NAVAL WARFARE. C7 NAVAL WARFARE ITS RULING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE HISTORICALLY TREATED BY REAR-ADMIRAL P. H. COLOMB, GOLD MEDALIST KOYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, AND LECTURER ON NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE AT GREENWICH. LONDON: W. II. ALLEN AND CO., Ltd., 13 WATERLOO PLACE. AND AT CALCUTTA. 1891. LONDON : rUINTKD BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED, 13 WATERLOO PLACE. S.W. PREFACE. In writing this book I have kept in mind the double object of showing that there are laws governing the conduct of naval war which cannot be transgressed with impunity ; and that there is no reason to believe them abrogated by any of the changes of recent years. I was induced to undertake it from observing, with some sur- prise, a wide-spread conception that either there never had been any laws governing naval war, or that if there had been such in the days of sailing ships, they had been entirely swept away and destroyed by the advent of steam, steel ships, armour, breech- loading rifled guns, and torpedoes. This belief appeared to me the more singular, as no one ventured to suggest that railways, the electric telegraph, breech-loading rifled ordnance, and small arms, had altered the well-established rules of war upon the land. But in considering the existence of such antithetical ideas side by side, it appeared to me that the cause might not improbably be found in the differences of method pursued by writers of naval and of military history. There did not exist, I believed, in any lan- guage a book written with the object of discriminating between the possible and impossible, the prudent and the imprudent, the wise and the foolish, in the conduct of naval war. But books describing war upon land with these objects in view were abundant in all languages, and I had been much struck with a more recent and powerful contribution to such literature — Sir Edward Hamley's Operations of War, Yet even the title chosen for this work seemed vi PREFACE. to confirm my view, in apparently inferring the opinion that war upon the land was, if not the only war of consequence to the world, at least tTie only war which would bear systematic analysis and treatment. I had long been aware that ordinary naval histories, especially works in English near our own time, were, as histories, quite the most unsatisfactory productions existing. They all ran in two grooves ; the one contenting itself in a mere chronological narra- tive of events having ho other connections but those of time and place ; the other being written for the glorification or condemna- tion of individuals whose characters were judged from isolated and disconnected acts. Perhaps no stronger illustration of my mean- ing can be drawn than by mentioning that while James is the recognized historian of the French Eevolutionary and Napoleonic Naval Wars, he did not think it necessary to furnish his volumes with more than a personal index. Historians then had generally neglected to give any attention to the causes of success or failure in naval war ; they did not connect the facts or events which were necessary for that purpose. Naval commanders, on the other hand, seem to have been so entirely convinced of the force of causes beyond their control, and so satis- fied of their obviousness, that they seldom alluded to them. Of writers on naval strategy there were absolutely none ; writers on naval tactics were few and far between ; they generally wrote as if the study of the tactics of manoeuvring embraced the whole sub- ject ; and the elaborate simplicity of Clerk of Eldin got an exten- sive hearing, because he stood almost alone as a writer in applying to the naval battle, considerations which no writer could omit in treating of the battle on land. I held this condition of the literature of naval war to be mainly responsible for the want of its study, which was common ; and thus for the existing belief that nothing was to be got from it either in lessons for the present, or guidance for the future. It was the conviction that no state of mind could well be more dangerous for this Empire, that led me think I might usefully employ my very moderate powers in writing a study of. some of PREFACE. vii the larger phases of naval war, from the strategical and tactical point of view. The book I hope may be a pioneer. It is no more than the study for what in abler hands might become a great picture. I have not pretended to re-write the histories I have used. My original research has been but small— indeed, the scope of the work did not admit of it. But I have trusted to create an interest by not only giving the narratives as I find them, but by endeavouring always to extract the reasons for each event, and to bring out the causes which here conduced to success, and there determined failure. I have a firm belief that the great laws of naval war which I have endeavoured to trace throughout the centuries in which England has been building up her power, would be absolutely dominant in any naval war which now arose ; and that they may be depended on for forecasting its course and preparing for it. Not that I assume to have, in all cases, arrived at just conclusions, but rather that there are in the history and experience of the past ample materials for forming them and acting on them. It will be observed that here and there in the book I have given evidence of an intention to extend my inquiry into what might be called the secondary operations of naval war. I have in this volume treated of " The Nature of Naval War" ; "The Struggle for the Command of Sea " as a preliminary object, whether pursued as an end in itself, or in view of some further operations; "The Differentiation of Naval Force," or the laws which divide ships into classes and govern their dimensions ; and the laws which govern the success or failure of " Attacks on Territory from the Sea." These are the main divisions into which experience has led naval war. But within these greater divisions are the smaller ones which embrace the practice of blockade ; the attack and defence of commerce ; and the whole field of tactics in the open sea. I had intended that this volume should contain brief notices of these things. But I found it was necessary to extend the chapters on territorial attack to a much greater length than I had originally prepared for, in order to combat the strongest prepossessions of the public mind to-day. And then I found it viii PREFACE. impossible to present an intelligible picture of the three lesser divisions in any space which would not unduly swell the present volume. Whether I deal with these portions of the subject hereafter, will very much depend upon the success of my first effort. I have scarcely ever in these pages applied the laws I treat of to the conditions of to-day. I consider that to be a separate subject ; and that it is enough, in the first instance, to show that application is possible. While this work was in process of appearing in the pages of the Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine, I was delighted to see by the publication of Captain Mahan's Influence of Sea Power, that on the other side of the Atlantic an abler pen, and a deeper thinker, had been at work on thoughts something like my own. In a sense, the two books form the complements of each other ; for while the American author dwells chiefly upon the influences which have followed the exertion of sea-power, I have devoted myself more to showing what sea-power is, and how it acts. An author is probably more conscious than any reader can be of his demerits, his lapses, and his errors. In offering my book to the public, I can only trust that it will remember that the use of an entirely new tool is not mastered in the first effort ; and that in my treatment of naval history I had no model to go by. CONTENTS. CHAPTEE I. The Nature of Naval War ..-._. 1 CHAPTEE II. The Struggle for the Command of the Sea - - - 25 CHAPTEE III. The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — continued - 44 CHAPTEE IV. The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — concluded - 65 CHAPTEE V. The Differentlvtion of Naval Force .... 80 CHAPTEE VI. Attempts to gain Command of the Sea with Definite Ulterior Purpose 107 CHAPTEE VII. Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — continued - - 129 CHAPTEE VIII. Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — contimied - - 149 X CONTENTS. CHAPTEE IX. PAGE Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — concluded - - 173 CHAPTEE X. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from THE Sea succeed or fail . . . . . 208 CHAPTEE XI. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 227 CHAPTEE XII. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 252 CHAPTEE XIII. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 279 CHAPTEE XIV. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 304 CHAPTEE XV. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 827 CHAPTEE XVI. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 849 CHAPTEE XVII. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 376 CHAPTEE XVIII. Attacks on Territory from the Sea — concluded - - 899 LIST OF MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Outline Chart of the British Seas Hull of the "Speaker" Ship of Henry VIII... Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1665, 1672 ... Naval Action between Dutch, English and French, 1673... The " Koyal Prince" Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1665, 1672 ... Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1665, 1672 .. Ships in Commission from 1793 to 1818 Line-of-Battle Ships in Commission from 1798 to 1818... Cruisers in Commission from 1793 to 1813 Theatre of Operations, 1690-92 Ships of the Line in Action, close of 17th Century Theatre of the French Plans of Invasion, 1695, 1744, 1759 The Movements of the Opposing Fleets in 1779 Theatre of the Operations, from 1797 to 1801 .. Position of Naval Forces after Outbreak of the War, 1803 Chart of the West India Islands European Theatre of the Operations. 1805 Road and Harbour of Chagre, 1779 ... Fortifications of Grenada, 1779 Chart of the West India Islands Outline Coast of St. Christopher's Guadeloupe, with Adjacent Islands Cai-te de Tlsle de la Martinique The Island of (ioree The Coast about Brest lo face page 2 page 9 To face page 9 )) )) 84 r 37 54 )) )) 56 >) „ 67 page 101 108 105 To face page 122 I) 11 128 11 146 152 168 174 188 196 )) " 223 224 page 248 To face 'page 5) 250 254 page • 1 2^2 264 269 Xll MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Sketch Chart of Cadiz Harbour Sketch Chart of Vigo Bay Chart of Mediterranean Coasts Cette in 1842 Chart of Gulf of St. Lawrence Sketch Plan of Porto Bello in 1817 ... Sketch Plan of La Guaira in 1888 Sketch Plan of the Harbour of Cartagena Sketch Plan of Puerto CabeUo in 1794 Sketch Plan of Louisburg, 1857-58 ... Sketch Map of Minorca in 1812 Sketch Plan of Gibraltar in 1812 Part of the Island of Ste. Lucie Plan de la Rade du Fort Royal Plan of the French Attacks upon the Island of Bombardment of Bomarsund ... Plan of Algiers, 1816 Plan of Acre Bombardment of Sveaborg Map of Charleston Harbour, South Carolina .. To face page 283 „ ,, 287 !) )) 312 55 )1 318 n ;; 322 ,, „ 332 „ ,, 351 ... page 335 To face page 352 )) 5) 354 ... jMge 364 To face page 368 " ') )» 386 ») )) 387 Grenada ,, ., 391 )) )j 404 I, ,) 407 ... „ ,, 410 )? j: 412 ••• )) >) 417 EI«blZ EER ATA Page 40, last line: for " English," read " Dutch." ,, 41, first two lines: /or "Dutch," read "English"; and /or "English," rend "Dutch." ,. 59, line 2: for " 700," read " 70." ,, G7, line 20 : for "Sussex," read «' Suffolk." .. 82, note: for " vol. ii., p. 968," read " p. 6." ,, 115, line 28: for "matters," read "masters." ,, 122, line 3: /or "Tynemouth," read " Teignmouth." ,, 187, note : for " Port Royal," read " Fort Royal." NAVAL WAEFAEE CHAPTER I. The Nature of Naval War. True naval war cannot be carried on until commerce bears a large proportion to the riches of a country, and till ships are able to keep the sea. — It could not, consequently, have existed before the time of Elizabeth. — But it was only as the Spanish war grew that the true principles were perceived, and a want of perception on the part of Spain was one of the causes of her failure. — At and after the close of the war, the true principles were, to a great extent, understood by Sir William Monson and Sir Walter Raleigh, as may not only be drawn from the language they used, but from the practice they recommended, and, in some cases, put in force. — The primaiy aim of naval ■war is the command of the sea. — Any other aim is an acceptance of the position of the inferior naval power, and the abnegation of all hopes of ultimate success. Unlike its military congener, of which the principles descend from times immemorial, naval warfare is of comparative modern origin. Sea fights there were, no doubt, in very ancient times, but sea fights do not of themselves constitute naval warfare. With possible exceptions here and there, in early Grecian or perhaps Roman days, the ancient sea-fights were the result of military expeditions by sea and not of naval considerations. The operations of military warfare have at all times been conducted with a view to territorial conquest ; the field of battle was struggled for by the combatants as a possession to be either temporarily held as a basis for further operations, or as part of the territory which was to be permanently occupied. The sea-fight of ancient times was but the contention of armies on the water, not to hold the field of battle and surrounding waters, but simply as the encounter of one army with another which was barring its way to the conquest of territory. Permanent occupation of the water, as of the land, was a thing undreamt of, because impossible 1 2 NAVAL WARFARE. to the trireme of the ancients, or to the galley of the Middle Ages. Nothing that was then built was what we now call a sea-going or a sea-keeping shij), and there was, in fact, nothing to call for such structures. It was not till the frequented water areas became greatly extended, and till the oar ceased to be a propulsive power in the ordinary ship, that it was possible to build her so that she should remain in permanent occupation of the sea. And yet, if we look back to what may be called the early days of naval warfare under sail, we shall observe that there was little or no contention for occupation of, or command over, the sea, such as was exercised and claimed over territory on laud. Neither riches, nor renown, nor any other advantages could be gathered directly from the sea. Commerce was absolutely small, but relatively to the power of nations possessing sea coasts, even smaller. The advantage of the sea was its convenience as a medium of transport, and it seemed one common to two neighbouring nations at war. Coasts were open, and the small attacks capable of being organized were sudden, and could not well, be prepared against. The great value of the sea was the easy means it presented for getting at the enemy's territory and ravaging it. England had for a long course of years put in a claim for what she called " the sovereignty of the seas " surrounding her. But this was chiefly a civil claim, not a military one. It was as nearly as possible a claim to extend what are now our admitted rights in our territorial waters — a belt three miles wide from the shore — over very large water areas indeed.* The whole claim being solemnly denied by the Dutch, and the denial formulated by the learned writer Grotius, Charles I. employed Selden to write a counterblast, reasserting the claim, and for the first time fitted out a fleet to enforce it. But the claim had to do with rights of fishery, rights of traffic, anchorages, and so on. It was apart from any ideas of water command for military purposes, even so late as Charles' days. At an earlier time the sea was regarded as a common highway for military expeditions, there being but little attempt to secure it for the use of one side only. Out of this view of the sea grew what I have ventured to christen * The British seas, or the Four Seas, as they were indifferently termed, over which this sovereignty was claimed, began at the point where the 63rd parallel touches the coast of Norway. Then the boundary ran down all the coasts to Cape Finisterre ; in that latitude to the meridian of 23° W. Then along this meridian, to the 63rd parallel and to Norway again. See Burchett's Naval History, p. 34. ^ ^^ OUTLINE CHART of the BRITISH SEAS To Face Pa^e P THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 3 *' cross-ravaging," a system of retaliatory expeditions attacking territory, destroying towns, burning property, and laying waste with fire and sword. This is a system to which we are early introduced, but which is not confined to very early dates. It is a system out of which not much advantage to either side has ever come ; but down to the latest periods we can find it where there is no distinct aim of purely naval warfare, that is to say, no distinct aim on either side to assert and maintain a control over the water, such as in military warfare is asserted and maintained over the land. Thus, in 1512, Sir Edward Howard crossed to Brest with a fleet from which forces landed and burnt Conquet. A reinforcement being sent out, the new fleet met and defeated the French fleet just as it came out of port. That operation finished a year's cam- paign ; but next spring Howard again proceeded to Brest, and the French, pending the arrival of some galleys from the Mediter- ranean, remained in i^ort, and permitted Howard to sail up the harbour, to burn and ravage the country opposite to Brest, but without attempting anything against the town itself, or the fleet there. The galleys then arrived at Conquet, where Howard, coming out of Brest, attacked them, but unfortunately lost his life in the encounter. Our fleet then returned home. But the French in their turn fitted out a fleet, ravaged the coast of Sussex and burnt Brighton. Sir Thomas Howard, brother of Sir Edward, fitted out another fleet before which the French retired, and he in his turn took an army over to Calais, and captured Terouenne and Tournay. In 1522, the Emperor Charles V. joined Henry VIII. in an expedition to Cherbourg, which place, falling into the hands of the allies, became the base of operations for ravaging and destroy- ing all the adjacent country. This done, the expedition returned to Portland. Sailing thence again, Howard took Morlaix by storm. Next summer (1523), however, we meet a condition of things more closely suggesting the form which naval war was ultimately to take, for Sir William Fitz-William passed over to the coast of France with a fleet of thirty-six sail, for the purpose of intercepting a French fleet which was understood to be escorting the Duke of Albany back to his Kegency in Scotland. He met and drove back this escort to Dieppe and Boulogne, and then Fitz-William, having thus gained the naval control of the surrounding waters, left a portion of his fleet to watch and mask the French in their 1 * 4 NAVAL WARFARE. ports, while he himself proceeded to ravage and destroy the coast as far as Treport, where he burnt the suburbs, and all the ships in the harbour. There were in our history no more expeditions by sea till 1544, when war broke out with Scotland, and then with France. King Henry landed an army at Calais, and marched to Boulogne, which fell into his hands after an investment by sea and land. The French, in their turn, fitted out a fleet and made for St. Helens, where, after a partial action, rendered memorable only by the loss of the Mary Rose which preceded it, they landed and attempted to hold the Isle of Wight. Failing in this, they landed in Sussex, where they were repulsed with loss. Eetiring to their own coasts, the French landed part of their army near Boulogne, presumably with the design of recovering it. But a change of wind either compelling it, or facilitating it, the French crossed again over to the English coast, where they were met and defeated by the English fleet. As a reply to this last attempt of the French, the English passed over to their coast and again burnt Treport and thirty ships which were found in the harbour."^ In 1547, the French made an attack on Guernsey and Jersey, but ships and troops being sent from England, the attack was abandoned after the enemy had suffered considerable loss. Calais fell to the French early in Mary's reign (1558), and not impossibly altered the general view of naval war by removing our last permanent foothold on the soil of France. But our immediate reprisal was a projected attack on Brest, which, however, dwindled down ultimately to the re-burning of Conquet, and the ravaging of the adjacent coasts in the usual manner. The whole system, it is readil}^ seen, was one of military reprisals, always more or less open to interruption by the naval forces of the power attacked. There is hardly any idea present on either side of getting such a control of the sea as would prevent the other side from undertaking these ravaging expeditions. The reply to landing and ravaging on one side is generally the attempt at cross-ravaging on the other. The sea is a convenient medium for the transport of armies, and the sea-fight proper only comes in incidentally, as when the French fleet issues from Brest to meet a force proposing to land in the vicinity, or as when Henry VIII. • It is not necessary to quote authorities specifically for these early illustrations, aa to which Burchett (1720), Lediard (1735), Berkley (1756), and Entick (1757) are all pretty well agreed. Lediard and Entick quote the original authorities, Burchett and Berkley do not. I have also consulted MM. Troude and Levot on the French side. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAE, 5 collects his ships at Spithead to interrupt the French in their proposed capture of the Isle of Wight. Naval war this is not, and neither to facilitate the attack, nor to strengthen the defence, is direct possession of the sea sought. Two things were wanting to alter this condition of military war carried on by water. On the sea itself was not to be found property of the enemy sufficient to make it an object of attack. Although sea-borne commerce was growing, it was not yet of a character or extent sufficiently important on any side to render its suppression a serious injury to the nation carrying it on. An hour or two's burning of a coast town probably offered greater prizes to the descending foe, and wrought greater distress in the nation attacked, than weeks or months of preying on the small and occasional cargoes which were to be found actually at sea. The other want was ships capable of keeping the sea. If the sea was to be controlled, it was absolutely necessary that the ships assuming to control should be able to maintain their position at sea continuously. So long as it was necessary to return to port after a very short stay at sea ; so long as ships were so mastered by the weather as to be continually driven back by it, with endeavours or intentions frustrated ; it was always open to the enemy to reassume, if only for a time, that control of the sea which had been challenged. This condition was not reached by mere change of season. Winter voyages or cruises were forbidden to both sides for centuries, for neither had ships competent to face the dangers of winter weather. War by sea ceased in winter, just as it did upon land, and therefore neither side could gain an advantage until the summer came round again. But the summer gale which drove a fleet before it into the shelter of safe havens, might not be felt in the enemy's locality, or might help him over to his enemy's coast. If one fleet ran short of water, of provisions, or of munitions ; or if its crews became sickly and demanded the recruitment of a stay in the quiet of harbour, it by no means followed that the other hostile fleet would be in the same condi- tion at the same time. If they were in condition to put to sea when the first fleet was obliged to return to port, they were entirely free to use the water as the medium of transport, and to carry out their ravaging expeditions by its means. Miscalculations might occur ; the fleet which had been compelled to retire into port, might be again ready for sea sooner than was anticipated, and there might be a sea-fight in consequence. But had the fleet which first retired into port been able to maintain its place at 6 NAVAL WARFARE. sea, or had it been at least understood to be ready to act at sea, the ravaging expedition could not have been carried out until the sea-keeping fleet had been in some way disposed of, or forced to withdraw. The supply of both these necessary ingredients of naval war was gradual, and as a consequence the change from the practice of cross-ravaging over a theoretically free sea to systematic naval war with rules deduced from experience, and settled axioms which had become instinctive from continued and forced acceptance, was gradual too. So far as this country is concerned, the sea-borne commerce question, either as one of defence or attack, did not come into material notice until the time of Elizabeth. But quite early in her reign, we begin to hear of the making of prizes in the Channel. Then we hear of French and Dutch privateers contemporaneous with, and perhaps, in cases, anticipating, the commencement of our partly legitimate and partly piratical war upon the rich commerce of Spain. Thus Burchett" says, speaking of the years 1560-62, and of the Queen's efforts to increase and improve the naval force : In imitation of this laudable example of the Queen's, many of her wealthy subjects, ■who lived near the sea coasts, set themselves to building of ships, so that in a short time those of the Crown and of private persons were become so numerous as, on occasion of any naval war, might employ 20,000 mer. The good effects of these preparations were shortly after seen in the war the Queen undertook in behalf of the Protestants of France, wherein, besides the land forces she sent over to Normandy to their assistance, her ships, scouring the seas, sorely distressed their enemies by taking great numbers of prizes from them, and at length totally interrupting their trade. Lediardjt quoting earlier authorities, says that when in 1561 Elizabeth fitted a fleet out to intercept Mary Queen of Scots on her return from France, she gave out that it was intended to clear the sea of pirates ; which indicates that a sea harvest was already beginning to be reaped. Entick particularizes more closely, and says — quoting several authorities — that as the French Court commissioned privateers to prey upon our ships, Elizabeth was obliged to follow their example, and by proclamation she gave leave to her subjects to make reprisals ; which was attended with such success, that one Clarke, with three frigates only, for his share carried into Newhavon, within a cruise of six weeks, eighteen prizes, valued at £50,000 sterling." J * Burchett, p. 343. t Lediard, vol. i. p. 138. t Entick, p. 208. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 7 From about this time, the attack and defence of commerce begins to take form and position as a regular element of naval war. The trade of England was pushing out in various quarters, under the auspices of the Company of Merchant Adventurers. Jenkinson opened it up with Russia and Persia ; John Hawkins, using the trade in slaves as his instrument, drew the West Coast of Africa and the Western Indies together. The Portuguese and the Dutch were actively pursuing trade in the East Indies and in South America. SjDain had a practical monopoly of commerce with the West Indies and the Pacific, which she was neither strong enough nor intelligent enough to hold. An early indication of the advent of a regular system of naval war is offered by the attacks of Danish freebooters on our Russian commerce. In 1570 the Danes were worsted, and five of their ships captured by the squadron of thirteen of the Merchant Adven- turers' ships in the Baltic. A formal report of the action was made to the Emperor of Russia by Christopher Hodsdon and William Burrough, who commanded the English ships.''^ About 1573 the French Protestants, having taken to the sea as privateers or pirates, for the purpose of injuring their Catholic countrymen, extended their now lucrative operations so as even to include the ships of their English friends. And later, again, the Dutch, privateering ostensibly against the ships of their Spanish enemies, were in the same way tempted out of the legitimate line of their proceedings by the richness of possible English prizes. Under the pretext — which was very likely no pretext, but a truth, in some cases — that our ships brought supplies and succour to the Sj)aniards by way of Dunkirk, they fell upon our commerce to its serious detriment. Sir Thos. Holstock, who was then Comptroller of the Navy, was employed to suppress this loose piracy, and succeeded in both cases.f But, perhaps, the real opening of the new phase, the source, as it were, from which the river of naval war was ever after to flow, was the treacherous attack by the Spaniards on Hawkins at St. Juan de Ulloa in 1507. All the world seems to have thereafter become alive to two things — the enormous value of sea-borne com- merce to the countries which carried it on, and the tremendous risks attending its prosecution in war on the one hand, as well as the great advantages arising from its attack on the other. As the growth of commerce can be inferred from the continued * Lodiard, vol. i., p. 152; Berldej-, p. 307. t Burchett, p. 344; Berkley, p. 312. 8 NAVAL WARFARE. mention of its attack and defence, so the capacity of ships to keep the sea can be as well inferred from the numbers and length of the voyages now undertaken. English commerce had arisen before there were English ships to conduct it, and in the early part of the sixteenth century Candiots, Eagusans, Sicilians, Genoese, and Venetians carried English cargoes to and from London and the Mediterranean ports.* But there must have been a very rapid and complete change as the century drew on. For the service of the Queen, in repelling the Armada, the City of London, on its own account, fitted out 38 ships of the average tonnage as then counted, of 161 tons, and average crews of 71 menf ; 197 ships, averaging 151 tons each, and carrying on an average 89 men per ship, were got together on that occasion under the different leaders on the English side.t And as the voyages to the Coasts of Guinea, to the Levant, and to the ports of the Baltic were now freely prosecuted, it is obvious that there was an abundant shipping of sea-going capacity. As to size, amongst the war-ships of Elizabeth, Lord Howard of Effingham had under him the Triumph, of 1,100 tons and 500 men ; the White Bear, of 1,000 tons and 500 men ; the Ark Royal, of 800 tons and 425 men ; the Victory, of the like ton- nage and 400 men ; the Elizaheth-Bonaventure, the Mary Rose, the Hope, and the galley Bonasolia, all of 600 tons and 250 men ; besides six ships of 500 tons, and a considerable number of about 300 tons. The change in the character of the ships, and their greater sea- worthiness, must be left more to inference than to proof, as there is very little that is authentic as to how ships were really constructed, rigged, and armed before the reign of Charles I. and the era of the Petts. Accurate marine artists scarcely existed before the times of the Vandevelds, the father born in 1610 and the son in 1633. Yet it is probable that the ships of Henry VHI. bore a not remote re- semblance to that given in the illustration, and if we compare it with the certainly authentic outlines of the Speaker, a Common- wealth ship of 1653, and suppose the change from the one type to * IT.ikluyt, quoted in Charnock, vol. ii., p. 7. + It is, perhaps, better to go by the number of men than by the tonnage as given. Monson gives tonnage as length x breadth x depth, which would give much more than the displacement. But if, as Mr. W. H. White thinks, the tonnage was the number of butts or " tuns "' which could be stowed, the tonnage was much less than the dis- placement. See Jlonson's Navdl Ti-acts, Book iii., and Mumuil of NdVdl Architecture, First Edition, p. 39. X Entick, p. 261. Sllir Ol IIENKV VIH. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 9 the other to have been gradual, we can picture the intermediate types which occupied the field in the reign of Elizabeth. So that, as the century approached its close, we had the two things necessary to establish purely naval war — abundant sea- borne commerce, and abundance of sea-going and sea-keeping war- ships. The inevitable result follows, that cross-ravaging from land to land falls into the back-ground ; the sea is regarded more and more as a territory necessary to be held by the nation which desires to win in naval war ; and it begins to be understood that if attacks on territory, to make which the forces must cross the sea, are to be resisted, the enemy must be met before he leaves the water. But yet was it a new thing, and so considered for some scores of Hll.r, OF THE " SPEAKER. years, to have war upon the water alone. So new, that one of the chief actors in these times of change, writing long after the change had fully established itself, mentioned with something like con- tempt, as "a mere action at sea," the dispatch of a squadron in 1590 under Sir John Hawkins and Frobisher, which, though it made no captures, stopped the whole trade from the West Indies to Spain in that year. Yet, though the fact was not thoroughly perceived at the time, the vast amount of Spanish riches which were afloat forced the war with Spain and made it a naval one. The ravaging of Spanish territory by the English no doubt hurt Spain, but the capture of the Spanish galleons not only hurt Spain more, but enriched the captors and the nation to which they belonged. Spain, however, 10 NAVAL WARFARE. was even less conscious than England of the change which was being effected in maritime warfare. She attempted to work on the lines which had been possible three-quarters of a century earlier, in the absence of commerce and sea-going ships ; and her grand and crowning error of the Armada was simply the embodiment of false notions as to the inevitable character of naval war. It is curious and interesting to trace the form of naval war, emerging confusedly and gradually during the eighteen years that covered the struggle between England and Spain ; but it is still more impressive to read the words of the chief actors in this struggle after it was over, and to observe how entirely they had accepted the new conditions and enunciated the line of policy, even in those early years, which successful naval war has ever since followed. I shall, therefore, run lightly through the principal incidents of the Spanish war, commenting as may be necessary while I proceed, and I shall then quote the emphatic language of Sir William Monson in 1640, when he was a retired offi,cer, and of the unfortunate Sir Walter Ealeigh during his twelve years' imprisonment in the Tower. Drake's first expedition to the West Indies was in 1585, and this was entirely on the military reprisal plan, or on the system of cross-ravaging ; so he sacked San Domingo, Cartagena, Santa Justina in Florida, and then returned home. But in 1587 we begin to see a change. Drake proceeds to Cadiz, not for the pur- pose of cross-ravaging, but to destroy the shipping which con- stituted the supply of the great armada preparing at Lisbon. Having succeeded in this enterprize, he fell somewhat back into the older grooves by assaulting certain castles on the coast of Spain ; but, becoming aware of the real ineffectiveness of such proceedings, he steered for the Western Islands for the interrup- tion of the enemy's commerce, then represented by an immense and valuable carrack expected from Mozambique. He succeeded in his ol)ject, and brought his great prize to England. Monson, not yet wholly alive to the real nature of naval war, but still in part comprehending, says of the first voyage : — And though this voyage proved both fortunate and victorious, yet considering it was rather an awakening than a weakening of him (the King of Spain), it had been far better to have wholly declined than to have undertaken it upon such slender grounds and with so inconsiderable forces. Of the second voyage, the Admiral says : — This voyage proceeded prosperously, and without exception, for there was both honour and wealth gained, and the enemy greatly endamaged.* * Monson's Naval Tracts, Book i. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 11 The next year, 1588, was the Armada year, as to which nothing need here be said ; but 1589 witnessed two expeditions, one under Drake, with land forces, as an attempt to replace the King of Portugal on his throne, which was of a wholly public character ; and the other under the Earl of Cumberland, which was almost wholly an attack on the commerce of the Eoman Catholic League against Henry IV., and of Spain. This was of the partly royal and partly commercial character which the state of the times favoured. Drake's expedition was a failure, due, it is said, to having wasted time in an abortive attempt on Corunna, or the Groyne, as it was then called. But it must be remembered that this was an entirely legitimate expedition, inasmuch as it was per- fectly certain that the terrible defeat of the Armada had cleared the sea of Spanish war ships for some time to come. The Earl of Cumberland began by capturing three of the League ships in the Channel. Then he took £7,000 worth of spices belonging to Spain out of Portuguese ships off the coast of Portugal. Then he pro- ceeded to the island of Flores, where he cajDtured an outward- bound Spaniard. Then, in the Road of Fayal, he made prize of Spanish ships. Later, he took a French League ship returning home from Canada. Then he forced the little island of Graciosa to afford him provisions and refreshment. Off Terceira, he took a Spanish ship worth £100,000, and then, on his return towards the coast of Spain, he made two prizes, each worth £7,000, and a third he drew out from under the guns of the castle of St. Mary's, worth a like sum. The only thing this expedition undertook which was in the nature of cross-ravaging, but which was, in the absence of any possible interruption from Spanish ships, an act always found proper to be performed in like circumstances, was the sacking of the town of Fayal. In 1590 was the expedition of Hawkins and Frobisher to the coasts of Spain and the Western Islands, to destroy the Spanish trade. This squadron was seven months at sea, and did not make a single capture of importance, and was what Monson charac- terized it, half in contempt and half understanding how com- pletely it had fulfilled its mission, "a bare action at sea." Spain was recovering from the blow of 1588, and even got so far as to propose to meet the fleet of Hawkins and Frobisher at sea. But realising the disaster that would follow a second defeat, and not having force enough to make success certain, Philip recalled his ships and left the English fleet free to lie across the Spanish trade route and to hold it. But as the least of two evils, consequent on 12 NAVAL WARFARE. this position of his enemy, the King of Spain forbade the sailing of the ships from the West Indies, and so abandoned the whole of the nation's sea-borne foreign commerce for one year. This was really a blow of the heaviest character to Spain, and, as we shall see, is the penalty that must be paid by the weaker naval power. But in this case it was still worse for Spain, as, in the then unsheathed state of ships' bottoms, lying in tropical waters for a summer produced weakness of structure almost amounting to dis- ablement, from the ravages of the worm. As a consequence, about a hundred of these detained ships were lost, with their rich cargoes, on the return voyage to Spain next year. In 1591 Lord Thomas Howard took command of a fleet to the "Western Islands, with the single intention of preying on Spanish commerce as before. But at this time the King of Spain had so far recovered himself as to send to sea a still larger and more powerful fleet than that of Lord Thomas Howard ; this he did, and what took place is of the essence and being of naval war. In those days — though a change was even then understood to be necessary — Lord Thomas Howard's absence left the Channel un- covered, and had things been as they were, cross-raiding on English territory might have been effected by the Spaniards. But at what price? At that of the probable loss of the whole West India commercial fleet. Any damage that could possibly be done to the shores of England would have been paid for, over and over again, by the vast prize that would fall unguarded into Lord Thomas Howard's hands, while the loss to Spain by this great transfer of property would have been entirely uncompensated. Before any attacks on English soil could be thought of, Spanish commerce must be protected ; and Don Alonzo de Bazan sailed to the Western Islands instead of to the Channel. Don Alonzo's fleet was greatly superior to that of Lord Thomas, and had the latter not been warned in time, all his ships might have suffered the fate of the Revenge with Sir Richard Grenville in command. Howard just escaped, and the Spanish Plate Fleet was saved. But so close was the issue, that had that fleet arrived at Flores one day sooner, or had Don Alonzo arrived one day later, Howard would have made the complete success he desired. But even though the main purpose of the expedition was a failure, Howard made sufficient captures in the course of his voyage to pay all its expenses, and Spain suffered not only to that extent, but also in the loss, already detailed, of the greater part of the rescued Plate Fleet on the way home, on account of the decayed condition of the ships. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 13 In the same j'ear, 1591, the Earl of Cumberland made a voj'age to the Spanish coast, wholly intent on the attack on Spanish commerce. Slight tangible success alone attended his exertions, but while intelligence of Don Alonzo's preparations drove him home, the fact of the Earl's being on the Spanish coast enabled him to despatch that warning to Lord Thomas Howard which allowed him to draw off his fleet in time — all but the Revenge. In 1592 Frobisher, in succession to Ealeigh, took a squadron to the coast of Spain and to the Islands, but this broke up and acted more or less independently, some ships on the coast and some at the Islands. Don Alonzo de Bazan, on his part, being ordered to cover the West India fleet, by so much disobeyed his instructions as to allow captures to be made which he might have prevented. But he was at sea in superior force to the English, and they were perforce driven home. The Earl of Cumberland, in 1593, repeated the practice which was now established of warring on Spanish commerce, first on the coast of Spain, and then, at the right season, amongst the Western Islands. Captures were made, of course, but Spain repeated her practice of appearing in superior force at the Islands, and neces- sitating thereby the retirement of the English. This was now the third year, during which neither side had gained much advantage, and when the guard of Spain on her com- merce had been nearly complete. Such proceedings were hardl}- of the essence of naval war, and might have progressed for an indefinite time. If Spain was able to show superior force at sea for three successive years, she should have pushed it farther. To get any advantage, she should have followed the English fleet up and mastered it. Then she would not only have protected her commerce, but would have been a position to push her attacks closer home. The Spanish error was that they did not understand this ; but possibW the question of season governed the Spanish naval policy to a greater extent than we can now easily realise. The English, on their part, if they had rightly understood the position, would have acted with the sole purpose of mastering the Spanish fleet as a necessary preliminary to the destruction of her commerce. But probably no one then perceived what was axio- matic a century later. Not improbably the failure to comprehend the exact position, however simple it may seem to us who have assimilated all past experience without knowing it, dictated the changed proceedings of the next few years. 14 NAVAL WARFARE. The Spaniards had joined the Eoman Catholic League, and in 1594 had ships in Brest, which was held in the interest of the faction. Three thousand English troops had been for some time operating in Brittany, in alliance with the troops of Henry IV., and Frobisher was now despatched with four ships to co-operate against the Spaniards, who at Brest were a threat to the security of the Channel. This operation was effectively concluded. But cross-raiding was again uppermost in the English mind ; for in the same year, 1594, Drake and Hawkins sailed for the West Indies with the intention of landing at Nombre de Dios, marching across to Panama, and possessing themselves of all the plunder which the sacking of that entrepot for silver was likely to afford. This expedition was late in sailing, because a certain fear of attacks at home grew out of the presence of Spanish ships at Brest and on the coast of Brittany. But a home squadron being fitted out, Drake and Hawkins sailed. The fears of cross-ravaging, though exaggerated, were not without foundation, for in this year four Spanish galleys ran over from France into Mount's Bay ; their crews landed and burnt Penzance, Mouse-hole, Newlin, and a neighbouring church. Then they re- embarked, and made off as suddenly and as secretly as they had come. Not a drop of English blood was shed, and all the his- torians agree that it was a mere piece of bravado, without sensible aim and object ; and the galleys were seen by no one, either during their approach or on their retirement. Before Drake and Hawkins sailed, news had reached England that a valuable Spanish carrack had put into Porto Piico damaged, and the Queen ordered them to make sure of this prize before attempting anything further. In this order, we had again a legitimate operation in the circumstances of the case. It was a worthy object ; not requiring time to achieve, and therefore not liable to interruption from the sea. The march across to Panama required the occupation of Nombre de Dios and the security ot their ships, not only to lie there, but to pass freely to sea laden with the spoils gathered from the shores of the Pacific. Clear ideas on such simple points were often wanting in those days, and even in the minds of Drake and Hawkins they could hardly have been present. The ships lingered at Guadaloupe, and allowed the Spaniards both information and time enough so to secure the treasure-ship that the English attack at Porto Kico was repulsed with loss, and Hawkins died, it is said, half of this trouble. Drake proceeded to Nombre de Dios, but found the march across impracticable, and he died, too, near hand, at Porto Bello. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 15 That which was to be expected had meantime happened ; and Baskerville, who succeeded to the command, only just escaped, after a partial action, the superior tieet which Spain had sent out to interrupt, in the only way possible, the operations of the English. Most probably, the failure of the march across the isthmus was the real saving of our fleet, which might otherwise have been caught half-manned at Nombre de Dios by the more powerful Spaniards. Monson remarks on the risen sea-power of Spain since 1591, and how, in this year, she had secured herself by two strong fleets, one of twenty sail in the West Indies and another of twenty-four sail at the Western Islands. As a consequence, so far, her commerce passed in security, though the ships saw neither a friend nor an enemy before their safe arrival at Lisbon. She was now really mistress at sea, and had she known what was proper to be done, she would have pushed up into the Channel with all her force before the English could have got out. By so doing she would have left her commerce and all her ports free behind her, for even if she failed to meet and beat the English in their own waters, her threat must have kept them at home. Bui if she could meet, and could beat them, it was impossible to limit the advantages to her which would immediately follow. She would have passed the period of naval defence, and would have been ready to take up the rule of attack from the sea, which was secure behind her. She was slow to read the lesson of the time, slower even than we were ; and though thus really superior at sea, she left herself entirely open to the secret, sudden, and powerful attack which was made upon Cadiz by the Lord Admiral Howard in command of the sea forces, and of Essex in command of the land forces, yet with some joint commission, in this year, 1596. The expedition did not sail till June 1st, and it was simply fatuous on the part of Philip, that with galleys raiding on our coast the year before, he should have had absolutely nothing by way of look-out, or avant-garde, to give him notice that a hundred and fifty ships were preparing to embark over seven thousand land forces, and that the Dutch were incorporating themselves in the grand design. But Spain was swelling with ideas of a repetition of her great cross-raiding designs of 1588. She was not in the least conscious that her breach of all the growing principles of naval war was the primary cause of her former failure, and would be, over and over again, the causes of her future failures as long as 16 NAVAL WARFARE. she continued them. She had been drivmg English fleets out of her own waters for four years running, and yet had not understood that water was water, and that if an EngUsh fleet fled before a Spanish one at Flores and off Cuba, the same fleet would be hard put to it off Plymouth or the Isle of Wight. But the thought was not in the Spanish Councils ; they set out great ideas for the inva- sion of a heretic England, and the support of a rebellious yet orthodox Ireland, and they left the main body of their prepara- tions open to the stroke of any one who chose to cross the sea to strike it. Howard and Essex sailed, as I have said, on the 1st of June. They took the most singular precautions by means of wide- spread videttes, which captured or detained every sail that was seen, so that early in the morning of the 20tli June the vast fleet was off Cadiz, with nothing to prevent them sailing right up and making themselves masters of the great assemblage of war and merchant ships that lay in unsuspecting tranquillity before them. But a day was lost in divided counsels,, and notwithstanding the clearness of their instructions to master the ships in the first instance, and Monson's urgency as a leading naval adviser, it was not till night that the determination to attack the ships was come to. The result was that though many ships were taken, and many burnt to prevent them falling into our hands, the lesser value — the occupation of the town for fourteen days, and its ransom for 120,000 ducats — assumed the most golden hue, and the blow was not as complete as it otherwise might have been. A point which is not cleared up in any of the histories before me, is the disposition of the Spanish fleet at this time. There were a considerable number of war-ships at Cadiz, no doubt, and some of the heaviest class. There was also at least a squadron at Lisbon, under Siriago, for six of them attacked a private expedition of the Earl of Cumberland off" the Eock. But I do not gather whether the fleets of the previous year were guarding commerce this year in the West Indies and at the Azores. The English commanders knew some days before their arrival at Cadiz what ships they would find there, but it was not known to the home Government what the disposition of the Spanish fleet was, for the ascertainment of this was one of the duties enjoined upon the English commanders. Unless these had some knowledge that the sea was free behind them, they could hardly have made the serious attack they did, and would certainly not have remained as much as fourteen days in possession of the town of Cadiz. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 17 It was a part of the Lords Generals' instructions to take the usual measures at the Western Islands for intercepting the Spanish trade, but disputes and discontents had arisen over the possible objections which might be taken at home, and no detach- ment westward was made. Essex was forbidden to attack Lisbon, and intelligence from Ferrol showed that no ships were there. So, as provisions were, as usual, running short, and there was no further operation open, the great fleet returned to England, arriving at Plymouth on August 8th. Even this reverse at Cadiz, due as it was to a wholly mistaken naval policy, had no sort of legitimate effect on the Spanish mind, at least in the early part of 1597. The invasion idea was so far uppermost, that an assemblage in force began to be made at Ferrol, and the commerce at the Western Islands was left open. That could be protected only on the spot, or by a close threat in the Channel. An assemblage at Ferrol, which could hardly be in great forc^ after the destruction at Cadiz,^ was not a strong threat, though in the rebellious condition of Ireland it certainly did require more notice than it had. Essex took a fleet off the port, but having been very late in sailing — he only left Plymouth on August I7th — owing both to late preparations and to adverse weather, the Spaniards were amplj^ secured against the simple raiding attack by part of the fleet, which was alone practicable. A determination was now come to which was only justified by want of full comprehension of what naval war necessitated. Essex sailed for the Western Islands, leaving it quite open to the Spanish fleet to follow him there, and perhaps fall on him at the least opportune moment, or else to deal such blows in our home waters as might be open to him. This move of Essex would have been entirely a false one had the English commerce been abreast of that of Spain in value, or near it, for then the Spanish ships might not only have fallen upon the English property at sea, and sent it securely into their own ports, but they were in a position to recapture the English prizes in returning to their home ports, if not to give battle to the returning war-ships in a presumably weakened state. The course taken was only less blamable, because English commerce did not approach the value of that of Spain. But the operations suggested were open to the Spaniards, and they were at sea the day after Essex left.* Their plan was to use their * Berkley, p. 420. 18 NAVAL WARFARE. local control of the sea in order to seize Falmouth or some western English port, and to use it as a base in which to rest and await the return of the fleet of Essex. Had their seamanship been equal to their strategy they might have done great things, and perhaps turned the tables on this occasion ; but a heavy gale off Scilly dispersed the Spanish fleet when on its way to fulfil the mission, and the ships returned to their own ports, allowing Essex to bring home in safety the few prizes he had picked up to the westward. We can easily trace the growing laws of naval war, unalterable and immutable if it is to be carried on with a view to the certain advantage of either side, and thereby to a speedy conclusion. We have seen Spain on her side able to guard and protect her trade by appearing in force at the point of attack ; and we have seen her leave her chief port and source of greatness wholl}^ open to the sudden attack of a fleet of whose approach she had no dreams. Now we see her making one forward step in advancing her base to Ferrol, and meditating operations in British waters. But as late as the middle of August, that is, when the season of naval operations is drawing to a close, the Spanish fleet has made no effort, and lies in its own port, masked by that of Essex. Only, therefore, by beating this fleet of Essex, or by some strategical error on the part of its commander, could the Spanish fleet have achieved its pur- IDOse. Meantime, unless there was a second fleet on the Spanish coast, and a third at the Western Islands, Spain is left open to attack by a second English fleet, supposing there was one, either on her commerce or on her territory. But Essex commits the only error open to him. On the chance that he may do more damage to Spain in the Western Islands than Spain can do in the Channel, he sails away to that quarter, leaving everything open behind him. Because little or nothing was done on either side, we must not suppose that such breaches of plain law could be committed with impunity. It was only by error and mismanagement that Essex failed to possess himself of the whole of the Spanish West Indian ships at one grand coup. The attack on Falmouth would perhaps have been made, and all that was to follow it carried out, had it not been for the heavy weather which occurred so opportunely to save the credit of Essex.* liut the reason of the whole matter is simple, and can be simply * It may be stated that the English had the belief that the Spanish fleet would, as usual, fly to protect its trade, but in the later years of naval war no such belief would have been allowed to operate. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 19 put. Supposing that the English damage to Spanish trade, and Spanish damage in the Channel, were of equal moment to each of the nations at war, how was either to be advantaged if both damages were done, any more than if neither were done ? Such cross-damaging can be of no force in bringing either nation to terms, and was much more calculated to exasperate and prolong the war. If Spain, then, committed the error of being too late in the Channel, and not in strength to have fought Essex fairly at sea, Essex should have held her fleet masked at Ferrol till the end of the season, and it would have been possible that a small detach- ment might have operated successfully upon the Spanish trade. The Spaniards were hardly wrong to have proceeded to carry out their intention of intercepting Essex on his return, rather than of following him to the Islands, though, as in former years, they might have secured their trade directly by the earlier despatch westward of the necessary force. It would almost seem as if these simple but great principles were now forcing themselves into men's minds as new light. For the Queen sent out no fleet next year (1598), and Spain made no move. There was but a private raiding expedition of the Earl of Cumber- land, which, after blocking, and so killing, the outward trade of Spain, made descents on the Canaries and Porto Rico. The transactions of the year 1599 were of a nature to give further form and substance to rules and maxims which, though congealing in parts, were still soft and unstable. I cannot -write [says Monson] of anything done in this year of 1599, for there was never greater expectation of war with less performance. Whether it was a mistrust the one nation had of the other, or a policy held on both sides to make peace with sword in hand, a treaty being entertained by consent of each prince, I am not to examine ; but sure I am, the preparation was on both sides very great, as if the one expected an invasion from the other, and yet it was generally conceived not to be intended by cither ; but that ours had only relation to my Lord of Essex, who was then in England, and had a design to try his friends in England, and to be revenged of his enemies, as he pretended, and as it proved afterwards by his fall. Howsoever it was, the change was not so great as necessary, for it was commonly known that the Adelentado had drawn both his ships and galleys to the Groyne ; which was not usually done, but for some action intended upon England or Ireland, though he converted them afterwards to another use ; for the galleys were sent into the Low Countries, and passed the narrow seas whilst our ships lay there. And with the fleet, the Adelentado pursued the Hollanders to the Islands, whither he suspected they were gone. This fleet of Hollanders, which consisted of 73 sail, were the first ships that ever displayed their colours in warlike sort against the Spaniards in any action of their own, for how cruel soever the war seemed to be in Holland, they maintained a peace- able trade in Spain, and abused us. This first action of the Hollanders at sea proved not very successful ; for after the spoil of a town in the Canaries, and some hurt done to the Island of St. Tome, they kept the sea for seven or eight months, in which time 2 * 20 NAVAL WARFARE. their General and most of their men sickened and died, and the rest returned with loss and shame. Another benefit which we received by this preparation was, that our men were now taught suddenlj- to arm, every man knowing his command, and how to be commanded, which before they were ignorant of ; and who knows not that sudden and false alarms in an army are sometimes necessary ? To say the truth, the expedition which was then used in drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging so great and royal a navy to sea, in so little a space of time, was so admirable in other countries, that they received a terror by it ; and many that came from beyond sea, said the Queen was never more dreaded abroad for anything she ever did. Frenchmen that came aboard our ships did wonder (as at a thing incredible) that Her Majesty had rigged, victualled, and furnished her royal ships to sea in twelve days' time ; and Spain, as an enemy, had reason to fear and grieve to see this sudden preparation.* The armament consisted of nineteen Queen's shij)s under Lord Thomas Howard ; they assembled in the Downs, but after a month there, the threat had presumably done its work, for the ships were recalled and dismantled. But the assemblage, following on a year's inaction, and that again following on the experienced dangers of certain strategical operations, dangers which it does not appear were recognized before, would seem to indicate the working of a leaven which would ultimately leaven the whole lump, and fix in men's minds the nature of the inherent principles of naval war. The year 1600 witnessed the founding of the East India Com- pany, and the sailing of three of their merchant ships under the guidance of James Lancaster, and thus the further develop- ment of the strength of a maritime nation in peace and of its weakness in war. The only naval operation was the despatch by England of a small squadron to attack Spanish trade at the Western Islands, and its being driven off by the threat of a much larger Spanish squadron. The Spanish trade however avoided all chances of capture by pursuing a route altogether clear of the Islands, so that Sir Richard Lewson, who commanded the English squadron, saw not a hostile sail. But the next year, 1601, again saw some relapse into the practice of cross-raiding, for while the English devoted themselves to assisting the Low Countries against the Spaniards, they left the sea so open that late in the year, when indeed, according to usage, fleets should be seeking their home ports, the Spaniards made for the port of Kinsale in Ireland with forty- eight ships and four thousand troops, and landed there. But it cannot be said that this operation was a complete restoration of the practice of cross-raiding, for the Spaniards * Naval Tracts, Book i., 1599. THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 21 were in alliance with the rebel Earl Tyrone, and might plausibly adventure a flying column into what might prove a friendly country. Yet did the result yield its experience, and add to the accumulating evidence of the existence of rule in naval war. Tyrone, on his side, failed to effect the junction which was sought. The Spaniards found themselves shut up in the town of Kinsale by the army of Mountjoy, which had already defeated Tyrone, while on the sea side they were blocked by Sir Richard Lewson. Yielding was a necessitj^ in the absence of all control of the sea, and the Spanish army was carefull}- conducted back to its own country, never again to illustrate their failure to appre- hend the possible in conducting war with a maritime power. But England, on her side, was more receptive of the lessons to be learnt. In March 1602, Lewson and Monson sailed " to infest the Spanish coast with a continual fleet,"" and, with an interval of return, this " infesting " was pushed far into the autumn, and Monson did not quit the Spanish waters till the 21st October ; a feat proving not only the capacity of the man, but his growing knowledge of the art of naval war, and the capabilities of the instruments for waging it. His attacks were whoU}^ confined to shipping, and were very successful. The Spanish fleet was, how- ever, much superior to his own ; it was at sea, but never succeeded in coming into contact with this consummate seaman, who could think and act. It was as if all the outlines of naval war had been marked when the Queen died next j'ear (1603), for her fleet was prepared to start for the coast of Spain as early as February, and to remain there till November ; a policy which would have held the naval forces of Spain in absolute check, unless she could have faced and beaten the English ; while the latter would have had the free sea behind them either to prosecute their own commerce in peace or to stifle that of the enemj'. It had taken all these eighteen years to learn the lesson that nothing can be done of consequence in naval war till one side secures the control of the water area. But even then it was not clear to men's minds that this control must either be acknow- ledged by the side which has it not, and all its disabilities ad- mitted ; or else it must be fought for by all the naval strength either side is capable of putting forth. Yet were the main principles partly apprehended and partly set forth by the two authorities, whose opinions I now quote in * Naval Tracts, Book i., 1602. 22 NAVAL WARFARE. fulfilment of my promise at the beginning of the chapter. Thus writes Sir William Monson : — "Whilst the Spaniards were employed at home by our yearly fleets, they never had opportunity nor leisure either to make an attempt upon us, or to divert the wars frora themselves ; bj^ which means we were secured from any attempt of theirs, as will appear by what follows. The Spaniards stood so much in awe of Her Majesty's ships, that when a few of them appeared on the coast they commonly diverted their enterprises — as, namely, in the year 1587, when Sir Francis Drake, with twenty-five ships, prevented an expedition that summer out of Cadiz Road for England, which the next year after they attempted in 1588, because not molested as the year before. Our action in Portugal, following so quick upon the overthrow in 1588, made the King of Spain so far unable to offend, that if the undertaking had been prosecuted with judgment, he had been in ill circumstances to defend it, or his other kingdoms. From that year to the year 1591 he grew great by sea, because he was not busied by us as before ; which ajipeared by the fleet that took the Revenge ; which armada of his, it is very likely, had been employed against England had it not been divei-ted that year by my Lord Thomas Howard. And for four years together after this the King employed his ships to the Islands, to guard his merchants from the Indies, which made him have no leisure to think of England. The voyage to Cadiz in 1596 did not only frustrate his intended action against England, but we destroyed many of his ships and provisions that should have been employed on that Service. He designed the second revenge upon England, but was prevented by my Lord of Essex to the islands ; which action of his, if it had been well carried, and that my lord would have believed good advice, it had utterly ruined the King of Spain. The next year that gave cause of fear to the Queen, was 1599, the King of Spain having a whole year, by our sufferance, to make his provisions, and brought his ships and armj' down to the Groyne ; which put the Queen to a more chargeable defensive war than the value our offensive fleet would have been maintained with upon his coast. This great expedition was diverted by the fleet of Holland, which the Adelentando pursued to the Islands. The following years, 1600 and 1601, there was hope of peace, and nothing was attempted on either side till the latter end of 1601 that he invaded Ireland ; but with ill-success, as you have heard. The last summer, 1602, he was braved bj' Her Majesty's ships in the mouth of his harbour with the loss of a carrack, and rendered unable to prosecute his designs against Ireland, for no sooner was Sir Richard Lowson returned but Sir William Monson was sent back again upon that coast, as you have heard, who kept the King's forces so employed, that he betook himself only to the guard of his shores. It is not the meanest mischief we shall do to the King of Spain, if we thus war upon him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and guarded, to the infinite vexation, charge, and discontent of his subjects ; for no time or place can secure them so long as they see or know us to be upon that coast. The sequel of all these actions being duly considered, we may be confident that whilst we busy the Spaniards at home, they dare not think of invading England or Ireland ; for by their absence their fleet from the Indies may be endangered, and in their attempts they have as little hope of prevailing.* Surely I hold [says Sir Walter Raleigh] that the best way is to keep our enemies from treading upon our ground ; wherein, if we fail, then must we seek to make him * Naral Tracts, Book i., 1603 THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 23 wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it should happen, our judj^ments are to weigh many particular circumstances, that belongs not to this discourse. But making the question general, the position, whether England, without the help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing, I hold that it is unable to do so ; and, therefore, I think it most dangerous to make the adventure. For the encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a most perilous consequence. Great difference, I know there is, and diverse consideration to be had, between such a country as P^rance is, strengthened with many fortified places, and this of ours, where our ramparts are but the bodies of men. But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to impeach it ; no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition. . . . For there is no man ignorant that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that coast them. '' Les arme'es ne volent point en poste — armies neither fl3''e nor run post," saith a marshal of France. And I know it to be true that a fleet of ships may be seen at sunset and after it, at the Lizard, and yet by next morning they may recover Portland : whereas an army of foot shall not be able to march it in six dayes. Again, when those troops lodged on the sea shores should be forced to run from place to place in vain, after a fleet of ships, they will at length sit down in the midway, and leave all at adventure.* If we regard the utterances of these leaders of the Ehzabethan era, and remember that what they wrote was not to set forth the principles of naval war in the abstract, but as they applied to the circumstances of their own country at the time, we shall under- stand to some extent how far they went towards full comprehension, and where they stoj)ped short of it. Both laid stress on the paramount importance of operations by sea. In Monson's opinion it was only by transferring the war to the sea coasts of Spain that an advantage could be gained in attack ; while Raleigh was clear that an attack coming over sea could only be met at sea. Neither leader gives any countenance to the old idea that the attack of one power on the territory of the other could be met by a counter attack of the same character. It follows that in both their minds the age of cross-raiding had passed away, and that the age of naval war as such, naval war absolutely on the sea, had taken its place. In both their eyes, the policy of Spain must have been a mis- taken one, unless she was driven to it by a clear sense of her inferiority at sea. But then, if she were clearly inferior at sea, both * Raleigh, History of the. World. Quoted by Creasy, Fifteen Deasivn Battles, &c., p. S6.5. I only possess the abridgement of Raleigh's works published by his grandson Philip Raleigh. But it is remarkable how completely that great man relies on ancient examples for modern guidance. Tlie Roman and Greek experiences serve him continu- ally with lessons for the English of James's time. 24 NAVAL WARFARE. men would have held that all her attempted raids on territory were practically useless. If she was not absolutely inferior at sea, and Monson was clearly of opinion that she was not so from 1591 to 1595, then her course of policy was from Monson's own showing a wrong one, except upon the ground of the enormous superiority of her commerce to ours. " The King employed his ships to the islands, to guard his merchants from the Indies, which made him have no leisure to think of England." Quite so. But if English commerce offered as important a field of attack as that of Spain, when looked at from the point of view of national importance, a Spanish attack upon English commerce would have left England ** with no leisure to think of " Spain. But in any case, the appearance of Spanish fleets in the Channel must, in Monson's opinion, have had just the same paralyzing effect on the English fleets — as far as any attack on Spain was concerned — as the presence of English fleets in Spanish waters confessedly had on those of Spain. Monson must have been per- fectly clear on this abstract proposition or he could not have urged, as he did, the importance of the English fleet's getting away for Spain as early as February. To be first in the field was the point. And the force that was first in the field must hold all the superiority of that position until it was beaten at sea. The control of the sea, or what I shall now and hereafter call by its established title, the " Command of the Sea," was hence- forth to be understood as the aim of naval war. A power striving for anything else, such as evasions, or surprises of ports or terri- tories, or merely defensive guardings of commerce, accepted the position of the inferior and beaten naval power, and could never hope, so long as she maintained that attitude, of seriously damaging her opponent. 25 CHAPTER II. The Struggle for the Command of the Sea. True naval war is established when there is sufficient property at sea to make its loss of serious importance to the State owning it; and when there are sea-keeping war- ships to attack it. — It may be attacked directly and defended directly, as in the earlier phases of the first Dutch war ; or sea-borne commerce may be destroyed if the com- mand of the sea is first obtained by the direct defeat of the enemy's war fleets, as in the later phases of the war. — Single victories cannot, however, give command of the flea for any time unless the naval force defeated has also been annihilated. — Though both the Dutch and English gained victories, they were merely steps towards the command of the sea, and the struggle was really still in progress when peace was made. In the last chapter I endeavoured to show how, in consequence of the presence of two requirements, large sea-borne commerce and war-ships capable of keeping the sea, naval warfare was settling into form at the close of the reign of Elizabeth. Its necessities, and the fixed rules arising out of those necessities, were becoming clear to English seamen who had full experience of the actualities surrounding and controlling it. But though knowledge of the subject had greatly advanced, it was probably the few and not the many who could look forward to a complete method in naval warfare. Commerce, I have observed, was chiefly on one side in the Spanish war, and the side which owned it was that which had the least clear views of the right way to keep it and to defend it. The war-ships were still not of a wholly sea-keeping character, and the question of their supply was one which nearly always governed their movements and their capacity for keeping the sea. In the peaceful years that followed through the reigns of James I. and Charles I. two things went on side by side, a wider distribu- tion of sea-borne commerce, and a continual improvement in the character of the war-ships as well as of others. These were the 26 NAVAL WARFARE. things which governed the nature of naval war, and as they grew towards a standard of completeness they necessarily tended to define and harden the rules under which naval war would in future be carried on. Perhaps the best idea of these growths may be gathered from the perusal of a nearly complete quotation from the latter part of Ealeigh's Discourse of the First Invention of Ships, and the several jxirts thereof. Whosoever were the inventers, we find that every age hath added somewhat to ships, and to all things else. And in mine own time the shape of our English ships hath been greatly bettered. It is not long since the striking of the topmast (a wonder- ful ease to great ships, both at sea and in harbour) hath been devised, together with the chain pump, which takes up twice as much water as the ordinary did. We have lately added the Bonnet and the Drabler. To the courses we have devised studding- sails, topgallant-sails, spritsails, topsails. The weighing of anchors by the capstone is also new. We have fallen into consideration of the length of cables, and by it we rc'iist the malice of the greatest winds that can blow. Witness our small Milbrooke men of Cornwal, that ride it out at anchor half seas over between England and Ireland, all the winter quarter. And witness the Hollanders that were wont to ride before Dunkirk with the wind at North- West, making a lee-shoar in all weathers. For true it is, that the length of the cable is the life of the ship in all extremities, and the reason is, because it makes so many bendings and waves, as the ship, riding at that length, is not able to stretch it ; and nothing breaks that is not stretcht in extremity. We carry our ordnance better than we were wont, because our nether over-loops* are raised commonly from the water, to wit, between the lower port and the sea. In King Henry the Eighth's time, and in his presence, at Portsmouth, the Mary Hose, by a little sway of the ship in tacking about, her ports being within sixteen inches of the water, was overset and lost. . . . W^e have also raised our second decks, and given more vent thereby to our ordnance lying on our nether-loop. W^e have added cross pillars in our royal ships to strengthen them, which be fastened from the keelson to the beam of the second deck to keep them from setting or from giving way in all distresses. We have given longer floors to our ships than in elder times, and better bearing" under water, whereby they never fall into the sea after the head and shake the whole body, nor sink stern, nor stoop upon a wind, by which the breaking loose of our ordnance, or of the not use of them, with many other discommodities are avoided. And, to say the truth, a miserable shame and dishonour it were for our shipwrights if they did not exceed all others in the setting up our Royal ships, the errors of other nations being far more excusable than ours. For the Kings of England have for many years been at the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for their own defence, and for the wars only. Whereas the French, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Hollanders (till of late) have had no proper fleet belonging to their Princes or States. Only the Venetians for a long time have maintained their arsenal of gallies. And the Kings of Denmark and Sweden have had good ships for these last fifty years. I say that the aforenamed kings, especially the Spaniards and Portugals, have ships of great bulk, but fitter for the merchant than for the man-of-war, for burthen than for battel. But as Popelimire well observeth, the forces of Princes by sea are marques de grandeux d'estate — marks of the greatness of an estate — for whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade ; whosoever commands the trade of the world, * Meaning the lower gun-deck. The term " over-loop " ((German, iiberhntf) became lost in the term orlop, as applied to the deck below the lower gun-deck. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 27 commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself. Yet can I not deny but that the Spaniards, being afraid of their Indian fleets, have built some few- very good ships ; but he hath no ships in garrison, as his Majesty hath ; and to say the truth, no sure place to keep them in, but in all invasions he is driven to take up of all nations which come into his ports for trade. The Venetians, while they attended their fleets and imployed themselves in their Eastern conquest, were great and powerful Princes, and commanded the maritime ports of Croatia, Dalmatia, Albania, and Epirus ; were lords of Peloponnessus and the islands adjoyning ; of Cyprus, Candia, and many other places. But after they sought to greaten themselves in Italy itself, using strangers for the commanders of their armies, the Turks by degrees beat them out of all their goodly countries, and have now confined them (Candia excepted) to a few small Grecian islands, which, with great charge and difficulty they enjoy. The first honour they obtained was by making war upon the Istrii by sea ; and had they been true to their spouse, to meet the sea, which once a year they marry, the Turk had never prevailed against them nor never been able to besiege any place of theirs, to which he must have transported his armies by his gallies. The Genoeses were also exceeding powerful bj- sea, and held many places in the East, and contended often with the Venetians for superiority, destroying each other in a long-continued sea war. Yea, the Genoeses were the most famous mercenaries of all Europe, both by sea and land for many years. The French assisted themselves by land with the cross-bowers of Genoa against the English ; namely, at the battel of Cressy the French had 12,000 cross-bowers. By sea also with their great ships, called the carrecks of Genoa, they always strengthened their fleets against the English. But after Mahomet the Second had taken Constanti- nople, they lost Caffa, and all Taurica Chersonesus, with the whole trade of the Euxine Sea. And although they sent many supplies by the Hellespont, yet having often felt the smart of the Turk's cannon, they began to slack their succours, and were soon after supplanted. Yet do the Venetians to this day well maintain their estate by their sea forces ; and a great loss it is to the Christian commonwealth in general that they are less than they were ; and a precipitate counsel it was of those Christian kings, their neighbours, when they joyned in league against them ; seeing they then were, and they yet are, the strongest rampiers of Europe against the Turks. But the Genoeses have now but a few gallies, being altogether degenerate, and become merchants of money, and the Spanish king's backers. But all the states and kingdoms of the world have changed form and policy. The Empire itself, which gave light to all principalities like a Pharoa, or high tower to all sea-men, is now sunk down to the level of the soil . . . insomuch as it is now become the most confused estate in the world, consisting of an Empire in title without territory, who can ordain nothing of importance but by a Dyet, or Assembly of the Estates of many free princes, ecclesiastical and temporal, in effect of equal force, diverse in religion and faction ; and of Free Cities and Hanse towns, whom the princes do not more desire to command, than they scorn to obey. Notwithstanding, being far less than they were in number, and less in force and reputation ; as they are not greatly able to offend others, so they have enough to du (being seated far asunder) to defend themselves The Castilians in the meanwhile are grown great, and (by mistaking) esteemed the greatest ; having by marriage, conquest, practice, and purchase, devoured all the king- doms within Spain, with Naples, Sicily, Millain, and the Netherlands ; and many places belonging to the Empire, and the princes thereof, besides the Indies, East and West, the islands of the West Ocean, and many places in Barbary, Guinea, Congo, and elsewhere. France hath also enlarged itself by the one-half, aud reduced Normandy, Britany, 28 NAVAL WARFARE. Aquitaine, with all that the English had on that side the sea, together with Langue- dock, Foix, Arminach, Bierne, and Dauphinie. Foi- this kingdom of Great Britain, it hath had of His Majesty a strong addition. The postern by which we were so often heretofore entered and surprized is now made up ; and we shall not hereafter need the double face of Janus, to look north and south at once. But there's no estate grown in baste but that of the United Provinces, and especially in their sea forces, and by a contrary way to that of France and Spain ; the latter by invasion, the former by oppression. For I myself may I'emember when one ship of Her Majesty's would have made forty Hollanders strike sail and come to an anchor. They did not then dispute de Man Lihero, but readily acknowledged the English to be Domini Maris Britdnniri. That we are less powerful than we were, I do hardly believe it ; for, although we have not at this time 135 ships belonging to the subject of 500 tons each ship, as it is said we had in the twenty-fourth year of Queen Elizabeth ; at which time also, upon a general view and muster, there were found in England of able men fit to bear arms, 1,172,000, yet are our merchant ships now far more warlike and better appointed than they were, and the navy royal double as strong as it then was. For these were the ships of Her Majesty's navy at that time : 1. The Triumph. S. The Revemje. 2. The Elizahetli Jonas. 9. The Hope. 3. The White Bear. 10. The Mary Rose. 4. The Philip and Mary. 11. The Dreadnomjht. 5. The Bonadventure. 12. The Minion. 6. The Golden Lyon. 13. The Swiftsure. 7. The Victory. To which there have been added : — 14. The Antilope. 20. The Ayde. 15. The Foresiyht. 21. The Achates. 16. The Swallow. 22. The Falcon. 17. The Handmaid. 23. The Tyyer. 18. The Jennett. 24. The Bidl. 19. The Bark of Bidlein. We have not, therefore, less force than we had, the fashion, and furnishing of our ships considered, for there are in England at this time 400 sail of merchants, and fit for the wars, which the Spaniards would call gallions ; to which we may add 200 sail of crumsters, or hoys, of Newcastle, which, each of them, will bear six Demi-culverins* and four Sakers,t needing no other addition of building than a slight spar deck fore and aft, as the seamen call it, which is a slight deck throughout. The 200 which may be chosen out of 400, by reason of their ready staying and turning, by reason of their windwardness, and by reason of their drawing of little water, they are of extream advantage near the shear, and in all bays and rivers, to turn in and out. These, I say, alone, and well manned and well conducted, would trouble the greatest Prince in Europe to encounter them in our seas ; for they stay and turn so readily, as ordering them into small squadrons, that three of them at once may give their broadside upon any one great ship, or upon any angle or side of an enemy's fleet, they shall be able to continue a perpetual volley of Demi-culverins without intermission, and either sink and slaughter the men, or utterly disorder any fleet of cross-sails with which they encounter. J * A 9^-pounder of 30 cwt. t A 5|-pounder of 12^ cwt. J Presumably the vessels Raleigh speaks of were fore-and-aft rigged ; and the •'cross-sails" were square-rigged ships. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 29 I say, then, if a vanguard be ordained of those hoyes, who will easily recover the wind of any other sort of ships, with a battle of 400 other warlike ships, and a Rear of thirty of His Majesty's ships to sustain, relieve, nnd countenance the rest (if God beat them not) I know not what strength can be gathered in all Europe to beat them. And if it be objected that the States can furnish a far greater number, I answer that His Majesty's 40 ships, added to 600 before named, are of incomparable greater force than all that Holland and Zealand can furnish for the wars. As also, that a greater number would breed the same confusion that was found in Xerxes' land army of seventeen hundred thousand soldiers ; for there is a certain proportion, both by sea and land, beyond which the excess brings nothing but disorder and amazement. Of these hoyes, carvils, or crumsters, (call them what you will) there was a notable experience made in the year 1574, in the river of Antwerp near Rumerswael, where the Admiral Boysott with his crumsters overthrew the Spanish fleet of great ships conducted by Julian Romero ; so contrary to the expectation of Don Lewis, the great Commander and Lieutenant of the Netherlands for the King of Spain, as he came to the banks of Bergen to behold the slaughter of the Zealanders ; but contrarv to his expectation he beheld his comrades, some of them sunk, some of them thrust on the shear, and most of the rest mastered and possessed bj' his enemies ; insomuch as his great Captain, Romero, with great difficulty, some say in a skiff, some say by swim- ming, saved himself. The like success had Captain Wrest of Zealand against the fleet which transported the Duke of Medina Cell, who was sent out of Spain by sea to govern the Netherlands in place of the Duke of Alva, for with twelve crumsters or hoyes, of the first troop of 21 sail, he took all but three, and forced the second, being twelve great ships filled with 2,000 soldiers, to run under the Rammekins, being then in the Spaniard's possession. But whence comes this dispute ? Not from the increase of numbers, not because our neighbours breed more mariners than we do ; nor from the greatness of their trade in all parts of the world. For the French creep into all corners of America and Africa as they do, and the Spaniards and Portugals emjjloy more ships by many, (the fishino- trade excepted) than the Netherlands do ; but it comes from the detestable covetous- ness of such particular persons as have gotten licenses, and given way to the trans- portation of our English ordnance. Here Ealeigh goes on to complain of the manufacture and export from this country for foreign nations, declaring that unless Spain had had large quantities of our iron guns she could not have removed the brass pieces from her ports to arm the ships of 1588 ■with, and then goes on : — Certainlj' the advantage which the English had by their bows and arrows in former times was never so great as we might now have had by our iron ordnance, if we had either kept it within the land, kept it from our enemies, or imparted it to our friends moderately. For as by the former we obtained many notable victories, and made ourselves masters of many parts of France, so by the latter we might have commanded the seas, and thereby the trade of the world itself. But we have now to our future prejudice, and how far to our prejudice I know not, forged hammers, and delivered them out of our hands, to break our own bones withal. For the conclusion of this dispute there are five manifest causes of the upgrowing of the Hollanders and Zealanders. The first is, the favour and assistance of Queen Elizabeth, and the King's Majestv, which the late worthy and famous Prince of Orange did always acknowledge, and in the year l.')^2, when I took my leave of him at Antwerp, after the return of the Earl of 30 NAVAL WARFARE. Leicester into England, and Monsieur's arrival there, when he delivered me his letters to Her Majesty, he prayed me to say to the Queen from him, suh umbra alarum titarum protegimur ; for certainly they had withered in the bud, and sunk in the beginning of their navigation, had not Her Majesty assisted them. The second cause was the employing of their own people in their trades and fishing, and the entertainment of strangers to serve them in their armies by land. The third, the fidelity of the House of Nassau, and their services done them, especi- ally of their renowned Prince Maurice, now living. The fourth, the withdrawing of the Duke of Parma twice into France, while in his absence he recovered those strong places of Friezland, Deventer, Zutphen, &c. And the fifth, the embarguing and confiscation of their ships in Spain, which constrained them and gave them courage to trade by force with the East and West India and in Africa, in which they employ 180 ships and 8,700 mariners. The success of a counsel so contrary to their wisdom that gave it, as all the wit and all the force the Spaniards have, will hardly (if ever) recover the damage thereby received. For to repair that ruin of the Hollander's trade into both Indies, the Spaniards did not only labour the truce ; but the King was content to quit the soveraignty of the United Provinces, and to acknowledge them for free States, neither holding nor depending on the crown of Spain. But be their estate what it will, let them not deceive themselves, in believing that they can make themselves masters of the sea. For certainly the shipping of England, ■with the gi-eat squadron of His Majesty's Navy Royal, are able, in despight of any Prince or State in Europe, to command the great and large fields of the ocean. But as I shall never think him a lover of this land, or of the King, that shall persuade His Majesty from embracing the amity of the States of the United Provinces (for His Majesty is no less safe by them than they invincible by him). So I would wish them (because after my duty to mine own soveraign, and the love of my country, I honour them most) that they remember and consider it, that seeing their passage and re-passage lies through the British seas ; that there is no port in France, from Calais to Vlushing, that can receive their ships, that many times outward, by westerly winds, and ordinarily homeward, not only from the East Indies, but from the Streights and from Spain, all southerly winds (the breezes of our climate) thrust them of necessity into the King's ports, how much His Majesty's favour doth concern them: for if (as themselves confess in their last treaty of truce with the Spaniards) they subsist by their trade, the dis- turbance of their trade (which England only can disturb) will also disturb their subsistence. The rest I will omit, because I can never doubt either their gratitudes or their wisdoms. For our Newcastle trade, from which I have digressed, I refer the reader to the author of the Trades Increase, a gentleman to me unknown, but so far as I can judge, he hath many things very considerable in that short treatise of his ; yea, both con- siderable and praiseworthy ; and, among the rest, the advice which he hath given for the maintenance of our hoyes and carvils of Newcastle, which may serve us (besides the breeding of mariners) for good ships of war, and of exceeding advantage. And cer- tainly I cannot but admire why the imposition of 5s. should any way dishearten them, seeing there is not one company in England upon whose trade any new payments are laid but they on whom it is laid raise profit by it. The silk-men, if they pay His Majesty 12d. upon a yard of sattin, they not only raise that 12d., but they impose 12d. or 2s. more, upon the subject. So they do upon all they sell, of what kind soever, as all other retailers do, of what quality or profession soever. And seeing all the maritime provinces of France and Flanders, all Holland, iind Zealand, Embden, Breame, &c. cannot want* our Newcastle or our Welsh coals, * i.e. " Cannot do without." STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 31 the imposition cannot impoverish tlie transporter, but that the buyer must make pay- ment accordingl}'. And if the imposition laid on those things whereof the kingdom hath no necessary use, as upon silks, velvets, gold and silver lace, cloath of gold and silver, cut works, cambricks and a world of other trumperv, doth in nothing hinder their vent here, but that they are more used than ever they were, to the utter im- poverishing of the land in general, and of those popinjays that value themselves by their outsides, and by their player's coats. Certainly imposing upon coals, which other nations cannot want, can be no hindrance at all to the Newcastle men, but that they must raise it again upon the French and other nations, as those nations themselves do which fetch them from us with their own shipping. For conclusion of this chapter, I say that it is exceeding lamentable, that for any respect in the world, seeing the preservation of the State and Monarchy doth surmount all other respects, strangers should be permitted to eat us out, by exporting and im- porting, both of our own commodities and those of foreign nations ; for it is no wonder that we are overtopped in all the trades we have abroad and far off, seeing we have the grass cut under our feet, in our own fields and pastures at home.* This general statement of the condition of shipping, both of war and commerce, and of the world's trade by sea, was written between 1609 and 1617, that is between forty-three and thirty-five years before the naval war between England and the United Provinces, which Ealeigh foresaw but did not fear, broke out. We can see that even at the earlier date all the materials for naval war were present, and judging from what happened at the later date, we can but suppose that development in all directions ulti- mately conducive to naval war went on. The disputes relative to the sovereignty of the British seas, which spent themselves in the blasts and counterblasts of literary champions in Charles the First's unfortunate reign, wanted not the sanction of preparation on the sovereign's part for the war to come. Little has been done towards elucidating the share which Charles' understanding of the naval conditions of the kingdom, and the want of understanding on the part of his opposing subjects, may have had in producing the civil war, but it seems to be certain that the chief jjart of the money question was a naval one, and that the superior classes of ships which Charles prepared and built had a most material effect on the course of the Dutch wars. In the first war the complaints of the Dutch admirals were unceasing as to the inferiority of the Dutch ships to those of the English. But in any case it is certain that when the first Dutch war broke out in 1652, those two elements — a great sea-borne commerce, and sea-keeping war-ships — which I have spoken of as fundamental in naval war, were abundantly present on both sides. And so far as the sea-keeping element in the war-ships went, not only had it made great advances, but owing to the neighbourhood of the two * An Abridgment of Sir Walter Raleiyli's History of the World, &c. 1702. 32 NAVAL WARFARE. states at war, and the confined theatre upon the stage of which the drama ^yas phiyed out, this sea-keeping quality was of less importance. The struggle was for the mastery at sea, whether territorial conquest was or was not to follow success in this respect. As both sides had a large commerce, each was necessitated to protect its own in the first instance. What was its strength in peace was its weakness in war, and naval force was necessary to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of such weakness. On the other hand, it would be a principal object for each state, after securing the safety of her own sea-borne commerce, to fall upon, to interrupt, and destroy that of her enemy, as being the part of the nation most readily got at, and as counting double advantage in all cases of capture. The mere destruction of a merchant ship was a loss to her owning state, but no gain to the capturing state. The capture of a merchant ship was equally a loss to the owning state, but it was a similar and direct gain to the capturing state. This great double object of preserving your own sea-borne com- merce and destroying that of the enemy might be aimed at directly or indirectly. The naval force might be divided, one half to guard the State's commerce and protect it from the attacks of the enemy, the other half to break through the commerce-guard of the enemy and attack that which had been guarded. In this case there would be battles between the forces which were guard- ing and the forces which were attacking. There would be two wars going on side by side. The English, to put the case into a concrete and practical form, would be found attacking the Dutch force which was guarding Dutch commerce, and the Dutch would be found attacking the English force which was guarding English commerce. But the two separate plans of war might be brought together in this way : — that the whole English force might be employed to see its commerce into what were assumed to be safe waters, free from the incursions of the enemy, and might then turn upon the whole Dutch force which had been endeavouring to do the same for its own commerce. Or the plan might be carried out vice versa. Otherwise, the objects of preserving our own commerce and destroying that of the enemy might be attained indirectly. If one power could beat the other power off the sea and into his ports — that is, considering war-ships only — it is obvious that the commerce of the conquering state would proceed and flourish, and that that of the conquered state would disappear. There might then be STRUGGLE FOB COMMAND OF THE SEA. 33 simply a series of great battles at sea, in which the element of merchant ships was absent, one fleet attacking the other in the hope of mastering it merely as a means to an end ; the end being a free sea for the commerce of the winner, and the power of capturing, destroying, or simply hindering the flow of the commerce of the loser. There may be all these varieties in the struggle for the command of the sea. That struggle is a phase or condition of naval war- fare, and when the command of the sea is achieved by one of the combatants a new phase sets in, as then one side will try to regain a position which it has lost, and the other side will be bent on holding the position it has gained. We are now, however, onl}' concerned with the previous phase, the struggle for the command of the sea ; and it is nowhere so well offered for investigation and study as in the three great naval wars between the English and the Dutch, beginning in 1652, 1665, and 1672. We have seen that descents on the coast of the enemy, which formed the staple of that war by water which, I think, can- not be classed as naval war, became less and less the staple up to dates when the military seamen quoted were able to la}' it down that such descents were preventible by sea, but not in any other way. We must not lose sight of this fact on entering upon the principles and practice which governed the three wars mentioned above. A principal source of Dutch wealth was her fisheries, chiefly carried on off the north-eastern coasts of Scotland. Charles I. had successfully enforced British rights over these waters, and the non- payment of the <£30,000 annually, which had been fixed by Charles as license dues, was, in fact, one of the causes of the war. In order to avoid the troubles of search and other interruptions at the hands of the English, a great part of the Dutch commerce, both outward and homeward, passed up north by the Shetland Islands. Other parts came up the Channel towards the Straits of Dover. When the negociations in London finally fell through early in July 1652, the points of attack on the Dutch at once open to England, were the great herring fleet in the Moray Firth ; the homeward- bound ships passing Shetland ; and the commerce up Channel. Accordingly the very first move on the part of the English was the dispatch of Blake at the head of sixty-six or sixty-eight sail to the North for the purpose of capturing or destroying the Dutch herring fleet, understood to be somewhere off the Moray Firth under convoy and guard of Dutch war-ships. The next open 3 34 NAVAL WARFARE. action was the despatch of Sir George Ayscue to Plymouth ; there to complete a fleet and to block the Channel against the homeward- bound Dutch merchant ships, and to guard our own trade. Ayscue had not long returned from the reduction of the Island of Barbadoes, one of the many acts of reprisal which had been going on between the two nations — and which were to all intents and purposes acts of war — for a long time previous to its formal declaration. On the declaration of war, Ayscue was lying with twenty-one sail in the Downs, and the Dutch Ambassadors quitting the Thames on the final failure of the negotiations, fell in, off the Schelde, with Tromp, at the head of seventy-nine sail, and inform- ing him of the general naval condition of England, particularly recommended to his notice the twenty-one sail that were then lying in the Downs."^ Tromp (Martin, the father of Cornelius) proceeded immediately to act on the hints given, but owing to the occurrence of calms was unable to reach the Downs in time to effect a sur^^rise, and thereupon bore away North after Blake. Blake on his side sighted the Dutch fleet of herring busses off Buchan Ness (where the figure 1 is placed on the chart), under the guard of twelve or thirteen war-ships, carrying from twenty to thirty guns each. He detached twenty ships of his van to attack them, and after a fight, lasting three hours, about 100 of the busses were taken, two sunk, and twelve war-ships made prizes of. The remainder of the Dutch fled to their own ports. Blake kept some of the busses with him, sent three with the wounded to Inverness, but after unloading them, sent the greater part of the captured busses to Holland with the released prisoners. He then pro- ceeded North to the neighbourhood of Foula and Fair Islands, between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands, for the purpose of carrying out the second part of his orders, the interception of the Dutch merchant ships homeward-bound from the West Indies. There (see 2 on the chart), on the 26th of July, Tromp sighted him, and both sides prepared for battle, when a gale of wind springing up from the southward and ending at N.N.W., shattered and dispersed Tromp's fleet during the night, while Blake's ships, getting to leeward of the Shetland Islands, remained comparatively * The authorities on which I chiefly rely for this chapter are The Life of Cornelius Van Tromp, published in 1()97, in London ; and Co/iiiiina Rostrata, by Samuel Colliber. the second edition published in London in 1739. The second work constantl}^ refers to the first, and both are works largely used by subsequent historians to whose accounts I have referred for clearing up discrepancies, of which there are a good many, especially as to dates. The dates I give are 0. S. ^3^^ THEATRE OFTHE DUTCH WARS, 1652 — 65—72 To Face Pa0e34- STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 35 ^anharmed. Tromp with part of his fleet fell back to the Meuse, again followed, but hardly pursued, by Blake. The remainder of Tromp's ships, except two war-ships that were wrecked on the rocks of Shetland, and three fire-ships that appear to have foundered, got safely into the Vlie and the Texel in the beginning of September. In the meantime, a second Dutch fleet had been fitting out in the Texel under the command of De Ruiter. By August 1st, it had grown to 15 sail and 2 fire-ships ; and then later, with a force made up to 22 sail and 4 fire-ships, De Ruiter put to sea and sailed towards the Straits of Dover, The object was to pass to the southward, gathering the outward-bound trade together eastward of the Straits of Dover, and then to convoy them down Channel, and so far to the westward as to place them presumably beyond danger of attack from the British ships. De Ruiter, accordingly, got as far as Gravelines by the 10th of August, where he was joined by the convoy of 50 merchant ships and a reinforce- ment of 8 war-ships. He proceeded with great caution and with abundant scouts and look-outs, no doubt supposing that he might at any moment be met by the fleet of Ayscue, whom Tromp had failed to get hold of in the Downs. On the 16th of August the Dutch had got as far as the longitude of Plymouth, but well to the southward towards the French coast ; and there, sure enough, was the expected British fleet of 40 sail, 12 of them of great size, 2 being of 60, and 8 of from 36 to 40 guns, with 5 fire-ships. It is claimed for De Ruiter that he had but 30 ships of war, of which only two carried as many as 40 guns, and the rest not more than 30 each. He, too, was hampered with the convoy, now grown to 60 merchant ships.* There was a heavy engagement, which was only put an end to by the approach of night, and it was disputed as to the side on which the victory lay. But the results remained clear enough. The fight took place somewhere about the position marked by the figure 3 on the chart. Ayscue after it, fell back to Plymouth, while De Ruiter next day, the 17th of August, was able to send his merchant ships away on their voyage under convoy of two men-of- war only, and he also followed up the English with some intention of attacking them in Plymouth Sound itself; but, having got * Colmnna Rostnita admits the heavier British ships, but makes the forces more numerically equal, and claims that twenty merchant ships were capable of fighting, and , quoted in the Life of Peun, vol. ii., p. 451. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 61 letters, and seeing the King and D. of York give us, and the officers of the Ordnance, directions in this matter, he did move, that we might do it as privately as we could, that it might not come into the Dutch Gazette presently: as the King's and D. of York's going down the other day to Sheerness was, the week after, in the Harlem Gazette. The King and D. of York hoth laughed at it, and made no matter, but said, ' Let us be safe, and let them talk ; for thei-e is nothing will trouble them more than to hear that we are fortifying ourselves." And the D. of York said, " What said Marshal Tourenne, when some in vanity said that the enemies were afraid, for they entrenched themselves ? ' Well,' says he, ' I would they were not afraid, for then they would not entrench themselves, and so we could deal with them the better.'" What appears remarkable in all this is the clear forecast of what would happen, two months before it did happen. It cannot be said that there was an}' surprise in the Dutch action, nor does it appear that there was much deception on their part. Every one seems to have known perfectly well that if the fleet was not kept up, the enemy would take advantage of it, and sail up the Thames to do what mischief might be done. The Dutch fell in completely with the expectation. With a fleet of 60 sail and a body of troops, De Ruiter put to sea on the 1st of June and made straight for the Thames, designing not only to copy the example set by the English in the Vlie the year before, but being supplied with troops, to make a much heavier descent upon the country. They anchored at the mouth of the Thames on the 7th, and hearing that 10 or 12 English frigates, with a convoy of 20 merchant ships bound to Barbadoes, were in the Hope,* a detachment of 17 light frigates, with fire-ships and small vessels, was prepared and despatched up the river under the command of Admiral de Gent, on the 9th of June. It is worthy of remark at this point, how precisely, so far, the practice followed that pursued in the Ylie. The main fleet lies outside keeping guard ; the shipping is made the first object of attack, and a detachment of light ships is sent to conduct it. The descent upon the land comes afterwards in both cases, even though in the latter there was military force which there was not in the former. f In the case of the Vlie, the attack is planned and made after the sea has been cleared of fleets capable of interfering ; in the case of the Thames, it is undertaken with the knowledge that no naval force exists which is capable of interfering. De Gent met with foul and light winds, and was never able to reach a higher point than a mile and a half below the Lower Hope (that would be somewhere off Thames Haven), and meanwhile the * The Lower Hope, above Thames Haven and below Tilbury Fort. t The whole of the troops, however, were not immediately available. See next p. 62 NAVAL WARFARE. ships there all escaped to the upper reaches of the river. This part of the expedition having miscarried, attention was turned to Sheerness and its newly arranged and apparently incomplete defences. Howevei- to-day [observes young Cornelius Da Witt, the son of the Pensioner, who was attached to the fleet in a civil capacity], about noon* (the 10th June), as the tide beo-an to come in, we advanced as far as the mouth of the river of Chattam. We presently gave orders to the land troops and marine soldiers to make a descent, and to attack the fort of Sheerness. In the meanwhile we advanced with our men-of-war, and anchored before the same fort. At our approach, one of the King's frigates with some other vessels, and some fire-ships that were there, betook themselves to flight, and the men in the fort ran away likewise before our troops got thither ; so that after the fort had been cannonaded about an hour and a h.alf, our seamen scaled it to pull down from thence the English banner. We found there fifteen pieces of cannon, which we carried ofi" to our ships ; ami a great magazine of masts, yards, and in general of all necessaries for the rigging of ships, valued at near 400,000 livers. We gave order to all our captains to carry, each of them, on board a good quantity, and to set fire to the rest. Because the most part of the troops were separated from us by foul weather, the general officers thought not fit to engage themselves too far up the country with so few people, or else they might have done a great deal of mischief. We are, however, of opinion to keep the river of London blocked up, and to hinder the passage of ships there, as much as 'tis possible for us. And to that effect Lieu- tenant Admiral De Ruiter is to come up and joyn us with the main body of the fleet, f Since my last letter of the 10th [he again writes to the States-General] by which I informed your High and Mightyneses of the taking of Sheerness, we have received fresh marks of God's protection by several glorious advantages we have newly obtained. After we had detached away some advice-yachts, and several boats armed, to go and sound the passage from hence to Chattam, we resolved to send up thither to-day Lieutenant- Admiral de Gent's squadron; and accordingly by the favour of a good N.E. wind, we unmoored from Sheerness at six in the morning (of June 12th). About noon we arrived near some English men-of-war, having on board them very large guns, and being very well manned, who made a show at first as if they would make a brisk defence ; but as soon as we had burnt four or five of them, some of the others were deserted, so that we took them. I cannot at present give you a particular account of what ships perished in the flames ; but I know vei-y well the Royal Charles, carrying ninety brass guns, and another carrying alike number, fell into our hands. There are still four or five more a little above us, against which we sent some of ours, and because there is a very great consternation among the English, we doubt not but to take them. According to the advices we have had of the enemy, they have sunk sixteen or eighteen ships, the most part fire-ships, to block the passage of the river against us. But, in sj^ite of all these precautions, our ships are passed up, and we flatter ourselves with the hopes to bring along with us those which wo shall have taken. ^ Albemarle was in command at Chatham, and was an eye-witness of all the destruction wrought, which, no doubt, was minimized as much as possible in his official report, which was presented to Par- * " Up ; " says Pepys, " and news brought us that the Dutch are come as high as the Nore, and more pressing orders for fire-ships." Ltfc of Penn, vol. ii., p. 441. t Life of Cornelius Tromp, p. 425. : Ibid., p. 426. STRUGGLE FOR COMMA XD OF THE SEA. 63 liament in February 1668. He complained bitterly of everything. Nothing was complete. Batteries ordered were incomplete ; the Royal Charles, which had been ordered up the river three months before, was left below to be captured. The ships sunk were not sunk in the right place, and ships ordered to be sunk were not sunk. He " could not get a carpenter but two that were running away." He " had no assistance from Commissioner Pett, nor no gunners nor men to draw on the guns, except the two masters of attendance." And so on, with the usual string of excuses made by those who have failed. But he had seen the guard-ships burnt, and the Royal Charles (82) carried off on the 12th, and the Great James (82) — otherwise the Royal James — the Royal Oak (76), and the Loyal London (90) burnt on the 13th, while he looked helplessly on, which was enough to set a man throwing the blame on some- body else, and particularly so to him as one of the advisers of this " defensive war." For the ships were all flag-ships, the very finest in the navy, and had carried admirals' flags at sea under his command only a very few months before. This act of destruction completed the work in the Medway. The Dutch fell back to the mouth of the river again, blocking it and putting a stop to all commerce by their presence. But troops were landed m Sheppy, and foraged indiscriminately for the use of the fleet. De Gent was also detached on the 15th of June to the Shetland Islands to pick up and convoy home the Dutch East India ships. Attempts were also made to send a light squadron up to Gravesend, but between newly-sunken ships and newly- erected batteries the defences were sufficient to frustrate the plan. The Dutch being reinforced by fresh troops, it was determined to make an attack on Landguard Fort, Harwich, and the i:)lan settled was as follows : — 1,600 soldiers and 400 seamen were landed — I think it must have been on the beach towards Felixstowe — out of fire from the fort. Vice-Admiral Evertz was, with fourteen men-of-war, to attack the fort on the sea-side, while Rear-Admiral Van Nes was to enter the harbour and attack from that side. Then, when the fire was subdued, the land force was to advance and comf)lete the capture. But they had reckoned without their host ; for the shoal water prevented either squadron from operating ; only a distant and useless fire being opened by Evertz. The troops made some attempts to advance on the fort in the open, but seeing that without the supporting fire of the ships it would be impossible to succeed, they re-embarked. The Dutch now set about more regularly blockading the Thames 64 NAVAL WARFARE. by smaller force higher up, while detachments watched off Harwich and the North Foreland to guard against surprise either from north or south. The news of the conclusion of peace reached the Dutch on the 4th of July, but such was the elation of the States at their success, that, on the plea that the treaty was not fully ratified, De Euiter was ordered into the Channel to prey upon the English commerce and to alarm the southern ports ; while Van Nes was directed to push up the Thames again to do what mischief he might. De Euiter, very possibly because of his knowledge of the situation, did little but to create alarm. But there was a sharp encounter hetween Van Nes and Sir Edward Spragge, who had got together some naval force and a good provision of fire-ships. The Dutch failed to make any impression, and in the end resumed the blockade of the Thames until the ratification of the treaty of peace relieved them from that duty. 65 CHAPTEE IV. The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — (continued). Experience has taught that a superior commerce cannot be protected by only an equal fleet ; and the Dutch, in the third war, still abandon commerce till greater strength is gained. — The direct struggle for the command of the sea is resumed at Sole Bay. — It is useless to prepare for making descents on the enemy's coast unless his fleet is first disposed of. — The embarkation of troops by the Allies is of no service. — The great powers of naval forces on distant expeditions if not met by like forces. The Dutch, throughout the whole of their second war with England, had carried it out on the principle of a simple and direct struggle for the command of the sea. They had nerved themselves for it by the abandonment of their commerce for the time, in order that neither their attention nor their forces should be diverted for a moment from the attainment of the main object in view. The result was that the protection of commerce dropped out of the regular programme, and great battles no longer hinged on the necessity of protecting convoy. The completeness of the change of system between the first and second Dutch wars is easily lost sight of from the confused, un- dramatic, and pointless way in which the stories have generally been told. But we note it when we observe that out of the seven battles which marked the progress of the first Dutch war, four arose directly out of the necessity of protecting commerce, and that three times, if not four, it was chance which prevented the occur- rence of battles under similar circumstances ; and in the second war, though there were captures of merchant ships on both sides, no battle came about in consequence of an endeavour to protect them. Thus, in the first war, we see it begin in July 1652 with an attack on the large squadron protecting the Dutch herring busses. Immediately afterwards, the accident of a gale of wind 5 66 NAVAL WARFARE. prevents Tromp from bringing Blake to action near the Shetland Islands, as a means of securing the return of the homeward-bound West India ships. In August, De Ruiter fights Ayscue off Ply- mouth, in defence of his convoy of 60 ships. In November, Tromp attacks Blake near the Straits of Dover, in order to leave the Channel free for the passage of 300 outward-bound Dutch ships. In February 1053, Blake in the Channel endeavours to intercept Tromp's convoy of 250 homeward-bound ships. In May, Dean and Monk all but bring Tromp to action off the Dutch coast, in order to make themselves masters of the 200 ships he was convoying outward ; and in June, Evertz was only prevented by the accident of wind from attacking Bodley in the Downs, when he was in charge of eight merchant-ships. In the second war, all this had passed away. Not a single battle arose out of commerce protection, and no outward-bound convoy left the ports of Holland. There were attacks, and very heavy ones, upon merchant shipping, but the heaviest were made upon shij)s at anchor in port ; as at Bergen, and in the Vlie, on the English side, and as at Gliickstadt, and the attempt on the ships in the Lower Hope on the Dutch side. It was more by chance than of set purpose that the Dutch captured nine English merchant ships on their way to fight the battle of Sole Bay ; and that the English possessed themselves at sea of some of the scattered merchant ships, which they had failed to master at Bergen. On both sides, again, we may observe a tendency to push the advantages even of a temporary command of the sea. This is shown principally in the successful and unsuccessful attacks on shipping in harbour ; but more strongly in the descents upon the land, as at the islands of Vlie and Schelling, where the English appeared to land with their ordinary crews only ; and at Sheerness and Harwich, where the Dutch employed regular troops. Still we have to note that these descents, as they were called, were only made when temporary command of the sea had been gained, and then only by detachments, the main body of the fleet being in all €ases, as it were, securing the rear of the attacking parties. Naval war had, in fact, found its limits and settled down into its bearings. The things which could and the things which could not be done with reasonable hopes of success were making them- selves manifest, and it was being seen in what direction the ulti- mate appeal to naval force lay. In both wars the English had had, on the whole, the best of it, and the Dutch, on the whole, the worst of it ; and things at To face Fade i STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 67 the end of the second war remained so much as they had been at the beginning of it — the raid on the Medway and Thames being quite understood on both sides to have been deUberately courted by the English — that the third Dutch war was laid out on the same principles as the second. There were the usual reprisals before war was declared, and England, taking advantage of her position as lying across the stream of Dutch commerce, fell upon it in March 1672 at the back of the Isle of Wight (No. 1 on the chart), and the small force that could be got together under Sir Eobert Holms was sufficient to levy a heavy contribution upon the unfortunate and unprepared Dutchmen. France, which had failed to make herself of any use to Holland as an ally in the second war, was very much of the same mind towards England in the third war. But not quite ; for she now brought a contingent of 36 men-of-war and 22 fire-ships under Count D'Estrees, and formed a junction with the Duke of York at the back of the Isle of Wight on the 14th of May, the united fleets sailing immediately to the favourite open anchorage of Southwold, or Sole Bay, on the coast of Sussex. But it may be usefully pointed out that the French alliance was employed, not to produce an overwhelming force at sea, but merely to relieve England from some part of the expense of the war. The Dutch generally sent to sea a fleet as large as that of the Allies. On the outbreak of the war, the Hollanders prohibited sea-borne commerce in much the same terms as in 1665 and 1666. They were eager to contest directly the great point at issue, and during the hours of darkness before day broke on May 28th, the cannon of the look-out ships announced to the allied fleet then at anchor, the approach of the enemy (No. 2 on the chart). The Allies were 65 sail of English and 36 sail of French, with 22 fire-ships, besides small vessels. The Duke of York com- manded in chief, under the red flag ; the white squadron was wholly French, under D'Estrees ; and the blue was commanded by the Earl of Sandwich. The Dutch were 91 sail of men-of-war, and 44 fire-ships, besides 23 yachts and small vessels. Their fleet was also in three squadrons, De Euiter commanding in chief with the red flag ; Admiral Bankert commanding the white squadron ; and Admiral De Gent the blue. The Allies were practically surprised. Many ships had to cut their cables to get into action, and the battle began between 7 and 8 a.m. De Euiter said of it that he had never been in so 6 ♦ 68 NAVAL WARFARE. continuous and obstinate a fight. The whole French squadron held back, and took as little part as they possibly could in the action. They retired out of the way to the southward, but were followed up to some extent, and lost two of their ships. Sandwich in the Royal James was determinedly attacked by fire-ships. The ship was fired and burnt, and Sandwich was drowned in attempting to escape from her. But notwithstanding this loss, and notwith- standing the defection of the French squadron, the Dutch were worsted, and fell back towards their own coasts, followed up by the English and by the French, who rejoined next day. The Dutch claimed to have burnt the Royal James, to have sunk two first-rates, and to have destroyed two other ships. They admitted that one of their ships was taken and another sunk. The Allies now appeared off the Dutch coast with some intention of making a descent somewhere in Zealand, but in the near presence of the Dutch fleet found it would not be feasible. They then made some preparation for a descent on the island of Texel, but circumstances of tide caused the abandonment of the idea, and the squadrons were employed in the simple blockade of the Maas and the Texel. The Dutch at this time were terribly pressed by the advance of the French armies by land, and the alarmed state of the sea- coasts. They sued for peace without success, but did not feel themselves strong enough to attempt another sea-fight with the Allies. But their privateers were in operation, and one of them carried an English East India ship as a prize into Bergen. The English also made prizes, and hearing at length that fourteen East India ships were on their way home north of Scotland, they cruized by the Dogger Bank in hopes of intercepting them. The merchant-ships, however, got safely into Bergen without having been seen, and as winter approached, all the war forces returned into their respective ports. At the begmning of 1673 the Dutch were full of a novel device, the idea of which has more than once since proved attractive, though I believe it has never been put in practice. They thought it might be feasible to block up the Thames by sinking vessels there, and for this purpose prepared eight ships with stones at Amsterdam, which were afterwards taken into the Texel. I assume that the early appearance of the English fleet at sea prevented any attempts to carry this design into execution. I can find no reason stated, only that the attempt was not made. In the early part of May, the Dutch fleet began to assemble in STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 69 the Schooneveld, the anchorage off the mouth of the Schelde. De Euiter is said to have failed in a design to intercept the EngUsh Canary, Bordeaux, and Newcastle merchant fleets in their passage into the Thames, and had then returned to the Schooneveld,^ but it is not mentioned by my earlier and fuller authority. However this may be, there they were on the 22nd of May. The Allies had joined their forces otf Eye, and they, too, had new ideas as to what was before them, for they took on board a body of troops with the intention of effecting a landing some- where in Zealand. They had 84 men-of-war, and 26 fire-ships and small vessels. In order to prevent the tendency to hang back which had been displayed at Sole Bay the year before, the French were now distributed in the fleet, and not drawn together in a separate squadron as had before been the case. Rupert com- manded the Red Squadron, D'Estrees the White, and Spragge, who had distinguished himself in the Thames in 1667, commauded the Blue. The Dutch were 70 men-of-war besides fire-ships, under De Ruiter, Tromp, and Bankert ; but their fleet was not complete, and was being gradually augmented. The Allies came in sight of the Dutch fleet thus anchored, on the 22nd May ; but the weather was foggy, and the lie of the shoals thereabouts was not known to the former fleet. Soundings gained could not be fixed in conse- quence of the fog, and the advance on the Dutch was delayed, the allied fleet anchoring in the neighbourhood. Bad weather followed for two or three days, and still further postponed action ; but on the 28th of May, the anniversay of the Battle of Sole Bay, both fleets were under way and came to action (No. 3 on the chart). The battle began about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and it lasted in the usual confused formf until 10 o'clock at night, when the Dutch claimed a victory, but anchored under cover of their shoals. Great slaughter had been done on the English ships in conse- quence of their being crowded with troops ; and it must be added that it could only have been by entire miscalculation that these troops were on board, as taking ships crowded with useless men * Burcbett, p. 403. Lediard, vol. ii., p. GOO, who also seems to speak as if De Ruiter, with 42 sail and his stone vessels, was off the Thames on the 2nd May, and frightened off b}' news of a fleet in the river. t " The two Royal Fleets made a motion, and having cast their squadrons into the form of a crescent made up directly towards the Dutch." — Life of Comelius Tromp, p. 464. 70 NAVAL WARFARE. into a fleet action must have been well understood to be a needless sacrifice of life. It seems clear that the Allies must have assumed that the Dutch fleet would not appear at sea, and that they could have made their contemplated descent without interruption. They were now in this position, that while they had lost but two men-of- war, both French, and the Dutch had lost one, which was disabled, and sank during the night with great loss of life, they claimed a victory without being able to follow it up, and so disprove the Dutch claim in the same direction ; for crowded with wounded, and embarrassed with the troops, they were not at all desirous to renew the action, however much it might be necessary to keep a watch on the movements of the Dutch fleet. As a consequence of this inaction the Dutch recovered their spirits and hopes, and on the 4th of June they made good their claims by putting to sea to assume the offensive directly. They were near the Allies by noon, but these drew off so persis- tently to the north-westward, that it was not till 5 o'clock in the evening that the battle began (No. 4 on the chart). The various historians are in direct contradiction over the chief events of the battle, which were, whether the Dutch, as Cornelius Tromp dis- tinctly says they did, chased the Allies to within five miles of Sole Bay, and were only prevented by darkness from continuing the battle,"^ or whether the English turned and drove the Dutch back to Schooneveld, which is the English statement.! It may be noted as something in dispute which cannot be settled here. What is material io note is that there was a second battle nine days after the first, in which the Dutch assumed the offensive, and that after it each fleet retired to its own shores. Perhaps it may here be usefully remarked that one of the his- toriansj not only admits the unwillingness of the Allies to come to action on account of their being hampered with their wounded, but claims that the Dutch, after their stay on their own coast, were re- inforced and refitted in a way which was impracticable for the Allies at sea. This is, no doubt, possible, though it is denied by the Dutch so far as any reinforcement goes ; but it illustrates the position taken up by a competent authority, not from his knowledge as a seaman, for he was not one, but from his experience as a naval statesman. This was the Duke of York's secretary, Sir William • Lt/e of CorneHus Tromp, p. 476. t Berkley, p. 514. Burchett, p. 403. Lediard explains it, vol. ii., p. 602, by saying the Dutch being to windward were able to hold off, and did so. \ Lediard, vol. ii., p. 601. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 71 Coventry, and Pepys records his opinion in the following words : — "30th (July 1666).— To Sir W. Coventry, at St. James'. I find him speaking very slightly of the late victory (the victory off the North Foreland, which was followed by the cruise upon the Dutch coast) ; dislikes their staying with their fleet up their coast, be- lieving that the Dutch will come out in fourteen days, and then we, with our unready fleet, by reason of some of the ships being maimed, shall be in bad condition to fight them upon their own coast. "^ Not precisely contemplating the same circumstances, but still with a tendency to the same line of thought, Lord Howe wrote in a similar strain a hundred and thirty years later. Doubtless these views operated on both sides of the North Sea, and militated against any attempt at that persistent watching of Dutch or English ports which was so much enforced in later wars, and so notably on this very Dutch coast by Duncan. Both in liability to damage by weather, and in defective victualling, it must probably be admitted that the ships of the middle of the seventeenth cen- tury and those of the end of the eighteenth differed largely, and with disadvantage in the former period. The practice after this battle, and after so many others, of both sides retiring into port and leaving the sea open, must to some extent be assigned to these causes, though possibly more to mere custom existing till another custom supervened. No ships were lost on either side in the encounter of the 4th of June ; but the Dutch authority states that the Allies admitted a loss of over 3,000 men, and this, if true, confirms the account of the crowded state of the ships, and supplies further proof of the reasons why they were not keen about close action. But, notwith- standing the lessons to the contrary which they would seem to have received, as to the great difficulty of making a descent on the enemy's shore until his fleet had been fully and finally dealt with, the Allies were still full of the project ; and having landed their wounded, they took on board 7,000 fresh troops, and put to sea again on the 17th of June. But the Dutch meanwhile showed an advance in the art of naval war by detaching a small squadron of observation to the Thames, under Eear-Admiral de Haan, who, on his return, was able to report having seen some 70 men-of-war at anchor off Sheerness, and of having heard that 30,000 troops were to be embarked at Tilbury Hope in preparation for a descent on Zealand. The Dutch found * Quoted in Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 412, already quoted in chap. iii. 72 NAVAL WARFARE. themselves unable to bring together sufficient naval force to make sure of fighting on something of an equality with the 60 English and 30 French ships of war which appeared before the Maas and Schevelling^ on the 23rd and 24th of June. In proximity to the 70 Dutch ships ready in the waters of Zealand, no descent was attempted, and the Allies passed to the northward off the Texel, along the coasts of Holland and Friesland to Vlie, Ameland and the Western Ems, and then back to the Texel again. The only claim made by the English historians to success in this demonstration is that it harassed the enemy's troops on the coast, and kept them continually alert ; that it blocked up his ports, and endangered his returning East India merchant fleet, of which, however, but one was taken. On the other hand, a fleet crowded up with troops, which were made no use of whatever, was in almost a critical condition in case even the inferior Dutch fleet should come upon it. The Dutch stood these insults and threatenings to their coast for a fortnight, and then, about the 3rd of August, about the time that the Allies got back off the Texel, they put to sea, and stood along- shore to the northward. Foul winds, and possibly great caution, hindered their progress, so that it was not till the 10th of August that the fleets sighted each other, and about eight o'clock in the morning joined in a furious and final battle for that command of the sea which had never yet fallen, and was not now to fall, fully into the hands of either power. The Allies were, as before observed. 90 strong under the former commanders — Eupert, D'Estrees, and Spragge. But a trust was once more placed in the French, which they were once more and finally to betray. D'Estrees commanded the white squadron, which was composed entirely of his own ships. The Dutch were 70 strong, under De Kuiter, Cornelius Tromp, and Bankert. The fight that ensued is said by the author of Columna Rostrata to have been " like a general war of the elements," and it lasted till after sunset (No. 5 on the chart). This could not have been, considering the great numerical inferiority of the Dutch, had not D'Estrees from the very first held aloof and left the English and Dutch to fight it out while he looked on. Tromp was in the Golden Lion, and Spragge in the Prince.f These two fell upon one another, until both ships were so disabled that they shifted their flags to * Schevenint^en, tho port of the Hague. t The historians say the Royal Prince, but it was probably the Prince, 90, built at Chatham in 1G70. See Charnock, vol. ii., p. 42G. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 73 the Comet and St. George, and fell upon one another again. The St. George became a second ship disabled under the feet of the English admiral, and he then passed into a boat to go on board the Royal Charles ; but on his way a shot cut his boat in two, and he was drowned. In other parts of the fleet equally stubborn contests were carried out, but in the end it does not seem to have been con- tested that the Dutch were victors. There was very slight loss of ships on either side ; the English admitted a yacht sunk, and the Dutch only allow a loss of a few fire-ships, either sunk or " uselessly spent ; " but there was great loss of men and officers. The English, besides Spragge, lost four captains, and the Dutch lost two vice- admirals, de Liefde, and Sweers, with two captains, and many superior officers wounded. The destruction of men in the English fleet was said to be very heavy, no doubt from their crowded con- dition. The Dutch claim to have kept the sea till the 12th Sep- tember, without sign of any attempt by the English to contest their substantial victory. This was the last act of the war. The English nation was sick of a Catholic alliance against a Protestant State, and the navy was heartily sick of consorts in battle whose policy it was to induce them to enter into action with inferior forces of their own, and then to leave them to do the best they could. Peace was concluded in February 1664, and the next time destiny brought English and Dutch into hostile naval operations, she brought them in side by side in the third possible change of alliance between the three great European nations. It had been first Dutch and French against the English, out of which very little had come. It was next French and English against the Dutch, out of which only a little more had come. It was next to be English and Dutch against the French, out of which a great deal was to come. I have, perhaps, sufficiently remarked upon the leading charac- teristics of the first and second Dutch w^ars, and how the first was •carried on with the idea that the command of the sea was not a primary necessity ; that an extensive commerce, which was m a sense the life-food of the State, might be protected by forces which were only large enough to contend on a fair equality with the enemy's war- ships bent on the capture or destruction of the very thing which the Dutch forces were assembled to protect ; how the •enemy, the English, with a smaller commerce, and consequently less distractions, were able to devote themselves almost completely to assuming the offensive ; how, after pursuing this policy through- out the first war, the Dutch, learning then- lesson, wholly changed 74 NAVAL WARFARE. it on the outbreak of the second war, and practically held their own, though with marked signs of inferiority, in a direct contention for the command of the sea, throughout it; and then, having reached firm ground in the wanderings of exjDerience, held to it on the outbreak of the third war, and maintained it with really improved success throughout its course. These are broad principles which lie, as it were, in prominent boulders on the plain landscape, as we survey, in the brief and not keenly critical or too closely investigating way we have done in these chapters, the further formation of the rules of naval war. As- to what may specially come from a comparison of the general con- duct of the third war with that which characterized the second, I think we may almost say that impatience with the method adopted in the second war was manifested on both sides in the third. There had been a descent on the shipping in the Vlie, which had been extraordinarily successful to the English and extraordinarily damaging to the Dutch. There had been a descent by the Dutch on the dismantled war-ships of the English at Chatham, which, though quite as successful to the Dutch, could only have been made up by the counters representing insult, to the damage they had sufi'ered in the Vlie. Then, again, there had been Tiddiman's un- successful attempt on the merchant fleet at Bergen, and men must have considered that probably a heavier force would have suc- ceeded. Altogether, when the third war broke out, there must have been a good deal of floating feelmg about in favour of something more dramatic and telling than a continuation of the long string of pitched battles, which wound its way back through twenty years of remembrance ; and so there is soon on the side of the Dutch the idea of snatching an advantage, not by necessary exertion and sacrifice, but by something with a preponderating element of chance in it. So the stone ships to block the Thames are prepared, and so, if some of the historians are right, does the scheme come to nothing, because the presence of superior English force eliminates chance. So do the English take on board troops for a descent on the Dutch shores, as it seems, on the chance that the Dutch fleet would not interfere ; and then, after it is found how much the Dutch fleet does interfere, and has to be fought off the Schooneveld twice ; and how heavy the loss of life has been in consequence, so far as we may gather, of too great reliance upon chance, even then this desire of a descent favoured by chance is not weakened. Fresh troops are embarked, who appear to have been useful as targets STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 75 for the Dutch chiefly in the one operation — a general action of the old type — in which it was found feasible to engage. It may be difficult to say with the materials before me — there may be none, in fact, which would give us the exact truth — but yet there is ground for believing that men did not lay sufficient stress on the circumstances surrounding the successes of the Vlie and the Medway, and hoped for the successes without the presence of like conditions. Sandwich need have had no apprehensions in detaching Tiddi- man early in August, for he was there himself with a full and victorious fleet, the Dutch having been, not two months before, frightfully beaten back into their ports, and full of the confusions, bickerings, and divided counsels, that the beaten side is prone to. When Rupert and Albemarle detached Sir Robert Holms on the peculiarly successful enterprise in the Vlie, it was but a fortnight after the Dutch, thoroughly beaten in the battle off the North Foreland, had been driven behind the shelter of their shoals, leaving the victorious English entirely unopposed at sea ; and when the Dutch made their appearance in the Medway, and carried off and burnt some of our finest war-ships, it was because the English had deliberately disarmed and unmanned those ships, clearly anti- cipating, and recording their anticipation three months before, that they would be attacked in the way they were. And on such grounds, the Dutch would have shown greater wisdom and pre- science had they postponed all idea of blocking up the Thames in 1673 until they were assured of being able to protect the detach- ment employed in the duty ; and the Allies would have shown a clearer apprehension of the situation had they been fully prepared to guarantee a landing without interruption from the Dutch fleet, without loss of communication with their own ships after landing, and with security for their re-embarkation. The histories do not tell us why these troops were so uselessly and so slaughterously carried about for two weeks on the Dutch coast, but reading between the lines, we seem to see that it was the want of these guarantees that enforced it. One of the earlier historians considers that the advance of the Dutch to fight the battle of the 4th of June was an unusual proceed- ing on their part, " for, from the first action agamst the English in these seas, anno 1652, till this time, they had seldom voluntarily engaged out of sight of their own coast ; nor had they ever been the aggressors in any one considerable fight, except twice, when they had the fortune to surprise the English, first m the Downs, 76 NAVAL WARFARE. in the time of Blake, and then in Souldbay, the former year (1672)."''^ I hardly think we can say that this was so, unless we injudiciously mingle the question of strategy which would deter- mine the locality of the battle, and the question of tactics which would determine its conduct. At present I hardly touch at all upon the tactics pursued in these wars, and may dismiss Colli- ber's observation with the remark that inasmuch as it generally happened that the Dutch were to leeward, not by their choice, but by the accident of wind, it was hardly in their power in those days to become tactically the aggressors. Strategically, I think, we must rather accept the opposite view, and say that the Dutch in the three wars showed latterly a greater and not a less tendency to fight near home. In the first war, the last battle off the Texel was the only one which could properly be said to have been fought on the Dutch coast, and in the second war, the capture of the cruisers by Robertson off the Texel was the only fight on that side of the water. In the third war, on the other hand, three out of the four great battles were fought on the Dutch side of the North Sea ; and I hardly think it was choice on the part of the Hollanders, I should say rather that a review of all the circumstances would show that they felt a decreasing power as each war went on, so that if the English had of themselves been as determined to beat the Dutch off the sea in 1672-73 as they had been in 1652-54, the war might have taken a different form, and the Dutch might have been pressed closer home than they were ; but the third war was distasteful to the prevailing opinion in England, and the alliance with France served as an economy, not as an increase of force. Without going more thoroughly into statistics than is conform- able to the scope of this work, I cannot say how the question of the protection and loss of commerce may have affected exactly the conduct of the war and its popularity. My principal autho- rity tells me that in the third war the loss of merchant ships by capture on both sides was considerable, but that it was greater on the side of the English than on that of the Dutch, simply because the Dutch prohibition left only the homeward-bound ships open to the English attack. f The immense destruction at the Vlie, and the considerable captures of the ships from Bergen, had in the second war probably far over-balanced the scale as against the Dutch ; while in the first Dutch war we might almost say * Coluiiina Rostrata, p. 238. f Coluiiina Rostrata, p, '2o0. STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 77 that the main effort had been immediately directed upon their enemy's commerce by the Enghsh. But if, while the battles of the war fleets, in consequence of the defections of the French, were fought without adequate result, and if English commerce had been suffering to a greater extent than that of the Dutch, there was some business objection to join to the moral one, and demand a cessation of the third war. English merchant shipping was immensely on the increase, as in 1688 it was estimated to have doubled since 1666, and if the Dutch by the prohibition of their own commerce were able to make the English losses proportion- ately the greater, the gain in so acting could be demonstrated. All these wars were begun and ended on the sea. Even the successful raids that were made into territory extended hardly beyond the water territory, and the prizes drawn were water prizes. We may say it was the near equality of the combatants in every way which kept the battles off the land. When it was found difficult to get through with arrangements for even mere rushes at the land, the organizing of great expeditions such as Spain had set her heart on was out of the question. The wars adhered to the more unstable element simply, j)erhaps, because neither side could get off it. While all that was really important in the drama was played in European waters, the byplot circulated in more distant parts of the world, wherever there were English or Dutch interests to attack or defend. In the first war. Van Galen on the one side and Commodore Bodley on the other fought in the Mediterranean over the right to carry on their own commerce unmolested, and to prevent the other from carrying on any at all, and did it with varying fortunes. And then the old system of cross-raiding, begun in an irregular war of reprisals, was ushered in and continued amongst the distant possessions of both States in Africa and in the West Indies. Sir Robert Holms, entirely unop^josed because no attempt or preparation to opi^ose him was or could have been made, ravaged down the West Coast of Africa, as already mentioned, to Cape Verd, Goree, Elmina, which withstood him, and Cape Coast Castle. Then he passed over to New Netherland, as New York was then called, and reduced it, because there was nothing to prevent him doing so. And then came the other side ; for news reaching Holland of the mischief that had been quietly done, the Dutch Government proceeded to undo it again, or to do it over again equally secretly. De Ruiter, then at Cadiz, slipped 78 NAVAL WARFARE. away quietly in Sir Robert Holms' footsteps, to retake, if possible, all that had been taken. He was, in some cases, successful, and he took the original English post of Fort Cormantin, though Cape Coast Castle and Chama held out against him. Then passing over to Barbados, he found himself not strong enough for more than the capture of merchant ships which were there, and at Monserrat, Nevis, and Newfoundland, after which he returned home to be placed in command of the home fleet as we have seen. But later on, in 1666-67, we had that tranfer and re-transfer of islands in the West Indies from State to State which, from beginning to end, seems to have been characteristic of war in those latitudes. The English began by taking St. Eustace, Tobago, and other places from the Dutch. Then the Dutch, under Commodore Quiryns, made themselves masters of Surinam. Next the French and Dutch together all but possessed themselves of half the Island of St. Christopher's. A naval expedition from Barbados, to restore things at the former island, failed on account of dispersal by wind. The Dutch still gaining strength, Evertson recovered Tobago, and made many prizes on the coast of Virginia. But then Sir John Harman arrived from England at St. Christo- pher's with twelve frigates, in March 1667. This made a concen- tration of the French and Dutch necessary, and stopped the raiding till it was decided which nation was to have the control in these waters. There was a general action in May off St. Christo- pher's, as to which the immediate results are disputed ; but the ultimate result was the separation of the French and Dutch, leaving the English in command of the sea, and enabling them to retake Surinam. An early operation of the third war was the recapture of Tobago by five or six ships and a regiment of foot from Barbados, under Sir Thomas Bridger. On the other side, the Dutch population possessed themselves of the Island of St. Helena, and drove the English Governor and people into the ships at anchor. But Commodore Mondy with four ships-of-war, on his way to offer convoy to the East India fleet, wanting fresh water and perceiving he must retake the Island to get it, proceeded to that business and concluded it. These special features of naval war will probably have to be reconsidered in some detail before we have done with them, in order to get more closely at their principles. We may say that in all the wars where the command of the sea was incomplete, and STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 79 •where territories which might be captured were tenable after capture, this kind of thing went on. I believe, so far as I can see, that at the moment all that is before us is to note how closely conquest follows the naval steps, and how all other power is, as it were, swallowed up by naval power. It is not, of course, that even in this very early stage, we do not see how naval force may be rendered unable to effect its purpose ; but the general result seems to give great preponderance to him who has the power over the water, and each possessor of this power seems to sweep all up as it progresses, leaving it to be again swept up by the next naval possessor of the broom. 80 NAVAL WARFARE. CHAPTER Y. The Diffeeentiation of Naval Force. The promiscuous system of fighting in the early days of naval warfare did not tend to the production of any particular classes of ships. — The rise of the line of battle tended to increase the force of the ships forming part of it, and to equalize their power. — At the same time the pursuit and defence of commerce tended to develop a lighter class of ships. — The necessities of a fleet in having j^i'opGr look-outs demanded a third class. — The results of these tendencies are traced down to 1813. In the previous chapters I have endeavoured to trace the rise of true naval war and its nature ; and then to show how, owing to the position which sea-borne commerce takes as the major part of the wealth and stability of nations, there may be, and have been, wars wholly naval — wars where the operations on the land, or against the land, have been insignificant, or else wholly absent, in comparison with the operations on the water. But as naval war arose and developed without premeditation, and even without knowledge at first of what it really meant, it followed that it was only by degrees that men came to understand what kinds of naval force were required in the economies of naval war, and how these kinds of force could be most effectively dis- tributed. If the first Anglo-Dutch war exhibited itself on a wholly new plan, a plan which had never been seen in the world before, it was quite possible to regard it as something exceptional, and to suppose that earlier types of war might revive. It did not follow at once that maritime nations should prepare for that kind of war, and no other ; it was not certain that this struggle for the com- mand of the sea was for ever after to be the one aim of naval nations, in the first instance ; and that unless there was at the outbreak of the war excess of power on one side sufiicient to assert and maintain it, the Anglo-Dutch type of war was permanent. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 81 But -when a second and a third war succeeded, of which the lines were, if anything, marked out in deeper cuts than ever, it could not but follow that all who had control over naval services should endeavour to prepare them for that kind of war and no other. And what, so far, was this kind of war ? It was, doubtless, chiefly a series of general actions between the most powerful forces that each side could bring to bear against the other. Secondarily, it was the defence and attack of commerce at sea. Thirdly, it was the attack and defence of commerce in port, supplemented here and there by attempts to damage the sources of naval strength, and to a very small extent by attempts to damage property on land. It had been made clear that the defence and attack of commerce could, and sometimes must, go on side by side with the direct struggle for the command of the sea ; but equally clear that the power against which the balance turned by ever so little in the great primary contest, was terribly handicapped as to the defence of its commerce. It had also been fully demonstrated that it was enth'ely hopeless to think of making attacks on shipping in port, on sources of war supply, or on property on land, unless there were at least an assured local command of the sea surrounding the point attacked. This was possibly the lesson least easy to learn, seeing that until the advent of the Dutch wars the system of cross-raiding had not been abandoned. Almost obviously some differentiation of naval force should have followed the determination of the Dutch in the second and third wars to abandon all attempts to defend their commerce, and by consequence to suppress it for the time. On the Dutch side, their whole power would be thrown into the form which was considered most suitable for the great fleet action, but v they might also have looked to a small expenditure on vessels most suitable for attack- ing the commerce of the enemy at sea. On the English side, the knowledge that the Dutch were determined to throw their whole energies into the general fleet action, as a direct endeavour to get such a command of the sea as would enable them to restore their commerce, would compel special attention to the preparation of the fleet for general action. The absence of Dutch commerce would equally divert attention from the provision of means for commerce attack, and there would remain commerce defence. But even here the attitude of the Dutch would have been such as not to arouse great apprehension, and, therefore, even commerce defence might have held in general estimation a subordinate place. Strategically, the effect was on both sides towards a dif- 6 82 NAVAL WARFARE. ferentiation of force into that which was considered most suitable for the general fleet action, and that supposed most efficient for the attack and defence of commerce, apart from those great efforts which had characterized the first Dutch war, but which were eliminated from the second and third by reason of the Dutch withdrawal of their merchant ships from sea. Further, the strategical effect of the time was to minimise the force set apart for the secondary object. The practice of privateering may be supposed to have tended still more to minimise the provision of public force for the attack on commerce. We have seen already* that, in the reign of Elizabeth, the practice of allowing subjects to fit out war-ships for preying on the enemy's commerce was in full force. The historians speak less of it in the Dutch wars, but still say enough to assure us that it was in effective force. To some extent, it relieved the states on both sides from the provision of a large force of vessels for the attack on commerce. But if the strategical conditions of naval war thus tended to a differentiation, the tactical conditions tended even more strongly that way. When the general action — the purely naval action of ships under sail — took, in the first Dutch war, its place as a revival of the military battle of the ancients and of the middle ages on the water, it was a novelty, and there was little sense either that it would ultimately require particular classes of ships or assume any particular form. Preparations for a sea-fight had not, before this time, assumed either characteristic. There was no differentiation of force, and hardly any adoption of form. We have seen that on the part of Spain, in 1588, the idea of a regular sea-fight appears to have been altogether absent. There was in the Spanish Armada, in fact, no differentiation of force, and no established order of fight. But neither was there on our own side. We collected an im- mense force, but in the lists handed down to us there is no sign of any classification, of any gathering together of classes of ships for the purpose of concerted action. There were several lists or groupings of the ships, but all of them without classification. There were 34 ships serving with the Lord High Admiral, all apparently Queen's ships, and their gradations went steadily down from the Triumph, of 1,100 tons and 500 men, to the Signet, of 30 tons and 20 men. Of 10 ships " serving by tonnage with the Lord Admiral," • Pago 6. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 83 the gradation of class descended pretty evenly, from the Edward of Maldon, of 180 tons and 30 men, to the Peppin, of 20 tons and 8 men. With Sir Francis Drake were 32 ships, from the galleon Leicester, of 400 tons and 160 men, to the Carvel, of 30 tons and 24 men; and so on through several other divisions consisting of smaller ships, but each list offering a gradual fall in the force of the ships from the highest to the lowest.* An analysis of the lists gives us 197 ships in all, manned by 15,785 men. The tonnage of some are omitted, but that of 175 of them came to 29,744 tons, and their sizes were thus distributed : — Ships. Tons. Ships. Tons. 1 - 1,100 5 - 300 1 - 1,000 7 - 250 2 800 26 - about 200 3 600 33 - 150 6 500 19 - 100 5 400 66 - under 100 1 360 There are thus no gaps, no points at which we can say, here are a group of ships suited to one purpose, and here a group suited to another. All the traces of classification fall into the one fact that as the ships grow smaller so they grow more numerous. A list of the navy at the Queen's death in 1603, handed down to us by Sir William Monson, supplies the following analysis : — Ships. Tons. Ships. Tons, 2 - 1,000 2 - 400 3 900 3 - about 300 3 - ■ 800 7 - 200 2 700 3 - 100 4 600 8 - under 100 4 500 In this list we have the same steady gradation downwards, from the most to the least powerful ships, but with the difference that the smaller ships are not so numerous, there being 20 ships of 400 tons and upwards and only 21 below that size. This is probably explained by the practice, which then obtained so largely, of mingling private enterprise with that of the State ; so that de- pendence was placed on the merchants to supply the smaller vessels required. * See Charnock's History 0/ Marine Architecture, vol. ii.. p. 59. 6 * 84 NAVAL WARFARE, Take, again, the list of the Queen's ships in the expedition of Essex to Cadiz,* and we find 17 ships which, as the fighting force, did not carry sokliers. There were 3 ships with crews of 340 men, 6 with 200 to 300 men, 2 with from 100 to 200 men, and 6 carry- ing under 100. Here still is the regular gradation from large to small, without any sign of classification or grouping such as would lead us to infer adaptation to particular purposes. But in the early part of the seventeenth century there was a tendency to group the ships, which afterwards developed into the well-known system of rating which has only fallen out of use in our own day. But the proposal of Sir Kobert Dudley (Duke of Northumberland), referred to, and the subsequent systems of classi- fication and rating, were not prompted by considerations either strategical or tactical, having to do apparently only with conve- nient nomenclature, account, and finance. Dudley's classification was as follows : — (1) The galleon, of 80 guns ; (2) the rambargo, a light frigate or pinnace ; (3) the gali- zabra, a galleas ; (4) the frigata ; (5) the galeron, a galley ; (6) the galerata, a small galley ; (7) the passa-volante, a dispatch vessel. From the nature of this grouping, it is plain that the attempted classification was no more than a desire to put into order that which had no order, and to group several diverse classes into one or two which fairly represented the mean of them. This plan of grouping was not adopted, though it may have hastened the adop- tion of another one. This was the one adojDted by His Majesty's Commissioners originally appointed to report on the state of the navy on the 12th February 1618. They reported on the numbers and tonnage of the ships they found, but it was not till they came to propose what the navy should be that they used any classification, or found any necessary. Then that which they used, and which re- mained the official classification for many years, had nothing to do with strategy or tactics, but was solely an administrative device. The navy proposed to be maintained and classed was : — 4 " Ships Royall," 800 to 1,200 tons. 14 " Great Ships," 600 to 800 „ 6 " Middling Ships," 450 „ 2 " Small Ships," 350 „ 4 " Pinnaces," 80 to 250 tons.t Not only do we detect no strategical or tactical idea in the names, * See Charuock, vol. ii., p. 151. f Ibid., vol. ii., p. 247. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 85 but the descending dimensions are regular, and all that we can certainly assure ourselves of is that there was, for some reason or another, a preference for ships of nearly, but not quite, the largest class. In a list of the navy at the close of James I.'s reign, 33 ships are given ; but except for the increase in the numbers of ships of from 600 to 900 tons, the descent is steady from 1,200 tons and 55 guns to 80 tons, as if there were an equal use for all sorts of ships, except for those carrying 32 to 44 guns, and of from 600 to 900 tons."^ The system of dividing the larger ships of the British Navy into six rates appears to have been introduced during the Common- wealth. It was certainly fully adopted as early as 1660. About this time it was recognized that first rates carried over 70 guns ; second rates, 60 to 70 ; third rates, 50 to 60 ; fourth rates, 38 to 50 ; fifth rates, 22 to 30 ; and sixth rates, 10 to 20. What we have to observe is that the divisions and classes are all administrative and financial. Nearly every man's pay, from the captain down- wards, was regulated by the rate of the ship he happened to be serving in. But apart from this, there was the convenience — largely used — of speaking of the rate instead of the ship ; and for years the master shipwrights at the yards received orders to build such and such a rate, and they were not expected to ask for any directions after receiving this simple order. But if we reflect for a moment over this early constitution of the " rates," we can see that it not only omits to notice what strategy and tactics might demand, but it is the negation of it, supposing strategy and tactics should demand anything but a regular grada- tion of force. On the face of it, if we have such a classification as is just described, the inference is that we are going to build an equal number of each class. The last thing we should think of is that, for the purposes of war, some of these classes will require to be immensely swelled, and some reduced to a minimum, if not eliminated altogether. So the establishment of a series of rates or ranks, which lasted all through our wars, and which existed, in theory at least, till a couple of years ago, may have been a direct hindrance to naval progress, which experience, indeed, perceived and threw off, but which was, nevertheless, a hindrance as long as it lasted. The system of rating in a regular gradation downwards seems to * Oharnock, vol. ii., p. 274. 86 NAVAL WARFARE. have been common to several nations during the latter part of the seventeenth century. My chief authority, Charnock, is sometimes not quite satisfactory as to accuracy in minor matters, and I think he would be guilty of interpolating into original documents, by way of explaining them, without giving full notice that he has done so. Therefore, when he gives us, without quoting his authority, a table of the strength of the French Navy in 1681, under the head of five "rates "and four smaller groups, we are not altogether certain whether or no the rates are an interpolation. However, as given, the first rates average 90 guns, the second 72 guns, the third 53 guns, the fourth 42 guns, the fifth 30 guns ; and then there are " small frigates," fire-ships, barca-longas, and pinks.* But it may be said that navies and fleets about the time of the outbreak of the first Dutch war — that is, about the middle of the seventeenth century — pretty fairly conformed to the ideal put for- ward in the system of rating, and ships were built less with the view of definite duties corresponding to their size and strength, than with the view of completing the tale of each particular rate in some approach to numerical symmetry. The British Navy stood thus on the 27th December 1653 : — 1st Bates : 3 of 891 to 1,556 tons, 64 to 104 guns, and 350 to 700 men. 2nd Bates : 11 of 721 to 875 tons, 54 to 66 guns, and 260 to 400 men. 3rd Bates : 11 of 532 to 800 tons, 44 to 60 guns, and 200 to 300 men. 4th Bates : 63 of 301 to 700 tons, 28 to 50 guns, and 100 to 220 men. 5th Bates : 35 of 105 to 500 tons, 12 to 36 guns, and 30 to 200 men. 6th Bates : 9 of 55 to 255 tons, 6 to 36 guns, and 25 to 130 men. 4 fire-ships of 10 guns and 30 men. 8 victuallers of 10 to 12 guns, and 30 to 40 men. In this list, though the mass of the ships are absorbed in the fourth and fifth rates, these rates themselves cover a very wide field, being as high as 50-gun ships, and as low as 12, pointing still more clearly towards the administrative rather than the tactical or strategical origin of the system of rating. But this date, 1653, was one where already the exiDerience of war had had its effect. Two years and a half before, there had been the same number of first and second rates, but only 7 third rates, and * Chamock, vol. ii., p. 310. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 87 20 fourth rates, and only 4 fifth rates. The result of the experience of war had been, therefore, to increase the numbers of the middle- class ships. We must remember what we have seen the nature of this war to be — namely, one where the attack and defence of a commerce which was collected in great masses formed the moving principle. It does not seem impossible to connect the increase of middle-sized ships directly with such a method of carrying on the war ; but, then, I think we must allow that the fleet action, pure and simple, fell into the second place. And there was as yet little in the fleet action to cause the clear differentiation which it after- wards did. I am not now going into the tactical question more than to trace its bearing on the differentiation of force ; but it is essential that we should keep in mind that up to the end of the first Dutch war the tactics employed were of a kind that allowed all classes of ships, without distinction, to take part in a general action. We have already seen that this was so, and it is made clear to us, from the numbers of ships employed, that the whole navy on each side, ships large and small, fought together. Sir William Monson, writing between 1635 and 1640 probably, gives us a very fair view of the tactical ideas in his earlier days, and the point at which they had arrived when he wrote ; and we can see all through that there was nothing to lead the men of that day to set apart particular classes of ships for the general action. Indiscriminate numbers rather than selected types would probably have represented the idea of force in the naval mind under the circumstances. The strict ordering of battles by ships [says Sir William Monsou] was before the invention of the bowline, for then there was no sailing but before the wind, nor no fighting but by boarding ; whereas, now, a ship will sail within six points of thirty-two, and by the advantage of wind may rout any fleet that is placed in that (the half-moon) form of battle. The weather at sea is never certain, the winds variable, ships unequal in sailing; and when they strictly seek to keep their order, commonly they fall foul one of another ; and in such cases they are more careful to observe their directions than to ofifend the enemy, whereby they will be brought into disorder amongst themselves. Suppose a fleet to be placed in the form of a half moon, or other proportion to fight, if an enemy charge them home in any of the corners of the half-moon, the}' will be forced to bear up room into their main battle ; and there will ensue dangers and disorders of boarding one another, insomuch that it will not be possible for a general to give new directions, but every ship must fight at its will, not by command. For the avoiding of such confusion, the instructions of a general ought not to consist of many words, for the greatest advantage in a sea-fight is to get the wind of one another; for he that has the wind is out of danger of being boarded, and has tho advantage where to board, and how to attempt the enemy. . . . The wind being thus gotten, a general need give no other directions than to every 88 NAVAL WARFARE. admiral of a squadron to draw together their squadrons, and everyone to undertake his opposite squadron, or where he shall doit for his greatest advantage ; but to be sure to take a good distance from one another, and to relieve that squadron that shall be over-charged or distressed. Let them give warning to their ships not to venture so far as to bring themselves to leeward of the enemy ; for so shall they either dishonour themselves, to see such a ship taken in their view, or in seeking to relieve her they shall bring themselves to leeward, and lose the advantage they had formerly gotten ; for it will be in the power of the enemy to board them, and they not to avoid it which was the only thing coveted by the Spaniards in our time of war by reason of the advantage of their ships, as I have before expressed.* Confirmatory of these views as to the methods of fighting which were in vogue when the first Dutch war broke out, we have the orders of the Earl of Lindsey to the captains of his fleet which he fitted out in 1635. If we happen [he says] to descry any fleet at sea, which we may probably know or conjecture designs to oppose, encounter, or affront us, I will first strive to get the wind (if I be to leeward), and so shall the whole fleet in due order do the like, and when we come to join battle, no ship shall presume to assault the admiral, vice-admiral, or rear-admiral, but only myself, my vice-admiral, or rear-admiral, if we be able to reach them ; and the other ships are to match themselves accordingly as they can, and to secure one another as cause shall require, not wasting their jDowder at small vessels or victuallers, nor firing till they come side to side.f This promiscuous sort of fighting, which is fairly well exhibited in the plate in Chapter II., might take in ships of every class, and did not tend to set up any one class over any other. But the opening of the Dutch wars brought the fire-ship into prominence, and in the early battles it was a terrible weapon. But, this being so, it was only natural that some measures should be taken to reduce its power. One great source of this power was the way in which the ships during a fight were distributed in masses, for a fire-ship drifting down from to windward upon such a mass was certain to grapple some ship. Again, it was soon discovered that a promiscuous attack and defence was a very uncertain and a very unsatisfactory one. We have seen how much all the great actions in the Dutch wars partook of the character of pitched battles, and the fact must have appealed with double force to those who had the conduct of naval affairs in charge at the time. The Dutch seem to have been earliest in devising means both to weaken the power of the fire-ships, and to bring the fieet not only under better control, but into such form as would insure the exertion of its collective power. This was the estabUshment of the Line as the fighting formation, and we get it in the English navy * Monson in Chiiir/u'll's Vojjiiycs, vol. iii., p. 320. t Iliid., vol. iii., p. 297. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 89 as early as March 31st, 1G55. Probably no doubt exists to prevent us giving to Sir William Penn the full credit of commencing the great tactical revolution. We have it in the " Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting," issued at that date by Blake, Monk, Disbrowe, and Penn ; but it will be seen that, though we have the Line introduced, it is done, as it were, tentatively, and without any of that conviction which gave it in after years so rigid a position in naval tactics. Article 2 says : — At sight of the said fleet (an enemy's fleet), the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, as also the rear-admiral, or he that •commands in chief in the third place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up to the admiral on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right, and the rear- admiral on the left ; giving a competent distance for the admiral's squadron, if the wind will permit, and there be sea-room enough.* Here we have the old idea of promiscuous fighting in squadrons prevailing, an idea which would admit of all classes of ships taking their share in the fight, the notion — traceable in previous quotations, and in this, so far — being that ships would seek out their matches and fight the battle out in a series of duels. But in Article 3 we have, faintly and tentatively, the new idea. As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a signal by firing two guns, and putting out a red flag on the foi"e-topmast head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy next to them ; and, in order hereunto, all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with the chief, unless the chief of their squadron be either lamed, or otherwise disabled (which God forbid), ■whereby the said ship which wears the flag shall not come in to do the service which is requisite. Then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to get in a line with the admiral, or the commander-in-chief next to him and nearest the enemy f These instructions formed the basis of those issued by James Duke of York when he took command of the fleet, and dated 27th April 16(35. J These latter show the greater precision in the order of fighting, which had been at least theoretically arrived at. The second instruction changes its form, and runs : — At sight of the said fleet, the vice-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the second place), with his squadron; and the rear-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the third squadron), with his squadron ; are to make what sail they can to come up, and to put themselves into that order of battle which shall be given them; for which the signal shall be the Union flag put on the mizen peak of the admiral's ship ; at sight whereof, as well the vice and rear-admirals of the red squadron, as the admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals of the other squadrons, are to answer it by doing the like. Here is, in some sort, the abandonment of promiscuous fighting. * Life of Sir William Penn, vol. ii. , p. 77. t Ihid. X I quote from the Life of Pmn, vol. ii., app. L. There is an undoubted copy of the Duke of York's instructions in the librarj' of the Royal U.S. Institution. 90 NAVAL WARFARE. A precise order of battle is in the background, and to be put in force by signal. The third instruction runs thus : — In case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and fleet, and they have sea-rcom enough, then they are to keep the wind as close as they can lie, until such time as they see an opportunity, by gaining their wakes, to divide the enemy's fleet ; and if the van of His Majestj'-'s fleet find that they have the wake of any considerable part of them, they are to tack and stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body ; and that squad- ron that shall pass first, being got to windward, is to bear down on those ships to- leeward of them ; and the middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the enemj-'s van, which the last squadron is to second ; and both of these squadrons are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron that divided the- enemy's fleet.* The other instructions which, for our present purpose, it is im- portant to note are numbers IV., VII., and VIII. Number IV., stands thus : — If the enemy have the wind of His Majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the com- manders of His Majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves in one line, close upon a wind, according to the order of battle. Instruction VII. runs thus : — In case His Majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stand towards them, and they towards the enemy, then the van of His Majesty's fleet shall keep the wind ; and wlaen they are come within a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay, until their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van ; and then their whole line is to tack (every ship in his own place;, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can (without endangering their loss of wind) ; and to stand along with them, the same tacks abroad, still keeping the- enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van ; and in case the enemy tack in the roar first, he who is in the rear of His Majesty's fleet, is to tack first, with as many ships, divisions, or squadrons, as are those of the enemy's ; and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth. Instruction VIII. runs : — If the enemy stay to fight (His JIajesty's fleet having the wind), the headmost squad- ron of His Majesty's fleet shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's ships. It may be said of these instructions, that their spirit, if not their letter, governed the conduct of sea fights as long as they were carried out under sail. But we must not suppose that because the Line was thus set out on paper as the fighting formation, not 'par excellence, but alone, that it at once assumed its full position in fact. It was slow in accomplishing its destiny. According to Pere Hoste, it was the formation taken up by both English and Dutch in the battle of the 29th of July 1653 ; and according to the same authority it was fully employed by the Duke of York in the * It is strange that, with these words in existence, there should have been thought- to be novelty in Clerk of Eldin's plan of " breaking the line." The author of the Life of Penn justly remarks upon the case. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 91 battle off the Texel, in June 1665. But it was dropped again by Albemarle in the battle of June 1666 ; and by the way Sir William Penn speaks of it, it seems clear that there was still con- troversy as to whether a line was, or was not, the best form in which to throw a fleet for fighting purposes. Pepys reports what Penn said of the fight, a few days after its unfortunate results wera made known : — " He says three things must be remedied, or else we shall be undone by this fleet. That we must fight in a line, whereas we fought promiscuously, to our utter and demonstrable- ruin ; the Dutch fight otherwise, and we whenever we beat them.* So that though the line was established on paper as the fighting formation soon after the outbreak of the first Dutch war, and though it was very precisely spoken of in authoritative instructions at the beginning of the second Dutch war, it had probably not got an absolutely firm hold in the third Dutch war. The term "line of battle " does not occur in the Duke of York's instructions. It is not used by Lord Torrington in 1690, who, when he writes de- scribing the French fleet then in sight, does not speak of " line-of- battle ships," but as ships "fit to lie in a line."t The advantages of the line were, however, certain to give it per- manence. It was, in the first place, the great defence against fire- ships; for when the fleet to leeward was drawn out in one thin line, it was comparatively easy to open out so as to let the fire- ships drift harmlessly through. I suppose that it was this fact that ultimately abolished the fire-ship as a weapon. It was at the height of its value when fleets fought in masses, as I have said ; but the more certain it became that both fleets would draw out into line, the less was the hope of an effective use of the fire-ship. As I am now on the differentiation of naval force, I may as well finish with the fire-ship at once, its reign really coinciding with the date before and during the line of battle. We have seen what a promi- nent part the fire-ship played all through the Dutch wars, though it is not always easy to say what numbers were employed in each fleet. But in 1678 there were 6 fire-ships to a fleet of 77 rated ships. Ten years later there were 26 fire-ships to 52 rated ships ready for sea. At King William's death there were 87 fire-ships- to 123 ships of the line. In 1714 there were about 50 fire-ships to- about 125 sail of the line. In 1727 the fire-ship had become less * See Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 399. Two other things -ivere mentioned, t Entick, p 548. The earliest use I find of the term is in the Life oj Cornelius Van Tromp, printed in 1697. 52 NAVAL WARFARE. popular, as there were only 3 or 4 to 123 sail of the line. In 1741 there were fire-ships at home, in the West Indies, and in the Mediterranean, but there were only 17 to a total of 180 rated ships, 129 of which were in commission. At the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) we had but 5 fire-ships against a total of 174 rated ships. At the peace of Paris (1763) there were 8 fire-ships in commission at home to 55 sail of the line. At the peace of 1783 we have fur- ther hints of the decadence of the fire-ship, as there were only 7 then serviceable, though there were 273 rated ships afloat. After the outbreak of the revolutionary war we cease to hear of them as parts of an ordinary fleet, and at the peace of Amiens (1802) we only find 9 or 10 ships spoken of at a time when the navy contained nearly 1,000 ships of all classes. The number of fire-ships in commission during the revolutionary war was 3 only, from 1794 to 1799. Then it rose to 7 for that year and for 1800, falling again to 3 in 1801, and to 1 only in 1802. In 1804 and 1805 there was 1 fire-ship in commission, but after this they disappear altogether as an effective weapon. The history of the fire-ship does not lack parallels in naval annals. It springs into favour as a weapon because the method of fighting in masses of ships clustered together offered peculiar facilities for its employment, but almost at once, the defence of drawing the fleets out into a long single line becoming established, the position of the fire-ship was weakened, and made a less important weapon than it had been. But the impetus it had received originally pushed it on, so that, though it was really weakened, it was held in higher estimation, and increased its numbers to a maximum at the «nd of William III.'s reign. Then experience begins to offer counteracting resistance to the waning impetus, and the weapon becomes gradually discredited. Yet it hangs on for years, after all thought of using it as it was originally used has passed away. Taking the rise, progress, and fall of the fire-ship as an illustra- tion of the differentiation of naval force, and the rules which govern it, we can recur to the line of battle and trace its effects. I have already pointed out how, in promiscuous fighting between two fleets, every class of ship was admitted, because, as there was no special order or rank of the ships, each could generally, and did generally, seek out her match and tight the battle out in a series of duels. But as soon as the single line became established, each ship had Jaer fixed place which she could not quit, and hence, if there were great diversities in the strength of ships forming the line, the THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 93 weakest was quite likely to find herself opposite the strongest in the ensuing battle. The action of the establishment of the line-of- battle tended, therefore, in the first place, to the excision of the weaker ships from their place in the line, and to the embodiment of Lord Torrington's idea of having only " ships fit to lie in a line " — that is, of having what afterwards came to be called line-of-battle ships. But, further, the tendency of the Line must have been to increase the power of the individual line-of-battle ship, so as to reduce the numbers, as a line of great extent would be unmanageable, and, in fact, could not be maintained as a line in view of changes of the wind. But on the other hand, the increase in the force of the individual shij) would not have been carried to an extreme. The fear of putting too many eggs in one basket might always be expected to operate, and though it might not prevent the occasional building of a ship which was gigantic by comparison, it would prevent the reduction of the line-of-battle ships to a very small number of very powerful ships. But just the same causes which prolonged the life ot the fire-ship beyond the ]Deriod when it could be usefully employed, would tend to prevent its being seen, even through some courses of years, that the real line-of-battle ship was a medium ship, neither descending to the lowest nor ascending to the highest rank in the scale of force. The custom which had obtained in the days of promiscuous fighting of building ships of all classes, with the idea that all classes could fight side by side in the general action, might be expected to prevail long after the reason of the thing had demanded a uniform pattern line-of-battle ship of medium power. But as the general action to be fought out in two opposing lines of ships became established, the attack and defence of commerce, which had existed before this time, called for suitable war-ships to carry it out. The establishment of the line-of-battle not only differentiated a powerful class of ships for taking part in that fighting formation, but as it excluded the smaller classes of ships from partaking in the general action it met half way the demand for special ships for looking after commerce, either by way of attack or defence. It would appear probable that the commerce protectors or attackers would be naturally the smaller class of vessels, because, in the case of great convoys, what happened in the first Dutch war would most naturally repeat itself, and that a line-of-battle force would be employed on both sides. Where the convoy was small. •94 NAVAL JVARFARE. the economy of war would not permit of weakening the main line of battle for so inferior a service ; g.nd while a lighter force might serve for the attack, so would a lighter force form a sufficient defence. The mere fact that a defence by way of convoy was furnished might put aside all idea of attack. For though it might be possible to furnish inferior force to attack unguarded merchant ships, it might be difficult to withdraw from the main force enough to make itself distinctly superior to the light force which was guarding a merchant convoy. Then, too, there must always have been the two words about convoy. A large concourse of merchant- ships would make a tempting prize, which it would be worth an effort to secure ; a proportionately powerful force might not safely be found to guard it. The alternative would be to break up the convoy into several sections, each under a light guard. It would be unlikely that all should be attacked, and those that were at- tacked, a light guard might be sufficient to defend. The general tendency on the whole would be to have a very numerous and very light set of ships, for the especial purpose of protecting their own commerce and attacking that of the enemy. We thus get a tendency towards such a differentiation of naval force as would set apart as line-of-battle ships those specially de- signed to fight in a line, and to act in concert, as the main strength of the naval position ; the citadel as it were of naval power ; that arrangement of naval force before which every other nature of naval force must bow, and which could not be overcome but by a greater quantity of like force. The necessity for this setting apart of a special class of ships to fight in the line of battle was fully admitted in 1744, and Admiral Lestock's anonymously published pamphlet against Mathews contains language forcibly pointing to the position the line of battle had taken, and to the certainty that sooner or latter uniformity in the ships composing the line-of- battle would be established as the necessary outcome of sea-fights so conducted. A line of battle [says the anonymous pamphleteer] is the basis and foundation of all discipline in sea-fights, and is universally practised by all nations that are masters any power at sea ; it has had the test of a long experience, and stood before the stroke of time, pure and unaltered, handed down by our jaredecossors as the most prudential and best concerted disposition that can possibly be used at sea. This order consists in a fleet of ships being extended in a straight line either ahead or abreast one ship of another, to keep as close together as the weather will permit, that at all times every ship may be ready to sustain, relieve, or succour one another . It is directed that each ship in the line of battle shall keejJ within half a cable's length of one another, which is about 50 fathoms ; that if His Majesty's fleet should have the wind of the enemy, the van shall steer with the van of the enemy, and there engage THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 95 them, bj- which means every ship knows her adversary, and from the foremost in the van to the rear, attacks them successively.* Thus the line-of-battle promised to establish uniformity, and also that the line-of-battle ship would approach this uniformity on the lines not of ships of extreme force, for then there would be too few of them, nor yet of a very low force, for then a fleet to be strong must be too numerous to handle. This was what was before the line-of-battle ship, and yet not of early accomplishment because of the force of custom and the tradition of the promiscuous manner of fighting. But as the line-of-battle ship was thus differentiated and parted from every other sort of war- ship, it followed that the fleet would require adjuncts m the shape of lighter ships to serve the purpose of look-outs or scouts. These ships would naturally be of much weaker force than the line-of-battle ship, for they would not take part m the fight ; but they would require to be of good size so as to be able to keep company with the fleet, and so as to have a speed greater than the fleet itself in order to out-sail it and return to it in the exercise of the functions of the look-out. These duties pointed to the heavy frigate, but to a ship as far below the line-of- battle ship in force as would allow of her carrying out the special role of attending on the fleet. Lastly, there was the much lighter attendant on commerce either by way of attack or defence, and if the practice of large convoys should fall, as it might, into disrepute, the tendency of these lighter and smaller vessels — not of the smallest size, but still low down in the scale of force — would be to grow. This differentiation of naval force into three classes : (1) the line-of-battle ship, (2) the frigate, and (3) the light cruiser, seems to grow naturally out of the conditions of naval warfare which we have seen established ; and yet judging by the progress we have seen, we should expect the differentiation to be of slow growth. It must, I think, be admitted as a fact that the naval mind is unaccustomed to project itself onward. It is so practical that it will not move until it is pushed ; and thus, though I think we can clearly trace the progress of differentiation of force, it never was complete ; and all we can say is that as years went on it grew nearer and nearer to the ideal, so that at the close of naval war about 1813, we get the remarkable results which will be seen. * A Narrative of the Proceedimis of His Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, from the hear 1741 to March 1744- London, 1744. 96 NAVAL WARFARE. I have already shown that in the earHer parts of the Dutch wars the differentiation was not marked. I will take as a later instance, the composition of the fleet of August 1666, commanded hy Prince Eupert and the Duke of Albemarle.* That fleet stood as follows: — Ships. Guns. 1 of 102 1 „ 90 2 „ 82 1 „ 80 2 „ 76 2 „ 72 2 „ 70 1 „ 66 Ships. Guns 4 of 64 6 „ 60 12 „ 58 1 „ 56 2 „ 54 6 „ 52 9 „ 50 14 „ 48 Ships. Guns 5 of 42 2 „ 44 3 „ 42 5 „ 40 4 „ 38 1 „ 34 1 „ 30 Perhaps the absence of differentiation is as well marked in this fleet as it could be, but it is also well marked in a list of the whole navy drawn up by a Eoyal Commission in 1686. t Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 5 of 100 2 of 64 6 of 42 3 „ 96 5 „ 62 1 „ 38 10 „ 90 3 „ 60 6 „ 32 2 „ 82 9 „ 54 6 „ 30 1 „ 80 1 „ 50 2 „ 28 4 „ 72 19 „ 48 1 „ 18 28 „ 70 3 „ 46 5 „ 16 1 „ 66 1 „ 44 Then, at the death of William III. (1702), the naA thusj : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 8 of 96 to 110 2 of 66 1 of 44 12 „ 90 1 „ 64 1 „ 40 16 „ 80 17 „ 60 28 „ 32 1 „ 74 3 „ 54 16 „ 24 2 „ 72 1 „ 53 22 „ 70 38 „ 48 We hardly trace any definite objects in the changes shown in the second list, the result of sixteen years' experience. There is some simplification and reduction in the number of types, a slight increase in the number of the heaviest line-of-battle ships, an * See Charnock, vol. ii., p. 397. t Entiek, p. 534. J Scliomberg^s Naval Cliroiwloijy, vol. iv., p. 4. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 97 increase in the 60-, 48-, and 32-gun ships, but we can hardly say that the real wants of the navy were being met. It is more as if opinion was swaying about, uncertain of its own aims, and acting in one way at one time and in another at another time. According to Schomberg, all the ships down to and including those of 48 guns were considered as proper to form the line of battle, but if this were so, it is only an evidence how little advance had been made in the true direction, for nothing could exceed the incon- gruity of so arranging a sea fight that a 48-gun ship should find herself matched against a 90-gun ship, or a 53-gun ship against a 110. The navy of 1727 begins, in more than one way, to show the influences on differentiation of the causes enumerated. And there is besides an increased simplification in the matter of reduction in the number of types. The navy stood thus"^' : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns 7 of 100 23 of 70 24 of 40 13 „ 90 24 „ 60 1 „ 30 16 „ 80 40 „ 50 28 „ 20 13 sloops of 4 to 10 guns. Schomberg now excludes all ships below 50 guns from place in the line of battle, which, if he has contemporary authority to justify the statement, shows the action of causes which would raise the force of the individual line-of-battle ship and make the type uniform. Then, too, we have the exhibition of the gap between the force of the smallest line-of-battle ship, and the largest frigate, in the sudden drop of from 50 guns in the one case, to no more than 40 in the other. The admission of the new class, the Sloop, with no more than 10 guns, is a distinct effect of the causes sketched out, and certain to operate sooner or later. We may now take the ships in commission in different parts of the world in 1741, through which we can trace still more clearly the tendencies of differentiation. At home the force in commission is stated as followst : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships, Guns. 3 of 100 7 of 70 4 of 40 6 „ 90 2 „ 60 15 „ 20 10 „ 80 13 „ 50 10 sloops 4 to 10 guns. * Schomberg, vol. iv., p. 10. t Ibid., vol. iv., p. 17. 98 NAVAL WARFARE. In the West Indies the force was : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 8 of 80 16 of 60 3 of 40 7 „ 70 3 „ 50 6 „ 20 3 sloops of 8 g uns. In the Mediterranean we had : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 2 of 80 3 of 20 5 „ 60 1 „ 8 2 „ 50 In these three fleets we can in some sort discern an increase in line-of-battle ships of what might be called upper middle strength, as — counting the 50-gun ships as of the line of battle, but nothing below that — we have 57 line-of-battle ships of from 60 to 80 guns, and only nine of more than 80, and only 18 of less than 60. And also in the ships below the rank of line-of-battle ship, we only get 7 of 40 guns, that is of the heavy frigate class we have spoken of, but 38 of a much smaller class, not carrying more than 20 guns. Here is distinct approach to that differentiation which reason leads us up to when we are able to look calmly back on the naval warfare of the past and to discuss its l^rinciples. But we can note that our ancestors saw through a glass darkly, and in the struggles of constant wars established principles without pausing to identify them, and without know- ing, perhaps, how much they were unconsciously guided by them. A further illustration can be drawn from the navy as it was found in commission at the death of George II., in 1760, with its distribution on the different stations. At Home. ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 7 of 90 10 of 64 6 of 32 2 „ 80 2 „ 60 5 „ 28 24 „ 74 3 „ 50 3 „ 18 2 „ 70 1 „ 36 11 „ 10 to 14 In this home fleet we see quite plainly the growth of the upper middle strength of the line-of-battle ships ; the widening of the gap between the weakest line-of-battle ship and the heaviest frigate ; and the distinct proportionate increase in the numbers of the lighter cruisers. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 99 In the East Indies. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 1 of 50 1 of 28 1 of 24 1 „ 20 2 „ 14 In this squadron we have the 50-gun ship passing out of the Hne of battle as it were, and becoming a heavy cruiser for distant and detached service. She is then accompanied not by ships in a regular descending scale, as she would have been during the period of the Dutch wars, but by a group of very much lighter cruisers, the heaviest of which has not, perhaps, half her force. Zw tJie West Indies. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 2 of 50 1 of 32 2 of 28 4 „ 20 1 „ 14 Where the characteristics of the squadron — which was divided into two between Jamaica and the Leeward Islands — are similar to those in the East Indies. In the Mediterranean. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 1 of 50 1 of 32 2 of 28 1 „ 14 1 „ 10 Where we have still the same thing. In North America. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 6 of 64 15 of 32 15 of 14 to 18. 5 „ 50 11 „ 28 9 „ 8 to 12. 3 „ 44 14 „ 20 In this squadron there is less of the marked differentiation we are beginning to see. But if we look at the three 44-gun ships as what I may call " border ships," being almost strong enough for the line of battle and unnecessarily heavy for the duties of a frigate, we still have the three classes of line-of-battle ship, frigate, and light cruiser; the multitude of the latter being entirely in accordance with the forecast which could have been made at the date of the third Dutch war. Nothing was gained by such varieties in force as 64, 50, and 44-gun ships. A stronger line of battle could have been produced of fewer and heavier ships all of one class ; and although progress towards this ideal is slow, I think the reader will now see that we are on the high way to its realisation. 7 * 100 NAVAL WARFARE. The Newfoundland Squadron. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 1 of 64 1 of 20 1 „ 50 5 „ 14 to 16 2 „ 28 7 „ 10 to 12. The differentiation of force in this squadron ma}^ be seen to conform more to the approaching rule, and to assimilate to that found in the East and West India Squadrons. We may now pass at once to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, of which the length and persistence may be supposed to have brought all the rules and principles of naval war to a climax. I have thought that the best way of exhibiting the operation of the causes we have seen at work in differentiating naval force is by using the graphic method, and exhibiting curves which show the proportions of each kind of force, and the quantities during each year from 1793. We have pretty well seen what was coming, and had our forefathers, in 1794, had before them in a clear light all the points we have been discussing, I think we may fairly assume that they would have done at first what they did at last, and so conducted the war with a greater economy. For what is plain to be seen, I think, is, that for naval warfare not a great many types of ships are required. Whether there be or be not a line of battle, there must be some fighting formation which is under all circumstances better than any other. The fact that a form of battle is established compels a uniformity of type of ship, because form prescribes place and prevents ships seeking their match. Therefore it becomes waste to produce a few exces- sively powerful ships to fight in a general action, while it is a danger to allow weak ships to take part in it. In the one case the excess of power may be, most probably will be, wasted against an inferior adversary ; m the other case, ships of greatly inferior force may be hopelessly beaten by those of medium or average strength. Then I think we can see that there should be an immense fall in the strength of the strongest cruiser below that of the weakest battle-ship. It should seem also that this strongest cruiser has her place as the eyes of the fleet, even as set forth by James Duke of York in his instructions. Then would come another heavy fall in the strength of the light cruiser, of which the special function is guardmg our own commerce and attacking that of the enemy. I do not see that anything is gained by great variety in type. There is always the consideration present that there is no guarantee that even with the infinite variety of type, such as we see com- THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 101 posed our navy in 1686, the particular ship most suited to the service will be where time and place requires her. Much more likely is it that the wrong types will be everywhere. In one case the ships available will be too weak, and risks will be run ; in another case the ships available will be too strong, and money will be wasted. These thoughts spring from our study of the nature of naval war as far as we have carried it. I offer circumstantial evidence of their correctness in the growth of differentiation as we have traced it, best seen above all, in Plates I,, 11. , III. Plate I. shows us the nature of the whole navy in commission, year by 3'ear, from 1793 till 1813. It impresses on us two points ; the 1793 9^ 9S S6 97 ,93 99 /300 0/ 02 03 O^ OS 06 07 08 09 /O // /— — ■ r f793 9* 9S S6 SI7 38 -99 /800Of 02 05 O'^ OS OS 07 Od OS> lO II / 52 1 „ 70 5 50 1 „ 08 1 44 •0 and real • of 35 ships : — Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 1 of 100 1 of 06 1 m 1 , , 04 5 ,, [)0 3 ,, 60 1 82 1 ,, 64 1 72 1 ,, 50 1(> „ 70 2 1 ri 48 36 ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 121 Here, I do not examine the tactics of the battle that followed. It is sufficient to mention that the Dutch in the van got into close action with the rear part of the French van, and were doubled on by the nine leading ships of the latter.* The British rear also got into action, but not so close, with the French rear. The ships in the French centre were to leeward of the van and rear, and Torrington in the British centre, attacked them only at long range, and left for some time a gap between himself and the Dutch. The Dutch were badly damaged, but saved themselves, or were saved by Torrington's orders, in consequence of their dropping their anchors when the ebb made, which the French not perceiving, drifted away to the westward out of gun-shot. t One of the Dutch ships, from inability to anchor, drifted away with the French and was captured. In the evening, Torrington weighed, and taking in tow the disabled ships, beat to the eastward against the light foul winds that prevailed, taking the precaution to drop his anchors when the ebb-tide made against him. The French followed, not in general chase, but in line of battle, the contemporary opinion being that the desire to maintain the fighting formation saved our fleet from destruction. At any rate, the council of war which sat on the 1st July, decided that things were so bad with them that if they were pressed by the French, it would be necessary to destroy the disabled ships and retire, rather than face a renewal of the fight. The French pursued, but not strenuously, for four days, by which time the Allies had reached Dover, and had left the enemy so far in the rear that the pursuit was abandoned, and the French drew off to the westward. The Allies suffered losses in the pursuit, four Dutch and one English ship having either been burnt or run ashore in a disabled state. Naturally, the alarm was great in England on the news of this defeat spreading. Immediate invasion was the least that was expected. But it should seem that Torrington was entirely right in his strategical judgment. The French made for their original destination, Torbay, where they anchored and landed a party to burn the village of Tynemouth, which was easily d'riven oft' by * Memoirs relatin;/ to Lord Torrinc/toji, p. 4(5. t Not only were numbers of ships against the Dutch, but the individual power of their ships was less than that of the French. The average force of the 22 ships forming the Dutch van was but 61-8 guns, while of the 25 leading ships of the French it was 64-7. 122 NAVAL WARFARE. the hastil}' assembled militia. They also destroyed one or two vessels of little value in the harbour, and later retired to Brest ; some ruined houses at Tynemouth, some burnt small craft, and a single captured man-of-war being the insignificant trophies of the great expedition. Torrington's defence of his conduct was the strategical condition he had to contend with. He was greatly inferior to the French, but they were powerless for mischief as long as his fleet existed. \Vhen forced by the Queen's order to fight a battle which there was no hope of winning against ships not only more numerous but of greater individual force, it behoved him to take care that he ran no risks of being beaten. That our fighting upon so great a disadvantage as we did was of the last conse- quence to the kingdom, is as certain as that the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had not both our weakness, and the strength of the enemy, been disguised to her. . . . It is true, the French made no great advantage of their victory, tho' they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia ; but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What then would have become of us in the absence of His Majesty, and most of the land forces ? As it was, most men were in fear that the French would invade ; but I was alwaj's of another opinion ; for I alwaj^s said, that whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt. In my letter of the 29th June, the matter is stated pretty plain : whilst we observe the French, they can make no attempt either on sea or shore, but with great disad- vantages : and if we are beaten all is exposed to their mercy. This I dare be bold to say, that if the management of the fleet had been left to the discretion of the council of war, there would have been no need of the excessive charge the kingdom was put to in keeping up the militia, nor would the French have gone of? so much at their ease.* So that, even though the beaten Allied fleet had come "to an anchor at the Nore in great confusion ; and expecting that the French might attack them, all the buoys were taken up, and other necessary dispositions made as soon as they got there, "f yet the strategy of the conditions was such as to leave and keep the great French fleet powerless. If, indeed, the enemy had followed up and beaten the fleet at the Nore absolutely, " all would have been at his mercy." But " a fleet in being," even though it was discredited, inferior, and shut up behind unbuoyed sandbanks, was such a power in observation as to paralyze the action of an apparently victorious fleet either against " sea or shore." This is the part of the battle of Beachy Head which consti- tutes its chief interest, but which is hardly touched by the * Torrington's defence, Entick, p. 549. t Memoirs relating to Lord Torriuf/ton, p. 47. 1 z o Ij .^ X ^ ^5 CVJ CO •+ ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 123 different historians who have related the story. The first attempt of the French to gain the command of the sea with a definite ulterior purpose failed, because, as a fact, they were not enter- prising or persevering enough to secure the preliminary condition. They had beaten our fleet, yet not to the point of annihilation which was necessary if the command of the sea was to he gained. Lord Torrington's acquittal by the court-martial which tried him, in the face of very strong influences on the other side, is a signi- ficant reminder of the naval views of that day.''' Both countries had now studied in the school of experience. But if the French had hardly got to understand what sort of a com- mand of the sea would be necessary before invasion could be thought of ; the English had taken some warning as to the dangers of delay and parsimony in the preparation of naval defence. The French plan for 1692 was as follows. By arrangement with the disaffected party in England, an attempt was to be made to land an army of 20,000 menf on the coast of Sussex, the arrival of which should be the signal for a general rising in the country on behalf of James. This army, assembling with the neces- sary sea-transport at La Hogue, Cherbourg, and Havre, consisted of 14 battalions of English, Scotch, and Irish, and 9,000 French, was joined by the ex-King.:[: No doubt it was originally intended that the French fleet of 1692 should be as superior to that of the Allied English and Dutch as it had been in 1690, and equally beforehand in l:)eginning hostilities. The authorities at Brest were ordered to prepare the whole of the ships there for sea, and orders were given that a contingent of 13 sail-of-the-line should join them from Toulon. Then the precedent of 1690 was taken up, and it was hoped that de Tourville — again in command — might be able to fall upon and destroy the British home fleet before it could be joined by the Dutch, and that then the invading military force might cross and encourage a successful rising of the Jacobites. But two things happened, or rather three, which marred and rendered abortive the otherwise reasonable plans of the French. The Toulon contingent, approaching the Straits of Gibraltar on the 18th of May, was met by a gale of wind, which drove two of the * A matter not touched on by any of the historians, which will deserve comment when I approach the tactical part of my subject, is the non-use by Torrington of his fire-ships. I have not observed that anyone says a word about them. t Forbin, quoted by Lediard, vol. ii., p. ^(k"). X Entick, p. 555. 0. Troude, vol. i., p. 209. Troude says there were but 12,000 men, but this is a mistake. 124 NAVAL WARFARE. ships ashore at Ceuta, and so dispersed and damaged the remainder that they were not able to reach Brest till the end of the month of July, by which time many things had happened. The second misfortmie which the French suffered were the per- sistent advices from English Jacobites, that many of the captains of the British fleet had been gained over to the cause of James, and would desert to the enemy at the first opportunity. The third misfortune was that the Dutch were more prompt and earlier than usual in joining the English fleet, and that Louis' information on this head had failed him.''^ James pressed upon Louis the certainty of his information with regard to the disaffected English captains, and the relative weak- ness of the English fleet alone ; and in an evil hour for the French success, Louis sent orders to de Tourville to put to sea with the 45 ships of the line and the 7 fire-ships which were ready at Brest, and to fall upon the English before the junction of the Dutch, whether they were strong or weak. De Tourville sailed, but foul north-easterly winds delayed his progress up Channel, and facili- tated the passage of the English down Channel, and the approach of the Dutch to join them. Cruisers were despatched after de Tourville, from Barfleur and elsewhere, to countermand the pre- vious orders, but the despatches never reached him, and he went on towards the point where the army for invasion was assembled. The English had, as I have observed, profited by experience. They do not seem to have had any accurate information of the French complete design, for they were, down to the last moment, proposing a descent on St. Malo, and the necessary troops were called together at Portsmouth for the purpose. But they were well aware that a great sea force early in the field was the double necessity under the knowledge that some design was in preparation in France. Admiral Kussell was appointed to the command of the Home fleet as early as the 3rd of December 1691, and great activity was displayed in pushing on the fitment of the ships. Look-out ships were sent out to observe the movements of the French, and as the ships grew towards readiness, two strong squadrons were despatched into the Channel with orders so curiously inconsequent as almost to show that the real designs of the French were quite misunderstood. Sir Ralph Del aval had arrived in the Downs with a squadron in the beginning of March, after successful convoy service from the Mediterranean, and was now ordered to reconnoitre the French * O. Troudo, vol. i.. p. 20i), c^ se(j. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 125 coast as far as Cape La Hogue, with scouts out to give him due warning of the enemy's approach. Then he was to cross over to the Isle of Wight, whence, if no orders reached him, he was to return along the French coast to Dover, and again, if no orders reached him, he was to repair to the flats off the North Foreland. Admiral Carter, with a considerable squadron, including 11 ships for the line, had orders on the 14th of April to sail to the Channel Islands, and to cruise near St. Malo for eight-and-forty hours, un- less " an opportunity of doing service " should recommend a longer sta}'. Then he was to look in at Havre, and if no service could be done there, he was to return to Spithead."^ It is not very easy to understand what was in the mind of the authorities dictating these orders. Mere reconnoitring a part of the French coast, where either no heavy ships or the whole naval force of France might be expected to be met, could have been much better carried out by a few very light and insignificant ships ; and it does not appear that mere collection of intelligence was the object. But if not, then what teas the object ? Dangers were run in separating such considerable bodies from the main fleet, and leaving them liable to be taken at a disadvantage. I do not per- ceive that value, compensating for the risk, was aimed at. And, indeed, this view seems to have been speedily taken, for counter- manding orders to both Admirals almost immediately followed, resulting in general directions to Russell, Delaval, and Carter to concentrate soath of the Isle of Wight. t Admiral Eussell, with the main body of the English fleet, arrived off Rye on the 8th of May, where some of the Dutch ships were already at anchor. The joined forces seem to have anchored there- abouts, and on the 10th a council of war decided, on considering the orders given to Sir Ralph Delaval, that it would be prudent to make a further delay off Rye, so as to secure his junction.^ The fleet, however, sailed for St. Helen's on the 11th, and on the 13th, Delaval and Carter, who had already formed a junction at sea, joined Russell at St. Helen's. The British admiral now found himself at the head of an enormous fleet. The Red squadron, under Russell, with Sir Ralph * Lediard, vol. ii., p. 656. f Lediard (vol. ii., p. 656, note) considers that the first countermanding orders followed on intelligence that the French were preparing for sea (at Brest ?). The dates were 20th and 23rd of April. Creasy, Invasions of' Emjland, says Russell was playing false, if so, many things are explained. X Burchett, p. 463 ; Lediard follows. 126 NAVAL WARFARE. Delaval and Sir Cloudesley Shovel as vice- and rear-admirals, consisted of 5 first-rates, 3 second, 16 third, and 7 fourth. The Blue squadron, under Admiral Sir John Ashby, Vice- Admiral Hon. George Eooke, and Eear-Admiral Hon. Eichard Carter, consisted of 1 first-rate, 7 second, 18 third, and 6 fourth-rates. The English part of the fleet consisted thus of 63 ships of the line, carrying 27,725 men, and 4,500 guns. Besides these were 23 frigates and fire-ships. The Dutch formed the White squadron, under Admiral Alle- monde and two Vice-admirals, and consisted of 36 ships-of-the- line, namely, 9 first, 10 second, 9 third, and 8 fourth-rates. The division carried 12,950 men, and 2,494 guns. Attached to the division were 14 frigates and fire-ships. The total line-of-battle force was therefore 99 sail, carrying 40,675 men, and 6,994 guns. I suppose that never before or since has such a tremendous naval force been assembled under one admiral, and yet from want of proper intelligence, the French admiral at the head of less than half the force, was quietly sailing up channel to be destroyed by it.^ Eussell seems to have had no advices of the near approach of the French. The AlHes were full of the intended descent on St. Malo, and Eussell's proposal was that, guarded by the whole fleet to the westward, the descent should be made by the troops pre- pared at Portsmouth. But as a preliminary a squadron of 6 light frigates was despatched towards Havre and that part of the French coast, to reconnoitre; and on the 18th of May the whole fleet weighed, and stood directly over towards Cape Barfleur. It does not appear that either side was aware of the immediate proximity of the enemy. The weather was thick, and the wind light from the westward, and the Allied fleet stood on, on the starboard tack, till about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th May. Then guns were heard from the look-outs to the westward, and soon, out of the fog, two of them appeared with the signals flying de- noting the presence of the enemy. Eussell at once made the signal for the rear to tack, so as to meet the French if it should turn out that they were on the port tack. But as the sun rose, the weather cleared, and the French were seen to be forming their line on the starboard tack with their heads to the southward. Eussell ran to leeward, and then, his line fairly well formed from S.S.W. to N.N.E., * Lediard gives the names and guns of 6:i French ships, and says there were 55 small craft attached. But he admits he may over-state. Troude gives names of captains as well, and I accept his statement, the more so as Russell himself makes the number as under 50. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 127 lay to and awaited the attack of the French, the Dutch White squadron forming the van, the Eed squadron the centre, and the Bhie the rear, as the signal to tack had been annulled. What concerns us, now that we have brought the French fleet all but into contact with the Allied fleet of twice its force, is less any close investigation of its disastrous defeat which most in- evitably followed, than those general reflections which naturally arise on such a complete failure of strategy. Let us first bear in mind that we have a set of conditions just opposite to those which had, two years before, surrounded the battle of Beachy Head. The superiorities of the attacking and defending fleets were reversed, and the attacking fleet was to windward, barred therefore from all chances of escape, because the propulsive force on which escape depended, was adverse. De Tourville had fallen into this horrible trap, not of choice, but from want of intelligence. Hoping, in the fog, that the enemy, of whose presence he possibly had warning for the first time by the sound of our look-out ship's guns, was at most the whole English, or the whole Dutch fleet, the lifting of the fog left him in face of a combination such as would have in any case kept him at Brest had he known of it. Close to him was the army of invasion and its transport. The cruising squadrons of the English had, up to this time, made it impossible for the force at La Hogue to dream of moving. Now, it was quite certain that, whatever happened, the game of invasion was up. It was not a question of de Tourville's being beaten, it was only one of escaping total annihilation, if such escape were possible. The invasion project so far had come to this, that there had been all the expense of collecting a useless army in Normandy, besides the certainty that such a collection was about to involve the greater or less destruction of the French fleet. We are not told how the tide was when the two fleets sighted one another. Had it been flood, de Tourville might have profited by the example of Torrington, and by dropping his anchors imme- diately, suffered the enemy to drift away from him. Had it been ebb, I know not what he could have done other than what he did do, that is, to put the boldest possible face on it, and bear down to the attack. But of course it was hopeless. In the thick weather that again set in, it was impossible to say exactly what happened, but that the unhappy French were everywhere beaten and dispersed. The wind had shifted to the N.W. by W. in the afternoon, which facili- 128 NAVAL WARFARE. tated the attempts of the French to escape south and south-west indiscriminately, which they did. Later on the wind changed to the eastward and freshened. Next day (the 20th May) Russell wrote that it had continued calm all night. There had, during the day's calm, been an engagement to the westward of him, " which he supposed to be the Blue." " I can give," he said, " no particular account of things ; but the French were beaten, and I am now steering away for Conquet Roads, having a fresh gale easterly, but extremely foggy. I suppose that is the place they design for.* If it please God to send us a little clear weather, I do not doubt but we shall destroy their whole fleet. I saw in the night three or four ships blow up ; but I know not what they were."t There was nothing now to be done but to pursue and destroy. Some of the beaten enemy made for St. Malo, and secured them- selves ; but some that escaped to Cherbourg and others to La Hogue were fallen upon and burnt by Delaval and Russell himself. There were no less than 15 ships of from 60 to 104 guns destroyed, 3 at Cherbourg, and 12 at La Hogue. The French attempt to gain the command of the sea had a second time failed, but now disastrously. * He was still 21 miles N.E. of Cape Barfleur when he wrote. Conquet Roads are close to Brest. t I have taken for illustration of battle at this date a sketch of a pictm-e which hangs in the house of the Admiral Superintendent at Devonport, and of which no history- exists, but to which I have had access through the kindness of Sir Walter Hunt-Grubbe, the present superintendent. The painting has suffered from decayed portions of it having passed through the hands of some audacious master painter in the yard, but what has not been touched is of exceeding beauty and truth. It is impossible to say who was the artist, but internal evidence points irresistibly to the conclusion that it ia nearly as old as the yard itself, which was founded in 1691, or is a copy of a picture of that date. The single reefs in the top-sails, the colouring of the hulls, the shape of the tops, shortness of the mast-heads, cut of the sails, and other things, all fix the date of the ships represented as close to that of La Hogue. 129 CHAPTEK VII. Attempts to Gain the Command of the Sea with Definite Ulterior Purpose. — (Continued.) The consequences of failure to gain command of the sea for an ulterior purpose. — The attempt of the French in IG95 to pass an arm}- over to England, and its collapse. — The attempt of 1744 hardly to be classed under the subject of the chapter. — Its daring and rashness. — Its absurd ending. — Mistaken strategy of France in 175G-59. — Countries unable to protect their own seaboard can scarcely hope to attack, those of other countries. — Narrative of the operations of 1759, and the destruction of every attempt at invasion. — Causes of French failure to be found in false strategical principles. It is proper that we should glance for a moment, before passing on, at the consequences likely to arise from a complete failure to obtain the command of the sea for an ulterior purpose : the consequences, that is, of making naval warfare a means rather than an end. In 1690 the French attempt had been frustrated by the sound policy of the Earl of Torrington operating under very disadvantageous conditions, but governed by a profound conviction of the tremendous risks which would be run if the rash adoption of any other policy should land the allied fleets in a serious disaster. In 1092 the French may be said to have adopted the opposite view. They were prepared to stake their maritime life upon a cast, and to stand the hazard of the die. De Tourville's orders were, practically, to go through with it without regard to consequences. The naval war was made subordinate to the military war which was ready to be launched from La Hogue, and so overwhelmingly important did this military war seem, that any mere naval risk was not to stand for a moment in the way of it. So the die was cast, the battle of La Hogue was fought, and the French navy was de- stroyed, scattered, and dispersed, and the consequences had to be taken, which, however, as will be related in the proper place, the 9 180 NAVAL WARFARE. i'rench, by a return to the principles of legitimate naval war, were able in some degree to discount in 1693. The Anglo-Dutch fleets may be said to have been quite unprepared for the absolute collapse which French maritime enterprise suffered on the defeat of de Tourville. Practically, the rest of the year 1692 and the whole of 1693 were spent in considering what was to be done, without coming to any definite conclusions. But in 1694 the notorious powerlessness of the enemy at sea determined an attack upon Brest by land and sea. There was, however, no heart in it, nor were the land forces nearly sufficient for so considerable an enterprise. It was in no degree surprising that on the failure of an attack on a fort in Camaret Bay the whole thing should have been abandoned ; yet the cool audacity of the attack was a direct consequence of the defeat of La Hogue, and the sense of Torring- ton's language in relation to a broken-up fleet — if it is beaten, all is exposed to the mercy of the enemy — came home to the mind of the English Government. They provided abundance of mortar boats — bombs, as they were then called — and laid in good store of shells. This being done, Dieppe was heavily bombarded on the 13th July 1694. Havre was bombarded on the 16th, and burnt steadily for two days. An audacious endeavour was made to smoke the inhabitants out of Dunkirk with a certain inventor's " smoak- boats," in September. The Ahies quietly took up a permanent position in the Mediter- ranean, and wintering for the first time in these latitudes, lay across French trade, watched French ports, and hampered every effort of France by sea. The year 1695 was but one series of bombardments. St. Malo, in July, was fired by " machines,^' and had 900 shells and carcases thrown into it. Granville was destroyed. Dunkirk was attacked again, but again unsuccessfully, in August. Calais was bombarded with 600 shells, and next year with 300 shells again ; while further down the coast, Belleisle, Houat, and Haedic were ravaged and harried. Palamos, captured by the French land- ways, was, in August 1695, bombarded by the Allies sea-ways ; and, in fact, it was from 1692 to 1697 a mere question with the victorious powers what sort of mischief might be most conveniently and economically carried out. The French navy was thrown into such a state of demoralization for those five years by the break-up oft' the coast of Normandy that most of what was done in the maritime war way was the work of private enterprise. These were the days of Jean ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 131 Bart in the North Sea, as a private adventurer under Government control, and of the practice of hiring out as to contractors the ships, officers, and men of the Eoyal Navy of France.^ Practi- cally, it may be said that the failure of de Tourville to gain the command of the sea for the temporary advantage of getting the army across the Channel, involved the close of the naval war and the leaving every spot of French coast open to the descents of the enemy. In the absence of any possible attempt to recover the naval posi- tion, France in 1695 was minded to try the possibility of rushing an army across, in the absence of the British fleet. The practice of laying uj) the great body of the fleet in the winter seemed to offer such an opportunity, and preparations were made for embark- ing an army at Dunkirk, Calais, and adjacent ports in the month of February. But intelligence to this effect having reached the English Government, orders were instantly given, on the 21st of that month, to mobilise the navy. So expeditiously was the busi- ness conducted that Piussell found himself, on the 28th, off Grave- lines, at the head of 40 sail of the line of English ships, and 12 Dutch, beside fire-ships and small craft. The mere appearance of such a fleet put to flight all ideas of any descent. The next attempt of the French was not made until 1744 ; and though it can hardly be classed as one where the command of the sea was sought, yet as the intention was to provide sufficient naval force to escort the army over, it cannot properly be passed by ; the less so as the expedition was prepared in peace, and its dis- charge upon our shores was intended to form the declaration of war. The preparations were made in the winter of 1743-44 with great secresy ; 15,000 troops in Flanders and Pieardy were assembled at Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, commanded by Count de Saxe, and accompanied by the Young Pretender and a body of his Scotch and Irish supporters. Transports for this force were col- lected at the ports, and a fleet of 18 sail of the line, under de Uoquefeuille was fitted out at Brest and Bochefort, and entered the Channel on the 3rd of February. t The British Government * La guerre de di'tail, la guerre de course avait seule occupe la IMarino de la France. Les batiments de IV-tat et les orticiers de vaisseau e'taient prctes, sous certaines condi- tions, aus armateurs ou aux compagniss qui voulaient tenter ce gendre d'entreprises ausquelles, du reste, les luinistres cux-mOiucs ne de laignaient pas de s'assooier. — 0. Troude, vol. i., p. 235. t According to Schomberg, 19 ships of 44 to 7(i gui's, and 4 of 2'j guns. Vol. v.. p. 207. 0. Troude says simply 20 vessels. Vol. i., p. 2!iG. 9 * 132 NAVAL WARFARE. does not appear to have been early apprised of the designs of France. The general preparations for carr34ng on the war with Spain, and guarding against a coming war with France were con- siderable, but more perhaps in the way of attack than of defence against a particular form of it. But the PJurnix 24, Captain T. Brodrick, was watching Brest^ and saw the squadron on the same day that it put to sea. She at once made sail for Plymouth, arriving there on the 3rd of Feb- ruary, and sent off express to the Admiralty with the news. The whole of the ships available were at once whipped up. Admiral Sir John Norris was placed in command ; he started for Spit- head, picked up the ships there on the 6th of February, and sailed for the Downs, where the whole fleet was ordered to rendez- vous. There he soon found himself at the head of 49 sail, of which 21 carried not less than 60 guns, and 11 not less than 44, a fleet therefore greatly superior to that which was approaching under de Eoquefeuille. This was seen at the entrance to the Channel by the Bideford and Kinsale, which were in charge of a convoy for Jamaica, on the 3rd of February, the day on which the Phaniix had arrived at Plymouth. Captain Young, who commanded the latter ship, judged that a higher duty was before him; he quitted the convoy, and made all speed to Plymouth with the news. The Admiralty were thus kept well informed of the progress and strength of the enemy. At Dunkirk the embarkation of the troops was proceeded with, though it is said that the process could only be made tasteful to the remainder of the troops by the execution of a recalcitrant member of the body on the beach, and in presence of his comrades. The French fleet met foul winds and weather, and did not reach the back of the Isle of Wight until the 17th. The Admiral sent forward a look-out ship to examine St. Helen's and Spithead, and on the reporr that nothing was there, conceived the remark- able idea that the British fleet had retired into Portsmouth harbour. He thereupon despatched Commodore Bareil with 5 sail to Dunkirk to hasten the embarkation, as if under the im- pression that the coast was clear. He himself fell into a three days' furious gale off the Isle of Wight, and suffered much damage ; but on the 22nd of February the wind changed to the westward and the weather cleared. The French Admiral took advantage of the change and anchored that evening off Dungeness. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 133 It is easy at this point to take notice of the daring, as well as of the rashness of such proceedings as these. They can hardly be counted as naval warfare, and more clearly represent naval gambling. To assume, as de Roquefeuille had done, that because there were no ships at Spithead, therefore Great Britain at an hour of peculiar danger and anxiety would leave her coasts so unguarded that a force of a score of line-of-battle ships might become master of the British seas, was to place an abnormal faith in the stupidity of the islanders. He was about to conduct an attack which had been long in jDreparation, and which was vital to Great Britain, and yet his force was relatively small, however looked at. It was true that the British had a great fleet de- tached to the Mediterranean, and a considerable force in the West Indies at the time, but it was hardly to be supposed that she would have denuded her own shores to such an extent as not to be able to match de Pioquefeuille's force. But unless she had done so, his position was perilous in the extreme. The method was not really an advance on that adopted in 1695, and which was so easily and so completely made absurd. The present attempt might just as easily turn out to be absurd, and something else, unless the very unlikely contingency of the absence of the British fleet could be calculated on. And some such ideas were very forcibly impressed on de Pioqub • feuille's mind when he saw, the nest day, the 23rd of February, the great fleet under Sir John Norris " tiding it round the South Foreland." At that moment, though the French were to wind- ward, they were apparently embayed to the eastward of Dun- geness, and powerless to escape from the superior fleet slowly approaching them. But fortune favoured the audacious squadron of the enemy. The tide failed Sir John Norris when he had got within six miles of the French, and the wind remaining foul and Hght, compelled him to drop his anchors. Upon ascertaining this respite, de Pioquefeuille called a council of war, which determined that the sooner they got out of their critical position the better, and orders were accordingly given to weigh at sunset and to make sail with the tide at seven in the evening. This was done, and fortune still befriending them, a furious gale sprang up which drove them down Channel at the rate of 12 knots, and safely, though in some disorder, into Brest. Sir John Norris finding, when day broke, that the French had disappeared, returned to the Downs so soon as the weather permitted, and arrived there once 134 NAVAL WARFARE. more on the 27th of February, though somewhat damaged by the heavy gale* Thus absurdly ended an expedition in which the chances were so much against the attacking side that it could not be ranged under the head of legitimate naval warfare. The French were only fortunate in escaping intact ; for any impartial judge ac- quainted with all the circumstances of the early days of February must have predicted certain ruin to the French fleet. The attempt was and was not one to gain command of the sea for the ulterior purpose of invasion. Undertaken while the two nations were as yet at peace, and prepared in secret, it was to operate by way of surprise, although it was all but impossible that surprise could be effective. The naval force was insufficient to completely break up and disorganize anything but a very small force of the British, and it had been shown in 1690 that anything short of complete demoralization of the defending forces would be of no avail to permit the invading army to cross. Therefore, if full thought had been given to the matter, it must have been con- sidered that the English Government would prove so extra- ordinarily supine as to leave practically no force in defence of its shores. But it could not have been unknown to the French Government that there never was a time when the English Government could be less accused of supineness, for in the previous December it had carried a vote appropriating 40,000 men for the sea, and 52,000 for the army and marines. The whole idea of the expedition betrayed a want of comprehension of the naval problem which pointed to the sinister influence of the most ignorant. War with France, being again formally declared in 1756, tended to put a stop to a sort of disgraceful panic fear of invasion which had possessed the country, and to turn attention towards direct measures for preventing such a thing. France on her part mistaking, with the instincts of a military nation, the true points of naval policy, was full of invasion projects, and notwithstanding the several lessons she had already received, was bent upon making the naval subordinate to the military view ; bent upon attempts to gain the temporary command of the sea with the ulterior purpose of passhig armies over it, if not going further, and supposing * The chief authorities for my description are Entick's Naval History ; Hervey's- Nacal llistory, 1779; Campbell's Lives of the Admirals; Batailles Novates de France, 0. Troude, 1867 ; Schomberg's Naval Chronology, 1815. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 135 armies could be effectually guarded, and safely landed, under the protection of a mere escort. The success of a somewhat contrar}' policy resulting in the capture of Minorca, and the general ill success of every other operation, instead of turning the attention of men of influence wholly to the concentration of naval force in order to wrest the command of the sea from the English, seemed to have directed attention more closely than ever to the idea of a military invasion. It was the more strange that such ideas should have prevailed at a time when the impotence of the French navy to protect its own shores was so very marked. Eochefort had been in September 1757 the object of a cool attack, in the absence of any French naval force competent to prevent it. In the following April (1758) Hawke broke up, in the inner waters of the Basque Eoads, the convoys destined for the protection and sustenance of the French North American Colonies ; and in June Anson assisted at another rehearsal of a favourite naval play — the partial destruction of St. Malo. In August the whole of the public works of Cher- bourg were demolished under the protecting wing of Commodore Howe. So far as experience had gone, only one way of preventing this kind of thing had been discovered ; this was the neighbourhood of a sufficient naval force. The establishment and maintenance of such forces, which it was understood were prepared to meet equal forces of the enemy face to face at sea, had hitherto been found sufficient to frustrate all intention of territorial attack. France had fallen into the belief that though she could not protect her own shores, she might attack those of her enemy with naval forces which were at least doubtful about their being able to obtain such a command of the sea as they might hold. There was, in effect, a doubt as to whether the forthcoming invasion was to be conducted by force or by stratagem ; by open defiance or secret evasion. And when the time came for putting such of it as remained possible into action, there was a difference of opinion between the Minister of Marine and the naval commander on the fundamental princi])les which were to govern proceedings. Strangely and ominously, it was the naval commander wbo held the view which was opposed to the teaching of experience so far. I shall advert to this point a little further on. In the lieginning of 175!), the French had three main fleets in existence. There were twelve sail of the line at Toulon under 136 NAVAL WARFARE. Eear- Admiral de la Clue.' At Brest, under Vice- Admiral Mar- shal de Conflans, was a force which was counted up to 17 sail by the British scouts in June, and proved to be 20 or 21 sail of the line strong in November ; and in the West Indies a squadron of 9 sail of the line under Eear- Admiral Bompart.t This made up a total force of 38 sail of the line capable of being concentrated, had the command of the sea been aimed at, on the English force oft" Toulon, not exceeding 14 or 15 sail of the line ; or on that off Brest, never exceeding 25 sail of the line, but seldom reaching that strength at any given moment. Command of the sea as an end was not, however, thought of. Such concentration as was contemplated did not pass beyond the object of convoy or escort for the armies. One of these was col- lected with complete transport about Morbihan, a district com- prising a group of estuaries opening into Quiberon Bay ; it consisted of 19,000 men under the command of the Duke d'Aiguillon, and was originally intended to be convoyed to Irvine near Ardrossan on the Firth of Clyde, by Captain de Morogues with 5 sail-of-the- line and frigates. Preparations were also made for the embarka- tion of another army at Havre, in flat boats and small craft, and a diversion was to be made by a third force sailing from Dunkirk under Thurot, acting against some point on the north-eastern coasts of England or Scotland, or possibly Ireland. Great differ- ences of opinion existed in France on the methods to be pursued, and no doubt as the months went on, and the preparations became more and more complete changes in the programme took place. The English Government, animated by the genius of the elder Pitt, took a practical view of the situation. The Dunkirk invading squadron which consisted of 5 frigates, was watched by 12 sail of from 50 to 12 guns under Commodore Boys. Commodore Sir Piercy Brett lay in the Downs or Yarmouth Eoads with another squadron of 8 sail, to guard against the chances of Thurot eluding Boys. An equal or superior fleet to that of de la Clue watched him in Toulon, and to Sir Edward Hawke was confided a fleet of 25 sail of the line and a powerful force of 50-gun ships and frigates^ for the purpose of watching Conflans and guarding Morbihan, Eochefort and the Basque Eoads, and preventing the unobserved escape of any French forces from these points. This is not the place to discuss the causes of the advance which * I give the name an wo t.^-nerallv hear it. M. Troude gives it as '■ do Laclue." + This is the usual spelli:i>^. but Troude spoils it " Bompard." X Sixteen, according to Schomberg. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 137 had been made in the powers of defence by naval force, as shown in this distribution of the British fleets. We have hitherto seen them, when the attack on our shores was imminent, concentrated close at home to await it. Now we see the points of resistance moved away from our own shores, and transferred to the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy's ports. The change was chiefly due, no doubt, to the improvements in naval architecture which had continually progressed, and also to the improved ([uality and quantity of the provisions carried, as well as to a better state of hygiene'' on board ship. But, undoubtedly, the change was also due to altered conceptions of the principles of naval war and to a more general acceptation of Lord Torrington's maxim that an intact defending fleet was an absolute bar to territorial attack. To the superficial strategist, the absence of great fleets in the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean was leaving the shores of England exposed. To the sound mind of Pitt and the instructed intellects of his naval supporters and advisers, the mere existence of these fleets was full protection to the coasts of the United Kingdom in the first instance, and afterwards cover for the more direct de- struction of the enemy's invading material, and immediate pre- vention of even the issue of invading forces from the watched ports. Not, of course, that danger did not arise, but that it came more from the division of the naval force into several groups, which might be incapable of supporting one another, than from any removal of the bulk of the naval force to the immediate neigh- bourhood of the enemy. As a direct employment of the cover gained by the masking of the French fleet at Brest, Bear- Admiral Kodney, with a squadron of 60- and 50-gun ships and bomb vessels, proceeded in July to bombard Havre and to destroy the invasion flotilla. Shells were poured into the place for fifty-two hours, and the flat boats en- deavouring to escape out of it were pursued, driven on shore, and afterwards ordered by the victorious admiral to be burnt by their own crews under penalty that otherwise the town of Port Bassin, where they had sought shelter, should sufifer the fate of Havre. The main naval object of the French was the junction of the fleet of de la Clue with that of Conflans at Brest, and the pre- * Hawke was able to maintain a winter blockade of Brest, but still bitterly com- plained of the badness of provisions, especially bread and beer, and had men constantly " falling down with scurvy," but this was a wonderful improvement on 1G'J5, when the mere fitting out of a winter fleet put 500 men on shore sick, and still left the fleet unhcalthj'. See Burrows' Li/'e of Hawke, passim, and Burchett, p. 541. 138 NAVAL WARFARE. vention of this was the special object of Admiral Boscawen off Toulon. The means employed were not at all the confining of de la Clue in his port, but rather the bringing him to action at sea. The underlying principle was plain enough. If the French fleet could be brought to battle, come what come would of it, all immediate idea of a concentration at Brest must be given up. Even were Boscawen thoroughly beaten, which was not at all likely considering the relative strength of the forces, a return to Toulon by the French to refit and repair would be imperative after the action. The success of the French plan, however, chiefly depended on de la Clue's avoidance of battle ; he was not to be drawn out, and he trusted to time to force Boscawen to retire for a space. The British Admiral kept watch till the beginning of July, and was then compelled by want of water and provisions, and by certain damage to some of his ships to fall back upon Gibraltar. The coast being so far clear, de la Clue weighed from Toulon on the 5th of August, with his fleet of 12 sail of the line and 3 frigates, in hopes of passing the Straits of Gibraltar unnoticed. But Boscawen had placed a look-out ship off Malaga, and another, the Gibraltar, between Estej^ona on the Spanish and Ceuta on the African shore. On the 17th of August, Boscawen's ships were still in the middle of refitting : their sails were unbent, and some of them had their topmasts down.* Towards evening the French fleet drew near the straits, and running before a strong easterly breeze, found themselves off Cape Spartel at midnight, in a pitch dark atmosphere, and with no sign that they were in any way followed, perhaps with no belief that they had been even seen. De la Clue was happy in the supposed success of his movements. No ship had shown a light, and the game was played and won ; Boscawen was outwitted, the blockade of Brest and Morbihan would be raised, and the Scotch invasion at least would proceed. But there was a fatal flaw in his own conduct, of which he was far from perceiving the consequences. He had thought much of pushing on himself, and had been less careful of the order in which he maintained the fleet astern of him. He had made Cadiz the rendezvous of his ships, and when darkness fell and pre- cluded tlio establishment of a fresh rendezvous, or even of any very definite communication of orders, by reason of the defective signal systems of those days, all the captains believed that Cadiz * Schoinberg, vol. i., p. 23^. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 139 was the destination. Now at midnight, the course to Cadiz was, perhaps, N.N.W., while the course to pass Cape St. Vincent and proceed up the coast of Portugal was, perhaps, W.N.W. At mid- night M. de la Clue began to think of pulling his fleet together, and began also to think that the rendezvous at Cadiz was a mistake. He would simply be blocked there, as he had been blocked at Toulon. He could never expect again such a chance as was now before him. He shortened sail to allow the fleet to close up ; he exhibited his stern lights to show his position, and he made, or attempted to make, a night signal which would direct the fleet to continue to steer to the westward." Then, fearing that Boscawen's look-out ships might see the lights, and assuming that his ships had all seen and understood the intended signal, he complacently extinguished his lights and made sail for Cape St. Vincent. At daylight he had but six ships with him, and it was not until 8 o'clock that the report of 8 sail to the eastward gave him hopes that the stragglers were rejoining. He was then 30 or 40 miles to the E.S.E. of Cape St. Vincent, and he took steps to let this remainder of his fleet come up with him. Now let us see what had been going on in the English fleet during this time. I do not think I can more clearly or forcibly tell the story than by quoting verbatim the language of the journal of the Captain of the Namur, Captain Buckle, Boscawen's flag-captain. t Friday, 17th August 1759, moored in Gabraltar Bay. Wind E.S.E. to East. First part moderate and fair, middle and latter part a fresh gale, and hazy. P.M., received a long-boat load of water. At 8 heard the report of several guns, soon after saw a ship in the offing with several lights, then we sent our barge, who returned and in- formed us that the ship we saw was the Gibraltar, who had seen fifteen large ships at the back of the hill. At 9 made the signal to unmoor. Bont the sails and hove up the best bower anchor. At 10 made signal and slipped ; the long-boat being made fast to the end of the cable, got athwart hawse, broke the slip-rope and went adrift. At 11 Cabritta Point bore west, three or four miles. Brought to, and hoisted in the boats. Employed clearing the shijD. At midnight made sail. At 1 a.m. out all reefs and set top gallant sails. Cape Spartel W. by S., seven or eight miles. At 6 saw seven sail to the westward. At 7 made the Gibraltar's signal to come within hail, and ordered him to make sail ahead and see what the strangers were. At 8 sis Swecds passed by to the southward. Made the signal for a general chase to the X.W. At 9 made the signal for the ships astern to make more sail, soon after repeated it. At noon all the fleet in chase. * Troude, vol. i., pp. 373-379. M. de Lapeyrouse, quoted by Troude, says the Admii'al made the signal to steer to the westward. But even as late as 1832 there was no such night-signal in the French navy ; the nearest signal was " sail largo " on the starboard or port tack. t The journal, with great numbers of others, is preserved in the Royal Victoria Yardi Deptford. The day begins at noon. 140 NAVAL WARFARE. Satiarday 18th, at noon Cape St. Vincent N.W. by W., distant eight or nine leagues. Winds East, E.N.E., and E.S.E. First part moderate and fair, middle and latter little ■wind. At 1 P.M. the strangers hoisted French colours, then we showed ours. Twenty minutes after made the signal to engage. At 50 minutes past made the America'.'! signal to make more sail. At 2 repeated it ; the enemy began to fire, as did the Culloden at 25 minutes past 2. At three-quarters past 2, the America backed her mizzen topsail and topgallant-sail and hauled up her mainsail. Then made her signal to make more sail. At 10 minutes past 3, made the Guernsey's signal to make more sail, which she not observing we soon after repeated it. At a quarter-past changed the chasing signal from N.W. to N.E. At 4 ran alongside the Ocean* having a flag at the mizzen topmast head, and engaged her and two other ships of the enemy till quarter-past 7, when they made sail and shot ahead of us. The mizzen-stay being shot away the mast went overboard. The fore and main topsail yards likewise shot away, and all our sails and rigging much damaged ; then the Admiral went on board the Newark and hoisted his tiag there. Soon after one of the French ships struck, being the Centaur, of 74 guns and 750 men, whom the Edijar lay by. We had six men killed in the action and upwards of forty wounded. People employed repairing the damages. At 10 Thomas Quinnell, Thomas Cattness, and .John Williams, seamen, died of their •wounds. At 5 a.m. saw our fleet in the S.W. and made sail after them- Sunday, August 19th, 1759. Noon, Cape St. Vincent N.W. J W. three or four leagues, winds West, N.W. by N., N.N.E., N.N. W., North, light airs and fair. At 2 p.m. saw three of the French ships at anchor to the eastward of Cape St. Vincent, and one on shore without any masts, being the Ocean, of 84 guns, who struck to the St. Albans, as did one of the others to the Warspite. At 7 saw one of the remaining two on fire. The Warspite brought her prize into the fleet, being the Temeraire of 74 guns and 750 men. Unbent the foresail and fore-topsail and bent new ones. At half-past 9, the ship (that) was on fire blew up. At 10, saw the Ocean on fire. At midnight our ships brought in the other French ship, called the J/o*s^e of 64 guns and 700 men. A.M. got up a new main topgallant mast and yard. Employed setting up a pair of sheers to raise the mizzen-mast. N.B. — The ship which blew up was the RedouhtaUe, of 74 guns. Monday, August 20th, Cape St. Vincent distant twelve leagues. Winds N.W., N., N.E. Moderate and clear. At 4 p.m. Cape St. Vincent bore N.W. by N., eight or nine leagues. Admiral Boscawen returned from the Newark and hoisted his flag here. Raised the mizzen mast, and stepped it on the upper deck. Such was the first battle of St. Vincent, as described in the cool and terse language of the official record. It is easy to understand what had happened in the French fleet. M. de la Clue, who paid with his life the forfeit of his error, small as it might have seemed at the time, had not been justified in assuming that his signals at midnight on the 17th had been seen and their purport understood. However he might have thought of it, his captains had no oppor- tunity of looking into his mind and noting what was going on there. Five of the line-of-battle ships, and all the frigates, miss- ing the rest of the fleet, had obeyed their orders and proceeded to Cadiz. The ships, which de la Clue did not see till 8 a.m. on the 18th, and which he for a time drew near to, supposing them to be * De la Clue's flag-ship. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 141 friends, were in fact the leaders of Boscawen's fleet, which were even then preparing for a general chase. The danger of playing fast and loose with a rendezvous had even then been fully recog- nized in the English navy, and it is highly improbable that any English admiral would have acted as de la Clue did. The impor- tance attached to the thing is well illustrated in this very journal of Captain Buckle, in which a new rendezvous being given out on the afternoon of the 20th, and a lieutenant from each ship summoned to receive it, the names of the officers thus made responsible are entered. The result of the error was a loss to the French of two line-of- battle ships burnt, and three captured, out of the total of seven. Two made their escape on the night of the 18th, and one reached Eochefort and the other the Canaries in safety. Poor de la Clue was landed badly wounded, and died of his wounds soon afterwards. The conjunction of the Toulon and Brest fleets was entirely aban- doned, and those French ships which had got into Cadiz, only thought themselves too happy in escaping to Toulon as late as the 17th of December. There was still the combination of Admiral Bompart's squadron with that of de Conflans, and against this Hawke was taking all possible steps. He was primarily concerned in a close watch upon Brest, in order that the fleet there should not be able to 23ut to sea unwatched and unfollowed. The secondary object was as close a watch on the invading force assembled at Morbihan. But the greater danger was the junction of the Toulon fleet with the Brest fleet, and even after he had heard from Boscawen of the result of the battle of the 18th and 19th of August, he saw no cause to relax his vigilance. Boscawen wrote on the 20th, and did not then know that the half of the French fleet was in Cadiz, and capable of being masked. So that when Hawke in the latter end of August heard that Bompart had actually sailed from America,, there was a possible combination at or near Brest of an exceed- ingly serious character. Bompart might make for Eochefort, and the moiety of de la Clue's fleet also, as a preliminary, and if Brest were opened, by heavy weather driving Hawke off, a junction might prove to be easy. He had not force enough to watch Eochefort as well as Brest. "If," he wrote on the 28th of August, " M. Bom- part's destination should be Brest, I shall do my utmost to inter- rupt him. But should he be bound to Eochefort I must not think of him " — for the reason that a detachment to Eochefort, though enough to meet Bompart's nine sail of the line, would leave him 142 NAVAL WARFARE. too weak even for Conflans, certainly too weak for the missing ships of de la Clue's fleet and that of Conflans' together.''' But later on, when Hawke was probably relieved of all apprehension on the score of the ships shut up in Cadiz, he did despatch Admiral Geary with a squadron to bar Bompart's •entry into Eochefort, while another squadron, under Captain Duff, lay in Quiberon Bay watching Morbihan. And then, on the 10th ■of October, the Admiralty having informed him that Bompart was not likely to sail for Europe at present, Geary was recalled. Hawke's plans were thus very simple ; he would watch Brest as long as the weather would let him, and when driven off he would invariably make for the then safe anchorage of Torbay, where the .store-ships and victuallers could always meet him, and where the whole efforts of the fleet would be concentrated on getting ready to put to sea the instant the wind changed. On the same 10th of October Hawke, being off Brest, wrote : — Their lordships will pardon me for observing that from the present disposition of the squadron I think there is little cause for alarm while the weather continues toler- able. As to Brest, I may safely affirm that, except the few ships that took shelter in Conquet, hardly a vessel of any kind has been able to come out of that port these four months. We ai"e as vigilant as ever, though we have not as much daylight. ... It must be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of them escape. f The fault of the weather, however, showed itself immediately, for on the 11th so heavy a westerly gale sprang up that the fleet sought shelter in Plymouth, whence Hawke wrote on the 13th : — Yesterday and this day, the gale rather increasing, I thought it better to bear up for Plymouth than run the risk of being scattered and driven to the eastward. While this wind shall continue, it is impossible for the enemy to stir. . . . The instant it shall be moderate, I shall sail again. J Then next day, he says : — Their lordships may rest assured there is little foundation for the present alarms. "While the wind is fair for the enemy's coming out, it is also favourable for our keeping them in ; and while we are obliged to keep oif . they cannot stir.§ The Admiral got back to his watch, now from the lateness of the season become one of desperate anxiety and hazard, by the 23rd of October, and the commanders of the inshore squadrons, break- ing down in health as they were from the strain, are only warned that there must be less relaxation than ever. By the beginning of ^November, Hawke was informed that Conflans was under orders to put to sea and engage the English fleet at once ; but probably the * Burrows' Lij'e i yj-r^Guada/oupe "^Dom/nica ^P^\Martir?/que dp S^ Lucia , Sty/ncent(^ o ^ Birdadoes GremdaO ^p^Todaqo -tS' To Face Pa^e /S8 ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 189 produce no other result than to increase the number of sick on board, which was ah-eady considerable.* His resolution was taken immediately. He put the whole of the West Indian troops into four frigates, with orders to land them at Guadaloupe. He sent two more frigates to convoy the prize sugar ships to the nearest port, and directed the whole six to rejoin him at a rendezvous 60 miles N.E. of Corvo, in the Azores. He then made sail for that rendezvous himself. The condition of things in Europe was now this : Ganteaume, with his 21 sail of the line and his troops, had been trying all these months to get away, but being too closely watched by Cornwallis with 18 or 20 sail had been unable to do so, and was still in the Roads of Brest. Missiessy, with his squadron, it will be remembered, had returned from the West Indies, and had got safe into Eochefort on the 20th of May. There he found orders waiting him which might have been put in force had he returned earlier. They were to the effect that if he could get away by the 15th of May, he was to return to the West Indies and join Villeneuve. If, however, the latter had left, he was to follow him direct to Ferrol, and to put into port there if Villeneuve was not met. If Ferrol was blockaded, this would pre- suppose the non-arrival of Villeneuve, and Missiessy was to cruise in the offing for a sufficient time to allow for Villeneuve's arrival, and to return to Rochefort if he failed to appear. t The late arrival of Missiessy, and the extensive repairs which his ships required, prevented his being soon ready for sea, and fresh instructions were issued to him. He was now directed to make a demonstration on the coast of Ireland, in order to distract the attention of the British, and to cause them to detach forces to that coast. He was, however, to keep away from the coast until the 4th to the 9th of July, burning or sinking every neutral or enemy's ship which might otherwise give note of his whereabouts. Between those dates he was to appear off the Shannon and Cape Clear, then to disappear again at sea, and finally to rendezvous 120 miles west of Ferrol from the 29th of July to the 3rd of August pending the arrival of Vice- Admiral Villeneuve, under whose orders he was then to place him- self. If this meeting did not take place before the 13th of August, Missiessy was to proceed to Vigo. If, however, Ferrol was found * Villeneuve thought that with Cochnine's ships there would be lt> against him ; the number, as we have seen, was exaggerated. — Troude, vol. iii. , p. i{46. t Troude, vol. iii., p. 334. 190 NAVAL WARFARE. to be not blockaded when Missiessy appeared off it, he was to take the division formed there under his orders, and remain at a con- venient rendezvous near at hand.^ On the 26th of June, the health of Missiessy had so broken down as to make it necessary that he should resign his command to Commodore Allemand. This officer, with his 5 sail of the line, was now blockaded at Eochefort by Eear-Admiral Stirling with an equal force. In Ferrol were still the Franco- Spanish squadron of 10 sail of the line, but now increased to 14 sail, and these ships were watched by Vice- Admiral Sir Eobert Calder, with only 10 sail of the line. It is easy to see how portentous to the issue of the war Ville- neuve's return across the Atlantic in June 1805 actually was. Before the 11th of July, the only thing known to Cornwallis and his outlying squadrons was that Villeneuve had actually arrived at Martinique about two months before, and that Nelson was on his way after him ; but what was about to happen, and when Ville- neuve would appear in European waters, was entirely hidden from knowledge. Only it was, on the face of things, probable that Nelson's arrival in the West Indies would drive Villeneuve home again. But if Villeneuve reached Ferrol at the head of 18 or 20 sail of the line, what could Calder do, except retire ? Such retirement would release the Ferrol ships, and Villeneuve' 3 fleet would be augmented to 34 sail of the line. There was then nothing to prevent him from appearing off Eochefort, driving Stirling away, and augmenting his fleet to 39 sail of the line by the addition of Allemand' s squadron. Cornwallis, off Brest, would only have some 28 sail of the line under his command when Calder and Stirling had fallen back and joined him. Would it be possible for him to face Villeneuve's 39 sail of the line, when Ganteaume was pressing out of Brest with 21 sail of the line behind him ? It would have been a desperate venture, but, short of power to beat both fleets in succession, there was nothing to prevent Villeneuve's sailing leisurely up the Channel from Ushant at the head of his GO sail of the line, and covering the passage of Napoleon's vast array to the shores of Kent and Sussex. Such speed had been made by Bettesworth i-n the Curieux, that Cornwallis got news of Villeneuve's being on his way home, and * Troude, vol. iii., p. 335. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 191 Admiralty orders thereupon, on the 11th of July, five days before Nelson reached Cape St. Vincent. In obedience to the order, he sent to Admiral Stirling to raise the blockade of Eochefort, and to join Calder off Ferrol. Calder, with his force thus augmented to 15 sail of the line, was ordered to take his post 100 ii. 'les west of Ferrol, and to wait for Villeneuve, who was supposed to have not more than 16 sail with him, whereas, as he have seen, he was at the head of 20 sail of the line. Calder was on this station when Nelson arrived at Cape St. Vincent. It will be well here to repeat the former process of assembling together the contemporary events, in order to get a clearer view of what was actually taking place. June 4th, 1805. — Villeneuve sails from Fort Eoyal, Martinique, with 20 sail of the line. Nelson arrives at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, and is joined by 2 sail of the line, making 12 in all. Jime 5th. — Villeneuve on his way to Antigua. Nelson sails for Trinidad. June 1th. — Villeneuve to the eastward of Antigua. Nelson arrives at Paria Bay, Trinidad ; finds he has been misled, and turns his head north. June 8th. — Villeneuve passing round the north part of Antigua, hears of the Sugar Convoy to theN.N.E.; chases and captures 15 sugar ships valued at 500,000 francs ; hears also of Nelson's arrival at Barbados, and supposes him to have 16 sail under his command. Nelson is approaching Grenada. June 9th. — Villeneuve, north of Antigua, puts the West Indian troops into six frigates to be landed at Guadaloupe. Nelson, off Grenada, learns that Villeneuve was seen to pass Dominica on the 6th. June 10th. — Villeneuve sails for the rendezvous oft' the Western Islands. Nelson is steering north for Antigua. June 12f/i. — Villeneuve is at sea on his way home. Nelson, at Antigua, disembarks his troops ; receives important intelligence at 8 P.M. ; despatches Bettesworth in the Curieux to the Admiralty, and sails, on 13th, with 11 line-of -battle ships for Cape St. Vincent. June QOth. — Villeneuve, at the rendezvous off Corvo, is joined by his frigates. Nelson is at sea on his way home. July drd. — Villeneuve re-captures a Spanish galleon valued at 15,000,000 francs, which had been taken by the British privateer Mars. Nelson still at sea. 192 NAVAL WARFARE. July 11th. — Villeneuve within five days' sail of Calder's rendez- vous. Nelson arrives off Cape St. Vincent. Nelson had now been chasing and continually missing Villeneuve for three months and thirteen days. His last run after him had covered more than 7,000 miles of sea, at the rate of 93 miles a day. There was now the choice before him of going east to Cadiz, or north to Ferrol, and under the spell of ill-fortune which ever pursued him he chose the former route. Collingwood was watching Cadiz, but Nelson did not now meet with him ; they only corre- sponded on the state of affairs, while Nelson put first into Gibraltar for stores and refitting, and then into Tetuan for water. He finally weighed from this latter place, with the intention of going north, on the 24th of July. Collingwood had been writing to Nelson, putting to him the dangers of the position, and the probable plans of Napoleon. He penetrated parts of the Emperor's apparent design, but he considered Ireland the main point about to be struck at. Nelson now received a second letter, in which Collingwood said : — The flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which is the great impediment to their undertaking. The Rochefort squadron's return confirmed me. I think thev will now collect their forces at Ferrol — which Calder tells me are in motion pick up those at Rochefort, who, I am told, are equally ready, and will make them about 30 sail ; and then, without going near Ushant or the Channel fleet, proceed to Ireland, when the Brest fleet — 21, I believe, of them — will sail either to another part of Ireland or up the Channel ; a sort of foi-ce that has not been seen in those seas perhaps ever. On the 25th of July, Nelson saw Collingwood, and talked matters over with him. He learnt then, also, ihat the Franco- Spanish fleet had actually been seen about half way between the West Indies and the Azores, steering for Europe on the previous 19th of June. Nelson stood again to the northward. He was 400 miles west of Lisbon on the 3rd of August. He crossed the Bay of Biscay without intelligence, and without meeting anything worth notice, and then finally joined the squadron of Cornwallis off' Ushant on the 15th. Meanwhile, this is what had been happening elsewhere. Calder was, as we have seen, on his rendezvous 100 miles west of Ferrol, ■with 15 sail of the line, in hourly expectation of seeing an enemy's fleet only larger by one line-of-battle ship than his own. His health was bad. The constant anxiety of his situation was wearing him down. But he was able, zealous, and willing. He had been ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 198 captain of the fleet under Jervis on Valentine's Day, and was not a likely man to fail. The morning of the 22nd of July was very thick, with a light breeze from W.N.W. Calder's ships were on the starboard tack, standing therefore, no doubt, under very easy sail to the south-west- ward. The Defiance was stationed as a look-out ship nine or ten miles to windward of the main squadron, and between eleven and twelve o'clock in the forenoon, during a momentary lifting of the fog, this ship signalled an enemy's fleet to the south-west. This was Villeneuve's 20 sail ; they were in three columns, steering straight for Ferrol, and nearly straight for the British fleet. Calder thereupon formed in line of battle, and Villeneuve did the same ; but the fog was too dense for either fleet to see what was done by the other, or even to count their numbers. As a fact, they were presently in the position of passing one another on opposite tacks, starboard side to starboard side, and as much as seven miles apart. It was not until 3 p.m. or thereabouts, that the Sirius frigatp, having been sent to reconnoitre, reported by signal the exact number — 20 — of the enemy's sail of the line. Calder thereupon made the signal to " engage the enemy," and immediately afterwards the signal to tack, the object being the natural one to close with the enemy on the same tack with him, but to leeward. It was still too foggy to see what was going on, but when the Hei'o, which was Calder's leading ship, got a little nearer, she found that the combined fleet itself had tacked, and was standing to the S.W. The Hero immediately tacked, and was followed by the rest of the British ships in succession. So the battle was joined very much in the old way. Both fleets were on the starboard tack, the British to leeward, engaging with their starboard guns, while the combined fleet engaged with their port guns. But what between the fog and the smoke, it was difficult to say what was happening, or almost what was being fired at. In this somewhat confused state, the firing went on as steadily as was possible, till about 8 o'clock, when it was found that two Spanish ships, the San Rafael and the Firme, had struck to the British fleet. It was growing dark at half-past 8, and the fleets were drawing rather apart. Calder made the night signal to discontinue the action, but the general state of things was such that the firing did not altogether cease till an hour later. It had lasted altogether about four hours and a half, and it had left the two Spanish prizes in the hands of the British, at a loss of 39 killed and 159 wounded, 13 194 NAVAL WARFARE. while the combined fleet had suffered a loss of 476 in killed and wounded. Calder's squadron now lay-to all night with their heads to the S.W., repairing damages, and the combined fleet remained in the same condition. At daylight on the 23rd of July it was almost as foggy as ever ; the two fleets were some 17 miles apart, and each was in more or less disorder. The British were hampered by the presence of the disabled prizes, and also by one of their own ships, the Windsor Castle, which was also disabled. Yet it was so thick that Calder could hardly tell what the situation of his fleet really was, and a movement to close up his ships was taken by Villeneuve to be a sign of weakness, who bore up with an intention, which he did not carry out, of reopening the engagement. Being to wind- ward, Villeneuve always had the opportunity, had he wished it, of bringing on the action again. Calder could certainly make attempts in that way, but only at some disadvantage. Villeneuve, however, was from his orders necessarily disinclined for more decisive action. His purposes would have been much better fulfilled had he never seen Calder at all, even if he had beaten him. Calder, on his part, had to remember that there were 14 ships from Ferrol, and 5 from Kochefort, which might be close upon him. The combined fleet was still 18 sail strong, while his own, on account of the disabled Windsor Castle, was reduced to 14 sail. The odds were heavy, when 19 additional enemies might be in sight as soon as the fog lifted. The two fleets passed out of each other's view on the 24th of July.* Villeneuve made for Vigo, and anchored there on the 26th. t Calder conveyed his prizes towards the Channel, then * At 6 A.M. on the 23rd, according to nautical time. f " In the first moment after the battle, Villeneuve was almost happy that he had met the English without experiencing a disaster ; but having left the scene of action, and having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened into a profound grief. ... To complete his misfortune, the wind which for two days had been favourable had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or sis days. Thus situated, he again wanted to proceed to Cadiz, Lauriston again opposed this course ; they split the difference and ran into Vigo." — Thiers' Ilintonj of the Consulate and the Empire (Authorized Translation), vol. v., pp. 236-7. Troude, vol. iii., p. 356, makes Villeneuve's decision to rest entirely on the wind, and his anxiety to land his sick and wounded. When the wind set in from the N.E. he steered for Cadiz ; then after six hours, on a change to S.S.W., he made for Ferrol ; then, on a change back to N.E., for Vigo. James {Naval History, vol. iv., p. 16) dates the arrival at Vigo as given in the text, but Troude (vol. iii., p. 356) makes it the 2bth. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 195 steered back for Ferrol, and finding on arrival off the port on the 29th of July that Villeneuve had not put in there, he resumed the blockade of it, and awaited orders. On the next day, the 30th of July, Villeneuve sailed from Vigo for Ferrol, but now with only 15 sail, having left three behind him at Vigo.* On the 1st of August a strong south-westerly gale sprang up, which drove Calder away to the north-east, and enabled Villeneuve to pass into Ferrol unobserved. And thus, in spite of his mishaps and difficulties, the French admiral again found himself at the head of a fleet (29 sail of the line) so numerically superior to anything he was likely to meet, that had the quality been equal to the quantity, what had j)assed would have been mere incidental circumstances, in no degree troubling or hindering the main action of the great plan which was now working towards the clenoument.\ Calder had detached Stirling with 4 sail of the line to resume the blockade of Kochefort, and now, when the wind moderated, and he reappeared off Ferrol on the 9th of August, with only 9 sail of the line, and found 29 enemy's ships ready to leave port, there was no possible course open to him but to fall back and join Lord Cornwallis off Ushant, which he did on the 14th. There was still one thing wanting to complete Villeneuve's arrangements before he proceeded to roll up the blockading fleet at Brest, to set Ganteaume free, and to sweep into the Channel in his company unopposed. When Stirling should get to Koche- fort, he was sure to find it empty, for Allemand had put to sea * The Atlas, French, and the America and Espaha, Spanish. They had not suffered much in the action, but were said to be slow sailers, and likely to delay the fleet. They remained as hospital ships to accommodate the 1,200 sick and wounded which were discharged from the combined fleet. Villeneuve was only too glad of any excuse to be quit of the Spanish ships. " They have always," he wrote to Decres, " brought us to the lowest depths of misfortune." — Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 238. t It was in this sense that Napoleon affected to write to Villeneuve at Ferrol, endeavouring to encourage him in the belief that all was as it should be (see the letter of August 18th at p. 242, vol. v., Consulate and Empire). Villeneuve, however, was not to be encouraged. "I am about to sail," he wrote to Decres from Ferrol. . . . " No doubt it is thought that sailing hence with 29 ships, I am considered able to fight vessels of anything like the same number ; I am not afraid to confess to you that I should bo sorry to meet with 20. Our naval tactics are out of date ; we only know bow to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations. ... I foresaw jill this before I left Toulon ; but all my delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine . . . then I was obliged to despair of everything." — Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 240. 13 * 196 NAVAL WARFARE. directly after the blockade had been raised nearly a month before. Villeneuve was bound, if he could, to pick up Allemand before he went on, and he seems to have had some idea of doing it off Cape Ortegal.* However this may be, Villeneuve sailed on the 11th of August, and was on the 13th and 14th off Cape Ortegal. The Rochefort squadron was, in fact, then close to him, but not actually seeing him, made for Vigo, and anchored there on the 16th of August. Villeneuve's latest orders from Napoleon had urged him to proceed to Brest, and give battle to the British fleet off that port at all hazards, even at the loss of his own fleet, in order to enable Gan- teaume to put to sea. That was all that was necessary, in the opinion of the Emperor, to allow the 150,000 men in the 2,000 vessels lying ready, from Etaples to Cape Grisnez, to cross the Channel. t I must allow the French Admiral to make his own statement in explanation, or justification, of the fact that on the 15th of August he bore up and steered for Cadiz. I was observed, on the day I quitted Feri'ol, and the next morning also, by the frigates and by 2 sail of the line of the enemy, which I chased by the fastest ships in the fleet without being able to api^roach them. Having found the winds from theN.E. set in, and having stretched to the W.N.W. during the whole of the 14th and loth without any appearance of change ; having no confidence in the state of the armaments of my ships, or in their speed, or in the precision of their manccuvres; the reunion of the forces of the enemy, their knowledge of all my proceedings since my arrival on the coast of Spain, left me no hope of being able to carry out the great object for which the fleet was destined. In struggling longer against foul winds, I should ex- perience irreparable damage and inevitable separations, the Spanish ship San Francisco de Asis having already lost her main topmast. Convinced that the state of affairs was essentially changed since the issue of His Majesty's orders, who, in directing the main part of his naval forces on the Colonies, had for his object to divide those of the enemy * Allemand's various orders, as stated, do not correspond with his acts. According to Troude (vol. iii., pp. 335-G), he should have made Ferrol as soon as he was free to put to sea, and only to cruise if he was prevented from doing so. At Vigo, he found orders from Villeneuve to rendezvous at the Penmarks. James (vol. iv., p. 27) says Allemand did not find any instructions at Vigo. t Troude, vol. iii., p. 357. Explanation of Plate III. 1. — Nelson, April 6, 1805. 2. — Villeneuve, same date. 3. — Villeneuve, April 8. 4. — Nelson, April IG. 5. — Nelson, May 5. G. — Nelson, May 12. 7. — Caldcr's action, June 22 Nelson asrain at 5. 8. — Villeneuve, August 12 (appros.). 1). — Allemand, same date (apjorox.). 10. — Nelson, same date. 11. — Calder, same date. 12. — Point where Villeneuve bore August 15th. 13. — Nelson, same date. 14 — Cornwallis and Calder, same date, up, PLATE m. To race Fade ,'96 ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 197 by drawing his attention to his distant possessions, in order to surprise him, and to strike at his heart by their sudden return to Europe and their combined reunion ; that this plan not having succeeded, being, in fact, upset by the time which had elapsed, and by the calculations to which the speed of the squadron had given occasion, the enemy was placed in a position to defend it : and that the junction of his forces, at this moment was greater than under any preceding circumstances, and was such that they might prove superior to the united fleets of Toulon ; seeing, therefore, no chance of success in this state of affairs, and, conformably to my instructions, I determined, on the third day after my departure, on the evening of the loth, being then SO leagues W.N.W. of Cape Finisterre, to bear up for Cadiz.* Let me now, finally, set out the contemporary events side by side, that the flow of the story up to the denoument may be the better comprehended. Jidy '2'2nd. — Yilleneuve's and Calder's fleets in action west of Ferrol ; Allemand's squadron within a day's sail of the spot. Nelson anchors in Mazarri Bay. July 24,th. — Villeneuve a.nd Calder lose sight of each other. Nelson sails from Mazarri Bay. Jidij 26th. — Villeneuve anchors at Vigo. Calder convoying his prizes to the northward. Allemand at sea looking for Villeneuve. Nelson off the coast of Portugal, steering to the northward. July 29th. — Villeneuve at Vigo ; Allemand at sea, looking for him. Calder off Ferrol, with 13 sail ; Nelson below the latitude of Lisbon, with 11 sail, steering to the northward. August 1st. — Calder driven from Ferrol to the N.E. by a gale of wind. Villeneuve sails from Vigo with 15 sail, and anchors at Corunna ; is now at the head of 29 sail ; Allemand still at sea looking for him. Nelson still south of Lisbon. August 9t]i. — Villeneuve still at Corunna; Allemand still at sea. Calder arriving off Ferrol with 9 sail, finds Villeneuve there, and falls back to join Cornwallis off Brest ; Nelson within six days of Ushant. August lltJi. — Villeneuve quits Corunna with 29 sail; Allemand in the neighbourhood of Cape Ortegal with 5 sail. Nelson withm four days of Ushant. August 13th. — Villeneuve off Cape Ortegal, standing W.N.W., with 29 sail ; Allemand close to, but not in sight. Nelson, 11 sail, within two days of Ushant ; Calder, 9 sail, within one day's sail of Ushant. August 15th. — Villeneuve, being 240 miles W.N.W. of Cape Finis- * Troudc, vol. iii., p. 300. He says (vol. iii., p. 551) that before leaving the West Indies, Villeneuve received orders which would have justified his going to Cadiz. I am disposed to think, however, that he was relying on the latter part of Napoleon's draft of May 8th, already quoted. 198 NAVAL WARFARE. terre, with a N.E. wind, bears up for Cadiz ; Allemand within one day's sail of Vigo. Nelson joins Cornwallis off Brest. August WtJi. — Villeneuve on his way south ; Allemand anchors at Vigo. Nelson on his way home with only Victory and Superb. While these transactions were in progress at sea, Napoleon had been apparently fully persuaded of the ultimate success of his plans, and fully determined to push his army across, so soon as the sails of the combined fleets should appear. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, reviewed a line of infantry nine miles long, and said : " The English know not what awaits them. If we have the power of crossing but for twelve hours, England will be no more."'^ He heard of Calder's action about the 13th of August, and on that day wrote to Villeneuve the commendatory letter already noticed, in which he said : — The English are not so numerous as you seem to imagine. They are everywhere in a state of uncertaiutj' and alarm. Should you make your appearance for three days — nay, even for 24 hours — your mission would be fulfilled. Wake the moment of your departure known to Admiral Ganteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a grander object did a squadron run such risks. . . For this great object of forwarding the descent upon that power which for sis centuries has oppressed France, we may all die withoiit regretting the sacrifice of life. . . . England has in the Downs only 4 ships of the line, which we daily harass with our praams and our flotillas, f On the 14th he wrote to Lauriston, who still remained on board Villeneuve's flagship, saying : — We are ready everywhere. Your presence in the Channel for 24 hours will sufEce.J On the 22nd of August the courier who had been despatched with the news of Villeneuve's having quitted Ferrol, arrived at Boulogne. The Emperor and the Minister of Marine were quar- tered some distance apart, and each received separate letters from Villeneuve's flag-ship. The Emperor heard from Lauriston, expressing full confidence that the fleet was on its way to Brest. The Minister Decres, received a letter from Villeneuve, which gave him strong reason to believe that Villeneuve would never appear at Brest. Before he saw Decres, the Emperor wrote to Ganteaume and to Villeneuve, supposing both would be at Brest when his letters reached. To Ganteaume he said, " Set out, and come hither." To Villeneuve he said, " I hope that you are at Brest. Set out ; lose not a moment. Bring my united squadrons into the Channel, * Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 222, et scq. t Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 243. X Ibid., p. 242. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 199 and England is ours ! We are all ready ; everything is embarked. Be here but for 24 hours and all is ended."* But presently Decres waited on him with the expression not only of his doubts about Villeneuve, and his conviction that he would next appear at Cadiz, but of his own view that the whole plan was a mistake — "horribly dangerous." Napoleon, apparently furious, pondered for twenty-four hours, and then accepting as certainty the Minister's belief, sent for his Secretary, Daru, and enacted with him that scene told with such dramatic effect by Thiers and Alison, from a paper left by Daru himself ; but over which Alison makes such a strange mistake. Daru being sent for, found the Emperor in his cabinet in a transport of rage, rushing up and down in a fury, and breaking out into exclamations : " What a navy ! What sacrifices for nothing ! What an admiral ! All hope is gone ! That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Cadiz. He will be blockaded there ! Daru, sit down and write ." What was written there and then were the preliminary directions for the Campaign of Austerlitz, and the final abandonment of the design of invading England. t In reviewing the nature and prospects of this last and appa- rently gigantic and complex effort of France, we are met by a very strong sensation of difficulty resting on the doubt— which I may own to operate with much force on my mind — whether Napoleon ever really meant to try the hazard of invasion. M. Thiers is quite satisfied that he did fully mean it, and he certainly seemed to do so. But with a mind such as Napoleon's, so firmly persuaded of the value of untruth, we never know where we are. Anyone reading the " Pieces Justificatives " given by Dumas in the eleventh volume of his Precis des Evenemens Militaires, where are set out in a continued series Napoleon's orders and observations on the movements and combinations of the Franco- Spanish fleets up to the 26tli of June, cannot fail to be struck with the very large space which is given to the West Indian arrangements, and the small space which the notion of command in the Channel occupies. And then the changes in the plans and their want of complete- ness require some explanation, if the Emperor was really earnest in that which, ostensibly, he was full of. It was only, apparently, * Consuliite and Empire, vol. v., p. 245. t Alison's mistake is that ho makes this scene occur on the Uth instead of the 23rd of August ; and that ho substitutes Ferrol for Cadiz. He was probably misled by his knovrledjje that Villeneuve was forbidden to enter Ferrol, not understanding that this only meant the hurbour of Ferrol, not the roadstead, and that the objection rested solely on the difficulty of getting out again except with a north-east wind. 200 NAVAL WARFARE. when the impossibility of the Brest fleet's putting to sea became manifest that the ultimate plan of Villeneuve's combining with the forces at Ferrol and Eochefort, and then passing up Channel to release Ganteaume at Brest was finally adopted. And then we have two statements by Napoleon himself : first, that half the flotilla was sham, and then, that the whole of it was sham. In his note on the flotilla, dictated after his return from Boulogne, he says the whole provision of armed vessels, praams, gun-boats, flat boats, and pcniches, were perfectly useless ; they were a mere blind, to deceive the English into the belief that he meant to attempt to cross without the cover of a fleet— a thing which he very well knew could not be done.^ Prince Metternich, in his autobiography, says : *' By far the greater part of the political prophets, the camp at Boulogne was regarded as a preparation for a landing in England. Some better instructed observers saw in this camp a French army held in readiness to cross the Khine, and that was my opinion. In one of my longer conversations with Napoleon in the journey to Cambray, whither I accompanied the Emperor in 1810, the con- versation turned upon the great military preparations which he had made in the years 1803-5 in Boulogne. I frankly confessed to him that even at the time I could not regard these offensive measures as directed against England. ' You are very right,' said the Emperor, smiling. * Never would I have been such a fool as to make a descent upon England, unless, indeed, a revolution had taken place within the country. The army assembled at Bou- lof^ne was always an army against Austria. I could not place it anywhere else without giving offence ; and, being obliged to form it somewhere, I did so at Boulogne, where I could, whilst collect- ing it, also disquiet England. The very day of an insurrection in England, I should have sent over a detachment of my army to support the insurrection. I should not the less have fallen on you, for my forces were echeloned for that purpose. Thus you saw, in 1805, how near Boulogne was to Vienna.' "f There is another incidental argument in favour of Prince Metternich's view, which is the varied and vague way in which Napoleon spoke of the length of time during which he required command of the sea to get his forces over. In July 1804 he said : " Let us be masters of the Straits for six hours, and we shall be * See Precis des Eveneinens Militairen, vol. xii., p. 316. f Memoirs of Prince Metternich. Translated by Mrs. A. Napior. 1880. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 201 masters of the world."* In draft instructions to Villeneuve, of May 8th, 1805, he says : " If your presence makes us masters of the sea for three days off Boulogne, we shall be able to make our expedition, composed of 160,000 men in 2,000 vessels. "f In the second draft on the same day, the time is four days and the number of men 150,000. J But, on the other hand, these direct statements, and these loose expressions seem to be outweighed by the distinctly anxious attitude of mind which Napoleon displayed as the time drew near when the arrival of Villeneuve off Brest was to be ex- pected. But if we are to believe that Napoleon was as much in earnest in the matter of a descent on the shores of England as he was in the matter of a concentration upon Ulm, then we must, I think, say that, confused by the double issue of a command of the sea, which was, after all, to be but an evasion of the enemy, Napoleon lost himself. The plans were too complex, too varied, and too indeterminate to have presented any real prospect of success. We are very generally accustomed to hear it said that Napoleon *' decoyed " Nelson to the West Indies, and we seem generally to suppose that Collingwood exactly fathomed the Emperor's drift. But the West Indian Expeditions were no feints ; nor do we gather that though, as a general principle, the idea was to draw the enemj^'s forces abroad. Napoleon distinctly contemplated that his admirals would be followed to the West Indies. Moreover, sup- posing it were otherwise, the idea of strategy would be somewhat lacking if we suppose that Villeneuve's main object in going to the West Indies was to draw Nelson after him. The fact proves it, for we see Nelson outsailing Villeneuve on the return voyage. If the main object had been to draw a British squadron away, the voyage to the West Indies should have been a pretended one, and Villeneuve, taking care that Nelson was duly informed of his sup- I)Osed West Indian destination, should have turned back on the limited Ferrol blockading squadron and annihilated it, while forming his junction with the ships in the port. It was the same with Missiessy's squadron. If command of the Channel had been primarily aimed at, a rendezvous at sea with Villeneuve would have been properly appointed, and not the distant one at Surinam. * Napoleon to Latouche-Treville. Precis ties Evcnemens ^[ilita^re.s, vol. xi., p. 200. + lhid.,-p. 249. : Ibid., p. 251. 202 NAVAL WARFARE. On the whole, I think that in some way or other, failure might have been predicted for designs which were too great, too complex, and too full of risk. The mere embarkation of bodies of troops on board the ships was against success in the supposed ulterior design, for it meant sickness and short supplies in the ships. Nor can we, in forming a calm judgment, omit to notice that Napoleon seems to have been acting all along in the very teeth of his naval advice. We know that both Villeneuve and Decres remonstrated with him, and the strong language of the Minister of Marine on the 22nd of August is not to be forgotten : A.nd to speak the whole truth, a Minister of Marine, subjugated by your Majesty in Daval affairs, serves you badly and becomes useless to your arms, if not actually injurious to them.* Thus once more, but finally, we seem to draw the lesson from this last effort of France that it is unavailing to attempt to obtain the command of the sea by any other means than by fighting for it, and that that is so tremendous an undertaking that it will not bear consideration side by side with any other object. * Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 247. 203 CHAPTEE X. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the Sea Succeed or Fail. The gradations in completeness of command of the sea in relation to attacks upon territory. — Special state of West and East Indian waters on account of trade-winds and monsoons. — Powers of holding places supplied over a commanded sea. — Limits of these powers. — Two objects in attack : (1) Ravage and destruction ; (2) occupation and conquest. — Time at disposal a measure of success in each over a doubtfully com- manded sea. — An expedition must either be accompanied by overwhelming naval force, or else naval force should be absent. — Attacks without troops rare ; confined to bom- bardment and forcing purposes. — System of citadels usual in fortification last century. — The philosophy of the system and its disadvantages to the power with superior naval foi-ce. — Superiority of naval defence. — Recapitulation. In the last four chapters I have dealt with the histoiy of the principal attempts of one naval power to wrest from the hands of another — but only for a time, and for a particular purpose — that command of the sea which the latter admittedly possessed. It has been seen that such attempts tend to become failures chiefly because attention, which ought to be wholly concentrated on a single class of operations of supreme moment, is dissipated and lost between two objects. So divided does the attention become, that whereas, ostensibly, the object is to get at least a local com- mand of the sea for a limited time, and at all hazards, actually, the great naval preparations are thrown aw'ay, and the ulterior purpose of descent upon territory is seen to rest for success, after all, much more on the evasion of probably opposing forces, than of beating them by superior force upon the spot. It has thus been seen that the dividing line between attempts to gain the command of the sea in order to facilitate a descent upon the land, and descents upon the land with an admitted want of command of the sea, is an exceedingly fine one. So Ihio, that it is the apparent magnitude of the naval preparations on the part of 204 NAVAL WARFARE. the attacking force, in pursuance of the first object, which chiefly remains to distinguish them. And then we further observe that the term "command of the sea," as applied to denote power to prevent the passage of an enemy intending to descend upon the land, is necessarily indefinite. Command may be absolutely complete, not only for that, but for all other purposes. It may be sufficiently complete to secure an expedition proceeding over sea for the attack of territory, from an}^ sort of interruption either then, or at the point of attack ; and yet it may not be sufficiently complete to make communications with the base from the point of attack absolutely secure. It may then be found by fine gradations, less and less complete, until command of the sea is wholly lost, and the enemy roves at will across the water routes which lead to the point of attack. Of this absolute command of the sea we have but the single historical instance of our own position in the Crimean War. It was in part the result of the peculiar position of the enemy's naval ports, opening into seas which were themselves narrowed into easily-guarded outlets — the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; the Sound and the Belts. These narrow passages formed, as it were, outer gates to the prisons within which the enemy was confined, and were as a warning to him of the double risks he ran in any attempts to escape. But it is quite possible that but for the agency of steam propulsion in our hands, that absolute command of the sea which geographical conditions favoured us in holding, might have been incomplete. When ships were propelled by the wind, nature constantly stepped in to confound the designs of art, and to put into the hands of one side, advantages which to it were as unlocked for as to the other side they were prohibitive. But it may be fairly argued that had steam been as much at command of the Eussian fleet as it was at command of that of the Allies, it is possible that even in the Baltic and Black Seas the control of the latter Powers might have been to some extent disputed. From this absolute command of the sea, which left the Allies in their attack upon the Crimea entirely at ease with regard to their communications, we go forward a step to the Franco-German War, where the command of the sea was at least threatened, and where operations on the line of communications, if in a very insignificant degree, actually took place.* In the American Civil War, although the Confederate naval forces were never strong enough to interfere * I allude to the captures made by the Aw/ustd off the mouth of the Gironde during the height of the war. ATTACKS ON TERPJTORY FROM THE SEA. 205 from seaward with any of the Federal attacks on Confederate ports, they were occasionally in a position to operate on the Federal water communications with their bases. That they did not do so, arose in the usual way, from a consideration of the balance of risks and advantages. In the Chilo-Peruvian War we find that the inferior naval power, while not strong enough to dispute the command of the sea, did operate on the communications most effectually in certainly one case.'^ In the Austro-Italian War of 1866, the Italian command of the sea was so ill estimated, that the inferior Austrian fleet was able to defeat the attempt to capture the Island of Lissa by a victory over the superior Italian fleet. Passing back from these modern illustrations, we ascend the stream of time to a set of conditions where each of the forces at war held a simultaneous command of the sea within the immediate sphere of the operations of its fleets, but not beyond it. Each side had forces on the open sea, intact and threatening. If attacks on the land were to be made by either side under such conditions, they were made by admittedly inferior naval forces, trusting entirely to evasion — to carrying out the work of surprise, and completing it so quickly as to preclude the probable arrival of superior relieving naval force ; or else they were made under cover of a locally superior naval force — a force which defied the inter- ference of the enemy at sea. We shall see this phase of the command of the sea abundantly illustrated in the history of naval war, and we shall compare, in numerous instances, the two methods of treating it in relation to attacks upon territory. Passing through this period or phase of the strategical position of the sea, considered as territory over which military forces march for the purposes of conquest at particular localities, we come to that very early phase which I have described in my first chapter, where neither side has, or attempts to have, any command of the sea; where the water may be considered a desert — in- different territory not subject to offensive and defensive operations — but a mere marching ground or medium for the transmission of military force from any one point to any other. I have endeavoured to show, in my first chapter, that the passage from this earliest phase of indifferent sea, to the second phase of sea of which the command may be disputed at any time * I allude to the capture of the Chilian transport liiinar, having on board 300 cavalry with their horses, by the Peruvian UuaKcur and Union. — Markbam's T/n' ITur betwein P,ru t as strong on the land side as they were on the sea side. Generally, too, as in both these instances, the citadels may have covered, but did not enclose the town. Sometimes wo meet towns well protected on the land side and hardly at all on the sea side, and ou looking over a number of plans one does not detect as much an.Kicty for the safety of the sea side as desire to be prepared for a land attack. It could hardly have been otherwise, if experience of attack was to be any guide. 224 NAVAL WARFARE. an arrangement would naturally tend to preclude attacks unless- there was ample time for the reduction of the fortress by the usual methods. But this is only another way of saying that the heart of the invaded country lies in the citadel. If it is otherwise, and occupation is intended, and the country may be held without the possession of the citadel, the latter may be neglected, as it will fall by the mere lapse of time. An apposite reflection may here be made. If the possession of the citadel involves the possession of the territory, and it falls, the new possessors of it become as strong as the old ones. In other words, any defence of this kind — as we shall see in many examples — cuts both ways. A place difficult to take is difficult to retake, if the defence is fixed on the land ; but a place depending on naval force for its defence ; that is to say, a place difficult to take in the presence of naval force, and only to be possessed by the holder of the superior naval force, may be much easier to retake than it was to take, as the naval force which allowed the capture may prove inferior to that which comes to recapture. The superior naval power may suffer more prolonged losses of territory which he has fortified and garrisoned, than of territory which he has only garrisoned, and which is without a citadel. The naval defence, that is, the command of the sea over which alone a hostile approach can be made, is therefore on all grounds the most perfect. Apart from it, the territory can only be pro- tected by a garrison, or by a garrison with a citadel. Supposing a temporary loss of command of the sea, conquest of the garrison may be made by landing a superior force. On resumption of the command of the sea, and consequent stoppage of reinforcements and supplies to the new garrison, the territory is easily retaken. But if the new garrison has possessed itself of a supplied citadel, the task of recapture becomes as much more difficult as the works of the citadel have added to the resisting strength of the new garrison. Supposing the superior naval power then admits the possibility of forces being landed on portions of its territory, it may be a question of policy whether the citadel as a substitute for a stronger garrison — which is its real character aud office — is really a wise and economical institution. Many occasions will arise in the next few chapters when these reflections will naturally present themselves. But we shall hardly avoid the conviction, I think, especially after a study of West Indian history, that command of the sea is the only real defence for territory which can be captured by FORTinCATlONS of GREJNIADA, 1779. VMtDS ivi. SUO Scale, zryn. 4E0 4- raliLO S^t'''^^"^'''''/''^^^-- '■-''h "XrL-^Hospital Hill S^CEORCE^ TOWN 1 ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 225 expeditions over it. Whether our forefathers, or our forefathers' enemies, wisely spent their money over garrisons and works which generally failed when the time came, rather than over simply driving the enemy off those seas, and keeping them out of them by a superiority of naval force, which wct'er failed, is perhaps a question not to be determined so long as we are unaware of the relative proportions of the sums so spent. If the garrisons and works were wholly insignificant in cost compared with the sums spent on the endeavour to obtain and keep the command of the sea, we might possibly say that the minority of instances in which garrisons and works prevented the West Indian islands from changing hands justified the policy. But if the former expenditure bore any considerable proportion to the latter, it might be possible to found an argument on the other side. In all attacks made over sea against territory, we shall note one almost universal rule. No attacks of magnitude are ever known direct from a distant base. The desire for sheltered, but not necessarily protected waters, forming a naval base near at hand for any operations against territory, has apparently never slackened from the beginning, and is best illustrated by the conduct of the Federals in the Civil War. Bases in their own territory being inconveniently distant from the scene of their operations against Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, they wrested ports — as at Cape Hatteras and Port Eoyal — from the hands of their enemy, and employed them for their own purposes as bases of naval operations. Eecapitulating, then, we have before us in the next three or four chapters the investigation by the light of naval history of the circumstances and conditions under which expeditions designed for the descent upon the land pass over the sea, and succeed or fail in their objects. We shall note that the strategical condition of the sea to be passed over is a primary element to be taken into consideration, and that it falls naturally under three heads : — (1.) Where the sea is indifferent', no naval force, properly so called, enters either into attack or defence ; where both are essentially military and conducted entirely on land. (2.) Where the command of the sea is doubtful. That is, where the expedition may be interfered with by naval force either on its way to the point of attack, at the point of attack, or by the subsequent cutting of its communications by s^a. 15 226 NAVAL WARFARE. (3.) Where the command of the sea is assured. That is, where it is either impossible that any naval force can interfere as above, or at least where there is reasonable probability that no naval force capable of interfering by sea can make its appearance before the completion of all the objects aimed at in the attack. We are to note cases of failure where the causes have been purely military, occurring after the landing has been completed. Of some, where causes of failure have been moral, as where the naval and military authorities have disagreed. Of some where the mere appearance, or even the rumour, of naval force has prevented, or caused the abandonment of the expedition ; and of others where the cutting of the communications by sea has brought about a failure when ostensibly the work was completed. In most cases we shall be able to see what it was that conduced to success, what it was that enforced failure ; and when our historical survey is concluded we shall probably have some idea, more or less founded on evidence, of what is impossible, possible, probable, and certain, in those operations of naval war which are mentioned at the head of this chapter. 227 CHAPTER XI. The Conditions under which Attacks on Teeritory from the Sea succeed or fail. The two most conspicuous examples of failure, the Armada and the Battle of Lissa are found at the beginning and end of naval history. — The Armada expedition de- scribed. — Causes of its failure parallel to those bringing about the failure of the Italians at Lissa. — And of Napoleon in Egypt. — Descents conducted over a doubtful sea must be expected to fail. — Descents upon friendly shores illustrated by those on Ireland in 1G89, &c. — The commencement of the long series of captures and recaptures of the West India Islands in 1690, exhibits all the elements of success in commanded sea, and co-operation between army and navy on the understanding that the navy places the army in position and then takes but a minor share in the attack. It is not a little remarkable that the two failures of attacks on territory most conspicuous from their magnitude and complete- ness should lie, the one near the very beginning of the his- torical record, and the other near the end of it. The whole naval force of Spain, and a great part of her military force, were con- centrated for a descent on the shores of England in the year 1588. The whole naval force of Italy, and some part of her military force were brought together for the conquest of the island of Lissa in the year 1866. Both undertakings were utter failures, and palpably from the same cause. The strategical error committed was the same that Napoleon committed in his descent upon Egypt, and that de Conflans intended to commit, had Hawke not interfered with him too much beforehand. I do not here propose to describe the failure of the Italians at Lissa, as that will come in its due chronological order, but it is necessary to mention it in juxtaposition with the failure of the Armada, as each throws light upon the other, and enables us to understand more clearly where the fundamental error lay. In describing the events surrounding the sailing, voyage, and dispersal of the Armada, I have found that I cannot possibly do 15 * 228 NAVAL WARFARE. better than to quote largely from a paper by Professor Laughton, read at the Royal Institution of Great Britain on May 4, 1888, and entitled " The Invincible Armada, a Tercentenary Retrospect." In preparing his paper, Mr. Laughton has consulted the best authorities, and its value is of no passing character. '* Drake's brilliant raid through the West Indies determined Philip on a decided course. For the past fifteen years the inva- sion of England had been mooted as a thing desirable and not impossible. It had been proposed by the Duke of Alva in 1569, and more recently in 1583, after his victory over Strozzi and his scratch fleet — mostly of French adventurers — at Tercera ; the Marquis of Santa Cruz had urged it as a necessary step towards the reduction of the rebellious Netherlands." The Duke of Parma had written to the same effect, repeating that English soldiers were of little count in presence of the Spanish veterans, and adding a statement which seems to have obtained general credence among the Spaniards, that the English ships at Tercera had been the first to fly ; had, in fact, played a part somewhat resembling that of the Egyptian ships at Actium. It is quite possible that there were some English ships at Tercera, though it is doubtful ; if there were, they certainly did not imitate Strozzi's ill-judged and suicidal manoeuvre of closing with the Spaniards, and, small blame to them, effected their escape. True or not, however, it appears certain that this reported flight of the English ships did have very considerable weight with many of the King's advisers ; and so advised, and at the same time impelled by wrath, he determined on the attempt. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was called on for his scheme, which extended to gigantic proportions. Everything was to be done from Spain. The whole shipping of the empire was to be collected. Every available soldier was to be mustered. According to the very detailed project submitted by Santa Cruz on 22nd March, 1586, the numbers amounted to : — No. Tons. Sailors. Soldiers. Great ships of war - 150 77,250 Store ships - 40 8,000 [ 16,612 55,000 Smaller vessels - - 320 25,000 besides — Sailors and Fighting No. Men. Rowers. Galeasses 6 720 1,800 Galleys - 40 3,200 8,000 * La Armada Jnvencible, por el Capitan de Navio C. Fernandez Duro. Tom. i., p. 241, ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 229 Giving a total of 556 ships of all kinds, and 85,332 men, to which were to be added cavalry, artillerymen, volunteers, and non- combatants, bringing up the number of men to a gross total of 94,222.- " A project so vast and so costly did not come within the King's idea of * practical politics ' ; he resolved on the expedition, but conceived the idea of doing it at a cheaper rate by utilizing the army in the Low Countries. From this grew up the scheme which ultimately took form. The Duke of Parma was to prepare an army of invaders in the Netherlands, and a number of flat- bottomed boats to carry it across the sea. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was to bring up the Channel a fleet powerful enough to crush any possible opposition, and carrying with it a body of troops which, when joined with those under Parma, would form an army at least as numerous as that which Santa Cruz had detailed as sufdcieut. "The necessary preparations were extensive, and it is not quite clear that, as they became more definite, Philip's ardour did not somewhat slacken. The cost was certain, the issue was doubtful ; and even if successful, the result might perhaps not be exactly what was desired. Philip had always posed as a supporter of the Queen of Scots, but the doubt must have suggested itself whether it was worth while, at this great cost, to conquer a kingdom for her, a kingdom which, with her French blood and French proclivities, would become vu'tually a French province. The death of the Queen of Scots, on 8-18 February 1587, removed this difficulty. Even if the conquered kingdom was to be handed over to James, James was not bound to France as his mother had been. Placed on the throne of England by Spanish arms, he might be expected, or even constrained, to hold it virtually a8 a Spanish fief. " Preparations were therefore now hurried on in earnest. Ships were collected at the several ports, and especially at Lisbon and Cadiz. It seemed probable that the invasion would be attempted in the summer of 1587, when, some months before, Drake, with a fleet of twenty-four ships, all told, appeared on the coast. The orders under which he sailed from England on 2nd April were to prevent the different Spanish squadrons from joining, and where he found their ships to destroy them. It was a grand and master- ful step, but it had scarcely been ordered before the Queen repented * Duro, vol. i., p. 2.33. 230 NAVAL WARFARE. of it. Counter orders were sent post haste to Plymouth, but Drake had already sailed. They followed him, but never found him ; perhaps the bearer of them was not too eager to find him. At any rate, Drake never got these orders, and acting on those first given, with which he had sailed, he did, at Cadiz, singe the King of Spain's beard in a most effective manner. Thirty-seven ships there collected were sunk, burnt, or brought away. They were as yet unarmed, unmanned, and when the forts were once passed, could offer no resistance. Other damage Drake did, insulting Santa Cruz in the very port of Lisbon, offering battle, which Santa Cruz was in no position to accept. " The destruction of shipping and stores at Cadiz necessarily delayed the equipment of the Spanish fleet ; the year passed away, and it was not ready. The following February (1588) the Marquis of Santa Cruz died. The loss to Spain was incalculable, for he was the only man who by birth was entitled, and by experience was competent, to command such an expedition as he had set on foot. Curiously, however, the King and his court do not seem to have realised their loss, and with a light heart appointed Don Alonso Perez de Guzman el Bueno, Duke of Medina- Sidonia, to the vacant command. Medina- Sidonia, now in his 38th year, was a man with no qualification for the post except his distinguished birth, and a gentleness of temper which, it was perhaps thought, would fit better with the idea of making him subordinate to the Duke of Parma. . . . His answer to the King on being ordered to take on himself the command is in itself a curiosity. ' The business,' he wrote, ' was so great, so important, that he could not conscientiously undertake it, being, as he was, altogether without experience or knowledge of either the sea or of war.' His objections were, how- ever, overruled ; and in an evil hour for his reputation, he con- sented. The equipment of the fleet was pushed on, and by the middle of May it was ready to sail from the Tagus. It did actually sail on 20th-30th May." A certain amount of alarm, even of terror, was created in Eng- land by the approach of the Armada, but " There was one class of Her Majesty's subjects, the members of which had not this exalted opinion of Spanish power and Spanish prowess. For the last twenty years English sailors had been, in their own irregular way, fighting the Spaniards on every sea where they were to be met, and had come to the conclusion that, whatever the Spaniard might be ashore, afloat he was but a poor creature ; the experiences of Drake, Hawkyns, Fenton, Fenner, and a score of others whose ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 231 names are less familiar, had proved that, even with great apparent odds in their favour, Spaniards were not invincible. . . . What English sailors thought of them may be judged from a letter written by Fenner, who was with Drake when he burnt the shipping at Cadiz. ' Twelve of Her Majesty's ships,' he said, * were a match for all the galleys in the Kmg of Spain's dominions.' " But the power of Spain, the tavern gossip and braggadocio of Lisbon, and the reports of spies who felt in honour bound to give full value for their hire, grossly exaggerated the size, the might, the armament, and the equipment of the fleet as it sailed from Lisbon. Of the numbers, size, and armament I shall have to speak presently. The equipment, with which we are just now concerned, was so well arranged and so perfect, that by the time the fleet reached Cape Finisterre, vast quantities of the provisions were found to be bad, putrid, and fit for nothing but to be thrown overboard. The ships were short of water, probably because the casks were leaky. The ships themselves were also leaking — strained, it was said, by the heavy weather, but really from being over-masted. Several of them were with difficulty kept afloat ; some were dismasted ; and the distress was so general that Medina- Sidonia determined to put into Corunna to refit. This he did, but without taking any precautions to let his intention be known through the fleet. The Scilly Isles had been given out as the ren- dezvous in case of separation, and some dozen of the ships, finding they had lost sight of the Admiral, did accordingly go to the neighbourhood of the Scilly Isles, where they were duly seen and reported at Plymouth. Their recall, the collecting the fleet at Corunna, the refitting, the re-provisioning, all took time. The damage was so great, the number of sick so large, the season getting so advanced, that a council of war urgently recommended postponing the expedition till next year. The King's orders were, however, imperative; and the fleet finally sailed from Corunna on the 12th-22nd of July. " The main part of the English fleet was meantime mustered at Plymouth, under the command of Lord Howard of Efiingham, the Lord Admiral of England, with whom were Drake and Hawkyns as Vice and Piear- Admirals ; several noblemen, including Lord Thomas Howard, the Admiral's nephew, his two sons-in-law, Lord Sheffield and Sir Robert Southwell, and that quaint mixture of courtier, adventurer, and buccaneer, the Earl of Cumberland ; together with many genuine sea dogs, of whom the best known 232 NAVAL WARFARE. are Frobiser, Fenner, and Fenton. Large numbers of merchant ships, levied by the Queen or by their own towns, had joined the fleet, which, as it lay at Plymouth consisted of about 80 sail, all told. From the time of his return from the coast of Spain in the previous summer, Drake had been urgent that he should be sent out again, with a still more powerful squadron, to repeat the blow. Hawkyns, Frobiser, Fenner — all seamen of experience — were of the same opinion. Howard, guided by their advice, repeatedly pressed the importance of the stej) ; but Elizabeth steadfastly refused. She hoped perhaps for peace ; more probably perhaps, she hoped that the war might continue to be carried on in the same cheap and desultory fashion as during the last three years, and was unwilling to set Philip the example of more sustained efforts. And so, notwithstanding the prayers and entreaties of Howard and Drake, backed up by the opinion of every man of experience, no further attempt was made on the Spanish ports. It is probable enough that had Drake been permitted, he would have kindled such a blaze in the Tagus, or in the harbour of Corunna, as would have effectually prevented the invasion which was now on foot. " It has been said over and over again '■' that the Duke of Medina- Sidonia was ordered by Philip to hug the French coast, so as to avoid the English fleet, and to reach the Straits of Dover with his force intact. Nothing can well be more inaccurate. He was on the contrary, ordered, if he met Drake near the mouth of the Channel to fall on him and destroy him ; it would be easier and more certain to destroy the English fleet piecemeal, than to allow it to collect in one. Nor do his instructions contain one word about hugging the French coast ; on the contrary, they advise the Scilly Isles or the Lizard as a rendezvous, and suggest the propriety of seizing on some unfortified port in the south of England. t As a matter of fact, a position south of the Scilly Isles was given out as a rendezvous in the first instance ; in the second, on sailing from Corunna, the rendezvous was Mounts Bay.t . " In crossing the Bay of Biscay the Spaniards experienced bad weather, and were a good deal scattered : barely two-thirds of the * Monson in C/iinrfnirc Voyayes, vol. iii., p. 149., Lediard's Naval Historij, vol. i., p. 253. Aa, at any rate, Jlediiia-Sidonla, by the testimony of both these authorities, acted in accordance with the determination of a council of war, the original orders are of less moment. t Duro, vol. ii., p. 8. X Ihid., vol. ii., pp. 27, 168. ATTACKS ON TERRITOEY FROM THE SEA. 23a fleet were in comiDany when Medina- Sidonia sighted the Lizard on the morning of the 19th July, according to the English calendar, which I shall henceforth follow. "Whilst the Duke of Medina-Sidonia waslying-to off the Lizard, on the 19th July, he was sighted by one of the English cruisers, the Golden Hind, commanded by Thomas Flemyng, who forth- with carried the news to the Admiral;* and, according to the familiar story, which I see no reason to doubt, found him, with the admirals and captains of the fleet, playing bowls on the Hoe. " The following day, Saturday, the 20th, the Spanish fleet was collected off the Lizard and moved slowly eastwards. A council of war was held. They had learned that the English fleet was at Plymouth, and the great weight of opinion among the Spanish leaders was that they ought to attack it there. It has always been said that Medina-Sidonia was prevented from doing this by his instructions. The statement is inaccurate. The letter of his instructions distinctly permitted him to attack the English fleet ; the spirit of them enjoined his doing it.f Fortunately, he misunderstood his instructions ; he conceived that he was bound to go up Channel, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left until he could effect a junction with the Duke of Parma. Had he, on the 19th, when he first learned that the English fleet was at Plymouth, crowded sail with even such ships as he had with him, he might have entered the Sound that evening. The wind was from the S.W., and the English ships, penned in between the Spaniards and the shore, would have been forced to fight hand to hand ; the result might easily have been disaster. The Spaniards neglected their chance, and it never recurred ; for during Saturday the English got out of the Sound, and stretched along the coast to the westward. On Sunday morning, when the two fleets were first in presence of each other, the English were to windward, and by the weatherly qualities of their ships had no difficulty in keeping the advantage they had gained. " And now, before the fighting begins, it is time to speak of the comparative force of the opposing fleets. We have all known from our infancy that the Spanisli ships, as compared with the * State Piipers, Domestic, ccxv., 02. t Monson has a curious paraj^raph which Mr. Laughton does not seem to have noticed. He says (Churchill, vol. iii., p. 304): •• In 1.">,S8. when the Duke of Medina came for England, had he beon furnished with a pilot that knew the Lizard, when ho made it for the Ramhead, he had tie next morning given an attempt upon our ships at Plimouth when he was not suspected or looked for." 234 NAVAL WARFARE. English, were stupendous in point of size, marvellous in their strength ; in guns and in number of men beyond all proportion. The numbers I give here, from the official Spanish record,* agree very well with those reported in England. t " Ships. Tons. Guns. Men. 130 57,868 2,431 8,050 Seamen. 18,973 Soldiers. 1,382 Volunteers, &c. 2,088 Eowers. Total - - - 30,493 "In one point alone of this statement is the difference from the English account worth noticing. Barrow gives the number of Spanish guns as 3,165. To this I shall presently recur. Mean- time, I have to point out that these numbers refer to the fleet as it left Lisbon. They had suffered a marked decrease before the fleet left Corunna, and a still further decrease before the fleet came into the Channel. Of the ships left behind I have no account. Some — and some large ships amongst them — certainly did not come on. Some, again, appear to have parted company on the voyage ; and of four galleys, from which much had been expected, one was driven ashore and wrecked near Bayonne : the other three making very bad weather of it, returned to Spain. J Allowing for these losses, I think it doubtful whether even 120 ships of all sizes came into the Channel ; the number of men did certainly not exceed 24,000 ; and, in the council of war held at Corunna, it was estimated as low as 22,500. On the other hand, the number of men borne in the English ships, when all collected together, is officially given as 15,925, to which ought to be added many more who were sent off from Plymouth on 21st July, or who joined as volunteers during the passage up Channel. It is difficult to estimate the gross total as less than from 17,000 to 18,000 men. " Our idea of the Spanish ships has been also somewhat ex- aggerated. According to Barrow : ' The best of the Queen's ships placed alongside one of the first class of Spaniards would have been like a sloop of war by the side of a first rate.' In point of tonnage they were, in fact, the same. The largest Spaniard, the * Duro, vol. ii.. pp. fiC. 83. t Barrow's Life of Drake, p. 270. X Dure, vol. i., p. G5 ; vol. ii., pp. Il)'.>, 142. ATTACKS ON TERltlTORY FROM THE SEA. 235 Regazona of the Levant squadron, is given as of 1,249 tons. The largest EngHsh ship, the Triumph, was of 1,100 tons, and many circumstances lead me to believe that the English mode of reckon- ing tonnage gave a smaller result than the Spanish."^ There is no doubt, however, that the Spanish ships looked larger. Their poops and forecastles, rising tier above tier to a great height, towered far above the lower-built English. Not that the larger English ships were by any means flush-decked ; but they were not so high-charged as the Spanish. The difference offered a great advantage to the Spaniards in hand-to-hand fighting ; it made their ships leewardly and unmanageable even in a moderate breeze, and, added to the Spanish neglect of recent improvements in rig, rendered them very inferior to the English in the open sea.f " And not only was there this inferiority of the ships ; there was at least a corresponding inferiority of the seamen. The Spaniards were, in fact, to a great extent fair weather sailors. Some there doubtless were who had doubled Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, but by far the greater number had little experience beyond the Mediterranean, or the equable run down the trades to the West Indies. To the English, on the other hand, accustomed from boyhood to the Irish or Iceland fisheries, in manhood to the voyages to the North-West with Frobiser or Davys, or round the world with Drake, the summer gales of the Channel were, by comparison, passing trifles — things to be warded oif but not to be feared. Even if the men had been equal in quality, the Spanish ships were terribly under-manned. The seamen habitually gave place to the soldiers, and soldiers commanded ; the seamen did the drudgery, and not one was borne in excess of what their soldier masters thought necessary. The absolute numbers speak for themselves, and one comparison will be sufficient. The San Martin, of 1,000 tons, the flag-ship of the Duke of Medina, had 177 seamen and 300 soldiers. The Ark, of 800 tons, the flag-ship of Lord Howard, appears to have had something like 300 seamen and 125 soldiers. " More important, however, than even this inferiority of the Spanish ships and sailors was the inferiority of their guns and gunners. Now here I come on to what is, I believe, to most of you, new ground. You have always been accustomed to hear of * Other modes of reckoning tonnage adopted in the following reigii gave results varying from 20 to 50 per cent. more. — Stdte Papers, Domestic, ccxxxvii. , (J4. t Compare Monson in Churchill, vol. lii., pp. 312, 31!). 236 NAVAL WARFARE. the number and size of the Spanish guns. The statements to that effect are absokitel}^ incorrect. The Spanish guns were, as a rule, small — 4, 6, or 10-pounders , they were comparatively few, and they were execrably worked.'^ The simplest way to show this is by a comparative table of armaments. It is not perfect, it is not rigidly accurate ; the means to construct a perfect or accurate table do not, I fear, exist ; but, so far as it goes, the table em- bodies the best information attainable. " The English armaments shown in it are from a list dated 1595- 99, t and may possibly show some imj)rovement on the armament of the ships carried in 1588. I see no reason, however, to sus- pect such. I have not been able to trace the original from which this paper was printed, but I have found of the same date, 1595, estimates for the armament of three ships now in building,! the ordnance for the first mentioned being described as ' answerable to the pieces that are in the Mer Honour.' I, therefore, show here also the armament of the Mer Honour, as given in the paper in the Archceologia already referred to. Ships' names. Tons. No. ' Weight of broadside in lbs. Description of guns. Pounders — of guns. 60 30 24 18 12 9 6 Small pieces. Spanish — S. Lorenzo . N. S. d. Rosario . Annunciada . Sta. Mar. d. Visari English- Triumph Ark . Nonpareil foresight Tiger . Tramontana Achates 386 50 370 4 8 6 6 10 1,150 422 41 195 3 7 4 1 • •• 703 275 24 67 3 3 666 307 18 54 6 1,100 500 68 402 4 3... 17 8 6 800 425 55 377 4 4 ... 12 12 6 500 250 56 264 2 3 ... 7 8 12 300 160 37 102 ... 14 8 200 100 22 83 6 14 150 70 21 52 12 100 60 13 36 ... ... 6 16 26 18 12 30 17 24 15 2 9 7 Second Table. Mer Honour . 800 1 ... 41 281 4 15 ... 16 4 2 Sept. 1595 . ? 1 ... 44 299 4 16 ... 18 4 2 Oct. 1595 I. . ? 44 282 20 ... , 20 4 ... „ 11. . . ? 36 222 ... 16 ... 12 8 ... " Another estimate that seems entitled to credit is that given of * Duro, vol. ii., p. 237. f Archinologia, vol. xiii., p. 27 ; Derrick's Rise and Progiesx of the Royal Navy, p. 31. X State Papers, /JoiiiPstic, ccliii, 114; ccliv., 43, ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 237 the armament of the Revenge — a ship of the same size and number of men as the Nonpareil, which was taken by the Spaniards in 1591, and was reported by them to have 43 brass guns, 20 on the lower deck, of from 4,000 to 6,000 lbs. weight, and the rest from 2,000 to 3,000.'^ The greater weights corresponded to 60, 30, or 18-pounders ; the smaller to the 9, and 6-pounders. " Of the Spanish armament we cannot speak with the same absolute knowledge ; but it seems admitted that the galeasses were the most heavily-armed ships of the fleet, and of these the San Lorenzo, which was taken off Calais, was the largest and heaviest. The report of her armament, given by people who had posses- sion of her for some time, corresponds fairly well with the official statement.f The Nucsti-a Seiiora del Rosario was the largest ship captured by Drake and sent into Torbay.J Her armament is given from the official inventory taken at Torquay. She is spoken of by Duro as one of the most powerful and best ships of the fleet. § The other two ships do not seem distinguished in any way from the others of the same size ; they belonged to the Levant squadron, and are classed with the San Juan de Sicilia of 800 tons and 26 guns, which is spoken of as having taken a prominent part in the action of 29th July. I have not met with any account of the armament of the ships of the Portuguese squadron, including the San Martin, San Felipe, and San Mateo, of which all three were in the thickest of the fight, and the two last were driven ashore in a sinking state. Neither have I met with any inventory of the Nuestra Seiiora de la Rosa, the ship that was partially blown up and was sent into Weymouth. I do not, of course, suppose that the more effective fighting ships of the fleet were armed like the Annunciada or Santa Maria de Visai'i ; but I do believe that the armament of these is a fair representative of that of a very large proportion of ships that have been counted as effective. " I must note 'also, that whereas the Spanish ships of below 300 tons burden carried four or six small guns — a merely nominal armament — English ships of 200 tons carried a very respectable armament, and ships even still smaller were not altogether despic- able. Of the way in which the English merchant ships were armed, we have no knowledge ; but considering that the fitting them out for purposes of war was no novelty, that many of them had probably been on privateering cruises before, and that the * Duro, vol. i., p. 76. t State Papers, Domestic, ccxiii., 67. Duro, vol. i., p. 390. J State Papers, Domestic, ccxv., 671. § Duro, vol. i., p. 834. 238 NAVAL WARFARE. Pelican or Golden Hind in which Drake went round the world — a ship of nominally 100 tons — had 14 guns, I would distinctly question Barrow's judgment that, "looking at their tonnage, two-thirds of them, at least, would have heen of little service, and indeed must have required uncommon vigilance to keep them out of harm's way.'^ They were not, indeed, the ships that were to be found in the forefront of the fight — no more were the Eiwyalus or Naiad at Trafalgar — but I see no reason to doubt that they did, in their own way, render good and efficient service. " It was not only in the number and weight of guns that the English had a great comparative advantage ; they were immensely superior in the working of them. I may quote here from Captain Duro a very remarkable statement, which, however, is fully corro- borated by original writers and by known facts. By the Spaniards, he says,t ' The cannon was held to be an ignoble arm ; well enough for the beginning of the fray, and to pass away the time till the moment of engaging hand to hand, that is, of boarding. Actuated by such notions, the gunners were recommended to aim high, so as to dismantle the enemy and prevent his escape ; but as a vertical stick is a difficult thing to hit, the result was that shot were expended harmlessly in the sea, or at best made some holes in the sails, or cut a few ropes of no great consequence.' On the other hand, the gun was the weapon which the English sailors had early learned to trust to. Their practice might appear con- temptible enough to an E.rcellent's gun's crew, but everything must have a beginning. With no disparts or side scales, with no aid beyond, possibly, a marked quoin to lay the gun horizontal, and with shot which — perhaps a good inch less in diameter than the bore of the gun — wobbled from side to side, or from top to bottom, leaving the gun at an angle that chance dictated, the hitting the object aimed at was excessively doubtful. Still, by firing a great many shot, they did manage to get home with sufficient to do a good deal of damage. The Spanish accounts speaking of the quickness of the English fire, estimate the English expenditure of shot as about three times their own. J " There is another point which may very probably have also stood in the way of the Spanish gunners. Through the greater part of the last century, the ports of Spanish line-of-battle ships were made much too small, with the idea, apparently, of keeping out the enemy's musketry shot, but with the actual result that their guns could neither be trained, depressed, or elevated. In * Life of Drake, p. 270. f Huro, vol. i., p. 77. J Ibid., vol. ii., p. 377. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 239 this way was possible such an action as that between the Glorioso, a 70-gun ship, and the King Geon/e, a frigate-built privateer of 32 guns, in 1747, in which the two ships engaged broadside to broadside for several hours without the privateer receiving any proportionate damage. In the beginning, some such fault was general, and to a very great extent the gun was brought to bear by the action of the helm ; but it is at least probable that Spanish ships carried it to a still greater degree, and that this might, to some extent, exaggerate the badness of the Spanish gunnery practice, which was very bad indeed. '* All this was quite well known to Philip, and therefore to the principal officers in the fleet, before they left Lisbon. The King's instructions to Medina- Sidonia ran : — ' You are especially to take notice that the enemy's object will be to engage at a distance, on account of the advantage which they have from their artillery and the offensive fireworks with which they will be provided ; and, on the other hand, the object on our side should be to close and grapple and engage hand to hand.'* This, perhaps, may partlj^ explain the comparatively small quantity of shot per gun provided for such a vast undertaking ; a quantity so small that, notwithstand- ing the slowness of their fire, they ran short even after the skirmishes in the Channel. " In estimating the opposing forces, this great superiority of the English armament must be taken into account. Of Spanish ships of 300 tons and upwards the number that left Lisbon was officially stated at 80, but of these 18 were rated as ships of burden {ureas de cargo), and, though they carried troops and some guns, could not be counted as effective ships of war. Of the remaining 62, many ought to be reckoned in the same categor}^ An armament such as that of the Annunciada or Sta. Maria speaks for itself. From the number of soldiers they carried, and from their lofty poops and forecastles, such ships would be dangerous enough in a hand-to-hand fight, but were perfectly harmless as long as they were kept at a distance. But counting all these, we have the following comparison of the fleets : — Spanish. English. XT Tons. -.T Tons. Nos. A AOS. . Average. Average. Of 300 tons and upwards - 62 727 23 552 Of 200 to 300 tons . . _ _ 26 210 49 Duro, vol. ii., p. 9. 240 NAVAL WARFARE. "The English ships of 200 tons being inchided as unquestionably superior as fighting machines to many of the much larger Spanish Ehips. " I am dwelling upon these points, to many of which I do not think sufficient attention has been paid, not as in any way detract- ing from the superlative merit of the Englishmen who fought and won in this great battle, but as showing that their achievement, however great, was still within the bounds of human prowess. The Spaniards of that time were among the most splendid soldiers that the world has seen ; and to speak of our men engaging them and defeating them, against such tremendous odds as are com- monly shown, is not to exalt our heroes, but to travesty them into paladins of impossible romance, or, in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary, to represent them and the land they defended as saved from extermination only by the direct interposition of pro- vidence, and by a heaven-sent gale of wind. " Time will not permit me, nor do I think it necessary, to describe to you in detail the fight of that eventful week ; to tell you how on Sunday morning, 21st July, the English, having gained the wind, fell on the ships of the Spanish rear-guard, under the command of Don Juan Martinez de Eecalde in the Santa Ana, and without permitting them to close, as they vainly tried to do, pounded them with their great guns for the space of three hours, with such effect that Eecalde sent to Don Pedro de Valdes for assistance, his ship having been hulled several times and her foremast badly wounded ; how Don Pedro's ship, the Nuestra Senora del Rosario, in going to his assistance, fouled first one and then another of her consorts, lost her bowsprit, foremast and maintopmast, and was left by Medina- Sidonia, who conceived it to be his duty to push on to Dunkirk, even at the sacrifice of this large and valuable ship, which was taken possession of by Drake the next morning and sent into Torbay; how another ship, the Nuestra Senora de la Rosa, of 945 tons, was partially blown up and was similarly left to be taken possession of by order of the Admiral, and to be sent into Weymouth ; how on the Tuesday there was another sharp action off Portland, and again a third on the Thursday off the Isle of Wight, when Kecalde's ship, the Satita Ana of 768 tons, received so much further damage that she left the fleet and ran herself ashore near Havre; how the English, joined as they passed along by many small vessels full of men, but finding their store of shot running short, were content for the next day with closely following up the Spaniards, who on Saturday ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 241 afternoon anchored off Calais, whilst the English anchored about a mile to the westward and to windward of them. Here Howard was joined by the squadron of the narrow seas, under Lord Henry Seymour and Sir William Wynter, by the contingent of the city of London, under Nicholas Gorges, and by many private ships, bringing the number up to a gross total of nearly 200, a large portion of which were very small, but of which, as I have already said, 49 were effective ships of war. The Spanish numbers had been reduced by the loss of three, if not four, of their largest and best shij)s, and were further reduced off Calais by the loss of the San Lorenzo, the largest and most heavily armed of the galleons. For on Sunday night Howard sent eight fire-ships in amongst the Spanish fleet ; the Spaniards, panic-struck, cut their cables, and by wind and tide were swept far to leeward. In the confusion the San Lorenzo damaged her rudder, and in the morn- ing was driven ashore, and after a sharp fight captured by the boats of the Ark and some of the smaller ships. But the fleet was away off Gravelines, and there on that Monday, 29th July, was fought the great battle which, more distinctly perhaps than any battle of modern times, has moulded the history of Europe ; the battle which curbed the gigantic power of Spain, which shattered the Spanish prestige, and established the basis of England's empire. " It would be pleasant to dwell on the details of this great fight, to tell you how the Spaniards, having formed themselves in a half moon, convexity in front, were charged on the wings and centre by our fleet ; on the westernmost or larboard wing by Drake, with Hawkyns, Frobiser, Fenton, Fenner, and others ; in the centre by Howard and his kinsmen, with the Earl of Cumber- land ; and on the starboard wing by Seymour, with Wynter and the squadron of the narrow seas ; how the wings were driven in on their centre ; how the ships, thus driven together, fouled each other, and lay a helpless and inert mass, whilst the English pounded them in comparative safety. * The fight,' Wynter wrote, ' continued from nine of the clock until six of the clock at night, in the which time the Spanish array bore away N.N.E., or north by east as much as they could, keeping company one with another. ... I deliver it to your honour upon the credit of a poor gentleman, that out of my ship there was shot, 500 shot of demi-cannon (30J lbs.), culverin (17^ lbs.), and demi-culverin (9^ lbs.) ; and when I was furthest off in discharging any of the pieces, I was not out of the shot of their harquebus, and most ]G 242 NAVAL WARFARE. times within speech one of another ; and surely every man did well. No doubt the slaughter and hurt they received was great, as time will discover it ; and when every man was weary with labour, and our cartridges spent, and munitions wasted — I think in some altogether — we ceased, and followed the enemy.'* " The subject is one that tempts to pursue it still further, but time warms me to draw to a close. It must be enough then to say that the Spaniards were terribly beaten ; that two of their largest ships, ships of the crack Portugal squadron, the San Felipe and San Mateo, ran themselves ashore on the Netherlands coast to escape foundering in the open sea. Howard says that three were sunk, and four or five driven ashore. In one case he can scarcely have been mistaken. ' On the 30th,' he says, * one of the enemy's great ships was espied to be in great distress by the Captain (Eobert Cross) of Her Majesty's ship called the Hope, who, being in speech of yielding unto the said Captain, before they could agree on certain conditions, sank presently before their eyes.' This may have been the San Juan de Sicilia, which was severely beaten in the fight and never returned to Spain, though it was not known how she was lost. The actual loss of life was certainly very great — how great was never known, for the pursuit of the English and the terrible passage round the west of Ireland pre- vented any attempt at official returns. Of the losses among the isles of Scotland and on the coast of Ireland, I do not intend now to speak. It is sufficient for my purpose to say that, according to the best Spanish accounts, which, in such an overwhelming disaster, are rather mixed, about half the original 130 got home again ; some apparently by the simple process of not going farther than Corunna, some, as three of the galleys, by turning back before they crossed the Bay of Biscay." Mr. Laughton does not touch, in this excellent sketch, on a material element in the failure of the Armada. The 19,000 soldiers that it was intended should be conveyed in the fleet did not form by any means the whole of the invading army. The main portion was to have been formed from the Duke of Parma's army, and was prepared to embark at Dunkirk, the Duke himself being indeed the real commander of the expedition. But our Allies, the Hollanders and Zealanders, took effective measures to prevent any junction between the two wings of the Spanish force, by inter- posing their own superior fleet. As Burchett puts it : — The twenty-seventh of July the Spanish fleet came to an anchor before Calais, »nd * Wynter to Walsingham, Ist August 1588. — State Papers, Domestic, ccxiv. , 7. ATTACKS ON TEIUUTOllY FROM THE SEA. 243 not far from them anchored the English Admiral, who, by the accession of the ships under the Lord Seymour and Sir William Winter, had now a hundred and forty sail, all stout ships, though the main stress of the engagement lay not upon more than fifteen of them. The Spaniards were now very importunate with the Duke of Parma to send out forty fly-boats to their assistance, for that otherwise, by the unwieldiness of their ships, they could not engage the light and active vessels of the English. They also desired him to use all speed in embarking his army, and be ready to take the first opportunity, under their protection, of landing in England. But, besides that his flat- bottomed boats were become leaky, and that he was not in other respects in that readiness which had been concerted, he was prevented from complying with these demands by the ships of Holland and Zealand, which, under the command of Count Justin of Nassau, continued to block up the harbours of Dunkirk and Newport, the only ports from whence he could put to sea.* Thus it is seen that even supposing there had been no encounters between the English and Spanish ships, or supposing the Enghsh had proved less superior than they were, still the great Armada was a palpable failure. Mr. Laughton does very rightly in pressing the point that in the collapse of the Armada there were no miracles, nor any special interpositions of Providence by gales of wind or otherwise. The case was simply that if Philip had been either better advised, or, being well advised, had been less headstrong, he would have known that not only was the task one most probably beyond his powers, but that it was impossible that he could suc- ceed as he went about it. And it may be further observed that if Medina- Sidonia was not justified by the letter of his orders in pur- suing the course which he did — and Mr. Laughton certainly seems to show that this was so — the arrangement of his force was such as to lead him to interpret the spirit of his orders in the way that he did. If Burchett is correctly informed, the same idea seems to have possessed Medina- Sidonia up to the moment of his final defeat at sea — namely, that it was a possibility in naval strategy to pro- ceed with a territorial attack over sea in presence of a hostile fleet. This was the primary error of the King of Spain ; and the great advantage of bringing the defeat of Medina-Sidonia and of Persano together is that the parallelism of the cases so emphatically con- firms the rule of strategy. Medina-Sidonia in 1588 fails to land a man, except as a fugitive, on the territory selected for descent, just as Persano does in 1866 ; and both suffer the overwhelming defeat of their fleets. It should not have been possible for the King of Spain to regard the English fleet as insignificant after the transactions at Cadiz in the year before. Had it been ever so insignificant, it was necessary * Burchett, p. 353. 16 * 244 NAVAL WARFARE. to jjaralyse its action in some way before any descent on the terri- tory it guarded could be attempted. Just in the same way, the Italian Government, or Persano for them, might have been justified in despising the Austrian force at Pola; but, however little its strength might have been esteemed, it was an absolute necessity to paralyse its action if the capture of the island of Lissa was to be accomplished. If neither Medina- Sidonia nor Persano had naval force enough for the double operation of paralysing the defending naval force, and covering the landing at the same time, and yet attempted to pursue the descent, they each courted the fate they met, and fully deserved it. In all cases of descent liable to be even watched by hostile fleets, we shall meet failure unless the descending forces are divided into two perfectly distinct parts ; one to paralyse the possibly interfer- ing naval force, and the other to conduct the descent itself. But Philip had a heavier task before him than Persano, inasmuch as there were three distinct opposing fleets which must be paralysed, and one of them, as lying between the two wings of the descending force, which must be defeated. There was, as we have seen. Lord Howard's fleet at Plymouth, Lord Henry Seymour's in the "narrow seas," by the Straits of Dover, and Count Justin's, blockading Dunkirk and Nieuport. Had Philip ever looked this matter in the face ? Had he in any way prepared his naval forces for division into the necessary four parts, each of sufficient strength — one to mask Lord Howard, one to mask Lord Henry Seymour, a third to defeat and then to mask Count Justin of Nassau, and a fourth to conduct and cover the landing ? There is no sign anywhere that ideas so obviously pressing found a j)lace in his mind ; and if Medina- Sidonia in any way represented the mind of his master, there must have been a firm belief that in some way or other the descent could proceed to success in the very face of three opposing fleets. Persano had but the one fleet to paralyse, but he must have been possessed with the same idea as Medina-Sidonia, that in some way or other the appearance of the Austrian fleet would not interfere with the regular conduct of the descent about to be undertaken on the island of Lissa, nor in any way hinder its ultimate success. But that an Admiral was found to act on such an idea, belief of its entrance into an Admiral's mind would be well-nigh impossible. The failure, then, of the descent upon England in 1588, and upon Lissa in 1866, as well as the collapse of Napoleon's accom- plished descentjupon Egypt, can all be set down to the one cause — ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 245 defiance of plain rules of naval strategy. If there was naval force enough to [do it, division should have been made so as to employ one part in paralysing possibly opponent fleets, and the other in covering the descent. If there was not naval force enough for this division, the expeditions ought never to have started, for, short of miracle, they were bound to fail, as all such must fail when conducted over a doubtfully commanded sea. I have adverted in my fourth chapter to the commencement of these descents and counter descents on outlying territories, which were begun by Sir Kobert Holms against the Dutch possessions on the coasts of Africa and America, and followed up on the other side by De Ruiter. I have also noticed the beginnings of those transfers and re-transfers of the West India Islands in 1666-67, which afterwards became so common between naval belligerents. I need not further advert to these remote events, as more recent examples of the same things are so numerous and so much more capable of treatment from the philosophical standpoint. But a few words as to certain expeditions to Ireland in James II. 's interest in 1689-90 and 1691 may be useful, as they form examples of the class of descents which I have spoken of in the previous chapter as not involving the element of time, and depending for their success on the reception which is given to them in the country itself. In such expeditions the navy is not concerned, except as convoy. There is no landing to be covered, nor footing to be made good and held. It is therefore legitimate to proceed by the method of evasion, though it is more consistent with promise of success that a possibly intercepting naval force should be watched and masked, or at least occupied, and that only a small convoying force should be directly employed in protecting the transports. In 1689 the English naval forces were disorganized, and beside the practical inefficiency of the ships for obtaining and keeping any adequate command of the sea, the necessary preparations were all in arrear, so that Admiral Herbert never had any hopes of inter- fering, nor ever made any attempt to interfere with the landing of James, which took place at Kinsale on the 12th March. When Herbert received the news, he was only in course of getting his fleet together, and all his hopes onl}^ extended to a possible inter- ception of the French convoy on its return. Even when he sailed for the westward, it was with but a portion of his fleet, and in the expectation that the rest of it might join him. Here, then, we have a clear case of landing on a friendly coast, 246 NAVAL WARFARE. in which the naval work was done when the military forces were landed ; and where therefore the question of the command of the sea did not arise, except during the passage over. But even here, the necessity for recruitment and supply followed."^ Herbert arrived off Cork on the 17th April, and learning there that further supplies were expected from Brest, he cruised down in that direction, and then in the Soundings, in hopes that fortune might favour him with a sight of the French convoy in crossing. In more modern times, with ships that it was safe to trust close off an enemy's port, Herbert would certainly have at once invested Brest by sea, and prevented any extensive sailings therefrom, as Cornwallis afterwards was able to do in 1805. But Herbert's ships were not of a character to be trusted in the way Cornwallis trusted his. As a consequence of this inability, 24 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and 6 fire-ships with 6,000 troops on board, all under the command of Lieut. -General Chateaurenault sailed from Brest on the 26th April (6th May), and reached the coast of Ireland unseen by Herbert, anchoring in Bantry Bay, on the 29th April (9th May).t Herbert, disappointed at seeing nothing of the enemy, re- turned to Ireland, and saw the French, counting with the transports 44 sail, off Kinsale, apparently in fact, at the moment of their arrival. He lost sight of them on their entry into Bantry, and was misled by a report of their entry into Balti- more. The French having anchored, proceeded at once with the land- ing of the troops. This was nearly completed, when about 4 o'clock in the afternoon (30th April or 1st May) the French counted 22 English line-of-battle ships and 6 small vessels approaching against the easterly wind, which blew down the bay.J Safe in his position, the French admiral went on with the dis- embarkation, but next morning got under sail and brought Herbert to action. The battle was indecisive. The English were in decided inferiority of strength, but yet not so weak as to offer any good prospect of complete defeat. The French admiral had landed his troops and fulfilled his mission ; there was no par- * I do not gather what number of men landed with James at Kinsale. lie was conducted over by Commodore Gabaret, who left Captain Duquesne Mosnier with 3 frigates at James' disposition. — Troude, vol. i., p. 190. t Troude, vol. i.,p. 190. The dates given do not accuratelj'^ corresj^ond with the English ones, nautical and civil time very likely conflicting. X Historians do not agree as to Herbert's numbers. Entick gives only 18. ATTACKS ON TERIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 247 ticular advantage to be gained by following up the English. Herbert, on his part, could not hope for decisive success against the French, and nothing could now undo the work of the landing. He made for his rendezvous, thirty miles west of Scilly, in hopes of meeting reinforcements, but failing in this he returned to Spithead, leaving the sea behind him free for the operations of the French. We may observe of these transactions that the lessons they convey are not very important. The French successes began because the English were wanting in the naval force which was necessary to prevent them. They continued because the landings were on a practically friendly shore, as if, indeed, there had been a transfer of troops from one port in France to another ; and because marine architecture was not sufficiently advanced to make the cutting of communications more than an operation of the most uncertain character ; and, lastly, because the French were in such superior force as really to defy the attacks of the English. Under such conditions, the arguments put forward in the last chapter almost guaranteed the French success. Like arguments fully account for the French successful landing in the Shannon in 1691 ; and the ineffectiveness of the blockade, or watching of the French naval forces by way of cutting communi- cations, is shown by the station taken up by the English fleet for watching Brest. It was no nearer than 24 miles west of Ushant, and this, although it must have been remembered that in 1689 de Tourville, favoured by the wind, had taken a very inferior French fleet into Brest in full view of the greatly superior but still powerless English fleet, powerless because it was unsafe to maintain a position closer to the entrance of the port.* I pass now to that prolific field for examples ot the kind required, the West Indies. King William " sent frequent orders and directions to the governors of the several plantations in America to annoy the French in those parts to the utmost of their power. And that they might be the better able to do this, and be at the same time secured from any insults from the French side, he had frequently sent them small s(|uadrons of men-of-war, to be always read}', and at their direction, on such occasions as they should find necessary to employ them in. . . . The French, however, were so numerous in their colonies, and by the riches of their plantations * Entick, p. 554. Troude, vol i., p. 195. 248 NAVAL WARFARE. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 249 were so able to fit out privateers to infest the western islands, that a small force was not only insufficient to disturb them, but also unable to protect the English settlements." ''■' As a consequence of these conditions, Captain Wright was placed, towards the close of 1689, in command of a squadron, strong for those days, and consisting of 1 third-rate, 7 fourth, and 2 fifth- rates, with 2 fire-ships and a ketch. He was to assemble his ships at Plymouth, there to embark a regiment of foot, and then to sail for Barbados. His orders were to consult with the Governor of Barbados as to securing the English plantations, and recovering such as might have fallen into the hands of the French, but not to remain longer there than was necessary to refresh his people, and to take troops on board. He was then to make for such of the Leeward Islands as, from intelligence of the enemy's proceedings, might most promise success. At the Leeward Islands he was to apply himself to General Codrington, and in all things relating to the land service to act according to his directions and the opinion of a council of war, either for landing the regiment or attacking the French colonies, recovering any of our islands, or annoying the enemy in any other manner. In enterprises at sea he was to act as should be advised by the Governor and Councils of War, when he had opportunity of consulting them, and, when it was necessary, to spare as many seamen as he could with regard to the safety of the ships ; and that the islands might not be exposed to insults, he was forbid to send any ship from the squadron until the Governor and Council were informed of it, and satisfied that the service did not require their immediate attendance. t Wright sailed from Plymouth on March 8th, 1G90, with a large convoy ; but before he arrived at Madeira, 5 of his war- ships and some part of his convoy was missing. He was happy, however, in finding them all at Madeira, and in reaching Carlisle Bay, in Bar- bados, on the 11th May without casualty, but with his men, after the too common fashion of those days, greatly reduced by weakness and sickness. However, being landed and cared for on shore, they speedily recovered and enabled him to put to sea on the 27th. On the 30th he arrived at Antigua, and being sworn a member of the Council presided over by General Codrington, proceeded to consult over future proceedings. It appears as if nothing was settled by the Council, but that the General and the Commodore themselves agreed on the outline of a * Eutick, p. 577. t H'id. 250 NAVAL WARFARE. programme, in accordance with which the Commodore sailed on June 3rd to Monserrat, where he was joined b}^ the General with additional troops, and together they sailed to Nevis. Here, on the 17th of June, they came to a determination to recover St. Chris- tophers from the French. The condition of this island had been that of a joint possession between English and French settlers. On the occurrence of the war the French settlers had been able to over- power the English, and now held the island. The first operations in the attack were that Sir Timothy Thorn- hill, with about 500 men, landed eastwards of " Frigate Bay.^' He was opposed by the French, but twice defeated them and marched towards Basse Terre, again defeating the enemy who designed to bar his progress. The General then landed with 3,000 men and marched upon Basse Terre, while the fleet prepared to co-operate by bombarding the town and forts. The fleet's inter- ference was not, however, necessary, for the enemy quitted their works and fled to the mountains. The army, continuing their march, burnt all before them, and finally encamped about a mile from the town. Fort Charles, however, was still held by the enemy. The fleet moved to the Old Pioad and anchored, awaiting the arrival of the army. On the 30th two guns were mounted in battery to play on the fort, while the fleet assisted by bombarding it from the sea, keeping under sail. On the 2nd of July the fort still held out, and nine 12-pounders were landed and placed in battery. This brought about the fall of the fort ; a flag of truce offering to surrender on terms came out on the 12th, and on .the 13th the place was given up. On the 17th it was determined to attack St. Eustatia, and Sir T. Thornhillwas landed there with his regiment without opposition, and the same evening the fleet anchored there. The citadel fort, however, though garrisoned by only eighty men, held out until the 24th. It was the only citadel in the island, and when it fell the conquest was complete. After finishing these two conquests the fleet returned to Fort Charles in St. Christophers to re-embark its guns and stores that had been landed. Then a council of war decided that, owing to the sickliness of the army, and the near approach of the hurricane season, nothing more could then be undertaken. The troops not left in garrison in the conquered islands, were relanded at Antigua, and the fleet returned to Barbados. These commencements of a long series of captures and recap- tures of islands in the West India group, are no doubt of a minor ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 251 character ; but I have ah-eady obseryed that principles are some- times miTch more apparent in war when the surroundings are simple, than when a vast entourage distracts the attention. In these two small conquests we have all the elements of success and none of those of failure. There is, first, a fully commanded sea, for there is nowhere any hint of even a small French naval force. There is agreement between the admiral and the general. There is sufficient military force. The work of placing the army in a position to operate is done by the navy, which supplies and recruits it. The army is the attacking force, and where the navy is brought in, it is merely as an assistant to the main attack. Its powers are measured against Fort Charles, and it is found that eleven light guns mounted on shore, in the hands of the army, but under the guarantee of a sea commanded by the navy, are found of more account than all the broadsides of the fleet. 252 NAVAL WARFARE. CHAPTEE XII. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the Sea Succeed or Fail. — {Continued.) Capture of Marie-Galante in March 1691. — Landing at Guadaloupe. — Siege of the forts at Basse Terre abandoned hastily in consequence of neighbourhood of French squadron. — Contemporary errors as to Commodore Wright's strategic position. — Suc- cessful attacks upon Nova Scotia from New England across an indifferent sea. — Failure of attack on Quebec from delay and insufiScient force. — Impossibility of territorial attacks over a doubtfully commanded sea, illustrated by the operations of Commodore Wren and Count de Blanac in the West Indies in 1692. — Failure of the attack on Mar- tinique in 1693 and its causes — Successes on West Coast of Africa and their causes. — Remarkable parados as to Goree. — Failure of attack on Brest and its causes. — Russell's operations in the Mediterranean in 1694-95. — The mere rumour of a French fleet forces abandonment of siege of Palamos. — Wilmot's operations in St. Domingo in 1695. — Success in spite of adverse conditions. — Various attacks on French Coast in 1694-95-96. — Reflections. The hurricane season being over, Commodore Wright returned with his squadron to Antigua, with the view of arranging with General Codrington for some further offensive operations against the enemy. The naval and military commanders met at St. Christopher's, and it was decided, in a Council of War, to make an attempt to carry Guadaloupe. But this conclusion had no sooner been arrived at than the Commodore received orders to sail for England with part of his squadron. Before this could be done, it was requisite to return to Barbados to obtain necessary provisions and stores which were expected there from England ; but, in any case, the attack on Guadaloupe must be abandoned. Wright accordingly sailed from St. Christopher's on the 15th December 1690, and arrived at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on the 30th. Here he began to disperse his squadron, presumably according to orders ; two ships to Jamaica, to be stationed there, and another ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 253 to convoy the trade thence homewards. It was necessary to detach a fourth to collect the trade from Barbados and the Lee- ward Islands, and these detachments left the Commodore with but seven ships, and these in many ways defective. Not many days had the Commodore lain at Barbados when counter-orders reached him from home, and on the 20tli January 1691 the Jersey, 48, arrived, convoying the desired victuallers and store ships. This reversal of his orders naturally reproduced the designs for offensive operations, and especially the idea of an attack on Guadaloupe. In preparation for this, the Commodore took up six merchant-men, and converted them into men-of-war.* With a fleet thus made up to 14 sail, Wright sailed, on 12th February, for the Leeward Islands to concert measures with General Codrington. Some disagreements arising between the commanders led to delays, but in the end it was determined to proceed against Guadaloupe, and to make capture of its dependency, the island of Marie-Galante, as a preliminary.f The expedition started on the 21st March, and on the 28th 900 men being landed under Colonel Nott possessed themselves with- out opposition of the town and fort, the authorities retiring into the country, but soon surrendering themselves as prisoners. At this point it is convenient to note that we have had to do with a chain of successes, the capture of St. Christopher's, St. Eustasia, and Marie-Galante, where in each case the landings were effected without opj)Osition, away from the cover of the forts, which all fell to the land attack either at once or after resistance for a certain time. The conditions of success were a sufficient military force, covered, or ready to be covered, in its landing by a naval force, and assisted where it was possible by the fire of the fleet in its subse- quent operations. There was agreement between the commanders by land and by sea, and the latter was absolutely unthreatened by the interference of any other sea force. Apparently there was no special design of holding Marie-Galante, for we read of our men having, while awaiting the arrival of General Codrington with the rest of the troops, "ruined the plantations and ravaged the country of Marie-Galante " ; but on the General's making his appearance, it was determined to proceed against Guadaloupe. The troops landed at Marie-Galante, being re- * Ono of 40 guns, two of 32, and three of 30 giuis each. Lediard, vol. ii., p. C4G. t Burchett (p. 45G) says that, allowing 350 men for the garrison of the new conquest, St. Christopher's, the available armj' was not more than 1,500 men, collected from Nevis, Monserrat, and Antigua, 254 NAVAL WARFARE. embarked, the whole army was landed in a bay on the west side of the island, probably near Capesterre, on the 21st April, and marched round the south part of the island towards Basse Terre. The French met them on their route, but were defeated and driven back after a sharp action. The British continued their march to Basse Terre, where they arrived on the 23rd, and burnt the town. " But there were two strong forts in the neighbourhood thereof which would require some time to reduce."^ The fleet had followed up the troops in their march, no doubt covering and supporting them as they skirted the shore, and the ships now anchored off Basse Terre, landing ammunition and equipment for the intended siege of the forts. But it was determined to try the effect of the fire of the ships upon them in the first instance. Wind and cur- rent operated unfavourably, however, and the ships were set nine miles and more to leeward — that is, to the northward of their intended battering position. Two batteries were now erected on shore, supplied with guns and a mortar from the ships, and the siege proceeded, after the example of that of Fort Charles. But some disquieting news arrived while this business was being con- ducted. The Commodore learnt that M. du Casse had arrived in the West Indies with a squadron from France, and that conse- quently his operations were at any moment liable to be interrupted — that, in fact, he was no longer in assured command of the sea. The operations were not, however, at once interrupted; but when, on the 14th May, one of the Commodore's look-out ships came in and reported 11 sail of French ships, supposed to be coming from Mar- tinique for the relief of Guadaloupe, the commander by land agreed with the commander by sea that the entire design must be instantly abandoned. The same night the whole of the troops were re-embarked, and so hurriedly that the mortar and all the siege appliances were left behind on shore. Next morning the squadron sailed for the eastward, against the trade wind and in blowing weather. In two days they saw the French squadron to windward, and it was supposed, from their situation, that the ships had landed a reinforcement at Guadaloupe. Wright gave chase to a portion of the French squadron, which, however, declined to be met, and the next day the whole British force anchored under Marie-Galante. There, taking the presence of the French squadron into considera- tion (it is said), with the sudden outbreak of illness among the soldiers and sailors, it was determined to disperse the expedition.f * Burchett, p. 458 t ^i«''. n GUADELOIPE. With the ad|acent islands, SA/NTES, MAP/E-GALA/VTE & DES/RADE. UPKUT Wff VOMDOn.'W To Fac: Pa^e 254. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 255 Codrington went back to Antigua with some of the troops and men-of-war, while Wright, with the rest, made for Barbados. This is the first clear instance we have of the abandonment of an attack on territory as the direct consequence of threatened interruption from the sea. That the attack could not go on when the immediate vicinity of a relieving naval force was assumed, may in this case seem obvious enough. It was not even necessary to this end that the two squadrons should meet, for the whole chance of success rested on the superiority in the field of the British force landed. The moment this scale was turned, the British troops must either have re-embarked or surrendered, and it was only reasonable to suppose that the French squadron re- ported would begin its operations by landing troops on the east side of the island sufficient to turn the scale against the British as soon as they marched across, just as the British had done, and as, indeed, the colleague commanders believed tho French had done when they saw him. Whatever way we look at it, we can see that it was impossible to go on with the attack. Supposing the British squadron to have been powerful enough to have met the French on an equality, could it have sailed away to do so, leaving the troops without a base either of supply or support, and with the doubt whether they might not at any moment find themselves between the old garrison in the forts and the new reinforcements just landed ? Could the attack have gone on, when at any moment a strong hostile fleet might advance on the British squadron simultaneously with a strong body of troops by land upon the besiegers ? But it is remarkable that neither the contemporary witnesses — not being sea officers — nor the subsequent historians, appear to have understood the Commodore's position. Everyone turns upon him as having done something cowardly and despicable, some placing the appearance of the French squadron only on a level with the appearance of sickness amongst the men, and evidently supposing that the one might have been got over as easily as the other. Commodore Wright having gone home sick from Barbados, all the historians cut at him as if the sickness was feigned to avoid deserved disgrace, and one of them declar- ing that, " for his negligence and cowardice, he was sent home a prisoner."^'' Two letters from contemporary members of the Bar- bados Council, Colonel Farmer and Mr. Reid, are given by Entick, * British Empire in America, vol. ii., p. 54, quoted by Lodiard, vol. ii., p. 647. The case illustrates the impossibility of the naval commander shaking off his responsibihty for territorial failures. 256 NAVAL WARFARE. which illustrate the sort of uninstructed views which can be taken of the operations of the naval commander. We must recollect that the man written of had enabled the troops to capture the islands of St. Christopher's, Monserrat, and Marie-Galante without a hitch, and in agreeing to abandon the attack on Guadaloupe was only doing what all subsequent commanders found themselves obliged to do. Colonel Farmer says : — Captain Wright, with all the King's ships, reinforced with 6 of our best merchant- men, equal to 4th and 5th rates, well manned, has been this seven weeks down there (at the Leeward Islands) ; and though great matters were talked of here before he went, as of taking and destroying all the French islands in a short time ; yet talking is all that has hitherto been done, except the taking a small fisher-boat. But the French have been more active ; for while these mighty things were performing by our fleets, in the roads and bays of St. Christopher's, Antigua and Mevis, they, with sloops and other small vessels, are busied in taking (both windward and leeward of this island) our vessels inward and outward bound, of which we have advice of 13 of all sorts already taken by them ; so that in a very short time we shall be in a miserable condition for want of provisions. Mr. Keid writes : — Our crops this year have been very small ; in all probability the next will be smaller, we not having had the usual seasons to plant. We have been annoyed extremely by a little French snow, who has, notwithstanding the King's fleet, taken, by report, 28 or 30 of our small vessels to leeward of this island, which has occasioned provisions to be scarce and dear. Our admiral, of whom we are like to be happily rid, has been slothful in their Majesties service ; he and General Codi'ingtou deserted Guadaloupe without any reason, only their own jealousies and fears of the French fleet, when we had three times the number of men that the French had. They left their mortar piece behind, though the French at the same time deserted the island also,* concluding we were going to attack Martinico. This expedition is one of the most unaccountable things I ever heard of. Neither of these writers at all understands that the whole matter was the appearance of the French squadron having changed the strategic conditions ; that while, in the absence of a French squadron, a sufficient military force landed under cover of ships, and properly handled afterwards, was certain to effect its object, the very gravest uncertainty and risk surrounded the whole opera- tion in the presence of a French squadron. The letters are also useful as showing the difference between a commanded sea, as re- gards territorial attacks, and as regards commerce protection — the certainty of the one, and the uncertainty of the other, unless the ports whence commerce destroyers may issue can be sealed up by blockade. These writers were clearly of opinion that there was no difference between these strategical conditions, and were quite un- * I have met no corroboration of this statement, which is not very conseijuont. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 257 aware that the forces proper for gaining command of the sea might be quite useless for protecting commerce. Two instances of expeditions conducted over an indifferent sea drawn from the coasts of North America, and as occurring in 1691, follow here in natural order. The one was a success and the other a failure, but the sea being indifferent neither depended on naval defence. At this time the French, to the number of 6,000 or 7,000, were in possession of Nova Scotia, or, as it was then called, Acadia, and on the outbreak of war occupied themselves in raiding upon the English settlements on the New England coast, chiefly those about Casco Bay and Wells. The strong place of Acadia was Port Koyal, now Annapolis, on the north-west coast, and against this the Government of New England determined to send an expedition. Seven hundred men were despatched from Nantasket Bay near Boston, under the command of Sir William Phipps, and the force being sufficient. Port Royal surrendered after a few days' resistance. On his return voyage Sir William Phipps conducted some further raiding, as at St. John's Eiver Settlement, west of Port Pioyal, on the Acadian coast. An attack was now prepared on a larger scale against Quebec. Thirty sail, carrying 2,000 troops, left Hull, near Boston, on August 6th, 1691, under Sir William Phipps, bound for the St. Lawrence. It was intended that this attack from the sea was to be supplemented by one of 1,000 Englishmen and 1,500 Indians marching overland upon Mount-Royal (Montreal), but this branch of the operations falling through, left the Count de Frontenac with the full strength of his garrison to oppose Sir William Phipps. Foul winds greatly delayed the progress of the expedition over sea, and three weeks were occupied in ascending the St. Lawrence. It was not till the 8th of October, in the most bitter weather, that Lieut. -General Whalley was landed for an assault on Quebec with but the 1,400 men which sickness had left available. The inten- tion was, that the ships with their guns should support on the west side the assault of the troops upon the east side of the City. Sir William Phipps waited in vain, however, for the movement of the troops, and sending on shore for explanations, found them paralyzed with the cold, and with the information that De Frontenac had 4,000 men with him. There was nothing for it but to re-embark the troops and abandon the enterprise, which was accordingly done. Some doubts seem to hang over the extent to which both troops and ships were actually engaged, but none sur- 17 258 NAVAL WARFARE. round the fact of the faikire. Its causes are plam enough. The expedition started too late in the season, and was not in sufficient force to begin with, being further wasted by the sickness which, at least in those remote days, was always the concomitant of combined operations. The historian in his recital recognizes the business character of war, by reducing the English loss to a money standard, and sighingly concluding with the observation that " thus ended this fruitless expedition, which cost the colony of New England forty thousand pounds.""^ In October 1691 Commodore Wren, in the Norwich, a fourth-rate of 48 guns, was ordered to take under his command two other fourth-rates, transports containing reinforcements for the troops in the West Indies, victuallers, and a merchant convoy. He was to proceed to Barbados and assume the command of the single third-rate, the Mari/, of probably 70 guns, with four other fourth-rates, and a fire-ship. He was to detach one of these eight fighting ships to carry out convoy duty from Jamaica, and to employ the remaining seven sail in securing the British territories and annoying the enemy until the spring of the year, when he was to bring the ships home. On his arrival at Barbados on the 16th Januar}' 1692, he was instantly warned that nine French war-ships were in the vicinity of the island ; that they had captured one of his fourth-rates, the Jersey, and that only the Mary and Antelope and the fire-ship could immediately join him, the remaining two ships being at the Leeward Islands. We have here a clear example of the doubtfully commanded sea, and may note what the consequences were. We hear nothing on either side of territorial attacks. The first proposal was that the Commodore should proceed with his ships to Antigua so as to con- centrate his forces ; but before this step was taken news arrived that the French had actually 18 sail in the West Indies, 8 of them cruising off Barbados, and the rest either fitted or fitting at Martinique. There was no hope then but to take advantage of the enemy's divided state, and two merchant ships fitted as war-shijps, with two privateers, being added to the Commodore's five ships, the squadron of 9 sailed on the 30th January with the intention of l)ringing the 8 or 9 French men-of-war to action. The enemy had, however, proceeded to the north in the meantime, so the Commodore returned to Barbados without getting sight of them. The French being thus concentrated, there was necessity * Lediard, vol. ii., p. 048. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 259 for a like concentration on the part of the British, and accordingly the squadron sailed for Antigua on the 17th February, detaching small look-out vessels to Martinique for intelligence. On arrival near the island of Desirada, close to Guadaloupe, Wren came in sight of 18 sail of French fighting ships, with 2 fire-ships and 5 or 6 small vessels. This was the squadron of Count de Blanac, and he had with him three prizes taken from the British, namely, the Jersey, 48, already mentioned, the Constant JVancick, probably 48, and the Marij Rose. The Com- modore's squadron was much scattered at this moment, and was, besides, hampered by the care of a merchant convoy. But by the exercise of great prudence and skill. Wren managed to avoid anything but a partial action with the French, and though he was obliged entirely to give up the design of concentrating his whole force in the West Indies, he managed to return to Carlisle Bay, Barbados, without the loss of one ship, on the 25th February. Though the French were thus in clear superiority of force at sea, they do not appear to have considered themselves strong enough in presence of Wren's squadron to undertake any territorial expedi- tions of moment, but Commodore Wren dying, Captain Boteler succeeded to the command, and, in compliance with the orders under which his predecessor acted, he detached certain ships for the local guard of the different ports in the islands, and sailed with the rest for England on the 14th June 1692, thus leaving the French practically in undisputed command of the West Indian seas.* Not impossibly the great perils to which our West Indian pos- sessions were left open by this withdrawal of the English squadron was quite understood by the Government, but the battle of La Hogue not having then given the quietus to French designs of command in the Channel, there was a natural desire to be strong at home. But, though the French do not appear to have taken full advantage of their command of the sea to carry any important British possession, trade suffered so much from the superiority of the enemy, that a determined eftbrt was set on foot to suppress him. For this purpose a squadron was fitted out in the month of November 1692 under the command of Rear-Admiral of the Blue Sir Francis Wheeler, who had already distinguished himself in command of the Albemarle at the battle of Beachy Head. This squadron consisted of 11 ships of and above the fifth rate, with three five-ships and store-ships, hospital and transport ships ; * Burchett, p. 4(30. 17 * 2G0 NAVAL WARFARE. 1,500 men were embarked under the command of Colonel Fowlkes. There was some new gromid broken m the orders under which this squadron acted, inasmuch as it left England wdth the definite purpose of attacking the French island of Martinique ; and, on its arrival at Barbados, orders were sent to General Codrington at the Leeward Islands, to prepare the troops under his command for co-operation, while arrangements were made for landing a battalion of seamen from the fleet, of which the Admiral was to be himself in command. None of the historians I have been able to consult, give any account of the French naval force in the West Indies, nor is there mention of any such in the subsequent operations. I think the facts may be explained by what I have said as to the strategical effect of the hurricane season in the West Indies. Wren's orders, when he left England in the winter of 1692, were to return in the spring, and the approach of the hurricane season may have determined this return in conjunction with the cause suggested above. The same cause would naturally have operated as to the return of the French, and the disaster of La Hogue might well have disinclined them from making any immediate exertions to take the command in the West Indian seas again when the season opened. At any rate. Sir Francis Wheeler's instructions, as summarized by the historians, give no hint of any probable opposition by sea. Wheeler reached Barbados on March 1st, 1693, and beside the regiments of Fowlkes and Godwin which he already had with him, he embarked about 800 men from Barbados, and proceeded direct to Martinique, reaching Cul de sac Marin, near the south end of the island, on April 1st. Here there was some delay, waiting for the arrival of Codrington with the troops collected from the Leeward Islands ; but the time seems to have been em- ployed in landing considerable parties to burn and destroy both west and east of the anchorage. On the 9th and 10th of April, either before or after the arrival of General Codrington, but I think it must have been immediately after, the usual council of war, composed of the land and sea officers was called, and diver- gencies of opinion seem to have at once made themselves apparent. There seem to have been differences of view as to whether the conquest of Martinique was to be attempted, or whether the expe- dition was to confine its operations to a series of landings and ravagingo, such as had already been entered on in the neighbour- hood of Cul de sac Marin ; and then the discussion turned on ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 261 whether Fort Eoj'al, the capital of the island, and the great port, on the southern part of the west shore, or St. Pierre, a place of secondary importance on the northern part of the same shore, was to be first attacked. It was decided that St. Pierre was to he attempted, and b}' the 20th the troops had been landed there and had committed some ravages. But then came the crucial ques- tion, debated in another council of war, whether the town and fort were to be besieged, or whether the troops were to be re-embarked for some further ravaging operations in other parts. The Admiral and a Colonel Colt were alone for persevering against St. Pierre, but the majority were against them, holding that there was not force enough ; that the troops were not to be depended on ; and that as of the 3,000 men landed, some 800 were either killed, wounded, or missing, within three days, it was hopeless to think of going on.* In accordance with the decision, the. men were re-embarked, but very naturally there was no heart for another landing, and it was determined to retire to Dominica to water the fleet and refresh the crews and troops. At Dominica, another council was held, still less inclined for action. A proposal to attack Guadaloupe was rejected, and it was decided to break up the whole expedition. Lediard t gives the following account of the debate. The great charge the Crown had been at on this expedition being considered by Sir Francis, he was of opinion that Guadaloupe ought to be immediately attacked, and General Codrington, as well as Colonel Fowlkes, were of the same mind, provided the squadron and army could remain there six weeks or two months ; for in less than that time it was believed it could not be effected, because the enemy was here as strong, or rather stronger, than at St. Peter's. But Sir Francis informed them that the King had positively ordered that the fleet should not continue in those parts longer than the last of May ; and the forces belonging to Barbados being very urgent to be gone, he having refreshed the officers and men, bent his course to New England, and arrived at Boston the 12th of June. This is the failure of a territorial attack over a commanded sea.t The land defences of Martinique did not prevent the attack being made, and we cannot say whether or no it might have succeeded had there been no delays, or differences of opinion in the council of war. It is conceivable that had the conquest of the island been the single aim, Fort Eoyal, with its excellent harbour, * Burchett is not altogether consequent in his narration. Lediard and Entick follow him not more consequently ; and none of them seem to have refen-ed to a map. I have collated their accounts into a somewhat more consequent form. t Vol. ii., p. 672. * '• During the whole expedition there was not any account received of a squadron of ships of war." — Lediard, vol. ii., p. (572. 262 NAVAL WARFARE. ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 263 might have fallen to a vigorous combined attack. The fleet again takes the second place in the attack, all the operations relied on being committed to the land forces. The failure may be said to have arisen from the double cause of too little force and inefficient handling. None of the immediate failure relates to points of naval strategy, or lies in any way on the naval forces employed ; but it may be said that the King's orders, in limiting the time during which command of the sea was to be held, may have prevented a successful attack on Guadaloupe.* Sir Francis "Wheeler, still carrying his troops with him, was naturally anxious, finding himself in command of the sea at New England, to make some conquest which should cover the Mar- tinique failure. He hoped to attempt the French settlement of Placentia in Newfoundland, which was a place where the attack by troops could be supplemented by that of the ships. The council of war was, however, against him, and the only service effected was the landing of a small force to ravage St. Pierre. Sir Francis did not receive official censure on his return to Eng- land in October 1693. He became almost at once Commander-in- Chief in the Mediterranean, but was drowned next year with all but two of his ship's company by the foundering of his flag-ship, the Sussex. The public were not so discriminating as the autho- rities in apportioning the blame for the failure in the West Indies. After his death, Wheeler was called an unfortunate man, suffering from undeserved clamour.f I pass now to consider in the order of time, but very briefly, some territorial operations on the West Coast of Africa, in 1692-93. The French at the end of 1692 had but two settlements on the West Coast, of which the head-quarters were the island of St. Louis in the Senegal River, and the island of Goree, just south of Cape Yerd. South of these settlements were those of the English East African Company in the Gambia, the head-quarters being at James Island. " The Royal African Company of England having of late years been molested in their trade in the north parts of Guinea, by the French, did, by virtue of their Majestys' Commission, order their agent-general, John Booker, Esq., at James Island in the river of * Campbell, vol. iii., p. 142, lays the chief cause of the failure on the sickness of the troops. He says, the loss by the sword did not exceed 120 men, while during the same period nearly a thousand either absolutely fell victims to disease, or were rendered incapable of service. t Campbell, vol. iii. ,p. 145. 264 NAVAL WARFARE. Gamboa, to attempt the dispossessing them from those parts ; which succeeded accordingly, as appears by letters from the said agent of the 14th March 1692-93, now received by way of Jamaica ; an abstract of which follows. " Having embarked myself, and above a hundred men of this island upon the Company's ships, Anne, Captain Leech, and the America, Captain Brome, with several sloops as an addition to the force they sent me, I arrived at Senegal river, the 30th of Decem- ber 1692, with great difficulty, and the loss of six men. I got over the bar, and whilst I was preparing to attack the fort called Louis de Bourbon, the first day of January, I received a letter from M. Desmolins, the Governor, offering to surrender if he and his men might have civil treatment ; which I readily granted, landed, and ISLA.ND OF GOKEE. took possession of the fort the same day, where I found fifteen cannon, &c. The said fort is situated in the mouth of the river Senegal, and has been in the possession of the French above fifty years, where I have now settled a factory, and called it by the name of William and Mary Fort. I continued there until the twenty-fifth, when I sailed thence, and having succeeded so well, called a council of war at sea the next day, where it was resolved to attack the Island of Goree, the only place remaining in the French possession in Guinea ; where I arrived with the ships the first of February, and continued to alarm the castles until Saturday the fourth, when in the night I landed with a hundred men under the old fort, within two hundred and fifty yards of the ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 265 new castle called St. Michael,* and commanded by Mr. Felix, situated on a rising ground, and mounted with twenty-eight guns, without any resistance till about break of day, when they fired furiously upon us with great and small shot. " About noon I sent them a summons to surrender before our cannon should be landed ; when they immediately desired a capitulation, which being granted, and articles agreed on, they marched out on the eighth, with their arms, bag and baggage, and colours flying, and were carried to the Company's fort at James Island, whence they are to be transported on the Com- pany's shipping, and at the Company's charge, for Europe. "t These attacks are minor, but still very good instances of the success which attends well-handled descents in sufficient force from a commanded sea. The island of Goree is, in little, an exponent of the great principles. " It produces nothing, and its importance is solely derived from its inaccessible situation, which renders it capable of being converted into an important military position." So speaks the EdinbimiJi Gazetteer of 1822. J But what are the facts as to its military position '? Originally occupied by the Dutch in 1617, and fortified by the works of St. Michael, it was duly captured in 1663 by Sir Kobert Holms in local command of the sea. It was retaken by De Euiter in the expedition alluded to in my fourth chapter. It was taken again by the French under D'Estrees in 1677. We have now seen it easily taken by the English in 1692-93, and it was soon after retaken from them by the French. They then re-fortified it,§ but it fell again easily to * Demolished by the English under Sir Robert Holms, but rebuilt by the French. t London Gazette, November 13th, 1698, quoted in C/iurchiWs Voyayes, vol. v., p. 423. The speed of intelligence in those days is well illustrated by the date of the gazette, nine months after the conclusion of the operations, and by way of Jamaica. X In the same way Brookes' Gazeteer speaks of it as " an almost impregnable mili- tary position." § " Some time after (that is after 1693) the French Company, to prevent any further invasion upon Gooree, caused the upper fort of St. Michael to be rebuilt, liftcen foot high, and furnished it with thirty-two guns, from eighteen to thirty-six pounders, an equal number of each ; the latter of which reach a mile beyond the great road of Goeroe ; whereas an eighteen pounder, iired from aboard a ship in the road, cannot reach it, which nothing under thirty-six pounders will do from thence, as has been experienced by the commander of the island." Barbot, in ChurcliUVs Voyages, vol. v., p. 424. The illustration is reduced from Barbot's own in the same volume, and it represents the condition of the island in 1682. The 64-gun ships which took the island in 1800 would not have had heavier guns than 24-pounders, and the two 44-gun ships would only have carried 18-pounders. I find, however, no mention of any attack, and I suppose the mere presence of Sir Charles Hamilton's three ships was sufficient to compel surrender. Had an attack been necessarj-, it would no doubt have been made by landing parties and guns mounted on shore in the usual way. 266 NAVAL WARFARE. Keppel's attack in 1758, and again in 1800 to the attack of Captain Sir Charles Hamilton with one 64 and two 44-gun ships. That is to say this " almost impregnable military position " has been chiefly characterized as being always attacked b}^ and always falling into the hands of, the Power commanding the adjacent sea. It may no doubt have looked impregnable, as many another frowning fortress has done, and yet it never showed itself to have any military value. James Island in the Gambia, from whence we have seen the forces issuing over a commanded sea to the capture of' St. Louis and Goree, fell in its turn to the French in 1695 as soon as their command of the sea was re-established. M. de Gennes sailed from Eochelle on June 3rd, 1695, with a squadron of 4 frigates and 3 smaller vesssels, furnished with mortars and shells, and fully supplied for a long voyage. He touched at Goree to refresh his men, being on his way to prosecute discoveries and conquests in the south seas. There he learnt that the state of the English garrison at James Island was such from sickness and want that it might be possible to carry the place. He entered the river Gambia on the 22nd July, guided by an English deserter and some negroes. He immediately set about investing the island by water, in order to stop its supplies, while he at the same time converted one of his pinks into a bomb-vessel. On the 23rd the French commander sent an officer to demand the surrender of the place from the English governor. After the polite fashion of those days, the French envoy was hospitably entertained with much drinking of the healths of the hostile sovereigns to the music of salvoes of artillery. At the end of it all, the envoy went back with the Governor's answer that he would defend the fort to the last extremity. But the investment was complete enough to intercept supplies, and though a couple of ineffective shell were discharged at the fort, it was unnecessary to pursue the attack further, as there was nothing but capitulation before the garrison, and on the 27th of July it was completed."^ This little affair is another example of the axiom that every place depending on the sea for supplies must fall to the Power in com- mand of the sea. And there is no limit to this rule, beyond the obvious one that if the command of the sea changes hands while the investment is in progress, the place is relieved and does not fall. * Barbot, in Churchill, vol. v., p. 427. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 267 We return again to the "West Indies for a moment, for an example of cross-raiding with very small naval, and considerable military force. The English had left West Indian waters almost in an indifferent state, so that M. Du Casse, the French Governor of St. Domingo, conceived the idea of making a conquest of Jamaica. He sailed from St. Domingo in June 1693 with 1,500 troops in 23 transports, convoyed by 3 men-of-war only, and landed at Port Morant, which was abandoned on his approach. He ravaged and plundered at will for some time, advancing probably towards Kingston, but being met by such forces as people in danger of losing their property unless they fight for it are wont to assemble, the French did not think fit to continue their design, and re- embarked, contented with the plunder they had collected. Practically, this was mere cross-raiding with which naval force had little to do, and naval strategy nothing. The landing at Port Morant, rather than in the neighbourhood of Kingston, seems to point towards an original idea of plundering and retiring, rather than of conquering and holding. The occurrence possibly illustrates the truth that if the sea is free, the enemy is also free to land where opposition is least ; and that, though such raids may be checked by the assemblage of land forces subsequent to the enemy's disembarkation, land forces alone cannot be suffi- ciently numerous or ubiquitous to prevent such attempts being initiated. Eeturning now to Europe, we have to bear in mind that the battle of La Hogue left the British for the time in almost unques- tioned command of the European waters. Instead of having any hopes of disputing with England at sea, France was only solicitous of securing and concentrating the remains of her broken up fleet. The thoughts of the English were entirely directed towards pre- venting this concentration, and if it might be possible, capturing the ports in which the French war ships lay, with the simple object of destroying them. The Channel and western waters having passed under the English command for the first time, the naval war began to assume its second stage, and to favour attacks upon territory, which contained a main element of success as proceeding from an unthreatened sea base. At a council of war called on board the Allied fleet in Torbay on the 5th June 1602, it was decided that part of the fleet should watch to the west of St. Malo, where it was believed that 25 of the enemy's ships had taken refuge, in order to cut off their retreat to Brest ; while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Spithead to join 268 NAVAL WARFARE. and support the land forces understood to be assembling there, for the purpose of a descent on St. Malo. Considerable delays occurred in assembling the transports, so that it was not till the 28th July that a council of the sea and land officers could be called. It was then decided that nothing could be done by the ships against St. Malo, or the ships there, until the place had been sufficiently reduced by the land forces. Unfor- tunately the land officers were equally satisfied that nothing could be done by the troops unless they were supported by the fleet. It was then considered whether anything could be done against Brest, or failing that, against Eochefort. But the officers of the fleet had had experience of the helplessness of " the great ships " in a gale of wind, and had formed the opinion already alluded to in Chapter X. as to shifts of wind making either side of the Channel a lee shore in six hours, to a fleet in the middle of it,* and they all decided that it was too late in the season for either of these enter- prises. But they agreed that the fleet might support any attempt of the troops on the coast of Normandy, or thereabouts, which would not occupy more than about a month. In the result no steps were taken, and the greater part of the ships from St. Malo were able to escape to Brest without meeting interruption.f We have here a failure even to make an attempt at descent, due perhaps, in a small degree, to divergence of opinion between the land and sea officers, but more because of delay and the lateness of the season, the importance of the latter element hanging on the backward state of the marine architecture of the day. A century later, the expedition would probably have gone on without reference to the season, and a steam expedition would probably not have been delayed. J In 1694, the command of the sea being still undisputed in home waters, a proposal to attack Brest took practical form. Lord Berkeley was given the command of a squadron of 22 English ships of and above the fifth-rate, with 19 Dutch line-of-battle ships, and a full supply of bombs, advice-boats, fire-ships and small craft. Transport, either in the war-ships or otherwise, was to be provided for about 6,000 troops. * Burchctt, p. 471. t Barchett, p. 470-470. J Vice-Admiral Rooke, who had made a preliminary oxamination of the approaches to St. Malo, and who would have attempted some of the ships in the harbour if the pilots would have carried his ships in, seemed satisfied of the feasibility of an attack. Burchett, p. 472. Six or seven thousand men were prepared for landing. Entick, p. 563. ATTACKS ON TKRIUTOBY FROM THE SEA. 269 The main features of the plan were that Kussell, who was to take a great fleet with him to command the Mediterranean Sea, and to assist the Spaniards against the French on the Spanish coast, should accompany Lord Berkeley's fleet towards Brest, and that the latter should then make for Camaret Bay, anchor and land the troops immediately. That when General Talmash, who was in command of the land forces, should have reduced the forts on the south side of the Goulet, the fleet might push in for the capture or destruction of Brest itself. BREST The two fleets parted on the 6th June, and Berkeley arrived at Camaret Bay on the 8th, when a council of war determined that General Talmash should at once land and attempt to make himself master of the fort at Camaret undercover of the frigates. " Accord- ingly a considerable number of forces were put on shore ; but the French coast being fortified and intrenched almost in every place, 270 NAVAL WARFARE. our men received so warm a reception that they were soon obliged to retm-n to the boats, and that, too, in no little disorder. " In this action we lost about 600^ men ; and the lieutenant- general himself being wounded in the thigh, died soon after at Plymouth. The Monk, Charles galley, and Shoreham, some of the ships which were sent in to protect the landing, and to batter the French forts, were very much shattered, and in them and the others about a hundred and twelve men were killed and wounded ; a Dutch frigate was sunk, and her captain killed ; besides which, we received many other damages. " The whole extent of the Bays of Camaret and Bertheaume (which lie on each side of the entrance into Brest water) was, in a manner, a continued fortification ; for where there w^as any place to put forces on shore, there had the French batteries and intrench- ments, and they threw bombs at our ships from five or six places. . . . " Thus ended this unlucky expedition ; but I cannot leave it without making this observation, that the French would not, in all probability, have been in such a posture to receive our troops had not early advice been given of the debates and resolutions concern- ing this affair, by Frenchmen who were consulted and advised with therein, as hath been before observed. "f The elements of success in such an attempt as this were the command of the sea, without which it could not have been thought of, and that force enough should have been landed out of the area commanded by the forts. The causes of failure are therefore plain enough. The command of the sea was present, but not the other element. The naval and military commanders, indeed, had no idea of finding any important works defending the landing at Camaret Bay until they saw them, and General Talmash, w4ien he landed, was well aware how desperate the venture was. The council of war was against the landing when it was seen how great the risk was ; but Talmash insisted on it as involving the honour of the English nation. He took not over 900 men on shore with him, many of the boats were left hard and fast by the ebb tide, and it seems that the greatest loss was in the endeavour to re- embark. J The cause of failure, then, was the improper handling of the troops in landing, whether the force was or was not sufficient to meet uuintrenched troops. We have seen the rule of landing out * Kntick says at least 500, p. o74 f Burcbett, p. 4i)l). + Entick, p. 574. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 271 of tlie area covered by the forts almost established in the West Indies, and we see it broken here. If Talmash was actuall}' pro- vided with force enough to maintain his position on shore, a landing in Douarnenez Bay might have proved as successful as that in Camaret Bay was disastrous. We must now follow Admiral Russell into the Mediterranean, as his operations there throw some light on the particular field of naval strategy which we are examining. The French at this time were making way in Catalonia ; they had possessed themselves of Palamos, a sea-port north-east of Barcelona, and the fear was that if the French were left in com- mand of the sea, Barcelona itself would fall when invested by land and water, and bombarded by the French fleet as it had been in 1691. Fears also pointed to Minorca as certain to fall into the hands of the French if the command of the sea was not disputed. Piussell entered the Mediterranean at the head of some 63 sail of the line, English and Dutch, and arrived at Cartagena on July 13th, 1694. He had intelHgence of the French naval force, not materially superior to his own, being in the vicinity of Barcelona, and further intelligence soon reached him that the enemy, having notice of his arrival, had abandoned operations on the coast of Spain, and had retired to Toulon and Hyeres. As exhibiting the effect which the improvement of marine archi- tecture was producing in placing naval Avarfare under settled rules, it is proper to remark here that the power of disputing the command of the sea was now well understood to be capable of holding territorial attacks in suspense. But it was equally ap- parent that these attacks would be resumed the moment the threat of the Allied fleet was withdrawn. Discussion turned wholly on the power the Allied fleet might have of wintering in the Mediter- ranean. The question was hotly disputed, for the idea of trusting " great ships " out of our home ports in the winter was a staggering one for the minds of that day.* The matter was decided from home, however, and the fleet kept its threat in force by wintering at Cadiz.t * Burchett, p. 507. Lediard, vol. il., p. 61»3. Entick, p. 575. Russell was himself against it, and seems to have thoutfht the winter season altered all the conditions. He was quite ready to face the French fleet in the summer, but at first looked for a forti- fied port to spend the winter in. t " The Spanish Secretary of State informed the admiral, soon after, that thoy were now under no apprehensions for Catalonia ; but that it was much feared the French would attack the fleet in Cadiz Bay; but he know these fears were ill-grounded. . . . to divert the Spanish Court from this melancholy apprehension, the Admiral assured •272 XAVAL WARFARE. Eussell received considerable reinforcements during the winter, and squadrons of the lighter ships were actually cruising during the winter months. In the spring, land forces to the number of about 4,500 arrived under the command of Brigadier-General Stewart. The same convoy conducted store ships and victuallers, as well as 12 bomb-vessels. The whole fleet then sailed for the neighbourhood of Barcelona, the French fleet not showing itself at all. The Spaniards were exceedingly dilatory in assembling either their land or sea forces in preparation for freeing Catalonia. No operations could be entered on for some time, but towards the end of July 1695, the Spanish troops marched upon Palamos, and on the 9th August about 4,000 English and Dutch troops were landed there from the fleet, under the command of General Stewart and Count Nassau. Notwithstanding the failure of the Spanish to provide the troops landed with the necessaries promised, the siege progressed with rapidity and success. The better part of the castle and town were battered down and the remainder set on fire in several places. There seemed nothing to prevent the speedy fall of the place, when one of Eussell's cruisers brought in a couple of the inhabitants of Toulon, who affirmed that the French had 60 men-of-war there, ready to put to sea. In Russell's view, the strategic condition of the sea was wholly altered by this intelligence. It was no longer possible to risk in- terruption by the appearance of the French fleet. The troops were immediately embarked, the attack on Palamos was given over, and the fleet sailed towards Toulon in quest of the enemy. This forms the second clear instance we have of the abandon- ment of an attack on territory as the direct consequence of threatened interruption from the sea. Four years had passed since the vials of wrath had been poured on the head of Commodore "Wright for anticipating the rule of naval warfare now acted on by Admiral Russell, but laid down by Lord Torrington. It is by such actions that rules of war are gradually established. It is not that they have ever been absent, but that they have remained like an unknown rock of which the existence was not suspected until some ship ran upon it. We may suppose that it is now marked on the historical chart, and that its position is well known. the Secretary, that as he would never have above two or three ships disarmed at a time, the enemy -would be very daring indeed if they attempted to force him in that harbour, unless their numbers did much exceed his." Lediard, vol. ii., p. G'J.5. Burchett, p. 514. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 273 We pass back again to the West Indies, where the French had not as yet attempted to dispute the command of the sea with us, having but three ships of war, besides some 19 privateers, the latter incapable of doing more than they were prepared for, namely, attacking our commerce. We had then three rated ships in the West Indies, so that a comparatively small squadron sent from England would give an ample command for the success of territorial expeditions. Captain Eobert Wilmot was, under these conditions, placed in command of five rated ships, accompanied by a compact little army of 1,200 or 1,400 men, with a train of artillery and fuU supplies of stores and munitions. The intention was to attack Petit Guavas (Petit Goave), a fortified place on the north side and near the base of the long peninsula which runs out due west from the south-west corner of St. Domingo (or Hispaniola, as it was then called). The Spaniards possessing the east end of the island, it was arranged that they should co-operate, and in April 1695 Wilmot, with three or four ships, was communicating with the Governor of St. Domingo, while the bulk of his fleet and the transports were on the north side of the island about Samana Bay. Bickerings, disputes, and jealousies broke out early and con- tinued late between Wilmot and Colonel Lillingstone, who com- manded the land forces, and the co-operation of the Spanish commanders was not secured without some additional friction.* But in the end it was determined that 1,700 Spaniards and 150 English troops should march across from San Domingo to Cape Francis, the easternmost French place of importance on the north coast, and should there meet the fleet and the troops landed from it. The plan was put in force, and, notwithstanding the disagree- ments, succeeded. The settlement fell, and the fort, which does not seem to have been inconsiderable, was abandoned, and blown up by the enemy. Spaniards and English then marched for sixteen days westwards to Port de Paix (Port Paix). Two thousand five hundred men had come by land, and men and guns were landed from the ships. The fort was besieged in form, and in form fell. It had mounted no less than 80 guns, and from Port de Paix and Cape Francis 130 guns and a considerable amount of ammu- nition were carried off. * Lillingstone, after the publication of Bui-chett's account of these transactions, wrote a reply accusing Wilmot (who did not lire to reach home) of all the crimes that a commander could well commit. 18 27.t NAVAL WARFARE. Sickness now breaking out amongst the troops, and divided counsels being still divided, the attack on Petit Guavas was given up. The squadron was separated so as to leave some strength in the West Indies, and "Wilmot sailed for England, which, however, he did not live to reach, as I have already observed. This expedition was successful as far as it went ; remarkably so, if we take into account the quarrels of the commanders. Apart from these, it had all the elements of success ; command of the sea, sufficient land force, and the support and co-operation of the fleet.* The aims of the expedition were destructive rather than conquering, but as there was an assured command of the sea, the difference in character of these two aims did not arise. A pecu- liarity of the operations lay in the fact that the landing was on friendly territory, with what amounted to a march across the frontier. In 1696, the French had despatched a squadron under M. de Pointis, to endeavour to make a capture of the rich Spanish convoy from the West Indies. Admiral Neville, with a squadron, was sent to the West Indies with a superior fleet, and with the special object of thwarting the French design. The French find- ing nothing in the West Indies to dispute with them, used their command of the sea to capture and plunder Cartagena, on the Spanish main.f Failing in bringing de Pointis' squadron to action, but assured of his superiority by the flight of the French, Neville afterwards sent a detachment to plunder and ravage Petit Guavas, he himself remaining in the neighbourhood as cover. In these two successful descents we have, on the one side, an example of action when in sujDposed command of the sea, and the somewhat narrower margin by which success, or at least full success, may sometimes be achieved. In the Enghsh attack on Petit Guavas, we have the command of the sea secured by the body of the fleet, which would contest any attempt to interfere with the detachment. In principle, the attack on Petit Guavas resembles that successful raid upon the Vlie described in my third chapter. While these descents upon territory, ending in failure or success, * Lediard uses two opposition accounts for his narrative, lliat of Burchett and that of Colonel Lillingstone ; of the latter he rather makes light I think, because he had no map before him. The soldier's account bears the stamp of truth about it. Wilmot's death is hardly an excuse for putting forward a certainly garbled account. t Burchett (p. 556) thinks Neville might have recovered Cartagena and destroyed the ships, had it been so determined. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 275 were being transacted in the West Indies, in America and in the Mediterranean, our command in the home waters, which had led to the attempt upon Brest, led also, in the years 1694, 1695, and 1696, to a series of bombardments of French coast towns, and some lighter ravaging attacks, which, though they are not properly classed under the heading I have chosen for this chapter, require a moment's attention as bearing on the proposition that while every territorial attack requires a commanded sea as a general rule, there is little or no limit to be placed on the nature of attacks which can be conducted from a commanded sea upon, territory. Immediately after the failure at Brest, Dieppe and Havre were heavily bombarded ; and inventors devised ingenious mechanisms, for effecting the destruction of shipping, piers, and towns which trusted to the security of their land defences. A machine vessel was blown up at the pierhead of Dieppe, but with little effect. A Mr. Meesters brought forward an elaborate plan for smoking the inhabitants out of Dunkirk, and blowing up the forts by means of special machines. The plan was put in force under the auspices of Sir Cloudesley Shovel in September 1694, but the inventor's expectations were not justified by the result." The year 1695 opened with deliberations over the possibilities of effecting anything material by descents upon, or bombardments of, the French coast towns, no French naval force showing any inclination to dispute our command of the home waters. The thoughts of the councils settled upon Dunkirk and St. Malo. Mr. Meesters' plans against Dunkirk were not yet discredited, notwith- standing his failure, and it was decided that the attack on Dunkirk should be on his hnes. As, however, he was not yet fully prepared, it was determined to occupy the time by the bombardment of St. Malo. A considerable squadron under Lord Berkeley, with bomb- vessels and frigates, got before the place on the 5th July, and, notwithstanding the lire of many forts, the whole of the shells carried — some 900, including carcases — were poured into the town, which was set on fire in the west part and burnt furiously. * Burchott (p. 501) has a remark on the operations of this year in the Channel which deserves quoting as exhibiting the business nature of war. " Thus ended our attempts on the French at home this year ; and although I will not pretend to make an exact computation of the expense these bombardments put the nation to, yet I do verily believe it was more than equivalent to the damage the enomy sustained from them." 18 * 276 NAVAL WARFARE. The squadron then passed on to Granville, which it is said was destroyed by the bombardment. On the 1st of August, Mr. Meesters being ready with his machine vessels and smoke- boats, a combined attack by the frigates and bomb-vessels of the squadron was made, followed by the advance of four of the smoke-boats and intended to have been followed up by the machine, or explosive vessels. But the smoke-boats proved to be a failure, and though some damage was done by the shells fired, the attack was considered to be a fiasco, and led to mutual recriminations between Mr. Meesters and the sea officers. Subsequently Calais was thoroughly bombarded for nearly a whole day, 600 shells being thrown into it, and this concluded the year's operations of this character on the French coast. The year 1696 opened with a proposal by Sir George Eooke to make another attack upon Brest, but without landing. His pro- posal was : — That the body of the fleet should be in Camarot and Bertheaume Bays, and a detach- ment be made to sustain the small frigates and bomb-vessels, while they went in to do ■what mischief they could. It was his opinion that by thus blocking up the enemy's fleet in their principal port, insulting their coasts, and burnmg their towns at the same time, it would expose them to the world, make them very uneasy at home, and give reputation to His Majesty's arms ; and this he believed might be done, if speedily undertaken, with the assistance of some small frigates, which were much wanted.* This project was not thought feasible ; a council of war sat at Torbay to consider how the fleet could best operate during the summer, and it was put before this council that the French were seemingly disposed to make head again at sea. It was agreed that if the French disarmed not, to proceed to the coast of France for the space of fourteen or fifteen days, for that thereby, if they had not an oppor- tunity of destroying some of their shipping, yet it might very much alarm them, and occasion the weakening of their armies by keeping up their militia and standing forces. It was also determined, that upon notice of their sending any squadrons to molest our trade, ;in equal strength should be detached to oppose them, and that when the French disarmed their ships, it would be convenient to divide ours, some to bombard their towns, and others on necessary services ; but yet that the whole should be so disposed of as that they might unite upon any emergent occasion. f The ultimate decision come to was to proceed to Brest in order to observe the condition of things there, and then to act as might be most desirable. The fleet accordingly looked into Brest in July, and finding that " all the great ships were up the river," with only * Burchett, p. 546. t Burchett, p. 5'tG. The language comes with peculiar force from one who wrote before 1720 as Secretary of the Admiralty, and must have had access to all papers. It shows the distinction drawn between the condition when the command of the sea was not disputed, and that when it might be. ATTACKS OX TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 277 two light squadrons read}' for sea, it was determined to carry out some bombarding and ravaging under cover of the main fleet. This accordingly lay near Belleisle, while detachments ravaged the He de Groix, Haedik, and Houat, and the bomb-vessels, escorted and covered by a detachment, shelled the towns of Olonne and St. Martin further to the south, throwing into them nearly 2,000 shells and carcases. If we take a general survey of what has been set forth in this chapter, we may draw a good deal of proof of the statements made in Chapter X. We can see at least a general tendency, both in the home waters and abroad, for both sides to require command of the sea before proceeding to territorial attacks. This is almost equally seen in what is commenced, abandoned, or omitted from consideration. Commodore Wright operates against territor}; successfull}^ so long as his command of the sea in the West Indies is not threatened. The moment it is threatened, he hastily abandons his territorial operations. Kussell follows precisely the same course in the Mediterranean. The English forces in the Channel everywhere operate at will against the French coast, so long as there is no sign of any considerable French fleet being able to put to sea. The French, on their side, abandon their operations against the Mediterranean coast of Spain the moment they know that Kussell may be in a position to interfere with them, and neither in the Mediterranean nor in the Channel is there any attempted territorial attack on their part. When the command of the sea in the West Indies is divided, neither Wren on the English side, nor Count de Blanac on the French, feel themselves able for territorial attacks, though the French are in a decided superiority. De Pointis' successful attack on Cartagena in the West Indies in 1G9G may be regarded as, in some sort, an example to the con- trary ; but not so much perhaps when it is remembered that his particular quarry was the Spanish silver fleet, and that when he attacked Cartagena in furtherance of this aim, he was not aware that Admiral Neville was in pursuit of him, and we have noticed that in contemporary judgment Neville might have made him suffer for his exploit if he had been rather more active. And again, notwithstanding Neville's superiority, he seemed to have taken care only to engage a detachment of his fleet in the destruction of Petit Guavas, just as we have seen Lord Berkeley acting from 278 NAVAL WARFARE. Belleisle upon the French coast under somewhat similar circum- stances. There is very little failure in the attack on territory when it is not interrupted by intelligence of approaching naval relief. "When there is failure, as at Quebec and Brest, we have almost clearly, insufficient military force and a reliance on the battering co- operation of the fleet ; or, as at Martinique, divided counsels and want of decision and speed. If the strength of the land defences is properly estimated, if sufficient troops are employed, landed clear of the fortifications of the enemy, and supplied and supported from the fleet, there appears to be, so far as we have yet come, no reason to doubt the fall of any place attacked, provided relief does not come to it over sea. ^'LS'@QJ-*=r-- 279 CHAPTEE XIII. The Conditions tinder which Attacks on Territory from the Sea succeed or fail — {Continued). Outbreak of the War of the Succession, 1702. — Preparations to attack Cadiz. — Questions as to amount and distribution of enemy's naval force. — Attack on Cadiz complicated by political considerations. — Cadiz. — Disputes as to landing and sub- sequent operations between sea and land officers. — Abandonment of expedition. — Attack on French fleet and treasure-ships in the inner harbour of Vigo. — Causes of success of attack. — Comparison with Farragut's attack on Mobile. — Captain John Leake, in absence of naval defence, raids Newfoundland. — Benbow in West Indies ; a doubtfully commanded sea and no teiTitorial attacks. — Whetstone reinforces Benbow. — Chateaurenault and Du Casse. — Their return to Europe leaves territorial attacks open. — Destruction of raiding force at Petit Goave. — Captain Hovenden Walker to West Indies. — Destruction of town of Basse Terre in Guadaloupe. — Failure to per- severe. — Graydon fails to attack Newfoundland. — Rooke's proceedings in the Mediter- ranean, 1704. — Chases French fleet and falls back to Lagos Bay. — Reinforced by Shovel. — Capture of Gibraltar. — Battle of Malaga. The outbreak of the War of the Succession, declared agamst France and Spain on May 4th, 1702, was signaHzed by the pre- paration of a great expedition destined for Cadiz, under the command of Sir George Kooke for the sea forces, and of the Duke of Ormond for the land forces. The fleet consisted of 30 English and 20 Dutch sail of the line, which, together with frigates, transports, store-ships, and other vessels, made up a total of 160 ships. The land forces amounted to some 12,000 men, of whom 9,600 were English. The expedition sailed from Spithead on June 19th, and, anchoring at St. Helen's, the main part lay there till July 1st.' That this expedition was prepared with some knowledge of the distribution of the French naval forces there seems little doubt, but I have not found it easy to piece the information together. • .^»i Impartial Account of all the Material Transactions of the Grand Fleet and Land Forces. By an ofiBcer that was present in those actions. 1703. 280 NAVAL WARFARE. Certain things were undoubtedly known, of which the following is a summary : — As the relations between this country and France and Spain were growing strained in the summer of 1701, Captain John Leake had been sent to cruise off Brest in August, in order to gain in- telligence. His news was that 8 French ships of war had gone to Cadiz, and that there were at Brest 19 sail of the line with fire- ships and a frigate, all ready to sail, under three flag officers. On this intelligence Sir George Eooke had been cruising off Ushant in September, and had returned to Spithead on the 20th. He had previously detached Sir John Munden with a strong squadron, to see our West India trade well to sea. Sir George's intelligence was, that on the 3rd of August a small squadron, with store-ships, had sailed from Brest for the West Indies ; also that Chateau- renault, with 10 line-of-battle ships, frigates, and store-ships, had gone to sea from Brest on the 29th August, the day Sir George had finally sailed from Torbay. These ships were understood to be victualled for six months. There were still 15 sail of the line lying at Brest, and they were stripping to refit against the next spring. It was also said that Count d'Estrees had arrived at Brest from Cadiz in order to take command in Chateaurenault's absence.* Further intelligence was brought by Captain Loades, who pro- bably arrived at home from Cadiz in January 1702. He had been several months at Cadiz, assisting the English merchants to bring away their goods as a preparation for the expected war. The Count d'Estrees had been at Cadiz all the summer, with 23 sail, which lay above the Puntales, and towards the latter end of October he had been joined by Chateaurenault from Lisbon, with 14 more sail ; and there were, besides, a considerable number of fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and store-ships. f At Cadiz it appears to have been understood that Count d'Estrees had departed with 7 sail and Spanish troops for Naples on the 1st November ; and that Chateaurenault, with 26 sail had proceeded early in December for the West Indies. After this there were only a few sail left at Cadiz. In April 1702, " a nimble frigate called the Lizard, commanded by Captain Eupert Billingsly," was sent to gain intelligence of * Burehett, pp. 587-89. t D'Estrees, by moans of many advice-boats, kept himself fully informed of every movement of the English fleets, and when Chateaurenault sailed, he knew that Ben- bow had preceded him in September. Burehett, p. GIO. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 281 the French preparations in the Atlantic ports, and he, by means of a story about a ketch carried off by a felonious crew, managed to observe a great deal until he got into Camaret Bay and M. Coetlogon, the commander of the forts there, told him " that if he did not suddenly depart the road, he would fire on him." But he found du Casse's squadron — that which Benbow met after- wards in the West Indies — collecting in the Basque Eoads, and ajDparently gathered that it was to go first to Ferrol, where troops were assembling, and then to proceed to the West Indies.* I suppose it was on Captain Billingsly's intelligence that Sir John Munden, on May 12th, 1702, with 9 sail of the line and 2 frigates, was despatched to Ferrol to bar the entry of the French squadron. He heard on May 16th, being then on the coast of Galicia, that 13 French ships were on their way from Eochefort to Ferrol, and on the 27th he had the mortification to see 1-4 sail of what he supposed were all war-ships pass him into Ferrol, owing to his inability to get up to them. This having happened, other intelligence led the council of war to suppose that there were 17 sail of the line now in Ferrol, which was a force so greatly in excess of his own, that in pursuance of his interpretation of his orders, he fell back into the soundings, and then, on June 25th, he sailed up to Spithead, passing on his way the great fleet of Sir George Eooke, which was Ijnng at St. Helen's. t Three days before his arrival. Admiral Fairborne (June 22nd) had sailed with a squadron of 30 sail in all, to block up the force supposed to be in Ferrol, and with orders that, if they should have sailed, he was to cruise on a rendezvous thirty or forty miles north- west of Finisterre to await the arrival of Sir George Eooke. This latter officer sailed from St. Helen's on July 1st, but was obliged to bear up for Torbay, so that he did not reach Fairborne's rendez- vous until July 30th. Arrived here, Eooke sent the Lime frigate to Ferrol for intelligence, which returned to report Ferrol empty and no signs of Fairborne. Eooke then bore up to the south-west- ward and on the 8th August, near Lisbon, Fairborne joined, having been blown down in that direction by a north-easterly gale.l • Burchett, in mistake, puts all this in 1701, and thereby makes the story more difficult to unravel. t Munden was tried by court-martial for his failure, and though he was fully acquitted, the Queen, yielding to popular clamour, ordered him to be broke. J Entick says (p. G24) that Fairborne " was reduced to great straights for want of provisions," which even at that date w^onld have been remarkable after only a six weeks' cruise. 282 NAVAL WARFARE. We must suppose, on these general grounds, that Sir George Eooke had every reason to beHeve that there was no naval force anywhere m his neighbourhood that was great enough to incon- venience him in any way, yet he seems from first to last to have exercised a certain caution before proceeding to Cadiz ; and quite possibly this caution, arising from shadowy doubts as to possible interruption from the sea, may have been the seat of the dislike to the whole expedition, attributed to him by Bishop Burnet, and of his abstention from giving that full support to the Duke of Ormond after he had landed, which otherwise might have been expected. On August 9th, frigates were sent into Lisbon to gain intelli- gence, and the fleet lay-to, pending their return. A council of war sat on the 11th, and on the 12th the Isabella, yacht, brought news that there were 4 French men-of-war and 4 galleys at Lisbon. On this Eooke steered for Cadiz, and about 5 o'clock on the 13th the fleet anchored about six miles west of the town of Cadiz. It is necessary to remember that this expedition was almost as much political as military, and might have been more so. The Allies supporting the House of Austria in its claims on the throne of Spain, against those of the Bourbons, looked to the advantage of possessing a port in Spain which should be open to them and devoted to the Austrian cause.* It was thought to be quite possible that Cadiz would declare for the Archduke Charles on the appear- ance of the allied fleet. These circumstances bring the case of the expedition somewhat within the category mentioned in Chapter X.f as being a landing on friendly territory, not involving the element of time, and therefore possible to be undertaken even when the command of the sea is disputed. On Sir George Eooke's arrival there was, however, no sign of friendliness on the part of Cadiz, and it became necessary to consider about obtaining the port by force. Bishop Burnet represents Sir George Eooke as averse to the whole expedition ;X and the Life, already referred to in the note, which may be presumed written with a favourable view of the Admiral's action, appears to bear the Bishop out as far as the * See the lettei- of the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt in The Life and Glorious Actions of the Rifjht Hon. Sir George Rook, Kt. (1707) to the Admiral. t P. 219. J " Rook spoke so coldly of the dosij^n he wont upon, before he sailed, that those who conversed with him were apt to infer that he meant to do the enemj' as little harm as possible." — History of His own Tiniest, vol. v., p. 38. Ed. 1823. Rota SUotch Chart of CADIZ HARBOUR NAUTICAL M I LES oa.n t'tfi Ferdina. ndo\* n Leon Island . ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 281^ actual operations against Cadiz were concerned. How far this arose from any personal jealousy of the Duke of Ormond, or pro- fessional jealousy of the sister service, is not so well made out. But the separate councils of war, at one time by the land and another by the sea officers, which were held, as well as the resolu- tions come to by those councils, seem to betray the reverse of that cordial co-operation between the services on which alone the attack on such a place as Cadiz could rely for success. As may be seen by reference to the sketch plan, the town of Cadiz lies at the end of a narrow peninsula stretching to the north- westward for about five miles from the main part of the island of Leon. The peninsula runs out into, and partly shelters from westerly and south-westerly winds, the Bay of Cadiz. The eastern shore of the bay is intersected by streams and marshes, and a narrow channel runs to the southward and eastward along the eastern side of the peninsula, forming the inner harbour of Cadiz, and it was guarded near the entrance by the fort of Puntales on the southern or Cadiz side, and by the fort of Matagorda on the northern side. Cadiz itself was guarded by the fort of San Sebas- tian on its outer or western side ; and across the bay to the north- ward was the town of Rota, and to the north-eastward, the fort of Sta. Catalina ; while in the same direction, but farther up the bay, was the town of Puerto Sta. Maria, generally called Port St. Mary's in the English records of the time. It may be seen that it is peculiarly a place for the combined attack of naval and military forces, and it cannot be forgotten what short work Howard and Essex made of it, the former surrounding the place with his ships while the latter conducted the operations by land. The actual capture of Cadiz was then made by the landing of Essex at Puntales under cover and support of the Dutch ships ; and in the different accounts of the attack in 1702 no valid reason appears to show that the same system might not have been carried out. The first proposal was to land on the sea side of the peninsula, but a joint council of war decided otherwise, and the landing was ultimately effected between Rota and Sta. Catalina, a mile from the latter place, so that its fire did not effect anything against the troops. A little four-gun battery, however, offered a slight opposi- tion to the landing ; but on the approach of the troops the Spaniards deserted it and spiked the guns.* Rota at once surren- * An Inijtartial Account, ^"c. 284 NAVAL WARFARE. dered, and the army marched to Puerto Sta. Maria, which was found to be deserted by the inhabitants. Here the soldiers fell to plundering, and got completely out of hand ; and it was supposed that the political effect of their conduct was more disastrous to the Austrian cause than the progress of the military expedition could possibly be favourable to it. Sta. Catalina fell easily to a detachment sent against it ; but there now arose the question of the next step. Manifestly, if Cadiz was to be captured by the troops, they must march round by way of Puerto Eeal, and either cross the Channel near Puntales and Matagorda, taking Matagorda as a necessary preliminary, or else march still further south and advance on Cadiz along the penin- sula ; thus ultimately putting themselves just where they would have been had they landed as first proposed. Sir George Eooke submitted that Matagorda should be captured, and a party of infantry marched thither and broke ground against it. But the roads were not practicable for cavalry and artillery, and Sir George Eooke was asked to transport them by sea from Puerto Sta. Maria. The flag-officers in council separately, decided that if the crossing by sea was made at all, the embarkation should be from the Mole at Eota. But they said the embarkation and crossing was none of their business, and that it was enough for them to look after their ships. However, if it was fine, a flag-officer and a captain might be spared to assist and advise on the embarkation.* Meantime Sir George Eooke and his council of flags changed their minds about Matagorda, and said that its capture would not help the navy in operating in the inner harbour above Puntales, where the French ships had withdrawn to be out of harm's way ; and would not assist in the main design of capturing the town of Cadiz. Ormond wrote of the possibility of taking Matagorda, and asked for boats to make a bridge across to Puntales. Eooke granted the boats and supplies, but it was resolved to have an independent bombardment of Cadiz by tl^e fleet " the first fair night." Politi- cally, this was objected to by the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt ; and very naturally, as the bombardment of a place in the name of the Austrian Archduke was not calculated to impress the bombarded inhabitants in his favour. The flag council of war, with the kind of grim humour so often mixed with the most serious affairs in the days gone by, replied to the Prince's memorial that they had the highest * Life of Sir George Rook, p. 79. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 285 esteem for his person, but did not find his name in Sir George Eooke's instructions, and therefore could not attend to him. Nevertheless, on the plea of unsuitable weather, the bombardment ■was indefinitely postponed.* Meantime Baron Sparr, who, with a detachment of 2,400 men, bad begun the attack on Matagorda, was not making much progress, though reinforced by 800 men. He had mounted four guns in battery in low wet ground, so low and so wet that the guns stuck in it as they fired. They were replied to not only by Matagorda, but by the galleys stationed for defence, and by the 2nd of September Sparr had lost sixty-five men in killed and wounded. In fact, the attack on Matagorda was proving to be a failure. It is not distinctly stated, but I infer that a good many seamen must have been landed, and that they were doing the rough work of the attack on Matagorda. Seeing the delay, the naval council of war came to certain conclusions : — Upon the repeated complaints of several of the captains of the fleet, that the subal- tern officers and ships' companies began to grow very sickly by their constant employ- ment and fatigues in digging, and other slavish services very unusual for seamen, who do think it indispensably our duty in the first place to take care of the fleet.f Such was the preamble to a resolution to recall all the seamen on board, but while the order was given, it was intimated to the Duke that if, after watering, the health of the men would suffer it, the boats of the fleet might assist the troops. No doubt, it was said, the fleet was there to assist the troops in reducing Cadiz, but time was getting on. The troops had landed on the 15th of August, and that was more than a fortnight ago ; it was not improper to ask how long the army was likely to be ? On this rather broad hint, the land officers^ council resolved that as the taking of Matagorda was so difiicult, and would not, even if accomplished, help the fleet to pass up to the inner harbour, it was judged impracticable by the land forces to make an attempt for the reducing of Cadiz, a work of considerable time for a much greater number of troops, and it was proper to re-embark and give up the objects of the expedition. And thus, in fact, was this expedition abandoned. That there was no real reason for its abandonment may be said to be plain enough. And if we ask why it was abandoned, we can but be answered that it was not persevered in. Very possibly the poli- tical hampered and confused the military considerations, and ^ Life of Sir George Hook, p. 90. t Ibid., p. 81. 286 NAVAL WARFARE. caused in the first instance a landing in the wrong place, and in the second, checked the possible vigour of the naval attack. The force was ample for the object in view, had it been properly handled, for the whole of the troops estimated to be in Cadiz were but 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse of regular garrison.* There was, as we have seen, no immediate question of possible interference with the operations from seaward ; and we at least know, from what followed, that such interference was the very last thought entertained by the only French admiral in a position to put it in practice. But, notwithstanding, Sir George Rooke seems to have laid stress on keeping his fleet intact, and dis- entangled from the land operations. On the whole, we are thrown back on the inference that this failure at Cadiz in 1702 was only an illustration of what mis- management and divided counsels can effect in the face of every other prospect of success. The attack on the French fleet guarding treasure and cargo ships at Vigo, carried out to such success by the same commanders less than a month after the failure of the Cadiz attempt, was not properly an attack on territory, though the territory had to be mastered before the ships could be attempted. It was essentially a joint attack, which could not have been even considered except as a joint attack. For the navy would have been powerless to penetrate the inner harbour had not the Duke of Ormond landed with 2,000 or 3,000 men,t and carried the batteries which guarded the southern shore of the entrance. But the troops could not have landed but by support of the fleet, nor could they, after landing, have destroyed or captured the enemy's ships. After its retirement from Cadiz, the fleet lay in Lagos Bay, where councils were held and considerations were entered into as to an attack on some other port of Spain. But all proposals of this kind were negatived, and the determination to return to England adhered to. Before the last ship quitted the bay, however, news reached her that ten days before, 80 French ships of war, convoying 22 Spanish galleons, had entered the port of Vigo. Sir George Eooke was already on his homeward route, but he was followed up, and on the 7th of October received the intelligence. A council of war was at once called, and an attack determined on. Vigo Bay is a long tapering inlet, running from the sea to the * Annals of Queen Ann, quoted by Lediard, vol. ii., p. 749. t Markham's Life of Robert Fairfax, p. 159, says 7,500 in all. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 287 north-eastward, and extending for some eight miles until it narrows into the Estrecho de Eande, which is only some 600 yards across^ and then, inside this narrow passage, the water broadens into a sort of lake, which is now rather shallow. The town of Vigo — in 1702 a mere fishing village — is on the south side of the inlet, and the town of Eedondela occupies the south-east corner of the inner lake just mentioned. What may be called the entrance to the Bay of Vigo is about a mile and three-quarters across, and at the time I write of there do not appear to have been any batteries or forts there. The town of Vigo was itself defended b}' some works, but they were not of any magnitude, and did not affect Sir George Eooke's proceedings in any way. Chateaurenault had drawn the whole of his ships and their convoy through the Estrecho de Eande, and forts and batteries had been erected on each side of the strait at its narrowest part ,- the works on the south side mounting 38, and that on the north 17, guns.'-' A boom connected the two forts and obstructed the passage ; and far within the boom the French fleet was anchored in th& form of a half moon, intended to protect the galleons.f On the 10th October Sir George Eooke's fleet passed up the Bay. It was fired on by the forts at Vigo in passing, but without effect,. and it anchored above the town to observe the situation and mature the plan. It was decided in the first place to land sufii- cient force to capture the batteries on the south side, and that when the English flag should be hoisted as a sign of the works having changed hands, 25 of the ships should proceed to break the boom and pass on to the attack of the French. About 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th the Duke of Ormond landed, with 2,000 or 3,000 men, In a sandy bay about two leagues from Vigo, and marched towards the battery and fort on the starboard side going into Redondela, which we attacked, and met with a vigorous opposition ; but our men so boldly pressing forward, made themselves * An IiiijHirtiiil Account, Sfc, p. 22. t " On the left hand was a battery of about 20 guns, and between that and the fort on the right a boom was placed athwart the harbour, made of masts, cables, and other proper materials, the French ships of war lying almost in the form of a half-moon a considerable distance within this boom, whereas, had they anchored close to it and laid their broadsides to bear upon our ships as they approached, we should in all probability have found the task much more difUoult. But they had so great a depen- dence on the strength of the boom, as to think themselves sutfitiently secured by that and the batteries on both sides of the harbour." — Burchett, p. 626. 288 NAVAL WARFARE. masters of the battery and trenches, and (forced) the enemy to retreat, although they had at least 20,000 in and near this place, yet durst not engage us, because they saw the resolution of our forces. We had no sooner took the platform, on which were 38 lieutenants ; and wounded, 2 colonels, 7 captains, and i) lieutenants ; and 3 ensigns died ; 154 soldiers were killed, 211 wounded, 72 died, 50 deserted, and 12 were taken prisoners. * The Comte de Lapeyrouse BonBls, in his Histoire de la Marine Fran^aise, says (vol ii., p. 28) : " L'arrive deM. Gabaret avec huit cents hommes inspira une nouvello ardeur aus Fran9ai8 et porta le decouragement dans les rangs ennemis." 294 NAVAL WARFARE. thirteen captains of the sea forces ; Colonel Eivers, who com- manded the land forces in succession to General Collembine, who had died some time before, six captains, and an Engineer officer. This council concluded that as the ships were mostly in a bad state ; as the whole of the troops they could muster were now under 1,100 men; and as both soldiers and sailors were weak and sickly, while the intelligence from Placentia, the objective of the expedition, represented it in a good state of defence with a superior garrison, it was judged to be impracticable to make any attack so late in the season. The final result was the return, in a more or less disordered condition, of the whole expedition to England. Burchett, in wishing that he " could, by summing up the whole, make any tolerable comparison between the services this squadron did the nation and the expense which attended it, and, which is still more valuable, the lives of many good officers, seamen, and soldiers," lays much stress on the time many of the ships had been out, some of them having been in the West Indies since 1698.* The inferences we may draw are somewhat wider. We see on the one hand that a doubtfully commanded sea is still preventive of territorial attacks ; and that even the assured command of the sea does not always admit of such operations. We note again that as at Guadaloupe sufficient force, well handled, landed from, and supported by, the fleet, should always be successful ; want of per- severance, aggravated by differences of opinion between the land and sea commanders, may easily cause conquests to stop short of completion. On the other hand, the case of Placentia may teach the nation that expects to fail in its command of the sea, that even a repu- tation for a defensive state, combined with accidents such as are common to the sea in all ages, may in practice become armour of proof. Sir George Piooke had proceeded to Lisbon with a fleet and troops in support of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who accom- panied the force, in February 1704. It was feared that this force might not be large enough to avoid blockade at Lisbon by the French fleet preparing at Brest, and it was demanded by the Admiral that strenuous exertions should be made to bring up his strength not only to avoid blockade, but to prevent the Brest and Toulon fleets from forming a junction, and thereby threatening the * Burchett, p, GOT. ATTACKS ON TERIUTOUY FROM THE SEA. 295 command of the sea which was necessary to carry out the intended operations on the Mediterranean coast of Spain.* Orders to proceed into the Mediterranean reached Eooke in April, he being informed that there was a probability of the French having designs upon Villa Franca and Nice, and that he was to take proper measures for frustrating them should the news be true. The flag-officers in council, however, represented that their force was not large enough to perform what might have been expected of it, for that both at Brest and Toulon the French preparations were active. t On the 25th of April a despatch from Lord Nottingham of the 10th of April, informed Eooke of the intention of the French to attack these places by sea ; and it was thereupon determined to proceed to their relief, but sailing to the northward of the Balearic Islands, and as near the coast of Spain as the winds would permit, towards Barcelona, for intelligence. If there were no intelligence of the supposed attacks, the fleet was not to go beyond Barcelona, and was to execute there the designs for its recovery to the Austrian cause which had been put forward by the Almirante of Castile, he holding that if troops were landed, and a show of bombardment made, the place would declare for Charles III. The force which it was intended Sir George Eooke should lead on this service was very considerable ; it was to comprise 30 English and 18 Dutch line-of-battle ships, with frigates, fire-ships bomb-vessels, &c., making up a total of 69 sail. But this was not considered alone sufficient either for the defen- sive or offensive operations upon territory which were to be under- taken. Sir Cloudesley Shovel was placed at the head of 25 sail of the line, and about the middle of May sailed to mask the sup- posed operations of the Brest fleet fitting out under the Count of Toulouse. As it was not quite certain whether the force at Brest might be designed to fall upon Sir Cloudesley's possibly inferior fleet in the Channel, or to proceed to the Mediterranean and form a junction with^ the Toulon fleet believed to consist of 25 sail of the line, Shovel was, if he had certain intelligence that Brest was empty, to fall back to the chops of the Channel, and not to proceed to the Mediterranean, or to detach ships thither until he was pretty sure that the French had gone south. On his way to Brest on May 15th, Shovel got news not only from home, but from one of his look-out frigates, that Brest was * Burchott, p. CGo. t Ilml., p. 669. 296 NAVAL WARFARE. really empty ; he fell back to a rendezvous 60 miles W.S.W. of Scilly, and then, leaving a ship there to give notice to stragglers, he proceeded to his second rendezvous, 420 miles W.S.W. of Scilly. This second move was determined by the non-receipt of intelli- gence, and by the fear that the French might intend to operate against our trade. On the 28th of May, as nothing had been seen or heard of the French, it was judged that they must have pro- ceeded either to blockade Eooke — supposed to be still at Lisbon — or to join the Toulon squadron, and so keep the command of the Mediterranean Sea. Shovel thereupon, after making provision for the security of the trade, sailed for Lisbon with the 22 ships of the line to which he had been limited by his orders, to join or to relieve Rooke at Lisbon as the case case might be.* Rooke, however, had sailed for the Mediterranean before this, and was off Cape St. Vincent on April 29th. He had then with him 22 English and 14 Dutch sail of the line. The actual force which the French no doubt knew they might have to meet in the Mediterranean, if they proposed to make either territorial attacks without securing the command of the sea, or to make a definite struggle for that command, was no less than 58 sail of the line. Eooke's rendezvous was Altea Bay, north of Alicante ; and off Cape Palos on the 8th of May, some of his ships chased a small French squadron, but without being able to come up with it. Meantime, the Count of Toulouse had actually quitted Brest on the 6th of May, with 23 sail of the line, and having touched at Cadiz proceeded on his way towards Toulon. The Prince of Hesse pressing Rooke with assurances that Barce- lona would certainly come over to the Austrian cause if an attack by land and sea were threatened, Rooke yielded. On the 19th of May 1,200 English marines and 400 Dutch troops were landed, and the Dutch ships made a show of seriously bombarding the place. But it was soon discovered that the French were too strong for the Austrian party, the men landed were re-embarked, and the fleet stood over toward Hyeres. As bearing on the strategy of territorial attack from the sea, we may here note that Rooke does not appear at this time to have supposed that there were more than 15 or 16 ships ready at Toulon, t while he had 36. Even had the attack been serious, and * See, for interesting light on these translations, Laughton's Memoirs of Lord Tor- ringfon. t Burchett, p. (J7G. According to Troudc, tho information was probably correct. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 297 had he intended to press it, there was nothing in the way of inter- ference from the sea to be apprehended, and nothing to prevent him from preserving a vastly superior force intact to meet it should intervention, contrary to all reasonable expectation, occur. But, in fact, the strategical question was little touched in executing what was a mere demonstration, not expected to last more than a few hours. On the 27th of May, at night, the English look-out ships ob- served a great fleet standing for Toulon, and Sir George Rooke, being informed, at once chased to the northward after them, and continued so all night. At daylight it was calm, but Eooke counted 40 sail doing all they could to pass into Toulon. He thereupon called a council of war, which decided to continue the chase as long as there might be a hope of cutting the enemy off, and when that failed, to fall back out of the Mediterranean again, as the junction of this fleet — which was that of the Count of Toulouse which we have just left — with the 15 or 16 supposed to be ready in Toulon, would be too powerful to be safely encountered by Sir George Eooke's present force. We may here note, however, that Rooke was really in the lion's mouth, had French intelligence and French enterprise been com- bined in full efficiency. As it was, the junction of the two fleets was not effective until July 22nd, before which date the Toulon ships were not ready to put to sea."'' Rooke chased till the evening of May 29th, when the French were within 90 miles of Toulon. The fear of an immediate junction of the enemy's forces seems then to have prevailed on the minds of the flag officers, and the fleet bore up for the Straits of Gibraltar, through which they passed on June 14th. I suppose Rooke must have been aware that Shovel was likely to reinforce him, for he only fell back as far as Lagos Bay, where he was joined by Shovel on the 16th of June. The strategical situation was now wholly changed. Even with all the ships of the Toulon fleet, the Count of Toulouse would not make up more than some 48 sail,t while Rooke had ten sail more. The flag officers were now of opinion that operations * Troude, vol. i., p. 250. He says that the delay was designed, and meant by the Minister of Marino to prevent the Count of Toulouse from reaping credit. t The actual force assembled two months later was 50 sail of the line, 24 galleys, 7 frigates, and 7 fire-ships (Troude, vol. i., p. 250), when Rooke's, by detachments, had come down to 55. See Thfi Ancinit and Modern History of Gibraltar, by J. S. Dodd, 1781,p. 38. 298 NAVAL WARFARE. against Cadiz and Barcelona might be renewed if land forces in sufficient numbers could be obtained, but they were probably supposing at this time that the French possible force did not amount to more than 39 or 40 sail. The want of sufficient troops making an attack on Cadiz im- practicable, and the Austrian claimant to the Throne of Spain, as well as the King of Portugal, being anxious that something should be done on the coast of Andalusia, a council of war was called on the 17th of July, the fleet being then twenty miles east of Tetuan, and a determination to make a sudden attack on Gibraltar come to. Such an attack as this, where the sea was not assuredly com- manded, required consideration. It does not seem probable that had it necessitated the employment of any large portion of the fleet, it could have been attempted, in view of the possibility of interruption from Toulon. But though the place was naturally and artificially remarkably strong, it was probably known to be very inefficiently garrisoned. It is certain that the intention was to capture it in a rush, and by surprise. The fleet being in Tetuan Bay, on July 19th Eear-Admiral Byng received orders to take with him 11 English and 6 Dutch ships of the line, with 3 bomb-vessels, and to be ready to proceed to bombard Gibraltar, previously discharging all the marines of his squadron into the other ships. These, with the rest of the marines of the fleet, were to be put under command of the Prince of Hesse, and to land, with 18 rounds of ammunition each man, on what is now the neutral ground. Signals were arranged both for night and day as to anchoring and bombarding, which latter was to follow the advices from the Prince of Hesse. The wind did not prove favourable till the 21st, when Eooke made Byng's signal to proceed in execution of his orders. On the 22ud, the whole fleet, except a squadron to be mentioned presently, followed Bj-ng and anchored at the head of Gibraltar Bay, and quite apart from the operations. The marines, to the number of about 1,800, were landed with scarcely any opposition, and they took possession of some mills which then existed within gunshot of the north part of the town. The Prince of Hesse sent a summons to the governor of the place to declare for Charles III., but no answer coming back that night, nor early next morning, Byng proceeded to warp his ships into their positions under a desultory fire. Meantime, the governor sent his answer, expressing ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 299 a determination to defend the place as a loyal soldier of Philip V. "When Eooke heard of the answer, he sent 5 additional ships to Byng, which made up his squadron to 22. The whole of this day seems to have been spent in getting the ships into position, but as the marines barred all approach on the land side, the delay was of no material consequence. At night Captain E. Whitaker was sent in with some boats to burn a French ship which lay at the old Mole, while Byng, to harass the enemy, directed the mortar vessels to open fire on the town. The next morning, the 23rd, about 5 o'clock, the forts began to fire on the ships, to which they, as ordered by signal, replied by so heavy a return fire that the inhabitants hurried out of the town and up the hill. The smoke became so great that Byng sent orders down the line to cease firing altogether from the light guns forming the upper tiers, and to direct a careful and slow fire from the lower tiers of heavy guns only'' ; about noon, he stopped the firing altogether, in order that he might see what effect had been produced. "Whitaker took these orders, and when on board the Lennox, communicating them to the commander. Captain Jumper, who was nearest the New Mole, both officers concurred in thinking that as the batteries at that point were silenced and many of the guns dismounted, it might be possible to land and capture them. Whitaker returning to Bj-ng with this opinion, the Admiral at once made signal for the boats to assemble, sending to Sir George Eooke to ask that the boats of the rest of the fleet should follow up. But before these boats arrived, Captains Hicks and Jumper had dashed in with the boats of Byng's squadron. Sir Cloudesley Shovel had got on board Byng's flag-ship, presumably to see the fight at a nearer view. He noted that a great number of priests and women who had taken sanctuary in the Chapel of Our Lady of Europa, were making a rush back to the town again on seeing the boats approach. He caused a gun to be fired across their path, which frightened them all back into the chapel again. The discharge of this gun was taken as a signal to reopen fire, and under cover of it the seamen landed, and pursuing two different routes, clambered over the works " with great valour and much * Byn>;'8 orders almost seem to find their ectype in what happened at the bombard- ment of Alexandria in 1882. 300 NAVAL WARFARE. more courage than prudence."'^ Either by accident or design, while one of the parties was mounting to the capture of what was called the Castle, and seems to have been a principal work on the New Mole, it blew up, and 2 lieutenants with 40 men were killed, and 60 wounded by the explosion. t The party were so dis- heartened by this accident that they turned back towards the boats ; but just then Whitaker was bringing up a further relay of boats, upon which the}' all faced about and took the remaining works without opposition. When Byng saw that the footing was made good, he sent further reinforcements, and ordered Whitaker to secure himself in his present position. Summonses were now sent to the town both by Byng and the Prince of Hesse ; and the Governor, moved, it is said, a good deal by the fact that the English and Dutchmen were between the town and all the women of the best families who were in the chapel, agreed to capitulate the next morning. The articles were accordingly signed, and next day, the 25th of July, the place was delivered up, everyone quitting the town except some twenty families. Thus fell the great fortress of Gibraltar into our hands, as, in fact, a place naturally in the power of the nation which commands the sea almost entirely surrounding it. It is a place so nearly an island that it cannot be attacked on the land side with much pro- spect of success ; while it cannot be so attacked at all, except in the absence of defending naval force. In a former chapter I have spoken of the attack and capture of Gibraltar chiefly by the ships and the seamen as something unique. The strength of the fortress may be measured by considering that probably 9,000 or 10,000 men were directly employed in the attack, while only about 150 were engaged in the defence. J The allied loss was near three times as great as this whole garrison, being 3 officers and 57 men killed, and 8 officers, and 207 men wounded. It is almost obvious why the attack on Gibraltar should be, as I say, unique. Usually, places to be attacked are defended by fortresses, and landings can be effected with a view to subsequent operations against them. But here it was the fortress itself which * Memoirs of Torrington, p. 142. t Drinkwator's History of Gibraltar, p. 10. Mr. Pocock (see " Journal of the Rev_ Thomas Pocock," printed as an appendix to Torrington's Memoirs, p. 123), says the explosion was an accident, one of our own men letting a lighted match fall into the powder. X Entick (p. 61.5), Drinkwatcr (p. 10). Torrington's Memoirs (p. 14(j) say eight}'^ men only, and Burchott confirms this. ATTACKS ON TEREITOEY FEOM THE SEA. 301 had to be attacked, and there was absolutely no other way of doing it. Strong as the place may have been, it must have fallen into Eooke's hands however strongly it had been garrisoned, had time allowed, and had there been no prospect of relief from the sea. For the fleet covered and protected the force on the isthmus, and that force blockaded the land approaches, while the detached portion of the fleet under Byng was competent to blockade it on the sea side. Cut off from supplies and reinforcements, there was nothing before any garrison but surrender within some definite time, marked by the original store of provisions and munitions. Such a mode of attack could not be undertaken with prospect of success but by the power holding an assured command of the sea ; and Gibraltar has defied its foes from that day to this, only because it has never been attacked by any power with such command. When it is so attacked its fall is certain. Over and over again it would have fallen to attacks made upon it had it not been relieved from the sea. Over and over again have the attacks been futile, because they had no assured sea base such as Sir George Eooke considered himself to possess in July 1704. But probably this base was not quite so secure as Sir George, in full prospect of speedy success, for the moment assumed it to be. That he was fully alive to the general situation is clear from the message the council of war sent to the sovereigns in esse and j^osse at Lisbon a month earlier, in answer to their expressed wish for operations on the coast of Andalucia. Attacks, it was said, could not be made without troops, and " the Marines being part of the ships' complements could not be spared at that juncture, when the French fleet were hourly expected upon them."* And Sir George took a precaution which we only hear of in the most inci- dental way. He detached Admiral Dilkes with a squadron to cruise off Malaga, no doubt with the intention of covering his operations at Gibraltar from any light interruptions, but more in order that he might have the earliest intelligence of any enemy's approach. t But though he recognized the danger, and prepared to take full precautions against it, there can be no doubt * Life of Rook, p. 12G. t I only find this in Mr. Pocock's Journal, p. 194, where, on the 24th July, appears the entry, "Admiral Dilks came in hither from cruizing of Malaga." Naval historians so seldom understand whero the pith of the narrative lies, that generally the best information comes from such chance statements. 302 NAVAL WARFARE. that he was either consciously or unconsciously running a good (leal of risk as the attack proceeded. Probably, if he had known that while Byng was warping his ships into place, the Count of Toulouse was preparing to quit Toulon in search of him with 50 sail of the line, the whole attack would have been post- poned. As it was, we have seen him weaken his original cover, first by landing his Marines, against what had been his earlier judgment ; then by engaging 5 more of his cover ships in the direct attack, and lastly by detaching his boats. On the other hand, besides the knowledge we have of Eooke's cognizance of the danger and of one at least of his measures of precaution, there are two matters of surmise which it may be pro- per to take account of. The Admiral probably now knew from Shovel the exact strength of the fleet which he had chased towards Toulon ; he might still have thought, as he had done before, that the Toulon squadron was not more than 15 or 16 sail strong. We have seen how troubled Byng was by the smoke of his guns ; this almost surely betokens either calm or westerly winds. In neither case could the French fleet have made any rapid ap- proach upon him, and he might easily have relied on the watch which was kept by Dilkes. Eooke was not long left ignorant of the risks he had run and escaped from. After the capture of Gibraltar, it was considered desirable to keep the fleet in the bay, except such squadrons as it might be necessary to detach for water. And Eooke seems to have thought little of a possible enemy, since he detached 5 Dutch ships for Lisbon and Plymouth, besides making up out of the fleet a garrison of 1,800 men for Gibraltar. Subsequently the whole fleet passed over to Tetuan for water ; and then on August 3, 12 ships remaining behind which had not completed their water, the rest stood over to Gibraltar with very light winds. At G o'clock on the morning of the 10th one of the scouts came in from the eastward, reporting the enemy in sight. There was considerable discussion as to what was best to be done. There was fear of allowing the 12 ships on the African coast to be cut off, there was also fear of battle with such short complements as the garrisoning of Gibraltar had left on board. Nor were matters mended when the look-out captain, John Heme of the Centurion, reported the French fleet to consist of 66 sail, and to be 30 miles to windward. Eooke's fleet was now between Gibraltar and Malaga, 9 miles from the latter place. It was determined to send in at once to Gibraltar ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 303 the fire-ships and small vessels to bring back half the Marines, while the fleet, in line of battle, stood towards the African coast to pick up the 12 absent ships, to whom expresses had been sent ordering them to join. Both arrangements succeeded, and after a few days' manoeuvring in consequence of the French returning to Malaga after seeing the allied fleet, to pick up their galleys, there was fought the indecisive battle of Malaga, which was a conse- quence of the capture of Gibraltar, but would probably have prevented it had it occurred a few days earlier. I mention it, not to go farther with any description of the battle here, but to show how the law of a doubtful command of the sea works, and how necessary it must be to pay attention to it in all cases of territorial attack. 304 NAVAL WARFARE. CHAPTER XIV. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the Sea Succeed or Fail — {continued). The protection of Gibraltar from the Lisbon base, 1704-5. — Sir John Leake relieves it three times, capturing attacking ships. — The English and Dutch assume command of the Channel and Mediterranean seas, and the French decline to contest it. — The recovery, based upon the command of the sea, of Barcelona to the Austrian cause, 1705. — Naval views as to the security of that command. — Leake, falling back to Lisbon, leaves Barcelona open to any attack possible within the time necessary for his return. — French invest Barcelona by land and sea. — Leake relieves it, just as he had relieved Gibraltar, by reassuming command of surrounding water, 1706. — The Mediter- ranean coast of Spain gradually falls under control of the Power commanding the sea. — In the West Indies, St. Christophers and Nevis raided in absence of English naval force, 1705. — Arrival of such force co-incident with cessation of territorial attacks. — Increase of English naval force suggests territorial attacks, but commerce suffers. — Increase of French naval force and check to territorial attack again co-incident. — In Europe, Ostende falls to investrnent by land and sea ; attack 'by land and sea on Toulon fails, 1707. — Forbin's attempt to invade Scotland checked by naval force. — Minorca falls to Power commanding sea, 1708. — Spanish coast held and supplied from the sea base. — French making head at sea, hope to carry Sardinia by evasion of allied fleet, Sir John Norris drives them back with loss, 1710. — Capture and abandonment of Gette. — Captiire of Port Royal, Nova Scotia. — Attack on Antigua prevented by appearance of naval force. — Raid on Monserrat interrupted by rumour of naval force approaching. — Failure of intended attack on Quebec under Sir Hovenden Walker, through wreck, season, and want of supply. — Attacks successful and unsuccessful on Leeward Islands in consequence of distance of naval force at Jamaica. — Duguay-Trouin's capture of Rio Janeiro. — Reflections on these occurrences. The arrangement come to for the defence of Gibraltar, after the battle of Malaga and in view of the necessary return home of most of the ships, was to land all the Marines except those of two ships that were under-manned, together with 60 gunners and 12 carpenters which the Prince of Hesse, appointed Governor, had asked for. Accordingly " 2,000 Marines were landed, and the garrison supplied with a quantity of stores and provisions and 48 ATTACKS OX TEURITORY FROM THE SEA. 305 cannon, in addition to the 100 there before."* Then all the ships which were found in a condition to remain abroad were placed under the command of Sir John Leake, to form the winter guard of the new conquest. As Gibraltar produced nothing that was necessary to the fleet, not even water, Leake, with 12 sail and a fire-ship, parted from Eooke off Cape St. Vincent in order to make Lisbon his head- quarters, and his action in protecting Gibraltar even from that distant base is not a little striking and instructive. The French and Spanish naturally determined to make strenuous efforts for the recovery of Gibraltar, and it seems by no means impossible that they might have succeeded had the efforts been great enough and carried out in the proper direction. Sir John Leake, greatly put to it to procure at Lisbon the necessaries for his ships, heard, on the 1st October, that Gibraltar was invested by land, and later he learnt that a squadron of 19 of the enemy's ships, great and small, had come into the bay, and that the inten- tion evidently was to invest the place by land and sea.f The squadron was that of M. de Pointis, with 13 sail of the line, J but so badly provided that he was no sooner arrived than he found it necessary to go to Cadiz for supplies. Sir John Leake, while hastening all preparations, received advice from the Prince of Hesse that de Pointis had landed 6 battalions and gone to the westward, leaving only 6 frigates of from 40 to 20 guns in the bay, and that the trenches had been opened on October 11th. Leake in council, determined to proceed at once to the relief of the Prince with his squadron, which now consisted of 14 English and 6 Dutch sail of the line. The fleet arrived at Gibraltar without adventure, and apparently found no force there. Leake landed some reinforcements, but upon receipt of intelligence — without any basis of truth that I can discover— of the approach of a superior French force, and being still unsupplied with neces- saries, he re-embarked the men landed except the gunners, car- penters, and marines, and made sail again for Lisbon. De Pointis on his side was being urged to re-establish the blockade, but was pressing the danger of his situation at Gibraltar in the presence of " 30 sail " in the Tagus, and recommending that he should remain at Cadiz, where he was not only secure but in a * Memoirs of Lord Torrimiton, p. 104. t Entick, p. 649. J Troude, vol. i., p. 25G. 20 306 NAVAL WARFARE. position to harass any convoys for Gibraltar, until he was re- inforced.* The French Government seems to have had but little conception of the strategy of the situation, and not to have under- stood that Gibraltar could never fall unless Leake were masked or beaten. De Pointis, however, managed to remain safe at or near Cadiz with his main force, while leaving a few frigates and small vessels to watch Gibraltar and check its supply by sea. Leake was ready, and got out of the Tagus on the 25th of October, and four days later he appeared in the bay of Gibraltar with such little warning that he captured the whole of the enemy's light squadron, consisting of 3 frigates, a sloop, a fire-ship, a store-ship full of ammunition, and other small vessels. The state- ment is that his arrival was most critical, as the enemy had intended to storm the fortress that very night, having prepared boats from Cadiz to land 3,000 men upon the New Mole.f Sii" John now remained at Gibraltar, and landed such men and stores as the fleet could spare. Towards the latter end of November he had intelligence that de Pointis was at sea, and he himself put to sea, keeping sight of Gibraltar in order to be in a position to receive him. On the 17th and 19th of December two convoys, one of 9 and the other of 7 transports, arrived, having on board 1,970 men, and no doubt stores for the garrison of Gibraltar. J On the 21st December a Council of War decided that it was quite safe for the allied fleet to go back to Lisbon to refit, as, beside the good condition Gibraltar garrison was now in, it was known that the besiegers were themselves suifering the greatest distress and privation. Leake was therefore back at Lisbon by January 19th, 1705. Further supplies and reinforcements arrived at Gibraltar during the month of January, and the French Government, disregarding de Pointis' arguments, ordered him back to re-establish the blockade. He sailed during the early days of March 1705, but had hardly reached Gibraltar when his ships were dispersed by a gale ; 8 were driven to sea, and he himself, with 5 sail of the line only, found his way to the anchorage. § News that de Pointis, with * Troude, vol. i. , p. 256. t The Prince of Hesse wrote that he did not think he could have held out against such an attack. — ^Hervej', vol. iii., p. 408. X The last convoj', off Cape Spartel, nearly ran into the toils of M. de Pointis' fleet of 22 sail, which as a ruse had hoisted English and Dutch colours ; us it was, 1 transport was captured, and 3 more with 2 war-ships as convoy, were forced back to Lisbon. § Troude, vol. i., p. 256. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 307 14 sail, bad arrived at Gibraltar, reacbed Leake at Lisbon, wbo sailed tbence on tbe 16tb of Marcb at tbe bead of 23 sail — English, Dutcb, and Portuguese — baving on board an Englisb, a Dutcb, and a Portuguese regiment. At balf-past 5 on tbe morning of tbe 20tb of Marcb, de Pointis' sbips were seen from tbe fleet to be working out of tbe bay of Gibraltar. Sir Tbomas Dilkes was de- tacbed to attack tbem, and tbe wbole were speedily eitber captured or destroyed. Sir Jobn Leake supposing that tbe remainder of tbe Frencb squadron migbt bave made for Malaga, proceeded tbitber after it, but learnt that tbe sbips, on bearing tbe firing in Gibraltar Bay, bad beat a speedy retreat to Toulon. Marsbal de Tesse, wbo was in command of tbe besieging land forces, upon tbis wrote to tbe Frencb King tbat it was impossible to continue tbe siege, and it was raised on tbe 1st of April 1705, after baving lasted five montbs. We may clearly say of tbis failure of tbe attacking, and success of tbe defending, force, tbat botb were centred on tbe proceedings of Sir John Leake. Just as it was not tbe force actually engaged which bad wrested the great stronghold from the Spanish, but the covering and sustaining force of Sir George Kooke, so it was not the defenders of tbe works, however gallant and enduring, who held tbem. It was the unmatched threat of Sir John Leake at Lisbon which would have operated to prevent tbe waste and disappoint- ment incurred by tbe Frencb bad they only understood its nature, and which, being foolishly dared, passed beyond the threatening stage and rolled over everything in its way. Just as Admiral de Pointis foresaw failure from a breach of the rules of naval war, so we may be sure tbat Sir George Rooke based his hopes of success when be attacked, in a consciousness that be had. force enough, apart from what was immediately engaged, to defy the enemy should be make his appearance from the sea. Tbe operations of Sir Cloudesley Shovel and tbe Earl of Peter- borough on the coast of Spain in 1705, although they were carried on against a territory which was at least in part friendly, are yet in some degree illustrative of the influences that are exercised by tbe neighbourhood of a possibly opposing fleet. Though the battle of Malaga bad been a drawn battle, and migbt, according to tbe judgment of contemporaries, bave turned against the Allies bad it been renewed by the French,* yet it had by no means given confi- dence to our enemies or tended to make tbem less cautious in * Burchett, p. G80. 20 * 308 NAVAL WARFARE. attacking. They had, mdeed, left the battle-field in the hands of Sir George Eooke, and b}- so much acknowledged his superiority at sea. The fact was doubtless recognized on both sides ; in stimulating the Allies to farther operations, which pre-supposed a command of the sea, yet not such assured command as would dispense with any precaution ; and in pressing on I'rance the necessity of recover- ing her maritime position. On the French side, fleets were fitted out at Brest and Toulon, and a formidable guerre de course under Forbin was initiated at Dunkirk. On the English side, in addition to the great attack- ing and covering force destined for the Mediterranean under the Earl of Peterborough and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, defending forces were placed under Sir George Byng for Brest, and Sir Thomas Dilkes for Dunkirk.^ By the middle of June 1705, Sir Cloudesley Shovel found himself at Lisbon at the head of a fleet of 58 sail of the line, of which 38 were English and 20 were Dutch, besides frigates, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and the other usual acccompaniments of a great fleet. The French Brest fleet was at this time supposed to consist of about 18 sail of the line, and the force, under Sir George Byng, left to watch it amounted to 12 sail of the line. His orders were to cruise off Ushant, and if he found that the enemy had sailed, he was, when assured that they were not bound up Channel, to detach Sir John Jennings with the ships intended for the main fleet. If Sir Cloudesley Shovel had no direct intelligence as to the strength of the Toulon fleet, he would have estimated it by remembering that the full French fleet of the year before had come up to 49 of the line and had been diminished by the loss of De Pointis' 5 sail, though possibly increased by subsequent additions. As soon as the fleet assembled at Lisbon, although the land forces were not yet fully collected, a council of war was held to consider the situation, the chief point of which was the possibility of a junction between the Brest and the Toulon fleets. t The first decision come to was to detach 46 or 48 ships to cruise between Cape Spartel and Cadiz, to interpose between the Brest and Toulon fleets and prevent their junction. On the 20th of June, however, this decision was reversed, and " it was agreed not to be advisable * Dilkes, however, came on with the grand lleet to Lisbon. t Peterborough and Shovel were in coinmissiou jointly iis admirals. Burchett, p. 684. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 309 to detach any ships, in regard the fleet was proceeding on action, and that there was a probabiKty of the junction of the enemy's ships of the ocean and Mediterranean.'"'' Leaving the Earl of Peterborough to await the completion of his army by the arrival of transports expected from Ireland, and by hoped-for additions from Portugal, Shovel with the main part of the fleet sailed from Lisbon on June 22nd, a measure which must have had for its object the covering and protecting the expedition which was to follow. The intention was to cruise off Cape Spartel as determined by the first council of war, until the Earl of Peterborough should join with his army.f Peterborough followed on July 17th; his army amounted to about 12,000 men, and the whole expedition being united at Gib- raltar, sailed thence on the 5th August and anchored in Altea Bay on the 11th. A determination was then come to, to endeavour to recover Barcelona to the Austrian cause, it being held for the Bourbons. The fleet was before the place on the 12th of August. On the 13th the troops were landed without opposition, a couple of miles from the town. But as the attack proceeded, the generals feared it might prove beyond the strength of the army. On the 5th September the generals, at the Archduke Charles's request, resolved to persevere in the attack, at any rate for a time ; but on the 7th the Earl of Peterborough was for giving the thing up and re-embarking, and the council supported him, alleging " that they had not been assisted eitlier by the fleet or by the country people as they expected ; that the King (Charles) was uncertain in his resolutions — one day for a siege, one day for a march ; and that the deputies of Catalonia had told my Lord Peterborough their people could not Avork where they were exposed to the enemy's fire. "J What had occurred in the meantime is well worth our attention. Peterborough was admiral as well as general, and Shovel, with his fleet, was under his orders. The generals, in their council of the 5th September, had relied upon the landing of a number of seamen and marines from the fleet, which Peterborough, as * Burchctt, p. CH5. t Byng had before this quitted Ushant and joined the main fleet. I have not been able to discover why. X The History of the Luit War in Spain, from 1702 to 1710. 1726. Page 25. This book, sometimes (juoted as An Impartial Imiuiry into the Manat. joc» ^ C/t'"^ 6caU of Mtlti A. — Position of Fort St. Louis and Kecloutits. C— Fort St. Joseph. D.— Mancinilla. B. — Fascine Hattery. &c. E. — Castillo Grande. ships of the line with 7 smaller vessels and the bomb-vessels, his own flag-ship, the Burford, having been left behind at Port Royal to careen after running ashore at Porto Bello. He left one ship to windward, to guard the approaches from the eastward, and himself anchored with his ships in the open water off the town of Carta- gena on the 3rd. On the 6th the bomb-vessels were placed in position under cover of the smaller vessels, and they opened and continued a bombardment until the morning of the 7th. A certain 336 NAVAL WARFARE. amount of damage only was done — " enough," as Vernon wrote, " to awaken Don Bias de Lezo, and to let him know I was not stealing upon him by surprise." This being accomplished, Vernon, on the 10th weighed, and after closely examining the coast and Boca Chica, with a view to possibly subsequent operations, stood away for Porto Bello to water, and with the intention of operating by way of bombardment upon the fortress of Chagres."^ This operation was systematically and deliberately carried out by the bomb-vessels, and three of the line-of-battle ships, using only their lower tiers, and firing slowly and carefully, from the 22nd of March 1740 till the 24th, when the fortress hoisted a flag of truce and surrendered. The fall of Chagres after an attack by bombardment alone, comes upon us now, we may observe, as in some sort a novelty in naval war. We have had captures of forts by the attack of land forces, without any direct assistance from the ships ; we have had them when the attack by ships has been made subsidiary to that by land forces ; and we have seen the captures made, as at Gibraltar and Porto Bello, where the main attack has been by the ships, and the land attack has completed it. We have also had bombard- ments where no surrender has followed. This fall of Chagres appears to be the first instance of capture following simple bom- bardment, but the course of history shows us that the result was exceptional, and depended on the geographical situation of the place, and the moral fibre of the garrison defending it. All this time nothing is heard of any possible opposition by the Spanish at sea, and we therefore observe the results in the cap- ture of Porto Bello and Chagres, and the bombardment of Carta- gena, of the strategic condition of a commanded sea. It can hardly be a mere coincidence that the expectation of the arrival of Spanish naval force, and the cessation of territorial attacks, should again be simultaneous. In the beginning of June 1740, Vernon had a despatch from the British Minister at Lisbon, announcing the departure from Cadiz of a Spanish squadron, said to be destined for the West Indies. Vernon thereupon put to sea from Jamaica and cruised to windward, in the hope of falling in with it ; but getting no intelligence he returned to Port Eoyal.f * Berkeley, p. G74 ; Entick, p. 749 ; Hervey, p. 110. f The naive misapprehension of historians in general as to the operating causes in the circumstances of naval war is aptly illustrated by a remark of Hervey (vol. iv. , p. 114). He says, " The abatement of this commander's (Vernon's) zeal, first appeared in the shoi-tness of this cruise." Hervey had clearly made a mental note of the cessa- ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 337 Although I do not find any mention of it, it seems more than probable that Vernon at this time had notice of the great likeli- hood that France would presently throw in her lot with Spain, and he may have known that not only was the Spanish squadron from Cadiz to be expected, but that another Spanish fleet,* accom- panied by a French one, had sailed from Ferrol, for a like desti- nation. I think that Vernon must have been aware, in the autumn of 1740, that the balance of power in the West Indies, so to call it, was about to be turned, and that this consideration tied his hands. It seems of all things the most unlikely that so soon after the daring and almost reckless attack upon Porto Bello, the admiral could have changed his nature, and have sunk, as he was accused of doing, into a slothful repose. To re-establish command of the sea in the West Indies, Rear- Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle sailed from Portsmouth on the 26th October 1740 at the head of 21 sail of the line,t besides frigates and fire-ships, and with a considerable body of marines and land forces under Lord Cathcart.J As usual, the actual departure of this fleet was much behind the appointed time. Vernon had such intelligence of its intended sailing, that he put to sea from Jamaica with his whole squadron on October 3rd, hoping to fall in with Ogle on the coast of Hispaniola. Instead of this, he only heard on the 12th of its detention by contrary winds at home. On the same day, he learnt that the Spanish Ferrol squadron, under Admiral Torres, had arrived at Porto Eico on September 7th, and had sailed for Cartagena on the 25th of the same month. Soon after this, he learned that the French fleet under the Marquis d'Antin had arrived at St. Louis in the west of Hispaniola, and that possibly some enterprise against Jamaica was threatened although war was not yet declared. This intelligence necessarily drove the admiral back to his headquarters at Port Eoyal, where he busied himself with preparations for defence, pending the time when the arrival of Ogle should enable him once more to take the offensive. tion of Vernon's activity after such a group of exploits as he had just described. But he did not in the least connect it with the apprehended arrival of a Spanish fleet in West Indian waters, * Twelve sail of the line. Entick, p. 751. t Entick, p. 752. Hervey (vol. iv., p. 107) says 25, and gives their names, hut several of the names do not appear in the list which Entick gives of the total West India fleet united under Vernon. t The regiments of Harrison and Wentworth, G regiments of marines, and detach- ments. Entick, p. 751. 22 338 NAVAL WARFARE. As, taking all together, the different and probably hostile forces were at bay, no steps were taken on either side, and Ogle arrived at what was then the neutral island of Dominica on December 19th, where Lord Cathcart died. Ogle then went on to St. Christo- pher's and sailed thence for Jamaica on December 28th, where he arrived on January 9th, 1741.* A council of war was presently held to consider the situation, and determine future proceedings. The resolution come to was: " That the whole fleet should proceed to windward, to observe the motions of the squadron under the command of the Marquis d'Antin, which had been for some time at Hispaniola ; and that Captain Dandridge should be sent before in the Wolf sloo-p, to get intelligence." " The resolution," says the historian Hervey, " taken by the general officers at this council was very surprising, and their motives for forming it quite inex- plicable. Every circumstance seemed to concur in pointing out an immediate attack upon the Havannah, by the reduction of which Spain would have been humbled into the most abject submission, and as it lay to leeward of Jamaica, the fleet might have reached it in two or three days. Instead of directing their force against that quarter, it was resolved to beat up against the wind to Hispaniola and St. Domingo, to observe the motions of the French squadron. Three weeks elapsed from the arrival of Sir Chaloner Ogle to the sailing of the fleet under Vice-Adrairal Vernon ; and when another fortnight had been spent in a fruitless cruise, intelligence was received that the French fleet had sailed for Europe in great distress, being destitute of men and provisions, neither of which could be procured in the West Indies. "t How easily the point of naval operations may be missed, is once more illustrated by this extremely instructive passage. The historian has been following through three volumes and a half the narrative of these incidents which I have brought together into a single group. As he has studied them, they have come into his mind mixed with an immense variety of other incidents, and it has never struck hitn that law has been governing every step that has been taken. So he does not perceive that Vernon's later conduct, and the resolution of the council of war, are only of a piece with all that had hitherto taken place in concordance with naval success. He has no consciousness that the fall of Porto Bello and Chagres were primarily due to the absence of possibly interfering naval force in * On his way six of his ships had a partial action with a small French squadron, supposing them to bo enemies. They separated with some loss and mutual apologies, t Hervey, vol. iv., p. 134. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 339 the West Indies, and that with the 12 sail of the Hne of Spaniards at Cartagena, beside the Cadiz squadron of 5, and the 14 French sail of the line at St. Domingo,* Vernon's 29 sail of the line was not a force to overawe each squadron separately and liberate a suffi- cient force to operate against Havannah at the same time. Yet nothing can be more certain than that any territorial attack under- taken by Vernon at this time would have been culpably foolish and rash, and would have deserved the terrible condemnation which must have been pronounced upon it, had France and Spain taken proper advantage of the British mistake. f More than foolish and rash would it have been to run to leeward to Havannah, leaving the French to windward of Jamaica, and offering, as it were, the right cheek for a blow which would be accepted on the left cheek subsequently. But the receipt of news that the French fleet had quitted the West Indies altered the whole position, and on February 16th a council of war decided to make an attack on Cartagena. The force at Vernon's disposal was now 29 sail of the line with 22 frigates, fire-ships, and bomb-vessels, and transports carrying, with the men-of-war, a body of about 12,000 troops. The fleet itself was manned by about 15,000 men, and the total number of the ships was about 124. J This was a gigantic armament, and if it had been found possible to destroy Porto Bello with about one-fifth of the ships and about one-twelfth of the men, the doom of Carta- gena must have appeared already sealed when the great fleet turned its course to the southward and steered for the place. On the 4th of March the armada dropped its anchors in the open water to the northward of the town of Cartagena, and at once made dis- positions as though a force was about to land on that part of the coast, and so drew the garrison to intrench itself in that direction. Cartagena was not unused to hostile demonstrations ending in capture. Sir Francis Drake had sacked it in 1585, and not long afterwards it had been again sacked and left in ruins by a few privateers. In 1697 it had been captured by the French under de Pointis, who were said to have made a booty of £9,000,000. It was now considered the principal, the most populous, and the best fortified city in Spanish America. Its garrison numbered 4,000 Spaniards, besides negroes and Indians, and now it was further * De Lapeyrouse Boafils, vol. ii., p. 2-ti;, gives the names. There were also live frigates. t Campbell (Zires of' the Admirals, vol. iv. , p. 275. Ed. 1813) is precisely under the same error. \ Entick, p. 754. 22 * 340 NAVAL WARFARE. strengthened by the Spanish squadron under Don Bias de Lezo. The approach to the town from the sea was naturally protected by shallow water, which extended nearly three miles out, and the want of shelter of any kind from northerly or westerly winds, put a regular attack from that side almost out of the question. The real objective in an attack on Cartagena was the port, which, again, was to be got at only by way of the narrow passage of Boca Chica, eight miles to the southward of the town. This entrance was defended on its northern shore, called Tierra Bomba, by a regular square fort called St. Louis with four bastions, strong and well-built, and mounting 82 guns and 3 mortars. The central work was strengthened by several redoubts : St. Philip with 7 guns, St. Jago with 15 guns, and a small fort of 4 guns called the Battery de Chamba. On the south side of the entrance was a fascine batterj'of 15 guns called the Barradera, and in a small bay at the back of that another battery of 4 guns; and facing the entrance on a small flat island stood Fort St. Joseph, of 21 guns. From this to the north shore a boom and cables were carried, and behind the boom one 70-gun and three 66-gun ships were moored with their broadsides covering the entrance. Beyond this passage lay the great lake or harbour of Cartagena, land-locked in all its southern part, and capable of sheltering a vast navy. About midway towards the town it grew narrower, and about three miles south of the town there was a second narrow passage formed by two peninsulas, the one to the west being crowned by a fort mounting 59 guns, called Castillo Grande, and the one to the east bearing a horse-shoe battery of 12 guns, called Mancinilla. There was a shoal between these two points, and ships had been sunk on each side to block the passage against the British. The town of Cartagena itself, spreading over two low sandy islands, was surrounded by natural defences of shoal water and swamps, and was artificially strengthened by works mounting no less than 300 guns. West of the city, about a mile from the gate called Himani, and on a hill fifty or sixty feet high, was the Castle of St. Lazar, which was a fort about fifty feet square^ with three demi-bastions, having guns mounted, two on each face, one on each flank, and three on each curtain. The fort itself was not so s-trong, but it was in a commanding position, and covered the approach to the city on that side. There was, however, a height about 400 yards from it, which entirely commanded it.* * Entick, p. 754 (note). — The place chosen for the beginning of the attack and the landing was that which de Pointis had successfully used forty-four years before. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 341 Vernon had already, as we have seen, some knowledge of the nature of the work before him. He had also sent in advance of the fleet a line of battle-ship, a frigate, and a sloop, to reconnoitre and sound. From the captains of these ships, and particularly from Captain Knowles of the Weymouth, who had hitherto acted as engineer to Vernon's operations, he learnt that the most suitable commencement of the attack would be to possess himself of the forts on the north side of Boca Chica, and that there was anchorage almost within musket shot of the redoubts St. Philip and St. Jago without opening the guns of the great fort of St. Louis or Boca Chica. The fleet being at this time organized in three divisions, Ogle commanding the van, Vernon the centre, and Commodore Lestock the rear, it was determined in council that Ogle should take his division down to Boca Chica, and should anchor three line-of-battle ships to batter forts St. Philip and St. Jago while two more attacked the smaller work of Chamba. On the 9th of March, Sir Chaloner Ogle, having with him General Wentworth, who had succeeded to the command of the troops on the death of Lord Cathcart, proceeded to the southward, and having placed the five ships in their appointed stations, reduced the fire of the batteries so completely, that 500 grenadiers being landed, under Lieut. -Col. Cochrane, they were in possession of the three redoubts by eight o'clock in the morning, and there was nothing to prevent such further disembarkation of troops as might be decided on. This success had been achieved with a loss of only six men directly, but indirectly it was heavier. One of the ships, the Shrewsbury, had had her cable cut by a shot, and not having a second anchor immediately ready, she drifted opposite the Boca Chica, and was for the whole of the day engaged with nearly all the batteries, thereby suffering great and useless damage, and a loss of sixty men in killed and wounded. Towards night on the 9th, the bomb-vessels got into place, and began to play on Fort St. Louis ; and during the next da}' the two regiments of foot and the six regiments of marines were all landed without opposition, and with and after them were carried great stores of artillery, ammunition, and camp equipage. On the 13th, a mortar-battery which had been erected began to play on Fort St. Louis, and by the 14th all the stores had been landed, as well as twelve 24-pounder8 from the ships' armaments. From the moment the troops landed they seem to have become 342 NAVAL WARFARE. sickly, and to have either lost heart or energy. Vernon com- plained to Wentworth of the dilatoriness of the military opera- tions, and Wentworth in reply complained of want of support from his officers. The navy seems to have omitted nothing that could convenience the soldiers, and the force landed was certainly super- abundant for the mere duty of reducing the remaining works on the Tierra Bomba side of Boca Chica. The fascine battery on the south side of the passage proving to be a great annoyance to the military camps, Vernon sent a landing-party of seamen which, on the night of the 19th of March stormed it, spiked the guns, and tore up the platforms, sustaining very little loss, and returning to the ships with six wounded prisoners. The main object of the army was the erection of a battery, under cover of a wood, to reduce Fort St. Louis to a condition suitable for the troops to attack, and it was hoped that this might be so speedily set in order as to enable the engineers to transfer their skill to the south side of the passage and to capture all the forts on both sides without putting the ships to the hazard of attacking a passage so formidably covered by guns. But the 21st of March arrived without the completion of the battery on the north side alone, though 500 seamen had been lent for that purpose. The vice-admiral began to grow seriously uneasy at the delay. The season was drawing on. The anchorage was so exposed and so bad, that the rocks were continually cutting the ships' cables. There was a growing danger of interruption from seaward, as Vernon had intercepted intelligence informing him that de Torres had arrived at Havannah with the Ferrol fleet, and was expecting to be joined by a French fleet under Eochefeuille. It became plain that if the business was to be done at all, the navy would have to take it in hand promptly, and finish it. Accordingly, on the 23rd, Commodore Lestock conducted an attack upon the northern forts and the ships supplementing them, with three 80-gun and three 70-gun ships. They were terribly shattered and obliged ultimately to draw off, but other ships took their places, and the seamen landing, carried those of the batteries on the south side which had been in part restored. Meanwhile the land forces had opened fire from their long delayed battery on the 22nd, and by the 24th, a practicable breach was effected in the ram- parts of Fort St. Louis. It was arranged to storm it on the evening of the 25th, and by way of diversion, Vernon sent Captain Knowles with a large landing-party to take the fort, as it were, in flank. The fortress fell so easily to Wentworth' s stormers, that Knowles ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 343 pushed on with the boats to Fort St. Joseph, which he took with hardly any loss, the garrison flying precipitately on his approach. It was the same with the ships. Arrangements had been made for scuttling them in the event of a reverse, but such was the hurry and confusion consequent on Knowles' approach, that one of them, the Gallicia, fell into his hands intact, with her captain and 60 men. A complete conquest of the passage was thus made, and nothing barred the way but the boom and the Gallicia, which Knowles speedily removed, and the next day, March 26th, the Admiral and several of the ships not only passed into the harbour, but advanced several miles towards the town. On the 26th, some of the ships directed to do so, had anchored just out of gunshot of Castillo Grande. By the 30th the whole fleet was inside, and it must have ap- peared to most of those engaged that a success as splendid as that of Porto Bello was already achieved. But certain points might have been taken into consideration. It is apparent to us now, and after the event, that a much larger force than necessary had been landed on Tierra Bomba ; that force had already suffered a loss of 400 by sickness and casualties. It had to be re-embarked before anything farther could be done, and when re-embarked it would carry the seeds of sickness with it. To complete the success, it was probably necessary to push the garrison of Cartagena at once, and before they had time to recover themselves, but the troops were not again ready to land until the morning of the 5th of April, and then not all of them. But pending their readiness, the ships had been pushing up and on. The fort on Mancinilla (Manzanilla) being weak, was de- stroyed by the Spaniards themselves on the nearer approach of the squadron ; and on the 30th Sir Chaloner Ogle with some of the ships of his division having anchored close to Castillo Grande, Captain Knowles reconnoitring in the evening, came to the conclu- sion that the enemy was evacuating that fort also. Next morning it was discovered that they had sunk the two remaining line-of- battle ships of the squadron in the channel, and had abandoned the fort, which was immediately taken possession of by the British. There was nothing now between the navy and the town but the sunken ships, and the shallow water beyond them.* Some of the bomb-vessels were now brought up, and on April 2nd began to play on the town, and a few of the guns of Castillo * No mention is made in my accounts, of Fort Pastelillo, which appears in the plan of 1854. 344 NAVAL WARFARE. Grande were likewise utilized in that direction. By the evening a passage was made through the sunken wrecks, and three fire-ships passed through it to occupy stations for covering the landing of the troops when it should take place. On the 3rd, the Weymouth, Captain Knowles' 60-gun ship, passed through the western channel and came under the fire of the town without material damage to herself, and next night she passed round the shoal to a secure position in the eastern part of the harbour, where were now assembled other covering ships which swept the surrounding country with their guns, and prepared for the landing of the troops from the transports which were beginning to warp in. Even now, and notwithstanding the delay, the fall of Cartagena could not but have seemed certain, to both soldiers and sailors. The troops began to land early on the morning of the 5th, at a place about two miles from St. Lazar,"*^ and though the whole of the garrison was drawn out of the town to oppose them, it was broken up into small parties, and Wentworth's advance was little retarded. What actually followed seems almost inexplicable. The Admiral, daring to rashness as we have seen him up to this moment, and trying everything before he pronounced that it could not be done, suddenly, and without warrant, came to the conclusion that there was not water to allow his ships to close up to the town and fire on it. As a fact, we now know that there was 7 fathoms water close up to where Fort Pastelillo is now shown on the 1854 plan, that is, within 1,000 yards of the town. He therefore made no advance after landing the troops. General Wentworth, on his part, had secured the convent sur- mounting the highest point, and knew or ought to have known, for he saw it with his own eyes, that Fort St. Lazar was not very strong, and was commanded from higher ground close to the east- ward of it. Instead of pushing on to what, after his experience, he ought to have supposed was an easy conquest, he not only made no attempt either upon the fort, or upon the heights commanding the fort, but set about making an encampment, and lay for three nights waiting for tents and baggage. Between the Admiral, who seemed suddenly to be morally para- lyzed, and the General, who had all the time seemed to think that if be kept his mouth open long enough the cherries would cer- tainly drop into it, there arose mutual recriminations. * Very probably near the spot ■where the house stands which is marked on the sketch- plan, if that be not the identical house which is spoken of in the accounts of the landing. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 345 The General complained that the fleet lay idle, while his troops were harassed and diminished by hard duty and distemper. The Admiral affirmed that his ships could not lie near enough to batter the town of Cartagena, and upbraided the General with •want of activity and resolution to attack the fort of St. Lazar, which commanded the town, and might be taken by scalade. Wentworth, stimulated by these reproaches, resolved to try the experiment. His forces marched up to the attack, but the guides being slain, they mistook their route and advanced to the strongest part of the fortifi- cation, where they were, moreover, exposed to the fire of the town. Colonel Grant, who commanded the grenadiers, was mortally wounded ; the scaling ladders were found too short ; the officers were perplexed for want of orders and directions, yet the soldiers sustained a severe fight for several hours with surprising firmness, but at length retreated in good order, leaving above 600 men killed or wounded on the spot.* This check was one that the troops could not recover ; sickness had alread};- shown itself amongst them to such an extent that 500 men were either dead or incapable, and in view of all the con- ditions, a council of war of the land officers decided that the troops must be re-embarked with all speed. This was done on the 15th, when 3,200, of the 5,000 landed, returned to their ships, and further operations against Cartagena were abandoned. Although in this undertaking all the forts accessible by sea which defended the approaches to Cartagena were destroyed, and with them a squadron of five sail of the line, yet the attack was a failure and not a success. But when we come to the question of why it was a failure, it is not so easily answered. It would seem clear that it was an error to land so great a force as was employed, chiefly in looking on, at the fall of the forts on Tierra Bomba. It seems at the same time strange that part of the force landed on the north side was not landed on the south side, or, at any rate, transferred to the south side when its weakness was discovered. But then the subsequent success in forcing the passage of the Boca Chica, and all the operations up to the moment of the second landing of the troops might be held to have condoned any errors at the beginning. Why it came to pass that after the second landing, and when a vigorous advance in any form, and in almost any direction, would have succeeded, there should have been no vigorous advance in any direction, passes knowledge. The ulti- mate failure of the attack on Cartagena is not explained, and that is all we can say about it. But it may be remarked of the forcing of the Boca Chica that it resembled in many respects the attack at Vigo. The difference in principle is that the fleet was unsheltered, and that the landing was in the face of the batteries. Why it should have been so is not explained, though perhaps a single glance at the locality * Hervey, vol. iv., p. 148. 346 NAVAL WARFARE. might even now explain it. With the great land force at disposal, it seems strange that it should not have been employed both north and south of the passage simultaneously, and there does not now seem any reason why one party should not have been landed well to the south, and another well to the north of the forts to be taken, and then that the ships should not have co-operated in the usual way. The loss and damage to the ships in engaging the batteries does not seem to have been met by commensurate advantages. We must observe that the hazard to which the shijDs were put was not deliberate, but was forced on Vernon by the threat of the Spanish force a thousand miles off at Havannah. The state of the ships was such, and his instructions so ordered it, that Vernon was obliged to send several of them home ; and then, with a smaller fleet and a body of troops reduced from its original strength of 12,000 to about 3,000 only, it did not seem that there could be any continuance of territorial attacks. Vernon, however, was of a different opinion, and considered that by dividing his fleet he might have sufficient force to watch and guard against the Spanish fleet at Havannah, and also to support a land attack. The placed aimed at was St. Jago de Cuba, a town and close harbour on the S.E. coast of the island, and then chiefly cele- brated as the rendezvous of the privateers. Entrance to the port was difficult, not only because of its narrowness, but also because of certain eddy winds, which caught ships at a certain part of the approach and necessitated very special appliances if the ship was to advance. For these reasons, and not so much because of any real strength of the place in the way of fortification and garrison, it was determined to push the usual principle of successful attack to its extreme limit as it were, and to take possession of a neigh- bouring port easy of access and entirely undefended, and to operate upon St. Jago de Cuba overland from that sea base. This port was Walthenam Bay (now Guantanamo), 40 miles to the westward of St. Jago de Cuba, an inlet noted for its convenience, and as a shelter during the hurricane months now apjDroaching. It appears to have been entirely unoccupied by the Spaniards, and not defended in any way, and Vernon sailed into it with his whole force on the 13th July 1741. This consisted of (51 sail in all, and comprised 9 sail of the line and 12 frigates and smaller vessels,* * lie had sent home 11 sail of the line under Lestock, and had left 9 sail of the line at Port Royal, G to protect Kingston, and 3 to follow him when they were ready. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 347 with transj)orts containing the 3,000 men remaining of the army, and 1,000 negro troops which had been raised in Jamaica. Three days were spent in getting the flotilla up the harbour, collecting information, and in placing six sail of the line across the entrance to secure it against any attack from the sea ; and in arrangmg Sir Chaloner Ogle's division and the frigates to block the entrance to St. Jago, and to watch the motions of the Spanish fleet at Havannah.''^ Then on July 20th 1741, a council of war decided to begin the reduction of the Island of Cuba by the proposed attack overland upon St. Jago. The landing was quickly and easily effected, and advanced posts were occupied on the road to St. Jago, which had been, on good evidence, considered not only practicable but convenient for the march. On the 28th of July this advanced guard had reached the village of Elleguava with scarcely a sign of opposing forces. Major Dunster, who was conducting the advance, then returned to a station which he had left occupied, and now, on the 2nd August, found to be held by some 500 men under Colonel Cochrane. It is unaccountable that at this juncture, when there seems on the record nothing whatever to have prevented the advance and com- pletion of the design, Colonel Cochrane should have taken his troops back to the main camp under Wentworth, and that on the 9th of August a council of war of the land oflncers should have decided " that they could not march any body of their troops far- ther into the country without exposing them to certain ruin ; and that they were firmly of opinion that their advancing with the army to St. Jago in their present circumstances was impracticable.^'t As the decision was in the hands of the land officers, the Admiral and the naval officers, whatever they may have thought, and how- ever they may have chafed at this second failure of the troops to complete what had been well begun, could not controvert it. But Vernon was not yet prepared to give up all hopes, and on the 4th September, leaving the troops in camp, he proceeded himself by • " As the security of the army and all the transports depended upon the squadron being in a condition to defend the harbour from any surprise on them, which was to be dreaded, as the Spaniards had so atronj? a force so near to them at the Havannah, Vice-Admiral Vernon, therefore, took the safest and most prudent precautions for their security, by forming the best dispositions with his six capital ships in a line, to defend the entrance to Cumberland Harbour" (so re-named by Vernon), "having dispatched the other part of the squadron to block up the harbour of St. Jago, and to watch the motions of the Spanish Admiral at the Havannah." — Entick, p. 761, t Ibid., p. 762. 348 NAVAL WARFARE. sea to St. Jago, in order to ascertain if it were possible to force the entrance with his ships. He ascertained, however, that it was a matter of warping in one ship at a time, and only with considerable difficulty, under the immediate fire of the batteries. He also found that there was neither anchorage nor landing-place near the mouth of the harbour. Eeluctantly he had to admit that approach in this way was hopeless. Nevertheless, he seems to have been so pressing upon General Wentworth to keep the hold they had got on Cuba, that it was not till November that he consented to re-embark the troops, and it was not till the 28th of that month that the expedi- tion quitted the ambitiously new-named Cumberland Bay. In looking back, we can see that Vernon, so far from deserving the slurs that were cast upon his name for apparent want of activity and for over-caution, was really exceedingly rash in his operations against Cuba, if he supposed it possible that de Torres, with his fleet from Havanna, was capable of taking the advantage offered to him. For while de Torres presumably had a compact force of 12 sail of the line in one body, Vernon's force was divided into three sections not exceeding 6 sail of the line each. He there- fore — if he ran any risks at all from Spanish movements — ran the greatest risk of being destroyed piecemeal by de Torres falling suddenly on Ogle at sea, defeating him by overwhelming superiority of numbers, and then blocking up Vernon in Cumberland Bay, while the military forces of Cuba gathered round him on the land side, and cut off his communication with the outer world entirely. It seems most probable that the Admiral and his naval surround- ings had by this time come to the conclusion that there was in no case much to be feared from the activity of the Spanish Admiral. On the face of the records I am using, the whole blame of these failures must rest on the shoulders of General Wentworth, though how much of this officer's shortcomings were due to the effect on his temper of Vernon's impetuosity and probably dictatorial man- ner, may be open to argument. Certainly the " conditions " under which these failures took place were more personal than material.* * Vernon asked to be recalled on his return to Jamaica, " under his dailj^ prayers for a deliverance from a gentleman whose opinions he had long experienced to be more changeable than the moon, though he had endeavoured, agreeable to his orders, to maintain the most civil correspondence in his power with General Wentwoi'th." Campbell, vol. iv., p. 490. 349 CHAPTER XVI. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the Sea Succeed or Fail — continued. Commerce suffers when territorial attacks are in progress. — The policy carried out in the West Indies, 1742. — The quarrels of joint commanders a fruitful cause of failure. — Knowles fails in his attacks on La Guaira and Porto Cavallo, 1743. — Successful attack on Louisbourg, 1745. — The causes of success usual. — Second successful attack in the same form on Louisbourg, 1758. — Peyton loses the command of the sea in the East Indies, Madras falls in consequence, 174G. — Attempted revival of cross-raiding at Cape Breton and L'Orient ; failure of both attempts, 174G. — The first capture of Minorca, 1756. — The siege and reliefs of Gibraltar, and fall of Jlinorca, 1780-81 and 1782. — Reflections. In considering the nature of the transactions in the West Indies which I described in the last chapter, it is proper to notice that while the navy was occupied in making territorial attacks, com- merce was suffering heavily. The result of the proceedings of 1741 was only, after all, to raise complaints in all the commercial centres of the kingdom. Petitions against the system of leaving commerce exposed poured in upon Parliament, and London, Bristol, Exeter, Glasgow, Liverpool, Lancaster, Bideford, South- ampton, and other places remonstrated with the Commons on the small regard which had been paid to the defence of that on which the greatness and prosperity of the country in a large degree rested.* But the policy of carrying out attacks upon territory was con- tinued in the West Indies, and Wentworth's forces being augmented in January 1742 by the arrival at Jamaica of 2,000 newly-raised Marines, a project was considered of landing an army at Porto Bello, and marching across the isthmus to the capture and destruc- tion of Panama. The cross- counsels between the Admiral and the * Entick, p. 7G7. 350 NAVAL WARFARE. General remained in full force and delayed the departure of the fleet and troops. A tedious voyage supervened ; the passage, which should have occupied but eight days, covered three weeks, so that the ships did not anchor in Porto Bello harbour until March 28th. The preliminary landings to occupy the Custom House and other parts of the town were effected without difficulty, the mag- nates of the place making no objection when assured of protection. But on the 31st the Admiral received a memorandum from the land officers, declining to persevere in the enterprise and recom- mending its immediate abandonment. There was, therefore, no choice left, and the whole expedition returned to Jamaica, arriving there in the middle of May. By the 23rd of September Vernon had his wish in the arrival of letters recalling him and General Wentworth, but not before he had given some of his mind to the latter in an assurance "that to his inexperience, injudiciousness, and unsteady temper was principally owing His Majesty's affairs having prospered so ill in those parts."* It is clear that the failures I have narrated contain lessons for all time, in the conduct of joint naval and military expeditions such as those described. The Home Government read the lesson in one way, by giving Ogle, Vernon's successor, the absolute command of the Marines, and transferring them to the service of the fleet. But without going so far as to say that the Admiral should be given the supreme command, with power to over-ride the decisions of the land officers, it is plain that in this case Wentworth ought never to have been left in command for a moment after such incompati- bilities of temper between the Admiral and the General had been shown as to render it probable that cordiality could not exist in carrying out the service. This remains plain, because there was never the least sign of failure on the part of the navy, which had done everything that was possible, both before and after the arrival of General Wentworth, and because in joint attacks the army must be considered an instrument in the Admiral's hands. Not indeed so as to give the Admiral a power of interference for which his education does not fit him, but as a something which cannot use the fleet, but can be used by the fleet. To put the matter gravely but firmly, it seems plain that had Vernon possessed the power of suspending Wentworth, the mistakes and shortcomings indicated would never have occurred. On the other hand, it seems obvious • Entick, p. 773. i ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 351 that had Wentworth possessed the power of superseding Vernon, there was no probability that matters would have been bettered. There is but little chance that any such powers would be conferred on either officer in great undertakings; but it behoves Government, without further inquiry, to remove a General in a joint expedition the moment it is seen that he cannot cordially support the Admiral.* In the absence of naval force, the Spaniards, from Fort St. Augustine in Florida, projected and carried out in June 1742 an invasion of the newly-settled colony of Georgia. Thirty-six trans- ports conveyed 4,000 troops, which were landed at St. Simons and marched upon Frederica ; but General Oglethorpe, the governor, made so good a show of defence that the Spaniards hastily returned to their ships and re-embarked. In February 1743, Captain Knowles, at Jamaica, was placed in command of 5 sail of the line, 1 frigate, and 3 sloops, with orders to proceed to Antigua, there to pick up 1 40-gun and 1 20-gun ship, and to make an attempt to reduce La Guaira and Porto Cavallo (Puerto Cabello) on the Caraccas coast of South America. Captain Knowles had not been present at the capture of Porto Bello, but he had arrived there shortly afterwards, and had been specially em- ployed in engineering the destruction of the forts. Afterwards he had been in a sense Vernon's right-hand man in planning the attacks upon Chagres and Cartagena ; he was also well acquainted with the coast. The selection was not, therefore, a random one, and what afterwards happened cannot properly be set down to the choice of the commander. The only troops he was furnished with, beside his Marines, were 400 men of Dalzell's regiment. He arrived within sight of La Guaira on February 18th. There was a considerable swell, which prevented any landing of men, and the ships could not be brought nearer than within a mile of the town. The attack, therefore, was no more than a distant bom- bardment, a form which had succeeded, indeed, at Chagres, but which, in tracing the history of attacks on territory to this point, we have seen no reason to put much faith in. It was said also that the Governor of the Caraccas had been in some way warned of the intended attacks, and had made considerable preparations for resistance. The fire began at noon and continued till night. The British had succeeded in blowing up one of the enemy's * These observations have no reference to those great undertaking?, like the invasions of the Crimea and Egypt, where any landings or attacks on ports are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. 352 NAVAL WARFARE. magazines certainl}^ but four of Knowles' line-of-battle ships were so disabled that they had to be sent to Curacoa to repair ; the Suffolk received 140 shot, and 92 men and officers were killed, and 308 wounded/'' As I have just observed, the causes of this repulse and loss were on the surface. Sir Chaloner Ogle and Captain Knowles ought never to have had any hopes of success in a form of attack which was supported simply by what had happened at Chagres as a very exceptional case. Warned by his failure, Knowles proceeded differently in his attack on Porto Cavallo. The place was known to be in a good state of defence, and garrisoned by some 5,500 men of various classes. Knowles procured the reinforcement of some Dutch volunteers, and proposed to make up a landing party in the usual way, covered by the fire of a detachment of his ships. He arrived near the place on April 15th, and anchored in or near Borburata Harbour, then called " The Keys of Barbarat." Com- modore Knowles, in reconnoitring the defences, observed that the entrance to the harbour was blocked by a ship moored there, from which chains extended to either shore. New fascine batteries were erected in suitable places, and the centre of the defence was the Castle of St. Philip, afterwards called Fort Libertador. On Point Brava were two new fascine batteries, one mounting 12 guns and the other 7, and Knowles determined to make these his objective, in hopes that they might be taken in flank, and their guns turned against the castle. Accordingly a landing party of 1,200 men was prepared, and two ships were sent in to engage and, if possible, to silence the two batteries. When night fell, the batteries were pretty well silenced, and the men were landed on the beach to the eastward, and marched along the shore towards Point Brava, the Commodore in his boat proceeding side by side with them. They took one of the batteries completely by surprise, but the alarm being given and some guns fired by the Spaniards, the mixed party which was landed immediately fell into confusion and panic, fired into each other's ranks, and fled along the beach to the boats in hopeless disorder. This unexpected failure determined the Com- modore to fall back on a general bombardment. It was carried out from about eleven in the forenoon of April 24th till dark, when the ships, having expended nearly all their ammunition and received considerable damage, returned to their anchorage at Borburata * Entick, p. 78G. ATTACKS ON TEUUITOHY FROM THE SEA. 353 Harbour. On the 28th it was conckided that no farther attempts on the place were likely to succeed, the squadron was broken up and the ships dispersed to their several stations. The causes of the failure at Porto Cavallo are not more difficult to seek than those which governed the repulse from La Guaira. The original attack was in the form which experience had shown to be best calculated for success, and had the party of 1,200 men landed been a homogeneous body of disciplined troops, there might have been every hope of a good result. But composed as it was of seamen, soldiers, and Dutchmen, acting together for the first time, it was not surprising that it should have fallen into confusion and panic in contact with an enemy in the dark. There was, as we have seen, no real reason to expect success from the general bom- bardment that afterwards, followed. As illustrating the strategical law that nothing but naval force will prevent attacks upon territory, for the reasons set out with so much force and clearness by Sir Walter Raleigh, we have it noted"" that the withdrawal of the usual station ships from the British Leeward Islands for these attacks on the Spanish Main, encouraged the Spanish privateers to push beyond their usual function of cap- turing merchant ships, and to land plundering parties on the Island of St. Christopher's. War having been declared against France in 1744, and there being no naval force to prevent it, the French garrison of Cape Breton made a successful raid on Nova Scotia, and captured Canso. But the arrival of a single British 40-gun ship seems to have put a termination to any farther designs of this kind by the French. In the West Indies both sides remained on the defensive so far as territorial attacks went, the British awaiting reinforcement before anything could be undertaken. By the year 1745 plans had been arranged between the American Colonies and the Home Government for retaliation on Cape Breton. The former furnished the troops to the number of 3,850 volunteers, with 85 transports, 8 20-gun privateers, and 10 smaller vessels ; these assembled at Boston and proceeded to Canso, in Nova Scotia, to await the covering squadron of 4 line-of-battle and other ships under Commodore Warren. On the 28th April the whole force arrived in Gabarus Bay, to the south-westward and within four miles of the fortifications of Louisbourg. The troops were immediately landed, being covered from the attack of a detachment sent to resist the landing by the * Entick, p. 787, note. 23 354 NAVAL WARFARE. fire of some of the lighter vessels. The troops now marched chrectly on Louisbourg, while Warren blocked the entrance to the harbom- and cut off all chance of remforcement and supply, cap- turing on this service many store-ships and one French line-of- battle ship, which was loaded with military stores.* Warren had been joined by three more sail of the line, and was thus an absolute master of the sea. The land forces making successful progress with full supplies coming to them from Gabarus Bay, Warren determined to push in upon the harbour, and for that purpose made arrangements for a sudden storming of the Island battery. The boats were caught in a dense fog on the first attempt, and were obliged to desist after alarming a garrison said to consist of only fourteen men. Before a second attack could be made, the French had so largely reinforced the Island battery that when the operation was attempted the British were beaten off with severe loss. A single night's work, however, sufficed to erect a battery near the * Entick gives the following description of Louisbourg at the time: — " The port of Louisbourg, or English harbour, is but a league distant by sea from the Bay of Ga- barus, and one of the best in all America ; being about four leagues in circumference, and having in every part of it seven fathoms water. The anchorage is good, and ships may run ashore on the sands without danger. The entrance is not above 400 yards broad, between two small isles, and is known twelve leagues off at sea by the Cape of Larembec (? Loran Head), which lies a little to the N.E. In the N.E. part of the harbour was a fine careening wharf for men-of-war to heave down, and very safe from all winds. On the opposite shore were the fishing stages, with room for 2,000 boats, to make their fish ; and on the starboard side of the harbour, going in, was a light- house, on a high rocky point, which might be distinguished on a clear night five leagues off at sea. The city was built on a point towards the sea, on the south side of the harbour, and was improved with fortifications that cost upwards of two millions of livres in building. The streets are regular and broad, principally composed of stone houses, with a spacious citadel on the western part of the town, near the ramparts, erected for the securit}' of the land side. . . . The greatest extent of the city is from the citadel to the eastern gate, called the Duke de Penthievre, which is more than half a mile ; and to walk round all the ramparts, mounted with heavy cannon, was at least two miles and a quarter. The road from the town to the country is by the western gate, over a drawbridge, where was a circular battery of 16 guns, 24-prB. , seated on and commanding the upper part of the harbour. Between this and the eastern gate was the Iron battery, mounting 30 guns. Opposite to this was the Grand battery of 35 42-prs., which commanded both the entry and all the bay; and at the mouth of the harbour was the Island battery, of 34 42-prs. The walls, ramparts, and bastions of the city, had 148 embrasures, though only 64 cannon were mounted ; but there were 10 mortars of 13-in. boi'c, and 6 of 9-in. ; and the garrison consisted of 1,200 regular soldiers, under the command of M. Chambon. But the fortifications on the land side were not entirely finished at the time of the siege, there being no out- works, glacis, or covered way. Besides, though the bastions and curtains were of masonry to the summit, which was 36 feet above the field, yet these, and the quoins and embrasures were cemented with such indifferent mortar that they were unable to resist the fury of a strong and continual battery." P. 803, note. "M -0 '^^^^oa,e P' ;> ■IV 1857-8. SKETCH PLAN . OF LOUISBITRG. JSei Milt ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 355 lighthouse, which commanded both the Island battery and the entrance to the harbour, and was of the greatest service to the besiegers. Meantime, the failing ammunition and stores of the British were replenished from over sea to Gabarus Bay, and news of further reinforcements to arrive immediately was received, side by side with intelligence that the French squadron at Brest intended for the relief of the place was masked by a sufficient British naval force. On the other hand, the command of the sea by their enemy was bringing distress to the besieged. Deserters told the English commanders of great shortness of food and ammunition, while four ships carrymg relief were captured by Commodore "War- ren's ships. His naval force was again reinforced, so that by June 11th he was at the head of 4 60-gun, 1 50-gun, and 5 40-gun ships, beside a crowd of smaller vessels. The fire was constant from all the British batteries, and by the 14tli prepara- tions for a general assault were nearly completed, when on the 15th the governor offered to capitulate, and terms being arranged, the French flag was struck on the 17th, and the British entered into possession. The siege had lasted 47 days, during which time 9,000 shot and 600 shell had been fired into the place, causing a loss to the garri- son of 240 killed, while the loss to the besiegers was only 100. The capture of the place is one of the best examples of successful co-operation between land and sea forces, each confining itself to its normal sphere of action. Its plan was, indeed, of the essence of all the teaching of naval war, and is in some sort paralleled by the more modern instance of Sevastopol, with the substantial difference that the Crimean port received supplies overland which were denied to Louisbourg. It will be observed that Vernon's plan of attack on St. Jago de Cuba was identical with that adopted against Louisbourg, where an undefended port was seized as a base for the land forces to act from, and the fleet operated doubly, as keeping communication open to that base, and closing the sea communications of the place to be attacked. To a certain extent we are also reminded of the operations of the Federals against the Confederate port of Charleston, and of the admitted mistake which was there made of bringing the fleet itself into contact with bat- teries and works, instead of reaching them through land forces supplied from the sea. The clear necessity that there should be command of the sea on the side of the attackhig party is well demonstrated by the opera- 23 * 356 NAVAL WARFARE. tions against Louisbourg. Had the squadrons destined to relieve the place not been masked by a British force off Brest, the mere fear of its approach would have paralyzed Commodore Warren's arrangements, and the care that was taken to reinforce him showed a consciousness of the fact on the part of the British Government. It is evident that had a superior French naval force arrived, Warren must either have abandoned the troops landed altogether, or else he would himself have been shut up with them in Gabarus Bay, to be besieged in turn by the garrison of Louisbourg. This place was given back to the French at the peace of Aix-la- Chapelle, but in 1758 it was again attacked by the British under Admiral Boscawen for the sea, and Generals Amherst and AVolfe for the land forces. The method pursued was identical with that of thirteen years before. The assemblage and landing was in Gabarus Bay, and Boscawen acted as Warren had done. The only differences were that the landing was opposed by troops covered by some works, and that there being line-of-battle and other ships in the harbour, the French took some of them to block the entrance, and Boscawen carried two others in a boat attack. The landing began on June 2nd, 1758, and the place surren- dered on July 17th, the siege having thus lasted within two days of the term occupied in the former siege. As in 1745, the garrison of 1758 had hoped vainly for relief from the sea, which was, as before, stopped by the British on the coast of France. But things had gone farther this year than in 1745. Boscawen sailed from England with his expedition on the 19th of February. On the 11th of March Hawke sailed with 7 sail of the line and 3 frigates, with the direct purpose of destroying in Aix Koads the very reliefs which M. de Drucourt, the Governor of Louisbourg, had hoped might reach him. He drove the 5 sail of the line there on shore and forced them to throw overboard their guns and stores in order to escape him.'^ It had been intended to attack Louisbourg the year before, but the presence of 18 French sail of the line in those waters effec- tually barred all attempts of the kind. So it may be said that the fall of Louisbourg was brought about by Hawke in 1758, as it had been by Martin in 1745, neither officer quitting Europe, but opera- ting to maintain the British command of the sea at Cape Breton.f * Schombcrg, vol. i. , p. 313. Lapcyrouse, vol. ii., p. 437. Troude, vol. i., p. 369. f In May, however. Count DucliafTault got away from Aix Roads, with 5 sail of the line, bound for Louisbourg via Martinique. Ho heard of the fall of the place there. Boscawon's force was 23 sail of the lino, 11 frigates, and 7 smaller vessels. The troops ATTACKS ON TERUITORY FROM THE SEA. 357 As bearing on the question of the actual vahie of fortification in naval warfare, it is worthy of remembrance that in 1760 Cap- tain Byron was directed to destroy the Louisbourg fortifications, and that they lay in ruins ever afterwards, although the place never again passed out of our hands. The withdrawal by Warren of most of the ships from the Leeward Islands left the sea there indifferent, and the arrival of the Chevalier de Caylus (or Cheylus) with a squadron put the command of the sea into the hands of the French and raised much alarm amongst the English Islands. He made no attempt on any territory however, except on the little island of Anguilla, which the garrison successfully defended. Territorial attacks in the West Indies may be said to have been abandoned almost entirely by both sides during the remainder of the war. As will be shown presently, the defence of British possessions on the other side of the Atlantic were really effected in Europe. But it may be mentioned that in 1748 Port Louis (Hispaniola) was added to the scanty list of places which surrendered to simple bombardment by ships. The batteries defending the place mounted 78 guns, and Eear-Admiral Knowles brought 8 sail of the line, showing a broadside of 257 guns, within pistol-shot of them, and continued to fire upon them for three hours, after which the place capitulated, the British losing 70 in killed and wounded.* Admiral Knowles seems to have held, in sj)ite of his experiences as a captain under Vernon and after, a greater faith in the direct attack of ships than most of his contemporaries. He proposed to attack St. Jago de Cuba directly, by ships forcing the entrance, a method which was not thought practicable by Vernon. Captain Dent, the officer placed in command of the ships intended for this service, observing a boom across the entrance and ships within it placed to oppose, did not think it prudent to make any attack. He was afterwards tried l)y court-martial for this failure, but was " most honourably acquitted. "f Al)0ut the year 1745 naval rivalries began to spring up in the East Indies, which l)rought into play the principles of naval war- fare in regard to territorial attacks which had hitherto been ex- emplified most perfectly in the West Indies. The French had not were 14,000. Lapoyroiise, vol. ii., j). 439. Troude, vol. i. , p. i?o2. Schombcrg, vol. iv., p. 20."). * It is generally to bo noted that war-ships have always been credited with greater ))0wcr8 against forts when it was possible to close with them. The inamensc numerical superiority of guns sometimes possible under such condition is here well oxemplitied. f Schomberg, vol. i., p. 250. 358 NAVAL WARFARE. as yet maintained si.ny squadron in those waters, but in order to counterbalance the British force of four sail of the line and two smaller ships under Commodore Barnet, which had been sent thither, the French Government commissioned Commander de la Bourdonnais, Governor of Mauritius and Bourbon, to make up a squadron out of the ships belonging, to the French East India Com- pany, and to operate against the English. In May 1746 La Bourdonnais was on the coast of Coromandel with 1 72-gun ship and 8 frigates of from 30 to 38 guns. Barnet had in the meantime died, and the British command descended to Captain Peyton. There was an engagement of a partial character between the two forces on June 25th, but the result was to make the British abandon all idea of further encounters, and to send the squadron to the north- ward, leaving Madras entirel}^ open to attack. La Bourdonnais arrived before the place with a considerable body of troops. These were landed south of the town, and pro- ceeded to invest it on the land side, while the French squadron prevented any relief arriving b}^ sea. Madras was in no condition to offer defence to such an attack, and it capitulated in a few days. The tactics of this attack were what we have seen usually pre- cedent to success ; the only note proper to make is that La Bour- donnais had become confident of his command of the sea from his experience of the British commander. We may fairly infer that Peyton was no strategist of the Torrington school, and was not aware that La Bourdonnais could have done nothing, if the British, doubtful of their superiority in action, had kept in a position of observation, and not attacked at all. Peyton having attacked, and having shown clearly by his conduct that he felt himself unable to make a second attempt. La Bourdonnais was justified in assuming that he had the command of the sea.''' Besides this, it must be remembered that Pej^ton had run away to leeward, and by so much deprived himself of any chance of inter- fering. And again, Madras being an open roadstead, the ships not being specially concerned in the actual attack, were still in a position to meet a hostile fleet without necessarily compelling the land forces to abandon the enterprise. Moreover, it is to be sup- * Entick, p. 809, makes out that La Bourdonnais, before attacking ]\Iadras, had put Peyton to the test by firing on one of the Company's ships in the roads on August 18th, and then passing south to observe whether Peyton would return to defend the place. Also that he heard how Peyton, on receipt of this news, had disappeared from Pulical, a little to the northward. It was this, according to Entick, that determined La Bour- donnais to make his attack. De Lapeyrouse (vol. ii., p. 359), however, represents La Bourdonnais as always alarmed by the possible interference of Peyton. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 359 posed that even in this case the troops were not in special danger, being able to retreat on their base at Pondicherry. Rear-Admiral Boscawen had left England at the close of 1747 at the head of an expedition intended to reduce the islands of Mau- ritius and Bourbon, and afterwards to operate for the reduction of Pondicherr}'. The squadron anchored in Turtle Bay, Mauritius, but the reports were that success was not to be hoped for unless a harbour could be seized, and as the season pressed, Boscawen made sail for India. The balance of sea power had been reversed by the arrival early in 1747 of Commodore Griffin with 4 sail of the line and a 40-gun ship ; and Boscawen found himself in assured command of the sea, when at the head of 9 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and some smaller vessels, the troops were assembled at Fort St. Davids, and marched overland to the attack, while a detachment of the fleet in- vested the place by sea as usual. The march of 24 miles began on August 8th, and the siege went on till the 6th October, when failure in the attack was admitted, and the troops marched back to Fort St. Davids. This was the last operation in the East Indies during this war, and there is nothing to be noted about it but the general fact that though command of the sea is required before such an attack can be contemplated, success does not follow its attainment in unbroken sequence. But in the East Indies, as in the West, we see the same general law prevail. Command of the sea must be fought for if it is not admitted, and territorial attacks must cease while this process goes on. They cannot be undertaken at all while the command is in abeyance ; but after it is settled, the side that holds it inevitably pushes on to the attack of territory, when success is measured by the power and skilfulness of the attack ; the land forces undertaking the active work, while the sea forces support, cover, and supply them. Coming now to the proceedings at home, so far as they relate to the subject of this chapter, we have to note the beginnings of that deeper naval policy which proposes to guard our distant possessions and to strengthen our distant fleets, not directly and on the spot, but indirectly, and at home. The sources of all naval power are to be found in each nation in not more than two or three com- modious sea-ports, which a variety of circumstances have set apart for the purposes of war. In England there were the Thames and Medway, Portsmouth and Plymouth ; while France had Brest, Lorient, Rochefort and Aix Roads, and Toulon. Spain had 360 NAVAL WARFARE. FeiTol, Cadiz, and Cartagena. Everything that could command the sea came originally out of these ports, and simultaneously with the growing ability to watch them from the outside grew the conception that command of the sea off the coast of America and in the West and East Indies could be preserved by that process. Eeinforcements and supplies prepared at Brest might be inter- cepted in European waters by the superior naval power, and the distant British squadrons, though not directly strengthened, would be indirectly kept powerful by the enforced weakness of the enemy. So we have seen the French force, destined in 1745 to relieve Louisbourg, unable to sail from Brest, Vice- Admiral Martin with a more powerful squadron masking it. In 1747, again, reinforcements and supplies were prepared at Brest to wrest the command of the sea once more from the British in North American and East Indian waters. The British Government sent Anson with 14 sail of the line to intercept them. He met the whole force, amounting, with the transports and store-ships, to 38 sail, on May 3rd, N.W. of Cape Finisterre, and captured all of the men-of-war and many of the other ships. Later in the year, 8 sail of the line, with a convoy, were preparing in Aix Roads for the West Indies. Hawke, with 14 sail of the line, left England in August to intercept them, and he also was successful in meeting them off Cape Finisterre. The French had put to sea on the 6th October ; on the 14th they fell into Hawke's clutches, who carried 6 of the 8 line-of-battle ships to Spithead with him. Notwithstanding the proofs of the general impracticability of cross-raiding when the sea was other than strategically indifferent, which lay behind them in history, the French in 1745, amongst other plans for raising insurrection in favour of the Pretender, formed one of a secret and sudden invasion. The idea was to throw 10,000 troops on shore near Plymouth during a single night, and without any attempt at covering naval force. " But, after much pains had been taken and vast preparations made, it was discovered that it was impossible to transport such a body of troops into England whilst the English remained masters of the Channel." "^ In 1746, the French had their opportunity, and got out a great expedition for the recapture of Cape Breton, taking ad- vantage of the momentary concentration of British thought on a design for the capture of Quebec. A squadron of 10 sail of * Hervey, vol iv. , p. 2'J3. ATTACKS ON TERlUTOnY FROM THE SEA. 361 the line, with frigates and smaller vessels, and 78 transports carrying 3,500 troops, left Eochelle on the 22nd June, under com- mand of the Due d'Enville, bound for a rendezvous in the Bay of Chibouctou (Chedabucto), in the N.E. of Nova Scotia. There was no attempt to intercept this expedition in its complete state, though a blockade of St. Male, where the transports were prepared, de- layed their arrival at Brest from the date fixed, 1st March, to the 15th April. In consequence of this delay, the squadron, which ought to have been assembled in Aix Eoads early in April, did not arrive there till 17th May, and did not sail till 20th June, anchor- ing for a day at Eochelle before finally quitting France. It was only indirectly to British effort that the failure of this expedition was due. All went well with it till it sighted the coast of Nova Scotia. Then it was overtaken on 13th September by a southerly gale, accompanied by thick fog. By the 27th September only 7 sail of the line, 2 frigates, a fire-ship, a bomb-vessel, and 30 transports had succeeded in gaining the rendezvous. Then general sickness broke out in the ships ; the Duke died of apoplexy, and his successor, d'Estourmelles, in a fit of delirium, destroyed him- self, and in the end what was left of the expedition returned in a miserable and exhausted state to Brest.'" Meanwhile, in England, the expedition which had been prepared against Quebec was turned against Lorient. It sailed from Ply- mouth on 14th September, and consisted of 16 sail of the line, with 8 frigates, bomb-ketches, store-ships, and 30 transports carrying 6 battalions of land troops, with " matrosses and bombardiers," in all 5,800 men. The sea commander was Admiral Lestock, who had been tried and acquitted by court-martial four months earlier for misconduct in Mathews's action ; the general was Sinclair. The troops were landed in Quimperle Bay, a few miles from Lorient, on 20th September, and marched next day upon the place. It immediately ofi'ered to surrender on terms, but these were re- jected, and a very ineffective and ill-arranged siege began. Lestock had intended to bring some of his ships up to take part in the operations, but subsequently changed his mind. Then followed a long story, comprising councils of war, references to the opinion of the engineers, shortness of ammunition, fatigues, sickness, and indiscriminate blame-throwing, after which Sinclair determined that the capture of the place was impracticable, and the troops were re-embarked without interruption, after being a week on shore. * Entick, p. 812 ; Schomberg, vol. i. , p. 231 ; Troude, vol. i., p. 309 ; Lapeyrouse, vol. ii., p. 297. 362 NAVAL WARFARE. Yet they left behind them several guns and mortars and much ammunition and stores.* It is not at all difficult to draw the lesson from these varied events of 1746. Most probably they were drawn by the Govern- ment, and the intercepting attacks of Anson and Hawke next year were the consequences. I have said that the British only contri- buted indirectly to the French failure on the other side of the Atlantic. But they did contribute, by the six weeks' delay which the watch upon St. Malo enforced. It is clear that an expedition which had to be collected at St. Malo, Brest, Aix Roads, and Piochelle, before it was in a state to sail finally, was entirely at the mercy of a superior and alert naval force. There was ample opportunity for falling on it as it collected, as well as when it finally put to sea. Probably the fact that superior force was hovering near might have stopped the sailing altogether, as it had done before. But the English Government was losing sight of the principles of war. It could not properly have thought of the capture of Quebec, if France was at the same time in a position to think of recapturing Louisbourg. If it contemplated an attack on Lorient, it should not have waited, as possibly it did, for the absence of the Brest fleet on the other side of the Atlantic. The sack of Lorient on one side and the loss of Cape Breton on the other was like an exchange of bishops in a game of chess. Bad play, unless there was an object behind it. If England was not strong enough to mask d'Enville's force in Brest, and to cover an attack on Lorient at the same time, she should not have contem- plated the latter. France on her side had no prudence in ofl'ering Lorient to sack for the sake of recovering Cape Breton. My historians say that the detention of the Quebec expedition, which became the Lorient expedition, was not explained. t Probably the Government became aware of its original strategical error when too late, and made the attack on Lorient as a sort of reprisal for the loss of Cape Breton, which it thereby discounted. The special tempta- tion, beside the sacking of a place which was the entrepot of East Indian wealth, was the notion of raising the French Protestants of Rochelle to rebellion, an idea which alone gave it any legiti- macy as an operation of war under the conditions. Having now reached the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and having traced closely through so many chapters, and with so few omissions, the history of naval warfare so far as it concerns attacks upon * Entick, p. 812; Lapeyrouse, vol. ii., p. 308. IbiiK, p. 811 ; Hervey, vol. ir., p. 302. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 363 territory carried out from the sea, I do not think it will be neces- sary to pursue that plan further. It was expedient to continue it for some time, in order to show that the excej^tions to rule were few and far between. Eule being now in a sense established, I shall content myself with sketching rapidly some of the more prominent and remarkable illustrations of those parts of it which we have seen in operation, so long as the wind was the motive power of ships, and then proceed shortly to examine what history tells us as to the continuance or otherwise of those rules when steam has become the propulsive power, and brought in its train various other new elements. We come first to the French attack on and ultimate capture of Minorca, an enterprise set on foot by the French before the declaration of war in 1756. In the spring of the year there were 12 sail of the line ready at Toulon, and two or three English at Port Mahon or Gibraltar under Commodore Edgecumbe. By the 10th of April the Marquis de la Gallisonniere, at the head of 12 sail of the line, 6 frigates, and 150 transports, was anchored in Hyeres Eoads, and nearly ready to put to sea. In the transports 15,000 troops were embarked under the command of the Due de Richelieu. In two days the expedition put to sea, and on the 18th the ships anchored before Ciudadela in the Island of Minorca. The English Government had been much more alive to the preparations for invasion understood to be in progress by France as a suitable means of declaring war, than they were to the nearer danger. They had plenty of advices through and from Germany, warning them of what was intended, but it was not till the 6th of April that Admiral Byng left St. Helen's with 10 sail of the line under orders to relieve Minorca if he should find it attacked. Even then the number and the bad condition of the ships showed that Government had no knowledge of the real strength of the French expedition. They got news of its sailing and of its force at the same time, under date April 18th, from Captain Hervey of the Phomix at Villa Franca. Captain Hervey informed the Govern- ment that General Blakeney, in command at Minorca, had collected about 5,000 troops and labourers inside Fort St. Philip, and was preparing for full resistance, which Captain Hervey thought he would be able to prolong until the arrival of Byng's relieving force. Later accounts, of the 21st April, direct from Minorca, soon after reached the Government. The French had landed on the 18th, and had at once possessed themselves of Ciudadela, from 364 NAVAL WARFARE. which the EngKsh garrison retired. The main body of the army was preparing to invest Fort St. Philip, while detachments were to advance on the town of Mahon, and the fleet was to block up the port by sea. Eichelieu met with no difficulties. The whole enterprise had been arranged and was being carried out on the Louisbourg pattern, and, saving relief from the sea, was as certain of success. Mahon was occupied without a shot having been fired. Fort St. Charles, on the north side of the harbour was attacked from seaward by boats and small vessels specially brought from Toulon. But Fort St. Philip was held to rival Gibraltar in strength, its garrison of Sketch Map of MINORCA IN 1812 Scale of Miles ? ;??■;» S regular troops was said to be from 2,500 to 3,000 men, and there was a general belief in England that it would hold out till Byng arrived, and that all would then be well. No doubt the French were running risks. If Fort St. Philip could hold out till Byng appeared, and if Byng should be even no more than a match for La Gallisonniere, the least they could suffer would be the loss of their whole army. And they had no sufdcient reason to believe that their 12 sail of the line could by any possibility be more than a match for the 13 sail of the line which they probably now knew that Byng would bring against them. It was a greater risk than was justified. The proper course would have been to threaten Minorca, and then to ATTACKS OX TEBRITOliY FROM THE SEA. 365 beat the fleet sent to relieve it ; after which Minorca would fall as a matter of course, without any risk of losing an army. Byng arrived at Gibraltar on May 2nd, heard from Edgecumbe the state of affairs at Minorca, joined to his own 10 sail the Commodore's 3, and sailed from Gibraltar on the 8th of May. On the 19th of May the French army had been just a month landed on the island, and La Gallisonniere, seeing Byng's fleet, sent on shore to borrow 450 men from the army to strengthen his crews. The next day the battle, which cost Byng his cruel con- demnation and death, took place. La Gallisonniere had proved more than a match for Byng, just as La Bourdonnais had proved more than a match for Peyton in another quarter of the world ten years before. Byng sailed away for Gibraltar, leaving Minorca to its fate, just as Peyton had sailed away towards Calcutta, leaving Madras to its fate. And on May 30th General Blakeney capitulated, as there was nothing else that he could do. The lesson, and the rule of war, here lie on the surface again. The fate of a garrison open to attack from a commanded sea is certain if the attack be made properly and with adequate force. It may be postponed by the employment of that citadel form of for- tification of which I have spoken in former chapters, and the more impregnable the citadel, the longer will be the delay before the place falls. But if the attacking force is sufficient and properly used, the citadel will be fully invested, and the fact that it is surrounded by water on one side does not affect its position. Commodore Edgecumbe had 3 sail of the line under his command ; if he had had 12, the idea of an attack on Minorca could not have been entertained at all. But, on the other hand, the fact that Fort St. Philip was so strong enabled Byng to come in sight of it while the English flag was still flying. Had there been no fortifi- cation, Minorca would have succumbed to a much smaller force long before any relief from England could have reached it. But again, it has to be noted that the French might have ravaged and destroyed everything on the island out of range of the guns of St. Philip, and then have sailed away again long before any relief could have appeared. Minorca, like Louisbourg after its first capture, passed back by the treaty of peace into the hands from which it had been wrested in war. Like Louisbourg it was destined to be a second time attacked by the power in command of the sea, to fall a second time, and not again during the war to come back to the hands which only from want of command of the sea had failed to hold it. 366 NAVAL WARFARE. In 1780, 1781, and 1782, the pressure on the resources of the United Kingdom in defending herself against France and Spain in alhance with her revolted colonies, while attempting to recover lost ground and to prevent revolt spreading farther, strained them near to breaking point.* Her possessions were attacked in the East and West Indies, and in the Mediterranean simultaneously^ The Mediterranean Sea at that time was of least importance to her, and she gave up all idea of maintaining her command there, not by choice, but by necessity. Her two possessions in those waters, Gibraltar and Minorca, were in no way necessary to her defence, unless that defence was trans- ferred to the shores of France and Spain. It may now be a question whether the East and West Indies could not have been better defended in Europe than they could possibly be in those distant waters ; and whether prevention would not have been better than cure. But the choice was made the other way, and it left the fortresses of Gibraltar and of St. Philip in Minorca a drag on resources to which they contributed nothing. They were useful only as bases and depots for operations, either active or passive, carried on against the coasts of France and Spain. If there were no such operations, Gibraltar and Minorca were for the time a trouble and a nuisance only. But they were great posts, strongly fortified and garrisoned ; the loss of either of them would not only seriously affect the prestige of the nation, and encourage her * The following table exhibits with fair accuracj' the distribution of our line-of-battle ships in 1778, 1779. 1780, 1781 and 1782. The stations were so continually exchang- ing their forces, and ships attending convoys passing and repassing so frequently, that no list would be absolutely correct which did not refer to a particular day : — Home West North Mediter- East Total. Waters. Indies. America. ranean. Indies. 1778 Summer 48 14 12 I 2 77 ,, Winter 43 23 11 2 1 80 1779 Summer 43 30 10 2 8 93 ,, Winter 42 30 10 2 8 92 1780 Summer 43 33 17 2 7 102 „ Winter 35 50 14 7 107 1781 Summer 39 44 19 12 115 ,, Winter 38 52 14 14 119 1782 Summer 35 59 12 22 129 ,, Winter 29 49 26 22 127 Notwithstanding these evidently gigantic efforts we were almost everywhere met by equal forces of the enemy, and often had to retire before superior force, while we lost besides our American Colonies, the Islands of Grenada, Tobago, St. Christopher's, Jklonserrat and Minorca, and surrendered Trincomalee. ATTACKS OX TElUilTORY FROM THE SEA. 367 enemies, but would to some extent render more difficult any transfer of the seat of war to Mediterranean coasts. Of the two places, Minorca was by far the most important. Gibraltar never had been, and never could be, so good a base to operate from as Minorca. Geographically it was too far from the French coast, while Minorca was placed nearly midway between Toulon and Cadiz. The anchorage at Gibraltar was contracted and detestable. Ships could not water there, and possible wharf space was very confined. It was attackable by land, and might be captured by land forces without the necessity of any covering navy. Minorca, on the other hand, possessed one of the finest harbours in the world. It was impossible to attack it by land forces alone unless the command of the sea were first assured. It was capable of i)ro- ducing much that was wanted for the refreshment and supply of ships' companies, exhausted and worn by watching enemy's ports. But unquestionably the prestige belonged to the least worthy place — Gibraltar. Minorca had passed mto and out of our hands, and it and we were used to it. True, the loss of it had led to the death of a great commander by the hands of the executioner, but then Gibraltar had never yet been successfully attacked. However narrow the issue had been, naval force had always appeared in time to prevent the final catastrophe. The habit of defending Gibraltar had been formed, that of defending Minorca had not been formed. Probably a great deal more money had been spent on the local defences of Gibraltar than on those of Minorca, and quite possibly instinctive reasoning confused value and cost. Lastly Gibraltar could be relieved b}' a naval force which need not be absent from the English Channel for more than two months and a half.* A fleet relieving Minorca might expect to be absent twenty days longer. t All these things together tended to concentrate attention on Gibraltar as a place tliat might be saved, and to leave Minorca to the chapter of accidents. It was with no willingness that any piece of territory was to be parted with, but there was a dire necessity about it which had to be faced. Grenada in the West Indies had already gone. The newly restored port of Savannah, and province of Georgia, had been almost successfully attacked by forces under cover of the * The relieving fleet of 1780 left Portsmouth on 26th December 177D, and sailed from Gibraltar on February 13th 1780. The second relief sailed on March 13th 1781, and returned on May 21st. The third relief sailed on September 11th 1782, and returned Xovember 15th. t Byng, sailing from Gibraltar on May 8th, \¥as not off Port Mahon till the 19th. Lord St. Vincent, leaving Gibraltar on May 12th 1799, reached Minorca on May 20th. 368 NAVAL WAIIFARE. same French fleet which had covered the capture of Grenada, and successfully faced Admhal Byron afterwards. In the East Indies troubles had not yet come, but they were certain. At home a British line-of-battle ship had been captured in sight of Plymouth, and a 40-gun frigate in sight of Scarborough. Besides all this, towards the close of the year 1779, Gibraltar, invested by land and sea, was guarded from any relief by a Franco- Spanish fleet of 24 sail of the line to operate from Brest, and 35 sail of the line to operate from Cadiz. With the coolness and the boldness which then generally characterized the action of the nav}'-. Sir George Piodney was despatched from the Channel in the last days of December at the head of 15 sail of the line, escorting an immense convoy of troop- ships, store-ships, and victuallers, with directions to throw rein- forcements and supplies into Gibraltar and Minorca, and then to proceed to reinforce the British power in the West Indies with the greater part of his fleet. He had the fortune which favours the brave. Off Cape Finisterre he fell in with a great convoy of the enemy destined for Cadiz, and captured it. An opportune gale of wind had caused the separation of the Cadiz fleet, and left Don Juan de Langara off Cape St. Vincent with only 11 sail of the line. Piodney fell upon them and captured or destroj^ed all but four of them. The Brest fleet was too sluggish in its operations to thwart the briskness of Kodney, and he took his convoy and his prizes safe into Gibraltar Bay on January 27th. He at once passed his supplies into that fortress, and despatched those for Minorca under convoy of 3 line-of-battle ships." So Gibraltar, invested, and in considerable straits, was again free, and relieved of all immediate danger. Minorca was not as yet seriously threatened, and Kodney proceeded for the West Indies in the middle of February. It is not possible to say what might have now happened to Gibraltar, had the whole naval power of the enemy been launched and sustained against it. But no attempt of this kind was yet made. Other concerns, indeed, employed the naval enemy. In April, Don Josef Solano sailed with 12 line-of-battle ships, several frigates, and 83 transports, carrying 11,460 troops for the support of the allied power in the West Indies. The 31 sail of the line which still remained at Cadiz, contented themselves with making * Admiral Barcolo, who was blockading Gibraltar with 4 or 5 ships of the line, some frigates and a number of galleys and gun-boats, retired under the guns of Algeciras on Rodney's approach. 51? /Ilqeciras \ / J New Moie ^ ^-''.ii Town furopa Po/nt SK ETCH PLAN O F GIBRALTAR IN 16 12 Scale '..f Miles ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 369 cruises to the northward and westward, with the view of destroying British convoys, or possibly of intercepting relieving forces. On 18th July they were joined by 5 more French sail of the line, and on the 9th of August, this great force being at sea, captured, and afterwards carried into Cadiz, no less than 55 ships of British East and West Indiamen. But France was feeling that something bolder and more tren- chant than this waiting game was now within her power, and hoped that the assemblage at Cadiz, ostensibly acting against Gibraltar, might be turned against Jamaica. International jealousies brought the project to an end, and on the 3rd of January, 1781, the French squadron, now commanded by d'Estaing, and probably of 19 or 20 sail of the line, was back at Brest. The blockade of Gibraltar had been taken up by Don Barcelo again, the moment Bodney disappeared. Cordova was by way of preventing its second relief, with about 30 sail of the line at Cadiz. The only really active operations against the place were con- ducted on the land side by Mendoza, and these were pushed on with great vigour and perseverance. From the direct attack Gibraltar was suffering little ; from the sea blockade it was suffering much, and a second relief was arranged. On March 13th, 1781, Vice-Admiral Darby sailed from Spit- head with a convoy of 200 sail of victuallers and store-ships, nearly half of which were for the relief of Gibraltar, and of which the escort was no less than 29 sail of the line, with 12 frigates and small vessels. It was practically the whole of the home force, but nothing short of such a display could insure the safety of a fortress, so far impregnable to all but famine.* * "So early as the preceding month (October, 1780), their wary and provident governor found it necessary to make a reduction of a quarter of a pound from each man's daily allowance of bread. Their quantitj* of meat was likewise reduced to a pound and a half in the week ; and that became, latterly, so bad as to bo scarcely eatable. ... Of the most common and indispensable necessaries of life, bad ship biscuit, full of worms, was sold at p shilling a pound ; flour, in not much better con- dition, at the same price ; old dried pease at a third more ; the worst salt, half dirt, the sweepings of ships' bottoms and store-houses, at eighteenpence ; old Irish salt butter at half-a-crown ; the worst sort of brown sugar brought the same price ; and English farthing candles were sold at sixpence apiece. But fresh provisions bore still more exorbitant prices. Even when the arrival of vessels from the Mediterranean opened a market, turkeys sold at .£3 123. apiece ; sucking-pigs at two guineas; ducks at half a guinea; and small hens sold at nine shillings apiece. A guinea was refused for a calf's pluck, and £1 7s. asked for an ox-head. To heighten every distress, the firing was so nearly exhausted as scarcely to afiford a sufficiency for the most indispensable culinarj' purposes." — Annual Register for 1782, pp. 99-100. Beatson, vol. v., p. 337. 24 370 NAVAL WARFARE. Darby arrived off Gibraltar on April 12th, and the next day he sent in the victuallers and transports, of which he had 97, under the escort of a detachment of 4 sail of the line and some frigates under Sir John Lockhart Eoss ; 13 store-ships and victuallers, under convoy of 2 frigates, were at the same time sent on to Minorca. *' From the moment in which Admiral Darby's fleet came in sight of the fortress, the Spaniards opened all their batteries, hoping by their tremendous cannonade and bombardment to pre- vent the store-ships and victuallers from approaching the rock. Perhaps nothing more awfully loud was ever heard before. A hundred and seventy pieces of cannon and eighty mortars dis- gorging at once their horrid contents on such a narrow spot, made the beholders imagine that not the works only but the rock itself, was in danger of destruction. The enemy continued this astonish- ing fire, night and day, for a considerable time, without inter- mission ; and the garrison returned it with the most undaunted and persevering resolution."^ The chief work of the blockade had been carried on by means of gun-boats, under oars, of which the Spaniards had constructed a considerable number. During the continuance of the convoy in the bay, about 20 of these craft used to issue from Algeciras every morning, taking advantage of the early calm, and displayed the greatest and most successful audacity in attacking the convoy and its covering ships. But by the 19th of April all the store-ships were cleared, and the coal-ships sunk inside the Mole to be weighed when wanted, and the Admiral made sail for England. f Meantime the whole military power of Spain was concentrated on the isthmus which connects the rock of Gibraltar with the main- land, 170 guns of the largest calibre, and 80 mortars, protected by stupendous works, poured their fire into the place, hurting the actual works but little, but leaving the town a wreck and uninhabitable. It was computed by the garrison that in the first three weeks of this attack the Spaniards must have expended 100,000 lbs. of gunpowder and from 4,000 to 5,000 shot and shell in every twenty-four hours. But after discharging 75,000 shot and 25,000 shell at this rate, it was lowered to 600 projec- tiles a day, and so continued for several weeks. J But the loss to the garrison, on account of the protection afforded by case- mates, was small. From April 12th to the end of June only 53 * Boatson, vol. v., p. 344. t Jbid., vol. v., p. 348. t Annual Reyister, 1782, p. 104. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 371 officers and men were killed and 260 wounded. So the siege proceeded with great expenditure on the one side,* and, now that provisions abounded, little hurt on the other. But now, in despair with Spanish delays, as they appeared to France, the latter proposed a determined attack on Minorca. Spain agreed, and on June 23rd, 18 sail of the line, commanded by de Guichen, arrived at Cadiz from Brest, and were placed by their commander under the orders of Cordova. In a month, a combined Heet of 49 sail passed out of Cadiz, escorting an army of 10,000 men. On the 25th July Cordova, agreeably to his orders, detached the transports with the army, under convoy of 2 line-of- battle ships and some frigates, while he himself returned towards the entrance to the English Channel. The progress of the army and its escort was so slow that it only got sight of the island on the 18th August. The former landing, it may be remembered, had taken place at Ciudadela ; but it was now held that that was a blunder, as the garrison of the island were not taken by surprise, and had time to collect into the citadel of Fort St. Philip. The plan now was to land only a detachment at Ciudadela and to land the main body in two parts, one three or four miles to the north, and the other three or four miles to the south of Port Mahon.f So far as it was a surprise, the plan failed, for there was plenty of time to draw in most of the outlying garrisons and to secure a certain amount of provisions. But Fort St. Philip was securely invested by land and sea, and the Due de Crillon, who was in command of the Allies, leisurely sat down before it, sending to Barcelona for reinforcements and stores in order to press on the siege. Six thousand additional troops presently arrived from Toulon, and the total force ultimately employed came to 16,000 men, with 109 pieces of battering cannon and 36 large mortars. The opposing garrison was no more than about 2,700, all told. It was about half the strength necessary to man the works. The blockade of the harbour was not complete. It was so incomplete that, though the enemy was in possession of all its shores, General Murray, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, was able to send a detachment in boats by night to l^eat up the Due de Crillon's quarters at Mola. And the British Consul at Leghorn was able to pass several ships into Fort St. Philip with supplies, and even with recruits. • The estimated cost of the ammunition expended was £10,000 a day. t The spots are marked bj- crosses on the sketch plan. 24 * 372 NAVAL WARFARE . The enemy was so leisurely that he did not open his batteries till November 11th, after which date they kept up a heavy fire, without, however, at first doing much damage to the works. The garrison replied with spirit and success ; but it was evident that an end must come if no relief appeared from the sea. And no relief could come. Minorca, with only half, or less than half, the garrison of Gibraltar, and without its prestige, could not draw the whole of the English home fleet to its succour,"^ and nothing was left but to hold out as long as it was possible. Leaving a commanded sea behind him, and the investment and siege of Gibraltar and Fort St. Philip in serene and uninterrupted progress, Cordova consulted as to the feasibility of attacking Darby at anchor in Torbay. He had all the numerical superiority neces- sary, and only the prestige of the English navy prevented its being done. It is impossible to say what the tremendous historical consequences of such an attack might have been had it succeeded ; but it was so near that when de Guichen returned to Paris it was difiicult to preserve him from a mob, because he had not enforced the opinion in favour of an attack which he was known to hold. The Due de Crillon proceeded with the siege of Fort St. Philip. It was well provisioned with all that could be stored, and though the fire of the enemy was now beginning to tell, in injuring the works, dismounting the guns, and in one case destroying a great magazine of provisions, yet little impression was made on the strength or moral of the garrison so far. But scurvy began to show itself, and a closer sea blockade stopped the entry of fresh vegetables. The general health of the garrison began to fail, and the end drew nigh. Fever and dysentery set in above the scurvy, and the defenders were becoming hors de combat by the indirect, though not by the direct, efforts of the besiegers. But they held out. They died in the guard-rooms and on their posts as sentries, and by the beginning of February 1782 only 660 men were fit for duty, and of these only 100 were untainted with disease. On February 4th General Murray offered to capitulate, and the decrepit garrison marched out with all the honours of war. The fall of Minorca caused the Spanish Government to hope for the best from a simultaneous attack on Gibraltar by land and sea. The nature of the attack is too well known to need recapitulation here. But it must be pointed out that while the land part of it was m ordinary form, the sea part was chiefly carried out by * The garrison of Gibraltar, when Darby turned his back on it, was 6,13:5. Beatson, vol. v., p. '.WX ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 373 specially prepared engines of war. It is only of antiquarian value to inquire how those engines were constructed. They never were, and never will be, repeated. It is enough to know that when brought face to face with the works on September 13th, 1782, they failed utterly and ignominiously, and that Gibraltar after the attack remained just as strong as it was before. But no stronger. It was impregnable to direct attack — so, apparently, was Fort St. Philip. But it would fall to the indirect attack of famine, as Fort St. Philip did, unless the whole naval power of England were once more put forth to save it. Lord Howe sailed on September 11th at the head of 34 sail of the line, besides frigates and small vessels. He escorted a great fleet of store-ships and victuallers, and carried two regiments in transports for recruiting the garrison. Lord Howe was the usual month in reaching the fortress, and heard on his way that the combined fleet of 40 sail of the line was ready to receive him. With some difficulty, owing to the bad navigation of most of the convoy, and in safety, owing to the sufferings of the Franco- Spanish fleet in a recent gale, and to their want of enter- prise. Lord Howe threw all his supplies into Gibraltar ; but he was during the whole time, as it were, facing the enemy's fleet; and so pressing was his condition that some of the officers of the garrison on a mission to the fleet were carried into the Atlantic and could not be landed. Keady to face and to fight the numerically superior force, Howe was not disposed to do it in the confined waters at the eastern entrance to the straits. He passed out of the Mediterranean 34 sail of the line strong ; he was followed by a fleet apparently 44 sail strong, which brought him to a partial engagement, but sheered off when Howe appeared prepared for closer quarters. This was the third and last relief of Gibraltar. I have com- bined it and the proceedings relating to its attack and defence, with the second fall of Minorca, led up to again by the first fall of that fortress, because all the operations seem to tell the same tale, and to be inseparable in principle, both the one and the other being those with which these chapters have made us familiar. Gibraltar, and Fort St. Philip at Minorca, were but those citadel fortresses which I have described in a previous chapter as being universally employed. But Gibraltar differed from Minorca, and from most sea-faced citadels, inasmuch as owing to the narrowness of its land face and the impregnability of one of its sea faces it was unapproachable except at enormous disadvantages. In no case could it be subject to a full cross fire such as an ordinary fortress 374 NAVAL WARFARE. regularly invested by land expects to be. The idea of breaching it in a regular wa}^ from the land side was almost hopeless. In such a condition its close attack by an overwhelming fire from line-of- battle shij)s was known to be at least exceedingly hazardous, but the form of attack — which Sir George Eooke had used for its first capture — was not employed. If we ask, Why not ? we must no doubt answer, Because of the wholesome fear of stone walls with which most naval authorities were imbued ; but, more, we are safe in saying. Because the Franco- Spanish command of the sea was precarious. The Allies were able to make themselves masters of Minorca, and to drive Gibraltar to excessive straits. But as what was going on in the East and West Indies and North America per- mitted the attacks on these strongholds, so the presence intact of a fleet of 30 or 40 sail of the line in Southern European waters was that which governed affairs in these distant parts of the world. Let l)ut the Franco- Spanish home fleet meet with complete defeat, and the strain which England was suffering would be relaxed. It was the necessities of her home naval affairs which drove her into such naval difficulties abroad, even as it was the pressure of her affairs abroad that made her home difficulties. For her enemies to throw themselves against the stone walls of Gibraltar might win Gibraltar — possibly. But what would a disabled fleet do against the intact British one, even numerically inferior? But in the cases of both Gibraltar and Minorca, the strength was not in the attack, but in the investment. Supplies were withheld from Fort St. Philip, and it fell. They were not withheld from Gibraltar ; they were thrown in at the risk of the United Kingdom, and to some extent it may be said that the American Colonies and Gib- raltar were weighed against one another, and the American scale went up. When Darby was passing out of the Channel to relieve Gibraltar, de Grasse was passing out to attack us on the other side of the Atlantic. At the time it was debated, and at the time it was doubted, whether the real rule of war was followed when Darby avoided him."^ Gibraltar was therefore on all grounds exceptional, and it held out because it was so. Minorca fell under the general rule, and passed into the enemy's hands, who absolutely commanded the surrounding sea. There was nothing peculiar about it, and it was attacked according to rule. As if to emphasize the maxims which were now accepted, the great naval force which was necessary, if * See Annual Reyistpr, 17.S2, \). 102. Darby sailed on iNIarch I3th, and de Grasse Bailed on March 22nd. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 375 Minorca was to be attacked at all, never even sighted the island. Now, and after all experience more than ever, was the attack on a port a military and not a naval affair. Now, and more than ever in the cases of Gibraltar and Minorca, was it seen how powerless the navy was in direct attack, how all-powerful in defence, and in indirect attack. And again we are brought face to face with the two or three prominent points which concerned the objects and uses of fortifica- tions. The citadel form in both cases showed its power of delay, and showed at the same time that it had no other power. A day after the troops landed, Minorca fell without opposition, and all the stores and appliances of the arsenal fell with it. Were philo- sophy permissible in war, the Allies might have captured Fort St. Philip nearly as soon, had it simply been invested out of the range of its guns. Gibraltar did not fall, just because it could not be invested for a long enough time, but also because troops could not be landed out of range of the batteries. Fortification so far has all that the range of its guns give it, but no more ; and when it can be invested and opposed by fortification, it falls whether or no for want of supply. Still we seem to see that those who made our history for us looked to their fortifications to serve the purposes of delay only, and not really of defence. 376 NAVAL WARFARE. CHAPTER XVII. The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the Sea succeed or fail — {continued). The war of American Independence prolific in strategical lessons. — But in the methods of attack there is no difference. — Fewer lessons can be drawn from the events of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, because the attacks on territory were generally based on the supposed alliance with part of the populations. — Lord Howe and d'Estaing at Sandy Hook. — The relief of Newport. — Junction of Byron and Howe forces d'Estaing to the West Indies. — Barrington's attack on St. Lucia. — D'Estaing's interference and Barrington's defence. — Reflections on the defective strategy on both sides. — Byron's strategical error in quitting his watch on the French fleet. — D'Estaing's capture of Grenada, and Byron's failure to relieve or recover the island. — Rodney's capture of St. Eustatia. — More perfect strategy of de Grasse against Rodney. — Misapprehension as to Hood's position off Fort Royal. — De Grasse's attack on and repulse from St. Lucia. — Success against Tobago. — Rodney jDaralyzed. — Suffren and Hughes in the East Indies, and the capture of Trincomalee. — Perfect system of the attack upon BelleisJe in 1761. The American War of Independence is, perhaps, more than any other prolific in examples of the influence which command of the sea, and the loss and regaining of that command has on the ini- tiation, the success, or the failure of expeditions carried over sea against ports and islands. The naval forces were more evenly balanced than usual on each side, and such a condition would, under ordinary circumstances, have led to a renewed struggle for the command of the sea similar to that which was carried out between England and Holland in their three great naval wars, or between England and France in their first naval war. But both in the East and in the West the countries at war were holding territories contiguous, and accessible the one from the other, either by sea or laud, or both. The great stake which was immediately played for was the independence or subjection of the North American Colonies of Great Britain, and she was, in con- sequence, precluded from throwing her whole force against the sea ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 377 forces of Spain and France. It might have been higher and better jDoHcy for these countries to have fought directly for the command of the sea in European waters, continuing the ill-organized but gigantic effort of 1779 with greater determination and sliill. But the more immediate and natural desire on the part of Spain to recover the great trophy of Gibraltar, and the necessity that lay upon France to succour directly the revolted English Colonies, together with the desire of increasing her holding in India, threw the Allies into a kind of naval war in which the attack and defence of territory became a primary object. The main point was to place at the proper times, in the proper localities, naval forces great enough to succour places which were defending themselves, or to cover attacks on the enemy's positions. In the West Indies and North America, the influence of season compelling the withdrawal for a time of nearly all naval force from the southern islands to the Northern Continent, and rice versa, and the double duty thrown on the forces on each side, of attacking and defending territories in close proximity, put actual command of the sea more or less hopelessly into the background, until the great victory of Eodney, in April 1782, sent the British scale of force permanently up. But in the distant Bay of Bengal, where reinforcements could only arrive at very long intervals after they had been asked for, the sea forces were about as evenly matched as they had been a century before in the North Sea. And there both sides showed themselves aware that all attacks on territory over a doubtfully commanded sea are, at best, chance- work ; five great and drawn battles were fought between Sir Edward Hughes and Sutfren simply for the command of the sea, which was never gained by either side.* Yet I must dwell for a short space in these waters, over one of the most perfect exercises of naval strategical ability which is left on historical record. The capture of Trincomalee by Suffren was a most admirable illustration of what can be done in the successful attack on territory from the sea, if the time-limit is thoroughly understood and properly calculated ; while, on the other hand, the exceeding narrowness of the limit shown is a warning as to the risks run under such conditions. We have seen that the method of attack by expeditions over sea had long been established, and that the idea of capturing ports or islands by naval forces alone was almost entirely out of view. The * The same characteristic had been exhibited in the former war in these waters, where Pocock and d'Achti set the example afterwards followed. 378 NAVAL WARFARE. experience of a century, marked by onl}^ one or two successes anrl many failures of ships against works, and almost uniform successes of troops covered and supplied b}^ ships when numerically sufl&cient and properly handled, had quite settled the plans of attack. Only extraneous causes, such as want of troops or disbelief in the enemy's strength, could lead to occasional departures from the established form. Therefore, as the motive powers and the weapons were similar to what had preceded them, we ought not to expect to draw any special lessons from the territorial attacks in the American War, or in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars with France, touching the method of attack. We have, in fact, drawn all those lessons already. But we shall find some useful illustrations as to the indirect influence of naval force, or even to its direct effect in covering, sustaining, or interfering with attacks upon territory. There is, however, at least one operation during the War of American Independence to which special attention must be drawn, on account of the very remarkable significance of its lesson. Charleston in South Carolina was twice attacked by exjDeditions over sea during the American War of Independence. The first of these attacks failed ; the second succeeded. Charleston was again twice attacked in the American Civil War, when the first attack failed, and the second succeeded. Between the two pairs of attacks eighty-seven years had rolled, and the whole face of naval war- fare had changed. Steam power had superseded sail power ; the shell had superseded the shot ; iron had to a great extent superseded wood ; and iron armour was adopted as the clothing of ships. Yet, according to the example, the rule of war which governed success and failure in attack had undergone no change. In 1776 and in 1863, ships alone failed to capture the place ; in 1780 and in 1864, troops supported by ships in the usual way succeeded. Otherwise, the one or two illustrations which I propose to draw from operations on the other side of the Atlantic during the War of American Independence, will have reference less to the form of attack than to the strategical causes which led to projecting such enterprises, and to their ultimate failure or success. We shall, in short, from one or two other examples, gain some confirmation of those views to which the examples of Louisbourg and Minorca had led us. The French Revolutionary War, though marked on its outbreak by many remarkable successful and unsuccessful attacks upon ATTACKS OX TERIUTOBY FROM THE SEA. 379 territory, is somewhat barren of the lessons conveyed by former wars, for the reason that poHtical causes, as much or more than mihtary ones, governed the initiation as well as the issues of nearly all these struggles. And this was the case equally in home waters in the East and West Indies, at the Cape, and in the Mediter- ranean. The state of semi-insurrection in which Ireland found itself determined the efforts of Heche and Morard de Galles upon Bantry in 1796, the landing of General Humbert in Killala Bay, and the more thoroughly abortive design of Bompart against Lough Swilly in 1798. So did the divided condition of the people of France encourage the disastrous descent of the Emigres at Qui- beron Bay in 1795. So did Corsica pass into the hands of the British, and out of them in 1794 and 1796. The reduction of the different ports in Ceylon in 1795-96 was undertaken in view of a presumed difference in political opinion amongst the Dutch possessors of the island, and the summonses to surrender assumed a willingness on the part of portions of the garrisons to revolt against the dominant Republican faction. At the Cape of Good Hope, when it fell to the British in 1795, there may have been less dependence on political division, and more on the weakness of the Dutch garrison, but still the political cause was there. In the West Indies, every island was politically divided against itself, and advantage of this circumstance was taken in 1794 by the expedition under Admiral Sir John Jervis, and General Sir C. Grey, that remarkable instance of union between the commanders of the sea and land forces which made a clean sweep of the French possessions. Thus, although all the conditions of military success which we have seen to be necessary were present in the attacks by which French ports were wrested from the hands that held them, some dependence was always placed on the military support which it was supposed might be drawn from the political feeling of a portion of the population. When this feeling turned, or was suppressed by a majority of opponents, the military force which had been supplied was found insufhcient, and the places fell back again into the hands of the French Eepublicans. The surrender of Toulon by the French Royalists to Lord Hood was an exaggerated instance of the principles now set forth. The idea in accepting it was that the political views of the Royalists might dominate, and an insufficient supply of military force to hold 380 NAVAL WARFARE. the place was provided. Had it been otherwise, had we recognized the unchanging rules which governed these cases, and sent out a garrison strong enough to hold the place apart from all depen- dence on politico-military support, resting its supply upon the sea as we had learned to do by Barcelona and other Spanish ports in the War of the Succession, the whole course of European history might have been changed. As it was, the Eoyalist cause grew weaker and not stronger as had been expected, in the South of France, and Toulon was evacuated by the British as an effect of that miscalculation. Corsica comes in as an illustration of the same kind. Military force, resting in a great measure on the belief that political opinion in the island was convertible into the same instrument of war, made its conquest. An undue dependence on political opinion left a fleet in the Mediterranean which was unable to hold its own, and a small garrison in the island face to face with a hos- tile population. The evacuation of the island and of the waters surrounding it was the necessary consequence. Precisely the same sort of thing went on in the West Indies. In the absence of any naval force to hinder it, and with a section of their populations to assist, Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadaloupe, and several ports in St. Domingo, fell easily in 1794 to the suf- ficient forces brought against them, though Martinique had re- sisted insufficient forces the year before. But the British hold on most of these places began to relax from the moment its grasp had closed on them. Guadaloupe was the first to feel the result of dependence on political opinion. Captured on the 20th April, a very small reinforcement of the Eepublican party thrown in on June 5th, was sufficient, even under the eyes of superior British force, to drive the garrisons out of the island by December 10th. Tiberoon in St. Domingo was recovered by the French in the same way and in the same month of 1794. By June next year, St. Lucia had followed the example set, and the insurrections in St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominique had well nigh carried those islands. For these reasons, and because, except in the ease of Corsica, the command of the sea was assured, there will be no need to dwell at length on the examples of territorial attacks found in the annals of the French Eevolutionary and Napoleonic wars. So far as they go, they contradict nothing of all that had gone before in illustration of the rules of naval warfare, and the only new lesson which can be drawn from them is the distrust which ought to ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 381 govern all ideas of dependence on political, as convertible into military, power. But an exception must be made in regard to the great expe- dition of Napoleon into Egypt, already alluded to in a former chapter,"^ and this for the reason that the real bearings of the transaction are so often misapprehended at the present day. Keverting, then, to the War of American Independence, I take, as an example of the power of even inferior sea- forces to prevent the success of territorial attacks, the relief of Newport in 1778. The story is well told by de Lapeyrouse Bonfils : — The Count d'Estaing, aftei- having examined the coast of Virginia, proceeded to the entrance of the Delaware. Contrary to his expectation, he saw neither Howe nor Clinton. Provoked by this accident, which withdrew from him a glorious opportunity, d'Estaing made sail for Sandy Hook. In spite of foul winds, he appeared on July 11th before the port, and at once made preparations for attack. Howe was at anchor inside the bar with 9 sail of the line, carrying 534 guns, while d'Estaing had with him 12 sail of the line carrying 856. Howe, surprised and ill-placed, found it impossible to offer a satisfactory resistance. The sole obstacle which met d'Estaing was the bar which connected Long Island and Sandy Hook, and which it was necessary for his ships to pass. At high water the operation was practicable ; the Count d'Estaing promised a hundred thousand crowns to the pilot who would act. The coup de main accorded with his character, and he knew that at the opening of a war, such an attack sufficed to draw fortune to the colours. The American pilots, with whom he took too much counsel, either from ignorance on their part, from disaffection, or want of zeal, dissuaded him from the enterprise. They made out that several of his ships drew too much water to pass the bar ; in consequence, d'li^staing weighed his anchors on July 22nd, and dropped them again some miles on the side of New Jersey. He provisioned and reappeared before Sandy Hook. The tide and wind suited to cross the bar, but although daring, the Count d'Estaing wanted that ready audacity which despises the rules of prudence to follow the dictates of genius. As at first, the pilots diverted him from his object. f One consideration, however, appeared to justify his circumspection. The arrival of Vice-Admiral Byron with a powerful fleet had been reported, and might it not have been feared that he would find himself placed between the latter and Admiral Howe ? However, the Americans, after the ill-success of the plan arranged at Paris, had fixed their attention on Rhode Island. For the accomplishment of this design, from which they anticipated the most important consequences, the concurrence of Count d'Estaing was considered necessary. Washington and Lafaj'ette undertook to negotiate with the French Admiral, and on his favourable reply, Congress appointed Sullivan to conduct the enterprise. Count d'Estaing quitted Sandy Hooli and stood for Rhode Island, whore he arrived on 2yth July. Sullivan proceeded to encamp near Providence. D'Estaing first anchored at Brenton's Ledge, live miles fi'om Newport, and occupied the three passes * Chapter X. t M. Chevalier (pp. 112, 113) points out that d'Estaing had the passage sounded, by one of his officers, who found only twenty to twenty-two feet of water on the bar. 382 NAVAL WARFARE. into the river. On the 8th August he got under sail, and, in spite of the fire from the enemy's batteries, penetrated as far as Newport, and entered the bay of Connonicut. On this sudden approach the English were seized with panic, and without dreaming of offering resistance, burnt the frigates Juno, Flora, Lark, Orpheus, and Cerberus, two corvettes and several magazines. Jleanwhile Admiral Howe, favoured by circumstances, from a defensive passed to an offensive attitude. Bj'ron's squadron, on making the coast of America, was dis- persed in a gale of wind. Four of his line-of-battle ships, driven by the gale, made for shelter at Sandy Hook, and reinforced the British squadron there.* From this moment, Howe, finding himself in strength, and knowing the importance of Rhode Island, prepared to subvert the projects of the Allies. His spies kept him informed of the position which the French squadron had taken up for the attack on Rhode Island. Well understanding those waters, he knew that, where anchored, the French could only weigh with a northerly wind, which during the month of August seldom prevailed on that coast. Howe consequently weighed, and appeared on August Oth off point Judith. The wind blew from the sea ; at the moment when he was most certain of the success of his arrangements, it suddenly changed, and blew from the northward. Count d'Estaing on his pai't, observed the enemy, and determined to proceed to attack him should the wind allow. When the northerly wind sprang up, d'Estaing hastened to weigh, and with a good breeze from the northward he bore down upon Admiral Howe on the 10th. The latter who, with two ships of the line less than d'Estaing, did not feel himself in a state to accept the battle which his impetuous adversary offered, soon stood away to the southward, in hopes that the wind might come from that quarter, which everything seemed to promise. The two fleets manceuvrod for a day and a half, the one to bring about, and the other to avoid, battle. It was now the 11th, towards five o'clock in the evening. A few hours more, and a general action would perhaps decide the fate of America. The wind, which had been freshening since the morning with continual rain, blew hard as the evening wore on, and ended ■during the night between the 11th and 12th in a terrible gale. Howe, who had his flag in a frigate, the better to direct the movements of his squadron, was separated from it, and his ships found themselves dispersed. Count d'Estaing was still more unfortunate. The Languedoc, which carried him, lost her rudder and all her masts. Others of the French ships suffered much in their masts and rigging. After the gale, which lasted forty hours, dangers not less great threatened some of the ships of our squadron. The Lanyuedoc, wandering at the will of the waves, was attacked by the Preston. The Mar-^eillais, nearly as much damaged, had a brush with the Renown. It required all their courage to escape the two adversaries, and the wind having fallen light, all the ships joined Count d'Estaing at Newport. Under any other circumstances, the route taken by Count d'Estaing would have been proper ; but he had received news of the junction of Byron with Howe. This certainly was more than sufficient to prevent him from committing an act of rashness without •excuse. In vain his captains implored him to give up the enterprise. The sole reason which he offered in refusal was the word of honour given to Sullivan that he would jeturn tu Newport. D'Estaing forgot that in such a case his promise was only relative, and could not bind him ; but like all his race he was, so to speak, superstitious on the point of honour, and almost put this chivalrous sentiment above the interests of his * My author is not quite accurate here. Before the 28th July the Renown, 50, had ^arrived from the West Indies ; on the 28th the Raisonahle, G4, joined from Halifax; And on the 30th the Cornwall, 74, and Centurion, 50, of Byron's fleet came in. See Hervey, vol. v., p. 552, ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 383 country. He exposed eight thousand mo i and twelve ships of the line to satisfy it. However it was, d'Estaing anchored at Rhode Island and saw Sullivan, who in- formed him of the presence at Sandy Hook of the combined fleets of Howe and Byron. Unable longer to co-operate in the reduction of the place, understanding all the danger of his position a few leagues distant from a fleet much superior in numbers to his own, of which most of the ships were defective aloft, Count d'Estaing informed Sullivan of his intention to proceed to Boston to refit. The American general, who had just received reinforcements, was in despair at the news. " Land," he said to the French Admiral ; " you promised. Your departure will hand us over to the English. Land; honour and friendship alike compel you." The Marquis de Lafayette was still more pressing ; but the preservation of his squadron was so absolutely bound up with its departure from Rhode Island that Count d'Estaing did not consider it his duty to yield to such solicitations. Besides, the conduct of Sullivan in the matter was not all calculated to retain him. The General, by his proposals as much as by certain equivo- cal acts, was suspected of having intelligence with the enemy. He did not like the French : and when Count d'Estaing made sail for Boston, he did not fear to outrage our national character in passing the word amongst his troops that the French were traitors ; insolence which was repelled with the spirit which it demanded, by the Marquis de Lafayette. The arrival of the French squadron at Boston, which took place on August 25th, and its retirement from Rhode Island, sowed disunion between the Allies, and was the pretext for many vehement struggles. England gained new partisans in the insurgent provinces, and the raising of the siege of one of her principal fortresses.* In this example, we see again that the neighbourhood of a superior fleet is destructive of all idea of territorial attack carried on from the sea, even where, as in the case of Newport, the main attack is from the land, and depending on the land for reinforce- ment and supply. The necessity of d'Estaing's retreat from Newport was made absolute by the junction of Howe and Byron, yet it was a necessity not recognized by either Lafayette or Sullivan, so easily are the fundamental axioms of naval war misunderstood by those who do do not feel their control. This, however, was the action of a superior naval force. We have to recollect that Newport had already been relieved by the presence of an inferior naval force. It was Howe's smaller fleet which drew away d'Estaing from Newport in the first instance, and could evidently have done it again and again in the same manner. The French account does not credit Howe with any desire to offer battle to d'Estaing, but the English accounts tell us that he intended to risk a battle if he could have the weather guage, and that even failing it he had drawn his fleet into line of battle, and prepared to attack in the leeward position when the fleets were separated by the gale. Had a battle ensued, Newport would still have been relieved, for d'Estaing, even as victor, must have gone to Boston to refit after such a struggle. * Lapeyrouse, vol. iii. , p. 45; see also Troude, vol. ii., p. iL' ; Chevalier, p. 3; Hervey, vol. v., p. 550; Schomberg, vol. i., p. 447. 384 NAVAL WARFARE. D'Estaing, however, clearly played a bad game, and deserved to suffer the contumely which the Americans poured upon him. Having Howe safe at Sandy Hook in inferior force, he should never have lost his grip of him when there were designs against Newport. An inferior, or at least an equal force, would have probably been sufficient to mask him in his own awkward position behind a bar, and then d'Estaing might have sent the remainder of his ships to co-operate with Sullivan against New- port, certain that, at least as far as Howe was concerned, there would be no interference from the sea. If, however, d'Estaing had considered that he was not strong enough so to divide his fleet in this way, he should have informed Sullivan of the im- possibility of his co-operating at all except by way of masking the English fleet. But had he divided his fleet, or had he confined himself to masking that of Howe, we have seen how^ fortune might have befriended him. Very possibly he might have made prizes of every one of the four ships which put into Sandy Hook, and reinforced Howe. It was not till October that Byron had collected sufficient force to attempt the blockade of d'Estaing in Boston, but then a storm again dispersed his ships, and enabled d'Estaing to slip out and proceed to the AVest Indies.^ This he did on November 3rd, and on the same day Commodore Hotham sailed from Sandy Hook for the same destination with a squadron of war-ships and 60 sail of transports, carrjdng 5,000 troops. These -were under Major- General Grant, for the defence of the West Indian Islands, or the attack of the enemy's possessions there, should the conditions allow. The two fleets were for some time close together without either being aware of the other's presence, and both met the same gale of wind, which proved more damaging to the French than to the English, dispersing the former, but enabling the latter to arrive at Barbados in safety. Rear-Admiral Barrington, who commanded on the Leeward Islands station, was in such weak force that far from being in a position to undertake offensive operations, he had been unable to prevent the fall of Dominique on the 7th of September to the arms of the Marquis de Bouille. But when Hotham joined him it was at once determined to make an attack on St. Lucia. Before such a determination was * "Le Comte d'Estaing, reduit a Enaction par la sup&iorite de Penneim'e, n'attondait qu'une occasion favorable pour se rendre dans les xVntilles. Profitant de I'e'loignement des Anglais, 11 fit route pour la Martinique." — Clievulier, p. 121. ATTACKS OX TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 385 come to, we may be sure that the strategical conditions were well considered by the two chiefs. As Hotham and d'Estaing had sailed from American ports on the same day, it seems certain that Hotham must have informed Barrington that d'Estaing was safely masked by the superior fleet of Byron. Interruption from the sea was, so far, not to be feared, and it might well have been supposed that even did d'Estaing manage to escape, Byron would have been so close upon his heels as to paralyze his motions. The sequel presents one of the most remarkable stories in the whole range of territorial attacks from the sea, showing on the one hand the extreme hazard of such attacks unless the command of the sea is fully assured beforehand, and on the other, the possibilities of successful resistance even in the most desperate extremities. , Barrington's squadron, now consisting of 7 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and a sloop, conveying the army in its transports, arrived off the island on December 13th, and on the same day Brigadier-Generals Meadows and Prescot landed in different parts of the Grand Cul-de-sac with a considerable body of troops, while Brigadier-General Sir Henry Calder protected the landing-place to keep open a communication between the fleet and army. There was no opposition to the landing, and the troops marched at once on the fortress of Morne-fortune, the chief land defence of the Bale du Carenage, which they took. The gale of wind, from which the French had sufiered most, might, however, have been most favourable to them, had skill or fortune allowed it. D'Estaing fell in with and captured three of Hotham's transports, from which he learnt the news of his sailing for the West Indies, and of his force, but not of his exact desti- nation. He wrongly concluded it to be Antigua, and bore away for that island, off which he cruised for some days, and then, disappointed at seeing nothing, he made for Martinique, where he arrived on December 6th, a week prior to Barrington's arrival at St. Lucia. My authorities do not say whether Barrington had early notice of d'Estaing's arrival, but as soon as he became aware of his presence, he placed all his transports at the bottom of the Cul-de-sac and drew his ships up in line across the entrance, covering each flank by the erection of batteries and the mounting of guns. The Baie du Carenage on tlie east coast of the island is entered from the west. The entrance is not more than 200 yards wide. Rocks surround the two points of this entrance, which is still rather narrowed by a shoal which extends from the south point 25 386 . NAVAL WARFARE. to the W.N.W. The depth of water varies from four to seven and a half fathoms in this passage. Inside the north point, at about 550 j'ards, is a second point, also sur- rounded by rocks ; Morne-fortune is in the dii-ection of and at a small distance from this point. Its guns protect at once the road, its entrance, and the Cul-de sac, though this is screened from fire on the north side and at the bottom of the bay. . . . On the 14th, in the morning, Vice-Admiral d'Estaiug had intelligence of the attack directed against St. Lucia ; he at once embarked 6,000 trooijs, and in the afternoon got under weigh with 11 sail of the line, a twelfth, the MarseiUais joined him next morning. On the 15th, in the morning, the squadron arrived ofif the Bale du Carenage. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief was to get alongside (elonger) the English line from north to south ; to anchor a ship abreast of each one of the enemy, and to authorize the captains to board their adversaries if they judged it prudent. In case of the depth of water being too great to anchor, he hoped to get positions inside the English line. The circumstances of wind, and the position of the enemy might, how- ever, modify tlie plan of attack. The Sagittaire (50) and the frigate Chimere had orders, in any case, to attack the battery on the south point ; the Provence (6-1) and the Vail/ant (64) were charged to silence the guns on the north point. The wind was light from the eastward. The French squadron passed along the English line, engaging it and receiving the fire of the batteries on shore, but it did not anchor ; it continued under sail, and in the evening renewed the attack of the morning. On the 17th d'Estaing anchored in the Creek du Choc, landed the troops and directed them upon Morne-fortune, distant a few miles only from the anchorage. The squadron subsequently (on the 24th) got under sail again to renew the attack on the English division ; but the lightness of the wind interfered with the projects of the Commander- in-Chief, and in the evening he returned to the anchorage. The expedition by land did not succeed. The troops were embarked on the 30th, and the squadron returned to Martinique. The governor of St. Lucia capitulated on the morning of its departure.* This occurrence, so striking in its contrasts, requires some little examination before we can look at it with the view of drawing out its lessons. A century ago these would all have been obscured by the paeans to be sounded in praise of the English skill and courage. Now we should be foolish to take that line. We should rather reflect on the greatness and imminence of the risks that were run, and treasure them up in order that in the time to come we at least might know how to avoid them in like cases. In the first place, the coincident sailing of Hotham and d'Estaing and their near neighbourhood en route to the West Indies, suggests that good fortune, and not skill, enabled Hotham to get to the West Indies at all. Then Lapeyrouse justly points out that when d'Estaing ascertained the truth from the captured members of Hotham's convoy, he had in his hands the greatest of opportunities had he chosen to use it. On the evening of the capture of these three transports, the wind was E.S.E., Antigua bore S.W. In running to the southward for twenty-four hours he had a * Troude, vol. ii., p. 17. See also Lapeyrouse, vol. iii., p. 53; Chevalier, p. 125; Schomberg, vol. i., p. 451. The illustration, from a contemporary print in the Royal United Service Institution, gives a capital idea of the position. iV rft ;^fi -* -n THE ISLAND OF Kv.i:t*'fi?,UCIE y/iriJ«t- > 5?-^, ^^/^ ?^'' >* c^ ^^^ sy voo-^ "*" French. Fhrt in 4p- Mi Aftlritoon. of Hu IS^ -"^ (^/i iait of the Liiic j ^- A French Tr F C< Choc the Road leading to the Vigie. E Admiral Byron's Fleet artinico. T Traverses thrown across the Road leading to m ATTACKS ON TERPdTOUY FROM THE SEA. 887 chance of meeting the convoy, or he would have assured himself in missing it, that its destination was not Barbados. Then, being in the latitude of Antigua, he might have run before the wind for that island, and in the morning he would have picked up the convoy before their arrival. Another important consideration should have deter- mined him. Barbados, by its position to windward, dominated the other islands ; it was presumable that the enemy would profit by the favourable wind to proceed to an anchorage there, because from this point it could distribute its forces according to convenience.* But then it seems strange that Barrington on his part should have made no attempt, by cruisers, to ascertain whether the coast was clear before he advanced upon St. Lucia. Fort Eoyal in Martinique was the known head-quarters of the French navy in the West Indies, and it was but 120 miles from Carlisle Bay in Barbados. It was not more than 60 miles from the south point of St. Lucia, and d'Estaing was at Fort Boyal a full week before Barrington arrived off St. Lucia. But again d'Estaing lost his chance a second time by not dispatching cruisers towards Bar- bados to ascertain whether that had been, after all, Hotham's destination. Had he done so he might have caught Barrington half seas over, when his total destruction might have been easy. From the moment of leaving Sandy Hook, until the moment of landing at St. Lucia, the English force therefore had been running a series of imminent risks, which even the doctrine of chances left it imprudent to run. Quite possibly Barrington's and Hotham's minds were dominated by chagrin at the loss of Dominique, and were full of the example which the French seemed to have set them in that success. But the capture of this island by the Marquis de Bouille had been in the nature of a snap-shot. Its nearness to Martinique had always left it and St. Lucia peculiarly open to sudden coups de main by troops alone, and nothing but the blockade of Fort Eoyal by sea could prevent such attacks being made. De Bouille had taken the island with 2,000 men, suddenly thrown into it, under the escort of no more than 3 frigates and a corvette. The expedition sailed after sunset on September 6th, the troops landed early next morning, and immediately occupied positions which commanded the capital of the island, and the governor capitulated the same day. Barrington, on learning what had happened, sailed to defend the island, but found the French flag flying everywhere. He returned to Barbados [says Chevalier], awaiting with the keenest impatience the reinforcements from America, of which he had been informed. Ho proposed to attempt some operation, the success of which should diminish the effect which the loss of Dooiiuique would prjduce in England. Ignorant that the Count d'Estaing had quitted * Lapevrousc, vol. iii. , p 57, 25 * 388 NAVAL WARFARE. Boston, he considered himself in command of the sea, and, in consequence, free to go wherever he thought proper. He cast his eyes on St. Lucia, the possession of which would be of peculiar value to the British navy.* Where be was in error, then, was m not making more sure of his ground, by the use of cruisers to Fort Royal, before proceeding in his expedition. Where he was fortunate was in selecting so defensible a post as that in which he had moored his squadron. Had he been forced to anchor in an open position, he would at least have courted a terrible disaster. Even as it was, we can only note that d'Estaing with a force so greatly superior could and ought to have destroyed Barrington, but he made no determined attack on him. The two cannonades were really distant affairs, without effect on either fleet. Chevalier tells us why, after the abortive attempt of the 24th, the attack was not renewed. D'Estaing, on the 28th, learnt that Admiral Byron was expected at Barbados, and that consequently his command of the sea was threatened. It must also be said, on the side of d'Estaing, that the attack of ships properly disposed under cover of batteries had always been considered extremely hazardous ; and we have, in the course of these chapters, observed that in such cases it was generally considered necessary to get possession of the batteries in the first instance. D'Estaing did not reach the island until it was practically in the hands of the British, and the attacks he attempted were in the nature of those on an assured British possession. D'Estaing was shortly to prove his case by exhibiting himself in the position of Barrington, while forcing Byron to occupy that o the French Admiral, and to fail very much as he did.f D'Estaing's information as to Byron had not been absolutely correct. He did not join Barrington until the 6th January 1779, and then it was at St. Lucia that the junction was formed. On the 11th, d'Estaing's frigates counted 15 British sail of the line at anchor at St. Lucia, which left him in a position of inferiority as to force. On the 19th he was joined by 4 sail of the line from France, under Count de Grasse, but Byron was about the same time joined by 4 sail of the line under Eowley. D'Estaing felt himself constrained to remain on the defensive, and presumably Byron did not consider himself strong enough to make any attack ; and the weeks and months rolled on. * P. 125. t It is proper to observe that my criticisms on the English success and the French failure at St Lucia agree with those offered by Lapeyrouse and Chevalier. The latter quotes Suffren, who commanded one of d'Estaing's line-of-battle ships, to the same effect as to the sea attack. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 389 On April 26th, Eear- Admiral de Vaudreuil joined d'Estaing with 2 sail of the line, and a third had arrived the evening before with a convoy. And then, on June 27th, the arrival of Eear- Admiral Lamotte-Piquet with 5 sail of the line, 3 frigates, and 60 transports loaded with troops, put d'Estaing in a position to operate on the offensive. I have not yet succeeded in getting a clue to the methods some- times pursued by our admirals in the West Indies when making St. Lucia their head-quarters and ostensibly watching Fort Koyal, Martinique. I do not know of anything which should have prevented such a watch upon the port as would either have brought on a general action, or intercepted these constant rein- forcements of the French. It seems difficult to believe that the principle of blockade, which had been so well understood and carried out in European waters by HaAvke, should, though its application there was at this time impracticable, have been alto- gether forgotten, yet I have not so far been able to discover any other explanation. D'Estaing was allowed to pass from inferiority to superiorit}', with the result we are to note, without apparently any attempt to prevent the growth of his force in what we ought really to call now the usual way. Early in June a considerable fleet of British merchantmen homeward bound was assembling at St. Christopher's to wait convoy. Byron, with, as far as I have ascertained, the alternative of blockade before him, chose to secure the safety of the convoy against d'Estaing, by himself accompanying it with his whole fleet. He proposed to make, with reference to d'Estaing, we may observe, a similar mistake to that which d'Estaing had made with reference to Lord Howe at Sandy Hook. Having the enemy in view, he should have kept him in view, being assured of the safety of the convoy as long as this was so. If d'Estaing was to be fought, it would be much better to fight him when unimpeded by the care of a convoy. If Byron, in his care of the convoy, were to quit West Indian waters, he left it open to d'Estaing to make any attack which the probable duration of his absence might warrant. Byron sailed from St. Lucia for St. Christopher's, to the north, with his whole fleet on June 6th, and d'Estaing, being well in- formed of all the circumstances, began operations by despatching a small force to the south for the caxDture of St. Vincent. In doing this, d'Estaing was entirely within rule. The Caribbee inhabi- tants of St. Vincent were in revolt against the English garrison, which only numbered 300 men. The chiefs of the Caribbees had 390 NAVAL WARFARE. solicited the help of the French, and there was every reason to suppose that once landed, the French troops could possess them- selves of the island and hold it, without need of maintaining com- munication over sea. So the naval part of the expedition con- sisted only of 3 corvettes and 2 schooners, carrj-ing no more than 400 troops, and the whole under the command of Lieutenant de Vaisseau Frolong du Eumain. He sailed from Fort Eoyal on the 9th of June, arrived in sight of St. Vincent on the 17th, landed his troops, received the expected help of the Caribbees, and the sur- render of the island next day. This was a small matter, but one which could only have taken place in the absence of Byron, and for which his absence was therefore directly responsible. But d'Estaing had larger business before him when the ships and troops already spoken of reached him on the 27th of June. He took the troops on board his fleet, now consisting of 25 sail of the line, and on June 31st made sail for Barbados. He must have been well aware of the risks he was running. He probably knew that Byron had under his command now 22 sail of the line, though they might not be all with his flag. Byron had already been more than three weeks absent to the northward, and it was not easy to say how soon he might re- appear. The French ships, crowded with troops, would have been much hampered in a general action. If they were in sufficient force to conquer the island, the main point was to get them on shore at once, and to be ready to meet Byron at sea in superior strength should he attempt to interfere = The direction of the wind was such that d'Estaing found he could not fetch Barbados. The pressure of the above considera- tion was upon his mind, and he stood for Grenada. On the 2nd July he anchored near Beausejour Point, a little distance from George Town, the capital of the island. On a height which commanded the town, the English had estabhshed an entrenched camp, armed with heavy guns. This position, known under the name of Hospital Hill, was occupied by a detachment of regular troops and militia — about 800 men. The Governor of Grenada, Lord Macartney, supposed it impregnable, and he had placed there everything that was most valuable in the colony. He himself occupied a fort between Hospital Hill and George Town. Count d'Estaing, expecting the arrival of Admiral Byron, wished to recover his libertj' of action as soon as possible. He deter- mined to make himself master of the entrenched camp by a coup de main, as he con- sidered it the kcj- of the position.* Immediateh' after sunset, the expeditionary corps, divided into three columns, commanded by Colonels Arthur and Edward Dillon and de Noaillcs, were put in motion. In order to divert the enemy's attention, a dcmonstra- * It must be borne in mind that d'Estaing was commander-in-chief by land as well as by sea. H-a§ ATTACKS ON TEIUilTORY FROM THE SEA. 391 tion was made in the evening against an English post facing the sea, in which some of the ships of the squadron took part. Towards eleven o'clock, our troops silently climbed the steep slopes which led to the summit of the hill. Although the English had accumulated obstacles, such as pallisades and stone walls, nothing was able to check the ardour of our troops. D'Estaing, sword in hand, was amongst the first to leap over the enemy's entrenchments. After a sharp but short struggle, the English laid down their arms. On the 4th, at break of day. Count d'Estaing fired a few shot into the fort where the Governor was placed. Lord Macartney, knowing that all resistance had become vain, sent an officer to treat of capitulation. The proposals which he made to Count d'Estaing being rejected, he surrendered at discretion. One hundred and two guns, sixteen mortars, three flags, provisions, stores, thirty merchant ships, fell into our hands. On the oth July, the troops which were not required to occupy the town and the forts were re-embarked.* Byron returned to St. Christopher's on July 1st, and immediately heard the news of the fall of St. Vincent. He at once decided to make an attempt for its recovery, and sailed with 21 or 22 sail of the line, and 28 transports carrying troops for landing, when he learnt, from a cruiser which had been in search of him, that Grenada was attacked. He pushed on for that island, with the hope of defending it if there was yet time. D'Estaing had heard, on the night of the 5th of July, that Byron was approaching, and had given orders to weigh at four o'clock next morning. At break of day the two fleets saw each other. Byron saw the French standing out to sea from St. George's Bay, their force not being then ascertained, but believed to be not greater than his own. Supposing that the French Admiral was anxious to avoid an engagement, he made signal for a general chase, and then, more aware of what was before him, a signal for close action. In the result, and owing in part to the fact of several of d'Estaing's ships which had been under weigh all night finding themselves to leeward, and also to the fact of Byron's discovering that Grenada was gone, the action was only partial. Byron lay-to for the night, and d'Estaing went back to his conquered anchorage in St. George's Bay. Byron had lost Grenada and was in no condition to recover it. He took his damaged fleet back to St. Christopher's. t Except that d'Estaing acted with his eyes open to the risk, and was superior in the attack on Grenada, while Barrington acted with his eyes shut, and was inferior in force at St. Lucia, the cases lie nearly on all fours. In the detail that Barrington after possessing himself of the commanding works, chose to meet the enemy at anchor, while d'Estaing chose to meet him under weigh, * Chevalier, p. 135. t Schomberg, vol. i., p. 470 ; Troude (whose account is a bad one), vol. ii. , p. G'2; Lapeyrouse, vol. iii., p. 88; Chevalier, p. 123. 392 NAVAL WARFARE. there is a difference, but the results and the main points were identical. The game on Barrington's part was a risky and a daring one, but there was no other, with his inferior force, for him to play. D'Estaing was playing the wrong game. It was clear that he might have kept himself superior to Byron, and his proper play was to beat him at sea. As it chanced, his bad play succeeded, but if Hospital Hill had been able to defend itself only for a day or two, the French might have lost their whole army. Byron and the forts of Grenada together were more than a match for d'Estaing, and the latter could never have embarked his troops had the anchorage in St. George's Bay been available for Byron. But as it was, Grenada was an enemy's country when Byron sighted it, just as St. Lucia had been an enemy's country when d'Estaing sighted it, and nothing could be done in presence of existing forces. The extracts which Chevalier gives from Suffren's letters, written at the time, are of the fullest value when we remember that Suffren's strategy in the East Indies was the greatest condemna- tion of d'Estaing's in the West. Suffren seems to have been clear that gallant as d'Estaing undoubtedly was, he was less a seaman than a soldier, and did not at all understand the elementary principles of naval war. As a contrast to this defective strategy in making territorial attacks, it may be useful to pass at once to an example of more perfect strategy which was carried out by de Grasse in 1781 against Eodney. In December 1780, the latter officer had arrived at St. Lucia from New York, and there being no sufficient naval force to oppose him, he arranged and carried out several territorial attacks. The arrival of Sir Samuel Hood from England raised his strength to 21 sail of the line, and the intelligence that war had been declared against Holland, gave him the opportunity of making conquest of the important island of St. Eustatia and its dependencies before the Dutch authorities had recovered from their astonishment at being summoned to surrender. But when he proceeded on this service with his main strength, he took care to mask the five French sail of the line and frigates, which were at anchor in the bay of Fort Royal, at Martinique. Eodney and General Vaughan now proposed to follow up this blow by an attack on Surinam and Cura9ao, but on 11th of Feb- ruary, news came that a French squadron of 8 or 10 sail of the line and frigates had been seen steering for the West Indies. Rear- ATTACKS ON TElUUTOllY FROM THE SEA. 393 Admiral Drake was then with 6 sail of the line carrying out the blockade of Fort Royal, already mentioned. Rodney, in view of the strategical conditions that Drake in weak force would be between two fires, but in strong force might be able to strike a blow at the approaching enemy, sent Sir Samuel Hood to take command of the blockade of Fort Royal with additional line-of- battle force. Having soon reason to believe that the approaching force was greater than had been represented, he sent further reinforcements to Sir Samuel Hood which raised his fleet to 18 sail of the line, while Rodney remained at St. Eustatia with the remaining 3 or 4. Rodney, however, was misinformed as to the strength of the approaching fleet. It was 21 sail of the line under Count dc Grasse, convoying a merchant fleet of 200 sail, and carrying G,000 land troops with a formidable artillery. The two fleets came into contact close to Fort Royal on the 29th of April, and the 5 French sail of the line in Fort Royal were able to get out and take part in the ensuing action. De Grasse, with such great superiority ought to have crushed Sir Samuel Hood ; but, as it turned out, there was a partial action only, in which the French were the greatest losers in men, though many ships of Hood's fleet were badly damaged, and Hood was forced to proceed to St. Christopher's to join Rodney and to refit. The junction took place after the 9th of May, and the whole fleet proceeded to refit and supply at Antigua. The command of the sea had thus passed entirely out of the hands of Rodney, and if de Grasse had been unbiassed in his views of the consequences, it is plain that he should have followed up Hood to the northward, and made immediate use of his superiority in a determined attempt to crush Rodney altogether. But French commanders seldom understood, or at any rate acted on, the plain principles of strategy. Even when numerically superior, their strategy was that of the inferior force, which tried to gain advan- tages by means chiefly of evasion. Rodney concluded that this would be the immediate action of de Grasse, and he felt all the inconvenience of being to leeward with a partially disabled fleet. He assumed that St. Lucia would be attacked, and sent letters to its Governor and to the senior officer of the ships there, that he was making all haste to come to their relief. Rodney's surmise was correct. The military expedition, consist- ing of some 1,200 men under the Marquis de Bouillu, sailed from 394 NAVAL WARFARE. Fort Eoj'al on the 9th of May, the same day that Hood had re- joined Eodney, and at once landed at several points at St. Lucia. On the 12th de Grasse supported, by appearing in Grosse Ilet Bay. But in the end the troops were embarked and the enterprise abandoned, and three separate reasons have been assigned for a circumstance that certainly wants explanation. It is said, first, that de Bouille found the place too strong for him ; secondly, that lie found he could not secure himself in his conquest if he made it, for several weeks ; and thirdly, that the whole attack was a mere feint to divert Rodney's attention from the real point which was to be struck at. There may be some reason in this last assigned cause, as well as in the two first ; for on the same day that de Bouille sailed for St. Lucia, a force of 1,300 troops, under convoy of 2 line-of-battle ships and some frigates, was despatched direct to Tobago in order to effect its capture before any relief to it could come over sea. If the chart of the West Indies be referred to, it will be seen that with Rodney at Antigua, de Grasse at Martinique, still nume- rically superior, and Tobago 200 miles, if not dead to windward, at least slow of approach from the northward, it becomes plain that the blow was well aimed. And then, too, it may be seen that the attack was in a sense covered by de Grasse's position, for he might reasonably expect to know when Rodney should proceed to the southward. After the withdrawal of de Bouille from St. Lucia the troops re-embarked were sent after the first instalment, and de Bouille either then went with them, or followed, while further troops for the attack, said in some of the accounts to reach 3,000 men, were pushed on. Rodney had news of the attack on St. Lucia immediately after his quitting Antigua, but not, it is said, of its abandonment. That news reached him when he was near Barbados, and it follows that he either believed in the capacity of St. Lucia to repel attack, as it is said,* or else he abandoned it to its fate in his fear of what might happen to Barbados. He had no idea whatever that Tobago would be attacked. But it may be that want of water, and the necessity of landing his sick, as is also alleged, determined him to make for Barbados on his way to St. Lucia, Barbados not being so much out of the way as it appears on the chart, because of the prevailing winds. He made detachments of a line-of-battle ship, a frigate, and several small vessels, to St. Lucia, fearing another attack on it, and thus weakened his own force. * Beatson, vol. v., p. 19 . ATTACKS OX TFAiRITORY FROM THE SEA. 395 It was on the 23rcl of May that Eodney anchored in Carlisle Bay, Barbados, and it was on the 27th that he first heard of the attack on Tobago, and the naval force mentioned was only that which convoyed the first detachment of troops. Eodney detached Drake on the 29th with six sail of the line and a land force, to succour Tobago, but had no sooner done so than he heard that de Grasse's whole fleet had been steering a course for that island. Very soon afterwards letters from Drake informed him that 20 sail of the line of the enemy were already at Tobago when he arrived there. This intelligence reached Eodney on June 2nd, and he put to sea with all his force on the 3rd, and was joined by Drake the same day. But de Grasse had already reaped the reward of his strategy. Eodney learnt on the 4th that Tobago had capitulated, and on the 5th his look-outs observed the French, fleet con- sisting of 24 sail of the line and 5 frigates, steering towards Grenada. Eodney had with him but 20 sail of the line, and did not care to risk an action except under more favourable geo- graphical conditions than existed at the time. Tobago no longer flew the English flag, and the operation was over. It must again be observed that though de Grasse's strategy on this occasion was good, and so far deserved success, it was not perfect. It was, as I have said, the strategy of the inferior force, and he ran the risk of having his detached force cut off before he could succour it. Not, indeed, that detaching a force was wrong in itself ; it was the proper policy of the inferior naval power, where the risk was worth running for the sake of the reward. The danger was in not keeping closer touch between his own and Eodne3^'s fleet ; had he done so, his detached force would have run but little risk. Eodney, as we have seen, anchored in Car- lisle Bay on May 23rd. De Grasse did not sail from Martinique till the 25th, the French troops only landed at Tobago on the 24th, and de Grasse only reached the island on the 31st, according to de Lapeyrouse, while, according to Beatson, Drake saw them on the 30th. Nautical and civil time may possibly account for the discrepancy, but it is certain that the time element, of which I have so often spoken, was not calculated with sufficient care, and that it was !good and ill fortmie, more than absolutely sound strategy, which gave Tobago to the French without a hitch, in 1781. But I think the finest piece of strategy against territory, as it may be practised by the naval commander who is not in assured command of the sea, was that exhibited by Suffren in the East 396 NAVAL WARFARE. Indies in 1782. This officer had found himself, by actual experi- ment, evenly matched by Sir Edward Hughes. He had had three pitched battles with him, one on February 16th, another on April 11th, and a third on July 6th, when each fleet had been of the same numerical strength, 11 sail of the line, but the French loss in killed and wounded had been more than double that of the English. At Cuddalore, after the last of these battles, Suffren heard of the approach of 2 sail of the line and other ships of war, as well as transports. He proceeded to meet them at Batacaloa, a port about sixty miles to the southward of Trincomalee, having taken on board 600 or 700 troops. Then for the time he was lost to the sight of Hughes, who remained refitting at Madras. On the 21st of August he was joined by the 2 sail of the line with transports and store-ships carrying 600 infantry, and he at once conceived his plan. In the south-west monsoon which then blew, it would, as Suffren knew, take a fleet about a fortnight to beat up from Madras to Trincomalee, while half a day was sufficient to run down from Batacaloa to the same place. If, therefore, Hughes got notice of the sailing of Suffren on the day that he sailed from Batacaloa, the French commander would have a fortnight for his operations against Trincomalee. This was one security drawn from the time element. But he now made up 15 sail of the line, while Hughes only made up 12. The risk was not excessive, even if Hughes should appear before Trincomalee surrendered, as the fleet itself was not necessary to support the attack, though some of its men and guns were. The passage was so exceedingly short between Batacaloa and Trincomalee, that there was no fear of being caught when hampered with troops and transport. Four or five days might have been taken as a reasonable time within which to effect the reduction of Trincomalee, and therefore in any case, Suffren was allowing a good margin. But he took the precaution to ascertain from the report of a cruiser which had watched off Trincomalee for the purpose, that the coast was clear before he sailed for his destination on the 21th of August. The fleet passed straight into the harbour on the succeeding day, and anchored within the forts and out of their fire. Broadsides had been ex- changed on passing them, but with little effect. On the night of the 26th 2,600 men were landed, and on the 27th and 28th, bat- teries were erected and armed with guns from the ships. Fire was opened on the forts on the 29th, and on the 30th the Governor of Trincomalee offered terms of capitulation, to which Suffren, not ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA, 397 at all easy in his mind as to the possibilities should Hughes appear before the surrender was complete, lent a ready ear. The French flag was hoisted on the works on the 31st, and Trincomalee had become a French possession. A less wise strategist than Suffren might easily have prolonged the siege for the exaction of severer terms ; but Suffren knew that after all the precautions possible to ba taken, there were yet adverse chances in war. It had happened that on the 12th of August one of Hughes's frigates, the Coventry, had chased the French frigate Bellona into Batacaloa ; to her astonishment she saw Suffren's squadron, with his transports, lying at anchor. Without a moment's delay she sped away before the south-west monsoon to warn Sir Edward Hughes at Madras of the danger. Hughes put to sea on August 20th, that is, four days before Suffren was ready to quit Batacaloa, and he arrived oft" Trincomalee during the night of September 2nd. At daylight in the morning he saw that his errand was bootless : that Suffren had outwitted him, and that the French flag had superseded the English on shore. Suflren had only just escaped a danger, although with his numerically superior fleet it could never have been a very serious one. But a miss was as good as a mile to the French commander who, with Trincomalee secure behind him, was able to come out and fight his fourth pitched battle with his enemy. The result was, as usual, indecisive ; Hughes returned to Madras, and Sufl'ren to the shelter of his new port, Trincomalee. Such was this famous exploit, which, with the rest of his con- duct in the East Indies, has placed Suffren in the highest rank of naval commanders. We must not forget, however, that the strategy emploj^ed was only justified in the absence of force enough to carry out the masking of Hughes and the attack on Trincomalee at the same time. Perfect strategy would have required that this should have been done, and as I have now brought these normal examples nearly to a conclusion, I may usefully subjoin an illustration where the method adopted was absolutely faultless. The case is the capture of Belleisle in 1761 by Keppel and General Hodson. Keppel sailed from St. Helens with 10 sail of the line, to be joined afterwards by 7 more. With him were a considerable body of frigates and sloops, and 100 sail of transports carrying 10,000 land forces. At the same time, Captain Buckle sailed for Brest with 12 sail of the line and 3 frigates. Brest was 398 NAVAL WARFARE. the only port whence any naval force capable of interfering with Keppel could issue ; so that not only was he prepared by the great fleet of 17 sail that he took to Belleisle, to meet any hostile fleet likely to make an appearance, but his operations were doubly secured inasmuch as all the existing French power was masked at Brest by Buckle. The French garrison at Belleisle was 2,600 men, so that the forces landed from Keppel's fleet were ample for the subjugation of the island ; and there being no chance of interference from the sea, its surrender in time was certain. On the 8th of April the first detachment was landed clear of all batteries at Port Andeo Bay, but it was repulsed after landing, by a body of the enemy who had entrenched themselves on a hill. A second landing in greater force was effected on the 22nd, near Fort D'Arsie, after its guns had been silenced by some of the ships of war, and the foot- ing on shore was made good. M. de St. Croix, the governor, then retired into his citadel, the town of Palais, which he defended until the 7th of June, when, a practicable breach having been made, he capitulated, and Belleisle became British territory. There is absolutely nothing to remark on this operation, except that the method pursued was as certain to produce success as any other which could be conceived. All experience had dictated what should be done, and being done, the result became a certainty. 399 CHAPTER XVIII. The Conditions under which x^ttacks on Territory from the Sea succeed or fail — (concluded). The expedition of Napoleon to Egypt as an instance of incorrect strategy. — The invasion of the Crimea in a sense analogous. — The capture of Bomarsund conducted in full accord with all the rules of naval warfare. — Long series of bombardments com- mencing with Algiers. — Syrian coast towns and Acre. — Odessa. — Employment of steam and sail on precisely the same duty and in the same way. — Sweaborg, a continuation of the old methods. — Bombardments by the Chilians of Peruvian coast towns. — The Angamos. — Long-range bombardments less novel than they seem : chief change from mortar to gun. — Sfax ; range of bombardment still extended. — Alexandria; ranges governed by geographical conditions. — Former lessons not disturbed. — Charleston, and the four attacks ujjon it ; two against rule and unsuccessful, two in accordance with rule and successful. — Other attacks on territory by the Federals. — The French fleet in the Baltic in 1870 ; remarkable prevalence of law. — Nothing to show that the old rules of war have changed. Those who have described the incidents which together make up the story of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, have seldom with- drawn themselves far enough from the details of the narrative to observe that, from beginning to end, the results were governed by law. That law, preceding chapters have given us pretty ample means to comprehend, and if we rightly exercise our faculties we shall have no difficulty in pronouncing that Napoleon wrongly set about his work. How far the whole scheme was visionary, and whether, supposing all had succeeded to his wish in Egypt, it would really have been possible to strike at India from that position, we need not argue. Our point is that Napoleon in his conduct of the expedition was false to rule, and deserved even worse than the loss of a fleet and an army which attended his misconception. No doubt the conditions under which the expedition was pre- pared were tempting. In December 1796 Sir John Jervis had been 400 NAVAL WARFARE. forced out of the Mediterranean by the junction of the French and Spanish fleets, making up 38 sail of the Hne against Sir John's 15, and no attempt had been made to re-enter it. In February 1797 the Spanish fleet, saihng from Cartagena to Cadiz, had been 27 sail of the line strong ; 25 of these felt the weight of Jervis's arm on the celebrated Valentine's day, but his fleet was still only 15 sail of the line, reinforcements from England having been dis- counted by an equal number of casualties. But the battle of St. Vincent left the Spanish fleet at Cadiz still 28 sail of the line in May, watched by St. Vincent with only 21. The French fleet of 12 sail of the line remained intact at Toulon, and there were from 12 to 15 sail of the line at Brest. The Dutch fleet which had encountered Duncan at Camper- down in October 1797 had been 15 sail of the line, was thus reduced to 6 only. The opening of the year 1798 therefore found some 60 sail of the line of the old stock, disposed in four of the enemy's ports, while general belief in France magnified the possible additions. England was troubled with alarms of invasion either of Ireland, Scotland, or the south coast of England. It was probably this fear which dictated the retention of such a large proportion of the ships at home, and continued the policy of abandoning the Mediterranean to the French at Toulon. The Channel fleet in the early part of the year 1798 was nominally 47 sail of the line, but some 18 of them do not appear to have acted at all in home waters unless they were held in reserve at anchor. In April there were only 17 ships of the nominal Channel fleet at sea, 6 under Sir E. Curtis off the coast of Ireland, and 10 under Lord Bridport at Brest, while one was on detached service with Warren off the French coast. At the same time, St. Vincent only had about 23 sail with him to watch Cadiz. In the North Sea there was a British fleet of nominally 19 sail ; while the needs of a maritime empire absorbed some 10 sail of the line in convoy duties, 16 in the West Indies and 11 at the Cape of Good Hope and in the East Indies. Nominally, we had 118 sail of the line (including 50-gun ships) in commission in the early part of 1798, but it does not seem that anything like that number were available at a given moment. Under such conditions as these, there was really little to lead the French Government to anticipate interference with their pro- ceedings in the Mediterranean, and there was a certain foundation for Napoleon's belief that fear of attack in India would make it ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 401 necessary for England to detach additional line-of-battle force thither, thus making Mediterranean operations still more secure from interference by sea. The assemblage of the force at Toulon was known to the English Government, yet the pressure on her naval resources was so great that it was not till the 30th of April 1798 that Nelson, with 3 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and a sloop, could be detached into the Mediterranean. As there were now 13 sail of the line at Toulon, the dispatch of Nelson^s force was really offering it as a sacrifice. But, as is well known. Nelson was prevented from reconnoitring Toulon by a gale which met him and dismasted his flag- ship on May 22nd, three days before the French expedition, consisting of 13 sail of the line and 59 other war-ships, with 400 transports carrying 36,000 men, sailed from Toulon and Genoa for Egypt. Nelson was not able to reach his rendezvous off Toulon till the 31st May, and by that time had learnt that the French fleet was at sea. Had the English Government not detached 8 sail of the line to reinforce St. Vincent, it is evident that Nelson must simply have returned to Cadiz. But his hopes of a reinforcement kept him at the Toulon rendezvous, and he was joined there, on -June 7th, by 11 sail of the line under Troubridge, making his fleet uj) to 14, or rather superior in number to the French. He was then able to proceed in search of them. It is not necessary to tell again here the well-known story of the pursuit, and the Battle of the Nile. It is only desirable to mention the one point which has not been as much noticed as it deserves, namely, that Nelson, on June 22nd, at daylight, actually saw off Cape Passaro two French frigates, part of Napoleon's force ; and that a line-of-battle ship was also seen by some of the ships. The ships seen were chased by the Leander, and if Nelson had not at the moment received information from a merchant ship which led him to recall the Leander, there can be no doubt that he would have met and destroj^ed the whole expedition at sea.* The ultimate result of this great invasion is well known. The fleet accompanying it was destroyed on the 1st August, and the army, after holding Egypt, but being so cut off from France that efforts were vain to supply and reinforce it, finally surrendered in 1801. It has sometimes been argued that the results of the Egyptian expedition were worth the sacrifice, but such a view is not generally held, and it seems difficult to believe that it was anything but a gigantic failure. * Nelson Dispatches, vol. lii., p. 43. 26 402 NAVAL WARFARE. Had the prospects been much better than they were, the conduct of the expedition was contrary to the plain rules of naval war. Before it started, steps should have been taken to prevent inter- ference by sea, by masking or employing St. Vincent's fleet. If he was left in a position to detach a force equal to the French, the risks were altogether too great to have justified the despatch of the expedition. There was really no object in taking the line-of- battle ships to Egypt, and the exceedingly narrow chance by which a battle at sea was missed on 22nd of June exhibits the danger in a striking light. Had the French line-of-battle ships remained at Toulon, it seems unlikely that Napoleon's expedition could have been interfered with at all, for Nelson could not have turned his back on them in view of the dangers of their junction with the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. But had Brueys in the first instance X)ushed for this junction, it remains possible that no attempt would have been made by England to recover the command of the Medi- terranean, owing to the large force which it would have been necessary to place off Cadiz. The loss of the French fleet at the battle of the Nile was primarily due to false strategy ; and if the French were not strong enough to mask the English fleet, they were courting defeat by employing invasion. Thus the expedition to Egypt was " an adventure," carried out, not in the cool deliberation which wins and holds success, but in a burst of Eepublican enthusiasm which would not stop to calculate chances. It failed, either because it was not properly conducted, or because it ought never to have been undertaken. There is a slight analogy between the French expedition to Egypt and the Anglo-French expedition to the Crimea. King- lake has stigmatized it as " an adventure " also, and there is no doubt that in disobedience to the strict rules of naval war, risks were run which were entirely unnecessary.* The chief breach of rule was the omission to mask the Russian ships at Sevastopol by a sufficient force, and thereby leaving the crowded transports open to devastation by a determined onset. There is no doubt but that the risk was known and felt at the time ; but a general absence of understanding that there always had been, and always would be, rule in these matters, placed the whole of the naval defending force with the transports, rather than in watch upon the only force of the enemy which could interfere with them.f The justifi- cation for breach of rule, was the great disproportion which existed * The Invasion of the Crimea, vol. ii., p. 145. t A watch was, however, kept upon Sovastopul by a frigate. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 403 between the defending British fleet with the transports, and the possible attacking force at Sevastopol ; and rule was yielded to so far as to keep this British fleet entirely clear of troops and ready for action.'^ Then, in the invasion itself, risks were run which were not necessary, and which even more justified the stigma of "an adventure." We have seen throughout these chapters that, assum- ing a command of the sea, suitable ports can always be captured and held on an enemy's coast, and that from them any sort of military expeditions can penetrate inland, resting on the absolutely secure base which the sea, being commanded, gives them. The safe course, the course according to rule, when it was determined to invade the Crimea, was to secure a port in the first instance — Kazatch or Balaklava — and then to operate inland from that base. This, which was afterwards found to be the necessity, should have been, according to experience, the preliminary. In omitting it, the most desperate and wholly unnecessary risks were run. Probably there never was an operation so splendidly conducted as the disembarkation of the British troops on the beach at Old Fort on the 14th of September 1854, yet these were the conditions — At 7 a.m., when the operations commenced, the water was smooth as glass; no enemy appeared to oppose the landing. As the ships were taking up position, only one Russian officer, with his mounted orderly, appeared on the beach, and remained beside his horse for a considerable time, apparently occupied with his note-book, as though he were dotting down our proceedings, certainly neither contemplating a descent upon his shores nor a departure from the rules of chivalry in the receipt of a warning shot. Suddenly our design seemed to burst upon his mind, and he beat a very hasty retreat, narrowly escaping capture, for the landing of the French troops further to the east- ward had not been noticed. By 6 P.M. , 30,000 infantry and 2-t guns, or 4 complete batteries, were landed ; but sunset came upon us with a louring sky and a threatening swell breaking on the beach, a sure indication of approaching wind, rendering the disembarkation of arlilleiy more and more tedious and difficult. At nightfall the weather was so bad, and sea heavy, * " It was upon the English fleet, therefore, that the duty of protecting the whole armada devolved ; and supposing that the enemy were aware of the helpless state of the French and Turkish vessels laden with troops, and of the enormous convoy of transports which had to be protected, he might bo expected to judge that it was incumbent upon him to come out of the harbour and assail the vast dotilla of trans- ports ; for under the guns of Sevastopol the Russians had 15 sailing ships of the line, with some frigates and brigs, and also 12 war steamers, though of these the Vladimir was the only powerful vessel. To encounter this force, and to defend from its enter- prises the rest of the armada, the English had 10 sail of the line (including 2 screw- steamers), 2 50-gun frigates, and 13 steamers of war heavily armed. . . . None of our ships of war carried troops on board ; they were, therefore, ready for action." — Kinglake, vol. ii., p. 145. 26 * 404 NAVAL WARFARE. that the difficult o}5eration had to be suspended. The troops had landed with three days' provisions in their haversacks, but without tents or camp equipage of any kind. Thus was that gallant army exposed for two days and nights on a hostile shore, with no water except what fell from the heavens, not half its artillery, no shelter, and in the vicinity of a powerful enemy.* It is terrible to think what the result might have been had the whole Eiissian force, close to at the Alma, marched upon the British by night when the cover of the ships' fire could not have been available. Looking back, it is plain what the risk was, and how unnecessary it was; it seems hardly possible that had the then authorities possessed any clear knowledge of the principles of naval warfare, a British army would ever have been placed in such jeopardy. A month before this " adventure," all the principles which had for a century and a half governed the successful attacks upon ter- ritory were put in force in connection with the capture of Bomar- sund, the Kussian citadel of the Aland Islands in the Baltic. We have first the Anglo-French fleets in command of the Baltic Sea, and controlling therefore the waters which surrounded Bomarsund. The forts were four in number. The chief, facing a narrow channel between the islands, was a stone fort, semicircular in shape, mounting upwards of 80 guns in two tiers, on the sea-faces, and said to be equally strong on the land face. A thou- sand yards north of the main fort, and the same distance west of it, were circular forts, each capable of mounting 36 to 40 guns, but of course incapable of concentrating any large proportion of them on one spot. There was another circular fort across the channel, and 1,000 yards distant from the main fort, and, lastly, a 5-gun battery 1,700 yards S.S.W. of the main fort, which guarded the approach by sea from the southward. Although it is stated that the main fort was equally strong on the laud and sea sides, it seems clear that the older principles of fortification were here departed from, and that there was no main citadel, stored and arranged so that a garrison might hold out for a considerable time, however attacked. The design of the works seemed somewhat Chinese in character, and contemplated attack upon the sea face only. From the moment that the Allies determined to attack Bomar- sund, it was decided that the navy was to play its old secondary part, and that 10,000 troops were to be employed against a garri- son of about one-third of this strength. * Captain (no\v Admiral Sir William) Mends, in Journal A'. U.S.I. , vol. vi., p. 397. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 405 The next point of arrangement was the assumed command of the sea, and the anxiety on this head is not a Uttle remarkable, seeing the overwhelming superiority which steam had given to the Allies.* Thus Sir Charles Napier writes to Sir James Graham, on July 10th, 1854, apropos of the intended attack — I shall take care to be on my guard against the Russians from Cronstadt. If they come down, so much the better. f The naval force told off to support the attack on Bomarsund was hut 4 steam line-of-hattle ships, with a few steam frigates and smaller vessels ; while Commodore Martin watched the Russian fleet with 9 sail of the line, mostly steam ; and the bulk of the allied fleet was concentrated at Ledsund to support Commodore Martin in the exceedingly remote possibility that an inferior fleet of sailing line-of-battle ships would dare to face, at sea, a superior fleet chiefly moved by steam. Yet the contingency was always present, and provided against. Sir James Graham wrote to Sir Charles Napier that : His block ships, screw frigates, some of his steamers, and a portion of the French squadron would be strong enough in invest Bomarsund, as there was no naval force except gun-boats opposed to him ; and that after detaching these, he and the French admiral would have 20 sail of the line at the neclc of the Gulf of Finland to keep the Russian fleet sealed up. J As for preventing the junction of the Cronstadt and Sweaborg fleets, if they wished it, this, said the Admiral to the First Lord, was utterly impossible, without remaining off there with the whole fleet, and leaving the French admiral and general to them- selves at Bomarsund, which Sir James could never have contemplated. Commodore Martin had 2 steam frigates and three paddle steamers in advance of him, and he would give timely notice should the Russians break ground. This, continued the Admiral, is the best disposition I could make, and I hope all will go right.§ Napier thought the number of troops to be sent was excessive ; he thought 5,000 quite sufficient, as it was not intended to hold Bomarsund through the winter. He wrote again : — The Gulf of Finland was well guarded by Commodore Martin, and he (the Admiral) had taken steps to act, should the Russian fleet attempt to disturb the operations going on.|l The reason why the large ships were not brought up to the fortress was the evident one that they miglit bo wanted to meet the Russian fleet, should an attempt he made by the enemy to raise the siege. . . . * The English fleet alone consisted of 18 sail of the line, of which 12 were steam; 5 steam frigates, 14 steam corvettes, and 4 steam sloops. The Russians had not a single steam line-of-battleship and very few — about 9 — steamers of anj* kind. t History of the Baltic Campaiyn of 1S54, cdhcd by G. Butler Earp, p. 281). X Earp, p. 318. § Ibid., p. 321. II Ibid.,^. 327. 406 NAVAL WARFARE. The French admkal thought of taking the greater part of his large ships to Bomarsund, to keep the troops and ships together. This arrangement rendered it imperative on Sir Charles to keep his large ships in readiness for any attempt on the part of the Russians. He had been strictly enjoined by Sir James Graham not to leave the Gulf at all, and when Sir James found that the bulk of the fleet was at Ledsund, he expressed his fears lest the Russians might suc- ceed in getting out. * On the oth (August) the Admiral expressed his fears to Admiral Parseval (Deschenes, the French Admiral) that the force at Ledsund was being reduced too low. should the Russian fleet attempt to disturb that of the Allies, f These various extracts from a book written in defence and under the inspiration of Sir Charles Napier, are a very ample proof that steam had in no way touched the great principles which govern territorial attacks. We shall see, before we close this chapter, that according to the very latest experience they remain intact. There is no need to describe the attack on Bomarsund. We have had the picture of it over and over again in the successes described in the preceding chapters. It happened that the most convenient landing-place for the French was covered by some of the guns of the 5-gun battery, and these were accordingly silenced by an overpowering bombardment from the ships. The English landing was clear of all opposition. Batteries were then erected to play upon the forts. Fire was opened first on the west circular fort on the 13th August, and it surrendered on the 14th to the French battery at 600 yards. The English battery opened on the north circular fort on the 15th at 950 yards, and by the afternoon it was untenable and surrendered. The main fort had been well shelled by the ships on the 15th, and was about to be proceeded against by the shore batteries on the 16th, when it sent out a flag of truce and surrendered, followed soon after by the last circular fort across the water. A long series of operations of a particular class — bombardments — is ushered in by that of Algiers. I shall touch upon it, and then make a few observations on the similar attacks which were carried out on Acre, Odessa, Sweaborg, Sfax, the coast towns in Peru, and Alexandria. Of these operations, all, it must be remem- bered, were carried out by naval Powers in command of the sea, thus continuing the old rule ; while only Acre and Sfax are cases where bombardment was other than a destructive and punitive operation. It is again worth}^ of observation that the bombard- ment of Algiers, Acre, and other Syrian coast towns, Sfax and * Earp, p. 332. t Ibid., p. 351). ATTACKS ON TERllITORY FROM THE SEA. 407 Alexandria, were conducted against enemies admittedly inferior in every respect, whether moral or material. The attack upon Sweaborg again was made, not by regular men-of-war, but by special gun and mortar boats, the latter differing in no essential point from those which the British had all along so freely used against the Channel ports of France. The sea front of Algiers, extending nearly north and south, l)ossessed a nominally terrific offensive power. A line of connected works three quarters of a mile long, closed the sea face of the town, and for half a mile or so on each side of this, a series of detached batteries fringed the shore, backed by heavier works inland. From a point near the north end of the sea face of the town, a mole in the form of a T extended 400 yards from the shore, and spread to right and left in arms parallel to the beach, and extending 600 yards. The southern arm formed the harbour, within which the Algerian fleet of a dozen frigates, corvettes, and brigs was closely packed. The sea-face of the mole carried works — in three cases of three tiers — which mounted some 200 guns, a few of exceptionally large calibre, besides mortars ; while the shore line of batteries showed over 250 guns along their fronts. But the whole system of forti- fication had this weakness, that there was deep water close up to the mole, and that ships brought against it at close quarters had little or nothing to contend against except the fire from the mole itself.^ But still the force set apart for the bombardment was small enough to show that the British Government, and presumably Lord Exmouth and his officers, did not believe that the actual strength of Algiers nearly approached its nominal appearance. It consisted of six sail of the line, two 40-gun, and two 36-gun frigates, five 18 and 10-gun corvettes and sloops, and four bomb- vessels ; the ships showing a broadside of 344 guns, besides the mortars. This force left Plymouth on the 28th of July, and was ready to leave Gibraltar on the 12th of August, joined by five Dutch frigates and a corvette, showing a broadside of 84 guns. The works had all been closely reconnoitred, and every captain in the fleet had been furnished with a plan of them and his appointed anchorage. On the morning of the 27th of August the whole fleet was in sight of the place, and certain terms of submission were submitted to * The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, by Edward Osier (Appendix). James says there might have been 1,000 guns in all. 408 NAVAL WARFARE. the Dey. This potentate, not seeing fit to respond to the message, the flag-ship of Lord Exmouth, the Queen Charlotte, led in, and anchored with springs on her cable, 50 yards only from the southern head of the mole. The other ships ranged themselves as nearly as possible in their assigned positions north and south of her, and in very close order, so that the strength of the fire was upon the mole itself. The Dutch formed the extreme south of the line, and the bomb-vessels lay 2,000 yards outside. The conduct of the Algerines as the ships approached was a proof to Lord Exmouth that the difterence between their moral and material force was quite as great as it had been estimated. Not a gun was fired from the land until the Queen Charlotte was seen to be quietly lashing herself to the main-mast of an Algerine brig fast to the shore. At the time, the mole was crowded in front of the works by a gazing crowd of two or three hundred people, to whom Lord Exmouth personally signalled to move out of the way of the broadsides immediately to follow. Not till then were three guns fired at the ships, replied to first by the whole power of the 100-gun three-decker, and then of every other ship as fast as the guns would bear. It was towards three o'clock in the afternoon that the action began, and in smoke and confusion was continued until 10 p.m. The Queen Charlotte then cut her cables and put to sea, followed by the remaining ships; and by two o'clock on the morning of the 28th every ship was out, and the bombardment of Algiers was over. Besides the regular men-of-war and bomb-vessels engaged, a numerous flotilla of ships' and other boats firing rockets and guns were employed between the ships, and at a little after 9 p.m. an explosion vessel, charged with 143 barrels of gunpowder, was run ashore and blown up on the north end of the mole. The fire of the Queen Charlotte brought down the whole of the batteries on the south end of the mole in three broadsides, exposing the vessels in the harbour to destruction, and leaving the works behind the mole open to the storm of shot. The shipping was burnt ; the upper tiers of guns on the mole and many of the town works were silenced, and the town was on fire in several places ; but it does not appear that the ships — even if they had not exhausted all their ammunition, which they had — could have remained in position. The amount of ammunition fired away by the ehips was tremendous, amounting for the G line-of-battle ships and 4 frigates to over 39,000 rounds, while the Dutch are reported to have fired over 10,000 rounds, the total weight of ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 409 round shot being estimated at 500 tons/'' The loss of hfe and limb in the ships was heav}'', amounting between Dutch and EngHsh to 141 killed and 742 wounded. One of the ships, the Impregnable, is stated to have received 233 shots in her hull, and she lost 210 in killed and wouncled.t The operations against the coast of Sj'ria in 1840, which involved bombardments by ships, of Beyrout, Djebail, and Sidon, and culminated in that of Acre, took place under somewhat exceptional circumstances. But the rule of war was not neglected which required the masking of any naval force which could by possibility interfere by sea. Such naval force as Mehemet Ali possessed, was closel}- watched by a British force off Alexandria during the whole time that hostilities lasted. Again, though bombardment was freely used, the country'- was not an enemy's country, for the towns bombarded and captured were friendly Turkish possessions, temporarily in the hands of hostile Egj-ptian garrisons. The object was to drive these garrisons out of Syria, and Turkish troops already possessing more or less hold on the land, co-operated with troops landed from the sea, in the general scheme of operations. "What lessons may be drawn from these coast attacks must there- fore be modified by these special considerations as well as by our knowledge that there was considerable difference in all cases between the nominal and the actual strength of the places attacked. Beyrout was partially bombarded by the ships, while a large Turkish and British land force lay in the vicinity. It was not a place capable of much resistance, and it was hoped that the Egyptian garrison would withdraw to save effusion of blood. The Governor dechning, the forts were again bombarded on September 11th, but still without result. But it was afterwards evacuated in consequence of the movements of the Turkish troops in its rear. Djebail was a small fortress, and was bombarded to cover the attack by a storming party landed from the Carysfort, Dido, and Cyclops steamer. The immediate attack failed, but the place was evacuated the same night. The capture of Sidon was effected on the 27th September by the fire of an 84-gun ship, the Thunderer, an Austrian frigate, a * Nine hundred and sixty-six 13 and 10 inch shells were thrown in by the bomb- vessels. t See Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the Year 1S1(>, by A. Salame ; James, vol. vi., p. 5G9 ; Life of Admiral V^isroinit Esmouth, by Edward Osier, p. 204. 410 NAVAL WARFARE. Turkish corvette, and a sloop, together with four steamers, the Cyclops, Gorgon, Stromboli, and Hydra, covering the landing of a sufficient body of troops. The business was quickly done, and the garrison of 3,000 men submitted to the force of 1,000 men landed against them, the loss of the attacking party being but 35 in killed and wounded. The capture of Acre was on the principle of the capture of Sidon, or, farther back, of the capture of Porto Bello. The belief, which turned out to be well founded, was, that if the ships could be brought sufficiently close to the walls, the fire might be subdued to a point permitting of the landing the British artillery and engineers, together with a division of Turkish infantry, which was held to be sufficient force to overcome an Egyptian garrison said to number 5,000 men. The plate, which is copied from that in Yonge's Naval History,^ sufficiently illustrates the nature of the attack. The ships took up their positions in the early part of the 4th Nwember 1840, and fire was opened on the works about two o'clock in the afternoon, and continued till near dark. The garrison at first replied with vigour, but with small effect, owing to the badness of the aim. But in a couple of hours one of the principal powder magazines, which was at the back of the town, exploded with most destructive effect, two whole regiments under arms being cut off. The garrison was paralysed by the accident. The fire slackened, and in half an hour ceased altogether. The Egyptians evacuated the place in the night, which was occupied by the British and Turks next morning. None of the ships were materially damaged ; and the loss in killed and wounded did not exceed 60 men.f The attack on Algiers and the operations against the Syrian coast towns exhibit signs of transition in the material of war. Congreve rockets, which we had not before heard of at sea, were used against Algiers ; and on the coast of Syria, steam was doing its part. But it is well to note that here, as later, steam and sail were employed indifferently on the same work. We are so far from observing any change in the method because of steam, and because few heavy shell guns, in the case of the Vesuvius, Gorgon, Stromboli, and Phoenix, had taken the place of many light guns in the frigates and line-of-battle ships, that the sailing ships have the inshore and the steamships the offshore position. Only the * The plato of Bomarsund is from the same source. t The War in Syria, by Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., vol. i., p. 196 Yonge's Naval Ili^fonj, vol. ii., p. 532. I / /*' ' Pique jBellerophao. (}Th'u, '^^-Vi^Pri'ncess Charlotte \] PonerFul.- '" ( Revenue Q^Vesu ^^"rgo vius St. ^!\_/(orth Toner 9l (\ Strom i?o/i St Lipsia ■ ^^£- Talbot ^ . ^ , ^ LarysH — CZ>- Casta. _ . ^ .^ -^® r — > tmntmrph Guerriera _ ^ — ^ i — > - ° Hazard 'yowy^ WasD^ Turkish Flag Ship ,k oeSouih_D,risJon^i ACRE AAA B C D.D. E F Wst/ 25 Feet high Cavalier Fort Ancient Mole Rums of Ancient Forts Sea Gate Position oF enploded macazme Q Engl/s/> Ships i Austrian D" 5 hirkish D° ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 411 advantage of more perfect locomotion is taken advantage of when Sir Robert Stopford, the British Commander-in-Chief, transfers his flag from the Princess Charlotte three-decker to a steamer. Hence our chief observation must be that there is not, up to 1840, any sign of a change either in the principles of strategy or of tactics in the attack from the sea upon territory. We therefore pass to the next prominent attack upon territory from the sea, the bombardment of the forts of Odessa on the 22nd of April 1854. The object of the demonstration, for it was not really more, was i^unitive, and 3'et care was taken that it should not be so. Odessa had, a few days earlier, fired on a flag of truce, and 4 British with 3 French steamers were detailed to inflict a certain amount of chastisement, not on the town or its ships, but on the forts defending the town. Government ships, and Govern- ment stores. The ships attacking naturally kept under way, as the force was not nearly sufficient to settle down to the work as at Algiers, and while this limited the damage to the ships — although the Vauhan, one of the French steamers was compelled to with- draw — it limited the damage done on shore. Gun-boats with rockets afterwards assisted in the bombardment, but as if to em- phasize how little in real fact steam had altered the processes of naval war, the sailing frigate Arethusa, under the command of Captain W. Pi. Mends,* took part in the operation side by side with the steamers. At last, a liltlo before noon, signs that oui- cannonade had not been without its eirect began to be seen in the flames which burst out from the fort at tho end of the mole, and from different parts of the works and storehouses which had been most exposed. At one o'clock the fort blew up with a terrible explosion ; the rest of the batteries, most of which were now in flames, discontinued their fire ; and Captain Jones brought his squadron closer in to attack the shipping beliind the mole. Its destruction was easy and rapid. Many of the vessels were sunk bj' our guns; others took fire, and the conflagration lasted throughout tho night and the greater part of the next day. Tho trading vessels under the quarantine mole, and tho unarmed part of the town" were spared; but the batteries, the Imperial docks and port, the barracks, and the abundant supplies of ammunition and military stores of all kinds accumulated in tho Goverment storehouses were utterly destroyed.! This was in reality the same sort of thing which towns on the north coast of France had been subjected to over and over again in earlier times. The only real difference was that the shells were fired from guns instead of mortars, and not against private property. But the bombardment of Sweaborg on the 0th and 10th of August 1855 was in reality a return, on a much more imposing * The present Admiral Sir William I\Iends, G.C.B. t Yonge, vol. ii., p. o&2. 412 NAVAL WARFARE. scale, to the ordinary operations against the French coast towns. Numbers of mortars mounted in specially built sailing mortar- vessels were the engines chiefly relied upon. Gun-boats carrying one or two heavy shell-guns formed the next implements of attack, and only one or two line-of-battle ships, at each extreme of the attack, created a diversion by firing for a short period, at somewhat long range, on some earthworks and gun-boats which formed the flanks of the defence. I have extracted the plan of the opera- tions from Yonge's History of the Navy, but as the object is not to go into detail of attack, I need only observe that with the excep- tion of the French mortar battery erected on an island, every- thing was kept in motion, and the casualties from the enemy's fire were very few. There w^as, however, a great failure amongst the mortars, many of them splitting up, rather than bursting, after a short time. The command of the sea, it may be remarked, was entirely secured by the immense fleet which was not occupied in the bombardment, and was ready to act against any possibly in- terfering force. The result of the bombardment was one great explosion, with lesser ones, and many fires, which continued long burning. The Eussian reports were that the damage was slight. The tele- graphic account to the Eussian Government at 10.17 p.m. on the 10th, was — The bombardment to-day has positively done no damage, either to the fortifica- tions or to the batteries or guns. In these two days the conflagration destroyed some buildings in the island of Stura-Ester-Swartoe.* No lives were lost on the side of the Allies. The Eussian loss was not published. They estimated that the allied fire reached thirty shells per minute, and that 10,000 shells were fired between 7 A.M. and 8 p.m. on the 9th of August. 1 have not seen what the actual expenditure of the Allies was, but I think the general im- pression has been that the allied expenditure on the attack was not more than balanced by the results obtained. Yet I suppose it must be considered as the greatest bombardment which was ever under- taken from the sea. Certainly, nothing resulted from it to alter the general judgment which had long been passed on operations of the class. Perhaps the most novel feature in the bombardment was the great distance at which it was carried on. Eeference to the plan shows that no gun or mortar vessel was nearer than 2,000 yards to the batteries, and that most of the mortar-boats were over 3,000. The method of altering the position of the mortar-boats * Annual Register for 1855, p. 131 ; Yonge, vol. ii., passim. Bombardment of SVEABO ijcatf. /y Lonqor „.. / ^ \sLongor^ '£ Gun Boats \ ff:^y^ Stt-faW Ground Vest'er Grourid Oster Ground La ff para A Posif'on of the Allied Gun tioats the first day. a Pocition to Mtiich A portion advsnceil on the second day C. C ^hf lines marked at each &nd by anchors indicate the hawsers /aid down from each mortar doal ODD DO The circles in which the 6ur boats moved E.E.E.EL. fores which did not exist in 1854 but were added in the winter of that year F F F The works destrorfd by the bombardment G G fft/ssian hne of Battle Ships moored head astern H. H ffussian ships Sunk to obstruct the channel. fi: English Ships # French [;■' # Russian D" ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 413 from time to time, by hawsers laid out ahead and astern, was pos- sibly not new ; and the circling of the gun-boats was but what might have been done in a somewhat varied manner by vessels under sail. All this leaves the chief change in material as the substitution of few and heavy shell guns for many smaller shot guns. It is not necessary to do more than notice the fact that our ships in the Black Sea — chiefly sailing line-of-battle ships — engaged the powerful Eussian forts at Sevastopol on the 17th October 1854, as an assistance and diversion to a bombardment from the land side at the same time. It was a fine exhibition of gallantry, but the Eussian works were not those of Algerines or Egyptians ; nor could they be approached nearer than 750 yards on the side chosen by the English flag-ship, so that the results were no more en- couraging than heretofore for that particular method of attack. A certain amount of bombarding was done by the Chilians on Peruvian coast towns in 1879-81. The naval forces were small on both sides, but it does seem worthy of note that Peru, as the inferior naval power, did not attempt to make territorial attacks from the sea, though she engaged ships covered by shore batteries.^ Nor can the Chilian bombardments by gun and rocket, as at Mollendo and Pisagua, be regarded as regular set attacks upon territory, but rather as casual reprisals upon practically undefended places, where troops had in the first instance fired on Chilian boats sent to destroy wharves and cargo barges, &c. These were minor affairs in ordinary course, which had constantly happened in the days of sail. Yet it ought to be observed that this first method of carrying on the war adopted by the Chilians, which came to some- thing like ignoring the Peruvian navy, was wholly condemned by the Chilian people, and many of those concerned in it lost their commands and reputations. Afterwards, when at Arica, it became a question, on the 4th October 1879, whether the Chilian squadron should bombard the place or go in quest of the Huascar, the latter decision was taken, and the result of it was the capture of that ship on the 8th. This gave the Chilians the command of the sea, and they very soon began to make use of it by pushing territorial attacks. The capture of Pisagua on November 2nd was almost in regular form. * The War on the Pacific Coast of South Amenca, 1879-81, by Lieutenant T. B. M. Mason, U.S.A. Oflace of Naval Intelligence; The War between Peru and Chili, by Clements R. Markham, C.B., F.R.S. 414 NAVAL WARFARE. The main body of the troops was landed some distance down the coast to advance on the place by land, while smaller bodies, covered by the ships, were to land at closer quarters, but chiefly by way of feint and diversion. But the Chilians were able to convert the feint into the real attack, and the main body found the work done on its arrival. Arica was shelled for a time by way of diversion on February 27th, 1880, but the ships drew off, finding that the odds were against them. But the general course of the Chilians was the carriage of troops along the coast, and the landing of them at convenient places for purely military operations. What was in some respects a novel feature in naval warfare took place here two days afterwards, and was continued for six days. The Chilians had bought an Irish cattle-ship, the Belle of Cork, and at Valparaiso they had fitted her with an 8-inch ll^-ton breech-loading Armstrong gun on a revolving carriage. It had a great range, much greater than any of the guns mounted on shore. Immediately on her arrival off Arica, this vessel, which had been re-named the Angainos, opened fire on Arica at from 6,000 to 8,000 yards range. She fired 100 shell into the place deliberately, but it does not appear that any great damage was done."^ This operation, which was several times repeated by the same ship at different places, until December 9fch, 1880, when the gun, on discharge, suddenly slipped out of its trunnion ring and disappeared overboard, was really less novel than it seemed. We have several times observed that when territorial attacks were designed, the ships were accompanied by bomb-vessels, sometimes two or three, sometimes only one. We have just read how at Algiers the bomb- vessels operated at what was then an extreme range, 2,000 yards. It was of the essence of the bomb-vessel's functions that she should throw shell at ranges which were, by comparison long. We have seen the gun and the mortar united at Sweaborg on precisely the same service, and now we see the Angamos alone performing just the functions which a bomb-vessel would have performed had the mortar been adopted instead of the gun. I suppose it is not im- possible that the howitzer may, for this kind of service, take the place of the gun, in which case the change would be even slighter than the Angamos made it.t * Lieutenant Madan. "Incidents of the War between Chili and Peru." — Journal R. U.S. J., vol. XXV., p. 700. Lieutenant Mason does not mention the occurrence. See also Markham. t Remark is offered b}' Lieutenant Madan as to the advantage the Am/aiiiun had bj- the superioritj' of the of range her gun. This was obviously an accident, and ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 415 The change seems to be summed up in the extension of the range at which bombardment is conducted. When the French bombarded Sfax on July 5th, 1881, the Chacal opened fire at 5,000 metres on the Water Battery, and breached it after an hour's work. The land batteries repHed with only 18 discharges. At first their shot fell short, but when they got the range, they reached the ship. On July the 6th, the Reine-Blanche and the Alma fired slowly and at long range, throughout the da}^ upon the town. The Pique and Chacal opened fire in the afternoon upon the batteries at 2,400 metres. These only replied with 13 discharges. On the 7th the same sort of fire was resumed, with the same feeble reply, but on the 8th the bombardment was pressed more closel}^ home by the emploj^ment of the armed launches of the ships up to ranges of 1,000 metres. On the 9th fire was again opened, but only two shots were returned. The fleet with the troops for landing arrived on the 14th of July, and, after further bombardment on the 15th and 16th, at ranges of from 2,200 to 6,500 metres, six battalions and a naval brigade landed, and after slight opposition and loss captured the town.* Here, again, we seem to be met by the reflection that the differences between an operation of this kind in 1781 and 1881 are matters of degree. If the range at which ships attack works for the purpose of silencing them to prepare for landing the troops is increased, the time necessary is correspondingly attenuated. The long range at Sfax was forced on the French ships by reason of the shallowness of the water. Perhaps the ships would have taken no part in the capture of Sfax a century earlier ; but the troops, and the command of the sea -the two requisites — would have been just as clearly demanded in the one case as in the other. The bombardment of Alexandria on the 11th July, 1882, had for its object "the destruction of the earthworks and dismantling of the batteries on the sea front of Alexandria." f Hence it was of a destructive and punitive character, such as the various bombardments of French Channel ports, and those of Algiers, Odessa, and Sweaborg. The position of the batteries, was alwaj's present when, in daj's gone by, a bomb-vessel opened on a fort with her mortars. * "Operations of the French Navy during the recent War with Tunis, 1880-81." Transhited from L'A rme'e Mini time, by Lieut. M. Fisher Wright, U.S. Navy, OflBce of Naval Intelligence, Washington. t Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour's Memorandum, July 10, 1882, given in Report of the British Nnval mid Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by Lieut. -Com. C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N. Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. 416 NAVAL WARFARE. and the lie of the rocks and shoals ^Yhich skh-ted the shore, governed the positions appointed for the ships. Such close quarters as the Princess Charlotte took up at Algiers were not feasible for the British ironclads. The shortest range from the batteries named for any of them was 1,000 3^ards, and that was extended to 3,700 yards in other cases. To go at all minutely into the results of this bombardment would be foreign to my purpose. The leading features are familiar to most readers. The fire was opened at 7 a.m., and continued until 5.30 P.M., when the ships anchored for the night. The ships — 9 battle ships, and 6 smaller vessels — threw 3,198 projectiles against the place, a general average for the battle- ships' heavy guns of 20*6 rounds per gun, or a rate per gun of one round in 314 minutes. * The loss and damage to the ships was not great. There were 6 killed, and 27 wounded on board. But the detail of the damage done to the forts makes up a long list, and seems formidable ; I must sum it all up in the conclusion of the competent onlooker who is my authority. He says, as the result of his observations : " Vessels are not yet, and never will be, able to fight on even terms with forts." This broad issue, so put, is equivalent to saying that all the modern improvements in ships have been met by equivalent improvements in forts, and unless the capacity for engaging at longer ranges be a change, there is none. Other broad issues arising out of the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria are, that the surrender of a place cannot be achieved without troops to occupy any more now than formerly ; and that the command of the sea remains a necessity before such an operation can be con- templated. A narrower issue advanced a stage at Alexandria was the superiority of fire from an anchored ship, and the preference for slow and deliberate fire when the range was considerable. Nothing was settled as to whether close quarters had lost its old effect in subduing the fire of an ordinary battery. Having thus traced out the more modern instances of attack by bombardment from the sea with or without the immediate aid of troops, I return to compare the older and more modern general attacks upon territory, and I take up this thread at Charleston in South Carolina, because, as I have observed, it was twice attacked in two different ways, and with different results, in the last century, and twice with analagous results in this century. In the spring of 1776 it was determined to make an attack on Charleston, then in the hands of the revolted Colonists, and early * Only 1,731 projectiles of and above 7 in. were fired, GENERAL MAP OF Charleston Harbour, South Carolina, Shewjpg Confederate de Fences and obstructions ^■^ Federa/ Botienes Confederate Bafteries Fort Wagner '-O ^ ikoNStOES ' -C Ofisr M,-,? Terpei/o cvnfsintny i ~- ZdOO Ills orpo'Mder one Forts & Ba tteries 1^ III 4^ §1 :58 Sultiyans 1. / 13 2 6 II 19 5 /<* Sumter 2 2 1 s James / S 3 S 1 2 5 8 Mi^ Pleasant 2 Castle Pinc/rney J 1 City Batteries / 7 3 2 City Sn/renchmenls 6 2 4-0 5 19 2 13 2/ 10 . -1 37 ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 417 in May, Commodore Sir Peter Parker, with two 50-gim ships, four 28-gun frigates, and five smaller vessels, including two bomh- vessels, arrived at Cape Fear, where he was joined by General Clinton and a body of troops. The armament sailed from Cape Fear on June 1st, and anchored off Charleston on June 4th. Two days were now employed in sounding and laying down buoys to mark the channel. The main ship channel into Charleston harbour runs from south to north, along the coast of Morris Island ; and the entrance to it is over a bar six miles south of Sullivan's Island, with only seventeen or eighteen feet of water over it. On the 7th, all the frigates and some of the transports were anchored inside it, probably five miles from Sullivan's Island. The troops were landed on Long Island, which lies to the north- east of Sullivan's Island, and is divided from it by a narrow channel. The 50-gun ships were got over the bar later, and by the 15th preparations were completed for the attack. The intention was to make a joint attack in the usual way, and certain works on Sullivan's Island, the forerunners of the ultimate Fort Moultrie, were made the first object of attack, as guarding the approach to the town. It was represented that the channel between Long Island and Sullivan's Island was easily fordable, and it was proposed to place the ships to attack the sea faces of the forts, while the troops assailed them in rear. There were difficulties in moving some of the ships up into their intended positions, but during the forenoon of the 28th June, fire was opened on the works by the bomb-vessels, and by all the ships that could bring their guns to bear. But then the troops found that the water they expected to cross was seven feet deep, and all idea of their taking part had to be given up. The ships carried on the attack for nearly ten hours, but made no sensible impression on the forts, and suffered themselves heavily. It became neces- sary to withdraw them, and the only result was that the ships were terribly shattered, the Bristol and Experiment (50's) lost 111 and 79 men respectively, and the rest of the ships in proportion. The attack was abandoned as a complete failure, and the troops were embarked and taken back to New York. ' The points which chiefiy concern us are the clear intention of making the troops conduct the main attack, and the collapse which followed the failure of the military action. I3ut Charleston was an important centre ; and another attempt upon it, this time successful, was made in 1780. No doubt the * Schombcrg, vol. i., p. 428; Beatson, vol. iv. ,p. l-tl*. 27 418 NAVAL WARFARE. place was now considered very much stronger than it had been four years earlier, but the size of the force assembled under Vice- Admiral Arbuthnot and General Sir Henry Clinton, was altogether out of comparison with the former one ; 7,550 men were now embarked at New York, and the naval force was 6 sail of the line, 7 frigates, and a sloop, all of which sailed from New York on December 16th, 1779, having been detained there for some time by the threat of d'Estaing's fleet, until it was ascertained that on the 1st November part of it had gone to the West Indies, and the rest, with d'Estaing himself, home to France.* The expedition first anchored ojff Savannah, where Clinton gathered information as to the situation of Charleston, and also ordered a co-operating force to march overland to Charleston to his assistance. It seems at once to have been arranged that the fleet should play a very subordinate part in the affair. Clinton landed his army on the 11th and 12th of February at Stono Inlet and John's Island, separated from Charleston by two rivers, the Stono, with the Wappoo Creek, and the Ashley Eiver running between James Island and Charleston itself. Between the 24th and 26th of February the army, except troops left on John's Island and Stono, to cover the communications, was passed over the Stono River to James Island, and advanced towards Charleston. A bridge was erected over Wappoo Creek, and defensive works were set up, while the material for the siege, including guns from the ships, was collected. The next step was to send all the line-of-battle ships back to New York, while Arbuthnot shifted his flag into the Roebuck, a 44-gun frigate. There was a small Franco- American naval force in Charleston Harbour, consisting of 1 44-gun and 1 32-gun frigates, besides 6 other smaller ones and 2 sloops. This force was for a long time able to seriously delay the passage of the British ships over the bar ; but when Arbuthnot persevered, and his ships were actually in the Channel, but still four or five miles from the entrance of the har- bour, the American Commodore, Whipple, first fell back to supj^ort Fort Moultrie, and then further back to the town. He afterwards abandoned all defence by ships. The guns were landed and placed in battery on shore. Ships were sunk between Shute's Folly and the town, and booms and obstructions were j)repared. * Schomberg and Beatson differ as to their dates, the former saying that Arbuthnot did not leave New York till February 11th, 1780, whereas Beatson makes the expedi- tion sight Carolina on February 1st. But the necessity which was felt of waiting for the disappearance of opposing force is worthy of note, and probably Beatson's dates are correct. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 419 But still this naval work, both of attack and defence, was mere diversion. The town had been covered by a line of works on the north side, and this was the real point of attack by Clinton. On the 29th March, the army, assisted by the boats of the fleet, which I think must have come up the Stono Kiver and Wai^poo Creek, crossed over and proceeded to make a formal attack on the works. It must be noted that the Cooper River and the land on the east side of the town was open, and that Charleston could therefore draw in supplies and reinforcements. On the 9th of April Clinton was ready to open his batteries, and on that day the British squadron weighed and ran the gauntlet of the forts on Sullivan^s Island, anchoring on the north coast of James Island, and as it was hoped, out of the fire from the guns of Charleston. In truth, the ships were well within range, but the fact that several shot passed through the Roebuck was concealed, and the enemy was deceived into so complete a belief of their shot falling short, that they left the British ships unmolested in a position where the Americans might perhai^s have been easily destroyed. Instead, they contented themselves with sinking more vessels in Cooper River, and by means of batteries and galleys forbidding approach in that direction. Clinton had been reinforced by the troops marching from Savan- nah, and he was subsequently reinforced from New York, while operations in the field in the rear of the siege works, and upon the Cooper River, tended to cut off the Charleston garrison more and more from outside help. The Admiral on his side made un- successful attempts to push small craft up the Cooper River, but the work of the ships was not done by them, but by their men in landing parties. These first took a post and battery at Mount Pleasant, and afterwards Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Sulli- van's Island capitulated. Meantime the work of the siege went on in the regular way. The third parallel was completed on the 6th of May, on the 8th the General — Lincoln — in command of Charleston was again summoned, and on the 11th he capitulated. If we pass now to the American Civil War, we shall see that though the details of the two pairs of attacks were different, the principles were alike, and the same results from their application followed. We have seen that in both the attacks described, the command of the sea was necessary, but that when it was used in the successful attack, it was more to secure a base for the army by means of the navy, than to employ the latter in direct opera- 27 * 420 NAVAL WARFARE. tions. The Federals in 1863 were fully assured of the command of the sea ; but in the new and remarkable constructions called monitors, with their immense shell guns and their supposed in- vulnerability, they had implements which, perhaps, they were fairly justified in believing would upset and destroy the well- established rules of naval war. However this may be, we find the belief everywhere prevalent that monitors were more than a match for fortifications, and a preliminary trial of the Montauk in January and February 1863 against Fort McAlister on the Ogeechee Kiver, which resulted in the expenditure of two stocks of ammu- nition without material result, only whetted the desire for further proof that old rules still held. On the 3rd of March, three of the new vessels fired on Fort McAlister for eight hours without doing more damage than could be repaired in a night, while some of the vessels were under repair after the bombardment was over, till the end of the month. The Federals at this time had all the advantages of ports to serve as bases, which the British had had in the American War of Independence. They had seized Port Eoyal, between the Con- federate ports of Savannah and Charleston, and had made it their main base, but they also used North Edisto Inlet, an excellent harbour within twenty miles of Charleston bar, and there, at the end of March 1863, the " ironclads," as the monitors were called, began to assemble, and from thence they sailed for Charleston bar on the 5th of April. There were 8 monitors, and the broadside ironclad Neiu Ironsides, bearing the flag of Eear- Admiral Dupont. The early proceedings were precisely as they had been so many years before ; there was the detention at the bar while it was sounded and buoyed, and then the gradual passage over at high water, with the final anchorage inside. It is not necessary for my purpose to go into much detail over the attack. We hear the very old story of the whole expedition being in the hands of the pilots, and of their being unwilling to move till noon on the 7th of April. Then the ships weighed and proceeded along the shore of Morris Island led by the Weehaivken, which had a most hampering and inconvenient torpedo-catching structure attached to her bows. It was intended that the ships should be in line ahead, and about 100 yards apart, but precise order was found to be difficult to maintain, liy the time the head of the line had reached Fort Wagner, Forts Moultrie and Sumter, and all the batteries within range opened fire, and the orders had been not to return it until within easy range of Sumter. But a ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 421 line of obstructions was observed between Sumter and Moultrie, which barred the further progress in that direction, just as, by an earlier system. Arbuthnot's progress had been barred up Cooper Eiver eighty-three years before. Various ditScuIties occurred in getting the ships into accurate positions against Sumter. Some ships got within 500 yards of the fort, others no nearer than 1,000. The fire of the monitors was found to be exasperatingly slow. It was difficult for the com- manders, between their narrow outlook from the pilot-houses and the smoke, to see what they were doing. The ships were hampered by the tides and shoal water, and by the space, which was arti- ficially narrowed by the supposed obstructions. The machinery of the guns failed in unexpected quarters. Bolt-heads and nuts flew about the interior of the turrets and pilot-houses in showers. The mere concussion in the interior, due to blows of the enemy's shot on the outside of the turrets, seem to have temporarily dis- abled the inmates. The modern minuteness of publication gives us data which we look for in vain amongst some of the older chronicles, and in a comparison of the guns in action and of the fire on each side, and its results, we can glean a fairly clear knowledge of how this operation stands when statistically viewed. There were 9 ships engaged against 6 forts and batteries. The ships carried 32 guns in all, of which 7 were 15-inch, 22 11-inch smooth-bores, and 3 150-pounders rifled. Fort Johnstone mounted only a 10-inch mortar; Fort Gunter mounted 44 guns, but the largest were 4 10-inch, and 8 8-inch Columbiads, with 2 9-inch Dahlgrens, all smooth-bores, and 2 Brooke's rifled 7-inch guns. There were 7 42-pounder rifled guns, the remainder being 32-pounders. Fort Moultrie bore nothing larger than 8-inch smooth-bore Columbiads, of which there were 9, the remainder being 32-pounders, rifled and smooth bores, with 2 mortars. Battery Bee, in continuation of Fort Moultrie, carried 5 10-inch and 1 8-inch Columbiads. Wagner had only 1 32- pounder rifled gun in action, while Fort Beauregard on Sullivan's Island and that on Cuming's Point mounted 4 guns between them. There were thus amongst the ships 32 guns, the smallest of which were as powerful as the largest of the guns in battery ; while of the 67 guns opposed to them, only 2 were up to the power of the 3 smallest guns carried afloat. Thirty-three of the Confe- derate guns did not exceed 42-pounders, and there were 10 10-inch mortars. 422 NAVAL WARFARE. If the number of the guns was adverse to the ships, the pre- sumptive power was the other way. The actual power turned out to be very much in favour of the forts, as while they fired 2,229 shot and shell, the ships only fired 139 shot and shell in all. All but 24 shot fired from the ships were directed upon Fort Sumter, which was struck 55 times, Moultrie 12 times, and Wagner twice. At least 346 shot or shell struck seven of the ships. The Keokuk received no less than 90 projectiles, the Wee- haicken 53, the Nantucket 51, and the rest smaller numbers. The number of projectiles that struck the New Ironsides is not given, but the Confederates asserted that she was struck 65 times. If this were so, we should have 19 per cent, of the projectiles fired from the forts taking effect, while 50 per cent, of those fired from the ships struck. =•• The Admiral ordered the ships out again at 5 p.m., being then under the intention of renewing the attack next morning. The Keokuk had withdrawn beforehand, but otherwise it was not sup- posed that the ships had been beaten till they reassembled at their former anchorage inside the bar. Then, as reported by the Admiral — No ships had been exposed over forty minutes, and yet in this brief period, as the Department will perceive by the detailed reports of the commanding officers, five of the ironclads were wholly or partially disabled, disabled too (as the obstructions could not be passed) in that which was most essential to our success — I mean in their armament, or power of inflicting injury hy their guns. ... I was convinced that persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater part of the ironclad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbour to fall into the hands of the enemy. As an earnest of the truth of the estimate, the Keokuk sank at her anchors next morning.f As usual, the weight of the failure, which should have fallen on those who ordered an attack which all experience was against, fell upon the Admiral, who did his best. Dupont was superseded by Admiral Dahlgren, and joint operations were arranged between him and General Gillmore, by way of Morris Island, the latter being already in occupation of Folly Island, with batteries on its north end to cover the advance into Morris Island. Dupont had already laid down the proper functions for the ships : — " Of course, the most that is expected from the action of these vessels is to relieve * Probably the difference is owing to the small targets the ships offered in comparison with the size of Fort Sumter, or to the inherent superiority of converging over diverging fire. t The Navy in the Civil War, the. Atlnnlic Coast, by Rear-Admiral Ammen, U.S.A., p. 91, et seq. ; Journal Royal U. S. Inst., vol. xii., p. 243; vol. xxv., p. 31G. ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 423 the troops as much as j)ossihle, and is to be considered of no other consequence." It can be seen from an inspection of the map that as the troops advanced to the north, their right flank would be covered by the shi^Ds, while the enemy's left flank would be exposed, and any works he had, or might have, to check the Federal advance, would be enfiladed by the ironclads. It was, perhaps, hardly possible to devise a more certain method of attack. Sumter would become untenable when Morris Island was held by the Federals, and the batteries on Sullivan's Island being matched by those across the water would be left open to be taken in flank from the sea ; while the obstructions, no longer covered by fire from both sides, might be deliberately removed by the Federal nav}'. The strength of the method of attack was recognized. On the 10th Jul}^ Gillmore opened his batteries against those of the enemy on the southern shore of Morris Island. Early the same morning four of the monitors crossed the bar and took the Morris Island batteries in flank. By eight o'clock the Confederates began to abandon their southern works and to make towards Fort Wagner. The monitors followed up, searching the sand hills, which were capable of concealing troops, as they proceeded. The Federal troops, covered by the ships, pushed on. From 9*30 a.m. to 6 P.M. the ships engaged Wagner at 1,200 yards range while Gillmore advanced to make his assault upon it. Then they withdrew out of fire for the night. In the morning Gillmore informed Dahlgren that he had assaulted Wagner and been repulsed. On the 19th of July the ships got within 300 yards of Wagner, and between their guns and those of Gillmore's batteries, the work was silenced ; but an assault made at night by the troops was again repulsed. Active operations were now suspended on Morris Island ; while preparations for renewed attack went on until 17th August, but there was diversion by way of Stono Kiver, very much in the form of Clinton's advance in 1783, in the meantime. The point of attack from the land was now changed to Fort Sumter, upon which all Gillmore's batteries opened on the above named day. The ships engaged Wagner and Cuming's Point batteries at short range, and Sumter at long range ; but the return fire was inconsiderable. The land batteries had done such service that the Confederate General in command reported '" Sumter in ruins, and all guns on N.W. face disabled, beside seven other guns." The ships attacked Sumter on the 23rd August at 800 yards, 424 NAVAL WARFABE. but only received six shots in reply. On the 25th there was a pause, in order to make an exchange of prisoners, but the state of Fort Sumter was such as to make the Admiral believe he could pass it with impunity if the obstructions did not prevent him. On the Light of the 2nd September, he took the ships up the harbour to within 600 yards of Sumter, and on the night of the 6th the Confederates evacuated Morris Island. On the night of the 8th the Federals made an attempt to storm Sumter by a boat expedition, but were repulsed, with destruction of boats and great loss of life. Sumter had long been powerless for offensive purposes, but was still held b}^ the Confederates, and the Federal navy, having established itself within the harbour, restricted its operations to those of blockade. Direct operations in fact ceased with the ruin of Fort Sumter. There was not military force enough to follow the plan of Clinton, and the obstructions, being considered fatal to naval advance, had proved their efficiency by the destruction of the Patapsco on January 15th, 1864. The operations of Sherman in rear of the town, combined with the vhtual possession of the port which the Federals held, led to the evacuation of Charleston on February 18th, 1864.- The analogies between the four attacks to which Charleston was subject, are, no doubt, hot absolutely complete. The first attack was entirely naval, not by choice, but by the failure of the troops to take their intended part in it. The third attack was wholly naval by choice, and by a special faith in the monitors which it may be said were far from being regular men-of-war, if they were not specially prepared for the sort of service to which they were put. Admiral Dupont, however, seems to have attributed his failure to the misapprehension of the nature of things, and not to any removal)le causes, and he was careful to lay down a subordi- nate part for the ships in any future attack. That is to say, that, in spite of the radical changes which had been made in the material, the Federals would have been wise to have taken past experience as their guide. The analogies between the two successful attacks are also to be found more in the principle than in the details. Had there been military force enough, Gillmore might have proceeded against Charleston just as Clinton did. But, then, owing to the strength of Fort Sumter as well as to the batteries on Sullivan's and * The capture of the town of Charleston was never in fact contemplated. The real object was the safe inshore anchorage for the purposes of blockade, which was obtained. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SKA. 425 Morris Islands, the fleet could not have passed up to within gunshot of Charleston itself, which the transfer of the obstructive barrier so much nearer the entrance of the harbour than it had been in 1780 might alone have prevented. It was necessary that the troops should, in the first instance, operate upon the harbour defences, and, these being subdued, it only wanted sufficient military force to proceed directly on Charleston. What seems clear is that the navy alone did not consider itself capable of pushing on, even though there was no great barrier of fortifica- tion to oppose. The comparisons which may be drawn between the four attacks upon Charleston make them a peculiarly valuable study ; but it must not be held that exceptions to rule are any more absent from the American steam wars than they were in previous sailing wars. The works defending the entrance to Port Eoyal were so situated, and of such a character, that they could be, and were, reduced by 14 war-ships before any men were landed. The main body of the ships passed and repassed Fort Walker at the south side of the entrance, at 500 to 850 yards, and shelled it till it was evacuated ; and then the fort on the north side. Fort Beauregard, which had hardly been attacked at all, was abandoned. There were about 100 guns in the ships and about 23 in the south fort. Works at Hatteras, mounting 25 guns, were also successfully bombarded by ships alone ; 70 guns on a broadside of the ships being opposed to 25 in the works, at a considerable range. But in these cases the troops were there, or the attacks would not have been made, and they occupied and held the forts which had succumbed to the ships' fire. The type of such actions was already given in Porto Bello, and not impossibly their success depended much on the particular character of the works attacked, and the exposure of the men in them. There were several remarkable instances of running the gauntlet, both past and between forts, in the American Civil War. These operations were practically new to naval forces, and were mainly the result of geographical conditions. Mobile, New Orleans, Vicks- burg must, unless their lessons are hereafter reversed, teach us that forts have of themselves little power to stop a fleet passing them. The attacks on and capture of Fort Fisher, one of the last great operations in which the Federal navy was concerned, must be noted as a further confirmation of the continuity of the rules of naval warfare through all material changes. 426 NAVAL WARFARE. Fort Fisher was the chief guard of the approach to Wilmington by Cape Fear Eiver. It was a powerful work mounting about 75 guns, and it was proposed to attack it by sea and land, with a fleet mounting 500 guns and an army disembarked in its rear. The army being behind time, the first attack was made by the old expedient of an explosion vessel, which proved the accuracy of the historical record in proving harmless. Then on the 24th December 1864, the tremendous armada bombarded. The fire of the fort was subdued and the ships were little damaged, but when an army of 3,000 men landed next day to co-operate with the ships, its General pronounced the fort intact for defensive purposes. The third, attack was made on the 13th and 14th of January by the ships alone, while 8,000 troops were landing and preparing to attack. The final attack was on the 15th, when the troops, sup- ported by the ships^fire, pressed on and on, till at ten o'clock at night the Federals were in full possession of the work. There were but 2,300 men in the garrison, and considering the enormous force brought against the place, we must probably infer that most of the naval fire was thrown away. The 8,000 troops, properly sup- ported from the sea by a much smaller naval force, would, according to experience, have succeeded equally well.* We have seen in the foregoing chapters that the lessons to be drawn from what was not done in the way of territorial attack are often as valuable as any that can be drawn from examples of what w'as done ; and perhaps one of the very latest exhi- bitions of this truth, the proceedings of the French fleet in the Baltic in 1870, is as pregnant with lessons as any that had pre- ceded it. The broad features of the situation were that the French fleet was entirely of the most modern character, all the changes in naval material having there displayed their full force, and therefore operating to produce all the changes in the method of naval warfare which were due to them. Yet it appeared that nothing was due to them. All the methods, influences, and governing causes which made or modified procedure in 1770 are found in full force in 1870, and leave us with the reflection that there is no reason to doubt the teaching of history as to naval warfare, even after it has been in theory revolutionized. The intention of the French in sending Bouet-Willaumez to the ' See JioyaiorCs History of the Nuc If durinij the liehcllion. Ammea's The Navy in the Civil War. The most concise accounts of the principal naval operations in the Civil War are those of Admiral Hamilton (now Sir Vesey) and Captain Long. R. U. S. Journal, vol. xxii.,p. 612, and vol. xxv., p. 310. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 427 Baltic in command of an ironclad fleet, was, in the first instance, the blockade of the German ports, but it was intended to devote it to the making of territorial attacks, while another squadron watched and masked the only existing German fleet at Wilhelms- haven on the Jade, outside the Baltic Sea. Here we have at once the re-establishment of the old condition that before terri- torial attacks can be made, a possibly interfering fleet must be masked. Not only so, but it was as well understood by the French Government in 1870 as ever it had been in former days, that the navy alone was practically powerless to make territorial attacks, and that whether ships were steam " battle-ships " or sailing " Ime-of-battle ships " they did not in themselves represent the proper force for conducting territorial attacks. So when Bouet- Willaumez was told that he would be given 14 ironclads to start to the Baltic with, he was told that La Eonciere le Noury would follow him with another squadron made up of gun-boats, floating batteries, and transports, conducting an army of 30,000 men under General Bourbaki. Bouet-Willaumez never passed beyond the blockading stage in the Baltic, imitating therein the conduct of the larger jDroportion of British admirals in command for years in the North Sea, the Channel, and the Mediterranean. There was a furious outcry against him in France by a people profoundly ignorant of the conditions, yet his answer was complete. He had no troops, no small vessels ; none of the ajDpliances for territorial attack ; and the masking of the very inferior German fleet was not complete. The conditions which had always prevented territorial attacks prevailed, and they were found to have just the same weight as they always had. The French people had assumed wrongfully that steam and rifled shell-guns had changed all things, but it was found that they had changed nothing ; that was all. When Bouet-Willaumez sailed from Cherbourg on the 24th July, he took with him but G battle-ships and 1 despatch vessel. With this force he proceeded to do the only thing open to him, namely, to watch the German squadron. But orders soon reached him (on August 2nd) to pass on into the Baltic, which he did. He reconnoitred the coast, considering the most suitable points of attack when the land forces and small craft, which he still ex- pected, should reach him. He made Kioge Bay his base, and refitted there, receiving a communication from his Government, dated August 7th, which inferred that none of the necessaries for 428 NAVAL WARFARE. territorial attack would reach him, and directly informed him that "it was in a strict blockade of German commercial ports that the chief means of action by the squadron would be found.'"" Subsequently Bouet-Willaumez reconnoitred Kiel again, and other parts of the coast, and then, having received one despatch from his Government which ordered him back to France, and another which bade him stay in the Baltic, he returned to Kioge Bay, and ordered a committee to assemble and report to him as to what might be in the power of the squadron as it stood, to effect by way of territorial attack. This Committee was immediately formed. It was composed of Rear- Admiral Dieu- donne, President ; M. Duburquois, Chief of the Staff ; Lacour, Colonel of Artillery ; and two Captains, chosen by lot. Captains Quilio and Serres, commanding the Guyenne and the Tlietis. On the 12th August they met on board the SurveiUante, and the same evening their report was complete. The following are the terms in which they expressed themselves with regard to the most important places on the Prussian littoral, and the military operations which might be undertaken : — Alsen. — The depth of water will not permit an approach to this point within at most 3,000 metres, a distance at which an engagement would be useless, because of the plunging fire of the forts. Nothing is here possible without a force to land. Besides, it is most probable that submarine mine defence extends along the shore, which it would be indispensable to remove, and which could not be attempted until the squadron was supplied with the necessary materials. Dupj^el and Kappeln. — Completely out of reach from the ships' guns. Too little water in the bays. We could only get at them with armoured gun-boats. Eckernford. — It is easy to destroy the isolated batteries, but they are of no impor- tance, and without the possibility of throwing troops on shore the reduction of the forts would be insignificant. Kiel. — It would be necessary to employ the whole force of the squadron. The success of gun-fire uncertain, on account of the height of the forts above the shore, and the losses certain for the assailants, if they were not able to occupy the forts as they were silenced. The forts of Frederiksdort being destroyed, and the squadron being unable to penetrate to the bottom of the bay within gunshot range of Kiel, on account of the obstructions, the torpedoes, and all the means of defence which have there been accumulated, the French ships would soon be forced to retire without even knowing the result of their attack. Neustadf. — An open town and without defence, but with a bay so shallow that the French ships could not even reach with their projectiles the merchant ships which are anchored some distance from the port, properly so called. It is the same all along the coast as far as — Colberg. — A strong place, besieged in 1807, and attackable (from the sea) at 2,200 metres. Before entering upon action there, it will be necessary to make a reconnais- sance, in order to make certain that the houses along the shore, the Casino in particular, do not mask fortifications which would compel a modification of the plan of attack. Danzitj. — The fort at the entrance to the bay is within range of our upper-deck guns, but only at a distance of 400 metres. The battery guns could not be used else- where with advantage. * The Oniijxiigii in the North Sea and the Baltic, by Reno' de Pont Jest. Journal R.U.S. Institution, vol xxxiii., p. 229. ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 429 Conclusion. — Colber^ and Danzig alone can be attacked ; but the small effect which will result from these two attempts will be of a nature to deprive the French squadron of the prestige of its force. In order to operate usefully, special vessels are required, and the prospect of forcing the enemy to assemble his troops on this part of the littoral. But this end is unattainable without a lauding force.* We thus see that all that was open to this modern steam fleet, whose real function was holding the command of the sea, and not territorial attack, was just what would have been open to a sailing fleet of line-of-battle ships in the same waters one hundred or two hundred years before. The projectiles which might be fired into Colberg or Danzig were larger, and would generally be shells ; their range was greater, and the attack might be conducted at a greater distance from the shore, but otherwise all the jJros and cons were the same as ever, and still as ever was it necessary that the ships attacking should have command of the sea assured. The proof came immediately. There remained, then, Colberg, and Vice-Admiral Bouet prepared to make some serious demonstration against this town, when he received, on the night of the 13th August, a dispatch which informed him that the Prussian fleet had left the Jade, and had passed up the Coast of Jutland to enter the Baltic. The fact might be true, for it was possible that Prince Adalbert might have learnt the departure of Admiral Fourichon from Cherbourg, and had left the Jade to seek the shelter of Kiel, which he thought might be attacked. In the face of this contingency, the Commander-in-Chief of the squadron did not hesitate an instant ; he hastily drew his ships together, and proceeded towards the Great Belt, to oppose the passage of the enemy's vessels, and to offer them battle. The attack upon Colberg was thus postponed by the threat of an inferior force, just as, so many years before, Newport had been saved by the threat of the inferior force of Howe. It was not, perhaps, that there was a fear of what the inferior force of the enemy might do, or attempt to do, directly. It was just the impossibility that a commander whose operations depended on his supremacy at sea, could allow that supremacy to be even questioned by the appear- ance of the enemy's fleet at sea and unfought. The information was subsequently fomid to be false, and again preparations were made for the attack on Colberg. When within 80 miles of the place, a gale of wind decided a rendezvous at Kioge Bay, and there true news reached Bouet-Willaumez that the French squadron had raised the blockade of the Jade. Col- berg was once more saved ; the Admiral felt bound to give the place up, and to make his dispositions to defend the Great Belt. Here, therefore, we see that under the latest conditions, as under the earliest, even so simple an operation as the distant and merely * Rene do Pont Jest. R.U.S. Journal, vol. xsxiii., p. 230. 430 NAVAL WARFARE. punitive or destructive bombardment of a place cannot be under- taken unless possibly interfering naval forces of the enemy are first masked. As if to conclude my argument, and make it unanswerable, we have the great defeat of the Italian fleet off the Island of Lissa in 1866 by the Austrians, which has been already alluded to. Here all the law that history had been so long elaborating was set at defiance. The Austrian force at Pola — supposed inferior — was unwatched by even a single cruizer. Persano proceeded to bom- bard the forts of Lissa without a notion of what the Austrian movement might be. He had run counter to historial teaching in making bombardment the first and main attack on the island, instead of first landing the troops and making the ships play the subordinate part in co-operating with them. He had fired away most of his ammunition, and was, on the 20th July, in the middle of landing the troops, when the Esploratore, the only ship in the shape of a look-out which he had established, signalled at about eight o'clock in the morning, the enemy in sight. They were so close that in two hours and a half, Tegetthoff had made his cele- brated signal to the ironclads to rush upon and sink the enemy, an enemy which, owing to its mistakes, was totally unready to meet him and suffered the defeat it had courted. I think, therefore, that these chapters leave us under the infe- rence that certain conditions — command of the sea, sufficient and well-handled land forces, landings either away from the batteries, or after their fire has been temporarily silenced, proper appliances and small vessels — have always been necessary to secure the suc- cess of territorial attack, and that there is at least nothing in recent times, to show that the rule has in any way changed. 431 INDEX. Acadia, 257. Achates (ship), 28, 236. Acre, 222, 406, 409, 410. Actiuui, 228. Active (ship), 182, 183. Admiral, the Lord High, 82. Admiralty, 173, 188, 191. Adalbert, Priace, 429. Adelentado, 19, 22. Africa, West Coast of, 7, 50, 77, 176, 211, 263. Agele, 319. Agincourt Road, 180. Aiguillon, Duke d', 136, 143. Aix, 164. Aix (Isle de), 175. Aix Roads, 179, 180, 356, 359, 360, 361, 362. Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 92, 356, 362. Ajaccio, 318. Aland Islands, 404. Albania, 27. Albany, Duke of, 3. Albemarle (see Monk). Alexandria, 166, 219, 222, 406, 407, 409, 415, 416. Algeciras, 370. Algiers, 217, 222, 406-408, 410, 411 414-416. Alicante, 111, 296, 313. Alison 199. Allemand, 180, 186, 190, 195-198. Allemonde, Admiral, 126. Allen, Sir T., 45, 56, 59. Alliance, Spanish, 158. Alma (ship), 415. Alma, River, 404. Almirante, 295. Alsen, 428. Altea, 296, 309, 312, 313. Alva, Duke of, 29, 228. Ambassadors, Dutch, 34. Ambleteuse, 175. Ameland, 72. America (ship), 264. America, 29, 186, 207, 245, 320, 382, 387. America, North, 150, 160, 211, 257, 377. America, South, 7. Amherst, General, 356. Amiens, Peace of, 92, 169. Amsterdam, 68, 169. Andalusia, 298, 301. Angamos, 414. Anglo-Dutch fleets, 130. Anglo-Dutch War, 80. Anguilla, 357. Annapolis (see Port Royal). Aimtinciado (ship), 236, 237, 239. Anson, Captain, 135, 332, 360, 362. Antelope (ship), 258. Anticosti Island, 322. Antigua, 187, 188, 191, 208, 249, 250, 252, 255, 256, 258, 259, 320, 323, 324, 332, 351, 385, 386, 393, 394. Antilope, 28. 432 NAVAL WARFARE. Antin, Marquis d', 337, 338. Antwerp, 29. Aquitaine, 28. Arbuthnot, Vice-Admiral, 418, 421. Archeologia, the, 236. Ardrossau, 136. Arethusa (ship), 411. Arica, 413, 414. ArJc (ship), 235, 236, 241. Arh Royal (ship), 8. Arlington, Lord, 60, 62. Armada, the Spanish, 8, 10, 11, 82, 108, 227, 228, 230, 242, 243. Arminach, 28. Arthur, Colonel, 290. Ashby, Admiral Sir John, 126. Ashley River, 418. Association (ship), 288. Atlantic, 158, 160, 190, 207, 357, 362, 373, 374, 378. Austerlitz, 199. Austria, 200. Ayscue, Sir Geora:e, 34-37, 47, 54, m. Ayde, 28. Azores, or Western Islands, 10-13, 15-20, 22, 189, 191, 192. Balaclava, 403. Balearic Isles, 183, 295. Baltic Sea, 7, 8, 53, 57, 158, 204, 331, 332, 404, 426-429. Baltimore, 246. Bankert, Admiral, 58, Q'?, 69, 72. Bantry Bay, 108, 157, 165, 168, 220, 246, 379. Barbados, 34, 61, 78, 183, 184, 186-188, 191, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 258, 260, 289-291, 384, 387, 388, 390, 394, 395. Barbary, 27. Barca-longa, 86. Barcelona, 182, 183, 271, 272, 295, 296, 298, 309, 311, 312, 324, 325> 371, 380. Barcelo, Don, 369. Bareil, Commodore, 132. Barfleur, 124, 126, 164. Bark of BuUein, 28. Barnet, Commodore, 358. Barradera, 340. Barrington, Rear- Admiral, 384, 385, '387, 388, 391, 392. Barrow, 234, 238. Bart, Jean, 131. Baskerville., 15. Basque Roads, 135, 136, 281. Basse Terre, 250, 254, 292. Bastia, 317. Batacaloa, 396, 397. Battery Bee, 421. Bayonne, 234. Beachy Head, 109, 119, 122, 259. Beachy Head, Battle of, 120-123, 127. Beatson, 395. Beaufort, Duke of, 53, 58. Beauregard, Fort, 421, 425. Beausejour Point, 390. Belle of CorJc (ship), 414. Belleisle, Island of, 130, 144, 277, 278, 397, 398. Belfast, 117. Bellona (ship), 397. Belts, the, 204. Benbow, Admiral, 281, 289-291, 293. Bengal, Bay of, 377. Bergen, 50, 51, 66, 68, 74, 76, 146. Berkeley, Lord, 54, 268, 269, 275, 277, 292. Berryer, Marshal, 143. Berteaume Bay, 186, 207, 270, 276. Bettesworth, 188, 190, 191. Beyrout, 409. Bideford (ship), 132. Bideford, 349. Bierne, 28. Billingsley, Captain Rupert, 280, 281. Biscay, Bay of, 137, 158, 192, 232, 242. Black Sea, 204, 413. Bhike, 33-39, 46, m, 7Q, 89. Blakeney, General, 363, 365. Blauac, Count de, 259, 277. Blockade, 18, 19, 21, 41, 42, 51, 53, 55, ()0, 62-64, 68, 116, 139, 145, 157-159, 175, 179, 180, 189, 190, 195, 196, 201, 427. Boarding, 87. Boca Chica, 335, 336, 340-342, 345. INDEX. 433 Bodley, Commodore, 40, 66, 77. Boraarsund, 404-406. Bomb Vessels, 137. Bombardment, 130, 137, 147, 164, 165, 222, 336, 357, 406-416, 420-422, 426. Bompart, Admiral, 136, 141-144, 148. Bompart, Commodore, 164, 220, 379. Bonadveuture, 28. Bonasolia, 8. Bonifacio, Straits of, 318. Bonnet, the, 26. Booker, John, 263. Borburata Harbour (the Keys of Barbarat), 352. Bordeaux, 45, 69. Border Ships, 102. Boscaweu, Admiral, 138-141, 144, 148, 356. Bosphorus, 204. Boston, 257, 261, 319, 321, 353, 383, 384, 388. Boteler, 259. Bouet-Willaumez, Admiral Count, 426, 427, 429. Bouille, Marquis de, 384, 387, 393, 394. Boulogne, 3, 4, 58, 131, 157, 163, 165, 174-179, 185, 186, 198, 200, 201. Bourbaki, General, 427, 428. Bourbon, Island of, 358, 359. Bourbons, 282. Boys, Commodore, 136, 146. Boysott, Admiral, 29. Bowline, 87. Bi*acket, Commodore; 45. Brandaries, 57. Brandenburg, 53. Brava Point, 352. Breame, 30. Breda, 59. Brenton's Ledge, 381. Bretagne (ship), 155. Brett, Commodore Sir P., 136. Brest, 3, 4, 14, 53, 59, 110, 111, 113, 122-124, 127, 130-133, 136-138, 141-148, 150, 15S, 156-lGO, 163-165, 169, 171, 172,174,175,177-180,185,186, 189, 190, 192, 195-198, 200, 201, 207, 217, 220, 246, 247, 267-270, 275, 276,278,280, 294-296, 308, 355, 356, 359, 360, 361, 362, 368, 369, 371, 397, 398, 400. Bridger, Sir Thomas, 78. Bridport, Lord, 165, 168, 400. Brighton, 3. Bristol, 349. Bristol (ship), 417. Britannia (ship), 310. British seas, 31, 42, 133. Brittany, 14,27, 150, 175. Brodrick, Captain, 132. Brome, Captain, 264. Brouncker, Lord, 58. Brown, Commodore, 334. Brown, General, 318. Brueys, Admiral, 402. Bruix, Admiral, 165-167, 171,176. Byron, Captain, 357, 359, 368, 381-385, 388-392. Buchan Ness, 34. Buckle, Captain, 139, 141. Bucknam, Captain, 288. Bueuo, Don Alonso Perez de Guzman el, 230. Bull (ship), 28. Burchett, 6, 242, 243, 292, 294. Burford, 334, 335. Burnett, Bishop, 112, 282. Burrough, William, 7. Butler, James, Duke of Ormond, 328. Byam, Colonel, 292. Byng, Admiral Sir George, after- wards Lord Torrington, 298, 302, 308, 312, 313, 316, 317, 327-329. Byng, Admiral John, 363-365. Cabritta Point, 139. Cadiz, 10, 15-17, 22, 45, 84, 111, 119, 138-143, 148, 150, 151, 158, 159, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 173, 176, 179, 182,184-186,192, 196-199, 229-231, 243, 271, 279, 280, 282-286, 296, 298, 305, 306, 308, 328, 336, 337, 339, 36^367, 368, 369, 371, 400-402. Caff a, 27. Cagliari, 182. Calais, 3, 4, 30, 130, 131, 179, 237, 241, 242, 276. Calcutta, 365. 28 434 NAVAL WARFARE, Calder, Sir Eobert, 190-195, 197, 198. Calder, Brigadier - General Sir Henry, 385. Callemberg, Admiral, 113. Camaret Bav, 130. Camaret, 186, 207, 269-271, 276, 281. Cambray, 200. Camperdowu, 162, 163, 169, 170, 400. Canada, 11. Canaries, 19, 69, 141, Candia, 27. Candoits, 8. Canso, 353. Cantabiano, 329. Cape Breton, Island of, 322, 353, 356, 360, 362. Cape Coast Castle, 77, 78. Cape Fear Eiver, 426. Capesterre,1254. Caraccas, 351. Cardinals, 146. Carenage, Baie du, 385, 386. Caribbees, 389, 390. Carlisle Bay, 186, 191, 249, 252, 259, 387, 395. Carlskrona, 332. Carrach, 10, 14. Cartagena (America), 10, 274,277, 290, 334-337, 339, 340, 343-345, 351. Cartagena, 158, 159, 162, 166-168, 172,179, 183, 184, 186, 271, 313, 314, 360, 400. Carter, Admiral, 125, 126. Carvel (ship), 83. Carvils, 29, 30. Carysfort (ship), 409. Casco Bay, 257. Cassard, M., 323, 324. Castile, 295. Castiliaus, 27. Castillo Grande, 340, 343. Castle, the, 300. Catalonia, 271, 272, 309, 311-313. Cathcart, Lord, 337, 338, 341. Catholic League, 11, 14. Caylus (Chevlus), Chevalier de, 357. Centa, 111, 124, 138. Centaur (ship), 140. Centurion (ship), 302. Cerberus (ship), 382. Cette, 318, 319, 324. Cevennes; 318, 319. Ceylon, 379. Chacal, 415. Chagres, 336, 338, 351, 352. Chama, 78. Chamba, Battery de, 340, 341. Channel, the, 6, 12, 14, 15, 17-19, 24, 33-36, 38, 39, 59, 64, 66, 109, 110, 112, 113, 124, 131-133, 143, 151-153, 155, 156, 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, 168, 171, 173, 176-178, 185, 190, 192, 194-196, 198-201, 207, 217, 221, 229, 232-235, 239, 259, 267, 277, 284, 295, 308, 360, 367, 368, 371, 374, 427. Channel Islands, 125. Chateaurenault, Admiral, 110, 111, 113, 246, 280, 287, 289-291. Chatham, 60, 62, 74, 115. Charity (ship), 49. Charnoch, 86. Charles I., 2, 8, 25, 31, 33. Charles II., 60, 61. Charles III., Archduke, 282, 294, 295, 309, 311-313. Charles V., 3. Charles Port, 250, 251, 254. Charles (gallev), 270. Charleston, 225, 355, 378, 416-418, 420, 424, 425. Chavagnac, Count de, 313. Cherbourg, 3, 123, 128, 135, 174, 177, 186, 427, 429. Chevalier, 388, 392. Chibouctou (Chedabucto), Bay of, 361. Chimere, 386. Choc, Creek du, 386. Ciudadela, 368, 371. Clarendon, 60. Clarke, 6. Clear, Cape, 189, 207. Clinton, General, 381, 417-419, 423, 424. Clyde, Firth of, 136. Cobham, Lord, 330, 331. Cochrane, 186, 188. Cochrane, Lieutenant-Colonel, 341, 347. Codrington, General, 249, 252, 253, 255, 256, 260, 261, 292. Coetlogon, M., 281, 290, INDEX. 435 Col berg, 428, 429. Collenibine, Greueral, 294. Colliber, 76. Collingwood, 192, 201. Colt, Colonel, 261. Columna Rostrata, 72. Comef (ship), 73. Command of the sea, 24, 33, 38, 39, 43, 46, 53, 65, 73, 78, 106-109, 123, 129, 134-136, 149, 150, 162, 170, 185, 201-205, 207, 224. Commerce, 2, 25, 80. Commerce, attack and defence of, 5-7, 26-33, 43, 46, 50, 51, 65, 76-78, 81, 82, 93, 94. Commerce, Dutch, 32-39, 42-45, 47, 56, 57, 66-68, 74, 81, 106, 107, 212, 394. Commerce, English, 17, 32, 34, 36, 53, 59, 66. Commerce, Prussian, 46. Commerce, Russian, 7. Commerce, Spanish, 11-13, 15, 18-20, 22, 46. Commissioners of the Navy, 55, 84. Commons, House of, 314, 333, 349. Commonwealth, 85, 212. Commomvealth (ship), 8. Conflans, Marshal Vice-Admiral de, 136, 137, 141-145, 148, 171, 227. Congo, 27. Conuonicut, Bay of, 382. Conquet, 3, 4, 128, 142. Constantinople, 27. Constant Warioick (ship), 259. Consul, 161. Convoy, 33, 35, 37-40, 42, 45, 48, 59, 65, 93, 94, 111, 124, 132, 155, 191. Cooper River, 419, 421. Copenhagen, 169, 222. Cordova, de, 151, 369, 371, 372. Cork, 175, 246. Cormantin, Fort, 78. Cornwall, Captain, 33'2. Cornwallis, 174, 175, 178, 189, 190, 192, 195, 197, 198, 246. Coromandel Coast, 358. Corsica, 181, 318, 379, 380. Coninna, 11, 197, 231, 232, 234, 242, 330, 331. Corvo, 189, 191. Council, Priw, 46, 59, 119. Council of War, 37, 115, 249, 252, 306. Coventry, Sir William, 71. Coventry (ship), 145. Cressy, 27. Crimea, 204, 217, 402, 403. Crimean War, 106. Croatia, 27. Cromwell, 42. Cronstadt, 405. Cross, Captain Robert, 242. Cross-ravaging or raiding, 3, 4, 9- 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 36, 77, 84, 207-210, 267. Cross-sails, 29. Cruisers, 59, 95, 98, 100, 101, 104- 106. Crumster, 29. Cuba, 16, 289, 290, 347. 348. Cuddalore, 396. Cul de Sac Marin, 260. Culloden (ship), 140. Cumberland, Earl of, 11, 13, 16, 19,231, 241. Cumberland Bay, 348. Cuming's Point, 421, 423. Cura9oa, 353, 392. Curieux (ship), 188, 190, 191. Curtis, Admiral Sir Roger, 400. Custom House, 350. CijdoiJs (ship), 409, 410. Cyprus, 27. Czar, the, 332. Dacres, Admiral, 186. Dahlgren, Admiral, 422, 423. Dalmatia, 27. Dalzell, Colonel, 351. Dandridge, Captain, 338. Danes, the, 7. Dantzig, 28, 429. Darby, Vice-Admiral, 369, 370, 372, 374. Darce, Don Antonio, 151. Dardanelles, the, 222, 204. Daiien, Isthmus of, 332. Daru, Count, 199. Dauphiny, 28. Davys, 235. D'Aiguillon, Due, 136, 143. 28 * 436 NAVAL WARFARE. D'Arsie, Fort, 398. De Bazan, Alonzo, 12, 13. De Belleisle, Marshal, 143. De Bonfils, Count Lapeyrouse, 312, 381, 386, 395. De Crillon, Dae, 371, 372. De Drucourt, M. 356. D'Euville, Due, 361, 362. D'Estaiug, Count, 369, 381-392, 418. D'Estourmelles, Due, 361. D'Estrees, Count, 67, 69, 72, 265, 280. De Forbin, Count, 308, 316, 324. De Frontenac, Count, 257. De Galles, Admiral Morard, 379. De Gata, Cape, 183. De Gennes, M., 266. De Gent, Admiral, 50, 61-63, 67. De Grasse, Count, 374, 388, 392- 395. De Guiehen, Admiral, 371, 372. De Gunn, Sir Bernard, 60. De Haan, Admiral, 71. De La Gallisonniere, Marquis, 363-365. De Lafayette, Marquis, 381, 383. De Langara, Don Juan, 162, 368. De Lezo, Don Bias, 336, 340. De Liefde, Vice- Admiral, 73. De Morogues, Captain, 136, 148. De Noailles, Colonel, 390. D'Orvilliers, 151, 153-155. De Pointis, Admiral, 274, 277, 305-308, 339. De Recalde, Don Juan Martinez, 240. De Eoquefeuille, Admiral, 131- 133. De Ruiter, 35-37, 50, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 77, 245, 265. De Saxe, Count, 131. De St. Croix, M. 398. De Torres, Admiral, 337, 342, 348. De Tourvrille, Count, 110-113, 116, 118, 122, 124, 127, 129-131, 247. De Witt; 36, 37, 40-42. De Witt, Cornelius, 62, 114. De Valdes, Don Pedro, 240. Deal, 40, 160. Dean, Admiral, 39, 40, 66. Decres, 176, 185. 198, 199, 202. Defiance (sliip\ 193. Delaware, 381. Delaval, Sir Ralph, 120, 124-126, 128. Demarara, 177. Demi-Culverin, 28. Denmark, 53, 158, 169. Dent, Captaiu, 357. Deschenes, Admiral, 406. Desirada Island, 259. Desiree (ship), 164. Desmolins, 264. Deventer, 30. Diamond Rock, 188. Diamond (ship), 321. Didon (ship), 186. Dido (ship), 409. Dieudonne, Rear- Admiral, 428. Dieppe, 3, 53, 58, 130, 275. Dilkes, Admiral, 301, 302, 307, 308. Dillon, Colonel, 390. Disbrowe, 89. Discourse of the First Invention of Ships (Raleigh's), 26. Djebail, 409. Dogger Bank, 52, 68. Dominica (Dominique), 176, 177, 187, 191, 208. 261, 338, 380, 384, 387. Donna Maria, Cape, 290. Douarnenez, 271. Dover, 39, 40, 121, 125. Dover Castle, 40. Dover, Straits of, 33, 35, 36, 41, 58, 66, 161, 200, 232, 244. Downs, the, 20, 34-38, 52, 59, 66, 75, 124, 132, 133, 136, 174, 175, 198, 316. Drake, Sir Francis, 10, 11, 14, 22, 83, 228, 232, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 339, 392, 393, 395. Drabler, the, 26. Dreadnought (ship), 28. Du Casse, Admiral, 254, 267, 281, 290, 291, 315-317, 320. Duburquois (M. de), 428. Duckworth, 166, 171, 222. Dudley, Sir Robert, Duke of North umberland, 84. Duff (Capt.), 142, 144, 145. Duguay Trouin, 323. Dulce (ship), 154. Duke William, 161. I INDEX. 437 Dupont, Rear-Admiral, 420, 422, 424. Duppel, 428. Dumas, 199. Duncan, Admiral (afterwards Lord Camperdowu), 71, 400. Diinfjeness, 132, 133. Dunkirk, 7, 36, 39,54, 58, 130-1 ^2, 136, 164, 174, 179, 240, 242-244, 275, 308, 316. Dunose, 114. Dunster, Major, 347. Dure, 237, 238. East India Company, 20. East India Comjiany (French), 358. East India Ships, 41, 50, 51, 63, 68, 72, 78. East Indies, 7, 30, 99, 357, 359, 360, 366, 368, 371, 379, 392, 395, 397. 400. Edgar (ship), 140, 321. Edgrcumbe, Commodore, 363, 365. Edinburgh, 316. Edward of Maiden (ship), 83. Egmond, 41. Egypt, 108, 109, 162, 164, 171, 175, 181, 182, 219-221, 227, 381, 399, 401, 402. Elbe, 58. Elizabeth, Queen, 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 29, 30, 82, 209, 232. Elizabeth Bonaventure (ship), 8. Elizabeth Jonas (ship), 28. EUiguava, 347. Elmina, 77. Embden, 30. Ems, 50, 72. English Islands, 357. Entick, 6, 255, 292. Epirus, 27. Esjploratore (ship), 430. Esquibo, 177. Essex, Earl of, 15-19, 22, 84, 283. Estapoua, 138. Estreches de Rande,*287. Etaples, 161, 175, 196. Eugene, Prince, 314. Euryalus (ship), 238. Evelyn, 55. Evertsou, 78. Evertz, Vice-Admiral, 63, 66. Excellent (ship), 238. Exeter, 349. Exmouth, Lord, 407, 408. Experiment (ship), 417. Fairborne, Admiral Sir Stafford, 281, 314. Fair Islands, 34. Falcon (ship), 28, 317. Falmouth, 18. Farmer, Colonel, 255, 256. Faro, 329. Farragut, 289. Fayal,' 11. Fear, Cape, 417. Federals, 225. Felix, Mr., 265. Felixtowe, 63. Fenner, 230, 232, 241. Fenton, 230, 232, 241. Ferrol, 17-19, 22, 151, 152,158,159, 165, 168, 174, 175, 177, 179, 185, 186, 189, 190-192, 194-197, 200, 201, 281, 337, 342, 360. Finisterre, Cape, 197, 207, 231, 281, 328, 360, 36 :s. Finland, Gulf of, 405. Fire-ships, 35, 40, 47, 48, 54, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68,. 73, 86, 88, 91-93, 111, 113-115, 126. Firme (ship), 193. Fisher, Fort, 425, 426. Fisheries, Dutch, 33, 42, 46. Fitz William, Sir W., 3. Flanders, 30, 131. Flemyng, Thomas, 233. J^/ora'(ship), 382. Flores Island, 11, 12, 16. Florida, 10. 351. Flushing, 30. Foix, 28. Folly Island, 422. Foresifjht (ship), 28, 236. Formidable (ship), 146. Forth, Firth of, 316. Fortification, nature and use of, 222-225 375. Fort Roval, 188J 191, 261, 387-390, 392-394 Fortune Bay, 289. Foula Island, 34. 438 NAVAL WARFARE. Fouriclion, Admiral, 429. Fowlkes, Colonel, 260, 261. Frances, Cape, 273. Frederica, 351. Frederiksdort, 428. Frejus, 167. French Privateers (see Privateers). French Protestants (see Protes- tants). Freshwater Bav, 114. Fries land, 30, 48, 72. Frigati, 84. Frigate, 86, 95, 98, 104. Frigate Bay, 251. Frobisher, 9, 11, 13, 232, 235, 241. F^lret (ship), 187. Fursis, Duke of, 318. Gabarus Bay, 353-356. Galerata, 84. G.'tleron, 84. Galicia, 281, 330. Gahgabra, 84. Galleas, 84. Galleon, 9. Galleys, 2, 3, 14, 15, 19, 26, 27, 84. GalUcia (ship), 343. Galliot, 48, 52. Galloper (shoal), 54. Gambia, 263. Gamboa, 264, 266. Gauteaume, Admiral, 179, 180, 185, 186, 188-190,195, 196,198, 200. Gaspe Bay, 321. Geary, Admiral, 142. Genoa, 167, 401. Genoese, 8, 27. George II., 98. George Town, 390. Georgia, 351, 367. Gibraltar, 111, 138, 150, 162, 165, 168, 171, 186, 192,298,300-307, 309, 311, 312, 324, 334, 363- 370, 372-377, 407. Gibraltar, Straits of, 111, 112, 117, 123, 138, 183, 184, 218, 219, 222, 279. Gibraltar (ship), 138, 139, 144. Gillmore, General, 422-424. Glasgow, 349. Gloria Castle, 332-334. Glorioso, 239. Gliickstadt, 58, 66. Goddard, Captain, 322. Godwin, 260. Golden Hind (ship), 233, 238. Golden Lyon (ship), 28, 72. Gonave Channel, 290. Good Hope, Cape of, 160, 235,332, 400. Goree (in Holland), 52. Goree Island (Coast of Africa), 77, 176, 263-266. Gorges, Nicholas, 241. Gorgon (ship), 410. Gottenberg, 59, 146. Goulet, of Brest, 186, 269. Gourdon, Admiral, 186. Gra.ciosa Island, 11. Graham, Sir James, 405, 406. Grant, Colonel, 345. Grant, Major-General, 384. Granville, 130, 276. Graveliues, 35, 37, 131, 241. GraveseDd, 63. Graves, Sir Thomas, 180. Graydou, Vice-Admiral, 291, 293. Great Belt, 429. Great James (ship), see Royal Ja.mes. Great Ship, 51, 84. Greemvich (ship), 3 '^4. Grenada, 187, 191, 367, 368, 380, 390-392, 395. Grenville, Sir Richard, 12. Grey, General Sir Charles, 379. Griffin, Commodore, 359. Grisnez, 196. Groix, Isle de, 277. Grosse Ilet Bay, 394. Grotius, 2. Groyne (see Corunna and Ferrol). Guadaloupe, 14, 176, 189, 191, 252 -254,256, 259, 261, 263, 292, 294, 380. Guadiana, river, 158. Guantanamo, 346. Guariiizo, 159. Guernsey, 4. Gtiernsey (ship), 140. Guiana, 176. Guichen (de), 371, 372. Gun-boats, 106. INDEX. 439 Gunfleet, 115-119. Gunter Fort, 421. Guyenne (ship), 428. Haedik, 130, 277. Hamburgh ships, 48. Hamburgh, 58, 58. Hamilton, Sir Charles, 267. Hamoaze, 112. Hampton Court (ship), 334. Handmaid (ship), 28. Hanover (Coast of), 158. Hanse Towns, 27. Haarlem Gazette, 61. Harman, Sir John, 78. Hardy, Admrl. Sir Chas., 151-156. Harwich, 48, 49, 52, 60, 64, 66. Hatteras, Cape, 225, 425. Havannah, 159, 188, 290, 338, 339, 342, 346-348. Havre, 123, 124, 126, 130, 136, 137, 145, 147, 164, 174, 179, 240, 275. Hawke, Admiral Lord, 135, 136, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 227,356, 360, 362, 389. Hawkins, John, 7, 9, 11, 14, 230, 231, 241. Helder, the, 169. Helvoetsluys, 37. Henry IV.(of France), 11, 14. Henry VIII., 3, 4, 26. Henry VIII., ships of, 8. Herbert, Admiral (afterwards Lord Torrington), 91, 93, 110, 112-114, 116-123, 127, 129, 130, 137, 152, 220, 245-247, 272. Heme, Captain John, 302. Hero (ship), 193. Heroe (ship), 146. Herring Fleet, the Dutch, 33. Herville, M., 313. Hervey, Captain, 363. Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince of, 284, 296, 298, 300, 304. 305, 311. Hicks, Captain, 299. Hill, Brigadier-General, 321. Himani, 340. Hispaniola, 208, 209, 273, 314, 337, 338, 357. Hoche, 108, 157, 379. Hodsdon, Christopher, 7. Hodson, General, 397. Hoe, the, 233. Holland, 149. 158, 169, 220, 243, 377, 392. Hollesley Bay, 174. Holms, Sir Robert, 50, 56, 57, 67, 75, 77, 78, 245, 265. Holstock, Sir Thomas, 7. Home Fleet, 124. Hood, Admiral Sir Samuel (after- wards Lord), 379, 392-394, Hope (ship), 8, 28, 242. Hopson, Admiral, 288. Horn, Cape, 235, 332. Hospital Hill, 390, 392. Hoste, Pere P., 90. Hotham, Commodore, 384-387. Houat Island, 130, 277. Howard, Lord, of Effingham, 8, 15, 16, 231, 235, 241, 242, 244, 283. Howard, Lord Thomas, 12, 13, 20, 22, 231, 232 Howard, Sir Edward, 3. Howard, Sir Thomas, 3. Howe, Adm'iral Lord, 71, 135, 373, 381-384, 389, 429. Hoys, 29, 30. Huascar (ship), 413. Hugues, Admiral Sir Edward, 377, 396, 397.' Hugues, Victor, 176. Hull, 257. Humber, the, 174. Humbert, General, 164, 379. Hydra (ship), 410. Hyeres, 271, 296, 363. Tie de Rhe, 38. Impregnable (ship), 409. India, 164, 359, 377, 399, 400. Indifference, state of the sea, 212. Invasion, 17, 43, 108, 109, 121, 134, 135, 138, 147, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157, 163, 168, 169, 171, 173, 210, 402, 403. Invasion flotilla, I37, 161, 169, 174, 178, 179, 200. Inverness, 34. Ireland, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 26, 109, 110,118,160,164, 165, 174-178, 186, 189, 192, 220, 240, 245, 246, 369, 379, 400. 440 NAVAL WARFARE Irish Seas, 110, 117. Iron Ccastle, 333, 334. Irvine, 137. Isabella (ship), 282. Isle of Wight, 4, 5, 16, 54, 67, 113, 117, 120, 125, 132, 240. Istrii, 27. Italian Fleet, 420. Italy, 227, 291. Iviza, 313. Jacobites, 110, 123, 124. Jacobites, Scottish, 330, 331. Jade, the, 427, 428. Jamaica, 132, 184, 187, 208-210, 216, 252. 258, 264, 267, 289, 291, 293-315, 320, 323, 325, 332, 336, 337, 338, 339, 347, 349, 350, 351, 369. Jamaica, Governor of, 333. James L, 25, 85, 229. James, Duke of York, afterwards James II., 47-49, 59, 60, 67, 89-91, 109, 110, 116, 124, 245. James Island, 263, 265, 266, 418, 419. James's Naval History, 104. •Tenkiusoh, 7. Jennett (ship), 28. Jennings, Sir William, 117. Jennings, Sir John, 308. Jersey, 4. Jersey (ship), 253, 258, 259. Jervis, Sir John, afterwards Earl St. Vincent, 162, 165-167, 170, 173, 193, 379. 399-402. John's Island, 418. Johnstone, Fort, 421. Jones, 411. Judith, Point, 382. Jumper, Captain, 299. Juno (ship), 382. Justin, Count, 243, 244. Jutland, Coast of, 429. Kappeln, 428. Kazatch, 403. Keith, Admiral Lord, 166-168, 1 71. Kent, 38, 190. Kentish Knock, 37. Keokuk, 422. Keppel, 266, 397, 398. Kerr, Captain, 314, 315. Kiel, 428, 429. Kiilala Bay, 164, 220, 379. Killigrew, Vice- Admiral, 111-113, 115-118, 120. King George (ship), 239. Kinglake, 402. Kingston, 267. King William, 247. Kinsale, 20, 21, 109, 220, 245, 246. Kinsale (ship), 132. Kioge Bay, 427-429. Knowles, Captain, 341-344, 351, 352, 357. La BaylifEe, 292. La Botirdonnais, 358. Lacoui-, Colonel, 428. Lafayette, Marquis de, 381, 383. La Gallisonniere, Marquis de, 363-365. Lagos Bay, 148, 183, 184, 286, 297. Lagrange, General, 176. La^Guaira. 351, 353. La Hague, Cape, 125. La Hogue, 123, 127-130, 259, 260, 267. La Hogue, battle of, 125-128. Lamotte - Piquet, Eear- Admiral, 389. Lancaster, James, 20. Laucastei', 349. Land's End, the, 59, 151. Landguard Fort, 63. Languedoc (ship), 382. Lark (ship), 382. La Ronciere le Noury, Admiral, 427. Latouche-Treville, 151, 174-176. Laughton, Professor, 228, 242, 243. Lauriston, 198. Lawson, 39, 41, 49. League, the Roman Catholic, 11, 14. Leake, Captain, afterwards Admiral Sir John, 280, 289, 305-307, 311-313, 316, 324. INDEX. 441 Leander (ship), 401. Lede, Marquis cle, 828, 329. Lediard, 6, 261, 292. Ledsund, 405, 406. Leech, Captain, 264. Leeward Isles, 208, 249, 253, 256, 258, 260, 289, 292, 320, 325,353, 357, 384. Leghorn, 59, 371. Leicester, Earl of, 30. Leicester (sbip), 83. Leith, 174. Lennox- (ship), 299, Leon Island, 283. Les Habitants, 292. Lestock, Admiral, 94, 341, 342, 361. Levant, 8. Levant Squadron, 235, 237. Lewson, Sir Eichard, 20, 21, 22. Libertador Fort, 352. Lillingstone, Colonel, 273. Lime (ship), 281. Lincoln, General, 419. Lindsey, Earl of, 88. Line, the, 88-93. Line of Battle, establishment of, 91-95, 97, 98, 104. Line-of-Battle ship, 95-98, 101, 102, 104, 106. Lisbon, 10, 15-17, 116, 162, 192, 197,;229-231, 234, 239,280-282, 295, 296, 301, 302, 305-309, 312, 313, 324, 325, 336. Lissa Island, 108, 205, 227, 244, 430. Littleton, Commodore, 320. Liverpool, 349. Lizard, the, 23, 154, 185, 232, 233. Lizard (ship), 280. Lloyd, Sir Godfrey, 60. Loader, Captain, 280. Logane, Gulf of, 290. Loire, the, 146. London, 8, 62, 118, 159, 349. Long Island, 381, 417. Lorient, 175, 185, 359, 361,362. Louisbourg, 353-357, 360, 362, 364, 365, 378. Louis de Bourbon, Fort, 264. Louis XIV., 119, 124. Low Countries, 20, 229. Lowestoft, 49, 52, 53. Lower Hope, the, 61, 66, 71. Loyal London (ship), 63. Lyons, Gulf of, 167, 180. Maas. 40, 48, 68, 72. Macartney, Lord, 390, 391. Madalena' Islands, 180, 181. Madeira, 184, 249. Madras, 358, 365-397. Mahon, 364. Maidstone, 145. Majorca, 313. Malaga, 111, 138, 218, 301-304, 307 317. Malta! 1<36J 171, 181. Maucinilla, 340, 343. Mann, 162, 170. Marcouf, Isles of, 164. Marie-Gala nte, 253, 254, 256. Marlborough, Earl of, 49. Marmont, 175. Mars (ship), 191. Marsala, 329. Marseillais (ship), 382, 386. Marseilles, 174, 318. Marshall, Earl, 328. Martin, Commodore, 319, 356, 360, 405. Martinico, 256. Martinique, 176, 177, 180, 184r-188, 190, 191, 209, 210, 216, 254, 258-261, 263, 278,289, 290, 292, 293, 320, 325, 380, 385, 387, 389, 392, 394, 395. Mary (ship), 258. Mary, Queen, 4. Mary, Queen of Scots, 6. Marv, Queen (William's Consort), liO, 119, 120, 122. Mary Rose (ship), 4, 8, 26, 28. 259. Matagorda, 283-285. Mathew, 360. Mathews, Admiral, 94. Mauritius, 358, 359. Mayo, 164. Mazon, Admiral, 185, 186. Mayzara, 329. MazarriBay, 18 ;, 197. McAlistcr, Fort, 420. McCleverty, Captain, 144. Meadows, Brigadier-General, 385. Medina Celi, Duke of, 29. Medina Sidonia, Duke of, 171, 230-233, 235, 239, 240, 243, 244. 442 NAVAL WARFARE. Mediterranean, 3, 8, 40, 59, 77, 92, 98, 99, III, 124, 130, 133, 137, 155, 158, 160, 162-166, 168, 170, 172,175,181, 182, 186, 235, 263, 269, 271, 275, 277, 291,295-297, 308, 309, 311, 313. 317, 326, 327, 330, 366, 367, 373, 379, 380, 400-402 427. Medway, 57 60, 63, 67, 75, 119, 359. Meesters, Mr., 275, 276. Meheniet Ali, 409. Mends, Captain W. R., 411. Mendoza, 369. Merchant Adventurers, Company of, 7. Mere Honott,r (ship), 237. Messina, 181, 327-329 Metternich, Prince, 200. Meuse, the, 35, 169. Mevis, 256. Mexico, 290. Meze, 319. Middling ships, 84. Miguells, Vice- Admiral, 330, 331. Milazzo, 329. Milbrooke Men, 26. Militia, 110, 122. Minho, 158. Minion (ship), 28. Minorca, 135, 166, 167, 171, 182, 271,315, 316,329,363-368,370- 375, 378. Missiessy, Admiral, 177, 180, 188- 190, 201, 217. Mitchell, Admiral, 169. Mobile, 289, 425. Modeste (ship), 140. Mola, 329, 371. Mole, the Old, 299, 370. Mollendo, 413. Mondy, Commodore, 78. Monk, General (afterwards Duke of Albemarle), 39-41, 54, 56, 59, 60, 66, 75, 89, 91, 96, 259. MonJc (ship), 270. Monserrat, 78, 188, 250, 256, 320, 323, 324. Monson, Sir William, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21-24, 45, 83, 87. Montank, 420. Moray Frith, 33. Morbihan, 136, 138, 141, 142. Morea, the, 181. Morlaix, 3. Morne-fortune, 385, 386. Morris Island, 417, 420, 422-425. Moultree Fort, 417-422. Mount Pleasant, 419. Mount Eoyal (Montreal), 257. Mount's Bav, 14, 232. Mountjoy, Earl, 21. Mouse-hole, 14. Mozambique, 10. Munden, Sir John, 280, 281. Murray, General, 371, 372. JVaiacZ (ship), 238. Namur (ship), 139. Nantasket Bay, 257. Nantucket, 422. Napier, Sir Charles, 405, 406. Naples, 166, 181, 182, 329. Napoleon, 108, 156, 157, 160-163, 171, 173-176, 178, 181, 185, 190, 196, 198-202, 219, 221, 227, 244, 381, 399, 400, 402. Napoleonic W ar, 100, 102, 106. Nassau, Prince Maurice of, 30. Nassau, Count, 272. Naval War, opening of Regular, 7, 23, 24, 205-207. Navigation Act, 42- Nelson, 164-166,171,173, 175,180- 184, 186-188, 190-192, 197, 198, 201, 218, 221, 401, 402. Netherlands, 228, 229, 242. Neustadt, 429. New England, 259. Newfoundland, 78, 100, 159, 177, 263, 289, 293, 322. Newark (ship), 140. Newcastle, 28, 30, 38, 59, 69. NeivcasUe (ship), 320, 321. Newhaven, 6. Newlin, 14. Newport, 381, 383, 384, 429. New England, 263, 321. New Ironsides (ship), 420, 422. New Jersey, 381. New Netherlands (see New York). New Orleans, 425. New York, 50, 77, 392, 417, 418. Nevis, 78, 250, 292, 313. Neville, Admiral, 274, 277. Nice, 158, 295. INDEX. 443 Nieuport, 36, 40, 6fi, 243, 244. Nile, 171, 221. Nile, Battle of the, 401, 402. Nombre de Dies, 14, 15. Nonpariel (ship), 236, 237. Nore, the, 55, 122. Norris, Admiral Sir Johu, 132, 133, 317, 318, 324, 328, 332. North America, 99, 141, 374, 377. North Edisto Inlet, 420. North Foreland, 54, 56, 64, 71, 75, 125. North Sea, 48, 51, 71, 7Q, 108, 131, 156, 158, 160, 162, 377, 400, 427. Normandy, 6, 27, 127, 130, 151, 268. Northern Confederacy, 169. Northumberland, Duke of (see Dudley). Norway, 50, 146. Norwich, 258. Nott, Colonel, 253. Nottingham, Earl of, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117-20, 295. Nova Scotia, 257, 319, 320, 353, 361. Nuestra Senora del Rosario (ship), 236, 237, 240. Ocean (ship), 140, 177. Odessa, 217, 222, 406, 411, 415. Ogeechee Kiver, 420. Ogle, Admiral Sir Chaloner, 337, 338, 341, 343, 347, 348, 350, 352. Oglethorpe, General, 351. Oldenburg, 158 Old Fort, 403. Old Eoad, 250. Olonne, 277. Opdam, Admiral, 48. Orange, Prince of, 29, 109, 169, 219. Orde, Admiral Sir Johu, 182. Orkney Isles, 34. Ormonde, Duke of, 279, 282-287. Or_pheus (ship), 382. Ortegal, Cape, 196, 197. Ostend, 40, 56, 161, 164, 175, 179, 217, 314. Our Lady of Europa, Chapel of, 299. Pacific, 7, 14. Palais, 398. Palamos, 130, 271, 272. Palermo, 166, 181, 182, 184. Palmas Bay, 1-2, 183. Palma, 313. Palos, Cape, 296. Panama, 14, 332, 349. Panther (ship), 321. Paria, Gulf of, 186. PariaBay, 191. Paris, Peace of (1763), 92. Paris, 150, 159, 160, 373. 381. Parker, Commodore Sir Peter, 417. Parma, Duke of, 30, 228-230, 233, 242, 243. Parse val. Admiral, 406. Passaro, Cape, 171, 328, 330, 401. Passa-volante, 84. Pastelillo, Fort, 344. Patapoco (ship), 424. Payance, 14. Peiho Ports, 222. Pelican (ship), 238. PembroJce (ship), 56, 317. Penn, Admiral Sir William, 36, 39, 41, 47, 55, 60, 89, 91. Pensee (ship), 177. Peppin (ship), 83. Pepvs, 47, 58-60, 71, 91. Persano, 243, 244, 430. Persia, 7. Peru, 406, 413. Peterborough, Earl of, 307-311, 313. Petit Godave, 290, 291. Petit Guavas, 273, 274, 277. Petts, the, 8. 63. Pevtou, Cai)tain, 358, 365. Philip II., 10-12, 15, 22, 46, 109, 228, 229, 232, 239, 243, 244. Philip and Mary (ship), 28. Philippines, 332. Pliipps, Sir William, 257. Phcehe (ship), 182-184. Phoenix (ship), 132, 363, 410. Picardy, 131. Pique (shijj), 415. Pisagua, 413. Pitt (afterwards Earl of Chatham), 136, 137. Placentia, 263, 294, 322. Plate Fleet, the Spanish, 12. 444 NAVAL WARFARE. Plymouth, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 112, 119, 120, 132, 142, 151- 155, 175, 230-234,244, 249, 270, 302, 359, 360, 361, 368, 407. Pola, 245, 430. Pondicberry, 359. Ponte Vedra, 331. Pope, the, 119. Popelmire, 26. Porcupine (ship), 154. Port Andeo Bay, 398. Port Bassin, 137. Portland, 3, 23, 39, 240. Port Louis, 357. Port Mahon, 168, 317, 329, 363, 371. Port Morant, 267. Porto Belio, 14, 332-339, 343, 349- 351, 410, 425. Porto Cavallo (Puerto Cabello), 351-353. Porto Eico, 14, 19, 187, 209, 337. Port de Paix, 273. Port Royal (Annapolis), 257, 319, 320, 324, 425. Port Royal, Jamaica, 289, 290, 335-337. Port Royal, South Carolina, 225, 420. Portsmouth, 26, 59, 60, 117, 124, 132, 175, 337, 359. Portugal, King of, 11. Portugal, 11, 22, 41, 58, 116, 139, 156, 197, 309. Portuguese ships, 11. Portuguese squadron, 237, 242. Prescot, Brigadier-General, 285. Preston (ship), 382. Pretender, the Young, 131. Prince (ship), 72. Princess Charlotte (ship), 411, 416. Privateers, 82. Privateers, Dutch, 6, 7, 68. Privateers, English, 6. Privateers, French, 6, 7. Protestants of France, 6. Provence (ship), 386. Providence, 381. Prussia, 46, 47. Puerto Roale, 284. Puerto Sta. Maria, 283, 284. Pula, 183. Puntales, 280, 283, 284. Quebec, 257, 278, 321-323, 360, 362. Queen Charlotte (ship), 408. Quiberon Bay, 136, 142, 144, 145, 148, 379. Quiberon Bay, Battle of, 144. Quilio, Captain, 428. Quimperle Bay, 361. Quirqus, Commodore, 78. Race, Cape, 293. Ragusans, 8. Raleigh, Sir Walter, 10, 13, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31, 45, 353. Rambargo, 84. Ramhead, the, 155. Rates, establishment of, 84-87. Red Sea, 163. Redondela, '?87-289. Redondola, 331. Redoutahle (ship), 140. Regagona (ship), 235. Meguhis (ship), 185. Reid, Mr., 255, 256. Beine-Blanche (ship), 415. B.e7iown (ship), 382, 383. Revel, 332. Revenge (ship), 12, 13, 22, 28, 237. Revolutionary War, the, 100, 102. Rhine, the, 200. Rhode. Island, 381, 382. Richelieu, Due de, 363, 364. Rio Janeiro, 323, 324. Rivers, Colonel, 294. Robertson, Commodore, 59, 76. Rochefeuille, Admiral, 342. Rocheforte, 131, 135, 136, 141, 142, 146 158, 159, 168,174-179, 185, 186, 189-92, 194-196, 200, 268, 261, 359. Rochelle, 53, 266, 361, 362. Rock of Lisbon, the, 16. Rodnev, Admiral, afterwards Lord, 137,"'368, 369, 377, 392-395. Boehuch (ship), 418, 419. Rooke, Admiral, afterwards Sir George, 126, 218, 276, 279-282, 284-287, 289, 291, 294-297, 299, 301, 302, 307, 308, 311, 330, 374. Roquelaure, Due de, 319. Rosas Bay, 167. INDEX. 445 Rosily, 176. Ross, 328, 330. Ross, Sir John Locbart, 370. Rota, 283. Rowley, Commodorej 388. Royal Charles (ship), 58, 62, 63, 73. Royal James (ship), 63, 68. Royal Oal- (ship), 63. Royal Prince (ship), 54, 55. Rithy (ship), 59. Rurnain, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, 390. Rupert, Prince, 47, 54-56, 59, 69, 72, 75, 96. Russell, Admiral, afterwards Earl of Oxford, 124-126, 128, 131,269, 271, 272, 277. Russia, 7, 169, 331. Russia, Emperor of, 7. Sagittaire (ship), 386. Saker, 28. Salisbury (ship), 316. Samana Bay, 273. Sampson, Admiral, 49. San Dominf^o, 10. San Felipe '(ship), 237, 242. San Francisco de Asis (ship), 196. San Juan de Sicilia (ship), 237, 242. San Lorenzo (ship), 236, 237, 241. San Martin (ship), 235, 237. San Mateo (ship), 237, 242. San Rafael (ship), 193. Sandwich, Earl of, 47, 50-52, 67, 68, 75. Sandy Hook, 381-384, 387, 389. Santa Anna (ship), 240, ,, 75, 274. Wager, Commodore, 315-317. Wagner, Fort, 420, 421, 423. Walker, Captain Hovenden, 291, 293, 321-323. Walker, Fort, 425. Walthenham Bay, 346. Wappoo Creek, 419. War, American Civil, 204, 212, 222, 225, 378, 419, 425. War of American Independence, 876, 378, 381. War, Austro-Italian, 205. War, Chilo-Peruvian, 205, 222. War, Crimean, 204, 212. War, Franco-German, 204, 212. War, Napoleonic, 208, 378, 380. War, Revolutionary, 378, 380. War of the Succession, 206, 279, 323, 380. Warren, Commodore, 353-357. Warren, Sir John, 164, 220, 400. Washington, General, 381. Weehaivken (ship), 420, 422. Wellington, Duke of, 116, 119. Wells, 257. Wentwortb, General, 341, 342, 344, 347-351. West Indies, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 77, 78, 98, 99, 147, 156, 160, 176, 178-180, 183, 187-190, 192, 201, 207-211, 217, 218 225, 228, 245, 247, 250, 254, 258-260, 263, 267 271, 273-275, 277, 280, 281, 289,291, 293,294, 313-316, 320, 323-326, 332, 336-339, 349, 353, 357, 360, 366-368, 874, 377, 379 380, 384-387, 389, 392, 394, 418. Western Islands (see Azores). Weymouth, 120, 237, 240. Weymouth (ship), 341, 344. Whalley, Lieut.-General, 257. Wheeler, Rear-Admiral Sir Fran- cis, 259-261, 263. Whetstone, Admiral, 290, 291, 293. White Bear (ship), 8. Whetham, Colonel Sir William, 292, 314. Whipple, Commodore, 418. Whittaker, Captain Sir Ed., 299, 300, 317. Wielings, the, 40, 56. Wight, Captain, 40. Wightman, Major- General, 328. Wilhelmshaven, 427. Willis, Colonel, 292. William and Mary, Fort, 264. William the Conqueror, 157. William III., 110, 116. Wilmington, 225, 426. Wilmot, Caj^tain Robert, 274. Windsor Castle (ship), 194. Windward Islands, 208. Wolfe, General, 356. Wolf (ship), 388. Wren, Commodore, 258-260, 277. Wright, Commodore, 249, 252-256, 272 277. Wynter, Sir William, 241, 243. Yarmouth, 40, 52, 174. Tonge's Naval History, 410, 412. Zealand, 40, 41, 48, 49, 68, 69, 242, 243. 273, =^ London : Printed by W. H. AUen & Co., Limited, 13 Waterloo Place, Pall MaU. S. 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