THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
SCHOOL OF LAW
OH1CAGO STAR
BINDERY
224 S. Syring St., L. A,
Tel. MUtual 4434
LAW LIBRARY
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
EAILWAY ACCIDENT LAW.
THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS
INJURIES TO THE PEBSON.
BT
CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON,
hi
OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAE.
PHILADELPHIA:
T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO.,
535 Chestnut Street.
1886.
Copyright, 1886,
BY
Christopher Stuart Patterson.
T
P£7?4r
5
MY FRIEND, AND MY PRECEPTOR
IN THE LAW,
THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM A. PORTER,
I GRATEFULLY DEDICATE THIS BOOK.
I leave these -words of dedication, as they were written when the prepara-
tion of this work was begun, although he, whose name honours thu
page, has, since then, in the fullness of years, in the maturity of his
powers, and to the sorrow of all who knew him, passed away from earth.
CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON.
(3)
735709
PREFACE.
My object in writing tins book has been that of
providing in a compact form a treatise, which should
be of practical use to judges and to counsel in the trial
of actions against railways for injuries to the person,
not only by furnishing references to the Leading, and
to the more recent, cases, but also by stating clearly
the general principles, whose application must deter-
mine cases for which exact precedents are not to be
found.
I am as conscious, as any of my readers can be, of
the many imperfections of my work, but I submit it
to the indulgent judgment of my professional brethren
in the hope that they will appreciate the labour and
the pains that have been devoted to its preparation.
C. S. P.
Philadelphia, October, 1886.
(5
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE RAILWAYS LIABILITY.
CHAPTER I.
NEGLIGENCE.
I. Negligence the test of liability.
II. The liability as aftected by the quasi-public character of railways.
III. Negligence denned.
IV. Distinctions in degrees of negligence.
V. Proximate and remote cause.
VI. The liability for injuries caused by an act of God.
VII. The liability for injuries caused by an act of the public enemy.
VIII. The liability for injuries caused by inevitable accident.
IX. The liability for injuries caused solely by the act of the injured person
X. The liability for omissions and acts of commission by agents and
servants.
XI. The liability for the negligent acts of those who are not agents or
servants.
XII. The non-performance of a duty imposed by statutes or municipal
ordinances.
XIII. Ultra vires.
CHAPTER H.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
I. Contributory negligence in general.
II. The rule in Davies v. Mann.
Vili TABLE OF CONTENTS.
III. The case of T. & F. S. P. Ky. v. Boudrou.
1\'. Comparative negligence.
V. Negligence in avoiding danger or inconvenience.
VI. Non-performance of collateral statutory duty as proof of contributoiy
negligence.
VII. The contributory negligence of lunatics, idiots, and children.
VIII. The plaintiff's contributory negligence when suing for injuries to
another.
IX. The attribution to the passenger of the carrier's contributory negli-
gence.
X. The attribution of the contributory negligence of one who has been
killed to those who sue for damages for his death.
XI. The attribution of the contributory negligence of the contracting
party to the party on whose behalf the contract was made.
XII. The attribution of the contributory negligence of parents and guar-
dians to children.
XIII. The attribution to the person injured of the contributory negligence
of third persons.
BOOK II.
THE TERSOXS FOR WHOSE ACTS OR OMISSIONS THE RAILWAY
IS LIABLE.
CHAPTEE .
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE RAILWAY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS.
I. The liability as affected by the character of the act, as one of omission
or of commission.
II. Special and general agency.
III. Classification of the persons for whose acts railways are liable.
CHAPTER II.
THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR THE ACTS OF THEIR SERVANTS.
I. The general nature of a master's liability for the acts of a servant.
II. The relation of master and servant must in fact exist.
III. The act must be within the scope of the servant's employment.
IV. If the relation exists, and if the act be within the scope of the employ
ment, it is not material that the master did not order the particulai
act.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX
V. The liability of the railway for its servants' trespasses.
VI. The liability of the railway for its servants' wilful acts.
CHAPTER III.
THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR THE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTORS.
I. The general rule of liability for the negligence of contractors.
II. The liability for a wrongful act done in pursuance of a contract.
Ill The liability for a contractor's non-performance of a duty incumbent
on the railway.
[V. The railway's obligation to anticipate negligence on the part of its
contractor.
CHAPTER IV. *
THE RAILWAY'S LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF OTHER RAIL-
WAYS AND OF PERSONS OTHER THAN SERVANTS AND CONTRACTORS.
I. The general rule determining the liability.
II. The liability of railways for lessees.
III. The liability of railways for mortgage trustees in possession.
IV. The liability of railways for receivers.
V. The liability of railways for means of transportation under the im-
mediate control of third parties.
VI. The liability of railways for connecting lines.
VII. The liability of a railway for the negligence of other railways which
under statutory authority use its line.
VIII. The liability of a railway for other railways or individuals which by
contract use its line.
BOOK III.
THE PERSONS FOR INJURIES TO WHOM THE RAILWAY IS
LIABLE.
CHAPTER I.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY BE INJURED IN THE COCRSE
OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS.
X TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTEK II.
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE DETERMINING THE LIABILITY OF THE RAIL-
WAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST THREE CATEGORIES.
CHAPTEE III.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST
CATEGORY, THAT IS, PERSONS WHO ARE RIGHTFULLY UPON HIGHWAYS
ADJOINING OR CROSSING THE RAILWAY'S LINE OR PREMISES.
I. The liability of the railway to travellers on the highway for traps
within its own premises which endanger the safety of the travellers
on the highway.
II. The liability of the railway to travellers on the highway for its negli-
gent construction of, or failure to repair, its buildings, etc.
III. The liability of the railway for injuries caused to persons on the high-
way by the negligent operation of its line.
IV. The liability of the railway for its negligent construction of, or failure
to repair, grade crossings.
V. The duty of the railway in the operation of its line at grade crossings.
VI. Contributory negligence at grade crossings.
CHAPTEE IV.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE SEC-
OND CATEGORY, THAT IS, LICENSEES.
I. The liability for injuries resulting from negligence in the construction
of, or in the failure to repair, the railway's premises.
II. The liability for the negligent operation of the line.
III. The effect of notice not to trespass.
CHAPTEE V.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE THIRD
CATEGORY, THAT IS, TRESPASSERS.
I. Trespassers on railway premises.
n. The turn-table cases.
III. Trespassers upon the cars.
TV. Trespassers on the line.
CHAPTEE VI.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE FOURTH
CATEGORY, — PASSENGERS, ETC.
I. The general principle determining the liability.
II. Passengers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI
III. Persons to whom the railway owes the same measure of duty that it
owes to its passengers.
IV. The Pennsylvania Act of 4 April, 1868.
V. The general duty of the railway to its passengers and to those to
whom it owes a like duty.
VI. The duty as to the adoption of improved appliances and methods of
operation.
VII. Railway regulations as affecting passengers.
VIII. Station approaches, platforms, and buildings.
IX. Boarding and descending from cars.
X. The duty of the railway in the operation of its line.
XL Contributory negligence of passengers.
CHAPTER VII.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE FIFTH
CATEGORY, THAT IS, THE SERVANTS OF THE RAILWAY.
I. The general principle determining the liability of the railway to its
servants.
II. The duty of the railway in its original construction and subsequent
maintenance in repair of its line, rolling stock, and appliances.
III. The duty of the railway in its selection and retention of servants.
IV. The duty of the railway in its operation of its line.
V. The liability of railways to their servants for the negligence of othei
servants.
VI. The servant's implied undertaking to take upon himself the risks of
the service.
VII. Minor servants.
VIII. The servant's contributory negligence.
IX. Statutes affecting the liability of railways to their servants.
BOOK IV.
THE REMEDY.
CHAPTER I.
THE FORM OF THE ACTION.
I. When the remedy is by action at law and when by suit in equity
II. When an action of trespass will lie.
III. The distinction between case and assumpsit.
IV. The joinder of common law and statutory claims.
V. Payment of money into court.
Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
THE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR INJURIES CAUSING DEATH.
I. The statutory right of action.
II. The common-law right.
III. Terms of statutes conferring the right of action.
CHAPTER III.
THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
I. The plaintiffs.
II. The defendants.
CHAPTER IV.
EVIDENCE IN ACTIONS AGAINST RAILWAYS FOR INJURIES TO THE PERSON
I. Admissibility of proof of declarations and admissions by agents and
servants of the railway.
II. Admissibility for the plaintiff of declarations of the person injured.
III. Admissibility for the railway of admissions and declarations of the
person injured.
IV. Admissibility of evidence as to changes in the construction or mode
of operation of the railway made subsequently to the happening
of the injury.
V. Inspection of the injuries of the person injured.
VI. Evidence as to the speed of trains.
VII. Evidence as to signals.
VIII. Admissibility of life tables in evidence.
IX. Evidence as to poverty of person injured, etc.
CHAPTER V.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
I. The burden of proving negligence.
II. The burden of proving contributory negligence.
CHAPTER VI.
PRESUMPTIONS.
I. The presumption as to negligence.
II. The presumption as to contributory negligence.
III. Certain minor presumptions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii
CHAPTER VII.
THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCES OF THE COURT AND THE JURY.
I. Negligence and contributory negligence as questions of fact.
II. The duty of the judge.
CHAPTER VIH.
DAMAGES.
I. Damages for breaches of contract.
H. Damages for torts.
III. Exemplary damages.
IV. The measure of damages in cases of injuries not causing death.
V. The measure of damages in cases of injuries causing death.
VI. Statutory limitations of damages.
CHAPTER IX.
RELEASES.
I. The railway's contractual exemption from liability as a carrier
II. Releases by the plaintiff or the person injured.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
THE REFERENCES ARE TO THE PAGES.
Abell v. W. M. R. R, 63 Md.
433, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 503 203, 212, 372
Abend v. T. H. & I. Ry., Ill 111.
202, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 614 365, 368, 374
Abernethy, Schilling v., 17 Week-
ly Notes of Cases (Penna.)
364 184
Abert, Knight v., 6 Penna. St.
472 183
Abbett v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 30
Minn. 482 436, 454
Abbott v. Macfie, 2 H. & C. 744 39
Able, I. C. R. R. v., 59 111. 131
63, 265
Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N.
143 122, 342, 372
Ackermann, P. R. R. v., 74 Penna.
St. 265 158, 171
Ackerson v. E. R. R., 3 Vroom
254 471
A. C. S. & M. Co., Brown v., 3
H. & C. 511 122, 301
Adams, P. R. R. v., 55 Penna. St.
499 490
Illinois R. R. v., 42 111. 474 502
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 74 Mo.
553, 7 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 414 416
v. L. & Y. Ry., L. R. 4 C. P.
739 15, 16, 63, 279
v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. ,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
380 265
U. P. Ry. v., 33 Kans. 427,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
376 169, 173
A.dams Express Co. v. Sharpless,
77 Penna. St. 517, 522 449
v. Egbert, 36 Penna. St. 360 460
v. Hay nes, 42 111. 89 5n2
v. Brooks, 42 111. 458 502
Brehine v., 25 Md. 328 502
Agnew, P. & R. R. R. v., 11
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 394 307
Agricultural Ins. Co., Johnson v.,
25 Hun 251 435
A. G. S. Ry., Gothard v., 67 Ala.
114 60,171
fl.Hawk, 72 Ala. 112, 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 197
160, 251, 265, 284, 416
Albertson, N. O., J. & G. N. R.
R. v., 38 Miss. 242 274, 439
v. K. & D. M. R. R., 48 Iowu
292 76
Albrighton, Honor v., 93 Penna.
St. 475 356
Alcorn, Stewart v., 2 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
401 148
Alden v. N. Y. C. R. R., 26 N. Y.
102 235, 240
Alexander v N. Ry., 33 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 474; 35 Id. 453 502
Alestree, Mitchell v., 1 Ventr.
295 434
Allegheny, Reed v., 79 Penna. St.
300 122
Fritsch v., 91 Penna. St. 226 6
Weir v., 95 Penna. St. 413 471
Allen v. B., C. R. & N. Ry., 57
Iowa 623, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 620 303
v. Playward, 7 Q. B. 960, 53
E. C. L. 122
v. L. & S. W. Rv., L. R. 6 Q.
B. 65 110
Lockwood v., 7 Mass. 254 463
v. Willard, 57 Penna. St. 374
122, 434, 441
Hart v., 2 Watts 116 9
i;. New Gas Co., 1 Ex. D.
251 356
P. R. R. v., 53 Penna. St
St. 276 473
XV
XVI
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGK
Allen, L, P. & C. E. E. v., 31 Ind.
394 501
Schuchardt v., 1 Wall. 368 454
Alleuder v. C, E. I. & P. E. E.,
37 Iowa 264 213, 480
v. O, E. I. & P. Ey., 43 Iowa
276 288
Allard, Wynn v., 5 W. & S. 524 47
Ailing, Sherlock v., 44 Ind. 184 233
Alison, Croft v., 4 B. & Aid. 590,
6E. C. L. 112,113
Allison v. C. & N. W. Ey., 42
Iowa 274 29, 292, 421
Alton v. Midland Ey., 19 C. B.
N. S. 243, 115 E. C. L.
390, 391, 400, 413
Allyn v. B. & A. E.E., 105 Mass.
77 434
Ambergate Ey., Watson v., 15
_ Jur. 448 137
American S. S. Co. v. Bryan, 83
Penna. St. 448 454
Express Co. v. Second Nat.
Bank of Titusville, 69
Penna. St. 394 501
Ames v. U. Ey., 117 Mass. 541 392
Anderson, P. & E. E. E. v., 94
Penna. St. 351, 6 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 407
30, 31, 34, 233, 240, 440
Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227 454
Andrews, P. & C. E. E. v., 39
Md. 329 284, 447
Phelan v., 52 Penna. St. 486 460
Angus, Dalton v., 6 App. Cas.
740 129
Anneslev v. Earl of Anglesea, 17
How. St. Tr. 1139 423
Ansell v. Waterhouse, 6 M. & S.
393 _ 390, 391, 394
Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63
Penna.St. 146 122, 305
Arnaud, Eegina v., 9 Q. B. 806,
58 E. C. L. 413
Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313 356
Arms, M. & St. P. Ey. v., 91 U.
S. 495 8, 471
Armstrong, C. E. E. v., 49
Penna. St. 186, 52 Id. 282
56, 60, 221, 227, 372, 491
Stevens v., 2 Seld. 435 102
v. L. & Y. Ey., L. E. 10 Ex.
47 80, 86
v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E.,
64 N. Y. 635 257
Armsworth v. S. E. Ey., 11 Jur.
758 469, 491
Arnold, Zell v., 2 Pen. & W. 292 390
v. I. C. E. E., 83 111. 273
251, 501, 503
Arnold, C. & L, C. C. E. E. v., 31
Ind. 174 306,366
A. E. E., Campbell v., 53 Ga.
488 60
Artz v. C, E. I. & P. Ey., 34
Iowa 153 170
Asbury, T. W. & W. Ey. v., 84
111. 429 301
Asbcraft, M. & M. E. E. v., 48
Ala. 16, 49 Id. 505
276, 420, 471
Ashmore v. Penna. Trans. Co., 28
N. J. L. 180 502
Asbton, Storey v., L. E. 4 Q. B.
476 102
Tarry v., 1 Q. B. D. 314 127, 148
Asbwortb v. Stanwix, 3 El. & El.
701, 107 E. C. L. 319
Aspell, P. E. E. v., 23 Penna. St.
147 22, 47, 63, 261, 262, 264
Assop v. Yates, 2 H. & N. 768 373
Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. 533 35
Atlanta, W. & A. E. E. v., Ga.
, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 233 412
Atterton, Mangan v., L. E. 1 Ex.
239 39, 94, 95, 148
A., T. & S. F. E. E., Brown v., 21
Kans. 1, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 271 346
v. Thul, 29 Kans. 466, 10
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
378 424
Smith v., 59 Kans. 738, 4
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
554 91
v. Plunkett, 25 Kans. 188, 2
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
127 346
v. Flinn, 24 Kans. 627, 1
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
240 35, 72
v. Holt, 29 Kans. 149, 11
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
206 303, 337
v. Eetford, 18 Kans. 245 308
v. Ledbetter, 34 Kans. 326,
21 Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas.
555 307
v. Wagner, 33 Kans. 660, 21
Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas.
637 307, 346
v. Moore, 29 Kans. 632, 11
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
243, 31 Kans. 197, 15 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 312
329, 369
A., T. & S. F. E. E. v. McCandliss,
33 Kans. 366, 22 Am. &
Eng. K. E. Cas. 296 377
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XV11
PAGE
A., T. & S. F. R. R. v. Weber, 33
Kans. 543, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 418 482
Atwood v. Reliance Trans. Co.,
9 Watts 87 501
Atkinson v. N . & G. Water-works
Co., L. R. 6 Ex. 404 ; 2 Ex.
D. 441 42
v. M. & C. R. R., 15 Ohio St.
21 134
Austin v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 2 Q.
B. 442 205, 390
M. C. R. R. v., 40 Mich. 247 344
v. M. S. & L. Ry., 10 C. B.
473, 70 E. C. L. 498
A.V. R. R.v. Findlay, 4 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
438 224
v. McLain, 9 1 Penna. St. 442 389
Baker v., 95 Penna. St. 211,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
141 303, 306
Duffr, 91 Penn. St. 458,
188, 189, 196, 208, 209, 217, 288
Nagle v., 88 Penna. St. 35 70
O'Donnell v., 50 Penna. St.
490 59 Id. 239
211, 240, 286, 288, 305, 313
Avery, C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 109
111. 314, 17 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 649 313, 329
Aveson v. Lord Kinnard, 6 East.
188 417
Ayers, A. & R. A. L. R. R. Co. v.,
53 Ga. 12 60
Ayles v. S E. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex.
146 444
A. & C, A. L. R. R. v. Wood-
ruff, 63 Ga. 707 308
v. Rav, 70 Ga. 674, 22 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 281 373, 379
A. & C, A., L. Ry., Britton v., 88
N. C. 536, "18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 391 250, 252, 281
A. & G. W. R. R. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 162 471
A. & N. R, R., Culp v., 17 Kans.
475 151
v. Bailey, 11 Neb. 332, 10
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
742 186
A. & P. R. R., Speed v., 71 Mo.
303, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 77 125, 133, 141, 344
Malier v., 64 Mo. 267 375
Nelson v., 68 Mo. 593 55, 265
A. & R. A. L. R. R. v. Ayres, 53
Ga. 12 60
A. & R. R. R., Presbyterian So-
ciety v., 3 Hill 367 4
B
A. & St. L. R. R., Mahoney v.,
63 Me. 68 133
Hopkins v., 36 N. H. 9 471
A. & S. R. R., Collins v., 12 Barb.
492 2S2
v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75 60, 160
A. & W. P. R. R., Vickers v., 64
Ga. 300, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 337 69
Gasway v., 58 Ga. 216 113, 114
v. Webb, 61 Ga. 586 308
v. Wyly, 65 Ga. 120, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 262 60, 159
Stiles v., 65 Ga. 370, 8 Am.
& Eng.R.R. Cas. 195 220, 272
A. & F. R. R. v. Waller, 48 Ala.
459 313
Babbitt, Crispin v., 81 N. Y. 516 328
Bachas, I. C. R. R. v., 55 111. 379 166
Bacon, John v., L. R. 5 C. P. 437
136, 241
B. & P. R. R. v., 58 Md. 482,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
4U9 191
Baddely, T. W. & W. R. R. v. 54
111. 19 233, 263, 292
Bailey, A. & N. R. R. v., 11 Neb.
332, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 742 186
Baker v. A. V. R. R., 95 Penna.
St. 211, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 141 304, 306
v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493 397
v. Portland, 58 Me. 199 65
v. W. & A. R. R., 68 Ga. 699
307, 382
Baird v. Pettit, 70 Penna. St. 477 372
Baldwin v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 50
Iowa 680 309
Baldauf, C. & A. R. R. v., 16
Penna. St. 67 501
Ball, Springett v., 4 F. & F. 472 470
Ballou v. C. & N. W. Ry., 54
Wise. 257, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 480 307, 309, 346
C. P. Mfg. Co. v., 71 111. 418 342
v. Farnum, 9 Allen 47 135
Bangs, L. S. & M. S. Ry. v., 47
Mich. 470, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 426 264
Banin, E. & C. R. R. v., 26 Ind.
70 108
Bank of England, Yarborough v.,
16 East 6, 99, 107
of London, Lawson v., 18 C.
B. 84, 86 E. C. L. 99, 112
of New South Wales v.
Owston, 4 A pp. Cas. 270 110
of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend.
158 390
XY111
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Banks v. H. St. By., 1 30 Mass. 4S5,
19 Am. «t Eng. R. R. Cas.
139 65, 111
Bant'ora, P. R. R. v., 54 Penna.
St. 495 492, 493
Bancroft v. B. & W. R. R., 97
Mass. 275 259
Barbour, Barton v., 104 U. S. 135
4, 136, 385
Barber, R. R. v., 50 Obio St. 541
Bard v. Yohn, 26 Penna. St. 482 102
Barber v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906 29
Barber, M. R. & L. E. R. R. v., 5
Ohio St. 541 301, 307
Barker, P. P. C. Co. v., 4 Colo.
344 2.-53, 292
Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392, 67
E. C. L. 148
Barnett, P. R. R. v., 59 Penna.
259 151, 153
Barney, Cardot v., 63 N. Y. 281 136
Barden v. B. C. & F. R. R., 121
Mass. 426 282
Barker, L. R. & F. S. Ry. v., 39
Ark. 491, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 195 489
Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121 122
Barringer v. D. & H. C. Co., 19
Hun 216 307. 368
Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9 ' 134
Barron, I. C. R. R. v., 5 Wall. 90
133, 141,469, 473
Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R R. R.,
92 N. Y. 289, 13 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 615
69, 162, 179
Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire,
3 Macq. H. L. 307 356
v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 282,
4 Jur. N. S. 767
97, 99, 100, 353, 355, 356
Bartlett, Blodgett v., 50 Ga. 353
265, 284
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 135
4, 136, 385
Barwick v. English Joint Stock
Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259 106
Bass v. C. & N. W. Ry., 36 Wise.
450, 39 Id. 636, 42 Id. 654
113, 251, 416
Bateman, Moffat v., L. R. 3 P. C.
115 293
Batchelor v. Fortescue, 11 Q. B.
D. 474 177
Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid.
39 498
Batterson v. C. & G. T. Ry., 49
Mich. 184, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 123
301, 304, 305, 346
PAGE
Baston v. G. 11. R., GO Ga. 340 190
Baxendale, Hadley v., 9 Ex. 341 460
Riley v., 6 H. & N. 445 342
Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187
Bayfield, C. & N. W. R. R. v., 37
Mich. 205 112, 350
Bayley v. M. S. & L. Ry., L. R. 7
C. P. 415, 8 Id. 148
106, 108, 109
Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113
U. S. 316 454, 456
Baylor v. D. L. & W. R. R., 40
N. J. L. 23 302, 345
Baughman v. S. & A. R. R., 92
Penna. St. 335 156, 172
Baulec v., N. Y & II. R. R., 59
N. Y. 356 314, 315
Bailey, N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v.,
' 40 Miss. 395 224
Baird v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 55
Iowa 121, 13 N. W. Rep.
731, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 128, 61 Iowa 359, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
75 305
Bannon v. B. & O. R. R., 24 Md.
108 193
Bartram, C. C. & C. R. R. v., 11
Ohio St. 457 251
B. Canal Co , Dunn v., L. R. 7 Q.
B. 244, 8 Id. 42 146
B. C. P. Ry. v. Kemp., 61 Md. 74,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
220 28, 391, 481
B. C. P. R. R. v. McDonnell, 43
Md. 552 42
B. C. R. P., Mulhado v., 30 N.
Y. 370 274, 424
Mangan v., 30 N. Y. 445 68
Spooner v., 54 N. Y. 230 290
Cregin v., 83 N. Y. 595 398, 481
Busch v., 29 Hun 112 86
Mangam v., 38 K Y r . 456 91
B. C. R. R., Day v., 76 N. Y. 593 114
Eppendorf v., 69 N. Y. 195 291
B. C. R. T. & N. R. R-, Smith v.,
6 Ex. 149
B. C. R. & N. By. v. Dowell, 62
Iowa 629, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 153 434
v. Coates, 62 Iowa 487, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 265
346, 431
Hawes v., 64 Iowa 315, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
220 436, 508
Crowley v.. 65 Iowa 658, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 56 318
Allen v., 57 Iowa 623, 5 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 620 308
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XIX
B. C. K. & N. Ry., Bryant v., 66
Iowa 305, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 593 347
Plaver v., 62 Iowa 723, 12
•Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
11 -J 283
Raymond?'., 65 Iowa 152, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 6,
18 Id. 217 436
Wells v., 56 Iowa 520, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 243
302, 345
Manning v., 64 Iowa 240, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
171 306
B. C. R. & M. Ry., Verry v., 47
Iowa 549 " 416
Black v., 38 Iowa 515 157
B. C. & N. R. R., Nolan v., 87 N.
Y. 63, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 463 290
Dixon v., 100 N. Y. 171
275, 508
Van Horn v., 59 Iowa 33, 7
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 591 426
B. C. & P. R. R., Metz v., 58 N.
Y. 61 135, 136
B. C. & F. R. R., Barden v., 121
Mass. 426 282
Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Penna. St.
197 35
Beal v. S. D. Ry., 3 H. & C. 341 8
Anderson Co. v., 113 U. S.
227 454
Beale, P. R. R. v., 73 Penna. St.
504 169, 171
Beard v. C. & P. R. R., 48 Vt. 1 01 254
Woolf v., 8 C. & P., 373, 34
E. C. L. 36
Beaver, I. R. R. v., 41 Ind. 493
205, 292
Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Penna. St.
463 148
v. C. I. Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
210 148, 152, 155
Beauchamp v. I. & G. N. Ry., 56
Tex. 239 251
v. S. Mining Co., 50 Mich.
163 29
Beck v. Weeks, 34 Conn. 145 502
Becker, C. & A. R. R. v., 76 111,
25 74
Beckman v. Shause, 5 Rawle
179 501
Beems v. C, R. I. & P- R. R., 58
Iowa 150, 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 658 377
Belair v. C. & N. W. R. R., 43
Iowa 662 377
Bell, Dixon v., 5 M, & S. 198, 1
Stark. 287, 2 E. C. L. 39, 95
C.,R. I.&P.R. R. v., 70 111.
1(12 74, 171
v. Midland Ry., 10 C. B. N.
S. 287, 100 E. C. L. 471
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo.
50,4 Am. & Eng.-R. R.
Cas. 580 111, 160, 193, 447
St. L., V. & T. H. R. R. v.,
81 111. 76 186
v. I. C. & R. Ry., 53 Ind. 57 135
Beggs, T. W. & W. R. R. v., 85
111. 80 188, 208, 209, 240
Behrens v. K. P. Ry., 5 Col. 400,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
184 374, 375, 436
Beisiegel v. N. Y, C. Ry., 40 N.
Y. 9 " 157, 162, 163
Bennett, Brien v., 8 C. & P. 724,
34 E. C. L. 213
v. G. T. Ry., 3 Ont. C. P. D.
446, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 627 160, 161
v. N. J. R. R., 36 K J. Law
225 86
v. L. & N. R. R., 102 U. S.
577, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 71 201, 253
Quarman v., 6 M. & W. 499
102, 103, 120
Benton v. C. R. R., 42 Iowa 192 170
v.C, R. 1. & P. Ry., 55 Iowa
496
109
Bentley, P. Canal Co. v., 66 Penna.
St. 32 436, 454
Berg v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 50
Wise. 419, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 70 344
Bernard, Coggs v., 2 Ld. Raymond
918, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 189
207 231
Berringer v. G. E. Ry., 4 C. P. D.
163 393
Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543 501
v. C. Ry., 40 Iowa 564 470
Besel v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
70 N. Y. 171, 9 Hun 457
318, 368, 369
Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. N. S.
550 133
Bett v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 8
Am. & Eng. Corpor. Cas.
437 42
Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y.
547 329
Bessex v. C. & N. W. Ry., 45
Wise. 477 308
B. H. R. R., Jacques v., 41 Conn.
61 473
XX
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
B. II. & E. E. E., Goodfellow v.,
106 Mass. 46 1 179
School Dist. v., 102 Mass. 552 501
B-, H. & H. B. E., Thompson, v.,
5 Ir. C. L. 517 262
Bidwell, McKee v, 74 Penna. St.
218 201, 422, 454
Bigelow v. Beid, 51 Me. 325 65
Bigelow Carpet Co., Bryant v., 131
Mass. 491 394
Bilbee v. L., B. & S. C. By., 18
C.B.N.S.5S4,114E.C L. 165
Billings, Shirley v., 8 Bush. 147
114,233
Billman v. L, C & L. E. B., 76
Ind. 166, 6 Am. & Eng.
E. B. Cas. 41 13, 26, 151
Bills, Ingalls v., 9 Mete. 1 233
Bingham v. Bogers, 6 W. & S. 495 501
Bininger, Crater v., 33 N. J. L.
512 460
Binks v. S. Y. Bv., 3 B. & S. 244,
113 E. C.'L. 183
Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 15
E. C. L. 39, 183
v. G. AV. By., 28 L. J. Exch.
3 439
Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 91
Birmingham Water-works Co.,
Blythu, 11 Ex.781 6,12.146
Birkett v. AV. H. J. By., 4 H. &
N. 730 138
Bissell v. N. Y. C. E. B., 25 N. Y.
442 502
v. M.S.&N.I.Ey., 22N.Y.
258 43, 138, 414
Bishop, W. & A. E. E. v., 50 Ga.
465 510
Black v. C. B. E., 10 La. An. 38 233
v. D. & E. Canal Co., 22 N.
J. Eq. 130 133
T'., AV. & AV. E. E. v., 88 111.
112 346, 376
v. B., C, E. & M. By., 38
Iowa 515 157
Blackburn, Sarch v., 4 C. & P. 297,
19 E. C. L. 183
Blair v. E. By., 66 N. Y. 313
216, 502
Blake, G. AV. By. v., 7 IL & N.
987 138
v. M. C. E. E., 70 Me. 60
314, 368
v. Midland By., 18 Q. B. 93,
83E.C. L. 486,491,492,493
v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 58 122
v. Thirst, 2 II. & C. 20 123,127
Blakely, M. E. E. v., 59 Ala. 477 233
Blakemore v. B. & E. Bv., 8 El.
& Bl. 1035, 92 E. C. L. 224
Blamires v. L. & Y. By., L. E. 8
Ex. 283 41, 276
Blessing v. St. L., K. C. & N. By.,
77 Mo. 410, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 298 366
Blocher, B. & O. E. E. v., 27 Md.
277 114, 471
Blodgett v. Bartlett, 50 Ga. 353
265, 284
Bluhm, P. P. C. Co. v., 109 111.
20, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 87 306, 480
Blumenthal v. Smith, 38 Vt. 402
136
Blyth v. Birmingham Water-
works Co., 11 Ex.781 6,12,146
v. Topham, Cro. Jac. 158 183
B. L. & C. J. By., Eoe v., 7 Ex.
36 107, 110, 112, 113
Winch «., 5 De G. & S. 562,
16 Jur. 1035 133
Boadle, Byrne v., 2 H. & C. 722
148, 440
Bock, P. E. E. v., 93 Penna. St.
427, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 20 76, 168, 395
Boland v. Mo. E. E., 36 Mo. 484
54,69
Bolch v. Smith, 7 H. & N. 736
176
Boldt v. N. Y. C. E. E., 18 N. Y.
432 356 375
Bonifieldfc. & A. E. E. v., 104
111. 223, 8 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 443 264, 364
Books v. Borough of Danville, 95
Penna. St. 158 407
P. E. E. v., 57 Penna. St. 345
209, 445, 468, 471, 473
Booth v. B. & A. E. E., 73 N. Y.
38 _ 317, 329, 330, 337
Borries v. Hutchinson, 18 C. B.
N. S. 445,114 E.G. L. 460
Borough of Danville, Books v., 95
Penna. St. 158 407
of Susquehanna Depot v. Sim-
mons, 17 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 362 122
Borst v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 66 N.
Y. 639 151, 155
Boston, Bowditch v., 101 U. S. 16 454
Gas-light Co., Holly v., 8
Gray 123 91
Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 122
Bosworth v. Swansev, 10 Mete.
363 65
Bottsford v. M. C. Br., 33 Mich.
256 303
Bothwell, Chapman v., 4 Jur. N.
S. 1181 489
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXI
Boudrou, 13th & 15th Sts.P. Ev.
Co. v., 92 Penna. St. 480,
8 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 244 47,48,57,290,495
Boulter v. Webster, 13 W. K. 2*9
489, 493
Boulton, White v., Peake 113 232
Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16 454
Bowen v. D. C. S. Ey., 54 Mich.
496, 19 Am. & Eng. B. E.
Cas. 131 150
v. N. Y. C. E. E., 18 N. Y.
408 246
J., M. & I. E. E. v., 49 Ind.
154 76
Bower v. Peate, 1 Q. B. D. 326 97, 128
v. G, M. & St. P. By., 61
Wise. 457, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 301 169, 420
Boyce, Jones v., 1 Stark. 493, 2
E. C. L. 14,62
Boyd, G. E. & I. E. E. v., 65 Ind.
526 235, 240
Boyer, Hughes v., 9 Watts 556
102, 454
P. & E. E. E. v., 97 Penna.
St. 91, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas 172
'42,82,86,164,168,443,495
Bolton, Mel. E. E. v., 43 Ohio St.
224, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 501 212, 370
Baker v., 1 Camp. 493 397
Bowler, L. & N. E. E. v., 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 866 323, 370
Bonham, S. C. Co. v., 9 W. & S.
27 134
Bonnell v. D., L. & W. E. E., 39
N. J. L. 189 169
Boring, M. & W. P. E. E. v., 51
Ga. 582 134
Boorman, Brown v., 11 CI. & Fin.
44 391
Boss v. P. & W. E. E.. E. I.
, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 364 264
Boylan, Penna. Co. v., 104 111.
595, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 734 156
Bohan, M., L. S. & W. Ev., 58
Wise. 30, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 374; 61 Wise.
391, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 276 167 428
B., P. & C Ey. v. McDonald, 68
Inch 316 280
v. Pixley, 61 Ind. 22 467, 470
B., P. & W. E. E. v. O'llara,
12 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 473 207, 208, 501
Bradshaw v. L. & Y. Ey., L. E.
10 C. P. 189 401
Brahbitts v. C. & N. W. Ey., 38
Wise. 289 356
v. B. W. Ey., 38 Mo. 289 382
Braddick, Fletcher v., 5 Bos. &
Pul. 182 103
Bradley v. B. & M. E. E., 2 Cush.
539 162
Braid, G. W. Ey. v., 1 Moo. P. C.
N.S. 101, 9 Jur. N. S. 339
31, 32, 240, 440
Bradburn v. G. W. Ey., L. E. 10
Ex. 1 474, 494
Bramall v. Lees, 29 L. T. 82 486, 489
Brame, Mob. L. Ins. Co. v., 95
U. S. 754 399
Branagan, T., W. & W. Ev. v., 75
Ind. 490, 5 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 630 434, 436
Brannon, P., W. & B. E. E. v., 17
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 227 13, 26, 107
Brann v. O, E. I. & P. Ey., 53
Iowa 595 303, 330, 369
Brassell v. N. Y. C. & B. E. E. E.,
84 N. Y. 241, 3 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 380 254, 257
Bregy, B. & O. E. E. v., 32 Md.
333 502
Brehme v. Adams Ex. Co., 25 Md.
328 502
Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. & P.
414, 11 E. C. L. 232
Brett, Wilson v., 11 M. & W. 115 8
Bremen, Gleason v., 50 Me. 222 436
Bresmer, G. & C. St. Ev. v., 97
Penna. St. 103 349, 373
Brickman v. S. C. E. E., 8 S. C. 173 305
Brien v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. 724,
34 E. C. L. 213
Brick v. E., N. Y. & P. E. E., 98
N. Y. 212, 21 Am. & Eng.
E.E.Cas.605 323,328,347.368
Bridge v. G. J. Ey., 3 M. & W.
244 45, 47, 51, 78, 86
Bridges v. N. L. Ev., L. E. 6 Q.
B. 371,7 ILL. 232
6, 261, 262, 266, 268, 450, 454
Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180 8, 446
v. Oliver, 4 FL & C. 408 200
Brigham, P., F. W. & C. Ey. v.,
29 Ohio St. 374 31, 32, 177
Brignoli v. C. & G. E. E. E., 4
Daly 182 240, 275, 439
Britton v. A. & C. A. L. Ey., 88
N. C. 536, 18 Am & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 391 250, 252, 281
v. G. AV. Cotton Co., L. E. 7
Ex. 130 41, 304
XXII
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Brinson, R. E. v., 70 Ga. 207,
64 Id. 475, 19 Am. & Eng.
R.R.Cas.42 190,192,197,443
Brocksmidt, Owen v., 54 Mo. 285 493
Britz, St. L. & S. E. Ry. v., 72 111.
261 342, 368
Brooks, T., W. & W. R. R. v, 81
111. 245, 292 188, 208, 209
v. Somervillc, 106 Mass. 271 454
v. B. & M. R. R., 135 Mass.
21, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.
('as. 345 262,263,266
Adams Ex. Co. ?-., 42 111. 458 502
Brooke, Mayor of Colchester v.,
7 Q. B. 339, 377, 53 E. C.
L. 51, 54
Brooklyn, Lehman v., 29 Barb.
234 441
Broom, E. C. Ry. v., 6 Ex. 314
99, 110, 112, 113
Brokaw v. N. J. R. R., 3 Vroom
328 108
B. R R., Burns v., 50 Mo. 1 39 290
Brophv, G. P. Ry. v., 105 Penna.
St. 38, 16 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 361 285
Brotherton t>.Wood, 3 Brod. & B.
54, 7 E. C. L. 390, 394
Brown, Caldwell v., 53 Penna. St.
453 323, 356, 493
v. A., T. & S. F. R. R , 31
Kans. 1, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 271 346
v. A. C. S. & M. Co., 3 H. &
C 511 122,301
v. C, M. & St. P. Ry„ 54
Wise 342, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 444 25, 27, 292, 407
v. C. & B. St. Ry., 49 Mich.
153, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 385 112, 434
v. French, 14 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 412 112
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 34 N. Y.
404, 32 Id. 600 166,246,275
O. & R. V. R. It. v., 14 Neb.
170, 1 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 501 32
Sills v., 9 C. & P. 601, 38 E.
C. L. 47, 48
v. E. & N. A. R. R., 58 Me.
384 91
v. B. &S. L. R. R., 22N.Y.
191 42
Bank of Orange v,, 3 Wend.
158 390
v. M. & St. L. Ry., 31 Minn.
553, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 333 366
v. M. R R., 64 Mo. 536 188
Brown v. W. & St. P. R. R., 27
Minn. 162 368
W.,A.&G.R.R.v.,17Wall.
445 132, 133
v. II. & St. J. R. R., 50 Mo.
461 196
v. M., K. & T. R. R., 64 Mo.
536 208
v. G. W. Ry., 40 Up. Can. Q.
B. 333, 2 Ont. Ap. Cas. 64,
3 Can. S. C. 159 221
v. Boorman, 11 01. & Fin.
44 391
Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill 282 50
Bruce, P. & L. E. R. R. v., 102
Penna. St. 23 4
Bruner, Johnson v., 61 Penna. St.
58 300
Bryan, American S. S. Co. v., 83
Penna. St. 448 454
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 31 Barb.
335 86
Thorogood v., 8 C. B. 115, 65
E. C L. 78, 85, 86
Bryant v. Eigelow Carpet Co.,
131 Mass. 491 394
v. B., C, R. & N. Ry., 66
Iowa 305, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 593 347
v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180, 202 114
v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 6ii Iowa
464, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 335 114
Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L.
30 314
Broue,hton v. M. G. W. Ry., 1 Ir.
C. L. 169 146
Brownell v. P. R. R., 47 Mo.
240 417
B. Ry., Carey v., 1 Cush. 475 397
Brand, H. Rv. v., L. R. 1 Q. B.
130, 2 "id. 223, L. R. 4 H.
L. 171 146
Bracken v. G. H. & S. A. Rv., 57
Tex 71. 14 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 691 168
Bresnahan v. M. C. Rv., 49 Mich.
410, 8 Am. &'Eng. R. R.
Cas. 147 190
B. S. R. R v. Harris, 67 Ala. 6 473
B.. S., O. & B. R. R. v. Rainbolt,
99 Ind. 551, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 466 240, 440
Bucher, Higgins v., Yelv. S9 397
v. Fitchburg R. R., 131 Mass.
156, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 212 65
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R-, 98
N. Y. 128, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 361 263, '464, 287
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XX111
Buck, T. H. &. I. K. K. ?•., 96 Ind.
346, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 234 28, 266
Buckingham, Lamphear v., 33
Conn. 237 134
Buckner, I. C. R. R. v., 28 111.
299 75
Budd, DufF v., 3 Brod. & B. 177,
7 E. C. L. 7
Bull v. M. & M. Ry., 67 Ma. 206 367
Bueneinann v. St. P., M. A: M.
Ry., 32 Minn 390. 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. (as. 153 254
Buel v. N. Y. C. R. R., 31 N. Y.
314 15, 62
Buesching ». Gas-light Co., 73
Mo. 229 436, 444
Buffett v. T. & B. R. R., 40 N. Y.
168 136. 214, 242
Bunting v. C. P. R. R., 14 Nev.
351, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 282 427
Burbank, McLean v., 11 Minn.
277 139
Burdge, I. B. & W. Rv. v., 94 Ind.
46, 18 Am. &"Eng. R. R.
Cas 192 109
Burke, N. O., St. L. & C. R.R. v.,
53 Miss. 200 281
v. S. E. Ry., 5 C. P. D. 1 500
Wanamaker v., 17 "Weekly
.Notes of Cases (Penna.)
225 373
v. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562 301
Burns v. Poulson, L. R. 8 C. P.
563 102
v. C. & Y. Ry., 13 C. L. (N.
S.) 543 237
1 B. R. R., 50 Mo. 139 290
v. B. & L. R. R., 101 Mass.
50 224
Burnett, Owen v., 4 Tvr. 133 7
Burgess v. G. W. Rv., 6 C. B. N.
S. 923, 95 E.*C. L. 253
Burling v. I. C. R. R., 85 111. 18
318 377
Burrows v. Erie Ry., 63 N.Y.'
556 103, 264
v. March. G. & C. Co. L. R.
5 Ex. 66, 7 Id. 96 95
Burnett v. B. & M. R. R,, 16 Neb.
332, 19 Am. & Eng. R.R.
Cas. 25 54, 193
Bush v. Johnston, 23 Penna. St.
209 148
v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pul.
404 119
Burton v. Pinkerton, L. R. 2 Ex.
340 461
v. Price, 57 Cal. 272 509
Burton v. G. H. & S. A. R. R..
61 Tex. 526, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 218 123
v. P., W. & B. R. R., 4 Har-
rington 252 152
v. W. J. Ferry Co., 114 U. S.
471 282
Busch v. B. C. R. R., 29 Hun 112 86
Bussian v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 50
"Wise. 325, 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 716 152, 508
Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. 206 468
Butler v. M. & St. P. Rv., 28 Wise.
487 166, 173
P. R.R.r., 57 Penna. St. 336
207, 468, 491, 501
Cooper v., 103 Penna. St. 412,
14 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna) 278 37tf, 374
Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East
60 45, 47, 51
v. W. R R., 10 Allen 532 168
Button v. H. R. R. R., 18 N. Y.
248 54, 436
C. & N. W. Ry. v., 6S 111. 409 411
Buxton v. N. E. Ry., L. R. 3 Q.
B. 549 138
Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722
148, 440
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 94
N.Y. 12 160,161
v. N.Y. C.&H. R. R.R., 83
N. Y. 620 69
B. & A. R. R., Allyn v., 105 Mass.
77 434
Carpenter v., 24 Hun. 104, 97
N. Y. 494, 21 Am & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 331 102, 255
Corcoran v., 133 Mass. 507
299, 434, 442, 444
Booth v., 73 N. Y. 38
317,329,330,337
Forsvth v., 103 Mass. 510
2-3;;, 254. 259
Mackint',, 135 Mass. 201, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 196
309, 311, 335, 367
Murdock v., 13." Mass. 15, 6
Am. A; Eng. R. R. Cas. 406
395, 467
Peeples v.. 60 Ga. 281 114
Roser., 58 N. Y. 217 316
Sweeney v., 128 Mass. 5. 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 138 180
Murphv v., 88 N. \ . 146, 8
Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 510
306, 369
Sprong v., 58 N. Y. 56 374
Flike v., 53 N. Y. 549
317, 322, 330
XXIV
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
B. & A. E. E., Elkins v., 115
Mass. 190 C9
Dickie v., 131 Mass. 516, 8
Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 203 149
Tinney v., 62 Barb. 218 299
Murphy v., 133 Mass. 121 179
Clark «., 128 Mass. 1, 1 Am.
& Eng. R. E. Cas. 134 375
Eamsden v., 104 Mass. 117
109, 110
Wheelwright v., 135 Mass.
225, 16 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 315 260
Wheelock v., 105 Mass. 203 257
B. & B. Ey. v. Keys, 9 H. L. C.
555 209
B. & C. E. E., Stewart v., 90 N.
Y. 5S8, 12 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 127 114, 117
B. & E. Ey., Blakemore v., 8 El.
& Bl. 1035, 92 E. C. L. 224
v. Collins, 7 II. L. 194 137
Praeger v., 24 L. T. N. S. 105
266, 267
Tebbutt v., L. E. 6 Q. B. 73
217, 256
B. & H. S. E. E., Dietrich v., 58
Md.347,llAm. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 115 291,416,454
B. & I. E. E. v. Snyder, 24 Ohio
St. 670 76
v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399 91
B. & J. E. Co., Sweeny v., 101 N.
Y. 520, 524 343
B. & L. E. E., O'Connor v., 135
Mass. 352, 15 Am & Eng.
E.B.Cas.362 69, 70, 166, 180
Burns v., 101 Mass. 50 224
Chaffee v., 104 Mass. 108 257
Gahaganw., 1 Allen 187 283
Commonwealth v., 134 Mass.
211 405
Eaton v., 11 Allen 500 86, 95, 139
Hickey v., 14 Allen 429 265, 284
Treats, 131 Mass. 371, 3 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 423 281
Cooke v., 133 Mass. 185 149
Lowell v., 23 Pick. 24 127
Favor v., 114 Mass. 350 152
Lovejoy v., 125 Mass. 79 308
Yeatou v., 135 Mass. 418, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 253 346
Woburn v., 109 Mass. 283 412
B. & M. E. E., Mayo v., 104 Mass.
137 436
Gordon v., 58 N. H. 396 421
Beaver v., 14 Cray 466 211, 368
Miller v., 1 28 Mass. 8, 1 Am.
& Eng. P. E. Cas. 141 366
Smith v., 120 Mass. 490 65
E. & M. E. E., Hoben v., 20
Iowa 562 374
Quimby v., 69 Me. 340 253
Eathburn v., 16 Neb. 441, 19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 137 150
Walker v., 128 Mass. 8, 1 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 141 306, 366
Bradley v., 2 Cush. 539 162
Brooks v., 135 Mass. 21, 16
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 345
262, 263, 266
Burnett v., 16 Neb. 332, 19
Am.&Eng.E.R.Cas.25 54,193
Johnson v., 125 Mass. 75 214, 283
Commonwealth v., 129 Mass.
500, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 457 214
Wright v., 129 Mass. 440, 2
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 121
169, 190
v. Eose, 11 Neb. 177, 1 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 253 250, 251
McKimble v., 139 Mass. 542,
21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
213 405
B. & N. E. E., Sheridan v., 36 N.
Y. 39 290, 292
B. & N. C. Ey., Conway v., 9 Irish
C. L. 498 368
B. & N. W. Ey., McAllister v., 64
Iowa 395, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 108 191, 196
v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277 114, 471
v. Depew,40OhioSt.l21, 12
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 64
191, 224
Bannon v., 24 Md. 108 193
Lewis v., 38 Md. 588 283
v. State, 33 Md. 542
54, 212, 372,376
v. State, 63 Md. 135, 21 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 202
287, 440, 490, 493
Washington v., 17 W. Va.
190, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 749 6
v. State, 29 Md. 252, Id. 420 246
State v., 24 Md. 84
36, 54, 158, 233, 493
v. School District, 96 Penna.
65, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 166 30, 31, 34
v. State, 60 Md. 449, 12 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 149 257, 283
v. Schwindling, 12 Weekly
Notes of Cases 349, 101
Penna. St. 258 177, 190
v. State, 62 Md. 479, 19 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 83
197, 416, 434
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXV
B. &N.W. Ry. v. Bregy, 32 Md.
333 ' 502
Kean v., 61 Md. 154, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 321
54, 74, 174
Mastin v., 14 W. Va. 180 205
Fowler v., 18 W. Va. 579, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 480 180
Randall v., 109 U, S. 478, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243
160, 246, 306, 344, 355, 356, 367
454
r.Hobbs, Md. , 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 337 169
v. Strieker, 51 Md. 47 302, 345
v. Wightman, 29 Grat. 431 491
Wonder v., 32 Md. 411 301
v. Whittington, 30 Grat. 805
374, 378
v. Worthington, 21 Md. 275
233, 240
v. State, 41 Md. 268 318, 373, 491
v. Noell, 32 Grat. 394 493
B. & P. R. R., District of Colum-
bia v. 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 179 412
v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439
6, 47, 283, 374
Pabst v., 2 McArthur 42 262, 470
B. & R. B. R. R., Smedis v., 88
N. Y., 13 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 445 157, 167, 175
B. & S. A. R. R., Putnam v., 55
N. Y. 108 280
B. & S. C. Ry., Fordbam v., L. R.
3 C. P. 368, 4 Id. 619 277
B. & S. Gaslight Co., Smith v., 1
Ad. & El. 526, 28 E. C. L.
99 112
B. & S. L. R. R., Brown v., 22 N.'
Y. 191 42
B. & W. R. R., Bancroft v., 97
Mass. 275 259
Caswell v., 98 Mass. 194 15, 62, 240
Farwell v., 4 Mete. 49, 1 Redf.
Am. Ry. Cas. 395
350,351,356, 359,363,366
King »., 9 Gush. 112 301,338,366
O'Brien v., 15 Gray 20 215
Schopman v., 9 Cush. 24 217, 233
B. & O. C. R. R. v. Rowan, 104
Ind. 88, 23 Am. & Eng.R.
R. Cas. 390 302, 345
Cagney v. II. & St. J. R. R., 69 '
Mo. 416 301
Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Penna. St.
453 323, 356, 493
v. N.J. S. N. Co., 47 N. Y. 290 235
P. A. & M. Ry. v., 74 Penna.
St. 421 95, 209
PAGK
88
65
280
390
60
377
473
396
87
134
177
Cannon, Rowland v., 35 Ga. 105
Wallace v., 38 Ga. 199
v. M. G. W. Ry., 6 Irish C.
L. 199
Campbell, Spencer v., 9 W. & S.
32
v. A. R. R., 53 Ga. 4o8
v. C, R. I. & P. Rf., 45
Iowa 76
Nebraska City v., 2 Black.
(S. C.) 590
Cantrell, St. L., I. M. & S. R. R.
v., 37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. K. Cas. 198
254, 264, 286, 287, 468, 474
Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y. 281 136
Carden, Schreger v., 11 C. B. 851
Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440
Carpenter v. B. & A. R. R., 97 N.
Y. 494, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 331 102, 255
v. Mining Co., 65 N. Y. 43
Carroll, Maener v., 46 Md. 212
v. S. I. R. R., 58 N. Y. 126
65, 235
D. & H. C. Co. v., 89 Penna.
St. 374 320, 321, 323
N. & C. R. R. v., 6 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 347 60, 370
v. P. R. R., 12 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 348
169, 172, 260
v. M. V. R. R., 13 Minn. 30 372
Carp ue v. L. & B. Ry., 5 Q. B.
747, 48 E. C. L. 274, 439
Carson v. Godley, 26 Penna. St.
Ill
Carter v. C. & G. R. R., 19
Shand (S. C) 20, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 414
191, 454
v. L., N. A. & C. R. R , 98
Ind. 522, 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 360 109, 189
Cartwright v. C & G. T. Ry., 52
Mich. 606, 16 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 321
Caruth, M. C. R. R. v., 51 Miss.
77
Case, L. C. & L. R. R. v., 9 Bush
728 86, 486
v. C, R. I. & P. R., 64 Iowa
762, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 142
Casey v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R.,
78 N. Y. 518
Caswell v. Worth, 5 E1.& Bl. 849,
85 E. C. L.
v. B. & W. R. R., 98 Mass.
194 15, 62, 240
200
266
469
442
416
36
XXVI
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Catlin v. Hills, 8 C. B. 123, 65 E.
C. L. 80, 86
Cauley v. P., C & St. L. E. B., 95
' Penna. St. 398, 98 Id. 498
76, 199,115, 188, 189, 190,
196, 446
Caulkins, Erie v., 85 Penna. St.
247 122, 125
Capper v. L. E. & St. L. B. B.,
103 Ind. 305, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. B. Cas. 525 367, 381
Cassidy v. M C. B. E , 76 Me.
488, 17 Am. & Eng. E. B.
Cas. 519 366, 381
Carleton v. F. I. Co., 99 Mass.
216 201
Cameron, Fries v., 4 Bicliardson
228 201
Cavens, L. C. & L. E. B. v., 9
Bush (Ky.) 559 323
Carlin v. C, B. I. & P. Ey., 37
Iowa 316 170
Campan v. M. S. E. E., 35 Mich.
468 190
Carey v. B. By., 1 Cush. 475 397
C, B. & Q. B. B. v. George, 19
111. 510 275, 439
v. Hazzaid, 26 111. 373 288, 292
v.Iowa, 94 U.S. 161 4, 5
Dougherty v., 86 111. 467
265, 427
Lalor v., 52 111. 401 350
Morris v., 45 Iowa 29
191,196, 469
v. Sykes, 96 111. 162, 2 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 254
287, 238
v. Warner, 108 111. 538, 18
Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 100
307, 378, 445
v. Van Patten, 74 111. 91 60
v. Dickson, 67 111. 122 411
v. Dickson, 63 111. 151, 7 Am.
By. Bep. 45 114
v. Gregory, 58 111. 272 308
v. Johnson, 103 111. 512, 8
Am. & Eng. B. B. Cas.
225 425, 432
v. Stumpfs, 55 111. 367 427
.v. Stumps, 69 111. 409 73
Sevmour v., 3 Biss. 43 139, 254
Gould v., 66 Iowa 590, 22
Am. & Eng. B. B. Cas.
289 308
Hazzard v., 1 Biss. 503 288
v. Avery, 109 111. 314, 17
Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas.
649 313, 329
Clark v., 92 111. 43 342
v. Dickson, 88 111. 431 151, 427
C, B. & Q. E. E. v. Dunn, 52 111.
45 J 151
v. Dougherty, 110111.521,19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 292 162
v. Dewey, 26 111. 255 260, 283
v. Lee, 60 111. 501 420
C. B. U. P. By., McQueen v., 30
Kans. 689, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. B. Cas. 226 211, 307
v. Henigh, 23 Kans. 347 73
C. B. E. E. v. Phillippi, 20 Kans.
12 160
C, C, C. & I. E. E., Lary v., 78
Ind. 323, 3 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas 498 177, 190
v. Newell, 75 Ind. 542, 8 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 377
240, 275, 276, 439
v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461,
8 Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas.
371 136, 240, 243, 276, 440
Kerwhacker v., 3 Ohio St. 172
54,65
C. C. E. E. v. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499
329, 379
v. Martin, 7 Colo. , 17 Am.
& Eng. B. E. Cas. 592 367
v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197, 8 Am.
&Eng. E. B. Cas. 410 54
Ward v., 19 Shand (S. C.)
521, 16 Am & Eng. E. B.
Cas. 356 274
Hinckley v., 120 Mass. 262, 436
v. McMahon, 103 111. 485, 8
Am. & Eng. B. B. Cas. 68
111,423
v. Mumford, 97 111. 560, 3
Am.& Eng. B. B. Cas. 312
274, 291
Summers v., 34 La. An. 139 285
Fitts v., 59 Wise. 325, 15 Am.
& Eng. B. B. Cas. 462 454
C. C. S. N. Co., Yeomans v., 44
Cal. 71 216
C, C. & C. E. E. v. Terry, 8 Ohio
St. 570 75, 86
v. Mara, 26 Ohio St. 185 418
Bartram v., 11 Ohio St. 457 251
v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 254
324, 326, 370
O, C. & I. C. By. v. Manson, 30
Ohio St. 451 287
v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37 109,215,292
v. Troesch, 68 111. 545 307, 434
C, D. & M. By., Walter v., 39
Iowa 33 69
Chaffee v. E. & L. B. B., 104
Mass. 108 173, 257
Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Ma-
son 242 114
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXV11
Chamberlain v. M. & M. E. E.,
11 Wise. 238 216, 355, 369
Chambers. I. C. E. E. v., 71 111.
519 265
Clark v., 3 Q. B. D. 327
39, 95, 148, 187
Chandler, Chamberlain v., 3 Ma-
son 242 114
Chanslor, Lemon v., 6S Mo. 340
208, 235
Chaplin, Greenland v., 5 Ex. 243
12,82
Tucker v., 2 C. & K. N. P.
730, 61 E. C. L. 87
Chapman v. Bothwell, 4 Jur. N.
S. 1181 489
v. E. Ev., 55 N. Y. 579 314
v. N. H". E.E., 19N.Y. 341 86
v. Bothwell, E. Bl. & E. 168,
96 E. C. L. 200
Charles v. Taylor, 3 C. P. D.
492 356
Chase v. M. C. E. E., 77 Me. 62,
19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
356 175, 444
Chenewith, L. & B. E. E. v., 52
Penna. St. 382 201,252,501
Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349 489
v. Bobbins, 2 Black 418 127
Bobbins v., 4 Wall. 657 127,412
Scammon v., 25 111. 424 122
v. Schollen, 75 111. 468 482, 489
Child v. Hearn, L. E. 9 Ex. 176
81,86
Chilton v. L. & C. By., 16 M. &
W. 212 99, 110
Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79
232 439
Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165' 394
C, H. & I. E. E. v. Eaton, 94
Ind. 474, 18 Am. & Eng.
E. K. Cas. 254 25, 467
Chant v. S. E. Ev., Weekly Notes
(Eng.) for 1866, p. 134 490
Charlton, t. & P. Ey. v., 60 Tex.
397, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 350 309, 338, 342
Chickering, Marsh v., 101 N. Y.
396, 400 301, 373
C. H. & II. Ev. v. Moore, 59 Tex.
64, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas 745 91
City of Dublin Steam Packet Co.,
Fenton v., 8 A. & E. 835,
35 E. C. L. 103
C. I. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161
157, 158, 166, 169
C. I. Ey., Beatty v., 58 Iowa 242,
8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
210 148, 152, 155
C, I. By., Ferguson v., 58 Iowa
293, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 614 374, 376
Ford v., Iowa , 17 Am.
& Eng. It. E. Cas. 599 434
Kellow v., Iowa , 21
Am. & Eng, E. E. Cas.
485 276
Sloan v., 62 Iowa 728, 11
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
145 135
C, I. & B. E. E., Hagenlocker v.,
99 N. Y. 136 417
Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D.
327 39, 95, 148, 187
v. C, B. & Q. E. E., 92 111.
43 342
v. Frv. 8 Ohio St. 358 122, 127
Holmes v., 6 H. & N. 349, 7
H. &N. 937 300,329, 350,382
T. H. & I. E. E. v., 73 Ind.
168, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 84 159, 169
McCully v., 40 Penna. St.
399, 406 447, 448
Kieto v., 1 Clif. 145 114
v. P. & E. E. E., 5 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
119 190, 196, 434
v. 8th Ave. E. E., 36 N. Y.
135 290
v. E. & D. E. E., 78 Va. 709,
18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
78 302, 345
v. St. P. & S. C. E. E., 28
Minn. 128, 2 Am. & Eng.
E. R. Cas. 240 345
C & E. I. Ey. v., 108 111.
113,15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 261 346
v. B. & A. E. E., 128 Mass.
1, 1 Am. & Eng. B. E.
Cas. 134 375
C. L. E. E., Davis v., 10 How.
Pr. 300 213
Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B.
439, 64 E. C. L.
16, 17, 19, 54, 63
Clay St. Hill Co., Tompkins r.,9
Cal. , 18 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 144 86, 394
Clayton, Deane v., 7 Taunt. 489,
2 E. C. L. 183
Clemmons, H. & T. C. E. E. v.,
55 Tex. 88, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 396 286
Cleveland v. Speyer, 16 C. B. N.
S. 399, 111 E. C. L. 371
v. N. J. S. Co., 68 N. Y. 306
204, 213
xxvm
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Cliff v. M. Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B.
258 165, 166
Clough. Williams v., 3 H. & N.
258 300, 344
Packet Co. v., 20 Wall. 529
416, 509
Clussman v. L. I. R. E., 73 N. Y.
606 214, 253
Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E.
E., 56 N. Y. 44 314
Clotworthv, H. & St. J. E. E. v.,
80 Mo. 220, 21 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 371 263, 264
C, L. & C. E. E., Thompson v.,
54 Ind. 197 154
(X, M. & St. P. E. E., Abbett v.,
30 Minn. 482 436, 454
Brown v., 54 Wise. 342, 3
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
444 25, 27, 292, 467
Foss v., 33 Minn. 392, 19 Am.
& Eng. E. R. Cas. 113 224
Gumz v., 52 Wise. 672, 5
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 583
112, 383
Hoppe v., 61 Wise. 357, 19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 74
77, 197, 425
Kelly v., 53 Wise. 74, 5 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 469 344
Jenkins v ,41 Wise. 112 112, 209
Pool v., 53 Wise. 657, 56 Id.
227, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 332, 8 Id. 360
205, 210, 286, 305, 307, 376
v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377
324, 325, 326, 362, 369
Grethen v., U. S. C C. Dis-
trict of Minnesota, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 342 94, 192
Goldstein v., 46 Wise. 404 224
Holland v., 18 Fed. Rep. 243 375
Cunningham v., 17 Fed. Rep.
882, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 217 374, 376, 379
Bower v., 61 Wise. 457, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
301 169, 420
Louckst>., 31 Minn. 526, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
305 163, 169
Mantel v.. 33 Minn. 62, 19
Am. & Eng R. R. Cas.
362 168
M. St. Ry. v., 33 Minn. 62, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
362 168
Schofield v., 114 U. S. 615,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
353 169, 172
C, M. & St. P. R. R., Townley v.,
53 Wise. 626, 4 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 562 69, 179
Berg v., 50 Wise. 419, 2 Am
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 70 344
Cottrill v., 47 Wise. 634 379
Hogan v., 59 Wise. 139, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 439
74, 167, 454
Kelley v., 50 Wise. 381, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65 378
Luebke v., 59 Wise. 127, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
183 347
Muster v., 61 Wise. 325, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
113 102, 256, 299, 318, 443
Phillips v., 64 Wise. 475, 23
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
453 323
Peschel v., 62 Wise. 338, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
545 323, 338, 368
Schaefert v., 62 Iowa 624, 14
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
696 171
Smith v., 42 Wise. 520 235, 345
Walsh v., 42 Wise. 23 25, 466
Robinson v., 60 Wise. 320, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
391 373
Schultz v., 48 Wise. 375 330, 369
Thompson v., 18 Fed. Rep.
239 683
Kearns v., 66 Iowa 599, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
287 308
Ditberner v., 47 Wise. 138 192
Cockle v. L. & S. E. Ry., L. R. 5
C. P. 457, 7 Id. 331 266, 267
Coates, B. C. R. & N. R. R., 62
Iowa 487, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 265 346, 431
Cobb, I. & St. L. R. R. v., 68 111.
53 471
Cockrell, Francis v., L. R. 5 Q.
B. 184, 501 200, 201, 237
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond
918, 1 Sm. L. C 189 207, 231
Cole, Schall v., 107 Penna. St. 1
50, 301
Colegrove v. N. Y. & N. H. R.
R., 20 N. Y. 492, 6 Duer
382 86, 282, 287, 413
Coleman v. S. E. Ry., 4 H. & C.
699 277
v. Riches, 16 C. B. 104, 81
E. C L. 102
v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 106
Mass. 160 108
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXIX
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns.
45 470
Colgan v. W. P. P- Ry., 4 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
400 71
Collarn, O. & M. K. K. v., 73 rnd.
261, 5 Am. & Eng. K. R.
314, 315, 316, 330, 469, 470
Colder, Laing v., 8 Penna. St. 479
233, 473, 501
Collett v. L. & N. W. Ry., 16 Q.
B. 984, 71 E. C. L. 215
Collins, Harrison v., 86 Penna. St.
153 126
B. & E. Ry. v., 7 H. L. 194 137
v. E. T. V. & G. R. R., 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 841 493
L. & N. Ry. v., 2 Duvall 114
50, 327, 355, 370
v. Middle Level Commrs.,
L. R. 4 C. P. 279 39, 95
P. F. W. & C. R. R. v., 87
Penna. St. 405 190
v. St. P. & S. C. R. R., 30
Minn. 31, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 150 368
v. A. & S. R. R., 12 Barb. 492 282
Coleman, Jencks v., 2 Sumner
221 251
M. C. R. R. v., 28 Mich. 440
260, 264, 416
Collis v. Selden, L. R. 3 C. P.
495 177
Colver, Griffen v., 16 N. Y. 489 460
Cone v. P., L. & W. R. R., 81 N.
Y. 207, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 57 306, 337
Robinson v., 22 Vt. 213 91
Connelly v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R, 88 N. Y. 346, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R, Cas. 459 170
Connell, H. M. & F. Ry. v., 88
Penna. St. 520 188, 196
Condon, M. P. Ry. v., 78 Mo. 567,
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
563 330, 369
Conway v. B. & N. C. Ry., 9 Irish
C. L. 498 368
Commonwealth, Pierce v., 14
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 97 4
v. B. & M. R. R., 129 Mass.
500, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 457 214
P. & E. R. R. v., 80 Ky. 147,
10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
318 155
v. Power, 7 Mete. 596
v. Smith, 10 Allen 448 134
200
495
65
149
338
158
146
501
Commonwealth v. Vt. C. R. R.,
108 Mass. 7 216
Condon v. G., S. & W. Ry., 16
Irish C. L. 415 489
Connor v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 59
Mo. 285 316
Conroy, T., W. & W. R. R. v., 68
111. 560 240, 303, 305
v. Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 382
Conservators of the Thames,
Winch v., L. R. 9 C. P.
Cook, C. Ry. of N. J. v., 1 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
319
Mohney v., 26 Penna. St. 342
Cooke v. B. & L. R. R., 133 Mass.
185
Coombs r. N. B. Cordage Co., 102
Mass. 522
Coon v. S. & N. R. R., 5 N. Y.
492 323, 356, 368
P. R. R. v., 17 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 137
Coons, M. N. Co. v., 6 W. & S.
101
Cooper, Berry v., 28 Ga. 543
v. Butler, 103 Penna. St. 412,
14 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 278 373, 274
v. C. R. R., 44 Iowa 134
300, 301,316,418
v. E. T. Co., 75N.Y. 116 413
v. M. & P. R. R., 23 Wise.
668 315
v. P., C. & St. L. R. R, 24
W. Va. 37, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 564, note 330, 369
L. & N. R. R. v., Ky.
6 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 5 193
Copper v L., E. & St. L. Ry.,
Ind. , 22 Am. & *Eng.
R. R. Cas. 277 323, 368
Coolbroth v. M. C. R. R., 77 Me.
165, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 599 347
Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568,
98 E. C.L. 6,112,434
C. O. R. R., Timmon v., 6 Ohio
St. 105 376
Corson v. M. C. R. R., 76 Me.
244, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 634 315
Coyle, II. R. R. v., 55 Penna. St.
396 168, 416
Cox, Pearson v., 2 C. P. D. 369 122
I. C. R, R. v., 21 111. 20 368
Cowles v. R. & D. R. R., 84 N.
C. 309, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 90 303, 323, 324, 370
XXX
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Cogswell v. O. & C. E. E., 6 Ore-
gon 417 75
Conlon u. E. R. E., 135 Mass.
195, 1") Am. &Eng. E. E.
( 'as. 99 151
Conlan, Penna. Co. v., 101 111. 93,
ti Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
243 364, 426
Copeland, M. & C. E. E. v., 61
Ala. 376 266, 2S3
Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556,
93 E. C. L. 200
Corey v. N. P. By., 32 Minn. 457,
19 Am. &Eng. E. B. Cas.
352 151
Corcoran v. B. & A. E. E., 133
Mass. 507 299, 434, 442, 444
Cordell v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E.,
64 N.Y. 535, 70 Id. 119,
75 Id. 330 160, 171, 434
Copley v. N. H. & N. Co., 136
Mass. 6, 19 Am. & Eng.
B. E. Cas. 373 173
Costar, Harris v., 1 C. & P. 636,
HE. C. L. 232
Costello v. S. E. E. B., 65 Barb.
92 240
Coucb v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 77
E. C. L. 40
Coultas, P., B. I. & St. L. E. E.
v., 67 111. 398 284
Coupland v. Hardingham, 3
Camp. 398 148
Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y.
517 320
Cornman v. E. C. By., 4 H. & N.
78 25, 255, 257
Cottrell ». O, M. & St. P. By., 47
Wise. 634 379
Corlis v. W., ST. & E. E. E.,
N. H. , 21 Am. & Eng.
E. B. Cas. 208 406
Conway, P., W. & B. E. E. v., 17
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 429 496
Conn. Mut Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y.
& N. H. E. E., 25 Conn.
265 399
Oosgrove v. N. Y. C. & H. E. B.
B., 87 N. Y. 88, 6 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 35 160, 161
(Jollier, M. P. By. v., 62 Tex.
318, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 281 276
Commonwealth v. B. & L. B. B.,
134 Mass. 211 405
C. P. I. Co., Larmore v., 101 N.
Y. 391 177
C, P. & A. B. B. v. Curran, 19
Ohio St. 1 204, 502
C. P. Mfg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 111.
418 342
C, P., N. & E. E. E., Twomley
v., 69 N. Y. 158 62
C. P. E. E., MeQuilken v., 64 Cal.
463, 16 Am. & Eng. B. E.
Cas. 353 2o9
McQuilkin v., 50 Cal. 7 353
Kline v., 37 Cal. 400, 587 109
Durkee v., 56 Cal. 388 492
Sweeny v., 57 Cal. 15, 8 Am.
& Eng. K. E. Cas. 151 343, 344
Nekrbas v., 62 Cal. 320, 14
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
370 166
Bunting v., 14 Nev. 351, 6
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
282 427
C. P. By. v. Foxlev, 107 Penna.
St. 537 454
v. Swayne, 13 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 41 440
Cragin v. N. Y. C. E. E, 51 N.
Y. 64 502
Craker v. C. & N. W. By., 36
Wise. 657 114
C, E. I. & P. E. B. v. Bell, 70
111. 102 74, 171
McCorkle v., 61 Iowa 5">5,
18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
156 264, 265
McCarthy v., 18 Kans. 45 409
v. Huflman, 78 Mo. 50, 17
Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas.
625 314, 315, 318
Morris v., 65 Iowa 727, 19
Am.&Eng.E.B.Cas. 180 409
v. Doyle, 18 Kans. 58 314
Artz v., 34 Iowa 153 170
Beems v., 58 Iowa 150, 10
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
658 377
Brann v., 53 Iowa 595
303, 330, 369
Deppe v., 36 Iowa 52 383
Farley v., 42 Iowa 234, 56
Id. 337, 2 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 108 155, 375
Kroy v., 32 Iowa 357 373
Lindsey v., 64 Iowa 407, 18
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
179 264
Perigo v., 52 Iowa 276 373
v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697
168, 169, 172
v. Lewis, 109 111. 120, 19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
224 508
Schroeder v., 47 Iowa 375,
41 Id. 344 383, 424
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXI
C, R. I. & P. R. R., Simonson v.,
49 Iowa 19 431
Frandsen v., 36 Iowa 372 383
Hart v., 56 Iowa 166 161
Lombard v., 47 Iowa 494 383
Murphy v., 45 Iowa 661 436
Case v., 64 Iowa 762, 19 Am.
& Eng. K. R. Cas. 142 442
Baldwin v., 50 Iowa 680 309
Mever v., 57 Iowa 555, 8 Am.
& Eng. K. R. Cas. 527 302
Mayes v., 63 Iowa 562, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 527 306
Marron v., 59 Iowa 423, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
177 109, 115
Dunleavy v., Iowa , 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
542 112
Benton v., 55 Iowa 496 109
Bryant v., 63 Iowa 464, 16
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
335 114
Baird v., 55 Iowa 121, 13 N.
W. Rep. 731, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 128; 61
Iowa 359, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 75 305
Campbell v., 45 Iowa 76 377
Connor v., 59 Mo. 285 316
Hatfield v., 61 Iowa 434, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
153 48
Houser v., 60 Iowa 230, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
501 306
Johnson v., 58 Iowa 348, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
206 109, 115
Koontz v., 65 Iowa 224, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
85 305, 345
Goodwin v., 75 Mo. 73, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
460 158
O'Keefe v., 32 Iowa 467 60
Pringle v., 64 Iowa 613, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
91 381, 417
Payne v., 39 Iowa 523 86
Pence v, 63 Iowa 746, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
366 168, 172
Rasmusson v., 65 Iowa 236,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
54 349
Romick v., 62 Iowa 627, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
288 376
Carlin v., 337 Iowa 316 170
C, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Dignan, 56
111. 487 166
Funston v., 61 Iowa 452, 14
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
640 166, 169
Walters v., 41 Iowa 71 77, 195
Laverenz v., 56 Iowa 689, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
274 169, 170
Tuttle v., 42 Iowa 518 411,481
Tuttle v., 48 Iowa 236 275, 439
MeAra v., 52 111. 296 275
Allender v., 43 Iowa 276 288
Martensen v., 60 Iowa 705,
11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
233 376
Whitsett v., Iowa , 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
336 377
C. R. R., Steele v., 43 Iowa
109 375
v. Sears, 61 Ga. 279 379
Benton v., 42 Iowa 192 169
v. Feller, 84 Penna. St. 226
166, 169, 454
Harty v., 42 N. Y. 468 1G0
Lindsay v., 46 Ga. 447 417
Moore v., 47 Iowa 688 169
Perkins v., 44 N. H. 223 417
Thompson v., 54 Ga. 509 60
v. Dixon, 42 Ga. 327 283
v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207, 64 Id.
475, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 42 190, 192, 197, 443
v. Letcher, 69 Ala. 106, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
115 264, 265
Cooper v., 44 Iowa 134
300, 301, 316, 418
Berry v., 40 Iowa 564 470
v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461, 66 Id.
746 213, 261, 264
Murch v., 29 N. H. 9
138, 251, 292
Davis v., 60 Ga. 329 474
v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 177, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
145 305, 383
v. Kennev, 58 Ga. 485, 64
Id. 100, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 155 307
Kenney v., 61 Ga. 590 307
v. Armstrong, 49 Penna. St.
193, 52 Id. 282
56, 60, 221, 227, 372, 491
Black v., 10 La. An. 38 233
Kinney v., 32 K J. L. 407 502
MacDougall v., 63 Cal. 431,
12 Am. & Eng.R. R.Cas.
143 436
XXX11
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
C. R. R. v. Roach, 64 Ga. 635, 8
Am. & Eug. R. R. Cas. 79
15, 62, 376, 491
v.VanHorn, 38 N. J. L. 133
262, 266
v. Richards, 62 Ga. 306 431
Hulsencamp v., 37 Mo. 537 54
Williams v.. 43 Iowa 396
302, 303, 374, 376
York v., 3 Wall. 113 501
v. Sears, 66 Ga. 409 471
v. Cook, 1 Weeklv Notes of
Cases (Penna.)"319 495
Demuckt!., 103 U. S. Ill, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
309 409
Kinney a., 34 N. J. L. 513
208, 505
McNaughton v., 19 Ct. of
Sess. Ca. 271 357
Hard v., 32 Vt. 473 366
C. R. R. R., Randall v., 132
Mass. 269 169
Riley v., 135 Mass. 292, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
181 444
Lawless v., 136 Mass. 1, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
96 307. 329, 337, 369, 380
Allender v., 37 Iowa 264
213, 480
Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry., L.
R. 1 C. P. 300 258
Crassweller, Mitchell v., 13 C. B.
237, 76 E. C. L. 102, 104
Crater v. Bininger, 33 N. J. L.
512 460
Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Penna. St.
139
47, 56, 209, 250, 252, 287, 445
v. Fisher, 9 Ex. 472 470
Cregin v. B. C. R. R., 83 N. Y.
595 398, 481
Cremer v. Portland, 36 Wise. 92 47
Crickett, McManus v., 1 East
107 108, 112
Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 328
Crissey v. H. M. & F. Ry., 75
Penna. St. 83 68, 454
Crocheron v. N. S. S. I. Ferry, 56
N. Y. 656 258
Crocker, Kinsey v., 18 Wise. 74 163
Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590,
6E. C. L. 112, 113
Crook, S. Ex. Co. v., 44 Ala. 468 501
Crossan, Murphy v., 98 Penna.
St. 495 300
Crowley v. B. C. R. & N. R. R.,
65 Iowa 658, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 56 318
Crump, Jordin v., 8 M. & W.
782 183
Crutchfield v. R. & D. R. R., 78
N. C. 300, 76 Id. 320 337, 374
Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 319,
HE. C. L. 447
C. S. B. Co., McGinnis v., 49
Mich. 466, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 135
301, 302, 306, 338
C, St. L. & N. O. R. R. v. Doyle,
60 Miss. 977, 8 Am. &
Eng R.R. Cas. 171 366
Perkins v., 60 Miss. 726, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
242 292
Peniston v., 34 La. An. 777 254
v. Trotter, 61 Miss. 417, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
159 259, 434
v. Trotter, 60 Miss. 442 443
v. Scnrr, 59 Miss. 456, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 351 263, 471
Moore v., 59 Miss. 243, 9
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
401 416
C, St. P. & M. R. R., Jewel v.,
54 Wise. 610, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 379 265
C, St. P., M. & O. R. R, Ransom
v., 62 Wise. 178, I9Am.&
Eng. R. R. Cas. 16 160
v. Lundstrom, 16 Neb. 254,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
52S 370
Lawson v., 64 Wise. 447, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
249 205
C. St. Ry. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
30 54, 471, 472
C. S Co., Fairchild v., 13 Cal. 604 233
C. S. R. R., McKune v., Cal.
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
589, 21 Id. 539 322, 370, 377
Trask v., 63 Cal. 96, 11 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 192 365
McKinne v., Cal. , 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
539 323
C. S. N. Co., Leonard v., 84 N.
Y. 48 409
C. S. & M. S. R. R., Kinsley v.,
125 Mass. 54 243
Cubitt, Rapson v., 9 M. & W.
710 102, 122
Culhane v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 60 N. Y. 133 427
Culp v. A. & N. R. R., 17 Kans.
475 151
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXX111
PAOE
Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596 413
Cummings, G. T. Ry. v., 106 U.
S. 700 337
v. P., C. & St. L. Ey., 92
Penna. St. 82 229
Cunningham v. I. R. R., 51 Tex.
503 122
v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 17
Fed. Rep. 882, 12 Am. &
Eng. R R. Cas. 217
374, 376, 379
Wilson v., 3 Cal. 241 158
Curran, C. P. & A. R. R. v., 19
Ohio St. 1 204, 502
Currie, Murray v., L. R. 6 C. P.
24 102, 122
Curtis v. D. & M. R. R., 23 Wise.
152, 27 Id. 158 263, 264
v. R. & S. R. R., 18 N. Y.
534 38, 275, 434, 439, 440,
473, 474
Mulligan v., 100 Mass. 512 70
Cutter, K."P. R. R. v., 19 Ivans.
83 469
C. V. R. R., Davis v., 55 Vt. 84,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
173 34, 303, 305, 330, 369
v. Mangans. 61 Md. 53, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
182 264
v. Hughes, 11 Penna. St.
140 148
v. Myers; 55 Penna. St. 288
212, 371
Mann v., 55 Vt. 484, 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 620 156
Ryan v., 23 Penna. St. 384
211, 356, 367
Johnson v., 56 Vt. 707 106
Merrill v., 54 Vt. 200, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
680 222, 372
O. W. D. Ry.. Mills v., 105 111.
63, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 128 263, 274
C. & A. R. R. v. Baldauf, 16
Penna. St. 67 501
Foster v., 84 111. 164 376
v. Bonifield, 104 111. 223, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 443
264, 364
v. Shannon, 43 111. 338 301, 482
Farnham v., 55 Penna. St. 62 501
v. Mock, 88 111. 87 434
v. Gretzner, 46111. 76 54, 427
v. Rush, 84 111 570 374, 376
v. Hoosey, 99 Penna. 492, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 254 284
v. Piatt, 89 111. 141 304, 307, 346
v. I'ondrum, 51 HI. 333, 54, 284
c
C. & A. R. R. v. Robinson, 106
111. 142, 13 Am.&Eng.R.
R. Cas. 620, 19 Id. 396
162, 427, 431
v. Wilson, 63 111. 167 256
v. Sullivan, 63 111. 293 314
v. Flagg, 43 111. 364 108, 251
People v., 67 111. 118 155
v. Garvey, 58 111. S3 166
v. McLaughlin, 47 111. 265 188
v. Hogarth, 38 111. 370 193
v. Randolph, 53 111. 510 288
v. Munroe, 85 111. 25 373
v. Becker, 76 111. 25 74
v. May, 108 111. 288, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R, Cas. 320 322
v. Keefe, 47 111. 108 367
v. Murphy, 53 111. 336 368
Gregory o, 58 111. 226 69,76
C. & B. R. R. v. Michie, 83 111.
427 188, 208, 209
C. & B. St. Ry., Brown v., 49
Mich. 153, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 385 112, 434
C. & E. Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99
U. S. 645 145
C. & E. R. R. v. Flexman, 103 111.
546, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 354 114
C. & E. I. R.R. v. Geary, 110 111.
383, IS Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 606 317, 368, 373
C. & G E. R. R., Brignoli v , 4
Daly 182 240, 275, 439
C. & G. R. R., Carter v., 19 Shand
(S. C.) 20, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 414 191, 454
v. Fay, 16 111. 568 292
C. & G. E."R. R. v. Harney, 28 Ind.
28 342, 350
C. & G. T. Ry., Batterson v., 49
Mich.*184, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 123 301, 304, 305, 346
Cartwright v., 52 Mich. 606,
16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
321 266
Hilts v., 55 Mich. 437, 17 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 628 315
Mitchell v., 51 Mich. 236, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 176
262, 265, 270, 434, 443
Piquegno v., 52 Mich. 40,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
210 344
C. & I. R. R. v. Russell, 91 111.
298 308
C. & I. C. R. R. v. Farrell, 31 Ind.
408 103, 253, 262, 266, 467
C. & II. Ry., Grote v., 2 Ex. 251
217, 236, 237, 240
X xxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
C. & N. W. E. R., Bass, v., 36
Wise. 450, 39 Id. 636, 42
Id. 654 113, 251, 416
Ballou v., 54 Wise. 257, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
480 307, 309, 346
Delie v., 51 Wise. 400 28, 473
v. Button, 63 111. 409 411
v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 112, 350
Johnson v., 49 Wise. 529, 1
Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 155 69
Ewen v., 38 Wise. 614 69, 76
Johnson v., 56 Wise. 274, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 47 1 69
Willoucrhby v., 37 Iowa 432 434
Woodward v., 23 Wise. 400 490
Sweet v., 45 111. 197 4S2
v. Miller, 46 Mich. 532, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 89 75, 169
Dewey v., 31 Iowa 373 88
Craker v., 36 Wise. 657 114
Dimick v., 80 111. 338 166
Hoye v., 62 Wise 666, 1 9 Am.
& Eng.R. R. Cas. 347 168, 454
Griswold v., Wise. , 23
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
463 220
Marqnetce v., 33 Iowa 562 109
McKinley v., 44 Iowa 314 114
Quaife v.', 48 Wise. 513 254
Davis v., 18 Wise. 175
263, 264, 265
Bessex v., 45 Wise. 477 308
Stetler, 49 Wise. 609 138
Davis v., 58 Wise. 646, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 424 179
v. Dimick, 96 111. 42, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 201 169
Duffy v., 32 Wise. 269 169
Fowler v., 61 Wise. 169, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas- 536
346, 369
Hunt v., 26 Iowa 363 356
v. Jackson, 55 111. 492 304, 329
Skellenger v., 61 Iowa 714, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206 346
v. Tavlor, 69 111. 461 319
Ryan v., 60 111. 171 330, 369
v. Whitton. 13 Wall. 270 409
W T edgwood v., 44 Wise. 44, 41
Id. 478 300, 307
v. Ward, 61 111. 130 345
v. Miranda, 108 111. 576, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 564 364
v. Moranda, 93 111 302 370
Bel air v., 43 Iowa 662 377
Haley v., 21 Iowa 15 26
Potter^., 21 Wise. 372, 22 Id.
615 60, 489
v. Fillmore, 57 111. 265 253, 416
C. & N. W. R. R., Allison v., 42
Iowa 274 29, 292, 421
Flanagan v., 45 Wise. 98, 50
LI. 462, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 150 302, 307, 345
Foley v., 48 Mich. 622, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
161 344
v. Donahue, 75 111. 106
318, 344, 373
Hartwig v., 49 Wise. 358, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
65 253
Heine v., 58 Wise. 528 327, 366
Lockwood v., 51 Wise. 50, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
151 318, 374, 376
v. Smith, 46 Mich. 504, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
535 112, 188, 189, 434
McDonald v., 26 Iowa 124,
29 Id. 170
250, 251, 254, 273, 431
Naylor v., 53 Wise. 661, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
460 343, 349
Patten v., 32 Wise. 524, 36
Id. 413 254
Roberts v., 35 Wise. 679
156, 166
v. Scates, 90 111. 586 254
v. Sweeny, 52 111. 330 60, 173
Jucker v., 52 Wise. 150, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 41 28
Brabbitts v., 38 Wise. _!S9 356
Pease v., 61 Wise. 163, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
527 327, 338, 346, 366
C. & G. T. R. R., Rhodes v.,
Mich. , 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 659 154, 427
Keyser v., Mich. , 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 91
196. 198
C. & G. E. R. R., Marshall v., 48
111. 475 418
C. & I., C. C. R. R. v. Arnold,
31 Ind. 174 306, 366
C. & M. R. R., Imhoff v., 20
Wise. 314 215, 263
C. & W. M. Ry., Maltby v., 52
Mich. 108,13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 606 156
C. & R. I. R. R. v. McKean, 40
111. 218 173
C. & T, R. R., Simmons v., 110
111. 340, 18 Am. & Eng.R.
R. Cas. 50 349
Manville v., 11 Ohio St.
417 368
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXV
C & P. R. R. v. Rowan, 66
Penna. St. 393 174, 407,
436, 444, 492, 493, 495
v. The State, 44 Md. 283 306
v. Speer, 56 Penna. St. 325 146
v. Sutherland, 19 Ohio St. 151 74
Beard i\, 48 Vt. 101 254
Wakefield v., 37 Vt. 330 161
C. & P. S. Ferry Co. v. Monaghan,
10 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 46 282, 440
C. & R. I. R. R. v. Rung, 104 111.
641, 11 Am. &Eng. R. R.
Cas. 218 306
v. Clark, 108 111. 113, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R, Cas. 261 346
v. Whipple. 22 111. 105 133, 141
C. & St. L. R. R. v. Woosley, 85
111. 370 127
C. & St. P. R. R. v. McCarthy, 20
111. 385 133, 141
C. & S. Ry., Hughes v., 39 Ohio
St. 461, 15 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 100, and note 122, 125
C & Y. Ry., Burns v., 13 C. L.
(N. S.) 543 237
C. & X. R. R. v. Webb, 12 Ohio
St. 475 335, 343, 367
Daggett v. I. C. R. R., 34 Iowa
284 283, 374
Dahl v. M. C. Rv., 62 Wise. 652,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
121 76
Dahlberg v. M. St. Rv., 32 Minn.
404, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 202 285
Dale v. D. L. & W. R. R., 73 N.
Y. 468 284, 422
v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R.,
63 Mo. 455 303, 375
Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740 129
v. S. E. Ry., 4 C. B. N. S.
296, 93 E. C. L. 488, 493
Dallas v. G. C. & S. F. R. R., 61
Tex. 196, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 575 368
Daley v. N. & W. R. R., 26 Conn.
591 91
Dalyell v. Tyrer, El. Bl. & El.
890, 96 E. C. L., 28 L. J.
Q. B. 25 103, 217
Damont v. N. O. & C. R. R., 9
La. An. 441 _ 63, 265
Daniel v. Metropolitan Ry., L.
R. 3 C P. 216, 591, 5 H.
L. 45 38, 129, 434, 442
Daniells v. Potter, 4 C. & P. 262,
19 E. C. L. 39, 95, 187
Dames, Indermaur v., L. R. 1 C.
P. 272, 2 id. 311 200
Davey v. L. & S. W. Rv., 11 Q.
B. D. 213, 12 Id.' 73 172, 436
Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St.
131 501
G. H. & S. A. R. R. v., 61
Tex. 204, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 431 277
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W.
546 51
Davis, Graham v., 4 Ohio St.
362 501
v. C. R. R.. 60 Ga. 329 474
v. C. L. R.R., 10 How. Pr.
300 213
v. C.V. R. R., 55 Vt. 84, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173
34, 303. 305, 330, 369
Morrison v., 20 Penna. St.
171 31
v. Duncan (U. S. C. C, So.
Dist. Miss.), 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 295 135, l3o
M. & W. R. R. v., 18 Ga. 679,
19 Id. 437 54
0.& M. R.R, v., 23 Ind. 553 135
v. O. & C. R. R., 8 Oregon
172 74, 420
v. C & N. W. Ry., 18 Wise.
175 263, 264, 26b
M. & W. R. R. v., 27 Ga.
113 60
v. N.Y. C. & H, R, R, R.,
47N.Y. 400 169
Davis v. C. & N. W. Rv., 58 Wise.
646, 15 Am. &Eng. R. R.
Cas. 424 179
Daugherty, N. Y., L. E. & W. R.
R. v., 11 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 437
240. 246, 274, 439
Dawson v. M. Ry., 7 H.& N. 1037
274, 439
v. L. & N. R. R., Kv. ,
11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
134 261
Dana, Montclair v., 107 U. S. 162 4.54
Daily v. N. Y. & N. H, R. R., 32
Conn. 356 418
Darlington, Lax v., 5 Ex. D. 35,
18, 63, 200
Darrigan v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R.,
52 Conn. 285, 23 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 438 323
Day v. Highland St. Ry., 135
Mass. 113, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 150 65
v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520 251
v. T., C, S. & D. Ry., 42
Mich. 523, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 126 346, 356
XXXVI
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Day v. Wood worth, 1 3 How. 371 47 1
Wilklns v., 12 Q. B. D. 110 490
v. B. C. R. R., 76 N. Y.
593 114
D. C S. Rv., Wood v., 52 Mich.
402," 19 Am. & Em*. R. R.
Cas. 129 115
Bowen v., 54 Mich. 496, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
131 150
Dean, Jar vis v., 3 Bing. 447, 11
E. C. L. 14S
Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489, 2
E. C. L. 1S3
Murphy v., 101 Mass. 466 436
Debevoise v. N. Y., L. E. & W.
R. R, 98 N. Y. 377 410
Decker, H. & B. T. R. R. v., 82
Penna. St. 119, 84 Id. 419
314, 330, 445, 491
De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich.
368 122
v. Jewett, 88 N.Y. 264, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 495
302, 305, 343, 345
Defries, Page v., 7 B. & S. 137 99
Degg v. Midland By., 1 II. & N.
773 212, 370, 371
De Graff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 76 N. Y. 125 235, 307, 373
Delamatyr v. M. & P. M. C. R.
R , 24 Wise. 578 264
Delahuntv, G. H. & S. A. R. R.
v., 53 Tex. 206, 4 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 628 306
Delie v. C. & N. W. Ry., 51 Wise.
400 28, 473
Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520
469, 470
Delanev, R., R. I. & St. L. R. R.
v., 82 111. 198 60, 490
Dennick v. C. R. R. of N. J., 103
U.S. Ill, 1 Am. & Ens.
R. R. Cas. 309 ~ 409
Demy v. Williams. 5 Allen 1 454
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 13 . Gray
481 31
Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W.
6 481
Deppe v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 36.
Iowa 52 383
Derrenbaeker v. L. V. R. R.. 87
N. Y. 636, 4 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas 624 306
Derbv, P. & R. R. R. v., 14 How.
469 99, 232, 233, 390
Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn.
253 233
Desotelle, Lyons v., 124 Mass.
387 65
PAGh
Dethick, Clavards v., 12 Q. B.
439, 64 E. C. L.
16, 17, 19, 54, 63
Devinney, P., F. W. & C. R. R.
v., 7 Ohio St. 197 356
Devitt v. P. R. R , 50 Mo. 302, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
533 302, 345
Dewey, C, B. & Q. R. R„ 26 111.
255 260, 283
v. C. & N. W. Ry., 31 Iowa
373 88
Dexter t>. Spear 4 Mason 115 468
Delamater, Probst v., 100 N. Y.
266 301
Depew, B. & O. R. R. v., 40 Ohio
St. 121, 12 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas 64 191, 224
Devo v. N. Y. C. R. R., 34 N. Y.
9 47
D., G., H & M. Ry., Young v.,
Mich. , 19 Am. &
Eng R. R. Cas. 417 151
D., H. & L. Ry., Taber v. t 71 N.
Y. 489 262
Dibbin, Hinton v., 2 Ad. & El. N.
S. 661, 42 E. C.L. 8
Dick v. I. C. & L. R. R., 38 Ohio
St 3S9, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
Cas. 101 370
Dickerson, O & M. R. R. v., 59
Ind. 317 474
Dickinson, Stone v , 5 Allen 29 394
«.N.E.Ev,2H & C. 735 492
v. P II. & N. R. R. W., 53
Mich. 43, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R Cas. 456, 18 N. W.
Rep. (Mich.) 553 275, 285
Dietrich v. B & II S Ry , 58 Md.
347. 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 115 291, 416, 454
Dills, K. C Ry. v., 4 Bush. (Ky.)
593 54, 471
Ditchett v. St P., D. & P. M. R.
R,67N. Y. 425 133
Dixon v. Bell, 5 M & S. 198, 1
Stark 287, 2 E. C L. 39, 95
v. M Board of Works, 7 Q.
B. D. 418 34, 146
v. B. C. & N. R. R., 100 N.
Y. 171 275, 508
C. R. R. v., 42 Ga. 327 283
Dickson, C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 67
111. 122 411
C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 63 111.
151,7 Am. Ry. Rep. 45 114
C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 88 111.
431 151, 427
Dietrich v. P. R. R., 71 Penna. St.
432 215
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxxvu
Dillave v. N. Y. C. E. R., 56
Barb. 30 253
Diehl, U. P. K. K. v., 33 Kans.
422, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas 350 2G4
Disher v. N. Y. C. & H. B. R. R.,
94 N. Y. 622, 15 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 233 301, 307
District of Columbia v. B. & P. E.
E., 4 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 179 412
o. McElligott, 117 U, S. 621 382
Ditberner v. C, M. & St. P. Ry.,
47 Wise. 138 192
Dickie v. B. & A. E. E., 131 Mass.
516, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 203 149
Dignan, C, E. I. & P. E. E, v.,
56 111. 487 166
Dill, G. & C. E. E. E. v., 22 111.
264 157
Dimick v. C. & N. W. Ey., 80 111.
338 ' 166
C. & N. W. Ey. v., 96 111. 42,
2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
201 169
D., L. & W. E. E., Baylor v., 40
N. J. L. 23 302, 345
Cone v., 81 N. Y. 207, 2 Am.
& Eng. R, E. Cas. 57 306, 337
Dale v., 73 N. Y. 468 284, 422
v. Naphevs, 90 Penna. St.
135, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 52 270, 271, 443
Eaton v., 57 N. Y. 382 210, 445
v. Mulberrin, 44 Penna. St.
375, 81 Id. 366 190, 227, 228
Eeeves v., 30 Penna. St. 454
55, 60
Bounds v., 64 N. Y. 137 114
Wasmer v., 80 N. Y. 212, 1
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
122 48, 156
Woodbridge v., 105 Penna.
St. 460, 16 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 55 35, 196
Thomas v., 19 Blatchf. 533 166
Bonnell v., 39 N. J. L. 189 169
D., L. & L. M. Ey., Lvon v., 31
Mich. 429 378
D., M. V. E. E., Eose v., 39 Iowa
246 208, 384, 502
Hamilton v., 36 Iowa 31 346
Doak, L. & B. E. E. v., 52
Penna. St. 379 246
Dobbin v. R. & D. E. E., 81 N.
C. 446 323, 370
Dobiecki v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 203,
8 Am. & Eng E. E. < as.
485 254, 256
Dolan, M. C. E. ft. v., 32 Mich.
510 314,356
v. D. & H. C. Co., 71 N. Y.
285 163
Donahue C. & N. W. Ev. »., 75
111. 106 3*18, 344, 373
G., H. & S. A. E. E. v., 56
Tex. 162, 9 Am. & Eng.
.E. E. Cas. 287 112
P., A. & M. P. Ey. v., 70
Penna. St. 119 109, 115
Donaldson, Bussy »., 4 Dall.
206 468
v. M. & M. E. E., 18 Iowa
280 431,432,493
Dorr v. N. J. S. N. Co., 4 Sandf.
S. C. 136 501
Dorsey v. P. & C. C. Co., 42 Wise.
583 308
Doss v. M., K. & T. E. E., 59
Mo. 37, 8 Am. Ev. Rep.
462 2*20, 264, 471
Dowell r. B. C. R, & N. Ry., 62
Iowa 629, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 153 434
v. V. & M. R. R., 61 Miss.
519, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 42 318, 376
v. G. S. Nav. Co., 5 E. & B.
195, 85 E. C. L. 52, 54
Downer, W. T. Co. v.. 11 Wall.
129 438
Downie v. Hendrie, 46 Mich.
49S, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 386 291
Downey, I. C. R. R. v., 18 111.
259 112, 115
Doyle, C, St. L. & N. O. R. R. v.,
60 Miss. 977, 8 Am. &
En^. R. R. Cas. 171 366
I. & G. N. Ry. v., 49 Tex.
190 307
Donovan, Batson v., 4 B. & Aid.
39 49S
Doyle, C, R. I. & P. Ry. v., 18
Kans. 58 314
Dougherty v. C, B. & Q. R. R.,
86 111. 467 265
C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 110 111.
521, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 292 162, 427
v. M. R. R., 81 Mo. 325, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
497 282, 440
Doughty v. L. D. Co., 76 Me. 143 356
Douglass, Manzoni »., 6 Q. B. D.
145 434
Dowling v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R.. 90 N. Y. 670, 1 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 73 69
xxxvin
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Drayton v. N. P. R. R, 10
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 55 152
Drew v. Peer, 93 Penna. St. 234 389
v. New River Co., 6 C. & P.
754, 25 E. C. L. 148
v. Sixth Ave. R R, 26 N.
Y. 49 489
Drvburgh, N. Y. & W. Tel. Co.
v., 33 Penna. St. 298 99
Dry mala v. Thompson, 26 Minn.
40 305, 329, 330
Drysdale, W. & A. R. R. v., 51
Ga. 644 474
D., S. P. & P. R. R. v. Pickard,
8 Colo. 163, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 286 n. 264, 265
Wilson v., 1 Colo. 101, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 192 319
v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1 431
D. Turnpike Co. v. Stewart, 2
Mete. (Ky.) 119 86
Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. &
N. 653 486, 488
Duggan, E., T. V. & G. R. R. v.,
51 Ga. 212 416
Duff v. A. V. R. R-, 91 Penna.
St. 458 188, 189, 196,208,
209, 217, 288
v. Budd, 3 Brod. & B. 177, 7
E. C. L. 7
v. G. N. Ry., 4 Irish Law
Rep. 17^ 501
Duffy v. C. & N. W.Ry , 32 Wise.
269 169
Duffey, L. R. & F. S. R. R. v., 35
Ark. 602, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 607 301, 349
Duffield, E., T V. & G. R. R. v.,
12 Lea(Tenn.)63, 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 35 3S2
Dunbar, O. & M. R. R. v., 20 111.
623 141
Duncan, Davis v. (U. S. C. C. So.
Diet. Miss), 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 295 135, 136
Morse v. (U. S. C. C. So. Dist.
Miss.), 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 374 466
E. & C. R. R. v., 28 Ind. 441
265, 270
Dunk, Weller v., 4 F. & F. 298 148
Dunham, H. & T. C. Ry. v., 49
Tex. 187 303
Dunn v. G. T. Ry., 58 Me. 187
210, 233, 286, 292
P., F. W. & C. Ry v., 56
Penna. St. 280 155,156,163
A. &G. W.R. H.v., 19 Ohio
St. 162 471
PAtiS
Dunn v. B. Canal Co., L. R. 7 Q.
B. 244, 8 Id. 4'. 14C
C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 52 111.
451 151
Durgin v. Munson, 9 Allen 396 3U5
Durkee v. C. P. R. R., 56 Cal.
388 492
Durkin v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 225,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
520 305, 330
T., W. & W. Ry. v., 76 111.
395 356
Dunkin, L., N. A. & C. Ry. v., 92
Ind. 601, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. ( as. 422 108, 189
Dunleavy v. C, R. I- & P. Ry.,
Iowa , 21 Am. &
Ens. R. R. Cas. 542 112
Dun v. S. & R. R. R-, 78 Va. 645,
16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
363 284
D., W. & P. Ry., Struthers v., 87
Penna. St. 282 146
D., W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, 3
App. Cas. 1155 174, 180,
260, 427. 436, 448, 452, 454, 457
Dyke v. E. R. R, 45 N. Y. 113 497
Dynen v. Leach, 26 L. J. Ex.
221 373
Dyer v. E. R. R , 71 N. Y. 228 86
D. & B. J. Ry., Huey v., 5 Irish C.
L. 206 373
D. & W. Ry., Scott v., 11 Irish
Com. Law 377 54
v. Snicker, 61 Tex. 427, 21
Am.&Eng.R. R Cas. 160
240, 436, 491
D. & M. R. R., Curtis v., 23 Wise.
152. 27 Id. 158 263, 264
v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99 425
D. & S. C. R. R , Greenleaf v., 33
Iowa 52 373
D. & II. C. Co., Barringer v., 19
Hun. 216 307, 368
Mann v., 91 N. Y. 495 12
Am. &Eng. R.R. Cas.199
314, 315, 320, 329, 332
v. Carroll, 89 Penna. St. 374
320 321, 323
Massoth v., 64 N. Y. 531 159
Dolanw., 71 N. Y. 285 163
Salter i-., 3 Hun. (N.Y.) 338 422
D. & R. Canal Co., Black v., 22 N.
J. Eq. 130 133
D. & R G. Ry. v. Harris, New
Mex. , 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 142 111
D. & S. W. R. R., Fry v., 45 Iowa
416 473
Starry v., 51 Iowa 419 436
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXIX
D. AS. E. E.K., State v., 36 Ohio
St. 436, 5 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 312 155
D. & N. R. R., Zeigler v., 52 Conn.
543, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 400 222
Earl of Anglesea, Annesley v., 17
How St. Tr. 1139 423
Earl of Dudley, Griffiths v., 9 Q.
B. D. 357 383, 410, 509
E. A. R. R., Whitaker v., 51 N.
Y.295 416
East Boston Ferry Co., Le Baron
v., 11 Allen 312 246, 442
Eastern R. R., Tyrrell v., Ill
Mass. 546
Eaton v. B. & L. R.R., 11 Allen,
500 86, 95, 139
D. L. & W. R. R., 57 N. Y.
382 210, 445
C. H. & I. R. R. v., 94 Ind.
474, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 254 25, 467
v. F. R. R., 129 Mass. 364, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
183 162, 163
Eakin, ST. & C. R. R. v., 6 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 582 409
Eames v. T. & N. O. R. R., 63
Tex. 660, 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 540 27
Eagan «>. F. R. R., 101 Mass.
315 169
Eckert v. L. I. Rv., 43 N. Y. 502
37, 50
E. C. Ry. v. Broom, 6 Ex 314
99, 110, 112, 113
i Corman v., 4 H. & N. 78
25, 255, 257
Manser v., 3 L. T. N. S. 585
237, 238, 240
Singleton v., 7 C. B. N. S.
287, 97 E. C. L. 94, 195, 196
Skip v., 9 Ex. 223 318, 373
Stokes v., 2 F. & F. 691 238
G. N. Rv. v., 9 Hare 306 133
Eden v. L. & F. R. R., 14 B.
Monr. 204 397
Edgar v. N. By., 4 Ont. (Can.)
201, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 347, 11 Ont. Apt). 452,
22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
433 262, 264, 266
Edgar, C. & E. Spring Co. v., 99
U.S. 645 145
Edgerton v. N. Y. C& H. R. R. R.,
39 N. Y. 227 274. 286, 292, 439
Edgelev, Sly v., 6 Esp. 6 120
Edwards r. L. .V- N. W. Ry., L. R.
5 C. P. 445 110,112
Egbert, Adams Ex. Co. v., 36
Penna. St. 360 460
Egerton, Gautret v., L. R. 2 C. P.
374 177
Elirgott v. The Mayor, 96 N. Y.
264 473
Eighth Ave. R. R., Clark v., 36
N. Y. 135 290
Sandford v., 23 N. Y. 343 50, 109
Eldredge v. M. cV St. L. R. R.,
32 Minn. 253, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 404 443
Elkins v. B. & A. R. R., 115
Mass. 190 69
Ellet v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry.,
76 Mo. 518, 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 183 34, 277
Elliott v. St. L. & I. M. R. R.,
67 Mo. 272 314
W. Ry. v., 9« III. 481, 4 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 651
305, 307, 345, 364
v. Hall, 15 Q. B. D. 315 202
Ellis v. Sheffield G. C. Co., 2 E.
& B. 767, 75 E. C. L. 127
v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R, R,,
95 N. Y. 546, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 641
303, 307, 337
v. L. &S.W. Ry., 2H.&N.
424 47
v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 9 C. P.
551 428
Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 575,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
300 305, 337
Elv v. St. L., K. O & N. Ry., 77
Mo. 34, 16 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas 342 32, 422
Emblen v. Myers, 6 H. & N.
54 471
Emerson v. N. N. Co., 2 Ont.
(Can.) 528 110
Empire Trans. Co v. Wamsntta
Oil Co., 63 Penna. St. 14 501
England, Feltham v., 7 B. & S.
676 (L. R. 1 Q. B 33);
2 Id. 33 320, 323, 324
English Joint Stock Bank, Bar-
wick v., L. R. 2 Ex. 259 106
Entwistle v. Fergner, 60 Mo. 214 417
Eppendorf v. B. C. R. R., 69 N.
Y. 195 291
Ernst v. H. R. R., 39 N. Y. 61 173
Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Penna. St.
247 122, 125
E. R. R., Blair v., 66 N. Y. 313
216, 502
Burrows v.. 63 N. Y. 556
103, 264
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
E. R. R., Green v., 11 Hun 333 257
Harper v., 32 N. J. L. 88, 3
Vroom 88 47,264
Knowlton v., 10 Ohio St.
260 501
Lyons v., 57 N. Y. 4S9 480
McGeary v., 135 Mass. 363,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
407 91
Morrison v., 56 N. Y. 302 103
Nicholson v., 41 N. Y. 525
40, 177, 178
Robertson v., 22 Barb. 91 283
Warner v., 44 N. Y. 465 434
Oilman v., 10 Allen 233, 13
Id. 433 314, 356, 368
Prescott v., 113 Mass. 370 153
Harvey v., 116 Mass. 269
260, 264
Dyer v., 71 N. Y. 228 86
Norten v., 113 Mass. 366 153
Keelcy v., 47 How. Pr. 256 38
Gibson v.. 63 N. Y. 449 343,
345, 378
Warner v., 39 N. Y. 468 298, 305
Chapman v., 55 N. Y. 579 314
Morrisey v., 126 Mass. 377 196
Truax v., 4 Lansing 198 216
Pollock v., 124 Mass. 158 153
Hodgkins v., 119 Mass. 419 303
Paulmier v., 5 Vroom 151
305, 337
Porter v., 3 Vroom 261 471
Smith v., 124 Mass. 154 134
Hanlan v., 114 Mass. 34 139
Ackerson v , 3 Vroom 254 471
Conlon v., 135 Mass. 195, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 99 151
Dyke v., 45 N. Y. 113 497
Plumtner v., 73 Me. 591, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
165 169
Faulkner v., 49 Barb. 324 305
Ervin, P.& R. R. R. v., 89 Penna.
St 71 42
Erwin, N. & C. R. R. v., Tenn.
, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R,
Cas. 465 15, 62, 286, 287
Essex Bank, Foster v., 17 Mass.
479 7
Estes, I. R. R. v., 96 111. 470 306
E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Fain, 12
Lea (Tenn.) 35, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. (as. 102 196
Haynes v., 3 Cold. (Tenn.)
222 355
Trollenger v., 11 Tenn. 533 251
v. Grurley, 12 Lea (Tenn.)
46, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 568 15, 62, 314, 366
E. T. V. & G. R. R., Collins v., 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 841 493
v. Duffield, 12 Lea (Tenn.)
63, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 35 382
v. Duggan, 51 Ga. 212 416
v. Smith, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 685
307, 374
v. Stewart, 13 Lea (Tenn.)
432, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 614 306
v. St. John, 5 Sneed (Tenn.)
524 196
v. Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.)
58, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 222 305, 378
v. Humphreys, 12 Lea
(Tenn.) 200. 15 Am. &
Eng. R, R. Cas. 472 196
v. Feathers, 10 Lea (Tenn.)
103, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 446 160
E. T. Co., Cooper v., 75 N. Y.
116 413
Evans v. P., F. W. & C. R. R. v.,
53 Penna. St. 250 457
Wray v., 80 Penna. St. 102 122
Evansich v. G. C. & S. F. R R.,
57 Tex. 123, 6 Am & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 182 69, 186
Everhart v. T. H. & I. R. R., 78
Ind. 292, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 599 212, 370, 371
Ewen v. C. & N. W. Ry., 38
Wise. 614 69, 76
Express Co. v. Kuntze, 8 Wall.
342 501
Eyles, Ravenscroft v., 2 Wils. 295 468
Eyster, W. U. T. Co. v., 91 U. S.
495, note 471
E. & C. R. R. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind.
102 37, 50
v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441 265, 270
v. Wolf, 59 Ind. 89 76
v. Banin, 26 Ind. 70 108
E. & N. R. R., Hanson v., 62
Me. 84 114
E. & N. A. R. R., State v., 67
Me. 479 134
Brown v., 58 Me. 384 91
E. & T. H. R. R. v. McKee, 99
Ind. 519, 22 Am. & Eng.
RR. Cas. 366 110
Faber v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 29
Minn. 465, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 277 160
Fain, E. T. V. & G. R. R. v., 12
J. B. Lea (Tenn.) 35, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
102 196
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xli
Fairchild t. C. S. Co., 13 Cal. 604 233
Fairrie. Wilkinson v., 1 H. & C.
633 177
Falkner v. G S. & W. Ey., 5 I.
C. L. 213 2S3
Fant, Pleasants v., 22 Wall. 121 453
Fairman v Lauman, 73 Ind. 568 470
Farnum, Ballou v., 9 Allen 47 135
Farnham v. C. & A. E. E., 55
Penna. St. 62 501
Farley v. C., E. I. & P. E. E., 42
Iowa 234, 56 Id. 337, 2
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 108
155 375
Farlow v. Kellv, 108 U. S. 288
274, 285
Farrell, C. & I. C. E. E. v., 31
Ind. 408
103, 253, 262, 266, 467
Faulkner, Potter v., 1 B. & S.
800, 101 E. C. L. 212, 370
v. E. Ey., 49 Barb. 324 305
Farwell v. B. & W. E. E., 4
Mete. 49, 1 Eedf. Am. Ey.
Cas. 395
350, 351, 356, 359, 363, 366
Favor v. B. & L. E. E., 114 Mass.
350 152
Fawcett v. P., C. & St. L. E. E.,
24 W. Va. 755, 19 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 1 11, 39
Fay, C. & G. E. E. v., 16 111. 568 292
v. M. & St. L. Ey., 30 Minn.
231, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 193 309, 330
Feathers, E. T. V. & G. E. E. v.,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 103, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
446 160
Felder v. L. C. & C E. E., 2
MacMullan 403 192
Feller, C. E. E. v., 84 Penna. St.
226 166, 169, 454
Feltham v. England, 7 B. & S.
676, L. E. 1 Q. B. 33. 2
Id. 33 320, 323, 324
Fenton v. City of Dublin Steam
Paeket Co., 8 A. & E. 835,
35 E. C. L. 103
Fergner, Entwistle v., 60 Mo. 214 417
Ferris, Blake v., 5 N. Y. 58 122
Fessler v. Love, 43 Penna. St.
313 460
Festal v. M. E. E., 109 Mass. 720
275, 439
Ferguson v. W. C. Ey., 63 Wise.
145, 19 Am. & En?. E. K,
Cas. 285 166, 173, 444
v. V. & T. E. E., 13 Nev.
184 155
Ferguson v. C. I. Ey., 58 Iowa 293,
5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
614 374 376,
Field, Huzzey v., 2 C. M. & E.
432 106
Fielding. Oakland Ey. v., 48
Penna. St. 320 68, 148, ?50
Fifield v. N. E. E., 42 N. H. 225
305, 344
Filbern, L. & N. E. E. v., 6 Bush.
(Kv.) 574 54
Filer v. JJ. Y. C. & H. E. E. E., 49
N. Y. 47, 59 Id. 351
18, 103, 264, 287,473
Fillmore, C. & N. E. E. v., 57 111.
265 253, 416
Fillibrowne v. G. T. Ev., 55 Me.
462 501
Finch, Walden v., 70 Penna. St.
400 201
Finney, M. & M. E. E. v., 10
Wise. 388 108, 416
v. N. P. Ev., Dak. ,
12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
17 454
Findlay, A. V. E. E. v.. 4 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
438 224
Finlavson, S. C. & P. Ev. v., 16
Neb. 272, 18 Am. '& Eng.
E. E. Cas. 68 306, 382, 424
Fitchburg E. E., Bucher v., 151
Mass. 156, 6 Am. & Eng.
E E. Cas. 212 65
Fitzgerald v. St. P., M. & M. E.
E., 29 Minn. 336, 8 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 310
28, 42, 91, 193
Fitzpatrick v. N. A. & S. E. E., 7
Ind. -J36 367
v. G. W. Ey., 12 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 645 29, 292
L. M. E. E. v., 42 Ohio St.
318, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 578 309,310,335,367
L. S. & M. S. E. E. v., 31
< Ohio St. 479 305
Fitzsimmons, K. C. Ry.w.,18 Kans.
34, 22 Id. 686," 15 Am. Ev.
Eep. 220 122, 186
F. I. Co., Carleton v., 99 Mass. 216 201
Fisher, Creed v., 9 Ex. 472 470
Fitts v. C. C. Ey., 59 W T isc. 325,
15 Am. (fe Eng. E. E. Cas.
462 454
Fix, L. E & W. Ev. v., 88 Ind.
381, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 109 25,467
Flagg, C. & A. E. E. v., 43 111.
364 108, 251
xlii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Flagler, Brownell v., 5 Hill 282 50
Flanders v. Meath 27 Cra. 858 74
Flanigan, I., B. &W.JEL. E. v., 77
111. 3(55 302, 303
Flanagan u. C. & N. W. Ey., 45
Wise. 98, 50 Id. 462, 2 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 150
302, 307, 345
Flexman, C. & E. E. E. v., 103
111. 546, 8 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 354 114
Fleming, L. & N. E. E. v., 14
Lea (Tenn.) 128, 18 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 347
25, 60, 250, 466
Fleck v. U. Ev., 134 Mass. 480, 16
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 372 290
Flemming v. St. P. & D. E. E.,
27 Minn. Ill 344
Fletcher v. Braddick, 5 Bos. &
Pul. 182 103
Bylands v., 3 H. & C. 774,
L. E. 1 Ex. 265, L. E. 3
II. L. 330 145
v. Tayleur, 17 C. B. 21, 84 E.
C. L. 460
Flinn, A. T. & S. F. E. E. v., 24
Ivans. 627, 1 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 240 35, 72
v. P., W. & B. E. E., 1
Houston (Del.) 469 205, 233
Flint v. N. & N. Y. T. Co., 34
Conn. 554 281
i>. N. & VV. E. E., 110 Mass.
222 152
Flower v. P. E. E., 69 Penna.
St. 210
74, 115, 188, 196, 288,370,371
Flike v. B. & A. E. E., 53 N. Y.
549 317, 322, 330
Fleytas v. P. E. E.. 18 La. An.
O S. 339 192
Flynn, K. C. St. J. & C. B. Ey.
v., 78 Mo. 195, 18 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 23
306, 382, 436, 444
F. L. & T. Co., Seaman v., 15
Wise. 578 489
Foley v. C. & N. W. Ey., 48
Mich. 622, 6 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 161 344
Foord, Smead v., 1 El. & EL 602,
102 E. C. L. 460
Ford v. L. & S. W. Ey., 2 F. &
F. 730 165, 246
v. C. I. E. E., Iowa ,
1 7 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
599 434
V. F. E. E., 110 Mass. 241
306, 329, 369, 382
Fordham v. B. & S. C. Ey., L. E.
3 C.-P. 368, 4 Id. 619 277
Forsdike v. Stone, L. E. 3 C. P.
607 476
Forrester, Butterheld v., 11 East
60 45, 47, 51
Fort, U. P. E. E. v., 17 Wall.
553 339, 350, 370
Forsyth v. B. & A. E. E., 103
Mass. 510 253, 254, 259
Forsythe, McCall v., 4 W. & S.
179 390, 394
Foster v Juniata Bridge Co., 16
Penna. St. 393 31
v. Fowler, 60 Penna. St. 27 4
v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479 7
Pittsburg Coal Co. v., 59
Penna. St. 365 460
N. C. & St. L. Ey. v.,
Tenn. , 11 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 180 335, 367
v. C & A. E. E., 84 111.
164 376
Foulkes v. M. Ey., 4 C.P. D. 267,
5 Id. 157
217, 218. 266, 269, 390
Fowler, H. & T. C. E. E. v., 56
Tex. 452, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 504. 32
Foster v., 60 Penna. St. 27 4
v. Locke, L. E. 7 C. P. 272,
9 Id. 751 n. 232
Priestley v., 3 M. & W. 1
296, 344, 350
v. B. & O. E. E., 18 W. Va.
579, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 480 180
v. C. & N. W. Ey., 61 Wise.
169, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 536 346
Fox, Wiggett v., 11 Ex. 832
342, 356
Knight v., 5 Ex. 721 122
H. & St. J. E. E. v., 31
Kans. 587, 15 Am. &Eng.
E. E. Cas. 325 370
Foy v. L. B. & S. C. Ev., 18 C. B.
N. S. 225, 114 E. C. L. 266
v. P. W. & B. E. E., 47 Md.
76 163
Fortescue, Batchelor v., 11 Q. B.
D. 474 177
Fortnev, P. E. E. v., 90 Penna.
St. 323, 1 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 129 174, 441. 454
Foss v. C. M. & St. P. E. E., 33
Minn. 392, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 113 224
Foxlev, C. P. Ey. v., 107 Penna.
St. 537 454
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xliii
Fraker v. St. P., M. & M. Ey., 32
Minn. 54, 15 Am & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 256.
323, 346, 368, 369
France, White v., L. R. 2 C. P.
D. 308 200
Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B.
184, 501 200, 201, 237
v. St. L. T. Co., 5 Mo. App.
Cas. 7 25, 466
Frandsen v. C, R. I. & P. R. R.,
36 Iowa 372 383
Franklin v. S. E. Ry., 3 H. & N.
211 487
Fray, U. P. Ry. v., 31 Kans. 739,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
158 378
Frazier v. P. R. R., 38 Penna. St.
104 313 314, 330, 356, 366, 373
Fredericks, T. W. & W. R. R. v.,
71 111. 294 301
Freemantle v. L. & N. W. Ry., 10
C. B. N. S. 95, 100 E. C.
L. 246, 247
Freeman, Overton v., 11 C. B. 867,
73 E C. L. 122
Freeman, St. L., I. M. & S.
Ry. v., 36 Ark. 41, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
608 91, 482
Freeman v. M. & St. L. Ry., 28
Minn 443, 7 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 410 133
Frelka, I. C. R. R. v., 110 111. 498,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
7 222, 470
French, Brown v., 14 Weekly
Notesof Cases (Penna.)412 112
Frey, Stockton v., 4 Gill 406 233
Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R.,
75 Mo. 595, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 280
77, 91, 1-57, 159, 167, 196,482
Fricsch v. Allegheny, 91 Penna.
St. 226 6
F. R. R., Holden v., 129 Mass.
268, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 94 306,363,367
Eaton v., 129 Mass. 364, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
183 162,163
Ford v., 110 Mass. 241
306, :'.29, 369,382
Moore v., 4 Gray 465 108
Snow v., 136 Mass. 552, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
161 102,255
White*., 136 Mass. 321, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
140 139, 233, 275
F. R. R., Warren v., 8 Allen 227
139,213,233, 257,2*7,436, 502
Titcomb ... 12 Allen 254 149
Tully v., 134 Mass. 499, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
682 169,425,429
Eagan v., 101 Mass. 315 169
v. Paue, 131 Mass. 391, 7 Am.
& Ens?. R. R. Cas. 86 180
F. Ry.. Jones v., L. R. 3 Q. B.
733 145
Frost v. G. T. R. R.,10 Allen 387
103, 270
Grizzle v., 3 F. & F. 622 320
Frederick, W. R. R. v., 71 111.
294 307
Fry, Clark v., 8 Ohio St. 358
122 127
v. D. & S. W. Ry., 45 Iowa
416 473
Fries v. Cameron, 4 Richardson
228 201
Friedman v. R. R , 7 Phila.
203 417
F. S. & P. V. Ry. v. Gibson, 96
Penna. St. 83 442
F. S. St. R. R., Ihl v., 47 N. Y.
317 70, 482, 489
F, S. & G. St. F. R. R. v. Haves,
97 N. T. 259, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 358 _ 291
Fuess, School District of Erie v.,
98 Penna. St. 600 122
Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46
300, 306, 329, 369
v. N.RE, 21 Conn. 557 263, 481
Fullerton, M. S. J". & A. R. R. v.,
14 C. B. N. S. 54, 108 E.
C. L. 151, 153
Furness Ey., McCawley v., L. R.
8 Q. B. 57 499
Furst v. S. A. R. R., 72 N. Y.
542 416
Funston v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 61
[owa 452, 14 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 640 166, 169
F. W. J. & S. Ry. r. Gildersleeve,
33 Mich. 133 303
F. & A. St. P. Ry. Co. v. Stutler,
54 Penna. St. 375 392, 413
F. & B. Turnpike Co. v. P. & T.
R. R., 54 Penn. St. 345
6, 146, 246
F. & P. M. By.v. Weir, 37 Mich.
Ill 208
Gilbert v., 51 Mich 488 152
Lewi-< v.,54 .Mich. 55, IS Am.
&En ? . E. R. Cas. 263 25, 466
0.WiIley,47 Mich. 88,5 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 305 156
xliv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
F. & P. Rv , Glassey v., 57 Penna.
St. 172 76
F. & W. R. R., Robinson v., 7
Gray 92 434
Gahagan o.B.& L.R. R.,1 Allen
187 283
Gale n. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R.,
70 N. Y. 594 470
Galena v. H. S. R. R., 13 Fed.
Rep. 116 114
Galentine, Penna. Co. v., 77 Ind.
320, 7 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 517 436
Gallagher, Haves v., 72 Penna.
St. 136 ' 148
v. Piper, 16 C. B. N S. 669,
111 E. C. L. 3-23,333,434
W. P. P. Ry. v., 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
413 68, 291
v. Humphrey, 6 L. T. N. S.
684 178
Penna. Co. v., 40 Ohio S..
637, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 341 222
Galliard v. L. & Y. Ry., 12 L.
T. 356 486, 491
Gallin v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R.
10 Q. B. 212 500
Gannon v. H. R. R., 112 Mass.
234 372
Gardiner, Birge v., 19 Conn. 507 91
Dengate v., 4 M. & W. 6 481
Gardner v. N. II. & N. R. R., 51
Conn. 143, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 170 18S, '208, 209
v. L. C. & D. Ry., L. R. 2
Ch. 201 • 132, 134
Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P.
374 177
Gasway v. A. & W. P. Ry., 58
Ga. 216 113, 114
Gas Lischt Co., Buesching v., 73
Mo. 229 436, 444
Gates v. S. M. R. R., 28 Minn.
110, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 237 31, 32, 300, 302,
303, 305
Gavett v. M. & L. R. R., 16 Gray
501 63, 265
Gay, Ware v., 11 Pick. 106 439
GaVnor v. O. C. & N. R. R , 100
.Mn.s. 208 17:;, 257, 266
Garcia, T. & P. Rv. v., 62 Tex. 285,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
384 205,210
Gartkmd v T. W. & W. Rv., 67
1)1. 498 338
Garvey, C. & A. R. R. v., 58 111.
83 166
G. A. Rv., Stein v., 10 Phila.
440 418
Galloway v. W. & A. R, R., 57
Ga. 512 510
G. C. & S. F. R. R., Evansich v.,
57 Tex. 123, 6 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 182 69, 186
Dallas v., 61 Tex. 196, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
575 368
Geary, C. & E. I. R. R. v., 110
111. 383, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 606 317, 368, 373
Gee v. Metropolitan Rv., L. R 8
Q. B. 161 i5, 63, 279, 280
v. L. & Y. Ry., 6 H. & N.
211 m 460, 462
Geese v, Stiles v., 71 Penna. St.
439 55, 60
Geddes v. M. R. R., 103 Mass.
391 282
George, C B. & Q. R. R. v., 19
111. 510 275, 439
v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 34
Ark. 613, 1 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 294 240, 275,
439, 503
v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex. 1 412
Gerard v. P. R. R., 12 Phila. 394,
5 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 251 229
G. E. Rv., Berringer v., 4 C. P.
D. 163 393
Pulling »., 9 Q. B.D.I 10 398
Read v., L. R. 2 Q. B. 555
410, 509
Richardson v., L. R. 10 C.
P. 486, 1 C. P. D. 342
238, 240, 309
Smith v., L. R. 2 C. P. 54 259
Gerety v. P. W. & B. R. R., 81
Penna. St. 274 88, 169
Geveke v. G. R. & I. Rv.,
Mich. , 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 551 151, 154, 474
G. H. & S. A. R. R. v. Bracken,
57 Tex. 71, 14 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 691 168
Burton v., 61 Tex. 526, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
218 123
v. Delahunty, 53 Tex. 206,
4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
628 306
v. Donahue, 56 Tex. 162, 9
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
287 112
Hamilton v., 54 Tex. 550. 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
528 341
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xlv
G. H. & S. A. E. E., v. Le Gierse,
51 Tex. 189 63, 264
v. Leinpe. 59 Tex. 19, 11
Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 201 349
v. Davidson. 61 Tex. 204,
21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
431 277
Gibbs, Mersey Docks Trustees ».,
3 H. & N. 164, 11 H. L.
C. 686, L. E. 1 H. L. 93
7,129,200,201,237,329
Giblin v. McMullen, L. E. 2 P. C.
335 454
Gibson v. Midland Ey., 2 Ont.
(Can.) 653 302, 345, 492
v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ey., 8
Mo. App. 488 151
F. B. & P. V. Ey. v., 96 Penna.
St. 83 442
v. E. Ey., 63 N. Y. 449
343, 345, 378
v. N. C. Ev., 22 Hun 289 335, 367
Gidlow, Griffiths v., 3H.&N.
648 373
Giles v. T. V. Ey., 2 El. & Bl. 822,
75 E. C."L. 445
Gill v. M. S. & L. Ev., L. E. 8 Q.
B. 186 217
Gilleland, P., F. W. & C. Ev. v.,
56 Penna. St. 445 31, 32
Gilshannon v. S. B. E. E,, 10
Cush. 228 211 356,368
Gillis v. P. E. E., 59 Penna. St.
139 177
Gilson v. J. C. H. Ey, 76 Mo.
282, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 132 235
Ardesco Oil Co. v., 63 Penna.
St. 146 122, 305
Gilmore, Beatty v., 16 Penna. St.
463 148
v. N. P. Ey., 18 Fed. Eep.
866, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 304 323,329,369
Oilman v. E. E. E., 10 Allen 233,
13 Id. 433 314, 356, 368
Gilbert, M. C. E. E. v., 46 Mich.
IT'l, 2 Am. & Eng. R. E.
Cas. 230 314
v. F. & P. M. Ev., 51 Mich.
488 152
I. .V G. N. R. R. v., 64 Tex.
536, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 405 467
Gi'lenv -iter v. M.& I. Ey., 5 Ind.
339 208
Gildersleeve, F. W. J. & S. Ey. v.,
33 Mich. 1 33 303
Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Penna.
St. 144 183, 196
PAGE
Ginna v. S. A. E. R., 67 1S.Y.
596 291
Ginther, McLeed i>., 80 Ky. 399,
8 Am. & Eng. K. K. Cas.
162, 15 Id. 291 317,355,416
Gillett, Osborn v., L. E, 8 Ex. 88 397
G. I. P. Ey., Martin v., L. E. 3
Ex. 9 217
Gilliam v. S. & N. A. E, E„ 70
Ala. 268, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 138 115
G. J. Ey., Bridge v, 3 M. & W.
244 45, 47, 51, 78, 86
Gladmon, W. & G. Ey. v., 15
Wall. 401 67, 68, 436
Glandine, Heil v., 42 Penna. St.
493 47, 56, 60
Glassev v. F. & P. Ev., 57
Penna. St. 172 76
Gleason, C. R. E. v , 69 Ga. 200 60
v. Bremen, 50 Me. 222 436
Glushing v. Sharp, 96 N. Y. 676,
19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
372 164
G. Mfg. Co., Gunter v., 18 S. C.
262 329
G. N. Ev., Duff v., 4 Irish Law
Eep. 178 501
Goff v., 3 E. & E. 672, 107
E. C. L. 445
Hamlin v., 1 H. & N. 408 460
v. Hanson, 10 Ex. 376 206,390
Harrison v., 3 H. & C. 231 39, 95
Leggott v., 1 Q. B. D. 599 401
Martin v., 16 C. B. 179, 81 E.
C. L. 48, 254
Pymr.,2B. &S.750, HOE.
C. L. ; 4 B. & S. 396, 116
E. C. L. 87, 482
Taylor v., L. E. 1 C. P. 385
39, 140
v. E. C. Ev., 9 Hare 306 133
Goddard, H. W. R. E. v., 25 Ind.
185 86, 157
v. G. T. Ey., 57 Me. 202 114, 471
Godlev, Carson v., 26 Penna. St.
"ill 200
v. Haggerty, 20 Penna. St.
387 200
Godding, Hamilton v., 55 Me. 428 65
Godfrey, I. C. E. E. v., 71 111. 500
177, 190, 197
Goff v. G. N. Ev., 3 E. & E. 672,
107 E. C. L. 445
Goldstein v. C, M. & St. P. Ey.,
46 Wise. 404 224
Goodchild, Eowning v., 2 W. Bl.
906 40
Goldev v. P. R. E., 30 Penna. St.
"242 205
xlvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Goodman v. KennelL 3 C. & P.
167, 14 E. C. L. 99
Goldthorpe v. Hardman, 13 M.&
W. 'Ml 148
Goodwin, Illidge v., 5 C. & P. 190,
2 l E. C. L. 39, 95, 148
v. C, R. L& P. K. R„ 75
Mo. 73, 1 1 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 469 158
Gorbett, H. & T. C. Rv. v., 49
Tex. 573 47, 60
Gordon v. G. St. & N. R. R., 40
Barb. 546 213
v. B. & M. R. R., 58 M . H. 396 421
v. Rolt, 4 Ex. 364 386, 388
Gormiey v, O. & M. Ry., 72 Ind.
31, 5 Am. & Eng. R R.
Cas. 531 368
Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch. 1 25 42
Gould v. McKeuna, 86 Penna. St.
297 31, 47
v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 66 Iowa
590 22 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 2S9 308
Gonzales v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R.,
50 How. Pr. 126 265
Gothard v. A. G. S. R. R., 67 Ala.
114 60,171
Gottleib v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R.
R., 29 Hun (N. Y.) 637,
100N.Y. 462 309,311
Goodfellow i>. B, H. & E. R. R.,
106 Mass. 461 179
Goodman, P. R. R. v., 62 Penna.
St. 329 157, 481, 490
Goetz, L., C. & L. R. R. v., 79
Ky. 442, 14 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 627 159
G. P. Rv- v. Brophy, 105 Penna.
St. 38, 16 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 361 285
v. Walling, 97 Penna. St. 55,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
20 290, 454
Grabel, T., W. & W. Ry. v., 88
111. 441 91
Gradin v. St, P. & D. Ry., 30
Minn. 217, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 644 209
Grabam, Davidson v., 2 Ohio St.
131 501
v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362 501
v. N. E. Ry., 18 C. B. N. S.
229, 114 E. C. L. 221,308,372
v. Pacific R. R., 66 Mo. 536 501
P. & O. Canal Co. v., 63
Penna. St. 290 148, 149, 473
T. H. & I. R. R v., 95 Ind.
286, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 77 ' 191, 193
C raliam v. G. W. Ry., 41 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 324 240
Gramlich u. Wurst, 86 Penna. St.
7 1 183, 196
Gray, H., M. & F. Ry. v., 3
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 421 68
v. P. & R. R. R. (U. S. C. C.
N. D. N. Y.), 22 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 351 86
v. Scott, 66 Penna. St. 345 68
Sharp v., 9 Bing. 457, 23 E.
C. L. 232
Green v. London Gen'l Omnibus
Co., 7 C. B. N. S. 290, 97
E. C. L. 99, 107
v. E. Ry., 11 Hun 333 257
M. & C. R. R. v., 52 Miss.
779 460
P. P. Ry. v., 56 Md. 84, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
168 212, 371
I. C. R. R. v., 81 111. 19 283
v. II. R. R. R., 2 Keyes (N.
Y.) 294 398
Green Bay Co., McArthur v., 34
Wise. 139 65
Greene, L. & N. R. R. v., Ky.
, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 95 192, 196
v.M.& St. L. Ry., 31 Minn.
248, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 214 306
Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243
12,82
Greenwood, Seymour v., 7 H. &
N. 354 107, 108
Greenwald v. M., H. & O. R. R.,
49 Mich. 197, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 133 338, 364, 367
Greany v. L. I. R. R., 101 N. Y.
419 427
Greenleaf v. I. C. R. R., 29 Iowa
14 373
v. D. & S. C. R. R., 33 Iowa
52 373
Gregory, C. & A. R. R. v., 58 111.
226 69
C. B. & Q. R R. v., 58 111.
272 308
v. Piper, 9 B.&C.591, 17 E.
C. L. 386, 387
Grethen v. C. M. & St. P. R. R.,
U. S. C. C. District of
Minn., 19 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 342 94, 192
Gretzner, C. & A. R. R. v., 46
111. 76 54, 427
Greer, Pittsburg v., 22 Penna. St.
54 39, 390
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xrvii
Grier v. Sampson, 27 Penna St.
183 148
Griffen v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489 460
Griffiths y. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q.
B. D. 357 383, 410, 509
v. Gidlow, 3 H. & N. 648 373
v. L. & St. K. Docks Co., 12
Q. B. D. 493, 13 Id. 259 344
Griffin, W. & T. P. R. P. v., 57
Penna. St. 417 135
Grizzle v. Frost, 3 F. & F. 622 320
Griggs, Christie v., 2 Camp. 79
232 439
_ v. Houston, 104 U. S. 553 ' 293
Grill v. Iron Screw C. Co., L. R.
1 C. P. 612 6, 8
Grote v. C. & H. Ry., 2 Ex. 251
217, 236, 237, 240
G. R. & I. Ry. v. Showers, 71 Ind.
451, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas 9 342
v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537
237, 276, 417, 426
v. Boyd, 65 Ind. 526 235, 240
Geveke v., Mich. , 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
551 151, 154, 474
G. R. R., Wright v., 34 Ga. 337 447
v. Thomas, 68 Ga. 744 151
v. Newsome. 60 Ga. 492, 66
Id. 57 151, 416
Baston v., 60 Ga. 340 190
v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645
15, 62, 376
Grush, T. W. & W. R. R. v., 67
111. 262 254
Grant, Twycross v., 4 C. P. D. 40 398
G. R. R. & B. Co. v. McCurdy,
45 Ga. 288 286, 2S7
v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410 375
G. R. & I. R. R., Haas v., 47
Mich. 401, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 268 163, 169, 171
Gruber v. W. & J. R. R.. 92 N.
C. 1, 21 Am.&Eng.R. R.
Cas. 438 43, 136, 275
Griswoldu. C. & N. W. Ry.,
Whc. , 23 Am. & Eng.
R.R. Cas. 463 220
Grows v. M. ('. R. K,, 67 Me. 100 171
G. S. Navigation Co.. Dowel! v.,
5 E.& B. 195,85 E. C. L.
52, 54
G.S. & V,'. By., Nichollsr., 7 Ir.
C. L. 40 262
Falkner v., 5 I. C. L. 213 283
G. St. &, N. R. R., Gordon v., 40
Mark 546 213
G. St. R. R. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala.
70 91
G. S. & W. Rv., Condon v , 16
Irish C. L. 415 489
G. T. Rv., Bennett v., 3 Ont. C.
P. D. 446, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 627 160, 161
v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 700 337
Dunn v., 58 Me. 187
210, 233, 286, 292
Fillibrowne v., 55 Me. 462 501
Holyoke v., 48 N. H. 541 421
Frost v., 10 Allen 387 103, 270
Goddard v., 57 Me. 202 114, 471
v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655
4, 205, 501, 503
Taylor v., 48 N. H. 229, 304
233, 418, 472
Torpy v., 20 Up. Can. (Q. B.)
446 211
"Williamson v., 17 Up. Can.
(C. P.) 615 . 25
Vars v., 23 Up. Can. (C. P.;
143 152
Paine v., 58 N. H. 611 156
Stott v., 24 Up. Can. (C. P.)
347 15 l
Worthen v., 125 Mass. 99 282
State v., 58 Me. 176 214, 436
Jewell v., 55 N. H. 84
103, 370, 371
Jones v., 45 Up. Can. (Q. B.)
193 38
Klanowski v., Mich. ,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
648 159, 427
Needham v., 38 Vt. 294 486
Peart v., 10 Ont. Ap. 191, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
239 160
Rosenberger v., 8 Ont. Ap.
482, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 448, 9 S. C. of Can.
311, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 8 160, 161
Gudger v. W. N. C. R. R., 87 N.
C. 325 150
Guinan, L. N. & G. S. R. R. v., 11
Lea(Tenn.)98 471
Gumz v. C. M & St. P. Ry , 52
Wise. 672, 5 Am. & En;?.
R. R. Cas. 583 1 2, 383
Gunter v. G. Mfg. Co., 18 S. C.
262 329
Oust, Hill v., 55 Ind. 45 338
Guthrie v. L. & N. R. R., 1 1 Lea
(Tenn.) 372, 15 Am &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 209 307
Gnrlev, E. T. V. & G. R. R. v.,
12 Lea (Tenn.) 46, 17
& Ent;-. R. R. ( 'as. 568
15, 62,31 :, 366
xlviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Guggenheim v. L. S. & M. S.
Ry., Mich. , 22 Am.
&Eng. R. R. Cas. 546 163, 447
Gullett. ( ). & M. R. R. v., 15 Ind.
487 256
G. W. Ry., Bird v., 28 L. J. Ex.
3 439
v. Blake, 7 II. & 1ST. 037 138
Bradburn v., L. R. 10 Ex. 1
474, 494
v. Braid, 1 Moo. P. C. N. S.
101, 9 Jur. N. S. 339
31, 32, 240, 440
Brown v., 40 Up. Can. Q. B.
333, 2 Ont. Ap. Cas. 64, 3
Can. S. C. 159 221
Hay v., 37 Up. Can. (Q. B.)
456 2S3
Burgess v., 6 C. B. K S. 923,
95 E. C. L 253
Haldan v., 30 Up. Can. (C.
P.) 89 265
Austin v., L. E. 2 Q. B. 442
205, 390
Fitzpatrick v., 12 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 645 29, 292
Purnell v. (mentioned by
Hellish L. J., in 2 C. P.
D. 210) 103
Siner v., L. R. 3 Ex. 150, 4
Id. 117 18, 21, 63, 270
Sutherland v., 7 Up. Can.
(C. P.) 409 502
Williams v., L. R. 9 Ex. 157
28,41
Woodger v., L. R. 2 C. P.
318 462
Wvatt v., 6 B. & S. 709, 118
E. C L. 34 L. J. (Q. B.)
204 20, 21, 37, 54, 63
Watkins v., 37 L. T. N. S.
193 259
James v., L. R. 2 C. P. 634,
note 165
Longmore v., 19 C. B. N. S.
183, 115 E C. L. 253
Nicholls v., 27 Up. Can. (Q.
B.) 382 86
v. Redmavne, L. R. 1 C. P.
329 * 460, 461
Graham v., 41 Up. Can. (Q.
B.) 324 240
Ellis v., L. R. 9 0. P. 551 423
G. W. R, R., Hawkins »., 17
Mich. 57, 18 Id. 427 502
v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 108
G. W. Cotton Co., Britten v., L.
R. 7 Ex. 130 41, 304
G. W. & S. Rv , Johnson v., 9
Irish Rep., C. L. 108 502
G. & C, St. P. By. r. Bresmer,
97 Penna. St. 103 349, 373
G. & C. U. R. R. v. Jacobs, 20
111. 478 60
G. & C. R. R. R. v. Dill, 22 111.
264 157
Haas v. G. R. & I. R. R, 47
Midi. 401, 8 Am. & Eng.
R.R. Cas. 268 163, 169, 171
Hacket, Little v., 116 U. S. 366 103
Hadlev v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 460
v. "Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P. 53 148
Hall, I., B. & W. R. R. v., 106
111. 371, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 146 277
I. C. R. R. v., 72 HI. 222 190
v. Johnson, 3 H. & C. 589 356
L. V. R. R. v., 61 Penna. St.
361 174, 441, 444
v. M. P. Ry., 74 Mo. 298, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
106 329, 369
v. N E. Ry., L. R. 10 Q. B.
437 500, 502
Elliott v., 15 Q. B. D. 315 202
v. Smith, 2 Bing. 156 122
v. N. J. S. N. Co., 15 Conn.
539 502
v. U. P. Ry., 16 Fed. Rep.
744 308
Hagan, P. & T. R. R. v., 47
Penna. St. 244 163, 174
Hagertv, Godley v., 20 Penna.
St. 387 200
Hahn v. S. P. Ry., 51 Cal. 605 152
Haynes, Adams Ex. Co. v., 42 111.
89 502
Haldan v. G. W. Ry., 30 Up.
Can. (C. P.) 89 265
Haley, M. P. Rv. v., 25 Kans. 35,
5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
594 299, 319, 383
Halloren, I. & G. N. R. R. v., 53
Tex. 46, 3 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 343
^ 31, 32, 233, 240, 246
Halm, ArSour v., Ill U. S. 313 356
Halli'day, Longmeid v., 6 Ex. •
731 412
Haley v. C. & N. W. R. R., 21
Iowa 15 26
Hallihan v. H. & St. J. R. R., 71
Mo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 117
35, 283, 299, 344, 374
Haigh, Marsdon v., 14 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
526 373
Hamlin v. G. N. Ry., 1 H. & N.
408 460
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xlix
Hamilton v. D. M. V. Ey., 36
Iowi St. 31 346
v. Godding, 55 Me. 428 65
v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72 460
v. Third Ave. E. E., 53 N.
Y. 25 471
v. N. Y. C. E. E., 51 N. Y.
100 416
v, G. H. & S. A. Ey., 54 Tex.
556, 4 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 528 341
v. T. & P. Ey., 64 Tex. 251,
21 Am. & "Eng. E. E. Cas.
336 220
Hammersley, O. & M. E. E. v.,
28 Ind. 371 76, 418
Hampton, H. & T. C. Ey. v., 64
Tex. 427, 22 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 291 216, 376
Hanlan v. E. E. E., 114 Mass. 44 139
Hagenlocker v. C. I. & B. E. E.,
99 N. Y. 136 417
Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. K
S. 588, 103 E. C. L. 35, 434
Hammond v. N. E. Ey., 6 S. C.
130 216
Hanning, N. O., M. & C. E. E. v.,
15 Wall. 649 123, 201
Hanlon, G. St. E. E. v., 53 Ala.
70 91
Hand, Simpson v., 6 Wh. 311
47, 81, 86
U. P. E. E. v., 7 Kans. 392 233
Hardisty, Wheelton v., 8 E. & Bl.
232, 92 E. C. L. 454
Hard v. C. Ey., 32 Vt. 473 366
Hardcastle v. S. Y. Ey., 4 H. &
N. 67 183
Hardy v. N. C. C. E. E., 74 N. C.
734 303
Hanson v. E. & N. E. E., 62 Me.
84 114
Hankey, Penna Co. v., 93 111. 580
302, 376
Hanrathy v. N. C. Ey., 46 Md.
280 307
Hand v. V. & C. E. E., 32 Vt. 473 356
Hardin, T. & P. E. E. v., 62 Tex.
367, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 460 240
Harmon, T. W. & W. Ey. v., 47
111. 298 151
Haring, N. Y., L. E. & W. E. E.
v., 47 N. J. L. 137, 21 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 436 43
Harlan v. St. L., K. C. & N. E.
E., 61 Mo. 480, 65 Mo. 22
55, 190
Hardingham, Coupland v., 3
Camp. 398 148
Hardman, GolcUhorpe v., 13 M
& W. 377 148
Hart v. Allen, 2 Watts 116 9
v. C, E. I. & P. Ey., 56 Iowa
166 161
Hartfield v. Eoper, 21 Wend. 6l5 91
Hartnall v. Byde Commrs., 4 B.
&S. 361, 116 E. C. L. 200
Hartwig v. C. & N. W. Ey., 49
Wise. 358, 1 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 65 253
Harty v. C. E. E., 42 N. Y. 468 160
Harris, Proctor v., 4 C. & P. 337,
19 E. C. L. 148
v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79 213
v. U. P. R E., 13 Fed. Rep.
591, 4 McCrary 457 38
B. S. E. E. v., 67 Ala. 6 473
D. & G. Ey. v., New. Mex.
15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
142 HI
Harrison, G. K Ey. v., 10 Ex. 376
206, 390
v. Collins, 86 Penna. St.
153 126
v. G. N. Ey., 3 H. & C. 231 39, 95
Harper v. E. E. E., 32 N. J. L.
88, 3 Vroom 88 47, 264
St. L., 1. M. & S. Ey. v., 44
Ark. 524 306
Harvey v. E. E. E., 116 Mass. 269
260, 264
v. N. Y. C.&H.E.E. E., 88
N. Y. 481, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 515 318, 338
Hassard, P. C. P. Ey. v., 75 Penna.
St. 367 t>8, 291, 454
Hathaway, Malone v., 64 N. Y.
5 321
Hause, U. P. E. E. v., 1 Wyoming
27 122
Hawks, A. G. S. Ey. v., 72 Ala.
112, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 197
160, 251, 265, 284, 416
Hawker, Mill v., L. E. 9 Ex. 309,
10 Id. 92 111
Hawkins v.G. W. E. E., 17 Mich.
57, 18 Id. 427 502
Hay v. G. W. Ey., 37 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 456 283
Hays v. H. G. N. E. E., 46 Tex.
280 112
Hayes v. Kennedy, 41 Penna. St.
378 31
v. Gallagher, 72 Penna. St.
136 148
v. M. C.E. E.,111 U.S. 228,
15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
394 27, 41, 198, 4&»
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Haves v. W. R. R., 3 Cush. 270 356
F. S. &G. St. P. R.R. v., 97
N. Y. 259. 21 Am. & Eng.
R.R. Cas.' 358 291
Havward, Allen v., 7 Q. B. 960,
53 E. C. L. 122
Kendall v., 5 Bing. N. C. -124 476
Hazard, (J., B. & Q. R. R. v., 26
111. 373 288, 292
v. C, B. & Q. R. R., 1 Biss.
503 288
Havcroft v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 64
N. Y. 636 71
Hanlon v. S. B. H. R. R., 129
Mass. 310, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 18 42
Hatfield v. C, R. I. & P. R. R.,
61 Iowa 434, 11 Am. &
Eng R. R. Cas. 153 48
Hawes «. B. C. R. & N. R. R., 64
Iowa 315, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 220 436, 508
Hawley v. N. C. Ry., 82 N. Y.
370, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 248 305, 375, 3S2
Haynes v. E. T. & G. R. R., 3
Cold. (Tenn.) 222 355
Hathaway v. M. C. R. R., 51 Mich.
253, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 249 346, 373
Harney, C. & G. E. R. R. v., 28
Ind. 28 342, 350
Harrington, T. & P. Ry. v., 62 Tex.
597, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 571 315, 344
Haslan v. M. & E. R. R., 4 Vroom.
147 168
Hatcher v. T. W. & W. R. R., 62
111. 477 135
Hatfield v. St. P. & D. Ry., 33
Minn. 130, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 292 424
Harper v. I. & St. L. R. R., 44
Mo. 488 315
H. B. M. & F. R. R., Thurber v.,
60 N. Y. 326 69
Heazle v. I. B. & W. Ry., 76 111.
501 440
Head, L. N. A. & C. R. R. v., 80
Ind. 117, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 619 157, 162, 196
Hearn, Child v., L. R. 9 Ex. 176
81, 86
Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D.
507 7, 200, 202, 224
Heeman, Towanda Coal Co. v., 86
Penna. St. 418 109,115
Heaven, Aston v., 2 Esp. 533 35
Hedges, Ivay v., 9 Q. B. D. 80 177
Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456 42
Hegeman v. Western R. R., 13 N.
Y. 9 2:57, 240, 240
Heil v. Glanding, 42 Penna. St.
493 47, 56, 60
P. & R. R. R. v., 5 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
91 74, 434
Heilman, N. P. R. R. v., 49 Penna.
St. 60 168
Heine v. C. & N.W. Ry., 58 Wise.
528 327, 366
Hemmingway, Sproul v., 14 Pick.
1 103
Hemingway v. McCullough, 15
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 328 102
Henderson, P. R. R. v., 43 Penna.
St. 449, 51 Id. 315
50, 205, 254, 422, 491, 501
P. C. & St. L. Ry. v., Ohio
St. , 5 Am. & Eng. R R.
Cas. 529 317
v. Stevens, L. R. 3 H. L. Sc.
& Div. 470 501
Hendricks v. S. A. R. R., 44 N.
Y. Sup. Ct. 8 281
J. R. R. v., 26 Ind. 228
47, 63, 265
v. W. & A. R. R., 52 Ga. 467
60, 510
Hendrie, Downey v., 46 Mich.
498, 8 Am. & Eng. R R.
Cas. 386 291
Henley v. H. R. R., 1 Edm. S. C.
359 240
Henry, v. L. S. & M. S. Ry.,
49 Mich. 495, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 110
299, 366, 434
v. P. & A. Bridge Co., 8 W.
& S. 85 146
v. S. I. Ry., 81 N. Y. 373, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.. 60
307, 318, 368
v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 76
Mo. 288, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cus. 136 26, 283
Henlock, Sadler v., 4 El. & Bl.
570, 82 E. C. L. 123
Herchenroder, Salisbury v., 106
Mass 458 42
Herbert v. N. P. Ry., Dak. ,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
85, 116 U. S. 642 307, 331
Hester, I. & G. N. R. R. v., 64
Tex. 401, 21 Am. & ling.
R. R. Cas. 535 349
Hetherington v. N. E. Ry.. 9 Q.
B. D. 160 489
Hewitt, Rigby v ■ 5 Ex. 240 82
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
li
Hexamer v. Webb, 101 TS. Y. 877
122, 125
Hey v. Philadelphia, 2 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
466 39
Henigh, C. B. & P. E. B. v., 23
Kans. 347 73
Heenrich v. P. P. P. Co., 20 Fed.
Eep. 100, 18 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 379 109
Hendrie, Kelly v., 26 Mich. 255 88
Henks, \V. E. E. v., 91 111. 406 160
Herring v. W. & E. E. E., 10
lred. 402 74, 192, 193
Hensil, Penna. Co. v., 70 Ind. 569,
6 Am. & Eng. E.E. ("as. 79
162, 164, 447
Ilenze v. St. L., K. C. & N. E. E..
71 Mo. 636, 2 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 212 169, 173
Henrice, P. C. P. Ey. v., 92
Penna. St. 431, 4 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 544 195, 419
Hendrv, Vanderbeck v., 34 N. J.
L. 472 177
Herrmann v. N. O. & C. E. E.,
11 La. An. 5 398
H. G. N. E. E., Havs v., 46 Tex.
280 112
Hiatt, E. & C. E. E. v., 17 Ind.
102 37, 50
Hibbard v. N. Y. & E. E. E., 15
N. Y. 455 215, 250
Hice v. Kugler, 6 Wh. 336 47
Hicks v. N. A. & H. Ey., 4 B. &
S. 403 n. 116 E. C. L. 494
Hickey v. B. & L. E. E., 14 Allen
429 265, 284
Higgins, H. & St. J. E. E. v., 36
Mo. 418 47, 211, 286
v. Bucher, Yelv. 89 397
St. L, I.M. & S. E. E. v.,
44 Ark. 293, 21 Am. & .
Eng. E. E. Cas. 629 303
v. W. T. & E. E., 46 N. Y.
23 109
Hill, Corby v., 4 C. B. N. S. 556,
93 E. C. L. 200
v. N. E. Co., 9 B. & S. 303 39, 95
v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45 338
Hilliard v. Eichardson, 3 Gray
349 122
Hills, Catlin v., 8 C. B. 123, 65
E. C. L. 80, 86
Hilts v. C. & G. T. Ey., 55 Mich.
437, 17 Am. & Eng. E.E.
Cas. 628 315
Highland St. Ey., Day v., 135
Mass. 113, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 150 65
Hinckley v. C. C. E. E., 120 Mass.
262 436
Hinds, P. F. W. & C. E. E. v., 53
Penna. St. 512 39, 280
Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Ad. & El. N.
S. 661, 42 E. C. L. 8
Hirschfeld i>. L. B. & S. C. Ey.,
2 Q. B. D. 1 508
H. M. & F. Ey. v. Connell, 88
Penna. St. 520 ^ 188, 196
Crissey v.. 75 Penna. St. 83
68, 454
v. Gray, 3 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 421 68
v. Kelley, 102 Penna. St.
115 35,74, 111
Smith v., 92 Penna. St. 450 76
Hoagland, Penna. Co. v., 78 Ind.
203, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 436 262, 263, 467
Hoag v. L. S. & M. S. E. E., 85
Penna. St. 293 12, 13
Hoar v. M. C Ev., 70 Me. 65
188, 210
Hobbitt v. L. & N. W. Ey., 4 Ex.
243 97, 102, 120
Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ey., L. E.
10 Q. B. Ill
2-1 , 263, 390, 459, 463
B. & O. E. E. v., Md.
19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
337 169
Hodsoll v. Stallebrass, 11 Ad. &
El. 301, 39 E. C. L. 473
Hodgkins v. E. E. E., 119 Mass.
419 303
Hoehl, P. & M. E. E., 12 Bush.
(Ky.) 41 70
Hoffman v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E.
E., 75 N. Y. 605 253
v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E.,
44 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1 445
N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E. v.,
87 N. Y. 25, 4 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 537 109, 189
I. C. E. E. v., 67 111. 287 224
Hogan r. C. M. & St. P. Ey.. 59
Wise. 139, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 439 74, 167, 454
v. S. E. Ey., 28 L. T. N. S.
271 281
Hofna^le v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E.
E., 55 N. Y. 608 122
Holbrook v. U. & S. E. E., 12 N.
Y. 236 284. 434, 443
Hoke v. St. L., K. C.^& N.' Ky.,
11 Mo. App. 575 368
Holden v. F. E. E., 129 Mass.
268, 2 Am. & Erg. E. E.
Cas. 94 306, 363, 367
Hi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Holdeu v. L. N. G. & C. Co., 3
M. G. & S. 1, 54 E. C. L. 47
Hole v. S. & S. Ry., 6 H. & N.
4S8 126
Holbrook, Corcoran v., 59 N. Y.
517 320
Bird v., 4 Bing. 628, 15 E. C.
L 39 183
Meara »., 20 Ohio St. 137 ' 137
Hollahau, Lewis v., 103 Penna.
St. 425 495
Holland, Ormond v., El., Bl. &
El. 102, 96 E. C. L. 297
v. C. M. & St. P. Ky., 18
Fed. Kep. 243 375
Holt, Churchill v., 127 Mass. 165 394
Holly v. Boston Gas Light Co.,
8 Gray 123 91
Holyoke v. G. T. R. R., 48 N. H.
541 421
Holmes v. Clark, 6 H. & N. 349,
7 H. & N. 937
300, 329, 356, 382
C. C. E. R. v., 5 Colo. 197,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
410 54
v. Mather, L. R. 10 Ex. 261 389
v. Onion, 2 C B. N. S. 790,
89 E. C. L. 103
v. N. E. Rv., L. R. 4 Ex.
254, 6 Id. 123 223, 372
v. Wakefield, 12 Allen 580 108
v. Worthington, 2 F. & F.
533 300
Hodges v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry.,
71 Mo. 50, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 190 160, 161
Hogarth, C. & A. R. R. v., 38 111.
370 193
Houck, I. C. Ry. v., 72 111. 285
299, 306, 446
Holt, A., T. & S. F. R. R. v., 29
Kans. 149, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 206 303, 337
Homan v. Stanley, 66 Penna. St.
464 148
Honor v. Albrighton, 93 Penna.
St. 475 356
Hope, P. R. R. v., 80 Penna. St.
373 13 39
Hopkins, M. & O. R. R. v., 41 '
Ala. N. S. 489 502, 503
v. A. & St. L. R. R., 36
N. H. 9 471
Hoppe v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 61
Wise. 357, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 74 77, 197, 425
Hoosey, C. & A. R. R. v., 99
Penna. St. 492, 6 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 254 284
Home v. Midland Ry., L. R. 8
C. P. 131 460, 462
Riley v., 5 Bing. 217 498
Smith v., 8 Taunt. 144, 4 E.
C. L. 7
Horn, Cuddy v., 46 Mich. 596 413
Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 22
Conn. 1, 23 Id. 609 44, 139
Houser v. C, R. I. & P. R R., 60
Iowa 230, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 501 306
Hoven v. B. & M. R. R., 20 Iowa
562 374
Hoye v. C. & N.W. Ry., 62 Wise.
666, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 347 168, 454
Horst, I. & St. L. R. R. v., 93 U.
S. 291 204, 233, 286, 292, 436
P. R. R. v., 16 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 567 151, 155
Hounsell v. Smvth, 7 C. B. N. S.
731, 97 E. C. L. 183
Houston, G, R. I. & P. R. R. v.,
95 U. S. 697 168, 169, 172
Hough v. T. & P. Ry., 100 U. S.
213 300,306,329,330,369,382
Houston, Griggs v., 104 U. S.
553 293
Howard Ex. Co. v.Wile, 64 Penna.
St. 201 454
Howe, V. & M. R. R. v., 52 Miss.
202 241
Howell, Lovell d,1C.P.D. 161 356
Howells v. L. S. Steel Co., L. R.
10 Q. B. 62 321
Howland v. Vincent, 10 Mete.
371 148
v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 54
Wise. 226, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 578 349, 368
Howard v. St. P., M. & M. Ry.,
32 Minn. 214, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 283 166
L. & N. R. R. v., Ky. ,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
98 190, 192
Howd v. M. C. R. R., 50 Miss. 178
301 314
H. R. R , Henley v., 1 Edm. S. C.'
359 240
Jones v., 107 Mass. 261 152
Snow v., 8 Allen 441
221, 305, 372, 377
v. Coyle, 55 Penna. St. 396
168, 416
Gannon v., 112 Mass. 234 372
Wilds v., 24 N. Y. 230, 432
60, 436
Webster v., 38 N. Y. 260 86
Ernst v., 39 N. Y. 61 173
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
liii
BL R. R. R., Button v., 18 N. Y.
248 54, 436
Luby v., 17 N.Y. 131 416
Johnson v, 20 N. Y. 65, 5
Duer 27 54, 436
Priest r., 65 N. Y. 589 114
Russell v., 17 N. Y. 134 211, 356
Mooney v., 5 Robertson (N.
Y.) 548 86
O'Mara v., 38 N. Y. 445 163, 167
Wilds v., 29 N. Y. 315 146, 159
Von Schaick v., 43 N. Y. 527 283
Green v., 2 Reyes (N.Y.)
294 398
H. Ry., Brand v., L. R. 1 Q. B.
130, 2 Id. 223, L. R. 4 H.
L. 171 146
H. St. Ry., Banks v., 136 Mass.
485, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 139 65, 111
H. S. R. R., Galena v., 13 Fed.
Rep. 116 114
Hubbard, Marshall v., 117 U. S.
415 454
Hudelson, I. C. R. R., 13 Ind. 325
213, 257
Hubvner v. N. O. & C. R. R., 23
La. An. 492 265
Hudson v. L. & N. R. R., 14 Bush
(Ky.) 303 153
Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556
102, 454
v. C. & S. Ry., 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 100, and
note, 39 Ohio St. 461 122, 125
v. Macfie, 2 H. & C. 744
39, 95, 187
C.V.R. R. v., 11 Penna. St.
140 14S
N. O., J. & N. Ry. v., 49 Miss.
258 314, 363
v. N.Y. & N. H. R. R., 36
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 222 445
v.W.&St.P.R.R.,27Minn.
137 343, 344
Hulburt v. N. Y. C. R. R, 40 N.
Y. 145 253
Hulett v. St. L., K. C. & N. Rv.,
67 Mo. 239 303, 376
Hulsencamp v. C. R. R., 37 Mo.
537 54
Hummell, P. & R. R. R. v., 44
Penna. St. 375
190,191,190,434
Humphrey, Gallagher v., 6 L. T.
N. S. 684 178
Schmid v., 48 Iowa 652 65
Hunt v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26 Iowa
363 356
v. P. R. R., 51 Penna. St. 475 1 25
Huntlev, G. R. & I. R. R. v., 38
Mich. 537 237, 276, 417, 426
Hunter, Scott v., 46 Penna. St.
192 39
v. Stewart, 47 Me. 419 25
v. Wanamaker, 17 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
232 (Pa. C. C. JR. ) 12
M. & C. R. R. v., 11 Wise.
160 156
Husson, N. C. Ry. v., 13 Weekly
ISotes of Cases (Penna.)
361, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 241 346
Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. Ry., 5
Ex. 343 342, 351, 355. 357, 366
v. W. & A. R. R., 53 Tenn.
634 43, 413
I. C. R. R. v., 47 111. 408 74, 192
v. St. P.. M. & M. Ry.. 32
Minn. 398, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 280 166, 169
Borries v., 18 C. B. K S. 445,
114 E. C. L. 460
Huzzey v. Field, 2 C. M. & R.
432 106
Humphreys, E. T. V. & G. R. R.
v., 12 Lea (Tenn.) 200, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
472 196
Huffman, C, R. I. & P. Rv. v., 78
Mo. 50, 17 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 625 314, 315. 318
L. & I. Ry. v., 28 Ind. 287 91
Hubgh v. N. O. & C. R. R., 6 La.
An. 495 306, 374, 398
Hurst, N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v.,
36 Miss. 660 467, 471
v. Taylor, 14 Q. B. D. 918 149
Huey, D."& B. J. Ry., 5 Irish C.
L. 206 373
Hurt v. S. R. R., 40 Miss. 391
204, 207
Hyatt r. Johnson, 91 Penna. St.
196 454
Hydraulic Works v. Orr, 83
Penna. St. 332 184, 196
Hyman v. Nye, 6 Q. B. D. 685 233
Hynes v. S. F. & N. P. R. R., 65
Cal. 316, 20 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 486 28, 198
H. & B. T. R. R. v. Decker, 82
Penna. St. 119, 84 Id. 419
314, 330, 445, 491
H. & G. N. R. R. v. Miller,
51 Tex. 270 338, 341
V. Randall, 50 Tex. 254 305
H. & St. J. R. R., Bell v., 72 Mo.
50, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 580 111, 160, 193, 447
liv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
H. & St. J. R. R. v. iliggins, 36
Mo. -US 47, 211, 286
Kelley v., 70 Mo. 604 263
Loyd v., 53 Mo. 509 264, 424
Limekeiler v., 33 Kans. 83,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
184 410
Porter v., 71 Mo. 66, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 44
304, 305, 329, 473, 474
Truitt v., 62 Mo. 527 34
Sherman v., 72 Mo. 62, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
589 73, 115, 209, 210,
212, 283, 370, 371
Snyder v., 60 Mo. 413 74
Sweigert v., 75 Mo. 475, 9
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
322 263, 436
Prv v., 73 Mo. 123 470
Winters v., 39 Mo. 468 285
McDermott v., 73 Mo. 516,
2 Am. & Eng. R R. Cas.
85 314, 330, 416
v. Fox, 31 Kans. 587, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 325 370
Price v., 77 Mo. 5U8, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 168 377
Adams v., 74 Mo. 553, 7 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 414 416
Cagney v., 69 Mo. 416 301
Sawver v., 37 Mo. 240 35. 235
Haflihan v., 71 Mo. 113, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R, Cas.
117 35, 2S3, 299, 344, 374
Kelley v., 75 Mo. 138, 13
Am. & Eng. R R. Cas.
638 42, 168, 173, 174
Isabel v., 60 Mo. 482 55, 77
Isabel v., 65 Mo. 475 196
v. Martin, 11 Bradwell 386 213
Scoville v., 81 Mo. 434, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
534 55
Turner v., 74 Mo. 603, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 38
135, 169
Welsch v., 72 Mo. 551, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
75 163
Zimmerman v., 71 Mo. 476,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
191 55, 75
Brown v., 50 Mo. 461 196
v. Clotworthy, 80 Mo. 220,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
371 263, 264
H. & T. C. Ry. v. Sympkins, 54
Tex. 615, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 11 196
PAGE
H. &T. C. Ry. v. Hampton, 64
Tex. X-ll, 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 291 216, 376
v. Schmidt, 61 Tex. 282, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
345 265
v. Maddox, Tex. , 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 625 307
v. Clennnons, 55 Tex. 88, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
396 286
v. Dunham, 49 Tex. 181 303
v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 573 47, 60
v. Myers, 55 Tex. 1 10, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 114
314, 346, 374
v. Leslie, 57 Tex. 83, 9 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 384 265
v. Shafer, 54 Tex. 641, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
421 417
v. Willie, 53 Tex. 318 367
Watson v., 58 Tex. 434, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
213 345, 346
Robinson v., 46 Tex. 540
356, 373
v. Pinto, 60 Tex. 516, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 286 305
v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
231 329, 369
v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
5^3 n. 268
r. Fowler, 56 Tex. 452, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 504 32
v. Waller, 56 Tex. 331, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 431 74
v. Ricbards, 59 Tex. 373, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. 70 191
H. & T. Ry. v. Oram, 49 Tex. 341 308
L, B. & W. R. R. v. Hall, 106
111. 371, 12 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas. 146 277
Heazle v., 76 111. 501 440
v. Toy, 91 III. 474 306
v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46, 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 192 109
v. Flanigan, 77 111. 365 302, 303
1. C. R. R.v.Able, 59 111.131
63, 265
Arnold v., 83 111. 273
251, 502, 503
v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90
133, 141, 469, 473
v. Hutchinson, 47 111. 408
74, 192
Muldowney v., 36 Iowa 462,
39 Id. 615 50, 373, 374, 376
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lv
I. C. E. K. v. Patterson, 93 HI.
290, 69 Id. 650 60, 374
Quinn v., 51 111. 495 284
v. Bead, 37 111. 484 502
v. Hofl'man, 67 111. 287 224
v. Chambers, 71 111. 519 265
v. Lutz, 84 111. 598 265
v. Frelka, 110 111. 498, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
7 222, 470
v. Houck, 72 111. 285
299, 306, 446
McClary v., 3 Neb. 44 32
v. Downey, 18 111. 259 112, 115
Burling v., 85 111. 18 319, 377
v. Cox, 21 111. 20 368
v. Godfrey, 71 111. 500
177, 190, 197
v. Jewell, 46 111. 99 373
v. Keen, 72 111. 512 367
v. Hall, 72 111. 222 190
v. Modglin, 85 111. 481 196, 377
Spencer v., 29 Iowa 55 169
Way v., 40 Iowa 341 373
v. Sutton, 42 111. 438 418
v. Welch, 52 111. 183 308
v. Buckner, 28 111. 299 75
Daggett v., 34 Iowa 284 283, 374
Greenleaf v , 29 Iowa 14 373
v. Hudelson, 13 Ind. 325 213, 257
Law v., 32 Iowa 534 251
v. Slatton, 54 111. 133 265
■o. Bachas, 55 111. 379 166
v. Green, 81 111. 19 283
Weldon v., 52 111. 290 486, 493
I. C. & L. R. R., Dick v., 38 Ohio
389, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 101 370
Billman v., 76 Ind. 166, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 41
13, 26, 151
I. C. & R. Ry., Bell v., 53 Ind.
57 135
Ihl v. F. S. S. R. R.,47 N. Y. 317
70, 482, 489
Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P.
190, 24 E. C. L. 39, 95, 148
Illinois, Munn v., 94 U. S. 130 4
Illinois R. R. v. Adams, 42 111.
474 502
Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304,
5 E. C L. 47, 183
Imhoff v. C. & M. R. R., 20
Wise. 344 215, 263
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14
Wall. 442 454
Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C.
P. 272, 2 Id. 311 200
Indiana R. R. v. Monday, 21 Ind.
48 501
Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100
Ind. 191 303 329
Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 1 233
Ingraham, T. W. & W. Ry. v., 77
111. 309 304, 307, 329, 346, 369
Insurance Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall.
531 11
v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44 11
Spensley v., 54 Wise. 433 454
Sabolla v., 54 Wise. 687 454
Iowa, C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 94 U.
S. 161 4, 5
I., P. & C. R. R. v. Allen, 31 Ind.
294 501
Iron Screw C. Co., Grill v., L. It.
1 C. P. 612 6, 8
I. R. R. v. Mowery, 36 Obio
St. 418, 3 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 361 . 15, 62 274, 439
i>. Beaver, 41 Ind. 493 205, 292
Cunningham v., 51 Tex. 503 122
v. Estes, 96 111. 470 306
Keep v , 9 Fed. Rep. 625 139
Isaacs v., T. A. R. R., 47 N. Y.
122 112, 114
Isabel v. H. & St. J. R. R., 60
Mo. 482 55, 77
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 65 Mo.
475 196
Isbell v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 27
Conn. 393 54
Ivay v. Hedges, 9 Q. B. D. 80 177
I. & G. N. R. R., Beauchamp v.,
56 Tex. 239 251
v. Dovle, 49 Tex. 190 307
v. Holloren, 53 Tex. 46, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
343 31, 32, 233, 240, 246
v. Hester, 64 Tex. 401, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
535 349
v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 491, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
649 486
v. Kentle, Tex. , 16
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
337 114
v. Smith, 62 Tex. 252, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 21
72, 193
Stewart v., 53 Tex. 289, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
497 254
v. Stewart, 57 Ter. 166 470
v. Jordan, Tex. , 10
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
301 172
Prince v., 64 Tex. 144, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
152 208, 210
lvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
I. & G. N. K. E. v. Terrv, 62
Tex. 3,S0, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 323 263, 467
v. Gilbert, 64 Tex. 536, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 4U5 467
I. & St. L. R. R. y. Horst, 93 U.
S. 291 204, 233, 2S6, 292, 436
v. Stoat, 53 Ind. 143 156
v. Stables, 62 111. 313 473
v. Cobb, 68 111. 53 471
Harper v., 44 Mo. 488 315
v. Kennedy, 77 Ind. 507, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
467 251
v. Morganstern, 106 111. 216,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
228 364
I. & C. R. R. v. Rutherford, 29
Ind. 83 284
v. Love, 10 Ind. 554 305
I. & V. R. R. v. McLin, 83 Ind.
435, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 237 159
Jackson, Metropolitan Ry. v., L.
R. 3 App. Cas. 198, L. R.
10C.P.49, 2C. P.L. 125,
H. L.
9, 24, 278, 451, 453, 454
C & N. W. Ry. v., 55 111. 492
304 329
Stone v., 12 C. B. 199, 81 E.'
C. L. 183
T. H. & I. R. R. v., 81 Ind.
19, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 178 114, 233, 275
v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 13 Lea
(Tenn.) 491, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 433 24, 151
v. K. C, L. & S. K. R. R.,
31 Ivans. 761, 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 178 300, 319
v. S. A. R. R., 47 N. Y. 274
109, 114
Jacobus v. St. P. & C. R. R., 20
Minn. 125 207, 286, 501
Jacques v. B. II. R. R., 41 Conn.
61 473
Jacobs, G. & C. U. R. R. v., 20
Ind, 478 60
James, Penna. Co. v., 81 j Penna.
St. 194 77, 158, 196
v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 2 C. P.
634, note 165
Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447, 11
E. C L. 148
Jamison v. S. J. & S. C. R. R,
55 Cal. 593, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 350 6, 233, 240, 241
Jay, Wigmore v., 5 Ex. 354
323, 332, 333
J. C. H. Ry., Gilson v., 76 Mo.
282 12 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 132 235
Jeffrey v. K. & D. M. R. R., 56
Iowa 546, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 568 299
Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 221 251
Jenkins v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 41
Wise. 112 112, 209
Jetter v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 2 Abb.
Ct. App. Dec. 458 310
Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 909, 76
E. C. L. 449, 454
v. C, St. P. & M. Ry., 54
Wise. 610, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 379 265
v. G. T. Ry., 55 N. H. 84
103, 370, 371
I. C. R. R. v., 46 111. 99 373
Jewett, Fuller v., 80 N. Y. 46
300, 306, 329, 369
Klein v.. 26 N. J. Eq. 474
136, 257, 385, 481
Shaw v., 86 N. Y. 616, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. Ill
168, 169, 173
Slater v., 84 N. Y. 61, 5 Am.
& Eng R. R. Cas. 515
316, 317, 326, 344, 362, 363, 366
Terry v., 78 N. Y. 338 275
De Forrest v., 88 N. Y. 264,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
495 302, 305, 343, 345
J. M. & I. R. R. v. Riley, 39 Ind.
563 214, 255
v. Bowen, 49 Ind. 154 76
v. Parmalee, 51 Ind. 42 263
Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501,
25 E. C. L. 102
John v. Bacon, L. R. 5 C. P. 437
136, 241
Johnson v. Agricultural Ins. Co.,
25 Hun 251 435
v. Bruner, 61 Penna. St. 58 300
v. B. & M. R. R, 125 Mass.
75 214, 283
Duckworth v., 4 H. & N.
653 486, 488
v. C. & N. W. Ry., 49 Wise.
529, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 155 69
v. H. R. R. R., 20 N. Y. 65,
5 Duer 27 54, 436
Kelly v., 128 Mass. 530 372
Rail v., 3 II. &C. 589 356
M. & W. R. R. v., 38 Ga.
409 284
v. W. C. & P. R. R., 70
Penna. St. 366 6, 18, 63, 264
v. C. V. R. R., 56 Vt. 707 106
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lvii
Johnson v. E. & D. E. K., 81 N.
C. 453 307
v. C. & N. W. Ey., 56 Wise.
274, 8 Am. & Eng. K. Ii.
Cas. 471 69
v. L. & N. E. E., Ky. ,
13 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
623 75, 160, 161
v. 0.. E. I. & P. E. E., 58
Iowa 348, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 206 109, 116
v. St. P. & D. Ey., 31 Minn.
283, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 467 156, 166
S. W. E. E. v., 60 Ga. 667 190
C, B. & Q. E. E. v., 103 111.
512, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 225 425, 432
v. G. W. & S. Ey., 9 Irish
Eep. C L. 108 502
Johnston, Bush v., 23 Penna. St.
209 148
Hyatt v., 91 Penna. St. 196 454
Tones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493, 2 E.
C. L. 14, 62
B. & P. E. E. E. v., 95 U. S.
439 6, 47, 283, 374
v. F. Ey., L. E. 3 Q. B. 733 145
v. H. E. E., 107 Mass. 261 152
L. V. Coal Co. v., 86 Penna.
St. 441 320, 322, 323
Robbins v., 15 C. B. N. S.
221, 109 E. C. L. 148
Williams v., 3 H. & C. 602
102, 104
v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 49
Mich. 573, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 221 349
N. & D. E. E. v., 9 Heisk.
(Tetin.) 27 306
S. E. E. v., 30 Kans. 601, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 201
305, 307
v. G. T. Ey., 45 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 193 38
v. Mayor, etc., of Liverpool,
14 Q. B. 1). 890 103
v. N. Y. C. & II. E. E. E.,
28 Hun 364, 92 N. Y. 678 310
V. L. E. E., Ky. , 22
Am. & Eng. E, E. Cas.
295 n. 376
Owings v.. 9 Md. 117 42
W. & A. E. K.r.,65 Ga.G31,
8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
267 161
Jordin v. Crump, 8 M. & W. 782 183
Jordan, I. & G. N. Ey. v., Tex.
, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 301 172
J. E. E. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind.
228 47, 63, 265
Kumler v., 33 Ohio St. 150 367
v. Swift, 26 Ind. 459 265
Jucker v. C. & N. W. E. E., 52
Wise. 150, 2 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 41 28
Judson v. N. Y. & N. H. E. E.,
29 Conn. 434 156
Juniata Bridge Co., Foster v., 16
Penna. St. 393 31
Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 2
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
545 136^301,330,413,414
Kane, T. & P. Ey. v., Tex. ,
15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
218 307
Kay v. P. E. E., 65 Penna. St.
273 6, 68, 91, 92, 166, 179
Karle v. K. C, St J. & C. B. E.
E., 55 Mo. 476 88
K. C. Ey. v. Dills, 4 Bush (Ky.)
593 ' 54, 471
v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kans. 34,
22 Id. 686, 15 Am. Ey.
Eep. 220 122, 186
K. C, St. J. & C. B. Ey., Straus
v., T5 Mo. 185, 6 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 384 263, 265
Karle v., 55 Mo. 476 88
Kersey v., 79 Mo. 362, 17
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
638 314
v. Flynn, 78 Mo 195, 18 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 23
306, 382, 436, 444
K. C. E. E. v. Thomas, 79 Ky.
160, 1 Am. & Eng. K. E.
Cas. 79 47, 246, 248 275, 286
K. C, L. & S. K. K. E., Jackson
v., 31 Kans. 761, 15 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 178 300, 319
Kean v. B. & O. K. E., 61 Md.
154, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 321 54, 74, 174
Kearney v. L. B. & S. C. Ey., L.
E. 5 Q. B. 411, 6 Id. 759
148, 149, 441
Keating v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E.
E., 49 N. Y. 673 273
v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E.,
98 N. Y. 128 263
Keeley v. E. Ey., 47 How. Pr.
256 38
Keffe v. M. & St. P: Ky., 21
Minn. 207 186
Keary, C, C. & C. Ey. v., 3 Ohio
St. 254 324, 326, 370
Keenan, P., W. & B. E. E. v.,
103 Penna. St. 104 307
lviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keen, I. C 11. K v., 72 111. 512 307
Keep r. I. K. R ,9 Fed. Rep. 625 139
Keller, P. R. R. t>., 67 Penna. St.
300 490
v. S. C. & St. P. R. K., 27
Minn 178 263, 419
Kelley, II. M. & F. Ry. v., Iu2
Penna. St 115 35, 74, 111
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 75 Mo.
133, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 038 42, 168, 173, 174
L. & N. R. R. v., 92 Ind.
371, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 1 282, 286, 287
v. C, M. & St. P. Ry , 50
Wise. 331, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 65 378
Kelly v. C, M. & St. P. R. R., 53
Wise. 74, 5 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas. 469 344
v. S. M. R. R., 28 Minn. 98,
6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
261 156, 422
Farlovv v., 108 U. S. 288
274 285
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 70 Mo.'
604 265
P. R. R. v., 31 Penna. St.
372 68, 69, 151, 471, 482
Transfer Co. v., 36 Ohio St.
86, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 335 86
v. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530 372
Steinmetz v., 72 Ind. 442 50
v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 29
Minn. 1, 6 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 93 163, 169
v. W. C. Ry., Wise.
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
633 302, 309
v. Hendrie, 26 Mich. 255 88
Keefe, C. & A. R. R. v., 47 111.
108 367
Keegan v. W. R. R, 8 N. Y. 175 306
Kellow v O I. R. R., Iowa
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
485 276
Kellogg, M. & St. P. Ry. v., 94
U. S. 469, 475 10, 13
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
79 N. Y. 72 169, 494
Kendrick, S. R. R. v., 40 Miss.
374 263, 467, 471
Kennanl, N. J. R. R. v., 21
Penna. St. 203 284
KV;nnev ,■. ( '. R. R., 61 Ga. 590 307
C. R. R. v., 58 Ga. 485, 64
Id. 1 00, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 155 307
Yonge v., 26 Ga. Ill 275, 440
PAGE
Kennedv, Hayes v., 41 Penna. St.
378 31
I. & St. L. R. R. v., 77 Ind.
507, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 467 251
v, N. M. R. R., 36 Mo. 351 54
Kentle, I. & G. N. Ry. v., Tex.
, 16 Am.& Eng. R. R.
Cas. 337 114
Kemp, B. C. P. Ry. v., 61 Md.
74, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 220 28, 391, 481
Kennell, Goodman v., 3 C. & P.
167, 14 E. C. L. 99
Kermode, Lowes v., 8 Taunt. 146 498
Kersey v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R.
R., 79 Mo. 362, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 638 314
Kerwhacker v. C, C, C. & I. Ry.,
3 Ohio St. 172 54, 65
Kessenger v. N. Y. & H. R. R.,
56 N. Y. 543 163, 166
Keyes, B. & B. Ry. v., 9 II. L.
C. 555 209
Keystone Bridge Co. v. New-
berry, 96"Penna. St. 246 323
Keyser v. C. & G. T. Ry.,
Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 91 196, 198
K. I. Co., Knupfle v., 84 N. Y.
491 42
Kieth v. N. II. & N. R. R., 140
Mass. 175, 23 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 421 310
Kilgore. P. R. R. v., 32 Penna.
St. 292 18, 203, 264
Killips, P. R. R. v., 88 Penna. St.
405 151,165,447
Kimball v. R. & B. R. R., 26 Vt.
247 502
Kindred, I. & G. N. R. R. v., 57
Tex. 491, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 649 486
King v. B. & W. R. R., 9 Cush.
112 301, 338, 366
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
72 N. Y. 607 306
v. O. & M. Ry., U. S. C. C.
Ind., 18 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 386 281
v. O. R. R., U. S. C. C. Ind.,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
119 377
Steamboat New World v., 1 6
How 469 8, 207, 233
V. Thompson, 87 Penna. bt.
365 481
v. M. Ry., 14 Fed. Rep. 277,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
119 330, 369
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lix
King v. N. Y. C. & IT. E. E. R,
66 N. Y. 181 122
W. & A. E. B. v., 70 Ga. 261,
19 Am. & Eng. E. R Cas.
255 447
Kingsbury, Shoemaker v., 12
Wall. 369 293
Kinney v. C. E. E. of N. J., 34
N. J. L. 513 208, 505
v. Central E. E., 32 N. J. L.
407 502
Kinsley v. C. S. & M. S. E. E.,
125 Mass. 54 136, 243
Kirb*«. P. E. E., 76 Penna. St.
506 225, 228
Kirk, N. P. R E. v., 90 Penna.
St. 15, 1 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 45 230, 490, 494
Kirkpatrick v. N. Y. C. & H. E.
E. R, 79 N. Y. 240 306
Kinsey v. Crocker, 18 Wise.
74 163
Kinsley, Pendleton v., 3 Clif. 416 114
Kitteringbam v. I. C. & P. Ey.,
62 Iowa 285, 18 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 14 299
Klanowski v. G. T. Ey., Mich.
, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 648 159, 427
Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474
136, 257, 385, 481
Kline v. C. P. E. E., 37 Cal. 400,
587 109
Klutts v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ey.,
75 Mo. 642, 11 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas."639 474, 480
Knapp v. S. C. & P. Ey., 65 Iowa
91, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 60 26, 305
Knight v. Abert, 6 Penna. St.
472 183
v. Fox, 5 Ex. 721 122
v. P. E. E., 23 La. An. 462 265
v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R E.,
99 N. Y. 25 28
v. P. S. & P. E. E., 56 Me.
234, 57 Id. 202
136, 233, 241, 254, 470
Baydure v., 2 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 713 39
v. Quarles, 2 Brod. & B. 102,
6 E. C. L. 400
Knittal, L. S. & M. S. Ey. v., 33
Ohio St. 468 373
Knowlton v. E. Ey., 10 Ohio St.
260 501
v. M. C. E. E., 59 Wise. 278,
16 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
330 65, 274
Knupfle v. K. I. Co., 84 N. Y. 491 42
Kolsti v. M. & St. L. Ey., 32
Minn. 133, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 140 . 186
Koons v. St. L. & 1. M. E. E., 65
Mo. 592 186
Koontz v. O, E. I. & P. Ey., 65
Iowa 224, 18 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 85 305, 345
Kopitoff v. Wilson, 1 Q. B. D.
377 232
K. P. Ey., Behrens v. 5 Colo. 400,
8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
184 374, 375, 436
v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442, 20
Am. Ey. Eep. 245
32, 440, 493
v. Peavey, 29 Kans. 170, 11
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
260 60, 384, 510
v. Cutter. 19 Kans. 83 469
v. Little' 19 Kans. 267 306
v. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94 431, 471
v. Eichardson 25 Kans. 391,
6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
96 16o
v. Salmon, 11 Kans. 83 211, 356
Summerhays v., 2 Colo. 484 367
Kramer v. S. F., M. St. E. E.,
25 Cal. 434 39^
Kresanowski v. N. P. Ey., 18
Fed. Eep. 229 374
Krom v. Levy, 48 N. Y. 679 460
Krouse, P., C. & St. L. Ey. v., 30
Ohio St. 222 215
Kroy v. O, E. I. & P. E. E., 32
Iowa 357 373
Kugler, Hice v., 6 Wh. 336 47
Kumler v. J. E. E., 33 Ohio St.
150 367
Kuntze, Ex. Co. v., 8 Wall. 342 501
K. & D. M. Ey., O'Neill v., 45
Iowa 546 374
Jeffrey v., 56 Iowa 546, 5
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas 568 299
Albertson v., 48 Iowa 292 76
K. & L. E. E., Osborne v., 68 Me.
49 370
Lacy, S. E. & D. E. E. v., 43 Ga.
461 410
Lacev, P. & N. Y. C. E. E. v., 89
Penna. St. 458 13
Ladd v. N. B. E. E., 119 Mass.
412 306, 307
Laing v. Colder, 8 Penna. St. 479
233, 473, 501
Laird, Boswell v., 8 Cal. 469 122
Lalor v. O, B. & Q. E. R, 52 111.
401 350
Lamb v. Palk, 9 C. & P. 629, 38
E. C. L. 102
lx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Lambeth v. N. C. R. R., 66 N. C.
494 264, 287
Lambkiu o. S. E. Ry., 5 App. Cas.
352 34, 275, 470
Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33
Conn. 237 134
Lanning v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N.
Y. 521 314, 330, 382
Langan ». St. L., I. M. & S. Ry.,
72 Mo. 392, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 355 220, 256
Lane, P. & R. I. R. R. v., 83 111.
449 240, 286
v. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177 434
Langdon, P. R. R. v., 92 Penna.
St. 21, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 87
251, 252, 286, 288, 289, 495
Lantz, M. S. & N. J. R. R. v., 29
Ind. 528 240
Latch v. R. Ry., 27 L. J. Exch.
155, 3H.&N. 930 (Am.
ed.) 38
Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C.
547, 12 E. C. L. 102, 103, 120
Lauman. Fairman v., 73 Ind. 568 470
Lavallev, L. S. & M. S. R. R. v.,
36 Ohio St. 221, 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 549
316, 323, 347, 370
Laverick, Searle v., L. R. 9 Q. B.
122 232
Lawson v. Bank of London, 18
C. B. 84, 86 E. C. L. 99, 112
v. O, St. P., M. & O. R. R.,
64 Wise. 447, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 249 205
Lax v. Darlington, 5 Ex. D. 35
18, 63, 200
Lawless v. C. R. R. R., 136 Mass.
1, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 96 307, 329, 337, 369, 380
Lawrence v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R.,
36 Conn. 63 502
Laicher v. N. O., J. & S. R. R.,
28 La. An. 320 75
Larmore v. C. P. I. Co., 101 N. Y.
391 177
Lary v. O, O, C. & I. R. R., 78
Ind. 323, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 498 177, 190
Laverenz v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 56
Iowa 689, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 274 169, 170
Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W.
519, 4 Id. 337 412
Langhoff v. M. & P. M. C. R. R.,
19 Wise. 489 159
Lansing, Perry v., 17 Hun 34 86
Law v. I. C R. R., 32 Iowa 534 251
PAGlt
L. B. & S. C. Ry., Bilbee v., 18
C. B. N. S. 584, 114 E. C.
L. 165
Foy v., 18 OB. N. S. 225,
114 E. C. L. 266
Hirschfeld v., 2 Q. B. D. 1 508
Kearney v., L. R. 5 Q. B.
411, 6 Id. 759 148, 149, 441
Lovegrove v., 16 C. B. N. S.
669, 111 E. C. L. 323, 356, 367
Skinner v., 5 Ex. 787
206, 274, 390, 439
Stapley v., L. R. 1 Ex. 21
41, 164, 166, 172
Toomey v., 3 C. B. N. S. 146,
91 E. C. L. 258, 434, 449
Weller v., L. R. 9 C. P. 132
261, 262, 266, 267
L. Bridge Co., Sullivan v., 9
Bush 81 47
L. Canal Co., Parnabv v., 11 Ad.
& El. 223, 39 E. C. L. 200, 201
L. C. & D. Ry., Lewis v., L. R. 9
Q. B. 71 261, 262, 270, 271
Moriarty v., L. R. 5 Q. B.
314 " 423
Gardner v., L. R. 2 Ch. 201
132, 134
L. O & N. Co., Lehigh Bridge
Co. v., 4 Rawle 8 31
L. C & L. R. R. v. Case, 9 Bush
(Kv.) 728 86, 486
v. Cavens, 9 Bush (Ky.) 559 323
v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442, 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 627 159
v. Mahony, 7 Bush (Ky.) 235
54, 431
L. C. & C. R. R., Felder v., 2
MtMu!lan403 192
L. C. Ry. v. Weams, 80 Ky. 420,
8 Am. <k Eng. R. R. Cas.
399 233
L. D. Co., Doughty v., 76 Me.
143 356
Leech, P. C. & St. L. R. R., 41
Ohio St. 388, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 541 note 349
LeBaron v. East Boston Ferry
Co., 11 Allen 312 246 442
LeBlanche v. L. & K W. Ry., 1
C. P. D. 286 467
Leach, Dynen v., 26 L. J. Ex.
221 373
Leahy v. S. P. Rv , Cal. ,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
230 307
LeClair v. St. P. & P. R. R., 20
Minn. 9 382
Lee v. Troy Citizens' Gas Light
Co., 98 N. Y. 115 436
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxi
Lee v. Woolsev, 1 6 Weekly Notes
of Case's (Penna.) 337 319
C. B. & Q. E. B. v., 60 111.
501 420
Lees, Bramall v., 29 L. T. 82
486, 489
Leggott v. G. N. By., 1 Q. B. D.
599 401
LeGierse, G. H. & S. A. E. E. v ,
51 Tex. 189 63, 264
LePeintur v. S. E. Ey., 2 L. J.
N. S. 170 460
Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb.
234 441
Lehigh Bridge Co. v. L. C. & N.
Co., 4 Bawle 8 31
Lehigh Iron Co. v. Eupp, 12
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 47 407
Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340
208, 235
Leslie, H. & T. C. E. E. v., 57
Tex. 83, 9 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 384 265
P. & N. Y., N. & E. E. Co. v.,
16 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 321 306, 329, 369
Letcher, C. E. E. v., 69 Ala. 106,
12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
115. 264, 265
Leroy, Wade v., 20 How. 34 473
Levering v. Union Trans. Co., 42
Mo. 88 502
Levy, Krom v., 48 N. Y. 679 460
Langridge v., 2 M. & W.
519, 4 Id. 337 412
Lett v. St. L. & O. Ev., 11 Ont.
Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 165 486, 490
Lewis v. L. C. & D. Ey., L. E. 9
Q. B. 71 261, 262, 270, 271
C, E. I. & P. E. E. v., 109
HI. 120, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 224 508
v. F. & P. M. Ey., 54 Mich.
55, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 263 25, 466
P., F. W. & C. Ey. v., 33
Ohio St. 196 323, 367
P. E. E. v., 79 Penna. St. 33
76, 77, 158, 196, 198
v. St. L. & I. M. Ey., 59 Mo.
495 305, 329, 369
v. B. & O. E. E., 38 Md.
588 283
v. Hollahan, 103 Penna. St.
425 495
Ledbetter, A., T. & S. F. E. E. v.,
34 Kans. 326, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 555 307
Lemont v. W. & G. E. E., 1
Mackey (E. C.) 180, 1
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
263 280
Lempe, G. H. & S. A. E. E. v.,
59 Tex. 19, 11 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 201 349
Leonard v. C. S. N. Co., 84 N.
Y. 48 409
Lewark, S. L. B. E. E. v., 4 Ind.
471 224
Levoy v. M. Ey., 3 Ont. 623, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
478 166
L. E. & St. L. E. E., Capper v.
103 Ind. 305, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 525 367, 381
Copper v., Ind. , 22
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
277 323, 368
L. E. & W. Ey. v. Fix, 88 Ind.
381, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 109 25, 467
L. G. Omnibus Co., Simpson v.,
L. E. 8 C. P. 390 434
L. I. E. E., McCosker v., 84 N.
Y. 77, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 567 328, 344, 368
Eckert v., 43 N. Y. 502 37, 50
Clussman v., 73 N. Y. 606
214 253
Stoddard v., 5 Sandf. S. C.
180 501
Werle v., 98 N. Y. 650 282
Willis v., 34 N. Y. 670 282, 284
Greany v., 101 N. Y. 419 427
Liddy v. St. Louis E. E., 40 Mo.
506 54
Lichfield, Morris v., 35 N. H. 271 65
Lichtenthaler, Lockhart v., 46
Penna. St. 151 81, 86
Lilly, Penna. Co. v., 73 Ind. 252 490
Lindsay, Searle v., 11 C. B. N. S.
429, 103 E. C. L. 356
v. C. E. E., 46 Ga. 447 417
Lindsey v. O, E. I. & P. E. E.,
64 Iowa 407, 18 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 179 264
Lincoln v. S. & S. E. E., 23
Wend. 425 29
Linton v. Smith, 8 Gray 147 122
Liscomb v. N. J. E. E., 6 Lans.
75 254
Limekiller v. H. & St. J. E. E.,
33 Kans. 83, 19 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 184 410
Limpus v. London Gen'l Omni-
bus Co., 1 H. & C. 526 99, 107
Little, K. P. Ey. v., 19 Kans. 267 306
v. Hacket, 116 U. S. 366 103
lxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
TAGE
Livezev r. Philadelphia, 04
Penna. St. 106 31
Lloyd, Rauch v., 31 Penna. St.
3 »8 67, 68, 151
L. L. & G. R. R. v. Rice, 10
Kans. 426 160
L. M. R. R. v. Fitzpatriek, 42
Ohio St. 318, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 578
309, 310, 335, 367
v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 416
323, 324, 369
v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 115
L. K A. & C. Rv., McClelland v.,
94 Ind. 276, 18 Am.& Eng.
R. R. Cas. 260 25
v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
387 60, 431
v. Dunkin, 92 Ind. 601, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
422 108, 189
Carter v., 98 Ind. 522, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
360 109, 189
v. Smith, 91 Ind. 119, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
608 156
v. Head, 80 Ind. 117, 4 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 619
157, 162, 196
v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
28 436
L. N. G. & C. Co., Holden v., 3
M. G. & S. 1, 54 E. C. L. 47
L. N. & G. S. R. R. v. Guinan,
11 Lea (Tenn.) 98 471
Locke v. S. C. & P. Ry., 46 Iowa
109 240, 303, 305
Elmer v., 135 Mass. 575, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
300 305, 337
Fowler v., L. R. 7 C. P. 272,
9 Id. 751, n. 232
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46
Penna. St. 151 81, 86
Lockwood v. C, N. & W. Ry.. 55
Wise. 50, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 151 318, 374, 376
v. Allen, 7 Mass. 254 468
N. Y. C. R. R. v., 17 Wall.
357 8, 204, 233, 501, 505
Lofton v. Vogdes, 17 Ind. 105 88
Lombard v. C, R. I. & P. R. R.,
47 Iowa 494 383
London Genl. Omnibus Co., Green
v., 7 C. B. N. S. 290, 97 E.
C. L. 99, 107
Limpus v., 1 H. & C. 526 99, 107
PAGE
Long v. P. Ry., 65 Mo. 225 330, 869
P. & R. R. R. v., 75 Penna.
St. 257 77, 158
Penna. Co. v., 94 Ind. 250, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
345 338, 341
M., K. & T. R. R. v., 27
Kans. 684 156
Longenecker v. P. R. R., 105
Penna. St. 328
. 163, 427, 444, 454
Longmore v. G. W. Ry., 19 C. B.
N. S. 183, 115 E. C. L. 253
Longmeid v. Halliday, 6 Ex. 761 412
Loonier, Derwort v., 21 Conn. 253 233
Lovell «. Howell, 1 C. P. D. 161 356
Loucks v. O, M. & St. P. Ry., 31
Minn. 526, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 305 163, 169
Lovegrove v. L. B. & S. C. Ry.,
16 C. B. N. S. 669, 111 E.
C. L. 323, 356, 367
Love, Fessler v., 43 Penna. St.
313 460
I. & C. R. R. v., 10 Ind. 554 305
Lowell v. B. & L. R. R., 23 Pick.
24 127
Lowery, Delphi v., 74 Ind. 520
469, 470
v. M. Ry., 99 K Y. 158 26, 152
Lowes v. Kermode, 8 Taunt. 146 498
Loyd v. II. & St. J. R. R., 53 Mo.
509 264, 424
Lord Kinnard, Aveson v., 6 East
188 417
Lovejov v. B. & L. R. R., 125
Mass. 79 308
L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Duffey, 35
Ark. 602, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 607 30 1,349
v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
10 205, 275, 288, 440
v. Barker, 39 Ark. 491, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
195 489
v. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
619 346
L. R. R., Jones v., Ky. , 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
295, n. 376
L. S. N. R. R. v. Norton, 24
Penna. St. 465
56, 60, 61, 190, 191
L. S. Steel Co., Howells v., L. R.
10 Q. B. 62 321
L. S. & M. S. R. R., Henry v., 49
Mich. 495, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 110 299, 366, 434
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxiii
L. S. & M. S. K. E., Haycroft v., 64
N. Y. 636 71
Hoag v., 85 Penna. St. 293 12, 13
Jones v., 49 Mich. 573, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 221 349
v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440,
5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
474 300,301,302,306,345,346
v. Knittal, 33 Ohio St. 468 373
Umback v., 83 Ind. 191, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
98 300, 346
Vosburgh v., 94 N. Y. 374 304
Wood v., 49 Mich. 370, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
478 263
v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 86, 169
v. Lavalley, 36 Ohio St. 221,
5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
549 316, 323, 347, 370
v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470, 3
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
426 264
Borst v., 66 N. Y. 639 151, 155
v. Fitzpatrick, 31 Ohio St.
479 305
Wolsey v., 33 Ohio St. 227
374, 378
Guggenheim v., Mich. ,
22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
546 163, 447
Mahlen v., 49 Mich. 585, 14
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas..
687 169, 173
L. S. & St. K. Co., Nitro-Phos-
phate Co. v., L. E. 9 Ch.
D. 503 41
Luby v. H. E. E. E., 17 N. Y. 131 416
Lucas v. Mason, L. E. 10 Ex. 251 102
v. N. B. & T. E. E., 6 Gray
65 220
v. M. & St. P. Ey., 33 Wise.
41 209, 210
v. IS.Y.C, E. E., 21 Barb.
(N.Y.)245 398
Luebke v. C, M. & St. P. Ey., 59
Wise. 127, 15 Am. &Eng.
E. E. Cas. 183 347
Lundin, K. P. Ey. v., 3 Colo. 94
431, 471
Lundstrom, C, St. P., M. & O.
E. K. v., 16 Neb. 254, 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
528 370
Lunt v. L. & N. W. Ey., L. E. 1
Q. B. 277 164
Lutz, ICE. E. v., 84 111. 598 265
L.V.Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Penna.
St. 44: 320, 322, 323
Morey v., 55 Iowa 671 349
L. V. E. E., Derrenbachcr v., 87
N. Y. 636, 4 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 624 306
v. Hall, 61 Penna. St. 361
174, 441, 444
v. McKeen, 90 Penna. St.
122 13, 454
Lyde, M. P. Ev. v., 57 Tex. 505,
II Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
188 346, 376, 432
Lvgo v. Newbold, 8 Ex. 302 91
Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 41
E. C L. 39, 66, 90, 94, 187
Penna. Co. v.. 90 111. 334
342, 374, 378
v. M. E. Ey., 90 N. Y. 77, 12
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
119 110
S. L. B. E. E. v., 4 Ind. 494 224
Lvons r. Desotelle, 124 Mas*. 387 65
v. E. E. E., 57 N. Y. 489 480
v. Martin, 8 A. & E. 502, 35
E. C L. 102
Lvon v. D., L. & L. M. Ey., 31
Mich. 429 378
L. & B. E. E. v. Chenewith, 52
Penna. St. 3S2 201,252,501
r. Doak, 52 Penna. St. 379 246
Ellis v., 2 H. & N. 424 47
Wills v., 129 Mass. 351, 2
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 27
251, 291
L. & B. Ey., Carpue v., 5 Q. B.
747, 48 E. C. L. 274, 439
Welfare v., L. E. 4 Q. B.
693 25§, 434, 442
L. & C. Ev., Chilton v., 16 M. &
W. 212 99, 110
v. Siekings. 5 Bush 1 54, 284
L. & N. E. E., Dawson v., Ky.
; 11 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 134 261
Hudson v., 14 Bush (Ky.)
303 153
v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
277 472
v. Howard, Ky. , 19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 98
190, 192
v. Schmidt, 81 Ind. 264, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. < as.
248 151, 154
v.Wolfe, 80 Kv. 82, 5 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 625 254
Schittenhelm v., Ey. ,
19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
III 191. 193
v. Orr, 84 Ind. 50, 8 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 94 300, 306
lxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
L. & N. E. E., Tanner »., 60 Ala.
621 233, 416
v. Kelley, 92 Ind. 371, 13
Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas. 1
282, 286, 287
v. Green, Ky. , 19 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 95 192, 196
Travis v., 9 Lea (Tenn.) 231 416
v. Collins, 2Duvall 114
50, 327, 355, 370
v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.)
128, 18 Am. & Eng. R. E.
Cas. 347 25, 60, 250, 466
Guthrie v., 11 Lea (Tenn.)
372, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 209 307
v. Cooper, Ky. , 6 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 5 193
v. Eobinson, 4 Bush (Ky.)
507 366
v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
866 323, 370
Johnson v., Ky. , 13
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
623 75, 160, 161
v. McKenna, 13 Lea (Tenn.)
280, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 276 40
v. McKenna, 7 Lea (Tenn.)
313, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 114 160
v. Milam, 10 Tenn. 223, 13
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
507 158 J
t>. Melton, 2 Lea (Tenn.)
262 167
v. Filbern, 6 Bush (Ky.) 574 54
Adams v., Ky. , 21 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 380 265
Bennett v., 102 U. S. 577, 1
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 71
201, 253
Smith v., 75 Ala. 449, 21 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 157 404
v. Watkins, Ky. ,12
Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas. 89 191
L. & N. W. Ey., Collett v., 16 Q.
B. 984, 71 E. C. L. 215
Edwards v., L. R. 5 C P.
445 110, 112
Sharrod v., 4 Ex. 580 389
Saunders v., 8 C. B. N. S. 887,
98 E. C. L. 481
Freemantle v., 10 C. B. N. S.
95, 100E.C. L. 246,247
Gallin v., L. R. 10 Q. B. 212 500
Hobbitt v., 4 Ex. 243
97, 102, 120
LeBlanche v., 1 C. P. D. 286 467
Lunt v., L. E. 1 Q. B. 277 164
L. & N. W. Ey., Eadley v., L. E. 9
Ex. 91, 10 Id. 100, 1 App.
Cas. 754 53, 54
Eeedie v., 4 Ex. 243
38, 97, 102, 120, 125
Eowley v., L. E. 8 Ex. 221
431, 469, 475, 479, 484
Skelton v., L. E. 2 C. P.
361 172
Stubley v., L. E. 1 Ex. 13
163, 166
Wright v., L. E. 10 Q, B.
298, 1 Q. B. D. 252 223, 372
L. & P. By., Muschamp v., 8 M.
6 W. 421 137
L. & M. M. Ey. v. Montgomery,
7 Ind. 475 48
L. & St. K. Docks Co., Scott v., 3
H. & C. 596 438, 441
Griffiths v., 12 Q. B. D. 493,
13 Id. 259 344
N. P. & O. C. M. Co. v., 9
Ch. D. 515 33
Smith v., L. K. 3 C. P. 326 200
L. & S. E. Ey., Cockle v., L. E.
5 C. P. 457, 7 Id. 321 266, 267
L. & S. W. Ey., Allen v., L. E.
6 Q. B. 65 110
Davey v., 11 Q. B. D. 213,
12 Id. 73 172, 436
Ford v., 2 F. & F. 730 165, 246
Hobbsi-., L. E. 10 Q. B.lll
24, 263, 391, 459, 463
Poulton v., L. E. 2 Q. B.
534 110
Smith v., L. E. 5 C. P. 102 6, 39
L. & Y. Ey., Adams v., L. E. 4
C. P. 739 15, 16, 63, 279
Armstrong v., L. E. 10 Ex.
47 80, 86
Blamires v., L. E. 8 Ex. 283
41, 276
Bradshaw v., L. E. 10 C. P.
189 401
Galliard v., 12 L. T. 356
486, 491
Gee v., 6H.&N. 211 460, 462
Nicholson v., 3 II. & C. 534 255
Sneesby v., 1 Q. B. D. 42 39
Vose v., 2 II. & K 728
220, 316, 356, 372
L. & F. E. E., Eden v., 14 B.
Monr. 204 397
L. & I. Ey. v. Huffinann, 28 Ind.
287 91
Maddox, H. & T. C. Ey. v.,
Tex. , 21 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 625 307
Seymour v., 16 Q. B. 327, 71
E. C. L. 344
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxv
Mackav v. N. Y. C. E. R, 35 N.
*Y. 75 166
Mackin v. B. & A. R. R., 135
Mass. 201, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 196
309, 310, 335, 367
MacDoncjall v . C. R. R., 63 Cal.
431. 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 143 436
Macfie, Abbott v., 2 H. & C. 744
39, 95, 187
Hughes v., 2 H. & C. 744
39, 95, 187
Mackev v, M. P. R. R., 18 Fed.
Rep. 236 47
Maener v. Carroll, 46 Md. 212 177
Mahoney v. A. & St. L. R. R., 63
Me. 68 133
L. C. & L. R. R. v., 7 Bush
(Kv.) 235 54, 431
v. M. R. R., 104 Mass. 73 330
N. P. R. R. v., 57 Penna. St.
187 95
Madden v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32
Minn. 303, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 63 348
Maginnis v. N. Y. C. R. R., 52
N. Y. 215 166
Mater v. A. & P. R. R., 64 Mo.
267 375
v.Vi.&St. P. Ry., 31 Minn.
401, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas 572 28
Maguire v. Middlesex R. R., 115
Masr. 239 284, 290
Maine, T. W. & W. Rr. v., 67
111. 29S 255
Mann, Davies v., 10 M. & W.
546 51
v. C. V. R. R., 55 Vt. 484,
14 Am. & Eng. R, R. Cas.
620 156
v. D. & H. C. Co.. 91 N. Y.
495, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 199 314,315,320,329,332
v. Preacher, 40 Vt. 332 502
v. S. C. & P. Ry., 46 Iowa
637 305
v. Weiand, 4 Weekly Notes
of Case9 (Penna.) 6 83, 407
Mangan v. B. C. R R., 30 N. Y.
445 68
v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Kc 239
39, 94, 9
v. B. C. R. R., 38 X. V. 456 91
Mangans, C. V. B. B. v., 61 Ml.
53, 18 Am. & Eng. R. B.
Cas. 182 264
Manknto, O'Learv?-.. 21 Minn. 65 422
Phelps v., 23 Minn. 276 422
K
Manley v. St. H. Ry. & Canal
Co., 2 H. & N. 840 149
Manser v. E. C. Ry., 3 L. T. N. S.
585 287, 238, 240
Malmsten v. M., H. & O. R. R.,
49 Mich. 94, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 291 86
Maleck v. T. G. R. R., 57 Mo. 18 114
Manson, C, C, C. & I. R. 11. v ,
:. I Ohio St 451 287
Marble v. Ross. 1 24 Mass. 44 60
Muriel 1 v. S. \V. Ry., S C. B. X.
S. 525, 98 E. C. L. 200, 225
Mantel v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 33
Minn. 62, 19 Am. &"Eng.
R. R. Cas. 362 166
Marsland, Nichols v., 2 Ex. D. 1 31
Mara, C, C. & C. R. R. v., 26
Ohio St. 185 418
March, G. & C. Co., Burrows v.,
L. R, 5 Ex. 66, 7 Id. 96 95
Marsden v. Haigh, 14 Weekly
X'otes of Cases (Penna.)
526 373
Marshall v. Y. N. & B- Ry., 11
C. B. 655, 73 E. C L'.
206, 390, 392
Hubbard v., 117 U. S. 415 454
v. Strieker, 63 Mo. 308 323
St. L., K. C. & N. R. R. v.,
78 Mo. 610, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 248 25, 466
v. C. & G. E. R. R., 4S HI.
475 418
Martin, C. C. R. R. v., 7 Colo.
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
592 367
v. G. I. P. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex.
9 217
P. G: N. Ry., 16 C. B. 179,
81 E. C. L. 48, 254
Lyons v., 8 A. & E. 502, 35
E. C. L. 102
O. & R. V. R. R. v., 14 Neb.
295, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
( as 236 178, 183
i». Stille, 3 Whart. 337 395
Thurston v., 1 Mason 197 470
Maschek v. St. L. R. R., 71 Mo.
276, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 38 35,74,112
Mason, Lucas i\, L. R. 10 Ex.
2>1 102
v. Mi. P. Ry., 27 Kans. 83,
6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
1 190, 192
Masterson r. N. Y. C. & H. R.
R. R.. 84 N. Y. 247, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
408 86, 155
Ixvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Mast in r. B. & O R. R., 14 W.
Ya. 180 205
Major, Chicago v., 18 111.349 489
Manzoni v. Douglass, 6 Q. B. D.
I I", 434
Marcelles, E. & T. C. Ry. v., 59
Tex. 334, 1- Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 231 329,369
Mans r. N. P. R. R., Dak. ,
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
620 436
Mark v. St. P., M. & M. Ry.. 30
Minn.492, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 86 50, 62
Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5 321
Manning v. B., C. B. & N. R. R.,
64 Iowa 240, 15 Am. &
Eng.R. R. Cas. 171 306
Marion v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 59
Iowa 423, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. R. Cas. 177 109, 115
Manville v. C. & T. R. R., 11
Ohio St. 417 368
Maltby v. C. & W. M. Ry., 52
'Mich. 108, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 606 156
Mahlen v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 49
Mich. 585, 14 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 687 169, 173
Manlv v. W. & W. R. R., 74 N.
C. 655 192
Marcott v. M., H. & O. Ry., 47
Mich. 1, 4 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 548 168
Marker, St. L. & S. F. R. R. v.,
41 Ark. 542 376
Marquette v. C. & N. W. Ry., 33
Iowa 562 109
Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N. Y.
396, 400 301, 373
v. S. C. R. R. 56 Ga. 274
416 423
Marten, M. P. R. R. Tex. ,'
22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
409 222
Martin, P. C & St. L. Ry. v., 82
ind. 47 (i, 8 Am. & Eng.R.
R. Cas. 253 159, 169
H. & St. J. R. R. v., 11
Bradwell 386 213
v. Wallace, 40 Ga. 52 66
Mathieson, Weeins v., 4 Macq.
H. L. 215 314
Mather, Holmes v., L. R. 10 Ex.
261 389
Matteson v. N. Y. C. R. R., 35 N.
Y. 487 240, 275, 417
Martensen v. C, R. I. & P. Ry.,
60 Iowa 705, 11 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 233 376
M., A. & B. Ry. v. Stewart, 30
Ivans. 226, L3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. ( 'as. 503 426
Massotli v. D. & 11. C. Co., 64 N.
Y. 531 159
Matthias, St. L. & S. E. Ry. v.,
50 Ind. 65 167
Matthews p. W. L. Waterworks
Co., 3 Camp. 403 120
P. R. R. v., 36 N. J. L. 531
163, 166
Mayes, M. & A. R. R. v., 49 Ga.
355 125, 133, 141
Mavo v. B. & M. R. R., 104
Mass. 137 436
Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7
Q. B. 339, 377, 53 E. C.
L. 51, 54
of Manchester, Scott v., 1 H.
& N. 59 122
of Liverpool, 14 Q. B. D.
890 103
Mayes v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 63
Iowa 562, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 527 306
M. Board of Works, Dixon v., 7
Q. B. D. 418 34, 146
McAra, C, R. I. & P. Ry. v., 52
111. 296 275
McAllister v. B. & N. W. Ry., 64
Iowa 395, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 108 191, 196
McArthur v. Green Bay Co., 34
Wise. 139 65
McCaffertv v. S. D. & P. M. R. R.,
6LN.Y. 178 122
McCall v. Forsythe, 4 W. & S. 179
390, 394
McCarthy, C. & St. P. R. R. v.,
20 111. 385 133, 141
v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 18
Kans. 45 409
McCauley, W r ard v., 4 T. R. 490 390
McClelland v. L., N. A.& C. Ry.,
94 Ind. 276, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 260 25
McClurg, P. & 0. R. R. v., 56
Penna. St. 294 250, 251, 284
McClary p. I. C. Ry , 3 Neb. 44 32
McCullough v. Shoneman, 14
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 395 102
Hemingway v., 15 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
328 102
McCully v. Clarke, 40 Penna. St.
399 406, 447, 448
McCune v. N. P. Ry., 18 Fed.
Rep. 875, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 172 305
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lx
XV1J
McCoy, L. & N. R. R. v., 81 Ky.
403, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 277 472
McComb v. N. C. R. R., 70 N. C.
178 416
McCool, O. & M. Packet Co. v.,
Ind , 8 Am. & Eng.
R, R. Cas. 390 440
McCloskey, P. R. R. v., 23 Penna.
St. 52(5 287, 492, 501
McCawley v. Furness Ry., L. R.
8 Q. B. 57 499
McCormiek, L. S. & M. S. Ry. v.,
74 Ind. 440, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 474
300, 301, 302, 306, 345, 346
McCorkle v. C, R. I. & P. R. R.,
61 Iowa 555, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 156
264, 265
McCosker v. L. I. R. R., 84 N. Y.
77, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 567 328, 344, 368
McCurdy, G. R. R. & B. Co. v.,
45 Ga. 288 286, 287
McCue, Packet Co. v., 17 Wall.
508 372
McDaniel, W. Ry. v., 107 U. S.
454 313, 470
McDade, G. R. R. & B. Co. v., 59
Ga. 73, 60 Id. 119
McDonald v. C. & N. W. R. R.,
26 Iowa 124, 29 Id. 170
250, 251, 254, 273, 431
McDonough, Schuylkill Nav. Co.
v., 33 Penna. St. 73 148
McEnery, M. C. & C. Co. v., 8
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 81, 91 Penna. St.
185 301, 373, 468
McElwee, W. C. & P. R. R. v., 67
Penna. St. 311 422
McElroy v. M. & L. R. R., 4 Cush.
400 141, 233, 240
McElmurry, A. & S. R. R. v., 24
Ga. 75 60, 160
McGinnis v. C. S. B. Co., 49 Mich.
466, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 135 301, 302, 306, 338
McGearv v. C. R. R., 135 Mass.
363, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 407 91
McGowan, Gillespie v., 100
Penna. St. 144 183, 196
v. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 61
Mo. 528 306, 323, 363
McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass.
467 65
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 59 N. Y.
468, 63 Id. 522 163, 165
McGrath v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R.,^*
Mass. , 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 5 349, 378
McGuire, Bartonshill Coal Co. v.,
3 Macq. H. L. 307 356
McFarlane v. The Queen, 7 Can.
S. C. 216 413
Mclntyre v. N. Y. C. R. R., 37
N. Y. 287 287
McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Penna. St.
218 201, 422, 454
E. & T. H. R. R. v., 99 Ind.
519, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 366 110
McKeen, L. V. R. R. v., 90 Penna.
St. 122 13, 454
McKean, C. & R. I. R. R. v., 40
111. 218 173
McKeever, M. S. R. R. v., 59 Cal.
294 404
McKenna, Gould v., 86 Penna.
St. 297 31, 47
L. & N. R. R, v., 13 Lea
(Tenn.) 280, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 276 40
McKenzie v. McLecd, 10 B. & C.
385, 25 E. C. L. 102, 104
McKinley v. C. & N. W. Ry., 44
Iowa 314 114
McKinney, Farmers' Bank v., 7
Watts 214
McKune v. C. S. R. R., Cal.
, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 589, 21 Id. 539
322, 370, 377
McLaughlin v. Pryor, 4 M. & G.
48, 43 E. C. L. 386, 388
C. & A. R. R. v., 47 111. 265 188
McLain, A. V. R. R. v., 91 Penna.
St. 442 389
McLeod, The Queen v., 8 Can. S.
C. 1, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 301 413
v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
162, 15 Id. 291 317, 355, 416
McKenzie v., 10 B. & C. 385,
25 E. C. L. 102, 104
McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn.
277 139
McLendon, S. & N. A. R. R. v.,
<i:; Ala. 266 474
McLin, I. & V. R. R. v., 82 Ind.
435, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
( as. 237 159
McManus v. Crickett, 1 East 107
108, 112
McMahon, C. C. Rv. v., 103 111.
485, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 68 111, 423
lxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
M< Mahon v. N. C. Ry., 39 Md.
!'o 69, 73, 447
McMullen, Giblin v., L. R. 2 P.
C. 335 454
McNaughton t>. C. Ry., 19 Ct. of
Sess. Ca. 271 357
McPadden v. N.Y. C. R. R., 44
N.Y.478 _ 32, 233,240
McPherson, Hamilton v., 28 N. Y.
72 460
McQueen v. C. B. U. P. Ry., 30
Kans. 6.S9, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 226 211,307
McTighe, P. R. R. v., 46 Penna.
St. 216 436
McDermott v. P. R. R., 30 Mo.
115 305
v. II. & St. J. R. R., 73 Mo.
516, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 85 314, 330, 416
McClary v. S. C. P. R. R., 3 Neb.
54 233
McDaniel, N. & C. R. R. v., 12
Lea (Tenn.) 386, 17 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 60-1 381
McDonald, B., P. & C. R. R. v.,
68 Ind. 316 280
McDonnell, B. C. P. R. R. v., 43
Md. 552 42
McDonoujrh v. M. R. R., 137
Mass. 210, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 354 291
Mel. R. R. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio St.
224, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 501 212, 371
M. C. & C. Co., McEnery v., 91
Penna. St. 185, 8 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
81 301, 373, 468
McCandliss, A., T. & S. F. R. R.
v., 33 Kans. 366, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
296 377
McKinne v. C. S. R. R.. Cal.
, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
( !as. 539 323
McKenna, L. & N. R. R. v., 7
Lea (Tenn.) 313, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 114 160
McKone v. M. C. R. R., 51 Mich.
601, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
< las. 29 219, 254
McElligott, Dist. of Col. v., 117
U. S. 621 382
McKimble v. B. & M. R. R., 139
Mass. 542, 21 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas 213 405
McNeil, N. & J. R. R. v., 61 Miss.
434, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
< 'as. 518 247
McQuilkin v. C. P. R. R., 64 Cal.
463, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 510 259
M. C. R. R., Hayes v., Ill U. S.
22S, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 394 27, 41, 198, 434
Hoar v., 70 Me. 65 188,210
v. Coleman, 28 Mich, 440
260, 264, 416
Chase v., 77 Me. 62, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 356 175, 444
v. Gilbert, 46 Mich. 176, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
230 314
v. Neubeur, 62 Md. 391, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
261 54, 163, 169
v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
101 302, 309, 346
Pzolla v., 54 Mich. 273, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
334 190, 436
White v., 61 Wise. 536, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
213 276, 424
Whitney v., 69 Me. 208 152
State v., 76 Me. 357, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 312
168, 436
Blake v., 70 Me. 60 314, 368
Howd v., 50 Miss. 178 301, 314
v Dolan, 32 Mich. 510 314, 356
Rodman v., 55 Mich. 57, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
521 346, 364, 366
Cassidy v., 76 Me. 488, 17
Am.' & Eng. R. R. Cas.
519 366, 381
Bottsford v., 33 Mich. 256 303
Bresnahan v., 49 Mich. 410,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
147 190
v. Caruth, 51 Miss. 77 469
Coolbroth v., 77 Me. 165, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
599 347
Corson v., 76 Me. 244, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
634 315
v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247 344
Hathaway v., 51 Mich. 253,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
249 346, 373
Peck v, Mich. , 19
Am. & Eng R. R. Cas.
257 105, 165
Knowlton v., 59 Wise. 278,
16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
330 65, 274
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxix
M. C. R. R.. McKone v , 51 Mich.
601, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 29 219, 254
Dakl v., 62 Wise. 652, 19
im. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
121 76
Grows v., 67 Me. 100 171
State v., 77 Me. 244, 21 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 216 405
M., C. S. & W. Ry., Bohan v., 61
Wise. 391, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 276 428
Meeks v. S. P. R. R., 52 Cal. 604 192
v. S. P. Ry, 56 Cal. 513,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
314 54, 91, 196
Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St.
137 135
Meath, Flanders v., 27 Ga. 358 74
Meek v. Penna. Co., 3S Ohio St.
632, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 643 42
Meier v. P. R. R., 64 Penna. St.
225 233, 235, 240, 246
Mellors v. Shaw, 1 B. & S. 446,
101 E. C. L. 319
Melton, L. & N. R. R. v., 2 Lea
(Tenn.) 202 167
Merrill v. C. V. R, R., 54 Vt.
200, 11 Am. &Eng. R. R.
Cas. 680 222, 372
Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs,
3 H. & N. 164, 11 H. L.
C. 686, L. R. 1 H. L. 93
37, 97, 129, 200, 201, 237, 329
Merchants' Bank, N. J. S. N.
Co. »., 6 How. 344 501, 503
v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604 454
Messmore v. N. Y. Shot Co., 40
N. Y. 422 460
Metropolitan Ry., Daniel v., L.
R. 3 C. P. 216, 591, 5 H.
L. 45 38, 129, 434, 442
Crafter !),LE.1C. P. 300 258
Gee v., L. R. 8 Q. B. 161
15, 63, 279, 280
v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App.
Cas. 198, L. R. 10 C. P.
49, 2 C. P. D. 125,
9, 24, 278, 451, 453, 454
Richardson v., L. R. 3 C. P.
374 278
Stanton v., 14 Allen 485 65
Metn. D. Ry., Woodley v., 2 Ex.
D. 384 349, 373
M. E. Rv., Lynch v., 90 N. Y.77,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
119 110
Merwin, McGrath v., 112 Mass.
467 65
Merry, Wilson v., 1 Sc. & Div.
320, 331 290, 320, 354, 383
Metz v. B. C. & P. R. R., 58 K
Y. 61 135, 136
Meyer v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 57
Iowa 555, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 527 302
v. M. P. R. R., 2 Neb. 320
36, 159, 195
v. Pacific R. R., 40 Mo. 153 54
Mehan v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R., 73
N. Y. 585 375
Messino, N. & C. R. R. v.. 1
Sneed (Tenn.) 220 207, 275
M. G. W. Ry., Broughton v., 1
I. C. L. 169 146
Cannon v., 6 Irish C. L. 199 280
M. H. & O. R. R., Malmstem v.,
49 Mich. 94, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 291 86
Greenwald v., 49 Mich. 197,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
133 338, 364, 367
Marcott v., 47 Mich. 1, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
548 16!S
Michie, C. & B. R. R. v., 83 111.
427 188, 208, 209
Middlesex R. R., Maguire v., 115
Mass. 239 284, 290
Middle Level Commrs., Collins
v., L. R. 4 C. P. 279 39, 95
Midland Ry., Alton v. 19 C. B.
N. S. 243, 115 E. C. L.
390. 391, 400, 413
Bell v., 10 C. B. N. S. 287,
100 E. C. L. 471
Blake v., 18 Q. B. 93, 83 E.
C.L. 486,491,492, 493
Degg v., 1 H. & N. 773
212, 370, 371
Gibson v., 2 Ont. (Can.) 653
302, 345, 492
Home v., L. R. 8 C. P. 131
460, 462
Mytton v., 4 H. & N. 615 137
Readhead v., L. R. 2 Q. B.
412, 4 Id. 379
118, 231, 234, 237, 24(
Tunney v., L. R. 1 C. P. 291
210, 368
Wright v., L. R. 8 Ex. 137
39, 140
Miles, L. R. & F. S. Ry. «., 40
Ark. 298, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 10
205, 275, 288, 440
Mills, N. C. Ry. v., 61 Md. 355,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
160 481
lxx
TABLE Or CASES CITED.
Miller v. P. & R. R. R-, 11
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 369 152
H. & G. N. R. R. v., 51 Tex.
270 338, 311
K. P. Ry. v., 2 Col. 442, 20
Am. Ry. Rep. 245 32, 440, 493
v. U. P. Ry., 17 Fed. Rep.
67, 12 Id. 600 307, 350, 382
v. B. & M. R. R., 128 Mass.
8, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 141 366
C. & N. W. Rv. v., 46 Mich.
532, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 89 75, 169
G. W. R. R. v., 19 Mich.
305 108
L. S. & M. S. Ry. v., 25
Mich. 274 86, 169
St. L , A. & T. H. R. R. v.,
43 111. 199 135
Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E.
737, 40 E. C. L.
102, 122, 123, 124
Millimann v. N. Y. C & H. R. R.
R., 66 N. Y. 642 74, 263, 292
Mill v. Hawker, L. R. 9 Ex. 309,
10 Id. 92 111
Mining Co., Carpenter v., 65 N.
Y. 43 134
Milam, L. & N. R. R. v., 10 Tenn.
223, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 507 158
Mills, C. W. D. Ry. v.. 105 111.
63, 11 Am. & Eng. R, R.
( as. 128 263, 274
Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry.,
106 U. S. 312 4
Miranda, C. & N. W. Ry. v., 108
111. 576, 18 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 564 384
Missouri R. R., Boland v., 36
Mo. 484 54, 69
Mitchell o. Crassweller, 13 C. B.
237, 76 E. C. L. 102, 104
v. Alestree, 1 Ventr. 295 434
C. R. R. v., 63 Ga. 177, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
145 305, 383
v. C & G. T. Ry., 51 Mich.
236, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 176
262, 265, 270, 434, 443
Raisin v., 9 C. & P. 613, 38
E. C. L. 54
Ravner v., 2 C. P. D. 357 102
r. W. & A. R. R., 30 Ga. 22 263
R. R. v., 11 Heisk. 400 439
Millikens, U. P. R. R. v., 8 Kans.
647 313
M. K. & T. R. R., Brown v., 64
Mo. 536 20b
Doss v., 59 Mo. 27, 8 Am.
Ry. Rep. 462 220, 264, 471
v. Long. 27 Kans. 684 156
v. "Weaver, 16 Kans. 456 470
M. L. S. & W. Rv., Howland v.,
54 Wise. 226, 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 578 349, 368
Bohen v., 58 Wise. 30, 15
Am. & Ent>'. R. R. Cas.
374, 61 Wise. 391, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
276 167
Bussian v., 56 Wise. 325, 10
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 716
152, 508
M. N. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101 146
Mobile L. Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95
U. S. 754 399
Mock, C, & A. R. R. v., 88 111.
87 434
Modglin, 1. C. R. R. v., 85 111.
481 196, 377
Moffatt v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P.
C. 115 293
Mohnev v. Cook, 26 Penna. St.
342 65
Monaghan, C. & P. S. Ferry Co.
v., 10 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 46 282, 440
Monday, Indiana R. R. v., 21 Ind.
48 501
Moon v. R. & A. R. R., 78 Va.
745, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 531
S. Ex. Co. v., 39 Miss. 822 501
Moore r. N. Ry., L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 110
G. R. R.V, 59 Tex. 64
v. P. R R,, 11 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 310, 99
Penna. 301, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 569 73, 190, 196
v. F. R. R., 4 Gray 465 108
v. P., W. & B. R. R., 16
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 53 157, 169, 193
v. C, St. L. & N. O. R. R.,
59 Miss. 243, 9 Am. &
Eng. R. R, Cas. 401 416
T. W. & W. Ry. v., 77 111.
217 299, 306, 446
R. & D. R. R. v., 78 Va. 93,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
239 307
A., T. & S. F. Rv. v., 29 Kans.
632, 11 Am." & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 243, 31 Kans. 197,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
312 329, 369
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxi
Moore v. W., St. L. & P. Ev., 84
Mo. 481, 21 Am. & Eng.
K. K. Cas. 509 347
C, H. & H. Ry. v., 59 Tex.
64, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 745 91
v. C. R. R., 47 Iowa 688 169
Rapho v., 68 Penna. St. 404 148
Morgan, P. R. R. v., 82 Penna.
St. 135 195
v. V. of N. Ry., 5 B. & S.
570, 117 E. C. L., L. R. 1
Q. B. 149 360, 368
Morey v. L. V. Coal Co., 55 Iowa
671 349
Morison, Joel v., 6 C. & P. 501,
25 E. C. L. 102
Moriartv v. L. C. & D. Ry., L.
R. 5 Q. B. 314 423
Morrison v. Davis, 20 Penna. St.
171 31
v. Erie Ry., 56*N. Y. 302 103
Morganstern, I. & St. L. Ry. v.,
106 111. 216, 12 Am. &
En 2 . R. R. Cas. 228 364
Morris v. E. R. R., 126 Mass. 377 196
v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo.
380 54
R. & D. R. R. v., 31 Gratt.
200 265
v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 45 Iowa
29 191, 196, 469
v. C, R. I. & P. Rv., 65 Iowa
727, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 180 409
v. Lichfield, 35 N H. 271 65
Morse v. Duncan, U. S. C. C S.
D. Miss., 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 374 466
M. & St. L. Ry. v., 30 Minn.
465, 11 Am. & Ens. R. R.
Cas. 168 349, 420, 421, 422
v. Slue, 1 Ventr. 238 498
Moss v. P. R. R., 49 Mo. 167 313, 314
Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall.
434 471
Mowery, I. R. R. v., 36 Ohio St.
418, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 361 15, 62, 274, 439
Montgomery, L. & M. M. Ry. v-,
7 Ind. 475 48
Moranda, U. & N. W. Ry. v., 93
111.302 370
Moyer, Norristown v., 67 Penna.
St. 355 148
Mooney v. II. R. R. R., 5 Robert-
son (N. Y.) 48 86
Moon v. R. & A. R. R., 78 Va.
745, 17 Am.& Eng. R. R.
Cas. 531 324, 369, 370
Montclair r. Dana, 107 U. S. 162 454
M. P. R. R, Mackey v., 18 Fed.
Rep. 236 47
Mever v., 2 Neb 320 36, 159, 195
Yawter v., 84 Mo. 679, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
176 409
v. Wilson, 28 Kans. 639 160
v. Marten, Tex. , 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
409 282
Nagel v., 75 Mo. 653, 10
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
7U2 69, 186, 480
Hall v., 74 Mo. 298, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 106
329, 369
v. Condon, 78 Mo. 567, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
583 330, 369
Collier v., 62 Tex. 318, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
281 276
v. Halev, 25 Kans. 35, 5 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 594
299, 319, 383
v. Lyde, 57 Tex. 505, 11 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 188
346, 376, 432
Mason v., 27 Kans. S3, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1
190, 192
v. Nichols, 8 Kans. 505 217
Powell v., 76 Mo. SO, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 467
158, 169
Rucker v., 61 Tex. 499, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
245 283
Rutter v., 81 Mo. 169, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
21 2 406
M. R. R. v. Blakelv, 59 Ala. 477 233
Festal v., 109 Mass. 720 275, 439
Mahoney v., 104 Mass. 73 380
Nichols v., 106 Mass. 463 274
Oram v., 112 Mass. 38 274
Wilton v., 107 Mass. 108, 125
Id. 130 209
Brown v., 64 Mo. 536 188
v. B. & C. R. R., 115 Mass.
347 133
Geddes v., 103 Mass. 391 282
Dougherty c, 81 Mo. 325, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
497 282, 440
M. Rv., Dawson v., 7 H. & N.
1037 274,439
Cliff v., L. R. 5 Q. B. 258
165, 166
lxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
M. Ry., Phyfe v., 30 Hun (N. Y.)
277 25
King y., 11 Fed. Rep. 277, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. ('as.
119 330, 3G9
Lowery »., 99 N. Y. 158 20, 152
Levov v., 3 Ont. 623, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 478 166
Foulkes «., 4 C. P. D. 267, 5
Id. 157 217,218,206,269,390
McDonough v., 137 Mass.
210, 21 Am. &Eng. R. R.
Cas. 354 291
Potter v., 30 L. T. N. S. 765,
32 Id. 36 400
Searles v., 101 N. Y. 661
435, 441
M. R. & L. E. Ry., Whaalan v., 8
Ohio St. 249 356, 368
v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541 301
M. Ry. & C. Co , Perren v., 11 C.
B. 855, 73 E. C. L. 396
M. St. Ry., Dahlberg v., 32 Minn.
404, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 202 285
v. O, M. & St. P. Ry., 33
Minn. 62, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 362 168
M. S. & L. Ry., Austin v., 10 C.
B. 473, 70 E. C. L. 498
Bayley v., L. R. 7 C. P.
415, 8 Id. 148 106, 108, 109
Gill v., L. R. 8 Q. B. 186 217
Rigg v., 12 Jur. N. S. 525 259
M. S. R. R. v. McKeever, 59 Cal.
294 404
M. S. & N. J. R. R. v. Lantz, 29
Ind. 528 240
Woodward v., 10 Ohio St.
121 409
M. S. & N. I. Ry., Eissell v., 22 N.
Y. 258 43, 138, 414
M. S., J. & A. Ry. v. Fullerton,
14 C. B. N. S. 54, 108 E.
C. L. 151, 153
Muhling, O. & M. R. R. v., 30
111. 9 207, 210
Mulhado v. B. C. R. R., 30 N. Y.
370 274, 424
Mulhair, W. P. P. Ry. Co. v., 6
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 508 434
Muldowney v. I. C R. R., 36
Iowa 462, 39 Id. 615
50, 373, 374, 376
Mulherrin, D , L. & W. R R. v.,
44 Penna. St. 375, 81 Id.
300 190, 227, 228
Mullen v. P. & S. M. S. S. Co., 78
Penna. St. 25 320, 322, 416
Mulliner, W. E. Canal Co. v., 68
Penna. St. 357 146
Munger, T. K. R. v., 5 Denio 267 50
Muim v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 130 4
Munroe, C. & A. R. R. v., 85 111.
25 373
Munson, Improvement Co. v., 14
Wall. 442 454
Durgin v., 9 Allen 396 305
Mumford, C. C. Ry. v., 97 111. 560,
3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
312 274, 290
Murch v. C. R. R., 29 N. II. 9 '
L38, 251, 292
Murdock v. B. & A. R. R., 133
Mass. 15, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 406 395, 467
Murphy v. Crossan, 98 Penna. St.
495 300
v. B. & A. R. R., 88 N. Y.
140, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
( as. 510 306, 369
v. Deane, 101 Mass. 466 436
v. C , R. I. & P. R. R., 45
Iowa 661 436
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 88
N. Y. 445, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 490 493
v. Smith, 19 C. B. N. S. 361,
115 E. C. L. : 120, 340
v. St. L. & I. M. Ry., 71 Mo.
202 314
C, & A. R. B. R. v., 53 111.
336 368
B.&A.R.R.?>.,133Mass.l21 179
Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C. P.
24 102, 122
v. Phillips, 35 L. T. 477 300
Randleson v., 8 A. & E. 109,
35 E. C. L. 99, 123
v. S. C. R. R., 1 McMullan
385 350, 356, 366
Muschamp v. L. & P. Ry., 8 M. &
W. 421 137
Muster v. C , M. & St. P. Ry., 61
Wise. 325, 18 Am. & Eng.
R.R. Cas. 113
102, 256,299, 318,443
Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass.
512 70
M. V. R. R., Smith v., 13 Minn.
30 372
Myers v. Snyder, Brightly N. P.
489 148
C. V. R. R. v., 55 Penna. St.
288 212, 371
Emblen v., 6 II. & N. 54 471
II. & T. C. R. R. v., 55 Tex.
110, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. U 314,346,374
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxiii
Myers v. R. & D. R. R., 87 X. C.
345, 8 Am. & Eng. K. R.
Czs. 293 152
Myttcn v. Midland Ry., 4H.&
N. 615 137
M. & A. R. R. v. Mayes, 40 Ga.
355 125, 133, 141
M. &. C. R. R. v. Green, 52 Miss.
779 460
v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176 31
v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637
374, 375
Ragsdale v.. 3 Baxter (Tenn.)
426 323
Atkinson v., 15 Ohio St. 21 134
v. Hunter, 11 Wise. 160 156
v. Whitrield, 44 Miss. 466 257
v. Copeland, 01 Ala. 3. 6
266 283
M. & B. R. R., Salter v., 88 N.'
Y. 42, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 437 159
M. & I. Ry., Gillenwater v., 5
Ind. 339 208
M. & E. R. R., Haslan v., 4
Vroom 147 168
State v., 25 X J. L. 437 151
M. & L. R. R., Smith v., 18 Fed.
Rep. 304 367. 374
Gavett v., 16 Gray 501 63, 265
v. Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 32,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
374 135, 264
M. & M. R. R. v. Finney, 10
Wise. 388 108, 416
v. Ashcroft, 48 Ala. 16, 49
Id. 305 276, 420, 471
Ball » , 67 Ala. 206 ' 367
Chamberlain v., 11 Wise.
238 216, 355, 369
Smoot v., 67 Ala. 13 303
v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 363
v. Crenshaw, 65 Ala. 566, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
310 69
Donaldson v., 18 Iowa 280
431, 432, 493
M. & O. R. R. v. Taft, 28 Mich.
289 314
Rogers v., Lea (Tenn.) ,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
412 135
v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672 306
v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. N. S.
489 502, 503
M. & P. R. R., Cooper v., 23
Wise. 668 315
Wilson v., 18 Ind. 226 367
M. & P., r. C. U. R., Spencer v.,
17 Wise. 187 285
M. £ P., M. C. R. R., Delamatyr
v., _4 Wise. 578 264
Langhoff v , 19 Wise. 4S9 159
M. & St. L. Ry., Schemer v., 32
Minn. 125, 518, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 173
19i, 431, 432, 492
Fay v., 30 Minn. 231, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
193 309, 330
Freeman v., 28 Minn. 443, 7
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
410 133
Greene v., 31 Minn. 248, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
214 306
Madden v., 32 Minn. 303, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
63 348
Ransier v., 32 Minn. 331, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
601 307, 337
Russell v., 32 Minn. 230 377
Sweeney v., 33 Minn. 153,
22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
302 374
Tierney v., 33 Minn. 311, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
543 330, 347, 369
Eldredge v., 32 Minn. 253,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
454 443
Brown v., 31 Minn. 553, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
333 366
v. Morse, 30 Minn. 465, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
168 349, 420, 421, 422
Kolsti v., 32 Minn. 133, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
140 186
M. & S. Kv, Whittaker v., L. R.
5GP. 464 n. 261,262
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U. S.
495 8, 471
Butler v., 28 Wise. 4S7 166, 173
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,
475 10, 13
Lucas v., 33 Wis. 41 209, 210
Keffe v., 21 Minn. 207 186
Rothe v., 21 Wise. 256 173
Schmidt v., 23 Wise. 186
28, 69, 19S
M. & W. R. R. v. Davis, 18 Ga.
679, 19 Id. 437 54
v. Davis, 27 Ga. 113 60
v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409 284
Sims v., 28 Ga. 93 193
v. Winn, 19 Ga 440 54
v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 15
lxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
M. & W. P. R. U. v. Boring, 51
Ga. 582 134
Nagel t>. M. P. Rv., 75 Mo. 653,
in Am &Eng.E. R. Cas.
702 69, 186, 480
Nagle v. A. V. R. E., 88 Penna.
St. 35 70
Napheys, U. L. & W. R. R. ?;.,
90 Penna. St. 135, 1 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 52
270, 271, 443
Naylor v. C. & N. W. Ry., 53
Wise. 661, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 460 343, 349
N. A. & H. Ry., Hicks v., 4 B.
6 S. 403 n., 1 1 6 E. C. L. 494
N. A. & S. R. R., Fitzpatrick v.,
7 Ind. 436 367
N. B. Cordage Co., Coombs v.,
102 Mass. 522 338
N. B. & T. R. R., Lucas v.,
Gray 65 220
N. B. R. R., Ladd v., 119 Mass.
412 306, 307
N. B. & M. R. R., Wheaton v.,
36 Cal. 593 233
N. C. C. R. R., Hardy v., 74 N.
C. 734 303
N. C. R. R., Lambeth v., 66 N.
C. 494 264, 287
McComb v., 70 N. C. 178 416
Welker v., 1 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 210 31
Shauck v., 25 Md. 462 323
Turner v., 63 N. C. 522 65
Poole v., 8 Jones (N. C.) 340 75
v. Husson, 13 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 361, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
241 346
Gibson v., 22 Hun 289 335, 367
Painton v., 83 X. Y. 7, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
454 307, 346
Hawley v., 82 N. Y. 370, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
24S 3U5, 375, 382
v. Mills, 61 Md. 355, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
160 481
r. The State, 29 Md. 420 29
N. C. Ry., McMahon v., 39 Md.
69, 73, 447
v. State, 54 Md. 113, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 66 170
Ilanratliy v., 46 Md. 280 307
N., C. & St. L. R. R. v. Wheless,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 741, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
633, 15 Id. 315 346, 367
N., C. & St. L. R R., Jackson v.,
13 Lea (Tenn.) 491, 19
Am & Eng. R. R. Cas.
433 24, 151
v. Foster, Tenn. , 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
180 335, 367
N. Co., Stiles v., 33 L. J. N. S.
311 145
Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2
Black (S. C.) 590 473
Needham v. S. F. & S. J. R. R.,
37 Cal. 409 54
v. G. T. R. R., 38 Vt. 294 486
Nehrbas v. C. P. R. R., 62 Cal.
320, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 370 166
Neir v. W. P. Ry., 12 Mo. App.
35 481
Nelson v. A. & P. R. R., 68 Mo.
593 55, 265
v. V. C. R. R., 26 Vt. 717
133 141
v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 60
Wise. 320, 22 Am. & Eng.
R.R. Cas. 391 373
N. E. Rv., Dickinson v., 2 H. &
C. 735 492
Buxton v., L. R. 3 Q. B. 549 138
Graham v., 18 C. B. N. S.
229,1 14 E. C. L. 221, 308,372
Hall v., L. R. 10 Q. B. 437
500, 502
Hammond v., 6 S. C. 130 216
Hetherington v.. 9 Q. B. D.
160 489
Holmes v., L. R. 4 Ex. 254,
6 id. 123 223, 372
Reynolds v., Roscoe's N. P.
591 217
Robson v., L. R. 2 Q. B. D.
87, 10 Id. 371
266, 26S, 451, 454
Sykes v., 32 L. T. N. S. 199 489
Swainson v., 3 Ex. D. 341 372
Thompson v., 2 B. & S. 106,
110 E.G. L. 17, 54, 200
Rose v., 2 Ex. D. 248 266, 268
Oliver v., L. R. 9 Q. B. 409 156
Waite v., El. Bl. & El. 729,
96 E. C. L. 84, 88, 94
Wanless v., L. R. 6 Q. B. 481 164
Neubeur, M. C. R. R. v., 62 Md.
391, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
< as. 261 54, 163, 169
Newbold, Lygo v., 8 Ex. 302 91
Newell, C, C, C. & I. R. R. v., 75
Ind. 542, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 377
240, 275, 276, 439
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxv
PAGE
Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 260 130
Newsome, G. R. R. v., 60 Ga.
492, 66 Id. 57 151, 416
Newson, Randall v., 2 Q. B. D.
102 233
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 29 N. Y.
3S3 224
New River Co., Drew v., 6 C. &
P. 754, 25 E. C. L. 148
New Gas Co., Allen v., 1 Ex. D.
251 356
Newberry, Kevstone Bridge Co.
v., 96 Penna St. 243 323
Nevin v. P. P. C. Co., 106 111.
222, 11 Am. &Eng. R. R.
( las. 92 391
N. H. R. R., Chapman v., 19 N.
Y. 341 86
N. H. & N. Co., Coplev v., 136
Mass. 6, 19 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 373 173
N. H. S. & T. Co. v. Yanderbilt,
1 6 Conn. 421 54
N. H. & N. R. R., Gardner v., 51
Conn. 143, IS Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 170 188, 208, 209
Town of Hamden v., 27
Conn. 158 412
Keith i'., 140 Mass. 175, 23
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
421 310
Nichols v. Marsland, 2 Ex. D.
1 31
v. M. R. R., 106 Mass. 463 274
v. .Smith, 115 Mass. 332 136
M. P. Ry. v., 8 Kans. 505 217
Nicholls v. G. S. & W. Ry., 7 Ir.
C. L. 40 262
v. G. W. Ry., 27 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 382 86
Nicholson v. L. & Y. Rv., 3 H. &
C. 534 255
v. Erie Ry., 41 N. Y. 525
40, 177, 178
v. Willan, 5 East 507 498
Nickerson, Severy v., 120 Mass.
306 177
Nickless, O. & M. Ry. v., 71 Ind.
271 205, 208
Nitro-Pliosphate Co. v. L. S. &
St. K. Co., L. R. 9 Ch. D.
503 41
Nieto v. Clark, 1 Clif. 145 114
Nix, S. C. R. R. v.. 68 Ga. 572
27, 409
N. J. R. R.. Bennett v., 36 N. J.
Law 22.") 86
Brokaw v., 3 Vroom 328 108
v. Kennard, 21 Penna. St.
203 284
N. J. R. R., Liscomb v., 6 Lans. 75 254
v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341 282, Uo
v. Palmer, 4 Vroom (N. J.)
90 136, 242
West v., 3 Vroom 91 166
N. J. R. & T. Co., Pollard v., 101
U. S. 223 395
N. J. S. Co., Caldwell v., 47 N.
Y. 290 235
N. J. S. N. Co., Dorr v., 4 Sandf.
S. C. 136 501
Hall v., 15 Conn. 539 502
v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.
344 501, 503
N. J. S. Co., Cleveland v., 68 N.
Y. 306 204, 213
N. K. Rv., Withers v., 3 H. &
N. 969 29, 32
N. L. Rv., Bridges v., L. R. 6 Q.
B. 377, 7 H. L. 232
6, 261, 262, 266, 268, 450, 454
N. M. R. R., Kennedy v., 36 Mo.
351 54
N. N. Co., Emerson v., 2 Ont,
(Can.) 528 110
Noell, B. & O. R. R. v., 32 Grat.
394 493
Noel, P. C. & St. L. R. R. v., 77
Ind. 1 1 0, 7 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 524 436
Nolan v. B. C. & N. R. R., 87 N.
Y. 63, 3 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 463 290
Nolthenis, Street R R. v., 40
Ohio St. 376, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 191 150
Nolton v. W. R. R., 15 N. Y. 444 216
N. O. M. Ins. Co. v. N. O., J. &
G. N. R. R, 20 La. 302 501
N. O. R. R. v. Statham, 42 Miss.
607 263, 292
N. O. C. R. R-, Wardle v., 35 La.
An. 202, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 60 274
N. O. & C. R. R., Damont v., 9
La. An. 441 63, 265
Herrmann v., 11 La. An. 5 398
Hubeuer v., 23 La. An. 492 265
Hubgh v., 6 La. An. 495
306, 374, 398
Varillat v., 10 La. An. 88 471
Weeks v., 32 La. An. 615 74
Norton, L. S. N. R. R. v., 24
Penna. St. 465
56, 60, 61, 190, 191
v. E. R. E., 113 Mass. 366 153
Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Penna.
St. 355 148
Northrop v. Ry. P. A. Co., 43 N.
Y. 516 241
lxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
N. O., J. & G. N. R. R., N. O.
M Ins. Co. v., 20 La. 302 501
v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 224
Albritson, 33 Miss. 242 274, 439
v. Hurst, 36 -Miss. 660 467, 471
N. O., J. & N. Ry. v. Hughes, 49
.Miss. 258 314
N. O., J. & S. R. R., Laicher v.,
28 La. An. 320 75
N. O., M. & C. R. R, v. Hanning,
15 Wall. 649 123, 201
N. O., St. L. & C. R. R. v. Burke,
53 Miss. 200 281
N. O. & N. E. R. R. i>. Reese, 61
Miss. 5S1 122
N. P. Ry., Herbert v., Dak. ,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
85, 116 U.S. 642 307,331
Kresanowski v., 18 Fed. Rep.
229 374
McCune v, 18 Fed. Rep.
875, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 172 305
Gilmore v., 18 Fed. Rep.
866, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 304 323, 329, 369
N. P. R. R., Drayton v., 10 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 55 152
v. Heilman, 49 Penna. St. 60 168
v. Kirk, 90 Penna. St. 15, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 45
230, 490, 494
v. Mahoney, 57 Penna. St.
187 95
Mares v., Dak. , 17 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 620 436
Finney v., Dak. , 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
17 454
Ricard v., 89 Penna. St. 1 95
228, 229
v. Robinson, 44 Penna. St.
175 151, 486
Wilson v,, 26 Minn. 278
15, 233, 436
N. P. & O. C. M. Co. v. L. & St.
K. Docks Co., 9 Ch. D.
515 33
N. Ry., Edgar v., 4 Ont. (Can.)
201, 16 Am. &Eng.-R. R.
Cas. 347 ; 11 Ont. App. 452,
22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
433 262, 264, 266
Alexander v., 33 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 474, 35 Id. 453 502
Moore v , L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 110
Watson v., 24 Up. Can. (Q. B.)
98 286
N. R. Co., Hill v., 9 B. & S. 303
39, 95
N. R. R., Fifield v., 42 N. H. 225
305, 344
Fuller v., 21 Conn. 557 263, 481
Wylde v., 53 N. Y. 156 413
N. S. Ry., Peek v., 10 IT. L.
473 499
N. S. S. I. Ferry, Crocberon v.,
56 N. Y. 656 258
Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. D. 425,
444 29, 31
Nurdin, Lynch v , 1 Q. B. 29, 41
E. C. L. 39, 66, 90, 94, 187
N. Y. C. R. R., Alden v., 26 N.
Y. 102 235, 240
Bissell v., 25 N. Y. 442 502
Boldt v., 18 N. Y. 432 356, 375
Bowen v., 18 N. Y. 408 246
Brown v., 34 N. Y. 404, 32
Id. 600 166, 246, 275
Buel v., 31 N. Y. 314 15, 62
Bryan v., 31 Barb. 335 86
Cragin v., 51 N. Y. 64 502
Deyo v., 34 N. Y. 9 47
v. Lock wood, 17 Wall 357
8, 204, 233, 501, 505
Denny v., 13 Gray 481 31
Matteson v., 35 N. Y. 487
240, 275, 417
Perkins v., 24 N. Y. 196 8, 502
Mackay v., 35 N. Y. 75 166
Poucher v., 49 N. Y. 263 502
Richardson v., 45 N. Y. 846 166
Richardson v., 98 Mass. 85 409
Beisiegel v., 40 N. Y. 9
157, 162, 163
Smith v., 24 N. Y. 222 502, 503
Reed v., 56 Barb. 493, 45 N.
Y. 574 240, 420, 421, 422
Stinson v., 32 N. Y. 333 502
Sutton v., 66 N. Y. 243 177, 178
Wells v., 24 N. Y. 181 502
Hamilton v , 51 N. Y. 100 416
Owen v., 1 Lans. 108 302, 345
Wright v., 25 N. Y. 565
323, 356
Lanning v., 49 N. Y. 521
314, 330, 382
Mclntyre v., 37 N. Y. 287 287
McPadden v., 44 N. Y. 478
32, 235, 240
Renwick v., 36 N. Y. 132
163, 169
McGrath v., 59 N. Y. 468,
63 Id. 522 163, 165
W T eber v., 58 N. Y. 459 163
Maginnis v., 52 N. Y. 215 166
Newson v., 29 N. Y. 383 224
Dillave v., 56 Barb. 30 253
Lucas v., 21 Barb. [N. Y.)
245 398
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxx
XV11
N. Y. C. K. E., Stillvvell v., 34
N. Y. 29 166, 419
Hulburt v., 40 N. Y. 145 253
N. Y. C. & H.. R. R.R., Hoffman
v., 75 N. Y. 605 253
v. Hoffman. 87 N. Y. 25, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
537 109, 189
Kin-? v , 66 N. Y. 181 122
Cosgrove v., 87 N. Y. 88, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 35
160, 161
Connelly v., 88 N. Y. 346, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
459 170
Davis v., 47 N. Y. 400 169
Clesthorn v., 56 N. Y. 44 314
Jones v.. 28 Hun 364, 92 N.
Y. 628 310
Keating v., 49 N. Y. 673 273
Keating v., 98 N. Y. 128 263
Pakalinsky v., 82 N. Y. 424,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
251 162, 163
Stackus v., 79 N. Y. 464 169
Thorpe v., 76 N. Y. 402 136, 243
Schwier v., 90 N. Y. 558, 14
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
656 193
Murphy v., 88 N. Y. 445, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R Cas.
490 493
Barry v., 98 N. Y. 289, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R Cas.
615 69, 162, 179
Dowling v., 90 N. Y. 670, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 73 69
Reynolds v., 58 N. Y. 248
69, 70
Bvrne v., 83 N. Y. 620 69
Wendell v., 91 N Y. 420 73
Filer v., 49 N. Y. 47, 59 Id.
351 18,103,264,287,473
Waldete v., 95 N. Y. 275, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
400 418
Besel v. 70 N. Y. 171, 9
Bun 457 -818,368,369
Piper v., 56 N. Y. 630 306
King v., 72 N. Y. 607 306
Gale v., 76 N. Y. 594 470
Kellogg v., 79 N. Y. 72 169, 494
Hoffman v., 44 N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1 445
Disher v , 94 N. Y. 622, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
233 301,307
Kirkpatrick v., 79 N. Y. 240 306
DeGraff" v., 76 N. Y. 125
235, 307, 373
N. Y. C. & H. R. R., Harvey v.,
88 N. Y. 481, 8 Am. & Eng
R. R. Cas. 5i5 316,338
Sheehan v., 91 N. Y. 332, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
235 317
Peck v., 70 N. Y. 587 107
Byrne v.,. 94 N. Y. 12 160,161
Cordell v., 64 N. Y. 535, 70
Id. 119, 75 Id. 330
160, 171, 434
Culhane v., 60 N. Y. 133 427
Casey v., 78 N. Y. 518 416
Bras'sell v., 84 N. Y. 241, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
380 254, 257
Waterbury v., 17 Fed. Rep.
671 188, 208, 210, 287, 445
Sauter v., 66 N. Y. 50
28, 431, 480
Ross v., 74 N. Y. 617 211, 369
Masterson v., 84 N. Y. 247,
3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
408 86, 155
v. Vick, 95 N. Y 267, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
609 211
Robinson v., 66 N. Y. 11, 9
Fed. Rep. 877, 20 Blatch.
338 86, 238, 240, 275, 439
Millimann v., 66 N. Y. 642
74, 263, 292
Armstrong v., 64 N. Y. 635 257
Bucher v., 98 N. Y. 128, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
361 263, 264, 287
Hofnagle v., 55 N. Y. 608 122
Nye, Hyman v., 6.Q. B. D. 185 233
N. Y. E. R. R., Weston v., 75 N.
Y. 595 254
N. Y. & E. R. R., Hibbard v., 15
N.Y. 455 215,250
Oliver v., 1 Edm. S. C. 589 240
v. Young, 33 Penna. St. 175 146
Ransom v., 15 N. Y. 415 474
N. Y., N. H. & II. R. R. R., Peck
v , 50 Conn. 379, 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 633
87, 164, 168
N. Y, N. H. & H. R. R., People
v., 89 N. Y 266, 10 Am. &.
Eng. R R. Cas. 230 155
Weeks v., 72 N. Y. 50 281
N.Y. & II. R. R., Edgerton v.,
39 N.Y. 227 274, 2S6, 292, 439
Baulec v., 59 N. Y. 356 314, 315
Saurmon v., 02 X. Y. 251 374
Oldheld v., 3 E. D. Smith
103, 14 N.Y. 310 436, 489
Gonzales v., 50 How. Pr. 126 265
lxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
N. Y. & II. R. R., Smith v., 19 N.
Y. 2a7 240, 246, 301, 372
Kessenger v., 56 N, Y. 543
163, 166
Jetter v., 2 Abb. Ct. App.
Dec. 458 310
N. Y. & N. H. R. R., Coleman v.,
106 Mass. 160 108
Judson v., 29 Conn. 434 156
Hughes v., 36 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
222 445
Colegrove v., 20 N. Y. 492, 6
Duer 382 86, 282, 286, 413
Isbell v., 27 Conn. 393 54
Lawrence v., 36 Conn. 63 502
Hood v., 22 Conn. 1, 23 Id.
609 44, 139
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.,
25 Conn. 265 399
Daily i'., 32 Conn. 356 418
N.Y, L. E. & W. R. R, Strohm
v., 96 N. Y. 305 473
Debevoise v., 98 N. Y. 377
410
v. Haring, 47 N. J. L., 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
436 43
Knight v., 99 N. Y. 25 28
v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. L.
161 86
v. Daugherty, 11 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
437 240, 246. 274, 439
Ellis v., 95 N. Y. 546, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
641 303, 307, 337
v. Powers, 98 N. Y. 274, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
609 307, 374
Seybolt v., 95 N.Y. 562, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
162 216, 274, 435, 439, 503
Gottleib v , 29 Hun (N. Y.)
637, 100 N. Y. 462 309, 311
N. Y. & N. E. R. R., Darrigan v.,
52 Conn. 285, 23 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 438 323
Tyler v., 137 Mass. 238, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
297 169
McGrath v., Mass. , 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
5 349, 378
N.Y. & W. Tel. Co. v. Dryburgh,
35 Penna. St. 298 99
N.Y. S. & W. R. R., Smith v.,
46 N. J. L. 7, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 399 39
N.Y. Shot ( a., Messmore v.,
40 N.Y. 422 460
N. Y. C. S. C. Co., Walton v., 139
Mass. 556, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 600, note
105, 256
N. & C. R. R. v. Erwin, Tenn.
, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 465 15, 62, 286, 287
v. Eakin, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.)
582 409
v. Smith, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 470,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
469 191
v. Stevens, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
12 492, 493
v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 852 409
Washburn v., 3 Head (Tenn.)
638 374
v. McDaniel, 12 Lea (Tenn.)
386, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 604 381
v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)
347 60, 370
Sprayberry v., 8 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 341 139
v. Smith, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)
174 167
v. Messino, 1 Sneed (Tenn.)
220 207, 275
N. & D. R. R. v. Jones, 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 27 306
N. & G. Water-works Co., Atkin-
son v., L. R. 6 Ex. 404, 2
Ex. D. 441 42
N. & J. R. R. v. McNeil, 61 Miss.
434, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 518 247
N. & L. R R., McElroy v., 4
Cush. 400 141, 233, 240
N. & N. Y. T. Co.. Flint v., 34
Conn. 554 281
N. & P. R. R. v. Ormsby, 27
Gratt. 455 91
N. & W. R. R-, Flint v., 110
Mass. 222 152
Daley v., 26 Conn. 591 91
Oakland Ry. v. Fielding, 48
Penna. St. 320 68, 148, 150
Oaks, G. R. R. & B. Co. v., 52
Ga. 410 375
Oakman, Sawyer v., 7 Blatch. C.
C. 290 65
Oastler, Watling v., L. R. 6 Ex.
73 95, 344
Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347 145
O'Brien v. B. & W. R. R., 15
Gray 20 215
O. B. Coal Co. v. Read, 5 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
3 305
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxix
O'Connor v. B. & L. R. R., 135
Mass. 352, 15 Am. & Eng.
E. R Cas. 362 09, 70, 156, 180
v. Pittsburgh, 18 Penna. St.
187 146
Smith v., 48 Penna. St, 218
QS, 71, 193
O. C. R. R., Todd v., 3 Allen 18,
7 Id. 207 207 284
Warden »., 137 Mass. 204,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
612 304, 306
O. C. & N. R. R., Gavnor v., 100
.Mass. 208 173, 257, 266
Sweeny v., 10 Allen (Mass.)
368 148, 163
Southworth v., 105 Mass.
342 154
O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R., 50
Penna. St. 490, 59 Id. 239
211, 240,286, 288, 305, 313
v. P. & W. R. R., 6 R. I.
211 160
O' Flaherty v. W. R. R., 45 Mo.
70 77
Ogden, C. C. R. R. v., 3 Colo. 499
329, 379
Ogier, P. R. R. v., 35 Penna. St.
60 162, 174
Ogle v. P., W. & B. R. R., 3
Houston 267 151
O'Hara, B., P. & W. R. R. ».,
12 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 473 207, 208, 501
Ohrbv i'. Uyde Commrs., 5 B. &
" S. 743, 117 E. C. L. 200
Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson, 99
Penna. St. 1 39
O'Keefe v. C, R. I. & P. R. R.,
32 Iowa 467 60
Oldfield v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 3
E. D. Smith 103, 14 X.
Y. 310 436, 439
O'Learv v. Mankato, 21 Minn.
65 422
Oliver, Briggs v., 4 II. & C. 408 200
v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 1 Edm.
S. C. 589 240
v. N. E. Rv., L. R. 9 Q. 15.
409 156
O'Mara v. H. R. R. R., 38 N. Y.
445 163, 167
Onion, Holmes v., 2 C. B. N. S.
790, 89 E. C. L. 103
O'Neill v. K. A D. M. Ry., 45
Iowa 546 374
O'Neil r. St. L., I. M. & S. R.
R., 9 Fed. Rep. 337 309
Oram v. M. R. R., 112 Mass. 38 274
H. & T. Ry. v., 49 Tex. 341 308
Ormond v. Holland, El. Bl. &
El. 102, 96 E. C. L. 297
Ormsby, N. A P. R. R. v., 27
< rratt. 455 91
Orr, Hvdraulic Works v., 83
Penna. St. 332 184, 196
L. & N. R. R. i'., 84 Ind. 50,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
94 300 306
O'Rorke v. U. P. Ry., Colo.
, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 19 347
O. Ry. & N. Co., Willis v., 11
Oregon 257, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 539 323, 368
Walsh v., 10 Oregon 250 308
O. R. R., King v. (U. S. C. C.
Ind.), 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 119 377
Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88 397
Osborne v. K. & L. R. R., 68
Me. 49 370
Ostertag v. P. R. R., 64 Mo. 421 73
Overton v. Freeman, 11 C. B.
867, 73 E. C L. 122
State v., 4 Zab. 438 215, 251
Owen v. Burnett, 4 Tyr. 133 7
Day v., 5 Mich. 520 251
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 1 Lans.
103 302, 345
v. Brocksmidt, 54 Mo. 285 493
Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 117 42
Owston, Bank of New South
Wales c, 4 App. Cas. 270 110
O. & C. R, R., Cogswell v., 6
Oregon 417 75
Davis v., S Oregon 172 74, 420
O. & M. R. R. v. Collarn, 73 Ind.
261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R.
" 314, 315, 316, 330, 469, 470
v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317 ii4
Gormley v.. 72 Ind. 31, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
581 368
King v., U. S. C. C. Ind., 18
Am.&Eng.R.R.Cas.3S6 281
v. Nick less, 71 Ind. 271 205, 208
r. Selby 47 Ind. 471
204, 208, 276
v. Yaltez, 85 111. 500
363, 364, 368
v. Davis, 23 Ind. 55:; 135
r. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 367
v. Dunbar, 20 III. 623 141
v. Muhling, 30 111. 9 207, 210
v. Gullett, 15 Ind. 487 256
r. Scbiebe, 44 111. 460 265
v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371
76, 418
lxxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
O. & N. R. R. v. Stratton, 78 111.
88 103
O. & M. Packet Co. v. McCool,
Ind. , 8 Am. & Eng.
K. R. Cas. 390 440
O. & R. V. R. R. v. Martin, 14
Neb. 295, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 236 178, 183
v. Brown, 14 Neb. 170, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
501 32
Pacific R. R., Graham v., 66 Mo.
536 501
Pack v. The Mayor, 3 Comst.
489' 481
Packer, Sykes v., 99 Penna. St.
465 344
Packet Co. v. True, 88 111. 608 214
v. McCue, 17 Wall. 508 372
Pabst v. B. & P. R. R., 2 Mc-
Arthnr 42 262, 470
Page v. Defries, 7 B. & S. 137 99
F. R. R. v., 131 Mass. 391, 7
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
86 180
Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395 136
Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Penna.
St. 213, 221 122
Paine v. G. T Rv., 53 N. H. 611 156
Painton v. N. C. By., 83 N. Y. 7,
5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
454 307, 346
Palk, Lamb v., 9 C. & P. 629 (38
E. C. L.) 102
Palmer, N. J. R. R. v., 4 Vroom
(N. J.) 90 136, 242
Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 373 454
Parmalee, J. M. & I. R. R. v., 51
Ind. 42 263
1 Parnabv v. L. Canal Co., 11 Ad.
6 El. 223, 39 E. C. L. 200, 201
Parr, Jewell v., 13 C. B. 909, 76
E. C. L. 449, 454
Parmeter, Beach v., 23 Penna.
St. 197 35
Parrott v. Wells, 15 Wall. 524 434
Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. II.
L. 748 314
Patterson v. P. & C. R. R., 76
Penna. St. 389
304, 306, 314, 330, 382
I. C. R. R. v., 93 111. 290, 69
Id. 650 60. 374
v. W., St. L. & P. Ry., 54
Mich. 91, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 130 218, 416
Patten v. Rea, 2 C. B. N. S. 606,
89 E. C. L. 99
Paulk, S. W. R. R. v., 24 Ga.
356 15, 62
PACiB
Patten r. C. & N. W. Rv., 32
Wise. 524, 36 Id 413 254
P. A. & M. P. Ry. v. Caldwell, 74
Penna. St. 421 95, 209
v. Donahue, 70 Penna. St.
119 109, 115
v. Pearson, 72 Penna. St. 169
76, 77
Parker v. W. & W. R. R., 86 N.
C. 221, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 420 168
Ind. Car Co. i'., 100 Ind. 101
303, 329
Paulmier v. E. Ry., 5 Vroom
151 305, 337
Payne v. Ross, 100 Penna. St.
301 374
St. L. & St. F. Rv. v., 29
Kans. 166, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 632 154, 160, 161
v. T. & B. R. R., 83 N. Y.
572, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 54 156
v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 39 Iowa
523 86
v. T. & B. R. R., 9 Hun
(N. Y.) 526 422
Pakalinsky v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
R. R., 82 N. Y. 424, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
251 162, 163
Pantzar v. T. F. I. M. Co., 99 N.
Y. 368 320, 329, 330
Pawling v. U. S., 4 Cranch 221 454
P., B. & W. R. R. v. Rohrman,
13 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 258, 12 Am &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 176 15,62
P. C. & St. L. Ry., Cauley v., 95
Penna. St.' 39S, 98 Id. 498
76,109,115, 188, 189, 190,
196, 446
Cooper v., 24 W. Va. 37, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
564, note 330, 369
Cummings v., 92 Penna. St.
82 229
Fawcett v., 24 W. Va. 755,
19 Am. & Eng. R R. Cas. 1 11
v. Henderson, 39 Ohio St. ,
5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
529 317
v. Leech, 41 Ohio St. 388, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
541, note 349
v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110, 7 Am.
6 Eng. R. R. Cas. 524 436
v. Rannev, 37 Ohio St. 665,
5 Am/& Eng. R. R. Cas.
533 367
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxi
P C. & St. L. Ry., v. Spencer, 98
Ind. 186, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 478 8(3, 218, 457
v. Sponier, 85 Ind 1(55, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
458 151, 470, 474
v. Staler, 41 Ohio St. 118,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
381 24
Welsh v., 10 Ohio St. 75 501
v. Williams, 74 Ind. 402, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
457 233, 240, 275, 420, 439
v. Thompson, 56 111. 138
233, 240, 248
v. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246 416
v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576 280
v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
628 416, 436
v. Yundt, 78 Ind. 373, 3 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 502
164, 165
v. Martin, 82 Ind. 476, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 253 159, 169
v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222 215
P., C. P. Rv. v. Hassard, 75
Penna." St. 367 68, 291, 454
v., Henrice, 92 Penna. St.
431, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 544 195, 419
P. C. & D. Rv., Potts v., 8 W. R.
524 305
P. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Penna.
St. 32 436, 454
Peck v. M. C. R. R., Mich. ,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
257 105, 165
Peck v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
70 N. Y. 587 107
Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B.
181, 76 E. C. L. 122
Peavey, K. P. Ry. v., 29 Kans.
170, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
( las. 260 60, 384, 510
Peek v. N. S. Ry., 10 II. L.
473 499
Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. D. 369 122
P. A. & M. Ry. v., 72 Penna.
St. 169 76, 77
Pease v. C. & N. W. Ry.. 61 Wise.
163, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 527 327, 338, 346, 366
Pease, Rex v , 4 B. & Ad. 30, 24
E. C. L. 146
Peate, Bower v.. 1 Q. B. D. 326 97, 128
Peck v. N. Y., X. II. & H. R. R.
R., 50 Conn. 379, 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 633
87, 164, 168
Peer, Drew v., 93 Penna. St. 234 389
Pender, Heaven v., 11 Q. B. D.
507 7, 200, 202, 224
Penna. Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind.
203, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 436 262, 263, 467
v. Conlan, 101 111. 93, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 243
364, 426
v. Lillv, 73 Ind. 252 490
v. Lynch, 90 111. 334
342, 374, 378
v. Galentine, 77 Ind. 320, 7
Am. & Eng. R. R, Cas.
517 436
v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 12 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 223
60, 306, 375, 379
v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 1 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 225
138. 233, 240, 242, 276, 286, 432
v. Stoelke, 104 111. 201, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. •
523 347
Taylor v., 78 Ky. 348 409
v. Toomey, 91 Penna. St.
256 109, 115
v. Hankey, 93 111. 530 302, 376
v. James, 8H Penna. St. 194
77, 158, 196
v. Long, 94 Ind. 250, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 245 338, 341
Meek v., 38 Ohio St. 632, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
643 42
Stewart v., Ind. , 14
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
679 148
Stoner v., 98 Ind. 3S4, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
340 27b
v. Boylan, 104 111. 595, 10
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
734 156
v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St.
637, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 341 222
v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 79
162, 164, 447
v. Rudel, 100 111. 603, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 30 416
v. Woodworth, 26 Ohio St.
585 216
Penna. Trans. Co., Ashmore v.,
28 N. J.L.I SO 502
Pendleton v. Kinsley, 3 Clif.
416 114
Peniston v. O, St. L. & N. O. R.
R., 34 La. An. 777 254
lxxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Perkins v. N. Y. C. E. K., 24
N. V. 196 8,502
v. C, St. L. & N. O. K. E.,
60 Miss. 726, 21 Am. &
En-. B. B. 242 292
». C. E. It., 44 N. H. 223 417
Perigo v. C, E. I. & P. E. E., 52
Iowa 276 373
Perren v. M. Ev. & C. Co., 11 C.
B. 855, 7*3 E. C. L. 396
Perry, C. E. E. v., 66 Ga. 746, 58
Id. 461 213, 261, 264
Pettit, Baird v., 70 Penna. St.
477 372
Peters v. Bylands, 20 Penna. St.
497 139
Peyton, W., St. L. & P. Ey. v.,
106 111. 534 138, 217, 470
Perrv, Lansing v., 17 Hun 34 86
Peeples v. B. & A. E. E., 60 Ga.
287 114
People v. N. Y., N. H. & H. E. E,
89 N. Y. 266, 10 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 230 155
v. C. & A. Ey., 67 111. 118 155
Peoples, P. E. E'. v., 31 Ohio St.
537 390
Pescbel v. C. M. & St. P. Ey., 62
Wise. 338, 17 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 545 323, 338, 368
Peart v. G. T. Ey., 10 Ont. App.
191, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 239 160
Pence v. C, E. I. & P. Ey., 63
Iowa 746, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 366 168, 172
P., F. W. & C. E. E. v. Brigharn,
29 Ohio St. 374 31, 32, 177
v. Collins, 87 Penna St. 405 190
v. Evans, 53 Penna. St. 250 457
v. Dunn, 56 Penna. St. 280
155, 156, 163
v. Gilleland, 56 Penna. St.
445 31, 32
v. Hinds, 53 Penna. St. 512
39, 280
v. Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196
323 367
v. Powers, 74 111. 341 316* 370
v. Euby, 38 Ind. 294 315
v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513 76
v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157 471
v. Devinney, 7 Ohio St. 197 356
P. G. & N. E. E. v. Wilt, 4 Wh.
143 388
Phelan v. Andrews, 52 Penna.
St. 486 460
Philadelphia, Hey v., 2 Weekly
Kotesof Cases (Penna.) 466 39
Live/^y v., 64 Penna. St. 106 31
Phillips v. S. W. Ey., 4 Q. B. D.
406, 5 Id. 85, 5 C. P. D.
280 470,473,414
Murrav v., 35 L. T. 477 300
v. E. & S. E. E., 49 N. Y.
177 264
v. E. & S. E. E., 57 Barb.
644 257, 273
v. V. M. & St. P. Ey., 64
Wise. 475, 23 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 453 323
Philippi, <J. B. E. E. v., 20 Kans.
12 160
Phyfe v. M. Ey., 30 Hun (N. Y.)
377 ' 25
P. H. & N. W. E. E, Dickinson
v, 53 Mich. 43, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 456, 18 N.
W. Eep. (Mich.) 553 275, 285
Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N S.
470, 100 E. C. L.
97, 122, 127, 200
D. S. P. & P. E. E. v., 8 Colo.
163, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 286, n. 264, 265
Pickford, Wyld v., 8 M. & W.
443 7
Pierce v. The Commonwealth, 14
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 97 4
Pillow, P. & C. E. E. v., 76
Penna. St. 510 281,440
Pinto, 11. & T. C. Ey. v., 60 Tex.
516, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 286 305
Pinkerton, Burton v., L. E. 2 Ex.
340 461
Piper, Gallagher v., 16 C. B. N.
S. 669, 111 E. C L.
323, 333, 434
Gregory v., 9 B. & C. 591, 17
E. C. L. 386, 387
v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E., 56
/N.Y. 630 306
Piquegno v. C. & G. T. Ey., 52
'Mich. 40, 12 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 210 344
Pittsburgh, Painter v., 46 Penna.
St. 213, 221 122
O'Connor v., 18 Penna. St.
187 146
v. Greer, 22 Penna. St. 54
39, 390
Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Penna.
St. 365 460
Pixley, B., P. & C. Ey. v., 61
Ind. 22 467, 470
Plaver v. B, C. E. & N. E. E.,
62 Iowa 723, 12 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 112 283
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxiii
PAGE
Piatt, C & A. R. R. v., 89 111. 141
304, 307, 346
Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 121 453
Plummer v. E. R. R., 73 Me. 591,
Am. & Eug. R. R. Cas.
165 169
Plunkett. A., T. & S. F. R. R. v.,
25 Kans. 188, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 127 346
P., M. & M. R. R. v. Smith, 59
Ala. 245 314
Pointer, Laugher v., 5 B. & C.
547, 12 E. C. L. 102, 103, 120
Pondrum, C. & A. R. R. v., 51 111.
333 54, 284
Pollard v. N. J. R. & T. Co., 101
U. S. 223 395
N. J. R. R. v., 22 Wall. 341
2S2, 440
Pollock v. E. R. R., 124 Mass.
158 153
Pool v. C, M. & St. P. Rv., 53
Wise. 657, 56 Id. 227, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
332, 8 Id. 360
205, 210, 2S6, 305, 307, 376
Poole v. N. C. R. R., 8 Jones (X.
C. ) 340 75
Poulson, Burns v., L. R. 8 C. P.
5U3 102
>orter v. H. & St. J. R. R., 71
Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 44
304, 305, 329, 473, 474
v. E. R. R., 3 Vroom 261 471
Portland, Baker v., 58 Me. 199 65
Creraer v., 36 Wise. 92 47
Portsmouth, Sager v., 31 Me. 228 501
Potts v. P. C & D. Ry., 8 W. R.
521 305
Potter, Daniels v., 4 C. & P. 262,
19 E. C. L. 39, 95, 187
v. C. & N. W. Rv., 21 Wise.
372, 22 Id. 615 60, 489
v. Faulkner. 1 B. & S. 800,
101 E. C. L. 212, 370
Smith v., 46 Mich. 258, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
140 308, 314, 335, 346, 367
v. W. & W. R. R., 92 N. C.
511, 21 Am. &Eng. R. R.
( us. 328 258
v. M. Rv., 30 L. T. N. S. 765,
32 Id. 36 400
Pa.cher v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N.
Y. 263 502
Poundstone, Rockwood v., 38 111.
200 431
Poulton v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R.
2 Q. B. 534 110 '
Powell v. P. R. R., 32 Penna. St.
414 250
C, C. & I. R. R. v., 40 Ind.
37 109,215,292
Sharp v., L. R. 7 C. P. 253 11
v. M. P. Rv., 76 Mo. 80, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
467 158, 169
Regina v., 9 Q. B. S06, 58 E.
C. L. 413
Powers. N. Y, L E. & W. R. R.
v., 98 N. Y, 274, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 609 307, 374
P., F. W. & C. R. R. v., 74
111. 341 316, 370
Pozzi v, Shipton, 8 Ad. & E. 963,
35 E. C. L. 390
P. P. C. Co. v. Bluhm, 109 111. 20
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cat,.
87 306, .480
v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344 233, 292
Henrich v., 20 Fed. Rep. 100,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
379 109
Kevin v., 108 111. 222, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
92 391
P. P. & J. R. R. v. Revnolds, 88
111. 418 240, 276
v. Siltman, 88 111. 529 166
P. P. Ry. v. Green, 56 Md. 84, 6
Am. Si Eng. R. R. Cas.
168 212, 371
v. Weiller, 17 Weeklv Xotes
of Cases (Penna.) 306 276, 440
Praeger v. B. & E. Ry., 24 L. T.
N. S. 105 266, 267
Pratt, Bett v., 33 Minn. 323, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
437 42
Preacher, Mann v., 40 Vt. 332 502
Prescott v. E. R. R., 113 Mass.
370 153
Presbyterian Societv v. A. & R.
R. R., 3 Hill" 367 4
Price, P. R. R. v., 96 Penna. St.
256, 113 U. S. 219, 1 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 234, 18
Id. 273 204, 216, 228, 229
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 77 Mo.
508, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 168 377
v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R.,
72 Mo. 414, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 365 55, 264
Burton v., 57 Cal. 272 509
Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1
296, 344, 350
Priest v. II. R. E R., 6S N.Y.
589 114
lxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Proctor v. Harris, 4 C. & P. 337,
19 E C. L. 148
Prvor, McLaughlin v., 4 M. & Gr.
48, 43 E. C. L. 386, 388
Pry v. H. & St. J. R. R., 73 Mo.
123 470
Prince v. I. & G. N. R. R., 64
Tex. 144, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 152 208, 210
Pringle v. C, R. I. & P. Rv., 64
Iowa 613, 18 Am. &*Eng.
R. R. Cas. 91 381, 417
P R. R. v. Ackerman, 74 Penna.
St. 265 158, 171
v. Aspell, 23 Penna. St. 147
22, 47, 63, 261, 262, 264
v. Allen, 53 Penna. St. 276 473
v. Bantom, 54 Penna. St. 495
492, 493
v. Beale, 73 Penna. St. 504
169, 171
v. Books, 57 Penna. St. 345
209, 445, 468, 471, 473
v. Barnett, 59 Penna. St. 259
151,153
v. Bock, 93 Penna. St. 427, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
20 76, 168, 395
v. Butler, 57 Penna. St. 336
207, 468, 491, 501
Brownell v., 47 Mo. 240 417
v. Adams, 55 Penna. St. 499 490
Carroll v., 12 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 348
169, 172, 260
v. Coon, 17 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 137 158
Creed v., 86 Penna. St. 139
47, 56, 209, 250, 252, 287, 445
Dietrich v., 71 Penna. St.
432 215
Flower v., 69 Penna. St. 210
74, 115, 188, 196, 288, 370, 371
v. Fortnev, 90 Penna. St.
323, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 129 174, 441, 454
Frazier r., 38 Penna. St. 104
313, 314, 330, 356, 366, 373
Fleytas v., 18 La. An. (O. S.)
339 192
Gerard v., 12 Phila. 394, 5
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 251 229
Gillis v., 59 Penna. St. 139 177
Goldey v., 30 Penna. St. 242 205
v. Goodman, 62 Penna. St.
329 157, 481, 490
v. Henderson, 51 Penna. St.
315, 43 Id. 449
50, 205, 254, 422, 491, 501
P. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Penna. St.
373 13, 39
v. Horst, 16 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 567 151, 155
Hunt v., 51 Penna. St. 475 125
v. Keller, 67 Penna. St. 300 490
v. Kelly, 31 Penna. St. 372
68, 69, 151, 471, 482
v. Kilgore, 32 Penna. St. 292
18, 263, 264
Kirby v., 76 Penna. St. 506
225, 228
Knight v., 23 La. An. 462 265
Kay v., 65 Penna. St. 273
6. 68, 91, 92, 166, 179
v. Langdon. 92 Penna. St. 21,
1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
87 251 , 252, 2S6, 288, 289, 495
Longenecker x., 105 Penna.
St. 328 163,427,444,454
v. Lewis, 79 Penna. St. 33
76, 77, 158, 196, 198
v. McCloskey, 23 Penna. St.
526 287, 492, 501
Meier v., 64 Penna. St. 225
233, 235, 240, 246
v. Matthews, 36 N. J. L. 531
163, 166
Moore v., 11 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 310, 99
Penna. St. 301, 4 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 569
73, 190, 196
v. McTighe, 46 Penna. St.
316 436
McDermott v., 30 Mo. 115 305
v. Morgan, 82 Penna. St. 135 ] 95
v. Peoples, 31 Ohio St. 537 391
Powell v., 32 Penna. St. 414 250
v. Price, 96 Penna. St. 256,
113 U. S. 219, 1 Am. &
Eng R. R. Cas. 234, 18
Id. 273 204, 216, 228, 229
v. Ogier, 35 Penna. St. 60
162, 174
Richter v., 104 Penna. St.
511 228, 230
v. Righter, 42 N. J. Law 180,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
220 60, 169, 173
v. Shay, 82 Penna. St. 198 508
Schultz v., 6 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 69 158, 169
Schum v., 107 Penna. St. 8
174,444,447
v. Snicker, 105 Penna. St. 142
103, 474
v. Vandiver, 36 Penna. St.
298, 42 id. 365
107, 108, 109, 468, 491, 493
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxv
P. E. R. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395,
15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
187 349, 368
v. Weber, 76 Penna. St. 157
174, 436, 444
Weger v., 55 Penna. St. 460
299, 323, 368
v. State, 61 Md. 108, 19 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 326
166, 168, 447
Weed v., 17 1ST. Y. 362 108
Totten v., 11 Fed. Eep. 564 474
v. White, S8 Penna. St.
327 257, 259, 261, 262, 266, 269
Weiss v., 79 Penna. St. 387,
87 Id. 447 174, 444
v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 318, 37
Id. 420
250, 251, 259, 270, 272, 468,
492, 493
v. Werner, 89 Penna. St. 59
50, 436
Whitford v., 23 N. Y. 465 409
Moss v., 49 Mo. 169 313, 314
Eohback v., 43 Mo. 187 313, 368
Strong v., 61 Cal. 326, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 273 174
Ostertag v., 64 Mo. 421 73
Devitt v., 50 Mo. 302, 3 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 533
302, 345
P. Ev., Long v., 05 Mo. 225 330, 369
P., E. I. & St. L. Ey. v. Coultas,
67 111. 398 284
Probst v. Delamater, 100 1ST. Y.
266 301
P. S. Ev. v. Tavlor, 104 Penna.
St. 306 12, 24, 152, 154, 156, 471
P. S. & P. E. E., Tobin v., 59 Me.
183 220, 253
Knight v., 56 Me. 234, 57
Id. 202 136, 233, 241, 254, 470
Pulling v. G. E. Ey., 9 Q. B. D.
110 398
I'urnell v. Gr. W. Ey. (mentioned
by Mellish, L. J., in 2 C.
P. D. 210) 103
I url v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ev.,
73 Mo. 168, 6 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 27 75, L62
Puterbaugh v. Eeason, 9 Ohio
St. 484 S6
Putnam v. B. & S. A. E. E., 55
N. Y. 108 280
P.,W.&B. R.R. r. Brannon, 17
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 227 13, 26, 107
Moore v., 16 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 53
107, 169, 193
P., W. & B. E. E. v. Stinger, 78
Penna. St. 225
6, 146, 151, 154, 454
v. Stebbing, 62 Md. 504, 19
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
36 434
Foy v., 47 Md. 76 163
Gerety v., 81 Penna. St. 274
88, 169
v. The State, 58 Md. 372, 10
Am . & Eng. E. E. Cas.
792 222, 372
State v., 47 Md. 76 172
Flinn v., 1 Houston (Del.)
469 205, 233
v. Keenan, 103 Penna. St.
124 307
Ogle v., 3 Houston 267 151
v. Quigley, 21 How. 213 471
State v., 60 Md. 555, 15 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 481 442
Burton v., 4 Harrington 252 152
v. Conway, 17 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 429 496
Pvm v. G N. Ey., 2 B. & S. 750,
110E.C.L., 4B.&S.390,
116 E. C. L. 87, 482
Pzolla v. M. C. E. E., 54 Mich.
273, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 334 190, 436
P. & A. Bridge Co., Henry v., 8
W. & S. 85 146
P. & C. E. E. o. McClurg. 56
Penna. St. 294 250, 251, 284
v. Pillow, 76 Penna. St. 510
281, 440
Patterson v., 76 Penna. St.
389 304, 306, 314, 330, 382
v. Sentmayer, 92 Penna. St.
276, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 508 301, ^02, 315, 378
v. Andrews, 39 Mil. 329 2S4, 447
P. & O. Canal Co. v. Graham, 63
Penna. St. 290 148. 149, 473
P. & L. E. E. E. v. Bruce, 102
Penna. St. 23 4
P. & N. Y. C. E. E. v. Lacey, 89
Penna. St. 458 13
P. & E. I. E. E. v. Lane, 83 111.
449 240, 286
P. & N. Y, N. & E. E. Co. v. Les-
lie, 16 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 321
306, 329, 369
P. & S. M. S. S. Co., Mullen v.,
78 Penna. St. 25
320, 322, 416
P. & E. E. E. v. Commonwealth,
80 Ky. 147, 10 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 318 155
lxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
P. & C. C. Co., Dorsey v., 42 Wise.
583 308
P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94
Penna. St. 351, 6 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cits. J(i7
30, 31, 34, 233, 236, 240, 440
v. Agnew, 1 1 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 394 307
v. Boyer, 97 Penna. St. 91, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
172
42, 82, 86, 164, 168, 443, 495
Clark v., 5 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 1J9
190, 196, 434
v. Derby, 14 How. 469
99, 232, 233, 390
v. Heil, 5 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 91 74, 434
v. Ervin, 89 Penna. St. 71 42
Miller v, 11 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 369 152
v. Hummell, 44 Penna. St.
375 190, 191, 196, 434
v. Killips, 88 Penna. St. 405
151,165, 447
v. Long, 75 Penna. St. 257 77, 158
Sullivan v., 30 Penna. St. 238
250, 274, 290, 439
v. Schertle, 97 Penna. St. 450,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
158
299, 302, 305, 345, 373, 376, 454
v. Spearen, 47 Penna. St. 300
68, 190, 193, 434
Timlow v., 99 Penna. St. 284 4
v. Towboat Co., 23 How. 209 65
Troutman r., 11 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
455 166, 179
Gray v. (U. S. C. C. N. D.
N.Y.), 22 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 351 86
P. & T. R. R., F. & B. Turnpike
Co. v., 54 Penna. St. 345
6, 146, 245
P. & T. R. R.u. Hagan, 47 Penna.
St. 244 163, 174
P. & M. R. R, v. Hoehl, 12 Bush
(Ky.) 41 70
P. & W. R. R., O'Donnell v., 6
R. 1. 211 160
Boss v., R. I. , 21 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 364 264
Quaife v. C. & N.W. Ry., 48
Wise. 513 254
Quarles, Knight v., 2 Brod. & B.
102, 6 E. C. L. 400
Quarman v. Bennett, 6 M. & W.
499 102, 103, 120
Quigley, P., W. & B. R. R. v., 21
"l low. 213 471
Quimby v. Y. < I. K. It., 23 Vt. 387 158
v. B. & M. R. R., 69 Me. 340 2 V 3
v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306 138
Quinn v. i. C. R. R., 51 J 11. 495 284
Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R.
9 Ex. 91, 10 Id. 100, 1
App. Cas. 754 53, 54
Ragsdale v. M. & C. R. R., 3
Baxter (Tenn.) 426 323
Rainbolt, B., S. (). & B. R. R. v.,
99 Ind. 551, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R Cas. 466 240, 440
Rains v. St L., I. M. & S. Ry.,
71 Mo. 164, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 610
302, 323, 345,307,493
Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 C. & P. 613,
38 E. C. L. 54
Randall v. B. & O. R. R.. 109 U.
S. 478, 15 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 243 160, 247, 306, 344,
355,356,367,454
H. & G. N. Ry. v., 50 Tex.
254 305
v. C. R. R. R., 132 Mass.
209 169
v. Hayward, 5 Bing. N. C.
424' 476
v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102 233
Randleson v. Murray, 8 A. & E.
109, 35 E. C. L. 99, 123
Randolph, C. & A. R. R. v., 53
111. 510 288
Ranney, P. C. & St. L. R. R. v.,
37 Ohio St. 665, 5 Am. &
Eng. R R. Cas. 533 367
Rapho v. Moore, 68 Penna. St.
404 148
Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710
102, 122
Rathburn v. B. & M. R. R., 16
Neb. 441, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 137 150
Ravenseroft v. Eyles, 2 Wils. 295 468
Raueh v. Lloyd, 51 Penna. St. 358
67, 68, 151
Raydure v. Knight, 2 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
713 39
Raymond v. B. C. R. & N. Ry.,
65 Iowa 152, 13 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 6, 18 Id.
217 436
Rayner v. Mitchell, 2 C. P. D.
257 102
Ray, A. & C. A. L. R. R. v., 70
Ga. 674, 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 281 373, 379
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxvii
Kamsden v. B. & A. K. R., 104
Mass. 117 109, 110
Ransom v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 15
N.Y.415 474
v. C, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 62
Wise. 178, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 16 160, 161
Ransier v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32
MinnJ331, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 601 307, 337
Rasmusson v. C, R. I. & P. Ry-,
65 Iowa 236, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 54 349
RathboneV U. R. R., 13 R. I.
709, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 58 274
Read, I. C. R. R. v., 37 111. 484 502
v. G. E. By, L. R. 2 Q. B.
555 410, 509
Readhead v. Midland Ry., L. R.
2 Q. B. 412, 4 Id." 379
118, 231, 234, 237, 240
Reason, Puterbaugh v., 9 Obio
St. 484 86
Rector, W., St. L. & P. Ry. v.,
104 111. 296, 9 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 264
109, 213, 263, 265
Redmavne, G. W. Ry. v., L. R. 1
C. P. 329 460, 461
Rea, Patton v., 2 C. B. 1ST. S. 606,
89 E. C. L. 99
Reed v. Allegheny, 79 Penna. St.
300 122
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 56 Barb.
493, 45 N. Y. 574
240, 420, 421, 422
O. B. Coal Co v., 5 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
3 305
Shaw v., 9 W. & S. 72 99
Reese, N. O. & N. E. R. R. v.,
61 Miss. 581 122
Barber v., 60 Miss. 906 29
Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry., 4 Ex.
243 38,97, 102, 120, 125
Reeves, M. & C. R. R. v., 10
Wall. 17ii 31
v. D., L. & W. R. R., 30
Penna. St. 454 55, 60
Regents Canal Co , Wither! ey v.,
12 C. B. N. S. 2, 104 E.
C. L. 52, 54, 88
Regina v. A rnaud & Powell, 9 Q.
.];. 806, 58 E. C. L. 413
Reid, Bartonsliill Coal Co. v., 3
Macq. H. L. 282, 4 Jur.
N. S. 767
07, 99, 100, 353, 355, 356
Bigelow v., 51 Me. 325 65
PAGE
Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30, 24
E. C L. 14G
Reliance Trans. Co., Atwood v. }
9 Watts 87 501
Renneker v. S. C. R. R., 20 Shand
(S. C.) 219, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 149 254, 259
Renwick v. N. Y. C. R. R., 36 N.
Y. 132 163, 169
Retford, A., T. & S. F. R. R. v.,
18 Kans. 245 308
Reynolds, Abraham v., 5 H. &
N. 143 122, 342, 372
v. N. E. Ry., Roscoe's N. P.
591 217
P. P. & J. R. R. v., 88 111.
418 240, 276
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
5S N. Y. 248 69, 70
Rhoades v. C. & G. T. R. R..
Mich. , 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 659 154, 427
Rhodes, G. R. R., 56 Ga. 645
15, 62, 376
Rhymney Ry., Thomas v., L. R.
6 Q. B. 266 138
Ricard v. N. P. R. R., 89 Penna.
St. 195 228, 229
Rice, L. L. & G. R. R. v., 10
Kans. 426 160
Richardson, Hilliard v., 3 Gray
349 " 122
v. G. E Ry., L. R. 10 C. P.
486, 1 C". P. D. 342
238, 240, 309
K. P. Ry. v.. 25 Kans. 391, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
96 163
v. Metropolitan Ry., L. R. 3
C. P. 374 278
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 45 N. Y.
846 166
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 98 Mass.
85 409
v. W- & M. R. R., 8 Rich.
L. 120 192
Rich, Bryant v., 106 Mass. 180,
202 114
Richards, C. R. R. t>., 62 Ga.
306 431
II. & T. C. Ry. v., 59 Tex.
373, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 64 191
Riches, Coleman v., 16 C. B. 104,
81 E. C L. 102
Richter v. P. R. R., 104 Penna.
St. 511 228
Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240 82
Rigg v. M. S. & L. lly., 12 Jur.
N. S. 525 259
lxxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eighter, P. R. R. v., 42 N. J.
Law ISO, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas.220 GO, 169, 173
Rilev v. Baxendale, 6 II. & N.
445 342
v. C. R. R. R., 135 Mass.
292, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 181 444
v. Home, 5 Bing. 217 498
J. M. & I. R. R. v., 39 Ind.
568 214, 255
T., P. & W. R. R. v., 47 111.
514 74
Ripon, Stewart v., 38 Wise. 584 292
Ritchie, R. & C. R. R. v., 102
Penna. St. 425, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 267
158, 169, 174, 444
Rider, H. & T. C. Ry. v., 62 Tex.
267, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 583 368
R., N. Y. & P. R. R., Brick v.,
98 N. Y. 212, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 605
323, 328, 347, 368
Roach, C. R. R. v., 64 Ga. 635, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79
15, 62, 376, 491
Robinson v. II. & T. C. Ry., 46
Tex. 540 356, 373
r. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 91
C. & A. R. R. v., 106 111. 142,
13 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 620, 19 Id. 396
162,427,431
Oil City Gas Co. v., 99 Penna.
St. 1 39
N. P. R. R. v., 44 Penna. St.
175 151,486
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
66 N. Y. 11, 9 Fed. Rep.
877, 20 Blatch. 338
86, 238, 240, 275, 439
L. & N. R. R. v., 4 Bush
(Ky.) 507 366
v. F. & W. R. R., 7 Gray 92 434
Roberts v. C. & N. W. Ry., 35
Wise. 679 156, 166
v. Smith, 2 H. & N. 213 319
Robertson v. E. R. R., 22 Barb.
91 283
v. T., H. & I. R. R., 78 Ind.
77, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 175 367
Robbins, Chicago v., 2 Black. 418 127
v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 127, 412
v. Jones, 15 C. B. N. S. 221,
109 E. C. L. 148
Rockwood v. Poindstone, 38 111.
200 431
Robson v. N. E. Ry , L. R. 2 Q.
B. D. 87, 10"ld. 371
266, 268, 451, 45-1
Rodman v. M. C. Ry, 55 Mich.
57, 17 Am. & Eng. E. R.
Cas. 521 346, 364, 366
Eoe v. B. L. & C. J. Ey., 7 Ex.
36 _ 107, 110, 112, 113
Eogers, Bingham v., 6 W. & S.
495 501
v. M. & O. E. E., Lea
(Tenn.) , 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 442 135
v. R. Ry., 26 L. T. N. S. 879 257
r. Wheeler, 43 N. Y. 598 134
Rogstad v. St. P., M. & M. Ry.,
31 Minn. 208, 14 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 648 224
Rollback v. P. R. R., 43 Mo. 187
313, 368
Rohrman, P., B. & W. R. R. v.,
13 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 258, 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 176 15, 62
Roll, Gordon v., 4 Ex. 364 386, 388
Roller v. S. S. R. R., Cal. ,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
333 74, 76
Roome, Savaignac v., 6 T. R.
125 110
Roney, Penna. Co. v., 89 Ind. 453,
1 2 Am. & Eng. R. R . Cas.
223 60, 306, 375, 379
Roper, Hartfield v., 21 Wend.
615 91
Rosenberger, G. T. Ry. v., 8 Ont.
Ap. 482, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 448 ; 9 S. C. of
Can. 311, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 8 160,161
Rose v. B. & A. R. R., 58 N. Y.
217 316
B. & M. R. R. »., 11 Neb.
177, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 253 250, 251
v. D. M. V. R. R., 39 Iowa
246 208, 384, 502
v. N. E. Ry., 2 Ex. D. 248
266, 268
Ross, C, M. & St. P. Ry. v., 112
U. S. 377
324, 325, 326, 362, 369
Marble v., 124 Mass. 44 60
v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R.,
74 N. Y. 617 211, 369
State v., 2 Dutcher 224 108
Parks v., 11 How. 373 454
Payne v., 100 Penna. St 301 374
Rothwell, Chapman v., E. Bl. &
E. 168, 96 E. C. L. 200
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxix
Rothe v. M. & St. P. Ry., 21
Wise. 256 173
Rounds v. D , L. & W. R. R., 64
N. Y. 137 114
Rourke v. White Moss. Colliery
Co., 2 C. P. D. 205
102, 103, 122, 126, 342
Rowan, C. & P. R. R. v., 06
Penna. St 393
174, 407, 436, 444, 492,
493 495
B. & O. & C. R. R. v., 104
Ind. 88, 23 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 390 302, 345
Rowland v. Cannon, 35 Ga. 105 88
Peachev v., 13 C. B. 181, 76
E C. L. 122
Rowley v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R.
"8 Ex. 22
431, 469, 475, 479, 484
Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl.
906 40
Roy, Penna. Co. v., 102 U. S. 451,
1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
225 136, 233, 240, 242,
276, 286, 432
Romick v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 62
Iowa 627, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 288 376
R. Ry., Latch v., 27 L. J. Exch.
155, 3 H. & N. (Am. ed.)
930 3S
Rogers v., 26 L. T. N. S. 879 257
v. Mitchell, 11 Heisk. 400 439
v. Walker, 11 Heisk. (Term.)
383 60
Friedman v., 7 Phila. 203 417
R., R. I. & St. L. R. R. v. Delany,
82 111. 198 60, 490
v. Wells, 66 111. 321 127
R. T. Co. v. Vanderbilt, 2 N. Y.
479 112
Ruby, P , F. W. & C. R. R. v.,
3S Ind. 294 315
RufFord. Beman v., 1 Sim. N. S.
550 133
Rung, C. & R. I. R. R. v., 104
111. 641, 11 Am. & Eng.
B. R. fas. 218 306
Rupp, Lehigh Iron Co. v., 12
Wecklv Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 47 407
Russell r. 11/ R. R. R., 17 N. Y.
134 211,356
C & R. I. R. R. v., 91 111.
298 308
v. M. & St. L. R. R., 32
Minn. 230 377
Rush, C. & A. R. R. v., 84 111.
670 374, 376
Rutherford, I. & C. R. R. v., 29
Ind. 83 284
Smith v., 2 S. & R. 360 387
Rudel, Penna. Co. v., 100 111. 603,
6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
30 416
Rucker v. M. P. R. R., 61 Tex.
499, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 245 283
Rutter v. M. P. R. R., SI Mo.
169, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 212 406
R. W. & O. R. R., Webb v., 49
N. Y. 420 13
R. W. Ry., Brabbitts v., 38 Mo.
289 382
Ryan v. C. V. R. R., 23 Penna.
St. 384 211, 356, 367
v. C. & K W. Ry., 60 III.
171 330, 369
Ryde Commrs., Hartnall v., 4 B.
& S. 361, 116 E. C. L. 200
Commrs,, Ohrby v., 5 B. &
S. 743, 117 E. C. L. 200
Rrder v. Wombvvell, L. R. 4 Ex.
32, 40 450, 452
Rylands, Peters v., 20 Penna. St.
497 139
v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774,
L. R. 1 Ex. 265 ; L. R. 3
H. L. 330 145
Ry. P. A. Co., Northrup v., 43
N. Y. 516 241
Theobald v., 10 Ex. 45 467
Ry., Taylor v., 48 N. II. 304 246
Waeker v., 39 N. Y. 469 235
v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St. 345
26, 280
R. & C. R. R. v. Ritchie, 102
Penna. St. 425, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 267
158, 169, 174, 444
R. & D. R. R. v. Morris, 31
Gratt. 200 265
Cowles v., 84 N. C. 309, 2
Am. & Eng. K. R. ( las. 90
303, 323 324,370
Crutch field v., 78 N. C. 300,
76 Id. 320 337, 374
Clark v., 78 Va. 709, 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 78 302, 345
Dobbin v., 81 N. C. 446 323, 370
Myers v., 87 N. C. 345, 8
Am. & Engl R. R. Cas.
293 151
Johnson v., 81 N. C. 453 307
v. Moore, 78 Va. 93, 15 Am.
&Eng. R. R. Cas. 239 307
R. & S. R. K., Phillips v., 49 N.
Y. 177 264
xc
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
R. & S. R. B., < tartis w., 18 N. Y. 534
38. 275. 434, 439, 440,
473, 474
Sherman v., 17 N. Y. 153 3G7
Phillips, 57 Barb. 644 257, 273
R. & B. R. R., Kimball v., 26 Vt.
247 502
R. & A. R. R., Moon v., 78 Va.
745, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 531 324, 369, 370
Sabolla v. Ins. Co., 54 Wise. 687 454
Sadler v. llenlock, 4 El. & Bl.
570, 82 E. C. L. 123
Sager v. Portsmouth, 31 Me. 228 501
Sales v. Western Stage Co., 4
Iowa 547 233
Saltonstall. Stokes v., 13 Peters
181' 15, 62, 439
Salter v. U. & B. R. B., 75 N. Y.
273 172
v. D. & H. C. Co., 3 Hun
(N. Y.) 338 422
v. M. & B. R. K. R., 88 N.
Y. 42, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 437 159
Sampson, Grier v., 27 Penna. St.
183 148
Salmon, K. P. By. v., 11 Kans.
83 211, 356
Sandford v. Eighth Ave. R. R.,
23 N. Y. 343 50, 109
Sammon v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 62
N. Y. 251 374
Sanger, V. C. 11. R. v., 15 Gratt.
230 130, 233, 240
Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P.
297, 19 E. C. L. 183
Saunders v. L. & N. W. Ry., 8
C. B. N. S. 887, 98 E.
C.L. 481
Sauter v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
66 N. Y. 50 28, 431, 480
Savaignac v. Roome, 6 T. R. 125 110
Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 lilatck. C.
C. 290 65
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 37 Mo.
240 35, 235
Sayre, Walsh v., 52 How. Pr. 334 424
S. A. R. R-, Hendricks v., 44 N.
Y. Sup. Ct. 8 281
Furst v., 72 N. Y. 542 416
Jackson v., 47 N. Y. 274 109, 114
Ginna v., 67 N. Y. 596 291
Salisbury v. Hercheuroder, 106
Mas-. 45S 42
S. B. R. R., (iilshannon v., 10
Cush. 228 211, 356, 368
\ B. H. R. R., Hanlon v., 129
Mass. 310, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 18 42
PAdB
S. B. & N. Y. R. R., Tolnian v.,
98 N. Y. 198 162, 175, 436
Mehan v., 73 N. Y. 585 375
Scammou v. Chicago, 25 111. 424 122
Schemer v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32
Minn. 125, 518, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 17;!
191, 431, 432, 492
Scates, C. & N. W. Ry. v., 90 111.
586 254
Scheffer v. W. C. V. M. & G. S.
R. R., 105 U. S. 249 11,29
Schertle, P. & R. R. R. v., 97
Penna. St. 450, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 158
299, 302, 305, 345, 373, 376, 454
Schall v. Cole, 107 Penna. St. 1
50, 301
School Pistrict of Erie v. Fuess,
98 Penna. St. 600 122
v. B. H. & E. R. R., 102
Mass 552 501
B. & O. R. R. v., 96 Penna.
St. 65, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 166 30, 31, 34
Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa
652 65
Schmidt, L. & N. R. R. v., 81
Ind. 264, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 248 151, 154
Schroeder v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 47
Iowa 375, 41 Id. 344 383, 424
Schopman v. B. & W. R. R., 9
Cush. 24 217, 233
Sclmchardt v. Allen, 1 Wall. 368 454
Schittenhelm v. L. & N. R. R.,
Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. Ill 191, 193
Schum v. P. R. R., 107 Tenna.
St. 8 174, 444, 447
Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Mc-
Donoutdi, 33 Penna. St. 7 3 148
Schwindling,^B. & O. R. R. v.,
12 Weekly Notes of Cases
349,101 Penna. St. 258 177,196
Schultz v. P. R. R., 6 Weekly
Notes of Cases 69 158, 169
v. T. A. R. R., 89 N. Y. 242,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
579 109, 189, 412
v. C. M & St. P. Ry., 48
Wise. 375 330, 369
Schofield v. C M. & St. P. Ry-,
114 U. S. 615, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 353 169, 172
Scothorn v. S. S. Ry., 8 Ex. Jill 137
Schreger^. Garden, 11 C. V>. 851 396
Schilling v. Abernethy, 17
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 364 184
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XC1
Schiebe, O. & M. B. B. v., 44
111. 460 265
Schaufler, 8. & N. A. K. E. v.,
75 Ala. 136, 21 Am. &
Eng. K. R. Cas. 405 265, 288
Schollen, Chicago v., 75 111. 468
482, 489
Schaefert v. C. M. & St. P. By.,
62 Iowa 624, 14 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 696 171
Schmidt v. M. & St. P. Ey., 23
Wise. 186 28, 69, 198
H. & T. C. E. E. v., 61 Tex.
282, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 345 265
Schwier v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E.
E., 90 N. Y. 558, 14 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 656 193
Scott v. D. & W. Ey., 11 Ir. Com.
Law 3<7 54
Gorris v., L. E. 9 Exch. 125 42
Gray v., 66 Penna. St. 345 68
v. Hunter, 46 Penna. St. 192 39
L. & St. K. Locks Co., 3 H.
& C. 596 438, 441
v. Mayor of Manchester, 1
H. & N. 59 122
v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 2
W. El. 892, 2 Sin. Lead.
Cas 797 9. 39, 95, 387
Scoville v. H. & St. J. E. E., 81
Mo. 434, 22 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 534 55
S. C. E. R., Murray v., 1 Mc-
Mullan s535 350. 356, 366
Eenneker v., 20 Shand (S.
C.) 219, 18 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 149 251, 259
Brickman v., 8 S. C. 173 305
v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572 27, 409
Marsh v., 56 Ga. 274 416, 423
S. C. & St. P. E. E., Keller v.,
27 .Minn. 178 263, 419
Tread wav v., 40 Iowa 526 416
S. C. & P. Ey. v. Stout, 2 Dillon
294, 17 Wall. 657 69, 184
Locke v , 46 Iowa 109
240, 303, 305
Knapp v., 65 Iowa 91, 18 Am.
&Eng. U.K. (as. 60 26, 305
Mann v., 46 Iowa 637 305
v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 272,18
Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas.
306, 382, 424
Smith v.. 15 Neb. 583, 17
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
661 322, 323
Youll v., 56 Iowa 346, 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
589 338, 345
S. C. & P. Ey., Kitterinjrham v.,
62 Iowa 285, li "..m. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 14 299
Scurr, C, St. L. & N. O. E. E. v.,
59 Miss. 456, 6 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 341 263, 471
S. C. Co. v. Bonham, 9 W. & S.
27 134
S. C. P. E. E., McClary v., 3
Neb. 54 233
S. D. Ey. Beal v., 3 H. & C. ?A± 8
S. D. & P. M. E. E., McCaffertv
v., 61 N. Y. 178 122
Seaman v. F. L. & T. Co., 1 >
Wise. 578 489
Sears, C. E. E. v., 66 Ga. 409 471
C. E?E. v., 61 Ga. 279 379
Searle v. Laverick, L. E. 9 Q. B.
192 232
v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. N. S
429, 103 E. C. L. 356
Searles v. M. Ey., 101 N. Y. 661
435, 441
Seaver v. B. & M. E. E., 14 Gray
466 211,368
Insurance Co. v., 19 Wall.
531 11
Second Nat. Bank of Titusville,
Am. Ex. Co. v., 69 Penna.
St. 394 501
Secor v. T., P. & W. Ey., 10 Fed.
Eep. 15 265, 283
v. St. P., M. & M. Ey., 18
Fed. Eep. 221 209, 210
Selden, Collis v., L. E. 3 C. P.
495 177
Selby, O. & M. E. E. v., 47 Ind.
471 204, 208, 276
Senior v. Ward, 1 El. & El. 385,
102 E. C. L. 374
Sentmayer, P. & C. Ey. v., 92
Penna. St. 276, 5 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 508
301, 302, 378
Seybolt v. N. Y., L. E, & W. E.
E., 95 N. Y. 562, 18 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 162
216, 274, 435, 439, 503
Seymour v. C, B. & Q. E. E., 3
Biss. 43 139, 254
v. Greenwood, 7 II. & N. 354
107, 108
v. Maddox, 16 Q. B. 327, 71
E. C. L. 344
S. E. Ev., Ayles v., L. E. 3 Ex.
146 444
Armsworth v., 11 Jur. 758
469, 491
Burke v., 5 C. P. D. 1 500
Coleman v., 4 H. & C. 699 277
XC11
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
S. E. Ry., Palton v., 4 C. B. N. S.
296, 93 E. C. L. 488, 493
Le Peintur v., 2 L. J. N. S.
170 460
Franklin v., 3 H. & N. 211 487
Lambkin, v., 5 App. Cas. 352
34, 275, 470
Waller v., 2 IT. & C. 102
356, 358, 363, 366
Walker v., L. E. 5 C. P.
640 112
Whitfield v., 1 El. Bl. &E1.
115, 96 E. C. L. 99, 107
Steel v., 16 C. B. 550, 81 E.
C. L. 122
Hogan v., 28 L. T. N. S.
271 281
Chant v., Weekly Notes
(Eng.) for 1866, p. 134 490
S. Ex. Co. p. Crook, 44 Ala. 46S 501
v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822 501
Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass.
306 177
S. F. & N. P. R. E., Hynes v., 65
Cal. 316, 20 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 486 28, 198
S. F. & S. J. R. R., Needham v.,
37 Cal. 409 54
S. F., M. St R. R., Kramer v., 25
Cal. 434 397
Shacklet, W., St. L. & P. Ry. v.,
105 111. 304, 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 166
86, 283, 413
Shafer, H. & T. C. R. R. v., 54
Tex. 641, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 421 417
Shaber v. St. P., M. & M. R. R.,
28 Minn. 103, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 185
159, 162, 169,420,422
Sharp, Dobiecki v., 88 N. Y. 203,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
485 254, 256
Glushing v., 96 N.Y. 676,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
372 164
v. Gray, 9 Bing. 457, 23 E.
C. L. 232
v. Powell, L. R. 7 C. P. 253 11
Durkin v., 88 N. Y. 225, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
520 305, 330
Sharpless, Adams Ex. Co. v., 77
Penna. St. 517, 522 449
Shannon, C. & A. R. R. v., 43
111.338 301,482
Shaw, Mellors v., 1 B. & S. 446,
L01E. C. L. 319
v. Reed, 9 W. & S. 72 99
Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
Ill 168,169,173
Shauck v. N. C. R. R., 25 Md.
462 323
Shause, Beckman v., 5 Rawle
179 501
Sharrod v. L. & N. W, Ry., 4 Ex.
580 389
Shay, P. R. R. v., 82 Penna. St.
198 508
Sheldon, Carlisle v., 38 Vt. 440 87
Shepherd, Scott v., 3 Wiis. 403,
2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 797, 2 W.
Bl. 892 9, 39, 95, 387
Sheridan v. B. & N. R. R., 36 N.
Y. 39 _ 290, 292
Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush. 147
114, 233
Sherman v. R. & S. R. R., 17 N.
Y. 153 367
v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo.
62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 589 73,115,209,210,
212,286,370,371
Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 Ind. 184
233
Sherstone, Tollitt v., 5 M. & W.
283 412
Sheffield G. C. Co., Ellis v., 2 E.
& B. 767, 75 E. C. L. 127
Shipton, Pozzi v., 8 Ad. & E.
963, 35 E. C. L. 390
Shires, L., N. A. & C. Ry. v., 108
111. 617, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 387 60, 431
Shoneman, McC'ullough v., 14
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 395 102
Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 12
Wall. 369 293
Showers, G. R. & I. R. R. v., 71
Ind. 451, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R, Cas. 9 342
Shearer, S. & M. R. R. v., 58 Ala.
672 166
Sheehan v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 91 N. Y. 332, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
235 317
Shanks, L., N. A. & C. Ry. v., 94
Ind. 598, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 28 436
Siekings, L. & C. Ry. v., 5 Bush
1 54, 284
Sills v. Erown, 9 C. & P. 601, 38
E. C. L. 47, 48
Simmons v. C. & T. R. R., 110
111. 340, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 50 349
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XC111
Simmons, Borough of Susque-
hanna Depot v., 17 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
362 122
Smith v., 13 Weekly Notes
of Cases ( Peuna.) 242, 103
Penna. St. 32 122, 125
Simonson v. C, R. I. & P. Rv.,
49 Iowa 19 431
Simpson v. Hand, 6 Wh. 311
47, 81, 86
v. L. G. Omnibus Co., L. R.
8 C. P. 390 434
Sims v. M. & W. R. R., 23 Ga.
93 193
Siner v. G. W. Rv., L. R. 3 Ex.
150, 4 Id. 117 18, 21, 63, 270
Singleton v. E. C. Ry., 7 C. B. X.
S. 287, 97 El C. L.
94, 195, 196
S. W. R. R. v., 66 Ga. 252,
67 Id. 306
188, 210, 265, 288, 443
v. S. W. Ry., 70 Ga 464, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
226 133
Sixth Ave. R. R., Drew v., 26 N.
Y. 49 489
Siltman, P., P. & J. R. R. v., 88
111. 529 166
S. I. Ry., Henry v., 81 X. Y. 373,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
60 307, 318, 368
S. J. R. R., Carroll v., 58 X. Y.
126 65, 235
S. J. & S. C. R. R., Jamison v.,
55 Cal. 593, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 350 6, 233, 240, 241
Skellenger v. C. & N. W. Ry., 61
Iowa 714, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 208 346
Skinner v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 5
Ex. 797 206, 274,"390, 439
Skip v. E. C. Ry., 9 Ex. 223 318, 373
Skivington, George v., L. R. 5
Ex. 1 412
Skelton v. L. & N. W. Rv., L.
R.2C.P. " 165, 172
Slatton, I. C. R. R. v., 54 111. 133 205
Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 607,
38 E. C. L. 102
Slattery, D., W. & W. Rv. v., 3
App. Cas. 1155 174, 180,
260, 427, 436, 448, 452,
454, 457
v. H. W. Ry., 23 Ind. 81 31
Slater v. Jewett, 84 X. Y. 61, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
515 316, 317, 326, 344,
362, 363, 366
Sloan, C. I. Ry. v., 62 Iowa 728,
11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
145 135
Slue, Morse v., 1 Ventr. 238 498
Sly v. Edgeley, 6 Esp. 6 120
S. L. B. R. R. v. Lewark, 4 *nd.
471 224
v. Lvnch, 4 Ind. 494 224
Slusser, P., F. W. & C. R. R. v.,
19 Ohio St. 157 471
Smedis v. B. & R. B. R. R., 88
N. Y. 13, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 445 157, 107, 175
Smead v. Foord, 1 El. & El. 602,
102 E. C. L. 460
Smith v. A., T. & S. F. R. R., 25
Kans. 738, 4 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 554 91
Bolch v., 7 H. & X. 736 176
Blumenthal v., 38 Vt. 402 136
v. B. & M. R. R., 120 Mass.
490 65
v. B. & S. Gas Light Co., 1
Ad. & El. 526, 28 E. C. L.
99, 112
Commonwealth v., 10 Allen
488 134
C. & X. W. Ry. v., 46 Mich.
504, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 535 112, 188, 189, 434
E., T. V. & G. R. R. v., 9
Lea (Tenn.) 685 307, 374
v. G. E. Rv., L. R. 2 C. P. 54 259
Hall v., 2 Bing. 156 122
v. H., M. & F. P. Ry., 92
Penna. St. 450 76
v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144, 4 E.
C. L. 7
v. Linton, 8 Gray 147 122
v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 5
0. P. 102 6, 39
v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 6
C. P. 14 12
v. L. & X. R. R., 75 Ala.
499, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 157 404
v. L. & St. K. Docks Co., L.
R. 3 C. P. 326 200
I. & G. W. Ry. v., 62 Tex.
252, 19 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 21 72
Kain v., 80 X. Y. 458, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 545
136,301,330,413,414
M. & M. R. R. v., 59 Ala.
245 363
Murphy v., 19 C B. X. S.
361, 115 E. C. L. 320, 340
v. M. & L. R. R., 18 Fed.
Rep. 304 367, 374
XC1V
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Smith, N. & C. R. R. v., 9 Lea
470, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Gas. 469 191
N. A: C. R. R. v., 6 Heisk.
171 167
Newel 1 v., 49 Vt. 260 136
Nichols v., 115 Mass. 332 136
v. N. Y. C. R. R., 24 N. Y.
222 502, 503
v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R., 19
N. Y. 227 240,246,301,372
v. N. Y. S. & W. R. R , 46
N.J. L. 7, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 399 39
Paige v., 99 Mass. 395 136
v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
140 ' 309, 314, 335, 346, 367
Pickard v., 10 C. B. N. S. 470,
100 E. C. L. 97, 122, 127, 200
Roberts v., 2 H. & N. 213 319
v. Rutherford, 2 S. & R.
360 387
Nugent v., 1 C. P. D. 425,
444 29, 31
v. O Connor, 48 Penna. St.
218 68, 71, 193
v. S. C. & P. R. R, 15 Neb.
583, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 561 322, 323
v. Simmons, 13 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
242, 103 Penna. St. 32 122, 125
Sprague v., 29 Vt. 421 134, 13S
v. St. L., K. C. & N. Rv., 69
Mo. 32 306, 345
v. St. P , M. & M. R. R., 30
Minn. 169, 9 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 262 15, 28, 62
v. St. J. & H. R. R., 55 Mo.
556 482
v. St. P. C. Ry., 32 Minn. 1,
16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
310 213, 274, 439
U. S. Bank v., 11 Wheaton
179 454
Venables v., 2 Q. B. D. 279 102
Walker v., 1 Wash. C. C.
152 468, 469
v. West Derby Local Board,
3 C. P. D. 423 148
v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 86
P. M. & M. R. R. v., 59 Ala.
245 314
v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 42
Wise. 520 235,345
v. E. R. R., 124 Mass. 154 134
L., N., A. & C. R. R. v., 91
Ind. 119, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 608 156
PAd
Smithson, M. C. R. R. v., 45 Mich.
212, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 101 302, 309, 346
Smoot v. M. & M. Rv., 67 Ala.
13 303
Smyth, llounsell v., 7 C.B. N. S.
731, 97 E, C. L. 183
S. M. R. R., Gates v., 28 Minn.
110, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 237
31, 32, 300, 302, 303, 305
Kellv v., 28 Minn. 98, 6 Am.
& *Eng. R. R. Cas. 264 156, 422
S. Mining Co., Beauehamp v., 50
Mich. 163 29
Snow v. II. R. R., 8 Allen 441
221, 305, 372, 377
v. F. R. R., 136 .Mass. 552,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
161 102, 255
Snyder, Myers v., Brightly N. P.
489 148
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo.
413* 74
B. & I. R. R. v., 24 Ohio St.
670 76
B. & I. R. R. v., 18 Ohio St.
399 91
Sneesby v. L. & Y. Ry., 1 Q. B.
D. 42 39
Somerville. Brooks v., 106 Mass.
271' 454
Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N.
246 177
Southcote's Case, 4 Rep. 84 498
Southwick, Coleman v., 9 Johns.
45 470
Southworth v. O. C. & N. R. R.,
105 Mass. 342 154
Spaight ■(>. Tedcastle, 6 App. Cas.
217 81
Sponier, P., C. & St. L. R. R. v.,
85 Ind. 165, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 453 151, 470, 474
Spear, Dexter v., 4 Mason 115 468
Spearen, P. & R. R. R. v., 47
Penna. St. 300
68, 190, 193, 434
Speer, C. & P. R. R. v., 56 Penna.
St. 325 146
Speed v. A. & P. R. R., 71 Mo.
303, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 77 125,133, 141,344
Speyer, Cleveland v., 16 C. B. N.
S. 399, 111 E. C. L. 371
Spencer, P., C. & St. L. R. R. v.,
US Ind. 186, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 478
86, 218, 457
v. Campbell, 9 W. & S. 32 390
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xcv
Spencer v. M. & P. I. 0. R. R., 17
Wise. 487 285
v. I. C. R. R., 29 Iowa 55 169
Spooner v. B. C. R. R., 54 N. Y.
230 290
Spicker, P. R. R. v., 105 Penna.
St. 142 103, 474
D. & W. R. R. v., 61 Tex.
427, 21 Am.&Eng. R. R.
Cas. 160 240, 436, 491
Sprague, Heeney v., 11 R. I. 456 42
v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 134, 138
Sprayberry, N. & C. R. R. v., 8
Baxt. (Tenn.) 341 139, 409
Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14 Pick.
1 103
Sprong v B. & A. R. R., 58 N.
Y. 56 374
Spaulding, Oakes v., 40 Vt, 347 145
Spensley v. Insurance Co., 54
Wise. 433 454
8. P. Ry., Hahn v., 51 Cal. 605 152
Leahy v., Cal. , 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 230 307
Meeks v., 56 Cal. 513, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
314 54, 91, 196
Meeks v., 52 Cal. 604 192
8. P. C. R. R., Tennenbroock v.,
59 Cal. 269, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 8 190, 192
Springett v. Ball, 4 F. & F. 472 470
S. R. R., Hurt v., 40 Miss. 391 204, 207
v. Jones, 30 Kans. 601, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
201 305, 307
v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374
262, 467, 471
S. R. & D. R. R., Lacy v., 43
Ga. 461 410
S. S. Ry., Scothorn v., 8 Ex. 341 137
S. S. R. R., Roller v., Cal.
19 Am.& Eng. R. R. Cas.
333 74, 76
Stackus v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 79 N. Y. 464 169
Stables, I. & St. L. R. R. v., 62
III. 313 473
Stallebrass, Hodsoll v., 11 Ad. &
El. 301, 39 E. C. L. 473
Stahl v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247 501
Staley, P., C. & St. L. R. R. v.,
41 Ohio St. 118, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 381 24
Stanley, I Ionian v., 66 Penna. St.
461 148
Bouthcote v., 1 H. & N. 246 177
W. M. R. R. v., 61 Md. 266,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
206 15, 279
Stanton v. Metropolitan R. R.,
14 Allen 485 65
Stanwix, Ashworth v., 3 El. & El.
701, 107 E. C. L. 319
Stapley v. L. B. & S. 0. Ry., L.
R. lEx.21 41, 164, 166, 172
Starry v. D. & L. W. R. R., 51
Iowa 419 436
State, B. & O. R. R. v., 29 Md.
252, 420 246
v. B. & O. R. R., 24 Md. 84
36, 54, 158, 233, 493
v. Overton, 4 Zab. 438 215, 251
P. R. R. v., 61 Md. 10 S 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
326 166, 168, 447
v. M. & E. R. R., 25 K J.
L. 437 151
v. E. & N. A. R. R., 67 Me.
479 134
B. & O. R. R. v., 33 Md. 542
54, 212, 372, 376
N. C. Ry. v., 29 Md. 420 29
v. Ross, 2 Butcher 224 108
v. D. & S. E. R. R,, 36 Ohio
St. 436, 5 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 312 155
B. & O. R. R. v., 41 Md. 268
318, 373, 491
v. G. T. Ry., 58 Me. 176 214, 436
P., W. & B. R. R v., 58 Md.
372, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 792 222, 372
B. & O. R. R. v., 60 Md. 449,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
149 257, 283
B. & O. R. R. v., 63 Md. 135,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
202 287, 440, 490, 493
v. P., W. & B. R. R., 60 Md.
555, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 481 442
N. C. Ry. v., 54 Md. 113, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
66 170
B. & O. R. R. v., 41 Md.
268 318
v. M. C. R. R., 77 Me. 244,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
216 405
B. &0. R.R. »., 62 Md. 479,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
83 196,416, 434
v. M. C. R. R., 76 Me. 657,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
312 168, 436
v. P., W. & B. R. R., 47 Md.
76 172
C. & P. R. R. v., 44 Md.
283 306
XCV1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Stoddard ». St. L., K. C & N.
R. R., (55 Mo. 514 379
Statham, N. O. R. R. v., 42
.Miss. 607 263, 292
Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill 406 233
Stoddard ». L. 1. Ry., 5 Sandf. S.
C. ISO 501
Stoelke, Penna. Co. v., 104 111.
201, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 523 347
Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen 29 394
Forsdike v., L. R. 3 C. P. 607 476
v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 123
v. Jackson, 12 C. B. 199, 81
E. C. L. 183
Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters
181 15, 62, 439
v. E. C. Ry., 2 F. & F. 691 238
Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B.
476 102
Stott v. G. T. Rv.,' 24 Up. Can.
(C. P.) 347 151
Stout, S. C. & P. Ry. v., 2 Dillon
294, 17 Wall. 657 69, 184
I. & St. L. Ry. v., 53 Ind.
143 156
Stratton, O. & N. R. R. v., 78 111.
88 103
Strong, W. & A. R. R. v., 52 Ga.
461 510
Straus v. K. C, St. J. & C. B.
Ry., 75 Mo. 185. 6 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 384 263, 265
Strauss v. W., St. L. & P. Ry., 17
Fed. Rep. 209 34
Struthers v. D. W. & P. Rv., 87
Penna. St. 282 146
Strohm v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R.
R., 96 N. Y. 305 473
Strieker, B. & O. R. R. v., 51 Md.
47 302, 345
Stublev v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R.
1 Ex. 13 163, 166
Stutler, F. & A., St. P. Ry. Co.
v., 54 Penna. St. 375 392, 413
Stumfs, C, B. & Q. R. R. v., 55
111. 367 427
State Bank, Merchants' Bank v.,
10 Wall. 604 454
Stebbing, P., W. & B. R. R. v.,
62 Md. 504, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 36 434
Steel v. S. E. Ry., 16 C, B. 550,
81 E. C. L. 122
Steele v. C. R. R., 43 Iowa 109 375
Steel, Couch v., 3 E. & B. 402, 77
E. C. L. 40
'Ueen, C. St. Ry. v., 42 Ark. 321,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
30 54, 471, 472
Stevens v. Armstrong, 2 Seld. 435 102
G. T. Ry. v., 95 U. S. Coo
4, 205, 501, 503
Harris v., 31 Vt. 79 213
Henderson v., L. R. 3 II. L.
Sc. & Div. 470 501
N. & C. R. R. v., 9 Heisk.
(Terra.) 12 492. 493
L. M. R. R v., 20 Ohio 416
323, 324, 369
v. Woodward, 6 Q. B. D. 318 102
Stewart, Brydon v., 2 Macq. H.
L. 30 314
v. Alcorn, 2 Weeklv Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 401 148
v. B. & C. R. R., 90 N. Y.
588, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 127 114, 117
Hunter v., 47 Me. 419 25
v. I. & G. N. Ry., 53 Tex. 289,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
497 254
M., A. & B. Rv. v., 30 Kans.
226, 13 Am.' & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 503 426
D. Turnpike Co. v., 2 Mete.
(Ky.) 119 86
I. & G. N. Ry. v., 57 Tex.
166 470
E. T. V. & G. R. R., 13 Lea
(Tenn.) 432, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 614 306
v. Penna. Co., Ind. ,
14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
679 148
v. Ripon, 38 Wise. 584 292
Strin^liam v., 100 N. Y. 516 337
v. T. H. & I. R. R., 103 Ind.
44, 21 Am & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 209 405
Stringham, Stewart v., 100 N. Y.
516 337
Steinwav, Benzing v., 101 N. Y.
547 329
Stillwell v. KY. C.R. R., 34 N.
Y. 29 166, 419
Strong v. P. R. R., 61 Cal. 326, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
273 174
S.& P. R.R. v., 61 Cal. 326,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
273 153
St. John, E. T. V. & G. R. R. v.,
5 Sneed (Tenn.) 524 196
Stiles v. A. & W. P. R. R., 65 Ga.
370, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 195 220, 272
Stringfellow, M. & L. R. R. R. v.,
44 Ark. 32, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 374 264
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XCV11
Stoner v. Penna. Co., 98 Ind. 384,
21 Am. & Eng. K. R. Cas.
340 * 273
Strieker, Marshall v., 63 Mo. 308 323
Studebaker, Wolf v., 65 Penna. St.
459 460
Stumps, C, B. & Q. R. E. v., 69
111. 409 73
Steinbrenner, N. Y.. L. E. & W.
R. R. v., 47 N. J. L. 161 86
Stringfellow, M. & L. R. E. R. v.,
44 Ark. 322, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 374 135
Stetler v. C. & N. W. Ry., 49
Wise. 609 138
Stead, C. I. Co. v., 95 U. S. 161
157, 158, 166, 169
Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 50
Stein v. G. A. Ry., 10 Phila. 440 418
Steinman, Bush v., 1 Bos. & Pul.
404 119
Steamboat Xew World v. King,
16 How. 469 8, 207, 233
Stead, C. I. Co. v., 95 U. S. 161
Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Penna. St.
439 55, 60
v. N. Co., 33 L. J. N. S. 311 145
Stinson v. N. Y. C. R. R., 32 N.
Y. 333 502
Stille, Martin v., 3 Whart. 337 395
•Stinger, P., W. & B. R. R. v., 78
Penna St. 225
6, 146, 151, 154, 454
St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. v. Miller,
43 111. 199 135
St. L., I. M. & S. R. R. v. Cantrell,
37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 198
254, 264, 286, 287, 468, 474
v. Harper, 44 Ark. 524 306
v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
608 91, 482
v, Higgins, 44 Ark. 293, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
629 303
Klutts v., 75 Mo. 642, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
639 474, 480
Murphy v., 71 Mo. 202 314
Rains v., 71 Mo. 164, 8 Am.
& Eng. R R. Cas. 610
302, 323, 345, 307, 493
George v., 34 Ark. 613, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 294
240, 275,439,508
Langan v., 72 Mo. 392, 3
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
355 220, 256
Wallace v., 74 Mo. 594 158, 318
Q
St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., O'Neil
v., 9 Fed. Rep. 337 309
St. L. & I. M. R. R.. McGowan
v., 61 Mo. 528 306, 323, 363
Elliott v., 67 Mo. 272 314
Gowan v., 61 Mo. 528 323
Koons v., 65 Mo. 592 186
Lewis v., 59 Mo. 495
305, 329, 369
St. L. & St. F. Ry. v. Pavne, 29
Kans. 166, 13 Am."& Eng.
R. R. Cas. 332 154, 160, 161
St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Britz, 72 111.
261 342, 368
v. Matthias, 50 Ind. 65 167
v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511
301, 30(5, 309, 338
St. L., A. & T. H. R. R., Thaver
v., 22 Ind 26 42,'54, 323
Street R. R. v. Nolthenis, 40 Ohio
St. 376, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 191 ' 150
St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., El let
v., 76 Mo. 518, 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 183 34, 277
Harlan v., 64 Mo. 480, 65
Mo. 22 55, 190
Dale v., 63 Mo. 455 303, 375
Henry v., 76 Mo. 288, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
136 26, 283
Smith v., 69 Mo. 32 305, 345
Hulett v., 67 Mo. 239 303, 376
Blessing v., 77 Mo. 410, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 298 366
Frick p., 75 Mo. 595, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 280
77,91,157,159,167, 196,482
Gibson v., 8 Mo. App. 488 151
Price v., 72 Mo. 414, 3 Ami &
Enc. R. R. Cas. 365 55, 264
v. Trigg, 74 Mo. 147, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 345
25, 263, 459, 466
Whalen v., 60 Mo. 323 474
Stoddard v., 65 Mo. 514 379
v. Marshall, 78 Mo. 610, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
248 25, 466
Ely v., 77 Mo. 34, 16 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 342 32, 422
Hoke v., 11 Mo. App. 575 368
Purl v., 73 Mo. 168, 6 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 27 75, 162
Hodges v., 71 Mo. 50, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 190
160, 161
Henze v., 71 Mo. 636, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
212 169, 173
XCV111
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., Yarnall
v., 75 Mo. 575, 10 Am. &
Eng. R. R. (.'as. 726 190
St. L. T. Co., Francis v., 5 Mo.
App. Cas. 7 25, 466
St. L. & S. P. Ry. f>. Marker, 41
Ark. 542 376
St. P., D. & P. M. R R, Ditchett
v., 67 N. Y. 425 133
St. P., M. & M. Ry., Hutchinson
«., 32 Minn. 398, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 280
166, 169
Fraker v., 32 Minn. 54, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
256 323, 346, 36S, 369
Fitzgerald v., 29 Minn. 336,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
310 28, 42, 91, 198
Mark v., 30 Minn. 493, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
86 50, 62
Buenemann v., 32 Minn. 390,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
153 254
Secor v., 18 Fed. Rep. 221
209, 210
Shaber v., 28 Minn. 103, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
185 159, 163, 169, 420, 422
Smith v., 30 Minn. 169, 9
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
262 15, 28, 62
Howard v., 32 Minn. 214, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
283 166
Faber v., 29 Minn. 465, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
277 460
Kelly v., 29 Mich. 1, 6 Am.
& Eng R. R. Cas. 93 163, 169
Rogstad v., 31 Minn. 208, 14
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
648 224
St. P. & D. R. R., Flemming v.,
27 Minn. Ill 344
Johnson v., SI Minn. 283, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
467 156, 166
Walsh v., 27 Minn. 367, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
114 344
Gradin v., 30 Minn. 217, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
644 209
Hatfield v., 33 Minn. 130, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
292 424
Vt. P. & P. R. R., LeClair v., 20
Minn. 9 382
St. L. & O. Ry., Lett v., 11 Ont.
Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 165 486, 490
St. P. C. Ry., Smith v., 16 Minn.
1, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 310 213, 274, 439
St. P. Water Co. v. Ware, 16
Wall. 566 127
St. H. Ry. & Canal Co., Manley
v., 2 H. & N. 840 149
St. P. & S. C. R. R., Clark v., 28
Minn. 128, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 240 345
Collins v., 30 Minn. 31, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
150 368
St. P. & C. R. R., Jacobus v., 20
Minn. 125 207, 286, 501
St. Lonis, Barry v., 17 Mo. 121 122
St. Louis R. R., Liddy v., 40 Mo.
506 54
Maschek v., 71 Mo. 276, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 38
35, 74, 112
St. J. & H. R. R., Smith v., 55
Mo. 556 482
St. L., V. & T. H. R. R. v. Bell,
81 111. 76 186
Suggs, T. & St. L. R. R. v., 62
Tex. 323, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 475 238, 275, 440
Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R., 30
Penna. St. 234
250, 274, 290, 439
C. & A. R. R. v., 63 111. 293 314
v. L. Bridge Co., 9 Hush 81 47
Summerhays v. K. P. Ry., 2 Colo.
484 367
Sutherland v. G. W. Ry., 7 Up.
Can. (C. P.) 409 502
C. & P. R. R. v., 19 Ohio St.
151 74
Sutton v. N. Y C. R. R., 66 N.
Y. 243 177, 178
I. C. R. R. v., 42 111. 438 418
Summers v. C. C. R. R-, 34 La.
An. 139 285
Swainson v. N. E. Ry., 3 Ex. D.
341 372
Swayne, C. P. Ry. v., 13 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
41 440
Swansey, Bosworth v., 10 Mete.
363 65
Swart wont, Tracv v., 10 Pet. 81 471
Sweeny v. C. P. R. R., 87 Cal. 15,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
151 343, 344
C. & N. W. Ry. v., 52 111.
330 60, 173
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XC1X
Sweeny v. B. & A. R. R., 128 Mass.
5, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
138 180
v. B. & J. E. Co., 101 N. Y.
520, 524 343
Sweenev v. M. & St. L. Ry., 33
Minn. 153, 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 302 374
v. O. C. & N. R. R., 10 Allen
(Mass.) 368 148, 163
Sweigert v. H. & St. J. R. R., 75
Mo. 475, 9 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 322 263, 436
S. W. Ry., Marfell v., 8 C B. N.
S. 525, 98 E. C. L. 200, 225
Phillips v., 4 Q.' B. D. 403, 5
Id. 85, 5 C. P. D. 280
470, 473, 474
Warburton v., L. R. 2 Ex.
30 222, 372
S. W. R. R. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356
15, 62
v. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252, 67
Id. 306 188,210,265,288,443
v. Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114 74
Singleton v., 70 Ga. 464, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
226 133
Johnson v., 60 Ga. 667 190
Swett, C & N. W. Ry. v., 45 111.
197 482
Swift, J. R. R. v., 26 Ind. 459 265
Sykes, C, B & Q. R. R v., 96 111.
162, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 254 287, 288
v. Packer, 99 Penna. St.
465 344
v. N. E. Ry., 32 L. T. N. S.
199 489
S. Y. Ry.. Binks v., 3 B. & S. 244,
113 E. C. L. 183
Hardcastle v., 4 H. & K 67 183
Sympkins, H. & T. C. Ry. v., 54
Tex. 615, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 1 1 196
S. & S. Ry., Hole v., 6H.&N.
488 126
S. & S. R. R., Lincoln v., 23
Wend. 425 29
S. & R. R. R-, Costello v., 65
Barb. 92 240
S. & U. R. R., Coon v., 5 N. Y.
492 323, 356, 368
S. & A. R. R., Baughman v., 92
Penna. St. 335 156, 172
Gilliam v., 70 Ala. 268, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
138 115
8. & N. A. R. R. v. McLendon,
63 Ala. 266 474
S. & N. A. R. R. v. Schaufler, 75
Ala. 136, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Las. 405 265, 288
Tyson v., 61 Ala. 554 314, ooO
S. & M. R. R. v. Shearer, 58 Ala.
672 166
S. & P. R. R. v. Strong, 61 Cal.
326, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 273 153
S. & R. R. R., Dun v., 78 Va. 645,
16 Am. & Eng. R. It. Cas.
363 284
T., A. A. & G. T. Ry., Veits v.,
55 Mich. 120, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 11 338, 346
Taber v. D., H. & L. Ry., 71 N.
Y. 489 262
Taft, M. & O. R. R. v., 28 Mich.
289 314
Talbot, Tuller v., 23 111. 357 233
Tanner v. L. & N. R. R., 60 Ala.
621 233, 416
Tarrant v. Webb 18 C. B. 797,
86 E. C. L. 314, 321
Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314
127, 148
Tavleur, Fletcher v., 17 C. B.
21, 84 E C. L. 460
Taylor, Briggs v., 28 Vt. 180 8, 446
Charles v., 3 C. P. D. 492 356
C. & K W. Ry. v., 69 01.
461 319
v. G. N. Ry., L. R. 1 C. P.
385 39, 140
Hurst v., 14 Q. B. D. 918 149
Hadley v., L. R. 1 C, P. 53 ]48
v. G. T. Ry., 48 N. H. 229,
304 233, 418, 472
v. Ry., 48 N. H. 304 246
P. S. Ry. v., 104 Penna. St.
306 12, 24, 152, 154, 156, 471
v. Penna. Co , 78 Ky. 348 409
T. A. R. R., Isaacs v., 47 N. Y.
122 112, 114
Schultz v., 89 N. Y. 242, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
579 1(19, 189, 412
T., C. S. & D. Ry., Day v., 42
Mich. 523, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 126 346, 356
Tebbutt v. B. & E. Ry., L. R. 6
Q. B. 73 _ 217,256
Ted castle, Spaight v., 6 A pp. Cas.
217 81
Terry, C, C. & C. R. R. v., 8 Ohio
St. 570 75, 86
I. & G. N. R. R. v., 62 Tex.
380, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 323 263, 467
v. Jewett, 78 N. Y. 338 257
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Tennenbroock v. S. P. C. R. K.,
59 ( al.269, 6 Am. & Eng.
!;. K. Cas. 8 190, 192
T. F. I. M. Co., Pantzar v., 99 N.
Y. 368 320, 329, 330
T. G It. P., Maleck v., 57 Mo. 18 114
Thaver v. St. L., A. & T. H. R.
R., 22 Ind. 26 44, 54, 323
The Assessors, Van Allen v., 3
Wall. 573 413
The Bernina, 11 P. D. 31 81, 86
The Thetis, L. R. 2 Ad. & E.
365 106
The Mayor, Pack v., 3 Comst.
489 481
The Milan, 1 Lush. 388, 403 84
The N. Dock Co., Wilson v., L.
R. 1 Ex. 177 460, 469
The Queen, McFarlane v., 7 Can.
S. C. 216 413
v. McLeod, 8 Can. S. C. 1,
16 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas.
301 413
Theobald, P., C. & St. L. R. R.
v., 51 Ind. 246 416
Third Ave. R. R., Hamilton v.,
53 N. Y. 25 471
Thirst, Blake v., 2 H. & C. 20
123, 127
Thomas, K. C. R. R. v., 79 Ky.
160, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 79 47, 246, 248, 275, 286
G. R. R. v., 68 Ga. 744 351
v. Rhvmney Ry., L. R. 6 Q.
B. 266 * 138
M. & C. R. R. v., 51 Miss.
637 374, 375
M. & O. R. R. v., 42 Ala.
672 306
v. W. V. T. Co., 100 Mass.
156 380
v. W. J. Ry., 101 U. S. 71 133
v. D., L. & W. R. R., 19
Blatchf. 533 166
Thirteenth & Fifteenth Sts. Ry.
Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Penna.
St. 480, 8 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna. ) 244
47, 48, 57, 290, 495
Thompson, King v., 87 Penna. St.
365 481
Drymala v., 26 Minn. 40
305, 329, 330
v. B., H. & H. Ry., 5 I. C. L.
517 262
v. C. R. R., 54 Ga. 509 60
v. N. E. Ry., 2 B. & S. 106,
110 E. C. L. 17, 54, 200
P., C. & St. L. R. R. v., 56
111. 138 233, 240, 248
Thompson v. C, M. & St. P.
Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 239 368
v. C, L. & C. R. R., 54 Ind.
197 154
Thomason, Union Trust Co. v., 25
Kans. 1, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 589 307, 383
Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115,
65 E. C. L. 78, 85, 86
Thorpe v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 76 N. Y. 402 136, 243
Thul, A., T. & S. F. R. R. v., 29
Kans. 466, 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 378 424
Thurber v. H.,B. M. & F. R. R.,
60 JSL Y. 326 69
Thurston v. Martin, 1 Mason
197 470
T. H. & I. R. R., Abend v., Ill
111. 202, 17 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 614 365, 368, 374
v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 18 Am.
& Ensr. R. R. Cas. 234 28, 266
Everhart v., 78 Ind. 292, 4
Am. <fe Eng. R. R. Cas.
599 212, 370, 371
v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 178
114, 233, 275
Robertson v., 78 Ind. 77, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
175 367
Clark v., 73 Ind. 168, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 84 159, 169
v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
277 191, 193
Stewart v., 103 Ind. 44, 21
Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas.
209 405
The Mayor, Ehrgott v., 96 N. Y.
264 473
Theobald v. Ry. Pass. A. Co., 10
Ex. 45 467
Tierney v. M. & St. L. Ry., 33
Minn. 311,21 Am &Eng.
R. R. Cas. 545 330, 347, 369
Timlow v. P. & R. R. R., 99
Penna. St. 284 4
Timmon v. C. O. R. R., 6 Ohio
St. 105 376
Tindall, O. & M. R. R. v., 13
Ind. 366 367
Tinney v. B. & A. R. R., 62
Barb. 218 299
Titcomb v. F. R. R., 12 Allen
254 149
T. M. R. R. v. Whitmore, 58
Tex. 276, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 195 314. 330
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
ei
Tobin v. P. S. & P. R. R., 59 Me.
183 220, 253
Todd v. O. C. R. R., 3 Allen 18,
7 Id. 207 207, 284
Tollitt v. Sherstone, 5 M. & W.
283 412
Tolman v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R.,
98 N. Y. 198 162, 175, 436
Tompkins v. Clay St. H. R. Co.,
9 Cal. , 18 Am. & En ? .
R. R. Cas. 144 86, 394
Toomey, Penna. Co. v., 91 Penna.
St. 256 109, 115
v. L. B. & S. C. Rv.. 3 C. B.
N. S. 146, 91 E. C. L.
258 434 449
Totten v. P. R. R., 11 Fed.' Rep!
564 474
Topham, Blvth v., Cro. Jac. 158 183
Torpy v. G. T. Rv., 20 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 416 211
Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86
Penna. St. 418 109, 115
Towboat Co., P. & R. R. R. v.,
23 How. 209 65
Townlev v. C. M. & St. P. Ry.,
53 Wise. 626, 4 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 562 69, 179
Townsend, Stahl v., 37 Ala. 247 501
v. Walthen, 9 East 277 183
L. R. & F. S. R. R. v., 41
Ark. 382, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 619 346
Town of Haraden v. N. H. & N.
R. R., 27 Conn. 158 412
Toppins, E. T. V. & G. R. R. v.,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 58, 11
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
222 305, 378
Toy, I. B. & W. R. R. v., 91 111.474 306
T., P. & W. Ry., Seeor v., 10 Fed.
Rep. 15 265, 283
v. Riley, 47 111. 514 74
Tracy v. Swartwont, 10 Pet 81 471
v. Wood, 3 Mason 132 7
Transfer Co. v. Kellv,36 0hio St.
86, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 335 86
Trask v. C. S. R. R., 63 Cal. 96,
1 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
192 305
Treat v. B. & L. R. R., 131 Mass.
371, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 423 281
Treadway v. S. C. & St. P. Ry.,
40 Iowa 526 416
Transportation Co., Walker v.,
3 Wall. 150 501
Travis v. L. & N. R. R., 9 Lea
(Tenn.) 231 416
Trigg, St. L., K. C. & N. R. R. v.,
74 Mo. 147, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 345
25, 263, 454, 466
Trollenger v. E. T. V. & G. R.
R., 1 1 Tenn. 533 251
Troesch, C, C. & I. C. Ry. v., 68
111. 545 307, 434
Trotter, C, St. L. & N. O. R. R.,
61 Miss. 417, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 159 259, 434
• C, St. L. & N. O. R. R. .., 60
Miss. 442 443
Trow v. V. C. Ry., 24 Vt. 4Sf 54
Troy Citizens' Gas Light Co., ;
Lee v., 98 N. Y. 115 436
Troutman v. P. & R. R. R., 11
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 455 166, 179
True, Packet Co. v., 88 111. 608 214
Truitt v. H. & St. J. R. R., 62
Mo. 527 34
T. R. R. v. Munger, 5 Denio
267 50
Truax v. E. R. R., 4 Lansing 198 216
Travellers' Ins. Co., Baylis v.,
113 U. S. 316 454, 456
Tucker v. Chaplin, 2 C. & K. N.
P. 730, 61 E. C. L. 87
Tuff v. Warinan, 5 C. B. N. S.
573, 94 E. C. L. 47, 51, 54, 84
Tuller v. Talbot, 23 111. 357 233
Tunnev v. Midland Ry., L. R. 1
C. P. 291 210, 368
Turner v. N. C. R. R., 63 N. C.
5^2 65
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 74 Mo.
603, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 38 135, 169
Tuttle v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 42
Iowa 518 411, 481
v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 48 Iowa
236 275, 439
Tully v. F. R. R., 134 Mass. 499,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
682 169, 425, 429
T. V. Ry., Vaughan v., 5 H. &
N.685 145, 146
Giles v., 2 El. & Bl. 822, 75
E. C. L. 445
T. W. & W. R. R. v. Baddely, 54
111. 19 233, 263, 292
v. Beggs, 85 111. 80
188, 208, 209, 240
v. Fredericks, 71 111. 294 301
v. Grush, 67 111. 262 254
v. Brooks, 81 III. 245, 292
188, 208, 209
Gartland v., 67 111. 498 338
v. Maine, 67 111. 298 255
Cll
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
T. W. & W. R. R. v. Ingraham, 77
111. 309 304, 307, 329, 346, 309
v. Asbury, 84 111. 429 301
v. Conroy, 68 111. 560
240, 303, 305
v. Moore, 77 111. 217
299, 306, 446
v. Durkin, 76 111. 395 356
v. Black, SS 111. 112 346, 376
v. Grabel, 88 111. 441 91
Hatcher v., 62 111. 477 135
v. Harmon, 47 111. 298 151
v. Branagan, 75 Ind. 490, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
630 434, 436
Tweed, Insurance Co. v., 7 Wall.
44 11
Twoinley v. C. P., N. & E. R R,
69 N. Y. 158 62
Twycross v. Grant, 4 C. P. D. 40 398
Tvler v. N. Y. & N. E. R E., 137
Mass. 238, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 297 169
Tyrer, Dalyell v., El. Bl. & El.
890,' 96 E. C. L., 28 L. J.
Q. B. 25 103, 217
Tyson v. S. & N. A. E. E, 61
Ala. 554 314, 330
T. & P. Ey. v. Hardin, 62 Tex.
367, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 460 240
Hough v., 100 U. S. 213
300, 306, 329, 330, 369, 382
v. Charlton, 60 Tex. 397, 15
Am. Si Eng. E. E. Cas.
350 309, 338, 342
v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597,
21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
571 315, 344
v. Kane, Tex. , 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
218 307
v. Garcia, 62 Tex. 285, 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
384 205, 210
Williams v., 60 Tex. 205, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
403 76
Hamilton v., 64 Tex. 251, 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
336 220
T. & B. E. E., Buffett v., 40 N.
Y. 168 136, 214, 242
Payne v., 83 N. Y. 572, 6
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
54 156
Payne v , 9 Hun (N. Y.) 526 422
T. & N. O. E. R., Eames v., 63
Tex. 600, 22 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 540 27
T. & W. Ey., Slattery v., 23 Ind.
81 306, 367
T. & W. E. R v. Goddard, 25
ln.1. 185 87, 157
T. & St. L. E. E. v. Suggs, 62
Tex. 323, 21 Am. & Eng.
E. R Cas. 475 238, 275, 440
Umback v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 83
Ind. 191, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 98 300, 346
Union Trans. Co., Levering v., 42
Mo. 88 502
Union Trust Co. v. Thomason, 25
Kans. 1, 8 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 589 307, 383
U. P. Ey. v. Adams, 33 Kans. 427,
19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
376 169, 173
v. Hause, 1 Wyoming 27 122
Harris v., 13 Fed. Eep. 591,
4 McCrary 457 38
v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553
339, "350, 370
v. Milliken, 8 Kans. 647 ■ 313
Miller v., 17 Fed. Eep. 67,
12 Id. 600 307, 350, 382
O'Eorke v., Colo. , 18
Am. & Eng. E. R, Cas. 19 347
v. Hand, 7 Kans. 392 233
Hall v., 16 Fed Eep. 744 308
v. Fray, 31 Kans. 739, 15
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
158 378
Diehl v., 33 Kans. 422, 21
Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas. 350 264
U. Ry., Ames v., 117 Mass. 541 392
Fleck v., 134 Mass. 480, 16
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
372 290
U. R E.^OTlaherty v., 45 Mo.
70 77
Eathbone v., 13 E. I. 709, 13
Am. & Eng. E E. Cas. 58 274
IT. S., Pawling v., 4 Cranch 121 454
U. S. Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat on
179 454
Utica, Stone v., 17 N. Y. 104 123
U. & S. E. E., Holbrook v., 12
JST. Y. 236 284, 434, 443
U. & B. R. R., Salter v., 75 N. Y.
273 172
Valirius,St. L. & S. E. Ry. v., 56
Ind. 511 301,306,309,338
Valleley, Ry. v., 32 Ohio St. 345
26,280
Valtez v. O. & M. R. R., 85 111. 500
363, 364, 368
Vandiver, P. R. R. v., 36 Penna.
St. 298, 42 Id. 365
107,108, 109, 468,491,493
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cm
Vanderbilt, Quimby v., 17 N. Y.
306 138
N. H. S. & T. Co. v., 16
Conn. 421 54
R. T. Co. v., 2 N. Y. 479 112
VanHorn, C. R. R. v., 38 N. J. L.
133 262, 266
v. B., C. R. & N. R. R., 59
Iowa 33, 7 Am. & Eug. R.
R. Cas. 591 426
Vaughan v. T. V. Ry., 5 H. & N.
685 145, 146
Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3
Wall. 573 413
Van Patten, C, B. & Q. R. R. v.,
74 111. 91 60
Vanderbeck v. Hendry, 34 N. J.
L. 472 177
Varillat v. N. O. & C. R. R., 10
La. An. 88 471
Vars v. G. T. Ry., 23 Up. Can.
(C. P.) 143 152
Vawter v. M. P. R. R., 84 Mo.
679, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 176 409
Vandyne, P., C. & St. L. Ry. v.,
57 Ind. 576 2S0
Van Steinburg, D. & M. R. R. v.,
17 Mich. 99 425
V. C. R. R, Commonwealth v.,
108 Mass. 7 216
v. Sanger, 15 Gratt. 230
130, 233, 240
Quimbv v., 23 Vt. 387 158
Nelson v., 26 Vt. 717 133, 141
V. C. Ry., Trow v., 24 Vt. 487 54
Veits v. T., A. A. & G. T. Ry.,
55 Mich. 120, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 11 338, 346
Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. D.
279 102
Verry v. B., C. R. & M. Ry., 47
Iowa 549 416
Wk, N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. v.,
95 N. Y. 267, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 609 211
Vickers, Wilt v., 8 Watts 227 390
v. A. & W. P. R. R., 64 Ga.
306, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 337 69
Vincent, Howland v., 10 Mete.
371 148
Vining, P., F. W. & C. R. R. v.,
27 Ind 513 76
V. Iron Works, Conroy v., 62
Mo. :;■") 382
V. of N. Ry., Morgan v., 5 B. &
S. 570,117 E. C. L., L. R.
1 Q. B. 149 360, 368
Vogdes, Lofton v., 17 Ind. 105 88
Vosburgh v. L. S. & M. S. Ry.,
94 N. Y. 374 304
Vose v. L. & Y. Rv., 2 H. & N.
728 "220, 316, 356, 372
VonSchaick v. H. R. R. R., 43
N. Y. 527 283
V. Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall.
529 416, 509
V. & M. R. R. v. Howe, 52 Miss.
202 241
Dowell v., 61 Miss. 519, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 42
318, 376
V. & C. R. R., Hand v., 32 Vt.
473 356
V. & T. R. R., Ferguson v., 13
Nev. 184 155
Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34 473
Wachter, P. R. R. v., 60 Md. 395,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
187 349, 368
Wakefield v. C. & P. R. R., 37
Vt. 330 161
Holmes v., 12 Allen 580 108
Waite v. N. E. Ry., El. Bl. & El.
729, 96 E. C. L. 84, 88, 94
Walden v. Finch, 70 Penna. St.
460 201
Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 95 N. Y. 275, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 400 418
Wallace, v. Cannon, 38 Ga. 199 65
Martin v., 40 Ga. 52 66
Paterson i\, 1 Macq. H. L.
748 314
W. St. L. & P. Rv. v., 110
111.114, 19 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 359 60, 173
v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 74
Mo. 594 158, 318
Waller v. S. E. Ry., 2 H. & C.
102 356, 358, 363, 366
A. & F. R. R. v.. 48 Ala.
459 313
. H. & T. C. Ry*. v., 56 Tex.
331, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 431 74
Walling, G. P. Ry. v., 97 Penna.
St. 55. 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 20 290, 454
Walker v. B. & M. R. R., 128
Mass. 8, 1 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 141 306, 366
v. S. E. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P.
640 112
v. Smith, 1 Wash. C. C. 152
468, 469
v. Trans. Co., 3 Wall. 150 501
R. R. v., 11 Heisk. (Tenn.)
383 60
civ
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Walrath, C, C, C. & I. B. E. v.,
38 Ohio St. 461, 8 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 371
136, 240, 243, 276
Walthen, Townsend v., 9 East
•J77 183
Walter v. C, D. & M. Ey., 39
Iowa 33 69
Walsh v. C. M. & St. P. E. E.,
42 Wise. 23 25, 466
v. O. E. & N. Co., 10 Oregon
250 308
v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334 424
v.St. P.&D.E.E„27MInn.
367, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 114 344
Wamsntta Oil Co., Empire Trans.
Co. v., 63 Penna. St. 14 501
Wanless v. N. E. Ey., L. E. 6 Q.
B. 481 164
Ward, Barnes v., 9 C. B. 392, 67
E. C. L. 148
v. C. C. E. E, 19 Shand
(S. C.) 521, 16 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 356 274
v. McCauley, 4 T. E. 490 390
Senior v., 1 El. & El. 385,
102 E. C. L. 374
C. & N. W. E. E. v., 61 111,
130 345
Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106 439
St. P. Water Co. v., 16 Wall.
566 127
Wardle v. N. O. C. E. E., 35 La.
An. 202, 13 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 60 274
Wanamaker v. Burke, 17 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
225 373
Hunter v., 17 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 232 (Pa.
O C. E. ) 12
Warburton v. S. W. Ey., L. E, 2
Ex. 30 222, 372
Warman, Tuff v., 5 C. B. N. S. .
573, 94 E. C.L. 47,51,54,84
Warren v. F. E. E., 8 Allen 227
139, 213, 233, 246, 257, 287,
436, 502
Yerger v., 31 Penna. St. 319
386, 388
Warner, C. B. & Q. E. E. v., 108
111. 538, 18 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 100 307, 378, 445
v. E. Ey., 39 N. Y. 468
298, 305
v. E. Ey., 44 N. Y. 465 434
Wasmer v. D., L. & W. E. E., 80
N. Y. 212, 1 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 122 48, 156
PAGR
Waters v. Wing, 59 Penna. St.
213 436
Waterhouse, Crofts v., 3 Bing.
319, 11 E. C. L. 447
Ansell v., 6 M. & S. 393
390, 391, 394
Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. E.
E. E., 17 Bed. Eep. 671
188, 208, 210, 287, 445
Watling v. Oastler, L. E. 6 Ex.
73 95 344
Watkins v. G. W. Ey., 37 L. T.
N. S. 193 259
L. & N. E. E. v., Ky. ,
12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
89 191
Watson v. Ambergate Ey., 15
Jur. 448 137
v. N. Ey., 24 Up. Can. (Q.
B.) 98 286
v. W., St. L. & P. Ey., 66
Iowa 164, 19 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 114 224
v. H. & T. C. Ey., 58 Tex.
434, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 213 345, 346
W T arden v. O. C. E. E., 137 Mass.
204, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. -61 2 304, 306
W., A. & G. E. E. v. Brown, 17
Wall. 445 132, 133
Way v. I. C. E. E., 40 Iowa 341 373
Wagner, A.. T. & S. F. E. E. v.,
33 Kans. 660, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 637 307, 346
Walters v. C. E. I. & P, E. E.,
41 Iowa 71 77, 195
Walton v. N. Y. C. S. C. Co., 139
Mass. 556, 21 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 600, note 105, 256
W T ashburn v. N. & C. E. E., 3
Head (Tenn.) 638 374
Washington v. B. & O. E. E., 17
W. Va. 190, 10 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 749 6
W. B. Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68
Penna. St. 357 146
W. C. & P. E. E., Johnson v., 70
Penna. St. 366 6, 18, 63, 264
v. McElwee, 67 Penna. St.
311 422
W. C. V. M. & G. S. E. E.,
Scheffer v., 105 U. S. 249
11, 29
W. C. Ey., Ferguson v., 63 Wise.
145, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 285 166, 173, 444
Kelly v., Wise. , 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
633 302, 309
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CV
Weams, L. C. Rv. v., 80 Kv. 420,
8 Am. & "Eng. R. R. Cas.
399 233
Webster, Boulter v., 13 W. R.
289 489, 493
v. H. R. R., 38 N. Y. 260 ' 86
Weber v. N. Y. C. R. R., 58 N.
Y. 459 163
A., T. & S. F. R. R. v., 33
Kans. 543, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 418 482
P. R. R. v., 76 Penna. St.
157 174, 436, 444
Weaver, M., K &T. R. R. v., 10
Kans. 456 470
Webb, A. & W. P. R. R. v., 61
Ga. 5S6 308
v. R. W. & O. R. R., 49 N.
Y. 420 13
C. & X. R. R. v., 12 Ohio
St. 475 335, 343, 367
Tarrant v. (25 L. J. N. S.
C. P. 263), 18 C. B. 797,
86 E. C. L. 314, 322
Hexamer v., 101 X. Y. 377
122, 125
Wedgwood v. C. & X. W. R. R.,
44 Wise. 44, 41 Id. 478
300, 307
Wedge. Milligan v., 12 A. & E.
737, 40 E. C L.
102, 122, 123, 124
Weed v. P. R. R., 17 N. Y. 362 108
Weems v. Mathieson, 4 Macq. H.
L. 215 314
Weeks, Beck v., 34 Conn. 145 502
v. N. O. & C. R. R., 32 La.
An. 615 74
v. N. Y., X. H. & H. R. R.,
72 X. Y. 50 281
Weger v. P. R. R., 55 Penna. St.
460 299, 323, 368
Weiand, Mann v., 4 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
6 S3, 407
Weiss v. P. R. R., 79 Penna. St.
387, 87 Id. 447 174, 444
Weiller, P. P. Ky. v., 17 Weekly
Xotes of Cases (Peuna.)
306 276, 440
Weir, F. & P. M. Ry. v., 37
Mich. Ill 208
v. Allegheny, 95 Penna. St.
413 471
Welfare v. L. & B. Ry., L. R. 4
Q. B. 693 258, 434, 442
Welch, 1. C. R. R. v., 52 111. 183 308
Welker v. N. C. R. R , 1 Weekly
Xotes of Cases (Penna.)
210 31
Weller v. Dunk, 4 F. & F. 298 148
v. L. B. & S. C. Ry , L. R. 9
C. P. 132 261, 262, 266, 267
Wells v. B. C. R. & X. R. R.,
56 Iowa 520, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas 243 302, 345
Parrott v., 15 Wall. 524 434
R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. v.,
66 111. 321 127
Welsch v. H. & St. J. R. R., 72
Mo. 551, 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 75 163
Welsh v. P., C. & St. L. R. R., 10
Ohio St. 75 501
Werner, P. R. R. v., 89 Penna.
St. 59 50, 436
Western R. R., Hegeman v., 13
X. Y. 9 237, 240, 246
Hayes v., 3 Cush. 270 356
Western Stage Co., Sales v., 4
Iowa 547 233
Weston v. X. Y. E. R. R., 73 X.
Y. 595 254
West Derby Local Board, Smith
v., 3 C. P. D. 423 148
Wendell v. X. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R., 91 X. Y. 420 73
Werle v., L. I. R. R., 98 X. Y.
650 282
Wetmore, L. M. R. R. v., 19
Ohio St. 110 115
Weldon. I. C. R. R. v., 52 111.
290 486, 493
West v. X. J. R. R., 3 Vroom 91 166
Whaalan v. M. R. & L. E. Rv.,
8 Ohio St. 249 356, 368
Whalen v. St. L., K. C. & X. Ry.,
60 Mo. 323 474
Wheaton v. X. B. & M R. R.,
36 Cal. 593 233
Wheeler, Barter v., 49 X. H. 9 134
Rogers v., 43 X. Y. 598 134
Wheelock v. B. & A. R. R., 105
Mass. 203 257
Wheelwright v. B. & A. R. R.,
135 Mass. 225, 16 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 315 260
Wheless, X. C. & St. L. R. R.,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 741, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
633, 15 Id. 315 346, 367
Wheel ton v. Hardisty, 8 El. &
BI. 232, 92 E. C. L. 454
Whipple, C. & R. I. R. R., 22
111. 105 133, 141
W.P. P. Ry. v., 5 Weekly
Xotes of Cases (Penna.)
68 63, 282
White u. Boulton, Peake 113 232
v. France, L. R. 2 C. P. D. 31 »8 2 K)
avi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
White v. F. R. It., 136 Mass. 321,
18 Am. & Eng. R K. ('as.
140
139,
Hammack v., 11 C. B. N. S.
588, 108 E. C. L. 35, 434
v. M.C. Ry., 6 1 Wise. 536, IS
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
213 276, 424
P. R. R. v., 88 Penna. St.
327 257, 259, 261. 262, 266, 269
White Moss Colliery Co., Rourke
v., 2 C. P. D. 205
102, 103, 122, 126, 342
Whitford v. P. R. R., 23 N. Y.
465 409
Whitfield v. S. E. Ry., 1 El. Bl.
&E1. 115, 96 E. C. L. 99, 107
Whitaker v. E. A. R. R., 51 N.
Y. 295 416
Whittaker v. M. & S. Ry., L. R.
5 C. P. 464 n. 261, 262
W. H. J. Rv., Birkett v., 4 H. &
N. 730 138
Whitney v. M. C. R. R., 69 Me.
208 152
Mowery v., 14 Wall. 434 471
Wkitmore, T. M. R. R. v., 58
Tex. 276, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 195 314, 330
Whitman v. W. & M. Ry., 58
Wise. 408, 12 Am. & Eng
R. R. Cas. 214 302,806, 367
Whittington, B. & O. R. R. v.,
30 Grat. 805 374, 378
Whitton, C. & N. W. Ry. v., 13
Wall. 270 409
Whitfield, M. & C. R. R. v., 44
Miss. 466 257
Whitsett v. C, R. I. & P. Ry.,
Iowa , 22 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 336 377
Wiggett v. Fox, 1 1 Ex. 832 342, 356
AViggins Ferry Co., Morrisey v.,
43 Mo. 880 54
Wightman. B. & O. R. R. v., 29
Grat. 481 491
Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Ex. 354
323, 382, 333
Wilkins v. Day, 12 Q. B. D. 110 490
Wilkinson v. Fairrie, 1 H. & C.
633 177
Wilds v. H. R. K, 24 N. Y. 230,
432 60, 436
v. H. R. R. R.. 29 N.Y. 315
146, 159
Wile, Howard Ex. Co. v., 64
Penna. St. 201 454
Wilkes. Iiott v., 3 B. & Aid. 304,
5 E C.L. 47, 183
Willan, Nicholson v., 5 East 507 498
Willard, Allen v., 57 Penna. St.
374 122, 434, 441
Willey, F. & P. M. Ry. v., 47
Mich. 88, 5 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 305 156
Willis v. L. I. R. R., 34 N.Y.
670 282, 284
v. O. Ry. & N. Co., 11 Oregon
257, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 539 323, 368
Wills v. L. & B. R. R., 129 Mass.
351, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 27 251, 291
Williams, Bremner v., 1 C. & P.
414, 11 E. C. L. 232
v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258
300, 344
v. C. R. R., 43 Iowa 396
302, 303, 374, 376
Demy v., 5 Allen 1 454
v. G. W. Rv., L. R. 9 Ex.157 28, 41
v. Jones, 3 II. & C. 662 102, 104
v. T. & P. Ry., 60 Tex. 205,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Las
403
P., C. & St. L. R. R. v., 74
Ind. 462, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 457
283, 240, 264, 420, 439
Williamson v. G. T. Ry., 17 Up.
Can. (C. P.) 615
Willie, II. & T. C. R. R. v., 53
Tex. 318
Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 115
C & A. R. R v., 63 111. 167
Kopitoff v., 1 Q. B. D. 377
v. Merrv, 1 Sc. & Div. 326,
331 ' 296, 320, 354, 383
v. N. P. R. R., 26 Minn. 278
15, 233, 436
Sleath v., 9 C. & P. 607, 38
E. C. L. 102
v. Cunningham, 3 Cal. 241 158
M. P. R. R. i-., 28 Kans. 639 160
v. The N. Dock Co., L. R. 1
Ex. 177 460, 469
v. D., S. P. & P. Ry., 7 Colo.
101, 15 Am. & Eng] R. R.
Cas. 192
v. M. &P. Rv.. 18 Ind. 226
Win, M. & W. R. R. v., 19 Ga.
440
Winn, M. & W. R. R. v., 26 Ga.
250
Winans, Y. & M. L. R. R. v., 17
How. 30
Winch v. B L. & C J. Ry., 5 De
G. & S. 562, 16 Jur. 1085
v, Conservators of the
Thames, L. R. 9 C P. 378 200
76
25
367
8
256
232
319
367
54
l r >
133
133
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CV11
Wing, Waters v. 59 Penna. St.
213 436
Winterbottom D.Wright, 10 M.
& W. 109, 115 412
Winters v . H. & St. J. R. E., 39
Mo. 468 285
Willoughby v. C. & N. W. Ry.,
37 Iowa 432 434
Wilt, P., G. & N. E. E. v., 4
Whart. 143 388
v. Vickers, 8 Watts 227 390
Wilton v. M. E. E., 107 Mass. 103,
125 Id. 130 209
Witherley v. Eegent's Canal Co.,
12 C. B. N. S. 2, 104 E. C.
L. 52, 54, 88
Withers v. N. K. Ey., 3 H. & N.
969 29, 32
Witherbee, Burke v., 98 N.Y.
562 301
W. J. Ferry Co., Burton v., 114
U. S. 371 282
W. J. Ey., Thomas v., 101 U. S.
71 133
W.L. Waterworks Co., Matthews
v., 3 Camp. 403 120
W. M. E. E. v. Stanley, 61 Md.
266, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 206 15, 279
Abell v., 63 Md. 433, 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
503 208, 212, 372
W. N. C. E. E., Gudger v., 87 N.
C. 325 150
W., N. & E. E. E., Corliss v., N.
H., 21 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 208 406
Woburn v. B. & L. E. E., 109
Mass. 283 412
Wolf, E. & C. E. E. v., 59 Ind.
89 76
v. Studebaker, 65 Penna. St.
459 460
Wolfe, L. & N. E. E. v., 80 Ky.
82, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 625 254
Wolsey v. L. S. & M. S. E. E., 33
Ohio St. 227 374, 378
Wombwell, Eyder v., L. E. 4 Ex.
32, 40 450, 452
Wood, Brotherton v., 3 Brod. &
B. 54. 7 E. C. L. 390, 394
Cotton v., 8 C. B. N. S. 568,
98 E. C. L. 6, 112, 434
t;. D.C.S. Ey., 52 Mick 402,
19 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas.
129 115
v. L. S. & M. S Ry., 49 Mich.
370, 8 Am. A "Eng. R. E.
Cas. 478 263
Wood, Tracy v., 3 Mason 132 7
Woodger v. G. W. Ey., L. E. 2
C. P. 31S 462
Woodbridge v. D., L. & W. E. E.,
105 Penna. St. 460, 16
Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 55 35, 196
Woodley v. Metn. D. Ey., 2 Ex.
D. 334 349, 373
Woodward, Stevens v., 6 Q. B. D.
318 102
Wooslev, C. & St. L. E. E. v., 85
111 370 127
Wonder v. B. & O. E. E., 32 Md.
411 301
Woodward, D., S. P. & P. Ey. v.,
4 Colo. 1 431
v. M. S. & N. I. E. E., 10
Ohio St. 121 409
v. C. & N. W. Ey., 23 Wise.
400 490
Wood worth, Day v., 13 How. 371 471
Penna. Co. v., 26 Ohio St.
585 216
Woolf v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 373, 34
E. C. L. 36
Woolsey, Lee v., 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
337 319
Worth, Caswell v., 5 El. & Bl.
849, 85 E. C. L. 36
Worthington, B. & O. E. E. v.,
21 Md. 275 233, 240
Holmes v., 2 F. & F. 533 300
Woodruff, A. & C. A. L. E. E. v.,
63 Ga. 707 308
Worthen v. G. T. Ey., 125 Mass.
99 282
W. P. Ey. v. Mulhair, 6 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
508 434
v. Whipple, 5 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 68 63, 282
v. Gallagher, 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.)
413 68, 291
Colgan v., 4 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 400 71
Neir v., 12 Mo. App. 35 481
Wray v. Evans, 80 Penna. St.
102 122
Wright v. L. & N. W. Ey., L. R.
10 Q. B. 29S, 1 Q. B. D.
252 223, 372
De Forrest v., 2 Mich. 368 122
v. Midland Ry., L. R. 8 Ex.
137 39, 140
P., C. & St. L. Ey. v., 80 Ind.
1S2, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 628 416, 436
CV111
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Wright v. N. Y. C R. E., 25 N. Y.
565 323, 356
Winter-bottom v., 10 M. & W.
109, 115 412
v. B. & M. R. R., 129 Mass.
440, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 121 169, 190
v. G. R. R., 34 Ga. 337 417
W. Ry. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
651 305, 308, 345, 364
v. McDaniel, 1U7 U.S. 454
313, 470
W. R. R., Keegan v., 8 N. Y. 175 306
Nolton v., 15 N. Y. 444 216
v. Frederick, 71 111. 294 307
v. Henks, 91 111. 406 160
Butteriield v., 10 Allen 532 168
W. St. L. & P. Ry., Moore v., 84
Mo. 481, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 509 347
Patterson v., 54 Mich. 91, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
130 218, 416
v. Peyton, 106 111. 534
138, 217, 470
v. Rector, 104 111. 296, 9 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 264
109, 213, 263, 265
Strauss v., 17 Fed. Rep. 209 34
V.Wallace, 110 111. 114, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
359 60, 173
v. Shacklet, 105 111.364, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
166 86, 283, 413
Watson v., 66 Iowa 164, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
114 224
W. T. Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall.
129 438
W. T. & R. R., Higgins v., 46 N.
Y. 23 109
Wurst, Gramlich v., 86 Penna. St.
74 183, 196
W. U. T. Co. v. Eyster, 91 U. S.
495, note 471
Thomas v., 100 Mass. 156 380
Wyatt v. G. W. Ry., 6 B. & S.
709, 118 E. C. L., 34 L. J.
(Q. B.) 204 20,31,37,54,63
Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443 7
W'vlde v. N. R. R., 53 N. Y. 156 413
Wynn v. Allard, 5 W. & S. 524 47
Wyly, A. & W. P. R. R. v., 65
Ga. 120, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 262 60, 159
W. & A. R. R. v. Drysdale, 51
Ga. 644 474
v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465 510
W. & A. R. R., Galloway v., 57
Ga. 512 510
v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461 510
Hendricks v., 52 Ga. 467 60, 510
v. Atlanta, Ga. , 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 233 412
Plutchinson v., 53 Tenn. 634
43, 413
Baker v., 68 Ga. 699 307, 382
v. Jones, 65 Ga. 631, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 267 161
Mitchell v., 30 Ga. 22 263
v. King, 70 Ga. 261, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 255 447
W. & G. Rv. v. Gladmon, 15
Wall. 401 67, 68, 436
W, & J. R. R, ( Gruber v., 92 N.
C. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 438 43, 136, 275
W. & M. R. R., Zemp v., 9 Rich.
L. 84 . 284
Whitman v., 58 Wise. 40S, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
214 302, 306, 367
Richardson v., 8 Rich. L.
120 192
W. & G. R. R., Lemont v., 1
Mackey (D. C.) 180, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
263 280
W. & R. R. R., Herring v., 10
Ired. 402 74, 192, 193
W. & St. P. R. R., Brown v., 27
Minn. 162 368
Hughes v., 27 Minn. 137
343, 344
Maher v., 31 Minn. 401, 13
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas-
572 28
W. & T. P. R. R. v. Griffin, 57
Penna. St. 417 135
W. & W. R. R., Parker v., 86 N.
C. 221, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 420 168
Manlv v., 74 N. G 455 192
Potter v., 92 K C. 541, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
328 258
Yarborough v. Bank of England,
16 East 6 99, 107
Yates, Assop v., 2 H. & N.
768 373
Yarnall v. St. L., K. C & N. R.
R., 75 Mo. 575, 10 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 726 190
Yeaton v. B. & L. R. R., 135
Mass. 418, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 253 346
Yeomans v. C. C. S. N. Co., 44
Cal. 71 216
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
C1X
Yerger v. Warren, 31 Penna. St.
339, 386 388
Y. N. & B. By., Hutchinson v.,
5 Ex. 343
342, 351, 355, 357, 366
Marshall v., 11 C. B. 655,
73 E. C L. 206, 390, 392
Yohn, Bard v., 26 Penna. St. 482 102
Y^ork v. C. K. R., 3 Wall. 113 501
Youll v. S. C. & P. Ry , 56 Iowa
346, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 589 338, 345
Young, N. Y. & E. R. R v., 33
Penna. St. 175 146
v. D., G. H. & M. Ry,
Mich. ,19 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas. 417 151
Yonge v. Kentiey, 28 Ga. Ill 275, 440
Yundt, P., C. & St. L. R. R. v.,
78 Ind. 373, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 502 164, 165
Y. & M. L. R. R. v. Winans, 17
How. 30 133
Zebe, P. R. R. v., 33 Penna. St.
318, 37 Id. 420
250, 251, 259, 270, 272,
468, 492, 493
Zeigler v. D. & N. R- R , 52 Conn.
543,23 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 400 222
Zell v. Arnold, 2 Pen. & W 292 390
Zemp v. W. & M. R. R., 9 Rich.
L. 84 284
Zimmerman v. H. & St. J. R. R.,
7 1 Mo. 476, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 191 55, 75
BOOK I.
•ME GENERAL NATURE OF THE RAILWAY'S LIABILITY
CHAPTER I.
NEGLIGENCE.
I. Negligence the test of liability.
II. The liability as affected by the quasi public character of railways.
III. Negligence defiued.
IV. Distinctions in degrees of negligence.
V. Proximate and remote cause.
VI. The liability for injuries caused by an act of God.
VII. The liability for injuries caused by an act of the public enemy.
VIII. The liability for injuries caused by inevitable accident.
IX. The liability for injuries caused solely by the act of the injured
person.
X. The liability for omissions and acts of commission by agents and
servants.
XI. The liability for the negligent acts of those who are not agents or
servants.
XII. The non-performance of a duty imposed by statutes or municipal
ordinances.
XIII. Ultra vires.
I. NEGLIGENCE THE TEST OF LIABILITY.
Negligence upon the part of the railway is the test of its liability.
1. It is obvious that the relation between the railway
and any person who may happen to be injured in the
course of that railway's operations must be either con-
tractual, or non-contractual. Of course, if there be a
legally enforceable contract between the railway and an
individual, the terms of that contract must, so far as
they extend, determine the liability of the railway for
Z NEGLIGENCE.
personal injuries to that individual. But the contract,
although full and complete in other respects, may not
contain any express stipulation as to the nature and
extent of that liability, or, if there be such a stipula-
tion, it may be of such a character that it is against the
policy of the law to recognize and enforce it. In either
of these contingencies the liability of the railway must
be rested upon the implied contract between the parties,
or, in other words, upon the duty raised by the law and
founded upon the relation of the parties. There may
also be, where there is a contractual relation between
the railway and the injured person, in addition to the
obligation created by the contract, a duty raised by the
law. If the relation between the railway and the in-
jured person be not founded upon contract, the liability
of the railway must solely depend upon the nature and
extent of the duty imposed by law.
2. In section 140 the persons who may possibly be
injured in the course of railway operations are classified,
and it is shown that the liability of the railway to
the individuals of each class is primarily dependent
upon the fact of the railway's negligence, yet, as will
be shown in other chapters of this book, that duty
upon the part of the railway, whose non-performance
is the essential element of its negligence, is not fixed
and unvarying, but is dependent on the relation be-
tween the individual injured and the railway, and may
be affected by the mental or physical incapacity of that
individual, and in some cases, also, by the circum-
stances under which the injury is inflicted. Thus the
railway does not owe a like duty to its passengers, to its
servants, to persons who are rightfully upon public
highways which adjoin or cross its line, to persons who
come upon its line or premises as mere licensees, and to
persons who trespass upon its line or premises ; nor
THE RAILWAY S GENERAL DUTY. 3
does the railway in all cases owe a like duty to adults
and to infants, nor to persons of average physical and
mental capacity, and to those who are of less than
average capacity, and whose incapacity has been made
known to the railway's agents or servants. So, also,
whatever be the relation which a j)erson may hold to
the railway, the railway may temporarily ow r e to him a
higher degree of duty if its agents or servants have, in
the exercise of their delegated authority, either by words
or by acts, led him to rely on the performance by the
railway of that higher degree of duty. For the pur-
poses of this introductory chapter, it is enough to say
that the general duty of the railway to all who are
brought into contact with the operation of its line re-
quires it in the original construction and subsequent
maintenance in repair of its station approaches, build-
ings, and platforms, and of the embankments, bridges,
cuttings, tunnels, levels, road-bed, rails, and switches
which constitute its line, and of the engines and cars
which it employs in the conduct of its business, to use
good and sufficient material, to engage skilled engineers
and contractors, and to follow correct methods of con-
struction ; from time to time to adopt and put into oper-
ation such appliances and methods of operation as,
having been tested and found to materially contribute
to the safety of railway operations, are in j3ractical use,
and can, in fact, be adopted by the railway ; to test its
machinery and appliances before they are put into use ;
from time to time to inspect its line, buildings, ma-
chinery, and appliances in order to guard against de-
terioration by wear and tear and by lapse of time ; to
make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for
the safety of all persons who shall be brought into
contact with the operations of its line; to employ a
sufficient number of servants ; to select those servants
4 THE QUASI PUBLIC CHARACTER OF RAILWAYS.
carefully; to make and enforce regulations for their
guidance ; and to use in the operation of its line every
reasonable precaution for the safe conduct of its busi-
ness; and a failure of duty in any one of these respects
will render the railway liable for such injuries as might
have been avoided by the performance of the particular
duty.
II. THE LIABILITY AS AFFECTED BY THE QUASI PUBLIC
CHARACTER OF RAILWAYS.
The liability of railways for the results of their negligence is neither
increased nor diminished by their quasi public character.
3. While it is true that railway corporations, although
created by the investment of j>rivate, and not public,
capital, are, as grantees of public franchises, subject to
governmental regulation and control, so far as they are
not protected by the terms of their charters, 1 yet, inas-
much as they are primarily organized for jmrposes of
private gain, they are private corporations, 2 and their
obligation to indemnify those whom they may injure by
the exercise of their franchises is neither increased nor
diminished by their quasi public character. It is true
that Bradley, J., has said 3 that " the business of the
common carrier in this country, at least, is emphatically
a branch of the public service, and the conditions on
which that public service shall be performed by private
enterprise are not yet definitely settled ;" but the sug-
gestion therein conveyed of a future ascertainment of
1 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 130 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa. Id. 161 ; G. T.
Ry. v. Stevens, 95 Id. 655 : Barton v. Barbour, 104 Id. 135; Miltenberger v.
Lopansport Ry., 10G Id. 312; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Penna. St. 27.
*Timlow v. P. & R. R. R., 99 Penna. St. 284; P. & L E. R. R. v. Bruce,
102 Id. 23 ; Pierce v The ( lommonwealth, 14 Weekly Notes of Cases 97 ; Pres-
byterian Society v. A. & R. R. B., 3 Hill 567
3 G. T. Ry. v. Stevens. 95 U. 8. 660.
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED. 5
the essential conditions of contracts of carriage bv rail-
way must, in the light of precedent and principle, be
construed as an intimation of prospective legislation
rather than as an authoritative declaration of existing
law, or even as a foreshadowing of a. judicial develop-
ment of old principles in new directions, for when a
railway has been chartered to construct a line and
thereon to transport passengers and goods for hire, its
franchise is the capacity thereby conferred of transact-
ing the business of a common carrier subject only to
such limitations as its charter prescribes, and to such
regulations as the State may, in the exercise of its police
power, lawfully impose upon individuals doing the like
business. Thus much was conceded by Waite, C. J., 1
when he said : " This company, in the transaction of its
business, has the same rights, and is subject to the same
control as private individuals under the same circum-
stances." Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that
in certain jurisdictions the law, from considerations of
public policy, denies to railways the privilege of con-
tracting for exemption from the results of their negli-
gence.
III. NEGLIGENCE DEFINED.
Actionable negligence is a non-performance of duty causing injury to
the person to whom the duty is owing.
4. The word "negligence" is so denned by lexicog-
raphers as to convey only the idea of a careless or
thoughtless omission to act, but that negligence which
is the subject of an action at law includes acts of com-
mission and of omission, and comprehends equally that
heedlessness which does not consider the possible results
of an act, that rashness which cares not whether or not
1 C. B. & Q. K. R. v. Iowa. 94 U. S. 161.
O NEGLIGENCE DEFINED.
wrong be done by an act, and that wilful malice which
intends the doing of wrong, and the distinction between
a careless non-performance of duty and the wilful
doing of wrong, in the characterization of any par-
ticular act, when done by an agent or servant of the
railway is only material in determining the responsi-
bility of the railway therefor.
5. Alderson, B., 1 has defined negligence as "the
omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those principles which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing some-
thing which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do." Paxson, J., 2 , has with greater brevity defined
negligence as " the absence of care according to the cir-
cumstances," and Willes, J., 3 has pertinently said :
" Confusion has arisen from regarding negligence as a
positive instead of a negative word. It is really the
absence of such care as it was the duty of the defendant
to use." 4
6. Yet it cannot be said that any one of tl^iese defi-
nitions is perfectly satisfactory, for they all fail to ade-
quately express the three essential elements of actionable
negligence, that is, first, the existence of a duty owing
by the defendant to the plaintiff or to the person whom
that plaintiff represents; second, a non-performance
of that duty by an act of commission or omission on
the part of the defendant; and third, an injury to the
1 Blyth >. Birmingham Water Works Co., 11 Ex. 781.
2 P. W. & B. R. R. v. Stinger, 78 Penna. St. 225.
3 Grill v. Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. G12.
4 Similar definitions are given in P>ridges v. N. L. Ry ., L. R. 7 H. L. 232;
Smith v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P. 102 ; Johnson v. W. C. & P. R. R-, 70
Penna. St. 366 ; Kay v. P. R. R., 65 Id. 273 ; Turnpike Co. v. P. & T. R. R.,
54 Id. 351 ; Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Id. 226 ; Jamison v. S. J. & S. C. R. R.,
55 Cal. 593, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 350; B. & P. R. R. v. Jones, 95 U. S.
439 ; Washington v. B. & O. R. R., 17 W. Va. 190, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
749.
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED.
plaintiff or the person whom he represents directly re-
sulting from the defendant's non-performance of that
duty. There must be both the existence of the duty
and the breach of that duty, for otherwise the defendant
has done no wrong, for as Erie, C. J., said l there can be
no satisfactory proof of negligence as against a defend-
ant, " unless it be shown that there existed some duty
owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, and that there
has been a breach of that duty." So far as regards the
right of action, it is immaterial whether the non-per-
formance of duty upon the part of the defendant has
been wilful or careless, but the form of the remedy and
the quantum of damages may be materially affected by
the wilful or careless character of the defendant's act,
and where the injury is done by the act of a servant,
the careless or willful character of the act may be ma-
terial in determining the responsibility of the master.
There must be actual injury, for otherwise the plaintiff
has suffered only damnum absque injuria.
7. Brett, M. R, 2 defines actionable negligence as
" the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill toward
a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of ob-
serving ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the
plaintiff, without contributory negligence on his part,
has suffered injury to his person or property." Of all
the judicial definitions of negligence, this seems to me
to be the most complete, but I venture to suggest that
actionable negligence may be denned, with sufficient
accuracy for all practical purposes, to be a non -per-
formance of duty causing injury to the person to whom
the duty is owing.
1 Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568, 98 E. C. L.
1 Ileaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 507.
O DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE.
IV. DISTINCTIONS IN DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE.
Distinctions in degrees of negligence are noiv generally regarded as
in t important.
8. The earlier cases, 1 following the civil law, attempted
to classify negligence under the three categories of
" slight," " ordinary," and " gross," but, bearing in
mind the definitions quoted in the preceding paragraph,
distinctions between the degrees of negligence become
of little or of no importance, for the want of that care
w 7 hich the circumstances of the particular case make
necessary is the foundation of a legal liability, whether
it be in itself slight, ordinary, or gross negligence. This
view has been sanctioned by high authority. Lord
Denraan 2 has said : " it may well be doubted whether
between gross negligence and negligence merely any
intelligible distinction exists." Lord Cranworth 3 has
said that he "could see no difference between negligence
and gross negligence ; that it was the same thing, with
the addition of a vituperative epithet." In the Supreme
Court of the United States, Curtis, J., 4 has character-
ized as impracticable any distinction between degrees
of negligence ; and Davis, J., 5 has said : '* gross negli-
gence is a relative term ; after all, it means the absence
of care that was necessary under the circumstances."
The same view has been taken in other cases. 6
9. But Bradley, J., 7 has said : " in each case the
1 Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. & B. 177, 7 E. C. L. ; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W.
443; Owen v. Burnett, 4 Tyr 133; Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144, 4 E. C L. ;
Tracy v. Wood, 3 Mason 132 ; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479.
2 Hinton v, Dibbin, 2 Ad. & El. N. S. 661, 42 E. C. L.
3 Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 115.
4 Steamboal New World v. King, 16 How. 469.
5 M. & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U. H. 495.
6 Beal v. S. D. Ry., 3 H. & C. 341 ; Grill v. Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. 1
C. P. 612; Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180; Perkins v. N. Y. C. R. R., 24 N.Y.
196.
7 N. Y. C. R. R. v. Lockwood. 17 Wall. 357.
PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. 9
negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is failure to
bestow the care and skill which the situation demands ;
and hence it is more strictly accurate, perhaps, to call
it simply ' negligence.' And this seems to be the ten-
dency of modern authorities. If they mean more than
this and seek to abolish the distinctions of degrees of
care, skill, and diligence required in the performance
of various duties, and the fulfillment of various con-
tracts, we think they go too far, since the requirement
of different degrees of care in different situations is too
firmly settled and fixed in the law to be ignored or
changed."
V. PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.
Tlie negligence of the railway must be the proximate, and not the re-
mote cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
10. It is, however, not sufficient to define negligence
in abstract terms. It is necessary, also, to discriminate
between those causes of injury to individuals which do,
and those which do not, result from negligence on the
part of the railway, and to illustrate the distinction by
reference to adjudged cases.
11. The negligence of the railway must have been
the efficient cause of the injury, for as Gibson, C. J., 1
has said, the defendant " is answerable for the conse-
quences of negligence, and not for its abstract exist-
ence," and as Cairns, L. C., 2 has said, " the negligence
must in some way connect itself, or be connected by
evidence, with the accident. It must be * * * incuria
dans locum injuries" If its negligence be the efficient
cause of the injury, the railway must, as Nares, J., 3
1 Hart ?-. Allen, 2 Watts 116.
2 M. Ry. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 198.
8 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 BL 892.
10 PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.
said, with regard to the original thrower of that squib
which has played so important a part in the history of
the law, be " answerable for all the consequences " of
its negligence; but those consequences in a legal sense
are the proximate and not the remote consequences,
for as Lord Bacon 1 said, in explanation of the maxim
" causa proximo, non remota spectatur," "it were infinite
for the law to judge the causes of causes and their im-
pulsions one of another ; therefore it contenteth itself
with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that
without looking to any further degree."
12. Of course, the soundness of the rule as thus stated
is generally conceded, but there is often great practical
difficulty in its application to the facts of particular
cases. It would, therefore, be desirable to obtain, if it
were possible, a test by which to determine whether or
not any specific act of negligence be the proximate
cause of the injury in any |)articular case.
13. Different tests have been suggested. In one
class of cases the suggested test is the existence of an
unbroken connection between the wrongful act or omis-
sion and the injury. The theory of this test is thus
explained by Strong, J., 2 "we do not say that even
the natural and probable consequences of a wrongful
act or omission are, in all cases, to be chargeable to the
misfeasance or nonfeasance. They are not, when there
is a sufficient and independent cause operating between
the wrong and the injury. In such a case the resort
of the sufferer must be to the originator of the inter-
mediate cause. But when there is no intermediate
efficient cause, the original wrong must be considered as
reaching to the effect and proximate to it. The inquiry
must, therefore, always be, whether there was any inter-
mediate cause disconnected from the primary fault and
1 Max. Eeg. 1. 2 M. & St. P. Ey. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 4fi9, 475.
PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. 11
self-operating which produced the injury. Here lies
the difficulty. But the inquiry must be answered in
accordance with common understanding. In a suc-
cession of dependent events, an interval may always be
seen by an acute mind between a cause and its effect,
though it may be so imperceptible as to be overlooked
by a common mind. * * * In the nature of things,
there is in every transaction a succession of events
more or less dependent upon those preceding, and it is
the province of a jury to look at this succession of
events or facts and ascertain whether they are naturally
and probably connected with each other by a continu-
ous sequence or are dissevered by new and independent
agencies, and this must be determined in view of the
circumstances existing at the time." 1
14. Another suggested test is that the injury should
be such a consequence as, under the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the case, might and ought to have been fore-
seen by the wrongdoer as likely to follow from his act.
Bovill, C. J., 2 states it thus : " No doubt one who com-
mits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary con-
sequences which are likely to result therefrom ; but,
generally speaking, he is not liable for damage, which is
not the natural or ordinary consequence of such an act,
unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable
means of knowing, that consequences not usually re-
sulting from the act are, by reason of some existing
cause, likely to intervene so as to occasion damage to a
third person. Where there is no reason to expect it,
and no knowledge in the person doing the wrongful act
that such a state of things exists as to render the dam-
1 Substantially the same view is taken in Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44 ;
Scheffer v. W. C. V. M. & «-. S. R. R., 105 U. S. 249 ; Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19
Wall. 531 ; Fawcett v. P. C. & St. L. Ry. 24 W. Va. 755.
* Sharp v. Powell, L. It., 7 C. P. 253.
12 PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.
age probable, if injury does result to a third person, it
is generally considered that the wrongful act is not (lie
proximate cause of the injury so as to render the
wrongdoer liable to an action." In the same case
Grove, J., said : " The expression, the ' natural ' con-
sequence, which has been used in so many eases, and
which I myself have no doubt often used, by no means
conveys to the mind an adequate notion of what is
meant ; ' probable ' would, perhaps, be a better expres-
sion," and Keating, J., based his judgment for the
defendant on the fact that the damage in question was
not " one which the defendant could fairly be expected
to anticipate as likely to ensue from his act."
15. The same view was obviously present to the mind
of Bramwell, B., 1 when he said, " it would be mon-
strous to hold the defendants responsible because they
did not foresee and prevent an accident, the cause of
which was so obscure that it was not discovered until
many months after the accident had happened."
Paxson, J., 2 states the same view clearly and forci-
bly, thus, " a man's responsibility for his negligence, and
that of his servants, must end somewhere. There is a
possibility of carrying an admittedly correct principle
too far. It may be extended so as to reach the reductio
ad absurdum, so far as it applies to the practical business
of life. We think this difficulty may be avoided by ad-
hering to the principle * * * that, in determining what
is proximate cause, the true rule is that the injury must
be the natural and probable consequence of the negli-
gence — such a consequence as, under the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the case, might and ought to have been
foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his
act. This is not a limitation of the maxim causa
1 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 785.
1 Hoag v. L. S. & M. S R. R., 85 Penna. St. 293.
PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. 13
proximo, non remota spectatur: it only affects its appli-
cation." 1
16. But, as is pointed out in the "judgments in Smith
v. L. & S. W. Ry., 2 it must be borne in mind in apply-
ing the last suggested test that a defendant, who does a
negligent act, ought to be held responsible for any
natural consequences of that act, although the particular
consequence which resulted from the act either was not
or could not have been anticipated by him. Neither
of the suggested tests is so precise and definite that its
application to the facts of any possible case will, at once
and beyond doubt, determine the liability of the railway
to the plaintiff, and in the end the correct solution of
the problem in any case is dependent upon the exercise
of a sound judgment by the judge and the jury ; for, it
is for the jury, as Paxson, J., 3 has said, "to ascertain
the relation of one fact to another, and how far there
is a continuation of the causation by which the result
is linked to the cause by an unbroken chain of events,
each one of which is the natural, foreseen, and necessary
result of such cause." 4 But it is for the court in this,
as in all other cases which go to the jury, to determine
in the first instance whether, assuming the truth of the
evidence, the jury can reasonably find a verdict for the
party upon whom, under the pleadings, the burden of
proof rests.
1 The last-mentioned test is adopted as the correct one in Greenland v.
Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243; Hoag v. L. 8. & M. S. R. R., 85 Penna. St. 293; P. S.
Ry. ?\ Taylor, 104 Id. 306 ; Hunter v. Wanaraaker, 17 Weekly Noteg of Cases
(Penna.) 232, 1 Penna. Sup. Ct. Digest 7.
2 L. R., 6 C. P. 14.
3 Hoag v. L. S. & M. S. R. R., 85 Penna. St. 294.
* Webb v. R. W. & O. R. R., 49 N. Y. 420 ; P. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Penna. St.
373 ; P. & N. Y. C. R. R. v. Lacey, 89 Id. 458 ; M. & S. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94
U. S. 469; L. E. R. R. v. McKeen, 90 Penna. St. 122; P. W. & P>. R. R. v.
Brannen, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 227 ; Billman v. I. C. & L. R. R.,
76 Ind. 166; 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 41.
5 Hoag v. L. S. & M. S. R. R., 85 Penna. St. 294.
14 INJURIES IN AVOIDING DANGER.
17. Where injuries are inflicted, in the course of rail-
way operations, upon the person of one who is himself
without fault, those injuries are generally so immediate
and all their effects so obviously connected, that there is
no reason to doubt that the damage is the proximate re-
sult of some particular act or omission on the part of the
railway, but when the question of proximate or remote
cause is raised, it turns either on the relation of the in-
juries, whatever they may be, to the particular act or
omission on the part of the railway, or on the connec-
tion between some subsequently developed injury to the
plaintiff and his original injury.
18. As illustrations of the first class there are the cases
of injuries suffered by one in attempting to escape from
a situation of apparent peril to life or limb in which he
has been placed by negligence on the part of the rail-
way, and the cases of injuries incurred in attempting to
obviate some more or less serious inconvenience, which
the railway's negligence or breach of contract has
brought upon one. As illustrations of the second
class, there are the cases of disabilities or maladies
supervening upon the immediately apparent injuries
inflicted by the railway's negligence.
Tfie railway is liable for injuries suffered by one in attempting to escape
from a situation of apparent peril to life or limb, in which he has
been placed by the negligence of the railway.
19. The leading case is Jones v. Boyce, 1 where the
plaintiff was a passenger by the defendant's coach ; a
rein having broken, and one of the leaders becoming
ungovernable, whilst the coach was passing a hill, the
plaintiff, apprehending the overturning of the coach,
which, however, was not overturned, jumped off, and in
1 1 Starkie 493, 2 E. C. L.
INJURIES IN AVOIDING INCONVENIENCES. 15
so doing broke his leg, whereas if he had remained on
the coach he would not have been injured. Lord Ellen-
borough directed the jury that " to enable the plaintiff
to sustain the action, it is not necessary that he should
have been thrown off the coach ; it is sufficient if he
was placed by the misconduct of the defendant in such
a situation as obliged him to adopt the alternative of a
dangerous leap or to remain at certain peril. If that
position was occasioned by the default of the defendant,
the action may be supported. On the other hand, if
the plaintiff's act resulted from a rash apprehension of
danger which did not exist, and the injury which he
sustained is to be attributed to rashness and imprudence,
he is not entitled to recover. The question is whether
he was placed in such a situation as to render what he
did a prudent precaution for the purpose of self-preser-
vation." 1
The railway is liable for injuries incurred by one in attempting, by an
ad not obviously dangerous, to obviate a serious inconvenience to him,
caused by the negligence of the railway.
20. Thus, in Adams v. L. & Y. Rv., 2 the door of the
carriage in which the plaintiff was riding would not
remain shut while the train was in motion, but there
was room enough for the plaintiff to sit away from the
door, and the weather was good. The plaintiff, having
1 See also Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Erwin (Tenn.),
3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 4(55; Caswell v. B & W. R. R., 98 Mass. 194;
E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Gnrley, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 46, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
568 ; G. R. R. v. Rhode-. 56 ( ra 645 ; C. R. R. v. Roach, 64 Id. 685, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R Cas. 79 ; P. B. & W. R. R. v. Rohrman, 13 Weekly Notes of Cases
258; 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 176; Smith v. St. P. M. & M. Ry., 80 Minn.
169, 9 Am & Eng R. R. Cas. 262; Iron R. R. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418,
3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 361 ; Buel v. N. Y. C. R. R., 31 N. Y. 314 ; S. W. R.
R. v. Panlk, 21 Ga, 356 ; Wilson v. N. P. R. R., 26 Minn. 278 ; M. & W. R.
R. r. Winn, 26 Ga. 250.
* L. R. 4 C. P. 739.
16 INJURIES IX AVOIDING INCONVENIENCES.
shut the door three times, attempted for the fourth
time to elose it within three minutes of the time of
arrival of the train at a station, and, in so doing, he fell
out and was injured. Judgment was entered for the
defendant upon the ground that, as the inconvenience
to the plaintiff from the open door was slight, and the
peril in attempting to close it was considerable, the in-
jury resulting from that attempt was caused solely by
his own carelessness. 1 On the other hand, in W. M.
R. R. v . Stanley, 2 a passenger was held entitled to re-
cover for injuries received in attempting to close the
door of his car while passing through a tunnel, the
railway having omitted to light the car, and the open
door inconveniencing the plaintiff and the other pas-
sengers in the car by its admission of smoke and cinders.
In cases such as these, probably the true ground of de-
cision is that the plaintiff cannot recover if in attempt-
ing to avoid that which is merely inconvenient, and in
no sense dangerous, he encounters a danger obviously
apparent to the minds of reasonable men ; but, on the
other hand, as Brett, J., 3 said, " if the inconvenience is
so great that it is reasonable to get rid of it by an act
not obviously dangerous, and executed without careless-
ness," the railway " would be liable for any injury that
might result from an attempt to avoid such inconveni-
ence."
1 In the later case of Gee v. M. Ey., L. R. 8 Q. B. 161, Adams v. L. & Y.
Ry. is commented on, and the application to the facts of that case of the doc-
trine as above stated, questioned.
2 61 Md. 266, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206.
s Adams v. L. & Y. Ry., L. R. 4 C. P. 744.
INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS. 17
Tlie railway ought not to be held liable in damages for injuries which
result not from its negligence, but solely from the attempt of the in-
jured person to obviate by his own rash act an inconvenience caused
to him by the railway s breach of contract.
21. There are also other cases which, though in
reality very different from those referred to in section
19, are generally decided upon the same principle, and
those are the cases of passengers who, when the railway
does not bring its train to a stop at a station, or does
not stop the train for a sufficient length of time to
enable them to enter or alight from the train in safety,
attempt to get on or off the train while it is in motion,
and are thereby injured. Many of the authorities hold
that the rule of decision in such cases is that the rail-
way is to be held liable for injuries thus caused, unless
the jury shall find that the person injured in getting on
or off the cars encountered a danger obviously apparent
to the minds of reasonable men. Other authorities hold,
that such injuries are self inflicted, and that the railway
is not to be held liable therefor. The principle involved
in these cases was ruled in Clayards v. Dethick, 1 where
the defendant had dug a dangerous trench in the only
outlet from a mews, and the plaintiff's horse in coming-
out of the mews fell into the ditch and was killed. Den-
man, C. J., directed the jury "that it could not be the
plaintiff's duty to refrain altogether from coming out of
the mews merely because the defendant had made the
passage in some degree dangerous, * * * though, if the
plaintiff had persisted in running upon a great and
obvious danger his action could not be maintained."
A verdict having passed for the plaintiff, a rule for a
new trial was discharged. Clayards v. Dethick is cited
with approval and followed in Thompson v. N. E. Ry., 2
1 12 Q. B. 439 ; 64 E. C. L.
* 2B. &S. 106; HOE. C. L.
J 8 INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS.
where the defendants as proprietors of a dock and tidal
basin, which they had opened for use before its con-
struction had been completed by dredging it throughout
to the required depth, were held liable in damages to
the owner of a ship which had grounded in leaving the
dock, although the pilot knew that the channel of
requisite depth was narrow, for the verdict of the jury
having negatived negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff, the plaintiff's recovery was not to be prevented
without proof that the state of the basin was such as to
render it imprudent to attempt to take the vessel out.
In Siner v. G. W. By., 1 where it was held that the
railway was not liable to a female passenger who was
injured in descending from a railway carriage, because
she chose to jump down rather than to avail herself of
the steps of the carriage, Kelly, C. B., said, in his dis-
senting judgment, 2 " I am clearly of opinion, however,
that a railway company are not entitled to expose any
passenger to the necessity of choosing between two alter-
natives, neither of which he could lawfully be called on
to choose, namely, either to go on to Bangor or to take
his chance of danger and jump out ; and if they do so
the choice is made at their peril." 3
22. On the other hand, in Lax v. Darlington, 4
Bramwell, L. J., said : " A person traveling on a
railway is taken to some place where he ought not
to have been taken — beyond a platform, for instance.
He jumps out, risking the danger, and hurts him-
self. In my opinion in such a case as that he ought
to have no remedy against the company for the
hurt; if he chooses to jump out and hurt himself, he
1 L. R. 3 Ex. 150 ; 4 Id. 117. 2 L. R. 3 Ex. 156.
8 Similar views are expressed in Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N. Y. 47 ; P. R.
R. v. Kilgore, 32 Penna. St. 292; Johnson v. W. C. & P. R. R., 70 Id. 357,
and in many other cases.
* 5 Ex. D. 35.
INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS. 10
must take the hurt. What he must do is to sit in
the carriage and be carried on beyond where he wants
to go, and then bring his action against the com-
pany for not affording him proper accommodation to
get out. I have no doubt of the good sense of that ;
I have not a misgiving of it, and I cannot agree to a
great deal of what was said in the case of Clayards
v. Dethick. 1 It was there asked, 'was the cabman
bound to stay in all day ?' Bound ! Bound to whom ?
A person being bound supposes his being bound to
somebody. It is an inaccurate expression. One does
not care about words except when they mislead. The
expression 'bound' was used there. Why, of course,
he was not bound, because there was nobody to say to
him, ' you shall.' But if he chooses to go out with an
obvious danger before him he must take the conse-
quences. Suppose a man is shut up in the top room of
a house unlawfully, is he bound to stay there ? He is
not bound to do anything of the kind; he may jump '
out if he likes to run the risk of breaking his neck or
his limbs ; he may let himself down by a rope or a
ladder, but if he runs the risk of getting out and breaks
his neck, the person who shuts him up is not guilty of
manslaughter ; and if he breaks his leg he ought not to
have any right of action against that person, although
he was not bound to stay there. Then there was an-
other expression used which I cannot help thinking
was an unfortunate one. It was this : ' What would a
prudent man do?' Just see the consequence of that
sort of reasoning. A prudent cabman with a good
horse having a shilling fare offered to him would have
stopped at home ; a prudent cabman with a bad horse and
a pound fare would have chanced it. The consequences
would be that he could recover if he hurt a bad horse,
1 12 Q. B. 439 ; 64 E. C. L.
20 INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS.
but could not recover if he hurt a good one. The truth
is, to talk of what a prudent man would do is a mis-
leading way of considering the matter. A prudent
man would lead a forlorn hope under some circum-
stances, because the possible gain, in his estimation,
would be equal to the risk. It is not, therefore, a
question of prudence. I dare say a prudent man might
jump out of a train going very fast, if he saw some im-
minent danger to his wife or child, or anybody for
whom he had great affection, and he could immediately
go and rescue them. It is not, therefore, a question of
prudence as far as he is concerned. I think that case
— I should not have discussed it at the length I have
done if an erroneous idea was not conveyed by it — can
only be justified on a ground which, I think, will be
found, especially in the judgment of Wightman, J.,
and upon which I am inclined to think some of the
judges really decided it. It is this : That the danger
there was not an obvious one ; that when the cabman
went out he got into trouble from what, in truth,
was a pitfall, the nature of which he was unaware of,
but which had been prepared for him by the defendant.
Upon that ground, perhaps, the judgment may be sup-
ported ; but I have a misgiving, even then, whether,
when there was a danger of accident, it was not his — I
will not say his duty — but whether it was not for him
to ascertain the extent of it before he ran the risk of it.
However, I think it is upon that ground only that the
case can be sustained. It is said that it has been after-
ward cited and adopted in Wyatt v. G. W. Ky. 1 It was
no doubt cited and adopted, but I am very much inclined
to think it was adopted upon the principle that I have
mentioned, and that may be seen especially from the
judgment of the majority of the court. If Clayards v.
1 6 B. & S. 709 ; 118 E. C. L. ; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 204.
INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS. 2L
Dethick and Wyatt v. Great Western By. Co. are
adopted to their full extent, I am constrained to express
my distrust of those cases."
23. The result reached in Wyatt v. G. W. By., 1 is
inconsistent with the doctrine of Clayards v. Dethick,
for it was there held that a person who while traveling
on a highway had been injured in opening for himself,
the railway servants being absent, a statutory gate which
a railway had erected at a local crossing, and which, when
closed, barred the highway, could not recover. Bram-
well, B., said forcibly in Siner v. G. W. Ry., 2 "suppose the
defendants had covenanted with the plaintiff, under seal,
to carry her to a particular place, and to provide proper
means of exit from the carriage, and that the plaintiff,
declaring upon the covenant, alleged a breach of con-
tract, and then went on to say, per quod, I jumped from
the carriage, and in so doing hurt myself, would that be
per quod f Would it be damage legitimately flowing
from the breach of contract ? I think not. She could
only say that her act was led or induced, not that it
was caused, by their breach of contract. It could not
be said that her jumping out was a legitimate conse-
quence of their neglect, and it is none the more so
because she sues in tort. The question has been argued
as if it were one of contributory negligence ; but it is
not. The whole mischief resulted from the plaintiff's
own act, and even assuming negligence in the defend-
ants, that negligence was not the cause of the accident."
24. Unquestionably, the true ground of decision in
cases of this class is that which is suggested by the dicta
quoted from the judgment of Bramwell, J., in Siner's
case. The obligation of a railway to take up or set down
a passenger at a particular station is an obligation de-
1 6 B. & S. 709 ; 118 E. C. L.
2 L. R. 3 Ex. 154.
22 INJURIES IN BOARDING OR LEAVING TRAINS.
pendent solely upon the contract between the particular
passenger and the railway, and not an obligation arising
out of the general duty of the railway to its passengers.
When, therefore, the railway does not stop its train at
the particular station at which it has contracted to
receive or deliver the passenger, or when the railway
does not stop its train at that station for a sufficient
time to enable the passenger to enter or alight from its
car, it thereby breaks its contract with the passenger,
but it does not inflict upon him that sort of wrong
which the law characterizes as a tort. Under such cir-
cumstances the passenger who, by the failure of the
railway to stop its train, is carried past his station, or
is left on the station platform, as the case may be, has
his remedy by an action at law against the railway for
the breach of its contract, and in that action he can
recover the damages which naturally and necessarily
result from that breach of contract, that is, compensa-
tion for any inconvenience to which the railway's
breach of contract has put him. But if, not content
with the remedy which the law gives him, or im-
pelled by a natural desire to carry out his precon-
ceived purpose, he jumps upon or from the train in
motion, or does any other act which is the cause of
injury to him, the railway ought not to be held liable,
for that injury, however unfortunate and however
serious, is the result not of the railway's failure to stop
its train in accordance with its contract, but of his own
rash act. Black, C. J., puts this very forcibly, 1 saying,
" If a passenger be negligently carried beyond the sta-
tion where he intended to stop, and where he had a
right to be let off, he can recover compensation for the
inconvenience, the loss of time, and the labor of travel-
ing back; because these are the direct consequences
1 P. R. R. v. Aspell, 23 Penn. St. 147.
INJURIES IN AVOIDING HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTIONS. 23
of the wrong done to him. But if he is foolhardy-
enough to jump off without waiting for the train to
stop, he does it at his own risk, because this is gross
imprudence, for which he can blame nobody but him-
self." If the views herein expressed be sound, those cases
have been wrongly decided wherein it has been held
that, under such circumstances, the plaintiff can recover.
25. Another class of cases in which the same result
should be reached is that of adult persons, who, find-
ing a railway crossing of a highway blocked by cars,
attempt to pass under or climb over the cars, and in so
doing are injured. In these cases there is, of course, no
contractual relation between the person injured and the
railway, but every such person has his remedy by action
against the railway for his individual loss resulting from
its obstruction of the highway, and any injuries which
he may bring upon himself in his efforts to avoid the
inconvenience caused by that obstruction are self in-
flicted, and are not justly chargeable to the railway.
Of course, where, under such circumstances, the person
injured, is by infancy or otherwise, incapacitated from
realizing the danger of doing the act which causes the
injury, a different principle applies, and the railway
may justly be held liable for its negligence in leaving
upon a highway that which may become a cause of injury
to persons so incapacitated. The mistaken result which
has been reached in so many of the cases of injuries
incurred in getting on or off moving cars, or in climb-
ing over or in passing under cars which obstruct a
highway crossing, is largely due to the fact that those
cases are, in general, considered to raise questions of
contributory negligence, whereas they really raise the
question of the relation between the plaintiff's injury
and the railway's non-performance of its duty as the
proximate or remote cause of that injury.
24 ILLUSTRATIONS OF REMOTE NEGLIGENCE.
Illusfratio7is of the general doctrine as to proximate and remote cause:
cases in which the negligence proven was held to be too remote.
26. In further illustration of the general doctrine as
to proximate and remote cause, reference may be made
to the following cases, in which the negligence proven
was held to be too remote to be considered the efficient
cause of the injury for which the plaintiff sought repa-
ration. In P. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Staley, 1 the railway
having unlawfully obstructed a highway crossing by a
train at rest, the plaintiff, in order to avoid the ob-
struction, turned into another street, and there was in-
jured by falling on the ice. In P. S. Ry. v. Taylor, 2
the railway had permitted a derailed and overturned
car to remain at the side of a highway crossing, and
the plaintiff's horse was frightened thereby. In Jack-
son v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 3 the railway obstructed a
highway crossing by a train, and the plaintiff, in avoid-
ing the obstruction by driving across the line at a point
where there was no public crossing, and, consequently,
no planking between the rails, was jolted out of his
vehicle, and thereby injured. In M. Railway v. Jack-
son, 4 the carriage in which the passenger was riding
being overcrowded, other persons attempted at a station
to force their way into the carriage, and the plaintiff,
having risen to prevent their entrance as the train
started, in order to save himself from falling, put his
hand on the edge of the door, where it was caught and
crushed by the act of the railway's servant in closing
the door, in the performance of his duty. In Hobbs v.
L. & S. W. Ry., 5 the railway set down the plaintiff and
his wife and children, at night and in a rain storm, at a
1 41 Ohio St. 118, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 381.
s 104 Penna. St. 306.
8 13 Lea (Tenn.) 491, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 433.
* 3 App. Cas. 193. 6 L. R. 10 Q. B. 111.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF REMOTE NEGLIGENCE. 25
station several miles distant from, that to which it had
agreed to carry them, and the wife contracted a severe
illness from walking in the storm. 1
27. In Cornman v. E. C. Ry., 2 the plaintiff, while in-
quiring for a parcel at a station upon a holiday, was
forced by a crowd of passengers against a weighing
machine, the foot of which projected about six inches
above the level of the platform, and was injured by
falling over that machine. In Hunter v. Stewart, 3 the
plaintiff, an unmarried woman, was disfigured by the
negligence of a carrier, and her possibility of successful
marriage thereby diminished. In Williamson v. G. T.
Ry., 4 the plaintiff was wrongfully expelled from a car,
and in leaving it fell and was injured. In Phyfe v. M.
Ry., 5 the plaintiff was so severely hurt as to be confined
to his house for a time, and he alone being able to open
the safe at his place of business, some gold which was
stored therein could not be sold, and he thereby lost
the profits on its sale. In McClelland v. L. N. A. &
C. Ry., 6 the railway was held not to be liable in damages
for the death of a drunken jmssenger, who, having been
rightfully expelled from a train, subsequently wandered
upon the line and was run over by another train, but
without fault on the part of the servants in charge of
1 See, also, in support of the rule in Hobbs' case : Walsh v. C. M. & St. P.
Ry., 42 Wise. 23; L. & N. R. R v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 128, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 347 ; Lewis v. F. & P. M. Ry., 54 Mich. 55, 18 Am. & Eng
R. R. Cas 263 : Francis v. St. L. T. Co., 5 Mo. App. Cas. 7 ; St. L., K. C. & N
R. R. v. Trigg, 74 Mo. 147, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 345 ; St. L., K. C. & N.
R. R. v. Marshal], 78 Mo. 610, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 248 ; sed cf. Brown
v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 54 Wise. 342, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 444 ; C, H. & I.
R. R. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 254; L. E. & W. Ry.
v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 109.
2 4 H. & N. 78) *\ 9 ' 3 4 7 Me. 419.
* 17 Up. Can. (C. P.) 615. 5 30 Hun (N. Y.) 377.
• 94 Ind. 276, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 260.
2G ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROXIMATE NEGLIGENCE.
that t rain. 1 In Henry v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 2 a rail-
way servant having directed a passenger to change from
one car to another at a way station, and the passenger,
having as directed gone to the other car, and having
been informed by a railway servant that he would not
be permitted to remain in that car because its train was
not made up, alighted therefrom, and while standing on
the line was injured by another train, and it was held
that his expulsion from the car was not the proximate
cause of his injury.
Illustrations of the general doctrine as to proximate and remote cause :
cases in which the negligence proven was held to be the proximate
cause of the injury.
28. In the following cases the negligence proven was
held to be a sufficiently proximate cause of the injury
to render the railway responsible therefor ; in P., W. &
B. R. R. v. Brannen, 3 the negligent blowing of an
engine whistle by an engine driver, thereby frightening
a horse on a highway, who, in running away, ran over
and injured the plaintiff while walking on the high-
way ; 4 the negligence of a railway in not maintaining
its roadbed and rails in a condition for the safe move-
ment of trains, whereby an engine was derailed, and
the engine driver in reversing the lever broke his
arm ; 5 the act of the railway's servant in mistakenly
putting a female passenger off the train at a station
three miles short of the station to which the railway
had contracted to carry her, whereby she, being preg-
1 See, also, Haley v. C. & N. W. R. R-, 21 Iowa 15 ; Ry. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio
St. 345.
2 76 Mo. 288, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1.36.
3 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 227. See also Lowery v. M. Ry., 99
N. Y. 158.
* See, also, Billman v. I. C. & L. R. R., 76 Ind. 166, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 41.
* Knapp v. S. C. & P. Ry., 65 Iowa 91, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 60.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROXIMATE NEGLIGENCE. 27
nant and being unable to ojbtain means of conveyance,
walked to her destination, and thereby brought on a
miscarriage and subsequent illness. 1 So, where a pas-
senger, having been ejected from a train in such man-
ner that he was run over by that train, and subse-
quently by another train of the railway defendant, and
death ensued, it was held that there was a cause of
action vested in his personal representatives under the
Georgia statute, whether the first or second train
actually caused his death. 2 So, in Eames v. T. & N.
O. E. R, 3 it was held that the failure of a railway to
cut clown on its right of w^ay bushes which afforded cover
to straying cattle was the proximate cause of injury to
cattle who, suddenly emerging from such cover and
going upon the line, were run over by a train before
the servants in charge of it could bring it to a stop.
So, in Hayes v. M. C. E. E., 4 where the railway was,
by reason of its failure to perform a statutory duty of
fencing its line on the borders of a public park, held
liable for the injuries of a boy who had strayed upon
the line and been run over by a train, Matthews, J.,
said : " It is further argued that the direction of the
court below was right, because the want of a fence
could not reasonably be alleged as the cause of the
injury. In the sense of an efficient cause, causa causans,
this is no doubt strictly true ; but that is not the sense
in which the law uses the term in this connection. The
question is, was it causa sine qua non — a cause which,
if it had not existed, the injury would not have taken
place — an occasional cause ; and that is a question of fact,
1 Brown v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 54 Wis. 342, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
444.
2 S. C. R. R. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572.
3 63 Tex. 660, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 540.
* 111 U. S. 228, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 394.
28 SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED INJURIES.
unless the casual connection is evidently not proxi-
mate." 1
The raihcay is liable for subsequently developed injuries that can-
not be proved to have resulted from a sufficient and independent
29. Where the question of proximate and remote
cause turns on the connection between some subse-
quently developed personal injury to the plaintiff and
the original injury, the rule deducible from the cases
seems to be that the railway is responsible for every such
subsequently developed injury that cannot be proven
to have resulted from a sufficient independent cause ;
thus railways have been held liable for cancer following
at an interval of three weeks after a blow on the breast
of a female passenger ; 2 for death by malarial fever fol-
lowing upon a fall into a creek at night; 3 for the
death of a child by pneumonia following upon the
shock of a blow from an engine ; 4 for hernia following
nine months after a scalding by an escape of steam
from an engine ; 5 for the death of a person under a
surgical operation which was made necessary by the
original injury, and which, although performed by
a competent surgeon, was unsuccessful; 6 for a pre-
mature confinement and birth of a dead child re-
1 See also Williams v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 9 Ex. 157 ; Maher v. W. & St. P.
By., 31 Minn. 401, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 572 ; Smith v. St. P., M. & M.
Ry., 30 Minn. 1 G9, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262 ; Hynes v. S. F. & N. P. R. R.,
65 Cal. 316, 20 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 486 ; Schmidt v. M. & St. P. Ry., 23
Wis. 186: Q. Fitzgerald v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 29 Minn. 336, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 310 ; Knight v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 99 N. Y. 25.
* B. C. P. Ry. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas, 220.
3 T. H. & J. Ry. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 234.
* Jucker v. C. & N. W. R. R., 52 Wis. 150, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
41.
6 Delie v. C. & N. W. R. R, 51 Wis. 400.
6 Sauter v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R R. % N. Y. 50.
INJURIES CAUSED BY ACT OF GOD. 29
suiting from fright caused to a pregnant female passen-
ger by a collision. 1 So, in Allison v. C. & N. W. Ry., 2
it was held that a passenger who had been injured by
the fault of the railway, and thereafter, while being
carried by the railway as a passenger, was again injured
by its fault, could recover for the second injury and for
its effects, although those effects were aggravated by the
prior injury. 3 On the other hand, the railway has been
held not to be liable for the death of a passenger by
suicide eiffht months after a collision in which he re-
ceived blows on the head and spine ; 4 nor for the possi-
bility of a second and future fracture of a leg by reason
of the oblique character of a fracture which had been
caused by the railway's negligence. 5
VI. THE LIABILITY FOE INJURIES CAUSED BY AN ACT
OF GOD.
A railway 13 not liable for injuries resulting from an " act of God,"
and without negligence on its part.
30. A railway is not liable for injuries caused by an
" act of God," which, as defined by James, L. J., in Nugent
v. Smith, 6 is the result of the operation of " natural
causes, directly and exclusively, without human inter-
vention," and which " could not have been prevented
by any amount of foresight and pains and care reason-
ably to be expected" of the railway. Thus in Withers
v. N. K. Ry., 7 an embankment which had been stand-
ing for five years, in a country subject to floods, was
1 Fitzpatriek v. G. W. Ry., 12 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 645 ; Beauchamp v. S. Min-
ing Co., 50 Mich. 163 ; Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906.
2 42 Iowa 274.
1 See, also, N. C. Ry. v. The State, 29 Md. 420.
« Scheffer v. W. C V. M. & G. S. R. R., 105 U. S. 249.
5 Lincoln v. S. & S. R. R., 23 Wend. 425.
« 1 C. P. D. 444. '3H.&N. 969.
30 INJURIES CAUSED BY ACT OF GOD.
undermined by an extraordinary flood. The train on
which the plaintiff was a passenger, and which was run-
ning at express speed, ran off the line at night by reason
of the sinking of the embankment, and the plaintiff was
injured. After a verdict for the plaintiff, a rule for a
new trial was made absolute, Pollock, C. B., saying:
" The company were not bound to have constructed their
embankment so as to meet such extraordinary floods."
In P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 1 the accident was like-
wise caused by the fall of an embankment, but there
was contradictory testimony with regard to the original
construction of the embankment, engineering experts
differing as to whether it had been so drained as to
carry off the water. There was also proof that the
train was drawn by an engine reversed, and that so
running the engine at night and in a storm was negli-
gence. Judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff was
affirmed in error upon the ground that upon the evi-
dence thus stated the question was properly left to the
jury. In B. & O. R. R. v. S. S. Independent School
District, 2 the district sued to recover damages for the
destruction of its school-house, which was carried away
by a flood which a culvert under the railway embank-
ment was not sufficiently large to pass. Judgment upon
a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed in error, because
the court below had instructed the jury in effect that
negligence upon the part of the defendant concurring
with the act of God, although that negligence did not
produce the injury, and its absence would not have pre-
vented it, was sufficient to render the defendant liable,
Green, J., saying, "If the act of God in this particular
case was of such an overwhelming and destructive char-
acter as by its own force, and independently of the par-
ticular negligence alleged or shown, produced the injury,
1 94 Penna. St. 351. 2 96 Tenna. St. G5.
INJURIES CAUSED BY ACT OF GOD. 31
there would be no liability, although there were some
negligence in the maintenance of the particular struct-
ure. To create liability it must have required the com-
bined effect of the act of God and the concurring neg-
ligence to produce the injury." In P., F. W. & C. Ky.
v. Brigham, 1 the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries
caused by the fall of the roof of a station-house, which
was blown down by a storm, the roof having stood for
eighteen years, and the testimony being conflicting as to
whether the roof had been properly constructed, and as to
the usual or unusual character of the storm. Judgment
upon a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed in error, be-
cause the judge at the trial instructed the jury "that the
defendants were bound to provide against all storms which
could reasonably have been expected, and by plain im-
plication that the defendants were bound to provide
against all storms that were not unprecedented, or were
of a kind that had ever happened within the range of
human experience," whereas the liability ought to have
been made to turn upon the question of whether or not
the defendants had used " that degree of care which a
man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to employ in
constructing or maintaining a building " for such a pur-
pose. The general principle, thus stated, is supported
by many authorities. 2
31. Carefully constructed and operated railways are,
* 29 Ohio St. 374.
2 G. W. Ry. v. Braid, 1 Moore P. C N. S. 101 ; Nichols v. Marsland, 2 Ex.
D. 1 ; P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374 ; Lehigh Bridge v. L. C.
& N. Co., 4 Rawle 9 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Penna. St 351 ; B. & O.
R. R. v. School District, 96 Id. 65, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 166 ; Foster v.
Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Penna St. 393 ; P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Giileland, 56 Id.
445; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Id. 100; Welker v. N. C. R. R., 1 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 210; Hayes v. Kennedy, 41 Id. 378 ; Morrison v. Davis,
20 Id. 171 ; Gould v. McKenna, 86 Id. 297 ; Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. D. 423 ;
I. & G. N. R. R. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 343 ; M. &
C. R. R. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176 ; Gates v. S. M. R. R., 23 Minn. 110, 2 Am. &
Eng R. R. Cas. 237 ; Denny v. N. Y. C. R. R., 13 Gray 481.
32 RECURRING ACT OF GOD.
therefore, not to be held liable for injuries resulting
from the carrying away of their embankments or bridges
by sudden and extraordinary floods ; * nor from the pros-
tration of their station buildings in an extraordinary
gale; 2 nor when the train is blown from the track by a
cyclone ; 3 nor when a train is derailed by the breaking
of a rail by sudden frost. 4 Under these authorities, the
duty of the railway, as to its line and buildings, is ade-
quately performed if they be so constructed as to resist
the ordinary and probable action of the elements ; but
in K. P. Ry. v. Miller, 5 a higher measure of responsi-
bility was wrongly imposed, for it was there held that
the railway is liable if it fail to provide against any
extraordinary floods which may in the exercise of the
highest degree of care be anticipated.
An extraordinary natural event does not, by occurring a second time,
cease to be properly characterized as an " act of God."
32. To constitute an extraordinary natural event, in
a legal sense, an " act of God," it is not necessary that
such an event has never happened before, nor does such
an event, by happening a second time, cease to be an
" act of God ;" thus in P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Gilleland, 6
the judge, at the trial, in his direction to the jury, having
said : " Now, under these circumstances, it will be for
you to determine whether the defendants ought or ought
not after the first and second floods to alter their culvert
1 Withers v. N. K. Ry., 3 II. & N. 969 ; G. W. Ry. v. Braid, 1 Moore P. C.
N. S. 101 ; I. & G. N. R. R v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 3 Am & Eng. R. R Cas.
343 ; Gates v S. M. Ry , 28 Minn. 110, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 237 ; H. & T. C.
Ry. v. Fowler, 56 Tex. 452, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 504 ; O. & R. V. Ry. v.
Brown, 14 Neb. 170, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 501 ; Ely v. St. L., K. C & N.
Ry., 77 Mo. 34, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 342.
2 P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374.
8 McClary v. I. C. By., 3 Neb. 44.
« McPadden v. N. Y. C. R. R , 44 N. Y. 478.
5 2 Colo. 442. 6 56 Penna. St. 445.
EECURKING ACT OF GOD. 33
by enlarging its cavity. Considering the frequency of
these floods, was it or was it not negligent in them not
to do so after the repeated instances and positive notices,
coupled with the request testified to," judgment was re-
versed; Agnew, J., in his opinion, said as to this in-
struction : " In effect this was to leave it to the jury to
find a liability for extraordinary floods, because a second
and a third happened like the first, and came in rapid
succession. If all were extraordinary, as the instruction
concedes, the surprise at the second and third could not
be less than at the first, and it was still more surprising
that they should come in this rapid succession. Being
extraordinary, neither second nor third could ha\e been
expected more than the first. The rule as to extraordi-
nary floods was therefore not changed. But the frequent
recurrence of what was supposed to be extraordinary was
some evidence that the real character of all these floods
had been mistaken by those who testified as to their ex-
traordinary character, and they were really only ordi-
nary freshets, though measuring up to the highest alti-
tude of that class. It was proper, therefore, to submit
this question to the jury with instruction, if they so
found the fact, to apply the rule as to ordinary freshets.
But from the manner of submitting the instructions,
doubtless the jury might understand that they were
permitted to allow damages for these extraordinary
floods because of their recurrence one after another in
so short a time. In this there was error." Fry, J.,
expressed the same view in his judgment in N. P. & O.
C. M. Co. v. L. & St. K. Docks Co., 1 saying : " I do not
think that the mere fact that a phenomenon has hap-
pened once, when it does not carry with it or import any
probability of a recurrence, when, in other words, it
does not imply any law from which its recurrence can
1 9 Ch. D. 515.
34 NEGLIGENCE CONCURRING WITH ACT OF GOD.
be inferred — places that phenomenon out of the opera
tion of the rule of law with regard to the act of God
In order that the phenomenon should fall within that
rule, it is not, in my opinion, necessary that it should
be unique; that it should happen for the first time. It
is enough that it is extraordinary, and such as could not
reasonably be anticipated."
Wliere negligence on the part of the railway has concurred vrith an
" act of God " in causing the injury, the railway must be held liable
therefor.
33. But, of course, where negligence on the part of a
railway has concurred with the act of God in causing
the injury, the railway will be held liable, as, for in-
stance, where there has been negligence in the original
construction of the line ;* or, where the railway ser-
vants, being aware that a railway bridge had been car-
ried away by a flood, do not take the proper steps to stop
an approaching train ; 2 or, where a storm of unusual
severity having carried away a properly constructed
embankment, the railway ran a train without causing
the roadbed and track to be carefully examined in
advance of the coming of the train. 3
1 P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Penna. St. 356 ; Davis v. C. V. R. R., 55
Vt. 84, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173.
2 Lambkin v. S. E. Ry., 5 App. Cas. 352.
3 Ellet v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 76 Mo. 518, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
183. See, also, as to the effect of negligence on the part of the railway con-
curring with an "act of God" in causing the injury: Dixon v. M. Board of
Works, 7 Q, B. D. 418 ; Truitt v. H. & St. J. R. R., 62 Mo. 527 ; B. & O. R. R.
v. School District, 96 Penna. St. 65, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 166 ; Straoss v.
W., St. L. & P. Ry., 17 Fed. Rep. 209.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 35
VTI. THE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY AN ACT
OF THE PUBLIC ENEMY.
Railways are not liable for injuries resulting from an act of a public
enemy.
34. Railways are not liable for injuries caused, with-
out negligence on their part, by an act of the public
enemy, as, where a railway bridge having been burned
by an armed force in rebellion against the government
of the United States, a train was, without negligence on
the part of the railway, precipitated into the chasm. 1
VIII. THE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY INEVIT-
ABLE ACCIDENT.
The railway is not liable for injuries caused, without negligence on its
part, by inevitable accident.
35. Railways are not to be held liable for injuries
resulting from inevitable accident, that is, accident not
due in any way to negligence on the part of the rail-
way, and such as no human foresight could avert. The
distinction between an act of God and an inevitable
accident is, that in the one case there is, and in the
other case there is not, the presence and operation of
vis major ; 2 thus, the railway was held not to be liable
for the death of a boy who climbed on a moving coal car,
and, having dropped his hat, fell, in the effort to re-
cover it, and was killed ; 3 nor where a child having hid
himself in a ditch on the line was discovered by the
1 Sawyer v. H. & St. J. R. R., 37 Mo. 240.
2 Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. 533; Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588, 103
E. C. L. ; Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Penna. St. 197 ; A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Flinn, 24
Kans. 627, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 240; Hallihan v. St. J. R. R., 71 Mo.
113, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 117; Maschek v. St. L. R. R., 71 Mo. 276, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 38 ; H. M. & F. P. Ry. v. Kelley, 102 Penna. St. 115.
3 Woodbridge v. D. L. & W. R. R., 105 Penna. St. 460, 16 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 55.
36 SELF-CAUSED INJURIES.
engine driver too late to stop the train j 1 nor where
boys, having, without the knowledge of the train men,
climbed upon a moving freight car, were thrown off by
a jolt in rounding a curve. 2 Upon the same principle
the railway is held not to be liable to its passengers for
injuries resulting from a hidden defect in its machinery
or appliances, which, by the exercise of care upon its
part, would not have been discovered.
TX. THE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED SOLELY BY
THE ACT OF THE INJURED PERSON.
The railway is not liable for injuries caused solely by the act of the
injured person.
36. Railways are not liable for injuries solely caused
by the act of the injured party, without negligence on
the part of the railway ; thus, in Caswell v. Worth, 3
the plaintiff, a servant, having declared upon a breach
by his master, the defendant, of a statutory duty to
fence certain dangerous machinery, the defendant
pleaded specially that the plaintiff wilfully and know-
ingly, and contrary to the express commands of the
defendant, set the machinery in motion, and, on de-
murrer, judgment was entered for the defendant. 4 So,
where a railway, in obedience to a statute, had erected
gates at a crossing but did not have any person in at-
tendance to open and close them, and the plaintiff at
night had opened the gates himself, and while he was
driving through, the gates in swinging struck and
frightened the plaintiff's horse, whereby the plaintiff
was thrown out and injured, it was held that the railway
1 Meyer v. M. P. R. R., 2 Neb. 320.
2 State, etc., v. B. & O. R. R., 24 Md. 84.
8 5 El. & Bl. 849, 85 E. C. L.
* See, also, the cases put by Coleridge, J., in summing up in Woolf v. Beard,
8 C. & P. 373, 34 E. C. L.
ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF SERVANTS, ETC. 37
was not liable. 1 Nor ought the motive, however praise-
worthy, which induces the person injured to do the act
which is demonstrably the sole cause of his injury,
render the railway liable for that injury ; thus, in E.
& C. E. K. v. Hiatt, 2 it was held that a son, who in
order to save his father's life, stepped upon the line in
front of a moving train and was injured, could not
recover from the railway. A contrary conclusion was
reached in Eckert v. L. I. Ky., 3 where the plaintiff's
decedent, standing near a railway line and seeing a
child between the rails before a rapidly approaching
train, rushed upon the line and threw the child off at
the cost of his own life, and judgment upon a verdict
for the plaintiff was affirmed in error by a divided
court, Allen and Folger, JJ., dissenting. It is obvious
that, in each of these cases, the question at issue was as
to negligence on the part of the railway, and not as to
contributory negligence on the part of the person in-
jured, and that in neither case did the railway owe any
duty to the person injured, and, for that reason, it could
not be negligent as to him. The Indiana case was, there-
fore, rightly, and the New York case wrongly, decided.
X. THE LIABILITY FOE, OMISSIONS AND ACTS OF COM-
MISSION BY AGENTS AND SERVANTS.
The railway is liable for an omission to perform its duty, by whomso-
ever that performance is omitted, and for negligent acts of commission,
if the negligent act be done by Us agent or servant.
37. Upon the principle stated by Blackburn, J., 4
where the injury is done by the omission of a particular
act of care, which the duty of the railway to the person
injured required it to do for his protection, the fact of
1 Wyatt v. G. W. lly., 6 B. & S. 709, 118 E. C. L.
» 17 [nd. 102. 3 43 N. Y. 502.
* The Mersey Docks Trustees i. Gibbs, L R. 1 H. L. 115.
OO ACTS OF OTHERS THAN SERVANTS.
the omission fixes the liability of the railway, and the
relation between the railway and the person who has
omitted to perform the particular duty is immaterial,
but where the injury is the result of misfeasance, the
liability of the railway is necessarily dependent not
only upon the character of the act done, but also upon
the relation of express or implied agency between the
railway and the wrongdoer, for, as Rolfe, B., said, 1
" the liability of any one other than the party actually
guilty of a wrongful act proceeds on the maxim qui
facit per alium facit per se."
XI. THE LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF
THOSE WHO ARE NOT AGENTS OR SERVANTS.
Railways are not liable for the negligent acts of persons who are not
agents nor servants of the railway.
38. Kail ways are not to be held liable for injuries
caused solely by the acts of persons who do not hold to
the railway any relation of express or implied agency,
as, for instance, where the injury results from the act
of a stranger in placing obstruction on the line ; 2 or, in
turning a switch so as to derail a train ; 3 or, in putting
on the track a fog signal, which, being exploded by the
train, injured a passenger. 4 Nor is the railway liable
where injury to a passenger results from the falling
upon a railway carriage of a bridge girder, which was
being placed in position by a contractor engaged by
another corporation, the railway having no reason to
anticipate negligence on the part of the contractor; 5
1 Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry., 4 Ex. 243.
2 Curtis v. R. & S. R. R., 18 N. Y. 534 ; Harris v. U. P. R. R., 13 Fed. Rep.
591, 4 MeCrary 454.
3 Latch v. R. Ry., 27 L. J. Exeh. 155, 3 H. & N. 930 (American edition) ;
Keeley v. E. Ry., 47 How. Pr. 25G.
* Jones v. g" T. Ry., 45 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 193.
5 Daniel v. M. Ry.", L. R. 3 C. P. 216, 591, 5 H. L. 45.
CONCURRING NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PARTIES. 39
nor, for injuries resulting from negligence upon the part
of another railway in the exercise of statutory running
powers over the defendant's line; 1 nor, for injuries
caused to a passenger by a mob of disorderly intruders
who forced their way into the train and assaulted the
passenger ; 2 nor, in general, for the acts or omissions of
independent contractors employed by the railway.
Negligence on the part of the railway is not excused by the concurrence
of the negligence of a third party unconnected with either the
railway or the injured person.
39. Where the plaintiff's injury can be traced to
negligence on the part of the railway as its primary
and proximate cause, the concurrence of the negligence
of a person unconnected with either the railway or the
person injured will not relieve the railway from respon-
sibility for the consequences of its negligence. This
general doctrine is asserted in many cases. 3 One of the
latest illustrations of this doctrine is to be found in the
case of Smith v. N. Y. S. & "W. R. R., 4 where a railway
was held liable for injuries caused by collision resulting
from the movement of certain cars which had been neg-
ligently left on a siding in such a situation that a
1 Taylor v. G. N. Ry., L. R. 1 C. P. 385 ; Wright v. M. Ry., L. R. 8 Ex.
137.
2 P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Hinds, 53 Penna. St. 512.
3 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 2 W. BL 892, 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 797 ;
Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198 ; Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190, 24 E. C. L. ,
Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 41 E. C. L. ; Daniels v. Potter, 4 C. & P. 262, 19
E. C. L. ; Hughes v. Macfie, Abbott v. Macfie, 2 H. & C. 744 ; Bird v. Hol-
brook, 4 Bing. 628, 15 E. C. L.; Hill v. N. R. Co., 9 B. & S. 303; Collins v.
M. L. Comrars., L. R. 4 C P. 279; Harrison v. G. N. Ry., 3 H. & C 231;
Sneesby v. L. & Y. Ry., 1 Q. B. D. 42 ; Clark r. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 327, dis-
approving Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Ex. 239; Smith v. L. & S. W. Ry., L.
R. 5 C. P. 98 ; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Penna. St. 54; Scott v. Hunter, 46 Id.
192; P. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Id. 373 ; O. C. Gas Co. v. Robinson, 99 Id. 1 ; Hey
v. Philadelphia, 2 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 466 ; Raydure v. Knight, Id.
713 ; Fawcett v. P. C. & St. L. Ry., 24 W. Va. 755, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1.
4 46 N. J. L. 7, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 399.
40 NON-PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY DUTY.
wrongdoer could readily throw them on to the main
line. 1 Nicholson v. E. R. R., 2 which apparently con-
tradicts the last-cited case, is, perhaps, distinguish-
able in that the person, whose injuries were the subject
of the action in that case, was a mere licensee.
XII. THE NON-PERFORMANCE OF A DUTY IMPOSED BY
STATUTES OR MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
Where the railway fails to perform a duty imposed by a statute, the
railway is, by reason of such failure, liable for any injuries directly
resulting therefrom, if the statide vests in the person injured a right
of action for such non-performance of duty ; but where the injuries
do not directly result from such non-performance of duty, or whei'e
the statute does not, in terms, vest in tlie person injured a right of
action, the railway is not to be held liable solely by reason of such
non-performance.
40. The Stat. Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 50, gives an
action on the case to any one aggrieved by the neglect
of a statutory duty, 3 but it does not necessarily follow
that that which gives the right to sue is conclusive evi-
dence of the fact upon which the right to recover must
be based. In Couch v. Steel, 4 a ship owner having
neglected a statutory duty of keeping on board his ship
a proper supply of medicines, it was held that a sailor
1 See, also, L. & N. R. R. v. McKenna, 13 Lea (Term.) 280, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 276 ; Brown v. P. R. R., 8 Rob. (La.) 45.
5 41 N. Y. 525.
3 Comyn's Dig. Action on Stat. F. ; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906.
*3£.&B. 402, 77 E. C. L.
Note. — All sidings on which cars are stored should be guarded, not only by
the locking of the switch connecting with the main line, but also by the locking
open of one rail, so as to divert from the main line a car if improperly
moved on the siding. In the case of a double tracked line each siding should
be so connected with a main line track that cars, in leaving the siding, should
proceed in the same direction in which trains proceed on the main line track with
which the siding is connected, and all siding switches should be safety switches,
preserving the main line unbroken, equipped with targets by day and with
lights by night, so arranged as to show automatically when tie switch is
open.
NON-PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY DUTY. 41
whose health had been injured for want of such medi-
cines could maintain his action. In Blamires v. L. &
Y. By., 1 it was held that non-compliance with a statutory
requirement of maintaining means of communication
between passengers and guards, is, where injury has
resulted to a passenger from the*want of such means of
communication, evidence of negligence. So in Britton
v. G. W. Cotton Co., 2 where the plaintiff, an employe,
had been injured from the defendant's neglect of the
statutory duty of fencing a fly wheel well, it was held
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. So also in
Stapley v. L. B. & S. C. By., 3 the same rule was applied
where the defendant had neglected its statutory duty of
maintaining a servant in charge of the gates across a
public carriage-way. In Williams v. G. W. By., 4 where
the defendant's line crossed a public footpath, on the
level, and the defendant had failed to perform its statu-
tory duty of erecting gates, and the plaintiff was found
upon the crossing with his foot severed, the defendant's
non-fulfilment of its statutory obligation was held to be
sufficient evidence of negligence to justify a verdict for
the plaintiff. In Hayes v. M. C. B. B., 5 a municipality
having under statutory authority made regulations for
the fencing of railways within its limits, and the de-
fendant having failed to comply with the regulations,
and a boy having been injured for want of such fence,
it was held that the defendant's neglect of its statutory
duty was evidence of negligence. The same doctrine is
asserted in Nitro-Bhosphate Co. v. L. S. & St. K. Co., 6
where the plaintiff's loss was directly traceable to the
defendant's failure to comply with the statutory regula-
tion imposed by its charter with regard to the height
1 L. R. 8 Ex. 283. J L. R. 7 Ex. 130.
3 L. R. 1 Ex. 21. « L. R. 9 Ex. 157.
5 111U. S. 228. • L. R. 9 Ch. D. 503.
42 DISOBEDIENCE TO MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
of its wall. On the other hand, in Atkinson v. N. & G.
Water Works Co., 1 where by statute the defendant was
ret pi i red to maintain lire-plugs with a sufficient supply
of water, and plaintiff, whose property had been burned
through defendant's default in not supplying a sufficient
supply of water, brought his action against thern, it was
held on demurrer, by the Exchequer of Pleas, that the
narr was good, but in the Court of Appeals this was re-
versed, upon the ground that the liability to private
action for neglect of a statutory duty depends " on the
purview of the legislature in the particular statute and
the language which they have employed." 2 The rule
deducible from the cases seems to be that which is stated
in the heading of this section.
A non-performance of a duty imposed by a municipal ordinance does
not per se constitide a ground of liability.
41. It is held in some cases that disobedience to a
municipal ordinance is not a ground of liability. 3 The
contrary doctrine is asserted in other cases. 4 It is held
in other cases that the failure of a railway to perform a
duty imposed by a municipal ordinance may be con-
sidered not as negligence, but merely as evidence of
negligence. 5
1 L. R. 6 Ex. 404, 2 Ex. D. 441.
2 See also Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch. 125; Fitzgerald v. St. P., M. & M.
Ry., 29 Minn. 3.!6, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310; Brown v. B. & S. L. R. R.
22 N.Y. 191 ; Thayer v. St. L., A. & T. H. R. R., 22 Ind. 26.
3 P. & R. R. R. v. Ervin, 89 Penna. St. 71 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Id.
91 ; Ileeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456; Knupfle v. K. I. Co., 84 N.Y. 491.
* Salisbury v. Ilerchenrodcr, 106 Mass. 458 ; Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 117;
B. C. P. R. R. v. McDonnell, 43 Id. 552 ; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 8 Am. <fe
Eng. Corpor. Cas. 437.
6 Kelley v. II. & St. J. R. R., 75 Mo. 138, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638;
Meek v. Penna. Co., 38 Ohio St. 632, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 643; Hanlon
r. S. B. H. R. R., 129 Mass. 310, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 18.
ULTRA VIRES.
XIII. ULTRA VIRES.
43
Where a railway has injured a person by its negligence, it is no de-
fence to the railway that the injury was done in the course of its
prosecution of a business which it had under its charter no power
to carry on.
42. As Beasley, C. J., said in K Y., L. E. & W. R. R.
v. Haring, 1 " it would, indeed, be an anomalous result in
legal science if a corporation should be permitted to set
up that, inasmuch as a branch of the business prosecuted
by it was wrongful, therefore all the special wrongs done
to individuals in the course of it were remediless. * * *
All wrongs done by such bodies are, in a sense, ult^a
vires ; and if the want of a franchise to do the tortious
act be a defence, then corporations have a dispensation
from liability for these acts peculiar to themselves." In
that case the plaintiff having been injured on a street
railway which was operated by the defendant, the court
held that the railway's want of authorized corporate
power to operate the street railway did not release it
from legal responsibility for the negligent operation of
that street railway. The doctrine of this case is sup
ported by other authorities. 2 So in Bissell v. M. S. &
N. J. R. R., 3 two railways, one of which had been char-
tered by the State of Michigan, and the other by the
State of Indiana, and each of which had been author-
ized to construct a line within its own State and carry
passengers thereon, having together engaged in the
business of carrying passengers over a third line in
another State, over which line their charter powers did
not extend, and a passenger while being carried over
1 47 N. J. L. 137, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 436.
2 Hutchinson v. W. & A. R. R., 53 Tenn. 634; Gruber v. W. & J. R. R., 92
N. C. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 438.
s 22 N. Y. 258.
44 ULTKA VIRES.
that third line having been injured, it was held that the
two railways were jointly liable to him.
43. On the other hand, in Hood v. N. Y. & N. H.
K. R., 1 the railway, not being authorized by its charter
to carry passengers by coaches to any point, or to carry
passengers by any mode of conveyance to C, having
contracted with the plaintiff to carry him by rail to P.
and thence by coach to C, and the plaintiff having been
injured while travelling by coach from P. to C, it was
held that the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff
for such injuries and was not estopped from pleading
that its contract with the plaintiff was ultra vires; but
the doctrine of this case is not generally accepted, and
the rule is that which is stated in the heading of this
section, and which is further illustrated by the cases
as to the liability of railways for negligence upon the
part of connecting railways.
1 22 Conn. 1, 23 Id. 509.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 45
CHAPTER II.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
I. Contributory negligence in general.
II. The rule in Davies v. Mann.
III. The case of T. & F. S. P. Ry. v. Boudrou.
IV. Comparative negligence.
V. Negligence in avoiding danger or inconvenience.
VI. Non-performance of collateral statutory duty as proof of contributory
negligence.
VII. The contributory negligence of lunatics, idiots, and children.
VIII. The plaintiff's contributory negligence when suing for injuries to
another.
IX. The attribution to the passenger of the carrier's contrilutory negli-
gence.
X. The attribution of the contributory negligence of one who has been
killed to those who sue for damages for his death.
XL The attribution of the contributory negligence of the contracting
party to the party on whose behalf the contract was made.
XII. The attribution of the contributory negligence of parents and guar-
dians to children.
XILI. The attribution to the person injured of the contributory negligence
of third persons.
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL.
Where the person injured, or the plaintiff, or any person whose negli-
gence is attributable to the plaintiff, has so far contributed to the
injury by his want of ordinary care, that, but for such want of
ordinary care on his part, the injury woxdd not have been done,
the railway is not liable to the plaintiff in damages for such injury.
44. The doctrine of contributory negligence was first
recognized in Butterfield v. Forrester, 1 decided in 1809,
where the defendant, for the purpose of repairing his
house, having obstructed part of a public highway, the
plaintiff, riding hard, at dusk, ran against the obstruc-
1 11 East 60.
46 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL.
tion, and was injured. Baylcy, J., directed the jury
that if a person riding with reasonable and ordinary
care could have seen and avoided the obstruction, and
if they were satisfied that the plaintifT was riding ex-
tremely hard, and without ordinary care, they should find
for the defendant. After a verdict for the defendant, a
motion for a rule for a new trial on the ground of misdi-
rection was refused, Ellenborough, C. J., saying, "One
person being in fault will not dispense with another's
using ordinary care for himself. Two things must con-
cur to support this action : an obstruction in the road
by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." In Bridge
v. G. J. Ry., 1 the plaintifT declared in case, averring a
negligent management by the defendant of its train,
whereby a collision was caused with a train in which the
plaintifT was a passenger. The defendant pleaded spe-
cially that those managing the train on which the
plaintifT was a passenger were so negligent that, " in
part hy their negligence, as well as in part by the defend-
ant's negligence," the defendant's train ran against the
other, etc. On demurrer, the plea was held bad in
form, because it amounted to the general issue, and bad
in substance, because it showed no ground for defeating
the plaintiff's recovery, Parke, C. B., saying, "Although
there may have been negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, yet, unless he might, by the exercise of ordi-
nary care, have avoided the consequences of the defend-
ant's negligence, he is entitled to recover ; if by ordinary
care he might have avoided them he is the author of his
own wrong."
45. The rule may, therefore, be formulated in these
terms: where the person injured, or the plaintifT, or any
person whose negligence is attributable to the plaintiff,
1 3 M. & W. 244.
THE REASON OF THE RULE. 47
has so far contributed to the injury by his want of
ordinary care that, but for such want of ordinary care
on his part, the injury would not have been done, the
, railway is not liable to the plaintiff in damages for such
1 injury. Thus stated, the rule is supported by innumer-
able authorities. 1
46. The reason of the rule is that the defendant can-
not justly be called upon to indemnify the plaintiff for a
wrong which the plaintiff has done to himself. Thus,
in Heil v. Glanding, 2 Strong, J., said, " the reason why,
in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party
can maintain an action against the other is, not that the
wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the
other ; it is that the law cannot measure how much of
the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own
fault. If he were allowed to recover, it might be that
he would obtain from the other party compensation for
his own misconduct." While a defendant's actionable
negligence consists in his failure to perform a duty
which he owes to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence is merely a failure to perform a duty
which he owes, not to the defendant, but to himself.
The law, therefore, draws no distinction between a
1 Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60; Tnffr. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573, 94
E. C. L. ; Bridge v. G. J. Ry., 3 M. & W. 244 ; Holden v. L. N. G. & C. Co.,
3 M. G. & S. 1, 54 E. C. L. ; Illott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304, 5 E. 0. L.;
Ellis v. L. & S. W. Ry., 2 H. & N. 424 ; B. & P. R. R. v. Jones, 95 TJ. S. 439 ;
P. R. R. v. Aspell, 23 Penna. St. 147 ; ITice v. Kugler, 6 Wh. 336 ; Simpson v.
Hand, 6 Id. 311 ; Wynn v. Allard, 5 W. & S. 524; Gould v. McKenna, 86
Penna. St. 303 ; 13th & 15th Sts. P. R^. v. Boudrou, 92 Id. 480 ; Heil v. Gland-
ing, 42 Id. 493 ; Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601, 38 E. C. L. ; Creed v. P. R. R.,
86 Penna. St. 139; Cremer v. Portland, 36 Wise. 92; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Gor-
bett, 49 Tex. 573; Mackey v. M. P. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 236; K. C. R. R. v.
Thomas, 79 Ky. 160, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79 ; Harper v. E. R. R., 3
Vroom. 88 ; Deyo v. N. Y. C. R. R., 34 N. Y. 9 ; J. R. R. v. Hendricks, 26
Ind. 228; Higgina ». H. & St. J. R. R., 36 Mo. 418; Sullivan v. L. Bridge
Co., 9 Bush 81.
J 42 Penna. St. 493, 498.
4S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFINED.
plaintiff's wilful or heedless subjection of himself to
peril, and, in either case, the maxim " volenti non fit
injuria " is applicable, for it is always to be presumed
that one's failure to do one's duty to one's self is volun-
tary.
47. Contributory negligence may, therefore, be de-
fined to be that want of reasonable care upon the part
of the person injured which concurred with the negli-
gence of the railway in causing the injury.
48. Contributory negligence can, therefore, be proved
only by showing, first, that on the part of the plain-
tiff something has either been done, or omitted to be
done, which, under the circumstances and from a pru-
dent regard for the plaintiff's safety, ought, in the one
case, to have been omitted, or, in the other case, to
have been done ; and, second, that that particular act of
commission or omission on the part of the plaintiff con-
curred with the defendant's breach of duty in causing
the injury to the plaintiff. If the proofs fail to show
either of these elements the plaintiff's contributory
negligence cannot be said to be established. In this
view, it is essential, as Coleridge, J., said, 1 that that
negligence upon the part of the plaintiff which is to
bar his recovery, should have substantially contributed
to the occurrence of the injury, and not merely to its
amount. 2
49. In Martin v. G. N. Ey., 3 Jervis, C. J., and
Maule, J., doubted whether the defence of contributory
negligence is available to a railway when sued by a
passenger for personal injuries, for the reason that the
1 Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601, 38 E. C. L.
1 See, also, Wasmer v. D., L. & W. E. E., 80 N. Y. 212, 1 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 122 ; Thirteenth & Fifteenth St. P. Ey. v. Boudrou, 92 Penna. St. 475 :
Hatfield v. C, E. I. & P. Ey., 61 Iowa 434, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 153;
L. & M. M. E. E. v. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 474.
8 16 C. B. 196, 81 E. C. L.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL. 49
action is grounded not upon a pure tort, but upon a
tort which is also a breach of a contract to carry safely.
The judgment in the cause, however, turned upon the
point that, at the trial, the defence had been advisedly
put, not upon any theory of contributory negligence, but
upon the fact of the plaintiff's negligence being the
sole cause of his injury, and that the jury, upon evi-
dence satisfactory to them and to the judge, had deter-
mined that issue adversely to the defendant. The doubt
suggested in that case does not appear to be supported
by other authority.
Tliat duty of ordinary care upon the part of the person injured, whose
nonperformance is contributory negligence, is not tmvarying, but
is dependent upon tJie circumstances of the particular case.
50. Contributory negligence upon the part of the
person injured, or upon the part of any one whose
negligence is attributable to him, cannot become a ma-
terial issue in the cause unless negligence upon the
part of the railway be either proven or conceded. The
duty of ordinary care upon the part of the person
injured for his own safety is not unvarying, but is
dependent upon the circumstances of the particular
case, and also upon the mental and physical capacity of
the person injured. Thus, the person injured is to be
held to the exercise of a lower degree of care, when, by
negligence upon the part of the railway, his vigilance
has been put to sleep and he has been lulled into a con-
dition of security, as, for instance, when the railway
has, by leaving open a gate at a crossing, intimated that
the line may be safely crossed ; or, when the railway
has, by the mode of construction and location of its
stations or cars, impliedly warranted the safety of a pas-
senger in some particular place in its stations or cars ',
or, when a railway servant has invited a passenger tc
4
50 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL.
occupy a particular position under an express or im-
plied representation that he may safely occupy thai
position. It is not contributory negligence in the
person injured, if, under circumstances of imminent
danger, when there is no time for reflection, he fail to
act in the exercise of a cool and deliberate judgment. 1
51. Neither the moral quality of the plaintiff's act,
nor its motive, however admirable, can, if that act be a
proximate cause of his injury, relieve him from the
legal consequences of contributory negligence. 2
52. Nor does the belief of a contributorily negligent
plaintiff, however reasonable, that he will not be injured
by the negligent act, avail to relieve him from its legal
consequences. 3
53. Where the contributory negligence of the person
injured is dependent upon his knowledge of the exist-
ence of a met, he, if not physically or mentally inca-
pacitated, must be assumed to have had that knowledge,
if he had such opportunity of knowing the fact as
would have made it known to a person of average ca-
pacity exercising ordinary care for his own safety. 4
Contributory negligence upon the part of the person injured will not
avail as a defence to the wrongdoer in the case of an injury wilfully
inflicted.
54. When the injury has been wilfully inflicted, con-
tributory negligence upon the part of the sufferer is
obviously not available as a defence to the wrongdoer. 5
1 P. R. R. v. Werner, 89 Penna. St. 59; Schall v. Cole, 107 Id 1 ; Mark v.
St. P., M. & M. Ry., 30 Minn. 493, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 86.
2 E. & C. R. R. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102 ; sed cf. Eckert v. L. I. R. R., 43 N. Y.
503.
3 Huldowney v. I. C. Ry., 36 Iowa 462.
4 P. R. R. v. Henderson, 43 Penna. St. 449.
5 Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill 282 ; T. R. R. v. Hunger, 5 Denio 267 ; Sand-
ford v. 8th Ave. R. R., 23 N. Y. 343 ; Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 ; L. & N.
R. R v. Collins, 2 Durall 114.
THE EULE IN DAVIES V. MANN. 51
II. THE EULE IN DAVIES V. MANN.
Although negligence upon the part of the plaintiff may have in fact
contributed to his injury, the railway will nevertheless be liable, if
its servants could by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the
injury to the plaintiff.
55. This qualification of the general rule was first
enunciated in Davies v. Mann, 1 where the plaintiff
having fettered the front les;s of his donkev had turned
him out into the public highway to graze, and while
there the defendant, driving recklessly, ran over the
donkey, and a verdict having been obtained by the
plaintiff, a rule for a new trial was refused : Abinger,
C B., saying, " as the defendant might, by proper care,
have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, he is
liable for the consequences of his negligence, though
the animal may have been improperly there ;" and
Parke, B., after referring to Butterfield v. Forrester, and
Bridge v. G. J. Ry., as authorities sustaining the plain-
tiff, adding, " although the ass may have been wrong-
fully there, still the defendant was bound to go along
the road at such a pace as would be likely to prevent
mischief. Were this not so, a man might justify driving
over goods left on a public highway, or even over a man
lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a
carriage going on the wrong side of the road." In
Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 2 Denman, C. J., cites
Davies v. Mann as authority for the proposition, that,
" as a general rule of law, every one, in the conduct of
that which may be harmful to others, if misconducted,
is bound to the use of due care and skill ; and the
wrongdoer is not without the pale of the law for this
purpose ;" and in Dimes v. Petley, 3 Campbell, C. J.,
1 10 M. & W. -346. ! 7Q.B. 339, 377, 53 E. C. L.
3 15 Q. B. 276, 233, 69 E. C. L.
52 THE RULE IN DAVIES V. MANN.
takes the same view of that case. In Dowell v. Navi-
gation Co., 1 Campbell, C. J., said, " in a court of com-
mon law the plaintiff has no remedy, if his negligence
in any degree contributed to the accident. In some cases
there may have been negligence on the part of a plain-
tiff remotely connected with the accident ; and, in these
cases, the question arises whether the defendant by the
exercise of ordinary care and skill might have avoided
the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of the
plaintiff, as in the often quoted donkey case : Davies v.
Mann. There, although without the negligence of the
plaintiff the accident could not have happened, the
negligence is not supposed to have contributed to the
accident within the rule upon this subject ; and, if the
accident might have been avoided by the exercise of
ordinary care and skill on the part of the defendant,
to his gross negligence it is entirely ascribed, he and he
only proximately causing the loss." In Tuff v. War-
man,- Wightman, J., refers to the cases which I have
cited, and says, " mere negligence or want of ordinary
care or caution would not, however, disentitle him (the
plaintiff) to recover, unless it were such, that, but for
that negligence or want of ordinary care and caution,
the misfortune could not have happened ; nor, if the
defendant might, by the exercise of care on his part,
have avoided the consequences of the neglect or care-
lessness of the plaintiff." In Witherly v. Regents Canal
Co., 3 Byles, J., treats the rule in Davies v. Mann as
equivalent to a declaration that the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence must, in order to bar his recovery, have
been a proximate cause of the injury.
56. The latest exposition of this doctrine in England
* 5 E. & B. 195, 206, 85 E. C. L. a 5 C. B. N. S. 573, 94 E. C. L.
12 C. B. N. S. 2, 104 E. C. L.
THE RULE IN DA VIES V. MANN. 53
is to be found in the case of Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1
where the plaintiff being a colliery owner, upon whose
premises there was a siding connected with the defend-
ant's line and over that siding a bridge eight feet high,
the defendant on a Saturday afternoon, after the plain-
tiff's servants had left work, ran upon the siding some
trucks, one of which had a broken truck piled upon it
to the height of eleven feet. On Sunday evening the
defendant brought other empty trucks on the siding,
and pushing them forward the truck on which was piled
the broken truck struck the bridge and broke it down.
The plaintiff brought his action to recover for the loss
of the bridge. The defence was contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in permitting the trucks to
remain on the siding from Saturday afternoon until
Sunday evening. At the trial Brett, J., directed the
jury in the following terms : " the plaintiff must have
satisfied you that this happened by the negligence of
the defendants' servants, and without any contributory
negligence of their own. In other words, that it was
solely by the negligence of the defendants' servants.
If you think it was, then your verdict will be for the
plaintiff; if you think it was not solely by the negli-
gence ol the defendants' servants, your verdict must be
for the defendants." The jury found for the defend-
ants, and the Exchequer of Pleas made absolute a rule
for a new trial, upon the ground of misdirection. The
Exchequer Chamber reversed and entered judgment for
the defendant, but the House of Lords reversed the
Exchequer Chamber and reinstated the judgment of
the Exchequer of Pleas making absolute the rule for
a new trial, Lord Penzance saying : " The law in these
cases of negligence is perfectly settled and beyond dis-
pute. The first proposition is a general one, to this
1 L. R. 9 Ex. 91, 10 Id. 100, 1 App. Cas. 754.
54 TUE EULE IN DA VIES V. MANN.
effect, that tlie plaintiff in an action for negligence
cannot succeed if it is found by the jury that he has
himself been guilty of any negligence or want of or-
dinary care which contributes to cause the accident.
But there is another proposition equally well established,
and it is a qualification upon the first, namely, that
though the plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence,
and although that negligence may, in fact, have con-
tributed to the accident, yet if the defendant could in
the result, by the exercise of ordinary care and dili-
gence, have avoided the mischief which happened, the
plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him. This propo-
sition, as one of law, cannot be questioned." The case
of Davies v. Mann has been followed in many other
cases. 1
57. The rule is sometimes stated that the plaintiff,
1 Eadley v. L. & N.W. Ey., L. E. 9 Ex. 01, 10 Id. 100, 1 App. Cas. 754;
Dowell v.'G. S. Nav. Co., 5E.&B. 195, 85 E. C. L.; Witherly v. Regents
Canal Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 2, 104 E. C. L. ; Tuff v. Warraan, 5 C. B. N. S. 573,
91 E. C. L. ; Morrisey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380; Hulseneamp v. C.
E. E., 37 Id. 537 ; Kennedy v. N. M. E. E,, 36 Id. 351 ; Boland v. Missouri
E. E., Id. 484; Meyer v. Pacific E. E., 40 Id. 15:5; Liddy v. St. Louis E. E.,
Id. 506 ; Scott v. D. & W. Ey., 11 Irish Com. Law 377 ; C. & A. E. E. v.
Gretzner, 46 111. 76 ; C. & A. E. E. v. Pondrum, 51 Id. 333 ; K. C. Ey. v. Dills,
4 Bush 593 ; L. & C. Ey. v. Siekings, 5 Id. 1 ; M. & W. E. E. v. Davis, IS Ga.
679 ; 19 Id. 437; M. & W. E. E. r.Winn, Id. 440; Eaisin v. Mitchell, 9 C. &
P. 613, 38 E C. L.; Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339, 378, 53 E.
C. L. ; Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 439, 64 E. C. L. ; Thompson v. N. E. Ey.,
2 B. & S. 106, 110 E. C. L. ; Wyatt v. G. W. Ey., 6 B. & S. 709, 118 E. C. L. ;
Ishell v. N. Y. & N. II. E. E., 27 Conn. 393 ; Meeks r. S. P. E. E., 56 Cal. 513,
8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 314; Needham v. S. F. & S. J. E. E., 37 Cal. 409;
C. C. E. E. v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 410; The State
v. B. & O. E. E., 24 Md. 84 ; Trow v. V. C. Ey., 24 Vt. 487 ; N. H. S. & T. Co.
v. Yanderhilt, 16 Conn. 421 ; Kerwhacker v. C., C, C. & I. Ey., 3 Ohio St. 172 ;
Burnett v. B. & M. E. E., 16 Neb. 332, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 25; M. C.
E. E. v. Neubeur", 62 Md. 391, 19 Am. & Eng. E E. Cas. 261 ; Kean v. B. &
( •. R. E., 61 Md. 154, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 321 ; Johnson v. H. E. E. E.,
5 Doer 27 ; Button v. II. E. E. E., 18 N. Y. 248; B. & O. E. E. v. The State,
.".:; Ml. 542; L. C. & L. E. E. v. Mahony, 7 Bush (Ky.) 235; L. & N. E. E.
r. FUbern, 6 Id. 574; Thayer v. St. L., A. & T. II. E^., 22 Ind. 26; C. St.
Ely. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 3C.
THE RULE IN DAVIES V. MANN. 55
though contributory negligent, can recover if the rail-
way's servants, after becoming aware of the dangerous
position into which the plaintiff, by his contributory
negligence, had brought himself, could have avoided
the injury to him by the exercise of due care on their
part, and failed to exercise that due care. 1
58. The rule in Davies v. Mann has been misunder-
stood and misapplied. It means only that that negli-
gence upon the part of the plaintiff which bars his
recovery from the defendant 'must have been a proxi-
mate cause of the injury, and that it is not a proximate,
but only a remote, cause of the injury, when the de-
fendant, notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence,
might, by the exercise of ordinary care and skill, have
avoided the doing of the injury. Thus stated, the rule
is consistent with the theory upon which the doctrine
of contributory negligence is based, and furnishes no
support for that of comparative negligence.
59. The rule in Davies v. Mann has not been followed
in Pennsylvania. In Reeves v. D., L. & W. R. R., 2
where the plaintiff sued to recover for cattle killed at a
highway crossing, judgment on a verdict for the de-
fendant was reversed for misdirection in failing to
charge the jury, " that if the injury result from the
want of care of both parties, neither has remedy against
the other ; but if it be not in any degree ascribable to
the negligence of one party, due regard being had to all
the circumstances of his position, he may have redress
from the other." In Stiles v. Geesey, 3 the plaintiff's
wagon and horses, while hitched to a tree on a highway
1 Nelson v. A. & P. R. R., 68 Mo. 593 ; Price v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 72
Mo. 414, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 3G5 ; Isabel v. II. & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo.
482 ; Harlan v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 65 Mo. 22 ; Scoville v. II. & St. J. R.
R., 81 Mo. 434, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 534; Zimmerman v. II. & St. J. R.
R., 71 Mo. 476, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 191.
2 30 Penna. St. 454. 3 71 Penna. St. 439.
5Q THE RULE IN DAVIES V. MANN.
and unattended, were struck and injured by the de-
fendant's wagon drawn by horses, the defendant's ser-
vant walking at some distance from the team and not
guiding them. Judgment on a verdict for the plain-
tiff was reversed in error, for misdirection in instructing
the jury, that if they found that the defendant had
been negligent in failing to guide his team it constituted
no defence to him that the plaintiff did not exercise
ordinary care in leaving his property where it was. In
Creed v. P. R. R., 1 where the plaintiff sued to recover
for injuries resulting from the derailment of the train
in which he was riding, and the defence was based on
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in riding in
what was claimed to be a position of danger, the court
having left to the jury the questions of negligence and
contributory negligence, and a verdict having passed
for the plaintiff, judgment non obstante veredicto was
entered for the defendant, upon the ground that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that judg-
ment was reversed in error, Gordon, J., saying : " The
test for contributory negligence is found in the affirma-
tive of the question ' Does that negligence contribute in
any degree to the production of the injury complained
of?' If it does, there can be no recovery ; if it does
not, it is not to be considered." 2 It is obvious that
these cases are not reconcilable with Davies v. Mann,
and the many cases which have followed in its lead.
1 8G Penna. St. 139.
2 See, also, L. S. N. R. R. v. Norton, 24 Penna. St. 465 ; Heil v. Glanding,
42 Id. 493 • C. R. R. v Armstrong, 49 Id. 193.
THE BOUDROU CASE. 57
HI. THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE IN 13TH AND 15TH STS.
P. RY. V. BOUDROU.
60. It is said, in some of the authorities, that the
plaintiff's negligence should have been a concurring
cause, and not merely a condition, of the plaintiff's in-
jury. Of course, there is an obvious distinction between
the cause, that is, that which produces the injury, and
those conditions or incidents which are the accidental,
but not necessary, concomitants of the injury, and, there-
fore, that negligence upon the part of the plaintiff,
which can be accurately characterized as a condition of
the injury, is not in any proper sense contributory neg-
ligence, because it does not contribute to the injury.
There is, however, a Pennsylvania case, in which this
distinction seems to have been carried to a dangerous
extent. In 13th and 15th Sts. P. Ky. v. Boudrou, 1 the
plaintiff, having become a passenger at night upon a
street car which was so crowded that he could not obtain
a seat, stood upon the back platform, and while there
was injured by being struck by the pole of another car
of the same line which, following the car upon which the
plaintiff was riding, came into collision with that car by
reason of the breaking of the brake chain. At the
trial, the judge directed the jury that the danger of a
collision between the car upon which the passenger was
riding and another car following it was not one of the
dangers which render it perilous to ride upon the rear
platform, and that, therefore, if the jury should find the
plaintiff negligent in standing upon the rear platform,
and yet find that the collision could not have happened
but for the negligence of the driver of the following car,
the plaintiff's negligence was to be considered too re-
mote to constitute a cause of the injury, and therefore
1 92 Penna. St. 475.
58 THE BOUDEOU CASE.
could not bar his recovery. The judge also declined to
direct the jury that, if they should find from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff occupied the back platform of
the car on which he received his injury for the purpose
of being carried as a passenger, he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. Judgment upon a verdict for the
plaintiff was affirmed in error, Trunkey, J., in deliver-
ing the judgment of the Supreme Court, saying : " The
large number of passengers in this city who voluntarily
stand upon the platforms, because there is neither sitting
nor standing room in the cars, do not, and ought not to,
anticipate that they will be run over by following cars.
Their position has no tendency to induce the driving of
one car into another. Whatever the degree of their
negligence in riding on the platform, and the ritks they
take in so doing, every one knows that so long as he re-
mains there, he is in no danger of being run down by a
car, unless from its heedless handling. When the
plaintiff was struck, his post was a condition, but not a
cause, of the injury. It neither lessened the speed of
the car he was on nor increased that of the other ; his
presence was not a cause of the broken chain and reck-
less driving of car 14; his place was an incident of an
over-crow T ded car, where the conductor had left the plat-
form to give him standing room, and had not pointed
him to a seat or requested him to enter the car." Shars-
wood, C. J., and Paxson, J., dissented, holding that the
question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence should
have been submitted to the jury. The dissenting judg-
ment of Paxson, J., is reported in 8 Weekly Notes of
Cases 244. This case stands alone, for in all the other
cases dealing with the question of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence in standing upon the platform of a
street car, it is held that the effect of the act is, at least,
a question for the jury. The dangerous extent of the
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 59
doctrine laid down in the judgment of the court is ob-
vious, for it can be said in every conceivable case that
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was not a
cause of the defendant's negligence ; thus, when a driver
approaches a railway line at a highway crossing without
looking or listening for approaching trains, and on the
crossing is run down by an engine whose driver has
given no warning of its coming, his contributory negli-
gence in failing to take that precaution, the taking of
which is generally held to be an indispensable prerequi-
site to his recovery of damages, is, if the judgment of the
Boudrou case be right, merely a condition and not a
cause of the injury, for his failure to look and listen
did not affect the speed of the approaching train, nor
was it the cause of the engine driver's failure to give
due warning of the approach of his train to the cross-
ing. Precisely the same reasoning can be applied to
every possible case of contributory negligence. If the
judgment in the Boudrou case is to stand unreversed,
there is in Pennsylvania, at least, an end of the doctrine
of contributory negligence.
IV. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
In Illinois, Georgia, and Tennessee, a contributorily negligent plain/
tiff is, under certain conditions, held to be entitled to recover damages
against a railway.
61. The doctrine of comparative negligence is admin-
istered to its full extent in Illinois, and to a modified
extent in Georgia and Tennessee. In Illinois the rule
is, that if the injured party omits some slight precaution
for his safety, and if the railway omits all care on its
part, or, in other words, if the plaintiff's negligence be
slight, and that of the railway when compared with that
60 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
of the plaintiff be gross, a recovery can nevertheless be
had. 1
62. In Georgia the rule, as deducible from the cases,
appears to be that if the contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff has been gross he cannot recover,
but that if his contributory negligence has been slight,
as compared with the negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, the latter is to be held liable, but the jury are
then to take that contributory negligence into consider-
ation in mitigation of the damages recoverable from the
defendant. 2
63. The rule in Tennessee is, as stated by Mr. Charles
Fiske Beach, Jr., in his valuable treatise upon Contribu-
tory Negligence, substantially the same as that which
prevails in Georgia. 3
64. There are many cases in which the theory of
comparative negligence has been disapproved. 4 Nor is
the rule in itself reasonable or defensible upon principle.
Where the plaintiff's want of care has been a proximate
cause of his injury, the defendant cannot, under any
1 W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Wallace, 110 111. 114, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
359 ; L. N. A. & C. Ry. v. Shires, 108 111. G17, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 387
C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Van Patten, 74 111. 91 ; I. C. R. R. v. Patterson, 93 Id. 290
G. & C. U. R. R. v. Jacobs, 20 Id. 478 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Sweeny, 52 Id. 3o0
R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. v. Delaney, 82 Id. 198.
2 A. & R. A. L R. R. v. Ayers, 53 Ga. 12; C. R. R. v. Gleason, 69 Id. 200;
A. & S. R. R. v. McElmurry, 24 Id. 75 ; A. & W. P. R. R. v. Wyly, 65 Id. 120 ;
Thompson v. C. R. R., 54 Id. 509 ; Campbell v. A. R. R., 53 Id. 488 ; Hen-
dricks v. W. & A. R. R., 52 Id. 467 ; M. & W. R. R. v. Davis, 27 Id. 113.
3 Beach on Contributory Negligence, p. 97 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Carroll, 6
Heisk. 347 ; R. R. v. Walker, 11 Heisk. 383 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Flemming. 14
Lea (Tenn.) 128 ; 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 347.
4 L. S. N. R. R. v. Norton, 24 Penna. St. 465 ; Heil v. Glanding, 42 Id. 493 ;
Reeves v. D. L. & W. R. R., 30 Id. 464; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Id. 439 ; C. R. R.
v. Armstrong, 49 Id. 193 ; W T ilds v. H. R. R., 24 N. Y. 432 ; Penna. Co. v.
Roney, 89 Ind. 453 ; O'Keefe v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 32 Iowa 467 ; P. R. R. v.
Righter, 42 N. J. Law 180; Gothard v. A. G. S. R. R., 67 Ala. 114; Potter v.
C. & N. W. Ry., 21 Wise. 372; Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44; H. & T. C. R.
R. v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 573 ; K. P. Ry. v. Peavey, 29 Kans. 170, 11 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 260.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 61
possible theory of duty or implied contract, be called
upon to indemnify him for that injury. To permit the
plaintiff's recovery under such circumstances is to de-
cide that he may hold the defendant responsible for his
non-performance of his duty to himself, and such a con-
clusion is not reconcilable with the theory upon which
the general doctrine of negligence is based. The practi-
cal difficulty in the administration of the doctrine of
comparative negligence is great. It is not easy for
trained judges, and it is always difficult for untrained
jurymen, to determine by comparison, in cases where
both plaintiff and defendant have by negligence con-
tributed to the injury, whose negligence exceeds that of
the other. As Woodward, J., said in L. S. N. E. R. v.
Norton, 1 "the law has no scales to determine in such
cases whose wrong doing weighed most in the compound
that occasioned the mischief," and the result of the ap-
plication of the rule in almost all causes, wherein indi-
viduals are plaintiffs and railways are defendants, is that
the jury must pass upon the question of contributory
negligence, for however clearly it might be proven that
the plaintiff had failed to observe that care which a due
regard to his own interests required of him, it would be
for the jury to say whether or not the railway's negli-
gence was gross as compared with that of the plaintiff,
and in every such case the jury would find for the
plaintiff.
1 24 Penna. St. 469.
62 NEGLIGENCE IN AVOIDING DANGERS, ETC.
V. NEGLIGENCE IN AVOIDING DANGERS OR INCONVENI-
ENCES.
A person w not chargeable with contributory negligence who is injured
in the effort to escape from an imminent peril to which he has been
exposed by the negligence of the railway; nor is a person chargeable
therewith who is injured in the attempt to obviate, by an act not
essentially dangerous, an inconvenience to him caused by the negli-
gence of the raihoay.
65. I have given my reasons for the opinion that the
real question in cases of injuries incurred in flying
from a danger, or in attempting to obviate some incon-
venience caused by negligence or breach of contract on
the part of the railway, is, whether or not the negli-
gence on the part of the railway is the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury, rather than whether or not the
plaintiff is contributorily negligent; but in many of the
cases the question is treated as one of contributory neg-
ligence, and it is generally held that a person is not
chargeable with contributory negligence who is injured
in the effort to escape from an imminent peril to which
he has been exposed by negligence on the part of the
railway. 1 Nor is it contributory negligence if the
plaintiff has been injured in the effort to avoid an in-
convenience by an act " not obviously dangerous, and
1 Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie 493, 2 E. C. L.; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet.
181 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Erwin, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 465 ; Caswell v. B. &
W. R. R., 98 Mass. 194 ; E T. V. & G. R. R. v. Gurley, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 46,
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 568 ; C. R. R. v. Rhodes, 56 Ga 645 ; C. R. R. v.
Roach, 64 Id. 635, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79 ; P. B. & W. R. R v. Rohr-
man, 13 Weekly Notes of Cases 258, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 176 ; Smith v.
St. P., M. & M. Ry., 30 Minn. 169, 9 Am & Eng R. R. Cas. 262; Iron R. R.
v. Mowerv, 36 Ohio St. 418, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas 361 ; Buel v. N. Y. C.
R. R , 31 N. Y. 314 ; S. W. R. R. v. Paulk 24 Ga. 356 ; Twomley v. C. P., N.
& E. R R P.. 69 N. Y. 158 ; Mark v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 30 Minn. 493, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 86.
NEGLIGENCE IN AVOIDING DANGEKS, ETC. 63
executed without carelessness." 1 On the other hand,
it is contributory negligence, if, in the attempt to avoid
that which is merely inconvenient and in no sense dan-
gerous, the person injured encounters a danger obvi-
ously apparent to the minds of reasonable men. 2
66. Two Pennsylvania cases seem to be open to
criticism. In Johnson v. W. C. & P. R. K., 3 by ar-
rangement two railway companies, whose lines met at a
junction, sold tickets over each other's line. A pas-
senger by one of the lines, having arrived at the junc-
tion just as the connecting train was leaving, attempted,
although he was carrying luggage in both arms, to
board that train after it was in motion, and in the
effort was thrown down and injured. Judgment on a
verdict for the defendant was reversed in error, because
the judge at the trial directed the jury that, "if the
train was distinctly running upon the track when the
plaintiff attempted to enter, he was guilty of negligence,
and cannot recover," the Supreme Court holding that it
should have been left to the jury to say, under all the cir-
cumstances in evidence, whether the danger of boarding
the train, when in motion, was so apparent as to have
made it the duty of the plaintiff to desist from the
attempt. In W. P. P. Ry. v. Whipple, 4 a female pas-
senger got into a crowded street car and voluntarily
1 Gee v. Metropolitan Ky., L. E. 8 Q. B. 161 ; Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B.
439, 64 E. C. L. ; Wyatt v. G. W. By., 6 B. & S. 709, 118 E. C. L.; the judg-
ment of Kelly, C. B., in Siner v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex. 150 ; Johnson v. W.
C. & P. R. R., 70 Penna. St. 357 ; W. P. P. Ry. v. Whipple, 5 Weekly Notes
of Cases 68.
* Adams v. L. & Y. Ry., L. R. 4 C. P. 739 ; Siner v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex.
150. 4 Id. 117 ; G. H. & S. A. R. R. r. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189 ; Damont v. N.
O. & C. R. R., 9 La. An. 441 ; I. C. R. R. v. Able, 59 111. 131 ; Gavett v. M. &
L. R. R., 16 Gray 501 ; J. R. R. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228 ; Judgment of
Bramwell, L. J., in Lax v. Darlington, 5 Ex. D. 28 ; P. R. R. v. Aspell, 23
J'enna. St. 147.
s 70 Penna. St. 357.
4 5 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 68.
64 NON-PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY DUTY.
stood, without taking hold of the straps hanging from
the roof of the car, which were within her reach, and
which were placed for the support of standing passen-
gers. She alone, of all the passengers in the car, was
thrown down by the jolt of a sudden stop, and, in
cross-examination, she excused her failure to take the
strap because her dress was so tightly laced that she
could not raise her arm. She admitted that, except
for her stays, she could have held the strap, and that
she could put her fingers partly through it, and that
the reason why she did not hold the strap was that it
would have disarranged her dress. The judge, at the
trial, directed the jury that the plaintiff was not disenti-
tled to recover by reason of her failure to avail herself of
the support which the straps would have afforded her,
if she could not " conveniently" reach them, and upon
a bill of exceptions to that direction judgment upon a
verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed in error. In
Johnson's case there was really no question for the
jury, for the plaintiff's own testimony showed that,
while encumbered with the luggage he was carrying,
he attempted to board a moving train ; and in Whip-
ple's case there was an obvious misdirection in permit-
ting the jury to consider the possibility of inconvenience
to the plaintiff in the disarrangement of her dress, as an
adequate excuse for her voluntarily incurring the risk
of standing without support in a moving car.
VI. NON-PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY DUTY.
The failure of the person, injured to perform a collateral statutory duty
ought not to be treated as contributory negligence.
67. The fact that the person injured was, at the time
of the injury, acting in disobedience to a collateral
statutory duty, ought not to be held to be such con-
NON-PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY DUTY. 65
tributary negligence as bars his recovery. Thus, it
has been held that disobedience to the laws, which, in
some States, require the observance of Sunday as a day
of rest and abstinence from worldly business, will not
prevent a plaintiff, who is injured while transacting
business on Sunday, from recovering from a defendant
whose negligence has caused the injury. 1 The contrary
doctrine is, however, asserted in many cases. 2
68. The extent to which the doctrine of these cases
can be carried is illustrated in some of the cases. In
the Massachusetts case, a telegraph company had failed
to obtain from the municipal authorities of Boston the
written evidence of permission to construct a telegraph
line in that city, and one of the telegraph companies'
servants, while engaged in climbing a pole and carrying
a wire, was injured by a passenger car running against
the wire, and, after verdict for the plaintiff, the defend-
ant's exceptions were sustained, on the ground that the
jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff was
doing an illegal act, which contributed to his injury,
and that he could recover for nothing less than wanton
injury. In the Georgia case, the plaintiff, a servant of
the railway, was injured while engaged in the perform-
1 Mohney v. Cook, 26 Penna. St. 342 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Tow-boat Co., 23
How. 209 ; Carroll v. S. J. Co., 58 N. Y. 126 ; McArthur v. Green Bay Co., 34
Wise. 139; Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 Match. C. C. 290; Schmid v. Humphrey, 48
Iowa 652; Morris v. Lichfield, 35 N. H 271; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 325;
Hamilton v. Godding, 55 Id. 428 ; Baker v. Portland, 58 Id. 199 ; Kerwhacker
v. C. C & C. Ry., 3 Ohio St 172; Knowlton v. M. C. R. R., 59 Wise. 278, 16
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 330; Baker i». Portland, 58 Me. 199.
2 Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Mete. 363; Stanton v. Metropolitan R. R., 14
Allen 485 ; Smith v. B. & M. R. R. 120 Mass. 490 ; Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Id.
387 ; Bucher v. Fitchburg R. R., 131 Id. 156, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 212;
McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Id. 467 ; Pay v. Highland St. Ry., 135 Id. 113, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 150 ; Banks v. H. St. Ry., 136 Mass. 485, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 139; Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga. 199.
The Massachusetts Statute of 1877, c. 232, provides that the statutes "pro-
hibiting travelling on the Lord's Day," shall not be available to railways as a
defence in actions for personal injuries.
5
GG CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN, ETC.
ance of his duty to the railway, upon a train which was
carrying troops and munitions of war for the Confed-
erate government, and it was held that his violation, in
that respect, of his duty as a citizen to the government
of the United States barred his recovery. So, in Martin
v. Wallace, 1 and in Turner v. N. C. R. R., 2 it was held
that soldiers in the Confederate service who were injured
while travelling by railway in the performance of mili-
tary duty could not recover from the railways for
injuries caused by their negligence.
69. The right doctrine is, that that violation of public
or private duty which is collateral to the injury cannot
be in law regarded as an efficient cause of the injury,
and for that reason cannot be considered as contributory
negligence. Tried by this test, the cases referred to in
the last section were wrongly decided.
VII. LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND CHILDREN.
Lunatics, idiots, and children are to be held only to the exercise of that
degree of care and discretion which ought reasonably to be expected
of persons of their age and capacity.
70. A higher degree of care is to be required of per-
sons of mature years than of infants, and of persons in
the full possession of their faculties than of those of in-
ferior mental or physical efficiency. Lunatics, idiots,
and children are only to be held to the exercise of that
degree of care and discretion which ought reasonably to
be expected in such persons, having regard to the age and
mental condition of the individual and the circumstances
of the particular case. Thus in Lynch v. Nurdin. 3 the
defendant's servant having negligently left a cart and
horse standing unattended in a highway, a child, while
climbing into the cart, was thrown down and injured
1 40 Ga. 52. J 63 N. C. 522. 3 1 Q. E. 29, 41 E. C. L.
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDEEN, ETC. 67
by the movement of the cart, another child having
started the horse. After verdict for the plaintiff, a rule
for a new trial was refused. Denman, C. J., said, " but
the question remains, can the plaintiff, then, consistently
with the authorities, maintain his action, having been at
least equally in fault ? The answer is that, supposing
that fact ascertained by the jury, but to this extent,
that he merely indulged the natural instinct of a child
in amusing himself with the empty cart and deserted
horse, then we think that the defendant cannot be per-
mitted to avail himself of that fact. The most blamable
carelessness of his servant having tempted the child, he
ought not to reproach the child with yielding to that
temptation. He has been the real and only cause of the
mischief. He has been deficient in ordinary care. The
child, acting without prudence or thought, has, however,
shown these qualities in as great a degree as he could
be expected to possess them. His misconduct bears no
proportion to that of the defendant, which produced
it." In W. & G. By. v. Gladmon, 1 where a child of
seven years of age sued to recover for injuries resulting
from being run over by a railway car on a street, judg-
ment upon a verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed in
error, Hunt, J., saying, " the rule of law in regard to
the negligence of an adult, and the rule in regard to
that of an infant of tender years, is quite different. By
the adult there must be given that care and attention
for his own protection that is ordinarily exercised by
persons of intelligence and discretion. If he fails to
give it, his injury is the result of his own folly, and
cannot be visited upon another. Of an infant of tender
years less discretion is required, and the degree depends
upon his age and knowledge. Of a child of three years
of age less caution would be required than of one of
1 15 Wall. 401.
68 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN, ETC.
seven, and of a child of seven less than one of twelve
or fifteen. The caution required is according to the
maturity and capacity of the child, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of that
case." In Rauch v. Lloyd, 1 the plaintiff, seven years of
age, in performing an errand, had safely crossed the
track of a railroad at a public crossing. On returning
he found the crossing blocked by the defendant's cars,
and while endeavoring to pass under one of them, the
cars started, and the plaintiff was run over and injured.
The judge at the trial instructed the jury in these
terms : " has or has not a boy who is capable of per-
forming an errand sufficient intelligence and discretion
to know the hazard of creeping under a train of cars
liable to be started at any moment ? And had or had
not the plaintiff such intelligence and discretion?"
Judgment having been entered on a verdict for the
defendant, was reversed in error. Woodward, J., in
delivering the judgment, said : " Children are to be held
responsible only for the discretion of children. * * *
If he had gone out of his way to place himself under
the cars, it might be accounted rashness, even in a
child; but pursuing the highway he may well have
supposed that the men who placed the cars there
expected him to pass under them. Considering his age
and all the circumstances of the case, we see nothing
that would justify the imputation of negligence or im-
prudence. He acted like a child, and he is not to be
judged as a man. * * * The strength of the plaintiff's
ease is that he had a right to pass along the highway,
and the defendants had no right to obstruct it. He
was in the exercise of a right, in a manner not unrea-
sonable or imprudent for a child, and they injured him
by reason of having stopped where they had no right
1 31 Penna. St. 358.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INFANTS. 69
to stop." These cases are supported by many other
authorities. 1
71. It is, therefore, not contributory negligence in
an infant to fail to exercise that degree of care for
his own safety, which may reasonably be expected in an
adult of average capacity. On the same principle, it is
not contributory negligence in a paralytic to fail to run
away from an imminent danger, or in a blind man not
to see an approaching peril, or in a deaf man to fail to
hear a warning of danger, or in a foreigner who does
not understand the English language to fail to appreci-
ate and act upon a warning spoken in that tongue. 2
Tlie general rule is that it is for the jury to determine, under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, what amount of reason and dis-
cretion ought to have been exercised by the injured infant.
72. Thus, in P. R. R. v. Kelly * the facts being
almost identical with those in Rauch v. Lloyd, the judge
at the trial instructed the jury to consider " whether
the injury might have been avoided by the exercise of
that care and discretion which was reasonably to be
looked for in a boy of his years," and the jury having
1 Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Penna. St. 358 ; P. R. R. v. Kelly, Id. 372 ; Oakland
Ry. v. Fielding, 48 Id. 320; Smith v. O'Connor, Id. 218; H. M. & F. Ry. v.
Gray, 3 Weekly Notes of Cases 421 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Spearen, 47 Penna. St. 300 ;
Kay v. P. R. R., 65 Id. 209 ; P. C. P. Ry. v. Hassard, 75 Id. 367 ; Crissey v.H.
M. & F. Ry., Id. 83 ; Gray v. Scott, 66 Penna. St. 345 ; W. & G. Ry. v. Gladmon,
15 Wall. 401 ; Mangan v. B. C. R. R., 30 N. Y. 445 ; W. P. Ry. v. Gallagher,
16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 413; Barry v. N.Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 92
N. Y. 289, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa. 615 ; Dowling v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R,
90 N. Y. 670, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. ( las. 73 ; Tliurber v. H. B. M. & F. R. R.,
60 N. Y. 326 ; Reynolds v. X. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 58 N. Y. 248 ; Byrne v. N.
Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 83 N. Y. 620 ; O'Connor v. B. & L. R. R., 135 Mass. 352, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 302 ; MoMahon v. N. C. Ry., 39 Md. 438 ; Schmidt v. M.
& St. P. Ry., 23 Wise. 186 ; C.& A. R. R. v. Gregory, 58 111. 226 ; Boland v. M.
R. R., 36 Mo. 484 ; S. C. & P. R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wallace 657 ; EVuns v. B. &
A. R. R., 115 Mass. 190.
2 Walter v. C. D. & M. Ry., 39 Iowa 33.
» 31 Penna. St. 372.
70 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INFANTS.
found for the plaintiff, judgment on their verdict was
affirmed in error. 1
Where the injured person is confessedly of average capacity and an
infant only in legal theory, it ought not to be left to the jury to de-
termine what amount of discretion ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to have been exercised by the injured person.
73. The general rule, as stated in the preceding sec-
tion, is, tb&i it is for the jury to determine what amount
of reason and discretion ought, under the circumstances
>f the particular case, to have been exercised by the
Jijured infant, but, of course, this doctrine cannot rea-
sonably be applied in the cases of those who are infants
only in legal theory, as, for instance, those who are be-
tween fourteen and twenty-one years of age. In Nagle
v. A. V. R. R., 2 where there was affirmed in error a
judgment of nonsuit upon the ground of the contrib-
utory negligence of the plaintiff, a boy of between four-
teen and fifteen years of age, Paxson, J., in a carefully
reasoned judgment says : " the law fixes no arbitrary
period when the immunity of childhood ceases and the
responsibilities of life begin. For some purposes ma-
jority is the rule. It is not so here. It would be
irrational to hold that a man was responsible for his
negligence at twenty-one years of age, and not re-
sponsible a day or a week prior thereto. At what age
1 See also Johnson v. C. & N. W. Ey., 49 Wise. 529, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 155 ; Ewen v. C. & N. W. Ey., 38 Wise. 614 ; Townley v. C. M. & St. P.
Ey., 53 Wise. 626, 4 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 562 ; Evansich v. G. C. & S. F.
E. E., 57 Tex. 123, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 182, Vickers v. A. & W. P. E. E.,
64 Ga. 306, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 337 ; M. & M. Ry. v. Crenshaw, 65 Ala.
666, 8 Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 340 ; Johnson v. C. & N. W. Ey., 56 Wise. 274,
8 Arm & Eng. E. E. Cas. 471 ; Nagel v. M. P. Ey., 75 Mo. 653, 10 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 702; P. & M. E. E. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush (Ky.) 41 ; Eeynolds v. N. Y.
C. & H. E. E. E., 58 N. Y. 248 ; Ihl v. F. S. St. E. E., 47 N. Y. 317 ; Mulligan v.
Curtis, 100 Mass. 512; O'Connor v. B. & L. E. E., 135 Mass. 352, 15 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 362.
2 88 Penna. St. 35.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INFANTS. 71
then must an infant's responsibility for negligence be
presumed to commence ? This question cannot be an-
swered by referring it to the jury. That would furnish
us with no rule whatever. It would give us a mere
shifting standard, affected by the sympathies or preju-
dices of the jury in each particular case. One jury
would fix the period of responsibility at fourteen,
another at twenty or twenty-one. This is not a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. It is question of law for the
court. Nor is its solution difficult. The rights, duties,
and responsibilities of infants are clearly defined by
the text writers as well as by numerous decisions. We
have seen that the law presumes that at fourteen years
of asre an infant has sufficient discretion and under-
O
standing to select a guardian and contract a marriage,
is capable of harboring malice and of taking human
life under circumstances that constitute the offence
murder. It, therefore, requires no strain to hold that
at fourteen an infant is presumed to have sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger,
and to have the power to avoid it. And this presump-
tion ought to stand until it is overthrown by clear
proof of the absence of such discretion and intelligence
as is usual with infants of fourteen years of age." 1
1 In Colgan v. W. P. P. Ry., 4 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 400, Biddle, J.,
applied the same rule in the case of a boy sixteen years of age. See also
Dietrich v. B. & H. S. Ry., 58 Md. 347, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 115, where
the injured boy was fifteen years of age ; but in Haycroft v. L. S. & M. S. Ry.,
04 X. Y. 636, where the injured infant was a girl, who was nearly seventeen
years of age, and whose injury was clearly due to her own carelessness, it was
held that the degree of care to be exercised by her was not as high as that
which was properly demandabie of an older person, and that it was for the
jury to determine whether or not she was contributorily negligent.
72 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INFANTS.
A railway owes to an infant, or to an adult of known mental or physx-
cal incapacity, a higher measure of duty than that which it owes to
an adidt of average mental and physical capacity.
74. Of course, a railway owes to an infant, or to a per-
son of known inferior mental or physical capacity, a
higher measure of duty than that which it owes to
adults of average mental and physical capacity : thus in
Smith v. O'Connor, 1 where the plaintiff, seven years of
age, sued to recover damages from the defendant for his
having negligently driven a horse and wagon over her
at a public crossing, judgment on a verdict for the plain-
tiff was affirmed in error, Strong, J., saying, "undoubt-
edly the age and capacity of the person injured may
have something to do with the question, whether a de-
fendant was guilty of negligence, for every one has a
right to act upon the supposition that adult persons will
take ordinary care to avoid danger, while such a pre-
sumption is unwarranted resj>ecting the conduct of those
who have not yet reached years of discretion. Hence a
higher degree of care and greater precaution are justly
demanded to avoid injury to the latter." Thy same
rule is applied where the railway servants know that an
adult is incapacitated by deafness, 2 and in such a case
they are bound to exercise for his protection a greater
degree of care than they would be required to exercise
if they did not know of his incapacity.
TJie fact of the infancy, or other incapacity, of the injured person will
not supply the want of proof of negligence on the part of the railway.
75. The fact of the infancy of the injured party will
not supply want of proof of negligence upon iiie part of
the railway ; thus, in A. T. & S. F. Ey. t\ Flinn, 3 the
1 48 Penna. St. 218.
* I. & G. N. Ry. v. Smith, 62 Tex. 252, 19 Am. & Eng. fi. R. Oas. 21.
8 24 Kans. 627, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 240.
CONTKIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INFANTS. 73
plaintiff, a girl of five years of age, having, with another
girl of the same age, been put by a relative on the rail-
way's train to proceed to a way station, and the servants
in charge of the train supposing them to be under the
charge of a passenger not having collected any fare from
them nor inquired as to their destination, and the train
having arrived and after waiting a reasonable time for
passengers to alight, had gotten under way, when the
plaintiff in attempting to alight was injured, it was held
that the railway was not liable. So in C. B. & Q. R. R.
v. Stumps, 1 the railway was held not to be liable to a boy
of seven years of age, who was injured while endeavor-
ing to climb on one of the cars of a freight train, which
was moving on the railway line which had been con-
structed on a public highway in a town, the proof show-
ing that the train was moving slowly under proper con-
trol, and that it was adequately manned. So in
McMahon v. N. C. Ry., 2 the railway was held not to be
liable to a boy less than six years of age, who was in-
jured while attempting to crawl unbler a car in motion.
So in Ostertag v. P. R. R., 3 the railway was held not to
be liable for the death of a boy, who, having taken his
seat beneath a freight car on a trestle was killed by a
sudden starting of the train. So in C. B. U. P. R. R.
v. Henigh, 4 the railroad was held not to be liable for the
death of a boy who climbed on a car on a siding,
loosened its brakes, and fell off or jumped off in front
of the car as it was moving by force of gravity on a
down grade. So in Wendell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 5
where a father sued for the death of a son seven years
of age, who, being accustomed to go to school and about
the streets without an attendant, was run over and killed
at a level crossing of a highway in the city of Schenec-
1 69 Til. 409. 2 39 Md. 438. 3 04 Mo. 421.
* 23 Kans. 347. 6 91 N. Y. 420.
74 INTOXICATION AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
tady, while attempting to run across the line in plain
view of an approaching train, it was held that the plain-
tiff should have been nonsuited, because the uncontra-
dicted testimony produced on his behalf showed no
negligence. So in Moore v. P. E. R., 1 a similar ruling
was made in the case of a boy ten years of age who
was killed while trespassing on a railway line. In
Sherman v. H. & St. J. R. R., 2 Hough, J., quotes with
approval the remark of Agnew, J., in Flower v. P.
R. R., 3 that the youth of the person injured "may
excuse him from concurring negligence, but it cannot
supply the place of negligence on the part of the com-
pany.
The fact of the intoxication of the injured person at the time of the in-
jury will not only not relieve him from the legal consequences of his
contributory negligence, but also, if his intoxicated state contributed
to the happening of the injury, will be admissible in evidence as
proof of contributory negligence.
76. The fact that the person injured was intoxicated
at the time of the injury, will not relieve him from the
legal consequences of his contributory negligence. 5
Proof of the intoxication of the person injured at the
time of the injury, is admissible in evidence for the
defendant, if the intoxicated state of the person injured
1 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 310, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 569.
2 72 Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
3 69 Penna. St. 210.
* See also Snyder v. H. & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo. 413 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Heil, 5
Weekly Notes of Cases 91 ; II. M. & F. P. Ry. v. Kelley, 102 Penna. St. 115;
Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358 ; Roller v. S. S. R. R., Cal. , 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 333 ; Ilogan v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 59 Wise. 139, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 439 ; Maschek v. St. L. R. R., 71 Mo. 276, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 38;
C. & A. R. R. v. Becker, 76 111. 25.
5 Kean v. B. & O. R, R., 61 Md. 154, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 321 ; T. P.
& W. R. R. i\ Riley, 47 111. 514 ; C, R. I. & P. R. K. v. Bell, 70 Id. 102; I. C.
R. R. v. Hutchinson, 47 Id. 408 ; Weeks v. N. O. & C. R. R., 32 La. An. 615
Milliman v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 642.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURED PERSON'S INCAPACITY. 75
contributed to the happening of the injury. 1 Evidence
is admissible to show that the plaintiff was an habitual
drunkard, as bearing on the question of the compensa-
tory damages to which he may be entitled. 2
An incapacity on the part of the injured person will not render the
railway liable to him under circumstances in which it would not be
liable to a person of average capacity, unless that incapacity be
known to the railway servants.
77. It has been stated that knowledge on the part of
the railway of the injured person's incapacity, imposes
upon the railway a higher measure of duty with re-
gard to that person, but it is, nevertheless, clear, that
the incapacity of the injured person, if not known to
the railway servants, will not render the railway liable
under circumstances in which it would not be liable to
persons who are not so incapacitated. This rule has
been applied in cases of deaf persons. 3
78. It is also to be said that the incapacity of the
person injured imposes on him the duty of exercising,
for his own protection, that degree of care for his own
safety that will, as far as possible, compensate for his
impaired sense of hearing, or of sight, or other disa-
bility. 1
1 Herring v. W. & R. R. R., 10 Ired. 402 ; I. C. R. R. v. Hutchinson, 47 111.
408 ; Weeks v. N. O. & C. R. R., 32 La. An. 615 ; Davis v. O. & C. R. R., 8
Oreg. 172; S. W. R. R. v. Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Waller,
56 Tex. 331, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 431.
2 C. & P. R. R. v. Sutherland, 19 Ohio St. 151.
3 C, C. & C. R. R. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Poole v. N. C. R. R., 8 Jones
(N. C.) 340; I. C. R. R. v. Buckner, 2S 111. 299 ; Johnson v. L. & N. R. R.,
Ky. , 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 623.
4 Johnson v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. , 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 623; C,
C. & C. R. R. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Zimmerman v. H. & St. J. R. R., 71
Mo. 476, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 191 ; Purl v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 73 Mo.
168, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 27 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Miller, 46 Mich. 532, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 89 ; Laicher v. N. O., J. & S. R. R., 28 La. An. 320 ;
Cogswell v. O. & C. R. R., 6 Oregon 417.
76 the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
viii. the plaintiff's own contributory negli-
gence when suing for injuries to the person
of another.
Tlie plaintiff's own contributory negligence ivill bar his recovery when
he sues for damage to himself resulting from the personal injuries of
some one else.
79. The plaintiff's own contributory negligence will
bar his recovery, not only when he sues for his personal
injuries, but also when he sues for the loss caused to
him by personal injuries done to some one else, as
when a husband, master, or parent sues for the loss of
the services of an injured wife, servant, or child. 1 Thus,
it has been held to be contributory negligence in a
parent to knowingly allow an infant of less than four
years of age to go at large in a city street without a
protector ; 2 or, a boy to serve the drivers of horse cars
with water ; 3 or, a boy to ride upon the lead horse of a
team at a railway crossing, the teamster retaining no
control over that horse ; 4 or a boy to serve laborers on
a construction train with water; 5 or children to play
upon a railway line. 6
80. On the other hand, it has been held not to be
necessarily contributory negligence in parents to per-
mit a child of eighteen months of age to play in close
1 Glassey v. F. & P. Ry., 57 Penna. St. 172; Smith v. H. M. & F. Ry., 92
Id. 450 ; Cauley v. P. C. & St. L. Ry., 95 Id. 398 ; P. R. R. v. Bock, 93 Id.
427 ; Roller v. S. S. R. R., Cal. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 333 ; B. & I.
R. R. v. Snyder, 24 Ohio St. 670 ; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Vining, 27 Ind.
513.
2 Glassey i>.F. & P. Ry., 57 Penna. St. 172.
3 Smith v. H. M. & F. Ry., 92 Penna. St. 450.
4 P. R. R. v. Bock, 93 Penna. St. 427.
6 O. & M. Ry. v. Hammersley, 2S Ind. 371.
6 Williams v. T. & P. Ry., GO Tex. 205, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 403 ; E. &
C. R. R. v. Wolf, 59 Ind. 89 ; J. M. & I. R. R. v. Bowen, 49 Ind. 154 ; Albert-
son v. K. & D. M. R. R., 48 Iowa 292 ; Ewen v. C. & N. W. Ry., 38 Wise. 613 ;
Hauley v. P. C. & St. L. Ry., 95 Penna. St. 398, 98 Id. 498.
NEGLIGENCE OF POOR PARENTS. 77
proximity to a railway line, under the guardianship of
another child eight years of age j 1 or to send a boy nine
years of age upon an errand which required him to
walk upon a railway line ; 2 or, to leave a child of tender
years under the care of a boy thirteen years of age ; 3 or,
under the care of a girl of eight years of age. 4
81. It has been held that poor parents of infant
children are not contributorily negligent if they do not
prevent their infant children from straying into the
public streets, or upon the lines of railways. 5 The judg-
ments in those cases seem to have been largely influenced
by the sentimental reflections of the judges upon the
poverty of the plaintiffs, and their consequent inability to
employ servants to watch their children, and the hard-
ship of requiring them to keep those children within
doors when they could not go safely abroad ; but those
learned judges failed to give clue weight to the consid-
eration that the railway was not responsible for the acts
of the parents in bringing the children into the world,
nor for that degree of misfortune which retained those
parents in a condition of more or less want, and that
there is no rule of law, nor principle of justice, which
compels railways to insure the public against the neces-
sary incidents of poverty, nor which entitles people,
either poor or rich, to make, at the expense of railways,
profitable speculations out of the deaths of the children
whom their own neglect of parental duty has exposed
1 P. A. & M. Ry. v. Pearson, 72 Penna. St. 169.
' P. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Penna. St. 33.
8 Dahl v. M. C. Ry., 62 Wise. 652, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 121.
4 C. & A. R. R. v. Gregory, 58 111. 226.
5 P. A. & M. Ry. v. Pearson, 72 Penna. St. 169 ; P. & R. R. R. o. Long, 75
Id. 257; Penna. Co. v. James, 81 J Id. 194; P. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Id. 33;
Hoppe v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 61 Wise. 357, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 74;
Isabel v. II. & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo. 475 ; Walters v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 41
Iowa 71 ; O' Flaherty v. U. R. R., 45 Mo. 70 ; Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R.,
75 Mo. 542, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 776.
78 ATTRIBUTION OF THE CAEELEE's NEGLIGENCE.
to peril. The cases of Pearson, Long, Lewis, ana James
are open to criticism in other respects. In Pearson's
case the jury were permitted to find that a girl of eight
years of age was a competent nurse for an infant per-
mitted to play in proximity to a railway track, yet such
a finding is clearly contrary to reason. In Long's.
Lewis's, and James's cases, the injured infants were tres-
passers, and the defendant's owed no duty to them,
and, a fortiori, none to the parents who took no care to
prevent their children straying into danger. Judge
Redfield, with his usual clearness, expresses sound views
on this subject. 1
IX. THE ATTEIBUTION OF THE CAEEIEE's NEGLIGENCE
TO THE PASSENGEE.
Where a passenger sues for injuries done by other than that passen-
ger's carrier, negligence upon the part of that carrier is, in some
jurisdictions, attributed to the passenger as contributory negligence
upon his part, but, in other jurisdictions, this attribution of contribu-
tory negligence is not recognized.
82. The reason of the rule is, not that the servant of
the passenger's carrier, who, by his negligence, has con-
tributed to the accident, is pro hac vice the servant of
the passenger, but that the carrier is so far the agent
of the passenger that his negligence is the passenger's
negligence, or, in other words, that the passenger, hav-
ing entrusted his person to the carrier, and having been
injured by the negligence of that carrier, combined
with the negligence of a third party who was not under
any contractual duty to him, cannot be permitted to
recover from that third party for an injury which
would not have happened if it had not been for negli-
gence on the part of that carrier co-operating in bring-
1 2 Eedf. Ry. Cas. 501.
ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE. 79
ing the passenger into a position of danger. This rule
of law is tacitly assumed, though not expressly stated,
in Bridge v. G. J. By., 1 for there the contributory neg-
ligence which was considered, was not the plaintiff's
1 own negligence, but that of his carrier. In Thorogood
v. Bryan, 2 the plaintiff sued to recover, under Lord
Campbell's Act, for the death of her husband, who was
negligently killed by the defendant's servant driving an
omnibus, the decedent having been a passenger on an-
other omnibus whose driver was negligent in not draw-
ing up at the curb, and in permitting the decedent to
alight on the street from his omnibus while in motion.
At the trial Williams, J., directed the jury that " if
they were of opinion that want of care on the part of
the driver of his omnibus in not drawing up to the
curb to put the deceased down, or any want of care on
the part of the deceased himself, had been conducive to
the injury, their verdict must be for the defendant."
The jury having found for the defendant, a rule for a
new trial was discharged, Maule, J., saying, "if the
deceased himself had been driving the case would have
been free from doubt. So there could have been no
doubt had the driver been employed to drive him and
no one else. On the part of the plaintiff, it is sug-
gested that a passenger in a public conveyance has no
control over the driver. But I think that cannot with
propriety be said. He selects the conveyance. He
enters into a contract with the owner, whom, by his
servant, he employs to drive him. If he is dissat-
isfied with the mode of conveyance, he is not obliged
to avail himself of it. According to the terms of the
contract he unquestionably has a remedy for any neg-
ligence on the part of the person with whom he con-
tracts for the journey. * * * If there is negligence on
1 3 M. & W. 244. • 8 C. B. 115, 65 E. C. L.
SO ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER^ NEGLIGENCE.
the part of those who have contracted to carry the pas-
sengers, those who are injured have a clear and un-
doubted remedy against them. But it seems strange to
say, that, although the defendant could not, under the
circumstances, be liable to the owner of the other om-
nibus for any damage done to his carriage, he still
would be responsible for an injury to a passenger. The
passenger is not without remedy. But, as regards the
present defendant, he is not altogether without fault.
He chose his own conveyance, and must take the con-
sequences of any default of the driver whom he saw fit
to trust."
83. In Catlin-y. Hills, 1 the plaintiff, having been a pas-
senger on the steamboat "Sons of the Thames," with
which the defendant's boat "Sapphire" had collided,
and having been injured by reason of the anchor of the
Sons of the Thames having become dislodged in the
collision and falling upon him, brought his action against
the owners of the Sapphire. Cresswell, J., directed the
jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover if they
were of opinion that there had been negligence on the
part of those entrusted with the conduct and manage-
ment of the Sons of the Thames, but that they must dis-
miss from their minds all that had been said about the
stowing of the anchor, for the plaintiff would be en-
titled to a verdict even though they should think
that the anchor had been improperly left unfastened.
The jury having found for the plaintiff, a rule for a new
trial upon the ground of misdirection was argued, but
before judgment was rendered the case was settled, it
being stated in a note to the report that it was under-
stood that the court would have discharged the rule.
In Armstrong v. L. & Y. By., 2 the L. & N. W. By.
had statutory running powers over the defendant's line,
1 8 C. B. 123, 65 E. C. L. ■ L. E. 10 Ex. 47.
ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE. 81
and the plaintiff, an officer of the L. & N. W. company,
was travelling on their pass and in their train over the
defendant's line, and was injured by an accident caused
by the concurring negligence of the two companies. It
was held that the plaintiff was so far identified with the
L & N. W. By., not by his official position, but by reason
of his being a passenger on its train, that he could not
recover for negligence to which they had contributed.
In Child v. Hearn, 1 the plaintiff, a plate layer in the
service of the G. E. By., was moving on their line in a
hand car when the defendant's pigs, having run through
a fence which the railway had, under statutory obli-
gations, constructed, and which was insufficiently con-
structed, upset the hand car and injured the plaintiff.
It was held that the plaintiff hj using the company's
line for their purposes was identified with their negli-
gence and could not recover from the defendant. 2 In
Pennsylvania the doctrine seems to have been adopted
to its full extent. In Simpson v. Hand, 3 the plaintiffs,
owners of goods shipped on the steamer Thorn, which
was run into by the steamer William Henry and the
goods destroyed, brought an action against the owners
of the William Henry, who defended upon the ground
that the collision was contributed to by the negligence
of the master and crew of the Thorn. It was held that
the neglisrence of the carrier's crew was attributable to
the plaintiffs, and that they could not recover. In
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 4 the plaintiff, a widow, sued
to recover for the death of her husband, a brakeman
upon coal cars which were run over the A. V. B. B. by
locomotives of the company, the decedent having been
1 L. R. 9 Ex. 176.
* See also Lord Blackburn's judgment in Spaight t;. Tedcastle, 6 App. Cas.
217, and "The Bernina," 11 P. D. 31.
3 6 Wharton 311.
* 46 Penna. St. 151.
6
82 ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER^ NEGLIGENCE.
killed by a collision with some empty oil cars which the
defendant had negligently placed near the railroad
track, negligence upon the part of the A. V. R. R. hav-
ing contributed to the accident. At the trial the judge
instructed the jury to disregard the contributory negli-
gence of the railroad, but judgment upon a verdict for
the plaintiff was reversed in error, the Supreme Court
holding that the contributory negligence of the carrier
must be imputed to the decedent. In P. & R. R. R. v.
Boyer, 1 the plaintiff sued to recover for the death of her
husband, a passenger in a car of a street railway, who
was killed in a collision of his car with the defendant's
train. Judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed in error because the judge at the trial took away
from the jury the question of the contributory negligence
upon the part of the driver of the street car.
84. There are, however, some English cases which
do not, at first sight, seem to be reconcilable with the
preceding cases. In Rigby v. Hewitt, 2 the plaintiff,
having been a joassenger in an omnibus, brought suit
against the owners of another omnibus which, while
both omnibuses were driving at great speed, collided
with the omnibus in which the plaintiff was a passenger
and threw him out. Rolfe, B., directed the jury that
the plaintiff was not disentitled to recover merely because
the omnibus in which he sat was driving at a furious
rate of speed, and that if the jury thought the collision
took place from the negligence of the driver of defend-
ant's omnibus and that plaintiff's omnibus was not in
fault, in not endeavoring to avoid the accident, then the
defendant was liable. The jury having found for the
plaintiff a new trial was moved for upon the ground of
misdirection, but the rule was refused. In Greenland
v. Chaplin, 3 the facts were curiously identical with those
1 97 Penna. St. 91. 2 5 Ex. 240. 3 5 Ex. 243.
ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE. 83
in Catlin v. Hills. Pollock, C. B., directed the jury
that if they were of the opinion that the collision was
owing to bad navigation of the defendant's steamboat,
they should find for the plaintiff, and if they thought
there was any negligence either in the stowage of the
anchor or on the part of the plaintiff in putting himself
in the place where he was on board his steamboat they
should find for the defendant. The jury having found
for the plaintiff a rule for a new trial was discharged.
Pollock, C. B., after commenting on the finding of the
jury which had negatived negligence on the part of the
plaintiff's carrier, added, "On consideration I am of
opinion that the law, as laid down by me in this respect,
was not correct. I entirely concur with the rest of the
court, that a person who is guilty of negligence, and
thereby produces injury to another, has no right to say
— 'Part of that mischief would not have arisen, if you
yourself had not been guilty of some negligence.' I
think that where the negligence of the party injured did
not in any degree contribute to the immediate cause of
the accident, such negligence ought not to be set up as an
answer to the action. And certainly I am not aware
that according to any decision which has ever occurred,
the jury are to take the consequences and divide them
in proportion according to the negligence of the one or
the other party." Yet these cases are not really author-
ities against the rule, for in each case the findings of the
jury negatived negligence on the part of the plaintiff's
carrier, and the dicta of the judges obviously had refer-
ence, not to the liability of the passenger for the negli-
gence of his carrier, in general, but to his liability for
that negligence upon the part of the carrier which
was too remote to be considered a proximate cause of the
injury. In Mann v. Wieand, 1 where a widow sued to
1 4 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 6.
84 ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE.
recover for injuries resulting in the death of her husband,
the defendant's vicious dog having frightened the horses
drawing a wa 2:011 in which the decedent had been invited
to drive and was being carried, judgment upon a verdict
for the plaintiff was reversed on other grounds, but in
his judgment Mercur, C. J., said: "the husband had no
control or authority over the driver ; nor did the driver
control the personal conduct of the husband. He,
therefore, was not liable for the negligent conduct of the
driver. * * * Negligence in a general sense would not
protect the defendant from liability for a direct and
proximate injury caused by his own negligence."
Judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed
in error upon other grounds, and the remarks of the
learned Chief Justice upon this subject must be regarded
as obiter dicta, which are not to be reconciled with the
judgments of his court in the earlier case of Lockhart
v. Lichten thaler, or the later case of P. & R. R. R. v.
Boyer, in whose decision he participated. In England
the rule has been criticised by the learned editor of
Smith's Leading Cases, 1 by Williams, J., in the course
of the argument in Tuff v. Warman, 2 and by the same
judge again in Waite v. N. E. Ry., 3 and by Dr. Lush-
ington in The Milan, 4 but its re-affirmance in the cases
which have been cited from the Law Reports would
seem to show that in the opinions of English judges
these criticisms are not well founded.
85. In Little, Receiver, etc., v. Hackett, 5 where the
facts were that the plaintiff, while being driven in a
hired hack, was injured at a grade crossing by the con-
curring negligence of the railway and the hack driver,
the judge at the trial directed the jury that the negli-
gence of the hack driver was not to be attributed to the
1 Vol. I, p. 366. ! 2C.B. N. S. 740, 89 E. C. L-
■ El. Bl. & El. 729, 96 E. C. L. 4 1 Lush. 388, 403. 5 116 U. S. 366.
ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE. 85
passenger, unless it should be found that the passenger
supervised and controlled the action of the driver. The
jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment
thereon was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a bill of exceptions to the direction of the
judge at the trial. Field, J., in delivering judgment,
said : " Cases cited from the English courts * * * and
numerous others decided in the courts of this country,
show that the relation of master and servant does not
exist between the passenger and the driver, or between
the passenger and the owner. In the absence of this
relation, the imputation of their negligence to the passen-
ger, when no fault of omission or commission is charge-
able to him, is against all legal rules. If their negligence
could be imputed to him, it would render him equally
with them responsible to third parties thereby injured,
and would also preclude him from maintaining an action
against the owner for injuries received by him. But neither
of these conclusions can be maintained ; neither has the
support of any adjudged cases entitled to consideration.
The truth is, the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan rests
upon indefensible ground. The identification of the
passenger with the negligent driver, or the owner, with-
out his personal co-oj)eration or encouragement, is a
gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The
parties are not in the same position. The owner of a
public conveyance is a carrier, and the driver, or the
person managing it, is his servant. Neither of them is
the servant of the passenger ; and his asserted identity
with them is contradicted by the daily experience of the
world."
86. It may be suggested in reply to the line of argu-
ment so forcibly stated by Field, J., in the last cited case,
that the reason of the rule is, as put by Maule, J., in
SO ATTRIBUTION OF THE CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE.
Thorogoood v. Bryan, 1 that the passenger having volun-
tarily contraeted with his carrier, and having thereby
put himself under the control of that carrier and of that
carrier's servants, must take upon himself the conse-
quences to himself of that carrier's negligence. It is
irrelevant to urge that it must be conceded that the car-
rier and the carrier's servant are not the servants of the
passenger, and that the passenger is not responsible to
third parties for injuries done to them by the negligence
of the carrier, or of the carrier's servant ; for the attri-
bution to the passenger of the carrier's contributory neg-
ligence is based, not upon an assumption by the passen-
ger of control over the carrier, but upon a submission
by the passenger of his person to the control of the car-
rier. Despite the criticisms, therefore, of so many and
so high authorities, I venture to believe that Thorogood
v. Bryan was rightly decided, and that the rule, as main-
tained in England and in Pennsylvania, is founded upon
correct principles of law. 2
1 8 C. B. 115, 65 E. C. L., section 82.
2 In opposition to the rule there can also be cited Colegrove v. N. Y. & N.
H. R. R., 20 N. Y. 492 ; Bennett v. N. J. R. R., 86 N. J. Law 225 ; Tompkins
v. Clay, St. H. R. R., Cal. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 144; Chapman v.
N. H. R. R., 19 N. Y. 341 ; W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Shacklet, 105 111. 364, 12 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 166 ; Dyer v. Erie R. R., 71 N. Y. 228 ; Danville Turnpike
Co. v. Stewart, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 119 ; L. R. R. v. Case, 9 Bush 728; Eaton v. B. &
L. R. R., 11 Allen 500 ; Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86, 3 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 335; Masterson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 84 N. Y. 247, 3 Am. &
Eng; R. R. Cas. 408 ; Robinson v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 66 Id. 11 ; Malmsten
v. M. II. & O. R. R., 49 Mich. 94, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 291 ; N. Y., L. E.
& W. R. R. v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. L. 161 ; Perry v. Lansing, 17 Hun 34 ;
Busch v. B. C. R. R., 29 Hun 112 ; Gray v. P. & R. R. R. (U. S. C. C. N. D. N.
Y.), 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 351 ; Webster v. II. R. R., 38 N. Y. 260 ; P., C. &
St. L. R. R. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 478. For the
rule there can be cited, Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, 65 E. C. L. ; Bridge
v. G. J. Ry., 3 M. & W. 244 ; Catlin v. Hills, 8 C. B. 123, 65 E. C. L. ; Arm-
strong v. L. & Y. Ry., L. R. 10 Ex. 47 ; Child v. Hearn, L. R. 9 Ex. 176 ; " The
Bernina," 11 P. D. 31 ; Simpson v. Hand, 6 Wh. 31 1 ; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler.
46 Penna. St. 151 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Id. 91 ; Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick.
621 ; C, C. & C. R. R. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Id. 484 ;
ATTRIBUTION OF A DECEDENT'S NEGLIGENCE. 87
87. Upon the same principle it lias been held that
where a wife is injured by collision with a train, while
travelling in a vehicle driven by her husband, his con-
tributory negligence bars her recovery. 1 So, where a
master sues for injury done to his property, while under
the care of a servant, the contributory negligence of
that servant will bar a recovery by the master. 2
S. THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
DECEDENT TO THOSE WHO SUE FOR DAMAGES FOR
HIS DEATH.
The contributory negligence of a person who has been killed will bar a
recovery by those who sue for damages for his death.
88. Contributory negligence on the part of the per-
son killed, will be a defence to an action by the parties
entitled to recover for his death. The limitation in
Lord Campbell's Act of the right to recover to such
cases only " as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party to maintain an action to recover
damages in respect thereof," has been construed by the
Queen's Bench in Pym v. Gr. N. By., 3 to have " refer-
ence, not to the nature of the loss or injury sustained,
but to the circumstances under which the bodily injury
arose, and the nature of the wrongful act, neglect, or
default complained of," and Cockburn, C. J., added,
Bryan v. N. Y. C. R. R., 31 Barb. 335 ; Nicholls v. G. W. Ry., 27 Up. Can. (Q.
B.) 382 ; Payne v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 39 Iowa 523 ; Mooney v. H. R. R. R., 5
Robertson <N. Y.) 548; L. S. & M. S. Ry. >: Miller, 25 Mich. 274. The rule
has obviously no application to the case of a passenger, who, having been landed
by a steamboat company upon a railway pier is run over on the pier by a train
negligently bandied by the railway company, there being no concurring negli-
gence on the part of the steamboat company. Malmsteu v. M. H. & O. R. R.,
49 Mich. 94, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 291.
1 Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440; Peck v. N. Y., N. H. & H. E. R., 50 Conn.
379, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 633.
2 T. & W. R. R. v. Goddard. 25 Ind. 185.
S 2B. &S. 759, 110 E. C. L.
88 NEGLIGENCE OF CONTRACTING PARTY.
" thus, if the deceased had by his own negligence mate-
terially contributed to the accident whereby he lost his
life, as he, if still living, could not have maintained an
action in respect of any bodily injury, notwithstanding
there might have been negligence on the part of the
defendant, the present action could not have been sup-
ported." So, Denman, C. J., in Tucker v. Chaplin, 1
in an action under Lord Campbell's Act, directed the
jury, that "the rules in actions brought under this
statute by representatives, are the same as in actions
brought by the injured parties themselves ; therefore,
if the deceased, by his conduct, leads to the accident,
an action under the statute does not lie." 2
XI. THE NEGLIGENCE OF A CONTRACTING PARTY AS
ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSON ON WHOSE BEHALF
THE CONTRACT WAS MADE.
Where the action is brought to recover damages for a tort founded upon
a contract, the contributory negligence of the contracting party will
bar a recovery by the person upon whose behalf the contract was made.
89. Where the suit is brought, not for a pure tort,
but for a tort founded upon contract, contributory neg-
ligence upon the part of the contracting party will bar
a recovery by the injured person on whose behalf the
contract was made. Thus, in Waite v. N. E. Ey., 3 the
plaintiff, an infant of five, had been taken by its grand-
mother to the defendant's station, where she had bought
tickets for the child and herself. Having to cross the
line in order to get to the platform at which the train
1 2 C. & K. N. P. 730, 61 E. C. L.
1 See, also, Witherley v. Regents' Canal Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 2, 104 E. C. L. ;
Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105; Rowland v. Cannon, 35 Ga. 105; Gerety v. P.,
W. & B. R. R., 81 Penna. St. 274 ; Karle r. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 55 Mo.
476 ; Dewey v. C. & N. W. By., 31 Iowa 373 ; Kelly v. Hendrie, 26 Mich.
255.
s El. El. & El. ; 719, 96 E. C. L.
NEGLIGENCE OF CONTRACTING PARTY. 89
was to stop, the grandmother and child, in crossing the
line, were run over and the child hurt. The jury hav-
ing found specially that the defendants and the plain-
tiff's grandmother were negligent, on these findings
Martin, B., entered the verdict for the plaintiffs, with
leave to the defendants to move for a nonsuit or the
entry of a judgment for them. After argument the
rule was made absolute. Campbell, C. J., said : " The
relation of master and servant certainly did not subsist
between the grandchild and the grandmother ; and she
cannot, in any sense, be considered his agent ; but we
think that the defendants, in furnishing the ticket to
the one and the half ticket for the other, did not incur a
greater liability toward the grandchild than toward
the grandmother, and that she, the contracting party,
must be implied to have promised that ordinary care
should be taken of the grandchild. * * * At all events, a
complete identification seems to us to be constituted
between the plaintiff and the party whose negligence
contributed to the damage which is the alleged cause of
action, in the same manner as if the plaintiff had been a
baby only a few days old, to be carried in a nurse's arms."
A writ of error having been taken to the Exchequer
Chamber, the judgment was affirmed. Cockburn, C. J.,
said : " I put the case on this ground, that, when a
child of such tender years and imbecile age is brought
to a railway station or to any conveyance, for the pur-
pose of being conveyed, and is wholly unable to take
care of itself, the contract of conveyance is on the im-
plied condition that the child is to be conveyed subject
to due and proper care on the part of the person having
it in charge." Pollock, C. B., said : " There really is
no difference between the case of a person of tender
years under the care of another, and a valuable chattel
committed to the care of an individual, or even not com-
90 NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS, ETC.
mitted to such care. The action cannot be maintained
unless it can be maintained by the person having the
apparent possession, even though the grandchild or the
chattel was not regularly put into the possession of
the person, as, for instance, though the party taking
charge of the child had done so without the father's
consent; that circumstance would make no difference
as to the question of the child's right." Bramwell, B.,
said : " In form the action is for a wrong ; but it is, in
fact, for a breach of duty created by contract. It is
alleged that the plaintiff was lawfully on the rail-
way. That could be so only on the supposition that
he had become a passenger through the instrumentality
of himself or another. There must be a contract or
duty. It is impossible to say that the company con-
tracted any other duty toward the infant, thus accom-
panied, than they would have contracted toward an
adult, or that they were responsible for what would
have occasioned no mischief but for the negligence of a
person having the custody of the plaintiff."
XII. THE ATTRIBUTION TO INFANTS OF THE CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS AND GUARDIANS.
Where the injured person is an infant of tender years, and the ground
of the action is a pure tort, it is for the jury and not for the court
to determine whether or not the contributory negligence of the parents
or guardians of the infant in permitting him or her to be at large
is such as to bar the infant's recovery.
90. There are many authorities for the proposition
that where an injured infant is the plaintiff, and the
cause of action is a pure tort, contributory negligence
on the part of the parents or guardians of the infant
plaintiff in permitting him or her to roam at large will
not bar the plaintiff's recovery. The question does not
seem to have been ruled in England. In Lynch v.
NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS, ETC. 91
Nurdin, 1 which is often cited in support of this propo-
sition, the question was not raised, although in the case
of Lygo v. Newbold, 2 Lynch v. Nurdin having been
cited, Alderson, B., misapprehending that case, said,
" the negligence, in truth, is attributable to the parent
who permits the child to be at large. . It seems strange
that a person who rides in his carriage without a ser-
vant, if a child receives an injury by getting up behind
for the purpose of having a ride, should be liable for
the injury;" but Pollock, C. B., obviously replying to
Alderson, B., put Lynch v. Nurdin on the correct
ground, that "the plaintiff, being a child of tender
years, could not be considered as causing any part of
the injury it had sustained, but that the mischief was
occasioned solely by the defendant's default." 3
91. Cowen, J., in Hartfield v. Roper, 4 where the
plaintiff, a child of two years of age, had sued to re-
cover for injuries received by being run over while
straying on a highway, puts the ground of his judg-
ment against the plaintiff thus : " an infant is not sui
juris. He belongs to another to whom discretion in
the care of his person is exclusively confided. That
person is keeper and agent for this purpose, and in re-
1 1 Q. B. 29, 41 E. C. L. 2 8 Ex. 302.
3 In support of the proposition there can aso be cited : Robinson v. Cone,
22 Vt. 213 ; Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507 ; Kay v. P. E. R., 65 Penna. St.
269 ; G. St. R. R. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70 ; B. & I. R. R. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St.
399 ; N. & P. R. R. v. Ormsby, 27 Gratt. 455 ; Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 75
Mo. 542 ; C. H. & 1 1. Ry. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 64, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 745 ;
Daley v. N. & W. R. R., 26 Conn. 591 ; McGeary v. E. R. R., 135 Mass. 363,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 407 ; Smith v. A., T. & S. F. R. R., 25 Kans. 738, 4
Am. & Eng. R. B. Cas. 554 ; St. L., I. M. & R. By. r. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41, 4 Am.
& Eng. B. B. < as. 608. Against the proposition there can be cited: Ilartiield
r. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 ; Mangam v. B. C. R. R., 38 N. Y. 456 ; Holly v. Boston
Gas Light Co., 8 Gray 123; Brown v. E. & N. A. R. R., 58 Me. 384; Fitz-
gerald v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 29 Minn. 336, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas 310;
L. & I. Ry. v. Iluffmann, 28 Ind. 287 ; T., W. & W. Ry. v. Grabel, 88 111. 441 ;
Meeks v. S. P. Ry., 52 Cal. 602.
* 21 Wend. 615.
92 NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS, ETC.
spect to third persons his act must be deemed that of the
infant, his neglect, the infant's neglect. If his propel
agent and guardian has suffered him to incur mischief,
it is much more fit that he should look for redress to
that guardian, than that the latter should negligently
allow his ward to be in the way of travellers and then
harass them in courts of justice, recovering heavy ver-
dicts for his own misconduct."
92. On the other hand in Kay v. P. R. R., 1 where
the plaintiff, nineteen months of age, sued to recover for
injuries caused by being run over by defendant's cars
upon a siding on an open lot, of which lot defendant
was in possession. The plaintiff lived with her parents
in a shanty on the lot, and the defendant had permitted
the public to make use of the ground. The injury was
caused by detaching a lumber car and sending it around
a curve on a down grade .unattended by a brakeman.
The jury found for the plaintiff, but upon a point re-
served, the court below entered judgment for the defend-
ant non obstante veredicto, which was reversed in error
upon the ground that the defendant having licensed the
public use of the lot it was for the jury to say whether
they had been negligent in moving their cars under the
circumstances, and also that the negligence of the par-
ents, if any, in permitting the child to stray from the
house could not be imputed to the child, Agnew, J.,
saying: "The doctrine which imputes the negligence of
the parent to the child in such a case as this is repulsive
to our natural instincts and repugnant to the condition
of that class of persons who have to maintain life by
daily toil. It is not the case where the positive act of a
parent or guardian had placed a child in a position of
danger, necessarily requiring the care of the adult to be
constantly exercised, as where a parent takes a child
1 65 Penna. St. 2G9.
NEGLIGENCE OF PAKENTS, ETC. 93
into the cars, and by his neglect suffers it to be injured
by straying off upon the platform. But here a mother
toiling for daily bread, and having done the best she
could, in the midst of her necessary employment, loses
sight of her child for an instant, and it strays upon the
track. With no means to provide a servant for her
child, why should the necessities of her position in life
attach to the child, and cover it with blame ? When
injured by positive negligence, why should it be without
redress ? A negligent wrong is done ; it is incapable
of contributing to it — then why should the wrong not
be compensated ?"
93. In order to justly estimate the relative weight and
value of these conflicting authorities, it must be remem-
bered that the precise question, is, whether or not, when
an infant has been injured by the negligence of a rail-
way, that is, by a failure on the part of the railway to
perform some specific duty which, under the particular
circumstances of the case, it owed to the infant, the
plaintiff's recovery is to be barred by the antecedent
failure of his or her parents or guardians to perform
that general duty of protection which they owe to the
infant. The question, therefore, does not arise until
negligence on the part of the railway has been proven,
but when that has been proven, the antecedent negli-
gence on the part of the infant's parents or guardians
does not constitute, injustice, a defence to the railway,
for if the railway can say to the infant, ''you would not
have been injured by my negligence, if your parents or
guardians had not been negligent in permitting you to
stray on the highway," the infant can reply, "it is true
they neglected their duty, but notwithstanding that
neglect I would not have been hurt if you had not failed
to do your duty to me." The necessary allegations of
the injured infant and the railway being thus stated, it
94 NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS, ETC.
would seem that the negligence on the part of the
infant's parents or guardians is a remote and not a
proximate cause of the injury, and that, for that reason,
that negligence is not in any proper sense contributory
negligence. This line of reasoning renders it unneces-
sary to invoke the humanitarian and sentimental consider-
ations upon which Agnew, J., dwells in Kay v. P. R.
R., and the intrusion of which into the judgments of
courts so often furnishes illustrations of the maxim
"hard cases make bad law." Dr. Wharton 1 assumes
that in England the law is as laid down in Hartfield v.
Roper. The question has, as I have stated, never been
raised in England. Neither Lynch v. Nurdin, 2 Single-
ton v. E. C. Ry., 3 Mangan v. Atterton, 4 nor Waite v. N.
E. Ry., 5 touch the question. When it does come to be
considered in England, the application of the doctrine
of Davies v. Mann will necessarily lead to the conclusion
that as the injury could have been, notwithstanding the
negligence of the infant's parents or guardians, avoided
by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the
railway, the negligence of the parents or guardians will
not bar the plaintiff's recovery. The carefully guarded
judgments in Waite v. N. E. Ry., show that that case rests
on the contractual relation between the parties and fur-
nishes no authority for an action grounded on a pure tort.
94. Of course, where a parent personally conducts a
child into a position of danger, the parent's contributory
negligence will be attributed to the child ; as, for in-
stance, where a child of tender years is injured while
trespassing upon a railway line in company with its
mother. 6
1 Law of Negligence, sec. 311. ! 1 Q. E. 29, 41 E. C. L.
'7C.B. N. S. 287, 97 E. C. L. * L. R. 1 Ex. 239.
4 El. Bl. &E1. 719, 96 E. C. L.
9 Grethen v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. (U. S. C. C District of Minnesota), 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 342.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF STRANGERS. 95
XIII. THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE OF STRANGERS.
The contributory negligence of third persons, unconnected with the
plaintiff or the person injured, will not bar the plaintiff's recovery.
95. The contributory negligence of persons uncon-
nected with the plaintiff will not be imputed to the
plaintiff as contributory negligence. Thus in N. P. R.
R. v. Mahoney, 1 the plaintiff, a child of four years of
age, while playing near the defendant's line, having
been picked up by an aunt to whom her parents had
not delegated her care and custody, was injured by the
railway's negligence concurring with that of the aunt
who was carrying her across the line ; and it was held
that the negligence of the aunt could not be imputed
as contributory negligence to the plaintiff. In P. A. &
M. P. Ry. v. Caldwell, 2 a similar ruling was made where
an infant was injured by negligence on the part of the
railway, concurring with the negligence of another in-
fant who was a companion of the plaintiff, but not in
charge of her. 3
1 57 Penna. St. 187.
1 74 Penna. St. 421.
s See also Eaton v. B. & L. R. R., 11 Allen 500 ; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W.
Bl. 892; Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198, Stark 287, 2 E. C. L.; Illidge v.
Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190, 24 E. C. L. ; Hughes v. Macfie, 2 H. & 0. 744 ; Hill v.
New River Co., 9 B. & S. 303 ; Burrows v. March G. & C. Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 66,
7 Id. 96 ; Collins v. Middle Level Commrs., L. R. 4 C. P. 279; Harrison v. G.
N. Ry., 3 H. & C. 321 ; Watling v. Oastler, L. R. 6 Ex. 73 ; Daniels v. Potter,
4 C. & P. 262, 19 E. C. L. ; Clark v. Chambers, L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 327, criti-
cising Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Ex 239.
96 FOE WHOM THE RAILWAY IS LIABLE.
BOOK II.
THE PERSONS FOR WHOSE ACTS OR OMISSIONS THE RAIL
WAY IS LIABLE.
CHAPTEE I.
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE RAILWAY'S RESPONSIBILITY
FOR OTHERS.
I. The liability as affected by the character of the act, as one of omission
or of commission.
II. Special and general agency.
III. Classification of the persons for whose acts railways are liable.
I. THE LIABILITY AS AFFECTED BY THE CHARACTER OF
THE ACT, AS ONE OF OMISSION OR OF COMMISSION.
Where the injury is done by the omission of a particular act of care
which the duty of the railway to the person injured requires it to do
for his protection, the fact of the omission fixes the liability of rail-
way ; and the relation between the railway and the person who has
omitted to perform the duty is immaterial ; but where the injury is
done by an act of commission, the liability of the railway depends
upon the fact of the relation of agency between the railway and the
actual wrongdoer.
96. To render a railway liable for an injury in the
course of its operations to the person of one who is him-
self without fault, it must necessarily be proven that
the injury resulted from either the omission of some
particular act of care, or the commission of some par-
ticular act of carelessness or of wilful wrongdoing, or
the negligent performance of some rightful act by the
railway, or by some person for whose act causing the
injury the railway is legally responsible.
LIABILITY AS AFFECTED BY CHARACTER OF ACT. 97
11 97. Of course, where the injury is done by an act, the
actual wrongdoer is civiliter responsible to the person
injured ; but the legal liability of the railway for the
injury is dependent upon the positive or negative char-
acter of the act which causes the injury, and upon the
relation of the wrongdoer to the railway. Where the
injury is done by the omission of a particular act of
care, which the duty of the railway to the person in-
jured requires it to do for his protection, the fact of the
omission fixes the liability of the railway ; and the re-
lation between the railway and the individual who has
omitted to perform the duty is immaterial; for, as
Blackburn, J., has said, 1 " the liability for an omission
to do something depends entirely on the extent to which
a duty is imposed to cause that thing to be done, and
* * * it is quite immaterial whether the actual actors are
servants or not." Upon the same principle, a railway
is liable for an independent contractor's non -perform-
ance of a duty whose performance was incumbent uj:>on
his employer, the railway. 2 On the other hand, where
the injury is done by an act of commission, as the rail-
way is an artificial person and can act only by its agents
or servants, its liability must depend upon the fact of
the relation of agency between the railway and the
actual wrongdoer, for, as Rolfe, B., has said, 3 "the lia-
bility of any one, other than the party actually guilty
of a wrongful act, proceeds on the maxim ' qui facit
per alium facit per se.' " 4
1 The Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. K. 1 H. L. 115.
1 Pickard v. Smith, 10 C B. N. S. 470, 100 E. C. L.; Bower v. Peate, 1 Q
B. D. 326.
3 Reedie v. L. & K W. Ry., Ilobbitt v. Same, 4 Ex. 243.
* See, also, the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid
3 Macq. H. L. 282.
7
98 FOR WHOSE ACTS THE RAILWAY IS LIABLE.
II. SPECIAL AND GENERAL AGENCY.
The relation between the railway and the actual wrongdoer may be
either a special agency, or that general agency which the law charac-
terizes as that of master and servant.
98. In the case of a special agency the railway can
be made liable only by proof of a delegation of authority
to do the particular act which is the cause of the injury,
or by a subsequent ratification of its performance.
Where the act is committed by a servant, the liability
of the railway is fixed if the act be within the scope
of, and be done in the exercise of, the servant's dele-
gated authority.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PERSONS FOR WHOSE ACTS
RAILWAYS ARE LIABLE.
99. The persons for whose acts causing injury rail-
ways are liable, may be classified as follows :
1. Servants of the railway, including under that term
all of the railway's officers and employes of every
grade.
2. Independent contractors.
3. Other corporations and individuals, including con-
necting railways, owners of cars run over the line, les-
see railways, etc.
LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR-' ACTS'- OF "SE RVAN"rS. 99
CHAPTER II.
THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR THE ACTS OF THEIR
SERVANTS.
I. The general nature of a master's liability for the acts of a servant.
II. The relation of master and servant must in fact exist.
III. The act must be within the scope of the servant's employment.
IV. If the relation exists, and if the act be within the scope of the employ
ment, it is not material that the master did not order the particulai
act.
V. The liability of the railway for its servants' trespasses.
VI. The liability of the railway for its servants' wilful acts.
I. THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MASTER'S LIABILITY
FOR THE ACTS OF A SERVANT.
The maxim " respondeat superior " means that a railway, like other
masters, is civiliter responsible for the acts of its servants if the par-
ticular act causing the injury be within the scope of, and be done in
the exercise of, the servant's delegated authority.
100. The general rule is that a railway, like other
masters, is legally responsible for an injury done by an
act of its servant if the particular act be within the
scope of, and be done in the exercise of, the servant's
delegated authority. 1
1 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 266, 4 Jur. N. S. 767 ; Randle-
son v. Murray, 8 A. & E. 109, 35 E. C. L. ; Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16
East. 6 ; Whitfield v. S. E. Ry., 1 El. Bl. & El. 115, 96 E. C. L. ; Limpus v.
London Genl. Omnibus Co., 1 II. & C. 526 ; Green v. Same, 7 C. B. N. S. 290,
97 E. C. L. ; Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 H. & N. 359 ; Lawson v. The Bank of
London, 18 C. B. 84, 86 E. C. L.; E. C. Ry. v. Broom, 6 Ex. 314 ; Chilton v.
L. & C. Ry., 16 M. & W. 212; Smith v. B. & S. Gas Light Co., 1 Ad. & El.
526, 28 E. C. L. ; Patten v. Rea, 2 C. B. N. S. 606, 89 E. C. L. ; Goodman v.
Kennell, 3 C. & P. 167, 14 E. C. L.; Page v. Defries, 7 B. & S. 137 ; Shaw ».
Reed, 9 W. & S. 72 ; N. Y. & W. Tel. Co. r. Dryburgh, 35 Penna. St. 298 ; P.
& R. R. R. v. Derby, 14 How. 469.
100 GEKEKALMIVJEE OF LIABILITY FOE SERVANTS.
101. The reason of the rule is nowhere more clearly
explained than hy Lord Cranworth, 1 who said : " Where
an injury is occasioned to any one by the negligence of
another, if the person injured seeks to charge with its
consequences any person other than him who actually
caused the damage, it lies on the person injured to show
that the circumstances were such as to make that other
person responsible. In general, it is sufficient for the
purpose to show that the person whose neglect caused
the injury was at the time when it was occasioned
acting not on his own account, but in the course of his
employment as a servant in the business of a master,
and that the damage resulted from the servant so em-
ployed not having conducted his master's business with
due care. In such a case the maxim ' respondeat supe-
rior ■ ' prevails, and the master is responsible. Thus, if
a servant driving his master's carriage along the high
way carelessly runs over a bystander, or, if a game-
keeper employed to kill game carelessly fires at a hare
so as to shoot a person passing on the ground, or, if a
workman employed by a builder in building a house
negligently throws a stone or brick from a scaffold and
so hurts a passer-by ; in all these cases (and instances
might be multiplied indefinitely) the person injured
has a right to treat the wrongful or careless act as the
act of the master : Qui facit per alium faeit per se. If
the master himself had driven his carriage improperly,
or fired carelessly, or negligently thrown the stone or
brick, he would have been directly responsible, and the
law does not permit him to escape liability because the
act complained of was not done with his own hand.
He is considered as bound to guarantee third persons
against all hurt arising from the carelessness of himself,
1 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 282.
RELATION OF MASTER AND SERVANT AS A FACT. 101
or of those acting under his orders, in the course of his
business. Third persons cannot, or, at all events, may
not, know whether the particular injury complained of
was the act of the master or the act of the servant. A
person sustaining injury in any of the modes I have
suggested has a right to say : ' I was no party to your
carriage being driven along the road, to your shooting
near the public highway, and to your being engaged in
building a house. If you choose to do, or cause to be
done, any of these acts, it is to you, and not to your
servants, I must look for redress, if mischief happens to
me as their consequence.' A large portion of the ordi-
nary acts of life are attended with some risk to third
persons, and no one has a right to involve others in
risks without their consent. This consideration is alone
sufficient to justify the wisdom of the rule which makes
the person by whom, or by whose orders, these risks
are incurred, responsible to third persons for any ill
consequences resulting from want of due skill or
caution." The reason of the rule, therefore, is, that
the master who has made choice of an incompetent or
careless servant ought, in justice, to indemnify those who
are not parties to the contract of service, and who have
been injured in the course of the servant's action in
the exercise of the authority delegated to him by his
master.
II. THE RELATION OF MASTER AND SERVANT MUST IN
FACT EXIST.
The rule does not apply to cases where the railway does not stand in
the character of employer to the person by ivhose act the injury has
been occasioned.
102. In order, to render the railway liable for the
act of a servant, it must be shown that the relation of
102 LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF POSTAL CLERKS, ETC.
master and servant in fact exists. 1 The railway is,
therefore, not liable if it does not stand in the character
of employer to the party by whose act the injury has
been occasioned. 2 Thus, a railway is not liable for in-
juries caused to a person while at work on a station
platform by the negligent act of a postal agent, trans-
ported under contract with the Post-Office Department,
in throwing a mail bag from the mail car of a passing
train, it being proven that it was the usage of business
for the mail bag to be thrown off at a point some two
hundred feet away from the station, and that the rail-
way had, therefore, no reason to anticipate that the
mail bag would be thrown on the station platform. 3 In
other cases, 4 the railway was held liable to passengers
who, while waiting for a train on a station platform,
were injured by mail bags thrown by postal agents, it
being proven that the railway had reason to know that
mail bags were habitually thrown upon that platform
from passing trains, and the railway being bound to
guard its passengers against such injuries, whomsoever
might be the person w T hose act caused the injury. These
1 Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237, 76 E. C. L. ; Joel v. Morison, 6 C. &
P. 501, 25 E. C. L ; Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 607, 38 E. C. L. ; Lamb v.
Ptilk, Id. 629 ; Bard v. Yohn, 26 Penna. St. 4S2 ; Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4
Q. B. 476 ; Rayner v. Mitchell, 2 C. P. D. 357 ; Burns v. Poulson, L. R. 8
C. P. 563 ; Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. D. 279 ; Lyons v. Martin, 8 A. & E.
502, 35 E. C. L. ; McKenzie v. McLeod, 10 B. 385, 25 E. C. L. ; Williams
v. Jones, 3 H. & C. 602 ; Coleman v. Riches, 16 C. B. 104, 81 E. C. L. ; Stevens
v. Woodward, 6 Q. B. D. 318.
2 Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 12 E. C. L. ; Quarman v. Bennett, 6 M.
& W. 499 ; Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556 ; Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry., Hobbit
v. Same, 4 Ex. 243; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737, 40 E. C. L.; Rapson
v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710 ; Lucas v. Mason,, L. R. 10 Ex. 251 ; Murray v. Currie,
L. R. 6 C. P. 24; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 2 C. P. D. 205;
Stevens v. Armstrong, 2 Selden 435 ; McCullough v. Shoneman, 14 Weekly
Notes of Cases 395 ; Hemingway v. McCullough, 15 Id. 328.
3 Muster v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 61 Wise. 325, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 113.
4 Snow v. F. R. R., 136 Mass. 552, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 161 ; Carpenter
P. B. & A. R. R., 97 N.Y. 494, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 331.
LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF VOLUNTEERS. 103
cases agree, not only in holding the postal agents not to
be servants of the railway, but also in treating as the
test of the railway's liability its failure to guard those
who are lawfully upon its station platform against
dangers which may reasonably be regarded as likely to
occur.
103. Nor is a railway liable for the acts of a volun-
teer assisting its servants, as, for instance, for the negli-
gence of passengers in assisting other passengers to
alight j 1 nor for advice given by passengers to another
passenger to leap from a moving train ; 2 or to leave a
train at a place other than a station ; 3 nor is the railway
to be held liable for the negligent act of a person en-
gaged as his assistant by a servant to whom the railway
has not delegated the power of employing an assistant. 4
Whether or not the person causing the injury be a ser-
vant of the railway is, of course, a question of fact for
the jury. 5
104. The test of the existence of the relation of master
and servant is to be found not in the payment of the
servant's wages by the railway, but in the exercise by the
railway of authority in appointing the servant, in di-
recting his acts, in receiving the benefit of those acts, and
in reserving the power of dismissing the servant. 6
1 Burrows v. Erie Ry., 63 N. Y. 556 ; Morrison v. Erie Ry., 56 Id. 302 ; O. &
N. Ry. v. Stratton, 78 111. 88.
2 Filer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 59 N. Y. 351.
3 Frost v. G. T. R. R., 10 Allen 387 ; C. & I. R. R. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408.
* Jewell v. G. T. Ry., 55 N. H. 84.
5 P. R. R. v. Spicker, 105 Penna. St. 142.
6 Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 12 E. C. L. ; Quarman v. Bennett, 6 M.
& W. 41)0 ; Purnell v. Gh W. Ry.. mentioned by Melish, L. J., in 2 C. P. D.
210 ; Holmes v. Onion, 2 C. B. N. S. 790, 89 E. C. L. ; Fenton v. City of Dublin
Steam Packet Co., 8 A. & E. 835, 35 E. C. L. ; Dalyell v. Tyrer, El. Bl. & El.
890, 96 E. C. L., 28 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; Jones v. Mayor, etc., of Liverpool, 14 Q. B.
D. 890; Fletcher v. Braddick, 5 Bos. & Pul. 182; Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14
Pick. 1 ; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 2 C. P. D. 205 ; Little v. Hacket,
116 U. S. 366.
104 the scope of employment.
iii. the act must be within the scope of the
servant's employment.
In order to render the railway liable for the act of a servant, it must
also be shoicn that the particular act which caused the injury was
within the scope of the servant's employment.
105. Where the relation of master and servant exists
between the railway and the person whose act is the
cause of injury to another person, the railway is not
liable if the servant in causing the injury is not acting
within the scope of his employment. Thus, 1 a tenant
in possession of a house was held not to be liable to the
owner of the house for the act of a servant who, being
employed to light a fire in a fire-place, undertook to
clean the chimney by burning it out, and in so doing-
set fire to the house. So one, 2 to whom another had
loaned his shed, in order that a sign-board might be
made therein, was held in the Exchequer Chamber not
to be liable for the act of a carpenter, who, while en-
gaged in making the sign-board, lit his pipe and dropped
the match, thereby setting fire to and burning the shed.
This doctrine is also illustrated by the cases of injury
done by servants who, entrusted with their employers'
horses for the doing of errands, turn aside to accomplish
some purpose of their own, and while accomplishing
that injure some one else. The test in cases of this class
is that put by Maule, J., 3 who says, "the master is liable,
even though the servant, in the performance of the duty,
is guilty of a deviation or a failure to perform it in the
strictest and most convenient manner; but when the
servant, instead of doing that which he is employed to
do, does something which he is not employed to do at
1 McKenzie v. McLeod, 10 B. & C. 385, 25 E. C. L.
2 Williams v. Jones, 3 H. & C. G02.
3 Mitchell v. CrassweDer, 13 C. B. 237, 76 E. C. L.
THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 105
all, then the master cannot be said to do it by his ser-
vant, and therefore he is not responsible for the negli-
gence of the servant in doing it." Upon this principle,
a sleeping-car company was held not to be liable for
injuries caused to one standing on a station platform, by
the act of the porter of a sleeping-car in throwing, for
his personal convenience, a bundle of soiled clothes from
a moving car. 1
106. But the fact that a railway servant has for a
considerable length of time performed a certain duty is
evidence to go to the jury that in so doing he was acting
by the express or implied assent of the railway, thus, 2
a flagman, not employed by the railway to watch a main
line crossing, but accustomed to warn persons about to
cross the main line, having invited the plaintiff to cross
when the line was not clear, and the plaintiff having
beeu injured, it was held that "the fact that he had uni-
formly performed such duty for several years was com-
petent evidence to be submitted to the jury as tending
to prove that he was so acting by the express or implied
assent of the railway."
IV. IT IS NOT MATERIAL THAT THE MASTER DID NOT
ORDER THE PARTICULAR ACT.
Where the relation of master and servant exists, and where the act
causing the injury is within the scope of the servant's employment,
it is not material that the master did not order or even know of the
doing of the particular act, or that in doing the act, or in the man-
ner of its performance, the servant disobeyed the express injunctions
of the master.
107. If the relation of master and servant exist, and if
the act causing the injury be within the scope of the ser-
1 Walton v. N. Y. C. S. C. Co., 139 Mass. 556, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
600, note.
2 Peck v. M. C. Ry., Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 257.
10G LIABILITY FOR A SERVANT'S TRESPASSES.
vant's employment, it is not material that the master
did not order or even know of the doing of the particu-
lar act. 1 This view is clearly stated by Willes, J.,
in a case 2 where a bank was held liable for a fraudulent
misrepresentation made by its cashier in the course of
business. That learned judge said : " the general rule
is that the master is answerable for every such wrong
of the servant or agent as is committed in the course of
the service and for the master's benefit, although no
express command or privity of the master be proved,"
and after referring to specific instances, he adds : " in
all these cases it may be said, as it was said here, that
the master has not authorized the act. It is true he has
not authorized the particular act, but he has put the
agent in his place to do that class of acts, and he must
be answerable for the manner in which the agent has
conducted himself in doing the business which it was
the act of his master to place him in."
V. THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY FOR ITS SERVANTS'
TRESPASSES IN THE EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY
DELEGATED TO THEM.
108. Nor will the railway escape liability, if in doing
the act or in the manner of its performance, the servant
disobey the express injunctions of his superior officers,
provided that the act be of that class with whose per-
formance the servant is charged. Thus, in 3 a case which
Pigott, B., has characterized as " very near the line," a
railway was held liable for the act of its porter in pull-
ing the plaintiff out of a railway carriage about to start,
because he believed the plaintiff was in a wrong car-
1 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259 ; Huzzey v. Field,
2 C. fcT. & R. 432; The Thetis, L. R. 2 Ad. &Ec. 365; Johnson v. C. V.R. R.,
56 Vt. 707.
2 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 265.
8 Bayley v. M. S. & L. Ry., L. R. 7 C. P. 415, 8 Id. 148.
LIABILITY FOR A SERVANT'S TRESPASSES. 107
riage, although the plaintiff was, in fact, in his right
carriage, it being proven that while the rules of the com-
pany required the porters to prevent passengers from
going by wrong trains, they did not expressly direct
them to remove a passenger from a carriage. So 1 a
railway has been held liable for the act of a brakeman
in removing a passenger from a car reserved for ladies,
it being the duty of the brakeman to notify the passen-
ger that the car was reserved. So 2 a railway has been
held liable for the death of a passenger resulting from
his wrongful and forcible removal from a car by its
conductor. So 3 a railway has been held liable for its
engine-driver's negligent blowing of a whistle in dis-
obedience of the railway's regulations.
Where the particular act is done in furtherance of the general pur-
pose of the railway, and is within the scope of the servant's author-
ity, the railway is liable, even though the act be a trespass.
109. "Where the particular act is done in furtherance
of the general purposes of the railway, and is within the
scope of the servant's authority, the railway is liable,
even though the act be a trespass. 4 Thus, 5 in a case
where the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant's
omnibus, and was removed by the conductor, a servant
of the defendant, in such a manner that the plaintiff fell
into the road and was severely injured, Pollock, C. B.,
said : " I do not believe he intended to do any mischief,
but his want of care clearly was the cause of the mis-
chief, and therefore I think the effect of the evidence is
that the servant, by carelessly executing his master's
» Peck v. X. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 70 X. Y. 587.
2 P. R. R. v. Vandiver, 42 Penna. St. 365.
3 P. W. & B. R. R. v. Brannen, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 227.
1 Yarborongh p. Bank of England, Hi East. 6 ; Whitfield v. S. E. Ry., 1 El.
Bl. & El. 115, 96 E. C. L. ; Green v. L. G. Omnil us Co., 7 C. B. N. S. 290, 97
E. C. L. ; Limpus v. S:une, 1 II. & C. 526 ; Roe v. B. L. & C. J. Ry., 7 Ex. 36.
5 Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 II. & N. 354.
108 LIABILITY FOR A SERVANT'S TRESPASSES.
commands, caused the mischief complained of, and that
is what I should have found had I been on the jury.
There is no doubt that the law on this subject was once
very much confused, and when McManus v. Crickett 1
was decided, the law had not been settled. I
think the view we take of this case is quite in conform-
ity with all the more recent decisions. Public safety
and private convenience require that we should so de-
cide ; for if we were to hold that a railway company is
not to be responsible for the act of its servant, causing
damage to a third person, unless it be an act done in the
mere negligent obedience to the orders of the company,
there would be no protection to lite public." And Mar-
tin, B., added : " I have no doubt that if the conductor
used unnecessary violence in removing the plaintiff, the
master would be responsible. If, by an act done by a
servant within the scope of his ordinary employment,
another person is injured, that person may maintain an
action against the master ; and the act of removing the
plaintiff from the omnibus was within the scope of the
conductor's ordinary employment. * * * The criterion
is not whether the master has given the authority to do
the particular act, but whether the servant does it in the
ordinary course of his employment."
110. The railway is, therefore, liable for the acts of its
conductors, brakemen, guards, or porters, in wrongfully
ejecting either passengers or trespassers from its trains,
or in rightfully ejecting such persons with unnecessary
force ; 2 and for the acts of a station master in ejecting
1 1 East. 107.
* Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 H. & N. 354 ; Bayley v. M. S. & L. Ry., L. R. 7,
C. P. 415, 8 Id. 148 ; P. R. R. v. Vandiver, 42 Penna. St. 365 ; R. R. v. Finney,
10 Wise. 3S8 ; Weed v. P. R. R., 17 N. Y. 362 ; Moore v. F. R. R., 4 Gray 465 ;
Holmes v. Wakefield, 12 Allen 580 ; L. N. A. & C. E. R. v. Dunkin, 92 Ind.
601, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 422 ; State v. Ross, 2 Dutcher 224 ; Coleman v.
N. Y. & X. II. R. R., 106 Mass. 160; Brokaw v. N. J. R. R., 3 Vroom 328;
C. & A. R. R. v. Flagg, 43 111. 364 ; E. & C. R. R. v. Banin, 26 Ind. 70 ; G. W.
LIABILITY FOE EXPULSIONS. 109
with unnecessary violence one who was loitering in the
station ; l and for injuries caused by assaults by its ser-
vants upon passengers while the servants are acting
within the scope of their authority. 2
111. Some of the cases 3 hold that the forcible removal
of trespassers from a railway train does not fall within the
implied authority of train hands, and that to render the
railway liable for damages done by such an act an ex-
press authority must be shown. The doctrine of most
of the cases, however, is, that wherever a railway servant
is put in charge of any property of the railway, as a
station master in charge of a station, or a conductor in
charge of a train, or an engine-driver or fireman in
charge of an engine, or a brake man in charge of a car,
that servant is necessarily charged with the duty of pro-
tecting that particular property, and he is, therefore,
for that purpose vested with an implied authority to re-
move trespassers therefrom ; and if he makes a mistake,
either by removing a person who is rightfully therein
or thereon, or by using unnecessary violence in the re-
moval of a trespasser, the railway must be held liable
for all such injuries as result, in the one case from the
R. R. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 ; Jackson v. S. A. R. R., 47 N. Y. 274 ; Kline
v. C. P. R. R., 39 Cal. 537 ; Higgins v. W. T. & R. R., 46 N. Y. 23 ; C. C. & I.
R. R. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37 ; Sanford v. E. A. R. R., 23 N. Y. 343 ; Marquette
v. C. & N. W. Ry., 33 Iowa 562 ; Carter v. L. N. A. & C. R. R., 98 Ind. 522, 22
Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 360; Kline v. C. P. R. R., 37 Cal. 400; Schultz v. T.
A. R. R., 89 N. Y. 242, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 579 ; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.
v. Hoffman, 87 N. Y. 25, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 537 ; Benton v. C. R. I. &
P. R. R , 55 Iowa 496.
1 Johnson v C. R. I. & P. Ry., 58 Iowa 348, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206.
a Bayley v. M S & L. Ry., L. R. 7, C. P. 415, 8 Id. 148 ; P. R. R. v. Van-
diver, 42 Penna. St. 365 ; I. B. & W. Ry v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46, 18 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 192 ; Ramsden v. B. & A. R. R., 104 Mass. 117 ; Pleenrich v. P. P.
C. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 100, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 379 ; W. St. L. & P. Ry.
v. Rector, 104 111. 296, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 264.
8 T. C. Co. v. Heeraan, 86 Penna. St 418 ; Cauley v. P. C. & St. L. Ry., 98 Id.
498 ; P. A. & M. P. Ry. v. Donahue, 70 Id. 119 ; Penna. Co. v. Toomey, 91 Id.
256; Manon v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., 59 Iowa 428, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 177.
110 LIABILITY FOR TRESPASSES.
removal, and in the other ease from the unnecessary
violence with which that removal is effected.
112. A railway is also liable for the acts of its ser-
vants in the exercise of statutory power conferred upon
the railway to arrest persons attempting to defraud them. 1
It is held in some cases, that where the railway has no
power under its charter to make an arrest, the railway
is not liable, for there cannot be an implied authority
to its servants to do that which the corporation has no
charter power to do. 2 In other cases, 3 it is held that
railways are liable for wrongful arrests made by their
servants in the mistaken exercise of the authority vested
in them by the railway, and that in such a case it con-
stitutes no defence to the railway that its agent in doing
the act did that which the railway was not authorized
by its charter to do, and that which the railway had not
empowered its servant to do. Upon the same principle
a railway was held liable 4 for the act of its servant in
seizing a passenger's luggage to enforce payment of his
fire. The doctrine of the last-mentioned class of cases
seems to be sound, for, if the person who does the
wrongful act be, in fact, a servant of the railway, and
if the act be done in furtherance of the general purposes
of the railway, and not to accomplish an independent
personal purpose on the part of the servant, the railway
ought to be held liable therefor, on the ground of an
implied delegation to the servant of authority for the
1 E. C. Ry. v. Broom, 6 Ex. 314 ; Chilton v. L. & C. Ry., 16 M. & W. 212 ;
Roe v. B. L. & C. J. Ry., 7 Ex. 3G ; Savaignac v. Roome, 6 T. R. 125 ; Moore
v. N. Ry., L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 ; Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, 4 App. Cas.
270 ; Edwards v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P. 445 ; Allen v. L. & S. W. Ry.,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 65 ; Gofi v. G. N. Ry., 3 E. & E. 672, 107 E. C. L.
2 Poulton v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B. 534 ; Emerson v. N. N. Co., 2
Ont. (Can.) 528.
3 Lynch v. M. E. Ry., 90 N. Y. 77, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 119 ; E. & T.
II. R. R. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 519, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 366.
* Ramsden v. B. & A. R. R., 104 Mass. 117.
LIABILITY FOR SERVANTS' ACTS. Ill
performance of the particular act, and the doctrine of
ultra vires cannot be held to negative the implication of
such a delegation, unless, in the words of Kelly, C. B.,
in his dissenting judgment in Mill v. Hawker, 1 corpora-
tions are "not to be liable for any tort at all committed
or authorized by them."
113. A railway is liable for an assault committed by
a servant under the orders of an executive officer of the
company, thus : where a servant of one railway was
wounded by a pistol shot fired by some one of the ser-
vants of another railway, acting under the orders of the
vice-president and general manager of their line, in an
attempt to take forcible possession of the line of the
first-mentioned railway, the last-mentioned railway was
held liable in damages to the injured person. 2
114. A railway is also liable for the act of its servant
in attempting to bribe an adverse witness, the servant
being engaged to prepare for trial actions against the
company, and the fact of such attempted bribery being
admissible in evidence against the company on the trial
of an action for injuries to the person, in which action
the person sought to be bribed was a witness. 3
115. Railways are not liable for a mistaken exercise
of judgment upon the part of their servants in an emer-
gency ; 4 nor, for a failure upon the part of their ser-
vants to act with the utmost possible promptitude
when the circumstances are such as to afford no time
for deliberation ; thus, 5 where a passenger railway car
was approaching a switch, and the attention of the
driver was necessarily directed to the switch, and a boy
1 L. R. 9 Ex. 309, 10 Id. 92.
2 D. & R. G. Ry. v. Harris, New Mex. , 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 142.
8 C. C. Ry. v. McMahon, 103 111. 485, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. G8.
* Banks v. II. St. Ry., 136 Mass. 485, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 139 ; Bell v.
H. & St. J. R. R, 72 Mo. 50, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 580.
6 H. M. & F. P. Ry. v. Kelley, 102 Fenna. St. 115.
112 LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS.
jumped on the front platform, remained there about
thirty seconds, and in jumping off was injured, it was
held that there was no negligence on the part of the
defendant, Green, J., saying : " where the sole basis
of liability is the omission to perform a certain duty
suddenly and unexpectedly arising, we think there
ought to be at least a consciousness of the facts which
raise the duty on the part of the person who is charged
with its performance, and a reasonable opportunity to
discharge it." 1
VI. THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY FOR ITS SER-
VANTS' WILFUL ACTS.
A railway is not liable for the wilful act of its servant beyond the
scope of that servant's general authority, unless it be proven that
there was an antecedent special authorization or subsequent ratifica-
tion.
116. A railway is not liable for the wilful act of its
servant beyond the scope of that servant's general
authority, unless it can be proven that there was an
antecedent special authorization or a subsequent ratifi-
cation. 2 The per curiam judgment of the King's Bench
1 Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568, 98 E. C. L. ; Brown v. French, 14 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 412; Gumz v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 52 Wise. 672, 5 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 583 ; Maschek v. St. L. R. R., 71 Mo. 276, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 38 ; Dunleavy v. C, R. T. & P. Ry., Iowa , 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 542 ; Brown v. C. & B. St. Ry., 49 Mich. 153, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
385 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 504, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 535 ;
Jenkins v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 41 Wise. 112.
2 McManus v. Crickett, 1 East. 106; Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590, 6 E.
C. L.; Lawson v. Bank of London, 18 C. B. 84, 86 E. C. L.; Edwards v. L. &
N. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P. 445 ; Walker v. S. E. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P. 640 ; E. C. Ry.
v. Broom, 6 Ex. 314 ; Roe v. B. L. & C. J. Ry., 7 Id. 36 ; Smith v. B. & S. Gas
Light Co., 1 A. & E. 526, 28 E. C. L. ; Hays v. H. G. N. R. R., 46 Tex. 280 ;
G. H. & S. A. R. R. v. Donahoe, 56 Id. 162, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 287 ;
Isaacs v. T. A. R. R., 47 N. Y. 122 ; R. T. Co. v. Vanderbilt, 2 N. Y. 479 ; C.
& N. W. Ry. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 ; I. C. R. R. v. Downey, 18 111. 259.
LIABILITY FOE WILFUL ACTS. 113
in Croft v. Alison, 1 states the distinction thus: "if a
servant driving a carriage, in order to effect some pur-
pose of his own, wantonly strikes the horses of another
person, and produce an accident, the master will not be
liable. But if, in order to perform his master's orders,
he strike, but injudiciously, and in order to extricate
himself from a difficulty, that will be negligent and
careless conduct for which the master will be liable,
being an act done in pursuance of the servant's employ-
ment."
117. Of course the railway is liable for a wilful
assault by a servant beyond the scope of his employ-
ment, if it subsequently ratifies the act. Proof of rati-
fication can be deduced from the fact that the railway,
with knowledge of its servant's commission of an un-
authorized assault on a passenger, has retained him in
its service and promoted him.' J But 3 it has been held
that a promise by a secretary of a railway to look into
the matter, and the subsequent offer of a pecuniary com-
promise of the plaintiff's claim, was not evidence of a
ratification by the railway of the unauthorized act of a
servant in arresting the plaintiff for non-payment of fare;,
and the fact that the attorney of the railway attended
before a magistrate at the hearing of a charge against
the plaintiff, was held not to be a ratification of the un-
authorized act of a servant in taking the plaintiff into
custody and carrying him before a magistrate. 4
118. It is, however, laid down by some authorities
that the railway is liable for wilful assaults by its servants,
even beyond the line of their duty, as, for instance, for
1 4 B. & Aid. 590, 6 E. C. L.
2 Bass v. C. & N. W. By., 39 Wise. 636, 42 Id. 654; Gasway v. A. & W. P
Ry., 58 Ga. 216.
3 Roe v. B. L. & C. J. Ry., 7 Ex. 36.
4 E. C. Ry. v. Broom, 6 Ex. 314.
8
114 LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS.
the act of a conductor in kissing a female passenger ; x
for the act of a brakeman, who, when accused of theft
by a passenger, struck the passenger in the face ; 2 for
the act of a conductor in calling a passenger out of a
train at a way station and beating him ; 3 for the act of
a brakeman in throwing water on a passenger while
standing in the doorway of a car ; 4 for the act of a con-
ductor in pointing a loaded revolver at a passenger,
and forcing him to leap from a moving train ; 5 for the
act of a conductor in wilfully insulting and assaulting
a passenger, when the conductor was not engaged in
the performance of his duties ; 6 for the act of an engine-
driver in sounding the whistle of his engine unneces-
sarily, and with the intention of frightening horses ; 7
for insulting and offensive epithets 8 applied by a railway
servant to a passenger. 9
119. On the other hand, it has been held that a rail-
way is not liable for the act of a servant, who, having
been placed at a car door to resist the entrance of pas-
sengers without tickets, assaulted a passenger who at-
tempted to force an entrance; 10 nor for the act of a
1 Craker v. C. & N. W. Ry., 36 Wise. 657.
2 C k E. R. R. v. Flexman, 103 111. 546, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 354.
3 Peeples v. B. & A. R. R., 60 Ga. 281..
4 T. H. & I. R. R. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 178.
5 Gallena v. II. S. R. R., 13 Fed. Rep. 116.
6 Goddard v. G. T. Ry., 57 Me. 202 ; Hanson v. E. & N. R. R., 62 Id. 84;
Maleck v. T. G. R. R., 57 Mo. 18 ; Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush 147.
7 C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Dickson, 63 111. 151, 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 45.
8 Bryant v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 63 Iowa 464, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 335.
9 See, generally, Pendleton v. Kinsley, 3 Clif. 416 ; Sherley v. Billings, 8
Bush 147; Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass.
180, 202; Kieto v. Clark, 1 Clif. 145 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277 ;
Stewart v. B. & C. Ry., 90 N. Y. 588, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 127, overruling
Isaacs v. Third Ave. R. R., 47 N. Y. 122 ; I. & G. N. Ry. v. Kentle, Tex. ,
16 Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 337 ; Jackson v. Second Ave. R. R, 47 N. Y. 275 ;
Rounds v. D., L. & W. R. R., 64 Id. 137 ; Day v. B. C. R. R., 76 Id. 593 ; Mc-
Kinley v. C. & N. W. Ry., 44 Iowa 314 ; Gasway v. A. & W. P. R. R, 58 Ga. 216.
10 Priest v. H. R. R. R., 65 N. Y. 589.
LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS. 115
servant in striking with a hatchet a passenger who had
provoked a quarrel with him, 1 nor for the act of a fire-
man in inducing a boy to assist in watering an engine, 2
nor for the act of a brakeman in ordering a boy to move
a load of lumber on a car in motion, 3 nor for the act of
a brakeman in throwing a stone at a boy trespassing on a
train, 4 nor for the act of a conductor in forcing a tres-
passing boy to jump from a moving car, 5 nor for the act
of a driver of a street car in striking a boy and knock-
ing him off the car, 6 nor for the act of a conductor in
pushing a trespasser off a moving car, 7 nor for the act
of an engine-driver in purposely driving his engine over
cattle on the line, 8 nor for the act of the driver of a street
car in wilfully running his car into a wagon, 9 nor for
the act of a brakeman in abducting a boy from his home
and carrying him away on a train. 10
120. The reported actions against railways for wilful
assaults committed by their servants may be classified
in three categories : first, those in which the person in-
jured was not a passenger of the railway ; second, those
in which the person injured was a passenger, and the
assault was committed by the railway's servant at a time
when he was engaged in the performance of his duty to
the railway, as, for instance, when collecting the passen-
ger's fare, or when preventing the passenger from enter-
ing, or remaining, in a particular car; and third, those
1 L. M. R. R. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110.
1 Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Penna. St. 210.
3 Sherman v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
* Towanda Coal Co. v. 1 Iceman, 86 Penna. St. 418.
i Cauley v. P. C & St. L. Ry., 98 Penna. St. 498.
6 P. A & M. P. Ry. v. Donahue, 70 Penna. St. 119.
7 Penna. Co. v. Toomey, 91 Penna. St. 256 ; Marion v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 59
Iowa 428, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 177.
8 I. C. R. R. v. Downey, 18 III. 259.
9 Wood o. D. C. S. Ry., 52 Mich. 402, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 129.
w Gilliam v. S. & N. A. R. R., 70 Ala. 268, 15 Am. & Eng. P.. R. Cas. 138.
116 LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS.
in which the person injured was a passenger of the rail-
way, and the assault committed by the servant was not
contemporaneous with that servant's performance of his
duty to the railway. In each category the decisions are
conflicting. In those of the first category, the railway
is generally held not to be liable, and in those of the
second and third categories, the railway is generally
held to be liable. A careful consideration of this ques-
tion upon principle will satisfy any one that the true
rule of decision in every case, where it is sought to hold
a railway responsible for the act of a servant causing
injury to a person, whether that person be or be not
a passenger, or whatever be the relation in which he
stands to the railway, is to be found in the answer to
the question, was the servant in doing the act perform-
ing, however negligently and however wrongfully, his
duty to the railway, or was he accomplishing some pur-
pose of his own, which had no necessary connection with
the performance of his duty to the railway? If the
former, the railway is liable ; if the latter, the railway
is not liable. In Johnson v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 1 where
the railway was held liable for the act of its station
master in ejecting the plaintiff from its station house
rightfully, but with unnecessary violence, Rothrock, J.,
thus states the rule : " the true test by which to deter-
mine the liability of the master, or employer, for the
negligent or wrongful acts of the servant, or employe, in
all this class of. cases is, was the wrongful or negligent
act done in the course and scope of the employment of
the servant, or agent ? If it was, the employer is liable.
But if the employe does any act out of his employment
* * the employer is not liable. For example, if an
agent, conductor, or other employe should assault a
loafer in a waiting-room in a personal quarrel, having
1 58 Iowa 348, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gas. 206.
LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS. 117
no relation to his employment, the company would not
be liable in damages."
121. Many of the cases hold that the railway is liable
to its passengers for unauthorized and wilful assaults by
its servants when it would not be liable to persons other
than passengers for such assaults. The ground of de-
cision in such cases is thus stated by Tracy, J.: 1 " By the
defendant's contract with the plaintiff, it had undertaken
to carry him safely, and to treat him respectfully ; and
while a common carrier does not undertake to insure
from injury against every possible danger, it does under-
take to protect the passenger against any injury arising
from the neo;lio;ence or wilful misconduct of its servants
while engaged in performing a duty which a carrier
owes to the passenger." The fallacy in this reasoning
can be readily pointed out. It is based on a misappre-
hension of the railway's implied obligation to its pas-
sengers. The railway does not insure their safe
transportation. It does not warrant to them the security
of its line, nor the roadworthiness of its carriages, nor
the capability of its servants. The duty of the railway
to its passenger is performed to its full measure when
the railway exercises the highest possible care in the
construction and operation of its line, machinery, and
appliances, and in the selection, organization, and dis-
cipline of its servants. It is liable to its passengers
only for negligence, and it is not negligence upon its
part, when a servant who has been carefully selected,
and for whose guidance in the performance of his duties
judicious regulations have been prescribed, but who is
nevertheless human and mortal, and, therefore, to some
extent, at least, both fallible and self-willed, does that,
in the exercise of his own volition and to serve his own
purposes, which the railway has not expressly nor im-
1 Stewart v. B. & C. E. E., 90 N. Y. 588, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 127.
118 LIABILITY FOR WILFUL ACTS.
pliedly authorized him to do on its behalf. To hold the
railway liable in such a case is not consistent, either
with the principles upon which rests the responsibility
of railways to their passengers for injuries caused by a
failure of their means of transportation, or with those
other rules of law of wider application which determine
the liability of principals for the acts of their agents.
It does not affect the question to argue, as Mr. H. G.
Wood has argued, 1 that because a common carrier of
goods is absolutely liable for its servants' loss of or
wanton injury to the goods which it has contracted to
carry, that, therefore, "it would be a singular rule and
an absurd one, that did not hold the carriers of pas-
sengers" responsible for injuries wilfully inflicted by its
servants upon those passengers. It is only necessary,
in reply to this view, to refer to the judgment of Mon-
tague Smith, J., in Readhead v. Midland Ry., 2 where
he shows the essential distinction between the implied
obligations of carriers of goods and of passengers. It
must be remembered that science has not yet enabled
railways to manufacture their servants to order. They
must take as those servants sentient human beings, each
of whom has an individuality which cannot be altogether
repressed. All that the railway can do in the exercise
of the highest possible care is to prudently select and
train its servants, and to make wise regulations for
their government, and when it has done that it is a plain
injustice to hold the railway responsible for its servant's
wilful and unauthorized act.
1 Law of Master and Servant 648 et seq., 2 Law of Railroads 1196.
2 L. R. 4 Q. B. 379.
INDEPENDENT CONTE ACTORS. 119
CHAPTER III.
THE LIABILITY OF EAILWAYS FOE THE ACTS OF INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTORS.
I. The general rule of liability for the negligence of contractors.
II. The liability for a wrongful act done in pursuance of a contract.
III. The liability for a contractor's non performance of a duty incumbent
on the railway.
IV. The railway's obligation to anticipate negligence on the part of its
contractor.
I. THE GENERAL EULE OF LIABILITY FOE THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF CONTRACTORS.
A railway is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
or of his servants in the course of the prosecution of a lawful work.
122. It often happens, in the course of railway opera-
tions, that independent contractors who are not servants
of the railway are engaged pro hac vice to perform some
specified work of construction, alteration, or repair.
The earlier cases held him who had delegated to an-
other the performance of any act, or who had contracted
with that other for its performance, liable not only for
all the acts done by the contractor in the exercise of the
delegated authority and in the performance of the con-
tract, but also liable for the negligence of the contrac-
tor, and of the contractor's servants. Thus, in Bush v.
Stein man, 1 the defendant being the owner of a house,
contracted with a surveyor to repair it, and the surveyor
sublet the contract to a carpenter, who employed a brick-
layer, who contracted with a lime-burner for lime, which
the lime-burner's servant placed on the highway in
1 1 Bos. & Tul. 404.
120 THE OLD RULE OF LIABILITY.
front of the house, and the plaintiff, having been in-
jured by reason of his carriage being overturned on the
lime, brought his action and recovered against the de-
fendant, Rooke, J., saying, " the person from whom the
whole authority is originally derived, is the person who
ought to be answerable, and great inconvenience would
follow if it were otherwise." The same view is taken
in two other cases, 1 but the doctrine of these cases has
long since been overruled. In Laugher v. Pointer, 2 and
in Quarraan v. Bennett, 3 where the question was as to lia-
bility for the negligence of an independent contractor
where the contract had reference to personal property,
Bush v. Steinman was sought to be distinguished upon
the ground that the contract in question in that case re-
lated to fixed property, and that therefore the owner
was to be held liable, but this shadowy and unsubstan-
tial distinction was rejected and finally overthrown in
Keedie v. L. & N. W. By. and Hobbitt v. Same, 4 in which
cases the plaintiffs sued under Lord Campbell's Act, as
widows of persons who were killed while passing on a
highway under a viaduct in course of construction as
part of the defendant's line, the accident having re-
sulted from the negligence of the workmen employed
by a contractor who had undertaken to build the via-
duct. The jury having found for the plaintiffs, a rule
for a new trial was made absolute, Bolfe, B., saying,
" the case of Bush v. Steinman, where the owner of a
house was held liable for the act of a servant of a sub-
contractor, acting under a builder employed by the
owner, was a case of fixed real property. That case was
strongly pressed in argument in support of the liability
of the defendants, both in Laugher v. Pointer and
1 Sly v. Edgley, 6 Esp. 6, and in Matthews v. W. L. Waterworks Co., 3 Camp.
403.
2 5 B. & C. 547, 12 E. C. L. 3 6 M. & W. 499. * 4 Ex. 243.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 121
Quarraan v. Bennett; and as the circumstances of those
two cases were such as not to make it necessary to over-
rule Bush v. Steinman, if any distinction in point of
law did exist, in cases like the present, between fixed
property and ordinary movable chattels, it was right to
notice the point. But, on full consideration, we have
come to the conclusion that there is no such distinction,
unless, perhaps, in cases where the act complained of is
such as to amount to a nuisance ; and in fact that, accord-
ing to the modern decisions, Bush v. Steinman must be
laken not to be law, or, at all events, that it cannot be
supported on the ground on which the judgment of the
court proceeded. * * * Mr. Justice Littledale in his
very able judgment in Laugher v. Pointer, observed
that the law does not recognize a several liability in two
principals who are unconnected. If they are jointly
liable, you may sue either, but you cannot have two
separately liable. This doctrine is one of general ap-
plication, irrespective of the nature of the employment ;
and applying the principle to the present case, it would
be impossible to hold the present defendants liable,
without, at the same time, deciding that the contractors
are not liable, which it would be impossible to be con-
tended. It remains only to be observed that in none of
the more modern cases has the alleged distinction be-
tween real and personal property been admitted. Our
attention was directed during the argument to the pro-
visions of the contract, whereby the defendants had the
power of insisting on the removal of careless or incom-
petent workmen, and so it was contended they must be
responsible for their non-removal. But this power of
removal does not seem to us to vary the case. The
workman is still the servant of the contractor only, and
the fact that the defendants might have insisted on his
removal if they thought him careless or unskillful, did
122 MODERN RULE OF LIABILITY.
not make him their servant." In Painter v. Pittsburgh, 1
Strong, J., said that Bush v. Steinman "long since
ceased to be regarded as a correct enunciation of the
law in England, and both its reasoning and authority
are denied." 2
123. The modern doctrine is that if an independent
contractor is employed to do a lawful act, the employer
not reserving a control over the manner of its perform-
ance, and in the course of the work he or his servant
commits some casual act of negligence, the employer is
not answerable. 3 By force of these principles, a rail-
way is not liable for injuries done in the operation of
its line while in process of construction by a contractor ; 4
but where a passenger is injured while being trans-
1 46 Penna. St. 213, 221.
2 See also Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray 349 ; DeForrest v. Wright, 2
Mich. 368.
3 Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 480, 100 E. C. L.; Overton v. Freeman,
11 C. B. 867, 73 E. C. L.; Knight v. Fox 5 Ex. 721 ; Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q.
B. 960, 53 E. C. L. ; Steel v. S. E. Ry., 16 C. B. 550, 81 E. C. L. ; Peachey v.
Rowland, 13 C. B. 181, 76 E. C. L.; Brown v. A. C. S. & M. Co., 3 H & C.511;
Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. D. 369; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; Hilliard
r. Richardson, 3 Gray 349 ; Scammon v. Chicago, 25 111. 424 ; School District
of Erie v. Fuess, 98 Penna. St. 600 ; Smith v. Simmons, 13 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 242 ; Allen v. Willard, 57 Penna. St. 374 ; Wray v. Evans, 80 Id. 102 ;
Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737, 40 E. C. L. ; Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C.
P. 24 ; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., L. R. 2 C. P. D. 205 ; Hall v.
Smith, 2 Ring. 156 ; as explained by Alderson, B., in Scott v. Mayor of Man-
chester, 1 II. & N. 59 ; (Wiggett v. Fox, 11 Ex. 832, as explained by Channell,
B., in Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 143, and dissented from by Cockburn,
C. J., in Rourke v. Colliery Co., 2 C P. D. 205 ;) Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46
Penna. St. 213 ; Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Id. 146 ; Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Id.
247 ; Borough of Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 362 ; Reed v. Allegheny, 79 Pa. St. 300 ; Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121 ;
Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 58 ; N. O. & N. E. R. R. v. Reese, 61 Miss. 581 ;
Hughes v. C. & S. Ry., 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 100, and note, Ohio St.; Lin-
ton v. Smith, 8 Gray 147 ; DeForrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368 ; McCafferty v.
S. D. & P. M. R. R., 61 N. Y. 178 ; Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 ; Clark v. Fry,
8 Ohio St. 358 ; Hofnagle v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R , 55 N. Y. 608 ; King v.
N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R-, 66 Id. 181 ; Hexamer v. Webb, 101 Id. 377.
4 K. C. Ry. v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kans. 34, 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 220; Cunning-
ham v. I. R. R., 51 Tex. 503; U. P. R. R. v. Hause, 1 Wyoming 27.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 123
ported over a line which is in process of construction
by contractors, and which has not been formally re-
ceived from the contractors, but the train is manned by
servants of the railway, and the passenger's injuries are
caused by the negligence of those servants, the railway
must be held liable therefor. 1
Where the railway, having contracted for the performance of a work,
has reserved to itself the control both of the result and of the means
by which that result is to be accomplished, it is liable for the negli-
gence of the contractor and his servants.
124. Where the railway has contracted for the per-
formance of a work, aud has reserved to itself control
both of the result and of the means by which that re-
sult is to be accomplished, the contractor and his ser-
vants are the servants of the railway, and the railway
is held liable as master for their acts. 2 In Randleson
v. Murray, 3 the defendant was a warehouseman who
engaged a master porter to remove a barrel from his
warehouse, the master porter employing his own work-
men and tackle, and from the negligence of those men
the tackle failed, the barrel fell, and the plaintiff was
injured. The case as reported does not distinctly show
whether the master porter was engaged merely for the
particular job or whether he was engaged by the day or
week for the removal of other barrels. Coleridge, J.,
directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff if
they considered there had been negligence in the use
of the tackle, and a verdict having passed for the plain-
tiff, a rule for a new trial was refused, Denman, C J.,
1 Burton v. G II. & S. A. R. R., Gl Tex. 526, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 218.
2 8 A. & E 109, 35 E. C. L. See also Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737, 40
E. C. L.; Sadler v. Ilenlock, 4 El. & Bl 570, 82 E. C. L. ; Blake v. Thirst,
2 II. & < :. 20 ; Stone v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 ; N. O. M. & C. R. R. v. Harming,
15 Wall. 649.
3 8 A. & E. 109, 35 E. C. L.
124 CONTRACTORS WHEN AGENTS.
saying : " Had the jury in this case been asked whether
the porters, whose negligence occasioned the accident,
were the servants of the defendant, there can be no
doubt they would have found in the affirmative," and
Littledale, J., adding : " It seems to me to make no dif-
ference whether the persons whose negligence occasions
the injury be the servants of the defendant, paid by
daily wages, or be brought to the warehouse by a person
employed by the defendant. The latter frequently
occurs in a large place like Liverpool, where many per-
sons exercise the occupation of a master porter. But
the law is the same in each case." In the later case of
Milligan v. Wedge, 1 where the defendant, a butcher,
having bought a bullock, had engaged a licensed drover
to drive it from the Smithfield Market, and the drover
employed a boy by whose negligence the bullock escaped
and injured the plaintiff, the jury having found specially
that the boy was not defendant's servant, but having
found a verdict for the plaintiff on the general issue,
Denman, C. J., said with regard to Randleson v. Murray :
" The work was in effect done by the defendant himself
at his own warehouse. If he chose instead of keeping a
porter to hire one only for the day, he did not thereby
cease to be liable for injury done by the porter while
under his control. Here it does not appear that the
defendant attended the drover or his servant, and the
mischief was done, not in the course of the butcher's
business, but of the drover's." And Williams, J., added :
" I agree with the decision of Randleson v. Murray, for
the warehouseman's servant, whether daily or weekly,
is equally under the control of the warehouseman ;" and
Coleridge, J., said : " The true test is to ascertain the
relation between the party charged and the party actu-
ally doing the injury. Unless the relation of master
1 12 A. & E. 73 7 , 40 E. C. L.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 125
and servant exist between them, the act of the one
creates no liability in the other." Therefore, reading
Randleson v. Murray as it is explained in Milligan v.
Wedge, it is not inconsistent with the later cases. Under
the doctrine of this section, two recent cases have been
decided : thus, where a railway company contracted
with an individual to take entire charge of its freight
business at its terminus, under the supervision of the
railway superintendent, the railway was held liable to
a person injured by the negligent handling of a train
by the contractor's servants, 1 and where a railway per-
mitted a contractor to exercise its franchise of running
cars drawn by steam over its line, 2 the railway was held
liable for injuries done by the negligence of the con-
tractor's servants.
The reservation to the railway of a limited control over the manner of
. doing the work will not render the raihvay liable for the contractor's
negligence.
125. The fact that the contract requires the contractor
to do the work in accordance with the plans, specifica-
tions, and instructions furnished by the railway will not
render the railway liable, 3 nor that the contract reserves
to the railway power to insist on the removal of careless
or incompetent workmen employed by the contractor; 4
nor that the contract reserves to the railway power to
direct changes in the time and manner of doing the
work ; 5 nor that the contract reserves to the railway the
right to direct as to the quantity of work to be done, or
as to the condition of the work when comjneted ; 6 nor
1 Speed v. A. & P. R. R., 71 Mo. 303, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 77.
1 M. & A. R. R. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355.
8 Hunt v. P. R. R., 51 Penna. St. 475 ; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Id. 32.
4 Reedie v. L. & X. W. Ry., 4 Ex. 243.
5 Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Penna. St. 247.
• Hughes v. C. & S. Ry., 39 Ohio St. 461, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 100.
126 WRONGS IN PURSUANCE OF CONTRACT.
that the contractor is paid by the day ; l nor that the
contractor's servant whose negligence caused the injury
is paid by the railway while directed and controlled in
his action by the contractor. 2
n. THE LIABILITY FOR A WRONGFUL ACT DONE IN
PURSUANCE OF THE CONTRACT.
The railway will be liable where the injury is done by a wrongful
act performed by the contractor in the execution of his contract.
126. The doctrine of the independent contractor will
not exempt a railway from liability where the act which
occasions the injury is one which the contractor was en-
gaged to do, and which he has done in pursuance of his
contract, and where the act in itself is a wrong. In such
cases the employer is, of course, liable, for the contractor
in fulfilling his contract is the employer's agent. Thus
in Hole v. S. & S. Ey., 3 the defendant, being authorized
by Act of Parliament to construct a railway draw-bridge
across a navigable river, had employed a contractor, by
whose negligence in the construction of the bridge the
bridge, when completed, could not be opened, and the
plaintiff's vessel was prevented from navigating the
river. After verdict for the plaintiff a rule for a new
trial was discharged, Pollock, C. B., saying: "This is a
case in which the maxim ' qui facit per alium facit per se }
applies. Where a person is authorized by an Act of
Parliament or bound by contract to do a particular work
he cannot avoid responsibility by contracting with an-
other person to do that work. Where the act complained
of is purely collateral and arises incidentally in the course
of the performance of the work, the employer is not lia-
1 Harrison v. Collins, 86 Penna. St. 153; Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y. 377.
* Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., I, R. 2 C. P. D. 205.
8 6 II. & N. 488.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 127
ble, because lie never authorized the act — the remedy
is against the person who did it. * * * But when the
contractor is employed to do a particular act, the doing
of which causes mischief, another doctrine applies.
Here the legislature employed the company to build
the bridge; in building that bridge the contractor
created an obstruction to the navigation, and for that
the company are liable." 1
III. THE LIABILITY FOR THE CONTRACTOR'S NON-PER-
FORMANCE OF A DUTY INCUMBENT ON THE RAILWAY.
The railway is liable where the injury is done by the contractor's non-
performance of a duty whose performance was incumbent upon the
railway.
127. So also the employer is liable where the contractor,
having been entrusted with the performance of a duty
incumbent upon the employer, neglects its fulfillment,
whereby an injury is occasioned. Thus in Pickard v.
Smith, 2 Williams, J., after stating the general rule of
non-liability for the negligence of an independent con-
tractor, added : " That rule, however, is inapplicable to
cases in which the act which occasions the injury is one
which the contractor was employed to do ; nor by a
parity of reasoning to cases in which the contractor,
having been entrusted with the performance of a duty
incumbent upon the employer, neglects its fulfillment,
whereby an injury is occasioned. * * * * * If the per-
formance of the duty be omitted, the fact of his having
entrusted it to a person who also neglected it, furnishes
1 See also Ellis v. Sheffield G. C. Co., 2 E. & B. 767, 75 E. C. L. ; Blake v.
Thirst, 2 H. & C. 20; Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 470, 100 E. C. L. ;
Tarry r. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418; Robbins v.
Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 ; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 359 ; Lowell v. B. & L. R. R.,
23 Pick. 24; St. P. Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566 ; R. R. I. & St. L. R. R.
v. Wells, 66 111. 321 ; C. &. St. L. R. R. v. Woosley, 85 Id. 370.
» 10 C. B. N. S. 483, 100 E. C. L.
128 NON-FERFORMANCE OF EMPLOYER'S DUTY.
no excuse either in good sense or law." And in Bower
v. Peate, 1 the plaintiff and the defendant being owners
of adjoining houses, and the plaintiff being entitled to
lateral support for his house from the defendant's soil,
the defendant employed a contractor to pull down his
house, excavate the cellar, and rebuild, the contractor
stipulating to underpin the plaintiffs house and make
good any damages. The plaintiff's house having been
injured by the negligence of the contractor's servant, it
was held that the defendant was liable, Cockburn, C. J.,
saying : "A man who orders a work to be executed, from
which, in the natural course of things, injurious conse-
quences to his neighbour must be expected to arise
unless means are adopted by which such consequences
may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that
which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot
relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some
one else, whether it be the contractor employed to do
the work from which the danger arises, or some inde-
pendent person, to do what is necessary to prevent the
act he has ordered to be done from becoming wrongful.
There is an obvious difference between committing work
to a contractor, from which, if properly done, no injuri-
ous consequences can arise, and handing over to him
work to be done from which mischievous consequences
will arise unless preventive measures are adopted.
While it may be just to hold the party authorizing the
work in the former case exempt from liability for injury,
resulting from negligence which he had no reason to
anticipate, there is, on the other hand, good ground for
holding him liable for injury caused by an act certain
to be attended with injurious consequences if such con-
sequences are not, in fact, prevented, no matter through
whose default the omission to take the necessary meas-
1 1 Q. B. D. 326.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 129
ures for such prevention may arise." Bower v. Peate
is recognized and approved by the House of Lords in
Dalton v. Angus. 1
rv. the railway's obligation as to the anticipation
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ITS CONTRACTOR.
The railway is not negligent if it does not anticipate and guard against
the negligence of a carefully selected contractor, to whom it has en-
trusted the prosecution of a lawful work.
128. A railway is not bound to anticipate that a care-
fully selected and experienced contractor will do his
work negligently, and, therefore, the railway is not liable
if it fails to take precautions against possible negligence
on the part of the contractor or of his servants ; thus in
Daniels v. M. Ry., 2 Lord Westbury, with that clear ap-
preciation of the practical effects of rules of law which
is always to be found in the judgments of the House of
Lords, said: "The ordinary business of life could not go
on if we had not a right to rely upon things being
properly done when we have committed and entrusted
them to persons whose duty it is to do things of that
nature, and who are selected for the purpose with j3ru-
dence and care, as being experienced in the matter, and
are held responsible for the execution of the work. Un-
doubtedly it would create confusion in all things if you
were to say that the man who employs others for the
execution of such a work, or the man who is a party to
the employment, has no right whatever to believe that
the thing will be done carefully and well, having selected,
with all prudence, proper persons to perforin the work,
but that he is still under an obligation to do that which,
1 6 App. Cas. 740. See also Roman v. Stanley, 66 Penna. St. 464 ; The
M. D. Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 116.
2 L. R. 5 H. L. 61.
9
130 ANTICIPATION OF NEGLIGENCE.
to him, in many cases, would be impossible, namely, to
interpose from time to time in order to ascertain that
that was done correctly and properly, the business of
doing which he had rightfully and properly committed
to other persons." On the other hand, in V. C. It. R.
v. Sanger, 1 the railway was held liable to a passenger
who was injured by the derailment of a train, resulting
from the fall of a stone from an embankment then in
process of construction by a contractor employed by the
railway, it being held that the railway was negligent in
failing to guard against such an accident. The right
doctrine, however, would seem to be that which is so
clearly stated by Lord Westbury.
1 15 Gratt. 230.
LIABILITY FOE OTHER COEPOEATIONS, ETC. 131
CHAPTER IY.
THE RAILWAY'S LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS
OF OTHER RAILWAYS AND OF PERSONS OTHER THAN SER-
VANTS AND CONTRACTORS.
I. The general rule determining the liability.
II. The liability of railways for lessees.
III. The liability of railways for mortgage trustees in possession.
IV. The liability of railways for receivers.
V. The liability of railways for means of transportation under the im-
mediate control of third parties.
VI. The liability of railways for connecting lines.
VII. The liability of a railway for the negligence of other railways which
under statutory authority use its line.
VIII. The liability of a railway for other railways or individuals which by
contract use its line.
I. THE GENERAL RULE DETERMINING THE LIABILITY.
The railway is liable for the negligent acts of other corporations and
of individuals, which hold to it a relation of agency.
129. Upon the principles stated in the preceding
chapters, the railway is not liable for the negligent acts
of those who are not its agents, and this doctrine is
further illustrated in the cases of injuries done in the
operation of a railway line by a receiver appointed by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or by mortgage trus-
tees in exclusive possession of the line, and also in the
cases of injuries done by negligence upon the part of
another railway, which exercises statutory running
powers over the line, or which operates the line by
virtue of a lease made under express statutory authority;
but the converse of the proposition is illustrated in the
cases of injuries done in the operation of a line by a
132 LIABILITY FOE LESSEES.
lessee to whom the line lias been lensed without express
statutory authority, and also in the cases of injuries
done to a passenger by the failure of a means of trans-
portation which is under the control of a third party.
II. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOE, THE NEGLIGENCE
OF LESSEES.
The railway is liable for the negligent acts of a lessee of its line, when
the lease has not been expressly authorized by statute, and not liable
when the lease has been so authorized.
130. A railway cannot without express statutory
authority divest itself of its franchise, or delegate to
others the performance of that duty which the legisla-
ture has imposed upon it ; thus, in Gardner v. L. C. &
D. Ry., 1 Cairns, L. J., said, " when Parliament, acting
for the public interest, authorizes the construction and
maintenance of a railway, both as a highway for the
public, and as a road on which the company may them-
selves become carriers of passengers and goods, it con-
fers powers and imposes duties and responsibilities of
the largest and most important kind, yet it confers
and imposes them upon the company which Parliament
has before it, and upon no other body of persons.
These powers must be executed, and these duties be dis-
charged by the company. They cannot be delegated or
transferred." * * * So, in W. A. & G. R. R v. Brown, 2
Davis, J., said, " it is the accepted doctrine in this
country, that a railroad coloration cannot escape the
performance of any duty or obligation imposed by its
charter or the general laws of the State by a vol-
untary surrender of its road into the hands of les-
sees." These views are abundantly supported by other
1 L. R. 2 Ch. 201. J 17 Wall. 445.
LIABILITY FOE LESSEES. 133
authorities. 1 Therefore, where the lease has not been
authorized by express statutory authority, both the les-
sor and lessee railways are liable for injuries done by
the lessee's negligent operation of the line. 2 Upon the
same principle, a railway is also liable for negligence
on the part of persons whom it voluntarily permits to
exercise its franchise of running cars over its line. 3
131. On the other hand, where a railway, under due
authority of law, has leased its line to another railway,
the lessor railway is not liable for torts committed by the
lessee railway in the operation of the line. 4 Yet, in
Singleton v. S. W. R. R., 5 where a lease had been
authorized by statute, the lessor railway was held liable
to a passenger who was injured by the negligent opera-
tion of a train by the servants of the lessee railway,
upon the ground that the statute authorizing the lease
did not, in terms, exempt the lessor railway from lia-
bility ; but this case is certainly in conflict with the
current of authority.
132. A railway operated on joint account by re-
ceivers of part of its line, and also by lessees of the
remaining part thereof, is liable where the railway has
permitted tickets to be issued in its name for transpor-
tation over the whole line ; 6 for, as Davis, J., said, " the
1 Y. & M. L. R. R. v. Winans, 17 Howard 30 ; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. N.
S. 550; Winch v. B. L. & C. J. Ry., 5 De G. & S. 562, 16 Jur. 1035 ; G. N.
Ry. v. E. C. Ry , 9 Hare 306 ; Black v. D. & R. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130 ;
M. R. R. v. B. & C. R. R., 115 Mass. 347 ; Thomas v. W. J. Ry., 101 U. S. 71.
2 I. C. R. R. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90 ; C. & St. L. R. R. v. McCarthy, 20 111.
385; C. & R. I. R. R. v. Whipple, 22 Id. 105; Nelson v. V. C. R. R., 26 Vt.
717 ; McElroy v. N. R. R, 4 Cush. 400 ; Y. & M. L. R. R. v. Winans, 17 How,
30; Freemann v. M. <fe St. L. Ry., 28 Minn. 443, 7 Am, & Eng. R. R, Cas, 410 ;
Speed v, A. & P. R. R., 71 Mo. 303 ; 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 77.
3 M. & A. R. R. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355.
4 Mahony v. A. & St. L. R. R., 63 Me. 68 ; Ditchett v. St. P.. D. & P. M. R.
R., 67 N. Y. 425.
5 70 Ga. 464, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 226.
6 W. A. & G. R. R. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445.
134 LIABILITY FOE, MORTGAGE TRUSTEES.
company having permitted the lessees and receiver to
conduct the business of the road in this particular, as
if there were no change of possession, is not in a posi-
tion to raise any question as to its liability for their
acts."
III. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF MORTGAGE TRUSTEES IN POSSESSION.
The railway is not liable for injuries done in the operation of its line
by trustees in possession wider a mortgage duly executed under
express statutory authority.
133. A railway cannot, without express statutory
authority, mortgage its franchise or line. 1 But where
a mortgage has been duly executed under such authority,
and the mortgage trustees have entered into possession
of the line in accordance with the terms of such a mort-
gage, the railway is not liable for injuries done by the
mortgage trustees or their servants. 2 Mortgage trus-
tees in possession are liable for injuries caused by their
nedect or that of their servants, and this liability is
enforceable in any jurisdiction in which they may be
properly served with process. 3 A corporation or an indi-
vidual, who, by voluntary conveyance, becomes the legal
successor of a railway and the assignee of its assets, takes
those assets charged with the liabilities encumbering
them, including claims for damages for personal injuries ; 4
but purchasers of a railway under a judicial foreclosure
of a mortgage are not liable for injuries done prior to
1 Gardner v. L. D. & C. Ry., L. R. 2 Ch. 201 ; Commonwealth v. Smith, 10
Allen 448 ; Carpenter v. Mining Co., 65 N. Y. 43 ; S. C. Co. v. Bonham, 9 W.
& S. 27 ; Atkinson v. M. & C. R. R., 15 Ohio St. 21.
J State v. E. & N. A. Ry.. 67 Me. 479.
3 Bpragae v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 ; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9 ; Lamphear
v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237 ; Rogers v. Wheeler, 43 N. Y. 598 ; Smith v.
E. R. R., 124 Mass. 154.
* M. & W. P. R. R. v. Boring, 51 Ga. 582.
LIABILITY FOE RECEIVERS. 135
their entry into possession of the railway, 1 unless such a
liability be imposed by statute. 2
IV. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF RECEIVERS.
The railway is not liable for injuries done in the operation of its line
by a receiver who has been appointed by a court of competent juris-
diction, and is in exclusive possession of the line.
134. A railway whose line is in the custody of, and
operated by a receiver, is not liable in damages for
injuries resulting from the negligence of the receiver
or his servants. 3 Receivers in possession and operating
railways are personally liable for their individual
breaches of contract and torts, but not for torts com-
mitted by the servants whom they employ in the opera-
tion of the railway. Railway receivers are liable in
their official capacity, and to the extent of the property
in their custody, as such receivers, for their breaches of
contract, and for all torts done by themselves or their
servants in the course of the operation of the railway. 4
So, where a receiver has, in obedience to a decree of
court, relinquished possession of the railway line and
property and been discharged, he cannot be compelled
to make compensation to one w T ho was injured in the
course of the operation of the line by the negligence of
1 W. & T. P. R. v. Griffin, 57 Penna. St. 417 ; Metz v. B. C. & P. R. R., 58
N. Y. 61.
2 St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. v. Miller, 43 III. 199 ; Hatcher v. T. W. & W. R.
R.. 62 Id. 477.
8 Ballou v. Farnum, 9 Allen 47; O. & M. R. R. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553; Bell
v. I., C. & R. Ry., 53 Id. 57 ; Metz v. B. C. & P. R. R,, 58 N. Y. 61 ; Rogers v.
M. & 0. R. R., Lea (Tenn.) , 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 442 ; Davis v.
Duncan (U. S. C. C. So. Dist. Miss.), 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 295 ; M. & L.
R. R. R. v. Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 322, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 374; Turner
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 74 Mo. 603, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 38.
* Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137 ; Sloan v. C. I. Ry., 62 Iowa 728, II
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 145.
136 LIABILITY FOR PARLOR OAKS, ETC.
the receiver's servants. 1 It has, however, been held
that receivers are only liable to action within the juris-
diction authorizing them to act, and by leave of the
court appointing them. 2 A receiver is personally liable
when he voluntarily becomes lessee of a connecting line
on which plaintiff is injured. 3
V. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS FOR MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION UNDER THE IMMEDIATE CONTROL
OF THIRD PARTIES.
The raihvay is liable to its passengers for negligence in the construction,
maintenance in repair, or operation of means of transport, which are
under the immediate control of third parties.
135. This rule is applied in cases where the injury is
done in an omnibus engaged by the railway to bring
the passenger to its station ; 4 or, in a ferry boat operated
by an independent corporation, but used by the railway
to carry its passengers to their point of destination ; 5 or,
on wharves and landings, 6 and in parlor and sleeping
cars. 7
1 Davis v. Duncan (U. S. C. C. So. Dist. Miss.), 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
295.
2 Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y. 281 ; Metz v. B. C. & P. By., 58 Id. 61 ; Klein
v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474 ; Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 135. See, contra :
Blunienthal v. Smith, 38 Vt. 402 ; Newell v. Smith, 49 Id. 260 ; Paige v. Smith,
99 Mass. 395 ; Nichols v. Smith, 115 Id. 332.
3 Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545.
* Buffett v. T. & B. R. R., 40 N. Y. 168.
5 N. J. R. R. v. Palmer, 4 Vroom (N. J.) 90.
6 John v. Bacon, L. R. 5 C. P. 437 ; Knight v. P. S. & P. R. R., 56 Me. 234 ,
Gruber v. W. & J. R. R., 92 N. C. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 438.
7 Penna. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 ; C, C. & I. Ry. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St.
461, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 371 ; Kinsley v. R. R., 125 Mass. 54 ; Thorpe v.
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 76 N. Y. 402.
LIABILITY FOE CONNECTING LINES. 137
VI. THE LIABILITY OF KAILWAYS FOB, THE NEGLIGENCE
OF CONNECTING LINES.
The railway is liable to one whom it has contracted to carry to a point
beyond the terminus of its own line and over the line of a connecting
railway for injuries done on that connecting line.
136. The question as to the liability of railways for
the negligence of connecting railways seems to have been
first raised in Muschamp v. L. & P. Ry., 1 where the
plaintiff sued for the value of a parcel which had been
delivered at one of the defendant's stations for carriage
to a point beyond the terminus of its line, and which
was shown to have been lost after its delivery to a con-
necting line. Judgment was entered upon a verdict for
the plaintiff. This case was followed in Watson v.
Ambergate Ry., 2 and Scothorn v. S. S. Ry., 3 and was
cited with approval in the judgments of the House of
Lords in B. & E. Ry. v. Collins. 4 The converse of the
proposition was ruled in the last cited case, where the
plaintiff, having delivered goods at the Bath Station of
the G. W. Ry. to be forwarded to Torquay over the lines
of the G. W. & B. & E. Ry. Companies, and the goods
having been destroyed by fire while in transit over the
line of the latter company, it was held that for want of
privity of contract that company was not liable for their
loss. In Mytton v. Midland Ry., 5 a similar ruling was
made with regard to a passenger's luggage, it being held
that there was no privity of contract as between the
passenger and the connecting railway, his contract being
entire with the railway from whom he had bought his
ticket for the transportation of himself and his luggage
to the point of destination, although that point of desti-
1 8 M. & W. 421. » 15 Jur. 448.
* 8 Ex. 341. »7 H. L. 194.
6 4 H. & N. 615.
138 LIABILITY FOE CONNECTING LINES.
nation was upon the line of the connecting railway
company. The question with regard to the liability of the
contracting railway company for injuries to the person
of the passenger was first raised in G. W. Ry. v. Blake, 1
where the plaintiff, having bought a ticket from the de-
fendant for his transportation to Milford, the defendant's
line terminating at Grange Court and their train thence
proceeding over the line of the S. W. Ry., and the de-
fendant's train while on the S. W. line having come into
collision with an engine of the S. W. Company, the col-
lision being solely due to the negligence of the servants
of the S. W. Ry., the plaintiff was injured ; and it was
held in the Exchequer Chamber that the G. W. Ry.
was liable to the plaintiff for the breach of their implied
contract to use reasonable care to maintain the whole
line to Milford in a condition fit for traffic. This case
was followed in Birkett v. W. H. J. Ry., 2 Buxton v. N.
E. Ry., 3 and Thomas v. Rhymney Ry. ; 4 although in
the first of these cases the judgment of the court might
have been put upon the narrower ground that there was
evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant's
servants, because the accident, although happening upon
a connecting line, had been caused by the negligent dis-
placement of a switch by a servant of the defendant
company. 5 In Sprague v. Smith, 6 a contrary conclusion
was reached, based upon the theory that the' plaintiff,
being necessarily aware that he must be exposed to the
risk of injury from negligence on the part of the persons
operating the line over which the defendant had con-
tracted to carry him, must be held to have undertaken
1 7 H. & N. 987. * 4 H. & N. 730.
3 L. E. 3 Q. B. 549. * L. E. 6 Q. B. 266.
5 See also Murch v. C. E. E, 9 Foster 9 ; Stetler v. C. & N. W. Ey., 49 Wise.
609 ; W. St. L. & P. Ey. v. Peyton, 106 111. 534 ; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y.
306 ; Bissell v. M. S. & N. I. E. E, 22 N. Y. 258.
6 29 Vt. 421.
LIABILITY FOE CONNECTING LINES. 139
to bear that risk, as the defendant could exercise no
control over the management of the other line. This
case does not seem to be supported by other authority,
and its reasoning cannot be regarded as satisfactory. 1
Some .of the cases hold that, while a railway selling to a
passenger a ticket for transportation by other railways,
or other carriers, to a point beyond the terminus of its
line may bind itself by contract to be liable for injuries
to that passenger received upon the lines of those other
railways, or carriers, yet the mere sale of the ticket does
not have that effect. 2 Nevertheless, the weight of au-
thority is in favour of the proposition that a railway, by
contracting to deliver a passenger at a point beyond the
terminus of its own line, does impliedly engage to be
answerable to him for the negligence of the agents whom
it employs for the purpose of performing its contract.
137. A railway is also liable to its passengers while
on its line for injuries caused by negligence upon the
part of another railway whose line connects with the
line of the carrying railroad ; as, for instance, where a
passenger was injured by the negligence of a servant of
the other railway in coupling its carriage to the defend-
ant's carriage on a flying switch. 3 The same principle
applies where a contract of carriage having been made
by the railway, the motive power is furnished by another
party, and the carrier is held liable for negligence
upon the part of the person furnishing the motive power. 4
1 See also Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. K. R., 22 Conn. 1, 23 Id. 609.
1 Harlan v. E. E. E., 114 Mass. 44; N. & C. E. E. v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 341.
s White v. F. E. E., 136 Mass. 321, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 140 ; Warren
v. F. E. E., 8 Allen 227 ; Eaton v. B. & L. E. E., 11 Id. 500.
4 Peters v. Eylands, 20 Penna. St. 497 ; Keep v. I. E. E., 9 Fed. Eep. 625 ;
McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277 ; Seymour v. C. B. & Q. E. E., 3 Biss. 43.
140 LIABILITY FOR OTHER RAILWAYS.
VII. THE LIABILITY OF A RAILWAY FOR THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF OTHER RAILWAYS USING ITS LINE UNDER
STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
Tlie railway is not liable for the negligence of another railway, which,
■under .statutory authority and without the voluntary consent of the
railway, uses its line.
138. It is, however, to be borne in mind, that the
carrier railway, where there has been no negligence
upon its part, or upon the part of its agents or servants,
is not to be held liable for an injury caused to its passen-
ger solely by negligence on the part of another railway,
which, under statutory authority, uses its line. Thus, in
Taylor v. G. N. Ry., 1 the defendant having been pre-
vented from carrying the plaintiffs goods within a rea-
sonable time by an unavoidable obstruction on its line,
caused solely by the negligence of the Midland Ry.,
which had, under an Act of Parliament, running powers
over the defendant's line, it was held that the defendant
was not liable to the j)laintiff for damages caused by the
delay. And upon the same principle, in Wright v.
Midland Ry., 2 where the defendant had contracted to
carry the passenger from Leeds to Sheffield over their
own line, and a train of the L. & N. W. Ry., which
had statutory running powers over the Midland line,
having, without any fault upon the part of the defend-
ant, run into the defendant's train and injured the
plaintiff, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover, the ground of the decision being that the de-
fendant was not an insurer of the safety of its passen-
gers, but a contractor " that all persons connected with
the carrying, and with the means and the appliances of
1 L. R. 1 C. P. 385. 2 L. R. 8 Ex. 137.
LIABILITY FOR OTHER RAILWAYS. 141
the carrying, with the carriages, the road, the signalling
and otherwise shall use care and diligence, so that no
accident may happen, but they contract no further."
Where, however, the carrier, railway is in any respect
negligent, it is liable, although the injury was, in part,
caused by negligence on the part of a railway which ex-
ercises statutory running powers over its line. Thus,
in McElroy v. N. & L. R. R., 1 the plaintiff, a passen-
ger on the defendant's line, was injured by the negli-
gent displacement of a switch by a switch-tender, the
switch having been put in position, and the switch-
tender being appointed, paid, and controlled by the C.
R. R., which, without defendant's consent, had been
empowered by statute to enter upon and connect with
defendant's line ; and the defendant was held liable
upon the ground that the switch was a part of defend-
ant's line, and that " it was within the scope of their
duty to see that the switch was rightly constructed, at-
tended, and managed, before they were justified in car-
rying passengers over it."
VIII. THE LIABILITY OF A RAILWAY FOR THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF OTHER RAILWAYS USING ITS LINE BY CON-
TRACT.
A railway, which, by contract, voluntarily permits another railway, or
an individual, to run trains over its line, is liable to its passengers
for the negligence of that railway or individual.
139. On the other hand, where a railway has, by
contract, authorized another railway or an individual to
run trains over its line, it is liable to its passengers for
injuries caused by negligence on the part of that other
1 4 Cush. 400.
142 LIABILITY FOR OTHER RAILWAYS.
railway or person. 1 Upon the same principle, the rail-
way, in Speed v. A. & P. B,. R., 2 was held liable for the
negligence of a contractor to whom it had delegated its
charter duty of transporting freight.
1 I. C. R. R. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90; C. & St. P. R. R. v. McCarthy, 20 111.
385 ; O. & M. R. R. v. Dunbar, Id. 623; C. & R. I. R. R. v. Whipple, 22 Id.
105 ; Nelson v. V. & C. R. R., 26 Vt. 717 ; M. & A. R. R. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355.
s 71 Mo. 303, 2 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 77.
THE PERSONS TO WHOM LIABLE. 143
BOOK III.
THE PERSONS FOR INJURIES TO WHOM THE RAILWAY IS
LIABLE.
CHAPTER I.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY BE INJURED
IN THE COURSE OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS.
140. The persons who possibly may be injured in the
course of railway operations can be classified under the
following categories :
I. Persons who are rightfully upon highways adjoin-
ing or crossiug the railway's Hue or premises.
II. Persons who come upon the railway's line or
premises as mere licensees.
III. Trespassers upon the railway's line, premises, or
cars.
IV. Persons who, in the course of the performance
of a contract based upon a valuable consideration, come
upon the line, premises, or cars of the railway, including
herein passengers of the railway ; attendants of pas-
sengers; passengers of another railway, received for
transportation in the railway's cars; passengers of
another railway, whose cars are run over the line of
the railway ; passengers of another railway with whom
a station is jointly occupied ; servants of another rail-
way while upon the line or premises of the railway in
the performance of their duty to that other railway;
consignors, consignees, and their agents, personally as-
144 CLASSIFICATION.
sisting iii the reception, carriage, or delivery of their
freight ; persons entering under special contract upon
the railway's line or premises; post-office employes
carried under a contract between the railway and the
Post-Office Department, or under a statutory duty im-
posed upon the railway ; persons carried under contract
between the railway and a third party; servants of
express companies whose cars are run, or whose goods
are carried over the line ; and persons who are carried
on the line to sell refreshments, newspapers, etc., to
passengers.
V. The servants of the railway, including herein
such officers and employes of every grade as are engaged
in the operation of the line.
The relation between the railway and the persons in-
cluded in the first three categories is non-contractual,
and the relation between the railway and the persons
included in the last two categories is contractual.
NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY. 145
CHAPTER II.
THE GENERAL, PRINCIPLE DETERMINING THE LIABILITY OP
THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST
THREE CATEGORIES.
If the railway be operated without express statutory authority, it it
absolutely liable for all injuries done in the course of its operation ;
but if it be operated under express statutory authority, it is liable
only for negligence.
141. The operation of a railway, involving the rapid
movement of engines and cars by the use of steam as a
motive power, is a hazardous business, and, if not skill-
fully and carefully conducted, threatens danger to life
and limb and injury to property. Its conduct, in the
absence of express statutory authority for the use of its
dangerous appliances, falls within that rule of law which
has found its best expression in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1
and which holds him who keeps or uses anything essent-
ially dangerous, civiliter responsible for all the damage
which the thing causes, even though there be on his
part neither wilful wrongdoing nor negligence. 2 But,
as Cockburn, C. J., said in Vaughan v. T. V. Ry, 3 "when
the legislature has sanctioned and authorized the use of
a particular thing, and it is used for the purpose for
which it was authorized, and every precaution has been
observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the legisla-
ture carries with it this consequence, that, if damage
' L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
1 Jones v. F. Ry., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733 ; Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774,
L. R. 1 Ex. 265, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 ; Stiles v. N. Co., 33 L- J. N. S. 311 ; Oakea
v. Spanlding, 40 Vt. 347 ; C. & E. Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645.
3 5 H. & N. 685.
10
146 NON- CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY.
results from the use of sueli thing independently of
negligence, the party using it is not responsible." 1
142. Therefore, a railway, whose construction and
mode of operation, and whose use of steam as a motive
power has been duly sanctioned by legislative authority,
is, in case of injury caused to any individual in the
course of its operations, liable only for negligence upon
its part, unless it has by contract lawfully bound itself
to a higher or a lower degree of liability. The char-
acter of the duty which the railway owes to the several
classes of persons included in the first three categories
is dependent upon the more or less rightful presence of
the person in the place where he receives his injury ;
thus, the railway owes to travellers on the highway a
high degree of duty, for their presence on the highway
is rightful, while it owes to those who come on its
premises, as mere licensees, a less degree of duty, for
licensees are bound to take the premises as they find
them, and it owes to trespassers on its line or premises
no duty beyond that of abstaining from intentional in-
jury to them, for it is not bound to anticipate the pres-
ence of, and to guard against unintentional injury to,
trespassers.
1 Blyth v. The B. Water Works, 11 Ex. 781 ; Vaughan v. T. V. Ry., 5 H. &
N. 685 ; Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30, 24 E. C. L. ; M. N. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. &
S. 101; Henry v. P. & A. Bridge Co., 8 Id. 85; O'Connor v, Pittsburgh, 18
Penna. St. 187 ; N. Y. & E. R. R. v. Young, 33 Id. 175 ; C. & P. R. R. v. Speer,
56 Id. 325 ; W. B. Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 Id. 357 ; Struthers v. D., W. & P.
Ry., 87 Id. 282 ; Dunn v. B. Canal Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 244, 8 Id. 42 ; Brand v. H.
Ry., L. R. 1 Q. B. 130, 2 Id. 223, L. R. 4 II. L. 171 ; Broughton v. M., G. W.
Ry., 1 Ir. C. L. 169 ; Dixon v. M. Board of Works, 7 Q. B. D. 418 ; P., W. &
B. R. R. v. Stinger, 78 Penna. St. 219 ; F. & B. Turnpike Co. v. P. & T. R R.,
64 Id. 345 ; Wilds v. H. R. R. R., 29 N. Y. 315.
LIABILITY TO PERSONS OX HIGHWAYS. 147
CHAPTER III.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED
IN THE FIRST CATEGORY, THAT IS, PERSONS WHO ARE
RIGHTFULLY UPON HIGHWAYS ADJOINING OR CROSSING THE
RAILWAY'S LINE OR PREMISES.
I. The liability of the railway to travellers on the highway for traps
within its own premises which endanger the safety of the trav-
ellers on the highway.
II. The liability of the railway to travellers on the highway for its
negligent construction of, or failure to repair, its buildings, etc.
III. The liability of the railway for injuries caused to persons on the
highway by the negligent operation of its line.
IV. The liability of the railway for its negligent construction of, or
failure to repair, grade crossings.
V. The duty of the railway in the operation of its line at grade cross-
ings.
VI. Contributory negligence at grade crossings.
143. The first category includes those who are right-
fully upon highways adjoining or crossing the railway's
line or premises.
I. THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO TRAVELLERS
ON THE HIGHWAY FOR TRAPS WITHIN ITS OWN PREM-
ISES WHICH ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF THE TRAV-
ELLERS ON THE HIGHWAY.
The railway is liable for anything in the nature of a trap, which,
although within its own premises, is yet so near to the highway as to
endanger the safety of travellers on the highway.
144. A railway, like other owners and tenants of
real estate, is also to be held liable for anything in the
148 LIABILITY FOR LEAPS, ETC.
nature of a trap, though within its own premises, but
yet so near to the highway as to be dangerous to trav-
ellers on the highway. The obvious illustrations of this
rule are to be found in the cases of unprotected pits and
excavations dug within the railway's premises, but yet
so adjacent to the highway that passers on the highway
are likely, without fault on their part, to fall into them. 1
II. THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO TRAVELLERS
ON THE HIGHWAY FOR ITS NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION
OF, OR FAILURE TO REPAIR, ITS BUILDINGS, ETC.
The railway is liable for a negligent construction or maintenance of its
buildings, etc., causing injury to persons lawfully on the highivay.
145. Where the railway's line or premises abut upon
a public highway, the railway, like other owners or
occupants of real estate, is liable to persons lawfully
upon the highway for any injury caused by its negli-
gence in the original construction of, or in its failure to
maintain in repair, its line and premises. 2 This rule
1 Hadley v. Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P. 53 ; Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392, 67 E. C.
L. ; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447, 11 E. C. L. ; Coupland v. Hardinghani, 3
Camp. 398 ; Weller v. Dunk, 4 F. & F. 298 ; Proctor v. Harris, 4 C. & P. 337,
19 E. C. L. ; Bush v. Johnston, 23 Penna. St. 209 ; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Id.
463; Grier v. Sampson. 27 Id. 183; Myers v. Snyder, Brightly N. P. 489;
Howland v. Vincent, 10 Mete. 371.
2 Kearney v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 6 Id. 759 ; P. & O. Canal
Co. v. Graham, 63 Penna. St. 290 ; Oakland Ry. v. Fielding, 48 Id. 320 ; C. V.
R. R. v. Hughes, 11 Id. 140 ; Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. McDonough, 33 Id. 73 ;
Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314 ; Clark v. Chambers, 3 Id. 327, criticising
Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Ex. 239; Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722; 111-
idge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190, 24 E. C. L. : Goldthorpe v. Hardman, 13 M.
& W. 377 ; Drew v. New River Co., 6 C. & P. 754, 25 E. C. L.; Smith v. West
Derby Local Board, 3 C. P. D. 423 ; Horaan v. Stanley, 66 Penna. St. 464 ;
Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Id. 355 ; Rapho v. Moore, 68 Id. 404 ; Hayes v. Gal-
lagher, 72 Id. 136 ; Stewart v. Alcorn, 2 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 401;
Bobbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. N. S. 221, 109 E. C. L. ; Beatty v. C. I. Ry., 58 Iowa
242, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 210 ; Sweeny v. O. C. R. R., 10 Allen 368 ;
Stewart v. Penna. Co., Ind. , 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 679.
HIGHWAY BRIDGES. 149
has been applied in cases where the railway line is car-
ried over a highway by a bridge. 1 Thus, in Kearney v.
L. B. & S. C. By., 2 the defendant, whose line crossed a
highway by a bridge, was held liable to the plaintiff,
who, while walking on the highway under the bridge,
was injured by the falling of a brick from an abut-
ment, the falling of the brick being considered, in the
absence of explanation by the railway as to the cause
of its fall, to be evidence of negligence.
146. This rule has also been applied in cases where
a highway is carried over the railway line by a bridge. 3
Thus, in Manley v. St. H. By. & Canal Co., 4 the de-
fendant having, under statutory power, constructed its
canal, and, having cut a public highway and placed
there a swivel bridge, which, when moved for the pas-
sage of boats, left the highway unfenced, and, at night,
also unlighted, and the plaintiff's decedent, while walk-
ing on the highway at night, having stepped into the
canal and been drowned, the bridge being left open for
the passage of a boat, it was held that the defendant
was liable. So, in P. & O. Canal Co. v. Graham, 5 the
canal company being required by its charter to build
and keep in repair bridges, by which highways were
carried over the canal, and the plaintiff, while passing
over one of these bridges, having been injured by the
fall of the bridge resulting from negligence on the part
of the company, it was held that the company was
liable. So, in Hurst v. Taylor, 6 a contractor for the
construction of a railway line, who, in the course of his
1 Kearney v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 6 Id. 759 ; Cooke v. B. &
L. R. E., 133 Mass. 185.
J L. R. 5Q. B. 411, 6 Id. 759.
3 Manley v. St. H. Ry. & Canal Co., 2 II. & N. 840 ; P. & O. Canal Co. v.
Graham, 63 Penna. St. 290 ; Dickie v. B. & A. R. R., 131 Mass. 516, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 203; Titcomb v. F. R. R., 12 Allen 254.
4 2 H. & N. 840. 6 03 Penna. St. 290. 6 14 Q. E. D. 918.
130 FAILURE TO REPAIR HIGHWAYS.
work, had diverted a public footpath, and had left the
point of divergence from the old way unguarded, and
dangerous by reason of its leading on to the line, was
held liable in damages to one who, at night, following
the old way, was injured by falling over a bridge abut-
ment ; the ground of decision being that " a duty is cast
upon those, who, in the exercise of statutory powers,
divert a public footpath, to protect, by fencing or other-
wise, reasonably careful persons using the footpath
from injury through going astray at the point of diver-
sion."
147. This rule has also been applied in cases where
the railway line is constructed upon a highway which
it is the duty of the railway to keep in repair, and
which duty the railway has not performed. 1 Thus, in
Oakland Ry. v. Fielding, 2 the defendant, whose line
occupied a public highway, and who had negligently
permitted a hole in the highway to remain unrepaired,
was held liable to the plaintiff, who was injured by
falling into the hole. So, where the line is constructed
on a highway within the bounds of a municipality,
whose ordinances, made under a legislative grant of
authority, require the line to be kept clear of snow,
the railway is liable for injuries done by its failure to
remove the snow in a reasonable time. 3 So, where the
railway has permitted an engineer's stake to remain on
a highway, and the plaintiff has been injured by falling
over that stake while walking on the highway, the rail-
way is liable to him in damages therefor. 4 So, in Con-
1 Oakland Ry. v. Fielding, 48 Penna. St. 320 ; Rathburn v. B. & M. R. R.,
16 Neb. 441, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 137 ; Stieet R. R. v. Nolthenius, 40
Ohio St. 376, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 191 ; G. C. Ry. v. Nolan, 53 Tex. 139,
:: Am. &Eng. R. R. Cas. 387.
2 48 Penna. St. 320.
3 Bowen v. D. C. S. Ry., 54 Mich. 496, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 131.
1 Gudger v. W. N. C. R. R., 87 N. C. 325.
INJURIES TO PERSONS ON HIGHWAYS. 151
Ion v. E. R. K., 1 the railway was held liable to one
injured on a highway by the fall of a derrick used in
the construction of a culvert.
III. THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY FOR INJURIES
CAUSED TO PERSONS ON THE HIGHWAY BY THE
NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF ITS LINE.
The railway is liable to persons lawfully on the highway for injuries
caused by its negligent operation of its line.
148. The railway is also liable to persons who are
lawfully on the highway, if it so negligently transact its
business as to render movement on the highway danger-
ous to passers-by ; as where a passer on the highway is
injured by the negligent roping of a car into a coal
yard, 2 or by the obstruction of a highway by cars, per-
mitted to remain at rest, blocking up a crossing ; 3 or by
a hand car negligently left upon a highway bridge, 4 or by
the fright of horses caused by the unnecessary and
excessive whistling of an engine, 5 or by an unnecessary
and excessive escape of steam from an engine, 6 or
1 135 Mass. 195, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 99.
2 N. P. R. R. v. Robinson, 44 Penna. St. 175.
3 Kauch v. Lloyd, 31 Penna. St. 358; P. R. R. v. Kelly, Id. 372; P. R. R
v. Horst, 10 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 567; Corey v. N. P. Ry., 32 Minn
457, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 352 ; Jackson v. N. C. & St. L. R. R., 13 Lea
(Tenn.) 491, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 433; State v. M. & E. R. R., 25 N. J.
L. 437 ; Ogle v. P. W. & B. R. R., 3 Houston 267 ; Young v. D. G. H. & M. Ry.
Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 417.
* P. C. & St L. R. R. v. Spanier, 85 Ind. 165, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 453.
6 P. R. R. v. Barnett, 59 Penna. St. 259 ; P. &. R. R. R. v. Killips, 88 Id. 405 ;
P. W. & B. R. R. v. Stinger, 78 Jd. 219 ; G. R. R. v. Thomas, 68 Ga. 744 ; Gulp
v. A. & N. R. R., 17 Kans. 475 ; G. R. R. v. Newsome, 00 Ga. 492 ; C. B. & Q.
R. R. v. Dickson, 88 111. 431 ; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Dunn. 52 111. 451.
8 M. S. J. & A. Ry. v. Fullerton, 14 C. B. N. S. 54, 108 E. C L. ; L. & N. R.
R. v. Schmidt, 81 Ind. 264, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 248 ; Gibson v. St. L., K.
C. & N. Ry., 8 Mo. App. 488; Stott v. Q. T. Ry., 24 Up. Can. (C. P.) 347 ;
Borstu. L.S. &. M. S. Ry., 66 N. Y. 639; Billmannv. I. C.^L.R.R.,76 Ind.
100, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 41 ; T. W. &. W. Ry. v. Harmon, 47 111. 298;
Geveke v. 1. R. & I. Ry., Mich. , 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 551.
152 NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF LINE.
by the fright of a horse caused by a derrick negligently
permitted to remain projecting over a highway in such
a manner as would naturally frighten horses, 1 or by the
fright of a horse caused by a hand car left at a crossing, 2
or by the falling of burning coals from the fire box of
an engine of an elevated railway upon the back of -a
horse attached to a wagon on the street under the line,
and upon the hand of the driver of the wagon, thereby
causing the horse to run away and preventing the driver
from controlling him, the horse in running away strik-
the plaintiff and injuring him. 3 But the railway is not
liable for injuries resulting from the fright of horses on
a highway caused by the mere sight of the train, or by
the noises necessarily incident to its movement, 4 nor
where the fright is caused by the ordinary noise of a
train in passing over a bridge ; 5 nor is the railway liable
where the horses were frightened by an ordinary escape
of steam from a locomotive ; 6 and in Gilbert v. F. & P.
M. Ky. 7 it is ruled that the fact that a car was left at a
highway crossing, and that a horse was frightened, will
not render the railway liable, unless it be shown that
the necessary effect of leaving the car in that position
was to frighten horses who were not more than usually
nervous. 8 The railway owes to persons on the highway,
whose horses may be frightened by the sudden appearance
1 Jones v. H. R. R. 107 Mass. 261.
2 Vars v./G. T. Ry., 23 Up. Can. (C. P.) 143 ; Myers v. R. & D. R. R., 87 N.
C. 345, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 293 ; Bussian v. M. L. S. &. W. Ry., 56 Wise.
325, 10 Am. &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 716.
3 Lowery v. M. Ry., 99 N. Y. 158.
* Hahnu S. P. Ry., 51 Cal. 605; Flint v. N. & W. R. R., 110 Mass. 222;
Beatty v. C. I. Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 210 ; Whitney v.
M. C. R. R., 69 Me. 208 ; Burton v. P. W. & B. R. R., 4 Harrington 252.
5 Favor v. B. & L. R. R., 114 Mass. 350.
6 Drayton v. N. P. R. R., 10 W T eekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 55 ; Mille/ v
P. & R. R. R., 11 Id. 369; Whitney v. M. C. R. R., 69 Me. 208.
7 51 Mich. 488.
8 See also P. S. Ry. v. Taylor, 104 Penna. St. 306.
NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF LINE. 153
of a train, the duty of giving notice of the approach of
its trains j 1 and this rule is applicable where the high-
way is carried over the railway by a bridge. 2
149. The failure to give statutory signals of the ap-
proach of a train to a crossing is negligence as against
those whose horses are frightened by the appearance of
a train which has not given such signals. 3
150. The place where, or the circumstances under
which, the act is done may render that negligent which
otherwise would not be negligent : thus, in M. S. J. &
A. Ey. v. Fullarton, 4 the railway was held liable to a
driver waiting at a railway gate on a highway to cross
a level crossing for injuries to the horses and carriage
caused by his horses being frightened by an escape of
steam from an engine, resulting from the act of the en-
gine-driver in blowing off steam from the vent cocks of
the engine near the railway gate. Erie, C. J., said: "it
appears that the plaintiff's horses were using the road
as of right, and that the company were also as of right
exercising the power given them by their Act of cross-
ing the highway, and, if there had been nothing to show
that they were not exercising their rights in the ordi-
nary way and with due and reasonable care, the company
undoubtedly would not be liable for the misfortune
which has happened. But I am of opinion that the
evidence abundantly shows that the company, by their
servants, exercised their right of crossing the highway
in an inconvenient and improper manner. Whilst near
the gate which separates the railway from the road, the
driver blew off the steam from the mud cocks in front
1 Hudson v. L. & N. R. R., 14 Bush (Ky.) 303 ; S. & P. R. R. v. Strong, 61
Cal. 32G, 8 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 273.
1 P. R. R. v. Barnett, 59 Penna. St. 259
8 Norton v. E. R. R., 113 Mass. 366; Prescott v. Same, Id. 370; Pollock v.
E. R. R., 124 Mass. 158.
* 14 C. B. N. S. 54, 108 E. C. L.
154 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON HIGHWAYS.
of the engine, so that the plaintiff's horses became en-
veloped therein and frightened, and so became unman-
ageable. It is clear that the company have not used
their railway with that attention to the rights and safety
of the Queen's subjects which, under the circumstances,
they were bound to exercise." 1
151. It is contributory negligence to drive a horse
which is known to be afraid of locomotives on a high-
way adjoining a railway, 2 or to drive horses up to a
crossing as an express train is seen to be approaching; 3
or to lead a horse up to a railway crossing at which
there is standing an engine, from which steam is escap-
ing ; 4 or to drive a horse up to an obstruction at a cross-
ing which was known to have frightened other horses, 5
or to tie a team on a highway near a crossing ; 6 nor can
a traveller on the highway recover for injuries caused by
the fright of his horses when he has driven them into
an apparently dangerous passage between railway cars
obstructing the highway ; 7 but if the horse be known
not to be afraid of engines or cars, nor to be easily
frightened, it is not necessarily contributory negligence
to leave him untied and unattended near a railway
crossing. 8 In any such case the question of contributory
negligence is dependent wpon the more or less danger-
ous character of the point to which the horse is driven,
or where he is permitted to stand, and upon the driver's
knowledge of his horse's disposition. Of course, where
one drives or rides a horse up to a crossing upon the
1 See also Geveke v. G. R. & I. R. R., Mich. , 22 Am. & Eng. R. R'
Cas. 551.
1 P., W. & B. R. R. v. Stinger, 78 Penna. St. 219.
3 Rhoades v. C. & G. T. R. R., Mich. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 659.
* L. & N. R. R. v. Schmidt, 81 Ind. 2G4, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 248.
5 P. S. Ry. v. Taylor, 104 Penna. St. 306.
6 St. L. & St. F. Ry. v. Payne, 29 Kans. 166
7 Thompson v. C. L. & C. R. R., 54 Ind. 197
8 Southworth v. O. C. & N. R. R., 105 Mass. 342.
MAINTENANCE OF CEOSSINGS. 155
Invitation of a railway flagman or gate-keeper, and the
horse is then frightened by a sudden escape of steam or
by other noises made in the operation of the railway,
the railway is liable, for the invitation of the flagman or
gate-keeper is an assurance that the crossing may be
safely approached. 1
IV. MAINTENANCE OF GRADE CEOSSINGS.
The railway is liable for injuries caused by highway crossings negli-
gently constructed or maintained.
152. Where the railway line is carried across a pre-
existing highway, it is generally the duty of the rail-
vay to keep the crossing in repair; 2 and this duty
includes the repairing of embankments, which are a
necessary part of the crossing ; 3 but the railway is not
bound to improve the highway so as to put it in better
order than it was before the railway crossed it. 4 The
test is, whether or not the crossing, as constructed and
maintained by the railway, unnecessarily impairs the
usefulness of the highway and interferes with the safe
enjoyment of that highway by the public f if it does,
the railway has not performed its duty in the premises ;
if it does not, the railway has done all that it ought to
be expected to do. The railway is not to be relieved
from the performance of this duty, because a street rail-
1 Borst v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 66 N. Y. 639; P. R. R. v. Horst, 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 567.
2 Farley v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., 42 Iowa 234; Ferguson v. V. & T. R. R., 13
Nev. 184; P. F. W. & C. Ry. v. Dunn, 66 Penna. St. 280; P. & E. R. R. v.
Commonwealth, SO Ky. 147, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 318 ; People v. C. & A.
Ry., G7 111. 118 ; State v. D. & S. E. R. R., 36 Ohio St. 436, 5 Am. & Eng. R.
E. Cas. 312.
3 Farley v. C. R., I. & P. Ry., 42 Iowa 234.
* Beatty v. C. I. Ry., 53 Iowa 242, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 210.
5 People v. N. Y., N. II. & II. R. R., 89 N. Y. 266, 10 Am. & Eng. E. R.
Cas. 230.
156 MAINTENANCE OF CROSSINGS.
way whose line uses the highway and the crossing as a
part thereof, is under a like obligation to keep the cross-
ing in repair. 1 While, as a general rule, the railway is
not bound to keep in repair the crossings of highways,
which have not been legally laid out and opened, 2 yet,
when the railway has licensed a general and public use
of such a crossing, it is bound to maintain it in repair. 3
153. The railway is liable to passers on the highway
for a crossing so negligently constructed as to cause in-
juries to persons lawfully using it, 4 for instance, for a
defective planking of a crossing, 5 or for the mainte-
nance of its rails at such a height above the level of the
crossing as to endanger the safe transit of wagons, 6 or
for an obstruction of the crossing by a wreck, provided
more than a reasonably sufficient time for the removal
of the wreck has elapsed. 7
1 Masterson v. N. Y. C. & H. K R. E., 84 N. Y. 247, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 408.
2 F. & P. M. Ey. v. Willey, 47 Mich. 88, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 305 ; M.,
K & T. Ey. v. Long, 27 Kans. 684.
3 Kelly v. S. M. E. E., 28 Minn. 98, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 264.
4 Eoberts v. C. & N. W. Ey., 35 Wis. 679 ; I. & St. L. E. E. v. Stout, 53 Ind.
143 ; Judson v. N. Y. & N. H. E. E., 29 Conn. 434 ; Maltby v. C. & W. M. Ey.,
52 Mich. 108, 13 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 606 ; L., N. A. & C. E. E. v. Smith, 91
Ind. 119, 13 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 608.
5 P., F. W. & C. Ey. v. Dunn, 56 Penna. St. 280 ; Baughman v. S. & A. E. E.,
92 Id. 335 ; Mann v. C. V. E. E., 55 Vt. 484, 14 Am, & Eng. E. E. Cas. 620 ;
Kelly v. S. M. Ey., 28 Minn. 9S, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 264 ; O'Connor v.
B. & L. E. E., 135 Mass. 352, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 362 ; Penna. Co. v.
Boylan, 104 111. 595, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 734 ; Payne v. T. & B. E. E., 83 N
Y. 572, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 54 ; Wasmer v. D., L. & W. E. E., SO N. y!
212, 1 Am. & Eng. E.E. Cas. 122.
6 Oliver v. N. E. Ey., L. E. 9 Q. B. 409; M. & C. E. R. v. Hunter, 11 Wise.
160; Johnson v. St. P. & D. Ey., 31 Minn. 283, 15 Am. & Eng. E.E. Cas. 467.
7 P. S. Ey. v. Taylor, 104 Penna. St. 306 ; Paine v. G. T. Ey., 58 N. H.
611.
GRADE CROSSINGS. 157
Where the railway line is laid upon a hightvay, travellers on that high
way may rightfully cross the line at any point, and not merely at
the intersection of that highway with other highivays.
154. Where a highway is used as a part of a rail-
way line, travellers on the highway have a right to cross
the railway line at any point, and not merely at the in-
tersections of other highways, and the railway is liable
to one injured while crossing at a point other than the
intersection of another highway, if the railway was in
any respect negligent in the operation of its line j 1 and
under such circumstances the railway is bound to ob-
serve, at every point of its line on the highway, the
same precautions which it is bound to observe at an
ordinary highway crossing.
V. THE DUTY OF THE RAILWAY IN THE OPERATION OF
ITS LINE AT GRADE CROSSINGS
It is the duty of the railway to operate its line at grade crossings of
highways, with due care for the rights of travellers on the highway.
155. The crossing at grade of a highway by a rail-
way line is always objectionable. It would undoubtedly
have been wise in the interests of the public, and eco-
nomical in the interest of railways, if the law had re-
quired that whenever a railway line crossed a pre-exist-
ing highway, it should be the duty of the railway to
carry its line over or under the highway ; and when-
ever a newly laid out highway crossed a pre-existing
railway line, it should be the duty of the municipality,
borough, or county, as the case might be, to carry its
highway over or under the railway line.
156. Where a railway line crosses a highway on the
1 L., N. A. & C. R. R. v. Head, 80 Ind. 117, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 619 ;
Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R, 75 Mo. 595, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280 ;
Smedis v. B. & R. B. R. R., 88 N. Y. 13, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 445.
158 railway's duty at grade crossings.
level, the relative rights and obligations of the railway
and of travellers on the highway are reciprocal, but it is
the privilege of the railway that its trains shall have the
right of way, and that all persons on the highway shall
yield precedence to the trains. 1
157. It is the duty of the railway to use such reason-
able precautions as will prevent collisions at such cross-
ings, exercising to that end such care and skill as pru-
dent and discreet persons, having the management of
such a business, would use, under the circumstances, of
the particular crossing. Where the line crosses a high-
way in or in the neighborhood of a town, and the cross-
ing is not protected by a gate, or by the presence of a
watchman, it is the duty of the railway to so moderate
and control the speed of its trains that the sound of the
whistle or bell of the engine will be an effectual warn-
ing to persons on the highway ; 2 but no rate of speed,
however high, is negligence per se. z Nor is a railway
required to run its trains at such a moderate rate of speed
that they can be stopped within the distance in which
obstacles on the line can be discovered at night by the
headlight. 4 Green, J., said pertinently, in R. & C. R.
R. v. Ritchie: 5 " The very purpose of locomotion by
1 P. R. R. v. Goodman, 62 Penna. St. 329 ; C. I. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161 ;
Beisiegel v. N. Y. C. Ry., 40 N. Y. 9 ; Moore v. P. W. & B. R. R., 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 53 ; G. & C. R. R. R. v. Dill, 22 111. 264 ; T. & W. R. R.
v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185 ; Black v. B., C, R. & M. Ry., 38 Iowa 515.
1 C. I. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161 ; The State v. B. & O r R. R., 24 Md. 84 ;
Quimby v. V. C. Ry., 23 Vt. 387 ; Wilson v. Cunningham, 3 Cal. 241 ; P. R. R.
v. Long, 75 Penna. St. 257 ; Schultz v. P. R. R., 6 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 69 ; P. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Penna. St. 33 ; Penna. Co. v. James, 81$ Id.
194 ; P. R. R. v. Ackerman, 74 Id. 265 ; P. R. R. v. Coon, 17 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 137.
3 R. & C. R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Penna. St. 425 ; 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
267 ; Wallace v, St. L., L M. & S, Ry., 74 Mo. 594 ; Goodwin v. C, R. I. & P.
R. R., 75 Mo. 73, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 460 ; Powell v. M. P. Ry., 76 Mo.
80, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 467.
* L. & N. R. R. v. Milam, 10 Tenn. 223, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 507.
5 102 Penna. St. 425.
SPEED AT GRADE CROSSINGS. 159
steam upon railways is the accomplishment of a high
rate of speed in the movement of passengers and freight.
It is authorized by law, and a railroad company in pro-
pelling its trains at high speed along its tracks in the
open country, is simply engaged in the lawful exercise
of its franchise. If it is evidence of negligence that a
train is run at this rate of speed, it must be because
running at a less rate is a legal duty ; but there is no
such duty established either by statute or decisions.
While there may, of course, be circumstances which re-
quire a diminished speed, it is only the force of those
circumstances which creates such a duty." Whether
the fact that the train, a collision with which on a high-
way crossing has caused the injury to the plaintiff, has
approached the crossing at a rate of speed in excess of
that permitted by statute, is to be regarded as negli-
gence on the part of the railway, depends on the pur-
view of the particular statute.
158. If the crossing be a specially dangerous one, it
is negligence in the railway if its train approaches the
crossing at the rate permitted by statute, provided that
rate be in excess of that which a due regard to the
safety of the public requires, 1 and it is for the jury to
determine whether or not the rate of speed of the train
be negligent, with reference to the more or less danger-
ous character of the crossing. 2
1 Shaber v. St. P., M, & M. Ry., 28 Minn. 103, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
185.
3 Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 75 Mo. 595, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280 ;
Meyer v. M. P. R. R., 2 Neb. 319 ; Wilds v. H. R. R. R., 29 N. Y. 315 ; Lang-
hoff v. M. & P. du C. R. R., 19 Wise. 489 ; L. C. & L. R. R v. Goetz, 79 Ky.
442, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 627 ; Khinowski v. G. T. Ry., Mich. ,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 648 ; Massoth v. D. & H. C. Co., 64 N. Y. 531 ; T.
H. & I. R. R. v. Clark, 73 Ind. 168, 6 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 84 ; I. & V. R.
R. v. McLin, 82 Ind. 435, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 237 ; P., C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Martin, 82 Ind. 476, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 253 ; Salter v. M. & B. R. R. R.,
88 N. Y. 42, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 437.
1G0 STATUTORY SIGNALS.
159.' The effect of the railway's non-performance of the
duty of giving notice of the approach of its trains to a
grade crossing, when that duty is regulated by statute,
depends upon the terms of the particular statute, but it
may be said that in general statutory directions as to
giving notice of the approach of a train to a crossing
must be followed, and a failure to follow them is negli-
gence as to persons on the highway injured while cross-
ing the line. 1
160. It has been held that such regulations, being
primarily intended for the protection of persons on the
highway, the failure to give the notice thereby prescribed
is not negligence as to railway servants working on the
line f nor as to trespassers on the line, 3 nor as to per-
sons who, although on the highway, are not intending to
cross the line ; 4 nor as to passengers in trains, 5 nor as to
travellers approaching the line on a private way, 6 or on
a blind alley ; 7 nor as to travellers approaching the line
on a private way running through the railway's yard, 8
nor as to one who ties his team on the highway near a
1 A. & W. P. R. R. v. Wyly, 65 Ga. 120, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262; A.
& S. R. R. v. McElmuny, 24 Ga. 75 ; L. L. & G. R. R. v. Rice, 10 Kans. 426 ;
C. B. R. R. v. Phillippi, 20 Id. 12 ; M. P. R. R. v. Wilson, 28 Id. 639 ; Peart
v. G. T. Ry., 10 Ont. Ap. 191, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 299 ; Faber v. St. P.,
M. & M. Ry., 29 Minn. 465, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 277 ; W. R. R. v. Henks,
91 111. 406.
2 Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109 TJ. 8. 478.
3 Harty v. C. R. R., 42 N. Y. 468 ; O'DonnelU. P. & W. R. R., 6 R. I. 211 ;
Bell v. H. & St. J. Ry., 72 Mo. 50, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 580.
* Cordell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 64 N. Y. 535 ; Byrne v. Same, 94 Id. 12 ;
E. T. V. & Ga. R. R. v. Feathers. 10 Lea (Tenn.) 103, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 446.
5 A. G. S. Ry. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112; L. & N. R. R. v. McKenna, 7 Lea
(Tenn.) 313, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 114.
6 Johnson v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. , 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 623.
T Byrne v. N. Y. C & H. R. R. R., 94 N. Y. 12.
8 Bennett v. G. T. Ry., 3 Ont. C. P. D. 446, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 627 ;
Hodges v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 71 Mo. 50, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 190.
9 St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Payne, 29 Kans. 166, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 632.
STATUTORY SIGNALS. 101
161. On the other hand it has been held that the
railway's omission to give the statutory signals is negli-
gence as to persons whose horses, while on the highway,
are frightened by the approach of a train ;* and gener-
ally that the omission of such signals is negligence as to
all persons, who being lawfully at or near a crossing are
exposed to injury by reason of the failure to give such
signals. 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia has
gone so far, in one case, 3 as to hold that the omission of
such signals is negligence in the case of injury to a
horse which, having strayed upon the line, was run over
at a point beyond the crossing.
162. Probably the true doctrine is that the terms of
the particular statute must be first looked to in order to
determine the classes of persons for whose protection the
giving of the signals is prescribed, and that in subordi-
nation to the directions of the particular statute, the giv-
ing of such signals ought to be held to be intended for
the protection of all persons who, being rightfully upon
the highway, are injured by reason of the railway's non-
performance of the statutory duty.
163. Of course, the railway may excuse its non-per-
formance of the statutory duty by showing that the duty
was, on the particular occasion, omitted within the
bounds of a municipality whose ordinances lawfully en-
acted forbade the giving of signals within its limits. 4 .
The omission of statutory signals, obviously, is not neg-
ligence to persons whose injuries are not caused by such
1 Cosgrove v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 87 N. Y. 88, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
35 ; Rosenberger v. G. T. Ry., 8 Ont. Ap. 482, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 448 ;
y S. C. of Can. 311, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 8 ; Ransom v. C, St. P., M. & O.
Ry., 62 Wise. 178, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 16.
4 Wakefield v. C. & P. R. R., 37 Vt. 330 ; Hart v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 56
Iowa 166.
s W. & A. R. R. ?'. Jones, 65 Ga. 631, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 267.
* Penna. Co. v. Ilensil, 70 Ind. 569, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79.
11
102 SIGN-BOARDS, GATES, AND FLAGMEN.
omissions, as where a boy who sees an approaching train
attempts to pass in front of it, and catching his foot
under the rail is held and run over; 1 or where a man
sees the smoke of an engine, but heedlessly assumes
that it is moving from instead of approaching the
crossing. 2
164. There are some authorities for the proposition
that when the railway has followed the statutory direc-
tions as to giving signals, etc., it has discharged its whole
duty in the premises ; 3 but the sounder doctrine would
seem to be that compliance with such statutory regula-
tions does not necessarily relieve the railway from the
necessity of taking such additional precautions as are
essentia] to the safety of passers on the highway. 4
165. Even when there is no statutory requirement as
to notice of a train's approach to a crossing, a railway is
negligent if due notice be not given of the approach of
its trains to a level crossing, and it is for the jury to
determine what notice is reasonable, under the circum-
stances, of the particular crossing. 5
166. The same principles are applicable to the rail-
way's non-performance of a statutory duty of erecting sign-
1 Pakalinsky v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 82 N. Y. 424, 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 251 ; Qf. L., N. A. & C. R. R. v. Head, 80 Ind. 117, 4 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 619.
2 Purl v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 72 Mo. 168, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 27.
3 C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Dougherty, 110 111. 521, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 292 ;
C. &A. R. R. v. Robinson, 106 111. 142, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 620;
Beisiegel v. N. Y. C. Ry., 40 N. Y. 9 ; Grippen v. Same, Id. 34.
* Richardson v. N. Y. C. Ry., 45 N. Y. 846 ; Bradley v. B. & M. Ry., 2 Cush.
539 ; Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 92 N. Y. 289, 13 Am & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 615; Eaton v. F. R. R., 129 Mass 364, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 183.
5 Tolman v. S., B. & N. Y. R. R, 98 N. Y. 198 ; P. R. R. v. Ogier, 35 Penna.
St. 60 ; P. & T. R. R. v. Hagan, 47 Id. 244 ; Longenecker v. P. R. R., 105 Id.
328; Loucks v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 31 Minn. 526, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
305 ; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Dunn, 56 Penna. St. 280 ; Renwick v. N. Y. C. R.
R., 36 N. Y. 132 : O'Mara v. H. R. R. R., 38 N. Y. 445 ; Guggenheim v. L. S.
& M. S. Ry., Mich. , 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 546 ; Kelly v. St. P., M.
& M. Ry., 29 Minn. 1, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 93.
FLAGMEN AND GATES. 163
boards at a level crossing, 1 but the failure of the railway
to maintain sign-boards at a crossing is not negligence
as to persons who, in fact, know of the existence and
the location of the crossing. 2
167. There is no rule of law which requires railways,
when not so required by statute, to maintain gates at
all crossings, 3 nor flagmen at all crossings ; 4 but, if it
be proven that the crossing, at which occurred the
injury sued for, is of such a character that the posting
of a flagman was necessary to the safety of travellers on
the highway, and would have prevented the particular
injury, the jury may then find negligence on the part
of the railway in its failure to post a flagman there. 5
Where a railway does employ a flagman at a crossing,
his failure to perform the duties of his post is negli-
gence on the part of the railway. 6 And the withdrawal
of the flagman by the railway, without notice to the
public, is negligence on the part of the railway ; 7 but
whatever be the character of the crossing, the failure
to post a flagman is not negligence as to persons whose
injuries are not due to the absence of the flagman. 8
168. Where a railway has, in obedience to statutory
requirements, erected gates at a level crossing, the fact
1 Shaber v. St. P., M. & M. R. R., 28 Minn. 103, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 185.
2 Haas v. G. R. & I. R R., 47 Mich. 401, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 268.
3 Stubley v. L. & N. VV. Ry., L. R. 1 Ex. 13.
* Beisiegel v. N. Y. C. R. R., 40 N. Y. 9 ; M. C. R.R. v. Neubeur, 62 Md. 391,
19 Am. & Eng. R, R. Cas. 261 ; Foy v. P., W. & B. R. R, 47 Md. 76 ; P. R. R.
v. Matthews, 36 N. J. L. 531 ; McGrath v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 59 N. Y.
468, 63 Id. 522 ; Pakalinsky v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 82 N. Y. 424, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 251 ; Weber v. N. Y. C. R. R., 58 N. Y. 459.
6 Welsch v. H. & St. J. R. R, 72 Mo. 551, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 75 ;
Kinsey v. Crocker, 18 Wise. 74; K. P. Ry.r. Richardson, 25 Kans. 391, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 96 ; p]aton v. F. R. R., 129 Mass. 364, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 183.
6 Kessenger v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 56 N. Y. 543 ; Sweeney v. O. C. & N. R. R,
10 Allen (Mass ) 3n8 ; Dolan v. D. & H. C. Co., 71 N. Y. 285.
7 P. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Yundt, 78 Ind. 373, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 502.
8 Penna. Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79.
1G4 NEGLECT OF SELF-IMrOSED DUTY.
that the gates are open is an invitation to cross, and an
assurance that the line can be safely crossed j 1 and
when the railway's gate-keeper, flagman, or train hand
invites a traveller on the highway to cross the line,
the traveller is not bound to exercise the same degree
of care which he would be expected to exercise if no
such invitation were given ; 2 but such an invitation by
a servant of the railway will not excuse a failure by the
injured person to exercise any care for his own safety. 3
It is the duty of gatemen to close the gates when a
train approaches a crossing, and the railway is not liable
to a traveller on the highway who is injured while
attempting to drive across the line before a moving
train, by the wheel of his carriage being caught in the
closing gate. 4
169. It has been held that the failure of the railway
to perform a self-imposed duty is not negligence ; thus,
where a railway, at a level crossing for foot passengers,
had voluntarily erected swing gates, and usually locked
the gates when a train was approaching, the fact that
on a particular occasion the gates were not locked, was
held not to be such negligence as rendered the railway
liable for the death of a person who walked on the line
at the crossing and was run over. 5 On the other hand,
in P. & R. R. R. v. Killips, 6 a jury were permitted to
find a railway negligent in that, having voluntarily
maintained a watchman and gates at a crossing of its
line by a city street, the gates were open and no watch-
man in attendance at a time when the plaintiff's dece-
1 Stapley v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., L. R. 1 Ex. 21 ; Wanless v. N. E. Ry., L. R.
6 Q. B. 481 ; Sharp r. Glushing, 96 N. Y. 676, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 372.
' Lunt v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R. 1 Q. B. 277.
s P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Penna. St. 91, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 172.
* Peck v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 50 Conn. 379.
5 Skelton v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R. 2 C. P. 631 . See also Cliff v. M. Ry., L.
R. 5 Q. B. 258 ; McGrath v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 59 N. Y. 468, 63 Id. 522.
• 88 Penna. St. 413.
NEGLECT OF SELF-IMPOSED DUTY. 165
dent, driving a horse on the street, was killed by being
thrown from his carriage in consequence of his horse
being frightened by the sudden appearance of an
engine, and by its excessive whistling. 1 So, the rail-
way has been 'held liable, when, under circumstances
of danger, the invitation to cross was given by its ser-
vant, who, while employed to perform other duties at
the crossing, had, for several years, voluntarily assumed
the duty of warning persons not to cross the line when
trains were approaching. 2 Probably the right doctrine
is, that if the particular precaution, although self im-
posed by the railway, has been observed for so long a
time, that travellers on the highway have become accus-
tomed to rely on it as a means of protection to them,
then, and then only, its discontinuance ought to be
regarded as negligence on the part of the railway.
170. Where the surrounding circumstances render
the crossing specially dangerous to travellers on the
highway, as where the line is curved, or there are
obstructions to the view, it is the duty of the railway to
take precautions commensurate to the danger, and it is
for the jury to determine whether or not the absence of
any particular precaution is negligence. 3
171. It is a duty incumbent on the railway to cause
1 See, also, P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Yundt, 78 Ind. 373, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 502.
2 Peck v. M. C. R. R., Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 257.
3 James v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 2 C. P. 634, note; Bilbee v. L. B. & S. C. Ry.,
18 C. B. N. S. 584, 114 E. C. L. ; Ford v. L. & S. W. Ry., 2 F. & F. 730 ; Stub-
ley v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R. 1 Ex. 13 ; Stapley v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., Id. 21 ;
Cliff tr. M. Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B. 258 ; C. R. R. v. Feller, 84 Penna. St. 226; C. I.
Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161 ; Mackay v. N. Y. C. R. R., 35 N. Y. 75; Richard-
son v. Same, 45 Id. 846; P. R. R. v. Matthews, 36 N. J. L. 531 ; Funston v. C,
R. I. & P. Ry., 61 Iowa 452, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 640 ; Nehrbas v. C. P. R.
K., 62 Gal. 320, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 370 ; Thomas v. D L. & W. R. R., 19
Hlatoliford 533; Roberts v. C. & N. W. I.'y., 35 Wise. 679; Eilert v. G. B.
& M. R. R., 48 Wise. 606; Dimick v. C. & N. W. Ry., 80 111. 338; P. P. & J.
R. R. v. Siltman, 88 111. 529.
106 FLYING SWITCHES, ETC.
its trains to approach and pass the crossing with care,
The performance of this duty requires, as before stated,
notice to travellers on the highway of the existence and.
location of the crossing, and of the trains' approach
thereto, and such a rate of speed of the train as,
under the conditions of the crossing, is prudent with
regard to travellers on the highway. The performance
of this duty also requires a careful operation of the line
in other respects: thus, trains should not pass each
other at speed on the crossing j 1 extraordinary precau-
tions should be taken if a train or an engine is to be
backed over a crossing ; 2 and especially must the
greatest care be observed, if cars are to be kicked, or
sent on a flying switch over a crossing f but the back-
ing of a train or engine over a. crossing, or the passing
of a crossing by cars on a flying switch, cannot properly
be said to be negligent, if precautions commensurate
with the danger are observed by the railway. 4
172. It is the duty of the railway to adequately light
its engines and cars at night, that its servants thereon
may be enabled to see obstructions, animate and inani-
1 West v. N. J. R. R., 3 Vroom 91.
2 Hutchinson v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn. 398, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 280 ; Maginnis v. N. Y. C. R. R., 52 N. Y. 215 ; Kissinger v. N. Y. & H.
R. R., 56 N. Y. 538 ; S. & M. R. R. v. Shearer, 58 Ala. 672 ; Johnson v. St. P.
& I). By , 31 Minn. 283, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas 407; Levoy v. M. Ry., 3
Ont. 623, 15 Am. & Eng. It. R. Cas. 478 ; Howard v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32
Minn. 21 1, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 283.
3 Troutman v. P. & R. R. R., 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 455; Kay
v. P. R. R., 65 Penna. St. 269 ; Ferguson v. W. C. Ry., 63 Wise. 145, 19 Am.
A: Eng. R. R. Cas. 285; Howard v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn. 214, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 283 ; Butler v. M. & St. P. Ry., 28 Wise. 487 ; Brown v. N.
Y. C. R. R., 32 N. Y. 600 ; P. R. R. v. State to use of McGirr, 61 Md. 108, 19
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 326 ; I. C. R. R. v. Bachas, 55 111. 379 ; C, R. I. & P.
R. R. v. Dignan, 56 111. 487 ; Stillwell v. C. R. R., 34 N. Y. 29; C. & A. R.R.
r. Garvey, 58 111.83.
4 Bohan v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 58 Wise. 30, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 374;
01 Wise. 391, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 276 ; Hogan v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 59
Wise. 139, 15 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 439.
LIGHTING ENGINES, ETC., AT NIGHT. 167
mate, upon the line at as great a distance as possible,
by the use of the best appliances in practical use j 1 but
the railway is not to be held liable for injuries that
result, without negligence on its part, from the light
becoming obscured by the operation of natural causes,
as where the headlight of a locomotive became so ob-
scured by a driving mist that an obstruction on the
line could not be seen by the engine-driver. 2 It is also
the duty of the railway to have its trains adequately
equipped with brakes, and manned by a sufficient num-
ber of hands to promptly control the movement of the
train, thus, it has been held to be negligence in the rail-
way to permit an engine to pass a crossing without an
eno-ine-driver and under the sole control of a fireman. 3
However questionable may be that decision, there is no
doubt that the servants on the train must be vigilant
and attentive to their duties when the train approaches
a crossing ; 4 and the presence of strangers in the cab of
the engine as it approaches a crossing, may, properly,
be held to be negligence on the part of the railway, on
the ground that their presence diverts the attention of
the engine-driver and fireman, when their attention
should be concentrated on the performance of their
duties. 5
1 N. A C. R. R. v. Smith, 6 Hiesk. 174; Smedis v. B. & R. B. R. R., 88 N.
Y. 13, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 445.
2 L. & N. R. R. v. Melton, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 262.
3 O'Marra v. H. R. R. R., 38 N. Y. 445.
* St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Matthias, 50 Ind. 65 ; Frick v. St. L., K. C.& N. Ry.,
75 Mo. 595, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280.
6 Marcott v. M., H. & O. Ry., 47 Mich. 1, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 548.
108 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AT CROSSINGS.
VI. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AT GRADE CROSSINGS.
It is the duty of travellers on the highivay, when approaching a grade
crossing, to exercise a prudent care for their own safety, and to that
end to look and listen, in order to satisfy themselves that it is safe to
cross the line.
173. It is the duty of travellers upon the highway,
whether on foot, or mounted, or in wagons, to exercise
a care for their own safety in approaching the line, and
especially to look and listen before attempting to cross
the line. 1 This rule is also applicable to horse cars
crossing the lines of steam railways, and it is the duty
of the drivers of such cars to look and listen before
crossing the line. 2 But where the testimony as to the
plaintiff's failure to look and listen, or, in other re-
spects, to exercise care, is contradictory, the question
is, of course, for the jury. 3
174. There are many authorities for the proposition,
that where the plaintiff's case shows that the person in-
jured did not look and listen before crossing the line,
it is the duty of the judge to nonsuit the plaintiff or to
direct a verdict for the defendant. 4 Other authorities
1 N. P. R. R. v. Heilraan, 49 Penna. St. 60 ; C, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Hous-
ton, 95 U. S. 697 ; State v. M. C R. R., 76 Me. 357, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
312; P. R. R. v. State, to use of McGirr, 61 Md. 108, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 326 ; Parker v. W. & W. R. R., 86 N. C. 221, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
420 ; Butterfield v. W. R. R., 10 Allen 532 ; Haslan v. M. & E. R. R., 4 Vroom
147 ; Peck v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 50 Conn. 379, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 633 ; G. H. & S. A. Ry. v. Bracken, 57 Tex. 71, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
691 ; Pence v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 63 Iowa 746, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 366;
Kelley v. H. & St. J. R. R., 75 Mo. 13S, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638.
2 P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Penna. St. 91, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 172;
Mantel v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., M., St. Ry. v. Same, 33 Minn. 62, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 362.
1 Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. Ill ; H. R. R. v.
Coyle, 55 Penna. St. 396 ; Hoye v. C. & N. W Ry., 62 Wise. 666, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 347 ; P. R. R. v. Bock, 93 Penna. St. 427, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 20.
4 P. R. R. v. Beale, 73 Penna. St. 504 ; C. R. R. v. Feller, 84 Id. 226 ;
Schultz v. P. R. R., 6 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 69 ; Gerety v. P., W. &
DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN. 169
hold that it is for the jury to decide whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff's failure to look and listen
was such contributory negligence as should defeat his
recovery. 1 It is held, in another line of authorities,
that only where the plaintiff's case discloses a failure to
look and listen before crossing, or otherwise to exercise
care for his own safety, when the view of the line was
unobstructed, and there were no circumstances to per-
turb his judgment or impede his action, is the court
B. R. E., 81 Penna. St. 274 ; C. R. I. & P. R. R. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697 ; Scho-
field v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 114 U. S. 615 ; Carroll v. P. R. R., 12 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 348 ; M. C. R. R. v. Neubeur, 62 Md. 391, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 261 ; R. & C. R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Penna. St. 405, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
267 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Hobbs, Md. ,19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 337 ; U. P.
Ry. v. Adams, 33 Kans. 427, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 376 ; Moore v. P., W. &
B. R. R., 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 53 ; Tully v. F. R. R., 134 Mass. 499,
14 Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 682 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 ; Mah-
len v. L. S. &. M. S. Ry., 49 Mich. 585, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 687 ; Powell
v. M. P. Ry., 76 Mo. 80, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 467 ; Wright v. B. & M. R.
R., 129 Mass. 440, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 121 ; Haas v. G. R. & I. R. R, 47
Mich. 401, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 268 ; Henze v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 71
Mo. 636, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 212 ; P. R. R. v. Righter, 42 N. J. 180, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 220 ; Turner v. H. & St. J. R. R., 74 Mo. 603, 6 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 38.
1 C. I. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161 ; Hutchinson v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn.
398, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280 ; Tyler v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 137 Mass.
238, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 297 ; Bower v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 61 Wise.
457, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 301 ; Loucks v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 31 Minn.
526, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 305 ; Shaber v. St. P., M. & M. R. R., 28 Minn.
103, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 185 ; Funston v. O, R. I. & P. Ry., 61 Iowa 452,
14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 640 ; Spencer v. I. C. R. R., 29 Iowa 55 ; Davis v.
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 47 N. Y. 400 ; Renwick v. N. Y. C. R. R., 36 N. Y.
132 ; Duffy v. C. & N. W. Ry., 32 Wise. 269 ; Eagan v. F. R. R., 101 Mass. 315 ;
T. H. & I. R. R. v. Clark, 73 Ind. 168, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 84 ; P. C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Martin, 82 Ind. 476, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 253 ; Kelly v. St.
P., M. & M. Ry., 29 Minn. 1, 6 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 93 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v.
Dimick, 96 111. 42, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 201 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Miller,
46 Mich. 532, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 89 ; Plummer v. E. R. R., 73 Me. 591,
6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 165 ; Moore v. C. R. R.,,47 Iowa 688j Laverenz v.C,
R. I. & P. Ry.,,56 Iowa 689, 6 Am. & Eng. R. IL Cas. 274 ; Bonnell v. D., L.
& W. R. R., 39~N. "j".L.'~I59; Randall v. C. R. R. R., 132 Mass. 269 ; Stackus
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R, 79 N. Y.464; Kellogg v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R.,
79 N. Y. 72 ; Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616 ; Greany -. L. I. R. R., 101 N. Y.
419.
170 DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN.
authorized in entering a nonsuit, or directing a verdict;
but that, under other circumstances, it is for the jury to
determine the measure of the duty of the person in-
jured. 1
175. There does not, however, seem to be any sound
reason why any different rule should be enforced by the
courts in cases of crossing accidents from that which
prevails in all other actions grounded upon negligence,
and in which contributory negligence is available as a
defence. There is, in every case, a preliminary question
for the judge to determine, and that is, whether, assum-
ing the truth of the testimony and all the inferences
that legitimately can be drawn from it, the jury would,
as reasonable men, be justified in finding a verdict in
favour of the party on whom the burden of proof rests.
The application of that rule of procedure would leave
to the jury the question of the effect of the failure of
the injured person to look and listen, except in those
cases where that failure, being proven or conceded as a
fact by the plaintiff's case, was so obviously a contri-
butory cause of the plaintiff's injury, and so incontro-
vertibly negligent that a jury of reasonable men would
not be justified in finding a verdict for the plaintiff.
The hard and fast rule, first enunciated in the Penn-
sylvania cases, that under all circumstances the person
injured must " stop, look, and listen " before crossing a
railway line, has no statutory basis, and is really a ju-
dicial usurpation of the function of the jury, for there
are conceivable cases in which the person injured might
justifiably go upon the railway's line without pausing to
" stop, look, and listen," as, for instance, when a flag-
1 Laverenz v. O, K. I. & P. Ey., 56 Iowa 689, 6 Am. & Eng. B. R. Cas. 274 ;
Carlin v. C., R. I. & P. Ry., 37 Iowa 316 ; Benton v. C. R. R., 42 Iowa 192;
Artz v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 34 Iowa 153 ; Connelly v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
88 N. Y. 346, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 459 ; N. C. Ry. v. State, to use of
Burns, 54 Md. 113, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 66.
DUTY OF INCREASED CAKE. 171
«
man invites him to cross, or when a gate protecting the
crossing stands open, or when the view of the line is so
obstructed that nothing can be seen, and a storm of
such severity is raging that no sounds incident to the
movement of trains could possibly be heard. The
Pennsylvania rule also goes further than that in most
other jurisdictions, in that it requires the person injured
not only to "look and listen," but also to "stop;" yet,
in most cases, one who approaches the crossing of a rail-
way line can effectually care for his safety by looking
and listening, without stopping.
176. There is, of course, no doubt that he is con-
tributorily negligent who attempts to cross a railway
when he sees or hears that a train is moving towards
the crossing. 1
177. Where the view of the line from the highway
is obstructed, or the crossing is in other respects spe-
cially dangerous, it is the duty of the traveller to exercise
a higher degree of care, and if he cannot, by looking
and listening, satisfy himself that it is prudent to cross
the line, he must stop, 2 or he must adopt such other pre-
cautions as ought to be taken under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case ; thus, where the view of the line
is obstructed it may be the duty of a traveller in a
.wagon to get out and lead his horse up to and over the
crossing; 3 yet, in P. R. R v. Ackerman, 4 a traveller
before sunrise on a foggy morning having approached
the line at a level crossing, there being snow on the line
which deadened the sound of the train, stopped his
wagon about ten steps from the line, where his view was
1 Grows v. M. C. R. R., 67 Me. 100 ; 0., R. I. & P. Ry. v. Bell, 70 111. 102 ;
Got hard v. A. G. S. R. R, G7 Ala. 114.
a Schsefert v C, M. & St. P. Ry., 62 Iowa 624, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
690; Haas v. G., R- & I. Ry., 47 Mich. 401, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 268;
Cordell v N. Y. C & H. R. R. R. 64 N. Y. 535, 70 Id. 119.
3 P. R. R. v. Beale, 73 Penna. St. 504. * 74 Penna. St. 265.
172 EXCUSES FOR CARELESSNESS.
obstructed by cars on a siding, and after looking and
listening, without seeing or hearing any train, drove
upon the line and was struck by a train which had given
no warning of its approach, and it was held that the
traveller had performed his whole duty in the premises.
Where one track of a double tracked line is obstructed
at a crossing by either a stationary or a moving train, it
is contributory negligence for a passenger to go upon the
line without looking up and down the other line of
rails. 1
178. The rule under consideration has no application
to cases where the plaintiff's failure to stop, look, and
listen was not a proximate cause of the injury, as where
the plaintiff was injured because a cork of his horse's
shoe was caught and held in a crevice between the planks
on the crossing. 2
179. The non-performance by the person injured of
the duty of approaching the crossing with care will not
be excused by the fact that the train, by collision with
which he was injured, was a special train ; 3 nor that the
train was behind time ; 4 nor that tliere was a failure on
the part of the railway to give notice of the approach of
the train to the crossing ; 5 nor that the train was run-
1 Stapley v. L., B. & S. C. Ry., L. R. 1 Ex. 21 ; Skelton v. L. & N. W. Ry.,
L. R. 2 C. P. 361 ; Carroll v. P. R. R, 12 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 348 ;
Pence v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 63 Iowa 746, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 366.
* Baughman v. S. & A. R. R., 92 Penna. St. 335.
3 Schofield v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 114 U. S. 615, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
353.
* Salter v. U. & B. R. R. R., 75 N. Y. 273 ; The State v. P., W. & B. R. R.,
47 Md. 76.
5 Davey v. L. & S. W. Ry., 11 Q. B. D. 213, 12 Id. 73 ; C, R. I. & P. R. R.
v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697 ; I. & G. N. Ry. v. Jordan, Tex. , 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 301 ; C. & R. I. R. R. v. McKean, 40 III. 218 ; Kelley v. H. & St. J.
R. R, 75 Mo. 138, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638 ; W., St. L. & P. Ry. v.
Wallace, 110 111. 114, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 359; U. P. Ry. v. Adams, 33
Kans. 427, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 376 ; Henze v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 71
Mo. 636, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 212 ; P. R. R. v. Righter, 42 N. J. 180, 2
EXCUSES FOE, CARELESSNESS. 173
ning at a rate of speed in excess of that permitted by a
municipal ordinance; 1 nor that an engine at night had
a train hand's lantern hung in front of it instead of an
ordinary headlight. 2
180. It may, however, not unreasonably be considered
that the railway's non-performance of its duty in this
respect ought to have the effect of relieving the plaintiff
of the necessity of exercising as high a degree of care as
would have been incumbent on him if the railway had
performed its duty in the premises; 3 thus, it has been
held that, where in the making of a flying switch over
a highway crossing, the engine has passed the crossing,
a person on the highway is not bound to anticipate the
coming of the detached cars, and it is for the jury to
determine whether he is negligent in going upon the
line without looking and listening. 4 It has also been
held that the failure of the servants of the railway to
give due notice of the approach of a train to a station
or a level crossing (as, for instance, by neglecting to
whistle or to sound the engine bell) may put to sleep
the vigilance of a traveller approaching the station or
the crossing, and may relieve him of the necessity of
stopping to look and listen before going upon the line; 5
and in D., W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, 6 it was held that
the neglect of the driver of a lighted express train in
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 220; Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616, 6 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. Ill ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Sweeney, 52 111. 325; Rothe v. M. & St. P.
Ry., 21 Wise. 256.
1 Kelley v. H. & St. J. R. R., 75 Mo. 138, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638.
* Mahlen v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 49 Mich. 585, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 687.
3 W., St. L. & P. Ry. v. Wallace, 110 111. 114, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
359 ; Gaynor v. O. C. & N. Ry., 100 Mass. 208 ; Chaffee v. L. R. R., 104 Id.
108 ; Copley v. N. H. & N. Co., 136 Id. 6, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 373 ;
Ernst v. H. R. R., 39 N. Y. 61.
4 Butler v. M. & St. P. Ry., 28 Wise. 487 ; Ferguson v. W. C. Ry., 63 Wise.
145, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 285.
5 P. R. R. v. Ogier, 35 Penna. St. 60 ; P. & T. R. R. v. Hagan, 47 Id. 244.
«3 App. Cas. 1155.
174 PRESUMPTION AS TO CARE.
not whistling when approaching a station at night was
causa causans of injury to a person who, having crossed
behind a stationary train, had come on the line without
looking and been run over.
181. Even if the person injured has been contributorily
negligent in heedlessly going upon the line, the railway
will nevertheless be liable to him, under the rule in
Davies v. Mann, if the railway servants, having discov-
ered his perilous situation in time to stop the train
before striking him, negligently fail to stop it. 1
182. It is held in some jurisdictions, that, in the ab-
sence of proof, the presumption is that the person in-
jured did look and listen, or in other words, that he was
not contributorily negligent, 2 but this presumption is re-
butted when testimony to the contrary has been adduced
on the part of the railway, and in such a case the jury
should be directed that if they believe that testimony,
they should find for the railway. 3 In other jurisdictions
it is held that where it is proven that the decedent,
being possessed of ordinary faculties and intelligence, was
struck at a level crossing by a moving and lighted train, the
presumption is that he was contributorily negligent in
not looking and listening, for if he had looked and
listened he must have seen the train, and he would not
have been struck. 4 Of course this last-mentioned pre-
sumption has no application to a case where, if the per-
son injured had looked and listened, he could not in all
probability have seen or heard any warning of danger,
1 Kean v. B. & O. R. R., 61 Md. 154, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 321 ; Strong
v. P. R. R., 61 Cal. 326, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 273 ; Kelley v. H. & St. J.
R. R., 75 Mo. 138, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638.
* C. V. R. R. v. Hall, 61 Penna. St. 361 ; C. & P. R. R. v. Rowan, 66 Id. 393 ;
P. R. R. v. Weber, 76 Id. 157 ; Weiss v. P. R. R., 79 Id. 387, 87 Id. 447 ; P. R.
R. v. Fortney, 90 Id. 323; Schum v. P. R. R, 107 Id. 8.
8 R. & C. R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Penna. St. 425.
* Tolman v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R, 98 N. Y. 198 ; Chase v. M. C. R. R., 77
Me, 62, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 356.
PRESUMPTION AS TO CARE. 176
as where a traveller was run over at a double-track
level crossing at night by a train, which was running
down grade with steam shut off, without a headlight,
and not sounding signals, while another train was ap-
proaching the crossing on the other track, with head-
light lit and sounding signals. 1
183. As between these conflicting presumptions, the
balance of sound reason seems to preponderate in favour
of the presumption that the person injured was negli-
gent if he does not prove that he was careful, for, if
the experience of mankind proves anything, it does
abundantly prove that men, women, and children are,
especially in this country, habitually reckless in ap-
proaching a railway line. Railway lines are here so
rarely fenced, so little guarded, so easily approached,
and so universally used as footwalks at all places save
in the neighborhood of large cities, and grade crossings
are unfortunately so much the rule and not the excep-
tion, that familiarity breeds contempt, and people ap-
proach and cross the line without realizing the danger
which they incur. Every man who drives or walks
about the country, in his own experience much more
frequently observes instances of carelessness than of
carefulness in the approach of people to railway lines.
Mr. Beach puts this view forcibly in his work on "Con-
tributory Negligence."
1 Smedis v. B. & R. B. R. R., 88 N. Y. 13, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 445-
LIABILITY TO LICENSEES.
CHAPTER IV.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED
IN THE SECOND CATEGORY, THAT IS, LICENSEES.
I. The liability for injuries resulting from negligence in the construction
or in the failure to repair the railway's premises.
II. The liability for the negligent operation of the line.
III. The effect of notice not to trespass.
184. The second category includes persons who come
upon the railway's line or premises as mere licensees,
that is, persons who, being neither passengers, servants,
nor trespassers, and not standing in any contractual re-
lation to the railway, are permitted by the railway to
come upon its premises for their own interest, conve-
nience, or gratification.
I. THE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEG-
LIGENCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF, OR IN THE FAIL-
URE TO REPAIR, THE RAILWAY'S PREMISES.
The railway is not liable to licensees for injuries resulting from the
condition of its premises or caused by its failure to maintain those
premises in repair, but it is liable to licensees for injuries caused by
negligence in the operation of its line.
185. As Martin, B., said in Bolch v. Smith, 1 " permis-
sion involves leave and license, but it gives no right." A
railway, like other owners of real estate, is, therefore,
not liable to mere licensees if its premises be out of repair,
1 7 H. & N. 736.
PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE. 177
provided there be no such concealed danger as can be
considered a trap for the unwary. 1
186. Under this general rule railways have been held
not to be liable to visitors for the sufficiency and safety
of their station buildings f thus in Lary v. C, C, C. & I.
R. R., 3 the railway was held not to be liable to one who,
having taken refuge from a storm in a dilapidated build-
ing which had formerly been used as a freight house,
but having been for some time unused had not been
maintained in a condition of repair, was injured by the
falling of its roof; so, in Gillis v. P. R. R., 4 the plain-
tiff sued to recover for injuries caused by the breaking
down of the defendant's platform at a station under the
pressure of a crowd of sightseers, the plaintiff having
gone to the station to see a train carrying the President
of the United States pass the station. At the trial the
court directed a verdict for the defendant, and judg-
ment thereon was affirmed in error upon the ground
that the plaintiff having gone to the defendant's station
for no purpose of business, but for his personal gratifica-
tion, could not maintain the action ; so, in B. & O. R.
R. v. Schwindling, 5 the plaintiff, an infant of five years
of age, loitering upon the platform of defendant's station,
was struck by a passing train and injured, and it was
held that he was not entitled to recover, for the defend-
ant owed him no duty; so, in O. & R. V. R. R. v.
1 Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 374; Colli* v. Seldon, L. R. 3. Id. 495;
Southcotev Stanley 1 II. & N. 246; Wilkinson v. Fairrie, 1 II. &. C. 633 ;
Ivay v. Hedges, 9 Q. B. D. 80 ; Sutton v. N. Y. C. R. R . 66 N. Y. 243 ; Nichol-
son v. Erie By., 41 Id. 525; Batchelor v. Fortescue, 11 Q. B. D. 474; Maenner
t;. Carroll, 46 Md. 212; Vanderbeck v. Hendry, 34 N. J. Law 472; Severy v.
Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306; Latmorev. C. P. I. Co., 101 N. Y. 391.
* I. C. R. R. v. Godfrey, 71 111. 500 ; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Bingham, 29
Ohio St. 364 ; Lary v. G, C, C. & I. R. R., 78 Ind. 323, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
498.
s 78 Ind. 323. 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 498.
* 59 Penna. St. 139.
s 12 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 349.
12
178 ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE.
Martin, 1 the railway was held not to be liable to a mere
licensee, who, while driving over the railway's premises
was injured by falling into an unguarded excavation;
so, in Nicholson v. E. Ry., 2 and in Sutton v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. R., 3 the railway was held not to be liable
to licensees for a failure to set the brakes on cars stored
on a siding, or otherwise block them, to prevent their
movement by force of the wind, or by gravity.
II. THE LIABILITY FOE THE NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF
THE LINE.
187. While licensees must take the railway's premises
as they find them, and, therefore, cannot hold the rail-
way liable for a failure of duty in not maintaining its
premises in a condition of sound repair, yet the railway
is bound as to such licensees to exercise ordinary care
in the conduct of its business on the premises upon which
it permits the licensees to come, and it is liable to them
for injuries done to them by its want of such care. This
distinction between what may be called active and pas-
sive negligence is well illustrated by the judgments of
the Queen's Bench in Gallagher v. Humphrey, 4 where
a warehouse owner was held liable to a licensee for in-
juries caused by the negligence of a servant in his lower-
ing of a barrel from an upper story of the warehouse,
Cockburn, C. J., puts the distinction thus : " I quite
agree that a person, who merely gives permission to pass
and repass along his close, is not bound to do more than
to allow the enjoyment of such permissive right under
the circumstances in which the way exists, that he is not
bound, for instance, if the way passes along the side of
a dangerous ditch, or along the edge of a precipice, to
1 14 Neb. 295, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 236. J 41 N. Y. 525.
» 66 N. Y. 213. 4 6L.T. N. S. 684.
ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE. 179
fence off the ditch or precipice. The grantee must use
the premises as the thing exists. It is a different thing,
however, where negligence on the part of the person
thus having granted the permission is superadded. It
cannot be that, having granted permission to use the way
subject to existing dangers, he is to be allowed to do any-
further act to endanger the safety of the person using
the way." In the same case, Wightman, J., said : " it
appears to me that such permission as is here alleged
may be subject to the qualification that the person giv-
ing it shall not be liable for injuries to persons using the
way arising from the ordinary state of things, or of the
ordinary nature of the business carried on, but it is dis-
tinguishable from the case of injuries wholly arising
from the negligence of that person's servants."
188. Upon this principle a railway has been held
liable to licensees for injuries caused by the movement
of trains by a flying switch. 1 So also, a railway has
been held to be liable in damages for its negligence in
leaving unattended the boiler of a steam pile driver,
which exploded and injured one who* was passing over
a footway which, without objection from the railway,
had been, for many years, used by the public. 2 It
may be therefore stated as a general rule, that where a
railway permits persons to cross its lines or premises,
it is bound, as to those persons, to exercise care in the
operation of its line, and it cannot treat them as tres-
passers. 3 It is, of course, for the jury to decide, whether
1 Kay v. P. R. K., 65 Penna. St. 269 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Troutman, 11 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 455.
2 Davis v. C. & N. W. Ry., 58 Wise. 646, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 424.
8 Davis v. C. & N. W. Ry., 58 Wise. 646, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 424 ;
Townley v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 53 Wise. 626, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 562 ;
Murphy v. B. & A. R. R., 133 Mass. 121 ; Barrett v. M. Ry., 1 F. & F. 361 ;
Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 92 N. Y. 289, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 615 j
Goodfellow v. B., H. & E. R. R, 106 Mass. 461.
180 NOTICE NOT TO TRESPASS.
the user was adverse under a claim of right, or merely
permissive as a licensee. 1
189. If the railway has, by the act of its servant,
given the person injured reason to believe that he might,
for a proper purpose, go on the line with safety, his pres-
ence on the line and his lack of vigilance is not contribu-
tory negligence. Thus, a person was held to be entitled
to recover, who, while travelling in charge of cattle, was
struck by a passing train on the main track when he
had gotten out of a cattle train on a siding to recover a
cow which had escaped from the train, the conductor
having assured him that the cattle train had the right
of way, and that he might safely go upon the line f but
the fact that the person injured is a servant of a con-
tractor engaged by a municipal corporation to construct
a bridge over the line, will not entitle him to go upon
the line, nor give him any status other than that of a
trespasser, if the circumstances show that the bridge
could have been built without requiring the servants of
the contractor to go upon the line. 3
III. THE EFFECT OF NOTICE NOT TO TRESPASS.
190. Where notices have been put up by a railway,
forbidding persons to cross the line at a particular point,
but these notices have been continually disregarded by
the public, and the railway's servants have not interfered
to enforce their observance, the railway cannot, in the
case of an injury occurring to any one crossing the line
at that point, set up the existence of the notices as
a defence to the claim of the person injured for dam-
ages. 4
1 F. R. R. v. Page, 131 Mass. 391, 7 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 86.
1 Fowler v. B. & O. R. R., 18 W. Va. 579, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 480.
5 Sweeney v. B. & A. R. R., 128 Mass. 5, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 138.
* D. W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155 ; O'Conner v. B. & L. R. R.,
135 Mass. 352, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 362.
INCREASED DUTY TO OTHERS. 181
191. It must be remembered, in this connection, that
where a person comes upon the premises of the railway,
not as a trespasser, nor as a mere licensee, but for the
purpose of transacting some business of common inter-
est to both parties, or where that person comes upon the
railway premises in the course of the performance of a
contract based upon a valuable consideration, there is
an implied warranty to him that the premises are
reasonably safe, and that neither he, nor his property,
shall be injured by negligence upon the part of the
railway.
182 LIABILITY TO TRESPASSERS.
CHAPTER V.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO PERSONS INCLUDED IN
THE THIRD CATEGORY, THAT IS, TRESPASSERS.
I. Trespassers on railway premises.
II. The turn-table cases.
III. Trespassers upon the cars.
IV. Trespassers on the line.
192. The third category includes trespassers upon the
railway's premises, line, or cars.
I. TRESPASSERS ON THE RAILWAY'S PREMISES.
Tlie railway is liable to trespassers upon its premises only for wilful
injury — that is, for its maintenance of a means of injury so essen-
tially dangerous that its existence is regarded as evidence of an in-
tention to do a wilful injury ; or, where the injury is done by the
negligence of a servant, for the failure of the servant to exercise or-
dinary care, when, by its exercise, before the doing of the injury, and
after he has discovered the injured person to be in peril, he cotdd
have avoided the doing of the injury ; or where the injury is done
by the act of a servant in the exercise of express authority delegated
to him by the railway to do the particular act.
193. Owners and tenants of real estate are liable to
trespassers for injuries caused by their unauthorized
maintenance of means of injury so essentially danger-
ous that their existence upon the premises can be re-
garded as not merely negligence upon the part of the
owner or tenant, but as evidence of an intention to do
wilful injury. The best illustrations of this doctrine are
TRESPASSERS ON RAILWAY PREMISES. 183
to be found in the cases of spring guns and dog spikes ; 3
yet, even in such cases, a plaintiff who has gone upon
the defendant's premises, with notice of the existence of
the means of injury, will not be permitted to recover. 2
194. But a railway, as an owner or tenant of real
estate, is not to be held liable for injuries to a plaintiff
who has strayed from the highway, and been injured by
a cause of injury within the railway's premises, and not
adjoining the highway, and whose existence is not evi-
dence of an intention to do wilful injury. 3 Thus in
Hardcastle v. S. Y. Ry., 4 the plaintiff's decedent hav-
ing strayed from the highway at night, and fallen into
an unfenced canal-feeder within the defendant's pre-
mises, and been drowned, it was held that the railway
was not liable. So, in Gillespie v. McGowan, 5 the de-
fendant was held not to be liable for the death of a boy
of about eight years of age, who was drowned in an
open well upon a vacant lot owned by the defendant.
So, in Gramlich v. Wurst, 6 the rule is laid down, that
"where the owner of land, in the exercise of lawful
dominion over it, makes an excavation thereon which is
at such a distance from the public highway, that a per-
son falling into it would be a trespasser upon the land
before reaching it, the owner is not liable for an injury
thus sustained."
1 Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 15 E. C. L.; Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489,
2 E. C. L. ; Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 297, 19 E. C. L. ; Townsend v.
Walthen, 9 East 277.
2 Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304, 5 E. C. L. ; Jordin v. Crump, 8 M. & W.
782.
3 Hardcastle v. S. Y. Ry., 4 H. & N. 67 ; Binks v. S. Y. Ry., 3 B. & S. 244,
113 E. C. L. ; Stone v. Jackson. 12 C. B. 199, 81 E. C. L. ; Blytb v. Topham,
Cro. Jac. 158 ; Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. N. S. 731, 97 E. C. L. ; Knight v.
Abert, 6 Penna. St. 472; Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Id. 74; Gillespie v. Mc-
Gowan, 100 Id. 144 ; O. & R. V. R. R. v. Martin, 14 Neb. 295, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 236.
* 4 II. & N. 67. , 5 100 Penna. St. 144.
6 86 Penna. St. 74.
184 THE TUEN-TABLE CASES.
II. THE TURN-TABLE CASES.
195. There, is a 'class of cases — the "turn-table
cases" — in most of which a result has been reached
which is not reconcilable with the authorities just re-
ferred to. Thus, in S. C. & P. Ry. v. Stout, 1 the plain-
tiff, a boy of six years of age, having been injured
while playing with other boys upon a turn-table within
the railway's premises, but unfenced and unlocked, the
injury having been directly caused by the other boys in
so turning the table while the plaintiff was on it that
his foot was crushed, Dillon, J., in the court below, di-
rected the jury, "that to maintain the action it must
appear by the evidence that the turn-table, in the con-
dition, situation, and place where it then was, was a
dangerous machine — one which, if unguarded or un-
locked, would be likely to cause injury to children ; that
if in its construction and the manner in which it was
left it was not dangerous in its nature, the defendants
were not liable for negligence ; that they were, further,
to consider whether, situated as it was in the defendant's
property in a small town somewhat remote from habita-
tions, there was negligence in not anticipating that in-
jury might occur if it was left unlocked or unguarded ;
that if they did not have reason to anticipate that chil-
dren would be likely to resort to it, or that they would
Gillespie v. McGowan, and Gramlich v. Wurst, do not seem to be recon-
cilable with the earlier case of Hydraulic Works v. Orr, 83 Penna. St. 332,
but in the later Pennsylvania case of Schilling v. Abernethey, 17 Weekly
Notes of Cases 364, where the owner of an alley, to which there was access
from a house which was let to a tenant, was held liable to the tenant's son, a
boy of twelve years of age, for injuries received by the falling upon him of the
wall of a privy while he was walking in the alley, the defendant having negli-
gently omitted to maintain the wall in a condition of good repair, Gordon, J.,
cites Hydraulic Works v. Orr, and treats it as of unshaken authority.
1 2 Dillon 294, 17 Wall. 657.
THE TURN-TABLE CASES. 185
"be likely to be injured if they did resort to it, then
there was no negligence." Judgment upon a verdict for
the plaintiff was affirmed in error, Hunt, J., saying, " that
the turn-table was a dangerous machine, which would be
likely to cause injury to children who resorted to it,
might fairly be inferred from the injury which actually
occurred to the plaintiff. There was the same liability
of injury to him, and no greater, that existed with refer-
ence to all children. When the jury learned from the
evidence that he had suffered a serious injury by his
foot being caught between the fixed rail of the roadbed
and the turning rail of the table, they were justified in
believing that there was a probability of the occurrence
of such accidents. So, in looking at the remoteness of
the machine from inhabited dwellings, when it was
proved to the jury that several boys from the hamlet
were at play there on this occasion, and that they had
been at play upon the turn-table on other occasions ; and
within the observation and to the knowledge of the em-
ployes of the defendant, the jury were justified in be-
lieving that children would probably resort to it, and
that the defendant should have anticipated that such
would be the case. As it was, in fact, on this occasion,
so it was to be expected that the amusement of the boys
would have been found in turning this table while they
were on it or about it. This could certainly have been
prevented by locking the turn-table when not in use by
the company. It was not shown that this would cause
any considerable expense or inconvenience to the de-
fendant. It could probably have been prevented by the
repair of the broken latch. This was a heavy catch,
which, by dropping into a socket, prevented the revolu-
tion of the table. There had been one on this table
weighing some eight or ten pounds, but it had been
broken off and had not been replaced. It was proved
ISO THE TURN-TABLE CASES.
to have been usual with railroad companies to have,
upon their turn-tables, a latch or bolt, or some similar
instrument. The jury may well have believed that if
the defendant had incurred the trifling expense of re-
placing this latch, and had taken the slight trouble of
putting it in its place, these very small boys would not
have taken the pains to lift it out, and thus the whole
difficulty have been avoided. Thus reasoning, the jury
would have reached the conclusion that the defendant
had omitted the care and attention it ought to have
given, that it was negligent, and that its negligence
caused the injury to the plaintiff. The evidence is not
strong, and the negligence is slight, but we are not
able to say that there is not evidence sufficient to justify
the verdict. We are not called upon to weigh, to
measure, to balance the evidence, or to ascertain how we
should have decided if acting as jurors. The charge
was in all respects sound and judicious, and there being
sufficient evidence to justify the finding, we are not
authorized to disturb it." 1
196. On the other hand, in St. L., V. & T. H. R. IL
v. Bell, 2 where the facts differed from those in S. C. & P.
Ry. v. Stout only in that the turn-table, though unlocked,
was secured by a latch, it was held that the railway was
not liable ; and in Kolsti v. M. & St. L. Ry., 3 the turn-
table having been latched but not locked, the defendant
having been permitted, against the plaintiff's objection,
to prove that the fastenings of its turn-table were similar
in character to those in general use on turn-tables, the
judge having directed the jury that "the defendant was
1 This case is supported by Evanisch v. G. C. & S. F. Ry., 57 Tex. 123, 6
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 182 ; Nagel v. M. P. Ry., 75 Mo. 653, 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 702 ; A. & N. R. R. v. Bailey, 11 Neb. 332, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 742 ; K. C. Ry. v. Fitzsimraons, 22 Kans. 686, 18 Id. 34 ; Keffe v. M. &
St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 ; Koons v. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 65 Mo. 592.
s 81 111. 76. s 32 Minn. 133, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 140.
THE TUKN-TABLE CASES. 187
not required to so fasten or secure the turn-table that
boys like the injured boy could not displace such fasten-
ings and put the turn-table in motion," and the jury
having found a verdict for the railway, an order refus-
ing a new trial was affirmed in error. The doctrine of
S. C. & P. Ry. v. Stout, and the cases of its class is,
that railways are to be held to be negligent if they do
not so construct the appliances which they use in the
conduct of their business, or so guard them, that children
cannot possibly injure themselves in meddling with those
appliances when they come upon the railway premises
or line, without any invitation, nor as mere licensees,
but as trespassers. This doctrine is far-reaching, and
if it is to be generally accepted, it must be applied in
many other cases besides those of turn-tables. It must
follow from this doctrine that railways will be liable, if
children injure themselves by stealing into a round-
house and putting in motion a locomotive engine, or by
loosening the brakes, taking away the blocks, and mov-
ing cars stored on a siding in a railway yard, or by
drowning themselves in a station water tank, or by fall-
ing into an ash pit, or by doing any one of a hundred
other things which they have no right to do, and which
it is not possible to prevent them from doing, unless
railways fence and guard by police their stations,
premises, yards, and lines. The miscarriage of justice
in these cases has probably resulted from a misappre-
hension of that line of cases, of which Daniells v. Potter, 1
Hughes v. Macfie, Abbott v. Macfie, 2 Lynch v. Nurdin, 3
and Clark v. Chambers 4 are the most conspicuous, and
which decide that one who leaves, in a public place
where t persons have a right to come, a dangerous
machine, is liable for injuries caused thereby to persons
1 4 C. & P. 262, 19 E. C. L. 2 2 H. & C. 744.
8 1 Q. B. 29, 41 E. 0. L. * 3 Q. B. D. 327.
188 THE TURN-TABLE CASES.
who are, in fact, without fault, or who, being infants,
are, in law, incapable of being contributorily negligent.
The distinction between that line of cases and the turn-
table cases is in the public or private character of the
place in which the instrument of danger is exposed.
The misapprehension as to the legal effect of Lynch v.
Nurdin and the cases of its class is evidenced by the
statement of Hunt, J., in his judgment in S. C. & P.
Ey. v. Stout, that the injured child in Lynch v. Nurdin
was a trespasser, whereas the fact was that he was in-
jured while climbing upon a cart which, with a horse
attached to it, the defendant had left unattended in a
public street, where the injured boy had a right to be,
and where the defendant had no right to leave his horse
and cart unattended. In contrast with the "turn-table"
cases, the case of C. & A. K. R. v. McLaughlin, 1 may
be profitably considered, for in that case it was held that
it was not the duty of the railway to so guard its cars
when standing on its line as to prevent children from
injuring themselves by climbing over them.
III. TRESPASSERS UPON CARS.
197. As a general rule railways owe no duty to per-
sons who come upon their cars, engines, or other means
of transportation, as trespassers, and are, therefore, not
liable to them for anything less than wilful injury, 2 thus
1 47 111. 265.
1 T. W. & W. Ry. v. Brooks, 81 111. 245, 292; C. & B. R. R. v. Michie, 83
Id. 427 ; Brown v. M. R. R., 64 Mo. 536; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Beggs, 85 111.
80 ; Duff v. A. V. R. R., 91 Penna. St. 458 ; Gardner v. N. H. & N. R. R.,
51 Conn. 143; Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 17 Fed Rep. 671 ; Eaton
v. D., L. & W. R. R., 17 Fed. Rep. 671 ; S. W. R. R. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252 ;
Hoar v. M. C. Ry., 70 Me. 65 ; Cauley v. P., C. & St. L. Ry., 95 Penna. St. 395,
98 Id. 498 ; Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Id. 210; H. M. & F. P. Ry. v. Connell, 88
Id. 520; Duff v. A. V. R. R., 91 Id. 458; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Smith, 46 Mich.
504, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 535.
TRESPASSERS ON THE CARS. 189
in Duff v. A. V. R. R., 1 a mother sued to recover dam-
ages for the death of her son, fifteen years of age, a
newsboy, travelling by the connivance of the conductor
for the purpose of selling papers, and killed in a collis-
ion ; judgment on a verdict for the defendant was
affirmed in error, because the plaintiff was a trespasser
and the defendant owed him no duty ; so in C. & N.
W. Ry. v. Smith, 2 the railway was held not to be liable
to a boy who was injured in jumping from the step of
an engine upon which he trespassed, and from which
he was ordered off by the fireman ; so in Cauley v. P.,
C. & St. L. Ry., 3 a boy, seven years of age, while play-
ing with some older boys upon a flat car, which was
being slowly shifted from one switch to another on the
defendant's line at the outskirts of a city, was ordered
by the defendant's servants to jump off, and in so doing
was injured. The boy and his parents brought separate
actions, and the cases were tried together, and the judge
at the trial directed a verdict for the defendant, judg-
ment upon which was affirmed in error, upon the
grounds that the father was contributorily negligent in
permitting his child to trespass upon the defendant's
line, and that the child being a trespasser the defendant
owed him no duty.
198. Nevertheless, although the person injured be a
trespasser, the railway will be liable to him if its servants,
in the exercise of authority delegated to them, expel
him with unnecessary violence. 4 The distinction is this:
if the trespasser's injuries are the result simply of the
1 91 Penna. St. 458.
* 46 Mich. 504, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 535.
1 95 Penna. St. 395, 98 Id. 498.
« L., N. A. & C. R. R. v. Dunkin, 92 Ind. 601, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
422 ; Hoffman v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 87 N. Y. 25, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 537 ; Schultz v. T. A. R. R., 89 N. Y. 242, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 412 ;
Carter v. L., N. A. & C. R. R., 98 Ind. 552, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 360.
190 TRESPASSERS ON THE LINE.
railway's failure to perform that duty which it owes to
every one who is rightfully upon its cars or other means
of transportation, he cannot recover, for he was not
rightfully there, and the railway has not failed to per-
form any duty which it owed to him ; but if, on the
contrary, his injuries are the result of the violence with
which the railway's servants have expelled him from
the railway's cars or premises, or if those injuries were
caused by the circumstances under which he was ex-
pelled, as, for instance, from a train in motion, then
the railway is liable to him therefor, provided always
that the servant who expelled him was, in so doing,
acting in the exercise of authority delegated to him by
the railway.
IV. TRESPASSERS ON THE LINE.
199. A railway, where it has not granted to others a
permissive use of its line, is entitled to the exclusive
use and occupancy thereof. In England it is, and it
ought to be everywhere, forbidden by statute to trespass
upon a railway's line. It is the general rule that tres-
passers upon a railway line are entitled to recover for
nothing less than wilful injury; 1 thus, in L. S. N. & C. R.
1 Wright v. B. & M. R. R., 129 Mass. 440, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 121 ; L.
S. N. & C. Co. v. Norton, 24 Penna. St. 465 ; Mulherrin v. D., L. & W. R. R.,
81 Id. 366 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Spearen, 47 Id. 300; Moore v. P. R. R., 99 Id.
301 ; Cauley v. P., C. & St. L. Ry., 95 Id. 398 ; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Collins,
87 Id. 405 ; Clarke v. P. & R. R. R., 5 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 119 ;
P. & R. R. R. v. Hummell, 44 Penna. St. 375 ; Lary v. O, C, C. & I. R. R.,
78 Ind. 323, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 498 ; Harlan v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R.,
64 Mo. 480; I. C. R. R. v. Godfrey, 71 111. 501 ; C. R. R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga.
207, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa. 42 ; Baston v. G. R. R.. 60 Ga. 340 ; S. W. R. R.
v. Johnson, Id. 667 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Howard, Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 98 ; I. C. R. R. v. Hall, 72 111. 222 ; Pzolla v. M. C. R. R., 54 Mich.
273, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 334 ; Campau v. , 35 Mich. 468 ;
Bresnahan v. M. C. Ry., 49 Mich. 410, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 147 ; Mason
v. M. P. Ry., 27 Kans. 83, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1 ; Tennenbrook v. S. P.
C. R. R., 59 Cal. 269, 6 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 8 ; Yarnall v. St. L., K. C. &
TRESPASSERS ON THE LINE. 191
R. v. Norton, 1 the defendant company was the lessee of a
branch line connecting with the main line of the P. &
R. Co. at Port Clinton. The plaintiff, an employe of
the P. & R. Co., was working with a portable steam
engine and circular saw which he had placed upon the
defendant's line, and he was injured by a train on the
defendant's line running into him. Judgment upon a
verdict for the plaintiff was reversed in error upon the
ground that the defendant was entitled to the exclusive
occupancy of its line, and that it owed no duty to the
plaintiff; so in Carter v. C. & G. R. R., 2 the railway
was held not to be liable to a trespasser on its line, who
had been injured by the explosion of a torpedo which
a railway servant had placed on the rails and with which
the trespasser had intermeddled ; so in P. & R. R. R. v.
Hummell, 3 the plaintiff, seven years of age, brought
suit to recover for injuries received while running
beside a car upon the defendant's line, and falling
under the wheels of the car. Judgment upon a ver-
dict for the plaintiff was reversed in error for want of
proof of defendant's negligence, Strong, J., saying,
railway companies " have a right to presume and act
on the presumption that those in the vicinity will not
violate the laws ; will not trespass upon the road of a
N. R. R., 75 Mo. 575, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. 726 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Depew,
40 Ohio St. 121, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 64 ; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Richards, 59
Tex. 373, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 70; T. H. & I. R. R. v. Graham, 95 Ind.
236, 12 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas 77 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Watkins, Ky. , 12
Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. 89 ; Bacon v. B. & P. R. R., 53 Md. 482, 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 409; N. & C. R. R. v. Smith, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 470, 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 469 ; Morris v. C, B. & Q. Ry., 45 Iowa 29 ; I. C. R. R. v.
Hall, 72 111. 222 ; McAllister v. B. & N. W. Ry., 64 Iowa 395, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 103 ; Schittenhelm v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. Ill ; Schemer v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32 Minn. 510, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 173.
1 24 Penna. St. 465.
* 19 Shand (S. C ) 20, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 414.
• 44 Penna. St. 375.
192 TRESPASSERS ON THE LINE.
clear track ; that even children of a tender age will not
be there, for though they are personally irresponsible,
they cannot be upon the railroad without a culpable
violation of duty by their parents or guardians ;" so in
Mason v. M. P. Ry., 1 the railway was held not to be
liable for the injuries of a woman who was run over
while walking ou a railway bridge. A fortiori, those
are deemed to be trespassers, and as such disentitled to
recover damages from the railway, whose injuries are
the result of their culpable carelessness in going to sleep
on a railway line, or in lying down on the line when
intoxicated. 2 Nor will it relieve a trespasser on the
line from liability for contributory negligence if he is
injured on a highway crossing, to which he has come,
not from the highway, but from the line; 3 nor, if having
been walking on the line, and having left it to escape a
moving train, he does not place himself at a sufficient
distance from the train, and is struck by a projecting
plank. 4
200. Regulations requiring the sounding of signals
before approaching crossings or curves on the line are
intended for the protection of travellers, and an engine-
driver's disobedience of such a rule is not evidence of
negligence when a trespasser on the line is injured. 5
201. Engine-drivers are entitled to assume that tres-
passers upon the line, who are apparently of average
1 27 Kans. 83, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1.
2 Richardson v. W. & M. R. R., 8 Rich. L. 120; Felder v. L. C. & C. R. R.,
2 Macmullan 403 ; Herring v. W. & R. R. R., 10 Ired. 402 ; Manly v. W. & W.
R. R., 74 N. C. 655 ; I. C. R. R. v. Hutchinson, 47 111. 408 ; Meeks v. S. P. R.
R., 52 Cal. 604 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Greene, Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 95 ; Fleytas v. P. R. R., 18 La. An. (O. S.) 339.
s Grethen v. C, M. & St. P. Ry. (U. S. C. C District of Minnesota), 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 342.
* C. R. R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207, 19 Am. & Eng. R R. Cas. 42.
5 L. & N. R. R. v. Howard, Ky. ,19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 98 ; Tennen-
brook v. S. P. C. R. R., 59 Cal. 259, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 8 ; Of. Ditberner
v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 47 Wise. 138.
INFANT TRESPASSERS. 193
bodily and mental capacity, will get out of the way of
the train ; l but, where the railway servants in charge
of the train see on the line a trespasser, whom they
know to be incapacitated by deafness from hearing the
train or its signals, it is their duty to stop the train ;
and the railway will be liable if they do not make every
effort to do so ; 2 so also, where they see a trespasser who
is prevented from escaping by his foot being caught
between the guard and main rail at a switch f so also,
where they see a team stalled upon the line. 4
202. The railway, under some circumstances, may
owe to an infant a higher measure of duty than that
which it owes to an adult; thus, if an engine-driver
were to see a child upon the line it would be his duty
to give warning by signal and make every effort to
stop the train, for it is a reasonable supposition that
the child might not sufficiently realize its danger, or, if
it did, might not accurately appreciate the necessity of
moving promptly off the line ; 5 thus, in P. & It. R. R,
v. Spearen, 6 the plaintiff, a girl of five years of age, was
injured in attempting to run across the defendant's line,
not at a public crossing, and between a coal train and
an engine following closely after the train. Judgment
upon a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed in error
1 P. & R. R. R. v. Spearen, 47 Penna. St. 300 ; Sims v. M. & W. R. R., 28
Ga. 93 ; Schittenhelm v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. Ill ;
Moore v. P., W. & B. R. R., 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 53; Herring
v. W. & R. R. R., 10 Iredell 402 ; Cell v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo. 50, 4 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas 580 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Cooper, Ky. , 6 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 5 ; T. II. & I. R. R. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 28G, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 77.
2 I. & G. N. Ry. v. Smith, 62 Tex. 252, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 21.
•' Burnett v. B. & M. R. R., 16 Neb. 332, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 25.
* C. & A. R. R. v. Hogarth, 38 111. 370.
5 P. & R. R. R. v. Spearen, 47 Penna. St. 300 ; Smith v. O'Connor, 48 Id.
218 ; Schwier v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 90 N. Y. 558, 14 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas.
656 ; cf. Bannon v. B. & O. R. R., 24 Md. 108.
6 47 Penna. St. 300.
13
194 INFANT TRESPASSERS.
for want of proof of defendant's negligence, Agnew, J.,
saying: " The degree of care required of the servants
of the company in such a case is dependent, in some
measure, upon the capacity of the injured party. If an
adult should place himself upon the railroad where he
has no right to be, but where the company is entitled
to a clear track, and the benefit of the presumption
that it will not be obstructed, and should be run down,
the company will be liable for wilful injury, or its
counterpart, gross negligence. But if a child of tender
years should do so, and suffer injury, the company
would be liable for the want of ordinary care. The
principle may be illustrated thus. If the engineer saw
the adult in time to stop his train, but the train being
in full view, and nothing to indicate to him a want of
consciousness of its approach, he would not be bound to
stop his train. Having the right to a clear track, he
would be entitled to the presumption that the trespasser
would remove from it in time to avoid the danger ; or,
if he thought the person did not notice the approaching
train, it would be sufficient to whistle to attract his
attention without stopping. But if, instead of the adult,
it were a little child upon the track, it would be the
duty of the engineer to stop his train upon seeing it.
The change of circumstances from the possession of
capacity in the trespasser to avoid the danger to a want
of it, would create a corresponding change in the duty
in the engineer. In the former case, the adult, con-
curring in the negligence causing the disaster, is with-
out remedy ; in the latter, the child not concurring from
a want of capacity, the want of ordinary care in the
engineer would create liability. But if the train were
upon the child before it could be seen, or if it suddenly
and unexpectedly threw itself in the way of the engine,
the engineer being incapable of exercising the measure
INFANT TRESPASSERS. 195
of ordinary care to save it, the child would be without
remedy, for the company's use of the track is lawful,
and the presence of the child upon the track is un-
lawful."
203. Yet there is no inexorable rule of law which re-
quires a train to be stopped whenever a child is seen upon
the line j 1 or a street car ; 2 thus, in P. R. R. v. Morgan, 3
the plaintiff, a girl of five years of age, was playing on the
defendant's line in the outskirts of a town, when a
repair train, with a caboose car in the front, backed
slowly down, two of the train hands being on the look-
out at the front of the caboose car. The plaintiff, see-
ing the train, started to run off the track, but caught
her foot between the rail and a space left for the flange
of the wheel. The train hands, seeing her caught,
promptly applied the brakes and signalled to the
engine-driver, who reversed the engine, but although
every possible exertion was used it was impossible to
stop the train until the front car had run past her.
The front wheel of the caboose, sliding under the pres-
sure of the brake, pushed the plaintiff's foot out of her
shoe and lacerated her foot, producing a permanent
injury. Judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed in error, because the judge, at the trial, in-
structed the jury that the train hands, having seen the
girl upon the track, were bound to stop, because they
had no right to assume that a child knows its danger,
or had the capacity to apprehend it, whereas, it should
have been left to the jury to find, whether, under all the
circumstances, the defendant was negligent, there being
no inexorable rule that a train must stop, under all cir-
1 Singleton v. E. C. Ry., 7 C. B. N. S. 287, 97 E. C. L.; P. R. R. v. Morgan,!
82 Penna. St. 135 ; Meyer v. M. P. R. R., 2 Neb. 319.
2 P. C. P. Ry. v. Henrice, 92 Penna. St. 431, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 544 ;
Walters v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 41 Iowa 71.
» 82 Penna. St. 135.
196 TRESPASSERS SLEEPING ON THE LINE.
cumstances, when a child is seen upon the track. Nor
can an infant, who is a trespasser on the line, recover
for anything less than wilful injury, or a carelessness
upon the part of the railway servants, so great as not to
be distinguishable from wilful injury, where the circum-
stances are not such as to bring the fact of the child's
infancy and consequent want of capacity to the notice
of the servants of the railway. 1
204. In some jurisdictions it is held that a trespasser
upon the line can recover, if the injury might have been
avoided by the use of ordinary care and caution upon
the part of the railway. 2 So it has been held that where
trespassers on the line were run over while asleep, or
insensible from intoxication, the railway was liable, if
its servants in charge of the train could, by the exercise
of ordinary care, have discovered the presence of the
injured persons and avoided the injury and did not do
so. 3 The practical effect of those authorities seems to be
1 Singleton v. E. C. Ry., 7 C. B. N. S. 287, 97 E. C. L. ; P. & R. R. R. v.
Hummell, 44 Penna. St. 375 ; Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Id. 210 ; Clark v. P. R. R.,
5 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 119 ; H. M. & F. P. Ry. v. Connell, 88 Penna.
St. 520; Duff v. A. V. R. R., 91 Id. 458; B. & O. R. R. v. Schwindling, 101
Id. 258 ; Moore v. P. R. R., 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 310 ; Hydraulic
Works Co! v Or, 83 Penna. St. 332, as explained in Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Id.
74, and substantially overruled in Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Id. 144 ; Cauley v.
P., S., C. & St. L. Ry., 95 Id. 398 ; Woodbridge v. D., L. & W. R. R., 105 Id.
460 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Greene, Ky. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 95 ; Mor-
risey v.B R. R., 126 Mass. 377; cf. P. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Penna. St. 33;
Penna. Co. v. James, 81 j Id. 194 ; Frick v. St. L., K. C.& N. Ry., 75 Mo. 595,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280 ; L. & N. A. & C. R. R. v. Head, 80 Ind. 117,
4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 619 ; Isabel v. H. & St. J. R. R., 65 Mo. 475. .
2 E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Fain, 12 J. B. Lea (Tenn.), 35, 19 Am. & Eng R.
R. Cas. 102 ; Morris v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 45 Iowa 29 ; McAllister v. B. & N. W.
Ry., Iowa , 19 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 108 ; I. C. R. R. v. Modglin, 85 111.
481 ; Meeks v S. P. R. R., 56 Cal. 513, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 314; Brown
v. II. & St. J. R. R., 50 Mo. 461.
' II. & T. C. Ry. v. Sympkins, 54 Tex. 615, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 11 ;
Meeks v. S P. R. R., 56 Cal. 513, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. 314; E. T. V. &
d. B. R. v. Humphreys, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 200, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 472;
Keyser v. C. & G T. Ry., Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 91 ; E. T. &
G. R. R. v. St. John, 5Sneed (Tenn.) 524.
LICENSE TO TRESPASS. 197
that the railway is to be held liable if its servants do
not, in running its trains, exercise vigilance in looking
for trespassers on the line, and care in avoiding injury
to them, but as the railway is entitled to the exclusive
possession and use of its line, it is not reasonable to re-
quire its servants to assume that trespassers will come
on the line, or that being on the line they will not heed
signals that warn them of their danger. Upon principle
the more reasonable doctrine would seem to be that
stated in the preceding paragraph, the result of which
is that engine-drivers are not bound to assume that
trespassers will be on the line, or to watch for them, and
that when they do see a trespasser on the line, ap-
parently of adult years and of average capacity, they
are bound to warn him by signal of his clanger, and
that having done so they may assume that he will get
off the line and that they are only bound to stop the
train when the circumstances of the locality are such
(for instance, on a bridge or in a narrow cutting) that
the trespasser does not have an opportunity to escape,
or when the trespasser does not apparently hear or heed
or comprehend the warning of his danger.
205. The mere fact that people have frequently tres-
passed upon a railway line, and that the railway has
not resorted to any means to protect its exclusive pos-
session of its line, will not imply the railway's consent
to such user, nor vest in the public any right thereto. 1
On the other hand, in Hoppe v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 2
in the case of a child who was killed while trespassing
on the line, evidence was admitted to show that the rail-
way line was generally used as a footway by the resi-
1 C. R. R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 42; I. C. R. R.
v. Godfrey, 71 111. 506 ; B. & R. R. v. The State of Maryland, to the use of
Allison, 62 Md. 479, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 83.
2 61 Wise. 357, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 74.
108 FENCING AS AFFECTING TRESPASSERS.
dents of the neighborhood, and a recovery against the
railway was sustained. The same view was taken in
P. R. R. v. Lewis. 1 But, of course, a right of way
across a line may be gained by an adverse user just as
any other right of way may be acquired, and people
whom the railway has permitted to cross its line can-
not be treated as trespassers, for they are licensees.
206. In Hayes v. M. C. Py., 2 the railway was, by
reason of its failure to perform a statutory duty to fence
its line on the border of a public park, held liable for
the injuries of a boy of less than nine years of age,
who having strayed from the park was, while trespass-
ing on the line, run over by a train. 3 On the other
hand, in Fitzgerald v. St. P., M. & M. Py., 4 it was held,
Gilfillan, C J., dissenting, that a failure on the part of
the railway to fence its line in obedience to a statute,
whose declared purpose was the prevention of injury to
cattle, could not be imputed to the railway as negligence
in the case of a child who had strayed upon the line and
been injured.
1 79 Penna. St. 33.
2 111 U. S. 228, 15 Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas. 394.
3 See also, Keyser v. C. & G. T. Ry., Mich. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
91 ; Hynes v. S. F. & N. P. R. R., Cal. , 20 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 486:
Schmidt v. M. & St. P. Ry., 23 Wise. 186.
4 29 Minn. 336, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310.
LIABILITY TO PASSENGERS, ETC. 199
CHAPTER VI.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED
IN THE FOURTH CATEGORY, PASSENGERS, ETC.
I. The general principle determining the liability.
II. Passengers.
III. Persons to whom the railway owes the same measure of duty that it
owes to its passengers.
IV. The Pennsylvania Act of 4 April, 1868.
V. The general duty of the railway to its passengers and to those to
whom it owes a like duty.
VI. The duty as to the adoption of improved appliances and methods of
operation.
VII. Railway regulations as affecting passengers.
VIII. Station approaches, platforms, and buildings.
IX. Boarding and descending from cars.
X. The duty of the railway in the operation of its line.
XI. Contributory negligence of passengers.
I. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE DETERMINING THE LIA-
BILITY OF THE RAILWAY.
207. The fourth category includes persons who, in the
course of the performance of a contract based upon a valu-
able consideration, come upon the line, premises, or cars
of the railway, including herein passengers of the railway ;
attendants of passengers ; passengers of another railway re-
ceived for transportation in the railway's cars; passengers
of another railway whose cars are run over the line of the
railway; passengers of another railway with whom a sta-
tion is jointly occupied ; servants of another railway while
upon the line or premises of the railway in the perform-
ance of their duty to that other railway; consignors, con-
signees, and their agents, personally assisting in the re-
ception, carriage, or delivery of their freight; persons
entering under special contract upon the railway's line
200 GENERAL RULE OF LIABILITY.
or premises ; Post Office employes carried under a con-
tract between the railway and the Post Office Depart-
ment, or under a statutory duty imposed upon the
railway ; persons carried under contract between the
railway and a third party; servants of express companies
whose cars are run, or whose goods are carried, over
the line ; and persons who are carried on the line to
sell refreshments, newspapers, etc., to the passengers.
All the individuals included in the several classes of
this category are entitled to demand of the railway a
like measure of duty.
The railway is liable for negligence to persons who come upon its line,
premises, or cars, in the course of the performance of a contract
based upon a valuable consideration.
208. Where a person, in the course of the perform-
ance of a contract made by the railway upon a valuable
consideration, comes upon the line, station, station ap-
proaches and surroundings, or other premises of a
railway, there is an implied warranty upon the part of
the railway to him that its line, station, station ap-
proaches and surroundings, or other premises, are safe,
in so far as care on the part of the railway can make
them safe, and that he shall not be injured by negli-
gence upon the part of the railway in the conduct of
its business. 1 The leading case is Parnaby v. Lancaster
1 Parnaby v. L. Canal Co., 11 Ad. & El. 223, 39 E. C. L. ; Mersey Docks Co.
v. Gibbs, 3 H. & N. 164, 11 H. L. C. 686, L. R. 1 II. L. 93 ; Marfell v. S. W.
Ry., 8 C. B. N. 8. 525, 98 E. C. L. ; Winch v. Conservators of the Thames, L.
R. 9 C P. 378 ; Ilartnall v. Ryde Commrs., 4 B. & S. 361, 116 E. C L. ; Ohrby
v. Ryde Commrs., 5 B. & S. 743, 117 E. C. L. ; Corby v. Hill, 4 C B. N. S. 556,
93 E. C. L. ; Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 470, 100 E. C. L. ; Chapman v.
Rothwell, E. Bl. & E. 168, 96 E. C. L. ; Thompson v. N. E. Ry., 2 B. & S. 106,
110 E. C. L. ; Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P. 274, 2 Id. 311 ; Smitli v. L.
& St. K. Docks Co., L. R. 3 Id. 326; White v. France, L. R. 2 C. P. D. 308;
Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q B. 184, 501 ; Lax v. Corporation of Darlington,
5 Ex. Div. 28; Briggs v. Oliver, 4 II. & C. 40S ; Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.
B. D. 502 ; Godley v. Haggerty, 20 Penna. St. 387 ; Carson v. Godley, 26 Id.
GENERAL RULE OF LIABILITY. 201
Canal Co., 1 where it was held in the Court of Exchequer
Chamber that a canal company, taking tolls for the
navigation, were bound to use reasonable care in mak-
ing the navigation secure, and were liable in damages
to the plaintiff, whose boat in navigating the canal had
been injured by collision with a sunken boat which the
canal company had neglected to remove, and Tindal,
C. J., 2 thus stated the principle upon which was rested
the liability of the defendant : " the company made the
canal for their, profit, and opened it to the public upon
payment of tolls to the company ; and the common law,
in such a case, imposes a duty upon the proprietors, not
perhaps to repair the canal, or absolutely to free it from
obstructions, but to take reasonable care, so long as they
keep it open for the public use of all who may choose
to navigate it, that they may navigate it without danger
to their lives or property." The ground of liability
thus clearly stated was approved in the judgments de-
livered in the House of Lords in the later case of The
Mersey Docks, Trustees v. Gibbs. 3 So in Francis v.
Cockrell, 4 where the defendant, being one of the stew-
ards of a race, had employed a competent contractor to
erect a stand from which the race could be viewed, and
the plaintiff, having paid a pecuniary consideration for
admission, was injured by the fall of the stand resulting
from negligence on the part of the contractor in building
it, it was held that the defendant was liable in damages
to the plaintiff, Kelly, C. B., saying : " that one who
lets for hire, or engages for the supply of, any article
or thing, whether it be a carriage to be ridden in, or a
111; Walden v. Finch, 70 Id. 460; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Id. 218; N. O.
M. & C It. R. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649; Bennett v. L. & N. R. R., 102 U. S.
577, 1 Am. &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 71 ; Carleton v. F. I. Co., 99 Mass. 216; L. &
B. R R. v. Chenewith, 52 Penna. St. 382 ; Fries v. Cameron, 4 Richardson 228.
1 11 Ad. & El. 223, 39 E. C. L. 2 P. 242.
8 L. R. 1 II. L. 93. * L. R. 5 Q. B. 501.
20l2 GENERAL KULE OF LIABILITY.
bridge to be passed over, or a stand from which to view
a steeple chase, or a place to be sat in by anybody who
is to witness a spectacle, for a pecuniary consideration,
does warrant and does impliedly contract that the article
is reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be ap-
plied ; but, secondly, he does not contract against any un-
seen, or unknown, defect which could not be discovered^
or which may be said to be undiscoverable by any or-
dinary or reasonable means of inquiry or examination."
So in Heaven v. Pender, 1 where the defendant, a dock
owner, supplied, under contract with a ship owner, a
staging for use by the servants of a painter who had
contracted with the ship owner to paint the ship, and
the plaintiff, who was one of the painter's servants, was
injured by reason of the fall of the staging resulting
from negligence upon the part of the dock owner in
failing to provide sound tackle, it was held in the Court
of Appeal, reversing the Queen's Bench Division, that
the defendant was liable. Brett, M. R., 2 putting the
liability in general terms says : " that whenever one
person is, by circumstances, placed in such, a position
with regard to another, that every one of ordinary sense
who did think would at once recognize that if he did
not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances lie would cause danger
of injury to the person or the property of the other, a
duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger." Cotton and Bowen, L. J J., however, while
holding the defendant liable did not concur in the gen-
erality of the principle as stated by the Master of the
Rolls. So in Elliott v. Hall, 3 a colliery owner and con-
signor of coals was held liable to the servant of his
consignee for injuries received in unloading coals from
1 11 Q. B. D. 503 « P. 509 8 15 Q. B. D. 315.
GENERAL RULE OF LIABILITY. 203
a truck, which had been hired by the consignor from a
third party for use in the transportation and delivery
of coals to the consignee, and which, when out of repair
by the negligence of the consignor's servants, had been
sent to the consignee. Grove, J., said : " if vendors of
goods forward them to the purchasers, and for that pur-
pose supply a truck, or other means of conveyance for
the carriage of the goods, and the goods are necessarily
to be unloaded from such means of conveyance by the
purchaser's servants, it seems to me perfectly clear that
there is a duty on the part of the vendors towards those
persons who, necessarily, will have to unload, or other-
wise deal with the goods, to see that the truck, or other
means of conveyance, is in good condition and repair,
so as not to be dangerous to such persons. I do not say
that the vendors would be responsible for latent defects,
or matters that they could not reasonably foresee, but
they are, in my opinion, bound to see that the machinery
of the truck is apparently in good order."
209. The result of the authorities, therefore, is thai
wherever one party enters into relations with another
party upon the basis of a contract made upon a valu-
able, though not necessarily a pecuniary, consideration,
and those relations bring one of the parties into contact
with a material agency which the contract requires the
other party to supply, the law then exacts of him who
supplies that material agency the duty of exercising
care in its selection, maintenance in repair, and opera-
tion ; and this duty must be so performed as to protect
not only the contracting party, but also those agents,
servants, and assistants, whom the nature of the relation
between the contracting parties justifies him in employ-
ing. Such is the general principle upon which rests
the liability of railways to the persons included in the
fourth category. It must, however, be borne in mind,
204 PASSENGERS DEFINED.
in this connection, that if there be an express contract
between the railway and any one of the persons in-
cluded in the fourth category, and if that contract be
enforceable in law, its terms must, so far as they extend,
determine the liability, but, if there be no such enforce-
able contract, the liability of the railway rests solely
upon the duty imposed by law.
II. PASSENGERS.
The relation of passenger and carrier is dependent upon the existence
of a contract of carriage.
210. A passenger may be defined to be a person whom
a railway, in the performance of its duty as a common
carrier, has contracted to carry from one place to another
place for a valuable consideration, and whom the rail-
way, in the course of the performance of that contract,
has received at its station, or in its car, or under its care.
A substantially similar definition is given by Paxson, J.,
in Price v. P. K. R 1
211. The terms of the definition show that the rela-
tion of carrier and passenger is dependent upon the
existence of a contract of carriage made upon a valu-
able consideration between the passenger and the rail-
way acting in the exercise of its charter powers, but to
constitute one a paying passenger, the payment of fare
in money is not essential, 2 for any valuable considera-
tion moving from the person injured to the railway will
render him a paying passenger, such as the fact that
he was travelling as a drover in charge of his cattle,
which the railway was transporting for hire; 3 or that
1 96 Penna. St. 267.
2 Cleveland v. N. J. S. Co., 68 N. Y. 306; Hart v. S. E. R, 40 Miss. 391.
s N. Y. C. R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 ; I. & St. L. R. R. v. Horst, 93
U. S. 291 ; C. P. & A. R. R. v. Currun, 19 Ohio St. 1 ; O. & M. Ry. v. Selby,
FAKE NOT PAID IN MONEY. 205
he, as the owner of a patented coupler, was travelling on
the defendant's line at its invitation in the course of
negotiations for the adoption of his patent; 1 or that he
was a detective carried over the line on a hand-car in
the performance of a special duty, for which the rail-
way had entered into a contract with him ; 2 or that he
was with the consent of the railway travelling on a
freight train in charge of stock or goods carried by the
railway for him. 3
212. So where the railway has contracted to carry
an individual whose fare is paid, or is agreed to be paid,
by the person with whom the contract is made, the rail-
way is liable to the individual, who is so received for
carriage, to the same extent as if he had personally paid
fare before coming upon the railway's premises or enter-
ing its cars ; thus, in Austin v. G. W. Ry., 4 the defend-
ant's charter requiring it to carry gratuitously upon
certain trains children under three years of asre, and to
charge half fare for children between three and twelve
years of age, and the plaintiff, a child of more than
three years of age, having been without fraudulent in-
tent taken by its mother, who had purchased a ticket
only for herself, upon the defendant's train, and having
been injured by the defendant's negligence, after verdict
for the plaintiff, a rule for a new trial was refused, it
being held that the plaintiff could recover upon the
47 Ind. 471 ; Mastin v. B. & O. E. E., 14 W.Va. 180; L. K. & F. S. Ey. v.
Miles, 40 Ark. 298; P. E. E. v. Henderson, 51 Penna. St. 315; Goldey v. P.
E. E., 30 Id. 242 ; O. & M. Ey. v. Nicklesa, 71 Ind. 271 ; Flinn v. P., W. & B.
E. E., 1 Houst. (Del.) 469; T. & P. Ey. v. Garcia, 62 Tex. 285, 21 Am. &
Eng. E. E. Cas. 384.
1 G. T. Ey. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655.
2 Pool v. C, M. & St. P. Ey., 53 Wise. 657, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 332, 56
Wise. 227, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 360.
3 I. E. E. v. Beaver, 41 Ind. 493 ; Lawson v. C, St. P., M. & O. E. E., 64
Wise. 447, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 249.
* L. E. 2 Q. B. 442.
206 FARE PAID BY OTHERS.
duty of the railway to carry safely every one whom it
had received for carriage, and also upon the ground of
a contract by the defendant with the mother to carry
her and the plaintiff safely, and that the non-payment
of fare by the mother for her child, while rendering
the mother liable to the defendant for that fare, could
not be held to bar the plaintiff's recovery. So in G. N.
R. R. v. Harrison, 1 the issue being whether the plain-
tiff when injured was lawfully in the defendant's car-
riage, it was held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber
that the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict on that
issue, having proven that he, being a reporter of a
newspaper, had travelled bona fide upon a ticket issued
at a reduced rate to the proprietor of the paper for his
reporters, and supplied by him to the plaintiff, though
the ticket bore the name of another reporter of that
paper and was marked " not transferable," it also being
shown that the defendant's porter had examined the
ticket and had placed the reporter in a carriage, and
also that the defendant's servants had on other occa-
sions permitted reporters of that paper to use indiffer-
ently the several tickets issued for that paper. Upon
the same principle the railway, in Marshall v. Y. N. &
B. Ry., 2 was held liable to the valet of a nobleman for
the loss of his personal luggage, although the master
had taken and paid for the servant's ticket. So in
Skinner v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 3 the defendant had con-
tracted with a benevolent society to run a train from
London to Brighton and return for a gross sum to be
paid by the society. The plaintiff, a passenger on the
train, having purchased his ticket from the society, was
injured in a collision caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. At the trial the defendant objected that there
1 10 Ex. 376. * 11 C. B. 655, 73 E. C. L. s 5 Ex. 787.
FREE PASSENGERS. 207
was no evidence that the plaintiff was a passenger to be
carried by the defendant for hire, but, after verdict for
the plaintiff, it was held that the defendant's duty to
carry safely any person lawfully in its carriages would
support the action. 1
213. So where a contract of carriage has been in fact
made between the railway and the passenger, and the
railway has agreed to transport the passenger gratui-
tously, it is liable to him to the same extent as if he had
paid his fare before coming upon the railway's premises
or entering its cars. The existence of the contract of
carriage, as a fact, fixes the liability of the railway, and
the law finds an adequate consideration for such a con-
tract, in the doctrine that " the confidence induced by
undertaking any service for another is a sufficient legal
consideration to create a duty in the performance of it." 2
The railway is, therefore, liable to persons whom it ac-
cepts for transportation over its line, and from whom it
demands no fare, to the same extent that it is liable to
passengers who pay fare. Thus, in P. & R. It. R. v.
Derby, 3 the plaintiff, a president of another line, and
a shareholder of the corporation defendant, having
been injured while being carried over the defendant's
line at the invitation of its president, judgment upon a
verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed in error, Grier, J.,
saying, the duty of the defendant to carry carefully
" does not result alone from the consideration paid for
the service. It is imposed by the law, even where the
service is gratuitous." 4
1 See also O. & M. R. R. v. Muhling, 30 111. 9 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Messino, 1
Sneed (Tenn.) 220 ; Hurt v. S. R. R., 40 Miss. 391.
2 Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Sm. L. C. 293.
8 14 Howard 468.
* See also Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469 ; P. R. R. v. Butler,
57 Penna. St. 335; B., P. & W. R. R. v. O'Hara, 12 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Penna.) 473; Todd v. O. C. R. R., 3 Allen 18,7 Id. 207 • Jacobus v. St. P. & C.
208 TRESPASSERS ON CARS.
214. It lias been stated in section 211, that the exist-
ence of the relation of carrier and passenger is dependent
upon the making of a contract of carriage. From this,
it follows that railways are not liable to persons who
have not been accepted as passengers, and the intention
of the person to pay his fare and his good faith are im-
material, when there has been no contract, express or
implied, on the part of the railway. 1 A fortiori, where
the person injured is a trespasser on the cars, the rail-
way owes him no duty, and is not bound to indemnify
him for anything less than injuries wilfully inflicted. 2
Thus, in Duff v. A. V. R. R., 3 a mother sued to recover
for the death of her son, a newsboy, whom the defend-
ant's train hands permitted to travel for the purpose of ■
selling newspapers, and judgment on a verdict for the
defendant was affirmed in error, upon the ground that
the plaintiff's son was a trespasser and not a passenger.
So, where the person injured travels on a non-transfer-
able free pass, which was issued to another person, and
represents himself to be that person, he can recover for
Ry., 20 Minn. 125; Rose v. D. M. V. R. R., 39 Iowa 246 ; F. & P. M. Ry. v.
Weir, 37 Mich. Ill ; Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340 ; O. & M. Ry. v. Selby, 47
Ind. 471 ; Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 17 Fed. Rep. 671 ; Abell v.
W. M. R. R., 63 Md. 433, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gas. 503 ; Gillenwater v. M.
& I. R. R., 5 Ind. 339 ; O. & M. Ry. v. Nickless, 71 Ind. 271 ; Prince v. I. &
G. N. R. R. 64 Tex. 144, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 152.
1 Gardner v. N. H. & N. Co., 51 Conn. 143, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 170.
* T., W. & W. Ry. v. Brooks, 81 111. 245, 292 ; C. & B. R. R. v. Michie, 83
Id. 427 ; Brown v. M. K. & T. R. R., 64 Mo. 536 ; T., W. & W. Ry. v. Beggs,
85 111. 80 ; Duff i'. A. V. R. R., 91 Penna. St. 458.
3 91 Penna. St. 458.
In some of the cases, as, for instance, in B., P. & W. R. R. v. O'Hara, 12
Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 473, it is held that a railway cannot, by con-
tract with a passenger whom it carries gratuitously, exempt itself from liabil-
ity for the results of its negligence ; but the contrary doctrine is asserted in
other cases, for instance, in Kinney v. C. R. R. of N. J., 34 N. J. L. 513.
The subject of the railway's right to limit its liability to passengers, whether
carried for full fare, or gratuitously, is considered in the last chapter of this
work.
AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE PASSENGERS. 209
nothing less than wilful injury. 1 Nor can one recover,
who, with intent to defraud the railway, induces the
railway servants to carry him without payment of fare. 2
The same principle was applied in the case of B. & B.
Ry. v. Keys, 3 where the plaintiff, knowing that while
the defendant carried luggage free, it yet required mer-
chandise to be paid for, took with him in defendant's
carriage a case of merchandise as luggage, and did not
declare nor pay for it, and it was held that he could not
recover for its loss ; because, by reason of his fraudulent
concealment, there was no express or implied contract
between the defendants and himself with respect to that
merchandise.
215. Where the person injured has been permitted by
the defendant's servants to ride upon the railway with-
out paying fare, the railway is liable if the servant was
expressly or impliedly authorized to bind the railway
by such permission; 1 but where the regulations of the
railway deny to the servant the authority of accepting
passengers, the railway is not liable. 5 Conductors in
charge of passenger trains have an implied authority to
accept persons as passengers thereon, 6 but as freight
trains are run by railways for the transportation of
freight, not passengers, the servants of the railway when
1 T., W. & W. Ry. v. Beggs, 85 111. 80.
1 T., W. & W. Ry. v. Brooks, 81 111. 245, Id. 292.
3 9 H. L. C. 555.
* Sherman v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589;
Wilton v. M. R. R., 107 Mass. 108 ; Same v. Same, 125 Mass. 130 ; P., A. & M
P. Ry. v. Caldwell, 74 Penna. St. 421 ; Gradin v. St. P. & D. Ry., 30 Minn.
217, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. (as. 644; Secor v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep.
221 ; Lucas v. M. & St. P. Ry., 33 Wise. 41 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Penna.
St. 139.
5 T., W. & W. Ry. r. Brooks, 81 111. 245; C. & B. R. R. v. Miehie, 83 Id.
427; Dufft). A. V. R. R., 91 Penna. St. 458; Jenkins v. C, M. & St. P. Ry.,
41 Wise. 112 ; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31 ; Gardner v. N. H. & N.
Co., 51 Conn. 143, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 170.
6 P. R. R. v. Books, 57 Penna. St 345 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Id. 139.
14
210 SERVANTS AS PASSENGERS.
in charge of such trains have no implied authority to
invite strangers to become passengers thereon, and in
the absence of proof of express authority vested in the
conductor of a freight train the acceptance of his invi-
tation to ride thereon does not make a stranger a pas-
senger j 1 nor have railway servants an implied authority
to accept persons as passengers on pay cars, 2 or on hand
cars, 3 but if it be proven that the railway servant was
authorized to accept the person as a passenger on a hand
car, 4 or on a freight train, 5 the railway will, by reason
of such acceptance, be liable to him as a passenger.
216. Where an individual is carried by a railway in
performance of the conditions of a contract of service he
is to be regarded as a servant, not as a passenger, thus,
in Tunney v. The Midland Ry., 6 the plaintiff was a
laborer employed to load a pick-up train, and the de-
fendant had contracted to carry him to and from his
work by train. While returning after his day's Avork
was done he was injured through the negligence of one
of the guards, and it was held that he could not recover,
for he was carried, not as a passenger, but under a con-
tract of service, and the cause of the injury was the
negligence of a fellow-servant; Willes, J., saying:
"there is always a strong inclination to find some mode
to give the plaintiff redress in cases of this sort, but one
man's misfortune must not be compensated for at another
1 Eaton v D., L. & W. R. R., 57 N. Y. 382 ; Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. R
R. R., 17 Fed. Rep. 671 ; cf. Dunn v. G. T. Ry., 58 Me. 187.
* S. W. R. R. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252.
3 Hoar v. M. C. Ry., 70 Me. 65.
* Pool v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 56 Wise. 227, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 360;
Prince v. I. & G. N. R. R., 64 Tex. 144, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 152.
5 Dunn v. G. T. Ry., 58 Me. 187; Lucas v. M. & St. P. Ry., 33 Wise. 41 ;
Secord v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 221 ; Sherman v. H. & St. J. R.
R., 72 Mo. 621, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 580 ; O. & M. R. R. v. Mahling, 30
111. 9; T. & P. Ry. v. Garcia, 62 Tex. 285, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 384.
6 l! R. 1 C. P. 291.
SERVANTS AS PASSENGERS. 211
man's expense." So also in Ryan v. C. V. R. R., 1 the
plaintiff, a laborer in the defendant's employment, was
engaged in repairing the road, and was carried to and
from his work on the cars, and while being so carried
he was injured by the negligence of the engine-driver.
It was held that he could not recover because he was
not a passenger, but a servant whose transportation was
an incident to his service, and that the defendant was
not liable for the negligence of the engine-driver, who
was the plaintiff's co-employe. 2 This rule has been
held to bar recovery in the case of a discharged servant,
who, on a journey to obtain other employment, was in-
jured while riding in a baggage car without payment of
fare; 3 but was held not to bar recovery in the case of a
servant of a contractor engaged in repairing the line and
transported in the railway's cars. 4 There are, however,
some cases which are not reconcilable with those which
have been quoted ; thus, in O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R., 5
the plaintiff, a journeyman carpenter, employed by the
defendant to repair its bridges, and carried to and from
his work by the defendant's train, was engaged at lower
wages in consideration of the company's carrying him
free to and from his work, and while being so carried
he was injured, the car in which he was riding being
thrown from the track by a broken rail. It was held
that the plaintiff was a passenger because he had no
duty to perform upon the train, and because, by the re-
1 23 Penna. St. 384.
* See also Gillshannoil v. S. B. R. R., 10 Cush. 228 ; Seaver v. B.& M.R.R.,
14 Gfay 466; Russell v. II. R. R. R., 17 N. Y. 134; Ross v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
R. R., 74 Id. 617 ; N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R. v. Vick, 95 Id. 267, 17 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 609; K. I'. Ry., v. Salmon, 11 Kans. 83; McQueen v. C. B. U. P.
R. R, 30 Kans. (ISO. 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 226.
3 II &St. J. R. P.. v. Biggins, 36 Mo. 418.
4 Torpy v. ( i. T. Ry., 20 Up. ( 'an. (Q. B ) 446.
* 50 Penna. St. 490, 59 Id. 239.
212 PASSENGER ACTING AS SERVANT.
duction in his wages, he, in effect, paid fare for his
transportation. 1 The right doctrine would seem to be
that whenever the person injured is carried in per-
formance of a contract of service, the railway is not
to be liable to him as a passenger, but only as a
servant.
217. It would seem also to be clear that a passenger
will not, by the performance of a casual service on a
train, cease to be a passenger and become an employe of
the railway. Thus, in C. V. R. R. v. Myers, 2 the con-
ductor of a private freight car which was being hauled
on the defendant's line, having, at the request of the
defendant's servant, cut loose the cars following his own,
and having resumed his proper place as a passenger,
was inj ured by negligence on the part of the engine-
driver ; and it was held that his recovery was not barred
because he had done an act of mere accommodation at
the request of defendant's servant, and without hire. 3
But where the passenger's injuries are clearly the result
of his voluntary act in taking upon himself the per-
formance of a servant's duty, the railway ought not to
be held liable to him, and such action ought to be re-
garded as contributory negligence on the part of the
passenger. In this view, the cases of Mel. R. R. v.
Bolton, 4 and P. P. Ry. v. Green, 5 would seem to have
been wrongly decided.
218. The relation of carrier and passenger begins
1 See also B. & O. R. R. v. The State, to use of Trainor, 33 Md. 542 ; Abell
v. W. M. R. R., 63 Md. 433, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 503.
4 55 Penna. St. 283.
3 See also Mel. R. R. v. Bolton, Ohio St. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
501 ; P. P. Ry. v. Green, 56 Md. 84, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168 ; cf. Degg
v. M. Ry.. 1 II. & N. 773; Potter v. Faulkner, 1 B. & S. 800, 101 E. C. L. ;
Everhart v. T. II. & I. R. R., 78 Ind. 202, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 599;
Kherman v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
4 Ohio St. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 501.
5 56 Md. 81, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168.
PASSENGERS. 213
when, a contract of carriage having been made, or the
passenger having been accepted as such by the railway,
he has come upon the railway's premises, or has entered
upon any means of conveyance provided by the railway. 1
Thus, in Brien v. Bennett, 2 the issue being whether or
not the plaintiff was a passenger, it was held that proof
that the plaintiff, having held up his finger to the driver
of the defendant's omnibus, and that the driver, having
stopped to take him up, and just as the plaintiff was
putting his foot on the step of the omnibus, had driven
on, causing the plaintiff to fall, entitled the plaintiff to
the verdict on that issue. So, in Smith v. St. P. C. By., 3
one was held to be a passenger who had hailed the
driver of a street car, and for whom the car had been
stopped, and who, while having one foot upon the step
of the rear platform of the car, was in the act of opening
its door when he was injured by a collision between that
car and another car.
219. Of course, the mere purchase of a ticket does
not make the purchaser a passenger ; he must also come
upon the railway's premises, or upon its means of con-
veyance before the relation can be said to have begun.
Nor is it enough that he has come to the railway's sta-
tion with the intention of taking passage by its train at
some indefinite time in the future. He must come to
the station a reasonable time before the departure of
the train by which he is to travel. 4 But if a person has
1 Brien v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. 724, 34 E. C. L. ; Warren v. F. R. R., 8 Allen
227 ; Davis v. C. L. R. R., 10 How. Pr. 300; Gordon v. G. St. & N. R. P., 40
Barb. 546; Smith v. St. P. C. Ry., 32 Mian. 1, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310
Allender v. C. R. R., 37 Iowa 264; \\\ St. L. & P. Ry. v. Rector, 104 111. 296
C. R. R. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 46J ; Cleveland v. X. .J Steamboat Co., 68 N. Y.306
II. & St. J. R.'R. v. Martin, 11 Bradwell 386; .serf. cf. I. C. R. R. v. Hudelson,
13 Ind. 325.
2 8 C. & P. 724, 34 E. C. L.
" 32 Minn. 1, 16 Am. & Enp. R. R. Cas. 310.
* Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79.
2 14 W 11 IN RELATION BEGINS AND ENDS.
the bona fide intention of taking passage by a train, and
if he goes to a station at a reasonable time, he is entitled
to protection as a passenger, not only from the moment
he enters upon the railway's premises, but also while
en route to the station in an omnibus run by the rail-
way to take passengers to their trains. 1
2'20. The relation of carrier and passenger having
been constituted, continues until the journey, expressly
or impliedly contracted for, has been concluded, and
the passenger has left the railway's premises ; thus,
one w T ho has been accepted as a passenger, is entitled to
protection as such while he is in the railway's station,
journeying on its line, in transit from one means of
conveyance to another provided by the railway, and
while he is temporarily absent from the cars at a way
station for a proper purpose; 2 but, in State v. G. T. R.
R., 3 it is held, that a passenger, who temporarily leaves
a train at a way station short of his destination, is,
while absent from the train, not a passenger. And in
Johnson v. B. & M. II. R., 4 it was held, that a pas-
senger who, having in the course of a journey by rail,
stopped over for a clay at a w r ay station, and wdiile
there having gone to the railway station for a purpose
not directly connected with his journey, was not a pas-
senger while at its station. So, in Commonwealth v.
B. & M. R. R., 5 in the case of an indictment of the
railway under the Massachusetts Statute of 1874, 6 for
negligently causing the death of a passenger, it was
held, that one who had left the train while it was in
motion had voluntarily ceased to be a passenger, and
had thereby forfeited his right to protection in that
1 Buffett v. T. & B. R. E., 40 N. Y. 168.
2 Clussman v. L. I. R. R., 73 N. Y. 606 ; J., M. & I. R. R. v. Riley, 39 Ind.
568; K. N. L. Packet Co. v. True, 88 111. 608.
'■' 58 Me. 176. * 125 Mass. 75.
5 129 Milss. 500, 1 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 457. 6 C. 372, I 163.
PERSONS OTHER THAN PASSENGERS. 215
character. A person who has been rightfully ejected
from the cars for misconduct or non-payment of fare,
cannot become a passenger by subsequently entering
the car and tendering his fare. 1 A passenger who has,
by mistake, taken a wrong train, is, so far as regards
protection from injury, a passenger on that train. 2
221. The relation of carrier and passenger ends only
when the journey contracted for has been concluded,
and the passenger has left the railway's premises ; 3 or,
if a reasonable time has elapsed after the arrival of the
train at the passenger's destination, which was sufficient
for the passenger to leave the railway premises. 4
III. PERSONS OTHER THAN PASSENGERS TO WHOM THE
RAILWAY IS LIABLE TO THE SAME EXTENT THAT IT
IS LIABLE TO ITS PASSENGERS.
222. The general principle stated in section 208, deter-
mines the liability of railways to post-office employes
carried under contract with the post-office, or under a
statutory duty imposed upon the railway ; thus, in Col-
lett v. L. & N. W. Ry., 5 the declaration having averred
that the defendant was bound by a statute to carry the
mails together with any officer of the post-office depart-
ment whom the postmaster-general should designate,
that the plaintiff was so designated, that while being
carried by the defendant, with the mails, he was* in-
1 O'Brien v. B. & W. R. R., 15 Gray 20; Hibbard v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 15
N. Y. 455 ; c/. Dietrich v. P. R. R., 71 Penna. St. 432 ; State v. Overton, 4 Zab.
438.
2 C, C. & I. R. R. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37.
3 P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222.
* Imhoff v. C. & M. R. R., 20 Wise. 344. 5 1G Q. B. 984, 71 E. O. L.
The persons, other than passengers, to whom the railway owes the same
measure of duty which it owes to its passengers, are enumerated in section
140, and the general principle determining the liability of the railway to
these several classes of persons is stated in section 208.
216 POST-OFFICE EMPLOYES.
jured by the negligence of the defendant's servants,
judgment was, on general demurrer, entered for the
plaintiff, Campbell, C. J., saying, " the defendant's duty
does not arise in respect of any contract between the
company and the persons conveyed by them, but is one
which the law imposes; if they are bound to carry
they are bound to carry safely;" and Patteson, J.,
adding, " the plaintiff's right to sue arises, not from any
particular contract with the defendants, but from their
general duty to carry the mails and officers ;" and Erie,
J., adding, " the defendants have a public duty to per-
form in conveying the servants of the public safely ;
the plaintiff has been injured by their neglect in the
performance of that duty, and has a right of action in
consequence." 1 In P. R. R. v. Price, 2 where a mail
agent, while engaged in the performance of his duty on
a train, had been killed by negligence on the part of
the railway, the court held that he was not a passenger,
but that he was " lawfully engaged" on the train within
the terms of the Pennsylvania Act of 4th April, 1868,
and that a recovery of damages for his death was barred
by that act. Railways are also liable to the same ex-
tent in the cases of soldiers carried under contract with
the government, 3 and agents carried under contract
with the express company employing them, 4 and vend-
ors of newspapers, refreshments, etc., who are permitted
by railways to travel on their trains for the purpose of
selling their wares to passengers ; 5 but a person accom-
1 See, also, Nolton v. W. E. E., 15 N. Y. 444 ; Seybolt v. N. Y„ L. E. & W.
E. E., 95 Id. 562 ; Hammond v. N. E. Ey., 6 S. C. 130 ; H. & I. C. Ey. v.
Hampton, 64 Tex. 427, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 291.
2 96 Penna. St. 256.
3 Tnmx v. E. E. E., 4 Lansing 198.
* Blair v. E. E. E., 66 N. Y. 313 ; Chamberlain v. M. & M. E. E., 11 Wise
238 ; Penna. Co. v. Woodworth, 26 Ohio St. 585.
5 Commonwealth v. V. C. E. E., 108 Mass. 7 ; Yeomans v. C, C. S. N. Co., 44
Cal. 71.
PASSENGERS OF OTHER LINES. 217
panying an express agent at his invitation, 1 and a news-
boy riding on a train without the permission of the
railway, and solely by the connivance of the train
hands, 2 are to be regarded as trespassers, for the rail-
way is no party to their jDresence on the train.
223. Upon the same principle, the railway is liable to
ihe passenger of another railway whose cars are run
over the line of the railway ; thus, in Grote v. C. &
H. By., 3 the defendant was held liable to the plaintiff,
who, while being carried as a passenger in the cars of
the S. & C. Rv. over the defendant's line (a rental being:
paid by the S. & C. Ry. to the defendant for the use of
its line), was injured by the fall of a bridge which had
been negligently constructed. So in Reynolds v. N. E.
Ry., 4 where a passenger having taken a ticket from rail-
way A for a journey over its line, and over the lines of
railways B and C, was injured on the line of B, it was
held that B was liable to him. So in Daly ell v. Tyrer, 5
the plaintiff having contracted with a ferryman to be car-
ried daily for a certain period was, while being ferried on
one of those days by a boat and crew hired by the ferry-
man, injured by negligence on the part of that crew, and
the master of the boat and crew was held liable to him."
224. The same rule is applied in cases of injury to
the passengers of another railway with whom a station
is jointly occupied; thus, in Tebbutt v. B. <fc E. Ry., 7
the stations at Bristol of the M., the B. & E., and the
G. W. railways were adjoining and open to one another,
1 M. P. Ry. v. Nichols, 8 Kans. 505.
2 Duff v. A. V. R. R., 91 Penna. St. 458. 8 2 Ex. 251.
* Roscoe's X. P. 591, cited by Thesiger, L. J., in Foulkes v. M. Ry., 5 C. P.
D. 169.
5 2S L. J. Q. B. 52, El. Bl. & El. 899, 96 E. C. L.
6 See also Martin v. G. I. P. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex. 9; Gill r. M. S. & L. Ry., L.
R. 8 Q. B. 186 ; Schopman v. E. & W. R. R., 9 dish. 24 ; W. St. L. & P. Ry."
v. Peyton, 106 111. 534.
' L. R Q. B. 73.
218 PASSENGERS OF OTHER LINES.
and the plaintiff having come in by a train of the M.
Ry., and intending to go on by the G. W. railway, was
passing through the defendant's station on his way to
the G. W- station when lie was injured by the negli-
gence of a servant of defendant in moving a truck laden
with luggage, and a verdict having passed for the plain-
tiff a rule for a new trial was discharged.
225. The same rule is applied in cases of injuries to
passengers of another railway at level crossings of the
two roads, and in jurisdictions, where the rule in Thoro-
good v. Bryan is not enforced, negligence upon the part
of the carrier constitutes no defence to the railway whose
negligence is the proximate cause of the injury. 1 Upon
the same principle in Patterson v. W. St. L. & P. Ry., 2
a line owned by the P. R. R. being used by several
companies under running powers granted by contract,
the plaintiff, a passenger on a train of one of those com-
panies, was held to be entitled to recover from another
of the companies for injuries caused by the negligent
displacement of a switch by a servant of the last-men-
tioned company.
226. The application of the same rule determines the
liability of a railway to the passengers of another rail-
way received by it for transportation in its cars ; thus in
Foulkes v. M. D. Ry., 3 the defendant company having
running powers over the line of the S. W. Ry., and the
plaintiff having bought at Richmond, on the line of the
S. W. Ry., a ticket from the S. W. company which en-
titled him to be carried to Hammersmith, on the line of
the M. D. Ry., and returned from there to Richmond,
the two companies by arrangement dividing the pro-
ceeds of the sales of such tickets, and having been re-
1 P. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 478.
* 54 Mich. 91, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 130.
8 4 C. P. D. 267, 5 Id. 157.
ATTENDANTS OF PASSENGERS. 219
ceived for his return journey as a passenger in a carriage
of the defendant company, was, at the termination of
that journey, injured in alighting at the Richmond sta-
tion of the S. W. Ry. by reason of the carriage being
unsuited to the station platform. After verdict for the
plaintiff, a rule to set aside that verdict and to enter a
verdict and judgment for the defendant was discharged
by the Common Pleas Division, and the defendant's
appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeal. The
judgments in both courts were put upon the ground
that the defendant having permitted the plaintiff to
travel by their train was bound to make provision for
his safety, but Bramwell, L. J., said, in concluding his
judgment, " if the contract had not been a contract with
the defendants and all that could have been complained
of was a non-feasance, I should hold that they were not
liable." This doctrine does not seem to be reconcilable
with the judgment in that case, nor with the drift of the
authorities.
227. Those who, by the permission of the railway,
come upon its premises to render personal assistance to
arriving or departing passengers are not mere licensees,
for the relation between the railway and its passengers
extends to and protects those whom the railway permits
to attend the passenger upon its premises. The railway
may, if it chooses, exclude such attendants from its
premises, or from any part thereof, but if it permits their
presence it is bound to protect them to the same extent
that it is bound to provide for the safety of its pas-
sengers ; thus, in McKone v. M. C. R. R., 1 the railway
was held liable for injuries caused by the unsafe con-
dition of its station surroundings to a husband who had
come upon the railway's premises to meet his wife, who
was a passenger upon an incoming train. So in Lan-
1 51 Mich. G01, 13 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 2'J.
220 SERVANTS OF OTHER LINES.
gan v. St. L., L, M. & S. Ry., 1 tlie railway was held
liable to a person who, having come to its station to see
a friend off, was, while walking on the platform, struck
in the back by the bumper of a moving engine, which
bumper projected eighteen inches over the platform. So
in Stiles v. A. & W. P. R. P., 2 where the injured person
had boarded a railway train, when it had stopped near a
station, to look for his wife and child who were pas-
sengers on the train, it was held that although he was
entitled to all the rights of a passenger, yet the proofs
showed so clear a case of contributory negligence on his
part that the railway was not to be held liable for his
injuries. 3 In Tobin v. P. S. & P. P. P., 4 this rule was
held to render the railway liable for its negligence to a
hackman who had driven a passenger to the railway
station. Lucas v. N. B. & T. P. P., 5 does not contradict
these authorities, for, in that case, the person injured hav-
ing entered a car of the defendant at its station, not as a pas-
senger, but forthe purpose of assistingan infirm passenger,
was injured in leaving the car after the train had started,
and it was, therefore, a clear case of self-inflicted injury.
228. The same rule is applied in cases of injuries to
the servants of another railway while upon the line or
premises of the defendant in the performance of their
duty to that other railway ; thus, in Vose v. L. & Y.
Py., e a station being in the joint occupation of the de-
fendant and the E. L. Ry., and the plaintiff's decedent,
a blacksmith in the service of the E. L. Py., while en-
gaged in repairing one of its wagons on a siding at the
station, was killed by the negligent shunting of a train
1 72 Mo. 392, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 355.
2 65 Ga. 370, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 195.
8 See also Doss v. M. K. & T. R. R., 59 Mo. 27 ; Hamilton v. T. & P. Ry., 64
Tex. 251, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 33G. * 59 Me. 183.
5 6 Gray 65. See also Griswold v. C. & N. W. R. R., Wise. , 23 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 463. 6 2 H. & N. 728.
SERVANTS OF OTHER LINES. 221
of the L. & Y. Co. on that siding. The jury having
found specially that the regulations for the management
of the station were defective, and that no persons other
than the defendants were negligent, the verdict was en-
tered for the plaintiff, and a rule for a new trial was
discharged. So in Graham v. N. E. By., 1 the plaintiff,
a guard in the service of the N. B. By., which had
statutory running powers over the defendant's line, was,
while engaged in the performance of his duty on a train
of the N. B. Company, passing over the defendant's line,
injured by his head coming in contact with a post which
was in such proximity to the line as necessarily to en-
danger the safety of guards on the trains. The jury
having found for the plaintiff, a rule for a new trial was
discharged. So in Snow v. H. B. B., 2 the W. B. B.
having, by agreement, running powers over certain
tracks of the defendant at D., and the plaintiff, a servant
in the employment of the W. B. B., having been injured
by a defect in the planks between the rails of the de-
fendant's tracks, was held entitled to recover from the
defendant. So in C. B. B. v. Armstrong, 3 the defendant
having running powers over the line of the P. & E. B.
B., and the plaintiff's decedent, a servant of the P. &
E. B. B., while travelling on its line in a hand-car for
the purpose of going to the point where he was to repair
a broken rail, having been killed by the negligent
movement of a train of the defendant company, it was
held that his connection with the P. & E. B. B. did not
bar his recovery from the defendant. So in Brown v.
G. W. By., 4 a collision having occurred at a railway
grade crossing between trains of two lines, because of a
failure of the air-brakes on one train to act, and because
1 18 C. B. N. S. 229, 114 E C. L. * 8 Allen 441.
3 49 Penna. St. 186, 52 Id. 282.
4 40 Up. Can. Q. B. 333, 2 Ont. Ap. Cas. 64, 3 Can. S. C. 159.
222 SERVANTS OF OTIIER LINES.
of the neglect of the servants on that train to apply the
air-brakes at a distance from the crossing sufficient to
permit the stoppage of the train by the use of its hand-
brakes, the railway owning and operating that train
was held liable to a servant of the other railway who
was injured by the collision while engaged upon the
other colliding train. 1 The same rule was applied in
Swainson v. N. E. Ry., 2 in the case of a signal man, one
of a joint station staff, but engaged and paid by one com-
pany, and injured by the negligence of the servants of
the other company, while in the discharge of his duties
to both companies. 3 The result of the authorities is,
that where a line, or a station, is in the joint occupancy
of two or more companies, the servants of each company
are not servants of the other companies, nor fellow-ser-
vants with the servants of those other companies, but
their right of recovery, in case of injury caused by neg-
ligence upon the part of those other companies, either
in an original defective construction of their lines, as in
Graham's case, or in a failure to maintain the line in an
adequate condition of repair, as in Snow's case, or in the
carelessness of their servants, as in Vose's, Armstrong's,
Warburton's, and Brown's cases, is that not of a servant
but of a passenger. In this class of cases, the injured
persons are more than mere licensees. The relation be-
tween the railway whom they serve and the other rail-
way, by whose negligence they are injured, is so far
founded upon a valuable consideration, that it raises upon
the part of that other railway an implied obligation that
it will not be negligent as against those servants.
1 See also Warburton v. S. W. Ry., L. R. 2 Ex. 30 ; P., W. & B. R. R. v. The
State, 58 Md. 372; I. C. R. R. v. Frelka, 110 111. 498, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 7 ; Penna. Co. v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St. 637, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
341 ; In re Merrill (C. V. R. R.), 54 Vt. 200, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 680;
Zeigler v. D. & N. R. R., 52 Conn. 543, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 400.
2 3 Ex. D. 341. 8 See also Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 143.
CONSIGNORS AND CONSIGNEES. 223
229. The same rule is applied in cases of injury to con-
signors and consignees personally assisting in the delivery
or reception of their freight. Thus, in Holmes v. N. E.
Ry., 1 it being the usage of business at a railway station for
coal wagons to be shunted on a siding and there unladen
by the shooting of their contents into cells beneath the
siding, the consignees personally assisting in the opera-
tion, the plaintiff while, with the acquiescence of the
railway's station-master, passing along a flagged way
over the cells for the purpose of getting some coal from
a wagon which had been consigned to him, was injured
by the giving way of a flag, and a consequent fall into
a cell ; and a verdict having passed for the plaintiff, a
rule to enter the verdict for the defendant for want of
evidence of negligence was discharged, upon the ground
that the relation between the consignee and the railway,
and the acquiescence of the station-master in the con-
signee's action raised an implied warranty on the part
of the railway, that its premises were reasonably safe,
and rendered it liable for the consequences of a breach
of that warranty ; and in the Court of Exchequer
Chamber, the order of the Exchequer Division was af-
firmed upon the ground stated in the judgments of the
court below. So, in Wright v. L. & N. W. Ry., 2 the
same principle was applied by the Court of Appeal in
the case of a consignee of cattle, who, while with the
permission of the railway's station-master, assisting in
the shunting of a car which had been consigned to him,
was injured by the negligent movement of another car
by the railway's servants, Coleridge, L. J., saying, " the
defendants being bound by contract to deliver the heifer
to the plaintiff, they, by their representative, the station-
master, allowed the plaintiff to take part in the delivery,
1 L. R. 4 Ex. 254, 6 Id. 123.
7 L. R. 10 Q. B. 298, 1 Q. B. 1 252.
224 CONSIGNORS AND CONSIGNEES.
and they were, therefore, bound to see that he did not
get injured by the negligence of their servants." So,
in A. V. R. R. v. Findlay, 1 the plaintiff, a teamster,
having gone to the defendant's station to receive a con-
signment of lime, and having brought his team up to
the track upon the assurance of the station agent that
no train would pass for half an hour, and a train hav-
ing come unexpectedly and rapidly, and injured the
plaintiff's horse, judgment upon a verdict for the plain-
tiff was affirmed in error. 2 But the railway is not
liable to a volunteer who, while assisting a consignee in
removing his freight, is injured by the breaking of a
crane erected by the railway on its premises, and per-
mitted to be used by the consignee, for the railway owes
no duty to the volunteer. 3 Nor is the railway liable to
a consignee who is contributory negligent, as, for ex-
ample, in driving a wagon into a passage way on the
side of a canal so narrow that in attempting to pass an-
other wagon he is thrown into the canal ; 4 or in going
on the line between the cars of a freight train for the
purpose of uncoupling the cars ; 5 or in carelessly cross-
ing the tracks in a railway yard ; 6 or in walking on the
line in a railway yard in front of a locomotive and
train which is obviously ready to move. 7
1 4 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 438.
1 See also Foss v. C. M. & St. P. R. R., 33 Minn. 392, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 113; Watson v. W. St. L. & P. Ry., 66 Iowa 164, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 114; I. C. R. R. v. Hoffman, 67 111. 287 ; Newson v. N. Y. C. R. R., 29
N. Y. 383 ; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 ; S. L. B. R. R. v.
Lewark, 4 Ind. 471 ; Same v. Lynch, 4 Ind. 494.
3 Blakemore ». B. & E. Ry., 8 El. & Bl. 1035, 92 E. C. L. In Heaven v.
Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 516, Cotton and Bowen, L. J J., question the propriety of
considering the plaintiff in Blakemore's case as a volunteer.
* Goldstein v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 46 Wise. 404.
5 Burns v. B. & L. R. R., 101 Mass. 50.
6 Rogstad v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 31 Minn. 208, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
648.
7 B. & O. R. R. v. Depew, 40 Ohio St. 121, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 64.
SPECIAL CONTRACTS. 225
230. The same rule is applied in cases of injury to
persons using for hire, or under special contract, any
portion of the railway's line or premises ; thus, in Mar-
fell v. S. W. Ry., 1 a railway having parallel to its line
a tramway, which was used by those of the public who
paid tolls to the railway for drawing goods in trucks on
the tramway, and which tramway crossed the railway's
line at a point where there were swinging gates, and
while the plaintiff's servants with a horse and truck
were crossing the line, the horse, becoming frightened
by an approaching train, swerved upon the line and
was killed, and it was held that the railway was liable,
for the plaintiff, by reason of his using the tramway
for hire, was entitled to insist upon its being reasonably
secure.
ry. THE MODIFICATION OF THE RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA
BY STATUTE.
231. The application -of the general rule, as stated
in section 208, has been limited by statute in Pennsyl-
vania, for the Act of 4 April, 1868, 2 provides "that
when any person shall sustain personal injury or loss
of life while lawfully engaged or employed about the
roads, works, depots, and premises of a railroad com-
pany, or in or about any train or car therein or thereon,
of which company such person is not an employe,
the right of action and recovery in all such cases
against the company shall be such only as would exist
if such person were an employe; provided, that this
section shall not apply to passengers." The constitu-
tionality of this statute has been sustained in Kirby v.
P. R. R., 3 Agnew, C. J., delivering the judgment, as
1 8 C. B. N. S. 52o, 98 E. C. L.
* Para. Laws 1868, p. 58, 2 Pur. Dig. pi. 5.
* 76 Penna. St. 500.
16
22G THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 18G8.
follows: "it maybe conceded that the natural rights
of men, among them that of personal security, are
guarded by the Bill of Rights, and ' that all courts shall
be open, and every man for an injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person, and reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial, or delay.' But in what respect
does this law trench upon this guaranty, or, indeed, on
any other in the Constitution? The person to be
affected by it must be one lawfully engaged or employed
on or about the road, etc. To be thus engaged he must
be there by his own consent. He is, therefore, volun-
tarily there, to perform some act or business connected
with the road or its works. He knowingly assumes a
relation regulated by the law, and thus places himself
under the operation of the law which governs the rela-
tion. He is not bound to assume the relation, and
when he does he acts with his eyes open. The law is
not retrospective, and takes from him no remedy for an
injury already sustained. The relation he assumes is
one of danger, and the fact of danger authorizes the
regulation by the State, as the conservator of the lives,
security, and property of her citizens. It is a police
regulation, which, having respect to the general good,
forbids individuals from undertaking a dangerous em-
ployment, except at their own risk, to the same extent
as if they were in the immediate employment of the
railroad company. Leaving each one to assert his
proper remedy against the person whose act of negli-
gence does him the injury, the law says to him that the
legal principle of respondeat superior shall have no
place in this particular relation ; that, as a matter of
proper policy for the good of all, those who voluntarily
venture into employment alongside of the servants of a
railroad company, shall have just the same remedies for
THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 1868. 227
injuries happening in the employment that these have,
and none other. In doing this, no fundamental right r
of the person thus voluntarily venturing is cut off or
struck down. The liability of the company for the
acts or omissions of others, though they be servants, is
only an offspring of law. The negligence which injures
is not theirs in fact, but is so only by imputation of law.
The law which thus imputes it to the company for rea-
sons of policy, can remove the imputation from the
master, and let it remain with the servant, whose negli-
gence causes the injury."
232. Paxson, J., states in his judgment in Mulherriu
v. D., L. & W. R. R., 1 that it is probable that the act was
passed in view of the assertion in C. R. R. v. Armstrong, 2
of the well-settled rule of law, that where one railway
grants to another railway running powers over its line,
a servant of the one railway is not a fellow-servant of
the servants of that other railway, and, therefore, not
barred from recovering from that other railway for in-
juries caused by the negligence of its servants. But
whatever may have been the reasons which induced the
legislative mind to enact the statute, it is certainly an
unjustifiable exercise of legislative power, and it ought
to be strictly construed. An analysis of the act shows,
that in order to bring any person within its purview it
must be proven, first, that the person is not a servant
of, or a passenger upon, the railway ; second, that the
injury must have occurred while the person injured was
lawfully engaged, or employed, on or about the line,
premises, or cars, of the railway, and that when these
facts are proven the right of recovery of the person in-
jured will be neither more nor less than that of a ser-
vant of the railway. The dictum of Gordon, J., in
1 81 PenDa. St. 366. » 49 Penna. St. 186.
228 THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 1868.
Ricard v. N. P. R. R., 1 that the words " engaged or em
ployed " as used in the statute comprehend " every
imaginable manner by which any one may, or might
be, brought in, upon, or about, the roadbed, cars, or
works of a railroad company," although quoted with
approval by Paxson, J., in P. R. R. v. Price, 2 would
seem to be disapproved of by the judgment of the court
iu the later case of Richter v. P. R. R 3 That dictum
is also irreconcilable with the reasoning upon which the
constitutionality of the statute is supported in Kirby v.
P. R. R., as a police regulation forbidding individuals
from knowingly undertaking a dangerous employment
connected with a railway line, except upon the implied
condition that tbey will hold the railway to no greater
liability than that which it incurs with regard to its
servants.
233. It has been held that the statute bars recovery,
in the case of a plaintiff who, while engaged in the ser-
vice of another party in loading coal on a siding which
was in the sole possession and under the exclusive con-
trol of the railway, was injured by the disengagement
from their engine of some cars which were not equipped
with a sufficient number of train hands to control them,
and which, running upon a down grade, came upon the
siding, the switch connecting the siding with the main
line having been left open by the negligence of the rail-
way's servants ; 4 where the railway had running powers
over the line of another company, and the plaintiff, a
freight brakeman in the employment of that other com-
pany, having left his train to turn a switch, while walking
on the line was run over by a train of the first-men-
tioned railway, of whose approach no notice was given; 5
1 80 Penna. St. 195. 2 96 Penna. St. 267.
» 104 Penna. St. 51 1. * Kirby v. P. K. K. ( 76 Penna. St. 508,
5 D., L. & W. R. Pv. v. Mulherrin, SI Penna. St. 366.
THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 1863. 229
where the plaintiff, having gone to a station to receive
freight consigned to him, and having, by permission of
the railway's agent, and for the purpose of unloading
his freight, entered a car upon a siding, was injured by
the negligence of the railway's servants in shunting cars
to the siding j 1 where a person, while unloading freight
from a ship lying at a wharf owned and controlled by
the railway, was injured by the negligence of the rail-
way's servants in permitting an unusual escape of steam
from an engine and so frightening the plaintiff's horses; 2
where the plaintiff, being the employe of a coal dealer,
and engaged in unloading cars upon a siding constructed
by the dealer upon his own land, and used by the rail-
way, not as part of its line, but only for the purpose of
delivering coal to the dealer, was injured by a collision
caused by the negligent shifting of cars from the defend-
ant's main line ; 3 and where the plaintiff, a mail agent
of the Post Office Department travelling on defendant's
line in the performance of his duties as such mail agent,
was injured by the negligence of the railway's servants
in disobeying orders and thus causing a collision. 4
234. The statute has been held not to bar recovery
in the case of a plaintiff who, while employed in and
about a rolling mill in hauling ashes in a barrow across
a siding upon his employer's premises, found the way
blocked by some empty cars unattached to any engine
or train, and in uncoupling and attempting to move the
cars was killed by a movement of the cars, caused by
the negligence of an engine-driver of the defendant
1 Ricard v. N. P. R. R., 89 Pcnna. St. 193.
J Gerard v. P. R. R., 12 Pi.ila. 394 ; 5 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 251.
3 Cummings v. P., C. & St. L. R R., 92 Penna. St. 82.
4 P. R. R. v. Price, 96 Penna. St. 256 (affirmed in 113 U. S. 219, on the
ground (hat the record raised no question of which the Supreme Court of the
United States could take cognizance on appeal from a State court).
230 THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 18G8.
in moving the cars without notice j 1 nor in the case
of a servant of the owner of a lumber yard adjoining
the railway line, in which yard there was a siding from
the railway, who was killed by cars run on the siding
and striking against a car with a defective brake and
unblocked, which had by the negligence of the rail-
way been permitted to remain on the siding. 2
235. Some of these decisions seem to be open to criti-
cism. In Kirby v. P. R. R., the negligence upon the
part of the railway was two-fold, first, in that the cars
that did the injury were insufficiently equipped with
train hands, and, second, in that the switch was negli-
gently left open. If the plaintiff had been a servant
of the railway he could not have recovered from the
railway upon the second ground, for that was the negli-
gence of his co-employes; but, although a servant, he
could have recovered upon the first ground of negli-
gence, for it was the duty of the railway to have its
cars equipped with a sufficient number of train hands
to prevent injury to other servants from that cause. It
would seem, therefore, that in that case the statute
ought not to have barred the plaintiff's recovery. The
case of Cummings v. P., C. & St. L. R. R., in which it
was held that the plaintiff came within the terms of the
statute, is not reconcilable with the case of N. P. R. R.
v. Kirk, in which, upon a similar state of facts, a con-
trary conclusion was reached. In the first-mentioned
case the locus in quo of the injury was a siding con-
structed by a coal dealer upon his own land, and used
by the railway, not as a part of its line (as was the case
in Kirby v. P. R. R.), but only for the convenience of
the dealer in delivering coal to him. This statute
1 Eichter v. P. K. K., 104 Penna. St. 511.
2 N. P. K. E. v. Kirk, 90 Penna. St. 15, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 45.
THE DUTY TO PASSENGERS. 231
ought to be repealed, for its only office is to relieve
railways from paying a just compensation to persons
injured, without fault on their part, by the negligence of
the servants of the railway. In future judicial applica-
tions of the statute, it may, perhaps, be borne in mind,
that to bar the plaintiff's recovery, it must be shown
that, not being a passenger or a servant, he voluntarily
entered upon an employment which exposed him to
danger in the course of the operation of the railway,
and that, if injured without fault on his part, he can
recover, notwithstanding the statute, wherever, under
like circumstances, a servant of the railway could re-
cover.
V. THE GENERAL DUTY OF THE RAILWAY TO PASSEN-
GERS.
The duty of the railway to its passengers, and to those to whom it otves
the same measure of duty that it owes to its passengers, requires it to
exercise the highest degree of care fur, but does not make it an in-
surer of, their safety.
236. As Montague Smith, J., said, in Readhead v. M.
Ry., 1 " the law of England has, from the earliest times,
established a broad distinction between the liability of
common carriers of goods and of passengers." In the
leading case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Holt, C. J., thus states
the rule with regard to the liability of common carriers
of goods and the reason for it. " The law charges this
person thus entrusted to carry goods against all events
but acts of God and of the enemies of the King.
For, though the force be never so great, as if an irre-
sistible multitude of people should rob him, never-
theless he is chargeable. And this is a politic estab-
lishment contrived by the policy of the law for the
1 L. R. 4 Q. B. 379. > 2 Ld. Raymond 918, 1 Sm. L. C. 291.
232 THE DUTY TO PASSENGERS.
safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs
oblige them to trust these sorts of persons, that they
may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these
carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all per-
sons that had any dealings with them, by combining
with thieves, etc., and yet doing it in such a clandestine
manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And
this is the reason the law is founded upon in that point."
It is obvious that neither the rule thus stated, nor the
reason given for it, is applicable to carriers of passen-
gers. In White v. Boulton, 1 Kenyon, C. J., at Nisi
Prius in 1791, directed the jury that carriers were
bound to carry their passengers "safely and properly."
In 1809, in Christie v. Griggs, 2 Sir James Mansfield,
C. J., held the carrier's duty to be, " that, as far as
human care and foresight could go, he would provide
safe conveyance." In Harris v. Costar, 3 Best, J., held
that the obligation to carry safely " meant that the de-
fendants were to use due care." Innumerable dicta to
a like effect might be quoted, but it is sufficient to cite
the words of Grier, J., who said, in the leading case in
the United States, 4 that " when carriers undertake to
convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency
of steam, public policy and safety require that they
be held to the greatest possible care and diligence. And
whether the consideration for such transportation be
pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of the pas-
sengers should not be left to the sport of chance or the
negligence of careless agents." The general rule, as
thus stated, is supported by a multitude of authorities. 5
1 Peake 113. 2 2 Camp. 79. 3 1 C. & P. 636, 11 E. C. L.
4 P. & K. R. R. v Derby, 14 Howard 468.
5 Christie v Griggs, 2 Camp. 80 ; Bremner i>. Williams, 1 C. & P. 414, 11 E. C.
L. ; Sharp v. Gray, 9 Bing. 457 ; White v. Boulton, Peake 113; Harris v. Cos-
tar, 1 C. & P. 636, 1 1 E. C. L. ; Fowler v. Locke, L. R. 7 C. P. 272, 9 Id. 751 n. ;
Searle v. Laveriek, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122; Kopitoff v. Wilson, 1 Q. B. D. 377;
RAILWAYS NOT INSURERS. 233
237. Railways, nor being insurers of the safety of
their passengers, nor liable for injuries to their pas-
sengers caused by an act of God, or resulting from in-
evitable accident, it would seem to follow that they
could not reasonably be held answerable for injuries to
their passengers resulting from such defects in their
machinery or appliances as could not have been guarded
against by the exercise of care on their part. Yet there
has been some conflict of authority on this point. This
question seems first to have been raised in Ingalls v.
Bills, 1 where the plaintiff, a passenger on a coach, was
injured by the breaking of an axletree of the coach by
reason of a hidden flaw, which the most careful exami-
nation failed to discover. Hubbard, J., in a learned
and soundly reasoned opinion, summed up the law in
the proposition that "where the accident arises from a
hidden and internal defect which a careful and thorough
Randall v. Newson, 2 Id. 102 ; Hyman v. Nye, 6 Id. 685 ; White v. F. R. R.,
136 Mass. 321 ; Sales v. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa 547 ; Wilson v. N. P. R.
R., 26 Minn. 280; Warren v. F. R. R , 8 Allen 233; Taylor v G. T. Ry.. 48
N. H. 229 ; T., H. & W. R. R. v. Baddeley, 54 111. 19 ; Dunn v. G. T. Ry.', 58
Me. 157 ; Tuller v. Talbot, 23 111. 357 ; P. & C. R. R. v. Thompson, 56 Id.
138 ; I. & St. L. R. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 ; T. H. & I. R. R. v. Jackson, 81
Ind. 20 ; Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 Id. 184; Penna.Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 ; M.
R. R. v. Blakely, 59 Ala. 477 ; Tanner v. L. & N. R. R., 60 Id. 621 ; Wheaton
v. N., B. & M. R. R, 36 Cal. 593 ; P. P. C. Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344 ; Der-
wort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 253; Flinn v. P., W. & B. R. R., 1 Houston (Del.)
499; U. P. R. R. v. Hand, 7 Kans. 392; Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush. 151;
Black v. C. R. R., 10 La. An. 38 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Worthington, 21 Md. 275 ;
McClary v. S. C. P. R. R, 3 Neb. 54 ; Laing v. Colder, 8 Penna. St. 482 ;
Meier v. P. R. R., 64 Id. 230 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Id. 351 ; I. & G.
N. R. R. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46 ; V. C. R. R. v. Sanger, 15 Grat. 236 ; P. &
R. R. R. v. Derby, 14 How. 468 ; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 Id. 469 ;
N. Y. C. R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 ; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill 406 ; The
State v. B. & O. R. R., 24 Md. 84 ; McElroy v. N. & L. R. R., 4 Cash. 400 ;
Schopman v. B. &. W. R. R., 9 Id. 24 ; Knight v. P.. S. & P. R. R., 57 Me. 202 ';
Fairchild v. C. S. Co., 13 Cal. 604; Jamison v. St. J. & S. C. R R., 55 Cal. 593,'
3 Am & Eng, R. R. Cas. 350 ; P. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462,
3 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 457; c/. L. C. Ry. v. Weams, 80 Ky. 420, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 399.
1 9 Mete. 1.
234 RAILWAYS NOT INSURERS.
examination vould not disclose, and which could not be
guarded against by the exercise of a sound judgment
and the most vigilant oversight, then the proprietor is
not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be
borne by the sufferer as one of that class of injuries for
which the law can afford no redress in the form of a
pecuniary recompense." In Readhead v. Midland By., 1
the plaintiff, a passenger by the defendant's line, was
injured by the derailment of the carriage in which he
was riding, caused by the breaking of the tire of a
wheel from a hidden flaw, which flaw it was proven was
not possible of discovery by the exercise of the greatest
care, either on the part of the railway company or of
the manufacturer of the wheel. The judge left it to the
jury to say whether on the evidence they were satisfied
that the injury to the plaintiff was due to the negligence
of the defendants. The jury found for the defendants,
and judgment was entered on the verdict for them, and
affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber on the ground that
carriers of passengers are not answerable as insurers for
the safety of their vehicles and appliances, but that
they are liable only for such accidents as may happen
from any defect therein which might have been pre-
vented by the exercise of due care on their part, and
that " the duty to take due care, however widely con-
sidered or however rigorously enforced, will not sub-
ject the defendants to the plain injustice of being com-
pelled by the law to make reparation for a disaster
arising from a latent defect in the machinery which
they are obliged to use, which no human skill or care
could either have prevented or detected." Blackburn,
J., dissented in the court below, conceding that the rule
in Coggs v. Bernard was not applicable, and that the
1 L. R. 2 Q. B. 412, 4 Id. 379.
RAILWAYS NOT INSURERS. 235
carrier of passengers is not an insurer, but holding that
the obligation of the carrier to provide a vehicle reason-
ably fit for the journey is absolute, and that a failure to
fulfill that obligation is sufficient to make hirn liable
for all the consequences, for the reason that the vehicle
being supplied and selected by the carrier, the passenger
having no means of examining the carriage and no voice
in its selection, there is an implied warranty that the
carriage is reasonably fit. In Alden v. N. Y. C. R. R., 1
the Court of Appeals of New York took the same view
as that expressed by Blackburn, J., but the later cases
in New York have followed the rule as laid down by
the Court of Exchequer Chamber. In Meier v. P. R.
R., 2 the injury resulted from a hidden flaw in the axle,
and judgment for the defendant was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, Agnew, J., saying : " Absolute liability
requires absolute perfection in machinery in all respects,
which is impossible. The utmost which human knowl-
edge, human skill, and human foresight and care can
provide is all that in reason can be required. To ask
more is to prohibit the running of railways unless they
possess a capital and surplus which will enable them
to add a new element to their business, that of in-
surers." 3
238. It is, therefore, the duty of the railway to ex-
ercise care in the provision of good and sufficient mate-
rial, to employ skilled engineers and contractors, and to
follow correct methods in the original construction, in-
spection, and subsequent maintenance in repair of its
1 26 N. Y. 102. 2 04 Pcnna. St. 225.
3 See also Gilson v. J. C. H. Ry., 76 Mo. 282, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 132 ;
Smith v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 42 Wise. 520 ; De Graff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
76 Id. L25; McPadden v. N. Y. C. R. R., 44 Id. 478; Caldwell v. N. J. S.
Co., 47 Id. 290; Carroll v. S. J. R. R., 58 Id. 126; G. R. & I. R. R. v. Boyd,
65 Ind. 526 ; Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340; Sawyer t. H. & St. J. R. R., 37
Id. 240.
236 EXTENT OF RAILWAY'S DUTY.
station approaches, station buildings, station platforms,
and of the embankments, bridges, cuttings, tunnels,
levels, roadbed, rails, and switches, which constitute its
line, and of the engines and cars which it uses in the
transportation of its passengers ; and it is also the duty
of the railway to adopt and put into operation a system
for the operation of its line, to make and enforce reason-
able rules and regulations for the safety of its passengers,
to employ a sufficient number of servants, to select its
servants carefully, to make and enforce regulations for
their guidance, and to use in the operation of its line
every reasonable precaution for the safe transportation
of its passengers. A failure of duty in any of these
respects will render the railway liable ; thus, where a
bridge or an embankment has broken down, its fall
must, in the absence of vis major, have resulted from
want of skill on the part of the engineer who planned
it, or on the part of the contractor who built it, or from
a failure to adopt the best method of construction or a
neglect to use materials of adequate strength, or from a
failure to maintain the bridge or embankment in a safe
condition. To relieve the railway from responsibility
for such an accident, it must appear that there was no
negligence in any one of these respects, and it is not
enough to show that the bridge was planned by a com-
petent engineer; 1 thus, in Grote v. C. & H. By., 2 where
a passenger was injured by the fall of a bridge, which
had been built by a competent engineer engaged by the
defendant, at the trial, Williams, J., directed the jury
" that the question was whether the bridge was con-
structed and maintained with sufficient care and skill
and of reasonably proper strength with regard to the
1 Grote v. C. & H. Ry., 2 Ex. 251 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Penna.
Rt. 351, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 407.
1 2 Ex. 251.
DUTY OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR. 237
purpose for which it was made, and that if they should
think not, and that the accident was owing to any such
deficiency, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover."
A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, a rule for
a new trial upon the ground of misdirection was refused,
Pollock, C. B., holding the test of freedom from liability
to be whether the defendant had employed a person
" fully competent to the work, and the best method is
adopted and the best materials are used," and adding :
" it cannot be contended that the defendants are not
responsible for the accident merely on the ground that
" they have employed a competent person to construct
the bridge."
239. The same principles are applicable in cases where
injury to a passenger results from the failure of any
means of transportation, whether resulting from original
defects in construction or from subsequent wear and tear
in operation. 1 While the railway has a right to assume
that rolling stock bought from a reputable manufacturer
is reasonably sufficient, and is not to be held liable for
latent defects in such rolling stock, which could not have
been discovered by the railway or by the manufacturer,
by any reasonable and practicable means of inspection, 2
yet where injury to a passenger results from an imper-
fection in the line, or in the means of transportation,
due to the negligence of the party who built the same
and furnished it to the railway, the railway is liable
therefor. 3
240. Upon the principle pointed out in Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, 4 if knowledge of the existence of a
1 Manser v. E. C. Ry., 3 L. T. N. 8. 585.
* G. B. & I. R. R. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537.
8 Grote v. C. & H. Ry., 2 Ex. 251 ; Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 ;
Hegeraan v. W. R. Corporation, 13 N. Y. 9 ; Readhead v. M. Ry., L. R. 4 Q.
B. 379 ; Burns v. C. & Y. Ry., 13 C. L. (N. S.) 543.
* L. R. 1 H. L. 93.
238 DUTY OF INSPECTION.
cause of mischief makes the railway responsible for the
injury it occasions, it will be equally responsible when,
by its negligence, the existence of that cause of mischief
is not known to it, and, of course, in such a case, the
negligence of the superintending officials of a railway
must be held to be negligence upon the part of the
railway.
241. It is the duty of the railway to vigilantly inspect
its line and buildings, and, as has been shown, the fact
that an injury was immediately caused by an act of God,
will not relieve the railway, if that injury could have
been guarded against by the exercise of care on the part
of the railway. It is also the duty of the railway, not
only to test its machinery and appliances before they
are put into use, but also to test them from time to time
subsequently, in order that it may be known if they are
deteriorating by wear and tear. 1 The criterion of neg-
ligence in such cases is, not whether the particular de-
fect, which was the cause of the injury, could possibly
have been detected by the use of scientific means of in-
vestigation, but whether the defect ought to* have been
observed practically and by the use of ordinary and
reasonable care. 2 So in the case of cars received by the
railway from another line for transportation over its
line, the duty of the railway requires it to subject such
cars to as thorough an inspection as the necessary exi-
gencies of the traffic permit ; thus, in Richardson v. G.
E. By. 3 the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's
line, had been injured by a collision caused by the break-
ing of the axle of a coal truck, resulting from a crack
which could have been discovered if the axle had been
1 Manser v. E. C. By., 3 L. T. N. S. 585 ; T. & St. L. R. R. v. Suggs, 62 Tex.
323, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 475.
2 Stokes v. E. C. Ry., 2 F. & F. 691 ; Robinson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 9
Fed. Rep. 877, 20 Blatch. 338.
3 I,. R. 10 C. P. 486, 1 C. P. D. 342.
DUTY OF INSPECTION. 239
scraped clean of dirt, and had been subjected to a minute
examination. The line of the Midland Railway con-
nected with the defendant's line at Peterborough, and
under a statute, 1 the defendants were bound to receive
and forward carriages and trucks delivered to them by
the Midland Company, and twenty to thirty thousand
of such trucks were received at that junction weekly and
forwarded. When this particular truck was brought
on the defendant's line at Peterborough certain defects,
in no way connected, however, with the defect which
ultimately caused the accident, were perceptible, and
such of the repairs as could be made were made. The
exigencies of traffic prevented the defendant from mi-
nutely examining the axle. The jury found specially
that the defect which caused the accident was discover-
able by careful examination, that it was not the duty of
the defendants to examine the axle, but that it was their
duty to require from the wagon company some strict
assurance that it had been thoroughly examined and
repaired. The judge directed a verdict for the defend-
ants, but the Court of Exchequer entered judgment for
the plaintiff upon the ground that the defendants were
negligent in not ascertaining that proper examination
had been made before the truck was allowed to proceed.
In the Court of Appeal, however, this judgment was re-
versed upon the ground that the defendants were not
bound to do more than had been done in the way of ex-
amining the truck under the circumstances of the case,
and that as the defects which were discovered were un-
connected with the particular defect causing the accident,
there was nothing to impose upon the defendants the
duty of making a more minute examination than the
exigencies of the traffic permitted.
242. The railway is, therefore, liable for negligence
1 Sec. 92 of 8 and 9 Vict. chap. 20.
240 DUTY OF MAINTENANCE.
in the original construction, or subsequent maintenance
of its roadway, 1 or of its rails, 2 or of its ties, 3 or of its
bridges, 4 or of its embankments, 5 or of its level crossings
of other lines, 6 or of its switches, 7 or of its rolling stock,
including cars, 8 car axles, 9 car brakes, 10 car wheels, 11 and
locomotives. 12
243. The duty of the railway extends to all its means
of transport, whether the particular means which proves.
to be deficient be, or be not, at the time of the injury,
1 G. W. Ky. v. Braid, 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 101 ; P., C. & St. L. R. K. v. Wil-
liams, 74 Ind. 462 ; O'Donnell v. A. V. R. E., 59 Penna. St. 259 ; V. C. R. R. v.
Sanger, 15 Gratt. 230 ; Mattison v. N. Y. C. R. R., 35 N. Y. 487 ; P., P. & J.
R. R. v. Reynolds, 88 111. 418.
2 Brignoli v. C. & G. E. R. R., 4 Daly 182; M. S. & N. J. R. R. v. Lantz,
29 Ind. 528 ; C, C, C. & I. Ry. v. Newell, 75 Ind. 542, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
377 ; George v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 34 Ark. 613, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
2y4 ; McPadden v. N. Y. C. R. R., 44 N. Y. 478 ; Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R., 56
Barb. 493.
3 P., C & St. L. R. R. v. Thompson, 56 111. 138 ; T. & P. R. R. v. Hardin, 62
Tex. 367, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 460.
* Grote v. C. & H. Ry., 2 Ex. 251 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Conroy, 68 111. 560 ;
Oliver v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 1 Edm. S. C. 589 ; Locke v. S. C. & P. Ry., 46 Iowa
109 ; K. P. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 ; Jamison v. St. J. & S. C. R. R., 55 Cab
593, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 350 ; B. S. O. & B. R. R. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551,
21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 466 ; D. & W. R. R. i>. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427, 21 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 160.
6 Henley v. H. R. R., 1 Edm. S. C. 359 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Penna.
St. 351 ; I. & G. N. R. R. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 343.
6 Graham v. G. W. Ry., 41 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 324.
7 N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v. Daugherty, 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.)
437 ; P. & R. I. R. R. v. Lane, 83 111. 449 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Worthington, 21
Md. 275 ; McElroy v. N. & L. R. R., 4 Cush. 400 ; Smith v. N. Y. & H. R. R.,
19 N. Y. 227 ; Caswell v. B. & W. R. R., 98 Mass. 194.
8 Penna. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 225 ; C, C, C. &
I. R. R. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461.
9 Hegeman v. W. R. R, 13 N. Y. 9 ; Alden v. N. Y. C. R. R., 26 N. Y. 102 ;
McPadden v. Same, 44 Id. 478 ; G. R. & I. R. R. v. Boyd, 65 Ind. 525 ; Richard-
son v. G. E. Ry., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, 1 C. P. D. 342.
10 N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v. Daugherty, 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.)
437 ; Costello v. S. & R. R. R., 65 Barb. 92.
11 T. W. & W. R. R. v. Beggs, 85 111. 80 ; Readhead v. M. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B.
412, 4 Id. 379 ; Meier v. P. K. R., 64 Penna. St. 225.
u Robinson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 20 Blatcf. 338 ; Manser v. E. C. Ry,
3 L. T. N. J. 585.
DUTY AS TO MEANS OF TRANSPORT. 241
under the management of the railway, or of a third
party ; * thus in John v. Bacon, 2 the defendant having
contracted to carry the plaintiff by steamer from Mil-
ford Haven to Liverpool, the mode of transit provided
being that passengers should go on board of a hulk,
owned by a third party, and moored in the harbor of
Milford Haven, and thence embark on the steamer when
it should stop en route from Haverford West. The
plaintiff, in descending from the hulk to the steamer,
fell into a hatchway in the hulk, negligently left un-
guarded, and after a verdict for the plaintiff a rule for
a new trial was discharged, the ground of decision being
that the carrier was answerable for any inadequacy in
the means of transit resulting from negligence on his
own part, or on the part of the person providing the
particular means whose defective condition was the cause
of injury to the passenger. So in Knight v. P. S. & P
P. P., 3 a railway which had contracted to carry a pas
senger part way by train and part way by steamboat,
was held liable to him for injuries caused by a failure
to maintain in good repair the wharf over which th<=
passenger was compelled to pass in going from the train
to the steamboat. So in V. & M. P. R. v. Howe, 4 the
wreck of a freight train having stopped the progress of
a passenger train at night, the passengers were directed
by the railway's servants to leave their train and tc
walk to another train beyond the wreck, crossing on a
plank over a ditch, there being no light at the plank,
and no notice being given of the approach to it, and the
plaintiff in so doing fell and was injured, and the rail-
way was held liable therefor. 5 So in Buffett v. T. & B.
1 John v. Bacon, L. R. 5 C. P. 437 ; Knight v. P. S. & P. R. R., 56 Me. 227 :
V. & M. R. It. v. Howe, 52 Miss. 202 ; Jamison v. St. J. & S. C. R. R., 55 Cal.
593, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 350.
1 L. R 5 C. P. 437. ' 56 Me 234. 4 52 Miss. 202.
6 Upon the same principle it was held in Northrup v. Ry. Pass. Assurance
16
212 SLEEPING-CARS, ETC.
R. R., 1 a railway was held liable to a passenger for in-
juries received in a railway omnibus while on his way
to the railway station, and in N. J. R. R. v. Palmer, 2 a
New Jersey railway was held liable for injuries re-
ceived by a passenger while crossing on a ferry boat
from New York to Jersey City.
244. Railways are also liable for injuries received by
their passengers in sleeping-cars and other cars run by
the railway as a part of its train, although such cars
may be owned and manned by an independent corpora-
tion, and although the passenger may have specially
contracted with that independent corporation for the
privilege of riding in such car. Thus, in Penna. Co. v.
Roy, 3 the plaintiff, having purchased a ticket from the
defendant, and become a passenger on its line, also pur-
chased a ticket from the Pullman Palace Car Co., and
having taken a seat in a car of the latter company,
which was run as part of a train of the defendant, was
injured by the falling of a berth in the car, resulting
either from a defective construction of the car, or from
negligence on the part of the servants in charge of the
car. Judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff' was re-
versed for an error in the court below in admitting ir-
relevant evidence ; but the liability of the defendant to
the plaintiff was thus clearly stated by Harlan, J. : " the
duty of the railroad company was to convey the passen-
ger over its line. In performing that duty, it could not,
consistently with the law and the obligations arising out
of the nature of its business, use cars or vehicles whose
inadequacy or insufficiency, for safe conveyance, was
Co., 43 N. Y. 516, that the personal representatives of a person injured in the
course of a journey by a connecting railway and steamboat line, by a fall on a
9lippery sidewalk while walking from steamboat to train, could recover under
a policy stipulating for indemnity against injury " when caused by any accident
while travelling by public conveyances, etc."
1 40 27- Y. 168. » 4 /room (N. 1.) 90. 3 J 02 U. S. 451.
SLEEPING-CAES, ETC. 243
discoverable upon the most careful and thorough ex-
amination. If it chose to make no such examination,
j
or to cause it to be made ; if it elected to reserve or ex- '
ercise no such control or right of inspection, from time
to time, of the sleeping-cars which it used in convey-
ing passengers, as it should exercise over its own cars,
it was chargeable with negligence or failure of duty.
The law will conclusively presume that the conductor
and porter, assigned by the Pullman Palace Car Com-
pany to the control of the interior arrangements of the
sleeping-car in which Hoy was riding when injured, ex-
ercised such control with the assent of the railroad
company. For the purposes of the contract under
which the railroad company undertook to carry Roy
over its line, and, in view of its obligation to use only
cars that were adequate for safe conveyance, the sleep-
ing-car company, its conductor, and porter, were, in law,
the servants and employes of the railroad company.
Their negligence, or the negligence of either of them,
as to any matters involving the safety or security of
passengers while being conveyed, was the negligence of
the railroad company. The law will not permit a rail-
road company, engaged in the business of carrying per-
sons for hire, through any device or arrangement with
a sleeping-car company whose cars are used by the
railroad company, and constitute a part of its train, to
evade the duty of providing proper means for the safe
conveyance of those whom it has agreed to convey." 1
So, in Thorpe v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 2 a passenger,
being unable to obtain a seat in any car of the train
other than the drawing-room car (which was not owned
nor manned by the railway), seated himself in that car,
1 Pee also C. C, C. & I. K. R. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461, 8 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 371 ; Kinsley v. L. S. & M. S. R. R, 125 Mass. 54.
* 76 N. Y. 402.
244 IMPROVED APPLIANCES.
and, having refused to pay the extra fare demanded for
a seat in that car, he was assaulted by the porter in
charge of that car, and the railway was held liable to
the passenger.
VI. THE DUTY OF THE RAILWAY AS TO THE ADOPTION
OF IMPROVED APPLIANCES AND METHODS OF OPERA-
TION.
The duty of the railway to its passengers requires it to adopt such im-
proved appliances and methods of operation as, having been tested
and found to materially contribute to the safety of railway operations,
are in practical use, and can be in fact adopted.
- 245. The standard of railway efficiency changes from
day to day with the progress of discoveries in science
and inventions in the arts, and that system and those
appliances of operation, whose adoption and application
a few years ago were regarded as the full performance
of the railway's duty to its passengers would be, to-day,
considered, in the practice of well-managed railways, to
fall far short of an adequate performance of that duty.
It is obviously within the scope of treatises upon engi-
neering and upon railway operation, and not within the
scope of a law book, to prescribe the particular system
and appliances which, according to the standard of to-
day, ought to be enforced and used by railways, but it
may be proper to notice here certain practical points
which railway experience has, up to this time, estab-
lished. The first point is the necessity of an intelligent
financial administration based upon sound principles,
for a railway whieh is under the pressure of chronic
pecuniary embarrassment cannot be as efficiently oper-
ated as one whose earnings exceed its necessary dis-
bursements for operating expenses, maintenance of line
and rolling stock, and payment of interest upon funded
debt, to say nothing of dividends to shareholders. If
IMPROVED APPLIANCES. 245
its embarrassments are so great as to involve the creation
of a floating debt, incurred for operating expenses, and
especially if its employes are not promptly and ade-
quately paid, it is obvious that the due maintenance of
line and rolling stock will be neglected, and that its
service will be disorganized. The next point is the
necessity of the organization of the service of the line on
a comprehensive system. It needs no argument to show
that the employes of a railway which undertakes to
move a large volume of traffic are so many in number,
and their duties are so various, and those duties require,
for their right performance, so much intelligence and
concentration of purpose that the employes must not.
only be adequately remunerated, and have the added
stimulus of anticipated promotion as a reward for faith-
ful service, and of prompt punishment for their non-
performance of duty, but they must also be organized,
trained, subjected to discipline, and controlled in their
action by wisely framed regulations which will, as far
as possible, minimize the exercise of individual discretion
by subordinates. The next point is that a thorough
and vigilant inspection of the line and a free use of the
telegraph in operating it, especially if the block system
be adopted and enforced, will, to a great extent, diminish
the danger of collision on the line with either moving
or stationary obstructions other than such as necessarily
result from want of fencing and the frequency of grade
crossings; and automatic train brakes will, if obstruc-
tions be observed, enable the train to be brought to a
speedy stop, and the modern increased solidity of the
cars, and their close and rigid coupling will, if the obstruc-
tion be met, prevent the breaking up or telescoping of
the cars. 1 There are many other points that might be
1 Railway science has not yet solved the problem of heating cars in such a
manner as to avoid the danger from fire in cases of derailment.
2-16 IMPROVED APPLIANCES.
noted, such as the use of guard rails on bridges and em-
bankments ; the flooring of bridges, so as to prevent the
falling of derailed engines or cars upon the trusses of
the bridge ; the connection of sidings with the main line
tracks so that a train must back in order to go upon the
siding ; the locking of sidings so that a train cannot be
heedlessly moved from the siding to the line ; the mark-
ing of ends of trains by flags and lights ; the guarding of
switches by automatic targets and lights, and the oper-
ation of the line upon the block system, and by the use
of interlocking signals whose normal condition is
danger, and which can only be moved to safety by levers
worked in the block houses. 1 Yet it cannot be laid
down as a general rule of law that the duty of every
railway to its passengers requires it to adopt in its en-
tirety the system of operation and the appliances to
which reference has been made, or any other system or
appliances, but it can only be said, that if it be proven
that any particular appliance or method having been
tested and found to materially contribute to the safety
of railway operations, is in practical use, could have
been adopted by the railway, and if adopted would have
prevented the injury to the plaintiff, it is then for the
jury to determine, whether or not the failure to adopt
that particular appliance or method was, under all the
circumstances of the case, negligence upon the part of
the railway. 2 The rule on this subject is well illustrated
1 See Barry's " Railway Appliances ;" Adam's " Notes on Railroad Accidents."
3 Freemantle v. L. & N. W. Ry., 10 C. B. N. S. 95, 100 E. C. L.; Ford v. L.
& S. W. Ry., 2 F. & F. 730 ; Hegeman v. Western R. R. Corporation, 13 N. Y.
9 ; Smith v. N. Y. & II. Ry., 19 Id. 127 ; Brown v. N. Y. C. Ry., 34 Id. 404 ;
Taylor v. Ry., 48 N. II. 304 ; B. & O. Ry. v. State, 29 Md. 252, Id. 420 ; Warren
v. Fitchburg Ry., 8 Allen 227 ; LeBaron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Id. 312;
Meier v. P. E. R., 64 Penna. St. 225 ; F. & B. Turnpike Co. v. P. & T. R. R., 54
Id. 345 ; L. <fc B. R. R. v. Doak, 52 Id. 379 ; N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v.
nerty, 11 W. N. C. 437; I. & G. N. Ry. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 3 Am. &
Rng. R. R'. Cas. 343 ; Bowen v. N. Y. C. R.R.,18 N.Y.40* ; K. C. R.R. v. Thomas,
IMPROVED APPLIANCES. 247
by the case of Freemantle v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1 in
which the general obligation of the railway as to the
adoption of improved appliances was discussed with
special reference to injury to property caused by fire
communicated by sparks escaping from an engine.
There was contradictory evidence in the cause as to the
mode of construction of the engine, the sparks from
which caused the fire, as to the sufficiency of its appli-
ances for the prevention of the emission of sparks, and
as to the possibility of preventing their emission by the
use of appliances other than those which were used.
Williams, J., directed the jury that the railway "in ihe
construction of their engines are not only bound to em-
ploy all due care, and all due skill for the prevention
of mischief occurring to the property of others by the
emission of sparks or any other cause, but they are also
bound to avail themselves of all the discoveries which
science has put within their reach for that purpose,
provided they are such as, under the circumstances, it
is reasonable to require the company to adopt. For
example, if the danger to be avoided were insignificant,
or very unlikely to occur, and the remedy suggested
were very costly or very troublesome, or such as inter-
fered materially with the efficient working of the engine,
then you will have to say whether it could reasonably
be expected that the company should adopt such a
remedy for such an evil. On the other hand, if the
risk were considerable, and if the expense or trouble or
inconvenience of providing the remedy is not great, in
proportion to the risk, then you would have to say
whether the company could reasonably be excused from
79 Ky. 1G0, 1 Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas. 79 ; Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109 U. S.
478; Bartley v. G. R. R., 60 Ga. 182; N. & J. R. R. v. McNeil, 61 Miss. 434,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 518.
1 10 C. B. N. S. 95, 100 E. C. L.
24S IMPROVED APPLIANCES.
availing themselves of such a remedy, because it might,
to some extent, be attended with cost or other disadvan-
tage to themselves." After a verdict for the plaintiff, a
rule for a new trial on the ground of misdirection was
refused.
246. It is said in some cases, that the duty of the
railway does not require it, for the sake of making-
travel on its road free from peril, to incur a degree of
expense which w r ould render the operation of its line
impracticable; 1 yet it may be questioned whether the
cost of the adoption of new appliances or modes of
operation, can be taken into consideration as an ele-
ment in determining the duty of the railway, for if
their adoption be necessary to the safe operation of the
line, the railway ought to adopt them whatever their
cost.
247. The extent of the application of this rule is, of
course, dependent on the facts of the particular case.
A newly constructed railway line, especially if laid out
through a thinly settled territory, moving but little traf-
fic, and running its trains at a low rate of speed, cannot
be expected to be either equipped or operated in precisely
the same manner as is necessary in the case of a rail-
way which moves a large volume of traffic, through a
settled country, and which runs its trains at a high rate
of speed. It may well be held that the last-mentioned
railway is negligent if it fails to adopt every appliance
and every method of operation which has been proved
to conduce to the safety of passengers ; while in the
case of the first-mentioned railway, its appliances and
methods of operation need only be such as the experi-
ence of well-managed railways has shown to be essential
to the safe operation of such a line. If any more strin-
1 P., C. & St. L. R. R. v. Thompson, 56 111. 138 ; K. C. R. R. v. Thomas, 79
Ky. 160, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79.
IMPROVED APPLIANCES. 249
gent rule than this is enforced, all railways must either
become insurers of the safety of their passengers or cease
their operations. If adequate tests of trial and use
have shown that any particular appliance or method of
operation will materially tend to secure the safety of
passengers, it may well be held that the failure to adopt
it is negligence on the part of the railway. But rail-
ways are not to be expected to avail themselves of every
new invention that is brought to their notice. The
suggested improvement must have passed beyond the
stage of experiment, and its theoretical sufficiency must
have received the seal of a recognized practical effi-
ciency before a railway can be held negligent for failing
to adopt it. While on the one hand the evidence of
this recognition cannot be found in the fact that one or
even some railways have adopted the particular appli-
ance, so, on the other hand, the fact that other railways
have not adopted it is not conclusive proof that it ought
not to have been adopted in the particular case ; and
the test in any such case is, whether or not the par-
ticular appliance is of recognized efficacy, and, under
like conditions, in general use by well-managed rail-
ways. In the application of these principles it is to be
borne in mind, that, in order to hold the railway liable
for negligence in failing to adopt and put into practical
operation any specific appliance or method of operation,
it must be shown that the adoption of the particular
appliance or method of operation would have prevented
the injury to the plaintiff, and that a well-managed
railway would, having regard to the situation of the
particular railway and the volume of traffic which it
moved, have adopted the particular appliance.
250 RAILWAY REGULATIONS.
VII. RAILWAY REGULATIONS AS AFFECTING PASSENGERS.
248. It is both the right and the duty of the railway
to make regulations for the safe conduct of its business,
but those regulations must be reasonable in themselves
and must be so published, that all persons who are to
be affected thereby, may have an opportunity of learn-
ing the existence and effect of such regulations. 1 Where
the regulations are, in themselves, reasonable, and have
been properly published, the passenger is bound to
inform himself as to their effect, and he must conform
thereto; 2 thus, in Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R., 3 Woodward,
J., said, the passenger's " consent is implied to all the
company's reasonable rules and regulations for entering,
occupying, and leaving their cars, and if injury befall
him by reason of his disregard of regulations which are
necessary to the conduct of the business, the company
are not liable in damages, even though the negligence
of their servants concurred with his own negligence in
producing the mischief."
249. There is some conflict in the cases upon the
question as to the determination of the reasonableness
of any particular regulation by the court or by the jury.
In some cases 4 it is held, that it is for the court
to determine whether any particular regulation is rea-
sonable. In other cases it is held, that the jury is the
appropriate tribunal for the determination of that ques-
1 McDonald v. C. & N. W. R. R., 26 Iowa 124 ; Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R.,
30 Penna. St. 238 ; P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Id. 326 ; P. R, R. v. McClurg, 56 Id.
294 ; Powell v. P. R. R., 32 Id. 414 ; C. R. R. v. Green, 86 Id. 421 ; O'Donnell
v. A. V. R. R-, 59 Id. 239 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Id. 139 ; B. & M. R. R. v.
Rose, 11 Neb. 177, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 253.
2 Britton v. A. & C. A. L. Ry., 88 N. C. 536, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 391 ;
B. & M. R. R. v. Rose, 11 Neb. 177, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 253.
s 30 Penna. St. 238.
* Ilibbard v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 15 N. Y. 455 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Fleming,
14 Lea (Tenn.) 128, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 347.
RAILWAY REGULATIONS. 251
tion. 1 The last cited cases would seem to enunciate the
sounder doctrine, especially in cases where the railway-
has not been by statute empowered to impose such reg-
ulations upon its passengers, for there is no analogy
between railway regulations as affecting passengers, who
are strangers to the railway corporation and ordinary
corporate by-laws as affecting members of the corpora-
tion. Whether or not any particular railway regula-
tion, as affecting the action of a passenger, imposes a
proper restriction upon that passenger's independence
of action, can only be determined upon a consideration
of the circumstances of the particular case, and for such
a consideration the jury, rather than the judge, would
seem to be the proper tribunal. The following regula-
tions have been held to be reasonable : requiring pas-
sengers to enter the cars only from the station plat-
form ; 2 prescribing the place and manner of leaving the
cars; 3 forbidding passengers to ride in baggage cars,
etc.; 4 forbidding passengers from putting their arms
out of car windows ; 6 forbidding passengers to ride on
platforms of cars ; 6 providing that specified trains shall
not stop at particular stations ; 7 forbidding passengers
to ride on freight trains ; 8 permitting passengers to ride
on freight trains only upon certain specified conditions. ,J
1 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 221 ; State v. Overton, 4 Zab. 435 ; Bass v.
C. & N. W. Ry., 36 Wise. 450 ; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520.
* McDonald v. C. & N. W. R. R., 26 Iowa 124.
3 P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 326.
* P. R. R. v. Langdon, 92 Penna. St. 21 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Id. 139.
6 P. & C. R. R. v. McClurg, 56 Penna. St. 294.
6 Wills v. L. & B. R. R., 1 29 Mass. 351 ; A. G. S. Ry. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 194.
7 Trollinger v. E. T., V. & G. R. R., 11 Tenn. 533; Beauchamp v. I. & G.
N. Ry., 56 Tex. 239.
8 Murch v. C. R. R., 29 N. H. 9.
9 B. & M. R. R. v. Rose, 11 Neb. 177, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 253 ; I. &
St. L. R. R. v. Kennedy, 77 Ind. 507, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 467 ; Arnold v.
I. C. R. R., 83 111. 273 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Flagg, 43 Id. 364 ; C, C. & C. R. R. v.
Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457 ; Law v. I. C. R. R., 32 Iowa 534.
252 RAILWAY REGULATIONS.
250. It is the duty of a railway to enforce its regula
tions ; * and railway servants, by permitting the passen-
gers to disobey regulations, will make the railway liable
for injuries caused to passengers by such disobedience;
but the servant's dispensing jjower does not apply to
regulations which forbid a passenger to occupy a posi-
tion of danger. Thus, in P. R. R. v. Langdon, 2 where
the plaintiff's decedent had been injured while riding
in the baggage car, in violation of the company's rules,
a reasonable view was taken as to the conductor's dis-
pensing power, Paxson, J., distinguishing between rules
which have regard to the convenience of the railway,
others to the comfort of the passenger, and yet others to
the safety of the passenger, and holding that a conduc-
tor cannot, in violation of a known rule of the railway,
license a passenger to occupy a place of danger so as to
make the railway responsible. Of course that disobe-
dience upon the part of the passenger to the railway's
regulations, which is to relieve the latter from the con-
sequences of the negligence of its servants, must be a
disobedience which is a proximate cause of his injury.
Thus, in P. P. P. v. Langdon, 3 the passenger was riding
in the baggage car, and was killed by reason of being
there ; while in L. & B. P. P. v. Chenewith, 4 the plain-
tiff's freight car was, in violation of the rules, attached
to a passenger train, but the plaintiff was injured by
reason of the negligence of the engine-driver in run-
ning over a cow upon the track. And in Creed v. P.
R. P., 5 a passenger, in violation of rules, was riding in
a caboose attached to a mixed freight and passenger
1 Britton v. A. & C A L. P.*., 88 N. C. 536, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
391.
7 92 Penna. St. 21. 3 92 Penna. St. 21.
4 52 Id. 382. & 86 Id. 139.
STATIONS. 253
train, but the position of the passenger was not the
cause of his injury.
VIII. STATION APPROACHES, PLATFORMS, AND BUILDINGS.
251. The railway is liable for negligence in its con-
struction of, or failure to repair, its station approaches. 1
Thus, in Longmore v. G. W. Ry., 2 the plaintiff's dece-
dent, while on his way to the defendant's booking office
at a station on a moonlight night, in crossing a wooden
bridge over the defendant's line, fell through an aper-
ture in the side railing and was killed, and the defend-
ant was held liable, upon the ground that the defect was
not patent, and that it was for the jury to determine
whether the bridge was reasonably safe. So, in Burgess
v. Gr. W. Ry., 3 the plaintiff, desiring refreshments, hav-
ing alighted at a station where he was to change cars
after dark, and the surroundings of the station not being
lit, procured a porter with a lantern to show the way to
a public house. While there he heard a train bell ring,
and, hurrying back by the most direct line to the train,
and mistaking the engine light for that of the station,
fell into a ditch on the defendant's premises and was
injured. After verdict for the plaintiff, a rule for a new
trial was refused. The railway is also liable for the
reasonable sufficiency of the approaches to a telegraph
office at a station. 4
1 Burgess v. G. W. Ry., 6 C. B. N. S. 923, 95 E. C. L. ; Hulbert v. N. Y. C.
R. R., 40 N. Y. 145; C. & I. C. R. R. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408; Bennett v.
L. & N. R. R., 102 U. S. 577 ; Hart wig v. C & N. W. Ry., 49 Wise. 3 "8, 1
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65 ; Tobin v. P. S. & P. R. R. 59 Me. 183 ; Forsyth v.
B. & A. R. R., 103 Mass. 510; Dillaye v. N. Y. C. R. R., 56 Barb. 30; Hoff-
mann v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 75 N. Y. 605 ; C. & N. R. R. v. Fillmore, 57
111. 265 ; Quimby v. B. & M. R. R., 69 Me. 340 ; Longmore v. G. W. Ry., 19
C. B. N. S. 183, 115 E. C. L.
* 19 C. B. N. S. 183, 115 E. C. L.
8 6 C. B. N. S. 923, 95 E. C. L.
« Clussman v. L. I. R. R., 73 N. Y. 606.
254 STATION PLATFORMS.
252. It is the duty of the railway to provide, at its
stations, reasonable accommodations for waiting passen-
gers ; and the railway is, therefore, liable for negligence
with regard to its station buildings, 1 urinals, 2 and station
platforms. 3 The railway is also liable for negligence in
permitting snow and ice to remain on its station plat-
forms. 4 The railway is also liable for injuries resulting
from its failure to adequately light its stations and plat-
forms. 5 Thus, in Beard v. C. & P. K. R. R., fi the rail-
way was held liable to a passenger injured by falling in
the dark down an unlit stairway on the railway's prem-
ises from the station platform to the public highway, the
stairs having been constructed by an express company,
but there being nothing to notify jDassengers that the
stairs were not intended for their use. Railways are
also liable for injuries to passengers caused by obstruc-
tions upon station platforms. Thus, in Martin v. G. N.
Ry., 7 the plaintiff, having arrived at the defendant's sta-
1 See the charge of Maule, J., to the jury, as reported in Martin v. G. N.
Ry., 16 C. B. 179, 81 E. C. L., and also the judgment of Dillon, J., in Mc-
Donald v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26 Iowa 124 ; and the note of Judge Redfield to
the last cited case in 2 Redf. Ry. Cas. 532.
a McKone v. M. C. R. R., 51 Mich. 601, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 29.
s Brassell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 84 N. Y. 241 ; Dobiecki v. Sharp, 88 Id.
203, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 485 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Scates, 90 111. 586 ;
McDonald v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26 Iowa 124, 29 Id. 170 ; St. L., L M. & S. R. R.
v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 198 ; P. R. R.«. Henderson,
51 Penna. St. 315 ; L. &N. R. R. v. Wolfe, 80 Ky. 82, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R
Cas. 625 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Grush, 67 111. 262 ; Liscomb v. N. J. R. R., 6 Lans.
75.
* Seymour v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 3 Biss. 43 ; Sheppard v. M. Ry., 20 Weekly
Reporter 705 ; Weston v. N. Y. E. R. R., 73 N. Y. 595.
5 Renneker v. S. C. R. R., 20 Shand (S. C.) 219 ; Stewart v. I. & G, N. Ry.,
53 Tex. 289, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 497 ; Forsyth v. B. & A. R. R., 103
Mass. 510 ; Beard v. C. & P. R. R., 48 Vt. 101 ; Knight v. P. S. & P. R. R., 56
Me. 234; Patten v. C. & N. W. Ry., 32 Wise. 524 ; Patten v. C. & N. W. Ry.,
36 Id. 413 ; Peniston v. C, St. L. & N. O. R. R., 34 La. An. 777 ; Buenemann
v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn. 390, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 153 ; Quaifei).
C. & N. W. Ry., 48 Wise. 513.
6 48 Vt. 101.
T 16 C. B. 179, 81 E. C. L.
STATION PLATFOEMS. 255
tion within two minutes of the time of departure of his
train, in running along the line in the dark, beyond the
station platform, in order to reach the train, fell over a
switch handle and was injured. No question of con-
tributory negligence was raised in the cause, but the de-
fence was rested entirely upon the ground that the
plaintiff's negligence had been the exclusive cause of the
accident; and the jury having found a verdict for
the plaintiff a rule for a new trial was refused. 1 So in
Nicholson v. L. & Y. Ry., 2 the railway was held liable
to a plaintiff who had been put down from the defend-
ant's train at a station, and the usual place of egress
being blocked by another train, in attempting to pass
behind that other train, he stumbled over some hampers
which had been put out of its rear carriage, and was
thereby injured.
253. Railways are also liable to passengers on station
platforms for injuries caused by objects negligently
thrown or falling from passing trains, as, for instance,
sticks of wood, 3 or mail bags. 4 In Riley's and Maine's
cases, the railway was held liable because the negligent
acts were done by its servant, and in Carpenter's and
Snow's cases, the mail bags having been thrown out by
postal agents, who were not servants of the railway, the
railway was held liable because it had reason to appre-
hend that mail bags would be thrown from the passing
train on the particular platform on which the injury
was done, and it was, therefore, bound to guard passen-
gers on its platform from the danger of being struck by
1 Martin v. G. N. Ry. has been criticised by Watson, B., in Cornman v. E. d
By., 4 II & N. 781.
*3II. &C. 534.
■ J. M. & I. R. R. v. Riley, 34 Ind. 568 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Maine, 67 111.
298.
* Snow v. F. R. R., 136 Mass. 552, 18 Am. & Eng.R R. Cas. 161 ; Carpenter
v. B. & A. R. R., 24 Hun 104, 97 N. Y. 494, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 331.
250 STATION PLATFORMS.
mail bags. The doctrine of these cases is further illus-
trated by Muster v. C, M. & St. P. Ey., 1 and by Wal-
ton v. N. Y. C. S. C. Co., 2 in the former of which cases
the railway was held not to be liable to a servant who,
while at work on a station platform, was injured by a
mail bag thrown from a passing train, it being proven
that the railway had no reason to apprehend that mail
bags would be thrown on that particular platform ; and
in the latter of which cases, the railway was held not
to be liable for injuries to a passenger upon a station
platform, caused by the act of a porter of a private car
in throwing, for his own convenience, upon the plat-
form from a passing train, a bundle of soiled clothes,
the porter not being a servant of the railway, and the
railway having no reason to apprehend that such a
negligent act would be done. Of course, where the
article which does the injury accidentally falls from a
passing train, or where the injured passenger is con-
tributorily negligent, the railway cannot be held liable
for his injuries. 3 Eailways are also liable to persons
lawfully upon their station platforms, for injuries caused
by the carelessness of the railway's servants in moving
or handling luggage. 4 Eailways are liable to pas-
sengers on station platforms if they are struck by a
passing train, any part of whose engine or cars projects
over the platform. 5 If there be no platform at the
train's stopping-place, the railway is negligent if its
servants do not assist passengers to alight, and if, for
want of such assistance, a passenger in alighting be
1 61 Wise. 325, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 113.
2 139 Mass. 556, Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. , note.
s O. & M. R. R. v. Gullett, 15 Ind. 487.
* Tebbutt v. B. & E. Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 73.
5 Dobiecki v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 203, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 485 ; Langan v.
St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 72 Mo. 392, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 355 ; C. & A. R.
B. v. Wilson, 63 111. 167.
STATION APPROACHES. 257
injured without fault on his part, the railway is liable
to him in damages therefor. 1
254. Where the arrangement of a station is such that
a passenger has to cross a track, either before entering
or after leaving the cars, he has a right to assume that
that track may be crossed safely, and the railway is
liable if he be struck by a train moving on that track,
when he is approaching or leaving the cars or station. 2
As Andrews, J., said in Brassell v. N. Y. C. & H.
R. R. R., 3 " a passenger, when taking or leaving a rail-
road car at a station, has the right to assume that the
company will not expose him to unnecessary danger;,
and while he must himself exercise reasonable care, his
watchfulness is naturally diminished by his reliance
upon the discharge by the company of its duty to pas-
sengers to provide them with a safe passage to and from
the train."
255. Of course, a railway is not to be held liable to
the passengers at its stations or on its premises, for
injuries which do not result from its negligence; thus,,
in Cornman v. E. C. Ry., 4 the plaintiff having gone in
the dark to a luggage counter upon his arrival at the
defendant's station, in order to get a parcel, and while
standing there, a train having come in and a crowd of
passengers passing out forced the plaintiff against a
weighing machine, in falling over which he Was injured,
1 M. & C. R R. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466.
2 Rogers v. R. Ry., 26 L. T. N. K. S79 ; Warren v. F. R. R., 8 Allen 227 ;
Gaynor v. O. C. & N. R. R., 100 Mass. 208; Terry v. Jewett, 78 N. Y. 338 ;
Brassell v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 84 Id. 241, 3 Am. & Eng. R, R. Cas. 380 ;
Green v. E. Ry., 11 Hun 333 ; P. R. R. v. White, 88 Perma. St 327 ; Klein v.
Jewett, 26 X. J. Eq. 174 ; Armstrong v. N. Y. C.& II. R. R. R., 64 X. Y. 635 ;
B. & 0. K. R. v. State, to use of Hauer, 60 Md. 449, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 149 ; Chaffee v. B. & L. R. R., 104 Mass. 108 ; Wheelock v. Ii. & A. R. R.
105 Id. 203; Phillips v. R. & 8. R. R., 57 Barb. 644; serf. cf. I. C. R. R. v.
Hudelson, 13 Ind. 325.
* 84 N. Y. 241, 8 Am. A Eng. R. R. Cas. 380. « 4 II. & N. 781.
17
258 ACCIDENTAL INJURIES AT STATIONS.
after verdict for the plaintiff a rule was made absolute
for a new trial, on the ground that there Avas no evi-
dence of negligence on the part of the railway. So, in
Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry., 1 the plaintiff, a frequent
traveller upon the defendant's train, in descending a
staircase leading from the highway to the defendant's
platform, slipped upon the casing of the stairs, which
was of brass, originally rough, but smooth by constant
use. Two witnesses having testified that the stairway
was unsafe, because the casing should have been of
lead not brass, a verdict passed for the plaintiff, but a rule
for a nonsuit was made absolute for want of proof of de-
fendant's negligence. 2 So, in Toomey v. L. B. & S. C.
Ey., 3 where on a station platform there were two doors,
the one having painted over it the words, " For gentle-
men," and the other having painted over it the words
" Lamp-room," and a passenger intending to go to the
urinal, having opened the other of the two doors, fell
down some steps and was injured, it was held that the
railway was not liable. So, in Potter v. W. & W. R. R./
the railway was held not to be liable for injuries caused to
a girl by her tripping over a rail on a track which she
was crossing in order to board a train. So, in Welfare v.
L. & B. Ry., 5 it was proven that the plaintiff went to the
defendant's station as an intending passenger, and, hav-
ing made some inquiries respecting the departure of
the trains, and having been directed by the defendant's
porter to look at a time-table suspended on the wall of
the portico of the station, was, while looking at the time-
table, injured by a plank and roll of zinc which broke
through the roof and fell upon him, and through the
'L.E.1 C. P. 300.
* See Crocheron v. N. S. S. I. Ferry, 56 N. Y. 656, in which the facts wei«
similar, and the judgment also for the defendant.
8 3 C. B. N. S. 146, 91 E. C. L.
* 92 N. C 541, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 328. 6 L. R. 4 Q. B. 693.
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES. 259
hole so made it was observed that a man was on the
roof. Blackburn, J., nonsuited the plaintiff, and the
Queen's Bench refused to take off the nonsuit, holding
that the railway could not be held liable for the defec-
tive condition of the roof in the absence of proof of
knowledge, or means of knowledge or obligation to
know the state of the roof, and that, as regards any pos-
sible negligence on the part of the man on the rooi) non
constat that he was not a servant of an independent con-
tractor rather than a servant of the railway. Upon the
same principle it was held that a railway was not liable
to a passenger for injuries caused by the bite of a dog,
which had strayed upon a station platform. 1 Nor is
the railway liable to a passenger who, in entering a car
at rest, falls ujjon its steps, for that is a case of inevita-
ble accident. 2
256. It is the duty of passengers on station platforms
to exercise a reasonable care for their own safety ; 3 thus,
it is contributory negligence in a passenger to run upon
a narrow platform by the side of a moving train, 4 or in
daylight to strike his head against a plank over the
platform, on which a porter is standing to clean a lamp. 5
So, if the passenger, where a safe and convenient plat-
form has been provided, voluntarily alights on the side
opposite to the platform, and while heedlessly crossing
a track is injured, the railway is not liable, 6 nor where
1 Smith v. G. E. Ry., L. R. 2 C. P. 54.
2 C, St. L. & N. O. R. R. v. Trotter, 61 Miss. 417, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
159.
» Renneker v. S. C. Ry., 20 Shand S. C. 219 ; Forsyth v. B. & A. R. R., 103
Mass. 510.
* Rigg v. M. S. & L. Ry., 12 Jur. N. S. 525.
5 Watkins v. G. W. Ry., 37 L. T. N. S. 193.
6 P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 318, 37 Id. 420 ; Bancroft v. B. & W. R. R.,
97 Mass. 275 ; McQuilkin v. C. P. R. R., 64 Cal. 463, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
353 ; Forsyth v. B. & A. R. R., 103 Mass. 510 ; c/. P. R. R. t>. White, 88 Penna.
St. 327.
260 NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGEKS.
the passenger having arrived at the station after dark
in suffieient time to get to the platform voluntarily
waits and attempts to get on the car from the side away
from the station; 1 nor will negligence upon the part of
the railway, in failing to give notice of the approach of
a moving train, in all cases render it liable to one who
fails to exercise reasonable care as to his own safety ;
thus, in Carroll v. P. E. E., 2 the plaintiff, in going to
the defendant's station, intending to be a passenger and
attempting to pass in front of a moving train which, as
he had admitted he could have seen if he had looked,
was run over, and having been nonsuited at the trial
judgment for the defendant was affirmed in error. 3 On
the other hand, in D. W. & W. Ey. v. Slattery, 4 the
plaintiff's decedent having gone to the defendant's station
to accompany a relative who was going to take a train
and having crossed the line at night in front of an ap-
proaching train, obtained the ticket for the passenger
and recrossed behind that train and was killed by a
fast express train upon the other track. The evidence
was contradictory as to whether the express train had
whistled or given other notice of its approach, and after
verdict for the plaintiff, it was held, Lords Hatherly,
Coleridge, and Blackburn dissenting, that the case had
been properly left to the jury.
IX. BOARDING AND DESCENDING FROM TRAINS.
257. It is the duty of railways to give to passengers
at its stations reasonable notice of the starting of its
1 M. C. R. R. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Harvey v. E. R. R, 116 Mass. 269.
■ 12 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.), 348.
•See also Wheelwright v. B. & A. R. R., 135 Mass. 225, 16 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 315 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. r. Dewey, 26 111. 255.
4 3 Ap. Cas. 1155.
CALLING NAME OF STATION. 261
trains, 1 and to give to its passengers in its trains reason-
able notice of the approach of the train to its stations,
in order that the passengers who are to leave the cars
may prepare to alight. 2 There has been some diversity
of opinion as to the effect of calling out the name of a
station when a train is in motion. In Lewis v. L. C. &
D. Ry., 3 Blackburn, J., said, "Calling out the name of
a station is not an invitation to alight." In Weller v.
L. B. & S. C. Ry., 4 Brett, J., said, "I agree that the
calling out the name of a station before the train has
come to a standstill is no evidence of negligence on the
part of the company;" and Honeyman, J., 5 expressed
his opinion to the same effect. In Whittaker v. M. &
S. Ry., 6 Bovill, C. J., said, it is "a question for the jury
whether the calling out of the name of a station amounts,
under all the circumstances, to an invitation to alight;"
and Willes, J., said, "I cannot now understand how it
could be said as a matter of law that the calling out of
the name of a station was not an invitation." In Bridges
v. N. L. Ry., 7 Pollock, B., said, "it is an announcement
by the railway officers that the train is approaching or
has arrived at the platform, and that the passengers
may get out when the train stops at the platform."
And Brett and Denman, JJ., thought that the question
was one for the jury. The subject was also somewhat
considered in P. R. R. v. Aspell, 8 and in P. R. R. v.
White, 9 but no positive view with regard to the neces-
sary legal effect of calling out the name of the station
1 Perry v. C. R. R., 58 Ga. 461. 66 Id. 746.
2 Dawson v. L. & N. R. R., Ky. ,11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 134.
8 L. R. 9 Q. B. 71. * L. R. 9 C. P. 132.
6 Id. 134. « L. R. 5 C. P. 464, note.
» L. R. 7 H. L. 224. • 23 Penna. St. 147.
• 88 Id. 327.
262 CALLING NAME OF STATION.
was expressed. 1 In Penna. Co. v. Hoagland, 2 where the
railway's servant on a train in motion at night announced
that the next stop would be at a certain station, naming
it, and the train having stopped shortly afterwards upon
a siding ten miles short of the station, a female pas-
senger, whose destination was that particular station,
and who was unacquainted with the route of the railway
or the location of its stations, there alighted with the
assistance of a railway servant who asked her no ques-
tions, and the train then proceeded, leaving her alone, -
and it was held that the railway was liable. In Edgar
v. N. K. R., 3 where the railway was held liable to a
female passenger who was injured in alighting from a
slowly moving train at a station, Patterson, J. A., said:
"the announcement that the next station was Lefroy
does not strike me as having much significance. As a
statement of a fact, it contained nothing new to the
plaintiff, and as a statement that it was intended that
certain passengers should get off the train at that station,
it contained no more information than what was con-
tained in the contract evidenced by the tickets. But,
taken in connection with the slowing of the train with-
out stopping it, it is, as far as it goes, a bit of evidence
consistent with the position taken by the plaintiff."
Perhaps, the right deduction from the cases is that the
1 See also Lewis v. L. C. & D. By., L. E. 9 Q. B 71 ; Weller v. L. B. & S. C.
Ky., L. E. 9 C. P. 132, 134; Whittaker v. M. & S. Ey., L. E. 5 C. P. 464,
note ; Bridges v. N. L. Ey., L. E. 7 H. L. 224 ; P. E. E. v. Aspell, 23 Penna,
St. 117 ; P. R. E. v. White, 88 Id. 327; C E. E. v. Van Horn, 38 N. J. L
133; .Mitchell v. C. & G. T. Ey., 51 Mich. 236, 18 Am.& Eng. E. E. Cas. 176
Taber v. D., II. & L. Ey., 71 N. Y. 489; C. I. E. E. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408
Pabst v. B. & P. E. R., 2 McArthur 42; Nicholls v. G. S. & W. Ey., 7 Ir. G
L. 40; Thompson i>. B., H. & II. Ey., 5 Id. 517; Brooks v. B. & M. E. E., 135
Mass. 21, 10 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 345; Edgar v. N. E. E., 4 Ont. (Can.)
201, 16 Am.& Eng.E. R. Cas. 347; Penna. Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203, 3 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 436.
8 78 Ind. 203, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 436.
3 11 Ont. App. 452, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 433.
DUTY TO STOP TRAINS, ETC. 263
effect which is to be attributed to such an announcement
is for the jury, if circumstances show that the announce-
ment was so made as to induce the person injured to
believe that the next stop of the train would be at a
station, at Avhich he might safely leave the train.
258. It is the duty of the railway to stop its trains,
for a reasonable time, at way stations in order that pas-
sengers may get on or off the cars with safety j 1 and the
railway is liable when its conductor, or other servant,
gives a signal to start while a passenger is obviously in
the act of getting on or off its train, 2 but if the train has
stopped a reasonable time, and the passenger has given
no notice of an intention to alight, and the conductor
does not see him in the act of alighting, the railway is
not liable for the act of its conductor in starting the train. 3
259. A passenger who is carried past the station, or
who is not taken up at the station to or from which the
railway had contracted to carry him, is entitled to re-
cover compensatory damages. 4 I have, in section 24,
1 Bucher v. N. Y. C. & H. E. R. R., 98 N. Y. 128 ; Wood v. L. S. & M. S.
Ry., 49 Mich. 370; Brooks v. B. & M. R. R., 135 Mass. 21 ; D. & M. R. R. v.
Curtis, 23 Wise. 152, 27 Id. 158 ; S. R. R. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374 ; Imhoff
v. C. & M. R. R., 20 Wise. 344 ; N. O. R. R. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607 ; Milli-
mann v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 642 ; P. R. R. v. Kilgore, 32 Penna.
St. 292 ; J., M. & I. R. R. v. Parmalee, 51 Ind. 42 ; Keller v. S. C. & St. P. R.
R., 27 Minn. 178 ; Swigert v. H. & St. J. Ry., 75 Mo. 475, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 322 ; W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Rector, 104 111. 296, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
264 ; Penna. Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 436 ; T.
W. & W. Ry. v. Baddeley, 54 111. 19 ; Fuller v. N. R. R., 21 Conn. 557 ; Davis
v. C. & N. W. Ry., 18 Wise. 175.
2 Swigert v. H. & St. J. R. R., 75 Mo. 475, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322 ;
Bucher v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R., 98 N. Y. 128 ; Keating v. N. Y. C. &. H. R.
It. It., 49 Id. 673 ; Mitchell v. W. & A. E. R., 30 Ga. 22 ; C. W. D. Ry. v. Mills,
105 111. 63, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 128.
■• Straus v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 75 Mo. 185, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
38 1 ; H. & St. J. R. It. v. CJotworthy, 80 Mo. 220, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 371.
' Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 10 Q. B. Ill; C, St. L. & N. O. It. R. v.
Scnrr, 59 Miss. 456, 6 Am. & Eng. It. 3. Cas. 341 ; Trigg v. St. L., K. C. & N.
It. R.. 74 Mo. 147, 6 Am. & Eng. It. R. Cas. 345 ; I. & G. N. R. R. v. Terry,
62 Tex. 380, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 323.
264 BOARDING AND LEAVING TRAINS.
given my reasons for the opinion, that when a passenger,
not having been set down or taken up at the station to
or from which the railway has contracted to carry him,
is injured in the attempt to board or leave a moving
train the railway is not liable to him, for his injuries
are the consequence, not of the railway's breach of con-
tract, but of his own rash act. There are, however,
many authorities for the proposition that in such a case
the railway is liable, if the person injured in getting on
or off the train did not incur a danger obviously appar-
ent to the mind of a reasonable man. 1 It is, neverthe-
less, generally held that when the train is moving at so
high a rate of speed, or where the j^lace of the passengers'
ascent or descent is so obviously perilous, that a person
of ordinary prudence would not attempt to get on or off
the train then and there, the act of the person injured
in so doing is such contributory negligence as will bar
his recovery. 2 It is, a fortiori, contributory negligence
1 Bucher v. N. Y. C. & H. E. R, E., 98 N. Y. 128 ; Swigert v. H. & St. J.
E. E., 75 Mo. 475, 9 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 322 ; C. E. E. v. Perry, 58 Ga.
461, 66 Id. 746 ; Johnson v. W. C. & P. E. E., 70 Penna. St. 357 ; P. E. E. v.
Kilgore, 32 Id. 292 ; C. V. E. E. v. Maugans, 61 Md. 53, IS Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 1S2; Edgar v. N. Ey., 4 Ont. (Can.) 201 ; Doss v, M., K. & T. E. E., 59 Mo.
37 ; Loyd v. H. & St. J. E. E., 53 Id. 509; Curtis v. D. & M. E. E,, 27 Wise.
158 ; D. & M. E. E. v. Curtis, 23 Id. 152 ; Filer v. N. Y. C/E. E., 49 N. Y. 47 ;
Delamatyr v. M. & P. M. C. E. E., 24 Wise. 578 ; Davis v. C. & N. W. Ey., 18
Id. 175 ; Price v. St. L., K. C. & N. E. E., 72 Mo. 414, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 365 ; St. L., I. M. & S. E. E. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. & Eng. E. R.
Cas. 198 ; C. & A. E. E. v. Bonifield, 104 111. 223, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
443; Lambeth v. N. C. E. E., 66 N. C. 494; U. P. E. E. v. Diehl, 33 Kans.
422, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 350 ; Boss v. P. & W. E E. E. I. , 21
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 364 ; H. & St. J. E. E. v. Clotworthy, 80 Mo. 220, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 371 ; M. & L. R. R. R. v. Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 32, 21
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 374.
2 McCorkle v. C, R. I & P. Ey., 61 Iowa 555 ; Phillips v. E. & S. R. R., 49
N. Y. 177 ; Harper v. E. Ry., 32 N. J. L. 88 ; D., S. P. & P. R. R. v. Pickard,
8 Colo. 163; M. C. Ry. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Harvey v. E. R. R., 116
Mass. 269 ; P. E. R. v. Aspell, 23 Penna. St. 147; G., II. & S. A. R. R. v. Le
Gierse. 51 Tex. 189; Lindsey v. C, R. I. & P. E. E., 64 Iowa 407, 18 Am. &
Eng. E. R. Cas. 179; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470; C. R. R. »,
Letcher, 69 Ala. 106, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 115; Burrows v. E. Ry., 63
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ETC. 265
in a passenger to attempt to board a train passing a way
station when the train has not been flagged, and the
servants in charge of the train have no reason to expect
that a passenger will attempt to get on the train then
and there. 1
260. Statutory regulations requiring certain signals
to be given upon the approach of an engine or car to a
railway station or highway crossing are primarily in-
tended for the protection of persons approaching the
line, and not of persons who are in or upon the cars; 2
nor will the railway's neglect to give due notice, or even
the particular notice prescribed by statutory authority,
of the starting of a train from a way station render it
liable to a passenger who voluntarily and without notice
to the railway's servants jumps from the train after it
has gotten under way; 3 nor will the railway's neglect
to give the statutory notice required before putting in
N. Y. 556 ; J. R. R. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228 ; Gavett v. M. & L. R. R., 16
Gray 501 ; Hickey v. B. & L. R. R., 14 Allen 429 ; Davis v. C. & N. Ry., 18
Wise. 175; Nelson v. A. & P. R. R., 68 Mo. 595 ; Kelly v. H. & St. J. R. R.,
70 Id. 604 ; Strauss v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 75 Id. 185, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 384 ; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Leslie, 57 Tex. 83, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 384 ;
S. W. R. R. v. Singleton, 67 Ga. 306 ; Jewell v. C, St. P. & M. Ry., 54 Wise.
610, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 379 ; I. C. R. R. v. Chambers, 71 111. 519 ; I. C.
R. R. v. Lutz, 84 Id. 598 ; Dougherty v. C, B. & Q. R. R., 86 Id. 467 ; R. & D.
R. R. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. 200 ; Gonzales v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R., 50 How. Pr.
126 ; Secor v. T. P. & W. R. R., 10 Fed. Rep. 15; Blodgett v. Bartlett, 50 Ga.
353 ; Haldan v. G. W. Ry., 30 Up. Can. (C. P.) 89 ; Knight v. P. R. R., 23
I -a. An. 462; Hubener v. N. O. & C R. R., Id. 492; Mitchell v. C. & G. T.
E?, 31 Mich. 266, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 176 ; McCorkle v. C, R. I. & P.
Ry., 61 Iowa 555, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 156 ; W., St. L. & P. Ry. v. Rector,
104 111. 296, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 264 ; R. & D. R. R. v. Morris, 31 Gratt.
200 ; Damont v. N. O. & C. R. R., 9 La. An. 441 ; I. C. R. R. v. Able, 59 111.
131 ; J. R. R. v. Swift, 26 Ind. 459; E. & C. R. R. v. Duncan. 28 Ind. 111 ; I.
C. R. R- v. Slatton, 54 111. 133 ; O. & M. R. R. v Schiebe, 44 111. 460 ; H. & T.
C. R. R. v. Schmidt, HI Tex. 282, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 345; Adams v. L.
& X. R. R., Ky. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 380; S. & N. A. R. R.v.
flchaufler, 75 Ala. 136, 21 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 405.
1 D., S. P. & P. Ry. v. Pickard, 8 Colo. 163, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 284.
a A. G. S. Ry. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 194.
1 C. R. R. & B. Co. v. Letcher, 69 Ala. 106, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 115.
266 ALIGHTING FROM CAR AT EEST.
motion a freight train standing on the line render it
liable to a passenger who, having left his train, attempts
to pass under the coupling which connects two of the
cars of the freight train. 1
261. While it is the duty of a railway company to
provide reasonably safe and convenient means of ingress
and egress from its cars and carriages, the railway is
only to be held liable for accidents happening to its
passengers in descending from a car when at rest at a
station, if the circumstances are such as to induce the
passenger to believe that he has reached his point of
destination, and that it is safe for him to get out. 2 In
contrasting the American and English decisions, the
difference in the mode of construction between railway
carriages commonly used in England and American
passenger cars must be borne in mind. Thus, in Foy v.
L. B. & S. C. R. R., 3 by reason of the occupation of
the platform by another train, the carriage in which
the plaintiff was a passenger on reaching its terminus
in the daytime did not come up to the platform. The
door of the carriage being some three feet above the
ground, the defendant's porter requested the plaintiff, a
female passenger, to alight. There w T ere two steps, one
on a level with the door, and the other one eighteen
1 M. & C. R. R. v. Copeland, 61 Ala. 376.
2 Foy v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 18 C. B. N. S. 225, 114 E. C. L. ; Praeger v B. &
E. Ry., 24 L. T. N. S. 105 ; Cockle v. L. & S. E. Ry., L. R. 5 C. P. 457, 7 Id.
321 ; Weller v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., L. R. 9 C. P. 126 ; Bridges v. N. L. Ry., L.
R. 7 H. L. 213; Robson v. N. E. Ry., L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 371 ; Rose v. N. E.
Ry., 2 Ex. D. 248 ; Foulkes v. M. D. Ry., 4 C. P. D. 267, 5 Id. 157 ; P. R. R.
r. White, 88 Penna. St. 327 ; T. H. & I. Ry. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 18 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 234 ; Cartwright v. C. & G. T. Ry., 52 Mich. 606, 16 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 321 ; C. & I. C. R. R. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408 ; Gaynor v. O. C.
& N. Ry., 100 Mass. 208 ; Brooks v. B. & M. R. R., 135 Mass. 21, 16 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 345; Edgar v. N. R. R., 4 Ont. 201, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
347; C. R. R. v. Van Horn, 38 N. J. Law 133; Edgar v. N. R. R., 11 Ont.
App. 452, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 433.
8 18 C. B. N. S. 225, 114 E. C. L.
ALIGHTING FROM CAR AT REST. 267
inches below that. The plaintiff got on the first step,
and taking the hand of a gentleman jumped to the
ground, and being in delicate health the concussion in-
jured her spine. Erie, C. J., left it to the jury to say
whether the accident was due to the plaintiff's careless-
ness, or to the defendant's negligence in not providing
a convenient means of descent. There was a verdict
for the plaintiff, and the court refused a new trial. In
Praeger v. B. & E. Ry., 1 the train had after dark drawn
up at a dimly lighted station, the platform not being
parallel to the rails, but by reason of its being beveled
off to make room for a siding, being some two feet away
from the carriage in which the plaintiff, a male pas-
senger, was riding. A guard opened the door, and said
nothing, and the plaintiff, believing that he was stepping
upon the platform, stepped out and fell between the car-
riage and the platform. Judgment on a verdict for the
plaintiff was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber on the
ground that there was evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant in that the station was dimly
lighted, the platform was defectively constructed, and
the defendant's servant omitted to warn the passenger
not to alight. In Cockle v. L. & S. E. Ry., 2 the facts
were identical with those in Praeger's case, excepting
that no guard had opened the carriage door, and it was
held in the Exchequer Chamber that " the leaving a car-
riage which had been brought up to a place at which
it is unsafe for a passenger to alight, under circumstances
which warrant the passenger in believing that it is in-
tended he shall get out, and that he may, therefore, do
so with safety, without any warning of his danger,
amounts to negligence on the part of the company."
In Weller v. L. B. & S. C. R. R., 3 the train after dark
1 24 L. T. N. S. 105. a L. R. 5 C. P. 457, 7 Id. 321.
» L. R. 9 C P. 126.
2G8 ALIGHTING FROM CAR AT REST.
was approaching a station, the lamps of which were not
lit, when the porter having called out the name, the
train overshot the platform and came to a final stop.
The plaintiff, a male passenger, and a commuter, hear-
ing the doors open and shut and seeing persons getting
out of the next carriage, stepped out and was hurt. At
the trial he was nonsuited, but a rule to take off the
nonsuit was made absolute, upon the ground that the
defendant was negligent in stopping its train at a point
where the lights were not lit, and in not warning the
passenger not to alight. In Bridges v. N. L. Ry., 1
Highbury Station was at the mouth of a tunnel, the
platform extending into the tunnel. The train arrived
after dark, the carriage in which the plaintiff, a com-
muter, was riding having stopped in the tunnel, but
not at the platform, and the name of the station having
been called by the guard. The plaintiff's decedent fell
in getting out of the carriage, and died from the in-
juries thereby caused. It was held sufficient evidence
of defendant's negligence for the jury. In Robson v.
N. E. Ry., 2 the facts were identical with those in Lewis'
case, and it was held by the Queen's Bench and by the
Court of Appeal that the defendant was negligent in
not stopping the carriage at the platform, and that the
plaintiff had a right to suppose that if she did not get
out the train would proceed, and that the defendant was
also negligent in not providing some safe means for
women to alight. In Rose v. N. E. Ry., 3 the train had
stopped at a station ; the carriage in which the plain-
tiff, a female passenger, was riding being beyond the
platform. The porter called to the passengers to keep
their seats. The plaintiff waited some time, but the
train not having backed, she got out, and in so doing
1 L. R. 6 Q. B. 377, 7 H. L. 213. J L. R. 10 Q. B. 271.
8 2 Ex. D. 248.
ALIGHTING AT STATIONS. 269
was injured. The jury found for the plaintiff, and
leave was given to the defendant to move to enter a
nonsuit. The court below entered the nonsuit, but
the Court of Appeal reversed and entered judgment
for the plaintiff, holding that the company was negli-
gent in not backing its train, or in not providing ser-
vants to assist the passengers in getting out. In Foulkes
v. M. D. Ry., 1 the door of the carriage in which the
plaintiff travelled was about two feet three inches above
the platform of the station at which the plaintiff was to
alight. Although it was after dark, and the carriage
had neither platform nor steps, no warning was given
to the plaintiff as to the depth of descent from the car-
riage to the platform, and in getting out he fell and was
injured. It was held that there was evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant. In P. R. R. v.
White, 2 the defendant's train on approaching Penn
Valley Station slowed up and stopped opposite a house
marked " Penn Valley Station," the brakeman having
announced before the train came to a stop, " the next
station is Penn Valley." The plaintiff's decedent
stepped off the car after it had come to a stop on the
side towards the platform, but separated from the plat-
form by another track, and was struck by a passing
express train and killed. The train had stopped under
the company's rules that local trains should give
way to express trains at stations, the regular station
being on the right side of the train and some distance
from where the train had stopped. The court below
entered judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff, and
the Supreme Court affirmed it on the ground that it
was for the jury to say whether, under the circumstances,
the plaintiff had a right to suppose that the train had
1 L. B. 4 C. P. D. 267, 5 Id. 157. ■ 88 Penna. St. 327.
270 ALIGHTING AT STATIONS.
come to a final stop at his point of destination. In C.
& I. C. B. R. v. Farrell, 1 the railway was held liable
to a passenger who was injured in alighting from the
cars at night, the train having come to a stop on a
bridge over a culvert, and a railway servant having
called out the name of the station.
262. On the other hand, where a passenger, in the
exercise of reasonable care, can see that by getting out
then and there in his own way, he is encountering a
peril, the railway is not liable. 2 Thus, in Siner v. G. W.
By., 3 the facts were similar to those in Foy's case, ex-
cepting that no servant of the defendant requested the
plaintiff to alight. At the trial the plaintiff was non-
suited, and the Exchequer Chamber affirmed the refusal
of the court below to take it off, upon the ground that
there was no evidence of negligence upon the part of
the defendant, the accident having been solely caused
by the plaintiff's own negligence in disregarding her
duty to use the conveniences provided by the company,
Hannen, J., saying : " other people got down without
injury. It is true the female plaintiff said she could
not. But she does not say why she could not. Sup-
pose she had said so of an ordinary platform. The
bare assertion would not be enough ; and applying the
common knowledge we all have as to the construction
of carriages, I think it lay upon the plaintiff to show
more special reason why it was dangerous or impossible
to use the footboard, so as to make it negligence on the
part of the company not to provide some other means
of alighting;" and Mellor, J., added, "the evidence
1 31 Ind. 408.
1 Siner v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex. 150, 4 Id. 117 ; Lewis v. L. C. & D. Ry., L.
R. 9 Q. B. 66; D., L.&W. R. R. v. Napheys, 90 Penna. St. 135 ; P. R. R. v.
Zebe, 33 Td. 318, 37 Id. 420 ; E. & C. R. R. v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441 ; Mitchell
v. C. & G. T. Ry., 51 Mich. 236 ; Frost v. G. T. Ry., 10 Allen 387.
"L.R. 3 Ex. 150, 4 Id. 117.
ALIGHTING AT STATIONS. 271
seems to me to establish, not negligence, but only a less
degree of convenience than is usual, and for that the
defendants are not responsible." In Lewis v. L. C. &
^ D. Ry., 1 a female passenger for Bromley, while the
train was passing after dark through the station, which
she knew well, heard the name of the station called by
the guard ; the train then stopped, with the carriage in
which the plaintiff was riding, at a point beyond the
platform. The plaintiff attempted to get out, and at
that moment the train started to back to the platform,
and the plaintiff fell and was injured. The plaintiff
was nonsuited. In D., L. & W. R. R. v. Napheys, 2 the
facts were identical with those in Foy's and Siner's
cases, and it was held that there was no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the defendant, Sterrett, J.,
saying, in his judgment: "the cars were at rest on the
track; there was no jar or breaking of machinery.
Mrs. Napheys, with the assistance of her husband, was
descending the steps from the platform of the car.
They had every opportunity of seeing and knowing
where she was going, and controlling her movements.
If the lower step were inconveniently or dangerously
high for her in the condition she was, she and her hus-
band has as good an opportunity as any one else of
knowing the fact. If they had even a suspicion that it
was in the least degree unsafe for her to take the last
step, there was no urgent necessity for her to do so.
The train had reached its destination, and there was no
occasion for haste in leaving the car. If they had any
apprehension of danger, or even of inconvenience in
descending from the lower step, there was nothing to
prompt them to incur the risk. They might have
called on those in charge of the train to provide a
better and more convenient means of egress if they
1 L. E. 9 Q. B. 70. * 90 Penna. St. 135.
272 ALIGHTING AT STATIONS.
deemed it necessary." In P. R. R. v. Zebe, 1 the plain-
tiff sued to recover damages for the death of his son.
The plaintiff and his son were passengers on a train
which stopped at its destination at the station platform.
At that point the defendant's line had two tracks, and
the j^laintiff and his son, instead of getting out upon the
platform side of the train, got out upon the other side,
and the son was killed by a train passing upon the
other track. The case was twice tried, and came twice
before the Supreme Court, the jury finding for the
plaintiff upon each occasion, the court below entering
judgment on the verdict, and the Supreme Court re-
versing. In the first report the judgment was reversed,
because the court below left the case to the jury without
proof of any necessity justifying the plaintiff and his
son in descending from the car upon the side away
from the platform. In the second report, the judgment
was reversed because the court below admitted the evi-
dence of two witnesses that they were in the habit, at
that station, of getting out from that side which was
away from the platform. And in each report, it was
held that the duties of the carrier and the passengers
are reciprocal, the carrier being bound to provide a
" safe and convenient means of egress and regress to and
from the line of their road," and the duty of the
passenger being to comply with "all the company's
reasonable rules and regulations for entering, occupying
and leaving the cars." Nor is the railway, when its
train is stopped at night before coming up to a station,
liable to one who, having boarded the train to look for
his wife and child, whom he expected to find as passen-
gers on the train, carelessly steps off a car platform into
a culvert, which he did not see in the darkness. 2
1 33 Penna. St. 318, 37 Id. 420.
Stiles v. A. & W. P. E. R., 65 Ga. 370, 8 Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas. 195.
ALIGHTING AT STATIONS. 273
' 263. It is not possible to reconcile all the cases, and
some two or three of the English cases might have been
differently decided if the judges who decided them had
not misapprehended the force and effect of the decision
of the House of Lords in Bridge's case as to the re-
spective provinces of the court and the jury. But there
is one broad ground of distinction running through the
cases which serves to reconcile most of them, and that
is, that while it is the duty of a railway to provide
reasonably safe and convenient means of ingress and
egress from its cars and carriages, the railway is only
to be held liable for accidents happening to passengers
in descending from its cars at rest when the circumstances
are such as to induce a passenger to believe that he has
reached his point of destination, and that it is safe for
him to get out. In this category are the cases of
Praeger, Cockle, Weller, Bridges, Bobson, Kose, Foulke,
White, and similar cases. On the other hand, the com-
pany is not to be held liable where the passenger, in
the exercise of reasonable care, can see that by getting
out then and there in his own way he is encountering
peril. This is the result of the cases of Siner, Lewi's,
Napheys, Zebe, and similar cases.
264. It is not necessarily contributory negligence in
a passenger to attempt to enter or leave a car at rest
when it is not in position at the platform ; ] and espe-
cially is this the case when the railway has usually per-
mitted passengers to so enter its cars. 2
265. It is the duty of a railway operating street cars
to allow to passengers a reasonable opportunity to alight
1 Stoner v. Penna. Co., 98 Ind. 384, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 340; Keating
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 49 N. Y. 673 ; Phillips v. R. & S. R. R , 57 Barbour
644.
* McDonald v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26 Iowa 124.
18
274 railway's duty in operating line.
from the cars ; l and the passenger on a street car should
give to the servant in charge of the car a reasonable
notice of his intention to alight; 2 but when the car has
come to a stop, a passenger is justified in attempting to
alight, and it is immaterial that he did not request the
conductor to make the stop for him, or notify the con-
ductor that he intended to get off then and there. 3
X. THE DUTY OF THE RAILWAY TO ITS PASSENGERS IN
THE OPERATION OF ITS LINE.
206. That duty of care for their safety which the
railway owes to its passengers requires it to use in the
operation of its line every precaution which the expe-
rience of well-managed railways has shown to be essen-
tial to the transportation of passengers in safety. The
railway is, therefore, liable whenever a passenger is in-
jured, without fault on his part, by its negligent con-
duct of its business ; as, for instance, by a collision be-
tween trains on the line, 4 or by a collision between a
train and cars on a siding ; 5 or between two street cars; 6
or by a derailment of the train carrying the passenger; 7
1 C. C. Ry. v. Mumford, 97 111. 560 ; Wardle v. N. O. C. R. R., 35 La. An.
202, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 60; Knowlton v. M. C. R. R., 59 Wise. 278, 16
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 330 ; Ward v. C. C. R. R., 19 Shand (S. C.) 521, 16
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 356.
1 Mulhado v. B. C. R. R., 30 N. Y. 370; Oram v. M. R. R., 112 Mass. 38;
Nichols v. M. R. R., 106 Id. 463.
3 C. W. D. Ry. v. Mills, 105 111 63, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 128 ; Rathbone
v. U. R. R., 13 R. I. 709, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 58.
* Skinner v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 5 Ex. 787 ; I. R. R. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St.
418, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 361 ; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v. Albertson, 38
Miss. 242.
5 N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v. Seyholt, 95 N. Y. 562, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 162 ; Farlow v. Kelly, 108 U. S. 288.
8 Smith v. St. P. C. Ry., 32 Minn. 1, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310.
» Carpue v. L. & B. Ry., 5 Q. B. 747, 48 E. C. L. ; Dawson v. M. Ry., 7 H. &
N. 1037 ; Sullivan v. P."& R. R. R., 30 Penna. St. 234 ; N. Y., L. E. & W. R.
R. v. Daugherty, 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 437 ; Edgerton v. N. Y. C.
DUTY IN OPERATING LINE. 275
or by an explosion of the boiler of a locomotive ;* or by
a negligent coupling of another car to that in which
the passenger is carried, so that the passenger is injured
by the jar; 2 or by the knocking of a gate bar at a
crossing against a train by a runaway team ; 3 or by a
jet of water thrown from a water tank upon a pas-
senger; 4 or by a jet of steam thrown on a passenger in
leaving a steamboat which the railway operates as a
part of its line ; 5 or by a collision with a coal bin in
too close proximity to the line. 6 So also the railway is
liable when its servants, being aware that a bridge,
which constitutes part of the line, has been carried
away by a flood, do not take the proper means to stop
an approaching train; 7 or where repairs to a line are
so negligently conducted that a collision ensues oetween
a passenger train and a construction train. 8 So the
railway is liable for injuries to a passenger in entering
a street car, caused by its negligence in banking up on
the sides of its line snow which it had removed there-
from. 9 So, also, the railway is liable for negligently
& H. R. R. R., 39 N.Y. 227; Festal v. M. R. R, 109 Mass. 720; George v.
St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 34 Ark. 613, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 294 ; P., C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462 ; G, C, G & I. Ry. v. Newell, 75 Id. 542 ;
Gurtis v. R. & S. R. R., 18 N.Y. 534; Tuttle v. G, R. I. & P. Ry., 48 Iowa
236; Brignoli v. G & G. E. R. R., 4 Daly (N. Y.) 182; G, B. & Q. R. R. v.
George, 19 111. 510 ; L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Mills, 40 Ark. 298, 13 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 10 ; Yonge v. Kerrney, 28 Ga. Ill ; T. & St. L. R. R. v. Suggs, 62
Tex. 323, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 475 ; K. G R. R. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160,
1 Am. & Eng. R R. Cas. 79 ; Brown v. N. Y. G R. R., 34 N. Y. 404 ; G, R. I.
& P. Ry. v. McAra, 52 111. 296 ; N. & G R. R. v. Messino, 1 Sneed (Tenn.)
220.
1 Robinson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 20 Blatchf. 338.
1 White v. F. R. R., 136 Mass. 321. 3 Tyrrel v. E. R. R., Ill Mass. 546.
* T. H. & I. R. R. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 178.
5 Gruber v. W. & J. R. R., 92 N. G 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 438.
6 Dickinson v. P., H. & N. W. R. R., 53 Mich. 43, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
456.
7 Lambkin v. S. E. Ry., 5 App. Cas. 352.
8 Matteson v. N. Y. G R. R., 35 N. Y. 487.
8 Dixon v. B., C. & N. R. R., 100 N.Y. 171.
276 SPEED OF TRAIN.
bringing a train to a stop at the crossing of anothei
Line in such a position that a passenger in or on its car
is injured by a collision with cars negligently moved on
that other line. 1 So the railway is liable for injuries
caused by the absence of a bell rope by which the train
might have been stopped ; 2 or by which the passenger
might have communicated with the guard; 3 and the
railway is liable for injuries caused by the fall of a
negligently constructed berth in a sleeping-car. 4 Illus-
trations might be multiplied indefinitely, but it is not
necessary, for the result of the authorities is simply
this, that the railway is liable for the injury incurred
by the passenger in the operation of the line, whenever
it is shown that that injury was caused either by the
railway's omission of some precaution which it was
bound to take for his protection, or by the commission
of a negligent act by some one for whose acts the rail-
way is legally responsible.
267. No rate of speed, however high, can be said to
be necessarily negligence as to passengers in the train; 5
but, of course, nothing will justify a high rate of speed
under conditions of danger. 6 Thus, where the line is out
of repair, it is negligence to run trains at a high rate of
speed. 7 So, in White v. M. C. Ry., 8 it was held to be
negligence with regard to a passenger in a street rail-
way, to run its car at a high rate of speed over rails
1 Kellow v. C. I. E. E., Iowa , 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 485. See
also P. P. Ey. v. Weiller, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 306.
* M. E. E. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 16, 49 Id. 305.
s Blamires v. L. & Y. Ey , L. E. 8 Ex. 283.
* Penna. Co. v. Eoy, 102 U. S. 451 ; C, C, C. & I. E. E. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio
St. 461. 8 Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas. 371.
5 G. E. & I. E. E. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537.
« O, C, C. & I. E. E. v. Newell, 75 Ind. 542, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 483.
7 P. P. & J. E. E. v. Eeynolds, 88 111. 418 ; O. & M. Ey. v. Selby, 47 Ind.
471 ; M. P. Ey. v. Collier, 62 Tex. 318, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 281.
8 61 Wise. 536, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 213.
SPEED OF TRAIN. 277
unguarded by frogs, at the entrance to a swinging
bridge. So, in Ellett v. St. L, K. C. & N. By., 1 the
railway was held to be negligent as regards a passenger
who was injured by a derailment of the train consequent
upon a sinking of the track in a flood, the engine-
driver having run the train at a high rate of speed
under conditions of danger ; so in I., B. & W. B. B. v.
Hall, 2 a jury were permitted to find the railway negli-
gent as to a passenger in a train which was derailed by
striking a cow on a straight line of track on a prairie,
because the train was running, soon after daybreak of a
foggy morning, upon its schedule time, fifty miles an
hour, the judge, at the trial, having left to the jury the
question whether or not, under the circumstances, the
rate of speed was negligent. The test of the proxi-
mateness or remoteness of the speed as a cause of in-
jury in any case of collision or derailment is to be
found in the answer to the question, was or was not that
speed prudent under the circumstances, as those circum-
stances either were, or ought to have been known, to
the servant who directed the movement of the train ?
268. The railway is also liable to its passengers for
injuries caused by the negligent closing of a door of a
car by a servant of the railway. Thus in Fordham v.
B. & S. C. By., 3 the plaintiff, while entering the de-
fendant's carriage after dark, holding a parcel in his
right hand, placed his left hand upon the open door of
the carriage, and a guard from without closed the door,
and in so doing injured the plaintiff's left hand; and it
was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 4 So,
in G. H. & S. A. B. B. v. Davidson, 5 where the plain-
1 76 Mo. 518. 2 106 111. 371, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 146.
8 L. R. 3 C. P. 368, 4 Id. 619.
* See also Coleman v. S. E. By., 4 II. & C. 699.
6 61 Tex. 204, 21 Am. & Eng. R. E. ( '.is. 431.
278 CAR DOORS.
tiff sued for injuries received in an ordinary American
saloon car, by the act of a railway servant in closing
the door upon the plaintiff's hand, it was held that it
was for the jury to determine whether or not the act of
the servant was negligent, regard being had to the
plaintiff's position at the time of the injury, and the
knowledge which the servant had of the possibility of
injury to the plaintiff by reason of the closing of the
door. On the other hand, in Richardson v. Metropoli-
tan By., 1 a plaintiff, having entered a carriage, permitted
his hand to remain upon the door for some half a
minute, and the defendant's porter, having first called,
" Take your seats," closed the door, and injured the
plaintiff's hand ; and it was held that the defendant
was not liable, the porter having closed the door in the
ordinary exercise of his duty after due warning, and the
sole cause of the injury being the plaintiffs negligence
in permitting his hand to remain on the door after he
had entered the carriage. So, in Jackson v. M. Ry., 2
it was held, in the House of Lords, affirming the Court
of Appeal and reversing the Common Pleas, that,
where the plaintiff had been injured by reason of having
risen in an overcrowded carriage to prevent the entry of
more passengers, the door being hastily closed by the
defendant's servant upon the plaintiff's hand, the rail-
way was not liable. In Richardson's and in Jackson's
cases, the injury was done by an act of a servant in the
course of his duty, and not negligently performed, and
injury resulted to the passenger only because he himself
was negligent ; while in Fordham's case the servant
closed the door upon a passenger in the act of entering
the car ; and in Davidson's case there was evidence
from which the jury might properly, and did, in fact,
1 L. R. 3 C. P. 374.
* L. R. 10 C. P. 49, 2 C. P. D. 125, 3 App. Cas. 193.
CAR DOORS. 279
find that the servant ought to have seen the position in
which the plaintiff was standing. The distinction,
therefore, is that the passenger is entitled to recover for
such injuries when they result from carelessness on the
part of the railway's servant, the passenger not con-
tributing to the accident by any imprudent act on his
part.
269. A passenger has the right to assume that the
doors of the car are reasonably secure, thus, in Gee v.
M. Ry., 1 the plaintiff, having risen from his seat in the
carriage for the purpose of looking at the signal lights
upon the line, put his hand on the bar across the win-
dow ; the door flew open, and the plaintiff fell out and
was injured, and it was held that he was entitled to
recover, for he might reasonably suppose that the door
had been properly shut by the defendant's servants, and
that he could with safety lean upon it. So, in W. M.
R. R v. Stanley, 2 a passenger was held entitled to
recover for injuries received in attempting to close the
door of his car while passing through a tunnel, the
railway having omitted to light the car, and the open
door inconveniencing the plaintiff and the other pas-
sengers in the car by its admission of smoke and cin-
ders. On the other hand, in Adams v. L. & Y. Ry., 3
the door of the carriage in which the plaintiff was
riding would not remain shut while the train was in
motion, but there was room enough for the plaintiff to
sit away from the door, and the weather was good.
The plaintiff, having shut the door three times, at-
tempted, for the fourth time, to close it within three
minutes of the time of arrival of the train at a station,
and, in so doing, he fell out and was injured. Judg-
ment was entered for the defendant upon the ground
1 L. R. 8 Q. B. 161. * 61 Md. 266, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206.
» L. R. 4 C. P. 739.
2S0 DISORDERLY PASSENGERS.
that, as the inconvenience to the plaintiff from the open
door was slight, and the peril in attempting to close it
•was considerable, the injury resulting from that attempt
was caused solely by his own carelessness ; but in the
later case of Gee v. M. Ry., 1 Adams v. L. & Y. Ry., is
commented upon, and the application to the facts of
that case of the doctrine as above stated questioned.
270. It is both the right and the duty of the railway
to remove from its cars disorderly passengers whose
misconduct endangers the safety of their fellow-passen-
gers ; 2 but the duty of the railway to its passengers does
not require it to maintain a police force, either at its
stations or on its cars, for the supjoression of riots, or the
prevention of any possible breach of the peace ; thus,
in P., N., N. C. R. R. v. Hinds, 3 the plaintiff, a female,
having been injured in the course of a fight between a
number of drunken men, who, at a station, had forced
themselves into the defendant's car and usurped the
control thereof, it was held that the defendant was not
liable, for its duty was to provide servants enough for
the ordinary conduct of its transportation business, but
not to provide police, and the conductor, not having
voluntarily admitted the creators of the disturbance,
but having been overpowered by them, the defendant
was not to be held liable. On the same principle it
was held in Cannon v. M., G. W. Ry., 4 that a railway
is not liable for injuries caused by the disorderly con-
duct of a mob who had taken possession of a station
platform. So also, in Putnam v. B. & S. A. R. R., 5 a
railway was held not to be responsible for a wilful
assault by one passenger causing the death of another
1 L. R. 8 Q. B. 161.
7 Ry. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St. 345 ; P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Vandyne. 57 Ind.
576 ; R, P. & C. R. R. v. McDonald, 68 Ind. 316 ; Leraont v. W. & G. R. R.,
I Mackey (D. C.) 180, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 263.
1 53 Penna. St. 512. * 6 Irish C. L. 199. 6 55 N. Y. 108.
DISORDERLY PASSENGERS. 281
passenger, where the servants of the railway had no
knowledge of the character or disposition of the wrong-
doer, and no reason to apprehend that he would com-
mit an act of violence. Nor is the railway liable to a
passenger for the value of securities of which that pas-
senger is robbed by violence as he is leaving the train
on its arrival at a station. 1 Nevertheless, the duty of
the railway requires it to protect its passengers from
the disorderly acts of other passengers and of strangers,
provided that the parties causing the disorder are not
sufficiently numerous or strong to overthrow the au-
thority of the railway servants ; for in such a case the
servants are negligent in not removing or controlling
the disorderly persons ; thus, in P. & C. E-. R. v. Pil-
low, 2 where the plaintiff had been injured in the course
of a fight in defendant's car between two other passen-
gers, defendant's servants negligently omitting to restore
order, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover. 3 Upon the same principle the railway is liable
to a passenger, who, while alighting at a station is
pushed off the steps of the car by a crowd of passengers. 4
The railway is also liable for injuries done to its pas-
sengers by the wrongful and wilful acts of its servants,
if the railway has been negligent, either in its selection
or retention of the wrongdoer in the service ; or if it
has subsequently ratified the servant's unauthorized act
by retaining him in the service, and a fortiori promoting
him, after his wrongful act has been brought to the
" Weeks v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 72 N. Y. 50.
2 76 Penna. St. 510.
3 See also, Flint v. N. & N. Y. T. Co., 34 Conn. 554 ; Britton v. A. & C. R. R.,
88 N. C. 536, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 391 ; Hendricks v. S. A. R. R., 44 N.
Y. Sup. Ct. 8 ; N. O., St. L. & C. R. R. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200 ; King v. O. &
M. Ry. (U. S. C. C. Ind.), 18 Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 386.
* Treat v. B. & L. R. R., 131 Mass. 371, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 423 ; Ho-
gan v. S. E. Ry., 28 L. T. N. S. 271.
282 SUDDEN JOLTS, ETC.
knowledge of liis superior officer. But if the railway
has not expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified
the act, or been negligent in the selection or retention
of the wrongdoer, it cannot be held liable for his wilful
act. ,
271. The railway is likewise liable for injuries to
passengers in its cars caused by a sudden jolting of the
car in starting or coming to a stop, and in such cases it
is for the jury to say whether or not the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in rising from his seat before
the car had stopped. 1 It is the duty of the railway to
provide seats for the passengers whom it undertakes to
carry; 2 but the mere failure to provide a seat for a
passenger is not such negligence as will render a rail-
way responsible to the passenger, if he, while standing,
be thrown down without negligence upon the part of
the railway. 3 It has, however, been held that the rail-
way is liable to a passenger, who, having entered a
crowded car, and no seat being obtainable, rode upon
the platform, and was injured while upon the platform ; 4
but these decisions seem to be open to criticism upon
the grounds stated in the next section.
XI. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGERS.
272. It is well settled that a passenger who, volun-
tarily and unnecessarily, places himself in a position of
1 N. J. R. R. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341 ; C. & P. S. Ferry Co. v. Monaghan,
10 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 46 ; W. P. P. Ry. v. Whipple, 5 Id. 68 ;
Barden v. B. C. & F. R. R., 121 Mass. 436 ; Worthen v. G. T. Ry., 125 Id. 99 ;
Geddes v. M. R. R., 103 Id. 391 ; Spearman v. C. St. R. R., 57 Cal. 432, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 193 ; M. P. R. R. v. Marten, Tex. , 22 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 409; Dougherty v. M. R. R., 81 Mo. 325, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
497.
2 L. & N. R. R. v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1.
3 Burton v. W. J. Ferry Co., 114 U. 8. 474.
* Werle v. L. I. R. R.,98 N. Y. 650 ; Colegrove v. H. & N. H. R. R., 20 Id
492 ; Willis v. L. I. R. R., 34 Id. 670 ; Collins v. A. & S. R. R., 12 Barb. 492.
passenger's negligence. 283
danger cannot hold the railway responsible for injuries
of which his position is the efficient cause, as, for instance,
where his injuries result from his crossing the line in
front of a moving train whose approach is known to him ; x
or from his returning, after a successful escape, to a
burning car in order to recover a valise which had been
left behind ; 2 or from his riding on an engine, 3 or from
his riding on a frieght car instead of in the caboose, and
while there incurring increased danger in adjusting a
falling load of timber ; 4 or from his walking on the track
in a railway yard; 5 or from his crossing on the plat-
form of a car of a freight train, apparently ready to
start, in order to reach the passenger train, and without
notice to those in charge of the freight train ; 6 or from
his going on the line, after alighting from a train at a
station and standing for a necessary purpose, and with-
out notice to the railway servants on the track behind
freight cars which are liable to be moved ; 7 or from his
crawling under and between the wheels of a freight
train in leaving a railway station; 8 or from his riding
on the platform of a moving car before the train comes
to a stop; 9 but as before stated, it has been held that
1 B. & O. E. R. v. State, 60 Md. 449 ; Falkner v. G. S. & W. Ry., 5 I. C. L.
213.
2 Hay v. G. W. Ry., 37 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 456.
8 Robertson v. E. Ry., 22 Barb. 91 ; B. & P. R. R. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 ;
Rucker v. M. P. R. R., 61 Tex. 499, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 245 ; Daggett
v. I. C. R. R., 34 Iowa 284; c/. W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Shacklet, 105 111. 364, 12
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 166.
4 Sherman v. H. & St. J. R. R., 72 Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589;
Player v. B., C, R. &. A. R. R., 62 Iowa 723, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 112.
5 Henry v. St. L., K. C & N. Ry., 76 Mo. 288, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
136 ; Hallihan v. II. & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 117 ;
Johnson v. B. & M. R. R., 125 Mass. 75.
6 C, B. & Q. Ry. v. Dewey, 26 111. 255 ; Lewis v. B. & O. R. R., 38 Md. 588 ;
Gahagan v. B. & L. R. R., 1 Allen 187.
i Van Schaick v, H. R. R. R., 43 N. Y. 527.
8 M. & C. R. R. v. Copeland, 61 Ala. 376 ; C. R. R. v. Dixon, 42 Ga. 327.
9 Secor v. T., P. & W. Ry., 10 Fed. Rep. 15; I. C. Ry. v. Green, 81 111, 19;
284 passenger's negligence.
the failure of the railway to perform its duty of provid-
ing the passenger with a seat will excuse his contribu-
tory negligence in riding on the platform, 1 yet this
doctrine cannot be regarded as reasonable, for if the
passenger cannot obtain a seat he may stand within the
car, or he may refuse to proceed on the journey, and
may hold the railway responsible for the damages re-
sulting from its breach of contract; but injuries result-
ing primarily from his voluntarily putting himself in
a position of such obvious danger as that of riding on
the platform of a car in motion cannot be said to have
been proximately caused by the railway's failure to pro-
vide him with a seat.
273. It is also contributory negligence in the passen-
ger to put his head or arm out of the window of a car
in motion. 2 On the other hand, in N. J. E. R. v. Ken-
nard, 3 the railway was held to be negligent because it
did not so bar its windows as to physically prevent
passengers from putting their heads or arms through
those windows, but that case is overruled by the later
cases in Pennsylvania. In C. & A. R. R. v. Pondrom, 4
it was held that the negligence of the passenger in per-
mitting his arm to rest on the window sill and to extend
outside was slight in comparison with the negligence of
the railway in permitting cars on different tracks to be
Blodgett v. Bartlett, 50 Ga. 353 ; A. G. S. Ry. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 12 ; C. & A.
R. R. v. Hoosey, 99 Penna. St. 492; Hickey v. B. & L. R. R., 14 Allen 429;
Quinn v. I. C. R. R., 51 111. 495 ; M. & W. R. R. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409 ; P.
R. I. & St. L. R. R. v. Coultas, 67 111. 398.
1 Willis v. L. I. R. R., 34 N. Y. 670; Zemp v. W. & M. R. R., 9 Rich. L.
84; Maguire v. M. R. R., 115 Mass. 239.
2 Todd v. O. C. R. R., 3 Allen 18, 7 Id. 207 ; P. R. R. v. McClurg, 56 Penna.
St. 294 ; I. & C. R. R. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 83 ; P. & C. R. R. v. Andrews, 39
Md. 329 ; Holbrook v. U. & S. R. R., 1 2 N. Y. 236 ; Dun v. S. & R. R. R., 78 Va.
645, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 363; L. & N. R. R. v. Siekinge, 5 Bush. (Ky.)
1 ; Dale v. D., L. & W. R. R., 73 N. Y. 468.
8 21 Penna. St. 203. * 51 111. 333,
passenger's negligence. 285
in such close proximity as to cause the injury for which
the plaintiff sued, and that, therefore, under the doc-
trine of comparative negligence the plaintiff was entitled
to recover. In Spencer v. M. & P. I. C. R. R., 1 Win-
ters v. H. & St. J. R. R., 2 and Summers v. C. C. R. R., 3
it is held that it is not necessarily contributory negli-
gence in a passenger to put his head or arm out of a
car window, and that it is for the jury to decide whether
or not, under all the circumstances of the particular
case, the act is so negligent as to bar his recovery. The
right doctrine seems to be that of Todd v. O. C. R. R.,
and the cases of its class, for the placing by a passenger
of any portion of his person outside of the window of a
car in motion is so obviously dangerous that adults of
average mental capacity instinctively refrain from it.
But where the passenger having rested his arm on the
sill of the window within the car, it was jostled out and
injured by a collision with a freight car which had been
negligently left on a siding in such a position that the
car carrying the passenger must strike it, the railway
was properly held liable. 4 So the railway was held lia-
ble where the passenger's arm similarly placed within a
street car was jolted out by a collision of that car with
another car upon a different track, on a curve which
was so sharp that the cars necessarily struck in pass-
ing ; 5 - so the railway was held liable where a passenger
in a street car while in the act of taking his seat, hav-
ing rested his hand on the base of an open window, it
was struck by a projecting sewer plank. 6
274. It is contributory negligence in a passenger to
1 17 Wise. 487. * 39 Mo. 468.
» 34 La. An. 139. * Farlow v. Kelly, 108 IT. S. 288.
6 G. P. Ry. v. Brophy, 105 Penna. St. 38, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 361.
• r>ahlberg v. M. St. Ry., 32 Minn. 404, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 202. See
also Dickinson v. P., H. & N. W. R. R., 18 N, W. Rep. (Mich.) 553.
286 passenger's negligence.
ride in a baggage, or other car, not intended for the
carriage of passengers, save with the consent of the
railway, 1 provided, of course, that the position of the
passenger was a contributing cause of his injury, and
was, in itself, so dangerous a place that a man of ordi-
nary prudence would not have voluntarily occupied it
under ordinary circumstances. Baggage cars and lug-
gage vans are not primarily intended for the carriage of
passengers. It is, in case of accident to the train,
dangerous to be in them, not only because they are in
general coupled to the engine drawing the train, and
preceding the passenger cars, but also because, in case
of derailment or collision, the boxes and trunks in the
baggage car are violently thrown about. It is, therefore,
not reasonable to hold the railway liable to one whose
injuries have been caused by his imprudence in volun-
tarily riding in such a car. It is, of course, not con-
tributory negligence in a passenger to ride in a pas-
senger car other than that in which he has been assigned
to a seat. 2
275. If the passenger assumes a position of danger at
the invitation of a servant of the railway, or under an
express or implied representation by a servant of the
railway that he may safely occupy the position, the
railway will, in general, be held liable for the injuries
resulting therefrom ; 3 thus, in B. & O. R. R. v. State, to
1 H. & T. C. R. R. v. Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 396 ;
K. C. R. R. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 79 ; P. R. R. v.
Langdon, 92 Penna. St. 21, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 87 ; P. & R. I. R. R. ».
Lane, 83 111. 448; Higgins v. H. & St. J. R. R., 36 Mo. 418 ; c/. Watson v. N.
Ry., 24 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 98 ; Jacobus v. St. P. & C. Ry., 20 Minn. 125.
* Penna. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451.
5 O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R., 59 Penna. St. 239; Dunn v. G. T. R. R., 58 Me.
187 ; Edgerton v. N. Y. C. R. R., 39 X. Y. 227 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Erwin,
Tenn. , 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 465 ; I. & St. L. R. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S.
291 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Kelley, 92 Ind. 371, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1 ; Pool
v. C. R. R., 56 Wise. 227 ; St. L., I. M. & S. R. R. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 198 ; G. R. R. & B. Co. v. McCurdy, 45 Ga. 288 ;
passenger's negligence. 287
use of Mahone, 1 and in Warren v. F. R. R., 2 the rail-
way was held liable to passengers who, upon the invi-
tation of and in company with a station master, while
crossing the line to enter a car, were struck by an en-
gine moving upon an intervening track. So in P. R.
R. v. McCloskey, 3 the railway was held liable to a pas-
senger who was injured by reason of his obedience to
specific instructions of the railway's servants, requiring
him to place himself in a particular car, although those
specific instructions were at variance with the railway's
general regulations. So in C, C, C. & I. R. R. v. Man-
son, 4 L. & N. R. R. v. Kelly, 5 and in Mclntyre v. N.
Y. C. R. R., 6 railways were held liable to passengers
who were injured while passing from one car to another
of a train in motion, under the direction of the con-
ductor. So in N. & C. R. R. v. Erwin, 7 the railway
was held liable to one, who, having arrived at a station
too late for his train, got upon an engine at the invita-
tion of the station master, and while journeying on the
line in the engine for the purpose of overtaking his
train, was injured by the negligence of servants of the
railway. So in St. L., I. M. & S. R. R. v. Cantrell, 8
the railway was held liable to a passenger who, at the
suggestion of the conductor, jumped from the platform
of a slowly moving train and was injured. 9 So in
Lambeth v. N. C. R. R., 66 N. C. 494 ; Filer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 59 N.
Y. 351 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Penna. St. 139 ; Colegrove v. N. Y. & H. & N. Y. &
N. H. Ry., 20 N. Y. 492 ; C, C, C & I. R. R. v. Manson, 30 Ohio St. 451 ; Water-
bury v. N. Y. C & H. R. R. R, 17 Fed. Rep. 671 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Sykes,
96 111. 162, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 254.
1 63 Md. 135, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 202. J 8 Allen 227.
* 23 Penna. St. 526. * 30 Ohio St. 451.
6 92 Ind. 371, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1. • 37 N. Y. 287.
7 Tenn. , 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 465.
8 37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 198.
9 See also Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R., 59 N. Y. 351 ; G. R. R. v. McCurdv, 45
Ga. 288 ; Bucher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 98 N. Y. 128, 21 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 361.
2S8 servant's invitation.
Allender v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 1 the railway was held
liable to a passenger who was injured while under the
direction of the railway conductor, entering a car at
rest, but not in position at the usual platform. So in
O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R., 2 the railway was held liable
to a passenger who was injured while riding in a bag-
gage car in violation of a rule of the railway, but with
the assent of the conductor of the train. So in C. B. &
Q. R. R. v. Sykes, 3 an intending passenger was held not
to be necessarily contributory negligent in passing, on
the invitation of a conductor, under a freight car which
barred his way to the station.
276. The fact that a servant of the railway invited,
or even directed the passenger to occupy a position of
danger will not render the railway liable for injuries
resulting therefrom, if the danger was so obvious, that
a reasonable man would not have obeyed the servant, or
accepted his invitation; 4 nor will the railway be liable
to a passenger who is injured in alighting at a danger-
ous place, because the conductor tells him that pas-
sengers sometimes alight there, but does not either invite
or command the particular passenger to alight at that
point. 5 Nor will the railway be held responsible if the
servant was not expressly, or impliedly, authorized to
give the invitation. 6 In particular is this the case when
the general regulations of the railway for the protection
of the passenger forbid him to occupy a position of
danger, as, for instance, to ride in the baggage car. On
1 43 Iowa 276. * 59 Penna. St. 239.
8 96 111. 162, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 254.
* Hazzard v. C. B. & Q. R. R-, 1 Biss. 503 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Randolph, 53
HI. 510 ; B. & P. R. R. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 ; S. W. R. R. v. Singleton, 67
Ga. 306, 66 Id. 252 ; S. & N. A. R. R. v. Schaufler, 75 Ala. 136, 21 Am. & Eng
R. R. Cas. 405.
6 C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Hazzard, 26 111. 373.
8 L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298 ; Huff v. A. V. R. R., 91 Penna
St. 458 ; Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Id. 210 ; P. R. R. v. Landgon, 92 Id. 21.
LICENSE TO DISOBEY EULES. 289
this point Paxson, J., says with great force in P. H. R.
v. Langdon, 1 "the rules adopted by railroad companies
are a part of their police arrangements. Some of them
are for the convenience of the company in the manage-
ment of its business. Others are for the comfort of
passengers, and yet others have exclusive regard to the
safety of passengers. The distinction between them,
and the difference in the consequences of their violation
is manifest. As an illustration: it would be unreason-
able to hold that the violation of the rule against smok-
ing could be set up as a defence to an action for personal
injuries resulting from the negligence of the company.
On the other hand, should a passenger insist upon riding
upon the cow-catcher, in the face of a rule prohibiting
it, and as a consequence should be injured, I apprehend
it would be a good defence to an action againct the
company, even though the negligence of the latter's ser-
vants was the cause of the collision or other accident,
by which the injury was occasioned. And if the pas-
senger thus recklessly exposing his life to possible acci-
dents were a sane man, more especially if he were a
railroad man, it is difficult to see how the knowledge or
even the assent of the conductor to his occupying such
a position could affect the case. There can be no license
to commit suicide. It is true the conductor has the con-
trol of the train and may assign passengers their seats,
but he may not assign a passenger to a seat on the cow-
catcher, a position on the platform, or in the baggage
car. This is known to every intelligent man, and appears
upon the face of the rule itself. He is expressly re-
quired to enforce it, and to prohibit any of the acts re-
ferred to, unless it be riding upon the cow-catcher, which
is so manifestly dangerous and improper that it has not
been deemed necessary to prohibit it. We are unable
1 02 Penna. St. 21, 28.
19
290 passenger's negligence on street cars.
to see how a conductor, in violation of a known rule of
the company, can license a man to occupy a place of
danger so as to make the company responsible. It is
otherwise as to rules which are intended merely for the
convenience of the company or its passengers. It was
said by Woodward, J., in Sullivan v. The Railroad
Company, 1 'that on the part of the passenger his assent
is implied to all the company's reasonable rules and
regulations for entering, occupying, and leaving their
cars, and if injury befall him by reason of his disregard
of regulations, which are necessary to the conduct of the
business of the company, the company are not liable in
damages, even though the negligence of their servants
concurred with his own negligence in causing the mis-
chief.' This principle is even broader than the one we
are now contending for. We only assert here, that if a
passenger wilfully violates a known rule intended for
his safety, and is injured in consequence of such viola-
tion, he is not entitled to recover damages for such
injury."
277. The conditions of travel on a street car are, of
course, different from those on lines of railway whose
cars are propelled at the higher rate which the use of
steam as a motor makes possible, and it is not necessarily
contributory negligence to ride on the platform of a
street car ; 2 nor to leave one's seat in a street car and to
stand on the rear platform, on which there is an accu-
mulation of ice and snow; 3 nor to stand on the front
1 30 Penna. St. 234.
2 Meesel v. L. & B. R. R., 8 Allen 234 ; Spooner v. B. C. R. R., 54 N. Y. 230 ;
G. P. Ry. v. Walling, 97 Penna. St. 55; Maguire v. M. R. R., 115 Mass. 237 ;
Sheridan v. B. & N. R. R., 36 N. Y. 39; Clark v. 8th Ave. R. R., Id. 135;
Burns v. B. R. R., 50 Mo. 139 ; Nolan v. B. C. & N. R. R., 87 N. Y. 63, 3 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 463 ; 13th & 15th Sts. P. Ry. v. Boudrou, 92 Penna. St. 480,
8 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 244.
8 Fleck v. U. Ry., 134 Mass. 480, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 372.
DISABLED PASSENGERS. 291
step of a horse car j 1 nor to get on or off a moving street
car; 2 but it has been held to be contributory negligence
to attempt to get on the front platform of a moving
street car whose step is obviously broken ; 3 or to sit on
the railing of the platform of a street car; 4 or to sit on
the step of a street car. 5 A street railway is, of course,
not liable to a passenger who is injured while standing
on the step of the front platform by being jolted off by
an ordinary movement of the car. 6 A street railway in
operating street cars is not bound to prevent passengers
from getting on and off the front platform of a car by
guards or fenders, but the absence of such means of
protection may properly be considered by the jury in
determining whether or not the railway failed in its
duty to one who was injured while alighting from the
front platform; 7 yet in W. P. P. Ry. v. Gallagher, 8
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the same
court which had decided P. C. P. Ry. v. Hassard, be-
cause the judge at the trial left it to the jury to find the
railway negligent in failing to provide such guards or
fenders.
278. Where the railway voluntarily accepts as a pas-
senger one whose physical disability is apparent, or is
made known to its servants, and renders special assist-
ance necessary, the railway is negligent if such assist-
1 W. P. P. Ry. v. Gallagher, 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 413.
2 G C Ry. v. Mumford, 97 111. 560, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 312 ; McDon-
ough v. M. R. R, 137 Mass. 210, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 354; Eppendorf
v. B. C. R. R., 69 N. Y. 195.
8 Dietrich v. B. & H. S. Ry-, 58 Md. 347, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 115.
* Ginna v. S. A. R. R., 67 N. Y. 596 ; Downey v. Hendrie, 46 Mich. 498, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 386.
* Wills v. L. & B. Ry., 129 Mass. 351, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 27.
« F. S. & G. St. F. R. R. v. Hayes, 97 N. Y. 259, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa.
358.
7 P. C. P. Ry. v. Hassard, 75 Penna. St. 367.
8 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 413.
292 PASSENGERS ON FREIGHT CARS.
ance be not afforded. 1 It lias been held that where the
physical condition of the person injured is at the time
of the injury such that the injuries caused by negligence
on the part of the railway are thereby aggravated, the
railway is not liable for that aggravation ; 2 but the more
correct view seems to be that taken in those cases which
hold that a defendant is equally responsible for injuries
inflicted by his negligence, and for an aggravation of
those injuries by reason of the impaired physical con-
dition of the person injured prior to and at the time of
the injury. 3
279. It is the duty of the railway, whatever be the
means of conveyance which it uses, to provide every-
thing which is essential to the safety of the passenger
and reasonably consistent with the transportation of
the passenger by the particular means of conveyance
so used ; thus one who has been accepted as a passenger
to be carried in a freight train is entitled to the same
character, though not to the same degree, of protection
as if he were carried in a passenger train. 4
280. The stringent obligations which the law imposes
upon common carriers of passengers are not applicable
to individuals occasionally carrying passengers gratui-
1 T. W. & W. R. R. v. Baddely, 54 111. 19 ; C. C. I. R. R. r. Powell, 40 Ind.
37 ; Milliniann v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 642 ; Sheridan v. B. C. R.
R., 36 N. Y. 39 ; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607.
* P. P. C. Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344.
3 Allison v. C. & N. W. Ry., 42 Iowa 274; Brown v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 54
Wise. 342, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 444 ; Fitzpatrick v. G. W. Ry., 12 Up.
Can. (Q. B.) 645 ; Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wise. 584.
4 Murch v. C. R. R., 29 N. H. 9 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Hazzard, 26 111. 373 ; I
R. R. v. Beaver, 41 Md. 493 ; I. & St. L. R. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 ; C. &
G. R. R. v. Fay, 16 111. 568; Edgerton v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R., 39 N. Y. 227 ;
Dunn v. G. T.Ry., 58 Me. 187.
As to the restricted statutory liability of railways in Mississippi to passen-
gers on freight trains, see Code 1880, \ 1054 ; Perkins v. C, St. L. & N. O. R.
R., 60 Miss. 726, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 242.
SPECIAL CARRIERS. 203
tously; 1 nor to railway contractors, who, in the course
of constructing a line, occasionally carry passengers for
hire; 2 nor are statutory regulations for the running of
trains which have been enacted for the protection of
passengers applicable to construction trains run by con-
tractors upon an uncompleted line. 3
1 Moffatt v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P. C. 115.
' Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 12 Wall. 369.
3 Griggs v. Houston, 104 U. S. 553.
294 RAILWAY SERVANTS.
CHAPTER VII.
THE LIABILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO THE PERSONS INCLUDED
IN THE FIFTH CATEGORY, THAT IS, THE SERVANTS OF THE
RAILWAY.
I. The general principle determining the liability of the railway to its
servants.
II. The duty of the railway in its original construction and subsequent
maintenance in repair of its line, rolling stock, and appliances.
III. The duty of the railway in its selection and retention of servants.
IV. The duty of the railway in its operation of its line.
V. The liability of railways to their servants for the negligence of other
servants.
VI. The servant's implied undertaking to take upon himself the risks of
the service.
VII. Minor servants.
VIII. The servant's contributory negligence.
IX. Statutes affecting the liability of railways to their servants.
I. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE DETERMINING THE LIA-
BILITY OF THE RAILWAY TO ITS SERVANTS.
The railway is liable to its servants only for negligence.
281. In the term "servants" there are included all
of the railway's officers and employes of every grade
who are engaged in the operation of its line. I use the
name " servant " rather than " employe," not only be-
cause it is of larger import, but also because the relation
of " master and servant " has long been a recognized
topic in the law, and the use of the term " servant "
renders more easy the reference to the many adjudged
cases which deal with that relation. The nature and
extent of the liability of railways for injuries to their
servants in the course of railway operations is determin-
RAILWAY SERVANTS. 295
able upon the general principles which are applicable
to the relation of servants to other masters acting in
their individual capacities. Masters do not insure the
safety of their servants ; and they are liable to them
only for negligence, that is, for a non-performance of
duty causing injury to the servants. The relation be-
tween masters and their servants being purely voluntary
and contractual, the nature and extent of the master's
duty is necessarily dependent upon the terms, whether
express or implied, of the contract of service. If there
be an express contract of service defining the master's
liability, its terms must govern, but in the absence of
any such contract the implied obligation of the master
is only that he shall not be negligent in his personal
participation in the work, nor in the personal participa-
tion in the work of any one whom he has put in his
place to represent him, and, in the exercise of an uncon-
trolled discretion, to conduct the business for him ; nor
in the provision of the machinery and appliances to be
operated by the servant, nor in failing to repair ma-
chinery and appliances which, although originally sound,
have become dangerously defective, and whose condition
either is, or ought to be, known to him ; nor in the
original selection, or subsequent retention in the service,
of servants whose incompetency either is, or ought to be,
known to him. This being the extent of the master's
implied obligation to the servant, it follpws, not only
that the servant must be held by reason of the voluntary
character of his engagement in the service, to have as-
sumed the risks of danger to himself necessarily incident
to the character of the service for which he engaged, in-
cluding the risks of the negligence of his fellow-servants,
but also that the servant cannot hold the master liable
for an injury to the happening of which his, the ser-
vant's, negligence has contributed. The general prin-
296 GENERAL KULE OF LIABILITY.
ciples tlms stated are fully supported by the authorities.
The leading case is Priestley v. Fowler, 1 where, in an
action by a servant against his master, a butcher, for
injuries received by the breaking down of an overloaded
van, after verdict for the plaintiff' judgment was arrested
on the ground, as stated by Abinger, C. B., that " from
the mere relation of master and servant no contract,
and, therefore, no duty can be implied on the part of
the master to cause the servant to be safely and securely
carried, or to make the master liable for damage to the
servant arising from any vice or imperfection unknown
to the master in the carriage, or in the mode of loading
and conducting it ;" and in elucidation of this general
principle, the Lord Chief Baron said, the master " is,
no doubt, bound to provide for the safety of his servant,
in the course of his employment to the best of his judg-
ment, information, and belief. The servant is not
bound to risk his safety in the service of his master,
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he
reasonably apprehends injury to himself; and in most
of the cases in which injury may be incurred, if not in
all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the proba-
bility and extent of it as the master. * * * In fact,
to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an en-
couragement to the servant to omit that diligence and
caution which he is in duty bound to exercise in behalf
of his master to protect him against the misconduct, or
negligence, of others who serve him, and which diligence
and caution, while they protect the master are a much
better security against any injury the servant may sus-
tain by the negligence of others engaged under the same
master than any recourse against his master for damages
could afford." So in Wilson v. Merry, 2 where the
1 3 M. & W. 1. ' L. E. 1 Sc. & Div. 326.
RAILWAY SERVANTS. 297
owners and operators of a mine were sought to be held
liable for the death of a miner, Cairns, L. C., said : " the
master is not, and cannot be, liable to his servant unless
there be negligence on the part of the master in that
which he, the master, has contracted, or undertaken, with
his servant to do. The master has not contracted nor
undertaken to execute in person the work connected with
his business. The result of an obligation on the master
personally to execute the work connected with his busi-
ness, in place of being beneficial, might be disastrous to
his servants, for the master might be incompetent, per-
sonally, to perform the work. At all events, a servant
may choose for himself between serving a master who
does, and a master who does not, attend in person to his
business. But what the master is, in my opinion, bound
to his servant to do, in the event of his not personally
superintending and directing the work, is to select
proper and competent persons to do so, and to furnish
them with adequate material and resources for the work.
When he has done this he has, in my opinion, done all
that he is bound to do." So in Ormond v. Holland, 1
where the defendants were builders and the plaintiff
was a servant, who, while ascending a ladder at a build-
ing in course of construction by the defendants, was
injured by the breaking of one of the rounds of the ladder
and a fall therefrom, there being no proof that the de-
fective condition of the ladder had been in any way
brought home to the knowledge of the defendants,
Campbell, C. J., directed a verdict for the defendants,
and a rule to enter the verdict for the plaintiff was dis-
charged, Campbell, C. J., saying : " we all agree that
the action is not maintainable. There was no evidence
of personal negligence; the builders used due and rea-
1 El. Bl. & El. 102, 96 E. C. L.
298 GENERAL RULE OF LIABILITY.
sonuble care to have competent servants ; and I think
they used more than ordinary care, and took extraor-
dinary precaution, that the plant should be sufficient.
There being no evidence of personal negligence, either
by interference in the work, or in hiring the servants,
or in choosing the implements, I am inclined to take
some blame to myself for encouraging this application
to the court; for, according to both decided cases
and to principle, it must fail." So in Warner v. E. Ry., 1
where it was sought to hold the railway liable for in-
juries to a servant caused by the fall of a bridge which
had been carefully constructed and frequently inspected,
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed in error, Bacon,
J., saying, inter alia : " the only ground which the law
recognizes of liability on the part of the defendant is
that which arises from personal negligence, or such want
of care and prudence in the management of its affairs,
or in the selection of its agents or appliances, the omis-
sion of which occasioned the injury, and which, if they
had been exercised, would have averted it." All of the
cases which are cited in this chapter serve to illustrate
the proposition as stated by Bacon, J., for, however
widely they may differ in their finding of that which
constitutes negligence under any particular state of facts,
they agree in holding negligence on the part of the rail-
way to be the test of its liability.
282. The liability of the railway to its servants being
dependent upon its negligence, it is not liable for in-
juries to them resulting from inevitable accidents, such
as the fall of a bridge which had been skilfully con-
structed and carefully inspected ; 2 nor the explosion of
the boiler of an engine from causes which could not
1 39 N. Y. 4G8 J Warner v. E. Ry., 39 N. Y. 468.
NON-LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENT. 299
have been detected nor guarded against ; * nor the
breaking of a rail by frost ; 2 nor the throwing of a
mail bag by a mail agent from a passing train upon a
station platform, when the railway had no reason to ex-
pect that the bag would be thrown upon the platform ; 3
nor the formation of a poisonous substance by the de-
cay of the grease in an axle-box, and the communica-
tion of that poison to a cut in the servant's hand, the
railway having no reason to anticipate that any poison-
ous substance would result from the decay of the grease ; 4
nor the sudden reversal of the engine and stoppage of
a train of construction cars to avoid a collision with
cattle on the line, thereby throwing off a laborer who
was upon the last car of the train ; 5 nor the movement
of a car upon a siding by the shifting of another car on
to the siding, thereby killing a servant who was stand-
ing behind it, when the other servants, who were doing
the shifting, had no reason to suppose that any one
would be injured by the movement of that car; 6 nor
the fall of a brakeman from a moving train when the
proof fails to show why he fell ; 7 nor the derailment of
a train by a misplaced switch, the evidence not showing
when, how, or by whom the switch was misplaced ; 8
nor a collision between a hand-car and a train, which
was caused by the fact that the foreman's watch was
slower than that of the conductor of the colliding train ; 9
1 I. C. Ey. v. Houck, 72 111. 285 ; T. W. & W. Ey. v. Moore, 77 Id. 217 ; I
B. & W. Ey. v. Toy, 91 Id. 474.
2 Henry v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 49 Mich. 495, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 110.
3 Muster v. C. M. & St. P. Ey., 61 Wise. 325, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 113.
* Kitteringham v. S. C. & P. Ey., 62 Iowa 285, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 14.
5 M. P. Ey. v. Haley, 25 Kans. 35, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 594; cf. Jeffrey
v K. & D. M. E. E., 56 Iowa 546, 5 Am. & Eng E. E. Cas. 568.
a Hallihan v. II. &St. J. E. E., 71 Mo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 117.
7 Corcoran v. B. & A. R. E., 133 Mass. 507; P. & E. E. E. v. Schertle, 97
Penna. St. 450, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 158.
8 Tinney v. B. & A. E. E., 62 Barb. 218.
9 Weger v. P H. E., 55 Penna. St. 460.
300 DUTY OF CONSTRUCTION, ETC.
nor the slipping of a servant from the step as Le was
climbing on a moving engine to make a coupling. *
283. As the liability of the railway to its servants is
dependent upon the fact of its negligence, it is bound
to its servants to exercise in its construction and in its
maintenance in repair of its line, rolling stock and ap-
pliances of labor, in its operation of its line, in the
conduct of its business, and in its selection of its ser-
vants of every rank, that degree of care which will
tend to secure its servants' safety to as great an extent
as is compatible with the conduct of an essentially haz-
ardous business by the use of human instrumentalities.
II. THE DUTY OF THE RAILWAY TO ITS SERVANTS IN THE
ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT MAINTE-
NANCE IN REPAIR OF ITS LINE, ROLLING STOCK, MA-
CHINERY AND APPLIANCES.
The duty of the railway to its servants requires the exercise of care on
its part in the original construction, inspection, and maintenance in
repair of its line, rolling stock, and apj)liances.
284. Railways do not warrant to their servants the
safe condition of their line, nor the security of their
appliances and machinery, and they guarantee only that
due care shall be used in constructing and in keeping
in repair, and in operating the line, appliances and
machinery. 2 Ruger, C. J., in Probst v. Delama-
1 Jackson v. K. C, L. & S. K. R. R., 31 Kans. 761, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
178.
* Clark v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937 ; Williams v. Clough, 3 Id. 258 ; Murphy
v. Crossan, 98 Penna. St. 495 ; Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Id. 58 ; Murray v.
Phillips, 35 L. T. 477 ; Hough v. T. P. Ry., 100 U. S. 213 ; Ford v. F. R. R.,
110 Mass. 241 ; Holmes v. Worthington, 2 F. & F. 533 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Orr,
84 Ind. 50, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 94 ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; L. S.
& M. S. Ry. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 ; Umback v. L. S. & M. S. Iy., 83 Ind.
191, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 98 ; Gates?;. S. M. Ry , 28 Minn. IK, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 237 ; Cooper v. C. R. R., 44 Iowa 134 ; Wedgwood v. C. & N.
DUTY OF CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 301
ter, 1 thus states the rule : " the duty of the master to fur-
nish safe, suitable, and sound tools, machinery and appli-
ances, for the use of the servant in the performance of
the work of the master, and to keep them in repair, is
not an absolute one, and is satisfied by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence on the part of the master
in the manufacture, selection, and repair of such ap-
pliances. * * * Yet, when the master has exercised all
of the care and caution which a prudent man would
take for the safety and protection of his own person, the
law does not hold him liable for the consequences of a
defect which could not be discovered by careful inspec-
tion, or the application of appropriate tests to determine
its existence."
285. Railways are not bound to their servants to pro-
vide the best possible appliances, but they are bound only
to supply such appliances as are in use by well managed
railways, and which they have skilfully constructed
and carefully maintained in repair. 2 Miller, J., thus
puts it in Marsh v. Chickering, 3 "the rule is that the
master does not owe to his servants the duty to furnish
W. Ry., 44 Wise. 44 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Asbury, 84 111. 429 ; Kain v. Smith,
80 N. Y. 458 ; Howd v. M. C. R. R.. 50 Miss. 178 ; Batterson v. C. & G. T.
Ry., 49 Mich. 184, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 123 ; Wonder v. B. & O. R. R., 32
Md. 411 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338 ; M. R. & L. E. R. R. v. Bar-
ber, 5 Ohio St. 541 ; Probst v. Delamater, 100 N. Y. 266.
1 100 N. Y. 266, 272.
* Brown v. A. C. S. & M. Co., 3 H. & C. 511 ; M. C. & C. Co. v. McEnery, 91
Penna. St. 185 ; L. R. & F. S. R. R. v. Duffey, 35 Ark. 602 ; Wonder v. B. & O.
R. R., 32 Md. 411 ; King v. B. & W. R. R., 9 Cush. 112 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v.
McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 (qualifying St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Valirius, 56 Id.
511) ; McGinnis v. C S. B. Co., 49 Mich. 466, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 135 ;
Schall v. Cole, 107 Penna. St. 1 ; Cooper v. C. R. R., 44 Iowa 134; P. & C. R.
R. v. Sentmayer, 92 Penna. St. 275 ; Cagney v. H. & St. J. R. R., 69 Mo. 416 ;
T. W. & W. Ry. v. Fredericks, 71 111. 294 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Asbury, 84 Id.
429 ; Smith v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 19 N. Y. 127 ; Disher v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
R. R., 94 N. Y. 622, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 233 ; Burke v. Witherbee, 98
N. Y. 562.
» 101 N. Y. 396, 400.
302 DUTY OF CONSTRUCTION, ETC.
the best known or conceivable appliances ; be is simply
required to furnish such as are reasonably safe and suit-
able; such as a prudent man would furnish if his own
life were exposed to the danger that would result from
unsuitable or unsafe appliances." As the duty of a
railway to its servants does not require it to provide the
best possible appliances, nor to insure its servants against
the ordinary dangers of the service, the railway is not
liable to freight brakemen because the bridges over ita
line are not sufficiently high to permit brakemen to
stand safely on the roofs of cars moving under such
bridges; 1 nor because its line is not ballasted, or is inter-
sected with ditches ; 2 nor because its switch frogs are
not blocked ; 3 nor because it has delayed for any length
of time to repair a car which is not in use, and which
has not been left in a position of danger; 4 nor because
it has not an uniform coupling for all of its engines
and cars; 5 nor because its car platforms are of
1 P. & C. R. R. v. Sentmayer, 92 Penna. St. 276, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
508 ; Owen v. N. Y. C. R. R., 1 Lans. 108 ; Devitt v. P. R. R., 50 Mo. 302 ;
B. & O. R. R. v. Strieker, 51 Md. 47 ; Rains v. St. L., T. M. & S. Ry., 71 Mo.
164, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 610 ; Wells v. B. C. R. & N. R. R., 56 Iowa 520,
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243 ; Baylor v. D., L. & W. R. R., 40 N. J. L. 23 ;
Gibson v. M. Ry., 2 Ont. (Can.) 653 ; Clark v. B. & D. R. R., 78 Va. 709, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 78 ; sed contra, B. & O. & C. R. R. v. Rowan, Ind. ,
23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 390.
2 P. & R. R. R. v. Schertle, 97 Penna. St. 450, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
158 ; DeForrest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 495 ; Wil-
liams v. C. R. R., 43 .Iowa 396 ; Gates v. S. M. Ry., 28 Minn. 110, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 237 ; Penna. Co. v. Hankey, 93 111. 580.
3 McGinnis v. C. S. B. Co., 49 Mich. 466, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 135 ; L.
S. & M. S. Ry. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 ; cf. Meyers v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 57
Iowa 555, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 527.
1 Flanagan v. C. & N. W. Ry., 45 Wise. 98, 50 Id. 462, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 150.
6 M. C. R. R. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 101 ; I.,
B. & W. R. R. v. Flanigan, 77 111. 365; Whitman v. W. & M. Ry., 58 Wiso
408, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 214; Kelly v. W. C. Ry., Wise. , 21 Am
* Eng. R. R. Cas. 633.
DUTY OF INSPECTION. 303
unequal height; 1 nor because the car couplings work
slowl j .'
, The duty of the railway to its servants requires frequent and thorough
inspections of its line and appliances.
286. In order that the railway may be assured that
its line, rolling stock, and appliances are in a reasonably
safe condition, the duty devolves upon it of causing as
frequent and thorough inspections of its line and appli-
ances to be made as can be done consistently with the
conduct of its business, and the railway which neglects
to perform that duty of inspection is liable to a servant
injured by reason of any defect in the line, rolling
stock, or appliances which such an inspection ought to
have detected. 3 Under circumstances of more than
ordinary peril, as in the case of violent storms, it is the
duty of the railway to inspect its line with more than
ordinary promptitude and thoroughness, and in partic-
ular to examine such portions of it as are peculiarly
liable to injury by storms, such as embankments. 4 It
is also the duty of the railway, in recognition of the
necessary deterioration in its line, rolling stock, machinery
and appliances, by wear and tear in use, and by decay,
1 Hulett v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 67 Mo. 239 ; F. W., J. & S. Ry. v. Gilder-
sleeve, 33 Mich. 133 ; I., B. & W. R. R. v. Flanigan, 77 111. 365 ; Hodgkins v.
E. R. R., 119 Mass. 419 ;. Bottsford v. M. C. Ry., 33 Mich. 256 ; St. L., I. M.
& S. R. R. v. Higgins, 44 Ark. 293, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 629 ; cf. Ellis v.
N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 95 N. Y. 546 ; Cowles v. R. & D. R. R., 84 N. C. 309.
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 90.
1 Williams v. C. R. R., 43 Iowa 396.
8 Brami v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 53 Iowa 595 ; Smoot v. M. & M. Ry., 67 Ala.
13; A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Holt. 29 Kans. 149, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206;
Locke v. S. C. & P. R , 46 Iowa 109; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Conroy, 68 111. 560;
Davis v. C. V. R. R, 55 Vt. 84, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173 ; Dale v. St. L.,
K. C. & N. R. R., 63 Mo. 455 ; H. & T. C. Ry. V. Dunham, 49 Tex. 181 ;
Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 191.
* Hardy v. N. C C. R. R., 74 N. C. 734 ; Gates v. S. M. Ry., 28 Minn. 110, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 237.
8U4 DUTY OF INSPECTION.
to exercise care in inspection for the purpose of discover-
ing not only accidental defects but also the effects of
deterioration and the progress of decay ; x thus, where
a railway had recently come into possession of a line
constructed by another company, it was held not to be
liable for injuries resulting from the defective condition
of that line, it not being shown that the railway had
been negligent either in not inspecting, or in not repair-
ing it, 2 but where a railway had come into possession, as
lessee, of another line, and had operated it without in-
spection, it was held liable to a servant who had been
injured by the fall of a bridge, whose defects could have
been discovered if the bridge had been examined by a
competent engineer. 3
287. If the railway has not been negligent in the
original construction, nor in the subsequent inspection
of its line, rolling stock, machinery, and appliances, and
a servant is, nevertheless, injured by reason of a defect
therein, it must be shown, in order to hold the railway
liable for the injury, that the officer, whose duty it was
to repair it, had been notified of the particular defect
which was the cause of the injury. 4 A master is liable
if the machinery or appliances are defective, in that
they do not comply with statutory requisites, and if
injury to a servant is caused thereby. 5 A master is
liable for his personal negligence in the construction of
machinery, and the negligence of the president of a
corporation, under such circumstances, is the neglect
1 Baker v. A. V. E. K., 95 Penna. St. 211, 8 Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas. 141 ;
Warden v. O. C. E. E., 137 Mass. 204, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 612.
1 Patterson v. C. & G. T. Ey., 49 Mich. 184, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 123.
1 Vosburg v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 94 N. Y. 374.
Patterson v. P. & C. E. E., 76 Penna. St. 389 ; Porter v. H. & St. J. E E., 71
Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 44 ; C. & A. E. E. v. Piatt, 89 111. 141 ; T. W.
& W. Ey. v. Ingraham, 77 Id. 309 ; C. & N. W. Ey. v. Jackson, 55 Id. 492.
6 Britton v. G. W. Cotton Co- L. E. 7 Ex. 130.
DUTY AS TO LINE, ETC. 305
of the corporation. 1 Eailways are liable if a person of
known incompetency has been employed to construct
rolling stock, machinery, or appliances, 2 and, although
a competent contractor has been employed for that
purpose, the railway is liable for his negligence in
construction.
288. The railway must, therefore, exercise care in its
construction, inspection, and 'maintenance in repair of
its line, roadbed, and track, 3 its embankments, 4 its
bridges and trestles, 5 its culverts, 6 its turn-tables, 7 its
1 Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Penna. St. 146 ; S. E. E. v. Jones, 30 Kans.
601, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 201.
2 Potts v. P., C. & D. Ey., 8 W. E. 524.
3 Porter v. H. & St. J. E. E., 71 Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 44 ; Haw-
ley v. N. C. Ey., 82 N. Y. 370, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 24S ; Snow v. H. E.
E., 8 Allen 441 ; O'Donnell v. A. V. E. E., 59 Penna. St. 239 ; I. & C. E. E. i>.
Love, 10 Ind. 554 ; Fifield v. N. E. E., 42 N. H. 225 ; H. & G. N. E. E. v.
Eandall, 50 Tex. 254 ; Durkin v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 225, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
520 ; Trask v. C. S. E. E., 63 Cal. 96, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 192 ; Knapp
•. S. C. & P. Ey., 65 Iowa 91, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 60; De Forrest v.
Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 495 ; Brickman v. S. C. E. E.,
8 S. C. 173 ; Lewis v. St. L. & I. M. Ey., 59 Mo. 495 ; Drymala v. Thompson,
26 Minn. 40 ; Baird v. C, E. I. & P. Ey., 55 Iowa 121, 13 N. W. Eep. 731, 8
Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 128 ; 61 Iowa 359, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 75 ; H.
& T. C, Ey. v. Pinto, 60 Tex. 516, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 286 ; Batterson v,
C. & G-. T. Ey., 49 Mich. 184, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 123; Pool v. O, M. &
St. P. Ey., 56 Wise. 227, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 360 ; P. & E. E. E. v.
Schertle, 97 Penna. St. 450, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 158.
* C. E. E. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 177, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas, 145 ; Gates v. S.
M. Ey., 28 Minn. 110, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 237.
5 McDermott v. P. E. E., 30 Mo. 115; Warner v. E. Ey., 39 N. Y. 468 ;
Faulkner v. E. Ey., 49 Barb. 324 ; O. B. Coal Co. v. Eeed, 5 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Penna.) 3 ; Paulmier v. E. E. E., 5 Vroom 151 ; Locke v. S. C. & P. Ey .
46 Iowa 109 ; T., P. & W. Ey. v. Conroy, 61 111. 162 ; T. W. & W. Ey. v. Con
roy, 68 111. 560; Mann v. S. C. & P. Ey., 46 Iowa 637 ; McCune v. N. P. Ey.
18 Fed. Eep. 875, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 172 ; Koontz v. C, E. I. & P
Ey., 65 Iowa 224, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 85 ; Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass
575, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 300 ; cf. W. Ey. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481, 4 Am
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 651.
• Davis v. C. V. E. E., 53 Vt. 84, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 173.
7 L. S. & M. S. Ev. v. Fitzpatrick, 31 Ohio St. 479 ; Durgin v. Munson, 9
Allen 396 ; E. T. V. «& G. E. E. v. Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 58, 11 Am. & Eng.
R R. Cas. 222.
20
30G DUTY AS TO ROLLING STOCK.
sidings, 1 its switches, 2 its round-houses, 3 its engines, in-
cluding boilers, 4 cow-catcher/' pilot and whistle, 6 air-
brake, 7 valves, 8 oil-cup, 9 draw-bar, 10 and chafing-irons; 11
its derricks, poles, and tackle; 12 its bridge-guards; 13 its
1 Patterson v. P. & C. R. R., 76 Penna. St. 393.
1 Smith v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 69 Mo. 32 ; Ladd v. N. B. R. R., 119 Mass.
412 ; Walker v. B. & M. R. R., 128 Id. 8 ; Piper v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R, 56
N. Y. 630; Penna. Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 223 ;
Mattery v. T. & W. R. R., 23 Ind- 81 ; Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109 U. S. 478,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440,
f> Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 474 (qualifying the rule laid down in St. L. & S. E.
Ry. v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511) ; McGinnis v. C. S. B. Co., 49 Mich. 466, 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 135 ; Mayes v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 63 Iowa 562, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 527.
s Manning v. B. C. R. & N. R. R-, 64 Iowa 240, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 171 .
* Ford v. F. R. R., 110 Mass. 241 ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; Hough v.
[\ & P. Ry., 100 U. S. 213 ; P. & N. Y., N. & R. R. Co. v. Leslie, 16 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 321 ; N. & D. R. R. v. Jones, 9 Heisk (Tenn.) 27 ; C.
& P. R, R. v. The State, 44 Md. 283 ; Kirkpatrick v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
79 N Y. 240; I., B. & W. Ry. v. Toy, 91 111. 474; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Moore,
77 Id 217 ; I. C. R. R. v. Houck, 72 Id. 285 ; M. & O. R. R. v. Thomas, 42
Ala. 672 ; Keegan v. W. R. R., 8 N. Y. 175 ; C. & I. C. C. R. R. v. Arnold,
31 Ind. 174 ; Hubgh v. N. C. & C. R. T., 6 La. An. 495 ; S. C. & P. Ry. v. Fin-
layson, 16 Neb. 272, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 68 ; Murphy v. B. & A. R. R.,
88 N. Y. 146, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 510 ; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. v. Harper,
44 Ark. 524.
5 1. R. R. v. Estes, 96 111. 470.
6 Hough v. T. & P. Ry-, 100 U. S. 213.
I K. C, St. J. & C. B. Ry. v. Flynn, 78 Mo. 195, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 23.
8 Cone v. D., L. & W. R. R., 81 N. Y. 207 ; C. & R. I. R. R. v. Rung, 104
111. 641, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 218.
9 E. T. V. & G. Ry. v. Stewart, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 432, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 614.
10 Whitman v. W.& M. R. Ry., 58 Wise. 408, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 214.
II Greene v. M. & St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 248, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 214.
" Holden v. F. R. R., 129 Mass. 268, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 94 ; Baker v.
A. V. R. R , 95 Penna. St. 211, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 141 ; King v. N. Y.
C. & H. R. R. R , 72 N. Y. 607 ; Derrenbacher v. L. V. R. R-, 87 Id. 636, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 624 ; G., H. & S. A. R. R. v. Delahunty, 53 Tex. 206,
4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 628 ; K. P. Ry. v. Little, 19 Kans. 267 ; McGowan
v. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 61 Mo. 528; P. P. Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 111. 20, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 87 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Orr, 84 Ind. 50, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 94; Houser v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 60 Iowa 230, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 501.
» Warden v. O. C. R. R., 137 Mass. 204, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 612.
DUTY AS TO APPLIANCES. 307
hand cars; 1 its passenger and freight cars, 2 including
freight car ladders, 3 couplings, 4 brakes and brake chains, 5
and check chains, 6 and its tools. 7
289. The railway's duty of care as to the construction
of its line renders it liable to its servants for injuries
caused by the location in dangerous proximity to its
line of any structure over which it may rightfully ex-
1 N. Y., L. E. & W. K. E. v. Powers, 98 N. Y. 274, 21 Am. & Eng. K. K.
Cas. 609 ; C. R. R. v. Kenney, .58 Ga. 485 ; Kenney v. C. R. R., 61 Id. 590 ; C.
R. R. v. Kenney, 64 Id. 100, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 155 ; E. T. V. & Gr. R.
R. v. Smith, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 685; I. & G. N. R. R. v. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190; Bar-
ringer v. D. & H. C. Co., 19 Hun. 216 ; Miller v. U. P. Ry., 17 Fed. Rep. 67 ;
S. R. R. v. Jones, 30 Kans. 601, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 201 ; T. & P. Ry.
v. Kane, Tex. , 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 218 ; McQueen v. C. B. U. P.
Ry., 30 Kans. 689, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 226 ; Pool v. C, M. & St. P. Ry.,
56 Wise. 227, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 360 ; U. T. Co. v. Thomason, 25 Kans.
1, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
2 C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Warner, 108 111. 538, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 100 ;
M. R. & L. E. R. R. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541 ; Flannigan v. C. & N. W. Ry.,
45 Wise. 98, 50 Id. 462, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 150.
3 C. & A. R. R. v. Piatt, 89 111. 141 ; T., W. & W. Ry. v. Ingraham, 77 Id
309 ; Ballou ». C. & IS 1 . W. Ry., 54 Wise. 257, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 480;
R. & D. R. R. v. Moore, 78 Va. 93, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 239.
* Lawless v. C. R. R. R., 136 Mass. 1, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 96 ; T. &
W. R. R. v. Frederick, 71 111. 294 ; Ellis v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 95 N. Y.
546 ; A.,' T. & S. F. R. R. v. Ledbetter, 34 Kans. 326, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 555 ; H. & T. C. R. R. v. Maddox, Tex. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
625 ; A., T. & S. F. R. R. v. Wagner, 33 Kans. 660, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
637.
5 Wedgwood v. C. & N. W. R. R., 44 Wise. 44, 41 Id. 478 ; Painton ». N. C.
Ry., 83 N. Y. 7, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 454 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Agnew, 11
Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 394; Herbert v. N. P. Ry., Dak. , 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 85 ; Jobnson v. R. & D. R. R. 81 N. C. 453 ; De Graff
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 76 N. Y. 125 ; Leahy v. S. P. Ry., Cal. ,15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 230 ; Disher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 94 N. Y. 622 ;
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 233 ; Henry v. S. I. Ry., 81 N. Y. 373, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 60 ; Ransier v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32 Minn. 331, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 601.
6 Ladd v. N. V. R. R., 119 Mass. 412.
T P., W. & B. R. R. v. Keenan, 103 Penna. St. 124; Guthrie v. L. & N. R
R., 11 Lea (Tenn.) 372, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 209 ; Baker v. W. & A. R.
R., 68 Ga. 699 ; C, C. & I. C. Ry v. Troesch, 68 111. 545 ; Hanrathy v. N. C.
Ry., 46 Md. 280.
308 DANGEROUSLY LOCATED OBSTRUCTIONS.
ercise exclusive control, sucli as cattle chutes, 1 coal
chutes, 2 bridge supports, 3 bridge trusses, 4 signal posts
and telegraph poles, 5 water tanks, 6 a station-master's
clothes-line post, 7 mail catchers, 8 piles of lumber, 9 and
station awnings. 10 But the duty of the railway to its
servants does not require it to construct and maintain
the bridges, by which highways or other railways are
carried over its line, at such a height that its servants
can stand erect or move on the tops of its cars without
possibility of the collision of their persons with such
bridges. The reason of the distinction is that such
bridges are not under the exclusive control of the rail-
way whose line passes under them, and the servants of
that railway, in entering upon the performance of duties
which require them to stand or move upon the tops of
its cars while in transit on the line, know that one of
the dangers incident to their employment is that of
coming in contact with such bridges, and they, there-
fore, by entering into the service, impliedly undertake
to bear that risk, but they do not impliedly undertake
to bear the risk of injury from dangerous constructions
1 Allen 'v. B., C, E. & N. Ey., 57 Iowa 623, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 620,
Dorsey v. P. & C. C. Co., 42 Wise. 583.
2 A., T. & S. F. E. E. v. Eetford, 18 Kans. 245.
J Graham v. N. E. Ey., 18 C. B. N. S. 229, 114 E. C. L.
4 W. Ey. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481, 4 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 651.
5 C. & I. E. E. v. Eussell, 91 111. 298; Hall v U. P. Ey., 16 Fed. Eep. 744;
A. & C. A. L. E. E. v. Woodruff, 63 Ga. 707 ; H. & T. Ey. v. Oram, 49 Tex.
341 ; Walsh v. O. Ey. & N. Co., 10 Oregon 250 ; sed cf. Lovejoy v. B. & L. E.
E., 125 Mass. 79.
6 A. & W. P. E. E. v. Webb, 61 Ga. 586 ; A. & C. A. E. E. v. Woodruff, 65
Id. 707 ; H. & T. Ey. v. Oram, 49 Tex. 341 ; Walsh v. O. Ey. & N. Co., 10
Oregon 250 ; cf. Gould v. C. B. & Q. E. E., 66 Iowa 590, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 289.
7 Kearns v. O, M. & St. P. Ey., 66 Iowa 599, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
287.
8 C, B. & Q. E. E. v. Gregory, 58 111. 272.
9 Bessex v. C. & N. W. Ey., 45 Wise. 477.
10 1. C. E. E. v.Welch, 52 111. 183.
CARS FROM OTHER LINES. ?>U ( J
which are under the exclusive control of the railway
which employs them.
The railway may assume that cars received from another line for trans-
portation over its line are properly constructed, and it is only bound
to make such an inspection of them as the exigencies of traffic
permit.
290. The through transportation of passengers and
goods over connecting lines without changing cars or
breaking bulk frequently requires railways to receive
and haul cars from other lines. The railway as a com-
mon carrier is bound to receive and haul such cars, but
its duty to its servants requires it to subject all such
cars to as thorough an inspection as the exigencies of
traffic permit, and if that inspection be not made, or if
upon such an inspection any such car be found to be
faulty in construction or dangerously out of repair, the
railway ought to decline to haul it, and if it does under-
take to haul it, the railway ought to be liable for any
injury to a servant caused thereby. The railway ought
not, however, to be held liable for hidden defects which
could not be detected by such an inspection as the exi-
gencies of traffic permit, nor ought it to be held liable
for its inspector's negligent performance of his duty,
save under those conditions which render a railway
liable for the negligence of any servant causing injury
to a fellow-servant. 1
1 Richardson ». G. E. Ry., L. R. 10 C P. 486, 1 C. P. D. 342; Fay v. M. &
St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 231, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. ('as. 193; St. L. & S. E. Ry.
v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511 ; Ballou v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 54 Wise. 257, 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Gas. 4S0; M. C. R. R v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 1 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Gas. 101 ; Oottleib v. N.Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 29 Bun (N. Y.) 637, 100
N. Y. 462; Baldwin v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 50 Iowa 680; Smith v. Potter, 46
Mich. 258, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gas. 140 ; Mackin v. B. & A. R. R., 135 Mass.
201, 15 Am.& Eng. R. R. ('as. 196; L. M. R. R. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio St.
818; T. & P. Ry. v. Charlton, 60 Tex. 397, 15 Am. A Eng. R. R. Cas. 350;
Kelly v. W. G. Ry., Wise. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gas. 633; O'Neil v.
310 CARS FROM OTHER LINES.
291. There is not a thorough agreement am mg the
authorities on this subject. Thus, in L. M. R. R. v.
Fitzpatrick, 1 where the railway was held not to be liable
to a servant for injuries resulting from the negligence of
its inspector of car repairs, in failing to detect in a car
received from another line, a hole which had been
burned in the runway on the top of a freight car, and
also in failing to discover that its brake wheel was in-
sufficiently fastened, the consequence of which negli-
gence was, that the servant, in walking on the runway
in the discharge of his duty, while the car was in mo-
tion, saw the burned hole, and, in attempting to avoid
it, slipped, and, catching hold of the brake wheel to
save himself, it gave way, and he fell between the cars
and was hurt, Mcllvaine, J., said: "undoubtedly the
law requires a railroad company to exercise reasonable
care in providing and maintaining safe machinery for
the use of its employes engaged in running trains upon
its road, but such employer as to such employe is not an
insurer of the fitness of its machinery for the purpose
for which it was intended. It is bound to vigilance,
but vigilance is the maximum of its duty. The success-
ful management of a railroad requires the co-operation
of many servants. Reasonable care in the employment
of careful and competent servants is required of the
company, but the exercise of reasonable care by such
servants is at the risk of Iris fellow-servants. The car
alleged to be defective, in this case, as the testimony
tends to show, was the car of another company on its
way home ; but admitting the duty of the company was
the same as if it had been its own car, this duty was to
St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 9 Fed. Rep. 337 ; Jetter v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 2 Abb.
Ct. App. Dec. 458; Jones v. N.Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 28 Hun. 364, 92 N. Y.
628; Kieth v. N. II. & N. R. R., 140 Mass. 175, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
421.
1 42 Ohio St. 318, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 578.
CARS FROM OTHEE LINES. 311
employ competent and careful inspectors and repairers.
If that were done, its duty to other operatives of the
road was performed." So, in Mackin v. B. & A. R. R., 1
upon similiar facts a like result was reached on the
ground, as stated by Allen, C. J., that the railway,
being bound as a common carrier, to receive from other
lines cars for transportation over its lines, its duty to its
servants with regard to cars so received, was not that
"of furnishing proper instrumentalities for service,
but of inspection, and this duty is performed by the
employment of sufficient, competent, and suitable in-
spectors, who are to act under ]3roper superintendence,
rules, and instructions ; and, however it may be as to
other cars, the inspectors must be deemed to be engaged
in a common employment with the brakemen as to such
cars while in transit, and until ready to be inspected for
a new service." Most of the cases cited in the last
note agree in their conclusion with the Fitzpatrick and
the Mackin cases. In Gottleib v. N. Y., L. E. & W.
R. R., 2 the railway was held liable to a freight brake-
man, who was injured while coupling defective cars
which had been received from another railway for trans-
portation over the line, and Earl, J., said, " the defend-
ant was under obligation to its employes to exercise
reasonable care and diligence in furnishing them safe
and suitable implements, cars and machinery for the
discharge of their duties, and upon the assumption that
the defendant was responsible for the condition of these
cars, as if they were owned by it, there can be but little
doubt that the evidence was ample to show that it had
failed in its duty to the plaintiff. The defect was an
obvious one, easily discoverable by the most ordinary
inspection, and it would seem to be the grossest negli-
1 135 Mass. 201, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Can. 196.
1 100 N. Y. 462.
312 CARS FROM OTHER LINES.
gence to put such cars into any train, and especially
into a train consisting of cars of different gauge. * * *
All the authorities hold that the company drawing the
cars of another company over its road owes, in reference
to such cars, some duty to its employes. It is not
bound to take such cars if they are known to be defec-
tive and unsafe. Even if it is not bound to make tests
to discover secret defects, and is not responsible for such
defects, it is bound to inspect foreign cars, just as it
would inspect its own cars. It owes the duty of inspec-
tion as master, and is, at least, responsible for the con-
sequences of such defects as would be disclosed or dis-
covered by ordinary inspection. When cars come to it,
which have defects visible or discoverable by ordinary
inspection, it must either remedy such defects, or refuse
to take such cars ; so much, at least, is due from it to
its employes. The employes can no more be said to as-
sume the risks of such defects in foreign cars than in
cars belonging to the company. As to such defects, the
duty of the company is the same as to all cars drawn
over its road. The rule imposing this responsibility
is not an onerous, or inconvenient, or impracticable one.
It requires, before a train starts, and while it is upon its
passage, the same inspection and care as to all the cars
in the train." The judgment in Gottleib's case was un-
questionably right, upon the facts as found by the jury,
and the law as laid down by Earl, J., in his judgment,
is not in practical effect at variance with that enuncia-
ted in the Fitzpatrick and Mackin cases ; for in those
cases there was negligence in the performance of the
inspector's duty; while in the Gottleib case, there was
a total failure on the part of the railway to perform the
duty of inspection.
292. As the railway owes to its servants the duty of
exercising due care with regard to all the instrumentali-
DUTY AS TO SELECTION OF SERVANTS. 313
ties of work which it supplies for their use, the fact that
another railway has contracted with it to keep in repair
the rolling stock which is delivered by that other com-
pany for transportation over its line, will not relieve it
from its obligation to its own servants to exercise due
care as to the safe condition of such rolling stock, and,
to that end, of inspecting it. 1
III. THE DUTY OF THE RAILWAY AS TO THE SELECTION
AND RETENTION OF SERVANTS.
The duty of the railway to its servants requires the exercise of care
in its selection and retention of servants.
293. It is the duty of the railway to its servants to
exercise due care in its selection, and retention in ser-
vice, of their fellow-servants, 2 and the full performance
of this obligation requires, as Harlan, J., said, in W.
Ry. v. McDaniel, 3 the exercise on its part of not simply
"the degree of diligence which is customary among
those entrusted with the management of railway prop-
erty, but such, as having respect to the exigencies of
the particular service, ought reasonably to be observed,"
* * * and such as " is fairly commensurate with the
perils or dangers likely to be encountered." 4 In order,
therefore, to render the railway liable by reason of its
selection or retention of an incompetent servant, it must
be shown that the negligence of that servant was the
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, and that
the officer of the railway, who is charged with the duty
of appointing and dismissing servants of that class,
1 C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Avery, 109 111. 314, 17 Am. & Eng, R. R. Cas.
649.
2 Moss v. P. R. R., 49 Mo. 167; Frazier v. P. R. R., 38 Penna. St. 104;
O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R., 59 Penna. St. 239 ; Rohback v. P. R. R., 43 Mo. 187 ;
U. P. R. R. v. Milliken, 8 Kans. 647.
8 107 U. S. 454. * Soc also A. & F. R. R. v. Waller, 48 Ala. 459,
314 INCOMPETENCY OF SERVANTS.
either knew, or ought to have known, of the incompe-
tency of the servant. 1 Notice of a fellow-servant's in-
competency to the officer performing, upon behalf of
the railway, the duty of employing and discharging
servants, or selecting them for particular service, is, of
course, notice to the railway ; 2 but notice to a fellow-ser-
vant is not notice to the railway, as, for instance, notice
of a conductor's incapacity to a servant, whose duty it
is to call the conductors for service in a designated
order, is not notice to the railway of the incompetency
of a conductor. 3
294. The railway will be liable if it retains in its
service a servant whose habits are known to be intem-
perate; 4 or an engine-driver who has habitually dis-
obeyed a rule of the railway forbidding the relinquish-
1 Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. 748 ; Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Id. 30 ; Weems
v. Mathieson, 4 Id. 215 ; Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797. 86 E. C. L.; H. & B.
T. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Penna. St. 119 ; 84 Id. 419 ; Frazier v. P. R. R , 38 Id.
104; M. C. R. R. v. Gilbert, 46 Mich. 176, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 230;
Murphy v. St. L. & I. M. Ry., 71 Mo. 202 ; Moss v. P. R. R., 49 Id. 169 ; El-
liott v. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 67 Id. 272 ; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Myers, 55 Tex. 110 ;
Gilman v. E. Ry., 10 Allen 233, 13 Id. 433 ; E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Gurley, 12
Lea (Tenn.) 46, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 568 ; N. O., J. & N. Ry. v. Hughes,
49 Miss. 258 ; Howd v. M. C. R. R., 50 Id. 178 ; C, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Huflmann,
78 Mo. 50, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 625 ; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 140 ; M. & O. R. R. v. Taft, 28 Mich. 289 ; Blake v.
M. C. R. R, 70 Me. 60 ; C, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Doyle, 18 Kans. 58; Baulec v. N.
Y. & II. R. R., 59 N. Y. 356 ; P., M. & M. R. R. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 ;
Kersey v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 79 Mo. 362, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
638.
2 H. & B. T. R. R. v. Decker. 82 Penna. St. 119, 84 Id. 419 ; Frazier v. P. R.
R., 38 Id. 104; Patterson v. P. & C. R. R., 76 Id. 394; O. & M. Ry. v. Col-
larn, 73 Ind. 261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 554 ; T. M. R. R. v. W T hitmore, 58
Tex. 276, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 195 ; Tyson v. S. & N. A. R. R., 61 Ala.
554; McDermott v. H. & St. J. R. R., 73 Mo. 516, 2 Am. & Eng! R. R. Cas.
85 ; Laning v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N. Y. 521 ; Mann v. D. & H. C. Co., 91 N.
Y. 495, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 199.
3 M. C. R. R. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510.
* H. & B T. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Penna. St. 119, 84 Id. 419; C & A. R. R.
v. Sullivan, 63 111. 293 ; M. C. R. R. v. Gilbert, 46 Mich. 176, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 230 ; Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R , 56 N. Y. 44 ; Chapman
v. E. Ry., 55 N. Y. 579 ; Gilman v. E. R. R , 13 Allen 433, 10 Id. 233.
INTOXICATED SERVANTS. 315
ment of the control of his engine to his fireman. 1 The
proof of frequent or continued acts of negligence by a ser-
vant, with knowledge thereof brought home to the railway ,
will fix its liability ; 2 thus, in Hilts v. C. & G. T. Ry., 3 the
fact that an engine-driver had been drunk on duty three
times within a period of nine months, was held to be
evidence of negligence on the part of the railway in
that its executive officers failed to learn of his dissipated
habits, and the railway was held liable to a servant who
was killed by being run over by the engine-driver's
careless management of the engine at a time when he
was intoxicated. But proof of specific acts of negli-
gence by a servant will not establish his incompetency,
nor render the railway liable for his retention, unless it
be shown that the servant's negligent character either
was, or reasonably ought to have been, known to the
officer, who, on behalf of the railway, exercised the
power of appointing and dismissing such servants ; 4 nor
will the fact that an engine-driver is shown to be near-
sighted and compelled to use glasses, render the railway
negligent if it retains him in the service. 5
295. The duty of the railway to its servants is not
adequately performed, unless care be exercised not only
in its original selection of servants, but also in its sub-
sequent organization, discipline, and control of those
servants. The action of its servants must be intelli-
gently directed and vigilantly supervised, and, to that
end, judicious regulations must be made and enforced
1 O. & M Ry. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 554.
J Baulec v. N. Y. & H. R. R.. 59 N. Y. 35G ; Mann v. D. & H. C. Co., 91 Id.
495, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 199.
3 55 Mich. 437, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 628.
4 C, R. I. & P. Ry. v. IIufT'mann, 78 Mo. 50, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 625 ;
Corson v. M. C. R. R., 76 Me 244, 17 Am & Eng R. R. Cas. 634; Cooper v.
M. & P. R. R., 23 Wise. 668 ; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 294 ;
Harper v. I. & St. L. R. R , 44 Mo. 488.
6 T. & P. Ry. v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 571.
316 DUTY IN OPERATING THE LINE.
for the government of its servants in the discharge of
their duties; those servants must be adequately paid;
they must be promoted, or otherwise rewarded, when
they merit special commendation for meritorious service ;
they must be promptly punished when they fall short
of a full and faithful performance of duty ; and they
must be unhesitatingly dismissed when their incompe-
tency has been proven.
IV. THE DUTY OF RAILWAYS TO THEIR SERVANTS IN
THE OPERATION OF THE LINE.
The duty of the railway to its servants requires the exercise of care in
its operation of its line.
296. It is the duty of railways to make regulations
for the safety of their servants, and to use all reasonable
means for the enforcement of those regulations, 1 but a
railway is not liable to an injured servant merely be-
cause his fellow-servants have disobeyed such regula-
tions. 2 A railway is, however, liable if it permits its
servants to habitually disregard regulations, whose en-
forcement is necessary to the safety of other servants, as
where a servant is injured by the careless handling of
an engine by a fireman, it being proven that the engine-
driver, in disobedience of the regulations of the railway,
was to the knowledge of his superior officers in the habit
of surrendering the control of his engine to the fireman. 3
A railway is not negligent to its servants if it varies
from its regular time-table in running its trains, pro-
1 Vose v. L. & Y. Ry., 2 H. & N. 728 ; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 5 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 515 ; Rose v. B. & A. R. R., 58 N. Y. 217 ; Cooper v. C. R.
R., 44 Iowa 134; P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Powers, 74 111. 341 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry.
v. La valley, 36 Ohio St. 221, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 549.
2 Rose v B. & A. R. R., 58 N. Y. 217.
3 O. & M. Ry. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 554 ; Connor
v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 59 Mo. 285.
DUTY IN OPERATING LINE. 317
vided tLat it gives to its servants reasonable notice of
any change, which if unknown to them, may endanger
their safety j 1 but where on a single track line a special
train is ordered to run when a regular train is due, and,
no effort having been made to hold the regular train, a
collision ensues and a servant is injured, the railway is
liable, for the negligence of its superintendent is its
negligence. 2 So also, where a construction train is
allowed to stand on the line in a curved cutting at a
time when a regular train is due, no notice being given
to the engine-driver or conductor of the regular train
that they may expect to find the construction train in
their way, and through the failure of a labourer to
properly signal the regular train, a collision having en-
sued and a servant on the construction train having
been injured, the railway was held liable therefor. 3 So
in McLeod v. Ginther, 4 the railway was held liable
to a servant injured in a collision which resulted from
the negligence of a telegraph operator in so writing out
an order for the movement of a train on a single track
line as to convey to the mind of a train conductor the
idea that he might safely occupy the line for a longer
time than that time which the order was intended to
give him.
297. It is the duty of the railway not to increase the
perils of its servants by the inadequacy of the force
employed in any particular work, and, in particular,
trains must be manned by a sufficient number of train
hands; 5 but a railway is not negligent to its labourers
1 Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 515.
■ Sheehan v. N. Y. C & II. R. R. R., 91 N. Y. 332, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 235.
3 P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Henderson, Ohio St. , 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
529.
* 80 Ky. 399, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 162, 15 Id. 291
* Flike v. B. & A. R. R., 53 N. Y. 549 ; Booth v. B. & A. R. R., 73 Id. 38 ;
0. & E. I. R. R. v. Geary, 110 111. 383, 1° Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 606;
3 IS SPEED OF TRAINS.
if it fails, to put a conductor in charge of a dirt
train. 1
298. The fact that a train is run at a rate of speed in
excess of that prohibited by statute is not necessarily
negligence as to servants of the railway on the train, 2
and apart from statutory regulation no rate of speed is
per se negligent, 3 but the circumstances of the particular
case, such as the approach to a level crossing, or the
proximity to a city, town, or village, or the defective
condition of the line, may render that rate of speed neg-
ligent which, under other circumstances, as, for instance,
on a straight line in good order in the open country or
so fenced that neither trespassing human beings nor
animals can come upon it, would not be negligent. 4
The running of a train at a high rate of speed past a
way station is not per se unlawful, and is not negligence
as to servants engaged in work on the station platform, 5
yet, in Crowley v. B., C, R. & N. R. K., 6 where a
labourer while clearing away snow in a railway yard
was injured by being struck by a train moving at a rate
of speed in excess of that permitted by municipal ordi-
nance within the city limits, the railway was held
liable.
299. A railway is negligent to those servants whose
duty requires them to walk on its line, or in its yards,
if it moves engines or trains at night without a head-
B. & O. R. R. v. State, 41 Md. 268 ; C & N. W. Ry. v. Donahue, 75 111. 106 ;
Skip v. E. C. Ry., 9 Ex. 223 ; Harvey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 88 N. Y.
481, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 51) ; cf. Besel v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 70 N.
Y. 171, reversing the judgment of the lower court as reported in 9 Hun 457.
1 Henry v. S. I. Ry., 81 N. Y. 373.
* Dowell v. V. & M. R. R., 61 Miss. 519, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 42 ;
Lockwood v. C. & N. W. Ry., 51 Wise. 50, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 151.
8 Wallace v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 74 Mo. 594.
* C, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Huffmann, 78 Mo. 50, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 625.
4 Muster v. C, St. P. & M. Ry., 61 Wise. 325, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 113.
6 65 Iowa 658, 18 \m. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 56.
NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW-SERVANTS. 319
light; 1 but the reversal of an engine in making up, or
switching, trains is not negligence on the part of the
railway ; 2 nor does the railway's duty to its train hands
engaged on moving trains require it to notify them be-
fore bringing the train to a sudden stop in order to
avoid a collision with trespassing cattle on the line. 3
The railway is liable to its servants for injuries caused
by collision with obstructions on the line which it has
been negligent in not discovering and removing. 4
Nevertheless, as is hereinafter stated, the servant takes
upon himself the risk of injury from the ordinary con-
duct of the business, including the negligence of his
fellow-servants, and the railway is only liable for such
injuries as result from the non-performance of its duty
to him.
V. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS TO THEIR SERVANTS
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF OTHER SERVANTS.
300. A master is liable to his servants for injuries
caused by his negligence while personally participating
with them in the work. 5 On the same principle, where
the master, by his personal interference in the conduct
of a work whose performance with safety to a servant
requires extraordinary care on the part of that servant,
urges the servant to a degree of speed which compels
him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise
take, such conduct on the part of the servant is not con-
tributory negligence. 6 Kailway corporations being
1 Burling v. I. C. R. R., 85 111. 18 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Taylor, 69 Id. 461.
• Jackson v. K. C, L. & S. K. R. R., 31 Kans. 761, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
178.
8 M. P. Ry. v. Haley, 25 Kans. 35, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 594.
• Wilson v. D., S. P. & P. Ry., 7 Colo. 101, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 192.
6 Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3 El. & El. 701, 107 E. C. L. ; Roberta v. Smith, 2
H. & N. 213; Mellors v. Shaw, 1 B. & S. 446, 101 E. C. L.
• Lee v. Woolsey, 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 337.
320 VICE-PRINCIPALS.
artificial beings and creatures of law, cannot render
themselves liable by any personal participation in their
servants' work, but they are, of course, liable to those ser-
vants for the negligence of their fellow-servants wherever
individual masters would be liable for the negligence of
such servants, and the corporate character of railways
neither increases nor diminishes their liability in that
respect.
301. The master being liable if his own negligence
in his personal participation with his servant in the
work be the cause of injury to the servant, it would
seem that the master ought to be equally liable if the
cause of injury to the servant be the negligence of a
person whom the master has placed in such a position
that he can fairly be considered as the master's repre-
sentative, with power to conduct the business in the
exerise of an uncontrolled discretion. That the master
would be liable in such a case was tacitly admitted in
Murphy v. Smith, 1 and in Feltham v. England, 2 and
expressly ruled in Grizzle v. Frost ; 3 and the doctrine
of these cases is supported by many American cases. 4
On the other hand, in Wilson v. Merry, 5 where it was
held that the operators of a mine were not responsible
for the death of a° miner caused by an interruption of
the free ventilation of the mine and a consequent explo-
sion of fire-damp, resulting from the erection of a scaf-
folding by the manager of the mine, Lord Cairns said :
"what the master is, in my opinion, bound to his
servants to do, in the event of his not personally super-
1 19 C. B. N. S. 361, 115 E. C. L.
2 L. E. 2 Q. B. 33. s 3 F. & F. 622.
* It is sufficient to cite Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517 ; Mullan v. P. &
8. M. S. S. Co., 78 Penna. St. 25, as construed in L. V. Coal Co. v. Jones, 86
Id. 441, and in D. & H. Canal Co. v. Carroll, 89 Id. 374 ; Mann. v. D. & H. C.
Co., 91 N. Y. 500 ; Pantzar v. T. F. I. M. Co., 99 N. Y. 368.
5 L. B. 1 Sc. & Div. 326.
VICE-PRINCIPALS. 321
Intending and directing the work, is to select proper
and competent persons to do so, and to furnish them
with adequate materials and resources for the work.
When he has done this he has, in my opinion, done all
that he is bound to do. And if the persons so selected
are guilty of negligence this is not the negligence of the
master." In Tarrant v. Webb, 1 Jervis, C J., put the same
view tersely, saying : " the master may be responsible
where he is personally guilty of negligence, but cer-
tainly not where he does his best to get competent
persons. He is not bound to warrant their competency."
In Howells v. L. S. Steel Co., 2 where a mine, in obedi-
ence to statutory provisions, having been put by its owner
under the " control " of a manager, and a miner having
been killed by the negligence of that manager in fail-
ing to withdraw the miners when the mine was invaded
by noxious gases, it was held that the master, the op-
erator of the mine, was not liable for the death so caused,
Cockburn, C. J., saying : " since the case of Wilson v.
Merry, it is not open to dispute that in general the
master is not liable to a servant for the negligence of a
fellow-servant, although he be the manager of the con-
cern." It is the clear result of these cases that in Eng-
land masters are not to be held liable to their servants
for the personal negligence of vice-principals. 3
302. The general rule in the United States is that
which is stated by Allen, J., in Malone v. Hathaway, 4
in these terras : " when the servant, by whose acts of
negligence, or want of skill, other servants of the com-
mon employer have received injury, is the alter ego of
the master to whom the employer has left everything,
reserving to himself no discretion, then the middle-man's
1 18 C. B. 804, 86 E. C. L. ■ L. R. 10 Q. B. 62.
» See also D. & H. Canal Co. v. Carroll, 89 Penna. St. 374.
* 64 N. Y. 5.
21
322 VICE-PRINCIPALS.
negligence is the negligence of the employer, for which
the latter is liable. The servant in such case represents
the master, and is charged with the master's duty.
'■• '■■ * * When the middle-man, or superior servant,
employs and discharges the subalterns, and the princi-
pal withdraws from the management of the business, or
the business is of such a nature that it is necessarily
committed to agents, as in the case of corporations, the
principal is liable for the neglects and omissions of duty
of the one charged with the selection of other servants,
in employing and selecting such servants, and in the
general conduct of the business committed to his care."
In L. V. Coal Co. v. Jones, 1 Mercur, C. J., uses nearly
identical language, saying: "where the master has
placed the entire charge of the business in the hands of
an agent, exercising no authority and no superinten-
dence of his own therein, he may be liable for the negli-
gence of such an agent to a subordinate employe."
Under all the American cases a servant to whom so
extensive an authority had been delegated would be
held to be a vice-principal, but in many of the cases a
much more limited delegation of authority is held to
constitute the person entrusted therewith a vice-princi-
pal. The test in some of the cases is the grant to a
servant of the power of appointing and discharging
subordinate servants, and as to such subordinates the
servant invested with that power is held to be a vice-
principal. 2 A more logical test is to be found in the
grant to a servant of that discretionary and supervisory
power in the administration of a railway which is neces-
sarily exercised by the controlling authority of the rail-
1 86 Penna. St. 439.
2 Mnllan v. P. & S. M. S. S. Co., 78 Penna. St. 25 ;_ Smith v. S. C. & P. R. P.,
15 Neb. 583, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 561 ; Flike v. B. & A. R. R., 53 N. Y.
549 ; McKune v. C. S. R. R., Cal. , 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589 ; C.
& A. Ry. v. May, 108 111. 288, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 320.
TRAIN-DISPATCHERS. 323
way, or by some agent to whom it has been specially
delegated.
303. If this test be applied, it will be found that the
executive officers, who direct and control the operation
of the line, or of any integral portion of it, and who
appoint and select subordinate servants, are vice-princi-
pals, and that foremen of gangs, yard-masters, station-
agents, engine-drivers, and conductors of trains, are not
vice- principals, but merely fellow-servants of the ser-
vants who serve under them. Upon this principle,
a train-dispatcher has been held to be a vice-prin-
cipal. 1
304. A foreman is merely a superior servant, and he
cannot properly be regarded as an alter ego of his mas-
ter. Nevertheless, in some cases, it is held that fore-
men are vice-principals. 2 On the other hand, it is held
in other cases, that a foreman is not a vice-principal; 3
1 McKinne v. C. S. R. R., Cal. , 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 539 ; Darri-
gan v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 52 Conn. 285, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 438 ;
Phillips v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 64 Wise. 475, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 453.
2 L. & N. R. R. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866 ; L. M. R. R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio
416 ; P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Lewis, 31 Ohio St. 196 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v.
Lavalley, 36 Id. 221, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 549 ; Smith v. S. C. & P. Ry.,
15 Neb. 583, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 561 ; Cowles v. R. & D. R. R., 84 N.
C. 309 ; Ragsdale v. M. & C. R. R., 3 Baxter (Tenn.) 426 ; L., C. & L. R. R. v.
Cavens, 9 Bush (Ky.) 559 ; Gilmore v. N. P. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 866, 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 304 ; Dobbin v. R. & D. R. R„ 81 N. C. 446.
3 Lovegrove v. L. B. & S. C. Ry.; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B, N. 8. 669, 111
, E. C. L. ; Feltham v. England, L. R. 2 Q. B. 33, 7 B. & S. 676 ; Wigmore
v. Jay, 5 Ex. 354 ; Wright v. N. Y. C. R. R., 25 N. Y. 565 ; Keystone Bridge
Co. v. Newberry, 96 Penna. St. 246; Brick v. R., N. Y. & P. R. R, 98 N. Y.
212; L. V. Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Penna. St. 441 ; Weger v. P. R. R., 55 Id.
460 ; Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Id. 453 ; D. & H. C. Co. v. Carroll, 89 Id. 374 ;
Coon v. S. & U. R. R., 5 N. Y. 492 ; Willis v. O. Ry. & N. Co., 11 Oregon 257,
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 539 ; Peschel v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 62 Wise. 338,
17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545 ; Marshall v. Strieker, 63 Mo. 308 ; Gowan v.
St. L. & I. M. R. R., 61 Id. 528 ; Rains v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 71 Id. 164, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 610; Shauek v. N. C. R. R., 25 Md. 462; Thayer n
St. L., A. & T. II. R. R., 22 Ind. 26 ; Fraker v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Mina
54, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 256 ; Copper v. L. E. & St. L. Ry., Ind.
22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 277.
324 FOREMEN".
thus, in Feltham v. England, 1 the defendant was a
maker of locomotive engines, and the plaintiff was a
workman in his service ; while an engine was being
hoisted on a travelling crane resting on brick piers, the
plaintiff, under the directions of the defendant's fore-
man or manager, having gotten on the engine, was
injured by its fall, resulting from the giving way of the
piers. After a verdict for the plaintiff a rule to enter
a nonsuit was made absolute, Mellor, J., saying, " the
master still retained the control of the establishment,
and there was nothing to show that the manager or
foreman was other than a fellow-servant of the plaintiff,
although he was a servant having greater authority."
305. In some of the cases it is held that the conduc-
tors of trains are vice-principals, as to the engine-drivers,
firemen or stokers, and train hands or guards, of their
trains; 2 thus, in C, C. & C. Ry. v. Keary, 3 where a
railway was held liable to a train hand for injuries
caused by the negligence of the conductor of his train,
Ranney, J., suggests the following reasons for the con-
clusion to which the court came, " that the principal is,
by anything incident to the contract of service, re-
leased from his obligation to everybody to superintend
and control the business with care and prudence, so as
to prevent injury, we think wholly unsupported by rea-
son, and, as yet, nearly so, by authority. For this pur-
pose (i. e., to superintend and control with skill and
care the dangerous force exerted), the conductor is em-
ployed, and, in this, he directly represents the company.
They contract for and engage his care and skill. They
1 L. R. 2 Q. B. 33.
* C, C. & C. Ry. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 254 ; L. M. R. R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio
415; C, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377; Moon v. R. & A. R. R., 78
Va. 745, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 531 ; Cowles v. R. & D. R. R., 84 N. C. 309
2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 90.
8 3 Ohio St. 254.
CONDUCTOKS. 325
commission him to exercise that dominion over the
operations of the train, which essentially pertains to
the prerogatives of the owner, and in its exercise he
stands in the place of the owner, and is in the discharge
of a duty which the owner, as a man and a party to the
contract of service, owes to those placed under him, and
whose lives may depend on his fidelity. His will alone
controls everything, and it is the will of the owner that
his intelligence alone should be trusted for this purpose.
This service is not common to him and the hands placed
under him. They have nothing to do with it. His
duties and their duties are entirely separate and distinct,
although both are necessary to produce the result. It
is his to command, and theirs to obey and execute.
No service is common that does not admit a common
participation ; and no servants are fellow-servants when
one is placed in control over the other. * * * It is the
duty of the servants to obey the orders of the superior
thus placed over them, and to perform as he shall
direct. * * * But they cannot be made to bear losses
arising from carelessness in conducting the train, over
which their employer gave them no power or control,
either separately or collectively, until we are prepared
to say that justice and public policy require the conse-
quences of duty omitted by one party to be visited upon
the other, although stripped of all power to prevent
such consequences." So, in C, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Ross, 1
the plaintiff, an engine-driver in the defendant's employ-
ment, was injured in a collision on a single track line,
caused by the neglect of the conductor of his train to
communicate to him a telegraphic order received by the
conductor from the train-dispatcher, directing the train
to pass another train at a certain siding. Judgment
upon a verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed in an opin-
112 u. s. 377.
826 CONDUCTORS.
ion delivered by Field, J., and concurred in by Waite,
C. J., and by Miller, Harlan, and Woods, JJ., but dis-
sented from by Bradley, Matthews, Gray, and Blatch-
ford, JJ. The ground of decision, as stated by Field,
J., is, that " the conductor of a railway train, who com-
mands its movements, directs when it shall start, at
what stations it shall stop, at what speed it shall run,
and has the general management of it and control over
the persons employed upon it, represents the company,"
and, therefore, his negligence is the negligence of the
company. These cases are obviously open to criticism.
The judgments therein seem to be based on a misunder-
standing of the practical method of railway operations.
It is far from accurate to say, as Banney, J., said of a
railway conductor in C, C. & C. By. v. Keary, 1 " his
will alone controls everything," or to assume, as Field,
J., assumes, in C. M. & St. P. By. v. Boss, 2 that such
an official "commands its" (the train's) "movements,
directs when it shall start, at what stations it shall stop,
at what speed it shall run, and has the general manage-
ment of it, and control over the persons employed upon
it." In fact, the negligence on the part of the con-
ductor, which was the subject of complaint in that case,
was, not that he had improperly exercised a discretion
vested in him, but that he had failed to show to the
engine-driver, and on his own part to obey, an express
order from his superior officer, the train-dispatcher,
commanding the train to wait at a particular station
until the arrival of a certain other train. The facts
upon which the plaintiff's claim was founded, therefore,
negative the theory upon which the railway was held
liable. As Folger, C. J., said, in Slater v. Jewett, 3
courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that "the
1 3 Ohio St. 254. ■ 112 TL S. 395.
3 84 N. Y. Gl, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 515.
ENGINE-DEIVEES. 327
great railways of the land are managed in the every-day
practical running of them, by over-looking officers at
distant places, who use the telegraph wires to keep all
the while informed where trains are, and to direct
their movements from hour to hour." In railway
practice a conductor cannot run his train as a master
sails his ship. No discretion is vested in him. The
time-table, as arranged by his superior officers, pre-
scribes the point and hour of departure of the train, the
time at which it is to pass each station on its way, its
place and hour of final stoppage, and fixes, by necessary
implication, its speed between the several stations. The
conductor is bound, in the running of his train, to
rigidly adhere to that time-table, unless otherwise di-
rected by a special order from competent authority. So
far, therefore, from being a vice-principal, or an execu-
tive officer to whom is delegated, in the words of Kan-
ney, J., "that dominion over the operations of the train
which essentially pertains to the prerogatives of the
owner," a conductor is merely the foreman of the hands
employed on the train, and, as such, he is their fellow-
servant. That conductors of trains are not vice-princi-
pals, but fellow-servants, as to the engine-drivers, fire-
men or stokers, and train hands or guards of their
trains, is held in two well-reasoned Wisconsin cases. 1
306. It is held in some cases that an engine-driver
is a vice-principal as to his fireman or stoker, and as to
train -hands and labourers. Thus, in L. & N. R. K. v.
Collins, 2 Robertson, C. J., said, that "in the use and
control of the engine, the engineer acts as the repre-
sentative agent of the common superior — the corpora-
1 Heine v. C. & N. W. Ry., 58 Wise. 528 ; Pease v. C. & N. W. Ry., 61 Id.
163, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 527.
2 2 Duvall 114.
328 servants' neglect of railway's duty.
tion." This view is as unsound in theory as it is un-
supported by other respectable authority.
307. It is obvious that the servant, whose negligence
has caused the injury, may in the discharge of one class
of duties act as a vice-principal, and in the discharge
of another class of duties he may be only a fellow-
servant. The liability of the railway to the injured
servant will then be dependent upon the character of
the duty whose non-performance by the negligent ser-
vant was the cause of the injury. 1
308. It is clear that that negligence of a servant,
which is the cause of injury to another servant of a
common master, must consist either in his carelessness
while personally participating with that other servant
in the work of their common master, or in his failure
to perform a duty to the injured servant which the im-
plied contract of service has devolved upon their master,
and the performance of which duty the master has dele-
gated to him, such as the exercise of due care in either
the provision and maintenance in repair of the instru-
mentalities of labour, or in the selection and retention
in service of the injured servant's fellow-servants. If
the servant's negligence be of the former character, the
railway ought not to be held liable therefor, if due care
has been exercised in the selection and retention in
service of the negligent servant, and if that negligent
servant be not a vice-principal, for, as is shown in a
subsequent section, every servant impliedly undertakes
to bear the risk of the negligence of those fellow-ser-
vants, in whose selection or retention in service the
master has not been negligent. If, however, the negli-
gence be of the latter character, whatever be the rank
of the negligent servant, or the degree of authority
1 Brick v. K., N. Y. & P. Ry., 98 N. Y. 212; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 Id. 516;
McCosker v. L. I. R. R., 84 Id. 77.
NEGLECT OF RAILWAY'S DUTY. 329
vested in him, the master ought to be held liable, upon
the principle stated by Blackburn, J., in The Mersey
Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 1 that "the liability for an
omission to do something depends entirely on the extent
to which a duty is imposed to cause that thing to be
done ; and it is quite immaterial whether the actual
actors are servants or not." In this connection, also, it
may well be remembered that Byles, J., said, with great
force, in his judgment in the Exchequer Chamber in
Clarke v. Holmes, 2 that " if a master's personal knowl-
edge of defects in his machinery be necessary to his
liability, the more a master neglects his business, and
abandons it to others, the less will he be liable." The
true rule, therefore, is that " no duty belonging to the
master to perform for the safety and protection of his
servants can be delegated to any servant of any grade
so as to exonerate the master from responsibility to
a servant who has been injured by its non-perform-
ance." 3
309. Upon this principle it has been held in many
cases, that, as it is the duty of the railway to its ser-
vants to take due care that its line, 4 rolling stock, ma-
chinery, and appliances 5 are in a safe condition for
1 L. R. 1 H. L. 115. '7H.&N, 949.
8 Mann v. D. & H. C. Co., 91 N. Y. 500 ; Booth v. B. & A. R. R., 73 N. Y.
40 ; Pantzar v. T. F. I. Co., 99 N. Y. 368 ; Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 547.
* Drymala v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 40; Lewis v. St. L. & I. M. Ry., 59 Mo.
495 ; Hall v. M. P. Ry., 74 Id. 298 ; C. C. R. R. v. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499 ; Porter
v. H. & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 44.
5 Hough v. T. & P. Ry., 100 U. S. 213 ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; Ford
v. F. R. R-, 110 Mass. 241 ; P. & N. Y. C R. R. v. Leslie, 16 Weekly Notes
of Tases (Penna.) 321 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Avery, 109 111. 314, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 649 ; II. & T. C. Ry. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 231 ; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Jackson, 53 111. 492 ; Indiana Car Co.
v. Parker, 100 Ind. 191 ; Gunter v. G. Mfg. Co., 18 S. C. 262 ; A., T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Moore, 29 Kans. 632, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243, 31 Kans. 197, 15
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 312; Gilmore v. U. P. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 866, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R Cas. 304; Lawless v. C. R. R. R., 136 Mass. 1, 18 Am. & Eng.
330 NEGLECT TO INSPECT.
operation, and to take due care that its servants' fellow-
servants are selected with care; 1 the omission to exer-
cise that care in either respect necessarily fixes the
liability of the railway, whatever be the rank of the
servant to whom the railway has delegated the perform-
ance of that duty. It follows that the duty of inspec-
tion being a duty whose performance is incumbent on
the railway, the railway is liable where that duty is
neglected or carelessly performed by the servant to
whom it has been entrusted; 2 thus, in Hough v. T. &
P. Ry., 3 where the railway was held liable for the death
of an engine-driver caused by the defective condition
of the engine, which was due to the negligence of those
servants of the railway, who were charged with the
duty of inspecting and directing the repairs of engines,
Harlan, J., said (p. 218) : " a railroad corporation may
be controlled by competent, watchful, and prudent
directors, who exercise the greatest caution in the selec-
tion of a superintendent or general manager, under
whose supervision and orders its affairs and business in
R. R. Cas. 9G ; T., W. & W. Ry. v. Ingraham, 77 111. 309 ; Davis ?<. C. V. R. R.,
55 Vt. 84, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173; Ryan v. C. & N. W. Ry., 60 111. 171.
i Laning v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N. Y. 521 ; II. & B. T. R. R. v. Decker, 82
Penna. St. 119, 84 Id. 419 ; Frazier v. P. R. R., 38 Id. 104; Patterson v. P. &
C. R. R., 76 Id. 394; O. & M. Ry. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 554; T. M. R. R. D.Whitmore, 58 Tex. 276, 11 Am.& Eng. R. R. Cas.
195 ; Tyson v. S. & N. A. R. R., 61 Ala. 554 ; McDermott v. H. & St. J. R. R.,
73 Mo. 516, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 85 ; Flike v. B. & A. R. R., 53 N. Y.
549 ; Booth v. B & A. R. R, 73 N. Y. 38.
2 Durkin v. Sharp, 88 N.Y. 225, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 520; Kain v.
Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545 ; Fay v. M. & St. L. Ry.,
30 Minn. 231, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 193; Drymala v. Thompson, 26
Minn. 40 ; Long v. P. R. R., 65 Mo. 225 ; Pantzar v. T. F. I. M. Co., 99 N. Y.
368 ; Cooper v. P., C. & St. L. R. R , 24 W. Va. 37, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
501, note; Schultz v. Ry., 48 Wise. 375; M. P. Ry. v. Condon, 78
Mo. 567, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 583; Long v. P. Ry., 65 Mo. 225; King
r. M. By., 14 Fed. Rep. 277, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. 119; Brann v. C, R. I.
& P. Ry., 53 Iowa 595 ; Tierney v. M. & St. L. Ry-, Minn. , 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 545.
3 100 U. S. 213.
NEGLECT TO INSPECT. 331
all of its departments are conducted. The latter, in
turn, may observe the same caution in the appointment
of subordinates at the head of the several branches or
departments of the company's service. But the obli-
gation still remains to provide and maintain in suitable
condition the machinery and apparatus to be used by
its employes, an obligation the more important, and the
degree of diligence in its performance the greater, in
proportion to the dangers which may be encountered.
Those, at least, in the organization of the corporation
who are invested with, controlling or superior authority
in that regard represent its legal personality; their
negligence, from which injury results, is the negligence
of the corporation. The latter cannot, in respect of
such matters, interpose between it and the servant who
has been injured without fault on his part, the personal
responsibility of an agent, who, in exercising the mas-
ter's authority, has violated the duty he owes, as well
to the servant as to the corporation. To guard against
misapplication of these principles, we should say that
the corporation is not to be held as guaranteeing or
warranting the absolute safety under all circumstances,
or the perfection in all its parts, of the machinery or
apparatus which may be provided for the use of em-
ployes. Its duty in that respect to its employes is dis-
charged when, but only when, its agents, whose business
it is to supply such instrumentalities, exercise due care
as well in their purchase originally as in keeping and
maintaining them in such condition as to be reasonably
and adequately safe for use by employes." So in N. P.
K. R. v. Herbert, 1 where the railway was held liable to
a yard hand for injuries caused by the negligently de-
fective condition of the brake, draw-bar, and bumper
1 116 U. S. 642.
332 NEGLECT TO INSPECT.
of a car, Field, J., said : " it is equally well settled,
however, that it is the duty of the employer to select
and retain servants who are fitted and competent for
the service, and to furnish sufficient and safe materials,
machinery, or other means by which it is to be per-
formed, and to keep them in repair and order. This
duty he cannot delegate to a servant so as to exempt
himself from liability for injuries caused to another
servant by its omission. Indeed, no duty required of
him for the safety and protection of his servants can be
transferred so as to exonerate him from such liability."
So in Mann v. D. & H. C. Co., 1 where the railway was
held liable for the negligence of a freight conductor,
who, in selecting at the request of the yardmaster at a
way station, from his train hands, the one who was to
signal and stop an approaching train, made choice of
one Townsend, a young and inexperienced servant who
had only once before flagged a train at night, and who
had on that occasion so negligently performed the duty
that he was then discharged from the service, but sub-
sequently reinstated, Andrews, J., said : " it would be
unreasonable that the master should confer upon a sub-
ordinate the power to select a man for so important a
duty as that entrusted to Townsend, and be exonerated
from responsibility on the ground that the subordinate
was negligent in its performance."
310. On the other hand, in Wigmore v. Jay, 2 which
was decided in 1850, the plaintiff' 's decedent, a brick-
layer in the employment of the defendant, a master
builder, was killed by the fall of a scaffolding resulting
from the unsoundness of a pole, whose unsoundness had
been brought to the notice of the defendant's foreman,
but the defendant took no part in the erection of the
1 91 N. Y. 495, 12 Am. & Eng. K. E. Cas. 199. s 5 Exch. 354.
NEGLECT OF MASTER'S DUTY. 333
scaffolding, and the unsoundness of the pole was not
brought to his notice. At the trial Pollock, C. B.,
directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that
as the defendant bad not personally attended to the
erection of the scaffold, the action could not be main-
tained, and a rule for a new trial was refused. So in
Gallagher v. Piper, 1 where the plaintiff being employed
in constructing a scaffolding for a building which
the defendants, who were builders, were engaged in
erecting, and having unavailingly applied for more
boards to Phear, the defendants' "general foreman or
manager," was injured in falling from the scaffold, which
was insufficient and unsafe to the knowledge of Phear,
but not to the knowledge of the defendants, who did not
personally interfere with the work ; after a verdict for
the plaintiff a rule for a new trial was made absolute.
Erie, C. J., and Wiles, J., held that Wigmore v. Jay, 2
was a conclusive authority for holding Phear to be a
fellow-servant. Williams, J., said: "the doubt I enter-
tain is whether Phear was not rather a sort of deputy-
master than a fellow-workman of the plaintiff, so that a
notice of the insufficiency of the materials to him would
be notice to the defendants themselves. Looking, how-
ever, at the evidence here I do not find enough to war-
rant the conclusion that Phear was intended to stand in
the place of the defendants, so as to bind them by his
acts or omissions in this respect." Willes, J., said : " it is
true he (Phear) filled a superior position, but still he
was a servant, and I am unable to draw any distinction,
in this respect, between one description of servant and
another, so long as that relation of master and servant
exists, and the party injured and the person whose neg-
ligence caused the injury are employed under one
common master. If this had been the case of a person,
1 16 C. B. N. S. 669, 111 E. C. L. * 5 Exch. 354.
334 NEGLECT OF MASTER'S DUTY.
who might be said to have authority to act for the
master as a kind of universal agent, I should have been
prepared to consider the suggestions thrown out by my
brother Byles in his judgment in Clarke v. Holmes, and
see whether he could come within the denomination of
servant at all. But, before I could bring myself to say
that such an agent did not come within the rule, I should
take time to look into the subject, and especially to con-
sider the position of that most authoritative of all agents,
the master of a ship. I should like to consider whether,
if the master of a ship, without the knowledge of his
owners, were to start from an intermediate port with the
vessel in a damaged and unseaworthy condition, and he
was in consequence driven on shore or upon a rock and
some of the crew thereby sustained personal injury, it
would be just or reasonable to hold the owners to be
liable to the sailors as they would undoubtedly be to
third persons. But it is unnecessary to discuss that
here, for it is plain that Phear was as much a servant
of the defendants as was any one of the labourers em-
ployed under his direction and control." Byles, J.,
said, in his dissenting judgment: "lie (Phear) was not
merely the foreman or manager pro hac vice, but had
been the general manager of the defendants' works for
many years, about twenty-four or twenty-five years.
He had the entire management of the men employed
under him, engaging them and dismissing them as he
thought fit. * * * He was acting-master. At all events,
there was evidence for the jury that such was his posi-
tion. Take the case of a large builder, who is never
seen near his work, but who trusts the entire conduct
of his business to a foreman or manager, who is eyes,
ears, tongue, brains, and everything to him. Is not the
master liable for acts of negligence of his employe (for
I will not use the term 'servant,' which, like that of
NEGLECT OF MASTER'S DUTY. 335
'foreman,' is susceptible of many meanings), whilst act-
ing thus for him ? If these defendants had been a cor-
poration aggregate they must have employed somebody
to represent them. Take the case of a railway company
employing a general traffic manager, and through his
negligence an accident happens to a servant of the com-
pany — is it to be said that the party injured is without
remedy because the corporation is incapable of personal
misconduct ? If the rule relied on be found so incon-
venient that it cannot be applied to a case like that,
ought it to be applied here ? That depends very much
on the position of Phear. If he had been a servant,
though a superior one, I should have entertained some
doubt, but I do not think he stood in the position of a
servant at all. He stood rather in the position of a
general agent for the defendants. It is true he was
called the foreman, but that is a word the meaning of
which is extremely various. The case of Wigmore v-
Jay is distinguishable in this, that there it does not ap-
pear that the person whose negligence caused the acci-
dent was anything more than foreman for the particular
work." The judgments of the House of Lords in
Wilson v. Merry, and of the Common Pleas in Tarrant
v. Webb, have been referred to in section 299. The
English rule is adopted in some American cases in
which it is held that inspectors of car repairs are fellow-
servants of train hands, and that railways are not liable
for injuries caused by the negligence of such inspectors. 1
311. Briefly stated, the doctrine of the English cases
amounts to this, that the master impliedly contracts,
not that he will personally provide the instruraentali-
1 C. & X. R. R. v. Webb, 12 Ohio St. 475 ; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Gas. 140 ; L. M. R. R. t>. Fitzpatrick, 42 Obio St. 318, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 578; Mackin v. B. & A. R. R., 135 Mass. 301, 15 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 196 ; N., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Foster, Tenn. , 11 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 180 ; Gibson v. N. C. Ry., 22 Hun 289.
336 ENGLISH AND AMERICAN RULES.
ties of the servant's work, but that he will not be negli •
gent in his selection or retention of the servants whom
he charges with that duty, and that, therefore, on the
basis of that implied contract, a servant necessarily as-
sumes as a risk incident to his employment, not only
the danger of injury from the negligence of those fel-
low-servants with whom he is, either remotely or nearly,
associated in the performance of his work, but also,
and equally, the danger of injury from the negli-
gence of those fellow-servants whom the master has
charged with the duty of supplying and maintaining in
repair the instrumentalities of the work. On the other
hand, the doctrine of the American cases is, that the ex-
ercise of care in the construction, inspection, and mainte-
nance in repair of the instrumentalities of labour, is, by
the implied contract of a service, imposed upon the
master as a duty, and that, therefore, the non-perform-
ance of the duty renders him liable for such injuries as
may result from that non-performance. The point of
divergence in the cases is, therefore, in their differing
conception of the master's implied contract, and the
difficulty in accepting the view laid down in the Eng-
lish cases is, that they limit the master's duty of exer-
cising care in the provision and maintenance in repair
of the instrumentalities of labour, and in the selection
of fellow-servants, to the mere exercise of care in the
selection of the servant to whom the master delegates
that duty ; whereas, the duty being incumbent upon
the master, its non-performance ought, in justice, to fix
his liability, without reference to the character of the
agency to whom he may delegate the performance of the
duty.
312. Nevertheless, in the consideration of this sub-
ject, it must be borne in mind, that, under the Ameri-
can rule, the railway does not guarantee to its servants
PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. 66<
the soundness of the appliances of labour which it fur-
nishes to those servants, or the infallibility of its in-
spection of those appliances, or the intelligence and dis-
cretion of its other servants ; but it only guarantees
that those to whom it delegates its duty of constructing,
inspecting, and maintaining in repair the instrumental-
ities of labour, and of selecting and retaining its other
servants, will not be negligent in the performance of the
duty thus delegated to them. In other words, the rail-
way is not an insurer of the result of the exercise of
the delegated authority, but it does contract that that
delegated authority shall be exercised with due care.
Therefore, when the railway has done its duty in the
construction, inspection, and maintenance in repair of
the instrumentalities of labour, and in the selection of
fellow-servants, it is not to be held liable for injuries to.
a servant that result solely from the negligence of his
fellow-servants. Where the negligence of the railway
in supplying defective appliances is the proximate cause
of injury to a servant, it is no defence to the railway
that the negligence of a fellow-servant concurred in
causing the injury. 1 Nor is it a defence to the railway
that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow-
servant of the injured person concurring with the rail-
way's proximate negligence in sending out a train with
an inadequate force of train hands;' 2 but where the
negligence of a fellow-servant is the proximate cause of
injury to a servant, the concurrence of negligence on
1 G. T. Ry. v. Hammings, 106 U. S. 700 ; Ellis v. N. Y., L. E. &. W. It. K.,
95 N. Y. 546, 17 Am. & Eug. R. R. Cas. 641 ; Cone v. D., L. & W. R. R., 81 N.
Y. 207, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 57; Pauimier v. E. Ry., 5 Yroom 151 ;
Crutchfield v. R. & D. R. R., 76 X. ' '. 320; A, T. & S. F. K. U. v. Bolt, 29
Kans. 14;;, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206; Lawless v. C. R. R. R., 136 Mass.
1, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 96 ; Elmer v. Locke, 133 Mass. 575, 15 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas 300; Ransicr v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32 Minn. 331, 21 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 601 ; Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y. 516.
3 Booth v. B. & A. R. K., 73 X. Y. 38.
22
338 MINOR SERVANTS.
the part of the railway, either in supplying the defec-
tive appliances, 1 or in failing to provide an adequate
force of servants, 2 will not render the railway liable for
the injury. Where a machine consists of separate
parts, which must be put together before the machine
can be operated, an injury to a servant resulting from
the insufficient putting together of those parts cannot
be said to be due to the failure of the railway to provide
safe appliances ; and when such parts are insufficiently
put together by a fellow-servant of the injured servant,
the railway is not liable, for the negligence is not its
own but that of the fellow-servant. 3
VI. THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS TO THEIR MINOR
SERVANTS.
313. It is the duty of a railway to its minor servants
to exercise a reasonable care for their safety, and not to
place them in positions of danger unsuited to their
years and capacity. 4 Nevertheless a minor servant, if
he be of more than tender years, takes upon himself the
ordinary risks of the service, including the risk of in-
jury from the negligence of his fellow-servants. 5 In
1 Pease v. C. & N. W. Ry., 61 Wise. 163, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa. 527.
2 Harvey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 88 N. Y. 481, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa
515.
s Peschel v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 62 Wise. 338, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545
* Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511 :
Coombs v. N. B. Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 522 ; Penna. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 345.
5 Viets v. T. A. A. & G. T. Ry., 55 Mich. 120, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 11
fl. & G. N. R. R. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270 ; Gartland v. T. W. & W. Ry., 67 111
498 ; King v. B. & W. R. R., 9 Cush. 112 ; T. & P. Ry. v. Carlton, 60 Tex. 397,
15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 350 ; Greenwald v. M. H. & O. Ry., 49 Mich. 197
8 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 133; McGinnis v. C. S. B. Co., 49 Mich. 466, 8 Am
* Eng R. R. Cas. 135 ; Youll v. S. C & P. Ry., 56 Iowa 346, 21 Am. & Eng
U. R. Cas. 589.
MINOR SERVANTS. 330
this connection the case of U. P. E. K. v. Fort 1 must be
considered. The facts in that case were, that the in-
jured servant, a boy of sixteen years of age, who had
been, with his father's consent, engaged as a helper to
a workman in a railway's machine shop, with the obli-
gation of obeying that workman's orders, was, on one
occasion several months after his entry into the service,
ordered by that workman to ascend a ladder resting on
a shaft among rapidly moving and dangerous machinery
for the purpose of adjusting a belt which had gotten out
of place, and having been injured by acting in obedience
to that order the father brought an action to recover
damages for a breach of the contract of service. Dillon,
J., left it to the jury to find whether, or not, the duty
imposed upon the minor servant by the order of the
workman was within the contract of service ; and he
further directed them, that if that duty was not within
the contract of service, and if the imposition of that
duty upon the minor was wrongful and negligent, the
railway was liable therefor, for " the principle, that the
master is not liable for the neglect of a co- employe in
the same service has no application, or no just applica-
tion, to such a case." The report is not very explicit,
but the jury appear to have found generally for the
plaintiff, and also, specially, that the injured servant
was engaged to serve under the workman, and " was re-
quired to obey his orders," that the order of the work-
man, in obeying which the minor was injured, was not
within the scope of the minor's duty, but was within
that of the workman, was not a reasonable one, and that
a prudent man would not have ordered the minor to
perform it. Judgment for the plaintiff on this verdict
was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States,
1 17 Wall. 553.
340 MINOR SERVANTS.
Bradley, J., dissenting. Davis, J., put the judgment
of affirmance on the ground that the general rule of
the master's exemption from liability for injury done
to a servant by the negligence of a fellow-servant, being
founded upon the servant's implied undertaking to bear
the risk of injury from such negligence, was inapplica-
ble, because the act in the doing of which the minoi
servant was injured was not within the contract of ser-
vice, and he added, somewhat inconsequently, "if it
were otherwise, principals would be released from all
obligation to make reparation to an employe in a subor-
dinate position for any injury caused by the wrongful
conduct of the person placed over him, whether they
were fellow-servants in the same common service or not."
He further said, referring to the workman's order to
the injured servant : " for the consequences of this hasty
action the company are liable, either upon the maxim
of respondeat sujierior, or upon the obligation arising
out of the contract of service. The order of Collett (the
workman) was their order." The judgment in this
case is open to obvious criticism. The injured servant
was not an infant of tender year's, nor an inexperienced
servant. He was a boy of sixteen years of age, who
had had the experience of " several months " of service
in the railway's machine shop. His father, by his con-
sent to the contract of service, had impliedly undertaken
on his behalf to bear the risk of the very injury that
happened, for the jury found specially that by the
contract of service the boy was required to obey the
workman's orders. The workman was not a vice-prin-
cipal unless every superior servant is as to every inferior
servant to be held to be a vice-principal. With this
case there can be profitably contrasted Murphy v. Smith, 1
1 19 C. B. N. S. 361, 115 E. C. L.
MINOR SERVANTS. 341
which, although cited upon the argument of U. P. K.
R v. Fort, was not noticed by Davis, J., in his judg-
ment. In the English case the defendant was the pro-
prietor of a lucifer match factory ; one Simlack was his
foreman, or general manager, and under him was a
workman named Dehor, who, in Simlack's absence, as-
sumed the managment of the establishment ; the plain-
tiff, a boy of sixteen years of age, having been engaged
by Simlack as the defendant's servant, undertook, with-
out any direction from Dehor, but in his presence, to
perform a part of the process of making matches which
it was not his duty to do, and which if not done skil-
fully was dangerous, and in doing that he was injured.
There was no proof that Simlack was absent at the time.
After a verdict for the plaintiff, the court made absolute
a rule to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that while
there was evidence that Simlack was a vice-principal,
there was no such evidence as regards Dehor, w T ho must
Bewconsidered as only a fellow T -servant, for whose negli-
gence the defendant was not to be held liable. As the
result of a careful comparison of these cases, I venture
to think that Murphy v. Smith was rightly, and U. P.
R P. v. Fort wrongly, decided.
314. Where a railway receives into its service a minor
without the consent of his father, or, if the father be
dead, of his mother, and the minor be injured without
fault upon his part, the railway is liable therefor to the
father, or, if the father be dead, to the mother j 1 but if
the minor has, with his parents' consent, been taken into
the railway service to work in a railway yard, the fact
that he is afterwards, with his own consent, put on duty as
a brakeman on the line, is not on the part of the railway
1 Hamilton v. G., H. & S. A. Ry., 54 Tex. 556, 4 Am. & Eng. B.B. Cas. 528 ;
H. & G. N. R. R. v. Miller, 49 Tex. 322 ; O. & M. Ry. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 866 ;
Penna. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 345.
342 servants' undertaking of risks.
such negligence as renders it liable for injuries happen-
ing to him. 1 In G. K. & I. E-. R. v. Showers, 2 where a
minor servant, who had heen engaged without the con-
sent of his father, was killed by the negligence of his
fellow-servants, the recovery was limited to the reason-
able value to the parent of his son's services during the
period of his engagement with the railway. 3
VII. THE SERVANT'S IMPLIED UNDERTAKING TO BEAR
THE RISKS INCIDENT TO THE SERVICE.
Railway servants do not impliedly take vpon themselves the risk of in-
jury from the railway's non-performance of its duty, either in sup-
plying or maintaining the appliances of labour, or in selecting or
retaining servants ; hut they do take upon themselves the ordinary
risks of the service, including the negligence of their fellow-servants.
315. Railway servants, as has been stated, do not
take the risk of injury from the railway's failure to per-
form its duty in constructing and maintaining in repair
its line, rolling stock, machinery, and appliances, nor in
exercising due care in its selection or retention of its
other servants ; nor do they take the risk of injury
from the negligent participation of the railway's vice-
principals in their work ; but they do take the risk of
injury from those dangers which are necessarily inci-
dent to the service upon which they have entered, and
which do not result from negligence on the part of the
railway. 4 The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than
1 T. & P. Ry. v. Carlton, 60 Tex. 397, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 350.
2 71 Ind. 451, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 9.
8 See also C. & G. E. R. R. v. Harney, 28 Ind. 28.
4 Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. Ry., 5 Ex. 343 ; Riley v. Baxendale, 6 H. & N.
445 ; Wigget v. Fox, 11 Ex.832, which is sometimes cited in support of this
proposition, is explained by Cliannell, B., in Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 II. & N.
143, and is criticised by Cockburn, C. J., in Rourke v. Colliery Co., 2 C. P. D.
207 ; Penna. Co. v. Lynch, 90 111. 334 ; St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Britz,72 Id. 261 ;
Clark v. C. E. & Q. R. R., 92 Id. 43; C. P. Mfg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 Id. 418;
servants' undertaking of risks. 343
in C. & X. R R. v. Webb, 1 by Sutcliff, C. J., who says :
" a person who seeks and engages in any employment
thereby assumes the ordinary risk, hazard, and danger
incident to the place and the duties which, for the con-
sideration agreed upon, he has undertaken to discharge.
This is equally true of employes upon railroad trains as
well as elsewhere, and in all other kinds of business and
positions. Whether the employe seek employment in a
machine shop, or on board a steamboat, upon a railroad
train, or to pilot rafts over dangerous rapids, to labour
in a powder-mill, or to serve upon a whale ship, or upon
a voyage of discovery in the Arctic regions ; in each
and all of the several employments and positions chosen,
the employe, by entering the service voluntarily, takes
upon himself the hazard and dangers properly incident
to the service in which he engages ; and the employer
is, in no sense, from the relation they sustain to each
other, a warrantor of the safety of the employe." So,
in Sweeney v. B. & J. E. Co.. 2 Danforth, J., said : "the
general rule is, that the servant accepts the service, sub-
ject to the risks incidental to it ; and where the ma-
chinery and implements of the employe's business are
at that time of a certain kind or condition, and the
servant knows it, he can make no claim upon the mas-
ter to furnish other or different safeguards."
316. There is no implied obligation upon the part of
the master to indemnify the servant against the ordi-
nary risks of the service, and the servant, when injured,
can only recover upon proof that the master knew of a
danger which was unknown to the servant, and which
Hughes v. W. & St. P. R. R., 27 Minn. 137 ; Gibson v. E. By., 63 N. Y. 449 ;
DeForest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264, 8 Am. & Eng. R. B. ( '.is. 495 ; Sweeney v.
C. P. Ry., 87 Cal. 15, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cos. 151 ; Naylor v. C. & N. W. By,
5.°> Wise. 661.
» 12 Ohio St. 475. ' 101 N. Y. 520, 524.
344 RISKS TAKEN BY TRAIN HANDS.
the master did not make known to him. 1 Upon this
principle, train hands take the risk of injury from the
negligent movement of other trains; 2 from the explo-
sion of nitro-glycerine while being moved in or loaded
upon cars; 3 from the danger of strain in handling-
heavy freight; 4 from the derailment of their train by
its collision with trespassing cattle on an unfenced
line; 5 from being struck by engines or cars moving
in a railway yard, without notice and unattended; 6
from accumulations of ice and snow on or near the
track; 7 from the jolting of cars on a siding, by rea-
son of worn rails being used in its construction; 8 from
slipping on ashes dropped from the fire-box of an en-
gine while coupling cars ; 9 from the jolting of freight
cars in making a flying switch, while the injured ser-
1 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1 ; Williams v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258;
Watling v. Oastler, I.. R. 6 Ex. 73 ; Griffiths v. L. & St. K. Docks Co., 12 Q. B.
D. 493, 13 Id. 259 ; Seymour v. Maddox, 16 Q. B. 327, 71 E. C. L. ; Sykes v.
Packer, 99 Penua. St. 405.
2 Randall v. B. & O. R. R, 109 U. S. 478 ; Slater v. Jewett, 84 N. Y. 61, 5
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 515 ; McCosker v. L. I. R. R., 84 N. Y. 77, 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Gas. 564.
3 Foley v. C. & N. W. Ry., 48 Mich. 622, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa.
161.
* Walsh v. St. P. & D. R. R., 27 Minn. 367, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa.
114.
5 Sweeny v. C. P. R. R., 57 Cal. 15, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 151 ; Flem-
ing v. St. P. & D. R. R., 27 Minn. 111.
6 Kelley v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 Wise. 74, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 469 ;
Hallihan v. II. & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 117 ; C
& X. W. Ry. v. Donahue, 75 111. 106; T. & P. Ry. v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597,
'21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 571 ; Speed v. A. & P. R. R., 71 Mo. 303, 2 Am. &
Eng. E. B. Cas. 77. In Berg v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 50 Wise. 419, 2 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 70, the railway was held liable, under a statute of Wisconsin,
to a trackman who was injured while working in a railway yard, by the
failure of the hands on a moving train to give him notice of its ap-
proach.
7 Piquegno v. C & G. T. Ry., 52 Mich. 40, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 210 ;
cf. Fifield v. X. K. R., 42 X. H. 225.
8 M. C. R. R. v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247.
9 Hughes*. W. & St. P. R. R., 27 Minn. 137.
RISKS TAKEN BY TRAIN HANDS. 345
vant is standing on the top of the cars; 1 from being
knocked oif their cars by a bridge when their duty re-
quires them to ride on the top of a freight car ; 2 and
from being knocked off their cars by the projecting
awning of an elevator; 3 or by the projecting roof of a
station. 4 Train hands also take the risks of injury from
inequalities in the track and the defects of appliances,
whose condition is known to them, and of which they
have not complained; 5 and of their feet being caught
in a frog at a switch ; 6 and of travelling to the repair
shop with a patently defective car; 7 of falling through
a railway bridge in process of being repaired while
walking over it in the discharge of their duty. 8 Train
hands also take the risks of defects in the cars, wheie
the existence of those defects is not the result of negli-
gence on the part of the railway, as, for instance, the
unexpected breaking of a brake-staff; or the breaking
1 Yorell v. S. C. & P. Ry., 66 Iowa 346, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
2 P. & C. Ry. v. Sentmayer, 92 Penna. St. 276, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 508 .
Owen v. N. Y. C. R. R., 1 Lans. 108 ; Devitt v. P. R. R., 50 Mo. 302 ; B. & O.
R. R. v. Strieker, 51 Md. 47 ; Rains v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 71 Mo. 164, 8
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 610 ; Wells v. B., C, R. & N. R. R., 56 Iowa 520, 2
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243; Baylor v. D., L. & W. Ry., 40 N. J. L. 23;
Gibson v. M. Ry., 2 Ont. (Can.) 658 ; Clark v. R. & D. R. R. 78 Va. 709, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 78 ; sed contra, B. & O. & C. R. R. v. Rowan, 104 Ind.
88, 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 390.
3 Clark v. St. P. & S. C. R. R., 28 Minn. 128, 2 Am. & Eng. R R. Cas. 240.
* Gibson v. E. Ry., 63 N. Y. 449 ; sed. cf. W. Ry. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 651. It would seem that the railway ought to bo held
liable where the construction, collision with which does the injury, is under
the control of the railway.
5 P. & R. R. R. v. Schertle, 97 Penna. St. 450 ; DeForest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y.
264, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 495.
8 L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 540 ; Smith v. St. L., K. C. & N.
Ry., 69 Mo. 32.
7 Flannagan v. C. & N. W. Ry., 45 Wise. 98, 50 Id. 462, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 150; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Ward, 61 111. 130; Watson v. II. & T.C. Ky., 58
Tex. 434, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 213.
8 Koontz v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 65 Iowa 224, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 85.
9 Smith v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 42 Wise. 520.
340 RISKS TAKEN BY TRAIN HANDS.
of ;i ladder on a car from the shortness of a bolt fasten
ing the slat; 1 or the breaking of the eye bolt of a brake
chain from a latent defect. 2 Train hands also take the
ordinary risks in coupling cars, 3 even though the car
load project beyond the ends of the platforms of the
car. 4 Train hands also take the risk of coupling defec-
tive cars which have been marked as such and put aside,
for the purpose of moving them to the repair shop, 5 and
of shunting or switching a defective car in a railway
yard, even though no express notice was given of the
defective condition of the particular car; 6 but it has
been held that they do not take the risk of negligence
1 Ballou v. C. & N. W. Ry., 54 Wise. 257, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 480 ; C.
& A. R. R. v. Piatt, 89 111. 141 ; T. W. & W. Ry. v. Ingrahani, 77 Id. 309.
2 Painton v. N. C. Ry., 83 N. Y. 7, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 454.
8 Day v. T. C. S. & D. Ry., 42 Mich. 523, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 126 ; T.
W. & W. R. R. v. Black, 88 111. 112 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. McCormick, 74 Ind.
440 ; M. C. R. R. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 101 ;
Viets v. T., A., A. & G. T. Ry., 55 Mich. 120, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 11 ;
M. P. Ry. v. Lyde, 57 Tex. 505, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 188 ; Skellenger v.
C. & N. W. Ry., 61 Iowa 714, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 206 ; Hathaway v.
M. C. R. R., 51 Mich. 253, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 249 ; C. & R. I. Ry. v.
Clark, 108 111. 113, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 261 ; B., C, R. & N. R. R. v.
Coates, 62 Iowa 487, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 265 ; Rodman v. M. C. R. R.,
55 Mich. 57, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 521 ; Pease v. C. & N. W. Ry , 61
Wise. 163, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 527; Fowler v. C. & N. W. Ry., 61
Wise. 169, 17 Am. & Eng^ R. R. Cas. 536; Umback v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 83
Ind. 191, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 98 ; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 2 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 140; N. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wheeler, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 741, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 633; H.& T. C. Ry. v. Myers, 55 Tex. 110, 8 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 114 ; Batterson v. C. Sz G. T. Ry., 49 Mich. 184, 8 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 123 ; L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 619 ; A., T. & S.F. R. R. v. Wagner, 33 Kana. 660, 21 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 637.
* N. C Ry. v. Husson, 13 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 361, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 241 ; A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Plunkett, 25 Kans. 188, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 127 ; Day v. T., C, S. & D. Ry., 42 Mich. 523, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
126 ; Hamilton v. D. M. V. Ry., 36 Iowa 31 ; cf. Brown v. A., T. & S. F. Ry.,
31 Kans. 1, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 271.
5 Watson v. H. & T. C. R. R., 58 Tex. 434, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 213.
6 Yeaton v. B. & L. R. R., 135 Mass. 418, 15 Am. & Eng. E, R. Cas. 253;
Fraker v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn. 54, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 256.
RISKS TAKEN BY FIREMEN, ETC. 347
of car inspectors in a yard in failing to mark damaged
cars, so as to give notice of the condition of such cars
to those who may be called on to coup^ them. 1
317. Firemen, or stokers, take the risk of injury from
"bucking" snow on the line, that is, from driving the
engine at speed into a snow bank for the purpose of
clearing the line of snow. 2 Station hands take the risk
of injury from throwing mail bags into moving trains. 3
Car repairers, while working beneath cars in a railway
yard take the risk of injury from the car being struck
by another car, when they habitually do such work
without asking that the car be protected by a flag ; 4 but
in one case the railway was held liable to a servant in-
jured while similarly engaged, the railway having con-
ceded by its answer that under its regulations the car
should have been protected by flags, 5 and in other simi-
lar cases of injury the railway was held liable by reason
of the failure of the foreman of the injured servant to
take precautions for his safety by guarding the car. 6
318. Labourers on the line take the risk of injury
from a defective condition of the roadbed when engaged
to repair it ; thus, in R, 1ST. Y. & P. K. K. v. Brick, 7 a
labourer engaged in the reconstruction of a dilapidated
line, and while being carried over the line in a construc-
tion train, was killed by the derailment of a train at a
level crossing, caused by the freezing of mud which
had been negligently permitted to fill up and remain in
1 Tierney v. M. & St. L. Ry., 33 Minn. 311, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545.
a Bryant v. B., C. R. & N. R. R, 66 Iowa 305, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
593.
3 Coolbroth v. M. C. R. R., 77 Me. 165, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 599.
* O'Rorke v. U. P. Ry., Colo. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 19; Penna.
Co. v. Stoeike, 104 111. 201, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 523.
5 Luebke v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 59 Wise. 127, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 183.
6 L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Lavalley, 36 Ohio St. 221, 5 Am. & Eng. B. R. Cas.
549 ; Moore v. W., St. L. & P. Ry., 84 Mo. 481, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 509.
7 98 N, Y. 212, 21 Am. & Eng." R. R. Cas. 605.
348 RISKS TAKEN BY LABOURERS.
the spaces between the rails and the planking of the
crossing. Judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed in error, Miller, J., saying inter alia, "it may
be assumed, we think, that the deceased in performing
the service in which he was engaged and in travelling
on the construction train, understood that he was not
working upon a road which was finished and in good
repair, but upon one which, having been long neglected
and but little travelled and latterly only by construction
trains, subjected him to greater risks and perils than
would be incurred under ordinary circumstances. In
entering the defendant's service he assumed the hazards
incident to the same." On the other hand, in Madden
v. M. & St. L. Ry., 1 the railway was held liable to a
train hand on a gravel train engaged in resurfacing the
roadbed, the train being derailed by the bad condition of
the roadbed, Gilfillan, C. J., saying: "there is no differ-
ence as to the duty of the master and the assumption of
risk by the servant between an employment to make
repairs and any other employment. In all cases the
servant is held to take on himself the risks necessarily
incident to the employment, unless, perhaps, they be
latent and known to the master, but not known to nor
by the use of proper diligence, discoverable by the ser-
vant ; and in no case does he take on himself the risks
that arise by reason of neglect on the part of the master,
unless they be known to him, or by the use of proper
diligence are discoverable to him. * * * The fact that
the work in which the plaintiff was employed was that
of repairing, or making preparations to repair, the track
did not diminish its duty to furnish safe and suitable
means and instruments to do his work. As it required
him, i 1 that work, to use the old track it should have
had it reasonably safe for the purpose." On this sub-
1 32 Minn. 303, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 63.
BISKS OF SPECIAL SERVICE. 349
ject, the doctrine of the Brick case would seem to be
sound. Labourers on the line also take the risk of in-
jury from the derailment of their train in pushing
through a snow bank ; x of a bank of earth caving in on
them while digging; 2 of the negligent movement of
trains upon the line ; 3 of being struck by a passing train
in a tunnel, while engaged in repairing the tunnel, 4 and
of being injured by defects in tools. 5 Well-diggers take
the risk of injury from the caving in of a well in pro-
cess of excavation. 6 An ostler in a railway's stable
takes the risk of being kicked by a vicious horse whose
character is known to him. 7
319. There are authorities for the proposition that
servants do not impliedly undertake to bear the risk of
injury in any special service, which does not fall within
their duties as defined by their contract of service, but
which they are ordered to perform by a superior officer,
as, for instance, where one who had been engaged as
brakeman on a passenger train, was injured while
coupling freight cars in a railway yard under the
orders of the superintendent of a division of the line, 8
or where a labourer in a railway yard who, having no
experience in coupling cars, was ordered by his foreman
to perform that service, and while so doing was injured
1 Howland v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 54 Wise. 226, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
578; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Morse, 30 Minn. 465, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168.
* Naylor v. C. & N. W. Ry., 53 Wise. 661, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 460;
Simmons v. C. & T. R. R., 110 111. 340, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 50; Morey
v. L. V. Coal Co , 55 Iowa G71 ; Rasmusson v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 65 Iowa 236,
18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 54.
s P. R. R. v. Wachter,60 Md. 395, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 187 ; McGrath
v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., Mass. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 5 ; I. & G. N.
R. R. v. Hester, 64 Tex. 401, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 535 ; P., C. & St. L.R.
R. v. Leech, 41 Ohio St. 388, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 541, note.
4 Woodlt-v r. M. D. Ry., 2 Ex. D. 384.
5 L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Duffey, 35 Ark. 602, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 637.
6 G., H. & S. A. R. R. v. Lempe, 59 Tex. 19, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 201.
T G. & C. St. Ry. v. Bresmer, 94 Penna. St. 103.
• Jones v. L. S. & M. S. Rv.. 49 Mich. 573, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 221.
350 fellow-servant's negligence.
by the negligence of an engine-driver ;* nor do servants
take the risks of negligence on the part of another rail-
way, upon whose line or premises they are compelled
to go in the performance of their duty to the railway
whom they serve, nor the risks of negligence on the
part of another railway which exercises either statutory
or contractual running powers over the line of the com-
pany they serve.
320. Railway servants also impliedly assume the
risk of injury from negligence on the part of their fel-
low-servants. This rule was not enunciated in Priestley
v. Fowler, 2 but it is the necessary result of the decision
in that case which rests the liability of the master upon
his personal negligence, for a master cannot be said to
be personally negligent if an injury is caused to a ser-
vant by the negligence of a fellow-servant, in whose
original selection and subsequent retention in his post
the master has exercised due care. The rule was first
distinctly enunciated in South Carolina in 1841, in
Murray v. S. C. R. R., 3 where a fireman having been
injured by the negligence of an engine-driver, the rail-
way was held not to be liable, for the reason that the
engine-driver no more represented the railway than
did the fireman, and each was liable to the railway
for himself and not for his fellow, and the railway was
not liable to either for the failure of the other. The
next case is Farwell v. B. & W. R. R., 4 in which judg-
ment was delivered in 1842 by Shaw, C. J. An engine-
driver having been injured by the negligence of a
switch-tender, the railway was held not to be liable,
and the great Chief Justice of Massachusetts rested the
1 Lalor v. C, B. & Q. R. R., 52 111. 401 ; see also C. & G. E. R. R. v. Harney,
28 Ind. 28 ; U. P. R. R. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553 ; CAN. W. Ry. v. Bayfield, 37
Mich. 205; Miller v. U. P. Ry., 17 Fed. Rep. 67.
1 3 M. & W. 1. 8 1 McMullan 385.
« 4 Mete. 49, 1 Redf. Am. Ry. Cas. 395.
fellow-servant's negligence. 351
exemption of the railway from liability to the plaintiff
upon the ground that the liability of a master for the
negligence of his servant, acting in the course of his
employment, and within the scope of his authority, and
causing injury to a stranger, is dependent upon the
want of privity between the master and the stranger,
but that the liability of a master to a servant, for
injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant,
must, if it exist, be maintained upon the ground of an
implied contract upon the part of the master to indem-
nify every servant against such injuries, and that the
want of adjudged cases illustrating the applications of
such an implied contract, is a denial of its existence.
The Chief Justice also stated, with force, certain general
considerations of public policy, which were very similar
to those put forth by Abinger, C. B., in Priestley v.
Fowler, 1 but which I neither quote nor rely upon, be-
cause it seems to me that judicial enunciations of legal
principles should have a more stable foundation than
considerations of public policy, which are not always
capable of exact definition, and which, under changed
circumstances and conditions, may be of questionable
applicability. The rule was first applied in England
in Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. By., 2 decided in 1850.
In that case an administratrix having brought suit
under Lord Campbell's Act, averred in her declaration,
that her decedent, a servant upon a train of the de-
fendant, was killed in a collision by the negligence of
the defendant, etc. The defendant pleaded specially
that the collision was solely caused by the negligence
of the defendant's servants, who were fit and competent
persons to have the government and guidance of the
colliding trains, etc. On demurrer to this plea, judg-
ment was entered for the defendant, Alderson, B., say-
1 3 M. & W. 1. "5 Ex. 343.
352 fellow-sekv ant's negligence.
ing, " the principle upon which a master is, in general,
liable to answer for accidents resulting from the negli-
gence or unskilfulness of his servant, is that the act of
his servant is, in truth, his own act. If the master is
himself driving his carriage, and from want of skill
causes injury to a passerby, he is, of course, responsible
for that want of skill. If, instead of driving the car-
riage with his own hands, he employs his servant to
drive it, the servant is but an instrument set in motion
by the master. It was the master's will that the ser-
vant should drive, and whatever the servant does in
order to give effect to his master's will, may be treated
by others as the act of the master, qui facit per alium,
facit per se. So far there is no difficulty. Equally
clear is it, that though a stranger may treat the act of the
servant as the act of his master, yet, the servant him-
self, by whose negligence or want of skill the accident
has occurred, cannot, and, therefore, he cannot defend
himself against the claim of a third person ; nor, if by
his unskilfulness he is himself injured, can he claim
damages from his master upon an allegation that his
own negligence was, in point of law, the negligence of
his master. The grounds for these distinctions are so
obvious as to need no illustrations. The difficulty is
as to the principle applicable to the case of several ser-
vants employed by the same master, and injury result-
ing to one of them from the negligence of another. In
such a case, however, we are of opinion that the master
is not, in general, responsible, when he has selected
persons of competent care and skill. Put the case of a
master employing A. and B., two of his servants, to
drive his cattle to market. It is admitted that, if by
the unskilfulness of A., a stranger is injured, the master
is responsible. Not so, if A., by his unskilfulness,
hurts himself; he cannot treat that as the want of skill
fellow-seevant's negligence. 353
of his master. Suppose then, that by the unskilfulness
of A., B., the other servant, is injured while they are
jointly engaged in the same service, there we think B.
has no claim against the master. They are both en-
gaged in a common service, the duties of which impose
a certain risk on each of them ; and, in case of negli-
gence on the part of the other, the party injured knows
that the negligence is that of his fellow-servant, and
not of his master. He knew, when he engaged in the
service, that he was exposed to the risk of injury, not
only from his own want of skill or care, but also from
the want of it on the part of his fellow-servant ; and he
must be supposed to have contracted on the terms, that
as between himself and his master, he would run this
risk." In Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 1 where it was
held that a mine-owner was not liable to a miner in his
service for injuries resulting from the negligence of
another servant, whose duty it was to operate the
engine, by whose power the miners were brought up
from the pit, Lord Cranworth said : " when the work-
man contracts to do work of any particular sort, he
knows, or ought to know, to what risks he is exposing
himself; he knows, if such be the nature of the risk,
that want of care on the part of a fellow-servant may
be injurious or fatal to him, and that against such want
of care his employer cannot by possibility protect him.
If such want of care should occur, and evil is the result,
he cannot say that he does not know whether the master
or the servant was to blame. He knows that the blame
was wholly that of the servant He cannot say the
master need not have engaged in the work at all, for lie
was a party to its being undertaken. Principle, there-
fore, seems to me opposed to the doctrine that the
responsibility of the master for the ill consequences of his
1 3 Macq. II. L. 282.
23
354 fellow-servant's negligence.
servant's carelessness, is applicable to the demand made
by a fellow-workman in respect of evil resulting from the
carelessness of a fellow-workman when engaged in a com-
mon work." In Wilson v. Merry, 1 where a mine-owner
was held not to be liable for the death of a servant caused
by the negligence of a fellow-servant in erecting a scaf-
fold which obstructed the circulation of air in the mine,
Lord Chancellor Cairns, after quoting from Lord Cran-
worth's judgment in Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, said :
" I would only add to this statement of the law, that I
do not think the liability or non-liability of the master
to his workmen can depend upon the question whether
the author of the accident is not or is, in any technical
sense, the fellow- workman or collaborates of the suf-
ferer. In the majority of cases in which accidents have
occurred, the negligence has, no doubt, been the negli-
gence of a fellow-workman ; but the case of the fellow-
workman appears to me to be an example of the rule,
and not the rule itself; the rule, as I think, must stand
upon higher and broader grounds. As is said by a
distinguished jurist : Exempla non restringunt regular//,
sed loquuntur de casibus crebrioribus. 2 The master is
not, and cannot be, liable to his servant unless there be
negligence on the part of the master, in that in which
he, the master, has contracted or undertaken with his
servant to do. The master has not contracted or under-
taken to execute, in person, the work connected with
his business. The result of an obligation on the master
personally to execute the work connected with his
business, in place of being beneficial, might be disas-
trous, to his servants, for the master might be incompe-
tent personally to perform his work. At all events, a
servant may choose for himself between serving a
master who does, and a master who does not, attend in
1 L.' E. 1 S. C. & D. 326. J Donellus de Jure Civ. L. 9, c. 2, n.
fellow-servant's negligence. 3-55
person to his business. But what the master is, in my
opinion, bound to his servant to do, in the event of his
not personally superintending and directing the work,
is to select proper and competent persons to do so, and
to furnish them with adequate materials and resources
for the work. When he has done this he has, in my
opinion, done all that he is bound to do. And if the
persons selected are guilty of negligence, this is not the
negligence of the master." In Randall v. B. & O. R.
R., 1 the rule is distinctly recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States. There are, however, some
cases in which the doctrine is denied ; 2 and in L. & N.
Ry. v. Collins, 3 the railway was held liable for injuries
caused to a labourer by the negligence of an engine-
driver in putting the engine in motion, while the
labourer was, as the engine-driver knew, engaged in
making some repairs under the engine, the ground of
decision being that the doctrine of agency rendered the
corporation liable for the negligence of its servants
causing injury to other servants as well as to strangers.
The unsoundness of this reasoning has been sufficiently
shown by the quotations which have been made from
the judgments in those cases which maintain the op-
posing view upon this question.
321. The general rule, therefore, is that servants take
the risk of the negligence of their fellow-servants and
the master, if he has not been negligent in the selection
or retention of the nesdiprent fellow-servant, is not im-
pliedly liable to indemnify them for any injury result-
ing from the negligence of that fellow-servant. 4
1 109 u. S. 478.
3 Chamberlain v. M. & M. R. R., 11 Wise. 238; L. & N. Ry. v. Collins, 2
Duvall 114; McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399, 8 Am. & Eng. K. B. Cm. L62 ;
Haynes v. E., T. V. & G. R. R., 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 222.
3 2 Duvall 114.
* Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. Ry., 5 Ex. 343; Wigmore v. Jay. 1.1. 864 ; Bar-
ooG COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
The common object of railway service being that of fitting the line for
traffic, and of carrying on the traffic, all who are employed in the
accomplishment of that object, and whose negligence may be the
cause of injury to one another, are to be deemed jcllow-servants.
322. At one time in England some of the judges
manifested an inclination to restrict within narrow
limits the doctrine of the master's immunity from re-
sponsibility to a servant for injuries caused by the neg-
ligence of a fellow-servant ; thus, in Holmes v. Clarke, 1
Pollock, C. B., said : " it would be quite consistent with
the authorities if we were to hold that a footman might
recover against his master for injury arising from the
neglect of the coachman or groom, the services being
different," and in Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, 2
Chelmsford, C, intimated thai a carpenter in the rail-
way service, engaged in repairing a railway carriage,
could not be considered a fellow-servant of the engine-
tonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 266 ; Vose v. L. Y. Ry., 2 H. & N.
728; Wigget v. Fox, 11 Ex. 832; Waller v. S. E. Ry., 2 H. & C. 102; Hall
v. Johnson, 3 Id. 589; Searle v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. N. S. 429, 103 E. C. L. ;
Lovegrove v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 16 C. B. N. S. 669, 111 E. C. L. ; Farwell v.
B. & W. R. R., 4 Mete. 49 ; Hayes v. Western R. R., 3 Cush. 270 ; Murray v.
S. C. R. R., 1 McMullan 385 ; Russell v. H. R. R. R., 17 N. Y. 13 1 ; Lovell v.
Howell, 1 C. P. D. 161 ; Charles v. Taylor, 3 Id. 492 ; Ryan v. C. V. R. R.,
23 Penna. St. 110; Frazier v. P. R. R., 38 Id. 104; Gilman v. E. R. R.,
10 Allen 233 ; Hall v. Johnson, 34 L. J. Ex. 222 ; Morgan v. V. of N. Ry.,
L. R. 1 Q. B. 149 ; Gillshannon r. S. B. R. R., 10 Cush. 228 ; Coon v. S. R. R.,
5 N.Y. 492; Boldt v. N. Y. C. R. R., 18 Id. 432; Wright v. N. Y. C. R. R., 25
Id. 562; Honor v. Albrighton, 93 Penna. St. 475; Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S.
313; Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Penna. St. 453 ; Allen v. New Gas Co., 1 Ex.
D. 251 ; Hand v. V. & C. R. R-, 32 Vt. 473; Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109
U. S. 478, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243; Doughty v. L. D. Co., 76 Me. 143;
K. P. Ry. v. Salmon, 11 Kans. 83 ; Brabbitts v. C & N. W. Ry., 38 Wise. 289 ;
M. C. R. R. v. Dolan, 32 Mich 510 ; Robinson v. H. & T. C. Ry., 46 Tex. 540 ;
T. W. & W. Ry. v. Durkin, 76 111. 395 ; Day v. T. C. S. & D. Ry., 42 Mich.
523, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 126; Whaalen v. M. R. & L. E. R. R., 8 Ohio
St. 249 ; Hunt v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26 Iowa 363 ; Carle v. B. & P. C. R. R., 43
Me. 269; P., F. W. & C. R. R. v. Devinney, 7 Ohio St. 197.
1 6 II. & N. 357 ' 3 Macq. II. L. 311.
COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 357
driver and the switch-tender, 1 and he said: 2 "where
servants are engaged in different departments of duty,
an injury committed by one servant upon the other by
carelessness or negligence in the course of his peculiar
work is not within the exception, and the master's lia-
bility attaches in that case in the same manner as if
the servant stood in no relation to him," and in the
same case, 3 Lord Brougham said that fellow-servants
are "men in the same common employment and engaged
in the same common work under that common employ-
ment." Later cases in England have, however, given
a much wider range to the scope of a common employ-
ment. In Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. By., 4 a guard, or
train hand, was held to be a fellow-servant with not
only the engine-driver, guards, and hands on his train,
but also with the servants performing the like duties
on a train which came into collision with his train.
Alderson, B., in delivering judgment for the defendant,
said on this point : " the principle is, that a servant,
when he engages to serve a master, undertakes, as be-
tween him and his master, to run all the ordinary risks
of the service, and this includes the risk of negligence
on the part of a fellow-servant, whenever he is acting
in discharge of his duty as servant of him who is the
common master of both. The death of Hutchinson
appears on the pleadings to have happened while he
was acting in the discharge of his duties to the defend-
ant as his master, and to have been the result of care-
lessness on the part of one or more other servant or
servants of the same master while engaged in their
service; and whether the death resulted from the mis-
management of the one train, or of the other, or of
both, does not affect the principle ; in any case, it arose
1 See McNaughton v. 0. Ky., 19 Court of Sess. < 'a. '-'71.
>p, 307. "P. 313. 4 6 Exch. 343.
C58 COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
from carelessness or want of skill, the risk of which
the deceased had, as between himself and the defendant,
agreed to run." So in Waller v. S. E. By., 1 wherein it
was held that a guard on a train, or train hand, was a
fellow-servant with the "gauger of plate layers," or
foreman of track repairs, by whose negligence the in-
jury was occasioned, Pollock, C. B., said : " I think
that the superintending the trains on their journey, and
the taking care that the rails on which the carriages
run are firmly and securely fastened and bolted con-
stitute one common object, viz. : that the passengers
shall be conveyed in carriages which are safe, and on
rails which are free from danger. Where, indeed, two
trains belonging to the same company are travelling on
different lines of rail which, at a certain point, intersect
each other or join a principal line, and, in consequence
of the negligence of the driver of one of the trains, a
collision ensues, by which the driver of the other train
is injured, I own there seems to me less of what may
be called an employment in one common object. No
doubt the common object of the two servants is the
driving their respective trains to their place of destina-
tion ; but each of them has in particular a different
object, one of them has one train under his control, the
other another train. But in this case the common object
of both servants was the safe conveyance of the pas-
sengers in that particular train, it being the duty of the
one to superintend the carriages of the other, and to
take care that the rails were in such a condition that
the journey might be safely performed. Viewing this
case with reference to the observation of Lord Cran-
worth in Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Beid, that when a
workman contracts to do work of any particular sort,
1 2 H. & c. 102.
COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 359
lie knows or ought to know to what risks he is exposing
himself, there can be no doubt that the guard of a rail-
way train must anticipate, among other probable sources
of danger on the journey, the neglect of a servant to
oil the wheels of the carriages, the neglect of another
to adjust the points, the neglect of another to take care
that the rails are safely and securely fastened and
bolted." In Farwell v. B. & W. R. R., 1 Shaw, C. J.,
said : " it was strongly pressed in the argument, that
although this might be so where two or more ser-
vants are employed in the same department of duty,
where each can exert some influence over the conduct
of the other, and thus to some extent provide for
his own security, yet that it could not apply where
two or more are employed in different departments
of duty at a distance from each other, and where one
can in no degree control or influence the conduct of
another. But we think this is founded upon a sup-
posed distinction, on which it would be extremely
difficult to establish a practical rule. When the
object to be accomplished is one and the same, when
the employers are the same, and the several persons
employed derive their authority and their compensation
from the same source, it would be extremely difficult to
distinguish what constitutes one department and what a
distinct department of duty. It would vary with the
circumstances, of every case. If it were made to depend
upon the nearness or distance of the persons from each
other, the question would immediately arise, how Dear
or how distant must they be to be in the same or different
departments. * * * Besides, it appears to us, that the
argument rests upon an assumed principle of responsi-
bility which does not exist. The master, in the case
supposed, is not exempt from liability, because the Ber-
360 COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
vant has better means of providing for his safety when
he is employed in immediate connection with those from
whose negligence he might suffer ; but because the im-
plied contract of the master does not extend to indem-
nify the servant against the negligence of any one but
himself ; and he is not liable in tort, as for the negli-
gence of his servant, because the person suffering does
not stand towards him in the relation of a servant, but
is one whose rights are regulated by contract express or
implied. The exemption of the master, therefore, from
liability for the negligence of a fellow-servant does not
depend exclusively upon the consideration that the
servant has better means to provide for his own safety,
but upon other grounds. Hence the separation of the
employment into different departments cannot create
that liability when it does not arise from express or
implied contract, or from a responsibility created by
law to third persons and strangers for the negligence
of a servant." In Morgan v. V. of N. Ky., 1 the plain-
tiff, a carpenter in the railway service, while working
on a scaffolding in the railway yard, was thrown down
and injured by the negligence of some porters in the
railway service in carelessly shifting an engine on a
turn-table. The judge at the trial having nonsuited the
plaintiff, the Q. B. discharged a rule to enter the ver-
dict for the plaintiff. Blackburn, J., after referring to
the general rule of a master's exemption from liability
for injuries done to a servant by the negligence of a
fellow-servant, said : " I quite agree that it is necessary
that the employment must be common in this sense,
that the safety of the one servant must in the ordinary
and natural course of things depend on the care and
skill of the others. This includes almost every, if not
1 5 B. & S. 570, 117 E. C. L., L. R. 1 Q. B. 149.
COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 3G1
every, case in which the servants are employed to do
joint work, but I do not think it is limited to such
cases. There are many cases where the immediate
object on which the one servant is employed is very
dissimilar from that on which the other is employed,
and yet the risk of injury from the negligence of the
one is so much a natural and necessary consequence of
the employment which the other accepts, that it must
be included in the risks which are to be considered in
his wages. I think that, whenever the employment is
such as necessarily to bring the person accepting it into
contact with the traffic of the line of railway, risk of
injury from the carelessness of those managing that
traffic is one of the risks necessarily and naturally in-
cident to such an employment, and within the rule."
The Queen's Bench having entered judgment against
the plaintiff, the Exchequer Chamber affirmed that
judgment, Erie, C. J., saying: "the plaintiff and the
porters were engaged in one common employment, and
were doing work for the common object of their mas-
ters, viz., fitting the line for the traffic ;" and Pollock,
C. B., adding : " it appears to me that Ave should be
letting in a flood of litigation were we to decide the
present case in favour of the plaintiff. For, if a car-
penter's employment is to be distinguished from that
of the porters employed by the same company, it will
be sought to split up the employes in every large estab-
lishment into different departments of service, although
the common object of their employment, however dif-
ferent, is but the furtherance of the business of the
master; yet it might be said with truth that no two
had a common immediate object. This shows that we
must not over-refine, but look at the common objecl and
not at the common immediate object." In Slater v.
3G2 COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
Jewett, 1 wherein the facts were identical with those in
C, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Ross, 2 with the exception that
the person injured was a fireman, and the persons whose
negligence caused the injury were a telegraph operator
and the conductor of the train which came into collision
with that on which the injured fireman was serving.
Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the
grounds of the judgment, as stated by Folger, C. J.,
are that "each of these agents" [the telegraph operator
and the conductor], "in doing their ordinary work for
the defendant, were fellow-servants of the intestate in
the same common employment. The conductor was
engaged in the particular work in which the intestate
was, that of moving trains. The telegrapher was en-
gaged in a work closely connected therewith, that of
receiving and giving information of the whereabouts
of trains, and communicating orders to those controlling
them for stopping or going on. This was a branch of
the general business of the defendant essential to the
smooth and successful movement of the whole, that
branch of it in which the intestate was engaged as much
as any other. * * * It cannot be contended that there
was anything required of the conductor that raised him
out of his relation to the intestate of a fellow-servant.
The act required of the conductor at the particular time
was to receive an order from an authorized source of
command, and in a prescribed mode to acknowledge the
receipt of it, and then to follow the direction. This
was service merely. It is contended that the duty of
the telegrapher at the time and the act required of him
were those that the defendant was bound to perform as
master, and that the negligent performance by the
operator was the negligence of the master. The argii-
1 85 N. Y. 61, 5 Am. & Eng. U. K. Cas. 515. a 112 U. S. 377.
TEST OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 363
ment to sustain this position consists, in part, in an
effort to show that the duties of the operator were in
no respect like to those of the intestate. They were
not like, but they tended to the same end, that of the
speedy, efficient, and successful carriage of passengers
and freight over the railway. There are many kinds
of servants of a great railway company. Their duties
are not in all cases the same, nor always alike, yet they
are all done to bring one result, and it is their conjoint,
simultaneous, and harmonious performance that does
effect the finality, sought through the whole complex
organism. If it be so that this operator sometimes re-
ceived and sent messages that had naught to do there-
with, still, on this occasion, the act required of him had
direct connection with the acts of those engaged in
moving the two trains. The position, that the operator
was hired and discharged by one superior agent and
the intestate by another, and that, therefore, they were
not fellow-servants, is not sound. The general authority
to hire and to turn away was in the defendant. It did
radiate from him through different chiefs of department
in his general work. His, however, was the ultimate
power. The heads of bureaus were not independent
contractors doing a branch of his work on their own
responsibility, and free from his interference with their
subordinates. He had the right to step into their
spheres of duty, and act for himself." 1
323. It, therefore, may be laid down as the result of
the authorities, that the common object of railway ser-
vice being that of fitting the line for traffic, and of carry-
ing on the traffic, all servants who are working for the
1 See also Holden v. F. R. R., 129 Mass. 268; Farwcll v. B. & W. R. R, i
Mete. 49; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cm. 615;
Waller v. S. E. Ry., 2 H. & 0. 102; N. O., J. & N. K. R. v. Hughe 19 Mitt.
258 ; Valtez v. O. & M. Ry., 85 111. 500 ; M. & M. R. R. v. Smith, 69 Ala. 2 US :
McGowan v. St. L. & I. M. R. R-, 61 Mo. 528.
364 TEST OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
accomplishment of that common object are fellow-
servants within the rule. A very simple practical test
is, as suggested in Valtez v. O. & M. Ry., 1 to hold those
to be fellow-servants whose negligence is likely to inflict
injury on one another. Under this rule railway servants
take the risk of injury from the negligence of their
fellow-servants, while those fellow-servants are tempo-
rarily discharging the duties of stations other than their
regular ones. This rule prevents a recovery by train
hands if injured by the negligence of a fireman while
acting as an engine-driver, 2 or of a conductor while act-
ing as an engine-driver. 3 It is held in some Illinois
cases that the test of the existence of the relation of
fellow-servants is, their habitual consociation and direct
co-operation in the performance of a common work, so
that they may influence each other to the exercise of
care, and that the existence of such a relation in any
case is a question of fact for the jury ; 4 thus, in I. & St.
L. Ey. v. Morganstern, 5 where the jury found that the
plaintiff's decedent, an inspector of rolling stock in the
defendant's service, had been killed by the negligence
of the defendant's baggage-master, and also that the
deceased and the baggage-master were hot fellow-
servants, judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict was
affirmed in error, Craig, J., saying: " the definition of
fellow-servant may be a question of law, but it is always
a question of fact to be determined from the evidence
1 85 111. 500.
2 Greenwald v. M., H. & O. E. E., 49 Mich. 197, 7 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
133.
3 Eodraan v. M. C. Ey., 55 Mich. 57, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 521.
* C. & N. W. Ey. v. Miranda, 108 111. 576, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 564;
W. Ey. v. Elliott, 98 111. 4S1, 4 Am. & Eng. E. E, Cas. 651 ; Penn. Co. v. Conlan,
101 111. 93, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 243 ; C. & A. E. E. v. Bonifield, 104 HI.
223, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 493 ; I. & St. L. Ey. v. Morganstern, 106 ILL
216, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 228.
4 106 111. 216, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 228.
THE ILLINOIS RULE. 365
whether a given case falls within that definition." But
in the later case of Abend v. T. H. & I. Ry., 1 the rule
as generally held is asserted. In this case a foreman
of wreckers, while being carried on a wrecking train to
the scene of a wreck, voluntarily seated himself in the
engine cab and was killed in a collision between that
train and another train, and Mulkey, J., said: "the
evidence shows that a wrecking force is always made
up in the hurry of the moment out of the employes and
servants of the company who happen to be within con-
venient reach, without regard to the particular line of
service in which they are employed. The removing of
obstructions from the tracks in case of a collision is, as
shown by the proofs in this case, a distinct branch of
service, to which all the labouring force of the company
are liable to be called without any reference to their
ordinary calling or duties, and when a force thus made
up goes aboard the wrecking train and starts to the
scene of disaster, they are all, including conductor, en-
gineer, foreman and brakeman, put as much in a com-
mon branch of service while on the way as they are
after their arrival and the work of clearing the track
has commenced. It is an error to suppose that a force
of men cannot be engaged in a common cause unless all
are continuously working at the same time, and engaged
in doing precisely the same kind of work. It is suffi-
cient if all are actually employed by the same master,
and that the work of each, whatever it may be, has for
its immediate object a common end or purpose, sought
to be accomplished by the united effort of all."
324. In the application of the rule of a common em-
ployment to the different departments and grades of
railway service, the cases are very numerous, and it
must be added, far from consistent. It has been held
1 111 111. 202, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. G'4.
366 CASES OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
that the following classes of servants are fellow-servants,
the injured servant being named first, and the servant
whose negligence has caused the injury being named
last. Engine-driver and switch-tender or pointsman; 1
engine-driver and road-master, acting as switch-tender
or pointsman; 2 engine-driver and train dispatcher; 3
engine-driver and station agent acting as yard master; 4
engine-driver and yard master; 5 engine-driver and
master mechanic in repair shop ; 6 fireman, or stoker, and
his engine-driver; 7 fireman, or stoker, and engine-
driver of another engine; 8 fireman, or stoker, and con-
ductor of another train, and telegraph operator ; 9 fire-
man, or stoker, and switch -tender or pointsman ; 10 fireman,
or stoker, and master mechanic in repair shop; 11 train
hands, or guards, and conductor acting as engine-
driver; 12 train hands, or guards, and train hands, or
guards, of the same train ; 13 train hands, or guards, and
foreman of labourers on line; 14 train hands, or guards,
and conductor of train; 15 train hands, or guards, and
1 Farwell v. B. & W. K. K., 4 Mete. 49.
I Walker v. B. & M. E. E., Miller v. Same, 128 Mass. 8, 1 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 141.
3 C, St. L. & N. O. Ey. v. Doyle, GO Miss. 977, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
171 ; Blessing v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ey., 77 Mo. 410, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
298.
* Brown v. M. & St. L. Ey., 31 Minn. 553, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 333.
5 E. T. V. & G. E. E. v. Gurley, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 46, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 568.
6 Hard v. C. Ey., 32 Vt. 473.
7 Murray v. S. C. E. E., 1 McMullan 385 ; Henry v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., 49
Mich. 495, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas- 110.
8 L. & N. E. E. v. Eobinson, 4 Bush (Ky.) 507.
9 Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 515.
10 King v. B. & W. E. E., 9 Cush. 112.
II C. & I. C. E. E. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174.
12 Eodman v. M. C. E. E., 55 Mich. 57, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 521.
13 Hutchinson v. Y., N. & B. Ey., 5 Exch. 343.
11 Waller v. S. E. Ey., 2 H. & C, 102.
15 Frazier v. P. E. E., 38 Penna. St. 104 ; Cassidy v. M. C. E. E., 76 Me. 488,
17 Am. & Eng. E. R. Cas. 519 ; Heine v. C. & N. W. Ey., 58 Wise. 528 ; Pease
v. Same, 61 Wise. 163, 17 Am. & Eng. E.E. Cas. 527.
CASES OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 367
engine-driver of another train j 1 train hands, or guards,
and fireman, or stoker, of the engine of their train; 2
train hands, or guards, and engine-driver of their train; 3
train hands, or guards, and train hands, or guards, of
another train; 4 train hands, or guards, and labourers
on line; 5 train hands, or guards, and inspector of car
repairs ; 6 train hands, or guards, and fireman, or stoker; 7
train hands, or guards, and train dispatcher; 8 train
hands, or guards, and yard master; 9 train hands, or
guards, and switch-tender; 10 train hands, or guards, and
yardmen who make up trains; 11 conductor and baggage-
master of train ; 12 switch-tender, or pointsman, and in-
spector of car repairs ; 13 labourers and foreman of track
layers; 14 labourers and engine-driver ; 15 labourers and
1 Kandall v. B. & O. K. R, 109 U. S. 478, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243.
2 Greenwald v. M. H. & O. R. R., 49 Mich. 197, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
133.
8 P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio St. 665, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
533 ; P., F. W. & C. Ry. v. Lewis, 33 Id. 196 ; H. & T. C. R. R. v. Willie, 53
Tex. 318 ; Summerhays v. K. P. Ry., 2 Colo. 484 ; N., C. & St. L. Ry. v
Wheless, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 74; 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 633, 15 Id. 315 ; Smith
v. M. & L. R. R, 18 Fed. Rep. 304 ; I. C. R. R. v. Keen, 72 111. 512 ; Sherman
v. R. & S. R. R., 17 N. Y. 153 ; Wilson v. M. & P. Ry., IS Ind. 226.
* Bull v. M. & M. Ry., 67 Ala. 206.
5 Holden v. F. R. R., 129 Mass. 268, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 94.
6 Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 140 ; C. & X. R
R. v. Webb, 12 Ohio St. 475; L. M. R. R. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio St. 318, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 578; Mackin v. B. & A. R. R., 135 Mass. 201, 1", Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 196 ; N., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Foster, Tenn. , 11 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 180.
T Greenwald v. M., H. & O. R. R., 49 Mich. 197, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
133.
8 Robertson v. T. H. & I. R. R., 78 Ind. 77, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 175.
9 Rains v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 71 Mo. 164.
10 Slattery v. T. & W. Ry., 23 Ind. 81.
11 Whitman v. W. & M. Ry., 58 Wise. 408, 12 Am. & En^. R. R. Cas. 214.
" C. C. R. R. v. Martin, 7 Colo., 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. I as. 592.
" Gibson v. N. C. Ry., 22 Hun 289.
" Lovegrove v. L , B. & S. C. Ry., 16 C. B. N. S. 669, 111 E. C. L.
15 Ryan v. C. V. R. R., 23 Penna. St., 384 ; Kumler v. .1. I!. B., 33 Ohio St.
150; Fitzpatrick v. N. A. & S. R. R., 7 Ind. 436; O. & M. Ry. v. Tindall, r.
Ind. 366; C. & A. R. R. r. Keefe, 47 111. 108; Capper v. L. E. & St. L. R. R.,
3G8 CASES OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
fireman, or stoker, of engine; 1 labourers ant] road
master; 2 labourer and section foreman ; 3 labourer and
engine-driver of steam shovel; 4 assistant yard master
and yard master; 5 yard master and general traffic
manager of the line; 6 yard hand and foreman of yard
hands; 7 night watchmen of tracks in yard and yard
hands ; 8 foreman of a wrecking crew and engine-drivers
of colliding trains; 9 conductor of a construction train and
train hands of a passenger train on which he was jour-
neying to join his train ; J0 carpenters, or car repairers,
and hands in yard employed in shifting trains; 11 car-
penters, or car repairers, and train hands ; 12 yard master
103 Ind. 305, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 525 ; IT. & T. C. Ry. v. Rider, 62 Tex.
267, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 583, note ; Rohrback v. P. R. R., 43 Mo. 187 ;
P. R. R. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 187 ; Weger v. P.
R. R., 55 Penna. St. 460 ; Henry v. S. I. R. R , 81 N. Y. 373, 2 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 60 ; Gormley v. O. & M. Ry., 72 Ind. 31, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
581 ; Collins v. St. P. & S. C. R. R., 30 Minn. 31, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
150; Tunney v. M. Ry., L. R. 1 C. P. 201 ; Blake v. M. C. R. R-, 70 Me. 60;
I. C. R. R. v. Cox, 21 111. 20; St. L. & S. E. Ry. v. Britz, 72 Id. 256 ; Coon r.
S. & U. R. R., 5 N. Y. 492 ; Foster v. M. C. R. R., 14 Minn. 360 ; Dallas v. G., C.
& S. F. R. R., 61 Tex. 196, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 575 ; St. L., I. M. &
S. R. R. v. Shackelford, 42 Ark. 417; Howland v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 54
Wise. 226, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 578; Copper v. L. E. & St. L. Ry.,
Ind. , 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 277.
1 Whaalen v. M., R. & L. E. Ry., 8 Ohio St. 249.
I Brown v. W. & St: P. R. R., 27 Minn. 162.
s Brick v. R., N. Y. & P. R. R., 98 N. Y. 212 ; Barringer v. D. & H. C. Co.,
19 Hun 216 ; Hoke v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 11 Mo. App. 575 ; Willis v. O.
Rv. & N. Co., 11 Oregon 257, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 539 ; Peschel v. C, M.
* St. P. Ry., 62 Wise. 338, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545.
4 Thompson v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 239.
6 McCosker v. L. I. R. R., 84 N. Y. 77, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 567.
• Conway v. B. & N. C. Ry., 9 Irish C L. 498.
' Fraker v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 32 Minn. 54, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 256.
8 C. & E. R. R. v. Geary, 110 111. 383, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 606.
9 Abend v. T. II. & I. Ry., Ill 111. 202, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R.Cas. 614.
10 Manville v. C. <% T. R. R., 11 Ohio St. 417.
II Morgan v. V. of N. Ry., L. R. 1 Q. B. 149 ; Oilman v. E. R. R., 10 Allen
233, 13 Id. 433, Valtez v. 6. & M. Ry., 85 111. 500 ; C. A A. R. R. v. Murphy,
53 111. 336.
12 Gilshannon v. C. B R. R., 10 Cush. 228 ; Seaver v. B. & M. R. R., 14 Gray
466 ; Besel v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 70 N. Y. 171.
CASES NOT OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT. 3G9
and train bands; 1 machinist in repair shop and boiler
makers in same shop ; 2 yard bands and driver of switch-
ing engine; 3 surveying engineer and conductor of train
on which he was carried to his place of work; 4 yard
hands and their foreman. 5
325. It has been held that the following classes of
servants are not fellow-servants, the injured servant
being named first and the servant whose negligence
caused the injury being named last : engine-driver and
conductor, 6 train hands, including engine-driver and
fireman, and servants charged with the duty of con-
structing and maintaining in repair line, rolling stock,
and appliances; 7 train hands and inspector of car re-
pairs, 8 train hands, or guards, and labourers on line ; 9
1 Besel v. N. Y. C & H. R. E. R., 70 N. Y. 171 ; Valtez v. O. & M. Ry., 85
111. 500.
1 Murphy v. B. & A. E. R, 88 N. Y. 146, 8 Am. & Eng. E.E. Cas. 510.
* Fowler v. C. & N. W. Ey., 61 Wise. 159, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 536.
* Eoss v. N. Y. C. & H. E. E. E., 74 N. Y. 617.
6 Fraker v. St. P, M. & M. Ey., 32 Minn. 54, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
256.
6 L. M. E. R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415 ; Chamberlin v. M. & M. E. E., 11
Wise. 238 ; C, M. & St. P. Ey. v. Eoss, 112 U. S. 376.
T A., T. & S. F. E. P v. Moore, 29 Kans. 632, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 243,
31 Kans. 197, 15 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 312 ; II. & T. C. Ky. t>. Marcelles, 59
Tex. 334, 12 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 231 ; Gilmore v. N. P. Ey., 18 Fed. Rep.
866, 15 Am. & Eng. E. R Cas. 304 ; Ford v. F. E. E., 1 10 Mass. 241 ; Hough
v. T. & P. Ey., 100 U. S. 213 ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; P. & N. Y. C.
E. E. v. Leslie, 16 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 321 ; Lawless v. C. E. E.
E., 136 Mass. 1, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 96; T. W. & W. By. v. [ngraham,
77 111. 309 ; Davis v. C. V. E. E., 55 Vt. 84, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 173 ;
Eyan v. C. & N. W. Ey., 60 111. 171.
8 Cooper v. P., C. & St. L. E. E., 24 W. Va. 37, 21 Am. A Eng. E. E. Cas.
564 note; Schultz v. C, M. & St. P. Ey., 48 Wise. 375; M. P. Ky. »•. Condon,
78 Mo. 567, 17 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 583; Long v. P. Ky., 65 M,,. 226 ; K iug
v. M. Ey., 14 Fed. Eep. 277, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 119 ; Brann v. C, E. I.
& P. Ey., 53 Iowa 595; Tierney v. M. & St. L. Ey., 33 Minn. 311, 21 Am. &
Eng. R R. Cas. 545.
* Lewis v. St. L. & 1. M. R. R., 59 Mo. 495; Hall v. M. P. Ky., 74 Id. 298,
8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 106 ; Moon v. R. & A. R. R., 78 Va. 745, 17 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 531.
24
370 VOLUNTEER SERVANTS.
train hands, or guards, and the conductor of their train ; *
train hands, or guards, and labourers on the line ; 2 sec-
tion foreman and engine-driver of train, 3 helper in ma-
chine shop and the workman whom he is employed to
help, 4 car repairer and his foreman, 5 labourer and train
dispatcher, 6 labourer and engine-driver, 7 labourer and
foreman acting as conductor of a construction train, 8
labourer and section boss, 9 and labourer and fireman,
or stoker. 10
326. The rule of law, that a master is not liable to a
servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-
servant in the course of their common employment,
prevents a recovery by a volunteer injured while assist-
ing the servant in his work, for the obvious reason that
a stranger cannot, by volunteering his services and
thereby exposing himself to danger, acquire any greater
rights, nor impose any greater duty on the master, than
would have been acquired by the one, or imposed upon
the other, il the stranger had been hired as a servant. 11
1 C, C. & C. Ry. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201 ; Cowles v. R. & D. R. R., 84 N.
C. 309, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 90 ; Moon v. R. & A. R. R., 78 Va. 745, 17
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 531.
2 Carroll v. N. & C. R. R., 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 347.
3 Dick v. I. C. & L. R. R., 38 Ohio St. 389, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 101.
* TJ. P. R. R. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553.
5 L, S. & M. S. Ry. v. Lavalley, 36 Ohio St. 221, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
549 ; H. & St. J. R. R. v. Fox, 31 Kans. 587, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 325.
6 McKune v. C. S. R. R., Cal, , 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589, 21 Id.
539.
' L. & N. R. R. v. Collins, 2 Duvall 114 ; Dobbins v. R. & D. R. R., 81 N.
C. 446 ; P., F. W. &. C. Ky. v. Powers, 74 111. 341 ; Dick v. I. C. & L. R. R., 38
Ohio St. 389, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. 101.
8 C, St. P., M. & O. R. R. v. Lundstrom, 16 Neb. 254, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 528.
9 L. & N. R. R. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 866.
10 C. & N. Vi. Ry. v. Moranda, 93 111. 302.
11 Degg v. M. Ry., 1 H. & N. 773 ; Potter v. Faulkner, 1B.&S. 800, 101 E-
C. L. ; Everhart v. T. H. & I. R. R., 78 Ind. 292, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
599; Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Penna. St. 210 ; Sherman v. II. & St. J. R. R., 72
Mo. 62, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589 ; Osborne v. K. & L. R. R., 68 Me. 49 ;
Jewell v. G. T. Ry., 53 N. H. 84.
VOLUNTEER SERVANTS. 371
This rule has been held to bar recovery in the case of
"volunteers injured while assisting railway servants ifl
turning a turn-table, 1 in setting a brake on a moving car, 2
in watering an engine, 3 in adjusting the load on a freight
car in motion, 4 or in moving a crate of merchandise. 5
On the other hand, it has been held that the rule does
not bar recovery in the case of a passenger who, having
alighted from the car of a street railroad after it had
been derailed, and having assisted in putting it on the
track, was, while climbing over the front dasher, injured
by the negligent act of the driver in starting the horses ; 6
nor in the case of a passenger on a street car, who is in-
jured while engaged, at the request of the driver, in
assisting to shunt the car to a siding ; 7 but, as in the
two last cited cases, the plaintiffs were injured by reason
of their voluntary participation in the work of the ser-
vants of the railway, it would seem that the railway
ought not to have been held liable for their injuries.
The rule does not bar recovery by a passer-by, who,
at the request of a servant, pauses to give his advice as
to the work, but does not otherwise participate in its
prosecution ; 8 nor by a passenger who, having rendered
some assistance on a train to the railway servants, and,
having resumed his place as a passenger, is subsequently
injured by the negligence of a railway servant; 9 nor by
persons who are not volunteers, but who participate in
the work of the railway for some purpose of common
interest to themselves and the railway, as where con-
1 Degg v. M. Ry., 1 H. & N. 773.
« Everhart v. T. II. & I. R R., 7S Ind. 292, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 599.
3 Flower v. P. R. R., 69 Penna. St, '210.
♦ Sherman v. H. & St. J. I!. B., 72 Mo. (12, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 589.
5 Jewell v. G. T. Ry., 55 N. H. 84.
8 P. P. Ry. v. Green, 56 Md. 84, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168.
7 Mel. R. R. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio St. 221, 21 Am. & Eng. K. B. Cas. 501.
8 Cleveland v. Speyer, 16 C. B. N. S. 399, 111 E. C. L.
9 C. V. R. R. v. Myers, 55 Penna. St. 2S8.
372 EX-SERVANTS.
-signees assist in the reception of their freight ; l nor by
servants of another railway who have come upon the
line, or premises, of the defendant railway in the per-
formance of their duty to that other railway ; 2 nor does
the rule bar recovery in the case of a servant of a rail-
way for injuries caused by the negligence of the servants
of another railway in the exercise of running powers by
the latter railway over the line of the first-mentioned
railway ; 3 nor in the case of the servant of a connecting
steamboat line, who is similarly injured ; 4 nor does the
rule bar a recovery from the railway by a servaut for in-
juries caused to that servant's wife by the negligence of
a fellow-servant. 5 If the relation of service is termi-
nated, the ex-servant is not barred from recovering for
injuries caused by his late fellow-servants. 6 A servant
employed by the day, who is injured after he has fin-
ished his day's work, or at a time when he is not in the
service, is no longer a fellow-servant of another servant
by whose negligence he is injured, and can, therefore,
recover from the master for injuries so received. 7
1 Holmes v. N. E. By., L. E. 4 Ex. 254, 6 Id. 123 ; Wright v. L. & N. W.
By., L. B. 10 Q. B. 298, 1 Q. B.D. 252; Kelly v. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530.
2 Vose v. L. & Y. By., 2 H. & N. 728 ; Warburton v. S. W. By., L. B. 2 Ex.
30 ; Swainson v. N. E. By., 3 Ex. Div. 341 ; Graham v. N. E. By., 18 C. B. N.
S. 529, 114 E. C. L. ; C. B. B. v. Armstrong, 49 Penna. St. 186, 52 Id. 282 ; P.,
W. & B.B. B. v. The State, to use of Bitzer, 58 Md. 372, 10 Am. & Eng. B. B.
Cas. 792 ; Merrill v. C. V. B. B., 54 Vt. 200; Snow v. II. B. B, 8 Allen 441 ;
Bee also Abraham v. Beynolds, 5 H. &, N. 142.
3 Smith v. N. Y. & II. E. E., 19 N. Y. 127.
* Carroll v. M. V. B. B., 13 Minn. 30.
5 Gannon v. H. B. B., 112 Mass. 234.
6 Packet Co. v. McCue, 17 Wall. 508.
/ 7 Baird v. Pettit, 70 Penna. St. 477 ; B. & O. E. B. v. The State, to use of
Trainor, 33 Md. 542; Abell v. W. M. E. E., 63 Md. 433, 21 Am. & Eng. B. B.
Cas. 503.
SERVANTS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 373
VIII. THE SERVANT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
It is contributory negligence in a servant to continue work with incom-
petent servants, or with an insufficient number of servants, or with
obviously defective machinery or appliances, or to carelessly expose
himself to danger in the conduct of his work; but when the servant
has complained to the proper officer of the defective apparatus, or of
the negligent fellow-servant, or of the inadequacy in the number of
servants, and he has been promised that the defect complained of
shall be remedied, the servant is not contributor ily negligent in
continuing work, provided, that the defect be not of such a character
as to render continuance in the work obviously and unavoidably
dangerous.
327. A servant cannot recover for injuries to which
his own negligence has contributed in voluntarily-
continuing to work, either with incompetent fellow-
servants; 1 or, with an insufficient number of fellow-
servants; 2 or, with obviously defective machinery and
appliances; 3 or, under running arrangements of trains
whereby the risk of injury to him is increased; 4 or, in
1 Frazier v. P. R. R., 38 Penna. St. 104 ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Knittal, 33
Ohio St. 468 ; Kroy v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 32 Iowa 357 ; cf. Huey v. D. & B. J.
Ry., 5 Irish C. L. 206.
2 Skip v. E. C. Ry., 9 Ex. 243 ; C. & E. I. R. R. v. Geary, 110 111. 383, 18
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 606 ; B. & O. R. R. v. State, 41 Md. 268 ; C. & N. W.
Ry. v. Donahue, 75 111. 106.
3 Dynen v. Leach, 26 L. J. Ex. 221 ; Assop v. Yates, 2 H. & N. 768 ; Grif-
fiths v. Gidlow, 3 Id. 648 ; Woodley v. M. D. Ry., 2 Ex. D. 384; Marsden v.
Haigh, 14 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 526 ; G. & C Ry. v. Bresmer,
97 Penna. St. 103 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Schertle, Id. 450, 2 Am. A ring. K. K. < as.
158; Cooper v. Butler, 103 Penna. St. 412; C. & A. R. R. v. Monroe, 85 111.
25 ; Perigo v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 52 Iowa 276 ; Muldowney v. I. C. R. I: ., 89
Id. 615 ; Kroy v. C, R. I. & P. R. R, 32 Id. 357 ; Way ». I. « '. K. I.'.. -40 Id.
341; Mansfield C. & C. Co. v. McEnery, 91 Penna. St. 185; Wanaraaker v.
Burke, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 225 ; De Graff v. N. Y. C. & 1 1. B.
R. R., 76 N. Y. 125-; Hathaway v. M. C. R. R., 51 Mich. 253, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 249 ; I. C. R. R. v. Jewell, 46 111. 99 ; Greenleaf v. I. I !. B . I: . 29
Iowa 14; Greenleaf v. D. & S. C. R. R., 33 Iowa 52; A. & < '. L L. B. R.
Ray, 70 Ga. 674, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 281 ; Marsh v. < flickering, 101 N.
Y. 396.
* Robinson v. H. & T. C Ry., 46 Tex. 640. See Nelson v. C, M. & St. P. R.
R., 60 Wise. 320, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 391, as to the necessity of allowing
0/4 RIDING ON ENGINE.
carelessly exposing himself to danger in the conduct of
his work. 1 Thus, it has been held to be contributory
negligence in a servant to ride on an engine when his
duty does not require him to be there ; 2 but it is, of
course, not contributory negligence in a servant to ride
on the engine when his duty requires him to be there,
as, in the case of the chief brakeman of a freight train. 3
It is not contributory negligence in a servant to ride in
a baggage car, for that is not necessarily a position of
danger. 4 It has been held to be contributory negligence
in an engine-driver to drive his engine at high speed
over a defective roadbed whose defects are known to
him ; 5 or, to drive his engine, after a storm, over a line
which is liable to be obstructed by land slides or wash
outs, at such a rate of speed that the engine cannot be
stopped in time to avoid collision with an obstruction; 6
to conductors and engine-drivers a reasonable opportunity for the examination
and comprehension of changes in time-tables.
1 Senior v. Ward, 1 El. & El. 385, 102 E. C. L. ; Cooper v. Butler, 14 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Penna.) 278 ; Payne v. Ross, 100 Penna. St. 301 ; Powers v. N.
Y., L. E. & W. R. R, 98 N. Y. 274 ; (sed cf. E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Smith, 9
Lea (Tenn.) 685); H. & T. C. Ry. v. Myers, 55 Tex. 110 ; Behrens v. K. P. Ry.,
5 Colo. 400, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 184; Muldowney v. I. C. R. R., 39 Iowa
615 ; Wolsey v. L. S. R. R., 33 Ohio St. 227 ; Ferguson v. C. I. Ry., 58 Iowa
293 ; Lockwood v. C. & N. W. Ry., 55 Wise. 50; Abend v. T. H. & I. Ry., Ill
111. 202, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 614 ; Crutchfield v. R. & D. R. R., 78 N. C.
300 ; B. & O. R. R. v. Whittington, 30 Gratt. 805 ; Sammon v. N. Y. & H. R. R.,
62 N. Y. 251 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Rush, 84 111. 570 ; Penna. Co. v. Lynch, 90 111.
333; Cunningham v. G, M. & St. P. Ry., 17 led. Rep. 882; Hallihan v. H. &
St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 117 ; Williams v. C. R. R.,
43 Iowa 396 ; Hoven v. B. & M. R. R., 20 Iowa 562.
2 Sprong v. B. & A. R. R., 58 N. Y. 56 ; O'Neill v. K. & D. M. Ry., 45 Iowa
546 ; Kresanowski v. N. P. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 229 ; B. & P. R. R. v. Jones, 95
U. S. 439 ; Smith v. M. & L. R. R., 18 Fed. Rep. 304 ; Abend v. T. H. & I. Ry.,
Ill 111. 202, 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 614 ; Doggett v. I. C. R. R., 34 Iowa
284.
8 Sprong v. B. & A. R. R., 58 N. Y. 56.
* Washburn v. N. & C. R. R, 3 Head (Tenn.) 638.
5 M. & C. R. R. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637 ; I. C. R. R. v. Patterson, 69 111.
650, 93 Id. 290.
6 Sweeney v. M. & St. L. Ry., 33 Minn. 153, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
302.
GOING UPON THE LINE. 375
or, to drive his engine over a switch at a rate in excess
of that permitted by the regulations of the railway ; x or,
to drive his engine with an obviously defective boiler,
under a pressure of steam in excess of the amount per-
mitted by the regulations of the line; 2 but it has been
held not to be necessarily contributory negligence in an
engine-driver to run his engine with ordinary care on a
line which he knows to be somewhat out of repair, but
as to whose specific defects he has no information ; 3 nor,
is it necessarily contributory negligence in the engine-
driver of a train which is behind time, to drive his
engine at a greater than schedule rate of speed when
approaching a switch at the entrance to a railway
yard. 4
328. It is contributory negligence in a servant to
unnecessarily go upon or cross the line, without exer-
cising care for his safety ; 5 but it is not necessarily con-
tributory negligence in a servant to go on the line in
the course of duty in the way of a moving train, if he
has reason to believe that the train will be brought to a
stop before reaching him ; 6 or, to pick up a coupling-
pin from the track before a slowly moving train, when
he has signalled the engine-driver to stop. 7 In some
cases it is held, following the doctrine, of Da vies v.
Mann, that even if a servant be contributorily negligent
in going upon the line or between the cars, and is
1 M. & C. R. R. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637 ; G. R. R. & B. Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga.
410.
2 Ilubgh v. N. O. & C. R. R., 6 La. An. 495.
3 Mehan v. 8. B. & N. Y. R. R, 73 N. Y. 585 ; JIawley v. N. C. By., 82 Id.
370, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 248; Dale v. St. L., K. I !. & N. Ky., 63 Mo. 455.
* Penn. Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 12 Am. & Eng R. R. « las. 223.
5 Maher v. A. & P. R. R., 64 Mo. 267 ; Bolland v. C, M. & St. P. Ky.. L8
Fed. Rep. 243; Boldt v. N. Y. C. R. R., 18 N. Y. 432; contra, Farley v. < , R
I. & P. Ry., 56 Iowa 337, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 108 : K I \ I
5 Colo. 400, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 184; dark v, B. & A R. B., L28 tfaaa,
1, 1 Am. & Eng. R.R. ( as. 134.
8 Steele v. C. R. R., 43 Iowa 109. 7 Steele v. C. K. R., 18 Iowa 109.
376 BOARDING AND LEAVING CABS.
injured by the negligence of fellow-servants, who know
of his danger, and who, by the exercise of care, could
avoid injuring him, the railway is liable to him for
such injury. 1 It is contributory negligence in a servant
to unnecessarily get on or off moving engines or cars; 2
but it is not contributory negligence in a servant to
jump from a moving train in order to avoid an apparent
danger, such as an imminent collision; 3 and in any
such case, it is for the jury to decide whether or not
the act of the person injured was, under the circum-
stances, prudent. 4 It is contributory negligence in a
servant to stand on an axle-box of a car in motion ; 5 or
to sit upon a platform car in motion with his feet
hanging over the side of the car; 6 or to unnecessarily
project his body from the door of a baggage car in
motion, so that it comes into contact with a bridge sup-
port. 7
329. It is contributory negligence in a servant to
couple cars in an unnecessarily dangerous manner, 8 but
1 B. & O. R. R. v. The State, 33 Md. 542; Bomick v. C, B. I. & B. By., 62
Iowa 627, 15 Am. & Eng. B. B. Cas. 288.
* Cunningham v. C, M. & St. B. By , 17 Fed. Bep. 882; Dowell v. V. & M.
B. B., 61 Miss. 519, 18 Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 42; Timmon v. C. O. B. B.,
6 Ohio St. 105.
3 C. B. B. & B. Co. v. Bhodes, 56 Ga. 645.
* C. B. B. v. Eoach, 64 Ga. 635, 8 Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas. 79.
5 Martensen v. C, E. I. & B. By., 60 Iowa 705, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
233.
6 St. L. & S. F. E. B. v. Marker, 41 Ark. 542 ; cf. Fool v. C, M. & St. B. By.,
53 Wise. 657, 3 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 332.
7 Jones v. L. E. E., Ky. , 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 295, note ; cf. H. &
T. C. B. E. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427, 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 291.
8 C & A. E. E. v. Bush, 84 111. 570 ; Muldowney v. I. C. E. E., 39 Iowa
615 ; Lockwood v. C. & N. W. Ey., 55 Wise. 50, 6 Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 151 ;
T., W. & W. Ey. v. Black, 88 111. 112; Foster v. C. & A. E. E., 84 111. 164;
Penna. Co. v. Hankey, 93 111. 580 ; Williams v. C. E. E., 43 Iowa 396 ; B. &
B. E. E. v. Schertle, 97 Benna. St. 450, 2 Am. & Eng. B. E. Cas. 158 ; M. B.
Ey. v. Lyde, 57 Tex. 505, 11 Am. & Eng. E. B. Cas. 188 ; Ferguson v. C. L
By., 58 Iowa 293, 5 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 614; Hulett v. St. L., K. C. & N.
E. E., 67 Mo. 239.
COUPLING CARS. 377
it is not necessarily contributory negligence in a train
hand to go between cars for the purpose of coupling
them without first examining the draw-bars in order to
see that they are properly adjusted, for every servant is
entitled to assume that the instrumentalities of worK
provided by the master are in good order. 1 Nor, if
cars are moving at a high rate of speed, and the brake-
man has signalled the engine-driver to slow up, is it
contributory negligence in the brakeman, in reliance
on the engine-driver's compliance with his request, to
go between the cars for the purpose of coupling them; 2
nor is it necessarily contributory negligence in a brake-
man to stand facing the draw-bar while coupling; 3 nor
is it necessarily contributory negligence in a train hand
to step, while his train is in motion, from the top of one
car to another; 4 nor to jump from the top of a freight
car to the tender rather than to climb down the laddei
at the side of the car. 5
330. It is contributory negligence in a servant to lie
down to sleep on the floor of a round-house so near the
track that in turning over in his sleep he puts his leg
on the track, where it is run over by an engine when
backed into its stall, 6 or to travel on the line in a hand
car when a train is known by the injured servant to be
due, 7 or to travel on the line in a hand car unprotected
1 King v. O. R. R. (U. S. C. C. Ind.), 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 119 ; Russell
v. M. & St. L. R. R., 32 Minn. 230.
J Beeras v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 58 Iowa 150, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 658 ;
Snow v. H. R. R., 8 Allen 441.
8 Eclair v. C. & N. W. Ry., 43 Iowa 662.
* A., T. & S. F. R. R. v. McCandliss, 33 Kans. 366, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 296.
* Whitsett v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., Iowa , 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
336.
8 Price v. H. & St. J. R. R., 77 Mo. 508, 15 Am. & Eng. R. B. I ■>- 168.
* Burling v. I. C. R. R., 85 111. 18; I. C. R. R. v. Modglin, LI. 481 ; Bed ef.
Campbell v. 0,, R. I. & P. Ry., 45 Iowa 76 ; McKune v. C. S. R. R., Cal.
17 Am. & Eng. R. B. Cas. 589.
378 RIDING ON TOP OF CARS.
by flagging in advance, the regulations of the railway
having notified the servant that special trains may be
expected at any time, 1 or to stand so near to the line as
to be struck by a passing car, 2 or to use a temporary
platform of pine wood as a bridge in moving heavy
freight from one car to another when a stronger platform
was available, 3 or to neglect to keep wet the rope of the
derrick with which he is working, 4 or to unnecessarily
mount on an engine on a turn-table, 5 or to knowingly
disobey the regulations of the railway, which, if obeyed,
would have prevented the injury, 6 or to attempt, in
coupling moving cars, to pass round the end of a freight
car which was not equipped with end ladders, platforms,
steps, or handles, 7 or to ride on the top of a car where
the servant's duty does not require him to put himself
in that exposed position, 8 but it is not necessarily con-
tributory negligence in a freight brakeman to climb to
the top of a moving car in a railway yard for the pur-
pose of braking it, and thus averting an impending
collision with another car. 9
331. It is not under all circumstances contributory
negligence in a servant to expose himself to a danger
which he could avoid ; for instance, an engine-driver is
not bound to desert his post on the engine, in order to
1 McGrath v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., Mass. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 5.
2 B. & O. R. R. w.Whittington, 30 Grat. (Va.) 805.
s Penna. Co. v. Lynch, 90 111. 333.
* U. P. Ry. v. Fray, 31 Kans. 739, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 158.
5 E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 58, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 222.
6 Lyon v. D., L. & L. M. Ry., 31 Mich. 429 ; G. R. R. & B. Co. v. McDade,
59 Ga. 73, 60 Id. 119 ; Wolsey v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 33 Ohio St. 227.
7 C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Warner, 108 111. 538, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 100.
8 P. & C. R. R. v. Sentmayer, 92 Penna. St. 276 ; Gibson v. E. Ry., 63 N. Y.
449.
• Kelley v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 50 Wise. 381, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65.
servant's contributory negligence. 379
escape an impending collision; 1 but a servant is con-
tributorily negligent when he exposes himself to a
danger which he could avoid without neglecting his
duty by the exercise of reasonable care for his own
safety. If, however, the danger be not so great, nor so
imminent, that a man of ordinary prudence would re-
fuse to encounter it in the performance of his duty, the
servant who voluntarily incurs that danger is not neces-
sarily contributorily negligent. 2 It may also be said
that when a servant is injured by reason of his presence
in a position of danger, the burden of proof is on him
to show that his duty to the railway requires him to place
himself in that position. 3
332. The general doctrine as to the effect of a servant's
contributory negligence in barring his recovery is well
illustrated by Cunningham v. C, M. & St. P. Ey., 4
where a mother having brought suit to recover for the
death of her son, a yardman, who was killed in attempt-
ing to step on the rear foot-board of a switching engine
which was backing towards him, Miller, J., after re-
ferring to the obligation on the part of the railway to
exercise care in providing the instrumentalities of
labour, added, "a man has no right to thrust himself
foiward into a dangerous position and say, 'if I am
killed, somebody will get damages for it,' or, 'if I am
hurt, I shall go to the hospital and be taken care of and
recover damages.' He has got to take care of himself,
as well as the railroad to take care of their duties and
their employes. These obligations are mutual, and it
1 Cottrill v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 47 Wise. 634 ; Penna. Co. v. Roney, 89 Tnd.
453, 12 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 223.
* Stoddard v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry., 65 Mo. 514; C. C. R. R. v. Og<lcn, .*',
Colo. 499.
3 C. R. R. v. Sears, 61 Ga. 279 ; A. & C. A. L. R. R. v. Ray 70 Ga. <;; I, 22
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 281.
4 17 Fed. Rep. 882, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 217.
380 servant's contributory negligence.
is the law that if a man voluntarily puts himself in a
dangerous position — does so unnecessarily when there
are other positions in connection with the discharge of
his duty which are safe, which he can be placed in, —
he cannot recover of the railroad company in damages
for that injury to which he has contributed by his own
negligence. That is the law. It is your duty to regard
it, and you have no right to say, that, because this rail-
road company is a great and powerful instrumentality,
it must pay for this man's life, whether he was negli-
gent, or careless, or not." The jury having found a
verdict for the plaintiff, Miller, J., promptly set the
verdict aside.
333. It is not necessarily contributory negligence in
a servant to expose himself to risk of injury in the per-
formance of his duty, where the circumstances are not
such as to afford to the servant an opportunity of esti-
mating the amount of risk incurred ; thus, in Lawless v.
C. R. R. R., 1 where a railway was held liable to a ser-
vant injured in coupling an engine to a car by reason
of the draw-bar of the engine being so low that it passed
under the bunter of the car, Colt, J., said: "the fact
that a person voluntarily takes some risk is not con-
clusive evidence, under all circumstances, that he is not
using due care. 2 The plaintiff was engaged in perform-
ing the duty required of him, and it was necessary that
the cars should be moved quickly to make way for an
expected train. * * * The question of his due care de-
pended, to some extent, upon the view that the jury
might take of his necessity for immediate action, tho
distance the bunters would have to pass each other be-
fore the car and engine would come so near together a?
to injure him, the speed at which the engine was mov-
1 130 Mass. 1, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 96.
* Thomas v. W. U. T. Co., 100 Mass. 156 ; Mahoney v. M. R. R., 104 Id. 7,1
COMPLAINT OF DANGER. 381
ing, the knowledge he had that the engineer knew the
danger, the confidence he was entitled to have that the
engineer would so manage the engine as not to injure
him, the reliance he was reasonably entitled to place
upon his ability to make the connection so as to prevent
the bunters passing, and probably other circumstances." l
334. The fact that a servant is ordered by his supe-
rior officer to do an act that is obviously dangerous, and
which when done was the cause of injury to the servant
will not render the railway liable for that injury, as, for
instance, where the foreman of a construction train
ordered a servant to jump from a station platform upon
a moving car ; 2 nor is the railway to be held liable where
a servant is injured by the negligence of fellow-servants
while he is doing an act of apparent danger in obedience
to the orders of his superior officer, as, for instance,
where a labourer was injured in getting upon a moving-
car under the order of his foreman, the engine-driver
negligently increasing the speed of the train with a jerk
and thus throwing the labourer under the train ; 3 nor is
the railway liable to a servant who is injured in obeying
the orders of an officer who has no rightful authority to
command, as, for instance, where a bridge watchman
was injured while working to clear a tunnel of fallen
rock under the orders of a servant, who was charged
with the duty of looking after killed stock. 4
335. When the servant has complained to the proper
officer either of the defective apparatus or of the negli-
gent fellow-servant, and that officer promises to remedy
the defect, or to discharge the negligent fellow-servant,
1 See also Pringle v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 64 Iowa G13, 18 Am. & Eng. R. 1 1.
Cas. 91.
* Cassidy v. M. C. R. R., 70 Me. 488, 17 Am. & Eng. B. Ft. Cas. 519.
8 Capper v, L. E. & St. L. R. R., 103 Ind. 305, '2\ Am. .v Eng. B. B. I la
* N. & C. R. R. v. McDaniel, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 386, 17 Am. & Eng. B. B.
Cas. 604.
382 STATUTES AFFECTING LIABILITY.
and the servant in reliance upon the fulfillment of the
promise continues in the work, and that defect in the
apparatus, or that negligence of the fellow-servant, is
not of such a character as to render it unavoidably
dangerous to continue the work, such continuance in
work is not contributory negligence on the part of the
injured servant; and, of course, in the service of a rail-
way, it is sufficient that the complaint be made to, and
the remedy be promised by that officer who is charged
with the duty in the one case, of ordering the repair of
defects of the character complained of, and in the other
case of discharging negligent servants; 1 but if the
danger of using the particular machinery or appliance,
or of performing the particular service be so obviously
great that a person of ordinary prudence would not con-
tinue to take the risk, the injured servant cannot
recover, although he acted under the express order of
his foreman or other superior officer. 2
IX. STATUTES AFFECTING THE LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS
TO THEIR SERVANTS.
336. In some jurisdictions the rules of law affecting
the liability of railways to their servants have been
materially modified by statutes. In England, under
the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c.
42, there is a statutory liability, with summary remedies,
1 Holmes v. Clark, 6 H. & N. 349, 7 Id. 937 ; Ford v. F. R. R., 110 Mass.
261 ; Lanning v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N. Y. 521 ; Patterson v. P. & C. R. R., 76
Penna. St. 3S9 ; LeClair v. St. P. & P. R. R., 20 Minn. 9 ; Brabbitts v. R. W.
Ry., 38 Mo. 289 ; Belair v. C. & N. W. R. R., 43 Iowa 663 ; Hough v. T. & P.
Ry., 100 U. S. 213 ; Conroy v. V. Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Hawley v. N. C.
Ry., 82 N. Y. 370, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 247 ; S. C. & P. Ry. v. Finlayson,
Neb. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 68 ; K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R. v.
Flvnn, 78 Mo. 195, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 23; Miller v. U. P. Ry., 12
Fed. Rep. 600 ; E. T. V. & G. R. R. v. Duffield, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 63, 18 Am. &
Eng. R R. Cas. 35.
1 Baker v. W. & A. R. R., 68 Ga. 699; District of Columbia v. McElligott,
117 U. S. 621.
STATUTES AFFECTING LIABILITY. 383
imposed under certain restrictions upon masters in the
cases of injuries to servants resulting, inter alia, from
the negligence of persons entrusted with a superintend-
ence of the work, and of persons to whose orders or
directions the workman at the time of the injury was
bound to conform, and, in the cases of railways, of any
person " in the service of the employer who has the
charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive
engine, or train." This Act is to continue in force
until December 31, 1887, and to the end of the then
next session of Parliament. In Griffiths v. The Earl
of Dudley, 1 Cave, J., said : " the Employers' Liability
Act was passed to remove the difficulty arising from the
decision in Wilson v. Merry. 2 The effect of it is that
the workman may bring his action in five specified
cases, and the employer shall not be able to say in
answer that the plaintiff occupied the position of work-
man in his service, and must, therefore, be taken to
have impliedly contracted not to hold the employer
liable. In other words, the legal result of the plaintiff
being a workman shall not be that he has impliedly
contracted to bear the risks of the employment."
337. In Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, railways are
by statute made liable to their servants for any neglect
or mismanagement by their agents, engineers, or other
employes. 3 The Iowa statute provides that " every
railroad company shall be liable for all damages sus-
tained by any person, including employes of the com-
pany, in consequence of any negligence of the agents,
or by the mismanagement of the engineers or other
1 9 Q. B. D. 366. 2 L. R. 1 H. L. Be. 826.
S C. R. R. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; Ghimz v. <'., M. & St, !'. Ry M .V-' Wi .,-.
672; TIT. Co. v. Thomason, 25 Kans. 1 ; M. P. Ky. v. Ealey, M. 35 ; Bchroeder
v. C, R I. & P. R. R., 41 Iowa 344, 47 Id. 375; Deppe v. Same, 86 Id. •">:>;
Lombard v. Same, 47 Id. 494; Frandsen v. Same, 3G Id. :;7'J.
384 STATUTES AFFECTING LIABILITY.
employes of the corporation to any person sustaining
such damage, all contracts to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." The constitutionality of this Act has been sus-
tained in Rose v. D. M. R. R. 1 The statutes in the
other States are of similar import. 2
1 39 Iowa 246.
x See notes to K. P. Ey. v. Peavey, 11 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 260.
THE FORM OF ACTION. 385
BOOK IV.
THE REMEDY.
CHAPTER I.
THE FORM OF THE ACTION.
T. When the remedy is by action at law and when by suit in equity.
ft. "When an action of trespass will lie.
TEI. The distinction between case and assumpsit.
IV. The joinder of common law and statutory claims.
V. Payment of money into court.
1. WHEN THE REMEDY IS BY ACTION AT LAW, AND WHEN
BY SUIT IN EQUITY.
The remedy is by action at law, excepting in those cases where the in-
jury has been done in the operation of a line by a receiver appointed
by a court of equity, and the court has refused to the plaintiff leave
to sue its receiver at law ; in such a case the plaintiff's only remedy
is in equity.
338. The remedy of the injured party is by an action
at law, excepting in those cases where the injury has
been done in the operation of a railway by a receiver
acting under the order of a court of equity, and the
court has refused to the plaintiff leave to bring his
action at law ; in such a case the only remedy of the
plaintiff is to present his claim on the fund in the re-
ceiver's hands at the audit of the receiver's accounts,
for it must be remembered that a receiver, as an officer
of the court appointing him, is only suable by its per-
1 Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 135 ; Klein v. Jewett, 2G N. J. Eq. 474.
25
380 CONTRACT AND TOUT.
The distinction between actions sounding in tort and actions sounding
in contract is in theory only formal, but in practice the distinction 13
material.
339. English lawyers, following in the footsteps of
the civil law, have drawn a sharp distinction between
actions sounding in tort and in contract, yet, as Mr.
Robert Campbell has pointed out, 1 this distinction is
in theory only formal, for all actions at law are grounded
upon the breach of a duty. That duty may have been
imposed upon the railway, either by its contract with
the plaintiff, or by reason of the relation in which the
plaintiff stands to it. In the former case the plaintiff's
right of action may be said to arise ex contractu, and
in the latter case ex delicto, but in either case the plain-
tiff's right to recover is necessarily based upon the
railway's breach of duty to him ; yet, in jurisdictions
where the common law rules of pleading and practice
have not been materially departed from, the form in
which the plaintiff brings his action may control the
amount of his damages, or even affect his right to re-
cover.
II. TRESPASS.
The railway is liable in trespass only for injuries wilfully inflicted by
its express authority or subsequently ratified.
340. To render a railway liable in trespass for per-
sonal injuries, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
that the injury was wilfully inflicted by an agent, or
servant, of the railway, and that the act which caused
the injury was expressly directed, or subsequently rati-
fied, by the corporation. 2 A railway company can act
only by its agents, or servants. When, therefore, a plain-
1 Treatise on the Law of Negligence 12.
1 Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591, 17 E. C. L. ; Yerger v. Warren, 31 Penna.
St. 319 ; McLaughlin v. Pry or, 4 M. &. G. 48, 43 E. C. L. ; Gordon v. Rolt, 4
Ex. 364.
TRESPASS. 387
tiff has been injured, that injuiy, in almost every con-
ceivable case, has resulted, not from the exercise of
wilful force upon the part of the defendant company,
nor by the action of its agents and servants in obedience
to orders, or express instructions, but from the negli-
gence of those agents or servants. If the driver of an
engine were, under the express instructions of an execu-
tive officer of the corporation, to run down a person, or
an animal, upon the line, or if, in obedience to the same
authority, the train hands were forcibly to eject a pas-
senger from the train, the corporation would be liable in
trespass. In the leading case of Scott v. Shepherd, 1 the
defendant was held liable to the plaintiff in trespass
because, by wantonly throwing the squib, he was held
to have intended all the consequences that followed
upon the original throwing. As Tilghman, C. J., said
in Smith v. Rutherford: 2 " the criterion of trespass
is force directly applied." Therefore, to render a de-
fendant liable in trespass, the act which injured the
plaintiff must have been done either personally by the
defendant, or by the defendant's servants, under his
express instructions. In Gregory v. Piper, 3 the defend-
ant, in order to obstruct a right of way claimed by the
plaintiff, had directed his servant to pile rubbish on his
premises near to, but not touching, the plaintiff's wall.
The servant did the work carefully, but some of the
rubbish naturally ran against the wall. It was held
that the defendant was liable in trespass, Littledale, J.,
saying: "if the servant, therefore, in carrying into
execution the orders of his master, uses ordinary care
and an injury is done to another, the master is Liable in
trespass. If the injury arises from the want of ordinary
care, and an injury is done to another, the master is
1 2 W. Bl. 892, 1 Sm. L. C. 549. * 2 S. & R. 3G0.
» 9 B. & C. 591, 17 E. C. L.
3S8 TRESPASS.
liable in case." In Yerger v. Warren, 1 the facts were
almost identical with those in Gregory v. Piper, and judg-
ment for the plaintiff in the court below was reversed in
the Supreme Court, because the judge at the trial had
directed the jury that the relation of master and servant
rendered the defendant liable in trespass, whereas the
jury should have been instructed that, unless the wrong
complained of had been done by the defendant's order,
he could not be liable for the trespass. In McLaugh-
lin v. Pryor, 2 the defendant sitting in his carriage
had directed his postilion to drive into a line of carriages
under such circumstances that his carriage necessarily
collided with the plaintiff's carriage. It was held that
he was liable to the plaintiff in trespass. In Gordon v.
Holt, 3 the defendant was a contractor, whose servants,
without his authority, broke the plaintiff's crane ; it
was held that the defendant was not liable, Parke, B.,
saying : " the result of the authorities is, that if a ser-
vant in the course of his master's employ drives over
any person and does a wilful injury, the servant, and not
the master, is liable in trespass ; if the servant by his
negligent driving causes an injury, the master is liable in
case. If the master himself is driving, he is liable in
case for his negligence, or in trespass because the act
was wilful." In P. G. & N. K. E. v. Wilt, 4 the defend-
ant's train at a highway crossing struck the plaintiff's
wagon and injured it. Verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff in trespass was reversed, Rogers, J., saying :
" A master is not liable, either in trespass, or in case,
for the wilful act of his servant, as by driving his mas-
ter's carriage against another without his direction, or
assent. But he is liable to answer for any damage aris-
ing to another from the negligence, or unskilfulness,
1 31 Penna. St. 319. » 4 M. & G. 48, 43 E. C. L.
3 4 Ex. 364. * 4 Whart. 143.
TRESPASS. 389
of his servant acting in his employ. * * * * * * The
authorities are uniform that case, not trespass, is the
proper remedy." Sharrod v. L. & N. W. By. 1 is to
the same point. There the plaintiff's sheep, through a
defect in a fence, got upon the defendant's line, and
were run over by an engine driven at the rate of speed
allowed by the defendant's regulations. It was held
that the plaintiff could not recover in trespass, Parke,
B., saying, page 585 : " The maxim qui facit per alium
facit per se, renders the master liable for all the negli-
gent acts of the servant in the course of his employment,
but that liability does not make the direct act of the
servant the direct act of the master. ****** I n a ]i
cases where the master gives the direction and control
over a carriage, or animal, or chattel, to another rational
agent, the master is only responsible in an action on the
case for want of skill, or care, of the agent, and no more."
In A. V. B. B. v. McLain, 2 the plaintiff was wrongfully
ejected by the defendant's conductor from a car, and it
was held, reversing the court below, that the defendants
were not liable in trespass for its servant's act done
without its authority, assent, or even knowledge."
Drew v. Peer 3 maintains the converse of the proposi-
tion, for the plaintiff, having brought case against the
defendant, the proprietor of a theatre, for his wrongful
expulsion from a theatre, it was held that the act hav-
ing been committed in the ordinary course of a servant's
employment, but not by the express instructions of the
defendant, the action was rightly case, and nol trespass.
So in Holmes v. Mather, 4 where the defendant being
driven by his servant, and not interfering with his ser-
vant's management, the horses ran away, and in turning a
corner struck the plaintiff, it was held thai case, not tres-
1 4 Ex. 580. ' ;, 1 Penna. St. 1 12.
3 y3 Penna. St. 234. * L. R. 10 Ex. 261.
390 CASE AND ASSUMPSIT.
pass, was the proper form of action, because the injury
was done by the servant without the master's express in-
structions. Therefore, when a person has been injured
by negligence upon the part of a railway, or upon the part
of the servants of that railway, the railway is not liable
in trespass. It is also to be remembered that the action
of trespass, being founded ujxm possession, cannot be
brought for injury to personal property, unless that
personal property was, at the time of the injury, in the
possession of the plaintiff. 1 Nor can a father recover
in trespass for an injury to a son, who, at the time of
the injury, is not in his service. 2
III. CASE AND ASSUMPSIT.
Passengers and servants of the railway may, by virtue of the con-
tractual relation between the railway and themselves, sue either in
case or assumpsit, bid all other persons can sue only in case, for the
relation between the railway and such persons is non-contractual.
341. He who, not being a passenger nor a servant
of the railway, and consequently not standing in a
contractual relation to the railway, is injured in the
course of its operations, can ground his action only on
the railway's breach of duty implied by law, for there
is no privity of contract between him and the railway.
An injured passenger may sue either in assumpsit upon
the contract, or in case upon the breach of the duty
raised by the law. 3 The general principle is, as stated
1 Ward v. McCauley, 4 T. R. 490 ; Spencer v. Campbell, 9 W. & S. 32.
2 Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts 227.
3 Ansell v. Waterhouse, 6 M. & S. 393 ; Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Ad. & El. 963.
35 E. C. L.; Brothcrton v. Wood, 3 Brod. & B. 54, 7 E. C. L.; Bank of Or-
ange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158 ; McCall v. Forsythe, 4 W. & S. 179 ; Zell v.
Arnold, 2 Pen. & W. 292; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Penna. St. 54; Marshall v.
Y. X. & B. Ry.. 11 C. B. 655, 73 E. C. L.; Skinner v. L. B. & S C. Ry., 5 Ex.
787 ; G. N. Ry. v. Harrison, 10 Ex. 376 ; Austin v. G. W. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B.
442 ; FoulkesV M. D. Ry., 4 C. P. D. 267, 5 Id. 157 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Derby,
14 How. 468; Alton v. M. Ry., 19 C. B. N. S. 243, 115 E. C. L. ; P R. R. v.
CASE AND ASSUMPSIT. 391
by Lord Campbell in Brown v. Boorman, 1 that, "wher-
ever there is a contract, and something to be done in
the course of the employment which is the subject of
that contract, if there is a breach of a duty in the
course of that employment, the plaintiff may either
recover in tort or in contract." Holroyd, J., in Ansell
v. Waterhouse, 2 puts the same view, saying, " although
the law will raise a contract with a common carrier to
be answerable for the careful conveyance of his passen-
gers, nevertheless he may be charged in an action upon
the case for a breach of his duty."
Yet the action, when brought to recover for injuries to a passenger, or
to a servant of the railway, is so far founded upon the contractual
relation between the railway and the person injured, that, whether
the form of the action be case or assumpsit, a stranger to the contract
cannot recover therein.
342. While, as Byles, J., said in Alton v. The Mid-
land By., 3 " the plaintiff has his election to sue either
upon the contract or for the tort," yet, " by changing
the form of action, the right to sue cannot be extended
to a 'stranger,'" for, as Blackburn, J., said, in Ilobbs
v. L. & S. W. By., 4 " the action is in reality upon a
contract; it is commonly said to be founded upon a
duty, but it is a duty arising out of a contract." The
action, therefore, when brought by an injured passenger,
is so far founded upon the railway's duty as arising out
of the contract between the railway and the passenger,
that only a party privy to that contrail can recover,
whether the form of action be case or assumpsit. Thus,
in Alton v. Midland By., 5 the plaintiff declared in case
Peoples, 31 Ohio St. 537 ; B. C. P. Ry. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 18 Am. & Eng.
R, R. Cas. 220 ; Nevin v. P. P. C. Co., 10G 111. 222, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 92.
1 11 CJ. & Fin. 44. ■ 6 M. & 8. 393.
3 19 C. B. N. S. 243, 115 E. C. L. ' L. K. 10 Q. B. 119.
6 19 C. B. N. S. 213, 115 E. C. L.
392 CASE AND ASSUMPSIT.
for injury to Lis servant, a passenger on defendant's
road, and consequent loss of services, averring that the
defendant had contracted to carry the servant " for hire
and reward to the defendant in this behalf;" the
defendants demurred to the declaration, and also
pleaded that they had contracted with the servant and
not with the plaintiff. On demurrer the plea was held
good, on the ground that a master can recover for loss
of his servant's services only when caused by a pure
wrong, but never when that wrong is, in substance,
only a breach of contract. In F. & A. St. P. By. Co.
v. Stutler, 1 a mother sued to recover for injuries to her
minor son, a passenger on defendant's line, the injuries
being caused by defendant's negligence. It was held,
reversing the court below, and following Alton v. Mid-
land By., that the plaintiff could not recover, the
ground of decision being that only a party to the con-
tract can recover for a breach of duty founded on that
contract. 2
Where the ground of action is a pure tort, any one who has suffered
a pecuniary loss directly resulting therefrom, may recover in case.
343. But where there is no contractual relation
between the railway and the injured person, any one
who, by reason of that injury, has suffered a pecuniary
loss, may recover in case for a breach of the duty of the
railway to carry safely any one whom they have re-
ceived upon their line or premises ; thus, in Marshall v.
Y., N. & B. By., 3 where the plaintiff, the valet of a
nobleman, sued to recover damages for his luggage lost
1 54 Penna. St. 375.
2 Yet it has been held in Massachusetts that a master can recover in case for
injuries to his servant while a passenger on defendant's line : Ames v. U. Ry.,
117 Mass. 541.
3 11 C. B. 655, 73 E. C. L.
CASE AND ASSUMPSIT. 393
on defendant's line, the plaintiff having been a passen-
ger, but his ticket having been bought and paid for by
his master, it was held that the plaintiff could recover,
Jervis, C. J., saying, the action lies for the luggage,
sued for as for personal injuries, " not by reason of any
contract between him and the company, but by reason
of a duty implied by law to carry him safely." So, in
Berringer v. G. E. Ry., 1 the claim alleged that the
plaintiff's servant took a ticket and travelled by the L.
I. & S. Ry., and that the train on which the servant was
a passenger came into collision with the defendant's train
at a junction through the negligence of the defendant's
employes, and that the servant was injured; and it
was held on demurrer that the action being against
independent wrongdoers, not parties to the contract
of carriage, and for a pure tort, the plaintiff could
recover.
DISTINCTIONS IN PRACTICAL EFFECT BETWEEN THE AC-
TIONS OF CASE AND ASSUMPSIT.
When the plaintiff sues in assumpsit, he must at Ids peril join all of the
parties with whom he contracted, he can recover for no tortious act
that is not a breach of the contract declared upon, and his recovery
therein is a bar to his subsequent action in another right upon the
same contract; whereas when he sues in case, he may join, as de-
fendants, any or all of those whose breach of duty injured him, he
may recover all such damages as proximately result from the breach
of duty, and his recovery in one right is no bar to his recovery in
another right for the same injury.
344. When the plaintiff sues in case he may, at hia
election, join as defendants any or all of the parties
whose breach of duty has caused his injury, but where
1 4 C. P. D. 1G3.
30-1 CASE AND ASSUMPSIT.
lie sues in assumpsit lie must, at his peril, sue all the
parties to the contract. 1 Thus, in Ansell v. Water-
house, 2 the plaintiff having averred in his narr that the
defendant was the proprietor of a stage coach, who,
as such, had received the plaintiff as a passenger under
a duty to carry him safely, and that by the negligence
of the defendant's servants, the plaintiff had been in-
jured, and the defendant having pleaded in abatement
that sixteen other named persons were co-partners, and
should have been joined as defendants, upon general
demurrer the plea was held bad, Bayley, J., saying :
" There is a broad distinction in personal actions between
tort and assumpsit, or such actions as arise ex contractu
and ex delicto, which are founded upon contracts or upon
wrongs independently of contract, and the proceedings
vary accordingly. In assumpsit the plaintiff in his dec-
laration and proof is confined to the very terms of the
contract, and can recover in damages for no tortious act
farther than it is a breach of the defendant's promise,
express or implied. Whereas actions upon the case lie
for the recovery of damages for consequential wrongs
accruing from misfeasance or nonfeasance from the
negligence or wilful conduct of the party, and in doing
or omitting something contrary to the duty which the
law casts upon him in the particular case."
345. Where the plaintiff sues in case he may recover
for all damages naturally and necessarily arising, result-
ing from the defendant's breach of duty to him, and
against any one or more of the parties whose breach of
duty has caused his injuries. 3 But when he sues in
1 McCall v. Forsyth, 4 W. & S. 179 ; Brotherton v. Wood, 3 Brod. & B. 54,
7 E. C. L.; Ansell v. Waterhouse, 6 M. & S. 385, 18 E. C. L.
» 6 M. & S. 385, 18 E. C. L.
8 Tompkins v. Clay St. H. R. Co., Cal. , 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 144 ;
Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen 29; Churchill v. Holt, 127 Maps. 165; Bryant v.
Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Id. 491.
JOINDER OF CLAIMS. 395
assumpit he can recover in damages for no tortious act
further than that it is a breach of the defendant's
promise, express or implied ; thus, in Murdock v. B. &
A. R. R.., 1 the plaintiff was arrested by defendant's ser-
vant for an alleged improper use of a ticket, and he
sued the defendant in contract for breach of contract of
safe carriage, and it was held, following Hobbs' case that
the plaintiff could recover only for the natural and
proximate consequences of the breach, and that to re-
cover for mental and physical suffering following the
arrest he should have sued in tort. Where assumpsit
is brought and judgment recovered on a breach of a
railway's contract of carriage, that judgment is a bar to
another action in another right on the same contract ;
thus, where a husband has sued and recovered in as-
sumpsit for his wife's injuries caused by a railway's
negligence in the performance of a contract of carriage
of the wife, it was held that that judgment was a bar to
a subsequent action of assumpsit brought by the husband
to recover for loss of the wife's services and his expen-
diture for her medical treatment. 2
IV. THE JOINDER OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY
CLAIMS.
Common law and statutory claims for damages may, under certain
conditions, be joined.
346. Common law and statutory claims for damages
may be joined in the same action, where they of the same
nature, admit of the same pleas, and are followed by the
same judgment. 3
1 133 Mass. 15, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 400.
» Pollard v. N. J. R. & T. Co., 101 U. S. 223.
» Martin v. Stille, 3 Whart. 337 ; P. R. R v. Bock, 93 Penna. St. 427.
396 PAYMENT INTO COURT.
V. PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO COURT.
The payment of money into court admits, under certain limitations,
the cause of action.
347. Payment of money into court by the railway
where the form of action is case, and the declaration
general and unspecific, admits a cause of action, but not
the cause of action sued for ; where the declaration is
. specific, so that nothing would be due from the railway
to the plaintiff, unless it admitted the particular claim
made by the plaintiff, the payment into court necessarily
admits the cause of action so averred in the declaration.
Payment of money into court upon a general count on
assumpsit admits only a cause of action to the amount
paid into court, and operates as an admission for no
other purpose. Payment of money into court upon a
declaration on a special contract admits the contract and
the breach. 1
1 Perren v. M. By. & C. Co., 11 C. B. 855, 73 E. C. L. ; Schreger v. Carden,
Id 851.
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH. 397
CHAPTER II.
THE EIGHT OP ACTION FOR INJURIES CAUSING DEATH.
I. The statutory right of action.
II. The common law right.
III. Terms of statutes conferring the right of action.
I. THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF ACTION.
At common law no action lies to recover damages for death, caused by
a tort.
348. The rule of the common law is, as laid down by-
Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton, 1 that " in a civil
court the death of a human being cannot be complained
of as an injury," and the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona succinctly expresses the legal theory that
a right of action for a tort, being personal, dies with
the person injured, and that any action brought there-
for abates at common law with the death of the plain-
tiff. 2 The preamble to Lord Campbell's Act, 3 to be
hereinafter referred to, recites that " no action is now
maintainable against a person who by his wrongful acts
may have caused the death of another person. In Os-
born v. Gillett, 4 the plaintiff declared against the de-
fendant for injuries to the plaintiff's daughter and
servant, by reason whereof she afterwards died, claim-
ing as special damages the loss of her services and her
burial expenses; and the defendant having pleaded,
inter alia, that the daughter " was killed upon the spot
1 1 Campb. 493.
2 Higgins v. Bucher, Yelv. 89; Eden v. L. & F. R. R., 14 B. Monr. 204;
Carey v. B. Ry., 1 Gush. 475; Kramer v. S. F. M. St. R. R., 26 Oal. 484.
• 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. * L. R. 8 Ex. 88.
398 RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH.
by the acts and matters mentioned in the declaration,
so that the plaintiff did not and could not sustain any
damage which entitles him to sue in this action," judg-
ment on demurrer was entered for the defendant by
Kelly, C. B., and Pigott, B. [Bramwell, B., dissenting],
upon the authority of Baker v. Bolton, and the legis-
lative recognition of the principle of that case in the
preamble to Lord Campbell's Act. So, in Pulling v.
G. E. By., 1 Pulling having, by the negligence of the
defendant, been injured at a level crossing, and after
bringing suit having died, and his widow and adminis-
tratrix having been substituted as plaintiff in the action,
and by her statement claiming damages for loss of de-
cedent's wages, medical expenses, and injury to his per-
sonal estate, judgment upon demurrer was given for
the defendant, upon the ground that the action being
brought for a pure tort did not survive, but was abated
by the death of the original plaintiff. 2 So, also, in
Cregin v. B. C R. R., 3 it was held that "when a hus-
band, having brought suit for injuries to the person of
his wife, died, his right of action for the loss of his
wife's society died with him, but his right of action for
the loss of his wife's services and for his expenses for
her medical treatment, being a pecuniary loss dimin-
ishing his estate, survived to his personal representa-
tives. The rule has also been applied where a widow
sued to recover for the death of her husband, an engine-
driver in a railway's service; 4 and where a husband
sued for the death of his wife killed by the railway's
negligence. 5 The same principle has been asserted in
1 9 Q. B. D. 110. s Cf. Twycross v. Grant, 4 C. P. D. 40.
8 83 N.Y. 595.
* Hubgb. v. N. O. & C. R. R., 6 La. An. 495, 498 ; Herrmann v. Same, 11
Id. 5.
6 Green v. H. R. R. R, 2 Keyes (N.Y.) 294; Lucas v. N.Y. C. R. R., 21
Barb. (N.Y.) 245.
BIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH. 399
actions brought by life assurance companies to recover
from persons, natural or corporate, by whose wilful or
negligent acts assured persons were killed and the as-
surance companies thereby compelled to make payment
of the amounts assured on the lives of such persons.
Thus, in Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 1 Brame
having wilfully killed McLemore, upon whose life
policies of assurance had been issued by the corpora-
tion plaintiff, payment of which had been made after
McLemore's death, the plaintiff sued Brame for the
amounts of those policies, as damages caused to it by
Brame's act. The cause was heard in the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana upon the
defendant's exception to the plaintiff's petition, and
judgment having been rendered thereon for the de-
fendant, was affirmed in error in the Supreme Court of
the United States, upon the ground that the relation
between the plaintiff and the assured was created by a
contract to which the defendant was not a party, and
that the damage to the plaintiff in being compelled to
make good its contract with the assured was not a ne-
cessary or proximate result of the wrong done by the
defendant in killing the assured. In Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. N. Y. & N. H. R R., 2
the same rule was applied where the plaintiff sought to
recover for the killing of its assured by negligence on
the part of the railway.
II. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT.
But where the death is caused by a breach of contract, an action lies at
common law to recover damages for the loss to the decedent's estate
directly resulting from that breach of contract.
349. But, of course, a different rule applies where the
injury, although from one point of view a tort, is from
1 95 U. S. 754. ' 25 Co™- 265 '
400 EIGIIT OF ACTION FOR DEATH.
another point of view a breach of contract, and it has
been held that in such cases the right of action survives
to the personal representatives. This rule has been
extended to permit recoveries by the executors of pas-
sengers injured by a railway's breach of its contract of
carriage. In Knight v. Quarles, 1 an administrator hav-
ing brought assumpsit, and averred in his narr that the
defendant, for certain fees to be paid him, undertook, as
an attorney, to examine a title for the plaintiff's intes-
tate, and that he omitted to do so, and that the intes-
tate in consequence took an insufficient title, whereby
his personal estate was injured, judgment on demurrer
was entered for the plaintiff, and Richardson, J., said :
" if a man contracted for a safe conveyance by coach,
and sustained an injury by a fall, by which his means
of improving his personal property was destroyed, and
that property in consequence was injured, though it was
clear he in his lifetime might, at his election, sue the
coach proprietor in contract, or in tort, it could not
be doubted that his executor might sue in assumpsit for
the consequences of the coach proprietor's breach of
contract." Willes, J., in his judgment in Alton v. Mid-
land Ry., 2 said, referring to Knights v. Quarles : " sup-
pose the personal estate of a servant sustained injury
through the defendant's breach of duty, as if he had
taken a quantity of luggage with him which had been
lost, or damaged, it is clear his executor could have sued
for that damage." In Potter v. M. Ry., 3 a wife having
been injured, while a passenger, by the defendant's neg-
ligence, and her husband having died, sued as his ad-
ministratrix to recover for her husband's loss in respect
of the injuries to her, and it was held in the Exchequer
Chamber that the right of action being founded on a
1 2 Brod. & B. 102, 6 E. C. L. » 19 C. B. N. S. 245, 115 E. C. L.
• 30 L. T. N. S. 765, 32 Id. 36.
EIGHT OF ACTION FOE DEATH. 401
breach of contract survived to the husband's personal
representative. In Bradshaw v. L. & Y. By., 1 where a
passenger, having been injured in a railway accident,
died in consequence of his injuries, but after an interval,
it was held that his executrix could recover in an action
on the contract for the damage suffered by the dece-
dent's estate by reason of the breach of the defendant's
contract to carry him with reasonable safety, the ground
of the decision being that the damage was not caused by
the decedent's death, but by his inability to attend to his
business during his lifetime, that inability resulting
from the accident. Bradshaw's case was followed as an
authority, but with apparent reluctance, in Leggott v.
G. N. By., 2 where the plaintiff, having sued to recover
under Lord Campbell's Act as the administratrix of her
deceased husband, again brought suit to recover for in-
jury done to his personal estate by reason of his inabil-
ity to attend to business from the date of the accident
to the date of his death, and it was held that the re-
covery in the first action was no bar to a recovery in
the second, the causes of action being different, and that
as the plaintiff sued in the two actions in different rights,
the pleadings in the first action, and the verdict for the
plaintiff therein, did not estop the defendant from deny-
ing, in the second action, the cause and the circum-
stances of the injury. 3
The right of action in suits to recover damages for death earned by a
tort is, therefore, statutory.
350. Therefore, for want of a common law remedy,
statutes vesting in certain designated persons a right of
action for injuries resulting from death by negligence
have been passed in different jurisdictions, and in the
1 L. E. 10. C. P. 189. '1 Q- B. D.699.
8 See also Cregin v. B. C. E. E., 83 N. Y. 595.
26
402 STATUTES VESTING THE EIGHT.
case of a death, caused in any jurisdiction by a railway's
breach of duty, the terms of the statute in force in the
particular jurisdiction must be looked to in order to
determine the right to sue, the form of action, the
parties plaintiff and defendant, the conditions of lia-
bility, and the measure of damages.
III. STATUTES CONFEEEING A EIGHT OF ACTION FOE DEATH.
351. The first of these statutes was enacted in Eng-
land in 1846, 1 and is known as Lord Campbell's Act.
It recites in its preamble that, " whereas no action at
law is now maintainable against a person who, by his
wrongful act, neglect, or default, may have caused the
death of another person, and it is oftentimes right and
expedient that the wrongdoer in such a case should be
answerable in damages for the injuries so caused by
him," and it enacts that whensoever the death of a person
shall be caused by such act, neglect, or default, "as would,
if death had not ensued, have entitled the party to
maintain an action to recover damages in respect there-
of," then the person who would have been liable if
death had not ensued shall, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured, be liable in damages at the suit
of the personal representative for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parent, and child of the deceased. The act
further authorizes the jury to "give such damages as
they may think proportioned to the injuries resulting
from such death to the parties respectively for whom
and for whose benefit such action shall be brought, the
damages to be apportioned among the beneficiaries as
the jury shall direct. The act also provides that not
more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the
same subject-matter complained of. A later act 2 pro-
1 9 & 10 Vict. c. 94. * 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95.
STATUTES VESTING THE EIGHT. 403
vides that if there be no personal representative any one
of the beneficiaries may bring the action. Lord Camp-
bell's Act has been followed in the statutes now in force
in Canada ; and in the states of the United States, stat-
utes of like effect have been enacted, references to, and
the material provisions of which are given in the follow-
ing table :
404
STATUTES.
2 ==3 si ta
-5 §
^2fcS
i5"2*°a
go
cfl * ~
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oj'OS w S K*'
cir-ll
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a) +»3
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£ 3 ~"-Q
3 o -2
a) a)
5 '3
SsS °
R
mpensa
the pec
e wife
all the
e just.
o
o
P ~A ^
^■^ o >>
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nd jus
rence
ies to
in.
i, und
es, ma
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with re
ary inj
next oi'
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3 £ ^ 0),
d "3 g 3 j
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5 |J
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15 .CM a^"
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i cj ao -; oc ?D
I If Tj" PtH iH
STATUTES.
405
£0 . o c3
£. = S £ £ 5
♦"do? - ~
o 3.5 «3o
£. -•-=•_ o
*d O .■«_• —
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h d d • ;
53 .9
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> o o .y
■r-'-Sd o w
C "£ •_ 3 ED
3 3 o & "™
^ — . O m
5 r T>iS3<0 , dO'-)< • -J
b§2r~-~d
S- ~ 333
f* O'd > -1
O O O > ja
1- O d "- i~
Cv— 3 «B Q t3
~ — — ~ to
o£ ?-d
oc 5h,s
43*3*0,
o a3 £53
o = G
KS x o/d
s <| i * ||
■2 O J> O _• m $
g&g -8. "3
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a j a so, ^ 5 £ h gag 5 s p,aa««
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p~".
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pa
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gco
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406
STATUTES.
u
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a O -U X -t-- 43
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5 S o oSd
Pn '_ «s a "S cfl . 22 fc
' S o * j ^ o) a) 3 ..*
ig "gj
a °2
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fa-
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C.91P.
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si
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si
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EH
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STATUTES.
407
52>;«o^s?S
a o t„ — a a ««
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1
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a K~ a "3 to Sh a
a a
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be distributed
y without liabi
'Books v. Danv
Mann v. Wie
>f Cases (Pen i
p, 12 Id. 47 ; C
, GG Penna. St.
*^ o
ry to
testae
See
t. 158
Notes
towan
<B rt
O - rjiU2 r-4
direct.
Keco
person
person
Reco
case ol
creditc
Penna
Weekl
L. I. C
R. R. v
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408
STATUTES.
B S* E
S"
co
- — ^> c„ fli ,a oj
<y
, a)
Sot
C g 3 P ^'3a
00 fl} - - - ■" ~
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878.
ao
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C. ~*it-H
^
<W
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT. 409
Statutes vesting a right of action for death have no extra-territorial
force, and are enforceable in other jurisdictions only by comity.
352. Such statutes have no extra-territorial force, and
they vest a right to recover only in cases where the
death has been caused within the state where the statute
is in force. 1 The general rule is that where a person
has died from injuries caused by negligence within a
jurisdiction whose statutes vest in the personal repre-
sentatives of the person so dying a right to recover
damages for the death, personal representatives appointed
in another jurisdiction may sue in that last jurisdiction
for the enforcement of the statutes governing the place
of death ; 2 but this doctrine is denied in some juris-
dictions. 3 The right to recover damages for death,
when established by state legislation, is enforceable in
a case between proper parties in the Federal Courts, and
the jurisdiction of those courts is not subject to limita-
tion by a proviso in a state statute that the action for
the recovery of such damages shall be brought only in
a state court. 4
353. The Missouri Statute 5 prohibiting the prosecu-
tion by a personal representative of a civil action for
injuries to the person of his intestate, an administrator,
appointed in Missouri, will not be permitted to sue in
that state in order to enforce a right of action un<l< r a
Kansas statute for the death of his intestate in Kansas-/
1 Whitford v. P. R. R., 23 N. Y. 465 ; N. & C. R. R. v. Eakin, 6 Coldwell
(Tenn.) 582.
» Dennick v. C. R. R., 103 U. S. 11, 1 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cm. 809 ; Leonard
v. C. S. N. Co., 84 N. Y. 48; S. C. R. R. v. Nix, Ji.-i <!:i. "-7-J; Morris ,-. C, K.
I. & P. Ry., 65 Iowa 727, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 180; N. & < '. R. R. V.
Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 852.
8 Woodward v. M. S. & N. J. R. R, 10 Ohio St. 121 ; Richardson v. N. Y.
C. R. R, 98 Mass. 85; McCarthy v. C, R. I. & P. R- E., 18 Kans. 46 ; Taylor
v. The Penna. Co., 78 Ky. 348.
* C. & N. W. Ry. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270. ' R. S. 1 879, Sea 97.
• Vawter v. M. P. R. R., 84 Mo. 679, 19 Am. & Eng. R. E. Oa 176.
410 EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT.
nor will an administrator appointed in Missouri be per-
mitted to sue in Kansas to recover for the death of his
intestate in Kansas. 1 Where the death is caused in one
jurisdiction and the action is brought in another juris-
diction, whose statutes authorize the action, it must be
shown, as those statutes have no extra-territorial force,
that there is a statute in the jurisdiction in which the
death was caused authorizing a recovery therefor, and
there is no presumption of the existence of such a
statute. 2 Under Lord Campbell's Act a settlement with
and a release of the railway by the person injured ex-
tinguishes the statutory right of action vested in his
widow. 3 So, also, where the person injured has con-
tracted with his employer that the benefit of the act
should not be claimed, it was held that his widow's
action was thereby barred. 4
1 Limekiller v. H. & St. J.R. R., 33 Kans. 83, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 184.
■ Debivoise v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 98 N. Y. 377 ; S. R. & D. R. R. v,
Lacy, 43 Ga. 461.
s Read v. G. E. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 555.
4 Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357.
PARTIES TO THE ACTION. 411
CHAPTER III.
THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
I. The plaintiffs.
II. The defendants.
I. THE PLAINTIFFS.
Where the action is founded on a contract, any party or privy to that
contract who has been injured by its breach, may sue as plaintiff, and
where the action is founded on a tort, not causing the death of the
person injured, any one who has suffered a pecuniary loss directly
resulting from that tort may sue as plaintiff, and where the action is
founded on a tort causing death, the party entitled by virtue of the
statute conferring the right of action may sue as plaintiff.
354. At common law the person who has been phys-
ically injured by a tort, and has survived his injury, can
sue as plaintiff, and if the injuries to that person have
not been the immediate cause of his death, any othei
person who has suffered a pecuniary loss directly re-
sulting from that injury may sue to recover damages for
that loss ; thus, an infant may sue by his next friend
for his personal injuries, and his father may also sue for
the loss of his child's services ; a servant may sue for
his personal injuries, and his master may also sue
for his loss of his servant's services ; and a wife may
sue for her personal injuries, and her husband may also
sue for his loss of his wife's society and services. 1 Where
a municipality has been compelled to respond in dam-
ages to a person injured by reason of the neglect of a
1 As a general rule where the action is brought to recover in the right of a
wife for her personal injuries her husband must be joined Bfl a necessary party
plaintiff, but under the statutes of Illinois and [owa, an action to recover fur
injuries to the person of a wife must be brought in her name, without joining
her husband: C. B. & Q, R. R. v. Dickson, 67 111. 122; C. & N. W. Ry. v.
Button, 68 Id. 409 ; Tuttle v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 42 Iowa 518.
412 PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
railway to keep in repair a highway which the railway
used as a part of its line, the municipality can recover
from the railway the amount of the damages so paid. 1
Of course, as hereinbefore stated, when the injury has
been done by the breach of a contract, one who was not
a party or privy to that contract cannot bring a suit
founded upon the contract.
II. THE DEFENDANTS.
The person or persons whose wrongful act or default was the cause of
injury to the plaintiff, and any other person or persons who are
legally responsible for the wrongful act or omission, may be made
defendants to the action, provided always that, where the action is
grounded upon a contract, both plaintiff and defendant are parties
or privies to the contract.
355. The individual who has, by his non-perform-
ance of duty, or breach of contract, caused the injury,
or any other person or persons, natural or corporate,
who may be legally responsible for the acts and defaults
of the wrongdoer, may be made the defendant, pro-
vided, of course, that where the action is grounded upon
a contract, the plaintiff is a party to the contract; thus,
a passenger who has been injured by a failure of any
of the means of transportation cannot recover for in-
juries caused thereby from the contractors who supplied
to the railway the particular article whose failure was
the cause of his injury, for there is no privity of con-
tract between the passenger and that contractor. 2 On
1 W. & A. R. R. v. Atlanta, Ga. , 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 233 ;
Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 ; District of Columbia v. B. & P. R. R., 4 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 179 ; Town of Hampden v. N. H. & N. R. R., 27 Conn. 158 ;
Woburn v. B. & L. R. R., 109 Mass. 283.
8 Tollitt v. Sherstone, 5 M. & W. 283 ; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Id. 109 ;
Longmeid v. Halliday, 6 Ex. 761. Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 4 Id.
337 ; and George v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex. 1, are distinguishable because
there tbe defendants were held liable upon the ground of fraud and misrep-
resentation.
JOINT TORT-FEASORS. 413
the same principle a person with whom a contract has
been made for the carriage of himself or of any other
person may sue for the damages done by the railway's
breach of that contract, but one who is no party to the
contract of carriage, however much he may have suf-
fered by the breach thereof, has no right of action for
that breach. 1
356. Where the State, in the exercise of its sover-
eignty, has taken possession of, and operates, a railway
line, it is, by virtue of its sovereignty, exempt from
liability to persons injured by the negligence of the
servants who are employed to operate the line; 2 but
the shares of the capital stock of the corporation being
as a legal entity distinct from the corporation, 3 the fact
that the State is the owner of all the shares of the
stock of a railway corporation will not exempt the cor-
poration from liability to suit for injuries caused by
negligence on its part. 4
357. Joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable;
thus, in Colegrove v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. & N. Y. &
H. R. R., 5 the plaintiff, while a passenger upon a train
of the first named corporation defendant, was injured
in a collision between that train and a train of the last
named defendant, and it was held that the two corpora-
tions as joint tort-feasors were jointly liable to him. 6
1 Alton v. Midland Ry., 9 C. B. N. S. 213, 115 E. C. L.; F. & A. St. P. K.
v. Stutler, 54 Penna. St. 37.").
2 McFarlane v. The Queen, 7 Can. S. C. 216; The Queen v. McLeod, 8 Id. 1,
16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 301.
3 Regina v. Arnoud & Powell, 9 Q. B. 806, 58 E. C. L. ; Vao AHot v. The
Assessors, 3 Wall. 573.
4 Hutchinson v. W. & A. R. R., 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 634.
5 6 Duer382, 20N.Y. 492.
6 See also Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596; Cooper v. E. T. Co., 76 N. Y. 110;
Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 646 ; W. ( St. L. A P.
Ry. v. Shacklet, 105 111. 364, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 106 ; Wyldo v. N. B.
R., 53N.Y. 156.
414 JOINT TORT-FEASORS.
So where two or more persons or corporations jointly
operate a railway, they are jointly and severally liable
to persons injured in the course of the railway's opera-
tions, and they may be sued jointly or severally. 1 So
the railway and its servant, who, by his act of com-
mission, injures any one to whom the railway owes a
duty, are jointly liable for that injury.
1 Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa. 545 ; Bissell v. M.
S. & N. I. Ry., 22 Id. 258.
EVIDENCE. 415
CHAPTER IV.
EVIDENCE IN ACTIONS AGAINST RAILWAYS FOE INJUEIES TO
THE PEESON.
I. Admissibility of proof of declarations and admissions by agents and
servants of the railway.
II. Admissibility for the plaintiff of declarations of the person injured.
III. Admissibility for the railway of admissions and declarations of the
person injured.
IV. Admissibility of evidence as to changes in the construction or mode
of operation of the railway made subsequently to the happening
of the injury.
V. Inspection of the injuries of the person injured.
VI. Evidence as to the speed of trains.
VII. Evidence as to signals.
VIIL Admissibility of life tables in evidence.
IX. Evidence as to poverty of person injured, etc.
358. The admissibility of evidence in actions against
railways is, in general, determinable by the rules of
evidence applicable to the particular form of action,
whether it be trespass, case, or assumpsit. I shall,
therefore, notice only certain rules of evidence, whose
applicability and effects have been discussed in the
more recent cases.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF PROOF OF DECLARATIONS AND
ADMISSIONS BY AGENTS AND SERVANTS OF THE
RAILWAY.
Such declarations and admissions are only admissible as pari of the
res yestoe when made contemporaneously ivith the happening <>f the
injury to the plaintiff.
359. Where the acts of an agent or servant will bind
the railway, there the representations, declarations, and
416 DECLARATIONS.
admissions of such agent or servant respecting the
subject-matter will also bind the railway, if made at
the time of the injury to the j)laintiff, and constituting
part of the res gestce} But declarations of the agent
or servant of the railway, if made subsequently to the
time of the injury to the plaintiff, are not part of the
res gestce and are not admissible in evidence against the
railway. 2 Yet declarations of a servant are admissible
when proven to have been made in the course of duty,
as, for instance, a report by an engine-driver to a switch-
tender that he had run over a man, it being the engine-
driver's duty to report to the switch- tender, that the
latter might hold other trains until the obstruction was
removed, but declarations of the engine-driver of the
manner of killing and the identity of the person killed
are not admissible. 3 Declarations of an alleged servant
of the railway are not admissible against the railway to
1 Story on Agency, § 134 ; H. E. E. v. Coyle, 55 Penna. St. 396 ; Mullan v.
P. & S. M. S. Co., 78 Id. 25 ; McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399, 15 Am & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 291, 8 Id. 162; Casey v. N.Y. C. & H. E. E. E., 78 N.Y. 518;
Penna. Co. v. Eudel, 100 111. 603, 6 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 30.
2 V. Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall. 529 ; M. & M. E. E. v. Finney, 10 Wise.
388 ; P., C. & St. L. E. E. v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
628 ; Moore v. C, St. L. & N. O. E. E., 59 Miss. 243, 9 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas.
401 ; M. C. E. E. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440 ; Treadway v. S. C. & St. P. Ey.,
40 Iowa 526; C. & N.W. Ey. v. Fillmore, 57 111. 265; Furst v. S. A. E. E.,
72 N. Y. 542 ; P., C. & St. L. E. E. v. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246 ; Dietrich v. B.
& H. S. Ey., 58 Md. 347, 11 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 115; Verry v. B., C, E.
& M. Ey., 47 Iowa 549 ; Newsom v. G. E. E., 66 Ga. 57 ; E. T. V. & G. E. E.
v. Duggan, 51 Id. 212; Travis v. L. & N. E. E, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 231 ; Tanner
v. L. & N. E. E., 60 Ala. 621 ; McComb v. N. C. E. E., 70 N. C. 178 ; Adams
v. H. & St. J. E. E., 74 Mo. 553, 7 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 414 ; Luby v. H. E.
E. E., 17 N.Y. 131 ; Hamilton v. N. Y. C. E. R., 51 Id. 100; Whitaker v. E.
A. E. E., Id. 295 ; Marsh v. S. C. E. E., 56 Ga. 274 ; Patterson v. W., St. L. &
P. Ey., 54 Mich. 91, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 130; A. G. S. Ey. v. Hawk,
72 Ala. 121, 18 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 194; McDermott v. H. & St. J. Ey.,
73 Mo. 516, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 85.
3 B. & O. E. E. v. State, to use of Allison, 62 Md. 479, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E.
Cas. 83.
DECLARATIONS. 417
prove that the person making the declaration was a
servant of the railway. 1
II. ADMISSIBILITY FOR THE PLAINTIFF OF PROOF OF
DECLARATIONS OF THE PERSON INJURED.
Such declarations are admissible or the plaintiff if part of the res
gestoz and made contemporaneously with the happening of the injury,
but they are not in any case admissible as " dying declarations,"
and exclamations of the person injured, indicating pain and suffer-
ing, though made subsequently to the injury, are admissible in evi-
dence for the plaintiff.
360. It has been held that declarations of persons
injured, as to the cause of the injury, are admissible in
evidence for the plaintiff as part of the res gestce, if the
declarations were made at the time of the accident. 2 It
has also been held that declarations and expressions of
the injured person, indicating pain and suffering, are
admissible in evidence for the plaintiff as part of the
■res gestce, although made at a time subsequent to the
happening of the injury; 3 and where the plaintiff sued
for an injury done to his leg, a piece of bone was
admitted in evidence with proof of the plaintiff's decla-
ration made subsequently to the injury, that it had just
come out of his leg. 4 But such declarations and excla-
mations, if made at a medical examination which was
undertaken for the purpose of obtaining testimony to
be used on behalf of the plaintiff at the trial, are not
admissible. 5 Declarations of the person injured, .is (<>
1 Lindsay v. C. R. R , 40 Ga. 447.
2 Entwistle v. Fergner, 60 Mo. 214; Bass v. C. & X. W, Ry., 12 Wise. 664 ;
Brownell v. P. R. R., 47 Mo. 240 ; Friedman v. R. K., 7 Phila. 208.
3 H.&T.C.R. R. r.Shafer, 54 Tex. 641, 6 Inn. & Eng. R. I:. Can. 421;
Avesoni). Lord Kiimard, 6 Eaal L88; Sfattesonv. N. V. C. !•'. R., :;"■ N. V.
487; Perkins v. C. R. R., 44 X. II. 223; Hagenlocker v. C. I. A l;. R. I;., 99
N.Y.I. 30.
* Pringle v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 01 In,va C,i:;, IS Am. .V Km-. R. R. Cas. 01.
5 G. R. & I. R. R. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537.
27
418 DECLARATIONS.
fche cause of his injury, when made after the happening
of the injury, and constituting merely a narrative of a
past transaction, are not part of the res gestae, and are
not admissible in evidence for the plaintiff. 1 Despite
the authorities which have been cited, it may well be
doubted whether the declarations of the person injured,
if made subsequently to the injury, are, in any case,
properly admissible for the plaintiff, for they are not
admissions against interest, nor are they part of the res
cjestm, in the sense that they are contemporaneous
explanations of any act done on the part of the plain-
tiff.
361 Dying declarations are admissible only in
criminal prosecutions, 2 and, of course, are not admissi-
ble in civil actions against railways for injuries causing
death. 3
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE FOR THE RAIL-
WAY OF THE PROOF OF ADMISSIONS AND DECLARA-
TIONS BY THE PERSON INJURED.
Such declarations, at whatever time made, are admissible in evidence
for the railway.
362. Declarations and admissions of the person in-
jured, at whatsoever time made, are admissible in evi-
dence for the railway, as admissions against interest,
and where the plaintiff is not the person injured, they
are binding upon the plaintiff by reason of his privity
with the person injured. 4 But the declarations of one
1 Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 95 N. Y. 275, 19 Am. & Eng. R, R.
Cas. 400 ; C, C. & 0. R. R. v. Mara, 26 Ohio St. 185 ; I. C. R. R. v. Sutton, 42
111. 438; Taylor v. G. T. R. R., 48 N. II. 304.
2 Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence 32.
■ Marshall v. C. & G. E. R. R., 48 111. 475 ; Daily v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 32
Conn. 356 ; Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 26 Hun. (N. Y.) 69.
4 Stein v. G. A. Ry., 10 Phila. 440 ; Cooper v. C. R. R., 44 Iowa 134 ; sed. cf.
O. & M. R. R. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371.
OVERWORKED SERVANTS. 419
who is neither the person injured, nor the plaintiff, nor
the plaintiff's agent, are not admissible in evidence for
the railway ; thus, where a wife sues in her own right for
her personal injuries, the subsequent declarations of her
husband as to the cause of the injury are not admissible
in evidence against her ; l nor are the declarations of a
wife as to the cause of the injury admissible in evidence
as against her husband, the plaintiff. 2
The non-performance of a duty by a railway servant may be proved by
direct evidence of the fact, or indirectly by evidence that the railway
servant was, at the time of the injury, incapacitated by intoxication
or otherwise, but it cannot be proved by showing that the servants
of the railway are habitually overworked.
363. Evidence is admissible to prove that a railway
servant who was charged with the performance of a par-
ticular duty at a particular time, and whose non-perform-
ance of that duty was the cause of the injury for which
the plaintiff sues, did not perform that duty by reason of
his absence from his post, or because he was then inca-
pacitated by drunkenness, or otherwise; but evidence
is not admissible to prove that servants of the railway,
who are charged with the performance of such duties,
are so habitually overworked that they are not compe-
tent for the performance of their duties, for such evi-
dence is, at best, only a presumption founded upon a
presumption. 3
1 Keller v. S. C. & St. P. R. R., 27 Minn. 178.
2 Stillwell v. N. Y. C. R. R., 34 N. Y. 29.
8 P. C. P. Ry. v. Henrice, 92 Penna. St. 431, 4 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 544.
420 COLLATERAL OCCURRENCES.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF PROOF OF COLLATERAL OCCUR-
RENCES.
"The occurrence of facts similar to, but not connected with, the fact in
issue by the relation of cause and effect, is not admissible in evidence."
364. The general rule is that quoted in the head
note, from Mr. Justice Stephen; 1 thus, the charge of
negligence against the railway being based on the main-
tenance of an imperfect switch and the failure to repair
a broken rail, evidence of other defects at other points
on the line is not admissible. 2 So, in an action for in-
juries to a passenger evidence is not admissible of
another accident at the same place under similar cir-
cumstances/' There are, however, some cases which
maintain a different doctrine ; thus, the question at
issue being whether signals were given at a particular
crossing by a particular train, it has been held that evi-
dence is admissible to show that such signals were not
given by that train at another crossing. 4 It has also
been held that evidence is admissible to show that en-
gines of the defendant habitually pass a certain crossing
at great speed, as tending to prove that on a particular
occasion another engine did pass the crossing at great
speed. 5 The negligence charged upon the railway being
a failure to maintain its line in a safe condition for the
transportation of passengers, evidence has been held to
be admissible of recent and frequent derailments of its
trains. 6 In such a case, evidence has also been held to
1 Digest of Evidence, cap. Ill, p. 15.
2 Morse v. M. & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168;
P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 457 ;
Reed v. N. Y. C. E. R,, 45 N. Y. 574.
3 Davis v. O. & C. R. R., 8 Oregon 172 ; O, B. & Q. R. R. v. Lee, 60 111. 501.
* Bower v. C, M. & St. P. It. 11., 61 Wise. 457, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas,
301.
> Bhaber v. St. P., M. & M. R. R., 28 Minn. 103, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 185.
6 M. & M. R. R. v. Ashcroft, 48 Ala. 15, 49 Id, 305.
SIMILAR ACCIDENTS. 421
be admissible as to the unsafe condition of the line at
points other than that where the injury happened. 1
The doctrine of those cases is more than questionable.
The existence of negligence upon the part of the railway
at a different place, or at the same place upon another
occasion, is not necessarily inconsistent with the exercise
of due care on the part of the railway at the time and
place of the injury, and the introduction of proof of
such collateral occurrences necessarily raises for deter-
mination by the jury distinct issues, whose consideration
has an obvious tendency to divert their minds from the
issues raised by the pleadings in the cause. Of course,
this rule does not exclude the evidence of occurrences,
which are not collateral to the plaintiff's injury ; thus,
where the plaintiff sues for injuries resulting from the
fright of a horse caused by some particular noise, evi-
dence that other horses were frightened at that time by
the same noise is admissible, for it tends to prove the
dangerous character of the noise. 2 So, where the case
turns on the sufficiency or insufficiency of a particular
appliance, such as a switch, evidence is admissible of
other accidents caused by switches similarly constructed,
because it tends to prove the insufficiency of the par-
ticular form of switch. 3
Proof as to changes in the construction or mode of operation of the
railway, made subsequently to the happening of the injury to the
plaintiff, is not admissible.
365. Evidence is not admissible to prove thai after
an accident, a railway made changes in the construction
of its line, or adopted a different mode of operation, as,
1 Allison v. V, A X. W. Ry., 42 [owa 27 I ; Holyoke v. ' ■. T. K. K., 48 N. B.
541; Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R., 56 Barb. 493.
2 Gordon v B. & M. K. R, 58 X. II. 396.
3 Morse v. M. & St. L. Ry., 'M Minn. 465, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. I !u. 168.
422 SUBSEQUENT CHANGES.
substituting new for old planks at a level crossing, 1 or
substituting a new bridge for the old bridge, the prox-
imity of whose sides to the line was the cause of injury
to the plaintiff', 2 or changing the character of a switch, 3
or reconstructing an embankment after a storm of un-
precedented violence; 4 or putting in new ties after an
accident. 5 On the other hand, it has been held that
evidence is admissible to show that after an accident at
a crossing certain precautions were taken to prevent
similar accidents; 6 or that where the injury to the
plaintiff had resulted from the removal of a plank at a
crossing, the railway had, after the happening of the
injury, replaced the plank in position; 7 or that where
the injury was caused by the proximity of a station plat-
form to a main line track, the railway, after the injury
to the plaintiff, relocated its platform; 8 or that where
the cause of injury to the plaintiff was the proximity of
a main line track to a coal scales, the railway after the
injury to the plaintiff had changed their relative loca-
tion. 9 On principle, it is not easy to see why such evi-
dence should be regarded as admissible. A change in
a mode of operating the line, or a substitution of a
different appliance at a particular point, is not necessarily
an admission that the discarded mode of operation or
appliance was dangerously defective, for, in railway
practice, such changes are frequently made from motives
1 Payne v. T. & B. R. R., 9 Hun (N. Y.) 526.
2 Dale v. D., L. & W. 11. R., 73 N. Y. 468.
3 Salter v. D. & II. C. Co., 3 Hun (N. Y.J 338 ; Morse v. M. & St. L. Ry., 30
Minn. 465, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168.
4 Ely v. St. L , K. C. & N. Ry., 77 Mo. 34, 16 Am. & Eng.' R. R. Cas. 342.
8 Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R., 45 N. Y. 574.
6 Shaber v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 28 Minn. 103. 2 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 185 ;
O'Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn 65; Phelps v. Mankato, 23 Minn. 276.
7 Kelly v. S. M. R. R., 28 Minn. 98, 6 Am & Eng, R. R. Cas. 264.
8 P. R. R. v. Henderson, 51 Penna. St. 315.
9 W. C & P. R. R. v. McElwee, 67 Penna. St. 311 ; see also McKee v. Bid-
well, 74 Id. 218.
PROOF OF SUBORNATION. 423
of economy, or from the desire of obtaining greater
efficiency without increased cost. The introduction of
such evidence is also open to the objection, that it
raises distinct and independent issues for the consider-
ation of the jury.
Proof is admissible of an attempt to suborn false testimony , as constitut-
ing an admission that the case of the party so attempting is not well
founded.
366. Evidence is admissible to prove that the plaintiff,
or the defendant, or the agent of either of them, endea-
voured to suborn false testimony to be adduced in the
cause ; x and, in Moriarity v. L. C. & D. Ry., Cockburn,
C. J., states, as the reason of this rule, that " the conduct
of a party to a cause may be of the highest importance
in determining whether the cause of action in which he
is plaintiff, or the ground of defence if he is defendant,
is honest and just ; just as it is evidence against a pris-
oner that he has said one thing at one time and another
at another, as showing that the recourse to falsehood
tends fairly to an inference of guilt. Anything from
which such an inference can be drawn is cogent and
important evidence with a view to the issue. So, if you
can show that a plaintiff has been suborning false testi-
mony, and has endeavoured to have recourse to perjury,
it is strong evidence that he knew perfectly well his
cause was an unrighteous one. I do not Bay that it is
conclusive. I fully agree that it should be pul to I In-
jury, with the intimation that it docs ool always follow
because a man, not sure he shall be able to succeed by
righteous means, has recourse to means of a different
character, that that which he desires, namely, the gain-
1 Annesley v. Earl of Anglesey 17 How. St. Tr. 1138 ; Moriarity 9. I
D. Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B. 314 ; C. C. Ry. v. McMahon, LOS IN. 486,8 km. &
R. E. Cas. G8; March v. S. C. K. B., 66 (la. 274.
424 INSPECTION OF INJURIES.
ing of the victory, is not his due, or that he has not
good ground for believing that justice entitles him to it.
It does not necessarily follow that he has not a good
cause of action, any more than a prisoner's making a
false statement to increase his appearance of innocence
is necessarily a proof of his guilt; but it is always evi-
dence which ous;ht to be submitted to the tribunal
which has to judge of the facts."
V. INSPECTION OF THE INJURIES OF THE PERSON INJURED.
The person injured is entitled to exhibit his personal injuries to the
jury, and the court, in its discretion, may direct the person injured
to submit to a physical examination by medical men appointed by
the court.
367. The person injured may exhibit his injuries to
the jury. 1 Where, in its opinion, the interests of justice
justify it, the Court may require the injured person to
submit to an examination by competent and disinter-
ested experts on behalf of the railway. 2 So also the
Court may, in its discretion, direct the person injured
to perform, in the presence of the jury, a physical act
which will necessarily test the nature and character of
his physical injuries. 3
VI. SPEED OF TRAINS.
Any witness who saw the train in motion at the place of the injury
may testify as to its speed, hit unless he fixes its speed by some reli-
able data, his testimony will be of little weight.
3G8. Any person who saw a train in motion at any
time, and at any place, is a competent witness to testify
1 Mulhade v. B. C. R. R., 30 N. Y. 370.
2 Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334 ; Schroeder v. C, R. I. & P. Ry., 47 Iowa
37.". ; A., T. & 8. F. Ry. v. Thul, 29 Kan. 466, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 378 ;
S. C. & P. Ry. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 68;
While i. M. C. R. R., 61 Wise. 536, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 213; Loyd v.
H. & St. J. R. R., 53 Mo. 509.
3 Hatfield v. St. P. & D. Ry., 33 Minn. 130, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 292.
PROOF OF SPEED. 425
as to the speed of that train at that time and place ; x
but unless the witness is experienced in observing the
movements of trains, and unless he observes the time
occupied by the movement of the train over a definite
space, his testimony will not furnish a reliable basis for
a determination of the actual rate of speed of the train.
As Lyon, J., said in Hoppe v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. : 2 " the
estimate of a witness, especially of a non-expert, of the
rate of speed of a moving railway train is very unsatis-
factory proof, and should be received with great caution.
If the res gestce render it impossible, or even highly im-
probable, that the estimate can be, or is, correct, it should
be rejected." In Tully v. F. R. R., 3 Colburn, J., said :
"the only evidence as to the rate of speed of the train was
the testimony of one witness, who saw the train stop,
that it stopped forty or fifty yards from the crossing ;
and of another that he noticed that the train, after it
had stopped, was about three hundred yards from the
place of the accident. We are of the opinion that no
inference could be drawn from this evidence, that the
train passed the crossing at an unreasonable rate of
speed. How soon the train would have stopped de-
pended upon the state of the track and the weight of the
train, upon the kind of brakes used, whether to be up-
plied by the engineer or by men along the train, and, ir
the latter, how quickly the men responded to the signal,
and upon how promptly after the accident the engineer
applied the brakes, or gave the signal, and how e
he discovered the accident, and upon these points there
was no evidence whatever. Neither was there any
evidence of how soon a given train, al a given rate of
1 D. & M. R. R. v. Van Bteinbnrg, 17 Mich. 99; <'., B. & Q. EL Et. ■ John-
son, 103 111. r >12, 8 Am. & Eng. B. B. Ca& 226.
2 61 Wise. 357, L9 Am. & Eng. B. B. Cas. 74.
8 134 Mass. 499, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. (;>!.».
426 OMISSION OF SIGNALS.
speed, could be stopped, under any given circumstances,
and this cannot be considered a matter of common
knowledge." On the other hand, in Penna. Coal Co.
v. Conlan, 1 witnesses were permitted to testify as to the
speed of a train without reference to any standard of
speed, and testimony was also admitted to show the dis-
tance run by the train after striking a person, without
showing any of the circumstances regarded as material
in the Tully case. In Van Horn v. B. C. K. & N. Ey., 2
non-expert witnesses were allowed to testify " that they
judged from the sound of the train that at the time of
the accident it was running very rapidly, and more
than six miles an hour, which it appears was the high-
est speed allowed by ordinance of the city ;" and
such testimony was held sufficient to justify a finding
of negligence against the railway. One case 3 goes so far
as to hold that only experts can testify as to the time
and distance within which a moving train can be
brought to a stop. In G. R. & I. R. R. v. Huntley, 4 it
is held that evidence as to the speed of a train should
show the actual rate by reference to some standard of
rapidity, and should show that that rate was dangerous
under the circumstances, and that the mere opinion of •
a passenger is not satisfactory proof of the speed of a
train.
VII. SIGNALS.
Tlie credibility and effect of testimony, that signals were or were not
given, is for the jury ; but they should be directed by the judge as to
the relative weight of the testimony.
369. The testimony of witnesses that signals were
given is of higher grade than testimony that they were
1 101 111. 93, G Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243.
» 59 Iowa 33, 7 Am. & Eng. R, E. Cas. 591.
3 M., A. & B. Ry. v. Stewart, 30 Kans. 226, 13 Am. & Eng R. R. Cas. 503.
* 38 Mich. 539.
OMISSION OF SIGNALS. 427
not given, and the testimony of witnesses who were
listening for the signals is of higher grade than the
testimony of witnesses who were not listening for them,
but the credibility and effect of all such testimony is
for the jury; 1 thus, in Greany v. L. I. R. E,., 2 where
the railway was held liable to a traveller on the high-
way, who was injured, at a grade crossing in a village
close to the railway station, by a train which was run-
ning at high speed, passengers on the train having tes-
tified that the crossing signals were not given, Dan-
forth, J., said, as to the evidence that the signals were
omitted : " it is apparent that the best evidence of the
fact in dispute would be the testimony of those persons
who, on the particular occasion in question, had the
custody or management of the bell or whistle. They
were, however, in the employ of the defendant, them-
selves interested in proving that the proper signals were
given by those instruments, and the law does not require
an adverse party to put his case in the hands of persons
having such relations to the transaction. Besides those
persons, all others must give evidence secondary in
character. One person might be watching the bell,
looking at it, or listening for its sound ; the value of
his testimony would depend upon his nearness to the
machine, the accuracy of his sense of sight or hearing,
the existence, or force, or direction of the wind, and
other causes. Another person might be neither look Lng
nor listening, and yet his position be such, and the cir-
1 D., W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, 3 App. Caa. 1155 ; Longenecker P.P. B K..
105 Penna. St. 328 ; C, B. & Q. R. E. v. Slumps, 55 III. 367 ; C. & A. K. B. v.
Gretzner, 40 Id. 74; C.,B.& Q. R. R. ■. Dickson, 88 I.I. 431 ; C. & A. B K. ,-.
Robinson, 106 Id. 142, 19 Am. & Eng. B. B. Caa. 396; 0., B. & Q. B
Dougherty, 110 Id. 521; Culhane v. N. Y. C. & H. B B B, 80 N.Y. 133;
Klanowski v. G. T. Ry, Mich. , 21 Am. A Eng. B B Caa. 648; Bhoade.
v. C.&G.T. Ry, Mich. , 21 Am.<& Eng. B B. Caa 659; Buntn
P. R. R, 14 Ney. 351, 6 ^Vm. & Eng. R. B. I !aa. 282.
2 101 N.Y. 419.
428 OMISSION OF SIGNALS.
cumstances about him so favourable, that his testimony
would be of equal or greater persuasive power than
that of the other. A jury must ascertain. An appel-
late court cannot say that the testimony of either should
be rejected. Nor should a trial judge be required to
determine its weight, or the fact which it did or did not
ascertain, if it has any legal effect. No error, there-
fore, was committed in allowing the witnesses, K., T.,
and R., to testify. They were passengers upon the train
causing the injury, and were in such position that it
would not have been impossible for them to have heard
the signal if it had been given." But in Ellis v. G. W.
By., 1 it was held in the Court of Exchequer Chamber
(Cockburn, C. J., dissenting), that testimony for the
plaintiff that the plaintiff did not see the lights of an
approaching train, nor hear its signals, is equally
consistent with two different states of facts, viz. : that
the train was not lit and the signals were not given, or
that the train having been lit and the signals having
been given, the witness failed to observe either the
lights or the signals ; and that for that reason the tes-
timony proves nothing, and makes no case to go to the
jury. The same view is expressed in Bohan v. M., C.
S. & W. By., 2 in which case Lyon, J., said, with great
force : " the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, that
they did not hear the bell ring, or did not see the
lighted lantern at the head of the gravel cars, is purely
negative, and its negative character is intensified by the
fact, which is made perfectly obvious by their testimony,
that they did not look attentively, but only casually, at
the approaching train, and the attention of none of
them was directed to the presence or absence of such
warnings. Upon this record the credibility of the de-
1 L. K. 9 C. P. 551.
a Gl Wise. 391, 19 Am. & Eng. R. E. Cas. 276.
OMISSION OF SIGNALS. 429
fendant's witnesses, who testified positively to the ring-
ing of the bell and the presence of the brakeman on
the gravel car with a lighted lantern, stands unim-
peached. * * * The negative testimony of plaintiff and
his witnesses, while it has some bearing upon the ques-
tion of the warnings, amounts to little more than, so to
speak, a mere scintilla of evidence, and did not justify
the jury in their disregard of all the positive and other-
wise unimpeached testimony that the warnings were
given." In Tully v. F. R. R., 1 Colburn, J., said : " the
only evidence upon the subject of the ringing of the
bell or sounding of the whistle came from one witness,
and was as follows : ' I thought I heard the sound of
the train coming, and it sounded to me like the puffing
of the engine, and about the bell ringing I cannot say
whether I heard it or not. I disremember, I was so
excited at the time.' And in answer to the question,
' Did you hear any whistle ?' he said, ' I don't remem-
ber.' This was all the evidence, and we are of opinion
that it would not warrant the jury in finding that the
bell was not rung, or that the steam whistle was not
sounded. If it is urged that, if the bell had been rung
or the whistle sounded, the witness would have remem-
bered it, it may be urged, with about the same force,
that, if the bell had not been rung nor the whistle
sounded, the witness would, under the circumstances,
have noticed the omission and remembered it. No
legitimate inference can be drawn from the testimony
one way or the other, and the attempt to draw an in-
ference could only end in a mere conjecture."
370. The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses
in such cases is, however honest and truthful, not re-
liable. The excitement and shock of the accident ne-
1 134 Mass. 499, 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa. 682.
430 OMISSION OF SIGNALS.
cessarily affect the accuracy of the plaintiff's recollection
as to the circumstances immediately preceding the acci-
dent. The plaintiff and those who are in his immediate
company at the time of the injury always believe that
signals of the train's approach were not given, because
they did not hear those signals, for if they had heard
them they would not have attempted to cross the line,
and they assume that, which the experience of life con-
tradicts, that if the signals had been given they must
have heard them. The testimony of disinterested by-
standers is equally unreliable, whether they testify that
the signals were or were not given, unless it be shown
that for some particular reason their attention was
directed to the approach of the train and to the sound-
ing or non-sounding of its signals, and this remark ap-
plies with the greater force to people who live near a
railway line, or whose calling comjiels them to pass their
time in proximity thereto, for such people become so
accustomed to the noises incident to railway operations
that any one sounding of the whistle or ringing of the
bell makes no impression upon them. At the best, the
testimony for the plaintiff being negative is not of equal
value with positive testimony that the signals were
given. The testimony of the engine-driver and fireman
that the signals were given is of greater value. The
railway servants who hold those responsible positions
are generally men of intelligence. They realize thor-
oughly the dangers necessarily incident to railway
operations. They know that their duty requires them
to give such signals, and that their own lives and the
lives of the train hands and passengers as well as the
lives of those who may cross the line may be put in
peril if a collision result from their non-performance of
duty in that respect, and that the disregard of that
duty is an unpardonable offence against discipline, and
LIFE TABLES. 431
as such, a cause of dismissal from the service. There
are, therefore, operating against the engine-driver's and
fireman's neglect to give the necessary signals some of
the strongest forces that v can control human action,
namely, the habits formed by discipline, professional
ambition, a sense of duty, and the love of life. The
reasonable doctrine is, as stated in section 369, that it is
for the jury to weigh the evidence, pro and con, as to
the giving of signals in such cases, but it is certainly
the duty of the judge to put before the jury those con-
siderations which determine the value of the conflicting
evidence on one side and the other, in order that a just
result may be reached. It is, however, held in Illinois,
that it being the province of the jury to determine for
themselves the credibility and weight of conflicting
evidence, it is not the duty of the court to direct the
jury what evidence is entitled to greater consideration
on their part. 1
VIII. ADMISSIBILITY OF LIFE TABLES.
Approved life tables are admissible in evidence to show, in case oj
death, the decedent's expectancy of life.
371. The Carlisle or other approved tables are ad-
missible in evidence to show the injured person's expec-
tancy of life. 2 In Rowley v. L. & N. W. Ry., the
Carlisle tables were referred to by a witness Who stated
1 Rockwood v. Poundstone, 38 111. 200; L. N. A. * C. Ry. v. Shirrs, 108 Id.
617, 19 Am. & Eng. R. It. Cas. 387 ; C. & A. It. R. v. Robinson, 106 111. L42,
19 Am. & Eng. It. R. Cas. 396.
> Rowley v. L. & N. W. Ry., L. R. 8 Ex. 221 ; McDonald v. < . A- V W
26 Iowa 124; Schemer v. M. & St. J, Ry, 32 Minn. 126, 618, L9 km. ■
R.R.Cas.173; Simonson v. C, R. I. & V. Ry, 48 [owa 19; K. P. Ry . t,
Lundin, 3 Colo. 94; D. S. P. & P. Ry. ''• W Iward, 4 Id. 1 ; Banter v. V ^ .
C & II. R. R. R, 66 N. Y. 60; C R. R. v. Richarda, 62 I to. 806 ; I tonald on
v .M.&M.R.R,18Iowa280; L. C. & L. R. R. v. Mahony,? Bn b(Kj )
235; B., C, K. & W . R. R. v. Coates, 62 Iowa 487, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. I B ,
265.'
432 TOVEKTY OF PERSON INJURED.
that he was an "accountant," and had had personal
experience as to the mode in which life insurance busi-
ness was conducted, and he then gave evidence as to the
expectancy of life which was material in that case. It
was held in the Exchequer Chamber that the evidence
was properly admitted, Blackburn, J., saying: "We
think the average and probable duration of a life of that
asfe was material, and we do not see how that could be
better shown than by proving the practice of life insur-
ance companies, who learn it by experience. It was
objected that the witness was not an actuary, but only
an accountant, but as he gave evidence that he was ex-
perienced in the business of life insurance, we think his
evidence was admissible, though subject to remark on
its weight." Brett, J., however, doubted the compe-
tency of the witness upon the ground that he was not an
actuary. In Donaldson v. M. & M. B. By., 1 and in Schef-
fler v. M. & St. L. By.. 2 it is held that the tables are
not to be proved by witnesses, but are to be judicially
taken notice of by the court.
IX. PROOF AS TO POVERTY OF THE PERSON INJURED.
Proof is not admissible of the poverty of the pterson injured, or killed,
or of the number of individuals dependent on him for support.
372. Proof of the number of the family dependent
upon the person injured, or of his or their poverty, is
not admissible, for such testimony would obviously tend
to prejudice the jury and to divert their minds from
the real issues in the cause. 3
1 18 Iowa 280.
a 32 Minn. 125, 518, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173.
3 Penna. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 225 ; C. B. A
Q. R. R. v. Johnson, 103 111. 512, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 225 ; M. P. By. v.
Lyde, 57 Tex. 505, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 188.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 433
CHAPTER Y.
THE BURDEN OF PEOOF.
I. The burden of proving negligence.
II. The burden of proving contributory negligence.
I. THE BURDEN OF PROVING NEGLIGENCE.
The burden is upon the plaintiff of showing affirmatively negligence
upon the part of the railway.
373. The general rule as to the burden of proof can
best be stated in the words of Mr. Justice Stephen, 1 as
follows : " whoever desires any court to give judgment
as to any legal right or liability which depends on the
existence or non-existence of facts which he asserts or
denies to exist, must prove that those facts do or do not
exist. The burden of proof in any action lies when
the action begins on that party against whom the judg-
ment of the court would be given if no evidence at all
were produced on either side, regard being had to any
presumption which might appear upon the pleadings.
As the action proceeds, the burden of proof may be
shifted from the party on whom it rested at first by his
proving facts which raise a presumption in his favour."
Under this general rule the plaintiff in actions tore-
cover for injuries resulting from negligence must show
affirmatively the duty of the defendant under I lie cir-
cumstances and the defendant's non-performance of
1 Digest of the Law of Evidence, art. 93, 96.
28
434 NEGLIGENCE.
that duty j 1 for, as Willes, J., said in Daniel v. M. Ry. : 2
" it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish by evidence
circumstances from which it may fairly be inferred that
there is reasonable probability that the accident resulted
from the want of some precaution which the defendants
might and ought to have resorted to ; and I go further,
and say that the plaintiff should also show with reason-
able certainty what particular precaution should have
been taken." This dictum is cited with approval in
Hayes v. M. C. R. R., 3 and in P., W. & B. R. R. v.
Stebbing. 4 When the evidence fails to establish the
defendant's duty and its non-performance, that is, when
the evidence is equally consistent with the existence or
non-existence of negligence, the judge ought not to
permit the cause to go to the jury. 5 So where in an
1 C. & N.W. Ey. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 504; Brown v. C. & B. St. Ey., 49 Id.
153; Henry v. L. S. & M. S. Ey., Id. 495; Mitchell v. C. & G. T. Ey., 51 Id.
236 ; C, St. L. & N. O. E. E. v. Trotter, 61 Miss. 417 ; Parrott v. Wells, 15
Wall. 524 ; P. & E. E. E. v. Heil, 5 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 91 ; Clark
v. P. & E. E. E, Id. 119 ; P. & E. E. E. v. Hummell, 44 Penna. St. 375 ; P. &
E. E. E. r. Spearen, 47 Id. 300; Holbrook v. U. & S. E. E, 12 N. Y. 236;
Curtis v. E. & S. E. E., 18 Id. 524; P.,W. & B. E E. v. Stebbing, 62 Md.
504, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 36 ; C, C. & I. C. Ey. v. Troesch, 68 111. 545 ;
Eobinson v. F. & W. E. E., 7 Gray (Mass.) 92.
2 L. E. 3 C. P. 216, 222. 3 111 U. S. 228.
4 62 Md. 504, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 36.
8 Cotton fl.Wood; 8 C. B. N. S. 568, 98 E. C. L.; Hammack v. White, 11 C.
J3. N. S. 588, 103 E. C. L. ; Toomey v. L., B. & S. C. Ey., 3 C. B. N. S. 146, 91
E C. L. ; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. N. S. 692, 111 E. C. L. ; Welfare v. L. &
B. Ey., L. E. 4 Q. B. 693 ; Manzoni v. Douglass, 6 Q. B. D. 145 ; Allyn v. B-
& A. E. E., 105 Mass. 77 ; Lane v. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177 ; Corcoran v. B. &
A. Ey., 133 Mass. 507 ; B., C, E. & N. Ey. v. Dowell, 62 Iowa 629 ; Carter v.
C. & G. Ey., 19 S. C. 20 ; B. & O. E. E. v. The State, to use of Allison, 62 Md.
479, 19 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 83 ; Ford v. C. I. E. E, Iowa , 17 Am.
& Eng. E. E. Cas. 599 ; C. & A. E. E. v. Mock, 88 111. 87 ; Cordell v. N. Y. C.
& H. E. E. E, 75 N. Y. 330 ; Warner v. E. E. E, 44 Id. 465 ; T., W. & W.
Ey. v. Branagan, 75 Ind. 490, 5 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 630; Willoughby v. C
& N.W. Ey., 37 Iowa 432; c/. Allen v. Willard, 57 Penna. St. 347 ; Simpson
v. L. G. Omnibus Co., L. E. 8 C. P. 390 ; Mitchell v. Alestree, 1 Ventr. 295.
W. P. P. Ey. v. Mulhair, 6 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 508, is not con-
«istent with the authorities.
BURDEN OF PROOF. 435
action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have
been caused by a railway's negligence, if it appears
that the injuries were occasioned by either one of two
causes, for one of which the railway is responsible, but
not for the other, the plaintiff cannot recover, for he
must show affirmatively that the causa causans of his
injury was negligence on the part of the railway, thus in
Searles v. M. Ry., 1 the plaintiff's injuries resulted
from the fall of a burning cinder from an engine on an
elevated railway upon the plaintiff, who was on the
street below, but the proof failed to show whether the
cinder came from the smoke stack, which was in good
order and guarded by a spark arrester, or from the
fire box, which was not shown to be out of repair, and
the court, therefore, entered judgment for the railway.
It is not necessary that the party on whom the burden
of proof rests should establish a case free from any
doubt, and it is sufficient to justify a verdict for him
that the evidence preponderates in his favour, and that
the jury would not act unreasonably in finding a verdict
for him. 2
II. THE BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
• GENCE.
It is held in some jurisdictions that the burden is also upon the plain-
tiff of showing affirmatively that the person injured was not con-
tributarily negligent, but the general rule seems to be that, if the
plaintiff's case has shown the railway to have been negligent, and
the railway relies upon contributory negligence as a defence, the
burden is on the railway oj proving that contributory negligence.
374. While all of the authorities agree that the
burden is upon the plaintiff of showing thai the de-
»101N.Y. 661. _ „ _ _ _
* Johnson v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 25 Hun 261 ; N. Y, L. E. & W. R. R. ft
Seybolt, 95 N. Y. 562.
436 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
I
fendant was negligent, or, in other words, that the id
jury resulted prima facie from the negligence of the
defendant, it is nevertheless held in some jurisdictions
that the burden is on the plaintiff of showing affirm-
atively that the person injured°was without fault, but
that that may be shown, either by direct evidence or
by proof of circumstances reasonably establishing that
the injury may have been occasioned without contribu-
tory negligence upon the part of the person injured. 1
Other authorities hold that if the j>laintiff's case has
shown that under the circumstances the defendant owed
him a duty, and that that duty has not been performed,
and that the injury has resulted therefrom, the obliga-
tion is then upon the defendant to prove plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence, if he relies upon that contributory
negligence as a defence to the action. 2 So far as re-
1 Per Brett, M. R., in Davey v. L. & S. W. Ry., 12 Q. B. D. 71 ; Murphy v.
Deane, 101 Mass. 466; Mayo v. B. & M. R. R., 104 Id. 137 ; Hinckley v. C. C.
R. R., 120 Id. 262; Tolman v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R., 98 N. Y. 198 ; Lee v. Troy
Co., Id. 115 ; Warren v. F. R. R., 8 Allen 227 ; Gleason v. Bremen, 50 Me.
222; State v. G. T. Ry., 58 Id. 176 ; State v. M. C. R. R., 76 Id. 357, 19 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 313 ; Pzolla v. M. C. R. R., 54 Mich. 273, 19 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 334; Murphy v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 45 Iowa 661 ; Starry v. D. & S.
W. R. R., 51 Id. 419 ; Raymond v. B., C, R. & N. Ry., 65 Iowa 152, 18 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 217, reversing s. c, 13 Id. 6 ; Behrens v. K. P. Ry., 5 Col.
400, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 184 ; Penna. Co. v. Galentine, 77 Ind. 320, 7
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 517 ; P., C. & St. L. R. R. v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110, 7 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 524 ; T., W. & W. Ry. v. Branagan, 75 Ind. 490, 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 630; Hawes v. B., C, R. & N. R. R., 64 Iowa 315, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 220 ; L., N., A. & C. Ry. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598, 19 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 28.
2 D., W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155 ; W. & G. Ry. v. Gladmon,
15 Wall. 401 ; L. & St. L. R. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 ; Oldfield v. N. Y. & H.
R. R., 14 N. Y. 310 ; Johnson v. H. R. R. R., 20 Id. 65 ; Button v. H. R. R. R.,
18 Id. 248 ; Wilds v. H. R. R. R., 24 Id. 230 ; Buesching v. Gas-Light Co., 73
Mo. 229 ; Sweigert v. II. & St. J. R. R., 75 Id. 475 ; Waters v. Wing, 59 Penna.
St. 213 ; Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Id. 32 ; P. R. R. v. Weber, 76 Id. 157 ; K. C,
St. J. & C. B. R. R. v. Flynn, 78 Mo. 195, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 23 ; D.
& W. R. R. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 160 ; P. R. R. v.
McTighe, 46 Penna. St. 316 ; P. R. R. v. Warner, 89 Id. 59 ; C. & P. R . R. v. Rowan,
66 Id. 393; Abbett v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 30 Minn. 482 ; Mares v. N. P. R. R.,
Dak. , 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 620 ; Wilson v. N. P. R. R., 26 Minn.
BURDEN OF PROOF. 437
gards the burden of proof, the conflict of authority on
this question is not of material importance, for the
plaintiff, under either line of authorities, is entitled to
go to the jury when he has proven an injury to himself
caused by negligence on the part of the defendant,
without any obvious want of care on his own part, but
the variance between the cases is, as shown in the next
chapter, of importance as regards the presumption of
contributory negligence, and, upon principle, it seems
to be much more reasonable to throw on the railway
the burden of proving that which only becomes a ma-
terial issue in the cause when negligence upon its part
has been proved.
278 ; McQuilken v. C. P. E. R, 50 Cal. 7 ; MacDougall v. C. Ry., 63 Cal. 431,
12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 143; P., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wright, 80 Ini 182, 5
An. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 628.
438 PRESUMPTIONS.
CHAPTER VI.
PRESUMPTIONS.
I. The presumption as to negligence.
II. The presumption as to contributory negligence.
III. Certain minor presumptions.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.
There is a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the rail-
way in the case of an injury caused by circumstances from which
may fairly be inferred a non-performance of duty on the part of the
railway.
375. In some cases "the very nature of the accident
may of itself, and through the presumption it carries,
supply the requisite proof;" 1 thus where circumstances
are proven from which it may fairly be inferred that
there is a reasonable probability that the accident re-
sulted from the want of some precaution which the
railway might, and ought to, have resorted to, there is,
in the absence of explanation by the railway, a pre-
sumption of negligence upon its part, or, as the rule is
put in Scott v. L. & St. K. Docks Co., 2 "where the par-
ticular thing causing the injury has been shown to be
under the management of the defendant, or his servants,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen, if those who have the manage-
ment use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in
the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from
want of care," In W. T. Co. v. Downer, 3 Field, J.,
thus states the rule : " a presumption of negligence
1 Wharton on the Law of Negligence, Par. 421. 2 3 H & C. 596.
s 11 Wall. 129.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. 439
from the simple occurrence of an accident seldom arises,
except where the accident proceeds from an act of such
a character that, when due care is taken in its perform-
ance, no injury ordinarily ensues from it in similar
cases, or where it is caused by the mismanagement, or
misconstruction, of a thing over which the defendant
has immediate control, and for the management, or
construction, of which he is responsible." 1 This rule was
first applied in cases where passengers were injured by
the breaking of the axle of a coach, 2 or by the careless
driving of a coach, 3 or by the coming off of a wheel of
a coach. 4 This presumption has been held to furnish
proof of negligence in cases of collision between two
trains operated by the same railway, 5 in the case of a
collision between two street cars, 6 in the case of collision
between a train which leaves the main line and cars on
a siding, 7 in the case of the explosion of the boiler of a
locomotive engine, 8 in cases of the derailment of railway
cars, 9 in the case of the giving way of an embank-
1 See also R. R. v. Mitchell, 11 Heisk. 400.
2 Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79. 3 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181.
* Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106.
5 Skinner v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 5 Ex. 787 ; I. R. R. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St.
418, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 361 ; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v. Allbritton, 38
Miss. 242.
6 Smith v. St. P. C. Ry., 32 Minn. 1, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310.
7 N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v. Seybolt, 95 N. Y. 562, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
162.
8 Robinson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R-, 20 Blatchf. 338.
9 Carpue v. L. & B. Rv., 5 Q. B. 747, 48 E. C. L.; Dawson ». M. By ,7 11.
& N. 1037 ; Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R-, 30 Penna. St. 23 I ; N. V, F, B. & W.
R. R. v. Daugherty, 11 Weekly Notes of < lases i Penna.) 437 ; Edgerton v. >'.
Y. C. & H. R R. R., 39 N. Y. 227; Festal v. M. R B., L09 Mass. 720; George
v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 34 Ark. 613, I Am. & Eng. B R Cas. 294; I'., C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462; < '., C.,C. & I By. v. Newell, 76 [d
Curtis*. B. & S. R R, 18 N. Y. 534; Tuttle v. <'., B I. & P. K.v., 48 [owa
236; Brignoli v. C. & G. E. R. K, 4 Daly L82; C, B. & Q. B B. v. '
19 111. 510. Pollock, C. B., in Bird v. Q. W. By., 28 L. J. Exch. 3, doubts u
to the applicability of the presumption of negligence on the part of the rail-
way in a case of simple derailment. See also Heaale v. l. l'>. & W. By,76 ill.
440 PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.
rrieiit, 1 in ,he case of the breaking down of a bridge, 2 in
the case jf the carrying away of a bridge by a freshet, 3
in cases where by a sudden jerk in starting or stopping a
car a passenger was thrown down, 4 in a case where a pas-
senger was injured in the course of a fight between other
passengers, 5 in a case where a passenger was injured by
the fall of a berth in a sleeping-car, 6 in a case where a
passenger on a packet boat was injured by a bale of
cotton negligently thrown down a hatchway by a ser-
vant of the packet company, 7 in a case where a passen-
ger while being carried in a car of the defendant, a
street car line, was injured in a collision between that
car and a railway engine, at a level crossing of the rail-
way line and the street on which the car ran; 8 in a
case where an intending passenger having purchased
a ticket, and while crossing the line at a station under
the direction of a station master, was, without fault upon
her part, run over by a train ; 9 in a case where the
plaintiff, walking upon the highway, was injured by the
fall of a barrel from the upper story of the defendant's
warehouse ; 10 in a case where the plaintiff, an officer of
501 ; Curtis v. R. & S. R. R., 18 N. Y. 543 ; L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Miles, 40
Ark. 298, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 10 ; Yonge v. Kinney, 28 Ga. Ill ; T. & St.
L. R. R. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 475.
1 G. W. Ry. v. Braid, 1 Moore P. C. N. S. 101, 9 Jur. N. S. 339 ; P. & R. R.
v. Anderson, 94 Penna. St. 251.
2 B. S. O. & B. R. R. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551, 21 Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 466.
3 K. P. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442.
4 N. J. R. R. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341 ; C. P. Ry. v. Swayne, 13 Weekly Notes
of Cases (Penna.) 41 ; Ferry Co. v. Monaghan, 10 Id. 46; Dougherty v. M. R.
R., 81 Mo. 325, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 325.
5 P. & C. R. R. v. Pillow, 76 Penna. St. 510.
6 C, C, C. & I. R. R. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
371.
7 O. & M. Packet Co. v. McCool, Ind. , 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 390.
8 P. P. Ry. v. Weiller, 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 306.
9 B. & O. R. R. R. v. State to use of Mali one, 63 Md. 135, 21 Am. & Eng. R
Ft. Cas. 202.
10 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 721.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. 441
the Custom's Service, while in the discharge of his duty,
entering the defendant's warehouse, was injured by the
fall of some bags of sugar from an upper story of the
warehouse ; l in a case where the plaintiff, walking on a
highway under a railway bridge, was injured by the
falling of a brick from an abutment, a train of the de-
fendant's having just passed, and the bridge having
been in use about three years and gaps being found in
the wall from which other bricks had apparently fallen; 2
in a case where, in the excavation of a cellar abutting
upon a highway, the cellar was left unfenced, and in
the morning the dead body of the plaintiff's decedent,
he being a man of proved sobriety, was found in the
cellar, with no marks of violence upon him other than
such as might have resulted from a fall into the cellar,
and with his watch and other personal property undis-
turbed; 3 and in a case where the dead body of the
plaintiff's decedent was found after dark between the
rails of the defendant's line, a train drawn by a locomo-
tive without a headlight having recently passed, and
decedent having been last seen upon the highway ap-
proaching a public crossing of the defendant's line. 4
376. This presumption has been held to be inappli-
cable in the case of a person injured on a highway used
as a part of a railway line by the falling upon him of
the door of a passing freight car, in the absence of
proof that the defect in the fastening of the door had
been brought to the knowledge of the defendant, or bad
so long existed that that knowledge must be presumed; 5
in a case where a passenger was injured by the fall
of a girder of a bridge over the line upon a carriage in
1 Scott v. L. & St. L. & K. Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596.
2 Kearney v. L. B. & 8. C. By., L. B. 6 Q. B. 759.
8 Allen v. Willard, 57 Penna. St. 374 ; rf. Lehman >■. Brooklyn, 29 Bart
*L. V. R. R. v. Hall, fil Penna.8t. 361 ; P. B, B < Fortn< 90 W
6 Case v. C, R. I. & P. R. K., 04 Iowa 7G2, 1'.' \>... <S Eng, l: B. ' ■< ■ I 12.
442 PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.
motion, the girder being placed in position by a con-
tractor engaged by a municipal corporation; 1 in a
case where a passenger, while looking at a time-table on
the wall of a station portico, was injured by a plank
and a roll of zinc which broke through the roof of the
portico and fell on him; 2 in a case where a passen-
ger in driving a wagon off a ferry-boat was injured by
the wheels of the wagon striking the drop of the ferry
and causing the load to fall; 3 in a case where a
passenger was injured by having his arm crushed be-
tween the window of a street car and a passing load of
hay; 4 in a case where it was proven that the dece-
dent, a brakeman, had fallen from a moving train and
been killed, but the evidence failed to show the manner
of his death or what he was doing at the time of his
fall; 5 in a case where the dead body of a man of
intemperate habits was found at the end of a stormy
night on a railway bridge over a street; 6 in a case
where a passenger was injured by having his arm
crushed between the window of his car and an object
projecting from cars at rest on another track; 7 in a
case where a passenger, while being carried in a horse
car, was injured by a collision between that horse car
and a train on the defendant's line; 8 in a case where
a passenger was injured in stepping down from the
platform of a car; 9 and in a case where a servant of the
1 Daniel v. M. Ry., L. R. 3 C. P. 216, 591, 5 H. L. 45.
1 Welfare v. L. & B. Ry., L. R. 4 Q. B. 693.
3 LeBaron v. E. B. Ferry Co., 11 Allen 312.
* F. S. & P. V. R. R. v. Gibson, 96 Penna. St. 83.
8 Corcoran v. B. & A. R. R., 133 Mass. 507.
6 State, to use of Barnard v. P., W. & B. R. R., 60 Md. 555, 15 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 481.
7 Holbrook v. U. & S. Ry., 12 N. Y. 236.
8 P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Penna. St. 91.
9 D., L. & W. R. R. v. Napheys, 90 Penna. St. 135, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Caa.
52 ; C, St. L. % N 0. R. R. v. Trotter, 60 Miss. 442 ; Mitchell v. C. & G. T.
PRESUMTTON OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 443
railway, while at work on a station platform, was in-
jured by a mail bag thrown by a post-office agent from
the mail car of a passing train. 1
377. The presumption of negligence in the case of
an injury to a passenger under any of the circumstances
above stated, is rebutted by proof of the care exercised
by the railway, and it is then for the jury to find
whether or not the railway was negligent. 2 In Georgia, 3
in cases of injury to any person other than a servant of
the railway, there is always a 'prima facie presumption
of negligence against a railway. 4
II. THE PRESUMPTION AS TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
In those jurisdictions where it is held that the burden is on the plain-
tiff of proving that he was not contributorily negligent, it is also held
that there is a rebuttable presumption of contributory negligence^
but in other jurisdictions where it is held that the burden is on the
railway of proving the plantiff's contributory negligence it is neces-
sarily held that there is a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff
was not contribidorily negligent.
378. In those jurisdictions where the burden is on
the plaintiff of proving affirmatively that he was not
contributorily negligent, the presumption necessarily is
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, 5 but in
other jurisdictions where the burden is not on the plain-
tiff of proving affirmatively that he was not contribu-
torily negligent, the presumption, of course, is that he
By., 31 Mich. 266, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 176 ; cf. Puller V. IT. R. R, 21
Conn. 557
» Muster v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 61 Wise. 325, IS Am. .V Bug. R. B. < !aa 118.
2 Eldredge ». M. & St. L. R. R., 32 Minn. 253, 21 fcn. & Eng. K, B. Cm. 494.
3 Par. 3033 of the Code.
* Central R. R. v. Brinson, 64 Ga. 47.1; S. W. K. R. v. Bingleton, 07 U. 808.
« Corcoran v. B. & A. R. R, 133 Ma*. 607 ; Riley *.C. B. R. B, 186 Mam
292, 15 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 181 ; Clia.se v. M. C. R. K,, 77 Me. 62, 19 Am.
A Eng. R R. Cas. 350.
444 MINOR PRESUMPTIONS.
was not contributorily negligent. 1 This presumption is
rebutted when testimony to the contrary is adduced, and
the jury should be directed that if they believe the
testimony they should find for the defendant. 2
III. MINOR PRESUMPTIONS.
379. Certain other presumptions are recognized in
some cases. Thus, where several other companies had
statutory running powers over the defendant's road and
defendant's train, on which the plaintiff was a passenger,
was run into by a moving train through the fault of the
guards of the latter, it was held that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary it must be presumed that the
train which caused the accident belonged to or was
under the control of the defendant. 3 Where a railway
owns a line in operation bearing the name of the railway
the presumption is that the railway operates it, and in
order to relieve itself from liability for injuries caused
by the negligence of the employes operating it, the bur-
den is upon the railway to show that it does not operate
the line. 4 So, also, there is a presumption that every
one riding in a railway car, intended for passengers, is
there lawfully, and the onus is upon the carrier to prove
affirmatively that such person was a trespasser; 5 but the
presumption is that an individual not in the service of
the railway and riding upon a freight train is not a
1 P. R. R. v. Weber, 76 Penna. St. 157 ; Weiss v. P. R. R., 79 Id. 387, 87 Id.
447 ; L. V. R. R. v. Hall, 61 Id. 361 ; C. & P. R. R. v. Rowan, 66 Id. 393 ;
Longenecker v. P. R. R., 105 Id. 328 ; Schura v. P. R. R., 107 Id. 8 ; Buesching
v. St. L. G. L. Co., 73 Mo. 229 ; K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R. v. Flynn, 78 Mo.
195 18 Am. & Eng. R. R, Cas. 23.
R. & C. R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Penna. St. 425. See sections 182, 183.
8 Ayles v. S. E. Ry., L. R. 3 Ex. 146.
* Ferguson v. W. C. Ry., 63 Wise. 145, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 285.
6 P. R. R. v. Books, 57 Penna. St. 345 ; Creed v. P. R. R., 86 Id. 139.
MINOR PRESUMPTIONS. 445
passenger. 1 As emergencies necessitating the arrest of
persons may be naturally expected to arise frequently
in the ordinary course of a railway's business, and are
of such a nature that a decision as to them must be made
promptly on the company's behalf, it is a reasonable in-
ference that the company have on the spot at their
stations officers authorized to make the decision promptly
for them, and where a plaintiff is arrested under the
authority of a superior officer at a railway station it will,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed
that he had authority to act for the railway. 2 A person
upon a train in motion acting as and wearing the uni-
form of a brakeman will be presumed to be a brakeman
in the employment of the railway operating the train. 3
A proven habit of intoxication in a conductor raises, in
the case of an injury to a passenger caused by the con-
ductor's action, a presumption of negligence. 4 If the
plaintiff has proven a physical injury it will be presumed
that physical pain followed the infliction of that injury,
and the existence of that pain as a substantive fact need
not be proved. 5 As a general rule there is no presump-
tion of negligence on the part of a railway in the case
of an injury to a servant of the railway. 6
There is a conclusive presumption that the laws of nature are certaiii
and uniform in their operation.
380. The presumptions which have been stated are
all rebuttable presumptions. Certain conclusive pre-
1 Eaton v. D., L. & W. R. R., 57 N. Y. 382 ; Waterbury v. N. Y. ( '. A : 1 1 B,
R. R., 17 Fed. Rep. 671.
2 Giles v. T. V. Ry., 2 El. & Bl. 822, 75 E. C L. ; Goff v. G. N. By. 8 I &
E. 672, 107 E. C. L.
3 Hughes v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R, 36 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 222 ; ffoffinao 9. N. Y.
C. &H. R. R. R., 44 Id. 1.
* P. R. R. ».Books,67 Penna. St.345 ; H. & B. T. It. B. v. I tecker, - I U. 12 I,
6 C. B. & Q. R. B. v. Wun.cr, 108 III. 588, 18 Am. & Eng. B. i:< a*. LOO.
' T. W. & W. Ry. v. Moore, 77 111. 217; I. C. Ry. v. Houck, 72 Id. 286.
446 CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS.
sumptions, however, have been recognized in the cases;
thus the accuracy and certainty of the operation of the
laws of nature is presumed and testimony cannot be
received to contradict those laws, 1 or to prove a manifest
impossibility, as that a car could, within a few yards from
a position of rest, attain a high rate of speed. 2
1 Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180.
* Cauley v. P. C. & St. L. Ry., 98 Penna. St. 498.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 447
CHAPTER VII.
THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCES OF THE COURT AND THE JURY,
I. Negligence and contributory negligence as questions of fact.
II. The duty of the judge.
I. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
QUESTIONS OF FACT.
Negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact to be de-
termined by the jury.
381. The maxim of the common law is, "ad questioner
juris respondent judices ; ad questionem facti respondent
juratores. ,> Every one concedes the soundness of the
general principle thus tersely stated, but there is often
a difference of opinion in the trial of causes as to the
real nature of the issue, and consequently as to the
character of the tribunal whose decision is to conclude
it. In actions for the recovery of damages for injuries
to the person, it is generally for the jury to determine
whether the defendant was negligent or the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent; 1 that is, whether either
party failed to exercise that degree of care which the
1 Crofts v. Waterhouse. 3Bing.319, HE. C. L: ; McCnllyr. Clarke, 40 Penna.
St. 406; W. & A. R. R. v. King, 70 Ga. 261, 19 Am. & Eng. B. EL I
Wright v. G. R. R., 34 Ga. 337 ; P. & C. B. B. v. Andrews, 89 Md.848; Mo-
Mahon v. N. C. Ry., Id. 449; P. R. B. v. State, to use of McGirr, 81 I.I. 108,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 326; P. & R. K. EL v. Killipo, 88 Penna. St. 412 ;
Schura v. P. R. R., 107 Id. 8; Bell v. H. & Si. J. Ft. EL, 7:' M6. 50, I \m. A
Eng. R. R. Cas. 580 ; Guggenheim v. L. 8. & M.S. K. EL, — Mich. — , 22 \ m &
Eng. R. B. Cas. 546; Peuna. Co. v. liens '1, 70 Ind. 569, 6 Am. A Eng. R. R.
Cas. 79.
448 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
circumstances of the case demanded, for the inquiry
necessitates, in the words of Strong, J., in McCully v.
Clarke, 1 an ascertainment of "both the duty and the
extent of performance." In order to reach a result the
jury have not only to consider the acts and omissions
of the parties, but they must also draw all the infer-
ences which directly result from those acts and omis-
sions, for, in general, the negligence of one party or
the other is, as Dr. Wharton has pertinently said, 2 not
"the subject of direct proof, but an inference from facts
put in evidence."
II. THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
It is the duty of the judge to submit for the determination of the jury
only those issues which are not concluded and agreed upon either
by the pleadings, or by express admissions of the parties, or by the
tacit admissions of the parties in their conduct of the cause ; and
before submitting those issues, it is the duty of the judge to deter-
mine whether as to each issue competent evidence has been produced,
which, if believed by the jury, will justify men of reasonable minds
in finding a verdict in favour of the party upon whom rests the
burden of proof in that particular issue.
382. Lord Blackburn has clearly pointed out, in his
judgment in D., W. & "W. Ry. v. Slattery, 3 that it is
the function of the jury to determine only those facts
which are the subject of controversy, and, therefore,
where any facts, and the necessary inferences to be
drawn from them, are expressly admitted, either by
the effect of the pleadings, or by a formal admission at
the trial, or are tacitly admitted " by such a conduct of
the cause as is equivalent to such an admission," it is
not necessary to take the opinion of the jury thereon,
but it is the duty of the judge to decide as to their
1 40 Penna. St. 406. * Law of Negligence 354.
8 3 App. Cas. 1201.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 449
legal effect. Therefore, upon the issue of the defend-
ant's negligence when the plaintiff has put in all the
legally admissible testimony which his counsel sees
proper to introduce, and upon the issue of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, when the plaintiff's case
has not shown him to have been contributorily negli-
gent, and when the defendant has put in all the evi-
dence which his counsel sees proper to introduce, it
becomes the duty of the judge to determine whether a
jury of reasonable men, believing that testimony, giving
full weight to it, and drawing all the inferences from it,
would be justified in finding a verdict for the party who
has produced that evidence, for as Williams, J., said in
Adams Express Co. v. Sharpless : x "the jury cannot
find nesdisence from facts and circumstances which do
not tend to show want of reasonable and ordinary care,
any more than they can find any other facts without
competent and sufficient evidence." It was formerly
the doctrine that a question of fact must necessarily be
submitted to the jury, if it were supported by no more
than a mere scintilla of evidence, but the later cases
have adopted a more reasonable rule, which has been
stated by different judges in different words, but to the
same effect. Thus, in Jewell v. Parr, 2 Maule, J., said :
"applying the maxim, de minimis non curat lex, when
we say that there is no evidence to go to a jury, we do
not mean that there is literally none, but that there is
none which ought reasonably to satisfy a jury thai the
fact sought to be proved is established." In Toomey v.
L.B.&S.C.Ky., 3 Williams, J., said: "it is not enough
to say that there was some evidence, Cor every person
who has had any experience in courts of justice knows
very well that a case of this sort against ;i railway com-
> 77 Penna. St. 522. 2 1 8 C B. 909, 76 E. C. L.
3 3 C. It. N. S. 149, 91 E. C L.
29
450 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
pany could only be submitted to a jury with one result.
A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there may
have been negligence on the part of* the defendants,
clearly would not justify the judge in leaving the case
to the jury; there must be evidence upon which they
might reasonably and properly conclude that there was
negligence." In Ryder v. Wombwell, 1 Willes said:
"there is in every case a preliminary question which is
one of law, viz. : whether there is any evidence on which
the jury could properly find the question for the party
on whom the onus of proof lies. If there is not, the judge
ought to withdraw the question from the jury, and direct a
nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff, or direct a verdict for
the plaintiff if the onus is on the defendant." In Bridges
v. N. L. Ry., 2 the judges having been called in, Pollock, B.,
said, referring to Ryder v. Wombwell: "this is a clear ex-
position of the rule, and it has been generally acquiesced
in and acted upon, and it follows from it that although
the question of negligence, or no negligence, is usually
one of pure fact, and, therefore, for the jury, it is the
duty of the judge to keep in view a distinct legal defi-
nition of negligence as applicable to the particular case;
and if the facts proved by the plaintiff do not, whatever
view can be reasonably taken of them, or inference
drawn from them by the jurors, present a hypothesis
which comes within that legal definition, then to with-
draw them from their consideration." The Lords, who
decided Bridges' case, having held that upon the facts
there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury, but
not in express terms either approving of or dissenting
from the rule as laid down in Ryder v. Wombwell, there
not unnaturally followed some misapprehension as to
the proper course to be pursued by a judge in directing
1 L. E. 4 Ex. 32. 'LR.7 H. L. 213.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 451
a jury upon a question of negligence In Robson v. N.
E. Rj., 1 Coleridge, C. J., intimated that the effect of
Bridges' case was that "if there was any evidence at all,
it is for the jury and not for the judge to say whether
there was negligence on the part of the company ;" and
Brett, J., added 2 that, "as the carrying of passengers
was conduct in the ordinary affairs of life, the jury was
the proper tribunal to decide;" and in Jackson v. Metro-
politan By., 3 Amphlett, J. A., said : "it is now settled
by the case of Bridges v. N. L. By. (though previously
doubted by many eminent judges), that the question
whether in cases of this sort negligence can be inferred
from a given state of facts, is itself a question of fact for
the jury, and not a question of law for the court, or the
presiding judge." But when Jackson's case came be-
fore the House of Lords, 4 Cairns, L. C, and Lords
O'Hagan, Blackburn, and Gordon concurred in holding
that Bridges' case did not have the effect attributed to
it of qualifying the rule in Byder v. Wombwell, Cairns,
L. C, saying: 5 "the judge has a certain duty to dis-
charge and the jury have another and a different duty.
The judge has to say whether any facts have been es-
tablished by evidence from which negligence may be
reasonably inferred ; the jurors have to say whether
from those facts when submitted to them negligence
ought to be inferred" and Lord Blackburn adding: "on
a trial by jury I conceive, undoubtedly, that the facts
are for the jury and the law for the judge. * • * It has
always been considered a question of law, to be deter-
mined by the judge, subject, of course, to review, whether
there is evidence which if it is believed, and the con-
trary evidence, if any, is not believed, would establish
1 2 Q. B. D. 87. ' P- 89 -
8 L. R. 2 C. P. D. 127. * 3 App. Cas. 193.
6 P. 197.
452 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
the fact in controversy. It is for the jury to say
whether and how far the evidence is to be believed.
And if the facts, as to which evidence is given, are such
that from them a farther inference of fact may legit-
imately be drawn, it is for the jury to say whether that
inference is to be drawn or not. But it is for the judge
to determine, subject to review, whether from those
facts that farther inference legitimately may be drawn."
In D. W. & W. Ey. v. Slattery, 1 the rule as thus de-
fined, was reasserted. Lord Coleridge, however, 2
doubted the practical efficacy of the rule, saying: "to
me the uselessness of such rules as practical guides lies
in the inherent vagueness of the word 'reasonable,' the
absolute impossibility of finding a definite standard to
be expressed in language, for the fairness and reason of
mankind, even of judges. The reason and fairness of
one man is manifestly no rule for the reason and fairness
of another, and it is an awkward, but so far as I can
see, an inevitable consequence, of the rule, that in every
case where the decision of a judge is overruled, who does
or does not stop a case on the ground that there is, or
is not, reasonable evidence for reasonable men, those
who overrule him say, by implication, that in the case
before them the judge who is overruled is out of the
pale of reasonable men. The same is true of a whole
court, the decision of which, in a case of this sort, is
reversed upon appeal." But this criticism, eminent as
is the source from whence it proceeds, would seem to be
answered by the observations of Mellor, J., and of Lord
Blackburn. The former said, in Ryder v. Wombwell : 3
"there is no doubt a possibility in all cases where the
judges have to determine whether there is evidence on
which the jury may reasonably find a fact, that the
*3 App. Cas. 1155. J P. 1197.
* L. R. 4 Ex. 42.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 453
judges may differ in opinion, and it is possible that the
majority may be wrong. Indeed, whenever a decision
of the court below on such a point is reversed, the ma-
jority must have been so, either in the court above or in
the court below. This is an infirmity which must affect
all tribunals." The latter, after quoting the statement
of Mellor, J., added, in Metropolitan Ry. v. Jackson i 1
"I quite agree that this is so, and it is an evil. But I
think it a far slighter evil than it would be to leave in
the hands of the jury a power which might be exercised
in the most arbitrary manner."
383. One of the best expositions of the rule is that
which was given by Miller, J., in the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Pleasants v. Fant, 2 where that
learned judge says : " it is the duty of a court in its re-
lation to the jury, to protect a party from unjust ver-
dicts arising from ignorance of the rules of law and of
evidence, from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from
any other violation of his lawful rights in the conduct
of a trial. This is done by making plain to them the
issues they are to try, by admitting only such evi-
dence as is proper in those issues, and rejecting all else ;
by instructing them in the rules of law by which that
evidence is to be examined and applied, and finally,
when necessary, by setting aside a verdict which is un-
supported by evidence, or contrary to law. In the dis-
charge of this duty it is the province of the court, either
before or after the verdict, to decide whether the plain-
tiff has given evidence sufficient to support, or justify,
a verdict in his favour. Not whether on all the evi-
dence the preponderating weight is in his favour, thai is
the business of the jury, but conceding to all the evi-
dence the greatest probative force which, according to
the law of evidence, it is fairly entitled to, is it sufficient
'3App.Cas.208. ' 22 Wall. 121.
454 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
to justify a verdict ? If it is not, then it is the duty of
the court, after a verdict, to set it aside and grant a
new trial. Must the court go through the whole cere-
mony in such a case, of submitting to the jury the testi-
mony on which the j>laintiff relies, when it is clear to
the judicial mind, that if the jury should find a verdict
in favour of the plaintiff, that verdict would be set aside
and a new trial had ? Such a proposition is absurd, and
accordingly we hold the true principle to be, that if the
court is satisfied that, conceding all the inferences which
the jury can justifiably draw from the testimony, the
evidence is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the
plaintiff, the court should say so to the jury." This
doctrine, in itself so obviously reasonable and so con-
ducive to the right administration of justice, has been
asserted in many other cases. 1
1 Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 909, 76 E. C. L. ; Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 E.
& Bl. (92 E. C. L.) 232; Bridges v. N. L. Ry., L. R. 7 H. L. 213; Eobson v.
K E. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 87 ; Metropolitan Ry. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App.
Cas. 193 ; D. W. & W. Ry. v. Slattery, Id. 1170 ; Pawling v. U. S., 4 Cranch
221 ; U. S. Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheaton 179 ; Parks v. Ross, 11 Howard 373;
Schuchardt v. Allen, 1 Wallace 368; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Id.
604 ; Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Id. 442 ; Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S.
16 ; Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109 Id. 478; Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts. 556;
Germantown P. Ry. v .Walling, 97 Penna. St. 55 ; Central R. R. v. Feller, 84 Id.
229 ; Amer. S. S. Co. v. Bryan, 83 Id. 448 ; P., W. & B. R. R. v. Stinger, 78 Id.
219 ; Crissey v. Hestonville P. Ry., 75 Id. 83 ; Phila. P. R. v. Hassard, Id.
376 ; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Id. 223 ; Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 P. C. 335 ;
L. V. R. R. v. McKeen, 90 Penna. St. 122 ; Demy v. Wiiliams, 5 Allen 1 ; Brooks
v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271; Penna. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Penna. 34 ;
Howard Express Co. v. Wile, 64 Id. 201 ; P. & R. R. R. v. Schertle, 97 Id.
450; Hyatt v. Johnston, 91 Id. 196 ; Longenecker v. P. R. R., 105 Id. 328 ;
Hoye v. C. & N. W. Ry., 62 Wise. 666, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 347 ; Spens-
ley v. Insurance Co., 54 Wise. 433 ; Sabotta v. Insurance Co., 54 Id. 687 ; Fitta
v. C. C. Ry., 59 Wise 325, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 462 ; C. P. Ry. v. Foxley,
107 Penna. 537 ; Hogan v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 59 Wise. 139, 15 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 439 ; Dietrich v. B. & H. S. Ry., 58 Md. 347, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 115 ; Carter v. C. & G. R. R., 19 Shand. (S. C.) 20, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 414 ; Finney v. N. P. Ry., Dak. 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 17 ; P.
R. R. v. Fortney, 90 Penna. St. 324, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 129 ; Abbett v.
C, M. & St. P. Ry. 30 Minn. 482 ; Montclair v. Dana., 107 U. S. 162 ; Ander-
son County v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227 ; Baylis v. Travellers' Insurance Co., 113 U.
S. 316 ; Marshall v. Hubbard, 117 U. S. 415.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 455
384. Negligence being a question of fact for the jury,
it necessarily follows that no possible act of either com-
mission or omission on the part of either the plaintiff
or the defendant can, with logical accuracy, be charac-
terized as per se negligent, but all that can be predicated
of any such act, when found or admitted as a fact, is,
that it is so obviously negligent, that a jury would not
be reasonable if they found it not to be negligence, and
that, therefore, it is the duty of the judge to so direct
the jury, and, if they find against his direction, to grant
a new trial. The jDractical application of the rule in
the trial of actions against railways for injuries to the
person, therefore, is, that, before submitting the issue
to the consideration of the jury, the judge must 1 deter-
mine whether or not the party on whom the burden of
proof lies has, according to the rules of evidence, proved
facts, which, although not necessarily satisfactory to
the mind of the judge, would justify a jury of reason-
able men in finding a verdict in favour of that party ;
thus, if the issue be taken upon the negligence of the
defendant, the question for the determination of the
judge is, whether or not the evidence produced on
behalf of the plaintiff, admitting its truth, stating it
fairly, and drawing from it all the inferences that rea-
sonably can be drawn from it, is such that the jury may
reasonably find a verdict for the plaintiff. If the evi-
dence does not amount to this, it is the duty el' the
judge to nonsuit the plaintiff or to direct a verdict for
the defendant. If the issue be taken upon the {►Iain-
tiff's contributory negligence, the judge musl determine
whether the testimony upon behalf of the plaintiff
proves him to have been contributorily negligent If
that testimony does have that effect, it is the duty of
the judge to nonsuit the plaintiff or to direel a verdict
for the defendant. If the plaintiff's case lias not de-
456 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
veloped contributory negligence, and the testimony pro-
duced upon the part of the defendant, admitting its
truth and drawing all the inferences that can reason-
ably be drawn from it does have that effect, it is then
the duty of the judge to submit the question of con-
tributory negligence to the jury ; but, if the testimony
offered by the defendant to establish the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence is not sufficient, conceding its truth
and drawing the inferences from it, to justify a verdict
for the defendant upon that issue, it is the duty of the
judge to direct the jury that the plaintiff has not been
shown to have been contributorily negligent. It must
be remembered that it is for the jury, and not for the
judge, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. It is,
therefore, not competent for the judge to direct a ver-
dict for the plaintiff upon the issue of the defendant's
negligence, when the evidence to establish that negli-
gence has been produced upon behalf of the plaintiff,
nor to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the issue
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, when the
evidence to prove that contributory negligence has been
produced upon behalf of the defendant, because, in either
case, the jury may not believe the witnesses, and it is
only when the truth of the testimony can be assumed
that the judge is authorized to direct a verdict, for the
direction of a verdict amounts to a statement that, ad-
mitting the truth of the testimony produced to support
the issue, that testimony is not legally sufficient to
support it. This view is illustrated by Baylis v.
Traveller's Ins. Co., 1 in delivering judgment, in which
case, Matthews, J., said : " without a waiver of the right
of trial by jury by consent of parties, the court errs if
it substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon ths
1 113 u. S. 316.
THE COURT AND THE JURY. 457
effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved in the
issue, and renders judgment thereon."
385. No one can carefully study the cases against
railways for injuries to the person as reported in the
books, or observe the trials of such causes in the courts,
without coming to the conclusion that there is often a
miscarriage of justice, for, as Lord Blackburn said, 1
the real question seems often to be " whether it was not
shabby in the railway company not to give something
to the widow and orphans of the deceased." It is com-
mon to attribute that result to the prejudices of jurors.
But a careful consideration of the details of any such
case will show that, more frequently, the real cause of
the failure to do substantial justice is the inability of
the judge at the trial to properly control the jury.
Better results would undoubtedly be attained if the
judges would submit specific questions for the deter-
mination of the jurors so framed as to elicit a distinct
finding as to the particular act of negligence upon the
part of the defendant, or of contributory negligence
upon the part of the plaintiff. 2 In jurisdictions where
this course upon the part of the judge is not permis-
sible, or, if permissible, not expedient, lie may never-
theless, if he be intelligent, courageous, of sufficient
decision of character, and, in one word, competent, pre-
vent, by the application of the rules of evidence, the
minds of the jury from being diverted from the true
point of inquiry, and submitting questions to them only
upon adequate proof, and in his charge putting clearly
and unmistakably before them the precise questions of
fact which it is their province to determine, and by his
1 D., W. & "W. Ry. v. Blattery, L. R. 3 App. Cm. 1162.
2 The technicalities required inflpecial rerdicts under the common law n odei
them inadvisable. See P., P. W. AG B. B. o. Evens, 53 Penna St. 2 I P,
C. & St. L. R. R. v. Spencer, 93 Ind. 186, 21 Am, & Eng. B. B. I a 178.
458 THE DUTY OF THE JUDGE.
instructions upon the law, conveyed in clear terms and
laid down with firmness and decision, he may save them
from being swayed by extraneous circumstances and
from misapprehending the question in the cause, the
evidence relevant to it, or the rule of law controlling
their decision, and if they should fail to obey his ruling
as to the law, or should disregard the evidence, he can,
by the granting of a new trial, prevent injustice.
DAMAGES. 459
CHAPTER VIII.
DAMAGES.
I. Damages for breaches of contract.
II. Damages for torts.
III. Exemplary damages.
IV. The measure of damages in cases of injuries not causing death.
V. The measure of damages in cases of injuries causing death.
VI. Statutory limitations of damages.
I. DAMAGES FOR BREACHES OF CONTRACT.
Where the action is grounded upon the railway's breach of a contract
of carriage, damages are recoverable for such injuries as naturally
result from the breach of contract, and for such other injuries as may
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
time of the making of the contract as a probable result of its breach.
386. Where the action is grounded upon the railway's
breach of a contract of carriage, the damages recover-
able are such as may fairly and reasonably be con-
sidered as either naturally arising, that is, arising
according to the usual course of things from such
breach of contract itself, or such as may be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract as the probable result of a
breach of it. 1 If the plaintiff seeks to recover special
damages beyond those which may be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties at the time
of the making of the contract as a probable result of a
breach of it, it is necessary that the circumstances upon
1 Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry., L. R. 10 Q. B. Ill; Qoimby v. Vanderbilt, 17
N. Y. 80G; Trigg v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ky., 71 Bio. 117, <i Am. ,*t In-. K. K.
Cas. 345.
460 BREACH OF CONTRACT.
which the claim for special damages is founded should
have been, before the making of the contract, brought
to the attention of the other contracting party; 1 and
in order that the notice of such special circumstances
should give the right of recovery of special damages, it
is necessary that those circumstances should be such that
the making of the contract with notice of those circum-
stances amounts to an actual engagement on the part of
the defendant to bear the exceptional loss. 2 In Hamlin
v. G. N. Ey., 3 the defendant had contracted to carry
the plaintiff by train from London to Grimsby, and
thence by a connecting train to Hull, and upon his
arrival at Grimsby, there being no train to take him to
Hull as there should have been according to the con-
tract, he was compelled to stay at Grimsby over night
and to pay Is. 4d. for his fare to Hull, and he arrived
at Hull too late to take a train to another place to
which he had intended to go on business, but which
intention he had not communicated to the railway. At
the trial the judge directed the jury that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover only for the cost of his stay at
Grimsby and his fare to Hull, but that, not having
communicated to the railway his intention of proceed-
ing beyond Hull, he could not recover damages for
having been prevented from so doing, and after a ver-
1 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 ; Hamlin v. G. N. Ry., 1 H. & M. 408 ;
Fletcher v. Tayleur, 17 C. B. 21, 84 E. C. L. ; Le Peintur v. S. E. Ry., 2 L. J.
N. S. 170 ; G. W. Ry. v. Redmayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329 ; Griffen v. Colver, 16
N. Y. 489 ; Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 Id. 72; Krom v. Levy, 48 Id. 679 ;
Crater v. Bininger, 33 N. J. L. 513 ; Fessler v. Love, 43 Penna. St. 313 ; Adams
Express Co. v. Egbert, 36 Id. 360 ; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Id. 365 ;
Wolf v. Studebaker, 65 Id. 459 ; Phelan v. Andrews, 52 Id. 486 ; Smead t;.
Foord, 1 El. & El. 602, 102 E. C. L. ; Borries v. Hutchinson, 18 C. B. N.
S. 445, 114 E. C. L. ; Messmore v. N. Y. Shot Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Wilson v.
The N. Dock Co., L. R. 1 Ex. 177 ; M. & C. R. R. v. Green, 52 Miss. 779.
2 Home v. Midland Ry., L. R. 8 C. P. 131 ; Gee v. L. & Y. Ry., 6 H. & N.
211.
» 1 H. & N. 408.
DAMAGES. 461
diet for the plaintiff with 5s. damages, a rule, which
was moved for on behalf of the plaintiff, was refused.
So in Burton v. Pinkerton, 1 the defendant having en-
gaged the plaintiff to serve as a mariner for twelve
months on a merchant ship, from London to Rio and
other ports, and the plaintiff having left the ship at Rio
because she was employed in the naval service of the
Peruvian government, then at war with Spain, brought
his action for his wages under the contract, and also for
the recovery of damages for his imprisonment at Rio
as a deserter, and for the loss of clothes of which the
defendant had deprived him. The jury having found
for the plaintiff in the sum of £12 10s. for loss of wages
and £50 damages for his imprisonment and loss of
clothes, a rule was made absolute for a new trial for the
£50 damages, Bramwell, B., saying : " it is true that
in one sense the defendant's conduct caused the impris-
onment ; but for that no doubt the plaintiff would not
have been imprisoned. That, however, is not enough.
Suppose, for instance, the plaintiff had met robbers
while ashore, and had been injured by them, he certainly
could have recovered nothing from the defendant for
such injury, yet the defendant might in that case also
be said to have caused the damage. According to tin 1
ordinary rule, damage, to be recoverable by a plaintiff,
must inevitably flow from the tortious actof the defend-
ant. It must be caused by him as the causa causans,
and this imprisonment was not so caused." So in <i.
W. Ry. v. Redmaync, 2 where the railway bad broken
its contract to carry certain goods to Cardiff, and to de-
liver them at a certain time, and the plaintiff losl the
profits of their sale because the plaintiff's agent, to
whom they were to have been delivered for Bale, bad
i L. E. 2 Ex. 340. ' L- * * & P - 329 -
462 BREACH OF CONTRACT.
left Cardiff before the goods arrived, it was held that
in the absence of notice to the railway of the purpose
for which the goods were sent such profits could not be
recovered as damages for the delay. So in Woodger v.
G. W. Ry., 1 where a commercial traveller had delivered
to the railway certain samples of goods to be carried to
Liverpool, but did not state the purpose for which the
goods were required at Liverpool, and the goods being
delayed the commercial traveller waited three days un-
employed at Liverpool, it was held that his hotel ex-
penses there could not be recovered as damages. So in
Home v. M. Ry., 2 where the plaintiffs, being shoe man-
ufacturers at Kettering, and having contracted to de-
liver at a day certain a quantity of shoes to a firm in
London, for the use of the French army, at a price
largely in excess of the market price, delivered the
shoes to the railway at Kettering in sufficient time for
their transportation to and delivery in London under
the contract, and gave notice to the railway that the
plaintiffs had contracted to deliver the shoes in London
at a stated time, and that unless delivered they would
be thrown on their hands ; the shoes not having been
delivered in time, and not being accepted, and being
sold by the plaintiffs at the market rate, which was
much lower than the contract price, it was held in the
Exchequer Chamber that, the railway not having been
informed of the exceptional character of the contract,
the difference between the market rate and the contract
price could not be recovered as damages naturally aris-
ing from their breach of contract. So in Gee v. L. &
Y. Ry., 3 it was held that a railway was not liable, by
reason of its breach of a contract to deliver cotton
to a manufacturer at a time certain, to compensate him
for the wages paid to hands who were kept in idleness,
1 L. R. 2 C. P. 318. » L. R. 8 C. P. 131. 3 6 H. & N. 211.
DAMAGES. 463
and for the profits he could have made if he had had
the cotton to work, no notice having been given to the
railway that the mill would be stopped if the cotton
were not delivered. So in Hobbs and wife v. L. &
S. W. Ry., 1 the defendant having broken its contract
to carry the plaintiffs by train to Hampton Court, and
having set them down after midnight of a rainy night
at a station some miles away, where the plaintiffs could
not obtain accommodation at an inn, nor secure any
means of conveyance to their home, and being com-
pelled to walk to their home, the wife caught cold and was
ill for some time thereafter, and expenses were incurred
for medical attendance. The jury having found for
the plaintiffs, and assessed as damages (in addition to
£2 paid into court by the railway) £8 in respect of
the plaintiff's inconvenience, and £20 in respect of the
wife's illness and its consequences, a rule for a new trial
was discharged as to the £8 and made absolute as to
the £20, Cockburn, C. J., saying : " now, inasmuch as
there was manifest personal inconvenience, I am at a
loss to see why that inconvenience should not be com-
pensated by damages in such an action as this. It has
been endeavoured to be argued, upon principle and
upon authority, that this was a kind of damage which
could not be supported ; and attempts were also made
to satisfy us that this supposed inconvenience was more
or less imaginary, and would depend upon the strength
and constitution of the parties, and various other cir-
cumstances; and that it is not to be taken that a walk
of so many additional miles would be a thing thai a
person would dislike or suffer inconvenience from ; and
that there may be circumstances under which a walk
of several miles, so far from being matter of inconven-
»L. E. 10 Q. B. 111.
4G4 BREACH OF CONTRACT.
ience, would be just the contrary. All that depends on
the actual facts of each individual case; and if the jury
are satisfied that, in the particular instance, personal
inconvenience, or suffering, has been occasioned, and
that it has been occasioned as the immediate effect of
the breach of the contract, I can see no reasonable prin-
ciple why that should not be comjDensated for. * * * *
To entitle a person to damages by reason of a breach of
contract, the injury for which compensation is asked
should be one that may be fairly taken to have been con-
templated by the parties as the possible result of the
breach of contract. Therefore, you must have something
immediately flowing out of the breach of contract com-
plained of, something immediately connected with it,
and not merely connected with it through a series of
causes intervening between the immediate consequence
of the breach of contract and the damage, or injury,
complained of. To illustrate that, I cannot take a
better case than the one now before us ; suppose that a
passenger is put out at a wrong station on a wet night
and obliged to walk a considerable distance in the rain,
catching a violent cold which ends in a fever, and the
passenger is laid up for a couple of months, and loses
through this illness the offer of an employment which
would have brought him a handsome salary. No one,
I think, who understood the law, would say that the
loss so occasioned is so connected with the breach of
contract as that the carrier breaking the contract could
be held liable. Here, I think, it cannot be said the
catching cold by the plaintiff's wife is the immediate
and necessary effect of the breach of contract, or was
one which could be fairly said to have been in the con-
templation of the parties. As my brother Blackburn
points out, so far as the inconvenience of the walk home
is concerned, that must be taken to be reasonably within
DAMAGES. 465
the contemplation of the parties; because, if a carrier
engages to put a person down at a given place, and does
not put him down there, but puts him down somewhere
else, it must be in the contemplation of everybody that
the passenger put down at the wrong place must get to
the place of his destination somehow or other. If there
are means of conveyance for getting there, he may take
those means and make the company responsible for the
expense ; but if there are no means, I take it to be law
that the carrier must compensate him for the personal
inconvenience which the absence of those means has
necessitated. That flows out of the breach of contract
so immediately, that the damage resulting must be ad-
mitted to be fair subject-matter of damages. But in
this case, the wife's cold and its consequences cannot
stand upon the same footing as the personal inconven-
ience arising from the additional distance which the
plaintiffs had to go. It is an effect of the breach of
contract in a certain sense, but removed one stage ; it is
not the primary, but the secondary, consequence of it ;
and if in such a case the party recovered damage by
reason of the cold caught incidentally on that foot jour-
ney, it would be necessary, on the principle so applied,
to hold that in the two cases which have been put in
the course of the discussion, the party aggrieved would
be equally entitled to recover. And yet the moment
the cases are stated, everybody would agree that, accord-
ing to our law, the parties are not entitled to recover.
I put the case: suppose in walking home on a dark night,
the plaintiff made a false step and fell and broke a Limb, or
sustained bodily injury from the fall, everybody would
agree that this is too remote, and is not the consequence
which, reasonably speaking, might be anticipated t<>
follow from the breach of contract, A person might
walk a hundred times, or, indeed, a great many more
30
40 G BREACH OF CONTRACT.
times, from Eslier to Hampton, without falling down
and breaking a limb; therefore, it could not be con-
tended that that could have been anticipated as the
likely and probable consequence of the breach of con-
tract. Again, the party is entitled to take a carriage
to his home. Suppose the carriage overturns, or breaks
down, and the party sustains bodily injury from either
of these causes, it might be said : ' if you had put me
down at my proper place of destination, where by your
contract you engaged to put me clown, I should not
have had to walk, or to go, from Esher to Hampton in
a carriage, and I should not have met with the accident
in the walk, or in the carriage.' In either of those
cases the injury is too remote, and I think that is the
case here ; it is not the necessary consequence, it is not
even the probable consequence, of a person being put
down at an improper place, and having to walk home,
that he should sustain either personal injury or catch a
cold. That cannot be said to be within the contempla-
tion of the parties so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover,
and to make the defendants liable to pay damages for
the consequences." In Francis v. St. L. T. Co., 1 the
facts were similar to those in Hobb's case, and a like
conclusion was reached by the court. 2
887. There are, however, some reported cases in
which passengers have been permitted to recover as
damages, for the breach by a railway of its contract of
carriage, compensation for illness following upon a
walk taken by the passenger in consequence of the
1 5 Mo. Ap. Cas. 7.
2 See also Walsh v. O, M. & St. P. Ry., 42 Wise. 23 ; L. & N. R. R. v. Flem-
ing, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 128, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 347 ; Lewis v. F. & P. M.
Ry., 54 Mich. 55, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 263 ; St. L., K. C. & N. R. R. v.
Trigg, 74 Mo. 147, 6 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 345 ; St. L., K. C. & N. R. R. v.
Marshall, 78 Mo. 610, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 248 ; Morse v. Duncan, TJ. S,
C. C S. D. Miss., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 374.
DAMAGES. 467
railway's breach of contract; 1 but there is, in the judg-
ments in these cases, nothing which answers the reason-
ing so forcibly put by Cockburn, C. J., in Hobb's
case.
388. Upon the same principle, a passenger, whose
contract of carriage has been broken by the failure of
the railway, through the arrival of its train too late to
make an advertised connection, cannot recover the cost
of a special train, where he had no business at the point
of destination which would have induced him to incur
such an expenditure at his own cost; 2 nor can a plain-
tiff, who sues in an action sounding in contract, recover
damages from the railway for indignities inflicted upon
him by the police, for a cold caught while confined, and
for mental suffering, following a wrongful arrest by the
railway's servants. 3 So, in Theobald v. Ry. Passengers
Assurance Co., 4 the plaintiff, in stepping from a rail-
way carriage at a station, slipped and fell without fault
upon his part, and brought suit against the defendant on
a policy covenanting that £1,000 would be paid to the
plaintiff's personal representative in case of his death,
or a proportionate part of the £1,000 to himself in case
of injury resulting from railway accident while trav-
elling. There was verdict for the plaintiff £34 19s. for
medical attendance and expenses, and £100 for loss of
time or loss of profits. A rule to enter a nonsuit was
1 Brown v. C, M. & St. P. Ry., 54 Wise. 342, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 444 ;
C, H. & I. R. R. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474, 18 Am. & Eng. R. B. < 9b& 26 I ; T..
E. & W. Ry. v. Fixe, 88 Ind. 381, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. 0m. 109 j Penna. Co.
v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203,3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 4.'.(, ; S. I.'. B. v. Een-
drick, 40 Miss. 374; C. & I.C.R. R. v. Farrell,31 Ind. 408; B, I'. AC. By. V.
Pixley, 61 Ind. 22; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. ft Bnrat, 36 Mi».660j LAG.N
R. R. v. Gilbert, 64 Tex. 636, 22 Am. A: ling. R. R. Cas. 406 ; LAG. N. B. ft.
v. Terry, 62 Tex. 380, 21 Am. & Eng. !: B. Oa 323.
* Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1 C. P. D. 286.
8 Murdock v. B. & A. R. R, 133 Mas- L6, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 406.
* 10 Ex. 45.
4G8 TORTS.
discharged, but a rule was made absolute to reduce this
damages to £34 19s., it being held that damages for
loss of profits are consequential, otherwise a passenger,
whose time or business is more valuable than that of
another, would, for precisely the same injury, receive
greater remuneration than another.
II. DAMAGES FOR TORTS.
In actions sounding in tort, the plaintiff is entitled to recover a fair
pecuniary compensation for the wrong done to him, the quantum of
which compensation is to be determined by the jury in the exercise
of a reasonable discretion, subject to review by the court, if that
quantum is so disproportionately large or small as to show that the
jury must necessarily have been influenced by improper motives, or
must have proceeded upon a wrong principle.
389. There was formerly no certain rule as to the
measure of damages in actions sounding in tort ; thus,
in Eavenscroft v. Eyles, 1 Wilmot, C. J., said, " in actions
on the case, the damages are totally uncertain and at
large." The modern theory is, that the damages
should amount to a pecuniary compensation for the
wrong done to the person injured. 2 It is the duty of
the judge, at the trial, to specifically instruct the jury as
to the measure of damages, and not to leave to them an
arbitrary discretion in the ascertainment of the amount
of the damages. 3 The measure of damages is to be
decided by the court, but the quantum of damages is to
be fixed by the jury, subject to the review of the court
1 2 Wils. 295.
* Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. 206 ; Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash. C. C. 152 ;
Lockwood v. Allen, 7 Mass. 254 ; Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason 115 ; St. L., I. M.
& S. Ry. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519.
J P. R. R. v. Books, 57 Penna. St. 339 ; P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Id. 318 ; P. R.
R. v. Vandever, 36 Id. 298 ; P. R. R. v. Butler, 57 Id. 335 ; Mansfield C. & C.
Go. v. McEnery, 8 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 81.
DAMAGES. 469
upon the principles hereinafter stated. 1 While the
measure of damages is compensation for the pecuniary
loss suffered by the party for whose benefit the action is
brought, yet the jury should take a reasonable view,
and should not give more than a fair compensation ; 2
thus, in Armstrong v. S. E. Ry., 3 Parke, J., directed
the jury that " it would be most unjust if, whenever an
accident occurs, juries were to visit the unfortunate
cause of it with the utmost amount which they think
an equivalent for the mischief done. * * * You are not
to consider the value of existence as if you were bar-
gaining with an annuity office. * * * I advise you
to take a reasonable view of the case, and give what you
consider a fair compensation ;" and in Rowley v. L. &
W. Ry., 4 Brett, J., reiterated these views, drawing
attention to the point that the same rule as to the
measure of damages must be applied in the cases of
corporate and individual defendants, and that if juries
do undertake to give " the fully calculated equivalent
of the pecuniary loss sustained by the person on whose
behalf the action is brought, * * * poor defendants
will be ruined, and the defendants most liable to such
actions will not be able to carry on their business upon
the same terms to the public as now." Nevertheless,
as Pollock, C. B., said, in Wilson v. N. Dock Co., 8
" cases of damage differ as much as the leaves of a tree
differ from each other, or rather the leaves of different
trees. No two are exactly alike, and one description
cannot be applicable to all. No precise positive rule
can embrace all cases, and, notwithstanding any rule
1 Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash. C. C. 152; I. C. R. B. v. Barron, •"> Wall, '.-(> ;
M. C. R. R. v. Caruth, 51 Misa. 77 ; Morris v. C, I:. & W B B., « lam '■!'< ;
K. P. Ry. v. Cutter, 19 Kans. 83; City of Delphi V. Lower?, 7 I 1ml. .'.'JO; O.
& M. R. R. v. Collarn, 73 Id. 261.
* Armstrong v. S. E. Ry., 11 Jur. 758 ; Rowley v. I- & W. By., 8 Ex. 221.
3 11 Jur. 758. 4 8 Ex. 221. & L. K. 1 Ex l'JO.
470 TORTS.
of law that may be laid down, it must be admitted
after all, that the question of the amount of damages
is one for the jury, and the jury only, provided the law
on the subject be properly laid down by the presiding
judge, and then the amount of damages be left at large
for the jury, we apprehend that a court would not
interfere with their verdict because the jury had appar-
ently come to some compromise among themselves, and
bad not strictly observed the supposed rule of law."
390. It is the duty of the court to grant a new trial
where the damages, in the opinion of the court, are so
grossly excessive, that the jury must, in awarding such
an amount, have been influenced by improper motives,
or have proceeded upon a wrong principle ;* and it is also
the duty of the court to grant a new trial where the
damages are grossly inadequate; 2 and especially where
the small amount of the damages, considered with
reference to the testimony in the cause, shows that the
jury have shrunk from deciding the issue submitted to
them. 3
391. As a general rule the quantum of the damages
is not subject to review in an appellate court. 4 The
jury are not to be permitted to increase the damages
by including interest from the time of the injury upon
that sum which they determine to be the pecuniary
1 Creed v. Fisher, 9 Ex. 472; Lambkin v. S. E. Ry., 5 App. Cas. 352; Cole-
man v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45 ; B.. P. & C. Ry. v. Pixley, 61 Ind. 22; O. &
M. R. R. v. Collarn, 73 Id. 261; Fairman v. Lauman, Id. 568; Delphi v.
Lowery, 74 Id. 520 ; Thurston v. Martin, 1 Mason 197 ; Knight v. P., S.& P.R.
R., 57 Me. 202 ; Gale v. N. Y. C & H. R. R. R., 76 N. Y. 594 ; M., K. & T. R.
R. v. Weaver, 16 Kans. 456 ; Berry v. C. Ry., 40 Iowa 564; Pry v. H. & St. J.
R. R , 73 Mo. 123 ; I. & G. N. R. R. v. Stewart, 57 Tex. 166 ; P., C. & St. L.
R. R. v. Sponier, 85 Ind 165, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 453.
J Phillips v. S. W. Ry., 4 Q. B. D. 406.
3 Springett v. Ball, 4 F. & F. 472.
* W. Ry. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; W., St. L. & P. Ry. v. Peyton, 106
111. 524 ; I. C. Ry. v. Frelka, 110 Id. 498 ; Pabst v. B. & O. R. R., 2 MacArthur
(D. C.) 42.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 471
compensation due by the defendant to the plaintiff; 1
nor are the jury to be permitted to include the plain-
tiff's counsel fees in the damages awarded to him.
III. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
Exemplary or punitive damages can be recovered where the wrong
has been done under circumstances of wanton violence and ojypres-
sion on the part of the railway, as evidenced by the character of the
act, and by the fact that the particular act has been done under an
antecedent authorization, or has been subsequently ratified, either
expressly, or impliedly by the retention in the service of the servant
whose wrongdoing has caused the injury.
392. Where the wrong has been done under circum-
stances indicating wantonness, violence, and oppression
upon the part of the wrongdoer, exemplary damages
are recoverable; 2 but such damages are not recoverable
against a railway unless the injury is the result of the
authorized or ratified misconduct of the servants of the
railway. 3 There are some cases which hold that where
a person is injured by gross negligence on the part of
the railway, he may recover exemplary damages; 1 but
1 Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434; Weir v. Alleghany, 95 Penna. St. 413;
P. S. Ry. v. Taylor, 104 Id. 300; C. R. R. v. Sears, 6ti Ga. 409.
2 Bell v. Midland Ry., 10 C. B. N. S. 287, 100 E. C. L. ; Emblen p. Myers, 6
H. & N. 54; Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 81 ; P. R. R. v. Kelley, 3] Penna.
St. 372 ; P. R. R. v. Books, 57 !d. 339.
3 M. & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Day ti.Woodworth, L3 How 871
P , W. & B. R. R. v. Quigley, 21 Id. 213 ; W. U. T. < io. v. Eyster, 91 I r. 8. 495,
note; N. O., J. & G. N. E. R. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660; B.&O. R. R. v. Blocber, 27
Md. 277; Goddard v. G. T. By., 59 Me. 202; C. 8. Ry. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321,
19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 30; I. & St. L. R. R. P.Cobb, 68 111. 58; 1 1
M., K. & T. R. R., 59 Mo. 27, 8 Am Ry. Rep. 462; K. P. Ry. v. Lundin, 8
Colo. 94; L. K. & GL 8. R. R. v. Guinan, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 98; 8. R. R. v. Ken-
drick, 40 Miss. 371; Ackerson v. E. R. R, 8 Vroom 254; Porter v. Same, Id.
2dl ; C, St. L. & N. O. R. R. v. Bcnrr, 59 Miss. 456, 6 Am. & Eng R i: I as.
341 ; P.,F. W. & C. R. R. v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. L57 ; Hamilton >■■ Third \v.-.
R. R., 53 N. Y. 25.
* Hopkins v. A.& St. L R. U, 36 \. H. 9; A. & Q W. Ry. v. Dnnn, 19
Ohio St. 162; M. & M. R. R. v. Ashcroft, 48 Ala. 15; Varillat v. S. <). A 0,
472 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
considering the want of any intelligible distinction be-
tween negligence and gross negligence, and bearing in
mind the principles hereinbefore stated, which deter-
mine the responsibility of railways for the acts of their
servants, the better doctrine is that a railway is not to
be held liable in exemplary damages for injuries caused
by the negligence of its servant, unless it be shown that
the servant's act was wilful in its character, and was either
authorized or ratified by the railway, nevertheless con-
ceding that such authorization or ratification can be evi-
denced either by an expressed order to do the act, or an
expressed approval of its commission, or by an antece-
dent retention of a servant of known incompetency, or
by a subsequent retention or promotion of the negligent
servant. 1
[V. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN CASES OF INJURIES
NOT CAUSING DEATH.
The measure of damages in case of injuries not causing death is, in
general, compensation for bodily and mental pain and suffering,
present and future, and for loss of earnings since the injury and
for loss of future earning power, and reimbursement of actual ex-
penditure, or legal liability incurred, for medical treatment and
nursing.
393. Actions sounding in tort for injuries to the per-
son being founded, not upon the damage only, but upon
the unlawful act and the consequent damage, the plain-
tiff cannot bring more than one action therefor against
the same defendant, and therein he may recover both
R. R , 10 La. An. 88; K. C. R. R. v Dills, 4 Bush (Ky.) 593; Taylor v. G T.
Ry., 48 N. H. 305 ; L. & N. R. R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 277 ; C. St. R. R. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 30.
' Cle S horn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 56 N. Y. 44 ; Hagan v. P. & W. R. R.,
3 R. I. 88.
DAMAGES. 473
present and prospective damages. 1 Upon this principle
the plaintiff may recover for future physical suffering
and loss of earning power where the apprehended con-
sequences are such as in the ordinary course of nature
are reasonably certain to ensue, but there can be no re-
covery in damages for merely possible consequences. 2
The mental suffering for which the plaintiff can recover
is that which is connected with and follows the injury ; 3
and the plaintiff may recover for any injury to health
resulting from exposure after the accident; 4 and in
proof of his loss of earnings since the injury, the plain-
tiff may show that he was engaged in a particular busi-
ness, and that the necessary effect of his injury was to
disable him from attending to his business, and thereby
cause a pecuniary loss to him ; 5 but if the business con-
ducted by the person injured be prohibited by law, he
cannot recover for his inability to continue it. 6
394. It is in general held that the damages recover-
able include compensation for bodily and mental pain
and suffering, present and future; reimbursement of
actual expenditure for, or legal liability incurred for,
medical treatment and nursing ; and compensation for
loss of earnings since the injury, and for loss of future
earning power. 7
1 Hodsoll v. Stallebrass, 11 Ad. & El. 301, 39 E. C. L.
J Strohm v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R, 96 N. Y. 305 ; Delie v. C. & N. W. 1 ty,
51 Wise. 400; Curtis v. R. & S. R. R, 18 N. Y. 534; Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R,
49 Id. 45; Fry v. D. & S. W. Ry., 45 Iowa 416; B. S. It. It. V. Hams, 67
Ala. 6.
3 I. & St. L. R. R. v. Stables, 62 111. 313; Porter v. II. & St. J. It. It., 71
Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. R. It. Cas. 44.
* Ehrgott v. The Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264.
5 Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black (S. C.)
590.
6 Jacques v. B. H. R. R., 41 Conn. 61.
7 Phillips v. S. W. Ry., 4 Q. B. D. 406, 5 Id. 85, n c. 1'. 1 1 ,280 ; Lain- v.
Colder, 8 Penna. St. 479; P. It. R. v. Allen, 63 U. 276; P. R. R V. Boob, 57
Id. 339; P. & O. Canal Co. v. Graham, 6:i Id. 290; I. C. R R V. Barron, 5
471 INJURIES NOT CAUSING DEATH.
395. The damages awarded to the injured plaintiff
are not to be diminished by his receipts from an acci-
dental insurance policy, because the insurer's contract
of indemnity, and not the contingency of the accident,
is the cause of his receiving the avails of the policy; 1
nor are the damages to be diminished by the injured
person's continued receipt of full wages from his em-
ployer during the period of his incapacity to labour. 2
396. There is a recent English case which illustrates
the rule of law as to damages for personal injuries, and
which is worthy of careful consideration. In Phillips v.
S. W. Hy., 3 the plaintiff was an eminent London phy-
sician of middle age and of robust health, making from
the practice of his profession an average income of
£5,000. Having been injured in a railway accident,
he underwent a great amount of pain and suffering; at
the time of the first trial, sixteen months after the acci-
dent, his condition was apparently helpless and hopeless,
and he had then incurred expenses for medical treat-
ment amounting to £1,000. Field, J., in substance
directed the jury not to attempt to give an exact equiv-
alent for the injury sustained, but to bring their reason-
able common sense to bear, and to consider that while
the plaintiff might die at any time, and while many
things might happen to prevent his continuing in prac-
WaU. 90 ; Eansom v. N. Y. & E. R. E., 15 N. Y. 415 ; Curtis v. E. & S. E. E.,
18 Id. 534; S. & N. A. E. E. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266; Whalen v. St. L., K.
C. & N. Ey., 60 Mo. 323; O. & M. Ry. v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317 ; P., C. & St.
L. Ey. v. Sponier, 85 Id. 165, 8 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 453; Porter v. II. &
St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 66, 2 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 44; Totten v. P. E. E., 11
Fed. Eep. 564; St. L., I. M. & S. Ey. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 8 Am. & Eng.
E. R. Cas. 198; Klutts v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ey., 75 Mo. 642, 11 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 639 ; Davis v. C. E. E., 60 Ga. 329 ; W. & A. E. E. v. Drysdale, 51
Id. 644; P. E. E. v. Spicker, 105 Penna. St. 142; Geveke v. G. E. & I. Ey.,
Mich. , 22 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 551.
1 r.radburn v. G.W. Ey., L. E. 10 Ex. 1 ; B. & O. R. R. tt Wightman, 29
Grat. 431.
a O & M. Ry. v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317. 8 4 Q. B. D. 406.
DAMAGES. 475
tice, yet, on the other hand, he might continue to live
for many years, and that they must give him fair com-
pensation for the pain, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment,
loss of income up to the time of the trial and prospective
loss of income in the future. The jury having found
for the plaintiff in £7,000, the plaintiff moved for a
new trial for insufficiency of damages and also on the
ground of misdirection as having led to an insufficient
assessment of damages. In the Court of Queen's Bench
it was held, Cockburn, C. J., delivering judgment, that
Field, J., had correctly directed the jury, but the rule
for a new trial was made absolute upon the other
ground, the Lord Chief Justice, after referring to the
rule laid down by Brett, J., in Rowley v. L. & N. W.
By., 1 saying: "we think that a jury cannot be said to
take a reasonable view of the case unless they consider
and take into account all the heads of damage in respect
of which the plaintiff complaining of a personal injury is
entitled to compensation. These are the bodily injury
sustained, the pain undergone, the effect on the health
of the sufferer, according to its degree and its probable
duration as likely to be temporary or permanent, the
expenses incidental to attempts to effect a cure or to
lessen the amount of injury, the pecuniary loss sus-
tained through inability to attend to a profession or
business as to which again the amount of injury may
be of a temporary character or may be such as to in-
capacitate the party for the remainder of his Life. I f a
jury have taken all these elements of damage into con-
sideration, and have awarded wli.it they deemed to be
fair and reasonable compensation under all the circum-
stances of the case, a court ought not, unless under very
exceptional circumstances, to disturb their verdict."
1 L. R. 8 Ex. 221.
476 INJURIES NOT CAUSING DEATH.
He distinguished the cases of Randall v. Hay ward, 1 and
Forsdike v. Stone, 2 upon the ground that they were ac-
tions for slander in which the jury may consider, not
only what the plaintiff ought to receive, but also what
the defendant ought to pay, and he added: "we think
the rule contended for has no application in a case of
personal injury, and that it is perfectly competent to us if
we think the damages unreasonably small to order a
new trial at the instance of the plaintiff. There can be
no doubt of the power of the court to grant a new trial
where, in such an action, the damages are excessive.
There can be no reason why the same principle should
not be applied where they are insufficient to meet the
justice of the case." The defendant having appealed,
the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the
Queen's Bench Division was delivered by James, L. J. 3
The Lord Justice said: "we agree that judges have no
right to overrule a verdict of the jury as to the amount of
damages merely because they take a different view, and
think that if they had been the jury they would have
given more or would have given less, still the verdicts
of juries as to the amount of damages are subject, and^
must, for the sake of justice, be subject to the supervision
of a court of first instance, and, if necessary, of a court
of appeal in this way; that is to say, if, in the judgment
of the court, the damages are unreasonably large, or
unreasonably small, then the court is bound to send the
matter for reconsideration by another jury." The di-
rection of Field, J., was substantially approved. The
case was tried a second time before Coleridge, L. C. J., 4
who instructed the jury, that while it was fair and
reasonable that the defendant should pay to the plain-
tiff, by way of compensation for the injury which he
1 5 Bing. N. C. 424. » L. E. 3 C. P. 607.
» 5 Q. B. D. 85. * 5 C. P. D. 280.
DAMAGES. 477
had sustained, the amount of compensation for it was to
be such as the jury might think would be fair and
reasonable, and that there must be taken into account
as elements of compensation the bodily pain and suffer-
ing which the plaintiff had endured, the loss of his pro-
fessional income from the time of the accident to the
time of the trial, and the loss of future income, basing
the estimate upon the proved net professional income of
the plaintiff, but remembering that that amount in-
cluded certain large presents or special fees. It had
been proven that the plaintiff, at the time of the acci-
dent, was in the receipt of a private income irrespective
of his professional earnings amounting to between £3,000
and £4,000 a year, and in his summing up the Lord
Chief Justice omitted to refer to that source of income.
The jury found a verdict of £16,000 for the plaintiff,
and the defendant having moved for a new trial, on the
ground of misdirection, the Common Pleas Division re-
fused the rule, Grove, J., saying: "the plaintiff is en-
titled to receive at the hands of the jury compensation
for the pain and bodily suffering which he has under-
gone, for the expense which he has been put to for
medical and other necessary attendance, and for such
pecuniary loss as the jury (having regard to his ability
and means of earning money by his profession at the
time) may think him reasonably entitled to." The de-
fendant then took the case to the Court of Appeal,
which sustained the court below in its refusal of a m-w
trial, Bramwell, L. J., saying: "I have tried, as judge,
more than a hundred actions of this kind, and the di-
rection which I, in common with other judges, have
been accustomed to give the jury has been to the fol-
lowing effect: 'You must give the plaint id' a compensa-
tion for his pecuniary loss; you must give him a
compensation for his pain and bodily suffering; of
478 INJURIES NOT CAUSING DEATH.
course it is almost impossible for you to give to an in-
jured man what can be strictly called a compensation,
but you must take a reasonable view of the case and
must consider under all the circumstances what is a fair
amount to be awarded to him.' I have never known a
direction in that form to be questioned. * * * It is
argned that it lias an unjust operation for the following
reason : two passengers are carried upon the same journey
for the same fare. If one of them is injured he will ob-
tain £10,000 damages against the company, whereas
if the other meets with an accident he will obtain only
£1,000. This result may be unreasonable as regards
the passengers inter se, but it is not unreasonable as be-
tween the company and the public. The company have
taken their powers upon certain conditions, and one of
them is that if they break their contracts to carry safely
and securely, (which may happen without any moral
blame attaching to them), they shall make adequate
compensation to the person injured. It may be that
the passenger who recovers £10,000 has paid too little
for his ticket, and that the passenger who recovers
£1,000 has paid too much; nevertheless together they
have paid what is a compensation to the company for
the risk which they undertake." Brett, L.. J., said:
"the action is for breach of a contract to carry a pas-
senger safely and securely, and the only damages which
can be obtained are damages for the breach of that con-
tract. The fundamental proposition, no doubt, is that
the plaintiff is to receive such damages as will compen-
sate him for the injury ensuing from the breach of the
contract. That injury is of a complicated nature, the
plaintiff has received a bodily hurt and he has also sus-
tained a pecuniary loss." * * * Lord Coleridge "in
effect told the jury that the compensation was to be such
as they might think fair and reasonable, but that they
DAMAGES. 479
must not attempt to give an absolutely perfect compen-
sation with respect to the pecuniary loss. I apprehend
that both these propositions are correct, and that the
reason why this general mode of leaving the question to
the jury is right is that human ingenuity has not been
able to devise a more correct proposition, and that if the
judge tries to make a perfect proposition he either states
something which is wrong, or omits to state something
which ought to be stated." The Lord Justice then re-
ferred to Kowley v. L. & N. W. Ey., 1 and added : " it
has been long recognized as a proper mode of summing
up to tell the jury to give such compensation as under
all the circumstances they may think fair and reason-
able, and at the same time, in order to assist them, to
point out some circumstances which they ought to con-
sider. When the jury have to give compensation for
the loss of a professional or trading income, the chief
points to be considered are the amount of that income
and of what it is made up. It has been in effect sug-
gested by the counsel for the defendants that the amount
of the income at the time of the accident ought not to
be taken into account. This suggestion seems to me to
be erroneous. * * * If no accident had happened,
nevertheless many circumstances might have happened
to prevent the plaintiff from earning his professional in-
come. He may be disabled by illness; he is Bubjeci to
the ordinary accidents and vicissitudes of life, and if all
those circumstances of which no evidence can be given
are looked at it would be impossible to exactly estimate
them. Yet if the jury wholly pass over them liny will
go wrong, because those accidents and vicissitudes ought
to be taken into account. It is true tint the chances
of life cannot be accurately calculated, but the judge
must tell the jury to consider them in order thai they
1 L. K. 8 Ex. 221.
4S0 DUTY OF PERSON INJURED.
may give a fair and reasonable compensation. In my
opinion it would be right that a jury should give the
same amount to a workingman and to a person of great
wealth for personal injury, if that is the same, and if
the accompanying suffering is the same, and that each
should receive the expenses which he has properly in-
curred, but that in estimating the pecuniary loss each
should receive as nearly as possible only the amount of
the loss which he has actually sustained." Cotton, L.
J., concurred. As to the condition of the plaintiff's
health at the time of the second trial and the prospect
of his ultimate recovery the case as reported is ambig-
uous. Lord Coleridge referred in his direction to the
jury to the "probability that for a year and a half or
two years more the plaintiff would be debarred from
following his profession." Grove, J., in refusing the
rule for a new trial, said : "the injury which he has sus-
tained will, in all human probability, deprive him of
the power of ever resuming his practice."
The person injured is bound to exercise for his cure and treatment the
care of a prudent man,
397. The party injured is bound to take such care
of himself after the accident as a prudent man would
take under the circumstances, but he is not bound to
employ a surgeon of the highest skill, nor is he an in-
surer of the success of the medical treatment; 1 yet
where the person injured had disregarded the advice of
his medical attendants to abstain from business for two
years, and had, because of such disobedience, become
permanently incapacited from doing business, whereas,
1 Klutts v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 75 Mo. 642, 1 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 639 ;
Nagel v. M. P. Ry., Id. 653, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 702 ; Sauter v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 50 ; Lyons v. E. Ry., 57 Id. 489 ; P. P. C. Co. v. Bluhm,
109 111. 20, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 87 ; Allender v. C, R. I. & P. R. R., 37
Iowa 264.
DAMAGES TO HUSBAND, ETC. 481
if he had rested, he would probably have regained his
health, the Common Pleas refused to disturb a verdict
in his favour for compensatory damages. 1
The measure of damages in a husband's suit for injuries to his wife
is compensation for the loss of his wife's society and services, and
reimbursement for the necessary expenses of her medical treatment
398. Where a husband sues for injuries to the person
of his wife, he is entitled to recover for the loss of his
wife's society and services and for the necessary ex-
penses of her medical treatment. 2 Where the suit is
brought on the wife's behalf to recover for her personal
injuries, there can be no recovery for any loss which
the husband may have sustained, and for which he
alone could bring suit, such as a diminution of the
wife's earning power, or the expenses of her medical
treatment, but the recovery can only be for the physical
injury done to the wife. 3
TJie measure of damages in a parent's or master's suit for injuries to
his child or servant is compensation for loss of service during the
minority of the child or the period of service, and reimbursement
for the necessary expenses of medical treatment.
399. Where a parent or master sues for injuries done
to the person of a child or servant, the plaintiff can
only recover for the loss of service during the period
of service, or during the minority of the child, and for
1 Saunders v. L. & N. W. By., 8 0. B. N. S. 887, 98 E. C. L.
2 King v. Thompson, 87 Penna. St. 365; P. B. R. v. Goodman, 62 1. 1 829 ,
Pack v. The Mayor, 3 Comst. 489 ; Xcir v. W. P. Iiy., 1 2 M<>. Lpp. 86 ; < iregin
v. B. C. R. B., 83 N.Y. 595.
3 Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 M. A. W. 6; King v. Thompson, 87 Penna. M
B. C P. Ry. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Fuller p. X. R. U.. 21 I fcmn. 557 ; V < '. By.
v. Mills, 61 Md. 355, 19 Am. & Eng. B. B. Gas. 160; Klein <■. Jewett, 26 X
J. Eq. 474; Tuttle v. C, B. I. & P. Ry., 42 [owa r .is.
31
482 DAMAGES
actual expenditure and legal liability incurred for the
medical treatment and care of the child or servant. 1
V. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN CASES OF INJURIES
CAUSING DEATH.
In actions to recover damages for injuries causing death, if the statute
authorizing the action does not prescribe any other measure of dam-
ages, the damages are in general to be assessed on the basis of the
pecuniary loss caused by the death to the persons for whose benefit
the action is brought.
400. In actions to recover for death the terms of the
statute authorizing the action are in general decisive
of the right to sue and the measure of damages. In
case of death or personal injury, resulting from negli-
gence on the part of the railway, where the parties for
whose benefit the action is brought fail to show any
pecuniary injury to themselves, nominal damages are
recoverable. 2 Of course, any pecuniary loss to the
person for whose benefit the action is brought and
directly resulting from the death should be taken into
consideration by the jury ; thus, in Pym v. G. N. Ky., 3
the plaintiff sued as the widow and administratrix of
her husband, who had never been in any profession or
business and was of independent property. The de-
ceased by will had so settled his property, which pro-
duced an income, of £4,000 annually, that in case of
his death £800 was to be annually paid to his younger
children, and the rest to the eldest son, charged with
1 P. R. R. v. Kell y, 31 Penna. St. 372 ; Frick v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 75
Mo. 542; Smith v. St. J. & II. R. R., 55 Mo. 556; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. v.
Freeman, 36 Ark. 41.
2 A., T. & S. F. R. R. v.Weber, 33 Kans. 543, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
418 ; Ihl v. 42d St. R. R., 47 N. Y. 317 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338 ;
(', & N. W. R. R. v. Swett, 45 Id. 197 ; Chicago v. Schollen, 75 Id. 468.
• 2 B. & S. 750, 110 E. C. L. ; 4 B. & S. 396, 116 E. C. L.
IN CASE OF DEATH. 483
the payment of the £800 and of a jointure to the widow
of £1,000. At the trial, Cockburn, C. J., directed the
jury: "if, after making allowance for what the de-
ceased would naturally have expended on himself, they
thought that a portion of his income beyond the £1,800
a year, to which his widow and eight younger children
became entitled at his death, would have been from
time to time set aside by him for the benefit of his
family, or appropriated to their education and advance-
ment in life, and would thus have secured to them ad-
vantages, which by his death they had lost, that would
constitute such pecuniary loss and damage as would
enable them to find a verdict for the plaintiff." The
jury found for the plaintiff in £13,000, £1,000 for the
widow and £1,500 for each of the younger children.
The defendant having obtained a rule in pursuance of
leave reserved to enter a verdict for the defendant, or a
nonsuit on the ground that the evidence established no
cause of action, or for a new trial because of excessive
damages, the rule on the former ground was dis-
charged, and on the latter ground the verdict having,
by consent of the plaintiff, been reduced to £9,000, that
rule was also discharged. The defendant having ap-
pealed to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, the judg-
ment of the Queen's Bench was affirmed, it being held
that an action under the statute is maintainable where
the decedent could have maintained no action if lie had
survived the injury, the condition in the statute haying
reference not to the nature of the loss or the injury
sustained, but to the circumstances under which I In-
bodily injury arose, and the nature of the wrongful act,
neglect, or default complained of; and thai while the
damages must be based on a pecuniary loss, the ex-
tinction of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary ;i<l-
vantase from the continuance of the life of the decedent
48-1 DAMAGES
is a sufficient cause of action, and that the statute giving
a remedy to individuals, not to a class, although the
death of the decedent caused no loss of property to his
family, yet as that death changed the mode of distribu-
tion of the income of that property, those whose reason-
able expectations of pecuniary advantage were disap-
pointed by that death were entitled to be compensated.
So, in Rowley v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1 the plaintiff sued as
executrix of an attorney who had covenanted to pay
his mother £200 annually during his and her joint
lives. No question was raised as to the damages re-
coverable for the widow and the children. At the time
of the decedent's death he was forty years of age, and
his mother sixty-one years of age. An accountant
having testified from the Carlisle tables as to the prob-
able duration of the son's and mother's lives, and as to
the cost to the mother of an annuity secured by the
government of £200 for her life, Kelly, C. B., in-
structed the jury that they might, if they thought
proper, calculate the damages which the mother was
entitled to recover by ascertaining what sum of money
would purchase an annuity of £200 for a person sixty-
one years of age, according to the average duration of
human life. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff
for £6,200, apportioning to the mother £1,200, and
the balance to the widow and children. The case
having been carried to the Court of Exchequer Cham-
ber by bill of exceptions, a venire de novo was granted
on the ground of misdirection, inasmuch as that which
the mother lost by her son's death was an annuity, not
for her life, but for the joint lives of her son and her-
self, which was of obviously less value than an annuity
for her life only, and the annuity was secured only by
1 L. R. 8 Ex. 221.
IN CASE OF DEATH. 486
the personal covenant of the deceased, whereas the tes-
timony referred to a government annuity. Brett, J., in
delivering judgment, said: "it seems to me that the
Lord Chief Baron did leave it open to the jury to sup-
pose, that they might properly assess as the proper
damages a sum of money which would be the present
price or value of an annuity which would give to the
mother an annual income equal to that she would have
received from her son for the probable duration of time
during which the covenanted annuity would have been
paid to her if her son had not been killed. That is, in
other words, to hold that the damages in such case may
be the ' fully calculated equivalent of the pecuniary
loss suffered by the person on whose behalf the action
is brought.' If juries do give such damages, poor de-
fendants will be ruined, and the defendants most liable
to such actions will not be able to carry on their busi-
ness upon the same terms to the public as now." And
after referring to Blake v. Midland By., and to Aims-
worth v. S. E. By., he quoted the usual direction, and
added: "I have a clear conviction that any verdict
founded on the idea of giving damages to the utmost
amount, which would be an equivalent for the pecuniary
injury, would be unjust. Founding my opinion on that
conviction, on the declaration of it by Parke, J., and
on the ordinary directions of judges, which directions
have not been for years challenged, I conclude thai the
direction that I have enunciated is the legal and the
only legal direction. A direction which leaves ii open
to the jury to give the present value of an annuity
equal in annual amount to the income losl for a period
supposed to be equal to thai for which it would have
continued if there had been do accidenl is a direction,
as it seems to me, leaving it open to a jury to give the
utmost amount which they may think an equivalent,
4S6 DAMAGES
and for the pecuniary mischief done, and sucL a direc-
tion is a misdirection according to law."
401. Therefore, as a general rule, the damages must
be so limited as to give not more than a compensation
for the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff, or by
the persons for whose benefit the action is brought. 1
The term " pecuniary loss" is not to be found in Lord
Campbell's Act, nor in some of the statutes in pari
materia which have been enacted in the several States
of the United States, but that term has been judicially
adopted, not only to express the character of that loss
to the beneficial plaintiffs which is the foundation of
their right of recovery, but also to discriminate between
a material loss which is susceptible of a pecuniary valu-
ation, and that inestimable loss of the society and com-
panionship of the deceased relative, upon which, in the
nature of things, it is not possible to set a pecuniary
valuation. In Lett v. St. L. & O. Ey., 2 Gait, J., in a
very few words clearly shows that the term " material,"
rather than " pecuniary," expresses with accuracy the
exact nature of that loss which can be compensated
under Lord Campbell's Act and the statutes which have
followed it.
In the term "pecuniary loss" there is included the loss to the person
for whose benefit the action is brought, of a reasonable expectation
of a pecuniary gain from the continuance of the life of the person
killed.
402. It is well settled that the term " pecuniary loss "
includes, not only the loss of any money which the
1 Blake v. M. Ey., IS Q. B. 93, 83 E. C. L. ; Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. &
N. 653; Galliard V L. & Y. Ry., 12 L. T. 356; Braniall v. Lees, 29 Id. 82;
N. P. R. R. v. Robinson, 44 Penna. St. 175 ; L., C. & L. E. R, v. Case, 9 Bush
(Ky.) 728; I; & G. N. R. R. v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 491, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas.649; Lett v. St. L. & O. Ry., 11 Ont. Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
165 ; I. C. R. R. v. Weldon, 52 111. 290 ; Needham v. G. T. R. R., 38 Yt. 294.
2 11 Ont. Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 165.
TO PARENTS FOR CHILD'S DEATH. 487
deceased was under a legal liability to pay to the per-
son or persons for whose benefit the action has been
brought, but also the loss of a reasonable expectation
upon the part of those persons of a pecuniary benefit
to them from the continuance of the life of the de-
ceased.
403. This reasonable latitude of construction has
been applied in the cases where a parent sues for the
death of a child ; thus, in Franklin v. S. E. By., 1 the
plaintiff sued as administrator to recover for the death
of his son twenty-one years of age, who had been in the
habit of assisting the plaintiff in certain work, for
which the plaintiff received three shillings and six pence
weekly. Bramwell, B., left it to the jury to say whether
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of any, and
what, pecuniary benefit, if any, from the continuance
of his son's life, and this direction was approved by the
court in banc, Pollock, C. B., saying : " it is also clear
that the damages are not to be given merely in refer-
ence to the loss of a legal right, for they are to be dis-
tributed among relations only, and not to all individuals
sustaining such a loss, and accordingly the rule lias
not been to ascertain what benefit could have been
enforced by the claimants had the deceased lived, and
give damages ascertained thereby. * * * Nothing
remains except that they should be calculated in refer-
ence to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit
from the continuance of his son's life, and, if so, to w bat
extent were the questions left, in this case, to the jury.
* * * We do not say that actual benefit Bhould have
been derived, a reasonable expectation is enough, and
such reasonable expectation may exist, though from the
father not being in need the son had never done any-
thing for him. On the other hand, a jury certainly
13H.&K211.
4S8 DAMAGES
ought not to make a guess in the mutter, but ought to
be satisfied that there has been a loss of sensible and
appreciable pecuniary benefit which may have been
reasonably expected from the continuance of the life.
We think, therefore, the action maintainable." So, in
Dalton v. S. E. Ry., 1 the plaintiffs, a father and a mother,
sued for the death of their son, twenty-seven years of
age, unmarried, but not living at home, earning about
£3 weekly, and accustomed to visit his parents at short
intervals, and to make them presents averaging about
£20 a year. Byles, J., directed the jury that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to recover under the statute, and sug-
gested that the jury should find specially the sums to
which the plaintiffs were entitled for their pecuniary
loss, and for the decedent's funeral expenses and the
plaintiff's mourning clothes. The jury having found a
verdict as to the pecuniary loss of £120, and as to the
mourning and funeral expenses £25, a rule for a new
trial was discharged as to the £120, and made absolute
as to the £25, Willes, J., saying, "the reasonable
expectation of pecuniary advantage of the relations
remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury,
and damages may be given in respect to the expecta-
tion being disappointed, and the probable pecuniary
loss thereby occasioned." So, in Duckworth v. John-
son, 2 the plaintiff sued for the death of his son, fourteen
years of age, who had earned 4s. a week for a year or
two, which had gone into the common family stock,
but who, at the time of his death, was out of employ-
ment, and it was held, that while no action under the
statute can be maintained unless the plaintiff proves
actual damage, that here there was sufficient actual
damage in the loss to the father of the gain which
he reasonably might anticipate for his boy's future
1 4 C. B. N. S. 296, 93 E. C. L. * 4 H. & N. 653
TO PARENTS FOR CHILD'S DEATH. 4S9
labour. So, in Bramall v. Lees, 1 a father having, at the
trial before Crompton, J., recovered a verdict of £15
for the death of a daughter twelve years of age, who
had never earned any money, but who might, if she
had lived, have obtained wage-earning work in a fac-
tory, a rule for a new trial was granted upon a motion
on behalf of the defendant, but was not pressed to argu-
ment, and in the later case of Chapman v. Both-well, 2
Crompton, J., referring to Bramall v. Lees, said that
the court were of opinion that the rule in that case
ought not to be granted, and that they only granted it
because of a doubt which he entertained, but that at
the end of the discussion he was satisfied that his doubt
was not well grounded. 3
404. The cases in the United States generally hold,
following in the line of Bramall v. Lees, that it is not
necessary for a parent, in order to establish a reason-
able probability of gain from the continued life of a
minor child, to show that the child ever has earned
anything, but that the value of the child's probable
future services is a matter of conjecture, and may be
determined by the jury without the testimony of wit-
nesses as to the value of such services. 4 Of course, the
jury in estimating the pecuniary loss to the parents of
a minor child, must take into consideration the fact
that the parents, if they may reasonably anticipate a
gain from the child's labour, must also defray (he
J 29L. T. 111. ■ 4 Jut. N. S. 1181.
8 See, also, Hetherington v. N. E. Ry., 9 Q B. D. L60; Condon p. G. S. &
W. Ry., 1G Irish C. L. 415; cf. Boulter v. Webster, 13 W. R. 289 ; Bj I
N. E. Ry, 32 L. T. N. S. 199.
* Oldfield v. N. Y. & II. R. R., 8 E. I>. Smith l"::. M N. Y. 810; Drew t>.
Sixth Ave. R. R.,26 Id. 49; Ilil v. 42d St. R. R., 47 [d.817; Chicago v.
Major, 18 111. 349; Chicago v. Bcholton, 76 1«1. 469; I . R. & Bar-
ker, 39 Ark. 491, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 196; Potter < C. A V W. Ry,
22 Wise. G15 ; Seaman v. F. L. & T. Co., 15 Id. 578.
490 DAMAGES-
necessary cost of the child's maintenance. 1 Where the
child is of age at the time of his or her death, or if
under age, has not been living under the parental roof,
the burden is on the plaintiff of proving a reasonable
expectation of his receiving a pecuniary benefit from
the continued life of the child ; 2 but where the child
lives under the parental roof, and is under age at the
time of his death, there is a presumption of pecuniary
loss to his parents resulting from his death.
405. Where a husband sues for his wife's death, or
where children sue for their mother's death, the hus-
band and children are entitled to recover, not only for
any pecuniary loss directly resulting from the death of
the wife and mother, as, for instance, where she is in
receipt of an annuity which has been appropriated to
the payment of family expenses, and which terminates
with her death, but also for the material loss resulting
from the deprivation of her services to her family. 3
This question is fully considered in the case of Lett v.
St. L. & O. Ry., 4 where all the English authorities
were reviewed, especially in the learned and elaborate
judgment of Patterson, J., and the conclusion reached
that the death of a wife and mother is such a material
loss as entitled the husband and the children living at
home to a substantial recovery in damages. In B. &
O. It. K. v. State to use of Mahone, 5 where adult chil-
1 The Penna. Co. ». Lilly, 73 Ind. 252 ; E., K. I. & St. L. Ey. v. Delaney, 82
HI. 198.
2 P. E. E. v. Adams, 55 Penna. St. 499; N. P. E. E. v. Kirk, 90 Id. 15; P.
E. E. fl.Kellar, 67 Id. 300.
3 Chant v. S. E. Ey., Weekly Notes (English) for 1866, p. 134; Wilkins v.
Day, 12 Q. B. D. 110; Lett v. St. L. & O. Ey., 11 Ont. Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng.
E. E. Cas. 105; P. E. E. v. Goodman, 62 Penna. St. 329 ; Mclntyre v. N. Y.
E. P.., 37 X. Y. 287 ; Woodward v. C. & N. W. Ey., 23 Wise. 400 ; cf, Dick-
ins v. N. Y. C. E. E., 23 N. Y. 158.
* 11 Ont. Ap. 1, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 165.
6 63 Md. 135, 21 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 202.
foe wife's death. 491
dren sued for damages for the death of their mother, it
was held that the plaintiffs could only recover for the
loss of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit
from the continuance of her life, and that those of the
children who lived apart from her, and who derived no
pecuniary benefit from her, could not be compensated
in damages, while, on the other hand, a married
daughter, with whom she lived, and in whose household
she performed domestic services, was entitled to be
compensated for her death.
406. Where a widow, or children, sue for the death
of their husband, or father, they can recover for the
loss of any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit
from the death of the husband or father. 1 Obviously
the loss suffered by the widow, or children, in the death
of the husband, or father, is that amount which the
deceased would probably have earned by his intellectual, ■
or bodily labour, in his profession, or business, during
the residue of his life, and which would have gone for
the benefit of his children, or widow, taking into con-
sideration his age, ability, and disposition to labour,
and his habits of living and expenditure. 2 Where a
widow sues for damages for the death of her husband,
her recovery is not barred by the fact that at the time
of his death she was, by agreement, separate. 1 from him. 8
407. Where the statute which creates the right of
recovery permits the suit to be brought for the benefit
of the next of kin (other than parents, husband, wife, or
children), they can recover damages base. I upoo an
» Armsworth v. S. E. By., 11 Jar. 758; Gillard v. L. & Y. By., 12 L. T. 866;
Blake v. M. C. By., 18 Q. B. 93, 83 E C. L. ; P. B. B.«. Vandiver, 86 Penna.
St. 298; P. E. E. v. Henderson, 61 II. 315; C. B. B.». knn trong,52 td
II. & B. T. E. E. v. Decker, 84 Id. 4 1 9.
2 P. R. E. w.Bntler, 59 Penna. Si 335; B.&0. R R. < Weightman, 29
Gratt. 431 ; C. R. R. ». Roach, 64 Ga. 635, B Am. & Eng. B. B. I fat 7'.' ; B. &
O. Ry. v. State, 41 Md. 268.
s D. & W. E. R. v. Spicker, Gl Tex. 427, 21 Am & Eng. B B Gas. 1' <>.
492 DAMAGES
estimate of their reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit from the continuance of the life of the deceased. 1
408. Where personal representatives sue for the
benefit of the decedent's estate, they can recover for
what would be the probable amount of the accumula-
tions of their decedent during what would probably
have been his lifetime. 2
409. A bastard is not a child within the meaning of
the statutes authorizing a recovery of damages in case
of death. 3
410. The ground of a recovery of damages in an
action for the death of any one, being the pecuniary
loss to those for whose benefit the action is instituted,
it is obvious that the personal sufferings of the deceased
are not an element of damage ; 4 nor can the plaintiff's
disbursements, or legal liability, incurred for the nurs-
ing of, and medical attendance upon, the deceased be
taken into consideration in estimating the plaintiff's
damages, for the cause of injury was the death. 5
411. It is clearly settled that no damages can be re-
covered by way of compensation for any merely senti-
mental loss, or by way of solatium for the sorrow and
grief which the death has caused to the surviving mem-
bers of the family of the deceased ; thus, in Blake v. Mid-
land Ry., 6 the plaintiff having brought suit under the
statute as administratrix of her husband, Park, B., di-
rected the jury that beyond the pecuniary injury they
might giveher compensation for thebereavement she had
1 Scheffler v. M. & St. L. Ry., 32 Minn. 125, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 173.
2 P. R. R. v. McCloskey, 23 Penna. St. 526.
3 Dickinson v. N. E. Ry., 2 H. & C. 735 ; Gibson v. M. Ry.. 2 Ont. (Can.)
658.
4 P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 318 ; Durkee v. C. P. R. R., 56 Cal. 388 ;
contra., N. & C R. R. v. Stevens, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 12.
* P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 318 ; P. R. R. v. Bantora, 54 Id. 495 ; C. &
P. R. R. v. Rowan, 66 Id. 393.
6 18Q. B. 03, 83 E. C. L.
FUNERAL EXPENSES. 40 3
sustained, but a rule for a new trial upon the ground
of misdirection was made absolute, the court holding
that the statute gives compensation only for the pecun-
iary loss ; * nor are the mental sufferings of those for
whose benefit the action is brought, elements of damage. 2
The damages in England do not include funeral expenses, etc., but in
the United States disbursements for that purpose are generally per-
mitted to be included.
412. It is settled in England, that the funeral ex-
penses of the deceased, and the cost of the mourning
dress provided for those for whose benefit the action is
brought, are not elements of damage. The ground of
that conclusion is thus stated by Willes, J., in Dalton
v. S. E. Ry. : 3 "the subject-matter of the statute is
compensation for injury by reason of the relative not
being alive ; and there is no language in the statute re-
ferring to the cost of the ceremonial of respect paid to
the memory of the deceased in his funeral, or in putting
on mourning for his loss." The same view is taken in
Boulter v. Webster. 4 On the other hand, in the Ameri-
can courts, it is universally held that funeral expenses
are, in such cases, recoverable as damages. 5 I am not
aware of any American case in which the question has
been raised, as to the right to recover the cost of pro-
1 P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna. St. 318 ; Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Id. 453 ; Donal-
son v. M. & M. R. R, 18 la. 280 ; I. C R. R. v. Weldon, 62 111. 290.
* Blake v. M. Ry., 18 Q. B. 93, 83 E. C. L. ; P. R. R. v. Vandiver, 86 Penna.
St. 298; The State v. B. & O. R. R, 24 Md. 84; K. P. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo.
442, 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245; N. & C. R. E. v. Stevens, Beiak. (Tenn.) 12;
Collir,9 1-. E. T. V. & G. R. R., Id. 841 ; B. & I >. R. R. '■ State to ose of Ma-
hone, G3 Md. 135, 21 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 202; eontra, B. -V O. R. R. ft
Noell, 32 Gratt. 394.
» 4 C. B. N. S. 306, 93 E. CL. 4 1 3 W. B, 289.
5 P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Penna, St. 818; P. B. R- v. Pont..,,,, :, I 1. 1 195 ; 0. A
P. R. E. v. Rowan, 66 Id. 393; Owen i>. Brockamidt, 5 1 Mo. 285 ; Mnrphy v.
N. Y. C. & H. R. E. R-, 88 N. Y. 445, 8 An & Eng. R. R. Caa. 490; Rain
t.St. L., f M. &. S. Ry., 71 Mo. 164, 6 Am. & Eng. B. R. Caa. 61ft
494 DAMAGES
viding mourning for the family, but I cannot see why
the same rule of decision should not be applied with
regard to that as with regard to the expenses of the in-
terment of the deceased, for funeral ceremonies, and the
clothing of the family in black, are alike conventional
expressions of respect for the deceased, and of sorrow
for his loss, and neither can be said to be done in the
performance of a duty imposed by law.
In the United States no deduction is to be made in respect of insurance
on the life of the person killed, but a different rule prevails in Eng-
land.
413. In Hicks v. N. A. & H. Ky., 1 Campbell, C. J.,
directed the jury that in estimating damages for death
they should deduct the amount of a policy recovered
from an accident insurance company, and that they
should also deduct the sums that the decedent or his
family would probably have paid as premiums, had he
lived, upon a policy of general life insurance, which he
had in force at the time of his death. This case was
cited with approval in Bradburn v. G. "W. Ry. 2 On
the other hand, it has been held in America that no
deduction is to be made in respect of policies of general
life insurance. 3
VI. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF DAMAGES.
414. Damages recoverable in case of death are limi-
ted by statute, in the hereinafter-mentioned States, to
the following amounts: Colorado, $5,000; Connecticut,
$5,000; Illinois, $5,000; Indiana, $5,000; Kansas,
$10,000; Maine, $5,000; Massachusetts, $5,000 ; Min-
nesota, $5,000; Missouri, $5,000; Nebraska, $5,000;
1 4 B. & 8. 403, note, 116 E. C. L. 2 L. B. 10 Ex. 1.
8 X. P. R. R. v. Kirk, 90 Penna. St. 15 ; Kellogg v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R.,
79 N. Y. 72.
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS. . 495
New Hampshire, $5,000 ; New York, $5,000 ; Ohio,
$10,000; Oregon, $5,000; Utah, $10,000; West Vir-
ginia, $5,000 ; Wisconsin, $5,000.
415. The Pennsylvania Act of 4 April, 18G8, having
limited recovery as against railways to $3,000 in cases
of personal injury not resulting in death, and to $5,000
in case of death, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873
prohibited any statutory limitation in either class of
cases. In C. R. R. v. Cook, 1 the Act of 1868 was held
to be unconstitutional, so far as it limited the damages
recoverable in cases not resulting in death, for the
reason that the right of recovering such damages being
of common law, and not of statutory origin, could not,
without violation of the Bill of Rights, be taken away
or impaired by statute. This doctrine was reasserted
in 13th & 15th St. P. Ry. v. Boudrou ; 2 but in C. & P.
R. R. v. Rowan, 3 which was decided before the adoption
of the Constitution of 1873, it was held that the right
of recovering damages for death being of statutory
origin, could be impaired or altogether taken away by
subsequent statutes, and in P. R. R. v. Lang-don, 1 de-
cided after the adoption of the Constitution of 1873, it
was held that the limiting Act of 1868 was unaffected
by that instrument, so far as regards a railway, which,
by its formal acceptance of the Act of 1868, had made
that Act a part of its charter, and thereby excepted
itself from the operation of the Constitution of is?::. In
P. &R. R. v. Boyer, 5 Gordon, J., intimated that a differ-
ent conclusion would be reached in a case where the
railway defendant had not formally accepted the Act
of 1868. In Lewis est al, Receivers of the ?.& R. R. R.
v. Hollahan, 8 it was held thai the Becond Bection of the
1 1 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 819. ' 92 Penna, 81 175.
3 66 Id. 393. * 92 Penna, Bt 21. ' 97 Penna. St 108.
« 103 Penna. St. 425.
496 DAMAGES.
Act of 4 April, 1868, has been repealed so far as
regards the limitation of recovery against a railway,
which had not, prior to the adoption of the Constitution
of 1873, accepted that statute, and thereby made it a
part of its charter, Sterrett, J., saying, in delivering the
judgment of the court: "the case of P. R. R. vi Lang-
don, cited and relied on by plaintiff in error, was well
decided on other controlling questions, but we do not
see our way clear to follow it as authority on the pre-
cise constitutional question involved in this case. One
of the questions in that case was as to the effect of
acceptance by the company of the Act of 1868. In
this case that question does not arise." In the later
case of P., W. & B. R. R. v. Conway, 1 wherein the
record failed to show that the railway had accepted the
Act of 1868, Paxson, J., says, in his judgment : " it may
not be out of place here to correct a misapprehension
of the learned judge below in regard to P. R. R. v.
Langdon, supra. That case has not been overruled as
he supposes. Some of the reasoning by which it was
supported is not sustained by the later case of Lewis v.
Hollahan, and as my brethren are wiser than myself, I
cheerfully submit to their views. Moreover, if, when
the main question comes up again, P. R. R. v. Langdon
shall be found to be a mistake, it will afford me pleasure
to join in overruling it. But the question has not been
here since, until the attempt to raise it in the present
case. It is, therefore, premature to assume that P. R.
R. v. Langdon has been overruled. This court has not
yet said that the new Constitution, ipso facto, repealed
charters."
416. Where suit is brought in New York upon a
contract of carriage made in that State, and the breach
1 17 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna.) 429.
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS. 497
resulting in personal injuries to the plaintiff was in
Pennsylvania, the statute of the latter State, limiting
the amount of damages recoverable, will not be enforced
in New York. 1
1 Dyke v. E. E. B., 45 N. Y. 113.
32
498 RELEASES.
CHAPTER IX.
EELEASES.
I. The railway's contractual exemption from liability as a carrier.
II. Eeleases by the plaintiff, or the person injured.
I. THE RAILWAY'S CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION FROM
LIABILITY AS A CARRIER.
In certain jurisdictio?is the law, from considerations of public policy,
forbids railways, as carriers of passengers, to contract for, exemption
from responsibility for the results of their negligence.
417. In certain jurisdictions, the law, from considera-
tions of public policy, forbids railways, as carriers of
passengers, to contract for exemption from responsi-
bility for the results of their own negligence, or that of
their agents or servants. In 1832, Mr. Justice Story,
in his commentaries on the Law of Bailments, 1 stated,
as the result of the cases up to that time with regard to
the right of a common carrier of goods on land to limit
his responsibility, that "Lord Coke declared it, in a
note to Southcote's case, 2 and that it was admitted in
Morse v. Slue. 3 It is now fully recognized and settled
beyond any reasonable doubt," 4 and he added : "still,
however, it is to be understood that common carriers
cannot, by any special agreement, exempt themselves
from all responsibility, so as to evade altogether the
salutary policy of the common law. They cannot,
therefore, by special notice, exempt themselves from
1 Sec. 549. 2 4 Rep. 84. 3 1 Ventr. 238.
* Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East 507 ; Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. 39 ;
Riley v. Home, h Eingh. 217 ; Lowes v. Kermode, 8 Taunt. 146 ; Austin v. M
S. & L. Ry., 10 C. B. 473, 70 E. C L.
CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION. 499
responsibility in cases of gross negligence and fraud,
or, by demanding an exorbitant price, compel the owner
of the goods to yield to unjust and oppressive limita-
tions and qualifications of his rights." In Peek v. N.
S. Ry., 1 Blackburn, J., admits the correctness of Judge
Story's conclusions, from the decisions up to the date
of the publication of bis book, saying, " in my opinion
the weight of authority was, in 1832, in favour of this
view of the law, but the cases decided in our courts
between 1832 and 1854, established that this was not
law, and that a carrier might, by a special notice, make
a contract limiting his responsibility, even in the cases
here mentioned of gross negligence, misconduct, or
fraud on the part of his servants, and, as it seems to
me, the reason why the legislature intervened in the
Railway and Canal Act (1854), was because it thought
that the companies took advantage of these decisions
(in Story's language) 'to evade altogether the salutary
policy of the common law.'" Lord Blackburn refers
to cases which abundantly sustain this view. Under
the Railway and Canal Act, 1854, 2 it is for the court to
determine whether the conditions imposed by the car-
rier, limiting his liability for the transportation of
goods, be or be not just and reasonable, but no statute
having thrown a similar protection over contracts for
passenger carriage, the law in England as to them is,
that the parties are free to make their own contracts,
and that the railway may stipulate l''->r exemption from
liability for all injuries to a passenger, whether caused
by the negligence of its servants or otherwise; thus, in
McCawley v. The F. Railway, 3 it was held on demurrer,
that a plaintiff travelling under a free pass, which, in
terms, stipulated that the "plaintiff should 'travel al his
own risk," cannot recover for injuries caused by the
MOH. L. 473. " 17 & 18 Vict. c. 81. *L.B JQ.B.57.
500 RELEASES.
railway's "gross and wilful negligence." In Hall v."N.
E. By., 1 the plaintiff, who travelled under a drover's
ticket issued by the N. B. By., for a journey from An-
gerton to Newcastle, the line of the N. B. By. termina-
ting at Morpeth, where the line of the defendant com-
pany began, the ticket stipulating the plaintiff should
travel at his own risk, and the plaintiff having been
injured between Morpeth and Newcastle on the defend-
ant's line, owing to the negligence of the defendant's
servants, it was held that the ticket bound the plaintiff
to travel at his own risk during the whole of the jour-
ney, and that the defendant was protected upon its
line as effectually as the N. B. By. was protected upon
its line. In Gallin v. L. & N. W. By., 2 the plaintiff
travelled on the defendant's line as a drover with cat-
tle, under a pass stipulating that he should travel at his
own risk, and the train arrived at its terminus after
dark, and the plaintiff's car was stopped on a bridge
with a low and dangerous parapet, the plaintiff, in
alighting, fell over the parapet and was injured, and it
was held that the terms under which the plaintiff trav-
elled exempted the railway from liability to him, not
only during the actual transit, but also while he was
leaving the railway premises. In Burke v. S. E. By., 3
the plaintiff bought from the railway a book of coupons
entitling him to travel between London and Paris. On
the second page of this book there was printed a con-
dition limiting the railway's responsibility to its own
trains, and the plaintiff having been injured in a
French train, the railway rested its defence on the con-
dition. It was held that the whole book was the con-
tract accepted by the plaintiff, and that he could not
reject the condition exempting the railway from liability.
1 L. R. 10 Q, B. 437. 2 L. R. 10 Q. B. 212.
'5C.P.D. 1.
CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION. 501
Henderson v. Stevens, 1 was distinguished on the ground
that in that case the contract was printed on the front
of the ticket, and the notice limiting the defendant's
liability was printed on the back of the ticket, and was
not proved to have been brought to the attention of the
plaintiff. 2
418. The weight of American authority, however, is
decidedly in favour of the proposition, that, while a
carrier of goods may by contract, or even by notice
brought home to the shipper of goods, limit his lia-
bility, yet he cannot by stipulation exempt himself
from responsibility for his own negligence or that of
his servants. 3 In the United States the same rule is
generally enforced in cases of contracts for the carriage
of passengers, whether the passengers be carried by
the railway, for the ordinary and legally established
rate of fare, or for a lower rate of fare, or even without
the payment of any fare. 4 The English rule is followed
1 L. K. 3 H. L. Sc. & Div. 470.
2 See, also, Duff v. G. N. Ry., 4 Law Rep. Ireland 178.
3 Beckman v. Shause, 5 Rawle 179; Laing v. Colder, 8 Penna. St. 479; At-
wood v. Reliance Transportation Co., 9 Watts 87 ; C. & A. R. R. v. Baldauf,
16 Penna. St. 67; Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. it S. 495 j Amer. Express Co. v.
Second National Bank of Titusville, 69 Penna. St. 394; Empire Trans. Co. v.
Wamsutta Oil Co., 63 Id. 14; Farnham v. C. & A. R. R., 55 Id. 62; N. J. S.
Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; Dorr v. N. J. 8. Nay. Co., 1 Bandf.
S. C. 136; Stoddard v. L. I. Ry., 5 Id. 180; Davidson a Graham, 2 Ohio St
131; Graham v. Davis, 4 Id. 362; Welsh v. P., C. & St. L. By, 10 Id. 75;
Knowlton v. Erie Ry., Id. 260; Fillibrowne v. < r. T. By., 55 Me. 462 ; Sagei v.
Portsmouth. 31 Id. 228 ; School District v. B., II. & E. B. B., 102 Mass. 552;
I., P. & C. R. R v. Allen, 31 Ind. 394; Berry i». Cooper. 28 I la. 5 IS ; Staid v.
Townsend, 'M Ala, 247; S. Ex. Co. v. Crook, U Id. 468; B. Ex. Co. a Moon,
39 Miss. 822; N. O. M. Ins. Co. r. X. < >., J. & Gr. N. B. K.. 20 La. in
York v. Central B.R.,3 Wall L13; Walker v. Transportation Co., Id. 160;
Express Co. v. Knntzc, 8 Wall. 342.
4 N. Y. C. R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 867 ; Gr. T. By. v. Bterena, 96 D. B.
655; P. R. R. v. McCloskey, 23 Penna. St. 526; P. B B. v. ITend* pmh, 51 Id.
315; L. &B. R. R v. Chenewith, 52 Id. 382; P. B. B a BaUer, 67 Id. 886;
B., P. & W. R. R. v. O'llara, L2 Weekly Notes of Cases (Penna I 178; Graham
v. P. R. R., 66 Mo. 530; Jacobus r. St. P. & C. B. B., 20 Minn. 126; I. B. K.
502 EELEASES.
in Canada, 1 and in Ireland, 2 and also in New York. 3
The case of Smith v. N. Y. C. R. R, 4 where the railway
is held liable, is only distinguishable from the latter cases
upon the ground that in that case the contract of ex-
emption was general in its terms, and did not specify as
a ground of exemption the negligence of the defendant
or its servant, but in effect Smith's case must be held
to be overruled as an expression of the law in New
York by the later cases in that State. There are also
some other cases in which the English and New York
cases are followed. 5
419. Where the passenger is to be carried also over
a connecting line, the limitation of liability made by
contract with the original carrier, when available to
protect the contracting line, avails also to protect the
connecting line. 6 A contract in terms exempting a
railway from responsibility for "damage" or "risks"
to the passenger will not be so construed as to relieve
the railway from liability for the results of negligence
v. Monday, 21 Ind. 48 ; Arnold v. I. C. E. E., 83 111. 273 ; I. C. E. E. v. Bead,
37 Id. 484; Warren v. F. E E., 8 Allen 227 ; C, P. & A. E. E. v. Curran, 19
Ohio St. 1 ; Eose v. D. M. V. E. E., 39 Iowa 246 ; M. & O. By- v. Hopkins, 41
Ala. N. S. 486.
1 Sutherland v. G. W. Ey., 7 Up. Can. (C. P.) 409 ; Alexander v. N. Ey., 33
Up. Can. (Q. B.) 474, 35 Id. 453.
2 Johnson v. G. W. & S. Ey., 9 Irish Eep. C. L. 108.
3 Wells v. N.Y. C. E. E., 24 N. Y. 181 ; Perkins v. N. Y. C. E. E., Id. 196;
Bissell v. Same, 25 Id. 442 ; Poucher v. Same, 49 Id. 263 ; Cragin v. Same, 51
Id. 64 ; Stinson v. Paine, 32 Id. 333 ; Blair v. E. Ey., 66 Id. 313.
* 24 N. Y. 222.
6 Ashmore v. Penna. Trans. Co., 28 N. J. L. 180 ; Kinney v. C E. E., 32 Id.
407 ; Hall v. N. J. S. N. Co., 15 Conn. 539 ; Beck v. Weeks, 34 Id. 145 ; Law-
rence v. N. Y. & N. H. E. E., 36 Id. 63 ; Kimball v. E. & B. E. E., 26 Vt.
247; Mann v. Preacher, 40 Id 332; Adams Ex. Co. v. Haynes, 42 111.89;
Adams Ex. Co. v. Brooks, Id. 458; Illinois E. E. v. Adams, Id. 474; Haw-
kins v. G. W. E. E., 17 Mich. 57, 18 Id. 427 ; B. & O. E. K. v. Bregy, 32 Md.
333 ; Brehme v. Adams Ex. Co., 25 Id. 328 ; Levering v. Union Trans. Co., 42
Mo. 88.
6 Hall v. N. E. Ey., L. E. 10 Q. B. 437.
CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION. 503
on its part. 1 In order to relieve the railway from lia-
bility for the results of its negligence, the contract for
its exemption must have been made with or accepted
by the person injured; thus, where a mail agent was
killed while travelling in charge of mails under a con-
tract between the railway and the government, it was
held that a condition of exemption in the pass given tc
and used by the agent was inoperative, because the
agent's right to free and safe transportation was absolute
under the contract between the railway and the govern-
ment. 2 It has been held in Illinois that a railway,
which runs a sufficient number of passenger trains for
the accommodation of the public, being under no legal
obligation to carry passengers on its freight trains, may
contract for a limitation of liability in cases of pas-
sengers so carried, provided that equal terms are held
out to all offering themselves to be so carried. 3 Where
a passenger is carried for a valuable consideration, his
use of a pass containing conditions exemjiting the rail-
way from liability for negligence will not estop him from
proving that he was not subject to those conditions. 4
420. While it mast be admitted that, as a general
rule, parties to contracts may, as they please, assume
obligations or limit their rights, yet it may well be con-
tended, in the light of public policy and with a just,
appreciation of the character and magnitude of railway
operations, that railways ought not to be permitted in
all cases to contract for exemption from the Legal con-
sequences of their negligence. In G. T. Ry. v. Stevens, 8
Bradley, J., pertinently says: "it is often asked with
l N. J. S. N. Co.v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Bow. 844; Smith v. \. V . C, B. k,
24N.Y. 22-J; SI. & O. Ry. v. Bopkins, 11 Ala.
■N.Y., L. E. & W. R. R. r. Seybolt, 95 N. Y. 562.
» Arnold v. I. C. R. R., 83 III. 273.
* G. T. Ry. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655. ' 98 I '■ S. 6G0.
504 RELEASES.
apparent confidence, may not men make their own con-
tracts ? or, in other words, may not a man do what he
will with his own ?" The question at first sight seems
a simple one, hut there is a question lying behind that.
"Can a man call that absolutely his own which he holds
as a great public trust, by the public grant, and for the
public use as well as for his own profit ?" Railways
do not deal with the public at arm's length, nor upon
equal terms. The exigencies of business and the con-
ditions of modern life compel individuals to avail them-
selves of the facilities which railways offer, and to accept
the terms which railways dictate. Therefore, that which
is in legal form a contract between the railway and its
customer is possibly the result of coercion rather than
of agreement, and, for that reason, should be looked
upon with suspicion, if its effect be to release the rail-
way from usual and reasonable obligations. The law
exacts damages for breaches of contract and other vio-
lations of duty chiefly in order to compensate, in so far
as possibly can be, the injured party for the wrong that
has been done to him ; and no one can doubt that
public policy demands not only that every wrong should
be legally redressed at the cost of the wrongdoer, but
also that that redress should so inevitably and so
promptly follow upon the commission of the wrong,
that the certainty of its exaction will be an ever-present
warning not to do a like wrong. It is also to be remem-
bered that inasmuch as railways are common and public,
and not private or special, carriers, any one act of neg-
ligence, which is the cause of injury to one passenger
or forwarder of goods, may at the same time be the
cause of the like or greater injury to other customers
of the railway. It is, therefore, to the benefit of the
public that all proprietors, managers, and servants of
railways should realize that every act of negligence on
CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION. 505
the part of the railway will, of necessity and without
exception, render the railway responsible in damages
to the party injured thereby, if that party be himself
without fault. This line of argument is forcibly stated
by Bradley, J., in his judgment in N. Y. C. E. It. v.
Lockwood. 1 Therefore, when a railway, in the exercise
of its charter powers, receives a passenger for trans-
portation upon payment of its ordinary and legally
established rate of fare, or for any consideration, pecu-
niary or otherwise, which it accepts as the equivalent
of that fare, it may well be contended that considera-
tions of public policy forbid the railway to enter into a
contract with that passenger which shall have the effect
of relieving the railway from responsibility for the con-
sequences of its negligence. But these considerations
do not apply to a case where the railway offers to the
passenger a free choice between the alternatives of, on
the one hand, transportation at the ordinary and legally
established rate of fare, with liability upon the part of
the railway to indemnify him against the consequences
of its negligence, and, on the other hand, transportation
at a lower rate of fare, or without any charge, upon
condition that the railway be exempted from liability
for its negligence. If, under such circumstances, the
passenger voluntarily accepts the last-mentioned alter-
native, considerations of public policy obviously do not
forbid the railway to avail itself of that exemption from
liability, whose insertion as a condition of the contract
was, either partly or wholly, the consideration for the
transportation of the passenger for less than the ordi-
nary rate of fare. This view was clearly put in Kenney
v. C. R. R. of N. J., 2 where the railway was held not
to be liable to one who was killed by its oegligence
1 17 Wall. 357. ■ 34 N. J. L. 513.
506 RELEASES.
while being carried as a passenger under a free pass,
which in terms exempted the railway from liability for
the results of its negligence. Van Syckcl, J., thus
stated the grounds of the judgment : " the deceased did
not choose to bargain with them in their general em-
ployment, in which they hold themselves ready to
transport passengers for hire, but asked and accepted
from them a gratuity. To hold otherwise would be to
say that a man, from the mere fact that his occupation
is that of a common carrier, cannot, as to an individual
transaction, be a gratuitous bailee. The company, there-
fore, in asking immunity against loss in this case, does
not seek to escape fram any part of its common-law'
liability. The objection that this contract is inconsis-
tent with, good morals and sound policy has been con-
sidered in all the cases of this kind which have been
submitted to judicial criticism. It differs widely from
the question, whether a person should be allowed to
stipulate against loss from his own negligence. Reasons
of great cogency could be stated against the validity of
such a contract, which can have no pertinency to this
issue. The doctrine of respondeat superior has not been
adopted, because there is any equity in imposing the
loss upon the superior, but in order to induce the prin-
cipal to use greater care in the selection, and to exercise
increased watchfulness over the acts and conduct of his
agents. While it may with great force be urged that
the policy which dictates this rule would be infringed
by permitting a railroad company, in the pursuit of its
ordinary business, to contract for immunity from such
loss, it is difficult to perceive how this consideration can
apply to a transaction without their ordinary employ-
ment, to a mere gratuity or accommodation, which con-
cerns none but the immediate parties to it. Why should
the passenger who solicits a free pass be permitted to
CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION. 507
escape the liability to loss, which he voluntarily assumes
in order to secure the accommodation? It is certainly
a breach of good faith in the passenger to attempt to fix
the carrier with responsibility in such case. * * * The
damage in this case resulted from the fault, not of the
directors of the company, but from that of its subor-
dinate agents, and no satisfactory reason has been given
why the contract, which the parties themselves made,
should be restrained of its full operation."
421. Of course, where a real freedom of choice be-
tween the alternatives is not offered to the passenger,
the condition of exemption ought not to protect the rail-
.way. This view is supported by the case of N. Y. C.
R. R. v. Lock wood, supra, where the plaintiff, having
shipped cattle under a contract providing for the trans-
portation of his cattle at less than tariff rates, and bind-
ing him to attend to the loading and transportation and
unloading of the cattle, and to take all risk of injury to
them, and of personal injury to himself or to whomso-
ever travelled with the cattle, and having received a
pass certifying that he had shipped sufficient stock to
pass free, but binding him to waive all claims for dam-
ages or injuries, was injured by the negligence of the
railway's servants, it being proven at the trial thai the
tariff rates were about three times the ordinary rates
charged, and that the usage of business was for all
drovers to ship cattle under agreements similar to that
made by the plaintiff, judgment upon a verdict for the
plaintiff was affirmed in error.
508 RELEASES.
II. RELEASES BY THE PLAINTIFF, OR THE PERSON
INJURED.
Subject to the qualifications stated, either the person injured or the
plaintiff may release his right of action either before or after the
injury.
422. Either the plaintiff, or the person injured, may-
bind himself and his privies by his release of the cause
of action if made upon an adequate consideration, and
with a full knowledge of its legal effect. But a release
will not bind the person injured which he was induced
to sign by false representations made by an officer of
the railway that his injuries were slight, and that if
they should ultimately become serious he would, not-
withstanding the release, be in a position to obtain fur-
ther compensation from the railway. 1 So, a release may
be set aside by proof that at the time it was executed,
the party releasing his claim was insane, and, if be sub-
sequently became sane, did not ratify it. 2 Whether or
not a release of a claim for damages has been obtained
through fraud is a question for the jury, and the burden
of proving the fraud is on the plaintiff,- 3 but in order to
warrant the submission of the issue on that point to the
jury, the evidence of the fraud must be clear and in-
dubitable. 4 A refusal upon the part of a passenger who
has been injured to pay his fare, and an assent thereto
upon the part of the carrier, does not amount to a settle-
ment of the passenger's claim for damages for the in-
jury, nor estop the passenger from asserting and enforc-
1 Hirschfeld v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 2Q.B.D.1.
3 George v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. R., 34 Ark. 613, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
294; Dixon v. B. C. & N. R. R., 100 N. Y. 170.
s Hawes v. B., C. R. & N. R. R., 64 Iowa 315, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 220;
C.,R.I. & P. Ry. v. Lewis, 109 111. 120, 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 224; Bus-
sian v. M., L. S. & W. Ry., 56 Wise. 325, 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 716.
* P. R. R. v. Shay, 82 Penna. St. 198.
RELEASE BY PRE-CONTRACT. 509
ing such, a claim. 1 It has been held that where a pas-
senger has sued his carrier and also the owner of a col-
liding carriage his release or discharge of the carrier
will bar his action against the other defendant. 2
423. A release by the person injured will bind those
who, after his death, sue for the damages caused to them
by his death ; thus, in Read v. G. E. Ry., 3 a widow
having brought suit under Lord Campbell's Act the de-
fendant pleaded that in the lifetime of the decedent
"the defendants paid him, and he accepted, a sum of
money in full satisfaction and discharge of all the claims
and causes of action he had against the defendants," and
on demurrer judgment was entered for the defendant,
Lush, J., saying: "the intention of the statute is, not
to make the wrongdoer pay damages twice for the same
wrongful act, but to enable the representatives of the
person injured to recover in a case where the maxim
actio personalis morltur cum persona would have applied.
It only points to a case where the party injured has not
recovered compensation against the wrongdoer. It is
true that s. 2 provides a different mode of assessing the
damages, but that does not give afresh cause of action."
424. A person may also bind himself and his privies
before receiving any injury by his stipulation that, if
injured, he will not claim damages; thus, in Griffith /•.
The Earl of Dudley, 4 the widow of a workman suing
under the Employer's Liability Act, 1880, for damages
caused to her by the death of her husband was held to
be barred by his contract with his employer, made upon
a valuable consideration for himself and his representa-
tives and any person entitled, in case of his death, oot
to claim any compensation under the Act for personal
» M. Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall. 528.
* Burton v. Price, 57 Cal. 272.
•L.B.3Q.B.555. •9Q.B.D.857.
510 EELEASES.
injury whether resulting in death or not. 1 On the
other hand, in K. P. Ky. v. Peavey, 2 the facts were
that the Kansas statute 3 subjected the railway to liability
to its servants for injuries caused by the negligence of
their fellow-servants, that after the passage of that Act
the plaintiff entered into the service of the railway, and
signed a written release stipulating that in consideration
of the wages to be paid to him he would not hold the
railway liable in damages for injuries caused to him,
inter alia, by the negligence of his fellow-servants, and
that the plaintiff was injured by such negligence; and
the court held the release void because against public
policy, and entered judgment against the railway.
Horton, C. J., thus states the ground of decision: "the
State has such an interest in the lives and limbs of its
citizens that it has the power to enact statutes for their
protection, and the provisions of such statutes are not
to be evaded or waived by contracts in contravention
therewith. The general principle deduced from the
authorities is that an individual shall not be assisted by
the law in enforcing a contract founded upon a breach
or violation on his part of its principles or enactments;
and this principle is applicable to legislative enactments,
and is uniformly true in regard to all statutes made to
carry out measures of general policy, and the rule holds
equally good if there be no express provision in the
statute peremptorily declaring all contracts in violation
of its provisions void." The fallacy in this line of
reasoning is obvious ; the relation between the railway
and its servants is purely voluntary and contractual ;
the servant is not compelled to enter the service of the
1 See also W. & A. R. R. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465 ; Galloway v. W. & A. R. R.,
57 Id. 512 ; W. & A. R. R. v. Strong, 52 Id. 461 ; Hendricks v. W. & A. R. R.
Id. 467.
2 29 Kans. 169. 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 260.
3 Ch. 93, Laws of 1874.
RELEASE BY PRE-COXTRACT. 511
railway, and the conditions of his service are the result
not of coercion, but of compact, and the railway is,
therefore, as much entitled to insist upon a release of
damages by pre-contract, as it is entitled to insist that
the servant's pay shall be two, three, or five dollars a
day, instead of twenty, thirty, or fifty dollars a day.
There is, in principle, an obvious distinction between
the relation which the railway holds to its servants and
that which it holds to persons not contractually con-
nected with it, and even to passengers who deal with it
on the basis of its quasi-public status.
INDEX.
The references are to the pages.
ABUTMENT.
Injury from falling over, 150.
Liability of railway to servants for injuries caused by dan-
gerous proximity of, to line, 307.
Presumption of negligence in case of falling of brick from,
441.
ACCIDENT, INEVITABLE.
See Inevitable Accident.
ACCIDENTAL INSURANCE.
See Insurance.
ACT OF GOD.
Definition of, 29.
Non-liability of railways for injuries caused solely by, 29.
Illustrations of, 32.
Recurrence of, 32.
Liability of railway where negligence on its part has con-
curred with, in causing the injury, 34.
Illustrations of negligence of railway concurring with, 34
ACTION.
See Assumpsit, Case, Trespass.
Form of, 385.
Distinction between contract and tort only formal in th<
but of practical importance, 386.
When the remedy is in equity, 3
ACTS AND OMISSIONS.
See Commission ok OMISSION, ' ►MISSION.
Liability of railway for acta dependent upon the relation
between the railway and the actor, the scope of bis authority,
and the character of the act, 97.
33
514 INDEX.
ADMINISTRATORS.
See Personal Representatives.
ADMISSIONS.
See Declarations.
AGENCY.
Relation of, between railway and wrongdoer fixes liability of
railway for wrongful act, 38.
Distinction in legal effect between special and general, 98.
AGENTS.
See Agency.
Contributory negligence of, 75.
ALTERATIONS.
See Changes in Construction.
ASSAULT.
Liability of railway for, 111, 112.
ASSUMPSIT.
When the action of lies, 390.
Damages in, 394.
ATTENDANTS OF PASSENGERS.
Liability of the railway to, 219.
AUXILIARY LINES.
See Connecting Lines.
BACKING TRAINS.
Care to be observed in, 1G6.
BASTARD.
Cannot recover damages for parent's death, 492.
BOARDING AND LEAVING TRAINS.
Liability of the railway for injuries incurred in, 16, 264.
Contributory negligence in, 62.
BOILERS.
See Engines.
Presumption of negligence in case of explosion of, 439.
BRAKES.
Duty of the railway to travellers on highways as to, 167
Duty of the railway as to brakes of cars stored on siding,
178.
Duty of the railway to passengers as to, 240.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 307.
BRIDGES.
Duty of the railway as to, with regard to passengers, 240.
INDEX. 515
BRIDGES— Continued.
With regard to servants, 305.
Non-liability for destruction of bridge by act of God, 32.
Or by public enemy, 35.
Duty of the railway to travellers on the highway as to rail-
way bridges over highways, 149.
Duty of the railway to travellers on the highway as to high-
way bridges over the line, 149.
Duty of railway to servants as to bridges over the line, 302.
Presumption of negligence in case of fall of, 440.
BRIDGE ABUTMENT.
See Abutment.
BRIDGE GIRDER.
See Girder.
BRIDGE-GUARDS.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 30(3.
BUILDINGS.
Duty of the railway to passers on the highway, as to. 148.
Duty of the railway to passengers, as to its, 240.
Duty of the railway to licensees, as to its, 177.
Duty of the railway to trespassers, as to its, 190.
Duty of the railway to servants, as to its, 305.
Nou-liability for destruction of, by act of God, 32.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
General doctrine concerning, 433.
Of negligence, 433.
Of contributory negligence, 438.
CANCER.
Liability of railway for, following railway accident, 28.
CARPENTERS.
As fellow-servants, 3G0, 3G8.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
Liability of railways as, 200.
Negligence of, attributed to passengers, 78.
CARS.
Duty of the railway to passengers with regard l<> its, 240.
With regard to cars received from other lin< - for transpor-
tation, 238.
Duty of railway to servants, with regard t<>, 307.
Duty of railway to servants, with regard to can received
from other lines for transportation, -JiM.
516 INDEX.
CASE, ACTION ON THE.
Where it lies, 390.
Damages iu, 394.
CATTLE-CHUTES.
See Chutes.
CAUSE, PROXIMATE AND REMOTE.
See Proximate and Remote Cause.
CHANGES IN CONSTRUCTION.
Admissibility of proof of made subsequently to injury, 421.
CHILDREN.
Contributory negligence of, 6Q.
Contributory negligence of parents, etc., as attributed to, 90.
Negligence, to be graduated by capacity, QQ.
Turn-table cases, 184.
For jury to determine capacity of, 70.
Not so as to, more than fourteen years of age, 70.
Railway owes higher measure of duty to, 71.
Fact of infancy will not supply want of proof of negligence
by railway, 72.
Liability of railway for injuries to minor servants, 338.
Damages recoverable by parent for injury to, 481.
For death of, 487.
CHUTES.
Liability of railway to servants for location of, in dangerous
proximity to line, 308.
CLASSIFICATION.
Of tho.se for whose acts railways are liable, 98.
Of those to whom railways are liable, 143.
Of those to whom railways are liable to the same extent as
to passengers, 143, 199.
Of fellow-servants, 365.
COAL-CHUTES.
See Chutes.
COLLATERAL OCCURRENCE.
Admissibility of proof of, 420.
COLLISION.
Presumption of negligence in case of, 439, 442, 443.
COMMISSION OR OMISSION.
Liability of the railway, as afleeted by the character of the
act as one of, 37, 96.
INDEX. 517
COMMON EMPLOYMENT.
See Fellow-servants.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
Defined. 59.
The rule of, in Illinois, 59.
The rule of, in Georgia and Tennessee, 60.
Not a reasonable doctrine, 60.
CONDUCTORS OF TRAINS.
Not vice-principals, 324.
As fellow-servants, 367, 369.
CONNECTING LINES.
Liability of railways for the negligence of, 137.
Liability of railways for the negligence of other railways
exercising statutory running powers, 140.
Liability of railways for the negligence of other railways
exercising contractual running powers, 141.
CONSEQUENCES.
See Proximate and Remote Cause.
CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.
Liability of railway to, when personally assisting in the
reception or delivery of their freight, 223.
Non-liability to volunteer assisting, 224.
Contributory negligence of, 224.
CONTRACT.
See Action.
Liability of railway to person using line, etc., under spe-
cial, 225.
Damages for breaches of, 459.
CONTRACTOR.
See Independent Contractor.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
In general, 45.
The reason of the rule of, 47.
Defined, 48.
Essentials of proof of, 48,
In avoiding dangers, or obviating inconveniences, 62.
Doubts as to the applicability of doctrine of, to paasengeii, 48.
Of persons deprived oftbi ir b >ns ss, 66.
Neither moral quality nor motive of act relevant if oneof
contributory negligence, 50.
518 INDEX.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE— Continued.
Opportunity of knowledge equivalent to knowledge for pur-
poses of, 50.
Of infants, 66.
Belief of contributorily negligent person not relevant, 50.
No defence in case of wilful injury, 50.
Railway liable if injury could have been avoided notwith-
standing negligence of person injured, or of plaintiff, 51.
Rule in Davis v. Matin explained, 55.
Comparative negligence, 59.
In not performing collateral statutory duty, 64.
Sunday travelling, 65.
Generally for jury to determine capacity of infants, etc., 69.
Not so, in cases of infants more than fourteen years of
age, 70.
Railway owes higher duty to infants, etc., than to adults of
average capacity, 71.
Fact of infancy, or other incapacity, will not supply want of
proof of negligence by the railway, 72.
Of drunkards, 74.
Knowledge of injured person's incapacity necessary to fix
railway with liability, where it would not be liable to person of
average capacity, 75.
Plaintiffs contributory negligence a bar when suing for in-
juries to another's person, 75.
Of parents, when suing for injuries to child, 76.
Of poor parents, 77.
Attributed, 78.
Attribution of carrier's negligence to passenger, 78.
Of passers, on highway near the line, 154.
Of passers, on highway at grade crossings, 168.
When contributory negligence at grade crossings is to be
decided by the court, and when by the jury, 168, 170.
Duty of increased care, wdien the crossing is specially dan-
gerous, 171.
Excuses for carelessness, 172.
Of trespassers, 183,192.
Of consignors and consignees, 224.
Of passengers, 259.
Of servants, 373.
Presumption of contributory negligence, 443.
A question of fact, 447.
INDEX. 519
CONTRACTORS.
See Independent Contractor.
CONTRACTING PARTY.
Contributory negligence of, as attributed to the person on
whose behalf the contract was made, 88.
COUPLINGS.
Railway not bound to servants to have uniform couplings,
302.
Servants take ordinary risks of, 346.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
See Scope of Employment. #
COURT AND JURY.
Provinces of, as to negligence and contributory negligence,
448.
As to damages, 468.
CROSSINGS.
Liability of railway for failure to maintain, in repair, 155.
Duty of the railway in the operation of its line at, 157, 166.
Reciprocal rights and obligations of the railway and of
passers on the highway at, 158.
At grade objectionable, 157.
Speed of trains at, 159.
Statutory signals at, 160.
Duty of the railway as to giving notice of approach of train
to, 162.
Duty of the railway as to flagman at, 163.
Duty of the railway as to gates at, 163.
Failure of the railway to perform self-imposed duty at, when
negligence, 164.
Increased duty of the railway when specially dangerous, 165.
Duty of the railway to its passengers with regard to COE-
struction and maintenance of, 240.
CROWD.
See Mob.
CULVERTS.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 805.
CYCLONE.
Non-liability of railway because train is Mown Brain track
by, 32.
Or station building is prostrated by, 32.
520 INDEX.
DAMAGES.
For breach of contract of carriage, 459.
For illness following such breach, 466.
For torts, 468.
The old rule, 468.
The modern rule, 468.
Provinces of judge and jury as to, 468.
Duty of the judge as to, 468.
Duty of the jury as to, 469.
Excessive, 470.
Inadequate, 470.
Not generally subject to review in appellate tribunal, 470.
Exemplary, 471.
In case of injuries not causing death, 472.
Not to be diminished by receipt from accidental insurance
policy, 474, 494.
Duty of person injured to exercise care in his surgical treat-
ment after injury, 480.
Measure of, in suit for personal injuries, 473.
In suit by husband for injuries to wife, 480.
In suit by parent or master for injuries to child or servant,
481.
In suit for death, 482.
Pecuniary loss, 486.
Damages recoverable by parent for child's death, 487.
By husband and children suing for death of wife and
mother, 490.
By widow and children suing for death of husband and
father, 491.
By next of kin, 491.
By personal representatives, 492.
Bastard cannot recover as a child, 492.
Personal sufferings of deceased not elements of damage, 492.
Do not include solatium, 492.
Funeral expenses, etc., when recoverable as, 493.
Life insurance, 494.
Statutory limitations of, 494.
DANGERS.
Liability of railway for injuries incurred in avoiding, 14.
Contributory negligence in avoiding, 62.
DEATH.
No right of action in tort for, at common law, 397.
IXDEX. 521
DEATH— Continued.
Right of action for, caused by breach of contract, 399.
Statutes authorizing recovery of damages for, 402.
Contributory negligence of the dead person attributable to
those who sue for damages for his death, 87.
DECLARATIONS.
Admissibility of, by agents or servants of the railway, 415.
By the plaintiff, or the person injured, 417, 418.
DEFECTIVE CARS.
See Cars.
DEFENDANT.
Who may be, 412.
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE.
See Negligence.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE.
See Negligence.
DEPOT.
See Station.
DERAILMENT.
Presumption of negligence in case of, 439.
DERRICK.
Injuries caused by, 151, 152.
Duties to servants with regard to, 306.
DOORS OF CARS.
Injuries incurred in closing, 15.
DRAWING-ROOM CARS.
See Sleeping-Cars.
DRIVER OF CARRIAGE.
Negligence of, imputable to person driven, 78.
DROVERS' PASSES.
Liability of railway, 204.
Effect of limitations in, 505.
DRUNKARDS.
Contributory negligence of, 7 I.
Liability of railway Cut- retention <>f' intemperate servant*,
314.
DUTY.
General, of tin- railway, .'!.
To passengers, etc., 231.
To servants, 295.
522 INDEX.
DUTY— Continued.
To licensees, 176.
To trespassers, 182.
To persons lawfully on highways at grade crossings, 162.
Higher measure of, to children, etc., 71.
Of the judge at nisi prius, 448, 468.
EMBANKMENTS.
Duty of railway to passengers in construction and mainte-
nance of, 240.
Not liable for destruction of, caused by act of God, 32.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 305.
Presumption of negligence in case of breaking down of, 440.
EMPLOYE.
See Servant.
ENEMY, PUBLIC.
See Public Enemy.
ENGINES.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 306.
ENGINE-DRIVERS.
Not vice-principals, 323, 327.
As fellow-servants, 366, 369.
Contributorv negligence of, 374.
ENGINEERS.
See Engine-drivers.
ENGINEER'S STAKE.
Liability of railway for injuries caused by falling over, on
highway, 151.
EQUITY.
When the remedy of the person injured is in, 385.
ESCORTS OF PASSENGERS.
Liability of the railway to, 219.
EVIDENCE.
In actions against railways for negligence, 415.
Burden of proof of negligence, 433.
Of contributory negligence, 435.
Presumption of negligence, 438.
Presumption of contributory negligence, 443.
Minor presumptions, 444.
Admissibility of declarations by agents. and servants of the
railway, 415.
INDEX. 523
EVIDENCE— Continued.
Admissibility of declarations by the plaiutiff or the person
injured, 417, 418.
Admissibility of proof of collateral occurrences, 420.
Admissibility of proof of changes in construction or mode of
operation of the line, 421.
Admissibility of proof of attempted subornation of perjury,
423.
Inspection of injuries, 424.
As to speed of trains, 424.
As to signals, 426.
Admissibility of life tables, 431.
Non-admissibility of evidence as to poverty of person injured,
etc., 432.
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES, 469.
EXECUTORS.
See Personal Representatives.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, 471.
EXEMPTION.
The railway's contractual, from liability for negligence, 498.
EXPLOSION.
See Boilers.
EXPRESS COMPANIES' AGENTS.
Liability of the railway to, 216.
Non-liability of the railway to persons accompanying, at
their invitation, 217.
FARE.
Payment of, in money, not essential to make one a pas- i
204.
Effect of payment of, by other than passenger, 205.
FELLOW-SERVANTS.
Implied undertaking by, to bear the risks of each Others'
negligence, 350.
The doctrine of a common employment, 356.
The test of a common employment, 363.
Classification of fellow-fiervants, 366.
Who are, 365.
Who are not, 369.
Test as to, 363.
FIGHT.
See Mob.
524 INDEX.
FIREMEN.
As fellow-servants, 366, 369.
Risks of injury taken by, 347.
FLAGMEN AT CROSSINGS.
Duty of the railway as to, 163.
FLOODS.
Railway not liable for, when caused by act of God, 32.
FLYING SWITCH.
Liability of railway for injuries from, 166.
FOG SIGNAL.
See Torpedo.
FOREMEN.
Not vice principals, 323.
FREE PASSENGERS.
Liability of railway to, 207.
FRIGHT.
Of persons, as excusing contributory negligence, 62.
Of horses —
By cars at rest, 151, 152, 153.
By derricks, 152.
By whistling of engines, 152, 153.
By escape of steam, 152, 153.
By falling of coals from elevated railway, 152.
By passing of train over a bridge, 152.
FROST.
Non-liability of railway for breaking of rail by, 32.
FUNERAL EXPENSES.
When recoverable as damages for death, 493.
GATES AT CROSSINGS.
Duty of the railway as to the maintenauce of, 163, 164.
GIRDER.
Railway not liable for falling of, on car, 38.
" GROSS NEGLIGENCE."
See Negligence.
GUARDIANS.
See Parents.
GUARDS.
See Train-hands.
index. 525
HAND-CARS.
Duty of servants with regard to, 307.
HERNIA.
Liability of railway for, 28.
HIGHWAYS.
Liability of railway for obstructions of, 23, 151.
Duty of the railway as to repair of, on which line is laid, 150.
Duty of the railway as to repairing, at crossings, 155.
Liability of railway for negligent construction of crossing
of, 156.
Right of passers on, on which line is laid to cross at any
point, 157.
HORSE-CARS.
See Street Cars.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Contributory negligence of husband when suing for injuries
to person of wife, 75.
Of husband when attributed to wife, 87.
Damages recoverable in suit :
By husband for injuries to wife, 481.
By husband for death of wife, 490.
By wife for husband's death, 491.
ICE AND SNOW.
Railway liable for neglect to remove, from stations, 25 [,
Street railway liable for neglect to remove from car plat-
forms, etc., 275.
Injuries caused by, 151.
ILLNESS.
Following breach of contract of carriage, when dan
recoverable for, 4C6.
IMPLEMENTS.
S.;e Tools.
IMPROVEMENTS IN MACHINERY AND OPERATION.
Duty of the railway os to the adoption of, 2 1 1.
i XA DEQUATE DAMAGES, 470.
INCONVENIENCES.
Liability of the railway for injuries incurred in avoiding, 1 -.
Contributory negligence in avoiding, 62.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.
The old rule as to the liability of the employer lor tie
ligence of, 119.
01b INDEX.
I N DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS— Continued.
The modern rule, 122.
Liability where the railway has reserved control both of re-
sult and means, 123.
Eftvct of the reservation of a more limited control, 125.
Liability of the railway for a wrongful act done in execu-
tion of the contract, 126.
Liability for the contractor's non-performance of a duty in-
cumbent on the railway, 127.
The railway's duty as to the anticipation of negligence on
the part of the contractor, 129.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENTS.
Definition of, 35.
Non-liabilty of railways for, 35
INFANTS.
See Children.
INJURIES.
See Inspection of Injuries.
Not causing death, measure of damages in, 472.
Causing death, measure of damages in, 482
INSANE PERSONS.
Measure of duty of railway to, 71.
Contributory negligence of, 66.
INSPECTION.
Duty of as to passengers, 238.
Duty of, as to servants, 303.
INSPECTION OF INJURIES.
Power of court to order, 424.
INSPECTORS OF REPAIRS.
As fellow-servants, 330, 335, 367, 369.
INSURANCE.
No right of action by company whose assured is killed by
negligence of railway, 399.
Damages as affected by receipts from policies of, 474, 494.
INTERFERENCE OF THIRD PARTY.
Will not relieve railway from responsibility for the conse-
quences of its negligence, 39.
Not attributed to plaintiff, or to person injured, as contribu-
tory negligence, 95.
INTOXICATION.
See Drunkards.
IXDEX. 527
INVITATION.
Liability of railway for servant's act in inviting person in-
jured to occupy a position of danger, 155, 164, 180, 286.
JOINDER.
Of common law and statutory claims, 395.
JOINT TORT FEASORS.
Liability of, 413.
JUDGE.
The duty of at nisi priiis, 447, 468.
JURY, PROVINCE OF.
See Court and Jury.
LABOURERS.
Risks of injury impliedly undertaken by, 347.
As fellow-servants, 367, 370.
LAW.
See Action.
When the remedy of the person injured is at law, and when
in equity, 385.
LAWS OF NATURE.
Conclusive presumption as to accuracy and certainty of, 446.
LESSEE RAILWAYS.
See Lessor Railways.
LESSOR RAILWAYS.
Liability of, for the negligence of lessee railways, 182.
LICENSEE.
Duty of the railway to, 176.
Non-liability of the railway to, for failure to maintain
buildings, etc., in repair, 177.
Liability to, for negligent operation of line, 178.
LIFE TABLES.
Admissibility in evidence of, 431.
LIGHT.
Duty of railway to light engines and can approaching a
crossiug at night, 167.
Duty of railway to adequately light ita stations, etc.,
318.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
By contract, 498.
LINE.
Duty of the railway to its passengers, with regard to, 240.
To its servants, with regard to, ■
528 INDEX.
LOCOMOTIVES.
Duty of the railway to its passengers, with regard to, 240.
LOGS.
Injuries by, thrown on station platforms, 255.
LOOK AND LISTEN.
The duty to, on the part of a person approaching a grade
crossing, 168.
LUNATICS.
See Insane Persons.
MAIL-BAGS.
Injuries by, thrown on station platforms, 255.
MAIL-CARRIERS.
See Post-office Employes.
MAIL-CATCHER.
Railway liable to servants for construction of, in dangerous
proximity to line, 308.
MAN-TRAPS.
See Traps.
MANUFACTURER.
Railway liable for negligence of, in construction of rolling
stock, 237.
MARRIED WOMEN.
See Husband and "Wife.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See Servant.
Contributory negligence of master, when suing for injuries
to servant, 76.
Contributory negligence of servant in charge of property,
attributed to master suing for injury to that property, 87.
MASTER, LIABILITY FOR SERVANT.
See Servant.
MINORS.
See Children.
MOB.
Railway not liable for injuries done by, 39.
MORTGAGE TRUSTEES.
Liability of railways for the negligence of, 134.
INDEX. 529
MOURNING.
When disbursements for, recoverable as damages for death.
493.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
See Ordinances.
NEGLIGENCE.
The test of liability, 1.
Comparative. See Comparative Negligence.
Contributory. See Contributory Negligence.
Defined, 5.
Degrees of, not material, 7.
Evidence of, 415.
Burden of proof of, 433.
Presumption of, 438.
A question of fact, 447.
NEGLIGENCE, COMPARATIVE.
See Comparative Negligence.
NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY.
See Contributory Negligence.
NEWSBOYS.
Liability of the railway to, 216.
NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY.
The general principle determining the liability of railways
to those with whom there is no contractual relation, 145.
OBSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS.
Liability of railways for, 23, 151.
OBSTRUCTIONS ON LINE.
Non-liability of railway for act of stranger, 38.
OMISSIONS.
See Commission or Omission.
Omissions of duty render railway liable without regard to
the relation of the actor to the railway, 97.
OPERATION OF THE LINE.
Liability of railway Co passers on highways for n
in its, 151.
Duty of the railway to passengers in, 27 L
To servants in, 316.
ORDINANCES.
Non-performance of duty imposed by, ai oegligi m
34
530 INDEX.
OSTLER.
Risk of injury impliedly undertaken by in railway stables,
349.
PALACE CARS.
See Sleeping-Cars.
PARENT AND CHILD.
Negligence of parents when suing for injuries to child, 76.
Contributory negligence of poor parents, 77.
Contributory negligence of parent as attributed to child, 90.
PARTIES.
Plaintiff, 411.
Defendant, 412.
PASS, FREE.
See Free Passenger.
PASSENGER.
The general principle determining the liability of railways
to its, 200.
Definition of, 204.
Payment of fare in money not essential, 204.
Liability of railway to free passengers, 207.
Liability of railway to trespassers on cars, 208.
Liability of railway to persons attempting to defraud the
railway of their fare, 209.
Implied authority of servants to accept persons for transpor-
tation as passengers on passenger trains, 209.
On freight trains, 209.
On pay cars, 210.
On hand cars, 210.
Servants as passengers, 210.
Passengers as servants, 212.
When the relation of carrier and passenger begins, 212.
Liability of the railway to passenger temporarily absent
from the means of conveyance, 214.
When the relation of carrier and passenger ends, 215.
Liability of the railway to post-office employes, 215.
To soldiers carried under contract with the Government, 216.
To express agents, 216.
To vendors of newspapers, refreshments, etc., 216.
To passengers of another railway, whose cars are run over
their line, 217.
To passengers of another railway with whom a station is
jointly occupied, 217.
IXDEX. 531
PASSENGER— Continued.
To passengers of another railway at a level crossing of the
lines, 218.
To passengers of another railway received for transportation
in its cars, 218.
To attendants of passengers, 219.
To servants of other lines, 220.
Liability of railways to consignors or consignees personally
assisting in the reception or delivery of their freight, 223.
Non-liability to volunteer assisting consignors or consignees,
224.
Contributory negligence of consignors and consignees, 224.
Liability to persons using the line or stations under special
contract, 225.
The Penna. act of 1868, 225.
Constitutionality of the act, 226.
Purview of, 227.
Cases under 228.
General duty of the railway to passengers, etc., 231.
Duty of the railway as to passengers in freight trains, 292.
Railway not liable for injuries caused solely by act of God,
29.
Or by inevitable accident, 35.
Or from such defects in machinery, etc., as could not have
been detected by exercise of due care, 233.
Duty of care in construction and maintenance of line in
rolling stock, 235.
Duty of inspection, 238.
Duty as to cars received from other lines, 238.
Duty as to roadway, 240.
Duty as to rails, 240.
Duty as to ties, 240.
Duty as to bridges, 2 10.
Duty as to embankments, 240.
Duty as to level crossings, 240.
Duty as to switches, 240.
Duty as to rolling stuck, 240.
Duty as to cars, 240.
Duty as to car-axles, 210.
Duty as to car-brakes, 2 10.
Duty as to car-wheels, 240.
Duty as to locomotives, 2 10.
532 INDEX.
PASSENGER— Continued.
Duty us to means of transportation controlled by other par-
ties, 240.
Duty as to sleeping-cars, etc., 242.
Duty of the railway as to the adoption of improved appli-
ances and methods of operation, 244.
Regulations as affecting passengers, 250.
Station approaches, buildings, and platforms, 253.
Duty of railway to give reasonable notice of starting of
train, 260.
Effect of calling name of station before train stops, 261.
Duty of railway to stop its trains at way-stations a reason-
ably sufficient time for the safe ingress and egress of passen-
gers, 263.
Injuries incurred in boarding and leaving moving trains,
22, 263.
Injuries incurred in descending from cars at rest, 266.
Duty of the railway in the operation of its line, 274.
Speed of train when negligent as to passengers, 276.
Liability of railway for negligent closing of door, etc., by
servant, 277.
Injuries incurred in closing doors, etc., 279.
Liability of railway for injuries caused by disorderly pas-
sengers, 280.
Injuries caused by sudden jolts, 282.
Contributory negligence of passengers, 282.
Crossing the line, 283.
Moving from car to car, 283.
Riding on the platform, 283.
Exposing head or arm out of window, 284.
Riding in baggage-car, 286.
Not necessarily negligent to ride on platform of street-
car, 290.
Increased duty of railway to disabled passenger, 291.
Injuries aggravated by impaired physical condition of the
injured person, 292.
Contributory negligence of carrier, as attributed to passen-
ger, 78.
Occasional carriers not liable as common carriers, 292.
May sue either in case or assumpsit, 390.
Stranger to the contract of carriage cannot recover in either
form of action, 391.
Presumption of negligence in cases of injury to, 439, 442.
INDEX. 533
PAYMENT INTO COURT.
Effect of, 395.
PERJURY.
Admissibility of proof of attempted subornation of, 423.
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
Measure of damages in action by, for death, 492.
Right of action for breach of contract followed by death, 399.
No right of action at common law for tort causing death, 397.
Statutes vesting right of action for death, 402, 403.
PILEDRIVER.
Injury for explosion of, 179.
PITS.
Injuries from falling into, 178, 183.
PLAINTIFFS.
Who may be, 411.
Contributory negligence of, when suing for injuries to some
one else, 75.
PLANKS AT CROSSING.
Liability of railway for defective, 157.
PLATFORMS.
Non-liability of railway to licensee for instability of station,
177.
Duty to passengers with regard to, 254.
PNEUMONIA.
Liability of railway for, 28.
POINTSMAN.
See Switch-tender.
POST-OFFICE EMPLOYES.
Not servants of railways, 102.
Non-liability of railway- for acts of, 1"'-'.
Not passengers, 210, 229.
Liability of railways to, 215.
PREMATURE CONFINEMENT.
Liability of railway for, 28.
PRESUMPTIONS.
Of negligence, 438.
Of contributory negligence, 4 13.
As to earn of traveller at grade crossing, 174.
Minor, 444.
534 INDEX.
PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.
Railway's negligence must have been the proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff, 9.
Plaintiff's contributory negligence must have been the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, 55.
Tests of, 10, 11.
Injuries incurred in avoiding dangers as illustrations of, 14.
Injuries in avoiding inconveniences as illustrations of, 15.
Injuries in boarding or alighting from trains as illustrations
of, 16.
General illustrations of, 23, 26.
Subsequently developed injuries as illustrations of, 28.
Negligence of railway and of fellow-servants as proximate
and remote cause of injury to servants, 337.
PUBLIC ENEMY.
Non-liability of railways for injuries solely caused by an act
of the, 35.
QUASI-PUBLIC CHARACTER OF RAILWAYS.
As affecting their liability, 4.
RAILS.
Duty of the railway to passengers, with regard to, 240.
RECEIVERS.
Liability of railways for the negligence of, and their ser-
vants, 135.
Liability of, for their own negligence and that of their ser-
vants, 135.
REFRESHMENTS.
Liability of the railway to vendors of, 216.
REGULATIONS.
As affecting passengers, 250.
As affecting servants, 316.
RELEASE.
Of damages, 508.
Not binding when induced by false representations, 508.
Release by person injured binding as those who sue for
damages for his death, 509.
By pre-contract, 509.
REMOTE CAUSE.
See Proximate and Remote Cause.
index. 535
ROADS.
See Highways.
ROADWAY.
Duty of the railway to its passengers, with regard to, 240.
To its servants, with regard to, 305.
ROLLING STOCK.
See Cars.
Duty of the railway to the passengers, with regard to, 240.
ROPING CARS.
Injuries by, 151.
ROUND-HOUSE.
Duty of railway to servants, with regard to, 30G.
Injuries in, 377.
RULES AND REGULATIONS.
See Regulations.
RUNNING SWITCH.
See Flying Switch.
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, 104.
SELF-CAUSED INJURIES.
Non-liability of railways for, 36.
SELF-IMPOSED DUTY.
Failure to perform, when negligence, 164.
SERVANTS.
Contributory negligence of, in charge of property attributed
to master when suing for injury to that property, 87.
General nature of master's liability for the acts of, !>!>.
" Respondeat superior" explained and illustrated, 100.
Relation of master and servant must in fact exist, 101.
Post-office employes pot servants, 102.
Non-liability of railways for acts of volunteers, L03.
Test of the existence of the relation of master and servant, 103.
Non-liability of railways for acts of assistants en
servants without authority, 103.
Scope of employment of, L0 1.
Non-liability of railways for acts of, beyond the sco]
th. ir employment, 105.
If the relation exist, and if* the act be within the scope of
employment, not material thai the si rvanl duob ived orders, 1""
Liability for servant tn pa < -, lo7.
536 INDEX.
SERVANTS— Continued. ,
Liability for servant's l-emoval of trespassers, 108.
Implied authority of, to remove trespassers, 109.
Liability for arrests by, 110.
Liability for assaults by, under orders, 111.
Non-liability for mistaken exercise of judgment by, in an
emergency, 111.
Liability for wilful acts of, beyond the scope of employment,
112.
Proof of ratification, 113.
Liability for servant's act in inviting person injured to
occupy position of danger, 155, 164, 180, 286.
Servants as passengers, 210.
Passengers as servants, 212.
Liability of railway to servants of other lines, 220
Definition of the term servant, 294.
General duty of masters to, 295.
Negligence the test of liability, 298.
Non-liability of railway for accidental injuries to, 300.
The railway's duty of care in the construction and mainte-
nance of appliances of labor, 300, 305.
The railway's duty of inspection, 303.
Liability of railway for location of structures in dangerous
proximity to the line, 307.
Liability of railway for defective condition of cars received
from other lines for transportation, 309.
Duty of the railway as to selection and retention of, 313.
Liability of railway for retention of incompetent, 314.
Duty of railway as to organization, discipline, and control
of, 315.
Duty of railway to, in the operation of the line, 316.
Regulations as affecting, 316.
Duty of railway to sufficiently man its trains, 317.
Speed, when negligent as to, 318.
Duty of railway to light its trains, 318.
Vice-principals, 320.
Railway's liability for negligence in construction, mainte-
nance, or inspection, without regard to rank of servant to whom
the neglected duty has been delegated, 328.
Negligence of the railway and of fellow-servants as proxi-
mate and remote cause, 337.
Duty of railway to minor, 338.
index. 537
SERVANTS— Continued.
Implied undertaking of, to bear the risks of the service. 342.
Risks of injury impliedly undertaken by train hands, 344.
By firemen or stokers, 347.
By labourers on the line, 347.
By -well-diggers, 349.
By ostler in railway stables, 349.
Risks of special service, 349.
Risks of injury from negligeuce of fellow-servants, 350.
The doctrine of a common employment, 356.
The test of a common employment, 363.
Classification of fellow-servants, 365.
Volunteers acting as servants, 370.
Termination of relation of master and, 372.
Contributory negligence of, 373.
Obedience to orders as an excuse for, 381.
Effect of complaint and promise to remedy defect, 381.
Statutes affecting liability of railways to, 382.
SICKNESS.
See Illness.
SIDINGS.
Duty of the railway as to storage of cars on, 40.
Duty of railway to servants, with regard to, 306.
SIGNALS.
At crossings, 160.
SIGNAL-POSTS.
Liability of railway to servants for location of, in dan :< roua
proximity to line, 308.
SIGN-BOARDS AT CROSSINGS.
Duty of the railway as to, 163.
SLEEPING-CARS.
Duty of the railway to passengers, with regard to, 242.
Non-liability of sleeping-car company for unauthorized acl
of servant of, beyond scope of employment, 106.
SNOW.
See Ice and Snow.
SOLDIERS.
Liability of the railway to soldiers, carried under contract
with the Government, 216.
538 INDEX.
SPEED OF TRAIN.
"When negligent as to passengers, 276.
As to travellers on highways, 158.
As to servants, 318.
STAKE.
See Engineer's Stake.
STATIONS.
Duty to passengers with regard to construction and mainte-
nance of, 253.
Liability for objects thrown from passing trains, 255.
For careless handling of luggage, 256.
For injuries due to projection of cars over platforms, 256.
Liability to servants for constructions in dangerous prox-
imity to line, 308.
STATION GROUNDS.
See Stations.
STATUTES.
See Sunday, Death.
Non-performance of duty imposed by, as negligence, 40.
Disobedience to, as contributory negligence, 64.
Affecting liability of railway to servants, 381.
The Penna. Act of 1868, 225.
Vesting a right of action for death, 402.
Such, have no extra-territorial effect, but are enforced in
other jurisdictions by comity, 409.
Joinder of common law and statutory claims, 395.
Statutory limitations of damages, 494.
STEAM.
Injuries to passers on highway from escape of, 152, 154.
STEPS.
Injuries on station, 258.
Injuries on car, 266, 271.
No presumption of negligence in such cases, 443.
STOKERS.
See Firemen.
STOP, LOOK, AND LISTEN.
The duty to, on the part of a person approaching a grade
crossing, 170.
STORMS.
See Act of God, Cyclone.
ixdex. 539
STRANGERS.
Non-liability of railways for injuries caused solely by acts
of, 38.
Contributory negligence of, no bar to plaintiff's recovery, 39,
95.
Presence of, in engine cab when negligence on the part of the
railway, 167.
STRAPS IN STREET-CARS.
Liability of railway for injuries incurred by not holding, 64.
STREETS.
See Highways.
STREET CARS.
Different conditions of travel ou, from that on steam cars,
290.
Not necessarily contributory negligence in passenger to ride
or stand on platform of, 57, 291.
SUBORNATION.
See Perjury.
SUICIDE.
Railway not liable for death by, following accident, 29.
SUITS.
See Action.
SUNDAY LAWS.
Disobedience to, as contributory negligence, Go.
SUPERIOR SERVANT.
See Foreman.
SURGICAL TREATMENT.
Duty of person injured to excrei.-e rare in, sitter injury, •!*().
SWITCHES.
Duty of the railway to passengers, with regard l<>, Li 10.
Duty of the railway to servants, with regard to, 306.
Non-liability of railway for act of stranger in moving
switches, 38.
SWITCH-TENDERS.
As fellow-servants, 366.
TELEGRAPH POLES.
Liability of railway to servant.-- for location of, in &
proximity to line, 308.
540 INDEX.
THIRD PARTIES.
See Strangers.
Liability of railways for means of transportation under tha
immediate control of, 240, 136.
TIES.
Duty of the railway to passengers, with regard to, 240.
TOOLS.
Duty of railway to servants, with regard to, 307.
TORPEDO.
Railway not liable to passenger for explosion of, by act of a
stranger, 38.
Injury to trespasser by explosion of, 189.
TORT-FEASORS.
Joint liability of, 413.
TORTS.
Damages in actions for, 468.
TRACK.
Duty of the railway to its passengers with regard to, 240.
Duty of the railway to its servants, with regard to, 305,302.
TRAIN HANDS.
Risks of injury impliedly undertaken by, 344.
As fellow-servants, 366, 369.
Contributory negligence of, 375.
TRAPS.
Liability of railways for, adjoining highways, 148.
For, within railway premises, 176, 183.
TRESTLES.
See Bridges.
TRESPASS.
Effect of notice not to, 180
Liability of railway for servants, 00.
"When the action of, lies, 386.
TRESPASSER.
Liability of the railway to, for the maintenance of unauthor-
ized means of injury, 182.
Injuries to, at turn-tables, 184.
Upon cars, 188.
On the line, 190.
INDEX. 541
TRESPASSER— Continued.
Train hands entitled to assume that trespasser will get out of
the way of the train, 192.
Higher measure of duty with regard to trespasser of known
or obvious incapacity, 193.
No absolute duty to stop train, if infant be seen on line, 19o.
Sleeping, etc., on line, 196.
Railway's failure to fence as affecting its liability to, 198.
TUNNELS.
Labourers impliedly undertake risks incident to working in,
349.
TURN-TABLES.
Injuries caused to trespassers by, 184.
Duty of railway to servants with regard to, 305.
TURNOUTS.
See Sidings.
ULTRA VIRES.
As a defence in actions for negligence, 43.
VENDORS OF REFRESHMENTS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC.
Liability of the railway to, 216.
VICE-PRINCIPALS.
Liability of railways to servants for negligence of, 320.
Who are, 322, 323.
Foremen are not, 323.
Conductors are not, 324.
Engine-drivers are not, 327.
Executive officers are, 323.
VOLUNTEERS.
Non-liability of railway f. >r acts of, 103.
Liability of railway to, 370.
WATCHMEN.
As fellow-servants, 368.
WATER TANKS.
Liability of railway to servants for location of, in dan
proximity to line, 308.
WELL-DIGGERS.
Risks of injury impliedly undertaken by, 3 19.
542 INDEX.
WHISTLE.
Duty of engine-driver to use, in approaching grade cross-
ing, 102.
Liability of railway for injuries resulting from fright of
horses caused by excessive use of, 151, 105.
WIFE.
See Husband and Wife.
WINDOWS.
Injuries in cases of arms or heads projected from, 284.
No presumption of negligence in such cases, 442.
YARD HANDS.
As fellow-servants, 368.
YARD-MASTERS.
As iellow-servants, 368.
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