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THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
AT THE BALLANTYNE PRESS 
 
 PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE, BALLANTYNE AND CO. LTB. 
 
 COLCHESTER. LONDON AND ETON, ENGLAND 
 
 1 
 
'THE 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 A DOCUMENTAKY ACCOUNT 
 
 REVEALING THE CAUSES OF HER STRENGTH, 
 
 WEALTH AND EFFICIENCY 
 
 BY 
 
 J. ELLIS BARKER 
 
 » ■ 
 
 AUTHOR OF * MODERN GERMANY,' ETC. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 E. P. BUTTON & COMPANY 
 
 681 FIFTH AVENUE 
 
 1916 
 

 /h 
 
 h 
 
 M 
 
 (X 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Innumerable books in the English language deal with 
 German history and German poUtical and economic affairs, 
 but practically not one of these has touched the heart of 
 things. None has revealed to us the mainsprings and hidden 
 causes of Germany's power, Germany's efficiency, and 
 Germany's economic success. None has displayed to us 
 the principles of German statesmanship and diplomacy, 
 and the factors which have shaped the national character 
 and the national conscience of the people. An adequate 
 account of the foundations of modern Germany does not 
 exist in any language, not even in German. In the present 
 volume such an account will be given for the first time. 
 For its composition the writings, speeches, and state papers 
 of Prusso-Germany's leading men from the time of the 
 Great Elector to the present, have been ransacked. 
 Hundreds of volumes which are to be found only in a few 
 of the greatest libraries outside Germany have been drawn 
 upon. Into a brief space all the most important pronounce- 
 ments of Prusso-Germany's leading men on the greatest 
 political questions have been compressed. The book con- 
 tains within a few hundred pages the quintessence of German 
 statesmanship in all its branches, and in the words of its 
 most celebrated and most authoritative exponents. 
 
 Nations are what they are owing Jo their past. Modern 
 Germany has been created by a few very eminent men such 
 as the Great Elector, Frederick Wilham the First, Frederick 
 
 ▼ 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 the Great, Bismarck, Moltke ; and Frederick was by far the 
 greatest of these. As the action of modern Germany is 
 based on the tradition which these men have created, we 
 can fully understand Germany only by studying their 
 teachings in word and deed. Not Bismarck, but Frederick 
 the Great, was the maker of the German Empire and of the 
 German nation. Frederick anticipated Bismarck's unifica- 
 tion of the Empire under Prussian leadership by the creation 
 of the Fiirstenbund. He ruled Prussia during no less than 
 forty-six years. He created during his long reign the 
 traditions of modern Germany by his example and by his 
 teachings. He left for the guidance of his successors a 
 number of most important state papers. They are 
 practically unknown to the EngHsh-speaking peoples, and 
 they have hitherto not been reprinted in this country. 
 Carlyle scarcely mentions them in his bulky historical 
 volumes. They are Httle known even to the German public, 
 but they are, and have been, the Bible of all Prusso-German 
 statesmen. These most important papers are reproduced 
 in full at the end of this volume. They are given in the 
 original French — Frederick could scarcely write German — and 
 it is to be hoped that they will be read and carefully studied 
 not only by statesmen and pubUcists, but also by the general 
 pubhc and by the rising generation. It seems desirable 
 that the present volume should serve as a text-book at schools 
 and universities. Young men and women may learn French 
 as well from the writings of Frederick the Great as from 
 those of La Fontaine and Bossuet, of Moh^re and Fenelon. 
 Besides, it is important that the citizens of the Anglo-Saxon 
 democracies, who, after all, direct the policy of their country, 
 should know something of the real Germany. It is 
 important that they should not merely be acquainted with 
 dry historical facts and dates, but that they should know 
 something of real history and of real statesmanship. 
 
 Incidentally the book reveals the failings of Democracy, 
 the defects of democratic organisation and administration. 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 It is no doubt possible to combine the advantages of 
 democratic with those of autocratic government, Hberty 
 with eflQciency, order, and economy. Democracy need not, 
 and should not, be synonymous with disorganisation, 
 instability, amateurishness, drift, muddle, waste, improvi- 
 dence, and unpreparedness for war. The present war has 
 revealed the weakness of Democracy. The views of the 
 greatest German rulers and statesmen collected in this 
 volume may indicate the cure. The experience of the 
 present war may cause Germany to become more democratic 
 and may cause the Anglo-Saxon democracies to become 
 better organised. The views of Frederick the Great on 
 the defects of democracy and of Cabinet Government should 
 be particularly interesting at the present moment. 
 
 The first three chapters have previously been published 
 in The Nineteenth Century and After. The fourth chap- 
 ter has appeared in The Contemporary Beview. Chapters 
 VI, VII, and VIII have appeared in The Fortnightly Beview. 
 Chapters V, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII are entirely new. I 
 would herewith sincerely thank the Editors of the periodicals 
 named for their permission to reprint these articles. They 
 have been very widely commented upon, and have been 
 repubhshed not only in the British Dominions, in the 
 United States, France, Russia, and Roumania, but even 
 in China. I would, however, draw attention to the fact 
 that these articles have not merely been reprinted, but that 
 they have been very greatly expanded, and that they have 
 provided only the nuclei of the chapters indicated. 
 
 The present volume is totally distinct from, and is 
 complementary to, my book, ' Modern Germany ' (Smith, 
 Elder & Co., 7s. &d. net), of which a fifth and very greatly 
 enlarged edition was published in 1915. That book deals 
 in nearly 900 pages exclusively with modern affairs, as 
 may be seen from the sub-title, * Her Political and Economic 
 Problems, her Policy, her Ambitions, and the Causes of her 
 Successes and of her Failures.' * Modern Germany ' has 
 
viii PKEFACE 
 
 been widely read throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. The 
 fourth edition has been pirated in the United States, and 
 the book has been translated even into Japanese. It is 
 widely used as a book of reference, and I venture to hope 
 that its successor will prove as popular and as useful to 
 statesmen, pohticians, educationaUsts, journalists, and pubhc 
 speakers. 
 
 J. ELLIS BARKER. 
 Apnl 1916. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I. ThB FOTJITDATIONS OF GbRMAKY'S StEENOTH, WbALTH, 
 
 AND EinciBiroY 1 
 
 II. The Foundations of Germany's Diplomacy . . 59 
 
 ni. The Policy of Bismarck aitd op William II . . 108 
 
 IV. The Foundations of German Education, and of the 
 
 National Character 150 
 
 V. The German Army and the General Staff . .168 
 
 VI. The Causes of the War 174 
 
 VII. Germany and Turkey 197 
 
 VIII. The German Colonlal Empire .... 212 
 
 THE MOST IMPORTANT PRUSSIAN STATE PAPERS 
 
 IX. Frederick the Great's Political Testament of 1776. 
 
 (Exposii Du GouvERNEMENT Prussien, &c.) . . 229 
 
 X. Introductory Chapter of Frederick the Great's 
 Posthumous Memoirs (Histoirb de mon Temps), 
 written for the guidance of his successors . 238 
 
 XI. Frederick the Great's Memoir on Government and 
 ON THE Duties of Sovereigns (Essai sur les Formes 
 
 DE GOUVERNBMENT, &C.) 248 
 
 Xn. Frederick the Great' s Directions for the Education 
 
 OF Princes (Instruction au Major Borcke) . 266 
 
 XIII. Frederick the Great's Instructions in case of his 
 
 Death in Battle, Defeat, or Capture . . 271 
 
 INDEX 273 
 
 iz 
 
THE 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 CHAPTEE I 
 
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH, WEALTH 
 AND EFFICIENCY^ 
 
 Before the outbreak of the present war many very eminent, 
 but very ill-informed, people publicly expressed the belief 
 that Germany would not dare to go to war because the 
 Powers ranged against her were too strong, because she was 
 too poor, because her finances were in disorder. Immediately 
 after its outbreak they proclaimed equally loudly that 
 Germany would rapidly be defeated, that the combination 
 of Franco-British wealth and of Eussian numbers, of the 
 greatest industrial and the greatest agricultural nation, 
 of the largest army and the strongest fleet, would inevitably 
 prove fatal to Germany, that before long the armies of the 
 Allies would sweep all over Germany and enter Berhn. 
 Since then many months have elapsed. The AlHes have 
 not yet succeeded in seizing firmly upon German soil. 
 On the other hand, the Germans are still in possession of 
 nearly all Belgium, and of Serbia, and they hold besides 
 large and exceedingly valuable districts of North-eastern 
 France and of Western Eussia which contain some of the 
 most important manufacturing centres. 
 
 ^ From the Nineteenth Century and After, July 1915. 
 
 B 
 
2 .TOE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Belgiui?!,.' Poland, and -North-eastern France have 
 become German strongholds and German arsenals. Germany- 
 controls territories filled with fortresses and with machinery 
 of every kind. Nor is this all. She has not only success- 
 fully defended her own country and invaded her neighbour 
 States ; she has in addition carefully organised the vast 
 territories occupied by her troops and has thoroughly 
 organised the defence of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
 Turkey as well. Lastly, she is providing Austria-Hungary, 
 Bulgaria, and Turkey not only with an abundance of officers 
 and soldiers, but also with money, arms, ammunition, and 
 suppHes of every kind. She is governing and administering 
 three great States. Without Germany's help Turkey and 
 Austria-Hungary would probably have been lost . Germany's 
 great mihtary achievements, her vast industrial and financial 
 strength, the foresight and abihty of her military and 
 industrial leaders and of her administrators, and the unity 
 and the unflinching devotion of her people in field and 
 factory have amazed even the best informed. 
 
 At the moment the cry of national organisation is on 
 everybody's hps. We are told that the British nation, 
 that the whole British Empire, must be organised for war, 
 that a perfectly organised nation such as Germany can be 
 overcome only if all the human and material resources 
 of the Empire are brought to bear upon the struggle. 
 Unfortunately, most Enghshmen have only a vague idea 
 what national organisation means and involves. Since 
 statesmanship, the science of the vital interests of the 
 State, as Prince Metternich described it, is absolutely 
 ignored by the British and American universities, Germany's 
 national organisation and administration are practically 
 unknown to the English-speaking peoples. Industrious 
 investigators have described to us in detail the outside 
 of certain German institutions and organisations, but 
 they have failed to show us their mainsprings and spirit, 
 and to reveal to us the true sources of Germany's strength, 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STKENGTH 3 
 
 wealth, and efficiency. In the following pages I will en- 
 deavour to describe the causes of Germany's marvellous 
 mihtary and economic achievements, and will show that 
 the chief cause of Germany's strength is discipline. In 
 doing this I shall give a large number of most important 
 documents, nearly all of which have not previously been 
 pubhshed in the English language. 
 
 German efficiency and thoroughness have been plants 
 of slow growth. Germany's administrative poHcy was 
 not created by Bismarck, nor was her mihtary pohcy 
 initiated by Moltke. If we wish to discover the sources 
 of Germany's power, we must acquaint ourselves with 
 the views and teachings of those great men who created 
 Germany's administrative, mihtary, financial, and economic 
 policy, who created her traditions, who made modern 
 Germany. We must look into the past to understand 
 the present. 
 
 Three centuries ago Brandenburg-Prussia, which be- 
 came a kingdom only in 1701, occupied probably a far 
 lower position in Europe than that held by one of the Balkan 
 States at present. The country had neither a national 
 organisation nor an army. The people were poor, rude, 
 uncultured, ignorant, and were devoid of a sense of unity 
 and of patriotism. The Germans, as a race, are not par- 
 ticularly gifted. Man for man, Enghshmen and French- 
 men are probably their superiors. However, a Govern- 
 ment can make or unmake the character of a nation. The 
 Germans have been made what they are by their masterful 
 rulers, especially by Frederick Wilham, the Great Elector, 
 by King Frederick WilUam the First, and by Frederick 
 the Great. Phable materials are most easily moulded. 
 The success of the three greatest rulers of Prusso- Germany 
 is perhaps largely attributable to the fact that they set 
 to work on the most unpromising raw material, upon poor, 
 ignorant, and submissive boors. 
 
 Frederick William, the Great Elector, was born in 1620, 
 
 b2 
 
4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 and he came to the throne in 1640, at a time when the Thirty 
 Years' War of 1618-48 was still raging. As a youth he had 
 spent three years in Holland, which was then the wealthiest, 
 the most advanced, and the most warlike country in the 
 world. As Brandenburg-Prussia had been terribly de- 
 vastated by the warring troops, he wished before all to 
 create an army for its defence. However, he found it very 
 difficult to raise the necessary money. Self-government 
 prevailed in his scattered dominions. As the nobility 
 and the Estates jealously defended their privileges and 
 refused to vote the necessary funds, the Elector resolved 
 to break their power and to place taxation on a compulsory 
 basis. 
 
 He gradually destroyed popular representation, such as 
 it was, and made the Estates a mere tool. At last they 
 were called together exclusively for the purpose of voting 
 money. They were allowed to sit only for a fortnight, 
 and to discuss nothing except the proposals which the 
 Elector put before them. At the same time, they were 
 informed that any funds which they failed to vote would 
 be collected from them by force, by ' military execution.' 
 The written remonstrances and protests of his Parliament 
 were usually returned unanswered. At last the Estates of 
 Prussia declared in 1674 that they did not care to attend 
 the Diet any longer because their gathering led to nothing 
 except an increase in taxation. The Great Elector replied 
 that he also did not see the necessity of a Diet which did 
 nothing but complain and produce nothing but unnecessary 
 expense and delay. Frederick Wilham, hke Bismarck, 
 preferred governing without a parliament. 
 
 Soon after his advent the Great Elector raised a force 
 of 8000 men. This was the first standing army of the 
 Hohenzollems, and it grew apace. In 1651, after eleven 
 years of government, the Great Elector had an army of 
 16,000, and in the war of 1665 he was at the head of 26,000 
 men supplied with seventy-two guns. His soldiers were 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH 5 
 
 highly trained and disciplined. By enormous exertions he 
 had made Brandenburg-Prussia an important military Power. 
 The Great Elector ruthlessly and tyrannously suppressed 
 existing self-government in his possessions, and gave to 
 his scattered and parochially minded subjects a strong 
 sense of unity. Relying upon his powerful army, he enforced 
 his will upon the nobility, the Estates, and the citizens, 
 and made himself the absolute master of the country. He 
 ruled the State with savage energy and with great abiHty. 
 To enable the people to bear the cost of a large army, he ^^"^^^z 
 strove to increase their wealth by promoting agriculture, ,y(^ 
 commerce, and the manufacturing industries. He im- ^^^^ 
 ported from Holland skilled engineers who reclaimed 
 swamps, and able farmers and gardeners who improved 
 cultivation. Every peasant had to lay out a garden, and 
 none might marry unless he had planted at least six oak 
 trees, and had planted and grafted at least six fruit trees. 
 To improve industry and commerce, he constructed the 
 Frederick Wilham Canal, connecting the Oder with the 
 Spree and the Elbe, and numerous high roads, and intro- 
 duced a modern system of posts and mails. 
 
 As his country had been depopulated by the Thirty 
 Years' War, he wished to attract to it new inhabitants. 
 By an Edict of October 29, 1685, he promised to the Hugue- 
 nots who fled from France owing to the revocation of the 
 Edict of Nantes assistance for defraying their travelling 
 expenses, permission to settle where they liked, freedom 
 to bring in their goods and chattels free of all charges. The 
 needy were to receive empty houses which the Elector 
 would buy from their owners. They were to be given 
 building material of every kind for repairing these houses, 
 and to be freed from all imposts for six years. The well- 
 to-do who wished to build houses for themselves were 
 to be given land and building materials, and to be free from 
 all imposts for ten years. The rights of citizenship were 
 to be given gratis. 
 
6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 Manufacturers and artisans were to receive machines, 
 raw material, and monetary subsidies. Agriculturists were 
 to obtain ground suitable for cultivation. The refugees 
 were to be allowed to settle differences among themselves 
 by voluntary courts of their own, and in every town a 
 preacher was to be maintained for them at the Elector's 
 cost. French noblemen were to enjoy equality with Prussian 
 noblemen, &c. 
 
 As the French refugees might be deterred by the rigorous 
 climate and the poverty of Brandenburg and migrate to 
 Switzerland, England, and Holland instead, the Elector 
 wisely tried to induce them to come to his country and 
 remain there by granting them far more valuable faci- 
 lities and privileges than they were offered elsewhere. 
 The result of his pohcy was that many French refugees 
 who had gone to Switzerland and Holland went later on 
 to Brandenburg. According to Ancillon's * Histoire de 
 Testabhssement des Frangois Refugies,' there were, in 1697, 
 12,297 French refugees in Brandenburg, not counting 
 the military. 
 
 Numerous French people settled in Berlin, brought^to 
 that town their industries, and raised the intelligence of 
 the population by their culture, energy, and vivacity. 
 The French immigrants and their descendants became 
 most valuable citizens. They founded industries, entered 
 the professions, and many of the most eminent Germans 
 are direct descendants of the French refugees. Some 
 maintained their French names, like De la Motte Fouque, 
 Michelet, Lestocq, Ancillon, De la Courbiere. Others 
 Germanised them. Among the descendants of the French 
 refugees were the brothers Humboldt. At the end of^the 
 Great Elector's reign no less than one-fourth of the inhabitants 
 of Prussia were foreign immigrants and descendants of 
 foreign immigrants. 
 
 By the pohcy outlined the Great Elector greatly in- 
 creased the population, the wealth; and the mihtary power 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 7 
 
 of his country. By a skilful and daring diplomacy, and 
 by the energetic use of his excellent army, which he had 
 been able to create only by destroying the power of the 
 Estates and by greatly increasing the wealth of the people, 
 he vastly enlarged his territories and gave to the State 
 a great prestige throughout Europe. Among his victories, 
 that over the dreaded Swedes at FehrbelHn was the most 
 glorious. During the forty-eight years of his wise, energetic, 
 but ruthless, reign, the territory of Brandenburg-Prussia 
 was increased by nearlji 50 per cent. Its population rose 
 from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000, notwithstanding wars, famine, 
 and pestilence. The success of the civil administration 
 of a country can be gauged largely by the revenue returns. 
 During the rule of the Great Elector the State revenue of 
 Brandenburg-Prussia increased, incredible as it may seem, 
 nearly five-fold, from 500,000 to 2,500,000 thalers. He had 
 found a poor, devastated country without order and without 
 an army. He left a greatly enlarged State, a comparatively 
 wealthy and much larger population, and a large and 
 excellent army to his successor. 
 
 In 1688 the Great Elector died. His place was taken 
 by Frederick the Third, who in 1701 assumed the royal 
 crown and the title of King Frederick the First. Frederick 
 was a vain and worthless monarch. Under his rule the 
 country decHned and decayed. Maladministration became 
 general. However, he maintained and even increased 
 the Prussian army. That was his only merit. 
 
 Under the inept rule of this Frederick, who tried to ape 
 Louis the Fourteenth, and who wasted the national re- 
 sources in vain ostentation, luxury, and debauchery, the 
 Hfework of the Great Elector was largely destroyed. The 
 unification, concentration, and organisation of the Prussian 
 administration and of the whole national life which that 
 great ruler had effected and the efficiency which he had 
 created were temporarily lost. Favourites and mistresses 
 ruled and robbed the country, and the worthless King went 
 
8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 so far in the neglect of his duties that he handed to 
 his Minister-favourites signed blanks to be filled with 
 orders and instructions at* their pleasure, thus saving 
 himself the trouble of reading documents requiring his 
 signature. 
 
 His son, Frederick William the First, was one of the 
 most remarkable and one of the greatest rulers the world 
 has seen. He is unknown to the English-speaking peoples, 
 for Carlyle and Macaulay have made a caricature of him. 
 His eminence as a ruler may be seen from the fact that 
 Frederick the Great, in writing an account of his hfe, closed 
 it with the words : * As all the strength of the spreading 
 oak has sprung from a httle acorn, so the greatness of 
 Prussia has sprung from the industrious life and the wise 
 measures of Frederick WilUam the First.' Frederick 
 Wilham was neither briUiant, nor had he winning ways. 
 /He was the organiser, the disciplinarian, the schoolmaster, 
 the true maker of modern Germany. History which has 
 named his son * the Great ' should call Frederick WilHam 
 the First ' the Thorough.' 
 
 The Great Elector had, as we have seen, destroyed the 
 power of self-government and of obstruction in Prussia, 
 and had thus cleared the way for his successors. Frederick 
 William the First made use of the opportunity which his 
 grandfather had thus provided, and founded in Prussia 
 a perfectly organised modern State, a model adminis- 
 tration, and created a perfectly equipped and ever ready 
 army. 
 
 Frederick Wilham was in every respect totally different 
 from his father. He was uneducated, boorish, coarse, 
 gluttonous, harsh, brutal, suspicious, domineering, grasping, 
 impetuous, and filled with energy and determination. 
 While he lacked nearly all the finer quahties, Nature had 
 given him cunning, unhmited common sense, a passionate 
 love of industry and orderhness, and a strong sense of 
 acquisitiveness, quahties which are often found in ilhterate 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STKENGTH 9 
 
 peasants who succeed in accumulating great wealth in a 
 life of unceasing labour, strife, and penurious thrift. 
 
 Frederick WiUiam the First had watched hfe at the 
 Prussian Court in his father's time with horror and disgust. 
 He came to the government in 1713. Although he was only 
 twenty-five years old and quite unacquainted with affairs 
 of State, he immediately set to work in his rough and 
 impulsive way to clear the Augean stable of Prussia, being 
 determined to save it from bankruptcy and to introduce 
 in it a regime of frugality, thrift, morality, and efficiency. 
 His first action consisted in dismissing the great majority 
 of the courtiers, reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth, 
 and applying the amount saved to increasing the army. 
 He sold the bulk of the useless jewellery, plate, valuable 
 furniture, horses, carriages, and wine which his spendthrift 
 father had accumulated, and forced those who had robbed 
 the State in his father's lifetime to disgorge. He sold or 
 let all unnecessary royal edifices, and converted vast royal 
 parks and pleasure gardens into ploughed fields and drill 
 grounds. While, according to Beheim-Schwarzbach, the 
 coronation of King Frederick the First had cost 6,000,000 
 thalers, his own cost only 2547 thalers and 9 pfennigs. 
 
 King Frederick Wilham had seen the advantage of 
 conscientious one-man rule, in the case of the Great Elector. 
 He resolved to administer Prussia autocratically, treating 
 the whole country hke a huge private estate, and to improve 
 it in every direction to the utniost of his ability. He wrote 
 on one of the first days of his government, according to 
 Droysen, that he would be his own field-marshal and his 
 own minister of finance. He might have added that he would 
 be his own minister of war, agriculture, commerce, education, 
 justice, religion, and home affairs as well. He ordered 
 the affairs of the Church, and prescribed the nature of 
 the services and of the sermons. In every sermon the 
 duties of the subject, and especially the duty of paying 
 the taxes punctually, had to be mentioned. Other creeds 
 
 './ 
 
10 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 were not to be attacked by the clergy. Sermons were to 
 be short. If a sermon lasted longer than an hour the 
 clergyman was to be fined two thalers. Frederick William 
 despised those citizens who Hved without productive work, 
 especially lawyers, artists, scientists, actors, dancing-masters, 
 and money-lenders, and he prosecuted usurers with the 
 greatest energy. Usurers advancing money to minors 
 could, by his edict of 1730, be punished with the confiscation 
 of their entire capital, with a whipping, and even with 
 death. He thought newspapers superfluous and wholly 
 mischievous. He prosecuted them, and in 1713 and 1714 
 he prohibited their appearance in BerHn altogether. 
 
 Frederick Wilham the First desired to strengthen 
 Prussia and to increase its territories. Clearly recognising that 
 wealth is power, and that only a disciplined, well-governed, 
 and prosperous nation can provide a powerful army, he 
 concentrated his boundless energy upon improving the 
 national administration, increasing the wealth of the people, 
 and strengthening the army. When Frederick WiUiam 
 came to the throne the army was in a bad state and was 
 80,000 men strong. He rapidly increased it. In 1725 
 it came to 64,263 and in 1740, the year of his death, to 
 89,099 men. At that time Prussia had only 2,240,000 
 inhabitants. How enormous Prussia's army was may be 
 seen by the fact that at the same proportion of armed men 
 to the civil population, England would now have in peace 
 time a standing army of nearly 2,000,000 men, and Germany 
 one of nearly 3,000,000 men. By sleepless vigilance he 
 made his army the most perfectly drilled and equipped 
 and the most ready force in the world. Frederick the 
 Great himself acknowledged in his writings that he owed his 
 wonderful victories to the excellence of the army which his 
 father had created by twenty-seven years of unceasing labour. 
 
 Frederick WiUiam worked unremittingly for the country 
 from dawn till deep into the night. Field-Marshal Count 
 von Seckendorf, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, a 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STKENGTH 11 
 
 most reliable observer, admiringly wrote on April 25, 1723, 
 according to Ameth's * Life of Prince Eugene ' : 
 
 It is certain that nowhere in the world one can see troops 
 comparable with the Prussians for beauty, cleanHness, and 
 order. Although in drill, training, and marching much is 
 forced and affected, nearly everything is useful and efficient. 
 Besides, it must be admitted that the army and the troops 
 lack nothing that is needed. The soldiers number 70,000, 
 and every regiment has at least a hundred more men than 
 the normal figure. The Arsenal is superabundantly provided 
 with field artillery and siege artillery, and only the teams 
 are missing. Moreover, there is such an enormous store of 
 powder, shot, and shells as if a great war was threatening. 
 In Berlin and all about Brandenburg one sees as many 
 troops moving as one saw in Vienna during the last war 
 against the Turks. All this activity is directed by the 
 King in person, and only by him. Besides, he looks after 
 the whole public administration in all its branches with 
 such care and thoroughness that not a thaler is spent unless 
 he has given his signature. Those who do not see it cannot 
 beheve that there is any man in the world, however intelhgent 
 and able he may be, who can settle so many things personally 
 in a single day as Frederick William the First, who works 
 from 3 o'clock in the morning till 10, and spends the rest of 
 the day in looking after and driUing his army. . . . 
 
 Frederick Wilham the First created not only the German 
 army, but also the German administration and the Civil 
 Service. He made the German bureaucracy the ablest, 
 the most hard-working, the most thorough and the most 
 conscientious body of Government servants in the world. 
 He created its traditions, and gave it that ability, zeal, 
 and integrity which it has shown ever since. 
 
 Having punished severely those officials who had taken 
 advantage of his father's neglect of pubhc affairs, having 
 dismissed the incompetent, and having reduced the salaries 
 of the over-paid, he endeavoured to force thoroughness 
 and good order upon the bureaucracy by his personal 
 
12 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 example and supervision, and by the severe punishment 
 
 of all who failed in their duty. However, the existing 
 
 organisation could not be made to work smoothly and 
 
 with despatch. When the King found that the departments 
 
 could not be made to work in harmony, and when all the 
 
 attempts of his ministers at reforming the service had 
 
 failed, he retired to one of his country houses and drafted 
 
 there in seclusion in his almost illegible hand and in very 
 
 ungrammatical German the most comprehensive regulations 
 
 for the reform of the Prussian administration. They may 
 
 be found in Foerster's ' Life of Frederick Wilham the 
 
 First,' in which they fill more than a hundred pages. All 
 
 the departments were to be harmonised by being united 
 
 in a single body. The King gave the most minute orders 
 
 regulating the proceedings of the ' General Directorate,' 
 
 the supreme administrative authority of Prussia, and of 
 
 the individual departments. The nature, thoroughness, and 
 
 minuteness of his instructions will be seen from the following 
 
 characteristic and amusing extract from the instructions 
 
 to the General Directorate : 
 
 In summer the Ministers shall meet at 7 o'clock in the 
 morning, and in winter at 8 o'clock. 
 
 The meeting shall not break up until all the matters 
 which are to be discussed and decided upon have been 
 disposed of. Not a single document must be left over for 
 another day. 
 
 If the business in hand can be finished in an hour, the 
 Ministers are free to go. If it cannot be settled in the fore- 
 noon, they must continue sitting without interruption until 
 6 o'clock in the evening or until all the business is completed. 
 
 We herewith order Our Minister von Printz that, if the 
 Ministers are working later than 2 o'clock in the afternoon, 
 he shall have fetched for them four good dishes of food from 
 the royal kitchens, together with an adequate quantity 
 of wine and beer. Half of the Ministers shall dine while 
 the other half shall continue working, and those who are 
 working shall dine as a second shift when those who were 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANTS STRENGTH 13 
 
 dining have finished and are again at their work. In that 
 way the work will be diligently and faithfully done. . . . 
 
 If one of the Ministers or one of their Councillors should 
 arrive an hour later than we have ordered, and if he has not 
 Our written permission for being late, one hundred ducats 
 shall be deducted from his salary. If one of the Ministers or 
 Councillors should miss an entire sitting without being 
 prevented by illness or without having Our permission, he 
 shall be fined by the deduction of six months' pay. If 
 anyone should miss a second sitting without Our permission 
 or without being ill he shall be dismissed from his office with 
 disgrace, for as we pay our Ministers and Councillors they 
 must work. 
 
 With regard to the dinner of the Cabinet and the Coun- 
 cillors, Minister von Printz received further instructions : 
 
 The head cook must at every sitting inquire at eleven 
 o'clock through a servant whether he should provide dinner 
 or not. Now we order herewith that in case dinner should 
 be required by the Ministers and high officials there shall 
 always be four good dishes, namely a good soup, a good piece 
 of boiled beef with vegetables, a good dish of fish, and a good 
 piece of roast beef, mutton, or veal. 
 
 In addition there should be a quart bottle of good Rhine 
 wine for every person. However, the bill of fare should not 
 always be the same. There should always be a change of 
 dishes. The food should always be the same as that which 
 is put before their Majesties themselves. It shall be served 
 only by a single servant, for otherwise the room will be 
 crowded with servants. To reduce the number of servants, 
 every one of the Ministers shall receive together four plates 
 and a glass, and a large basket shall be provided into which 
 the soiled plates can be put. 
 
 Frederick William had the highest conception of duty. 
 He lived not for himself or for his family, but for his country. 
 He worked most conscientiously and like a strenuous 
 business man. Thoughts of his duties constantly disturbed 
 his sleep. Not unnaturally he demanded that all his officials 
 
14 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 should be as hard-working and as thorough as he was himself, 
 He treated his ministers as unceremoniously as he did his 
 non-commissioned officers if they neglected their duty. 
 In speaking of the Prussian Administration he habitually 
 called it * my machine.' It became indeed a machine 
 absolutely controlled by the King. It acted with precision 
 and speed, like clockwork. His officials had to work un- 
 ceasingly and rapidly, but they were not allowed to become 
 mere mechanical tools, for intelligence was as much demanded 
 of them as was industry. Isaacsohn in his excellent three- 
 volume work, ' Geschichte des preussischen Beamtenthums,' 
 described the reforms introduced by Frederick William the 
 First as follows : 
 
 The Prussian Civil Service was organised and developed 
 on mihtary lines. In the Prussian Civil Service, as in the 
 army, skill, obedience, punctuahty, cleanliness, and deter- 
 mination became the first and most indispensable qualifica- 
 tions. Official positions were given only to those who pos- 
 sessed a thorough practical knowledge of their office, and 
 whose appointment was an obvious advantage to their 
 superiors and to the State. The military spirit which per- 
 meated Prussia since the time of Frederick William the First 
 filled the whole body of officialdom to the highest degree, 
 and caused Prussia to be called a mihtary State. Already 
 as Crown Prince, Frederick WilUam wore chiefly a military 
 uniform, and after 1725 he appeared exclusively in mihtary 
 dress. . . . 
 
 The great characteristic of the new Prussian bureaucracy 
 was the absolute responsibility of every official. None 
 could hide behind another's back or behind a piece of paper, 
 or plead that he had misunderstood his orders, that others 
 were responsible. If a mistake had been made the culprit 
 could invariably be found and punished. Isaacsohn tells 
 us : 
 
 Never before had the officials so urgently and so unceas- 
 ingly had impressed upon them the fact that they were 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STKENGTH 15 
 
 personally responsible, and never before had personal 
 responsibility so sternly been enforced. . . . The principle 
 of personal responsibility was the great characteristic 
 feature of the instructions given by the King to his Ministers. 
 Every document put by the higher officials before the General 
 Directorate had to be signed by one of the Councillors who, 
 by giving his signature, assumed responsibihty for its con- 
 tents, and every document put before the King bore in addi- 
 tion the signatures of the five departmental Ministers. . . . 
 
 No Councillor was to be employed in the province to 
 which he belonged, in order to abolish favouritism and 
 personal considerations of every kind. Officials were to act 
 with absolute impartiality. . . . That was particularly 
 necessary because the nobility and the prosperous citizens, 
 from whose ranks the higher officials were recruited, were 
 not in sympathy with the administrative and financial 
 reforms introduced by the King. . . . 
 
 The absolute subordination of the Civil Service from the 
 highest to the lowest, their unquestioning obedience to the 
 King, together with their absolute responsibihty not only for 
 their own actions, but also for those of their colleagues and 
 their inferiors, created among them an extremely strong 
 sense of professional honour, solidarity, and of professional 
 pride. The influence of the nobihty and of Society dimin- 
 ished unceasingly. The service of the King required un- 
 divided attention. The King's uniform, which every Civil 
 Servant had to wear when on duty, kept the feehng alive 
 among them that they were the King's servants and had to 
 represent the King's interests. The power of the officials 
 and their independence, in case they were opposed by strong 
 social influences, was increased by the fact that the officials 
 were strangers in the districts in which they were employed, 
 for Frederick WilHam continued the policy of appointing 
 only strangers to the district to official positions, a poHcy 
 which the Great Elector had introduced in order to overcome 
 the opposition of the Estates in his policy of centralisation 
 and of unlimited personal Government. . . . 
 
 Every official document had to be signed, and every 
 signature involved the responsibility of the man who gave 
 
16 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 it. The members of the Ministry were jointly responsible 
 for one another. Every mistake, every error, every delay 
 was visited on the guilty. The greatest exertions were 
 demanded from all officials. Remonstrances and protests 
 were useless. The King enforced discipline absolutely, 
 and his servants had either to obey or to go under. The 
 discipline enforced had the most marvellous results. He 
 taught the officials to work with exactitude, rapidity, 
 conscientiousness, and care, and thus Prussian officialdom 
 became a model throughout Germany. 
 
 Ministers of State, hke generals and colonels, obeyed 
 unquestioningly and carried out their orders with military 
 precision and punctuahty. Only if the King had clearly 
 acted in error they ventured upon a respectful protest. 
 Every Minister, even if he were personally easy-going and 
 soft-hearted, was compelled in his own interest to maintain 
 in his department the same rigid spirit of order, punctuality, 
 and rapidity which the King enforced upon his Ministers, 
 and from the Minister's room the spirit of order and efficiency 
 spread through the departments and through all ranks down 
 to the humblest officials. 
 
 Frederick William hated flattery, and demanded from 
 all his officials brevity and the naked truth. An official 
 who had deceived him was lost. In his instructions to 
 the General Directorate he stated emphatically in specially 
 large print : 
 
 We do not wish in any way to he treated with flattery. We 
 wish always to hear the clear truth. Nothing must he hidden 
 from Us, and no falsehood must he put hefore Us, for We are 
 the Lord and King and can do what We like. 
 
 In order to ensure the integrity and efficiency of the 
 Prussian Administration and of the whole body of officials, 
 Frederick William created a special authority, the ' Fiskalat,' 
 which, by means of agents, was to supervise and watch 
 all the officials and to bring every irregularity directly 
 before the King. In his instructions to the chief of the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 17 
 
 Fiskalat, von Kattsch, the King wrote with his own hand : 
 * Von Kattsch shall not spare anyone, whoever it may be^ 
 even if it be my own brother. He must, of course, carefully 
 look out for thieves of every kind. He must watch all 
 and spare none, and he may be assured that I shall support 
 him with energy against all as long as I live.' The monthly 
 and quarterly reports of the Fiskalat enabled the King 
 to deal rapidly with every abuse, trace it to its very source, 
 and punish the guilty. 
 
 A government which governs can easily form the 
 character and the habits of the people. The German 
 people are often praised for their thoroughness, industry, 
 frugality, and thrift. These qualities are not natural^/-^ 
 to them. They received them from their rulers, and 
 especially from Frederick William the First. He was an 
 example to his people, and his son carried on the paternal 
 tradition. Both Kings acted not only with thoroughness, 
 industry, frugality, and economy, but they enforced these 
 qualities upon their subjects. Both punished idlers of 
 every rank of society, even of the most exalted. The 
 regime of Thorough prevailed under these Kings, who 
 together ruled during seventy-three years. These seventy- 
 three years of hard training gave to the Prussian people 
 those sterhng qualities which are particularly their own, 
 and by which they can easily be distinguished from the 
 easy-going South Germans and Austrians who have not 
 similarly been disciplined. 
 
 Frederick William the First was a stern disciplinarian, 
 not only to his people, but even to his family. When his 
 son and heir tried to flee the country in order to escape 
 the bodily violence which he had to suffer from his father, 
 Frederick William wished to have him shot by a court- 
 martial as a deserter, although he loved his children, for 
 duty, as he conceived it, was with him a stronger sentiment 
 than affection. The harshness of Prussian education and 
 the absolute discipline enforced in the Prussian families ^ 
 
18 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 and the Prussian schools are due to the example of the 
 man who not only created the Prussian State but moulded 
 J the character of the German people upon his own. 
 
 Following the example of the Great Elector, King 
 Frederick WilHam strove to increase the wealth of the 
 people, by improving communications and agriculture, 
 by encouraging commerce and industry, and by settUng 
 numerous foreigners on the waste lands in his dominions. 
 He drained swamps, constructed canals and roads, and on 
 June 3, 1713, three months after he had come to the throne, 
 he demanded that all the suppUes for the army should be 
 bought in Prussia. Only then it was discovered how low 
 the Prussian industries had sunk. To raise them, Frederick 
 WilHam protected the manufacturing industries, especially 
 the woollen industry, and forbade in his instructions to 
 the General Directorate the investment of Prussian capital 
 abroad. 
 
 How lavishly the thrifty King spent money for the 
 improvement of the country may be seen by the fact that, 
 although the whole income of the State amounted only to 
 7,400,000 thalers per year, he spent in the course of six years 
 6,000,000 thalers for improving the Province of Lithauen 
 alone. He created there a number of towns, 332 villages, 
 twenty-four water-mills, eleven churches, hundreds of 
 schools, &c. 
 
 The Germans are perhaps the best educated people, 
 and they have Frederick Wilham to thank for it, for he 
 was the first monarch who introduced compulsory education. 
 It aimed at making the people useful and patriotic citizens. 
 On September 28, 1717, Frederick Wilham pubhshed an 
 edict, which stated : 
 
 We regret that we have noticed that parents, particularly 
 in the country, omit to send their children to the schools, 
 and allow them to grow up in ignorance not only of reading, 
 writing, and reckoning, but also in the knowledge of those 
 things which are necessary for their soul and their salvation. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 19 
 
 In order to abolish this most pernicious evil we have 
 resolved to pubHsh this edict and to order most earnestly 
 that in those places where there are schools parents shall be 
 compelled by severe pmiishment to send their children to 
 school daily in winter and at least once or twice a week in 
 summer, when they are not wanted at home, so that they 
 shall not forget entirely in the summer what they have 
 learned in winter. The children shall pay 2 dreiers per week 
 to the schools, and if the parents cannot afford it, the school 
 money shall be paid by the Local Authorities. 
 
 While Frederick William promoted elementary educa- 
 tion, recognising its practical utihty, his peasant-Hke 
 ignorance prevented him understanding the use of the 
 sciences and arts. He despised higher education, learning, ^ 
 and the arts of civiHsation, to the despair and dismay of his 
 son and heir, who loved them. He made learned professors 
 court fools, and made his court fools university professors. 
 Hence, Prussia remained a land of boors and soldiers, and 
 Frederick the Great beheved to his death that Germany 
 was an unsuitable soil for the sciences and arts, that German .-' 
 was and always would remain a barbarous tongue, that 
 the arts and sciences could not flourish in Prussia, and he 
 surrounded himself with Frenchmen. 
 
 King Frederick Wilham was a great organiser and 
 administrator. He created the framework of the Prussian 
 State and its traditions, and impressed his own character 
 upon the nation. However, he did not possess the gifts 
 of a great commander, and still less those of a diplomat. 
 His boorish roughness, his impetuousness, and his choleric 
 temperament prevented him securing any success in the 
 field of diplomacy. Therefore, he obtained only an in- 
 significant accession of territory. However, owing to 
 his excellent administration and his thrift, he built for 
 the future. He enormously increased the strength and the 
 efficiency of the country. He trebled the national revenues. 
 He greatly increased the wealth and the number of the 
 
 c2 
 
20 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 people. He vastly improved the land. He nearly trebled 
 the army, made it the most efficient force in the world, 
 and accumulated a vast store of war material and a large 
 War Fund, with the help of which his son acquired Silesia 
 and successfully resisted nearly all Europe during the 
 Seven Years' War. 
 
 The Great Elector prepared the ground, King Frederick 
 WiUiam the First firmly laid the foundations, and Frederick 
 the Great erected thereon the edifice of modem Germany. 
 
 The strength of Germany lies in her form of government, 
 as shaped by her rulers. She owes her power to her great 
 sovereigns. The Great Elector and Frederick WilHam 
 the First were not men of many words. They were men 
 of action. They practised an enlightened absolutism, but 
 did not preach it. While sovereigns hke Louis the Four- 
 teenth of France and Frederick the First of Prussia used 
 their absolute power chiefly for gratifying their vanity, 
 their greed, and their lust, men hke the Great Elector and 
 Frederick WilUam the First saw in their power a trust. 
 They worked with all their might for the greatness and 
 glory of their coimtry and for posterity, and they crushed 
 all opposition, and made themselves absolute masters of 
 the State in order to increase the efficiency of their action. 
 
 Frederick the Great's character widely differed from 
 that of his father. He was a man both of action and of 
 words. He possessed eloquence, imagination, and a fluent 
 pen — he would have made an excellent jom'nalist — and he 
 both practised and preached an enlightened absolutism. 
 He gave eloquent expression to the faith within him, and 
 he tried to make the people understand the policy of their 
 rulers and to make them partners in their Sovereign's glory. 
 
 Frederick the Great was the most gifted and the most 
 successful Prussian monarch. He was a great strategist, 
 a great tactician, a great diplomat, a great economist and 
 financier, a great organiser, and a great administrator. 
 
 As he had been most successful in all his undertakings, 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 21 
 
 it is only natural that his views and teachings have always 
 enjoyed the greatest prestige in the highest Prusso- German 
 circles, and that they have deeply influenced the action 
 of his successors and of their statesmen. Among the 
 numerous writings which he left, his confidential memoirs 
 written for the guidance of future generations and his 
 
 * Political and Military Testaments ' are of course most 
 authoritative. Among the many pupils of Frederick the 
 Great was Bismarck. It is no exaggeration to say that the 
 writings which Frederick the Great addressed to posterity 
 are the arcana imperii of modern Germany. Those who 
 desire to learn the secret of Germany's strength, wealth, 
 and efficiency, should therefore most carefully study the 
 teachings of Frederick the Great. 
 
 Frederick's * Political Testament' of 1752, addressed 
 to his successors, begins with the significant words : 
 
 The first duty of a citizen consists in serving his country; 
 I have tried to fulfil that duty in all the different phases 
 of my life. 
 
 The idea that the King is merely the first citizen, and 
 that his duty consists in serving his country with all his 
 strength and all his ability runs through the writings of 
 Frederick the Great. In his later memoirs he elaborated that 
 idea. For instance, in his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvern- 
 ment,' written in 1777, twenty-five years after his first 
 
 * Pohtical Testament,' he stated : 
 
 The citizens have accorded pre-eminence to one of their 
 number only because of the services which he can render 
 them. These services consist in maintaining the laws, in 
 meting out justice, in opposing with all his strength the 
 deterioration of morals, in defending the State against its 
 enemies. 
 
 The ruler should carefully watch the cultivation of the 
 soil. He should provide an abundance of food for the people, 
 encourage industry, and further commerce. He ought to 
 
22 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 be like a sentinel who watches unceasingly the neighbours of 
 the State and the activities of its enemies. 
 
 It is necessary that the sovereign should act with fore- 
 sight and prudence and conclude alliances in good time, 
 and he ought to choose his AUies among those who are most 
 likely to promote the interests of his country. 
 
 Each of the functions named requires a wealth of know- 
 ledge from the sovereign. He must study profoundly the 
 physical conditions of his country, and should thoroughly 
 know the spirit and character of the people, for an ignorant 
 sovereign is as guilty as an ill-disposed one. Ignorance in 
 the ruler is due to his laziness, while malice springs from an 
 evil mind. However, the sufferings caused by his mistakes 
 are as great in the one case as in the other. 
 
 Princes, sovereigns, and kings have not been given 
 supreme authority in order to live in luxurious self-indul- 
 gence and debauchery. They have not been elevated by 
 their fellow-men to enable them to strut about and to insult 
 with their pride the simple-mannered, the poor, and the 
 suffering. They have not been placed at the head of the 
 State to keep around themselves a crowd of idle loafers whose 
 uselessness drives them towards vice. The bad administra- 
 tion which may be found in monarchies springs from many 
 different causes, but their principal cause lies in the character 
 of the sovereign. A ruler addicted to women will become 
 a tool of his mistresses and favourites, and these will abuse 
 their power and commit wrongs of every kind, will protect 
 vice, sell offices, and perpetrate every infamy. . . . 
 
 The sovereign is the representative of his State. He and 
 his people form a single body. Euler and ruled can be happy 
 only if they are firmly united. The sovereign stands to his 
 people in the same relation in which the head stands to the 
 body. He must use his eyes and his brain for the whole 
 community, and act on its behalf to the common advantage. 
 If we wish to elevate monarchical above republican govern- 
 ment, the duty of sovereigns is clear. They must be active, 
 hard-working, upright and honest, and concentrate all their 
 strength upon filling their office worthily. That is my idea 
 of the^duties of sovereigns. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STRENGTH 23 
 
 A sovereign must possess an exact and detailed knowledge 
 of the strong and of the weak points of his country. He 
 must be thoroughly acquainted with its resources, the 
 character of the people, and the national commerce. . . . 
 
 Eulers should always remind themselves that they are 
 men like the least of their subjects. The sovereign is the 
 foremost judge, general, financier, and minister of his 
 country, not merely for the sake of his prestige. Therefore, 
 he should perform with care the duties connected with these 
 offices. He is merely the principal servant of the State. 
 Hence, he must act with honesty, wisdom, and complete 
 disinterestedness in such a way that he can render an account 
 of his stewardship to the citizens at any moment. Conse- 
 quently, he is guilty if he wastes the money of the people, 
 the taxes which they have paid, in luxury, pomp, and de- 
 bauchery. He who should improve the morals of the 
 people, be the guardian of the law, and improve their educa- 
 tion should not pervert them by his bad example. 
 
 Frederick took his regal duties very seriously. Like 
 his father he worked indefatigably and unceasingly for 
 his country. He rose in summer at three o'clock, and in 
 winter at four o'clock, and a quarter of an hour later he 
 was at his desk. Like his father he worked much and 
 slept little, and set an example of industry and thoroughness 
 to his subjects. 
 
 His capacity for work was prodigious. Like Frederick 
 William the First he supervised the army and the Civil 
 Service in all its branches. In addition, he conducted 
 personally the enormous business of his very active diplomacy, 
 and as chief of the staff he planned his campaigns. 
 
 He was ready to practise that absolute devotion to 
 the State which he preached in his writings. That may 
 be seen by his unceasing activity. It may also be seen 
 by the fact that he was prepared to lay down his life for 
 his country not only in the heat of battle but in cold deliber- 
 ation. He repeatedly gave instruction that, if made a 
 prisoner, he should be sacrificed for Prussia. On January 10, 
 
24 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 1757, for instance, during the second year of the Seven 
 Years' War, when Prussia's position was critical, he sent 
 the following instructions to his Minister and confidential 
 friend and adviser, Count Fink von Finkenstein : 
 
 In the critical position of Prussia's affairs, I must give 
 you my orders. These will empower you to take all the 
 necessary measures in case of a great misfortune. 
 
 (1) If, which Heaven forbid, one of my armies should be 
 completely defeated in Saxony, or if the French should drive 
 the Hanoverians out of the country, occupy Hanover, and 
 threaten to invade Brandenburg itself, or if the Eussians 
 should penetrate into Brandenburg, the royal family, the 
 Highest Courts of Justice, and the Departments of State 
 must be brought into a place of security. If we are defeated 
 in Saxony about Leipzig, the most suitable place for the 
 royal family and the treasure is Kiistrin. If the Eussians 
 should advance into Brandenburg, or if a disaster should 
 overwhelm us in Lusatia, everything must be brought to 
 Magdeburg. The last place of refuge is Stettin, but it must 
 be resorted to only in case of the utmost necessity. The 
 garrison, the royal family, and the treasure are inseparable. 
 They always go together. To the treasure must be added 
 the crown diamonds and the royal table silver. In case of 
 need the royal silver and the gold plate must be melted down 
 without delay. 
 
 (2) If I should be killed in action, the national business 
 must be carried on without the slightest change. Nobody 
 must notice that the government has changed hands. The 
 rendering of the oath and the act of homage to the new 
 ruler should take place as quickly as possible throughout 
 Prussia, and especially in Silesia. 
 
 (3) I might have the misfortune of being made prisoner 
 by the enemy. In that case, I absolutely prohibit that the 
 slightest consideration be paid to my person and that any 
 notice whatever be taken of the letters which I may write 
 from my place of confinement. In case of such a misfortune 
 I will sacrifice myself to the State. Everyone must obey 
 my brother, and he and all my ministers and generals are 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANTS STRENGTH 25 
 
 responsible to me with their heads that neither territory nor 
 money is offered to the enemy in exchange for my liberty, 
 that the war will be continued, that all advantages for 
 defeating the enemy will be made use of, that matters will 
 be treated as if I had never existed. 
 
 I hope and believe that you, Count Fink, will not find it 
 necessary to make use of the orders contained in this letter. 
 However, in case of misfortune I empower you herewith 
 to carry out these instructions, and as a token that they 
 embody my firm and constant will, and that they have been 
 given after thorough and careful deliberation, I sign this 
 letter with my own hand and append to it my own seal. 
 
 Frederick concentrated his whole energy and ability 
 upon the government and the advancement of his country, 
 and he desired that his successors also should manage them- 
 selves the entire business of the State. In order to enable 
 them to fulfil this heavy task, he considered that a special 
 education was required. 
 
 In a State such as Prusso- Germany the education of 
 the future ruler is of course a matter of supreme importance, 
 for the fate of the country depends upon the character and 
 ability of the monarch. Therefore, the instructions which 
 Frederick the Great wrote for the education of his nephew 
 and successor, and sent to Major Borcke on September 24, 
 1751, when the heir-presumptive was seven years old, are 
 of the highest interest and importance to all who wish 
 to understand the policy and character of modern Germany 
 and the causes of its success, for it may be said that 
 Frederick's instructions have guided all his successors in 
 the education of their heirs. The following are the most 
 interesting passages from that most important document : 
 
 I entrust to you the education of my nephew, the Heir- 
 Presumptive of Prussia. As there is a great difference 
 between the education of the child of a private citizen and 
 of a child that will be called upon to rule the State, I here- 
 with give you my instructions for your guidance. . . . 
 
26 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 The boy should learn history, but not Uke a parrot. 
 The great utility of history consists in enabling us to compare 
 the present with the past. The intelligent study of history 
 shows the causes which have brought about vast changes 
 in the world. It shows besides that, generally speaking, 
 vice is punished and virtue rewarded. Attention must be 
 drawn to the fact that the ancient writers are not always 
 reliable, and that one must critically examine their state- 
 ments before beheving them. . . . 
 
 The greatest and most important part of education con- 
 sists in shaping the character. Neither you nor all the 
 powers of the world can change the character of a child. 
 Education can only moderate its passions and instincts. 
 
 You should treat my nephew like an ordinary child that 
 will be called upon to succeed by its own exertions. Ee- 
 proach the boy for his faults, and tell him that he will be 
 despised by all if he will not learn. He must not be allowed 
 to become conceited. He should be brought up quite 
 simply. He must be courteous towards all, and must be 
 made to apologise immediately if he has been rude to any- 
 body. He must be taught that all men are equal, and that 
 exalted birth without exalted merit is worthless. Let him 
 talk freely to all. That will make him self-possessed. It 
 does not matter if he talks nonsense, for he is only a child. 
 His whole education should be directed with the aim of 
 making him self-reliant. He should not be guided by 
 others. Whether he speaks foolishly or wisely, his ideas 
 should only be his own. 
 
 It is very important that he should love the army. 
 Therefore he m.ust be told at all occasions and by all whom 
 he meets that men of birth who are not soldiers are pitiful 
 wretches. He must be taken to see the troops drilling as 
 often as he likes. He ought to be shown the Cadets, and 
 be given five or six of them to drill. That should be an 
 amusement for him, not a duty. The great point is that he 
 should become fond of military affairs, and the worst that 
 could happen would be if he should become bored with them. 
 He should be allowed to talk to all, to cadets, soldiers, 
 citizens, and officers, to increase his self-reliance. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 27 
 
 It is particularly important that he should learn to love 
 his country, and that all people whom he meets should utter 
 only patriotic sentiments. With all questions discussed 
 some moral ideas might be connected. He should learn to 
 love humanity and kindness, sentiments which grace all 
 honourable men, and particularly princes. 
 
 My nephew will, when he becomes older, begin to do 
 service as a lieutenant. He must pass gradually through 
 all the ranks. That will prevent him becoming conceited. 
 The officers who dine with him should contradict and tease 
 him freely to make him self-possessed and bright. He 
 should see as much of the world as possible. ... At every 
 opportunity you should inculcate in him love and respect 
 for his father and mother and for his relatives. You will 
 find out his passions, but you must try to moderate, but not 
 to destroy them. He should never do anything without 
 good reason, except during his hours of recreation. For 
 minor transgressions he should be scolded. For greater 
 ones he should be punished by being deprived of his sword, 
 by being placed under arrest, and by other punishments 
 likely to appeal to his sense of honour. 
 
 Eeport to me about him every month, and more often if 
 necessary. Do not make him timid by showing too much 
 anxiety about his health and safety. Great care must of 
 course be taken of him, but he must not notice it. Other- 
 wise he will become soft, timid, and nervous. These instruc- 
 tions are valid only till the child is ten or twelve years old. 
 
 Prussia has been a military State since its beginning. 
 The country has grown great by successful wars and by 
 conquest. Frederick WiUiam the First not only created 
 a powerful army but militarised the administration and 
 the civil institutions as well. He made the entire civil 
 life of the country subservient to his military requirements 
 and ambitions. Frederick the Great clearly recognised 
 that the future of Prussia would depend upon its army, and 
 upon the military strength of the country as a whole, that 
 it needed a form of government which was most likely to 
 
28 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 increase the power of the State. The activity of the 
 Great Elector, of Frederick William the First, and his 
 own achievements had shown him how greatly an able 
 monarch, who is entirely unhampered by popular interfer- 
 ence and control, can advance a naturally poor and weak 
 country. 
 
 Frederick was deeply convinced of the superiority 
 of monarchical over democratic government in adminis- 
 trative matters in general, and especially in matters of 
 foreign policy and of war. A military State, like an army, 
 should, in his opinion, be governed not by an Administration, 
 not by statesmen and generals, but by a commander-in- 
 chief, by the Sovereign himself. He showed an unlimited 
 contempt for feeble sovereigns, for the weakness and in- 
 efficiency of the then existing republics, such as Holland, 
 and for those States which under monarchical forms were 
 democratically governed, such as England. He repeatedly 
 described England as a republic in disguise and sneered 
 at its army. He frequently expressed his opinion that 
 monarchy was a far more efficient form of government, 
 especially in war, than democracy. He wrote, for instance, 
 in his * Lettre sur I'Amour de la Patrie ' : 
 
 A monarch is not a despot, whose only rule of conduct is 
 his caprice. He must be the centre of the State where all 
 the lines from the circumference unite. A monarchical 
 government can maintain in its deliberations that secrecy 
 which is absent in republics, and the various branches of the 
 administration can act together like a well-trained team of 
 horses. Besides in monarchies party spirit is far less ramp- 
 ant than in republics, which are often plagued by party strife 
 and by party intrigue. 
 
 In his * Histoire de mon Temps,' Frederick wrote : 
 
 Sweden which, under Gustavus Adolphus, had been a 
 land of heroes became the home of cowardice and infamy 
 under a republican government. Thus kingdoms and 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STKENGTH 29 
 
 empires may decline and fall after having risen to the 
 greatest glory. The cause of Sweden's decline may probably 
 be found in the change in the form of its government. While 
 Sweden was a monarchy, the army was honoured. It was 
 efficient for the defence of the State, and could never become 
 a public danger. 
 
 In republics the government must, by its very nature, 
 be peaceful, and the military must be kept down, for the 
 politicians in power are afraid of generals who are worshipped 
 by their troops and who may bring about a revolution. 
 In republics men of ambition can obtain power only by 
 intrigue. Thus corruption arises and destroys public 
 morality. The true sense of honour is lost. All try to 
 succeed by intrigue. Besides, in republics secrecy is never 
 observed in matters of State. The enemy knows their 
 plans beforehand and can foil them. . . . 
 
 When Sweden was turned into a republic it became 
 weak. The love of glory was replaced by the spirit of 
 intrigue. Disinterestedness was replaced by cupidity. The 
 public welfare was sacrificed to individual advantage. 
 Corruption went so far that in the Swedish Parliament 
 sometimes the French and sometimes the Kussian party 
 was supreme, but never the Swedish. 
 
 The views expressed by Frederick regarding the republic 
 of Sweden should give food for thought to EngHshmen and 
 Americans. Democracy, both in the monarchical and in 
 the republican form, provides undoubtedly a less efficient 
 government than a monarchy. In democracies party 
 spirit proves only too often more powerful than 
 patriotism. While party interests are promoted those of 
 the nation are disregarded and suffer neglect. Besides, 
 democracies are administered not by men of action but 
 by men of words, by amateurs whose position depends on 
 the popular will and upon the popular whim. Consequently, 
 nearly every Government measure brought forward in a 
 democratic State is determined not on its merits, not by its 
 national utility or necessity, but by the question : Will it be 
 
30 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 popular or unpopular ? Will it gain or lose votes ? Will 
 it strengthen or weaken the politicians in power or the 
 Opposition ? Besides, every measure, however secret, must 
 be discussed in pubhc although pubHc discussion may 
 imperil the existence of the State. While a monarch in a 
 well-organised monarchy such as Germany can, in a 
 time of danger, command and thus employ the whole 
 national resources to the best advantage without delay, 
 the head of a democratic Government can hope to unite 
 the citizens and impel them to action only by begging 
 and imploring, by exhorting and beseeching them to do their 
 duty. 
 
 A modem democracy, like an old-fashioned charity, 
 is run on voluntary contributions. A democracy has not 
 one master, but many masters. Every deniocratic citizen 
 claims for himself the right to decide whether he will obey 
 or not, for he is one of the sovereigns. In the words of the 
 judicious Bagehot : * The natural instinct of Englishmen 
 is to resist authority.' Politicians pander to the electors, 
 and thus the people in democracies are taught that they 
 have rights, but not that they had duties. Many months 
 after the beginning of a war in which Great Britain's existence 
 is at stake, the pohticians who had prevented and opposed 
 the tuition of patriotism in the schools began teaching 
 the citizens by posters, by the methods of patent medicine 
 vendors, the duty of defending their country. 
 
 Organisation in time of a crisis can be efficient only if 
 the men in power can command, and if those over whom 
 they have authority are certain to obey. Democracy is 
 government by argument. It does not organise, but it 
 disorganises, and the men in authority are afraid to order 
 men to fight or to work because every democrat claims for 
 himself the right to do what he likes, the right to resist 
 authority. The German Government has opposed parha- 
 mentary institutions to the utmost, and has given to the 
 ParHament which it has granted to the people merely the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY'S STRENGTH 31 
 
 power of a suburban debating society, not so much because 
 the rulers and the aristocracy were jealous of their privileges, 
 but because they feared, and rightly feared, that the de- 
 mocratisation of Germany would destroy its power, and 
 would prove fatal to the country in case of war. 
 
 Circumstances have made Prussia a military State. 
 The country has grown great by its military strength. 
 Frederick clearly recognised that the existence and the 
 future of Prussia depended upon the army. Therefore 
 the army was his principal care. It was to be an army 
 not for show and for parade, but exclusively for use in 
 war. In his * Political Testament ' of 1752 he wrote : 
 ' The army must be managed in peace in such a manner 
 as to make it as efficient as possible in case of war.' Nothing 
 was to be left to chance. Preparation down to the smallest 
 details was unceasingly recommended by Frederick. Prussia 
 was to rely in war not on her Allies, but entirely on her 
 own unaided strength. The King wrote in his * Essai sur 
 les Formes de Gouvernement ' : 
 
 The size of the national army must depend on the strength 
 of possible enemies. A ruler cannot safely reckon upon his 
 Allies, for these do not always fulfil their obligations, or they 
 fulfil them only in part. Those who count upon the strength 
 of their Allies as upon their own are sure to be deceived. 
 
 Frederick thought it of the highest importance that 
 the Sovereign himself should direct and command the 
 army. He wrote in his * Political Testament ' of 1776 : 
 
 If the sovereign himself does not manage the army and 
 does not set an example to his people in military matters 
 all is lost. If the ruler shows by his actions that he prefers 
 the loafing courtiers to his officers, all men will prefer idling 
 at court to working hard in the army. 
 
 In his * Political Testament ' of 1752 he wrote : 
 
 That ruler rules best who has carefully laid down his 
 
32 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 policy and who rules himself. He will not be hampered 
 at the moment when a decision must promptly be made, for 
 he holds all the threads in his own hands. It is particu- 
 larly important for him that he should possess as much 
 knowledge as possible of all mihtary details. 
 
 Men who are not soldiers are ill-fitted for devising a plan 
 of campaign, especially if they are unacquainted with all the 
 mihtary technicaUties, the knowledge of which is indispens- 
 able. He who does not know the need of an army, who is 
 not acquainted with its thousand and one requirements, 
 who does not know how an army is mobilised, and who is 
 unacquainted with the art of war, who neither knows how to 
 keep discipline among troops in peace time, nor how to lead 
 them in time of war, will never succeed in conducting a war 
 even if he should be a most able man and statesman, econo- 
 mist, and financier. 
 
 I wish to convince my successors that it is necessary for 
 every King of Prussia to make war his particular study and 
 to encourage those who wish to take up the noble and 
 dangerous profession of arms. 
 
 As Prussia is surrounded by powerful States my succes- 
 sors must be prepared for frequent wars. The soldiers must 
 be given the highest positions in Prussia for the same reason 
 for which they received them in ancient Eome when that 
 State conquered the world. Honours and rewards stimulate 
 and encourage talent, and praise arouses men to a generous 
 emulation. It encourages men to enter the army. It is 
 paradoxical to treat officers contemptuously and call theirs 
 an honoured profession. The men who are the principal 
 supports of the State must be encouraged and be preferred 
 to the soft and insipid society men who can only grace an 
 ante-chamber. 
 
 Only the sovereign can create and maintain perfect 
 discipline, for only he can act with authority, and blame 
 and punish severely according to desert without respect to 
 birth and rank. Only he can liberally reward the deserving, 
 can constantly review the troops and keep them efficient. 
 Therefore the King of Prussia should be a soldier and should 
 be himself the Commander-in-Chief. . . . 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH 83 
 
 Monarchies are disgraced by soft and idle rulers who 
 leave the command of their troops to their generals, and thus 
 tacitly avow their pusillanimity and their incapacity. 
 
 Those who have asserted in the past that civiUan 
 politicians are fit to manage the army and navy, and that 
 a Cabinet, a number of politicians, can make plans of war, 
 will do well to ponder on Frederick the Great's testamentary 
 views. 
 
 Frederick was of opinion that the quality of the army 
 depends in the first instance upon the ability and character 
 of the commander. He was exceedingly careful in selecting 
 men for high command, and he wrote in his * Guerre de 
 Sept Ans ' : 
 
 The ability and determination of a general are more 
 decisive in war than the number of soldiers. . . . 
 
 Generally speaking, towns are defended neither by their 
 fortifications nor by the strength of their garrison, for all 
 depends on the ability, courage, and determination of their 
 commander. 
 
 The perfect discipline of the German army has surprised 
 many observers. At the word of command German soldiers 
 will act like automata, perform the greatest deeds of valour, 
 or commit the most shocking crimes. That perfect dis- 
 cipline which makes men machines in time of war was created 
 by Frederick William the First and was recommended as 
 indispensable by Frederick the Great. The latter wrote 
 in his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 : 
 
 Military discipline makes the troops absolutely obedient. 
 It makes blindly obedient the soldier to his officer, the officer 
 to his colonel, the colonel to his general, and the generals to 
 the commander-in-chief. A soldier who murmurs against a 
 non-commissioned officer, or who draws his weapon against 
 him, and an officer who draws his weapon against his com- 
 mander, must be punished with death, for no clemency is 
 possible towards those who violate the rules of discipline. 
 
84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Insubordination supplies a dangerous example. The slight- 
 est loosening of the bonds of discipline would create a spirit 
 of lawlessness and of mutiny, and would force the com- 
 manders to obey their men. Therefore the generals and 
 colonels are given a despotic power over their regiments. 
 
 The commanders must be responsible to the sovereign 
 with their lives for the obedience of their men. Hence a 
 ruler is certain that his orders will be carried out. Strict 
 discipline makes the troops so accustomed to absolute 
 obedience that they no longer know how to disobey. They 
 will neither grumble, nor argue, nor complain. They will 
 do what they are told, act according to orders, expose them- 
 selves to the greatest dangers, and go to their death at the 
 word of command. They will follow their officers and 
 perform deeds of marvellous valour. 
 
 Discipline fills and regulates the lives of the soldiers, 
 prevents them using violence, stealing, drinking, and gamb- 
 ling, and causes them to return to their quarters at the 
 appointed time. Thus discipline will be better observed 
 among soldiers in the army than among monks in a monas- 
 tery. Absolute subordination through all grades makes the 
 whole army dependent upon the will of a single man, the 
 ruler, and if he is a skilful general he need only give his 
 orders, for he can be certain that they will be carried out 
 with exactitude. 
 
 In a democracy in which indiscipline is^general, where 
 men in authority can request, but not command, f where 
 the army is controlled by civilian politicians, the maintenance 
 of perfect military discipline is of course impossible. More- 
 over, the English soldier has two masters : his officer and 
 the law. If he shoots at the word of command he may be 
 hanged for murder. That conception alone suffices to 
 destroy a perfect sense of discipline in the army. 
 
 Frederick kept the greatest secrecy with regard to 
 Prussian affairs. His opponents were rarely able to antici- 
 pate the King's plans. On the other hand, Frederick 
 was determined to become acquainted with the intentions 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 85 
 
 of his possible enemies. With this object in view he 
 developed a most perfect system of espionage in all the 
 countries in which Prussia was chiefly interested. The 
 King wrote in his memoirs : 
 
 If one wishes to oppose the plans of one's enemies one 
 must know their plans. 
 
 Natural allies are those States the interests of which are 
 identical with our own. Nevertheless alliances may be 
 concluded among nations the interests of which differ, 
 although they will be only short-lived. 
 
 In the present position of Europe all States are strongly 
 armed, and as a Power of superior strength can destroy 
 the weaker ones, it is necessary to conclude alliances either 
 for mutual defence or for foiling the plans of one's enemies. 
 However, alliances by themselves do not suffice. It is 
 necessary to have in one's neighbour States, and especially 
 among one's enemies, agents who report faithfully all they 
 see and hear. Men are bad. It is most necessary to protect 
 oneself against being surprised. 
 
 Germany's financial strength and her financial pre- 
 paredness for war have surprised all observers, except 
 those who are acquainted with Prusso- Germany's financial 
 policy, and with her financial preparedness for war in the 
 past. Here also Frederick Wilham the First, and especially 
 Frederick the Great, have created a tradition by which 
 Germany continues to be guided. 
 
 Finance is a most powerful weapon in war, and none 
 understood its importance better than Frederick the Great. 
 He wrote in his * Political Testament ' of 1752 : 
 
 If a country wishes to be happy and respected it is 
 necessary that good order in the national finances should be 
 maintained. . . . 
 
 Prussia has not the riches of Peru, nor wealthy mer- 
 chants and banks, nor all the numerous resources possessed 
 by France, Spain, and England. However, by means of 
 industry and thrift, Prussia may succeed in occupying a 
 
 d2 
 
86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 worthy place by their side. The most important thing is 
 that carefulness and good order should be observed in both 
 income and expenditure. 
 
 In his ' PoHtical Testament ' of 1776 Frederick stated 
 his views on financial preparation for war more fully. He 
 wrote : 
 
 Since the Seven Years' War Prussia's State revenues 
 have prodigiously increased. . . . The national revenue 
 amounts at present to 21,700,000 thalers. With that sum 
 the whole of the national expenditure is provided and 187,000 
 soldiers are maintained. After all the necessary expenditure 
 has been provided for, there remains every year a surplus 
 balance of 5,700,000 thalers. Of that sum 2,000,000 
 thalers are deposited every year in the Treasury, while the 
 remaining 3,700,000 thalers are spent on fortifications, on 
 land improvements, on compensation for disasters, &c. 
 These 5,700,000 thalers are used in war time for paying the 
 war expenditure, which comes to 11,000,000 thalers per 
 annum. Hence, 5,300,000 thalers are required as extra- 
 ordinary expenditure for every year of war. 
 
 That sum may be drawn from the Treasury, which 
 contains at present 19,300,000 thalers. Besides that sum 
 Prussia has another War Fund of 4,500,000 thalers, the so- 
 called Small War Fund, from which the cost of mobilisation 
 will be defrayed. In addition, there exists a War Fund of 
 4,200,000 thalers at Breslau for purchasing forage for an 
 army of 60,000 men, and there is a Fund of 900,000 thalers in 
 the Bank at Magdeburg with which forage for six weeks can 
 be bought. 
 
 Besides, the War Chest should contain 11,000,000 thalers 
 for paying the regiments in advance in war time. Of that 
 sum 4,000,000 thalers are there, and the remaining 7,000,000 
 will be added within three years. It should be noted that 
 if the whole war expenditure is to come out of the war 
 treasure, the money in hand sufl&ces only for a campaign of 
 four years. Hence Prussia must act with the greatest cir- 
 cumspection and economy so as to have money in hand at 
 the time when peace comes again in sight. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH 37 
 
 It will be noticed that in 1776, thirteen years after 
 the ruinous Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had 
 accumulated financial resources sufficient to pay for a war 
 lasting four years. Yet he deplored that the money in 
 hand sufficed ' only for a four years' campaign.' Foresight 
 in financial affairs, the necessity of the most ample financial 
 preparation for war, was taught by Frederick the Great, 
 and subsequent rulers have acted in accordance with his 
 teachings. 
 
 Frederick the Great attached the highest value to 
 well-ordered finances, to the possession of large funds 
 which might be used in time of national emergency. Hence 
 he valued a good system of taxation which would incon- 
 venience the citizens as little as possible and which would 
 be strictly just. In his * Essai sur les Formes de 
 Gouvernement ' we read : 
 
 Foreign policy cannot prosper, and the army cannot be 
 strong, unless the national finances are in perfect order, 
 and unless the ruler himself is economical and prudent. 
 Money is like a sorcerer's wand. Miracles may be per- 
 formed with it. Great political undertakings, the main- 
 tenance of an army, and a wise social policy require money. 
 
 No Government can exist without taxation. The great 
 art of raising taxes consists in doing it without oppressing 
 the citizens. To ensure that taxation should be fair, 
 careful Government surveys and valuations of land are made. 
 These are carefully classified, and thus taxation is imposed 
 in accordance with the capacity of the individuals. It 
 would be unpardonable if through a clumsy taxation the 
 tillers of the soil should be made to abandon the land. 
 Having acquired their property, they ought to be able to live 
 on it with their families in comfort. 
 
 Frederick the Great provided in peace not only all the 
 money required for a protracted war, but the food as well. 
 He wrote in his ' PoHtical Testament ' of 1776 : 
 
 We have in Berlin a magazine of corn of 36,000 wispels, 
 
88 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY 
 
 sufficient to feed an army of 60,000 men dm:ing a whole 
 year. There is an equally large magazine in Silesia for 
 another 60,000 men. Besides there is a fund of 2,000,000 
 thalers reserved for purchasing grain in Poland. That 
 sum can furnish 120,000 wispels. Thus Prussia is protected 
 against the possibility of famine in time of peace, and in time 
 of war she has sufficient corn in hand for a campaign of 
 three years. 
 
 Those who, at the beginning of the war, believed that 
 Germany could be starved into surrender were not ac- 
 quainted with the providence of the German Government, 
 and with the food pohcy which Frederick William the First 
 and Frederick the Great had introduced, and which is 
 still pursued by the Prusso-German Government. That 
 Government not unnaturally follows the tradition created 
 by the greatest Prussian rulers. 
 
 Frederick William the First had, as we have seen, created 
 in the General Directorate a Supreme Administrative 
 Authority, in which all the Departments of State were co- 
 ordinated so that all should work in harmony and unison 
 instead of hampering and obstructing one another as they 
 had done hitherto. That co-ordination was still further 
 developed by Frederick the Great, who thought it indis- 
 pensable for the efficiency of the national administration 
 that all the great departments of Prussia should work 
 like a single body. He wrote in his ' Political Testament * 
 of 1752 : 
 
 All the branches of government should be closely inter- 
 connected. The management of the national finances, the 
 national policy, and the army are inseparable. It does not 
 suffice that one of these branches is well managed. All 
 three must be efficiently conducted and must advance in the 
 same direction, like a well-trained team, pulling the car of 
 State. 
 
 [§, In his * PoHtical Testament ' of 1776 Frederick once 
 more exhorted his successors : 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STKENGTH 89 
 
 Foreign policy, the army, and the finances are the three 
 great branches of statesmanship, and they are so closely 
 interwoven that they cannot be separated. All three must 
 be cultivated simultaneously. If all three are promoted 
 simultaneously in accordance with the rules of sound policy 
 the State will reap the greatest advantage. ... In France 
 there is no real union among these three branches. They 
 do not co-operate. Each Minister is occupied only with 
 the care of his own department. If a similar state of affairs 
 should arise in Prussia the State would be lost. 
 
 In the following extract from his * Essai sur les Formes 
 de Gouvernement ' of 1777, Frederick the Great seems 
 almost to describe Cabinet government on a democratic 
 basis, such as exists in England, where men govern without 
 system and without a plan, and where government naturally 
 and inevitably results in waste, confusion, muddle, and 
 inefficiency, if not in disaster. The King wrote : 
 
 If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and 
 places it into the hands of paid men, of the Ministers ap- 
 pointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the 
 left. A general plan is no longer followed. 
 
 Every Minister disapproves of the actions of his prede- 
 cessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary, 
 wishing to originate a new policy which often is harmful. 
 He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to over- 
 throw the existing institutions in order to show their ability. 
 In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can 
 take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a 
 bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials 
 blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings. 
 
 Men are attached to their own. As the State does not 
 belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest 
 in its welfare. Hence the government is carried on with 
 careless indifference, and the result is that the administra- 
 tion, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus 
 the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals 
 direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic 
 
40 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY 
 
 administration disappears. Everyone follows his own 
 notions. No link is left which connects the directing factors. 
 As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together 
 the single object of measuring time, all the springs and 
 wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co- 
 ordinated that all the departments of the national admin- 
 istration work together with the single aim of promoting 
 the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be 
 lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual 
 interests of ministers and generals usually cause them to 
 oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent 
 the carrying through of the most necessary measure. 
 
 These wise words of Frederick the Great should be 
 placed in golden letters in all the pubHc offices, and be 
 learned by heart by every school child. 
 
 In modern times Great Britain has experienced the 
 efficiency of one-man rule in the time of Cromwell and of 
 the elder Pitt. Under these two men the British Govern- 
 ment worked like a single body, animated by a single will, 
 with the most gratifying success. A Prime Minister can 
 preserve the unity in the Cabinet, and the unity of govern- 
 mental action, only if he possesses the supreme direction 
 of all departments, if Cabinet Ministers are not his equals, 
 but his subordinates, if the curious fiction of joint responsi- 
 bility of the Cabinet is abandoned, if the Prime Minister 
 alone is responsible. A Prime Minister cannot unify the 
 great departments and services by acting merely the part 
 of an amiable chairman at a suburban temperance meeting. 
 
 Unfortunately, Democracy, after having destroyed 
 the power of the King, has gradually undermined that of 
 the Ministers as well. Thus the nation is left without a 
 guide. It has become a gigantic business with a large 
 body of squabbling amateur directors, but without a general 
 manager. No one is there to command. Amateurs, men 
 without knowledge, without practical experience, without 
 authority, without power, without initiative, nominally 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STKENGTH 41 
 
 govern the country, but in reality they merely occupy 
 office, pose as administrators, and allow things to drift. 
 And what is worst, they have suppressed the expert. Amateur 
 politicians have muzzled the military and naval experts, and 
 the * sovereign ' nation is not allowed to know the truth. 
 
 The Ministers in power practise on the nation the con- 
 fidence trick on a gigantic scale. They attribute all the 
 achievements of the experts to themselves, but make the 
 experts scapegoats for their mistakes. Custom, tradition, 
 the system is to blame for this state of affairs rather than 
 the men who occupy ministerial positions. That practice 
 prevails not only in England, but in all democracies, Switzer- 
 land alone excepted. France was almost as unprepared 
 for war as was Great Britain, owing to the inefficiency of 
 her political system. 
 
 Germany owes her efficiency not to the greater ability 
 of the Germans themselves, but to the political system 
 which Frederick William the First and Frederick the Great 
 have created, to the fact that a single will animates the 
 whole administration of the State, that the whole nation 
 acts like a single man, and every other consideration is 
 subordinated to the national interest, while in democracies 
 parties and people are squabbling, and the Departments 
 of State are aimlessly pulling some in one direction and 
 some in another. 
 
 Administrative efficiency requires not only a good system 
 but also good men. Frederick the Great knew no favourites. 
 In his own words, * Nature has not distributed talents accord- 
 ing to rank and lineage.' Frederick, like Napoleon, gave 
 rank and position only to merit. For obtaining good public 
 servants and increasing their zeal, he attached the greatest 
 value to two factors — to rewards and to punishments. He 
 wrote in his * Political Testament ' of 1752 : 
 
 Men are ruled by two motives : by the fear of punish- 
 ment and the hope of reward. . . . 
 
42 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY 
 
 A ruler should search for unknown merit and reward 
 men for worthy deeds performed in secret. He should 
 always pay attention to this and keep agents everywhere 
 so as to be informed of meritorious deeds. He should 
 watch for good actions as carefully as tyrants do for con- 
 spiracies. 
 
 In his * Political Testament ' of 1776 we read : 
 
 It is particularly necessary for the preservation of morals 
 that distinctions should be bestowed only for merit and not 
 for wealth. That principle has been disregarded in France, 
 and the consequence has been that public morals have 
 declined. Formerly Frenchmen could obtain honours 
 only by worthy deeds, but now they beheve that wealth 
 alone suffices to bring them honours. 
 
 In his * Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement * of 
 1777 he stated : 
 
 The promotion of morality in the widest sense is one of 
 the most important duties of the sovereign. He can do 
 much by distinguishing and rewarding the worthy and by 
 showing his contempt for the worthless. A ruler should 
 loudly disapprove of every dishonourable act and refuse 
 distinction to those who will not mend their ways. 
 
 A sovereign may do irremediable injury to the State by 
 distinguishing people of wealth but without merit, for 
 honours bestowed on the worthless rich strengthen the 
 widely held idea that wealth alone suffices to give distinction. 
 If that behef should gain ground, greed and cupidity will 
 break all bounds. A scramble for wealth will ensue, and the 
 most reprehensible means for acquiring riches will be 
 employed. Corruption will spread apace, become general, 
 and take deep root. Men of talent and of character will be 
 disregarded, and the people will honour only those who by 
 ostentatious expenditure advertise their wealth. 
 
 To prevent the corruption of the national character the 
 sovereign must distinguish only men of true merit and 
 treat with contempt men of wealth without virtue. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STRENGTH 43 
 
 The way in which Frederick practised what he preached 
 may be seen by the methods by which he forced the nobiHty 
 to act worthily towards their country. In the Prussian 
 Code, compiled under the inspiration of Frederick the Great, 
 we read in the chapter on the nobility : 
 
 Men of nobility are particularly entitled to honourable 
 employment in the service of the State according to their 
 abilities. . . . 
 
 Loss of nobility is the consequence if a person of noble 
 birth leads a dishonourable life, or a life by which he lowers 
 himself to the level of the common people. 
 
 For committing a common crime people of noble birth 
 may be deprived of their nobility by judicial decision. 
 
 Unfortunately, England has been corrupted by pohticians 
 who have bestowed rewards on the worthless and neglected 
 and discouraged the deserving. Distinctions and honours 
 are rarely given for services rendered to the nation. Hence 
 the saying, ' Patriotism does not pay,' is generally heard. 
 Titles and honours are frequently bestowed by party men 
 upon other party men. They are sold for cash or are given 
 for party services, and often for unavowable ones, to people 
 who sometimes have done the greatest injury to the State 
 and nation by preying upon the people, drugging them 
 with patent medicines, plying them with bad drink, or 
 deceiving them in the interest of the governing party. 
 On the other hand, patriots who have laboured all their 
 life for their country die in poverty and obscurity. Thus 
 intrigue is rewarded and patriotism discouraged. 
 
 People who have travelled in Germany have been sur- 
 prised by the efficiency of the Government services, by the 
 punctuality of the trains, by the cheapness and promptness 
 of justice, the excellence of the post and telephone, the 
 efficiency of national education, the conscientiousness and 
 the honesty of all officials, and the absence of muddle, 
 delay, and waste. The excellence of the German officials 
 
44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 is due to their training. Frederick the Great considerably- 
 increased the efficiency of the wonderful civil service which 
 his father had created by applying to it his principle of 
 rewards and punishments, and by appropriate laws such as 
 the following. They form part of the Prussian code, which 
 breathes in every chapter the Frederician spirit. We read : 
 
 Nobody may be given official employment unless he is 
 sufficiently qualified for his post and has given proof of his 
 ability to fill it. 
 
 He who by bribery or by other improper means has 
 obtained official employment must immediately be dismissed. 
 
 All agreements and promises by which private advan- 
 tages are promised for obtaining official employment are 
 null and void. 
 
 He who knowingly entrusts an official position to an 
 unfit person must make good the damage which may arise 
 to the State or to private individuals through the ignorance 
 or the incompetence of the person appointed. 
 
 Officials in authority who have neglected to prevent 
 mistakes and misdemeanours on the part of their subordin- 
 ates which they might have prevented by acting in accord- 
 ance with the official regulations are liable for the damage 
 which their neglect has caused to the State and to private 
 citizens. 
 
 These laws and their watchful observance have naturally 
 increased greatly the efficiency of the Prussian bureaucracy. 
 
 Before the advent of Frederick the Great, important 
 positions in the State were given rather according to favour 
 than according to merit. Frederick abolished this abuse. 
 He was determined to give official positions only to men of 
 ability, regardless of their birth and descent. He wrote 
 in his ' Histoire de mon Temps ' : * Nature has distributed 
 gifts amongst men without considering their ancestors.' 
 He anticipated Napoleon's principle, * La carriere ouverte 
 aux talents.' 
 
 Frederick believed that the strength of a State consists 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH 45 
 
 not in its wealth, but in its power — that men are more im- 
 portant than commodities. He attached particular value 
 to agriculture, recognising that the peasantry would supply 
 him with excellent soldiers, and that the development of 
 the national agriculture would enable the soil to nourish 
 a very large population. The King wrote in his * Anti- 
 Machievel ' : 
 
 The strength of the State consists not in the extent of its 
 territory, not in the possession of a large solitude, but in the 
 wealth and in the number of inhabitants. Therefore it is 
 to the interest of a prince to people his country and to make 
 the inhabitants prosperous. 
 
 In his * Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' we 
 read : 
 
 The agriculturists are truly the bread-winners of the 
 State. They should be encouraged to cultivate the land 
 carefully, for the true wealth of the country consists in the 
 productivity of the soil. It is true that Holland flourishes, 
 although she produces scarcely one-hundredth of the food 
 consumed by the people. However, Holland is a small 
 State, where commerce has replaced agriculture. It is 
 clear that the greater the territory of the State is, the more 
 necessary is it to promote its rural industries. . . . 
 
 The King stated in his * Political Testament ' : 
 
 War is a bottomless pit, which swallows up men. There- 
 fore attention must be paid to people the country as much 
 as possible. Consequently it is necessary that the land 
 should be well cultivated and that the cultivators should 
 be prosperous . 
 
 In Frederick's ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' 
 we read : » 
 
 Steps must be taken to provide at all times an abundance 
 of food for the people. To do this the first requirement is 
 to have the soil carefully cultivated, to drain all the wet land 
 which can be drained, and to increase the number of cattle 
 
46 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 and thereby increase also the production of milk, butter, 
 cheese, and manure. Besides, an exact account must be 
 made of the quantity of grain of every kind produced in 
 good, medium, and bad years. When allowance is made for 
 the quantity of grain consumed, we know how much surplus 
 there is for exportation in good years, or how much shortage 
 there is likely to be in bad ones. 
 
 Every provident sovereign should establish magazines 
 to protect the people against scarcity and famine. In the 
 bad years 1771-1772, Saxony and the provinces of the 
 Empire suffered terribly because they had neglected that 
 precaution. The people were forced to eat the bark of trees. 
 Entire districts became depopulated. Thousands of people, 
 pale and emaciated, like spectres, left the country in order 
 to find sustenance abroad. How their rulers must have 
 reproached themselves when they saw the calamities which 
 they had caused ! 
 
 Frederick the Great, like the Great Elector and Frederick 
 William the First, strove to enrich the people by wise 
 governmental action. He settled large numbers of immi- 
 grants in his thinly peopled provinces, and promoted the 
 national industries by protection and by importing skilled 
 workers from abroad who created new industries in Prussia. 
 According to his Minister Hertzberg, Frederick founded 
 more than 1200 villages, and^in}1786, the year of his death, 
 between one-fifth and one-sixth of the inhabitants of 
 Prussia, or more than a million, were immigrants, or de- 
 scendants of immigrants. During Frederick's rule about 
 350,000 foreigners were induced to settle in Prussia. In 
 1785 Prussia had 165,000 industrial workers who produced 
 manufactures to the value of 30,000,000 thalers per year, 
 an enormous sum at the time. 
 
 The productivity of Prussia's agriculture was stimulated 
 by wise laws. The code drafted in Frederick's Hfetime 
 laid down : 
 
 Every agriculturist is obliged to cultivate his property 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 47 
 
 thoroughly and economically for his own good and for that 
 of the community in general. Therefore he may be forced 
 by the State to cultivate his land adequately, and if he never- 
 theless continues to neglect it he may be compelled to cede 
 it to others. 
 
 No peasant is permitted to sell crops before they are 
 gathered. 
 
 The number of peasant holdings must not be dimin- 
 ished, either by incorporating them in landed estates or by 
 combining several of them in one hand. On the contrary, 
 landed proprietors are obliged to see that the holdings in 
 their villages are duly occupied. Peasants' properties 
 where teams are kept must not be converted into holdings 
 where no teams are kept except by special permission of the 
 State. 
 
 Desiring to increase the strength of Prussia, Frederick 
 the Great was as much interested in matters economic 
 as in war. As soon as a war was ended, the King en- 
 deavoured to repair its ravages and to increase the wealth 
 of the people as much as possible. Immediately after 
 the end of the first and second Silesian wars, Frederick 
 concentrated all his energy upon raising the economic 
 strength of the nation. In the first chapter of his * Guerre 
 de Sept Ans,' the^King tells^us :) 
 
 Although the late King Frederick William I had taken 
 care to bring order into the finances of Prussia, he had not 
 been able to do everything that was needed. He had neither 
 the time nor the means to accomplish so great a work, and 
 the things which had to be done were numerous. Waste 
 lands had to be cleared and cultivated, factories to be estab- 
 lished, commerce to be extended, and industry to be en- 
 couraged. 
 
 As the first years of the King's reign were devoted to 
 war, he could turn his attention to internal affairs only after 
 the establishment of peace. Along the Eiver Oder there 
 were vast swamps, which had probably been uncultivated 
 since the beginning of time. Plans were made for draining 
 
48 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 the country. This was done by a canal from Kiistrin to 
 Wrietzen, and 2000 famihes were established on the re- 
 claimed land. Farther on, about Stettin, 1200 families 
 were planted. Thus a small province was conquered by 
 industry from ignorance and sloth. The manufacture of 
 woollens was hampered by the lack of weavers. These 
 were imported from abroad, and a number of weaving 
 villages, comprising two hundred families each, were 
 created. 
 
 In the district of Magdeburg it had been a custom since 
 time immemorial that foreigners should come in for the 
 harvest and return to their homes when it had been gathered. 
 King Frederick permanently established these immigrants 
 about Magdeburg, and thus settled a large number of strangers 
 on the land. Through the various measures taken, two 
 hundred and eighty new villages were created ; but the 
 towns were not neglected. The King built a new town on 
 the river Swine near the mouth of the Oder. It was called 
 Swinemtinde. 
 
 Everywhere new industries were called into being. In 
 Berlin the manufacture of rich stuffs and velvets was 
 established. Factories producing light velvets and mixed 
 stuffs were erected at Potsdam. A sugar refinery was 
 established in Berlin. A factory for making curtain stuffs 
 was made to enrich the town of Brandenburg. At Frank- 
 fort-on-the-Oder the making of Eussian leather was intro- 
 duced, and in Berlin, Magdeburg, and Potsdam was intro- 
 duced the manufacturing of silk stockings and silk hand- 
 kerchiefs. The planting of mulberry trees was established 
 all over German3^ The clergy were made to serve as leaders 
 to the cultivators, and they taught them how to raise silk- 
 worms. In out-of-the-way places where wood was super- 
 abundant but unsaleable through lack of rivers ironworks 
 were established which furnished the army with guns and 
 shells. About Minden and in the Mark, saltworks were 
 created and those at Halle were improved. In a word, 
 industry was encouraged in the capital and in the provinces. 
 The Emden Trading Company established an important 
 branch in China. By reducing the export duties of the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STKENGTH 49 
 
 harbours of Stettin, Konigsberg, and Kolberg, the customs 
 receipts were doubled. 
 
 Through all these enterprises the revenues of the Crown, 
 excluding those of Silesia and East Frisia, were increased in 
 1756 by 1,200,000 thalers although the King had not intro- 
 duced any additional imposts whatever. A census showed 
 that the number of the inhabitants amounted to 5,000,000. 
 As it is certain that the wealth of the State consists in the 
 number of their inhabitants, Prussia could consider herself 
 to be twice as powerful as she had been during the last 
 years of the reign of Frederick William I, the father of King 
 Frederick. 
 
 The national finances and the administration of justice 
 did not monopolise the king's attention. The army, that 
 powerful instrument for the glory and preservation of States, 
 was not neglected. Eighty pieces of heavy artillery were 
 cast, and twenty mortars. The store of gunpowder which 
 had been accumulated amounted to 56,000 quintals. In the 
 magazines there were 36,000 wispels of oats. Thus every- 
 thing was prepared for a war which was to be foreseen. . . . 
 The ants gather in summer the food they consume during 
 the winter, and a ruler must save in time of peace the funds 
 which he has got to spend in time of war. 
 
 Prussia had been devastated by the Seven Years' War, 
 which ended in 1763. It had largely been fought on Prussian 
 territory. The condition of the country resembled its 
 condition after the Thirty Years' War. Frederick has 
 told us in his * Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg *: 
 
 Prussia's population had diminished by 500,000 during 
 the Seven Years' War. On a population of 4,500,000 that 
 decrease was considerable. The nobility and the peasants 
 had been pillaged and ransomed by so many armies that 
 they had nothing left except the miserable rags which 
 covered their nudity. They had not credit enough to 
 satisfy their daily needs. The towns possessed no longer a 
 police. The spirit of fairness and order had been replaced 
 by anarchism and self-interest. The judges and the revenue 
 
50 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 authorities had given up their work owing to the frequency 
 of invasions. In the absence of laws, a spirit of recklessness 
 and of rapacity arose. The nobility and the merchants, 
 the farmers, the working-men, and the manufacturers had 
 raised the price of their labour and productions to the utmost. 
 All seemed intent upon ruining each other by their exactions. 
 That was the terrible spectacle which the formerly so flourish- 
 ing provinces of Prussia offered after the conclusion of the 
 war. The appearance of the provinces resembled that of 
 Brandenburg after the end of the Thirty Years' War. 
 
 However, Prussia rapidly recovered owing to the King's 
 wise and energetic policy. Keferring to himself in the third 
 person, as he habitually did in his writings, he stated in 
 his ' Memoires depuis la Paix ' : 
 
 There is no way to increase the wealth of a country except 
 by increasing its manufacturing industries. That is clear 
 and evident. Hence the King, after the peace, concentrated 
 all his energy upon this object. Within ten years, by 1773, 
 264 new factories had been established in the Prussian 
 provinces. Among them was the porcelain factory in 
 Berlin which gave work to 500 people, and its produce soon 
 exceeded in quality the famous Saxon china. A tobacco 
 factory with branches in all the provinces was created, and 
 it developed an export trade in manufactured goods. 
 
 The war had disastrously influenced the Prussian Ex- 
 change, and had thus harmed Prussia's foreign commerce. 
 Immediately after the peace the inferior coinage was with- 
 drawn and the exchange was improved by a State Bank 
 founded with this object in view. It had a capital of 800,000 
 thalers, which was found by the King. It had at first some 
 bad experiences, but later on proved a great success. 
 
 Sovereigns, like private people, must make economies 
 BO as to have money when it is wanted. Wise agriculturists 
 regulate watercourses and use them for increasing the fer- 
 tility of the soil. Acting on the same principle, the Prussian 
 Government increased its revenue and used the surplus for 
 promoting the public good. It not only restored what 
 the war had destroyed, but improved all that could be 
 
FOUNDAO'IONS OF GEEMANY'S STRENGTH 61 
 
 improved. It drained swamps, improved the land, increased 
 the number of animals in the country, and utilised the sandy 
 soil for afforestation. 
 
 The draining of the swamps along the rivers Netze and 
 Warthe cost 750,000 thalers, and 3500 families were settled 
 on the land thus regained to agriculture. The work was 
 finished in 1773, and 15,000 people were settled where 
 formerly had been a wilderness. The marshes about Fried- 
 berg were similarly treated and 400 foreign families were 
 settled there. In Pomerania similar works were under- 
 taken. In Brandenburg the marshes of the Havel, of the 
 Rhine, and many others were drained. About Magdeburg 
 2000 new families were planted. Since the death of his 
 father, Frederick WiUiam the First, the King had settled 
 13,000 new families. 
 
 Silesia was not neglected. The ravages which the war 
 had inflicted were made good and improvements begun. 
 The rich abbeys were compelled to establish manufacturing 
 industries, and soon linen, copper, and iron industries, 
 tanneries, and oil mills arose, and 4000 new families were 
 planted in the agricultural district of Lower Silesia. 
 
 Large landowners had incorporated numerous peasant 
 properties in their land. Recognising that the posses- 
 sion of property attaches the citizens to their country, and 
 that they can care little for a State where they have nothing 
 to lose, the landowners were compelled to re-establish the 
 peasants. In compensation the King helped them and 
 improved their credit by means of loan banks. Also he 
 took pleasure in spending 300,000 thalers in repaying some 
 of their most pressing debts. 
 
 All these expenses were necessary. Money had to be 
 lavishly spent in the provinces to accelerate their recovery, 
 which otherwise would have required a century. By acting 
 generously and lavishly prosperity quickly returned, and 
 100,000 people who had fled from the war-stricken country 
 returned. 
 
 In 1773 the population was by 200,000 larger than it was 
 in 1756, when the Seven Years' War began. In Upper 
 Silesia 213 new villages were created. They had 23,000 in- 
 
 e2 
 
52 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 habitants, and plans were made for increasing the Pomeranian 
 agriculturists by 50,000 and those of the Mark by 12,000. 
 That project was carried out toward 1780. Between the 
 years 1740, when King Frederick came to the throne, and 
 1779 the population of the provinces increased as follows : 
 That of Prussia from 370,000 to 780,000 ; that of the Mark 
 from 480,000 to 710,000 ; that of Magdeburg and Halber- 
 stadt from 220,000 to 280,000 ; that of Silesia from 1,100,000 
 to 1,520,000. 
 
 Although enormous sums were spent on improving the 
 country, vast amounts were devoted to military purposes 
 as well. On the other hand, King Frederick did not indulge 
 in ostentatious expenditure, usually found at Courts, but 
 lived like a private man. With rigid economy the Treasuries 
 were filled. 
 
 In 1770 all Northern Europe was stricken by famine. 
 The infliction required vigorous action. The poor received 
 gifts of corn. The King had accumulated large magazines 
 in all parts of the country. He had 76,000 wispels of grain, 
 enough to feed the army during a whole year, and 9000 
 wispels for the capital alone. His providence protected 
 the people from starvation. The army was fed from the 
 magazines, and the people were given grain for food and 
 seed. Next year the harvest was bad again, and the neigh- 
 bour States suffered much more than Prussia because they 
 had neglected establishing magazines in time of abundance. 
 
 While barley cost two thalers per measure in Prussia, 
 it cost five thalers in Saxony and Bohemia. Saxony lost 
 more than 100,000 inhabitants through starvation and flight, 
 and Bohemia at least 180,000. On the other hand, more 
 than 20,000 Bohemian peasants and as many from Saxony fled 
 to Prussia, where they were welcomed, and they were made to 
 people the territories which had been reclaimed to agriculture. 
 
 In economic matters, as in matters concerning the 
 national defence, the public administration, and the national 
 iinances, Frederick the Great acted with foresight and 
 providence, and his successors continued his policy. He 
 wrote prophetically in his * Memoires depuis la Paix ' : 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STKENGTH 63 
 
 A "wise economic policy constantly improved upon from 
 father to son can change the character of the State and 
 convert it from a poor into a wealthy country. A wise 
 economic policy can make a State so wealthy that it can 
 exercise in Europe as great an influence as any one of the 
 leading States. 
 
 By pursuing the wise fostering policy which Frederick 
 the Great had initiated, the Hohenzollerns have indeed 
 converted poor agricultural Prussia into a wealthy Great 
 Power, possessed of highly developed industries and a 
 vast international trade. 
 
 During the last four decades, while British agriculture 
 has utterly declined and decayed, Germany's agricultural 
 production has fully doubled in weight, and has more than 
 doubled in value. Hence, Germany is agriculturally 
 almost self-supporting. On a territory which is only 
 75 per cent, larger than that of the United Kingdom, Ger- 
 many grows bread-corn for 45,000,000 people, while the 
 United Kingdom grows bread-corn only for 5,000,000. 
 Besides, Germany produces, on her 75 per cent, larger area, 
 three times as much meat, about nine times as much potatoes, 
 and twenty times as much timber as the United Kingdom, 
 and enormous quantities of sugar and tobacco, of which 
 none are produced in this country, although it is suitable 
 for their production. Hence food is far cheaper in blockaded 
 Germany than in Great Britain. 
 
 The wise policy of encouragement initiated by Frederick 
 William the First and Frederick the Great, and reintroduced 
 by Bismarck, has not only enormously increased Germany's 
 agricultural production and rural wealth, but has had a 
 still more marvellous effect upon her manufacturing 
 industries. During the last thirty-five years the engine 
 power of Prussia has increased more than seven-fold. 
 While the British manufacturing industries as a whole, 
 comparatively speaking, have remained stagnant, the 
 German manufacturing industries have marvellously in- 
 
54 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 creased, and her formerly insignificant iron and steel industry 
 is now far greater than that of this country. 
 
 In the manufacturing industries, as in commerce, 
 Germany has successfully challenged the formerly un- 
 challengeable supremacy of this country. The policy 
 of action, of wise governmentalism, has triumphed in 
 agriculture, in industry and in commerce over that of 
 laissez-faire and non-interference. Unfortunately, those 
 who during the last two decades have unceasingly pointed 
 out the danger of allowing Great Britain's agriculture to 
 decay and her manufacturing industries to decline and to 
 be outstripped by German competition, as the writer of 
 this book has frequently done in the pages of The Nine- 
 teenth Century^ The Fortnightly BevieWy and elsewhere, 
 preached to ears deliberately deaf. The politicians in 
 power did not ask whether the national safety was en- 
 dangered by allowing the manufacturing industries, and 
 even the iron and steel industry, which provides weapons 
 for war, to stagnate or to decline, or whether the decay 
 of agriculture would do irremediable harm to this country 
 and perhaps cripple it in the hour of peril ; they simply 
 asked whether Protection was politically a * profitable ' 
 policy, whether it would gain or lose votes, and, believing 
 that it was an unpopular policy, that it might lose votes, 
 the politicians in power preached Free Trade. 
 
 Those who are acquainted with the causes of Germany's 
 efficiency and success must look towards the future with 
 concern. Germany makes war cheaply but efficiently. 
 Great Britain makes war wastefuUy. She has spent 
 colossal amounts with lamentably inadequate results. 
 In view of the comparatively small war expenditure of 
 Germany and the enormous expenditure of Great Britain, 
 and in view of the wonderful revival which the Prussian 
 industries have experienced after the greatest national 
 disasters, even after 1763 and 1806, in consequence of 
 the energetic action of her Government, and of nation- 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S STEENGTH 65 
 
 wide co-operation, Germany may conceivably be able to 
 bear the costs of the present war better than Great Britain, 
 and Great Britain may emerge from the war more crippled 
 than Germany. Unpreparedness and muddle are very 
 expensive luxuries in war, in administration, and in matters 
 economic as well. 
 
 A hundred and fifty years ago Prussia was a land peopled 
 by boors. Now it is a land peopled by professors, scientists, 
 and artists. Frederick the Great was the first Prussian 
 monarch to realise that science and art increase the strength 
 and prestige of nations. Hence, he began cultivating 
 the sciences and arts, and his successors followed his example. 
 As science and art were found to be sources of national 
 power, they were as thoroughly promoted as was the army 
 itself, while in this country education remained amateurish. 
 Men toyed with science, and the universities rather taught 
 manners than efficiency. 
 
 Frederick the Great vastly improved the Prussian 
 law. He desired that people should be able to obtain, 
 not law, but justice speedily and cheaply. With this end 
 in view he caused legal procedure to be shortened by wise 
 regulations, and, in order to simphfy the law, he had it 
 codified. Herein lies the reason that justice may be obtained 
 quickly and cheaply in Germany, and that the laws are 
 simple and plain ; whereas in this country the laws are a 
 maze, and justice is sometimes unobtainable because of the 
 intricacies of the law, its uncertainty, and its ruinous cost. 
 
 The details given in these pages show clearly that 
 Germany's strength, wealth, and efficiency are due to the 
 governmental system of the country. Germany's power 
 has been created by her most eminent rulers, the Great 
 Elector, King Frederick William the First, and Frederick 
 the Great. They abolished self-government of every 
 form, and made the whole nation a gigantic machine for 
 carrying out the sovereign's will in war and in peace. In- 
 dividually, the Germans are very ordinary men. Collectively 
 
66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 they have been amazingly successful because the whole 
 power of the nation is organised, and can be employed 
 against other nations in peace and war by an absolute 
 sovereign. The secret of Germany's strength, wealth 
 efficiency, may be summed up in a single word : Discipline. 
 Apparently Germany is a constitutionally governed State 
 possessing a Parliament, manhood franchise, &c. In reality 
 Germany is more absolutely governed than ever before, for 
 with the introduction of universal military service resistance 
 on the part of the people has become impossible. 
 
 At first sight it may seem that it is hopeless for a de- 
 mocracy to compete with a highly organised monarchy 
 such as Germany, that Great Britain is now suffering for 
 the execution of Charles the First, that in the conflict 
 between absolutism and democracy, democracy is bound 
 to be defeated, that democracy is doomed. The conclusion 
 is scarcely justified. A democracy may be efficient, business- 
 like, provident, and ready for war. That can be seen 
 by the example of Switzerland. It would be more correct 
 to say that a Government which governs is likely to defeat, 
 in peace and in war, a Government which drifts. 
 
 Nations are made by their leaders. Unfortunately the 
 characteristic of British democracy is self-indulgence, while 
 the characteristic of the German people, and of the Swiss 
 people, too, is duty, patriotism, and work. British politicians 
 have pursued the policy of pander which German statesmen 
 and Swiss politicians have wisely disdained. The advocates 
 of democracy, and especially of British democracy, may 
 point to the successes of the English race in every cHme, 
 and to the fact that it owns one half of the habitable globe ; 
 the English race, however, has expanded so successfully, 
 not because of democratic government, but in spite of it. 
 It has flourished so greatly because of its capacity for 
 colonising, because it was first in the field, because it was 
 favoured by chance, because the great nations were fighting 
 among themselves while Englishmen were conquering the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANTS STRENGTH 57 
 
 globe, because it never had to fight an organised absolutism 
 such as the German. 
 
 Will the British and American democracy hold its 
 own against Germany, or will it go under ? That is the 
 question which the war will settle. 
 
 It is too late to discuss principles of government when 
 existence is at stake. The problem is to defend the Hberty 
 of Great Britain, of the British Empire, of the Anglo- 
 Saxon race, and of its Allies in the Hfe and death struggle 
 in which they are engaged. The resources of the British 
 Empire and of its AlHes are boundless. They dispose 
 of 700,000,000 men as compared with only 150,000,000 
 Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians, and Turks. The German 
 combination has no chance against the Entente Powers if 
 the gigantic resources of the British Empire are at last 
 organised for war. 
 
 Analysis of Germany's organisation shows that nation- 
 wide and Empire-wide organisation cannot be effected 
 by voluntary methods, by persuasion, and by entreaty. 
 By persuasion one can organise a team of athletes, not an 
 Empire. Effort is merely wasted if those who ought to 
 work in the factory fight, and those who ought to fight 
 continue working, or idling. Organisation must be met 
 by organisation, absolutism by absolutism. The nation 
 and Empire want real leading, a system which can compel 
 those who ought to fight to join the army, and those 
 who ought to work to labour to the best of their ability. 
 It seems that only a system conferring absolute power 
 for the duration of the war can organise the forces of the 
 United Kingdom and of the Empire as a whole. 
 
 Democracy is on its trial. The Anglo-Saxon race is 
 fighting for its existence. There is danger in delay. War 
 is a one-man business. Every other consideration should 
 be subordinated to that of achieving victory. When the 
 United States fought for their hfe, they made President 
 Lincoha virtually a Dictator. The freest and most unruly 
 
68 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 democracy allowed Habeas Corpus to be suspended and 
 conscription to be introduced, to save itself. Great emer- 
 gencies call for great measures. The war demands great 
 sacrifices in every direction. However, if it leads to Eng- 
 land's modernisation, to the elimination of the weaknesses 
 and vices of Anglo-Saxon democracy, if it leads to the 
 unification and organisation of the Empire, the purifica- 
 tion of its institutions, and the recreation of the race, the 
 gain may be greater than the loss, the colossal cost of the 
 war notwithstanding. The British Empire and the United 
 States, the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, have 
 apparently arrived at the turning-point in their history. 
 
CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY^S DIPLOMACY ^ 
 
 Many British historians, statesmen, and publicists have 
 endeavoured to explain to us the hidden causes of the 
 present war. They have dwelt on the warlike and bom- 
 bastic utterances which WiUiam the Second has made ever 
 since he came to the throne, and have traced the conflagration 
 to two powerful influences : to the boundless ambition and 
 conceit of the German Emperor and to the support which 
 he received by the teachings of German jingoes of the 
 military and of the professorial variety, from Treitschke 
 to Bernhardi. They have compared the Emperor to 
 Bismarck, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First. 
 However, nothing is easier than to establish superficial 
 but entirely misleading historical parallels. 
 
 Unfortunately, the British Universities, while devoting 
 much time to abstract economic theory, miscalled political 
 economy, and to the dust and dry bones of history, have 
 completely neglected statesmanship, that most important 
 of all sciences, in its practical and historical aspects. Before 
 the war mediaeval Germany was assiduously studied by 
 the professors, but modern Germany was disregarded 
 and was scarcely known. Militarily and intellectually 
 Great Britain was equally unprepared for Germany's 
 attack, and those who unceasingly tried to warn the nation, 
 as the writer of these pages has done in The Nineteenth 
 
 ^ From The Nineteenth Century and After, June 1915. 
 69 
 
60 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Century, The Fortnightly Beview, and elsewhere during 
 fifteen years, were treated as alarmists, cranks, and anti- 
 Germans. 
 
 After the outbreak of the war, British soldiers and 
 statesmen hastily began to organise a national army, 
 and British professors endeavoured to explain to the public 
 modern German history and German statesmanship, two 
 subjects with which they are deplorably ill acquainted. 
 When it was too late, scraps from the political writings 
 of Treitschke and his disciples were published in translation 
 for the information of the pubhc, and now everyone who 
 has read some extracts from Treitschke and Bernhardi 
 believes that he fully understands Germany's character 
 and policy. 
 
 The rash poHcy of WiUiam the Second in no way re- 
 sembles that of Prince Bismarck, nor is it comparable 
 with that of Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon the First. 
 In another part of this book I shall show that William 
 the Second, soon after his advent, threw Bismarck's policy 
 and teaching to the winds, and that the Iron Chancellor 
 spent the last eight years of his life in strenuous opposition 
 to the Emperor's reckless poHcy, and foretold that it would 
 lead to Germany's ruin. William the Second has certainly 
 not acted in accordance with Bismarck's views and methods. 
 His world-embracing ambitions may resemble those of 
 Napoleon the First, and his attitude and his absolutist 
 pronouncements no doubt remind us of Louis the Fourteenth's 
 celebrated Uetat c^est moi. He has not, however, taken 
 Frenchmen for his model, but one of his predecessors, 
 Frederick the Great. 
 
 The Emperor bears in many respects a most remarkable 
 resemblance to his great ancestor. Modern German states- 
 manship is not Bismarckian but Frederickian. Treitschke 
 and Bernhardi are not innovators, but imitators. They 
 are merely expounders of the methods of Frederick the 
 Great. A study of Frederick's policy is not only interesting 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY^S DIPLOMACY 61 
 
 at the moment, but it should prove of very considerable 
 practical value to the statesmen of the nations allied against 
 Germany. Such a study will reveal to us the hidden causes 
 of the war and of Germany's conduct before and during 
 the struggle, and it will give us an excellent insight into the 
 traditional methods of Prussian statesmanship. It will 
 show us how Prusso- Germany rose from insignificance and 
 poverty to greatness and affluence, and it will at the same 
 time teach us the way by which alone the Entente Powers 
 can bring the war to a successful conclusion. 
 
 The British Universities, while pubhshing at great 
 expense editions and translations of the writings of remote 
 antiquity, which are entirely useless for all practical purposes, 
 have paid no attention to the most important foreign 
 political writings with which every well-educated English- 
 man ought to be acquainted. For Bismarck's statesmanship 
 those who do not read German have to rely mainly upon 
 his badly translated ' Memoirs,' which contain chiefly 
 personal matters, and upon Busch's chatter ; while for 
 that of Frederick the Great they have to turn to the roman- 
 cings of Carlyle and Macaulay. Frederick the Great's 
 most valuable political writings are as unknown in this 
 country as are Bismarck's. Frederick wielded a most 
 prolific pen. His general writings fill thirty moderate-sized 
 volumes, and his political correspondence, of which so far 
 only part has been published, forty very large ones. He 
 wrote only in French, and the large majority of the extracts 
 from his writings and letters given in the following pages 
 have not previously been published in English. 
 
 The Germans are stolid and one-sided people. WiUiam 
 the Second strikingly resembles his great ancestor by his 
 un- German vivacity, his restlessness, and his great ver- 
 satility. The Emperor poses as an authority on aU things 
 human and divine, and endeavours not only to direct in person 
 the Army, the Navy, the Church, and all the Departments of 
 State, but all the arts and sciences and the economic activities 
 
62 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 of Germany as well. Similarly, Frederick the Great was 
 the Government. He was his own Commander-in-Chief, 
 Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, Minister of Finance, of Commerce, and of Justice, 
 &c. His assistants were mere clerks. In addition he was 
 an excellent economist, historian, and musician. He wrote 
 a good deal of indifferent French poetry and philosophy, 
 and he patronised and endeavoured to direct all the sciences 
 and arts and the entire business of Prussia. 
 
 WiUiam the Second, like Frederick the Great, is a 
 consummate actor. Frederick the Great posed before 
 the world as a philosopher, a friend of man, and a free- 
 thinker. William the Second poses as a devout and deeply 
 religious man. Both Frederick the Great and WiUiam 
 the Second have acted with the greatest hypocrisy, un- 
 scrupulousness, and heartless brutality. Both have success- 
 fully deceived the world in the early part of their career 
 by their frequently made fervent protestations that they 
 loved peace and pubHc morality, and condemned injustice, 
 tyranny, and war, and both have attacked their unsus- 
 pecting and unprepared neighbours after having lulled 
 them to sleep by their pacific and generous utterances. 
 
 Before studying the views and poUcy of Frederick the 
 Great we should cast a glance at his immediate predecessors, 
 for thus we shall be able to follow the progress of Prussia 
 since the time when it became a kingdom. 
 
 Frederick's grandfather, the first King of Prussia, who 
 was crowned a king in 1701, was despicable as a man and 
 a monarch. Frederick the Great has drawn a terrible 
 picture of him in his ' Memoires de Brandebourg,' pubHshed 
 in 1751. He wrote : 
 
 Frederick the First was attracted by the pomp surround- 
 ing royalty. He was actuated by vanity and self-love. He 
 liked to exalt himself above others. His acquisition of the 
 royal crown was caused by a common and childish vanity. 
 In the end it proved a poUtical master-stroke, for the royal 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 63 
 
 dignity delivered the House of Brandenburg from the yoke 
 of the House of Austria. The crown became a spur and a 
 challenge to his posterity, and he seemed to urge his heirs : 
 * I have acquired for you a great title. Make yourselves 
 worthy of it. I have laid the foundation of your great- 
 ness. It is your duty to accomplish the work which I have 
 begun. . . . ' 
 
 The armies marching through Prussia, in the time of 
 Frederick the First, had spread disease throughout the 
 country, and famine had increased the effect of the pestil- 
 ence. The King abandoned his people in their misfortune, 
 and, while his revenues did not suffice for the magnificence 
 of his expenditure on vain pomp, he saw in cold blood more 
 than 200,000 of his subjects perish whose lives he could 
 have saved by timely action. . . . 
 
 To obtain the royal crown he sacrificed the lives of 30,000 
 of his subjects in wars made on behalf of the Emperor. 
 The royal dignity appealed only to his vanity and his love 
 of dissipation. He was open-handed and generous, but 
 bought his pleasures at a terrible cost. He sold his subjects 
 as soldiers to England and Holland like cattle to the butcher. 
 
 He wasted the wealth of the nation in prodigal and vain 
 dissipation. His Court was one of the most magnificent 
 in Europe. His favourites received large pensions. Nothing 
 could equal the magnificence of his palaces. His fetes were 
 superb. His stables were filled with horses, his kitchens 
 with cooks, and his cellars with wine. He gave an estate 
 worth 40,000 thalers to a servant for shooting a large stag. 
 He intended to pawn his domains at Halberstadt in order 
 to buy the Pitt diamond which ultimately was bought by 
 Louis the Fifteenth. . . . His favourites were overwhelmed 
 with gifts ; and while his eastern provinces perished through 
 famine and pestilence he did not lift a finger to help them. 
 
 Frederick the First died for the good of his country 
 in 1713, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick William 
 the First, the father of Frederick the Great. Frederick 
 Wilham the First reduced the expenditure of the Court 
 to a minimum, introduced the most rigid economy in the 
 
64 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 country, and employed the national resources exclusively 
 for creating a large army and a great war chest. He con- 
 verted Prussia into an armed camp and militarised the 
 whole nation. His character is drawn as follows by Frederick 
 the Great in the ' Histoire de mon Temps ' : 
 
 The late King Frederick William the First strove to 
 make his country happy, to create a well- disciplined army, 
 and to administer his finances with order and wise economy. 
 He avoided war in order not to be diverted from this worthy 
 aim, and thus he advanced his country unostentatiously 
 on the way to greatness without awakening the envy of 
 other States. 
 
 In Frederick's essay ' Des McBurs, des Coutumes, de 
 rindustrie,' we read : 
 
 Under Frederick the First Berlin had been the Athens of 
 the North. Under Frederick William the First it became 
 its Sparta. Its entire government was militarised. The 
 capital became the stronghold of Mars. All the industries 
 which serve the needs of armies prospered. In Berlin 
 were established powder mills and cannon foundries, rifle 
 factories, &c. . . . 
 
 Frederick William the First strove less to create new 
 industries than to abolish useless expenditure. Formerly, 
 mourning had been ruinously expensive. Funerals were 
 accompanied by extremely costly festivities. These abuses 
 were abolished. Houses and carriages were no longer 
 allowed to be draped in black, nor were black Hveries to be 
 given to servants. Henceforward people died cheaply. 
 The military character of the Government affected both 
 customs and fashions. Society took a military tone. No 
 one used more than three ells of cloth for a coat. The age of 
 gallantry passed away. Ladies fled the society of men, 
 and these compensated themselves with carousals, tobacco, 
 and buffoonery. 
 
 Frederick William the First died on May 17, 1740, and 
 was succeeded by his son, Frederick the Second, the Great. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 65 
 
 As Frederick loved the French language and French elegance, 
 was devoted to poetry, music, and art, and hated the army, 
 he was despised by his coarse and brutal father. He seemed 
 to him a fop and a degenerate, another Frederick the First. 
 Men in Prussia and abroad who had suffered under the harsh 
 and parsimonious government of Frederick WilKam the First 
 hailed Frederick's advent with joy. They thought that the 
 rule of the martinet had come to an end, that life in Prussia 
 under the new sovereign would be pleasant and peaceful. 
 
 Frederick was twenty-eight years old when he came 
 to the throne, and he had done his best to deceive the world 
 as to his real character. He was beheved to be witty, 
 genial, and peaceful, if not unmiHtary. In 1737, three 
 years before he ascended the throne, he published a book 
 called ' Considerations sur Tetat du corps pohtique de 
 I'Europe,' which concluded with the words : * It is a dis- 
 grace for a ruler to ruin his State ; and to attempt to obtain 
 territories to which one has no justified claim must be 
 branded as criminal injustice and rapacity.' 
 
 Two years later, in 1739, Frederick the Great wrote 
 his celebrated book * The Anti-Machiavel.' It was pub- 
 lished in 1740, the year when he came to the throne. In 
 it he stated with the greatest emphasis that policy should 
 be based upon morality, and laid down the remarkable 
 doctrine that ruler and subjects were equals, and that the 
 sovereign was the first servant of the State. In the first 
 chapter of the ' Anti-Machiavel ' we read : ' A sovereign, 
 far from being the absolute master of the people, should 
 only be the highest official (le premier mctgistrat).' In 
 another edition of the same book that expression was re- 
 placed by *le premier domestique.' In the * Memoires de 
 Brandebourg ' he stated that a ruler should be * le premier 
 serviteur de I'Etat.' Frederick the Great, in his * Anti- 
 Machiavel,* laid down the duties of kingship as follows : 
 
 Eulers ought to be exclusively occupied with the duties 
 
66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 of study and of government in order to be able to act with 
 intelligence and in the fullness of knowledge. Their business 
 consists in thinking correctly and in acting in accordance 
 with their intelHgence and convictions. 
 
 In the * Anti-Machiavel ' Frederick utterly condemned 
 the pohcy advocated by the great Florentine statesman. He 
 castigated the boundless ambitions of rulers, and urged that 
 the action of sovereigns should be animated by philosophy, 
 by a lofty ideahsm, by love of mankind, by virtue, and by 
 love of peace. We read in the Preface and in Chapter VI : 
 
 While Spinoza undermined the foundations of faith, 
 MachiavelU undermined those of statesmanship. ... I 
 venture to take up the defence of humanity against that 
 monster which strives to destroy humanity, and would 
 oppose reason and justice to sophistry and crime. . . . 
 Floods which overwhelm the land, the fire of Ughtning which 
 reduces towns to ashes, and pestilences which depopulate 
 entire provinces are not as terrible to the world as the 
 dangerous morals and the unbridled passions of kings. The 
 celestial inflictions last only for a time. They rage only 
 over a hmited space, and Nature makes good the destruction 
 they have caused, but for the crimes of kings entire nations 
 Buffer for a very long time. . . . 
 
 I would tell the kings that their true political interest 
 consists in outshining their subjects in virtue. I would 
 tell them that it is not enough for them to establish for 
 themselves a great reputation by means of brilliant and 
 glorious actions, but that on their part actions are required 
 which will promote the happiness of the human race. 
 
 Of all the sentiments which exercise a tyrannic influ- 
 ence over our minds, none is more fatal, more contrary to 
 humanity, and more pernicious to the peace of the world 
 than unrestrained ambition, an unquenchable desire for 
 false glory. 
 
 No terms were strong enough for Frederick with which 
 to brand a conquering prince, who to him was merely a 
 crowned villain. He told the world in his * Anti-Machiavel * : 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 67 
 
 Heroes and highwaymen possess the same courage and 
 the same skill. The only difference between them is, that a 
 conqueror is an illustrious thief and that a highwayman is 
 an obscure one. The former is rewarded for his deeds with 
 a laurel wreath, and the latter with the rope. 
 
 The ' Anti-Machiavel ' is a paean of peace. Peace is 
 described as the greatest blessing and war as the greatest 
 crime. The book significantly ends with the following 
 powerful sentences : 
 
 I feel convinced that if monarchs would fully realise the 
 miseries which a declaration of war inflicts upon their peoples 
 I should not appeal in vain to their better feelings. But 
 their imagination is not sufficiently strong. They do not 
 appreciate the evils of war ; they do not know them, and 
 they are protected against war's horrors by their exalted 
 position. They do not feel the taxes and imposts which 
 crush the people, the loss of the youth of the nation enrolled 
 in the army, the infectious diseases which decimate the troops, 
 the horrors of battles and sieges, the sufferings of the 
 wounded and of the mutilated, the sorrows of the orphans 
 who have lost in their father their only support, the loss of 
 so many useful men who have been cut off before their time. 
 
 Sovereigns who see in their subjects merely their slaves 
 will sacrifice them without pity and see them perish without 
 regret, but princes who see in otherfmen their equals and 
 consider themselves as the soul of the body politic, of the 
 people, will carefully preserve thejprecious blood of their 
 subjects. 
 
 As government should be based on virtue and on the 
 love of mankind, it should be carried on with scrupulous 
 honesty, the more so as honesty is not only a virtue but 
 an advantage to those who possess it. Treaties should be 
 observed most rehgiously and be broken only in case of 
 direst need. We read in the * Anti-Machiavel ' : 
 
 Both honesty and worldly wisdom demand that sove- 
 reigns should religiously observe the treaties which they 
 
 f2 
 
68 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 have concluded, and that they should scrupulously fulfil 
 all their stipulations. . . . 
 
 A ruler is sometimes compelled by disagreeable necessity 
 to break his treaties and alliances. However, he should 
 part with his obligations like an honest man. He should 
 advise his Allies in time of his intention, and he should 
 before all never take such an extreme step unless the welfare 
 of the people and absolute necessity make it inevitable. . . . 
 
 Looking solely at the interest of rulers, I assert that it is 
 very bad policy on their part to act like rascals and to deceive 
 the world. They deceive only once, and then lose credit 
 everywhere. 
 
 According to the ' Anti-Machiavel,' Frederick's ideal form 
 of government was a limited monarchy on the English 
 model : 
 
 It seems to me that if we look for a model among the 
 Governments of the present time we find it in England. In 
 England, Parliament stands between the King and the people. 
 The English King has the greatest power for doing good, but 
 none for doing evil. 
 
 The ' Anti-Machiavel ' is not merely an expression of 
 the purest and most praiseworthy sentiments, for it con- 
 tains at the same time many exceedingly shrewd and practical 
 political observations. Frederick the Great utterly con- 
 denmed entrusting the forces of the country to ministers 
 or generals, to underlings. In his opinion, the ruler should 
 command the army in person, and should be supported 
 by an able general if he did not possess the necessary military 
 gifts: 
 
 A ruler should command his troops in person. His army 
 is his home, his interest, his duty, his glory. Being the 
 defender of justice, he ought to be the defender of his 
 subjects, and as this is one of the most important objects 
 of his ofi&ce, he ought not to entrust it to anyone else. Be- 
 sides, his presence with the army abolishes misunderstanding 
 among his generals and differences between them which are 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 69 
 
 harmful to his interests and to those of the army. His 
 presence creates order in the matter of magazines, ammuni- 
 tion and warHke provisions, without which even a Julius 
 Caesar would be helpless. As the ruler orders battles to be 
 fought, he should also command in battle, and should by his 
 presence increase the courage and confidence of his troops 
 and animate them by his example. 
 
 Although Frederick censured in the strongest terms 
 war in the abstract, he very sensibly recognised the necessity 
 of war against oppression and against the overweening 
 ambitions of another nation. He justified only wars of 
 defence, and he laid down the theory of the balance of 
 power in the following sentences : 
 
 Sometimes sovereigns are wise in undertaking wars of 
 precaution. Such wars are technically wars of attack. 
 Nevertheless, they are just. When the excessive strength 
 of a State threatens to overflow its boundaries and to engulf 
 the world, wisdom commands us to oppose dykes and to 
 arrest thereby the torrent while it can still be controlled. 
 When we see clouds arise on the horizon and when lightning 
 announces to us the coming storm, the threatened sovereign 
 who cannot weather it alone will, if he is wise, combine with 
 those who are threatened with the same danger, and who 
 have therefore the same interests. 
 
 If the kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had allied 
 themselves in time against the power of Eome, Eome would 
 never have been able to overthrow them. A carefully 
 devised alliance and an energetically conducted war would 
 have prevented Eome from achieving its aims and enslaving 
 the world. It follows that a ruler will act more wisely if 
 he embarks upon a war of aggression while he is still master 
 of his destiny, while he can still choose between war and 
 peace, than if he should sit still and wait until times have 
 become desperate, for then a declaration of war on his part 
 would serve no purpose except to delay his enslavement and 
 ruin for a little while. 
 
 It is an excellent maxim that it is better to surprise than 
 
70 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 to be surprised in war, and all great men have taken advan- 
 tage of it. 
 
 The * Anti-Machiavel * was an act of self-revelation 
 on the part of Frederick. At the end of the sixth chapter 
 we read the remarkable words : * Let Caesar Borgia be 
 the model of those who admire Machiavelli. My model 
 is Marcus Aurelius.' 
 
 We have listened to Frederick's profession of faith 
 publicly made in the year 1740, when he came to the throne. 
 His book created an immense sensation throughout Europe, 
 and impressed rulers and peoples with the idea that a mild, 
 generous, and peace-loving Sovereign had ascended the 
 Prussian throne. However, the world was deceived. 
 While Frederick seemed to be devoted to peace, art, beauty, 
 and all the virtues, he was devoured by an insatiable thirst 
 for glory. He was determined to win renown either by 
 fair means or by foul, and was prepared to use the worst 
 methods described by Machiavelli to fulfil his ambitions. 
 He was ready to bring about a war which would cost count- 
 less lives, and which might end in the utter destruction 
 of his country and of his dynasty. 
 
 The Emperor Charles the Sixth had no son. He desired 
 that his hereditary rights, after his death, should fall to his 
 daughter Maria Theresa, and had endeavoured to guarantee 
 her peaceful succession by treaties with nearly all the 
 Powers, the so-called Pragmatic Sanction, to which Prussia 
 also had adhered. Although Prussia had signed that 
 solemn act which guaranteed Austria's integrity, Frederick 
 resolved to claim under the flimsiest of pretexts from 
 Austria four duchies of Silesia which had been in Austria's 
 undisputed possession ever since the Peace of Westphaha in 
 1648. We shall learn Frederick's motives for attacking 
 Austria partly from his correspondence, partly from his 
 * Histoire de mon Temps.' The latter is an historical 
 document of the very greatest importance. It is true 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 71 
 
 its style is occasionally flippant. However, it was written 
 by Frederick for the guidance of the future rulers of Prussia, 
 and is therefore an invaluable supplement to his political 
 and military testaments. Its author told us in the Preface : 
 
 I wish to transmit to posterity the principal events in 
 which I have taken a part, or of which I have been witness, 
 for the guidance of those who will rule Prussia after me. 
 Thus they may learn the reasons of my actions, the means 
 which 1 employed, the enterprises of Prussia's enemies, 
 the course of diplomatic negotiations, &c. 
 
 While in his * Anti-Machiavel ' Frederick described love 
 of peace and morality as the greatest virtues of a ruler, and 
 condemned ambition, love of glory, and love of conquest 
 in unmeasured terms, he revealed his true character in 
 the Preface of the * Histoire de mon Temps.' There he 
 revealed the fact that love of glory and conquest was after 
 all a virtue and his principal motive. He stated : 
 
 The true merit of a good prince consists in being sincerely 
 attached to the public welfare — to love his country and to 
 love glory. I mention glory because that happy instinct 
 which arouses in men a strong desire to acquire a good 
 reputation is the mainspring which incites them to heroic 
 actions. The love of glory is the power which awakens the 
 mind from its lethargy and causes us to embark upon useful, 
 necessary, and praiseworthy enterprises. 
 
 The Emperor Charles the Sixth, a naturally strong 
 and healthy man, died suddenly and rather unexpectedly 
 on October 20, 1740, at the early age of fifty-five. Frederick 
 was at the time in the country, at Eheinsberg, and he 
 immediately wrote to Jordan and other friends of his that 
 he would make use of the opportunity and attack Austria 
 in order to acquire glory, that he wished to employ the 
 powerful army which Frederick William the First had 
 created and the war treasure which he had accumulated 
 
72 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 by his thrift. On November 1, 1740, Frederick wrote to 
 his principal Minister, von Podewils : 
 
 ... I give you a question to solve. When one has the 
 advantage, should one make use of it or not ? I am ready 
 with my troops and with everything else. If 1 do not use 
 them now 1 keep in my hands a powerful but useless instru- 
 ment. If I use my army it will be said that I have had 
 the skill of taking advantage of the superiority which I 
 have over my neighbours. 
 
 Frederick made war upon Austria in 1740, not because 
 Prussia had any serious and valid claims to Silesia, but 
 merely because the young King was eager to acquire glory 
 and had a strong and ready army, while Austria was dis- 
 organised, was totally unprepared for war, and was likely 
 to prove an easy prey. The Austrian Government had 
 fallen into the hands of a young and inexperienced woman, 
 who lacked good advisers and generals ; and other Powers 
 were likely to follow Frederick's example, dispute the 
 Austrian succession, and endeavour to seize part of the 
 Austrian heritage. The King has told us with great can- 
 dour — or should one call it cynicism ? — ^in his ' Histoire de 
 mon Temps * : 
 
 After the conclusion of the Turco-Austrian War [in 
 which Austria was badly defeated] the Austrian army was 
 completedly ruined. . . . The larger part of the Austrian 
 troops remained in Hungary, but they numbered only 43,000 
 combatants. No one thought of reorganising and complet- 
 ing the army. Besides these, the Austrians had only 
 16,000 men in Italy, at most 12,000 in Flanders, while five 
 or six regiments were distributed in the Hereditary Lands. 
 Instead of being 175,000 men strong, the Austrian effectives 
 did not reach 82,000. . . . 
 
 Notwithstanding her disorganisation and hidden weak- 
 ness, Austria was, in 1740, still reckoned among the most 
 formidable of European Powers. People thought of 
 Austria's vast resources, and believed that a man of genius 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 73 
 
 might put everything right. Meanwhile, Austria replaced 
 strength with pride, and she sought comfort for her recent 
 humiliation by thinking of her glorious past. . . . 
 
 Prussia had a national income of only seven milHon 
 thalers. The provinces were poor and backward owing to 
 the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, and were unable 
 to furnish adequate resources to the sovereign. Hence the 
 ruler had to rely for financing a war on the economies made 
 in the past. The late King Frederick WilHam the First 
 had accumulated a war treasure. Although it was not 
 very large it sufficed. One could make use of one's oppor- 
 tunities. However, matters had to be managed with 
 prudent care. One had to avoid a long-drawn-out war, and 
 to hasten a decision. 
 
 It was most awkward that Prussia had no regular shape. 
 The provinces of the country were small in size, and were 
 spread all about Central Germany from Poland to Brabant. 
 Her geographical position gave Prussia many neighbours 
 more than she would have had if her territory had been 
 rounded off and formed a solid block. 
 
 As matters stood, Prussia could go to war only if she was 
 supported either by France or by England. One could 
 march hand in hand with France, for that country thirsted 
 for glory and desired to humble the House of Austria. 
 From the English one could have obtained nothing except 
 subsidies, which they would pay only for the promotion of a 
 poHcy favourable to British interests, while Eussia had as 
 yet not sufficient weight in the balance of European power. 
 
 After the death of the Emperor, Austria was in a most 
 difficult position. The national finances were in confusion. 
 The army had fallen to pieces and was disheartened by its 
 failure in the War with the Turks. The Ministers were dis- 
 united. At the head of the Government was a young woman 
 without experience [Maria Theresa, who was only twenty- 
 three years old] who had to defend a disputed succession. 
 Hence the Austrian Government did not appear redoubtable. 
 
 The King of Prussia was certain that he was able to 
 obtain alHes. Frederick's determination to make war upon 
 Austria was confirmed by the death of the Empress Anna of 
 
74 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Eussia. Through her demise the Eussian crown fell to the 
 youthful Grand Duke Ivan, a son of a Princess of Mecklen- 
 burg and of Prince Anton Ulrich of Brunswick, and the 
 latter was Frederick's brother-in-law. To all appearances, 
 Eussia would, therefore, during the minority of the young 
 Czar, be more interested in maintaining order in the interior 
 of the Empire than in defending -the Pragmatic Sanction in 
 Austria. . . . 
 
 Marshal Miinnich, who^had caused the elevation of the 
 Prince of Brunswick and of his Mecklenburg consort, was 
 the most eminent personage in Eussia. He wielded for all 
 practical purposes the sovereign power during the Grand 
 Duke's minority. The Prince of Brunswick was weak and 
 unintelligent. His wife was capricious, and she possessed 
 all the faults of an ill-educated woman. Under the pretext 
 of congratulating the Prince of Brunswick and his wife, 
 the King sent Baron Winterfeld on a mission to Eussia. His 
 real reason for sending Winterfeld was to gain over Marshal 
 Miinnich, who was Winterfeld's father-in-law. He wished 
 to induce the Field-Marshal to favour the designs which 
 Prussia was on the point of carrying out. The success of 
 Winterfeld's mission was as great as could be desired. 
 
 Although every precaution was taken to disguise the 
 intended expedition against Austria, it was impossible to 
 accumulate perishable provisions, to establish magazines, 
 to assemble artillery, and to move large bodies of troops 
 without attracting attention. The public began to suspect 
 that some enterprise was about to be undertaken. The 
 Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Damrath, advised his Court 
 that a storm was brewing which might sweep over Silesia. 
 The Council in Vienna replied : * We will not and cannot 
 believe your news.' Nevertheless, the Austrian Court 
 sent the Marquis Botta to Berlin nominally with the mission 
 of congratulating King Frederick on his succession, but 
 really in order to find out whether the Austrian Ambassador 
 was right or whether he had given a false alarm. . . . 
 
 Although King Frederick was firmly determined upon 
 his policy, he thought it useful to make an attempt at 
 arriving at an agreement with Vienna. With this object 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 76 
 
 in view, Count Gotter was dispatched to Vienna. He was 
 to declare to Maria Theresa that King Frederick would 
 assist her against all her enemies if she would cede Silesia 
 to him. As that offer was likely to be rejected, Count Gotter 
 was authorised to declare war on Prussia's behalf. However, 
 the Prussian army travelled more quickly than the Prussian 
 Ambassador. It entered Silesia two days before Count 
 Gotter arrived in Vienna. 
 
 Twenty battalions and thirty-six squadrons were directed 
 towards Silesia, and these were followed by six battalions 
 who were to besiege the fortress of Glogau. Although that 
 number was quite small it seemed sufficient to seize an 
 undefended country. . . . 
 
 On December 23, 1740, the Prussian army entered 
 Silesia. On their march the troops distributed everywhere 
 proclamations " in which were shown the rights which the 
 House of Brandenburg had to Silesia. At the same time 
 manifestoes were distributed in which it was stated that 
 the Prussians took possession of Silesia in order to defend 
 that country against attacks from a third Power. Thus 
 it was hinted with sufficient clearness that Prussia would not 
 abandon Silesia without fighting. At the same time, in 
 consequence of these proclamations, the nobility and people 
 of Silesia did not look upon the Prussians who entered their 
 province as hostile invaders, but considered their arrival 
 as an endeavour on the part of a neighbour and ally to 
 assist in the defence of that province against third 
 parties. 
 
 Frederick the Great has told us in his * Guerre de Sept 
 Ans ' : 
 
 If sovereigns wish to make war they are not restrained 
 by arguments suitable for a public proclamation. They 
 determine the course upon which they wish to embark, 
 make war and leave to some industrious jurist the trouble 
 of justifying their action. 
 
 Frederick's intention to attack Austria without cause 
 surprised and scandahsed even his best friends. His 
 
76 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 intimate friend Jordan wrote to the King from Berlin on 
 December 14, 1740 : 
 
 Les critiques croient la demarche presente directement 
 opposee aux maximes renfermees dans le dernier chapitre 
 de I'Antimachiavel. 
 
 To this the King replied : 
 
 Laisse parler les envieux et les ignorants ; ce ne seront 
 jamais eux qui serviront de boussole a mes desseins, mais 
 bien la gloire. J'en suis penetre plus que jamais, mes 
 troupes en ont le cceur enfle, et je reponds du succes. 
 
 On November 1, 1740, Frederick had expressed to his 
 Minister, von Podewils, as we have seen, his determination 
 to attack Austria. Five days later, on November 6, he 
 requested Professor von Ludewig, who during forty years 
 had collected material showing Prussia's claims to four 
 Silesian duchies, to send him a memoir for his justification. 
 
 Although Frederick had in his * Anti-Machiavel ' recom- 
 mended honesty and straightforwardness in diplomatic 
 negotiations, he acted with incredible unscrupulousness. 
 Writing on November 15 to his Ambassador in Vienna, 
 he stated that the position in Europe had become so critical, 
 and that the balance of power in Europe, the preservation 
 of the German Empire and German liberty were so much 
 endangered, that he was forced to employ violent remedies. 
 Hence he had resolved to invade Silesia, partly in order 
 to prevent that province being seized by another State, 
 partly in order to be able to support and save Austria 
 from the ruin with which she was threatened. He 
 dwelt on the purity of his motives, and stated that he 
 was ready to guarantee the Austrian possessions against 
 all comers and to conclude an alliance with Austria if that 
 country would cede Silesia to Prussia. 
 
 Very naturally, his ' offer ' was decHned. 
 
 Frederick invaded Silesia before Count Gotter, the bearer 
 of his ultimatum, had arrived in Vienna. The province 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 77 
 
 stood open to the Prussian troops, and was entirely un- 
 defended. In order to disarm resistance on the part of the 
 inhabitants, Frederick informed them by a Proclamation, 
 dated December 1, that, as the Emperor had died without 
 leaving an heir male, the Austrian succession had been 
 challenged, that there was a danger that other Powers 
 might seize Silesia, and that he occupied that province 
 with his troops, ' not at all in the intention of insulting 
 Her Majesty, Maria Theresa, but, on the contrary, in 
 order to manifest his friendship with the house of Austria, 
 to promote its true interests, and to contribute to its 
 preservation ; that no hostihty was to be expected from 
 the Prussian troops, and that he hoped that the inhabitants 
 would act hke good neighbours.' 
 
 That Proclamation singularly resembles the one 
 addressed to the inhabitants of Belgium at the beginning 
 of the present war. 
 
 Wishing to deceive the other European Powers as 
 to his intentions as long as possible, Frederick sent, on 
 December 6, 1740, a declaration to the principal embassies, 
 according to which the invasion of Silesia was not intended 
 to be a hostile attack, for it was worded as follows : 
 
 Le Eoi, en faisant entrer ses troupes en Silesie, ne s'est 
 porte k cette demarche par aucune mauvaise intention contre 
 la cour de Vienne et moins encore dans celle de vouloir 
 troubler le repos de I'Empire. Sa Majeste s'est cru indis- 
 pensablement oblige d'avoir sans delai recours ^ ce moyen 
 pour revendiquer les droits incontestables de sa maison 
 sur ce duche, fondes sur des anciens pactes de famille et 
 de confraternite entre les electeurs de Brandebourg et 
 les princes de Silesie, aussi bien que sur d'autres titres 
 respectables. 
 
 Les circonstances presentes et la juste crainte de se voir 
 prevenir par ceux qui forment des pretentions sur la succes- 
 sion de feu I'Bmpereur ont demand^ de la promptitude dana 
 cette entreprise, et de la vigueur dans son execution. Mais 
 
78 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 si ces raisons n'ont pas voulu permettre au Koi de s'eclaircir 
 prealablement la-dessus avec la reine de Hongrie et de 
 Boheme, elles n'empecheront jamais S.M. de prendre tou- 
 jours les interets de la maison d'Autriche fortement ^ coeur, 
 et d'en etre le plus ferme appui et soutien, dans toutes les 
 occasions qui se presenteront. 
 
 In a letter sent to the King of England on December 4, 
 he stated that he had invaded Silesia in order to guarantee 
 Germany's Hberty and to protect Austria, and that he was 
 acting in Austria's true interests. He wrote : 
 
 Monsieur mon Frere : La grande confiance que j'ai dans 
 I'amitie de Votre Majeste, et nos interets communs dans les 
 conjonctures critiques d'a present, m'obligent ^ Lui com- 
 muniquer sans reserve mes sentiments sur les mesures a 
 prendre dans la situation epineuse des affaires ou I'Europe se 
 trouve maintenant, et k Lui faire part en meme temps de la 
 demarche ^Jlaquelle j'ai ete oblige de recourir, pour remedier 
 promptement au danger dont I'Europe entiere, la liberte 
 de I'AUemagne, et le systeme de I'Empire sont menaces 
 6galement. 
 
 La maison d'Autriche, en butte a tons ses ennemis, 
 depuis la perte de son chef et le delabrement total de ses 
 affaires, est sur le point de succomber sous les efforts de ceux 
 qui font ouvertement des pretentions sur la succession, ou 
 qui meditent en secret d'en arracher une partie ; et comme 
 par la situation de mes Etats je me trouve le plus interess6 
 ^ en empecher les suites et k prevenir surtout ceux qui 
 pourraient avoir forme le dessein de s'emparer de la Silesie, 
 qui fait la surete et la barriere de mes provinces limitrophes, 
 je n'ai pu me dispenser de faire entrer mes troupes dans ce 
 duche, pour empecher que d'autres, dans les conjonctures 
 pr6sentes, ne s'en emparent k mon grand prejudice et k 
 celui des droits incontestables que ma maison a eus de tout 
 temps sur la plus grande partie de ce pays-1^, comme je ne 
 manquerai pas de le manifester en temps et lieu. 
 
 Mon intention en cela n'a d 'autre but que la conservation 
 et le veritable bien de la maison d'Autriche. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 79 
 
 Je me suis meme explique sur cela par mon ministre k la 
 cour de Vienne d'une maniere que, si elle entend ses veritables 
 interets, elle ne balancera pas un moment ^ y domaer les 
 mains. . . . 
 
 In striking at unprepared Austria Frederick had well 
 calculated his chances. Austria and all the other Powers 
 were unready for war. The King tells us in his * Histoire 
 de mon Temps,' in tones of satisfaction : 
 
 [Towards the end of 1740 all the Powers discussed, 
 negotiated, intrigued, and strove to come to some arrange- 
 ment, to form alliances. However, none of the European 
 Powers disposed of troops ready for immediate action. None 
 had had the time to accumulate magazines and stores. So 
 King Frederick made use of this state of affairs in order to 
 carry out his great plan. 
 
 Frederick no longer considered his subjects as his equals 
 whose hves should be cherished, as he had done in the 
 ' Anti-Machiavel.' He wrote callously in this ' Histoire 
 de mon Temps ' : * When Kings play for provinces, men 
 are merely gambhng counters.' Summing up the events 
 of the first Silesian war, the King stated : 
 
 The acquisition of Silesia increased Prussia's revenues 
 by 3,600,000 thalers. The greater part of that sum was used 
 to increase the army. In 1741 it consisted of 106 battalions 
 and 191 squadrons, and we shall presently see the use which 
 Frederick made of these troops. . . . 
 :., Silesia was united to Prussia. A campaign of two years 
 had sufficed for conquering that important province. The 
 War Fund which the late King had collected was nearly 
 exhausted. Still, it is very cheap to acquire States when 
 they cost only seven or eight millions. Chance helped in 
 carrying through the enterprise successfully. It was neces- 
 sary that France should allow herself to be dragged into 
 the war with Austria. . . . 
 
 The principal cause of the successful conquest of Silesia 
 was the army which had been formed in the course of twenty- 
 
80 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 two years by an admirable discipline and which was superior 
 to the troops of all the other States of Europe. Besides, the 
 Prussian generals were true citizens. The ministers were 
 wise and incorruptible, and the whole enterprise was accom- 
 panied by that good fortune which often favours youth 
 but shuns old age. If that great undertaking had failed, 
 King Frederick would have been called a foolish prince. He 
 would have been reproached for having begun an enterprise 
 that was beyond his strength. Owing to his success he was 
 declared to be lucky. Indeed, Fortune makes one's reputation. 
 Fortunate men are praised and unfortunate men are blamed. 
 
 Silesia was to be merely a stepping-stone towards 
 further conquests. Describing the events of the year 1744, 
 Frederick the Great significantly wrote in his ' Histoire 
 de mon Temps ' : ' The acquisition of Silesia had given 
 new strength to Prussia. Hence Prussia was now able 
 to carry out with energy the plans of the ruler.' 
 
 Frederick's calculations had proved correct. His 
 excellent and well-led army defeated the slowly gathering 
 Austrian troops. Other States desired to take advantage 
 of Austria's weakness and to share in the plunder. France 
 was made to play the same part by Frederick the Second 
 which Austria-Hungary has been made to play by WiUiam 
 the Second. In May 1741 Frederick concluded at Nymphen- 
 burg with France and Bavaria an alliance against Austria. 
 In June 1742 a separate peace was made between Prussia and 
 Austria at Breslau which gave to Prussia all Silesia. Its 
 possession increased Prussia's population by no less than 
 one half. 
 
 France and Bavaria, Prussia's Allies, continued the 
 war against Austria. Gradually Austria gathered strength 
 and defeated her two opponents. Fearing that Austria, 
 having defeated France and Bavaria, might retake Silesia, 
 Frederick resolved to recommence the war and to attack 
 her before she had become too strong. He concluded some 
 alhances, and in 1744 once more acted as the aggressor. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 81 
 
 Again he strove to deceive the world as to his motives, 
 and endeavoured to justify his conduct in an ' Expose des 
 motifs qui ont oblige le Eoi de donner des troupes auxiliaires 
 a I'Empereur,' ^ which concluded with the words : * En 
 un mot, le Eoi ne demande rien, et il ne s'agit point de ses 
 interets personnels ; mais Sa Majeste n'a recours aux armes 
 que pour rendre la Hberte a TEmpire, la dignite h I'Empereur, 
 et le repos a I'Europe.' 
 
 Once more Frederick the Great was victorious, but 
 as his position had become precarious he made peace with 
 Austria at Dresden. That peace merely confirmed the peace 
 previously made. No territorial gain rewarded Frederick 
 for the second war. He was no doubt disappointed, 
 for his ambitions were by no means satisfied by the con- 
 quest of Silesia. In 1752, four years before the outbreak 
 of the Seven Years' War, he wrote a pohtical testament 
 in which he urged upon his successors that they should 
 conquer Polish Prussia, Swedish Pomerania, and especially 
 Saxony, which country he considered a particularly valu- 
 able and desirable possession. In his political testament 
 of 1776, the ' Expose du Gouvernement Prussien,' Frederick 
 wrote : 
 
 De n^cessite il faut s'emparer de la Saxe. . . . S'il 
 s'agit des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent a 
 cette monarchie, les Etats de la Saxe sont sans contredit 
 ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en I'arrondissant et lui 
 formant une barriere par les montagnes qui separent la Saxe 
 de la Boheme. . . . Cette acquisition est d'une necessite 
 indispensable pour donner ^ cet Etat la consistance dont il 
 manque. Car, des qu'on est en guerre, I'ennemi pent 
 avancer de plain pied jusqu'^ Berlin sans trouver la moindre 
 opposition dans son chemin. 
 
 Meanwhile the world had no longer any illusions as to 
 the character of Frederick the Second. It had recognised 
 
 ^ This Emperor, who disputed Maria Theresa's succession, was Charles 
 the Seventh, Elector of Bavaria. He was set up by Frederick the Great. 
 
 o 
 
82 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 that the King was not merely a poet, a philosopher, and 
 a champion of all the virtues, but that in him were combined 
 unscrupulousness with craft, and craft with power. The 
 nations around saw in Frederick a danger to the peace of 
 Europe, and their alarm was increased by the fact that 
 Frederick's diplomacy was feverishly active in every quarter, 
 and that his army was constantly increasing in strength. 
 
 Very naturally his neighbours wished to protect them- 
 selves in time. Austria and Saxony concluded an alliance 
 in 1745, and Eussia joined it. Through the bribery of 
 some officials, Frederick had become acquainted with 
 these arrangements which were to restrain his aggression. 
 He was annoyed, and in 1756 he resolved to embark upon 
 a third war of attack, and he began it by invading coveted 
 Saxony in August of that year. As usual he made a surprise 
 attack. When, in July, the Saxon Court became seriously 
 concerned at Prussia's military preparations, the King 
 wrote on the 10th of that month to his Ambassador at 
 Dresden : 
 
 I find it somewhat extraordinary that Saxony has become 
 alarmed at my so-called military preparations, and that I 
 should be believed to be organising three armies for war. 
 You must positively assure those who speak to you on the 
 subject that no army is being formed, that only some regi- 
 ments are being moved according to the ordinary routine 
 as they are in other countries, such as Austria. 
 
 The following month Frederick invaded Saxony with a 
 large army, ostensibly on the ground that necessity com- 
 pelled him to attack Austria by way of Saxony, because 
 Austria intended to strike at Prussia. Saxony was thus made 
 another Belgium. On August 26 the King wrote to his 
 representative at Dresden in tones of unctuous 
 rectitude : ) 
 
 The unjust proceedings and dangerous plans of Austria 
 are forcing me to violent measures, which I should hke to 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S DIPLOMACY 83 
 
 have avoided out of love of peace and of public tranquillity. 
 Circumstances compel me to march my army into Saxony 
 in order to reach Bohemia. ... In making this declaration 
 in a most polite and tactful manner to the King, you should 
 impress upon him the fact that necessity compels me, and 
 that the Vienna Court is solely responsible for these hard 
 and disagreeable consequences. 
 
 The British Ambassador Mitchell reported on August 27 
 to his Government a conversation with Frederick the 
 Great in which the King had stated that he was compelled 
 to forestall the Austrians, and that ' nothing but the absolute 
 necessity of his affiairs made him take that step.* We 
 are reminded of the German declaration made at the beginning 
 of the present war that France's intention to attack Ger- 
 many by way of Belgium compelled her to invade that 
 country in self-defence. 
 
 Having occupied Dresden, Frederick had the archives 
 searched. The defensive treaties between Saxony, Austria, 
 and Eussia and much correspondence were discovered, 
 and these were pubHshed and described to the world as a 
 vile conspiracy against Prussia. WilHam the Second 
 merely repeated at Brussels the performance of his ancestor 
 at Dresden. 
 
 Having invaded Saxony, Frederick explained his conduct 
 to the world in the usual way. The war had been forced 
 upon him. Once more he was the innocent victim. In his 
 celebrated ' Memoire Raisonne,' justifying the invasion, 
 which was distributed in thousands of copies in all countries, 
 and which may be found in Hertzberg's ' Recueil,' we read : 
 
 Les raisons, qui ont mis le Roi dans la necessity de 
 prendre les armes contre la Cour de Vienne et de s'assurer 
 pendant cette guerre des Etats hereditaires ^ du Roi de 
 Pologne, sont fondees sur les regies les plus exactes de I'equit^ 
 et de la justice. Ce ne sont pas motifs d'ambition ni des 
 
 ^ That is to say, Sayony. Frederick Augustus the Second, Elector of 
 Saxony by inheritance, was, like his father, the elected King of Poland. 
 
 g2 
 
84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 vues d'aggrandissement. C'est une suite de projets, de 
 complots et de trahisons de la part de ces deux Cours qui 
 ont oblige Sa Majeste de songer a sa defense et a sa surete. 
 Les decouvertes qu'EUe a faites sur cette importante matiere 
 mettent cette verite dans tout son jour et forment une 
 espece de demonstration de la justice de sa cause et des 
 mauvais procedes de ceux qui I'ont forcee d'en venir k 
 ces tristes extremites. . . . 
 
 In German and even in English histories may be read 
 the fable that a European Coalition had been formed with 
 the object of despoiling Prussia, that Prussia was forced 
 into the Seven Years' War. Yet Count Hertzberg, who 
 wrote the * Memoire Kaisonne ' at Frederick's orders, and who 
 conducted the Prussian Foreign Office in Frederick's time dur- 
 ing more than two decades, admitted himself in a paper read 
 before the Berlin Academy in 1787, the year after Frederick's 
 death, that in 1756 there had been no conspiracy against 
 Prussia and no plan to attack her ; that combined action 
 had been planned by Austria, Saxony, and Kussia only 
 if Prussia should be the aggressor. A full account of his 
 lecture may be found in Schoell's ' Histoire Abregee des 
 Trait es de Paix.' The Prussian historian von Kaumer more 
 recently stated that ' Frederick had not proved, and could 
 not prove, that a formal offensive alHance against him 
 had been concluded between Austria, Eussia, and Saxony.' 
 
 Frederick the Great, hke Napoleon the First, kept his 
 own counsel. We do not know for certain why he invaded 
 Saxony in 1756. As he was not threatened by a hostile 
 coahtion as he alleged, as the second Silesian War had not 
 brought him the hoped-for territorial increment, and as in 
 1752 ^ he had, in his political testament, urged his successors 
 to acquire Saxony, one may safely conclude that he went 
 to war in the hope of acquiring that country. 
 
 Germany's assertions that a conspiracy was formed 
 
 1 As we have seen, he also urged the acquisition of Saxony in his 
 later ' Political Testament ' of 1776. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 85 
 
 against her by King Edward and Sir Edward Grey finds its 
 exact counterpart in Frederick's assertions made in 1756. 
 
 The peculiar attitude of modern Germany towards 
 treaties, which are treated as scraps of paper if they are 
 inconvenient to her and as sacred undertakings if she can 
 benefit by them, is based on the precedents set by Frederick 
 the Great and upon his teachings. In his ' Anti-Machiavel ' 
 the King urged that honesty was the best policy, that faith 
 should be kept by rulers, that treaties should be reUgiously 
 observed, as will be seen by reference to the extracts given 
 at the beginning of this chapter. These views soon changed 
 when a change was deemed advantageous. In the Preface 
 of the ' Histoire de mon Temps ' we read : 
 
 Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these Memoirs 
 accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken. 
 Although examples of broken treaties are common, the 
 author of these Memoirs would require better reasons than 
 precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties. 
 A sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State. 
 In the following cases alliances may be broken : 
 
 (1) When one's ally does not fulfil his engagements ; 
 
 (2) When one's ally wishes to deceive one, and when one 
 cannot by any other means prevent him ; 
 
 (8) When necessity {force majeure) compels one ; 
 (4) When one lacks means to continue the war. 
 
 By the will of Fate wealth influences everything. Rulers 
 are slaves of their means. To promote the interest of their 
 State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable. If a ruler 
 must be ready to sacrifice his life for the welfare of his 
 subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for the 
 benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has 
 undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his 
 people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered 
 everywhere. It is not our intention to justify all breaches 
 of treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are 
 cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration 
 of the welfare of the people, oblige sovereigns to transgress 
 
86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 because the violation of a treaty is often the only means 
 ■whereby complete ruin can be avoided. 
 
 To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person 
 must scrupulously observe the given word, even if he should 
 have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private 
 person breaks his contract the damaged person can have 
 recourse to the protection of the law, and however the 
 decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what 
 tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another sovereign breaks 
 his treaty ? The word of a private person involves in 
 misfortune only a single human being, while that of sove- 
 reigns can create calamities for entire nations. The question 
 may therefore be summed up thus : Is it better that a nation 
 should perish, or that a sovereign should break his treaty ? 
 Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this 
 question ? 
 
 In other words, advantage was to decide whether a 
 treaty was to be kept or broken. Frederick broke his 
 treaties shamelessly. He abandoned his ally, France, 
 because it suited him, as he frankly admitted in his ' Histoire 
 de mon Temps.' The King wrote : 
 
 We must now touch the reasons which led to an armistice 
 between Prussia and Austria. This is a dehcate question. 
 The poHcy of the King was wrongful and shady (scabreuse). 
 
 The object of the war, as far as King Frederick was 
 concerned, was to conquer Silesia. He concluded alHances 
 with Bavaria and France only with that object in view. 
 However, France and her AlUes looked upon the object of 
 the alHance in a different way. The Cabinet at Versailles 
 was convinced that Austria had arrived at the hour of her 
 destiny, and that her power would be destroyed for all time. 
 The downfall of Austria was incompatible with the liberty 
 of Germany, and did in no way suit the King of Prussia, who 
 worked for the elevation of his dynasty, and who did not 
 intend to sacrifice his troops^in order to create new rivals to 
 himself. . . . 
 
 Had King Frederick too strenuously supported the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 87 
 
 operations of the French troops, their success -would have 
 been dangerous to himself. From an Ally he would have 
 become a subject of France. . . . 
 
 Queen Maria Theresa stood at the edge of a precipice. 
 An armistice gave her breathing time, and the King could 
 break the armistice at any moment convenient to himself. 
 
 France learned the meaning of the saying, ' travailler 
 pour le Eoi de Prusse.* 
 
 In deserting France, Frederick explained his conduct 
 in a letter written June 10, 1742, to Cardinal de Fleury, 
 the principal Minister of France, in which he stated : 
 
 L'avenir ne m'offre que des perspectives funestes, et dans 
 une situation aussi critique (quoique dans Famertume de 
 mon coeur) je me suis vu dans la necessite de me sauver du 
 naufrage et de gagner un asile. Si des conjonctures facheuses 
 m'ont oblige de prendre un parti que la necessite justifie, 
 vous me trouverez toujours fidele a rempUr les engagements 
 dont Texecution ne depend que de moi. 
 
 These mendacious professions of impotence to continue 
 the war glaringly contrast with the real reasons for abandon- 
 ing France given by the King in his posthumously published 
 history. 
 
 Although Frederick readily broke treaties which were 
 not advantageous to himself, he condemned in the strongest 
 terms those nations which failed to fulfil their engage- 
 ments towards Prussia. To the end of his days he expressed 
 hatred and contempt for England because she had broken 
 her treaty with Prussia towards the end of the Seven Years' 
 War. Modem Germany tells us that she was justified in 
 breaking her treaty regarding Belgium, but that Italy 
 acted criminally in refusing to participate in the Belgian 
 crime. 
 
 Bismarck induced Italy to join the Austro- German 
 AlHance, as he repeatedly stated, not so much in the hope 
 of obtaining her support in time of need, but in order to 
 
88 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 keep her neutral in case of a great war. Herein he followed 
 Frederick's teachings, for the King wrote in his ' Anti- I 
 Machiavel ' : 
 
 It is frequently asserted that treaties are useless because 
 their stipulations are hardly ever fulfilled, and that men are 
 no more scrupulous now than they were in former ages. To 
 those who argue thus I would reply that although both in 
 ancient and in modern times rulers have failed to fulfil their 
 treaty obligations, it is always advantageous to conclude 
 treaties. An ally is an enemy the less, and if your ally does 
 not come to your aid, you induce him by means of an alliance 
 to remain neutral — at least for some time. 
 
 Sham alliances were highly valued by Frederick. He 
 wrote to his Minister von Podewils on June 1, 1742 : 
 
 For the future security of Prussia's new possessions I 
 rely upon a good and numerous army, a large war treasure, 
 strong fortresses, and sham alliances — that is, upon alHances 
 which at least will make some impression upon outsiders. . . . 
 
 The easiest way to neutrahse a powerful country and 
 a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alhance 
 with that very State. Therefore we read in his ' Expose 
 du Gouvemement Prussien,' his ' PoHtical Testament ' of 
 1776 : 
 
 One of the first poHtical principles is to endeavour to 
 become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may 
 become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason 
 we have an alliance with Kussia, and thus we have our 
 back free as long as the aUiance lasts. 
 
 During the last two centuries all the Eussian Czars 
 except one married German princesses. German princesses — 
 the supply is very large — have sat upon many foreign 
 thrones and often influenced the pohcy of nations in Ger- 
 many's favour. Prusso-Germany's matrimonial policy was 
 established on a broad basis and most highly developed 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 89 
 
 by Frederick the Great. In order to influence Eussia's 
 policy in Prussia's favour he strove in 1744 to direct Eussia's 
 policy through German influence in the ruling family as he 
 had done in 1740. The King has told us in his ' Histoire 
 de mon Temps * : 
 
 Nothing would have been more opposed to Prussia's 
 interests than to allow the formation of a matrimonial 
 alHance between Eussia and a Saxony hostile to Prussia. 
 At the same time, nothing would have seemed more un- 
 natural than to sacrifice a Prussian princess of the blood 
 royal in order to dislodge the Saxon princess whom the Saxon 
 Court wished to give to the Grand Duke to wife. Another 
 expedient was necessary. Of all the German princesses of 
 marriageable age none seemed more suitable for Eussia and 
 none seemed more Hkely to serve the interests of Prussia at 
 the Eussian Court than the Princess of Zerbst. 
 
 With the object of supplanting the Saxon princess by 
 the Princess of Zerbst, compHcated intrigues were entered 
 upon, and they proved completely successful. The Eussian 
 Czarina was prevailed upon to consent, and the Princess 
 of Zerbst, known to history as Catherine the Second, the 
 Great, went to Eussia and influenced Eussian poHcy in 
 Prussia's favour. By making similar use of family in- 
 fluences, Frederick the Great strove to direct, in Prussia's 
 favour, the policy of Sweden, which then was still a very 
 important State. Frederick has told us in his * Histoire 
 de mon Temps ' : 
 
 When the Eussian Czarina had agreed to it that the 
 Princess of Zerbst should marry the Grand Duke, her son, 
 matters were made easy for marrying Princess Ulrike of 
 Prussia to the new Crown Prince of Sweden. Prussia 
 founded her security upon these two family alhances with 
 Eussia and Sweden. A Prussian Princess close to the 
 Swedish throne could not possibly be hostile to her brother 
 King Frederick, and a German Princess married to a Eussian 
 Grand Duke, a Princess who had been brought up and 
 
90 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 educated on Prussian territory and who owed her elevation 
 to the action of the Prussian King, could not desert him 
 without ingratitude. 
 
 Pescribing the events of the year 1773, King Frederick 
 stated in his * Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ' : 
 
 By careful management and intrigue the King succeeded 
 in inducing the Eussian Czarina to choose the Princess of 
 Darmstadt, the sister of the Princess of Prussia, as a wife for 
 her son the Grand Duke Paul. In order to have influence in 
 Eussia it was necessary for Prussia to place there persons 
 who were likely to favour Prussia. It was to be hoped that 
 the Prince of Prussia, when succeeding King Frederick, 
 would be able to draw great advantage from the fact that his 
 wife's sister had married the Eussian heir to the throne. 
 
 Bribery, corruption, and spying have been among the 
 most conspicuous characteristics of the policy of modern 
 Germany. German money is lavishly spent abroad for 
 influencing opinion and the action of foreign Governments, 
 and according to apparently reliable reports the German 
 Emperor himself has taken a strong and personal interest 
 in the more seamy side of the German Secret Service. If 
 these reports are true, he has acted as a faithful disciple 
 of Frederick the Great. In his time spying, corruption, 
 and bribery were brought to the highest perfection. 
 
 We have seen in the beginning of this chapter that 
 Frederick, when intending to attack Austria for the first 
 time in 1740, sent to Eussia Baron Winterfeld. He was 
 to influence his father-in-law, Field-Marshal Miinnich, who 
 at the time was all-powerful in Eussia, and he was to resort 
 freely to bribery. On December 6, 1740, Frederick wrote 
 to his Ambassador at Petrograd : 
 
 You must use all your skill to gain Field-Marshal Miinnich 
 to my interests, and must spare neither compHments nor 
 promises of gratitude. You can assure him that if, by 
 employing his authority and credit, he induces the Eegent 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 91 
 
 to support me, I will give him and his posterity in perpetuity 
 the estate of Biegen, which has a yearly income of more than 
 6000 thalers, and I shall give him as well the County of 
 Wartenberg in Silesia. . . . 
 
 As both the properties mentioned were in Silesia, which 
 Frederick was about to overrun and conquer, Miinnich 
 was directly interested in the success of Frederick's piratical 
 expedition. 
 
 Two days later he wrote in the instructions for Count 
 Gotter, who was sent to Vienna with that celebrated ulti- 
 matum to Maria Theresa which arrived two days after 
 the Prussian army had invaded Silesia : 
 
 If the Cabinet in Vienna can be gained to Prussia's 
 interests by bribery, my Ambassador, von Borcke, had 
 instructions given him on the 7th of this month to offer up 
 to 200,000 thalers to the Grand Chancellor, Count Zinzen- 
 dorff, and 100,000 thalers to the Secretary of State, Toussaint. 
 If others have to be bribed. Count Gotter should let me know, 
 and I will give my orders. 
 
 On January 11, 1741, Frederick wrote to his Ambassador 
 in Petrograd, von Mardefeld, that if the estates which were 
 to be offered to Field-Marshal Miinnich by his son-in-law, 
 Count Winterfeld, Prussia's special envoy, should not 
 suffice to gain him over to Prussia's interests, Winterfeld 
 could dispose of 100,000 thalers as well. In 1745 Herr 
 von Mardefeld was ordered to offer 40,000 thalers to Count 
 Bestucheff if Eussia would remain neutral during the second 
 Silesian War. 
 
 When, in the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Frederick 
 the Great became hard pressed by his enemies, it occurred 
 to him that he might possibly detach France by bribing 
 Madame de Pompadour, the all-powerful mistress of King 
 Louis the Fifteenth. The political correspondence of the 
 King, pubhshed on behalf of the German Government in 
 a large number of volumes, contains a number of references 
 
92 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 to that interesting transaction. For instance, on July 7, 
 1757, Frederick wrote to his sister : 
 
 My deae Sister, — It is too kind of you to take so much 
 trouble with my affairs. I am ashamed to abuse your 
 kindness. Still, as you are wilHng to promote the con- 
 clusion of peace, I would ask you to send M. de Mirabeau to 
 France. I will gladly bear the expenses of his journey, and 
 he may offer to the King's favourite a sum up to 500,000 
 thalers for the conclusion of a peace. He may even increase 
 his offer far above the sum named, if Madame de Pompadour 
 should bind herself to procure to Prussia not only peace, but 
 also some advantages. You understand, of course, that this 
 business must be treated with the greatest dehcacy, and that 
 my name must not be connected with it. If the people in 
 England should get wind of this transaction, all would be 
 lost. . . . 
 
 Soon Frederick increased the bribe which he was wilHng 
 to offer to Madame de Pompadour. On September 26, 
 1767, he wrote to Colonel von Balbi : 
 
 ... I sincerely hope that the secret negotiations which 
 I have opened will substantiate, unless cessions of territory 
 should be required. As I have been informed that the 
 transaction might be soon concluded if I could make up 
 my mind to cede to Madame de Pompadour the principality 
 of Neuchatel and Valangin for life, I have much pleasure 
 in telhng you that I shall raise no difficulties, and I authorise 
 you expressly by the present letter to mention this offer to 
 your friends so that they can boldly insinuate and promise 
 to Madame de Pompadour on my behalf [that I shall cede to 
 her the principality named for life as soon as peace is con- 
 cluded between France and Prussia. The revenues of the 
 principality will be hers, and I trust that she will use her 
 whole influence so that the conditions of peace will be 
 advantageous, or at least little onerous, to Prussia. . . . 
 
 Frederick the Great achieved his master stroke in 
 corruption during the period of peace which preceded the 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S DIPLOMACY 93 
 
 Seven Years' War, when men in the Austrian and Saxon 
 Diplomatic Services whom he had bribed delivered to him 
 the most important secrets of State. The King tells u;^ 
 in his * Guerre de Sept Ans ' : 
 
 A man named Weingarten, who was secretary to La 
 Puebla, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, allowed himself 
 to be used by King Frederick, and furnished the King with 
 the most secret correspondence which passed between the 
 Austrian Ambassador and the Court of Vienna and the Court 
 of Petersburg. 
 
 This man, whose services were exceedingly important, 
 at last became suspected by his master. He was lucky 
 enough to notice it in time. He escaped from the Embassy 
 and claimed the King's protection. He was withdrawn 
 with difficulty from the prosecution which the Austrian 
 Ambassador set on foot, was hidden and sent to Kolberg, 
 where he changed his name. 
 
 Although that source of information was thus cut off, 
 there was another channel by which the King received 
 reliable information regarding the plans of his enemies. He 
 was well served by an employee of the Secret Chancellery 
 of Saxony at Dresden. That man handed every week to 
 the Prussian Minister to Saxony the despatches which the 
 Dresden Court received from Petersburg and Vienna, and 
 he also supplied him with copies of all the treaties deposited 
 in the Dresden archives. 
 
 The employee of the Foreign Office at Dresden mentioned 
 by the King was the notorious Friedrich Wilhelm Menzel. 
 He was engaged, not by one of the King's underlings without 
 his knowledge, but by the direct orders of Frederick himself, 
 and the King settled all the details regarding this man 
 in a letter sent on April 8, 1752, to von Maltzahn, his Am- 
 bassador in Dresden. We read in it : 
 
 Quant a celui que le sieur Rehnitz vous a amene [Menzel] 
 je vois, par les echantillons que vous m'avez marques de 
 son savoir-faire, que ce sera un sujet bien utile et dont nous 
 
94 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 saurions tirer des connaissances tres utiles. C'est aussi 
 pourquoi vous devez vous arranger et prendre les concerts 
 qu'il faut avec lui. 
 
 J'ai resolu de lui faire payer une pension jusqu'^ 2000 
 ecus par an, selon que vous conviendrez avec lui, et mon 
 conseiller prive Eichel a mes ordres de vous faire parvenir 
 cet argent en tels termes que vous le desirerez, soit par des 
 expres ou par des remises en argent, tout comme vous le 
 jugerez convenable. 
 
 Pour vous mettre aussi en etat de faire d'abord des 
 largesses a cet homme, j'ai fait ordonner par le conseiller 
 prive Eichel au banquier Splitberger de vous remettre la 
 Bomme de 500 ecus sous le pretexte d'un argent qui lui 
 avait ete remis par vos parents, afin de vous le faire payer 
 a Dresde. 
 
 Au surplus, vous vous garderez bien de ne rien communi- 
 quer au departement des affaires etrangeres des avis que vous 
 tirerez de ce canal, sans mes ordres expres, parceque je 
 veux, pour etre d'autant mieux assure du secret, que tout 
 ceci ne passe que par mes mains seules. C'est aussi pourquoi 
 vous ne me ferez autrement vos rapports a ce sujet que par le 
 chiffre immediat dont vous etes en possession. 
 
 Quant au sieur Kehnitz, comme je crains tout comme 
 vous qu'il ne gate par sa conduite imprudente et inconsideree 
 toute cette affaire vous tacherez a le disposer de partir le 
 plus tot possible de Dresde en I'assurant que ses affaires 
 particulieres qu'il a la, n'en souffriraient pas, et que je lui 
 saurais gre, s'il voulait faire un tour dans le pays de Saxe 
 pour engager et m'amener ici quelques Parchentmacher 
 [skilled artizans] que je voudrais bien etablir dans ce pays-ci. 
 
 Je remets tout a votre dexterite et prudence et attendrai 
 votre rapport sur la maniere que vous aurez tout arrange. 
 
 Frederic. 
 
 Between 1752 and 1756 Menzel betrayed the diplomatic 
 secrets of Saxony and of her AUies to Frederick. How 
 greatly the King was interested in Menzel's activity will 
 be seen by the fact that he is mentioned or alluded to in 
 no les^ than thirty-six of the King's published letters. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 95 
 
 Frederick cherished him Hke the apple of his eye, and 
 frequently had enjoined care upon him, sent him on holi- 
 days, &c. 
 
 Frederick was the most thrifty of monarchs in all matters 
 except bribery and corruption. Professor von Ludewig, 
 mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter, when set to 
 work to prove Prussia's historic claims to Silesia, was paid 
 three thalers (95.) a day for his labour, and he was remuner- 
 ated for his forty years' activity in collecting the necessary 
 material to support the King's claim * with a Httle wind 
 that costs nothing,' in the shape of a title, as von Podewils 
 put it. 
 
 Frederick attached the highest importance to the 
 possession of a large fund of ready money to be used for 
 poHtical purposes at the right moment. He wrote in his 
 * Anti-Machiavel ' : 
 
 Cardinal de Ketz stated rightly that in important affairs 
 money should be regarded as of no consequence. A sove- 
 reign should therefore always be in the position of controlling 
 large funds usable in case of necessity. 
 
 In his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 Frederick stated : 
 
 Statesmanship ought to look as far as possible into the 
 future and calculate the chances and the constellations of 
 Europe, and make use of them either for concluding alliances 
 or for foiling the plans of Prussia's enemies. 
 
 It must be remembered that it is not possible to shape 
 the course of history. However, opportunities must be 
 seized when they occur. Hence the finances of the country 
 must always be in order. Herein lies the reason that there 
 should always be kept a large reserve of ready money, for 
 then only can the Government strike immediately when the 
 right moment for action has arrived. War itself should be 
 conducted in accordance with the true principles of states- 
 manship. One must strike the most sanguinary blows at 
 one's enemies. 
 
96 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Frederick the Great, like William the Second, en- 
 deavoured to produce dissension within the Governments 
 of countries the activities of which he desired to cripple. 
 Immediately after his first attack upon Silesia, on January 6, 
 1741, he wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd : 
 
 You will skilfully throw an apple of discord among the 
 Eussian ministers so that we can carry out the principal aim 
 which we have in view. I leave you full liberty to employ 
 not only flatteries and promises, but as much money as you 
 think necessary, and Major von Winter f eld can draw on 
 the offices of the Company. 
 
 Frederick the Great was absolutely unscrupulous. 
 He deliberately brought about three wars, and he employed 
 unhesitatingly the worst methods of MachiavelH. Never- 
 theless, hke Shakespeare's Eichard the Third, he posed 
 habitually as an injured innocent. In his ' Guerre de Sept 
 Ans * he described his great and good opponent as follows : 
 
 King Frederick had, in the person of the Empress Maria 
 Theresa, an ambitious and vindictive enemy, and she was all 
 the more dangerous as she was a woman who stuck obstin- 
 ately to her opinions and was implacable. Devoured by 
 ambition, Maria Theresa wished to pursue glory in every 
 way. 
 
 When, soon after the beginning of the Seven Years' 
 War, France and Sweden joined Austria, Eussia, and Saxony 
 against Prussia, and when Frederick began to experience 
 serious defeats, he cried to Heaven about the wickedness 
 of his opponents. On July 13, 1756, he wrote despairingly 
 to his sister Wilhelmine : 
 
 [I am in the position of a traveller who is surrounded by a 
 number of rascals and on the point of being murdered 
 because these robbers wish to divide his goods among them- 
 selves. Since the League of Cambrai there has never been 
 an example of a conspiracy similar to that which that criminal 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 97 
 
 triumvirate has engineered against me. It is infamous, a 
 disgrace for mankind, and a crime against morality. Has 
 the world ever seen three powerful princes forming a plot 
 to destroy a fourth who had done nothing to them ? 
 
 I have never had any differences with France or with 
 Eussia, and still less with Sweden. Three men acting thus 
 against a neighbour would be condemned by the law. Never- 
 theless, we see three monarchs giving such a horrible example 
 to their subjects. I am a king, and believe that I should 
 think like a king. 
 
 It has always been my principle that to a Sovereign his 
 good name should be more precious than his life. A con- 
 spiracy has been hatched against me. The Court at Vienna 
 has insulted me, and I should have considered myself dis- 
 honoured had I borne the insult. Thus the war was begun, 
 and a band of rogues attacked me from all sides That is 
 my story. 
 
 In the introduction to his * Memoires depuis la Paix de 
 Hubertusbourg,' the arch-deceiver among kings protested : 
 ' During my whole life I have never deceived anyone. Still 
 less shall I deceive posterity.' 
 
 Modern Germany, like Frederician Prussia, loudly 
 protests her innocence. Her alliances were legitimate, 
 and were purely defensive. Those of her opponents were 
 meant for aggression, were a conspiracy against Germany. 
 According to her protestations, Germany has never deceived 
 or attacked any Power. She is a peaceful State, and the 
 other nations have fallen on her without any cause, desiring 
 to destroy Germany and German civilisation. 
 
 Modem Germany is guided by the principles of Macht- 
 'politik. It is frequently assumed that the policy of using 
 power ruthlessly has been invented by Bismarck, Treitschke, 
 Bernhardi, &c. In reaUty, the policy of using power ruth- 
 lessly was evolved and brought to the highest perfection 
 by Frederick the Great. He wrote in his * Histoire de 
 mon Temps ' : ' Eoyal crowns are won only by means of 
 big guns.' Believing that all policy was founded in the 
 
98 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 last resort upon power, upon force, life in peace was for 
 Frederick the Great a constant preparation for war. He 
 wrote in his ' Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ' : 
 * Peace was to the Prussian armies a school, and war was 
 the practice.' 
 
 Although Frederick was of opinion that States were 
 founded not upon right but upon force, and although he 
 believed that States could be established, enlarged, and main- 
 tained only by force, he absolutely disapproved of the 
 wanton abuse of force. Like Cardinal Kichelieu and Prince 
 Bismarck, he was absolutely opposed to wars of aggression, 
 to wars of precaution, to wars of prestige, to rash inter- 
 ference in international affairs. We read in his preface 
 to the ' Histoire de mon Temps ': 
 
 All who have bowels of compassion and look at things as 
 they are must be deeply moved by the evils which statesmen 
 inflict upon the people, either through thoughtlessness or 
 through their passions. 
 
 Beason prescribes for us a rule of conduct which, in^my 
 opinion, every statesman should observe. It is, to make 
 use of one's opportunities, and to embark upon a dangerous 
 enterprise only when circumstances are favourable, but not 
 to force the pace and to leave all to chance. There are 
 moments which one should seize, when one should act with 
 the utmost energy, and there are others when prudence 
 compels us to remain inactive. This question requires our 
 most profound thought, and we must examine not only the 
 present position of affairs, but also study all the conse- 
 quences to which our enterprise may give rise, and weigh the 
 means possessed by ourselves against those of our enemies, 
 in order to be able to gauge which side is Hkely to prevail. 
 If the decision should not be left to cold calculation, but 
 should be influenced or dictated by passion, a happy issue 
 of a great enterprise is impossible. 
 
 Statesmanship requires patience, and the masterpiece of 
 the skilled^statesman consists in doing the right thing at the 
 right moment and in^the right way. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 99 
 
 History is the school of princes. They should strive to 
 learn from the mistakes made in past centuries, so as to 
 avoid them. Thus they may learn how to map out a wise 
 policy, and how to carry it out step by step. Only he who 
 has best calculated his chances and who has most carefully 
 laid down his line of action, can hope to overcome men who 
 act less logically. 
 
 It will be noticed that Frederick the Great recommended 
 coupling energy with moderation. 
 
 When, in 1740-41, he had succeeded in wresting Silesia 
 from Austria, he desired that Prussia should remain at peace, 
 and should, by a policy of moderation, reconcile Europe to 
 the great increase of Prussia's power. On June 21, 1742, 
 he wrote to his Minister Podewils : 
 
 At the present moment our task consists in making the 
 capitals of Europe accustomed to see Prussia occupy the 
 great position which she has obtained by her war with 
 Austria, and I believe that great moderation and a concilia- 
 tory attitude towards our neighbours will help us in this. 
 
 The pohcy recommended in the foregoing letter singularly 
 resembles that urged by Bismarck in the thirtieth chapter 
 of his posthumous memoirs, in which we read : 
 
 We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeUng 
 which has been called forth through our growth to the 
 position of a real Great Power by honourable and peaceful 
 use of our influence, and so convince the world that a 
 German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partizan, 
 and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would 
 be that of France, Eussia, or England. 
 
 Frederick the Great and Bismarck would undoubtedly 
 have loudly disapproved of the war which WiUiam the 
 / Second so rashly began in 1914. 
 
 Frederick the Great, hke Bismarck, spent the later years 
 of his Hfe in Jaying down the principles of statesmanship 
 
 h2 
 
100 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 for the benefit of future generations, and Frederick, like 
 Bismarck, looked with anxiety and pessimism towards 
 the future. In the concluding passages of his history of 
 the Seven Years' War he stated : 
 
 Time, which heals everything, will no doubt give back 
 to Prussia her old prosperity and splendour. The other 
 Powers also will recover. However, in future other ambi- 
 tious men will bring about new wars and new disasters to 
 mankind, for it is a peculiarity of men that they will not 
 learn by experience. The follies committed by the fathers 
 are not heeded by the sons. Every generation must make 
 its own experiences. . . . 
 
 May Heaven — supposing Providence looks down upon our 
 human miseries — protect Prussia and the Kings who will 
 govern the State in future against the calamities from which 
 the country has suffered in the troublous times which I have 
 described, and may they never be compelled to hav( recourse 
 to those terrible and violent measures which had to be 
 employed to protect the State against the ambitious hatred 
 of all Europe, which wished to destroy the House of Branden- 
 burg and to exterminate for all time the very name of 
 Prussia. 
 
 In many passages of Frederick's writing we find a 
 free expression of his pessimistic forebodings ,which were 
 only natural in view of the worthlessness of his nephew 
 and successor, Frederick Wilham the Second. In his 
 * Histoire de mon Temps ' we read : ' La fortune est souvent 
 plus funeste aux princes que I'adversite. La premiere 
 les enivre de presomption ; le seconde les rend circonspects 
 et modestes.' Good fortune was indeed fatal to Frederick 
 Wilham the Second and Frederick William the Third. 
 It made them presumptuous. They neglected the State, 
 and allowed the army to dechne. The rule of these two 
 princes led to Prussia's downfall in 1806. 
 
 Frederick recommended that Prussia should follow 
 a cautious, conservative, and moderate policy. He desired 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPIiOMACY tm 
 
 that the country should not lightly engage in war, that 
 Prussia's sovereigns should only rarely engage in hostihties. 
 The great King thought it particularly important that 
 Prussia should go to war only if the campaign was Hkely 
 to be highly profitable to the State. He wrote in his 
 ' Political Testament ' of 1776 : 
 
 As Prussia is not rich, care must be taken not to enter 
 into a war where nothing can be gained. In such a war one 
 exhausts one's strength, one can only lose, and if later on 
 some good opportunity should arise, one cannot take 
 advantage of it. 
 
 All territories lying at a distance from the State are a 
 burden. A village on the frontier is more valuable than a 
 principaHty sixty miles away. 
 
 It is necessary to hide with care, and as much as'possible, 
 one's ambitious plans, and it is advisable to awaken envy 
 among the European Powers, for their division enables 
 Prussia to strike. . . . Secrecy is a most important virtue 
 both in statecraft and in war. 
 
 During the Seven Years' War, Prussia, supported by 
 England, successfully resisted the united forces of Austria, 
 Eussia, France, Saxony, and Sweden. More than once she 
 suffered serious defeats. Yet she was not overwhelmed. 
 The causes of her successful resistance to nearly all Europe 
 should be of particular interest at the present moment 
 when Germany is engaged in a similar and apparently 
 hopeless struggle. In the Seven Years' War Prussia fought 
 against three Great Powers. Now, Germany fights against 
 three races, the Latin, the Slavonic, and the Anglo-Saxon 
 race. The highest authority on the causes of Prussia's 
 successful resistance is undoubtedly Frederick the Great 
 himself. In 1759 Prussia suffered a number of most dis- 
 astrous defeats, and the King's position seemed to be 
 desperate. In commenting on the campaign of that year 
 the King wrote : 
 
 That campaign was perhaps the most disastrous of all, 
 
10;2 v'THE ^FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 and Prussia would have been lost if her enemies, who knew 
 how to defeat her, had known equally well how to take 
 advantage of their victories. 
 
 How Prussia weathered her greatest defeat may be seen 
 from the Battle of Kunersdorf . At that battle the Prussians 
 lost a large number of guns to the Russians, and an enormous 
 number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the end of 
 the day scarcely 10,000 men of Frederick's army remained, 
 and these were a flying mob. Commenting on that dis- 
 astrous battle the King wrote : 
 
 Had the Russians known how to take advantage of their 
 victory, had they pursued the discouraged Prussian troops, 
 Prussia would have been lost. Owing to their inaction, they 
 gave King Frederick time to make good his losses. Nearly 
 all the Prussian generals were wounded. Prussia's enemies 
 had it in their power to end the war. They need only have 
 given their defeated enemy the cowp de grace. But they 
 stood still and, instead of acting with vigour and energy, as 
 the occasion demanded, congratulated each other on their 
 success and praised their good fortune. 
 
 Prince Soltikoff explained the reason of his inactivity. 
 When Marshal Daun, the Austrian general, urged him to 
 continue his operation with vigour he repHed : * I have 
 done enough during this year. I have won two battles which 
 have cost Russia 27,000 men, and before going into action 
 once more I wish to wait for a couple of Austrian victories. 
 It is not right that the Russian troops should bear the 
 brunt and do all the fighting.' Only with difficulty could 
 the Austrians induce the victorious Russians to cross the 
 river Oder. 
 
 Commenting on the campaign of 1761-62, Frederick 
 the Great told us : 
 
 At the end of the last campaign in the opinion of all 
 statesmen Prussia was lost. She was saved by the death of 
 a woman, and was supported and saved by the help of that 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S DIPLOMACY 103 
 
 Power which had been most eager to destroy her. In a 
 similar manner Madame Masham saved France in the War of 
 Succession by her intrigues against Lady Marlborough, 
 How vain are all our calculations ! The smallest accident 
 influences and changes the fate of empires. Chance makes 
 a plaything of us, laughs at the vain wisdom of us mortals 
 elevates some and overthrows others. 
 
 Frederick the Great was saved from annihilation, as 
 he himself admitted, through the mistakes of his opponents, 
 and especially through their lack of unity. When all 
 seemed lost Fate saved the King by the death of the 
 Empress Ehzabeth of Russia. Her son, Peter the Third, 
 a blind admirer of Frederick, not only made peace with 
 Prussia, but concluded an alHance with her. 
 •V ■ When matters were desperate with Prussia, Frederick 
 tried to divide the Allies against themselves. Writing of the 
 year 1760, he told us in his ' Guerre de Sept Ans ' : 
 
 From day to day the war became more difficult, and the 
 risks and dangers constantly increased. Although the 
 Prussians were fortunate. Fortune betrayed them several 
 times. Nothing could be hoped for from Italy, and Turkey 
 had so far not seemed inchned to let it come to a breach with 
 Austria. Therefore the only resource left consisted in 
 dividing or separating the Powers which had formed 
 the anti-Prussian AlHance. With this object in view 
 negotiations were entered upon both in France and in 
 Russia. 
 
 As we have seen, the negotiations with Russia proved 
 successful in the end through the death of the Czarina. 
 
 In the ' Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans,' Frederick 
 summed up the causes of Prussia's successful resistance 
 as follows : 
 
 In 1757, during the second year of the Seven Years* 
 War, it seemed impossible that Prussia would be able to 
 resist the attack of the Powers arrayed against her. If we 
 
104 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 carefully examine the causes which led to so unexpected an 
 issue, we find that the following reasons prevented Prussia's 
 downfall : 
 
 (1) The lack of agreement and harmony among the 
 Powers which formed the Anti-Prussian Alliance ; their 
 different interests, which prevented them agreeing with 
 regard to the mihtary operations which were undertaken ; 
 the lack of unity among the Eussian and Austrian generals, 
 which made them over-cautious when opportunity demanded 
 that they should act with energy and destroy Prussia, as 
 they might easily have done. 
 
 (2) The over-artful policy of the Court at Vienna. That 
 Court made it a principle to ask Austria's allies to undertake 
 the most difficult and the most dangerous operations, so 
 that at the end of the war Austria should possess a better 
 and stronger army than that of any of the other Powers. 
 The pursuit of this policy caused the Austrian generals to 
 act with over-great caution. Hence they abstained from 
 giving the coujp de grace to Prussia when Prussia's position 
 was absolutely desperate. 
 
 (3) The death of the Eussian Czarina, with whose demise 
 the Eusso-Austrian Alliance died as well ; Eussia's desertion 
 of the anti-Prussian AlHance, and her alHance with King 
 Frederick, which was concluded by the Czarina's successor, 
 Peter the Third. 
 
 Frederick the Great summed up the losses caused by 
 the Seven Years' War as follows : 
 
 Prussia had lost by the war 180,000 men, and in addition 
 33,000 people had died owing to the ravages of the Eussians. 
 According to estimates, the Eussian troops lost 120,000 men. 
 The Austrians estimated their loss at 140,000 men, the 
 French theirs at 200,000 combatants, the EngHsh and their 
 AlHes lost 160,000 men, the Swedes and the troops of the 
 German Circles 23,000 men. The French Government had 
 lost all credit, and the French commerce with both Indias 
 had been destroyed by the EngHsh. Sweden was on the 
 point of becoming bankrupt. Prussia had suffered most, 
 for the Austrians, French, Eussians, Swedes, and the troops 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY'S DIPLOMACY 105 
 
 of the Circles under the Duke of Wurtemberg had ravaged 
 the country. 
 
 Before his advent to power, Frederick the Great had 
 posed as a philanthropist, a lover of peace, and a friend 
 of virtue. Animated by insatiable ambition and recognising 
 that he could easily conquer Silesia, he attacked Austria 
 in 1740, little heeding the consequences. That reckless 
 and criminal attack led to two further wars, and Prussia 
 would have been lost had not chance saved her at the most 
 critical moment. 
 
 The Seven Years' War alone cost more than a milUon 
 lives ; and according to Frederick's own statement, * the 
 state of Brandenburg, after the Seven Years' War, re- 
 sembled that caused by the Thirty Years' War.' Frederick 
 the Great had declared in his ' Anti-Machiavel ' that his 
 model was Marcus Aurehus, while that of the admirers 
 of Machiavelli was Caesar Borgia. Frederick himself, 
 like his imitator William the Second, was in many respects 
 another Borgia ; but William the Second has improved 
 upon his ancestor by using weapons which Frederick disdained 
 and condemned. 
 
 The Seven Years' War inflicted terrible sufferings upon 
 Prussia and all Europe, but it laid the foundation of Prussia's 
 greatness, of modern Germany. By his conquests Frederick 
 nearly doubled the national territory, increased Prussia's 
 population from 2,250,000 to 5,500,000 inhabitants, and 
 made her one of the Great Powers. Besides, Prussia's 
 successful resistance to nearly all Europe enormously in- 
 creased her prestige. It enabled Prussia to weather her 
 defeats of 1806, and the remembrance of the Seven Years' 
 War is now encouraging Germany and inspiring her with a 
 firm hope of a final victory. 
 
 The history of the Seven Years' War suffices to show 
 that it will not be an easy matter for a great European 
 CoaHtion to triumph over the Germanic combination of 
 
106 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Powers. The experience of the Seven Years' War and 
 of many other wars proves that coahtions suffer from serious 
 disadvantages, that disunion is hable to appear in their 
 ranks, and that a dictatorship, such as that which exists 
 permanently in Germany, has enormous advantages over 
 Governments less well organised for war. In the time 
 of Frederick the Great lack of energy and of initiative 
 in warfare lamed the power of the Coahtion. 
 
 After all, it is only natural that amateurs who co-operate 
 with difficulty are at a disadvantage in contending against 
 perfectly drilled and organised professionals, that a miHtary 
 State which absolutely obeys a single will enjoys enormous 
 advantage over several non-military States. Modern war 
 is conducted by armed nations. Exactly as the command 
 of an army cannot safely be entrusted to a committee, 
 but only to a single commander-in-chief, the guidance 
 of a nation at war is best entrusted to a single man, to a 
 dictator. That was clearly recognised by the ancient 
 Eomans, the most fervent repubhcans the world has seen, 
 and the modern democracies that are fighting for their 
 liberty may do well to learn from Home's example. 
 
 Austria suffered grievously at Prussia's hands in the 
 time of Frederick the Great and of Prince Bismarck. Is 
 she wilHng to be ruined completely by WilHam the Second, 
 who has dragged her into the present war, or will she re- 
 member her sufferings and turn at the most critical moment 
 against her ancient enemy, as Bismarck foreshadowed ? 
 He wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 If in Austria anti-German tendencies, whether national 
 or religious, were to gain strength, and Austria leagued 
 herself with Germany's enemies for the purpose of making a 
 clean sweep of the results of 1866, no words are needed to 
 show how greatly aggravated would then be the peril of 
 Germany. This idea is pessimistic, but no means chimerical. 
 
 If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation 
 of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German poHcy 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 107 
 
 appear salus 'publica for Austria-Hungary, public faith could 
 not be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice. 
 
 In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error 
 to exclude the possibility of a hostile poHcy such as was 
 pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. 
 May not the pohcy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy 
 on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Eussia, 
 be again pursued towards another Power ? . . . 
 
 We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose 
 sight of the possibiHty that the poHcy of Vienna may willy- 
 nilly abandon us. 
 
 In disclosing the existence of the Ee-Insurance Treaty 
 with Eussia, and foretelUng the present war, and the break- 
 down of the Triple AlHance, in the Hamburger Nachrichten 
 on January 24, 1892 (the full text will be found in another 
 chapter of this book), Bismarck wrote : 
 
 No one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment 
 will not reawaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at 
 Germany's cost if the pressure of European events should 
 weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidehty to treaty, 
 Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new 
 German Empire. 
 
 Germany's defeat would mean Austria's annihilation. 
 Germany's victory would make her a German vassal State. 
 It seems not impossible that at the critical moment the 
 alHed Powers might approach Austria and offer her com- 
 pensation for the losses which she is bound to suffer in the 
 east and south, by giving Silesia back to her and joining 
 the chiefly Eoman Cathohc South German States once more 
 to the Dual Monarchy. Austria might recover the great 
 position which she held in Germany and revenge herself 
 upon Frederick the Great at the cost of WilHam the Second. 
 The present Emperor may have rashly destroyed not 
 only the lifework of Bismarck but that of his great ancestor 
 as well. 
 
CHAPTEK III 
 
 THE POLICY OF BISMARCK AND OF WILLIAM II * 
 
 Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, Germany's 
 greatest son, was born on April 1, 1815, at Schonhausen. 
 He died on July 30, 1898, at Friedrichsruh. Fate has its 
 ironies. Apparently William the Second took the terrible 
 decision which brought about the present war at a Council 
 held at the Neues Palais in Potsdam on July 30, 1914, the 
 anniversary of Bismarck's death ; and the celebration of 
 the centenary of Bismarck's birth has taken place in the 
 turmoil of a war which seems likely to end in the destruction 
 of Bismarck's life-work and of the Empire which he had 
 laboriously created. 
 
 To the broad masses of the English-speaking people, 
 and even to most well-informed men in this country. Prince 
 Bismarck is an unknown and a sinister figure, a mysterious 
 and terrible character, a man of blood and iron, Germany's 
 evil genius, a statesman devoid of human feeling ; who 
 by diaboHcal cunning, unscrupulousness and violence, 
 by the medieval methods of Machiavelli, united Germany ; 
 who imprinted his character deeply, and fatally, upon the 
 new Empire, and forced it into a path which inevitably 
 led to the present catastrophe. Those, however, who see 
 in Bismarck a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous schemer of 
 boundless ambition, who beheve that the Iron Chancellor 
 is responsible for the present war, and that William the 
 
 1 From The Nineteenth Century and After, April 1915. 
 108 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 109 
 
 Second and his supporters have merely acted in accordance 
 with Bismarck's teachings, are in error. The principal 
 characteristic of Bismarck's foreign policy was not its 
 daring and miscrupulousness, but its perfect sanity, one 
 might almost say its wise moderation and its cautious 
 restraint. 
 
 The present war is solely the work of William the Second 
 and of his entourage. Had not the Emperor and his 
 counsellors deliberately thrown to the winds Bismarck's 
 pleadings for a sane policy and his unceasing admonitions, 
 Germany would still be prosperous and at peace. Un- 
 fortunately, statesmanship is little studied in Great Britain. 
 Bismarck, the statesman, is almost unknown even to those 
 who are keenly interested in politics and who have adopted 
 pohtics or diplomacy as a profession. This is the more 
 to be regretted as Bismarck was probably not only the 
 greatest diplomat but the greatest statesman, in the fullest 
 sense of the word, of whom we know. In his social policy, 
 economic policy, parliamentary policy, and in matters of 
 organisation and administration he was a pioneer, and 
 in all these he was probably as great as he was in the 
 sphere of foreign policy. Unfortunately statesmanship, the 
 greatest of all human sciences, is completely neglected at 
 the Anglo-Saxon Universities in both hemispheres. If it 
 were taught, as it ought to be, there would be chairs of 
 Bismarckian statesmanship at every university. 
 
 The greatness of a statesman may be seen not by his 
 eloquence and his parliamentary and electoral successes, 
 but by his national achievements. Bismarck created 
 an empire and made a nation. Measured by the positive 
 success of his activity Bismarck was undoubtedly one of 
 the greatest statesmen known to history. In 1862, when 
 Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia, Germany 
 was merely a geographical expression, and Prussia was a 
 weak, poor, small, torn, and disunited State. It consisted 
 of two disjointed halves, which were separated from one 
 
110 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 another by the independent States of Hanover and Hesse. 
 It had only 18,491,220 inhabitants. It had practically no 
 merchant marine, no manufacturing industries, and very 
 little wealth. The nation and its Government were in 
 conflict. Austria dominated and domineered over Prussia. 
 The country had been shaken to its foundations by the 
 revolution of 1848. Another revolution seemed not im- 
 possible. 
 
 Civil strife was so acute, and the internal difficulties 
 of Prussia were so great when Wilham the First ascended 
 the Prussian throne, that he had actually written out in 
 his own hand his act of resignation. With difficulty 
 Bismarck induced the despairing monarch to tear up that 
 fatal document. 
 
 King and Parliament were in deadly conflict. Kingship 
 had fallen so low in public esteem that, as Bismarck has 
 told us, scarcely anyone raised his hat to the King in Berlin 
 except a couple of Court hairdressers. Such was the posi- 
 tion when Bismarck took office. He resolved to break the 
 power of the pugnacious Prussian Parliament, to strengthen 
 to the utmost the authority and power of the Crown, to deprive 
 Austria of her leadership, to conquer for weak and despised 
 Prussia the supremacy in Germany and in Europe. 
 
 Bismarck is unique among statesmen. Gifted with 
 marvellous foresight, he formed the full programme of 
 his entire life-work as a comparatively young and quite 
 inexperienced man, and was able to carry it out in every 
 particular in the course of a long and laborious Ufe. In 
 manuscript notes written down in March 1854, and in a 
 long memorandum sent to Otto von Manteuffel, the then 
 Prime Minister of Prussia, on July 25, 1854, both of which 
 are reprinted in vol. ii. of the ' Anhang zu den Gedanken 
 und Erinnerungen von Otto Fiirst von Bismarck,' we find 
 laid down the complete policy which Bismarck pursued un- 
 swervingly to the day of his death. He then advocated, 
 for instance, that Prussia should follow not a German 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 111 
 
 but a purely Prussian policy ; that she should make herself 
 supreme in Germany, following, if necessary, an anti- 
 Austrian poHcy ; that she should cut herself off from 
 Austria, and should not support that country if the pursuit 
 of her Balkan ambitions should involve the realm of the 
 Hapsburgs in trouble with Eussia. 
 
 As a young student, Bismarck, hke many men of his 
 time, dreamed of a United Germany. However, while the 
 vast majority of Germans wished to unite all the German 
 States and the States of Austria-Hungary in some loose 
 form of federation, Bismarck aimed at creating a compact 
 and purely German Germany, a great national and homo- 
 geneous State, under Prussia's leadership, expelling Austria 
 out of Germany and leaving to the House of Hapsburg 
 the rule of the ahen nations, of the Slavs, Magyars, Eou- 
 manians, and Italians. 
 
 )^. In the beginning of his official career Bismarck advocated 
 the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel, desiring 
 to make Prussia a seafaring and naval Power. He recom- 
 mended the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, 
 and looked hopefully forward to a war with Napoleon the 
 Third, who then dominated Europe, trusting that his 
 overthrow would unite Germany and give to Prussia the 
 hegemony in Germany and Europe. 
 
 Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862. 
 Supported by the King, he immediately set to work to 
 strengthen the Prussian Army immensely, for he wished 
 to make Prussia independent and powerful with its help. 
 As the Prussian Parliament absolutely refused to vote 
 the large funds required, he governed for years without a 
 Parliament and without a budget, collecting the taxes by 
 force. Two years after, in 1864, supported by Austria, he 
 made war upon Denmark, and took from that country 
 Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel. At that time, Austro-Prussian 
 co-operation was indispensable for achieving Bismarck's 
 aims. As the two Germanic Powers seemed firmly united, 
 
112 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 and as Russia and France were not ready for war, the States 
 of Europe only protested against the seizure of the Danish 
 territories, but did not intervene. 
 
 Austria had served Prussia well by enabling her to 
 acquire the coveted Danish territories, but the defeat of 
 the Dual Monarchy was required to make Prussia supreme 
 in Germany and to give her the leadership of the other 
 German States, the adherence of which would immensely 
 strengthen her mihtary power. The Austro-Prussian 
 condominium in Schleswig-Hol^ein lent itself admirably 
 to the production of the necessary casus belli. War was duly 
 brought about in 1866. The Prussian people and their 
 parHamentary representatives, who had dreamt of a Greater 
 Germany, embracing Prussia, Austria, and all the smaller 
 States, and who detested Bismarck as an enemy of liberalism 
 and of representative government, protested passionately, 
 but in vain, against the Bruderkrieg, the fratricidal war. 
 Owing to the great increase of the Army, made against the 
 will of the representatives of the people, Prussia had become 
 exceedingly strong. She defeated Austria, and that country 
 lost her supremacy both in Germany and in Italy. By arms 
 Prussia had established her paramountcy in Germany. 
 
 Austria's defeat had freed Prussia from Austria's leader- 
 ship, had made her independent, had greatly increased her 
 power and prestige, and had loosely attached to Prussia 
 the Central and South German States, who naturally in- 
 clined towards the victor. To weld Prussia and the South 
 German States into a firmly united body, to give Prussia 
 for all time the leadership in Germany, and to reconquer 
 the formerly German Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck required 
 a successful war with France, the hereditary enemy. He 
 clearly recognised that only a victory over France could 
 arouse among all the German States and peoples an 
 enthusiasm sufi&ciently strong to overcome the petty 
 jealousies which had divided Germany since the dawn of 
 her history. 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 113 
 
 In six yearf, from 1864 to 1870, Prussia had, under 
 Bismarck's leadership, fought three most successful wars. 
 She had acquired free access to the sea. She had created 
 an organic connection between the detached eastern and 
 western halves of the Monarchy by incorporating Hanover 
 and Hesse as a result of the war of 1866. She had acquired 
 vast German territories, and had firmly joined to herself 
 the purely German South German States. She had re- 
 conquered Alsace-Lorraine, and had won for the King of 
 Prussia the Imperial Crown. Thus, Bismarck had at the 
 same time made Prussia great, had united Germany, and 
 had firmly established the authority of the King. He had 
 achieved all this against the will of the people and against 
 that of the most influential circles. Even the King himself 
 had always to be persuaded and convinced, cajoled and 
 threatened, to follow Bismarck's lead. 
 
 Government against the will of the people, as carried 
 on by Bismarck, had proved marvellously successful. The 
 King-Emperor was given the full credit of Bismarck's 
 achievements. Hence, Bismarck's successes had steadily 
 increased the authority of the monarch. The people had 
 been taught to trust their rulers bhndly and unquestioningly, 
 and to treat their shortsighted parliamentary represent- 
 atives almost with contempt. The behef in authority 
 among the people was greatly strengthened by a patriotic 
 education in the elementary schools, and by making the 
 formerly free universities of Germany and the Press instru- 
 ments of the Government and of the Imperial will. Thus, 
 the Hberal and democratic Germany of former times was 
 destroyed. 
 
 Having created Prusso-Germany's greatness, Bismarck 
 wished to estabhsh the country's security for all time. By 
 an economic policy which at the same time was wise and 
 daring, he created a wonderful system of State railways, 
 and a powerful and efficient merchant marine. He con- 
 verted Germany from a poor and almost purely agricultural 
 
114 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 State into a wealthy industrial country. He introduced a 
 system of State Insurance which has been copied by many 
 countries, and secured Germany's position among the 
 Powers by the most wonderful system of alHances which 
 the world has seen. 
 
 By sparing Austria after her defeat of 1866, Bismarck 
 made possible her reconciliation with Germany. By 
 placing the Dual Monarchy into opposition with Kussia at 
 the time of the Eusso-Turkish War, he raised the spectre 
 of a Russo-Austrian War. It alarmed Vienna very greatly, 
 and made an Austro- German AUiance not only possible 
 but necessary. 
 
 Fearing the abiding resentment and hostiUty of defeated 
 and humiliated France, Bismarck wished to isolate that 
 country. The German-Austrian AUiance did not seem to 
 afford a sufficient guarantee against the formation of an 
 anti- German coalition, in which France would, of course, 
 be the moving spirit. 
 
 To alienate France and Italy, Bismarck gave to France 
 at the Congress of Berlin Tunis, to which Italy had by far 
 the stronger claim, and thus he involved these two countries 
 in bitter hostility, and a ten years' Customs war. He 
 prompted France to acquire colonies in opposition to 
 England, and at the same time encouraged England to 
 occupy Egypt, to the possession of which France considered 
 herself entitled. Thus, he estranged France and England. 
 Furthermore, England and Russia were made to quarrel 
 over Constantinople and Asia. 
 
 France's hostility, combined with Austro- German pres- 
 sure, forced Italy to join the German-Austrian AUiance. 
 The Triple Alliance was created. Germany could rely on 
 the support of two Great Powers, while France, Russia, 
 and England were isolated. Germany's security seemed 
 throughly established. Nevertheless, Bismarck still feared 
 the formation of a coalition hostile to Germany. It is true 
 the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. 
 
POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 115 
 
 Still, Kussia might conceivably feel threatened by that 
 combination and endeavour to protect herself by a counter- 
 alliance with France, Germany's natural enemy. 
 
 To prevent Eussia and France combining, Bismarck 
 not only demonstrated to Eussia Germany's sincere friend- 
 ship whenever an opportunity offered, but he concluded 
 with that country a secret but purely defensive alliance 
 which assured Eussia that Germany would not aid Austria- 
 Hungary if that country should attack Eussia, but, on 
 the contrary, observe towards Eussia an attitude of bene- 
 volent neutrality. The two treaties completely shackled 
 Austria's freedom of action, and tied that country to the 
 German car of State. They made Austria-Hungary a 
 junior partner in the AHiance. With the two alternative 
 Alliances Bismarck could always play off Austria-Hungary 
 against Eussia, or Eussia against Austria-Hungary. The 
 initiative in the Triple AlHance was reserved to Germany. 
 
 As England was hard pressed by France in Africa, and 
 by Eussia in Asia, she naturally inclined towards German}'-, 
 and would probably have assisted that country in a war 
 with France and Eussia. She was considered to be an 
 imofficial, a semi-detached, member of the Triple AHiance. 
 In addition, Eoumania, ruled by a Hohenzollern Prince, 
 was attached to the Triple AHiance by a secret treaty, and 
 Turkey could be relied upon to support Germany against 
 Eussia in time of need. As Eussia and England were 
 friendly to Germany, France was isolated and unable to 
 find an ally. By this wonderful system of alliances, con- 
 cluded with all the important European nations, which 
 were encouraged to quarrel among themselves, Bismarck 
 dominated and directed all Europe. An anti- German 
 coalition was unthinkable. Germany ruled Europe. 
 
 Bismarck pursued not an ambitious policy of domination, 
 but a purely nationalist and a conservative poHcy. He did 
 not aim at ruHng the world. The wars which he had brought 
 about were in truth wars of nationahty. They were under- 
 
 i2 
 
116 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 taken solely for the purpose of uniting the divided German 
 nation. They were means to an end, and they were neces- 
 sary for Germany's unification. Ever since his youth, 
 Bismarck had wished to see all Germans, except the Roman 
 Catholic Austro- Germans, united in a single State, ruled 
 by the Hohenzollerns. In 1871 he had achieved his ideal. 
 When, by three successful wars, he had accompHshed his 
 aim, he considered his work completed. He had created 
 a great German Empire, and he desired the new Empire 
 to keep the peace and to remain a purely German State. 
 Ever since 1871 Bismarck strove to avoid war. It has 
 often been asserted, but it has not been sufficiently proved, 
 that Bismarck intended to attack France in 1875. He 
 denied that intention to the day of his death, unceasingly 
 condemning wars of ambition or precaution, such as that 
 brought about by William the Second. 
 
 The future historians of Germany may tell their readers 
 that Bismarck created the German Empire and that William 
 the Second destroyed it. It seems exceedingly strange 
 that Bismarck's successors proved unable to continue 
 Bismarck's work, for their task was simple and easy. At 
 the time when the Iron Chancellor was dismissed the position 
 of the German Empire was impregnable. The Triple 
 Alliance was a rock of strength, and as Austria was kept 
 in check by the German-Russian secret treaty of alliance 
 Berlin retained the initiative. England, Russia, Turkey, 
 and Roumania were firm friends of Germany, and were 
 likely to support that country in case of need. Isolated 
 France was Germany's only enemy. 
 
 It is true Bismarck had no great successor. He has 
 often been reproached for not having trained a statesman 
 to take his place. However, great statesmen, hke great 
 poets, are born, not made. Besides, Germany no longer 
 required a great statesman to continue Bismarck's work, 
 for that far-seeing statesman had left to his successors the 
 fullest and the most detailed instructions for their guidance. 
 
POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 117 
 
 His policy, like that of every truly great statesman, was 
 distinguished by its simplicity and by its absence of secrecy. 
 No statesman has ever taken his contemporaries more 
 freely and more fully into his confidence than has Prince 
 Bismarck. He laid his policy open to all Germany, and 
 the Germans showed their gratitude and admiration for 
 the founder of the Empire by publishing in full Bismarck's 
 innumerable speeches and addresses, despatches. State 
 papers, newspaper articles, confidential and private corre- 
 spondence, and his conversations and table-talk in many 
 hundreds of volumes. Modern Germany gave itself over 
 to a veritable Bismarck cult. The Bismarck Hterature of 
 Germany is about as copious as is the Napolc?onic literature 
 of France. Bismarck's views on every subject and on 
 every question were studied, not merely by the elect, but 
 by the masses. His * Memoirs,' his political testament, 
 were and are probably as widely read and as frequently 
 quoted in Germany as the Bible and Goethe's * Faust.' 
 
 Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great 
 by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's 
 unity and firmly estabhshed the State, Bismarck desired to 
 estabhsh its permanence and security by pursuing a peace- 
 ful, prudent, moderate and conciliatory foreign policy, 
 rightly fearing that a policy of dash and adventure, of 
 interference, provocation and bluster, would raise dangerous 
 enemies to the new State. In one of the concluding chapters 
 of his * Memoirs,' his pohtical testament, .that great states- 
 man laid down on large lines the policy which Germany 
 ought to pursue in ^he future, in the following phrases :~ - 
 
 In the future not only sufficient mihtary equipment, 
 but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the 
 German ship of State through the currents of coalition to 
 which, in consequence of our geographical position and our 
 previous history, we are exposed. . . . 
 
 We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeHng 
 among the nations, which has been called forth through our 
 
118 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable 
 and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world 
 that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less 
 partizan, and also less harmful to the freedom of other 
 nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia or 
 England. . . . 
 
 In order to produce this confidence, it is above everything 
 necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be 
 easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events. 
 
 William the Second came to the throne on June 15, 
 1888. He disagreed with Bismarck on important questions 
 of domestic and foreign poHcy. He dismissed the founder 
 of Modern Germany on March 22, 1890. After his dismissal, 
 Bismarck watched with concern and anxiety the unceasing, 
 reckless, and neurotic activity of the young Emperor. He 
 feared that the youthful monarch, encouraged by Court 
 flatterers, place-hunters, and adventurers, might endanger, 
 or even destroy, the newly created Empire, and deep 
 pessimism took hold of him. Hoping to save his country, 
 Bismarck devoted the remaining eight years of his life 
 entirely to political teaching. He laid down the principles 
 of his foreign and domestic policy in a large number of news- 
 paper articles and speeches, he criticised freely and fearlessly 
 the mistakes of his successors, and he gave to his country 
 the essence of his statesmanship, the arcana imperii, in 
 his ' Gedanken und Erinnerungen,* his ' Memoirs,' which 
 may be found in every German house. 
 
 Bismarck's pessimism as to Germany's future, which 
 impressed numerous Germans who paid him homage in 
 his retirement, was chiefly caused by the unstable, rash, 
 overweening and domineering character of WilHam the 
 Second, by his vanity and by his susceptibihty to flattery. 
 I have already quoted in this book the following two para- 
 graphs from Bismarck's * Memoirs,' obviously comparing 
 William the Second with his grandfather, but they will 
 bear repetition : 
 
POLICY OF BISMARCK AND OF WILLIAM II 119 
 
 The Emperor William I was completely free from vanity 
 of this kind ; on the other hand, he had in a high degree a 
 peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries 
 and of posterity. ... No one would have dared to flatter 
 him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity, 
 he would have thought ' If anyone has the right of praising 
 me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my 
 face.' He would not admit either. . . . 
 
 What I fear is that by following the road in which we are 
 walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the 
 moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than 
 the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is the 
 qualification, then demands will be made on the general 
 ability of the monarch which even a Frederick the Great 
 could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war 
 and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day. 
 
 Referring to the misrule of former Prussian kings, 
 Bismarck significantly wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 In an absolute monarchy no one except the sovereign 
 can be proved to have any definite share of responsibility 
 for its policy. If the King comes to any unfortunate deci- 
 sions, no one can judge whether they are due to his own will 
 or to the influence which various personalities of male and 
 female gender — aides-de-camp, courtiers and political in- 
 triguers, flatterers, chatterboxes, and tell-tales — may have 
 upon the monarch. In the last resort the royal signature 
 covers everything ; how it has been obtained no one ever 
 knows. 
 
 William the Second dismissed Bismarck because he 
 thought his own pohcy wiser than that of his experienced 
 Chancellor. BeHeving himself a genius, he wished to be 
 his own Chancellor. He had no use for statesmen, for men 
 of genius and of character such as Bismarck, but only for 
 time-serving nonentities, for men without backbone, who 
 were ready to execute without question the Imperial will 
 
120 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 and every Imperial whim, regardless of the consequences 
 to the comitry. On July 1, 1897, Bismarck commented on 
 the impending retirement of Herr Marschall von Bieberstein 
 from the German Foreign Office. He discreetly pointed 
 out that not Herr von Marschall, but the Emperor himself 
 was to blame for the mistakes of Germany's foreign policy 
 made since Bismarck's dismissal. He wrote in the Ham- 
 burger NacJiricMen : 
 
 A number of papers, especially the Kolnische Zeitung, give 
 a good character to Herr von Marschall at the occasion of his 
 impending resignation. . . . 
 
 We have not noticed that Herr von Marschall has been 
 guided by any political views and principles of his own in 
 carrying out the Imperial orders. We are convinced that 
 he possessed certain principles when he entered the Foreign 
 Office, but we do not believe that he had any opportunity 
 to apply them during his seven years of office. We believe 
 that he has merely done his official duties by carrying out the 
 instructions which he received from the Imperial Chan- 
 cellor on behalf of the Emperor. . . . 
 
 We do not intend to criticise Germany's policy during 
 the last seven years, but we should be acting unjustly in 
 holding him responsible for that policy. We consider that 
 he had no part in shaping it, that he merely did what he 
 was told. 
 
 William the Second has made numerous absolute pro- 
 nouncements, such as * You Germans have only one will, 
 and that is My will ; there is only one law, and that is 
 My law^' * Sic volo, sic juheo.^ ' Only one master in this 
 country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush 
 to pieces.' Like another Louis the Fourteenth, WilHam 
 the Second taught the people ' UStat c'est moi.' Bismarck 
 dreaded the Emperor's inclination tow^ards absolutism. 
 He considered his recklessness to be doubly dangerous in 
 view of the great power possessed by the monarch, and the 
 abject flattery and servility prevailing in German Court 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 121 
 
 circles, on the one hand, and in view of the extreme docility 
 of the well-drilled German nation on the other. Hence, 
 Bismarck strove with all his might to create a counter- 
 poise to the Emperor in an enlightened public opinion, in 
 an independent Parliament, and in frank public criticism 
 of the Emperor's policy. He wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 Absolutism would be the ideal form of Government for a 
 European State were not the King and his officials as other 
 men to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman 
 wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and 
 well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imper- 
 fections, such as an over-estimation of their own wisdom, 
 the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention 
 petticoat influences, both legitimate and illegitimate. 
 Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism 
 he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism ; 
 the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk 
 of losing his way. 
 
 Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a 
 free Press and of Parliaments in the modern sense of the term. 
 
 After his dismissal, Bismarck settled in Friedrichsruh, 
 his country seat, close to Hamburg, and the Hamburger 
 Nachrichten became the principal organ in which he 
 stated his views, in numerous anonymous articles which 
 betray his authorship by their style. They will be found 
 collected in the seven- volume work of Penzler, and in the 
 two-volume work of Hermann Hofmann, two journalists 
 who edited them, and in the pubhcations of Poschinger, 
 Horst Kohl, Liman, Blum, and other writers on Bismarck. 
 It should be added that the vast majority of the extracts 
 given in this chapter have not been published in the English 
 language. Their authenticity may be seen by the fact 
 that Bismarck did not repudiate their authorship when, 
 during his lifetime, they were collected and pubHshed by 
 Penzler and described as articles emanating from the great 
 Chancellor. 
 
122 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 In the Hamburger NachricMen of November 24, 1891, 
 Bismarck commented severely on the Emperor's pronounce- 
 ment * Suyrema lex regis voluntas.'' He contrasted it 
 with his first speech from the throne, on June 27, 1888, 
 in which the Emperor had promised that he would maintain 
 the existing constitution, and had stated that he was satisfied 
 with his position as established by it. 
 
 On December 11, 1891, Bismarck received the editor 
 of the Eisenhahn Zeitung, Referring to the Emperor's 
 pronouncement * Sic volo, sic juheo,' he told the journahst 
 that he saw Germany's salvation in the possession of a 
 strong monarchy and of a Parhament which defended 
 the rights of the people. On the following day, Decem- 
 ber 12, 1891, receiving a deputation of the town of Siegen, 
 Bismarck said : 
 
 The most disquieting feature for me is that the Reichstag 
 has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from the 
 bureaucracy. . . . The Reichstag is the indispensable 
 cement of Germany's national unity. If its authority 
 declines, the bonds which hold Germany together are 
 weakened. 
 
 On July 24, 1892, Bismarck, addressing a South German 
 deputation at Kissingen, said : 
 
 I would have gladly continued my wbrk, but our young 
 Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German 
 Reichstag is the focus of our national life. To strengthen 
 the Reichstag, the responsibility of Ministers should be in- 
 creased. Anyone can become Imperial Chancellor, whether 
 he is fitted for the office or not, and the Chancellor's post may 
 be abused to such an extent that he becomes a mere secre- 
 tary, and that his responsibility is limited to executing 
 the orders he receives. ... If ministerial responsibility 
 were established by law, a man who does not possess the 
 necessary qualifications would not take office. . . . 
 
 When I became Minister, the Crown was threatened by 
 the people. The King was discouraged because he could no 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 123 
 
 longer rely on his Ministers, and he wished to abdicate. 
 Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. 
 Perhaps I have gone too far in that direction. We now 
 require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe 
 that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy. Other- 
 wise we fall a prey to official absolutism. We require the 
 bracing air of public criticism. Our entire constitution is 
 based on it. If Parliament becomes powerless, becomes 
 a mere tool in the hands of the Government, we return to 
 the regime of absolutism. 
 
 Bismarck was particularly dismayed at the Emperor's 
 unceasing and exasperating interference in foreign poKtics 
 which threatened to create everywhere enemies to Germany. 
 On July 30, 1892, he stated in his speech at Jena that in 
 foreign poHcy the most important thing was not activity 
 but patience, and he attributed much of his success to the 
 fact that he had learned patience when stalking deer or 
 fishing. Continuing, he said : 
 
 The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the co-opera- 
 tion of the monarchical will with the convictions of the 
 governed people. . . . 
 
 It is a dangerous experiment nowadays to strive after 
 absolutism in the centre of Europe. Henceforward we must 
 aim at strengthening independent pohtical thought and 
 pohtical conviction in our ParHament and among the German 
 people. . . . 
 
 The wars which united Germany were necessary, but 
 there is no need for further wars. Our wishes are fulfilled. 
 We should be frivolous or clumsy if we allowed ourselves 
 to be involved in further wars without need. If we follow 
 a conservative poHcy we shall be able to hold our own against 
 all comers, although we are in the centre of Europe. Ger- 
 many cannot conduct aggressive cabinet wars. Besides, a 
 nation which can be forced into such wars does not possess 
 the right constitution. . . . 
 
 Since 1870 we have avoided further wars and have striven 
 to strengthen Germany. In building up the empire some 
 
124 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 kind of dictatorship was necessary, but that cannot be 
 considered as a permanent feature. Our task can be com- 
 pleted only when Germany possesses a powerful Parliament 
 which embodies our sense of unity. 
 
 As Bismarck's appeals to the German Parliament and 
 to the German people to assert themselves proved fruitless, 
 he endeavoured to find a counterpoise to the Emperor in 
 the minor States of Germany, which are represented in the 
 Federal Council. He wrote, on June 11, 1897, in the Le^p- 
 ziger Neueste NacJiricJiten : 
 
 According to Article 8 of the German Constitution, there 
 exists within the Federal Council a committee on foreign 
 affairs, formed by representatives of the Kingdoms of 
 Bavaria, Saxony, and Wiirtemberg, and by two representa- 
 tives elected by the other Federal States. That Committee 
 is entitled to demand information from the Government 
 regarding diplomatic affairs. Formerly, a meeting of the 
 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council was of 
 the greatest rarity. Prince Bismarck guided Germany's 
 foreign poHcy, and no one felt the necessity of controlling 
 him. Now matters are different. 
 
 Although we do not wish to criticise the achievements of 
 Prince Hohenlohe or Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, we 
 feel that it is necessary to remind the country of the existence 
 of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council. 
 We are of opinion that the German people are entitled to 
 know the character of the ' changes ' which have taken 
 place in the relations between Vienna and Berlin, about 
 which inspired Austrian papers have been writing, and we 
 hope that these ' changes ' have not taken place at Ger- 
 many's cost, that they will neither lead to Germany's isola- 
 tion nor to Germany's dependence upon Austria and Eussia. 
 
 The watchword of modern Germany is * Machtpolitik.' 
 Unrestrained violence is advocated as a policy. During 
 recent years, and especially since Bismarck's death, many 
 leading 'Germans have advocated a ruthless policy devoid 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 125 
 
 of morality and based exclusively on brute force. Modem 
 Germany has paid lip-worship to Bismarck, but has dis- 
 regarded his teachings, for that great statesman endeavoured, 
 in the main, to follow an honest, moderate, and straight- 
 forward poKcy, and he attached the greatest value to 
 pohtical morality. On July 21, 1893, addressing a thousand 
 people from Brunswick, Bismarck said : 
 
 The possession of moral authority is a very important 
 factor in pohtical hfe. To avoid wars, something more is 
 needed than the possession of a powerful army. I attach 
 value to the respect and the prestige which Germany enjoys 
 among the non-German nations. Eespect and prestige 
 are desirable not merely to satisfy national vanity and 
 ambition. They are valuable and extremely useful assets 
 which carry with them great advantages, and we suffer when 
 Germany's prestige and respect are diminished. 
 
 Contemplating with concern the Chauvinistic tendencies 
 which had become noticeable in Germany imder the govern- 
 ment of WilHam the Second, Bismarck, after his retirement, 
 unceasingly urged that Germany should follow a poHcy of 
 peace, of moderation, of good faith, and of good fellowship 
 towards other nations. He wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feehng 
 which has been called forth through our growth to the 
 position of a real Great Power by the honourable and peace- 
 ful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a 
 German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, 
 and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would 
 be the hegemony of France, Kussia, or England. 
 
 It has always been my ideal aim, after we had estabhshed 
 our unity within the possible hmits, to win the confidence not 
 only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great 
 Powers, and to convince them that German poHcy will be 
 just and peaceful now that it has repaired the injuria 
 tem'porum, the disintegration of the nation. In order to 
 produce this confidence it is above everything necessary 
 
126 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled 
 in case of friction or untoward events. 
 
 In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds 
 better than the subtlety of earlier ages. 
 
 Advocating a peaceful, honourable, and straightforward 
 policy, Bismarck was absolutely opposed to unnecessary 
 wars, and especially to preventive wars. Hence, he would 
 not allow the military men, who easily incline towards 
 war, to exercise any influence upon statesmanship. He 
 wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 Even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are 
 forced upon one. Besides, one cannot read the cards of 
 Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical develop- 
 ment and make one's own calculations accordingly. It is 
 natural that in the staff of the army not only young, active 
 officers, but experienced strategists also should feel the need 
 of turning to account the efficiency of their troops and their 
 own capacity to lead, and should wish to make themselves 
 renowned in history. It would be a matter of regret if that 
 feeling did not exist in the army. However, the task of 
 keeping that feeling within such limits as the nation's need 
 of peace can justly claim is the duty of the poHtical, not the 
 mihtary, heads of the State. 
 
 That feeling becomes dangerous only under a monarch 
 whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist 
 one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences. 
 
 How peaceful Bismarck's views were may be seen from 
 the following New Year article which appeared in the 
 Munchener Allgemeine Zeitung on January 4, 1892. We 
 read : 
 
 The indisputable predominance of Germany in European 
 policy from the end of the Franco- German War to the end 
 of the 'eighties was due, before aU, to the superiority of the 
 German army and to the great personal prestige and influence 
 enjoyed by the Emperor William I and Prince Bismarck. 
 Since then other nations have increased their readiness for 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 127 
 
 war, and since the disappearance of the old Emperor and of 
 his Chancellor, Germany's authoritative position has natur- 
 ally diminished, for only fresh successes can give Germany 
 that prestige and influence which she acquired in the times 
 of these men. However, successes similar to those achieved 
 in the time of William I do not often recur. 
 
 The German Empire, as left by its founders, does not 
 require new foreign wars, for nothing can be gained by them. 
 On the contrary, Germany's principal aim must be to increase 
 its internal strength, so that the Empire may be able to 
 weather future storms. In the time of William I it was 
 necessary to bring about appeals to arms, because the 
 foundations of Germany's national life had to be laid. Now 
 it is Germany's task to avoid these decisions as far as possible, 
 for by war nothing can be gained, and only that which has 
 been won can be lost. That has been Prince Bismarck's 
 leading political idea ever since the Peace of Frankfort in 
 1871. ... 
 
 In entering upon the New Year we express the wish 
 that German statesmanship may not abandon the funda- 
 mental directions which have been laid down for its guid- 
 ance, that Germany may, at least in the domain of foreign 
 policy, continue to pursue the old course. 
 
 After dismissing Bismarck, WilHam the Second an- 
 nounced to the world that he would henceforth steer the 
 ship of State over a new course, and that he would lead 
 Germany towards a great and glorious future. FiUed 
 with anxiety lest the reckless ambition of the Emperor 
 would involve the young Empire in unnecessary and perilous 
 wars, Bismarck wrote, in a series of articles pubhshed in 
 the Milnchener Allgemeine Zeitung between May 12 
 and 18, 1892 : 
 
 Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad 
 national basis. When that task had been fulfilled he and 
 his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the 
 creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices. 
 This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary for 
 
128 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it 
 was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to 
 arms in which Germany could win nothing, but could only 
 lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory 
 beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune. . . . 
 
 Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea 
 of isolating France and of placing the new frontiers which 
 he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other 
 Powers. . . . 
 
 Germany's position and activity will always largely 
 depend upon her Allies. On the day when the leading 
 German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they 
 should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy 
 the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally 
 well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can 
 guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is 
 made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we 
 wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . . 
 
 Is it really necessary to pursue a new course ? The new 
 pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State 
 with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor, 
 but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course 
 that had been steered in the past ? 
 
 Wishing to avoid unnecessary and ruinous wars, Bismarck 
 desired before all to avoid a war with Kussia, Germany's 
 traditional ally, who had saved Prussia from extinction 
 in the time of Napoleon, and who had supported her in 
 the wars of 1866 and 1870, and had thus enabled Germany 
 to achieve her national unity. Besides, Germany and 
 Kussia had no conflicting interests, and neither Power had 
 reason to covet any territory possessed by the other. 
 
 Desiring that Germany should develop in peace, and 
 fearing the possibility of a hostile attack, Bismarck had 
 concluded a purely defensive alHance with Austria-Hungary 
 and Italy. It seemed, therefore, not Hkely that Kussia 
 would attack either Germany or Austria. Hence a war 
 with Kussia seemed to be possible only if an Austro- 
 
POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 129 
 
 Eussian quarrel should break out about the Balkan Penin- 
 sula and if Austria was the aggressor. 
 
 Bismarck was determined that Germany should not be 
 drawn unnecessarily into a purely Austrian quarrel. Hence 
 he had concluded with Eussia a secret defensive Treaty 
 which, as has previously been stated, assured that country 
 ^f Tjermany's "Ibenevolent neutrality in the event of an 
 Austrian attack. 
 
 As long as Eussia felt sure of Germany's benevolent 
 neutrality if attacked by Austria, she had no cause to ally 
 herself with France. Thus France remained isolated, 
 and Austria could not venture to attack Eussia unless 
 with Berlin's approval. Hence she was compelled to be 
 guided in her Balkan policy by Germany. If, on the other 
 hand, Eusso- German relations should become bad, it was 
 clear that Eussia would turn to France for support, and 
 that Austria would be able to drag Germany into her Balkan 
 adventures. Bismarck wrote in his * Memoirs ' : 
 
 After the conclusion of our defensive alliance with Austria 
 I considered it as necessary to cultivate neighbourly relations 
 with Eussia as before. . . . 
 
 If, however, Germany should quarrel with Eussia, if an 
 irremediable estrangement should take place between the 
 two countries, Austria would certainly begin to enlarge her 
 claims to the services of her German ally, first by insisting 
 on an extension of the casus foederis, which so far, accord- 
 ing to the published text, provides only for the measures 
 necessary to repel a Eussian attack upon Austria ; then by 
 requiring the casus foederis to be replaced by some provision 
 safeguarding the Austrian interests in the Balkans and the 
 East, an idea to which the Press has already succeeded in 
 giving practical shape. 
 
 The wants and the plans of the inhabitants of the basin 
 of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present limits 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The German Imperial 
 Constitution points out the way by which Austria may ad- 
 vance and reconcile her political and material interests, so 
 
130 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Koumanian 
 population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, however, no part 
 of the policy of the German Empire to lend its subjects, 
 and to expend their blood and treasure, for the purpose of 
 realising the designs of a neighbouring Power. 
 
 In the interest of the European political equihbrium 
 the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a 
 strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object 
 for which she might, in case of need, stake her own peace 
 with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from 
 going outside this security, and should not deduce from the 
 alUance claims which it was not concluded to support. . . . 
 
 After Bismarck's dismissal the defensive Eusso- German 
 Treaty, the so-called Ee-Insurance Treaty, was not renewed. 
 Prince Hohenlohe wrote in his diary on March 31, 1890 : 
 
 It seems more and more clear that differences regarding 
 Eussia between the Emperor and Bismarck have brought 
 about the breach. Bismarck intended to leave Austria in 
 the lurch, while the Emperor wished to support Austria, 
 even if his policy should involve him in war with Eussia 
 and France. That is made plain by Bismarck's words that 
 the Emperor carried on his policy like Frederick William 
 the Fourth. Herein lies the danger of the future. 
 
 In another part of his ' Memoirs,' Prince Hohenlohe 
 wrote that the Emperor's refusal to renew the Eusso- German 
 Treaty was the principal cause of Bismarck's dismissal. 
 
 The old Emperor was so strongly convinced of the 
 necessity of Germany keeping peace with Eussia that on 
 his death-bed, addressing WilHam the Second, he said, 
 according to Bismarck : ' Thou must always keep in touch 
 with the Eussian Emperor ; there no conflict is necessary.' 
 These were some of his last words. 
 
 Bismarck had been dismissed largely because the 
 Emperor wished to reverse Bismarck's poHcy towards 
 Eussia and Austria-Hungary. Foreseeing that a discon- 
 tinuance of the Eusso- German Treaty would ultimately. 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 131 
 
 and almost inevitably, involve Germany in an Austro- 
 Eussian war about the Balkans, where Germany had no 
 direct interests, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger 
 Nachrichten on April 26, 1890, only five weeks after his 
 dismissal : 
 
 Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for 
 promoting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula. 
 These Austrian plans have never been encouraged by Ger- 
 many as long as Germany's foreign policy was directed by 
 Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every 
 opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian 
 incident, shown with the utmost clearness that he is very 
 far from wishing to promote Austria's special interests in the 
 Balkans in antagonism to Eussia. Such a policy would not 
 be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. 
 That Alliance views only the damnum emergens, not the 
 lucrum cessans, of the signatory Powers. 
 
 Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's 
 ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions 
 exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other 
 nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not 
 to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan poHtics. 
 These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are 
 (apart from Eussia) England, France, and Italy. Austria 
 can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers 
 if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and 
 Germany need not concern herself about them. Germany's 
 point of view is this : that she has no interests in Balkan 
 affairs. 
 
 Five months later, on September 29, 1890, Bismarck 
 renewed his warning in the Hamburger Nachrichten : 
 
 In the past, when the relations between Germany and 
 Austria and between Germany and Eussia were discussed, 
 there were two points of danger : Firstly, that German 
 policy — or, what would be worse, the German Army — 
 should be placed at the disposal of purely Austrian interests 
 in the Balkans against Eussia ; secondly, that ^Germany's 
 
 k2 
 
132 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 relations with Eussia should be endangered and brought 
 to the breaking-point by unnecessary Press attacks. 
 
 We have always warned against this twofold danger, 
 but we have never advised a breach of treaty faith towards 
 Austria. The Austro- German alliance does not demand 
 that Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests 
 against Eussia. It only demands that Germany should assist 
 Austria if her territories should be attacked by Eussia. . . . 
 
 We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good 
 and cordial relations between Germany and Eussia. If 
 Austria and Eussia should differ, Germany can mediate most 
 successfully if she is trusted in St. Petersburg. Besides, a 
 breach with Eussia would, according to our inmost conviction, 
 make Germany dependent upon Austria. . . . 
 
 No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy 
 without a war with Eussia which would demand enormous 
 sacrifices in blood and treasure. The Balkans do not 
 concern Germany. We are interested in the maintenance of 
 peace, and we do not care how Austria and Eussia arrange 
 their spheres of interest in the Balkans. . . . 
 
 Being anxious that good relations should exist between 
 Germany and Austria, and that Austria's power and position 
 should be preserved, we have opposed mistaken views as 
 to the scope of the Austro-German Treaty, and have en- 
 deavoured to show that that Treaty does not oblige Germany 
 to support Austria in the Balkans. 
 
 Hinting at the so-called Ee-Insurance Treaty with 
 Eussia which WilHam the Second had refused to renew, 
 under the provisions of which Germany was to support 
 Eussia in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by 
 Austria, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten of 
 January 24, 1892 : 
 
 The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879 contem- 
 plated, as far as Eussia was concerned, only mutual defence 
 against a possible attack. Hence Germany always pointed 
 out in Vienna that the Austro-German Alliance protected 
 only the Dual Monarchy itself, but not its Balkan policy, 
 
POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 133 
 
 against Eussia. With regard to the Balkans, Germany had 
 unceasingly advised Austria to find protection by means of 
 a separate Treaty with the States interested in the Balkans, 
 such as England and Italy. Belying on the unaggressive 
 character of the Austro- German Treaty, Germany was 
 always able to go hand in hand with Eussia, and to influence 
 Austria if the Eastern policy of that country seemed likely 
 to take an undesirable turn. 
 
 This advantageous position, the maintenance of which 
 made considerable claims upon the skill of Germany's 
 diplomacy, was later on believed to be too complicated. 
 Besides, personal misunderstandings [between the Emperor 
 and the Czar] impaired the good relations between BerHn 
 and St. Petersburg, and led to the Eusso-French rapproche- 
 ment. Thus the position has changed to Germany's dis- 
 advantage. Formerly it was in Germany's power to arrive 
 at any moment at an understanding with Eussia, in con- 
 sequence of treaty arrangements which existed side by side 
 with the Austro- German Treaty, but which exist no longer. 
 In consequence of the estrangement between Germany and 
 Eussia, Austria has been enabled to exercise considerable 
 pressure upon Germany. 
 
 ForetelHng the present war and the breakdown of the 
 Triple Alliance, Bismarck continued : 
 
 Apparently German statesmanship no longer observes a 
 disinterested attitude in Eastern affairs. By following the 
 path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of 
 gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the 
 end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for 
 the Balkan policy of Vienna. In view of that possibiHty, 
 it will be readily understood that Prince Bismarck again and 
 ever again gave warning that Germany should not break 
 with Eussia. . . . 
 
 The change in the European situation to Germany's 
 disadvantage cannot be excused by extolling the power of 
 the Triple AlHance. Formerly the Triple Alhance existed 
 as it does now, and its importance was increased by the fact 
 that Germany had a free hand, directed it, and dominated 
 
134 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Europe. We fear that since then the strength of the 
 Alliance has not increased. . . . 
 
 A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the 
 like may shake its foundations so greatly that in spite of all 
 written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it. 
 In that case Germany's position would become extremely 
 serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would 
 be compelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans 
 without reserve. Germany might get into the leading- 
 strings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the 
 new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether 
 Austria's historic resentment will not reawaken and 
 endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the 
 fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the 
 pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Not- 
 withstanding her fideUty to treaty, Austria may be dis- 
 inclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire. 
 
 Considering good relations between Eussia and Germany 
 absolutely essential for Germany's security, and desiring 
 to bring about a renewal of the Eusso-German Ee-Insurance 
 Treaty, Bismarck at last embarked upon a great Press 
 campaign. He revealed to Germany and the world the fact 
 that there had formerly existed a secret treaty with Eussia 
 in the plainest language in his celebrated article which 
 appeared on October 24, 1896, in the Hamburger Nach- 
 richten. We read in it : 
 
 Eusso-German relations remained good until 1890. 
 Up to that date both States were fully agreed that if one of 
 them were attacked the other would observe a benevolent 
 neutrality. For instance, if Germany were attacked by 
 France she would be sure of Eussia's benevolent neutrality, 
 and Eussia would be sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality 
 if she was attacked without cause. That agreement has not 
 been renewed since the time when Prince Bismarck left office, 
 and if we are rightly informed about the occurrences which 
 have taken place in BerHn it appears that the failure to renew 
 the treaty was not due to Eussia being dissatisfied at the 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 135 
 
 change of Chancellors. It was Count Caprivi who refused 
 to renew the mutual insurance of Eussia and Germany, 
 although Bussia was ready to renew it. As at the same 
 time Germany pursued a philo-Pohsh policy, it was only 
 natural that the Eussian Government should ask itself: 
 What can be the object of Prussia's PoHsh poHcy, which 
 stands in flagrant opposition to the friendly relations 
 established at the time of the Emperor Wilham the First ? 
 We need not mention other anti-Eussian indications 
 at the German Foreign Office. Caprivi's attitude in the 
 general European policy and in Germany's Pohsh pohcy 
 was such that Eussia, notwithstanding her great power, had 
 seriously to consider the future. During the Crimean War 
 all Europe, Prussia excepted, had been hostile to Eussia. 
 We do not intend to assert that a similar position will return. 
 Still, it is only natural if a powerful State like the Eussian 
 Empire says to itself : ' We must have at least one reHable 
 Ally in Europe. Formerly we could reckon with the three 
 Emperors Alliance. Afterwards we could depend upon the 
 House of Hohenzollem. If, however, in times of difficulty, 
 we should meet with an anti-Eussian poHcy, we must en- 
 deavour to arrange for support elsewhere.' The Kronstadt 
 meeting and the first rapprochement between Absolute 
 Eussia and Eepublican France was solely brought about by 
 Caprivi's poKtical mistakes. Hence, Eussia was forced to 
 find in France that security which of course her statesmen 
 desired to obtain. 
 
 This article created an immense sensation not only in 
 the entire German Press but in the Press of the world. 
 
 The Government -inspired Press accused Bismarck of 
 high treason in divulging secrets of State, and threatened 
 him with the pubHc prosecutor and with imprisonment. 
 The disclosure led to a prolonged Press campaign in the 
 course of which Bismarck defended the Ee-Insurance Treaty 
 with great vigour in numerous articles. With wonderful 
 energy Bismarck, who was then eighty-two years old, en- 
 deavoured once more to direct the poHcy of Europe with 
 
186 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 his indefatigable pen. He not merely criticised Germany's 
 foreign policy and pointed out the dangerous mistake which 
 had been made in destroying the intimate relations which 
 existed formerly between Russia and Germany ; he en- 
 deavoured at the same time to bring about a re-grouping 
 of the Powers and to create differences between Russia 
 and France likely to destroy their recent intimacy. This 
 may be seen from many articles of Bismarck's, pubhshed 
 at the time in various journals. 
 
 In his * Memoirs ' Bismarck summarised his views as 
 to the attitude of Russia and France in this blunt phrase : 
 * With France we shall never have peace ; with Russia 
 never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or 
 dynastic blunders falsify the situation.' 
 
 ' Dynastic blunders ' have done what Liberal stupidities 
 failed to achieve. 
 
 In his articles and in his * Memoirs ' Bismarck repeatedly 
 pointed out that Austria-Hungary might not only abandon 
 Germany in the hour of need, but, remembering the loss 
 of Silesia to Prussia and the Battle of Koniggratz, turn 
 against Germany. 
 
 Unceasingly Bismarck pointed out in the clearest 
 language that Germany was under no obHgation whatever 
 to support Austria in the Balkans, and that, in case of 
 serious Austro-Russian differences, such as those which 
 arose in July 1914 about Serbia, Germany should not act 
 as Austria's unconditional supporter but as a mediator 
 between the two States. Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger 
 NachricMen on January 15, 1893 : 
 
 The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance provides only 
 against an attack on Austrian and German territory on the 
 part of Russia. Being thus limited, the possibihty is excluded 
 that the Treaty may serve Austria's special interests in the 
 Balkans. The purpose of the AlHance is exclusively to 
 prevent a Russian war of aggression. Its purpose is in no 
 way to strengthen Austria in the pursuit of a purely Austrian 
 
POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 137 
 
 policy in the East. Germany has no interests in the East. 
 Besides, if she supported Austria's Balkan poUcy she would 
 defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is to preserve the 
 peace. 
 
 If Austria was entitled to the support of Germany's 
 bayonets if engaged in the East, a coUision with Eussia 
 would become probable. Hence the casus foederis is limited 
 to the possibihty of a Eussian attack upon one of the two 
 Alhes. The task of Germany, as Austria's Ally, consists 
 in acting as a mediator between the two Powers in case 
 of differences in tjhe Balkans. If Austria wishes to further 
 her individual interests in the Balkans she must seek 
 support not in Germany, but among those countries 
 which are interested in the East — England, France, and 
 Italy. 
 
 Bismarck spoke and wrote in vain. His shallow 
 successors treated his advice with contempt. The great 
 German statesman not only pointed out the mistake which 
 the Emperor had made in breaking with Eussia but he 
 tried to recreate the intimate relations which formerly 
 existed between Germany and Eussia. His exertions 
 proved unavailing, and he wrote despairingly in the West- 
 deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in June 1892 : 
 
 The worst that has happened under the Chancellorship 
 of Caprivi is that all the threads connecting Germany with 
 Eussia were suddenly broken. The German Emperor tried 
 to win over the Eussian s with amiable advances. However, 
 busy intermediaries reported to him expressions from the 
 Czar's entourage which proved that his intended visit to 
 Eussia would be poUtically unsuccessful. Then WilHam 
 the Second immediately went to England and concluded 
 with England the Treaty relating to Zanzibar and Hehgo- 
 land, and that anti-Eussian demonstration was followed by 
 his philo-Pohsh poHcy, which was hurtful to Eussia. Ger- 
 many's foreign poHcy could not have taken a more fatal 
 step than to threaten Eussia with the re-establishment of 
 the Kingdom of Poland in case of a Eussian defeat. That 
 
138 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 was bound to lead to the Franco-Kussian rapprochement 
 and to Kronstadt. 
 
 Bismarck clearly recognised that the alliance between 
 Italy and Austria was an unnatural one, and that Italy's 
 fidelity to her two partners would depend partly on the 
 character of Germany's poHcy, partly on England's relations 
 with Germany. In view of Italy's long and exposed sea- 
 border and of her vulnerability in case of an attack from 
 the sea, Italy could obviously not be expected to support 
 Germany and Austria if such support would involve her 
 in hostilities with the strongest naval Power. For this 
 reason, among others, Bismarck was anxious that Germany 
 and England should be firm friends. He wrote in the 
 Hamburger Nachrichten on June 13, 1890 : 
 
 The co-operation of Germany, Austria, and Italy 
 threatens no one. The Triple AlHance does not involve 
 dangers which would become fatal to the co-operation of 
 these three States. On the contrary, the AlHance is designed 
 to strengthen the peace of Europe. The casus foederis 
 towards Eussia arises only if Eussia attacks the territory of 
 one of the two AlHes. This limitation deprives the Alliance of 
 all aggressive tendencies, and excludes the possibility that 
 it may serve the special interests of Austria in the Balkan 
 Peninsula and thus threaten the preservation of peace. . . . 
 
 The Austro-Itahan AlHance is not equally favourable. 
 Between Austria and Italy there are unadjusted differences, 
 which are to be found particularly on the side of Italy, such 
 as the anti- Austrian aspirations of the Irredentists. Besides, 
 the Italian Eadicals are opposed to the Triple Alliance, and 
 sympathise with France. . . . 
 
 In view of France's aspirations, Italy must be able to 
 rely on the assistance of the English fleet, for the Triple 
 Alliance cannot protect the ItaHan coasts. Hence, Italy 
 has to think of England, and consideration of England may 
 conceivably Hmit Italy's freedom of action. The mainten- 
 ance of the present relations between Austria and Italy 
 must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as, 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 139 
 
 if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple 
 Alliance, the Austrian Army would be compelled to protect 
 the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer 
 be able to fulfil Article 1 of its AlUance with Germany, 
 according to which it should assist Germany * with its entire 
 armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro- 
 German Alliance would miHtarily lose so much that its 
 value would become very problematical. . . . 
 
 If we sum up the considerations developed we find that 
 the present position is quite satisfactory. As long as 
 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the 
 Triple AlHance, and as long as these three States may 
 reckon on the assistance of the Enghsh sea-power, the peace 
 of Europe will not be broken. We must take care that 
 friendly relations between Austria and Italy and between 
 Italy and England shall be maintained. Besides, we 
 must see that the Triple AUiance is restricted to its original 
 scope, and that it is not allowed to serve those special 
 interests which have nothing to do with it. We therefore 
 firmly trust that, as far as Germany is concerned, the * old 
 course ' will be preserved with particular care. 
 
 Bismarck died on July 30, 1898. We know from his 
 speeches that he attached the greatest value to good rela- 
 tions between England and Germany, that he saw in England 
 ' Germany's natural and traditional ally.' 
 
 The greater part of the German colonies was acquired 
 by Bismarck. His principal care was to ensure Germany's 
 security on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the 
 greatest value to Great Britain's good will and support in 
 view of the possibihty of Continental comphcations. Con- 
 sidering Germany's Continental interests infinitely more 
 important than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused 
 to pursue a transmaritime and colonial poHcy in opposition 
 to England, fearing that an anti-British policy would drive 
 England into the arms of France and Eussia. Even when 
 diplomatic differences had arisen between the two countries, 
 Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great 
 
140 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Britain. On March 2, 1884, for instance, he stated in the 
 Keiehstag with reference to an Anglo- German dispute : 
 
 I shall do everything in my power in order, sine ird et 
 studio, and in the most concihatory manner, to settle this 
 matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly inter- 
 course which has at all times existed between England and 
 Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse, which is most 
 natural because neither Power possesses vital interests 
 which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. 
 I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies 
 us our modest attempts at colonising. 
 
 He laid down at greater length his guiding principles 
 in his intercourse with Great Britain on January 10, 1885, 
 when he stated in the Reichstag : 
 
 The last speaker has told us that we must either abandon 
 our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to such 
 an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or to speak 
 more clearly, that our navy should rival that of England 
 herself. However, even if we should succeed in building up 
 a navy as strong as that of England, we should still have 
 to fear an alliance of England and Prance. These Powers 
 are stronger than any single Power in Europe is or ever can 
 be. It follows that the policy indicated by the last speaker 
 is one which should never be striven after. 
 
 I would also ask the last speaker not to make any at- 
 tempts to disturb the peace between England and Germany 
 or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two 
 Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may 
 find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I ab- 
 solutely deny that possibiHty. It does not exist, and all the 
 questions which are at present being discussed between 
 England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to 
 justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North 
 Sea. Besides, I really do not know what disputes could 
 arise between England and Germany. There never have 
 been disputes between the two countries. From my diplo- 
 matic experience, I cannot see any reasons which can make 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 341 
 
 hostilities possible between them, unless a cabinet of incon- 
 ceivable character should be in power in England, a cabinet 
 which neither exists nor which is ever likely to exist, and 
 which criminally attacks us. 
 
 Four years later, on January 26, 1889, only a short time 
 before his dismissal, he stated with reference to the Anglo- 
 German Zanzibar dispute in the Eeichstag : 
 
 I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar 
 in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived 
 at an understanding with England, we shall take the neces- 
 sary measures in Zanzibar in agreement with that country. 
 I do not intend either actively to oppose England or even to 
 take note of those steps which subordinate British individuals 
 have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa we act 
 in perfect harmony with the British Government. We are 
 marching hand in hand, and I am firmly resolved that our 
 relations shall preserve their present character. 
 
 English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous 
 places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally 
 hostile to German interests. Nevertheless, we are acting 
 in perfect unison with the British Government. We are 
 absolutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve 
 Anglo-German harmony and to continue working in co- 
 operation with that country. 
 
 The preservation of Anglo-German good-will is, after all, 
 the most important thing. I see in England an old and 
 traditional ally. No differences exist between England and 
 Germany. I am not using a diplomatic term, if I speak of 
 England as our ally. We have no aUiance with England. 
 However, I wish to remain in close contact with England 
 also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched 
 side by side during at least a hundred and fifty years, and if 
 I should discover that we might lose touch with England 
 I should act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing 
 England's good-will. 
 
 Modern Germany has erected to Bismarck countless 
 statues. Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and 
 
142 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Bismarck's memoirs have been printed in hundreds of 
 thousands of copies, and they are found on the book-shelves 
 of the German people by the side of Schiller and Goethe. 
 But Modern Germany has forgotten, or she deUberately has 
 disregarded, Bismarck's policy, and Bismarck's warnings. 
 
 Bismarck saw in England ' an old and traditional ally.' 
 Hence he never thought an Anglo- German war possible. 
 To him such a war was, as he said, unthinkable. 
 
 As long as the great Chancellor hved Wilham the Second 
 did not venture upon pursuing a violently anti-British 
 poHcy which was bound to drive this country into the arms 
 of France and Kussia. Although WilHam the Second was 
 hostile to England, he was probably restrained by the fear 
 of Bismarck's criticism during the Chancellor's lifetime. 
 Soon after Bismarck's death WilHam the Second began his 
 naval campaign. 
 
 When Bismarck had closed his eyes a violent anti- 
 British agitation, financed by Krupp and carried on by 
 hundreds of generals and professors, was started throughout 
 Germany, and in 1900 was pubhshed the great German Navy 
 Bill, in the introduction of which we read the ominous 
 and oft-quoted words : * Germany requires a fleet of such 
 strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would 
 jeopardise the supremacy of that Power.' 
 
 Bismarck had observed the Emperor's Anglophobia 
 in its more modified form with alarm, fearing its effect 
 upon Italy. He had written in a series of articles on the 
 European situation, pubhshed in the Milnchener Allgemeine 
 Zeitung from May 12 to 18, 1892 : 
 
 In discussing Anglophobia in Germany we must remem- 
 ber that the principal Anglophobe is supposed to be the 
 Emperor WilHam the Second, who was hostile to England 
 not only as Crown Prince, but even during the first years of 
 his rule. 
 
 England's attitude towards :the Triple AlHance depends 
 not upon the HeHgoland Treaty, but on Italy. If England 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 143 
 
 is opposed to Germany we can never reckon upon Italy's 
 help. . . . 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Army is at Germany's disposal 
 only if the Dual Monarchy does not require its use against 
 Italy. Otherwise, one-haK of the Austrian army would be 
 lost to Germany. . . . Italy is therefore a very important 
 factor in the Triple Alliance, even if she limits her action 
 to abstaining from attacking Austria. . . . 
 
 The idea that Eussia may make a surprise attack upon 
 Germany is Utopian. Only moderate diplomatic skill on 
 Germany's part is required to avoid a war with Eussia for 
 generations. The tension among the nations would be 
 greatly diminished if we should succeed in recreating in 
 leading Eussian circles the faith in Germany's neighbourly 
 honesty which has disappeared since Bismarck's resignation. 
 
 A Eussian war is a calamity which must not be brought 
 upon the population of the Eastern Provinces of Germany 
 without pressing necessity. The seriousness of a Eusso- 
 German war is particularly great, because it would im- 
 mediately lead to a Franco- German war, while, on the other 
 hand, a Franco-German war need not lead to Eussian inter- 
 vention. Besides, the impossibiHty of obtaining adequate 
 compensation for such a war must be borne in mind. What 
 can Germany obtain from Eussia ? ... At best she would 
 obtain a second neighbour- State thirsting for revenge. 
 Germany would be in an uncomfortable position created 
 by her own rashness. 
 
 !r^ Bismarck did not consider England's support as a matter 
 admitting of doubt. He reckoned upon it as a matter of 
 course. Commenting upon an important colonial debate 
 in the Eeichstag, he wrote in the Munchener Allgemeine 
 Zeitung on February 8, 1891 : 
 
 The value of England's friendship consists in this : that 
 in case of a war she protects the ItaHan coasts or, which is 
 perhaps more uncertain, helps in protecting the German 
 shores. By doing this, England would largely act in her 
 own interest. . . . 
 
144 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Three days later he wrote in the Hamburger Nach- 
 richten : 
 
 In decisive moments our co-operation with Italy would 
 be influenced by England's attitude. The greater or lesser 
 measure of good relations between England and Germany is 
 not without influence upon Italy's poHcy, and it is certainly 
 questionable how Germany's relations with Italy would 
 shape themselves if Italy should no longer be in the position 
 of being attached by an equal friendship to England and to 
 Germany. 
 
 On May 19, 1892, he wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten : 
 
 We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that Italy's 
 faithfulness to the Triple Alliance depends largely upon 
 the relations existing between England and that country. 
 Italy cannot run the risk of being isolated in the Mediter- 
 ranean, and of being defeated by France. Hence she must 
 be certain of the protection of the Enghsh fleet in case of 
 need. 
 
 The agitation for strengthening the German navy began 
 in a mild way soon after WiUiam the Second came to the 
 throne. Bismarck, observing that dangerous development 
 with concern, warned Germany against frittering away her 
 strength and competing on the sea with the French or 
 English fleets. Addressing 3000 people from Schleswig- 
 Holstein, Bismarck said on May 26, 1895 : 
 
 I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, because unless 
 we had that province we could not hope to have a German 
 fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of 
 need Germany should be able to hold her own against a 
 second-rate navy. Formerly we had no fleet. I should 
 consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with 
 the French or the English navy. However, we must be 
 strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second- 
 rate Powers which we cannot get at by land. 
 
POLICY OF BISMARCK AND OF WILLIAM II 145 
 
 Two years later Bismarck warned Germany more 
 emphatically against creating a fleet strong enough to 
 challenge England. On September 4, 1897, Mr. Maximilian 
 Harden published in the Zukunft the following pronounce- 
 ment of Prince Bismarck : 
 
 The papers are discussing unceasingly whether the 
 German fleet should be increased. Of course, all that is 
 required in the opinion of sober-minded experts should be 
 voted. I have never been in favour of a colonial policy of 
 conquest similar to that pursued by France. As far as one 
 can see, the most important thing for Germany is a strong 
 and reliable army provided with the best weapons. I am 
 of Moltke's opinion — that we shall have to fight on the 
 Continent of Europe for the possession of colonies. We 
 must beware of undue economy in naval matters, but we 
 must also guard ourselves against fantastical plans which 
 might cause us to quarrel with people who are important 
 for our position in Europe. Qui trop emhrasse. . . . 
 
 In December 1897 Bismarck stated his views on 
 Germany's transmaritime pohcy as follows in the Leifziger 
 Neueste Nachrichten : 
 
 The German Government should not embark on under- 
 takings unless they are absolutely required, or at least justi- 
 fied, by the material interests of the State. . . . Nothing 
 would be more strongly opposed to Germany's interests 
 than to enter upon more or less daring and adventurous 
 enterprises guided merely by the desire to have a finger in 
 every pie, to flatter the vanity of the nation or to please the 
 ambitions of those who rule it. To carry on a policy of 
 prestige would be more in accordance with the French than 
 the German character. In order to acquire prestige, France 
 has gone to Algiers, Tunis, Mexico, and Madagascar. If 
 Germany should ever follow a similar policy, she would 
 not promote any German interests, but would endanger the 
 welfare of the Empire and its position in Europe. 
 
 Bismarck clearly foresaw that by embarking recklessly 
 
146 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 upon a policy of adventure in the colonial sphere, Germany 
 might endanger her relations with Great Britain. Besides, 
 he foresaw that by wresting Port Arthur from victorious 
 Japan in company with Eussia and France, and occupying 
 Kiaoohow, she might later on be exposed to Japan's hostihty. 
 He did not understand why Germany should have gone 
 out of her way to drive Japan out of Port Arthur with the 
 help of France and Eussia. Therefore he wrote on May 7, 
 1895, in the Hamburger Nachrichten : 
 
 It appears that Japan, following the friendly advice of 
 Germany, Eussia, and France, has abandoned the Liao- 
 tung Peninsula. Germany has no interest whether the 
 district in question remains in China's possession or not. If 
 she has nevertheless exerted pressure upon Japan she might 
 have had reasons with which we are not acquainted. Pos- 
 sibly the pohcy made in BerHn may have been due to the 
 persuasiveness of people who were in favour of a poHcy of 
 prestige similar to that pursued in the time of Napoleon the 
 Third. 
 
 If Germany's action at Tokio was intended to do a service 
 to Eussia, it might perhaps be approved of. However, 
 Eussia might have been supported by an attitude of bene- 
 volent neutrahty without active interference. . . . 
 
 For the present we beheve that Germany's initiative in 
 East Asia was not timely, and we doubt whether that pohcy 
 and the extraordinary change of attitude towards England 
 can be justified. We cannot help fearing that Germany's 
 initiative in East Asia is merely a symptom of a defect from 
 which our foreign pohcy suffers : that it springs from the 
 inability to sit still and wait. We do not see why it was 
 necessary to run any risks. . . . 
 
 Germany's action has diminished the sympathies for 
 Germany which hitherto existed in Japan. That loss was 
 perhaps unnecessary. The loss incurred on the one side 
 may perhaps be balanced by gains, but only the future can 
 show whether there are any gains. 
 
 Eeverting to Germany's East Asiatic pohcy, Bismarck 
 
POLICY OF BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 147 
 
 wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten on May 23, 
 1895 : 
 
 Germany's action against Japan can only be explained 
 by a desire to regain good relations with Kussia, which have 
 lately been lost. If that is the case, the Government should 
 be careful not to fall between two stools. Kussia desires to 
 obtain ice-free harbours in the East, and Germany has no 
 reason either to support or to oppose her. During decades 
 we have endeavoured to encourage France to develop and 
 expand in every direction — except in that of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 We have encouraged her to expand in Tunis, in India, and in 
 Africa, and we have a similar interest as regards Eussia in 
 the East. Germany has Kttle interest in the Black Sea, but 
 still less in the Sea of Japan. . . . 
 
 As we said before, we do not know the intentions of the 
 Government, but we can only recommend that Germany, 
 after having once more grasped Kussia 's hand, should hold it 
 firmly and stand by Kussia as long as Germany's own inter- 
 ests are not hurt thereby. If the contrary poUcy is followed, 
 the result would be that we should offend Kussia as much as 
 we have already offended Japan by our interference. 
 
 Bismarck gave two most impressive warnings regarding 
 mistakes in foreign poHcy in general and regarding a German 
 attack on France, such as that which took place in 1914, 
 in particular. In chapter xxviii of his * Memoirs ' the great 
 statesman wrote : 
 
 Errors in the poHcy of the cabinets of the Great Powers 
 bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or in 
 BerHn, but they are never harmless. The logic of history is 
 even more exact in its revisions than the chief Audit Office of 
 Prussia. 
 
 In chapter xxix, entitled * The Triple Alliance,' 
 ^^ Bismarck wrote regarding a German attack upon France : 
 
 It is explicable that for Kussian poHcy there is a limit 
 beyond which the importance of France must not be dimin- 
 ished. That limit was reached, I beheve, at the Peace of 
 
 l2 
 
148 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Frankfort, a fact which, in 1870 and 1871, was not so com- 
 pletely realised at St. Petersburg as five years later. I 
 hardly think that during the Franco- German War the 
 Eussian Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, 
 Eussia would have for neighbour so strong and so united a 
 Germany. 
 
 Bismarck was a most loyal citizen. He never 
 endeavoured to revenge himself on the Emperor for the 
 disgraceful way in which he was dismissed, and for the 
 persecution which, after his dismissal, he suffered at the 
 hands of the bureaucracy, no doubt by the Emperor's 
 orders. Although he distrusted the Emperor's reckless 
 and adventurous personal policy, he never attacked him 
 or reproached him personally. He merely criticised his 
 advisers and their action, and laid down the broad principles 
 of Germany's poUcy in his posthumous * Memoirs ' and in 
 numerous speeches and articles. 
 
 Bismarck's worst fears have been realised. The German 
 nation, as I stated before, has paid hp-service to Bismarck, 
 but has utterly disregarded his warnings and advice. 
 William the Second and his courtier-statesmen have ap- 
 parently destroyed Bismarck's creation. They cannot plead 
 that they were not warned, for Bismarck foretold unceasingly 
 that the Emperor's rash interference would lead to the 
 break-up of the Triple Alliance, make Germany subservient 
 to Austria-Hungary, involve her in war with Eussia about 
 the Balkan Peninsula where Germany possesses no interests, 
 detach Italy, bring about Japan's hostility, and end in 
 Germany's isolation in Europe. 
 
 The official and non-official spokesmen of Germany 
 have asserted unceasingly that a world conspiracy had 
 been formed against their country, that Eussia, or England, 
 is to blame for the present war. Those who are acquainted 
 with Bismarck's writings know that the present war 
 has not been caused by England's jealousy or Eussia's 
 ambitions, or France's thirst for revenge, but only by 
 
POLICY OP BISMAKCK AND OF WILLIAM II 149 
 
 Germany's own folly, and especially by the action of her 
 Emperor, who dismissed Bismarck, disregarded his warnings, 
 and plmiged the nation into a war which may end in 
 Germany's destruction. 
 
 Bismarck died at the ripe age of eighty-two. During 
 no less than thirty-nine years he was in the service of the 
 Government, first as Ambassador and then as Prime Minister 
 and Chancellor. As Prime Minister of Prussia and Chan- 
 cellor of Germany he was uninterruptedly in of&ce during 
 twenty-eight years, and during the whole of that long 
 period he laboured and fought unceasingly with the single 
 object of establishing the German Empire and of con- 
 solidating it. Bismarck scarcely knew the meaning of 
 pleasure or of relaxation. He laboured day and night. 
 Frequently in the course of the night he called one of his 
 secretaries to his bedside and dictated to him. The great 
 Chancellor gave all his time, in fact his whole life, to his 
 country. After his dismissal in 1890 he spent the last eight 
 years, not in resting from his labours, but in fighting for his 
 country. He fought not against the Emperor, as his 
 enemies and enviers have often asserted, but against the 
 pernicious policy, the incompetent statesmen, and the 
 dangerous influences which, he feared, would cause Ger- 
 many's downfall. Bismarck laboured and fought in vain. 
 A century after his birth the wonderful edifice which he 
 erected almost single-handed seems to be crumbling. One 
 man created the German Empire, and another one is 
 apparently destroying it. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN EDUCATION AND OF 
 THE NATIONAL CHARACTER^ 
 
 There is a vast literature on German Education. Innu- 
 merable books, pamphlets, and articles give us the fullest 
 details of the German school system in all its branches. 
 Enthusiastic British and American educationalists have 
 explored the great education machine of Germany in every 
 aspect, and have bidden the Anglo-Saxon countries to copy 
 it. However, most writers on German Education have 
 considered only its outward aspects and its present state. 
 They have failed to explain to us the secret of Germany's 
 education. An educational system, like a national consti- 
 tution, cannot be copied. It is a thing that has been 
 evolved in the course of centuries. We can understand 
 German education and the German character only if we 
 go back to the foundations, if we consider the way by 
 which the German educational system has been created. 
 
 The Germans, and particularly the North Germans, 
 the" Prussians, were until comparatively recent times a 
 nation of ignorant boors. To-day they are the best educated, 
 or at least the most educated, people in the world. They 
 have been made what they are by their great rulers, es- 
 pecially by Frederick WiUiam, the Great Elector, King 
 Frederick William the First, and King Frederick the Great. 
 
 It would, perhaps, lead too far to study the government 
 
 1 From The Contemporary Review, January 1916. 
 150 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTER 151 
 
 and the influence of the Great Elector. He ruled from 
 1640 to 1688. It requires some mental effort to appreciate 
 his educational activities at the present day. It will 
 perhaps suffice to say that he introduced in Prussia the 
 regime of enlightened absolutism as has been shown in the 
 beginning of this book. He destroyed the independence 
 of the nobility, of the towns, and of the estates, and made 
 the whole people a willing instrument in the hands of their 
 ruler. 
 
 The Great Elector died, and was succeeded by his son, 
 Frederick, who became the first King of Prussia. The 
 son was a worthless monarch. He sacrificed the welfare 
 of his country to his vanity and his lust. Under his rule 
 Prussia declined and decayed. He was succeeded by his 
 son. King Frederick William the First, a coarse-mannered, 
 ignorant brute. Frederick William was as uncultured as 
 was President Kruger. At the same time he possessed, 
 like Kruger, great natural abilities. He allowed himself 
 to be guided by his instincts. He ruled Prussia absolutely 
 in accordance with his will, in accordance with the precedent 
 which the Great Elector had created. Frederick William 
 loved the army. He was fond of order and cleanliness, 
 and he was extremely thrifty and parsimonious. He 
 founded in Prussia a model administration and a model 
 army, and he moulded the character of the people upon 
 his own. 
 
 Frederick the First had tried to imitate Louis the Four- 
 teenth of France. He spent the money of the citizens 
 lavishly and almost ruined the country. His son was out- 
 raged by the outlandish elegance and luxury, the waste 
 and immorality, which his father had introduced in Prussia. 
 His instinct rebelled against his surroundings in his early 
 childhood. When, as a small boy, he was given a dress of 
 the most precious brocade, he refused to wear it. At great 
 trouble he was prevailed upon to put it on. However, 
 before joining the company he crept into a chimney, covered 
 
152 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 himself with soot, and entered the royal presence looking 
 like a sweep. He hated the full-bottomed powdered wigs 
 with enormous flowing curls which Louis the Fourteenth had 
 made popular. One day the little prince was sitting among 
 a number of pompous old courtiers ornamented with the 
 largest and costhest French wigs. He himself wore only a 
 Httle one. Suddenly, the Crown Prince exclaimed that 
 it was too hot for wearing wigs. The courtiers of course 
 agreed. In a moment Frederick WilHam threw his own 
 wig into the blazing fire, exclaiming, ' He is a rascal who 
 does not follow the Crown Prince's example ! * All the 
 courtiers regretfully, but obediently, followed suit. 
 
 When Frederick William the First came to the throne 
 his first action consisted in inspecting the royal accounts 
 and in reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth. Without 
 a moment's delay, all the superfluous courtiers and servants 
 were dismissed or pensioned. All unduly high salaries 
 were reduced. The superfluous royal buildings and groimds 
 were sold or let to the best advantage. Eoyal parks and 
 ornamental gardens were converted into ploughed fields 
 and into drill grounds for the army. The unnecessary 
 jewellery which his father had accumulated, vast quantities 
 of costly wines, and many horses and carriages were sold. 
 Innumerable objects of silver and gold were sent to the 
 Mint and turned into coin. While in his father's time the 
 characteristic of the Prussian Court had been elegance 
 and luxury, its characteristic feature under Frederick 
 William the First became simpHcity and thrift. The King 
 hved Hke a simple private citizen. Upholstered furniture, 
 carpets, and rich hangings were banished from the royal 
 rooms. The new King preferred plain wooden floors and 
 plain wooden tables and chairs. Simplicity and cleanliness 
 became the predominant note of the royal residence. 
 
 The impetuous King hated luxury. He would tolerate 
 luxury neither in his own family nor among others. By 
 legislative enactments, profusion in dress and wastefulness 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTEK 153 
 
 of expenditure were checked. The King hated the French 
 fashions, and tried to make them ridiculous. With this 
 object in view he caused the most despised men in his army, 
 the provosts, who acted as mihtary poHce and as execu- 
 tioners, to be dressed at parade in the richest French fashions 
 and in flowing wigs. The ladies at Court were not allowed 
 to use paint or powder. Elaborate French cooking was 
 banished from the royal kitchens. The royal table was 
 suppHed with the plainest viands. When the King on 
 his walks noticed an attractive smell of cooking emanating 
 from the house of a peasant or of a citizen of small means, 
 he would not hesitate to enter and to invite himself to dinner. 
 He would ask after the price of the food, and then insist 
 that the royal cook should provide him with a meal of 
 the same kind at the identical price. 
 
 In his personal expenditure the King was the thriftiest 
 of men. For the sake of economy he always wore oversleeves 
 and an apron when working at his desk. He checked the 
 accounts of the royal household down to the smallest sums, 
 and woe betide a dishonest servant or one who through 
 ignorance or carelessness had spent too much in supplying 
 the royal family. The same economy which the King 
 practised in his person and his family he required from all 
 the officials and from the private citizens as well. Every 
 penny had to be carefully accounted for. Ministers of 
 State were told that common paper, which was cheaper 
 than white paper, was good enough for their use. In large 
 matters the King was economical as in small ones. Every 
 year considerable sums of money were saved. Officials 
 who wished to acquire the King's favour had to produce 
 large surpluses. Vast sums thus saved were employed for 
 strengthening the army and for improving the country by 
 building canals and high roads, by draining marshes and 
 irrigating dry land, by settling large numbers of foreigners 
 on reclaimed waste lands in Prussia, and by accumulating 
 a fund in ready money in the cellars of the royal castle. 
 
154 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Frederick William the First educated the Prussians not 
 only to habits of frugality, economy, and order, but to 
 industry and thoroughness as well. In his father's time 
 the Government business had been left to underlings, who 
 had abused their position. Frederick William resolved 
 to take the whole national business in his own hands and 
 to become the principal official of the State. He fulfilled 
 his duties most conscientiously. Thoughts of the national 
 business disturbed his sleep. He rose at the break of dawn 
 and worked indefatigably till far into the night. He was 
 no doubt the most industrious man in his kingdom. On 
 every walk and every ride he acted as general inspector to 
 the nation, supervising, admonishing, helping or punishing 
 the people on the spot. When he saw working-men idling 
 at their work he accelerated their movements with his stick. 
 Once on one of his early morning walks the King approached 
 one of the Potsdam gates and noticed that a traveller who 
 had arrived by the night mail from Hamburg was knocking 
 in vain at the gate. The enraged King had the gate opened, 
 rushed into the gatekeeper's house, and with his stick drove 
 him out of bed and out of office. Then, returning to the 
 astonished traveller he apologised to him, and expressed 
 his deep regret that a Prussian official should have been so 
 neglectful of his duties. Frederick William hstened to all 
 complaints, and investigated them in person if possible. 
 While he insisted that all the citizens should be industrious 
 and thrifty, he was always pleased when he saw hard-working 
 men enjoying innocent amusements. Once he came, on 
 one of his walks, to an inn where people were playing at 
 ninepins. He watched their game and praised them for 
 spending their leisure hours in such a healthy way. The 
 players told their friends, and when the King happened to 
 pass the ninepin-alley a few days later there was a crowd 
 of loafers who waited for the King's applause. Immediately 
 the King grew red in the face, rushed among them, and 
 drove them to their business with his stick. 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAKACTEK 155 
 
 Frederick William the First died in 1740, and was 
 succeeded by his son, Frederick the Great. Frederick the 
 Great is known to the world chiefly as a soldier and as a 
 diplomat. Like Napoleon the First, he was his own Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, and 
 Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is not so much known 
 that Frederick the Great, hke his father, administered in 
 person all the principal offices of State, that he was a great 
 administrator and, before all, a great educator in the widest 
 sense of the word. He was an indefatigable worker. He 
 rose in summer at three o'clock in the morning, and in winter 
 at four o'clock, and his servants had instructions to get him 
 out of bed by force if he did not rise immediately when 
 called. A quarter of an hour after having been awakened, 
 Frederick was at his desk, reading his correspondence 
 and dictating replies. He, Hke his father, became to the 
 Prussian people a model of industry, thoroughness, and 
 economy. 
 
 Frederick the Great left numerous hitherto unpublished 
 writings for the guidance of his successors, as well as printed 
 essays and books scarcely known to the English-speaking 
 peoples, in which he explained the principles which guided 
 his numerous activities. His enlightened views as to 
 education in the narrower sense are extremely interesting 
 and valuable, especially as they have had the greatest 
 influence upon Prusso- German educational policy. He wrote 
 in his * Memoir es depuis la Paix ' : 
 
 Custom, which rules the world, holds imperious sway 
 over the narrow-minded. Still, a Government must not 
 restrict its activities to a single aim. It must be prompted 
 to action not only by the consideration whether action is 
 profitable. The public welfare has numerous aspects, and 
 the Government should interest itseK in all. Among the 
 objects which the Government should further with particular 
 care, the education of youth is one of the most important. . . . 
 Unfortunately teachers strive merely to fill the memory of 
 
156 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 their pupils with facts and dates, and omit to strengthen their 
 intelHgence and their judgment. 
 
 Frederick the Great beKeved that by a wisely directed 
 education a nation might be raised rivalling the ancient 
 Greeks and Komans in bravery and general abiHty. He stated 
 in his pamphlet, * Lettre sur T Education,' written in 1769 : 
 
 The vast number of great men which Kome and Greece 
 have produced have influenced me in favour of the education 
 of the ancients. I am convinced that by following their 
 methods one can create a nation superior in character and 
 abihty to the generahty of modern nations. 
 
 The education given to the children of the nobility 
 throughout Europe is extremely bad. In Prussia they are J 
 given their first education in the parental house, and an 1 
 intermediate and higher education at the schools and the 
 universities. In the house of the parents, blind parental 
 love prevents them giving their children the necessary 
 correction. Mothers particularly, even if they rule their 
 husbands with despotic severity, have a boundless indul- 
 gence for their children. These are handed over to servants, 
 who flatter and spoil them, who inspire them with pernicious 
 ideas, and who thus fatally influence minds so tender. The 
 educators who are generally chosen for the children when 
 they are a little older are, as a rule, either clergymen or 
 young lawyers who often themselves need educating. . . . 
 
 Children are trained to habits of idleness by being allowed 
 to be idle. Men who wish to get on in the world require a 
 hard and laborious education. Boys should be given work 
 of composition, which should be corrected and recorrected. 
 By forcing them to rewrite and to improve their work, they 
 will be taught to think correctly and to express their ideas 
 with facility. Instead of following this method, teachers 
 cram the brains of the young with facts and allow the working 
 intelHgence of their pupils to remain inactive and un- 
 developed and to become atrophied. Children are forced 
 to accumulate knowledge, but are prevented from acquiring 
 that discriminating intelligence with which alone they can 
 make good use of the knowledge which they have acquired. 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTEE 157 
 
 The softness of their first education makes boys effemi- 
 nate, comfort-loving, lazy, and cowardly. Thus, instead of 
 rearing a hardy race resembhng the ancients, a race of 
 pleasure-loving sybarites is created. Hence young men 
 lead Hves of idleness and of self-indulgence. They believe 
 that they have been born to enjoy comfort and pleasure, and 
 that men of their position are under no obligation to be useful 
 members of society. Consequently, they will commit 
 follies of every kind, run into debt, drink and gamble, and 
 ruin their famihes. 
 
 Young men cannot be too well educated. They cannot 
 possess too much knowledge, whatever their calling may be. 
 The profession of arms, for instance, requires very vast 
 knowledge. Nevertheless, one often hears people say : 
 * My boy will not learn. I shall therefore make him 
 a soldier.* He may become a private, but not an officer 
 qualified to fill the highest posts. 
 
 In the administration of justice and of the national 
 finances, in the diplomatic service and in the army, illustri- 
 ous birth is an advantage. However, all would be lost if 
 birth should become more potent than merit. A Govern- 
 ment which would exalt birth above merit would no doubt 
 experience fatal consequences. ... It is an error to beHeve 
 that the arts and sciences soften the national character. 
 All that serves to enhghten the mind and to extend the range 
 of knowledge, elevates the national spirit. 
 
 In Frederick's opinion, education should improve the 
 character and increase the abihties of the people. It 
 should be practical and useful rather than ornamental and 
 showy. These principles should apply to the education of 
 girls as well. He wrote in his * Lettre sur I'Education ' : 
 
 I must confess that I am surprised to see that people of 
 the highest position bring up their daughters Hke chorus 
 girls. They chiefly wish that their daughters should be 
 admired, that they should please by their appearance. 
 Apparently it is considered unnecessary that they should 
 be esteemed, and it is forgotten that their business in life 
 consists in raising families. Their education should be 
 
158 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 directed towards their principal object in life. They 
 should be taught to detest everything that is dishonourable. 
 They ought to learn wisdom and be made to acquire useful 
 and lasting quaUties. Instead of this, parents endeavour 
 to cultivate their beauty and grace, attractions which are 
 evanescent. Example is more precious than precept. 
 How then can parents teach their daughters wisdom and virtue 
 if they themselves lead idle and frivolous Hves and devote 
 themselves to luxury and to other scandalous practices ? 
 
 Frederick the Great clearly recognised that the sciences 
 and arts are apt to increase the prestige and the power of a 
 nation. He regretted that the Prussians were a nation 
 of boors, and he wished to create culture among them by a 
 suitable education. He therefore encouraged all the 
 sciences and arts, estabhshed learned institutions, and 
 promoted study and investigation in every way. He wrote 
 in his * Discours de I'Utilite des Sciences ' : 
 
 The inborn gifts of men are small. Men possess tenden- 
 cies which education may develop. Men's knowledge must 
 be increased so as to widen their horizon. Their memories 
 must be filled with facts, so that their imagination will have 
 sufficient material with which it can work. The critical 
 faculties of men must be sharpened so as to enable them to 
 discriminate between the valuable and the worthless. The 
 greatest genius among men, if devoid of knowledge, is like 
 an uncut diamond. How many geniuses have been lost to 
 society, and how many truly great men have lived and died 
 in obscurity, because their great natural gifts remained un- 
 developed either through lack of education or through lack 
 of opportunity ! The welfare and the glory of the State 
 require that the people should be as well educated and as 
 enlightened as possible, for then only can the nation produce 
 men of the highest abiHty in every walk of life for the good 
 of the country. . . . 
 
 All enhghtened rulers have patronised and encouraged 
 those learned men whose labours are useful to society, and 
 now matters have come to such a pitch that a State will 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAKACTEE 169 
 
 soon be a century behind its neighbours if it neglects to 
 encourage the sciences. In this respect Poland furnishes us 
 with a warning example. 
 
 Very interesting are Frederick's own instructions for 
 the Academie des Nobles in Berlin, where sons of the nobility 
 were to be educated. Frederick the Great wrote : 
 
 The professor of law should draw upon Hugo Grotius. 
 The pupils should not be turned into juridical experts. ' Well- 
 brought-up men should possess some sound general ideas 
 about the law, but need not have profound legal knowledge. 
 The law professor shall therefore limit himself to giving to 
 his pupils some knowledge of the rights of the citizens, of 
 the rights of the people, and of the rights of the monarch. 
 They should have some idea of international law. At the 
 same time they should be told that international law lacks 
 that authority and compelling power which are possessed 
 by the ordinary law, and that it is therefore a phantom to 
 which sovereigns appeal even when they are violating it. 
 The lessons will be wound up by the study of the Frederician 
 code, which, being the body of the national laws, should be 
 known by all the citizens. 
 
 If the pupils should do wrong, they must be punished. If 
 they do not know their lessons, they should be made to wear 
 a donkey's head. If they are lazy, they should be given only 
 bread and water. If they are ignorant through ill-will, 
 they should be locked up, deprived of food, scolded, served 
 last at table, not be allowed to carry their sword in pubhc, 
 and be compelled to ask pardon in public. Obstinate pupils 
 should be allowed to carry only an empty scabbard until 
 they repent of their obstinacy. But under pain of imprison- 
 ment the governors of the academy are prohibited from 
 beating their pupils. As they are young men of position, 
 they should possess greatness of soul and a keen sense of 
 honour. The punishments inflicted on them should awaken 
 their ambitions but should not humihate them. 
 
 Law is an important part of the national education. 
 Frederick the Great was eminent not only as an educa- 
 
160 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 tionalist, but also as a law-giver. He considered that the 
 citizens were entitled to obtain justice quickly and cheaply, 
 that the confusion and the multiplicity of laws prevented the 
 poor obtaining justice, and enabled the rich and cunning to 
 oppress the poor and the weak. He laid down his principles 
 regarding the laws in various writings. In his * Dissertation 
 sur les Kaisons d'fitablir ou d'Abroger les Lois ' he wrote : 
 
 Few and wise laws make the people happy, while the 
 multiplicity of laws embarrasses jurisprudence. A good 
 doctor does not overdose his patients with medicines, nor 
 does a skilful legislator overdose the public with super- 
 fluous laws. Too many medicines are harmful. They 
 neutralise one another. Too many laws create a maze, in 
 which the lawyers and justice itself become lost. 
 
 England has a law against bigamy. Once a man was 
 accused of having married five wives. As the law had to be 
 interpreted literally, he could not be punished for bigamy. 
 To make the law clear it ought to have stated ; ' Whoever 
 marries more than one woman will be punished.' The vaguely 
 worded laws of England, which are Uterally interpreted, 
 have given rise to the most ridiculous abuses. 
 
 Carefully worded laws leave no room for chicanery. 
 When they are vaguely and obscurely expressed, it becomes 
 necessary to discuss and to determine the intention of the 
 law-givers, and judges, instead of adjudicating on the facts, 
 have to waste their time in expounding and interpreting 
 the law. 
 
 One can limit the addresses of lawyers to the recital 
 of facts which can be supported by proofs, and their addresses 
 may be concluded with a short recapitulation. Nothing 
 is more powerful and more moving than an appeal to the 
 passions, to sentiment, made by a man gifted with eloquence. 
 An eloquent advocate can move his hearers in any way he 
 Hkes, and can thus obscure the truth. Lycurgus and Solon 
 prohibited the use of eloquence in the law courts. . . . 
 Prussia has followed that wise custom of Greece. Eloquence 
 is banished from our pleadings. 
 
 When the laws of a State have not been collected in a 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTER 161 
 
 code it is only natural that the existing laws frequently 
 contradict each other. As they have been made by different 
 legislators at different times, they lack that unity which is 
 essential in all important matters. 
 
 In his * Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' Frederick 
 wrote : 
 
 Good laws must be clearly expressed. Otherwise 
 trickery can evade them, and cunning take advantage of 
 them, and then the weak will become a prey to the powerful 
 and the cunning. Legal procedure should be as short as 
 possible. Otherwise the people will be ruined by protracted 
 law suits. They should not have to spend vast sums in 
 litigation, for they are entitled to justice. The Law Depart- 
 ment of the Government cannot be too watchful in pro- 
 tecting the people against the grasping greed of the lawyers. 
 The whole legal apparatus should be kept in order by 
 periodical inspections, when those who believe that they 
 have been wronged by the law can place their complaints 
 before the visiting Commission. 
 
 Punishments should never be excessive. Violence should 
 never displace the laws. It is better that a sovereign should 
 be too mild than too severe. Laws must be devised in 
 accordance with the national character. A docile people 
 does not require severe laws. 
 
 More than 150 years ago Frederick the Great endeavoured 
 to make the laws plain and clear to all by compiling a code. 
 Great Britain is still devoid of a code. Contradictory 
 laws and all the evils described by Frederick the Great 
 abound. The law in England, and in America too, is a 
 scandal, and the lawyers oppose the compilation of the laws 
 in a code in their own interest. 
 
 The old Prussian Code, which was inspired by the ideas 
 of Frederick the Great, is a model of clearness and brevity. 
 It is interesting not only because it shows how plain and 
 simple the law can be made by a government which has 
 the will to simplify it, but also because it shows how powerful 
 
162 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 an educational instrument legislation can become in the 
 hands of a wise government. The old Prussian Code 
 established clearly the rights and duties of ruler and ruled, 
 of the State and of the citizen. While England and the 
 United States are swayed by individuaHsm, while in the 
 Anglo-Saxon countries the interests of the individual are 
 placed above those of the community as a whole, Frederick 
 the Great impressed upon his people throughout his Code 
 the fact that the whole is more important than the part, 
 that the State is more important than the individual. In 
 the Introduction to the Code we read, in the beautifully 
 clear and brief language which makes it a model of style : 
 
 Every citizen is obliged to promote the welfare and 
 security of the community in accordance with his position 
 and means. If the rights and duties of the individual should 
 come into collision with the promotion of the general welfare, 
 the rights and advantages of the individual citizen must 
 range after the interests of the community. On the other 
 hand, the State is obliged to make good the damage which 
 individuals may suffer by sacrificing their rights and interests 
 to the general welfare. 
 
 It will be noticed that the State, the community, was 
 given enormous powers over the individual, powers which 
 might be abused. To prevent their abuse, the citizens 
 were enabled to proceed at law against the State with the 
 same ease with which they could proceed against one another. 
 The Code stated : 
 
 Differences between the head of the State and his sub- 
 jects will be settled before the ordinary law courts, in 
 accordance with the law, and will be decided by them. 
 
 That was not an empty assertion. While in England and 
 in the United States the popular representation is all- 
 powerful, and can, with impunity, act unjustly towards 
 the citizens, the Prussian people were enabled by law to 
 place their differences with Government and ruler before 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTER 163 
 
 the law courts. When Frederick the Great had built 
 the chdteau of Sansouci he found that a windmill close 
 by disturbed him at his work. He offered to buy the mill, 
 but the miller refused to part with it at any price. Annoyed 
 by his refusal, the King threatened to seize the mill, paying 
 the miller compensation, whereupon the proprietor fear- 
 lessly repHed that the King could not act against the law, 
 that he would take the matter to the law courts if Frederick 
 used violence, and the result was that the miller remained 
 in undisturbed possession of his property. 
 
 By the action of the Great Elector, of Frederick WilHam 
 the First, and of Frederick the Great, the ruler and the 
 Government of Prussia had been given the greatest powers. 
 Frederick the Great was no doubt a despot, but he was 
 an enlightened despot. He claimed for the State the most 
 far-reaching rights, but he insisted that ruler and Govern- 
 ment, being endowed with the greatest power, were obliged 
 to fulfil their duty towards the citizens, that they should 
 act towards them the part of Providence. The old Prussian 
 Code lays down : 
 
 All rights and duties of the State towards the citizens 
 are united in the sovereign. 
 
 The principal duty of the ruler of the State consists 
 in maintaining peace and security towards other nations 
 and in the interior of the country, and in protecting every 
 citizen in the enjoyment of his life and property against 
 violence and against disturbance. 
 
 The duties before mentioned were generally recognised 
 by conscientious sovereigns. However, Frederick the Great 
 went farther. He was of opinion that the Government 
 should not only protect the citizens, but should also promote 
 their prosperity by wise interference, and come to their 
 aid when in distress. The Code states ; 
 
 It is the duty of the ruler to provide measures and 
 create institutions whereby the citizens will obtain means 
 
 m2 
 
164 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 and opportunities for developing their abilities and powers, 
 for using them and for increasing their prosperity. 
 
 Hence, the head of the State is possessed of all the 
 privileges and powers which are required in order to obtain 
 this object. 
 
 The State is obliged to maintain the security of the 
 subjects and to defend their person, their honour, their 
 rights, and their property. 
 
 Hence, the State is obliged to take the measures and 
 to create the institutions necessary for providing justice, 
 for taking care of those who cannot help themselves, and 
 for preventing and punishing transgressions and crimes. 
 
 Germany was the first State to introduce a system of 
 National Insurance. As Bismarck inaugurated the first 
 national insurance laws, it is often believed that he originated 
 Germany's social policy. In reality he merely carried out 
 the duties which Frederick the Great had recommended, 
 and which were laid down in the old Code. The old Prussian 
 Code distinctly states that those citizens who are in need 
 are entitled to employment, and that they are entitled to 
 support if employment cannot be found for them, or if 
 they are unable to work. On the other hand, citizens were 
 not allowed to live in idleness by begging, and institutions 
 which encouraged idleness and dissipation, even if they 
 were charitable institutions, were not to be tolerated. The 
 Code states : 
 
 It is the duty of the State to provide for the maintenance 
 of those citizens who cannot provide for themselves, and 
 who cannot obtain maintenance from those private persons 
 who, according to the law, are obliged to provide for them. 
 
 Those who lack means and opportunities to earn a living 
 for themselves and their dependents, are to be supplied 
 with work suitable to their powers and capacities. 
 
 Those who will not work, owing to laziness, love of 
 idleness, or other disorderly inclinations, shall be made to 
 do useful work by compulsion and punishment. ' ' 
 
 Foreign beggars must neither be allowed to enter the 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHARACTEE 165 
 
 country nor to remain in it if they have entered it, and if 
 they should have succeeded in entering it by stealth, they 
 must be sent back across the frontier. 
 
 The native poor must not beg. They must be sent 
 back to the place to which they belong, and must there be 
 provided for in accordance with the law. The State is 
 entitled and obHged to create institutions and to take 
 measures which prevent destitution among the citizens, and 
 which prevent exaggerated expenditure and waste. 
 
 Arrangements and institutions which promote idleness, 
 especially among the masses of the people, and which are 
 harmful to diligence and industry, must not be tolerated 
 within the State. 
 
 Charitable and other institutions which favour and 
 promote incHnation towards idleness, may be dissolved 
 by the State, and their income may be used for the benefit 
 of the poor. 
 
 Those who deliberately live by begging, such as tramps 
 and idlers of every kind, must be made to work ; and when 
 they are useless they must either be cheaply provided for 
 or be expelled from the country as strangers. 
 
 Thieves and other criminals who, owing to their evil 
 inclinations, may become dangerous to the community, 
 shall not be allowed to leave prison after they have served 
 their sentence unless they have shown that they are able 
 to make an honest living. 
 
 Authorities and officials who neglect the preventive 
 measures outlined will be held responsible for themselves 
 and for their subordinates, according to the circumstances 
 of the case. 
 
 Germany does not swarm with tramps, touts, and idlers 
 of every kind who Hve by defrauding charitable organisations 
 and kindly disposed private people, because the nation has 
 been trained to habits of industry and thrift during the 
 last two hundred years. The Prussian sovereigns themselves 
 have given an example of industry and thrift to their people , 
 and they have, in addition, endeavoured to make the people 
 industrious and thrifty by wise legislation, for the principles 
 
166 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 contained in the old Code still guide the German Government 
 and the local authorities of the country. 
 
 On his journeys, Frederick the Great, like his father 
 Frederick WilUam the First, lent a wilHng ear to the com- 
 plaints of all his citizens. Eeferring to his activity when 
 travelling, he wrote to Voltaire : 
 
 I endeavour to prevent that in Prussia the strong oppress 
 the weak, and I try to mitigate sentences which appear to 
 me to be too severe. That is part of my occupation when 
 travelling through my provinces. Every citizen can ap- 
 proach me without let or hindrance, and his complaints 
 are investigated either by myself or by others. Hence I 
 am able to help numerous people who were unknown to 
 me until they handed to me their petitions or complaints. 
 As I am apt to revise sentences the judges are careful and 
 cautious, and are not likely to proceed with over-great 
 harshness. 
 
 Frederick the Great endeavoured by law not only to 
 promote industry and to discourage idleness among the lower 
 classes, but among the middle and upper classes as well. 
 Peasants and farmers who cultivated their land badly could 
 be compelled to cede it to others unless they improved its 
 cultivation. By careful Government regulation efficiency 
 was enforced in every direction. Officials could only be 
 appointed if they had given satisfactory proof of their 
 abihty, and people of the middle classes were allowed to 
 engage in industrial and professional pursuits only if they 
 had shown their capacity. Quacks, humbugs, and frauds 
 of every kind, who flourish so greatly among Anglo-Saxon 
 nations, were not allowed to make a living in Prussia. In 
 all professions, in all callings, from the highest to the lowest, 
 efficiency and competence, thoroughness and industry, were 
 required and were enforced by appropriate regulations and 
 laws. The nobility were given great privileges, but corre- 
 sponding duties were required of them. Appointments were 
 to be made only according to abihty and merit, and noble- 
 
EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAKACTEE 167 
 
 men who had disgraced themselves or had not done their 
 duty towards the State, could be deprived of their title and 
 position either by the sovereign or by the law courts. Full 
 rehgious Hberty was granted, but no rehgious body was 
 allowed to encourage hostility to the State or to promote 
 immorahty, for the Code stated : 
 
 Every citizen must be allowed complete freedom of 
 religion and of conscience. 
 
 On the other hand, every religious body is obliged to 
 teach its members fear of God, obedience to the laws, 
 loyalty towards the State, and moral behaviour towards 
 the citizens. 
 
 Two centuries ago the Germans were a nation of boors. 
 They were poor, ignorant, backward, and undiscipHned. 
 They have become a cultivated and a powerful nation by 
 the training which they received from their ruler-statesmen, 
 who have been the most successful educators, in the widest 
 sense of the word, which the world has seen. Great Britain 
 and the United States may learn from their example. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE GERMAN ARMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF 
 
 The success of an army, like that of any individual, depends, 
 in the first place, not upon its brute strength, but upon its 
 brain. The General Staff is the brain of an army. A 
 General Staff in some form or other has existed in armies 
 since time immemorial. Cromwell had an excellent 
 General Staff, although it bore a different name. However, 
 the General Staff in its modern and most perfect form is a 
 German invention. Count von Moltke's greatest merit 
 consists in having created the German General Staff upon 
 foundations which promised to ensure its permanent use- 
 fulness and value. 
 
 Unfortunately no English books on military affairs 
 give a true inside view of the wonderful organisation of the 
 German General Staff. The existing military literature 
 deals exclusively with its outward activities. The most 
 valuable account existing is contained in the confidential 
 reports which Colonel Stoffel, who was the military attach^ 
 of France in Berlin from 1866 to 1870, sent to his Govern- 
 ment. As that book has not been translated into English, 
 I would herewith give some extracts from it which describe 
 the organisation and activities of the German General 
 Staff: 
 
 The Great General Staff in Berlin is perfectly organised 
 for the training of oflBicers and for serving as a brain to the 
 army. At its headquarters may be found all the documents 
 
 168 
 
GEEMAN AEMY AND THE GENEKAL STAFF 169 
 
 necessary for studying the different European armies and 
 the countries which may become theatres of war. All 
 books, military journals, pamphlets, and other publications, 
 maps, charts, &c., which appear anywhere in Europe are 
 collected and classified. It possesses particularly the most 
 complete investigations regarding the countries bordering 
 upon Prussia. A special feature is a collection of the most 
 detailed studies regarding the resources of the various 
 countries, their geographical features, their roads, towns, 
 and villages, their population, their revenues, their water- 
 courses, the volume, depth, and width of streams, their 
 points of passage, &c. Nothing similarly complete exists 
 in France. 
 
 It must be proclaimed very loudly, and as an incontro 
 vertible truth, that the Prussian General Staff is the first 
 and foremost in Europe. The French Staff cannot be com- 
 pared with it. I have unceasingly pointed this out, being 
 convinced that if there should be an early war; the North 
 German Federation would derive the very greatest advan- 
 tages from its General Staff, while the French would terribly 
 regret the inferiority of theirs. This question seems to me to 
 be the gravest of all. I do not wish to disguise it, and my 
 conviction is so strong that I raise a cry of alarm. Caveant 
 consules ! I should not do my duty did I act differently. . . . 
 
 General von Moltke is the chief of the staff, and he 
 possesses almost absolute powers. He chooses the ofi&cers 
 who are to be admitted and to be employed by the General 
 Staff. He makes the promotions, which the War Minister 
 merely ratifies, and he distributes staff officers throughout 
 the army. His power is practically unlimited, and his 
 position, which would appear incomprehensible in France, 
 appears in Prussia only natural, because the integrity and 
 merit of von Moltke are generally recognised in that country. 
 
 Any Heutenant in the army, after three years' service 
 with his regiment, may enter the War Academy (Kriegs- 
 Akademie) at Berlin. This is an important military high 
 school. It is the foremost military school in Europe by 
 the character of the teachers and by that of the tuition. 
 It is not merely a staff school, for it has a larger aim. Its 
 
170 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 object is to familiarise chosen and ambitious officers with 
 the higher aspects of the art of war by giving them a training 
 which will develop their intellectual faculties, and which wiU 
 enable them to become good staff officers and prepare them 
 for obtaining a high command. . . . 
 
 Of the 120 Heutenants who on an average wish to join 
 the academy every year, only the 40 who show most 
 abiHty are admitted. They are selected by severe examina- 
 tions from the 120 who have come forward. The course of 
 the study extends over three years; and it continues during 
 nine months of every year. During the remaining three 
 months the officers rejoin their regiments and take part 
 in the autumn manoeuvres. In the third year the pupils 
 receive their training in actual staff duties and travel during 
 a month through varied country under the guidance of 
 their professors. During that month they occupy themselves 
 with reconnaissances, practical studies of the ground, mihtary 
 map-making, placing camps for troops, and other practical 
 mihtary problems. . . . 
 
 When these three years of training have passed, all the 
 lieutenants are sent back to their regiments, and the professors 
 and the director of the academy point out to General von 
 Moltke the most promising and the most zealous pupils. 
 Now of the forty officers the twelve ablest are chosen, and 
 these are transferred for six or nine months to a regiment 
 belonging to another arm than that with which they have 
 hitherto been acquainted. Those men who during that 
 new stage have shown the necessary zeal and ability in 
 their new surroundings are then called by General von 
 Moltke to Berlin to serve their apprenticeship on the General 
 Staff. However, they work there not in staff officer's 
 uniform, but in their regimental uniform. The distinction 
 of being allowed to wear a staff officer's uniform is not 
 easily obtained. . . . 
 
 The one or two years which the officers chosen spend 
 at the General Staff headquarters in Berlin, learning the 
 practical staff business, are of the greatest importance to 
 their future career, for they attend the highest mihtary 
 training school of the country, which is directed by General 
 
GEKMAN AEMY AND THE GENEEAL STAFF 171 
 
 von Moltke in person. By personally supervising the 
 training of the young officers, von Moltke becomes acquainted 
 with their character,^ and is able to judge of their abiHties. 
 He carefully introduces these young men to the work of 
 each of the departments of the General Staff, and in addition 
 he deHvers lectures to them. He orders them to write 
 essays on subjects which he chooses himself, and he reads 
 and criticises these essays before the assembled officers. 
 However, in doing so he never mentions the name of the 
 author, in order neither to hurt the feelings of the unsuccessful 
 nor to arouse a spirit of vanity among the successful . . . 
 
 When this temporary service at the headquarters of 
 the General Staff, which is a kind of apprenticeship, has 
 been completed. General von] Moltke chooses secretly those 
 officers with whom he has been working who are to be 
 appointed to the General Staff. He could, of course, 
 immediately appoint those Jwhom' he considers to be the 
 most competent. However, in order not to hurt |the feelings 
 of the unsuccessful men, all the officers who have served 
 their apprenticeship are indiscriminately sent back to 
 their regiments, where they resume their former duties. 
 The less gifted are left there, but the most promising ones 
 are, after several months' practical service, promoted 
 captains over the heads of their fellows, and are given the 
 distinguishing and much-coveted uniform of the General 
 Staff. ... 
 
 h General von Moltke employs the captains who have 
 thus been chosen according to his discretion. He gives 
 them work for which they have shown particular aptitude, 
 and he sends the majority of the men to the staffs of the 
 different army corps in the provinces, where they become 
 acquainted with the corps duties. The Prussian staff 
 officers, unhke the French, are not permanently tied to 
 their desks. They are not occupied all the time with 
 clerical work, for all this is left to non-commissioned officers 
 and privates. 
 
 In being chosen for the General Staff the officers gain 
 not only prestige, but obtain at the same time substantial 
 material advantage, for by being promoted captains, they 
 
in THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 obtain that grade from six to eight years earlier than they 
 would have obtained it in the ordinary way. . . . 
 
 Out of the 120 promising ofi&cers who on an average 
 come forward every year, desiring to join the War Academy, 
 only the forty ablest are admitted after severe examinations, 
 as has been pointed out, and of these forty only the twelve 
 most capable men are finally chosen, as has been shown. 
 However, among the officers who have not come forward 
 to study at the War Academy, and among those who have 
 attended the War Academy and who have been rejected, 
 there may of course be men of very great ability. In order 
 that these should be discovered and employed on the General 
 Staff, the regimental commanders are invited to propose 
 every year, through the generals commanding, to von Moltke 
 those officers who have shown the greatest professional 
 knowledge, zeal, and aptitude. The commanders of regiments 
 and corps are of course anxious to discover as many able 
 officers as possible in their commands, and to recommend 
 them to von Moltke. To the officers who have thus been 
 recommended to him. General von Moltke sends problems 
 to solve and questions to answer. If they show signs of 
 talent and of abihty in carrying out the tasks which von 
 Moltke gives them, he calls them to the General Staff and 
 employs them tentatively. If they give satisfaction, they 
 receive permanent appointments. If they disappoint him, 
 they are sent back to their regiments. . . . 
 
 All the mechanical staff work is left to underlings. 
 The staff officers themselves are occupied solely with the 
 study of important military questions, with brain work of 
 the highest importance. Every year the chief of the staff 
 of each army corps makes with all the staff officers a so-called 
 staff journey in order to extend their knowledge. On that 
 journey practical problems of war are treated. The officers 
 of the Great General Staff of Berlin make every year a simi- 
 lar staff journey, which is conducted by General von Moltke 
 himself and which lasts from two to three weeks. . . . 
 
 As shown by the details given in the foregoing, the 
 superiority of the Prussian General Staff over the staffs of 
 other nations is due firstly to the careful selection of the 
 
GEKMAN AKMY AND THE GENEEAL STAFF 173 
 
 staff officers from all the officers of the army, for all officers 
 may compete for staff appointments, as has been shown. Its 
 superiority is due, in the second place, to the fact that only 
 ambitious, capable, and industrious officers will come forward, 
 for they know that they can hope to succeed in obtaining 
 a staff appointment only if they work earnestly and with 
 the greatest concentration, for they are aware that only the 
 ablest will be selected — that appointments are made exclu- 
 sively by merit. By this most careful selection; and by the 
 highest professional training of the staff officers, Prussia 
 has secured for herself the foremost body of staff officers 
 in the world. The more frequently I compare the German 
 staff officers with the French staff officers, the more I am 
 struck with the superiority of the former. 
 
 It has been said that genius is an infinite capacity of 
 taking pains. Count von Moltke was a most painstaking 
 and conscientious worker. By infinite application and by 
 unremitting labour, he succeeded by the means described 
 to select from the large body of the German officers 
 practically all the best men and training them in their 
 duties. The great successes which the German army has 
 obtained in 1866, in 1870-71, in the present war, are chiefly 
 attributable to the General Staff, which has been the brain 
 of the army in the fullest sense of the term, which has trained 
 the commanders. Other nations may learn from Germany's 
 example. The methods practised by von Moltke are of 
 course applicable not only to the army, but to every Govern- 
 ment department and to every large commercial 
 organisation. 
 
CHAPTEE VI 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE WAR^ 
 
 Wars are due to direct and indirect causes, and, as a rule, 
 the latter are far more potent than the former. Hence; 
 incidents which are small, if not trivial, in themselves often 
 bring about a long and universally expected outbreak of 
 hostilities. The Franco-German War of 1870-71, for 
 instance, was not caused by Bismarck's alteration of the 
 Ems telegram, but by the pent-up and century-old hatred 
 existing between France and Germany, by the passionate 
 desire of the German States to form a united Empire, and 
 by the determination of Napoleon the Third to prevent such 
 a union and to dominate and rule the continent of Europe. 
 The aims of France and Germany were incompatible. 
 The deep-seated Franco-German differences had produced 
 a state of tension and bitterness between the two nations 
 which made war inevitable, and the blustering, blundering, 
 and interfering policy of Napoleon the Third had intensi- 
 fied and accelerated matters and brought them to a crisis. 
 The Ems telegram was merely the last straw. The outbreak 
 of the present war had been expected for a long time. It 
 was overdue, and it did not take the world by surprise. 
 The tension among the Great Powers had increased during 
 many years. Long ago the breaking-point had been reached, 
 and when it was seen that the dreaded hour had actually 
 arrived, many people exclaimed, almost with rehef : At last ! 
 
 1 From The Fortnightly Review, September 1914. 
 174 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAK 175 
 
 Exactly as the outbreak of the Franco- German War of 
 1870-71 was rather due to Napoleon's folly than to Bis- 
 marck's genius, even so the outbreak of the present war 
 is due chiefly to the ambition, the self-confidence, and the 
 insufficient capacity of the German Emperor, who has 
 played the part of Napoleon the Third in almost every 
 particular. 
 
 When William the Second came to the throne Germany 
 dominated the continent of Europe, and her preponderant 
 position was willingly borne, because she was believed to 
 be peaceful and contented. With the advent of WilHam 
 the Second the character of her foreign policy changed 
 completely. He dismissed his Chancellor, undertook the 
 direction of Germany's foreign policy, and announced 
 that he would steer the ship of State over a new course, 
 his own course. He imparted to Germany's policy his own 
 nervous restlessness. Germany began to interfere in every 
 quarter of the world, and to pick unnecessary quarrels, 
 not only with her great neighbour-States, but with Great 
 Britain and the United States as well. Even the small 
 States bordering upon Germany and Germany's own allies 
 became uneasy and alarmed at the Emperor's unceasing, 
 neurotic, and dangerous activity. Everywhere Germany's 
 policy became disliked and suspected. 
 
 During the reign of William the Second one great crisis 
 in the affairs of Europe followed another. Owing to his 
 feverish interference in all parts of the world, the great 
 nations were dragged repeatedly to the very brink of a 
 world-war. Since 1888 the mihtary and naval forces of 
 Germany were increased at an unprecedented rate, and all 
 Europe and the United States had to follow suit. Year 
 by year the armament race became more furious, more 
 exasperating, and more unbearable, and even the small 
 and peaceful neutral States, feeling alarmed at Germany's 
 diplomatic and military activities, felt compelled to arm to 
 the utmost. In Bismarck's time, Germany had been the 
 
176 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 nucleus of a great peace group of nations, and Germany's 
 probable opponents were isolated. Under the regime of 
 William the Second the grouping of Europe changed com- 
 pletely. The nations threatened by the Emperor's un- 
 ceasing activity felt insecure in their isolation. A strong 
 group of Powers opposed to Germany's expansion, or 
 rather to the Emperor's policy, arose. Germany became 
 virtually isolated. 
 
 Bismarck had wisely followed a policy of concentration, 
 a purely continental policy. He was anxious to be able 
 to rely on British support in case of a great national emer- 
 gency. WiUiam the Second threw Bismarck's wise caution 
 rashly to the wind. Not being satisfied with Germany's 
 great position, not being satisfied with the fact that Germany 
 dominated the land, he wished her to dominate the sea 
 as well. In resounding phrases, such as ' Germany's 
 future hes upon the water,' ' The trident must be in our 
 fist,' and many similar ones, he announced his determination 
 to his people and to the world. 
 
 Encouraged by the most influential circles, and aided 
 by the official apparatus, an anti-British agitation was 
 created throughout Germany. In 1895 the Kruger telegram 
 and the diplomatic campaign connected with it clearly 
 revealed Germany's intentions. In autumn 1899 the 
 Boer War broke out, and the German Government con- 
 firmed by its action its anti-British attitude. The occasion 
 of the Boer War and of England's initial defeats was used 
 for denouncing this country by an unscrupulous campaign 
 of vituperation and calumny, and for demanding an enormous 
 increase of the German fleet. Many Germans beUeved 
 that the sun of Great Britain had begun to set, and they 
 wished Germany to become her successor. On the day of 
 the disaster of Magersfontein, on December 11, 1899, Prince 
 Billow, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 significantly said in the Keichstag, in support of an immensely 
 increased naval programme : 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAE 177 
 
 The necessity to strengthen our fleet arises out of the 
 present state of the world, and out of the circumstances 
 of our oversea policy. Only two years ago no one would 
 have been able to foresee the way in which things have begun 
 to move. It is urgent to define the attitude which we have 
 to take up in view of what is happening. . . . We must 
 create a fleet strong enough to exclude attack from any 
 Power. 
 
 A fortnight after the disaster at Spionkop, Admiral 
 Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, 
 stated : * We do not know what adversary we may have 
 to face. We must therefore arm ourselves with a view to 
 meeting the most dangerous naval conflict possible.' 
 
 In spring 1900, while the Boer War was still in progress, 
 and its issue extremely doubtful, the German Government 
 brought out an enormous navy bill. In its preamble the 
 German Government clearly showed that it desired to 
 challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, for in it we 
 read the ominous words : — 
 
 Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war 
 with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks jeo- 
 pardising the supremacy of that Power. 
 
 It is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet 
 should be as strong as that of the greatest sea Power, 
 because, generally, a great sea Power will not be able to 
 concentrate all its forces against Germany. But even if 
 it should succeed in confronting us in superior force, the 
 enemy would be so very much weakened in overcoming the 
 resistance of a strong German fleet that, notwithstanding 
 the victory gained, the enemy's naval supremacy would 
 no longer be secured by the possession of a sufficient fleet. 
 
 The German Press is largely controlled, or inspired, 
 by the German Government, and the Government is so 
 powerful that it is able to exercise, in various ways, control 
 over German hterature and over the activity of public 
 speakers and lecturers. With the evident approval of the 
 
178 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Government, the old anti-British campaign was extended 
 to the utmost. Hundreds of University professors, generals, 
 and admirals were encouraged to preach on public platforms 
 and in countless books, pamphlets, and articles, Britanniam 
 esse delendam. They preached that Great Britain was a 
 faithless and a decaying nation and Germany's hereditary 
 enemy, that Germany was destined to rule the sea and to 
 rule the world. Mr. Eisenhart wrote in his book, ' Deutsch- 
 land beim Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts,' Berlin, 
 1900: 
 
 We consider a great war with England in the twentieth 
 century as quite inevitable, and must strain every fibre 
 in order to be prepared to fight that war single-handed. 
 The experience of all time shows that colonial empires 
 are more fragile and less enduring than continental ones. 
 We do not require a fleet against France or Kussia. Let 
 them ravage our coasts in case of war. We require a fleet 
 only against England. 
 
 The Koloniale Zeitschrift wrote on January 18, 1900 : 
 
 The old century saw a German Europe. The new one 
 shall see a German world. To attain that consummation 
 two duties are required from the present German genera- 
 tion : to keep its own counsel and to create a powerful 
 fleet. 
 
 Field-Marshal General Colmar von der Goltz, a leading 
 German soldier, wrote in the Deutsche Bundschau of 
 March 1900 : 
 
 We must contradict the frequently expressed opinion 
 that a war between Germany and Great Britain is impos- 
 sible. Great Britain is forced to distribute her fleets over 
 many seas in peace as well as in war. In that necessary 
 distribution lies her weakness. Germany is in a better 
 position. . . . 
 
 As places are not wanting where the English defences 
 are weak, it would be a mistake to consider a landing in 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAK 179 
 
 England a chimera. The distance is short enough if a 
 daring admiral succeeds in securing supremacy on the sea 
 for a short time. The material basis of our power is large 
 enough to enable us to destroy the present superiority of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 I ^^ Innumerable quotations of similar character could 
 easily be given.^ 
 
 When, after various diplomatic defeats and the 
 humihating issue of the Mexican adventure, the prestige 
 of Napoleon the Third and of Imperial France had dechned 
 to the utmost, when the Emperor of the French had ahenated 
 all Europe and the majority of the French people, he desired 
 to strengthen his position by a successful war, and he rushed 
 into Bismarck's trap. In case of a war with Prussia he had 
 counted upon the support of Austria-Hungary and Denmark, 
 whom the Prussians had defeated and despoiled, and upon 
 that of Italy, who owed her freedom to France. However, 
 Napoleon the Third, hke William the Second, was his own 
 Foreign Minister, and was unable to pursue a consistent 
 policy. Guiding the poUcy of the State over the heads, 
 or behind the backs, of his Ministers, he had managed 
 France's foreign poHcy so badly that none of the three 
 Powers upon whose support he had firmly counted was 
 wilUng to help him. The hour of need found him without 
 a friend. 
 
 At the beginning of his reign, when WilHam the Second 
 promised that he would steer the German ship of State on a 
 new course, that his course was the right one, and that he 
 would lead Germany towards a great and glorious future, 
 he was beheved in by all German patriots. But when 
 failure followed failure, when it was seen that England, 
 France, and Italy greatly increased their possessions while 
 Germany merely retained her old territories, and when 
 opportunity after opportunity for Germany's expansion 
 was allowed to go by unused, the people surrounding the 
 Monarch became exasperated. In the highest mihtary and 
 
 n2 
 
180 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 aristocratic circles William the Second was spoken of with 
 contempt as a bungling braggart. After the second Morocco 
 crisis the Post, an ultra-patriotic Berhn journal, actually- 
 referred to the Emperor as a * foltron miserable,' quoting 
 with approval a French journal. Even the Crown Prince 
 revolted against his father and his father's policy, and he 
 openly showed his contempt for it. It is conceivable, 
 and indeed probable, that the state of mind of Wilham the 
 Second in 1914 was similar to that of Napoleon the Third 
 in 1870. Humiliated and ambitious rulers are dangerous. 
 
 During more than a century Austria-Hungary has 
 striven to prevent Russia seizing Constantinople and to 
 acquire Salonica for herself. Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 allowed the Balkan War to break out in the firm expecta- 
 tion that it would result in the victory of Turkey and the 
 defeat of the Slavonic Balkan States, to the great advantage 
 of the two Germanic States, which were Turkey's protectors, 
 and which reckoned upon Turkey's support against Russia 
 in case of a great war. The victories of the AlHes caused 
 consternation and dismay in Berlin, and especially in 
 Vienna, which is more directly interested in Balkan affairs. 
 Hence Austrian diplomacy endeavoured to weaken the 
 Balkan States by sowing dissension among them. With 
 this object in view, Austria-Hungary forbade Serbia and 
 Montenegro to acquire a harbour on the Adriatic, created 
 an independent State of Albania out of the territory acquired 
 by the Allies, brought about the second Balkan War, and 
 repeatedly threatened Montenegro and Serbia with war, 
 although she knew that Russia would never tolerate an 
 Austrian attack upon Serbia. From a despatch of Sir 
 G. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 
 published in the ' Correspondence respecting the European 
 Crisis,' No. 6 (1914), we learn : * During the Balkan crisis 
 M. Sazonoff had made it clear to the Austrian Government 
 that war with Russia must immediately follow an Austrian 
 attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 181 
 
 of Serbia was as intolerable to Russia as the dependence 
 of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. 
 It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death.' 
 When, during the Balkan settlement, Austria was on the 
 point of attacking Serbia, the late Archduke Franz 
 Ferdinand, who was in favour of a vigorous foreign policy, 
 went on a flying visit to Springe to plead for the German 
 Emperor's support in case of a collision with Russia, but, 
 to the disgust and sorrow of the German mihtary party, the 
 Emperor declined to help him. 
 
 The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the foremost 
 statesmen of Austria-Hungary were foiled for a time, but 
 they hoped to find an opportunity for crushing Serbia; 
 acquiring Albania, and opening to the Dual Monarchy a 
 road to the coveted port of Salonica. A few weeks before 
 the Archduke's murder, William the Second visited him 
 at his castle of Konopischt in Bohemia. Ostensibly the 
 Emperor visited the Archduke merely in order to see his 
 celebrated rose-gardens. However, it soon leaked out that 
 at Konopischt a secret treaty had been concluded between 
 Austria-Hungary and Germany, and it seemed highly 
 probable that at that castle the German Emperor reversed 
 his former policy, and pledged himself unconditionally to 
 support Austria-Hungary with Germany's entire strength 
 if Austria-Hungary should attack Serbia and should in 
 turn be attacked by Russia. 
 
 What was the reason of the Emperor's change of poHcy ? 
 The morbid instability of the German Emperor's 
 character is perhaps a sufficient explanation for his change 
 of front. Under William the Second Germany's policy 
 has been as incalculable and as unstable as was the poHcy 
 of France under Napoleon the Third. Besides, during the 
 last few years many of the most eminent German soldiers 
 and thinkers had taught that Germany required elbow-room ; 
 that the European balance of power hampered her expan- 
 sion ; that a war between the Triple AUiance on the one 
 
182 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 hand and France and Eussia on the other was inevitable ; 
 that the moment was favourable ; that Germany should 
 strike before Eussia had entirely recovered from her defeats 
 in Asia, and had completed her great army reorganisation. 
 
 In the event of a war with France and Eussia, the atti- 
 tude of Great Britain was, of course, of the greatest import- 
 ance to Germany. Her action might prove to be the decisive 
 factor in such a war. Italy is most vuhierable by sea, for 
 her principal towns lie on the seashore, and afford ideal 
 targets to naval gunners. She has an immense coast-line, 
 and her principal railroads run close to the sea over countless 
 viaducts and bridges, and through hundreds of tunnels 
 which may be destroyed from the sea by a few carefully 
 aimed twelve-inch shells. Last, but not least, Italy is 
 economically at least as dependent upon her maritime trade 
 as is Great Britain. It was, therefore, obvious that Germany 
 and Austria could expect Italy's support in case of war 
 only if Great Britain was friendly or neutral. In these 
 circumstances it was obviously essential that a war should 
 break out in respect of an object in which Great Britain 
 had no direct interest. As there was no defensive alliance 
 between Great Britain on the one side, and France and 
 Eussia on the other, but only a loose Entente, it was firmly 
 expected that Great Britain would remain neutral as long 
 as her own interests were not touched. This was beheved 
 all the more strongly as Great Britain was generally thought 
 to be an unreliable Power in case of war. Very likely the 
 Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the supporters of his policy 
 persuaded the German Emperor that Great Britain might 
 conceivably not lift a hand in the defence of Serbia. The 
 problem, therefore, was to pick a quarrel with Serbia in 
 which Serbia would appear to be in the wrong. If Great 
 Britain should not assist France and Eussia, Italy could 
 safely aid Austria-Hungary and Germany, and would 
 probably do so in the hope of territorial aggrandisement. 
 ^An attack of Austria-Hungary upon Serbia might lead 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAE 183 
 
 to a war between the Central European Powers on the one 
 side, and France and Eussia on the other. However, it 
 was not certain whether Kussia was willing to take Serbia's 
 part. Conceivably, Kussia had only been bluffing when she 
 informed Austria that an attack on Serbia would be equiva- 
 lent to an attack on Kussia herself. If Austria-Hungary 
 should succeed in smashing Serbia without being involved 
 in a war with Kussia, the position of the Triple Alliance 
 would be immensely strengthened, for Russia's prestige 
 among the Balkan Slavs and among the Slavs of Austria- 
 Hungary would have received a most deadly blow. With 
 very little bloodshed the Triple Alliance would have firmly 
 established its supremacy on the Continent. If Kussia, 
 after all her threats, was not ready to go to war for Serbia, 
 she would probably also not go to war if Salonica was taken 
 by easy stages. If Kussia was merely bluffing, the two 
 Germanic Powers had a chance of establishing their hege- 
 mony over the Balkan Peninsula and over Constantinople 
 itself. Much evidence goes to show that the leaders of 
 Germany's foreign policy, and especially the Emperor, 
 firmly calculated upon Kussia's unreadiness. Their hopes 
 were apparently imparted to the Ambassadors, and the 
 German Ambassadors, considering themselves rather the 
 Emperor's servants than the servants of their country; 
 humoured the Imperial views as to Kussia's unreadiness, 
 as will be seen in the following pages. 
 
 A few weeks after the Konopischt interview the Arch- 
 duke was murdered by Austrian citizens of Servian race. 
 Austria-Hungary took the blow surprisingly quietly. 
 Inquirers demanding to know what the Government pro- 
 posed to do were merely told that a judicial inquiry was 
 taking place, and that, of course, nothing could be done 
 until the mystery surrounding the crime had been cleared 
 up. Nobody in authority in Austria-Hungary seemed 
 seriously concerned, nobody seemed to expect that dangerous 
 complications might follow. On July 10 a well-informed 
 
184 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Austrian diplomat casually told an English acquaintance 
 that the murder of the Archduke would cause no trouble 
 with Serbia, and certainly no war. On July 20 Sir Edward 
 Grey wrote to Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador 
 in Berlin : * I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he 
 had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard 
 to Serbia. He said he had not, but Austria was certainly 
 going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as 
 very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything 
 recently except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the 
 Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion 
 that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be 
 cleared up.' Three days later, on July 23, Austria-Hungary 
 addressed to Serbia an unacceptable ultimatum, which 
 brought on the present war ! 
 
 What had happened in the meantime ? 
 
 The Times of July 25 contained side by side two equally 
 startling articles, one concerning the breakdown of the 
 Buckingham Palace Conference, and the other giving 
 the astonishing demands addressed by Austria-Hungary to 
 Serbia. There is apparently some connection between the 
 two. It has been shown before that Great Britain's attitude 
 was of the very greatest importance to Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary, in case the Austro-Serbian trouble should 
 lead to a war between the Triple Alliance and France and 
 Kuissia. A few days before the Serbian ultimatum was 
 despatched, when Count Berchtold told the Italian Ambas- 
 sador that the situation between Austria-Hungary and 
 Serbia was not grave, there was reason to hope that the 
 Buckingham Palace Conference might lead to a settlement 
 by consent, and to a lasting peace, in Ireland. By July 23 
 all hope of such a settlement was abandoned. Civil war 
 in Ireland, and perhaps in Great Britain as well, laming the 
 power of the United Kingdom for action abroad, seemed 
 imminent and unavoidable. 
 
 Austria's ultimatum was couched in the most abrupt 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAK 185 
 
 and threatening language. Without offering a scrap of 
 evidence that the Serbian Government was directly or 
 indirectly responsible for the Archduke's murder, it requested 
 within forty-eight hours the fulfilment of absolutely impos- 
 sible demands. Within forty-eight hours Serbia was to 
 destroy both her national independence and her constitution. 
 Even if Serbia had been willing to concede all Austria asked 
 for, she could have done so only by passing legislation for 
 which forty-eight hours would have been totally insulB&cient. 
 Austria's demands were obviously meant to be unacceptable, 
 and to make war inevitable. On July 25 Sir M. de Bunsen 
 telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey from Vienna : ' Language 
 of Press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender 
 of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired.' On July 27 
 he wired : * The impression left on my mind is that the 
 Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war 
 inevitable.' 
 
 Austria has for many decades followed a timorous and 
 hesitating policy, a policy of inaction and of surrender. 
 During the recent crisis she has acted with energy for the 
 first time since Francis Joseph came to the throne. That 
 unusual and positively reckless energy was imdoubtedly 
 caused by the knowledge that she coiQd absolutely rely on 
 Germany's aid, should an attack on Serbia be followed 
 by complications with Eussia. It is perfectly clear that 
 Austria acted not by her own volition, but as Germany's 
 agent. In the words of M. Sazonoff, reported by the 
 British Ambassador at St. Petersburg : * Austria would 
 never have taken such action unless Germany had first 
 been consulted.' The Kussian Ambassador in Vienna 
 stated that ' any action taken by Austria to humiliate 
 Serbia could not leave Eussia indifferent.' * If actual war 
 broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to locahse it, 
 for Eussia was not prepared to give way again as she had 
 done on previous occasions, especially during the annexation 
 crisis of 1909.' The Eussian charge d'affaires remarked 
 
186 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that ' the 
 Austrian Note was drawn up in a form rendering it im- 
 possible of acceptance as it stood.' Austria-Hungary 
 evidently sought a war with Serbia, knowing full well that 
 it might lead to a war with Kussia. Her action was fully 
 understood in St. Petersburg. On July 25 Sir G. Buchanan 
 reported by telegram to Sir Edward Grey a conversation 
 which he had with the Eussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 In the course of it the Minister stated : ' Austria's action 
 was in reality directed against Kussia. She aimed at 
 overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and 
 establishing her hegemony there.' 
 
 Austria evidently did not intend to restrict herself 
 to punishing Serbia for her unproved complicity in the 
 Archduke's murder. On July 25 Sir E. Eodd reported 
 from Eome to Sir Edward Grey by telegram : * There is 
 reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica 
 railway.' That view prevailed not only in Italy. A few 
 days later Mr. Beaumont telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey 
 from Constantinople : * I understand that the designs of 
 Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and 
 a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I gathered 
 this from a remark let fall by fche Austrian Ambassador 
 here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of 
 Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance 
 on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman 
 population discontented with Serbian rule.' 
 
 Fate seemed to favour Austria and her partner Germany. 
 The Austrian ultimatum expired on Saturday the 25th 
 at 6 o'clock in the evening. On Sunday, July 26, a collision 
 occurred in Dubhn between Nationalist gun-runners and 
 British soldiers. Several Nationalists were killed and many 
 wounded. The sensation was enormous. In Nationalist 
 Ireland a spirit of fierce hatred arose against England 
 and against Ulster. Conciliation between Nationalists and 
 Orangemen seemed out of the question. The outlook for 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAK 187 
 
 the"^ Amending Bill, which was intended to pacify Ulster by 
 securing her independence from Dublin, seemed hopeless. 
 Great Britain was simultaneously threatened with civil 
 war, with a revolt of the Nationalists against the Govern- 
 ment, and with a split in the Cabinet. England's right 
 arm seemed paralysed. 
 
 P' On the very day of the Dublin bloodshed, the German 
 Emperor suddenly returned from his cruise. In document 
 No. 33 of the White Book, from which the numerous quota- 
 tions given in this chapter have been taken, we read a 
 telegram from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey stating : 
 * Emperor returned suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regrets 
 this step which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative.' 
 The high officials of the German Foreign Office regretted 
 the Emperor's arrival apparently because they did not 
 approve of the policy which William the Second, as, before 
 him, Napoleon the Third, carried on over the heads of the 
 responsible officials. Careful study of the White Book 
 reveals the fact that the policy which led to the war was 
 carried on by the Emperor at the instigation, and with the 
 assistance of, the military war party, and of certain Am- 
 bassadors against the opinion of the leading men at the 
 German Foreign Office who, despairingly but unsuccessfully, 
 endeavoured to prevent the worst. 
 
 Throughout the White Book we find evidence that the 
 German Chancellor and the German Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs did their utmost to preserve the peace of 
 Europe, but that their action was overruled by the rashness 
 of their master. To start with, the deadly Austrian ulti- 
 matum, which was the immediate cause of the war, was 
 apparently known and approved of by the Emperor, but 
 was quite unknown to the Foreign Office. On July 25 Sir 
 H. Rumbold telegraphed from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey 
 that he had seen the German Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, who had * confessed privately that the Note 
 
188 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 (presented to Serbia) left much to be desired as a diplomatic 
 document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he 
 had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that 
 Note, he had, in fact, had no such knowledge.' On the 
 same day Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir H. Kumbold : 
 * The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the 
 German Foreign Office saying that his Government had 
 not known beforehand, and had no more than other Powers 
 to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian Note to Serbia.* 
 Five days later, on July 30, Sir M. de Bimsen telegraphed 
 to Sir Edward Grey from Vienna : ' Although I am not 
 able to verify it, I have private information that the German 
 Ambassador (in Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian 
 ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and tele- 
 graphed it to the German Emperor. 1 know from the 
 German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line 
 of it.' Apparently the fatal ultimatum was drafted by the 
 Austrian Foreign Office with the collaboration of the German 
 Ambassador in Vienna and of the German Emperor, but 
 without the knowledge of the Foreign Office in Berhn and 
 of the German Foreign Secretary ! 
 
 Unfortunately, the German Emperor is his own Chan- 
 cellor and his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 He has very frequently appointed favourites to high posi- 
 tions and dismissed able men, because they lacked the 
 courtier's qualifications. The German Ambassadors are 
 appointed by the Emperor, and it is not unnatural that 
 men who owe their position to the Emperor's good- will, and 
 who know his character, rather report what is Hkely to please 
 their master than what is true and useful to Germany. 
 William the Second has been extremely unfortunate in 
 the choice of his Ambassadors, and herein Hes the reason 
 that Germany has habitually been completely misinformed 
 as to the policy of foreign countries, and as to their attitude 
 in certain contingencies. Owing to the insufficient capacity 
 of her Ambassadors, Germany was totally misinformed as 
 
THE CAUSES OP THE WAB 189 
 
 to the attitude which Eussia, France, and Great Britain 
 were likely to adopt if Austria should make war on Serbia. 
 Owing to false but pleasing reports sent to BerUn, the 
 leaders of Germany's foreign policy believed that Eussia 
 would keep quiet if Serbia was struck down, that France 
 was not ready, and that, in any case. Great Britain would 
 remain neutral. On July 26 the British Ambassador in 
 Vienna reported to Sir Edward Grey : * According to con- 
 fident behef of German Ambassador, Eussia will keep quiet 
 during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is 
 resolved to inflict. . . . France, too, was not at all in a 
 condition for facing a war. ... As for Germany, she knew 
 very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary 
 in this matter.' On July 30 he telegraphed : * Unfortu- 
 nately, the German Ambassador is himself so identified 
 with extreme anti-Eussian and anti-Serbian feeling pre- 
 valent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of 
 peace with entire sincerity.' On August 1 the British 
 Ambassador wired : * I agree with His Excellency . (the 
 Eussian Ambassador in Vienna) that the German Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his 
 strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.' 
 
 Similar incapacity was shown by the German repre- 
 sentative in St. Petersburg. On July 29, Sir G. Buchanan 
 telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey : * I fear that the German 
 Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he 
 uses to his own Government the same language as he did 
 to me to-day. He accused the Eussian Government of 
 endangering the peace of Europe by their mobihsation, 
 and said, when I referred to all that had been recently 
 done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.' 
 M. Sazonoff remarked to Sir G. Buchanan on August 1 : 
 ' Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna 
 and St. Petersburg : the former was a violent Eussophobe 
 who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his 
 Government that Eussia would never go to war.' 
 
190 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 When the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg found 
 that by his folly he had been largely responsible for 
 Germany's fatal decision, he completely broke down with 
 despair and remorse. Sir G. Buchanan telegraphed, on 
 July 30, describing the decisive interview between the 
 German Ambassador and M. Sazonoff : ' German Am- 
 bassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on 
 seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonoff 
 to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to Berlin.' 
 The Times of August 1 describes the closing scene as 
 follows : 
 
 Seeing that Kussia had not replied to Germany's ulti- 
 matum. Count Pourtales called at the Kussian Foreign Office 
 and insisted on seeing M. Sazonoff. In a voice trembling 
 with emotion he asked if Eussia agreed to Germany's 
 demand (to demobilise). M. Sazonoff answered that the 
 silence of the Eussian Government meant refusal. Count 
 Pourtales repeated his question a second time. M. Sazonoff 
 reiterated his refusal. Count Pourtales asked a third and 
 last time, and again the Minister repKed with a firm refusal. 
 Thereupon the Ambassador took his leave crestfallen, 
 handing in the text of a verbal Note. In the hurry it was 
 not noticed that the paper contained alternative replies, 
 one recording Germany's satisfaction with Eussia's hypo- 
 thetical surrender. 
 
 Germany seems to have been equally badly informed as 
 to Great Britain's attitude. From many passages in the 
 White Book we learn that she counted firmly on British 
 neutrahty. 
 
 While the German Chancellor and his Secretary of 
 State for Foreiga Affairs desired a peaceful settlement of 
 the Serbian difficulty, the Emperor, supported by his 
 Ambassadors in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and pushed 
 on by the mihtary party, evidently thought the moment 
 favourable for risking a war between Germany and Austria- 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 191 
 
 Hungary on the one side, and France and Russia on the 
 other, especially as Great Britain seemed likely to remain 
 neutral, being not interested in Serbia and having her hands 
 full with her domestic troubles. According to a telegram 
 sent by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
 French Ambassador in London, Germany's military pre- 
 parations began on Saturday, July 25, the very day 
 when Austria's ultimatum to Serbia expired. On July 
 28, two days after the Dublin massacre, the Militdr 
 Wochenblatt, the official German army weekly, endeavoured 
 to strengthen the hands of those who were determined 
 on war by printing a remarkable article depreciating 
 the Russian army, and stating that its fighting power 
 was hugely overestimated, that numbers were less im- 
 portant than moral, ability of the higher officers, the 
 national spirit, railways, geographical factors, etc. ' In 
 Germany, all military preparations for war,' the journal 
 added, ' have been taken with that attention to all 
 details which is characteristic of Germany. It can, there- 
 fore, be said, without exaggeration, that Germany can 
 face the advent of grave events with complete equani- 
 mity, trusting to God and her own might.' On the same 
 day the Austrian Emperor pubhshed a manifesto to his 
 people, in which he intimated, in no uncertain language, 
 that he was prepared for a war with Russia. He 
 stated : 
 
 ... In this solemn hour I am fully convinced of the 
 whole significance of my resolve and my responsibility 
 towards the Almighty. I have examined and weighed 
 everything, and with a serene conscience I set out on the 
 path to which my duty points. ... I trust in Austria- 
 Hungary's brave and devoted forces, and I trust in the 
 Almighty to give the victory to my arms. 
 
 This sonorous manifesto would obviously have been 
 very much out of place if Austria-Hungary had contem- 
 
192 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 plated only a war with little Serbia, which was completely 
 exhausted by two previous wars. 
 
 Austria's determination to challenge Eussia, and her 
 readiness to fight that country, feeling sure of Germany's 
 support, was demonstrated still more clearly by the ofi&cial 
 and inspired Press of the country. The Pester Lloyd, for 
 instance, had an article in leaded type on July 28, the day 
 when the Emperor's proclamation was pubUshed, in which 
 we read : 
 
 The remotest consequences of the action against Serbia 
 have been fully thought out and tested, and accordingly 
 the people can set its mind at rest that the Dual Monarchy, 
 having decided on this step, is in a position to meet each 
 of its consequences with arms in its hands. . . . We possess 
 the strength to make our vital interests respected in all 
 circumstances. This is doubtless no secret to other States, 
 which are certainly . very exactly informed as to the forces 
 at the disposal of the Dual Monarchy. If, nevertheless, 
 we support the localisation of the conflict with Serbia, 
 we only give a new proof that our care for the maintenance 
 of the peace of the world is not less than that of any other 
 Power in Europe. 
 
 Germany alone could restrain Austria at the critical 
 moment by refusing to follow her into a dangerous 
 adventure, provided her hands were not tied. However, 
 while the German Foreign Office seemed inclined to promote 
 a peaceful solution, the attitude of the Austrian Govern- 
 ment remained absolutely unshaken, for reasons which will 
 become apparent only in the future. The German Foreign 
 Office apparently was not only ignorant of the Austrian 
 ultimatum, but worked for peace up to the last moment. 
 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed on July 28 to Sir Edward 
 Grey : * At invitation of Imperial Chancellor I called upon 
 his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me 
 to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should 
 work together with England for maintenance of general 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAE 193 
 
 peace, as they had done successfully in the last European 
 crisis.' On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed 
 from Berlin : ' I found Secretary of State very depressed 
 to-day.' On the same day M. Sazonoff telegraphed to 
 Count Benckendorff in London : * The German Ambassador 
 informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany 
 has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, 
 and that she will continue to do so, even after the declara- 
 tion of war.' The last telegrams received from Sir Edward 
 Goschen show that the German Chancellor was absolutely 
 stunned by the course which events had taken. According 
 to newspaper reports, his face was so much distorted by 
 terror and grief that the people did not recognise him when 
 he drove with the Emperor from Potsdam to Berlin. 
 
 On July 28 the tone of the German and Austrian Press 
 was confident and warhke, because Great Britain seemed 
 to be incapable of energetic action. The Dubhn massacre 
 seemed to continental observers to be the beginning of 
 civil war. They were promptly disillusioned. On July 30 
 Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons : ' It is of 
 vital importance, in the interests of the whole world, that 
 this country, which has no interests of its own directly at 
 stake, should present a united front and be able to speak 
 and act with the authority of an undivided nation.' The 
 second reading of the Amending Bill relating to Ireland 
 was postponed indefinitely. Suddenly Great Britain was 
 seen to present a united front, and to be ready for action. 
 When it was too late, Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 recognised their miscalculation. Great Britain was Hkely 
 to stand on the side of France and Kussia, and if Great 
 Britain should support France and Eussia, Italy would 
 obviously desert her alHes. Suddenly and unexpectedly 
 the position had become extremely perilous to Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary. These two countries were hkely 
 at the same time to incur unexpectedly the active hostihty 
 of Great Britain and to lose the support of Italy. In 
 
194 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 case of war their chances had suddenly very seriously 
 deteriorated. 
 
 Up to July 30, the day when all British party differences 
 disappeared as by magic, in consequence of Mr. Asquith's 
 appeal, Austria-Hungary unconditionally declined all sug- 
 gestions of negotiation, mediation, or conference in order to 
 settle peacefully her differences with Serbia. That is shown 
 by perusal of Documents 61, 62, 81, and 93, pubHshed in 
 the White Book. As late as July 28 Count Berchtold said 
 to the Eussian Ambassador that * the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government could no longer recede, nor enter into any 
 discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note.' 
 That haughty and irreconcilable attitude disappeared when, 
 two days later, on July 30, Great Britain had settled her 
 domestic differences in ParHament. On July 30 Sir E. 
 Eodd, the British Ambassador in Eome, telegraphed to 
 Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent 
 for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had 
 declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the 
 Eussian Government. But he had reason to believe that 
 Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice 
 to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we (the British) 
 should act with France and Eussia, and was most anxious 
 to avoid issue with us. 
 
 On July 30 Germany became evidently nervous about 
 Great Britain, while Austria's attitude was still unchanged. 
 However, on the following day Austria-Hungary also became 
 aware that her Serbian policy, if persisted in, might have 
 the most disastrous consequences to the Dual Monarchy, 
 for M. Sazonoff telegraphed to the Eussian Ambassador in 
 London : 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readi- 
 ness of his Government to discuss the substance of the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Sazonoff replied by 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAK 195 
 
 expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that 
 the discussion should take place in London with the partici- 
 pation of the Great Powers. 
 
 M. Sazonoff hoped that the British Government would 
 assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of 
 Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very- 
 important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop pro- 
 visionally to her mihtary action on Serbian territory. 
 
 On the following day, August 1, Sir Edward Grey 
 wired to Sir M. de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in 
 Vienna : 
 
 Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. 
 He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count 
 Berchtold, and gave me the substance. 
 
 It states that Count Berchtold begged the Kussian 
 Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best 
 to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Peters- 
 burg that the * door had been banged ' by Austria-Hungary 
 on all further conversations. The Kussian Ambassador 
 promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this 
 occasion to the Kussian Ambassador the assurance which 
 had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect 
 that neither an infraction of Serbian sovereign rights, 
 nor the acquisition of Serbian territory was being contem- 
 plated by Austria-Hungary. 
 
 The sudden and complete volte face of Austria-Hungary 
 showed that that country had become alarmed, and was 
 anxious to climb down. Apparently the war would not 
 have taken place had not the German Emperor sent his 
 ultimatum to Kussia on the very day when Austria-Hungary 
 declared herself ready to discuss matters regarding Serbia. 
 Study of the White Book reveals the fact that Kussia 
 strove earnestly, and with all her might, to avoid the war 
 into which she was reluctantly forced. On July 30 Kussia 
 was ready to stop all her mihtary preparations, for on that 
 
 o2 
 
196 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 day M. Sazonoff handed to the German Ambassador the 
 following proposal, capable of secm*ing peace : 
 
 If Austria, recognising that the conflict with Serbia 
 has assumed character of question of European interest, 
 declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum 
 points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, 
 Kussia engages to stop all military preparations. 
 
 Unfortunately, the German Emperor would not wait. 
 It seems that, at the last moment, the German Emperor 
 could have preserved the peace had he cared to do so. 
 Possibly he chose to go to war, because he feared that a 
 peaceful settlement, after the previous demonstration of 
 Germany's determination, would be condemned by his own 
 subjects as another and a crowning failure of his blustering 
 policy. Eemembering the reproaches which had been 
 levelled against him for having twice given way to France 
 over Morocco, he thought it, perhaps, incumbent upon 
 himself to avoid another and a greater diplomatic failure 
 which would have been fatal to his prestige. At the moment 
 when peace and war were in his hands, William the Second 
 acted exactly as did Napoleon the Third, when at that 
 fatal hour he would not be satisfied when the Prince of 
 HohenzoUern withdrew his candidature to the Spanish 
 throno which had caused the differences between France 
 and Prussia. Striving to maintain his prestige at the cost 
 of the greatest war which the world has seen, William the 
 Second may well have ruined both his country and his 
 dynasty. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMANY AND TURKEY ^ 
 
 At Germany's bidding, Turkey has attacked the Entente 
 Powers. If, as appears probable, the present war should 
 end in the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, we 
 may take it that Turkey has committed suicide, or rather, 
 has been compelled to do so. 
 
 Financially, miUtarily, and morally, Turkey is exhausted. 
 She has recently lost two great wars. In her campaign with 
 Italy she lost Tripoli, and in her struggle with the Balkan 
 States she lost the bulk of her European possessions. As 
 the latter are far more valuable than the former, it was 
 only natural that many Turks desired to regain at least 
 part of the lost Balkan territories if a good opportunity 
 should arise. Immediately upon the outbreak of the 
 present war Turkey began a general mobilisation. In view 
 of her recent losses in Europe, it was permissible to assume 
 that her preparations aimed at the reconquest of the 
 provinces which had been conquered by Bulgaria, Serbia, 
 Greece, and Montenegro. As Bulgaria is Turkey's most 
 immediate neighbour, her mihtary preparations might 
 conceivably be aimed at that State. Indeed, official Turkey 
 explained that she was making ready for war in order to 
 meet a possible attack from Bulgaria, which at the end of 
 the Balkan War had lost Adrianople to the Turks. On 
 August 4, the day when Great Britain declared war on 
 
 ^ From The Fortnightly Review, December 1914; 
 197 
 
198 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Germany, Mr. Beaumont, who at the time represented 
 Sir L. Mallet, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 Grand Vizier to-day renewed assurances that Turkey 
 intends to observe strict neutraUty. Mobilisation has 
 been decided upon only because it would take months to 
 complete, and because the Government wished not to be 
 taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though 
 they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Eussia 
 — ^attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Eetention 
 of German military mission meant nothing and had no 
 poHtical significance. He regarded them as Turkish 
 employees who were doing good work, and as they had 
 offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse. 
 
 This communication, and those which are given in the 
 following pages, are taken from the White Book, ' Events 
 Leading to the Eupture of Eelations with Turkey ' (Cd. 
 7268). According to a statement made by the Grand Vizier, 
 the Turkish Prime Minister, to the British representative 
 in Constantinople, Turkey's mobilisation was merely a 
 measure of precaution, a defensive step directed principally 
 against Bulgaria. The unveracity of this assertion was 
 obvious. Far from fearing a Bulgarian attack, Turkey 
 had apparently been negotiating with Bulgaria with a 
 view to obtaining that country's aid in a war of revenge 
 and of aggression. Soon afterwards it became clear that 
 Turkey was mobilising at Germany's bidding against 
 Eussia, and perhaps against England as well. The Goeben 
 and Breslau arrived at the Golden Horn on August 10. 
 On the 21st of that month Sir L. Mallet telegraphed to 
 Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 . . . Marshal Liman (von Sanders) and the German 
 Ambassador are recklessly striving to force the Turks 
 into declaring war on Eussia, in which case the Goeben 
 and Breslau would presumably sail for the Black Sea. 
 They are prepared to achieve this object if necessary by a 
 cowp d'etat, making the Minister of War dictator. 
 
GEKMANY AND TUKKEY 199 
 
 Six days later, on August 27, Sir L. Mallet sent to Sir 
 Edward Grey a most remarkable forecast. He tele- 
 graphed : 
 
 German ships. There are grounds for thinking that 
 Germans are urging Turks to send Goehen into Black Sea, 
 where they would argue that she has a right to go as a 
 Turkish ship. The Germans would count upon Eussian 
 warship attacking her, and war would ensue, seemingly 
 provoked by Kussia. Object of Germans is to create a 
 diversion here, draw off some Eussian troops and enemies 
 from Austria and embroil us at the same time. 
 
 Two months and two days after the despatch of this 
 telegram, on October 29, the event predicted took place. 
 The Turks chose the anticipated pretext for their naval 
 attack upon Eussia. Earely has a diplomatic forecast 
 been more timely or more correct. 
 
 While, on August 27, Sir L. Mallet thought that the 
 Germans, while planning a Turkish attack upon Eussia, 
 only intended * to embroil us at the same time,' the Enghsh 
 representative in Egypt recognised that Turkey was 
 preparing to attack England in Egypt. On August 28, 
 Mr. Cheetham, the British Agent in Cairo, telegraphed 
 to Sir Edward Grey the following ominous news : 
 
 Ottoman forces are being mobilised in Hedjaz and 
 farther south, and existing mihtary activity in Eed Sea 
 may thus be explained. About sixty Turkish officers 
 arrived at Alexandria recently and passed through Egypt 
 down Eed Sea. Their destination was the Yemen. Twelve 
 thousand Turkish troops are reported in Jeddah region. 
 Signs are not lacking that, in case of war, an attack on 
 Egypt is contemplated by Turkey. A few Turkish officers 
 are now in the Delta. Steps have been taken to watch all 
 those that are known. I learn from a good source that 
 all information of Turkish mobihsation reported from 
 Constantinople is correct. Meanwhile, emissaries are being 
 sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt to stir up 
 
200 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 feeling against Great Britain. Activity at Gaza is reported, 
 but it is uncertain whether this is more than raising of 
 levies to replace regulars withdrawn from the north by 
 mobilisation. 
 
 Simultaneously with this telegram, which showed that 
 a position very threatening to Great Britain in Egypt 
 and beyond had suddenly arisen, there arrived in London 
 a very disquieting telegram from Sir L. Mallet, dated 
 hkewise August 28, which informed Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 . . . Consignments of gold from Germany have arrived 
 (at Constantinople) for German and Austrian banks. Private 
 German residents have sent away their wives, and quantities 
 of medical stores have been purchased and put on board 
 German ships. I hear that German Ambassador is adopting 
 tone of friendly commiseration for Great Britain, who, he 
 asserts, will never assist Kussia in any movement against 
 Turkey. He has made the remarkable statement that his 
 Government will now offer favourable terms to France, 
 which she will certainly accept ; that Germany will then 
 wage a platonic war with England, whose heart is not in 
 the struggle, and who will make terms to save her Fleet ; 
 and that Germany and England will then combine against 
 Eussia. 
 
 Day by day information received by the Foreign Office 
 showed that Germany intrigued to involve Turkey simul- 
 taneously in a war with Eussia and with England, and that 
 an ever-growing stream of German arms and ammunition 
 and of German gold was flowing towards the Golden Horn. 
 On October 17 the British Ambassador telegraphed to 
 Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 Since end of September following have reached Constanti- 
 nople : Six thousand nine hundred cases of Mauser ammuni- 
 tion ; 540 cases of Mauser rifles ; thirteen trucks of war 
 material; and about £800,000 in bar gold. Arrival of a 
 submarine in sections is expected shortly, and I am informed 
 that such a consignment, together with two aeroplanes. 
 
GEKMANY AND TUEKEY 201 
 
 left Eustchuk on 8th October. Two German ships were 
 recently escorted from Sulina by Breslau, and are reported 
 to have brought submarine. But there is no evidence at 
 present to prove this. 
 
 From day to day the position of affairs became more 
 ominous and more threatening. While the Grand Vizier 
 unceasingly assured the British Ambassador that only 
 precautionary measures were taken, that Turkey contem- 
 plated no aggression, and that he had the situation perfectly 
 under control, the mobilisation of the Turkish troops and 
 their concentration on the Eussian and Egyptian borders 
 clearly showed that Turkey prepared everything for an 
 early attack upon Eussia in the Black Sea and upon Great 
 Britain in Egypt. The Grand Vizier was either playing a 
 double game or he was ignorant of the development of 
 affairs. At any rate, it was obvious that his nominal 
 subordinate, the notoriously philo- German War Minister, 
 Enver Pasha, had taken matters into his own hands — that 
 he was practically all-powerful. In view of the great and 
 rapidly-increasing peril. Sir L. Mallet addressed, on Sep- 
 tember 23, the following most remarkable note of protest 
 to the Grand Vizier : — 
 
 CoNSTAirrrNOPLE, September, 23, 1914. 
 
 YouB Highness, — 
 
 In the course of our interview of yesterday morning, 
 I had the honour to inform your Highness of the anxiety 
 that the news which reached me from Syria in regard to 
 the miHtary preparations and plots against Egypt now going 
 on in that province was causing me. So long as it was a 
 question of preparations similar to those made in other 
 parts of the Empire as a consequence of the general mobihsa- 
 tion, I did not mention the matter to your Highness, although 
 special importance might attach to aU such doings in the 
 neighbourhood of the Egyptian frontier. Similarly, I have 
 been able up to the present to reject, as improbable tales, 
 the rumours which have reached me from more than one 
 
202 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 source, according to which a sudden blow directed against 
 the Suez Canal was being planned with the object of ren- 
 dering it impassable, although I am aware that the enemies 
 of Great Britain are intriguing with the object of leading 
 your Highness's Government into adventures as insensate 
 and even more insensate, than this. I should, however, fail 
 in my duty towards my Government, and, I may add also 
 towards the Government of your Highness, if I did not 
 bring to your Highness's knowledge the latest reports 
 which have reached me. It appears from these reports 
 that the minds of the Bedouins are being excited by pro- 
 fessional agitators, who, encouraged by the Ottoman Govern- 
 ment, are desirous of inflaming them against England. 
 The military preparations which up to a certain moment 
 bore a similar character to those in the other provinces 
 of the Empire, have lately changed into a converging move- 
 ment towards the south. Troops are being brought from 
 such distant centres as Mosul. General activity reigns 
 everywhere from Damascus to Maan, and cumulative 
 evidence leads my consul at Jerusalem to the belief that 
 an organised expedition against Egypt is in project for 
 the next few days. 
 
 I trust that the reports, the contents of which I have 
 just summed up to your Highness, put a wrong interpreta- 
 tion on facts which, as such, cannot be discussed. But I 
 repeat that I should fail in my duty if I did not bring to 
 your Highness's knowledge the grave pre-occupation which 
 they cause me, and the impression which they make upon 
 his Britannic Majesty's Government, and if I did not place 
 you on your guard against the disastrous consequences 
 which would ensue for your Highness's Government, if 
 they were to follow a course so contrary to their own interests 
 as that of becoming the accomplice of Germany in an attack 
 upon Egypt. 
 
 Your Highness will remember that, at the beginning of 
 the present war. Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. Beaumont to 
 give you the assurance that, provided that Turkey main- 
 tained strict and absolute neutrality during the war, and 
 so long as unforeseen circumstances did not arise, his 
 
GEKMANY AND TUEKEY 203 
 
 Britannic Majesty's Government had no desire nor intention 
 of annexing Egypt, nor of modifying her regime in any way 
 whatsoever. I had the honour to confirm this assurance 
 to your Highness shortly after my return to Constantinople. 
 Since then, being desirous of avoiding any possibility of 
 misunderstanding with the Imperial Government, I have 
 repeatedly called your Highnesses attention to the condi- 
 tional character of the assurances given by Sir E. Grey, 
 Now, I hold it to be my duty to declare once more to your 
 Highness that my Government take the most serious view 
 of the unprecedented violations of neutrality already com- 
 mitted by the Turkish Government in retaining German 
 ofi&cers and men on board the German warships, and by 
 subsequently taking in their service numerous other Germans 
 in a similar military capacity. 
 
 It does not seem to me necessary at this moment to 
 recapitulate the details of still further departures from 
 neutrality committed by Turkey in favour of the enemies 
 of Great Britain. Nor need I insist on the consequences 
 which might ensue if, to add the last touch to so grave a 
 situation, my Government were to become convinced that 
 the Imperial Government were seriously meditating an 
 attack against Egypt, or that they were a party to disloyal 
 intrigues against the security of the Suez Canal, or against 
 the present regime in Egypt. Your Highness can judge of 
 the whole importance and possible extent of these conse- 
 quences. 
 
 I enclose in this note a memorandum enumerating in 
 detail the facts which can be considered as indications of 
 a forthcoming attack upon Egypt. 
 
 This dignified, powerful, impressive, and statesmanlike 
 protest, which may serve as a model to future generations 
 of diplomats, met with the dilatoriness and the evasions 
 usual in Turkey. The British Ambassador's solemn warning 
 remained unheeded. A month later, on October 23, Sir 
 L. Mallet telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 I have seen the Kussian Ambassador again this morning. 
 He is sure that unless Turks mean to betray Germans, the 
 
204 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 possibility of which he does not exclude, they will make 
 war on Kussia on receipt of first half of the sum of £4,000,000 
 which Germany is providing. It is concurrently reported 
 about £1,000,000 has already arrived. 
 
 While at the beginning of the war it seemed possible 
 that Germany might take Paris with a rush and defeat 
 France and Eussia on land, it must, by the end of October, 
 have become obvious to every Turk endowed with common 
 sense that the tide was turning, that Germany and Austria 
 were Hkely to lose the war which they had so rashly 
 begun. 
 
 It is true that the Turkish papers were day by day 
 reporting glorious German and Austrian victories in the 
 East and West. However, these mendacious reports could 
 deceive only the ignorant populace of Constantinople. The 
 Turkish Government, being kept constantly informed 
 by its diplomatic and military representatives in Eussia, 
 Prance, and England about the position of affairs, knew no 
 doubt that Fate was no longer favouring Germany and 
 Austria- Hungary, that in a war of attrition the Entente 
 Powers were likely to win. The fortune of war had visibly 
 begun to turn. The German army had been defeated near 
 Paris, and had hastily retreated towards the Belgian frontier, 
 and the combined German aud Austrian armies had been 
 defeated in front of Warsaw, and were rapidly withdrawing 
 towards the West. Several official telegrams informed us 
 that the Germans were at the time sending enormous 
 amounts of gold to Constantinople. Of course, the Turks 
 required money for paying their troops. Still, the un- 
 scrupulous and lavish way with which the representatives 
 of Germany have endeavoured to bribe the officials and the 
 Press in other countries, justifies one in concluding that 
 Turkey's support of Germany at a moment when Germany's 
 position had become compromised was due, perhaps, not so 
 much to the blindness, the rashness, and the fanatic zeal 
 
GEKMANY AND TUEKEY 205 
 
 of some leading Turks, such as Enver Pasha, but to bribery. 
 That only can explain what is otherwise inexplicable. 
 
 At a time when Turkey was nominally at peace with 
 Kussia and Great Britain, her army was mobilised and 
 concentrated upon the Kussian and Egyptian frontiers. 
 Spies in Germany's pay swarmed through Egypt. Egyptian 
 officers and civil servants were bribed. Endeavours were 
 made to smuggle large quantities of explosives into Egypt. 
 Enterprising parties for blowing up the Suez Canal were 
 sent out by the Germans. All these preparations were 
 undertaken in time of peace, and they were known not 
 only to the British Foreign Office, but to various neutral 
 Governments as well. Hence, it seems most regrettable 
 and unfortunate that Eoumania allowed vast quantities 
 of German explosives, ammunition, arms, and other war- 
 like stores, and numerous German military and naval 
 officers and men, to pass unhindered through that country 
 into Turkey. 
 
 Under Germany's guidance Turkey endeavoured to 
 provoke Eussia and England into an attack, so as to be 
 able to appeal to the Mohammedans throughout the world 
 for help against the aggressors. From many of the best- 
 informed German writers we know that it was Germany's 
 intention, in case of war with Great Britain, to raise the 
 Mohammedans throughout the world against this country. 
 The fact that that intention was to be found among the 
 leaders of Germanj^'s foreign policy may be seen from the 
 statement which the German Emperor made at Damascus 
 at the time of his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. At the occa- 
 sion of a banquet in that town he solenmly assured ' the 
 300,000,000 Mohammedans throughout the world who 
 venerate in the Turkish Sultan their Caliph, that the 
 German Emperor would be their friend and protector for 
 all time.' 
 
 As Turkey had not succeeded in provoking Eussia and 
 England into an attack by taking over the Goehen and 
 
206 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Breslau by means of a sham purchase, by vexing their 
 trade, by concentrating large bodies of troops, transport 
 animals, vehicles, and guns on the Kussian and Egyptian 
 frontiers, by engaging in the most reckless conspiracies 
 directed against Kussia and England, and by abolishing the 
 capitulations and the foreign post offices established in 
 Turkey, a final attempt was made upon Great Britain's 
 patience by requesting her to withdraw from Egypt. The 
 British Government was apprised of this incredible request 
 in a telegram from Sir L. Mallet despatched on October 23, 
 in which we read : 
 
 . . . My French colleague inquired (from the Minister 
 of Marine) what was the meaning of preparations in Syria 
 and of all the violent talk about Egypt. Minister of Marine 
 replied that England was treating Egypt as if it belonged 
 to her, whereas it formed part of Ottoman Dominions. 
 Turks were indifferent about India, Tripoli, and Tunis, 
 &c., but Egypt was on their frontier, and they felt about it 
 as French did about Alsace-Lorraine. They would do 
 nothing officially, but would shut their eyes to any agitation 
 which was directed against English occupation of Egypt. 
 Continuing, he referred to a proposal which he had made 
 me a fortnight ago, to the effect that England and Turkey 
 should now sign convention on lines of Drummond- Wolff 
 Convention, providing for evacuation of Egypt by British 
 troops at end of war. It is quite true he made this sugges- 
 tion. I did not report it at the time because it was so 
 entirely unpractical. This shows that Germans are turning 
 all their attention to Egypt, and are inciting the Turks 
 against us, so that we must expect to have a considerable 
 amount of trouble on frontier. Turkish newspapers are 
 full of Egypt just now, and of our high-handed proceed- 
 ings. It is, e.g., announced to-day that we have closed 
 El Azhar mosque. There is no doubt that Germans are 
 at bottom of this, and are inciting religious fanaticism of 
 Turks against us. 
 
 We can scarcely wonder that the Turks were anxious to 
 
GEEMANY AND TUKKEY 207 
 
 regain Egypt. Under England's administration Egypt has 
 once more become a wealthy country, and the Tm:k is a 
 famous plunderer. 
 
 Nominally, Egypt was still a Turkish tributary State, and 
 legally Turkey was perhaps entitled to regain full control 
 of that country. However, morally Turkey had lost the 
 right to rule Egypt, or indeed any other alien nation. The 
 history of Turkey is a history of destruction and devastation. 
 Wherever the Turk has gone he has ruined and ravaged. 
 He has created nothing. In the Middle Ages the Turks 
 succeeded in conquering the most flourishing lands of 
 antiquity. The glorious empires of Babylonia, Assyria, 
 Egypt, Phoenicia, Carthage, Persia, Greece, Palestine, and 
 the Arab Empire, with the wonderful towns of Nineveh; 
 Babylon, Cairo, Alexandria, Susa, Bagdad, Basra, Damascus, 
 Athens, Jerusalem, &c., were one by one conquered by the 
 Turks, and were uniformly converted into a wilderness. In 
 antiquity, and even during part of the Middle Ages, Greece, 
 Asia Minor, and the lands on the southern shore of the 
 Mediterranean were the most densely populated countries 
 in the world. As they have an excellent soil and climate, 
 they ought to be still densely populated and flourishing. 
 However, with the advent of the Turks a blight has fallen 
 upon them. The great characteristic of the Turkish Empire 
 is its desolation. How desolate it is may be seen from the 
 fact that the wealthy lands ruled by the Turk contain 
 per square mile only 30 inhabitants, while France has 
 per square mile 189*5 inhabitants and Germany 310*4 inhabi- 
 tants. In the times of antiquity the territory which is 
 now under Turkey's sway supported probably from five to 
 ten times as many people as it does at present. In ancient 
 times and in the early Middle Ages Mesopotamia was the 
 granary of the world. It was a most fruitful and most 
 densely populated land. Bagdad had 2,000,000 inhabitants. 
 Arts and sciences flourished. A most wonderful system 
 of canals irrigated that naturally dry country, but the 
 
208 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Turks destroyed the canal system, which had painfully 
 been built up during thousands of years. At present the 
 former granary of the world is a desert and a wilderness. 
 Per square mile there are only fourteen people in Mesopotamia. 
 If, under a civilised government, Mesopotamia should once 
 more be provided with an efficient irrigation system — ^it can 
 easily be re-created — it will probably once more have room 
 for very many millions of people. 
 
 The Turks have exterminated civilised nations by the 
 sword, by the neglect and destruction of public works, 
 and by confiscation. The ancient centres of civilisation 
 where the Turks settled declined and became mere sites 
 covered with ruins, upon which sordid villages arose. It 
 is difficult to realise nowadays that in the Middle Ages 
 Bagdad was by far the largest, the wealthiest, and the most 
 highly civilised town in the world, the greatest centre of 
 commerce, industry, art, science, and learning ; or that 
 Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia were only recently, 
 when under Turkish rule, dirty and poverty-stricken villages. 
 Those Turkish towns which are flourishing owe their pros- 
 perity solely to the non-Turkish population. Constantinople 
 is prosperous owing to its unrivalled geographical position, 
 which even Turkish misgovemment cannot destroy, and to 
 West European, Greek, and Armenian business men. 
 Smyrna is a purely Greek town. As the Turks have invari- 
 ably brought ruin and misery to the most prosperous coun- 
 tries which they had conquered, and as misgovemment 
 and cruelty have been characteristic of their rule over all 
 ahen nations which had the misfortune to fall under their 
 sway, from the time of Sultan Othman to the present day; 
 Turkey has no moral right either to rule over foreign 
 nations or to retain any longer naturally wealthy districts 
 which can nourish a large and happy population. They 
 have misused their trust. These barbarians have no right 
 to retain any longer the holy places of three leading religions 
 and most of the ancient centres of European civilisation. 
 
GEEMANY AND TUKKEY 209 
 
 In the past Great Britain has been Turkey's'^best friend. 
 While Eussia and Austria-Hungary attacked the Turks 
 and wrested from them their territories piece by piece, 
 Great Britain consistently endeavoured to preserve Turkey's 
 independence and integrity and to bring at the same time 
 justice and good government to the unhappy peoples hving 
 under Turkish rule. With this twofold object in view she 
 defended Turkey diplomatically and by force of arms. At 
 the same time, she urged Turkey unceasingly to reform 
 her methods of government. Turkey has shown, like an 
 old and hardened criminal, that she is not reformable. 
 She has lately changed her constitution, but the character 
 of her blood-stained Government has remained the same. 
 She has been, and is still, governed by a cruel and unUmited 
 despotism which acts without faith, without conscience, and 
 without pity. Turkey's hour has struck. 
 
 The present war is a war against German militarism 
 and a war of hberation. If it should end in a victory for 
 the Allied Powers, it should not merely lead to the freeing 
 of the subjected and oppressed Poles, Southern Slavs, 
 Eoumanians, &c., in Europe, but also to the freeing of the 
 nationahties who Hve under Turkish tyranny in Asia. The 
 Turkish Empire resembles Austria-Hungary. It is inhabited 
 by people of numerous races and of ten religions, and the 
 non-Turkish races are fearfully misgoverned and cruelly 
 ill-treated. Near the Eussian border dwell large numbers 
 of Armenians, among whom the Turks have perpetrated 
 numerous massacres in the time of Abdul Hamid. The 
 coastal districts of Asia Minor are inhabited by millions of 
 Greeks, who dwell in dense masses along the shore of the 
 ^gean Sea. They are the descendants of the ancient Greeks 
 who settled in Asia Minor in the time of ancient Troy. They 
 are the most industrious and most prosperous inhabitants 
 of Asiatic Turkey. After the Balkan War the Turks began 
 to drive scores of thousands of these Greeks from their 
 prosperous homes by violence and massacre. The Greeks 
 
210 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 and Armenians are anxious to rid themselves of the Turkish 
 yoke. Greece wishes to expand and to join to the mother- 
 land the ancient Greek colonies on the coast of Asia Minor 
 sung by Homer. 
 
 Among the dissatisfied nationalities dwelling in Asiatic 
 Turkey the Arabs occupy a most important position. They 
 have had a great past. In the Middle Ages, under the 
 Ommiades and Abbasides, they ruled a world empire. 
 Their sway extended from the Persian Gulf through Southern 
 Europe and North Africa into Morocco and Spain. They 
 were not merely a nation of conquerors. They were by 
 far the most civilised nation of the period. They were 
 most advanced in philosophy, literature, mathematics, 
 architecture, engineering, medicine, chemistry, the manu- 
 facturing industries, commerce, shipping, &c. The Turks 
 adopted the Arab religion, but they destroyed the civilisation 
 of the creators of the Alhambra. The 12,000,000 Arabs 
 are no longer willing to bear the Turkish yoke and to provide 
 the bulk of the taxes and the majority of Turkey's soldiers. 
 They have begun to demand freedom for themselves. 
 They, and many non- Turkish Mohammedans, are no longer 
 wilhng to see the holy places of Islam exploited and defiled 
 by a band of usurpers. The Arab nation may once more 
 attain independence, if not greatness. Some years ago 
 Negib-Azourg Bey published a book, * Le Eeveil de la 
 Nation Arabe dans I'Asie Turque.' It contains a manifesto 
 to the enUghtened nations of Europe and America, in which 
 the National Committee of Turkish Arabs accuses the Turks 
 of the devastation of the glorious countries ruled by the 
 Ommiades and Abbasides, and asks the world for sympathy 
 and support. The Alhed Powers should support the claims 
 to freedom of the oppressed Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. 
 Among the direct descendants of the Prophet there are 
 no doubt men of non-Turkish nationality who have a 
 stronger claim to be the protectors of the holy places of 
 Islam than has the Sultan of Turkey. 
 
GEEMANY AND TUEKEY 211 
 
 As the Turks have had three months to prepare for 
 their aggression, their defeat may not be easy. At the 
 same time, Turkey's power of resistance should not be 
 over-estimated. Turkey is, after all, only a small country. 
 She has 21,273,900 inhabitants. She is very poor. Most of 
 her citizens are profoundly dissatisfied. In her last wars 
 she has lost vast quantities of arms and ammunition, and 
 enormous numbers of men, and as she has only a few 
 railways and scarcely any roads, she has to overcome very 
 great difficulties in raising, concentrating, equipping, and 
 arming large bodies of men. Besides, Turkey is vulnerable 
 in many parts. 
 
 The downfall of Turkey may raise the question of 
 Constantinople. Very possibly the Germans induced Turkey 
 to attack England and Eussia, not only for strategical, but 
 also for diplomatic reasons. They hoped, no doubt, that 
 the question of Constantinople would lead to disagreement 
 among the Allies. 
 
 »2 
 
CHAPTEE VIII 
 
 THE GERMAN COLONIAL EMPIRE ^ 
 
 Many people who are insufficiently acquainted with the 
 German colonies have in the past described them as small 
 and valueless. They are neither the one nor the other. 
 Small and large, valuable and valueless are terms of com- 
 parison. Comparatively speaking, the German colonies are 
 not small, and they are not without actual and prospective 
 value. 
 
 The extent of the German Colonial Empire will be seen 
 from the following figures : 
 
 
 Square Miles. 
 
 Togo .... 
 
 . 33,700 
 
 Kamerun 
 
 . 292,000 
 
 South- West Africa . 
 
 . 322,450 
 
 East Africa . 
 
 . 384,180 
 
 1,032,330 
 
 Kiauchau 200 
 
 New Guinea and Pacific Islands . 96,160 
 
 1,128,690 
 
 The German Empire embraces 208,780 square miles, 
 France extends to 207,076 square miles, Austria-Hungary 
 has 261,030 square miles, Italy 110,623 square miles, Spain 
 196,173 square miles and the United Kingdom 121,633 
 
 1 From The Fortnightly Review, August 1915. 
 212 
 
THE GEKMAN COLONIAL EMPIEE 213 
 
 square miles. The German Colonial Empire is more than 
 nine times as large as the United Kingdom. It is a little 
 larger than Germany, France, Austria-Hmigary, Italy, 
 Spain, and Great Britain combined, and it is somewhat 
 larger than the whole of Argentina. The Union of South 
 Africa contains 473,100 square miles and Khodesia 439,575 
 square miles. Germany's African possessions alone are 
 therefore considerably larger than the Cape Province, 
 Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Ehodesia 
 combined. 
 
 The value of land of all kinds, and especially of very 
 extensive land, of vast colonies, cannot be ascertained 
 by ordinary commercial principles, by the question what 
 wiU it fetch in the market, what does it produce, what 
 profits does it yield ? The value of land is actual and 
 potential. Lands possessed by a nation have, furthermore, 
 not only an actual and prospective economic value, but a 
 strategic value as well. Economically, Gibraltar, Malta, 
 and many other important points are worth very Httle, or 
 are a positive burden, to the Empire, because the cost of 
 their upkeep is greater than the income which they yield. 
 Nevertheless other nations would gladly purchase from 
 Great Britain some of her economically valueless possessions 
 at a very high price. 
 
 Let us first of all consider the economic value of the 
 German Colonial Empire. 
 
 Land of all kinds has an actual and prospective value. 
 An unwholesome morass near a large town may become 
 invaluable building land some years hence after having 
 been drained. Arid desert territories in Arizona and 
 New Mexico, which a few years ago were valueless and 
 were considered unusable for any purpose, have been 
 turned into bounteous agricultural land and orchards by 
 means of irrigation. A few decades ago, the ground con- 
 taining the Kimberley diamond mines and the gold mines 
 of the Eand could be bought at the price of inferior 
 
214 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 agricultural and pastoral land. A century and a half ago, 
 when France lost Canada to England, Voltaire wondered that 
 great and intelHgent nations should go to war for ' quelques 
 arpents de neige.' At present Canada contains many more 
 inhabitants than the three greatest departments of France, 
 the departement de la Seine with Paris, the departement 
 du Nord with Lille and Roubaix, and the departement 
 Pas de Calais. When France evacuated Canada a few 
 thousand Frenchmen were left behind. Their number 
 has increased to more than three millions. At the present 
 moment there are actually more Frenchmen of Canadian 
 extraction than Hve in Paris itself. The time will probably 
 come when the population of Canada will be very much 
 greater than that of France within its present limits, 
 t One of the most remarkable features of modern times 
 has been the expansion of the European race. In 1800 
 less than 10,000,000 white men lived outside Europe. At 
 present the number of white men outside Europe approaches 
 150,000,000. The time undoubtedly will come when the 
 majority of people of the white race will live on the spacious 
 continents across the sea. In 1800 the United States had 
 only 4,300,000 white inhabitants, Canada was peopled by 
 about 200,000 white men, and the Australian continent 
 contained only 6500 whites. Steam, steel, and electricity 
 have reduced to a minimum the enormous distances of 
 the past. It is now easier to go to Canada or Africa than 
 it was formerly to go to Scotland or Ireland. Improved 
 communications have opened up continents which formerly 
 were inaccessible and were believed to be closed to civihsation 
 for all time. The opening up of the extra-European con- 
 tinents has only begun. The time will come when vast 
 territories which are still inaccessible can be as easily 
 reached as Toronto and Vancouver. 
 
 Formerly people were deterred from emigrating not only 
 through distances but also through the rigour of an in- 
 hospitable cHmate and through the strange and fearful 
 
THE GEEMAN COLONIAL EMPIKE 215 
 
 diseases which are usually found in countries uninhabited 
 by white men. It is a curious fact that the advent of 
 civilisation leads not only to a great improvement in sanita- 
 tion, but to an improvement of climate as well. In the 
 time of Juhus Caesar, Switzerland, Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary, and England were considered to possess so in- 
 hospitable a chmate that they were thought fit only for 
 savages. The cHmate of these countries has been enormously 
 improved by the labour of man, by the cutting down of 
 forests, by the draining of swamps, and especially by 
 agriculture. The countries of northern Europe possess 
 undoubtedly a far more genial climate than they did in 
 olden times. The meteorological departments of California 
 and Utah have found that from year to year the rainfall 
 in these drought-stricken territories increases and that 
 it increases particularly in those portions where agriculture 
 is most actively pursued. Europe and Asia are in large 
 parts greatly overcrowded. The population of the world 
 continues, rapidly increasing. Consequently, land suitable 
 for the settlement of white men becomes from year to year 
 more precious, especially as the improvement of com- 
 munications makes colonial land from year to year more 
 accessible, and as the advances of civilisation and of sanita- 
 tion make Hfe in the far-off colonies more healthful and 
 more pleasant. 
 
 The German colonies He, as a glance at the map will 
 show, in the tropical and sub-tropical zones. They lie on 
 latitudes which are usually considered unfit for the habitation 
 of white men. However, large portions of German South- 
 West Africa and of German East Africa lie at so high an 
 altitude above the sea that the cHmate is moderate, bracing, 
 and extremely healthful. Although German East Africa 
 lies on the equator, the table lands in the interior, Hke those 
 of neighbouring Uganda, are perfectly suitable for the 
 settlement of white men. According to German Govern- 
 ment memoirs a territory as large as Prussia in that colony 
 
216 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 is fit for the permanent habitation of white men. German 
 South- West Africa, which is German no longer, lies on the 
 same latitude as the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, 
 Northern Natal, and Southern Ehodesia. Large portions of 
 that colony lie also at a high altitude and are chmatically 
 susceptible to dense settlement by white men. The white 
 men of the Empire will undoubtedly find a large additional 
 outlet in German Africa. The time may come when the 
 superabundant inhabitants of the South African Union 
 will overflow into Ehodesia and into South-West Africa 
 and eventually into German East Africa as well. 
 
 The German colonies are frequently considered value- 
 less by those who regard merely present values. Land 
 is always a speculative purchase. Men who buy land 
 look to future prices. With the progress of civilisation, 
 with the increase of population, land will become more and 
 more valuable, not only in the moderate zones, but in the 
 tropical and sub-tropical zones as well. From year to 
 year the over-populated territories of Europe and of Asia 
 are less able to support themselves with the produce of 
 their own territories. From year to year they have 
 to go further afield in search of foreign food and raw 
 materials, and with the improvement of communica- 
 tions and the lowering of freights, countries which 
 formerly exported Httle are becoming more and mor§ 
 important factors in the household of over-populated 
 Europe and of over-populated Asia. When inland com- 
 munication in colonial countries was Hmited to transport 
 by human carriers and pack animals, and when shipping 
 freights were very high, only the most valuable and the 
 least bulky produce could be despatched from the far-off 
 colonies to Europe and from Europe to far-off lands. At 
 that time the most valuable articles of commerce were 
 spices, precious stones, pearls, gold, silver, silk, and to these 
 were added later on tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, sugar, and 
 other luxuries. In these times the spice islands and the 
 
THE GEEMAN COLONIAL EMPIRE 'ZlT 
 
 sugar islands were considered the most valuable possessions. 
 Countries which produced timber, ore, and grain, such as 
 Canada, the northern States of America, and Argentina 
 were considered worthless. From year to year the tropics 
 are yielding larger quantities of food and raw materials to 
 the over-populated districts of the world. Vast quantities 
 of timber, ores and metals, of animal and vegetable fats, 
 of cotton, coffee, cocoa, rubber, &c., are exported thence. 
 The tropics possess an inexhaustible soil. They are nature's 
 hothouse. The exploitation of the tropical and sub-tropical 
 countries has scarcely begun. The marvellous develop- 
 ments of the rubber industry shows how wonderfully the 
 productivity of these countries can be increased. 
 
 Hitherto the German colonies have produced Httle, not 
 because they are naturally poor, but because they were new 
 colonies and because they were unskilfully exploited by 
 a Government which did not understand the management 
 of colonies. A nation which desires to develop new colonies 
 must open them up. It can open them up either by private 
 enterprise, as is done in this country, or by State action. 
 The German Government did neither. It distrusted private 
 enterprise. It feared that private men might corner or 
 squander the natural resources of the colonies. Conse- 
 quently it did not throw open its colonies to the business 
 men of the world, and not even to the German business men. 
 Everything had to be done methodically. Regulations 
 for every possible contingency were drafted. The land 
 was measured, explored, and described. Colonial statistics 
 and colonial law codes were produced. The activities of 
 all desiring to exploit the colonies had to be minutely 
 regulated. The direction of all the colonial activities was 
 jealously retained by the officials in Berlin. If a business 
 man went to the colonies he found that he could not begin 
 operations. If he wished to trade with the natives, to 
 build railways and roads, to prospect for gold or copper, 
 to farm, to grow rubber or cotton, he had to apply for 
 
218 
 
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 official permission. Months and years had to be spent in 
 disheartening endeavours to convince the authorities of 
 the necessity of giving men a free scope, of allowing them 
 to go ahead. Many Germans spent their all endeavouring 
 to get to work, and, being constantly hampered by insur- 
 mountable regulations, at last gave up in despair and 
 returned to Germany heartbroken and ruined. 
 
 As the Government did not allow private men to go 
 ahead, and as the Eeichstag refused to vote sufficient funds 
 for railway construction, &c., the colonies languished for 
 a long time, stifled by red tape. At last, about a decade 
 ago, a new spirit arose. The Government still refused 
 private people permission to open up and exploit the colonies 
 in the English style, but it began opening them up by means 
 of State roads and railways. The progress made during 
 the last few years may be visualised by the following 
 table : 
 
 Kailways in the Geeman Colonies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kilometres 
 
 In 1894 14 
 
 In 1896 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 In 1898 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
 
 In 1900 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
 
 In 1902 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 466 
 
 In 1904 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 479 
 
 In 1906 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,350 
 
 In 1908 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,988 
 
 In 1910 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 2,721 
 
 In 1912 . 
 
 • 1 
 
 A 
 
 
 t 
 
 
 3,867 
 
 1 /-in J 1 -4 r\ 
 
 Germany acquired her African colonies in 1884 and 1885. 
 Within ten years she had constructed only fourteen kilo- 
 metres, or eight miles, of railway for a territory many times 
 larger than the whole of Germany ! The railway mileage 
 continued increasing in a ridiculously slow and inadequate 
 manner up to the time when a great rising in the South- West 
 
THE GEKMAN COLONIAL EMPIEE 
 
 219 
 
 African colony clearly demonstrated the necessity of more 
 railways, and until Herr Dernburg, an able and energetic 
 business man, became Colonial Secretary. La 1912 the 
 gigantic African possessions of Germany combined did not 
 have as many miles of railway as had Httle Switzerland or 
 Western Australia or Ehodesia. 
 
 Absence of railways has been largely responsible for 
 the unsatisfactory position of the German colonies. With 
 the increase of railway construction these colonies have 
 rapidly advanced, and their progress shows that they possess 
 great possibihties. The progress of the German colonies 
 may best be seen by two tests : by their income from 
 taxation and by their exports. Between 1903 and 1913 
 the yield of the taxes of East Africa has increased in round 
 figures from £180,000 to £690,000 ; that of Kamerun 
 from £100,000 to £450,000 ; that of Togo from £55,000 to 
 £170,000 ; that of South- West Africa from £110,000 to 
 £795,000. The increase in the income furnished by the 
 German colonies is very gratifying. During the last ten 
 years, during which the Government has begun building 
 railways with some energy, the taxes provided by the 
 colonies have grown between four- and five-fold. Since 
 1903 the exports of the German African and of the Pacific 
 colonies have grown as follows : 
 
 
 
 
 Exports from 
 
 Exports from 
 
 German African 
 
 German Pacific 
 
 Colonies. 
 
 Colonies. 
 
 1903 .... £1,084,000 
 
 £194,000 
 
 1904 
 1905 
 
 
 
 . £1,041,000 
 
 . £1,172,000 
 
 £196,000 
 £220,000 
 
 1906 
 
 
 
 . £1,276,000 
 
 £282,000 
 
 1907 
 
 
 
 . £1,796,000 
 
 £262,000 
 
 1908 
 
 
 
 . £1,886,000 
 
 £436,000 
 
 1909 
 
 
 
 . £2,913,000 
 
 £567,000 
 
 1910 
 
 
 
 . £4,132,000 
 
 £910,000 
 
 1911 
 
 
 
 . £4,075,000 
 
 £821,000 
 
220 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 If we wish to estimate correctly the economic value of 
 the German colonies we must not only consider their present 
 value but their future possibilities. We must bear in mind 
 that the development of these vast territories has only 
 begun and has been badly begun. 
 
 The official export statistics will tell us something of the 
 productions of the various colonies. East Africa exports 
 chiefly rubber, hides and skins, sisal hemp, copra, ivory, 
 and gold ore. Kamerun exports chiefly rubber, palm 
 kernels and palm oil, cocoa, ivory, and timber. Togo 
 exports chiefly palm kernels and palm oil, rubber, raw 
 cotton, and cocoa. South- West Africa exports chiefly 
 diamonds, copper ore, lead, and hides and skins. The 
 development of plantations has only begun, but already 
 highly gratifying results have been achieved. Experiments 
 on a considerable scale have shown that the German African 
 colonies can furnish vast quantities of excellent cotton, 
 cocoa, coffee, tobacco, bananas, rubber, &c. Herr Dern- 
 burg repeatedly stated that he believed that ultimately 
 Germany might draw the bulk of the cotton, coffee, cocoa, 
 rice, tobacco, palm oil and palm kernels which she needs 
 from her colonies. The German planters were certainly 
 extremely optimistic as to the possibilities of their industries, 
 provided the Government created the necessary facilities 
 and gave them a free hand. 
 
 How much the German colonies have been held back 
 by Government red tape may be seen by the fact that 
 South- West Africa's mineral production is extremely small, 
 although it is a highly mineralised country. The diamonds 
 which are found there are very small, but they are of excellent 
 quality. They do not occur in pipes as at Kimberley and 
 elsewhere, but are picked up in the sand. Prospectors 
 have tried to locate the pipe or pipes from which they came, 
 but they have not yet succeeded in finding their origin. 
 The small but precious diamonds are found in an extensive 
 territory. Consequently theft is easy and supervision is 
 
THE GEEMAN COLONIAL EMPIKE 221 
 
 difficult. Nevertheless the Government in its wisdom im- 
 posed so heavy a tax on diamonds that smuggKng on a 
 large scale is known to have taken place. According to 
 the official figures the diamond exports from South- West 
 Africa come to about £1,300,000 per year. Very possibly 
 the illicit exports are equally large, if not larger. The copper 
 and lead mines of the country have hitherto yielded little, 
 owing to the Government's misplaced economy on the 
 one hand and to its policy of strangulation on the other. 
 As soon as South- West Africa and the other German colonies 
 are thrown open to the enterprising and the industrious, 
 and are administered in a reasonable and generous manner 
 as are the other English colonies, a wonderful development 
 will take place. Their production will increase many fold 
 in^a few years. 
 
 The German bureaucracy has not only hampered the 
 colonists with innumerable vexatious restrictions, but has at 
 the same time overburdened them with taxes. Animated 
 by the ambition to create model colonies, to show the world 
 how to colonise, German officials have tried to create another 
 Germany in the wilds. Magnificent and substantial but 
 empty towns have been laid out, huge schools and pubhc 
 buildings have been erected, monuments and statues have 
 been raised, parks and public gardens have been created. 
 Money was wasted in every direction on unnecessary osten- 
 tation, and a huge body of officials was maintained so that 
 everybody should be registered and labelled, that everything 
 in the German colonies should be exactly as in Germany. 
 The pubhc buildings in the budding German colonies are 
 among the finest in the world. 
 
 To develop colonies two factors are required : accessi- 
 bihty and labour. The German Government, until recently, 
 did not understand the importance of either. It neglected 
 the building of railways and at the same time exterminated 
 the natives. The German Government embarked somewhat 
 half-heartedly upon colonisation. Men who had disgraced 
 
222 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 themselves in Germany and who had become impossible 
 in their own comitry were given official positions in the 
 colonies. Many of the early administrators were brutes 
 and drunkards who disgraced themselves by the most 
 infamous illtreatment of the natives. Several of these men, 
 such as Messrs. Leist, Wehlan, Peters, and Prince Arenberg, 
 have acquired European notoriety. The Imperial Govern- 
 ment winked at the misdeeds of its official representatives. 
 Peters was dismissed in 1897 for fearful cruelty, but was 
 reinstated in 1905. German barbarity and inhumanity 
 naturally led to the revolt of the natives and this to their 
 slaughter by their taskmasters. In all colonies great 
 massacres occurred. That poHcy was particularly fatal 
 to South- West Africa, Germany's richest colony. There, 
 as in other parts of Africa, German representatives found 
 quarrelUng negro tribes, and they insinuated themselves 
 by offering to some of the chiefs protection against their 
 enemies. Treaties of protection were concluded. Pro- 
 tection was paid for by the cession of vast stretches of 
 valuable land, but when the natives asked for protection 
 in accordance with the wording of the treaty it was often 
 refused to them. Treaties between Germany and the natives 
 were amended by new paragraphs whereby further stretches 
 of land were taken from them without their consent. In- 
 stead of protecting them against their enemies as they had 
 promised, the Germans sometimes furnished the natives 
 with arms and afterwards demanded that these arms should 
 be given up again. When the natives resisted, as was only 
 natural, war was made on them without mercy, and their 
 property was taken. In consequence of that policy and of 
 the cruelties and extortions practised with impunity by 
 numerous individual traders. South- West Africa was fre- 
 quently in a state of war. In 1893 and 1894 Germany 
 was at war with the Hottentots under Hendrik Witboi. 
 In 1896 the Khauas Hottentots and Hereros revolted. 
 During 1897 and 1898 Germany fought the Zwartbooi 
 
THE GEEMAN COLONIAL EMPIEE 223 
 
 Hottentots. La 1903 the Bondelzwarts rose. In 1904 a 
 great rising of the Hereros occurred. It took the German 
 Government three years to subdue them by a miHtary force 
 which at one time approximated 20,000, and the campaign 
 cost about £20,000,000. Before this terrible campaign 
 South- West Africa, which is more than 50 per cent, larger 
 than the whole German Empire, was, according to official 
 estimates, inhabited by 200,000 natives. According to the 
 latest official figures there are at present in South- West 
 Africa only 82,000 natives. During three years of war more 
 than half the natives were exterminated. As some of the 
 native tribes did not rise, the Hereros were the chief sufferers. 
 They almost disappeared. Men of all ages, women and 
 children were slaughtered or driven into the waterless 
 desert, where they died of thirst. The character of 
 Germany's campaign will become apparent from a pro- 
 clamation of the Commander-in-Chief, General von Trotha, 
 issued on October 2, 1904, which was worded as follows : 
 
 I, the great General of the German soldiers, send this 
 letter to the Herero nation. The Hereros are no longer 
 German subjects. They have murdered and robbed, they 
 have cut ofi the ears and noses and other members of 
 wounded soldiers, and now they are too cowardly to fight. 
 Therefore, I say to the people : Whosoever brings one of 
 the chiefs as a prisoner to one of my stations shall receive 
 1000 marks, and for Samuel Maherero I will pay 5000 
 marks. The Herero nation must now leave the country. 
 If the people do it not, I will compel them with the big 
 gun. Within the German frontier, every Herero with or 
 without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. I 
 will not take over any more women and children, but I 
 will either drive them back to their people or have them 
 fired on. These are my words to the nation of the Hereros. 
 
 The great General of the mighty Emperor, 
 
 VoN Trotha. 
 
224 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Owing to the cruelty and folly of the German Govern- 
 ment and its colonial representatives innumerable natives 
 have been killed, and South- West Africa has suffered par- 
 ticularly through the reduction of native workers. After 
 the war the Germans endeavoured to increase the popula- 
 tion from the neighbouring countries. Many Boers were 
 attracted to South- West Africa by lavish promises, but they 
 did not like the dictatorial ways of the officials and the 
 bureaucratic restrictions which circumscribed their activities 
 in every direction, and they left very soon. The Germans 
 had acquired so bad a reputation through their ill-treatment 
 of natives that many natives left South- West Africa, and 
 the natives of the surrounding countries refused to work 
 on German territory. 
 
 South- West Africa is an ideal country for raising sheep, 
 goats, and cattle. According to a statement made by 
 Professor Hahn, of Capetown University, before the German 
 Budget Commission, South- West Africa had 2,000,000 
 cattle, but their number was greatly reduced by the rinder- 
 pest. According to him the south of the colony is as 
 favourable for raising sheep and goats as is Cape Colony. 
 The animals kept in South- West Africa have increased 
 during the last few years at a remarkabiy rapid rate. Be- 
 tween 1907 and 1912 cattle have increased from 52,531 to 
 171,784, wool sheep from 3526 to 46,901, other sheep from 
 98,069 to 440,000, goats from 99,663 to 448,279. Lately 
 the raising of ostriches has been begun. However, farming, 
 the raising of animals, and the pursuit of mining have been 
 severely hampered by the absence of native workers. The 
 fact that notwithstanding the scarcity of native labour, 
 numerous devastating wars, absence of railways, and 
 innumerable governmental restrictions. South- West Africa 
 has developed as rapidly as it has done, that taxation 
 and exports have enormously increased in a short number 
 of years, proves that the country is a valuable one, and that 
 its possibiHties are very great. That impression is con- 
 
THE GEKMAN COLONIAL EMPIEE 226 
 
 firmed by the emigration of Germans to South- West Africa. 
 South- West Africa contained on January 1, 1912, 12,135 
 Germans, of whom 2533 were mihtary and police. In other 
 words, it had almost 10,000 bona fide German inhabitants, 
 or more than twice as many as all the other German colonies 
 combined. 
 
 The absence of natives has great disadvantages, but 
 it has also great compensating advantages. The scarcity 
 of natives compelled the Germans to treat South- West 
 Africa more or less as a white man's land. The German 
 farmers who have settled in the country have shown that 
 white men can work there. Possibly South- West Africa 
 may remain a white man's land, containing a few thousand 
 natives, possibly numerous native labourers will be intro- 
 duced. At any rate, the authorities will have the great 
 advantage of an almost empty country, where they can do 
 more or less what they like without fear of race friction 
 and of native risings. That is a very unusual position in 
 South Africa, and it may lead to some exceedingly valuable 
 experiments. 
 
 The present value of the German colonies may be small. 
 They have caused a yearly loss to Germany because the 
 home Government simultaneously stifled private enterprise 
 and spent money lavishly in the colonies on unnecessary 
 of&cials, on costly buildings, and on railways and other 
 undertakings which private capital might have provided. 
 As soon as the German colonies are freed from their German 
 shackles and as soon as peace has returned they will be 
 self-supporting, and before long they should be exceedingly 
 flourishing. After all, one must look at colonies and 
 possessions, not from the narrow point of the individual, 
 who hves only for a short number of years, but from that 
 of the nation and the race which should Hve for ever, 
 Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which were almost 
 worthless a century and a half ago, are now the most valuable 
 assets of the British race. It would have been the greatest 
 
 Q 
 
226 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 calamity to the race if these vast territories had fallen 
 into other hands. The German colonies may appear to 
 be of little value at the moment, and their present com- 
 mercial value may be small, but a century and a half hence 
 they also may become priceless assets of the nation and 
 the race. Statesmen, in considering values, must not 
 apply to them the short-sighted views of a private man, 
 who desires that he and his children should financially 
 benefit by his acquisitions. They must look at territories 
 from the point of view of the nation and race, which should 
 be immortal. 
 
 The German colonies possess not only a substantial 
 immediate and a very large future economic value. They 
 are at the same time exceedingly important from the 
 strategical point of view. Modem Germany has not grown 
 naturally, almost automatically, like a tree, like the British 
 Empire. It has been made by great warrior-monarchs ; 
 it has grown by conquest. Modem Germany has been 
 created, not by statesmen, but by soldiers. Bismarck 
 had high military talents. His policy was a military policy, 
 He pursued his diplomatic campaigns from the military 
 point of view, and military considerations largely influenced 
 his colonial policy as well. He was a conqueror. His 
 aim and that of his successors was not merely to create 
 and maintain struggling colonies on the west coast and 
 the east coast of Africa, but to acquire all South Africa for 
 Germany. From Bismarck's conversations and numerous 
 confidential letters we know that he wished Germany to 
 stretch out a hand towards the Boers, and to expel the 
 British from South Africa with their assistance. His 
 attempts at effecting military settlements in Africa began 
 soon after the Franco-German War and many years before 
 Germany acquired her first colony. 
 
 It was Germany's plan to link up her colonies in West 
 Africa and in East Africa, and thus to isolate the Cape 
 and to get into direct contact with the Transvaal. That 
 
THE GEKMAN COLONIAL EMPIEE 227 
 
 attempt was prevented by Cecil Ehodes. Ehodesia 
 was made to separate German South- West Africa from 
 German East Africa. The development of Ehodesia and 
 of the other British territories lying east of German South- 
 West Africa was greatly hampered, because no direct outlet 
 to the sea could be secured by way of the German territory. 
 The expulsion of Germany from her African colonies will 
 stimulate and facilitate the development of the neighbouring 
 English and other colonies. Last, but not least, the acquisi- 
 tion of the German colonies will free the British possessions 
 of great dangers. From South- West Africa the neigh- 
 bouring British possessions could be threatened. For 
 many years intrigues were carried on in which South- West 
 Africa was to serve as a German base of attack. Strategical 
 railways were built suitable for an attack on the Cape ; 
 troops were demonstratively collected ; the soldiers who 
 had fought against the Hereros were settled in the country. 
 Germany's occupation of South- West Africa was no doubt 
 in part responsible for the Boer War. 
 
 If South- West Africa had remained German, a prosperous 
 and populous colony would have arisen. Another Germany, 
 another nation in arms, would have been created close to 
 Cape Colony. All South Africa would have become an 
 armed camp. Germany would have endeavoured to 
 accumulate in South- West Africa vast stores of arms and 
 ammunition, which, in case of war, might have been handed 
 over either to German reservists from South America 
 and elsewhere who might have been sent to that colony 
 or to the natives for use against the British settlers. That 
 danger is gone. General Botha's campaign was extremely 
 difi&cult and very glorious. In future years it would have 
 been infinitely more difi&cult, and it would have cost untold 
 lives and hundreds of millions. The successful campaign 
 against South- West Africa is extremely valuable, because 
 General Botha's victory has destroyed a centre of intrigue 
 and unrest whence mischief might have been done, not only 
 
 Q2 
 
228 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 in South Africa, but in all parts of the British and of the 
 French colonial empires. Had South- West Africa not been 
 taken the natives in Asia and in Africa would have been 
 told that Germany was dominating Africa ; that she would 
 drive the English and French out of the country ; that, at any 
 rate, France and England were there by Germany's per- 
 mission. The conflagration might have spread much farther. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 EXPOSE DU GOUVEKNEMENT PRUSSIEN DES PRINCIPES STJR 
 LESQUELS IL ROULE, AVEC QUELQUES REFLEXIONS 
 POLITIQUES ^ 
 
 Pour se faire une idee generale de ce gouvemement il 
 faut examiner en detail toutes les branches du gouveme- 
 ment, et puis les combiner ensemble. 
 
 Je commence par les finances, qui sont comme les nerfs 
 dans le corps humain, qui font mouvoir tous les membres. 
 
 Depuis la guerre, les revenus de I'Etat ont ete pro- 
 digieusement augmentes, savoir: d'un million deux cent 
 mille ecus par I'acquisition de la Pomerellie, un million 
 de tabac, cent mille de la banque, cinquante mille du bois, 
 quatre cent mille des accises et peages, cent trente mille du 
 sel de Schonebeck, cinquante-six mille du loto, au dela de 
 deux cent mille ecus par les nouveaux taux des bailliages, 
 cent mille ecus des bois ; de sorte qu'a present le total 
 des revenus monte a vingt et un millions sept cent mille 
 ecus, dont, outre toutes les autres depenses de I'Etat ac- 
 quittees, cent quatre- vingt-sept mille soldats sont entretenus. 
 Les depenses decomptees, il reste tous les ans cinq milKons 
 sept cent mille ecus, dont jusqu'ici deux millions ont ete 
 annuellement deposes dans le tresor, et trois millions sept 
 cent mille ecus ont ete employes, soit aux fortifications, soit 
 aux ameliorations du pays, soit pour reparer des malheurs, 
 ainsi qu'en subsides pour les Busses et en batiments. Mais 
 
 1 This is the famous political testament of 1776* 
 
230 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 la destination de ces cinq millions sept cent mille, en temps 
 de guerre, est pour payer les extraordinaires des campagnes, 
 qui montent chaque annee k onze millions, de sorte que, 
 cinq millions sept cent mille decomptes, reste a ajouter 
 annuellement la somme de cinq millions trois cent mille 
 ecus. Cette somme doit etre prise du tresor, qui est fourni 
 de dix-neuf millions trois cent mille ecus, outre quatre 
 milKons trois cent mille ecus, ce qu'on appelle le petit 
 tresor destine k rendre I'armee mobile. Nous avons encore, 
 d'ailleurs, quatre millions deux cent mille a Breslau, tout 
 prets pour acheter et ammasser les fourrages pour une 
 armee de soixante mille hommes, et neuf cent mille dans 
 la banque pour acheter du fourrage pour six semaines k 
 Magdebourg ; en outre, la caisse de guerre doit avoir onze 
 millions pour pouvoir payer en temps de guerre les regiments 
 d'avance ; quatre millions s'y trouvent dej4, les autres 
 y seront dans trois ans. Mais il faut remarquer que si 
 Ton veut puiser tous les extraordinaires de guerre du tresor, 
 on ne pourra durer que quatre campagnes, ce qui fait que 
 de necessite il faut s'emparer de la Saxe, menager le plus 
 que Ton pent le tresor, qui ne doit servir proprement qu'a 
 remplir le vide de quelques provinces envahies par I'ennemi. 
 Voil^ le fond des choses, qui demontre qu'il faut user de 
 la plus grande economie pour avoir le dernier ecu en poche 
 lorsqu'on negocie la paix. Get argent, ces deux millions 
 qui sortent tous les ans de la circulation en entrant dans 
 le tresor, paraitront une somme tres- considerable ; mais 
 ce qui justifie cette operation, c'est que la balance de com- 
 merce est en faveur de I'Etat de quatre millions quatre 
 cent mille ecus, de sorte que la circulation des especes 
 augmente encore dans le public annuellement de deux 
 millions quatre cent mille ecus. Cette balance etait contre 
 la Prusse a la mort du feu roi, oil la monarchie perdait 
 annuellement cinq cent mille ecus par les importations. 
 J'ai trouve moyen, en etablissant beaucoup de manu- 
 factures, et surtout a I'aide de la Silesie, de la mettre sur 
 
EXPOSE DES PEINCIPES 231 
 
 I'etat que je viens d'annoncer. C'est pourquoi il ne faut 
 pas perdre les manufactures de vue ; par leur moyen, 
 cette balance peut encore s'augmenter dans nos possessions 
 actuelles de quelques cent mille ecus. Mais ce qui importe 
 surtout, c'est de conserver le bon ordre etabli maintenant 
 pour la regie des deniers publics et la surveillance sur 
 toutes les caisses; sans quoi le peuple paye beaucoup 
 et le souverain est vole. 
 
 Des Magasins 
 
 II y a ici un magasin de trente six mille winspels, dont 
 on peut nourrir un an une armee de soixante mille hommes ; 
 il y a un magasin pareil en Silesie pour le meme nombre 
 de troupes, et d'ailleurs un fonds de deux millions pour 
 acheter des grains de la Pologne ; ce qui pourra foumir 
 cent vingt mille winspels, par le moyen desquels le pays 
 sera k I'abri de toute famine, et, en cas de guerre, avec le 
 ble qu'il y a deja, on aura de quoi faire trois campagnes. 
 
 De Waetenberg 
 
 Wartenberg a tous les ans quatre cent quarante mille 
 6cus d'epargne, qui sont employes en partie pour les 
 armes, pour augmenter son dep6t, en partie pour I'artillerie, 
 dont on a construit les canons pour la nouvelle forteresse 
 de Silesie, et une reserve, a laquelle on travaille encore 
 ^ present, de quatre cents canons de reserve pour la 
 campagne. 
 
 De l'Armee 
 
 La situation de cet Etat nous oblige d'entretenir beau- 
 coup de troupes, car nos voisins sont TAutriche, la Eussie, 
 la France et la Suede. Le pied de guerre est de deux cent 
 vingt mille hommes, y compris les bataillons francs et 
 r augmentation dans la cavalerie. De ce nombre on pourra 
 
232 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 mettre en campagne cent quatre-vingt mille hommes ; 
 mais des qu'il faut former trois armees, il saute aux yeux 
 que nous n'en avons pas trop en comparaison de nos voisins. 
 Je crois que la discipline doit rester sur le pied ou elle se 
 trouve, ainsi que les evolutions introduites, a moins que 
 la guerre ne change, car alors il n'y a de parti qu'a se plier 
 aux circonstances et a changer avec elles ; mais pour egaler 
 les enemies ou les surpasser il faut que ce soit par I'ordre et 
 par la discipline, encourager les officiers et les distinguer, 
 pour qu'une noble emulation les porte k surpasser leurs 
 adversaires qu'il ont k combattre. Si le souverain ne 
 se mele pas lui-meme du militaire, et s'il n'en donne pas 
 I'exemple, tout est fini. Si Ton prefere les faineants de 
 cour au miUtaire, on verra que tout le monde preferera 
 cette faineantise au laborieux metier des armes, et alors, au 
 lieu que nos officiers sont nobles, il faudra avoir recours 
 aux roturiers, ce qui serait le premier pas vers la decad- 
 ence et la chute de I'armee. Nous n'avons a present que 
 soixante-dix citoyens par compagnie ; il ne faut point 
 s'ecarter de ce principe, pour menager le pays, qui, par 
 I'augmentation de la population, pourra fournir des res- 
 sources ou recrues, si la guerre le rend necessaire. Les 
 forteresses sont en bon etat, a 1' exception de Stettin, dont 
 le plan est tout fait. II faudrait miner toute I'enceinte de 
 Magdebourg. La partie dans laquelle nous sommes le 
 plus faibles est celle du genie. II nous faudrait encore trente 
 bons officiers ingenieurs ; mais la difficulte est de les trouver. 
 Les mineurs sont bons. II faudrait egalement augmenter 
 le nombre des quartiers-maitres, parce que, suppose trois 
 armees, leur service demande plus d'habiles gens que nous 
 n'en avons. Notre population est de cinq millions deux 
 cent mille ames, dont quatre-vingt- dix mille a peu pres 
 sont soldats. Cette proportion pent aller ; mais il ne faut 
 pas que Ton prenne des cantons plus de huit cent quarante 
 par regiment d'infanterie et quatre cents par regiment 
 de cavalerie. 
 
EXPOSE DES PRINCIPES 233 
 
 Db la Politique 
 
 Un des premiers principes de la politique est de tacher 
 de s'allier a celui de ses voisins qui peut porter a I'Etat 
 les coups les plus dangereux. C'est par cette raison que 
 nous sommes en alliance avec la Eussie, parce qu'elle 
 nous rend le dos libre de c6te de la Prusse, et que, tant 
 que cette liaison dure, nous n'avons pas a craindre que 
 la Suede ose nous attaquer en Pomeranie. Les temps 
 peuvent changer, et la bizarrerie des conjonctures peut 
 obliger a prendre d'autres engagements ; mais jamais on 
 ne trouvera avec les autres puissances 1' equivalent des 
 avantages que Ton trouve avec la Eussie. Les troupes 
 fran9aises ne valent rien, et les Frangais sont accoutumes 
 a ne secourir que faiblement leurs allies ; et les Anglais, 
 faits pour payer des subsides, sacrifient leurs allies, a la paix, 
 pour favoriser leurs propres interets. Je ne parle point 
 de la maison d'Autriche, avec laquelle il parait presque 
 impossible que des liens solides se forment. S'il s'agit 
 des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent a cette 
 monarchie, les Etats de la Saxe sont sans contredit 
 ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en I'arrondissant et 
 lui formant une barriere par les montagnes qui separent la 
 Saxe de la Boheme, et qu'il faudrait fortifier. II est difficile 
 de prevoir comment cette acquisition pourrait se faire. 
 La maniere la plus sure serait de conquerir la Boheme 
 et la Moravie, et de les troquer avec la Saxe ; soit enfin 
 que cela put s'operer par d'autres trocs ou des possessions 
 du Ehin, en y ajoutant Juliers ou Berg, ou de quelque 
 fagon que cela se fasse. Cette acquisition est d'une necessite 
 indispensable pour donner a cet Etat la consistance dont 
 il manque. Car, des qu'on est en guerre, I'ennemi peut 
 avancer de plain pied jusqu'a Berlin sans trouver la moindre 
 opposition dans son chemin. Je ne parle pas, d'ailleurs, 
 de nos droits de succession au pays d'Ansbach, JuHers et 
 Berg, et le Mecklenbourg, parce que ce sont des pretentions 
 
234 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 connues, et dont il faut attendre revenement. Comme 
 I'Etat n'est pas riche, il faut se garder sur toute chose de 
 se meler dans des guerres ou il n'y a rien a gagner, parce 
 qu'on s'epuise k pure perte, et qu'une bonne occasion 
 arrivant ensuite, on n'en saurait pas profiter. Toutes les 
 acquisitions eloignees sont k charge a un Etat. Un village 
 sur la frontiere vaut mieux qu'une principaute k soixante 
 lieues. C'est une attention necessaire de cacher autant 
 qu'il est possible ses desseins d'ambition, et, si Ton peut, 
 de reveiller I'envie de I'Europe contre d'autres puissances, 
 a la faveur de quoi Ton frappe son coup. Cela peut arriver, 
 et la maison d'Autriche, dont I'ambition va le visage 
 demasque, s'attirera de reste I'envie et la jalousie des 
 grandes puissances. Le secret est une vertu essentielle pour 
 la pohtique aussi bien que pour I'art de la guerre. 
 
 De la Justice 
 
 Les lois sont assez sagement faites dans ce pays. Je 
 ne crois pas qu'on ait besoin d'y retoucher ; mais il faut que 
 tous les trois ans il se fasse une visite des tribunaux des 
 provinces, pour qu'il y ait des surveillants qui s'informent 
 de la conduite des juges et des avocats, que Ton punit 
 quand on les trouve en defaut. Mais comme les parties et 
 les avocats tachent d'eluder les meilleures lois, il est necessaire 
 que tous les vingt ans on examine par quel raf&nement ils 
 allongent les proces, et qu'on leur mette des barrieres, comme 
 on a fait a present, pour ne pas prolonger les proems, ce 
 qui ruine les parties. 
 
 Combination du Total du Gouveknement 
 
 Comme le pays est pauvre, et qu'il n'a gufere de res- 
 sources, c'est une chose necessaire que le Souverain ait 
 toujours un tresor bien muni, pour soutenir au moins 
 quelques campagnes. Les seules ressources qu'il peut 
 
EXPOSE DES PEINCIPES 235 
 
 trouver dans le besoin consistent dans un emprunt de cinq 
 millions de la Landschaft, et a pen pres quatre millions 
 qu'il pourra tirer du credit de la ban que ; mais voila tout. 
 II a a la verite en temps de paix cinq millions sept cent 
 mille dont il pent disposer ; mais la plupart de cet argent 
 doit, ou entrer dans le tresor, ou etre employe a des usages 
 publics, comme forteresses, ameliorations, manufactures, 
 canaux, defrichements, forteresses, batisses de villes dont on 
 fait en pierre les maisons qui sont en bois, le tout pour rendre 
 la constitution de I'Etat plus solide. Ces raisons que je viens 
 d'alleguer exigent que le souverain de ce pays soit econome 
 et homme qui tienne le plus grand ordre dans ses affaires. 
 Une raison aussi valable que la premiere s'y joint encore ; 
 c'est que s'il donne I'exemple de la profusion, ses sujets, 
 qui sont pauvres, veulent Fimiter et se ruinent. II faut 
 surtout, pour le soutien des mceurs, que les distinctions soient 
 uniquement pour le merite et non pas pour les richesses ; 
 ce principe mal observe en France a perdu les moeurs de 
 la nation, qui autrefois ne connaissait que le chemin de 
 I'honneur pour parvenir k la gloire, et qui croit a present 
 qu'il suffit d'etre riche pour etre honore. Comme les 
 guerres sont un gouffre ou les hommes s'abiment, il faut 
 avoir I'ceil a ce que le pays se peuple autant que possible, 
 d'ou il resulte encore un autre bien, c'est que les campagnes 
 en sont mieux cultivees et les possesseurs mieux a leur 
 aise. Je ne crois point que dans ce pays on doive jamais 
 se laisser persuader de former une marine militaire. En 
 voici les raisons. II y a en Europe de grandes marines, 
 savoir : celle d'Angleterre, celle de France, d'Espagne, 
 de Danemark et de la Kussie. Jamais nous ne pourrons 
 les egaler ; ainsi, avec quelques vaisseaux, demeurant 
 toujours inferieurs a d'autres nations, la depense serait 
 inutile. Ajoutez que, pour tenir une flotte, I'argent qu'elle 
 couterait nous obligerait de reformer des troupes de terre ; 
 que le pays n'est pas assez peuple pour fournir des recrues 
 a Tarmee et des matelots pour les vaisseaux, et enfin que 
 
236 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 les batailles de mer sont rarement decisives ; d'ou je conclus 
 qu'il vaut mieux avoir la premiere armee de I'Europe que 
 la plus mauvaise flotte des puissances maritimes. 
 
 La politique doit porter ses vues aussi loin qu'elle peut 
 dans I'avenir, et juger des conjonctures de I'Europe, soit 
 pour former des alliances, soit pour contrecarrer les projets 
 de ses ennemis. II ne faut pas croire qu'elle peut amener 
 les evenements ; mais quand ils se presentent, elle doit les 
 saisir pour en profiter. Voila pourquoi les finances doivent 
 etre en ordre. C'est par cette raison que de I'argent doit 
 etre en reserve pour que le gouvernement soit pret d'agir 
 sitdt que les raisons politiques lui en indiquent le moment. 
 La guerre meme doit etre conduite sur les principes de 
 la politique, pour porter les coups les plus sanglants ^ 
 ses ennemis. C'etait sur ces principes qu'agissait le prince 
 Eugene qui a rendu son nom immortel par la marche et 
 la bataille de Turin, par celles de Hochstadt et de Belgrad. 
 Les grands projects de campagne ne reussissent pas tous ; 
 mais quand ils sont vastes, il en resulte toujours plus 
 d'avantages que par ces petits projets ou Ton se borne a 
 la prise d'une bicoque sur les frontieres. Voil^ comma 
 le comte de Saxe ne donna la bataille de Kocoux que pour 
 pouvoir executer I'hiver d'apres son dessein sur Bruxelles, 
 qui lui reussit. 
 
 II est evident, par tout ce que je viens de dire, que la 
 politique, le militaire et les finances sont des branches si 
 etroitement liees ensemble, qu'elles ne sauraient etre separees. 
 II faut les mener de front, et de leur combinaison, assujettie 
 aux regies de la bonne politique, resultent les plus grand 
 avantages pour les Etats. En France, il y a un roi qui 
 dirige chaque branche a part. C'est le ministre qui preside, 
 soit aux finances, soit a la guerre, soit aux affaires etrangeres. 
 Mais le point de ralliement manque et ces branches, n'etant 
 pas reunies, divergent, et les ministres ne sont chacun 
 occupes que des details de leur departement, sans que 
 personne reunisse a un but fixe I'objet de leurs travaux. 
 
EXPOSE DES PKINCIPES 237 
 
 Si pareille chose arrivait dans cet Etat, il serrait perdu, 
 parce que les grandes monarchies vont malgre les abus, 
 et se soutiennent par leur poids et leur force intrinseque, 
 et que les petits Etats sont vite ecrases, si tout en eux 
 n'est force, nerf et vigueur. 
 
 Voila quelques reflexions et mes idees sur le gouveme- 
 ment de ce pays, qui, tant qu'il n'aura pas pris une plus 
 grande consistance et de meilleures frontieres, doit etre 
 gouveme par des princes qui soient toujours en vedette, 
 les oreilles dressees, pour veiller sur leurs voisins, et prets 
 k se defendre d'un jour a I'autre contre les projets pemicieux 
 de leurs ennemis. 
 
 (Signe) Frederic. 
 
CHAPTEK X 
 
 HISTOIBB DE MON TEMPS 
 AVANT-PROPOS. 1775 
 
 La plupart des histoires que nous avons sont des com- 
 pilations de mensonges meles de quelques verites. De 
 ce nombre prodigieux de faits qui nous ont ete transmis, 
 on ne pent compter pour averes que ceux qui ont fait 
 epoque soit de I'elevation ou de la chute des empires. H 
 parait indubitable que la bataille de Salamine s'est donnee 
 et que les Perses ont ete vaincus par les Grecs. II n'y a 
 aucun doute qu'Alexandre le Grand n'ait subjugue Tempire 
 de Darius, que les Eomains n'aient vaincu les Carthaginois, 
 Antiochus et Persee ; cela est d'autant plus evident qu'ila 
 ont possede tous ces Etats. L'histoire acquiert plus de 
 foi dans ce qu'elle rapporte des guerres civiles de Marius 
 et de Sylla, de Pompee et de Cesar, d'Auguste et d'Antoine, 
 par I'authenticite des auteurs contemporains qui nous 
 ont decrit ces evenements. On n'a point de doute sur 
 le bouleversement de I'empire d' Occident et sur celui 
 d' Orient, car on voit naitre et se former des royaumes du 
 demembrement de I'empire romain ; mais lorsque la 
 curiosite nous invite a descendre dans le detail des faits 
 de ces temps recules, nous nous precipitous dans un laby- 
 rinthe plein d'obscurites et de contradictions, et nous n'avons 
 point de fil pour en trouver Tissue. L 'amour du merveilleux, 
 le prejuge des historiens, le zele malentendu pour leur patrie, 
 
HISTOIEE DE MON TEMPS 239 
 
 leur haine pour les nations qui leur etaient opposees, toutea 
 ces differentes passions qui ont guide leur plume et les 
 temps de beaucoup posterieurs aux evenements ou ils 
 ont ecrits, ont si fort altere les faits en les deguisant, qu'aveo 
 des yeux de lynx meme on ne parviendrait a les devoiler 
 k present. 
 
 Cependant, dans la foule d'auteurs de Tantiquite Ton 
 distingue avec satisfaction la description que Xenophon 
 fait de la retraite des dix mille qu'il avait commandes et 
 ramenes lui-meme en Grece. Thucydide jouit ^ peu pres 
 de memes avantages. Nous sommes charmes des trouver 
 dans les fragments qui nous restent de Polybe, Tami et le 
 compagnon de Scipion I'Africain, les faits qu'il nous raconte, 
 dont lui-meme a ete le temoin. Les lettres de Ciceron 
 a son ami Atticus portent le meme caractere ; c'est un des 
 acteurs de ces grandes scenes qui parle. Je n'oubKerai 
 point les Commentaires de Cesar, ecrits avec la noble sim- 
 plicity d'un grand homme ; et, quoi qu'en ait dit Hirtius, 
 les relations des autres historiens sont en tout conformes 
 aux evenements decrits dans ces Commentaires ; mais 
 depuis Cesar I'histoire ne contient que des panegyriques ou 
 des satires. La barbarie des temps suivants a fait un chaos 
 de I'histoire du Bas-Empire, et Ton ne trouve d'interessant 
 que les Memoires ecrits par la fille de I'empereur Alexius 
 Conm^ne, parce que cette princesse rapporte ce qu'elle a vu. 
 Depuis, les moines, qui seuls avaient quelque connaissance, 
 ont laisse des annales trouvees dans leurs convents, qui 
 ont servi a I'histoire d'Allemagne ; mais quels materiaux 
 pour I'histoire ! 
 
 Les Fran^ais ont eu un eveque de Tours, un Joinville et le 
 Journal de I'Etoile, faibles ouvrages de compilateurs qui 
 ecrivaient ce qu'ils apprenaient auh asard, mais qui difficile- 
 ment pouvaient etre bien instruits. Depuis la renaissance 
 des lettres, la passion d'ecrire s'est changee en fureur. Nous 
 n'avons que trop de memoires, d'anecdotes et de relations, 
 parmi lesquelles il faut s'en tenir au petit nombre d'auteurs 
 
240 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEBMANY 
 
 qui ont eu des charges, qui ont ete eux-memes acteurs, qui ont 
 ete attaches k la cour ou qui ont eu la permission des souve- 
 rains de fouiller dans les archives, tels que le sage president 
 de Thou, Phillippe de Comines, Vargas, fiscal de concile 
 de Trente, mademoiselle d'Orleans, le Cardinal du Retz, 
 etc. Ajoutons-y les Lettres de M. d'Estrades, les Memoires de 
 M. de Torcy, monuments curieux, surtout ce dernier, qui 
 nous developpe la verite de ce testament de Charles II, 
 roi d'Espagne, sur lequel les sentiments ont ete si partages. 
 
 Ces reflexions sur Tincertitude de I'histoire, dont je me 
 suis souvent occupe, m'ont fait naitre I'idee de transmettre 
 k la posterite les faits principaux auxquels j'ai eu part ou 
 dont j'ai ete temoin, afin que ceux qui a I'avenir gouveme- 
 ront cet Etat puissent connaitre la vraie situation des choses 
 lorsque je parvins k la regence, les causes quim'ont fait agir, 
 mes moyens, les trames de nos ennemis, les negociations, les 
 guerres, et surtout les belles actions de nos officiers, par 
 lesquelles ils se sont acquis I'immortaHte a juste titre. 
 
 Depuis les revolutions qui bouleverserent premi^re- 
 ment I'empire d'Occident, ensuite celui d'Orient ; depuis 
 les succ§s immenses de Charlemagne ; depuis I'epoque 
 brilliant e du regne de Charles- Quint ; apres les troubles 
 que la reforme causa en AUemagne et qui durerent trente 
 annees ; enfin apres la guerre qui s'alluma a cause de la 
 succession d'Espagne, il n'est aucun evenement plus remarqu- 
 able et plus interessant que celui que produisit la mort de 
 Temper eur Charles VI, dernier male de la maison de 
 Habsbourg. 
 
 La cour de Vienne se vit attaquee par un prince auquel 
 elle ne pouvait supposer assez de force pour tenter une 
 entreprise aussi difficile. Bientdt il se forma une con- 
 juration de rois et de souverains, tous resolus k partager 
 cette immense succession. La couronne imperiale passa 
 dans la maison de Bavi^re, et lorsqu'il semblait que les 
 evenement s concouraient k la ruine de la jeune reine de 
 Hongrie, cette princesse, par sa fermete et par son habilete, 
 
HISTOIKE DE MON TEMPS 241 
 
 se tira d'un pas aussi dangereux, et soutint sa monarchie 
 en sacrifiant la Silesie et une petite partie du Milanais ; 
 c'etait tout ce qu'on pouvait attendre d'une jeune princesse 
 qui, a peine parvenue au tr6ne, saisit I'esprit du gouveme- 
 ment et devint I'ame de son conseil. 
 
 Get ouvrage-ci etant destine pour la posterite me delivre 
 de la gene de respecter les vivants et d'observer de certains 
 menagements incompatibles avec la franchise de la verite : 
 il me sera permis de dire sans retenue et tout haut ce que 
 Ton pense tout bas. Je peindrai les princes tels qu'ils sont, 
 sans prevention pour ceux qui ont ete mes allies et sans 
 haine pour ceux qui ont ete mes ennemis; je ne parlerai 
 de moi-meme que lorsque la necessite m'y obligera, et Ton 
 me permettra, a I'exemple de Cesar, de faire mention de 
 ce qui me regarde en personne tierce, pour eviter I'odieux 
 de I'egoisme. C'est a la posterite a nous juger ; mais si 
 nous sommes sages, nous devons la prevenir en nous jugeant 
 rigoureusement nous-memes. Le vrai merite d'un bon 
 prince est d'avoir un attachement sincere au bien public, 
 d'aimer sa patrie et la gloire ; je dis la gloire, car I'heureux 
 instinct qui anime les hommes du desir d'une bonne reputa- 
 tion est le vrai principe des actions heroiques ; c'est le 
 nerf de I'ame qui la reveille de sa lethargie pour la porter 
 aux entreprises utiles, necessaire et louables. 
 
 Tout ce qu'on avance dans ces memoires, soit a I'egard des 
 negociations, des lettres de souverains ou de traites signes, 
 a ses preuves conservees dans les archives. On peu re- 
 pondre des faits militaires comme temoin oculaire ; telle 
 relation de bataille a ete differee de deux ou trois jours 
 pour la rendre plus exacte et plus veridique. 
 
 La posterite verra peut-etre avec surprise dans ces 
 memoires les recits de traites faits et rompus. Quoique 
 ces exemples soient communs, cela ne justifierait point 
 I'auteur de cet ouvrage, s'il n'avait d'autres raisons meilleures 
 pour excuser sa conduite. 
 
 L'interet de I'Etat doit servir de regie aux souverains. 
 
242 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Les cas de rompre les alliances sont ceux : (1) ou Tallin 
 manque a remplir ses engagements ; (2) ou I'allie medite 
 de vous tromper et ou il ne vous reste de ressource que de 
 le prevenir ; (3) une force majeure qui vous opprime et 
 vous force a rompre vos traites ; (4) enfin I'insuf&sance des 
 moyens pour continuer la guerre. 
 
 Par je ne sais quelle fatalite, ces malheureuses richesses 
 influent sur tout. Les princes sont les esclaves de leurs 
 moyens ; I'interet de I'Etat leur sert de loi, et cette loi 
 est inviolable. Si le prince est dans I'obligation de sacrifier 
 sa personne meme au salut de ses sujets, a plus forte raison 
 doit-il leur sacrifier des liaisons dont la continuation leur 
 deviendrait prejudiciable. Les exemples de pareils traites 
 rompus se recontrent communement. Notre intention 
 n'est pas de les justifier tous. J'ose pourtant avancer qu'il 
 en est de tels, que la necessite ou la sagesse, la prudence 
 ou le bien des peuples obligeaient de transgresser, ne restant 
 aux souverains que ce moy en-la d'eviter leur ruine. 
 
 Si Fran9ois I avait accompli le traite de Madrid, il 
 aurait, en perdant la Bourgogne, etabli un ennemi dans 
 le coeur de ses Etats. C'etait reduire la France dans I'etat 
 malheureux ou elle etait du temps de Louis XI et de Louis 
 XII. Si, apres la bataille de Muhlberg, gagnee par Charles 
 Quint, la ligue protestante d'AUemagne ne s' etait/ pas 
 fortifi.ee de I'appui de la France, elle n'aurait pu eviter de 
 porter les chaines que I'Empereur lui preparait de longue 
 main. Si les Anglais n'avaient pas rompu I'alliance, si 
 contraire a leurs interets, par laquelle Charles II s'etait 
 uni avec Louis XIV, leur puissance courait risque d'etre 
 diminuee, d'autant plus que, dans la balance poHtique de 
 I'Europe, la France I'aurait emporte de beaucoup sur 
 I'Angleterre. 
 
 Les sages, qui prevoient les effets dans les causes, doivent 
 a temps s'opposer a ces causes si diametralement opposees 
 a leurs interets. Qu'on me permette de m'expliquer 
 exactement sur cette matiere delicate, que Ton n'a guere 
 
HISTOIEB DE MON TEMPS 243 
 
 traitee dogmatiquement. II me parait clair et evident 
 qu'un particulier doit etre attache scrupuleusement a sa 
 parole, Teiit-il meme donne inconsiderement. Si on lui 
 manque, il pent recourir k la protection des lois, et quoi 
 qu'il en arrive, ce n'est qu'un individu qui souffre ; mais 
 a quels tribunaux un souverain prendra-t-il recours, si un 
 autre prince viole envers lui ses engagements ? La parole 
 d'un particulier n'entraine que le malheur d'un seul homme, 
 celle des souverains des calamites generales pour des nations 
 entieres. Ceci se reduit a cette question : vaut-il mieux 
 que le peuple perisse ou que le prince rompe son traite ? 
 Quel serait I'imbecile qui balancerait pour decider cette 
 question ? 
 
 Vous voyez par les cas que nous venons d'exposer 
 qu'avant de porter un jugement decisif sur les actions d'un 
 prince, il faut commencer par examiner murement les 
 circonstances ou il s'est trouve, la conduite de ses allies, 
 les ressources qu'il pouvait avoir ou qui lui manquaient 
 pour remplir ses engagements. Car, comme nous I'avons 
 deja dit, le bon ou le mauvais etat des finances sont comme 
 le pouls des Etats, qui influent plus qu'on ne le croit ni 
 qu'on ne le sait dans les operations politiques et militaires. 
 Le public, qui ignore ces details, ne juge que sur les appar- 
 ences, et se trompe par consequent dans ses decisions ; 
 la prudence empeche qu'on ne le desabuse, parce que ce 
 serait le comble de la demence d'ebruiter soi-meme par 
 vaine gloire la partie faible de I'Etat : les ennemis, charmes 
 d'une pareille decouverte, ne manqueraient pas d'en profiter. 
 La sagesse exige done qu'on abandonne au public la liberte 
 de ses jugements temeraires, et que ne pouvant se justifier 
 pendant sa vie, sans compromettre I'interet de I'Etat, 
 Ton se contente de se legitimer aux yeux desinteresses de 
 la posterite. 
 
 Peut-etre ne sera-t-on pas fache que j'ajoute quelques 
 reflexions generales a ce que je viens de dire sur les evene- 
 ments qui sont arrives de mon temps. J'ai vu que les 
 
244 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 petits Etats peuvent se soutenir centre les plus grandes 
 monarchies lorsque ces Etats ont de I'industrie et beaucoup 
 d'ordre dans leurs affaires. Je trouve que les grands 
 empires ne vont que par des abus, qu'ils sont remplis de 
 confusion, et qu'ils ne se soutiennent que par leurs vastes 
 ressources et par la force intrinseque de leur masse. Les 
 intrigues qui se font dans ces cours perdraient des princes 
 moins puissants : elles nuisent toujours, mais elles n'empechent 
 pas que de nombreuses armees ne conservent leur poids. 
 
 J'observe que toutes les guerres portees loin des frontieres 
 de ceux qui les entreprennent n'ont pas les memes succes 
 que celles qui se font a portee de la patrie. Ne serait-ce 
 pas par un sentiment naturel dans I'homme qui sent qu'il 
 est plus juste de se defendre que de depouiller son voisin ? 
 Mais peut-etre la raison physique Femporte-t-elle sur la 
 morale par la difficulte de pourvoir aux vivres dans un 
 trop grand eloignement de la frontiere, a fournir a temps 
 les recrues, les remontes, les habillements, les munitions 
 de guerre, etc. Ajoutons encore que, plus les troupes 
 sont aventurees dans des pays lointains, plus elles craignent 
 qu'on ne leur coupe la retraite ou qu'on ne la rende difi&cile. 
 Je m'aper9ois de la superiority marquee de la flotte anglaise 
 sur celle des Frangais et des Espagnols reunie, et je m'etonne 
 comment la marine de Philippe II, ayant eu autrefois 
 cet ascendant sur celle des Anglais et des Hollandais, 
 n'a pas conserve d'aussi grands avantages. 
 
 Je remarque encore avec surprise que tons ces armements 
 de mer sont plus pour I'ostentation que pour I'effet, et 
 qu'au lieu de proteger le commerce, ils ne I'empechent pas 
 de se detruire. D'un cote se presente le roi d'Espagne, 
 souverain du Potose, obere en Europe, creancier a Madrid 
 de ses oJB&ciers et de ses domestiques ; de Tautre, le roi 
 d'Angleterre, qui repand a pleines mains ses guinees, que 
 trente ans d'industrie avaient accumulees dans la Grande- 
 Bretagne, pour soutenir la reine de Hongrie et la Pragmatique 
 Sanction, independamment de quoi cette reine de Hongrie 
 
HISTOIKE DE MON TEMPS 245 
 
 est obligee de sacriiier quelques provinces pour sauver le 
 reste. 
 
 La capitale du monde Chretien s'ouvre au premier 
 venu, et le pape, n'osant pas accabler d'anathemes ceux 
 qui le font contribuer, est oblige de les benir. L'ltalie est 
 inondee d'etrangers qui se battent pour la subjuguer. 
 L'exemple des Anglais entraine comme un torrent les 
 HoUandais dans cette guerre qui leur est etrangere, et ces 
 republicains qui du temps que des heros, les Eugene, les 
 Marlborough, commandaient leurs armees, y envoyaient 
 des deputes pour regler les operations miHtaires, n'en 
 envoient point lorsqu'un due de Cumberland se trouve a 
 la tete de leurs troupes. Le Nord s'embrase et produit 
 une guerre funeste a la Suede. Le Danemarck s'anime, 
 s'agite et se calme. La Saxe change deux fois de 
 parti ; elle ne gagne rien ni avec les uns ni avec les 
 autres, sinon qu'elle attire les Prussiens dans ses Etats et 
 qu'elle se ruine. Un conflit d'evenements change les 
 causes de la guerre : cependant les effets continuent, quoique 
 le motif ait cesse. La fortune passe rapidement d'un parti 
 dans Fautre ; mais Fambition et le desir de la vengeance 
 nourissent et entretiennent le feu de la guerre. II semble 
 voir une partie de joueurs qui veulent avoir leur revanche 
 et ne quittent le jeu qu'apres s'etre entierement ruines. 
 
 Si Fon demandait a un ministre anglais : Quelle rage 
 vous oblige a prolonger la guerre ? C'est que la France 
 ne pourra plus fournir aux frais de la campagne prochaine, 
 repondrait-il. Si Fon faisait la meme question a un ministre 
 fran^ais, la reponse serait a peu pres semblable. Ce qu'il 
 y a de deplorable dans cette politique, c'est qu'elle se joue 
 de la vie des hommes, et que le sang humain, repandu avec 
 profusion, Fest inutilement. Encore si, par la guerre, on 
 pouvait parvenir k fixer soHdement les frontieres et h 
 maintenir cette balance des pouvoirs si necessaire entre les 
 souverains de FEurope, on pourrait regarder ceux qui 
 ont peri comme des victimes sacrifices a la tranquillite 
 
246 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 et k la surete publique. Mais qu'on s'envie des provinces 
 en Amerique, ne voila-t-il pas toute I'Europe entrainee dans 
 des partis differents pour se battre sur mer et sur terre. 
 
 Les ambitieux devraient considerer surtout que les 
 armes et la discipline militaire etant a peu pres les memes 
 en Europe, et les alliances mettant pour I'ordinaire I'egalite 
 des forces entre les parties belligerantes, tout ce que les 
 princes peuvent attendre de leurs plus grands avantages 
 dans les temps ou nous vivons, c'est d'acquerir par des 
 succes accumules ou quelque petite ville sur les frontieres, 
 ou une banlieue qui ne rapporte pas les interets des depenses 
 de la guerre, et dont la population n'approche pas de nombre 
 des citoyens peris dans les campagnes. 
 
 Quiconque a des entrailles et envisage ces objets de 
 sangfroid doit etre emu des maux que les hommes d'Etat 
 causent aux peuples, faute d'y reflechir ou bien entraines 
 par leur passions. La raison nous prescrit une regie sur 
 ce sujet, dont, ce me semble, aucun homme d'Etat ne doit 
 s'ecarter ; c'est de saisir I'occasion et d'entreprendre 
 lorsqu'elle est favourable ; mais de ne point la forcer en 
 abandonnant tout au hasard. II y a des moments qui de- 
 mandent qu'on mette toute son activite en jeu pour en 
 profiter, mais il y en a d'autres ou la prudence veut qu'on 
 reste dans I'inaction. Cette matiere exige la plus profonde 
 reflexion, parce que non-seulement il faut bien examiner 
 I'etat des choses, mais qu'il faut encore prevoir toutes les 
 suites d'une entreprise, et peser les moyens que Ton a avec 
 ceux de ses ennemis pour juger lesquels I'emportent dans 
 la balance. Si la raison n'y decide pas seule, et que la 
 passion s'en mele, il est impossible que d'heureux succes 
 suivent une pareille entreprise. La politique demande 
 de la patience, et le chef-d'oeuvre d'un homme habile 
 est de faire chaque chose en son temps et a propos. 
 
 L'histoire ne nous foumit que trop d'exemples de 
 guerres legerement enterprises ; il n'y qu'^ se rappeler la vie 
 de Francois I et lire ce que Brant6me dit etre le sujet de 
 
HISTOIKE DE MON TEMPS 247 
 
 sa malheureuse expedition du Milanais, ou ce roi fut fait 
 prisonnier a Pavie ; il n'y a qu'a voir combien peu Charles- 
 Quint profita de I'occasion qui se presentait a lui, apres 
 la bataille de Muhlberg, pour subjuguer I'Allemagne ; il 
 n'y a qu'a voir I'histoire de Frederic V, electeur palatin, 
 pour se convaincre de la precipitation avec laquelle il 
 s'engagea dans une entreprise bien au-dessus de ses forces. 
 Et dans nos derniers temps, qu'on se rappelle la conduite 
 de Maximilien de Baviere, qui dans la guerre de Succession, 
 lorsque son pays etait, pour ainsi dire, bloque par les allies, 
 se rangea du parti des Fran^ais, pour se voir depouiller 
 de ses Etats. Et plus recemment Charles XII, roi de 
 Suede, nous fournit un exemple plus frappant encore des 
 suites funestes que I'entetement et la fausse conduite des 
 souverains attire sur les sujects. 
 
 L'histoire est I'ecole des princes ; c'est a eux de s'in- 
 struire des fautes des siecles passes, pour les eviter, et 
 pour apprendre qu'il faut se former un systeme et le suivre 
 pied a pied, et que celui qui a le mieux calcule sa conduite 
 est le seul que puisse I'emporter sur ceux qui agissent moins 
 consequemment que lui. 
 
CHAPTEK XI 
 
 ESSAI SUE LES FOEMES DE GOUVEENEMENT ET SUE LES 
 DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS (1777) 
 
 Nous trouvons, en remontant k I'antiquite la plus reculee, 
 que les peuples dont la connaissance nous est parvenue 
 menaient une vie pastorale, et ne formaient point de corps 
 de societe : ce que la Genese rapporte de I'histoire des 
 patriarches en est un temoignage suffisant. Avant le 
 petit peuple juif, les Egyptiens devaient etre de meme 
 eparpilles par families dans ces contrees que le Nil ne sub- 
 mergeait pas ; et sans doute il s'est ecoule bien des siecles 
 avant que ce fleuve, dompte, permit aux regnicoles de se 
 rassembler par bourgades. Nous apprenons par I'histoire 
 grecque le nom des fondateurs des villes et celui des legis- 
 lateurs qui les premiers les rassamblerent en corps ; cette 
 nation fut longtemps sauvage, comme le furent tous les 
 habitants de notre globe. Si les annales des Etrusques, 
 des Samnites, des Sabins, &c., nous etaient parvenues, 
 nous apprendrions assurement que ces peuples vivaient 
 isoles par families avant de s'etre rassembles et reunis. Les 
 Gaulois formaient deja des associations du temps que Jules 
 Cesar les dompta. Mais il parait que la Grande-Bretagne 
 n'etait pas perfectionnee k ce point lorsque ce conquerant 
 y passa pour la premiere fois avec les troupes romaines. 
 Du temps de ce grand homme, les Germains ne pouvaient 
 se comparer qu'aux Iroquois, aux Algonquins et pareilles 
 nations sauvages ; ils ne vivaient que de la chasse, de la 
 
 248 
 
[LES DEVOIKS DES SOUVEEAINS 249 
 
 peche, et du lait de leurs troupeaux. Un Germain croyait 
 s'avilir en cultivant la terre ; il employait k ces travaux 
 les esclaves qu'il avait faits a la guerre ; aussi la foret 
 d'Hercynie couvrait-elle presque entierement cette vaste 
 etendue de pays qui compose maintenant I'AUemagne. 
 La nation ne pouvait pas etre nombreuse, faute de nour- 
 riture suffisante ; et c'est 1^ sans doute la veritable cause 
 de ces emigrations prodigieuses des peuples du Septentrion, 
 qui se precipitaient vers le Midi pour chercher des terres 
 toutes defrichees et un climat moins rigoureux. 
 
 On est etonne quand on se represente le genre humain 
 vivant si longtemps dans un etat d'abrutissement et sans 
 former de societe, et Ton recherche avidement quelle raison 
 a pu le porter a se reunir en corps de peuple. Sans doute 
 que les violences et les pillages d'autres hordes voisines ont 
 fait naitre a ces peuplades isolees I'idee de se joindre a 
 d'autres families pour assurer leurs possessions par leur 
 mutuelle defense. De la sont nees les lois qui enseignent 
 aux societes h, preferer I'interet general au bien particulier. 
 Des lors personne, sans craindre de chatiment, n'osa 
 s'emparer du bien d'autrui, personne n'osa attenter sur 
 la vie de son voisin, il fallut respecter sa femme et ses 
 biens comme des objets sacres, et si la societe entiere se 
 trouvait attaquee, chacun devait accourir pour la sauver. 
 Cette grande verite, qu'il faut agir envers les autres comme 
 nous voudrions qu'ils se comportassent envers nous, devient 
 le principe des lois et du pacte social ; de la nait I'amour 
 de la patrie, envisagee comme I'asile de notre bonheur. 
 Mais comme ces lois ne pouvaient ni se maintenir ni 
 s'executer sans un surveillant qui s'en occupat sans cesse, 
 ce fut I'origine des magistrats, que le peuple elut et auxquels 
 il se soumit. Qu'on s'imprime bien que la conservation 
 des lois fut I'unique raison qui engagea les hommes ^ se 
 donner des superieurs, puisque c'est la vraie origine de 
 la souverainete. Ce magistrat etait le premier serviteur 
 de I'Etat. Quand ces societes naissantes avaient k craindre 
 
250 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 de leurs voisins, le magistrat armait le peuple et volait a 
 la defense des citoyens. 
 
 Get instinct general des homines qui les anime k se 
 procurer le plus grand bonheur possible donna lieu a la 
 formation des different s genres de gouvemement. Les 
 uns crurent qu'en s'abandonnant a la conduite de quelques 
 sages ils trouveraient ce bonheur ; de la le gouvernement 
 aristocratique. D'autres prefererent I'oligarchie. Athenes 
 et la plupart des republiques grecques choisirent la demo- 
 cratie. La Perse et I'Orient ployaient sous le despotisme. 
 Les Komains eurent quelque temps des rois ; mais lasses 
 des violences des Tarquins, il tournerent la forme de 
 leur gouvemement en aristocratie. Bient6t, fatigue de la 
 durete des patriciens, qui I'opprimaient par des usures, le 
 peuple s'en separa, et ne retouma a Eome qu'apres que 
 le senat eut autorise les tribuns que ce peuple avait elus 
 pour le soutenir contre le violence des grands ; depuis, 
 il devint presque le depositaire de I'autorite supreme. 
 On appelait tyrans ceux qui s'emparaient avec violence 
 du gouvemement, et qui, ne suivant que leurs passions 
 et leurs caprices pour guides, renversaient les lois et les 
 principes fondamentaux que la societe avait etablis pour 
 sa conservation. 
 
 Mais quelque sages que fussent les legislateurs et les 
 premiers qui rassemblerent le peuple en corps, quelque 
 bonnes que fussent leurs institutions, il ne s'est trouve 
 aucun de ces gouvemements qui se soit soutenu dans toute 
 son integrite. Pourquoi ? Parce que les hommes sont 
 imparfaits, et que leurs ouvrages le sont par consequent ; 
 parce que les citoyens, pousses par des passions, se laissent 
 aveugler par I'interet particulier, qui toujours bouleverse 
 I'interet general ; enfin parce que rien n'est stable dans 
 ce monde. Dans les aristocraties, Tabus que les premiers 
 membres de I'Etat font de leur autorite est, pour I'ordinaire, 
 cause des revolutions qui s'ensuivent. La democratie des 
 Komains fut bouleversee par le peuple meme ; la masse 
 
LES DEVOIKS DES SOUVEKAINS 251 
 
 aveuglee de ces plebeiens se laissa corrompre par des citoyens 
 ambitieux qui ensuite les asservirent et les priverent de 
 leur liberte. C'est le sort auquel I'Angleterre doit s'attendre, 
 si la chambre basse ne prefere pas les veritables interets 
 de la nation a cette corruption infame qui I'avilit. Quant 
 au gouvemement monarchique, on en a vu bien des especes 
 differentes. L'ancien gouvemement feodal, qui etait presque 
 general en Europe il y a quelques siecles, s' etait etabli 
 par les conquetes des barbares. Le general qui menait 
 une horde se rendait souverain du pays conquis, et il par- 
 tageait les provinces entre ses principaux officiers ; ceux-la 
 a la verite etaient soumis au suzerain, et lui foumissaient 
 des troupes, s'il les demandait ; mais comme quelques-uns 
 de ces vassaux devinrent aussi puissants que leur chef, 
 cela formait des Etats dans I'Etat. C'etait une pepiniere 
 de guerres civiles dont resultait le malheur de la societe 
 generale. En AUemagne ces vassaux sont devenus inde- 
 pendants ; ils ont ete opprimes en France, en Angleterre 
 et en Espagne. Le seul modele qui nous reste de cet abomin- 
 able gouvemement subsist e encore dans la republique 
 de Pologne. En Turquie, le souverain est despotique, 
 il pent commettre impunement les cruautes les plus re- 
 voltantes ; mais aussi lui arrive-t-il souvent, par une vicissi- 
 tude commune chez les nations barbares, ou par une juste 
 retribution, qu'il est etrangle a son tour. Pour le gouveme- 
 ment vraiment monarchique, il est le pire ou le meilleur 
 de tous, selon qu'il est administre. 
 
 Nous avons remarque que les citoyens n'ont accord^ 
 la preeminence a un de leurs semblables qu'en faveur des 
 services qu'ils attendaient de lui ; ces services consistent 
 a maintenir les lois, a faire exactement observer la justice, 
 a s'opposer de toutes ses forces a la corruption des moeurs, 
 a def endre I'Etat contre ses ennemis. Le magistrat doit avoir 
 I'oeil sur la culture des terres ; il doit procurer I'abondance 
 des vivres a la societe, encourager I'industrie et le commerce ; 
 il est comme une sentinelle permanente qui doit veiller 
 
252 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 sur les voisins et sur la conduite des ennemis de I'Etat. On 
 demande que sa prevoyance et sa prudence forment h 
 temps les liaisons, et choississent les allies les plus con- 
 venables aux interets de son association. On voit par 
 ce court expose quel detail de connaissances chacun de ces 
 articles exige en particulier. II faut joindre k cela une 
 etude approfondie du local du pays que le magistrat doit 
 gouvemer, et bien connaitre le genie de la nation, parce 
 qu'en pechant par ignorance, le souverain se rend aussi 
 coupable que par les peches qu'il aurait commis par malice : 
 les uns sont des defauts de paresse, les autres des vices 
 du coeur • mais le mal qui en resulte est le meme pour la 
 societe. 
 
 Les princes, les souverains, les rois ne sont done pas 
 revetus de Tautorite supreme pour se plonger impunement 
 dans la debauche et dans le luxe ; ils ne sont pas eleves 
 sur leurs concitoyens pour leur orgueil, se pavanant dans 
 la representation, insulte avec mepris a la simplicite des 
 moeurs, a la pauvrete, a la misere ; ils ne sont point k la tete 
 de rfitat pour entretenir aupres de leurs personnes un tas de 
 faineants dont I'oisivete et I'inutilite engendrent tons les vices. 
 La mauvaise administration du gouvernement monarchique 
 provient de bien des causes differentes, qui ont leur source 
 dans le caractere du souverain. Ainsi un prince adonne 
 aux femmes se laissera gouverner par ses maitresses et 
 par ses favoris ; ceux-la, abusant du pouvoir qu'ils ont 
 sur Tesprit du prince, se serviront de cet ascendant pour 
 commettre des injustices, proteger des gens perdus de 
 moBurs, vendre des charges, et autres infamies pareilles. 
 Si le prince, par faineantise, abandonne le gouvemail de 
 rEtat en des mains mercenaires, je veux dire a ses ministres, 
 alors I'un tire a droite, Fautre a gauche, personne ne travaille 
 sur un plan general, chaque ministre renverse ce qu'il 
 a trouve etabli, quelque bonne que soit la chose, pour 
 devenir createur de nouveautes et pour realiser ses fantaisies, 
 souvent au detriment du bien public ; d 'autres ministres 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEKAINS 263 
 
 qui remplacent ceux-la se hatent de bouleverser k leur 
 tour ces arrangements avec aussi peu de solidite que leurs 
 predecesseurs, satisfaits de passer pour inventeurs. Ainsi 
 cette suite de changements et de variations ne donne pas 
 a ces pro jets le temps de pousser racine. De la naissent 
 la confusion, le desordre et tous les vices d'une mauvaise 
 administration. Les prevaricateurs ont une excuse touts 
 prete : ils couvrent leur turpitude de ces changements 
 perpetuels ; et comme ces sortes de ministres se contentent 
 de ce que personne ne recherche leur conduite, ils se gardent 
 bien d'en donner I'exemple en sevissant contre leur sub- 
 alternes. Les hommes s'attachent a ce qui leur appartient ; 
 rEtat n'appartient pas a ces ministres ; ils n'ont done pas 
 son bien veritablement a cceur, tout s'execute avec non- 
 chalance et avec une espece d'indifference stoique, d'ou 
 resulte le deperissement de la justice, des finances et du 
 militaire. De monarchique qu'il etait ce gouvernement 
 degenere en une veritable aristocratie ou les ministres et 
 les generaux dirigent les affaires selon leur fantasie ; alors 
 on ne connait plus de systeme general, chacun suit ses 
 idees particulieres, et le point central, le point d'unite, est 
 perdu. Comme tous les ressorts d'une montre conspirent 
 au meme but, qui est celui de mesurer le temps, les ressorts 
 du gouvernement devraient etre montes de meme pour 
 que toutes les differentes parties de I'administration con- 
 courussent egalement au plus grand bien de I'Etat, objet 
 important qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue. D'ailleurs, 
 rinteret personnel des ministres et des generaux fait pour 
 I'ordinaire qu'ils se contrecarrent en tout et que quelquefois 
 ils empechent 1' execution des meilleures choses, parce que 
 ce ne sont pas eux qui les ont proposees. Mais le mal arrive 
 a son comble, si des ames perverses parviennent a persuader 
 au souverain que ses interets sont differents de ceux de ses 
 sujets ; alors le souverain devient I'ennemi de ses peuples 
 sans savoir pourquoi ; il devient dur, severe, inhumain 
 par mesentendu; car le principe dont il part etant faux, 
 
254 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 les consequences le doivent etre necessairement. Le souve- 
 rain est attache par des liens indissolubles au corps de 
 I'Etat ; par consequent il ressent par repercussion tous 
 les maux qui affligent ses sujets, et la societe souffre egale- 
 ment des malheurs qui touchent son souverain. II n'y a 
 qu'un bien, qui est celui de I'Etat en general. Si le prince 
 perd des provinces, il n'est plus en etat comme par le passe 
 d'assister ses sujets ; si le malheur I'a force de contracter 
 des dettes, c'est aux pauvres citoyens a les acquitter ; en 
 revanche, si le peuple est peu nombreux, s'il croupit dans la 
 misere, le souverain est prive de toute ressource. Ce sont 
 des verites si incontestables, qu'il n'est pas besoin d'appuyer 
 davantage la-dessus. 
 
 Je le repete done, le souverain represente FEtat ; lui 
 et ses peuples ne forment qu'un corps, qui ne peut etre 
 heureux qu'autant que la concorde les unit. Le prince 
 est a la societe qu'il gouveme ce que la tete est au corps ; 
 il doit voir, penser et agir pour toute la communaute, afin 
 de lui procurer tous les avantages dont elle est susceptible. 
 Si Ton veut que le gouvernement monarchique Temporte 
 sur le republicain, Tarret du souverain est prononce : il 
 doit etre actif et integre, et rassembler toutes ses forces 
 pour remphr la carriere qui lui est prescrite. Voici Fidee 
 que je me fais de ses devoirs. 
 
 II doit se procurer une connaissance exacte et detaillee 
 de la force et de la faiblesse de son pays, tant pour les 
 ressources pecuniaires que pour la population, les finances, 
 le commerce, les lois et le genie de la nation qu'il doit 
 gouverner. Les lois, si elles sont bonnes, doivent etre 
 exprimees clairement, afin que la chicane ne puisse pas 
 les toumer a son gre pour en eluder I'esprit et decider de 
 la fortune des particuliers arbitrairement et sans regie ; 
 la procedure doit etre aussi courte qu'il est possible, afin 
 d'empecher la mine des plaideurs, qui consumeraient en 
 faux frais ce qui leur est du de justice et de bon droit. Gette 
 partie du gouvernement ne saurait etre assez surveillee, 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 255 
 
 pour mettre toutes les barrieres possibles a I'avidite des 
 juges et a Finteret demesure des avocats. On retient tout 
 le monde dans son devoir par des visitations qui se font 
 de temps a autre dans les provinces, ou quiconque se croit 
 lese ose porter ses plaintes a la commission, et les prevari- 
 cateurs doivent etre severement punis. II est peut-etre 
 superflu d'ajouter que les peines ne doivent jamais passer 
 le delit, que la violence ne doit jamais etre employee au 
 lieu des lois, et qu'il vaut mieux qu'un souverain soit trop 
 indulgent que trop severe. Comme tout particulier qui 
 n'agit pas par principes a une conduit e inconsequent e, 
 d'autant plus import e-t-il qu'un magistrat qui veille au 
 bien des peuples agisse d'apres un systeme arrete de politique, 
 de guerre, de jS,nance, de commerce et de lois. Par exemple, 
 un peuple doux ne doit point avoir des lois severes, mais 
 des lois adaptees a son caractere. La base de ces systemes 
 doit toujours etre relative au plus grand bien de la societe ; 
 les principes doivent etre adaptes a la situation du pays, 
 a ses anciens usages, s'ils sont bons, au genie de la nation. 
 Par exemple, en politique c'est un fait connu que les 
 allies les plus naturels et par consequent les meilleurs 
 sont ceux dont les interets, concourent avec les ndtres, 
 et qui ne sont pas si proches voisins, qu'on soit engage 
 en quel que discussion d'interet avec eux. Quelquefois 
 des evenements bizarres donnent lieu a des combinaisons 
 extraordinaires. Nous avons vu, de nos jours, des 
 nations de tout temps rivales et meme ennemies marcher 
 sous les memes bannieres ; mais ce sont des cas qui 
 arrivent rarement, et qui ne serviront jamais d'exemples. 
 Ces sortes de liaisons ne peuvent etre que momentanees, 
 au lieu que le genre des autres, contractees par un interet 
 commun, pent seul etre durable. Dans la situation ou 
 I'Europe est de nos jours, ou tous les princes sont armes, 
 parmi lesquels il s'eleve des puissances preponderantes 
 capables d'ecraser les faibles, la prudence exige qu'on 
 s'allie avec d'autres puissances, soit pour s'assurer des 
 
256 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 secours en cas d'attaque, soit pour reprimer les projets 
 dangereux de ses ennemis, soit pour soutenir, a I'aide de 
 ces allies, de justes pretentions contre ceux qui voudraient 
 s'y opposer. Mais ceci ne suffit pas ; il faut avoir chez 
 ses voisins, surtout chez ses ennemis, des yeux et des oreilles 
 ouverts, qui rapportent fidelement ce qu'ils ont vu et 
 entendu. Les hommes sont mechants ; il faut se garder 
 surtout d'etre surpris, parce que tout ce qui surprend effraye 
 et decontenance, ce qui n'arrive jamais quand on est 
 prepare, quelque facheux que soit I'evenement auquel on 
 doit s'attendre. La politique europeenne est si fallacieuse, 
 que le plus avise pent devenir dupe, s'il n'est pas toujours 
 alert e et sur ses gardes. 
 
 Le systeme militaire doit etre egalement assis sur de 
 bons principes qui soient surs et reconnus par I'experience. 
 On doit connaitre le genie de la nation, de quoi elle est 
 capable, et jusqu'ou Ton ose risquer ses enterprises en la 
 menant a I'ennemi. Dans nos temps, il nous est interdit 
 d 'employer a la guerre les usages des Grecs et des Komains. 
 La decouverte de la poudre a canon a change entierement 
 la fagon de faire la guerre. Maintenant c'est la superiorite 
 du feu qui decide de la victoire ; les exercices, les reglements 
 et la tactique ont ete refondus pour les conformer a cet 
 usage, et recemment, I'abus enorme des nombreuses artil- 
 leries qui appesantissent les armees nous force egalement 
 d'adopter cette mode, tant pour nous soutenir dans nos 
 postes que pour attaquer I'ennemi dans ceux qu'il occupe, 
 au cas que d'importantes raisons I'exigent. Tant de raffine- 
 ments nouveaux ont done si fort change I'art de la guerre 
 que ce serait de nos jours une temerite impardonnable a 
 un general, en imitant les Turenne, les Conde, les Luxem- 
 bourg, de risquer une bataille en suivant les dispositions 
 que ces grands generaux ont faites de leur temps. Alors 
 les victoires se remportaient par la valeur et par la force ; 
 maintenant I'artillerie decide de tout ; et I'habilete du 
 general consiste a faire approcher ses troupes de I'ennemi 
 
LES DEVOIKS DES SOUVEEAINS 257 
 
 sans qu'elles soient detruites avant de commencer a I'attaquer. 
 Pour se procurer cet avantage, il faut qu'il fasse taire le 
 feu de Tennemi par la superiorite de celui qu'il lui oppose. 
 Mais ce qui restera etemellement stable dans I'art militaire, 
 c'est la castrametrie, ou I'art de tirer le plus grand parti 
 possible d'un terrain pour son avantage. Si de nouvelles 
 decouvertes se font encore, ce sera une necessite que les 
 generaux de ces temps-la se pretent h ces nouveautes, et 
 changent a notre tactique ce qui exige correction. 
 
 II est des fitats qui, par leur local et par leur constitu- 
 tion, doivent etre des puissances maritimes ; tels sont 
 I'Angleterre, la HoUande, la France, I'Espagne, le Danemark : 
 ils sont environnes de la mer, et les colonies eloignees 
 qu'ils poss^dent leur prescrivent d 'avoir des vaisseaux 
 pour entretenir la communication et le commerce entre 
 la mere patrie et ces membres detaches. II est d'autres 
 Etats, comme I'Autriche, la Pologne, la Prusse et meme 
 la Eussie, dont les uns pourraient se passer de marine, et 
 les autres commettraient une faute impardonnable en 
 politique, s'ils divisaient leurs forces en voulant employer 
 sur mer des troupes dont ils ont un besoin indispensable 
 sur terre. Le nombre des troupes qu'un Etat entretient 
 doit etre en proportion des troupes qu'ont ses ennemis ; 
 il faut qu'il se trouve en meme force, ou le plus faible risque 
 de succomber. On object era peut-etre que le prince doit 
 compter sur les secours de ses allies. Cela serait bon, si 
 les allies etaient tels qu'ils devaient etre ; mais leur zele 
 n'est que tiedeur, et Ton se trompe a coup sur, si Ton compte 
 sur d'autres que sur soi-meme. Si la situation des frontieres 
 est susceptible d'etre defendue par des forteresses, il ne 
 faut rien negUger pour en construire, et ne rien epargner 
 pour les perfectionner. La France en a donne I'exemple, 
 et elle en a senti I'a vantage en differ entes occasions. 
 
 Mais ni la politique ni le miHtaire ne peuvent prosperer, 
 si les finances ne sont pas entretenues dans le plus grand 
 ordre, et si le prince lui-meme n'est econome et prudent* 
 
 8 
 
268 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 L'argent est comme la baguette des enchanteurs, par le 
 moyen de laquelle ils operaient des miracles. Les grandes 
 vues politiques, I'entretien du militaire, les meilleures 
 intentions pour le soulagement des peuples, tout cela demeure 
 engourdi, si I'argent ne le vivifie. L'economie du souverain 
 est d'autant plus utile pour le bien public, que s'il ne 
 se trouve pas avoir des fonds sufi&sants en reserve soit 
 pour fournir aux frais de la guerre sans charger ses peuples 
 d'imp6ts extraordinaires, soit pour secourir les citoyens 
 dans des calamites publiques, toutes ces charges tombent 
 sur les sujets, qui se trouvent sans ressource dans des temps 
 malheureux ou ils ont si grand besoin d'assistance. Aucun 
 gouvemement ne pent se passer d'impdts ; soit republicain 
 soit monarchique il en a un egal besoin. II faut bien que 
 le magistrat charge de toute la besogne publique ait de 
 quoi vivre que les juges soient payes, pour les empecher 
 de prevariquer, que le soldat soit entretenu, afin qu'il ne 
 commette point de violences faute d'avoir de quoi sub- 
 sister ; il faut de meme que les personnes preposees au 
 maniement des finances soient assez bien payees pour que 
 le besoin ne les oblige pas d'administrer infidelement les 
 deniers publics. Ces differentes depenses demandent des 
 sommes considerables ; ajoutez-y encore quelque argent 
 mis annuellement de c6te pour les cas extraordinaires : 
 voila cependant ce qui doit etre necessairement pris sur 
 le peuple. Le grand art consiste a lever ces fonds sans 
 fouler les citoyens. Pour que les taxes soient egales et non 
 arbitraires, Ton fait des cadastres, qui, s'ils sont classifies 
 avec exactitude, proportionnent les charges selon les moyens 
 des individus ; cela est si necessaire, qu'une faute im- 
 pardonnable en finance serait si les imp6ts, maladroitement 
 repartis, degoutaient Tagriculteur de ses travaux ; il 
 doit, ayant acquitte ses droits, pouvoir encore vivre avee 
 une certaine aisance, lui et sa famille. Bien loin d'opprimer 
 les peres nourriciers de I'Etat, il faut les encourager a bien 
 Qultiver leurs terres ; c'est en quoi consiste la veritable 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 259 
 
 richesse du pays. La terre foumit les comestibles les plus 
 necessaires, et ceux qui la travaillent sont, comme nous 
 I'avons deja dit, les vrais peres nourriciers de la societe. 
 
 On m'opposera peut-etre que la Hollande subsiste 
 sans que ses champs lui rapportent la centieme partie 
 de ce qu'elle consume. Je reponds a cette objection que 
 c'est un petit Etat, chez lequel le commerce supplee k 
 I'agriculture ; mais plus un gouvernement est vaste, plus 
 I'economie rurale a besoin d'etre encouragee. 
 
 Une autre espece d'impdts qu'on leve sur les 
 villes, ce sont les accises. Elles veulent etre maniees avec 
 des mains adroites, pour ne point charger les comesti- 
 bles les plus necessaires k la vie, comme le pain, la petite 
 biere, la viande, &c., ce qui retomberait sur les soldats, 
 sur les ouvriers et sur les artisans ; d'ou il s'ensuivrait, 
 pour le malheur du peuple, que la main-d'ceuvre rehausserait 
 de prix ; par consequent les marchandises deviendraient 
 si cheres, qu'on en perdrait le debit etranger. C'est ce 
 qui arrive maintenant en Hollande et en Angleterre. Ces 
 deux nations, ayant contracte des dettes immenses dans 
 les dernieres guerres, ont cree de nouveaux impdts pour 
 en payer le dividende, mais comme leur mala dr esse en a 
 charge la main-d'ceuvre, ils ont presque ecrase leurs manu- 
 factures. De la, la cherte en Hollande etant augmentee, 
 ces republicains font fabriquer leurs draps k Verviers et k 
 Liege, et I'Angleterre a perdu un debit considerable de ces 
 laines en Allemagne. Pour obvier a ces abus, le souverain 
 doit souvent se souvenir de Tetat du pauvre peuple, se 
 mettre a la place d'un paysan et d'un manufacturier, et 
 se dire alors : Si j'etais ne dans la classe de ces citoyens 
 dont les bras sont le capital, que desirerais-je du souverain ? 
 Ce que le bon sens alors lui indiquera, son devoir est de 
 le mettre en pratique. II se trouve des provinces, dans 
 la plupart des Etats de I'Europe, ou les paysans, attaches 
 S. la glebe, sont serfs de leurs gentilshommes ; c'est de 
 toutes les conditions la plus malheureuse et celle qui revolte 
 
260 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 le plus rhumanite. Assurement aucun homme n'est n6 
 pour etre Fesclave de son semblable ; on deteste avec raison 
 un pareil abus, et Ton croit qu'il ne faudrait que vouloir 
 pour abolir cette coutume barbare ; mais il n'en est pas 
 ainsi, elle tient a d'anciens contrats faits entre les possesseurs 
 des terres et les colons. L 'agriculture est arrangee en conse- 
 quence des services des paysans ; en voulant abolir tout d'un 
 coup cette abominable gestion, on bouleverserait entiere- 
 ment I'economie des terres, et il faudrait en partie indemniser 
 la noblesse des pertes qu'elle souffrirait en ses revenus. 
 
 Ensuite s'offre I'article des manufactures et du commerce, 
 non moins important. Pour qu'un pays se conserve dans 
 une situation florissante, il est de toute necessite que la 
 balance du commerce lui soit avantageuse ; s'il paye plus 
 pour les importations qu'il ne gagne par les exportations, 
 il faut necessairement qu'il s'appauvrisse d'annee en annee. 
 Qu'on se figure un bourse ou il y a cent ducats : tirez-en 
 journellement un, et n'y remettez rien, vous conviendrez 
 qu'au bout de cent jours la bourse sera vide. Voici les 
 moyens d'obvier k cette perte : faire manufacturer toutes 
 les premieres matieres qu'on possede, faire travailler les 
 matieres etrangeres pour y gagner la main-d'ceuvre et tra- 
 vailler a bon marche pour se procurer de debit etranger. 
 Quant au commerce, il roule sur trois points : sur le superflu 
 de vos denrees, que vous exportez ; sur celles de vos voisins, 
 qui vous enrichissent en les vendant ; et sur les marchan- 
 dises etrangeres que vos besoins exigent et que vous im- 
 portez. C'est sur ces productions que nous venons 
 d'indiquer que doit se regler le commerce d'un fitat ; voila de 
 quoi il est susceptible par la nature des choses. L'Angleterre, 
 la Hollande, la France, I'Espagne, le Portugal, ont des 
 possessions aux deux Indes et des ressources plus etendues 
 pour leur marine marchande que les autres royaumes ; 
 profiter des avantages qu'on a, et ne rien entreprendre 
 au dela de ses forces, c'est le conseil de la sagesse. 
 
 II nous reste h, parler des moyens les plus propres pour 
 
 i 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 261 
 
 maintenir invariablement I'abondance des vivres, dont la 
 societe a un besoin indispensable pour demeurer florissante. 
 La premiere chose est d'avoir soin de la bonne culture des 
 terres, de defricher tous les terrains qui sont capables de 
 rapport, d'augmenter les troupeaux pour gagner d'autant 
 plus de lait, de beurre, de fromage et d'engrais ; d'avoir 
 ensuite un releve exact de la quantite de boisseaux des 
 differentes especes de grains gagnes dans de bonnes, dans 
 de mediocres et dans de mauvaises annees ; d'en decompter 
 la consommation, et, par ce resultat, de s'instruire de ce 
 qu'il y a de superflu, dont Fexportation doit etre permise, 
 ou de ce qui manque a la consommation, et que le besoin 
 demande qu'on se procure. Tout souverain attache au 
 bien pubhc est oblige de se pourvoir de magasins abondam- 
 ment fournis, pour suppleer a la mauvaise recolte et pour 
 prevenir la famine. Nous avons vu en AUemagne dans les 
 mauvaises annees de 1771 et de 1772, les malheurs que 
 la Saxe et les provinces de I'Empire ont soufferts, parce 
 que cette precaution si utile avait ete negligee. Le peuple 
 broyait I'ecorce des chenes, qui lui servait d'aliment. Cette 
 miserable nourriture accelera sa mort ; nombre de families 
 ont peri sans secours ; c'etait une desolation universelle. 
 D'autres, pales, blemes et decharnes, se sont expatries pour 
 chercher des secours ailleurs ; leur vue excitait la compassion, 
 un coeur d'airain y aurait ete sensible. Quel reproches 
 leurs magistrats ne devaient-ils pas se faire d'etre les specta- 
 teurs de ces calamites sans y pouvoir porter de remede ! 
 
 Nous passons maintenant a un autre article, aussi 
 interessant peut-etre. II est peu de pays ou les citoyens 
 aient des opinions pareilles sur la religion ; elles different 
 souvent entierement ; il en est d'autres qu'on appelle des 
 sectes. La question s'eleve alors : Faut-il que tous les 
 citoyens pensent de meme, ou peut-on permettre a chacun 
 de penser a sa guise ? Voila d'abord de sombres politiques 
 qui vous disent : Tout le monde doit etre de la meme opinion, 
 pour que rien ne divise les citoyens. Le theologien y 
 
262 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY 
 
 ajoute : Quiconque ne pense pas comme moi est damne, 
 et il ne convient pas que mon souverain soit roi des damnes ; 
 il faut done les r6tir dans ce monde, pour qu'ils prosperent 
 d'autant mieux dans I'autre. On repond a cela que jamais 
 une societe ne pensera de meme ; que chez les nations 
 chretiennes la plupart sont anthropomorphites ; que chez 
 les catholiques le grand nombre est idolatre, parce qu'on 
 ne me persuadera jamais qu'un manant sache distinguer 
 le culte de la trie et d'hyperdulie ; il adore de bonne foi 
 rimage qu'il invoque. Voila done nombre d'heretiques 
 dans toutes les sectes chretiennes ; de plus, chacun croit 
 ce qui lui parait vraisemblable. On peu contraindre par 
 violence un pauvre miserable a prononcer un certain formu- 
 laire, auquel il denie son consentement interieur ; ainsi le 
 persecuteur n'a rien gagne. Mais si Ton remonte k I'origine 
 de la societe, il est de toute evidence que le souverain n'a 
 aucun droit sur la fa^on de penser des citoyens. Ne faudrait- 
 il pas etre en demence pour se figurer que des hommes ont 
 dit k un homme leur semblable : Nous vous elevons au-dessus 
 de nous, parce que nous aimons a etre esclaves, et nous vous 
 donnons la puissance de diriger nos pensees a votre volonte ? 
 lis ont dit au contraire : Nous avons besoin de vous pour 
 maintenir les lois auxquelles nous voulons obeir, pour nous 
 gouverner sagement, pour nous defendre ; du reste, nous 
 exigeons de vous que vous respectiez notre hberte. Voila 
 la sentence prononcee, elle est sans appel, et meme cette 
 tolerance est si avantageuse aux societes ou elle est etablie 
 qu'elle fait le bonheur de I'Etat. Des que tout culte est 
 libre, tout le monde est tranquille ; au lieu que la persecution 
 a donne lieu aux guerres civiles les plus sanglantes, les 
 plus longues et les plus destructives. Le moindre mal 
 qu'attire la persecution est de faire emigrer les persecutes ; 
 la France a eu des provinces dont la population a souffert, 
 et qui se ressentent encore de la revocation de I'edit de 
 Nantes. 
 
 Ce sont la, en general, les devoirs qu'un prince doit 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 263 
 
 remplir. Afin qu'il ne s'en ecarte jamais, il doit se rappeler 
 souvent qu'il est homme comme le moindre de ses sujets ; 
 s'il est le premier juge, le premier general, le premier financier, 
 le premier ministre de la societe, ce n'est pas pour qu'il 
 represente, mais afin qu'il en remplisse les devoirs. II n'est 
 que le premier serviteur de I'Etat, oblige d'agir avec probite, 
 avec sagesse et avec un entier desinteressement, comme 
 si a chaque moment il devait rendre compte de son ad- 
 ministration a ses citoyens. Ainsi il est coupable s'il 
 prodigue I'argent du peuple, le produit des impdts, en 
 luxe, en faste, en debauches, lui qui doit veiller aux bonnes 
 mcBurs qui sont les gardiennes des lois, qui doit perfectionner 
 I'education nationale, et non la pervertir par de mauvais 
 exemples. C'est un objet des plus importants que la 
 conservation des bonnes moeurs dans leur integrite ; le 
 souverain pent y contribuer beaucoup en distinguant 
 et recompensant les citoyens qui ont fait des actions ver- 
 tueuses, en temoignant du mepris pour ceux dont la de- 
 pravation ne rougit plus de ses dereglements. Le prince 
 doit desapprouver hautement toute action deshonnete, 
 et refuser des distinctions a ceux qui sont incorrigibles. 
 II est encore un objet interessant qu'il ne faut pas perdre 
 de vue et qui, s'il etait neglige, porter ait un prejudice 
 irreparable aux bonnes moeurs ; c'est quand le prince 
 distingue trop des personnes qui, sans merite, possedent 
 de grandes richesses. Ces honneurs prodigues mal a propos 
 confirment le public dans le prejuge vulgaire qu'il suffit 
 d'avoir du bien pour etre considere. Des lors I'interet et 
 la cupidite secouent le frein qui les retenait ; chacun veut 
 accumuler des richesses ; on emploie les voies les plus 
 iniques pour les acquerir ; la corruption gagne, elle s'enracine, 
 elle devient generale ; les hommes a talents, les hommes 
 vertueux sont meprises, et le public n'honore que ces batards 
 de Midas dont la grande depense et le faste I'eblouissent. 
 Pour empecher que les mceurs nationales ne se pervertissent 
 jusqu'4 cet horrible exc^s, le prince doit etre sans cesse 
 
264 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 attentif a ne distinguer que le merite personnel et a ne 
 temoigner que du mepris pour I'opulence sans moeurs et 
 sans vertus. Au reste, comme le souverain est proprement 
 le chef d'une famille de citoyens, le pere de ses peuples, 
 dans toutes les occasions il doit servir de dernier refuge 
 aux malheureux, tenir lieu de pere aux orphelins, secourir 
 les veuves, avoir des entrailles pour le dernier miserable 
 comme pour le premier courtisan, et repandre des liberalites 
 sur ceux qui, prives de tout secours, ne peuvent trouver 
 d'assistance que par ses bienfaits. 
 
 Voila, selon les principes que nous avons etablis au 
 commencement de cet essai, I'idee exacte qu'on doit se 
 former des devoirs d'un souverain et de la seule maniere 
 qui peut rendre bon et avantageux le gouvernement monar- 
 chique. Si bien des princes ont une conduite differente, il 
 faut I'attribuer au peu de reflexion qu'ils ont fait sur leur 
 institution et sur les devoirs qui en derivent. lis ont porte 
 une charge dont ils ont meconnu le poids et I'importance, 
 ils se sont fourvoyes faute de connaissances, car dans nos 
 temps Fignorance fait commettre plus de fautes que la 
 mechancete. Cette esquisse de souverain paraitra peut- 
 etre aux censeurs I'archetype des stoiciens, I'idee de sage 
 qu'ils avaient imagine, qui n'exista jamais, et dont le seul 
 Marc-Aur^le approcha le plus pres. Nous souhaitons 
 que ce faible essai soit capable de former des Marc-Aureles ; 
 ce serait la plus belle recompense a la quelle nous puissions 
 nous attendre, et qui ferait en meme temps le bien de 
 I'humanite. Nous devons cependant ajouter a ceci qu'un 
 prince qui fournirait la carriere laborieuse que nous avons 
 tracee ne parviendrait pas a une perfection entiere, parce 
 qu'avec toute la bonne volonte possible, il pourrait se 
 tromper dans le choix de ceux qu'il emploierait a I'adminis- 
 tration des affaires ; parce qu'on pourrait lui representer 
 les choses sous un faux jour ; que ses ordres ne seraient 
 pas executes ponctuellement ; qu'on voilerait des iniquites 
 de fagon qu'elles ne parviendraient pas a sa connaissance ; 
 
LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 265 
 
 que des employes durs et entiers mettraient trop de rigueur 
 et de hauteur dans leur gestion ; enfin, parce que, dans un 
 pays etendu, le prince ne saurait etre partout. Tel est 
 done et sera le destin des choses d'ici-bas, que jamais 
 on n'atteindra au degre de perfection qu'exige le bonheur 
 des peuples, et qu'en fait de gouvemement, comme pour 
 toute autre chose, il faudra se contenter de ce qui est le 
 moins defectueux. 
 
CHAPTEK XII 
 
 INSTRUCTION AU MAJOR BORCKB (1751) 
 
 Jb vous confie 1' education de mon neveu, I'heritier pre- 
 somptif de la couronne ; et comme il est tres-different de 
 bien elever un particulier, ou celui qui est destine a gouverner 
 des Etats, je vous donne ici une instruction sur toutes 
 les choses que vous devez observer. 
 
 1°. Touchant les maitres : 
 
 II faut que mon neveu parcoure I'histoire ancienne, 
 qu'il sache les diiferentes monarchies qui se sont succede, 
 de I'histoire grecque surtout ce qui se passa dans la guerre 
 d'Artaxerce, de Philippe et d'AIexandre, dans I'histoire 
 romaine, le temps des guerres puniques et de Cesar. II 
 ne faut point lui fatiguer la memoire par les noms des 
 princes qui se sont succede, pourvu qu'il sache ceux des 
 hommes illustres qui ont joue un grand r61e dans leur 
 patrie. 
 
 II ne suffit pas de lui apprendre I'histoire comme k 
 un perroquet ; le grand usage des faits anciens est de les 
 comparer aux modernes, de developper les causes qui ont 
 produit des revolutions, de montrer comme pour Fordinaire 
 le vice est puni et la vertu recompensee. II faut, de plus, 
 lui faire remarquer que les historiens anciens ne sont pas 
 toujours veridiques, et qu'il faut examiner et juger avant 
 de croire. La partie de I'histoire la plus essentielle et 
 la plus indispensable, c'est celle qui prend a Charlemagne 
 et qui finit k nos jours ; j'entends par histoire celle de 
 
 266 
 
INSTRUCTION AU MAJOR BORCKE 267 
 
 TEurope. II la lui faut faire etudier avec soin, ne s'attacher 
 qu'aux faits principaux, et n'entrer dans un plus grand 
 detail qu'a la guerre de trente ans. Qu'il apprenne 
 I'histoire de sa maison, cela va sans dire. 
 
 En apprenant la geographie, il est necessaire de lui 
 donner une idee des etats et de leur gouvemement ; et 
 comme cette etude va tres bien avec celle de I'histoire, 
 on peut, en lui enseignant Tune, lui apprendre I'autre en 
 meme temps. 
 
 Dans quelque temps on pourra lui faire un petit cours 
 de logique depouille de toute pedanterie, et autant qu'il 
 en faut pour qu'il disceme de lui-meme le point faux 
 d'un raisonnement et en quoi ime proposition n'est pas 
 juste. Ensuite on pourra lui faire lire les orateurs, Ciceron, 
 Demos thene, quelques tragedies de Racine, &c. 
 
 Quand il aura quelques annees de plus, on pourra lui 
 donner un abrege des opinions des philosophes et des 
 differentes religions, sans lui inspirer de haine pour aucune, 
 en lui faisant voir qu'elles adorent toutes Dieu, mais par 
 des moyens differents. II ne faut pas qu'il ait trop de 
 consideration pour le pretre qui I'instruit, et il faut qu'il 
 ne croie les choses qu'apres les avoir examinees. 
 
 J'en reviens a la religion catholique. EUe est assez 
 etendue en Silesie, dans les duches de Cleves et ailleurs. 
 Si cet enfant devenait calviniste fanatique, tout serait 
 perdu. II est tres-necessaire d'empecher meme le pretre 
 de dire devotement des injures aux papistes ; mais le 
 gouverneur doit adroitement faire sentir k son eleve que 
 rien n'est plus dangereux que lorsque les catholiques ont 
 le dessus dans im pays, par rapport aux persecutions, a 
 I'ambition des papes, et qu'un prince protestant est bien 
 plus le maitre chez lui qu'un prince catholique. 
 
 II s'entend de soi-meme que mon neveu apprenne ^ 
 lire, k ecrire, ^ compter ; ainsi je passe ces articles sous 
 silence. II est trop jeune pour apprendre les fortifications, 
 il en sera temps quand il aura dix ou onze ans. 
 
268 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY 
 
 Les exercices comme danser, faire les armes et monter 
 h cheval peuvent s'apprendre I'apres-midi, dans le temps 
 de la digestion. Si Fenfant avait envie d'apprendre le 
 latin, le polonais ou I'italien, il ne dependra que de lui ; 
 mais s'il n'y marque pas d'inclination, il ne faut pas le 
 presser la-dessus, de meme que la musique. 
 
 Voici pour ses etudes et ses exercices. Votre grand art 
 sera de lui faire le tout avec plaisir, de bannir la pedanterie 
 de ces etudes et de lui en faire venir le gout ; c'est pourquoi, 
 au commencement surtout, il ne faut pas charger la dose. 
 
 Nous en venons a present a la plus grande et essentielle 
 partie de I'education, qui est celle des moeurs. Ni vous 
 ni toutes les puissances de I'univers ne sauraient changer 
 le caractere d'un enfant ; tout ce que peut I'education, 
 c'est de moderer la violence des passions. Traitez mon 
 neveu comme un particulier qui doit faire sa fortune ; 
 dites-lui que s'il a des defauts, ou s'il n'apprend rien, il 
 sera meprise de tout le monde. Citez lui I'exemple du 
 M. de Schwedt et de Henri. II ne faut point lui mettre 
 du vent en tete, et I'elever tout simplement. Qu'il soit 
 obligeant en vers tout le monde, et que s'il fait une grossierete 
 a quelqu'un, que celui-la la lui rende sur-le-champ. Qu'il 
 apprenne que tous les hommes sont egaux, et que la naissance 
 n'est qu'une chimere, si elle n'est pas soutenue par le merite. 
 Laissez-le parler tout seul avec tout le monde, pour qu'il 
 devienne hardi. Qu'importe qu'il parle de tort et travers ? 
 On salt que c'est un enfant, et, dans toute son education, 
 faites, autant qu'il sera en vous, qu'il agisse par lui-meme, 
 et qu'il ne s'accoutume point a se laisser mener ; que ses 
 sottises soient a lui, de meme que les bonnes choses qu'il 
 fera. 
 
 II est d'une tres-grande importance de lui inspirer du 
 gout pour le militaire ; pour cette raison il faut dans toutes 
 les occasions lui dire tant vous-meme que de lui faire dire 
 par d'autres que tout homme de naissance qui n'est pas 
 soldat n'est qu'un miserable. H faut le mener tant qu'il 
 
INSTEUCTION AU MAJOE BOKCKE 269 
 
 veut voir des troupes. On peut lui montrer les cadets 
 et en faire venir avec le temps cinq ou six chez lui faire 
 Texercice ; que cela soit un amusement et non pas un 
 devoir, car le grand art est de lui donner du gout pour ce 
 metier, et ce sera^'t tout perdre que de I'ennuyer ou de le 
 rebuter. Qu'il parle a tout le monde, a un cadet, a un 
 soldat, h un bourgeois, a un officier, pour qu'il devienne 
 hardi. 
 
 Qu'on lui inspire surtout de Fattachement pour ce pays, 
 et que personne ne lui tienne des discours que de bon patriote ; 
 et sur toute sorte de sujets et de discours on peut y glisser 
 quelques reflexions de morale, qui tendent a lui precher 
 I'humanite, la bonte et les sentiments qu'il convient a un 
 homme d'honneur et surtout a un prince d'avoir. 
 
 Je veux que, quand il sera plus age, il commence a 
 faire le service de lieutenant, pour qu'il passe tout les 
 grades ; ainsi il ne faut point lui mettre du vent dans la 
 tete. Que les officiers qui dinent avec lui I'attaquent et 
 I'agacent pour le rendre hardi et gai, et qu'il voie le plus 
 de monde que se pourra. Dans ses heures de recreation, 
 s'il a en vie de voir des enfant s de son age, cela ne fera pas 
 de mal ; il est un peu tacitume, et il est tres-necessaire de 
 I'eveiller ; c'est pourquoi vous vous appliquerez a le rendre 
 le plus gai que possible. Dans toutes les occasions vous 
 aurez grande attention a lui inculquer le respect et I'amour 
 qu'il doit a son pere, a sa mere, et la deference envers 
 ses parents. Quand vous le connaitrez davantage il faudra 
 voir quelle sera sa passion. Dieu nous garde de la detruire ! 
 mais travaillons a la moderer. Quand il est dans son 
 particulier, qu'il ne fasse jamais des choses sans en rendre 
 raison, a moins que ce ne soit dans ses heures de recreation. 
 S'il est souple, soyez doux, s'il est retif, donnez-vous toute 
 I'autorite qu'il vous convient, punissez-le en lui dtant 
 I'epee, en le mettant aux arrets, et, tant qu'il se peut, en 
 le piquant d'honneur ; jusqu'^ present il parait fort doux, 
 mais avec I'age il se developpera davantage. 
 
270 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY 
 
 Vous rendrez toutes les semaines compte de sa conduite 
 au pere, et a moi tous les mois. S'il y a quelque cas ex- 
 traordinaire, vous pourrez toujours recourrir a moi. Ne le 
 rendez pas timide par de trop grands menagements pour 
 sa sante, ou par crainte que malheur n'arrive. II faut 
 avoir un grand soin de lui, mais il ne faut pas qu'il s'en 
 aper9oive, cela le rendrait douillet, timide et pusillanime. 
 Mon frere pourra regler ses heures comme il le jugera a 
 propos, et vous pourrez prendre vos mesures la-dessus. 
 
 Cette instruction n'est bonne que jusqu'a I'age de dix 
 a douze ans, ou il vous en faudra une autre proportionnee 
 aux progres de mon neveu, a son age et aux circonstances. 
 
 Fait a Potsdam, ce 24 Septembre 1751. 
 
 {Signi) Fbbdbric. 
 
CHAPTEE XIII 
 
 AU MINISTEE d'eTAT, COMTB DE FINCKENSTBIN, A BERLIN 
 
 Instruction SecrJ^tb pour lb Comtb db Finck 
 
 Berlin, 10 Janvier 1767; 
 
 Dans la situation critique ou se trouvent nos affaires, je 
 dois vous dormer mes ordres, pour que, dans tous les cas 
 malheureux qui sont dans la possibilite des evenements, 
 vous soyez autorise aux partis qu'il faut prendre. 
 
 S'il arrivait — de quoi le Ciel preserve ! — qu'une de mes 
 armees en Saxe fut totalement battue, ou bien que les 
 Fran9ais chassassent les Hanoveriens de leur pays et s'y 
 etablissent et nous inena9assent d'une invasion dans la 
 Vieille-Marche,ou que les Busses penetrassent par laNouveDe- 
 Marche, il faut sauver la famille royale, les principaux 
 dicasteres, les ministres et le directoire. Si nous sommes 
 battus en Saxe du c6te de Leipzig, le lieu le plus propre pour 
 le transport de la famille et du tresor est k Ciistrin ; il 
 faut, en ce cas, que la famille royale et tous ci-dessus nommes 
 aillent, escortes de toute la gamison, a Ciistrin. Si les Busses 
 entraient par la Nouvelle-Marche, ou qu'il nous arrivat 
 un malheur en Lusace, il faudrait que tout se transportat 
 4 Magdebourg. Enfin, le dernier refuge est a Stettin ; mais 
 il ne faut y aller qu'^ la demiere extremite. La gamison, 
 la famille royale et le tresor sont inseparables et vont 
 toujours ensemble ; il faut y ajouter les diamants de la 
 couronne et I'argenterie des grands apartements, qui en 
 
 271 
 
272 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEBMANY 
 
 pareil cas, ainsi que la vaisselle d'or, doit etre incontinent 
 monnayee. 
 
 S*il arrivait que je fusse tue, il faut que les affaires 
 continuant leur train sans la moindre alteration et sans 
 qu'on s'aper^oive qu'elles sont en d'autres mains ; et en 
 ce cas il faut hater serments et hommages, tant ici qu'en 
 Prusse, et surtout en Silesie. 
 
 Si j'avais la fatalite d'etre pris prisonnier par Tennemi, 
 je defends qu*on ait le moindre egard pour ma personne, 
 ni qu'on fasse la moindre reflexion sur ce que je pourrais 
 ecrire de ma detention. Si pareil malheur m'arrivait, je 
 veux me sacrifier pour I'Etat, et il faut qu'on obeisse 4 
 mon frere, lequel, ainsi que tous mes ministres et generaux, 
 me repondront de leur tete qu'on n'offrira ni province ni 
 ran^on pour moi, et que Ton continuera la guerre, en poussant 
 ses avantages tout comme si je n'avais jamais existe dans 
 le monde. 
 
 J'espere et je dois croire que vous, comte Finck, n'aurez 
 pas besoin de faire usage de cette instruction ; mais, en 
 cas de malheur, je vous autorise ^I'employer, et, marque que 
 c'est, apres une mure et saine deliberation, ma ferme et 
 constant e volonte, je la signe de ma main, et la munis de 
 mon cachet. 
 
 Fr6d6ric, E. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Note. — ^The letter ' f ' following a page number signifies ' and following 
 page ' ; ' ff ' ' and following pages.' 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Absolutism, Monarchical, condemned by Bismarck . . . .119 fE 
 
 Agriculture, Promotion of 18, 21, 45 ff, 63 
 
 Albania 180 
 
 Alliance, Triple — See Triple Alliance. 
 
 Alliances, Frederick the Great's views regarding binding force of 
 
 22, 35, 68, 85 £E 
 
 Amateurs, Danger of Government by 32 ff, 39 fE 
 
 Anglophobia in Grermany, principally caused by William II according 
 
 to Bismarck .......... 142 
 
 Anti-Machiavel 65 fi 
 
 Aristocracy — See Nobility. 
 
 Army, Danger of management of, by amateurs . . . . 32 fE 
 
 „ German, and the General Staff ..... .168 ff 
 
 „ Grerman, Discipline of . . . . . . . 33 f 
 
 „ Frederick the Great's principles relating to the . . . 31 ff 
 „ Prussian, Increase of . . . . . . . 10 ff. Ill 
 
 Austria-Hungary and Serbia. . . . . . . .180 ff 
 
 „ „ Bismarck foretells likelihood of Germany getting 
 
 entangled in the Balkan through . . . 134 
 „ „ Bismarck's poUcy towards 
 
 112, 114, 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff 
 
 „ „ Position of, in 1740 72 ff 
 
 „ • „ Possibility of her attacking Germany outlined by 
 
 Bismarck 106 f, 134 
 
 „ „ tried in 1914 to avoid war at last moment . . 195 
 
 „ „ Ultimatum of, in 1914 184 
 
 „ „ war with Prussia in 1866 ..... Ill f 
 
 „ „ was the tool of William II in 1914 . . .185 ff 
 
 B 
 
 Balance of Power, European, Frederick the Great's advocacy of . 69 f 
 Balkan problems, Bismarck's policy towards . . 129 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff 
 
 Balkan Wars, First and Second 180 f 
 
 Beggars and idlers. Treatment of, in Prussia . . . . .164 ff 
 
 Bismarck and Napoleon III in Franco-German War . . . 174 f 
 
 „ Career and achievements of . . . . . .109 ff 
 
 „ Colonial policy of 139 ff 
 
 273 T 
 
274 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 PAGB 
 
 . 115 
 . 114 
 .124 f 
 .119 fiE 
 . 145 
 .123 ff 
 .126 ff 
 . 141 
 . 119 
 . 142 
 . 124 
 
 Bismarck concludes Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia 
 
 concludes Triple Alliance . . . , 
 
 condemns * Machtpolitik ' . . . . 
 
 condemns monarchical absolutism . 
 condemns policy of prestige .... 
 
 condemns unceasing interference of William II 
 condemns wars of prestige and prevention 
 considers conflict with England unthinkable . 
 contrasts character of WiUiam I with that of William II 
 describes William II as the principal Anglophobe 
 desires counterpoise to Emperor in Federal Council . 
 
 „ „ „ in free Press and Parlia- 
 
 ment . . .121 £E 
 desires Grermany to follow a policy of peace and modera- 
 tion . . . . . . . 117 f, 124fE 
 
 desires good relations with Great Britain . . . 139 fi 
 
 desires responsibility of Ministers in Grermany . . . 122 f 
 
 foretells breakdown of Triple Alliance . . 133, 138 f, 142 f 
 foretells Italy's secession from Triple Alliance 138 f, 142 f, 144 f 
 foretells that Austria may turn against Germany . 106, 134 
 foretells that Germany wiU get into Austria's leading- 
 strings ......... 134 
 
 foretells trouble with England 
 
 foretells trouble with Japan .... 
 
 largely increases Prussian Army 
 
 makes Germany a rich industrial State . 
 
 makes war upon Austria .... 
 
 makes war upon Denmark .... 
 
 makes war upon France .... 
 
 on possibility of Austria attacking Germany . 
 Policy of ...... . 
 
 towards Austria . . 112, 114, 128 ff, 
 
 .145 ff 
 . 146 f 
 . Ill 
 . 113 
 . li2 
 . Ill 
 . 112 
 106 f, 134 
 .108 ff 
 132 ff, 136 ff 
 
 . 129 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff 
 
 . 115 
 
 . 112, 114 
 
 . 114, 138 f 
 
 . 115 
 
 115, 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff 
 
 . 115 
 
 . 110 
 
 Balkan problems 
 
 England 
 
 France . 
 
 Italy . 
 
 Roumania 
 
 Russia . 
 
 Turkey ....... 
 
 prevents William I abdicating ..... 
 
 protests against non-renewal of Re-Insurance Treaty with 
 
 Russia 130 ff 
 
 reveals existence of Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia . . 134 ff 
 states that Triple Alliance has a purely defensive character 
 and does not cover Austrian aggression in Balkan 
 
 Peninsula 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 f 
 
 „ warns Germany not to compete at sea with England . 144 f 
 „ warns Germany not to antagonise Great Britain . .139 ff 
 „ warns Germany not to antagonise Russia 
 Boer War . 
 
 Bribery and corruption practised by Frederick the Great 
 Buckingham Palace, Conference of, 1914 
 Biilow, Prince, Anti-British policy of . 
 
 35, 
 
 143 
 176 
 
 90 ff 
 
 184 
 
 176 f 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 275 
 
 Cabinet Government, Frederick the Great on 
 
 Cabinet, The, under Frederick William I 
 
 Causes of the War 
 
 Character, German, Foundations of the 
 
 Character of Prussian people, how formed 
 
 Citizen, Rights and duties of the Prussian 
 
 Civil Service, Prussian, under Frederick William I 
 
 „ „ Secret of efficiency of Prussian 
 
 Coalitions, Frederick the Great on weakness of 
 Code, Prussian, Extracts from 
 Colonial Empire, The Grerman 
 Colonial policy of Bismarck and of William II 
 Colonies, German, Future and value of the . 
 Colonising policy of Frederick the Great 
 „ „ of Frederick William I 
 
 Coronation, Cost of, under Frederick I and Frederick William 
 Corruption and bribery practised by Frederick the Great 
 
 PAGE 
 
 . 38 ff 
 . 12 f 
 .174 fE 
 .150 ff 
 . 17 ff 
 .162 ff 
 . 12 ff 
 
 43 f, 165 
 .101 ff 
 
 44, 161 ff 
 
 .212 ff 
 
 .139 ff 
 
 .212 ff 
 
 46, 50 ff 
 
 . 18 
 
 9 
 
 46, 60 fi 
 
 Democratic and Monarchical Government compared . . . 28 ff 
 Democratic Government, Frederick the Great on . . . 28 ff, 39 ff 
 Denmark and Prussia ......... Ill 
 
 Diplomacy and history. Study of, neglected in Anglo-Saxon countries 
 
 2, 59 ff, 109 
 
 Discipline is the principal cause of Germany's strength ... 3 
 
 „ Military, how enforced in Prussia . . . . . 33 f 
 
 Distinctions and rewards, Frederick the Great on . . . . 42 f 
 
 Dublin riots of 1914 186 f 
 
 E 
 
 35 ff, 47 ff, 113, 152 ff 
 
 .150 ff 
 
 .25 ff 
 
 ff, 155 ff, 
 
 Economic policy of Prusso-Germany . . 18, 
 Education, German, Foundations of 
 
 „ of princes, Frederick the Great on 
 
 „ Prussian . . . . 18 f, 55, 150 
 
 Efficiency of German Civil Service, Secret of . 
 Ems Telegram ....... 
 
 England and Turkey ...... 
 
 „ Bismarck considers hostility with, unthinkable 
 
 „ Bismarck desires good relations with 
 
 „ Bismarck values the friendship of . 
 
 „ Bismarck warns against competing with British Navy 
 
 „ Bismarck foretold danger of complications with 
 
 „ Bismarck policy towards. .... 
 
 „ Policy of, before the outbreak of the war. 
 
 „ Traditional policy of, towards Turkey 
 
 266 ff 
 , 266 ff 
 . 43 
 . 174 
 .197 ff 
 . 141 
 .139ff 
 .143 f 
 . 144 f 
 .145ff 
 . 115 
 .182 ff 
 . 209 
 t2 
 
276 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 F 
 
 PAas 
 
 Fehrbellin, Battle of 7 
 
 Finances, national, Frederick the Great on . . . . . 35 fE 
 Fink von Finkenstein, Frederick the Great's letter to . . . 24 f 
 
 Fiskalat, The 16 f 
 
 Food policy of Frederick the Great 37, 62 
 
 Foreign Office, German, was kept in ignorance of William II's war 
 
 policy 187 ff 
 
 Foreign Policy, Frederick the Great on ..... 37 
 
 France, Germany's policy towards ..... 112, 114 
 
 „ Germany's war with (1870-71) 112 
 
 Franco-German War of 1870-71, Causes of the .... 174 f 
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, and William II ... . 181 
 
 „ „ Murder of 183 
 
 Francis Joseph, Address by, in 1914 ...... 191 
 
 „ „ Timorous old man's policy of ... . 185 f 
 
 „ „ was the tool of William II 185 ft 
 
 Frederick I, King of Prussia, Character and activities of . 7 f, 62 f, 151 
 
 Frederick the Great, Agricultural policy of 45 £E 
 
 „ „ asserts that a conspiracy has been formed 
 
 against him 96 f, 100 
 
 „ „ Bribery, corruption, and espionage practised 
 
 by 90 fE 
 
 „ „ Character and activities of . . . 20 fE, 155 
 
 „ „ claimed that the Seven Years* War had been 
 
 forced upon him . . . . . 83 fE 
 „ „ Colonising policy of . . . . 46, 50 fE 
 
 „ „ condemns MachiaveUi's teachings . . . 66 fE 
 
 „ „ condemns war and praises peace . . 67, 97 fE 
 
 „ „ Economic policy of . 18, 35 fE, 47^fE, 113, 152 fE 
 
 „ „ Educational policy of . . . .65, 166 fE 
 
 „ „ ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement,' text 
 
 of 248fE 
 
 „ „ Food policy of .... 37, 46 fE, 52 
 
 „ „ ' Histoire de mon Temps,' introduction, text 
 
 of 238 fE 
 
 „ „ Industrial policy of . . . . . 48 f 
 
 „ „ ' Instructions for Major Borcke,' text of. . 266 fE 
 
 „ „ instructions if captured, defeated, or killed in 
 
 battle 24f, 271f 
 
 Matrimonial policy of . 
 
 on alliances 
 
 on Army matters . 
 
 on Battle of Kunersdorf 
 
 on Cabinet Government. 
 
 on causes of his victories 
 
 on Democratic Government 
 
 on distinctions and rewards for merit . . 42 f 
 
 on duties of kings 
 on education of princes 
 on Foreign Policy . 
 on freedom of religion 
 
 . 80 fE 
 22, 36, 68, 86 fE 
 . 31 fE 
 . 102 
 . 38 fE 
 .101 fE 
 . 28 fE 
 
 . 21 fE, 65 fE 
 . 25 fE 
 . 37 
 . 167 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 277 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Frederick the Great, on glory 71 
 
 on 'Machtpolitik'. 97 fE 
 
 on military discipline . . . . . 33 f 
 
 on national finances and financial policy. . 35 fE 
 on the necessity of unity in Government. . 38 ff 
 on taxation ....... 37 
 
 on the management of the nobility . 43, 166 
 
 on the true strength of the State ... 45 
 on weakness of coalitions .... 101 £E 
 
 ' Political Testament ' of . . . .229 flE 
 
 Reclamation policy of . . . . . 60 f 
 
 recommends acquisition of Saxony ... 81 
 
 Silesian War of 70 flE 
 
 Social policy of 163 flE 
 
 ' Testament Politique,' text of . . . 229 
 tries to corrupt Madame de Pompadour , . 92 
 Unscrupulousness and duplicity of . « 75 fE, 80 fE 
 
 Frederick William I, King of Prussia, Character and activities of 
 
 8 flE, 64, 151 flE 
 
 Frederick William, the Great Elector, Character and activities of 
 
 6 fE, 151 
 
 French refugees in Brandenburg-Prussia 6 
 
 G 
 
 General StafE and the German Army 168 £E 
 
 Glory, Frederick the Great on . . . . . . .71 
 
 Goltz, Colmar von der ........ 178 f 
 
 Government, Monarchical and Democratic compared . . 28 fE, 39 fE 
 Great Britain, Bismarck considers hostilities with, unthinkable . 141 
 
 „ and Turkey 197 fE 
 
 „ „ Bismarck desires good relations with . . . 139 fE 
 
 „ „ Bismarck values the friendship of . . . . 143 f 
 
 „ „ Bismarck warns against competing with British 
 
 Navy ........ 144 f 
 
 „ „ Bismarck's policy towards . . . . .115 
 
 „ „ Policy of, before outbreak of the war . . . 182 f 
 
 „ „ Traditional policy of, towards Turkey . . . 209 
 
 Great Elector, Character and activities of 5 fE 
 
 H 
 
 Heligoland 137 
 
 History and diplomacy. Study of, neglected in Anglo-Saxon countries 
 
 2, 59 fE, 109 
 
 Industrial policy of Bismarck . , . . . . .113 
 
 „ „ of Frederick the Great . . . . . 48 f 
 
 Insurance, National, Foundation of, by Frederick the Great . . 163 fE 
 
 Ireland, Influence of, upon outbreak of the war . . . 184, 186 f 
 
278 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Italy, Bismarck foretold probable secession of, from Triple Alliance 
 
 138 f, 142 f, 144 
 
 „ Bismarck's policy towards 114, 138 f 
 
 „ Policy of, before outbreak of the war . . , . .182 
 
 Japan, Bismarck foretold danger of complications with 
 Justice, Frederick the Great on . 
 
 . 146 f 
 55, 159 ff 
 
 King, The, is the first citizen and the first servant of the State 21 S, 65 f 
 Kings, Duties of, according to Frederick the Great 21 ff, 65 ff, 162 S. 
 Kriiger telegram .......... 176 
 
 Krupp 142 
 
 Kunersdorf, Battle of 102 
 
 Law and justice, Frederick the Great on 
 Ludewig, Professor .... 
 
 55, 159 fE 
 . 95 
 
 M 
 
 Machiavelli, Frederick the Great's condemnation of 
 ' Machtpolitik ' condemned by Bismarck 
 
 „ condemned by Frederick the Great 
 
 Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great 
 
 „ „ Frederick the Great on character of 
 
 Matrimonial policy of Frederick the Great 
 Menzel, the spy ....... 
 
 Mesopotamia, Condition of . 
 Militdr Wochenblatt incites to war in 1914 
 Ministers, Responsibility of, urged by Bismarck 
 Moderation, Policy of, recommended by Bismarck . 
 
 „ „ „ by Frederick the Great 
 
 Moltke, Field-Marshal von, and German General Staff . 
 
 99, 
 
 117 f. 
 
 56 fE 
 
 124 f 
 
 97 ff 
 
 70 ff 
 
 96 
 
 88 fE 
 
 93 fE 
 
 207 f 
 
 191 
 
 122 f 
 
 124 ff 
 
 . 99 
 
 ,169 ff 
 
 N 
 
 Napoleon III and the Franco-German War ..... 174 f 
 „ „ and William II compared. ..... 179 f 
 
 Navy BiU, German, of 1900 142, 177 
 
 Nobility, Frederick the Great on the management of the . 43, 166 
 
 Opportunities, Favourable, should be used for making war 
 Organisation, Importance of, ignored by most Englishmen *- 
 
 95, 98 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 279 
 
 PA-QB 
 
 Peace and moderation. Policy of, recommended by Bismarck 
 
 99, 117 f, 124 £E 
 
 „ „ recommended by Frederick the Great . 99 
 
 Poland 137 
 
 Policy, social, Foundations of ...... . 163 f 
 
 Pompadour, Frederick the Great's attempt to corrupt Madame de . 92 
 Population determines strength of the State . . . . 45, 48 
 
 „ Policy of Frederick the Great to increase . . . 60 fE 
 
 „ Prussian, decrease of, during Seven Years' War . . 49 
 
 Precaution, Wars of, condemned by Bismarck . . 95, 98, 117 f, 124 fE 
 
 Press, German, Anti-British activity of . . . . . 177 flE 
 
 Prestige, Policy of, condemned by Bismarck ..... 145 
 
 „ Wars of, condemned by Frederick the Great . . 95, 98 
 Princes — See Kings. 
 
 R 
 
 Reclamation policy of Frederick the Great . . . . . 50 f 
 
 „ „ of Frederick William I 18 
 
 Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia . . . . . .115 
 
 „ „ „ Bismarck protests against non- 
 
 renewal of . . . . 130 fi 
 
 „ „ „ Existence of, revealed by Bismarck 
 
 134 £E 
 
 „ „ „ not renewed by WUliam II . . 130 
 
 Religion, Freedom of . . . . . . . . .167 
 
 Republics — See Democratic Government. 
 
 Responsibility of Ministers urged by Bismarck . . . .122 f 
 
 Revenue of Brandenburg-Prussia, Increase of . . . '7, 36, 79 
 
 Rewards arid distinctions, Frederick the Great on . . . .42 
 
 Roumania, Bismarck's policy towards . . . . . .115 
 
 Rulers — See Kings. 
 
 Russia, Bismarck's policy towards . . 116, 128 fE, 132 £E, 136 ff 
 
 „ Policy of, before outbreak of the war .... 182 £E 
 
 S 
 
 Saxony, Acquisition of, recommended by Frederick the Great 
 
 „ Invasion of, by Frederick the Great . 
 Serbia and Austro -Hungary .... 
 Seven Years' War, How begun 
 
 „ „ How havoc of, was overcome 
 
 „ „ Losses in men caused by . 
 
 „ „ Terrible efEect of 
 
 „ „ Why Prussia was victorious in 
 
 Silesian War, Causes and commencement of . 
 Social policy, Foundations of . . . 
 
 Sovereigns — See Kings. 
 Spying practised by Frederick the Great 
 StafE, General, and the German Army . 
 
 81 
 
 , 82 ff 
 180 ff 
 , 82 ff 
 . 50 ff 
 . 104 
 . 49 f 
 .101 ff 
 . 70 ff 
 .163 ff 
 
 . 90 ff 
 .168 ff 
 
280 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 State, Conception and powers of, in Prussia 162 & 
 
 Statesmanship ignored at British and American Universities 2, 59 &, 109 
 Stoffel, Colonel, on Prussian General StaflE 168 fE 
 
 T 
 
 Taxation, Frederick the Great on . . . . . . .37 
 
 Tirpitz, Admiral von ......... 177 
 
 Treaties, Frederick the Great on binding force of . . 22, 36, 68, 85 
 
 Triple Alliance 114 
 
 „ „ Breakdown of, foretold by Bismarck . 133, 138 f, 142 f 
 
 „ „ Purely defensive character and limited scope of 
 
 115, 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 f 
 
 Turkey, Asiatic, Condition of 207 f 
 
 „ Bismarck's policy towards . . . . . .115 
 
 „ Frederick the Great's policy towards .... 103 
 
 „ Germany and the war ....... 196 fE 
 
 „ Great Britain's traditional policy towards .... 209 
 
 U 
 
 Unity, Frederick the Great on necessity of, in Government . . 38 fE 
 
 Universities, Anglo-Saxon, neglect history and statesmanship . 59 fE, 109 
 
 W 
 
 War, Causes of the 174 fE 
 
 Wars of prevention and prestige condemned by Bismarck 
 
 95, 98, 117 f, 124 fE 
 ^; „ „ „ „ condemned by Frederick the Great 
 
 95, 98 
 
 Weingarten, the spy 93 
 
 William I, Abdication of, prevented by Bismarck . . . .110 
 „ and William II compared by Bismarck . . . 119 
 
 William II and Archduke Francis Ferdinand . . . . .181 
 „ and William I compared by Bismarck . . . .119 
 „ Anti-British policy of ... 139 fE, 142 fE, 176 fE 
 
 „ „ „ condemned by Bismarck . .142 fE 
 
 „ Character and policy of . . 60 fE, 108 fE, 175 fE 
 
 „ Far Eastern Policy of, criticised by Bismarck . . . 146 
 
 „ is called a poUron miserable 180 
 
 „ over-ruled Bethmann Hollweg and the German Foreign 
 
 Ofl&ce 187 
 
 „ refused to renew Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia . 130 flE 
 
 „ Similarity of, with Napoleon III . . . . . 179 f 
 „ Unceasing interference of, condemned by Bismarck .123 fE 
 „ was, according to Bismarck, the principal Anglophobe in 
 
 Germany . . ..... 142 
 
 Z 
 Zanzibar 137 
 
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