W.5 
 
 1798 
 
 Cooke 
 
 Arguments for and against an 
 
 Union, between Great Britain 
 
 and Ireland
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 ARGUMENTS 
 
 FOR AND AGAINST 
 
 AN UNION, 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 
 
 CONSIDERED. 
 
 DUBLIN PRINTED : LONDON RE-PRINTED 
 
 JOK J. WRIGHT, OPPOSITE OLD BOND-STREET, 
 PICCADILLY. 
 
 DECEMBER 1798.
 
 ARGUMENTS 
 
 FOR AND AGAINST AN 
 
 UNION, % 
 
 CONSIDERED. 
 
 IT appears from a variety of circumftances, 
 that the fubject of incorporating the Iriih with 
 the Britifli Legiflature, and forming a complete 
 Union of Great Britain and Ireland, is undergo- 
 ing a dufcuffion by the leading characters of both 
 kingdoms ; and it is rumoured, that fome mea- 
 fure may be propofed upon it to the two Par- 
 liaments. 
 
 The queftion is of fuch extent and importance, 
 and applies fo warmly to all the feelings, preju- 
 dices and paffions of the human mind, that it 
 cannot fail to be univerfally debated : the only 
 fear is, that it will not be properly debated. 
 
 If it is to be decided by paflion, or by force, 
 
 there is no mifchief which the agitation of the 
 
 B queftion 
 
 1140592
 
 queftion may not produce j if it is to be deter- 
 mined on its merits, it cannot fail' to be uftfol. In 
 one cafe the rejection or adoption of it would 
 terminate in difcontent or convulfion j in the other, 
 the refult of 'conviction would produce fatisfadion. 
 
 The object of the confiderations which follow, 
 is not to give an opinion upon any Plan of Union, 
 which .may be in contemplation, but to ftate the 
 general arguments which refpect the fubject, and 
 to prove that it ought to be difcufTed with temper, 
 and that it deferves fuch a difcuffion. 
 
 Let us firft view the quefiion in the abftraft. 
 Two independent ftates, rinding their feparate ex- 
 iftence mutually inconvenient, propofe to form 
 themfelves into one ftate for their mutual benefit. 
 
 Such is the Quefiion of Union, than which no 
 queftion can be devifed mbre fit for fober and 
 philofophical argument. 
 
 Again Every independent fociety or ftate has 
 a right, confident with its exifting duties and 
 obligations, to propofe the means which appear 
 moft probable, for the attainment of the happinefs 
 of its people. 
 
 If it appears probable that fuch happinefs can 
 beft be attained by remaining in its prefent ftate, 
 
 feparate
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 feparate and independent of any other country, 
 reparation and independency ought to be main- 
 tained at all hazards. If it appears probable, that 
 fuch happinefs can beft be attained by a federal or 
 an Incorporate Union with another country, fuch 
 an Union ought to be the national object. 
 
 When the Seven United Provinces, being cruelly 
 oppretfed by the Spanifh Government, feparated 
 from that Government, in order to efcape from 
 tyranny, and to fecure liberty and happinefs, they 
 acted according to right, in declaring and eftablifh- 
 ing their Independence. 
 
 When the Sabines found they could not main- 
 tain themfelves any longer againft the Romans, 
 and faw, that by uniting with them, they had an 
 opportunity of increafmg their liberty, their hap- 
 pinefs, and their power, they acted according to 
 the principles of reafon and right, in relinquiming 
 their feparate independency as a ftate^ and by 
 their Union laid the foundation of Roman great- 
 nefs. 
 
 This reafoning and thefe instances, form a com- 
 plete anfwer to all declamation upon the common 
 topics of national dignity and national pride. 
 Were any perfon to exclaim, " who ihall dare 
 to propofe, that the independence of Ireland mail 
 be annihilated ?" I would anfwer him by another 
 
 queftion,
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 queftion If the liberty, the conveniences, the 
 happinefs, the fecurity of the people of Ireland, 
 will be improved by^an incorporation of the Irifli 
 with the Britim legiflature, fhall we not for fuch 
 advantages endeavour to procure that incorpo- 
 ration ? 
 
 England was formerly divided into feven king- 
 doms, which were continually engaged in pre- 
 datory wars with each other, and the ifland was 
 a general fcene of confufion and barbarifm. A 
 wife and fagacious prince united thefe feparate 
 kingdoms into one Empire. Did the people of 
 the Heptarchy lofe their independence by this 
 Union ? Was a Mercian degraded by becoming 
 an Englimman ? Were the people of the feven 
 nations made dependant, or were they debafed 
 and enflaved by abolilhing the local regulations 
 which divided them into feparate and hoflile fo- 
 cieties, deftru&ive of themfelves and each other, 
 and by aflbciating and uniting under one regimen, 
 one code of government, and one fovereignty ? 
 
 We might extend this reafoning, were it not 
 too obvious, both to Wales and Scotland : How 
 is a Welchman degraded by being reprefented in 
 the Britifii Parliament ? How is a Scot enflaved 
 by becoming a Briton ? 
 
 The
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 The queftion of forming an Union between 
 two countries, muft never be confufed with the 
 fubjeclion of one country to another. The latter 
 is fuppofed to be the refult of force, the former 
 of confent ; the latter is calculated to extinguifli 
 the power and independence of one of the par- 
 ties j the former by the communication of privi- 
 lege and the Union of ftrength, to increafe the 
 power and independence of both. The one is 
 therefore, never to be fubmitted to, but from 
 neceffity, the other may be the object of choice. 
 
 An Union may be compared to a partnerfhip 
 in trade. If a merchant finds, that from circum- 
 flances of fituation, want of credit or capital, he 
 cannot carry on his bufmefs alone, with advantage, 
 will he not be wife to unite himfelf, if poffible, to 
 an extenfive and wealthy firm, and to become a 
 fharer in proportion to his contribution of induftry 
 and capital, in the fecure profits of an eftablifhed 
 houfe ? 
 
 If, therefore, the meafure of forming an Union 
 between two kingdoms, whofe feparate exiftence 
 is inconvenient, is abftractedly agreeable to reafon 
 and philofophy, and if in many inftances, it has 
 been attended with advantage to the contending 
 parties, it is plainly a iiibjeft for temperate 
 difcuffion. 
 
 7 If
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 If an Union may be advantageous, in what 
 cafes is it likely to be moft fo ? 
 
 An Union prefuppofes that when it is com- 
 pleted, the contracting ftates fhall be bound to- 
 gether by the fame Conftitution, Laws, and Go- 
 vernment; and by an identity of interefts, and 
 equality of privileges. 
 
 When, therefore, one of the States, defirous 
 to form an Union, is inferior in point of civili- 
 zation, agriculture, commerce, manufactures, mo- 
 rals, manners, eftablimrnents, Conftitution; and 
 the other State is eminent and fuperior to all the 
 world in thefe advantages; it is evident, that an 
 Union, in fuch a cafe, muft be mod beneficial to 
 the former for there is every probability, that 
 the Union will communicate, by degrees, all its 
 advantages and excellencies; and the inferior So- 
 ciety will be thus, placed in a ftate of continual 
 emulation, and improvement, 
 
 Let us compare then the fituations of Great 
 Britain \and Ireland the former enjoys the belt 
 practical Conftitution and Government, which any 
 nation has ever experienced; the people are in 
 general the moft civilized, the moft obedient to 
 Law, the moft honeft in dealing, the moft decent 
 in morals, the moft regular in Religion of any 
 
 people
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 people in Europe. They have the beft agriculture, 
 the moft extenfive commerce, and have carried 
 manufactures, arts, and fciences beyond any other 
 nation. Their foldiery is brave and orderly j their 
 naval greatnefs is unrivalled. 
 
 Now, in many of thefe particulars, we acknow- 
 ledge and lament the inferiority of Ireland our 
 civil and religious difcontents, jealoufies and 
 difturbances j the confpiracics, the infurrections* 
 the rebellions which have difgraced us; proclaim 
 our defects in civilization and policy that the 
 former is not fufficiently diffufed to prevent irre- 
 gularity and licentioufnefs, nor the latter ftrong 
 enough to reprefs them. Our agriculture is by no 
 means perfect ; there is only one manufacture of 
 great importance; and commerce, though it has 
 been of late years increafed beyond our hopes, is 
 not carried to that extent which the powers and 
 refources of the nation are able to reach. 
 
 Let thefe countries be united, and identified in 
 government, in policy, in intereft, what muft be 
 the unavoidable confequence ? Ireland will be 
 gradually rifmg to the level of England j or 
 England gradually finking to the level of Ireland ; 
 and it is obvious which is moft probable. 
 
 If any perfon has a fon uneducated, unim- 
 proved, and injured by bad habits, and bad 
 
 company j
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 company; in order to remedy thefe imperfec- 
 tions, would it not be his firft endeavour to 
 eftablifh him in the beft focieties, and introduce 
 him into the moft virtuous, the moft poliflied, 
 and the moft learned company; and if he could 
 once reconcile him to fuch companies, and teach 
 him to relilh their converfation, would he not be 
 certain of his fon's improvement, and of his finally 
 turning out to his credit and fatisfadlion ? 
 
 What can any fanguine Irifh Patriot wifh for 
 his country but that its inhabitants mould attain 
 the fame habits, manners, and improvement which 
 make England the envy of Europe ? and by what 
 means can he hope to attain that end fo effectually 
 as by uniting with her Government, and binding up 
 all her intereils and concerns in the fame bottom ? 
 
 Suppofing there were no other reafons which 
 rendered the Union of the Sifter Kingdoms defire- 
 able, the (late of Europe, and efpecially of France, 
 fcems to dictate its peculiar policy at the prefent 
 day. France .as not only united to herfelf, and 
 incorporated a great addition of territory, but has 
 rendered abfplutely dependent on her will, almoft 
 ail the fmaller ftates which furround her. Geneva 
 is incorporated, Savoy is incorporated, all the 
 Auftrian provinces in Flanders, all the German 
 ftates, on this fide of the Rhine, are incorporated. 
 
 Spain
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 .Spain is fubjeft to her influence ; Holland, Switzer- 
 land, Sardinia, and the new Republic of Italy, are 
 occupied by her armies j to every country fhe 
 extends her principles, and her intrigues, and on 
 this kingdom her defigns have been nearly fuc- 
 cefsful. No continental power could refift her 
 arms. Great Britain alone maintained the conteft : 
 but, in proportion as the power of France is in- 
 creafed, fo ought the ftrength of the Britifh Em- 
 pire to be augmented. If, from the difunited 
 ftate of the Britifh Empire, any particular part of 
 it has become open to the attacks of France, or of 
 its republican faction in England, that avenue of 
 difunion Ihould be clofed j how could it have 
 been poffible for England to have formed the 
 barrier, which fhe has oppofed to the French 
 power, if Scotland as well as Ireland at this day, 
 had continued a feparate kingdom, equally open 
 to French intrigue ? She would probably have 
 fallen a facrifice to France, and the liberties of 
 Europe would have fallen with her. 
 
 France well knows the principle and the force 
 of incorporations. Every ftate which fhe unites to 
 herfelf, fhe makes part of her empire, cne and in - 
 diviftble, arid will* not differ any mention to be 
 made in negotiation of reftitution. Whilft in 
 her affeded plans of policy for the liberties of the 
 Britifh Empire, fhe maintains the principle of fe- 
 paradon, as eflential to freedom, fhe confiders the 
 C Union
 
 Union of England and Scotland as an ufurpation 
 of the former j and leav ing England to her fate, 
 would make Scotland and Ireland feparate Repub- 
 lics. France well knows the adage, dum fingull 
 fugnant unroerfi vincuntur > and fhe has played that 
 game fuccefsfully ; but as we wilh to check the 
 ambition of that defperate, and unprincipled 
 power, and if that end can only be effected by 
 maintaining and augmenting the power of the 
 Britiih Empire, we fhould be favourable to the 
 principle of Union, which muft increafe and con- 
 folidate its refources. 
 
 If an Union may be defirable between two 
 independent kingdoms, it muft be mod defirable 
 when fuch two kingdoms are united under one 
 Sovereign, and have feparate legiflatures ; for they 
 have all the difadvantages without the advantages 
 of an Union. The Sovereign muft refide in one 
 of the kingdoms : there would of courfe be the 
 metropolis of the empire ; there would be the real 
 feat of the government; thence would flow all the 
 counfels; and thither would refort thofe, who 
 wi(hed for favour and emolument. The kin^- 
 
 o 
 
 dom, where the monarch did not refide, not hav- 
 ing the origination- of all counfels and meafures, 
 and having much of its rents carried away by ab- 
 fentees, would be in a perpetual ftate of jealoufy 
 and difcontent ; and being feparate in all refpecls, 
 but in thfc individual perfon of the monarch, ' 
 
 would
 
 ( II ) 
 
 would be a prey to foreign faction ; and an empire 
 thus compofed could never be in a ftate of full 
 fecurity, for there never could be a certainty that 
 all parts of it would purfue the fame fyftem. 
 
 The objections to this predicament were fo 
 ftrong in Scotland before the Union, that the 
 Scots brought in a Bill of Settlement, to provide 
 that their Monarch fhould never be the fame perfon 
 as the King of England; upon this the alternative 
 of Union or Separation became inevitable, and at 
 length they wifely preferred the former What has 
 been the confequence ? The Scotch, becoming 
 entitled to all the privileges of Britifli fubjects, 
 have greatly added to their own civilization and 
 wealth : have enjoyed internal tranquillity and fecu- 
 rity; and enabled Great Britain, by the confolida- 
 tion of the whole ifland under one Government, to 
 reach that height of profperity and glory which 
 makes her the envy and the proteclrefs of Europe. 
 
 In the fituation which Scotland held previous to 
 the Union does Ireland fland at prefent j except 
 that the Crown of Ireland isbyexprefs ftatutes of 
 declaration and recognition perpetually annexed 
 to and dependant upon the Crown of England j fo 
 that whoever is King of England, is in right of that 
 title, ipfo facto, King of Ireland. The King of 
 Ireland, as the King of Scotland before the Union, 
 re fides in another kingdom. The counfels for 
 
 the
 
 the Government of Ireland are framed in the Britifh 
 Cabinet j the Government of Ireland is actually 
 adminiftered by a Britifh Lord Lieutenant, who 
 diftributes the patronage of the Crown ; the Irifli 
 Parliament is fuppofed to be in a great degree 
 fubject to Britifh influence, and near one million 
 of the rents of the kingdom are annually exported 
 to Abfentees. The jealoufies upon thefe points 
 are great and unavoidable, and form the perpetual 
 topic for inflaming the minds of the people in 
 newfpapers, and the unvarying theme of com- 
 plaint and invective by Parliamentary Oppofition. 
 Nor can this inconvenience ceafe whilft affairs re- 
 main as at prefent 3 for fo long as we form part of 
 the Britifh Empire, we mufl acknowledge one Ex- 
 ecutive Power, one prefiding Cabinet ; and it is of 
 indifpenfable neceffity for that Cabinet to induce 
 every part of the empire to purfue the fame prin- 
 ciples of action, and to adopt the fame fyftem of 
 meafures, as far as poflible : and as the interefts of 
 England mufl ever preponderate, a preference 
 will be always given to her, or fuppofed to be 
 given, which has the fame effect. The Irifh Par- 
 liament is certainly in its inflitution independent ; 
 it may when it pleafes act contrary to the policy of 
 the empire j it may exhort the King to make war 
 when the views of England are pacific; it may 
 declare againft a war when England is driven into 
 one by neceffity; and it has actually afferted a 
 Right to chufe a Regent of its own appointment, 
 
 diflinct
 
 ( -3 ) 
 
 diftinct from the Regent of Great Britain j it may 
 alfo declare againft treaties, and refufe to ratify 
 commercial articles. Now if Ireland, having thefc 
 powers, fhould at any time exert them in oppoli- 
 tion to the conduct of England, the empire would 
 be endangered or diffolved j and fo long as the 
 Parliament of Ireland, from motives of difcretion 
 and prudence, does not exert them, it will be fub- 
 ject to the imputation of being meanly and corr 
 ruptly fubfervient to the Britiih Cabinet ; and the 
 imputation being conftantly repeated and alw ys 
 liable to be renewed, will have In future, as it has 
 had already, a prejudicial influence on the public 
 mind, leading the people to diftruft and to difpa- 
 rage their legiflature. 
 
 Add to this the melancholy reflection, that the 
 Irifh Parliament has been long made the Theatre 
 for Britifh Faction. When at a lofs for fubjects of 
 grievance in Great Britain, they ever turn their 
 eyes to this kingdom, in the kind hope that 
 any feed of difcontent may be nourilhed, by their 
 foftering attention, into ftrength and maturity. 
 Incapable of beating the minifter on his own. 
 ground, they change the place of attack, and 
 wound him from the fide of Ireland. Need I 
 allude to the Queftion of the Commercial Pro- 
 pofitions, the Queftion of the Regency, and the 
 Queftion of the Catholics , when we have feen 
 the Leaders of the Britiih Oppofition come forward 
 
 to
 
 ( 14 ) 
 
 to fupport the Character of Irifli Rebels, to palliate 
 and to juftify Irifli Treafon, and almoft to vindi- 
 cate Irifli Rebellion ? If then, differing from Great 
 Britain in Imperial Queftions, would difiblve the 
 Empire, and if uniformly concurring with her, 
 muft fubject the Parliament to perpetual impu- 
 tation of criminal fubferviency to a foreign Cabinet; 
 and if fo long as an Irifli free and independent 
 Parliament remains, it muft be fubjeft to the 
 Cabals of Britifli Party j might it not be a meafure 
 of wifdom to incorporate the Parliaments toge- 
 ther, and that Ireland mould accept the fame 
 Guarantee for its Liberty and Profperity, as fatis- 
 fies the people of England ? 
 
 It is notorious that before the Union, Scot- 
 land had always a connexion and alliance with 
 France ; which fmce the Union has totally va- 
 nifhed. Her feelings, conduct and policy have, 
 fmce that period, been entirely Britifli. It is equally 
 notorious that a correspondence was kept up with 
 France, by a party in this kingdom, efpecially 
 fo long as the Pretender lived, who had the 
 appointment to all the Irifli Roman Catholic 
 Biftioprics, and who difpofed of them in concert 
 with the Court of France. It is alfo manifeft that 
 a connexion with France has been lately renewed 
 upon new principles i and it is obvious that the 
 French will never ceafe to intrigue in this kingdom, 
 yvhilft we remain in our prefent ftate, which pre- 
 
 fents
 
 ( S ) 
 
 fents fo favourable an opening to intrigue of every 
 kind. 
 
 Now let us fuppofe that an Union of the Britifli 
 and Irilh Legiflatures were completed upon fair 
 and equitable principles, what would be our new 
 fituation ? The Monarch would remain in England 
 as at prefent; the Abfentee proprietors of land 
 might in fome degree increafe j and London, as at 
 prefent, would be the general refort for bufmefs, 
 for advance rr>ent, for pleafure. But the Britifh 
 Cabinet would receive a mixture of Irimmen, and 
 the counfels of the Britifh Parliament would be 
 much influenced by the weight and ability of the 
 Irifh Members ; all our party contefts would be 
 transferred to Great Britain ; Britifh faction would 
 ceafe to operate here ; there would be no jealoufy 
 of Britifli Influence on the Cabinet or Parliament; 
 there would be no claming of diftincl: interefts, 
 no fear of Ireland becoming too powerful to govern. 
 France could no longer fpeculate on the nature 
 of our diftincl Government and Parliament ; and 
 hope to feparate the kingdom, in fab, from 
 Great Britain, as it is already feparated in theory. 
 The cultivation, the improvement of Ireland, like 
 that of Scotland, would be peculiarly attended to, 
 as the increafe of our wealth, confequence, ability, 
 and power, muft tend to increafe the fecurity of 
 the Empire, not to endanger it ; and in pro- 
 pcmon that we felt the benefit of an Union, our 
 attachment to it would be flrengthened, 
 
 8 All
 
 [ 16 ] 
 
 All writers have agreed in condemning what is 
 called imperium in imperio. It is this vice of 
 conftitution which has annihilated Poland, where 
 every fenator was a fovereign j and has enflaved 
 the Seven United Provinces, where each province 
 was a Sovereign. Franklin and Wafhington, the 
 founders of the American Empire, had not courage 
 in their firft project of a conftitution for the Ame- 
 rican ftates, to exclude this radical evil, but left 
 each ftate independent. So foon as the preffure 
 of neceffity, which had confederated the ftates, 
 ceafed in confequence of peace, the fault of fuch 
 a conftitution became evident : it was clear to men 
 of common capacity, that an empire, confifting of 
 Thirteen independent focieties, without one com- 
 mon Imperial controul, would foon divide into 
 Thirteen independent empires. To obviate this 
 neceffary, though poffibly diftant confequence, the 
 wifdom of the Americans projected a new con- 
 ftitution, in which this original vice was remedied,- 
 the feparate independency of each ftate was wifely 
 relinquimed ; a general legiflative, and a general 
 executive were formed for the government of the 
 Union in every imperial concern; and each re- 
 fpective ftate was confined to local and municipal 
 objects. At the fame time, a juft deference was 
 paid to all the Teft Laws and religious eftablifli- 
 ments throughout the Union j and each ftate being 
 allowed to maintain its ecclefiailical arrangements, 
 all religious ftruggle and animofity was prevented. 
 
 To
 
 ( '7 ) 
 
 To the wifdom of this plan of Union the ftrength 
 and happinefs of the United States may be attri- 
 buted If each had retained to itfelf its feparate 
 independent Legislature, is^ it probable that the 
 American Empire could have lafted to the prefent 
 day ? If French intrigue had at one time fuch influ- 
 ence in America as nearly to have overturned the 
 exifting Union, how could its efforts have been 
 refilled, when the gaining of one ftate alone might 
 have diffolved the Union ? To injure America in 
 its prefent form, a majority of the reprefentatives 
 of the whole Union muft be feduced; to have 
 deftroyed her power under her firft Conftitution, 
 the corruption of one ftate alone would have been 
 fufnYient. 
 
 What are the fentiments of Mr. Adams, the 
 Prefideut of the United States, with refped to 
 their firft federal and the prefent incorporate 
 Union " The former," fays he, t was formed 
 c< upon the model and example of all the con* 
 ct federacies, ancient and modern, in which the 
 <f federal council was only a diplomatic body; 
 " even the Lycian, which is thought to have been 
 <e the beft, was no more. The magnitude of 
 " territory, the population, the wealth and com- 
 merce, and efpecially the rapid growth of the 
 c -United States, have ftiewn fuch a government 
 " to be inadequate for their wants 5 and the new 
 <e fyftem, which feems admirably cajculated to 
 D " unite
 
 C ) 
 
 unite their interefts and affections, and bring 
 * c them to an uniformity of principles and fenti- 
 <f ments, is equally well combined to unite their 
 " wills and forces as a fingle nation. A refult of 
 " accommodation cannot be fuppofed to reach the 
 " perfection of any one : but the conception of 
 cc fuch an idea, and the deliberate Union of fo 
 fc great and various a people, in fuch a plan, is 
 " without all partiality or prejudice, if not the 
 " greateft exertion of human underltanding, the 
 " greateft tingle effort of rational deliberation which 
 *' the world has ever feen." 
 
 If fuch are the fentiments of the prefent, let us 
 advert to the opinions of their late Prefident, 
 General Wafhington. In the letter addrefllng the 
 prefent conftitution of America for acceptation, 
 he has thefe words <c In all our deliberations upon 
 " this fubjecl:, we kept fteadily in our view, that 
 ' which appears to us the greateft intereft of every 
 ** true American, the confolidation of our union, 
 *' in which is involved our property, fafety, per- 
 " haps our national exiftence. This important 
 " confide ration, ferioufly and deeply imprefled upon 
 *< our minds, led each ftate in the convention to be 
 " lefs rigid in points of inferior magnitude, than 
 ** might have been otherwife expected j and thus 
 <c the conftitution, which we now prefent, is the 
 * refult of a fpirit of amity, and of that mutual 
 
 *' deference
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 " deference and conceflion, which the peculiarity 
 ft of our political fituation rendered indifpen- 
 fable." 
 
 When, therefore, an Union is propofed to our 
 confideration, it may not be prudent for us to fpurn 
 at a principle, which the fagacity of Adams, and 
 the virtue of Wafhington, confidered as indifpen- 
 fable to che profperity, fafety, and perhaps the 
 eidftence of America; a principle, which hasdif- 
 appointed the prophecy of politicians, that the 
 American Union would fplit into feparate and con- 
 temptible ftates, which has prefer ved her from the 
 intrigue and corruptions and infolence of France; 
 and which enables her to defy the menaces of that 
 unprincipled power, with confcious fuperiority. 
 
 Having confidered a few general topics, which 
 the quftion of Union naturally fuggefts, let us 
 examine the arguments which refult from the par- 
 ticular fituation of Ireland, as to its property, 
 its eftabliihments, and religious divifions. 
 
 Nine-tenths of the property of Ireland are in 
 pofleflion of Britifh Defendants. Their lands 
 were taken from the original inhabitants, and con- 
 firmed to the prefent poffefibrs, chiefly by the A& 
 of Settlement, but a large part of them was held 
 under Britifh Ads of Parliament for a century. 
 The poffeffors of thefe lands are of the Proteftant 
 
 religion.
 
 religion, and acknowledge the King as the head 
 of their church j whereas the original inhabitants 
 are Catholics, and acknowledge the fpiritual jurif- 
 diction of a foreign power. Thefe Proteftants, 
 thus pofiefimg nine-tenths of the property, arc 
 only one-fourth of the inhabitants in number, and 
 they have been obliged to rely upon Britifh af- 
 fiftance, for the prefervation of their property and 
 exiftence at different periods. 
 
 The eftablifhed Religion is the Proteftanr, and 
 the Church is, in Conftitution, fimilar to that of 
 England, and endowed with the Tythes of the 
 whole kingdom, and with great property in land. 
 The Paftors of the diflenting Proteftants are in a 
 degree fupported by grants of the Legiflature. 
 
 The Catholics having (hewn great power in the 
 conteft at the Revolution, were long fubjefted to a 
 feverc code of laws, which kept them in fubordi- 
 nation ; that code has, within thefe few years, been 
 almoft entirely repealed j but, though they enjoy 
 a complete toleration, they are by no means con- 
 tented, but demand political equality with the 
 Proteftants, and fuch an alteration in the Parlia- 
 mentary Conftitution, as will give their numbers 
 proportionate power. 
 
 The Proteftants, recollecting the ftruggles which 
 were made by the Catholics in the reign of 
 
 Elizabeth!
 
 ( It ) 
 
 Elizabeth, in the reign of Charles the Firft, and 
 'in the reign of James the Second, and poffibly 
 fancying that they difcover fimilar views in the 
 prefent unhappy conteft, aft with diftruft and 
 caution. They plaufibly argue, that thofe who 
 have the fuperiority of number, when once they 
 can obtain the power, will not long want the pro- 
 perty of the ftate. They guard therefore with 
 vigilance their Ecclefiaftical and Parliamentary Ef- 
 tablifhments, and look to Great Britain as the 
 guarantee of their fafety and importance. 
 
 The Proteftants flate, that when the Catholics 
 were rcftrained by fevere laws, the kingdom con- 
 tinued in tranquillity for a century ; but Jo foon as 
 national confidence, the refult of that tranquillity, 
 induced them to repeal the Reftriclions by which 
 the Catholics were bound, the ancient fpirit of ri- 
 valry revived, and the Catholics demanded fuch 
 a change of the Conftitution, as would gradually 
 transfer to them all the power of the ftate. 
 
 The Proteftants feel likewife other caufes of 
 diftruft, fuggefted by recent circumftances, on 
 which it is defirable to caft a veil, when a,ccufation 
 on one fide, and juftification on the other, tend 
 more to exafperate than to conciliate, and to pro- 
 long our diftractiofls than heal them. 
 
 Would to God it were poflible to bury all that 
 has pafi*ed in benevolent oblivion 5 but fuch a con- 
 
 (ummatiori,
 
 fummation, though devoutly wifhed, cannot be 
 fuddenly expected. Whilft the opinions of Europe 
 are afloat ; when all the foundations of fociety 
 are, as it were, broken up and torn afunder ; when 
 all the old principles and notions, which bound 
 us together in fibordination and peace, are loof- 
 ened or diflblved ; when it appears dubious and 
 uncertain what turn the public mind will afiume, 
 and in what fyftem it will ultimately repofe j the 
 expectation of any quick return to former dilpofi- 
 tions of confidence, and habits of amity are pof- 
 fitly chimerical. 
 
 In the mean while, under the prefent temper and 
 feelings, it is not to be hoped that Proteftants 
 will confent to furrender their political powers, 
 much lefs can they be perfuaded, that they could 
 do it with fafcty. 
 
 At the fame time, whilft Ireland continues a 
 feparate kingdom, the Catholics will not drop 
 their claims, nor the argument of numbers in 
 their favour. So far from dropping their claims, 
 they have already renewed them j and the Ca- 
 tholics of Waterford, in an addrefs to the Lord 
 Lieutenant, have repeated their demand for po- 
 litical equality, and advanced it on a plea of me- 
 rit. They have dill, and will ever have elec- 
 tioneering partifans in parliament, and fpeculative 
 
 advocates
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 advocates in England to feed their hopes, and 
 they will be fupported by every open oppofer, or 
 fecret ill-wifher to the government. 
 
 If then the feparate Conftitution and Eftabli fo- 
 ments, and Teft Laws of Ireland are to continue 
 as at prefent, the kingdom muft remain in a con- 
 tinual ftate of irritation the numbers of Ca- 
 tholics compared to Proteftants are as three to one. 
 Modern political writers upon Religious Eftablim- 
 ments lay it down as a principle, that every ftate 
 ought to eftablifh that religious feel which is moft 
 numerous ; but as it happens that in Ireland, the 
 moft numerous religious feel: does not acknowledge 
 the fupremacy of the ftate, but profefTes itfelf to 
 be fubjecl to a foreign jurifdiclion ; their religion 
 could not be eftablifhed, without deftroying the 
 Conftitution, which is founded on the principles 
 of Civil and Ecclefiaftical Liberty, and the Ex- 
 clufion of foreign interference and jurifdiclion. 
 
 But fuppofe, at length, that the Proteftants, 
 worn out by importunity, concede to the demand 
 of political Equality made by the Catholics 
 what are the confequences ? 
 
 In the firft place, the prefent Parliamentary 
 Teft Oaths muft be repealed, and a new Oath 
 framed to meet Catholic Feelings, and admit the 
 jurifdiclion of the Pope. 
 
 5 In
 
 , ( H ) 
 
 , In the fecond place, the Act of Supremacy 
 and of Uniformity, muft be repealed. For no- 
 thhg could be fo abfurd, as to make men who deny 
 the fupremacy of the King, and the competency 
 of Parliament in Eccleflattical Concerns, mem- 
 bers of the fupreme power, viz. the Legislature ; 
 and at the fame time, to fubjec"l tht.fe very men 
 to the penalties of Premunire and Treafon fof 
 denying that iupremacy and competency. 
 
 In the third place, you eftablifh the principle, 
 that the date is indifferent in religious concerns, 
 and that it is of no confequence to the Hate, what is 
 the religion of its fubjecls -, from which it follows, 
 cither that there ought to be no eftablifhed religion 
 at ally but that religion fhould be left to chance 
 or fecondly, that ail religions ihould be equally 
 eftbliihed or thirdly, that if one is to be eftab- 
 liflied for the fake of religious inftructionj it ought 
 to be the religion of the majority, which is the 
 Catholic. 
 
 In the fourth place, you eflablim, or acquiefce 
 in the right of the Pope to a real, and efiential 
 jurifdiction within this realm, in all matters relat- 
 ing to the Church and its Government j and the 
 right which has been, aflerted of the College of 
 Cardinals, which is the Pope's Cabinet, to manage 
 the ecclefiaftical affairs of Ireland. 
 
 Thus
 
 Thus fofoon as the Catholics of Ireland are ad- 
 mitted into the Legiflature, and the Tell Oaths 
 and Act of Supremacy repealed, the Proteftant 
 Church Eftablilhment becomes a public wrong. 
 That Eftablifhment is defenfible at prefent, becaufe, 
 on principles of reafon, and from the nature of a 
 free conftitution, no religious feet can claim a right 
 to be eftabli filed and fupported by the ftate which 
 denies the competency of the ftate to regulate 
 their conduct j but when that principle is aban- 
 doned, the defence of the Proteftant Church Eftab- 
 lifliment is abandoned alfo. 
 
 It further follows, from the admiflion of the 
 Catholics to political equality, that the frame of 
 the Houfe of Commons mould be reformed. It is 
 a known hiftorical fad, that the Irilh Houfe of 
 Commons was framed with the fole view of ex- 
 cludingRoman Catholics ; when therefore the prin- 
 ciple of excluding Roman Catholics is given up, 
 the alteration of the Houfe of Commons in favour 
 of the Catholics follows of courfe. 
 
 Admitting the Catholics to feats in the Legifla- 
 ture, and retaining the prefent Parliamentary Con- 
 ilitution, would be like inviting a man to dinner, 
 and on his acceptance of the invitation, fhutting 
 the door in his face. 
 
 If then Reform muft follow what is called 
 
 Fmancipationj and one be the unavoidable confe- 
 
 E qucncc
 
 quencc of the other, would not a revolution of 
 power foon take place ? would it not pafs from 
 Proteftant into Catholic hands ? and what hope 
 could the Proteftants retain of preferving their 
 fituation when they had loft their power in the 
 Legifiature, and their right to the Church Eftab- 
 lifhment. 
 
 Let us confider then what would be the natural 
 effects of a favourable Legiflative Union. 
 
 Firft The empire would have but one Legifla- 
 ture, one organ of the public will, and the dangers 
 which arife from an imperium. imperio, from two fu- 
 preme powers would be avoided. 
 
 Secondly Ireland would be in a natural fitua- 
 tion j for all the Proteftants of the empire being 
 united, fhe would have the proportion of fourteen 
 to three in favour of her eftablifhment i whereas at 
 prefent there is a proportion of three to one againft 
 it. 
 
 Thirdly The Catholics would lofe the advan- 
 tage of the argument of numbers, which they at 
 prefent enjoy, and the Conftitution of the Empire 
 would agree with the theory. 
 
 Fourthly Whilft Ireland remains a 
 Country from Great Britain, Great Britain is not 
 
 pledged
 
 pledged upon any Ipecific principle to fupport one 
 led in Ireland more than another ; if (he cannot 
 preferve the connexion of the two kingdoms by 
 upholding the Proteftants in their eftablifhment, 
 their power, and their property, I know not by 
 what tie fhe is debarred from affifting the Ca- 
 tholics ; for whilft the kingdoms are feparate and 
 independent, Ireland, except where the Crown is 
 concerned, is merely bound by the ties of intereft 
 to England, and in a fimilar manner England is 
 only bound by the Rights of the Crown and ties 
 of intereft to Ireland. She is pledged topreferve 
 Ireland to the Britifh Crown, but not to any parti- 
 cular means or any particular principles for main- 
 taining that connexion. But if Ireland was once 
 united to Great Britain by a Legiflative Union, and 
 the maintenance of the Proteftant Eftablifhment 
 were made a fundamental article of that Union, then 
 the whole Power of the Empire would be pledged 
 to the Church Eftablimment of Ireland, and the 
 property of the whole Empire would be pledged 
 in fupport of the property of every part. 
 
 An objection to this reafoning has been made by 
 ftating that an Union would encreafe Abfentee 
 Proprietors j that the proprietors of eftates are ge- 
 nerally Proteftants j that of courfe Proteftant influ- 
 ence would decreafe, and confequently the fecurity 
 for Proteftant property. 
 
 The
 
 The anfwer to this objection is, that it does not 
 appear that the Abfentees from Scotland increafed 
 after the Union, and that an argument from expe- 
 rience in political reafoning is fuperior to any argu- 
 ment in theory. Another mode of reply is, that 
 fuppofe Abfentees were to be increafed, this evil 
 would be compenfated by the folid advantage of hav- 
 ing a fixed unalterable Conftitution, and of having 
 the whole power and property of Great Britain its 
 guarantees. When once the hope of change were 
 at an end, and the hope of forcing fuch a change 
 deftrpyed, difiatisfaction would fink into acqui- 
 efcence, and acquiefcence foften into content. 
 
 Another objection is, that if an Union be made 
 upon Proteftant Principles, it cannot fail to excite 
 the oppofition of the Catholics, and to encreafe 
 their difaffection to a Government which perpetu- 
 ally bars them from power j that confequently the 
 Catholics would be more and more difpofed to cul- 
 tivate a foreign connection, and when free from the 
 vigilance of a Proteftant Refident Parliament, 
 more likely to effectuate that connection, and the . 
 plans refulting from it, without being detected. 
 
 To folve this objection it is only neceflary to 
 date it as a petitio principle. What ground is there 
 to afiume that the Catholics will afTume an Union, 
 though founded on Proteftant Principles ? 
 
 Why
 
 Why may not an Union be fo fhaped as to be fa- 
 vourable to the Proteflants, without being unfa- 
 vourable to the Catholics ? 
 
 Firft A Free Toleration will be fecured to 
 their Religion. Their power of electing Repre- 
 fentatives will be perpetuated, as well as their ca- 
 pacity of filling mod of the offices of State. 
 
 Second It may be advifeable to connect with 
 an Union a proper fupport for their Clergy and 
 fbme fyftem of regulation for their Church, not 
 inconfiftent with their Ecclefiaftical Principles, and 
 calculated to do away mifconceptions of their reli- 
 gious tenets, and to difcontinue practices which 
 have been attended with inconvenience. 
 
 Third The difpenfatiqns which arife in coun- 
 ties from Candidates Handing on the Proteftant 
 or Catholic interefts, and all little parifh jealoufies 
 will ceafe, from which circumftance great incon- 
 veniences have been already felt. 
 
 Fourth If the Proteftant Intereft be fecured, 
 there will be no necefiary ftate partiality towards 
 Proteftants, which is a natural fource of com- 
 plaint. 
 
 Fifth Catholics will feel more confident under 
 a Legislature framed upon a more extended bafis, 
 
 where
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 where the majority of members will not be influeno 
 td againft them by local prejudices or antipathies. 
 
 Sixth -Sectarian ftruggle will terminate, and 
 tranquillity being reflored, animofities will gradual- 
 ly relax, and there being no ground for political 
 jealoufy and contention, the habits and connections 
 of focial life will re-produce confidence and friend- 
 fliips, where exift, at prefent, rivalry and fufpicion. 
 
 Seventh An opening may be left in any plan 
 of Union, for the future admiffion of Catholics to 
 additional privileges. And Proteflants can never 
 object to fuch an opening, as they may reft af- 
 fured, that the Britifh Proteftant Parliament will 
 not imprudently admit Catholic pretenfions, as 
 the Tell Laws could not be partially repealed ; 
 and it is evident, that the Catholics could not 
 force their claims with hoftility againft the whole 
 power of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 Eighth The Catholics aremoft numerous in the 
 fouth and weft of Ireland i and it is conceived, 
 that thofe parts of the kingdom would be moil 
 benefited by an Union, as to agricultural and 
 commercial advantages. 
 
 Ninth As all the ftruggles of the Catholics for 
 political predominancy have failed, and as they 
 cannot hope to carry their wi flies by domeftic or 
 
 even
 
 ( 3' ) 
 
 even foreign force, they would do well to adopt a 
 fettlement, which would enfure them many po- 
 litical and all civil advantages, and reft fatisfied 
 with a much greater degree of toleration than 
 Proteftants have ever enjoyed under a Catholic 
 (late. 
 
 To anfwer the other objection which was 
 ftated, we may obferve, it does not follow that, if 
 an Union were made, that the government of Ire- 
 land would be lefs vigilantly adminiftered; it 
 probably would be adminiftered with more atten- 
 tion , becaufe it would be lefs di ft rafted by the 
 bufmefs of party and of Parliament j and for the 
 fame reafons, it would be adminifltred more im- 
 partially. 
 
 With regard to Difienters, they are fuppofed to 
 be in a ratio of about one-feventh to the whole 
 population of the kingdom, and of one-fixth to 
 the Catholics. They are mollly manufacturers, 
 and fome of them are merchants; but they have 
 little influence in the prefent reprefentation. 
 
 Whilft Ireland remains a feparate kingdom, they 
 are the leaft confiderable body of the people ; but 
 were an Union formed with Great Britain, the 
 Di {Tenting intereft would be in a very different 
 ratio in the empire, and their importance and 
 power would proportionably rife. 
 
 8 It
 
 It is difficult to comprehend the wifdom of their 
 junction with the Catholics, in order to overthrow 
 the Proteftant power and eftabliihment ; for, fup- 
 pofing their project to have been completed, they 
 would have been at the mercy of their allies. 
 
 If they had fucceeded in their plans with the 
 Catholics, their confequence in the ftate would 
 have been probably annihilated ; if an Union 
 takes place, their importance in the empire will 
 encreafe, and, as to their ftaple manufacture, it 
 will be fecured for ever. 
 
 As it is probable that a modus for Tythes will 
 accompany the meafure of an Union, both Ca- 
 tholics and Diffenters would be efientially relieved 
 and benefited by that part of a new fyftem. 
 
 Some perfons have conceived that it might be 
 advantageous to the Difienters, if the government 
 of their Church were more aflimilated to the 
 Church of Scotland, which is under the moft ex- 
 cellent difciplinej but when the {tumbling block 
 of Tythes is removed, they may probably fall 
 in witli the Proteftant Church. The caufe of dif- 
 ference between Proteftants and Diffenters have 
 been for fome time obfolete, and they refort to 
 feparate congregations, more from early prejudice 
 and cuftom, than from any rational or even al- 
 ledged neceffity. 
 
 Having
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 Having confidered briefly in what manner an 
 Union would affect the great religious defcriptions 
 of the people, we may proceed to examine its in- 
 fluence on the different orders and claffes of the 
 State. 
 
 The Peerage would probably in any plan of 
 Union, be reprefented like the Scotch peers, by a 
 delegation to the Britifh Parliament. This arrange- 
 ment would not affect thofe nobles who are peers 
 of Great Britain, and it would be favourable to 
 thofe who rcfide in Great Britain. There are forty- 
 one of the former clafs, and about eighty of the 
 latter. The remaining fourfcore peers who attend 
 Parliament occafionaily, would be the only peers 
 materially interefled, but almofl all of them have 
 confiderable property in land, and as all perfonal 
 privileges and prerogatives would remain to them, 
 the general advantages of an Union in giving per- 
 manent fecurity to their tides and their properties, 
 would compenfate any diminution of confequence 
 they might feel from their not being all certain of 
 feats in the Britifh Parliament. 
 
 The fpiritual peers would be amply recompenfed 
 by the fecurity given to their diocefan eftates, and 
 to the general intercfts and eftablilhments of the 
 church. 
 
 F The
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 The fame reafoning will apply to thofe who have 
 parliamentary influence in the Houfe of Commons: 
 Yet it mult be acknowledged that fome facrifices 
 muft be made of power, of emolument, of im- 
 portance. Many fchemes have been in circulation 
 for adjufting the reprefentation of this kingdom in 
 the Britifh Parliament. It is not the defign of this 
 publication to examine them ; but can it be doubted 
 that a reafonable reprefentation may be felefted, 
 which, however, it muft interfere with the conve- 
 niencies of fome individuals, will give this kingdom 
 a proportionate influence in the Houfe of Commons 
 of the empire. There is no difficulty in the fubjecl: 
 fo great, which may not be obviated, if an Union 
 is of importance to be attained, and if we ferioufly 
 endeavour to effecl: it. 
 
 The chief oppofition to the meafure, muft 
 be expe&ed from the Bar, who are fuppofed 
 to be more perfonally interefted againft it 
 than any clafs in fouety. It is a general habit in 
 the gentlemen of Ireland to educate their fons at 
 the Temple, and the number of barriflers is much 
 greater in proportion here than in England. And 
 as the profeffion will not fupport, by any means, 
 the numbers which purfue it, lawyers in Ireland ex- 
 tend their circle to politics, and are very numerous 
 in Parliament, and extremely aftive in the bufmefs 
 of it. In England there are few lawyers in the 
 
 Hcufe
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 Houfe of Commons; whereas in Ireland they are 
 a formidable phalanx. Were a legifiative Union 
 to take place, Irifh lawyers would be deprived of 
 the parliamentary market for their abilities and am- 
 bition; they could not attend the Britilh Parliament 
 without renouncing bufmefs; they would be entirely 
 confined to profefilonal profpectsj and mere poli- 
 tical emoluments and fituations, would be. taken 
 from their grafp. 
 
 But when oppofition to an Union came forward 
 from the Bar, it muft be taken into confideration, 
 that the very reafons which make the Bar oppofe 
 an Union, are arguments in favour of it. 
 
 1. It is obvioufly the intereft of the nation, that 
 the law mould be accurately and deeply ftudied; 
 and it will be more probable that (Indents will pay 
 attention to their profefllon when their hopes of ad- 
 vancement are confined to knowledge and ability 
 in the line of it. In proportion as you have abler 
 lawyers, you will have abler judges, efpecially 
 when the temptation of placing them upon the 
 bench, from political reafons, is removed. 
 
 2. It is obvious that it would be prudent to ex- 
 clude from the Legiflature, young adventurers, 
 who have but little ttake in the country, who have 
 acquired by habit a facility of ipeaking upon every 
 fubjecl:, and upon every fide of a fubjecl:, and 
 
 who
 
 who only confider^ a feat in Parliament as the 
 means of bringing their abilities to market. 
 
 It does not, however, appear that the profpects 
 of the Bar would be materially injured by an 
 Union j the offices to which lawyers are iiiually 
 appointed, would remain the fome; and if the 
 road to them was more through profefiional 
 merit, than Parliamentary fervices, it does not 
 appear, that either the Bar or the Public would 
 be injured. 
 
 It is faid, alfo, that the oppofition of the Bar 
 is not likely to be unanimous j and that fome 
 leading characters, who have thought mod on 
 the fubjecT:, and who are capable of thinking beft, 
 who ought to have great weight, where their 
 intereft is in no fhape concerned, and where pur- 
 fuit of public good can alone fway their opinions, 
 fo far from confidering an Union as deftructive, 
 conceive it as pregnant with folid and permanent 
 benefit. Aged and experienced characters are 
 certainly as liable to political temptations, as the 
 virtuous ardency of youth j but where no private 
 intereft can operate, and efpecially where the 
 point of intereft, the cuibonoj lies againft an opinion 
 given, one mould never hefitate between the natural 
 precipitation of youth, and the cautious decifions 
 of experience. 
 
 . 
 
 To
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 To demonstrate to the Clergy, the advantages 
 'of an Union, would be loft labour indeed ; if 
 they are fuppofed in general to be fufficicndy. 
 fenfible to the intereih of the Church, we may 
 fafely leave them to their ufual difcernment, in 
 the queftion before us. 
 
 The gentlemen of landed property, would bs 
 merely affcded, as the profperity of the king- 
 dom in general would be increafed or diminifhed. 
 If an Union would produce tranquillity, fecurity, 
 commercial and agricultural advantages, eftatts 
 in lands would be proportionably benefited. 
 Political contefts, party ftruggles. may be th$ 
 harveft of enterprizing adventurers, but they blight 
 the hopes, and blaft the fortunes of country- 
 gentlemen. Land in England, during times of 
 peace, is fold from thirty to forty years purchafe ; 
 in Ireland the price of land feldom exceeds twenty 
 years purchafe. This is attributable to the fup- 
 pofed different flate of tranquillity and fecurity of 
 the two kingdoms. The continual infurrections in 
 different parts of the country, of White Boys, Oak 
 Boys, Right Boys, Defenders, United Irifhmen, 
 have made refidence unfafe, and diminifhed the 
 certainty of rents, and the value of tenure. If it 
 is probable that an Union would put an end to 
 thefe diforders, by introducing fteadinefs of ad- 
 miniftration, and regular fubordination, the value 
 of eilates would gradually rile to the Englilh level, 
 
 and
 
 and fpcculators in land, would naturally prefer 
 this -kingdom as the fcene of improvement and ex- 
 periment in proportion as the foil is in general fu- 
 perior to that of England, and from being lefs im- 
 proved, more fit for experiment-. The monied 
 capital of England, has of late years been increafed 
 to fuch a degree, that, notwithftanding the enor- 
 mous loans which have been borrowed by Govern- 
 ment, the monied men are embarrafled in what 
 manner to invtft the capitals with advantage and 
 fecurity. When a peace arrives, and loans (hall 
 ceafev the difficulty of employing capital will be 
 augmented, and there can be no doubt that if the 
 ftate of this country can be rendered fecure, it 
 will be abundantly employed in Irilh purchafes and 
 Irifh fpeculation. 
 
 It is alfo certain, that Great Britain does not pro- 
 duce fufficient corn for her confurnption ; it muft be 
 a great object, therefore, for Irifh landed gentle- 
 men to fecure a preference in the Britim market for 
 ever, which an Union would certainly effect. 
 
 As we fuppofe the Union which we are difcuding, 
 will confer all commercial advantages which Great 
 Britain enjoys upon Irifli fubjecls, it would be loft 
 time to prove that our merchants muft be gainers 
 by the meafure. The Britim adminift ration, in 
 order to encreafe the wealth of the kingdom, for 
 the purpofes of power, are perpetually employed 
 
 in
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 in devifing the means of extending the commerce 
 of England ; and under the wife regulations of that 
 Government, a commerce has been eftablifhed j 
 and by the late naval victories has been fecured, 
 which is the aftonifhment- of the world. An Union 
 then will place the Irifh merchant upon an equality 
 with the Britilh, and he will be certain to enjoy for 
 ever the fame privileges, protection, regulations, 
 bounties and encouragements, as are enjoyed by the 
 greateft commercial country that ever flourimed. 
 
 The queftion of Union will be debated in the 
 metropolis, and one of the chief arguments againft 
 it is, that it will ruin the metropolis, and render it 
 a defert. The fame argument was ufed moft 
 powerfully at the time of the Scotch Union, with 
 regard to Edinburgh : the defertion of that capital, 
 was predicted, the bankruptcy of its fhopkeepers, 
 the ruin of its proprietors, was foretold andinfifted 
 upon; yet, notwithftanding the Union, and the 
 prophecy, Edinburgh, fo far from decaying, has 
 flourimed more fince the Union, than it had done 
 before. It will be confidered, that Dublin muft 
 ftill be the refidence of a Viceroy and his court j 
 that fciences, arts, amufetnents, may be culti- 
 vated in proportion, as there will be lefs atten- 
 tion to politics ; that it will be the feat of juftice : 
 which will be adminiftered as at prefent -, the 
 chief feat of revenue, and the head-quarters of 
 the army. It will probably monopolize the corn 
 7 trade
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 trade between Great Britain and Ireland , and 
 from the citcumftance of the Canals, which are 
 making in every part of England, and communi- 
 cating with London, its commerce for all Englifli 
 goods with Liverpool, will greatly increafe ; and 
 in proportion, as canals from Dublin are carried 
 to different parts of the kingdom, it will be the 
 depot for their confumption in all articles of Britifh 
 tnanufa&ure and import. 
 
 A fimilar prediction is made as to the depo- 
 pulation of the country in general 5 and with much 
 lefs reafon. For what induces refidence ? Is it not 
 peace and comfort, and fecurity ? What has banifh- 
 ed fo many families, but the lofs of thefe invalua- 
 ble bkffings ? Reftore to Ireland good humour and 
 t anquillity, and comfort, and fecurity; her fugi- 
 tives will foon return, taxes will be lower in Ire- 
 land, living will be cheaper. Thefe advantages, 
 afllfted by the natural attraction of property, and 
 the place of nativity, v/ill foon bring back the 
 proprietors of the foil. Property is ever fluctuat- 
 ing; men of eftate are apt to be imprudent and 
 prodigal ; and the accumulations of wealth, acquired 
 by the lawyer, the merchant, the manufacturer, 
 and the farmer, are ultimately invefted-in the 
 purchafe of land. New purchafers do not early 
 .abandon their property ; as, therefore the wealth 
 and trade of the country encrcafe, the purchafers 
 of land will en.creafe, and with new purchafers new 
 icfidcnts. The
 
 ( 41 ) 
 
 The adverfaries of an Union admit, that it will 
 be beneficial to trade and manufactures; we need 
 not then be terrified by alarms of depopulation. 
 
 The next city in confequence to the metropolis 
 is Cork, which enjoys a fituation particularly cal- 
 culated for foreign trade, and an excellent harbour 
 for Men of War to refort to for the protection of 
 the ifland and its commerce. It is alfo the em- 
 porium of provifions for the British Navy, and a 
 place for all homeward bound convoys to make 
 to in times of war, when the channel might 
 be dangerous to approach. From the conve- 
 nience of the fituation of Cork, it would proba- 
 bly, after an Union, become a Marine Station, 
 and a Dock-yard would be there formed. It is 
 known that the three prefem harbours of England, 
 viz. the Thames, Portfmouth, and Plymouth, 
 are inadequate to the extent of the navy ; and 
 that a new ftation is greatly wanted. If an Union 
 were once effected, there can be little doubt that 
 Cork would be felected for the purpofe. 
 
 Limerick and Waterford would not be par- 
 ticularly affected, except in proportion as an 
 Union, by inducing the import of Britilh capital, 
 and the general extenfion of trade, Ihould natu- 
 rally augment their commercial exertions ; and 
 this general argument is applicable to all parts of 
 the South- weft. * 
 
 G With
 
 "With regard to the North of Ireland, which 
 carries on a manufacture of linen, of which 
 52,ooo 3 ooo of yards have been exported in one 
 year ; all that can be defired is to confirm a trade, 
 which, by its extent, feems a monopoly. Great 
 Britain gives a preference in her market, to I rim 
 over German linens of 37 per cent, and grants a 
 bounty of three half-pence a yard on all Iri(h linens 
 re-exported, the value of which does not exceed 
 eighteen-pence a yard. Thefe advantages in fa- 
 vour of the North of Ireland, England might 
 repeal or diminish, whenever fhe pleafes ; by an 
 Union, they might be fixed for ever* 
 
 It may now be defirable to obviate feveral 
 objections which are naturally and generally 
 brought forward to diffuade Ireland from an 
 Union. 
 
 Firft. jfln Union would extinguijh Ireland. The 
 name may remain, and furely it will riot extinguifii 
 the people and the foil ; though it may meliorate 
 both. If its reprefcntatives fit in the fame place 
 with its Executive, and by that means obtain 
 great influence in the councils of the Empire ; 
 and the fame fccurity for its fituation as the 
 people of England enjoy, how will Ireland be 
 extinguilhed ? 
 
 Second.
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 Second. What can be Jucb madnefe and folly as 
 for a -people to fend its Legiflature from tb: Metro- 
 polis of their own Country , which is convenient to all 
 its Member s> to Jit in the Metropolis of another Coun- 
 try* Separated by the Jea y at a great diftance, to the 
 inconvenience of all its Members ? 
 
 The anfwer to this objection is, that Ireland is 
 part of an Empire j that the King of Ireland refides 
 in that diftant Metropolis ; that having two Le- 
 giflatures in one Empire is incompatible with its 
 fafety j that a Confolidation of thofe Legislatures 
 promifts great advantages; that the diftance of 
 Ireland from the Metropolis of England, is not 
 greater than that of Scotland -, that in the French 
 Republic the diftance of Toulon and many other 
 parts from Paris, is much greater than the diftance 
 of Dublin from London j and that in America the 
 diftance of Charleftown and other Capitals from 
 Philadelphia, is in the fame proportion : yet no 
 inconvenience is felt in thefe cafes j and the in- 
 convenience of diftance may be eafily balanced by 
 the advantages of Union. 
 
 Third. r-Shall we tamely rcfign that Legijlature 
 whofe Independence was Jo glorioufly ajerted and efta- 
 blijhed by the arms of the Volunteers ? 
 
 It is not intended to detract from the merit of 
 the Volunteers of Ireland. In afferting the inde- 
 
 pendenc?
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 pendece of the Legiflature of Ireland, they were 
 convinced they were promoting her happinefs and 
 fecurity ; they meant well, they acted nobly, but 
 they have failed in fucccfs. The fecurity and hap- 
 pinefs of Ireland is at prefent fufpended. It does 
 not appear that the continuance of a feparate Le- 
 giflature will reflore it. Some new arrangement 
 muft be tried If the Volunteers of Ireland armed 
 for the happinefs of their country, they armed for 
 a feparate Legiflature, provided they could obtain 
 it j but if that has failed, and nothing but an Union 
 can procure it, they armed for an Union , it was 
 not the means but the end which was in their 
 contemplation. To fecure the liberty and the pro- 
 perty of their countrymen, to increafe the happi- 
 nefs and profperity of their country, were their ob- 
 ject; and whoever beft purfues that object, fights in 
 their caufe, and enlifts under their banners. Can 
 we fuppofe, if, in 1779, Ireland had been united 
 to Great Britain by an identity of Legiflature, that 
 if her privileges had been equally great, and 
 equally eftabiilhed ; that if we had then been in the 
 enjoyment of a trade as free as the commerce of 
 England ; if her liberties had been fecured by the 
 Habeas Corpus Bill ; if our Judges had been in- 
 dependent, and if we had not been degraded by 
 Legiflating Privy Councils in fhort, if our Con- 
 ftitution had been the fame as the Britim, that the 
 Volunteers would have flood forth to deftroy the 
 profperity and happinefs of fuch a ftate, and have 
 
 diffolved
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 difiblved that which produced them ? Would they 
 not, on the contrary, have confidered any attempt 
 to feparate the kingdoms as hoftile, and have 
 treated the advifers of fuch folly as enemies ? 
 
 Nor was it fo much the theoretic defects of our 
 former connexion with Great Britain, which roujed 
 the volunteers, as the practical evils refulting from 
 it, and efpecially the reflraints upon our commerce. 
 But their acquifidons, which removed thofe evils 
 and reftraints, have produced, (as was at the time 
 foretold) new inconveniencies and evils : What 
 then is the ftate of the cafe ? a fubordination of the 
 Irifh Legiflature to the Britifh, has been experien- 
 ced and fou - 1 injurious ; a feparate Legiflature has 
 been tried, and proved inadequate to fecure our 
 happinefs; an incorporation with the Britilh Par- 
 liament may flill be reforted to, which promifes 
 the fecurity of our fubordinate ftate, the advantages 
 of our independent fituation, and is in theory pre- 
 ferable to both. 
 
 Fourth.-T-JVf#y? // not be the height of folly to part 
 with the management of our own concerns for ever? 
 
 The obvious anfwer is, that in a fair Legiflative 
 Union with Great Britain we fhall retain as far as 
 is neceffary, and not part with at all the manage- 
 ment of our concerns. We fhall have Irishmen 
 in the originating Cabinet of Great Britain; we 
 
 {ball
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 ihall have a number of Irilh Representatives in 
 proportion to our relative confequence, and in the. 
 Parliament of the Empire. Our affairs will be 
 there difcufled by our own Members, in the pre- 
 fence of the wifeft and freed affembly which ever 
 exifted, where our intereft is their intereft, our 
 profperity their profperity, our power their aggran- 
 dizement, and where of courfe the anxiety of our 
 welfare muft be as great in the Britim as in the 
 Irim part of the Legiflature. 
 
 But this objection might as well be urged by 
 Yorkfhire, or any county in England as by Ireland. 
 It will be faid the Members for Great Britain will 
 out-number the Members for Ireland, as five to 
 one ; fo may Y orklhire complain that the Members 
 for Great Britain are in proportion to the Members 
 for Yorkfhire as fifty to one. 
 
 The fame weak argument was advanced at the 
 time of the Union for Scotland; it was then re- 
 futed in terms, it has fmce been refuted by expe- 
 rience. 
 
 Fifth. A kingdom that fubjeffs its own Legi/la- 
 ture to the will of another kingdom, becomes itsjlave. 
 Let the pofition he granted, and let it be allowed 
 that it is true, with refpeft to an Union of defpotic 
 countries; with regard to an Union of free coun- 
 tries it does not apply. For an Union, prefuppo- 
 
 fmg
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 fing that the Legidature of the united empire is 
 compofed of numbers of reprefentatives, propor- 
 tionate to its component parts, and that the laws 
 to be made muft attach generally and not partially, 
 and that there is an identity of privileges and in<- 
 terefts througout the whole; it will follow, that 
 fo long as any part of the Union remains free, the 
 whole will remain free. Who would defire to have 
 better fecurity for his liberty than an Englifhman 
 poffefTes for his ? The liberties of the empire are at 
 prefent maintained by a feparate body of repre- 
 ientatives for Great Britain, and a feparate body of 
 reprefentatives for Ireland; how will either be en- 
 dangered when a common body of reprefentatives 
 fliall be formed on a fcheme of mutual intereft for 
 the joint prefervation of both ? 
 
 . Sixth. It is urged that the preftnt is a moft im- 
 proper time to agitate the quejlion^ when the feoflt 
 are injuch a flats cf irritation and turbulence^ and 
 the kingdom engaged in war. 
 
 Ic may be argued on the other hand, that the 
 prefent is the period moft adapted for its dbfcuffion j 
 for whilft the feelings of our late misfortunes are 
 frefh, it is natural that we mould be anxious to 
 provide every fafeguard againft their recurrence, 
 and that we ought not to adjourn the confideration 
 of our permanent fafety to a cafual interval of 
 
 peace,
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 peace, when a temporary enjoyment of tranquillity 
 may render us indifferent and regardlefs. 
 
 As to a time of war, it is true, that the Volun- 
 teers took advantage of the embarraflrnents of 
 Great Britain in the laft war, to affert the independ- 
 ence of our Parliament. It is likewife true, that 
 the United Irimmen in the prefent war have taken 
 advantage of the fuppofed weaknefs of Great Britain 
 to play the game of feparation. When, therefore, 
 enemies of the empire take advantage of a time of 
 war and embarraffment to effect its ruin, we fhould 
 turn againft them their own game, and make ufe 
 of a time of war to eftablim its fecurity. 
 
 Seventh. The qiteftion of Union is beyond ths power 
 and competence of Parliament; a Houfe of Commons 
 elected for eight years, cannot abolijh the Houfe of 
 Commons for ever. 
 
 This objection is eafily anfwered by confidering 
 the end of LegiQative inftitutions, by which their 
 competency is belt defined. The end for which 
 Legiflature is eftablilhed by a free people is to 
 maintain their property, to protect their characters, 
 to fecure the liberty of their perfons, and to con- 
 fult the convenience and happinefs of the people. 
 Now if it be not poflible for a Legiflature to enfure 
 thefe ends to its conftituents by preferving itfelf 
 3 feparjte
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 feparate from another kingdom, and if by unk- 
 ing itfelf with another kingdom, it is certain or 
 highly probable that their ends will be attained ; it 
 follows, that were a Legiflature to refufe entertain- 
 ing fuch a queftien it would defert its duty, which 
 is the purfuit of the general good. That in the 
 difeuffion of the queftion the Legiflature ought to 
 liftcn to the opinion of the people is true, and it 
 will not aft againft that opinion if univerfal j bud 
 on the other hand, it ought not to be terrified by 
 the clamour of a few, and fhould be fatisfied by 
 general acquaintance. 
 
 If this argument had any real weight, we could 
 never have obtained the reformation, and the 
 eftablifhment of Proteftantifm ; we could never 
 have procured the Revolution, and have changed 
 the line of hereditary fucceffion to the throne ; 
 the Union of Scotland and England could not 
 have been entertained. It is a common maxim 
 in logic, that what proves too much, proves 
 nothing; and if this maxim is applicable to fub- 
 jefts, where ftri<5t reafoning is required, it cannot 
 be excluded from political arguments^ where 
 probabilites and experiences muft be reforted to, 
 and queftions are to be decided by the principles 
 of moral reafoning, not by mathematical precifion. 
 
 Eighth. The arguments from national dig- 
 nity, and national pride, have been obviated al- 
 ii ready >
 
 ( JO ) 
 
 ready ; but as they will be repeatedly urged, ss 
 being eafy topics of declamation, another mode 
 of rejecting them may be fuggefted. 
 
 Ireland, independent Ireland, has, at this 
 moment, its commerce in all parts of the world, 
 protected, without expence, by the Britilh Navy. 
 Her fupplies for the year are chiefly raifed by the 
 Britilh Minifter in England, on the faith of the 
 Britiih Parliament ; her country is protected from 
 domeftic and foreign enemies, by forty thoufand 
 Britilh troops, at the expence to Great Britain, 
 of fcven hundred thoufand pounds a-year. If her 
 dignity and pride do not fuffer by receiving fuch 
 affiftance and protection, how can they be in- 
 jured, if (he makes herfelf a part of that nation, 
 incorporates her Legiflaturc into that of Great 
 Britain, and converts that protection, which fbe 
 now receives as favour* into a right ? 
 
 Ninth. When Ireland was fuhjeft to the con- 
 troul of tbe. Britijh Parliament, was Jhe not 
 kept down in a wretched Jlate of penury, by tbe 
 tyranny of Great Britain ; and. will Jhe not be re- 
 duced to a fimilar Jiate y by again Jubjefting her 
 reprejentative to theirs? Has not all the im- 
 provement of tbe kingdom arijen from the exertions 
 t>f a free Legiflature -, and Jhall we anfent to part 
 with that power, which has been the only cauje 
 of our prosperity ? 
 
 This
 
 an 
 
 This argument would have fome weight if 
 Union were a flate of fubjection, from which 
 it is efientially diftinguifhed, as has been demon- 
 ftrated before. The great advantage of an Union 
 is, that it places Ireland on an equality with 
 Great Britain, and prevents its fubjeclion for 
 even The vice of our former connexion with 
 England was, that Great Britain made laws to 
 bind Ireland, without binding herfdf at the fame 
 time, by the fame laws. After an Union, par- 
 tial laws cannot be made, where general in- 
 terefl is concerned j we lhall have full fecurity 
 that the Britilh United Parliament will never 
 injure Ireland, becaufe it muft at the fame time 
 injure herfelf, and this is the bed poflible fe- 
 curity. 
 
 It is certain, that fmcc the independence of the 
 Irifh Legiflature, our commerce has incrcaled, 
 but that has been effected by Great Britain ad- 
 mitting us to her Colony trade and by relaxing 
 the Navigation Laws ; and if the giving us fome 
 of the advantages of Britifh Commerce, has been 
 of fuch benefit already, what progrefs may we 
 not expect, when all the advantages of the Britifli 
 Market, and Britifli Commerce fhall be fecured 
 to us for ever, which cannot fail to be the effect 
 of an Union i 
 
 Tenth.
 
 Tenth. An Union mufl be our ruin cr deftrufticn ; 
 ell we want is a good jleady Admmj!ration t 
 and firmly conduced) and then all things will g 
 
 Here we muft afk, what is meant by a firm wl 
 Jleady Adminiftration ? Does it mean fuch an Ad- 
 miniflration as attends to the encreafe of the na- 
 tion in population, its advancement in agriculture, 
 in manufactures, in wealth and profperity ? If 
 that is intended, we have had the experience of it 
 thefe twenty years ; for it is univerfally admitted, 
 that no country in the world ever made fuch rapid 
 advances as Ireland has done in thefe refpefts j 
 yet, all her acceflion of profperity has been of 
 no avail; difcontent has kept pace with improve- 
 ment, difcord has grown up with our wealth, 
 confpiracy and rebellion have fhot up with our - 
 profperity. 
 
 What then is intended by zfteady and firm Ad- 
 miniftration ? Is it a determined, inflexible fupport 
 of Proteftant Afcendency, and a rigorous and 
 indignant rejection of Catholic claims ? Who will 
 be a guarantee of that fyftem, and whom will it 
 content ? The Catholics will not acquiefce in its 
 propriety. A party of Proteftants in Ireland, 
 term it unjuft and abfurd j another party in 
 England term it by fouler names j great leaders 
 in oppofition, poffibly the future minifters of Eng- 
 land, may condemn it $ and fome members of the 
 7 Britifh
 
 a. 
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 Britiih Cabinet arc fuppofed to be adverfe to it. 
 Its (lability may reft upon accident, upon the 
 death of a finale charade r, upon the change of a 
 Minifter, on the temper of a Lord Lieutenant -, 
 and the policy of this fyftem is much doubted by 
 the people of England. 
 
 But perhaps a firm and ftcady Admhijlratu* 
 means Catholic Emancipation and Reform. Dr. 
 M'Nevin, however, and the United Irilhmen, 
 allure us, that thefe meafures are the certain intro? 
 duftion of Separation and Republicanifm, and 
 that they were merely adopted \vith that view by 
 the United Iriftimen. Fas eft & ab kofte doctri. 
 
 If then mere attention to agricultural and com- 
 mercial profperity, and to general improvement, 
 will not preferve good order, fubordinauon, and 
 allegiance ; if the power of maintaining Proteftant 
 Afcendancy is uncertain, and the project of Catho- 
 lic Emancipation and Reform is pregnant with 
 danger, ought we to reject the confideration of a 
 mcafure with contumely and difdajn, which places 
 our Conltitution on the lame footing of iecurity 
 as that of Great Britain, and holds out Briti/h 
 Principles, Bridfh Honour, and Britith Power, as 
 the guarantee of our Liberties, and I&abli 
 
 A few of the topics relating to an Union have 
 been now difcufled, an.4 ic is hojped they have been 
 
 difcuffed 
 
 \
 
 ( S4 ) 
 
 difeufled in fuch a manner as to prove that the 
 fubjeft of an Union with Great Britain deferves 
 the ferious and calm deliberation of every hooeft 
 man ; that it is not to be encountered by pafllon, 
 nor combated with arms. 
 
 An Union has this advantage it may be our 
 falvatlon - t it cannot be our ruin. 
 
 Kqual liberty, equal privilege, with the people 
 of Great Britain, guaranteed by a Parliament com- 
 pofed from the Reprefentatives of both kingdoms, 
 ind upheld by the power of all the fubjects of the 
 two iflands; in fhort, the confolidation of Great 
 Britain and Ireland into one kingdom, with one 
 Conftitution, one King, one Law, one Religion, 
 can never be the ruin of Ireland. It widens the 
 foundation of our liberties, it advances our prof- 
 peels of improvement, it flrengthens the bafis of 
 profperity in domeftic fecufity, and enfures our 
 Imperial Independence by confolidating our power. 
 
 There may be prejudices to overcome j there 
 may be private inferefts to manage and to com- 
 penfate; there may be the intrigues of our enemies 
 to counteract j but if the nature of our fituation, 
 our permanent and great' interefts, demonftrate an 
 Union to be falutary for our perpetual improve- 
 ment, fecurity, and (lability, let us boldly follow 
 where our reafon kads, though private intcreft and 
 
 local
 
 k>cal prejudice, and hoftile intrigue, fhall attempt 
 to impede and arreft our progrefs. 
 
 The defign of what has been written is to re- 
 move any improper prepoffefilon againft an Union 
 in general ; the detail of the fubject has not been 
 entered upon. It may be obferved, however, that 
 the following points are fuppofed : 
 
 Firft. The prefervation of the Proteftant reli- 
 gion and eftablifhment, as a fundamental article. 
 
 Second. An equitable number of Peers and 
 Commoners, to fit in the Parliament of the Empire. 
 
 Third. An equality of Rights and Privileges, 
 and a fair adjuftment of commerce. 
 
 Fourth. An equitable arrangement as to reve- 
 nues, debts, and future taxes, fuitable to our fitua- 
 tion and powers. 
 
 Fifth. The continuance of the civil adminiftra- 
 tion in Ireland, as it (lands at prefent accommodated 
 to the new fituation of the kingdom. 
 
 o 
 
 Sixth. An arrangement for the Roman Catho- 
 lic clergy, fo as to put an end, if poffible, to reli- 
 gious jealoufies, and to enfure the attachment of 
 that order of men to the ftate. 
 
 Seventh.
 
 Seventh. Some further provifion to the Dif- 
 fenting clergy. 
 
 Eighth. An arrangement with refpeft to tithes. 
 
 It is furely poffible that all thefe points may be 
 properly adjufted, by wife and noble men, fo as to 
 prove upon the whole a rational and permanent 
 fyftem upon which we may fecurely clofe up our 
 interefts with thofe of Great Britain : But it would 
 be ufelefs to enter into the detail of any meafure, 
 fo long as the public mind fhould refufe to dif- 
 cufs its principle. If all advantages are to be re. 
 jefted, becaufe they cannot be obtained but 
 through the medium of an Union; if we had 
 rather continue in turbulent infecurity, than be 
 united in profperity and happinefs with Great 
 Britain $ and if we prefer adhering with tenacious 
 obftinacy to falfe notions of Pride, rather than 
 to cherifh the fentiments of true Independence, 
 the labour of detailed reafoning would be loft 
 and futile. 
 
 But as we truft the foregoing obfervations may 
 tend to incline every rational mind to a fair Exa- 
 mination and Enquiry, we may hereafter profit on 
 the difpofition and temper of the Public, and fug- 
 geft a fcheme for confideration, accompanied with 
 calculations and details. 
 
 Some
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 . Some of the ftatements which have been made 
 in this publication, feem to have the tendency of 
 increafing Party Animofity ; whereas the object of 
 the writer is to reconcile and extinguish them ; but 
 he knows not how to induce men to think rightly, 
 without making them fee their fituation and con- 
 fefs it. 
 
 The premifes which have been ftated cannot be 
 controverted. If our fituation be imputed to mal- 
 adminiftration, who can fecure us from its recur- 
 rence ? If to the inflability of affairs, who can in- 
 fure their future confiftency ? If to the prevalence 
 of the Proteftant Monopoly, who can induce men 
 to relinquish what appeared to them the fecurity for 
 their properties ? If to the efforts of the Catholics, 
 who can force them to abandon their claims ? 
 
 Is there not fome fettlement to be anxioufly 
 wifhed for, which may lay thefe caufes of difcon- 
 tent afleep, and quiet them for ever? We have 
 been fufficiently diftra&ed and .harafled. We 
 have drank enough from the bitter cup of dif- 
 fenfion. Shall then any attempt to enfure tran- 
 quillity be the fource of difcordj (hall the difcuf- 
 fion of a plaufible theory lead to paffion and re- 
 fentmentj and an honeft attempt to allay the com- 
 motions of the State, and to fettle its jarring 
 interefts, be a provocatiun to new animofities and 
 frelh outrages? 
 
 I The
 
 The enemies of the empire have ftated, that 
 Ireland can never be happy until fhe is feparated 
 from England; it is the opinion of many of her 
 friends, that (he never can be truly happy till ihc 
 is entirely united with England. 
 
 The one attempt would make Ireland the fcer.e 
 of corned in Europe; would deluge her with 
 blood; would reduce her to defolation: the latter 
 by making her power, the power of Great Britain, 
 and the power of Great Britain her own, would 
 enable the Britifh Empire to defy every hoftile 
 attack, and to fecure to the happy coafts of the 
 two iflands, all the bleflings of genuine and 
 rational liberty, of true and folid independence 
 and fecurity. 
 
 y w i * 
 
 THE END. 
 
 I'iiJfi
 
 CjaylorJ 
 
 Syracuse, 
 Stockton, I 
 
 000 0*7 
 
 9U9. 
 
 C77a 
 1798