'ill' 
 
 Xf v" ^^^ i> ■»'T^T4; 
 
 Zbc tUnivcxsit^ of Cbicaao 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 B 4 sn saa 
 
 THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTb AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF niiLOSornY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANG'^AGF.S ND LITERATURES 
 
 BY 
 
 HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON 
 
 ', 
 
 
 1 
 
 "^ 
 
 ' 
 
 cvj 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 -! 
 
 
 t 
 
 ,' * 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1913 
 
EXCHANGE 
 
View VI. — General i)iinoraina of the battlefield taken from Knoll F looking northwest 
 
Ube TUnirermtp ot CbicaQO 
 
 THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES 
 
 BY 
 
 HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1913 
 
XTbe illnirersitp of Cbtcago 
 
 THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES 
 
 BY 
 
 HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1913 
 

^x: 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The text of this study was prepared and printed before the war, but 
 owing to the fact that I was confined behind the Turkish fines in Syria 
 durirg the whole of the war, it was impossible to secure the cuts of the 
 illustrations and maps till some time after the conclusion of hostilities. 
 Meanwhile the photographs had suffered from the lapse of time and an 
 effort to secure new ones in the summer of 1920 failed owing to the stupidity 
 of certain Syrian auto-drivers. But the photograi)hs, such as they are. will 
 nevertheless serve to illustrate the text. 
 
 Had the University of Chicago regulations governing the publication of 
 theses permitted, I would gladly have rewritten the whole manuscript in the 
 light of the recent campaign of the Eg>'ptian Expeditionar\' Force under 
 Lord AUenby in the same region in which Thutmose III, nearly 3,500 years 
 earUer, also defeated an enemy advancing from the north toward Egj^pt. 
 There are certain interesting and striking parallels and contrasts between the 
 strategy' of the earliest and of the latest victorious commanders of campaigns 
 in central Palestine. 
 
 This study is confined almost entirely to an effort to interpret the Annals 
 of Thutmose III in the light of the geography of the environs of Megiddo. 
 I have entered into no philological discussion, although such points were 
 thoroughly considered in preparation of the translation of the Annals. I 
 regret that 1 am unable to incorporate certain material bearing on the sub- 
 ject of this study which has appeared since the text was printed in Beirut, 
 Syria, in 1913, and also that I cannot make use of certain valuable suggestions 
 made by those who campaigned in Palestine in 1917-18. A number of typo- 
 graphical errors have crept into the text which were unavoidable under the 
 
 circumstances in which it was printed. 
 
 Hauold 11. Nelson 
 
 461758 
 
■KGHAKSS 
 
THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Battle of Megiddo on May 15th, 1479 B.C. between the Egyptians 
 under Thutmose III and the allied forces of the Syrian states is the first 
 battle in history which we can study in any detail. Most of the ancient 
 oriental accounts of battles are mere statements of the forces engaged 
 and of the outcome of the conflicts. Among the Egyptian records, how- 
 ever, there are preserved in considerable detail the narratives of two or 
 three engagements from which we can gather, with greater or less 
 clearness, the general plan of each battle, the disposition of the troops 
 and the manoeuvres of the opposing armies.' So far these battles have 
 been studied either without reference to the topography of the battle- 
 fields, or with insufficient data regarding the physical features of the 
 area of operations and the bearing they must have had on the course of 
 the engagement. In the following discussion of the Battle of Megiddo it 
 has been my endeavor to interpret the scanty records of the conflict 
 preserved in hieroglyphic in the light of the topography of the region, 
 which I studied on two visits to the battlefield in the summers of 1909 
 and 1912. On those two occasions I made a series of surveys and took a 
 number of photographs which are here reproduced. They include a suf- 
 ficient number of views to bear out my observations on the topography 
 which are contained in the text of this discussion. I have used as the 
 basis of my plan of the battlefield the excellent map in Schumacher's 
 Tell el-Mutesellim, Band II, adding myself certain details not found on 
 the original, especially the configuration of the hills to the west and 
 
 I Besides the Battle of Megiddo, compare, for the Battle of Kadesh, Breasted, Battle of 
 Kadeih, and for the siege of Memphis by Piankhi see Breasted, /Incient Records, IV, 857-865. 
 
2 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 south of Megiddo, and verifying most of the altitudes found on Schu- 
 macher's map. In this connection I wish to thank for their assistance 
 my colleagues. Dr. Harvey Porter, of Beirut, Syria, who visited Megiddo 
 with me in 1909, and especially Professor Alfred H. Joy, also of Beirut, 
 who was with me in 1912, without whose assistance my work would 
 have been attended with great difficulty and delay. 
 
 In the introduction to his "Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland" 
 Kromayer says: 
 
 "Wenn es in der modernen Kriegsgeschichte von je her als unerlassliche Voraus- 
 sctzung fiir die Erkenntnis gegolten hat, dass den Schilderungen der Feldziige 
 und Schlachten Kartcn und Plane beigefiigt seien, so muss man sich wundern, 
 dass man bei der Behandlung antiker Schlachten so lange Zeit geglaubt hat, 
 dieses Hilfsmittel cntbehren und auch ohne dasselbe zu einem leidlichen Ver- 
 standnisse kommen zu konnen. 
 
 "Es braucht ja vor Leutcn, die auch nur ein ganz klein wenig mit den Beding- 
 ungen dieses Studiums bekannt sind, eigentlich gar nicht mehr ausgesproch- 
 en zu werden, dass selbst die genaucste und lebendigste Schilderung solcher 
 Ereignisse fur sich allein tot und unanschaulich bleibt, dass ein Blick aut" eine 
 gute Karte mehr gibt als stundenlanges Studium oft nur irrtumveranlassender 
 Beschreibungen. " 
 
 I have quoted at such length from Kromayer on account of the impor- 
 tance, as it seems to me, of his position on the study of military history 
 in its application to oriental military movements, a position which can- 
 not be too much emphasized and which, if adopted by some oriental his- 
 torians, would have prevented many of the impossibilities in the inter- 
 pretation of ancient historical inscriptions which are now found in some 
 of the current histories. It has been my effort in the following study to 
 take Kromayer's position throughout. I have consulted the discussions 
 of the battle contained in the chief histories, those of Breasted, Brugsch, 
 Budge, Hall, Maspero, Meyer, Petrie and Wiedemann, and have also 
 made use of Schumacher's topographical and archaeological studies in 
 MuNDPV and in his Tell-el-Mutesellim. The chronology of the 
 campaign is that of Breasted, as presented in his Ancient Records, II, 
 409, which is based on his studies in AZ, 37, 123 ff. and 39, 60-68. For a 
 bibliography of the older publications of the hieroglyphic sources the 
 reader is referred to Breasted's Ancient Records, II, 391, note a. The pre- 
 sent study is based on the text of the Annals of Thutmoselll in Sethe's 
 Urkunden der 18. Dynastie, pp. 647-667, with a few changes and omis- 
 sions where Sethe's text is entirely a restoration by the editor. I have 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 3 
 
 also taken into account such other references to the battle as may be 
 found in the Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions, all of which are publish- 
 ed in Sethe's Urkunden. 
 
 At this point I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to Pro- 
 fessor Breasted, from whom I have received constant encouragement and 
 continued and most valuable suggestions. Any acknowledgment of 
 the help and inspiration derived from his stimulating teaching is, at 
 best, inadequate. Since the appearance of his Ancient Records any one 
 who attempts to deal with historical subjects in the Egyptian field must 
 consciously or unconsciously appropriate much from that valuable mine 
 of information. Though the translation of the Annals appearing in the 
 Records is based on an inferior text to the one I have been able to use 
 (as the Urkunden did not appear till after the Records were already out), 
 nevertheless T have drawn much assistance from Dr. Breasted's transla- 
 tion, in some cases even adopting his very words where I felt there was 
 ho reason for changing them. Many of the variations from his translation 
 Dr. Breasted would himself incorporate in substance into a new edition 
 of the Records. 
 
 I wish also to thank my colleague in Professor Breasted's seminar, 
 Mr. George Allen, who has made several helpful suggestions on doubt- 
 ful passages in the text. 
 
Thk Battle of Mkoiddo 
 
 I 
 
 THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS 
 THE ANNALS, LINES 6-13 
 
 Urk. 647 Year 22, month four of the second season, day 25; [his Majes- 
 ty was in the fortress of]2 (7) Tharu on the first victorious 
 campaign [to repulse the invaders]-' (8) of the boundaries of 
 
 Urk. 648 Egypt, in valor, [in victory, in might, in triumph.] 
 
 (9) Now it was a [long] time [that they ruled this land which 
 was in] (10) disturbance. Every man was working for [their 
 princes who were in Avaris.] (11) It came to pass at a later 
 time that the garrison which had been there (12) were in the 
 city of Sharuhen. 
 They were from Yeraza (13) to the Marshes of the Earth* 
 
 2. Sethe would read "his Majesty passed by the fortess of." However, the usual restor- 
 ation, as I have given it, seems to fill the lacuna as well and agrees with the formula usual through- 
 out the Annals. For the restoration cf. Rouge, Iriscr. iter. 207. 
 
 3. Sethe, "Neue Spuren der Hyksos in Inschriften der 18. Dynastic," ./4Z, p. 73 FT, sup- 
 ports this restoration of the Urkunden, but the use of the rare word tki'zv, "invaders", seems too 
 definite to be accepted. 
 
 4. Sethe, op. cit., p. 84, translates the passage "von Jrd bis zu den Enden der 
 Erde". This phrase, "From Yaraza to the Marshes of the Earth," Breasted, Atuierit Records, II, 
 416, noted, interprets as meaning "from northwestern Judea to beyond the Euphrates." This also 
 seems to be the meaning given by IVliiller, j4. und E., p. 281 ff. Maspero, Recueil, II, p. 50, 
 translates the passage " a partir de la ville de leraza, jusqu'aux regions lointaines de la terre". 
 On the other hand, Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near East, p. 234, note i, says, "This does 
 not mean the country from Northwestern fudea to beyond the Euphrates, as Breasted 
 thinks, but to the Serbonian bog and Lake Menzala. " That the term, "Marshes 
 of the Earth", was originally applied to the marshes of the Delta is most likely and thus 
 it came to signify the extreme north as known to the Egyptian of the prehistoric period. As, 
 however, the Egyptian frontier was pushed over into Asia and geographical knowledge extended, 
 the old term came to be applie.1 to the Naharin region, which was then the northern Imiit of 
 Egyptian geography. Hall, on page 234, translates the passage under discussion, "from Yeraza 
 to the marshes of Egypt", in which lie renders t' as "Egypt", a rather unjustifiable liberty 
 with the meaning ot the word which prejudges the question. That the term "marshes" 
 would apply aptly to the plains ot northern Syria, at least in the rainv winter and early summer, 
 is evident to any traveller who has tried to make his way across the wide stretches of flooded 
 land around Aleppo at that time of year. "The Marshes of Asia" are constantly referred to in 
 the historical inscriptions; see /Indent Records, II, 120, 321, 38^, 402; III, 118. Agiin, 
 "the Marshes of Naharin" occurs in Ancient Records, II, 631, and III, I 18. "Marshes" is 
 syniinvinoiis wirli Mir.inni in Ancicm Records, II, 659. In Ancient Records, III, 480 we have re- 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 5 
 
 when they began to^ revolt against his Majesty. ^ 
 
 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 4; day of the 
 feast of the royal coronation; (14) at the city of "Which-the 
 -prince-seized", Gaza [is its name in Kharu.]' 
 
 [Year 23,] (15) first month of the third season, day 5; depar- 
 ture from this place in valor, [in victory,] (16) in might, in 
 triumph, to overthrow that wretched foe and to extend (17) 
 [Jrk. 649 the boundaries of Egypt, according to that which his father, 
 
 Amon, commanded (18) he seize. 
 
 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 16; at the city 
 of Yehem. 
 
 When Thutmose III at last became sole ruler of Egypt after the death 
 of his queen Hatshepsut, about 1480 B.C., he found himself confronted 
 with a dangerous situation in his Asiatic provinces. The remnants of 
 the Hyksos power, driven from Egypt a hundred years earlier by 
 Ahmose I, and since brought into subjection to Egypt by Amenhotep I 
 and Thutmose I, had taken advantage of the military inactivity of 
 Hatshepsut's supremacy to combine for a last struggle with the ex- 
 panding power of Egypt.8 The center of the movemen t seems to have 
 been the King of Kadesh on the Orontes. Under his leadership the dy- 
 nasts of Syria-Palestine united and their combined forces advanced 
 
 ference miide to the "marshlands" (plu) as being the extreme limit of the world, therefore not 
 of Egypt. Again in Ancient Records, 11, loi, 657; III, 434, "iVIarshes" is clearly used to re- 
 fer to countries remote from Eiiypt in northern Syria. It is strange if in this passage alone among 
 historical inscriptions "the Marshes of the Earth" (not "Egypt") should be used of Egypt, 
 especially when the writer is speaking of a revolt, the center of which was in the north at 
 Kadesii, and the members of which included "every chief of every northern country." [Urk. 
 IV, 660, 7). 
 
 5. The idiom ■zi;' r in this passage is of uncertain meaning. Breasted, PSBA, 23, 239 ff., sug- 
 gests the translation "to be about to, to begin". The latest discussion, that in Gardiner, Admo- 
 nititns, p. 53, suggests that the "notion of a logical development in a wrong direction, is present 
 in a greater or less degree". In titling der K. P. Akademte, XXXIX, p. 51, Erman gives the 
 meaning as "sich anschickt-n zu", on the basis of the Berlin Dictionary material. None of these 
 explanation seems to entirely fit all the cases. I have adopted Erman 's rendition as nearly as pos- 
 ible, adapting the idea to the exegences of translation where necessary. 
 
 6. The translation as given above is based on Sethe's reconstruction, of>. cit., pp, 73-86. The 
 restoration of such words as "Avaris", however, is altogether too daring to serve as a basis for sei- 
 entific conclusions. As it does not prejudice in any way the results of the present study, I give the 
 passage in full. 
 
 7. So Sethe. Equals "is its Palestinian name"- a very doubtful restoration. 
 
 8. For the latest evidence of the identity of the Asiatic opponants of Thutmose III with the 
 Hyksos, see Sethe's reconstruction of the text of the Annals, o/>. cit. 
 
6 . The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 southward to the Plain of Esdraelon to meet the advance of Thutmose 
 III who was bent on bringing the rebellious states again under Egyptian 
 control. In the 22nd year of his reign, on the 25th day of the 8th month 
 (April 19th, 1479 B.C.), Thutmose marched out of Egypt at the frontier 
 fortress of Tharu 9 on his eastern border and lead his army towards 
 Palestine. Just how large his forces were it is impossible to say, though 
 we may be certain that they comprised not more than 15,000 to 20,000 
 men, while 10,000 would probably not be underestimating their 
 numbers. '0 The Asiatics certainly did not outnumber the Egyptians, 
 and we may therefore place the contending forces at between 10,000 
 and 15,000 men each. Of these a portion was chariotry and the re- 
 mainder infantry, armed for the most part with bows and spears. The 
 sword was as yet almost, if not entirely, unknown in oriental warfare, 
 probably not coming into use in the East till the introduction of Sherden 
 mercenaries, who first appear under Amenhotep III."' Each chariot 
 held two men, the driver and an archer. The Hittites later were accus- 
 tomed to use three men to a chariot, but we have no evidence that the 
 Asiatics at this time used more than two men. The effectiveness of the 
 chariot depended on the skill of the archer and on the demoralization 
 wrought among the enemy by the charge of the chariots into their 
 ranks. 
 
 On the 4th day of the 9th month (April 28th), Thutmose was in 
 Gaza, the first important place he met in Palestine. 12 On the 16th of the 
 month (May 19th) he reached Yehem, where he seems to have come in- 
 to touch with the enemy for the first time. Just where this city lay is 
 open to question. It must have been located on the coast plain near the 
 southern slope of the Carmel Ridge, for, first, it was at or near the junc- 
 tion of three roads that led across the Ridge into the Plain of Esdraelon, 
 and the only three roads that thus cross the Ridge meet on the coast 
 plain at the foot of the Ridge not far from Tellel-Asawir (see Map I); and, 
 second, it lay so near the Ridge that when the army marched out of 
 
 9 For location of Tharu see Kiithmann, Die Ostg'tnze j4e^\ptens, pp. 33-46, 
 
 10 For a discussion of the available material on the size of Egyptian armies see Breasted, 
 Baltic of Kadesh, pp, 8-n. 
 
 11 Knudtzon, El-Amarna Tafeln, 122. 
 
 12 On the importance of Gaza and its neighborhood from a military standpoint see Olmstead, 
 Sargon of Auyria, p. 62 ff. Also Hartmann "Die Strasse Von Damaskus nach Kairo" 
 ZDMG, 64, p. 668. 
 
V 
 
 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 ^ehen on May 13th, the troops had already assumed the pecuUar forma- 
 tion necessitated by the mountain defile, 13 but which would have been 
 entirely unnecessary on the open coast plain. Near the spot where the 
 three roads meet is located the modern village of Yemma, which Petrie 
 has identified with Thutmose's halting place.i'* Although the identifica- 
 tion is little more than guesswork, still Yehem must have lain in the 
 neighborhood of Yemma, and may be provisionally located near that 
 spot. 
 
 Any army approaching Syria from the south along the coast road 
 encounters just beyond Yehem the first natural barrier to its advance. 
 The ridge of hills, shooting off from the highlands of Ephraim, running 
 from southeast to northwest and terminating at the seaward end in Mt. 
 Carmel, cuts through the coast plain and offers a natural bulwark of 
 defence to southern Syria. '^ The Ridge, stretching out for eighteen or 
 nineteen miles, runs along the southern edge of the Plain of Esdraelon. 
 It is crossed in two places by roads which apparently have, since the 
 beginning of history, serves as highways of commerce for the caravans 
 passing back and forth from Egypt to Mesopotamia. The Ridge itself 
 falls naturally into two parts, the northern section, which forms Mt. 
 Carmel, and the southern end, known first as Belad er-Ruhah and 
 further south as Umm el-Khataf and Umm el-Fahm.'6 The sides of Mt. 
 Carmel itself rise so steeply from the plain, especially on the north, that 
 nothing but the roughest and steepest footpath can cross it. At its 
 highest point it attains an altitude of 1,800 feet, while at its southern 
 extremity, just above the road from Tell Kaimun to Tell el-Asawir, it 
 is still some 1,000 feet above the sea. No hostile army, nor indeed peace- 
 ful caravan, can climb its rocky eastern side. In order to reach the north 
 of Carmel, an army approaching from the south must either go around 
 
 13. Urk., IV, 652. 
 
 14. Hist, of Egypt, II, p.327. Cf. Miiller, MVAG, 1907, I,p.22. M»i^ao, Struggle of 
 the Nations, p. 2 5 7, note I, puts Yehem at el-Kheimeh (following F. de Saulcy). Hall, Arte. 
 Hist, of the Near East,p. 235, suggests that the town probably lay in the present Wady Yah- 
 mur, a small wady in the low hills south ot 'Ar'arah. 
 
 15. The following description of this region is drawn from my own notes, as well as from 
 the numerous accounts of this district which have been published by travellers. 
 
 16. For lack of any other designation I shall speak of this whole range of hills, including 
 Carmel, BelSd er-RQhah, Umm el-Fahm and Umm el-Khataf, as the Carmel Ridge, distin- 
 guishing it thus from Mt. Carmel proper, which forms its northern end. 
 
8 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 the northern end by the site of the modern city of Haifa on the sea, the 
 road usually followed by the crusading and other armies coming along 
 the coast plain, or must pass around the southern end either by the road 
 already referred to, running from Tell el-Asawir to Tell Kaimun, or by 
 the road through Subbarin and down the Wady Milh to Tell Kaimun. 
 
 The remaining two-thirds of the Ridge keeps along at a moderate 
 height of from 800 to 1,500 feet above the sea level. As seen from 
 across the Plain of Esdraelon, the northern section of the Ridge ,known as 
 Belad er-Ruhah, between Carmel proper and Umm el-Fahm, is re- 
 markably even in height, and is lower than either extremity of the 
 Ridge. The two roads, to which I later refer as the first road and the 
 third road, cross the Ridge at either end of this middle section. The 
 northern side, which abuts directly upon the Plain of Esdraelon, is fairly 
 steep and rocky and to-day is almost totally devoid of verdure. To the 
 traveller following the road from Haifa to Jenin along the northern base 
 of the hills this Ridge presents a most inhospitable and forbidding ap- 
 pearance. There are to-day only a very few scantily populated villages 
 between the seaward end of the plain and Tell el-Mutesellim. The in- 
 habitants of these villages draw their livelihood from the cultivation of 
 the plain, and there are no signs of vineyards and groves on the hills 
 themselves. This portion of the Ridge repels any advance of population 
 from the plain, while its desolate appearance seems to accentuate the 
 difiRculty of crossing it presented by its barren, rocky slopes. 
 
 Between Tell el-Mutesellim and Jenin the hills assume a more pleas- 
 ing aspect and several fairly prosperous villages are scattered along 
 their base. But these villages also turn rather towards the plain than 
 towards the hills, which here rise to a considerable height in the re- 
 gion of Umm el-Khntaf and Umm el-Fahm. 
 
 The southern slope is, for the most part, much more gradual, rising 
 gently out of the coast plain, and is covered with a fair growth of 
 trees, the evident remains of much more extensive forests. The water- 
 shed lies well to the north side of the Ridge, so that, while this line of 
 hills seems to offer an obstacle to an enemy approaching it from the north, 
 it, on the other hand, rises so gradually from the plain on the south that, 
 to a vigorous commander approaching from that direct'on, it ni'ght seem 
 to present but little impediment to an advance. While several hostile 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 9 
 
 armies have crossed the Ridge from south to north,''' few, if any, have 
 assayed it from north to south. Those invaders from the north who 
 have not taken the coast road around the northern end of Carmel, have 
 avoided the dangers of the nari-ow passes by following the more open 
 and less difficult road around the southern end by Jenin, through the 
 Plain of 'Arrabeh to Baka or Zeita. 
 
 To cross the Ridge two roads start from Tell el-Asawir.'^ The one 
 runs almost due north to Tell Kaimun, while the second, starting 
 slightly northeast, bifurcates at 'Ain 'Arah, one branch reaching the 
 Plain of Esdraelon at Tell el-Aghbarlyeh, and the second branch at Tell 
 el-Mutesellim. For conveniance of designation and to avoid confusion 
 I shall speak of these roads as the first roads (Tell Kaimiln to Tell el- 
 Asawir), the second road (Tell el- Aghbariyeh to 'Ain 'Arah), the third 
 road (Tell el-Mutesellim to Tell el-Asawir), and the /o«r^/i road (Je- 
 nin, the Plain of 'Arrabeh to Baka or Zeita). There are one or two rough 
 paths that cross at other places, serving to connect the various villages 
 scattered along the Ridge, but none of them shows Evidence of ever hav- 
 ing been an ancient highway, nor would they offer an opportunity for an 
 army to cross the hills. A study of Map I will show that these four 
 roads occupy the only passes over the Ridge, so that, in ancient as in 
 modern times, they served as the only regular lines of communication 
 between the coast plain and the Plain of Esdraelon. 
 
 The first road, though fairly easy of ascent on the southern slope oi 
 the Ridge, is yet steep at the northern extremity. It does not connect at 
 the northern end with any highway to the northeast, but leads rather 
 into the Phoenician Plain than into the Plain of Esdraelon. '^ 
 
 For the moment I shall pass over the second road, which debouches in- 
 to the great plain st Tell el -Aghbariyeh, and shall consider in some de- 
 
 17. These include Thutmose III, Pharaoh Necho, and Napoleon. It is interesting, how- 
 ever, that Napoleon in his retreat kept to the sea road around the northern end of Carmel. 
 
 18. Schumacher, "Die Aegyp. Hauptstrasse von der Ebene Sharon zur Ebene Jezreel," 
 MuNDPy, 1903, p. 4. 
 
 19. There is still another road north of the first loaJ, which, however, is really a branch 
 oi the first road for it starts from Tell Kaimn and branching off from the main road to the 
 right, ascends the Wady Milh and so on by Subbarn to the plain. As the northern end ofthis 
 road reaches Esdra?lon at the same spot as does the first road, for the purpose of this discussion 
 it may be regarded as offering the same advantages or disadvantages as does the latter road. I have 
 therefore not taken it up in detail, but consider that the arguments applied to the first road 
 apply equally well to it. 
 
10 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 tail the third and most important of the roads that cross the Ridge, 
 that running from Tell el-As^wir to Tell el-Mutesellim. 
 
 At the spot where the road from Tell el-Mutesellim and that from 
 Tell Kaimun meet was once a stronghold, to-dav marked by the con- 
 siderable mound of Tell el-Asawir, which, together with a possible 
 settlement on the site of the village of ez-Zebadne^o opposite, controlled 
 the junction of these two important commercial highways. Starting 
 from Tell el-Asawir, the road enters the Wady 'Arab, which is there 
 one half to three quarters of a mile wide and is flat and open. There are 
 evident traces of an old Roman road that once led through the wady. 
 About four miles above Tell el-Asawir lies 'Ain 'Arab, the first of se- 
 veral springs that are scattered along the way (see View I). In fact, be- 
 tween this point and the outlet of the road near Tell el-Mutesellim, a 
 distance of about nine miles, there are five or six good springs and wells 
 and several smaller sources of water. It is by far the best provided in 
 this respect of any of the roads that cross the Ridge. At 'Ain 'Arab, 
 where the modern village of 'Arab stands, there was once a fortress 
 which, with 'Ar'arah on the other side of the wady, commanded the 
 junction of the road from Tell el- Aghbariyeh with that from Tell el- 
 Mutesellim. Up to, and i slightly beyond, the point where this road 
 branches off, the wady remains open to a width of from a third to half a 
 mile and with its excellent water supply offers abundant camping 
 ground for an army of ten or fifteen thousand men preparing to cross 
 the Ridge by either of the two roads (see View II). In fact, all the way 
 from Tell el-Asawir to a quarter of a mile above 'Ar'arah the valley is 
 wide and level and is even cultivated some way up the slopes on either 
 hand. In the spring of the year — the season at which I crossed this pass 
 — when the grain is yet green, the prospect that meets the traveller's 
 eye as he enters this wady is most pleasing. The ascent, moreover, is 
 so gradual as to be scarcely perceptible and it is possible to drive a car- 
 
 20. Also apparently known locally as Wady 'Arab 
 
 21. This Tell is generally so designated both on the English Survey Map and in accounts 
 of the region. Schumacher, MuNDPf^, 1903, p. 5, in a very careful and detailed account of 
 the region, speaks of it as "Tell es-Samra." There is undoubtedly a "Shirbet es-Samra" at that 
 point, buf my own inquiries in the neighborhood as to the name of the Tell seemed to show no 
 unanimity of opinion on the part of the inhabitants of the district. 1 have therefore adhered to 
 the name Tell el-Asiwir 
 
The Battle of Megiddo . 11 
 
 riage even as far as the top of the pass at Ain Ibrahim. 22 The latter part 
 of the ascent, from above 'Ain 'Arab to the head of the pass, is more 
 narrow, contracting in places to a hundred yards or so. Just before the 
 top is reached, a rough donkey-path turns off to the right and winds up 
 the hillside to the village of Umni el-Fahm, a notorious haunt of highway- 
 men, which nestles above in a theatre of hills opening to the northwegt. 
 The top of the pass near Ain Ibrahim is about 1,200 feet above the 
 sea, making a total rise from 'Ain 'Arab of only about 750 feet in approx- 
 imately six miles. Throughout its length at intervals appear remains 
 of the ancient Roman road, with here and there a milestone either in situ 
 or lying nei^r by. At 'Ain Ibrahim the valley opens out to two hundred 
 yards or so, as if to offer a halting place to the caravans before they 
 enter upon the more abrupt descent on the northern side of the Ridge 
 From the top of the pass the road gradually descends, passing the vil- 
 lage of Masmiis and winding about among the hills (see View III). It 
 continues to decline for about a mile and a half, sinking some three hun- 
 dred feet below the top of the pass. At this point the main valley turns 
 to the right and reaches the plain a little to the south of Megiddo. It, 
 however, is exceedingly narrow and rough and from its very formation 
 could never have been used as a road, a conclusion which is strengthen- 
 ed by the fact that its opening is not marked by any settlement. When 
 the road reaches the point where the valley makes this sudden turn, it 
 continues straight on up a slight rise of about a hundred feet and then 
 descends alonga smaller wady (see View IV). This latter gradually con- 
 tracts as it proceeds till, about half a mile above the mouth of the val- 
 ley, it reaches its narrowest point, being not more than ten yards wide. 
 A little further on the road takes a sudden turn and, opening out rapid- 
 ly to a couple of hundred yards, it emerges upon the plain of Lejjun 
 (see View- V). The opening of the valley is of sufficient width to allow 
 a body of several thousand troops to assemble within it without having 
 to overflow into the plain beyond. The road from 'Ain Ibrahim to the 
 opening of the valley is about three miles long and descends within that 
 distance some six hundred and fifty feet, so that the descent on the 
 north side is much steeper than is the ascent on the other side of the 
 Ridge. Throughout the ascent on the south the road runs along the floor 
 
 22. I myself have gone by carriage to nearly a mile above 'Ar'arah. 
 
12 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 of the wady which is almost level (see View II). On the north of 'Ain 
 Ibrahim, however, it is narrower and the bottom is therefore worn by 
 the winter torrents which make it impassable as a road bed. The road 
 here keeps some fifty feet up the slope on the west side of the wady, 
 and for this reason is much rougher and narrower, not being capable in 
 many places of accommodating more than two travellers abreast. The 
 contrast between the ascent on the south and the descent on the north 
 is therefore marked. The hills on either side slope down gradually to- 
 wards the bottom of the valley (see View III). Of course such a road 
 could be easily defended by a comparatively small number of men, but, 
 on the other hand, an invading army could readily keep possession of 
 the hills on either hand which are neither steep nor high above the 
 valley. Nowhere, till a few hundred yards from the mouth of the pass, 
 can a sight of Tell el-Mutesellim or its immediate surroundings be ob- 
 tained by any one descending from 'Ain Ibrahim, though a watcher 
 posted on the hill above Lejjun could descry an approaching army at 
 least a mile above the mouth of the pass. 
 
 The second road, thatw^hich runs from 'Ain 'Arab to Tell ol-Aghbari- 
 yeh, is a more difficult and less used road than the one to Tell el-Mutesel- 
 lim. It is merely a rough mule-path totally different from the third 
 road with which it connects. It rises "400 feet in 5 miles towards the 
 watershed of Belad er-Ruhah. It passes by the old ruined Khan of el- 
 Mawiyeh and through Kefrein, descending thence some 500 feet in 
 3 miles"23 and reaches the plain at Tell el-Aghbariyeh. It was once 
 perhaps the main line to Nazareth, but has been abandoned, as it cross- 
 es the Kishon at a spot where there are some dangerous pools. It now 
 serves principally for the villages along its course. 
 
 Around the southern end of the Carmel Ridge runs the fourth road 
 from ez-Zeita to Jenin by way of the Plain of 'Arrabeh, which through- 
 out the history of this region has served as an alternate route with that 
 starting from Tell el-Mutesellim for the caravans coming down from 
 Damascus to the coast plain. 24 This road is less shut in than are those 
 through the heart of the Ridge, and to an invading army desirous of 
 reaching the Plain of Esdraelon, it offers a more secure passage. Only on 
 
 23. Suifey of fVeitern FaJestine, 11, p 50. 
 
 24. Hartmann, ZDMG, 64, pp. 665 ff. 
 
The Battle of Megtddo 13 
 
 one side do the hills threaten the road. It enters the hills by the Wady 
 el-Ghamik and then passes along the Plain of 'Arrabeh near Dothan, 
 descending by the Wady Belameh to Jenin. The highest point is only 
 800 feet above sea level and the steepest gradient extends over about four 
 miles of the way, where the rise is less than 100 feet per mile. In winter 
 this is the usual road for travellers on horseback, as the third road where 
 it crosses Esdraelon is impassable in winter. ^s 
 
 Skirting the southern edge of the Plain of Esdrtelon under the shadow 
 of the Ridge itself runs an old road that has served to connect the cities 
 on the southern edge of the plain. Along its course it cuts through the 
 various roads that cross the plain. At each such junction there stood in 
 ancient times a fortified city, which thus guarded the entrance to its 
 respective pass and controlled the commerce passing along the road. The 
 entrance to the first road was guarded by the city that stood on Tell 
 Keimiin. This spot probably marks the site of Jokneam26 and by its 
 relations both to the mountain pass and to the opening of the Plain of 
 Esdraelon towards Acre must have early risen to considerable import- 
 ance. At the mouth of the second road lies Tell el-Aghbariyeh,27 once 
 the site of an ancient stronghold. Tell el-Mutesellim, the spot where 
 Megiddooncestood,28 guards the entrance to the third road. Later this 
 site was abandoned in favor of Lejjun, about a mile away, directly at 
 the mouth of the pass through which the third road crosses the Ridge. 
 
 25. SurirY of fVeitern Palestine, II. p. 50. 
 
 26. Robinson, Later Bib. Resean/ies, p. 114. Eric. Bib under Jokneam. Swz'ey 0/ 
 ff^estern Palatine, II, 48, says that it was "possibly the Cyamon of Judith (VII 3). The 
 place is mentioned under it< modern name in the Samaritan Book of Joshua. John of Wirtz- 
 burg (iioo) calls it Cain Mens, 8 miles from Nazareth, near Carmel; iMarino Sanuto ( 1321) 
 says that Cain was here killed by an arrow by Lamech, and marks the place on his map in the 
 position of Keimun. Tetellus (1130) makes Kains Mons 10 miles from Acre, 3 miles from 
 Carmel, and speaks of a fountain at its foot where Cain was killed. In the 'Onomasticon' it is 
 called Cimona, and placed 6 Roman miles from Legio, on the way to Ptolemais." During the 
 Crusades the fortress of Caymont occupied this site, and formed the center of one of the smaller 
 Latin fiefs. 
 
 27. Dr. E. Graf von Miilinen, MuNDPV, 1908, p. 40, states that at this spot are two 
 groups of houses which' are called "gliubajja" which the Survey Map erroneously calls "aghba- 
 riyeh." 
 
 28. G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog., pp. 386 ff., gives the evidence for the identification of the 
 location of Megiddo as follows: "At the base of the central plain, just opposite Jezreel, is a place 
 called Leijun — the Roman Legio, Legion, at the mouth of the chief pass towards Sharon. It 
 was, therefore, as important a site as Jezreel, and as likely to give its name to the plain. In 
 Roman times it did so. Jerome calls the great plain both the Plains of Megiddo and the Campus 
 Legionis. Moreover the only town definitely named in the immediafe neighborhood of Megiddo 
 Taanach upon the waters of Megiddo— is undoubtedly the present Tannuk, four miles from 
 
14 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 Thf fniirffi road, round the southern end of the hills, was controlled by 
 Jezreel and to a certain extent by Taanach. The size of the tells that 
 mark this line of cities testifies to the importance that their location gave 
 them in ancient times. This whole road is also abundantly supplied 
 with water. 
 
 At Tell el-Mutesellim the Carmel Ridge suddenly recedes from the 
 plain, forming a great bay or indentation in the hills about a mile deep 
 and a mile and a half wide. The center of this bay is occupied by a group 
 ofmounds^^on the highest point of which stands the Tell (see View VI). 
 Between the mounds, marked G, H ,1 on Map II, and the foothills enclos- 
 ing the bay is a narrow stretch of flat, cultivated land which thus se- 
 parates the mounds, of which the Tell forms a part, from the main 
 Ridge (see View VII). 
 
 To the north and east of the Tell extends the Plain of Esdra^lon, 
 gradually sloping away from the Ridge to the Kishon in the midst 
 of the plain. The site of the city projects slightly beyond the line of the 
 Carmel Ridge, Megiddo enjoying thereby one of the most commanding 
 positions in Palestine. ^o The whole plain lay stretched out before the 
 inhabitants of the city, who thus obtained a sight of all who passed 
 along the roads across the plain. 
 
 The low foothills. A, B, C, D and E, which enclose the bay, rise to an 
 average height of about two or three hundred feet above the cultivated 
 land at their base. With the exception of B, which is lava, they are of 
 
 Lejjun ; and there even seems a trace or the name in the name the Arabs give to Kishon, the 
 Muqutta. Omitting this last item, we have enough of evidence to support Robinson's identifica- 
 tion ot Lejjun with Megiddo, even against the plausible rival which Major Condor has favored 
 in MuiedJa', a site with considerable ruins at the foot of Gilboa, above Jordan and near Beisan." 
 To this evidence may be added that from the Annals of Thutmose III in which, as Breasted, 
 Ancient Records, II, 426, note d, points out, the Asiatic army, which fights a battle before 
 Megiddo, has its south wing at Taanach 5 hence Megiddo must have lain not far to the north 
 of Taanach. The city also lay near the opening of the middle one of three roads that cross the Ridge, 
 the southernmost of which came out near Taanach. I have already shown where, according to 
 the conformation of the country, this road must have lain, and just at the mouth of the middle 
 road is Tell el-Mutesellim. For a refutation of Condor's identification see G. A. Smith, Hin. 
 Geog., p. 887, note. 
 
 29. I have here used the term "mound" to distinguish these three elevations from the 
 "hills" behind them and from the "knoll" F. They are, of course, not artificial mounds but 
 natural elevations. 
 
 30. Hall, y4nc. Hist, ef the h'ear East, p. 235, erroneously states that "both towns" 
 ( Meg'ddo and Taanach) "stand back behind the ridge halfwav down to the pain." In walk- 
 ing across Esdraeion from Megiddo to Nazareth, 1 have been impressed with the remarkable s^te 
 that Megiddo occupied, the Tell forming one of the most conspiruous features of the Ian. scape. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 15 
 
 limestone formation, to-day totally devoid of trees and covered with a 
 scant growth of thorns and bunch grass. The limestone is laid bare 
 here and there on their sides, which form a succession of rough ledges 
 where the scanty soil has been washed away by the heavy winter rains 
 (see View IX). If these hills were ever under cultivation, all traces of 
 it have entirely disappeared. Their sides are of moderate steepness, ris- 
 ing at an angle of 15" to 20'. At the point marked K there is a break 
 in the encircling hills, the cultivated land extending into the gap for 
 some distance till it gradually terminates in rocky land as the hills a- 
 gain approach the plain. Beyond the gap K the enclosing hills terminate 
 in an isolated knoll, marked F on Map II, which rises only about seven- 
 ty-five or a hundred feet above the surrounding land. This knoll is also 
 of limestone formation, though the slopes are not quite so rocky as are 
 those of the foothills just described (see View V). 
 
 Between the hills A and B, and B and C the wadies are small and run 
 back for only a short distance till they are lost in the hills be'hind. Be- 
 tween C and D is a wide opening known as Wady es-Sitt, receding for 
 some two miles into the range (see View X). At the head of this 
 wady is a perennial spring, 'Ain es-Sitt, of considerable size, the stream 
 which 1 have identified with the Brook Kina of the Egyptian sources 
 (see Map II). Between hills D and E is the opening of the pass over the 
 Ridge along which the Egyptian army advanced on Megiddo. The culti- 
 vated land lying between these foothills and the group of mounds G, H, 
 and I, on which Megiddo stood, is flat and free from large stones. At 
 the northern end opposite Megiddo this strip is about a fifth of a mile 
 wide, gradually broadening as it sweeps around to the south and east 
 till opposite the mouth of the pass it attains a width of about half a 
 mile (see View VII). Across this strip of land the Kina has cut a chan- 
 nel, ranging from two to three feet deep at the opening of the Wady es- 
 Sitt, marked "a" on Map II, to fifteen or eighteen feet deep at the point 
 "b" and beyond (See ViewXI). After crossing the cultivated land the 
 brook turns at right angles and runs along the edge of the mounds H and 
 I, turning again so as to flow between the mound I and the knoll F, till it 
 enters the plain of Esdraelon. The channel of the stream is uniformly fif- 
 teen to twenty feet below the bank on either hand. These banks are fair- 
 ly steep and continue so till they fall away gradually, so that at "c" it is 
 
16 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 possible for the road to Taanach to cross the stream with only a slight 
 descent of three or four feet. At "b" a road crosses the stream by a steep 
 descent, while at "d" there is a bridge. 
 
 The two mounds G and H, together with the Tell, are really one, 
 though they are separated by slight depressions. The Tell is the high- 
 est part of the group, being 125 feet above 'Ain el-Kubbi at its northern 
 base. The mound G is slightly lower, averaging about one hundred feet 
 above the 'Ain. Between the two is a narrow cut or trench, possibly 
 partly artificial, having been dug out as a sort of dry moat to render the 
 the city less accessible on that side, but partly caused by the gradual 
 rising of the Tell from age to age, as city after city was bviilt and de- 
 stroyed on its site. This depression is some thirty feet deep. The sur- 
 face of mound G is level, except for the ruins of Graeco-Roman struc- 
 tures with which it is to-day encumbered. Between G and H there is 
 only a slight depression of a few feet. The surface of H is also covered 
 with remains of late buildings and is, moreover, by nature not so level 
 as is G. Between the two mounds G and H and the mound I there is a 
 considerable depression through which at present a road runs. I is much 
 lower than H, rising not more than forty to fifty feet above ' Ainel- 
 Kubbi. Its surface is level. 
 
 The sides of the Tell slope sharply to the plain on either hand, run- 
 ning down at about an angle of 30° in many places (see View XII). The 
 sides of the mounds G, H, and I are much more gradual for the most 
 part, except on the side where H borders on the brook Kina, at which 
 place the land descends more abruptly to the bed of the stream. On the 
 west of these mounds the ascent is gradual (see View XIII), so much so 
 that a wheeled vehicle could with ease drive on to the mounds from that 
 side. The north side of the Tell descends to a sort of terrace raised some 
 feet above the plain beyond. Just below this terrace is the spring, 'Ain 
 el-Kubbi, which in ancient times supplied the inhabitants of Megiddo 
 with water. 
 
 Along the east side of the Tell runs the road spoken of on page 13 as 
 cf)nnecting the line of cities which guarded the series of crossroads on 
 the northern side of the Carmel Ridge. From, or across, this road at 
 the points marked e, f, g, h, and i, run other roads all of which con- 
 verge on the mouth of the pass leading over the Ridge south of the 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 17 
 
 city. No better evidence of the importance of this same pass could be of- 
 fered than the presence of these five roads all leading into this one valley. 
 
 At about the time of Thutmose Ill's campaign Megiddo was a strong- 
 ly fortified place. Its defences consisted of a massive brick wall enclos- 
 ing an area roughly oval in shape, some three hundred and fifteen me- 
 ters long by two hundred and thirty meters wide. 31 The wall, supported 
 by buttresses at intervals, was about ten meters high and six meters 
 thick, protected especially on the south and west against the driving of 
 the winter rains by a projecting glacis. There is no evidence of a moat 
 around the city, though on the south the Tell is separated from the 
 mound G by the depression already spoken of. The excavations have dis- 
 closed only two gates, one on the south and one on the north, -^2 though there 
 were probably others as yet undiscovered. The city's natural defences were 
 weakest on the south and west, where the height of the Tell above 
 the plain is much less than on the east and north. This may in part ac- 
 count for the fact that the projecting glacis along the foot of the wall is 
 broadest on those sides, thus rendering it more difficult to scale the 
 wall with ladders. 33 
 
 Megiddo makes its advent into history with the first campaign of 
 Thutmose III. That its story runs far back of any written record is 
 certain, not only from the evidence of neolithic settlement on the site 
 which the excavation of the Tell has disclosed, 34 bvit also because we 
 cannot suppose that a situation so favorable to human habitation would 
 not have been early occupied. Its abundant water supply, 35 its isolated 
 position rendering it easily defensible on all sides, its close relation to 
 the rich plain of Esdraelon, and finally, when commerce had developed, 
 its command of the natural highway from Mesopotamia to Egypt, 
 would all offer unusual inducements to the growth of a large and flourish- 
 ing settlement. However, its situation on the great artery of commerce 
 was the most determining factor.38 In the early world, after trade be- 
 
 31. Schumacher, Tell el-Muteiellim, 1, p. 23 fF. 
 31. Schumachrr, op. cie., I, p. 77 ft", and p. 47 
 
 33. Ci. Holscher, Holies Tor fori Mcdiriet Hahu, p 63. 
 
 34. Schumacher, op cit., I, p. 11 ft. 
 
 35. The K.ina, which flows by the Tell, is the most considerable aftluent of the Kishon on 
 the south. 
 
 36. This was the road across the Ridge mentioned in the Tabula Peutingeriana and was 
 in Arab times, except during the supremacy of the Crusaders, the regular way tor the caravans 
 
18 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 tween Egypt and the north had taken extensively to the land route, 
 such cities undoubtedly collected heavy toll from the passing caravans 
 of merchants, much as did the feudal barons of the Middle Ages. 
 
 Not only did Megiddo command the great route from Mesopotamia, 
 but it also lay on the road connecting the Phoenician Plain with the hills 
 of Ephraim and Judah. The commerce which sought these highlands 
 came down from the coast cities and, turning inland after it left Acre, 
 passed through the narrow gap at the northern end of Esdraelon, along 
 the base of the Carmel Ridge, by Megiddo and Taanach, and on to Sa- 
 maria and Jerusalem. 37 While these trade routes flourished, Megiddo 
 or its successor Legio (modern Lejjun), were prominent cities, but when 
 commerce lapsed or was diverted elsewhere, they sank into insignifi- 
 cance. 
 
 But the military significance of Megiddo was not less marked than 
 was its commercial importance. The Carmel Ridge, cutting through 
 the coast plain to the very shore of the sea, stands like a rampart 
 erected against an attack on Syria from the south. All south of Carmel 
 is the level, uninterrupted coast plain, stretching into the Sinaitic desert 
 south of Gaza. From this latter point to the boundaries of Egypt is des- 
 ert save for the few wells or springs at intervals along the road. The 
 Egyptian invader of Syria has met opposition between the Delta and 
 Carmel only at one point, the neighborhood of Gaza,^^ where the des- 
 ert meets the fertile land of the Philistine Plain. Did the Egyptian en- 
 counter defeat at this point, he found himself in a dangerous situation 
 indeed, with only the desert road behind him and no refuge from a pur- 
 suing foe till the frontier forts at Tharu were reached. Thus any cam- 
 paign that aimed at gaining the Plain of Esdraelon fell naturally into 
 three movements: first, the advance to Gaza; second, the advance along 
 the Philistine Plain; and third, the crossing of the Carmel Ridge. 
 
 In the Annals these natural stages in the campaign have been noted, 
 showing that already the military commanders of the day conducted no 
 haphazzard warfare, but took into account the larger problems of 
 
 from Damascus to Cairo. See Hartmann, "Die Strasse voii Damaskus nach Kairo," ZDMG, 
 64, p. 665 ff. 
 
 37. This was the route frequently followed by the Assyrian armies, and liter by the pil- 
 grims of the Middle Ages. 
 
 38. G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog., p. 184. Olmstead, Stirgon of Assy ia, p. 54. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 19 
 
 military tactics, and were fully aware of the importance in the successful 
 manipulation of troops attached to an accurate knowledge of the topog- 
 raphy of the field of operations.^^ The Egyptian wars of liberation had 
 developed the first known school of military experts at all commen- 
 surable with modern army boards. 
 
 Why the Allies did not meet Thutmose's advance in the neighborhood 
 of Gaza is not entirely clear. For one thing, such a move would have 
 taken them far from their northern base of operations. Moreover, the 
 south seems to have been either friendly, or, at most, not actively hos- 
 til, to the Egyptians. The fact that the list of the cities said to have been 
 "captured" on the first campaign^o includes the names of many towns 
 in southern Palestine, would not weigh heavily against this view, when 
 we take into consideration the evident fact that, in all the lists of con- 
 quered cities, any places of importance included within the field of ope- 
 rations were regularly enumerated, whether they had been loyal to the 
 Pharaoh or had rebelled. 
 
 Suffice it to say that, having failed to seize the first natural point of 
 resistance to the Egyptians, the King of Kadesh took up his position 
 at the next natural rampart, the Carmel Ridge. There he could secure 
 the most advantageous position for repulsing the invaders. That, having 
 shown his appreciation of the strength of this position by deliberately 
 taking his stand at Megiddo, he should then have thrown away the ad- 
 vantage afforded by the narrowness of the mountain pass through which 
 Thutmose was compelled to move, is as remarkable as it is inexplica- 
 ble. *' At any rate the Allies permitted Thutmose to accomplish the first 
 two movements of the campaign, the march to Gaza and thence to the 
 
 ■59. The Anridlsgive in connection with this campaign the dates of the foUowin gevents: 
 (i) the departure from Tharu, (2) the arrival at Gaza, (3) the departure from Gaza, (4) 
 the arrival at Yehem, (5) the departure from 'Aruna, (6) the Battle of Megiddo. The first 
 two dates mark the first stage of the campaign; the s-cond two, the second stage; and the last 
 two, tlie third stage. 
 
 40. U'k, IV, pp. jjg--ji6. 
 
 41. The military importance of this road is evident from the fact that the Romans placed a 
 strong force at the northern end, at Legio, modern Lejjun, the actual camp itself probably oc- 
 cupying the knoll marked F on Map II. Cf. Schumacher, Te// el-Mutesellim, I, p 88. G.A. 
 Smith, Hist. Geog., p. 389, calls attention to the frequent occurance of the names Bethshan, 
 Taanach, Megiddo, Dor, as marking a line of fortresses "on the one great avenue across coun- 
 try", and refers to Josh, xxvi, ll: Judges i, 27: I Kings iv. 12: I Chron. vii, 29. These 
 cities were all strong fortresses and held out against the Hebrew attempts at conquest, remaining 
 Canaanite till late in their history. 
 
20 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 Carmel Ridge, without opposition, nor do they seem in any way to have 
 taken advantage of the difficulties the Egyptians encountered in accom- 
 plishing the third movement to strike Thutmose under circumstances so 
 favorable to the success of the Allies. Our meager sources must 
 leave us forever ignorant of the reasons of the Allies for thus throwing 
 away their greatest chance of victory. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 21 
 
 II 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF THE CARMEL RTDGE 
 THE ANNALS, LINES 18-49 
 
 Urk.649 [ His Majesty J commanded (19) to counsil together with liis 
 victorious army, saying, "Now that [wretched] enemy (20) of 
 Kedesh, having come and having entered into Megiddo, he is 
 [there] (21) at this moment. He has assembled to himself the 
 chiefs of [ all ] the countries [which were] (22) subject to 
 
 Egypt as far as Naharin, consisting of (23) the 
 
 Kharu, the Kode, their troops, [their peopIe;](24) for he says, it is 
 reported, 'I am ready to [fight against his Majesty here] (25) in 
 Megiddo'. Tell ye me [that which is in your hearts."] 
 
 (26) They said in the presence of his Majesty, "How is it 
 possible to march **2 upon(27)this road which becomes narrower? 
 It is [reported] (28) saying, 'The enemy are there, ready upon 
 
 Urk. 650 [the outside,43 and they are] (29) becoming numerous.' Will not 
 horse go behind [horse, the troops] (30) and the people like- 
 wise? Shall our vanguard be (31) fighting, while the [rear- 
 guard] is yet standing (32) in 'Aruna, without their having 
 fought? Now there are still two roads. (33) One road, behold 
 it is our '*'' it comes out at (34) Taanach. 
 
 42. Lit. "It is like what to go upon this road?" 
 
 43. So Sethe's restoration, probably taken from Urk. IV, 655, 5, where it undoubtedly 
 refers to the king waiting at the mouth of the pass. This restoration would then suppose that 
 the mejSengers report the enemy to be assembled at the pass "outside" the valley or the moun- 
 tains. Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 421, restores "holding the way against a multitude" which 
 would seem to fill the lacuna as well as Sethe's as far as the hieroglyphics are concerned, though 
 the report of the massengers would not then agree with the situation as disclosed on the king's 
 arrival at the mouth ot the pass. 
 
 44. Sethe restores, "Behold it is excellent for our lord". Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near 
 East, p. 236, gives "there is that one which is best for us". Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 
 
22 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 The other, behold it is at the (35) north side^s of Zefti, so that 
 we shall come out at the north of Megiddo. (36) Let our vic- 
 torious lord proceed according to the de[sign of] his heart there- 
 in, (37) but do not cause us to march upon this impassable 
 road." Then [were brought] (38) massages concerning [that 
 wretched] foe. [Then was reported the information ?] con- 
 cerning [this] matter (39) which they had mentioned before. 
 Urk. 651 Spoken in the Majesty of the Court, L.P.H. "I [swear] (40) 
 as Re loves me, as my father Amon favors me, as my nostrils 
 are renewed (41) with satisfying life, my Majesty proceeds 
 upon this 'Aruna road. (42) Let him whose desire it is among 
 you march along these (43) roads you have mentioned. Let 
 him whose desire it is among you go (44) in the following of 
 my Majesty. Do not let them think among these (45) enemies 
 whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon (46) another 
 road (because) he is beginning to fear us?' (So) they will 
 think." (47) They said in the presence of his Majesty; "May 
 thy father Amon, Lord of Thebes, Presider over Karnak, do 
 [according to thy desire.] (48) Behold us as the following of thy 
 Majesty in whatever place [thy Majesty] proceeds. (49) The 
 servant is at the back of [his] lord." 
 Having arrived at Yehem, somewhere on the south of the Carmel 
 Ridge, Thutmose halted long enough to hold a council of war, as the 
 Annals puts it, with "his troops". The messengers which appear later 
 in the account, were undoubtedly spies who had been sent ahead by the 
 Pharaoh to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. In all probability 
 it was their return with the news of the preparation made by the Allies 
 on the north of the Ridge to check the Egyptian advance that led the 
 Pharaoh to call the council. There will certainly have been frequent 
 conferences between the Pharoah and his officers. The j^riestly scribe 
 
 421, gives, "one road, behold, it will us". Mnspcro, Recieil, II, p.<;i, gives, "un 
 
 chemin voici qu'il nous mettra sur la grande route a I'Ouest de Taanaka". The remarkable thing 
 about this passage is that on it several historians have based a srateme 't that the officers advocated 
 one of the roads in preference to the other, when, as a matter of fact, we do not know what 
 they said of the Taanach road, owing to the lacuna, while th -y certainly did not sav that the 
 Zetti rond was preferable. 
 
 45. Or, "at the road north of Zefti". This, however, is improbable, as the Annalist 
 never elsewhere uses w'-r of "road" but prefers tnni instead. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 23 
 
 who made these excerpts from the daily records of the campaign gives 
 us such full details of this particular council because of the importance 
 of its decisions on subsequent events, but chiefly because it brings out 
 prominently the fearlessness of the king in contrast to the cautious 
 nature of his officers. Like many oriental military records the doings of 
 subordinates are introduced only as a foil to the overshadowing figure 
 of the monarch. 
 
 The king opens the conference by laying before his officers the infor- 
 mation received: first, that the King of Kadesh has already occupied 
 Megiddo; second, that he is at the head of a strong coalition reaching as 
 far as Naharin in the north; and, third, that he is preparing to make a 
 stand at Megiddo against the Egyptian army. In view of this situation 
 the king asks the advice of his officers as to how to proceed. Such is the 
 brief account given in the Annals of the drift of the royal speech. How- 
 ever, as the officers at once begin to object to the advance by the direct 
 road, we must suppose that the king had already pointed out this road 
 as the one he intended to take. 
 
 Upon hearing the royal decision the officers seem to have been dismay- 
 ed, though we may be sure that their consternation has suffered no 
 diminution at the pen of the royal secretary, who would seek thereby 
 to enhance h"s master's own reputation for daring. The interrogative 
 form of their reply (lit. "It is like what to go upon this road which be- 
 comes narrower?"), trembles with their surprise and fear. They at once 
 raise the objection that the spies have brought information to the effect 
 that the enemy are waiting just outside the pass the king has chosen 
 and that they are, in all probability, very numerous, or, if we accept 
 Breasted's restoration,"*^ they are making great preparations to dispute 
 this very road with the Egyptians. Besides, the officers declare, the road 
 is too narrow to allow of any military formation being maintained.'*'' 
 The army will be strung out in such a long, thin line that the advance 
 guard will already have come in contact with the enemy before the 
 
 46. Ancient Records, II, 421. 
 
 47. An interesting commentary on this statement is the passage from Judith, iv, 6-7; "Also 
 Joacim the high priest, which was in those days in Jerusalem, wrote to them that dwelt in Be- 
 thulia and Betomestham, which is over against Esdraslon, towards the open country, near to Do- 
 thaim, charging them to keep the passages of the hill country: for bv them there was an entrance 
 into Jud-a, and it was easy to stop them that would come up, because the passage was strait, for 
 two men at most", or, as a variant lias it, "as they came up, the pass being narrow, in double 
 
24 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 rear guard has left 'Aruna. As alternative routes they suggest two 
 other roads, "^8 one of which issues from the mountains in the direction 
 of Taanach, and the other of which, passing on the north of Zefti, issues 
 to the north of Megiddo. "^^ The royal wrath at this objection to the 
 'Aruna road was probably apparent by this time, for the officers close 
 their advice by acknowledging the supremacy of the Pharaoh's will, but 
 still they beg that he will not choose the difficult mountain pass. In sup- 
 port of their request they further submit the report of the spies to which 
 they had already referred. 
 
 The situation in which the Egyptian army now found itself is evident 
 from the foregoing account of the progress of the council. It is apparent 
 that the halt was made at Yehem, because, in view of the report of the 
 spies, it was necessary for those in charge of the campaign to decide how 
 the Ridge, lying between them and the enemy, was to be crossed, ^ehem 
 lay at, or near, the junction of three well-known roads, and it now be- 
 
 file at most." The actual character of this pass is an interesting illustration of the meaning ot the 
 Egyptian phrase iv^ r, the various suggestions in regard to the meaning ot which I have men- 
 tioned in note 5. As the traveller advances along the road, he is impressed by the fact that the 
 wady becomes steadily narrower (seepages 10-12) thus conforming to the idea of a gradual 
 change of condition for the worse, which seems to underlie the Egyptian idiom. 
 
 48. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 256, states that the officers of the king advised 
 Thutmose to follow the road that ran to the north ot Zefti. There is no evidence for this state- 
 ment in the Annals, as they specifically st.ite that two roads were suggested, either of which were 
 acceptable to the generals. Budge, Hiit. of Egypt, IV, p 32, makes the statement that "of 
 three roads that lead to Megiddo, two were rejected by the generals as unsuitable, but the king 
 decided to march there by one of them.'" There is a break in the inscription at this point where 
 Sethe restores "One road, behold it '\s excellent for our lord; it comes out at Taanach." The 
 surviving portions of the Annals, however, contain nothing to indicate that any preference was 
 expressed by the officers. 
 
 49. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 257, note I, (as mentioned on p. 7, note 14) 
 locates Yehem at el-Kheimeh and indentifies Zefti with Saffa, about halt way between Jerusalem 
 and Jaffa. He says, "The third road ran north of Zatiti, to meet the great highway that cuts 
 the hill district of Nablus, skirting the foot of Tabor near Jenin, a little to the north of Megid- 
 do." There are certain objections to this identification. In the first place, it is difficult to see 
 why it should have taken the Egyptians from the fifth to the sixteenth of the month to cover 
 tlie short distance from Gaza to Satfa, something less than fifty miles, while for the next fifty 
 miles, from SafFa to the Carmel Ridge, they required only from the sixteenth to the nineteenth. 
 The second fifty miles will also have been through the more hostile portion of the country where 
 one would expect the progress to have been slower. In the second place, the road by Taanach, 
 which was suggested as an alternate route to the one north of Zefti, would enter the Plain 
 of Esdrjelon at almost exactly the same spot as the road from Nablus to Jenin and the latter roaii 
 would therefore otter no advantages over the Taanach road for an armv operating agrinst 
 Megiddo. Moreover, one fails to see why 'he officers should have desired to take a road which 
 skirted "the foot of Tabor near Jenin", coming out on the nortii of .VIegiddo, when they 
 would thereby expose their line of communication with the south to the attack of the enemy, 
 and would also have to march across the whole width of Esdra'lon only to inaich back again to 
 Megiddo. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 25 
 
 came necessary, before advancing further, to decide upon one of these 
 roads as the route to be pursued.'*^ The king favored the one known as 
 the 'Aruna road, which we learn from the later developments of 
 the campaign, issued from the mountains at Megiddo. It is described as 
 being very narrow and difficult, but in this matter due allowance must 
 be made for exaggeration on the part of the officers who desired to avoid 
 it and who would naturally paint its disadvantages in the most lurid 
 hues. That this road crossed the Ridge between the two roads which the 
 officers favored is also evident, for one of these latter roads entered the 
 plain towards Taanach, which is to the south of Megiddo, and the other 
 road is specifically stated to have issued from the mountains north of 
 Megiddo. 
 
 That the Pharaoh's officers were familiar with the country before 
 them is evident. Possibly the spies who had been sent forward to re- 
 connoitre had brought back information in regard to these mountain 
 passes, though the campaigns and commerce of the preceding century 
 must also have made the Egyptians fully acquainted with the roads of 
 Palestine-Syria, especially with the great route to and from the Eu- 
 phrates. This same road across the Carmel Ridge apparently did not 
 enjoy a very savory reputation among the Egyptians. It is probably 
 that described in Papyrus Anastasi 1, where its dangers and difficulties 
 are dwelt on with a wealth of harrowing detail, including wild men of 
 more than human ferocity, and deep gorges such as are scarcely found in 
 Palestine at all and certainly not in the region of Megiddo. ^o This des- 
 cription of the famous road cannot be taken seriously. It is in the gen- 
 eral tone of the rest of this remarkable papyrus, exaggerated and dis- 
 torted beyond all measure wherever the writer is describing the utter 
 incompetency and cowardice of the "Maher", and designed through- 
 out to exhibit the writer's erudition and knowledge of strange words 
 and names. Although, of course, the papyrus dates from several hund- 
 
 49. For a discussion of the historical importance of these passes see G. A. Smith, Hist. 
 Geog., p. I 50 fF. 
 
 50. Gardiner, Hieratic Texts, I, pp. 25-27: "Beliold tlie is in a ravine two thousand 
 
 cubits deep, filled with boulders and pebbles. ******* The (.') narrow defile is 
 infested (.') with Shosu concealed beneath the bushes; some of them are of four cubits, or of 
 five cubits, from head (.') to foot {>), fierce of face, their heart is not mild, and they hearken 
 not to coaxing. *********** Thy path is filled with boulders and pebbles, 
 without a passable track {}) overgrown with reeds and brambles, briers and wolf-pads. The 
 ravine is on one side of thee, the mountain rises on the other." 
 
26 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 red years after the Megiddo campaign, s' it still serves to show that the 
 road was regarded as rough and dangerous, even w^hen Syria was far 
 better know to the Egyptians than in Thutmose's day. 
 
 Roads, especially where they are not paved, shift from age to age. In 
 the Orient this is especially true of the roads that traverse the plains. 
 New paths are constantly being made, their direction being governed 
 largely by the rise or fall of towns and by shifts in the trend of com- 
 merce. ^^ One has only to note the Roman roads, remains of which still 
 survive throughout Syria and Palestine but so many of which no longer 
 mark lines of travel, to note how impossible it is to dogmatize on the 
 location of an ancient road from data furnished by modern roads. In 
 mountainous regions, however, we have data on which to base a con- 
 clusion in regard to the location of an ancient road that do not exist in 
 the case of more level country. We can rest assured that in ancient, as 
 in classical, mediaeval and modei'n times, roads which crossed moimtain 
 ranges followed the courses marked out by nature, the passes which still 
 exist to-day. When, therefore, w^e look for the roads which Thutmose's 
 council discussed and which crossed the Carmel Ridge, we can turn to 
 the map of the country as it is to-day and feel assured that from it 
 we can learn with reasonable certainty the possible routes by which the 
 Ridge would have been crossed in antiquity. That there was no road, 
 other than a rough donkey-path, over the southern end of Umm el- 
 Fahm is obvious from any careful study of the map. Or that any army 
 wishing to go from the coast plain by the most direct road to Megiddo 
 should choose any other route than that by the Wady 'Arah is difficult 
 to conceive. Any other course would have necessitated the scaling of a 
 succession of rough hills, a most fatiguing and unnecessary labor, when 
 right at hand lay a direct and easy course along the bottom of the wady 
 which led directly to the desired goal. In the preceding description of 
 the Carmel Ridge, I have pointed out the fact that all the passes of the 
 mountain are occupied to-day by roads. Therefore, in discussing the 
 situation that now confronted Thutmose, I shall take it for granted that 
 the roads considered by the council of war were essentially the same, as 
 far as location goes, with those that cross the Ridge to-day and the his- 
 
 51. Gardiner, op. cit., p. I . 
 
 52. Cf. Ramsey, Hist. Geo^. of Asia Minor, p. 83. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 27 
 
 tory of which we can trace back to Roman times in the remains of the 
 paving still in situ. 
 
 A glance at Map I will show the road the king advocated. The 
 road can be none other than the one running from Tell el-Asawir by 
 'Ain 'Arab past 'Ain Ibrahim to Megiddo. The king evidently preferred 
 to make directly for the enemy's position. The officers, on the other hand, 
 feared the narrow mountain defile, where the army would be strung out 
 in a long line and so would be particularly liable to attack. The enemy, 
 sweeping down from the heights on either hand, would be able to cut 
 such a line in two and do great damage before any united resistance 
 could be offered. The gentle slopes leading into the wady would offer 
 opportunities for a considerable body of men to make such a descent 
 with ease on any army crossing the pass (see View III). If, on the con- 
 trary, Megiddo could be approached from the side of the plain, not only 
 would the dangers of the pass the avoided, but ample opportunity 
 would be given for the use of the chariotry,53 which branch of the service 
 would be only a hinderancc in the mountain defile. The officers, there- 
 fore, advocated either one of two other roads. One of these came 
 out of the mountains towards Taanach. This can have been none other 
 than the one running around the southern end of the Ridge through the 
 Plain of ' Arrabeh, entering Esdraelon in the neighborhood of Jenin.^* 
 By pursuing this course, the plain could be reached considerably to the 
 south of Megiddo and the advance on the city could then be made by 
 way of Taanach. Here too the open plain would offer ample opportunity 
 for manoeuvres and would enable the Egyptians to bring all their force 
 into action at once, thus avoiding the danger of their being defeated in 
 detail, as might be the case if they took the 'Aruna road. 
 
 The other road favored by the council is less certain of identification. 
 It is possible that it may have been the road branching off from the 
 Wady 'Arab at 'Ain 'Arab and issuing from the mountains near Tell el- 
 Aghbariyeh. This, however, seems very unlikely as the road reaches 
 
 53. During the rainy season the plain is very muddy and in the middle is often impassable, 
 owing to the feet that the drainage from the plain cannot be readily carried off". However, by 
 the time Thutmose reached this region in May, most of the plain would have been dry enough 
 to allow of the free use of chariots upon the level, cultivated fields. 
 
 54. The advice of the officers would seem to have been dictated by ordinary military pru- 
 dence, and we cannot but feel that Thutmose was assuming grave responsibilities and taking 
 great risks when he disregarded it. The king's choice, however, was justified by the event. 
 
28 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 the plain only a short distance from Megiddo and would have been open 
 to practically the same disadvantages as was the direct road to Megid- 
 do. Moreover, as ' Aruna probably lay near the junction of these two 
 roads, the term " 'Aruna Road", used constantly throughout the Annals 
 to apply to the middle one of the three chief roads, might equally well 
 apply to either of these two roads. The Annalist would most probably 
 have used some other term to apply to the road that issued at Megiddo, 
 ^the third road) had he been contrasting it with the road to Tell el- 
 Aghbariyeh /'the second, road). The road from Tell el-Asawir to Tell 
 Kaimun seems most likely to have been the "road north of Zefti", be- 
 ing the counterpart on the north to the road around the southern end of 
 the Ridge towards Taanach. The only other route, that around the 
 seaward endof Carmel, is too great a detour to have been seriously con- 
 sidered. By taking the road issuing from the mountains at Tell Kaimun, 
 the advantages mentioned as being derived from the use of the fourth 
 road would be equally well secured, except thtit the fourth road is some- 
 what easier for chariots. In any case it is obvious that the officers de- 
 sired to reach the open country on the other side of the Ridge before 
 encountering the enemy, hence their very evident reluctance to follow 
 the Pharaoh along the direct road to Megiddo. 
 
 In answer to the objections of his officers, Thutmose's anger blazed 
 up. His reply is one of the most remarkable royal utterances in all the 
 range of ancient oriental records and fairly rings not only with wrath 
 but also with contempt. We can picture to ourselves the Pharaoh ris- 
 ing from his seat as he ends the council in disgust and with scorn bid- 
 ding those of his officers who are afraid to accompany him follow the 
 road their fears dictate, but calling upon those who would stand by him 
 to follow his lead, adding, as a final rebuke, "They shall not think 
 among the enemy whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon 
 another road because he is beginning to fear us?' " It is the first instance 
 in history of one born to lead calling upon him who will to follow him 
 into danger or be forever branded a coward. And in the reply of the 
 officers we hear not only the abject submission of the courtier who has 
 offended royalty, but the shamed acquiescence of the soldier caught in a 
 situation where he may be accused of cowardice; "Behold us as the fol- 
 lowing of thy Majesty in whatever place thy Majesty proceeds." 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 29 
 
 III 
 
 THE CROSSING OF THE CARMEL RIDGE 
 THE ANNALS, LINES 49-84 
 
 Urk. 652 [His Majesty commanded to issue] (50) orders to the entire 
 
 army ^^ (51) this road which was becoming narrow. 
 
 [Behold his Majesty took] (52) an oath, saying, "I will not per- 
 mit [my victorious army] to set out (53) in advance of my Majes- 
 ty." 56 (54) He set out in advance of his troops 
 
 himself. [Every man] was assigned (55) his position,^' horse 
 behind horse, [his Majesty] being (56) at the head of his troops. 
 
 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 19; the watch in 
 [life]58 (57) at the royal tent was at the city of 'Aruna. My 
 Majesty proceeded (58) northward, bearing^^ his father Amon- 
 Re. Lord of Thebes, [who opened the way] (59) before me, 
 
 5 5- Sethe's restoration would read; "Your victorious lord will protect your footsteps upon 
 this road, etc." 
 
 56. Sethe restores; "Now his Majesty proposed (rdy-n) in his heart that he set out'". 
 
 57. Lit. "His steps of marching". 
 
 58. A technical phrase. It occurs again in Urk. iv, 656, 13, and also in Ramses II's re- 
 cord ot" the Kadesh campaign ( Breasted, Battle of KaJei/i, p. 18.) The second occurance in 
 the Annals is prob.ibly Sethe's authority for the restoration of "life" in the present passage. In 
 Ramses' inscription the phrase reads, "The goodly watch in life, prosperity and health in the 
 rent of his Majesty was on the height south of Kedesh." Ramses' phrase is obviously the com- 
 plete form, which is abbreviated in the Annals. I take it that the "Watch in life, prosperity and 
 health" is a technical phrase for jthe royal body-guard or the guard especially det.iiled to pro- 
 tect the roval tent. In that case, both here and in Urk. IV, 656, 13, we may have a nominal 
 sentence which would read, "The watch in life was in the tent of the kii.g". .As such a guard 
 would undoubtedly be stationed as soon as the king's tent was pitched at the lime of setting up 
 camp, the phrase in our text would then become equivalent to "The camp was pitched at 
 'Aruna". On the restoration of *nh in the text, see Breasted, Ancient Records II, 425, note a. 
 
 ^9. Lit. "under". Wr sometimes contams so much of the idea of motion that it is 
 construed with the preposition r, as !n Urk. IV, p. 310, where b' is used of carrying the sacred 
 image of Amon ( kr )t-f Tmn r hb-f ) across the river to one of his great feasts It is not neces- 
 sary to translate the passage "under the protection of" as does Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 425, 
 nor to omit the s-gn altogether as Masuero, Recueil, II, p. 56. The same word, hr, is used of 
 transporting Amon-of-the-Ways in the Report of Wcnamon; see RecucH, XXI, p 8g. 
 
30 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 Urk. 653Herakhte was (90) my father Amon 
 
 strength of sword (61) my Majesty. 
 
 His Majesty went forth [at the head of] his [troops] prepared 
 
 (62) in numerous battle-array one. [Their] (63) 
 
 south wing was atTaanach, [while their] (64) north wing was 
 at the southern corner of [the valley of the Kina.^^ Then] (65) 
 
 his Majesty cried out upon (66) They are fallen. 
 
 Now, that [wretched] enemy (67) 
 
 Urk. 654... (68) Amon (69) ye 
 
 of (70) his Majesty for his might more than (71) ... 
 
 Troops of his Majesty in (72) 'Aruna. 
 
 Now the rearguard of the victorious troops of his Majesty 
 was at the [city] of (73) 'Aruna when the vanguard issued at 
 the valley of the Kina. (74) They filled the mouth of the valley. 
 
 Then they said in the presence of his Majesty, L. P. H. , (75) 
 "Behold, his Majesty goes forth together with his victorious 
 troops and they fill the (76) valley. Let our victorious lord har- 
 ken to us this time (77) and let our lord guard for us the rear 
 Urk. 655 of his troops and his people. (78) When the rear of the troops 
 goes forth for us, then we shall fight against (79) these Asiatics; 
 then we shall not give thought [to] the rear of (80) our army.''^! 
 
 His Majesty halted outside, waiting (81) there, guarding 
 
 the rear of his victorious army. 
 
 Now the rear of the expedition (82) was going out upon this 
 road, when the shadow turned, (83) and his Majesty arrived at 
 the south of Megiddo on the bank of the Brook Kina, when it 
 was seven hours from the turning by the sun. 
 
 Then the camp of his Majesty was pitched there and com- 
 Urk. 656 mand was given to the entire army, saying, "Prepare your- 
 selves; make ready your weapons, for one is to advcince to fight 
 with this wretched enemy in the morning." Wherefore one was 
 
 60. The portion of the text preserved may also read, "Their south wing was at the corner 
 south of". Sethe restores; "south oi the Brook A'/«a," which restoration 1 have, in part, follow- 
 ed for reasons given later. As far as the size of the lacuna goes the ori^jinal might have read, 
 "south of the city of Meg^iddo. 
 
 61. This passage must be added to those cited by Breasted, Andent Records, II, ^9, noted, 
 as instances of a real patriotic feeling evinced by the use of the phrase "our troops". 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 31 
 
 proceeding (84) to rest in the royal tent. The officers were pro- 
 vided for.^2 Provisions for the court were secured. The sentries 
 of the army made the rounds. ^3 They said, "Steadfast! Stead- 
 fast! Watchful! Watchful!" The watch in life was at the royal 
 tent. One came to report to his Majesty, "The land is well;^'* 
 the troops of the north and the south likewise." 
 
 When the council had broken up, the king gave orders to set out on 
 the 'Aruna road. It is significant that the records so strongly emphasize 
 the fact that the king led the line of march in person. After the vigoi-ous 
 repremand he had given his officers at the council, he could do no less 
 than occupy the place of danger himself. He would thereby also be able 
 the better to prevent any surprise by the enemy and would encourage 
 his men by his own example. So, the necessary orders having been giv- 
 en for the disposition of the troops during the crossing of the mountains, 
 the army set- out. 
 
 At the most commanding position in the pass lies the modern village of 
 'Ar'arah, which has been identified with the ancient 'Aruna. ^^ j^ 
 support of this identification it may be argued that; first, if the road 
 running from Tell el-Asawir to Megiddo is the 'Aruna road re- 
 ferred to in the Annals, then somewhere along the course of the road we 
 must look for the city of 'Aruna as occupying a prominent position. Sec- 
 ond, the city must have lain well within the pass, for the Egyptians 
 had already been compelled to assume a single file formation before they 
 reached 'Aruna. Third, the distance of 'Aruna from Megiddo is about 
 half a day's march for an army, which we know from the Annals was 
 not more than about seven or eight miles at the farthest. ^^ We 
 must assume that the Egyptians would push on as fast as possible 
 through this mountain defile so as to free themselves from the danger of 
 attack as soon as possible, but at the same time they would have been 
 
 6i. On miirzusee Gardiner, Admonitions, p. 102-103 
 
 63. Lit. ''passed by, crossed over''. 
 
 64. This word, mrnv, "waste, might perhaps refer to the source from wliich some of the 
 troops were drawn. In that case they wouU' be the auxiliary troops from the fringe ot the desert. 
 But if this surmise were correct, wliy are they mentioned before the regular troops, thejw'yf 
 of the south and north.' 
 
 65. Wiedemann, Aegypt. Geschichte, p. 347. Petrie Hi>t., <]f' Egypt II, p. 325. 
 
 66. The distance from Tharu to Gaza is about 125 miles. This the Egyptians covered in 
 nine davs, m, iking an averaj;e of fourteen miles a day. 
 
32 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 hindered from making their best time by the confined nature of the road. 
 Fourth, there must have been sufficient room and a sufficient water supply 
 at 'Aruna to allow of the Egyptian army having camped there one night. 
 These conditions are all satisfied by the location of 'Ar'arah. For, first, 
 it occupies the most prominent position in the pass, just at the junction 
 of the road to Tell el-Aghbariyeh with that to Megiddo and is surround- 
 ed with sufficient cultivable land to support a fair sized population. Sec- 
 ond, it lies well within the pass, being about two hours' journey from 
 the mouth. Third, it is about seven or eight miles from Megiddo, just the 
 maximum distance we would suppose the Egyptians to have travelled 
 between 'Aruna and Megiddo. Fourth, it is abundantly supplied with 
 water, and is located in an opening in the wady large enough to accom- 
 modate a considerable body of troops (see View II). From these consid- 
 erations it seems reasonably certain that 'Aruna must have lain some- 
 where near the site of the village 'Ar'arah. Etymologioally, however, it 
 seems hardly possible to equate 'Aruna("-rw-7i'J with 'Ar'arah (•^cjc). 
 
 If we are right in this identification of 'Aruna with the modern 'Ar- 
 'arah, then shortly after leaving Yehem the host would have entered 
 the mouth of the Wady 'Arah and would have found itself in the situa- 
 tion which the officers of the army dreaded so much, where it was im- 
 possible to maintain any other than a long-drawn-out line of march. 
 With this necessity of the topography the account in the Annals entire- 
 ly agrees, for upon leaving Yehem, the Egyptians are said to have march- 
 ed, at once, "horse behind horse", in the single file formation that the nar- 
 row valley demanded. It is not to be supposed that even on the coast plain 
 from Gaza to Yehem the army had marched in any other than column 
 formation. In most parts of the valley also this formation could be more 
 or less maintained. If, however, the enemy had attacked the army in the 
 open plain, it would have been possible for the Egyptians to have formed 
 in some sort of battle-array. In the mountain pass, on the other hand, 
 the long, straggling column necessitated by the narrow road could not 
 have been organized into any sort of formation. It is on this account 
 that the record so strongly emphasizes the straggling line which the 
 country necessitated. 
 
 On the thirteenth day of the month (May 12th) the Egyptians were 
 at 'Aruna, that is, on the third day after they are recorded to have been 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 33 
 
 at Yehem. We are not to suppose that it took three days to cover the 
 distance between the two towns. If we are right in pvitting yehem 
 somewhere near tlie junction of the three roads across the Ridge, it 
 would not have taken more than one day for the army to have reached 
 ' Aruna. It is possible that the spies sent out to locate the enemy were 
 not dispatched till after Yehem was reached, in which case it would 
 have been necessary for the king to wait a day or two at Yehem for 
 their return. It is not necessary to suppose that the council was called 
 on the sixteenth. That date possibly indicates the time of arrival at the 
 city, at which the king may have remained for several days. We must 
 suppose that as soon as possible after the announcement of the king's 
 decision to cross the Ridge directly to Megiddo, the advance was begun, 
 for there would have been no object in delay, as far as our information 
 goes. The nineteenth of the month was therefore occupied in the march 
 to 'Aruna, at which place the Egyptians camped that night. Provided 
 the location of Yehem as given above is in general correct, it would have 
 been possible for the king to have pushed on further that night before 
 camping. But in that case nightfall would, in all probability, have found 
 the army still toiling through the pass, and they would have been com- 
 pelled to halt so near to Megiddo that their camp would have been 
 exposed to attack by the enemy had the latter been vigilant. Moreover, 
 at 'Aruna there was a good camping-place (see page 10) with plenty 
 of water, a favorable situation found nowhere else on the road. Fur- 
 thermore, the distance from 'Aruna to Megiddo, as shown by the time 
 occupied in crossing the pass the next day, was just about enough to 
 allow the Pharaoh to get his entire army through the mountains in 
 the course of the day and enable them to prepare for battle on the 
 morrow. 
 
 In the passage of the mountains the king led the way accompanied 
 by, or, in the words of the Annals, "bearing" his father, Amon. This is 
 the only instance I know of in Egyptian records where we are told that 
 statues or images of the gods were carried into battle, as the Hebrews 
 carried the ark. The image of Amon in its portable shrine, born on the 
 shoulders of a body of priests, undoubtedly accompanied the van of the 
 army where was the king's chariot and "opened the way" before his 
 Majesty. On the walls at Medinet Habu is a relief depicting the de- 
 
34 
 
 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 parture ofRamses III for the first Lybian campaign. ^'^ Before the king is 
 a chariot bearing the standard of Amon, a ram's head surmounted by 
 the sun-disk, the whole supported on a pole attached to the chariot 
 (see Fig. I). Above the chariot is an inscription which reads: "Ut- 
 terance of Amon-Re, king of gods: 'Lo, I am before thee, lord of the 
 Two Lands, Usermare-Meriamon. I give [to thee] all [might and power] 
 
 among the Nine Bows; terror their chiefs, I will open [ for] 
 
 thee the ways of the land of Temeh. I will trample them before thy 
 horses.' "68 n jg interesting that this phrase "open the ways", so com- 
 mon in the inscriptions, should be so graphically illustrated by the 
 
 Figure I. From Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte und Bilder, II, p. ^4. 
 
 chariot of Amon preceding the king along the road to Lybia. Is it not 
 more than likely that in Thutmose's inscription, where the king is said 
 to be carrying his father Amon who in turn "opens the way" before him, 
 we have just such another scene as that shown at Medinet Habu. 
 We know of instances where portable cult images were carried 
 
 67. Champollion, Alinuments, 217. Rosellini, Alonumenti i^torici, 124. 
 
 68. Breasted, y4ncient Records, IV, 49. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 35 
 
 far from Egypt, such as the image of Khonsu which was sent to the 
 land of the Hittites by Ramses II, ^9 or the image of Amon-of-the-Way 
 that Wenamon carried to the king of Byblosjo The divine names given 
 to the four divisions of Ramses II's army on the campaign of Kadesh'^i 
 suggest that perhaps each division of the army bore an image of the 
 deity under whose special protection it marched. Thutmose III, who 
 owed his elevation to the throne to the intervention of Amon, might 
 well emphasize the presence of the deity at the head of the expedition 
 which was being carried on ostensibly at the god's command. 
 
 The fragmentary condition of lines 61-71 makes it impossible to deter- 
 mine clearly the connection between the portions of the text that still 
 survive. It is evident, however, that with the words, "pr-t yn h m-f", 
 that is, "His Majesty went forth", in line 61, the Egyptians had reached 
 the mouth of the pass and were about to make their exit into the open 
 plain by the Kina. The "going-forth" was undoubtedly from the narrow 
 mountain defile. As the mouth of the valley was reached, the Egyptian 
 vanguard formed in battle-line, ready to resist any attack by the Asia- 
 tics and to cover the main body of the army still pushing through the 
 mountains behind. '2 
 
 On thus issuing from the mountains the king, to judge from the re- 
 maining fi-agments of the inscription, called out to his troops as he descri- 
 ed the Asiatics across the Kina. The few words, "They are fallen. Now 
 this wretched enemy", suggest such an interpretation and, the second 
 
 69. of), lit., Ill, 419 ff. 
 
 70. op. lit., IV, 557 ft' 
 
 71. op. lit., Ill, 310 ft". 
 
 72. Until the appearance of the Urkunden there was no certainty as to who "went forth". 
 Masoero has supplied a //w-sign after pr-t yn, but, at best, it was a restoration. Owing to the 
 fact that the statement which immediately follows undoubtedly refers to the disposition of the 
 Asiatic forces, Breasted, Ancient RecorJi II, 416, interpreted the words pr-t yn as applving to the 
 Asiatics. He therefore concluded that ttiere h.\d been an engagement in the mountains between 
 the Egyptians ana the Allies. Hall, Anc. Hin. of the Near East, p. 237, says "The people 
 of the village of Aruna ******* attacked the troops on the next day, and caused con- 
 siderable annoyance to the rearguard, which was fighting near Aruna while the king with the van 
 had crossed the head of the pass without resistance and was descending the slope of the Ruhah 
 towards Megiddo." Since the publication of the Urkunden, Maspero's restoration is seen to 
 have been correct, for Sethe has found on the walls at Karnak the traces of a /w-sign, showing 
 that it was the king, not the Allies, that went torth in battle-array. Therefore Breasted's battle 
 in the mountains must be given uu. Hall's statement in regard to the rearguard fighting while 
 the van was already across the mountains is not at ill supported bv the inscriptions, which make 
 no mention ot any such situation. In fact, all through this section of the Annals the fear of the 
 Eirvptians is constantly that just the opposite will occur and that the van will be fighting while 
 the rear are still in 'Aruna without having fought. 
 
36 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 person plural pronominal suffix preserved in line 69 would indicate that 
 the M'^ords were addressed to those about the speaker. The object of 
 what was said seems to have been to encourage the troops and perhaps 
 to point out the successful accomplishment of the royal plan which the 
 officers had opposed at Yehem. 
 
 After the words "numerous battle-array" Sethe would supply "n 
 gmn-f hry iv' ", that is, "not did he find a single enemy", '3 all of. which 
 sentence is pui'e restoration except the word translated "single". Despite 
 the fact that the restoration seems exactly to fill the lacuna, there is 
 far too little ground for assuming that those particular words are what 
 occupied the break. For historical purposes restorations which do not 
 materially modify the meaning of a passage may be accepted with re- 
 serve even on comparatively slight evidence, but to add the statement 
 of a fact of such historical importance as the denial of any conflict with 
 the enemy in a place where such a conflict would naturally be expected, 
 and that merely on the strength of a single word which does not in it- 
 self contain any clue to the nature of the lost passage, is too great a 
 liberty with the text to be accepted, even if the restoration does just 
 fill the lacuna. The fact that there is no mention of a meeting with the 
 enemy, as far as the surviving portions of the text go, does not warrant 
 the insertion of a denial of such an encounter. The best that we can do 
 with this passage is to say that we do not know what occupied the 
 lacuna. 
 
 The statement that "The southern wing (lit. "horn") was at Taanach 
 
 while the northern wing was at the corner " can refer only to 
 
 the disposition of the Asiatic force, as Breasted has pointed out.'"* It is 
 obvious that the enemy had miscalculated the movements of the Egyp- 
 tian army and expected them to advance by the road around the south- 
 ern end of the Ridge and so to approach Megiddo from the direction of 
 Taanach. The Annalist is evidently describing the Asiatic lines as extend- 
 ing from Taanach on the south to "the corner " on the north. 
 
 Sethe's restoration here, "the corner of the valley of the Kina", though 
 still only a surmise, is possible, for we can hardly beli(>ve that the Asia- 
 tics would have left Megiddo entirely undefended, and if one end of their 
 
 73. Urk. IV, 653. 
 
 74. Aticieiit Records, II, 426, note d. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 37 
 
 line reached to the valley of the Kina, which flows by Megiddo, they 
 would thus be in some position to defend the city. On this hypothesis 
 we must suppose that the main body was somewhere on the road be- 
 tween Taanach and Megiddo with its probably detached extremities at 
 either city, these outposts being the "wings" of the Annalist. They were 
 thus prepared to mass their forces at either point according as the 
 Egyptians advanced by Taanach or by the 'Aruna road direct to Megid- 
 do. Still it is astonishing how little military wisdom the Asiatics seem 
 to have displayed throughout this whole campaign. They took no ad- 
 vantage apparently of the opportunity for harassing the Egyptians of- 
 fered by the narrow mountain pass. In fact, as far as we can see, they 
 were unaware of which road Thutmose had chosen, until the Egyptians 
 were almost at Megiddo. It seems to me that we must reach this con- 
 clusion if we suppose that they allowed the Egyptians to ci-oss the 
 mountains without attacking them in the narrow defile. At no time 
 th-oughout the campaign were their chances of successful resistance to 
 the invader so bright as when the Egyptian force was winding about 
 among the hills, and this great opportunity they seem deliberately to 
 have neglected. However, when our sources are so meagre and are also 
 written from the enemy's standpoint, we cannot be positive on such a 
 point. 
 
 The Annalist informs us that when the vanguard of the Egyptians 
 had reached the opening of the pass, the rearguard was still far behind 
 on the other side of the Ridge at 'Aruna, the point from which the army 
 had set out in the morning. The officep who accompanied the king at 
 the head of the army must have watched the opening of the valley with 
 anxious eyes to catch a glimpse of the whereabouts of the enemy and 
 to make svire that their fears, as expressed at the council at Yehem, were 
 not about to be realized. As the army turned the last bend of the road, 
 several hundred yards before it enters upon the plain, they found that 
 the valley spread out to a couple of hundred yards in width while the 
 slopes of the hills rose gently on either hand. The eager troops behind, 
 pushing rapidly forward, not only to see what lay ahead, but also, no 
 doubt, to free themselves from the dangerous position in which the nar- 
 rowness of the pass placed them, soon filled the mouth of the valley 
 (see View I V)i and, we must suppose, in the case of the infantry, even 
 
38 The Battle of Megtddo 
 
 the slopes of the hills. What they saw before them was the wide expanse 
 of level land, probably covered with ripening harvests, stretching for 
 half a mile to the banks of the Kina, and beyond, about a mile away, the 
 walls of Megiddo, the stronghold of the enemy and their own objective 
 (see View V). And beyond the city lay the fertile plain of Esdraelon, 
 with its grain fields and orchards, extending away to the blue hills of 
 Galilee. No doubt between the Egyptians and the open plain was the 
 northern wing of the Asiatic army, now probably in great commotion 
 as they realized that their enemy had done the thing they had not cal- 
 culated on and had surprised them with the bulk of their force far down the 
 road towards Taanach. And no doubt in the Egyptian ranks many an 
 officer and private looked with longing eyes at the open spaces of the 
 great plain between which and themselves lay the enemy, and thought 
 with fear of the long, straggling line of troops hastening over the hills at 
 the mercy of any strong force which might swoop down on them from 
 the heights on either hand. 
 
 At this point the officers plucked up courage to make one further re- 
 quest of the king. "Let our victorious lord harken to us this time", they 
 said, even though he had seen fit to disregard their advice at Yehem. 
 They then called Thutmose's attention to the troops behind him, who 
 were gradually filling the mouth of the valley, as one by one the com- 
 panies of infantry and "squadrons" of chariotry filed out of the narrow 
 road and took up their positions in the rear of the waiting vanguard. 
 They urged the king to wait at the mouth of the pass till all his troops 
 had arrived, so that when the army finally emerged into the open, they 
 might give all their attention to the enemy in front and m'ght not have 
 to weaken their strength by being compelled to detach a portion of their 
 force to cover the arrival of the straggling rear. Now that Thutmose 
 had actually reached Megiddo and had shown the feasibility of his own 
 plan of campaign, he seems to have consented willingly to their suggestion, 
 also, no doubt, realizing the wisdom of not dividing his army in the face 
 of the enemy. By stationing a suffic'ent force on the hills on either side 
 of the mouth of the valley, he could command a strong position. On his 
 left was a long ridge, (marked D on Map II) two or three hundred feet 
 high, which sloped down on the south into the valley in which the 
 army then stood, and on the north was protected by th(> wide openuig 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 39 
 
 of Wady es-Sitt (see View X). On (he south of the valley-mouth was 
 another equally high hill (marked E on Map II) which, though hound- 
 ed by a more shallow wady on the other si(i(\ could still be held against 
 the attack of a large force. With these two heights in his possession, 
 and we cannot suppose that he failed to seize them at once, and with 
 his vanguard, undoubtedly composed of picked troops, facing the enemy 
 in front, he might feel reasonably safe from any attack by his foes until 
 the rearguard had finally made its passage of the mountains. By grad- 
 ually advancing his front into the open but still keeping the mouth of 
 the valley well covered, he could make room for the fresh arrivals as 
 they came up, until, when all ttad safely crossed, he could advance bold- 
 ly with all his force into the fields bordering on the Kina. 
 
 At this point in his narrative the Annalist furnishes us with a most 
 interesting datum. He says : "Now when the rear of the expedition was 
 setting out upon this road, the shadow turned; and his Majesty arrived 
 at the south of Megiddo on the bank of the brook Kina, when it was 
 seven hours from the turning (measured) by the sun." So far as I know 
 this is the only instance in the Egyptian records where an event is 
 timed, as we to-day would time it, by the hours of the day. Taking this 
 passage in conjunction with Borchardt's study of Egyptian sun-clocks,'^ 
 we are able to ascertain the time of the king's arrival at his camping- 
 place down to the very hour of the day. Borchardt's article is based on 
 the study of the remains of two such clocks, one of which bears the in- 
 scription: "Living Horus, Mighty Bull Shining in Thebes, the Beloved 
 of the Two Goddesses, etc. etc.. King of Upper and Lower Egypt, 
 
 Menkheperre (Thutmose HI), Son of Re, ", showing that in the 
 
 reign of Thutmose III such instruments for measuring time by the sun's 
 shadow were already in use. According to Borchardt's reconstruction 
 (see Fig. II) the instrument was placed so that the transverse piece A-B 
 lay in a north-south direction, while the longitudinal section C-D would 
 then extend in an east-west line. The shadow cast by A-B on C-D would 
 gradually shorten as the sun rose, until at noon time, when the sun 
 stood directly over head, there would be no shadow upon C-D at all. 
 The longitudinal section was divided into six parts to correspond to the 
 six hours of the morning, and as the shadow cast by A-B retreated from 
 
 75. Botchardt, "Alti.gyptische Sonnenulirfu", AZ, 48 (1911), p 9 fF. 
 
40 
 
 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 one of these parts to another the observer could ascertain with tolerable 
 exactness the time of day. To tell the afternoon hours it was necessary 
 to reverse the instrument so that it would face the west, and the pro- 
 gress of the hours would then be indicated by the lengthening of the 
 shadow cast by the transverse A-B upon C-D. 
 
 This brief summary of Borchardt's reconstruction of the working of 
 Egyptian sun-clocks gives us the data necessary for the vmderstanding 
 of the Annalist's statement that the shadow turned. Obviously by this 
 
 Figure II. From Zeitschrift tur agvptische Sprache, 48 (191 1), Tatel 2. 
 
 phrase he referred to the time at which the shadow, instead of with- 
 drawing towards C, turned around, as it were, and began to lengthen 
 out towards D after the reversal of the clock. The turning of the shadow 
 would then indicate noon, the hours before the shadow turned belonging 
 to the morning, and those after the shadow turned to the afternoon. The 
 turning of the shadow cannot very well apply to sunrise, and so many 
 hours after the turning would therefore not refer to the morning hours. 
 To speak of the shadow turning instead of the clock being turned would 
 be no more inconsistent than are many of the terms in popular use to- 
 day, as when we speak of the sun going down, etc. It is evident that 
 the rearguard of the Egyptians left ' Aruna at noon or shortly after, that 
 is, when the shadow turned, and that the king reached the banks of tlie 
 Kina at seven o'clock in the evening, that is, seven hours from the turn- 
 ing (measured) by the sun. If the kiiig waited at the opening of the val- 
 ley for the arrival of the rearguard and then at once moved forward to 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 41 
 
 the night's camping- place, it would seem that it took the rearguard 
 seven hours to cross the Ridge, about the time that we would expect to 
 be consumed in the passage by troops encumbered with camp furniture 
 and all the motley array that accompanies an army on the march. If, 
 therefore, it took the rearguard seven hours to march from 'Aruna to 
 Megiddo, we must suppose that the van had consumed much the same 
 time in covering the same distance. As the king was at the mouth of 
 the valley at least by noon, for the rearguard which left 'Aruna at noon 
 did not leave till after the van had crossed the Ridge, he must have 
 started from 'Aruna at least by five o'clock in the morning, the whole 
 day being thus consumed in the passage. In Palestine in the month of 
 May it would still be bright daylight at seven in the evening and the 
 army would therefore have reached its camping-place well before 
 dark.76 
 
 The spot chosen for the Egyptian camp was most certainly the ex- 
 panse of level ground extending along the south bank of the Kina 
 (see View VII). A more suitable location could not have been chosen. Here 
 was an ample stretch of flat land just a,t the opening of the pass (see 
 Map III). By camping here the army secured its line of commiinication 
 with the south by which it had just come from the other side of the 
 Ridge. Besides, the wady of the Kina served as a defence on the two sides 
 most exposed to attack from the direction of Megiddo. The stream furnish- 
 ed abundant water for both men and animals. Moreover, if the Egypt- 
 ians posted a force on the knoll F, they would be able to prevent attacks 
 from the east during the night. It is obvious that the army did not 
 move out into the open Plain of Esdra^lon, for to do so they would have 
 been obliged to pass through the forces of the enemy who held the road 
 to Taanach and, had they succeeded in doing so, they would have been 
 cut off from their line of communication over the Ridge. Furthermore, 
 
 76. All the current histories have interpreted this passage to mean that the army completed 
 the crossing of the mountains by about one in the at'ternoon. taking "seven hours from the 
 turning" to mean seven hours from sunrise. This interprrtation, aside from the fact that the 
 "turning" seems to have little meaning when applied to sunrise, would be difficult of acceptance, 
 owing to the facts of the physical situation. That an army of 10,000 to 15,000 men, with all 
 the camp furniture of an army on a campaign far away from home, and a large part of whose 
 force consisted of chariots, could traverse a narrow mountain defile eight to nine miles long be- 
 tween sunrise and one o'clock in the afternoDn is almost inconceivable. An army, strung out in 
 almost single file, from the time the van left 'Aruna till the rear reached the mouth of the 
 valley by Megiddo, would certainly have consumed the best part of a day. 
 
42 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 the Annals would seem to indicate that the bank of the Kina south of 
 Megiddo, at which place the army arrived at seven in the evening, was 
 the spot where the camp was pitched. Any location on the bank of 
 the brook out in the open plain would not have been south, but eat<t 
 or north, of Megiddo, and throughout the Annals the writer is quite 
 accurate in the indication of direction. Also the location of the camp 
 at this spot falls in well with the operations in the next day's battle 
 
 Our knowledge of the appearance of an Egyptian camp is largely 
 drawn from the battle reliefs of Ramses II. ^'^ These have been so fre- 
 quently and so fully described that it is not necessary to enter into a 
 discussion of the subject here, especially as it does not bear directly on 
 the problem before us. Suffice it to say that, if we may trust the reliefs, 
 Ramses' camp was bounded by the shield? of the troops set up on end so 
 as to inclose a large rectangular piece of ground. In the center of this 
 inclosure stood the royal tent, around which were camped the troops and 
 camp-followers. Such in general we may suppose to have been the ar- 
 rangement of Thutmose's bivouack by the Kina. The Annalist gives us a 
 glimpse into the routine activities of the camp that shows us how order- 
 ly war had already become even in this remote age. First of all orders 
 were issued to the troops to prepare themselves and their weapons for 
 the morrow's conflict, and we may picture to ourselves the busy scenes 
 as bowstrings were tested, arrows, speai's and knives sharpened, chari- 
 ot wheels examined, and all the military accoutrement put in order. The 
 king withdrew to his tent, doubtless to consult with his officers and de- 
 cide upon the plan of action to be followed in the morning as based on 
 the topography of the immediate environs of Megiddo. Some such con- 
 sultation must have taken place, for it is evident that the next day's 
 conflict was no haphazzard engagement but a well-ordered and well- 
 generaled battle with all the physical features of the region taken into 
 consideration. The phrase which I have translated, "The officers were 
 provided for" may possibly refer to the issuance of these orders to the 
 various officers of the army. The words "ivh' n sm,si() ' 'are quite obscure, 
 but would seem to refer to the distribution of rations to the troops or 
 court. Then follows the statement that the watch made its rounds and 
 that the royal guard, "the watch in life", was stationed at the royal 
 
 77. Lepsius, Denkma'er, III, 154, 155. Breasted, B<itt!c of KaJesh,. Plate I. 
 
TflE Battle of Megiddo 43 
 
 tent. Then, when all these preparations had been carried out, report 
 was made at headquarters, to put it in modern terms, that "all's well". 
 The army had settled down to rest before the arduous duties of the 
 next day. 
 
 Of what was going on across the Kina among the Asiatics the Annal- 
 ist has told us nothing. We can only surmise the movements of the 
 enemy. That they were taken by surprise is evident from what has 
 gone before. They had apparently made their preparations for meet- 
 ing Thutmose in the direction of Taanach,''^ and when they discovered 
 that he had taken them in the rear, their consternation must have been 
 great. As, however, Thutmose did not advance from the mouth of the 
 pass for some five hours or more after the Egyptian vanguard had 
 accomplished the crossing, the Asiatics would have had abundant time 
 to recall their main body from the direction of Taanach, only about four 
 or five miles away, and to prepare to meet the Egyptian advance on the 
 following day. 
 
 The Asiatics would undoubtedly have pitched their camp so as to 
 place it between the Egyptians and the city (see Map III). No more 
 favorable location for a camp could have been found than the almost 
 level top of the mound G just south of Megiddo (see View VI). It is 
 an elevated p'ece of ground that could therefore be more easily defended 
 than a lower situation, while by choosing this spot the Asiatics could 
 protect the city on its weakest side where the wall was lowest and 
 most accessible. We must also suppose the camp to have been located 
 at about this spot, rather than on the lower land to the west, north or 
 east of the city, for on the next day when the center and right of the 
 Egyptians closed in from the west and south of the city, they seem to 
 have charged directly through the camp of the Allies. To have made this 
 possible the camp must have been located at about the spot indicated 
 above. As to what went on in the Asiatic quarters that night, the An- 
 nalist has given us no information and it is useless to speculate on such 
 a subject. 
 
 78. At any rate it seems evident that, of the three roads across the Ridge, the Zefti road 
 did not enter seriously into the calculations of the Asiatics, for they apparently so disposed their 
 forces as to enable them to concentrate rhe'r troops near the mouth either of the 'Anina road 
 or of the road bv Taanach. Had tliey anticipated an attack from the Zetti road, they would 
 most probably have advanced a portion of their force along ttie road north ot Megiddo, a move- 
 ment which does not seem to have been undertaken at all. 
 
44 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 IV 
 
 THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 
 THE ANNALS, LINES 84-90 
 
 Urk. 657 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 21; day of the 
 feast of the new moon as usual. The king appeared early in 
 the morning. Then orders were issued to the entire army to 
 cross [the valley of the Kina.]'?^ (85) His Majesty proceeded in a 
 chariot of electrum, clad in his accoutrements of war, like Horus 
 the Valiant, Lord of Offerings, like Montu of Thebes. His father 
 Amon was strengthening his limbs. The south wing of the 
 
 army of his Majesty was at a hill south of Kina, 
 
 and the north wing was at the north-west of Megiddo, his Ma- 
 jesty occupying the center. Amon was the protection of his 
 members. The power of the might of [Set was the strength] 
 (86) of his limbs. 
 Then his Majesty prevailed against them at the head of his 
 
 Urk. 658 troops; (and when) they saw that his Majesty prevailed against 
 them, they fled headlong [to] Megiddo with faces of fear. They 
 abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver. 
 They drew them [up] by hoisting with their garments into 
 this city. Now the people had shut up this city against them 
 [and they let down] (87) garments to hoist them upward into 
 this city. 
 
 Now had the troops of his Majesty only not given their 
 hearts to plunder the possessions of the enemy, they would 
 [have plundered] Megiddo at this moment, while the wretched 
 enemy of Kadesh and the wretched enemy of this city were 
 
 79. The restoration "valley of the Kina" ( \n-t k\-->!^) would seem just to fill the lacuna 
 as given in the Urkunden, and would also agree with the actual situation as developed in the 
 discussion above. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 45 
 
 drawn (up) to secure their entrance into their city, the fear of 
 his Majesty having entered (88) [into their hmbs.] Their arms 
 were weak. His serpent diadem had prevailed against them. 
 
 Urk. 659 Then were captured their horses and chariots of gold and 
 silver, made an easy [spoil.] Their battle-array was lying 
 stretched out like fishes in a [corner.]80 The victorious troops 
 of his Majesty went around counting their respective portions. 
 Then was captured the tent of [that] wretched [enemy,] which 
 
 was worked^' [with (89) silver] The entire army 
 
 was rejoicing and giving praise to Anion [for the victory] 
 which he had given to his son on [this day. They gave praise] 
 to his Majesty, exalting his victory, They brought up the spoil 
 they had taken, consisting of hands, of living prisoners, of 
 
 Urk. 660 horses and chariots of gold and silver and of painted stuff. 
 
 (90) His Majesty commanded his army, saying, 
 
 "Capture ye victory. Behold, [every land] is 
 
 given [to my Majesty according to the command] of Re this 
 day; for every chief of every [north]ern country which has re- 
 volted is within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the 
 capture of Megiddo. Capture ye, capture ye, thoroughly!" 
 
 At this point it is necessary to determine from just what direction 
 the attack upon the Asiatic lines was delivered on the following day. 
 Our data for reaching a conclusion on this subject are woefully meagre 
 and leave us at the last not quite satisfied. Only two statements are 
 made in the Annals in regard to the location of the Egyptian lines. 
 First, "Then orders were issued to the entire army to cross [the valley 
 of the Kina]", and, second, "The south wing of the army of his Majesty 
 
 was at a hill south of Kina and the north wing was at the 
 
 northwest of Megiddo, his Majesty occupying the center." One other 
 fact may be added to this scanty information, namely, that the Asiatic 
 
 80. Or as Settle divides the text, "like fishes in a round corner". I have followed Breas- 
 ted's arrangement (Ancient Records, II, 431) and have construed sny with what follows rather 
 than with what goes before. In any case the passage is obscure. 
 
 81. Generally heretofore the hieroglyphic figure of a bird at this place has been read as a 
 s'-sign, on which reading was based the statement thit the captured tent contained the son of the 
 king of Kadesh, who thus fell into Thutmose's hands. Sethe, however, reads on the stone a 
 ^'-sign and so restored byk., "worked, wrought," which reading I have here followed. 
 
46 The Battle of Megtddo 
 
 camp most certainly lay between the Egyptian army and the city, for, 
 as has been already pointed out, the Egyptians, in pursuing the Asiatics 
 fleeing into the city after the battle, came upon the latter's camp and 
 stopped to plunder it. The camp, therefore, very likely lay almost op- 
 posite the Egyptian center, so that the troops converging oti the city all 
 fell to plundering the possessions of the enemy. Had the camp lain to 
 one side, it is likely that at least a part of the army would have contin- 
 ued the pursuit of the fleeing foe up to the city walls. On these few 
 facts and this one deduction must rest the decision as to the direction 
 from which the Egyptian attack was made. 
 
 "The northwest of Megiddo" and ''the hill south of Kina" 
 
 mark the two extremities of the Egyptian lines. "The former must re- 
 fer to the strip of cultivated land between the Tell and the hill A (see 
 Map II), that is, at or near the northern end of this strip of land where 
 it opens into the plain of Esdrselon (see View IX). The "hill south of 
 
 Kina" is undoubtedly the knoll F. Being a detached eminence 
 
 it would easily serve as a defensible termination to a line of battle. By 
 occupying this rise the Pharaoh could protect the southern wing of his 
 army and until it moved forward away from the knoll, could prevent 
 the enemy from turning his right flank. Either C or D, the other two 
 hills which might be considered south of the Kina, are so much in line 
 with the hills on either side of them that they would hardly serve 
 as a natural defence upon which to rest one wing of the army. Nor do 
 they stand out prominently enough to serve as a distinctive designation 
 of location. Moreover, as the steepness of the bank of the Kina where 
 it skirts the south side of the mound H, is too great to allow of troops 
 making an effective attack on H from that direction, the right or south 
 wing of the Egyptian force must have been compelled to move round 
 mound H to the east to attack the Asiatic south wing. If, therefore, the 
 southern extremity of the Egyptian line rested on knoll F i)efore 
 the battle, the Pharaoh's troops would have been in a position to 
 advance directly against the enemy defending the east side of the group 
 of mounds (see Map IV). 
 
 If, therefore, we take the knoll F as the "Hill south of Kina", 
 
 we must then decide whether the Egyptian line of battle faced the city 
 from the west and soutli of Megiddo or from the open plain to the north 
 
The Battle of Megtddo 47 
 
 and east, In either case it would be possible to station the troops so that 
 one wing would be to the northwest of the city and the other wing 
 would rest on the knoll F. Had the Annalist but seem fit to designate 
 the wings of the army as right and left, we would then be able to locate 
 the Pharaoh's line of battle exactly, but as he speaks of them merely as 
 the north wing and the south wing, we are left to solve our problem in 
 accordances, with what seems to agree best with all the known circum- 
 stances, especially with the topography. 
 
 The statement that "orders were issued to the entire army to cross 
 [the Valley of the Kina"] does not throw any light oii this aspect of the 
 problem. Whether the army was drawn up to the west and south or to 
 the north and east of the city, it would have been necessary for the 
 bulk of the troops to cross the Kina before taking up their position. We 
 can therefore eliminate this datum from the determining factors of the 
 situation. 
 
 That the Egyptian line of battle was drawn up on the north and east 
 of the city seems highly improbable for the following reasons. First, as 
 we have seen, the Pharaoh's camp on the night before the battle must 
 have lain in the open stretch of land between the Kina and the mouth 
 of the valley through which the 'Aruna roadran. To have advanced into 
 the open plain would have cut him off from his line of communication 
 with the south and, in case of defeat, would have exposed his army to 
 almost certian destruction as it would have cut off the way of retreat. 
 Second, in advancing into the plain Thutmose would have ex]iosed his 
 force to a flank attack from the direction of Megiddo, much more than 
 would have been the case had he moved out to the west and south of 
 the city. Third, as the Asiatic camp lay between the Pharaoh 's battle- 
 line and Megiddo, we must suppose that the camp was situated to the 
 northeast of the city and therefore that the Asiatics had failed to place 
 themselves between the city and the Egyptians on the previous night. 
 Fourth, if the Allies' camp was so situated to the northeast of the city, 
 then it would have been necessary for the Egyptians to make a wide 
 detour in the Plain in order to take up their station previous to the 
 battle, and in so doing they would have exposed themselves, when at a 
 great disadvantage, to the attack of the enemy. Fifth, if the Asiatic 
 camp lay to the northeast of Megiddo, the Asiatic army would, of 
 
48 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 course, have been drawn up to the north and east of their camp. The 
 Egyptian army, therefore, in taking up their position to the north and 
 east of the Alhes, but with the wings of their army resting on the hill 
 A and the knoll F, would have been strung out in a most remarkable for- 
 mation. At best their line would have been very thin and would have 
 formed roughly at least 270' of a huge circle with the Asiatic camp and 
 army well in the center of the circle. That the Pharaoh would have at- 
 tempted to assume any such extraordinary formation is as difficult to 
 conceive as it is difficult to suppose that the Asiatics would have stood 
 quietly by and either have allowed themselves to be so surrounded or 
 not have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the enemy's 
 extended and weakened line to cut it in two in the center and roll the 
 shattered portions back upon the wings. Taking all these circumstances 
 into consideration, it seems certain that we can dismiss any idea of the 
 king's having drawn up his lines to the north and east of the city. 
 
 Turning to the alternative position, that to the west and south of 
 Megiddo, we find the following considerations in favor of Thutmose's 
 having chosen that side of the city for his attack. First, he would be 
 able thereby to secure his line of retreat back over the 'Aruna road to 
 the south. Second, he would not have to expose the bulk of his army to 
 a flank attack while taking up his position. Third, such a location would 
 allow of our placing the Asiatic camp on the mound G, between the 
 city and the Egyptian encampment, the place where we would naturally 
 expect it to be located. Fourth, the Egyptian lines would not have been 
 drawn out so far but that they could have been compact enough to have 
 made them an effective attacking force. Their length would have been 
 only about half that necessary had they taken u]) the other i)osition to 
 the north and east of Megiddo. Considering the whole situation, it 
 would appear certain that Thutmose's army was drawn up to the west 
 and south of the city in the semicircle of cultivated land between the 
 hills A, B, C, D, and E and the mounds G, H, and I. 
 
 On the morning of the battle, the twenty -first day of the first month 
 of the third season (May 15, 1479), the signal for the commencement of 
 hostilities seems to have been the appearance of the king from the royal 
 tent. At once the order was issued, as the Annals has it, "to the entire 
 army to cross [the valley of the Kina]" As the Egyptian camp most 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 49 
 
 certainly stood on the south of the Kina on the flat land between the 
 brook and the hills D and E, the words lost in the lacuna must have 
 referred to the depression through which the brook flowed. There is no 
 other feature of the topography of which the word "cross" could well be 
 used. It seems safe, therefore, to proceed on the assumption that the 
 royal command was to cross the Kina. That the words "entire army" 
 are to be taken literally is impossible, if we are to accept the statement 
 that the south wing of the Egyptian force was later at the "hill 
 
 south of Kina". The lacuna in this instance must also have included 
 
 some phrase applicable to the valley of the Kina. If the entire army had 
 crossed the brook, the south wing could not well be said to be at the 
 hill south of the brook, for the channel that the stream has cut is so 
 marked a feature of the topography that we may be sure it, rather than 
 the hill sorfth of it, would have been mentioned had the brook intervened 
 between the Egyptian south wing and the hill. When the Annalist 
 speaks of the "entire army", he probably uses it in a loose sense to des- 
 ignate the large majority of the troops, including, as we shall see, the 
 center and the north wing. Only on this interpretation of the words "the 
 entire army" is is possible to reconcile these conflicting statements. ^2 
 
 82. In the current liistories the most detailed accounts ot the position of the Egyptian troops 
 are given by Maspero, Budge, Breasted and Hall as follows: Maspero, Stnigg/e of the Nations, 
 p. 258, "By dawn the next day the whole army was in motion. It was formed into a single 
 line, the right wing protected by the torrent, the left extended into the plain, stretching bevond 
 Megiddo towards the north-west." Budge, Hist, of Egypt, IV, p. 33-34, "At d.iybreak on 
 the 21st the whole army marched out in single formation, its right wing resting on the river and 
 its left reaching to Megiddo on its north-western side." Brensted, Hiit. of Egypt, p. 289, "Late 
 in the afternoon of the same day (the fourteenth) or during the ensuing night, Thutmose took 
 advantage of the enemy's position on the east and south-east of his own force to draw his own 
 line around the west side of Megiddo and boldly thr'^w out his left wing on the northwest of the 
 city. He thus secured, in case of necessity, a safe and easy line of retreat westward along the 
 Zefti road, while at the same time his extreme left might cut off the enemy from flight north- 
 ward." Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near East, p. 238, "The Egyptians who advanced in line, 
 pivoting on their right wing, which remained upon the spur of hill above el-Lejja and south of 
 the brook Kina, until the left wing had swung around to the north-east of Megiddo itself." All 
 these interpretations agree in general and also, to a large extejit, fit in with the local topography. 
 In some points, however, they are open to criticism. Both Maspero and Budge state that the 
 right wing rested on the River Kina, Vvhereas ths Annalist "States that it rested on "a 
 
 hill south of. Kina", which certaitily cannot be interpreted to mean the river 
 
 itself. Also the Annals give no support to Budge's phrase, "in single formation." Breasted sug- 
 gests that the Egyptians took up their position "late on the same day (the day of crossing 
 the mountains) or during the ensuing night." However, he interpreted differently the phrase 
 which I have translated "the king appearei' early in the morning," The latter translation would 
 preclude the idea of the Egyptians iiaving taken up their position before the morning of the battle. 
 Hall's statement that the Egyptian army piloted on their right wing, which remained on a squr 
 ot hill above el-Lejja [sic) is difficult to understand in the face of the configuration of the coun- 
 try, tor It would seem to necessitate the crossing of the low limestone hills around Megiddo bv 
 
50 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 In order to reach the north bank of the Kina, the Egyptian force 
 would have to cross the stream at or near the point "a" at the 
 opening of the Wady es-Sitt. This would have been necessitated by the 
 depth of the channel that the stream has cut across the flat cultivated 
 land. As has already been pointed out, this channel is some fifteen or 
 twenty feet deep at "b", while at "a" it is only two or three feet deep. 
 As there was a body of Egyptian chariotvy with the center of the army, 
 it would be necessary for them to find some point at which the crossing 
 could be easily made, and such a point is found anywhere along the 
 course of the stream south of "a". That all the chariots in the Egyptian 
 ranks were with that portion of the army north of the Kina is certain, 
 for the banks of the stream between "b" and the place where the brook 
 crosses the Taanach road at "c" are so steep, in places being practically 
 perpendicular, as to preclude all idea of chariots crossing the stream be- 
 tween those points, especially in the face of an enemy, as would have 
 been necessary had the chariots advanced towards the city from the 
 south of the Kina. 
 
 As the Egyptians were the attacking force, their formation and posi- 
 tion would necessarily be determined to a great extent by the location 
 and disposition of the Asiatic army. It will therefore be necessary to 
 consider the position of the Allies before proceeding further with the 
 discussion of the Egyptian lines of battle. With their camp pitched on 
 mound G there would be but one formation natural for the Allies to 
 assume. It is hardly conceivable that they would have foregone the ad- 
 vantage to be derived from the elevated position of the mounds. We 
 must suppose that their lines were drawn up around the edge of mounds 
 G, H and I. By this formation they would have had the natural defence 
 against the onslaught of the Egyptians that the sloping sides of the 
 mounds afforded and, in the case of the south wing, the channel of tbe 
 Kina also (see Map IV). That there was a strong body of chariots with 
 the Allies is certain, not only from the fact that the chariot as an instru- 
 ment of warfare was in use in Asia before it was known in Egypt, 
 but also from the fact that among the spoil taken from Megiddo after the 
 
 the ch.Triots in the center of the Egyptian lines, .111 impossible feat. All there accounts, however, 
 agree that the attack on Megiddo was delivered from the south and west of th • city and not 
 from the side of the plain, though in one or two instances the accompanying mai's do not b,o 
 place the battle-field. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 51 
 
 battle were 924 chariots and 2,238 horses of all kinds. We need not sup- 
 pose that all of them were present in the battle. Undoubtedly many of 
 them were taken during the course of the later siege and some may have 
 come from surrounding towns, the spoil from which has apparently been 
 included in that from Megiddo in the lists of booty. This is by far the 
 largest number of chariots recorded as having been taken in any battle 
 during Thutmose's campaigns. The only other three instances in which 
 the numbers have survived give us 13 chariots from I-n-r-t^^ on the sev- 
 enth campaign, 15 from the district of Nuges^"* on the ninth campaign, 
 and 60 from I-r-y-n and Naharin^^ on the tenth campaign. But as in other 
 respects the numbers in the lists of booty from Megiddo are far in ex- 
 cess of those recording the spoil from the later campaigns, we must sup- 
 pose that the forces put into the field by the Allies at Megiddo were larg- 
 er than the Egyptians encountered in any of the subsequent campaigns 
 where they were dealing with more or less isolated states instead of 
 with a wide spread and powerful coalition. 
 
 As has already been said, it is not probable that all the chariots and 
 horses which figure in the lists of booty from Megiddo were actually 
 present in this battle. There must have been a sufficient number present, 
 however, to have constituted a considerable portion of the Asiatic 
 strength. It is necessary, therefore, in determining the position of the 
 allied troops to take this body of chariots into consideration. If we are 
 right in placing the Egyptian lines in a semicircle along the strip of 
 cultivated land between the foothills and the mounds on which the Asia- 
 tics were camped, that consideration alone would lead us to conclude 
 that the enemy was drawn up in roughly similar formation opposite 
 them. When we examine the topography of the battle-field, we see at 
 once that such a formation is exactly that which an army occupying 
 the mounds G and H, and possibly I, would be likely to assume. By 
 arranging their lines along the top of the slopes on the west and south 
 of the mounds G, H and I, the Asiatics would be able to secure what 
 advantage was to be derived from forcing their opponents to attack 
 them while charging up hill. Moreover, should they themselves charge 
 
 83. Urk. IV, 691. 
 
 84. Uri. IV, 704. 
 
 85. Urk. IV, 711. 
 
52 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 forward against the Egyptians, they would have the advantage of ad- 
 vancing down hill, as did the Greeks at Marathon. If we consider it like- 
 ly that the Allies would thus accommodate themselves to the topog- 
 raphy of the country, there can then be only one location where they 
 could conceivably have placed their chariotry. The northern part of the 
 western slope of mound G is too steep to allow chariots to descend with 
 any assurance that they would arrive at the bottom of the incline in an 
 upright position. The same is true of the south and east side of mound 
 H. However, between the northwest side of mound G and the south 
 side of mound H the descent from the mounds to the cultivated land 
 below is quite gradual, allowing a space about half a mile long down 
 which chariots could advance with ease (see View XIII). It is at this 
 point in the Asiatic lines, therefore, that we must locate their chariotry. 
 It is there also, in the center of their force, that we would naturally ex- 
 pect them to mass their greatest strength, opposite the portion of the 
 Egyptian army that Thutmose himself led in person. 
 
 With the Allies thus disposed, the location of the Egyptians becomes 
 fairly certain. The north wing, which was to the northwest of Megiddo, 
 was drawn up along the foot of the hill A with a portion of the Asiatic 
 foot opposite it on the side of the mound G. The Egyptian center, prob- 
 ably composed largely of chariots, took up its position along the foot of 
 the hills B and C opposite the Asiatic center, which was on the western 
 edge of the mound H. Then the Egyptian south wing, where only foot- 
 soldiers were practicable, probably held the ground occupied on the pre- 
 ceding evening by Thutmose's camp, the southern extremity of the 
 wing resting on the knoll F. 
 
 When once the battle was joined, the chariots would charge at 
 full speed upon the opposing ranks. At the word of command, therefore, 
 we may suppose that the Egyptians advanced upon the mounds G, H 
 and I from the west and south. Direct advance upon the south of mound 
 H would be very difficult, as the banks of the Kina and the slope of the 
 mound is steep at that point. We may therefore suppose that the Asia- 
 tics left only a small force to hold this jwsition and placed their 
 south wing on mound I, one extermity of the line be'ng protecte;! by tlie 
 steep side of mound H and the other by the channel of the Kina. If the 
 south wing of the Egyptians was compose! of infantry, it would be pos- 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 53 
 
 sible for them to cross the Kina to the attack of the Asiatic south wing. 
 When once this wing had been broken, the Egyptians could then attack 
 the Asiatic main body in the rear with teUing effect. It is possible that 
 some such movement, rapidly executed, won the day for the Pharaoh. 
 
 Of the actual conflict which took place there is not a vestige of infor- 
 mation. To judge from the Annalist's narrative it would seem that the 
 Asiatics fled without striking a blow. "Then his Majesty prevailed against 
 them at the head of his troops; and when they saw that his Majesty 
 prevailed against them, they fled headlong to Megiddo with faces of fear. 
 They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver. They 
 drew them up by hoisting with their garments into this city, for the 
 people had shut up the city against them, and they let down garments 
 to hoist them upwards into the city." That the Allies held their ground 
 for any great length of time seems unlikely, if we are to trust the state- 
 ment of the number of hands cut from the dead, only 83 being recorded 
 among the spoil from Megiddo.^^ Although this figure may not represent 
 the exact number of the slain, it is evident that the Asiatics fled after 
 offering very little resistance. Why they did so is not plain. They prob- 
 ably mustered a considerable force and they certainly had the advan- 
 tage of position. It is likely, however, that they had been hastily 
 gathered together, many undoubtedly having been forced into the coa- 
 lition against their will, as was sometimes the case among the Syro- 
 Palestinian allies in the later period of the Assyrian invasions. It is pos- 
 sible that the Egyptian force proved to be larger than the Asiatics had 
 expected to encounter. Moreover, the seat of the rebellion was in the 
 north, and many of the Allies must have felt themselves far away 
 from their home land and have lost interest in the conflict as they ad- 
 vanced towards the south. Perhaps the fact that the Pharaoh had out- 
 
 86. Only once more, on his last campaign, does Thutmose record tlie number of hands 
 taken from the slain, tbev then amounting to only 29 (^Urk. IV, 731). These figures from 
 Thutmose's campaigns are the smallest, as far as I know, of any in the Egyptian royal annals. 
 The number of liands recorded as taken from the slam in battle increase with the later inscrip- 
 tions. In the time of the great war that Merneptah waged with the Lybians and their allies from 
 among the northern invaders, we find at least 3,410 hands taken (Breasted, Ancient Records, 
 III, 588), while in Ramses Ill's Lybian campaigns the figures run into the twelve thousands 
 (Breasted, op. cit. IV, 54). Either the earlier wars were fought with far less numerous foes 
 than in the time of the great invasions of the XIX and XX Dynasties, or the later accounts are 
 greatly exaggerated, or the custom of cutting c.fF the hands of the slain was much more com- 
 monly practised in later times than under the XVIII Dynasty, with whom the custom makes 
 its first appearance. 
 
54 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 manoeuvred them would have upset any previously laid plans of the 
 Allies. Whatever may have been the reason, the Asiatics fell back be- 
 fore the Egyptian advance and their rout was immediately complete. 
 
 The situation at the Battle of Megiddo was not unlike that which 
 subsequently developed in the course of the action at Kadesh between 
 Ramses II and the Hittites.^' In the latter case the Egyptian camp lay 
 along the bank of the Orontes and the Hittites, in attacking the camp, 
 threw out their wings to either side and inclosed the Egyptian army, 
 driving it back towards the river. In the battle of Megiddo the Egyp- 
 tian army threw out its wings and inclosed the Asiatic army, driving 
 it back through its camp to the city of Megiddo behind. At Kadesh the 
 utter destruction of the Egyptian force was prevented by the fact that 
 the Hittites stopped to plunder the Egyptian camp. The same event in 
 the battle of Megiddo prevented the total destruction of the Allies. As 
 Thutmose's army closed in on the Asiatic forces, the Egyptians in pur- 
 suing the fleeing foe, found it necessary to pass through the enemy's 
 camp, and the rich plunder that lay everywhere around proved too 
 much for their discipline. Forgetting the routed Asiatics, the Pharaoh's 
 army set to looting the captured camp, thus affording the enemy the 
 opportunity to effect their entrance into Megiddo or to flee to the north 
 across the plain of Esdrselon. What might, therefore, have proved the 
 total annihilation of the Asiatics, was turned into a mere defeat, though 
 a severe one, and Thutmose found that the cupidity of his troops was to 
 cost him still further efforts. 
 
 When the Asiatics turned to flee before the Egyptian onset, they 
 found themselves confronted with a most dangerous situation. The in- 
 habitants of the city, who must have been intently watching the strug- 
 gle from the top of the wall, when once the magnitude of the disaster 
 which had befallen their arms became apparent, lost all thought for the 
 safety of the survivors and shut the gates of Megiddo in the faces of their 
 troops fleeing to the city for safety. Few, if any, of the chariots of the 
 Allies were saved. Had the conflict taken place in the open plain, many 
 of the Asiatics could have made use of their chariots in effecting their 
 escape across the plain. That, however, was impossible in the situation 
 in which they found themselves. On the west, south, and southwest 
 
 87 Breasted, Battle of Kadesh, p. 34. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 55 
 
 were the advancing Egyptians, while to the north lay the city, its gates 
 shut against friend and foe alike. Escape, except over the city wall, 
 was possible only to the northeast, and to flee in that direction it was 
 necessary for them to cross their camp and descend the steep sides of 
 the mound G on the northeast, a decline too precipitate for horse 
 and chariot, even had they been able to make their way through the 
 debris scattered about the camp. As a result of this unforseen situation, 
 the Asiatics "abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of 
 silver" and took to their heels for safety. This fact probably accounts 
 for the large number of horses and chariots mentioned above as enu- 
 merated among the spoil of Megiddo. Many of the Allies must have es- 
 caped northward into the plain of Esdraelon and beyond, especially 
 when they found the city gates closed against them. When once they 
 had reached the plain, they would have been safe, for the Egyptians, as 
 we saw, had abandoned the pursuit for the lure of plunder. Those who 
 turned towards the city, among which number were the kings of Kadesh 
 and Megiddo, were drawn up into the city by the inhabitants. The glacis, 
 extending along the base of the wall, allowed the fugitives to get near 
 enough to the top of the wall so that the inhabitants, by lowering the 
 long girdles from their waists, could pull them up to the top. The 
 Egyptian sense of humor is evident in the relish with which the Annalist 
 describes the undignified escape of the kings, dangling at the ends of the 
 lowered garments. Had the Egyptians pursued the Asiatics, they would 
 undoubtedly have been able to inflict great loss upon the mass of dis- 
 organized fugitives, struggling for an opportunity to climb into the city. 
 The absorption of the victors in the plundering of the camp could not 
 be better illustrated than by the fact that the enemy were allowed the 
 time necessary to effect their escape in this cumbersome fashion. It is like- 
 ly that the royal fugitives did not long remain within the walls, for 
 when Megiddo finally surrendered after a siege, they were not among 
 the prisoners. Probably seeing the hopelessness of the situation, they 
 lingered in the city only long enough to gather a few followers, and 
 then escaped by the northern gate, still surviving,**^ just above the 
 terrace-like projection on the north of the Tell. 
 
 Meanwhile the Egyptian army was gathering in a rich harvest of 
 
 88. Schumacher, Tell el-Mutesdlim, II, plate a. 
 
56 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 spoil. Besides the chariots already spoken of, the hands cut from the 
 bodies of the few Asiatics who had fallen in battle, totaling only 83, were 
 gathered together as evidence of victory. Many of the enemy must have 
 been made captive in the confusion of the rout and these too counted as 
 spoil. One of the most conspicuous prizes, however, was the tent of the 
 king of Kadesh, a sumptuous affair, supported by seven poles and work- 
 ed, probably, with silver. It undoubtedly contained handsome furniture, 
 a prize for that time as notable as was, at a later day, the famous tent 
 of Darius captured by Alexander, the Great. All this booty seems to 
 have been gathered together before the king. A large share of the spoil 
 was made over to the treasury of Anion. Much must have gone to re- 
 plenish the royal coffers. Some of it undoubtedly was given as rewards 
 to those members of the army who had distinguished themselves in the 
 engagement. 
 
 At this point an interesting supplement to the Annals is furnished by 
 the biography of Amenemheb, one of Thutmose's genecals, who accom- 
 panied the king on many of his campaigns, though whether he was pre- 
 sent at Megiddo is uncertain. In relating his part in Thutmose's cam- 
 paigns in Syria, he says : 
 
 When his Majesty cams to Nahirin, I brought off three msn from the fight 
 there ; I set them before thy Majestv as living prisoners." "Again I toiighton 
 
 that expedition in the land of Carchemish. I brought off as living 
 
 prisoners. I set them before mv lord. He rewarded me with a great reward." 
 Again I beheld his victory in the countrv of Takhsi, the wretched, in the city 
 
 of Mero I brought off Asiatics, 3 men, as living prisoners. Then 
 
 my lord gave to me the gold of honor; list thereof: 2 flies, a lion, a female slave 
 and a male slave. "^^ 
 
 The larger objects of spoil were thus brought up before the king, who 
 undoubtedly indicated the share belonging to Amon, that des-gned for 
 the royal treasury, and that to be divided among the army. In the days 
 of Ahmose I it Wc\s the duty of the royal herald to present to the sover- 
 eign those of his coinmanders who had a claim on the royal favor be- 
 cause of conspicuous valor.^o We may picture to ourselves a scene of bar- 
 baric splendor as the Pharaoh sat enthroned upon the battlefield, sur- 
 rounded by his officers and troops, while Intef, the herald,^' brought be- 
 
 89. Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 581 fF. 
 
 90. Breasted, op. lit. II, 9, 11. 
 
 91. Breasted, o/>. cit. II, 767 fF. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 57 
 
 fore the king, one by one, the candidates for the sovereign's rewards. And 
 much of the praise that the army is said to have given to the king prob- 
 ably arose from the acclamations of the soldiery as to one after an- 
 other of their favorite officers Thutmose distributed the marks of his favor. 
 We cannot suppose, however, that much time was consumed in this 
 wise. Thutmose realized that his work was only half done while Megid- 
 do itself remained in the enemy's hands. He therefore urged on his 
 army to continue the successful efforts they had begun, adding: "Behold, 
 [every land] is given [to ray Majesty according to the command] of Re 
 this day; for every chief of every northern country which has revolted is 
 within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the capture of Me- 
 giddo." But apparently the great opportunity had been lost. The delay 
 occasioned by the plundering of the camp had been sufficient to allow the 
 leaders of the Allies to escape, and when finally the city fell, "every 
 chiefs of every northern country" was no longer within it. 
 
58 The Battle of Megtddo 
 
 V 
 
 THE SIEGE OF MEGIDDO 
 
 THE ANNALS, LINES 90-98 
 
 Behold, (91) [officers] of the nuiff to 
 
 hasten [to cause that] every [man should know] his posi- 
 tion. They measured [this] city, inclosing it with an earth- 
 work, fenced about with the green wood of all their pleasant 
 
 Urk. 661 trees, while his Majesty himself was upon the fortress, south 
 
 of this city, watching (92) [upon it day and night.] 
 
 inclosed with a thick wall with 
 
 its thick wall. The name was called "Menkheperre-is-the-en- 
 snarer-of-the-Asiatics". People were appointed to watch at 
 the tent of his Majesty, to whom was said, "Steadfast! Stead- 
 fast! Watchful! watchful!" [Now] his Majesty (93) 
 
 [It was not pei-mitted that] one of them [go out] to the out- 
 side upon the back of this wall except to go out to knock (?) at 
 the door of their fortress. 
 
 Now everything that his Majesty did to this city and to this 
 wretched enemy together with his wretched army was record- 
 ed on the day by its name, by the name of the voyage, by Ibe 
 
 Urk. 662 name of the officers of the (94) rnnft 
 
 They were recorded upon a roll of leather in the temi)!(' 
 
 of Amon on this day. 
 
 Now the chiefs of this country came upon their bellies to kiss 
 the earth because of the might of his Majesty; to beg the 
 breath for their nostrels, because great was his power and be- 
 cause .great was the might of Amon over [every] foreign coun- 
 try. All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his 
 Majesty, bearing their tribute of silver, gold, lapis-lazuli, mal- 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 59 
 
 akite, and carrying in clean grain, wine, cattle, small cattle, for 
 the army of his Majesty. 
 
 Urk, 663 One gang of them was bearing tribute southward. Then 
 
 his Majesty appointed anew the chiefs of (96) [every city] 
 
 Megiddo: 340 living 
 
 captives, 83 hands, 2,041 mares, 191 female colts, 6 stallions, 
 
 male colts, 1 chariot worked with gold, its [pole] of 
 
 gold, belonging to that foe; [one] beautiful chariot wrought 
 with gold belonging to the chief of (97) [Megiddo.] 
 
 Urk. 664 892 chariots of his wretched army: total 924. 1 beautiful 
 
 bronze suit of armor of that foe; one beautiful bronze suit of 
 
 armor of the chief of Megiddo; 200 suits of armor of his 
 
 wretched army, 502 bows, 7 poles of mery- wood wrought with 
 silver of the tent of that foe. 
 
 Now the army [of his Majesty] seized (98) 
 
 387 , 1,929 cattle, 2,000 small cattle, 20,500 
 
 small white cattle. 
 
 Apparently no effort was made to take the city by storm. Just why 
 Thutmose did not make such an attempt at once is hard to surmise. We 
 know from the results of the excavations at Megiddo that the place was 
 strongly fortified, but brick walls, even of the strongest, were no deterrent 
 to the king on his later campaigns when he breached the walls of 
 Kadesh, a much more formidable fortress than Megiddo.^2 n jg possible 
 that he realized what was apparently the real situation in the city, 
 namely, that no preparation had been made to resist a long siege, and 
 he may therefore have decided to let hunger fight for him, rather than 
 risk the chance of a repulse if he attempted to take the place by storm. 
 He therefore issued the necessary orders and the preparations for the 
 siege began. 
 
 The details of the methods pursued by the Egyptians in the siege are, 
 like the details of the battle, very obscure. The Annals state that "they 
 measured this city, inclosing it with an earthwork, fenced about with 
 the green wood of all their pleasant trees, while his Majesty himself 
 was upon the fortress east of the city, watching [upon it day and night.] 
 
 92. Breasted, Ancient RecorJi, II, 590. , 
 
60 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 inclosed with a thick wall with its th'.ck 
 
 wall. Its name was called, 'Menkheperre-is-the-ensnarer-of-the-Asia- 
 
 tics'. It was not permitted that one of them go out to the outside upon 
 
 the back of this wall except to go out to knock at the door of their in- 
 
 closure." In the account of the feasts and offerings instituted by the 
 
 king on his return from this campaign, Thutmose says that he made 
 
 these offerings "when my Majesty returned from the land of Retenu on 
 
 the occasion of the first victories which my father Amon gave to me in 
 
 his giving to me every land of Zahi, assembled and shut up in one city, 
 
 ********I ensnared them in one city. I built upon them with 
 
 a thick wall to of the breath of life, by the favor of my 
 
 father Amon."^^ Another fragment containing an account of the first 
 
 campaign preserves the meagre statement: "Majesty surrounded it with 
 
 a wall, made thick Not did they breathe the breath 
 
 of life, being surrounded in front of their wall."^* 
 
 Before making any suggestions in regard to the method pursued by 
 
 the Egyptians in constructing this wall, I should like to quote a passage 
 
 from Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea by the Peloponne- 
 
 sians. The narrative runs; 
 
 "In the first place the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city 
 with a stockade, that henceforth no one might get out. "Fhey then began to 
 raise a mound against it, thinking that with so large an amy at work this would 
 be the speediest way of taking the place. So they cut timber from Cythaeron 
 and built on either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed crosswise 
 in order that the material might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones, 
 earth and anything which would fill up the vacent space, a. * * * * The 
 Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former attempt, surrounded 
 Platasa with a wall. Trenches out of which they took clay for the bricks were 
 formed both on the inner and outer side of the w;i]l."35 
 
 Taking this passage from Thucydides in conjunction with the account 
 in the Annals it would seem most likely that Thutmose first marked 
 out, or "measured", a line of circumvallation along which edrth works 
 were to be thrown up. It is possible that the timbers used in "fencing-m" 
 the city were employed, as at Plataea, to strengthen the earthworks, 
 forming a sort of framework in which to pack the e.irth and stones. The 
 
 93. Breasted, op. cit. 6 1 6. 
 
 94. Breasted, op. cit. 440. 
 
 95. Thucydides (Jowett's translation), II, 75-78. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 61 
 
 trees^s may, on the other hand, have been used, as Maspero suggests,^'' 
 to form a sort of stockade or palisade, which could be easily and quickly 
 erected to assist in shutting up the city until the heavier rampart of 
 earth could be thrown up. Earthworks about two miles long would ef- 
 fectively inclose the Tell. At least one tower or bastion was raised upon 
 the wall, though it is not at all unlikely that such towers were located 
 at intervals along the entire line of siege works. The one tower men- 
 tioned in the Annals stood on the east of the city. Here the king made 
 his headquarters, directing the troops from this advantageous posi- 
 tion where the widest outlook over the operations could be secured. 
 
 This method of conducting a siege by walling in a town was in use 
 throughout antiquity. An interesting parallel is recorded on the north- 
 Syrian stela of Zakir, king of Hamath, dating from the eighth century 
 B. C.98 Zakir relates how Bar-Hadad, son of Hazael, king of Aram, assem- 
 bled seven kings against him: 
 
 '•All these kings erected entrenchments against Haz[rak.] They threw up a 
 wall higher than the wall ot Hazrak and exxavated a moat deeper than [its moat.] " 
 
 The rampart that Thutmose erected around Megiddo could hardly have 
 been as high as the wills of the city except on the south, owing to the 
 fact that the city stood on a natural elevation from the base of which 
 the land slopes away on the west, north and east. Moreover, as the 
 Egyptians do not seem to have done more than starve the city into sub- 
 mission, it was not necessary to raise the ramparts high enough to over- 
 look the city. 
 
 The sources omit all mention of any encounter between the Egyptians 
 and the Asiatics during the siege. That such conflicts occurred we may 
 feel certain, and in the biography of Amenemheb we have a suggestion 
 of the many stirring events, the details of the story that the Annals give 
 only in outline. As the siege progressed, the supplies in the city ran short. 
 
 96. To-d,iy the region around the Tell is utterly destitute of' trees. In Thutmose's day, 
 however, it was probablv heavily wooded. On the south side of the Carmel Ridge are still the 
 remains of the great forest for which this region was once famous (Josephus, JVars, XIII, 2. 
 Strabo, XVI, 26). Possibly this forest extended over t> the Esdra?lon side of the Ridge and afford- 
 ed Thutmose the trees needed for his siege-works However, the term "pleasant (lit. sweet) 
 tre^s" used in the Annals would seem to refer rather to fruit trees, such as the olive, than to 
 ordinary forest timbt-r. In the Middle Ages there were many fine gardens in and about the plain 
 aniH the same may have been true even at this early date. The Papyrus Anastasi I, referred to 
 earlier, would also indicate that the district was well wooded. 
 
 97. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 258. 
 
 98. Pognon, Inscriptions Stmitifues, p. 173. 
 
62 The Battle of Megiddo 
 
 Megiddo was well supplied with water, to be sure, from 'A^n el-Kubbi 
 at the northern base of the Tell. Schumacher has demonstrated that 
 this spring is an artificial source, the water being brought down in an 
 underground channel from 'Ain es-Sitt.99 It is also highly pro])abl(' that 
 there existed some connection with this channel within the city itself as 
 the excavations at other Palestinian sites have shown to have been cus- 
 tomary. It was lack of food rather than of water that probably caused 
 the surrender of the city. The Annals state that the Egyptians did not 
 allow any of the Asiatics to "go out to the outside upon the back of this 
 wall except to go out to knock (?) at the door of their inclosure." This 
 statement can only mean that none of the inhabitants of Megiddo were 
 allowed to leave the city unless they came out to surrender to the 
 Egyptians. In this way the siege continued until famine, most probab- 
 ly, forced the inhabitants to surrender. 
 
 The siege had begun on May 15th. The next date in the campaign 
 that we are able to fix is not later than October 11th, at which time 
 Thutmose was in Thebes celebrating a feast of victory. In the interval 
 occurred the siege, a march to southern Lebanon where three cities 
 were captured and a fortress of some kind was constructed, and the re-- 
 turn to Egypt. The operations subsequent to the fall of Megiddo could 
 not well have been carried out in less than three months and probably 
 consumed even more time. If, as seems evident, Megiddo was unprepar- 
 ed for a siege, a month would be ample for the interval between the 
 commencement of the work on the inclosing rampart and the surrender 
 of the place. But this again, like so much connected with the battle, is 
 at best conjecture. 
 
 The fall of the city carried with it the submission of the other towns 
 and villages in the region around Megiddo. Being the most commanding 
 fortress between Jezreel and the coast, it must have exercised control 
 over an extensive territory, the inhabitants of which naturally looke 1 
 to Megiddo as their protector and their place of refuge in time of danger. 
 It is not at all unlikely that the leisurely march of the Egyptic\ns from 
 Gaza to Yehem had seen the submission of many of the towns and 
 strongholds in the south. If they had joined in the revolt the dec'sion 
 of the Allies to make their stand at Megiddo must have loft tlie state 
 
 99. Schumacher, Tell el-Mutesellim, I, p.i6o. 
 
The Battle of Megiddo 63 
 
 to the south defenceless before the Egyptian advance. With the fall of 
 Megiddo the towns in northern Palestine would undoubtedly have seen 
 the uselessness of further resistance and would have hastened to make 
 their submission. The Annals tell us that "the chiefs of the country 
 were coming upon their bellies to kiss the earth because of the might of 
 his Majesty, to crave breath for their nostrils, because great was his 
 power and because great was the might of Amon over every country. 
 All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his Majesty, bearing 
 their tribute." 
 
 The importance of the fall of Megiddo cannot be overestimated. It 
 crushed once for all the rebellion in the south. In the subsequent cam- 
 paigns we have no reference to any serious trouble south of the district of 
 Nuges and the southern Lebanon. This overwhelming defeat of the Allies 
 just at the beginning of their rebellion served largely to break up 
 the alliance, and the later campiagns of Thutmose were almost en- 
 tirely against a succession of isolated powers. Only in the extreme north, 
 in Naharin and the Orontes valley, was any united effort made to stem 
 the tide of Egyptian advance. A coalition of all Syria-Palestine was 
 made impossible by the crushing blow that the Allies had received at 
 the very beginning of the movement. It gave the Pharaoh the prestige 
 gained from success in the initial battle of the war, and to a great extent 
 paved the way for his subsequent victories in the north. Since the 
 fall of Sharuhen, after a three years' siege by Ahmose I a century earli- 
 er, it was the most important single step towards the final conquest of 
 the country by Egypt. It was a fitting introduction to the wars of the 
 greatest conqueror the world had then seen. That it made a lasting 
 impression on the people of the time is evident from the many references 
 to the battle as well as from the fact that the Annals devote almost 
 as much space to this first campaign as to all the succeeding ones put 
 together. It is the first battle in history in which we can in any meas- 
 ure study the disposition of troops and as such forms the starting point 
 for the history of military science. 
 
View III. — Looking southwest along the Aruna Road from a point about a 
 mile above the northern opening of the valley. 
 
 View IV. — Looking southwest along the Aruna Road about a quarter of a 
 mile above the northern opening of the valley. 
 
w 
 
 p^ 
 
y. 
 
 X 
 
 > 
 
 fe 
 
 >, 
 ^ 
 
View X. — Wady es-Sitt 
 
 View XI. — The Wady of the Kina, showing the deep trench the brook has cut 
 across the plain. 
 
View XII.— Profile of east slope of Tell el-Mufesellini where Megiddo stood 
 
iHi 
 
■Miim}^,-?^ 
 
 

 
RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT 
 
 TO— ► 202 Main Library 
 
 LOAN PERIOD 1 
 HOME USE 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS 
 
 1 •month loons may be renewed by colling 642-3405 
 
 6-month loons moy be rechorged by bringing books to Circuiotion Desk 
 
 Renewols and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date 
 
 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW 
 
 j^Mzsm 
 
 r^ 
 
 A 
 
 TzcuiiL jun4 m 
 
 lAt\ 
 
 SeTP^iooj 
 
 ^mm- JUL 8 4 1981 
 
 A PR 2 7 IQffi 
 
 BECCIR. Mfif ^113 
 
 RECEIVE 
 
 ED BY 
 
 0rJ2l198(t 
 
 QBTUUTION DEPT, 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY 
 FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 12/80 BERKELEY CA 94720 
 
 ®s 
 
 UF 
 
 ^^^M^_ 
 
 LD 21-ldOm-7,'33 
 
YD 14214 
 
 GENERAL LIBRARY - U.C. BERKELEY 
 
 BOOOabS^MB 
 
 461756 
 
 DT?7 
 //if 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
:.; 
 
 L