i MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY IN THE YEARS 1848 AND 1849 vetvf BY ARTHUR GORGE!, NEW YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 359 & 331 PEARL STREET, FRAXKLIN SQUARE. 18 52. r-^ ■6^ ^t^Sd PREFACE The resistance of Hungary to Austria and Russia was broken, Kossuth and Szemere and their partisans saved themselves, like the Poles, on a neutral territory. I re- jected flight ; and the majority of the unfortunate com- batants for Hungary against New Austria followed my example. Hereupon I was pardoned, and meanwhile banished to Carinthia. The decision on the fate of my companions, however, was left to the Master of the Ordnance, Baron Haynau. The striking contradiction between my pardon and the subsequent executions might have induced the relatives of some of those who were awaiting the decision of their case to suppose that it would be possible for me, by some means, to save these unfortunate men ; for, immediately after the first executions at Arad and Pesth, I was re- quested by letters from various quarters to exert my pre- sumed influence with the government of Austria in favor of one or other of the politically compromised persons who had come into the power of Baron Haynau. The failure of these applications needs scarcely to be mentioned. I had positively no influence at all to exert. I had, on the contrary, to perceive that it was my duty to suppress even the anxious cry for pardon, so long as Baron Haynau remained the absolute master of life and death to my companions in war. My intercession could but kindle still higher the pious zeal of the Baron. PHEFACE. Not Tintil there was a pause in the execution of the capital sentences pronounced at Arad and Pesth, and it seemed to be indicated by this circumstance that Baron Haynau no longer ruled with unlimited sway in my country, could T venture to beg attention to the logical consequences of my being pardoned, without having to fear at the same time that my intercession would com- pletely endanger the lives of those whose deliverance it implored. I was on the point of handing my petition, addressed to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, to the local mili- tary authority of Klagenfurt to be kindly forwarded, when the rumor that the Monarch would perhaps visit Carinthia also on his state -progress in May, 1850, roused in me the desire, as will easily be conceived, to make my request orally to his Majesty. The rumor, indeed, was well founded ; but an audi- ence was refused me, and I was referred with my petition to the Minister of the Interior. Re-encouraged in some degree by the assurances with which Herr von Bach dis- missed me, I thought it best to present through him my petition to the Monarch. This T did in the following letter : To his Excellency the Minister Alexander von Bach. " Your comrades will not be deceived, if they expect the clemency of his Majesty" — were the last consolatory words with which your Excellency was pleased to dismiss me yesterday. How deeply they penetrated into my afflicted soul, how quickly they revived my well-nigh extinguished belief in the prevalence of forgiving sentiments in the breast of the offended earthly dignities, let the inclosure declare to your Excellency. ^t is a feeble attempt to implore the pardon of his Majesty for those who are not in the fortunate position of being able to do so for themselves. But I know not the language which has power to reach the heart of his Majesty; your Excellency, on the contrary, can not be a stranger to it. My words are perhaps too bold ; perhaps the use I make in the inclosed document of the reminiscences of a mournful past is calculated to thwart my purpose. It can not be concealed from your Excellency's sound judgment, whether both are fitted to be of use to my unfortunate companions, or whether the PREFACE. iii mischief of a contrary effect may perhaps threaten them from my ignorance of the bearing of this step. And thus my anxious uncertainty about the consequences of the in- closed most submissive petition will excuse me for daring once more to approach your Excellency with the respectful prayer, that your Excellency would be pleased most kindly to decide, on a humane consideration of that which it was not permitted me personally to lay before his Majesty whether the petition most respectfully inclosed in the original is worthy to be pre- sented to his Majesty by your Excellency's gracious intermediation. Klvigenfurt, 21st of May, 1850. My petition to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, was as follows : Your Majesty ! When, on the 13th of August last year, I laid down our arms before the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, 1 begged that my unfortunate companions might be spared, as well as the deeply distressed people of Hungary, freely giving up myself in expiation of what had been done. I despised flight, and purposely avoided, after as well as before the laying down of our arms, any expression or action tending to my own safety; for I wished at least to share the fate of my companions, if my prayer should not be granted ; since my companions were guilty of no act for which they deserved a more rigorous fate than myself. The laying down of our arms was resolved upon in a military council, at which I was not even present. I merely undertook to execute this reso- lution : and nevertheless, I was pardoned, while a part of the members of this military council lost their lives, another part their property and liberty. I it was especially whose independent acts,~ favored by the fortune of war, so long hostilely delayed the realization of your Majesty's great idea of a united free Austria : and notwithstandiij^g, your Majesty was pleased to grant pardon to me, while my former inferiors — the tools of my daring hand — ^were given up to the inexorable severity of, the courts-martial. In vain I sought for a point of view, regarded from which my fate and that of my unfortunate companions might be made to agree. I found none ; and abandoned myself to the torturing thought that the act of Vilagos, by its consequences speedily and bloodlessly terminating the Hungarian revo- lution, had been accounted meritorious in me exclusively, and had been rewarded with my pardon. Deeply afflicting as this supposition is to me, I firmly cling to it because it has become to me the ground of hope, that those of my former companions who are still alive might not much longer be deprived of your Majesty's most high pardon, if my ingenuous words were permitted to re-echo in your Majesty's soul. The surrender at Vilagos, with all its consequences, would have been impracticable without the magnanimous co-operation of all those on whom your Majesty's courts-martial have since either inflicted death, or the severest imprisonment. TIk; dead — they rest in peace ; neither affected any more by fear or hope. PllEFACE. ut the living — they still hope. The pardon which has been extended to/ne, their leader, continually encourages them to hope. For them I venture my prayer, w^hose boldness the sacred interests of umanity may justify, the oppressive burden of my grief may excuse. Mercy for them implores the man who could never hope or pray for mercy for himself, although sacred duties forbade him to reject it when freely offered. Mercy for those whom death has not yet removed beyond the influence of your Majesty's clemency. For all, who, by love to their country, in the midst of great bewildering events, enticed from the path of duty, partly too late entered on the honorable way of return, partly could not again enter on it through insur- mountable obstacles ; and whose faithful love to their fatherland justifies the sure expectation, that they would repay with threefold interest their sacred debt to the great common fatherland by a devoted co-operation in healing the wounds they had once helped to inflict. The gloomy prisons, unbarred at your Majesty's gracious nod ; the purification-commissions relieved from their melancholy duty by the merci- ful words, '•'forgiven and forgotten" — would restore to thousands their liberty, their home, their respectable position in society — to the common fatherland a great number of intelligent faithful citizens — to the state many a capable tried servant. The .apprehension of a shameful abuse of your Majesty's pardon is con- tradicted by every trait in the general national character of the Magyars ; and even in the non-Magyars among my unfortunate companions, this apprehension vanishes at the remembrance of their voluntary submission. A single stroke of the pen would gain for your Majesty millions of thankfully devoted hearts — a secure refuge at any time — and thousands of millions of timorous, though voiceless, complaints would become most joyously-sounding wishes for blessings on Francis Josenh the magnani- Four or five weeks later, several of my companions in arms were pardoned ; those, namely, who, like myself, belonged to the category of the so-called '' quitted" of- ficers, that is, those who had quitted the rank of officers in the Austrian army before the breaking out of the war between Hungary and Austria, bat on their departure had given a written promise never to fight against the armies of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria. The publication of this act of mercy induced me to address the following letter to the Minister of the Interior : To his Excellency the Minister of the Interior, Alexander von Bach. His Majesty's recent act of mercy, to which all those officers owe their deliverance from the dungeons, who as "quitted" royal imperial officers PREFACE. V had taken service in the revolutionary Hungarian army, and were for this reason condemned by the courts-martial, has surprisingly revealed the beautiful meaning of those consolatory words with which your Excellency dismissed me. The hearts of those who have now been given back to their families and to their friends overflow with loud blessings for those men who put tlfe thought of mercy into the Monarch's heart, and made it there germinate to a noble action. None of the public voices announces their names ; but nevertheless I am constrained firmly to believe that the pardon of a considerable number of my companions has certainly been most decid- edly promoted by your Excellency ; not, perhaps, in consequence of the hopeless steps which I dared, but rather in spite of them ; for I can very well conceive that all I urged verbally and in writing, believing it to be in favor of my companions, was more fitted to incite than to conciliate. It came, however, from me, the living evidence, the irrefutable reproach, that punitive justice has by no means been dealt out in equal measure to the participators in the Hungarian revolution. On a first superficial glance, this disproportion seems now to be equalized — let us leave the dead in peace — for I also belong to the category of the quitted royal imperial officers. But he who, on the one hand, does not overlook the limited political horizon of the soldier, and, on the other, the events of the summer of 1848, standing somewhat isolated in history, can hardly free himself from the apprehension, that the reproach of inequality in punishing and forgiving has gained but a broader basis by pardoning all quitted officers, in face of the still condemned active ones. The Monarch, whose will is law to the army, was represented in the summer of the year 1848 by two executive powers, crippling -each other, and nevertheless legitimate ; the army was divided between both by distinct military oaths. Publicly disavowed by both, but secretly supported by one of them, a third national military power arose, and with fatal haste first hurled the fire-brand of civil war from the south into the heart of the monarchy. In the midst of this general confusion, only a few succeeded in guessing for which of the two legitimate executive powers the Monarch would de- clare himself, simultaneously disavowing the other ; for the proclamations — which were calculated to explahi to many an isolated body of troops, to which they came direct, the true will of the Monarch — were either not communicated to the others at all, or too late, and moreover in such a manner as to weaken their effect. The first steps of the soldier ordered to Hungary for the maintenance of the Hungarian executive power, already nullified in Vienna, were made consequently under the moral influence of the recent military oath, out of obedience, the fundamental principle on which the existence of every regular armed force depends. The quitted officers already pardoned were not subjected to this influence. They broke their promise, given in the reciprocal bond when they quitted — never to serve with arras in hand against the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria — from a free, independent resolve. By the pardon of these men, the execution of the condemnations of the active officers, still proceeding, gains an expression of rigor, which causes it not only easily to be forgotten that these also have already been mitigated in the way of mercy, hut which moreover might even raisse the natural compassion of the masses for those who are punished to a kind of martyr- vi PREFACE. worship, with all its traditional consequences, especially to be regretted by Austria. The modest expression of a deeply felt thanks, which I wished to give to my words, has by degrees been changed, from continually looking at so many still- unbarred prisons, into the almost avowed one of a substantiated intercession ; and while I am aware of this, the doubt again ari^fes, whether I do not thereby perhaps injure where 1 wish to benefit. This doubt would silence me forever in behalf of my companions, were it not counter- acted by the conviction, that your Excellency, recognizing in all its great- ness the irresistible effect of clemency ixpon the human heart, and dis- regarding the contradictory views of parties, will successfully conduct to its consummation that work of reconciliation which has already been so nobly begun. Klagenfurt, 30thofJune, 18.50. I give these documents in the Preface, because I think their contents may be calculated to serve as a pledge beforehand to the reader of the frankness of the subsequent records of my life and acts. Those historical documents of value which accidentally remained in my possession appear in their proper places, partly given i)P.rj^atim. partly faithfully translated from Hungarian into Grerman. The surprisingly small number of documents is ex- plained by the circumstance, that I never expected to survive the revolution. ARTHUR GORGE I. Klagenfurt, 15th of August, 1851. Note.— The reader is requested to observe that wherever miles are mentioned, the German long niile ( = nearly 5^ English miles) is meant. In some instances the word ' (German)' has been inserted before 'miles,' but it is feared not uniformly.— TVansJ. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Enter the Honv^ds. Occupations out of Hungary. Advanced to Honv6d major. Szolnok; the Volunteer Mobile National-guards. Political confession of faith 13 CHAPTER II. Detached to the island of Csepel. Nominated commander-in-chief of the south- ern militia, and simultaneous extension of my military mission. Count Eugene Zichy arrested ; examined, condemned, and executed by court-martial 17 CHAPTER HI. Three days' armistice after the battle at Pakozd, Velencze, and Sukoro. Vasar- helyi. Recommencement of hostilities. Perczel my commander-in-chief. The mili- tia. Opening of the expedition against Major-general Roth. Skirmish at Tacz. Disarming of a Croat column. Philippovich in Perczel's head-quarters. Retreat of Major-general Roth. Dispute between Perczel and myself. Disarming of the Roth corps at Ozora 35 CHAPTER IV. Advanced to Honved colonel, and recalled from the Perczel corps. Kalozd. Take possession of some jewels belonging to the late Count Zichy. Vasarhelyi. Pestli. Deliver up the jewels 48 CHAPTER V. A consultation at Kossuth's. His want of confidence in Moga. Secret object of my recall from the Perczel corps and mission to Parendorf 51 CHAPTER VI. The command of the van-guard of the army of the upper Danube transferred to me. Ladislaus Csanyi. Our outposts on the Lajtha. First crossing of the frontier. The head-quarters at Parendorf, and my secret mission. The troops of the van-guard. Second crossing of the frontier 55 CHAPTER VII. First proclamation of Prince Windischgratz, and its consequences. A deliberation beforehand at Moga's about the impending third crossing of the frontier. Some light on the first two crossings of the frontier. The military council in Nikelsdorf. Kos- suth in Parendorf. His ultimatum to Prince Windischgratz. The agitations in the camp for the offensive A Hungarian tmmpet made prisoner in the hostile camp, and its consequences 60 CHAPTER VIH. Third and last crossing of the frontier. The battle at Schwechat. Remarks upon it . 68 CHAPTER IX. A conference with Kossuth. His experience on the flight from Schwechat. Count Guyon named colonel of the national guard and commander of the expedition against Field-marshal Lieut. Simunich. The chief command of the army of the upper Dan- ube transferred to me. The expedition against Simunich fails. The two meetings between Bern and myself 79 CHAPTER X. Reasons which had determined me to accept the chief command of the army. I demand the evacuation of the frontier ; Kossuth its occupation. Kossuth's depend- ency. Nevertheless I desire him for Dictator. My reasons. My letter to the Com- mittee of Defense in reference thereto. Controversies between Kossuth, the Com- mittee of Defense, and Meszaros on the one part, and myself on the other. Proofs of it 85 CHAPTER XI. Reasons why I was not removed from the chief command when in Presburg. Why I did not, of my own accord, resign. Whether I did or did not aspire to the dictator- ship and why. A private letter. Establishment of defensive works at Presburg, Wieselburg, and Raab. The state of Hungary in autumn, 1848, and the regular troops 100 viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. Prince Windischgratz crosses the frontier. It is evacuated. Presburg abandoned. Great losses. Beginning of the retreat toward Raab. Combat at Wieselbiirg. Con- tinuation of the retreat as far as Raab. Patriotic devastations. An end put to tliem. Troops believed to be lost unexpectedly saved 108 CHAPTER XIII. Raab evacuated without drawing a sword. Combat with the rear-guard at Babol- na. Vertesi Hegyelc. Plan of defense. Undeceivings. General Perczel defeated at Moor. Offensive disposition against Perczel's conqueror. Retreat toward Ofen. 112 CHAPTER XIV. Perczel's views about his defeat at Moor. The last resolutions of the Diet at Pesth. Kossuth demands a decisive battle before Ofen, and at the same time the army to be saved and the capitals spared. The impracticability of this. Kossuth at Debreczin. Military council in Pesth. Its resolutions. Battle at T6t6ny. Evacua- tion of the capitals 118 CHAPTER XV. The state of Hungary and the regular troops after the evacuation of the capitals. The proclamation of Waizen. The regular troops get out of the rain and under the spout 125 CHAPTER XVI. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube. Offensive against Field-marshal Lieut. Simunich. Its interruption by Field-marshal Lieut. Csorich. Characteristics of Colonel Count Guyon. I insist on prosecuting the offensive against Simunich. The chief of the general staff proposes to save the corps of the upper Danube in the mount- ain-towns, and prevails 132 CHAPTER XVII. The district of the mountain-towns. Position of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube before the retreat thither. Position of the hostile corps. The plan of retreat. Its execution. Position of the corps d'arm6e of the upper Danube in the mountain- towns 137 CHAPTER XVIII. The enemy attacks the mountain-towns. Zsarnocz. Turning column of Colonel CoUery. Conflict at Hodrics (22d of January) 141 CHAPTER XIX. The defeat of the Guyon division at Windschacht (21st of January), and its retreat from Schemnitz as far as Bucsa (22d of January), subsequently becomes known. Critical situation of the Aulich division. Saved from it. Still more critical situation of the Guyon division and that of the left wing. Final junction in Neusohl of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. A previous order to retreat by the war-minister is afterward taken into consideration. Our lines of retreat from Neusohl toward the upper Theiss. Plan for retreating as far as the Zips. A train of heavy-loaded wag- ons as rear-guard. The retreat commences. A tempter. Disposition of the popu- lation ^ 150 CHAPTER XX. Arrival of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube in the Zips. Sudden attack at Iglo (between the 2d and 3d of February). Dangerous situation of the corps d'ar- mee of the upper Danube. A possible outlet. Reasons against making use of it, and for the offensive against Field-mar.shal Lieut. Count Schlick. Offensive begun. Posi- tions of the corps under Klapka and Schlick. The combinations deduced from it very unfavorable for the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. Importance of the bat- tle at the Branyiszko. A reckoning with the past 158 CHAPTER XXI. Report on Guyon's victory at the Branyiszko (5th of February')- Essentially changed -situation of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. Count Schlick aban- dons the basis of his operations. Conjectures occasioned thereby as to his next in- tentions. Measures against them. Surprising defensive measures of the enemy. Direct news from Colonel Klapka. Their influence on our dispositions for attack. The enemy evacuates Kaschau without striking a blow. Junction of the corps d'ar- mee of the upper Danube with the Hungarian forces on the Theiss. Klapka's last operations against Count Schlick. Offensive concerted between Klapka and myself. The Klapka corps undertakes the pursuit of the Schlick corps. Lieut.-general Dem- binski orders the Klapka corps from Kaschau to Miskolcz. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube undertakes the pursuit. Its results 166 CHAPTER XXII, Dembinski becomes Hungarian commander-in-chief. New classification of the Hungarian forces. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube receives the name, Sev- CONTENTS. ix enth Army Corps. Antipathies therein against Dembinski's being commander-in- chief. Causes and consequences. Measures taken against the consequences. Dem- binski recognized as commander-in-chief 173 CHAPTER XXIII. Dembinski rejects the plan of operations concerted between Colonel Klapka and myself. The seventh army corps ordered to Miskolcz. First encounter with Dem- binski. Dembinski's first acts as Hungarian commander-in-chief 177 CHAPTER XXIV. Dembinski's dispositions assume an offensive character. His dissatisfaction with Klapka and the government. His dispositions of troops. Encounter with Dembinski in Erlau. The enemy himself assumes the offensive. Dembinski's characteristics . 183 CHAPTER XXV. Position of the Hungarian army immediately before the two days' battle at Kdpol- na. Termination of the first day's battle (26th of February). Dembinski's disposi- tions for the second day's battle. Circumstances causing delay in forwarding them to the army corps. Guyon arrives too late at Kapolna 189 CHAPTER XXVI. The second day's battle at Kapolna (27th of February). The Kmety division arrives too late at Kerecsend. Dembinski's dispositions of troops after the battle. . . 194 CHAPTER XXVH. Dembinski after the battle at Kapolna declines any ftirther resistance. I disap- prove of this measure, but can no longer prevent it. A private misimderstanding be- tween Dembinski and myself. The support of the army 206 CHAPTER XXVni. Retreat to Mezo-Kovesd. The camp there. Battle at Mezo-Kovesd on the 28th of February. Guyon's characteristics 210 CHAPTER XXIX. Dembinski intends to give the army rest. His dispositions to that effect. The army enters the cantonments. Klapka attacked at Eger-Farmos (1st of March). The army quits the cantonments. Dembinski's theory for procuring rest. Character of the Windischgratz- Dembinski campaign 214 CHAPTER XXX. The Klapka divisions refuse unconditional obedience to Dembinski. Dembinski decrees the retreat beyond the Theiss. Klapka effects it with his divisions (2d of March). I delay the retreat of the seventh army corps. Reasons for it. Dembinski countermands the retreat of the seventh army corps. Mv written declaration against it. I effect the retreat (3d of March) 219 CHAPTER XXXI. The staff-ofiicers of the army demand Dembinski's removal from the chief command. The government commissary Szemere undertakes to execute it. Dembinski's unsuc- cessful objections. Kossuth's arrival at the army. Interrogation of the staff-ofllicers. Vetter appointed commander-in-chief 224 CHAPTER XXXH. Colonel John Damjanics victorious at Szolnok. Dembinski allows us subsequently to discover his plan of operations 230 CHAPTER XXXni. The new (Vetter-Dembinski) plan of operations. The interregnum in the army. My acts during it 234 CHAPTER XXXIV. Kossuth and his political opponents 238 CHAPTER XXXV. My journey to Debreczin. Termination of the interregnum. Vetter commander-in- chief 241 CHAPTER XXXVI. Independent operations of the seventh army corps. The Vetter-Dembinski plan of operations abandoned. Advance of the united army as far as Gyongyos and Hort. . 244 CHAPTER XXXVII. Vetter falls sick. The chief command provisionally transferred to me. Our plan of attack. The seventh army corps conquers at Hatvan (2d of April), and thereby renders possible the execution of the plan of attack 247 CHAPTER XXXVHI. The first, second, and third army corps separate from the seventh corps, and be- X CONTENTS. gin to turn the enemy. One half of the third army corps defeats the enemy at Tapi6- Uicslte, after the latter had previously defeated the whole first corps (4th of April). Continuation of the turning-mancEUvre 250 CHAPTER XXXIX. Battle at Isaszeg (6th of April) 258 CHAPTER XL. On the state of affairs in Hungary 268 CHAPTER XLI, Delayed advance against Godolo after the battle of Isaszeg. Retreat of Prince Windischgratz toward the capital. The seventh army corps before and after the bat- tle of Isaszeg 271 CHAPTER XLH. Kossuth in Godollo 274 CHAPTER XLHI. The new plan of operations. Its execution, by storming Waizen, begun on the 10th of April, 1849. The sudden attack on Lossoncz (end of March), and its probable con- sequences , 279 CHAPTER XLIV. Details of the battle at Waizen. Continuation of operations as far as the river Gran at L6vencz. The resolution of the Diet at Debreczin, 14th of April, 1849 283 CHAPTER XLV. Crossing the Gran. Damjanics conquers at Nagy-Sarlo on the 19th of April. My views on this combat. Continuation of the operations. The battle at Kemend on the 20th of April. Relief of the fortress of Komorn on the left bank of the Danube on the 22d of April 288 CHAPTER XLVI. Preparation for the relief of the fortress of Komorn on the right bank of the Dan- ube. Sudden attack on the hostile trench in the night between the 25th and 26th of April. The relief on the right bank also effected on the 26th of April 294 CHAPTER XL VII. Retrospective glance at my helpless situation as commander of the army, after the first news of the declaration of independence. How events assisted me. Situation at that moment, and my proclamation of Komorn ^02 CHAPTER XL VIII. The theatre of war after the 26th of April. Instead of the uninterrupted prosecu- tion, as at first intended, of our offensive operations against the hostile main army, the siege of the fortress of Ofen comes into the fore-ground 311 CHAPTER XLIX. My appointment as war-minister. Damjanics becomes unfit for service. Klapka leaves the main army in order to act as my substitute in the war-ministry. Changes in the army 320 CHAPTER L. Poltenberg occupies Raab. The main body of the army invests Ofen. The range of the investment. The fortress of Ofen. The disposition of our batteries. The over-hasty attack. Its cessation. My letter to Major-general Hentzi. His answer, A letter from Klapka, in which he dissuades from the operations against Ofen 322 CHAPTER LI. The siege of Ofen 329 CHAPTER LH. Criticism on the siege and defense of Ofen 342 CHAPTER LIII. The events of the war on the upper Waag. Condition of affairs in the district of the operations of the main army at the time of the taking of Ofen. Klapka's plan of defensive operations, and my disposition of the troops, immediately after the taking of Ofen 345 CHAPTER LIV. A meeting between General Klapka and myself. Its consequences. I refuse the distinctions which the Diet had intended for me, and in consequence of this enter into communication with the parliamentary opponents of the declaration of independence . 349 CONTENTS. xi CHAPTER LV. Account of the circumstances which, on the one hand, bound me to the chief com- mand of the army, and on the other hand determined me to undertake personally the management of the ministry of war. Plan for the offensive against the Austrians. Origin of the central office of operations 355 CHAPTER LVI. My meeting with members of the peace-party in Debreczin 358 CHAPTER LVII. Kossuth and the declaration of independence. My relation to Kossuth after the 14th of April, 1849 364 CHAPTER LVni. The seat of government, notwithstanding my counter-representations, transferred from Debreczin to Pesth. Commencement of my activity against the existence of the declaration of independence. Two captured Honved officers executed by order of the new commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, Baron Haynau 367 CHAPTER LIX. Significance and consequences of the executions mentioned in the preceding chap- ter. Continuation of my endeavors hostile to the existence of the act of independence. The final aim of these endeavors. The peculiarity of my relation to the peace-party, to Szemere, to Kossuth. Supplementary facts from my duties as war-minister 371 y^ CHAPTER LX. Events on the theatre of war of the Hungarian main army from the taking of Ofen to the middle of June. Reciprocal position of the Hungarian and Austrian main armies at that time. My suppositions about the enemy's plan of operations. Uncer- tainty as to the strength and the serious commencement of the Russian intervention. The influence of this uncertainty on my resolves as commander-in-chief of the army. The causes. >f the delay of our offensive. Dispositions for the retreat and other preparations in the event of a serious commencement of the Russian intervention 379 CHAPTER LXI. The opening of our offensive against the Austrians (on the 16th of June) miscarries. I fix the 20th of June for a second more energetic attempt at the offensive. General Klapka dissuades from it, and proposes again instead his plan of defensive operations, but in vain 387 CHAPTER LXIl. The events of the war on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of June 392 V • CHAPTER LXHI. ~ The first news of the serious commencement of the Russian intervention. Their confirmation, and influence on my resolutions. The ministerial council of the 26th of June. Loss of Raab (28th June). Retreat into the fortified camp at Komorn 414 CHAPTER LXIV. Differences between the government and myself 424 CHAPTER LXV. The 2d of July 430 CHAPTER LXVI. The last days at Komorn 446 CHAPTER LXVH. A part of the main army leaves Komorn. Retreat as far as Waizen. First encounter with outposts of the Russian main army. Battle at Waizen (15th of July). Not able to improve the advantages gained by it, and informed that the Russian main army was immediately opposite us, I determine on turning the latter by Miskolcz. Reasons for this choice. Necessity of gaining on the new line of retreat a considerable advance on the Russian main army. The only means of attaining it, the nightly retreat from the position before Waizen, is ordered for the night between the 16th and 17th of July. Unexpected interruption. The hostile surprise very early in the morning of the 17th of July. General Leiningen nevertheless enables the army to depart. Rear-guard combat on the Waizen mountain, before Retsag and at this place. Continuation of the retreat on the 17th of July as far as Vadkert. Commencement of the further retreat on the 18th toward Balassa-Gyarmat 471 CHAPTER LXVIII. Events of the war from the 1 8th to the 20th of July. Our conjectures at that time about the plan of the enemy's operations. Their influence on the employment of the divers army corps. Dispositions for the march on the 21st of July 489 xii CONTENTS. CHAPTER LXIX. The first Russian trumpets in tiie camp of the army under my command. Imme- diate consequences of this event 494 CHAPTER LXX. Continuation of the operation of breaking through toward Miskolcz. Drawing up of the army on the left bank of the Sajo. Situation of the army at that time. En- coimter of outposts at Harsany on the 23d of July. Dispositions for the 24th 503 CHAPTER LXXI. A letter of the Russian General Count Riidiger. My answer. What occurred to it. Exchange of arms between Lieut.-General Sass and myself 509 CHAPTER LXXH. Combat at Goromboly on the 24th of July. Battle on the Sajo on the 25th. Retreat from the Sajo to the left bank of the Hernad. My determination to remain on the Hernad. Motives for it 512 CHAPTER LXXHI. Kossuth censures my answer to the Russian commander-in-chief. Particular mo- tives which determined me to receive this censure in silence. The real object of a letter to General Klapka. Conditions for a favorable turn of affairs in the south of Hungary. I advise Kossuth to remove Dembinski from the chief command. Kossuth assents, and intends himself to take the chief command. A projected rendezvous with Kossuth does not take place « 519 CHAPTER LXXIV.* The Russians cross the Theiss at Tiszafiired. Our strategic situation on the Hernad. A new Russian corps enters on tlie scene of war. Combat at Gesztely on the 28th of July. Commencement of the retreat from the Hernad in the night between the 28th and 2gth. News about the movement of the Russians from Tiszafiired. Division of the army into two columns (at Nyiregyhaza). Dispositions of the march for the combined retreat. Explanations of them ; and instructions for the leader of the secondary column. Conflict between the latter and the Russians at Debreczin on the ^d of August. The situation of the principal column (the main body of the army) during this conflict and immediately after it. Retreat as far as Gross- Wardei'n. General Nagy-Sandor's culpability, and my seeming indulgence toward him. The consequences of the 2d of August at Debreczin, and their influence on the further dis- positions. Uninterrupted continuation of the retreat from Gross-Wardein to Arad. . 522 CHAPTER LXXV. Supplementary account of divers circumstances, rumors, and events, from the time of the retreat from the Hernad to Arad 538 CHAPTER LXXVI. The next war operations, and Lieut.-General Dembinski's retreat from Szoreg to Temesvar. General Nagy-Sandor on his march from Arad to Temesvar attacked and forced back to Arad. The last ministerial council of the 10th of August, 1849 554 CHAPTER LXXVII. The provisional government and the negotiations with Russia. Tendency of my taking part in the latter 566 CHAPTER LXXVIII. My last meeting with Kossuth. Count Guyon reports that Dembinski's army has been scattered at Temesvar. I call upon Kossuth to resign. He nominates me com- mander-in-chief. Csanyi induces the governor to resign. Kossuth's last proclama- tion to the nation. Answer of the Russians to our invitation to negotiate. I propose an unconditional surrender before the Russians. The military council accepts my proposal 569 CHAPTER LXXIX. March from Arad to Vilagos. Events there 594 CHAPTER LXXX. The surrender of arms 605 CHAPTER LXXXI After the surrender of arms 608 MY LIFE AND ACTS. CHAPTER I. The summoning cry of distress of the first independent Hunga- rian ministry of war, " The Country is in danger !" drew me from the quiet country-life in which I had passed the spring of 1848, on the estate of a female relative in the north of Hungary, into the ranks of the Honved battalions, which had just been raised. Having formerly been a lieutenant in the royal imperial Aus- trian army, I was immediately invested with the rank of captain, and attached to the fifth battalion of Honveds. The station for its formation was Raab (Gyor). There I found a captain my senior in rank already occupied in the organization of his company. I had known this man when I served in the royal Hungarian Noble Life-guards, and knew also that, not long before, he had been pensioned as a royal im- perial lieutenant on account of his mental imbecility. What services could the country expect in the time of war from one whose intellectual faculties had not sufficed for the claims of the service in the time of peace ? The preferment of such a man to the rank of captain made me fear that sufficient strictness had not been exercised in the choice of the Honved officers. Sadder were the experiences in this respect which awaited me. This senior comrade of mine was intellectually unfit for his post ; the chief of the battalion was also morally so. He was generally recognized as a usurer well known in Pesth. In these painful circumstances, I joyfully hailed the decree of the ministry, which suddenly transferred me from the battalion to a more independent sphere of action ; and from this time I saw my battalion no more 14 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Ill Pesth, whither this decree ordered me, I received a com- mission to purchase for Hungary a supply of flint-muskets, they lying in Smyrna and Constantinople, and to use the greatest possible speed in transporting them to Pesth. This project failed as the person who offered them could not be depended upon ; and I was then commanded to establish a manufactory for fusees and percussion-caps ; but meanwhile to furnish percussion-caps during the next year, by obtaining speedy supplies from similar manu- factories already existing. The fulfillment of this task led me, in August 1848, to Prague and Wiener-Neustadt. I visited several times the royal imperial manufactory for fireworks situated near the last mentioned place, to learn the process of manufacturing fusees adopted there. In- troduced by the then ministry of war at "Vienna, I received the necessary information from the directors of the establishment in the most obliging manner. The war of Hungary with the southern provinces of Sclavonia had almost exhausted the stock of fusees at the disposal of the Hungarian ministry of war. I was therefore ordered at the same time to provide Hungary with a fresh supply direct from the royal imperial establishment for fireworks ; and assisted by the Vienna ministry of war, quickLy executed this commission. On my return to Pesth, I submitted to the ministerial president a proposal for the establishment of a manufactory for fusees and percussion-caps. But there were always more important things to be attended to. I Avas obliged to wait, and wait, and again wait, till at last I lost all patience, and insisted on being em- ployed in the war against the Raizen. My request was acceded to. I had to join the suite of the minister of war, Avho was about to proceed to the Hungarian camp, and superintend the operations against the revolted Raizen and Serbians. I had already waited an hour for our departure on board the steamer appropriated to the minister of war, when I suddenly received orders to remain in Pesth, and assist in the formation of a plan for the concentration of the mobile National-guard from the four circles of Hungary, regard being paid to the strategic conditions of the country. I had immediately to take the com- mand in one of the circles, and was appointed to that on this side the Theiss ; my chief station being Szolnok. On this occa- sion I was advanced to the rank of Honved major. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 15 In Szolnok I obtained my first insight into the state of affairs in Hungary, and was, alas, undeceived. I had supposed that all my countrymen were animated, like myself, with a determination to sacrifice every thing for the salvation of the fatherland. I con- fidently expected that the whole Mag5''ar population of Hungary would rise as one man in defense of our native soil and all that renders it dear to us. But the formation of the mobile National- guard was already rendered necessary, in general, by a moral defect in the National-guard itself, of which the tragi-comical influence on the events of the war threatened to become an in- exhaustible source of numerous, successful, though involuntary parodies on the traditions of the heroic ages of Hungary. To leave their own hearths, that they might defend those of their fellow-citizens, which were nearer the danger, seemed to fathers of families and proprietors among the National-guard a matter demanding most mature deliberation. With a most af- fecting pathos they dwelt on the far more sacred duty of preserv- ing their own dear selves, and obstinately refused to march against the enemies of the country ; and if their Jiobilisation was nevertheless sometimes successful, the country was more injured than benefited by it, because the expenses of such an organization were, in comparison with that of regular troops, disproportionately great, while their services were just as dispro- portionately small, nay, were scarcely warth mentioning. This experience had suggested to the ministry the idea of making the personal obligations of the National-guards partly transferable to others, partly profitable to the state in money or money's worth. It was granted to each battalion of National- guards, whose duty it would have been, for instance, to serve with its whole contingent during six weeks against the enemy, to send only a part of its contingent into the field, but for a pro- portionately longer time. These partial contingents of National- guard battalions were consequently composed of volunteers, and were thus called Volunteer Mobile National-guards. The name of the circle by which they were sent completed their designa- tion. By the collective expression "volunteers" were understood those also who did not serve freely, that is, those who, belonging to the poorer classes, had been forcibly levied by lot. Szolnok is situated in the circle on this side the Theiss. 16 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The estimated number of mobile National-guards to be furnished by this district was about 5000 men, who, as it was said, were already eager for combat, and needed only to be put into ranks, to be a little drilled, and then led against the enemy. But of the 5000 men thus officially calculated upon, in the course of a month with great difficulty I got together scarcely 700, and of these hardly 100 real volunteers. This, thierefore, was my con- tingent when, in the end of September, I was ordered to occupy Csepel, an island on the Danube below Ofen-Pesth, and to frus- trate at any cost attempts to cross the Danube by Field-marshal Lieutenant Ban Jellachich, or his auxiliaries under Generals Roth and Philippovich. Before I proceed to describe my acts, which only now begin to be of some importance, I think it necessary to explain the relations in which I then stood to the political questions of the day. ^^ The month of March 1848 brought for collective Hungary an independent and responsible ministry based on the ancient con- stitution. In this ministry was vested the executive power over Hungary Proper, as well as over all the provinces united under the Hungarian crown, without distinction as to the nationality of the inhabitants. This ministry had the sanction of his ma- jesty King Ferdinand V. of Hungary. At the summons of that ministry I joined the ranks of the newly-raised Hungarian troops. The royal imperial troops, of whatever nationality, who had been removed from Austria into Hungary, had already taken oath to the constitution, the maintenance of which was the first duty of that ministry. The recently-formed Hungarian troops also took the same oath. This constitution, so far as I could judge of its influence on the welfare of my country, met with my approba- tion, and it was the most natural of all feelings which caused me to defend it. All attempts made by the provinces peopled by non-Magyar races to change the constitution through any other than the lawful parliamentary means, as aiming at the overthrow of the existing form of government, were considered high treason. Whether the Austrian monarchy could preserve its former im- portance as a great European power, after the isolation of the Hungarian ministries (principally of war and finance) from the governing power constituted in Vienna for the other provinces ; MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUT. 17 and whether Hungary, recognising the guarantees of Austrian influence as the principal condition of its own existence, would not have to sacrifice to the consolidation of collective Austria a part of its newly-acquired advantages ; — these were questions, the answers to which lay beyond my sphere, nay, which, can- didly speaking, I had never put to myself Such were my personal relations to the political questions of that day. CHAPTER n. My forces on the island of Csepel being insufficient to oppose with certainty, over an extent of more than two (German) miles, any attempt (supposing such probable) of the enemy to cross from the left to the right bank of the Danube, I had to endeavor, if possible, to increase my numbers there, and also to obtain powers which might enable me successfully to resist far more dangerous enemies — the indolence, cowardice, and treason of the inhabitants of the district. For this purpose I requested from the Prime-minister, Count Louis Batthyanyi, a document au- thorizing me to form a court-martial to adjudicate upon cases of disobedience, cowardice, and treason, to confirm condemnations to death, and order their execution. Furnished with this docu ment, I repaired to the place of my destination. At the commencement of my new duties, the Prime-minister entrusted me with the chief command of a division of mixed troops stationed at Duna-Foldvar, as well as of the local militia levied from the lower Danube. The original object of my mis- sion was also extended, and the field of my operations widened ; I had to prevent the junction of General Roth's corps with the troops of Ban Jellachich. The division in Duna-Foldvar consisted of about 1200 infantry from the so-called Hunyady-Schar, and some cavalry. There being no probability that General Roth would dare, single-hand- ed, to cross the Danube, through a country where he could not count on any sympathy, it was to be expected that he would try 18 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. by every means to unite as soon as possible with Jellacliicli. But the latter had already reached Stuhlweissenburg (Szekes-Feher- var), while Generals E,oth and Philippovich were five or six days' march more to the south. Not strong enough to engage the latter, I had, on the contra- ry, to fear that the detached division in Duna-Foldvar would shortly be attacked and beaten by them, perhaps even destroyed. I therefore drew the troops from Foldvar to Adony, on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the southern part of Csepel, and confined myself to crossing from east to west the line of commu- nication between Generals Roth and Jellachich, about Soponya, by two parallel chains of outposts, one facing the north against the camp of Ban Jellachich at Stuhlweissenburg, the other southward against the troops of Generals Roth and Philippovich. Thus I should render impossible all communication between the two hostile corps by means of patrols, couriers, or spies. The local militia, which had been speedily levied from the strip of land occupied by. the outposts, furnished them with reinforce- ments. On the 29th of September, 1848, Counts Eugene and Paul Zichy, coming from Stuhlweissenburg, were stopped at the northern outpost line : on suspicion of being hostile, they were arrested, and escorted on the following day to my head-quarters at Adony. I was at Csepel when the news reached me. To convince myself what the facts were, I returned without delay to Adony. In the streets 1 met crowds of the inhabitants, and of the south- em militia concentrated there, evincing the most hostile excite- ment against the two prisoners. While inquiring what had been done with them, I met by chance two staff-officers (a colonel and a major) of the Hunyady-Schar. By a decree of the Prime-minister both were under my command, without reference to their seniority and rank. I was informed by them that, dur- ing my absence, they had already given orders to escort the counts to Pesth. I asked the reason of these orders. The col- onel assumed a mysterious air, and invited me to accompany him to his lodgings. When there, he whispered to me, with evi- dent satisfaction, that he had taken care both counts should share the fate of Count Lamberg. " The major here," he conti- nued, pointing to him, "will take upon himself the conduct of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 19 the escort, and harangue the people in the streets of Pestli against the counts while marched through the town. The peo- ple is certainly still disposed to execute Lynch-law on account of the murder of Count Lamberg . . . ." I could hardly believe my senses. This plan would have immolated two men to the blind rage of the populace, merely on account of their name I After having in vain endeavored to convince its contrivers of the infamy of such an act, I was obliged to make use of my author- ity over them. Reversing their arrangements, I ordered that the prisoners should not be escorted to Pesth, but that they should be immediately examined, and according as they were found guilty or innocent of high-treason, should either be tried by a court-martial or set at liberty. Whereupon I received for answer : "I might try to execute this myself, and at all events take the responsibility of what I intended to do." The execution of my order was indeed most hazardous. In the neighborhood of Adony, on the right bank of the Danube, I had not a single man at my disposal, except the militia and the Hunyady-Schar. The militia considered as their first duty the destruction of all whom they suspected, or who were represented as being so ; and both counts had been pointed out to them as traitors to the country. The Hunyady-Schar, on the other hand, was a corps of little discipline ; the colonel just mentioned com- manded them in person. He had organized them, he had made all the appointments ; he suffered all kinds of dissolute conduct — to him they were devoted : while they hardly knew me by name ; and, besides, the relation in which I (a major) stood as commander-in-chief to their commander (a colonel) had in it something offensive to the troop itself In addition to this, the Hunyady-Schar also had already been incited against both counts ; and from among the whole mass of armed men assem- bled there, not a single voice was raised for the prisoners, but every one declaimed against them. The jeering allusion of the colonel to the consequences of my intention to liberate the two counts in case they should not be found guilty, acquired through these circumstances a dangerous significance. I soon saw that if I seriously intended to have my orders executed, I must act decisively, speedily, and in person. First of all, the prisoners had to be conveyed to Csepel, conse- quently across the Danube. On that island there were about 20 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 400 men of the battalion I had myself formed, and on whose obedience I could already rely ; and there were there at that time only very small bands of lagging militia wandering about, against whose hostile intentions they could be sufficiently pro- tected. There was but little means of communication, over the broad arm of the Danube, between the island and Adony ; so that when once upon the island, there was no longer much to fear from the militia, and the Hunyady-Schar on the Adony shore. But the transport of the counts to Csepel was just the most difficult part of the task ; and, from the evidently increas- ing excitement of the masses, threatened to be soon imprac- ticable. The greatest speed, therefore, seemed necessary. I went immediately in search of the prisoners, and found them at dinner in a house close to my own quarters, a guard being in the court-yard, and with them the officer who had escorted them hither. The house was surrounded by such dense crowds of people that it was only with great difficulty I could get into it. On entering the room of the prisoners, they were presented to me by the officer on duty ; and Count Eugene Zichy, when his name was mentioned, added, that he was the unfortunate ad- ministrator of this comitate (Stuhlweissenburg), on whom had fallen the hatred commonly felt against those who hold the office of administrator, and the more heavily in proportion to the strictness of his former administration. " I have, however," continued the count, " always been a good patriot, and formerly belonged to the liberal party." His remarks were interrupted by his companion in misfortune, who mentioned as a decisive proof of his patriotic feelings, that he had, within the last few days, resigned his post as officer in a R. I. cavalry regiment, that he might not have to fight against his native country. I re- quested them to reserve their defense till the time of judicial examination, and told them to prepare immediately for their transport to Csepel. I then left them, and went to arrange their escort. As the object of this escort was less to frustrate any appre- hended attempt at escape on the part of the prisoners, than to protect them from violence in the midst of the dense masses of the population of Adony and the local militia, exasperated espe- cially against Count Eugene Zichy, I had at my command but a small number of individuals fit for the service. However, I MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 2J succeeded in finding some among the soldiers of the Hunyady- Schar, who had formerly served, and were fortunately sober. Of these I formed the escort, and remained constantly near the prisoners during their removal from the place of custody to the bank of the Danube, because I apprehended some malicious dis- turbance from the two staffofEcers already mentioned, and did not trust even the escort. Several officers of the National-guard, who had joined me of their own accord when I left Pesth for Csepel, now continued by my side, and honorably assisted me in protecting the prisoners against the hostile designs of the mass. It took us about half an hour to reach the Danube. Our way thither lay through the midst of the town, and then close past the camp of the militia. At first, and so long as the crowd consisted of those whom just before our setting out I had energetically warned, in a short address, not to commit any violence against the counts, no in- terruptions occurred. These, however, were soon succeeded by others, who repeatedly attempted to break through the escort, and, with the most horrid imprecations, to seize the prisoners. It was now important to repress these manifestations, without having recourse to extreme measures ; because on the great number of drunken persons in the crowd, a premature use of arms might have produced an effect directly contrary to that intended. The attacks even of the most furious were directed only against Count Eugene Zichy. Several crowded close on the escort, and impetuously demanded to be shown him, that they might reckon with him ; and after they were repulsed, they gave vent to their rage, generally in the most vociferous accusations against him. These had mostly reference to his inhuman treat- ment of those under his authority. Amid many and various scenes such as these, which grew ever more menacing and more intimidating to the escort, we at last reached the Danube. I had previously charged some officers to have in readiness the means necessary for crossing. But at the mere rumor, that I intended to convey the counts to the island, only for the purpose of more certainly allowing them to escape, all boats had suddenly disappeared. The officers whom I had sent vainly endeavored to procure some. Every moment of delay evidently increased the danger to which the lives of the prisoners were exposed : close to the flat shore of the Danube, 22 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. pressed down to the water's edge by the excited peasants, far from any place of protection I Preservation without boats was impossible. At whatever cost, they must be obtained. Finding even threats unavailing, the officers had seized two millers of the place, and with these they forced their way through the crowd. I threatened them with death unless they immediately enabled us to cross. This succeed- ed. In a few minutes two millers' boats were ready to receive us. Meanwhile the rage of the populace had reached its height. Close to the place where we were awaiting the boats, several hundred scythes, intended for the militia, were piled up. A party of my own battalion guarded them. The escort having directed its repulses mainly against our armed assailants, those nearest us now were almost wholly without arms. The rising bank of the river enabled the masses to have constantly in view the objects of their hostility. This circumstance was particularly favorable to the instigators against the counts. As often as they were recommended to the vengeance of the crowd by any agita- tor, he could at the same time distinctly point them out. This increased the effect. Short addresses, to the purport that both of them would long ago have been hung on the nearest tree, had they been poor peasants, and not high and noble counts ; that there was no law for punishing counts, and no justice for peasants, &c., &c., were continually re-echoed by a thousand voices. With increasing anxiety I counted the moments till the arrival of the boats. At last they came. But scarcely had we proceeded to embark, when suddenly one of the mass cried out : "Don't let them cross ; we shall be deprived of our just vengeance I" and in an instant a dense forest of weapons of every kind bristled over the heads of the unarmed crowd in front, who now rushed toward the pile of scythes, that they also might arm themselves. The party on guard drew back terrified. The escort also began to waver. Matters had now come to extremities. I called to my people to take courage, and commanded them to shoot dead, without hesitation, the first man who should dare to advance a step. The cocking of the muskets fortunately checked the foremost of the assailing peasants ; they hesitated, and before the rest could encourage them to renew the attack, I was in the boats MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 23 with the escort and the prisoners, and already some strokes from the shore. Immediately on arriving at the island, I called together the court-martial, which was to examine and pass sentence on the counts. I had succeeded in saving them from the fury of an enraged mob, but could not, without acting contrary to my con- victions, save them from the stringency of the articles of war. The examination and court-martial were held in conformity with the prescribed regulations of the royal imperial Austrian army ; these, as well as the articles of war on which they are based, having been introduced among the recently-formed Hun- garian troops. The office of president devolved upon me. I had at my disposal only the two staff-officers of the Hunyady-Schar already mentioned ; and neither of these could I conscientiously permit to decide on the life or death of the men whose destruc- tion they had already resolved upon. The basis of the proceedings was the written report of the commander of the outposts on the capture of the counts, which was accompanied by the documents discovered on searching the articles of wearing-apparel and carriage of the Count Eugene Zichy. Among the latter were numerous copies, still wet from the press, of two proclamations ; one of which was addressed to the Hungarian nation, the other to the troops in Hungary. At the bottom of both had been printed the name of his Majesty King Ferdinand V. of Hungary, with the date : Schonbrunn, 22d Sep- tember, 1 848. The legal counter-signature of a responsible Hun- garian minister was wanting to both. Their contents were cal- culated to encourage the South-Sclavonian provinces of Hungary, which had revolted against the lawful executive in Pesth, in their attempt to overthrow the lawfully existing government, and even to seduce the troops, who had sworn to the constitution of the country, to participate in this revolt. Beside these proclamations, an open letter was found among the papers, in the following words : " To THE EoYAL IMPERIAL BrIGADIER-GeNERAL VoN HoTH. " General. — At the request of Count Eugene Zichy, I have decided that a safe-guard and every protection be given to the Count. — Stuhl- weissenburg, 27th September, 1848. " Jellachich, m. p. {mnnu propria), Field-Marshal Lieutenant." 24 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAE,Y. Count Eugene Zichy's own depositions were in substance as follows : When the Archduke Stephen, palatine of Hungary, a short time since, came to Stuhlweissenburg, with the intention of remaining near the Hungarian camp, he (Count Zichy) had for the last time left his usual residence, Kalozd, and repaired to Stuhlweiss- enburg. There he remained even after the departure of the archduke palatine, and the retreat of the Hungarian army. Soon afterward, the Croat army under the personal command of Ban Jellachich had reached and occupied the town. All the civil officers of the comitate of Stuhlweissenburg, whom the Croats could capture, had been kept prisoners in the comitate- house. This caused the inhabitants of the town to address themselves to him (Count Zichy), whom the Croats had left un- molested, with the request that he would induce Ban Jellachich to prevent his Croats from plundering. This request he had made, and with success. When he (Count Zichy) had afterward heard that General Uoth was approaching Kalozd with a Croat corps of 10,000 men, he asked from Ban Jellachich a safe-guard (sauvegarde), that he might protect the poor inhabitants of the place against the robberies of the Croats ; whereupon Ban Jellachich had given him the above-mentioned letter to Roth. Armed with this letter, after the main army of the Croats had taken their departure for Yelencze, he had left Stuhlweiss- enburg, accompanied by his cousin, now his fellow-prisoner, for the purpose of repairing to Kalozd, there to await the arrival of General Roth, and obtain from him protection for the poor in- habitants of the place against the plundering of his soldiers ; but immediately after to return to Stuhlweissenburg, and from thence start for Presburg. His stay at Kalozd was to be only for a few hours. He had neither disseminated the proclamations found in his carriage, nor had he wished to do so. The originals had been brought by Count Mensdorf, a royal courier, from Vienna, and printed in Stuhlweissenburg by order of Ban Jellachich. The copies which lay before us had been left behind by two officers of the Croat army quartered in his house at Stuhlweissenburg, and in mistake packed up with his things by his valet. To weaken the suspicion that he had intended to carry these MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 25 proclamations to General K-oth's camp, Count Zichy constantly- renewed the protestations of his patriotic sentiments. I was thus induced to ask him how it happened then, that, being so patriotic, it had not occurred to him to transmit to the Hungar- ian camp the news of the menacing proximity of the Croat aux- iliary corps, which he had been aware of two days before his ar- rest, as was plain from the date of the letter of protection, which lay before us. The justification of Count Zichy was to this efiect : He had been unable to leave Stuhlweissenburg before the 29th, because Ban Jellachich and his army did not quit the town sooner. Un- til that day it had been surrounded by Croats. These would have stopped and plundered him (Count Zichy), had he at- tempted to leave Stuhlweissenburg before the departure of the enemy, his letter of protection being in force only for General Roth's camp. "When at last, on the 29th, he had left Stuhl- weissenburg, he believed it to be superfluous to transmit intelli- gence to the Hungarian camp of the approach of the Croat aux- iliary corps, supposing, as he did, that it was already generally known: Beside, he had immediately announced at the station (where he was arrested), that General Roth was advancing with his corps. The charge against Count Eugene Zichy consisted : 1 . In an understanding with the enemies of the countr)^ 2. In active participation in the open revolt of the South Sclaves against the government lawfully existing in Hungary, by propagating proclamations intended to abet the revolt. As most direct evidence of the first crime there lay before us, the letter of protection ; as evidence of the second, the proclama- tions. In his statement Count Zichy had endeavored to weaken both these proofs. He called the letter of protection (Schutzbrief) an ordinary letter of safe-guard {Sauvegai'deschreibeii), such as is often given during war by the commanders of troops even to the in- habitants of an enemy's country, from innocent and humane considerations. But in regard to the proclamations, he affirmed that they had been packed up with his luggage by mistake on the part of his valet. To clear himself still more distinctly from the suspicion of both the crimes contained in the accusations, he repeatedly en- B 26 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. deavored to introduce into his statements protestations of his pa- triotic sentiments ; and excused himself for having neglected to transmit the news of the approach of the hostile auxiliary corps of Croats, from the supposition that their advance was already generally known. He moreover adduced, in proof of these patri- otic sentiments, the circumstance that, when he found Hungar- ian outposts in Soponya, he had, in evident contradiction to that supposition, immediately communicated to them the news of the approach of the hostile auxiliary corps. The rules of the court-martial allow of no defense. The votum informativum of the auditor or law-officer, customary in the ordinary military tribunals, has no place in the court-mar- tial. The auditor, or, in his absence, his deputy, at the conclusion of the examination, has to communicate to the president of the court-martial only and secretly, his opinion as to the sentence Avhich the law prescribes ; and he, after having considered the opinion of the auditor, decides for himself, and communicates his decision secretly to his fellow-judges, calling upon them to notify their assent by drawing their side-arms, or their dissent by omit- ting this act : all the members of the court-martial vote at the same time. According to these rules, the right of forming a positive judg- ment in a court-martial is exclusively reserved to the president : all the other members — not excepting even the auditor — are confined within the narrow bounds of rejecting or ratifying, by swift resolve, the proposed judgment, without previous consulta- tion, nay, without having had even the time necessary for ma- ture deliberation. Thus the law claims the decision on the life or death of those brought before a court-martial almost entirely for the president ; and it is therefore his duty, in the secrecy of his own conscience, to undertake Jhe defense of the accused against the judicial opinion of the auditor. Viewed in this light, it was my duty to consider in his favor the value of those declarations of Count Eugene Zichy, by which he had endeavored to weaken the force of the before-mentioned charges. The most serious accusation was the attempted dissemination of the enemy's proclamations. Count Zichy having asserted that his valet had by mistake packed up the proclamations with MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 27 his luggage, I had to endeavor to find proofs of the credibility of this assertion in the coincident circumstances. But in vain I For the proclamations had been left behind them by the officers of the enemy quartered in the house of Count Zichy ; and it ap- peared most probable that Count Zichy, as proprietor of a house in the town of Stuhlweissenburg, which certainly had several rooms, did not, considering his oft-protested patriotic sentiments, occupy the same room with the enemy's officers, nor even hold any friendly intercourse with them. The proclamations, there- fore, could only have been left in one of the rooms occupied by the officers while quartered in the house. Further, according to his own declaration. Count Zichy resolved, immediately after the departure of the officers, to go to Kalozd for a few hours only, and to return immediately to Stuhlweissenburg. On such short excursions much luggage is not commonly taken, but generally only such articles as are daily, nay, hourly needed. From what has been already said, these articles could scarcely have been left lying in the rooms just quitted by the officers of the enemy, consequently not near the proclamations, by possibility forgotten in these rooms. In the face of these probabilities I, alas, could not comprehend how it could have happened, that while the valet was engaged — probably in the sitting-room of his master — in arranging the articles necessary for a journey of only some hours' duration, the proclamations left lying in another room had so fallen into his hands as, by mistake, to have been packed up with them. The pretty considerable bulk and the striking shape of the forty- three pieces (this was the number of proclamations found) of coarse printing-paper in half-sheets, when lying among the other articles, were sufficient to contradict the assumption of such a mistake. It would have sounded far more credible, that the proclama- tions had been intentionally packed up by the valet, and of course, considering the patriotic feelings of his master, without his knowledge. But Count Zichy, on the discovery of the proclamations in his carriage, might have immediately perceived the danger which threatened the life of his valet in consequence of this discovery, and, secure in the consciousness of his own innocence — in spite of the indignation which, considering his oft-asserted patriotic senti- 28 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. ments, he must have felt at the intentional act of his valet — mij^ht have had a kind of generous compassion for him, and have resolved to represent the evidence of his crime as the consequence of a mere mistake. I at least could very easily conceive the possibility of such a fit of generosity ; and had hereby to be only still more incited to weaken the dangerous suspicion of traitorous understanding with the enemies of the country, which the Count, by a noble emotion of the heart, might in a most critical w^ay have turned off from the guilty head of his valet on to his own innocent one — ^by de- veloping, where possible, the positive proofs of his asserted patriotic sentiments, from the coincidence of his own declarations with the motives for the facts now before me, these motives becoming con- sistently discernible by means of the accessory circumstances. For this purpose there were, however, in the Count's own declaration, only three points, in some degree favorable, to be taken into consideration. The Count had declared that : 1 . At the solicitation of the inhabitants of Stuhlweissenburg, he had interceded with Ban Jellachich to put a stop to the rob- beries of the Croats. 2. He had requested the letter of protection from Ban Jella- chich likewise, only with the intention of protecting the poor inhabitants of Kalozd against the robberies of the Croats of Gen- eral Roth. Finally, 3. He had immediately communicated to the first Hungarian soldiers whom he unexpectedly met near Soponya, when on his journey from Stuhlweissenburg to Kalozd, the menacing approach of General Roth with his corps of 10,000 Croats. But however favorable the light thrown on these points, it could not be overlooked that Count Eugene Zichy possessed a house in Stuhlweissenburg, and that Kalozd was his own estate ; and that consequently the personal interest which he had in seeing Stuhlweissenburg as well as Kalozd spared from the robberies of the Croats, was quite sufficient to impel him to the acts mentioned under (1.) and (2,), even in a total absence of patriotism. But the third point seemed, from the coincidence of the simul- taneous circumstances, far more calculated to testify against, than for, the patriotism of the Count. For, had he been well affected to his country and its defenders, the unexpected challenge of a MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 29 Hungarian outpost must either have joyfully surprised him, or awakened in him the most anxious solicitude for the safety of his country's troops, exposed to the attacks of a hostile corps of 10,000 men. Both feelings could only have decided him to hasten as much as possible the communication of his certain knowledge of the threatened danger. Had the Count been well disposed to his country and its defenders, the thought that, forced by circumstances, he had been obliged to apply to its enemies for the necessary protection to his person and property, would have been painful ; the challenge of the Hungarian outpost must have filled him with the joyful hope that behind this outpost there stood an army of his countrymen sufficiently strong to deliver him at once from his painful position ; he must have longed for this deliver- ance, and made haste to insure it by a behavior fitted to awaken confidence. Nay, even had the Count, in sight of the hostile armies, remained entirely neutral in his feelings, the challenge of the Hungarian outpost must have decided him, if conscious of the purity of the object of his journey, on the score of prudence at least, instantly and freely to produce the letter of protection from the Croat general, for the very purpose of proving the purity of his intention, and of preventing the suspicion — equally dangerous and unworthy — ^that he, a Hungarian subject, lived in treason- able communication with the rebels against the lawfully-existing order. But Count Zichy had to be forcibly arrested ; and only after this had taken place, did he mention the menacing proximity of the auxifiary corps of Croats, asking his captors if they did not know that General Roth was approaching with 10,000 men. But the Count concealed the enemy's letter of protection. This was discovered only in consequence of the forcible search among his articles of dress. This circurast^ce, as well as the resistance to the challenging outpost, which necessarily preceded the forcible arrest of the Count, made it easier to recognize the meaning of a menace than of a friendly communication in the Count's question, whether they did not know that General Roth was approaching with 10,000 Croats ; and testified not only against his self asserted patriotism, but much more to the existence of a mode of thinking and acting, which had every thing in common with that of the open enemies of the country — except its openness. 30 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The reflections to which another point in the Count's state- ment gave rise, led unfortunately to the same conclusion. When the proclamations discovered in the carriage of Count Zichy were laid before him during the examination, he distinctly recognized them as the same which the enemy's officers, who had been quartered in his house at Stuhlweissenburg, had left there. He must consequently have seen these proclamations during the time that elapsed between the departure of the officers and his own setting out from Stuhlweissenburg. Had the Count been a true patriot, he would immediately have destroyed these proclamations. For he knew every detail of the manner in which their originals had reached Stuhlweissenburg ; and could not have been ignorant of their dangerous tendency as regarded the lawfully-existing order of things in Hungary. The speediest destruction of those copies was, moreover, in his power, without the slightest risk ; the enemy's officers, who had brought them into the house, and had forgotten them there, hav- ing marched away with the w^hole of their array. But Count Zichy had neglected to do this ; and hence it ap- peared — as has already been pointed out — that the existence in his breast of the patriotic sentiments, asseverated by him during the examination, was wholly untenable. His statement, that these proclamations had come into his car- riage only by a mistake of his valet, now indeed became more credible, because very probably the Count had himself brought them into his own sitting-room, and consequently near to the articles which were to be taken with him on his short journey. But through the barefaced senselessness with which Count Zichy dared to affirm during the examination, notwithstanding the letter of protection, the contents of which expressed an almost unlimited confidence on the part of the hostile general in the friendly disposition of his protege, that he had neglected to trans- mit to the Hungarian camp the news of the approach of the aux- iliary corps of Croats, only because he had supposed that it was already generally known ; through the same barefaced senseless- ness with which he adduced, as a proof of his patriotic sentiments, that he had communicated the news of the near danger from the enemy to the first Hungarian outpost which he met at Soponya, — he had entirely destroyed the credibility of all his other state- ments during the examination : and the evidence on which both MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 31 the points of accusation against Count Zichy were founded, acquired only so much the greater weight from his contradictory declarations. Upon this evidence, the officer who acted as auditor of the court-martial had delivered his judicial opinion: That Count Eugene Zichy, for being in an understanding with the enemies of the country, and for active participation in the South-Sclavo- nian rebellion by propagating proclamations drawn up in its favor, as guilty of high treason — (the Hungarian original copy of the judgment contains the expression, "traitor to the fatherland") — be punished with death by hanging. Before I, as president of the court-martial, adopted this opinion of the auditor as my own decision, I had to make it clear to my- self, whether, and how far, from the evidence before me and the coincidence of the circumstances, I was morally convinced that, contrary to the declarations of Coimt Zichy, he was really guilty of both the crimes with which he was charged. Although my deliberations in favor of the Count had led to the unfavorable result, that he did not feel the slightest sympathy for the legitimate cause of his country, still it was not placed beyond a doubt that he lived in actual understanding with its enemies. His violent behavior, in consequence of which he had to be forcibly arrested ; his question, resembling a threat, ad- dressed to the Hungarian outposts, whether they did not know that a Croat auxiliary corps was already close at hand; his secreting the enemy's letter of protection ; — all this might just as well have had its origin in the Count's intractable nature, and in his habit of never treating inferiors otherwise than brutally, as in his surprised consciousness of guilt, and sudden perception that an imposing carriage alone could rescue him from the danger of being rigorously searched, and, after the discovery of the letter of protection and the proclamations, hung on the nearest tree as an enemy's spy. The contents of the letter of protection only could furnish the principal proof of the Count's real understanding with the en- emies of the country ; and this letter appeared, at first sight, nothing more than the concession of a so-called safe-guard, or protective watch-post {Schutzwache.) By "safe-guard" is generally understood that usage in war which is commonly applied in those cases in which the act con- 32 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. cems the interests of humanity in their widest sense, for the pre- servation of human lives or things which either could never have had, or have already ceased to have, any influence on the oper- ations of war. In such cases, for instance, the general who leaves a place appeals to the humane feelings of his advancing adversary, when he avails himself of this usage of war, probably introduced into the armies of all civilized states. In the Austrian army this usage of war consists in placing the persons or things in question under the care of a special protect- ive watch-post, whose duty it is to protect what has been con- fided to it from every kind of injury until an opportunity oflers of consigning to an officer of the enemy — the higher in rank the better — the written request, in such cases always indispensable, addressed by its own general to that of the enemy, and with it, at the same time, what had been placed under its protection. Protective watch-posts of this kind are generally not made prisoners by the enemy, but are duly escorted either to their own outposts, or at least far beyond the chain of those of the enemy. Hence their name '' safe-guard," which passed over to the custom itself This is undoubtedly the noblest blossom of the most chi- valrous mode of carrying on war. The chief condition, however, for the performance of this usage of war with security is, that its application neither may nor can cause any advantage whatever to the general as such. This cir- cumstance must be so plain as to be evident to the enemy also. To travelers capable of bearing arms, the safe-guard is applica- ble only in very rare cases : in particular only when their former as well as their present sphere of action is evidently remote from the cause of the war, as also from the war itself But a letter written by a commander-in-chief of an army, and given to a traveler whose relation to the war does not correspond to these conditions, in order that the possessor of this letter may be considered as a friend and not as an enemy by an isolated corps of the same army, within the circuit of whose operations he intends to move — such letter can never bear any analogy to the humane war-usage of the safe-guard. The letter in question, even if only that part of it be consider- ed in which a safe-guard is assigned to Count Zichy in General Roth's camp, was consequently nothing else than an especially MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. ^3 favorable passport given by the enemy ; the mere granting of which forced on one the supposition that the writer of the pass- port — in this case the enemy's commander-in-chief^ — had akeady received indubitable proofs of Count Zichy's sympathy with the objects of the war in which he was engaged. The correctness of this supposition appeared to be still more confirmed by the con- cluding formula of the letter — namely that " every protection be given to the Count." Nevertheless it can not be denied that a letter of protection of the same tenour, miitath mutandis, granted to a harmless per- son — for instance, to a man of scientific celebrity, that he may not be interrupted in his journey, undertaken to make researches in the natural or other sciences — would have led at worst to the temporary loss of the bearer's personal liberty ; it being assumed as a matter of course, that his conduct toward the outpost who stopped him had not been so suspicious as that of Count Zichy. But Count Zichy was, as is generally known, neither a person of scientific, nor, under the then existing circumstances, of an otherwise Jiarmless celebrity. By the constitution recently sanc- tioned by the king, he had, like many others of his rank and po- litical creed, been deprived of an influential position in the coun- try, of many of his privileges of nobility, nay even of a consider- able part of his revenues. That he therefere longed again, like many others of his rank and political creed, for the ante-March fleshpots of Egypt, and that he had sympathies for the overthrow of the recent Hungarian constitution, and especially for the Croat invasion on account of its feudal-reactionary character — was more than probable. Of Magyar origin, he had, however, by ac- tions to prove this sympathy to the enemy's general-in-chief, before he could obtain the letter of protection which lay before us. Consequently this letter of protection, in accordance with the events which preceded its discovery, made it in fact evident that the Hungarian, subject. Count Zichy, had an operative under- standing with the enemies of his country. Once arrived at this moral conviction, I positively could no longer adduce any argument to show that Count Zichy, had not himself taken these proclamations with him from Stuhlweissen- burg,to Kalozd, intending to hand them over to General Roth that he might disseminate them. Being aware of the proximity of the hostile auxiliary corps to Stuhlweissenburg, and comforted 34 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. by the supposition that his country had no troops between that place and the enemy's main army, the execution of such a design appeared to Count Zichy to be altogether without danger, and the opportunity therefore extremely favorable for rendering an im- portant service to the party to which he adhered, without any sacrifice to himself But these considerations led to the further moral conviction that Count Zichy had really endeavored to disseminate the hos- tile proclamations, and that he was engaged in the execution of this design, when he was unexpectedly stopped and arrested by our outposts. In accordance with this conviction, the motives also were re- vealed which had induced Count Zichy to state, that the procla- mations were in his carriage by a mere mistake, and not from the criminal intention of his valet. It was by no means the impulse of a generous compassion which had drawn from the Count this assertion ; but the fear of being confronted with his valet, from whose attachment he might expect that, to exonerate his master he would perhaps take upon himself a mistake, but certainly not the criminal intention, the avowal of which might be followed by the punishment of death. After all this, I was deprived, on the one hand, of any valid reason for coming to a conclusion different from the judicial opin- ion of the auditor ; while, on the other hand, the great danger in which the country was at that time, and the importance of a successful accomplishment of my mission toward averting it — on which account I had been invested with powers so unusually am- ple — demanded the strictest application of the laws of war against crimes of that kind. I therefore passed sentence : That Count Eugene Zichy had really committed the crimes of which he was accused, had there- by forfeited his life, and deserved the punishment of death by the halter. This sentence was unanimously adopted by the whole court- martial, and was carried into effect after the delinquent had re- ceived the last offices of religion. Count Eugene Zichy's fellow-prisoner, Count Paul Zichy — against whom the proofs requisite for the proceedings of a court- martial did not exist — was handed over for trial to the ordinary tribunals. CHAPTER III. The first important battle, which was fought on the 29th September, 1848, between the Hungarian army and the Croats, at Pakozd, Yelencze, and Sukoro, led to a three days' armistice. During this interval the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army, the Austrian General Moga, held a council of war upon the operations to be next undertaken. Before this council was summoned, I had received orders from the commander-in-chief to draw back my outposts from Soponya, and to proceed with a part of my detachment, on the 1st of October, to Ercseny (Ercsi) on the right bank of the Danube, above Adony. On the 30th, immediately after the termination of the court-martial against the Counts Zichy, I obeyed these orders. On the 2d of October, a lieutenant of the Hunyady-Schar, named Vasarhelyi, arrived at Sziget-Ujfalu, on the island of Csepel, opposite Ercsi, with a report that, soon after the Counts Zichy had been conveyed from Soponya to Adony, a suspected individual had been stopped on the line of outposts near the former place ; had taken to flight at the first challenge of the vidette ; and while escaping had thrown away a crumpled- up note. This note had been found by the pursuing patrol, and handed over to him (Vasarhelyi.) In a few lines, with- out legible address or signature, it mentioned a hiding-place in Count Zichy's castle at Kalozd, " where," thus the document ran, " may be, found what is sought for." This hint had de- termined himlyasarhelyi) to undertake immediately an expedi- tion to Kalozd, hoping to find there a large supply of arms. "When arrived at Kalozd, he got hold of the count's intendant, and forced him to point out the hiding-place indicated in the note. But, instead of the supposed supply of arms, only two iron chests, securely locked, were to be found ; and these he had immediately brought away to save them from the Croats, who were just approaching. He was ignorant of the contents of the chests, as they remained locked. I asked to see the note in question ; but received for ansAver, 36 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. that, having found out the hiding-place, the identity of which with that indicated by the note was undoubted, he had taken no further heed of the note, which had been lost by him while engaged in searching for the hiding-place. Moreover, he thought the chests he had brought with him would be sufficient proof of the correctness of his statements. I found, in fact, no reason to doubt them ; and having con- vinced myself that neither of the chests had been opened, I ordered Yasarhelyi to escort them without delay to Pesth, and deliver them to the government. At the same time I sent by him a report of the whole affair, in which I recommended him to the attention of his superiors for promotion out of his turn. Meanwhile the armistice had been made use of by Ban Jel- lachich for such a speedy flank-march from his position, after the battle on the 29th September, toward K.aab, that it became impossible for General E,oth to overtake him with his auxiliary corps, which was consequently exposed to the danger of meet- ing with total discomfiture, a few days later, by being separated from the Croat main army, as well as from the Croat-Sclavo- nian frontier, by Hungarian forces. On the 4th of October hostilities recommenced between Grene- ral Moga's troops and those of Ban Jellachich. I was incorporated with my detachment into the corps of Moriz Perczel, who was then colonel and commander of the so- called Zrinyi-Schar, which had been appointed to act independ- ently against General Roth's Croat corps. This I learned only on the evening of the 3d of October in Adony, whither I had returned from Ercsi ; and as, according to a previous decree of the Hungarian commander-in-chief, I retained my independent position, and was intrusted with the same mission, I had already issued my arrangements against General Roth for the following day. Moriz Perczel thus took, on the evening of the 3d of October, the principal direction of the expedition against General Roth, and assigned to m.e the command of the vanguard. He made no changes in my previous dispositions. Our object was, in the first instance, to get between General Roth and the road to Stuhlweissenburg, and either drive him back to the south, or at least detain him till we should be suffi- ciently reinforced to defeat him. In the latter case, the militia, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 37 organizing m the south of Hungary, on the right bank of the Danube, was charged to render his retreat into Croatia as diffi- cult as possible. The brief instructions for this purpose, which I, as command- er-in-chief of the southern militia, gave to my sub-commanders, were nearly these : " The militia is not to be employed in open combat against regular troops, especially if these are provided with artillery : open combat, therefore, is to be avoided as far as possible. It is to alarm the enemy by the successive display of constantly changing and augmenting masses beyond the reach of his guns ; to obstruct his movements, by destroying the most important means of communication in the hostile district of operations (defiles, dams, bridges, &c.), as well as by removing the faciHties for transport existing in the neighborhood ; and to expose him to the most destructive privations, by consuming the nearest provisions, and secreting the more remote. These are the duties to which the militia has to confine itself." That, in fact, I could scarcely expect more useful services from the mihtia, the following statements will show. As commander-in-chief of the southern militia, I was never ig a condition to know, even approximately, what numbers I should have at my disposal at any given time, or in any appointed place The militia came, and the militia went, just as it felt inclined. Generally, however, it came when the enemy was far off'; when the enemy approached, the militia departed. In a word, it liked to avoid seeing the enemy. When by accident, however, and in spite of every precaution, it had the misfortune to come so near the enemy as to hear his shots, it shouted, " Treachery I" and ran away as fast as it could. The utmost degree of physical weariness was on such occasions the only means of bringing the militia-men to a stand, that is, to a lying down. These good people were mostly armed with scythes, and a very few of them with old rusty muskets, to which " going-off'" was almost as rare an occurrence as it was to their scythes. The militia-men had a particular predilection ibr cannons. These they drew after them with enthusiasm, even without orders. Their first question to the person who presented himself as their leader, always was, whether he had cannons. If his answer was in the affirmative, they joyfully prepared to march ; 38 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. if not, he could scarcely reckon on any considerable number of adherents. For this reason their leaders very often made use of the artifice of assuring them that they had sent their guns already in advance against the enemy. Clumsy as this trick vi^as, it was sometimes sufficient to keep the militia-men on their legs for some days. The attachment of the militia to heavy guns (naturally to friendly ones) was severed in the first moment of danger from the enemy. It might be calculated with certainty, in ninety- nine cases out of every hundred, that from a zealous expedition of militia with artillery, in a very short time all the men would return, somewhat exhausted indeed, yet otherwise unhurt, but without the cannons. The resolute leader of a well-disciplined corps of from 8000 to 10,000 men could therefore hardly be efiectually misled, in his operations, as to the hostilities practicable with such a militia. Yet in the circumstances of the auxiliary corps of Croats under the command of Generals Roth and Philippovich — abandoned by Ban Jellachich, probably from higher considerations — the hostilities even of this militia sufficed to prepare the ruin of the Croat corps, nay, finally to accomplish it. Perczel's whole corps, which, besides the militia just de- scribed, was employed against Roth, consisted of scarcely 3000 men, with 200 horses and eight pieces of artillery ; all, except the cavalry, being freshly-organized troops. The main body of this army left Adony on the 4th of October, at daybreak, to traverse, in the shortest time, by Seregelyes, all roads leading from the south to Stuhlweissenburg, and ascertain first of all how far General Roth had already advanced toward that place. A squadron of hussars, a company of the Hunyady- Schar, and four guns, formed the vanguard. A fl^nk-column, consisting of a part of the militia and two companies of the Hunyady-Schar, had been sent from Adony, by Sarosd to Aba, to endeavor to efiect a junction with the militia — which lay still more to the south, on the road from Aba to Bogard — and, by a change of direction toward the east, to pre- vent the escape of the enemy from Kalozd — where we supposed he was — into the less-protected territory lying between the Da- nube and the channels of the Sarviz, by which, with the disposi- tions already made — thanks to our tactic and strategic inex- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 39 perience — the possibility of righting ourselves would have become very problematical. The dispositions for this day, 4th October, were : Vanguard : Seregelyes. Southern flank-column : Sarosd ; its advanced posts as far as Aba and Sarkeresztur. Main body : Szolga Egyhaza. Arrived at Seregelyes, I learned from a scout, that in the forenoon the enemy had been seen on the road between Soponya and Tacz, marching toward Stuhlweissenburg ; and I at once resolved to advance immediately, on my own responsibility, with the vanguard to Tacz, and attack him. I took my way thither by P. Barand and P. Foveny, of which I informed Colonel Perczel, and at the same time desired him to follow me speedily, that the enemy might not escape us. Toward evening — though still in broad daylight — I stood before Tacz. The place was occupied by infantry, and, according to my information, by two battalions. Having only one company of infantry at my disposal, and that one having never stood fire, I ordered a section of hussars to attack the village, though occu- pied by infantry, and this contrary to every existing rule of tactics, reckoning on the Croat's dread of the hussars, even then well known. The attack, supported by some discharges of can- non, was made by the hussars with their accustotned energy, and after a few minutes the enemy was in wild flight toward So- ponya, and the village of Tacz in the possession of our troops. During the night we bivouacked at P. Foveny, and had our outposts in Tacz. I heard nothing from Perczel during the whole night, and was therefore obliged, at daybreak on the 5th of October, to retreat from Foveny to Seregelyes, lest I might perchance be cut ofl' from our main body by a hostile column advancing on the road from Aba to Stuhlweissenburg. Scarcely had I left P. Foveny, when this apprehension ap- peared to be justified by the report of a patrol, that the enemy was already marching between myself and Perczel on the above- mentioned road to Stuhlweissenburg. Now the enemy was already nearer to this town than myself; and if I did not succeed in getting the start of him on the 40 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. parallel road from Tacz to Stuhlweissenburg, General Roth's junction with Ban Jellachich, in my opinion, could no longer be prevented ; for I had even then no idea of the speed with which Ban Jellachich had been striving to execute his famous flank-movement, and consequently could not suppose that a Hun- garian column was already in Stuhlweissenburg. Leaving the infantry behind, I had again returned with the cavalry and artillery, by P. Foveny, to the road from Tacz to Stuhlweissenburg, and was on a forced march thither, when I met, coming from that direction, a patrol of hussars, which had been sent to seek a junction withPerczel, and from whose report I concluded that the enemy would no longer find the troops of Ban Jellachich in Stuhlweissenburg, but our own. We naturally availed ourselves of this favorable circumstance immediately to turn our front again to the road from Aba to Stuhlweissenburg, on which we resolved, at any cost, to attack the advancing enemy. In the execution of this project I was interrupted, howevei: by two parlementaires (trumpets) from the hostile column (it was the commander of the troop himself and his adjutant), who came to declare to us that the Croats had entered Hungary with no hostile intention, and that least of all would they fight against the royal Imperial troops. I was just then enveloped in a Szicr.^ In reply to this»decla- ration of the ptirlementaires, I threw off the Sziir, and accom- panied this di'splay of my Honved uniform with the question, whether the i^arlementaire and his troops had likewise no hos- tile intentions against me and mine, who, though we were not royal imperials, were nevertheless good royalists. His answer was confined to the repeated assurance that the Croats had not entered Hungary as enemies. A general hilarity followed this ingenuous assertion. I contented myself, in reply, with taking out my watch, and fixing the time when I would attack, if they had not previously laid down their arms. Fifteen minutes appeared to me quite' long enough for consideration. Before the expiration of the time I received the report, that the hostile column would make no resistance. It amounted to above 1000 infantry. The cheapness of this not inconsiderable advantage made me * A top-coat made of coarse thick woolen stuff. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 41 at first suspicious, and I took the greatest precaution in approach- ing the spot where the Croat troop awaited to be disarmed. But I soon learned that while their commander was treating with us, our main body had suddenly made its appearance on their only line of retreat to General Roth's main body. Perczel had left Seregelyes early on the 5th of October to follow his vanguard, and reached the road from Aba, on which the Croat column had advanced toward Stuhlweissenburg, only after it had already carelessly passed at the height of Seregelyes. This happy accident obtained for us, without combat, a propor- tionately large number of prisoners, as well as their muskets — of incomparable greater value to us. While Perczel was occupied with arrangements respecting the prisoners of war who had laid down their arms, he having with his main body reached the hostile troop before myself, a prisoner was sent to me by my outposts in Tacz. This man, a courier of General Roth, had received a letter from his general, address- ed "To the commander of the royal Imperial troops in Stuhlweis- senburgh," with orders to take it to this place. From this letter it was evident that General Roth had been abandoned without orders to his fate, and was then actually in a very critical position. This might also have induced him the same day to seek for a mediation, on the way to which he was met by Moriz Perczel. Immediately after the events just related, Colonel Perczel marched with his main body to Tacz ; and a few hours after our arrival there. General Philippovich, as General Roth's delegate, appeared before the line of our outposts, and was conducted to the colonel's head-quarters. Here he declared that the former conflicts between the Croat and Hungarian troops were merely the consequences of misun- derstanding, and desired an unobstructed retreat into Croatia. Perczel, on the other hand, required an unconditional surrender. As might have been expected, no arrangement was come to; and toward evening hostilities recommenced. "We immediately advanced to Csosz, and rewiained encamped at the southern extremity of this place during the night of the 5th of October. But the enemy left Soponya on the same nig-ht, hoping to get the start of us in his retreat by Lang, Kalozd, and Degh, toward Croatia. On the morning of the 6th of October, with the cavalry 42 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of our corps (two squadrons of hussars), I hastened after him, along the route just mentioned. Perczel was to follow as quickly as possible with the artillery. Not until after we reached Lang did I ascertain that the enemy had passed Kalozd toward Degh. at the same time, a shorter route from Lang to Degh was pointed out to me, without touching Kalozd. While with the cavalry I pursued the longer route by Kalozd, I recommended Perczel, who meanwhile had scarcely left his camp at Csosz, to take the shorter road, that he might retrieve the time lost. The result of later inquiries, how- ever, showed that the direct line of communication between Lang and Degh was impracticable for heavy trains. This I reported to Perczel without delay, and expressly warned him, still in time, against taking the route just recommended, unless its practicabil- ity could previously be placed beyond doubt. Perczel, however, gave no heed to this warning, but marched from Lang, not by Kalozd, but directly to Degh, encountered serious obstacles, and did not arrive with his fatigued and hungry troops till late in the evening ; whereas I and the hussars had come up with the enemy about mid-day, but was unable to attack him with success, or effectually disturb his orderly re- treat. This new loss of time, which the enemy well knew how to improve, gave them another important start of us ; while our troops had been uselessly and excessively fatigued. The conclusion was evident, that the frequent repetition of similiar blunders would frustrate our object, which was, in fact, nothing less than the total destruction of Roth's corps. This apprehension of mine contrasted strangely with the con- tents of a dispatch from the Committee of Defense of the Diet, which reached me on the morning of the same day. In it I was charged, as independent commander of our expedition against General Roth, so soon as I should have annihilated his corps, to prepare a similar fate for another hostile chief of faction, whose name I forget. I had communicated the original of this dispatch to Perczel before he left the road to Kalozd with our main body, and in- tended at first to leave the reply to him. But irritated at the prolonged non-appearance of the main troops, I resolved during the afternoon, to answer it myself, which I did as follows : MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 43 " Having since the 3d of this month been removed from the chief con- duct of the operations which have for their ohject the destruction of the auxiliary Croat corps commanded by General Roth, it was with no small surprise that I learned, by a decree which I received to-day from the Com- mittee of Defense, that I was expected not only to annihilate the said corps, but likewise to repulse the Serbians, who threaten an irruption into the country. "The Committee of Defense seems to be utterly ignorant of the state of affairs in the camp ; and I take the liberty hereby to declare, that I can by no means hold myself responsible for the success- of the expedition against Roth, convinced as I am, that it would be the greatest injustice to call one man to account for the faults of another. "Our cause is too sacred for me to hesitate to speak the truth, even when so doing may have the appearance of mean jealousy. " This premised, I would call the attention of the honorable Diet to the fact that, besides oratory and good-will, military knowledge. is essential to the right management of troops. " The command given to me on the 2d, I had to deliver up to Perczel on the 3d. " Degh, 6th of October, 1848." At the same time I wrote to Perczel, reproaching him with the loss of time caused by his imprudence, and announcing my firm resolution to proceed for the present according to the tenor of the above letter, and more energetically against him, in case, through his fault, this campaign should miscarry, to the great detriment of the country. By this I intended, either to make Perczel — whose military abilities unfortunately did not inspire me with the least confi- dence — receive more tractably my counsels relative to the con- duct of the war, or to effect my removal from his corps ; because I really could not accustom myself to the spirit in which he began to act, and which had been evident enough even on the first day. Nevertheless I employed the afternoon — which had not been improved for any important operation against the enemy — in observing the movements of the Croat corps, which retreated on the same day from Degh toward Ozora, along' the river Sio, followed by me with a few hussars to the edge of the forest lying between these places, and in collecting as exact information as I could respecting the motions of the southern militia (of Tolna), which had been placed in the rear of the enemy. This information was favorable enough. The passages over the Sio, which lay in the enemy's line of retreat, it was reported, had already been destroyed, so that we should be certain of 44 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. reaching the enemy, thus retarded, on the following day near Ozora. The inhabitants of the district, however, thought it would not be advisable to cross the forest with artillery, because the transport of heavy trains along the very deeply-rutted roads of this sandy soil would be extremely difficult. For our purpose — I was further informed — the forest could be skirted only at its eastern extremity, by a pretty good way through the fields lead- ing from Degh by Szilas-Balhas to Ozora. But this was a con- siderable circuit ; and it would accordingly be advisable for the column to set out on its march to Szilas-Balhas before nightfall, that it might not be too much exhausted when it made its ap- pearance next morning on the battle-field. The northern edge of the forest is about an hour's march from Degh. As far as this I had followed the enemy. To follow him further seemed dangerous, nay superfluous ; since the in- habitants of the district all agreed in asserting that he could take only one direction, namely, to Ozora, if indeed he intended to cross the Sio. I therefore returned with the vanguard to Degh, and immediately sent the artillery — which arrived first of the main body — together with the cavalry, to Szilas-Balhas, without waiting for Perczel's arrival, or asking his consent. It was night before Perczel himself reached Degh. He vehe- mently called me to account for the last letter I had written to him ; and went so far as to scofl' at the impotency of my proceed- ings against him. " Perhaps you do not know," he exclaimed, " that my party is the predominant one, not only in the Diet, but also in the Com- mittee of Defense ; and that I need only pronounce a single word to crush you at any moment I" My answer, that I did not serve his party, but my country, and was there for its welfare even against his party, irritated him still more. He formed the leaders of the several independent divisions of his corps into a kind of purifying commission, and cited me before it. He claimed the presidency of the commission for himself " This major," thus he opened the proceedings, pointing to me, "has himself confessed, as you know, gentlemen, that he did wrong, when he, the day before yesterday, as commander of my vanguard, advanced with it to Tacz, while the main body was still in Szolga Egyhaza, and dared, on his own responsibility, to MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 4C: attack this place, where the enemy was in great force. Further, this major yesterday evening moved on with the vanguard from Tacz to Csosz, again without my authority, and even without my knowledge. He also dares to censure my conduct, and to denounce me to a government which has been called into power by my party, nay is composed of my party." (Several members of the commission expressed great indignation.) *' Justify your- self I" cried Perczel to me, after he had finished. " The severe criticism," I replied, *' to which I subject my own actions, entitles me to be equally severe on the actions of others. You have to-day led your main body," I continued, " contrary to my representations, by a road, of the practicability of which you could not have been convinced. In consequence you encountered obstacles, to remove which cost you the time that, had you listened to me, you might have saved, and em- ployed in overtaking and attacking to-day the fleeing enemy. To make up for the time lost is no longer in your power. By your fault the enemy has gained an advantage which, wisely improved, may place him beyond our reach. A lucky accident can alone make good this loss. And this, if it should happen, will be more than you deserve. But even the luckiest accident would be without benefit to us, if such a fault as you committed to-day be repeated. This is the expanded meaning of the few words I wrote to you this afternoon. " I could have left matters as they were, had I not received — as you know — a dispatch from the Committee of Defense, w^herein I am treated as independent commander, and held re- sponsible for the success of this expedition. I owe it to myself to refuse to be accountable for your faults. This I have done in my reply to the Committee of Defense ; and at the same time warned it in future to be more cautious in the choice of inde- pendent leaders. And that you might know how you stand with me, I at the same time informed you of the step I had taken against you. If my conduct appears to you to be insubor- dinate, you can inflict on me the punishment which the law pre- scribes. But he is a scoundrel, who, in consequence of such open demeanor, has the impudence to accuse me of denouncing him I'^ After this reply, there were apparently only two ways open to Perczel ; either to retract the accusation of denunciation he had brought against me, or the duel. 46 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Perczel found a third : he called for the guard, and ordered me to be immediately shot. It seemed as if I should hardly have the necessary time left me to prepare for death. Several members of the assembly,, however, interceded so energetically in my behalf, that Perczel preferred at last to let me live, and to retract his accusation. It was unfortunately impossible to pass over here in silence this scandalous scene, because a knowledge of it is indispensable toward forming a judgment on the position which Perczel, after this, constantly endeavored to take against me. Immediately after this scene, the purifying commission — to- gether with myself, who had been accused before it — was changed into a council of war ; and I now reported my recent information respecting the movements of the enemy, as well as concerning the positions and doings of the militia in their rear ; further, as to the dispositions I had made in consequence of this information. These latter again enraged Perczel against me. With reason he objected that I had no authority for making such dispositions ; but with less reason, that his corps was thereby denuded of the whole of its artillery and cavalry, and that a judicious arrangement of the troops for the following day was now impossible. "You have crossed," he exclaimed, " all my plans by this pre- cipitate, self-willed, bad arrangement, I intended to awe the enemy by passing, en front, the forest between Degh and Ozora with my whole corps. This is now no longer possible, you hav- ing sent my cavalry and cannons God knows where I" After I had made some remarks on the impracticability of this strange scheme, I declared that I was willing to take the re- sponsibility of the dispositions I had made, if the infantry was employed agreeably thereto. I meant that the column making the circuit of the wood, after being well re-inforced by infantry, should open the attack ; while the rest of the infantry, crossing the forest line between Degh and Ozora, a cheval of the road con- necting these places, and occupying the south edge, Avas kept e7i reserve, and only in case the enemy, in spite of the attack of the column, attempted to break through toward the east in the direction of the still-remaining bridges over the Sio, should rush out and attack him flank and rear ; or, in case he aimed at seeking refuge in the forest, should endeavor to prevent him. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 47 "If," I added, "the Croats nevertheless conquer, we are too weak to hinder their retreat into their own country. But if they do not succeed, or if they shrink from a battle, they will then be forced by us to the west toward the Flatten lake ; and thus, in- closed between the lake, the Sio, and our troops, there will be no alternative for them but either to surrender or fight for their lives." After a long and vehement debate, this proposal was adopted. I undertook the command of the column that was to skirt the wood ; and early in the forenoon of the 7th of October, 1848, reached its southern side ; the enemy being encamped to the northeast of us, in a great hollow square within gun-range. The heights on my left, as far as the river Sio, had been occupied since the preceding evening by the local militia of Tolna. The commander of this division of the militia had unquestionably a very large share in the successful issue of this expedition. On the report of a patrol of hussars, that Perczel had already reached the southern edge of the forest, to the north of the hostile camp, I gave the signal to attack. But before the as yet un- practiced artillerymen could execute this order, a trumpet ad- vanced from the hostile square, and rendered any attack super- fluous. I was not present at the parley which took place. But when it was ended, Perczel ordered his sub- commanders to assemble near the enemy's square. He had likewise summoned the hostile general and his superior officers. I arrived at the place appointed for meeting just at the mo- ment when Perczel had decided on the fate of the latter. They, as well as the soldiery, were to lay down their arms, and were ordered to be escorted to Pesth, but the soldiery to their own country. Meanwhile, however, the whole hostile corps were to remain together in the camp, until the best of our troops had been marched round them, as it were in triumph. By this Perczel intended to distinguish in an especial manner several divisions of his corps. But scarcely were the rest of the army, including the militia, aware from the incessant shouts of Eljen (vivat), that the proximity of the enemy no longer endangered their lives, than they of. their own accord left their ranks, and came running up in wild disorder, that they also might have a closer view of the Croats. 48 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. In spite of the urgent representations of his sub-commanders. Perczel seemed to take pleasure in this confusion. It was not till the militia began to seize on the bayonet-muskets, which the Croats had laid down, intending to carry them off as memorials of this glorious day, that Perczel perceived, too late, the con- sequences of his weakness. With the exception of twelve antiquated cannons, out of thq whole equipment of Uoth's corps he could place only a very small portion at the disposal of the Committee of Defense. CHAPTER lY. On the 7th of October, 1848, the Croat corps of General Roth had ceased to exist ; the southern militia was on its way home ; and Perczel was proceeding with his troops to Ozora, where he rested during the 8th. On the same day I was prompted to the rank of Honved colonel, and received an order to return im- mediately to Pesth. I left Ozora on the 9th, and arrived late in the evening at Kalozd, where I had to halt for fresh horses. Here I heard by chance that the intendant of the late Count Eugene Zichy had secreted " a great quantity of very valuable jewelry," being part of the estate of his lord, and that he kept it concealed, with the intention, probably, of withholding it from the state ; to which now — so every body said — the Count's whole property belonged. To ascertain in the shortest way how far this rumor was true, I went, accompanied by several officers of my suite, among whom was my auditor, and conducted by the principal informer, to the residence of the said intendant ; and having previously stationed some attendants on the outside, and also at the several points of communication in its interior, with the auditor only I entered one of the rooms to obtain, by surprise, a confession from him, in case he intended concealment. This precaution, however, seemed superfluous ; the intendant declaring, without circum- locution, that he had several valuables concealed ; and that he was very glad of this opportunity of being relieved from the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 49 charge of them. Accordingly, while he went to fetch the arti- cles in question, I called into the room the officers who had re- mained outside, and, having given him a receipt for them, took possession, in their presence, of several really valuable things ; after they had been inspected, a list made of them, and the cases sealed that contained them. On this occasion I learnt from the intendaut that, immediately after the arrest of the Count, a certain Lieutenant Vasarhelyi and his men had arrived at Kalozd, had searched the castle, and had forcibly carried off some iron chests containing valuables, a great number of costly weapons, and also a hatard (state-car- riage) drawn by four beautiful horses : that a few days later, when the Croats had retreated, the Count's stud had been plun- dered by several officers of Colonel Perczel's corps ; that the castle, especially its kitchen and cellar, had been constantly put in requi- sition by officers ; that those formerly subject to the Count did great damage to the estate ; and much more to the same effect. To put an end to the latter disorders (the extortions on the part of the officers having necessarily ceased, the scene of war being now removed to remote districts), I left my auditor in Kalozd, that he might make a complete inventory, in the short- est possible time, of the whole property of the Count, both fixed and movable, and place the said property under the superintend- ence of the functionary from whom I had received the jewelry ; and, in particular, that he should proclaim martial law against all who, from covetousness or malice, dared to injure the prop- erty of the late Count. And to give weight to this measure, I left a trusty officer with twenty-four men as garrison in Kalozd. Having made these arrangements, I left Kalozd, carrying with me the jewels, and continued my journey to Adony without interruption. The 10th of October was spent at Adony in transacting sev- eral military affairs. Toward evening, the steamer which was conveying Generals Roth and Philippovich, with their officers, to Pesth, arrived at Adony. I availed myself of this opportunity to reach Pesth early on the morning of the 11th ; and directly after my arrival, drew up the following report to the Diet : HoNouED Diet — On the 9th of this month, passing through Kalozd, I learned : 1. That certain jewels, which had been the property of Count Eugene C 60 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Zichy, executed by sentence of court-martial for high treason, were in the custody of the Seignorial Hofrichter Konrad Durneisz. 2. That the inhabitants of Kalozd, by their continual plunderings, are injuring the movable portions of the property especially, which now belongs to the state. I have consequently, in the name of the Diet, and counting on its sub- sequent sanction, ventured to take the followiug steps : 1. I have received from the Hofrichter Konrad Durneisz the jewels specified in the inclosed inventory, and hereby deliver them up into the hands of the president of the honored Diet. 2. I have charged the local authorities of Kalozd, by the resolution here inclosed, to proclaim martial law against all who in future should dare to injure the movable or other property belonging to the estate of Kalozd. 3. I have instructed my auditor, G. E,., to make an inventory of the whole estate of Kalozd, with all its movables, and to place if, together with the official inventory, under the superintendence and responsibility of the said Konrad Durneisz, and subsequently to report upon the pro- ceedings. 4. I have charged Major K., who was stationed in Kalozd on the said day, to leave there, till further orders, an officer with twenty-four men for the formation of a court-martial. Pesth, 11th of October^ 1848. (My signature follows.) In this report the President of the Diet is said to be the person into whose hands I deposited the jewels taken by me at Kalozd ; while it was actually Kossuth in person who received them from me, in the presence of several members of the Committee of Defense. The cause of this contradiction is, that when I wrote this report in BTungarian, reproduced here in a German translation, I was not aware of the true position of the Committee of Defense, and for security addressed it directly to the whole of the Diet, knowing that the Committee of Defense was composed of mem- bers of the Diet. I therefore myself took this report, with its inclosures, the inventory of all the jewels I had received in Kalozd, the jewels themselves, and the document for proclaiming martial law in Kalozd, to Kossuth, who was then staying at the Glueen-of- England Hotel. He was so unwell as to be confined to his bed. This, however, did not prevent him from taking a personal share in the most important afiairs of the day. I was therefore admit- ted to him ; and handed over to himself, as has been already stated, my report to the Diet, with the jewels and the other doc- uments. I also remember that, at my especial request, the con- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 51 tents of the cases were immediately compared with the original inventory, in the presence of Kossuth and several other persons, and were found intact. But whether the correct delivery of the jewels was certified to me in writing or not, I can not now remember. It is also very possible that, having been personally present at the comparison of the jewels with the inventory, and being thereby satisfied that nothing was missing, I afterward wholly forgot to ask for a receipt : as in the course of this day I was not only a passive spectator, but also an active participa- tor in the transaction of matters of the highest importance, and well calculated to make me neglect so ordinary a precautionary measure. CHAPTER V. The degree of firmness, so unusual at that time, which I had shown as president of the court-martial against Count Zichy ; the open and decided blame with which I had censured freely, and even in writing, the armistice concluded with Ban Jellachich, immediately after it was agreed upon ; the success of the Hun- garian arms against Roth's corps, which my friends attributed more to the measures I had taken, single-handed, against the will of Perczel, than to what had been done in executing his orders ; — all this might have directed the attention of the leaders of the Hungarian movement toward me, and made them believe that I was the man who would succeed in giving decision to the wavering operations of Moga's army. In the course of the very day on which I had delivered Zichy's jewels to the Committee of Defense, I and one of my comrades, who had been promoted at the same time as myself to the rank of Honved colonel, were invited by Kossuth to a consultation on the question, whether the time had not now come for promoting, off-hand, several Honved staff-officers even to the rank of general. This, Kossuth thought, appeared to be the sole guarantee that the staff' of command would fall into trusty hands, when vacated by the hourly-expected resignation of General Moga and that of 52 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. his comrades, Generals Teleki and Holtsche, or by their "being suddenly pensioned, which seemed necessary. My comrade spoke first, and declared himself decidedly against this measure. " By so doing," he exclaimed, "you would com- mit a crying injustice ; because the greater number of staff- officers of Moga's army are our seniors in rank, and are more deserving than ourselves. " Be the ground on which you stand as an independent Hun- garian government," he added, " ever so legal, you can not maintain yourselves at present without the regular troops. And yet you do all you can to weaken their sympathies for the just cause of the country. It is in the soldier's nature to be attached to his superior, so long as that superior conscientiously fulfills his duties. Any slighting to the superior becomes, in that case, like- wise a mortification to the inferior. I will not affirm that those divisions whose commanders should be slighted by our promotion would instantly forget their oath to the Constitution ; but dis- content is to be feared ; and a dissatisfied army has seldom suc- ceeded in nailing victory to their colors." This was in entire accordance with my own views ; and I hastened to throw a still clearer light upon the consequences of our sudden promotion, dragged in, as it were, by the hair of the head. "We, ourselves," I exclaimed, "once belonged to these bodies of troops, and occupied therein somewhat inferior posi- tions ; and now, after a short space of time, unmarked by any exploits, we should suddenly appear as the commanders of those who, a short time before, were our superiors. Even although I admit that, in spite of all this, we might still reckon upon a cer- tain obedience, nevertheless by no means upon a cheerful, un- wearied one ; and least of all, upon the affection and confidence of troops who would see their former and sometimes distinguished leaders slighted by us, the parvenus (as they would now call us). "You fear," I continued, "the pohtical tendencies of the present leaders of the troops ? The soldier generally cares very little about politics. He does what he is ordered, and asks dis- tinct orders; he requires in his chiefs, on every occasion, a de- cisive coming forward and leading the way. This is applicable to the officer as well as to the soldier. None of my present comrades, after they had sworn to the Hungarian Constitution, would ever have imagined that they had to follow any orders MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 6. except those of the Hungarian Ministry of War, had they not been allured from the distinctly-marked and straight course of blind obedience into the intricate labyrinthan way of the delib- erative one. This has been done. The government in Vienna, as well as that in Pesth, conscious of their weakness, have both forced the army into this field ; and now they expect from it — the former, the restitution of its power over Hungary ; the latter, the preservation of what has been gained. " But the leaders of the independent bodies of troops, distrust- ing as Hungarians the government in Vienna, and as soldiers that in Pesth, have become irresolute ; and this irresolution has already spread itself into the lowest ranks of their inferiors. The Committee of Defense seems to be aware of this, and thinks that the most appropriate remedy for the evil is to promote us, and send us to Moga's army ; but this measure would only cause the irresolute troops to become also dissatisfied. *' The present commanders of the regiments must be distin- guished and promoted. If they accept these favors they are permanently gained, and with them their inferiors ; if not, away with them ! " If the maintenance of the Constitution is at all possible by force of arms, it can be effected only in this way." '• And who are the staff' oflScers in Moga's army," asked Kos- suth in return, " whom you believe to be the most meritorious and most to be relied upon ?" I had no answer to give, because Moga's army was entirely strange to me ; but my comrade named several, and the promo- tion of some of them was immediately decided on. Soon after this, my comrade withdrew. I wished to do so too, but was detained by Kossuth ; and then, for the first time, I learned the real object of my recall from Perczel's corps. The whole of the Committee of Defense had a particular dis- trust of General Moga and those nearest him. The doubtful issue of the first engagement with the invading Croat army on the 29th of September, at Velencze, Pakozd, and Sukoro ; the discouraging disorder in which the defensive position, victoriously maintained by our troops till the end of the battle, had been left by them during the succeeding stormy and dark night, to take up another at Martonvasar ; the armistice of three days, which had been granted immediately afterward to Ban Jellachich, by /4 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. the skillful improvement of which the Croat army had been enabled to retreat without opposition across the Lajtha ; the want of energy with which the consequent pursuit of Ban Jella- chich had been prosecuted, and its sudden abandonment at the Lajtha at the very moment when it could apparently have been persevered in most successfully ; these were the facts which had shaken the confidence of the Committee of Defense in the straight- forwardness of General Moga's war-operations. But as the royal Commissary Ladislaus Csanyi, invested with unlimited authority, and associated with him, continued, in his reports to the Committee of Defense, positively to deny that there was any ground for suspecting Moga, the members of the com- mittee, fearing lest the general and his associates had already succeeded in imposing on Csanyi also, were desirous of obtaining the judgment of a competent and trustworthy man, formed from his own inspection, on the movements of Moga. I was to be this man ; and therefore received the secret mission to repair imme- diately to his head-quarters at Parendorf, there ostensibly to place myself at the disposal of the commander of the army, but really to penetrate into the spirit of the man, and instantly to reveal the least indications of treachery. I confess that I did not myself approve Moga's war-operations ; I attributed to him, however, less of intentional treason than of want of penetration and resolve. Nevertheless, I thought treason possible, and accepted the mission ; with this modification, how- ever, that I should not confine myself to merely disclosing actually existing treacherous designs, but, at the same time, should en- deavor to frustrate them at whatever danger. This modification was unconditionally sanctioned by the Comm.ittee of Defense, and had almost led to my further promotion, namely, to that of Hon- ved general. Kossuth, at least, spoke about his intention of having a general's commission immediately prepared for me to take with me, that I might thereby be prospectively empowered in flagranti to assume the command of the army, if necessary ; passing over all the other royal Imperial generals, besides Moga, who were with the army. This measure, however, was not carried out ; why, I never knew. In the night between the 11th and 12th of October, I was already on my way to Parendorf, and reached Moga's head- quarters early on the morning of the 13th. CHAPTER VI. MoGA immediately assigned to me the command of the van- guard, at that time the outposts on the Lajtha ; while its former commander was employed upon another point. Before I entered on my new post, I had to announce in person to the royal Commissary Csanyi my arrival at the army. On this occasion I saw him for the first time. He was brief with me. His manners, his whole exterior, distinguished him favor- ably from all the other civil authorities of the Hungarian revolu- tion : it at once inspired confidence and commanded respect. These qualities are certainly not always the emanations of a manly character : in Csanyi they were. The man who had impressed me at first sight, I learned afterward to revere. The most advanced Hungarian videttes stood on the right bank of the Lajtha, being in connection, with some intervals, from Wilfleinsdorf to Hollern ; the staff of the outposts was quartered in the railway station at Bruck, quite near to the Lajtha, consequently on the outmost line of the videttes. The ijiain troop of the outposts encamped at scarcely a quarter of an hour's distance behind it. Immediately after I had entered on my new post I asked to be allowed either to draw back my main troop or to advance the line of my videttes, because to observe the enemy was altogether impossible while prohibited from crossing the Lajtha ; and the protection of the army, under the present establishment of the vanguard, was defective in the highest degree. As the outposts were now situated, the enemy could at any time and by single patrols alarm not only the main troop of the outposts behind Bruck, but likewise that of the army before Pareiidorf To these representations I received for answer, that it was no longer worth while to undertake comprehensive changes in this respect, the army being about to cross the Lajtha in a few days. In fact, the first advance took place in the afternoon of the 17th of October. 56 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The dispositions I received were : to march about half an hour's distance on the way through the fields from Bruck to Fischamend, and establish the outposts in an extensive semi- circle from Wilfleinsdorf to Pakfurth. The main army passed likewise through Bruck, and encamped d cJieval of the main road from Bruck to Schwechat, at the same height as the main troop of the vanguard. It happened to me in this expedition, as it often does in mancBuvres in time of peace : before the outposts were estab- lished, there came an order to fall back. The main body of the army marched again across the Lajtha before midnight ; and I was obliged, notwithstanding all my renewed representations, to take up with my brigade my old, unchanged position behind the Lajtha. The general staff in Parendorf had kept secret the cause of this sudden return to the former camp. It was only whispered that the Committee of Defense had itself commanded this " Halt !" and " Right-about I" It appeared now as if it were intended to confine us to the defensive ; because I received, directly after our return, strict orders to destroy all artificial passages over the Lajtha, as well as to render the existing natural ones impassable, and to occupy them. The latter part of my orders could not be executed, on account of the great extension of the line and the shallowness of the river, so that it became useless to carry into effect the first part of them. The general staff, however, would listen to no counter-representations : the bridges had to disappear. In the head-quarters at Parendorf a momentarily impending attack on the part of the enemy was every day talked of; and nevertheless the troops were dislocated in such a manner as even the leisurely routine of the service in time of peace would not have excused. Of many a body of men, even the chief of the general staff could not tell whether they still existed, or where. Others of them, about whose distribution he gave the most detailed accounts, suddenly made their appearance in an oppo- site direction ; their arrival having been preceded by very alarm- ing reports from thence, of the approach of some hostile corps, which, by the way, could with just as much probability have come from the moon. It can not be denied that all this seemed to indicate the exist- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 57 ence of systematic treason : but, be this as it may, the proceed- ings in the Hungarian head-quarters at Parendorf made me feel that they were merely the consequence of the very same per- plexity under which the Pesth Diet, with the Committee of Defense at its head, was laboring. Deliberately planned treason presupposes a fixed determina- tion. But over Parendorf, as over Pesth, there then hung the , heavy thick mist of an indistinct perception of what ought really to be done. In a few days after my arrival at the camp, I felt that my ambiguous mission had entirely failed ; failed especially in that sense in which it had been conceived and undertaken by me. Determined, at any price, to force the commander of the army, whom the gentlemen of the Committee of Defense believed to be a secret ally of the chief of the Croat army, to reveal his inten- tions, I had found in him a straightforward, open man, who had already, long before my arrival, declared, without being called upon to do so, that although he would still continue, in obedience to the emperor's orders, to defend Hungary against the attacks of the Croats, yet that he would not cross the frontiers of the country unless compelled ; and that he declined, beforehand, to be responsible for the consequences of such a step. I had, therefore, either immediately to abandon my ambiguous position in the camp, or to lower myself by denouncing the pitiful nntirgues plotted, from purely selfish motives, by a few coryphei of the camp as well as of the head-quarters ; their sole object being, in case of a favorable issue of Hungari/m affairs, to elevate their contrivers as high as possible, and, in an unfavorable one, to save them. Choosing the former, I devoted all my attention to the accom- plishment of those duties which devolved on me as commander of the outposts. My brigade consisted of five battalions of volunteer National- guards — a second edition of the local militia augmented by fire- arms. These battalions, however, were already divided, like ?"the regular ones, into companies, and provided with officers ; but the latter were, with a few exceptions, almost wholly destitute of military knowledge. I compelled them to employ the time of easy outpost-service in that training of which they stood so much in need. This, of 58 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGAEY. course, was not possible without the use of severe measures. These produced discontent, opposition. Frequent and urgent complaints of my despotic severity reached the head-quarters ; but meeting with no attention, were carried to the royal Com- missary Csanyi. It was fortunate for me that Csanyi was an old soldier, and knew how to estimate such complaints. There was nothing left for the poor malcontents but to bite the sour apple, and learn to obey. So difficult was this, that it cost* many a man his life. To accustom my brigade to the divers nerve-shaking aspects of war, I often caused the chain of videttes, as well as the camp behind Bruck, particularly at night-time, to be thrown into alarm ; I took advantage of every rumor about the enemy, how- ever vague it might be, to make my troops believe that he was actually marching against us ; and at such times sent out across the Lajtha, on my own responsibility, small divisions as recon- noitering patrols ; and so forth. This latter experiment drew on me a severe reprimand from the head-quarters. Because, it was said, we had to act on the defensive, and to avoid all offensive hostilities, that we might not provoke the opposing troops to sanguinary reprisals ; as we did not know whether they belonged to the Croat or to any other corps. But as a contradiction to this reprimand, in the course of the next day a Honved captain made his appearance with an im- provised section of pioneers, for the purpose of restoring the re- cently-destroyed bridges, so far as was absolutely necessary. Scarcely was this work finished, when the dispositions lor a second advance over the Lajtha, on the 21st of October, followed. This time we broke up in the morning, and halted only near Stix-Neusiedel, in face of a weak division of cavalry that await- ed us between Gallbrunn and Stix-Neusiedel, which the fire from two batteries compelled to retreat behind Gallbrunn. Accord- ing to some of the inhabitants of Stix-Neusiedel, Gallbrunn was occupied by hostile infantry, and I received orders to take it by storm. It did not come to this ; for another " Halt !" and " Right-about I" of the Committee of Defense suddenly stopped the advance of my storming-columns against the place, which was, moreover, unoccupied. We accordingly encamped between Stix-Neusiedel, and Gallbrunn a cheval of the road, and marched MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGARY. 69 next morning at day-break back to Parendorf — I with my brigade once more in our old, inevitable position behind the Lajtha. During these two advances it was always distinctly said that our ofiensive movements were against Ban Jellachich's army, which had to be attacked and destroyed in behalf of the young constitutional liberty of Austria, not only on this side the Lajtha, but also beyond it. If, on the other hand, it was asked why the pursuit of Ban Jellachich had been at all interrupted, the answer was, that at that time they had, of necessity, to respect the territory beyond the Lajtha as neutral ground, in the confident expectation that the Croats would be disarmed by Austria, the remainder of Ban Jellachich's army broken up, and consequently the originators of the unhappy civil war be deprived of the power to renew it. Thus reasoned the non-military men, in opposition to the views which had gained ground among the regidar troops of the camp at Parendorf, including the two Honved battalions which were there. Though scarcely one of these divisions, when engaged in the pursuit of Ban Jellachich, would have given it up within the limits of the country without positive orders, they all, never- theless, now believed that, by having driven the enemy beyond them, they had done as much as their new military oath (to defend the Constitution of Hungary) required of them ; while by the aggressive crossing of their own frontiers they feared to violate ^their old oath of fidelity to the monarch. In consequence of this apprehension, several deputations of officers appeared before Csanyi, to declare, in the name of the troops to which they belonged, their opinion that the Lajtha ought ?iot to be crossed. I do not know in what way and by whom the regular troops had been so successfully relieved from this fear, as to take part in the two expeditions beyond the frontiers on the I7th and 21st; because I had always abundant occupation in Bruck, and seldom went into the camp at Parendorf; and then only on account of some pressing affair relating to the service. As for myself, it was perfectly plain to me what was the duty of every Hungarian, soldier or not soldier, in the then existing circumstances. Obedience was due to the executive power ap- pointed by the collective Hungarian Diet, so long as the Diet itself continued to act in accordance with the Constitution. 60 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The administration of the country by the Committee of Defense instituted by the Diet in the stead of the retired ministry of Batthy- anyi, was, it is true, not based on the constitution. But, in the face of the Croat invasion, supported by the minister of war at Vienna ; in the face of the subsequent illegal nomination of the unfortunate Count Lamberg as commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Hungary (the Croat included), and he having been just as illegally authorized to dissolve the Hungarian Diet — the form- ation of the Committee of Defense was, after the retirement of Count Batthyanyi, only a measure demanded in self-defense. CHAPTER VH. The interruption of the second offensive attempt on the 21st of October was caused by the necessity of waiting for Kossuth, who was already approaching with a reinforcement of 12,000 men and several batteries. Meanwhile the first proclamation of Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz reached the regular troops in the camp at Paren- dorf It was evidently intended to intimidate, but totally missed its aim. The officers of the regular troops felt only a just indig- nation that Prince "Windischgratz should suppose that they would break their military oath, and could be recalled under a threat of capital punishment, from a post which had been in- trusted to them by their monarch, and for which they had been mustered by his nephew, the Palatine of Hungary, against Ban Jellachich. The appearance of this proclamation, however, had a consider- able influence on the general discussions upon the question, whether the Lajtha was to be crossed again, or not. For numerous voices rose once more against the crossing of the Lajtha ; because, as it was thought, the offensive would then no longer be directed against Ban Jellachich alone, but also against Prince Windisch- gratz, who, correctly speaking, had hitherto committed no act of hostility against Hungary. Nevertheless, others contested this opinion, asserting that Prince Windischgratz had already openly MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 61 enough shown his hostihty to Hungary, by joining Ban Jellachich ; and that the very fact that he had done so, was a still further justification of the offensive. The majority, however, dissented from the latter opinion. According to my judgment, the decision of the preliminary question — whether, and how far, the crossing of the frontier was necessary or not for the protection of the endangered Constitu- tion — was the indispensable condition of both propositions. But that decision appertained to the Diet alone. So long as it was unknown, any participation in the agitations for or against the offensive seemed to me to have no object. I kept myself aloof from them. But when, soon after the appearance of the above proclama- tion, I was summoned to the head-quarters, and was directly called upon by Moga, in the presence of several staff-officers, to state undisguisedly my opinion about the impending offensive, I then declared myself, from purely military considerations, de- cidedly against it. " Yes, here," exclaimed Moga, in evident agitation, ** all cry out against it ; but before the Commissaries no one ventures even to open his mouth ; and I am then always outvoted. On you alone," continued he, turning toward me, " I still rely. Take courage, and speak before the president as undisguisedly as yoa have now spoken here." "^ Only after this scene did I begin to comprehend how it could incidentally have happened that the Lajtha had already been twice crossed ; and that the offensive thus begun had notwith- standing been again broken ofl^ without our having, as it were, even seen the enemy. The solution of this enigma evidently lay in the insignificance of the majority of those persons, who, by virtue of their position in the camp as well as at the head-quarters, were called upon to exercise an influence on the decisions of the council of war. On this side the Lajtha, they voted, out of fear of the Commissaries, against Moga, and the frontiers had to be crossed on the offensive ; but on the other side the Lajtha, out of much greater fear of the enemy, they voted against the Commissaries, and Moga was allowed to lead the army back again to Parendorf. Such experience might have determined the commander of the army to augment his council of war, before the arrival of the :_____ _._ i^.:^Mm._ 62 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. President Kossuth, by some new members, on whom somewhat more of reliance could be placed. This was probably the reason of my sudden call to the head-quarters. I was late, and did not enter the room in which the council of war was held until after all the other members had already expressed their opinion about the offensive, which was similar to my own. My colleagues, in giving their votes, had probably allowed the formula in use pre- viously to March, '' as in duty bound, agreeing with his Excel- lency the high-born Referant," to display itself so strongly, that Moga prospectively saw himself once more abandoned, if, with tlbis council of war, he should bring the subject under discussion before Kossuth, the president of the Committee of Defense. Hence the indignation with which he received my declaration also ; and hence likewise his urgent request, superfluous in my case, that I would defend, before the president himself, the conviction I had just expressed. An opportunity for so doing was about to present itself in a few hours. Kossuth was expected in Nikelsdorf (Miklosfalva) on the evening of the same day ; and Moga resolved to receive him there with the assembled council of war. A part of the reinforcement which Kossuth brought with him had already reached Nikelsdorf, when we arrived thither from Parendorf. Kossuth also soon made his appearance. A quarter of an hour afterward the council of war was assembled in his temporary lodgings, and presided over by him. Kossuth opened the deliberation with a speech calculated to re- present the crossing of the frontiers of the country in favor of besieged Vienna as a moral necessity for Hungary, and any thought of neglecting to do so as a dishonorable one. He depicted in glowing colors the merits of the inhabitants of Vienna in respect of the young liberty of Hungary ; their magnanimous sacrifices for Hungary's welfare ; and finally, the miseries of the block- ade, which, in so doing, they had brought down upon their city. "Vienna still stands" — thus he concluded his speech — "still unshaken is the courage of her inhabitants, our most faithful allies against the attacks of the reactionaiy generals. But without our assistance, they must nevertheless succumb ; for they fight a too unequal battle. " Let us, therefore, make haste, gentlemen, to pay a debt MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. 63 which must appear sacred to us, mindful of what we owe to our brethren in Vienna. " We must to the help of the inhabitants of Vienna I The honor of the nation demands it of us. And we can do it with an assurance of victory ; because I bring to the brave army, which has^but recently driven before it the fleeing enemy over the fron- tiers, 12,000 warriors — untried indeed, but animated with patriotic ardor for the fight, and burning with desire to contend with their tried comrades for the laurel on the battle-field. Yes, we will do it ! "We will advance ! Our friends in Vienna are anxiously reckoning upon it ; and the Hungarian has never abandoned his friend !" Moga spoke next, evidently having in view mainly to divert the discussion from the field of sentimental politics, and partly to remind us of our military oath, partly to call attention to the want of discipline in the army, and thereby give us a hint from what point of view solely and exclusively we had to judge of the ad- vantages and disadvantages of the offensive, as well as of its admissibility or inadmissibility, and to give our votes accordingly. He concluded his speech, certainly not an ineffective one, by an energetic »appeal to all the members of the council of war to speak out fearlessly their convictions. A long silence was the comfortless answer to this invitation. I refrained from speaking, out of consideration for my seniors. But •\vhen Moga had reiterated his appeal with the words, " Now, then, gentlemen, speak ! you have spoken very decidedly in Par- endorf I" I put all regard for others aside, and began : " Though one of the youngest members in this assembly, both in rank and in experience, yet I speak first, because the silence of my seniors seems to indicate that they wish to reserve to themselves a later opinion. "The President has thrown light upon the necessity of the offensive in favor of Vienna in a political point of view. " Neither is the solidarity between our fighting in self-defense and the insurrection in Vienna clear to me, nor do I know the intimate connection between the events at Vienna and those at Pesth ; nay even about the naked facts, only unvouched-for re- ports have occasionally reached me. " The pressing necessity for our offensive against the hostile army on the other side of the Lajtha I must therefore leave to be 64 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. decided by those who, from their discernment in political matters, their knowledge of the connection and real nature of the events beyond the frontiers of our country with those in its interior, as well as from their public position, are called thereto. " If I am ordered to cross the Hungarian frontiers with a hostile intent, being incapable of judging at present of the political ten- dency of this step, I shall obey without contradiction. But if I am asked whether, in our present circumstances, I advise the offensive, I can give an answer only from a military point of view, and that from the following considerations : " Apart from the numerical superiority of the enemy, we have to ask ourselves not only whether our army is in that condition which is necessary for the success of any offensive operation in general, but in particular when such an operation is to be carried on in a neutral, not to say hostile territory. " Troops intended to act on the offensive must be capable of manoeuvering ; that is to say, each division must have the dex- terity to execute the movements ordered in the prescribed time, and in unison with the adjoining divisions. " Only a very small part of our army is capable of manoeuver- ing. The few regular troops, and one or two Honved battalions excepted, it consists of divisions which fall into confusion in the simplest movements on the exercise-ground ; and they are in general commanded by men who, from their inadequate military knowledge, are calculated only to heighten the confusion when once introduced. " On the battle-field, a movement executed with precision by separate divisions in critical moments often decides the contest ; but mostly the calm and orderly keeping together of the troops, confiding in the firmness of their commander ; and the calm resolution of the latter, relying upon the steady obedience of his inferiors. In all the divisions of the National-guard and the Vol- unteers, these being the elements of which almost two-thirds of our army consists, we can not suppose this reciprocal confidence, because the conditions necessary for it are wanting. " Every offensive, to be carried on successfully, further requires certain, regular supplies for the troops ; otherwise it miscarries from their physical weakness. Disciplined troops can be fur- nished with provisions for several days in advance ; not so the undisciplined. It seems burdensome to the National-guard, as MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 65 well as to the Volunteer, to drag with him his own rations for some days on the march, already toilsome enough without this. He satisfies his present hunger, and sells or gives away the rest, or even, without hesitation, throws it away. Hence arises the necessity for having even their next day's provisions carried after the troops ; and the army is encumbered by a train of wagons which alone is not infrequently sufficient to impede its motions just at the most critical moment. Moreover, even if we deny the existence of this latter fatality, it is still true that, from the utter want of a regular internal management in the divisions, even when the provisions are carried after the army, still the support of each man is not secured ; because the officers do not know how to manage and superintend judiciously the equal distribution of the provisions ; or rather, in their stupid indolence, they do not trouble themselves at all about it. And so it happens, as I wit- ness almost daily among my own brigade in the camp^ that in one and the same battalion, to which even more than the abun- dantly sufficient total-ration is given in mass, some companies are hungry, while the others have a superabundance, and overload their stomachs from fear of a fast-day being near at hand. "What the worth of a famished soldier is, probably every one of the gen- tlemen present can judge from his own experience. " The ofiensive requires, finally, troops hardy and accustomed to fight. The majority of ours belong not to this category. On the battle-field two opposing powers contend for the mastery over the steadfastness of the soldier. Honor, patriotic enthusiasm, perhaps also the fear of the punishment which the articles of war decree against the cowardly soldier, urge him forward ; while the death thundered against him from the enemy's artillery frighten's him back. According as the one or the other of these two powers gains the upper hand, the troops vanquish or are vanquished. The history of war teaches us that young troops, although well disciplined and well led, more frequently experi- ence the latter fate. What destiny could we prognosticate for our undisciplined and ill-led battalions ? " And besides all this, I must also express my apprehension, that by this ofiensive we are in danger of losing forever the sympathy supposed to be felt for us on the other side the Lajtha ; for what the Croats have spared, our Volunteers, our National- guards will hardly spare — the property of the rural population. 66 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. During our second advance to Stix-Neusiedel I saw with my own eyes the traces of the devastation which our troops left behind them in that district as their memorials ; and as yet no scarcity, of food had taken place, which, considering the defective prepa- rations for our support, is the more certainly to be expected the further we advance. Though I have heard from time to time complaints about the thefts committed by the Croats, I found nevertheless, for instance, the expensive props of the vine-grower left untouched in all the vineyards ; but these, after our depart- ure, in spite of the complaints of their proprietors, and notwith- standing the strict prohibition, were burnt, and the cultivated fields maliciously trodden down. The Hungarian militia-man seldom makes a distinction between the German who fights against us, and the German who wishes us victory or at least remains neutral. Hiszen csak a nemete I (' It belongs only to the German') so runs the common saying, by which he thinks himself authorized to commit every kind of devastation on a foreign territory. Such abuses can be prevented only by the strictest discipline ; but I must once more repeat, it is in this very thing that we are deficient. " As I might, however, be reproached with exaggeration, I will run the risk of a harmless test, the result of which will show us whether we can hazard or not the proposed offensive. " Let us issue an order, for instance, that the whole camp be ready to start on the day after to-morrow at five o'clock in the afternoon, and let us convince ourselves how far this order has been executed. If we find the whole camp duly prepared — though not just precisely at the fixed hour, yet say two hours later — then will I unconditionally vote for the offensive." Kossuth was evidently displeased with my declarations, and put to me the question : ' ' How high did I estimate the enthu- siasm which his address would call forth among the troops." " In the camp, and immediately after the address, very high; but after the endurance of hardships, and in presence of the enemy, very low," was my answer. " Then you think," he asked again, irritated, " that we shall not bring back a single man of our army ?" " For the safety of the National-guards and the Volunteers," I replied, "■ their nimbleness is to me a sufficient guarantee ; but the few good troops which we. possess might be ruined by it, and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 67 with them the material which we so pressingly need for training up a useful army." Kossuth concluded the deliberation without a decision being come to ; but he held out a prospect of its being resumed at Parendorf Hereupon I took my leave, and returned immedi- ately to Bruck. On the following day Kossuth arrived at Parendorf His first official act in the camp was to assemble the officers of the reg- ular troops before his lodgings, and read to them a letter ad- dressed to Prince Windischgratz, wherein, so far as I remember, he pointed out the right of the Hungarians in opposition to Ban Jellachich and his party, and, based upon this, demanded of the Prince that the Ban and his corps should be disarmed, that it might thereby be shown that the Hungarian Constitution, recent- ly sanctioned by the king, was deemed sacred. He demanded likewise, I think, the raising of the blockade of Vienna ; but especially, within a short, fixed time, a satisfactory answer to this letter, in default of which Hungary would be compelled to attack and annihilate her enemy and his allies, even on neutral ground. Two trumpets took their departure with this ultimatum to Prince Windischgratz, immediately after it had been communi- cated to the officers. The contents of this letter, which I have here given only very superficially, met with considerable sympathy from those present, so far as I could remark ; and i\ might be foreseen that the agi- tation for the offensive in favor of Vienna, if continued in this way, would not be unsuccessful. Kossuth might have reckoned on this, and therefore have resolved by such means to weaken in its consequences the defeat sustained in the council of war at Nikelsdorf • Several members of the Diet, who made their ap- pearance in the camp as Hungarian chasseurs, likewise did all they could to gain parts of the army for the offensive ; while Kossuth carried on the agitation on a much larger scale, went from one division of the encamped troops to another, and endeav- ored by the fire of his oratory to animate them for the combat against the enemy beyond the Lajtha. A regular council of war, like that in Nikelsdorf, so far as I know, was not again held. The whole deliberation was pro- tracted by discussions repeated at hap-hazard, which became 68 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. daily more general, so that the whole camp soon took part in them. Sympathy for the offensive was visibly increasing. At first, indeed, several regiments declared that in no case would they cross the Lajtha against Prince Windishgratz, he- cause this would be an act of open revolt. But after the boldest defenders of this opinion had, one after another, been very plainly threatened with dismissal — and thus officers already high in station would have been suddenly exposed to an uncertain fate — the monitors gradually decreased in number, and soon the last was silenced. Meanwhile the answer of Prince Windishgratz was eagerly expected. But of the two trumpets — a Konved colonel and a captain of the National-guard — only the latter returned ; the former having been taken prisoner in Ban Jellachich's camp, and not again set at liberty. This violation of the law of nations completely destroyed every opposition, which was perhaps still striving to maintain itself in the camp of Parendorf, against the proposal of the President to hasten to assist the oppressed inhabitants of Vienna. Kossuth appeared, therefore, to be willing to wait only for still more exact intelligence from Vienna ; but when, instead of this, the thunder of the great guns from the capital reached our ears, then at last it was said that no more time was to be lost ; and the advance began on the 28th of October. CHAPTER VIII. With the right wing continually leaning against the Danube, and on the left protected as much as possible by the chief body of the cavalry — the main body of the army advanced in three columns to the Fischa. My brigade was the vanguard during the march ; but in the battle-array it had to form the left wing of the centre. The head-quarters remained during the night from the 28th to the 29th of October with the reserve to the east of Enzersdorf, near the Fischa. on the edge of a small wood. The right wing MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. «9 stood near Fischamend, the left near Margarethen-am-Moos. The villages Schwaadorf, Klein-Neusiedel, and Fischamend, were occupied by our outposts. My brigade was encamped close by Karlsdorf. In conformity with an order I had received, I kept up a large fire during the whole night on the highest point of the nearest environs, to an- nounce our advance to the inhabitants of Vienna. On the 29th we passed over the Fischa, without, however, marching more than a (German) mile* this day in the direction of Schwechat. During the following night we bivouacked in a somewhat con- centrated position on the eminences between the Fischa and the Schwechat. Scarcely had darkness quite set in, when the officer of the gen- eral's stafi', Nemegyei, present with our left wing, saw visions, which, with a rare scrupulosity, and to our no little trouble, he committed to paper, in the form of reports to the commander of the army, " that we had already been turned." The Raab scythe-bearers, consisting of several thousands, were immediately sent thither from the reserve for the security of the left wing. They reached the camp of my brigade without accident. From us they had perhaps still half an hour's march to the ideally- menaced point : but the ordnance-officer of the left wing, who had been appointed to conduct them thither, lost the direction, and led them circuitously about during several hours, till at last they stopped from sheer exhaustion, and left to Nemeg}fei alone the unequal combat with the spectral turning-column of the enemy. Insignificant as this incident seemed to be, it actually exerted an important influence on the disgraceful issue of the approach- ing battle. The troops of almost the whole centre, but especial- ly those of its left wing (my brigade) were already, early in the morning of the 30th, physically exhausted, morally shaken ; they had had no rest, and were quite unable to resist the fatal effects of the terrible rumors of the preceding night. As I had foretold, I saw the enthusiasm, which had really been very vividly kin- dled by the President's fine speeches in the Parendorf camp, al- ready on the point of extinction. "We had lost the battle before it had been begun. =* Equivalent to 5f English miles. — Transl. 70 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. Early on the morning of the 30th of October my brigade had been advancing for a long time, when I received orders instantly to halt, and allow myself to be overtaken by the whole line ; the duty assigned to my brigade, to form the vanguard of the army, being no longer practicable, on account of the visible proximity of the enemy opposite all points of our extended line. I obeyed. Soon afterward an active engagement of artillery commenced on the extreme right wing, and revealed to us that it had al- ready advanced disproportionately far. At the same time serried lines of the enemy showed themselves on the eminences of Schwechat. I thought that, by attacking them, I should be the means of procuring for our right wing more favorable chances of combat ; and my left being secured by the brigade of cavalry against being passed round, the centre of the army also already slowly following us, I resolved, contrary to the received orders, and' on my own responsibility, to attack. While still twice as far from these lines as the range of their guns, a second order from the commander-in-chief interrupted me in the execution of my project. " I must halt," it said, " and attack only after express orders." Meanwhile the right wing had advanced to Mannsworth, and the contest between the tirailleurs, began on the eastern limit of this place. Prom a hill in front of my brigade I could observe it almost in detail. With an unusually intense interest I watched its progress : it was the first obstinate encounter of tirailleurs, of which I had been an eye-witness. Our troops, quite contrary to my anticipation, conducted them- selves very bravely : especially a battalion of Szeklers, and the second volunteer battalion from Pesth, under the command of the daring major of the National-guards, Count Guyon. On this occasion he had incontestably the greatest merit ; for he was always to be seen foremost where the danger was great- est. These battalions earned for themselves on that day renown for courage. The battle round Mannsworth was still not completely decided, when the centre of the army arrived in the same line with my brigade : and I was ordered to gain the height in front of Schwe- chat, southward of the road from Schwaadorf to Schwechat, and there to wait till commanded to attack that place. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 7f In the execution of this order, I met with no obstacle ; the hostile lines, which had at first shown themselves before Schwe- chat, having meanwhile again disappeared. The other brigades of our centre developed themselves to my right, north of the road just mentioned, on the open space between the latter and the army's extreme right wing, which alone fought round Mannsworth. From the northeastern extremity of Schwechat my neighbor- ing brigade was saluted by an insignificant discharge from the enemy's artillery ; whereupon the provisional chief of our gene- ral's staff, Major Pusztelnik — to whom, in the stead of the regu- lar chief, Colonel Kollmann, had been committed, for his debut as it were, the management of the details of this offensive — or- dered all batteries of the first line to fire. Though I saw no enemy before me, nevertheless, supposing that Schwechat might be held by him, I also made my battery play upon the place, intending thereby to facilitate the ensuing attack of the tirailleurs. The attack had scarcely begun, when another *' Halt !" from the general-in-chief interrupted it ; and condemned the whole centre, without regarding the advantages which had already been gained on the right wing, to await, inactive, the issue of the -battle which was just threatening to open on our extreme left wing. In fact, when taking possession of the eminences near Schwe- chat, we had remarked the advance of a very strong column of hostile cavalry from Zwolfaxing toward Rauchenwarth, whose movements plainly showed that they intended to turn our left wing. Colonel Michael Repasy, commander of the left-wing, had re- mained unusually far behind, while we were advancing from the last bivouac ; so much so, that after the drawing-up of the centre on the eminences near Schwechat, there was an interval of more than a quarter of a mile (ly'j English) between its (the centre's) left wing and that of the army. This lagging of Colonel Repasy was adduced as the principal reason for the orders to halt, which so frequently interrupted the advance of the centre. It was, however, inexplicable to us, who were in the centre, why the general-in-chief did not prefer to push on more quickly the left-wing, which consisted only of cavalry, instead of con- 72 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. staiitly keeping the centre back : and not less inexplicable was the reason for our being drawn up so as to be exposed to the grape-shot from the enemy's position, beyond which we could very distinctly observe speedy preparations making for an attack with artillery on our unprotected fronts without being allowed either to prevent or avoid it. As we stood there in a state of inaction, we were not much better off than if we had been placed within the most efficient gun-range of a fortified hostile position, and ordered patiently to wait till the unprepared enemy at his leisure, had taken his measures against us. The orders of the general-in-chief evidently indicated his desire to await the hostile attack ; but in that case we ought to have retired at least four times artillery-range, so as to draw the ene- my completely out of Schwechat, and deprive him of the prepon- derating advantage of his protected position and the employment of his forces. By this retrograde movement of the right wing and of the centre, the dangerous interval between the latter and the left wing, which the enemy seemed just then intending to attempt, would likewise be judiciously closed ; for opposite to this interval, in the direction, namely, between Zwolfaxing and the Treasury paper- manufactory, a not insignificant division of the enemy's ai:my, isolated from their turning main column, was suddenly observed, which, though presumably destined only for communication be- tween the turning-column and their principal position at Schwe- chat would nevertheless by its further advance have endangered, first of all, the unprotected left wing of our centre, and conse- quently immediately my brigade. I therefore resolved in person to seek for the general-in-chief, and induce him to alter his plans. I found him in company with the President, the Commissaries, and several deputies, at a point in the rear whence the whole of the arrangement of the army could certainly be surveyed, but not at all its disadvantages in regard to locality and tactics, in their details. I told him my apprehensions ; he paid no attention to them. Exasperated at this, I could not refrain from remarking that from the point on which he stood, he was quite unable to judge of the position of the foremost line. ** I stand where I can survey the whole ; and do you execute MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 73 in silence what I order I" replied the general to me, in a haughty tone of reprimand. Kossuth interfered accommodatingly, and asked for a repetition of the details of our position, and the disadvantages attached to it. But I was now no longer sufficiently collected to reiterate a circumstantial explanation of all these matters. I replied, briefly and abruptly, that the dispositions were of such a kind, that I did not feel inclined to charge myself with the responsibil- ity of their consequences ; and rode back in haste to my brigade, without waiting for the President's intervention. The hostile divisions, observed opposite our gigantic interval, seemed to have come considerably nearer during my absence Sharper eyes than mine discovered that they consisted of cavalry. I had only six platoons of the tenth regiment of Hussars (William) at my disposal. The battalions of Honter Volunteers and Gomor National- guards formed the flank (left) of my position, disposed in form of a hook ; they stood to the south of a deeply-cut field- way, leav- ing Schwechat in the direction toward Rauchenwarth. This seemed to me to present a sufficient obstacle to an attack of cavalry directed against my left flank ; and I consequently drew back these battalions to the ground lying to the north of the field-way. The position of my brigade, which consisted on that day of four battalions, eight pieces of artillery, and six platoons of hus- sars, was accordingly as follows : On the right wing, next to the high road, stood the Nograd battalion, on its left and near it two guns ; then the first batta- lion of Pesth Volunteers : these divisions faced Schwechat. To the left, farther back than the first battalion of Pesth Volunteers, and forming a hook with it, stood the battalion of Honter Volun- teers, with their front toward Zwblfaxing ; on its left and near it the Gomor National-guards ; then, again, two pieces of artil- lery. The cavalry was there only to protect the guns, on account of want of confidence in the foot-soldiers. Pusztelnik had borrowed four of my guns, intending with them to betake himself to the continuation of the south-eastern outlet of Schwechat — far beyond the reach of my position — and by cannonading it, prevent the enemy, as far as possible, from debouching on that point. Not till the next day did I see these D 74 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. guns igain ! But the enemy did debouch nevertheless, and took us by surprise with a fire of artillery truly murderous at so short a distance, and far surpassing that of my four guns. By his first shots he at once threw my battalions into irreme- diable confusion. The Gomor National-guards ran away first. These were followed by the Honter Volunteers, after they had overturned their commander, horse and all, in his endeavors to stop them. Only with the greatest efibrts did he succeed in working his way out of the agglomeration of the ranks, who, in their panic terror, were rushing headlong over one another. By my orders he hastened in advance of his fleeing battalion, to rally it, if possible, out of the reach of the enemy's batteries, and lead it forward again. Meanwhile I hoped to hold the place with the first Pesth bat- talion, which I supposed to be still firm. But then I wished to attempt to storm the hostile battery. Had not my battalions times innumerable solemnly promised that they would follow me till death ! Nevertheless, by anticipation, I gave up all hope of the return of the Gomor National-guards. During the first minutes of the cannonade from the enemy, being exclusively occupied with the Honter Volunteers, I had not observed what was taking place in the first Pesth battalion. I now found it also already in confusion ; and its commander, the National-guard major. Count Ernest Almassy, almost beside himself with exhaustion, in consequence of his strenuous efTorts to keep his men together. I saw in an instant the impossibility of maintaining the position with this battalion until the return of the Honter Vdlunteers ; and yet I madly believed it possible to animate it to storm the hostile batteries. " Forward I for- ward against the guns I" shouted I to the irresolute ; and Cap- tain Gozon of the battalion seized the banner, ran ahead with it some fifty paces toward the enemy, planted it in the ground, and cried in Hungarian, "Hither, Magyar I here waves thy ban- ner !" From thirty to forty of the most courageous followed the in- trepid man. But while the foremost rank joined them only laggardly, those behind deserted more and more ; and after a few minutes the battalion resembled a misshapen elongated reptile, for the greater number crawled away on all fours, while those who fled erect tumbled over them. In vain did Captain Gozon MY LIFE AND ACTS IN IIUNGAEY. 75 again hold up the banner, wave it high in the air, and exhaust himself with inspiring shouts ; in vain did the commander of the battalion, with his adjutant, at last fall on the fugitives — they were no longer to be stopped ; and even those few who had advanced at Gozon's first call, quickly deserted him again one after the other ; and he soon stood there alone with the banner. I rode up to him, gave him my hand as a mark of my esteem for his heroism, and recommended him to save the banner. Saving my guns was of far more importance to me. Those of the left wing had already been dragged away by the battalions in their flight. Only those of the right wing remained. With anxious solicitude I therefore hastened thither, and im- periously demanded of the commander of the battery, what he still wanted there by himself. He excused himself by saying that he had received no orders to retire. "Now, then, make haste and be oft' I" I exclaimed; quite overlooking, in my excitement, the stoical courage evinced by this excuse. But the man had the blood of a fish in his veins. " There are still some charges here," replied he, in a Bohemian-German dia- lect ; "may I not first fire them off'?" I was almost ashamed of my anxiety before him. Irritated, I gave a bluff' consent, and turned my horse toward the high road, to see what had hap- pened meanwhile to my neighbour brigades. I had supposed that the Nograd Volunteer battalion to the right, in the rear of the guns, had run away long ago. My sur- prise, therefore, was indescribable, when my first glance in this direction fell on the serried and immovable mass. It stood in the direction of the most violent fire of the hostile batteries, though in a gently-sloping hollow protected from it. This circumstance I overlooked, however, in the first instance, and thus believed that I had before me a battalion of heroes. " Advance swiftly to cover the retreat of the artillery, and then form the rear-guard I" I called, encouraged, to the commander, and thought I should still accomplish wonders with such heroes. AVhat a deception ! Scarcely was the battalion out of its covert and exposed to the balls of the battery, when the commander shouted with all his might, " Volunteers, forward I — fire, all I" But the volunteers remained immovable ; the whole mass dis- harged their high-presented muskets at the hussars, who, in pro- 76 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tecting the retreating guns, were just passing close by their front (fortunately none of the shots hit) ; and the next minute the bat- talion of supposed heroes was already on its way to join the rest. One of its men alone disdained to take part in the general flight, and acted as if he would of himself form the rear-guard of my whole brigade. Thus, out of nearly 5000 men of those National-guards and Volunteers about whose valor I had already heard so many tirades ; who, as they themselves had repeatedly asserted, were burning with desire to measure themselves with an enemy whom they never mentioned but with the greatest contempt — there re- mained to me, after a short hostile cannonade, a single man ! and this one was an elderly, half-invalid soldier I The firmness with which at Nikelsdorf I had opposed the Pres- ident's urging to the offensive, proved, I should think, clearly enough that I was perfectly prepared for an unfortunate debut of these " inspired legions ;" but what I had just experienced far exceeded my worst apprehensions. I thought I should have sunk into the earth for shame at the unspeakable cowardice of my countrymen, and wished that a ball would strike me from my horse I Of my once-numerous suite, only my younger brother and a first-lieutenant of the tenth regiment of hussars had constantly kept near me during moments of danger. Accompanied by them I sorrowfully left the field of battle — the witness of our shame — and had then no presentiment that the honor was yet reserved for us of taking part in future combats, the consequences of which would embitter to the victors of Schwechat the memory of this day. Slowly I rode toward the midst of the centre. I almost feared the sight of my comrades, whom I supposed to be still engaged in the battle with their brigades. Alas, I had no reason for fear. The whole of our forces from Schwechat to Mannswbrth was as if swept away. The other brigades were said — incredible as it seems — to have taken to their heels even before mine. Like a scared flock, the main body of the army was seen has- tening in the greatest disorder toward the Fischa for safety. The broad plain was literally sown all over with single fugi- tives ; nowhere, as far as the eye could reach, was a compact di- vision to be perceived. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 77 It was to be expected that the enemy would take advantage of his victory, resolutely pursue, and render it impossible to get our train of artillery safely across the Fischa. This was con- firmed by his advancing batteries. Nothing else than a desperate combat by the rear-guard could now save the army. At whatever cost, something must be done to effect this. Fortunately the horses of my two companions were still pretty fresh. I therefore dispatched one of them in the direction of Schwaadorf, the other toward Fischamend, after the fugitives, to stop and assemble as many as they possibly could. The result of their exertions was hopelessly small, about 1000 men in all, and even these were continually on the point of run- ning away again. I no longer saw any hope of preservation. But, next to God, the enemy was on this day merciful and compassionate to us, for — he did not pursue us. Unmolested we reached before night the opposite bank of the Fischa ; and equally unmolested on the next day we entered again the " legal ground" of our country. Scarcely had the last sound of the artillery before Schwechat died away, when the strangest opinions were heard as to the real cause of the failure of our offensive operations For instance, the masses of deserters from the National-guards and Volunteers — who had at their command a surprising readi- ness for interpreting every defeat sustained through their coward- ice as being the inevitable result of some treason — asserted that the inhabitants of Vienna, secretly leaguing with Prince Win- dischgratz, had exhorted us to hasten to their assistance, and had during the battle united themselves with the hostile troops against us. Absurd as this story sounds, it was but a natural consequence of those agitations which had led to the expectation of a sally of the inhabitants of Vienna simultaneously with our attack, and thus of the easiest victory over the blockading army. Moga's dispositions during the offensive, but especially during the conflict, were likewise severely criticised ; and by many of his inferiors expressly interpreted as if he had wished to deliver the whole army into the enemy's hands. That this had not suc- ceeded — they further said — ^was owing to Prince Windischgratz, or rather to his sub-commanders, who purposely allowed us to es- cape with only a black eye. But the civil coryphei of the Hungarian movement difiused 78 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. these opinions very diligently throughout the country ; on the one hand, to weaken the just reproach that they by their agita- tions for the crossing of the Lajtha had led the nation to take a foolhardy, pernicious step ; on the other hand, to revive the drooping courage of the people, by pointing to sympathies, which they said existed for the cause of Hungary even in the Austrian army. A conscientious estimate of the peculiar circumstances under which the battle of Schwechat had been fought, scarcely permits, however, an unreserved concurrence in this somewhat bold judg- ment. It c£[n not certainly be denied, on the one side, that our gen- eral's dispositions here and there led to the suspicion that he intended to deliver his army 'into the enemy's hands. On the other side, it must be admitted, that the enemy had entirely confined the pursuit of our deserting centre and right wing to sending at i-andom after us his projectiles from two, or, at most, three positions he had taken up for his artillery when advancing ; while his gigantic turning-column, opposed by our quite isolated, feeble left wing, under Repasy, discontinued its attacks just at the moment when it had become impossible for our general to reinforce the left wing. It must further be granted, that the enemy could have been hindered from pursuing neither by a sally of the inhabitants of Vienna, nor by the supposition that our flight was merely a feigned one. All this taken together consequently furnishes reason enough for the supposition, that he intentionally let us escape with only a black eye. But I oppose to this, that it can not be imagined there was, either on the part of Moga or on that of his sub-commanders, a clear knowledge of what they really intended to do on the day of the battle of Schwechat And I find the more natural expla- nation of the defective leading of our army, as well as of their unexpected preservation, partly in the embarrassment, easily conceivable after thirty years of peace, of the opposite leaders and their troops ; partly, perhaps, also in the circumstance that the national excitements of the year 1848 had not yet succeeded in so completely effacing from the ranks of the regular troops of both armies the remembrance of the fellowship which had existed among them shortly before, as that it would have been possible for them to fight against each other like embittered enemies. CHAPTER IX. Early on the 31st of October, I had received, during the march, an order from the commander of the army not to lead my brigade again to Bruck, into the inevitable position on the Lajtha, but to Kitsee (Kopeseny), and to encamp before that place. Here, consequently, there reached me, in the night between the 31st of October and the 1st of November, 1848, the Pres- ident's order to appear before him without delay at Presburg (Pozson). At the same time I was invited to the head-quarters (in the seignorial castle of Kitsee), Moga wishing to speak to me previously. It was past midnight when I arrived at the head-quarters. I found Moga already retired to rest ; but his adjutant was wait- ing for me, and communicated to me beforehand, that his chief, in consequence of a fall from his horse, by which he was severely bruised, had become incapable of continuing the command of the army, and had proposed me to the President as his successor. I therefore rode immediately to Presburg ; and very early in the morning of the 1st of November I stood beside the President's sick-bed ; for, in the delicate state of his health, the recent events had brought on a kind of fever. A violent fit, he assured me, had just left him. He invited me to take a seat near his bed, as our conversation might be of some duration, and complained first of the excessive cowardice of the National-guards and Volunteers, still more of the battalion of the foot-regiment Preussen, and especially of its commander. Major Gyozei,* a coward beyond compare. This battalion, according to Kossuth, stood in the second line of the middle brigade of the centre (in the array before Schwechat my neighbor brigade to the right), and at the beginning of the hos-* * This was his Magyarized name ; his German name is unknown to 80 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tile cannonade had taken to flight the first of all — nay, during the flight had thrown away even their havresacks and cartridge- pouches. I remembered, indeed, to have noticed, during my last ride over the position occupied by our centre, in the direction indicated, a remarkably great mass of equipments, with white straps, that had been thrown away, and far around not any dead or wounded to be seen. However, said Kossuth, the National-guards had afterward succeeded in disputing with this regular battalion the palm of greater cowardice. Because when he had left General Moga, after many vain attempts to put a stop to the flight which now had become general, and had hastened back in his carriage to Fischamend — as was natural, only with the intention of stopping the fugitives at the bridge of the Fischa — he found it already occupied to such a degree by deserters, that he could himself get over it only in consequence of the very energetic efforts made by his armed followers. " And this was much," added Kossuth, in an explanatory manner ; " for I had not remained a great while after the com- mencement of the retreat, on that point behind the place where the reserve of the army stood — where, shortly before the hostile attack on our centre, we had for the last time spoken together in the general's company — and had ridden pretty quickly from thence to Fischamend I " I was now obliged," continued Kossuth, '* to defer the execu- tion of my original design to a point lying still farther on. I ordered fresh horses to be put to my carriage, and availed myself of the time while this was being done, to address those who were fleeing close by my side, and so perhaps stop them. But, in vain. They only waved their hats in friendly salute, wishing me many times long life, and ran on unheeding. " Though disgusted in the highest degree at such conduct, I could not but see the impossibility of damming up any where in the midst the stream of fugitives without the energetic co-opera- tion of a compact troop ; and this confirmed me still more in my resolution to overtake those who had fled farthest, before I should Venture again to attempt rallying them. " Meanwhile the fresh horses had been put to the carriage. I had no time to lose, and urged haste. But however broad the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 81 main road might be, I was nevertheless every here and there again and again interrupted in my swift journey by a new dense multitude of fugitives. " Behind almost each of these crowds I was obHged to make a formal speech from my carriage, to be allowed at least to drive on before them. And thus it happened that, in spite of the re- peated change of horses, I could not overtake the first of the deserters before I was in front of Presburg, in the so-called Au. There at last, eight (German) miles from Schwechat — the fel- lows must clandestinely have taken to their heels at the earliest opportunity after the first discharge of artillery — the danger from the enemy appeared to them no longer sufficiently great to make them run farther. They were camping contentedly along the road, and were just taking some refreshment when I arrived among them. Beside myself with indignation, I resolved to sentence them to the severest punishments ; and for this purpose asked the name of the division to which they belonged. But the wretches felt themselves even flattered by my ' kind inquiry ;' and while some of them repeatedly called to me with self-satis- faction that they were the National-guards of the comitate of Komorn, the rest bellowed continually, ' Eljen Kossuth I' " When the President in the council of war at Nikelsdorf — evi- dently offended at my unreserved description of the state of dis- cipline existing in our army — had put the question to *fTfe, with, a malicious sneer, whether I seriously feared that we should not bring home a single man from the offensive across the Lajtha, I answered. " I was not alarmed about the National-guards and Volunteers — they had nimble legs I" I could not now feel other- wise than astonished to see how perfectly the President's own experience justified my then doubted judgment. Still I refrained at this time from making any remark upon it ; because Kossuth appeared to me not only physically but also morally shattered. However, he was not the latter by any means. Although, after his recent journey from Fischamend to Presburg, he could no longer answer so decidedly for the heroism of the National- guards and Volunteers as he had previously done, nevertheless he still attributed the chief blame of the disgraceful issue of our offensive in favor of Vienna to the indecision of the commander of the army ; and strenuously maintained that a more determined leading qf the troops would have been followed by victory. 82 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. " The accident which has made Moga suddenly incapable of service," added Kossuth, " I consider as a hint to remove forever from the command of the army all politically-wavering elements. This seems to me especially necessary at the moment when it is important to prepare for the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieu- tenant Simunich — who has meanwhile already hostilely pene- trated into the country from the north as far as Tyrnau (Nagy Szombat) — the fate of Generals Roth and Philippovich, and thereby simultaneously to destroy on the one hand a not incon- siderable part of the hostile forces, and on the other to rekindle anew the enthusiasm of the country, depressed in consequence of the disaster at Schwechat — and thus, as it were, kill two birds with one stone. " I have therefore advanced Count Guyon from major to colonel of the National-guards, and made him commander of the expedition against Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich. His heroic conduct before Mannsworth is a guarantee to me that this expedition will at least not fail from its leader's Avant of decision. It might indeed more easily miscarry through his unskillfulness ; for I distrust the military knowledge of Guyon. To obviate this, I have placed by his side as counsellor the chief of Moga's general staff, the Honved colonel Kollmann. But then, according to our system, Kollmann, as Honved colonel, and still more as his senior in rank, is properly Guyon' s superior ; and he must consequently first of all be won, as he best may, to a voluntary subordination to the commands of the latter. For this, however, and especially the more to expedite the preparations for this expedition, in which the most trusty troops of the army shall be employed, I need the vigorous assistance of an energetic commander of the army. Would not you undertake the command of the army ? Ifou seem to me to be above all others the right man for this post I" " What, then, will my senior comrades in the army say, when they see themselves passed over, on my account, and without reason?" replied I, interrogatively. "I have thought of that," answered Kossuth, "and had al- ready offered to several of them the staff of command, as soon as I knew of Moga's accident ; but have received just as many answers declining to accept it. Hereupon you were proposed to me for this post by Moga. As to what your comrades will say MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 83 to it, you may therefore, I think, be perfectly easy. They will be nominated generals together with you, only you receive the seniority of rank. If therefore you accept the staff of command, endeavor above all to set on foot as quickly as possible the expedition against Field-marshal Simunich, and to arrange any differences between Kollmann and Guyon, if such should arise, before they personally fall out, and thus render mediation impos- sible." " I accept the staff of command," I answered, " and will im- mediately go in search of those gentlemen ; but I must remark, that I despair beforehand of any favorable result from my medi- ation. Why do you not prefer to entrust Kollmann with the command of the expedition, and associate Guyon with him as sub-commander ? ' ' " Because before Schwechat I had an opportunity of having confirmed by my own observation the ambiguous reputation which Kollmann has with the army," replied Kossuth. " You should but have seen the pitiful countenance with which he was stealing about before Schwechat among the commander's suite, and how it at once became irradiated with joy, when, after the beginning of the general flight in the centre, his leader turned his horse toward the preserving Fischa. I can not tell, how- ever, how much of this delight is to be attributed to the tran- quilising thought that he (Kollmann) in the general's suite could now honorably withdraw himself from the approaching danger, and how much to malignant satisfaction at the baffled debut of his substitute Pusztelnik. This much, however, appears to me to be certain, that Kollmann is destitute of those moral qualities which, to ensure its success, I presume to be indispensable in the leader of the expedition against Simunich. " Moreover I have already definitively charged Guyon with the command of this expedition. If Kollmann, therefore, should per- severe in refusing to recognize the former as his chief, then Pusz- telnik must again act in Kollmann' s place." Agreeing with this measure, I left the President, and made a vain attempt to arrange the wished-for understanding between Kollmann and Guyon, conformably with Kossuth's intention. In the meanwhile, however, they had already had words ; and Kollmann steadily refused to lead the expedition under Guyon's command. Pusztelnik was consequently associated with the 84 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. latter as chief of the general staff. Part of the troops for this campaign left Presburg before daybreak, and all of them in the course of the 1st of November. The rest of the army, in the mean time, was distributed, for the protection of the frontier, on the right bank of the Danube from the Neusiedel lake to Pres- burg ; on the left from Presburg to Hochstetten. Kossuth awaited the issue of the expedition in Presburg, whi- ther also my head-quarters were transferred. A few days after the commencement of the expedition I re- ceived an invitation from the President to a rendezvous with the Polish general Bem, who had just arrived at Presburg from Vienna, and was immediately to start for Guyon's expeditionary corps, to give a new and favorable turn to the operations of the latter, which were already near becoming a failure. In consequence of this invitation I saw Bem for the first time, without knowing more of his former fortunes than his sudden ap- pearance in Vienna in the course of the past month of October, and his participation in the defense of that city. Our conversation was very short. He communicated to me that Kossuth was sending him to Guyon to assist him both with his advice and co-operation. Some days after this, Bem had again come back to Presburg ; and, as Kossuth had already set out for Pesth, he invited me, through Csanyi, to a conference. This time it lasted somewhat longer. Bem told me that he had reached Guyon a day too late to be able to exercise any effective influence on the course of this unfortunate campaign. He then remarked, what distinguished talents Guyon possessed as a general ; but that the officers of the regular troops were still not quite uniform in their obe- dience ; and so on. Finally he declared that he should go to Kossuth at Pesth, that he might be employed somewhere in the field. Bem's presence produced a depressing effect upon me. I knew neither whence he came, nor what were his aims. His emerging in Vienna, which has remained inexplicable to me ; his doings there, which I knew only by report ; and now sudden- ly the devotedness, just as inexplicable, which he constantly protested for the defense of my country — these circumstances led me involuntarily to suppose him to be something of a "knight errant" in a modern revolutionary style of warfare. My coun- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 86 try's cause appeared to me to be too sacred, too just, not to make me feel a decided aversion to the companionship in arms of such elements. Moreover Bem's favorable judgment with respect to Guyon, as well as the contrary in regard to the body of officers of the regular troops, so diametrically contradicted my own experience, that I found therein very little reason to expect for my country any enduring success from Bem's doings in the field of battle. Except on these two occasions at Presburg, I have never seen Bern, nor have I had any other direct intercourse with him. CHAPTER X. The Constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest. The nation had acknowledged this, and had unanimously risen to the conflict. Their leader was the man of their confidence — Kossuth. But being no soldier himself, he under-estimated the import ance of the soldier, and believed that the thunder of the enemy's artillery would be silenced by the mere war-cry of masses oi people brought together by extemporised declamations. Soldiers — myself among the number — had warned him against such a dangerous self-deception. The warning was unheeded by him ; and before Schwechat he paid dearly for his expe- rience. Then he offered me the command of the defeated army. I hailed this step as a proof that Kossuth had forever sacrificed to the welfare of the country his anti-military enthusiasm, and accepted this important post with the clear conviction that the combat of the nation for its rights was a combat in self defense, and in the firm belief that it would remain so : I accepted it, because I felt inwardly the vocation for it, and that by refusing it, I should have violated my duty to my country ; finally, be- cause the higher I stood, the more likely it seemed to me that I should be able to inspire my fellow citizens, by my own exam- 86 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. pie, with that devotion to the just cause of the fatherland, with- out which it was vain to think of saving it. But even during the first days of my new sphere of action I found that the day of Schwechat had neither cured the civil rulers of the error of allowing, in the disposal of the armed forces, political considerations to prevail at the expense of strategic ones, nor had it deterred them from the repetition of the experiment of making war without soldiers. My proposition was — on the right bank of the Danube to move back with the main army to Raab, with the advanced corps to Wieselburg (Moson) ; on the left, to protect Presburg and defend the principal passages across the White Mountains (Feher Hegyek) with strong isolated detachments only, which, in case of the advance of a superior force of the enemy should effect their retreat, on the one .^ide to Leopoldstadt (Lipotvan), on the other to Komorn (Komarom) : further, to reorganize the active army, to transfer the seat of government, and of the Diet, together with the cadres of the battalions about to be raised, behind the Theiss ; and to make use of the end of autumn for raising troops, for establishing magazines and depots, and in gen- eral for the organization of a trusty, well-regulated army. It was, however, rejected. In opposition to this, it was said that the frontier must re- main occujned, and the reorganization of the army be car- ried on in face of the enemy ; because that with every hand- breadth of country lost, there was also a falling away from us of a part of the people. Their sympathies for the maintenance of the Constitution \i^ere not yet sufficiently well-grounded to be able to resist the discomfiture sustained in a combat remarkably unfortunate for us. Above all, the discouraging efl^ect of the defeat at Schwechat must be mitigated as much as possible by the maintenance of the frontier. Then would the inhabitants, especially those of that part of Hungary which is situated next to the seat of the Austrian government, accustom themselves in a very short time to the absence of their former relation to Aus- tria, being obliged, inconsequence of the blockade of the frontier, to break off' their commercial connections with the non-Hungarian territories of Austria, to confine their mercantile activity to the interior, and thus mark the more abruptly the frontier of Hunga- ry toward Austria. Moreover, by means of the hermetical MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 87 blockade of the frontier, the exportation of provisions to the cap- ital — to the detriment of the hostile army concentrated in and around it — would also be entirely prevented ; the buyingf-up of the supplies of corn and hay stored in the frontier comitates, and amassing them in the fortress of Komorn and its environs, would be secured, as well as a favorable market for the new Hungarian paper-money. In vain did I call attention to the fact, that in spite of all this, by the occupation of the frontier, they were merely striving for transitory and secondary advantages, and abandoning for these the durable and most important benefit which the possession of a well-organized armed force would secure to us ; while the re- organization of the army, during the harassing service of the outposts along such an extended line of frontier, would be ren- dered very difficult, nay almost impossible. I was outvoted, and might consider it fortunate that at least no objection was made to the reorganizing of the army, by which I understood nothing less than the disbanding of the battalions of National-guards and Volunteers, and the formation of regular Honved battalions out of the material thereby gained. But scarcely had Kossuth left Presburg to return to Pesth, when my exertions in this direction also began to be most ob- stinately obstructed. Even during the President's sojourn of some days at Presburg, I had frequently had occasion to perceive that he was opposed to my purely military plans, not perhaps from his own personal con- viction, but only in consequence of the most prejudicial influence of those about him, who had not been very happily chosen for the furtherance of the good cause. The difficulties which he sud- denly raised from Pesth against the reorganization of the army as I had proposed it, although he had seemed perfectly to agree with it when in Presburg, plainly confirmed this supposition. The source of these difficulties, again, could be found, in my opinion, only in external influences, and very probably in those of the members of the Committee of Defense. Though I scarcely knew them by name, it was nevertheless sufficient to know that they likewise v/ere not soldiers, and that the power of the leaders of the army had always been a thorn in the side of the civil power. But by this miserable petty jealousy the salvation of the coun- 88 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. try might be wrecked, notwithstanding the most heroic persever- ance in fight on the part of the nation. All, consequently, depended on creating a supreme power in the state, which being unrestricted, would consequently be raised above all such jeal- ousy. But this power must be vested in one person ; it could only be the dictatorship. The one and only possible dictator of Hun- gary at that time was Kossuth. Though not quite adapted for it, being ignorant of war, and disinclined to the measure of maintaining a standing army, which, however, is indispensable in the modern system of warfare ; he nevertheless appeared to me to be much less obstructive to the successful progress of our cause than a governing collegium, like the Committee of Defense, in its nature practically irresponsible, and to whose proceedings the proverb of too many cooks was very often strikingly applicable. As dictator — thus I reasoned — Kossuth would have to choose his residence with the principal army of the country, therefore with the army of the upper Danube. If once for a longer time in his direct proximity, I hoped soon to gain him over to my con- viction, that the salvation of the country was not possible othei^ wise than with the assistance of a well-disciplined armed forces consequently neither with National-guards nor with Yolunteei corps. And if theory had not been sufficient for this purpose, new practical experiences a la Schwechat would do the rest in a very short time. Once cured of his illusion on this point, Kossuth would prob- ably also have soon duly subordinated the political motives for the employment of the armed forces to the strategic considera- tions. From these remarks the occasion is evident of the following letter to the Committee of Defense, in this instance written in German : " Presburg, Wth November, 1848. " On the 31st of October, in the present year, I was invited by the President to take the command of the Hungarian army of the upper Danube. " I undertook it — and with it the obligation to do whatever might contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the salvation of our oppressed country. ^ >*---■: MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 89 " The history of all nations, which, though at one time near is great, is ver}^ great, and unfortunately may hecome still greater. " No true patriot ought to conceal from himself, that the danger their ruin, have elevated themselves again to that stage of ex- istence which includes the condition of a permanent endurance, teaches us that there are moments when all lesser considerations must give way, if the whole is to be saved ; teaches us further, that without unity of will preservation is impossible ; teaches us finally, that this unity can be obtained only when the confidence of the whole nation, or at all events of a preponderating part of it, concentrates itself in one man, and when the nation, placing this one freely over themselves for a certain time, voluntarily does homage to his will. So has it hitherto been, and so will it con- tinue to be. I do not believe that the course of the world will take another direction out of love to Hungary. " Whether all Hungary already stands so near the brink of ruin, that the hand of a firm dictatorship can alone save it from destruction, — this may be judged of by those men who have con- sidered it adapted to the times to place the greatest part of the Hungarian army under the orders of a mere private individual. But that this part of the army has been brought by recent events very near to total dissolution, is a fact which no military man by profession can deny. " To find out with whom the blame of this rests, must be post- poned to a time when the mental excitement, which just now seems to be ever on the increase, shall have subsided, and given place to a calm, comprehensively just, nay considerate judg- ment of all the circumstances. But at present there must be speedy help." (The original contains here, by way of parenthesis, an attack against the then predominating mania for indulging in suspi- cions. What follows connects naturally word for word with the preceding.) " My business is to propound T^oz^^; and I therefore declare my convictions as follow : "1. All nepotism in the promotions must for ever entirely cease. " 2. All irregular bodies of troops must be strictly kept apart from the regular, and placed under their own separate com manders. 90 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. " The best plan would be, to disband immediately all irregular troops ; to pre-engage separately those individuals among them who are bound to military service, and to employ them for com- pleting the bodies of regular troops already existing. " The rebaptising of the so-called Volunteer battalions to Hon- ved battalions is a very unhappy experiment. The name is changed, but the child remains the same. " The Volunteer battalions are worth little or nothing, because only a very small number of the officers and subalterns understand their duty. Can we promise to ourselves more from these ap- pointments, when they are called Honved instead of National- guards ? The greater number remains notwithstanding asinus in pelle leonina. " Some have advanced the opinion, that one battalion of Vol- unteers or National-guards placed between two Honved battalions is equivalent to a third Honved battalion. So long as it does not come to bread-breaking,* this may be so ; but at the first grape-shot the Volunteer battalion runs voluntarily away, and as a rule carries off with it involuntarily both Honved battalions to its right and left. There have been exceptions, but how many? *' The officers of the Volunteers, if they wish to pass over into the ranks of the Honved, ought previously to undergo an examin- ation before a commission composed of tried, skillful officers ; and if this examination proves satisfactory, they should be transferred, but only as juniors in rank. A few exceptions, the reward of distinguished merit, might be made, according to the decision of the commander-in-chief of the army alone. Moreover, "3. The promotion of officers within certain limits ought to be confided to the commander of the army alone. Either the com- mander of the army deserves this confidence, and then there is no risk run ; or he does not deserve it, and then away with him I Only, no half-measures I "4. The commander of the army is made responsible for all the dispositions of troops ; but then nobody except himself ought to dispose of his army. " An army without unity in the command is like a man who has fallen out with himself; neither from the one nor the other can any thing decided be expected. ^ i.e. while there is no danger. — Transl. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 91 " 5. The army needs rest and refreshment ; for it is depressed physically and morally. Rest and refreshment it can not find here in Presburg ; — Presburg, on account of the overpowering forces of the enemy menacing simultaneously from Austria, Mo- ravia, Silesia, and Gallicia, is an untenable position, and will soon become the grave of our army. "6. All the Volunteer battalions are covered with vermin, because since Jellachich's entrance into Stuhlweissenburg, where they lost their stock of body-linen, they have only one set a-piece. If they wish to wash it, they must wear their cloak all day long on their naked body. In the field this might do ; but here, in these close quarters, the pedicular disease has got the upper hand to such an extent, that there are individuals whose skin is already quite ulcerated. At least one set of body-linen for change per man, and more suitable quarters, together with rest, are the only means of remedying this disgusting and dangerous malady. " Fresh linen may be sent us, but not better quarters and rest. " The constant watchfulness requisite to secure an extended open city like Presburg from hostile surprises, is too great to leave to the troops the resting-time needful for their absolutely essen- tial purification and refreshment. On the other hand, Presburg does not afford sufficient space for quartering to enable the troops required for its security to be lodged in such a manner as their preservation urgently demands. "7. All the divisions of the National-guards which did not engage themselves for the duration of the war must be imme- diately disbanded ; because while this real public scourge costs immense sums, on account of the enormous compensation which was secured to it by the comitates for the period of its services, it seems to exist only for the purpose of scoffing at the laws, and pestiferously infecting our best-disciplined troops with the bad spirit by which it is itself pervaded. Therefore away with it ! Better no army at all, than one in whose separate parts the laws are scofied at in the most scandalous manner. " The (Edenburg National-guards ' on foot,' at the mere news that the enemy was approaching, immediately deserted to their homes ; those ' on horseback' did the same a few hours later. All that remained of them was the commander and some officers I "At the request of the President Kossuth, I have taken the 92 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. command of a part of the Hungarian army, and it is my most sacred duty to see that its honor is preserved unsullied. " A whole army may he heaten, and forced to yield, without injury to its honor ; hut if a single division of it plays the coward and runs away without having even seen the enemy, the honor of the whole army is stigmatized. " I expect, from the ever-lauded equity of the honorahle Com- mittee of Defense, that I shall not he expected again to hazard the honor of my hrave army by receiving into its ranks divisions which deserved rather the disgraceful name of ' Mob of run- aways,' than the honorable one of 'Defenders of the fatherland.' " 8. From points (5.) and (6.) the proposition naturally fol- lows : to occupy Presburg only so far as is absolutely necessary with a part of the army ; and to remove the head-quarters and the main body to some other place which offers greater advan- tages as well for the defense of the country as for the reorganiza- tion of the army. ^ " This proposition I shall have the honor of laying before you in my next letter." (My signature follows.) This letter had as its consequence just the contrary of what I intended ; for now Kossuth, together with the Committee of De- fense and the War-ministry, opposed more decidedly than before all my propositions and measures tending to the consolidation of the army. The following extracts from the rough draughts of several letters sent from Presburg to Kossuth in Pesth, being accidentally at hand, furnish evidence of this. The originals are drawn up in Hungarian. I give the passages quoted from the German translation. "Presburg, 15th November, 1848. " Honored President, *' According to the purport of a decree of the Committee of Defense, the individuals qualified for filling the positions of staff- officers are to be proposed by the commander of the army and the royal commissary ; but those fitted for becoming subalterns by the regiments or battalions and the royal commissary. ** This decree, indeed, deprives me of the right of appointing MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGAUY. 93 officers up to the rank of captain, and of the sole right of pro- posing those from captain upward, which had been confided to me by you, honored President. But this is not what troubles me most : it is rather my experience that even this more recent decree is not inviolably observed, as I have perceived from the promotion of Major Szaz to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. " Major Szaz decamped somewhat nimbly from Mannsworth, leaving to its fate a division of his battalion which was placed next to the enemy. This is a fact ; and it is in my opinion — without wishing to dictate — reason enough for not proposing him for promotion. My good Major Szaz, however, has not fallen on his head : he is suddenly taken ill, needs the Kaiser-bath at Ofen, sets out immediately thither, and, look you, now he is already lieutenant-colonel ! " In the nomination of officers and in promotions there reigns, generally speaking, frightful abuse. To-day, for instance, I read in Kozlony* — I must confess with surprise — the promotion of my younger brother to the rank of captain. He had already been made Honved first-lieutenant without either myself or him knowing how this could have happened ; for I had promoted him only to a lieutenancy in the National-guards, and at the same time appointed him my adjutant (because I could make the best use of him in the organization of the Volunteer mobile National-guard) ; but had firmly resolved to take no such fur- ther step for him as could even in the remotest degree have the appearance of favoritism. I do not know consequently whom my brother has to thank for these favors. But thus much I know, that both of his promotions are just as irregular as innu- merable others ; and I am much inclined to suspect that his latter advancement especially is nothing else than a deep-laid scheme to frustrate my exertions for the abolition of nepotism. But this does not at all divert me from my purpose." " The sergeant-majors of hussars, V. and H., who have been promoted to the rank of lieutenants, I pray to have removed to another regiment, because these are the persons who, when in Gallicia — for the purpose of enabling themselves to return with their men to Hungary — carried along with them their superior officer, whom they bound ; and thus committed the greatest military crime, though from patriotic motives. The country * The official gazette of the Committee of Defense. 94 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. rewards their zealous patriotism by promotion ; but the service strictly requires that they be removed from the ranks of that body of troops, v^^here they serve only as dangerous examples of rew^arded disobedience." " The period of service of the battalion of the Borsod National- guards expires on the 20th of this month ; and already on the 10th have these people demanded to return home. The royal commissary Csanyi has attempted to induce them to remain longer on duty. But they have repeatedly declared, that they vi^ill positively not continue any longer ; for they are not such fools as to expose again their dear lives in the last five days of their service, after the good God has preserved them hitherto from the fire of the enemy's guns. " I have consequently not the least reason to lament the de- parture of these zealous patriots ; but certainly cause enough to complain of the loss of so many good muskets and equipments. I have therefore desired the royal commissary at least to retain their arms for the defense of the country, though he dismiss the men. If this succeeds, we shall have gained more than we shall lose ; for the fifteenth Honved battalion, which loiters about in Presburg without arms, can then be immediately supplied with the muskets of these Borsoders." (My signature follows.) "Presburg, 17 th November, 1848. " Honored President, " When I spoke earnestly against the formation of volunteer battalions, and the employment of the scythe-bearers in the field, I was not listened to by you, honored President, because, accord- ing to your views, enthusiasm of itself is sufficient to stand in the stead of order, perseverance in sustaining the toils and hardships of war, obedience, discipline, and more of the like military and only military virtues. Would God it were so I mat- ters would then be quite different with us. But, alas, Hungarian enthusiasm seems to be only a straw fire. " I have already reported the conduct of the Borsod National- guard. " The day before yesterday, the Honter Volunteer battalion, intended to be employed against the enemy, arrived without arms on the muster-ground. The men declared at the same MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 95 time that they had been sent by their comitate only for a service of from six to eight, or at most of ten weeks' duration, and that this time had expired long ago. Consequently they would not move another step against the enemy. " The accompanying report of the commander of the battalion, with its documents, gives a more particular explanation of this occurrence, as well as of the deceptive means which had been employed by the local authorities of the comitate of Honter in enlisting the volunteers. " The men of the battalion of Zemplin National-guards (en- gaged for six months) are also in a state of excitement, because they likewise have been deceived by their comitate, inasmuch as it has not sent them the necessary articles of clothing. And in the cold November nights a man is frozen if his cloak is the only cloth garment which he has as a protection against the cold. To-day two Zemplin National-guards appeared before me, in the name of the whole battalion, with the request that I would permit them to return to their homes, because the cholera was ravaging their comitate in a dreadful manner. "This morning I expect similar requests from all the Volun- teer battalions. " To those of the Zemplin comitate I have answered, that I would lay their request before the Committee of Defense ; but that until the arrival of a decision in their favor, they must per- form their duties, otherwise I should be obliged to punish most severely those who were refractory. " The period of service of four-sevenths of the Gomor National- guards also expires about this time. These most certainly do not remain !. " The metamorphosing the Volunteer into Honved battalions does not succeed well. Only very few of the men can be pre- engaged. Thus it is chiefly the officers who are favorable to this metamorphosis ; so that, notwithstanding their ignorance and uselessness, they may for a still longer period receive their large pay, and continue to play their pranks in the capacity of officers. " They agitate against the examination of officers, instead of acquiring some solid knowledge. One of the most zealous among these agitators is a captain of the National-guards, Sigismund Thaly, of the Eszterhazy battalion, whose company will be dis- 96 UY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. missed to-morrow, their time of service having expired. On this occasion dismissal likewise awaits him, unless he shall previously undergo the examination. He now suddenly demands a fort- night's furlough. I see through his plan. He wants a certificate of leave of absence, to prove in Pesth that he is still really in the service ; supported by it, he would certainly find ways and means to be transferred into one or other of the Honved battal- ions. This calculation of the captain of the National-guards, Sigismund Thaly, is a pretty little scheme, and perhaps not entirely without prospect of success, because several cases have already shown, that to be promoted one need only go to Pesth. " Of the said Eszterhazy battalion three companies will set out the day after to-morrow for their native fields (i. e. two more besides the company of Captain Sigismund Thaly). To detain them here any longer is an impossibility ; but I will at least make them leave their arms behind them. "'Your army is already weak, and yet you weaken it still further I' might be said of my not forcibly detaining the home- sick. I know this well, but still can not do otherwise ; and the less so, as I have a settled conviction that though my small army, by such departures 'as these, will certainly be weakened in numbers, it will nevertheless be morally strengthened ; for in war there is nothing more disheartening to the soldier than the apprehension of being left in the lurch by his comrade. " I have so disposed of my forces as to keep the enemy in check from (Edenburg as far as Nadas. I must, however, con- fess that, despite all one's energy, with troops insufficiently pro- tected against even the frosts of autumn, this is not only difficult to accomplish, but also exposes the army itself to very great danger. The brigade at Nadas, in particular, appears to me to be a second Leonidas troop, not so much on account of the over- powering forces of the enemy, as from their endurance of the hardships incident to their circumstances of time and place, their disproportionately arduous service, and their want of clothing. "A few days since the cholera also began to insinuate itself into the army, and this to such a degree, that out of twenty-nine who fell sick, eleven died. But all this can not be otherwise, be- cause, according to your opinion, my task is, with a corps of scarcely 20,000 men (of whom two-thirds are good-for-nothing volunteers), to defend at the same time the north of Hungary, the city of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 97 Presburg, and moreover the comitates of Wieselburg and (Eden- burg." " The Committee of Defense has not yet authorized me to employ the troops according to my own discretion. " Probably my opinions are rather too radical, in maintaining* that it can by no means be decided in Pesth, whether the so- called 'pass' of Nadas (across the "White Mountains) can be defended with block-houses or not. It seems as if in Pesth a difTerent opinion prevailed on this subject, as w^ell as about promotions." " I take the liberty, honored President, of again calling your attention to some illegal promotions. " The comrades of a certain Merei, subaltern officer in the first Honved battalion, intended to expel him, because he had suddenly pretended to be ill in the camp at Parendorf immedi- ately before the offensive over the Lajtha. He repairs to Pesth, and, look you, becomes captain in the eighteenth Honved battalion ! Soon afterward a sub-lieutenant of the first Hon- ved battalion is appointed first lieutenant in the eighteenth battalion, but declares, on finding Merei there, that he can not accept the promotion. Now the body of officers of this bat- talion will enter a protest against Merei' s being associated with them. " Beldi, formerly a sub-officer in the hussars, had stolen some- thing from one of his superiors, was punished for it by running the gauntlet ten times, and being dismissed ; but notwithstand- ing this he is now an officer in a Honved battalion." (My signature follows.) In spite ol the assurance of victory which characterized the proceedings of the then civil rulers of Hungary, and declared itself plainly enough by their persevering in the idea — to say the least of it, very naive in the eyes of a soldier — of fighting the battle of liberty with Volunteers and National-guards ; Kossuth was nevertheless one day suddenly overtaken with anxiety, lest the enemy should concentrate his forces, which were considerably superior to ours, upon a point beyond the Lajtha — if not unob- served, yet unhindered by us — and then at once somewhere break into the country, without our being able to stop Iiim. Associated with this anxiety was also the apprehension of the possible ex- E 98 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tinction of the sympathies of the people for our cause, notwith- standing our occupation of the frontier. Both fears caused Kossuth urgently to request that I would not always stand so inactive on the frontiers, but rather open a regular war of partisans* against Austria ; surprise the enemy with the rapidity of lightning, at one time here, and immediately afterward in another place, then in a third, and so on — God knows where else — and thereby prevent him from concentrating his forces on a fixed point, or at least induce him to think they were every moment necessary somewhere else, and even to at- tempt to realize it : thus he would fatigue and dispirit his troops ; and render them unfit for the execution of the oflensive dreaded by Kossuth. In such a warfare Kossuth saw at the same time a rich source of warlike heroic adventures, which, duly diffused by the daily press, would serve to counteract the apprehended extinction of the sympathies of the people for our struggle. These requirements of the President — occasioned at first by an order of the enemy to his army, which led us to expect a speedy irruption into Hungary, and of which Kossuth had subjoined a copy to his letter to me — caused me to answer him verbatiin as follow : " The order of the enemy to his army, which you have com- municated to me, informs me that it is in fact no longer in my power to prevent his concentration ; because it has already been most conveniently effected on the other side the Lajtha, and he can advance across our frontier almost in parade-march — for in- stance, at Kittsee (Kopcseny), where neither bridges nor defiles interrupt his great undertakings. " Do not take this remark for pusillanimity. If there be one who does not despair of the cause of our country, I am the man I But let us not deceive ourselves in relation to the greatness of the danger, of which I recognize the factors more in the feeble pa- triotism of our countrymen than in the rmmerical superiority of the enemy. The comitates of Presburg, Neutra, Trencsin, Wie- selburg, and CEdenburg, are so many hothouses, if not of open antipathy against us, at least of the most pitiable inaction. " The so-called ' guerrilla warfare' would certainly find in me * Kossuth erroneously called this mode of warfare "guerrilla combats :" and entering into his idea, I have retained this appellation in my letter of reply to him. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 99 its most zealous champion. In our present condition, however, such a war is impossible. Impossible, because the rural popu- lation does not stand by us, but shuts its doors against its starv- ing countrymen. Impossible is such a war, because our infantry are almost barefooted, and our cavalry, on their enfeebled horses, are scarcely able any longer to stagger after the infantry ; and then the teams of the artilleiy I But the saddest matter of all is, that we have no hope of soon bringing our horses again into good condition ; for the hay is bad, and the oats are likewise none of the best I Impossible is a war of that kind, because scarcely a battalion can march even the distance of one station without dragging after it a loi;ig train of wagons : now the most essential requisite for the so-named ' guerilla divisions ' is facility of motion. For so-called surprises, which are made only at short distances, the enemy is too far off." (In the same letter I throw light circumstantially on our pre- carious situation in the position which has been taken up on the frontier as follows :) " In my opinion, Presburg can be defended, unless the garrison is to be sacrificed, only so long as there remains in our possession, on one side Nadas, on the other Parendorf, Gattendorf, and Kittsec. " The brigade at Nadas will maintain itself until the enemy menaces it by a wide circuit in its rear ; or forces a passage on the spot ; or, finally (if neither of these cases should happen), so long as Presburg is not abandoned by us, which must inevitably take place (the opening of the hostile offensive with an isolated attack on Presburg being presuppoesd),* so soon as the enemy shall have succeeded in taking the first of the redoubts ; partly because I should no longer be able to depend upon our still young soldiers, partly because the redoubts further back are altogether insufficient, from their construction, for defense. " With Presburg the northwestern comitates certainly fall like- wise : however, all in vain I With my small army, I must by no means engage in any war on the frontier ; for this would be to abandon it in detail, and with it at the same time our country. This is my conviction I *' I am very sorry, honored President, that this conviction of mine is diametrically opposed to what you anticipate from the * The sentences in parentheses are not in the original rough-draft ; they are inserted only for the easie'.- understanding of the passages cited. 100 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ' guerrilla war.' With what hearty good- will would I accede to the carrying out of all your projects, were it in any way possible under the existing local circumstances ! " The defile of Nad as is said to be a pass which might be rendered impracticable with little labor. For the last six days, under the protection of a strong brigade, considerable forces have been working at it ; and the whole result obtained is, that if this point be left by us to-day, the enemy will restore the road in two days' time. And soon this point Tnust be quitted, because the men can not endure the fatigue much longer. One-third of the brigade is unfit for service from the want of foot-gear ; 500 men are already ill. Half of those who ,can do duty are constantly at the outposts, day and night, under the open sky, and not even. the Honved soldiers have cloth garments " (My signature follows.) CHAPTEU XI. If we take into account the numerous controversies between, the Committee of Defense and myself, which prevailed during the first period of my chief command of the army, as well as the categorical language in which I asserted my convictions ; and if it be considered how easy it was to foresee that but a single step separated such language from action ; — the question comes prom- ineatly forward : what could have induced the revolutionary rulers of the civil power in Hungary to refrain from removing me even at that time from the chief command of the national army ? The answer to this question may perhaps be found in the cir- cumstance, that the more skillful and experienced military men constantly refused to accept the chief command ; while those who were eager for it possessed the confidence of the govern- ment even less than myself The royal commissary Csanyi — who was present with the army, and who, having formerly been a soldier, generally coin- cided in my views — by the firmness with which he exerted his MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 101 weighty influence with the government in my favor, may also have essentially contributed to my retaining the chief command of the army. Another question will be : what was it that prevented me, in spite of the controversies just mentioned, from resigning the chief command ? The answer to this question is plainly and simply to be found in the motives which had determined me to accept the command at all. The obstacles already presented by the head, body, and tail of the Committee of Defense to my endeavors, which were the re- sult of my clear conviction of what Hungary needed, were not sufficient to discourage me. But at that time I had no presenti- ment whatever of the existence of those political tendencies, which, to my great surprise, Kossuth disclosed to me five months later. (It seems even problematical whether Kossuth himself had then the slightest idea of what five months afterward ap- peared to him to be so indispensably necessary for the salvation of the country.) My political penetration extended no farther at that time than to the perception of those intentions which, hostile to the Consti- tution of my country, were entertained on the other side the Lajtha. And these intentions had protruded so far out of their effete constitutional mask, that they could easily be discovered even by that part of the nation from whose hands the hard swelling caused by their recent toils had scarcely disappeared. But the circumstance, that this very part of the nation, in spite of all this, did not recognize these intentions, and even after it had recognized them, still continued to be averse to con- tend for the preservation of the benefij;s which had been con- ferred on it while it was in a dream ; — this, I say, was only a most afflicting proof of the pernicious influence produced by its hitherto depressed position on the moral and spiritual develop- ment of by far the greater number of my countrymen. Yet this very circumstance justified in my eyes the combat, even though its success should be confined for the present merely to rendering im- possible the re-establishment of their former dependent condition. Even in this case — the most unfavorable that could occur — the combat had, however, a still higher import. To metamorphose Hungary into a conquered province of 102 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Austria — an object toward which, with uninterrupted constancy Vienna had been directing all her endeavors for three centuries — seemed now to be also the main purpose of the great arma- ment beyond the Lajtha. It had now been decided that Hun- gary, as a state, should at last expiate by its utter destruction the manifold annoyances which its former constitution — com- mendable only in default of a better — had caused to the divers fathers of the country, and to their household and public serv- ants. This destruction, with regret be it spoken, had already been partly prepared during several years by the national arro- gance of the original Magyars. Now it was that those on the other side the Lajtha almost believed they had but to strike the finishing blow. The nation owed it to its honor not to await this llow in slavish hu7nility, perhaps even on its knees and with bended neck. I seemed to have been destined to be one of its last leaders ; and though nothing less than a national enthusiast, yet the grandeur of the situation filled me to such a degree with the idea of identifying my personal honor as a free man with that of the nation, that it soon became my leading sentiment. It was this idea especially which often made the employment of extremely strict, nay even harsh measures appear to me to be a duty ; and probably the involuntary gleaming of this idea through the mysterious gloom which concealed the motives of my actions — in addition to my remarkable taciturnity in decisive moments — had called into existence the almost superstitious con- fidence with which the nation — so uniformly and to the last deceived in regard to its desperate condition by Kossuth and his party — looked to me of necessity as its saviour, at that time also when, with a simultaneous disregard of every humane considera- tion, a last vain attempt for salvation could be dared. A third question will be : whether I did or did not attempt, when in Presburg, to obtain for myself the dictatorship ; and what were my reasons ? Bid I not distinctly hear an inward call to seize, even with despotic power, upon the march of my country's destiny ; had I not even at that time a firm conviction of the necessity of a dictatorship ; had I not been able to foresee that Kossuth would be just as unsuccessful a dictator as he had been a successful agitator ? MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 103 In the face of all these truths, unless I were to deny their ex- istence, it would be incomparable more difficult for me to answer this question in a mysterious than in a clear and distinct manner. Have I ever aspired to the dictatorship ? No. Why did I never make any effort to obtain it ? Because the dictatorship in my hands would have been an impossibility, nay a sheer absurdity. Why would the dictatorship in my hands have been an im- possibility, a sheer absurdity ? Because I spent the whole of my early youth, up to the month of April 1848 — precisely the season best adapted for acquiring information — beyond the frontiers of my native land, almost apart from any connection with it, and nearly ignorant of my country's customs, usages, and laws, and above all, wholly deficient in even a superficial and general acquaintance with the civil administration ; ignorant to such a degree, that in strictly political matters, for instance, I was obliged to believe, gener- ally on the mere word of the Committee of Defense, that their measures were judicious, and favorable to the idea that directed all my efforts. Because, being still unknown to the country, and not possess- ing the confidence of the nation, I could, under the most favora- ble circumstances, only have usurped the name without the real power of a dictator ; and because, even when, somewhat later, a part of the nation began to put confidence in me, my power as dictator — considering the difference between my political views and those of Kossuth, who still continued to be the most popular man in Hungary — would have been by so much the more pre- carious, the less I was able to replace his civil administration by a more suitable one, and to render his agitation against me abortive by more effective counteraction. These are the reasons why the idea of obtaining for myself the dictatorship was a sheer absurdity. I never thought of it, so long as the events of the war and their results left even the narrowest field for the exercise of the civil government. Instead of this, with a frank acknowledgment of all my defi- ciencies in that matter, and chiefly only that I might not lose all my influence in the adjustment of the approaching struggle in self-defense, I often accommodated myself even to positively 104 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. unsuitable decrees of the civil government ; and this principally at the commencement, when ray removal from the chief com- mand would have been an easy task to the Committee of De- fense. Thus it happened that, in spite of the numerous controversies between us, we all remained at our posts — Kossuth, the Com- mittee of Defense, and the Minister of War on one side ; myself on the other. My adversaries, however, at the beginning, appa- rently only through pure dread of the phantom of a military government, placed me in situations, against whose undermining influence on my determination to follow steadily the cause I had chalked out for myself, I took refuge in sarcasm, my constant and faithful ally when driven almost to desperation. The following passage, from one of those letters which I wrote during my sojurn at Presburg, is, it must be admitted, a rather trivial production in this strain. At the same time this passage sketches very faithfully the critical position of the army on the upper Danube, and not less faithfully the moderation of my hopes for the future. Presburg, 21sf November, 1848. " Dear Friend — When I shall have been gathered to my fathers, if your hand has not mouldered in the grave, sit down and write the history of Don Q^uixote the younger ; in me you will find the hero of the romance. " He who never saw a revolutionary army, may undertake a pilgrimage to my camp. There is a commander-in-chief, with stafl' and suite, not one of them over forty I There are also soldiers ; but the real soldier among them blushes for his com- rades. To command, is here to make one's self ridiculous. A reprimand is declaimed against as an impertinence, punishment as a tyranny. Therefore thought I with myself in my simplic- ity, ' Eat, bird, or die 1'=^ and drive these worthless fellows to the devil — that is, if I do not previously order them to be shot. The cholera assists ; and if the enemy does his part, the trio will soon have finished the game. " But I can not comprehend this fellow. He is at least twice as strong as I am ; his troops are well drilled and well equipped ; yet he does not attack I =* A proverb expressive of the necessity of yielding to the force of cir- cumstances — Transl. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. 105 "Can this be mother- wit ; and can he have so much calcula- tion as to wish to destroy us through inaction ? I can not be- lieve it, and smell a rat — in good German, jpaura. So much the better for us I All his patrols ask only for hussars ; my first attempt shall be, to make him ask for the Honveds also. The young fellows are not much disposed to venture themselves, unless they have each a cannon in their haversack, and besides that one hussar on their right, and another on their left hand. But patience I The fever will abate at length — (it is true the Hungarian fever generally lasts a good while) — I hope it will do so before next spring, that is, if we live so long ; then you may rejoice, trifolium, "VYindischgratz, Jellachich, Harban I* " Of guns I have already enough to feed pigs with. This very day I have written to Kossuth not to send me any more. I do not trust the volunteers ; they run away very good-natured- ly, and leave me stuck fast in the mire. '' But I have no percussion-caps ; and you, in all probability, are no better off. There will be good fun. Is there no supply at all of Belgian caps ? Shouldn't you think that, in the end, a flint-musket would be even better than a percussion-musket — without caps ? ** When messieurs the commanders of the battalions ask me for caps, I give them the stereotyped answer : ' I am very glad that I have none. You hit nothing ; attack with the bayonet I' Good God, what long faces !" The establishment of the fortifications at Presburg, as well as those at Wieselburg and Raab, furnished me with abundant matter for similar reflections. "When I arrived at Presburg, the defensive works were already half finished. They seemed to me wholly superfluous, consider- ing, on the one hand, the menacing position which Field-mar shal Lieutenant Simunich occupied in our rear, and on the other taking into account the very probable supposition that the main forces of the enemy, advancing by CEdenburg and through the forest of Parendorf, would enter the interior of the country ; and * Prince Windischgratz, Ban Jellachich, and Hurban (the latter a Scla- vonian ecclesiastic from one of the northern comitates of Hungary), were then considered to be the representatives of the movement which aimed at the overthrow of the Hungarian Constitution and the destruction of the " State of Hungary." 106 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. thus, in an indirect manner, force those of our troops, stationed on the road to Presburg and near the fortress, to retreat in the direction of Komorn. But these fortifications were likewise un- suitable in regard to their disposition as well as to their execu- tion. Nevertheless, they had the sympathy of the country, and had to be continued. Besides, if I had ordered them to be sus- pended, this would have deprived me of all influence for the im- mediate future. With the defensive works at Wieselburg and Raab the case was different. These had, generally speaking, my approbation so far as the necessity for their establishment was concerned ; and this as precautionary, in case the enem.y should defer acting on the offensive till the following spring. From want of time, however, I was obliged to leave the planning of the works, as well as their execution, entirely to Kollmann, who was then con- sidered the most celebrated man in his profession. Unacquainted with the nature and disposition of the ground near Raab, I had entertained the mistaken notion that with a force so disproportionate to that which the Prince Windisch- gratz had at his command, I should succeed in stopping at that place the further progress of the enemy ; and it was not till I beheld for the first time the fortifications of the encampment at Kaab, which were then almost finished, that my mistake was plainly apparent. They had been established for an army of 80,000 men at least, while my whole forces amounted to scarce- ly more than 12,000 ; and the reciprocal protection between the several isolated works had been calculated for a distance which defied the effect of field-pieces of the largest calibre. Thus the affairs of Hungary at the end of the autumn of 1848 were in a very tottering condition. I had been president of the court-martial by which Count Eugene Zichy^ was condemned to death; I was called "the soul" of the short and successful campaign against Generals Roth and Philippovich ; and it is a fact, that after I had been invested with the command over the troops on the upper Danube, the * From Presburg I had directed proceedings to be taken against Cap- tain Vasarhelyi of the Hunyady-Schar (belonging to Perczel's corps) for the plunderings of which he was accused in the castle of Kalozd. Here- upon I received a report from the south of Hungary, that Vasarhelyi had fallen in an insignificant skirmish, soon after the disarming of the Croat corps under General Roth. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 107 taking up of arms assumed afar more determined character than it had ever before done ; but still its real nature did not at all warrant the expectation of such an energetic resistance as would have been worthy of the inheritors of the name of a noble and heroic nation. The former of these two prominent periods of my last sphere of action provoked the arrogance of the Committee of Defense ; the latter, that of almost the whole nation. As respects the Committee of Defense — because the former of these two inci- dents having put to flight its political adversaries in Hungary, it enjoyed by this means an absolute and undisturbed power ; as respects the nation — because the latter brought into vogue the silly delusion, that the Hungarian by merely taking up his scythe would frighten the enemy out of the land, or that he had but to disarm him, and send him generously home again ! The governors (Kossuth and his party) gave themselves up more blindly to this delusion than those whom they governed ; and placing no confidence in the regular troops, they now be- lieved themselves strong enough, and saw no danger whatever in openly shewing to the latter this want of confidence. Wounded by this suspicion on the one hand, and on the other instinctively scenting revolutionary designs behind it, the regular troops were even in the month of November, 1848, almost ripe for revolt. The declaration which I issued in the name of the army, in answer to a second proclamation by Prince Windischgratz, stat- ing that the Committee of Defense was, in the present condition of Hungary, its sole and lawful government, scarcely sufficed to retain the services of the officers of the regular troops for the national cause. Better was the impression I made by defending most energetically their interests against the Committee of De- fense ; — still better the influence produced by the constant hom- age which was paid to the Committee of Defense by the minis- ter of war, Mezaros, who held his charge from the king — (this minister was unquestionably a lawful political compass to the regular troops during their revolutionary wandering in Hungary, though a very uncertain one — a circumstance of which the offi- cers could not be aware at that time) ; — but the best effect was owing to the manner and form in which the sudden change on the throne took place during the first half of the month of De- cember, 1848. CHAPTER XII. On the 14th or 15th of December, 1848, Field-marshal Sim- unich attacked our brigade between Nadas and Jablonicz, and forced it back toward Tyrnau. Before 1 resolved on quitting Presburg, in consequence of this disaster, I wished to endeavor to drive the enemy once more back across the White Mountains, and sent Colonel Count Guyon and Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik with reinforcements to Tyrnau. On the 16th of December, however, the general advance of the hostile main army took place against the points Parendorf, Neu- dorf (Ujfalu), Gattendorf (Gata), Baumern (Kortvelyes), and Kittsee, which were occupied by our troops. .From the great superiority of the enemy's forces, our resistance along the whole line could be only of short duration, without dan- ger of being annihilated. The commander of the brigade in Parendorf had not reflected upon this, and had engaged himself too far in the combat, while the hostile column directed against Neudorf met there with but an insignificant opposition. By the unobstructed advance of the latter, the former lost his communication with the neighboring brigade in Gattendorf When this had been reported to me from Gattendorf, I ordered the whole line between Parendorf and Presburg to be relinquish- ed, in order to commence the retreat to Altenburg (Magyar Ovar), and Wieselburg (Moson), as had been determined upon before- hand. Presburg, however, was to be held during the following day, till our outposts from the march had assembled there. The, pontoon across the Danube was to be abandoned to the stream. After the arrival of the last outpost the garrison of Presburg was to retreat without delay to Komorn. I left the execution of this order to Colonel Aulich, commander of the second foot-regiment (Alexander). My presence was necessary on the right bank of the Danube. I left Presburg, therefore, while yet night, between the 16th and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 109 17th of December ; took my way to Altenburg by Sommerein (Somorja), on the Grosse Schiitt (Csallokoz), crossed on the morn- ing of the 17th the great Danube between Csoleszt and Kiliti, and reached Altenburg and Wieselburg with a few attendants in the course of the forenoon, where I found assembled the troops which had been repulsed the preceding day ; those from N eudorf, Gattendorf, Baumern, and Kittsee, without loss ; but of those who had been distributed in Parendorf, Neusiedel (Nezsider), Weiden (Vedeny), and Gols (Gallos), only the cavalry with their guns and the fourteenth Honved battalion. The rest of the infantry and artillery, by the speedy advance of the enemy upon Neudorf, had been forced from their line of retreat to Altenburg away toward the marshes of the Neusiedel lake. Across these, however, the so-called Pamhagen dam, between Pamhagen (Pomogy) and Eszterhaza leads ; but this dam also was impassable at that time ; and I could not help fearing that the missing divisions were irre- coverably lost. The spirits of the troops, in consequence of this very sensible loss, were extremely depressed. A single cannon-shot seemed sufficient to dishearten the men, especially the infantry, to the last degree. I had, at least, to be prepared for the worst ; and therefore sent back the whole of the infantry, together with the foot artillery, toward Raab, before a hostile attack on Altenburg or "Wieselburg could be possible ; but I intended to wait with the cavalry till mid-day of the 18th of December in the camp of the last-named places, to hinder, if necessary, the too speedy advance of the enemy upon the main road. Mid-day of the 1 8th came, without an enemy being visible ; and I now ordered one-half of the cavalry likewise to retreat to- ward Raab. This half, however, had been on its way scarcely half an hour, when the remaining half was alarmed by a hostile column of cavalry advancing from the west. It is easily conceivable that the enemy — whatever were his intentions — must be firmly repulsed before I could hope to con- tinue my retreat perfectly free from danger. The half of the cavalry which had already set out was immediately ordered back again, to form the reserve in the impending encounter, . Both Altenburg and Wieselburg are inclosed by a canal on the west and south. Between this canal and these places we en- camped ; the enemy approached on the other side of it. All the no MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. bridges across the canal except one had already been destroyed. This one was situated to the east of our camp, on our line of retreat to Raab. Notwithstanding this, the enemy marched at first directly toward that part of the canal which was just opposite our front, until some shots obliged him to change the direction of his march. He inclined toward the south ; but continued uninterruptedly his advance against our line of retreat, though describing a consider- able circuit. It would certainly now have been easy to have gained upon him such a considerable advance, on the shortest line over the remaining bridge along the road to Raab, as would have made it impossible for him to overtake us and force us to an engage- ment. But I feared above all the pernicious effects of a repeated retreat, without previous combat, on the future maintenance of my troops, and resolved to engage the enemy at all hazards. For this purpose I crossed the canal by the bridge, and advanced on the other side to meet him. We encountered each other to the south of Wieselburg ; he with his left, we with our right wing leaning on the canal. At first it seemed as if he intended to fight a very serious conflict. He dispatched a part of his forces to turn round our left wmg to the south ; and from the front of his position promptly and spirit- edly answered the fire of our approaching guns. But when our left wing advanced in echelons to the attack of the hostile turning- column, the enemy seemed to have suddenly lost his eager desire for the contest. He abandoned one position after another, with- out even bringing his forces into action ; and before sunset he had escaped from our further attacks by means of such a speedy re- treat in the direction of Kaltenstein, that, as I learned by a report from our extreme wing, he had not even found the time necessary for placing in security such of his men as had become disabled. Some of them, who were left to save themselves by means of their still sound legs, had been overtaken by a patrol of hussars, and cut down in the first heat. It was a striking circumstance in this encounter, that in spite (ff the cannonade, which lasted several hours, not one of the en- emy's shots had told ; while the positions which .he had aban- doned were marked here and there by traces of blood, and some carcasses of horses. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Ill Before my arrival at Wieselburg the Committee of Defense had ordered the destruction by fire of all such stores of corn and hay as it would not be possible to transport to Komorn. In fact, I remarked even during the fight the burning of corn-stacks on the southeastern extremity of Wieselburg. But not far distant from the corn which had been set on fire, a long double row of very large hay-ricks stood still untouched ; and a column of hostile cavalry, as we saw, had already entered Altenburg on the north, between the canal and the town, and was just advancing toward Wieselburg. A bold stroke was necessary to destroy likewise these immtMise supplies of hay, to the detriment of the enemy. Twelve hussars undertook it voluntarily ; they crossed to the other side of the canal at the risk of their lives, and notwith- standing the proximity of the enemy, set fire to all the hay-ricks. The like was done in some farms situated toward the Hansag, before our departure from the field of battle. On the morning of the 18th my troops were stilL extremely dejected ; the evening found them full of courage. They had seen the enemy flee ; and they continued their retreat, from the field of battle they had victoriously maintained, toward Raab, in the best possible spirits. This advantage, of the utmost import- ance to us at that time, we owed solely to the fortunate accident that the hostile commander on this occasion had somewhat too great a desire to fight for a mere reconnoitering, and, on the other hand, somewhat too little for a serious engagement. Before midnight we reached Hochstrass (Otteveny), and on the following day (the 19th of December) Raab. The stores of hay and corn which were discovered by our patrols nearest to the main road, were likewise burnt during this retreat; that the enemy, obliged to meet his" most pressing wants by conveying supplies thither from great distances, might be continually stopped in his advance. Soon, however, we perceived the disproportion between the very great loss to the rural population, and the small advantage to the defense of the country, which resulted from these hard measures, and desisted from further devastations. In Raab the joyful news had meanwhile arrived that the divi- sions of infantry and artillery from Parendorf, missing since the 16th, had nevertheless succeeded in safely reaching the road from CEdenburg to Raab, after restoring as far as necessary the 112 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. numerous bridges over the Pamhagen dam that had been de- stroyed. This lucky escape was owing to the circumstance, that the hostile column, which by the 15th had advanced as far as (Edenburg, was in the course of the 16th not forward enough to render impossible the debouching of the fugitives on the above- named road near Eszterhaza. CHAPTER XIII. The President Kossuth wrote to me at Raab, not to give up that place for at least ten days. In this matter he had addressed himself to the wrong person. To determine how long Raab should remain in our power depended, considering the numerical superiority of the hostile troops, only and exclusively on the good pleasure of Prince Windischgriitz. He was pleased to defer the attack upon Raab until the 27th ; and thus it happened that the wish of the President, reckoned from the date of his above-men- tioned dispatch, was gratified. On what idea this desire was based has not even subsequently become clear to me. In the evening of the 26th a report from the nortnern outposts on the Kleine-Schiitt (Szigetkoz) reached my head-quarters at Raab, that a strong hostile turning-column coming from Zamoly had already advanced along the great Danube so far, that it menaced the road from Raab to Gonyo (one of our lines of re- treat). A similar manoeuvre of the enemy was to be expected on the south of Raab. I now perceived the necessity of quitting Raab before daybreak next morning, and beginning the retreat toward the capital in two columns. Two-thirds of the corps, together with the head-quarters, were directed to Dotis (Tata) along the so-called Fleischhacker road, one-third over Gonyo. The main road along the Danube was to be left open for the train of the army and its escort, moving from Presburg by Komorn to the capitals. It was indeed high time to evacuate Raab, if my intention of reserving our forces for the last decisive combat before Ofen MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 113 was to be realized ; for the column retreating from Raab by Oonyo was already attacked by the enemy's turning-column, at a short distance behind Raab, and could continue its retreat un- liindered only after it had repulsed the attack. I had been induced to form the intention just mentioned by the heroic declaration of the government : they ivould be buried under the ruins of Ofen. I had already successfully combated a simi- lar longing for the ruins of Raab, by showing that Raab was not Hungary. Bat the tenacity with which Kossuth seemed desi- rous of clinging to this idea, entitled me to suppose that the gov- ernment was really resolved on a last decisive battle before Ofen; and I beheved I was bound to subordinate to this magnanimous determination even my own intention, according to which, as I had already declared in Presburg, the seat of the government must be transferred to behind the Theiss. The first station of the march of our main column was Babol- na and its environs. Very early on the next day, the 28th of December, the retreat ought to have been continued. But a strict observance of the dispositions enjoined, in an army consisting for the most part of young, little-disciplined troops, is a rare occurrence. And so it happened that the early hour fixed for setting out on the march on the 28th was not kept. The rear-guard was obliged to wait before Babolna for the moving off of some retarded divisions belonging to the main body, and was there overtaken by a troop of the enemy in pursuit. The commander of the rear-guard perceiving the danger which threatened him, if he engaged in a serious contest at the entrance of a defile, as the road through Babolna was, posted his artillery and infantry at gun-range behind the village ; but one half of the cavalry had to oppose the entrance of the enemy into the village until the other half, following the artillery and infantry, should have taken up their position in the rear, at a distance necessary for the attack. But on this unlucky day even the generally brave hussars had not their heart in the right place. They fled without awaiting the attack, precipitated themselves on the still-marching divisions of infantry and on the artillery, throwing the former into confu- sion, startling the horses of the latter, and completely discoura- ging all the divisions of the rear-guard. In vain the commander 114 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of the rear-guard opposed the fugitives ; in vain he exhorted the divisions of infantry to remain compact and to offer a firm resist- ance ; a panic terror paralyzed every energy. Even before the enemy's cavalry debouched from Babolna, the batallions had lost all firmness ; two of them saved themselves, in scattered flight, on some tracts of intersected ground ; the third was overtaken by the hostile cavalry, and partly cut down, partly made prisoners. The hussars fled without stopping till they came to the Czonczo brook near Nagy Igmand. Here the partly steep, partly marshy banks first set bounds to their wild flight. Besides the battalion mentioned we also lost an ammunition-chest The main body, together with the head-quarters, reached on this day Felso-Galla ; the rear-guard, Banhida, on the north- western declivity of that chain of mountains which, being the continuation of the Bakony forest, extends in manifold windings, in a northeastern direction mainly, as far as the Danube near Visegrad, and bears the name of Vertesi Hegyek. " Here" — so said every one — " the enemies of the country sludlfitid their grave I The people are already preparing to dig it broad and deep ! The few roads and ways which lead across this ridge shall be destroyed ; then it becomes an impregtmble gigantic fortress, and the people ready to vanquish or die THEREON I The Fleischhacker road runs betiveen Banhida and Bicske through a defile, as does also the road from Kis-Ber to Moor at Sdrkdny. Here, as there, a single resolute division can stojJ a wliole army T' And I — to whom the skeleton of the principal mountain- chains, roads, and rivers of Hungary was then scarcely familiar, and who knew of the nature of the Vertesi Hegyek only gener- ally that they existed — allowed myself to be induced by this talk to agree to the following plan of defense. The head-quarters of the corps of the upper Danube were to be removed back for the winter, in the last extremity, as far as Bicske ; the winter-quarters to be established along the Vertesi Hegyek, with their principal stations at Almas, Tata, Banhida, Kecsked and Ondod. Moriz Perczel, meanwhile advanced to the rank of general — who would by no means subordinate him- self to the command of the army of the upper Danube, and wish- ed moreover to remain independent — had taken on himself the defense of the Sarkany defile by means of a small regular corps, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY 115 and of the tracts of ground lying between this defile and the Flatten lake (Balaton) by patrolling columns. The so-called guerrilla warfare would in this way be applied on the largest scale, and protect the organization of a most imposing army, to be concentrated in the capitals and their environs. In conformity with this plan, General Perczel was conducted sufficiently early from Papa to Kis-Ber, that he might immedi- ately commence his part of the duty, by occupying and defending the Sarkany defile. I believed, it is true, in the possibility of a general rising of the people causing very considerable disturbances in the combined operations of even a larger, well-disciplined, and Avell-led army ; nay, I still believe it. But I did not believe that the all-perva- ding and enduring enthusiasm indispensable for this existed among the Hungarian rural population, whose indolence had. long ago become proverbial, and whose warlike spirit, extolled to the stars, I had already learned to appreciate, by my own expe- rience, in its utter worthlessness. The little sympathy for the national contest, whic?i, during my retreat from Raab to the capitals, I met with almost every where in the country, did not consequently tak» me unawares. But much more surprised was I by the view which I obtained, on the very day of the disaster at Babolna and directly after it, du- ring a reconnoitering ride in the mountains represented as being so extremely impracticable, of their real nature, as well as of the defensive works so highly lauded in the communications of the Committee of Defense. These latter had been eulogised to such a degree, that, during my retreat from Raab, I almost feared %ve should hardly be able to find a passage open for our own safety. "We met indeed with ditch-works on the road, which we could march past without the least interruption — not, as it might be supposed, through the space which had been left for us, but far and wide, to the right and to the left. We found likewise some abatis constructed, to the utility of which our good-natured Hon- veds, in their childlike naivete, bore the most conscientious testi- mony by setting light to them for the purpose of warming them- selves at the fire. But we searched in vain for the place which some government commissary had taken for a *' defile." In consequence of my having been undeceived in these respects I removed the head quarters on the 29th of December to Bicske ; 116 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. and perceiving that the whole great plan fox the defense of the Vertesi mountain-range wa.sjust as great an absurdity, I began to draw my troops nearer to the mountains, that I might secure the Fleischhauer road as far as possible. It was more than probable that the enemy's main army would advance on this road ; while, on the contrary, only his secondary forces would take that from Uaab by Kis-Ber, Sarkany, and Moor, which General Perczel with his corps would be so much the more capable of resisting, as I had already detached a strong column of cavalry, with a battery, from Raab to Ondod, to the north of Moor, and during the retreat from Kocs a brigade by Kecsked and Majk to Csakvar, to prevent his being turned round on the right, and to maintain him in communication with my corps. The part of my troops which had been ordered for the retreat from Raab by Gonyo to Dotis was consequently drawn back to Zsambek ; while Colonel Guyon retreated after crossing the Danube, on the main road to Vorosvar, having previously, on his way, hazarded an engagement in Tyrnau, which was equally unlucky as aimless, with the far superior forces of Field-marshal Simunich, and had tjien marched toward Komom. The rest of my forces, which on the 16th of the same month were disposed on the left bank of the Danube, had partly re- mained as garrison in Komorn, and partly had rejoined me while I was still in Raab. Immediately after my arrival at Bicske on the evening of the 29th of December, I learned that a carriage-road existed from this place to A.-Galla, sufficiently practicable to turn round upon it, even with artillery, any position a cheval of the Fleischhauer road between these places. Certainty on this point appeared to be of great importance with reference to the dispositions next to be made. I employed the 30th of December to obtain in person this certainty ; left for that purpose my head-quarters early in the morning, and returned only toward evening, at the moment when whole swarms of dispersed troops from Perczel' s corps ar- rived with the disastrous news, that General Perczel had been attacked by the Austrians between Moor and Sdrkdny, and had suffered a total defeat. My army, then divided into six brigades, occupied on the 30th of December the following positions : a brigade on the main road MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 117 of Vorosvar, one in Zsambek, one in Bicske, one in Csakvar, one in F.-Galla, and one in Buda-Ors. Several of these brigades had furnished their contingent for the formation of the column which had been detached to Ondod, as has been mentioned before. But this column had already joined Perczel before the unfortunate engagement near Moor, and was consequently at the moment not disposable. By those of Perczel's corps who, having been dispersed to Bicske, had reached our camp, almost all his battalions were numerously represented. Hence it might be concluded that his forces had been so scattered, that he would not be able to pre- vent with the remainder the victorious advance of the hostile right wing on any point before the capitals ; while the accounts of the fugitives at the same time all led to the apprehension, that in his flight he had taken the direction of Stuhlweissenburg, and thereby given an opportunity to the hostile right wing to separate him from me by a resolute advance from Moor over Lovas-Bereny. To avert this impending danger, during the night between the 30th and the 31st of December the brigade from Bicske was dispatched to Baracska, that of Csakvar to Vail, that of Zsambek to Soskut, and at the same time that of F.-Galla to Bia. After the accession of FerczeVs co7'ps, the offensive ivas to be resimied against the enemy's right wing, for the- purpose of giving a r)wre favorable turn to the campaign by its destruction. But the defeat of General Perczel had broken at once the Roman courage of the Cmnmittee of Defense. Early in the morning of the 31st of December, 1848, 1 received a decree, signed by Kossuth, and drawn up in this instance in Germa7i, wherein I was ordered to retreat ivith my corps d'armee tvithout delay into the first line before Ofen, that is, on the height of Teteny, Buda-Ors, Budakeszi, and Hidegkut. I replied by sending a report of the last dispositions, and be- sides took the liberty of decidedly blaming the retreat thus ordered ; but was nevertheless obliged to desist from the offensive against the hostile right wing ; for without the assistance of Perczel's corps I had no expectation of success, and it was not to be doubted that Perczel, from personal hostility, ivould take part against me for this order of the Committee of Defense. Still in the course of the 31st of December, as soon as General 118 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Perczel, coming from Stuhlweissenburg, had entered the protect- ing sphere of my brigades, I drew back that of Vail to the height of Hanzsabeg, and that of Baracska to Tarnok. The divisions of the army which had been sent to Bia and Soskut remained there ; those of Yorbsvar, however, received an order from the Committee of Defense immediately to approach the capitals. The head-quarters advanced to Promontorium. CHAPTER XIV. On the 1st of January, 1849, the main body of my army con- sequently stood in an extensive circuit from Hanzsabeg as far as to Bia. I had left my head-quarters very early in the morning to convince myself personally that the dispositions ordered the night before had been strictly observed by all the divisions. I met the ruins of Perczel' s corps on the road between Teteny and Hanzsabeg, and finally Perczel himself He rode close to my carriage, and surprised me with the assurance that he had in- deed abandoned the field of battle at Moor, but that this circum- stance did not in the. least justify the supposition that he had been beaten ; his loss being far exceeded by that of the enemy, as was made evident by the continual arriving of the dispersed troops. "Especially," said I, interrupting him, "if you deduct from your loss those runaways also — there are far more than a thou- sand of them — whom I caused to be driven together one by one in Bicske, and transported to Ofen, where they are awaiting your orders upon the Generalswiese. You probably establish your head-quarters in Pesth ?" "Yes," replied he, "for my personal presence with the gov- ernment is absolutely necessary at this time ; but to my troops I shall grant some days' rest, and shall therefore quarter them in Ofen. The enemy will not recover for a long time from the severe blow I have given him near Moor, and therefore you have nothing at all to fear. I will for certain be on the spot at the right moment." xr- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY^. ' 119 At that time I could still compassionately laugh at Perczel's boasting ; for I was then ignorant of what a few days later I could no longer doubt, namely, that the manner of speaJciiig and acting of this man was the element in which the Committee of Defense, nay even a great 'part of the Diet, mx)st complacently moved ; a manner of speaking and acting, which, void of any steady moral basis, was well calculated to give birth to the seri- ous apprehension, that the loyal personal sacrifices of the army for the Constitution might be abused as a cloak for the execu- tion of pla7is of high-treason, and mweover most ruinous to the country. When, late in the afternoon, I returned to my head-quarters through Buda-Ors I was informed that meanwhile a deputation sent by the Diet to the hostile general-in-chief, Prince "Windisch- gratz had been there, and had demanded an escort to the hostile outposts, for which they had been directed to the brigade in Hanzsabeg. These deputies had also brought a letter for me from Kossuth. I felt as if I had fallen from the clouds when I learned from it that the Government and the Diet had the day before decided : Once 7nore to enter on the way of accommodation ; and at the same time To transfer its seat from Pesth to Debreczin ; whilst I Should give to the enemy a decisive battle in the first line before Of en ; but in doing so, Keep in view the salvation of the army on the left bank of the Danube, and in every possible way the preservation of the capitals. Kossuth, to whose memory it could not but be still very vividly present how irritated Prince Windischgratz had been with him even before the battle at Schwechat, now suddenly once more entered upon the way of accommodation ! Could he from this step hope for any thing for his country? No. Was this an upright step ? No ; it was merely one void of COUNSEL. Kossuth, who during the last two months had constantly refused my repeated advice to remove, while it was yet time, the seat of government to behind the Theiss, asseverating that the government would die first at Raab, then before Ofen ; — 120 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Ko.ssuth, I say, thought now was the time suddenly to perceive that Ofen and Pesth were all Hungary y^si as little as Raab, and that the government, in case of necessity, could die even in Debreczin, or elsewhere. What could so suddenly have induced Kossuth subsequently to follow my advice ? Could it be a prophetic glance into the approaching glorious future ? Oh, no I It was only la peur pour la peau. Probably it was merely the saine motive which had determ- ined him to order me to give the enemy a decisive battle before Ofen — perhaps to cover his flight to Debreczin. To this supposition it might at least be objected, that the flight of the government needed no protection, since the speed with which it could be accomplished by railway as far as Szolnok took away all danger of hostile pursuit ; and that perhaps Kos- suth so urgently demanded a battle to be fought on the right bank only " for the honor of the nation," or for the purpose of gaining time to remove the multifarious stores of provisions. However, be that as it may, the task which Kossuth had assigned to me could only have been assigned by such a general as Kossuth. The chain-bridge, then the sole communication over the Da- nube, which was scarcely frozen, was only barely practicable ; it could be made use of, but not without precaution. Precaution presupposes leisure ; but it is just of this that there is least during a retreat after a decisive and lost battle ; unless a part of the defeated army should sacrifice itself in an obstinate fight by its rear-guard, to secure for the main body the time necessary for its retreat. But an obstinate fight by the rear-guard is conceivable only when there is a simultaneous use made of all the advantages accidentally offered for the defense on the line of retreat. Houses and rows of houses, among other things, present such advantages. To enable me to give a last decisive battle to the enemy on the right bank of the Danube, I had previously to reunite the parts of my army which had been separately stationed on the Fleischhauer road and on the main road to Stuhlweissenburg. But the protection of both roads had to be kept in view at the same time as this junction. This was possible only where the two roads opened into one and the same level valley, conse- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 121 quently between Buda-Ors and Promontorium on the one side, and the Brocken (Gellerthegy) on the other. Upon every point further distant from Ofen the concentration of the main army could only have been effected on one of the two hostile lines of attack, while the other must have been abandoned, and with it at the same time our line of retreat to Ofen. The field presented by local circumstances for the desired last decisive battle on the right bank of the Danube lay, therefore, at a distance from Ofen and the chain -bridge not far exceeding the bounds even of the most sluggish hostile pursuit after a lost battle. How could the rear-guard stop this pursuit, when neither the suburbs of Ofen nor the town itself were allowed to be occupied and defended, that they might not be exposed to the dangers of a hostile attack ? And how was sufficient time to be got for saving the defeated army with precaution, in spite of the un- retarded pursuit of the enemy, on to the left bank of the Danube, over the chain-bridge, which had been made practicable only so far as was absolutely necessary? I hastened early in the morning of the 2d of January to Pesth, to put these questions to Kossuth, and call upon him to renounce either the battle or the salvation of the army, or at least his regard for the capitals »and the sympathies of the proprietors of the houses. In case he should accede to none of these modifica- tions, I was determined voluntarily to resign my post. This latter determination had been finally come to principally by my deliberation upon the motives of his intended flight to Debreczin. But the President was no longer in Pesth when I arrived there on the morning of the 2d of January, 1849. With the care of the defense of the country he had charged General Yetter as substitute of the minister of war Meszaros, who — as was generally said — had been sent to destroy a hostile corps under the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick, which had already advanced as far as Kaschau. I addressed myself consequently with my request to General Vetter, and invited him at the same time to take the command in my stead, because the unfortunate results of the campaign had made me doubt my ability for the post confided to me. General Yetter, however, said that he was not inclined to en- danger his .renown as a general, acquired laboriously in the war F 122 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. against the Uaizen, by undertaking the conduct of a relinquished campaign. Nevertheless, he promised to call together a council of war, in which my present task should be modified, so as to render it practicable, and a decision be come to upon the meas- ures to be next taken for the defense of the country. This council of war was assembled in the course of the day, under the presidency of the royal Commissary Csanyi, and came to the following resolutions : ''The principal object in vieiv should be the saving of the army on to the left bayik of the Danube. "■After accomplishing the retreat, General Perczel with his corps was to draw back toward Szohiok ; ivhile I with mine, by Waizen ( Vdcz), had to operate against the Jiostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich on the Waag. " The expedition hi the south against the Raizen and Serbians %vas to be abandoTwd, and the fmxes employed in it (under the command of Colonel Count Vecsey) draivn to the middle Theiss, for the protection of the new seat of goverrv- ment. ''In case of extremity, the three corps d'armee of Mezdros, Perczel, and Vecsey were to joi7i each other during their con- centric retreat to Debreczin ; while it was left to me, according to circumstaiices, to choose for my point of retreat Komorn or the upper Theiss'' The object of the council of war in detaching me into the northwestern comitates was to divert the hostile main army FROM THE shortest LINE OF OPERATION AGAINST DeBRECZIN. Meanwhile from 4000 to 5000 infantry had been concentrated in Waizen. " These I tvas to receive on my march through Waizen; but for them I was to give up from my corps to General Perczel, witlwut delay, one battalion of infantry, twelve squadrons of hussars, and a battery of twelve-pounders. " That the retreat of my corps d'armAe from its position on the right to the left bank of the Danube across the chain-bridge might be possible without danger, the enemy's frindpal attack was not to be awaited. " For the protection of this retreat General Perczel was to oc- cupy the intrenched pi'indpal appi'oaches to Of en'' Perczel, however, declared that he could not do so before the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 123 following day, almost his whole corps being dispersed through the capitals. I saw from this that I could not rely on Perczel, and resolved in the mean time myself to take charge of the protection of my retreat. On the 2d of January my six brigades stood thus : In Teteny ; Near Hanzsabeg, with the outposts toward Ersci and Marton- vasar ; In Soskut, with the outposts in Tarnok, Zamor, and Barathaza ; In Buda-Ors, with the outposts in Bia ; Outside Altofen (0-Buda), with the outposts toward Kovacsi, Vorosvar, and Sz.-Endre ; and In the suburb of Ofen, " Christinenstadt." In consequence of these resolutions of the council of war, on the 3d of January I removed the brigades from Hanzsabeg and Buda-Ors to Ofen, and that of Soskut to Buda-Ors ; ordered the outposts upon the Fleischhauer road back as far as Csik ; while the brigade of Hanzsabeg was not to draw in its outposts till they had been relieved by those of Teteny. The commander in Hanzsabeg had not observed this precau- tionary measure, but withdrew his outposts before those of Teteny, who were to relieve them, had arrived on the spot, and began his march to Ofen, without remarking — in spite of its being sun- shiny mid-day — ^that a hostile corps, coming from Martonvasar, was upon his heels. It was only a lucky accident that saved the brigade of Teteny from an unintentional attack of the enemy in broad daylight. A division of hussars just in the nick of time threw itself upon the cuirassiers, by whom the outposts of the Teteny brigade, while on their march toward Hanzsabeg, had been attacked, and were obstinately pursued already nearly as far as Teteny. A violent conflict ensued, in which the cuirassiers suffered con- siderable loss. Their flight delayed the attack of the hostile corps, and afforded to the Teteny brigade the time necessary to prepare for battle. The brigade which was on its march from Hanzsabeg back to Ofen had meanwhile reached Promontorium. On the first news of the enemy's attack, I ordered it immediately to return, and advance again by Teteny to Hanzsabeg. It deployed to the left 124 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNG AST. of the road to Stuhlweissenburg, while the Teteny brigade was turned toward the right. Although there were only about 4000 men on the spot at my disposal, I was determined to advance on the offensive. The combat, however, had scarcely assumed a somewhat more active character, when suddenly an officer, who had been de- spatched to me from Pesth, arrived on the field of battle, and re- ported to me, tJiat General Vetter desired I would not allow myself to be led into any offensive, the enemy having crossed the Danube below Hanzsabeg, for the purpose of threatening the capitals from the left bank likewise. On receiving this information I immediately began the retreat, and continued it as far as Promontorium, without being pursued by the enemy. There I allowed the troops to rest for some hours, after which, together with the head-quarters, they were to continue the retreat before midnight, with one part as far as Ofen, with the other as far as Pesth ; while I myself rode to Buda-Ors, to order the brigade of that place also to retreat to the left bank. Ofen remained oc- cupied till the following day (4th of January) by my rear-guard, when it was relieved by General Perczel's troops, and followed my main body, which was already on its march for Waizen. General Yetter was much displeased with this precipitate "sal- vation of the army on to the left bank of the Danube ;" and when, moreover, the news of the enemy's having crossed the river below Hanzsabeg — the immediate cause of my retreat — proved to be unfounded, this retreat then appeared in fact to have been over-hurried, at least by one day. What had been done, how- ever, could not be undone. But General Perczel declared, " he would rather see the cap- itals reduced to a mass of ruins, than ivithdraw without a con- test:' Fortunately for Ofen and Pesth, Perczel belonged to that party whose last proclamations (if there remained no other historical documents of this period) would induce posterity to dig for the bones of the former Committee of Defense under the walls of Ofen. CHAPTER XV. In the night between the 4th and 5th of January, 1849, I quitted Pesth with my head-quarters, and reached Waizen in the course of the next day. The Hungarian armed rising — although originally stirred up by the officious instigation of the nationalities against each other systematically introduced from Vienna, and diametrically opposed to the realization of the idea of a collective Austrian unity, sub- sequently not less officially enounced — was nevertheless purely 7^iON ARcnic AJ.-constittitional : and herein lay its strength ; for it was to this circumstance solely that it owed the co-operation of the regular troops. Besides, in the year 1848 Hungary could be insurgent only in a monarchical point of view. A proof of this, experienced innumerable times, is, that the agitations in favor of the arming succeeded onhj ivhen they were attempted " in the name of the King.'' A proof of this are the great difficulties that had to be sur- mounted, when it was necessary — -in contradiction to the pro- clamations dispersed in great numbers by the authorized or unauthorized agents of the reactionary party, and furnished with the King's sig7iature — to procure for the Pesth government, all legitimate as it was, an active support in the country. A proof of this is the being obliged to paralyze the effect of those reactionary proclamations by others, drawn up with a con- trary intent, and likeivise in the King's name. Nay, even anti-dynastic ideas ivere exotic growths in Hun- gary. If these were to be acclimatized, the political soil — although the Vienna government measures had right valiantly dug it up — must nevertheless previously have a corresponding manuring. The manure necessary for this purpose came, so far as I know, from two sources — I am not certain ii primary ones ; namely, From the free exercise of popular oratory, and 126 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. From the fails accomplis of the Committee of Defense. Of these two kinds of manure, diverse in origin, which has been the most favorable to the acclimatizing of these exotic ideas is, I think, not yet decided ; but this much is certain, that the old soldiers first scented the filth of the Committee of Defense, and were not inclined to allow the legal sail, on which they had unfortunately to fight against their former comrades, to be dejiled. We should certainly go too far were we to attribute to the po- litical sagacity of the old soldiers this scenting — perhaps prema- ture — of anti-dynastic tendencies in the acts of the President Kossuth, dating them from the year 1848. As soon as religious, political, and national ideas divide man- kind, there is a generally prevalent inclination to suppose in those of a different opinion the want of all social as well as private virtues ; and inversely, from the recognized deficiency in some just then prized virtue, it is commonly immediately concluded that the person deemed blameworthy holds the opinion, religious, political, or national, which happens to be most detested. This weakness was not foreign to the old troops, of monarchic- constitutional, nay, specifically dynastic opinions ; and herein, I believe, was the source of their — alas jD-ophetic — presentiment. In the end of October they had confided in Kossuth's assevera- tions, J,hat the offensive beyond the Lajtha was intended only for the punishr>ie7it of Ban Jellachich, and his allies, the Ban being with reason hated on account of his intrigues, which first dis- united the army, and against whom, besides, they had been mus- tered by the King's cousin. In the beginning of December they had received as true and genuine Kossuth's declarations that, according to the literal meaning of their military oath, they had to become surety with body and soul, notwithstanding the 'pro- claimed change in the throne, for King Ferdinand V. and the Constitution sanctioned by him. They had suffered for this belief, and thereby became still more inaccessible to doubt what Kossuth said. When, after this, they had come to the painful conclusion, that, with the superior forces of the enemy, victory was no longer conceivable, then they wished, out of a national and military feeling of honor, for a last and decisive combat — a gloi'ious fall! Kossuth met them half-way, and promised them this combat MT LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 127 before the walls of Ofen ; he himself — thus he vowed — ivoulcl there jperish with them ! And the old soldiers calculated upon it. But Kossuth, having had sufficient time to consider, since the battle of Schwechat (on the 30th of October) till the moment when he declared his resolution to be buried under the walls of Ofen (about the end of December), whether the removal of the seat of government from Pesth to Debreczin would not perhaps be more conducive to the welfare of the country — and neverthe- less discovering for the first time the necessity of this change of residence only when he ought to have redeemed his magnanimous solemn promise ; it seemed as if the so sudden recognition of the possibility of saving the country just as well from Debreczin had itjg motive less in patriotism than in perceiving that Debreczin happened to be several day's march farther than Pesth from the head-quarters of Field-'jnarshal Prince Windischgratz ; and Kossuth, by his improvised official " Sauve qui peut /" behind the Theiss, seemed only a posteriori to have furnished proof that he was incapable of dying for the fatherland. In a word : The hero Kossuth debased himself to a braggart ; and in the eyes of the monarchically-minded brave old soldiers, Kossuth the braggart could only be a republican ! Distrust took the place of confidence in the old troops toward Kossuth. A part of the officers quitted our ranks suddenly ; the rest visibly wavered. Only their confidence in me could still secure the latter. But this had already been struck two violent blows. Immediately after the battle near Wieselburg I had communi- cated to Kossuth, in rather frivolous phrase, the events of the day, intending to mitigate the painful impression which the re- port of another retreat must make on him. The issue of this contest, favorable for us directly on the battle- field ; the entirely unimpeded easy retreat from "Wieselburg to Hochstrass, in the face of the danger of seeing our whole corps dispersed, to which the most insignificant hostile pursuit would have exposed us — had given me the right to call the combat near Wieselburg a victorious one for us. " Ma gybztunk .'" (' To-day we have vanquished I') I wrote to Kossuth, and depicted in glowing colors the resolute bearing of the hussars during the engagement ; and closed with the en- 128 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. couraging words, " Csak rajta! majcl elhdmink mi a czudarok- kali'' (' Cheer up I we will yet be rid of these fellows !') Kossuth had considered it judicious to make this private letter public through the daily press. Furthermore, the Government had printed and partly dis- tributed a proclamation to the army, drawn up in the spirit of its last Pesth resolutions — I know not by whom — and, without my authority, containing my signature. In this I was made to urge the army to a last decisive battle under the walls of Ofen, in contradiction to the retreat to the left bank of the Danube, which directly afterward had been ordered by me in person. The errmieous supposition, that those private communications about the Wieselburg battle had been intended by myself for publication, and that this proclamation to the army was genuine — from the great resemblance of both of them to the official rodomontades of Messrs. Kossuth, Perczel, and several others — shook so much the confidence even of those officers who had not then deserted me, that I was obliged to make haste to strengthen it anew by an open exposition of the tendency of our combat, as I understood it. I did this in the following address to my corps d'armee. "To THE ROYAL HUNGARIAN CORPS d'aRMEE OF THE IJpPER DaNUBE. " The advantages which the numerical superiority of the enemy has obtained over the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, but especially the more recent events, seem, through their naturally discouraging influence, to have shaken in some cases even that noble self-reliance which united lis all in this, the most just of struggles. " To re-animate this shaken self-reliance, and thus revive that courage which has perhaps in some measure been depressed, is the first duty of the leader. "I discharge this duty especially by opening to the corps d'armee of the upper Danube the prospect of more favorable opportunities, through the impending diversion against a portion of the enemy ; but I hope to raise the self-reliance of the corps d'armee principally by speaking out openly and honestly my judgment and conviction concerning what has already been done, as well what we have yet to do. "I accepted the post which was offered to me, because I believe the cause of Hungary to be a just one. "And I will maintain xnY post, so long as it is entrusted to me, should even the best among us become irresolute, and withdraw their arm from the good cause. "This consciousness enables me, in judging of the events since the 1st of November. 1848, undisguisedly to confess my own mistakes: hoping MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 129 thereby to give to the corps d'armee the surest guarantee that more judi- cious measures will be taken in future. " I erred when 1 ceased to urge the Committee of Defense, by unanswer- able arguments, to desist from the defense and blockade of the frontier ; since all the other mischances to which the corps d'armee has been unde- servedly exposed arose solely from the fact, that in consequence of the harassing fatigues of the outpost service, the organization as well as the augmentation and consolidation of the army remained only pious wishes. "I erred when, in the head-quarters at Bicske, I gave effect to the positive order of the Committee of Defense to retreat with the corps d'armee into the first line before Ofen; because through this retreat, for which there was but little reason, the corps d'armee was placed in the ambiguous light of evading a serious conflict, which would have been decisive for the good cause. " But I had received these orders from that authority, which the respon- sible Hungarian minister of war. General Meszaros, elected by the country to this post, and confirmed by our King Ferdinand V., himself recognized, and still continues to recognize, as the supreme governing power ; for upon its mandate he himself took, and under its aegis retains, the com- mand over the army on the Theiss against General Count Schlick, hostilely opposed to us. And I could do this with the calm consciousness that I was committing no illegal action, nor misleading the royal Hungarian corps d'armee, intrusted to my command, into any such action, so long as the Committee of Defense did not disavow itself. "But when, on the 1st of January, 1849, while the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, prepared for the combat, and notwithstanding the ordered retreat to the first line near Ofen, was still posted at Hanzabeg, Tarnok, Soskot, Bia, &c. — the Committee of Defense, instead of justifying, by its heroic perseverance when in the proximity of danger, the confidence which we had always reposed in its loyalty, in an unaccountable manner suddenly left the capital ; and by doing so, and stiil more by sending a deputation, without our knowledge and consent, to the commander-in-chief of the hostile troops, placed us in a perplexing and desperate, nay, even ambiguous position ; — then it was that in many a one among us the sus- picion must have arisen that we had been degraded from the eminence due to us as defenders of the constitutional liberty of Hungary, down to that abasement in which the usual methods for the furtherance of personal private interests are accustomed to be successfully pursued. " Without denying the loyalty of the Committee of Defense — however deeply it may have shaken by its sudden disappearance from the capital our confidence in it — I believe it to be my duty to invite the corps d'armee, that it may be preserved from the most miserable of all fates, that of utter internal dissolution, either, after mature deliberation, to adopt as its own the following declaration, the purpose of which is to secure us against any suppositions injurious to our honorable position ; or to declare openly what- ever difierent views it may entertain on the subject." {My signature follows.) This declaration runs thus : " The royal Hungarian corps d'armee of the upper Danube — the nucleus of which, with the stafi", once belonged to the Austrian united forces, until, no MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. after the recognition of the royal Hungarian ministry of war, the Hungarian regiments were placed exclusively under its authority — in obedience to the will of the constitutional King of Hungary, took oath to the Hungarian constitution. It was at first opposed, under the chief command of the Archduke Palatine, to the royal imperial troops under Jellachich ; and, in spite of the saddest political confusions, always faithful to its oath, has hitherto complied only with the orders of the responsible royal Hungarian ministry of war, or with those of the Committee of Defense, declared by the former authority to be legal. " Supported by this irrefutable fact, the corps d'armee of the upper Dan- ube accordingly protests most decidedly against the supposition of having ever served the private interests of any party in Hungary, and declares that all such rumors are infamous calumnies. But the same irrefutable fact of the vmshaken fidelity with which the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, in fighting for the maintenance of the Hungarian constitution, has inde- fatigably submitted itself to all decrees of the Committee of Defense, and this in spite of the most inexpressible privations and deceptions, fairly entitled the corps d'armee to expect that the Committee of Defense would at least scrupulously avoid one thing, namely, placing the corps d'armee in an ambiguous position. " After the corps d'armee of the upper Danube had protected the front- ier, according to the orders of the Committee of Defense, during a month and a half with a rare self-denial, by the most fatiguing outpost service ; — after it had victoriously repulsed the enemy, though much stronger, in the battle at Wieselburg ; — after it had undauntedly held the desperate position at Raab, until the moment when its right flank was already turned by the enemy, and when its own retreat, necessary for the salvation of the capitals, could be rendered possible only by an obstinate conflict with the hostile turning-column ; — after it had held itself ready for fight, partly before, partly behind Dotis, B^nhida, Neszmely, Csakviir, Zamoly, Ondod, and Sarkany, until the victorious advance of the enemy's right wing by Moor caused us to resume the ofiensive by Martonvasar, though obliged in consequence of the positive order of the Committee of Defense to exchange this oflensive for the defensive before Ofen ; and all this without having met with those much-dreamt-of sympathies of the inhabitants of the cir- cle on the other side the Danube, and without even the least preparation having been made by the Committee of Defense to hinder the advance of the enemy's superior forces on the main and by-roads to the communica- tions of the above-named places ; — there remained but one consoling pros- pect for the much-suffering corps d'armee — that of a decisive combat im- mediately in front of and in the capitals of Hungary. " The former resolute tone of the decrees of the Committee of Defense, as well as its proclamations to the people, justified the expectation, that at this decisive moment, so long desired and now at last come, it would display an all-inspiring energy. "And instead of all that should and could have been done, there arrived at the head-quarters at Promontoriura, on the 1st of January, 1849 : " 1. The information that the Committee of Defense had left the cap- itals. *' 2. A decree of the Committee of Defense, that a decisive battle should be fought upon the first line before Ofen, at the height of Teteny, Bia, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGAEY. 131 &c., but without sacrificing the corps d'armee, or exposing the cap- itals to a bombardment ; that is to say, were the battle lost, the corps d'armee, in spite of only one passage being secured across, and in spite of the pursuing enemy, should be saved upon the left bank of the Danube, without the defense of the town. "3. The order to escort a deputation to the commander-in-chief of the enemy's army. " Any one of these three facts, viewed separately, would have been suf- ficient in itself to shake the confidence of the corps d'armee in the mem- bers of the Committee of Defense ; but taken together they must excite apprehensions that the corps d'armee had been, up to this moment — to use the mildest expression — a useful but dangerous tool in unpracticed hands. " To be able to maintain its position unshaken and upon strictly lawful grounds amid the political intrigues to which our poor country may very shortly be exposed, the corps d'armee of the upper Danube publicly makes the following declaration : "1. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube remains faithful to its oath, to fight resolutely against every external enemy for the main- tenance of the constitution of the kingdom of Hungary sanctioned by King Ferdinand V. "2. With the same resolution, the corps d'armee of the upper Danube will oppose itself to all those who may attempt to overthrow the con- stitutional monarchy by untimely republican intrigues in the interior of the country. "3. It is a natural consequence of the right understanding of constitu- tional monarchy — a form of government for the maintenance of which the corps d'armee of the upper Danube is determined to contend to the last — that it can obey only and exclusively those orders which are forwarded to it in the form prescribed by law through the responsible royal Hungarian minister of war, or through his representative ap- pointed by himself (at present General Vetter). "4. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube, mindful of the oath taken to the constitution of Hungary, and mindful of its own honor, having remained perfectly conscious of what it has to do and is determined to do, declares, finally, that it will adhere to the result of any conven- tion made with the enemy, only if it guarantees on the one hand the integrity of the constitution of Hungary, to which the corps d'armee has sworn, and on the other, if it is not inimical to the military honor of the corps d'armee itself. (My signature follows.) Neither within or without my corps d'armee, to my knowl- edge has any voice puhlicly been heard against this proclama- tion. The old soldiers regained their confidence in me and in the cause which I represented, and ceased to waver. They could not anticipate that they had come out of the rain to get under the spout — thanks to the dependence of the war- 132 MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. minister Meszaros on the president Kossuth ; a fact of which tliey were not then aware. I, on the contrary, had already remarked when in Preshurg manifold indications that Meszaros was not independent, but had considered these, at that time, only as a natural consequence of his really powerless position, from the good understanding exist- ing between myself and Kossuth, and found no reason for sus- pecting that symptoms of a moral defect remained in the cour- ageous old soldier — the original existence of which could not be reconciled either with Meszaros remaining at his post, nor with the obstinacy with which he had hitherto opposed every modifi- cation in war-business though approved of by experienced mil- itary men — after this jxnverless position of the minister of war had been changed into a powerful one by my decided espousing of his side. CHAPTER XVI. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube, according to the muster-rolls consisting of from 15,000 to 16,000 men, underwent in Waizen a new classification into four divisions : two wing- divisions, one centre division, and one reserve. Colonel Aulich commanded the division of the right wing. Colonel Kmety that of the centre. Colonel Count Guy on that of the reserve. The command of the division of the left wing was likewise confided to a Honved colonel. Each division consisted of two brigades, under distinct brigade- commanders. These divisions were almost equal in strength, and differed little from each other in their relative proportions of the three kinds of force (infantry, cavalry, and artillery). The division of the left wing alone was directed from Waizen along the Danube as far as the Eipel (Ipoly), but afterward in a northwestern direction, on the shortest line, toward Tyrnau. The division of the right wing moved at the same time by Retsag, Nagy-Oroszi, Szanto, Levencz (Leva), Yerebely, toward Leopold- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 133 stadt, the fort on the Waag to "be relieved. The right flank was followed at intervals of a day's march by the centre and the re- serve. By detaching the division of the left wing between the fortress of Komorn and the hostile corps concentrated round Leopoldstadt, it was intended to divert the attention of the latter at first from the danger menacing from the south, and to induce it to lay itself open to our principal attack from the east. On the 10th of January the divisions of both wings reached the little river Zsitva, the right wing near Yerebely, the left two (German) miles southward from that place ; the division of the centre, together with the head-quarters, Levencz ; that of the reserve, Szanto. The division of the right wing (Aulich) was the van-guard, and the division of the reserve (Guyon) the rear-guard of the corps d'armee. On the said day the Aulich division on its entrance into Vere- bely encountered the van-guard of the hostile corps under Field- marshal Lieutenant Simunich ; while the Guyon division, just when marching out from Ipolysag was overtaken and attacked by the hostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich, which had been ordered to pursue us. The reports of both occurrences reached my head-quarters at Levencz almost at the same time. Colonel Count Guyon, too weak to repel the hostile attack, had soon withdrawn, with little loss, and speedily continued his march to Szanto. The division of the left wing advanced on the 11th of January from the river Zsitva to Komjathi on the river JSTeutra ; the other three divisions of the corps d'armee had to rest a day in their stations of Verebely, Levencz, and Szanto. I left Levencz on the morning of this day to ride to Szanto, that I might learn the particulars of the conflict which had taken place at Ipolysag. On my route I heard some discharges of artil- lery from the direction of Szanto. I could only suppose that the Guyon division had been again attacked, and quickened my pace. At about half an hour's distance from Szanto I found the Guyon division in a defensive position a cheval of the road, ex- pecting the attack of the enemy, though he was nowhere to be seen. The cannon-shots had been fired at a party of our own 134 MY LIFE ANP ACTS IN HITNGAUY. recruits, which marched across the fields toward the division, for the purpose of joining it. Colonel Count Guy on was certainly a very brave officer, but his ignorance equaled his braveiy. Without having sent out even a single patrol from Szanto toward Ipolysag, which would have brought him long ago the certain news that the enemy was still in Ipolysag ; he had given away to the unfounded apprehen- sion that he was most obstinately pursued, had started at day- break from Szanto toward Levencz, and believed that he must prepare for a mortal combat on the very spot where I found him vainly expecting the enemy. He had taken the recruits for a hostile turning-column. The few shots which he fired at them completely sufficed to frighten the poor devils hap-hazard into tJiat valley which was situated between his position and the declivity on which they had just marched. But Colonel Guyon thought this movement was a desperate attempt to attack his position, until at last he was awoke from his dream by some volunteer hussars who had been ordered to charge the recruits. While Colonel Guyon expected the enemy in his position be- tween Szanto and Levencz, the latter could unobserved take the shortest road from Ipolysag, by Nemeti, to Schemnitz (Selmecz- banya), and^ occupy the district of the mountain-towns without drawing a blade ; or he could rest himself in Ipolysag for one or even two days, after his recent forced march, and make the brave Colonel Guyon for the present maintain his most injudi- ciously chosen position — against ennui. After I had emphatically represented this to Colonel Guyon, I ordered his division back into the places lying nearest to the road toward Levencz, that it might the more speedily be supp(;iied by the Kmety division, stationed in Levencz in the event of a hostile attack, perhaps even in the course of the day, being made upon their cantonment. The principal object of our operations, commenced from Waizen was, as I had already indicated in my proclamation, to act on the offensive against the hostile corps under Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich, and especially to relieve the fmt of Leo- poldstadt on the Waag, blockaded by him. The first intimation I had of the untenableness of this fort — even against a mere bombardment — was when I was in Raab, and when it was already too late to withdraw its garrison and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 135 armament without danger. This had now to be done after all, if possible, by the relief of the fort. Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich's hostile operations in my rear — although we had expected something of the kind, nay, by our eccentric retreat from the capitals had, as has been mention- ed, fully calculated on it — rendered my offensive against Field- marshal Lieutenant Siraunich an undertaking attended with great risk. Nevertheless I persisted in its execution, until at length the well-founded representations of the new chief of my general staff — appointed in the stead of Lieut. -colonel (formerly Major) Pusz- telnik, who was unfit for this post — succeeded in deciding me to choose another object for my operations. He urged me to consider : That the leading idea of our march toward the north, namely, •' the diversion of the hostile main forces from the Theiss, so as to render possible the organization of new troops behind that river,'' presupposed, as a fundamental consideration, i)ajQ preserva- tion of the corps d'armee. That to effect both of these objects, we must restrict ourselves to mere demonstrations, and avoid any actual combat that would endanger the existence of the corps. That should we, in the end, not succeed in relieving Leopold- stadt ; being surrounded on the north, east, and west by hostile corps who were confident of victory, we should be forced to re- treat toward the south, to the fortress of Komorn, or to fight our way between Gran (Esztergom) and Komorn to the right bank of the Danube. But in the first of these cases we ran the risk of discouraging the garrison of this, the most important bul- wark in the country, far more than it would have been by the closest investment ; while in the latter case we should, in addi- tion, expose our own corps to the greatest danger. That, consequently, the injurious results of a failure in the attempt to* relieve Leopoldstadt bore a striking disproportion to the advantages which could result to us, even under the most favorable circumstances, from its successful deliverance. That, from the position just taken up by the hostile forces, the relief of Leopoldstadt was almost without any further influence. That this relief, according to the intention of the leading idea of our march toward the north, was to be nothing else than the 136 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. commencement of those demonstrations by which we hoped " to divert the hostile 'main artnij from the Theiss."" That the deliverance of the garrison of Leopoldstadt, and the reinforcement of our corps d'armee thereby, was only a secondary aim — a welcome addition, as it were, to the advantages which our cause would derive from the realization of this idea. But this idea — the chief of my general staff argued farther — was already realized, the enemy having fallen into the snare eve^i earliei than, witJwut under-esti'niating him, we could have ex- pected. The moment of greatest danger for our cause was fortunately gone by ; for a hostile ofiensive from Pesth against Debreczin Avas scarcely any longer to be feared, now that Field-marshal Lieu- tenant Csorich had been sent on our track. It was therefore impossible for me not to perceive that our next operations must now be directed solely to the deliverance of the corps d'armee from a position which was already critical enough to endanger its very existence. To effect this, even the garrison of the fort of Leopoldstadt must be sacrificed, if necessary. How- ever great this sacrifice might appear, any attempt to save the garrison was connected with still greater disadvantages. The line of the retreat into the mountain-towns was still open to us for the next twenty-four hours ; but not after the expiration of that time. The rigor of the season augmented the hardships of. the war— carried on now by us under the most unfavorable cir- cumstances — to such a degree, that they of themselves were sufficient to destroy our troops even without direct co-operation on the part of the enemy. Some days' rest seemed to him to have now become of the most urgent importance in reference to the existence of the corps d'armee. A great part of it was but very imperfectly clad. The supplies of cloth, leather, and linen, which we had discovered, and taken with us, at the last moment, when marching out from Waizen, might perhaps be sufficient to rem- edy this deficiency. But of this stock of cloth, leathei*, and linen, garments had previously to be made. This, however, could not be accomplished while on the march. For this purpose several days' rest was necessary. This would be secured to us by the immediate occupation of the mountain-towns, and moreover an important part also of our line of retreat toward the upper Theiss. Consequently he could by no means approve of the offensive MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 137 against Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich, and proposed the RETREAT SIDEWAYS INTO THE DISTRICT OF THE MOUNTAIN-TOWNS. More brilliant, more alluring — he said finally — might appear to me the deliverance of Leopoldstadt ; more favorable perhaps to my renown, if it succeeded ; but to avoid any critical conflicts seemed to him at present nevertheless more judicious, even if we thereby repeatedly exposed ourselves to the suspicion of faint- heartedness. If the affairs of Hungary were still as bad as they luere a fm'tnight ago, he would not advise a retreat. But they were now — he said — already incomparably better, thanks to the blindness of the enemy ! The uninterrupted continuation of the offensive against Debreczin might have destroyed at one blow the sineivs of our resistance. But, as it seemed, Prince Windisch- gratz preferred to prepare for us a lingering, torturing death. What have we to do now ? Let us continue to give him the oppoi-tunity of trifling away, i7i these preparations, nwre time and strength: the nation will probably recover in the MEANWHILE FROM ITS FIRST PANIC TERROR. I could not deny the correctness of these opinions, and gave up the offensive against Field-marshal Simunich, though not with- out inward reluctance. This reluctance sprang from the painful thought of abandoning the garrison of Leopoldstadt to certain destruction, among whom also were two men, who having been my intimate friends in early days, remained still dear to me. CHAPTER XVII. By the " district of the mountain-towns" is here to be under- stood, without regard to political divisions, that tract of land in the valley of the river Gran, which includes especially the towns of Schemnitz (Selmeczbanya), Kremnitz (Kormoczbanya), Altsohl (0-Z61yom), and Neusohl (Beszterczebanya). The Gran (Garam) flows through this district from Neusohl to Heiligenkreuz (Szentkereszt) almost at a right angle, turning from the western direction in which it reaches Neusohl suddenly 138 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. to the south, and at Altsohl bends again just as suddenly to the west, at Heiligenkreuz first resuming the new-shaped direction of its course from the source to the mouth. The lofty boundaries of the valley of the Gran, partly covered with forests, partly rocky, to the south as well as to the north, can, so far as they limit the district just named, be traversed with artilleiy only at detached points ; while an offensive ad- vance with strong columns from the south into the valley itself appears to be hazardous on account of the frequent crossing of the road from one bank of the river to the other, with the dangerous proximity of a hostile cantonment in and around Schemnitz. Two main roads, leading from the south into the district of the mountain-towns, meet at Schemnitz, one from Ipolysag by Nemeti, the other from Levencz by Frauenmarkt (Bath). There exists, besides, another western by-road, which, near Zsarnock and by Hodrics, joins Schemnitz with the road that likewise leads from' the south upward into the valley of the Gran. The other approaches from the south into the district of the mountain-towns conduct to Altsohl, having previously united into one road two or three (German) miles before reaching this town. Across the northern boundaries of the valley of the Gran two roads lead out of the valley of the Turocz from Mosocz into the territory of the mountain-towns ; on the one side by Turcsek to Kremnitz, on the other by Hermanecz to Neusohl ; and a third out of the upper valley of the Vag from Rosenberg, across the mountain of Sturecz, likewise to Neusohl. Further, a fourth line of communication leads out of the valley of the Neutra from Privigye to Kremnitz. Neusohl and Kremnitz were at that time menaced only from the valley of the Turocz, and this by the hostile brigade of Ma- jor-general Gotz and his allies the Sclavonian militia ; but the above-mentioned approaches were easy to defend, and, as well as the valleys of the upper Waag and Gran, were still in our possession. The southern mountain-towns, Altsohl and Schemnitz, appeared to be more seriously menaced than the two northern ones, espe- cially Schemnitz, it being exposed to attack from three sides at the same time. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 139 But innumerable difficulties awaited the aggressor, by reason of the extremely rigorous winter, and the deep snow on the mountains : and the chief of my general staff could therefore really predict with much probability, that we should be able to maintain ourselves in the mountain-towns easily until our troops should have recovered themselves. The position of our corps d'armee on the evening of the 11th of January 1849 was, as before mentioned, the following : The division of the left wing in Komjathi, on the river Neutra. The Aulich division in Verebely, on the river Zsitva. The Kmety division in Levencz, on the left bank of the river Gran. The Guyon division in Varsany, on the road from Ipolysag to Levencz. Before us, in Neutra (Nyitra), on the river of the same name, stood a part of the hostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich ; in our rear, in Ipolysag, that of Field-marshal Lieu- tenant Csorich. Schemnit'z, the next to our position and at the same time most important point for us of the mountain-towns, was consequently nearer to us than to the two hostile corps ; the road from Levencz to Schemnitz could not be endangered by either of them so long as we were posted as above indicated : nevertheless it was pos- sible, if we delayed any longer in Levencz, that Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich might reach this point before us, if he had started early on the 11th from Ipolysag, by Nemeti, toward Schemnitz, advancing onward in the valley of the Schemnitz- Bach. In fact, on the evening of the 1 1th we were informed by a scout, that a hostile column had been seen in the course of the day marching along the road from Ipolysag to Schemnitz ; its strength, however, was not indicated more precisely. For the purpose of again getting the start of this column, the Kmety division had to set out during the night between the 11th and 12th of January from Levencz, by Frauenmarkt, toward Schemnitz. The Aulich division left Verebely on the 12th, and took its route by St. Benedict (Szent Benedek) and Heiligenkreuz to Kremnitz. The division of the left wing, leaving Komjathi likewise on the 12th, should follow it as far as Heiligenkreuz ; but from 140 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. thence march to Altsohl, occupy this place, and advance its outposts immediately toward the south as far as Dobronyiva (Dobrona). During the course of the 12th, in order to protect these opera- tions, the Guyon division should oppose to the uttermost the advance beyond Levencz of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich. Being forced to suppose that there was an offensive under- standing between the movements of the two hostile corps, which menaced us in front and rear, there remained, notwithstanding all the circumspection of the chief of my general staff, reason enough to apprehend, on the one hand, that we should find Schemnitz already occupied by the enemy, and on the other, see the division of our left wing destroyed. Fortunately, however, there existed only an " observing'' un- derstanding between the two hostile corps ; and thus it became possible for us to lead the corps d'armee "of the upper Danube" without accident into the district" of the mountain-towns. The Kmety division, together with my head-quarters, reached FrauQnmarkt during the night between the 11th and 12th. From hence a small column of infantry with two guns was dispatched without delay across the mountains to Prinzdorf (Prencsfalu), on the road to Nemeti, with directions to turn to the south immediately after reaching that point, to occupy the narrow valley of Teplicska, and to send out patrols as far as Nemeti. The main body of the Kmety division continued, likewise during the night, its march to Schemnitz, and arrived thither early in the afternoon of the 12th, while almost at the same moment some lancers of the corps of Field-marshal Lieu- tenant Csorich were taken prisoners in Nemeti by the patrols of the Prinzdorf column. On the 15th of January the divisions stood thus : The Aulich division in Kremnitz, with the outposts to the north in Perk, to the south and west in Heiligenkreuz. The Kmety division in Neusohl, with the outposts toward the northwest in Hermanecz. The division of the left wing in Altsohl, with the outposts toward the south in Dobronyiva, toward the southeast in Szalatna ; and The Guyon division in Schemnitz and Windschacht, with the outposts toward the south, on the road to Levencz. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 141 For the protection of both flanks of the Guyon division, Princz- dorf and Teplicska, on the road to Nemeti, continued to be occu- pied by a detachment of the Kmety division ; and Zsarnocz, westward from Schemnitz, in the valley of the Gran, on the road to St. Benedict, by a part of the Aulich division. CHAPTEU XVIII. The troops on their march had found the communications into the mountain-towns partly covered with ice, partly blocked up with snow, and only with great exertions had they been able to advance. The same obstacles could not but make it appear doubtful whether there would be any hostile attack against the mountain-towns for a considerable time. But scarcely had the divisions entered their presumptive winter-quarters when a thaw came on, and smoothed for the enemy the roads which ice and snow had made so very difficult for us. It is true that Colonel Aulich, soon after his arrival in Krera- nitz, had by repeated forced reconnoiterings toward Turcsek on the road from Kremnitz to Mosocz so energetically frustrated the attacks intended by the brigade of Major-general Gotz and the Sclavonian free-troops, that we could not in future be molested from this side ; but the danger menaced more seriously in the south. The corresponding news received from scouts announced the approach of considerable hostile forces on the roads from Frauen- markt and St. Benedict. The detachment in Zsarnocz, which ought to have yielded only to a superior hostile attack, abandoned this position ; whether through ignorance or cowardice on the part of the com- mander could not be ascertained. Zsarnocz had again to be occupied by us, in order to secure Schemnitz, in case of a hostile attack on the road to Frauen- markt. The Guyon division, however, could not be further weakened by detaching any. part of its troops. Consequently the Aulich division received an order to occupy Zsarnocz again 142 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. with a battalion of infantry. Thtf commander of the battalion dispatched for this purpose, while on his march from Heiligen- kreuz toward Zsarnocz, heard it rumored that the enemy was already in possession of the place, and turned immediately to the " right about," because his orders happened to say nothing about " attacking," and also made no mention of the possibility of the enemy's being in Zsarnocz. On the 20th of January, when in Neusohl, I received intelli- gence of this unwelcome incident, and hastened the same night to Kremnitz, to lead in person a column from thence to Zsar- nocz. On the evening of the 21st of January I had reached it with a battalion of the foot-regiment Alexander, a squadron of the ninth regiment of hussars, and a three-pounder battery of six pieces. The hostile Colonel CoUery, by advancing from the south upward along the valley of the Gran, had arrived at Zsarnocz the day before with the twelfth battalion of chasseurs, some cavalry, and about half a rocket-battery, but early in the morning of the 21st of January had continued his march by Hodrics toward Schemnitz. By the attack which it was to be foreseen the hostile turning- column would make on the following day, the Guyon division could easily be forced to abandon its position near Windschacht, and as a consequence even Schemnitz. To frustrate this I resolved to march after Colonel Collery and attack him in his rear. Colonel Guyon was informed of this project during the night between the 21st and 22d of January, and ordered on his part to anticipate the attack of the enemy's turning-column. The road from Zsarnock to Schemnitz leads, as has been said, by Hodrics, in a narrow valley, ascending to the northern thickly- wooded bank, at first gently in the bottom of the valley, but above the last-named place rather steeply. Here the road had been made impracticable in several places by natural abatis, which so far as was absolutely necessary were manned by us, but only with volunteers, and more for observation than for defense. "When I broke up very early on the 22d of January from Zsar- nocz toward Hodrics, I hoped to find the enemy still delayed by the abatis, and occupied in removing them, I was, however, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. 143 soon informed that he had succeeded in overcoming all these hin- drances during the course of the preceding night. From Hodrics I despatched strong patrols in a southeastern direction, partly to harass likewise the enemy posted before Wind- schacht, partly to give intelligence to the Guyon division of our approach, which I always presumed to be still in its position before Windschacht. Higher up than those parts of the road on which the remains of the removed abatis were still to be seen, we encountered the enemy. He had occupied the declivity of the mountain above the road with sharp-shooters on a point favorable for commanding the road. I ordered a company on to the height of the wooded mountain- side, to eject the hostile sharp-shooters, or at least divide their fire, and thus facilitate the advance of a storming-column of in- fantry along the road. Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik — a short time before, as has been mentioned, the chief of my general staff, but now commander of the brigade to which belonged the battalion of the foot-regiment Alexander engaged in this attack — had voluntarily joined this expedition, and undertook in person the command of the company sent on to the height. In case the storm on tlje road should be repulsed, I ordered two guns to advance and be unlimbered : intending by their fire to stop the pursuing enemy, and protect our preparations for a renewed attack. The rest of the battery remained with the rear-guard, as did also the greater part of the cavalry. Several hussars had voluntarily galloped along that part ol the road which the fire of the enemy commanded, but were received with such a brisk volley of musketry, that they were forced to turn back as quickly as possible. This of itself sufhced to discourage the infantry, among whom was a very large num- ber of recruits. Nevertheless our sharp-shooters on the declivity meanwhile opened their fire ; and now I believed the moment had arrived for advancing the storming-column on the main- road. But after the first hostile shots, it turned back ; and there was the less chance of stopping it, as the enemy itself sent for- ward along the road a small division of chasseurs with crossed bayonets. A panic terror seized the infantry and the cannoneers of the 144 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. two unlimbered guns. They turned in disgraceful flight. The hussars would have barred their passage, but they crawled away under the horses, although the horsemen kept slashing at them with their swords. In the dreadful confusion thereby produced, the artillery-horses took fright ; and of the rest of the battery, ex- cept one piece, part tumbled down the declivity, part could not at all be got again under way. The commander of the battery, struck by a ball from the enemy, had fallen near the two unlimbered guns ; while his men, leaving their pieces behind them, ran away with the imple- ments necessary for loading. During my fruitless efforts to keep the most courageous of the infantry together for the protection of these guns, I was my- self forced back by degrees to the place where they had been planted. Some balls whistling past us in rapid succession caused me soon to be left completely alone. Even my adjutant, an in- trepid valorous man, had disappeared. As, however, I had not seen him fall, his absence gave me some ground of hope ; for I was convinced he had left me only for the purpose of stopping, if possible, the fugitives farther behind, and rallying them for another attack. Nevertheless I saw that with such troops victory was absolutely impossible, though I hoped at least to be able to save the artillery. I was therefore constrained to remain where I was, although alone. Close to the guns stood an ammunition-cart placed athwart the road. Behind it I sought meanwhile a partial shelter from the enemy's balls. The noise of my troops fleeing toward the valley now scarcely reached my ears ; but in its stead I distinguished from the oppo- site direction confused shouts, and at intervals the sounds of the Austrian popular hymn. Next moment the storming hostile chasseurs broke forth from the last turn of the road. This stag- gered me too. Undecided whether I should yield to the natural instinct that urged me to save myself, or, in despair at the humili- ation I had suffered, aw^ait the thrust of the hostile bayonets, I looked at one time in the direction of my fleeing troops, and then toward the advancing enemy. Suddenly it seemed to me as if they wavered at the sight of the guns, as if the " Hurrah 1" died on their lips. With prompt decision I searched for the match. But whether it was that I overlooked it, or that the fugitive UY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 145 gunners had taken even this with them, I did not find it — and thereby completely discouraged, I also now took to flight. I was on foot — my preservation therefore extremely improba- ble. I had thought of this too late. I now sought to escape the searching looks of the pursuing enemy by leaping onward to the wooded slopes, for the purpose of gaining ground unobserved among the trees ; but stumbling at almost every leap, I was obliged immediately to come down again to the open road. The hostile chasseurs were already close enough behind me to take sure aim ; which they indeed did ; but the road being much inclined, I fortunately sank at every step under the line of sight, and thus my shako received a ball, which was probably destined for my skull ; all the others whistled harmlessly past me. The brave chasseurs evidently shot rather too eagerly. "With some what more coolness in their aim, they might have spared both themselves and their commander-in-chief much trouble next spring. However, I meanwhile did my best to shorten as much as pos- sible the time during which I had to serve them as a walking target. A cavalry horse without a rider, coming from the side of the enemy, galloped suddenly past me. About a hundred paces from me a hussar stopped it for his wounded dismounted com- rade, whom he would not abandon in spite of the danger to his own life. After he had assisted him to escape, he accidentally caught sight of me, rode speedily toward me, and offered me his own horse, with the remark, that his life was of less value than mine. This magnanimity had an altogether peculiar effect on me. I suddenly believed that the day need not yet be given up for lost. " You had better gallop after these scamps of infantry, and bring some back to me ; but they must be such fellows as you I" I impetuously called to the heroic hussar. " All is in vain I" re- plied he, with an oath ; " they are- Sclavonians, not Magyars I" This observation on their nationalty was certainly just, but the conclusion deduced from it not quite correct ; for the coward cannoneers were Magyars, not Sclavonians. Moreover, the next moment seemed as if it would give the hussar the lie even in re- gard to the Sclavonians ; for scarcely had he finished his swear- ing, when round the next projection behind which the road loses G 146 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. itself downward, a column of infantry, led by my adjutant, ar- rived swiftly for my deliverance. I had not been deceived in the adjutant. My newly roused determination not yet to give up the contest now ripened more quickly into action. " Follow me !" I called to them, they ap- pearing very resolute ; " your comrades will not remain behind, when they know that we are again advancing. This brave hussar," I confidently added, "will take care of that ; will you not, comrade ?" — and without stopping for an answer, I again advanced up to the mountain. The Sclavonians probably under- stood very little of what I shouted to them in Hungarian ; how- ever, they followed fearlessly. The enemy's fire now grew more animated : we had no time to return it. I felt continually urged to address my men. He who, himself in danger, inspires others with courage, most strengthens his own. "Follow me I" I repeatedly called out; "you see they hit nothing 1" But unfortunately just then a ball did hit ; a man in the first rank fell moaning to the ground ; and in a twinkling the rest had again taken to flight. The sudden extinction of a last hope, that has unexpectedly emerged — even though it may be but a foolish one — shakes more vehemently than the gradual disappointment of all previous well-founded expectations. *' It is all over for to-day !" cried the adjutant. " Forever I" I added, in despair. "When I retired from the guns, I had already given up the day for lost, just as much as now ; but the knowledge of this dis- graceful necessity had not there, as here, been forced upon me all at once. There I still had regard to my own safety ; here I re- nounced it. This desperate indifference must also in part be attributed to the unusual relaxation of my physical powers. On the summit of moral enthusiasm death is sought — in the depth of physical exhaustion it is no longer avoided. The simultaneous coinci- dence of both conditions in one and the same individual appears to me impossible. Only in the intermediate phases can either valor or cowardice be spoken of. " Let us save ourselves, before it be too late !" called out my adjutant, seized me by the arm, and dragged me away with him MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 147 down hill. The hussar also — (he had been right this time wdth regard to the Sclavonians) — rode again up to me, and once more invited me to mount his horse. Irritated at this request, and angry at the annoyance of being dragged along, I endeavored to disengage my arm from the adjutant ; but he would not let go, even when a ball from the enemy passing between us had almost lamed the elbow of the arm with which he held me : whereupon perceiving that, by a further opposition on my part, not only my own life, but the lives of my two faithful companions also, would be endangered, I immediately began again voluntarily to take part in the flight, and exert my last physical powers. In the vicinity of the uppermost houses of Hodrics stood a car- riage for the severely wounded ; but these had one and all been made prisoners of war. I could therefore avail myself of the carriage without scruple in order to overtake my troops. Not till I reached the lower part of the village did I succeed in com- ing up with them. Here I found the hussars still endeavoring to drive together the dispersed infantry. It was a humiliating spectacle ; but far more humiliating was the thought that I was the commander of such a troop ; and the boldest imagination, after such events, would have been baffled in its attempt to discover within the bounds of probability the elements of the subsequent necessity for a Russian intervention in Hungary in favor of " independent united Austria." I intended then and there to decimate the infantry and the servers of the lost guns ; but a glance at the thinned ranks told me that they were already more than decimated. Our loss amounted, besides the five guns and some hussars, to almost two companies of infantry. Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik was also missing. He had been wounded and taken prisoner, as we learnt afterward. The enemy did not pursue us further ; so that our march back from Hodrics to Zsarnocz could at least be performed in order. Here I gave a short rest to the troops ; but I felt myself irre- sistibly impelled further on, the sooner to obtain full certainty as to the fate of the Guyon division. That it must have simultaneously suffered a defeat was beyond a doubt. But these questions urgently demanded an answer : whither 148 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. and how far it had been forced back ? — whether, in its first fright, it had not even perhaps receded as far as Neusohl, and thus made it possible for the enemy, swiftly following in its track, to cut off on the one hand the division in Altsohl, on the other that in Kremnitz, from each other and from the remaining two in Neusohl ; and thereby divide my corps d'armee into throe parts, and destroy them separately ? This nobody in Zsarnocz could give me. The dispositions for the Aulich division had also to be issued in the course of the next night, nay even partly executed. Accompanied by my adjutant, I accordingly hastened forward in a carriage to Kremnitz. I had been warned in Zsarnocz not to travel without a strong escort, because a hostile division from Hodrics, across the north- ern ridge of the mountain, could long ago have reached the road from Zsarnocz to Heiligenkreuz, and I had to take this route. I paid no attention, however, to the warning. Not far from the place which had been pointed out as danger- ous to my safety, a menacing " Halt I who goes there ?" in Ger- man, interrupted the course of the horses ; and next moment our carriage was surrounded by foot-soldiers with white straps. The challenge in German and the white straps made us suspicious. My adjutant would not immediately produce the colors. " A general," he answered, delaying ; and " Of what battalion are you ?" he asked, in return, harshly, at the same time leaning out over the carriage, that he might discover, in spite of the dark- ness, some more distinct mark among the soldiers. " Never mind about the battalion I — what general?" was the answer, accompanied by a closer advance of the soldiers to the carriage. Our situation was not pleasant. We were now obliged to explain. If it should be followed by a hostile declaration, we could be saved, perchance, only by a shot at the importunate questioner, a jump on to the coach-box, and a lusty lash at the horses. I had soon considered this ; and rising by degrees from my seat, seized a pistol, noiselessly cocked it, and thus awaited, ready for the leap, with suppressed breathing, what should happen. Meanwhile, my companion still delayed with the information. Continually endeavoring to recognize before we should be recog- nized, he leant forward still more over the carriage-door toward MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 149 the soldiers, who had come quite close. The short pause seemed to me an eternity. I thought I could scarcely wait longer for the moment of decision. " It is Alexander infantry I" the adjutant at last called out, and gave the desired information without more ado ; for he had recognized a sergeant of the troop, to whom he rememhered hav- ing given in person a certain order on the morning before the dis- astrous conflict. The Alexander infantry at that time still wore white straps. This circumstance, however, had not occurred to either of us in the first moment of surprise, any more than that the chasseurs who had been opposed to us M Hodrics had black straps. This sergeant, together with the small number of men now distributed round our carriage, was the remains of the company I had sent from Hodrics, during our advance, as a reconnoitering patrol, toward "Windschacht. It had been suddenly attacked on all sides, while marching through the forest, and the greater part of it taken prisoners. Only these few succeeded in cutting their way through rearward, and passing Hodrics where the footpath leads from the southern declivity across the little place to the northern ridge of the mountain ; having previously awaited, in a hiding-place hard by, the marching past of a hostile patrol, which was observing our retreat to Zsarnocz. Unmolested, they then reached; after crossing the above-mentioned ridge of the mount- ain, the road from Zsarnocz to Heiligenkreuz ; and were just on the point of joining their battalion in Zsarnocz when they met us. ' I directed them to wait where they were for their battalion, which was on its march back ; and then continued my journey to Kremnitz without further interruption. CHAPTER XIX. In Kremnitz I found already authentic news of Colonel Guyon, which unfortunately confirmed almost all my apprehensions. He had been defeated on the preceding day, the 21st of January, at Windschacht, and obliged to retreat to Schemnitz. On the following night he received my order to attack the hostile turn- ing-column. This he attempted to do next morning ; but his men — like mine at Hodrics — made off as soon as the enemy's first shots had been fired. Meanwhile he was forced by the at- tack directed against him from Windschacht to evacuate Schem- nitz also ; nay, the depression of his troops compelled him even to cross the Gran near Breznicska, and fall back as far as Bucsa. The junction of the Aulich division with the other divisions on the road leading through the valley of the Gran seemed now, as I had feared, to be impossible. For this road formed at several points, quite close to the right bank of the river Gran, narrow de- files, open toward the left bank. But I had little reason to sup- pose that an enemy, who was not deterred from carrying out his operations by the necessity for such daring marches as Colonel Collery's recent one from the lower valley of the Gran by Zsar- nocz and Hodrics toward Schemnitz, would leave unoccupied the left bank of the Gran, opposite the just-mentioned points — very unfavorable for the march of the Aulich division through the valley of the Gran — as he had already obtained, in consequence of Colonel Guyon's hasty retreat to Bucsa, undisturbed possession of the left bank of the Gran along this road. To effect a junction of the Aulich division with the main body of the corps d'armee in the north of JSTeusohl — through the valley of the little river Turocz, by Perk, Turcsek, Stuben toward Mo- socz, and then, turning to the right, Cseremosne, Bartoska, and the mountain Hermanecz — seemed, if possible, still more danger- ous, an account of Major-general Gbtz's menacing position upon this line, and the unfavorable disposition of the inhabitants of this district toward us. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. 151 There was consequently nothing left for us but to make use of the precarious road across the mountain-ridge between Kremnitz and Neusohl, even at the risk of losing a part of the baggage and artillery. From Kremnitz, as well as from Neusohl, steep forest-paths lead close under the highest point of the mountain chain ; and the path here is formed by a rocky ridge, which can be crossed only by a single foot-passenger at a time. The inhabitants of the mountain declivities use these paths, as we were assured, only occasionally during the winter, and then with light sledges, in such a manner that, when arrived below the ridge, they unload them, take them to pieces, drag every thing, one by one, over the ridge to the opposite continuation of the path, there put the sledges together again, and seated upon them slide down with their freight to the place of their destination. For the purpose of rendering possible the use of this com- munication, already sufficiently difficult on account of its steep- ness, independently of that fatal impediment, an opening had once been made through the rocky ridge at the narrowest part of its base ; but this tunnel en miniature had since, bit by bit, fallen in again. "We had consequently to clear it out, and considerably enlarge large it, so as to be able to pass through it with our artillery. This was accomplished on the 24th of January ; and during the following night the Aulich division also passed through the tunnel, in both, cases not without excessive exertions on the part of the troops. But in the meantime the Guyon division and that of the left wing were threatened with the unforeseen danger of being sepa- rated from the main body of the army, and destroyed while isolated. In the same night on which the Aulich division had effected its difficult march over the Szkalka (the name, I believe, of the short spur which, extending from the spot where the rivers Gran and "Waag branch off in a southeastern direction between the mountain-towns Neusohl and Kremnitz, is terminated by the Laurinberg), so rapid a thaw once n>ore suddenly set in, that the Gran, overflowing its banks by the next morning, inundated the roads between Neusohl, Altsohl, and Bucsa, to the height of several feet. The divisions in Altsohl and Bucsa were thereby 152 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. not only completely isolated from the main body in Neusohl, but even from each other ; and their situation seemed incomparably more dangerous than that of the Aulich division had recently been, principally because, on the one hand, to my knowledge, no obstacle stood in the way of the victorious enemy in Schemnitz, which could have prevented him from attacking the Guy on divi- sion at Bucsa with superior forces, and destroying it utterly, or immediately taking it all prisoners, since Guy on' s retreat to Alt- sohl or Neusohl through the inundated ground was impossible ; — on the other hand, because during the last few days repeated reports had arrived from the division in Altsohl, that numerous patrols of cavalry were advancing more and more boldly from Karpfen (Karpona) toward Altsohl, and these must be considered as the precursors of an attack soon to be expected from this di- rection likewise. A speedy decrease of the hemmed-in waters was not at all to be expected, in consequence of the heaped-up masses of ice which stopped the course of the Gran ; and any attempt to wade through the deluged expanses of the roads, threatened — so the inhabitants of that district asseverated — certain destruction to the troops. The loss of a part of my corps appeared at this time inevitable ; for neither from Bucsa nor from Altsohl did there exist even a barely practicable road to Neusohl, on which a circuit might have been made round the fatal inundation. "We owed our deliverance from this desperate situation, strange- ly enough, to the effects of a tragi-comical event which happened on the 22d of January — consequently before the inundation — to the Guyon division in Bucsa, immediately after its retreat from Schemnitz. Colonel Guyon — void alike of fear and of penetration as he al- ways was — had scarcely arrived in Bucsa with his defeated division, exhausted by its march, when he resolved, after a short rest, to set out again toward Schemnitz, that he might take im- mediate revenge on the victors of the day. Now as his soldiers were utterly destitute of the military ardor necessary for the ac- complishment of this project, he thought to impart it by means of brandy ; this made them drunk, however, rather than eager for combat. Moreover, discipline, never the strongest feature in the Guyon division, had soon fallen so very low, that even the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 153 daily false alarm, " The enemy is approaching !" was sufficient to create such a confusion in the camp, as could scarcely have been exceeded after a total defeat. The most terrified ran back as far as Neusohl. The dispersed divisions, hovv^ever, by de- grees again assembled in Busca : but the dread of an attack had once taken possession of them ; it mounted afterward with the waters of the Gran, and became at last stronger than the fear of being drowned. Only in this way was it possible for Colonel Guyon to attempt the retreat by the deeply-inundated roads : and the success of his hazardous enteprize brought suspicion on the inhabitants of the district of having represented the dangers connected with it as so formidable from treacherous hostility toward us. The division in Altsohl had far greater difficulties to contend with in a similar attempt. It had to cross the river itself, by means of the overflowed bridge, and where the stream was very rapid ; its road also lay considerably deeper under water. But the example of the Guyon division had its effect : and some hours later the whole of the four divisions of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube were assembled at Neusohl. "We afterward learned, it is true, that we might quite comfort- ably have awaited the subsiding of the waters ; for the hostile brigade of Major-general Wiess, by which we supposed Altsohl to be menaced, had been suddenly drawn back toward Pesth ; and the victors at Windschacht, Hodrics, and Schemnitz believed themselves too feeble for further attacks, nay even expected to be attacked by us. But we had no suspicion whatever of all this ; although it by no means seldom happens that mutual fears are entertained on both sides, and often without reason on either part. We should, however, not have been able to protract our stay in the mountain-towns, even had we been informed of these cir- cumstances early enough. For the really irresistible enemy who drove us out of them was hunger ; the thaw having made the roads to the southern comitates, whence we had to obtain our provisions, impassable, and thus the transport from thence of corn for a long time was impossible. Directly after my arrival in Schemnitz I received an order from the war-minister Meszaros to begin my march bafck toward the upper Theiss without delay, and to act against Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick, in concert with the then Colonel 154 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Klapka, who, in the stead of the war-minister, had just taken the command of the latter's corps, which had been repeatedly miserably defeated by Count Schlick. I was to attack the Schlick corps from the southwest, while Klapka intended to assail it from the south. The same reasons which had decided me when in Levencz to adopt the side-march to the mountain-towns had in Schemnitz made me resolve not to obey at present the above order of the minister of war : for I could not hesitate to estimate the disad- vantages which might arise to the country from this disobedience, only very low in comparison with those which must have been the inevitable consequence of the anticipated destruction of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. Aft^ the unexpected success in concentrating the corps d'armee in Neusohl, circumstances were quite changed, and instead of justifying a continued disobedience to this order, urged me, on the contrary, no longer to delay the commencement of the retreat to the upper Theiss. The question now was, not whether, but hoiv this retreat should be accomplished. Only two ways were at that time open to us from Neusohl : either through the valley of the upper Gran as far as Vorbsko, from thence across the southern limits of the district of the Gran valley into the Murany valley and that of the little river lolsva, then by Tornalja, Putnok, into the supposed circuit of the opera- tions of Klapka' s corps ; or through the Zips (Szepes megye), the Saros, and Abanjvar comitates. On i\ie first line a hostile conflict was highly probable, on the latter it was certain, and moreover with the dreaded victorious corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, which just then occu- pied these comitates. In spite of this, however, we chose the latter route, because on the former we had to fear, in consequence of the continuance of mild weather, impassable roads, and at Tornalja hostile attacks from two opposite directions even during our march ; because, informed in time of our movement, the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, or, at all events, a part of it — from Kaschau (Kassa) along the road from Torna, on the one hand, and the brigade of Major-general Wiess, which we then supposed to be already near Altsohl, by Vamosfalva (Milna), Zelene, and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 155 Rimaszombat, on the other— could reach Tornalja long before us, and either await us ready for combat, or fall upon us even during our march. On the route through the Zips, on the contrary, we could reckon, even with continued thaw, if not upon good yet upon firm roads ; were ourselves the assailants; and had not to fear any un- expected attack in the flanks or the rear during our whole march ; since, according to what we then believed to be the position of the hostile forces, we could neither be overtaken on that route, nor by the forced, march of any hostile corps on another route could we lose the start w hich we had already gained, and which we just then most urgently wanted to enable us deliberately to prepare our attacks on the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, and to execute them undisturbed in flank and rear. In consequence, the following plan of retreat was projected : The Hungarian corps d'armee of the upper Danube to begin its retreat from Neusohl toward the upper Theiss, through the Zips, in two columns of equal strength. One, composed of the Guyon division and that of the left wing, to move through the valley of the Gran, then by Pohorella, Vernar, Sztraczena, and Huta, to Iglo ; the other, formed by the Aulich and Kmety divisions, to march, after having passed over the ground between the Waag and the Gran, through the valley of the upper AYaag into that of the Poprad, and then by Donnersmark (Csotortokhely) to- Leutschau (Locse). The successful attainment of the two last-specified objects of the march must absolutely precede any idea of a serious ofliensive against the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick. The southern column, which had to proceed through the valley of the Gran, received for rear-guard a tram of several hundred wagons, laden with stores of various kinds belonging to the state, among which were supplies of military clothing, a movable musket-manufactory, a stock of sugar and cofiee, tin, copper, materials for muskets, and so on. These were mostly things ordered by the Committee of Defense, wdiich we found prepared in different places on our march from Waizen to Schem- nitz, partly already on the way to the capitals, which were now occupied by the enemy, partly only ready to be sent thither ; and made them accompany our movements, that they might arrive as safely as possible at the new seat of the government. 156 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. To do more for the protection of a train of wagons, which had grown to an unueual length, seemed, however, to be a too ex- hausting service for the troops, who were besides already excess- ively harassed by the retreat in forced marches ; and as I would not send it in advance, because the most insignificant hostile rumor coming from the point whither we were retreating would have caused it to stop, and thus have interrupted in their march the divisions behind it — the wagons had to follow the troops as they best could. These stores would, it is true, fall a certain prey to the enemy, if it occurred to him to pursue our southern column ; but then he had also to remove out of his way the whole train before he could overtake the divisions, which would be already two days' march in advance of him ; and the commander of the small detachment accompanying the train — not indeed to defend it, but only to maintain order in its transport — had been charged to abandon to the enemy the booty only piecemeal, where practica- ble, and thereby, as well as by frequently barricading the road with wagons, and finally by carrying with him or destroying the draught-horses, render pursuit as difficult as possible. The permanent advance which was secured to the southern column in consequence of the execution of these measures was important enough to indemnify us for the loss of the state's stores ; for it must not be overlooked, that our retreat from the mountain-towns to the upper Theiss was at the same time an offensive movement against Count Schlick's corps, and that our principal aim had to be directed toward endeavoring not to be overtaken by the hostile brigades of Generals Gotz and Prince Jablonowski, which came behind us before we had forced our march through the district in which Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick was operating at that time. However, the enemy did not pursue the southern column, and the whole of the stores consequently remained at the disposal of the government. A quantity of precious metal, partly coined, partly uncoined, which we had found in the mountain-towns, was to be conveyed for greater security under the protection of the northern column, and afterward handed over to the government. (This was ac- complished from Kaschau.) This plan of retreat was promptly put in execution. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 157 On the 27tli of January, 1849, the last troops of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube left the mountain-town Neusohl. My head-quarters marched with the northern column, and reached Rosenberg (Rozsahegy) on the 28th. Here there arrived from the Zips a messenger — sent by Field- marshal Windischgratz, as he said — who requested a secret con- ference with me. This I granted him. He assured me it was the desire of Field-marshal Windisch- gratz that I should lead the corps d'armee of the upper Danube to his serene highness — this I did not for a moment doubt ; and if I acceded to this desire, a full amnesty and a life free from care, though out of Austria, would be guaranteed to me — this also I did not doubt in the least. But when the messenger had finished, I nevertheless called into the room some staff-officers, communicated to them the object of the secret conference which had just taken place, and handed to the messenger a litho- graphed copy of my proclamation from Waizen, as the answer for HIM who Jiad sent him, with the remark, that this was the ultimatum of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube and of its commander. During our retreat from the Lajtha as far as Buda-Pesth, we had met, as has been mentioned, with but little sympathy on the part of the population ; in the mountain-towns, and the comitates bordering on the north, the majority was disposed even against us ; still the people remained generally passive, except a few tricolor demagogues, whose activity, however, had no other result than causing some individuals, renowned as black-and- yellow zealots, to be arrested by my orders in Schemnitz, trans- ported to Neusohl, and there after some days again set at liberty. But a dozen obscure Sclavonian agitators were carried with us as prisoners from St. Nikolaus (Szent Miklos), and afterward sent to Debreczin. . CHAPTER XX. The necessary orders having previously been given to the rear- guard for securing by a demonstration the march of the northern cohimn against the hostile brigade of Major-general Gotz, which was pressing on after us from the comitate of Turocz through that of Arva, and it having been likewise charged with the destruction of all the bridges in the valley of the Waag over which we had passed ; the main body of the Schlick corps just then operating, though unsuccessfully, against Tokja, with the intention of forcing the passage over the Theiss at that place ; both columns of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube could consequently easily and exactly execute the detailed orders given when in Neusohl for the whole march from the mountain-towns into the Zips, and on the 2d of February, 1849, they stood al- ready — the southern column with its head, the Gruyon division, in Iglo in the valley of the Hernad, the northern at the same height with it in the valley of the Poprad. Lieutschau was on that day still occupied by a feeble division of the Schlick corps. Colonel Guyon took no notice of it, and sent away his officers, who were awaiting his orders, with the soporific injunction that the next day should be a day of rest. But a critical night had still to precede that following day. In its course the Guyon division in Iglo was surprised by the hostile column of Leutschau, and lost a piece of artillery. The enemy himself, however, unwisely induced by the confusion which the surprise had caused in Guyon's camp to continue his attack longer than was advisable with his small forces, lost a part of his rocket-battery, whereupon he retreated hastily by Kirchdrauf (Szepes-Varalja) to the Branyiszko, that saddle of the mountain-chain separating the comitates of Saros and Zips, over which the shortest communication between Leutschau and Eperjes leads. Although this sudden attack could not be called a successful one, on account of the sensible loss which the enemy had suffered, yet it furnished a proof of the spirit of warlike resolution which MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 159 distinguished the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, and presaged hindrances to our further attempt at breaking through toward the upper Theiss ; the accomplishment of which we had to hasten so much the more, as the united hostile brigades of Generals Gotz and Prince Jablonowski, with their allies the Sclavonian militia, were pressing on after us in the valley of the Waag, being now only two days' march in our rear ; and as their attack on our rear, if combined with the simultaneous energetic opposition of the Schlick corps in our front, might very easily cause the ruin of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. There was, it is true, another expedient left us, by which it would have been possible to accomplish, without combat, the junction of our corps d'armee with that of Colonel Klapka, and then immediately attack Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick from the south and southwest — the original idea of the war-minister Meszaros. This expedient consisted in removing the corps d'armee into the valley of the little river Bodva, starting from Iglo in two columns ; to be executed with the one by Rosenau (Rosnyo-banya), Harskut, Almas, Gorgo, Torna to Moldau (Sepsi), and the other by Svedler, Einsiedel (Remete), Stosz, Metzen- seifen, to Jaszo. But then the enemy would also have been more favorably situated for the junction of his forces, now sep- arated by the corps d'armee of the upper Danube; and the fame of the Schlick corps, which had so much influence on our troops, would have been still more dangerously increased. The reasons which prevented us from adopting this plan were in fact mainly of a moral nature. They were the same which impelled us to force our way through the mountain-road over the Branyiszko, while only demonstrations were made in the Hernad valley by Krompach and Klukno ; the same reasons which determined me, in forcing this passage, to put in front those troops in which the least confidence could be placed. In consequence of tittle-tattle exaggeration, the mountain-road across the Branyiszko had gained the renown of being a defile, and moreover impregnable from the west. To force the Brany- iszko was at that time equivalent to taking the bull by the horns. But this was just the point to which I wished finally to bring my infantry, which, with the exception of only a few battalions, was not to be trusted. The Guyon division consisted of infantry of the thirty-third 160 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Honved battalion, which had been totally routed on the 21st of January at "Windschacht ; of the thirteenth Honved battalion, which had completely failed us on the following day, imme- diately after the first shot of the hostile chasseurs in the attack undertaken from Schemnitz against the turning-column of Col- onel Collery ; furthermore, of a battalion of what were called pioneers, a platoon of Hungarian volunteer chasseurs, and two Honved battalions raised in JSTeusohl only a fortnight ago, con- sisting of quite raw recruits sent in by the rural districts. The thirty-third and thirteenth battalions, ever since the days of "Windschacht and Schemnitz, remained, as may be conceived, in the odor of cowardice, and were ripe for decimation ; the pioneers and Hungarian chasseurs, about thirty men strong, were for action still unknown quantities, because untried ; but what could be expected from the fourteen-day soldiers of both the last- mentioned bodies of troops ? The other three divisions had at least one or two tried battalions. But the taking by storm of the Branyiszko by these last would have produced only an insignificant sensation among the corps d'armee : for every one was convinced beforehand that these few good battalions always valorously did their duty in presence of the enemy. Nay, it was even to be feared that a victory gained by the best troops would support the fixed idea that this favor- able result could have been obtained only by these very battal- ions. The more vivid their recollection of the defeats lately suffered, the more this would have caused the highly dangerous want of self-confidence to be felt by the less trusty divisions. In this way the trusty troops would have lost in numerical strength and the unixu^ly ones would have gained nothing ; while, on the contrary, an insignificant victory gained by the latter must become to the whole corps d'armee a source of higher self-confi- dence, in comparison with which the perhaps greater numerical loss would appear hardly worthy of notice. Therefore the Guyon division aloTie was sent on before to attack the hostile position on the Branyiszko, while the division of the left wing, designed for the support of the foimer, had to remain in Kirchdrauf (Szepes-Varalja), and the Kmety division to make a demonstration on the road along the Hernad. The Aulich division remained in the valley of the Poprad to support the rear-guard, the head-quarters in Leutschau. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 161 On the 5tli of Februaiy, 1849, the Guyon division attacked the enemy in his position on the Branyiszko ; while the officers of the head-quarters and their column innocently arranged a soiree dansante in Leutschau for the night from the 5th to the 6th. Since our side-march from Levencz and Verebely into the dis- trict of the mountain-towns, where our situation began to be a critical one, I recommended to the divisions the employment of similar preservatives against that poor-sinner state of mind which only too easily gets hold of the officers of an isolated army seriously and continually menaced from all sides — as the corps d'armee of the upper Danube was at that time — and immediately seizing also on the men, guarantees victory to the enemy even before the battle has commenced. I was myself, however, on that day too much racked by incer- titude about the issue of the combat on the Branyiszko, to take part this time, as on former occasions, in the quickly organized ball. Alone in my lodgings I awaited with painful impatience a report from the field of battle. Of Colonel Klapka we knew on the 5th of February only thus much, that he had still, on the 24th of January, the defensive task of frustrating the " advance of the Schlick corps d'armee across the Theiss, near Tokaj ; so we were informed by a letter written in French by Colonel Stein, adjutant-general of the war- minister, and containing the autograph signature of the minister of war, Meszaros, dated from Debreczin, the 24th of January, 1849, which reached me only on the 5th of February, that is, on the twelfth day after it had been dispatched. Meanwhile, it is true, rumors had reached my head-quarters about two encoun- ters, favorable for the Hungarian arms, which Colonel Klapka was said to have had with Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick on the 22d of January at Tarczal, and on the following day, the 23d, at Bodrog-Keresztur ; the said private letter of the 24th of January, however, did not mention the matter ; and as the distance of these places from Debreczin was only about twelve (German) miles, the news of both victories would have reached the latter place before the sending away of this letter. We had, therefore, so much the greater reason to doubt the au- thenticity of the rumors about the victories of Colonel Klapka at Tarczal and Bodrog-Keresztur, because these appeared under the same 2^07npous form as that under which many a defeat suffered 162 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. by us had been obliged to do duty as victory, to raise — as they said — the spirits of the people. According to the tenor of this official communication, and that we might act with certainty, we could by no means calculate upon a simultaneous energetic offensive of Colonel Klapka against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick. All we could expect was, that Colonel Klapka, on the news of our approach, would closely follow Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, who very probably was hastening against us from the Theiss. A resolute rear- guard, however, could nevertheless easily detain him until the Field-marshal should have succeeded in getting rid of our corps d'armee. In more precise terms : Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick stood with his main army on the 24th of January at Tokaj, on the Theiss, on the offensive against Debreczin ; Colonel Klapka with his corps, opposite to him, on the defensive. The supposition that the enemy had been successful in his offensive would have been an especially favorable one for the corps d'armee of the upper Danube in its position on the 5th of February, 1849. In order to preserve ourselves against optimist illusions, we had to assume that the certain news of our approach had found the Schlick corps still on this side the Theiss. Moreover, Colonel Guyon, four days before his arrival at Iglo, early in the morning of the 30th of January, had pryingly fallen upon a post of intelligence dispatched in our direction from the hostile column in Leutschau, and so unskillfully that some of these men escaped. They could on the same day have carried to Leutschau the certain report of our approach ; and on the next day, 31st of January, Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick in Tokaj — if nearer to Kaschau, the worse for us — could know what he had to do, in case he did not under-estimate the corps d'armee of the upper Danube — a circumstance which could not be sup- posed in a general like him. The distance from Tokaj to Korotnok on the western foot of the Branyiszko is nineteen (German) miles, consequently five successive marches of four miles per day. To accomplish this task presupposes £l brave, hardy infantry ; it does not, however, exceed — especially in winter — the maximum of what they can accomplish. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGAUY. 163 The troops of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick were inured to fatigue, and brave. It was impossible for the Klapka corps to persevere in these forced marches toujours a la piste of the main body of the Schlick corps. "Why ? Because the pursuer while following can never neglect certain precautionary measures — and these cost time ; because the pur- sued again and again stops the pursuer by opposing to him part of his forces as rear-guard ; because this rear-guard, besides its direct resistance, has moreover considerable means at its disposal for interrupting repeatedly the progress of the pursuer on a road intersected by many important local impediments, as is that from Tokaj to the Branyiszko. The strength of the Schlick troops was generally estimated at about 15,000 men. It is clear that the forced march of five days must produce a considerable number of stragglers. But even these taken into account, together with the rear-guard. Field- marshal Lieutenant Schlick on the 5th of February could oppose to us 10,000 men, in two columns at the same height, one on the Branyiszko, the other at Klukno on the Hernad ; while Colonel Klapka on the same day could have advanced scarcely further than Kaschau. Moreover, the road into Gallicia was open to the baggage of the Schlick corps. The attack upon the hostile position on the Branyiszko on the 5th of Februaiy, if repulsed, would only excite the enemy to as- sume the offensive, and this probably with the intention of again defeating us before Colonel Klapka had overtaken him ; while I should be obliged — on the one hand by the pursuit of the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades, together with their allies the Sclavon- ian militia, on the other by my determination no longer to avoid the combat — ^to act likewise on the offensive, namely, to a com- pulsory renewal of the attack of the 5th ; and thus the conflict between the Schlick corps and the corps d'armee of the upper Danube on the 6th of February must become a decisive one. By these combinations the issue of the attack of the 5th already obtained for us almost the importance of an answer to the ques- tion, *' To he, or not to be?'' and the painful impatience with which I was awaiting Guyon's report becomes explicable — the more so, as the news received from Kirchdrauf in the course of 164 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. the afternoon, that there had arrived thither already several "wagons full of wounded from the Guyon division, had placed beyond doubt the actual beginning of a serious battle on the Branyiszko. This news certainly did not sound unfavorable, considering that running away, and even leaving the wounded behind, after each serious engagement, had hitherto been exclusively the course fol- lowed by the most of the infantry of the corps d'armee, especially that belonging to the Guyon division. But the higher these hopes of mine had been raised hereby, the deeper they sunk on account of the inconceivably long delay of all further news. Despairing, I stood on the threshold of a reckoning with the past. The perception of unavoidable great dangers at hand, if con- sciousness does not refuse its assistance, urges us irresistibly to that height of intellectual activity, whence the still-hoping glance more boldly than at other times endeavors to pierce the vail of futurity, so as to discover beyond it more favorable con- junctures ; but whence the already-despairing searches in the opposite direction for that crossing of the roads where we perhaps took the wrong direction. The dangers which menaced the existence of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, and next, through it, that of the father- land, were unavoidably near and great. The perception of this had not indeed shaken my self-reliance, but it had put hope to flight, and in its room came the question, imperiously demanding an answer : Whether it would not have been better to have forborne that step, which had led me so far as to prevent me now from return- ing, although thousands looked up to me with the firm confidence, that I would not let them be destroyed in the desperatio^n of fruitless efforts ! Whether it would not have been better to have issued to the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, instead of the defying pro- clamations at Waizen, a pacific summons to a voluntary laying- down of arms. Although I had perceived when in Presburg : That the repeated attempts of the Vienna ministers to over- throw the constitution of Hungary by force of arms were 7Wt less revolutionary, because our attempt, on German-hereditary ground, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 165 to attack the Croat Ban Baron Jellachich in revolt against the lawful government of the country, even when, or xdAhexonly when, he had crept under the iegis of Field-marshal Prince "Windisch- griitz and his army — had been apparently an aggressive act against Austria. That the constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest. That such a contest was sufficiently justified by the single re- sult of rendering impossible for the present the re-establishment of its foi-mer dependent conditimi. That the nation now more assuredly owed it to its hmwr to seize the sword for the existence of Hungary as a state, because hitherto it had unfortunately indolently looked on while the rude arrogance of several from its midst drove the greatest part of the Sclavonians and Romanians into open revolt, and thus foolishly promoted only the views of those who desired nothing more earn- estly than the ruin of the state of Hungary. All this I had perceived while yet in Presburg. Nevertheless I was forced to admit when in Waizen : That the nation cared desperately little for its honor, and that I had not the power to force it to act otherwise. That the enemy had an armed force at its command /«r su- perior to ours. That consequently the contest — though demanded thrice over — must remain a fruitless one. In addition to this came the apprehension— excited by his un- worthy public conduct— oi\VL\x\g\3,Q^ on the part of Kossuth, which might be sufficient to justify, though only anachi'onistically, the acts of violence of the Vienna government. What then was it that, considering the visible degeneracy of the nation, the gigantic superiority of the enemy, and my shaken confidence in the purity of Kossuth's politics — could still prevent me from recognizing as my first duty to my companions in arms the speediest renunciation of all further resistance ? It was the conviction that, if the overthrowing of the reformed constitution of Hungary succeeded at the first assault, millions of families, for the sake of a few thousands, would immediately be brought again under the old yoke of subjection. And those who looked up to me with firm confidence that I would not allow them to perish in the desperation of fruitless 166 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. efforts, DID WELL IN TRUSTING ME ; foi 710 effort is fruitless when it is made in defense of the most essential 'personal rights of mil- lions ; and every day that the corps d'armee of the upper Danube passed under my command was gained for the securing of these rights — gained moreover for the very salutary chastisement (un- fortunately not the directly personal one) of those men who (I mention as an instance only one fact) had been sufficiently un- principled to advise the monarch to bind to-day a part of the army by an oath to the Hungarian Constitution, and expect to- morrow this very part of the army — perhaps out of loyal instinct'^ — to make common cause with the enemies of the Constitution they had sworn to. Thus I became quits with the past ; thus I remained from this time protected against all weapons which the future might turn against me with the intent of mortally injuring the sinews of my firm resolve to save or to avenge the constitution — namely, the conviction that I had to regret nothing of all I had already done for this purpose, nor the consequences of it. With the equanimity of resignation I now awaited the still- delayed news of the issue of the battle on the Branyiszko. CHAPTER XXI. The night between the 5th and 6th of February was half passed, when an officer delivered to me Colonel Guyon's written report, that the enemy had abandoned his position, begun his retreat toward Eperjes, and was being vigorously pursued. Colonel Guyon sent me at the same time one of the enemy's dispatches that had been seized. It contained an urgent request from the commander of the hostile column opposed on the Hernad to our Kmety division — which was making demonstrations along the same road toward Kaschau — to the hostile commander on the Branyiszko, Major-general Count Deym, for assistance, especially artillery. The situation of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube ap- peared now to be suddenly essentially changed. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 167 From this hostile dispatch we could conclude with certainty : That the hostile column on the Hernad must be much weaker than that which had been dislodged from the Branyiszko ; and that, consequently, Before Eperjes we could scarcely any longer mieet with resist- ance. For if Major-general Deym could have thought it possible at all to prevent our advance with his comparatively feeble brigade — if I remember right, scarcely 2000 men strong — even by the total loss of all his troops, he would assuredly not have aban- doned the position on the Branyiszko ; just as he would hardly have left it, if he had entertained the slightest hope of receiving any considerable reinforcement in the course of the day, or even of the following night, by arresting some division of the Schlick corps on its advance against us, and already sufficiently near for the purpose. The surprisingly small strength of the enemy dislodged from the Branyiszko — according to the supposition that we had before us on the evening of the 5th the Schlick main army in two col- umns, on the Branyiszko and on the Hernad — showed, first of all, that Either the passage of the enemy across the Theiss near Tokaj had succeeded, and consequently Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick already menaced Debreczin, and resolutely marching against this object, doubtless the most important, deliberately abandoned the base of his operations ; Or, that he had undervalued the importance of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube previous to the successful and yet miscarried surprise of Iglo (in the night from the 2d to the 3d of February), but that after this surprise there was no longer suffi- cient time to oppose to us a greater force on these barriers. Both indications urged us to a speedy continuation of the of- fensive thus favorably commenced. On the 6th the Aulich division was removed from the Poprad valley into the line of Kirchdrauf, Krompach ; the head-quarters to Kirchdrauf I hastened in a carriage after Colonel Guyon to- ward Eperjes, to convince myself of the real position of affairs. I did not succeed, however, in overtaking him ; for I had to be back again in Kirchdrauf before evening, to resolve upon the dispositions for the following day, and to issue them. But I ;^-L'. 168 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. came up with the division of the left wing, which followed close on the Guy on division, and learnt from its commander that Col- onel Guyon had already reached Eperjes, and found it evacuated by the enemy. This unexpected hasty abandonment of the base of operations led us to suppose that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, after the loss of the Branyiszko, had suddenly resolved to effect espe- cially the junction of his corps with the brigades of the Major- generals Gotz and Jablonowski ; that he intended to accomplish this on the shortest communication between Kaschau and Leut- schau, by Bela, Hamor, and Klukno ; and for this reason drew back with such uncommon celerity, on the road to Eperjes to- ward Kaschau, the part of his corps which had been repulsed from the Branyiszko. By doing so he could meanwhile have his baggage escorted safely from Kaschau by Jaszo, Schmolnitz (Szomolnok), into the Zips. This supposition was by no means improbable in itself, because we knew nothing whatever of Klapka's operations, except what we learnt from the official communication of the 24th of Janu- ary, and the still earlier rumors about the encounters at Tarc- zal and Keresztur ; and this decided us (on the 7th of February) to leave the whole Kmety division on its former line of demon- stration on the Hernad, but to dispose the Aulich division from Kirchdrauf only as far as half-way toward Eperjes, while the head-quarters, together with the division of the left wing, were trasferred to Eperjes. According, however, to information obtained by scouts in the evening of the 7th, the enemy seemed again to have evacuated Eperjes for the purpose of concentrating himself behind the river Tarcza, and once more advancing against us ; since the scouts reported that they had seen large masses of troops moving from Kaschau toward Eperjes. It was then to be expected that the enemy would attack on the following day ; and as a precaution the Aulich division was now ordered all the way to Eperjes ; while the Kmety division received instructions to advance on the direct road toward Kas- chau by Hamor and Bela, from the 8th onward no longer merely making demonstrations, but attacking in earnest where it met with resistance ; and as soon as it should hear a continued can- nonade in the direction of its left flank, immediately to march J%m.. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 169 awaiiist Kaschau, and even if its attacks should be repeatedly re- pulsed, incessantly to begin them anew. Intending to let the enemy come over the Tarcza before we re- sumed the projected offensive against him, we remained during the night from the 7th to the 8th on the defensive ; and were surprised on the morning of the 8th by the news, tho.t tJie enemy Jiad demolisJied the bridge over the river Tarcza at Leinesdn. I say ''surprised,'' because — after the enemy had sufficiently convinced us by the advance of his main body toward the Tarcza, which had begun on the previous evening, that he did not intend the execution of the above-mentioned junction with the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades — we had no reason to take this advance for a defensive measure, unless we had presupposed as certain the closest proximity of Klapka's corps in the rear of the enemy. But this we could not do, since all our scouts sent to look out for Klapka, either did not come back at all, or if they did, it was without bringing us any intelligence. Not till after the retreat of the ' enemy from Lemesdn did an emissary, whom Colonel Klapka had sent to me several days previously, succeed in reach- ing my head-quarters. Now the communication over the Tarcza had first to be re- stored. Considering the little experience and imperfect equip- ment of my corps of pioneers, this required much time. We hoped to find near Felso-Olcsar a communication still remaining across the river. Information collected beforehand confirmed this, and made us resolve to advance in two columns from Eperjes toward Kaschau, with the Aulich division on the left bank of the Tarcza to the passage just named ; but with the Guyon division and that of the left wing on the main road over the bridge near Lemesan, which should be previously repaired. Before the arrival in our camp of Klapka's emissary, we be- lieved that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick intended to fall back only as far as the mountain of Kaschau, for the purpose of giving us there a decisive battle, when we should have been nearer to the town of Kaschau — the point of junction of the line of retreat of his main body — as well as to the column detached on the direct road from Kaschau to Leutschau against our Kmety division. We intended in that case, by advancing on the main road of Eperjes with the Guyon division and that of the left wing, to oc- cupy him in front until the Aulich division should have accom- H 170 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. plished its passage across the Tarcza at Felso-Olcsar, but then immediately to pass over to the real decisive attack upon the front and right flank of his position ; while the Kmety division, advised by the thunder of the guns, had to do the same upon the isolated line of attack which had been assigned to it. But since we had been apprised- — as has been said, only late in the course of the 8th of February — by our emissary, that Colonel Klapka had been some days already acting on the offensive against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick — the chief of my gen- eral staff called my attention to the circumstance, that Count Schlick very probably intended to evacuate Kaschau and fall back by Torna into the district of the operations of the Austrian chief army ; and I therefore abandoned the intention of awaiting the Aulich division, which might possibly be delayed by its pas- sage over the river at Felso-Olcsar. The Guyon division and that of the left wing had to attack the enemy immediately and with- out hesitation, wherever they might find him. But the restoration of the bridge at Lemesan went on so slowly, that our advanced troops did not reach Kaschau till the morning of the 10th of February, while the enemy had left the town on the evening of the 9th. At the same time Klapka's corps also arrived at Kaschau, and the corps d'armee of the upper Danube was now again united on the Theiss with the Hungarian forces, which had meanwhile been greatly strengthened. In the course of the same day Colonel Klapka appeared in Kaschau ; and late in the evening I repaired thither myself, to deliberate with him and arrange our further operations. Klapka — after he had succeeded by the battles at Tarczal, Bodrog-Keresztur, and Tokaj (on the 22d, 23d, and 31st of January), in frustrating the attempt of the Schlick corps to cross the Theiss — in the beginning of February had assumed the offensive against it on his own behalf, without knowing any thing more of me than that I still continued the struggle in the mountain-towns, in spite of the instructions of the war-minister to hasten back to the upper Theiss. Only the unexpected hasty falling back of the Schlick corps on all lines toward Kaschau, after the hot days of Tarczal, Keresztur, and Tokaj, led Klapka to the conclusion that I must already have left the mountain-towns and appeared in the rear of his adversary. He then accelerated his own advance to\vard MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 171 Kaschau, summoning all his strength, and thus rendered it abso- lutely impossible for Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick to execute his purpose, resolved upon too late, of falling with all his forces first upon me, and then turning himself anew against Klapka only after he had vanquished me. Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick must now have seen that he would be attacked in Kaschau at latest on the 10th of Feb- ruary by both Hungarian corps in the north and south simul- taneously, and evacuated, as has been mentioned, the town on the 9th, in order to save his corps by a bold though dangerous retreat through Torna toward Waizen. Although this retreat was, so to say, executed before Klapka's eyes, he was nevertheless unable to prevent it, because on the 9th the main body of his corps was, in spite of accelerating his advance to the utmost of his power, still in part one, in part two days' march in the rear behind the Hernad, and as the advanced troops alone were then and there at his disposal. But this only made him resolve to pursue the fleeing enemy more energetically; and for this purpose, on the 10th of February he disposed one half of his main body as far as Enyiczke and Nagy- Ida, while the other half arrived at Hidas-Nemeti. and two divisions of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube at Kas- chau. Thus stood matters when Colonel Klapka and myself saw each other again, on the evening of the said day, for the first time since the evacuation of the capitals. On the 11th of February Klapka expected, by means of a forced march, to approach the enemy sufficiently near to be able to overtake him by the following or at latest the second day thereafter, and at least to disperse him in detail. I was, how- ever, during the same time, to prevent at any cost the junction of the Schlick corps d'armee with the Gbtz and Jablonowski brigades, which had followed me as far as the Zips ; and when successful in this, was to attack them. Thus we aimed at weakening in every possible way, if not at the entire destruction of the hostile forces in upper Hungary, so as thereby to render the chief army of Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz less able to withstand the attacks which were to be directed against it from the middle Theiss. We agreed in an instant on the earlier details of our separate 172 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. operations. The results of these operations to become the basis of later ones. My wish to examine the corps d'arm6e of Colonel Klapka, or at all events a part of it, decided me to start in a carriage during the night from the 10th to the 11th for Hidas-Nemeti where, as has been mentioned, a part of the corps was just then stationed. I intended to accompany these troops on the 11th of February on their march, in order to observe them more ilosely during it, and that I might be enabled to institute a comparison between them and those of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. This part of Klapka's corps was to leave Hidas-Nemeti on the 11th, and follow that part which had already advanced as far as Nagy-Ida and Enyiczke. But on its way it was overtaken by a new order of Klapka, in obedience to which it had immediately to return and march back toward Miskolcz. Greatly surprised at this unexpected disposition, in direct con- tradiction to our agreement of the preceding evening, I left the column, which was now returning again toward Hidas-Nemeti, and hastened to Klapka's head-quarters at Enyiczke, for the purpose of learning the reason of this counter-march ; which I found to be, that an order had suddenly arrived from Lieutenant- general Dembinski, for Colonel Klapka instantly to set out back again toward Miskolcz, by forced marches, with the whole of his corps. Klapka was at that time under Dembinski's chief command. He consequently believed himself bound to obey, and I could not prevent him ; but I resolved to undertake immediately — though late — the pursuit of the Schlick corps abandoned by him, with a part of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube ; without, however, giving up the offensive against the Gotz and Jablo- nowski brigades. The division of the left wing of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube had therefore in the course of the day (the 11th) to start from Kaschau, and hasten after the Schlick corps. The latter had by this time, it is true, gained an advance of two days' march — thanks to Dembinski's order ; during the next two days, however, its rear-guard was overtaken, and on the 13th at daybreak surprised near Szen. The enemy lost in all MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 173 perhaps from 60 to 70 cavalry and about 100 infantry ; but this was the sole result of the pursuit — and the last of my acts as the independent commander of the royal Hungarian corps d'armee of the upper Danube. CHAPTER XXII. At the same time as the account of the successful surprise at Szen, a dispatch from the minister of war once more, after a long pause, arrived at my head-quarters. It contained two most important documents : 1. An ordre de hataille for the whole Hungarian forces. 2. The nomination of the Polish Lieutenant-general Dembin- ski as commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian troops, ex- cept those which were under Bem's chief command in Transylvania, the garrisons of the fortresses that were in our hands, and the troops surrounding those occupied by the enemy. According to this I also was placed under Dembinski's orders. The first named document divided the whole of the Hungarian forces into isolated divisions of from 4,0.00 to 6,000 men each, which received the appellation " division of the army," and a number as a distinctive mark. These divisions were to serve the commander-in-chief in his strategic combinations as a war- operative unity. The former corps d'armee were consequently divided, according to their strength, into from two to three such divisions of the army. The strength of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube — amounting still to from 15,000 to 16,000 men in consequence of our losses in the mountain-towns having been from time to time compensated for by continual recruitings — was not known in Debreczin at the time when this ordre de hataille was drawn up. The corps d'armee of the upper Danube accordingly figured as a single army-division, the XVIth, in the said document. (After- ward, however, I was charged to divide it into three army-divi- sions, while it received as corps d'armee, instead of the designa- 174 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tion " of the upper Danube," the number VIL By the appella- tion the " seventh corps d'armee" will therefore in future always be meant the former corps d'armee of the upper Danube.) The rumor had preceded these dispatches by some days, and had encountered considerable antipathies in the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. The greater number of the officers had, like myself, not even the slightest knowledge of the glorious war- like past of Lieutenant-general Dembinski ; while the sudden re- call of the Klapka corps to Miskolcz, and the immediate favorable consequences of this measure to the fleeing enemy, were not ex- actly calculated to create all at once confidence in the talents of the unknown foreigner as a general. These officers, not dissatis- fied with my command hitherto, did not consider my being subor- dinated to the authority of this foreigner, whose debut was so un- lucky, as in any way justifiable, and believed that the motives for Dembinski's appointment as commander-in-chief must be sought. Partly in the animosity of the Committee of Defense against me, caused by the proclamation of Waizen ; Partly in the intention to give them a leader who did not recognize that proclamation. The first supposition raised the sympathies of the officers for me, and at the same time their jealousy of the relatively-increas- ing importance of the other Hungarian corps in consequence of the degradation of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube to a simple army-division ; while the second quite sufficed to awaken again the apprehensions of " republican intrigues," declared first after the evacuation of the mountain-towns, and for a while ap- peased bv the proclamation of Waizen, which was silently ac- knowledged by the government. The consequence of this was, that consultations took place in almost all the divisions about measures of resistance, more or less energetic, against the recent decree of the war-minister Meszaros, who through it fell under the suspicion of allowing himself to be made a tool of by the Committee of Defense. I was informed of these agitations, however, only when, in con- sequence of them, three divisions had already declared themselves positively against my subordination to Dembinski's orders, and for the independency of my position as commander of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube. Nay, the Kmety division especi- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 175 ally assured me of its absolute obedience, even in case I should judge it to be necessary to lead it against Debreczin. The Guyon division only, in opposition to the other three divisions of the corps, gave an evasive declaration ; but with it, and as com- mentary on it, the information arrived at the same time from this very division that Colonel Guyon had made this declaration toithout Jiaving consulted the body of his officers. From these expressions of such a lively antipathy against Dem- binski's being commander-in-chief, though they had been evinced only after previous agitations, I could nevertheless not avoid com- ing to the conclusion, that the older officers in particular, with whom the agitations originated, felt just as strongly as myself an apprehension that Hungary's combat in self-defense would ac- quire, sooner or later, through the participation of foreign ele- ments in it, an aggressive signification against Austria, by which the invasion of Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz would be afterward justified. But this conclusion led me next to the thought, either to retire from my post, or straightway to oppose myself with the corps d'armee to the recent decree of the war- minister. However, I could not long fail to see that the former step would immediately have brought with it the dissolution of the whole corps d'armee of the upper Danube. For had not its bravest, its most useful officers repeatedly declared, that they M^ould take part in the combat only so long as w?/ participation in it guaranteed to them the maintenance, on the part of the Committee of De- fense also, of the principles expressed in the proclamation of Waizen ? Now the dissolution of my corps d'armee would very considerably have weakened Hungary's means of resistance ; and consequently by retiring I should have injured the cause of my country more than, for instance, his serene highness Field-mar- shal Prince Windischgratz, whose especial charge it was. I therefore could not leave my post. But if I remained at my post and would not obey, then I must be prepared for its resulting in my dismissal, the conse- quences of which would have been tantamount to those of my voluntary retirement. After calm reflection, there was nothing left for me but to obey, and console myself meanwhile with the vain hope, that the recent measures of the government, though they had not their 176 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. origin in a correct perception of the true interests of our distressed country, yet still were not to be exclusively ascribed to impure motives. Once resolved on obedience, I had next to think on the means of paralyzing the spirit of resistance against the decree of the war- minister, which, by these agitations, had been stirred up in the whole corps d'armee ; and to do this without — by an unwise de- creeing of punishments against the continuance of the agitations which apparently had been introduced imder my segis, because by officers high in rank — giving rise to a suspicion that I ap- proved of Dembinski's being appointed commander-in-chief, and thereby weakening, to the disadvantage of the country, the confi- dence of the corps in me, and thus obtaining instead of a prompt obedience, because voluntary, at most a passive, because forced one. That, on the other hand, I must not approve of the agitations was plain ; but neither could I ignore them entirely, for it was already generally known that I had been informed of their result. I thought I should solve this difficult problem best by issuing the follow pacifying address to the corps d'armee, avoiding therein all political matters, and assuming that the corps d'armee was, as it were, wounded only in its esprit cle corps. " Order of the Day. " The decree of the Minister of war of the 12th of February, 1849, places the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, with the changed appellation of the ' Royal Hungarian sixteenth division of the army' under the chief com- mand of Lieutenant-general Dembinski. " In officially communicating this to the whole sixteenth division of the army, I most solemnly call upon all the staff and superior officers under my command to treat this apparent humiliation with the same indifference with which I — resigning my independence as commander of a corps d'armee, in obedience to the decree of the united Diet — submit myself freely to the orders of the Lieutenant-general Dembinski, who is said to be a worthy general, and one grown gray in war. (My signature follows.) " Kaschau, Uth of February, 1849." This address had the desired effect. The agitations in my favor against Dembinski — though as I heard afterward, secretly continued — were in future without any disturbing influence on the free submission of the corps to the orders of the general-in-chief The minister of war Meszaros, however, regarded this order of the day as the corpus delicti of a daring attempt on my part MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 177 to stir up mutiny against himself and Dembinski, and resolved to reprimand me — as it seemed very seriously. This reprimand was nevertheless a well-deserved one, because I had omitted to inform the war-minister of the circumstances which had called this order of the day into existence ; although I had omitted to do so only for this reason, because therein 1 must inevitably have thrown a very clear light on his nullity as war-minister in regard to Kossuth and the Committee of Defense. CHAPTER XXIII. Almost simultaneously with the above-mentioned dispatches from the minister of war, I also received an order from Dembinski immediately to communicate to him circumstantially what was the strength of my corps, how and where it was distributed, and what plan of operations I had at that time in execution. Dembinski received all this information without delay. My plan of operations was that concerted with Klapka a few days previously. In my communication I pointed out the import- ance of the continued occupation of Kaschau, the advantageous position of my corps d'armee just then, and the extremely un- favorable situation of the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades, and their allies the Sclavonian militia. I did not fail also to c^li Dembinski's attention to what a favorable opportunity w^as oflbr- ed to us at this moment of defeating separately, on the one hand the last-named hostile forces, on the other the Schlick corps ; and perhaps, by my rapid advance to the relief of Komorn, of com- pelling Field-marshal Prince "Windischgratz again to relinquish his offensive operations against the Theiss ; and by these means secure to ourselves time, of which we had still no superfluity, to prepare for a decisive stroke. Dembinski's answer was to this effect, that he did not by any means overlook the value of my suggestions relative to the near- est operations ; but that he perceived the moment for the intend- ed decisive blow had already arrived, and could not be deferred : he therefore urgently summoned me for the present to leave to 178 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. their fate the brigades of Gbtz and Jablonowski, together with their allies the Sclavonian militia, and lead my corps d'armee, as soon as possible, from their position around Kaschau to Mis- kolcz. In consequence of this order I left Kaschau ; and dividing my corps into two columns, marched one by Enyiczke, Forro, Szikszo, the other by Moldau and along the valley of the Bodva, to Mis- kolcz. Dembinski received, with a report hereupon, at the same time a detailed account of the daily stations on the route. By this means he could send his dispositions direct to any single division during the march, instead of forwarding them through me. The two columns of the seventh army corps were of the same strength. Each of them consisted of two divisions (I still retain- ed meanwhile the original plan of having the corps d'armee in four divisions) : the column in the valley of the Bodva, of the division of the left wing (the command of which, after the volun- tary retirement of its former commander, was confided to Colonel afterward General Poltenberg), and the Guyon division ; the second column — that on the high road from Kaschau to Miskolcz — consisted of the Aulich and Kmety divisions. At the head of both columns were, in the valley of the Bodva, the Poltenberg division, on the main road the Aulich division. On the 20th of February, according to the plan for the march, the former should have arrived at the height of Edeleny, the latter at Szikszo. On the same day, while on the way from Forro to Szikszo, the latter received Dembinski's order, by turning westward into Szikszo from the main road, to continue its march with the least possible interruption as far as Sajo-Szent-Peter. That I might obtain some certain information respecting the movements of the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades, I had re- mained later in Kaschau, and left this town only with the last sections of my corps. I did not, therefore, learn the altered route of the Aulich division till afterward, from a report of its com- mander. "Whether this deviation from the line of march toward Miskolcz was for a part of the distance only — a temporary one — or rather was the starting-point of a new line of operations, perhaps re- moved to the road to Lossoncz, was for me now a most import- ant question, because on it depended the arrangements to be MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 179 made, by way of precaution, relative to providing for the corps. I thought I should receive an explanation soonest by proceeding to Dembinski's head-quarters at Miskolcz, and accordingly hast- ened thither in the first instance, on the 21st of February. Both Dembinski and his adjutant were absent ; and nobody at his head-quarters could give me the desired explanation. This uncertainty as to the position of the seventh army corps, of which the Aulich and Poltenberg divisions should, according to the original plan of march, have already reached Miskolcz on the 21st ; the conviction that Dembinski had taken no care what- ever to provide for them in the new district of location, and that consequently these divisions for that day at least must either suffer from hunger, or resort to the forcible seizure of the most essential supplies ; and, in the next place, the apprehension of seeing undermined the hitherto good discipline of the seventh corps through the repeated occurrence of such demoralizing cir- cumstances, which though certainly not always unavoidable, yet generally, and in this case especially, could very easily have been guarded against : all this induced me to represent, in a letter to General Dembinski, the injury which must result to the success of our arms, if he directed the movements of isolated parts of an army corps without at the same time giving due infoi-mation on the subject to its commander, who was responsible for the main tenance of his troops in a warlike condition. The letter which contained these representations was delivered at Dembinski's head-quarters, with a request that I might be immediately informed of his return. He did not return, if I recollect rightly, till the morning of the 22d of February ; and I at once waited upon him, in com- pany with the chief of the general staff, as well as the then adjutant of the seventh army corps, and another officer of my suite. As I entered with my companions, Dembinski had just finished reading my last letter to him ; he had perhaps also already seen the " Order of the Day," of the 14th of February, from Kaschau, given above ; and probably both had violently excited him against me ; for scarcely had I introduced myself and my com- panions, when he attacked me with uproarious vehemence. He expatiated on his services to Hungary, and the great sacrifices he had already made for the salvation of my country. 180 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. " I have laid down the supreme command in my fatherland* to save this poor comitry," cried he ; " yes, I have just now saved your corps, while you do not trouble yourself at all about it. Do you know where your divisions are ? No I you do not know I Yet you reproach me. I came to Hungary only on the condition that I should be intrusted with the supreme command over all the Hungarian troops ; and the government has em- powered me to have you shot, if you do not obey. I have met you with kindness, because I know that it must mortify a Hun- garian to serve under a non-Hungarian. But you reproach me for my orders, instead of obeying them I" Dembinski was somewhat exhausted by the excessive strain- ing of his voice, and gasped a moment for breath. 1 wished to take advantage of this involuntary pause to show him that his orders, so far as they concerned me, had been punctually fol- lowed. But he probably attributed to me an aggressive inten- tion, and interrupted me with the question, several times repeated in the greatest passion : whether I thought he had not courage enough to fight a duel with me. Without, however, waiting for my answer, he suddenly digressed to recent events. "I advised you to be very cautious on your march toward Putnok," continued he ; " why have you not followed my ad- vice ?" and so on. It was to Dembinski's adjutant, who was present, and made meanwhile unceasing efforts to calm his chief, that I owed at last the opportunity of speaking. I now enumerated all the orders which had come to me from him, showed that they had been punctually followed, and wished to know what order I had disobeyed. As he could make no reply to this, he again began talking of the above advice, which I had not followed. But I reminded him, that disregard of well-meant advice was not disobedience ; that, besides, his advice had been quite super- fluous, as the march of the seventh army corps from Kaschau to Miskolcz had been already arranged with an eye to the danger which threatened from Putnok ; and I finally requested him to send me only orders, and to communicate to me also such as he should think it necessary to give in a direct manner to separate * Dembinski probably meant that which was intended for him in spe of a new insurrection in Poland. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 181 divisions of my corps ; but that, once for all, I thanked him most courteously for his advice. Hereupon I and my companions took our leave. I could not on this occasion resist the impression, that I had just made the acquaintance of a man who would be much more in his proper place as the inmate of a lunatic asylum than as the leader of an army. Dembinski's adjutant, a circumspect man, followed us directly, and sought to excuse the unwonted violence of his chief, by representing it as the consequence of my letter, which had been taken as conveying censure. He assured me besides, that Dem- binski already saw that in his passion he had given way to un- just expressions ; adding that, for these reasons, he hoped no ob-, stacle would be made on my part to smoothing the way for a future entente cordiale between us. I declared to Dembinski's adjutant, that, on the contrary, I intended to take care to preserve a good understanding between myself and his chief; but would therefore raise my demands on his exertions in the service of my country so much the higher. Dembinski's performances up to that time, however, so far as I was acquainted with them, justified but very slender expecta- tions. On the 5th of February he had crossed the firmly frozen Theiss near Lok, below Tokaj, with the then Kazinczy army- division, and had marched at first to Miskolcz. There he learned on the 9th, or at latest in the night between the 9th and the 10th, that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick had left the town of Kaschau, taking the road to Torna. On the 11th he ordered back to Miskolcz the Klapka corps (from this time called the first army corps), which was pursuing the enemy ; but while on its march made it turn toward Sajo-Szent-Peter and Putnok. On the 14th of February Dembinski attacked, with only the Kazinczy division the main body of the retreating Schlick corps at Tornalja. The attack was repulsed at its very beginning ; whereupon Dembinski drew the Klapka corps, together with the Kazinczy division, which had at the same time been broken up and incorporated with it, back to Miskolcz, and from thence made them advance on the road of Mezo-Kovesd toward the capitals. The seventh army corps he likewise called back from Kaschau to Miskolcz, to make it follow the first corps. 182 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Now the question was, why Dembinski, who certainly intended to attack Schlick's retreating corps in earnest and not in mere fun, had not done this two days sooner (on the 12th)? Tor- nalja is only seven (German) miles from Miskolcz ; Dembinski could consequently quite easily have stood before Tornalja on the 12th. The answer to this might perhaps be found in the recalling of the first army corps from Nagy-Ida and Enyiczke to Miskolcz, and would be, that Dembinski did not dare to go against the Schlick corps with the feeble Kazinczy division alone. But this explanation is contradicted by the fact, that on the 14:th he had nevertheless actually dared the attack with only ihe Kazinczy division; while the first army corps remained inactive at Putnok. Then again, in excuse of Dembinski, it might be assumed that he had moved the first army corps nearer to the point of attack only that, being protected by it in his rear, he might be able to execute his attacks with the Kazinczy division the nioie boldly and obstinately. Irrespective of the strategic disproportion which existed in the present case between the modest offensive opera- tions of a single weak division and the imposing protective meas- ures which had required a whole corps d'armee, this supposition is contradicted by the notorious haste with which Dembinski at once utterly abandoned the attack on the marching column of the Schlick corps, as soon as the enemy had seemed disposed seriously to accept the combat. Irresolution stamped this mismanaged offensive of Dembinski against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick. A further performance of Dembinski was the following : While the seventh army corps, as has been mentioned, was marching in two columns of equal strength and on the same height, the one in the Bodva valley, the other on the high road from Kaschau to Miskolcz, Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick made an offensive movement from Rimaszombat by Putnok to- ward Miskolcz. Dembinski, informed of this sufficiently early, was quite right in concentrating both the Guyon and Poltenberg divisions when advancing toward Sajo-Szent-Peter, the point menaced next by the enemy, and moreover drew toward him also the Aulich division from Szikszo, in order energetically to repulse the enemy. To this measure nothing can be objected. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 183 But now the enemy — apprised of this — suddenly gives up the offensive, and withdraws, by a forced retreat, from the dan- ger of a disadvantageous conflict. And what does Dembinsld then? He allows the three divisions from early in the morning till late at night, in battle array, to await — evidently in vain — the attack of the enemy, while man and horse are perishing with HUNGER AND THIRST. This mistake made me apprehend a great want of penetration on the part of Dembinski. But irresolution and want of penetration are not among the qualities desired in a general. I CHAPTER XXIV. It seemed as if Dembinski seriously intended to assume the offensive against the Austrian army. In the evening of the same day on which I had spoken for the first time with him (22d of February), I received an order to follow the first army corps on the main road toward Mezo- Kovesd. All the dispositions during this advance were forwarded to us, already elaborated in their details, from Dembinski's war-oflice. On the 24th of February the head-quarters of Lieutenant- general Dembinski were in Mezo-Kovesd, mine in Mezo-Keresztes. I availed myself of the afternoon of that day to pay a visit to Dembinski ; for I really wished to bring about a good understand ing between him and me. He received me in such a manner as plainly showed that he intended to make me forget his absurd behavior during our first meeting in Miskolcz. He had just got Klapka's report of a sudden attack made during the preceding night on those troops of the Schlick corps which had entered Petervasara the day before, but which had been only partially successful. Some days earlier a hostile division of cavalry had been sur- 184 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. prised in Kompolt by Aristid Dessewffy, first lieutenant in the first army corps, and had suffered severe loss. These attacks greatly incensed Dembinski against Klapka. He asserted that by such surprises our offensive was only re- vealed to the enemy before the time ; while, on the other hand, they prevented the enemy from discovering his own intentions. It can not be denied that there was a certain originality in this opinion. Its originality was especially evident in the nat- ural consequence resulting from it, which in the present instance plainly amounted to this, that Dembinski would have been better pleased if Colonel Klapka had allowed himself to be suddenly attacked by the Austrians ; because then, on the contrary, they %vould have revealed their offensive prematurely, and Klapka would have been prevented from discovering Dembinski' s in- tentions. Besides Klapka, the government also was on this day the ob- ject of Dembinski's dissatisfaction. He complained, that the seat of the government being fixed in Debreczin, and the neces- sity of continually protecting that town, greatly increased the ditficulty of his task against the enemy. Further, that the government could not be depended on for the fulfillment of its promises : thus, for instance, it had been promised to him, that from the 16th of February onward there should constantly be a fortnight's provisions for 60,000 men at his disposal in Tiszafiired ; while according to the reports which had just been received from thence, the wants of the next five days were scarcely pro- vided for. The entente cordiale between Dembinski and myself seemed now to be in a fair way. Dembinski had already made me the confidant of his vexation at Klapka's sudden attacks, and at the unfulfilled promises of the government. Satisfied with these results of my initiative at accommodation, I returned toward evening to my head-quarters at Mezo-Keresztes. In Dembinski's war-office the detailed dispositions for the next days had been delivered to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps, who had accompanied me on this visit, in case Dembinski should think proper to admit him to a consulta- tion in common — while Dembinski himself had not said a word about them to me, and had evidently been endeavoring to avoid any conference upon our operations. Thus I learned only after MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 185 I had already left Dembinski what was to be done on the en suing days. The dispositions made known the intention of first occupying the little river Tama from Sirok as far as Bod ; but at the same time in the details the tendencij to isolate from each other the divisions of one mid the same army corps was striking. While the one half of the first army corps was ordered to Sirok, and the other to Kapolna, the Poltenberg division of the seventh army corps, advancing from Mezo-Kosved through Kc» recsend, had*^to place itself between the former two, and occupy Verpelet and Fel-Dobro, while the Aulich division should take its direction to Kal. To perceive the disadvantages of thus intermingling two army corps accustomed to the peculiarities of their own commanders, no very rare perspicacity — one would think — is wanted. Dembinski consequently was either destitute of even this per- spicacity, or the motive of this measure, uncalled for by the circumstances, and materially restricting the capacity of the separated divisions as well as of the whole army corps for ren- dering service, was no other than a definite endeavor on his part to accustom the separated divisions to being isolated from their commanders of army corps, thereby weakening the dreaded influence of these commanders on the minds of their troops, and thus to render possible the predominance of his own influence. Dembinski had given me to understand on the 24th of Feb- ruary in Mezo-Kovesd, that he was desirous of speaking with me again on an early day, but that on the following day he would remove his head-quarters to Erlau (Eger.) This intima- tion induced me to pay him a second visit in the forenoon of next day, the 25th, while he was still in Mezo-Kovesd, and before his departure for Erlau. But I no longer found him in his old head-quarters ; and supposing that he had probably some important affair to discuss with me, I immediately -continued my ride as far as Erlau. I overtook him on the road thither, entered with him into Erlau, and there awaited his orders. Toward evening he excused himself, that he had found neither time nor opportunity for a conference with me, and appointed the next day at his head-quarters. I had to ride back during the night to Mezo-Kovesd, to make 186 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. some important arrangements in my own head-quarters, which on the 26th of February were to be at that place. In the forenoon of the 26th, however, I was back again in Erlau, expecting Dembinski's orders. This time he spoke with me only upon some measures relating to the subsistence of the troops. But in the further course of the conversation he put some questions to me about the ground and the manner of fighting which were best suited to the troops of the seventh army corps. I told him that hitherto they had learnt only the little war in the mountains. He then inquired what kind of troops in the corps were most to be depended upon. Before, however, I could answer, he said that he believed our infantry, as a whole, could not be relied on, but that from the cavalry he expected extraordinary services. I confirmed his supposition in so far as related to the seventh army corps — the other corps I hardly knew by name ; at the same time calling his attention to the fact that our cavalry, though superior to that of the enemy in agility and perseverance, was by no means its equal in numerical strength. Dembinski hereupon assured me, with much earnestness, that he uncommonly wished for a few thousand more men than WERE JUST THEN AT HIS DISPOSAL. It can not in fact be denied that therein Dembinski had SOMETHING in common with the most celebrated generals. Meantime midday had arrived. Dembinski was entertained by a prebendary in Erlau, and invited me, together with the chief of the general stafi' of my army corps, who had again accompanied me on this visit, to dine with him. The meal was nearly over ; we were just adding the best to the good — the world-renowned Erlau wine — when suddenly it was reported that a brisk thundering of cannon was heard in the direction of Verpelet. Dembinski denied it a priori, and did so even very angrily when the report was confidently repeated. Having opened a window of the saloon, I had meanwhile convinced myself with my own ears of the correctness of the report, and now invited Dembinski to do the same. Unwillingly he quitted the table, came near the window, and listened ; his countenance expressing the conviction that we were all deceived. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 187 The repeated hollow sound of the ground, however, was too distinctly perceptible, and too similar to the distant thunder of cannon, to be mistaken for any other sound. From the moment when Dembinski was forced to acknowledge this, his demeanor degenerated into the fury of a demoniac ; above all, he bawled for a carriage and horses. But the only available means of con- veyance in all his head-quarters was a farmer's cart, which had brought me and my companion — the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps — from Mezo-Kovesd to Erlau, and stood ready for our return. We invited Dembinski to allow him- self to be conveyed in our company to the proximity of the field of battle. He had no choice, and was obliged to comply. I urged haste. The poor vehicle might have taken us forward about 100 paces, and we were still within the town, when suddenly a few of the more curious from among the masses of the inhabitants of Erlau sprang forward, and laying hold of the reins of the horses, asseverated in good Hungarian, that it was impossible for them to suffer the general-in-chief to be taken a single step further in such a miserable cart. This would be — they thought — a disgrace to the town of Erlau, nay, to the whole nation. Irritated at this foolishness, I authoritatively ordered the un- welcome champions of the honor of the town and nation to get out of the way. Dembinski, who understood not a syllable of Hungarian, fell into a still greater passion than myself, f.nd assisted me with his menacing gestures ; the chief of the general staff helped us in our shouting and swearing, and the guardians of Erlau's honor yielded ; we got again under way. Dembinski now wished to know what these people had want- ed. I interpreted to him their practical views in reference to the honor of their town and nation ; when, lo, he made the cart stop, and declared he would wait till better horses and a more respectable carriage could be procured. I had been very wrong to behave so brutally to the champions of their civic and national honor I Dembinski, however, very soon repented of his hasty determ- ination ; for in spite of the evident speed with which one of the patriots had set off, with the intention of placing his equipage at our service, a considerable time elapsed without our getting sight 188 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of the respectable carriage promised us, and the thunder of the artillery rather increased than diminished. From a conceivable precaution we had meanwhile kept our seats in the much-despised hay-cart. The patriot with the equipage might possibly delay too long, or in the end altogether fail us. Dembinski and I were seated on a bundle of straw, which had been laid across the racks, and had partly been forced by our weight into the body of the wagon, which became nar- rower toward the bottom. The thunder of the battle — as has been said — rather increased than diminished. At each new hollow sound along the ground Dembinski started up, but just as often fell back again on his seat with all his weight. These shocks operating upon one side of the bundle of straw under us, it was by jerks more and more pushed to my side, and at last, together with me, over the low rack of the wagon ; while Dembinski on his side sank in ever deeper and deeper, and finally so deep that he could no longer sit upright. This situation seemed to me not befitting the dignity of the general-in-chief I feared that to the honorable public it might even appear ridiculous. The incidental remark of a patriot very close to us, that that gentleman (pointing to Dembinski) must be a very brave man, because he was growing so extremely angry at each explosion of cannon, while he (the speaker) was filled with alarm — certainly convinced me that my apprehensions as to the ridicule were unfounded ; nevertheless I advised the gen- eral to alight meanwhile until the new means of conveyance should arrive. Already out of all patience, however, Dembinski would now hear neither of alighting nor of waiting any longer, but wished to continue again without delay our jouifney in the wagon. Against this the honorable public protested anew, crowded together in front of our horses, and said that the caleche would be there immediately. This indeed made its appearance next moment, and thus prevented the unequal contest which threatened to take place between the impatient general and the patient patriots of Erlau. In this new and really more respectable carriage we proceeded uninterruptedly toward Verpelet. But the nearer we approached the field of battle, and the louder the thunder of the great guns became, the more Dembinski's expressions, both in words and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 189 gestures, were unlike those of a being endowed with reason. One absurdity followed another from the trembling lips of the commander-in-chief, while at one time rowing alternately with his arms and legs, as if he would accelerate the motion of the carriage, at another repeatedly starting up from his seat, next threatening with his fists m the direction of the battle-field, he revealed to us the state of his mind in all its pitifulness. This state was the moral agony of a braggart, who having pretended to be a strong swimmer, was now seized with mortal fear lest he should be drowned, because the water into which he had ventured happened to reach up to his neck I As far as I could make out from the mass of nonsense. with which we were regaled by Dembinski during this journey, it must on this day have, been still very far from the intention of the Hungarian general-in-chief to give battle to the enemy. At least his oft-repeated exclamations, '* This I did not wish yet ! It is too soon yet !" mainly indicated this. But if this was the case, then was it in fact by no means handsome on the part of Messieurs the Austrian generals to at- tack us without saying a single word about it to any one, or even previously asking Mr. Dembinski whether it would be agreeable to him just then ! CHAPTER XXV. Dembinski's last dispositions in detail, dated from the head- quarters at Mezo-Kovesd, the 24th of February, for the first and seventh army corps, and a division of the second corps, which was then cantoned in Tiszafiired and Poroszlo, extended to the 26th of February inclusive. In consequence of these dispositions, on this day — during which we were attacked so completely contrary to Dembinski's wish — his forces stood : A division of the first army corps in Sirok ; The Poltenberg division of the seventh corps in Verpelet and Fel-Dobro ; 190 ^ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The other division of the- first corps in Al-Dobro, Totfalva, Kapolna, and Kompolt ; A division of the second corps in Kal. The first and second army corps consisted each of two divi- sions; while the seventh corps contained four, as has been al- ready often mentioned. One division of the second army corps Dembinski had left behind in Poroszlo and Tiszafiired, to defend the passage across the Theiss. But three divisions of the seventh corps stood on the 26th of February in Muklar (Aulich), in Mezo-Kovesd (Guyon), and in Abrajiy (Kmety). During our journey from Erlau to Verpelet we had discovered that Kapolna was the centre of the engagement, and turned therefore from Szalok by Domend and Kerecsend on to the high road of Gyongyos, which leads to Kapolna. The day was com- ing to a close, the fire of the guns began already to be seen, when we reached the last-mentioned place. While still outside the town we met the standards of a regi- ment of hussars which had been ordered to attack. In the Austrian army there exists the custom — I know not from what period — of the cavalry leaving its standards com- pletely out of action, so as not to run the risk of losing them mal a propos in an attack. This custom certainly says less for the self-reliance of the troops than for their wise precaution. It had, however, been introduced, and our hussar regiments had re- tained it, in order to make partie egale with their adversaries. We ordered three men from the escort of the standards to alight, and mounted their horses. Dembinski and the chief of the gen- eral staff of the seventh army corps rode to Kapolna ; I, by Dem- binski's direction, to Kal. I was to take measures to keep the Tama, near the latter place, in our possession ; he would do the same near Kapolna. While I was still on my way, the combat near Kal suddenly ceased. I had indeed no particular desire — in the probably pre- cipitate and disorderly retreat of our troops, which might per- haps be the cause of the sudden interruption of the engagement — to encounter, alone as I was, the advancing enemy, and pre- ferred going round the place eastward. After thus having crossed the road to Szikszo, and reached that from Fiizes to Abrany, I MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 191 learned from some peasants that the division of the second army- corps, for which I was seeking, had at the very commencement of the battle advanced across the Tarna, and was still on the other side. The night was very dark ; I wandered about for a long time, until I succeeded in finding the division. It had ef- fected its passage across the Tarna by making use of a ford that was practicable with difficulty. I called the attention of the commander to the danger to which his troops were exposed by their position, close to the ford that might easily be missed, by the mere essay of a night attack on the part of the enemy ; and ordered him immediately to make the division fall back to the left bank, and leave only the outposts on the right. Meantime the hostile rocket-battery before Kapolna also finally ceased its efforts to set fire to that place, after having vainly con- tinued them till the night became very dark ; and the combat was extinct along the whole line, without Dembinski or myself having exercised any influence on its course. In my then subor- dinate position, there reached me mostly merely private rumors about Klapka's doings, as well as about the details of this first day's battle of Kapolna in general. Only this much I know for certain, that our troops maintained on that day (26th of February) the whole line of the Tarna from Verpelet as far as Kal, and did not abandon it till the second day of the battle (the 27th.) The main body of the division of the second army corps having been quartered in Kal as well as was practicable, and provided with victuals, I hastened back to Kapolna, to learn what Dem- binski intended to do on the following day. I found the commander-in-chief at a farm-house situated oa the main road eastward from Kapolna ; but could not speak with him, he being already asleep when I reached his night-quarters. He had, however, given the following dispositions for the next day (the 27th of February) : " The Aulich division advances for the reinforcement of the extreme left wing of the army from Maklar to Kal, joins there the division of the second army corps, and hinders the enemy from crossing the Tarna. " The Guyon division has to advance from Mezo-Kovesd as far as Kapolna, to strengthen the centre ; " And the Kmety division from Abrany as far as Kerecsend, and there remain en reserve. \\3 R A /Ty ]92 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. " The remaining divisions have to maintain their positions on the Tarna." Colonel Klapka continued to be entrusted with the right wing, and myself with the left, near Kal, during the next day also ; while Dembinski reserved to himself again the command of the centre. The drawing up of the special orders necessary in consequence of these dispositions, as well as dispatching them with the great- est speed to the divisions, had been committed by Dembinski to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps. He was destitute, however of almost all means for discharging this import- ant commission. Dembinski's orderly officers had remained be- hind in Erlau, mine in Mezo-Kovesd. Our being in Kapolna was known in neither of those places. A single officer — of the division of the first army corps, which was in action near the latter place, whom Dembinski had taken for the purpose of send- ing him as a courier to Erlau — was at our disposal, but only in so far as the dispatches could go through Erlau. The chief of the general staff" of the seventh army corps happened fortunately, on the morning of the 26th of February, to have ordered two of my orderly officers from Mezo-Kovesd to Erlau, that they might be there in readiness on any unforseen emergency during our presence in Dembinski's head-quarters. To this precaution he now owed the possibility of sending the orders to the Aulich di- vision (in Maklar) and to the Kmety (in Abrany), by Dembin- ski's courier to Erlau, and from thence by these two orderly offi- cers on to Maklar and Abrany. When, on returning from Kal, I arrived, as has been mention- ed, at Dembinski's night-quarters near Kapolna, the courier of the commander-in-chief had been gone a long time with the dispatches for Aulick and Kmety. I expressed a serious apprehension that the dispatch for the Kmety division in Abrany, especially, would reach its destination too late, on account of the great cir- cuit through Erlau ; but I soon perceived that, under existing circumstances, it had not been possible to adopt any better plan. Dembinski had given the dispositions only late at night. Then the chief of the general staff!' of the seventh army corps — if he wished to send the orders direct to one or other division — would first have had himself to seek in the camp for the requisite officer ; but the night was pitch dark, and the troops were camping with- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 193 out watch-fires, on account of the proximity of the enemy ; the places where they were encamped, as well as the localities around Kapolna were unknown to him. Thus he had to fear he might wander about uselessly half the night, without finding a camp ; and even if he should be successful, it still remained doubtful wheth- er any one of the officers would immediately have condescended to the nocturnal ride as courier. An order of the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps had no weight with the officers of the first army corps, to whom he was scarcely known by name. It was consequently to be feared, that in this way, even under the most favorable circumstances, more precious time might be lost than the circuitous route by Erlau would take ; besides, the for- warding of an important dispatch by the first, best officer who happens to be at hand, is always running a risk, and was es- pecially so in our army, which swarmed with uncertain officers. The chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps intend- ed to deliver in person the dispatch to the Guyon division in Mezo-Kovesd ; it seemed to me, however, more advisable to let him remain near the commander-in-chief, and to go myself with the dispatch to Mezb-Kovesd. I could the rather venture to do this, even at the risk, if stopped by any unforeseen obstacle, of ar- riving too late at my post in Kal, as in that case the command of the left wing of the army would have devolved upon Colonel Aulich ; and as he had far more experience and tact on the bat- tle-field than myself, my accidental delay would by no means have had a really unfavorable influence on the issue of the contest. The arrival of the Guyon division on the field of battle at the earliest possible moment was of great importance — of incompar- ably more than my presence in Kal at the beginning of the action. Time pressed, and I hastened to discharge the duty of courier. The route which I took from Kapolna to Mezo-Kovesd lay through Kerecsend. Here I quite unexpectedly met with Col- onel Poltenberg. By his patrols, who had been sent toward Kapolna after the termination of the combat, and who in the darkness probably had taken a wrong direction, he had been in- formed in Fel-Dobro that Kapolna was already occupied by the enemy ; whereupon he led his division from Fel-Dobro back to Kerecsend, fearing he might be isolated. I corrected Poltenberg's erroneous suppositions about the result of the conflict of the past 194 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. day, communicated to him his task for the next morning, adding that he must of necessity advance again to the Tama before day- break ; and then continued my way to Mezo-Kovesd. I arrived about four o'clock in the morning (on the 27th of Feb- ruary), ordered the troops quartered there to be roused, and gave to Colonel Guyon the order to advance with the greatest speed to Kapolna — but myself awaited its execution ; for however much Guyon could be relied upon in the field of battle itself — that is, when the performance of his task did not require any particular discernment, but only purely personal valor — he little answered all other demands that war makes on the leader of large independent bodies of troops. His arrangements commonly reminded one of the motto, " Every thing imprudently — Every thing inopportunely !" they had consequently corresponding re- sults. Thus it happened this time, that in spite of my reiterated urging him to haste, he delayed the departure of his division until it was broad daylight. Only after it had arrived at Kerecsend, and the distribution of spirits, as usually officially ordered by Guyon before every engage- ment, was well over, could I at last with confidence report to the commander-in-chief the approach of the Guyon division. CHAPTER XXVI. Dembinski had just been forced to evacuate Kapolna when I came up with him, some hundred paces eastAvard of his last night-quarters, with the announcement of the approach of the Guyon division. While yet at some distance, he called to me, why was I not at my post ! — and continually pointing in the di- rection of Verpelet, he exclaimed repeatedly, "The right wing already retreats, because you are not at your post." " The right wing does not concern me ; I command the left/' was my answer. " But I have sent you an order to command the right wing," he exclaiitied. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 196 " I know of no such order," I replied, vexed at this new occa- sion of a conflict with the commander-in-chief " Then ride instantly to Verpelet," he imperiously ordered me, " and there take the command ; for the two colonels are rivals." I now knew what I had to do ; briefly made my report of the approach of the Guyon division ; and without wasting another word, hastened across the fields toward Yerpelet. While on my way thither, I began to reflect on what Dem- binski could have meant by the two rival colonels. From the position of the army he could evidently have referred only to Klapka and Poltenberg : but the former commanded an army corps, while the latter was merely the commander of a division, was far younger in rank, and was besides altogether free from any pretension which could have justified the supposition that he dis- puted with Klapka the chief command of the right wing. The right wing was in fact retreating, though probably not because Poltenberg had resisted Klapka's orders, but because the united forces of Klapka and Poltenberg were not strong enough to cope with the Schlick corps. In order to join the Austrian chief army on the shortest line — in sight of Dembinski's army — the Schlick corps had during the preceding night successfully forced the defile at Sirok, which was occupied by a division of the first army corps under Klapka's per- sonal command ; the other corps being stationed, as has been mentioned, near Kapolna. Klapka had retreated with his division, after the loss of the defile, as far as Verpelet, where he joined himself to the Polten- berg division, sent thither in the meanwhile by Dembinski, for the purpose of defending the passage across the Tama against the Schlick corps, which, advancing from Sirok by Szent-Maria, ap- peared on the morning of the second day of the battle at Kapolna (27th of February) on the right bank of the Tarna, opposite Ver- pelet. Field-marshal Schlick, however, fmxecl the passage, and both Hungarian divisions were driven back. To bring these to a stand, and to lead them forward again, was therefore the task which Dembinski had just assigned me. On the southeastern heights near Verpelet I already encoun- tered some of Poltenberg' s pieces of horse-artillery, the servers of which had been cut down by the hostile cavalry. The resolute attack of a squadron of Alexander hussars, vigorously supported 196 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. by the fire of the fourteenth Honved battalion, had, it is true, re- gained from the cuirassiers the cannons that had Ijeen lost ; but as they for the moment were without servers, they had to be withdrawn from the combat. Soon after the guns, I came upon a part of the infantry — more consueto, in most admired disorder — and at last upon the cavalry, well-serried, but not retiring en echiquier ; the retreat was, in- stead, a general one, and altogether without plan or regularity ; the batteries went on heedlessly among the divisions. The gen- eral impression produced on me by the whole scene was, that nothing more could be done that day. Poltenberg's confident personal bearing contradicted this com- fortless conclusion ; though, on the other hand, the unmistakable expression of despondency in Klapka's features seemed to justify it. The reason of this very different state of mind in the two leaders on one and the same point was probably to be found in recent events. The Kalpka division during the last night had accomplished nothing at Sirok, and just now at Verpelet but very little ; while Colonel Poltenberg was satisfied with the behavior of his troops during the preceding evening at Fel-Dobro, as well as in the late conflict at Verpelet. I found both colonels in consultation as to what was to be im- mediately done then and there. Klapka declared that he, for his part, would ride toward Erlau in pursuit of the half of his divi- sion which had retreated in that direction, and again lead it against the enemy. Should this, he said, be no longer possible, he would confine himself during the day to protecting Erlau. I had nothing to say against the execution of this idea ; the less so, as the other half of the division of the first army corps, under the direction of the commander of division Bulharin (a Pole), remained there at my disposal. Colonel Klapka accordingly did as he had said ; and I took the further command of the right wing of the army, now weak- ened by a fourth. The said half of the Bulharin division, thus placed at my dis- posal, consisted of three battalions and an incomplete battery of three-pounders. The three battalions strolled on without com- pactness, in picturesque groups, like peasants to the festival of their church's dedication, only somewhat quicker, toward the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 197 heights before Domend and Kerecsend. The train was conse- quently so expanded on all sides, that at present it was useless to think of compacting the ivhole of the brigade which had been committed to me. I must be content if I should accomplish this with a part of it. Indicating as the place of my next position the nearest emi- nences toward Kerecsend, which commanded the widest extent of ground, I dispatched the officers of my suite to combine on this point as many as possible of the three scattered battalions. Poltenberg's division had remained together. It had to re-establish a junction between the Bulharin half division — the extreme right wing of the army — and the centre near Kapolna. To the east of Verpelet an insignificant, narrow, undulating ridge of eminences stretches from north to south toward the high road between Kapolna and Kerecsend, and terminates, north of the road, in a summit well wooded on its eastern declivity. It is situated about half an hour's distance northwest of Kerecsend, and commands the whole ridge. From it sinks an elongated hill, being the last lateral spur, toward Fel-Dobro, and forming with the ridge a re-entering angle, the sides of which diverge to- ward the northwest, that is, toward Verpelet. The northern declivity of this hill is pretty steep, the western, on the contrary, slopes more gently ; while toward the south- west and south — consequently in the direction of Kapolna and the high road — the undulating ground, converging with the not less gently sloping southern declivity of the said summit, becomes level. Colonel Poltenberg established himself with his division on this hill, while the Bulharin half division was employed for the occu- pation of the ridge north of the summit. But the summit itself was to serve as a last hold for the said half division, in case it should be repulsed from the ridge by the enemy. From this summit not only the ridge toward the north, far be- yond gun-range, could be surveyed, but also the whole battle-field of Kapolna. When the Poltenberg division and the Bulharin half division were established on the two points above mentioned, the position of our army was in echelons from the centre to the right. The 198 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. centre facing Kapolna and the left wing facing Kal stood nearly at the same height. By the rapid advance of Field-marshal Schlick, however, the hostile army soon arrived in a line parallel with our own. Field-marshal Schlick, after having successfully forced the passage of the Tarna at Verpelet, had immediately prepared him- self for pursuing us, and disposed his left wing on the northern continuation of the ridge occupied by the Bulharin half division, his right against Kapolna, while his centre advanced straight to the interval between Poltenberg's position and that of the Bulharin half division, or — what is equivalent — to the re-en- tering angle formed, as has been mentioned, by the occupied heights. By this manoeuvre Field-marshal Schlick re-established his junction with the left wing of the hostile chief army, which ad- vanced simultaneously against us by Al-Dobro, and arrived at the same time with it in an oblique direction against the front of the centre and of the right wing of the main army. The hostile position formed, consequently, during the ensuing action, a line broken forward, while our position, parallel with it, described one broken backward. Field-marshal Schlick had — judging from his ensuing disposi- tions for attack — very correctly perceived that, by forcing both the positions of our right wing, he should most contribute toward disengaging the centre of the Austrian main army, the further advance of which, after the successful dislodging of Dembinski from Kapolna, was very considerably impeded by our centre, which had been reinforced by the Guyon division. He accordingly, while yet out of the reach of our guns, divi- ded the centre likewise of his corps, employing one half in an at- tack on Poltenberg's position, the other in forcing the Kerecsend height. By the designation "Kerecsend height" is here to be under- stood particularly only the ridge of heights occupied by the Bul- harin half division ; but in the latter period of the action, its southern extremity, the summit covered with wood toward the east — therefore the extreme right wing of the battle-array of our army. Not till after our centre should have effected its retreat over the bridge at Kerecsend — a retreat to which we were in fact com- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 199 pelled in consequence of the violent and dangerous attacks of the Schlick corps on our right wing — was Poltenberg to be allowed to retire from his hill, while the Kerecsend height had to be held to the last, to cover his own retreat. Poltenberg successfully accomplished his task, in spite of the repeated violent attacks of the Schlick corps. The details of its execution, however, escaped me ; my attention up to the last mo- ment of the action being chiefly engaged by the defense of the Kerecsend height. When 1 — in riding back to the Kerecsend height from that point near Verpelet where I had encountered Colonels Klapka and Poltenberg for the first time this morning, and had arranged with them what was further to be done — arrived there, the three straggling Klapka battalions which had been appointed for its defense were for the most part again assembled, and the guns of the battery of three-pounders were likewise already planted. The Kerecsend height served the Hungarian army during the further course of the engagement as a point of support on the ex- treme right : it can readily be defended against an attack from the north. A hostile turning of our right could so easily be frus- trated by the other half of the Bulharin division — which after the loss at Verpelet had fled toward Erlau, and which Colonel Klap- ka had promised again to lead against the extreme left flank of the Schlick corps — that a serious intention of attempting to turn our right could never with probability be supposed in the enemy. In spite of this considerable advantage, the Bulharin half divi- sion seemed to me nevertheless to be insufficient for the energetic defense of the Kerecsend height ; as I could not expect, judging from the former conduct of the battalions, that they would re- pulse the attacks of the enemy with remarkable valor, and as the incomplete battery of three-pounders would neither awe the as- sailant by its calibre nor by the number of its guns. In the seventh army corps there existed, besides the 'often-men- tioned four divisions, also a reserve, called " the column of the head-quarters." This column — originally composed in Waizen after the evacuation of the capitals, and chiefly intended for ser- vice in the head-quarters only — consisted of two companies of grenadiers, from thirty to forty men of the German legion, and 200 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. half a squadron of hussars of different regiments not belonging to the army corps : it had subsequently received important acces- sions in the mountain-towns, consisting of the small remains of a battalion of Ernest infantry, which Colonel Guyon had imperilled in the street-fight with the corps of Field-marshal Simunich in the town of Tyrnau, and of two seven-pound howitzer batteries each of five pieces — vvhich had been formed of the howitzers of the batteries of the corps, for the especial purpose of making eventual attacks on places, or in general on pieces of ground not accessible to direct shot — and finally by that part of a rocket- battery which had been taken from the enemy in the sudden attack at Iglo. This column of the head-quarters, together with the Guyon di- vision, had advanced in the morning from Mezo-Kovesd to Ker- ecsend, and had been since then kept en reserve on the bridge westward of that place. I now ordered the two batteries of howitzers to the Kerecsend height, and had them planted on the northern declivity of the summit. At half gun-range before these stood the three-pounders ; at a further distance of about a thousand paces, a gentle descent of the ground allowed the left wing of the enemy a covered and easy access to our ridge of heights. From this slope emerged at first a division of hostile cavalry ; at sight of which the Bulharin battalions were immediately disposed to flee into the wood, which covered the whole eastern declivity of the ridge. We succeeded, however, in delaying their flight at least till the beginning of the real attack. This division of hostile cavalry — which had evidently been advanced only for the purpose of a provisional reconnoitering of our position — was immediately driven back by the fire of our three-pounders ; and this again encouraged our intimidated in- fantry. Lieutenant-colonel Aristid Dessewffy, properly commander of the cavalry of the first army corps, but at that moment — I know not by what accident — remaining separated from his troops and without employment, voluntarily undertook, during the defense of the Kerecsend height, the duty of Bulharin, the helpless and inactive commander. Immediately after the division of hostile cavalry had disappeared, he proceeded with a part of the infantry MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 201 against the real column of attack, and arrested its advance over the slope to the part of the ridge where we were posted. The enemy now directed one of his battalions from the centre to storm the Kerecsend height on its western declivity, in order to make way for the attacking-column. If the storming had succeeded, this battalion would have appeared on the height in Dessewfiy's rear, in the straight line between him and our three- pounders, and, on the one hand, would have dislodged the three- pounders, whose fire could produce no effect so long as Dessewfiy was posted in their front, without annoying him also ; on the other hand would have obliged DessewfTy to withdraw in a lateral direction over the eastern declivity, and thus have push- ed him afterward entirely out of the combat. The storming bat- talion, however, did not stand the fire of our howitzers, but when at the foot of the western declivity turned toward the north ; and later probably joined the column which attacked Dessewfiy in front, and by which he was gradually pressed back. Meanwhile I gained time to occupy with infantry, by way of precaution, the wooded declivity of the summit — our last point of support, as has been mentioned — in case the whole ridge should be taken by the enemy. Unfortunately I had at my disposal for this purpose at that moment only those troops of the seventh army corps that could least be depended upon, namely, the Tyrol chas- seurs. These, together with the Poltenberg division, had been ordered early in the morning to Verpelet, but had taken to flight from thence by themselves, and had assembled only upon the Kerecsend height. They pleaded as their excuse, that not hav- ing bayonet-muskets, they could not stand against the attack of the hostile cavalry. I hoped they would now render so much the better service in the defense of the wooded declivity, as an attack of cavalry was not to be feared there. Lieutenant-colonel Dessewfiy with his sharp-shooters was mean- while again so far pressed back, that the enemy from the slope could gain the top of the ridge with masses of infantry and a rocket and field-piece battery ; and now the Bulharin battalions could no longer be made to keep their ground ; they evacuated the whole of the ridge, running over the eastern wooded declivity down into the valley of the rivulet which, coming from Szollat, flows by the west end of Kerecsend, where the bridge of Kerecs- end joins its there elevated banks on a level with the main road ^02 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. leading over it. Lieutenant-colonel DessewfTy accordingly return- ed alone to the summit, abandoned by his troops. The forces of infantry at my disposal were thereby diminished to the few hundred Tyrol chasseurs, who, as has been mentioned, occupied the eastern wooded part of the summit. I accordingly for my reinforcement drew near me the battalion of Ernest in- fantry from the column of the head-quarters. In the mean time that part of the Bulharin division in pursuit of which, after the loss of Verpelet, Colonel Klapka had hastened toward Erlau, in order to lead it once more against the enemy, unexpectedly attacked in its flank the column advancing along the ridge. This attack in the flank, however, was speedily repulsed, and the hostile rocket and field-piece batteries were brought into ac- tion against our howitzers and three-pounders. The latter I im- mediately took entirely out of action, because, with their small calibre, they must have been uselessly destroyed in the unequal contest. Soon after I also withdrew the six howitzers, which had already become unfit for service, partly from want of ammu- nition, partly in consequence of damages they had sustained. The rest of the howitzer batteries, consisting of four pieces, had therefore to persevere alone to the end of the conflict. The enemy now advanced to within half gun-range of our position on the summit ; posted, from want of breadth in the ridge, his rocket-stands to the right (from the enemy), his bat- tery of field-pieces to the left backward ; and immediately opened a murderous fire. The rockets, little as they used formerly to injure us on the plain, produced now a literally levelling efiect in sweeping over the rising arched ground. This rendered our position — the last we had to lose — almost untenable. The Ernest battalion was just arriving on the sum- mit ; from its valor I expected considerable relief in our desper- ate situation. It was of the first importance to take the rocket- battery by storm, or at least to dislodge it. I dispatched the battalion by the western declivity of the summit, covered with only a few trees, that along it, protected as far as possible, it might get near the rocket-battery. But this battalion, which had recently been completed with recruits, could scarcely be brought forward above a hundred paces. It then ran away toward the valley, and withdrew between Poltenberg's position MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 203 and the summit, out of the action. Two attempts to dislodge the rocket-battery by means of an attack with a squadron of Alexander hussars failed likewise ; while the Tyrol chasseurs at the same time evacuated the wood on the eastern declivity of the summit. The four howitzers could maintain their position only so long as this parcel of forest remained in our possession. I conse- quently sent for the last sections of the reserve which were still at my disposal — the grenadiers and the two mixed platoons of hussars — in order to charge the former with the further mainten- ance of the parcel of forest, and to attempt once more with the latter to dislodge the rocket-battery. The hussars arrived first at the howitzers. Captain Szey- mond, who led them, had, however, scarcely given the word of command to attack, when a rocket-case struck him from his horse. His men refused to proceed. The grenadiers also in the mean time had reached the height, and, ranged on the edge of the forest, awaited my orders. Some bullets from the hostile field-battery happened to pass over their heads ; and these fellows, as tall as trees, became all at once very diminutive — scarcely higher than their bear-skin caps. This was an unfortunate debut. But I already knew from experience, that the least obstacle thrown in the way of an enemy gains actually, as its consequence, a certain, though not always important amount of time. I therefore ordered the grenadiers, in spite of their spiritless conduct, and after some energetic re- primands for such an exaggerated reverence of the hostile bullets, to advance at a storming-pace into the wood as far as its northern edge, and hold it. A new difficulty arose in the wood. By the first bullets, at which the grenadiers were so much frightened while still on the wooded height, they saw perfectly well the real focus of the dan- ger, and showed no mean desire to avoid it, and go off in an eastern direction down the declivity. I remarked this just in the nick of time, quickly sprang from my horse, and, assisted by the brave officers of these troops, succeeded in bringing them at last into the right direction, the northern. Not till then did I re- turn to the undefended part of the summit, where the howitzers stood. Here, however, a notable mishap befell. The commander of 204 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. these howitzers, while I was occupied in the wood, had perceived the impossibility of holding out any longer, and begun the retreat over the top of the summit the more speedily, as the protection of the battery (Alexander hussars) had been forced to yield by the fire of the hostile rockets and guns. While one of the howitzers was being limbered, a projectile from the enemy struck the team, and killed one of the horses. The terrified men cut the traces of the other horses, and galloped after the pieces which had al- ready been started. I found the commander of the battery and the cannoneers en- gaged in unsuccessful efforts to push the abandoned piece up-hill. In order to get it under way, the assistance of far more men was necessary. I hastened toward the western declivity of the sum- mit, in the hope of still finding there a part of the Ernest battal- ion. In their stead I found some skirmishing hussars of the Al- exander regiment. A captain of this regiment was just about assembling them. I called him with his men to give assistance. Chance had made me hit on the right man ; in spite of the sharp fire, he was on the spot in a twinkling with some hussars. The enemy, however, must have remarked how matters were going on here ; for his projectiles fell ever thicker about the stuck-fast howitzer. The more urgently necessary appeared to me my own presence there. The brave captain of hussars, on the contrary, was in fear for my life, and pressed me to quit the dangerous place, engaging his honor for the safety of the how- itzer. This circumstance, and the simulfaneous arrival of my younger brother, on whose resolute perseverance I could also rely, induced me to comply. 1 rode speedily across the highest point of the summit toward the southern declivity, which was secured against the enemy's fire. During the hot conflict I had not observed what was taking place in our centre. I now saw with satisfaction that the mis- sion of the extreme right wing was accomplished ; for the centre was already wholly, and Poltenberg partly over the bridge at Kerecsend. I was anew more anxious about the greatly endan- gered howitzer, and determined partly to stop Poltenberg's re- treat, and dispatch one of his battalions across the summit to its hard-pressed position. But this advance was scarcely half-exe- cuted when the brave captain of hussars appeared with the piece on the summit, and thus nobly redeemed his word of honor. He MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 205 conducted the train ; my younger brother — whose horse a bullet had killed under him — closed it ; the cannoneers, some hussars, and the ever-fearless Aristid DessewfTy drew the howitzer. The latter had suddenly arrived on the spot during my absence, and readily interested himself in its rescue. Now that this had been effected, I immediately ordered the just- advanced battalion of the Poltenberg division to return, and again continue its retreat over the bridge at Kerecsend ; while the grenadiers, whom the enemy had pressed down over the wooded declivity into the valley of Kerecsend, passed the rivulet above the bridge, and marched back across the fields to the northern entrance of the village. During the combat on the Kerecsend height I had received two orders from Dembinski. One was the retarded one, intended to call me early in the morning to Verpelet to take the command of the right wing of the army ; the other contained instructions to maintain the Kerecsend height until he (Dembinski) with the centre should have effected his retreat over the Kerecsend bridge, and then to draw back to the eminence behind Kerecsend (east of the place). When I reached this eminence with the Poltenberg division and the column of the head-quarters, I found there the Kmety di- vision, which had only shortly before arrived from Abrany. The orderly officer, charged with the marching order from Erlau to this division, had lost the road in the dark night, and reached Abrany only late in the morning ; hence the delay in the arrival of the Kmety division at Kerecsend. Dembinski, it was said, was wounded, and had ridden to Mak- lar. According to the dispositions which he had issued in Ke- recsend after the retreat, that division of the first army corps which had stood in the centre, and the division of the second army corps of the left wing, had already started for Mezci-Kovesd, the Guy on division to Maklar. This latter place was also desig- nated as the station of retreat for the Poltenberg division and the columns of the head-quarters of the seventh army corps. The Aulich division had to bivouack near Szikszo to protect the road to Mezo-Kovesd ; and the Kmety division on the eminences of Kerecsend to protect Maklar and provide for the out-post service. Thus ended Dembinski's offensive, which he had assumed against the Austrian main army for the re-conquest of the capitals. CHAPTER XXVII. Dembinski had given up the second day's battle at Kapolna as lost. The reasons for this were palpable — we had been defeated ; and the troops urgently needed a short respite, to render them again quite fit for the field, after the harassing fatigues of the day. But to judge from their location after the battle, as stated at the end of the preceding chapter, Dembinski, with the battle, gave up at the same time all further resistance : and the more I considered the circumstances which, conspiring together, had caused the loss of the recently fought action, the less I found that this step was imperative. These circumstances were : 1. The loss of Sirok on the night preceding the second day's battle, and, as a consequence of it, the junction of the Schlick corps with the hostile main army on the very field of battle, whereby a hostile force, numerically and morally superior, was brought into action with our right wing, isolated by the distance of more than a (German) mile from its centre. 2. The too late arrival on the field of almost a third of our army. 3. The separation of the divisions of one and the same army corps from each other. 1. To relieve the right wing in time was impossible, its dis- tance from the centre and the reserve being at the first too great (even supposing that the Kmety division had reached Kerecsend early enough). Dembinski could avoid this defect in the next position — per- haps behind Kerecsend, as I supposed — in which he might intend to withstand the enemy. 2. The too late arrival of the Kmety division left the army without a strong, sufficient reserve. The army being now concentrated, Dembinski had no longer to fear this disadvantage in the next engagement. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HtJNGARY. 207 3. By the dismemberment of the different army corps, bodies of troops quite strange to each other were brought into close con- tact during the conflict, none of the divisions knowing in what degree they could rely on the steadfastness of the divisions near them on their right and left ; a circumstance which can not be overlooked with impunity. By this dismemberment of the dif- ferent army corps, half of the first corps was also deprived of the skillful guidance of Klapka, and I was obliged to command a por- tion of his troops, which were stranger to me than those of the enemy, and that at a time when they had to perform extraordi- nary duty ; whereas such services can be secured only by the per- sonal influence of a commander familiar with the peculiarities of the troop. Dembinski, taught by the disastrous consequences of his unskil- ful experiment of separating, could easily reunite the different army corps before the next combat, and then confidently expect far more from their conduct on the field of battle. I found accordingly — as has been said — the entire abandon- ment of all resistance nothing less than commanded. On the contrary, there existed circumstances which most de- cidedly encouraged to the resolute continuance of the combat on the next day. These circumstances were : The behavior of our troops during the battle, and that of the enemy after it. This behavior had been throughout surprisingly good. Disor- ders had occurred — but only as the exceptions — under my per- sonal command, in the extreme right wing of the army, namely, on the Kerecsend height : these, however, were sufficiently ex- cused, partly by the fact that the commander and troops were strangers to each other ; partly because some bodies of the troops — as, for instance, the battalion of Ernest infantry (which had been filled up only a fortnight ago with quite raw recruits), the grenadiers, and the two platoons of mixed hussars — stood fire for the first time on that day ; and partly by the greatness of the task which I had assigned to the troops. Even these disorders were only of short duration, and the shaken ranks for the most part could easily be restored to order, even within reach of the hostile fii^. It seemed as if the days of Schwechat, Parendorf, Babolna, and Hodrics would never again return ! The behavior of the enemy after the battle, on the contrary, 208 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNOARY. evinced no trace of that consciousness of victory, which subse- quently found such highly poetical expression in the famous bul- letin of Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz. The sun of the 27th of February 1849 stood yet pretty high in the heavens when the last thunder of cannon at Kapolna had long died away, and the victor nevertheless declined any pursuit ; in spite of the strong inducement thereto furnished by Dembinski's dispositions. Was not this a silent Te Deum for the permission at last quietly to take breath over the dear-bought laurels of victory ? The heroically bold Schlick, to whom alone, without reserva- tion, belongs the honor of the day, had advanced the foremost against us ; but even he, after he had occupied the Kerecsend height, evacuated by our right wing, uttered a distinct " Enough for to-day," and made his troops immediately prepare their bivou- ac-fires before our eyes. (And no wonder I He had, during the last twenty-four hours, been obliged to travel with his brave corps a distance of fully six (German) miles ; on his way to force three positions ; and be- side to take in tow the Field-marshal together with the chief army. A handsome stroke of work this ! In the end, the Schlick corps would perhaps also have to pursue ; while the chief army, which during the same time had scarcely gained half a mile of ground, allowed itself quietly to dream something about the " total destruction" of the rebels ?) But a conqueror, who, after victory, even when invited by cir- cumstances, does not pursue, places himself involuntarily on an almost equal moral level with the vanquished. Such a one after the victory is absolutely not more formidable than before it. Field-marshal Windischgratz after the battle of Kapolna was such a conqueror : and on this very account it seemed to me that Dembinski's dispositions, for retrograding after the battle in such headlong haste, were, considering the surprisingly good behavior of our troops, not only uncalled for but decidedly blamable. They were, however, already for the most part executed when I. was informed of them ; and although the Kmety division urged me again and again, Dembinski being wounded, to take the chief command and annul his insulting dispositions, it could not very well be done. I should by such a step have been*guilty of unjustifiable precipitancy. Colonel Kmety could not help soon MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 209 perceiving this himself, and promised to yield to what for the present was unavoidable. I then rode to Maklar to seek for Dem- binski, and learn the nature of his wound. I inquired a long time in vain for his .lodging. Several were pointed out to me, which had been destined for Dembinski and his suite ; but in none of them could the commander-in-chief at that moment be found ; every where it was said he had just been there. That I might the sooner discover his abode, I left officers of my suite in each of the quarters indicated, charging them as soon as Dembinski should arrive in one of them to forward informa- tion of it to me without delay to a certain specified point in the place. This measure caused a misunderstanding. Dembinski thought, when, on returning to the place which he had selected for him- self, he found one of my orderly officers there, that I had left meanwhile somebody to retain it for myself, and received me with bitter reproaches about this presumed arrogance on my part, since to him, the commander-in-chief, were due the most commodious quarters, and so on. But I intended just then to establish my head-quarters in the bivouac of the Kmety division, and therefore naturally could not for a long time understand Dembinski's fracas. Dembinski's wound did not seem to be mortal. His further dispositions were : the troops should proceed with their cooking, and the whole army return on the following morn- ing to Mezo-Kovesd. — The troops would very willingly have cooked, if they had but had something to cook. Notwithstanding my subordination to Dembinski's chief com- mand, I had taken care from the first that the regular supplies of the seventh army corps should be through its own intendancy ; while the support of Dembinski's whole army had been transfer- red to the government commissary-in-chief, Bartholomiius von Szemere, who was invested with unlimited powers. This non-central system of support brought the military organ- ised supply-branch of the seventh army corps into frequent con- flict with Szemere's officials, and occasioned the peremptory de- cree of the commander-in-chief, that in future the separate divi- sions of the army should receive their provisions directly from Szemere. 210 . MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Now Szemere was deemed, and not undeservedly, an adminis- trative genius ; for he managed the supplies of Dembinski's army at least so ingeniously that the troops almost perished of hunger. Accordingly their discontent with Dembinski's mode of war- fare naturally soon rose to the highest pitch ; for the vote of dis- trust, which he had by his premature retreat called forth against himself, was subscribed by many thousand empty stomachs so much the more willingly, and with a severe clause, because the conviction was general among the army, that he never, never forgot the filling of his own belly. CHAPTER XXYIII. The night between the 27th and 28th of February, which followed the second day of the battle of Kapolna, passed without disturbance. Early in the morning of the 28th all the divisions of the army marched back to Mezo-Kovesd. The Kmety division formed the rear-guard. A considerable hostile column of cavalry followed close at its heels. Dembinski ordered the camp to be pitched at the west end of Mezo-Kovesd a cheval of the road to Kerecsend. To the south of it the Poltenberg division stood next, then the first army corps, and on the extreme left wing one division of the second army corps. To the north of the road the Guyon division was estab- lished next, and on the extreme right wing the Aulich division. Between Mezo-Kovesd and Maklar a broad plateau, slightly elevated above the southern plains, extends from northwest to southeast. The village of Szihalom stands partly on its south- western gradual declivity. From this plateau the ground flat- tens undulatingly toward Mezo-Kovesd, and is intersected by sep- arate, deeply sunk veins of water in an almost perpendicular di- rection with the roadfrom Szihalm on to Kovesd. The ground slopes in the same manner along the Erlau road toward Mezo- Kovesd. MY- LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. 211 Our camp in front of this place was consequently commanded direct by those two sides, from which a hostile attack mainly threatened us, and, notwithstanding the veins of water winding to and fro in our front, it was destitute of the most essential ad- vantages of a defensive position ; while, on the other hand, our capability for the offensive was not a little embarrassed by those very veins of water. Dembinski in the choice of this camp was probably laboring under the fixed idea, that the enemy, satisfied for the time being with our retreat as far as Mezo-Kovesd, on this day would un- dertake nothing more against us. The circumstance, that neither the further line of retreat had been specified, nor any in- structions issued how to proceed in case of being attacked, be- trayed with still greater certainty the present prevalence of that fixed idea in Dembinski. And thus all the conditions necessary for the success of a hostile surprise in broad daylight were fulfilled on our part as sufficiently as possible. This attack we had not long to wait for. The Kmety division, shortly before its arrival within gun- range of the camp, was all at once very vehemently assailed by the hostile column which had only observed it close at hand for a long time, and was in parts thrown back upon the surprised ' camp itself I was on my way to Dembinski's head-quarters, to disabuse him, if possible, of the above-mentioned fixed idea, when the first firing of artillery, by which the onset announced itself, anticipa- ted my intention. Dembinski, however, was just at dinner, and,' through the welcome clattering of plates and glasses in his immediate vicinity, failed to hear the less agreeable thunder of cannon from afar. My oral announcement of the hostile attack consequently found him wholly unprepared; nevertheless he hastened immediately to the point of danger ; myself — delayed by the awkwardness of a hussar to whom I had entrusted my horse — a few minutes after him. On the western outlet of Mezo-Kovesd a bridge has to be cross- ed. On it I encountered a half-battery of the Kmety division in hasty flight. The commander of this battery solemnly protested that the whole camp had been scattered, and that he had only 212 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. very narrowly succeeded in saving his guns. The poor man was so terrified, he could no longer trust his own eyes ; otherwise he, as well as myself, might have been convinced by one glance from the bridge in the direction of the camp, that the danger was by no means so great as he represented it. I ordered his battery to halt and return. About a thousand paces from Mezo-Kovesd, on the other side of a second bridge, over which the road from Mezo-Kovesd to Szihalom and Kerecsend leads, I found the Kmety, Guyon, and Aulich divisions drawn up in battle-array, and the cavalry of the last division (the ninth regiment of hussars) just returning from a successful attack ; while the Poltenberg division, the first army corps, and the isolated division of the second, joined speed- ily the advancing right wing. The enemy had already hastened as far back as the elevation of Szihalom, and watched from thence, with great self-denial, the successful efix)rts of some hussars to get under way the half-bat- tery which had been taken from him by the ninth regiment of hus- sars, and bring it to our front, a gun-range and a half further back. But Dembinski, in very bad humor, probably in consequence of his interrupted dinner, inveighed continually — not perhaps against the enemy, but against our advancing, called the suc- cessful attack a piece of stupidity, and finally ordered — when the repetition of similar outpourings had been rendered disagreeable to him by the pithy answers of some hussar officers — for the whole front of the army a thoughtful " Halt I" He then made us await nightfall where we were. The ene- my, in his turn, might now indulge in the same reflections on us as we had lately done on him, when he had suflered a few hus- sars to carry off' his guns under his very nose. It is already known, from what has preceded, that Colonel Guyon was suddenly attacked in the night between the 2d and 3d of February at Iglo by a column of the Schlick coi^s, on which occasion a piece of artillery was taken from him. This gun, the capture of which by the enemy Colonel Guyon had constantly denied, it so chanced was now one of the three pieces just taken by us. The former assertion of Guyon, that the miss- ing cannon must have lost its way in the ivoods of Iglo, amid the general confusion which occurred during the surprise, could — in spite of the contradictory circumstance, that this cannon had really been in the enemy's possession — out of respect for MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 213 Guyon's well-known love of truth, of course not be doubted; and there consequently arose about the cannon, missing since the day at Iglo, the dark suspicion that it had there been with- drawal from the Guyon division with a treacherous intent, and delivered to the Schlick corps, which a week later was retreat- ing from Kaschan by Torna and Tonalja I — This supposition may be thought absurd ; however, every country has its own customs ! In my country the supposition of some treachery is the common favorite formula according to which the most natu- ral unpleasant occurrences are analysed in a piquantly-mystical manner, which also incidentally tickles the national vanity. One fine day the Kozlbny — evidently with the intention of rendering one of my personal opponents popular in the country — had dithyrambically reported, that Guyon at Iglo (just during that fatal night between the 2d and 3d of February) had utterly annihilated the enemies of the fatherland.- How then could it have been possible for the destroyed to take a cannon from their destroyer ? * I have mentioned above an officer of artillery, whom I had encountered with his battery in wild flight on the bridge of Mezo-Kovesd, immediately after the commencement of the hos- tile attack on our camp. I ordered him to be shot for the crime of cowardice, of which he had been guilty by his flight, and in- tended to have the sentence executed in flagranti, as a warning example, in front of the division to which he belonged. Dera- binski, however, from whom, as he was present, I had previous- ly to obtain permission for the execution of the sentence, par- doned the delinquent. Another otherwise brave officer, of the first army corps, hap- pened shortly before the hostile attack to have got drunk, and in this state had made unlawful booty. When attempted to be ar- rested, he resisted arms in hand, and thereby lost his life, being pierced by the balls of the escort. Darkness had meanwhile set in ; Dembinski refired to rest. Soon afterward the troops also were allowed to re-occupy their former encampments, and those divisions could now cook, to which fate, under the guise of Szemere and his commissaries of supply, had by way of exception, been favorable during the day. The rest were obliged previously to solicit contributions, but with indifierent suc- cess ; for the patriots of Mezo-Kovesd were wise, prudent people. CHAPTER XXTX. The morning of the 1st of March, found us still in the camp at Mezo-Kovesd, full of fasting resignation to Dembinski's will, which had not yet been pronounced. Toward midday it was at last made known. " In order to secure to the troops^^ — so it was said in the in- troduction to the dispositions for this day — " tlie time necessary for their refreshment, cantonments are assigned to them'' These cantonments were : For the whole first army corps, and the isolated division of the second corps, Eger-Farmos ; For tke Aulich division, Lovo ; For the Kmety and Pbltenberg divisions, Szent-Istvan ; For the Guyon division, Negyes. As these cantonment-stations — only two, three, the furthest four hours' march, Eger-Farmos scarcely half an hour more from the hostile camp than Mezo-Kovesd — were situated in a plain as easily accessible to the enemy as to us ; and as by trans- ferring our army into them a hostile attack seemed at most to be delayed only for the time which the enemy needed to find out one or the other cantonment-station and to reach it; and as we could not suppose that Dembinski by the rest and refreshment which were promised to the troops in the new cantonments meant merely that which would last for afeiv hours, — we could not at once comprehend how these dispositions would answer the object for which they had been intended, according to the intro- duction. On the contrary, the apprehension that our position in these cantonsnents might become incomparably more 'perilous tlian in Mezo-Kovesd was awakened by the most superficial comparison of both situations. However few the advantages offered for defense by the camp at Mezo-Kovesd, the army was at least united there, not so dis membered, and moreover stronger by the Kmety division, than on the last day of the battle of Kapolna. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 215 An attack on the part of the enemy, even if executed with his whole force, had here — the relation of mutual strength mainly considered — less chance than at Kapolna. And even if victory should again he on the side of the enemy, there still re- mained to our general-in-chief the possibility of obviating a greater misfortune by timely dispositions. The cantonments which we were to occupy, on the contrary, dismeTnbered the army. If the enemy intended to attack us in Mezo-Kovesd, as Dembin- ' ski's introduction to this disposition tacitly presupposed, then the already-mentioned dista7ices of the cantonment-stations at Szent- Istvan, Lovo, and Eger-Farmos, from Mezo-Kovesd were not great enough to prevent him from a further advance against one of them. No matter which he attacked, he could secure to himself but too easy a victory ; while our commander-in-chief, through the great distance of the separate divisions of the army from each other, as well as from his head-quarters in Poroszlo, was utterly unable, after a hostile attack had once commenced y to make dispositions time enough to avert a serious disaster. The dispositions for the cantonments, however, did not contain a syllable of any jp'ecautionary measure in case of such an attack, not even a point of junction or of retreat was indicated in them. This defect in the dispositions was the more striking as, with the simultaneous removal of the first army corps and the isolated division of the second corps to Eger-Farmos, it could no longer be the result of the fixed idea, that the enemy certainly would not attach the cantonments. The circumstance that Eger-Farmos, the cantonment-station which was situated nearest to the enemy, had, in comparison with the others, been occupied in such remark- able strength, pointed directly to the fact that the thought of form- ing a strong rear-guard had been influential in bringing about these dispositions. This thought, however, could have originated only in the supposition of a hostile attack ; while, on the contrary, this supposition was flatly contradicted by the carelessness with which the beginning of the eccentric retreat from Mezo-Kovesd into the cantonments had been delayed till full midday, and thus this manoeuvre, which could so easily have been accomplished unobserved under Ihe veil of the past night or the fog of the morn- ing, had been exposed to the spying looks of the enemy's ad- vanced troops in Szihalom. 216 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. To these enigmatical contradictions we found rw solution ; and as our confidence in Dembinski had moreover been already shaken, we could not greatly enjoy the thought of the " promised rest and refreshment," when we broke up about midday of the 1st of March from the camp of Mezo-Kovesd for the cantonments. My head-quarters closely adjoined the Poltenberg and Kmety divisions, which were ordered to Szent-Istvan. About two hours before nightfall the promised rest and re- 'freshment was disturbed by a vehement and continuous thunder- ing of artillery, which penetrated to us from the direction of Eger-Farmos. Colonel Klapka — who was located in this place with the whole first army corps and the isolated division of the second corps — had been attacked ; and, considering the proximity of the united hostile army, there was no reason for supposing but that this attack had been made with far superior forces. Under these circumstances it was to be feared that Colonel Klapka would be defeated, and pressed back toward Poroszlo, and that consequently the Aulich division in Lovo would be endangered ; and it was my duty to prevent, if possible, these calamities, by ordering the Poltenberg and Kmety divisions to advance without a moment's delay to Eger-Farmos. I could execute this duty the easier as Szent-Istvan was of no strategic importance at all to us. The shortest and, as we were assured, best way from this place to Eger-Farmos is through Lovo ; but this best way was impracticable. We had scarcely advanced halfway when the thunder of cannon from Eger-Farmos suddenly ceased. Klapka's defeat, as well as the advanced darkness, might be the cause of this ; the greater was the necessity for hastening our march. But all our eflbrts were rendered abortive by the accumulation of obstacles which impeded our progress on this road, almost impassable during this season. In front of Lovo we had to cross the Kanya brook, which had overflowed its banks. The darkness of the night and the depth of the water rendered unavoidable the use of a good many pre- cautionary measures, which took up time. Not till after mid- night was our passage completely effected, and the Aulich, Pol- tenberg, and Kmety divisions again reunited. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 217 Some of our troops stationed at Eger-Farmos had reached Lovo several hours earlier. From these we now learned, that on the road from Szihalom through Szemere the enemy had con- tinually flanked Colonel Klapka's march from Mezo-Kovesd to Eger-Farmos, and had attacked him most violently with artillery immediately after his arrival at Eger-Farmos ; but that, after an obstinate resistance, he had retreated toward Poroszlo, where- by these sections of troops, being separated from their main body, had been obliged to fall back on Lovo. This information decided me to break up the camp at Lovo after a short rest, and to march back with the Aulich, Polten- berg, and Kmety divisions by Ivanka toward Poroszlo, sending at the same time an order to the Guyon division in Negyes to do the same. How fatigued and weary soever the troops might have been when Dembinski sent them at midday of the 1st of March, 1849, from the camp of Mezo-Kovesd for their refreshment into the cantonments of Negyes, Szent-Istvan, Lovo, and Eger-Farmos, the rest they found there was so quickly refreshing, that they were already enabled early on the morning of the 2d of March, 1849, — invigorated in the highest degree ! ? — to reunite themselves in Poroszlo. Eighteen short hours had sufficed to place in the clearest light the geniality of the theory, according to which Dembinski had projected, in the golden-mouthed* morning-hour of the 1st of March, 1849, the refreshment dispositions for his — by the way be it said — more hungry than fatigued army. This theory is naturally developed from these dispositions, as follows : " 2%e rest necessary for re-invigorating a defeated army is secured by occupying dispersed cantonments in the immediate vicinity of the enemy'' s operations, in a plain, of which the INTERSECTIONS OF THE GROUND DO NOT PERHAPS OBSTRUCT A victorious enemy IN HIS ADVANCE, BUT CERTAINLY EMBARRASS THE JUNCTION OF THE PARTS OF AN ARMY WHICH ARE SEPARATELY CANTONING." Or, in other terms, and at the same time applicable to the present case : * " The hours of the morning have their mouth full of gold," a German proverb, which has its equivalent in the English, "Early to bed, and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise." — Transl. K 218 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. '' If an already defeated army, which continues, still exposed to the attacks of the enemy, is to be secured agai?ist them, sepa- rate it IF POSSIBLE, UNDER TH^jpENEMY's EYES intO from four to five parts, more or less equal to each other, and confidently distribute these separate parts into tlie near surrounding places, several hours distant from each other, betioeen which places there exist in part no communications at all, in part such as are practicable only ivith uncommo7i difiicidty ; for in a civil- ized enemy there can always with certainty be assumed to be so much of good-breeding as that, at once recognizing AND honoring THE EMINENTLY PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARY, HE WILL INSTANTLY CEASE FROM THE OFFENSIVE." Field-marshal Windiscligratz had m fact j ustified such a flat- tering supposition by the remarkable moderation with which he pursued us only on the day after the battle of Kapolna, and even then with forces so small that it was not at all difficult for us to/ repulse their attack without inconvenience — as has been already mentioned — and, at the same time, take from them three guns. Prince Windiscligratz afterward also proved himself not quite unworthy of such a flattering supposition, since he again attacked xvith forces 7iot superior our three divisions, which were moving before his eyes to Eger-Farmos ; whereby, of course, was caused Klapka's retreat by night to Poroszlo, which, though somewhat inconvenient it is true, was otherwise almost without loss. Or could what Dembinski took for the courteous good-breeding of Prince Windischgratz have been only the expression — in spite of the days of Kapolna — of continued contempt for his adver- sdiry? Could neither the days of Kapolna, nor that of Mezo- Kovesd have sufficed to correct that disdainful opinion of the importance of our resistance, for which indeed sufficient grounds had been furnished at first by the great retreat from the Lajtha to beyond the Danube, and the simultaneous reports of victory circulated by the Committee of Defense ? Whatever may be the answers to these questions, the short campaign between Windischgratz and Dembinski, since the sec- ond day of the battle of Kapolna, had now assumed on bath sides the character of what is called at drafts a " losing-game." It is well known that this game is won by the player ivho first gets rid of all his men. To this end, his endeavor is, to move his men always unprotected in front of those of his adversary, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 219 that they may be taken. Both commanders proved themselves very adroit at this. Thus did Field-marshal Windischgratz, on the 28th of February, at Mezo-Kovesd ; thus did General Dem- binski on the day after, the 1st of March, at Eger-Farmos. But the latter was unmistakably master, and would most certainly have won — that is, would hsive first lost all his draftsmen — un- less the jEit had suddenly come upon them, at first by arbitrary moves to spoil the losing-game, which in the cantonments stood so extremely favorable for Dembinski, and finally even to turn out their lord and master ; and all this simply because they (Dembinski's draftsmen) had taken into their heads the notion that with them only a winning game should be played. CHAPTEU XXX. When I arrived, early in the morning of the 2d of March, with the Aulich, Poltenberg, and Kmety divisions, at Poroszlo, Colonel Klapka informed me, that in consequence of Dembinski's dispositions of the preceding evening for cantonment, the com- manders of the three divisions under his (Klapka' s) command in Eger-Farmos, had declared, in the name of their officers, that they would no longer receive any order from Dembinski, unless it was counter-signed either by himself (Klapka) or by me. The commanders of these divisions (Dessewffy in the stead of Bulha- rin) immediately afterward repeated the same declaration to me in person, Klapka being present. Dembinski had, before ray arrival at Poroszlo, ordered the three divisions united under Klapka to retreat without delay behind the Theiss. Conformably to this order they were just about to march, when their commanders informed me of this desire to metamorphose the absolute commander-in-chief Dem- binski into a constitutional one. But I could not suppose it possible that such experienced sold- iers as Colonel Klapka and his three commanders of division were in earnest in proposing the application of the constitutional principle to the command of an army during war ; and took 220 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. this request simply for a consilium abeundi, which was to be laid before the commander-in-chief Dembinski. But as such an extraordinary measure required at least the concurrence of an overwhelming majority of the army ; and as the four divisions of the seventh army corps — consequently more than one half of the arm.y — had not yet refused obedience to the commander-in- chief ; and as I was moreover of opinion that such an important step ought not to be taken in too much Imste — with Klapka's consent, I called upon these three commanders of division to com- ply for the present unconditionally with Dembinski's arrange- ments, until the retreat of the whole army behind the Theiss, which seemed just then to be his intention, should have been accomplished, when they would have an opportunity of deliber- ately consulting upon the subject. The commanders of division declared themselves willing to do so, and returned to their troops, as did also Colonel Klapka ; while I hastened to Dembinski's head-quarters, to announce to him the arrival of the Aulich, Poltenberg, and Kmety divisions in Poroszlo, and obtain his further orders for them. Dembinski received me very ungraciously ; talked of not know- ing how to obey, of running away from every hostile cannon-ball ; declared that it had not been his plan to return again behind the Theiss, but that we forced him to do so, and that for this reason he had already ordered the retreat. The seventh army corps had immediately to follow Klapka's divisions. Having been dismissed with this injunction, I hastened to appoint places where the seventh army corps should encamp (the Guyon division also had meanwhile arrived from Negyes), until Klapka's divisions, on their retreat from Poroszlo over the Theiss, should be far enough in advance not to embarrass the marching of the seventh army corps in their rear. Dembinski at the same time removed his head-quarters to Tiszafiired. I did not see him again on the right bank of the Theiss. Besides the seventh army corps, six squadrons of cavalry be- longing to the second corps were also at the same time in Porosz- lo. They belonged to that army division which the comman- der-in-chief, during his just-terminated offensive operation, had left behind in Poroszlo and Tiszafiired, to secure the passage across the Theiss between these two places ; and, according to MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 221 Dembinski's last dispositions, were to remain in Poroszlo to observe the enemy, even after the retreat of the seventh army corps be- hind the Theiss had been effected. I was just ready to commence the retreat, when the enemy, advancing toward Poroszlo on the road from Besenyo, suddenly began to deploy before us in scarcely stronger force than our own. At first he seemed as if he intended to attempt an attack on our camp. Considering the fatal characteristics of our line of retreat, re- treat for the moment could not be thought of This line consisted of a causeway, just wide enough to allow two vehicles to pass each other. The Theiss had already over- flowed ; this causeway was the sole communication between Po- roszlo and the bridge over the Theiss. Poroszlo is a locality stretching from north to south, and lying on an elevation, which limits westward the extent of inundation on the right bank of the Theiss, here above a league in breadth. This elevation slopes steeply toward the east, and forms at the same time the right bank of the brook Csero, the left bank of which is situated in the inundated ground itself, across which the causeway leads to the bridge over the Theiss, which is about a league further off. The connection of the causeway with the elevation commanding it, and on which Poroszlo stands, is ef- fected by means of a wooden bridge, resting on piles, over the brook Csero The clear space between the eastern row of houses of Poroszlo and the slope of the bank of the brook Csero admits of batteries being planted, which, the causeway lying in a vertical direction with this row of houses, would command it (the causeway) lengthways, and expose it to a cross-fire; consequently the troops retreating on it could be literally sivept down, without any possi- bility being presented to them of planting more than one gun — namely, on the causeway itself — against the hostile batteries, which gun would then evidently have to form the extreme rear- guard. Poroszlo, in its breadth — in the direction from west to east — is intersected by several streets. One of them opens on to the clear space, between the right bank of the Cserc) and the eastern front of the houses, exactly opposite the bridge ; the other streets open, part of them above, part below the bridge. 222 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAP.Y. The seventh army corps remamed. as has been said, still in the camp before the long western boundary of the place, when the enemy deployed in our front at about gun-range and a half distance. The view was unobstructed ; our retreat could not he masked. To begin such a retreat under the eyes of the enemy must invite him to attack, and to immediate pursuit. While of all the streets which intersect the place in its breadth, we could make use of only that one which opens opposite the causeway, if we would avoid obstacles incalculable in their con- sequences, occasioned by the concourse of several retreating col- umns immediately before the bridge ; the enemy, by advancing through the other streets, could reach the clear space before the eastern front of the houses sim.ultaneously with our last section, plant his guns in the direction of the causeway, and sans gene begin the work of destruction. In doing so, the direct injury which his fire would have caused to us would have been not at all comparable to what would have ensued in consequence of the thronging on the narrow causeway. I feared that in the cha- otic confusion I should be forced to see several guns and ammu- nition-chests tumbling down over the slopes of the road ; and 1 preferred to accept where I was even an unequal contest, and defend myself to the last, than to begin the retreat under such untoward circumstances. The first offensive advance of the enemy was followed by a similar movement on our part ; the suspension of our advance by the falling back of the hostile vanguard. After which both parties contented themselves with observing each other during the day. Late in the afternoon, a patrol of hussars, which had been sent out in the direction of Heves, returned with some prisoners, lan- cers, whom the commander of the hostile column in Heves had charged with a despatch " to the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Wrbna in Poroszlo." The contents of this dispatch informed us that we had no hostile attack to fear from Heves. In my suite there served as courier, among others, a harmless Lo-Preszti hussar. This remarkable troop was distinguished prin- cipally by its red cloaks. The harmless fellow felt cold, and was enveloped in his cloak, when the lancers were brought in. Where- MY LIFE AND- ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 223 upon one of them took the red-cloaked Lo-Preszti hussar for the executioner, who — so the tale ran in the hostile camp — used first to cut ofi^ the ears of the prisoners, and after a while their heads also. The brave lancer, at the mere sight of the red Lo-Preszti hussar, was now naturally seized with the gallows-fever, and re- covered only after being well recruited by means of bacon, bread, and wine. There was no longer any prospect of our being attacked in the course of the day. The enemy before us seemed to feel himself too weak, and intended to await reinforcements, which might arrive during the night. We were consequently obliged to effect the delayed retreat under cover of night, in order to avoid the danger of an overpowering attack, which was to be expected next day. I issued the orders necessary for this purpose, and reported to Dembinski the cause of the delay. The second hour after midnight was fixed for leaving the camp. Before midnight, however, I received, in answer to my report, Dembinski' s order to remain in Poroszlo with the seventh army corps during the next day also, and accept a combat, in case the enemy should attack. Dembinski evidently wished to try his Juck once more at the " losing game," and that with the seventh army corps alone. But I had no desire for such a game ; and declared to Dembinski, in a special letter — after a concise review of the principal points in his career till now as commander-in-chief — That this order appeared to me to have for its object to expose to useless slaughter the best Hungarian corps ; a corps for the pres- ervation of which I, as its commander, was responsible to the coun- try ; — that the favorable opportunities for striking decisive blows had been neglected by him (Dembinski) at Tomalja, Kerecsend (immediately after the battle of Kapolna), and Mezo-Kovesd ; — that the present position of the seventh corps, with a long open, indefensible defile in its rear, was badly adapted for accepting a serious combat, by which he seemed now suddenly to be anxious to make up for lost time ; — that the corps must, on the contrary, be saved as quickly as possible from this dangerous position ; — but that this was only possible by the retreat during the night, which I had. already ordered ; and that I was ready to answer before a council of war for this act of disobedience. 224 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY Before daybreak of the third of March I had already quitted Poroszlo with the seventh army corps, and left behind me there, in order to observe the enemy, only the six squadrons of cavalry of the second army corps. I reached without interruption the left bank of the Theiss. The hostile corps, however, the attacks of which I thought to avoid by this retreat during the night, had at the same time marched back from Poroszlo to Besenyo ; and thus once more the one had been in fear of the other, and both again without reason. CHAPTER XXXI. The decided vote of want of confidence in Dembinski on the part of the commanders of division under Klapka had in the meantime found the most lively echo in the divisions of the seventh army corps. The army was thus already in fact with- out a leader. General Repasy, commander of the second army corps, and Colonel Klapka, perceived, as well as myself, that this state of the army could not continue long without endangering the country. We therefore, without constraint, agreed to lose no time in as- sembling the staff-officers of the divisions of our corps that were not then on service, to deliberate how this condition might most judiciously be remedied ; but to invite the government commis- sary-in-chief, Bartholomaus von Szemere, to take part in the con- sultation, that even the appearance of the army conspiring against the government might he avoided. The conclusion to which this assembly of staff-officers came, as well as the reasons for the resolution, may be briefly summed up as follows : That to beat the enemy, and yet endure hunger, might be put up with. To be beaten by the enemy, but at least to have after- ward enough to eat and drink, might perhaps also be tolerable. But to be repeatedly beaten, and moreover endure hunger as well MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 225 as all imaginable fatigues, was too bad, and could no longer be borne. That Lieutenant-general Dembinski — especially by the man- ner in which he, as commander-in-chief, had conducted his offens- ive intended for the reconquest of the capitals — had brought all these calamities on the army, and in consequence had forfeited/or- ever its confidence. The representative of the government, Bartholomiius von Szemere, who was present, was consequently requested to take suitable measures for removing Lieutenant-general Dembinski from the chief cormnand of the army ; and for transferring it — until the definite appointment of Dembinski's successor — to one of the commanders of army corps present. In order to let Szemere be completely free in the choice of a commander-in-chief ad interim, I declared beforehand that I had no objection whatever to his appointing to the temporary chief command either of my young comrades, Repasy or Klapka. But both of them, on their part, judging it fitting that the pro- visional command of the army should be entrusted to me, as being in rank the eldest commander of a corps — there was no longer any choice left to Szemere ; and he consulted with me as to the way in which, with the least ofiense, Dembinski could be removed from the chief command. We thought to proceed in the most delicate way by Szemere's immediately inviting the commander-in-chief by letter to avoid the bitter pill intended for him, by a voluntary retiring from his post, and to transmit to him (Szemere), in a confidential way, his journal of operations, together with the rest of the proto- cols. Dembinski, however, either did not believe in the possibility of being removed in consequence of a simple Vote of want of confidence on the part of the army, or he hoped to gain the crown of martyrdom ; for he positively would not hear of a volun- tary retirement. It seemed likewise possible that he doubted the genuineness of the vote of want of confidence on the part of the army, and considered it to be merely forged, perhaps by me. He had consequently in the first place to be entirely freed from this illusion. To this end, Szemere, accompanied by Repasy, Klapka, and myself, and, unless I am mistaken, also by Aulich and the chief 226 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of the general staff of the seventh army corps, went next day to Dembinski's head-quarters. But that no conciliatory means might be left untried, Szemere saw Dembinski at first alone, and announced to him beforehand what awaited him next moment, if he should continue to refuse voluntarily to lay down the staff of command. This measure also having been unsuccessful, Szemere summon- ed us — who had meantime been waiting in the ante-chamber — to enter likewise, and then declared to Dembinski in our pres- ence, that the army had no longer any confidence in his command and that he could not fail to perceive how the want of this con- fidence paralyzed his further efficiency as commander-in-chief. Dembinski seemed to be laboring under the supposition that all this had for its object less the removing him from the chief command than the satisfying our eager desire for the disclosure of his plan of operations, which had formed the basis of his un- successful ofi^ensive, and which was carefully kept secret by him : for the substance of his answer to Szemere's declaration was the following reminiscence of that campaign to which he owes his ante-March, Conversationslexicon celebrity : " One day during my retreat in Lithuania," thus Dembinski began his tale, " my officers came to me, and desired to know whither I was leading them. Gentlemen, I replied, do you see my cap here ?" Hereupon Dembinski actually seized his indoor-cap, and put it on his head. " If I could suppose," he continued, proceeding with his an- swer to the said officers, " that this cap had any perception of what I think, and whither I am leading you" (the officers in Lithuania, not us), " I would throw it on the ground and trample it under my feet, and in future go about without a cap." With this Dembinski tore the poor cap off his head again, crumpled it up for awhile in evident indignation, and threw it mercilessly on the ground. He must give us the same answer — he hereupon intimated — - so often as we should ask him about his plan of operations. Dembinski here plainly overlooked how essentially different his position was with respect to us from what it had been tvith respect to the officers in Lithuania. These officers wished only to know whither he was leading MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGAUY. 227 them ; we knew already whither he Imd led us — namely, into the sauce. ^ These only doubted of his capacity as a general ; we no longer doubted of the contrary. These were still willing to follow him on certain conditions ; we no longer on any whatever. I strongly suspect that in Dembinski it was only " the vanity of authorship" which led him to cite to us, so mal a jyt'opos, his smart answer to these officers. After a long discussion, without result, between Dembinski and Szemere, during which the honor of spokesman on our part was left to the latter exclusively, this scene terminated with Dembinski's repeated declaration, that he would not voluntarily retire — whereupon we took our leave. Szemere, however, had now to bite the sour apple, and, by virtue of his unlimited power, officially to inform Lieutenant- general Dembinski that he must without delay give up the chief command of the army to me. As soon as I was convinced that Dembinski had received this order from Szemere, I charged the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps to take possession of the registers of the service, which were kept at the quarters of the chief command. Dembinski, however, had taken them meanwhile under his own oharge, and obstinately refused to give them up. The chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps took up the raiatter in good earnest, and placed a guard at Dembinski's door. I quite approved of this measure, and immediately informed the government commissary-in-chief, Szemere, of Dembinski's arrest. Szemere had not been prepared for this turn of affairs, declared that he did not at all agree to Dembinski's being arrest- ed, and immediately set him at liberty. Next day the President Kossuth, with the war-minister Mes- zaros and Field-marshal Lieutenant Vetter, arrived at Tisza- fiired. For Szemere had reported to Debreczin — undoubtedly immedi- ately after the arrival of my last letter from Poroszlo to Dem- binski — that mutiny had broken out in the army. Even before Szemere's letter, two staff-officers, dispatched by Klapka and myself, had arrived at Debreczin, in order to open * i. e. into the very jaws of destruction. — TransL 228 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. the eyes of the government as to the chief causes of the doubtful progress of our war-operations. The government took this step for an omen confirming Sze- mere's report. Hence Kossuth's speedy journey from Debreczin to Tiszafiired. Now commenced a lengthened examination of the staff-officers of the army. The point of it was directed against me. Meszaros and Vetter discharged the functions of judicial exam- iners. My letter from Poroszlo to Dembinski did not appear in itself svjficient reason for instituting proceedings against me ; while, nevertheless, a notable satisfaction was desired to be given to Dembinski. He had probably — ^just as he did before me on the morning of the 2d of March in Poroszlo, so now in Tiszafiired before Kos- suth and his colleagues — thrown the blame of his (Dembinski's) retreat behind the Theiss on the army itself, and especially on Klapka and myself, and might thus have excited the suspicion, that both of us had frustrated the execution of his plan of opera- tions, which was unknown to us, by our intentionally bringing on battles unfavorable in their results — for instance, on the days of Kapolna and Eger-Farmos — and this to render it impossible for him to remain Hungarian commander-in-chief The discovery of facts confirmatory of this suspicion appeared, consequently, to be the chief aim of these examinations. Had this been attained, two birds would have been killed with one stone — "Dembinski" and "victory" would have ceased to be contradictions; and myself and my proclamation of "Waizen would have ended our struggles ! The latter especially caused Kossuth much vexation. Chiefly to render harmless its and its author's influence had Dembinski been written for to Paris — were the independent army divisions invented. The royal Hungarian-constitutional cm-ps d'ar- mee of the upper Danube should disappear in the army of tlie Polish-Hungarian revolution, that " Octavianus" Kossuth might be enabled at last, unrestrained, to enact with " Anto- nius" Bem and *' Lepidus" Dembinski, " a triumvirate en minia^ ture^ It is easily conceivable that the more Dembinski's unexpected failure again enveloped in mist the already bright prospect hereof, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 229 the more earnestly must Kossuth have desired that " the blame of this failure'' should be brought home to Klapka and me. Meszaros and Vetter accordingly examined with might and main — I forget now during how many days. They did not find, however, what they sought. "Dembinski" and *' victory" constantly remained contradic- tions ; myself and the proclamation of Waizen were not yet to end our struggles ! My punishment for disobedience to Dembinski was confined to a long-winded, humorous lecture, which Meszaros read me one day just after dinner, in Vetter's presence, after the examination of all the staff'-officers was concluded. " In vino Veritas'' — he began — " says a Latin proverb ; I have therefore to-day intentionally taken some glasses of wine more than I needed, to enable me to tell you the truth frankly. Soon after you was appointed general and commander of the corps d'armee of the upper Danube, I must remark that you failed in that respect for the war-minister which I should have thought you owed him. Times innumerable you have slighted me by sending your proposals direct to the Committee of Defense. * The old Meszaros ig an old pigtail; why lose time?' you may have thought. I accommodated myself to it ; for I am no friend to sycophancy. Then I heard one fine morning, you had sud- denly proclaimed that old Meszaros was the sole authority you acknowledged in the country. You can conceive my righteous astonishment at this ? you can conceive how difldcult it was for me to comprehend the reason of this distinction of my insignifi- cant self — expected least of alJ from you? you can conceive what trouble it cost me merely to identify myself rightly with my new dignity as the sole authority recognized by you in the state ? At last I succeeded, however ; and I now believed I could the more certainly reckon on your obedience, the more you had to make good in this respect for former times. But what a deception I You were pleased merely to jest, and have been no more obedient to me since than before ; and just as little have you obeyed more recently the man whom I appointed your com- mander-in-chief. It seems, therefore, as if you had been chosen by Providence to give the he to the proverb which says that * He who would command, must first learn to obey.' " This introduction was then followed by some rhapsodical re- 230 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. citals from the military regulations of the royal imperial Austrian army; and a kind " take it not amiss" sweetened at the end even the few bitternesses which during the harmless lecture had escaped from the kind-hearted old gentleman, probably against his will. I thought I could not show my gratitude for so much gentle forbearance better than — while passing over in considerate silence an investigation into the alleged inconsistencies in my conduct toward Meszdros — by confining myself to the justification of my disobedience to Dembinski, which I did by some counter-citations from the same military regulations whence the war-minister had taken the really reprimanding part of his discourse. Meszaros availed himself of my answer to resume the discourse, and informed me that Dembinski had already been removed from the chief command, and that Vetter would take it. CHAPTER XXXII. Kossuth either had not the courage to oppose the judgment pronounced against Dembinski by the assembly of staff-officers, or he perceived that it wa-s just ; suffice it — Dembinski did not immediately obtain, so far as I know, any satisfaction whatever for the afiront he had sufl^ered. It was left to him to see how he should console or avenge himself Some days after the retreat of the army to Tiszafiired, Colonel John Damjanics — having crossed the Theiss at Czibakhaza with his army division (one half of the third army corps) — appeared suddenly on the railway from Pesth to Szolnok, between the hos- tile brigades under Ottinger in Abany and Kargern in Szolnok, attacked the latter, and defeated it. Dembinski now claimed the honor of this victory exclusively to himself; because, about a week or a fortnight before, he had sent to the third army corps, which stood on the left bank of the Theiss, opposite Szolnok and at Czibakhaza, an order to attack the enemy in the beginning of March. Neither Damjanics nor his brave troops, nor the indolence of the hostile brigade under Ottinger in Abany, nor the comfortable feeling of security of that MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 231 under Kargern in Szolnok, which allowed itself to be literally- surprised in the midst of a boundless plain in broad daylight — nothing of ftll this, according to Dembinski's view, had any merit in the victory — only he alone ; while, on the other hand, it was solely owing to me — said Dembinski further — that this victory could not now exert any favorable influence on the oper- ations of our chief array : for through my treason the battle of Kapolna had been lost ; I had been the cause why the canton- ment-stations Eger-Farmos, Lovo, Szent-Istvan, and Negyes — in which he intended to await the victory of Szolnok, in order to advance again immediately toward the capitals — had to be evac- uated by our army ; nay, even the last possibility of suddenly resuming the offensive had been destroyed by me alone, in re- treating from Poroszlo across the Theiss, contrary to his express command. Thus Dembinski consoled — thus avenged himself; and Count Guyon seconded him therein. But the declarations which escaped from Dembinski at this occasion about his most secret war-operative thoughts, when com- bined with the events already communicated during the campaign, enable us to perceive, almost in its details, the plan of operations according to which Dembinski thought to reconquer the capitals. During the second half of February Dembinski had at his disposal ten army divisions, the strength of each of which varied on an average from 4000 to 4500 men, baggage train included. Seven of these army divisions he destined for attack along the high road of Gyongycis. One he left at Tiszafiired and Poroszlo for the protection of the passage across the Theiss between these places. Two army divisions (the third anny corps) had to take Szol- nok in the beginning of March, and then to make a demonstra- tion on the railway-line against the capitals. Dembinski's plan of operations was consequently this ; Demonstration along the railroad ; principal attack along the high road of Gyongyos. A demonstration — to answer its object, namely, to make the enemy believe that the demonstrating column is the princi- pal column for attack — must be undertaken with reference to such circumstances of time and place as do not beforehand pre- vent the enemy being deceived. 232 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Bearing this rule in mind, Dembinski had quite correctly de- ferred the commencement of the demonstration on the railroad till the beginning of March ; for, having been opposed as late as the 21st of February, with the seventh army corps to Field- marshal Schlick at Sago-Szent-Peter, and as this place was at least nine good marching stations distant from the point where the demonstration on the railroad was to be commenced — the enemy would have perceived immediately, from the attack on Szolnok, made, for instance, before the 3d of March, that our main FORCE was by no means to he sought for behind this column. We ought not, in justice, to suppose that Dembinski intended to bring his principal column of attack on the main road of Gy- ongyos into conflict with the enemy seven or eight days before the beginning of this demonstration along the railroad ; for this would have been sheer nonsense, and Dembinski's plans of opera- tions were always based on a distinct, definite idea — only in their eocecution he alivays got into difficulties. Moreover we must re- member that Dembinski had as early as the 26th of February repeatedly asserted that he had by no means wished for the con- flict on the Tarna. We may therefore be completely at rest on this point, namely, that Dembinski wa,s, from the first determined to await the begin- ning of the demonstration, nay even its consequences, favorable for our principal attack ; and his advance from Miskolcz as far as the Tarna must appear to us consequently only as an arrange- ment for the intended principal attack. Dembinski undoubtedly intended to steal away unobserved with his seven army divisions to the Tarna, in order to remain there hidden until this demonstration should have been begun. For this reason it was, that, on the 24th of February, at Mezo-Kovesd, he complained so bitterly to me about Klapka's sudden attacks on Kompolt and Petervasara, and was quite right in maintaining that Klapka was disclosing to the enemy his (Dembinski's) inten- tions ; for these surprises plainly directed the enemy's attention to our principal column of attack. It is true that Klapka might oppose to this, that the principal column of attack could not have reached the Tarna unobserved, unless Dembinski had had ready at least thirty thousand invisi- ble-caps, so that each of our soldiers might have drawn one of them over his ears, and thus become invisible. This, however, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 233 will not at all prevent Dembinski — as we already know him — from afterward maintaining that the execution of his plan of operations was wrecked entirely in consequence of Klapka's sur- prises ; for its execution we must consider as wrecked with the first discliarge of cannon on the 26th of February. The two-days' battle of Kapolna, which this discharge of can- non opened, seems to have been given by the commander-in-chief only par depit. As soon as it was lost, however, he had again ready a new definite plan of operations. We deduce this directly from his own declarations made in consequence of the victory at Szolnok. The lines of operation remained the same as those in the first plan, only Dembinski had this time to abandon the decep- tion by means of demonstration, just because this deception was no longer possible after the battle of Kapolna. He consequently intended only to await the taking of Szolnok, and then imme- diately to resume the offensive on the main road of Gyongyos. He calculated naturally on this, that the resolution with which the third army corps would advance on the railroad must oblige Field-marshal Windischgratz either to weaken his main forces by detachments to the railway-line, or even completely retreat toward the capitals. To this plan of operations also, and the combinations on which its execution depended, considered in itself, not m.uch can be ob- jected : only in the preliminary arrangements for it, Dembinski had again overlooked a trifling matter. As is known, he intended to conceal his defeated and pursued seven army divisions for the time being in the oft-mentioned can- tonments, and to let them rest until — as has been said — Szolnok should be taken. In order to be quite sure that these seven army divisions should n/Jt be discovered in their hiding-places, Dembinski — since we had no invisible-caps in our possession — by way of wise precaution, immediately after the battle of Kapolna, should — ^beginning with Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz, and ending with the last hostile private soldier — have so pasted up the eyes of each man, that the whole Austrian army had re- mained at least during eight days in total blindness. Dem- binski having neglected to do this, had to see his second plan of operations also wrecked in the combat at Eger-Farmos, and re- treated in despair behind the Theiss. CHAPTER XXXIIL After Dembinski's dismissal in the camp at Tiszafiired, it was felt to be urgently necessary that the troops should immedi- ately march. Tiszafiired, whose stores were exhausted, proved to be very unfavorably situated for the speedy importation of large supplies — especially at that time, when the inundation had just set in. The conjoint chief command, which — as we shall presently see — had succeeded to Dembinski, was destitute of the firmness requisite for energetically repressing disorders arising in the camp. In place of the just- wrecked plan of operations Yetter and Dembinski projected a new one, namely : Demonstration on the high road of Gyongyos with the seventh army corps. Principal attack on the railway-line with the first, second, and third corps. This plan of operations was submitted to the President for his approval. Undoubtedly Kossuth had good manners enough to find it incomparable ; nevertheless — he might perhaps have thought — it would at the same time be desirable to be at once quite certain that no accessory circumstance had been neglected therein, in itself insignificant, and yet perhaps important enough to be espied by envious eyes, and immediately sharply criticised. Gorgei or Klapka — Kossuth might have thought further — will certainly discover directly any weak point in this plan of opera- tions, and if we omit previously to ask their judgment upon it, though only j)ro farma, they will do all they can to damage it with the troops ; nay principally on account of the troops, with which both these commanders of army corps seem unfortu- nately to be very popular, this precaution is indispensable. Finally, Kossuth might have offered to take upon himself person- ally to confer with me about the plan of operations, leaving to General Vetter to speak with Klapka on the subject. Thus I explain to myself the occasion of a tete-a-tete between MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 235 me and Kossuth, during which he, after some hints about a cer- tain amount of consideration which must still be shown toward Dembinski, suddenly began upon the plan of operations, expressly assuring me that Dembinski and Yetter had, indeed, projected it, but that he (Kossuth) nevertheless wished, before he had it put into execution, to hear my judgment upon it. I answered, that a plan of operations was soon made, and that, as far as regarded them-y, there was just as little to object against this as against the one recently abandoned ; the main point was the execution, the details of which depended upon the effect, not always to be foreseen, of the hostile counter-movements, as well as upon a great number of other casualties. Hereupon I was dismissed, with the assurance of deeply-felt thanks, and so forth ; but was shortly after again sent for by the President. This time Kossuth — naturally again under four eyes — ^began in an especially confidential manner : that the definitive nomina- tion of Vetter as commander-in-chief was still undecided upon, nay, all things considered, was not even very probable ; that I had consequently still further to act as provisional commander- in-chief, and immediately to prepare for the execution of the new plan of operations. "Without hesitation I declared myself ready — taking Kossuth's hints about the still undecided definitive promotion of Vetter, in the first instance for nothing else than the natural consequence of a rising scruple on the part of the latter in the meanwhile — and hastened to consult with Klapka and the chief of the gen- eral staff of the seventh army corps about the dispositions to be first made for the troops, according to the new plan of opera- tions. Soon after I had left Kossuth, Yetter came in quest of me, and likewise charged me with the same commission as I had already received from the former ; but he — in contradiction to Kossuth — assigned as the sole and exclusive reason for it, the circum- stance that the personnel of his war-office had been left behind in Debreczin, and that he was therefore not able immediately to take the chief command in due form. He alleged this with such ingenuousness as in him — a man who seemed to be void of every kind of dissimulation — must be considered a proof that he had no presentiment of the doubtfulness of his promotion, which Kos- 236 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARy. suth had expressly specified as the reason of my further acting as provisio7ial commander-in-chief of the army. I sought in vain for a valid reason for this ambiguous behavior on the part of the President. The sole supposition which oc- curred to me was, that Kossuth wished thereby merely to allay my presumed discontent at Vetter's appointment to the chief com- mand, already definitively indicated, that I might not, so long as the army remained in Tiszafiired, and consequently in close con- tact with me, perchance entertain the idea of instigating the troops against Vetter. This supposition, however, seemed to me not sufliciently tenable. It would have been so perhaps, if, with Vetter's previous knowledge, Kossuth had given these hints about the improbability of his promotion. That the President, how- ever, had dared to give these intimations behind Vetter's backy and had thereby seriously compromised him — who conducted himself toward me already as actual commander-in-chief of the army — but had at the same time exposed himself to the danger of being compromised by me with Vetter ; — all this found in tJiat supposition no foundation whatever. Only later experience led me subsequently to suppose, that Kos- suth, probably while in Tiszafiired, had felt that " longing fm' the staff of command,'' which afterward tormented him so often ; that he therefore had taken advantage of Dembinski's removal to introduce a kind of interregnum in the chief command of the army, during which he could satisfy this *' longing" at least for a time ; and that his ambiguous behavior toward Vetter and my- self, as well as the ivhole comedy with the plan of operations, had its origin only in his intention to pi'olong the interregnum as much as possible, whereby Kossuth might not have failed to make way for his direct influence with the army in future. My proceedings during the interregnum were confined to sign- ing the order of march for the first and second corps — which were sent from Tiszafiired down toward Czibakhaza — and to reducing the four army divisions to three, this having been ordered long ago, as has been mentioned, by the war-minister, and the possibility of executing the order having at last presented itself in Tiszafiired. Kossuth in the mean time had received critical news from Komorn. The commander of the fortress, General Torok — it was said — was Tiot eaual to the post which he held ; he was p*' MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 237 altogether deficient in firmness ; a more energetic man must speedily be put in his place, if we would not run the risk of losing the fortress. The President now consulted with me about the choice of a new commander of the fortress. I proposed Colonel Guyon for this post, as what was wanting here was merely an energetic man, and as the military council of the fortress consisted of men who were able to supply Colonel Guyon's deficiency in the knowledge necessary to every commander of a fortress. Kossuth adopted this suggestion ; nevertheless, to be quite secure, he thought it necessary to appoint another commander besides Guyon for the fortress of Komom. His choice fell on the then Colonel Lenkey. Both had now to look out, how they should get into the fortress : he who first succeeded in doing so, was to remove Torok from his post, and take the command of the fortress upon himself The President previously made both of them generals, and at the same time also Colonels Damjanics, Klapka, and Aulich. Count Guyon consequently left the seventh army corps ; his division was broken up, and its troops incorporated into the other three divisions ; while the command of the division of the right wing, which had become vacant by Aulich's nomination to general and commander of the second army corps, was given to the senior colonel of the latter. The enemy having forced back our out-posts from Poroszlo, and having burnt — after an attempt at a hasty reconnoitering toward the wretchedly constructed tete-de-pont of the Theiss — the Poroszlo bridge over the brook Csero ; and the crossing of the river being impracticable on any other point between Tisza- fiired and Tokaj, partly on account of the inundation, partly of the present want of materials for a bridge — the seventh army corps had now, with this changed aspect, to march up the river as far as Rakamaz, opposite Tokaj, in order here to gain at last the right bank of the Theiss. CHAPTER XXXIV. In the preceding chapter I gave expression to the conjecture, that Kossuth in Tiszafiired had striven primarily only for tlie establishment of his direct influence with the army. Apart from the evident pains he took to leave the post of commander- in-chief unoccupied as long as possible, whereby — easily circum- venting the indolent war-minister — he brought himself into im- mediate contact with the several commanders of the troops — I find this conjecture confirmed especially by his successful attempts to secure to himself for the future also this g-wasz-good-naturedly- patriarchal official relation between him and myself How these attempts could be successful with me will become evident from what follows :• I had not seen Kossuth from the beginning of November 1848 till the early part of March 1849, and had kept up no direct intercourse whatever with him since his flight from Pesth to Debreczin. The correspondence between us, active as it had been during my sojourn in Presburg, was entirely interrupted some time before the evacuation of the capitals. Kossuth had, in fact tried, while I was with the then corps d'armee of the upper Danube in the mountain-towns, to renew our correspondence; but without success, for I did not answer his letters. This I beheved I owed to those officers of the corps d'armee, who con- tinued to take part in the defense of the country only in conse- quence of my iwoclamation of Waizen. Being obliged, however, only too soon to discover that Meszaros was, on the one hand, unfortunately altogether unworthy of the confidence which the officers had placed in the firmness of his political opinions, and, on the other, was in general calculated rather to bring the regular defense of the country by degrees completely into decay than to promote it ; — it seemed to me much more advantageous for the security of the political basis on which I wished to maintain the war against Austria, as well as for the continuance of the contest itself, that I should no longer MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 239 throw any obstacles in the way of a direct understanding between / Kossuth and myself. For this reason I had put the steps which became necessary for removing Dembinski from the chief command directly under the 3Bgis of the government, by causing Szemere to take part in the assembly of staff-officers ; for this reason also, on the arrival of Kossuth in Tiszafiired, I determined to press on him as much as possible a thorough consideration of the dangers which would ensue to Hungary from the intermixture of revolutionary tenden- cies with the legal cause of our combat in self-defense. I thought I should obtain this object most surely by surprising, as it were, Kossuth with the following question : whether he did not thinh that Hungary might he still quite satisfied ivith the constitu- tion of 1848, IF THE PORTFOLIOS OF WAR AND FINANCE WERE AGAIN TRANSFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF ViENNA. KoSSUth's answer was an evasive one ; he thought only, he said, that the liberty of Hungary would be constantly in danger, so long AS Poland also was not free, and that ivith the freedom of Hungary the freedom of Europe likewise would certainly be lost. The most natural question on my part would now have been, what Kossuth meant by the freedom of Hungary, Poland, and Europe ; but he prevented me from any further scrutiny of his political creed by the declaration, which under existing circum- stances was a very important one, that he held it to he the most SACRED duty of all %vho meant honorably by the country, to agitate no question, and to venture on no step, the investi- gation OR CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH might divide the nation into parties, and so only increase the power of the common ENEMY OF ALL. There was a severe reproof /or me in this declaration ; for it was I who had already, by the proclamation of Waizen, agitated such a questio7i and ventured on such a step. But the more keenly I felt the censure contained in the declaration just made by Kossuth, the more strongly did I believe it contained a guar- antee that he would himself undertake nothing by which the power of THE COMMON ENEMY OF US ALL SHOULD BE INCREASED. On the strength of this belief I completely gave up all further op2)osition to Kossuth, and endeavored to combat — unfortunately in vain — merely from the point of Hungarian national honor. 240 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. even his Poland ma7iia, with which, /rcw^ political aversion, I could by no means connect myself. This belief strengthened anew my confidence in Kossuth ; while his conduct, simulating reciprocal confidence, rendered me completely inaccessible to any sus'picion against him. After these premises it was no longer difficult for Kossuth to regulate the relation between us quite as he thought jyro'per ; not difficult for him to persuade me that in Debreczin there existed a party which was striving to call forth a decision of the Diet, in accordance with which the nation would have to sur- render to Prince Windischgratz at discretion; that he could hardly any longer oppose with sufficient energy the agitations for this purpose, as he could not absent himself even for one day, without having to fear that a motion made with this intent might obtain the majority of the Lower-chamber ; that he could venture on this journey to Tiszafured only because the represen- tatives had pledged to him their word of honor that they would come to NO conclusion ivhatever during his absence, ivhich had been limited to a certain number of days, and that he had to be back at Debreczin without fail before the expiration of the fixed term, in order to preserve the nation from the most disgraceful of all fates, from self degradation, self-abandonment ; that there was but one thing which could save him for some time, and with him the whole country, from this painful situation, and this one thing was — a victory I — even if not a decisive one, at least one upon which a retreat of our troops did not again im- mediately follow ; for that in Debreczin the watchword ran, it is true, literally, ''Victory m- death!"" but in reality signified, ''A victory ! or we die from anguish." Taking all this for genuine truth, how could I suspect in the members of this party (later the peace-party) the advocates of MY political creed ? After I had already received, as has been mentioned, a lecture from the war-minister for my disobedience to Dembinski, Kossuth asked me : if I had been in Dembinski's place, what I would have done with Gorgei ? " I would have had him shot," I replied ; "for if I had been in Dembinski's place, I would not have issued orders a la Dembinski, consequently icould have given no occasion whatever fm' a similar disobedience." Of this answer Kossuth reported to the Diet only the first ') '1 A /? V MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARyS^^^CAL^t;;.: clause : the second clause, containing my reason, he passed over in silence ; and thus represented me as the poor repentant sinner pardoned by him. The members of the later peace-party taking this also for genuine truth, how could they suspect in me, thejpor sinner par- doned BY Kossuth, an advocate of their political creed ? Kossuth by lying had interposed a thick vail between his polit- ical opponents, and thus retained free scope for the prosecution of his own " personal" policy. CHAPTER XXXV. Kossuth, Meszaros, and Vetter had left Tiszafiired again, and had returned to Debreczin ; the first and second army corps were on their route to Szolnok ; the seventh corps had now to cross the Theiss at Tiszafiired, in order to begin the demonstration on the main road of Gybngyos ; and as yet nobody knew who com- manded the army ! The troops might suppose it was myself; while I was con- vinced of the contrary, but without knowing any thing more pre- cisely about the futflre nomination of the commander-in-chief, than that, as has been already mentioned, on the one hand, Kossuth had contradicted the probability of Tetter's being ap- pointed to this post ; on the other, only that Vetter had acted as if he were already invested with the office. Neither the latter circumstance nor Dembinski's removal were officially known ; Meszaros had sunk within these few days in Tiszafiired complete- ly to naught ; Kossuth was still irresolute ; and thus the army strolled, in a good-natured spontaneity as it were, toward an uncertain destination. So long as the impossibility of passing the Theiss with the seventh army corps at Tiszafiired, or between this point and Tokaj, had not been proved by attempts, I had, as commander of this corps — which moreover, according to the new plan of operations, had to operate independeyitly — no particular reason to trouble myself much whether Peter or Paul should become L 243 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. commander-in-chief. But when the inevitable necessity suddenly forced itself on me, of gaining the right bank of the Theiss by means of the considerable circuit by Tokaj, then I had to fear that the delay — impossible to be foreseen at Kossuth and Vetter's departure from Tiszafiired resulting therefrom to the demonstra- tion on the main road of Gybngyos, might essentially embarrass the future commander-in-chief of the army in the immediate execution of the new plan of operations. I hastened therefore to Debreczin, to learn to whom the command of the army had at last really been confided, and in order immediately by word of mouth to inform the new commander of this delay in the demon- stration, and to urge him at once to decide that the previous plan of operations should remain in full force in spite of this delay, or if not — ivhat task was next to be assigned to the seventh army corps. On my arrival at Debreczin, I found Kossuth just on the point of writing to me. He could now orally discuss with me the subject of his intended written communication. At first he asked me what qualifications I required in the future commander-in- chief of the army. " That he he a soldier and a Hungarian ; in other respects, whether older or younger in rank than myself is to me indifier- ent," was my answer. Hereupon Kossuth informed me without any further circumlo- cution, that he had already signed Vetter's nomination as com- mander-in-chief. At the same time he» asked me my judgment of him. I replied, that I could not yet give any opinion on Vet- ter, having been only twice in contact with him, and then but very transiently ; that those, however, who professed to know him, represented him as an experienced, brave soldier. Now it was not this which Kossuth wished to know about Yet- ter, but whether I did not think him capable of treason to the country. In answer to this question I assured the President that Vettcr had made on me the impression that he was a man of honor. I intended now to take my leave, in order to find the new com- mander-in-chief, transact with him my business relating to the service, and then very speedily rejoin my corps. Kossuth, how- ever, asked me to stay a little longer, as the first distribution of the recently created order of military merit was about to take MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 243 place at his residence, and he should be pleased if I would assist in person on the occasion. Soon afterward the then civil and military coryphei of Hungary who were present at Debreczin assembled at Kossuth's. Kossuth opened the ceremony by a short speech appropriate to the occasion ; then called over the names of those who had been found worthy of having first conferred on them the order of the second class of military merit (there were three classes) ; and in conclusion decorated such of the persons named as happened to be present. The ceremony was over, Yetter was present, and my time was short ; I therefore availed myself of the occasion to state to him the reason for my being there ; and after I had received his an- swer, that in spite of the delay in crossing the Theiss, the task of the seventh army corps in the operations for the next campaign, remained the one already mentioned, I again left Debreczin — a few hours after my arrival there — and hastened back to my head-quarters at Egyek. Among those who were decorated with the order of the second class of military merit were also Perczel and myself; nay — if I am not mistaken — even General Count Vecsei, whose merits in the field at that time, so far as I know, never sufficed to raise the standard of value above the freezing-point. General Klapka, on the contrary, was passed over, ''out of consideration'' for Mes- zdros — as was said. In order to understand how an iiijustice toward Klapka could be demanded out of " consideration'' for Meszdros, we must re- member that Meszaros, after he had been repeatedly unmercifully beaten by Field-marshal Schlick, had transferred the command of his utterly demoralized corps to Klapka, and that he, a few weeks later, with the same troojys, had successfully engaged the same enemy in several hot battles. This " consideration" for Meszaros, at Klapka' s expettse, be- comes perfectly explicable, if we consider that Meszaros himself, as war-minister, could not pilay a passive part in the scrutiny of tliose who were to be decorated. Nay, we are obliged to recog- nize such " consideration" positively as a postulate of the most tender duty toward one's self, when — as in the present instoMce — ONE AND THE SAME human skin incloses him who is both the object and the agent in the " consideration." CHAPTEU XXXVL The tete-de-po7it between Tiszafured and Poroszlo had al- ready received an adequate number of troops from the second army corps. Directly after my return from Debreczin, the whole seventh army corps consequently was marched from Egyek and Csege by Tiszapolgar, Szent-Mihaly, Tiszalok, and JN'agy-Falu to Rakamaz. In the stead of the bridge on piles over the Theiss, uselessly destroyed by fire in the month of January out of excessive fear of an offensive against Debreczin on the part of Field-marshal Schlick, the passage over the Theiss between Rakamaz and Tokaj had been re-established by means of a floating bridge. Over the river Hernad at Gesztely was thrown a similar bridge, time enough to enable the seventh army corps, after its passage over the Theiss, to advance without impediment from Tokaj by Mis- kolcz to the main road of Gyongyos, and pursuing it further, with the division of the right wing as far as Szikszo, with those of the centre and of the left wing as far as Szihalom and Mezo-Kovesd. In Tokaj the army corps had suffered a diminution of eight squadrons of hussars, which, according to the order of the com- mander-in-chief, had to be sent to Czibakhaza for the reinforce- ment of the main body of the army. In Miskolcz the army corps sustained another loss of from 300 to 400 infantry, one platoon of hussars, and two guns. Of these troops an independent column was formed and detached into the northern comitates against the Sclavonian militia, which the hostile brigades under Gotz and Jablonowski had left there, when they marched, after Dembinski had retreated behind the Theiss, from Kaschau by Miskolcz into the district of the opera- tions of their chief army. It was also in Miskolcz that I saw for the first time the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March with its boundless proviso; that obtruded gigantic hond^ with the clause, ** I will pay WHEN IT PLEASES ME !" MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAUY. 245 In Mezo-Kovesd we received information from a scout that the nearest hostile corps was stationed at Heves, while on the main road before us, even as far as Gyongyos, no enemy had been seen. The demonstration had consequently to begin with the march to Heves ; and the army corps at the height of Szikszo was directed from the main road in two columns toward the south, one of which advanced by Erdotelek, the other by Besenyo. An over-hasty patrol of hussars betrayed to the enemy our approach too soon. He drew back — so said the report — toward Jasz-Apati. We thought we had now once more to continue our demon- stration against the capitals parallel with the main road, to induce Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz — whose attention must have been already directed to us in consequence of the reports of the column which had retreated from Heves — to detach larger forces against us, and thus facilitate in a direct manner the advance of our main army on the railway-line against the capitals. Vetter had, however, meanwhile crossed the Theiss at Czibakhaza only to retreat again immediately behind it, and again to project a new plan of operations, the execution of which had to begin with marching back from Czibakhaza to Tiszafiired and passing the Theiss between this place and Poroszlo. The seventh army corps was ordered, from its position at Besenyo and Erdotelek, to protect this passage. This was the end of the demonstration of the seventh army corps against the capitals, as well as of the whole second of- fensive, which had scarcely begun. About the same time I charged the small expeditionary corps, which had been detached from Miskolcz into the northern comi- tates against the Sclavonian militia, to direct its inroads mainly toward Komorn. Thereby, on the one hand, an end would be put to the patrolling about of hostile detachments in the valley of the Eipel (Ipoly) ; on the other, the enemy would be induced, by thabold marches of this insignificant expeditionary column, to suppose the approach of a stronger corps, as well as the inten- tion to relieve Komorn by its means. After two-thirds of the main army had debouched at Poroszlo, the seventh army corps as vanguard lined the Tarna from. Fel- Dobro as far as Bod, and awaited in this position the approach of the main bodv. 246 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY Meanwhile divers rumors were heard about the details of the passage across the Theiss at Czibakhaza, and the retreat behind the river immediately subsequent thereupon ; and these rumors, taken together, attributed to Field-marshal L. Vetter, if possible, still less ability for the post of commander-in-chief than Dem- binski had shown. I could not therefore but apprehend that I should see the just-impending offensive founder once more in consequence of incapacity in the command. This thought left me no peace. "While my army corps was stationed on the Tarna, and had every prospect of remaining inactive during some days, I started, about the end of March, from Kerecsend for Tiszafiired, where Kossuth, Vetter, Damjanics, Klapka, and Aulich were then stay- ing. I hoped to succeed so far as that the new plan of opera- tions, in case it was already adopted, as well as the nearest preparations for its execution, might previously be brought be- fore a military council to be deliberated upon. Of the persons just named, Generals Damjanics and Klapka were the first whom I met in Tiszafiired. Before them I gave vent in some severe remarks to my vexation at the purposeless moving to and fro of the army with which Field-marshal L. Vetter had entered on his new charge ; and was not a little surprised when Damjanics interrupted me, in order to accuse himself, in Vetter's stead, of deserving the blame of the recent sudden abandonment of the plan of operations ; for he it was who — contrary to his former custom — intimidated by the news that the enemy, 60,000 strong, stood opposite them, had proposed the immediate return of the troops, when they had scarcely effected their passage over the Theiss. I had never before either seen or spoken to Damjanics. The manly frankness which he showed by accusing himself in Vet- ter's stead — although averse to him in his inmost soul — won for him at once my esteem and confidence ; while, on the other hand, the certainty that Field-marshal L. Vetter had no jpart in the blame of the miscarriage of the late offensive deprived me of every reason for doubting the capability of the commander-in- chief for his post. I naturally desisted now, without further hesitation, from my original design of having the project for the nearest operations submitted to the judgment of a military council, and confined MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 247 myself to informing the President Kossuth, and the commander- in-chief of the army Yetter, that I had come, as presumptive leader of the vanguard, merely for the purpose of receiving oral information — consequently more circumstantial — relative to my special mission during the next advance. Vetter informed me that he intended for the present to confine himself to a single compact advance along the main road as far as Gyongyos, and to arrange the movements to be executed further on than Gyongyos according to those of the enemy, but at all events to maintain the offensive until something decisive should happen. Thus, in the end of March, 1849, the Hungarian chief army — according to the documents, the baggage-train included, not quite 42,000 men strong, vv^ith about 160 pieces of artillery, two being tw^elve-pound batteries of six guns each — was concentrated in the near environs of the battle-field of Kapolna, in order for once to act at last in earnest. On the 31st of March we had already reached with the main body Gyongyos, with the advanced troops (the seventh array corps) Hort, without drawing a blade. CHAPTER XXXVn. During our advance to Gyongyos and Hort, Field-marshal L. Vetter suddenly fell ill ; and the Hungarian army was again without a leader, facing the enemy, who was ready for fighting. According to rank, it seemed to be due to me as a matter of course to act as Vetter's representative in the chief command. I felt, however, an inward repugnance to demanding that here rank alone should decide, while I Tnyself adopted the principle of allowing the mere rank to exercise an influence in the choice of my sub-commanders only between candidates of almost equal aptitude. I therefore insisted only on the speedy filling up of the vacant chief command ; while Damjanics and Klapka expressly de- manded that it should be transferred to me, as the senior in rank 248 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of the commanders of corps. Kossuth was consequently obliged to appoint me at least as Vetter's provisional substitute. He had thereby probably to overcome two concentrically-opposed sentiments, namely, his childish fear of my presumptive rivalry, and his own longing for the staff of the chief command ; be- cause only thus can it be explained how — in spite of the press- ing necessity for a leader being given to the army which was advancing on the offensive — several days could elapse from the arrival of the medical report stating Yetter's physical inability to take a personal share in the campaign, until my nomination as commander-in-chief ad interim. I believe I make no mistake in asserting that it was on the evening of the 30th of March 1849, that Kossuth's order for me to appear in Erlau without delay reached me in Gyongyos. I arrived at Erlau during the same night, received there on the morning of tlie 31st of March from Kossuth the charge to take the command of the army meanwhile, until Vetter should re- cover, and returned in the evening to Gyongyos. In the mean time we were informed by scouts that the enemy was about to concentrate his main forces at Godollo, and had established intrenchments on the points of passage across the little river Galga, as well as at the convent of Besenyo. Thus it seemed as if Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz intended to maintain the defensive, and await our principal attack on the main road from Gyongyos to Pesth. This line of attack being intersected by the two little rivers Zagyva and Galga, the marshy banks of which of themselves rendered the advance of an army uncommonly difficult, Klapka proposed to attack on the Gyongyos main, road only with the seventh army corps ; while with the first, second, and third corps, from Gyongyos by Arokszallas and Jasz-Bereny, to turn the de- fensive position of the enemy on the Galga in its right flank. All attacks combined with far turnings expose, it is well known, one of the two parts of the army on the offensive, which are isolated from each other during the manoeuvre of turning, to the danger of being attacked and beaten by a hostile superior force, whereupon the other part commonly shares the same fate. The extent of this danger bears an exact relation to the extent of the circuit which the turning-column makes. In the above-mentioned project of Klapka, for instance, the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 249 seventh army corps had by itself to be exposed during at least four or five days to the overpovi^ering attack of the hostile main army presumed to be on the Galga ; a space of time during which Prince Windischgratz and his counselors must necessarily have been asleep to be too late in remarking the movement of our principal column of attack. But when I nevertheless voted for the execution of Klapka's project, I did so only because I had already repeatedly experi- enced — as, indeed, only a short while ago under Dembinski — that if opposed to Prince Windischgratz, many a strategic sin might be committed altogether with impunity. My appointment to Vetter's post obliged me to remit the com- mand of the seventh army corps to the oldest commander of division in the corps, for whom again was • substituted in his command the oldest staff-officer of the division. Vetter having retained his staff in Tiszafiired, I also transferred to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps the management of the details of the collective operations of the army, and put in his place in the seventh army corps a staff officer of hussars fortunately competent for the office. It was understood as a matter of course that all these changes were to be considered only as temporary, so long as Vetter's re- turn still remained in prospect. Klapka's project of turning the enemy had received, besides my assent, also that of the provisional chief of the general staff of the whole army, and the beginning of the turning was fixed for the 2d of April. On the same day the seventh army corps was to commence, by its advance as far as Hatvan on the Zagyva, its attacks on the position of the enemy on the main road from Gyongyos to Pesth. The results of a reconnoitering, undertaken the day before (1st of April), from Hort toward this point, gave us reason to suppose that the enemy (the Schlick corps) would make a vigorous resistance. Field-marshal Schlick did more than that. He even took up the offensive (on the 2d of April) simultaneously with our seventh army corps. The encounter between it and the Schlick corps took place half way from Hort to Hatvan. The royal Hungarian seventh army corps conquered. Hatvan and the line of the Zagyva from Szent-Jakab as far as Fenszaru were the immediate fruit of this victory, equally im- 250 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. portant to us in a strategic as in a tactic point of view : in a strategic, because the possession of the line of the Zagyva essen- tially facilitated the masking of the manoeuvre of our principal column of attack ; in a tactic, because the seventh army corps, about 15,000 strong, in the position of Hatvan could resist any repeated hostile attack that could be attempted far more success- fully with half its strength, than in that at Hort with its whole. I had purposely remained in my head-quarters at Gyongycis during the battle at Hatvan, consequently far from the field, that I might not embarrass during the action my substitute in the seventh army corps on his debut as independent commander. So that the favorable issue of this battle brought us, besides the material advantage, also the moral one of the satisfactory con- viction that to the new commander of the seventh army, corps could confidently be intrusted the accomplishment of the highly important mission which fell to the share of this corps during the turning-manoBuvre of the principal column of attack ; and the already commenced turning was continued with so much the more confidence. CHAPTER XXXVni. The first, second, and third army corps* — about 27,000 men in all — were stationed during the battle of Hatvan, on the 2d of April, at Arokszallas ; in the evening of the 3d of April they reached Jasz-Bereny ; Kossuth and I arrived simultaneously with them at the latter place, both having left Gyongyos that morning. General Klapka had meanwhile been informed that the corps of Ban Jellachich had been seen in the course of the day march- ing from Alberti toward Pilis along the railway line. According to our plan of march we had to reach on the 4th * The strength of these three army corps was at that time very unequal ; the first (Klapka) amounted to from 11,000 to 12,000 men; the second (Aulich) reached about 9,000 ; the third (Damjanics) fluctuated between 6,000 and 7,000 ; the baggage-train included. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 251 of April, with the first corps Tapio-Bicske, with the third Nagy- Kata, with the second Tapio-Szele. In consequence of the news about the proximity of the Croats, Klapka left at daybreak, on the 4th of April, the camp at Jasz- Bereny, in order to advance over Tapio-Bicske on the direct route toward Pesth, so as aggressively to cross the supposed movement of the Ban against Godollo, and thereby frustrate, if possible, his junction with Prince Windischgratz. General Dam- janics, with the third corps, followed close behind Klapka as far as Nagy-Kata. General Aulich moved with the second, as ar- ranged, to Tapio-Szele. The victory of our seventh army corps at Hatvan, which, as is known, had been gained without my personal co-operation, had determined me to adopt the plan of leaving in future the hands of all the commanders of corps completely free in the execution of the task assigned them, and to interfere only at critical times : for if my personal influence as commander-in-chief had a de- cidedly favorable effect, it ought to be reserved for moments of the most imminent danger ; if it had not, then I undoubtedly did better the seldomer I made it felt. Thus Klapka also was not to be embarrassed in the least by my presence during his offensive against the Ban. Not till late in the morning of the 4th of April did I leave Jasz-Bereny, in order to remove my head-quarters to Nagy-Kata, after having advised Kossuth — being concerned for his personal safety — rather to await the results of the day in the former place. I was with my suite perhaps halfway to Nagy-Kata, when we saw thick clouds of smoke ascending from behind it, appear- ing to indicate an artillery action ; but hearing no thundering of cannon, although the distance was apparently short, we took these clouds of smoke to be merely the consequence of an accidental fire- brand, and troubled ourselves no more about it. This delusion, however, did not last long. In the next quarter of an hour I received a report, that Klapka had encountered the enemy near Tapio-Bicske, and was already retreating. We now hastened our ride, and soon found this Job's-post un- fortunately more than sufficiently confirmed ; for already in Nagy- Kata we met the first army corps fleeing en debandade from Tapio-Bicske back thither. I inquired first of all for General Klapka, its commander ; but 252 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. he being no where to be found, I next attempted to stop and arrange again the frightened and dispersed battalions. My suite assisted me therein with great devotedness. From useless ex- hortations it came to flat, and at last to sharp strokes ; however, the hostile projectiles had constantly far more effect than our blades. I had soon sufficiently convinced myself of it ; and now sent to General Damjanics, who was with his corps in the camp behind Nagy-Kata, an order by the most severe measures to put a stop to the flight of the first corps, to arrange it, and send it again in advance. At the same time I ordered my suite to assist General Damjanics therein, while I continued my original route toward Tapio-Bicske, in order to make myself in the mean while acquainted with the position and strength of the enemy. * The last swarms of the first army corps had not quite passed me, when an officer, whom I remembered to have seen once in Klapka's suite, galloped on from the direction of the abandoned field of battle. "With the intention of learning from him some- tliing more particular respecting the fate of his chief, I barred his way. " Save yourself .... Klapka has fallen .... a battery is lost .... all away .... the enemy already here . . . . ! I I" cried he, while still far from me, and anticipating my questions. One might have taken this ill-omened man, from his laconic reports, for a Spartan, had he not been at the same time so anxiously endeavoring, first on the right, and then on the left, to get past me. I held the edge of my sabre across his nose, that he might at last stop his horse and give me an answer. But now it was evident, that this pseudo-Spartan knew nothing certain either about Klapka or the army, least of all about the enemy ; and I let him immediately continue his course. In the next moment, quitting the southwestern extremity of Nagy-Kata, I stood upon the field of battle abandoned by the fugitive first corps ; at gun-range before me the little river Tapio, which can not be forded on account of its marshy banks ; on the other side of it, at the distance of about half a (German) mile, Tapio-Bicske ; between it arid the river the ground hilly and sandy, near the river more level ; the only bridge across the river Tapio, and at the same time the single direct communica- tion between these places, already crossed by a part of the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 253 enemy's infantry, under the protection of the hostile artillery planted along the opposite bank of the river ; the openly dis- played forces of the enemy small in proportion to those of the defeated first army corps ; the regaining of the bridge by all means our next task ; this was the sum of what I was able to perceive at a first glance. General Damjanics had taken up a position before the south- western extremity of Nagy-Kata, which faced the field of battle, with half of his forces, the Visocki division, at the very com- mencement of Klapka's retreat, in order to receive him. These troops stood consequently already prepared for action, while those of Klapka were still fleeing. The numerical strength of the Visocki division certainly did not amount to a third part of the first army corps, but it comprised the third and ninth Honved battalions, besides a battalion of the Schwarzenberg regiment under the command of the high-spirited Count Charles Leiningen- Westerburg, and defeated forthwith the same enemy who had just discomfited Klapka's whole corps. While a battery, planted along the river below the bridge, vigorously attacked the position of the hostile artillery, the third and ninth Honved battalions advanced concentrically against the bridge itself The tirailleurs at the first onset drove back to the opposite bank the swarm of the enemy's sharp-shooters, who had already advanced to this side of the river. The serried sections of both battalions, full of emulation, prepared to storm the bridge ; but instead of at once impetuously advancing over it, out of rivalry they ran foul of each other when close to it. The honor of first storming was vigorously contended for by the ninth and third battalions in turn. The commander of the third battalion fortunately put a speedy end to the dispute by a heroic impromptu action. With swift resolve he seized the banner of the ninth battalion, rode with it over the bridge amid the hostile grape-shot, and next moment the two battalions, exasperated against each other, stormed in unison, the third battalion follow- ing its brave commander, the ninth its banner. The enemy quitted the position along the river, and retreated behind the nearest sand-hills. Here he offered indeed once more an energetic resistance ; but it lasted no longer than the passage of the Visocki division over the bridge. As soon as this was effected, the enemy repulsed anew began his retreat, and having 254 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. evacuated even Tapio-Bicske, posted himself for the last time on the heights to the southwest of this place ; he did not, however, again await our attack, but preferred a hasty retreat toward Koka to any further conflict. When we arrived at the place of his last position, he had already got beyond the fire of our guns ; he could only be reached by our cavalry. It was consequently my intention to have him pursued by them. General Damjanics meanwhile — after he had succeeded in stopping and re-forming the Klapka corps, and had dispatched it together with the ramaining half of his own corps from Nagy- Kata toward Tapio-Bicske — hastening in advance of these troops with the rest of his cavalry, had arrived at the Visocki division. From him I requested that a troop might be detached in pur- suit of the enemy. He appointed for this purpose the whole of his cavalry, the Hanover and Ferdinand hussar regiments, under the command of the then Colonel (afterward General) Joseph von Nagy-Sandor. Nagy-Sandor led the hussars brilliantly forward : it appeared to us as if the queue of the hostile column began to disband itself. Nagy-Sandor commenced the pursuit with some well- executed changes of direction, sometimes to the left, sometimes to the right : the fleeing enemy gained ever more ground. Nagy- Sandor made hereupon a decided turn to the left against the peaceful village of Pand, situated far from the line of the enemy's retreat, blockaded it, took it afterward by storm ; and finally returned from the pursuit with a few private servants as captives, and as booty the baggage of their masters. The flee- ing enemy must have felt deeply indebted to him. The first army corps and the rest of the third had meanwhile also arrived on the southwestern heights of Tapio-Bicske. I ordered them to bivouac there ; and rode back to the village, for the purpose of speaking with General Klapka, who, as I just learnt, h^^d been seen there. To my great satisfaction, I found that no mischance had happened to his person. Less satisfac- tory were his communications about the circumstances which had brought on the defeat of the first corps. "When just about entering Tapio-Bicske, it was surprised on the outskirts of this place by the fire of hostile infantry. The head of the column was dispersed like chaff before the wind, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 255 and the enemy, speedily developing his forces, immediately as- sumed the offensive. Klapka, in order to gain time for deploying his long marching- column, ordered a part of his cavalry to charge the enemy. But the first regiment of hussars (Emperor), which he had appointed to make the attack, unfortunately belonged to the most uncertain troops in our army. Its staff-officers attacked, but their divisions turned back, threw themselves on Klapka's columns which were deploying, and spread terror and confusion among them. One single battery stood firm, while all the other parts of the corps, now seeking safety in flight, hastened back to the bridge over the Tapio. The enemy captured the abandoned battery, and could now direct the destructive fire of his guns, henceforth un- obstructed, upon the masses, which, unable to resist, were al- ready close to the entrance of the Tapio bridge, and thronged together in a densely entangled clew. Absolute despondency reigned in their ranks. Some sought refuge against the hostile balls in the marshes of the Tapio — escape from the roaring of the death that threatened, in the dismal silence of the extinction that awaited them. All efforts on the part of Klapka to re-organize his troops for fight were in vain. He had at last to think of his own safety. He descended along the river toward Tapio- Szele, and was for- tunate enough to discover in this direction a second passage across the Tapio ; on account of the great circuit h.e had to make, however, he did not reach Nagy-Kata till the Visocki division had already advanced to the attack. However, the speedy and successful prosecution of this offen- sive tranquilized him at least as to the further fate of his own corps ; and utterly exhausted, he now sought first of all the rest so urgently necessary to recruit him. Those about him had probably kept that circumstance secret out of consideration for him ; and this naturally explained the divers rumors afloat respecting his fate ; one representing him as wounded and a prisoner, another as having fallen on the field of battle, a third as suffocated in the marshes of the Tapio ; which altogether, considering the events of the day, appeared certainly more credible than the real cause of his long absence from the first army corps. Klapka's loss on that day was therefore important in a mate- 256 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTJNGARY. rial no less than in a moral point of view ; for besides a consider- able number of men able to bear arms and a whole battery,* he lost also a good part of our confidence in his wise foresight before, as well as in his steady perseverance during danger. Both losses were naturally felt equally by all of us, but the moral perhaps more sensibly by us than by him. We got over the material loss, however, and consoled ourselves for the moral one with the hope that Klapka, by the defeat of his whole corps, as well as by the victory gained directly afterward by one half of the third corps, would be rendered more circumspect, and at the same time incited to endeavor to be in future more prudent and firmer. The premature disclosure of our plan for the principal attack, however — in consequence of the participation of the Visocki division in the combat, rendered necessaiy by Klapka's defeat — could neither be undone by philosophizing, nor could we console ourselves with any well-founded hopes respecting it ; and it was only the apprehension of seeing our seventh army corps at Hat- van endangered in the highest degree by even the shortest inter- ruption of the offensive, that determined us to persevere in the turning-manoeuvre, though it had been betrayed. For this reason, in spite of the uncommon fatigues of the pre- ceding evening, the first army corps had to advance on the 5th of April as far as Siily, the third as far as Szecsci on the line of retreat of the enemy, leading toward Koka, while the second corps was sent to T6-Almas. The latter place was for us on that day the most important point to reach. For it was possible that the army of the Ban, with the rear-guard of which we had been engaged the day before near Tapio-Bicske, felt strong enough to attempt by itself near Fenszaru to cross the Zagyva, which was watched at this point on our part only by a standing patrol, and then, appearing to the southeast of Hatvan — consequently in the rear of our seventh army corps — with the simultaneous assistance of the Schlick corps in front, to take it between two * After the conflict at Tapio-Bicske, it was commonly said in our army that the Visocki division had regained from the enemy the battery taken from Klapka. 1 do not remember, however, to have received any official report to that effect; and as far as I could see with my own eyes, the enemy in his retreat before the Visocki division left behind on the field of battle only one long howitzer and an ammunition-chest which had caught fire. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 257 fires. To hinder this manoBuvre, or in. case the Ban, though it seemed not probable, should have employed already the night between the 4th and 5th of April in executing it, to take him in the same snare which he had laid for our seventh army corps — was the strategic idea on which was based the above-men- tioned direction to T6-Almas, given to General Aulich with the second army corps. I betook myself thither in the course of the afternoon, while my head-quarters remained behind in Szent-Marton-Kata, where at the same time Kossuth with his attendants arrived from Jasz- Bereny. When I reached To- Almas, the corps of the Ban, coming from the west, was just passing Zsambok, and moved in a single long column toward Fenszaru ; thus confirming our previous supposi- tion as to the next operation of this corps. I was detei-mined quietly to await the. beginning of his pass- age over the Zagyva, and then immediately to attack with the second corps, at the same time sending the third from Szecso to Dany, and the first from Siily to Koka. The hostile column, however, when it reached the Zagyva, suddenly halted, and soon afterward turned back again, directing its march in the opposite direction toward Godollo. From the position of both armies decisive conflicts being in prospect for the next two days, I preferred now to reserve the strength of the second army corps, and confined myself to harass- ing the marching back of the hostile corps from the Zagyva only by two squadrons of hussars. We could not explain to ourselves on that day what the Ban could have intended by the two contrary manoeuvres which fol- ■ lowed each other in so short a time ; for this momentary appear- ing on the Zagyva was evidently not sufficient for a demonstra- tion against our seventh army corps, and there were far too many troops for a mere reconnoitering of the passage across the river at Fenszaru, for which a common patrol would have been quite enough. CHAPTER XXXIX. On the 6th of April the first and third army corps were or- dered to advance as far as Isaszeg, the second as far as Dany. My head-quarters adjoined the latter ; while I intended to await with some attendants at Koka either the uninterruptedly ex- ecuted advance, or the commencement of a probable conflict. Considering the short distance, we had not the least doubt that the thunder of an action with artillery, if fought at Isaszeg, would be quite distinctly heard in Koka. Early in the forenoon the forest of Isaszeg caught fire. The rural inhabitants of the district said that the Croats had set fire to it intentionally, in order to render it impossible for our army corps to advance through it. About midday the Damjanics and Klapka army corps encoun- tered the Ban near Isaszeg ; the thunder of artillery, however, did not penetrate over to us at Koka, and the clouds of smoke ascending from the burning forest by their gigantic extent con- cealed from us the smoke of the battle at Isaszeg. Just as little prepared for the one as for the other event, I had neither made it known in the head-quarters at Dany, nor to the two army corps which had been directed to Isaszeg, that I was to be found in Koka ; and thus I did not receive till about three o'clock in the afternoon, by a hussar who had been sent in advance with my horses, a report of the commencement of the combat and of its unfavorable turn. In alarm I hastened to reach the battle-field ; having pre- viously dispatched an officer of my suite to General Aulich with an order to start immediately with the second army corps for Isaszeg. I had no idea that Aulich was already on his way ; that the chief of the general staff, who had remained behind in Dany, had made him advance soon after the commencement of the conflict. The more gloomily, during my anxious ride from Koka to the battle-field, I felt my hope — to call the day still ours — shrouded in night by the apprehension that Aulich would arrive too late, ¥ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 259 the more joyously was it illumined, as by the stroke of a magic wand, when, about half a mile from Isaszeg, in the forest, which was still in flames in different parts, I suddenly saw before me the second army corps. Almost at the same instant, an officer of hussars of the seventh army corps came galloping toward me — seemingly from the ex- treme left wing of the enemy — with a report that the enemy had abandoned the line of the Galga without drawing a blade, and that the seventh army corps had marched to Godollo. Now I believed I was quite certain of victory. We could judge only approximately, by our ear, of the position of the battle ; for the forest did not permit us to see far. A little to the right from the direction of the forest-way on which the Aulich corps advanced to the battle-field, the thunder of cannon was the most lively, on both sides framed as it were by the crepitating fire of musketry. On the left wing the dis- charge of small arms seemed to be far more feeble, and the point from which it could be heard much further distant fromi the line of artillery-fire than that on the right. Aulich, led by this indication, directed two battalions of his corps to the right, forward, to reinforce the extreme right wing, while he pursued unceasingly with his main body the forest- way on which he was, which seemed to lead straight to the left wing of the line of artillery-fire, as perceived by the ear. Between this point and that of the engagement of tirail- leurs, which was heard, as has been said, much more to the left, we supposed there was a wide interval in our line of battle : I now took likewise the same direction, and outstripping the Aulich column, had soon left it behind me, when there suddenly emerged before me some isolated battalions of the Klapka corps, which were once more retreating as they pleased. Consequently our ideas as to the situation of the combat were unfortunately confirmed. The left wing under Klapka had already taken to flight ; only the right under Damjanics, and on the extreme left two battalions — likewise sent thither by Dam- janics for Klapka' s assistance — still remained. At the mere sight of the fleeing battalions of Klapka I could scarcely contain my indignation ; for the recent disgraceful behavior of these troops before Tapio-Bicske was present to my mind. k 260 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Under threats of the most degrading punishments, I ordered them to return instantly to the battle-field. Q,uickly and lightly they had stepped out while retreating ; now that they had again to march forward, they dragged them- selves toilsomely along as if near sinking to the ground from weariness. One of the commanders of these battalions seemed to have his heart in the right place. " My battalion retreats by the order of General Klapka !" he called to me in a haughty tone. I con- sidered this assertion an empty excuse ; but the commander of the battalion maintained it obstinately, and said that Klapka, who was not far off, and was retreating in person with his main body, would confirm it. I hastened in search of him ; and found him in the direction indi- cated, actually occupied with arranging his retreating main body. To my question, what was the meaning of this retreat, while Damjanics, on the contrary, alone kept his ground on the battle- field ? he declared he was forced to advise the giving up of the combat, for his infantry had not a single cartridge left, and was besides already too much exhausted. " Victory," he added, " no longer possible to-day, may be possible to-morrow ;" and the ex- pression on his features showed me that he had but spoken out his inmost conviction. Here my authority as commander-in-chief was at an end. Klapka's conviction of the necessity of the retreat had first to be shaken, before I could expect to see my order again to attack executed. I consequently called upon General Klapka to consider that he himself had projected the plan of attack, from the execution of which he intended to desist to-day, to find it to-morrow undoubt- edly still more difiicult ; that he himself had recognized as an indispensable condition, the execution most punctually of the ordered dispositions day by day, and at any cost ; that the reasons on which he founded his dissuasion from the combat were not at all valid, for the infantry seemed, judging by its speed in the retrograde movement, to be by no means so much exhausted, as that it could not yet essay some attacks with the bayonet, and for this they had still cartridges enough, even if they had ab- solutely fired away the last. " Conquer to-day I" I called out at last, " or back behind the Theiss I Such is the alternative. I MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 261 know of no third. Damjanics still continues the battle — Aulich advances : we must conquer !" A resolute " Forward !" was the surprising reply of Klapka ; and I now hastened again to the field of battle to animate the brave Damjanics to a still further perseverance, by the joyful news of the speedy arrival of Aulich, and the renewed advance of Klapka. The same way, which I had left a few moments ago for the purpose of finding Klapka, led me to the northwestern edge of the forest. The field of battle was now extended before me, to the right and to the left bounded in form of a bow by this edge. The line of battle which our troops occupied — in its eastern (right) half ever firmly maintained by Damjanics, in the western (left) already given up by Klapka — leant with both wings on the last northern spurs of the forest of Isaszeg lying in our rear, these spurs projecting toward the enemy. Before the centre of our line of battle, at gun-range distance, lay the point on which the brook Rakos, the course of which from Godollo thus far is a southeastern one, suddenly turns west- ward to the village of Isaszeg, situated immediately in front of our left wing. We stood consequently on the left bank of the Rakos, parallel with its lower (western) course and its imaginary prolongation toward the east ; while the enemy was posted opposite to us — close above the deviation of the brook from southeast to west — a cheval of its bed : with the right wing beyond (to the north of) the burning village of Isaszeg, on the plateau of a high com- manding steep ravine along the right bank, with the left wing, however, on the left bank, across the sloping ridge, which is here no longer wooded, and which, flanking the upper course of the Rakos, stretches northward to GoduUo, and on the southern de- clivity of which lies that projection of the forest of Isaszeg which was occupied by our right wing. The nature of the ground required on both sides the employ- ment of the infantry on the extreme wings, while on the wide plain between them the battle was waged exclusively by the cavalry and the artillery. At the moment when I arrived in the centre of our line, the point of support of our left wing (the height covered by the forest- spur to our left, which advances to the brook Rakos close below Isaszeg) had been taken by storm in spite of the obstinate resist- 262 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ance of the two battalions which Damjanics had detached thither, as above mentioned, to reinforce Klapka. Between this point and General Damjanics' left wing (which lay in the centre of qur original line of battle), opposite to the enemy's right wing, gaped the immense interval caused by Klapka's precipitate retreat. The left wing of the Damjanics army corps was consequently quite isolated. The greatest part of the cavalry of this corps, which had been concentrated here for the protection of Damjanics' left wing, was, however, already in retreat when I arrived on the spot. I instantly stopped the retreat, and ordered the hussars imme- diately to march forward again at the same height as the far- advanced right wing. While this was being executed, I rode toward that spur of the forest which — as our right point d'appui — the infantry of the third corps (Damjanics) still continued to defend firmly against the attacks with the bayonet made by the hostile left wing, and where Damjanics in person was also just then. I found this brave man, in spite of the critical position in which Klapka's unjustifiable retreat had placed him, unshaken, un- daunted. Nothing was further from his thoughts than giving up the combat ; although the unsparing expressions in which he gave vent to his indignation at Klapka's behavior, plainly showed that he had by no means overlooked the danger of being taken in his left, and opened out by the hostile right wing. I tried to tranquillize Damjanics, by assuring him that Klapka was again advancing. His confidence in Klapka, however — already greatly shaken in consequence of the day of Tapio-Bicske — seemed now to be completely destroyed. " What avails this advance ?" cried Damjanics ; " if a drunken Honved complains of sickness, and another throws open the lid of his cartridge-box, Klapka will straightway lament afresh that his battalions are tired to death, and have no more cartridges ; will immediately turn back anew, and leave me again in the lurch." The news of the proximity of Aulich, and of the two battal- ions, which, as has been mentioned, had been sent in advance from the second,. army corps to reinforce the extreme right wing, appeared the more to pacify General Damjanics. The quick remark, that now it was possible to advance again, with which Damjanics received my communication that Aulich would soon arrive, not only now rendered superfluous every ex- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 263 hortation to continued perseverance, but it made me even fear that Damjanics intended to resume directly the offensive against the hostile left wing. I say " fear," because by the first glance at the field of battle, I had been convinced, that strategically the offensive was at pre- sent ordered only to our left iving, while the right had to content itself with maintaining its position. In order to justify this conviction I must again mention the report which was made to me, before I met Klapka, by an officer of hussars of the seventh army corps relative to the advancing of this corps toward Godollo, on the road of Gyongyos to Pesth. Admitting this report to be correct, and perceiving, from the strength of the enemy immediately in front of us, that he had left behind for the protection of Godollo but an insignificant force, 1 could confidently expect the speedy and victorious appearance of our seventh corps in the rear of the hostile left wing. It could not be doirbted that a defeat awaited the latter in consequence of the double attack in front and rear, of which this expectation gave prospect. This wing could avoid the danger of this double attack only by a well-timed retreat to Godollo. A premature offensive on the part of our troops nearest to it would have directly forced him to this saving retreat, and this the more certainly the more victorious they should be. By such a premature offensive of our right* wing we should consequently destroy our prospect- ive defeat of the hostile left. The chief duty of our right wing consequently was to remain on the defensive until the first discharge of cannon from the seventh army corps in the rear of the hostile left should be heard. Not till that welcome signal was our right wing allowed to assume the ofiensive. Very differently stood affairs with our left wing and with the right of the enemy. The latter was in possession of a strong position for artillery to the north of Isaszeg. From thence it protected the place itself, as well as the road which passes through it to the capitals. This was indeed the task with which the enemy's right wing seemed willing mainly to content itself Its delaying to advance from its strong position against General Damjanics' left wing, exposed by Klapka's retreat, betrayed this clearly enough. *In the original "linken," left; but evidently a misprint. — Transl. 264 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Here, therefore, nothing was to be gained by the defensive on our part ; while an energetic attack might obtain for our left wing possession of the right bank of the Rakos, and at the same time the possibility of keeping even pace with the later offensive of our right wing. I now hastily communicated these views to General Damjan- ics ; since, as has been mentioned, his animated exclamation, that the advance could now immediately begin again, made me fear a premature offensive of our right wing. Damjanics, however, showed that he quite agreed in my views, and at once assured me that he would confine himself mean- while to maintaining the forest-spur on our extreme right wing, while I hastened in the first instance to take the guidance of the battle in the centre. The cavalry of the third corps, which I had only just ordered to advance, was once more in retreat when I reached it after the conversation with Damjanics. Several hostile projectiles quickly succeeding one another had struck its ranks. The men intended to abandon this violently attacked point. I had to prevent them. The head of the Aulich army corps was already so near the edge of the forest, that it could reach it in a few minutes, in order immediately to deploy enfrcmt to the left of the Damjanics corps. The opening, however, was situated just in the direction of the hostile front fire by which the hussars were then suffering. A retreat of the latter would have brought the fire still nearer to the opening, and have indirectly endangered Aulich's deploy- ing. At the same time large masses of cavalry emerged in front of our centre. In order to anticipate their onset, and likewise for the purpose of silencing as quickly as possible this galling fire (if I remember rightly, it came from a rocket-battery), I sent the second reg- iment of hussars (Hanover) to attack. Whether a part of the third regiment of hussars (Ferdinand) — perhaps a division* — assisted also, I can not now say with certainty. In the very beginning of the advance the hussars got into the line of the oblique fire of the enemy's guns planted to the right of our centre ; allowed themselves, from the dreaded activity of * Half of a regiment of cavalry, — Transl. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 265 these guns, to swerve from the straight direction, and fell into a marked deviation to the left. The masses of hostile cavalry in front of our centre, at first concealed from my sight by the beginning of the attack, now became visible again on the right of the hussars in consequence of this deviation to the left. Fearing that the hussars might be overtaken in their right flank, I caused them, having at that moment no others at my disposal, to be followed en dehandade by a platoon of the third regiment of hussars (Ferdinand), which was posted near there for the protection of the battery of the left wing of the third corps. An uncommonly vehement fire of serried masses of infantry suddenly called my attention ofi' from the centre to the extreme right wing. The attack was in progress, the straight fire of the hostile cen- tre was already silenced, the van of the Aulich army corps was debouching from the forest, and during it was not distracted by the oblique fire of the guns of the hostile left wing. I conse- quently thought I could leave without uneasiness the' centre for some time, in order to convince myself personally how matters stood in the forest-spur to our right, where the battle, as has been mentioned, had now become very hot. When I had advanced some distance into the wood which forms this forest-spur, toward the extreme right wing, it seemed to me as if I had come just between the enemy's and our line of tirailleurs ; for I heard firing simultaneously to the right and to the left before me : I could not, however, perceive either to the right or left the tirailleurs themselves. I believed conse- quently that our sharp-shooters had already retreated very far, and turned immediately to the right for the purpose of overtak- ing them and driving them again forward. I now met the two battalions sent in advance from the Aulich corps, when it was on its way to assist the right wing. Their edaireurs, confused by the fury of the combat on the furthermost line, were firing at random before them during their advance. The brave battalions of the third corps — again repulsing just then a desperate attack of the hostile left wing with that vehement fire of tirailleurs which I had supposed, in the first moment of surprise, to come from the enemy — were thus taken in the rear by the fire of their own succourers. M 266 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. I hastened to stop this dangerous confusion, and then returned again to the centre. My first glance, when, on riding out of the forest-spur, I gained an unobstructed prospect, fell upon the opposite wooded declivity to our left. The flashing of the separate shots in the twilight of the evening enabled me distinctly to perceive on that declivity two parallel lines of fire, which approached ever nearer the village of Isaszeg. From this I discovered with satisfaction that Klapka had been in earnest with his resolute "Forward!" by which.he had inter- rupted my representations against continuing his retreat. He had resumed the offensive in an energetic manner. In front of our centre I saw the hussars returning from the attack. They were still so far off', that it was impossible to de- cide whether they were pursued or not. Fearing that the former might be the case, I intended just to ride toward them, for the purpose of trying if their flight could not be put a stop to, when the hussars seemed suddenly to halt. And not without reason ; for one of Aulich's batteries, having been planted in the centre, while they were attacking, and I was with the right wing, had taken the return of our cavalry for an attack of the enemy's horse, and had directed its fire against it. I discovered this mis- take, so destructive to the hussars, soon enough to spare them its further sad consequences ; unfortunately, however, they had suf- iered considerable loss from the fire of this battery hefwe I again reached the centre. In spite of this misfortune they had remained in good order, and returned — by no means pursued by the enemy — back again to the position they had occupied before the onset. After this attack the enemy did not again disturb our centre. But on both wings the combat still raged — most vehemently on our right. The hostile left wing had already repeated his vigor- ous attacks several times with scattering impetuosity, and hereby had soon rendered the defensive of our right wing, at first volun- tary, now a necessity ; for the combat in the forest, which lasted several hours, dispersed our battalions ; so that if an offensive was to be assumed with them, they would first have to be ral- lied again, and for this some time was needed, which, with the repeated assaults of the hostile left wing, could not be spared. In vain had I been expecting every minute till sunset the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 267 emerging of our seventh army corps in the rear of the dangerous enemy. The seventh corps was nowhere to be seen ; and the hostile left wing could. unimpeded continue his attacks till the last gleam of evening twilight. The deep darkness of the night at last commanded the suspen- sion of hostilities here also. The combat had already ceased on all sides. But still I knew not whether we had conquered In the centre, where I commanded in person, the combat had not been decisive, the efforts of the enemy against this point be- ing weak and inconsiderable. The contest had been decisive only on both wings. To call the day ours, Damjanics ought to have maintained his position, Aulich and Klapka taken Isaszeg by storm. The painful feeling of uncertainty about this urged me to hasten first to the right wing. About it I was the most anxious ; for, as is known, the erroneous report of the advance of our seventh corps had induced me, in spite of the attacks of the enemy here being the most dangerous, to have this point most feebly occupied, only with about the fourth part of the infantry, while the other three- fourths were employed against Isaszeg. It seemed to me, consequently, to be a good omen for the issue of the battle, that I found Damjanics still in his former position. Neither himself nor his adversary had yielded. Both had en- camped on the field of battle. I had soon returned again to the centre, in the expectation that perhaps a report from the left wing had meanwhile arrived there. Its arrival, however, was delayed too long for my impatience : so, accompanied by some officers, I rode straight to Isaszeg, for the purpose of learning as soon as possible in whose possession the place was. Not far from it, a challenge in German made us start. It might be the enemy ; but it might also be one of those old hussars, to whom the identity of the Hungarian " Allj- ki vagy?" with the German ''Halt! wer da?'' (Haiti who goes there ?) was still not quite clear. We replied in Hungarian. "Aulich" was the answer. It was he indeed. Returning from Isaszeg, he brought the joyful news, that the right wing of the enemy was retreating toward Godollo. The victory was ours ! CHAPTER XL. With the victory at Isaszeg, Hungary, alas, was already to have attained the culminating point of her greatness. So Kos- suth willed it I The enemy's victory at Kapolna had as ks consequence the proclamation of the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, for United Austria. This constitution on its birthday presupposed Hungary to be conquered, and while it gave a prospect to the peoples of Austria of constitutional happiness, after the expiration of a provisional eternity, it destroyed at the same time the Hungarian constitu- tion of the year 1848, together with the ancient rights of the kingdom of Hungary, which it declared to be a political corpse, courageously mutilated this corpse, and by way of precaution poured over the wounded surfaces the permanently dissociating aquafortis of the equal right of the nationalities, that the ampu- tated limbs might not unite again to the trunk, even on the day of the apocalyptically-promised constitutional resurrection. The provisionally mutilated kingdom of Hungary, however, chanced still to number some soldiers with whom the octroyed abortion of Austria's centralists availed no more than the value of the paper which imposed on the astonished world the assump- tion, that the battle of Kapolna had been the unexpected throes of this untimely birth, and that, consequently. Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz also had, in some measure, assisted at the delivery. These soldiers of Hungary were of opinion that the Vienna ministers might continue till death octroying, centralizing, and proclaiming equal rights, without thereby changing the limits of even one single picssta, so long as Field-marshal Prince Windisch- gratz remained captivated by the illusion that he had fulfilled his mission to Hungary non plus ultra by the victory at Kapolna, and that he could settle the rest merely by forcibly collecting declarations of submission. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 269 These soldiers of Hungary greeted the octroyed constitution as the presumed deliverer from the painful incertitude in which they had been placed by the true Hegira of the Hungarian revo- lution — Kossuth's flight from Pesth to Debreczin ; the incertitude, namely, whether the more decided enemies of the constitution of the year 1848 dwelt ''beyond the March and Lajtha,'' or ''be- yond the Theiss;'' whether they had chiefly to resist the troops of the former, the army of Prince Windischgratz, or the cham- pions of the latter, the Poles and republicans. By the octroyed constitution, on the one hand, the duplicity with which Prince Windischgratz called himself and his army within the frontiers of Hungary "constitutional," was indeed placed in the clearest light ; on the other hand, the legality of the standing of these soldiers of Hungary was so clearly and dis- tinctly proved, that it immediately appeared incontestable even to the doubters by profession. It would have been denying ex professo to President Kossuth every trace of mother-wit to suppose that, whatever were his political tendencies, after the appearance of the octroyed consti- tution he could even for a moment think to force Hungary from its defensive position — at an earlier period already imposingly firm, and by the new constitution become completely unassaila- ble — into an offensive one, by which it could obtain, besides the approbation of fools, only Russo- Austrian blows, and at most the part — unworthy of a manly nation — of a competitor with the Polish emigration for the happiness of being pitied by sentimental Europe. On the modest supposition, consequently, that kind dame Nature had not withheld from President Kossuth such a small degree of mother-wit as sufficed for this latter recognition, the Poles and fatherland republicans — the champions, as has been mentioned, of those enemies of the constitution of 1848 living " beyond the Theiss'' — appeared to us (I believe it is self-evi- dent, that I reckoned myself also among those " soldiers" of Hungary here spoken of) as harmless cavaliers, to whom fate seemed to have assigned as the element wherein they had to live and move, hardly the living stream of the history, at most the marsh of the chroniqUe scandaleuse, of Hungary. We considered them hardly worth notice ; but believed we had discovered what Hungary exclusively wanted, when we 270 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. answered the octroyed constitution briefly and firmly with the days of Hatvan, Tapio-Bicske, and Isaszeg. We believed, on the one hand, that Kossuth's overweening arrogance had been reduced within the bounds of attainable, reasonable aims by the unhappy conclusion of the year 1848, the warning proclamation of "Waizen, the disgraceful debut of Dembinski, the defeats of Bem from time to time, the realized attempt at Russian intervention in Transylvania ; by the loss of the fortress of Esseg, of the Banat and the Bacska ; but especially by the greatness of the sacrifices which the late successes on the field of battle had cost us : on the other hand, that his confidence in our honest resolve to defend to the last the rights of the coun- try had been firmly established by these same successes of our arms. We hoped, further, that Hungary would deem it her honor to resemble a man, who, conscious of his strength, and alike re- moved from arrogance and despondency, entering the lists in a good cause — and only in such — aspires to a noble prize, even should it be death on the shield. Nay, we confidently expected that the nation with heart and soul would join us, who had not wavered in misfortune, who re- solved not to grow giddy in prosperity. Vain, however, was all our believing; hoping, expecting I Kossuth thought on the unhappy conclusion of the year 1848, only to admire the ingenuity of his flight from Pesth to Debrec- zin. The warning proclamation of Waizen, Dembinski's disgrace- ful debut, were considered by him as clear proof of my striving for the military dictatorship. From Bem's defeats, the losses of Esseg, Banat, and the Bacska, he deduced only the mischievous conclusion, that Hungary having not much more to lose, had the more to gain. In regard to the attempt at intervention on the part of Russia, he fondly dreamt of the infallibility of the coun- ter-interventions of France, England, Germany, America, and Turkey in favor of Hungary ; and while he under- valued the heavy sacrifices which had purchased our recent victories, the victories themselves served only to raise his arrogance to absolute mad- ness, and Kossuth's madness was unfortunately the gospel of the credulous nation. Had Kossuth possessed the courage to share only once the dangers in the battle-field of those whose victories he — so full of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 271 his own importance — considered to be the immediate emanations of his personal presence at the head-quarters, the end of the next week would have found him, if not wiser, at least more prudent. But he lacked this courage ; and Hungary, as has been said, was to have attained with the victory of Isaszeg the culminating point of her greatness. t CHAPTER XLI. In consequence of the retreat of the enemy's right wing from Isaszeg to Godollo, their left also had necessarily to evacuate the field, and this during the night, which put an end to the battle of Isaszeg. The left retreated likewise to Godollo. The advance on our part to the attack of the camp which the enemy had established in front of this place ought to have com- menced very early in the morning of the 7th of April. Our re- serve of ammunition, however, had not yet arrived, on account of the delay caused by the precautionary measures rendered in- dispensable by its passage through the burning plaiies of the Isaszeg forest, and our need of ammunition obliged us to await at Isaszeg till its arrival. Meanwhile it was discovered that that part of the battle-field lying nearest to Isaszeg was thick-sown with still-unopened pack- ets of cartridges, which the men of the Klapka battalions had thrown away on the previous day, without doubt during the first moments of the encounter, in order to induce General Klapka, by showing him their empty cartridge-boxes, to give up the com- bat. Klapka having assigned as the principal reason for his first retreating from Isaszeg, that his battalions had no cartridges, I can not forbear calling the sudden idea (although obsolete) of these battalions of unhesitatingly throwing away their cartridges a very successful one — but only in the case of Klapka. The reserve of ammunition at last arrived at Isaszeg; but among the cartridges distributed to the infantry some were dis- covered the contents of which consisted for the most part of com- mon road-dust. I never learnt who it was that had acquired 272 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. for himself this new kind of merit in the eyes of the hostile army. It may be conceived that separating the cartridges filled with sand delayed still further our advance against Godollo ; and Field-marshal Windischgratz found thus sufficient time to en- ter unmolested on his retreat from Godollo toward the capitals, chosen from strategic reasons [sic). His rear-guard had already reached Kerepes, when we again united with the seventh army corps at Godollo, toward which it had been likewise advancing by Bag and Aszod. The seventh army corps had received — if I mistake not — on the 5th of April an order to take Aszod in the course of the 6th, and to secure for itself the passage across the Galga for the 7th, on which day it had to advance on the offensive against Go- dollo. On the 5th the enemy had advanced with numerous forces from Aszod toward Hatvan, and seemed at first to intend to at- tack the position of the seventh corps there, but under the pro- tection of his cavalry he soon moved back again toward Aszod. The commander of the seventh army corps now attacked this cavalry with two divisions of hussars, and was repulsed with loss. Nevertheless, conformably to the received order, the day after (6th of April) he assumed the offensive with his whole corps — with the divisions of the left (Poltenberg) and of the right wing against Aszod, and with that of the centre (Kmety) against Bag — but found these places already evacuated by the enemy. The officer who — as has been mentioned in Chapter XXXIX. — met me in the forest of Isaszeg, while on my way from Koka to the battle-field, was sent to me by him from Aszod with a report that the advance of his corps to Aszod and Bag was accomplish- ed. This officer, during his ride from Aszod toward the right wing of our position before Isaszeg, while crossing the main road to Bag had probably remarked by chance the Kmety division marching along it, and taken it for the whole seventh army corps advancing against Godollo. Hence the positiveness with which he announced to me that the seventh army corps was already on its direct march to Godollo. Colonel Kmety, arrived with his division in Bag, heard there the thunder of cannon from Isaszeg, which was not audible at MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. 273 Aszod, and really importuned the commander of the seventh army corps to begin the offensive against GodoUo hmnediately , although his orders fixed it not till the next day ; but in vain I The commander thought he was obliged to confine himself to ob- serving the orders received from the head-quarters. However, Colonel Kmety did not allow himself by any means to be prevented by the scruples of his commander from advanc- ing at least with his division alone against Godollo. But when halfway thither, before the convent of Besenyo, he encountered a hostile position, to force which his small body was not suffi- cient ; and the Damjanics, Aulich, and Klapka army corps had consequently to gain the victory at Isaszeg without the co-oper- ation of the seventh army corps. It is true that now — in consequence of the excessive dread the commander of the seventh army corps had of undertaking any step which exceeded the distinctly prescribed line — the merit of these three army corps in the victory at Isaszeg, as well as the moral importance of this victory in favor of the Hungarian arms, seemed much raised ; nevertheless we had the more seriously to regret that the commander of the seventh army corps had not followed Kmety' s wise advice, because, by not doing so, time was given to the enemy to avoid a defeat which was more than probable, considering the reciprocal position of the armies on the 6th of April. After the junction had been effected, on the 7th of April, in Godollo, between the army corps which were advancing from Isaszeg and the seventh corps, a part of the latter was charged with the pursuit of the enemy, who w£Cs retreating toward the capitals. This pursuit had, however, small result, and after the exchange of some shots with the hostile rear-guard, was imme- diately abandoned again. CHAPTER XLII. In the course of the 7th of April, a few hours after our entry, Kossuth also, with his attendants, arrived at GodoUo. He ap- peared satisfied with the services of the army, and spoke much and well of the eternal thanks of the nation. After a while he desired to converse with me alone in his chamher. On this occasion I obtained the first indications of the leading tendency of his politics. Now — said he — the time is come to answer the octroyed con- stitution of the 4th of March by the separation of Hungary from Austria. The patience of the nation — he continued — was exhausted ; if it would show itself at all worthy of liberty, it must not only not tolerate the unreasonable assumption of the octroyed consti- tution, but it must moreover exact heavy reprisals. The peo- ples of Europe would judge of the worth of the Hungarian nation according to the answer it should give to that constitution. Their sympathies would depend upon that judgment (sic.) England, France, Italy, Turkey, even all Germany itself, not excepting Austria's own hereditary states, were waiting only till Hungary should proclaim itself an independent state, to impart to it their material aid, and that the more abundantly, as they had hitherto been sparing of it. The sore-tried, oppressed sister nation of the Poles would speedily follow the example of Hungary, and united with it would find a powerful ally, both for defense and ofiense, in the Porte, whose interests had so often suffered from the policy of Austria and Russia, With the freedom of Hungary, the free- dom of Europe would fall ; with Hungary's triumph there would be as many successful risings against hated tyranny as there were oppressed peoples in Europe. " Our victory is certain," were nearly the words in which he continued ; " but we can do much more than for ourselves alone, we can and must fight and conquer for the freedom of all who wish us the victory. Our word, however, must precede the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 275 deed, our cry of victory, the assured victory itself, and announce its redeeming approach to all enslaved peoples, that they may be watchful. and prepared, that they may not stupidly sleep away the moments destined for their salvation, and so afford time for our common enemies again to recover, to assemble and strengthen themselves anew. We can not be silent now that the octroyed constitution has denied our very existence. Our silence would be half a recognition of these acts, and all our victories would be fruitless I We must therefore declare ourselves I But a decla- ration such as I should wish would raise the self esteem of the nation, would at once destroy all the bridges behind the still undecided and wavering parties within and without the Diet, would by the proximity and importance of a common object force into the background mere party interests, and would thus facilitate and hasten the sure victory." "All this is not quite clear to me," was nearly my answer. "Words will not make Hungary free ; deeds can alone do that. And no arm out of Hungary will execute those deeds ; but rather armies will be raised to prevent their execution. Yet, granted that Hungary of itself were strong enough at the present moment to dissociate itself from Austria, would it not be too weak to maintain itself as an independent state in a neighborhood in which the Porte, in spite of a much more favorable position, has already been reduced to an existence by sufferance only ? We have lately beaten the enemy repeatedly — that is undeniable. But we have accomplished this only with the utmost exertion of our powers. The consciousness that our cause was just has enabled us to effect this. The separation of Hungary front Austria would no longer be a just cause ; the struggle for this would not be a struggle ^/br, but against the law; not a struggle for self-defense, but an attack on the existence of the united Austrian monarchy. And while we should hereby mortally wound innumerable ancient interests and sympathies ; while we should hereby conjure up against our own country all the un- happy consequences of a revolution uncalled for by any circum- stances ; while we should hereby force the old troops, the very kernel of our army to violate their oath, and thus morally shake them — we should find ourselves weaker day by day ; while at the same time in every neighboring state a natural ally of our opponents would arise against us, the disturbers of the 276 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. BALANCE OF POWER IN EuROPE. * We Can not put up with the octroyed constitution in silence !' Granted ! but is what we have just done * putting up with it in silence V Could we have answered the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March more strikingly than we have done ? I can not decide what, or how much, is advantageous to the peoples of Europe ; but that to the peoples of Hungary the smallest victory on the battle-field brings more profit and honor than the most arrogant declaration, I see clearly enough ; and I once more repeat, that battles won for the legitimate King Ferdinand V. and the constitution sanction- ed by him, are the best answers that Hungary can give to the chimeras of the Austrian ministers." Kossuth inquired doubtingly, whether I really believed that the old troops had ever thought seriously of Ferdinand V. and the constitution of the year 1848. " Of what else should they have thought," I exclaimed, *' when, immediately after the evacuation of the capitals, determ- ined on a voluntary departure to the enemy's camp, the only means that remained to retain them for the Hungarian cause — which is principally indebted to them for its success hitherto — was my proclamation of Waizen ? "What was the real significa- tion of that demonstration which my corps d'armee, without my participation or knowledge, proposed to make against General Dembinski, in Kaschau, but their anxiety lest in me they should lose a commander who respected their military oath ? I have shared prosperity and adversity with these troops. I know their feelings. And should King Ferdinand V. stand here before us now, I would invite him, without the slightest hesitation, I — unarmed and unprotected — to follow me into the camp, and re- ceive their homage ; for I am certain there is not one in it who would refuse it to him." Kossuth, apparently but little edified by my want of enthu- siasm for his political ideas, abruptly broke off our conference ; nor did he ever mention to me one syllable more of the separa- tion of Hungary from Austria. It is even now an unrevealed mystery to me whether he ever communicated these ideas to the other leaders of the troops, and if so when, and with what success. A second subject of discourse in Godollo between Kossuth and myself was, what means should be taken to secure a humane MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 277 treatment to our officers made prisoners by the hostile army. It was reported that the Hungarians in general, but especially the officers, who had been captured, were treated in the enemy's camp with unexampled inhumanity ; that the latter were con- sidered as guilty of high-treason, no notice whatever being taken of those officially managed intrigues — not by Hungary, however — through which the troops who had sworn to the Hungarian constitution were forced into a hostile position against their former comrades. This subject had already been discussed in Debreczin before the Committee of Defense, in consequence of which a letter from the war-minister to the commander of the hostile army reached our head-quarters, which was to be laid before the President Kossuth, and after his approval, forwarded to the hostile outposts. The tone of this letter, however, would have been well calcu- lated to convince Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz, that on the 2d, 4th, and 6th of April he had in fact as totally beaten us as his memorable bulletins strove to make the world believe was the case. It was consequently rejected ; and I myself drew up a letter for the commander of the Austrian invading army in Hungary, wherein I assured him, among other things, that we intended to respond to every single execution of Hungarian officers taken prisoners, by the execution of three Austrian officers from among our captives. This declaration was now forwarded — after Kossuth had ex- pressed his satisfaction with it — in several copies to the hostile outposts. The third and at that time most pressing question which I discussed with Kossuth in Godollo related to the object to be next chosen for the operations of our army. Kossuth was of opinion that we should immediately advance from Godollo by the shortest line against the capitals, and take them by storm. Not without difficulty could he be dissuaded from this idea. For — said he — all our victories had no real importance, so long as the capitals remained occupied by the enemy. Only their reconquest could afford to the country a real proof of the success of our work of liberation. This alone was able quickly to raise the spirit of the nation, and give it strength to eiidure. This, above all, must be kept in view ; — for that with the failure of the nation's hope of a quick and 278 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. favorable final result of these war-operations would fail also simultaneously all the resources so urgently demanded for the energetic continuance of the combat. Nevertheless, how incontestable soever this assertion of Kos- suth's, instead of the capitals, Komorn had to be chosen as the next object of operations, even though there was danger that the nation, through the delay hence resulting to the reconquest of Buda-Pesth, should fall back into its former condition of discour- agement. r I endeavored consequently to convice the President, that to pay immediate attention to the wisheb of those who rated the reconquest of the capitals higher than the deliverance of Komorn, would be to commit a grave strategic error. Apart from this, that these wishes must find a satisfaction alike tragic and de- fective in the probable result of the operation for attacking the capitals from the left bank of the Danube : a tragic one, because thereby the defenseless Pesth would be exposed to all the mis- eries of a besieged town ; a defective one, because it was not conceivable that we should be able from Pesth to drive out the enemy, who, it might be foreseen, would settle in Ofen. At the same time I thought in necessary to call the President's attention to the fact, that, on account of the peculiarity of our next movements, it would not henceforth be so easy as it had hitherto been, to find for him a perfectly safe abode in the prox- imity of the army, as it would be at the expense of the unem- barrassed pursuit of our strategic aims. After a long debate Kossuth seemed at last to be convinced of all this, and refrained afterward not only from making any ob- jection to the execution of our further operations — to be directed next to the deliverance of the fortress of Komorn — but also re- solved on returning from Godollo to Debreczin, for which place he set out — if I mistake not — on the 10th of April. But however ardently Kossuth while on the way may have mused over what was most for Hungary's benefit, two things, at all events, he appears to have overlooked : 1 . That Hungary had already plenty to do, if it would guard itself meanwhile from the blessings of the octroyed constitution and its appendix of provisos — the tape- worm, by which, as soon as born, it was enfeebled — if it would remain in possession of its rights ; and MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 279 2. That Hungary, if it strove to be independent of Austria, resembled a fool, who should wish to separate his head and arms from his trunk, that he might be able to walk about more easily. CHAPTER XLIIL I DO not remember that any one else of importance in the Hungarian camp, except Dembinski and Kossuth, had ever se- riously entertained the idea of regaining the capitals by means of an actual attack, directed on the left bank of the Danube. But if, nevertheless, Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz, or his tem- porary substitute, believed the realization of such an idea on our part to be probable, it was most opportune for us ; since, while we had first only the deliverance of Komorn in view, it may easily be conceived that it must have been of very great im- portance to us to make the enemy believe that we thought of nothing else but the immediate reconquest of the city of Pesth. With this view, the chief of the general staff of the army, who, like myself, was acting ad interim, projected the following plan of operations : " The seventh army corps to gain the line of Fot-Dunakeszi, and interrupt the direct communication between Waizen and the capitals on the Danube, as well as on its left bank. " The second army corps (Aulich) — reinforced by a small in- dependent column, which, during the advance of the principal army on the road of Gyongyos toward Godollo, had been left behind to secure the passages across the Theiss at Szolnok and Czibakha- za, and had been ordered to follow on the railM^ay-line of Szolnok only after the day of Tapio-Bicske — to occupy the main road of Kerepes, the road of Keresztur, and the railway-line of Szolnok. " Both these army corps to demonstrate from their positions in the direction of Pesth. " Meanwhile the third (Damjanics) and first (Klapka) army corps to march on the shortest line from Godollo to Waizen, take this town, if it be occupied by the enemy, and continue their 280 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. marcli without interruption by Retsag, Nagy-Oroszi, Ipolysag, to Levencz (Leva.) " As soon as the two last-named army corps have taken Wai- zen, the two army divisions of the wings of the seventh corps to follow them from Dunakeszi, while the division of the centre (Kmety) continues by itself the demonstration against Pesth, thus masking the departure of the other two divisions. " After the third, first, and the above-mentioned two-thirds of the seventh army corps have finally left Waizen on the road indicated toward Levencz, the second army corps (Aulich) to undertake, besides the line of demonstration which had till then been assigned it, that likewise of the Kmety division, while the latter to start for Waizen, and remain there. " The further operations of the main column directed by Wai- zen to Levencz will be, to cross over the river Gran, and deliver the fortress of Komorn." We could herein by no means assume so much passivity on the part of the commander of the hostile main army concentra- ted before Pesth, as, to our astonishment, he subsequently dis- played. We had to expect that, weary at last of the ever-re- peated demonstrations with which General Aulich had to regale him, he would exchange the defensive for the offensive, in order to rid himself once for all of his troublesome adversary. The consequences of this must have been to threaten next the lines of communication which had hitherto existed between the main body of our army — on its march by Levencz to Komorn — and the government as well as war-supplies existing behind the Theiss. The most important of these lines of communication was the main road of Gyongyos. However many were the advantages it offered us, both on account of its shortness and practicability, we had nevertheless to prepare to renounce the regular use of it during the continuance of the above-indicated operations. As a compensation for its loss, the road leading from Miskolcz by Putnok, Lossoncz, Balassa-Gyarmat, and Ipolysag to Levencz, must serve our turn. The rendering both lines of communication as secure as pos- sible was the principal task of the Kmety division in Waizen ; which moreover, had to preserve the connection between the main body of our army on the Gran and the second army corps MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 281 before Pesth, as well as to serve the latter as a reserve in case of necessity. I was firmly resolved to keep steadily in view the deliverance of Komorn, even at the risk of the hostile main army before Pesth meanwhile assuming the offensive against our isolated second army corps (Aulich.) In this latter case, as a matter of course there would remain for Aulich nothing else to do than — after disputing every inch of ground with the enemy as long as possible — to begin his eccen- tric retreat toward Tiszafured, Szolnok, and Czibakhaza, and confine himself, if it came to the worst, to the occupation of the points of passage across the Theiss, particularly easy to maintain during the inundation. In other respects, a continuous offensive on the part of the hostile main army encamped before Pesth against Aulich, and consequently against the basis of our operations, appeared to me already less alarming, because Kossuth, before his departure from Godollo to Debreczin, had assured me, by all that is sacred, that General Bern was already on his march from Transylvania, which had meanwhile been completely reconquered, toward Baja on the lower Danube, and would certainly have crossed the river there by the middle of April with a force of at least 16,000 men, in order to turn immediately to the north toward Raab, and after effecting the junction of his troops with ours would take the chief command of the whole army in Vetter's place. This certainty moreover considerably lessened the reasonable apprehension that the commander of the hostile main army be- fore Pesth, by the first, best energetic offensive attempt against Aulich, would convince himself of the numerical weakness of the troops of his opponent, and therein immediately recognizing our real intentions, would oppose them with energy on the shortest line from Pesth-Ofen by Gran (Esztergom) and the bridge over the Danube there ; for in this case Bem's appearing in the rear of the enemy would easily release our main column in the valley of the Gran. Thus the more confidently was the execution of the above- communicated plan of operations commenced on the 8th of April, 1849, from Godollo. In the mean time a hostile courier, sent from Waizen to G6- dollo, fell into our hands. His dispatches confirmed the suppo- 282 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. sition that Waizen was garrisoned by the enemy ; the imperial Gotz and Jablonowski brigades were stationed there. In the evening of the 10th of April I received in Godcillo, by an orderly officer of General Damjanics, a report that Waizen had been taken by storm by the third army corps (Damjanics) in the course of the forenoon, in spite of the obstinate resistance of the two imperial brigades. That the hostile commander-in-chief did not, from this storm- ing of Waizen, already discover what were our intentions, I can only explain on the supposition that he had really taken for a stronger corps that insignificant expeditionary column of the seventh army corps which — as has been said in the XXXVIth Chapter — had been sent about the middle of March from Miskolcz, originally against the Sclavonian militia, who at that time had been left behind in Kaschau and Eperjes by the Gotz and Jab- lonowski brigades, which column however, was afterward directed toward Komom. The hostile Colonel Almasy, detached into the valley of the upper Eipel, probably to destroy this expeditionary column, with a force notoriously more than sufficient for the purpose, succeeded in reaching Lossoncz toward the end of March. Here, however, he allowed himself to be surprised in bright midday by this ex- peditionary column ; a part of his troops, together with the mil- itary chest, to be taken from him ; and himself for ever deterred from any further offensive. Our slender expeditionary column — consisting, as is well known, of only a few hundred infantry, thirty-two hussars, and two guns — in the enemy's account of this mishap had probably increased to the bulk of an army corps, and thus led the commander of the hostile army, concentrated before Pesth, to suppose that this pre- sumed Hungarian army corps — closely following after the column of the Austrian Colonel Almasy, which after the sudden attack at Lossoncz was retreating helter-skelter toward the Danube — had suddenly appeared before Waizen, and had driven from thence the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades, intending immediately to join the main body of our arm^y in the attack on the position of the Austrian main army before Pesth. The moral impression of this surprise at Lossoncz seemed moreover, during our offensive operations against Godollo, to have already influenced Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz ir. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 283 the disposition of his troops. At least the circumstance that the hostile army corps under Field-marshal Lieut. Csorich still con- tinued to occupy Waizen during the battle of Isaszeg — which the enemy might have foreseen with certainty for at least thirty-six hours — can likewise be explained only on the assumption that the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps, which had surprised Colonel Almasy in Lossoncz, had been seen by him in the multiply ing-glass of the first panic terror — a mockeiy indeed of all calculation — and its numerical strength at least twenty times over-estimated ; and that Field-marshal Prince Windisch- gratz had necessarily been induced by the result of this exagger- ation to dispose the Csorich army corps on the road from Waizen to Lossoncz. CHAPTER XLIV. The news of the successful dislodgment from "Waizen of the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades determined me to transfer the head-quarters during the night between the 10th and 11th of April from Godollo to that town. There I first learned the following important details of the en- gagement : When General Damjanics, appearing with the third army corps before Waizen, observed the enemy's preparations for a serious defensive, he at the same time saw that the opportunity was fa- vorable for completely destroying or forthwith capturing him. With this view, the first army corps (Klapka), which followed close behind the third (Damjanics), was to turn the town of Waizen to the east, masked by the ground, and occupy the ene- my's only line of retreat, the road from Waizen to Yerocze, while the third corps had to obstruct him in front until this manoeuvre should be executed. Klapka, agreeing in this plan, prepared immediately to exe- cute the turning ; but nevertheless did not reach the fitting centre of gravity of the hostile line of retreat until the enemy, meanwhile retreating from Waizen had passed it. 284 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Klapka now attributed to the undue haste of General Dam- janics, the latter to Klapka' s tardiness, the failure of the man- CEUvre calculated for the complete defeat of the enemy : while the mediating supposition, that Klapka' s intention had been de- tected by the enemy before it was too late, and had been frustra- ted by an accelerated retreat, seemed to be contradicted by the obstinacy with which the enemy had endeavored to dispute with General Damjanics every foot of ground, nay even the town itself This disagreement between the two commanders of corps, Damjanics and Klapka, originating from the day ofTapio-Bicske, and considerably heightened by that of Isaszeg, assumed thus, in consequence of the day of "Waizen, a character that gave rise to serious reflection. Moreover, on this day, besides Klapka, the colonel and com- mander of the cavalry of the third corps, Nagy-Sandor, and the Polish legion, some hundred men strong, had also drawn upon themselves the most violent indignation of General Damjanics : Nagy-Sandor, because during the engagement he complied with an order to advance, perhaps in an equally satisfactory manner as that in which we remember he executed the order to pursue on the day of Tapio-Bicske ; the Polish legion through the fol- lowing : The bridge at the southern extremity of Waizen — ^briskly de- fended by the hostile tirailleurs, who had been pressed back to the very skirts of the town — was to be taken by storm. The same Hungarian staff-officer, who on the 4th of April had so gloriously distinguished himself as commander of the third Honved battalion at the storming of the bridge across, the Tapio, animated the Po- lish legion, stationed not far off, to the storm, and intended, by seizing their banner, to lead them on in person. The Polish stan- dard-bearer, however, refused to part with the banner intrusted to him, and the whole legion declined to storm. This bridge was now taken by the sections of the third and ninth Honved battalions in just as resolute a manner as that across the Tapio on the 4th of April had been won ; and the same heroic staff-officer, who here again led the storm with the banner, had his horse killed under him. After the loss of the bridge the enemy was no longer able to hold the southern entrance of Waizen ; the third and ninth bat- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 286 talions drove him back at first into the interior of the town, until at last he began to evacuate it without further resistance. The battalions of the third corps now assembled themselves, and formed one marching-column arranged in the order in which they had penetrated into the town ; but the Polish legion, who, as has been said, had refused to storm the bridge, and who, even during the further fight-like advance into the interior of the town, had only hobbled behind the third and ninth Honved bat- talions, now knew how to gain, during the rallying, the head of this column, and by this trick to make it appear as if the honor of the day belonged to it. I had enough to do to put an end, on the one hand, to the dis- putes between Damjanics and the officers of both his cavalry regiments, who espoused the side of their commanders against him ; on the other, to the serious collisions between the Polish legion and the Honved battalions. The enemy numbered also among his losses in the combat of the 10th of April, Major-general Gotz : mortally wounded, he fell into our hands, and died the day after. According to our plan of operations, the main body of our army — the third array corps (Damjanics), the first (Klapka), and two-thirds of the seventh corps — after the taking by storm of Waizen, began its march without delay to Levencz ; the army division under Kmety was removed from Dunakeszi to Waizen ; and a part of the second army corps (Aulich) undertook in its stead the occupation of Dunakeszi. For the protection, on the one hand, of the left flank of the main body marching to the north, on the other, of the Kmety division in Waizen, against the hostile attempts to be apprehend- ed from the upper Danube, an expeditionary column, composed of two divisions of hussars and two pieces of artillery from the seventh army corps, was disposed along the Danube upward to the lower Gran. While the main body approached Levencz, we learned that the former expeditionary column of the seventh army corps — which had surprised Colonel Almasy in Lossoncz, and immedi- ately after this event had been charged to direct its expeditions toward the district of the northern mountain-towns and the Turocz comitate — had in the mean time returned toward Eperjes, and been obliged, by a decree which had been sent to it from De- 286 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. breczin, to place itself at the disposal of Lieut.-general Dembin- ski, who had again been employed by Kossuth — namely, had been intrusted with the command of a new army corps formed in Kaschau. The district of the mountain-towns being occupied by the enemy, and our main body seeming to be menaced thereby in its rear during its further movements from Levencz towards Ko- morn, a new expeditionary column, under the command, of my elder brother, the Honved Major Armin Gorgei, was dispatched to dislodge the enemy from the mountain-towns, on the 16th of April, in the first instance against Schemnitz (Selmeczbanya). Our main body, which, in consequence of similar detachings and the losses it had already sustained during the campaign, now amounted to scarcely more than 25,000 men, had arrived on the previous day at the river Gran, with the first corps at the height of Levencz at Szecse, with the third above this point at 0-Bars, and with the two army divisions of the seventh corps below it at Zsemler. At each of these three points bridges had speedily to be thrown across the river. The enemy, however, by way of precaution, had removed or destroyed the greater part of the materials fit for this purpose that had existed in the near environs ; and the single ready-made scaffold-bridge which we carried with us scarcely reached half- way across the river, just then swollen to an unusual height. Of the three places for crossing above mentioned, that at 0-Bars seemed to offer most facilities for the construction of a bridge. We intended to let the third army corps, which had been disposed hither, cross first, in order to protect, by descend- ing along the right bank, the passage to be effected further down between Szecse and Kalna by the first army corps, and at Zsem- ler by the two-thirds of the seventh corps. For this purpose not only the ready-made scaffold-bridge, but also other chief requisites for bridge-building were placed at the disposal of the chief of the Hungarian pioneers, who was charged with the formation of a Bridge at 0-Bars. He proved himself, however, incompetent for the task assigned him ; and in spite of all the circumstances favorable to the con- struction of the bridge at 0-Bars, that between Kalna and Szecse was finished soonest, though not till the night between the 17th and 18th. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 287 On the 17th of April a courier from Debreczin appeared at my head-quarters at Levencz with the news that the Diet had ac- cepted Kossuth's proposition, that, as an answer to the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March 1849, the dynasty of Habsburg- Lorraine be declared to have forfeited its hereditary right to the throne of Hungary ; that the future form of government for Hun- gary, however, be an open question ; and for the present that a provisional government be appointed. However completely such a resolution on the part of the Diet corresponded with my national feelings — ^thanks to the manner in which the said dynasty had taken part against Hungary in the civil war, originally stirred up by the Croat Ban Baron Jel- lachich at his own instance — as it could nevertheless not find favor — which I had already by way of warning explained to the President Kossuth in Godollo — even before the tribunal of the most ordinary policy, much less before that of a rational love for one's country ; so such a resolution was very far from being justi- fied by the dynastic disposition of the old troops, and especially of the old officers of the army, on whom it is self-evident must de- volve the task of procuring support for it, not only in the interior of Hungary, but also beyond it. This resolution of the Diet moreover stood in direct contradic- tion to the declared conviction of Kossuth himself at Tiszafiired in the beginning of March, that it was the most sacred duty of all ivho meant honorably by the country to venture on no step, the consequences of which might divide the nation into parties, and consequently only increase the poiver of the common enemy of all. It stood in still more direct contradiction to what Kos- suth had told me at the same time and place respecting the desire of the majority of the Diet for cowardly submission, the real existence of which was in fact betrayed by the tone of the letter addressed to Field-marshal Prince "Windischgratz, on the subject of the Hungarian prisoners of war in the hostile army, which letter had been sent to Kossuth from Debreczin to Godol- lo, to be by him approved and forwarded to its destination. In the face of these contradictions, as well as in the face of the remarkable silence with which in Godollo Kossuth had heard my objections against the expediency of an offensive step against Austria — without refuting them — and had made me believe that he had given up his flagrant idea of answering the octroyed con- 288 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. stitution in any other way than by a still more energetic contin uance of the defensive war, I had to doubt, if not the genuineness of the unofficial verbal communications of the Debreczin courier, at all events that this resolution of the Diet was unchangeable ; and was thereby induced to bid the courier — who was immedi- ately hastening back to Debreczin — orally inform the gentlemen of the Government and the Diet that it was high time they ceased to be cowardly in adversity, insolent in prosperity. To undertake any energetic step against the Government and the Diet — however urgently such a step seemed to be demanded, partly by the general exasperation which the news of that resolu- tion of the Diet called forth in my head-quarters, partly as a consequence of my proclamation of Waizen — was altogether impossible, from the circumstance that, on the one hand, I was, with the main body of the army, above thirty (German) miles distant from Debreczin ; on the other, that I was just then occu- pied with our most important strategic task, the relief of Komorn. Yielding to what was unavoidable, I had rather chiefly to consider how most certainly to prevent the sudden dissolution of our army, the consequence mainly to be feared from that fatal political step. Here, however, I frankly confess I was at my wits' end ; and never should I have been able to exorcise again the spirit of division which Kossuth's political non plus ultra had conjured up in the ranks of the army, had not events come to my assist- ance in the hour of greatest need. CHAPTER XLV. Of the three bridges ordered to be thrown across the river Gran, only the middle one (between Kalna on the right, and Szecse on the left bank) was practicable on the 18th of April ; the lower one, at Zsemler, was to be finished on the 19th ; while the completion of the upper one, at 0-Bars, threatened to take several days still. The enemy had not yet shown himself on the right bank of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 289 the Cxran opposite us, but it was impossible he could delay much longer ; and if he made his appearance before we had effected the passage, although only with the fourth part of our troops, it would be easy for him effectually to obstruct us, since the right bank commanded the whole extent of the river occupied by us, namely, on the middle and lower point of the passage. We therefore, in the course of the 18th, made use of the only bridge that was ready, between Kalna and Szecse, for occupying the right bank of the Gran, not only with the first corps (Klapka), but also with the third (Damjanics), which had meanwhile been ordered from 0-Bars down to Szecse, and proceeded directly down the river toward Nagy-Sarlo, to protect the passage across the Gran, which the two-thirds of the seventh corps had to effect at Zsemler on the following day ; while the Klapka corps was for the present charged with observing the main road toward Neutra (Nyitra), and the carriage road toward Surany. Early in the forenoon of the 19th of April a brisk thunder of artillery suddenly resounded from the southwest, from the right bank of the Gran, to Levencz. It was the commencement of the battle of Nagy-Sarlo. The third army corps was to continue its march on this day, flanked on its right by the first, on the shortest line toward Komorn ; the two-thirds of the seventh corps, after they should have crossed the river at Zsemler, were to advance on the main road toward Gran (Esztergom) — if I am not mistaken — as far as Damasd, in order to protect the third corps on its left flank against a hostile attack ; the head-quarters, however, were to be transferred to one of the nearest places north of Nagy-Sarlo. Now this conflict made it questionable whether our whole body should advance ; because, with our utter want of informa- tion as to the strength of the enemy, its consequences could not be foreseen ; and it appeared therefore more judicious to let the head-quarters abide in Levencz till the battle should be decided. I myself remained also in Levencz, though, when the first thunder of artillery was heard, I was about to ride to Zsemler, in order to expedite as much as possible the completion of the bridge there, and the passage of the two-thirds of the seventh army corps. I intended personally to assist in the conduct of the battle, but only if it should take a decidedly unfavorable turn ; and in order N 290 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. in such case to be immediately at hand, I could not leave the head-quarters ; besides, from the elevated ruins of the old castle at Levencz the progress of the contest could be unobstructedly observed better than from any nearer point. All the confusion w^hich might have arisen from supposing mo to be present in the station of the head-quarters, wliich had been appointed on the right bank of the Gran for this day, V4^as obvi- ated by my sending thither several orderly officers. These officers w^ere to forward to Levencz all the reports which should arrive for me at this place. In like manner other orderly officers were stationed at Zsemler, with directions to keep me constantly acquainted with the progress of the bridge constructing there. Finally, the bridge at Kalna was also manned with a strong section of the head-quarter troops, in order to stop and collect the fugitives of our two corps engaged in the combat, in case they should come there with the intention of fleeing back to the left bank of the Gran. But on this day we had no runaways in our ranks ; the enemy, on the contrary, had the more of that article. In spite, however, of all the arrangements I had made for ob- taining the speediest information of the progressive state of affairs on the battle-field, as well as respecting the construction of the bridge at Zsemler, it was only late in the night between the 19th and 20th of April that I learned from the written report of Gen- eral Damjanics, that he had put the enemy to ffight. At the same time a convoy of the severely wounded of the seventh corps arrived from the battle-field by Zsemler at Levencz ; whereby I was assured of the completion and practicability of the temporary bridge across the Gran at Zsemler, as well as of the possibility of hastening after our main body by a much shorter route than that by Kalna. Leaving Levencz without further delay, I reached Zsemler during the same night ; but on, account of the extreme darkness could not till the morning of the 20th overtake the army corps under Damjanics and Klapka, which, on the preceding evening, had already advanced beyond Cseke toward Komorn, in pursuit of the enemy. Contrary to all expectation, I found Damjanics again violently excited against Kltpka and the commanders of his cavalry. He accused the former of intending, at the very beginning of the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 291 battle, once more to betake himself to a hasty and disorderly- retreat ; the latter, of being incapable of being urged to any attack whatever, and of having done literally nothing during the action. According to the details obtained from other sources, the com- manders of General Damjanics' cavalry — so far as I can remem- ber — seemed indeed to deserve in the fullest degree the reproach cast on them : General Klapka, however, less. It is true, that he had asserted at first that the enemy opposed to him was his superior in numbers ; and on this account had repeatedly ur- gently demanded to be reinforced from the third army corps. But when his request had been most promptly acceded to on the part of General Damjanics, he held out firmly, and essentially contributed to the decisive result of the day ; the honor of which is certainly mainly due to General Damjanics, on the ground that he, as my substitute on. the field of battle, had remained unshaken, in spite of the dubious behavior of Klapka at the outset. The battle at Nagy-Sarlo (on the 19th of April, 1849), was the consequence — unexpected by the enemy — of our having crossed the river Gran, the day before, on the 18th, with the first and third army corps, between Kalna and Szecse, and of the enemy's concentric offensive movement, from the west (out of the valley of the Neutra), and south (from the point where the Gran empties itself into the Danube), commenced against us simulta- neously — consequently, in any case, too late — with the intention of preventing our crossing the river. The following two facts clearly prove that the hostile com- mander had not been prepared for encountering two-thirds of our main body on the right bank of the river Gran. (On ac- count of the late passage across the Gran at Zsemler of the sev- enth army corps, only a part of its cavalry, under Poltenberg's personal command, could take part in the action, near its close.) 1. His troops dispersed in disorder, after they had once begun to give way, in the most diverging directions toward the west. 2. Not till a long time after the commencement of this de- bandade en gros did hostile columns, marching upward along the Gran, emerge from the south before our extreme left wing, which, moving downward along the Gran, turned them on the right, and forced them now likewise to flee in a western direction. 292 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The first of these facts justifies the supposition, that no def- inite line of retreat had been marked out, by way of precaution, to the hostile troops. This, however, is omitted — immediately before an expected conflict — only when a leader is beside him- self from absolute confidence of victory ; and to suppose such a moral condition in the Austrian generals serving in Hungary, after the days of Szolnok, Hatvan, Tapio-Bicske, Isaszeg, and Waizen, is, I should say, somewhat too difificult. In accordance with the first fact, the second also indicates that the hostile general, on the 18th of April, supposed that the greatest part of our main body was still on the other side the Gran, and consequently that he was prepared on the 19th for any thing rather than for a decisive conflict ; for, on the contrary supposition, he must have taken care especially of the arrival in good time of his forces on the battle-field. These two facts undeniably justify the supposition, that the Austrians were completely taken by surprise on the 19th of April by the Hungarian army corps of Damjanics and Klapka (at that time amounting together to 16,000 men) ; igx should it be denied that they were surprised, then the Austrian offensive, wrecked on that day, would, both in its plan and execution, sink utterly below the level of criticism. On the 20th Damjanics and Klapka continued their march toward Komorn as far as Jaszfalu ; but the two-thirds of the seventh army corps descended along the river Gran toward the Danube, encountered at Kemend a strong hostile column, at- tacked it without delay, and obliged it to retreat over the pon- toon across the Gran to the right bank of the Danube. In this contest the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps, which had been already dispatched from "Waizen toward the lower Gran, partly co-operated ; for being on the left bank of the Gran, and flanking the enemy, who was retreating along the opposite bank of the river, it directed against him the fire of both its guns, almost without intermission. This expeditionary column was to have crossed the Gran after the battle at Kemend, and rejoined the main body of the seventh army corps. The bridge at Kemend was not, however, com- pleted, and the column was consequently obliged to march as far as Zsemler, that it might there at last gain the right bank of the Gran. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 293 Of the enemy defeated on the previous day at Nagy-Sarlo only some scattered groups showed themselves on this side the little river Neutra, who preferred being made prisoners to wandering about longer without aim. We had accordingly up to Koraorn no longer to fear any re- sistance in masses. The nearer our main body approached it, however, the more our still indispensable line of communication by Levencz with the left bank of the Theiss appeared to be exposed to such hostile attempts as were practicable from the northwest and southeast. The protection toward the southeast remained with the two-thirds of the seventh army corps — located for this purpose at Kemend, and afterward at Kobblkut — until the Kmety army division, which had been ordered from Waizen up the Danube to Parkany, should have arrived there ; while for protection toward the northeast, that expeditionary column, which, after the battle at Kemend, was obliged to march as far as Zsemler to gain the right bank of the Gran, after having effected its passage, had to make reaching Verebely the object of its next isolated service. . The present securing of our com- munication with Levencz toward the northwest, however, was effected in the mean time by two divisions of hussars, who started during the night between the 20th and 21st of April from Jaszfalu toward Verebely. General Guyon, since his nomination to the command of the fortress of Komorn, had several times unsuccessfully attempted to reach the fortress unobserved through the hostile surrounding line, and had thereupon retreated again within the circuit of the operations of our main body. In Jaszfalu he resolved upon a renewed and forcible attempt to enter Komorn in spite of the hostile surrounding troops, and requested a squadron of hussars for this purpose. He broke through the hostile line on the 21st of April, and surprised the garrison, now very low-spirited, with the reanimating intelligence of the unexpected relief near at hand. On the 22d this relief was effected on the left bank of the Danube. The Damjanics and Klapka army corps bivouacked before the Waag tete-de-pont of the fortress of Komorn. CHAPTER XLVI. The fortress of Komom is known to lie on the left bank of the Danube, and to reach with only one of its outworks, the so-called fort or tete-de-pont of that river, across to its right bank. The garrison, whose firmness during the siege deserves in general the most honorable mention, had fortunately maintained this important outwork, in spite of repeated vigorous bombard- ments, and thereby secured to us the possibility of throwing a bridge across the Danube between it and the fortress, and thus of effecting deliverance on the right bank also in a very short time. At the same place a bridge of boats had been thrown across some weeks before, but within a few days had been sunk by the enemy's batteries on the right bank. To avert the recurrence of such a result, we had recourse to solid swimming supports instead of hollow ones, that is, we tried our fortune with a floating-bridge. Taking into consideration the efforts of the hostile batteries to hinder the formation of the bridge, together with the circum- stance that we found not the least thing prepared for such an undertaking, in consequence of the erroneous views prevailing generally in the fortress of Komorn, as well as in the town, that to bridge over the Danube by means of rafts was impracticable ; we might certainly be well content to be able to open the offens- ive against the hostile blockading corps on the right bank of the Danube on the fourth day after the arrival of our main body within the range of the fortification. This offensive was to begin with a nocturnal surprise on the hostile trenches. Between the proper inner fortress of Komorn and its western outworks — the so-called Palatinal line — is situated the town of Komorn, with its southern rows of houses only a few steps dis- tant from the bank of the stream. Directly in front of the town, on the right bank of the Danube MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 295 — therefore west of the fort — lay the village of Uj-Sz6ny, at that time, in consequence of the siege, only a scene of conflagration. Westward (up the river) of it, the right bank of the Danube rises to a height, from which the opposite outwork (the Palatinal line), nay even the principal rampart of the fortress, are commanded ; the latter wall, however, only within the widest range of the largest calibre. This commanding point is known in German by the name of *' Sandberg," in Hungarian of " Monostor." In the autumn of 1848 the Hungarian government had the then prosperous village of Uj-Szony surrounded on the west, south, and southeast with earth-works, in form of a large curve, and reaching from the Monostor as far as the Danube fort. The ex- tensive space between it and the river was to serve as an en- trenched camp ; but the country at the time of the victorious invasion of Prince Windischgratz was still without an army for this camp, and the fortress of Komorn was destitute of the forces necessary for the occupation and maintenance of its gigantic line of defense. The besieger could consequently take possession of the abandon- ed earth- works without drawing a sword, and partly appropriate them to his own purposes. He had cut his trenches along the main road from Raab to Ofen, which, parallel with the bank of the stream, crosses the fortified camp, and had planted his batte- ries, so formidable to the fortress, on the Monostor and south of the Danube fort ; against these we directed the sudden attack by which we opened our offensive designed for the complete deliverance of the fortress. In the night between the 25th and 26th of April, about 4000 infantry, composed of the best troops of the Damjanics and Klapka army corps, under the command of Colonel Knezich, crossed the just-finished floating-bridge. One half of the column took for the object of its attack the small market-town 0-Szony, east of the Danube fort ; the other the hostile battery lying south of it. Both points were in our hands by daybreak of the 2Gtli of April ; as was also the equipment of the battery, already reduced to four 24-pounders and two 18-pounders, together with its guard, consisting of about 200 men, who laid down their arms without further resistance. In the same night, far above the Palatinal line, two battalions 296 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. of the fortress troops crossed the Danube in boats, for the purpose of executing simultaneously a brisk tirailleur attack on the bat- teries posted on the Monostor. By this we intended to attract the enemy's attention thither, that the attack with the bayonet on the hostile battery erected to the south of the Danube fort might be more certainly successful. The commander of the two battal- ions from the fortress, however, was not equal to his task : the attack of tirailleurs on the Monostor did not take place ; but the enterprise against 0-Sz6ny and the batteries to the south of the Danube fort nevertheless completely succeeded. As soon as the news arrived, the Damjanics and Klapka army corps, which had remained during the nightly expedition of Colonel Knezich on the left bank, commenced in their turn the passage over the floating-bridge to the right bank of the Danube. Two or three days before, the Kmety division — as is known, sent from Waizen to Parkany — had reached the latter place, and the other two-thirds of the seventh army corps, which had re- mained behind in Kobolkut (at that time under the temporary command of Colonel Poltenberg), were to join immediately the Damjanics and Klapka army corps in Komorn ; when suddenly there arrived intelligence of a hostile advance from Szered toward Neuhausel (Ersek-Ujvar), which caused the detaching of Polten- berg to Perbete and Bajcs, for the protection of our line of com- munication with Levencz : this was so much the more necessary as we were daily expecting an additional supply of ammunition by that route. The favorable result of the surprise by night, however, sug- gested as our next enterprise, to transport as speedily as pos- sible a stronger force to the right bank of the Danube ; and while the Damjanics and Klapka army corps had to pass over the floating-bridge, a courier hastened to Perbete to inform Pol- tenberg that he must reach Komorn with his troops without loss of time, and immediately follow these two army corps to the right bank of the Danube. Meantime that half of our troops for the surprise which had been sent against the hostile battery situated to the south of the Danube fort, after taking it by storm, had turned eastward against the other earth-works, which were disposed in a large curve ex- tending to the Monostor, and had captured those nearest to them one after another at the first assault. But the far-extended, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 297 isolated advance of this column of infantry, scarcely 2000 men strong, exposed it to the most dangerous assault on the part of the main force of the hostile besieging troops of all the three arms, before the right bank of the Danube was attained by the first sections of our main body. Notwithstanding the solidity of the floating-bridge, it could not be made use of without such an amount of precaution as caused considerable delay ; between the end of the bridge and the point on which these 2000 men of our troops of surprise were engaged in unequal combat against the three combined arms of the enemy, there existed an obstacle insurmountable for cavalry and artillery — the trench, the lowering of which at intervals occasioned another loss of time ; and in this way more than an hour had already elapsed since the commencement of the attack of the hostile artillery against our isolated weak section of in- fantry, before the first half-battery of the Damjanics corps could at last take part in the conflict. During the following action Klapka had to command our left wing (toward 0-Szony and Mocsa), Damjanics the centre (toward Puszta-Csem and Puszta-Herkaly), while I undertook the conduct of the combat on the right wing toward Acs. The contest between the troops of surprise and the besieging army lay in the range of General Damjanics (in our centre). Thither the troops debouching by degrees on the right bank were first of all directed. We could not, however, by any means con- fine ourselves exclusively to strengthening our centre, because it remained nevertheless for a long time exposed to the danger of being overpowered — on the one hand, on account of the great superiority of the hostile forces already concentrated against it ; on the other, from the slow arrival of our reinforcements by the floating-bridge ; and because, if it should be overpowered, which was easily possible, we should lose our sole point of support, ex- cept the Danube fort, on the right bank, without having gained in the meantime a new one. A new point of support, however, and one indeed most im^ portant for us — the Monostor — seemed just then to be neglected by the enemy, and while the centre still held out, the more easily to be gained by us, as I supposed for certain, that the two bat- talions of the fortress, who were to keep up a distracting tirailleur attack against the Monostor, to favor the nightly surprise, but N* ' 298 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. who had failed in doing so, would now — several hours after the time fixed — at least have arrived on the spot. I accordingly interrupted for a time the concourse of troops proceeding from the outlet of the floating-bridge toward the centre, in order to turn off a half-battery, v^th a half-squadron of hussars for its protection, by themselves toward the Monostor. They found it already abandoned by the enemy, although the two battalions of the fortress had not yet appeared. However enigmatical the — apparently voluntary — evacuation of the Monostor may seem, our surprise at the enemy's thus ex- posing himself did not prevent us from improving it as conscien- tiously as possible. The half-battery, with its slender protection of cavalry — although all that our right wing possessed — advanced immediately over the Monostor and along the main road toward Acs. The object of this advance was evidently to divert a part of the hostile forces which were still acting with numerical supe- riority, against our centre. Whether, and how far, this object was attained, I could, however, not perceive with my own eyes on account of the distance between our centre and the right wing. I only saw that my half-battery, during its isolated ad- vance, was threatened by superior forces in its right flank as well as in front, and that it ran the risk of being separated from the centre and destroyed, unless the earth-works situated between the centre and the Monostor, but nearest to the latter, were speedily manned with infantry. Without delay I employed for this purpose two battalions of the Klapka corps, which were just passing over the floating- bridge ; for our left wing, under Klapka, was at that time the least menaced. The far-advanced half-battery withdrew again in the mean- time toward the Monostor. At the same time the adversary seemed to have recognized — too late, however — the importance of the Monostor to him ; at least this was indicated by the resolution with which the hostile left wing exchanged its hitherto passive demeanor for the offens- ive, in order to dispute with us the possession of the Monostor. The reader is aware, from what precedes, that by the appella- tion " Monostor" is here meant the most commanding point of the right bank of the Danube above Uj-Szony ; at the same time, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 299 the point on which the fortified camp leans to the west. From this point the undulating ground descends toward the west (up the stream), and is covered, to the extent of about double gun- range,* only by vineyards and isolated fruit-trees. Where these end, the wood begins, known to me only by the name *' Forest of Acs," which extends along the bank of the Danube, up the stream, as far as the brook Czonczo. The width of this forest gradually increases from the vineyards. At the distance of three or four gun-ranges from the Monostor, however, a large piece of forest branches off from the wood on the river-bank, about one or two gun-ranges in a southern direction toward Puszta-Herkaly. This piece of forest is crossed near its southern limit by the main road from Raab. Between its eastern edge and the fortified camp the ground is free and open, as well as between its west- ern edge and the brook Czonczo. Beyond the brook, on its left bank, lies the village of Acs, through which leads the main road from Raab. This southern piece of forest, together with the whole forest on the river-bank adjoining it, as far as the vineyards of the Monos- tor, were in the possession of the enemy, and their line of retreat toward Acs was hereby completely secured. If we intended se- riously to endanger this, we must evidently first drive him fur- ther into the forest of Acs, at least as far as beyond the southern piece of the forest. My original attempt, to advance with a half- battery along the main road to Acs, without regard to the forest on the river-bank flanked by it, could be successful only as a feint. However, the resolute offensive, which the hostile left wing had now suddenly assumed, proved that the adversary had already sufficiently recovered from his first surprise — to the con- sequences of which we were probably indebted for the very wel come evacuation of the Monostor — no longer to allow himself to be imposed upon by mere firing with blank-cartridges. While the artillery and cavalry of the hostile left wing pressed on — at an equal height with the eastern end (turned toward us) of the forest on the river bank — after our half-battery on its re- * By " gun-range," where this expression occurs in the present work without the addition of a defined calibre, is always meant the distance at which, in hostile encounters in the open field, batteries of six-pounders are most frequently used. This distance generally varies from 800 to 1000 paces. 300 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. treat toward the Monostor along the main road, a swarm of tirailleurs rushed out from this eastern part of the forest toward the vineyards of the Monostor, which on our part was occupied only by two companies of the seventeenth Honved battalion. These sufficed, it is true, to maintain the vineyards, but not for a successful counter-attack, which I intended. Consequently two other companies of the same battalion were ordered forward ; this was one of the two battalions which I had sent from the Klapka corps on to the Monostor, to compensate for the still- missing battalions of the fortress. The brisk shrapnell-fire of these hostile divisions of artillery, which had closely followed our retreating battery on the open ground bordering upon the south of the Monostor, rendered this attack difficult. It nevertheless succeeded ; and soon after the four companies of the seventeenth Honved battalion had estab- lished themselves in the forest on the river-bank. At the same time there arrived at the Monostor from our left wing, as a re-inforcement to our right, the first regiment of hus- sars (Kaiser), besides a half-battery. The battalions of the for- tress which had been in vain expected for a long time, also ar- rived at last. The forces at my disposal consisted consequently of four Honved battalions, eight squadrons of hussars, and eight guns. With these I believed I could now the more confidently assume the offensive against the hostile left wing in the forest, as well as in the open ground contiguous to the south, because Damjanics had already vigorously repulsed the attacks on our centre, nay was even acting on the offensive, so that the earth- works next the Monostor no longer needed to be defended by troops. As the principal object of attack for the right wing I chose the above-indicated piece of forest, which extends from the forest on the river-bank in a southern direction toward Puszta-Herkaly be- yond the main road. I intended to attack it simultaneously from both ends ; in the south, its point, with the two battalions from the fortress ; in the north, its basis (where it joins the forest on the river-bank), with the seventeenth battalion ; while the other battalion of the Klapka corps had to remain in reserve. Of course the hostile forces of artillery and cavalry, developed on the open ground a clieval of the main road, had previously to be completely dislodged. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 301 Occupied with the accomplishment of this task, I had already advanced nearly to gun-range distance of the piece of forest, when I was overtaken by a written report from General Damjanics, to this effect : " The enemy has been reinforced. Nagy-Sandor with the main body of the cavalry has been overthrown. Klap- ka is retreating toward the fort of the Danube. If the right wing advances further, I am no longer able to protect it from being turned on the left, without exposing my own left." These news obliged me to interrupt my advance ; nay, I im- raiediately sent back the battalion of the reserve to the Monostor, that it might meanwhile again occupy the earth- works situated nearest to this point, I wrote to Damjanics, that he, like myself, should give way, even to a superior force, only tardily ; and if it came to the worst, maintain at any rate the earth- works of the fortified camp lying within his range. The hostile left wing also seemed to have received meanwhile considerable reinforcements ; for it now suddenly resumed, with superior force of artillery, the combat which had already ceased on its part ; while of my eight guns, after a short reply to the hostile cannonade, six pieces were silent from want of ammuni- tion. The chests, which had been sent for the purpose of bring- ing us fresh supplies of ammunition, had all been returned to us empty. Only two guns had still some powder and ball remain- ing. The fire of these, however, had to be reserved for the pos- sible case, that the enemy might intend to make a more ener- getic attempt than formerly to reconquer the Monostor. I consequently withdrew all the eight guns from the combat, and sent them back to the Monostor. The commander of the first regiment of hussars had perhaps conceived this to be the desired signal for a general retreat, as he used the utmost speed in reach- ing the Monostor with his regiment, and even outstript the guns. The two battalions of the fortress would have followed the ex- ample of the hussars : fortunately, however, I perceived this in- tention time enough to prevent it. I had both the battalions of the fortress marched up enfrcmt opposite the hostile cannonade, and forced them to stand it with- out flinching. By this open display, as it were, of contempt of death, I intended beforehand to make the success of storming our position on the Monostor appear doubtful to the enemy. I 302 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY, had great difficulty in this matter with the troops, who were accustomed to the protecting breast- works of the ramparts of the fortress ; still more, however, with the staff-officer who com- manded these battalions. And after all, the attempt to impose upon the enemy by a passive resistance, turned out to be super- fluous ; because, notwithstanding the vehemence of his renewed attack, he, had no intention whatever of assuming the offensive ; since, had he purposed the reconquest of the fortified camp, he could not have forborne a simultaneous advance in the forest along the bank of the Danube against the Monostor ; but no such advance was attempted. As soon as I discovered this circumstance — not, it is true, till the battahons of the fortress had sensibly suffered — I released them from their painful situation, allowing them to retire by degrees out of the reach of the fire of the artillery. By this means the foremost line of battle of our right wing reached the same height with that of the centre under Damjan- ics, who, although stopping his advance, in consequence of Nagy- Sandor's flight and Klapka's retreat at the commencement, had, nevertheless, firmly maintained himself on the ground he had already gained. By our giving up the offensive, the day's battle came to an end early in the afternoon. An unconcerted armistice took place. The enemy, satisfied that he was no longer menaced by us, wholly desisted from further attacks on our position in front of the fortified camp ; while the two army corps under Damjanics and Klapka were condemned to an equal inactivity from the want of ammunition, which had already been generally felt ; and the two-thirds of the seventh army corps, hastening hither from Perbete, and having still a pretty good supply of ammunition, did not make its appearance on the right bank of the Danube, on account of its great distance from Komorn, until night had set in, namely, long after the enemy had effected his retreat from the field of battle. The day, however, remained ours ; for we had taken the forti- fied camp together with the enemy's trench, the equipment of a besieging battery, and considerable stores of pioneers' tools and projectiles — nay, even the tents of the hostile camp ; and had completely delivered the fortress : while the enemy, far from dis- puting with us the possession of all this, contented himself with MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAEY. 303 the hurried protection of his retreat from the field of battle by Raab to Wieselburg ; in which, indeed, the greatest service was rendered to him by the scarcity of ammunition on the part of the artillery of both the army corps (Damjanics and Klapka) engaged in this day's action, which prevented them from attacking him, as well as by the too late arrival of Poltenberg on the field of battle. With the complete deliverance of Komorn, the execution of the plan of operations projected in Godollo — after the battle of Isas- zeg — by our chief of the general staff had satisfactorily suc- ceeded ; thanks to the unshaken firmness of General Damjanics during the battle of Nagy-Sarlo, as well as to the admirable per- severance and rare masterly skill with which General Aulich knew how so long to fetter the Austrian principal army concen- trated before Pesth, and to deceive it as to our real strategic intentions, until the subsequent perception of them appeared to be only the more calculated to lead our bewildered adversary to his disgraceful defeat at Nagy-Sarlo. CHAPTER XLYIL When, on the 17th of April 1849, the news of the resolution adopted three days before by the Diet reached my head-quarters at Levencz, and all the officers of my suite who happened to be present immediately expressed the most undisguised indignation at this resolution; when, on the following day, the officers of the seventh army corps called upon me for the fulfillment of the second point especially in the concluding declaration of my proclamation from Waizen, and moreover informed me beforehand, that the whole seventh army corps intended to do the same officially on the first opportunity ; while at the same time a disposition nothing less than unfavorable to the new law seemed to prevail among the army corps under Damjanics and Klapka ; — -I had seriously to apprehend that the army was near its dissolution. The peculiar conjunctures of the moment* obliged me to resolve, in the last extremity — that is, if the seventh army corps should * See Chapter xliv. 304 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. insist on my acting in a determined manner, in accordance with my proclamation of Waizen against the decision of the 14th of April — to summon the staff-officers of the army, and likewise deputies from the corps of subaltern officers belonging to all bodies of troops, to assemble for consultation, and set down the declara- tion of the majority of the assembly as a compromise between the parties of different opinions existing in the army. The danger of such a step, in the face of the conflicts with the enemy to be expected ; the excitement of the passions during the discussion ; the depressingly vivid exhibition — unavoidable on the occasion — of the pernicious consequences to Hungary of the 14th of April ; the participation in our further contests of probably scarcely half of those who, through the admitted difference of opinion for and against the law of the 14th of April — whatever the decision of the majority — would otherwise be forced to fight against their conviction ; — all these undeniable consequences of this desperate resolve proved to me clearly enough that, as I could nevertheless discover no better means, my sagacity was here nonplused. In the conclusion of the chapter in which the 14th of April was mentioned here for the first time, I was obliged, anticipat- ing the chronological order of these records, already to acknowl- edge, that while in this perplexed condition, evenU came to my assistance : and such was really the case. The seventh army corps — accidentally not united — before the battle of Nagy-Sarlo could come to no decision upon the intended demonstration against the law of the 14th of April. After this battle, the operations on our part, which had been interrupted for several days by the tardy construction of the bridge across the river Gran, had again reached that point of offensive develop- ment, when they completely absorbed at the same time both the physical and mental activity of the soldier ; and while the known success of these operations — the defeat of the enemy at Nagy- Sarlo on the 19th, his retreat from the battle-field at Kemend over the Danube on the 20th, the partial deliverance of Komorn on the 22d, its complete relief on the 26th of April, and finally the general retreat of the Austrian army toward the frontiers of the country — satisfied alike the adversaries and the non-adversaries of the 14th of April ; the former by this very success were strengthened in their idea, first of all to exi^el completely out of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 305 the country the external enemies to the Hungarian constitu- tion of 1848, in order afterward to get rid more easily of its in- ternal foes, and thus to restore that constitution, the overthrow of which was the point where the political extremes of the Hun- gary of that day met. Confidence in the possibility of realizing this idea, however, in spite of the late victories, by which it had been raised, dissolved into pure enthusiasm before a single cahn glance of the soldier at the recent past, the present, and the near future. The Hungarian arms in the space of four weeks had, it is true, performed such unwonted exploits, as to have prophesied would have been to succeed in rivaling Kossuth's most high-flown pro- clamations. With our armed forces, however, small in proportion to those of the enemy, I could by no means conceal from myself, that these exploits were the extreme which Hungary had to ex- pect from her army with its then degree of military training. "We were unfortunately obliged to admit, according to my own experience in the field, that it was not, perhaps, a high degree of valor pervading the " young army," which had nailed victory to our colors. Nay, we were forced to acknowledge — however pow- erfully self-love strove against it — that a considerable part of the ' thanks of the nation for the speedy and happy termination of the just-described April campaign, was due at bottom to Field-mar- shal Prince Windischgratz and the Ban Baron Jellachich. We had gained bloody victories. This, indeed, no bulletins could nullify, even with the best intentions on the part of the enemy ; but the palm of most of these victories was constantly due only to a small part of our army, almost always to one and the same part. In it the young original Honved soldiers were indeed strongly represented, but still disproportionately less so than the old soldiers, the regular ones, as they were called — the former constituent parts of the very army opposed to us. This portion of our force — as no reliance whatever could be placed on the re- mainder, the greater part by far — could never at any time be spared ; it bore the brunt in every engagement ; the majority of the losses by which we had to purchase every advantage on the field of battle had constantly fallen upon the ranks of our best troops — those who could not be replaced. And the rest were very far from having gained, during the course of the campaign, so much in discipline and valor as to 306 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. make up m a moral point of view for our losses. The strict military discipline, which, assisted hy the older officers, I had been endeavoring to introduce, and not altogether without success, into the corps d'armee of the upper Danube — now the seventh army corps — met with little sympathy from the commanders of the other corps, Aulich excepted. As the temporary substitute of the commander-in-chief. Field-marshal Lieut. Vetter, however, I had not in fact sufficient power to keep my comrades energetically to equal efforts. The greater part of the hopeful young army could not always as yet be supplied with provisions for more than one day in ad- vance ; consequently the uninterrupted resolute pursuit of the beaten enemy was never possible ; but without such a pursuit there can be no complete defeat, and without it no favorable termination to a war, which, like that between Hungary and Austria, especially after the 14th of April 1849, could end only with the complete defeat of the one or the other armed force. Moreover, the camp of the most of the army corps literally swarmed with the vehicles of officers, non-commissioned officers, and sutlers, without reckoning the wagons necessary for the trans- port of the daily supplies. This barricade of wagons, inseparable from the army, and extremely obstructive to its swift, continuous advance, already rendered an accidentally called-for flank move- ment a problem difficult of solution, and any thought on the part of the general of the possible necessity for a retreat was enough to make one's hair stand on end. In order accordingly to nail victory lastingly to the Hungarian tricolor banner in this state of discipline of the majority of our troops, either the army must be augmented to such an extent, that numerically superior forces, under the command of skillful leaders, could be opposed to the enemy on all points on whibh the coun- try was menaced by him ; or the leaders of the Hungarian army, in general inferior to the enemy in number, discipline, and valor, must remain superior to the hostile generals, taking one with an- other, in the amount of the.fortune-of war or of talent to such a degree as had hitherto been the case. To satisfy the first demand of this alternative was simply im- possible ; for, however willingly the country might have furnish- ed the number of recruits necessary for the formation of new bat- talions, the means of equipping them, according to the exigencies MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 307 of the modem system of warfare, were wanting. And the idea of raising the army to the desired strength with scythe-bearers, or perhaps even with Amazons, may perhaps do well enough aa clap-trap in high-sounding debates about the invincihleness of this or that nation ; but the lips of an experienced soldier, to whom the esteem of his companions in arms is still of some im- portance, can not speak of it without irony I The second demand of the preceding alternative could only be addressed to that firm in which " pious wishes" are realized. It is true the history of war names gifted generals who knew how to secure victory in spite of the inferior number of their troops ; but nowhere do we find definite measures and formulas given, by the use of which it would be possible to discover be- forehand — to pass over the fortune-of-war in silence — first, the strategic genius of an individual, then the maximum of the rela- tive minus in the number of troops which would be compensated for by a certain quantity of genius in the general. Nay, even assuming that such measures and formulas were indicated by the art of war, and that we had the ability to make the best pos- sible use of them, we might, it is true, have been spared many a sad mistake in the choice of our own commanders of troops ; but to preserve unchanged the favorable proportion in which the leaders of our armies have hitherto appeared to be superior to the hostile generals in fortune-of-war or talent would nevertheless have no longer been in our power, after the chief command of the hostile army had been transferred from Field-marshal Prince Windisch- gratz to the Master of the Ordnance Baron Welden. For although the latter's renown, in the light in which it had then penetrated to our ranks, appertained rather to the author than to the general, the woeful change in the condition of the Austrian army from De- cember, 1848, to April, 1849, had fully convinced us, that an ap- pointment to the hostile chief command more favorable to us than that of Field-marshal Prince Windischgratz was almost impossible — an equally favorable one in the highest degree improbable. Our situation, after this change in the hostile chief command, in spite of our late victories, threatened consequently to become at all events more critical than it had previously been, altogether in- dependently of the fateful consequences of the 14th of April to us. If, moreover, I took these also fully into consideration, I could not fail to perceive that — with the probability of seeing the hos- ^ 308 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tile forces opposed to us soon augmented to an overwhelming superiority — it was indeed quite indifferent whether Field-mar- shal Prince Windischgratz or any other stood at the head of the hostile army. The change in the Austrian chief command, by the side of the inauspicious declarations of the Austrian soldiers who had been made prisoners on the 26th of April, sank to a subordinate circumstance, insignificant as regarded the question of the existence of Hungary. For these prisoners of war related, that their officers had con- soled them for the repeated retreats with the assurance that a Russian army was already about marching against us, and that the Austrian forces were retreating only in order to await the entrance of the former into Hungary. These declarations were indeed derided by our optimists, as flying rumors. Nay, even to myself they came unexpectedly ; for I had supposed that the Austrian Government, as it seemed now to be necessary to make an unusual sacrifice for the salvation of the monarchy, would, for reasons which it is superfluous to. enumerate, decide rather on the evacuation of Italy than on the acceptance of foreign aid. The unlooked-for nature of these de- clarations, however, could scarcely weaken their credibility in the eyes of those who were unprejudiced enough to consider, that the hostile officers, even from jealousy of the victorious reputation of their own army, would have hesitated to console their bewil- dered inferiors with the prospect of the assistance of a foreign army, if the same consolation had not been given to them by their generals, and to these by the ministers in Vienna. I no longer doubted for a moment that the Emperor of Russia would interfere with Hungary. Hereupon our optimists again thought, that in such a case England, France, Sardinia, North America, all Germany, Tur- key, &c., Avould immediately declare war against the Emperor of Russia. But however plausible this view had been before the 14th of April, after that day its surprisingly quick propagation seemed to me to be only a lamentable proof how largely a certain epidemic of political eccentricity prevailed in my country. More- over, it must be quite indiflerent to the defender of any cause which falls in consequence of the hostile intervention of a third party, whether the right of this third one to interfere is or is not afterward disputed by a fourth or fifth. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 309 The Debreczin lawgivers of the 14th of April had with the Russian intervention immediately raised the ghost of the last hours of the country ; but were not in possession of the right magic formula to lay it again. They could not compensate for this by all their optimist oracular apothegms ; could not charm away the gaping wounds, of which I mentally saw that my fatherland was bleeding to death ; could not deceive the calm glance, before which, as has been said, confidence in the possible realization of the idea of again restoring the constitution of the country, in defiance of its external as well as internal enemies — namely, those Debreczin lawgivers — ^melted away as mere en- thusiasm. The facts, the consideration of which led to this sorrowful re- sult, lay open to the glance of every soldier in our main army — they were generally known. From them any one might deduce the same inference, before which my belief in the possibility of saving Hungary from the " blessings of the octroyed constitution'* had already melted into thin air. For this no peculiar sagacity was necessary. A mind uninfatuated and a vision unobstructed were quite sufficient. And the blind belief — which could not withstand that infer- ence ; which alone kept the army still together ; in which alone the old constitutional soldiers, in spite of their hostile feeling against the lawgivers of the 14th of April, were united with the friends of the latter in the struggle against the army of the octroyed constitution — was consequently a very uncertain means of unison for the parts of the Hungarian army opposed to each other in their political opinions. The same troops which the contest against Austria united to-day might to-morrow employ their arms against each other. The most dangerous enemy of the Hungarian army did not stand in front of it, he lurked — thanks to the 14th of April, which had aroused him — in their own ranks ; it was the spirit of discord, silenced for the present, but by no means banished forever, by a not less dangerous enemy, the spirit of arrogance. To cajole the former — for I distrusted my power of successfully combating it openly — to destroy the latter, on the contrary, at one stroke, I saw was my next task, if I had still the energetic prosecution of the war against Austria seriously at heart, which, notwithstanding the 14th of April, was really the case. 310 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY; I attempted to accomplish this by a proclamation, the original sketch of which, in Hungarian, I happen still to possess. I hero give it in the German translation. " KoMORN, 29th April, 1849. "Companions in Arms ! " A month has scarcely elapsed since we stood on the other side of the Theiss, casting a doubtful glance into our doubtful future. " Who would then have believed that a month later we should have already crossed the Danube, and have delivered the greater part of our fair country from the yoke of a perfidious dynasty? '' The boldest among us had not dared confidently to expect so much. "But the noble feeling of patriotism had insphed youj and in your courage the enemy beheld — numberless legions. " You have been victorious — victorious seven times in uninterrupted succession — and you must continue to conquer. " Think of this when you again encounter the enemy. "Every battle we fought was decisive; more decisive still will be every one we have yet to fight. " On you has devolved the happiness, by the sacrifice of your lives, of securing to Himgary her ancient independence, her nationality, her free- dom, and her permanent existence. Such your most glorious, holiest mission. " Think of this when you again encounter the enemy. " Many of us imagine the wished-for future to be already won. Do not deceive yourselves ! This combat — not Hungary alone against Austria — Europe will fight, for the natural, most sacred rights of peoples agamst usurping tyranny. " And the peoples will conquer every where ! " But you can hardly live to witness the victory, if you dedicate your- selves to the combat with unflinching fidelity; for this you can do only with the firm resolve to fall a sacrifice in this most glorious, noblest victory. "Think of this'when you again encounter the enemy. " And being animated by the lively belief that none of you would pre- fer a degraded existence to a glorious death; that you all feel with me that it is impossible to enslave a nation, whose sons resemble the heroes of Szolnok, Hatvan, Tapio-Bicske, Isaszeg, Waizen, Nagy-Sarlo, and Komorn — I have for you in future, even amid the fiercest thuiader of the battle, but one cry : " Forward, comrades ! forward ! " Think of this when you again encounter the enemy." The attack against the dynasty, which I designedly associated with my review of the rapid, fortunate course of the recent cam- paign, was intended to shake the fundamental aversion of the old constitutional soldiers to the law of the 14th of April, and thus in some measure to become myself the mediator between them and the part of the army well disposed to the law. This in itself hazardous attempt — thanks to the popularity MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 311 which I enjoyed among the old soldiers of the main army espe- cially — had nevertheless the favorable result, that those of the officers belonging to this category who could by no means feel that their further participation in the war was compatible even with the mere silent acknowledgment of this law, quitted the ranks of the active army, at least with every possible avoidance of any exciting eclat ; while the rest — reckoning the silent ac- knowledgment as none at all — soothed themselves with the cir- cumstance that no official homage whatever had been offered in the name of the army to the law of the 14th of April. CHAPTER XLVIII. The state of affairs in the sphere of operations of the Hun- garian main army, immediately after the 26th of April (the day of the complete relief of Komorn), was as follows : On the left bank of the Danube — out of the island of Schiitt — the Austrian forces were retreating to the right bank of the Waag, in part forced back, in part merely followed, in the valley of Turocz, by Armin Gorgei's expeditionary detachment ; along the road from Levencz to Neutra by the expeditionary column, which had been sent from the seventh army corps to Verebely before the relief of Komorn ; in the island of Schiitt itself the western besieging corps falling back toward Presburg, abandoned that part of the island which is situated next to the fortress, to the extent of one or two days' march, to a column detached from the garrison of Komorn. On the right bank of the Danube, the Austrian main army, after the evacuation of the city of Pesth, which took place on the 23d or 24th of April — leaving as a garrison in the fortress of Ofen (Budavar) some battalions under the command of Major- general Hentzi — had divided itself into two unequal parts, and begun its retreat out of the interior of the country toward its frontier, on two diverging lines. The smaller part, the corps d'armee of Ban Baron Jellachich, marched along the Danube down to the Drau ; while the larger part (comprising that por- Ij^m kiVERSITYJ 312 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tion of the army which had been defeated by Colonel Poltenberg on the 20th of April at Kemend on the river Gran, and obliged to retreat to the right bank of the Danube over the pontoon at Gran) retreating on the Fleischhauer road, the shortest line toward Vienna, having been accidentally stopped by the battle on the 26th of April in its retrograde movement, continued it again on the following day in company with the besieging corps of Komorn. On our side. General Aulich, as soon as Pesth was occupied, had undertaken the formation of a bridge across the Danube below the capitals, in order to reach without delay the lines of junction between the garrison of Ofen and the Jellachich corps ; Colonel Kmety, on his part, had the pontoon over the Danube between Gran and Parkany restored, and removed his army division to the right bank of the river near Gran ; while the other two-thirds of the seventh army corps, under Poltenberg, with the Damjanics and Klapka ai-my corps, after the battle of the 26th of April, remained together in the fortified camp at Komorn, where we confined ourselves, on the 27th, after the retreat of the enemy toward Raab, to occupying with strong detachments the places lying nearest to us on the main road to Raab and the Fleischhauer road, and having the enemy's retreat observed by means of patrols. When we perceived from the reports that arrived, that the enemy, not intending any offensive repelling operation, really hastened to confirm the declaration of our prisoners, that the Austrian army would remain on the defensive till the irruption of the Russian army ; it would perhaps have been best for us, strategically considered, without taking any serious notice of the hostile garrison of Ofen and the Jellachich corps, which was withdrawing toward the south, speedily to have reunited the main army, and opened immediately the new campaign by an offensive on the enemy's principal line of retreat by Raab toward Vienna. But it so happened that the batteries of the Damjanics and Klapka corps in the last encounter (on the 26th of April) had fired almost their last cartridge, and the supplies of ammunition, which were to come from beyond the Theiss, had suddenly inex- plicably failed. The batteries of the two divisions of the seventh army corps, under Poltenberg, in the fortified camp at Komorn MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 313 — of the third division of the same corps under Kmety, near the (^ran — and, if I mistake not, likewise those of the second corps (Aulich) near the capitals — were still, it is true, able to take the field, but only for one, or at most two serious days' fighting. The execution of the present idea of an uninterrupted prosecu- tion of our offensive operations against the hostile main army was consequently delayed by the necessity of previously awaiting the arrival of the next transport of ammunition, which, according to the official information received by the commander of the artillery of the army, ought to have taken place long ago — a necessity rendered imperative, considering the certainty of finding the enemy's resistance as well as the amount of danger increased with every step in advance. The reflections, moreover — as may be conceived, of an unusually vivid cast, and chiefly of a political nature — to which the Debreczin impromptu of the 14th of April gave rise, soon led to the complete abandonment of that idea ; and this the more certainly, as my two strategic counselors (Gen- eral Klapka and the chief of the general staff) did not agree in their views as to what object of operations it would be most ju- dicious for us next to choose. The chief of the general staff persisted in his original proposal to continue the ofiensive against the main body of the hostile army, which was retreating on the road to Raab, with the simultaneous advance of a part of the garrison of Komorn in the island of Schiitt toward Presburg ; dwelling at the same time on the great probability of being able within a few days to restore regularity in the accidentally interrupted arrival of supplies of ammunition. General Klapka, on the contrary, pleaded for the urgent neces- sity of taking Ofen, pointing out that this fortress, so long as it was occupied by the enemy, blocked up the chain-bridge, the most important communication for us across the Danube during the just-proposed offensive. This communication, he added, was the most important, because situated on the shortest line between the active army on the right bank of the Danube and the war- stores behind the Theiss, and as a permanent solid connection between both banks of the Danube the least exposed to disturbing influences. General Klapka mentioned further, that the hostile garrison of Ofen rendered insecure the nrincipal communication with the 314 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. roads leading from central Hungary, and stopped completely the traffic on the Danube between the north and south of the coun- try. It was true that another communication, out of the im- mediate reach of the fortress, might be substituted in the mean time, and could be perfectly secured by closely investing the fortress with a force sufficient to frustrate all sallies of the hostile troops of occupation ; but as the deduction of such considerable forces as seemed necessary for closely investing it could by no means be borne, considering the proposed offensive against Raab, only a one-sided palliative would be gained by the investment, for the traffic on the Danube would remain interrupted, as before, in its most susceptible point. It could be re-established only by a resolute enterprise against Ofen calculated for the reduction of the fortress. Such an undertaking seemed moreover to be enjoined by the prospect of coming into possession (most important to Hungary) of the armament of the fortified place and of the enormous quan- tities of war-supplies of all kinds which were stored there ; but most urgently was it called for by the consideration of the inspir- ing impulse to the most strenuous prosecution of the war, which would be imparted to the nation by the reconquest of Ofen, its historical palladium. General Klapka asserted finally, that the march against Ofen had the sympathies of the army in its favor ; and if moreover, he concluded, there be taken into consideration, on the one hand, the certainty of becoming master of the fortress on the first as- sault with an imposing force, if not without drawing a sword — a certainty which, according to all the information hitherto re- ceived respecting the moral state of the garrison, was scarcely to be doubted ; on the other hand, the probability that the news of the unexpectedly sudden fall of Ofen would only increase the present consternation in the hostile camp, and thus the more favor our offensive to be commenced immediately afterward with un- divided strength ; — then the reconquest of Ofen must be acknowl- edged to be at present the nearest operation of the war for the Hungarian main army. Klapka's proposal was so far in accordance with Kossuth's last mtimations to me, as they likewise urged above all things the reconquest of Ofen. Klapka agreed Avith Kossuth also in believing the rumors about MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 315 the dejection of the garrison of Ofen. This he did, nevertheless, not to such an extent as Kossuth, according to whom the mere crossing of some Aulich battalions from the Pesth bank of the Danube to that at Ofen, would be immediately followed by the fall of the fortress. His confidence in the truth of these rumors, however, was still strong enough to lead him to suppose that the garrison of the fortress, in the face of an imposing force, would not let it come to a regular siege. Still I most decidedly distrusted these rumors, breathing con- tempt of the adversary. They savored of the very same national arrogance, which had found its ultimate expression in the law of the 14th of April, and — to my surprise — a thousandfold echo even in the ranks of the " young army." And if I nevertheless did not deny the probability of becoming master of Ofen without a regular siege, the reason of this was solely that I doubted the possibility of rendering the place tenable by means of some tem- porary fortifications, it having been acknowledged to be untena- ble scarcely four months before, and abandoned by us without drawing a blade to the victorious army of Field-marshal Win- dischgratz. However, neither the erroneously supposed facility of taking Ofen, in which Klapka and myself agreed, although on dif- ferent grounds, nor the other reasons by which he supported his proposal, nor Kossuth's urging the same object as Klapka recom- mended to be next aimed at, nor finally the circumstance that I estimated far higher than the chief of the general staff the un- certainty of speedily re-establishing again an uninterrupted sup- ply of ammunition — none of these sufficed to make Klapka's plan of operations appear "to me preferable to that of the chief of the general staff. The motives which chiefly decided me to abandon the idea of an uninterrupted prosecution of our offensive operations against the hostile main army were, as I have already indicated, mainly of a political nature. My personal conviction of the impossibility of inducing tlwse parts of the vmin army which were opposed to the law of the lAth of April, even assuming the most favorable course of the proposed operations on the line to Raab, to prosecute them be- yond the frontier of the country, led me — considering the in- significant military importance of the western frontiers of Hun- 316 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. gary situated next to the right bank of the Danube — to perceive that the final strategic aim, which ought to have formed the basis of those operations, was wanting. Through this conviction I was further led to the idea of giving to those operations — should the fortune-of-war repeatedly smile upon us during them — at least a. political conclusion, by inviting, immediately after reaching the Lajtha, in the name of the victo- rious Hungarian army, the Austrian Government as well as the Hungarian Diet to prefer the way of a peaceable agreement, based on the Hungarian constitution of 1848, to the exasperated continuance of an unhappy civil war. The probability of the success of this step I deduced from the following considerations : The octroyed constitution of Olmiitz which denied to the king- dom of Hungary its further existence, and the resolution of the Diet at Debreczin that of the empire of Austria, both stood on one and the same level of " impracticability without foreign AID." In Olmiitz as well as in Debreczin a great word had been spoken, without its having been previously maturely considered, whether their own disposable forces were sufficient to justify the word by the deed, though only in the sense of the right of might. Those at Olmiitz, who had therein set those at Debreczin a good example, maintained also their precedence — so it happened ac- cidentally — in the course that undeceived both in a humiliating manner. The result of the April campaign — according to the known declarations of the captured Austrian soldiers about the impend- ing Russian intervention in Hungary — seemed to have forced upon the Austrian ministers, with the perception of the greatness of the danger into which they had brought Austria by their acts, simul- taneously the extreme means for saving it — the aid of Russia. The question now was, whether the Austrian Government would be fmyre injured by desisting from the realization of the octroyed constitution, or by the lie which it was about to give to its own power by having recourse to Russian aid. According to my simple notions of state-policy, if it seemed im- possible for the Austrian Government without foreign aid to carry out the experiment of forming, although only provisionally, a Jia?7wge?ieous state from the heterogeneous constituent parts of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 317 the Austrian monarchy, under a simultaneous guarantee of the equality of rights of the nationalities calculated rather to separate than to unite them — it had been better altogether to abandon this hopeless experiment, and return to Austria's relation to Hun- gary, which, based on national rights, had been regulated by our constitution modified in the year 1848. The Austrian Government — after the Hungarian Diet should have abandoned in like manner the carrying out of its experi- ment, still more hopeless without foreign aid, of creating an in- dependent Hungary — could undertake this, without compromis- ing its authority in the interim' of the country more than it had already done by the ineffectual proclamation of the octroyed con- stitution, as shown by the result of the April campaign, or than it now seemed to be taking the best way of compromising it abroad likewise, by receiving Russian aid. The Austrian Government could perfectly well disengage itself from the octroyed constitution without shaking the reverence for the dynasty, any more than it had already done by overthrowing the constitution of Hungary sanctioned in 1848. It could finally put its hand to an agreement with the Hunga- rian Diet based on the Hungarian constitution of 1848 — intro- duced, as I said, by the peaceable initiative of the Hungarian army, assumed to have victoriously advanced as far as the Lajtha — with the assured prospect, that the agreement would take place with some modifications of the Hungarian constitution in favor of the central power of Austria ; lor in case such an agree- ment should have been wrecked by the opposition of the Debrec- zin Diet, I was firmly resolved to dare the extreme against it. I think it unnecessary to point out, how far from me is the thought of pleading here for the practicability of my just developed idea of reconciliation (at that time), in the face of the fact that the Austrian Government still — two full years since the last active opposition of Hungary to the realization of the octroyed constitution has been subdued by Russian aid — thinks it can not do without the proviso, equally convenient as unconstitutional, as well as a state of siege, even in tho&e extra-Hungarian parts of free, united, constitutional Austria, in which a similar opposition has never been observable. I confine myself simply to communicating the reflections on the opportunity of carrying out the idea of reconciliation, which 318 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. were stirred up in me during the events I am describing, by the endeavor to gain a clear way for the salvation of the fatherland between the 01 miitz octroyed constitution and the Debreczin 14th of April — at that time the Scylla and Charybdis of the constitu- tional kingdom of Hungary. A knowledge of that leading idea is indispensably necessary to the formation of a right judgment on my conduct during those days. The difficulties connected with the realization of this idea of reconciliation, the precariousness, nay, daring of the steps neces- sary to it, I nevertheless did not conceal from myself even at that time. But what serious attempt to save Hungary from that fatal dilemma would have been connected with fewer difficulties ? would have been less daring, less precarious ? And I was urged to dare some serious attempt in the direction indicated, by the clear inward conviction that such an attempt was not only better fitted to promote the welfare of the nation, but was also far more conformable to its historical character, than the humiliating acknowledgment of the Olmiitz octroyed constitution on the one hand, or the arrogance of the Debreczin 14th of April on the other. Consequently, when I acceded to Klapka's proposal to let the reconquest of Ofen precede the vigorous prosecution of our offens- ive operations against the hostile principal army, I did so with the conviction that the attempt to facilitate an agreement between the Austrian Government and the Hungarian Diet, based on the constitution of the year 1848, must have far more chance of success if the fortress of Ofen was previously ours, than if it con- tinued in the possession of the enemy in spite of our supposed victorious offensive operations, apparently menacing Vienna itself. But the more ardently I now wished, on the one hand, for the spcedij fall of Ofen, and the greater, on the other hand, my dis- trust of the innumerable rumors about the depressed moral state of the garrison of the fortress, the more resolutely, once determ- ined to act against Ofen, must I accede also to Klapka's proposal, that it should be undertaken with an imposing force. Although prejudiced by the preconceived opinion, that the fortress of Ofen could scarcely be sufficiently tenable to be held long against the attacks of infantry alone, if vigorously supported by a brisk fire MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 319 of howitzers — the ammunition necessary for which, it so happen- ed, could in this instance be taken from the stores of the fortress of Komorn ; — I nevertheless believed in the probability of an energetic resistance on the part of the garrison, but thought to render it of no avail by the massive superiority of our forces on all points of attack. I consequently appointed, besides the second army corps (Au- lich), which moreover was already stationed near the capitals, also the first corps (Klapka) and the third corps (Damjanics), together with the Kmety division of the seventh corps, for the operations against Ofen ; while only the remainder of the latter corps, under Poltenberg, was to be directed against E-aab ; and a part of the garrison of Komorn, on the same height with the former two divisions, to advance on the island of Schiitt. General Klapka declared that he completely agreed in this measure ; the chief of the general staff, however, only on condi- tion, that the operations against Ofen, once begun, were not to be given up again, if we should be suddenly undeceived as to the presupposed facility of taking the fortress, and thereby a vacilla- tion be brought into our operations, which would infallibly be closely followed by the discouragement of our army, and the victory of the enemy. In this consultation about the next operations of the main army we kept in view the hostile corps of Ban Baron Jellachich, which had been directed from Ofen soutliAvard — trusting to the assurances which Kossuth had given us during his sojourn at Godollb^ about the simultaneous movements of General Bem — only in so far as we assumed, that he, who, according to these assurances, was to have crossed the Danube at Baja with a force of 16,000 men in the second half of the month of April, would effect this passage, though too late — as we thought wben in Godollo — to help us in the relief of Komorn, at all events early enough to thwart Ban Jellachich in his march toward the south. * See Chapter xliii. CHAPTER XLIX. In consequence of the resolution of the Diet at Debreczin of the 14th of April, the Committee of Defense was dissolved, and in its stead a provisional governor of the country, with a ministry by his side, took the reins of the government of Hungary. The governor of the country was Kossuth. He offered me the portfolio of the minister of war. I received his letter con- taining the offer before the consultation upon our next war- operations, described in the preceding chapter, had taken place. This offer was very welcome to me, inasmuch as I therein greeted the possibility of at once putting a finishing stroke to the use-and-wont mode in which the war-ministry had been con- ducted, to the great injury, in many respects, of matters relating to the defense of the country. But in order to charge myself in person with the portfolio, I should have been obliged to quit the army ; and I could by no means entertain a thought of this, so long as I clung to that leading idea, to which Kiapka's proposal, that the capture of Ofen should be our next undertaking, was indebted for my assent. Generals Damjanics and Klapka were also of opinion — though for a different reason, since I had not thought the time was come for communicating to them this my leading idea — that I ought to remain with the army. Considering the uncommon popularity which I enjoyed in the main army — said they — my removing from the chief command might affect the troops in a manner prejudicial to the successful progress of our operations. The necessity for saving the war-ministry without delay from the state into which it had sunk, destitute alike of energy and prudence — the occasion just then seeming to be favorable for doing so — was nevertheless not less evident ; and accordingly General Damjanics offered to undertake for the present in my room the direction of the business of the war-ministry. Damjanics was at that time with Aulich, the Hungarian gen- eral of the main army most to be relied upon before the enemy. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 321 By his separation from its ranks for a time, it would suffer a sensible though temporary loss. Consequently it may be conceived that the only reason which induced me to consent to Damjanics departing to Debreczin as my provisional substitute in the war-ministry, was the conviction, on the one hand, that Hungary's war in self-defense, must come to a disgraceful end, if the real cancer of the defense of the country — the arbitrary conduct of the separate independent com- manders of troops, and the favoritism prevailing in the nomina- tion of officers and promotions — should continue as heretofore, from weakness or want of discernment, to be encouraged and cherished in the war-ministry itself; on the other hand, that Damjanics was just the man very speedily and radically to ex- tirpate these cancerous diseases. The loss might therefore truly be said to be irreparable, which not only the army but the cause of Hungary in general sustained, when General Damjanics, on the evening before the day fixed for his departure from Komorn to Debreczin, in consequence of an unfortunate leap from a carriage, shattered his leg, and was thereby rendered forever unfit for service. After this lamentable accident, General Klapka declared him- self ready to act as my substitute in the war-ministr}^ ^ut apart from the circumstance, that I should miss him much with the army — to whose advice I always used to attach great im- portance — he seemed to me to be of too yielding a nature to be equal to the Herculean task which awaited him at Debreczin. There was, however, no other choice left me, if I would not run the risk of seeing the ministry of war fall under a perhaps still more doubtful guidance than that of General Meszaros had Jbeen. General Klapka consequently left the army, to betake himself to Debreczin. In his stead Colonel Nagy-Sandor undertook the command of the first army corps ; that of the third corps (Dam- janics) was intrusted to Colonel Knezich. Both colonels were accordingly advanced to the rank of gen- erals. CHAPTER L. The sudden retardation of the confidently expected supplies of ammunition, had, on the 26th of April (the day of the com- plete relief of Komorn), placed us in the strange position of being obliged to terminate a battle, favorable to us as regarded our success on that day, with a defensive bearing. For the same reason also we could not — as has been mention- ed — on the following days continue with our whole strength the offensive operations, which had originally been intended only for the relief of Komorn. The speedy pursuit of the enemy by the two Poltenberg army divisions — that third part of our force united on the evening of the 26th of April in the fortified camp of Komorn, of which the artillery was still fit for action — did not, however, promise any favorable result ; because the hostile main army, which had been opposed to us on the 26th of April, had begun its retreat from the field of battle toward Raab in the best order and voluntarily : therefore, though retreating, it was by no means in such a condition as that it could not have re- pulsed, with sensible disadvantage to the pursuer himself, a pur- suit undertaken on our part with proportionately weak forces. Meanwhile the inexplicable, sudden retardation of the supplies of ammunition was the very natural cause of our irresolution during several days, in consequence of which it happened that Poltenberg did not reach E.aab with his two army divisions till the 1st of May, after it had been evacuated by the enemy ; and the other parts of our main army could not begin the blockade of the fortress of Ofen till late in the forenoon of the 4th of May, in the following manner : Below Ofen, on the road from Stuhlweissenburg, secured against j the fire from the fortress by the Blocksberg, the second corps '^ (Aulich) encamped, and took upon itself the close investment of the fortress, commencing from the Danube as far as up to the Fleischhauer road. "With the investing range of the second corps, that of the first MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 323 (Nagy-Sandor) — wliicli established itself behind the Spitzbergel, and undertook the investment as far as the little Schvvabenberg — was in close junction. From hence to near the suburb (the Wasserstadt), situated to the north of Ofen on the bank of the Danube, the investing range of the third corps (Knezich) extended, which had advanced on the road from Kovacsy up to the suburb of Christinenstadt. The prolongation of the blockading line to the Danube again, above the fortress, was assigned to the Kmety division, which encamped on the southern extremity of Alt-Ofen (O'-Buda), north of the Wasserstadt. ' The principal rampart of the fortress crowned the elongated hill, which, rising close to the bank of the Danube, adjoins the edge of the plateau on which the city proper of Ofen stands. This rampart, taken as a whole, formed in fact only four fronts : two long ones, almost parallel with the course of the Danube, and two others, short as compared with the former two, which joined (in reference to the course of the Danube) the upjjc?' and lower ends of the long fronts, and thereby completely inclosed the inner space of the fortress. The eastern of the two long fronts faced the Danube, or what is the same, the city of Pesth. It formed in the ground-plan, as respects its principal form, an obtuse re-entering angle, and consisted of a line of defense of remarkable irregularity, which was many times broken through at unequal distances. In the apex of the re-entering angle of this front, above the prolongation of the chain-bridge, was situated one of the four principal entrances to the fortress, the " Water-gate." Below this point, immediately on the bank of the stream, was a forcing-pump, which supplied the town and fortress with water from the Danube. The securing of this forcing-pump, situated beyond the princi- pal rampart at the southern end of the Wasserstadt, consequently quite exposed to any attacks from the north and south along the bank of the stream, had been effected by the Austrians, during their occupation of the capitals, by several intrenchments, formed of palisades and of walls and houses prepared for being defended by infantry, which leant on the one side against the principal rampart, on the other descended into the Danube, and Avhich separated from the outside, together with the forcing-pump, the 324 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. opening also of the chain-bridge on the right bank of the Danube. The access from the Pesth bank — the left — over the chain-bridge itself, partly dismantled of its carriage-way, was moreover defend- ed by a blockhouse erected on the prolongation of the bridge in the space inclosed by the intrenchments. The long front in question extended upward and downward far beyond the points on which these intrenchments leant. The part of the Wasserstadt nearest to the forcing-pump lay immediately under the northern half of the Pesth front, repeat- edly mentioned ; while from the high commanding principal rampart — the southern half of this front — the main approach through the Wasserstadt to the forcing-pump, the principal line of attack of the northern intrenchments which protected it, could be cannonaded in its length, passing over them. These local dispositions, however, we learned to know and appreciate only during the siege, after having previously many times dearly paid for our experience. Thus much about the eastern long or Pesth front, from recol- lection ; there being no plan of the fortress of Ofen, as it then stood, at my command. The western long front of the fortress faced the Spitzbergel with its southern half, with its northern end the little Schwa- benberg. Its principal rampart presented the aspect of a straight line of defense, strengthened by projecting rondels only on two points, the northern terminating one, and south of its centre. The rondel situated, as has been said, south of the centre of the front, namely, the " Weissenburg" rondel, had to play the most important part during the siege. It divided the most western long front of the fortress into two unequal halves, a southern (the shorter), and a northern (the longer one). The principal rampart of the southern half appear- ed, compared with that of the northern, to be somewhat re-en- tering, and difiered moreover from it in that not far from the Weissenburg rondel it changed from a simple enclosing wall into a terraced one ; while the northern in its whole length consisted only of a simple uninterrupted straight enclosing wall. Through the Weissenburg rondel itself another of the four principal entrances to the fortress led, the *' Stuhlweissenburg- gate ;" it was, however, blocked up. i MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 325 Of the two short fronts, the southern (an irregular combina- tion, and one very favorable for the defense in consequence of the points of support offered by the locality) with the " Castle- gate" looked toward the Blocksberg, and the northern (a straight line of defense with a flanking fire, like the western long front) with the " Vienna-gate" toward that ridge of heights between which and the Danube the Wasserstadt and Alt Ofen are situated. The hill on which the fortress stands is, as it were, the last spur of this ridge of heights. Both are perceptibly separated "only by a saddle, over which the Vienna suburb extends from the Wasserstadt as far as the nothern end of the Christinenstadt. The inner space of the fortress, corresponding with the two long fronts, was, for its small width, disproportionately long ; while the circumstances, that the western long (Weissenburg) front presented an almost straight line of defense, but the Pesth front formed a re-entering angle, necessitated a considerable con- traction of the inner space at the apex of this re-entering angle. Just on this contraction lay, in the Pesth front, the open Water- gate, serving as the principal communication with that part of the declivity and the bank of the*stream Avhich was protected against our attacks by the intrenchments ; in the Weissenburg front the rondel of that name. As the last-mentioned long front was divided by the Weissen- burg rondel, the inner space of the fortress seemed also to be divided by the foresaid contraction into two unequal halves, a southern shorter, and a northern longer one. In the southern, besides the smaller part of the town, stood likewise the royal castle, together with the park belonging to it, which was sur rounded by a high strong wall, exposed on none of its points to the straight effective fire, and formed the extreme line of defense of the southeastern part of the fortress. As objects of attack — the castle-park, with the castle-gate, on the west and close to the park, and the nearest parts of the prin- cipal rampart, were assigned to the second corps (Aulich) ; the adjoining southern half of the Weissenburg front and its rondel, to the first corps (Nagy-Sandor) ; the salient angle on the north- ern extremity of this long front, together with the adjacent north- ern short one, the Vienna front with its gate, to the third ^oorps (Knezich) ; and the forcing-pump on the bank of the Danube, protected by the intrenchments, to the Kmety division. 326 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. In the range of the second corps on the northern edge of the Blocksberg, at the commencement of the investment a twelve- pounder field-battery was planted against the fortress ; as well as another battery of the same calibre on the little Schwaben- berg, and both the increased seven-pounder howitzer batteries belonging to the seventh corps, on the ridge opposite the Vienna front. The battery on the little Schwabenberg and the two howitzer batteries were in the range of the third corps. It was not my intention to attack the place without previously having summoned the garrison to surrender. The over-hasty zeal of the commander of the howitzer batteries, however, caused a cannonade on our part before this summons had been sent. , This attack was of course stopped as speedily as was permitted by the considerable distance, especially of the Blocksberg battery, from the head-quarters at the northern extremity of Christinen- stadt ; and after this was effected, an Austrian officer, whom we had brought with us a prisoner, was sent into the fortress with a written summons addressed personally to the commander Major- general Hentzi. As I possess no copy of this letter, of the agreement of which with the original I could be morally convinced, I can indicate here only that part of its contents which has remained vividly in my memory. It contained : Information that Ofen was 'invested by us. An opinion, that it would not be possible to maintain the place long against us. A summons to surrender it, with the promise of honorable treatment as prisoners of war (the officers with their arms, the men without). The assurance of a humane treatment of the prisoners, even in case the garrison intended to resist to the last, provided that the chain-bridge and the city of Pesth, from which the fortress had to expect no attack, were spared : if this con- dition were not complied with, however, the pledge of my word of honor, that after the taking of the fortress, the whole garrison should be put to the sword. An appeal, founded on the rumors that Major-general Hentzi was a native of Hungary, to his patriotic sentiments ; and finally. I MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 327 An explanation, that I had chosen for the bearer of this letter an Austrian officer, who was our prisoner, because our trumpets used to be detained in the Austrian camp. I remember further to have declared in the same letter, that this violation of the personal liberty of a hostile trumpet, as well as the bombardment of Pesth, and the attempt to destroy the chain-bridge, were infamous acts. My view of the moral character of those actions is still the same : I must now, however, here retract the assertion, that it was usual with the Austrian army to make our trumpets pris- oners. I know of only the one case of this kind, which I have mentioned in the seventh Chapter of this work. Nevertheless my assertion at that time appears to be justified, inasmuch as, rendered cautious by that case, I could never again determine to send a Hungarian officer as trumpet into an Austrian camp ; and the cases, where this has been attempted by other leaders of Hungarian troops, and the international usage which guaran- tees the inviolability of the trumpet in the hostile camp has been respected on the part of the Austrians, did not come to my knowledge till after the time in which the date of my letter to Major-general Hentzi falls. The reply of Major-general Hentzi to me contrasted very strangely with the absurd rumors of an unparalleled depression in the garrison of Ofen, in consequence of which Kossuth could hardly stop till some of Aulich's battalions had crossed the Dan- ube, that the said garrison might not have to wait any longer for the plausible reason they desired for laying down their arms ; on which rumors also Klapka had principally based his proposal, first of all to march against Ofen. In this answer Major-general Hentzi scoffingly repudiated the assumption, that he would evacuate without resistance the place confided to him ; declared Ofen to be a really tenable place, although our precipitate retreat in the early part of the year 1849 seemed to have proved the contrary ; called upon me immediately to put a stop to my firing, if I wished Pesth to be spared ; added moreover, that he must in any case, and directly, bombard Pesth, because he was forced by a cannonading which had just 710W been commenced there.^ He then corrected my erroneous * Major-general Hentzi's assertion, that a cannonading had taken place from Pesth against Ofen, was tmtrue. 328 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. supposition that Hungary was his native country ; and declared finally, that he would hold out to the last man, as in duty and honor bound. Meanwhile General Klapka, on his journey from Komorn through Pesth to Debreczin, had stopped some days in Pesth ; and during this time, partly from his own reflections, partly from information obtained about the state of the fortress of Ofen and the disposition of the garrison, had become convinced that the taking of Ofen might not be so speedily accomplished, as he had endeavored to prove to the chief of the general staff' and myself, in our consultation at Komorn on our further operations. This new conviction caused him in writing to dissuade me from storming Ofen. By the date, the letter in which he did so (it was, if I remember right, of the 1 st or 2d of May) seemed to have been intended to find me still on the march against Ofen, while the means which Klapka had taken to forward it to me in- To justify this assertion, and the bombardment of the city of Pesth, which had actually been commenced in the afternoon of the 4th of May, on the following day a placard made its appearance, in which Major-gen- eral Hentzi described even the effect of one of the balls fired from Pesth : " The Ofen pier" — so it was said in this placard, as near as I remember — " has been struck and injured by a projectile from a cannon on tho lower part of both of its corners, facing the Pesth bank." This statement was correct, as I convinced myself personally after the fall of the fortress : nevertheless the assumption, that this projectile had come from the Pesth hank was just as incorrect as the whole assertion of a cannonading from Pesth was untrue. Such an attack could not have taken place, because, in order not to expose Pesth to a bombardment, I had given, before the investment of Ofen, an order to General Aulich, not only to avoid any attack, nay even demonstration against the fortress from the Pesth bank, but not even to allow a gun to be seen on any point of the bank situated within range of the fortress ; and because the result of a sub- sequent investigation proved that this order had been conscientiously obeyed. This damage on the upper pier could consequently only have been caused by a ball from the twelve-pounder battery, which had been planted on the Blocksberg. I may repeat here, that my intention, not to attack the fortress before having summoned it to surrender, had been frustrated by the precipitancy of the commander of the howitzer batteries ; that the twelve-pounder bat- tery on the little Schwabenberg and on the Blocksberg began to fire imme- diately after the howitzer batteries ; and that the latter especially, to which the order to stop firing could not be communicated so quickly as to the others, on account of the considerable distance from my head-quarters to the point where it was planted, had already been playing unceasingly when Major-general Hentzi replied to ray letter. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 329 dicated the contrary intention ; for I did not receive it till after Major-general Hentzi had been very categorically summoned to surrender, and had hereupon given just as categorical a refusal. After that summons, however, and the reply to it, my views of what is called " military honor" no longer permitted me to retire from before Ofen, without having previously exerted my- self to the uttermost to take it. Moreover, regard for the honor of our arms, acting at present as a motive for the siege of Ofen, was supported also by those political reasons which had mainly determined me, in the con- sultation held at Komorn about the next operations, to give the preference to Klapka's proposal over that of the chief of the general staff (see Chapter XLVIII). If I had then supposed that the speedy fall of Ofen would pre- sent a favorable opportunity for the attempt to invite to a peace- able agreement the Austrian Government as well as the Hunga- rian Diet, in the name of the Hungarian main army, assumed to have victoriously advanced as far as the Lajtha — I could not fail to perceive, after Major-general Hentzi's energetic reply to my summons, the absolute necessity there was that Ofen should fall, whether sooner or later, before I could have the most remote idea of daring this attempt with any prospect of success, even if the progress that attended the immediate offensive toward the Lajtha were ever so successful. CHAPTER LI. Major-general Hentzi had not said too much, when he asserted, in his reply, that Ofen, since the occupation of the capitals by the Austrians, had been changed into a tenable place. I was soon to have an opportunity of convincing myself of the correctness of this assertion, and of the precipitancy of my con- trary opinion. "While our prisoner, the Austrian officer, was on his way to the fortress with my letter to Hentzi, the Kmety division stood in the Wafserstadt, awaiting the order to storm the intrenchments. ■^^•v 330 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The trumpet returned with Major-general Hentzi's answer; and a few minutes after the orders to attack were on their way to the Kmety division, and the batteries posted on the Blocksberg, the little Schwabenberg, and the ridge opposite the Vienna front. Kmety attacked courageously, as he always did, and was in- directly supported by the brisk fire of our batteries, which aimed at the general discouragement of the garrison. Our intention in storming the intrenchments in front of the forcing-pump was that we might destroy the latter. The fortress of Ofen possessed, as far as I knew, neither cis- terns nor wells. From time immemorial two aqueducts had served to remedy this defect. One of them, which supplied the fortress with good water for drinking, from a spring on the great Schwabenberg, we had already destroyed. If we should succeed in like manner with the second, the forcing-pump, every supply of water would be completely cut off from the interior of the fortress ; and the garrison, in my opinion, could not hold out many days. The storming of the Kmety division, however, miscarried, and the losses we suffered in it were sufficient to deter us from the repetition of a similar separate undertaking. The fire of our batteries also had to be moderated even during the course of the first day, and confined to merely answering the different hostile shots, because the enigmatical hindrance, which had put a stop to the regular arrival of supplies of ammunition now for a long time, was still unremoved, I have a very lively recollection of the fact, that the com- mander of the artillery of the main army did not succeed till during the further progress of the siege of Ofen in discovering at the same time the cause of the delay that had taken place in sending the ammunition for the field-artillery, as well as the reason of this delay. Immediately after the evacuation of the city of Waizen on the part of the enemy (April 10th), the rumor had been spread be- yond the Theiss, that the capitals of the country were already in our hands, and that the communication by means of the Pesth and Szolnok railway would consequently be reopened. From this rumor, the individual charged with forwarding the ammunition to the main army was induced to direct the canvois — instead of sending them, as hitherto, by Miskolcz and Ipojysag, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 331 or on the Gyongyos main, road — to Szolnok, supposing that by- making use of the railway, they would reach the place of their destination much sooner. But when doing so he omitted to in- form the commander of the artillery of the main army that he had changed the route of the transport ; and thus these supplies of ammunition — which the artillery commander, after having vainly expected their arriva) for some days in the fortified camp of Komorn, had ordered to be searched for on all imaginable routes, except, of course, on the impracticable railway line — re- mained undiscovered for a long time, first in Szolnok, till the re-opening of the railroad communication (in the end of April or beginning of May), and afterward even in Pesth also. The inevitable consequence of this state of things, the sudden silence of our batteries — after the brisk fire of artillery by which the storming of the Kmety division against the intrenchments had been seconded — which during more than a week had been only now and then partially broken through, had probably assured the enemy ; for all this time he did scarcely any thing from which we could have inferred that any notice was taken of our prepara- tions for a very serious attempt to become masters of the fortress ; while we could least of all conceal from his observation those preparations which most clearly betrayed our intention to efiect a breach in a part of the fortress wall. After the unsuccessful attack of the Kmety division on the in- trenchments, I agreed with the chief of the general staff' to defer the assault, which at first we had intended to undertake without loss of time, until it could either be combined with the simul- taneous use of a breach, or we should be convinced that it was impossible for us to effect a breach with the means of siege at our command. We came to this conclusion from the attention we paid to the elevation (the Spitzberg) facing the southern half of the Weissen- burg front, but especially that short space opposite it which lay south of the Weissenburg rondel, immediately between it and the commencing point of the terraced exterior inclosure ; this eleva- tion being rather favorable for the erection of a breach-battery. For the interior of the fortress at this place, as well as in by far the greater part of its circumference, was separated from the exterior only by a simple wall, which, though strong, was com- pletely exposed to our direct fire. 332 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. The unusually great distance of the point fit for the erection of the breach-battery from the wall of the fortress, however, ren- dered the probability of success the more seriously doubtful, as we could arm the breach-battery at most with only four twenty-four and one eighteen-pounder.^ The sensible loss, moreover, with which the attack of the Kmety division on the intrenchments in front of the forcing-pump had been repulsed, had at once created in me so much respect for the strength of the fortress of Ofen, that the sucessful result of a mere escalade by itself seemed now to be far more improbable. The formation of the battery on the Spitzbergel was conse- quently energetically undertaken without further deliberation; and that from the time of beginning it till the first breach-shot more than a week elapsed, was owing neither to the enemy, who, as has been said, did extremely little to delay its construc- tion, nor to the circumstance that we were obliged to seek for all the materials needed for it, nor to our mistakes during its erec- tion, but solely and exclusively to the narrow-mindedness of Gen- eral Count Guyon, the then commander of the fortress of Komorn. This showed itself in his refusing at first to deliver up the above-mentioned five battering-guns, and complaining to Kossuth that I intended to exhaust the means for the defense of the for- tress intrusted to him. Fortunately Kossuth's conviction of the necessity for taking Ofen coincided with my own, although — as I thought I afterward per- ceived — for quite different reasons ; and thus General Guyon had at last to submit to supply our most urgent want of besieging artil- lery out of the stores of the fortress of Komorn. He did this, how- ever, tardily enough to delay for several days the armament of the breach-battery, which was at last completed. Foreseeing this opposition to me on the part of Guyon, 1 had in- tentionally at first asked only for the delivery of the said captured guns, because they did not belong to the armament of the fortress of Komorn, and consequently Guyon could by no means find in my demand any valid reason for refusing to comply with it. I was obliged to observe this precaution, in consequence of being ^ These were the same five undamaged pieces of the battery which we had taken from the Austrian blockading-corps in the sudden attack on the trench before Komorn (on the 26th of April) ; the sixth piece — an eighteen- pounder — was already spiked when it fell into our hands. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 333 at first uncertain whether Kossuth was disposed for or against the regular siege of Ofen. But when I thought I could infer with certainty, from Gruyon's compliance, which at last took place, that Kossuth had this time taken a decided part for me, or, more cor- rectly, for the furtherance of my undertaking against Ofen, much time as it would cost, I then immediately raised my demands on Guyon somewhat higher, and claimed besides the equipment for a breach- battery, the delivery also of four mortars, I believe thirty- pounders. These, however, I did not receive till near the end of the siege. Besides the breach-battery, adjoining it on the right a dis- mounting-battery * of from twelve to sixteen gun-stands had been thrown up ; for the armament of which, however, only six- pounders could be employed, because we had at our disposal no other twelve-pounder batteries than the two posted on the Blocks- berg and the little Schwabenberg. Opposite these approaches, which were in fact not of very great consequence, the enemy thought he had done enough, when he armed the Weissenburg rondel with cannon, and planted besides four pieces of the largest calibre (if I remember right, they were four-and-twenty-pounders), without any protection, on the ram- part between the Weissenburg rondel and the one situated at the northern salient angle, about a hundred paces distant from the former, and disturbed our workmen from time to time by separate shots. The only effect of these measures upon us, however, was, that we drew back the first corps (Nagy-Sandor), which was encamp- ing westward from the Spitzbergel, just in the line of these shots, to the ground lying on the Fleischhauer road, which was protected against the fire of the fortress by the western continuation of the Blocksberg. In like manner I had been obliged by the fire from the north- ern rondel of the Weissenburg front, on the first day of the siege * This dismounting-battery properly originated, so to say, against our will. It was primarily intended for a breach-battery. But when almost completed, the place on which it had been planted, as well as its whole construction, turned out to be not calculated for a breach-battery. The erection of a new breach-battery was now — after the loss of several days — undertaken, close to the left of the former, which was made use of afterward as a dismounting-battery, having been extended on the right several gun-stands. 334 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. to draw back with my head-quarters from the suburbs of Christ- inenstadt. I removed them first to the entrance of the Auwinkel,=^ then to the great Schwabenberg. During the whole time of constructing our batteries we had confined our fire to indispensable replies to that of the enemy. By this we intended, on the one hand, as much as possible to spare our ammunition, which in the mean time had been a little augmented, and to reserve it for the energetic defense of the breach-battery ; on the other hand, to confirm the enemy in the remarkable lukewarmness with which he carried on the defense of the Weissenburg front, which was menaced by us, and was notoriously his weakest side. On the ninth or tenth day of the siege (I can not indicate the day with certainty) the breach-battery began to play. The first breach-shot was at the same time the signal for all the other batteries to open their fire as briskly as possible on the opposite ramparts of the fortress. Especially the howitzer bat- teries were to play upon the Vienna front; the twelve-pounder batteries upon the four twenty-four-pounders planted without pro- tection on the rampart of the Weissenburg front ; and the six- pounders of the dismounting-battery, thrown up to the right of the breach-battery, upon the enemy's guns on the Weissenburg rondel. The unexpectedly vehement attack of artillery seemed to make a powerful impression on the defender ; for with evident haste he drew back the four twenty- four-pounders from the rampart into the interior of the fortress, behind the outermost row of houses, and allowed our breach-battery to play almost entirely undisturbed during the whole day. It is also possible that, on account of its great distance, he believed he had not much to fear for his rampart from it. Be this as it may, the gaps, any thing but inconsiderable, which our breach-battery had made in the stone-work, in spite of the great distance, by the evening of the first day were suffi- cient to rouse the defender to increased activity, and on the next morning his four twenty-four-pounders, protected by traverses against the fire of our twelve-pounder battery, stood again on the rampart ; at the same time, on several points of the latter, the digging of a ditch (which doubtless was intended to compen- * A pleasure-ground. — Transl. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 335 sate for the want of a sheltered rampart-walk) had been begun, and the earth- works behind the breach, which had likewise been commenced during the night, and vigorously continued during the day, plainly showed the intention of isolating this breach from the inner space of the fortress by a kind of intrenchment. On this and the following days the defender no longer looked idly on, as during the course of the preceding day, while our breach-battery continued, its effective brisk fire. On the con- trary, he attacked it with a treble cross-fire from three points — to the south of the breach, from the Weissenburg rondel, and from the traverses ; while from the interior of the fortress he threw bombs against it. In spite of all this, by the end of the following day (the third of the assault by the battery), if I am not mistaken, the breach appeared to us to be so far advanced, that we believed it already practicable. Major-general Hentzi had meanwhile been exerting himself to fulfill his threats in a terrific manner. For Pesth, as on the first day of the siege, so also on some of the following ones, was bombarded with increasing vehemence ; and my precipitancy in ordering the general storm in the night of the 17th or 18th of May — without having previously thoroughly convinced myself that the breach was practicable — had its origin in my indigna- tion at these bombardments, which were altogether unjustifiable in whatever light regarded. The dispositions for this storm indicated as objects of attack — for the second army corps, the park of the castle and the castle- gate with its nearest environs ; for the first corps, the breach ; for the third corps, the northern rondel with its vicinity on the salient angle of the Vienna and Weissenburg fronts ; and for the Kmety division, the intrenchments before the forcing-pump. The attack commenced shortly after midnight, was unsuccess- ful on all points, and was discontinued before daybreak. The storming-columns of the first corps had encountered an obstacle in the overhanging remains of still undemolished stone- work at the upperm,ost edge of the breach, insurmountable with- out ladders. The imperfection of the breach being masked by the apex of the loose heap of debris, which gave way under the feet of the assailants, had escaped our previous observation — confined to a mere glance. The attempt at escalade of the 336 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. third corps had been rendered impracticable by the insufficient length of their ladders ; that of the second corps, in whose ob- jects of attack this circumstance was not prominent, was de- feated by the valor of that part of the garrison by which the park of the castle and its vicinity were defended. Finally, the attack of the Kmety division failed through the impossibility of advancing against the intrenchments along their approaches, upon which projectiles of all kinds were ^Jaowered down from the ramparts of the Pesth front. The defensive activity of the enemy, suddenly so vividly ex- cited by the effective fire of our breach-battery, showed itself after this storming in a still higher degree of development than before it. The earth-works on the rampart extending from the Weissenburg to the northern rondel, as well as those behind the ' breach, were most zealously continued, and, besides, the strength- ening of the environs of the castle-gate energetically commenced. For he hastened to demolish soraie buildings in the vicinity of the castle-gate, which had favored the escalade attempted by the r troops of the second corps, and prepared others for defense. \] The more reason had Ave — opposed to an enemy who appeared i resolved to dare the worst, and taught by the bitter consequence ^ of my precipitancy, the failure of our first storming — to do all in our power that our next effort for the final fall of the fortress might not again be unsuccessful. In the attempt of the third corps to escalade the rampart of the fortress near the salient angle of the Vienna and Weissenburg front, it has been mentioned that the length of the ladders they possessed had proved to be insufficient. That the next escalade of the third corps might not fail again from this cause, longer ladders were sought for ; and instead of the vicinity of the salient angle, where the rampart of the fortress was almost highest, the part of the Vienna front situated nearest to the gate of that name was fixed as the object of attack for the third corps. At the first storming, the breach was still impracticable. The breach-battery had consequently immediately afterward to con- tinue its attacks vigorously ; and in order to be quite sure of suc- cess, it was arranged that the troops of the first army corps, when they next stormed at the breach, should, like those appointed for the escalade exclusively, be provided with ladders. In the first stomiing our troops had found the approach to the MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 337 breach impeded by occasional high and strong fences of all kinds, as walls, iron gratings, planks, &c. ; these had first of all to be removed out of their way, at a great cost of time and strength. From the loud noise unavoidable in such operations, the enemy could guess our intention long before the arrival of our storming- column at the foot of the breach. Instead of the defender, the assailant consequently was rather the surprised ; for the former began the combat before the latter was in a condition to attack him. The storming had not yet commenced, and already the troops of the first corps were exhausted by their efforts during the advance on the difficult ground, and shaken by the vehement fire of the too-soon alarmed enemy. Before the next escalade all hindrances had therefore to be completely removed from the approach to the breach. Till now the garrison, especially in the interior of the fortress, had been only occasionally molested by our projectiles ; they had enough of the necessary rest to remain, with a simultaneous abundance of victuals, in perfectly good humor. Undoubtedly it would be of very great advantage to us during the next storm, if they could meanwhile be brought down a little. We thought to attain this object most certainly by bombarding from this time the inner part of the fortress as briskly as the scantiness of our means permitted (we had meanwhile obtained from the fortress of Komorn the above-mentioned four mortars, and had planted them partly on the Blocksberg, partly in the Vienna suburb), and at the same time cannonading it with the twelve-pounder and howitzer batteries, in order to set fire to those buildings especially which were pointed out to us by scouts as magazines and bar- racks. By the first storming, it will be seen — if the details just given be duly considered — that the garrison could not by any means be taken by surprise. But the less unexpected an attack, the more doubtful its success, other circumstances being equal. It was consequently of the first importance to insure to the next storming, by some means, the advantage of a surprise. To this end, immediately on the approach of the first night after the miscarried assault, noisy feigned attacks were made on the whole circuit of the fortress, except on the Pesth front which was inaccessible to us, and continued uninterruptedly till about two in the morning ; at this hour, however, the fire of musketry P 338 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. and that from the batteries completely ceased, and recommenced only with bright daylight. The repetition of this manosuvre during the two or three following nights was intended, on the one hand, to frustrate the nocturnal undertakings of the enemy, directed perhaps to rendering the breach or the approach to it impracticable ; on the other hand, to accustom him to believe that the second hour after midnight was the fixed time, after which till the next night set in, he had no longer to fear any further molestation. The last repetition of these feigned attacks took place in the night between the 20th and 21st of May. With the second hour after midnight our brisk nocturnal har- assing fire suddenly ceased this time also, and immediately the preparations for the real storm noiselessly began. Masked by the darkness of the night, the columns approached their objects of attack, awaiting the signal for the onset. At the stroke of three in the morning all the batteries together sent forth a discharge ; then they were silent again. This was the signal for the general storming. The darkness, which still continued for some time, rendered it impossible at first to observe distinctly what was taking place at the breach, although the situation of the head-quarters was fa- vorable for this purpose. But the flashing of the divers discharges of cannons and muskets from the Weissenburg rondel, the short luminous curves of the hand-grenades thrown from it against the near breach, and the brisk fire of tirailleurs maintained on our part by a dense chain of sharp-shooters deployed in the rear of the real storming-columns against the defenders, in order to facili- tate the assault — meanwhile gave us reason to believe that our troops were already on the breach. Soon afterward, in the twilight, we could perceive that the masses repeatedly stormed up the breach, but were nevertheless as often driven back again by the fierce fire from the "Weissenburg rondel. At almost every new assault, however, some of them gained the rampart. But the next moment these also were no longer any where to be seen ; the balls of the defenders might have struck them down. The longer we observed these unsuccessful efforts, the clearer became the conviction in us, that our tirailleur fire, spite of its briskness, was far from sufficient to disconcert, to the degree re- MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 339 quired for the success of the storming, the most obstinate defend- ers of the breach, the forces of the Weissenburg rondel. Here it was necessary to help with artillery. The breach-battery, and the dismounting one to the right of it, received orders to open their fire against the Weissenburg rondel, but in such a manner, that the projectiles might pass over it as close as possible. We promised ourselves from the imposing noise of the solid bullets rushing in quick succession over the heads of the men of the Weissenburg rondel, a far more favorable success for the assail- ants than from the musketry of our sharp-shooters, murderous though it was. In consequence of the considerable distance of the breach-bat- tery from the head-quarters, a good while elapsed before this order could be carried into effect ; and we could distinctly re- mark in the meanwhile, that the continued attempts at storming, undertaken time after time with evidently less strength, grew ever more unsuccessful. But as soon as these batteries began to play, the sinking courage of our troops seemed suddenly to revive. The next assault, essayed with visibly greater energy, brought the larger half of the then storming party on to the rampart. The Weissenburg rondel now lay to the left behind them ; they turned to the right and very soon disappeared in the still-impenetrable shade of the dark walls of some half-finished houses situated not far from the breach. Painful uncertainty seized us as to the fate of these brave fel- lows. A second attempt to storm, with almost as favorable and enig- matical an issue, and even a third, succeeded the first at short intervals. After the last, however, an inexplicable standstill suddenly took place. The breach was no longer stepped upon — and nevertheless, as nearly as we could calculate, scarcely more than half a battalion could have reached the rampart. It seemed as if the combat, just at the moment when it began to take a more favorable turn for the assailants, had been basely given up by them. Anxiously we endeavored to discover, in the proximity of the breach, still but very faintly illumined, some particular cause for this sorrowful change of afiairs. The fire from the Weissenburg rondel — thanks to the activity of our breach and dismounting-batteries — had rather slackened 340 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. than increased, though it still continued pretty uninterruptedly. But otherwise not one of the garrison was visible on the rampart next the breach ; only at some distance south of it, we thought we remarked a hostile troop, which seemed to assemble just then on the rampart, in order to advance directly to the breach and again occupy its apparently abandoned proximity. Yet, though we watched it a long time, we could not perceive that it gained ground toward the breach. At first we took this for a favorable sign, supposing that those of our troops who had previously mounted the breach had not succumbed, and were now prevent- ing this troop from advancing on the rampart toward the breach. But along the whole extent of the rampart as far as the breach not a single shot had been fired ; and judging from the immobility of this troop, attacks with the bayonet were out of the question. The increasing daylight at last explained all contradictions. That troop on the rampart was assembled round the tricolor ban- ner of a Honved battalion I It consisted in part of those brave fellows who had previously mounted the breach, and had there found a tenable spot ; in part of those who had preferred to escalade by means of ladders the " terraced enclosure," rather than make further attempts to gain the rampart by the breach. But the escalade — rendered difficult by the fire of the Weissen- burg rondel also, though, on account of the greater distance, in a less degree than mounting the breach, and moreover confined at the uppermost w^all to a single ladder — furnished only a very feeble afflux of fresh forces for the reinforcement of that isolated troop on the rampart. The apprehension of seeing these give way before the desperate attacks of the garrison, if the escalade on the Vienna front and the storm on the intrenchments before the forcing-pump should now be suddenly abandoned, as it was already day, and these undertakings had not yet succeeded — induced me speedily to send two officers from the head-quarters to the third corps and the Kmety division, to convey to them the encouraging news of the success of the first corps, and communicate to them at the same time a strict order for the increasingly energetic continuance of their attacks. This measure, however, was soon seen to be superfluous. The two officers could scarcely have got half way from the head- quarters to the Vienna suburb, when we saw the first escaladers MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 341 of the third corps on the rampart of the Vienna front, advancing toward the angle formed by it and the "Weissenburg front ; the Croats, on the contrary, who had defended this point, retreating into the interior of the fortress. Soon afterward, the sign of submission — an off-hand white banner — waved from one of those traverses on the "Weissenburg rampart, which had been thrown up to protect the four twenty- four-pounders planted there against our breach-battery. But the waving of this banner did not in the least prevent the defenders of the Weissenburg rondel from continuing their fatal fire against the escaladers of the first corps on the terraced in- closure, as briskly as was practicable, considering the activity of our tirailleurs and batteries directed against them ; and so long as this lasted, we had of course to take no notice at all of this sign of submission ; the lesg so, as it had accidentally escaped our observation by whom the white banner had been set up. The anonymous " entreaty for pardon" might have originated only from a peaceful citizen of Ofen, whose house chanced to be sit- uated in one and the same direction with the Weissenburg rondel and our breach-battery, by the bullets from which it was perhaps being roughly handled. After a while, however, one of the garrison suddenly ap- proached the traverses, seized the banner, and bore it with un- steady steps to the Weissenburg rondel. Arrived there, he planted it on the parapet. This seemed to some among the defenders of this point a wel- come pretext for desisting from further resistance. The greater part continued to fire. Moreover, a few moments later, an officer appeared on the rondel, approached the parapet, tore down the sign of submission, and threw it on the ground. But scarcely had he retired, when the banner waved anew over the parapet. And now the. idea of submission seemed to have the majority of the defenders in its favor ; for only some of them still fired oc- casionally. These also at last laid down their arms. Our bat- teries and tirailleurs ceased their fire ; and while the latter mounted the Weissenburg rondel by means of ladders, the major- ity of the battalion of the first corps had already forced their way from the point where they had gathered on the rampart, south of the breach, into the interior of the town, and the last desperate combat had now commenced in the streets. This, however, we 342 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. were prevented from observing by the range of houses along the rampart of the Weissenburg front : we saw only the smoke of the enemy's guns spreading over the roofs. Almost simultaneously a cloud of powder-smoke of uncommon extent rose on the other side of the fortress. This had been aimed at the chain-bridge I But the irrational intention had been frustrated by the injudicious nature of the mine, which was designed to blow in pieces the gigantic chains of the bridge. Half an hour afterward I received General Nagy-Sandor's re- port, that the fortress together with the garrison — Major-general Hentzi mortally wounded — was completely in our power. CHAPTER LII. About noon of the 4th of May, Ofen was invested by us, and not till the morning of the 21st did we gain possession of the place ; we had consequently employed almost seventeen entire days in its conquest. The chief causes of this loss of time, by no means unimportant to us, were, next to the firmness of the hostile garrison, the want of all preparation for the operations of a siege, which had un- expectedly proved necessary ; our mistakes during the siege ; our deficiency of besieging-artillery ; and moreover the unseasonable scruples — to choose the mildest expression — of the commander of the fortress of Komorn, Count Guyon. It can not be denied, that the fortress of Ofen, from the method of defense adopted by Major-general Hentzi, must have been in our possession at furthest within eight days, if, instead of the preconceived opinion of being able to conquer it by mere attacks with infantry and howitzers, I had at once brought with me the besieging-park from Komorn, had prepared beforehand the requi- sites for the construction of batteries, and with more circumspec- tion and equal energy had set about the construction of the batter- ies themselves. For the method in which Major-general Hentzi conducted the defense seemed to be based on the peculiar illusion, that the longer maintenance of a besieged strong place depended MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 343 not so much on the energetic impediments thrown in the way of the besiegers' operations, as on the amount of devastation com mitted on some point beyond the offensive range. Instead of hindering, at any sacrifice, the construction of our batteries, without the completion of which we should have been confined exclusively to the escalade — certainly very precarious, considering the valor of the garrison — Major-general Hentzi used exclusively for the r^eated bombardments of Pesth those colos- sal means, of the possession of which he had with good reason boasted in his reply to my summons to surrender. While on our part the intrenchments at the Spitzbergel were carried on uninterruptedly under his very eyes, though with evi- dent helplessness, and one half of the guns employed in those bombardments would have suflficed to frustrate the erection of the breach-battery ; Major-general Hentzi was, above all, solicit- ous for the demolition of the deserted House of Representatives, and amused himself, by the way, in changing into ruins and ashes some dozens of houses happening to belong to thoroughly excellently-disposed black-and-yellow Pesth citizens ; till, at last, the cannibal personal gratification arising from the further repe- tition of similar experiments was embittered to him by the thun dering memento mori of our breach-battery, which had mean- while been completed. Not till his foot was already excoriated, did Major-general Hentzi seem to observe where the shoe really pinched him. From this time, it is true, we see him do every thing in his power subsequently to raze the parapets, the construction of which he had taken en bagatelle; subsequently to silence the guns, the planting of which in the batteries he had not even, attempted to prevent ; subsequently we see him undertake, with surprising energy, and unceasingly continue the construction of defensive works, which he ought to have begun on the first day of the siege. But these gigantic efforts had only the usual result of all " sub- sequents.'' They came too late. Those days on which they ought to have been made, Major-general Hentzi thought he must devote exclusively to the bombardment of Pesth. And now that they were past, that is, when our twenty-four- pounders were already in activity, he could no longer prevent us from effecting a breach ; nay, even the most desperate resist- 344 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ance of the garrison could not then retard the fall of the fortress, which, considering our want of means and our helplessness during the siege, might still be said to be premature. The above-described defense of Ofen was enfeebled, in spite of all its valor, by the prevalence of a destructive rage, ascribable only to political fanaticism, but just as foolish as absolutely de- testable. The bombardments of Pesth were, I repeat it, by no means justifiable in any point of view. Not politically ; because the Pesth "landlords," as has been said, were neither Kossuthians nor republicans. And just as little strategically : for these bom- bardments (apart from what has already been said against them) did not even accomplish their object as repressive measures ; as such they should have induced us to give up the siege immedi- ately, and march off straightway. This, however, by no means took place ; and with a calm estimate of the then state of the specifically-Austrian cause in Hungary, might have been foreseen on the part of the enemy (even if no importance at all was attached to the categorical tone of my summons to surrender) with just as little difficulty as the dangerous exasperation, which, in consequence of these devasta- tions of the city of Pesth, must seize upon our ranks against their originators. Considering all this beforehand, I had asked Major-general Hentzi to spare the city of Pesth and the chain-bridge, under the assurance that he had no attack whatever to apprehend from the left bank of the Danube. I had simultaneously guaranteed to him and to his troops, even if they should defend themselves to the last, a humane treatment, provided these objects, which were innoxious, to the garrison, were spared. The bombardments of Pesth showed clearly enough that no regard was paid to humane considerations ; and I immediately issued an express proliihition to all the divisions of the besieging army against giving quarter to the garrison. But on the cap- ture of its commander I set an especial price : for I intended to make an example of him, as a warning to those who have an itching for purposelessly augmenting the horrors of war. Major-general Hentzi fell mortally wounded into my power ; with the dying man a higher power was already reckoning. The garrison was not put to the sword. Let it be thankful to MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 345 those officers who, in part, have since expired on the scaffold, in part are languishing in the state-prisons of Austria ; let it hold the memory of its noble-minded enemies in honor ! CHAPTER LIII. About the middle of the month of April, 1849, as is known from what precedes, while the main body of our principal army was on its march from Waizen toward Levencz, an expeditionary column, composed of six companies of infantry, one squadron of hussars, and two six-pounders, under the command of the Hon- ved Major Armin Gorgei, was detached into the district of the mountain-towns to purge them from the Austrian garrisons ; and thus protect the rear of the main body of our army during its further advance against Komorn. On the 18th of April, Major Gorgei began the fulfillment of his mission by taking Schemnitz by storm. The hostile soldiers, who on this occasion became our prisoners, stated that the strength of the Austrian column, distributed in the district of the mountain-towns, consisted of ten companies of infantry and two pieces of artillery. The commander of these troops (Major Trenk) stood on that day with a part of them in Neusohl. At the first news of the expulsion of his troops from Schem- nitz, Major Trenk evacuated the district of the mountain-towns without further opposition, and concentrated his forces near Szent-Marton, in the Turocz comitate, which it bounds on the north. Major Gorgei pressed forward on the shortest route (by Krem- nitz) toward Szent-Marton. Simultaneous reconnoiterings on the part of the Austrian and Hungarian columns led to a conflict at Pribocz in the night between the 22d and the 23d. The Hun- garian advanced troops were victorious ; and Major Trenk now retreated through the Sztrecsen defile, and across the Waag as far as Varin on the right bank of that river. At the same time the Sclavonian free-corps were roving about 346 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. in the Liptau comitate. They had been expelled from Eperjes in the second half of the month of March by the expeditionary column which had been detached from the seventh army corps, then acting independently, and sent from Miskolcz against them. This is the expeditionary column which subsequently surprised the Austrian Colonel Almasy in Lossoncz. These free-troops now intended undoubtedly to join the Austrian Major Trenk in Varin, by Also-Kubin, Parnicza, and Tcrhova. But a company of Major Gorgei's expeditionary column — which had, in the mean time, crossed the Waag at Szucsan — overtook and attacked them on the 28th, not far from Also- Kubin, made about 160 of them prisoners, and put the remainder to flight toward Tverdossin. The captured free-troopers were disarmed and sent away to their homes. Major Gbrgei now hastened against Major Trenk in Varin by the same route as that on which he had perhaps expected to be joined by the Sclavonian free-corps. The attack on Varin took place on the 1st of May. Major Trenk was defeated, and on the 2d was pursued, by Budetin, as far as Kadolya, on the road to Jablunka. Before it was possible to overtake him, Major Gorgei received news that Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, coming from the Zips, with from 6000 to 7000 men and eighteen guns, had broken into the Liptau. Ifi consequence of this information, the further pursuit of Major Trenk was abandoned ; and by the 4th of May our expe- ditionary column was already in Szent-Miklos in the Liptau, partly to impede the advance of Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel as much as possible ; partly, in the last extremity, to protect the road from Rosenberg to Neusohl. To retard the westward advance of these hostile forces in the valley of the Waag, seemed to be demanded by the natural sup- position, that Lieutenant-general Dembinski — who, it is known, had been intrusted, soon after his removal from the chief com- mand, with the charge of an army corps, newly formed in Eperjes and Kaschau, and had occupied the Zips before the irruption into it of Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel — was now pur- suing the latter. This supposition was, however, any thing but natural in the case of Dembinski. As far as my knowledge of him went, Dembinski, as soon as he scented the enemy a-head. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 347 had always without exception moved back. So also this time. Instead of pursuing Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, Dembinski bar- ricaded himself in the Saros comitate against that of Zips ; while Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel left the latter in an opposite direction, probably for the purpose of reaching on the shortest line the left wing of the Austrian main army on the central Waag. This shortest line led, indeed, through the district of the moun- tain-towns. Our expeditionary column, which had destroyed the bridges over the Waag between Szent-Miklos and Rosenberg, and occupied the defile at the latter place, was nevertheless sufficient to determine Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, by turning northward from Szent-Miklos, to pass the territory between the rivers Waag and Arva on mountain-ways practicable only with extreme diffi- culty, and to accomplish his strategic task on the road from Also-Kubin by Varin, Silein (Zsolna,) and Trencsin ; w^hile our expeditionary column, flanking his left, continually protected tho district of the mountain-towns. Meanwhile we perceived the disproportion between the great extent of the district to be protected and the small strength of the expeditionary column ; and from the camp of Ofen six com- panies of infantry, half a squadron of hussars, and two three- pounders, were sent to ij as a reinforcement. When this reinforcement reached the expeditionary column, Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel had already effected his junction with the Austrian main army. To form the extreme left wing of the latter seemed at the same time to have been assigned to the independent brigade of Major-general Barko, which, coming from Silesia, broke into Hungary through the Jablunka defile, and advanced toward Silein on the Waag. At the time of the fall of Ofen our now reinforced expedition- ary column was just about assuming the offensive against this hostile brigade ; while the other expeditionary column from tho seventh army corps, which, as is known, had shortly before the relief of Komorn been detached to Verebely, had advanced from this point as far as Neutra, for the purpose of occupying the hostile forces distributed on the central Waag, and thereby favor- ing the undertakings of Major Gorgei against the Barko brigade. Poltenberg had stood with his two army divisions of the seventh corps in and before Raab since the beginning of May, 348 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. but little disturbed by the Austriaiia ; and a part of the garrison of Komorn at the same height in the great Schiitt. Kossuth's previous assurances (at the beginning of April, in Godollo), that Lieutenant-general Bern would cross the Danube at Baja with 16,000 men in the second half of April, had not been confirmed. Even in May, Bern was only at Temesvar ; and the Ban Baron Jellachich consequently reached the right bank of the Drau without molestation. While I purposed resuming the offensive against the Aus- trian main army immediately after the fall of Ofen, a plan of operations was drawn up by my substitute in the war-ministry, General Klapka, the fundamental idea of which for the war-op- erations was, that we should observantly await the irruption of a Russian army into Hungary, now thought probable even by the provisional government ; and moreover having as its inten- tion to subordinate all the leaders of Hungarian troops in Hun- gaiy and Transylvania to the control of the ministry of war. This plan owed it to the latter intention, and not to its idea for the war-operations, that I did not reject it at the outset, but only afterward practically disavowed its fundamental idea of opera- tions by my disposal of the troops, which was intended to render possible the renewal of the offensive against the Austrian main army before the invasion of the Russians. Immediately after the fall of Ofen, accordingly, the first, second, and third army corps were directed from the camp at Ofen, by Gran, to the left bank of the Danube, toward the lower Waag ; but on the right bank only the Kmety division, by Stuhl- weissenburg, toward the territory situated between the Flatten and the Neusiedel lakes. CHAPTER LIY. During the siege of Ofen, and shortly before the failure of the first general assaults— about the middle of the month of May — General Klapka, leaving Debreczin for some days, suddenly ar- rived at my head- quarters pn the great Schwabenberg ; partly that MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 349 he might convince himself personally of the progress of the siege ; partly that he might communicate to me the most important points of what he had at present learned, during the short time of his occupation as war-minister, about certain circumstances which had remained unknown to us who were with the army. These were, the relation in which the most important war-sup- plies and the resources of the country stood to the development of greater forces in the field, generally recognized as indispensa- ble, — that of the war-ministry to Kossuth, — of Kossuth to the Diet. The resources of the country General Klapka described as in- sufficient for energetically carrying on the war even for half a year longer. Apart from the financial difficulty, which was moreover no secret to the army, Klapka pointed especially to the circumstance, that the supplies of gunpowder and of saltpetre were not enough for even the comple'te equipment of the fortresses which were in our power ; and that the manufactories of arms furnished but a small part of what the government had publicly announced they were capable of producing. General Klapka on that occasion declared undisguisedly his sorrowful conviction, that the salvation of Hungary was impos- sible without foreign assistance, and that this would be probable only if we succeeded in resisting the combined attacks of the Aus- trians and Russians — of the intervention of the latter he doubted just as little as myself — until the end of next autumn ; because in consequence of the prevailing peculiarities of this season of the year in by far the greater part of Hungary, a suspension of operations on the part of the hostile armies would be unavoid- able, and the continuance of the resistance until the next spring be facilitated to us, and thereby the necessary time be secured to induce foreign countries to take part with Hungary. The principal condition — Klapka thought further — ^for a resist- ance as successful as these conjectures presupposed it to be, was, above all things, union in the conduct of the operations of all parts of the national army, isolated from each other. Recogniz- ing this, he had directed his activity hitherto, as my substitute in the war-ministry, especially to the attainment of this indis- pensable unity. Unfortunately he had encountered herein almost insuperable difficulties. 350 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. These consisted partly in the circumstance that the majority of the independent commanders of troops in their operations had been accustomed to take not the slightest notice of the general purpose, and completely to ignore the decrees of the war-ministry ; and partly in Kossuth's habit, without the knowledge of the war- minister, of constantly exercising on the operations of some of the independent leaders a direct influence, almost always as injuri- ous to the progress of our cause in the field as it was partial, whereby these leaders were of course encouraged in their disobe- dience to the war-minister. On this occasion General Klapka spoke very unfavorably of Kossuth generally. "With lively indignation he blamed, among other things, especially the intention of Kossuth, and of those who sided with him, to exterminate completely the Serbians (^. e. the Schokazen and E-aizen) in the Banat and the Bacska, and, without more ado, colonize the districts thus depopulated with Hon ved battalions. -- Finally, the new law of the kingdom of the 14th of April, and especially the manner in which it had been originated, Klapka condemned most unsparingly. He described the real creators of this law, in expressions by no means honorable to them, as men who had never made any sacrifice for the good of the countr}% and who in general had scarcely any thing to lose. While those who were in all respects the most estimable patriots — assever- ated Klapka — men who had already really made the most im- portant sacrifices for the salvation of Hungary, and among these a very considerable part of the representatives, were without ex- ception decided adversaries of this law. Two or three weeks previous to the time at which this confer- ence between General Klapka and myself took place in the camp before Ofen, a private letter from the then government commis- sary (afterward minister of communication) Ladislaus Csanyi, had reached me in Komorn (before the complete relief of this for- tress), wherein he declared to m», that he could countenance the separation of Hungary from Austria only because Kossuth had assured him by letter that it had my entire approval. Now as Kossuth, when he wrote in the sense just indicated to the government commissary Ladislaus Csanyi, could not possibly have forgotten my decided disapprobation of his intention (com- municated to me, as is known, in Godollo, after the battle of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 351 Isaszeg) to venture on a politically offensive step against Austria, and consequently could not feel himself justified even in assuming my sympathy for the decision of the Diet of the 14th of April ; — it may be conceived, that by Csanyi's letter alone I must have been rendered suspicious of the imrity of the manner in which the decision of the 14th of April had been obtained. The above-mentioned communications of Klapka, as to the ex- istence of a numerous weighty party in the Diet, which, though not approving of the law of the 14th of April, had nevertheless voted for it, now confirmed the suspicion which had been awak- ened in me by Csanyi's letter; while, again, the credibility of these communications (from my entire confidence in Csanyi's strict probity and love of truth, the result of my personal convic- tion,) found a strong support in this letter. I consequently declared that I perfectly agreed with the pro- posal, which Klapka made to me in the course of our conference, to open the way to a reciprocal approximation between the ad- versaries of the new Hungarian law and the army ; and learned with thankful acknowledgment, from Klapka' s further commu- nications, that during his short stay in Debreczin he had already taken the initiative to such an approximation, and had assured the most eminent persons of the said party (the so-called " peace- party") not only of my personal sympathy, but moreover of that of the whole main army for them (the adversaries of the new law). Nay, I most urgently exhorted Klapka to continue his activity in this direction immediately after his return to Debrec- zin ; — and this after he had shown me the contradiction between the aversion of the peace-party to the new law, and their co-op- eration in the decision of the 1 4th of April, by revealing to me that the members of the Diet belonging to the peace-party had been shaken in their resolute opposition to the proposed declara- tion of independence, partly by Kossuth's assertion, that the army so eagerly desired the separation of Hungary from Austria, that the proclamation of it, should the Diet delay any longer, was to be apprehended from the army ; partly by the intimidating de- meanor of the population of Debreczin, fanaticized by Kossuth and his agents for the idea of the total defection from Austria. I had hitherto considered the new Hungarian law of the 14th of April — in my ignorance of the circumstances under which it saw the light — to have been the result of a resolution of the 352 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. •whole Diet, which, though inconsiderate, or originating in decep- tion, was nevertheless a voluntary one. And because such a resolution could by no means be made to harmonize with those communications which Kossuth (in the beginning of March, 1849 in Tiszafiired) had made to me upon the unceasing demand of the very same Diet for unconditional submission to the power of Prince Windischgratz, without at the same time assuming the existence of some contrary sudden impulse ; I had hitherto sup- posed that the exasperation, which had seized the collective body of the Hungarian representatives at the Olmiitz stroke of policy, had been so extremely intense, as — in conjunction with the na- tional arrogance, which had perhaps been inflamed by the sur- prisingly favorable progress of the April campaign — to have suf- ficed to call into existence the law of the 1 4th of April. But with this supposition, I could not deny that the law, in spite of all the irrationality contained in it, had a nimbus of the national will ; and however injurious in its consequences (more to Hungary than to Austria) this law might appear to me, the secretly hostile position which I took up against it was rendered very painful to me by the idea, that with the Diet, the whole nation, as it were, was opposed to me. Only in consequence of Klapka's intimation of the manner in which this law originated (the first intimation moreover which I had received of it), I began to feel my hostile position to it be- coming by degrees more bearable, in the same measure as my conviction increased that the law of the 14th of April had not been desired by the nation, but was the*handiwork of Kossuth, and forced upon it by him. The sensible loss of seventeen days before Ofen ; the supposition unfortunately only too well founded, that the Austrian s might have meanwhile pretty well recovered from the stunning blows of the April campaign, and that they might, moreover, have con- siderably strengthened their main army in Hungary by drafting thither all their forces not required elsewhere ; the statements of Klapka as to our insufficiency in the most essential war-supplies ; — all this was certainly very unfavorable to the possibility of realizing my idea, namely, to urge the provisional governments on this and the other side the Lajtha to a compromise, based on the constitution sanctioned in the year 1848, before the Russian intervention should actually begui. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 353 But nevertheless I was forced to recognize in the serious at- tempt to carry out this idea — considering my grave doubts of the existence of an energetic European sympathy for Hungary's in- dependence as a state — the only beam which might perhaps be still strong enough to reward the last convulsive clinging to it of the submerging. And if I had not been deterred from the thought of an armed opposition to the new Hungarian law, at a time when I could not but believe that in such a step I should have the whole nation against me ; then, I should suppose, it can not be neces- sary to detail the reasons which led me to persist in this thought, after Klapka's accounts had proved beyond doubt the existence of a numerous party in the country of the same political opinions as myself — a party which contained the majority of those who were acknowledged to be the most disinterested patriots. A few days after the taking of Ofen, a deputation from the Diet appeared in Pesth for the purpose of rewarding me, in the name of the Diet and of the Government, for my services in the army of the fatherland, with the order of the first class of mili- tary merit, and the rank of Field-marshal Lieutenant. I felt a repugnance to accept rewards from that party, the political acts of which I could not fail to perceive were injurious to the nation. But in order to mask as much as possible the real significance of my refusal, I began by stating it to the deputation of the Diet, and adduced as motives for my conduct, partly the statutes of the order of military merit, according to which the first class of these distinctions did not at all appertain to me ; partly the incompatibility of the dignity of field-marshal lieutenant with the republican programme of government of the ministerial president Bartholomaus von Szemere. In consequence of this, all official intercourse between me and the deputies ceased. I was, however, honored by their leaders with a private visit ; and on this occasion became unexpectedly acquainted with two decided opponents to the new law. These had probably perceived, in my refusal to accept the above-mentioned rewards, a confirmation of what had been told them by Klapka during his presence in Debreczin relative to my disapproval of the decree of the Diet of the 14th of April, and had thereby felt themselves encouraged to meet me with confidence. They quite undisguisedly expressed their joy at the false posi- 354 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. tion in which I had placed the Government by my unexpected refusal of the distinctions intended for me ; confirmed and com- pleted Klapka's former evidences of Kossuth's intrigues, by means of which he had brought about the declaration of independence ; and finally cautioned me against accepting the portfolio of war- minister, or, more correctly, they earnestly besought me not to leave the army. Only so long as I actually stood at the head of the army — said they — could I reckon on its obedience, on its unreserved confi- dence — would my word have weight in the balance of public opin- ion — would it maintain its influence even with that large part of the nation which my personal enemies had set against me. This was just as little a secret to the leaders of the 14th of April party — the men of the Government — as was the danger by which their policy would be menaced if I took part against them. This was also the reason why the Government feared to transfer to mo definitively the chief command of the army ; why it wished to remove me from the theatre of war ; and only that it might ap- pear justified before the army in doing so, had it ofiered me the minister's portfolio. I hereupon gave the two leaders of the deputation from the Diet the tranquilizing assurance that other additional circum- stances obliged me still to retain the chief command. I did not, however, communicate to them my previous determ- ination to compel the Diet in due time by force of arms to amiul the law of the 14th of April, because I had given up all thoughts of the execution of this determination as soon as the discovery of a weighty party in the Diet of the same political opinions as myself, led me to suppose it now possible to strive for the same object— which at first had seemed to me to be attainable only by the bayo- net — with the observance at the same time of the constitutional forms, which had obtained in Hungary such general authority. Moreover, the way in which this was forthwith to be attempted had not been at all discussed during the above-mentioned private visit, which the leaders of the deputation from the Diet paid me. I knew then that I should be at Debreczin in the course of a few days, and preferred to await the opportunity which would proba- bly be offered to me there, of declaring openly before a larger num- ber of members of the peace-party my views in relation to the present situation of Hungary. ^'^ V ' CHAPTER LY. General Aulich immediately after the taking of Ofen, in consequence of an obstinate inward complaint, had applied for his dismissal into retirement. General Damjanics was miserably laid up with his shattered leg. All the other coryphaei pf the army, except General Klapka, had been far too little tried as independent leaders to be confidently intrusted with the chief conunand. General Klapka, however, I could by no means wish at the head of the army, with my in- tention of resuming most energetically the offensive against the Austrians before the Russians should prevent us from doing so, after he had so decidedly declared himself for observing the de- fensive, in the general plan of operations projected by him, and approved by the council of ministers in Debreczin. Under these circumstances I was constrained to retain the chief command of the army. Not mistaking the weighty influence of the war-ministry upon the services and the political disposition of the army, I was, how- ever, already convinced of the necessity of obstructing for ever the way in which Kossuth and those about him had hitherto known how to gain this influence ; and unfortunately General Klapka, during the short time he had acted as my substitute in Debreczin, had justified in a very deplorable manner my apprehension that he might scarcely be equal to this task, on account of his being of too yielding a nature. For I was one day surprised by the appointment of a sister of the Governor of Hungary as foster-mother-in-chief of the sick of the country ; and moreover by a war-ministerial decree, signed by Klapka himself, which subordinated the authorities of all hos- pitals in the country, in all their administrative relations, to the immediate rule of the said foster-mother-in-chief of the sick of the country. The aptitude of the fair sex for nursing the sick has hitherto, I should think, been denied by nobody ; but " to nurse the sick" and " to organize and conduct the nursing of the sick of a whole 356 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. country, especially of an army during war," are certainly two different things. This could not have been unknown to General Klapka ; but his moral strength, as above indicated, might have been insufficient to oppose, with the regard due to the fair sex, yet still with manly firmness, the administrative inclinations of a lady, which even with the best intentions were at any rate inopportune. In consequence of this the war-ministry under Klapka had lost more of its independence in a few days than under Meszaros in months. It would indeed have been unjustifiable to intrust it any longer to a guidance, the weakness of which completely opened the door to the remarkable passion of Kossuth and those about him of both sexes for dabbling in the most important affairs of war, constantly with as much want of common sense as with excessive vanity. Klapka himself seemed to know this ; for shortly after the fall of Ofen he declared that he found he was not at all in his element as war-minister, and wished to return to the active army. As this moment, however, I knew of no disposable person whatever, to whom I could more satisfactorily have transferred my duties as war-minister than to General Klapka ; and I was thus obliged for the present to take upon myself personally the war-ministry also, at least until I should see the possibility of confiding the principal direction of it to a substitute on whom I could rely. Accordingly I went to Debreczin in the beginning of June, my personal presence with the army not being indispensable for the next few days in the present condition of affairs on the theatre of war. The main army had lost in Generals Damjanics and Aulich its two best leaders. After the taking of Ofen it was literally an orphan. At least I considered it so. Neither Klapka's talents as a general, though extraordinary, nor my own efforts, appeared to me sufficient to make up for the heavy loss which the army had sustained in those two per- sons. But to the new commanders of corps. Generals Nagy-Sandor and Knezich, to Colonel Poltenberg, as well as to Aulich's suc- cessor in the command of the second army corps, Colonel Asboth, MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 357 no opportunity had hitherto been afforded for trying their inde- pendent action before the enemy — either in critical moments on the field of battle, as in the case of Damjanics at Isaszeg and Nagy-Sarlo ; or in accomplishing a strategic task alike perilous and decisively important, as was that of Aulich during the April campaign before Pesth. And there was no reason to suppose that the offensive cam- paign against the Austrians, which I seriously intended, in spite of Klapka's plan of defensive operations, would be less fertile in similar critical moments and situations. I was therefore obliged to decide either to open this campaign with the main body of the principal army concentrated under my personal command on a single line of operation, and to face at random its later critical phases with commanders of army corps as yet untried ; or to break up the main body of the army corps, and attempt the opening of the campaign with distinct indepen- dent army corps on several lines of operation, for the purpose of discovering, at the very commencement of the campaign, those among the new commanders of army corps who might be quali- fied to compensate for Generals Damjanics and Aulich. In accordance with the opinion of the chief of the general staff I chose the latter expedient. According to this, our offensive against the Austrians — as we shall see afterward — was to begin with a combined attack of the independently-operating first, second, and third army corps on the hostile position at the Waag ; and the reunion of these army corps, under my personal command, was not to take place till after the successful crossing of that river. The seventh army corps, under Poltenberg and Kmety, had meanwhile to demonstrate on the right bank of the Danube. My task as commander-in-chief was consequently limited, during the first development of these offensive operations, to merely keeping an eye upon their unity. I intrusted the fulfillment of this task to the chief of the gen- eral staff This convenient measure led to the establishment of a mobile central office of operations for all Hungary, and to an attempt at realizing my twofold intention — of bringing unity into the opera- tions of all the national armies, and of putting an end to Kos- suth's injurious influence on the progress of those operations. 358 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. This plan also enabled me to devote my personal exertions, during some days, exclusively to the management of the affairs of the war-ministry, without having to fear that any thing would thereby be neglected in the sphere of the operations of the main army ; for, on the one hand, the supposition was highly probable, that the Austrians — disconcerted by the defeats they had suffered during the April campaign — scarcely thought of daring an offen- sive step against us before the invasion of the Russians en gros ; on the other hand, in order to be able to commence the attack on the hostile position on the Waag with energy, the enemy's advanced troops had previously to be driven back from the left to the right bank of the Waag, and then the preparations, always lengthy, rendered necessary by our great want of the equipments for bridges, were to be made, which should render the intended crossing of the Waag in the face of the enemy possible by us. Both tasks, in my opinion, could scarcely be accomplished before the time when I intended to return from Debreczin. In case, however, during my absence of several days from the army, any unforeseen circumstances should occur on the theatre of war, the chief of the general staff was empowered to issue, according to his own judgment, to the separate army corps such especial dis- positions as in consequence of these circumstances were necessary to be instantly taken ; all commanders of corps, divisions, and columns of the main army having been ordered to regard equally as my own the official signature of the chief of the general staff, who at the same time was chief of the mobile central office of operations. CHAPTER LVI. I HAD not been deceived in mj* expectation, that I should find an opportunity in Debreczin of expressing before several members of the peace-party my views on the consequences of the declara- tion of independence, as well as on the measures which should be taken without delay by all of us who did not agree to the separation of Hungary from Austria, whether on principle, oi MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 359 merely on account of its results — in order to restore the constitu- tion of 1848. Scarcely had I arrived in Debreczin, when I received from one of the two representatives who in Ofen, a few days before, had warned me against accepting the portfolio of war, a pressing in- vitation to a confidential meeting with several who shared his political opinions. This meeting accordingly took place on the very first evening after my arrival in Debreczin. I was introduced by the representative alluded to into an as- sembly of from fifteen to twenty persons, who for the most part were unknown to me. Among those present with whom I had previously come in contact was Field-marshal Lieutenant Mes- zaros. The majority of those present wished me to inform them, in the first place, what foundation there was for the intelligence, first brought to Debreczin by General Klapka, of the prevalent antipathy in the ranks of the main army to the declaration of independence. Now this intelligence, when originally brought to Debreczin by General Klapka (in the beginning of May), was in so far really untenable as that the discontent with the declaration of indepen- dence had not then been predominantly observable in the tvhole of the main army, but only in a smaller part of it — the seventh army corps. But since then — especially during the unwelcome leisure at the siege of Ofen — the ofiScers who had previously been in the Austrian service, and who were naturally enemies to the declara- tion of independence, had been so successful in their propagand- ism against it in the other army corps also, that now, in the be- ginning of June, I could, without the slightest departure from truth, most decidedly corroborate Klapka' s accounts — at all events anticipated in the beginning of May — of the prevalence in the ranks of the main army of sentiments opposed to the declaration of independence. With equal decision I declared Kossuth's assertion, that the stroke of policy of the 14th of April had been desired by the army, to be untrue. I ventured to declare this, not merely from the fact, that Kos- suth, when he at first made known in Godollo his longing for a 360 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. political demonstration against the Olmiitz octroyed constitution, was earnestly advised by me not to indulge this desire ; I asserted it on the well-grounded supposition that Kossuth had received no answer to his inquiries touching the seasonableness of making such a demonstration from any of the commanders of army corps then present in Godollo, which could have authorized him to conclude that the army wished, nay, positively demanded, the separation of Hungary from Austria. Not from Damjanics ; because an expression which he made use of in my presence on the 20th April (the day after the battle of Nagy-Sarlo) — " he should really like to know how far the in- dependent Debrecziners would have run, had the Austrians, instead of us, been victorious the day before !" — showed no par- ticularly friendly feeling for the 14th of April. Not from Klapka ; because he actually — as was again con- firmed to me just now — had in set terms reproached some rep- resentatives on account of the 14th of April, even supporting his reproaches by vivid descriptions of the antipathy prevailing in the army to the declaration of independence. Finally, not from Aulich, or the then commander of the sev- enth army corps ; because probably Kossuth had thought it super- fluous to hear repeated twice over nearly the same answer as I had given him. For these two were under me while I was com- mander of the former corps d'armee "of the upper Danube," and in Kaschau took part in the known demonstration in my favor against Dembinski's being commander-in-chief. Now these an- tecedents could hardly have been unknown to Kossuth, and had most probably decided him not to ask the opinion of the two last- named commanders of army corps about the opportuneness of his longed-for demonstration, which was alike hostile to our constitu- tion of 1 848 and to that of the Olmiitz octroyed. It may still be objected, that Kossuth may have derived his conviction of the sympathy felt for his personal policy in the Hungarian army, concentrated in Godollo after the battle at Isaszeg, not from its leaders, but from the ranks of the different corps. Indeed, it seems very likely that Kossuth, with sufficient lei- sure, might have succeeded in persuading the troops in Godollo to noisy manifestations of lively sympathy for something similar to the 14th of April; just as he had once been successful, in the K^ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 361 camp at Parendorf, in agitating Moga's army, which was totally disinclined to carry offensive operations across the Lajtha, within a few days to diametrically opposite sentiments. The wish, re- peatedly expressed by Kossuth, especially in Godollo, to pay familiar visits to the various army corps in their quarters, also clearly betrayed that he was preparing a second edition of the camp-speeches which were so successful in Parendorf But perhaps the anticipation of finding in Grodollo, instead of the national guards and volunteers of the Parendorf camp, an audience that had already smelt powder, and the modest doubt of the success of his oratorical efforts before an audience of that kind, or — what is much more probable — the fear of my contre- coup had frightened him from his intention ; suffice it to say, the confidential visits to the camp did not take place, and Kossuth restricted himself in Godollo solely to witnessing the third army corps defile before him on its march against Waizen (on the 8th or 9th of April). There was, it is true, on this occasion an animated shout of "Long live Kossuth, the saviour of his country I" which re- peatedly greeted him from the ranks of the troops as they passed. Yet rightly considered, this very shout ought, as its consequence, to have made him feel disgust at any further thought of the coup d'etat of the 14th of April, doubtless at that time already planned, and should have determined him to sacrifice his personal policy for the salvation of the fatherland. But scarcely any of these details were mentioned at my meet- ing with the members of the peace-party. The assembly showed that it had confidence in me ; it seemed to place implicit faith in my simple assurance that the Diet had been mystified by Kossuth : it asked no proof of it. I now advised the immediate abolition of the law of the 14th of April, in order to save Hungary from the Russian invasion, and consequently from certain destruction ; but received for answer the comfortless news, that the Diet had already adjourned, and would not meet again in Pesth till the beginning of July. Some of those present accompanied this information — perhaps unintentionally — by casual remarks, from which I thought I must infer that it would not be unwelcome to the peace-party, if in the meantime, the abolition of this law were to proceed from the array. At a time when every conjuncture seemed to guarantee to its a 362 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. realization eminently successful results, I had formed in my own niind tlie idea of the abolition, by means of a military coup d'etat, of the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April, This was. as is known, immediately after the complete relief of Komorn, and before the setting out of the main body of our principal army against Ofen, when the Austrian army was in full retreat ; and the probability was undeniable, after a speedy reduction of the garrison of Ofen, of prosecuting the victory of the tri- color banner over the black-and-yellow flag as far as the Lajtha. To the fortunate issue of the April campaign, as commander-in- chief of the main army, I was at that time indebted for an authority, the weight of which would have sufficed to counter- balance any political views opposed to mine prevailing in the country. After an equally fortunate May campaign, as far as the western boundaries of Hungary, I might have reckoned with per- fect certainty on dispersing the whole of the party of the 14th of April by the simple proclamation : " The declaration of inde- pendence is invahd ! The constitution of 1848 forever I" — if the army stood by me, I leave it to the judgment of each individual to decide whether the main army would have stood by me or not. Suffice it for me to affirm that, under the just-mentioned favor- able conjunctures, I was firmly resolved, at my own risk, to dare the finishing stroke at the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April. But the victorious advance of our main army as far as the Lajtha appeared to me the indispensable condition. For the main army, in my opinion, needed this new confirma- tion of the renown of its arms, that its nimbus might secure to the said proclamation such a reception in the country as was necessary to frustrate every armed faction favorable to the dec- laration of independence. The loss of time consequent upon the regular siege of Ofeii, which had unexpectedly become necessary ; the credible rumors of a considerable reinforcement of the Austrian main army hav- ing meanwhile taken place, and the threatening proximity of the Russians ; Aulich's unavoidable retirement from the theatre of war ; and Klapka's declared partiality for the defensive ; — all this made the accomplishment of that "indispensable condition" extremely doubtful ; while, at the same time, the discovery of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 363 the peace-party, as well as the disclosure of the manner in which the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April originated, allowed me to hope that it might perhaps be set aside even in a regular par- liamentary manner. In consequence of this I relinquished the idea of the military coup d'etat as absurd. In concert with the peace-party, however, the taking up again of this idea seemed to me any thing but absurd ; — after that, through the unexpected adjournment of the Diet, the possibility of getting at the declaration of independence in a parliamentary way appeared to be postponed to a time long before which the Russians could already be in the country. But as conjunctures had become meanwhile far more unfavor- able, I wished that the peace-party might first calmly look in the face all the dangerous consequences to be anticipated from the realization of such an idea, before it declared itself in favor of it. The remarks above referred to as cursorily dropped by some members of the peace-party during our conference, from which, as has been said, I thought I might infer the sympathies of the peace-party for the abolition of the new law of the Diet by means of a military counter-revolution, consequently induced me ujidis- guisedly to discuss this step, together with its immediate proba- ble results. But scarcely had I begun to do so, when the assembly inter- rupted me with vigorous shouts of, " No military revolution I ]^o government of the sabre !" This was the 7iegative result of my meeting with the men of the peace-party. I had expected a positive one, but in vain. I entered the assembly full of joyous hopes. I left it unde- ceived. I had confidently reckoned on finding the peace-party, though it had been obliged to yield by a bold stratagem of Kossuth's, still ready for action, and determined on a desperate counter-stroke. I found it entirely beaten out of the field, for the moment unfit for the contest, and apparently, even with reference to the later renewal of the struggle, without a firm resolve, without a definite plan. To me at least it had communicated neither. Possibly it may have omitted this only through excessive caution. This reserve, however, constrained me to suppose that the peace-party felt itself altogether too weak to resist successfully, either i7i par- 364 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. liament or out of it, its political opponents — the men of the 14th of April. And so I could no longer remain in uncertainty as to the direction I had to give to my premeditated hostile activity against the continued existence of the new law of the Diet. hi parliament the peace-party had to be strengthened by the addition of new forces. To this end, the officers serving in the main army who had parliamentary qualifications, and on whose political sentiments I could rely, were urged to solicit most zeal- ously their election as representatives for any places accidentally vacant. Out of parliament I had to endeavor to deprive the party of the 14th of April of its most influential supporters. These were the leaders of the national forces isolated from the main army : Bem, Moritz Perczel, Dembinski, and besides, Count Guyon, commander of the fortress of Komorn. These had to be removed from their posts, and the vacant commands intrusted to men from whom at the decisive moment I had no reason to fear opposition in support of the declaration of independence. I 'Could accomplish this, however, only as acting minister-of- war. The conviction of this fully determined me to overcome the moral aversion I felt to taking the oath to a law, the over- throw of which, even in the most favorable case, seemed indis- pensable to the salvation of the great cause of Hungary. CHAPTER LYIL The political relationship between Kossuth's views relative to the conditions on which the stability of the liberty of Hungary depended (see Chapter XXXIV.) and the coup d' etat oi the 14th of April was not to be mistaken. These views Kossuth had communicated to me in the begin- ning of March, 1849 ; at a time when the octroyed constitution of Olmiitz could not yet be known of by us. In the face of this fact, the assumption that the coitp cVetat of MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 365 Olmiitz had been needed in order to call into existence that of Debreczin seemed untenable. Kossuth might go on calling the latter a constrai7ied demon- stration against the former ; I nevertheless remained convinced, that in Kossuth the embryo of the declaration of independence was already in a far-advanced state of development — only inter- rupted by Dembinski's unlucky debut as commander-in-chief — when the octroyed constitution of Olmiitz came into the world. I remained convinced of this, because those expressions of Kos- suth in Tiszafiired (in the beginning of March, directly after Dembinski's removal) as to the necessity of making Poland free, that Hungary might remain and that Europe might become so, had been too surprising to me at the time for them to have slipped from my memory. It is known that these expressions had been called forth by my endeavor seriously to warn Kossuth against any departure from the legal basis of our combat in self-defense. As distinctive marks of Kossuth's political tendencies, they were even then sufficient to force me into the most decided oppo- sition to him ; but they seemed to sink down almost to the sig- nificance of an inoperative private opinion, when Kossuth directly after assured me that he held it to be the most sacred duty of all who meant honorably by the country to venture on no step, the consequences of which might increase the power of the com- mon enemy of us all. On this protestation I suppressed all apprehension that Kossuth could allow himself to be seduced by his private political views into any step hostile to the existing constitution. This protestation of Kossuth's, however, was not sincerely meant ; it belonged only to the category of those well-known means by which he knew how to prevent any reciprocal ap- proach between the army and the peace-party, and subsequently tp execute his coujj d'etat — means, the frequent employment of which especially characterized Kossuth's tactics with regard to his political adversaries. The couj) d'etat of the 14th of April showed me, unfortunately too late, that where I had hitherto confided, there the most decided distrust would have been fitter. At the same time I perceived that the result of this coup d'etat was so palpably injurious to the just cause of Hungary, that I 366 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. could not but accuse the man who had introduced it, either of over-haste or of an inordinate striving after the attainment of predominating personal objects. The accusation of over-haste appeared to me to be deprived of its force by the circumstance already mentioned, namely, that Kossuth, six weeks before the 14th of April, was already work- ing at the political fundamental idea of this coup d'etat ; with- out taking into account the conference which he had with me in Godollo (a week before the 14th of April) about its opportune- ness, or the motives which induced me decidedly to dissuade him on that occasion from any such step. The other accusation, on the contrary, has first to be weak- ened. Until now, as far as I know, this has not yet been done. Hereby, I should think, is sufficiently explained the essential difierence in the personal relation between Kossuth and myself after and before the 14th of April. Before that day I submitted my will with full confidence to Kossuth's influence. The tactics of which Kossuth had hitherto made use against the peace-party and myself forced me to adopt the same tactics against him. My entering the ministry was the first employment of these tactics. That Kossuth did not trust me — in this I could not possibly be deceived. It is a philosophical necessity to mistrust him whose confidence w^e have abused. He mistook, however, the real motives of the counter-stroke which he feared from me. His supposition, that I opposed his policy only from personal rivalry, was my most powerful defensive and ofiensive ally against him. He doubtless supposed, that only my personal vanity (the author of the proclamation of Waizen) had been wounded by his cmip cVetat. He believed at the same time that by appointing me war- minister, he had hit upon the real soothing balm for the sensitive wound ; and when I had actually accepted the portfolio of war, he falsely imagined that the wound was already in a fair way of being radically healed — that my opposition to the declaration of independence was completely removed. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 367 How Kossuth reconciled with this illusion jny refusal to accept the distinctions intended for me in consequence of the taking of Ofen, remains, however, inexplicable. But that he nevertheless did labor under such an illusion can not be denied, for the simple reason that he suffered the union of the powers of war-minister and of the chief command of the main army in my person — a union in the highest degree dangerous to his policy — till the moment when 1 myself perceived the necessity of delivering him from the bonds of that illusion. CHAPTER LVIII. Immediately after the relief of Komorn, I had proposed to Kossuth to remove the seat of government into that fortress. He answered, that the government could not expose itself to the risk of being blockaded by the enemy ; it must always secure the possibility of exerting a direct influence on the parts of the coun- try not yet occupied by the enemy's arms. On my arrival in Debreczin, after the taking of Ofen, I now learned that the seat of government was about to be transferred to Pesth. I endeavored in vain to show Kossuth that circum- stances were all against it ; that the government, now that the demolition of the fortifications of Ofen was commenced, would be exposed to danger from the enemy in the capitals not less than in Debreczin. The removal of the government to Pesth — Kossuth maintained on the contrary — was indispensable, principally because the cap- itals figure in the national traditions as the seat of the real rulers of Hungary. The inhabitants between Pesth and Debreczin had very strikingly shown to the government when fleeing last win- ter behind the Theiss, that with the traditional residence it had given up its right to their homage. The triumphal procession from Debreczin back to the capitals was intended to renew in the people this homage, which it had at that time refused to the government. The Hungarian was fond of pomp, and believed there was power only where he met with ]i07n]i. He (Kossuth), 368 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. in the consciousness of the victory they had gained, would every where harangue the people, and animate it to further glorious combats for its independence from Austria. Moreover — he re- marked in conclusion — all the ministries had already packed up, and the most of them were by this time on their way thither. The Diet was adjourned, and summoned to Pesth for the begin- ning of July. A sudden change of these measures would make the triumphant conquerors suspected in the eyes of the people as fugitives again, would depress the public feeling, nay would soon spread terror and confusion throughout the country. He could not take upon himself the responsibility of the consequences of all this. The ministries — that of war likewise — were in fact already occupied with their transferrence to the capitals when I arrived at Debreczin ; and this circumstance alone convinced me of the uselessness of offering any further opposition to Kossuth's ardent longing for the solemn entrance into Pesth. At the same time I was forced to suppose it was solely out of eager desire for the satisfaction of this longing, that Kossuth had been so strongly bent upon the taking of Ofen, as even to side with me against Guyon, in order to render the regular siege of that place possible. My intention of removing Generals Bem, Perczel, and Dem- binski from the army, seemed to be practicable — without rous- ing Kossuth's suspicions against me — only with his personal as- sent and co-operation. In order to secure this, he had to be con- vinced of the indispensable necessity for bringing these command- ers of troops again under the authority of the ministry of war. He seemed to enter into my views ; but strove in many ways against their consequences. Whether merely out of mistrust of me, or from dread of those persons, could not be known with cer- tainty. Probably both reasons lay at the bottom of the difficul- ties which Kossuth raised against the energetic coercion of these generals, especially of Bem. It is true he himself complained of the latter's dissipation of money, of his disturbing encroachments on the administration of the country, the arbitrary reduction in the price of salt in the country of the Szekler, the forcible transferrence of families of Hungarian peasants into Wallachian places (after their original inhabitants had been driven out) — measures such as were not even permitted to him (Kossuth) without the previous consent of I MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 369 the Diet, and which betrayed clearly enough Bern's inclination to play the sovereign in Transylvania. In spite of this — Kossuth thought — he vi^as obliged seriously to dissuade from any energetic steps against Bern, because he had threatened to resign the chief command of the army in Transylvania the moment any of his measures were disavowed ; but that to him Bem's remaining at his post seemed to be indispensable to the maintenance of Tran- sylvania. I saw that, with these views of Kossuth's about Bern, I ran the risk of falling into open conflict with him, if I insisted on the ap- plication of stringent measures against Bem. The necessity for giving way to Kossuth in this case, in order the more certainly to gain him for the steps I intended to take against Perczel and Dembinski, appeared tome indispensable. I accordingly promised Kossuth to leave to him alone the regulation of all those admin- istrative affairs in which contests were to be feared between the war-ministry and Bem, and contented myself for the present with frustrating his intention of transferring to Field-marshal Lieut. Bem, besides the chief command over the army in Transylvania, also that over the troops of Generals Count Vecsey and Perczel, which were separately operating in the Banat and the Bacska. The possibility of so frustrating this intention of Kossuth's, as that he not only did not guess the real tendency of the measure, but moreover must have felt himself obliged to me, was presented by the following circumstances. Field-marshal Lieut. Vetter, stiJl the really appointed com- mander-in-chief of the main army, had, as is known, fallen seri- ously ill just before the commencement of the April campaign ; but in the course of the campaign — during the first half of the month of April — he felt his health already sufficiently re-estab- lished to enable him to resume the command of the main army. He also prepared without delay for so doing, and informed Kos- suth of it ; who had, however, in the mean time entertained the apprehension, that a sudden change in the chief command of the army might disturb the successful progress of the campaign, and used various means to hinder Vetter's departure for the main army, until the siege of Ofen. During it Vetter at last, it is true, arrived in the sphere of the main army ; he did not, however, avail himself of his rights as its commander-in-chief, but staid, as I heard, by turns in Pesth and in Godollo. Not till after the 370 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. fall of Ofen did a reciprocal explanation — an oral one — take place between him and me. He declared, that now that the main army had become accustomed to consider me as its com- mander-in-chief, he no longer thought of pressing his claims to this post, but said that he demanded from me, the future minister of war, a compensation for the injury which had been done to his public honor by Kossuth's intriguing against his re-entering on the active duties of commander-in-chief — that is, bis appoint- ment to a post corresponding to the rank with which he had been invested. This request of Tetter's seemed to me not only very reasonable, it was besides most agreeable to me, in order that I might profit by the embarrassment into which Kossuth had brought himself with respect to Vetter, and give him the means of reconciling him — justly exasperated at having been, to say the least, unde- servedly slighted — by nominating him commander-in-chief of the army in the Bacska and the Banat. Kossuth signed the decree for Tetter's nomination most will- ingly. He seemed in fact to have no presentiment of the real extent of my proposal ; it appeared rather as if he felt himself greatly obliged to me for the excellent opportunity I had afforded him of repairing the wrong he had done to Vetter. Simultaneously with this affair I pursued the strict submission of Generals Perczel and Dembinski to my orders as war-minister. The strong aversion of both of them to recognize a superior military authority, added to the any thing but friendly personal relations in which both stood to me, led me confidently to antici- pate that the consequential execution of these measures would of itself be sufficient soon to render insupportable to them the fur- ther remaining at their posts. Nevertheless both showed more tenacity than I had expected. Both must be removed. Kossuth seemed fortunately to be much less convinced that they were in- dispensable in the field than he was in the case of Field-marshal Lieut. Bem. In the removal of Guyou from the command of the fortress of Komorn I had far less difficulty. For it so happened that Klapka in person asked this post' for himself in conjunction with the chief command over three army corps, and seemed also to be quite equal to it ; while Guyon's well-nigh proverbial small stock of military knowledge stood in a tragi-comical disproportion UHIv MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HTTNGAR^K^ C, , ,-,371 to the duties devolving on the commander of a fortress. Accord- ingly, almost as a matter of course, the command of the fortress of Komorn was taken from Count Guyon, and intrusted to Gen- eral Klapka; while Guyon was appointed commander of the corps of reserve which was just about being raised. Kossuth had nothing to object to this change in the command of the fortress of Komorn ; the more warmly, on the other hand, did he declaim against Guyon's being placed with the reserve. It was unjustifiable — he said — to employ the brave lion-hearted general in the reserve, when his place should be in the foremost line of the army ; unjustifiable certainly to derive no advantage from powers like Guyon's just at the moment when the danger of the country appeared to be increasing threefold. Nevertheless Guyon — the zealous repeater of Kossuth's polit- ical confession of faith of the 14th of April — remained with the reserve. Even had his political opinion been the reverse of what it was, he would not have escaped the reserve ; for it seemed to me dangerous to intrust an ifidependent command, in the face of the enemy to a general who, as experience showed, had his heart indeed in the right place, but not his head. While I was endeavoring, in the manner above described, to purge the army from those partisans of the 14th of April who were at that time known to me, and were, as I believed, not to be too lightly regarded, I was surprised by the news of an event which deeply moved the army, nay the whole nation. The Austrian Master of the Ordnance, Baron Haynau, the successor of Baron Welden in the chief command of the hostile army, announced to us the beginning of his activity in his new sphere by some executions. Two Hungarian officers, Ladislaus Baron Mednyanszky and Philip Gruber, prisoners, also fell a sac- rifice to it. CHAPTEE LIX. Ladislaus Baron Mednyanszky and Philip Gruber had be- longed to the garrison of the fort of Leopoldstadt, on the A¥aag. The fort, after a short bombardment, was surrendered in the 372 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGAHY. beginning of February, 1849, to the besieging Field-marshal Lieutenant Simuriich. Mednyanszky and Gruber — as I after- ward learned — are said to have been the only men who declared themselves against this act. For this reason, after being made prisoners, their lot was a much harder one than that of their comrades. A court-martial sentenced both to death. This happened while Prince Windischgratz held the chief com- mand in Hungary. But neither he nor his immediate successor, Baron Welden, had this sentence carried into effect. Only Baron Haynau did this. Mednyanszky and Gruber were hanged at Presburg in the fifth month of their captivity ; after the rumors about their sentence being commuted to several years' imprisonment in a fortress had gained credit, and were rendered probable on many accounts, but chiefly by the unusual delay in the execution of the sentence. These executions appeared to be not sufficiently justified by that act alone which was imputed to the condemned as a crime, after pardon had previously been granted to so many Hungarian officers taken with arms in their hands, who had formerly been in the Austrian service. They were intelligible at all, only if we either assume that Baron Haynau has inherently a peculiar predilection for such proceedings, and that these executions con- sequently stand in immediate connection with himself, and would not have taken place under another commander-in-chief; or if we admit that they must be considered as repressive measures on the part of the Austrian government against the decision of the Hungarian Diet of the 14th of April. In the latter case, it had evidently the appearance as if Mednyanszky and Gruber, though made prisoners by the Austrians in the beginning of February, had nevertheless been executed as accomplices of those men who full ten weeks later put the royal imperial dynasty of Habsburg- Lorraine under the Hungarian imperial ban. The exasperation against Austria reached, in consequence of these executions, the culminating point. I had — as is known — ^before the 14th of April, in a letter to Prince Windischgratz, threatened that for every captive Hungarian officer put to death three Austrian officers should be sacrificed. Kossuth in the name of the nation, and Klapka in the name pf the array, fipw dem9