance, if the United States were one of the 
 component nations, no amendment to the international 
 constitution could probably be assented to by it with- 
 out some corresponding amendment to the Constitution 
 of the United States, to which the assent of three- 
 fourths of the States would be necessary. It would 
 take several years to obtain this assent if it were ob- 
 tained at all. 
 
 While therefore a three-fourths vote of each house 
 of the Congress would suffice to enact an amendment 
 
240 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 to the international constitution, it would also be im- 
 portant to provide that no vote upon the passage of an 
 amendment be taken in either house of the Congress 
 until a reasonable time (say, four years) after the 
 formal proposal of it. This would give the several 
 national governments adequate opportunity to con- 
 sider the subject in all its bearings and would also 
 answer the requirements of nations situated like the 
 United States whose governments are responsive to 
 the will of the people. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWER OF AMENDMENT 
 
 The Constitution of the United States declares that 
 no State shall by any amendment be deprived of its 
 equal suffrage in the Senate. The reason for this limi- 
 tation is obvious. It was inserted in order to prevent 
 the passage of any amendment which would destroy 
 the constitutional balance between the smaller and the 
 larger States through the equality of representation 
 in the Senate. 
 
 Without question our international constitution 
 ought to contain a similar limitation, since the balance 
 of the equal representation of sovereignty in the upper 
 house against the unequal representation according to 
 population in the lower is one of the fundamental 
 conditions of the union. 
 
 But this is not the only basic condition of the com- 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IX, Sees, i, 2. 
 
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS 241 
 
 pact as proposed. Others are the right of the more 
 populous States to be represented in the lower house 
 of the Congress in proportion to federal population; 
 the right of each component nation to veto the legis- 
 lation of the Congress which it believes subversive of 
 the reserved rights of the nations; the right of a na- 
 tion to withdraw from the union after a designated 
 term of membership; the right of each nation to its 
 equal representation upon the Supreme Court of the 
 United Nations ; and the exemption of the sovereign or 
 chief executive of each nation from the operation of the 
 judicial power of the United Nations. 
 
 These are all fundamental conditions of our inter- 
 national compact, without the existence and guaranteed 
 continuance of which no nation would probably be will- 
 ing to assent to it. An express provision therefore 
 should be inserted to the effect that no amendment shall 
 be passed which shall affect them, except by unanimous 
 consent. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. IX, Sec. 2. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 DISCIPLINE OF A COMPONENT NATION 
 
 VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS BY A 
 COMPONENT NATION 
 
 The checks and balances already suggested for our 
 proposed constitution would seem sufficient to prevent 
 the international government itself from violating the 
 compact by unjustifiable encroachments upon the re- 
 served powers of the component nations. 
 
 That each nation would possess a right of qualified 
 veto upon international legislation, would have an 
 equal voice upon the Supreme Court, the final inter- 
 preter of the international constitution, laws, and 
 treaties, and in the last resort would have the right 
 to withdraw in peace from the union, would appear to 
 constitute sufficient safeguards against any permanent 
 violations on the part of the international government 
 or any majority of its sister nations of the obligations 
 towards it imposed upon them by the constitution. 
 
 On the other hand, however, while our plan as thus 
 far developed has imposed upon each component na- 
 tion certain obligations and duties toward the interna- 
 
 242 
 
DISCIPLINE OF COMPONENT STATE 243 
 
 tional government as a whole and toward its sister na- 
 tions, no check has as yet been suggested whereby, if a 
 component nation radically or persistently violates 
 these obligations, pressure may be brought to bear 
 upon it to compel it to observe them. 
 
 It is not necessary to suppose a component State so 
 indifferent to its duties as to fail to send delegations 
 to the Congress or to fail to appoint its delegates to the 
 Supreme Court or to other international courts within 
 its boundaries, thus embarrassing the operations and 
 functions of the international government. No com- 
 ponent nation would be likely to act thus, since it would 
 thereby merely lose its voice and influence in interna- 
 tional affairs while yet, so long as it might remain in 
 the union, it would be bound by the laws and decisions 
 passed. Should a nation ever reach such a stage of 
 indifference it would be far more likely to withdraw 
 at once from the union, as it would have the right to 
 do. 
 
 The cases chiefly to be guarded against would be 
 those wherein a nation, while willing and anxious in 
 general to avail itself of the advantages of the union, 
 would yet be slow and unwilling to pay the price in 
 cheerfully and loyally yielding to the constitutional 
 wishes of the majority of its fellows. 
 
 Suppose for example a component nation to refuse to 
 give up an excessive proportion of armed troops or 
 ships of war, paying no regard to the action of the 
 Congress in that regard; or to decline to obey an ad- 
 verse judgment of the Supreme Court in a suit insti- 
 
244 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 tuted against it by a sister State; or to refuse to recog- 
 nize within its limits those privileges and immunities 
 of the citizens of its sister States guaranteed by the 
 constitution; or to insist upon levying tariff duties on 
 goods imported into its borders from other States in 
 violation of the constitution or enforcing within its 
 limits other laws declared by the Supreme Court to 
 be violative of the constitution; or to insist upon 
 waging war against other States, either members or 
 not members of the union, or persistently threatening 
 to do so or deliberately engaging in conduct that would 
 provoke another State to make war upon it; or, in case 
 of a civil war within the boundaries of a sister State, to 
 insist, contrary to its constitutional duty, upon interfer- 
 ing in the contest and giving aid and comfort to one 
 side or the other; or to acquire unconstitutionally terri- 
 tory which it refuses to surrender. 
 
 The presence of such a disturbing influence, if per- 
 manent, instead of strengthening our union, would 
 merely weaken it, converting it from an institution es- 
 tablished to insure peace into a breeder of discord 
 and violence. 
 
 Of course it would be possible for the other nations 
 composing the union to use force under such circum- 
 stances and by war, if necessary, to compel the recalci- 
 trant State to observe its constitutional obligations. 
 But to adopt such a remedy would be a direct contra- 
 diction of the fundamental principle upon which our 
 union would be founded, the preservation of peace. 
 
 Assuming that the disturbing element would desire 
 
METHODS OF DISCIPLINE 245 
 
 to remain in the union and enjoy its advantages (for 
 otherwise it would substitute, in the place of disturbing 
 the peace of the union, the simpler and more satisfac- 
 tory procedure of withdrawing therefrom), it is pos- 
 sible to conceive of more consistent and law abiding 
 remedies than the use of violence, and yet equally effica- 
 cious. 
 
 II 
 
 MODES OF DISCIPLINE SUGGESTED 
 
 Two methods of disciplining a recalcitrant member 
 of the union suggest themselves, one economic in char- 
 acter, and the other political. 
 
 In the first place, the Congress may be authorized 
 to declare an embargo upon part or all of the trade 
 carried on between the offending nation and the other 
 component nations of the union, to remain in force so 
 long as in the judgment of the Congress might be neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Such a measure would of course impose some degree 
 of hardship upon the innocent States whose trade would 
 thus be affected, but the burden would, theoretically 
 at least, fall upon all alike since the embargo would 
 apply alike to all, and even though unevenly distri- 
 buted, the loss and inconvenience to none could be 
 greater than the use of force and war as a remedy, 
 since the very first measure in case of war would be 
 the cessation of all trade with the offending State. 
 
 The Congress might not in some cases find it neces- 
 
246 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 sary to lay an embargo upon all of the trade between 
 the several States; the disciplinary measure might 
 prove successful when applied to only a portion of it. 
 And the Congress ought probably to be given a discre- 
 tion in this respect. But whether the embargo be laid 
 on some or all of the trade, so much of the trade 
 as is prohibited ought to be prohibited to all the States 
 alike. If State A is the offender and States B and C 
 are two of the component nations, the Congress ought 
 not to be permitted to prohibit all trade between A and 
 B in certain articles, while allowing C to trade with A 
 in the same articles. 
 
 In the second place, if the application of the em- 
 bargo prove insufficient to deter the offending State, 
 the Congress ought to be authorized to take the further 
 step of expelling the offender from the union alto- 
 gether. Indeed cases might be imagined in which it 
 might be best to adopt this course in the first instance 
 without waiting to apply the milder remedy of the em- 
 bargo. On the whole it would appear to be wise to 
 leave with the Congress a discretion as to which remedy 
 shall be applied. 
 
 But upon the expulsion of a State, it would be fair 
 and just and tend toward future peace to treat the 
 State thus expelled, so far as its rights in the common 
 property are concerned, in the same manner as a State 
 which voluntarily secedes is treated, that is, to restore 
 to it such territory (outside the seat of government) as 
 it may have ceded to the union, and upon an accounting 
 of the common assets and liabilities before the Su- 
 
CHECK ON POWER TO DISCIPLINE 247 
 
 preme Court, to turn over to it such balance as may 
 prove to be due. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 CHECK UPON DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE 
 CONGRESS 
 
 Even though it be conceded that the Congress ought 
 to possess the disciplinary powers mentioned, yet we 
 might well hesitate to place so dangerous a power in 
 the hands of a bare majority of either house. The 
 power might easily be diverted into an engine of op- 
 pression and a means of obtaining trade advantages at 
 the expense of a powerful competing rival. 
 
 It would seem therefore to be a proper precaution 
 to demand that such action may be taken by the Con- 
 gress only with the assent of a very considerable ma- 
 jority of the votes in each house. 
 
 Since such disciplinary action is in a sense extra- 
 constitutional and (if it should result in the expulsion 
 of a component nation) would really effect an essen- 
 tial change in the constitution of the government, if 
 not in " the constitution," and since it has been pro- 
 vided that no nation shall be permitted to become a 
 member of the union except upon a three-fourths vote 
 in each house, it would seem appropriate to fix the 
 same majority as necessary to pass either of the dis- 
 ciplinary measures suggested. 2 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. X, Sees, i, 2, 4. 
 
 2 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. X, Sec. 3. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 NUMBER OF ASSENTING NATIONS NECESSARY TO 
 ESTABLISH THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 The Constitution of the United States required for its 
 establishment the assent of nine, that is, three-fourths, 
 of the thirteen then existing States, the same proportion 
 required for the valid enactment of an amendment. 
 
 The conditions confronting the framers of the great 
 American document differed radically from those 
 which the nations of the world are facing today. 
 
 During some ten years previous to the adoption of 
 the American Constitution, the thirteen States had 
 been united politically under a league or alliance known 
 as " the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual 
 Union," which had definitely proved itself a failure as 
 an instrument of government, but which nevertheless 
 had united the States by a common bond. Those Ar- 
 ticles expressly declared that no amendments thereto 
 or changes therein should be effected without the unani- 
 mous consent of all the States. Changes had become 
 absolutely essential, but it was feared with reason that 
 
 248 
 
CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED 249 
 
 unanimous consent could not be obtained to make them. 
 On the other hand, it was believed that unless the as- 
 sent of more than a bare majority of the States was 
 obtained, it would not only be dangerous to break up 
 the existing union, but the success of the new one would 
 be in peril. Hence the framers of the Constitution fixed 
 upon the proportion of three-fourths of the States as 
 being sufficient to insure its probable success. 
 
 In the case of our international constitution, However, 
 the component nations have never been in union, save 
 through temporary alliances between certain of them; 
 and they are by no means so nearly on the same footing 
 of equality as to wealth, population, or political or mili- 
 tary strength, as were the American States at the adop- 
 tion of their Constitution. 
 
 The questions, which are the nations, and how 
 many, whose assent ought to be regarded as necessary 
 to the practical success of the union, are questions of 
 practical statesmanship, which must be left to the deci- 
 sion of our supposed conference of nations called to 
 discuss the feasibility of some such plan of union as 
 that advocated in these pages. 
 
 But for the sake of placing a complete scheme before 
 the reader, it is suggested that no such union could 
 meet with success if it do not include at least five of 
 the eight existing " Great Powers," that is, Austria- 
 Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
 Japan, Russia, and the United States. Without these, 
 or a majority of them, the union would be of little 
 service in preventing wars, and other nations would be 
 
250 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 apt, and indeed ought, to decline to surrender impor- 
 tant sovereign rights in the creation of a federal gov- 
 ernment which would be unable to guarantee peace to 
 them or the rest of the world. 
 
 On the other hand, the accession of these nations, or 
 a majority of them, would secure also the assent of 
 many others, since they would find within the union a 
 protection against unjust aggressions they could not 
 hope to find outside. Wars between nations, if not 
 eliminated altogether, would be then reduced to a 
 minimum, and the burdens of war taxes, armaments, 
 national ill will, and human woe greatly alleviated. 
 
 Since there are eight of the " Great Powers," and 
 the assent of five of these would suffice to insure the 
 success of the union and to induce other nations to 
 join it, the number of nations whose assent would be 
 sufficient to establish the constitution between them 
 has been tentatively fixed at eight, of which at least 
 five must belong to the group of " Great Powers." 1 
 
 II 
 
 METHOD OF RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 The Constitution of the United States provided 
 that 
 
 " The ratification of the conventions [of the 
 people] of nine States shall be sufficient for the 
 establishment of this Constitution between the 
 States so ratifying the same." 
 
 1 See Appendix, Const'n U. N., Art. XI, Sec. i. 
 
CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED 251 
 
 In the political vocabulary of the United States, the 
 term, " conventions of nine States," signifies that in 
 each State there be called by the proper governmental 
 authority a " convention of the people," the number 
 of members of which, as well as their distribution and 
 apportionment among the people and the rules govern- 
 ing their selection by the people, would be previ- 
 ously determined by law. The membership would 
 usually consist of several hundred, elected by the 
 people, one member to so many thousands of con- 
 stituents. 
 
 In the American political theory, in the absence 
 of a requirement that its work be submitted by a 
 referendum to a vote of the people, the " convention 
 of the people " is clothed with the ultimate sovereignty 
 of the State and its people, and is superior to the ordi- 
 nary legislative assembly which possesses merely a de- 
 rivative or secondary sovereignty, or certain govern- 
 mental powers. 
 
 Hence when the American Constitution provided 
 for its own ratification by " conventions " in the sev- 
 eral States, it was building its authority upon the 
 strongest and deepest foundations known to American 
 political science, the ultimate sovereign will of the 
 people of the several States. The document thus con- 
 stituted the most solemn of all treaties, a treaty not 
 made through the ordinary or u derivative " sov- 
 ereignty of the States as represented in their ordinary 
 governmental action, but made by the " ultimate " sov- 
 ereign will of the people themselves, rising supreme 
 
252 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 over the " derivative " sovereignty or mere govern- 
 mental agencies. 
 
 But amid few of the nations of the world do these 
 political theories of the United States prevail. In 
 Great Britain, for example, the theory is that the " ulti- 
 mate " sovereignty rests not in the people as such, but 
 in the Parliament, the most powerful and influential 
 branch of which is the House of Commons, composed 
 of representatives of the people. And in still other 
 countries the theory is that the " ultimate " sovereignty 
 is vested in the person of the sovereign. 
 
 It cannot be supposed therefore that our interna- 
 tional compact could be made to depend upon actual 
 ratification by the people of the several nations acced- 
 ing to it, even though this were the strongest founda- 
 tion on which to rest it. 
 
 It would nevertheless be desirable, if possible, to 
 place the status of this solemn compact, partaking, 
 as it does, of the nature of a fundamental law involv- 
 ing profound changes in the existing constitution of 
 each component State, upon a distinctly higher plane 
 than that occupied by ordinary treaties. Hence it be- 
 comes necessary to seek out the foundation for it that 
 would be recognized by all nations in common as the 
 strongest and deepest. 
 
 It must of course be assented to by the constitutional 
 treaty-making power of each nation (after such 
 changes in its existing constitution as might be rendered 
 needful by the adoption of this international compact) ; 
 but its binding and supreme obligation ought to be 
 
CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED 253 
 
 recognized and emphasized by making it a condition 
 of ratification that, besides the assent of the ordinary 
 treaty-making power of each component nation, the 
 sovereign or chief executive of each shall solemnly 
 pledge in writing the honor of his nation as well as 
 of himself and his successors to the faithful and hon- 
 est observance of the compact in all its parts so long 
 as the nation remains in the union, leaving all dis- 
 putes to be settled peaceably in the modes indicated 
 therein. 
 
 If it be argued that such a pledge is implied in the 
 making of every treaty, and that it would add nothing 
 to the sanctity of this compact, it may be replied that 
 while this is true in theory and viewing treaties from 
 a high moral plane unaffected by pressing personal or 
 public interests, it is also true that in practice national 
 governments have frequently violated treaties most 
 flagrantly when they have conflicted with supposed na- 
 tional interests, and have not regarded either their own 
 or their nation's honor as sullied thereby. The mere 
 implication of the pledge has proved insufficient to 
 deter in many cases. 
 
 But may it not reasonably be supposed that an ex- 
 press and solemn pledge of the honor of the nation 
 and its rulers would prove a. very considerable obstacle 
 and stumbling block to the violation of this compact, 
 not only because of its peculiar nature and the special 
 sanctity thrown around it, but also because, even should 
 the rulers themselves see a supposed national profit 
 in violating it, the people feeling their own honor pub- 
 
254 A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
 
 licly pledged, would be more likely to condemn and 
 oppose the violation? It would thus cease to be a 
 mere governmental agreement and would become a na- 
 tional one in the fullest sense. 1 
 
 1 See Appendix, Consf n U. N., Art. XI, Sec. 2. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 AND 
 TENTATIVE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
 IN 
 
 PARALLEL COLUMNS 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION. 
 
 We the people of the United 
 States, in order to form a more 
 perfect Union, establish justice, 
 insure domestic tranquillity, pro- 
 vide for the common defense, 
 promote the general welfare, and 
 secure the blessings of liberty to 
 ourselves and our posterity, do 
 ordain and establish this Consti- 
 tution for the United States of 
 America. 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 Section i. All legislative pow- 
 ers herein granted shall be vested 
 in a Congress of the United 
 States, which shall consist of a 
 Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives. 
 
 Section 2. The House of Rep- 
 resentatives shall be composed of 
 members chosen every second 
 year by the people of the several 
 States, and the electors in each 
 State shall have the qualifications 
 requisite for electors of the most 
 numerous branch of the State 
 legislature. 
 
 Representatives and direct taxes 
 shall be apportioned among the 
 several States which may be in- 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, ITS OR- 
 GANIZATION AND POWERS 
 
 Section i. All legislative pow- 
 ers herein granted shall be vested 
 in a Congress of the United Na- 
 tions, which shall consist of a 
 Senate and House of Delegates. 
 [Ante, pp. 32 et seq.] 
 
 Section 2. i. The House of 
 Delegates shall be composed of 
 delegations representing the sev- 
 eral component nations, chosen 
 as the laws of each nation shall 
 direct. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 50 et seq.] 
 
 2. Each nation shall be repre- 
 sented in the House of Delegates 
 by votes in proportion to the pop- 
 
 257 
 
2 5 8 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 eluded within this Union, accord- 
 ing to their respective numbers, 
 which shall be determined by 
 adding to the whole number of 
 free persons, including those 
 bound to service for a term of 
 years, and excluding Indians not 
 taxed, three-fifths of all other 
 persons. [Now modified by 
 Amendment XIV, Sec. 2.] The 
 actual enumeration shall be made 
 within three years after the first 
 meeting of the Congress of the 
 United States, and within every 
 subsequent term of ten years, in 
 such manner as they shall by law 
 direct. The number of Represen- 
 tatives shall not exceed one for 
 every thirty thousand, but each 
 State shall have at least one Rep- 
 resentative, and until such enu- 
 meration shall be made, the State 
 of New Hampshire shall be en- 
 titled to choose three, Massachu- 
 setts eight, Rhode Island and 
 Providence Plantations one, Con- 
 necticut five, New York six, New 
 Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, 
 Delaware one, Maryland six, Vir- 
 ginia ten, North Carolina five, 
 South Carolina five, and Georgia 
 three. 
 
 The House of Representatives 
 shall choose their speaker and 
 other officers; and shall have the 
 sole power of impeachment. 
 
 [The President, Vice-President, 
 and all civil officers of the United 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 ulation of all its territories, which 
 shall be determined by adding to 
 the whole number of white per- 
 sons one-third of all other per- 
 sons: provided that persons of 
 full Japanese blood shall, for the 
 purposes of this section, be 
 counted as white persons. The 
 actual enumeration shall be made 
 within five years after the first 
 meeting of the Congress of the 
 United Nations, and within every 
 subsequent term of ten years, in 
 such manner as they shall by law 
 direct. The number of votes to 
 which each nation shall be en- 
 titled in the House of Delegates 
 shall not exceed one for every 
 four millions of population, or 
 fraction thereof in excess of fifty 
 per centum, estimated in the 
 manner before mentioned, but 
 each nation shall have at least 
 one vote. Until such enumera- 
 tion shall be made, each na- 
 tion shall be entitled to votes on 
 the basis mentioned, in accord- 
 ance with the last official census 
 taken by such nation prior to its 
 ratification of this constitution. 
 Each delegation shall cast the 
 votes of its nation as a whole or 
 in such other manner as the na- 
 tion may by its laws direct. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 33 et seq.] 
 3. The House of Delegates 
 shall choose its presiding and 
 other officers. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 0. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 States shall be removed from of- 
 fice on impeachment for, and con- 
 viction of, treason, bribery, or 
 other high crimes and misde- 
 meanors. Article II, Sec. 4.] 
 
 Section 3. The Senate of the 
 United States shall be composed 
 of two Senators from each State 
 elected by the people thereof for 
 six years; and each Senator shall 
 have one vote. 
 
 The electors in each State shall 
 have the qualifications requisite 
 for electors of the most nu- 
 merous branch of the State legis- 
 lature. [Amendment XVII.] 
 
 Immediately after they shall 
 be assembled in consequence of 
 the first election, they shall be di- 
 vided as equally as may be into 
 three classes. The seats of the 
 Senators of the first class shall be 
 vacated at the expiration of the 
 second year, of the second class at 
 the expiration of the fourth year, 
 and of the third class at the ex- 
 piration of the sixth year, so that 
 one-third may be chosen every 
 second year. . . . 
 
 The Vice-President of the 
 United States shall be President 
 of the Senate, but shall have no 
 vote unless they be equally di- 
 vided. 
 
 The Senate shall choose their 
 other officers; and also a Presi- 
 dent pro tcmpore, in the absence 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 [See Article III, Sec. 2, cl. 2.] 
 
 Section 3. i. The Senate of the 
 United Nations shall be composed 
 of delegations from each compo- 
 nent nation chosen as the laws of 
 each nation shall direct. Each 
 delegation shall have two votes, 
 which shall be cast as a whole or 
 in such other manner as each na- 
 tion may by its laws direct. 
 [Ante, pp. 46 et seq.] 
 
 2. The Senate shall choose its 
 presiding and other officers. 
 
260 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 of the Vice-President, or when he 
 shall exercise the office of Presi- 
 dent of the United States. 
 
 The Senate shall have the sole 
 power to try all impeachments. 
 When sitting for the purpose, 
 they shall be on oath or affirma- 
 tion. When the President of the 
 United States is tried, the Chief 
 Justice shall preside; and no per- 
 son shall be convicted without 
 the concurrence of two-thirds of 
 the members present. 
 
 Judgment in cases of impeach- 
 ment shall not extend further 
 than to removal from office, and 
 disqualification to hold and en- 
 joy any office of honor, trust or 
 profit under the United States; 
 but the party convicted shall 
 nevertheless be liable and sub- 
 ject to indictment, trial, judgment, 
 and punishment, according to 
 law. 
 
 [For terms of office of Repre- 
 sentatives, see Article I, Sec. 2, 
 cl. I, and of Senators, see Article 
 I f Sec. 3, cl. i; Amendment 
 XFIL] 
 
 [For eligibility of representa- 
 tives, see Article I, Sec. 2, cl. 2, 
 and of Senators, see Article I, 
 Sec. 3, cl. 3.] 
 
 [When vacancies shall happen 
 in the representation (i.e., in the 
 lower House, and now, by the 
 Seventeenth Amendment in the 
 Senate also) from any State, the 
 executive authority thereof shall 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 [See ante, pp. 60 et seq.] 
 
 Section 4. i. The terms of of- 
 fice and the number of the mem- 
 bers, of the delegations in each 
 house shall be at the will of the 
 respective nations they represent, 
 as directed by its laws. Each na- 
 tion shall also regulate by its 
 own laws the eligibility of its 
 delegates in either house and the 
 recall of each or all of them. 
 [Ante, pp. 50 et seq.] 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 261 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 issue writs of election to fill such 
 vacancies. Article I, Sec. 2, cl. 
 4; Sec. 3, cl. 2; Amendment 
 XVIL] 
 
 [The Congress shall assemble 
 at least once in every year, and 
 such meeting shall be on the first 
 Monday in December, unless they 
 shall by law appoint a different 
 day. Article I, Sec. 4, cl. 2.] 
 
 [Neither House, during the ses- 
 sion of Congress, shall, without 
 the consent of the other, adjourn 
 for more than three days, nor to 
 any other place than that in 
 which the two houses shall be sit- 
 ting. Article I, Sec. 5, cl. 4.] 
 
 Section 5. Each House shall be 
 the judge of the elections, returns, 
 and qualifications of its own 
 members; and a majority of each 
 shall constitute a quorum to do 
 business; but a small number 
 may adjourn from day to day, 
 and may be authorized to compel 
 the attendance of absent mem- 
 bers, in such manner and under 
 such penalties as each House may 
 provide. 
 
 Each House may determine the 
 rules of its proceedings, punish its 
 members for disorderly behavior, 
 and, with the concurrence of two- 
 thirds, expel a member. 
 
 Each House shall keep a jour- 
 nal of its proceedings, and from 
 time to time publish the same, ex- 
 cepting such parts as may require 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 2. The Congress shall remain 
 in perpetual session, subject to 
 such recess, not exceeding four 
 months at one time, as the two 
 houses shall from time to time 
 agree upon. 
 
 [Ante, p. 53.] 
 
 3. Neither house shall, with- 
 out the consent of the other, ad- 
 journ for more than one week, 
 nor to any other place than that 
 in which the two houses shall be 
 sitting. 
 
 [Ante, p. 53.] 
 
 Section 5. i. A 'majority of the 
 votes in each house shall consti- 
 tute a quorum to do business; but 
 a smaller number may adjourn 
 from day to day. 
 
 2. Each house may determine 
 the rules of its proceedings, pun- 
 ish delegates for disorderly be- 
 havior, and, with the concurrence 
 of two-thirds of the votes, expel a 
 delegate. 
 
 [Ante, p. 65.] 
 
 3. Each house shall keep a 
 journal of its proceedings, and 
 from time to time publish the 
 same in such language or Ian- 
 
262 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 secrecy; and the yeas and nays 
 of the members of either House 
 on any question shall, at the de- 
 sire of one-fifth of those present, 
 be entered on the journal. 
 
 Section 6. The Senators and 
 Representatives shall receive a 
 compensation for their services to 
 be ascertained by law, and paid 
 out of the treasury of the United 
 States. 
 
 They shall in all cases, except 
 treason, felony, and breach of the 
 peace, be privileged from arrest 
 during their attendance at the ses- 
 sion of their respective Houses, 
 and in going to and returning 
 from the same ; and for any 
 speech or debate in either House, 
 they shall not be questioned in 
 any other place. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 guages as the Congress may by 
 law direct, excepting such parts 
 as may require secrecy; and the 
 votes of the delegations in either 
 house on every question (save on 
 a question of adjournment) shall 
 be entered on the journal, unless 
 the Congress shall by law other- 
 wise direct. 
 
 [Ante, p. 65.] 
 
 Section 6. i. The delegations 
 in either house shall receive, in 
 proportion to the number of votes 
 each delegation is entitled to cast, 
 compensation for their services to 
 be ascertained by law, and paid 
 out of the treasury of the United 
 Nations. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 53 et seq.] 
 
 2. The members of each dele- 
 gation shall have the privileges 
 and immunities of ambassadors to 
 a foreign State, while passing 
 through the territories of other 
 component nations. They shall in 
 all cases, except felony and 
 breach of the peace, be privileged 
 from arrest during their attend- 
 ance at the session of their re- 
 spective houses, and in going to 
 and returning from the same; 
 and for any speech or debate in 
 either house, they shall not be 
 questioned in any other place 
 than the State they respectively 
 represent, in accordance with its 
 laws. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 54, 55-] 
 
 No Senator or Representative 
 shall, during the time for which 
 he was elected, be appointed to 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 263 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 any civil office under the author- 
 ity of the United States, which 
 shall have been created, or the 
 emoluments whereof shall have 
 been increased, during such time; 
 and no person holding any. office 
 under the United States shall be 
 a member of either House during 
 his continuance in office. 
 
 Section 7. All bills for raising 
 revenue shall originate in the 
 House of Representatives ; but the 
 Senate may propose or concur 
 with amendments as on other 
 bills. 
 
 Every bill which shall have 
 passed the House of Representa- 
 tives and the Senate, shall, be- 
 fore it becomes a law, be pre- 
 sented to the President of the 
 United States. If he approve he 
 shall sign it, but if not he shall 
 return it, with his objections, to 
 that House in which it shall have 
 originated, who shall enter the 
 objections at large on their jour- 
 nal, and proceed to reconsider it. 
 If after such reconsideration two- 
 thirds of that House shall agree 
 to pass the bill, it shall be sent, 
 together with the objections, to 
 the other House, by which it shall 
 likewise be reconsidered, and if 
 approved by two-thirds of that 
 House, it shall become a law. 
 But in all such cases the votes of 
 both Houses shall be determined 
 by yeas and nays, and the names 
 of the persons voting for and 
 against the bill shall be entered 
 on the journal of each House re- 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Section 7. No law for raising 
 revenue or for the regulation of 
 commerce shall continue in force 
 for a longer term than ten years 
 from its passage. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 55 et seq.] 
 
 Section 8. i. In order that any 
 measure proposed in either house 
 shall be binding on the com- 
 ponent nations, it shall first 
 have passed each house by a ma- 
 jority of the votes present. But 
 if any component nation shall en- 
 tertain a doubt as to the constitu- 
 tionality of a measure thus passed 
 on the ground that it impairs the 
 reserved powers of the compo- 
 nent nations, such nation, through 
 its delegation in each house, may, 
 within thirty days after it has 
 been so passed, give notice to the 
 Congress that it is deliberating 
 whether it shall veto the measure. 
 If, within the time mentioned, no 
 nation shall have given such no- 
 tice, or if, within one year from 
 such passage, the nation or na- 
 tions giving such notice shall not 
 have vetoed it by a statement to 
 that effect entered on the journal 
 of each house, the measure shall 
 become binding. 
 
264 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 spectively. If any bill shall not 
 be returned by the President 
 within ten days (Sundays ex- 
 cepted) after it shall have been 
 presented to him, the same shall 
 be a law, in like manner as if he 
 had signed it, unless the Congress 
 by their adjournment prevent its 
 return, in which case it shall not 
 be a law. 
 
 Every order, resolution, or vote 
 to which the concurrence of the 
 Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives may be necessary (except on 
 a question of adjournment) shall 
 be presented to the President of 
 the United States; and before the 
 same shall take effect, shall be 
 approved by him, or being dis- 
 approved by him, shall be re- 
 passed by two-thirds of the Sen- 
 ate and House of Representatives, 
 according to the rules and limi- 
 tations prescribed in the case of a 
 bill. 
 
 Section 8. The Congress shall 
 have power 
 
 To lay and collect taxes, duties, 
 imposts, and excises, to pay the 
 debts and provide for the com- 
 mon defense and general welfare 
 of the United States; but all 
 duties, imposts and excises shall 
 be uniform throughout the United 
 States; 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 2. If, after such notice and 
 within one year from such pas- 
 sage, a nation shall veto the 
 measure on the ground mentioned, 
 it may be voted on again in each 
 house and if three-fourths of all 
 the votes of each house shall 
 be cast therefor, it shall be- 
 come binding, notwithstanding the 
 veto; if not, it shall not be bind- 
 ing. Periods of Congressional 
 recess shall not be estimated in 
 the thirty days or in the year 
 herein referred to. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 57 et seq.] 
 
 Section 9. The Congress shall 
 have power 
 
 i. To lay and collect taxes 
 upon land, in order to pay the 
 debts of the United Nations, pro- 
 vide for their common defense, 
 and execute the powers herein 
 granted to them. All taxes upon 
 land shall be uniform throughout 
 the territories of the several com- 
 ponent nations; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 69 et seq.] 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 265 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 To borrow money on 
 credit of the United States; 
 
 the 
 
 To coin money, regulate the 
 value thereof and of foreign coin, 
 and fix the standard of weights 
 and measures; 
 
 To provide for the punishment 
 of counterfeiting the securities 
 and current coin of the United 
 States ; 
 
 To regulate commerce with 
 foreign nations, and among the 
 several States, and with the In- 
 dian tribes; 
 
 [The migration or importation 
 of such persons as any of the 
 States now existing shall think 
 proper to admit, shall not be pro- 
 hibited by the Congress prior to 
 the year 1808, but a tax or duty 
 may be imposed on such importa- 
 tion, not exceeding ten dollars for 
 each person. Article I, Sec. 9, 
 cl. i.] 
 
 To establish an uniform rule 
 of naturalization and uniform 
 laws on the subject of bankrupt- 
 cies throughout the United States ; 
 
 To establish post offices and 
 post roads; 
 
 To promote the progress of sci- 
 ence, and useful arts, by securing 
 for limited times to authors and 
 inventors the exclusive right to 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 2. To borrow money on the 
 credit of the United Nations, 
 through the issuance of bonds 
 [and to provide by law for the 
 issuance of paper currency] ; 
 [Ante, pp. 74 et seq.] 
 
 [3. To coin money, regulate the 
 value thereof and of foreign coin, 
 and fix the standard of weights 
 and measures] ; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 76, 78.] 
 
 4. To provide for the punish- 
 ment of counterfeiting the securi- 
 ties, [coin and paper currency] 
 of the United Nations; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 77, 78.] 
 
 5. To regulate international 
 commerce by uniform laws; but 
 nothing herein shall be construed 
 to give to the Congress the power 
 to regulate immigration, emigra- 
 tion, or the migration of persons 
 to or from a component State ; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 79 et seq.] 
 
 [See ante, pp. 97 et seq., 159 
 et seq.] 
 
 [See Article IV, Sec. I, cl. 2] 
 
 6. To regulate international 
 postal and other communication 
 by uniform laws; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 85 et seq.] 
 [7. To provide for interna- 
 tional copyrights and patent 
 rights] ; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 87, 88.] 
 
266 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 their respective writings and dis- 
 coveries; 
 
 To constitute tribunals inferior 
 to the Supreme Court; 
 
 To define and punish piracies 
 
 and felonies committed on the 
 
 high seas, and offenses against 
 the Law of Nations; 
 
 To declare war, grant letters of 
 marque and reprisal, and make 
 rules concerning captures on land 
 and water; 
 
 To raise and support armies, 
 but no appropriation of money to 
 that use shall be for a longer 
 term than two years; 
 
 To provide and maintain a 
 navy; 
 
 To make rules for the govern- 
 ment and regulation of the land 
 and naval forces; 
 
 To provide for calling forth 
 the militia to execute the laws of 
 the Union, suppress insurrections, 
 and repel invasions; 
 
 To provide for organizing, 
 arming, and disciplining the mili- 
 tia, and for governing such part 
 of them as may be employed in 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 8. To constitute tribunals infe- 
 rior to the Supreme Court; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 88 et seq.] 
 
 9. To define and provide for 
 the punishment and redress of of- 
 fenses and private wrongs (other 
 than breaches of contract) com- 
 mitted on the high seas, and of- 
 fenses against the Law of Na- 
 tions; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 92, 93.] 
 
 10. To declare war, and make 
 rules concerning captures on land 
 and water; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 93 et seq.] 
 
 11. To raise and support arm- 
 ies; but no appropriation of 
 money to that use shall be for a 
 longer term than two years; 
 
 12. To provide and maintain a 
 navy. 
 
 13. To make rules for the gov- 
 ernment and regulation of the 
 land and naval forces of the 
 United Nations; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 93 et seq.] 
 
 14. To provide for calling 
 forth the armed forces (includ- 
 ing the militia) of the several 
 component nations, in order to ex- 
 ecute the laws of the union, sup- 
 press insurrections against the 
 government of the United Na- 
 tions, and repel invasions; 
 
 15. To provide for governing 
 such part of the armed forces of 
 the component nations as may be 
 employed in the service of the 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 267 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 the service of the United States, 
 reserving to the States, respec- 
 tively, the appointment of the of- 
 ficers, and the authority of train- 
 ing the militia according to the 
 discipline prescribed by Congress; 
 To exercise exclusive legisla- 
 tion in all cases whatsoever, over 
 such district (not exceeding ten 
 miles square) as may, by cession 
 of particular States and the ac- 
 ceptance of Congress, become the 
 seat of the government of the 
 United States, and to exercise like 
 authority over all places pur- 
 chased by the consent of the leg- 
 islature of the State in which the 
 same shall be for the erection of 
 forts, magazines, arsenals, dock 
 yards, and other needful build- 
 ings; 
 
 To make all laws which shall 
 be necessary and proper for car- 
 rying into execution the foregoing 
 powers, and all other powers 
 vested by this Constitution in the 
 government of the United States, 
 or in any department or officer 
 thereof. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 United Nations, reserving to the 
 nations, respectively, the appoint- 
 ment of the officers and the au- 
 thority of training the forces; 
 [Ante, pp. 93 et seq.] 
 
 1 6. To exercise exclusive legis- 
 lation in all cases whatsoever, 
 over such district (not exceeding 
 fifty square miles) as may, by 
 cession of particular nations and 
 the acceptance of the Congress, 
 become the seat of the govern- 
 ment of the United Nations, and 
 to exercise like authority over all 
 places purchased by the consent 
 of the State in which the same 
 shall be, for the erection of 
 forts, magazines, arsenals, dock 
 yards, and other needful build- 
 ings; and 
 
 [Ante, pp. 95, 96.] 
 
 17. To make all laws which 
 shall be reasonably necessary and 
 proper for carrying into execution 
 the foregoing powers, and all 
 other powers vested by this con- 
 stitution in the government of the 
 United Nations, or in any depart- 
 ment or officer thereof. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 96, 97.] 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, ITS OR- 
 GANIZATION AND POWERS 
 
 Section i. The executive power 
 shall be vested in a President of 
 the United States of America. 
 
 Section i. i. The executive 
 power of the United Nations 
 shall be vested in a Council of 
 Ministers, composed of members 
 
268 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 He shall hold his office during 
 the term of four years, and, to- 
 gether with the Vice-President, 
 chosen for the same term, be 
 elected, as follows: 
 
 Each State shall appoint in 
 such manner as the legislature 
 thereof may direct, a number of 
 electors, equal to the whole num- 
 ber of Senators and Representa- 
 tives to which the State may be 
 entitled in the Congress, but no 
 Senator or Representative, or per- 
 son holding an office of trust or 
 profit under tLe United States, 
 shall be appointed an elector. 
 
 [The electors shall meet in 
 their respective States, and vote 
 by ballot for President and Vice- 
 President, one of whom, at least, 
 shall not be an inhabitant of the 
 same State with themselves; they 
 shall name in their ballots the 
 person voted for as President, and 
 in distinct ballots the person 
 voted for as Vice-President, and 
 they shall make distinct lists of 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 of the Congress, and consisting of 
 a prime minister and such others, 
 appointed by him and removable 
 at his pleasure, as the Congress 
 shall by law direct, provided that 
 not more than two of the council 
 shall be of the same nation. 
 [Ante, pp. zoo et seq.] 
 
 2. The prime minister shall 
 hold his office until he be recalled 
 by a resolution passed by a ma- 
 jority of all the votes of either 
 house of the Congress, unless the 
 position fall vacant by his death, 
 resignation, or recall from the 
 Congress, by the nation he repre- 
 sents. He shall be chosen as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 [Ante, pp. in, H2.] 
 
 3. A nominating committee, 
 composed of eight Senators and 
 eight Delegates, elected by their 
 respective houses in accordance 
 with the rules of each house, who 
 shall choose their own chairman 
 and prescribe the times and 
 places of their own meetings, 
 shall nominate to each house 
 three members of the Congress 
 for the office of prime minister. 
 Upon the receipt of such nomina- 
 tions, each house shall vote by 
 ballot upon the nominees accord- 
 ing to the rules prescribed by the 
 Congress. If none of those named 
 shall receive a majority of all 
 the votes in each house, another 
 committee shall be elected as be- 
 fore, who shall nominate three 
 other members of the Congress. 
 These shall be voted for in like 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 269 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 all persons voted for as Presi- 
 dent, and of all persons voted for 
 as Vice-President, and of the 
 number of votes for each, which 
 lists they shall sign and certify, 
 and transmit sealed to the seat of 
 government of the United States, 
 directed to the President of the 
 Senate; the President of the Sen- 
 ate shall, in presence of the Sen- 
 ate and House of Representatives, 
 open all the certificates and the 
 votes shall then be counted ; the 
 person having the greatest num- 
 ber of votes for President shall 
 be the President, if such number 
 be a majority of the whole num- 
 ber of electors appointed ; and if 
 no person have such majority, 
 then from the persons having 
 the highest number not exceeding 
 three on the list of those voted for 
 as President, the House of Repre- 
 sentatives shall choose immedi- 
 ately, by ballot, the President. 
 But in choosing the President, the 
 votes shall be taken by States, the 
 representative from each State 
 having one vote; a quorum for 
 this purpose shall consist of a 
 member or members from two- 
 thirds of the States, and a ma- 
 jority of all the States shall be 
 necessary to a choice. And if the 
 House of Representatives shall 
 not choose a President whenever 
 the right of choice shall devolve 
 upon them before the fourth day 
 of March, next following, then 
 the Vice-President shall act as 
 President, as in the case of the 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 manner and upon like conditions 
 as the previous nominees, and so 
 on until a prime minister be 
 chosen by a majority of all the 
 votes of both houses of the Con- 
 gress. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 106 et seq.] 
 
270 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 death or other constitutional dis- 
 ability of the President. The per- 
 son having the greatest number of 
 votes as Vice-President shall be 
 the Vice-President, if such num- 
 ber be a majority of the whole 
 number of electors appointed, and 
 if no person have a majority, then 
 from the two highest numbers on 
 the list, the Senate shall choose 
 the Vice-President; a quorum for 
 the purpose shall consist of two- 
 thirds of the whole number of 
 Senators, and a majority of the 
 whole number shall be necessary 
 to a choice. But no person con- 
 stitutionally ineligible to the of- 
 fice of President shall be eligible 
 to that of Vice-President of the 
 United States. Amendment XII.] 
 
 The Congress may determine 
 the time of choosing the electors 
 and the day on which they shall 
 give their votes, which day shall 
 be the same throughout the 
 United States. 
 
 No person except a natural 
 born citizen, or a citizen of the 
 United States at the time of the 
 adoption of this Constitution, 
 shall be eligible to ,the office of 
 President; neither shall any per- 
 son be eligible to that office who 
 shall not have attained to the age 
 of thirty-five years, and been 
 fourteen years a resident within 
 the United States. 
 
 In case of the removal of the 
 President from office, or of his 
 death, resignation, or inability to 
 discharge the powers and duties 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 271 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 of the said office, the same shall 
 devolve on the Vice-President^ 
 and the Congress may by law 
 provide for the case of removal, 
 death, resignation, or inability, 
 both of the President and Vice- 
 President, declaring what officer 
 shall then act as President, and 
 such officer shall act accordingly, 
 until the disability be removed, or 
 a President shall be elected. 
 
 The President shall, at stated 
 times, receive for his services, a 
 compensation, which shall neither 
 be increased nor diminished dur- 
 ing the period for which he shall 
 have been elected, and he shall 
 not receive within that period 
 any other emolument from the 
 United States or any of them. 
 
 Before he enter on the execu- 
 tion of his office, he shall take the 
 following oath or affirmation: "I 
 do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
 that I will faithfully execute the 
 office of President of the United 
 States, and will to the best of my 
 ability, preserve, protect, and de- 
 fend the Constitution of the 
 United States." 
 
 Section 2. The President shall 
 be Commander-in-Chief of the 
 army and navy of the United 
 States, and of the militia of the 
 several States, when called into 
 the actual service of the United 
 States; he may require the opin- 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Section 2. The prime minister 
 and the subordinate ministers 
 shall receive from the treasury of 
 the United Nations such compen- 
 sation, in addition to that to 
 which they may be entitled as 
 members of their respective dele- 
 gations, as shall be prescribed by 
 law; nor shall they receive dur- 
 ing the period of their ministry 
 any other emolument from the 
 United Nations or any of them. 
 [Ante, pp. 112, 113.] 
 
 [See Article VIII, Sec. 2.] 
 
 Section 3. The prime minister, 
 acting through the council or the 
 appropriate minister, as the law 
 shall direct, shall 
 
 [See ante, pp. 114 et seq.] 
 
272 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 ion in writing of the principal of- 
 ficer in each of the executive de- 
 partments, upon any subject re- 
 lating to the duties of their re- 
 spective offices, and he shall have 
 power to grant reprieves and 
 pardons for offenses against the 
 United States, except in cases of 
 impeachment; 
 
 He shall have power, by and 
 with the advice and consent of 
 the Senate, to make treaties, pro- 
 vided two-thirds of the Senators 
 present concur, and he shall 
 nominate, and by and with the 
 advice and consent of the Senate, 
 shall appoint ambassadors, other 
 public ministers, and consuls, 
 judges of the Supreme Court, and 
 all other officers of the United 
 States, whose appointments are 
 not herein otherwise provided for, 
 and which shall be established by 
 law; but the Congress may by 
 law vest the appointment of such 
 inferior officers, as they think 
 proper in the President alone, in 
 the courts of law, or in the heads 
 of departments. 
 
 The President shall have 
 power to fill up all vacancies 
 that may happen during the re- 
 cess of the Senate, by granting 
 commissions which shall expire at 
 the end of their next session. 
 
 Section 3. He shall from time 
 to time give to the Congress in- 
 formation of the state of the 
 union, and recommend to their 
 consideration such measures as 
 he shall judge necessary and ex- 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 i. Grant reprieves, commuta- 
 tions of sentence and pardons for 
 offenses against the United Na- 
 tions; 
 
 [Ante, p. 115.] 
 
 2. Make treaties with nations 
 not members of this union, by and 
 with the advice and consent of the 
 Congress, concerning matters to 
 which the constitutional powers 
 of the United Nations shall 
 extend, provided two-thirds of 
 the votes present in each house 
 concur. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 115 et seq.] 
 
 3. Appoint and remove, sub- 
 ject to such regulations of the 
 civil, military, and naval service 
 as may be prescribed by law, 
 ambassadors and all other execu- 
 tive officers of the United Na- 
 tions, whose appointments are 
 not herein otherwise provided 
 for, and which shall be estab- 
 lished by law; but the Congress 
 may by law vest the appoint- 
 ment of inferior court officers in 
 the courts of law; 
 
 [Ante, pp. ii 8 et seq.] 
 
 [See ante, pp. 122, 123.] 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 273 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 pedient; he may, on extraordi- 
 nary occasions, convene both 
 Houses, or either of them, and in 
 case of disagreement between 
 them with respect to the time of 
 adjournment, he may adjourn 
 them to such time as he shall 
 think proper ; 
 
 He shall receive ambassadors 
 and other public ministers; 
 
 He shall take care that the 
 laws be faithfully executed; 
 
 And shall commission all the 
 officers of the United States. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Section 4. The President, Vice- 
 President, and all civil officers of 
 the United States, shall be re- 
 moved from office on impeach- 
 ment for, and conviction of, trea- 
 son, bribery, or other high crimes 
 and misdemeanors. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 Section i. The judicial power 
 of the United States shall be 
 vested in one Supreme Court, and 
 in such inferior courts as the Con- 
 gress may from time to time or- 
 dain and establish. 
 
 4. Receive ambassadors and 
 other public ministers; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 120, 121.] 
 
 5. Execute and enforce the 
 laws of the United Nations; 
 
 [Ante, p. 121.] 
 
 6. Commission all the execu- 
 tive officers of the United Na- 
 tions; but the judicial and legis- 
 lative officers of the United Na- 
 tions shall be commissioned as 
 the laws of the States appoint- 
 ing them shall direct. 
 
 [Ante, p. 122.] 
 
 [See Article HI, Sec. 2, cl 2. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT, ITS OR- 
 GANIZATION AND POWERS 
 
 Section i. The judicial power 
 of the United Nations shall be 
 vested in one Supreme Court, 
 and in such courts of the com- 
 ponent nations or in such infe- 
 rior international courts as the 
 
274 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 The judges, both of the Su- 
 preme and inferior courts shall 
 hold their offices during good be- 
 havior; and shall, at stated times, 
 receive for their services, a com- 
 pensation which shall not be di- 
 minished during their continu- 
 ance in office. 
 
 [See Article U, Sec. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Congress may provide or estab- 
 lish. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 88 et seq., 129 et 
 seq.] 
 
 Section 2. i. The judges, bcth 
 of the Supreme and inferior in- 
 ternational courts, shall be ap- 
 pointed by the executive author- 
 ity of the State they respectively 
 represent, or wherein they are 
 respectively to perform their ju- 
 dicial functions, in such manner 
 as shall be prescribed by the laws 
 of each State; shall hold their 
 offices during good behavior; and 
 shall, at stated times, receive 
 from the treasury of the United 
 Nations for their services a com- 
 pensation which shall not be di- 
 minished during their continu- 
 ance in office. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 125 et seq.] 
 
 2. A judge, either of the Su- 
 preme or an inferior international 
 court, may be removed from ofr 
 fice by the Congress for extortion, 
 bribery, corruption, or other high 
 crime or misdemeanor. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 62 et seq.] 
 
 Section 3. i. The Supreme 
 Court shall consist of such equal 
 number of representatives from 
 each of the component nations as 
 the Congress shall by law deter- 
 mine. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 130 et seq.] 
 
 2. Immediately after they 
 shall be assembled in conse- 
 quence of the first appointments, 
 they shall be divided by lot as 
 equally as may be into three sec- 
 
APPENDIX 275 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 tions. The first section shall hear 
 and finally determine all contro- 
 versies properly coming before 
 the court, which shall affect am- 
 bassadors, other public ministers, 
 or consuls accredited to the 
 United Nations or to any of them; 
 or which shall arise between com- 
 ponent nations, or between the 
 United Nations and one or more 
 nations, either members or not 
 members of this union ; or between 
 one or more of the component 
 nations and nations not members 
 of this union; or between nations 
 not members of this union. The 
 second section shall hear and fi- 
 nally determine all civil cases, 
 properly coming before the court, 
 wherein private persons are liti- 
 gant on one or both sides. The 
 third section shall hear and 
 finally determine all criminal 
 cases properly coming before the 
 court. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 132 et seq.] 
 3. If a party to the litigation is 
 dissatisfied with the decision of 
 any section that the case is or is 
 not triable therein, he may ap- 
 peal from such decision to the 
 entire Supreme Court, all the sec- 
 tions sitting together; and a like 
 appeal shall lie in case of con- 
 flicting decisions of several sec- 
 tions upon questions involving 
 the interpretation of this consti- 
 tution, or of the laws or treaties 
 of the United Nations, or of the 
 treaties of the several component 
 nations made or which shall be 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Section 2. The judicial power 
 shall extend 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 made with each other or with na- 
 tions not members of this union. 
 [Ante, pp. 134 et seq.] 
 
 4. Immediately after the first 
 division of the Supreme Court 
 into sections, the judges in each 
 section shall draw lots for their 
 respective positions or order of 
 official seniority therein. The 
 judge drawing the first place in 
 his section shall be the presiding 
 judge thereof until removed by 
 death, resignation, action of the 
 Congress, or promotion to a 
 higher section, in which case his 
 place shall be taken by the judge 
 next in order of official seniority. 
 The presiding judge of the first 
 section shall be the chief justice 
 of the Supreme Court. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 133, 134.] 
 
 5. When a vacancy occurs in 
 any section, all judges in that sec- 
 tion holding positions below the 
 vacant place shall advance one 
 degree in official seniority, leav- 
 ing the last position in such sec- 
 tion vacant, which vacancy, in 
 case of the first two sections, 
 shall be filled by promotion of 
 the presiding judge of the section 
 next below; and, in case of the 
 third section, by the appointment 
 of another judge by the executive 
 authority of that nation the loss 
 of whose representative on the 
 court inaugurated the series of 
 vacancies. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 133, 134.] 
 Section 4. The judicial power 
 of the United Nations shall 
 extend 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 277 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 To all cases, in law and equity, 
 arising under this Constitution, 
 the laws of the United States, 
 and treaties m&de or which shall 
 be made under their authority; 
 
 To all cases affecting ambas- 
 sadors, other public ministers, 
 and consuls; 
 
 To all cases of admiralty and 
 maritime jurisdiction; 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 i. To all cases arising under 
 this constitution, or under the 
 laws or treaties of the United 
 Nations, or under treaties made 
 or which shall be made by the re- 
 spective component nations. In 
 any justiciable case arising under 
 this clause, when such a course is 
 necessary to a proper decision, 
 the court having jurisdiction of 
 the case, shall for the purposes of 
 its decision, disregard as uncon- 
 stitutional any law or treaty of 
 the United Nations which violates 
 this constitution, and shall in like 
 manner disregard any law or 
 treaty of a component nation 
 which violates this constitution or 
 the laws or treaties of the United 
 Nations which shall be made in 
 pursuance thereof. Provided, that 
 neither the Supreme Court nor 
 any section thereof shall thus dis- 
 regard any law or treaty unless 
 three-fourths of the judges com- 
 prising the court or section shall 
 have so determined, but shall en- 
 force the same. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 136 et seq.] 
 
 2. To all cases affecting am- 
 bassadors, other public ministers 
 and consuls accredited to the 
 United Nations or to any of 
 them; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 142, 143-] 
 
 3. To all cases of offenses and 
 private wrongs (other than 
 breaches of contract) committed 
 on the high seas; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 143 et seq.] 
 
2 7 8 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 To controversies to which the 
 United States shall be a party; 
 
 To controversies between two 
 or more States; between a State 
 and citizens of another State; be- 
 tween citizens of different States; 
 between citizens of the same 
 State claiming lands under grants 
 of different States; and between 
 a State, or the citizens thereof, 
 and foreign States, citizens or 
 subjects. 
 
 In all cases affecting ambassa- 
 dors, other public ministers, and 
 consuls, and those in which a 
 State shall be party, the Supreme 
 Court shall have original juris- 
 diction. 
 
 In all the other cases before 
 mentioned, the Supreme Court 
 shall have appellate jurisdiction, 
 both as to law and fact, with such 
 exceptions, and under such regu- 
 lations as the Congress shall 
 make. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 4. To controversies to which 
 the United Nations shall be a 
 party; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 145, I4 6.] 
 
 5. To controversies between 
 two or more component nations; 
 
 [Ante, p. 146.] 
 
 [See ante, pp. 147 et seq.] 
 
 6. To controversies between 
 component nations and nations 
 not members of this union; and 
 
 [Ante, p. 147.] 
 
 7. To controversies between 
 two or more nations not members 
 of this union, but consenting to 
 the exercise of such jurisdiction, 
 provided, that no department of 
 the government of the United Na- 
 tions shall undertake to enforce a 
 decision rendered in such circum- 
 stances. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 147, 148.] 
 Section 5. i. In all cases af- 
 fecting ambassadors, other public 
 ministers, and consuls accredited 
 to the United Nations, or to any 
 of them, and those in which any 
 nation shall be party, the Su- 
 preme Court shall have original 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 150 et seq.] 
 2. In all the other cases be- 
 fore mentioned the Supreme Court 
 shall have appellate jurisdiction, 
 both as to law and fact, upon ap- 
 peal from inferior international 
 courts, and from the courts of the 
 component nations when exercis- 
 ing the judicial power of the 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 279 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 The trial of all crimes, except 
 in cases of impeachment, shall be 
 by jury; and such trial shall be 
 held in the State where the said 
 crimes shall have been commit- 
 ted; but when not committed 
 within any State, the trial shall 
 be at such place or places as the 
 Congress may by law have di- 
 rected. 
 
 Section 3. Treason against the 
 United States shall consist only in 
 levying war against them, or in 
 adhering to their enemies, giving 
 them aid and comfort. No person 
 shall be convicted of treason un- 
 less on the testimony of two wit- 
 nesses to the same overt act, or 
 on confession in open court. 
 
 The Congress shall have power 
 to declare the punishment of trea- 
 son, but no attainder of treason 
 shall work corruption of blood or 
 forfeiture except during the life 
 of the person attainted. 
 
 [The judicial power of the 
 United States shall not be con- 
 strued to extend to any suit at 
 law or equity commenced or 
 prosecuted against one of the 
 United States by citizens of an- 
 other State, or by citizens of sub- 
 jects of any foreign State. 
 Amendment XL] 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 United Nations, with such excep- 
 tions and under such regulations 
 as the Congress shall make. 
 [Ante, p. 153.] 
 
 [See Article IV, Sec. 3, cl 4. 
 
 [See Article IV, Sec. I, cl. 3.] 
 
 Section 6. The judicial power 
 of the United Nations shall not 
 extend to any original suit insti- 
 tuted by private persons against 
 a component nation; nor to any 
 personal proceeding against the 
 sovereign, chief executive, or any 
 member of the ministry or cabinet 
 of a component nation. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 154, 155.] 
 
280 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 The Congress shall have power 
 to dispose of and make all need- 
 ful rules and regulations respect- 
 ing the territory or other prop- 
 erty belonging to the United 
 States. Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. 
 
 [All persons born or natural- 
 ized in the United States, and 
 subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
 are citizens of the United States 
 and of the State wherein they 
 reside. Amendment XIV, Sec. i. 
 
 The Congress shall have power 
 to establish an uniform rule of 
 naturalization. Article I, Sec. 8, 
 cl. 4. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 ARTICLE IV 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF 
 THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
 Section i. i. No territory other 
 than that referred to in the six- 
 teenth clause of the ninth section 
 of the first Article of this consti- 
 tution shall be acquired in any 
 manner by the United Nations in 
 time of peace ; nor in war, except 
 through temporary military occu- 
 pation, to be returned at the end 
 of the war to the nation from 
 which it shall have been taken, 
 unless the Congress, three-fourths 
 of all the votes of each house 
 concurring, shall decide that the 
 general peace will be subserved 
 by granting the occupied terri- 
 tory to one or more of the com- 
 ponent nations, or to a nation 
 not a member of this union, or by 
 making of it an independent 
 State. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 157 et seq.] 
 
 2. No such status as " citizen- 
 ship of the United Nations " shall 
 be recognized, except in case of 
 persons born in the seat of the 
 government of the United Na- 
 tions, who have never been citi- 
 zens of any State, or citizens of 
 a component State permanently 
 domiciled in such district at the 
 time of the cession thereof to the 
 United Nations. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 97 et seq., 159 et 
 seq.] 
 
 3. No such crime as "treason 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 281 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 [See Article HI, Sec. 3.] 
 
 No capitation, or other direct, 
 tax shall be laid, unless in pro- 
 portion to the census or enumera- 
 tion hereinbefore directed to be 
 taken. No tax or duty shall be 
 laid on articles exported from any 
 State. Article I, Sec. 9, cl. 4, 5. 
 
 No money shall be drawn from 
 the treasury, but in consequence 
 of appropriations made by law; 
 and a regular statement and ac- 
 count of receipts and expendi- 
 tures of all public money shall be 
 published from time to time. 
 Article I, Sec. 9, cl. 7. 
 
 No preference shall be given 
 by any regulation of commerce 
 or revenue to the ports of one 
 State over those of another, nor 
 shall vessels bound to, or from, 
 one State be obliged to enter, 
 clear, or pay duties in another. 
 Article I, Sec. 9, cl. 6. 
 
 No title of nobility shall be 
 granted by the United States. 
 Article-I, Sec. 9, cl. 8. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 against the United Nations" shall 
 be recognized. 
 
 [Ante, p. 1 60.] 
 
 4. No tax of any description 
 shall be laid by the United Na- 
 tions, other than taxes upon land. 
 [Ante, pp. 1 60, 161.] 
 
 5. No money shall be drawn 
 from the treasury of the United 
 Nations but in consequence of ap- 
 propriations made by law; and a 
 regular statement and account of 
 receipts and expenditures of all 
 public money shall be published 
 from time to time. 
 
 [Ante, p. 162.] 
 
 6. No appropriation of public 
 money shall be made for purposes 
 other than those provided for in 
 this constitution; nor for bounties 
 or subsidies other than reason- 
 able pensions for aged or in- 
 capacitated public servants of the 
 United Nations. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 162, 163.] 
 
 7. No preference shall be given 
 by the United Nations to the ports 
 or trading centers, to the ships or 
 other vehicles of commerce, to 
 the persons engaged therein, or to 
 the highways of commerce of one 
 component nation over those of 
 another. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 163 et seq.] 
 
 8. No title or order of nobility 
 or of privilege shall be granted 
 or created by the United Nations. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 165, 166.] 
 
282 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 And no person holding any of- 
 fice of profit or trust under them 
 shall, without the consent of the 
 Congress, accept of any present, 
 emolument, office, or title, of any 
 kind whatever, from any king, 
 prince, or foreign State. Article 
 I, Sec. 9, cl. 8. 
 
 The privilege of the writ of 
 habeas corpus shall not be sus- 
 pended, unless when in case of 
 rebellion or invasion the public 
 safety may require it. Article I, 
 Sec. 9, cl. 2. 
 
 Congress shall make no law re- 
 specting an establishment of reli- 
 gion or prohibiting the free exer- 
 cise thereof. Amendment I. 
 
 No religious test shall ever be 
 required as a qualification to any 
 office or public trust under the 
 United StatesArticle VI. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 9. No person while holding 
 any office of profit or trust under 
 the United Nations, shall, without 
 the consent of the Congress, ac- 
 cept of any present, emolument, 
 office, or title, of any kind, what- 
 ever, from any king, ruler, or 
 State. 
 
 [Ante, p. 167.] 
 
 Section 2. i. It is the right of 
 any person imprisoned under or 
 by color of the authority of the 
 United Nations, or contrary to the 
 laws or treaties thereof, or be- 
 cause of the alleged exercise of 
 a right, or omission or violation 
 of a duty, claimed to exist under 
 the constitution, laws, or treaties 
 of the United Nations, or under 
 a treaty of a component nation or 
 under the Law of Nations, to ap- 
 ply immediately to any court au- 
 thorized by the Congress to in- 
 quire of and determine the legal- 
 ity of the imprisonment, and to 
 secure a prompt discharge if the 
 imprisonment be illegal. This 
 right shall never be suspended by 
 the Congress unless when, in 
 case of rebellion or invasion, the 
 public safety may require it. 
 [Ante, pp. 168, 169.] 
 
 2. The Congress shall make no 
 law respecting an establishment 
 of religion or prohibiting the free 
 exercise thereof, or requiring any 
 religious test as a qualification to 
 any office or public trust under 
 the United Nations, or imposing 
 civil disabilities upon any person 
 because of his religious belief; 
 [Ante, p. 170.] 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 283 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 [Congress shall make no law] 
 abridging the freedom of speech 
 and of the press. Amendment I. 
 
 [Congress shall make no law] 
 abridging the right of the people 
 peaceably to assemble, and t6 pe- 
 tition the government for a re- 
 dress of grievances. Amend- 
 ment I. 
 
 A well regulated militia, being 
 necessary to the security of a free 
 State, the right of the people to 
 keep and bear arms shall not be 
 infringed. Amendment II. 
 
 No soldier shall, in time of 
 peace, be quartered in any house 
 without the consent of the owner, 
 nor in time of war, but in a man- 
 ner to be prescribed by law. 
 Amendment III. 
 
 Nor shall private property be 
 taken for public use without just 
 compensation. Amendment V. 
 
 No person shall be deprived of 
 life, liberty, or property, without 
 due process of law. Amend- 
 ment V. 
 
 No bill of attainder or ex post 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 3. Nor any law abridging the 
 freedom of speech and of the 
 press in any component State to a 
 greater extent than is customary 
 by law or usage in such State ; 
 
 [Ante, pp. 170, 171.] 
 
 4. Nor any law abridging the 
 right of the people peaceably to 
 assemble, and to petition the gov- 
 ernment for a redress of griev- 
 ances. 
 
 [Ante, p. 172.] 
 
 5. The United Nations shall 
 not infringe the right of the peo- 
 ple to keep and bear arms. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 172, 173.] 
 
 6. No soldier shall, in time of 
 peace, be quartered by the United 
 Nations in any house without the 
 consent of the owner, nor in time 
 of war, but in a manner to be 
 prescribed by law. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 173, i?4-] 
 
 7. No person's private prop- 
 erty shall be taken by or under 
 authority of the United Nations 
 for public use without just com- 
 pensation. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 175 et seq.] 
 
 8. No person shall be deprived 
 by the United Nations of life, lib- 
 erty, or property, but after due 
 opportunity to be heard in a reg- 
 ular, orderly, and appropriate 
 proceeding; nor be denied by 
 them the equal protection of the 
 laws. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 177 et seq.] 
 Section 3. i. No law convict- 
 
284 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 facto law shall be passed. Ar- 
 ticle I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. 
 
 The right of the people to be 
 secure in their persons, houses, 
 papers, and effects, against un- 
 reasonable searches and seizures 
 shall not be violated, and no war- 
 rants shall issue, but upon prob- 
 able cause, supported by oath or 
 affirmation, and particularly de- 
 scribing the place to be searched 
 and the persons or things to be 
 seized. Amendment IV. 
 
 No person shall be held to an- 
 swer for a capital or otherwise 
 infamous crime, unless on a pre- 
 sentment or indictment of a grand 
 jury, except in cases arising in the 
 land or naval forces, or in the 
 militia, when in actual service in 
 time of war or public danger, nor 
 shall any person be subject for 
 the same offense to be twice put 
 in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
 shall be compelled in any crim- 
 inal case to be a witness against 
 himself. Amendment V. 
 
 In all criminal prosecutions, 
 the accused shall enjoy the right 
 to a speedy and public trial, by 
 an impartial jury of the State and 
 district wherein the crime shall 
 have been committed, which dis- 
 trict shall have been previously 
 ascertained by law. Amend- 
 ment VI. 
 
 The trial of all crimes, except 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 ing and punishing a person for 
 alleged offenses, nor any ex post 
 facto law punishing crime, shall 
 be passed by the Congress. 
 [Ante, pp. 181, 182.] 
 
 2. The right of the people to 
 be secure in their persons, houses, 
 papers, and effects, against un- 
 reasonable searches and seizures 
 shall not be violated by the 
 United Nations, and no warrants 
 of arrest or of search shall issue 
 but upon probable cause, supported 
 by oath or affirmation, and par- 
 ticularly describing the place to 
 be searched and the persons or 
 things to be seized. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 182, 183.] 
 
 3. No person, acquitted of 
 crime or punished therefor, shall 
 be punished again by the United 
 Nations for the same offense; nor 
 shall any person be compelled by 
 them in any criminal case to be a 
 witness against himself. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 184, 185.] 
 
 4. In all criminal prosecutions 
 by the United Nations, the ac- 
 cused shall enjoy the right to a 
 speedy and public trial by an im- 
 partial jury of the State and dis- 
 trict wherein the crime shall have 
 been committed, which district 
 shall have been previously ascer- 
 tained by law, but where not 
 committed within any State, the 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 285 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 in cases of impeachment, shall be 
 by jury; and such trial shall be 
 held in the State where the said 
 crime shall have been committed; 
 but when not committed within 
 any State, the trial shall be at 
 such place or places as the Con- 
 gress may by law have directed. 
 Article III, Sec. 2, cl. 3. 
 
 In suits at common law, where 
 the value in controversy shall ex- 
 ceed twenty dollars, the right of 
 trial by jury shall be preserved, 
 and no fact tried by a jury shall 
 be otherwise re-examined in any 
 court of the United States, than 
 according to the rules of the com- 
 mon law. Amendment VII. 
 
 [In all criminal prosecutions, 
 the accused shall enjoy the right] 
 to be informed of the nature and 
 cause of the accusation; to be 
 confronted with the witnesses 
 against him; to have compulsory 
 process for obtaining witnesses in 
 his favor; and to have the assist- 
 ance of counsel for his defense. 
 Amendment VI. 
 
 Excessive bail shall not be re- 
 quired, nor excessive fines im- 
 posed, nor cruel and unusual pun- 
 ishments inflicted. Amendment 
 VIII. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 trial shall be at such place or 
 places as the Congress shall by 
 law have directed. The number 
 of jurors, and the majority of 
 them necessary to find a verdict, 
 shall be prescribed by law. 
 [Ante, pp. 187 et seq.] 
 
 [See ante, pp. 174, 175.] 
 
 5. In all criminal prosecutions, 
 by the United Nations, the ac- 
 cused shall enjoy the right to be 
 informed of the nature and cause 
 of the accusation; to be con- 
 fronted with the witnesses against 
 him; to have compulsory process 
 for obtaining witnesses in his fa- 
 vor; to have the assistance of 
 counsel for his defense; and, 
 under such conditions as may be 
 prescribed by law, to be admitted 
 to bail. Excessive bail shall not 
 be required, nor excessive fines 
 imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
 punishments inflicted. 
 
 [Ante, p. 189.] 
 
286 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 No State shall enter into any 
 treaty, alliance, or confederation. 
 Article I, Sec. 10, cl. i. 
 
 No State shall, without the con- 
 sent of Congress . . . enter into 
 any agreement or compact with 
 another State or with a foreign 
 power. Article I, Sec. 10, cl. 3. 
 
 No State shall lay any duty of 
 tonnage. Article I, Sec. 10, cl. 3. 
 
 No State shall, without the con- 
 sent of the Congress, lay any im- 
 posts or duties on imports or ex- 
 ports, except what may be abso- 
 lutely necessary for executing its 
 inspection laws, and the net pro- 
 duce of all duties and imposts 
 laid by any State on imports or 
 exports, shall be for the use of 
 the treasury of the United States; 
 and all such laws shall be subject 
 to the revision and control of the 
 Congress. Article I, Sec. 10, 
 cl. 2. 
 
 No State shall, without the con- 
 sent of Congress. . . . keep troops 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 ARTICLE V 
 
 LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS 
 OF THE COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 Section i. No component na- 
 tion shall enter into any treaty 
 concerning matters subject to the 
 control of the United Nations, or 
 into any alliance or confedera- 
 tion; nor, without the consent of 
 the Congress, into any other 
 treaty, agreement or compact with 
 any other nation. All treaties 
 made by a component nation 
 with nations not members of this 
 union shall contain provision for 
 the peaceable settlement of all 
 disputes arising therefrom. 
 [Ante, pp. 197 et seq.] 
 
 Section 2. No component na- 
 tion shall, without the consent of 
 the Congress, lay any tax upon 
 the carrying capacity of any ship 
 or other vehicle of international 
 commerce, or on any person be- 
 cause engaged therein; or any 
 imposts or duties on imports or 
 exports, except what may be abso- 
 lutely necessary for executing its 
 inspection laws, and the net pro- 
 duce of all duties and imposts 
 laid by any nation on imports or 
 exports shall be for the use of 
 the treasury of the United Na- 
 tions, and all such laws shall be 
 subject to the revision and con- 
 trol of the Congress. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 201 et seq.] 
 
 Section 3. i. No component 
 nation shall, without the consent 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 287 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 or ships of war in time of peace 
 ... or engage in war, unless 
 actually invaded, or in such im- 
 minent danger as will not admit 
 of delay. Article I, Sec. 10, cl. 3. 
 
 No State shall grant letters of 
 marque and reprisal, coin money, 
 emit bills of credit, make any- 
 thing but gold and silver coin a 
 tender in payment of debts, pass 
 any bill of attainder, ex post facto 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 of the Congress, in time of peace, 
 keep troops (exclusive of militia) 
 or ships of war in excess of ten 
 per centum of the number of 
 troops and war vessels kept by 
 the United Nations; or engage in 
 war with other nations, unless 
 actually invaded or in such im- 
 minent danger as will not admit 
 of delay. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 205 et seq.] 
 
 2. Nothing herein shall be con- 
 strued to prohibit a nation, which 
 is keeping such troops or ships 
 when it enters this union, to effect 
 a gradual reduction of its forces 
 according to a general plan to be 
 determined by the Congress, until 
 the ten per centum before men- 
 tioned be attained. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 205 et seq.] 
 
 3. In no event shall a compo- 
 nent nation be required to reduce 
 the number of its troops below a 
 minimum of one-tenth of one per 
 centum of the population of all 
 its territories, estimated as pro- 
 vided in the second clause of the 
 second section of the first Article 
 of this constitution; nor the ton- 
 nage of its ships of war below a 
 minimum of one per centum of 
 the tonnage of its merchant ma- 
 rine. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 208, 209.] 
 
 [See Article VI, Sec. /.] 
 
288 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 law, or law impairing the obli- 
 gation of contracts, or grant any 
 title of nobility. Article I, Sec. 
 10, cl. i. 
 
 No State shall make or enforce 
 any law which shall abridge the 
 privileges or immunities of citi- 
 zens of the United States; nor 
 shall any State deprive any per- 
 son of life, liberty, or property 
 without due process of law; nor 
 deny to any person within its 
 jurisdiction the equal protection 
 of the laws. Amendment XIV. 
 
 The right of citizens of the 
 United States to vote shall not be 
 denied or abridged by the United 
 States or by any State on account 
 of race, color, or previous condi- 
 tion of servitude. Amendment 
 XV. 
 
 Neither slavery nor involun- 
 tary servitude, except as a pun- 
 ishment for crime, whereof the 
 party shall have been duly con- 
 victed, shall exist within the 
 United States, or any place sub- 
 j e c t to their jurisdiction. 
 Amendment XIII. 
 
 No new State shall be formed 
 or erected within the jurisdiction 
 of any other State; nor any State 
 be formed by the junction of two 
 or more States or parts of States, 
 without the consent of the legisla- 
 tures of the States concerned as 
 well as of the Congress. Article 
 IV, Sec. 3, cl. i. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 [See Article VI, Sec. /.] 
 
 [See ante, pp. 192 et seq.] 
 
 Section 4. No component na- 
 tion shall, without the consent of 
 the Congress ( three-fourths of all 
 the votes of both houses concur- 
 ring) and of the nations directly 
 concerned, acquire in time of 
 peace any sovereignty, control, or 
 jurisdiction over the territory of 
 another nation, whether or not it 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 289 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 Full faith and credit shall be 
 given in each State to the public 
 acts, records, and judicial pro- 
 ceedings of every other State. 
 And the Congress may by general 
 laws prescribe the manner in 
 which such acts, records, and pro- 
 ceedings shall be proved, and the 
 effect thereof. Article IV, Sec. i. 
 
 The citizens of each State shall 
 be entitled to all privileges and 
 immunities of citizens in the sev- 
 eral States. Article IV, Sec. 2. 
 
 No State shall pass any bill of 
 attainder, ex post facto law, or 
 law impairing the obligation of 
 contracts. Article I, Sec. 10, cl. i. 
 
 No State shall make or enforce 
 any law which shall abridge the 
 privileges or immunities of citi- 
 zens of the United States; nor 
 shall any State deprive any per- 
 son of life, liberty, or property 
 without due process of law; nor 
 deny to any person within its 
 jurisdiction the equal protection 
 of the laws. Amendment XIV. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 be a member of this union, nor in 
 time of war, or as a consequence 
 thereof, but as provided in the 
 first clause of the first section of 
 the fourth Article of this constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 209 et seq.] 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 
 RELATIONS OF THE COMPONENT 
 NATIONS TO EACH OTHER, AND 
 
 TO THE UNION 
 
 Section i. No component na- 
 tion shall abridge the privileges 
 and immunities of citizens of 
 other States, either members or 
 not members of this union, or of 
 citizens of the United Nations, by 
 passing any law convicting and 
 punishing them for alleged of- 
 fenses, or any ex post facto law 
 punishing crime, or any law im- 
 pairing the obligation of con- 
 tracts; or by depriving such citi- 
 zens of life, liberty, or property, 
 but after due opportunity to be 
 heard in a regular, orderly, and 
 appropriate proceeding; or by 
 denying to such citizens the equal 
 security of their persons and 
 property; or in violation of any 
 treaty or agreement, between the 
 nations concerned. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 212 et seq.] 
 Section 2. The United Nations 
 guarantee to the citizens of each 
 component nation, as well as to 
 the citizens of the United Nations, 
 while they are within States not 
 members of this union, such 
 
290 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 The United States shall guar- 
 antee to every State in this Union 
 a republican form of government, 
 and shall protect each of them 
 against invasion . . . and on ap- 
 plication of the legislature, or of 
 the executive (where the legisla- 
 ture cannot be convened) against 
 domestic violence. Article IV, 
 Sec. 4. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 privileges and immunities as are 
 secured to aliens by the Law of 
 Nations, or by treaty between the 
 several powers concerned. 
 [Ante, pp. 215, 216.] 
 
 Section 3. The United Nations 
 shall protect each component na- 
 tion against invasion. 
 
 [Ante, p. 217.] 
 
 Section 4. i. In case of inter- 
 nal dissensions within any compo- 
 nent State, neither the United Na- 
 tions nor any other component na- 
 tion shall intervene by force be- 
 tween the contending parties, but 
 the United Nations, acting on be- 
 half of all the other component 
 nations, shall adhere to the rules 
 of the Law of Nations in such 
 case made and provided, and 
 shall continue to recognize the de 
 facto government of such nation 
 as the existing government, which 
 shall exercise and enjoy all the 
 functions, rights, and privileges 
 of the nation under this constitu- 
 tion, until such government be 
 overthrown and a new one be 
 substituted therefor, in which case 
 the new government shall then 
 exercise and enjoy such functions, 
 lights, and privileges. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 217 et seq.] 
 
 2. If, in consequence of such 
 dissensions, a portion of the ter- 
 ritory of the aation concerned is 
 erected into an independent State, 
 the Congress shall proceed to re- 
 adjust the representation of the 
 original nation in the House of 
 Delegates; and to admit, if it be 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 291 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 New States may be admitted by 
 the Congress into this Union. 
 Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. i. 
 
 The Congress shall have power 
 to dispose of and make all need- 
 ful rules and regulations respect- 
 ing the territory or other property 
 belonging to the United States; 
 and nothing in this Constitution 
 shall be so construed as to preju- 
 dice any claims of the United 
 States, or of any particular State. 
 Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. 
 
 The enumeration in the Consti- 
 tution of certain rights shall not 
 be construed to deny or disparage 
 others retained by the people. 
 Amendment IX. 
 
 The powers not delegated to 
 the United States by the Constitu- 
 tion, or prohibited by it to the 
 States, are reserved to the States, 
 respectively, or to the people. 
 Amendment X. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 desired, the newly created nation 
 into the union upon the terms and 
 conditions provided in the fifth 
 section of this Article. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 220, 221.] 
 
 Section 5. Other nations may 
 
 be admitted to this union by the 
 
 Congress, three-fourths of all the 
 
 votes of both houses concurring, 
 
 provided that such nations comply 
 
 with the terms and conditions of 
 
 the second section of the eleventh 
 
 Article of this constitution. 
 
 [Ante, p. 221.] 
 
 ARTICLE VII 
 
 THE RESERVED RIGHTS OF THE 
 COMPONENT NATIONS 
 
 Section i. Each component na- 
 tion reserves its sovereignty and 
 independence ; and every jurisdic- 
 tion, power, and right not dele- 
 gated to the United Nations by 
 this compact, nor prohibited by it 
 to the component nations. 
 [Ante, p. 222.] 
 
 Section 2. i. The right is re- 
 served to each nation acceding to 
 this constitution to withdraw in 
 peace from the union after 
 twenty-five years from the time 
 of such accession, having pre- 
 viously given one year's notice of 
 such intention to the Congress. 
 [Ante, pp. 223 et seq.] 
 
 2. Upon withdrawal, the se- 
 ceding nation shall, by the act of 
 
292 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 This Constitution, and the laws 
 of the United States which shall 
 be made in pursuance thereof, 
 and all treaties made, or which 
 shall be made, under the author- 
 ity of the United States, shall be 
 the supreme law of the land; and 
 the judges in every State shall be 
 bound thereby, anything in the 
 Constitution or laws of any State 
 to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 Article VI, cl. 2. 
 
 The Senators and Representa- 
 tives before mentioned, and the 
 members of the several State 
 legislatures, and all executive 
 and judicial officers, both of the 
 United States and of the several 
 States, shall be bound by oath or 
 affirmation, to support this Consti- 
 tution. Article VI, cl. 3. 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 secession, regain complete sov- 
 ereignty, jurisdiction, and control 
 of all land ceded by it to the 
 United Nations, save such as may 
 be included within the seat of 
 government of the United Na- 
 tions, and shall be entitled to, and 
 bound by, such adjustment of its 
 share of the common property 
 and debts as the Supreme Court, 
 or the proper section thereof, may 
 determine is equitably due. 
 [Ante, pp. 227, 228.] 
 
 ARTICLE VIII 
 
 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
 
 LAWS, AND TREATIES OF THE 
 
 UNITED NATIONS 
 
 Section i. This constitution 
 and the laws and treaties of the 
 United Nations made in pursu- 
 ance thereof, shall be the supreme 
 law in every component State; 
 and the judges in every State 
 shall be bound thereby, anything 
 in the constitution, laws, or 
 treaties of any State to the con- 
 trary notwithstanding. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 229, 230.] 
 
 Section 2. All legislative, ex- 
 ecutive, and judicial officers, both 
 of the United Nations and of the 
 several component nations, shall 
 be bound by oath or affirmation to 
 support this constitution. 
 [Ante, pp. 230, 231.] 
 
APPENDIX 293 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 But no religious test shall ever [See Article IV, Sec. 2, cl. 2.] 
 
 be required as a qualification to 
 any office or public trust under 
 the United States. Article VI, 
 cl. 3. 
 
 The Congress, whenever two- 
 thirds of both Houses shall deem 
 it necessary, shall propose amend- 
 ments to this Constitution, or, on 
 the application of the legislatures 
 of two-thirds of the several 
 States, shall call a convention [of 
 the States] for proposing amend- 
 ments, which, in either case, shall 
 be valid to all intents and pur- 
 poses, as part of this Constitution, 
 when ratified by the legislatures 
 of three-fourths of the several 
 States, or by conventions [of the 
 people] in three-fourths thereof, 
 as the one or the other mode of 
 ratification may be proposed by 
 the Congress. Article V. 
 
 Provided that no amendment 
 which may be made prior to the 
 year 1808 shall in any manner af- 
 fect the first and fourth clauses in 
 the ninth section of the first Ar- 
 ticle; and that no State, without 
 its consent, shall be deprived of 
 its equal suffrage in the Senate. 
 Article V. 
 
 ARTICLE IX 
 
 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITU- 
 TION 
 
 Section i. The Congress, by a 
 two-thirds vote of both houses, 
 may propose amendments to this 
 constitution, which shall be valid 
 to all intents and purposes as part 
 of this constitution when con- 
 curred in by three-fourths of all 
 the votes of both houses, subject 
 to the provisos contained in the 
 section next following. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 232 et seq.] 
 
 Section 2. Unless passed by 
 unanimous consent in both houses 
 of the Congress, no amendment 
 shall be valid which is passed, 
 before the expiration of four 
 years from the time it is proposed 
 by the Congress; or which shall 
 deprive any nation of its equal 
 suffrage in the Senate, or of its 
 suffrage in the House of Dele- 
 gates in proportion to population, 
 or of its equal representation 
 upon the Supreme Court; or 
 which shall deprive any nation 
 of the right to veto a measure of 
 the Congress, or which shall de- 
 prive any nation of the right 
 
294 APPENDIX 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 peaceably to withdraw from the 
 union; or which shall extend the 
 judicial power of the United Na- 
 tions to any personal proceeding 
 against the sovereign or chief 
 executive of any component 
 nation. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 240, 241.] 
 
 ARTICLE X 
 
 DISCIPLINE OF A COMPONENT 
 NATION 
 
 Section i. If a component 
 State shall refuse or neglect to 
 fulfill its obligations under this 
 constitution, or the laws or 
 treaties made in pursuance there- 
 of, it shall be subject to discip- 
 line by the Congress after due 
 warning. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 242 et seq.] 
 
 Section 2. Discipline of a com- 
 ponent State shall extend no fur- 
 ther than to an embargo of part 
 or all of the commerce between 
 the State to be disciplined and all 
 the other component States, or to 
 the expulsion of such State from 
 the union. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 245, 246.] 
 
 Section 3. No disciplinary 
 measure shall be passed except 
 by the assent of three-fourths of 
 all the votes in both houses of 
 the Congress. 
 
 [Ante, p. 247.] 
 
 Section 4. When a State shall 
 have been expelled from the 
 union, it shall have the same 
 rights and incur the same obliga- 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 295 
 
 U. S. CONSTITUTION 
 
 The ratification of the conven- 
 tions [of the people] of nine 
 States, shall be sufficient for the 
 establishment of this Constitution 
 between the States so ratifying 
 the same. Article VII. 
 
 
 U. N. CONSTITUTION 
 
 tions with respect to lands ceded 
 to the United Nations and with 
 respect to the common property 
 and the common debts, as if it 
 had withdrawn therefrom under 
 the second clause of the second 
 section of the seventh Article of 
 this constitution. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 246, 247.] 
 
 ARTICLE XI 
 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITU- 
 TION 
 
 Section i. The agreement of 
 eight nations, of which at least 
 five shall be from the following 
 group: Austria-Hungary, France, 
 Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
 Japan, Russia, and the United 
 States of America, shall be suffi- 
 cient for the establishment of this 
 constitution between the nations 
 agreeing thereto. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 248 et seq.] 
 
 Section 2. Such agreement 
 shall be evidenced by the assent 
 of the constitutional treaty-mak- 
 ing power of each nation, accom- 
 panied by a solemn written affir- 
 mation by the sovereign or other 
 chief executive authority, pledg- 
 ing the sacred honor of the nation 
 and of himself and his successors 
 faithfully and honestly to observe 
 this compact in all its parts, leav- 
 ing all disputes arising under it 
 to be settled in the modes indi- 
 cated therein. 
 
 [Ante, pp. 250 et seq.] 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 [References are to pages] 
 
 Accounting of assets, by seced- 
 ing State, 227-228, 292; by ex- 
 pelled State, 24.6-247, 294- 
 
 295- 
 
 Accused, arrest of, 182-183, 284; 
 discharge of, on habeas corpus, 
 168-169, 282; entitled to bail, 
 189, 285; no second jeopardy 
 of, 184-185, 284; not to testify 
 against himself, 185-186, 284; 
 to be confronted with adverse 
 witnesses, 189, 285 ; to be in- 
 formed of charge, 189, 285; to 
 be tried by jury, 187-188, 284- 
 285 ; to compel attendance of 
 witnesses, 189, 285; to have 
 aid of counsel, 189, 285; to 
 have due process of law, 181, 
 212-214, 283, 289; to have 
 equal protection of laws, 181, 
 212-214, 283, 289. See Checks. 
 
 Adjournment of Congress, 53, 
 261. 
 
 Admiralty, jurisdiction in, 143- 
 145, 277. 
 
 Admission of States to league, in 
 case of civil war in State, 220, 
 290-291 ; in general, 221, 291. 
 
 Aliens, citizens abroad to have 
 rights of, 215-216, 289; protec- 
 tion of, in component States, 
 212-214, 289. 
 
 Alliances, States not to enter into, 
 200, 286. 
 
 Alsace and Lorraine, as cause of 
 war, xvi. 
 
 Ambassadors, appointment of, 
 118, 272; delegates in Congress 
 regarded as, 55, 262; judicial 
 power extends to, 142-143, 277 ; 
 original jurisdiction of Su- 
 
 preme Court embraces, 151-153, 
 278 ; reception of foreign, 120- 
 121, 273. 
 
 Ambitions of nations, as cause of 
 war, xiii, 17. 
 
 Amendment of constitution, in 
 general, 232-241, 293-294; limi- 
 tations on power of, 239-241, 
 293-294; proposal of, 236-237, 
 293; ratification of, 237-240, 
 294; subverts Supreme Court's 
 decisions, 141-142. See Checks. 
 
 Appeal, from State to interna- 
 tional courts, 89-91, 153, 275, 
 278-279; to sections of Supreme 
 Court, 132-134, 275, 278; to 
 Supreme Court, 134-135, 153, 
 275-276, 278. 
 
 Appointment, of delegates in 
 Congress, 50-52, 258, 259; of 
 executive officers, 118-120, 272; 
 of judges, 125-128, 274; of min- 
 isters, 109-110, 268; of prime 
 minister, 105-106, 268-269; of 
 Supreme Court justices in sec- 
 tions, 130-132, 274-276. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Appropriations of money, for 
 armies, 94-95, 266; for boun- 
 ties, 162-163, 281; for general 
 purposes, 162-163, 264, 281 ; for 
 pensions, 162-163, 281. 
 
 Arbitration, courts of, ix-xi. 
 
 Argentina, population of, 42; 
 votes of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Armies, appropriations for, lim- 
 ited to two years, 94-95, 266 ; 
 right of States to keep, 206- 
 209, 286-287; right of United 
 Nations to raise and support, 
 266. See Checks. 
 
 299 
 
INDEX 
 
 Arms, carrying and keeping of, 
 172-173, 283. 
 
 Arrest, discharge from illegal, 
 168-169, 282; freedom from, a 
 privilege of delegates in Con- 
 gress, 54, 262; warrants of, 
 182-183, 284. 
 
 Arsenals, forts, etc., Congress to 
 control, 95-96, 267; surrender 
 of, to seceding State, 227- 
 228, 292; surrender of, to 
 expelled State, 246-247, 294- 
 295. 
 
 Arts, condition of, as measure of 
 State's influence, 34. 
 
 Assembly, popular right of, 172, 
 283. 
 
 Attainder, bills of, general na- 
 ture, 181-182; not to be passed 
 by Congress, 182, 283-284; not 
 to be passed by States against 
 citizens of other States, 213- 
 214, 289. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, assent of, to 
 constitution, 249-250, 295 ; pop- 
 ulation of, 40; votes of, in Con- 
 gress, 44. 
 
 Backward populations, how esti- 
 mated, 37-39, 4 1 , 258. 
 
 Bail, grant of, to accused, 189, 
 285; no excessive, to be re- 
 quired, 189, 285. 
 
 Balance of power, as cause of 
 war, xv. 
 
 Banking, control of, by Con- 
 gress, 66-67, 74-75, 265. 
 
 Belgium, population of, 41 ; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44, 47. 
 
 Bills of attainder, 181-182, 213- 
 214, 283-284, 289. 
 
 Bolivia, population of, 42. 
 
 Bonds, Congress may issue, 74- 
 75, 265. 
 
 Bounty legislation by Congress, 
 162-163, 281. 
 
 Boycott of component States, 242- 
 247, 294. 
 
 Brazil, population of, 42; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Bribery, judges removable for, 
 62-63, 129, 274. 
 
 British Empire. See Great Brit- 
 ain. 
 Bulgaria, population of, 41. 
 
 Cable, control over, by Congress, 
 86-87, 265. 
 
 Census of populations, 35-48, 258. 
 
 Checks and balances in constitu- 
 tion, demand for, xxxii-xxxiii, 
 25, 26, 27; (i) government con- 
 trolled by component States: 
 in legislative department, dele- 
 gates in Congress appointed 
 and removable by States, 52, 
 
 258, 259 ; in executive depart- 
 ment, prime minister appointed 
 by Congress, 105-108, 259; and 
 removable by either house, in- 
 112, 259; subordinate min- 
 isters appointed and remova- 
 ble by. prime minister, 109-112, 
 268 ; ministers removable by 
 their several States, 50-52, 258, 
 
 259, 260; in judiciary depart- 
 ment, judges appointed by 
 States, 127-128, 274; remova- 
 ble by Congress, 63-65, 129, 
 274; treaties by ministry and 
 Congress, 117, 272; constitu- 
 tion amended by Congress, 
 232-241, 293 ; admission of new 
 States by Congress, 220, 221, 
 290-291; (2) Great Powers 
 balanced against smaller na- 
 tions: in legislative depart- 
 ment, Great Powers to pre- 
 dominate in House of Dele- 
 gates, 35-48, 258; equal repre- 
 sentation of States in Senate, 
 46-48, 259; no measures to pass 
 save by consent of both houses, 
 46-47, 257, 263 ; limited life of 
 tax and commerce laws, 55-57, 
 84, 26? ; Jn executive depart- 
 ment, ministry dependent on 
 Congress, 105-112, 268-269; in 
 judiciary department, equality 
 of representation on Supreme 
 Court, 130-132, 274; (3) pro- 
 tection of a minority of States 
 against a majority: powers 
 of Congress as limited as pos- 
 
INDEX 
 
 301 
 
 sible, 66-67; in legislative ac- 
 tion, Congress to tax land only, 
 70-72, 160-161, 264, 281 ; tax 
 must be uniform, 72, 264; com- 
 mercial laws to be uniform, 
 83-87, 163-165, 265, 281; lim- 
 ited life of tax and commercial 
 laws, 56-57, 263 ; veto power 
 of States, 57-60, 263-264; in 
 executive action, dependence of 
 ministry on Congress, 105-112, 
 267-269; in judicial action, 
 equality of representation on 
 Supreme Court, 130-132, 274; 
 no personal proceedings against 
 rulers of States, 155, 279; in 
 treaty-making, treaties made 
 by ministry with consent of 
 two-thirds of Congress, 117, 
 272; treaties to be within con- 
 stitutional powers, 117-118, 272; 
 in amending constitution, con- 
 sent of three-fourths of Con- 
 gress required, 237-239, 293 ; in 
 admission of new States con- 
 sent of three-fourths of Con- 
 gress required, 220, 221, 290- 
 291 ; (4) protection of each 
 single State in its reserved 
 rights: no needless powers to be 
 granted, 75, 77, 193; express 
 reservation of sovereignty and 
 rights, 222, 291 ; State's right 
 to veto legislation, 57-59, 263- 
 264; State's right to secede, 
 223-228, 291-292; no "citizen- 
 ship of United Nations," 97, 
 159, 280; no "treason against 
 United Nations," 160, 280-281; 
 equality of representation on 
 Supreme Court, 130-132, 274; 
 no amendment can deprive 
 States of most important re- 
 served rights, 240-241, 293 ; 
 uniformity of legislation, 72, 
 83-87, 162-165, 264, 265, 281; 
 neutrality in case of dissen- 
 sions in a State, 217, 290; no 
 personal suits against rulers, 
 *55 279; no su it by private 
 person against State, 154, 279; 
 (5) protection against un- 
 
 constitutional acts of govern- 
 ment: legislative action, courts 
 may declare laws unconsti- 
 tutional, 138-141, 277; veto 
 power of States, 57-60, 263- 
 264; State's right of secession, 
 223-228, 291-292 ; executive ac- 
 tion, dependence of ministry on 
 Congress, 105-112, 267-269; 
 courts may declare acts illegal 
 and actionable, 157; appropria- 
 tions for armies for two years 
 only, 86-87, 266; judicial ac- 
 tion, judges removable by 
 Congress, 63-65, 129, 264; Su- 
 preme Court to declare laws 
 unconstitutional only by a 
 three-fourths vote, 138-140, 277; 
 Congress may override Su- 
 preme Court by a three-fourths 
 vote amending constitution, 
 141-142, 293 ; no personal pro- 
 ceedings against rulers of 
 States, 155, 279; (6) protec- 
 tion against wars between com- 
 ponent States or between com- 
 ponent States and foreign 
 States: each State to keep rea- 
 sonable numbers of troops, 206- 
 208, 286-287; each State to re- 
 duce its forces to reasonable 
 limits, 206-208, 286-288; league 
 to raise and support armies 
 and navies, 93-95, 266; each 
 State guaranteed against inva- 
 sion, 217, 290; courts to ad- 
 judge disputes between States, 
 146, 278; no State to tax or 
 burden commerce of other 
 States, 201-203, 205, 286; Con- 
 gress to control international 
 commerce and communication 
 by uniform laws, 79-85, 87, 265, 
 281; no State to acquire terri- 
 tory of another without con- 
 sent, 209-211, 280, 288-289; no 
 State to oppress citizens of an- 
 other, 137, 212-214, 289; league 
 to protect citizens of compo- 
 nent States when abroad, 215- 
 216, 289-290; disciplinary pow- 
 ers of Congress, 242-247, 294- 
 
302 
 
 INDEX 
 
 295; league and States to be 
 neutral in case of internal dis- 
 sensions in sister State, 217, 
 290; States to enter into no al- 
 liances, 197-200; States to make 
 no treaties without consent of 
 Congress, 197-200, 286; State 
 treaties to provide for peace- 
 able settlement of disputes, 201, 
 286; (7) protection against 
 wars between league and one 
 or more component States: 
 league not to interfere in do- 
 mestic concerns of States, 66, 
 190, 193; league's power to tax 
 confined to land only, 69-74, 
 160-161, 264, 281 ; league's tax 
 and commercial laws to be uni- 
 form, 72, 83-84, 163-165, 264, 
 
 265, 281; limited life of 
 league's tax and commercial 
 laws, 55-57> 263 ; league to 
 have jurisdiction of wrongs on 
 high seas and offenses against 
 Law of Nations, 92-93, 143-145, 
 
 266, 277 ; State's right to veto 
 international legislation, 57-59, 
 263-264; Supreme Court to de- 
 clare void and illegal uncon- 
 stitutional acts of Congress or 
 ministry, 138-141, 277; su- 
 premacy of international con- 
 stitution, laws, and treaties, 227- 
 231, 292 ; Supreme Court to de- 
 cide disputes between league 
 and component States, 145, 146, 
 278; States' right to keep 
 armies and navies, 206-209, 
 286-287; State's right to secede, 
 223-228, 291-292; disciplinary 
 powers of Congress and limits 
 thereto, 242-247, 294-295 ; pledge 
 upon ratification of constitu- 
 tion, 252-254, 295; (8) pro- 
 tection against wars between 
 league and foreign States: 
 league to embrace majority of 
 Great Powers, 249-250, 295; 
 war powers of league, 93-95, 
 266-267; league to levy no 
 taxes on international com- 
 merce, 160-161, 264, 281; no 
 
 secret treaties without consent 
 of Congress, 117, 201, 272, 286; 
 league to acquire no territory, 
 157-159, 280; States to acquire 
 no territory without consent of 
 States concerned and of Con- 
 gress, 209-211, 280, 288-289; in- 
 ternational courts to protect 
 aliens while in component 
 States, 137, 212-214, 289; 
 league to protect citizens of 
 component States while abroad, 
 215-216, 289-290; (9) protec- 
 tion of private rights against 
 invasion by league: courts to 
 construe international constitu- 
 tion, laws, and treaties, 136- 
 i37 277; Congress not to tax 
 imports, exports, business, or 
 trades, 72, 160, 264, 281 ; com- 
 mercial laws of Congress to be 
 uniform, 83-84, 265, 281 ; right 
 of discharge from illegal im- 
 prisonment, 168-169, 282; free- 
 dom of press and of speech, 
 170-171, 283; freedom of re- 
 ligion, 170, 282; right of as- 
 sembly, 172, 283 ; right of peti- 
 tion, 172, 283; right to carry 
 and keep arms, 172-173, 283 ; 
 quartering of soldiers, 173, 283; 
 eminent domain, 175-176, 283; 
 due process of law, 177-179, 
 181, 283; equal protection of 
 the laws, 179-180, 181, 283; 
 jury not required in civil cases, 
 174-175; no grand jury re- 
 quired, 186; trial by jury in 
 criminal cases, 187-188, 284- 
 285; bills of attainder, 181-182, 
 283-284; ex post facto laws, 
 181-182, 284; general warrants, 
 182-183, 284; security of dwell- 
 ings and effects, 182-183, 284; 
 double jeopardy, 184-185, 284; 
 self-incrimination, 185-186, 284; 
 other guarantees, 189, 284-285; 
 (10) protection of private 
 rights against invasion by com- 
 ponent States: in case of citi- 
 zens of other component States 
 or of United Nations, 212-214, 
 
INDEX 
 
 303 
 
 289; in case of aliens, 212-214, 
 289; (n) protection of pri- 
 vate rights against invasion by 
 foreign States: in case of citi- 
 zens of component States or of 
 United Nations when abroad, 
 215-216, 289-290. 
 
 Chief Justice of Supreme Court, 
 133-134, 276. 
 
 Chile, population of, 42; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 China, open door in, as cause of 
 war, xv ; population of, 41; 
 votes of, in Congress, 41. 
 
 Citizens^ mistreatment of, by 
 other States as cause of war, 
 xxvi; not protected by league 
 against acts of their own 
 States, 195; of component 
 States in other component 
 States, rights of, 212-214, 289; 
 of component States abroad, 
 rights of, 215-216, 289-290; of 
 different States, judicial power 
 does not extend to cases be- 
 tween, 148-150; of foreign 
 States in component States, 
 rights of, 195-196, 212-216, 289; 
 of foreign States, rights of, 
 regulated by treaties, 215-216, 
 289-290; of United Nations, 
 who are, 97-99, 159, 280; of 
 United Nations, no naturalized, 
 97-99* J 59 280; of United Na- 
 tions protected in component 
 States, 212-214, 289; of United 
 Nations protected in foreign 
 countries, 215-216, 289-290. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Civil rights, guarantees of, 168- 
 180, 282-285. 
 
 Civil war in component State, 
 neutrality in case of, 217-221, 
 290-291. 
 
 Civilization, as measure of 
 State's influence, 34. 
 
 Class legislation, invalidity of, 
 72, 83-84, 85-87, 163-165, 179- 
 180, 264, 265, 283, 289. 
 
 Coinage, control of, by Congress, 
 66-67, 76-77, 265. 
 
 Colombia, population of, 42. 
 
 Colored populations and white, 
 37-39, 41, 258. 
 
 Commerce, as measure of State's 
 influence, 35-36; control of, in 
 United States, 79-81 ; control 
 of international, to be sur- 
 rendered to league, xxv, xxx- 
 xxxi, 265 ; control of interna- 
 tional, by Congress, 79, 82-83, 
 263, 265; desire for, as cause 
 of war, xiii, xxvi, 14-16, 17; 
 distribution, not production, 81, 
 83 ; domestic, controlled by 
 component States, 82, 192-193, 
 201 ; embargo of, to discipline 
 component States, 245-247, 294; 
 emigration or immigration not 
 included in, 84-85, 265! inter- 
 national, made up of interstate 
 or foreign, 82; limit f life of 
 laws regulating, 55-57, 263; no 
 discriminations in, as between 
 States, 83-87, 163-165, 265, 281, 
 286; no State to tax or burden, 
 201-205, 286; no State tonnage 
 duties upon, 205, 286 ; routes 
 or seats of, as cause of war, 
 xiii. See Checks. 
 
 Commercial policies, as cause of 
 war, xv. 
 
 Commercial treaties, 118, 201, 
 272, 286. 
 
 Commissions, issuance of, 122, 
 
 273- 
 
 Communication by cable, wire- 
 less, etc., Congress to control, 
 85-87, 265. 
 
 Commutation of sentence, 115, 272. 
 
 Compensation, for property taken 
 under eminent domain, 175- 
 176, 283; of delegations in 
 Congress, 53-54, 262; of judges, 
 128-129, 274; of ministers, 112- 
 113, 271. 
 
 Component States. See States. 
 
 Conciliation between nations, ix- 
 x. 
 
 Congress, composed of two houses, 
 32-47, 48-50, 257; House of 
 Delegates with votes propor- 
 tioned to population, 35-48, 
 240, 258; Senate representing 
 
34 
 
 INDEX 
 
 equality of sovereignty, 46-48, 
 240, 259 ; delegations to both 
 houses appointed and remova- 
 ble by States, 50-52, 258, 259; 
 terms of office of delegates, 
 50-52, 258, 259; sessions, re- 
 cesses, and adjournments of, 
 53, 261 ; compensation of dele- 
 gates to, 53-54, 262; privi- 
 leges of delegates to, 54-55, 
 262; summoning and proroga- 
 tion of, 124, 261 ; State veto 
 upon action of, 57-60, 263-264; 
 appointment and removal of 
 ministry by, 105-109, 267-268 ; 
 interpellations in, 122-123; no 
 power of impeachment in, 60- 
 63; removal of judges by, 62- 
 63, 129, 274; powers of, con- 
 current or exclusive, 68-69, 
 197, 291 ; powers of, express 
 and not to be implied, 68-69; 
 power of, to tax land, 69-74, 
 264, 281 ; tax laws of, limited 
 to ten years, 55-57, 84, 263; 
 taxation by, limited to land, 
 160-161, 264, 281; taxation by, 
 for what purposes, 72-74, 264; 
 to borrow money, 74-75, 265; 
 to issue paper currency, 75-76, 
 265 ; to coin money, 76-77, 265 ; 
 to punish counterfeiting, 77- 
 78, 265 ; to fix standards of 
 weights and measures, 78-79, 
 265; to regulate international 
 commerce and communication, 
 79-85, 85-87, 265; regulations 
 of commerce and communica- 
 tion by, to be uniform, 83-87, 
 162-165, 265-266, 281; regula- 
 tions of commerce by, limited 
 to ten years, 55-57, 263; to 
 provide for international copy- 
 rights and patents, 87-88, 265; 
 to establish inferior interna- 
 tional courts, 88-92, 129-130, 
 266; to define and punish 
 wrongs on high seas, 92-93, 
 266; to define and punish of- 
 fenses against Law of Nations, 
 92-93, 266; war powers of, 93- 
 95, 266-267; to control seat of 
 
 government, arsenals, etc., 95- 
 96, 267; ancillary powers of, 
 96-97, 267; no power in, to 
 naturalize, 97-99, 159, 280; ap- 
 propriations of money by, for 
 support of armies limited to 
 two years, 94-95, 266; appro- 
 priations of money by, in gen- 
 eral, 162-163, 264, 281; bounty 
 and pension legislation by, 162- 
 163, 281; not to create com- 
 mercial preferences as between 
 States, 163-165, 265, 281; not 
 to establish titles or privi- 
 leged orders, 165-166, 281; to 
 suspend habeas corpus, when, 
 168-169, 282; to recognize re- 
 ligious liberty, 170, 282; to rec- 
 ognize freedom of speech and 
 press, 170-171, 283; not to pass 
 bills of attainder or ex post 
 facto laws, 181-183, 283-284; 
 to fix number of jury, 187-189, 
 284-285; treaties to be ratified 
 by two-thirds of, 117, 272; 
 States to make treaties only 
 with consent of, 201, 286; 
 States to acquire territory only 
 with consent of three-fourths 
 of, 209-211, 286; to admit new 
 States to league, 220-221, 290- 
 291 ; to readjust representation 
 of States in, in case of civil 
 war, 218-219, 290-291 ; notice 
 to, necessary in case of State 
 veto, 57-60, 263-264; notice to, 
 necessary in case of secession 
 by State, 226, 291 ; acts of, the 
 supreme law, 229, 230, 292; 
 amendments to constitution pro- 
 posed by two-thirds of, 236- 
 2 37 2 93 > amendments enacted 
 by three-fourths of, 237-240, 
 293 ; limitations on power of, 
 to amend constitution, 240-241, 
 293 ; power of, to discipline 
 component States, 242-246, 294- 
 295; power of, to regulate 
 slave trade, 192-193 ; not to con- 
 trol emigration or immigra- 
 tion, 84-85, 192-193, 265. See 
 Checks. 
 
INDEX 
 
 305 
 
 Constitution of United Nations, 
 amendment of, 236-241, 293 ; 
 interpretation of, by Supreme 
 Court, 132-133, 136-140, 277; 
 number of nations to adopt, 
 248-250, 295 ; oath of State of- 
 ficials to support, 230-231, 292; 
 outline of articles of, .28-29; 
 ratification of, 250-254, 295 ; 
 supremacy of, 229-231, 277, 
 292 ; contrasted with that of 
 United States, 8, 257-295. 
 
 Consuls, judicial power extends 
 to, 142-143, 277. 
 
 Contracts, laws affecting obliga- 
 tion of, 213-214, 289. 
 
 Copyrights, control of, by Con- 
 gress, 66-67, 87-88, 265. 
 
 Costa Rica, population of, 43. 
 
 Council of ministers. See Ex- 
 ecutive Department; Ministry. 
 
 Counsel, aid of, in criminal cases, 
 189, 285. 
 
 Counterfeiting, Congress to pun- 
 ish, 77-78, 265. 
 
 Court, supreme. See Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 Courts, distinguished from arbi- 
 tral tribunals, ix, x; establish- 
 ment of inferior, by Congress, 
 88-92, 266; establishment of, 
 would not of itself end war, 
 xi-xxiii; judicial power vested 
 in, 136-150, 273; jurisdiction of, 
 136-150, 150-152, 153, 227-228, 
 246, 276-279, 292, 294-295; 
 justiciable questions triable by, 
 xii, xiii; political questions not 
 triable by, xii, xiii; power of, 
 to appoint clerks, etc., 120, 272. 
 See Judges; Judiciary. 
 
 Crimes, against Law of Nations, 
 Congress to define and punish, 
 92-93, 144-145, 266; against 
 United Nations, punishment of, 
 145-146; ex post facto laws 
 punishing, 181-182, 212-214, 
 283-284, 289; guarantees in 
 trials for, 177-189, 284-285; 
 judges removable for, 62-63, 
 129, 274; legislative convic- 
 tions of, 181-182, 212-214, 283- 
 
 284, 289; on high seas, control 
 of Congress over, 92-93, 266; 
 on high seas, judicial power 
 extends to, 143-145, 277; par- 
 dons for, 115, 272; reprieves 
 for, 115, 272; retroactive legis- 
 lation punishing, 181-182, 213- 
 214, 283-284, 289; treaties of 
 extradition for, 118, 201, 272, 
 286. See Accused; Arrest. 
 
 Cuba, population of, 42. 
 Cupidity of nations as cause of 
 
 war, xiii, 14-16. 
 Currency, control of Congress 
 
 over, 66-67, 74-75, 265. 
 
 Debates in Congress, freedom 
 from responsibility for, 54-55, 
 262. 
 
 Delegated, power not, reserved 
 to States, 222, 291 ; powers of 
 United Nations are, 66-69, 291. 
 
 Delegates. See Congress; Repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 Delegates, House of. See Con- 
 gress; House of Delegates. 
 
 Delicts. See Crimes; Wrongs. 
 
 Departments of government, pow- 
 ers distributed among, 30-31 ; 
 executive department, 100-124, 
 267-273 ; judiciary department, 
 125-155, 273-279; legislative de- 
 partment, 32-99, 257-267, 280- 
 
 285. See Checks; Congress; 
 Executive Department; Min- 
 istry; Judges; Judiciary. 
 
 Denmark, population of, 41. 
 
 Diplomatic agents. See Ambas- 
 sadors. 
 
 Discipline of component States, 
 in general, 242-247, 294-295; 
 modes of, 245-246, 294-295; 
 safeguards to, 247, 294-295. 
 
 Discrimination, commercial regu- 
 lations not to show, as between 
 States, 83-87, 163-165, 265, 281, 
 286; general laws of Congress 
 not to show, 180-181, 283 ; laws 
 of States not to show, 212-214, 
 289; tax laws of Congress not 
 to show, 72, 264. 
 
 District, ceded as seat of govern- 
 
306 
 
 INDEX 
 
 ment, Congress to control, 95- 
 
 96, 267. 
 Dominican Republic, population 
 
 of, 43- 
 
 Double jeopardy, 184-185, 284. 
 Due process of law, in general, 
 
 177-179, 181, 283, 289; rights 
 
 of citizens not to be destroyed 
 
 by other States without, 213- 
 
 214, 289. 
 
 Duties. See Taxation. 
 Dwelling, protection of, from 
 
 search, 183-184, 284; soldiers 
 
 quartered in, when, 173, 283. 
 Dynastic ambitions, as cause of 
 
 war, xiii. 
 
 Economic boycott of component 
 States, 245-247, 294-295. 
 
 Economic policies, as cause of 
 war, xv. 
 
 Ecuador, population of, 43. 
 
 Embargo of component States, 
 245-247, 294. 
 
 Emigration, Congress not to con- 
 trol, 84-85, 265. 
 
 Eminent domain, 175-177, 283. 
 
 England. See Great Britain. 
 
 Equal protection of laws, 179, 
 181, 213, 283, 289. 
 
 Equality of States, in Senate, 46- 
 48, 240, 259; on Supreme 
 Court, 130-132, 241, 274. 
 
 Establishment of constitution, 248- 
 254, 295. 
 
 Evidence, against oneself, 185- 
 186, 284. See Witnesses. 
 
 Executive department, appoint- 
 ment of, 105-112, 267-268; ap- 
 pointing power of, 118-120, 
 272 ; commissioning power of, 
 122, 273 ; compensation of min- 
 isters, 112-113, 271; distribu- 
 tion of powers among, 113-114, 
 271-273 ; eligibility of minis- 
 ters, 109, 260, 267-268 ; en- 
 forcement of laws by, 121, 273 ; 
 interpellations of, in Congress, 
 122-123 ; number of ministers, 
 no-iii, 267-268; of European 
 States and United Nations, 
 104; of United States with 
 
 United Nations, 100-104; or- 
 ganization of, 100-114, 267- 
 271; pardoning power of, 
 115, 272; powers of, 115- 
 124, 271-273 ; reception of am- 
 bassadors by, 120-121, 273 ; re- 
 moval of ministers, 111-112, 
 268; removing power of, 118- 
 120, 272; selection of prime 
 minister, 105-108, 268-269; se ' 
 lection of subordinate minis- 
 ters, 109-110, 268; terms of 
 office of, III-H2, 268; treaty- 
 making power of, 115-118, 272. 
 See Checks. 
 
 Executives of States, appoint- 
 ment of international judges 
 by, 126-128, 274; commissioning 
 of officials by, 122, 273 ; judicial 
 power not to extend to, 155, 
 279 ; oath of, to support inter- 
 national constitution, 230-231, 
 292; ratification of constitu- 
 tion by, 252-254, 295. 
 
 Exclusive power of Congress, con- 
 trasted with concurrent power, 
 68-69, I 97j over arsenals, forts, 
 etc., 95-96, 267 ; over seat of 
 government, 95-96, 267. 
 
 Exports, Congress not to tax, 72, 
 166-161, 264, 281 ; States not to 
 tax, 201-205, 286. 
 
 Ex post facto laws, not to be 
 passed by Congress, 181-182, 
 283-284; not to be passed by 
 one State against citizens of an* 
 other, 213-214, 289. 
 
 Expulsion, of component States 
 from league, 242-247, 294-295; 
 of delegates from Congress, 
 261. 
 
 Extradition treaties, 118, 201, 
 272, 286. 
 
 Federal populations, 38-43, 258. 
 
 Federal Union of Nations, con- 
 trasted with league for com- 
 pulsory arbitration and con- 
 ciliation, xxviii-xxx; need of, 
 xxii, xxiii; not designed to cre- 
 ate a single new nation, 8 ; pro- 
 posal of a, 25-29. See Checks. 
 
INDEX 
 
 307 
 
 Federal unions, existing, distin- 
 guished from a federal union 
 of nations, 7-9; wars between 
 component States prevented by, 
 1-9. 
 
 Financial powers of Congress, 74- 
 77, 265. 
 
 Former jeopardy, 184-185, 284. 
 
 Forts, arsenals, etc., control of, 
 95-96, 227-228, 267. 
 
 France, assent of, to constitution, 
 249-250, 295; population of, 
 39; votes of, in Congress, 44, 
 
 Freedom, from arrest, a privilege 
 of delegates to Congress, 54, 
 262; guarantees of individual, 
 168-189, 282-285; guarantees of 
 national, 156-167, 190-211, 280- 
 282, 286-288; meaning of, 178; 
 no one to be deprived of, with- 
 out due process of law, 177-179, 
 181, 213-214, 283, 289; of re- 
 ligion, 170, 282; of speech and 
 press in Congress, 54-55, 262; 
 of speech and press in general, 
 170-171, 283; of trade, as pre- 
 ventive of war, 14-16, 202; of 
 trade, as between the compo- 
 nent States, 201-205, 286; of 
 trade, with States outside the 
 league, 72, 160-161, 201-205, 
 264, 281, 286; persons illegally 
 confined entitled to, 168-169, 
 282. See Checks. 
 
 General welfare, found only in 
 powers delegated to league, 72- 
 74, 162-163, 264, 281. 
 
 Germany, assent of, to constitu- 
 tion, 249-250, 295; population 
 f 39 5 votes of, in Congress, 
 
 44, 47; 
 
 Grand jury, not required, 186. 
 
 Great Britain, assent of, to con- 
 stitution, 249-250, 295 ; popula- 
 tion of, 37, 38-39; votes of, in 
 Congress, 45, 47. 
 
 Great Powers, assent of majority 
 of, to constitution, 249-250, 
 295; balanced against more 
 numerous small States, 35-48, 
 
 258-259; predominance of, in 
 House of Delegates, 35-48, 258; 
 represented equally with other 
 States in Senate, 46-48, 259. 
 See Checks; States. 
 
 Greece, population of, 41. 
 
 Greed of nations as cause of war, 
 xiii. 
 
 Guaranties, of component na- 
 tions against invasion, 217, 
 290; of nonintervention in case 
 of civil war, 217-221, 290-291 ; 
 of private rights in civil cases, 
 168-180, 212-216, 282-283, 289; 
 of private rights in criminal 
 cases, 181-189, 212-216, 283- 
 285, 289. See Checks. 
 
 Guatemala, population of, 42. 
 
 Habeas corpus, right to, 168-169, 
 282; suspension of, 169, 282. 
 
 Haiti, population of, 43. 
 
 High seas, Congress to control in- 
 ternational commerce on, 79, 
 82-83, 26 3 26 5; Congress to 
 control communications by way 
 of, 85-87, 265 ; Congress to de- 
 fine and punish offenses on, 92- 
 93, 266; judicial power extends 
 to offenses and wrongs on, 143- 
 
 J 45> 277- 
 
 Holland, population of, 40; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Honduras, population of, 43. 
 
 Honor of nations, as cause of 
 war, xiv, 17-18; pledged to 
 support constitution, 253-254, 
 295. 
 
 House of Delegates, organization 
 of, 36, 46, 49, 257-262; organ- 
 ization of, how affected by 
 amendments, 241, 293 ; power 
 of, to make rules and choose 
 officers, 65, 261 ; privileges of 
 members of, 54, 262; veto of, 
 on acts of Senate, 46, 257, 263. 
 See Checks; Congress. 
 
 Ignorance of other nations, as 
 
 cause of war, 19-20. 
 Immigration, Congress not to 
 
 control, 84-85, 265. 
 
308 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Immorality of nations, as cause 
 of war, 3-7, 14; prevented by 
 federal union, 5-7. 
 
 Impeachment, no power of, in 
 Congress, 60-63. 
 
 Imports, Congress not to tax, 72, 
 160-161, 264, 281; States not to 
 tax, 201-205, 286. 
 
 Imprisonment, discharge from il- 
 legal, 168-169, 282. 
 
 Independence of States, reserved, 
 222, 291. See Checks. 
 
 Indirect taxes, Congress not to 
 levy, 72, 160-161, 264, 281; 
 States not to levy, 201-205, 286. 
 
 Industrial boycott, to discipline 
 States, 242-247, 292-293. 
 
 Internal dissensions in States, 
 neutrality in, 217-221, 290-291. 
 
 International arbitration, ix-x. 
 
 International commerce. See 
 Checks; Commerce. 
 
 International conciliation, ix-x. 
 
 International Congress. See Con- 
 gress. 
 
 International constitution. See 
 Constitution. 
 
 International copyrights and pat- 
 ents, 87-88, 265. 
 
 International courts. See Courts; 
 Judges; Judiciary. 
 
 International executive. See Ex- 
 ecutive Department; Ministry. 
 
 International law. See Law of 
 Nations. 
 
 International postal and other 
 communications, 85-87, 265. 
 
 Interstate commerce. See Com- 
 merce. 
 
 Interstate relations, 197-201, 212- 
 214, 217-219, 289-291. 
 
 Intrastate commerce, not con- 
 trolled by Congress, 82, 265. 
 
 Invasion, protection of States 
 against, 217, 290. 
 
 Inventions, protection of, by pat- 
 ents, 87-88, 265. 
 
 Italy, assent of, to constitution, 
 249-250, 295 ; population of, 
 40; "unredeemed," as cause of 
 war, xvi ; votes of, in Congress, 
 
 Japan, assent of, to constitution, 
 249-250, 295 ; people of, treated 
 as of white race, 37-39, 258; 
 population of, 38, 39, 258; 
 votes of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Jealousies, as cause of war, 20-22. 
 
 Jeopardy, twice in, 184-185, 284. 
 
 Journals of Congress, 261-262. 
 
 Judges, appointment of, 126-128, 
 274; classification of, on Su- 
 preme Court, 132-134, 274-276; 
 compensation of, 128-129, 274; 
 in each State to support con- 
 stitution, laws, and treaties, 
 229-231, 292; independence of, 
 128-129, 274; jurisdiction of, 
 136-154, 276-278; of States may 
 exercise international jurisdic- 
 tion, 89-90, 273; removal of, 
 63-65, 129, 274. 
 
 Judicial decrees inadequate to 
 settle political disputes, xi- 
 xxiii. 
 
 Judicial power of United Na- 
 tions, cases under constitution, 
 laws, and treaties, 136-142, 
 277; cases affecting ambassa- 
 dors, etc., 142-143, 277 ; cases 
 on high seas, 143-145, 277; 
 cases involving United Nations, 
 145-146, 278 ; cases between 
 component States, 146, 278 ; 
 cases affecting other nations, 
 147-148, 278 ; not cases between 
 citizens of different States, 148 ; 
 nor suits by private persons 
 against States, 154, 279; nor 
 personal proceedings against 
 rulers of States, 155, 241, 279. 
 
 Judiciary department, appellate 
 jurisdiction of Supreme Court, 
 I 53> 278; appointment of, 127, 
 274; compensation of, 128-129, 
 274; Congress to create sub- 
 ordinate courts of, 88-90, 129- 
 130, 266, 273-274; independ- 
 ence of, 128-129, 274; jurisdic- 
 tion of, 136-154, 276-279; or- 
 ganization of, 125-135, 273-276; 
 organization of Supreme Court, 
 1 30- I 35 274-276; original juris- 
 diction of Supreme Court, 150- 
 
INDEX 
 
 309 
 
 152, 278; removal of judges in, 
 62-63, I2 9> 2 74- See Checks; 
 Courts; Judges; Judicial Power. 
 
 Jury, former jeopardy is convic- 
 tion or acquittal by, 184-185, 
 284; in civil cases, 174-175; in 
 criminal cases, 187-188, 284- 
 285 ; no requirement of grand, 
 186; number necessary to con- 
 stitute, 188, 285; number neces- 
 sary to verdict of, 188, 285. 
 
 Jurisdiction. See Courts; Judges; 
 Judicial Power. 
 
 Justiciable disputes, distinguished 
 from political, xiv-xxii, 23-24; 
 redressed by courts or arbi- 
 tration, xiv-xxii, 23-24. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Land, Congress to tax only, 71- 
 72, 160-161, 264, 281. See Ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 Law, as foundation of morality 
 among nations, 1-7; citizens not 
 to be denied equal protection 
 of, in other States, 213-214, 
 289; due process of, 179, 181, 
 213-214, 283, 289; equal pro- 
 tection of, 179, 181, 213-214, 
 283, 289; executive department 
 to enforce the, 121, 273 ; judi- 
 ciary to interpret the, 136-142, 
 277; passage of, ^ 35-48, 257- 
 266; supremacy of international 
 constitution and, 229-231, 292; 
 unconstitutionality of a, 138- 
 142, 272, 292. 
 
 Law of Nations, Congress to de- 
 fine and punish offenses against, 
 92-93, 266; citizens when 
 abroad protected under, 215- 
 216, 289-290; neutrality under, 
 in case of civil war in compo- 
 nent States, 217-221, 290- 
 291. 
 
 League to enforce peace, some 
 obstacles to, xxix; contrasted 
 with federal union of nations, 
 xxviii. See Checks. 
 
 Legal rights of nations distin- 
 guished from political powers, 
 xii-xvi. xx. 
 
 Legal tender, power of Congress 
 to issue, 74-77, 265. 
 
 Legislation, limitations on power 
 of, as to Congress, 156-189, 
 280-285 ; limitations on power 
 of, as to States, 190-212, 286- 
 288 ; of States as to citizens of 
 other States, 213-214, 289; un- 
 constitutionality of, 138-142, 
 277, 292; uniformity of, in tax- 
 ation, 69-74, 26 4> 283, 289; uni- 
 formity of, as to commerce, 79- 
 85, 162-165, 265, 281, 283, 289; 
 uniformity of, as to communi- 
 cations, 85-87, 265; veto of 
 States upon international, 57-60, 
 263-264. See Checks; Con- 
 gress; States. 
 
 Legislative department, control 
 of, over executive, 100-114, 
 267-271 ; convictions of crime 
 by, 181-182, 212-214, 283-284, 
 289 ; oath of members of, 230- 
 231, 292; organization of, 30- 
 65, 257-262; powers of, 66-99, 
 264-267, 280-285, 290-291; two 
 houses of, preferable to one, 
 32, 43-50, 257. See Checks; 
 Congress. 
 
 Liberty. See Freedom. 
 
 Life, no one to be deprived of, 
 without due process of law, 
 181, 212-214, 283, 289. 
 
 Limitations, on amendments of 
 constitution, 240-242, 293 ; on 
 discipline of States by Con- 
 gress, 247, 294-295; on judicial 
 power, 153-155, 279; on pow- 
 ers of Congress, 156-189, 280- 
 285; on powers of executive, 
 105-109, 268, 271-273; on pow- 
 ers of States, 190-211, 286-288. 
 See Checks. 
 
 Majorities. See Votes. 
 
 Measures, Congress to fix stand- 
 ards of, 78, 265. 
 
 Mexico, population of, 42. 
 
 Migration of citizens, Congress 
 not to control, 84-85, 265. 
 
 Military aims, as cause of war, 
 xiii, 17. 
 
3io 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Military force, as measure of 
 State's influence, 34. 
 
 Military officers, appointment and 
 removal of, 118-120, 272. 
 
 Military preparedness, as cause 
 of war, xv. 
 
 Militia, States to keep, 206-209, 
 266, 287; use of, in repelling 
 invasion, 217, 266. 
 
 Ministers, executive. See Execu- 
 tive Department; Ministry. 
 
 Ministers, public. See Ambas- 
 sadors. 
 
 Ministry, appointment of, 105- 
 no, 267-269; compensation of, 
 112-113, 271; composed of 
 prime minister and council, 
 105-110, 267-268; Congress not 
 summoned or prorogued by, 
 124; dependent on Congress, 
 loo-no, 267-269; distribution 
 of powers among, 113-114, 
 267-268; eligibility of, 109, 
 260, 267-268; interpellations 
 of, in Congress, 122-123 ; num- 
 ber of, iio-ui, 267-268; powers 
 of, 115-124, 271-273; removal 
 of, III-H2, 267-268; selection 
 of prime minister, 105-108, 268- 
 269; selection of subordinates 
 in, 109-110, 267-268; terms of 
 office of, in-112, 267-268. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Misdemeanor, judge removable 
 for, 62-63, 129, 274. 
 
 Money, appropriations of, for 
 army, 94-95, 266; appropria- 
 tions of, in general, 162, 281; 
 Congress to borrow, 74-75, 
 265 ; Congress to coin, 76-77, 
 265 ; Congress to control, 66- 
 6 7 74'77> 265; Congress to 
 issue paper, 75-76, 265. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, as cause of 
 war, xv. 
 
 Montenegro, population of, 41. 
 
 Morality, of individual, secured 
 by law, 1-3; of nations, se- 
 cured by federal union, 3-7. 
 
 Nationalism, spirit of, as cause 
 of war, xiii. 
 
 Nations, ambition of, as cause of 
 war, 17; cupidity of, as cause of 
 war, 14-16; honor of, as cause 
 of war, 17-18; immorality of, 
 as cause of war, 3-7, 14; jeal- 
 ousies and suspicions of, as 
 cause of war, 20-22; law of, 
 (see Law of Nations) ; preju- 
 dice and ignorance of, as 
 cause of war, 19-20; pride of, 
 as cause of war, 17-18. See 
 Checks; States. 
 
 Naturalization, no power of, in 
 Congress, 97-99, 280. 
 
 Naval officers, appointment and 
 removal of, 118-120, 272. 
 
 Navies, States to keep, 206-209, 
 287; support of international, 
 94-95, 266. See Checks; War. 
 
 Navigable waters, control of, 79- 
 85, 92, 265, 277, 281. See Com- 
 merce. 
 
 Netherlands, population of, 40; 
 votes of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Neutrality, in case of civil war 
 in component State, 217-218, 
 290-291. 
 
 Nicaragua, population of, 43. 
 
 Norway, population of, 41; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Notice, no one to be deprived of 
 rights without, 177-179, 181, 
 212-214, 283, 289; States not 
 to be disciplined without, 242- 
 247, 294; States not to veto 
 measures without, 57-60, 263- 
 264; States not to secede with- 
 out, 226, 291. 
 
 Oath of office, 230-231, 292. 
 
 Obligation of contracts, laws af- 
 fecting, 213-214, 289. 
 
 Offenses. See Crimes. 
 
 Officers, appointment of judicial, 
 127, 274; appointment of legis- 
 lative, 50-52, 258, 259; ap- 
 pointment of ministerial, 105- 
 114, 267-268; appointment of 
 subordinate, 118, 119, 272; 
 commissioning of, 122, 273; 
 oath of, 230-231, 292; removal 
 of judicial, 62-63, !29, 274; re- 
 
INDEX 
 
 moval of legislative, 50-52, 258, 
 259; removal of ministerial, 
 105-114, 267-268; removal of 
 subordinate, 118, 119, 272. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Open door in China, as cause of 
 war, xv. 
 
 Original jurisdiction of Supreme 
 Court, 150-152, 278. 
 
 Original suit by private person 
 against State not permitted, 
 153, 154, 279. 
 
 Panama, population of, 43. 
 
 Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slav- 
 ism, as cause of war, xv. 
 
 Paper money, Congress to issue, 
 74-76, 265. 
 
 Paraguay, population of, 43. 
 
 Pardon, power of, 115, 272. 
 
 Patents, Congress to regulate, 87- 
 88, 265. 
 
 Peace, federal unions make for, 
 10-24. See Checks; War. 
 
 Pension laws of Congress, 162- 
 163, 281. 
 
 Peonage, control of domestic, 192- 
 
 193- 
 
 Peru, population of, 42. 
 
 Petition, popular right of, 172, 
 283. 
 
 Poland, as cause of war, xvi. 
 
 Policy, national, as cause of war, 
 xv. 
 
 Political ambitions, as cause of 
 war, 17.^ 
 
 Political disputes, breed wars, 23- 
 24; not justiciable, xiii-xxi, 23- 
 24. 
 
 Political powers, surrender of, by 
 States necessary to prevent 
 war, xvii, xxiv-xxvi, 286-288. 
 
 Population, armies of States pro- 
 portioned to, 207-209, 287 ; as 
 measure of State's influence, 
 36-43 ; backward, contrasted 
 with progressive, 37, 258; 
 census of, 35-48, 258; federal, 
 contrasted with actual, 38-43, 
 258; of various countries, 38- 
 43 ; unequal, balanced against 
 equal sovereignty, 46-47, 258- 
 
 259 ; votes of States in House 
 of Delegates proportioned to, 
 46-47, 258; white, contrasted 
 with colored, 37-39, 41, 258. 
 
 Portugal, population of, 40. 
 
 Postal communication, Congress 
 to regulate, 85-87, 265. 
 
 Powers, distribution of constitu- 
 tional, 30-31. See Constitution. 
 
 Powers, Great. See Great 
 Powers. 
 
 Powers of States, limitations on, 
 190-211, 241, 286-288; surrender 
 of, in federal union, 11-12; sur- 
 render of certain, necessary to 
 prevent wars, xxii, xxiv-xxvi, 
 11-12; to adopt constitution, 
 250-254, 295; to amend con- 
 stitution, 232-241, 293 ; to bur- 
 den or tax commerce, 201-205, 
 286; to control Congress, 52, 
 258, 259, 263 ; to control ex- 
 ecutive ministry, 105-112, 267- 
 268 ; to control judiciary, 127- 
 129, 273-276; to maintain 
 armies and navies, 201-205, 
 287; to make treaties, 197-201, 
 286 ; to secede from league, 
 223-228, 291-292; to veto inter- 
 national legislation, 57-60, 263- 
 264; to wage war, 201-205, 
 287. See Checks. 
 
 Prejudice of race, as cause of 
 war, xv, 19-20. 
 
 Presiding justices of Supreme 
 Court, 133-134, 276- 
 
 Press, freedom of. See Freedom. 
 
 Pride of nations, as cause of 
 war, xiv, 17-18. 
 
 Prime minister, appointment of, 
 105-108, 268-269; powers of, 
 115-124, 269, 291-293; removal 
 of, IH-II2, 269. See Executive 
 Department; Ministry. 
 
 Privileges, of citizens in other 
 States, 212-215, 289; of dele- 
 gates to Congress, 54-55, 262. 
 
 Production of goods, not part of 
 commerce, 81, 83. 
 
 Progressive and backward popu- 
 lations, 37-39, 41, 258. 
 
 Property, meaning of, 178-179; 
 
INDEX 
 
 not to be destroyed without due 
 process of law, 179, 181, 212- 
 215, 283, 289. 
 
 Proposal of amendments, 236- 
 237, 293. 
 
 Prorogation of Congress, 124, 261. 
 
 Prosecution for crime. See Ac- 
 cused; Arrest; Trial. 
 
 Public ministers. See Ambassa- 
 dors. 
 
 Public opinion, as preventive of 
 war, xxvii. 
 
 Public purpose, appropriations 
 for, 162-163, 264, 281 ; com- 
 pensation for private property 
 taken for, 175-176, 283; nature 
 of, 162-163, 264, 281 ; taxation 
 for, 72-74, 264. 
 
 Public trial, right to, 187, 284. 
 
 Punishments, Congress to pro- 
 vide, for counterfeiting, 77-78, 
 265 ; for offenses on high seas, 
 92-93, 266; for offenses against 
 Law of Nations, 92-93, 144- 
 145, 266; no cruel and unusual, 
 189, 285; of delegates in Con- 
 gress for disorderly conduct, 
 261. See, Accused; Arrest; 
 Crimes. 
 
 Quartering of soldiers, 173-174, 
 
 283. 
 Quorum, majority of either house 
 
 of Congress constitutes, 261. 
 
 Race prejudices, as cause of war, 
 xv, 19-20. 
 
 Ratification, of amendments to 
 constitution, 237-240, 293 ; of 
 constitution, 250-254, 295. 
 
 Rebellion, in component States, 
 217-219, 290-291. 
 
 Recess of Congress, 53, 261. 
 
 Religion, freedom of, 170, 282. 
 
 Removal, of judges, 62-63, I2 9 
 274; of delegates in Congress, 
 50-52, 258, 259; of prime min- 
 ister, iu-112, 268; of subordi- 
 nate ministers, 109, 112, 267- 
 268 ; of subordinate officials, 
 118-120, 272. 
 
 Representatives in Congress, ap- 
 
 pointment of, 50-52, 258, 259; 
 compensation of, 53-54, 262; 
 expulsion of, 261 ; privileges of, 
 54-55. 262; removal of, 50-52, 
 
 258, 259; terms of, 50-52, 258, 
 
 259, 260; votes of, 46-47, 258, 
 259. 
 
 Reprieve, power of, 115, 272. 
 Republic of Nations, league to be 
 
 a, 1 66. See Constitution. 
 Reserved rights of States, 222- 
 
 228, 291-292. 
 Residents of seat of government, 
 
 as citizens of United Nations, 
 
 97-98, 159, 280. 
 Retroactive laws, as to contracts, 
 
 213-214, 289; as to crimes, 177- 
 
 179, 181-182, 213-214, 283-284, 
 
 289; as to property, 177-179, 
 
 213-214, 283, 289. 
 Revenue. See Taxation. 
 Revolution in component State, 
 
 217-219, 290-291. 
 Roumania, population of, 41. 
 Russia, assent of, to constitution, 
 
 249-250, 295 ; population of\ 
 
 39 ; votes of, in Congress, 45, 
 
 47- 
 
 Salvador, population of, 42. 
 
 Search, warrants of, 182-183, 284. 
 
 Seas. See High Seas. 
 
 Seat of government, Congress to 
 control, 95-96, 284; residents 
 of, as citizens of United Na- 
 tions, 97-98, 159, 280. 
 
 Secession of States, accounting 
 for assets upon, 227-228, 292; 
 compulsory, 242-247, 294-295 ; 
 right of, 223-228, 291-292; 
 State's right of, not to be lost 
 by amendment, 239-241, 293. 
 See Checks. 
 
 Secret diplomacy, check on, 115- 
 116, 272, 286. 
 
 Sections of Supreme Court, 132- 
 134, 274-276.^ 
 
 Self-incrimination, 185-186, 284. 
 
 Senate, appointment to, 50-52, 
 259 ; compensation of delegates 
 to, 53-54, 262; equality of 
 States in, 46, 259; equality in, 
 
INDEX 
 
 not affected by amendments, 
 240, 293 ; eligibility to, 46-48, 
 50-52, 260; expulsion from, 
 261 ; privileges of delegates to, 
 54-55, 262; recall from, 50-52, 
 259, 260; State veto upon ac- 
 tion of, 57-60, 263-264.; to make 
 its rules and choose its officers, 
 65, 261 ; veto of, on action of 
 House of Delegates, 46, 263. 
 See Checks; Congress. 
 
 Senators. See Representatives. 
 
 Serbia, population of, 41 ; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Slave trade, Congress to control, 
 192-193, 263. 
 
 Slavery, Congress not to control 
 domestic, 192-193. 
 
 Sovereign, no personal proceed- 
 ings against, 155, 241, 279. 
 See States. 
 
 Sovereignty of States, conception 
 of, illusory, xxiv-xxv, xxviii; 
 equality of, in Senate bal- 
 anced against unequal popula- 
 tions in House of Delegates, 
 46-47, 258-259; equality of, in 
 Senate not affected by amend- 
 ments, 240-241, 293; reserva- 
 tion of, 222, 291. See Checks. 
 
 Spain, population of, 41. 
 
 Speech, freedom of. See Free- 
 dom. 
 
 Speedy trial, right to, 187, 284. 
 
 Standards of weights and meas- 
 ures, Congress to fix, 78, 265. 
 
 Standing armies. See Armies. 
 
 States, adoption of constitution 
 by, 248-254, 295 ; admission of, 
 to league, 220, 221, 290-291 ; 
 boycott of, 242-247, 294-295; 
 cession of territory to United 
 Nations by, 95-96, 157-159, 
 267, 280; citizens of, protected 
 against United Nations, 168- 
 189, 282-285 ; citizens of, pro- 
 tected in other, 212-216, 289; 
 courts of, may exercise inter- 
 national jurisdiction, 88-92, 
 273 ; de facto government of, 
 recognized in case of civil war, 
 218-220, 290-291 ; discipline of, 
 
 by Congress, 242-247, 294-295; 
 dismemberment of, as result of 
 civil war, 220, 290-291 ; dis- 
 putes between, tried in Supreme 
 Court, 132-133, 151-153, 278; 
 equality of, in Senate, 46-48; 
 240, 259; equality of, on Su- 
 preme Court, 130-132, 241, 274, 
 293 ; executives of, to appoint 
 judges, 126-128, 274; executives 
 of, to ratify constitution, 252- 
 254. 295; expulsion of, from 
 league, 242-247, 294-295; guar- 
 anteed against invasion, 217, 
 290; internal conflicts within, 
 217-219, 290-291 ; jurisdiction of 
 disputes between, 145-147, 150, 
 278; jurisdiction of cases be- 
 tween citizens of different, 
 148-150; jurisdiction of per- 
 sonal proceedings against rul- 
 ers of, 155, 279; jurisdiction 
 of suits by private persons 
 against, 154, 279; laws or 
 treaties of, unconstitutional, 
 138-142, 229-231, 277, 292; lim- 
 itations on powers of, 190-211, 
 286-288; measures of influence 
 of, 33-43; neutrality in case of 
 civil war in, 217-221, 290-291 ; 
 not to acquire territory, 209-211, 
 286; not to be interfered with 
 in dealing with their own citi- 
 zens, 195; not to enter into al- 
 liances, 200, 286; not to tax 
 carrying capacity, 205, 286 ; not 
 to tax imports or exports, 201- 
 205, 286; number of, to estab- 
 lish constitution, 248-250, 295 ; 
 officials of, to swear to sup- 
 port constitution, 230-231, 292; 
 original jurisdiction of Su- 
 preme Court over, 151-153, 
 278 ; populations of, repre- 
 sented in House of Delegates, 
 35-48, 258; relations of, to each 
 other, 212-220, 289-291; re- 
 served rights of, 222-228, 291- 
 292 ; secession of, from league, 
 223-228, 291-292; sovereignty 
 of, reserved, 222, 291 ; treason 
 against component, 160; treaty- 
 
314 
 
 INDEX 
 
 x making power of, 200-201, 229- 
 231, 286; veto power of, 57-60, 
 263-264; war powers of, 206- 
 209, 286-287. See Checks. 
 
 Statute law. See Law; Legisla- 
 tion. 
 
 Subsidies, 162-163, 281. 
 
 Suffrage. See Votes. 
 
 Supremacy of international con- 
 stitution, laws, and treaties, 
 229-231, 292. 
 
 Supreme Court, allotment by, of 
 share of common assets to se- 
 ceding or expelled State, 227- 
 228, 246-247, 291-292, 294-295; 
 appeals to sections of, 132-134, 
 275-276; appeals to, from sec- 
 tions of, 134-135, 275-276; ap- 
 pellate jurisdiction of, 153, 
 278; appointment of judges of, 
 127-128, 274; classification of, 
 into sections, 132-134, 274-276; 
 compensation of judges of, 
 128-129, 274; equality of 
 States on, 130-132, 241, 274; 
 established by constitution, 127, 
 273-276; independence of, 128- 
 129, 274; organization of, 130- 
 135, 274-276; original jurisdic- 
 tion of, 150-152, 278; power of, 
 to declare laws and treaties un- 
 constitutional, 138-142, 277; re- 
 moval of judges of, 62-63, I2 9> 
 274. See Checks. 
 
 Suspicions, national, as cause of 
 war, xxvi, 20-22. 
 
 Sweden, population of, 41; votes 
 of, in Congress, 44. 
 
 Switzerland, population of, 41. 
 
 Tariffs, Congress not to lay, 72, 
 160-161, 264, 281 ; States not to 
 lay, 201-205, 286; unfair, as 
 cause of war, xiii. 
 
 Taxation, bounties and subsidies 
 not to be granted, 162-163, 281 ; 
 by Congress, for what pur- 
 poses, 73-74, 264; by Congress, 
 limited to land, 69-74, 160-161, 
 264, 281 ; by Congress, limited 
 to ten years, 56-57, 263 ; by 
 Congress, to be uniform, 72, 
 
 264; by Congress, may orig- 
 inate in either house, 56 ; by 
 States, how limited, 201-205, 
 286; dangers of power of, 70- 
 71 ; pension legislation by Con- 
 gress, 162-163, 281. 
 
 Telegraphic and telephonic com- 
 munication, Congress to con- 
 trol, 86-87, 265. 
 
 Terms of office, of delegates to 
 Congress, 50-52, 258, 259, 260; 
 of judges, 128-129, 274; of 
 prime minister, 111-112, 268- 
 269; of subordinate ministers, 
 HI-II2, 267-268; of subordi- 
 nate officials, 118-120, 272. 
 
 Territory, cession of, by States 
 to United Nations, 95-96, 157- 
 X 59> 267, 280; desire for, as 
 cause of war, xiii, xxvi, 14-16, 
 17; no acquisition of, by 
 United Nations, 157-159, 280; 
 occupation of, by United Na- 
 tions in war, 157-159, 280; 
 when acquired by component 
 States, 158-159, 209-211, 280, 
 288 ; when divided in case of 
 civil war, 217-220, 290-291. 
 See Checks. 
 
 Titles of nobility not to be 
 granted, 165-166, 167, 281. 
 
 Tonnage, States not to lay du- 
 ties of, 205, 286; States to keep 
 war vessels in proportion to 
 mercantile, 209, 287. 
 
 Torts on high seas, Congress to 
 define and redress, 92-93, 266; 
 judicial power extends to, 143- 
 145, 277. 
 
 Trade, as measure of State's in- 
 fluence, 35-36; desire for, as 
 cause of war, xiii, 14-16; desire 
 to control, as cause of war, 
 xxvi; freedom of, as preven- 
 tive of war, xiii, 72, 201-205; 
 unfair competition in, as cause 
 of war, xiii. See Checks; 
 Commerce. 
 
 Trade marks, 88. 
 
 Trade routes, desire for, as cause 
 of war, xiii. 
 
 Treason, against component 
 
INDEX 
 
 315 
 
 States, 160; against United 
 Nations, no such crime as, 160, 
 280-281. 
 
 Treaties, authority of United 
 Nations to make, 115-118, 272; 
 authority of States to make, 
 197-201, 212, 286; breach of, 
 as cause of war, xvi-xvii; citi- 
 zens when abroad protected by, 
 213-216, 289, 290; Congress to 
 assent to, 116-118, 201, 272; 
 constitution the most solemn of 
 all, 251, 252-254; judicial 
 power extends to, 136-142, 277; 
 limited within constitutional 
 bounds, 117-118, 272; ministry 
 to negotiate, 117-118, 272; 
 must provide for peaceable set- 
 tlement of disputes arising 
 therefrom, 201, 286; secret, 
 checks upon, 116, 272; su- 
 premacy of, 229-231, 292; un- 
 constitutionality of, 138-142, 
 277, 292. 
 
 Treaty-making power, of each 
 State to assent to constitution, 
 252-253, 295; of United Na- 
 tions, 116-118, 292. 
 
 Trial, in civil cases without jury, 
 174-175; in criminal cases by 
 jury, 187-189, 284-285; public 
 and speedy, 187, 284; punish- 
 ment without, prohibited, 181- 
 182, 213-214, 283, 289. See Ac- 
 cused; Arrest. 
 
 Troops, quartering of, 173-174, 
 283 ; proportion of, to be kept 
 by States, 206-207, 287; right 
 of United Nations to raise and 
 support, 266-267. See Armies, 
 
 Unconstitutionality, of laws and 
 treaties of States, 138-142, 229- 
 231, 277, 286, 292; of laws and 
 treaties of United Nations, 117- 
 118, 138-142, 272, 277, 292; 
 veto of laws by States be- 
 cause of, 57-60, 263-264. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Uniformity, of commercial regu- 
 lations, 83-84, 162-165, 265, 
 281, 283; of interpretation of 
 
 constitution, laws, and treaties, 
 X 35 J 37i of postal, etc., regu- 
 lations, 85-87, 265; of tax laws, 
 72, 265, 281, 283. 
 
 United Nations, constitution of, 
 2 57-295. See Constitution. 
 
 United States, assent of, to con- 
 stitution, 249-250, 295 ; consti- 
 tution of, 257-295 ; population 
 of, 40; votes of, in Congress, 
 
 45, 47- 
 Uruguay, population of, 43. 
 
 Venezuela, population of, 42. 
 
 Verdict of jury, 188, 285. 
 
 Vested rights, protected, 178-179, 
 283, 289. 
 
 Veto, by each house of Congress 
 upon the other, 257, 263 ; by 
 each State upon Congress, 32- 
 33, 57-60, 241, 263-264. 
 
 Votes in Congress, admission of 
 States to league by three- 
 fourths of, 220, 221, 290-291 ; 
 amendments to constitution 
 proposed by two-thirds of, 236- 
 2 37 2 93 > amendments enacted 
 by three-fourths of, 237-240, 
 293 ; appointment of prime 
 minister by a majority of, 105- 
 108, 268; legislation by a ma- 
 jority of, 261 ; majority of, to 
 constitute a quorum in each 
 house, 261 ; removal of judges 
 by a majority of, 62-63, I2 9, 
 274; removal of prime minister 
 by a majority of, 111-112, 268; 
 States to acquire territory by 
 three-fourths of, 158-159, 209- 
 211, 280, 288; State's veto of 
 legislation overriden by three- 
 fourths of, 57-60, 241, 264; 
 treaties ratified by two-thirds 
 of, 116-118, 272. See Checks; 
 Congress. 
 
 Votes in Supreme Court, law or 
 treaty declared unconstitutional 
 by three-fourths of, 138-142, 
 247. 
 
 Votes of States, in House of Dele- 
 gates proportioned to popula- 
 tion, 35-48, 240, 258; in Sen- 
 
INDEX 
 
 ate equal, 46-48, 240, 259; 
 expulsion of delegate* in either 
 house by two-thirds of, 261. 
 
 War, acquisition of territory by 
 States in time of, 209-211, 280, 
 288-289; acquisition of terri- 
 tory by United Nations in time 
 of, 157-159, 280; appropria- 
 tions for, limited to two years, 
 94'95 266; causes of, xii-xviii, 
 13-24; federal unions check, 
 10-24; guarantee to States 
 against, 217, 290; neutrality 
 towards State in case of civil, 
 217-221, 290-291; obligations 
 of States not to be enforced by, 
 244-247, 287; powers of, how 
 far surrendered by States, 94, 
 287; power of, vested in 
 league, 93-95, 266; power of, 
 how far vested in States, 206- 
 209, 287; results from exercise 
 
 of political powers rather than 
 legal rights, xii, xv, xvii, xix, 
 xx ; right of States to keep ves- 
 sels of, 206-209, 287. See 
 Checks. 
 
 Warrant of arrest or of search, 
 182-183, 284. 
 
 Weights, Congress to fix stand- 
 ards of, 78, 265. 
 
 White populations, contrasted 
 with colored, 37-39, 41, 258. 
 
 Wireless communication, Con- 
 gress to control, 86-87, 265. 
 
 Witnesses, accused to be con- 
 fronted with, 189, 285; ac- 
 cused to compel attendance of, 
 189, 285; not to incriminate 
 themselves, 185-186, 284. 
 
 Worship, freedom of, 170, 282. 
 
 Wrongs on high seas, Congress 
 to define and redress, 92-93, 
 266; judicial power extends to, 
 143-145, 277. 
 
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