We . *+ "•rs%s > t u r a I S c U N I V E R S I TY OF CALIFORN Lemon Picking and the Ventura County Tree Production Incentive Wage System assess Roy J. Smith • Daniel T.Seamount • Bruce H.Mills CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN 809 Lemon Picking and the Ventura County Tree Production Incentive Wage System 1 ^b THIS BULLETIN *describes lemon picking practices and standards in Ventura County and their development over the past twenty years ♦discusses the variations of picking rates due to orchard, seasons, differences in pickers and management practices and their effect on costs and earnings ♦explains the use and effectiveness of the tree production incentive wage system as a device to stabilize earnings ♦examines the impact a minimum wage would have upon picker wages and practices ♦suggests an intended level of earning as an alternative to the minimum wage concept The bulletin is aimed specifically at employers of lemon pickers but many of its findings should be of value to other users of farm labor and to those outside agriculture who are faced with basically similar labor conditions. ACKNOWLEDGMENT We wish to express our appreciation to the managements, directors, and members of the lemon packing houses in Ventura County, for more than twenty years of cooperation and friendship. We also wish to thank Mr. H. Najima, assistant specialist, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of California, Los Angeles, for his invaluable contribution in gathering and analyzing all 1954-55 data used in this report. JANUARY 1965 THE AUTHORS: Roy J. Smith is Professor of Agricultural Economics, Department of Horticultural Science, Agricultural Experiment Station and Citrus Research Center, Riverside; Daniel T. Seamount is Associate Specialist, Department of Horticultural Science, Agricultural Experiment Station and Citrus Research Center, Riverside; Bruce H. Mills is Statis- tician, Ventura County Citrus Growers Committee. 1 Submitted for publication September 30, 1963. CONTENTS LEMON PICKING IN VENTURA COUNTY 4 THE TREE PRODUCTION INCENTIVE WAGE SYSTEM 5 The Tree Production System is Simple 5 Rate of Pick Data 7 Intended Level of Earnings 7 BASIC CONCEPTS 8 HISTORY OF TREE PRODUCTION INCENTIVE WAGE SYSTEM 14 INDIVIDUAL RATES OF PICK 19 RATE OF PICK AS INFLUENCED BY ORCHARDS AND ORCHARD PICKS 23 Yield 24 Tree Height 25 Size of Fruit 27 Other Variables 30 EARNINGS STABILIZATION 30 Remaining Instability 31 BACKGROUND TO CURRENT PROBLEMS 32 The Grower Income Situation 32 Rising Wage Levels 33 CHANGES IN PICKING PRACTICES AND STANDARDS 34 Measurement of Change 34 Management Considerations 37 Prospects for Further Changes 39 IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIENCE 41 IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGES 46 Introductory "Example" Crew 47 The Total Complex of Variables 48 An Incentive for the Inexperienced 50 The Critical Issue 50 Alternatives to Management, If Management Acts Alone 50 Conclusions as to the Use of the Minimum Wage 51 DIFFERENCES AMONG PACKING HOUSES 51 COSTS 54 Measurement of Direct Labor Cost Changes 54 Overhead Costs 54 The Analysis of Picking Costs 55 Level of Earnings 55 ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE 57 LITERATURE CITED 60 LEMON PICKING IN VENTURA COUNTY The average cost of picking lemons in California can be calculated for 1961-62 at 45 cents per 50-pound field box of fruit (California Citrus League, 1963A). A simi- lar calculation for the same year indicates that all labor and material costs for lemon production on the tree averaged 85 cents per field box (California Citrus League, 1963B). The 45 cents picking cost, being a cash charge direct to growers, clearly is one of their most important expenses. Picking efficiency must receive, therefore, close attention. Ventura County in 1962 had about 21,- 245 acres of lemons, some 46 per cent of the state's total (California Crop and Live- stock Reporting Service, 1963) but because of higher yields was producing about half of the state's lemon crop. Ventura County has the world's greatest concentration of lemon production so the area study is par- ticularly significant as to industry picking costs. There are 737 lemon growers in Ven- tura County. 2 The picking is done by 13 2 Correspondence with office of Agricultural Com- missioner, Ventura County Dept. of Agric, Santa Paula, August 1, 1963. large packing-house organizations (figure 1), most of them handling more than 1,000 acres of lemons each. Four of these 13 op- erate two complete lemon packing houses each. (Only 16 houses are shown in figure 1 because one organization has two com- plete houses only a block apart under one name.) Six of the packing-house organizations are cooperatives. Four others are each owned by a farming organization doing its own picking and packing. (Two of these also operate large orange operations, both growing and packing, and one also picks and packs for other growers). The remain- ing three lemon packing-house organiza- tions are privately owned, specialized pack- ing-house organizations, in each case pick- ing and packing for a number of growers. (Two of these three, however, are owned by people having other large farming in- terests as well). Because picking and packing fruit re- quires highly specialized management and a large investment, many growers (even those growing up to a thousand acres of lemons) turn their picking operations over %^lf#iHV V-v^'r-ivv "(-■■'•>/:--.. ■:-:+:< .VENTURA COASTAL f fcSATICOY LEMON VENTURA PACIFIC SEABOARD VSOMIS LEMON •/ £ SANTA CLARA r a L OXNARD CITRUS .,.. ,>.„Jr ^' ! 'Sf* IIMR Fig. 1. Location of lemon packing houses in the coastal and interior area of Ventura County. Three houses now are joined with others, making it 13 packing house organizations in all. [4] to the packing houses. Because orchard operations, such as irrigating and spraying, must be synchronized with picking, the packing-house managers keep growers in- formed about policies and practices and try to obtain their assent. The growers in a cooperative have final control through the board of directors. Most growers, how- ever, leave the picking problems almost entirely in the hands of the packing-house management through their board of di- rectors. Since World War II, most of the pick- ing has been done by Mexicans imported under a treaty contract arrangement be- tween the United States and Mexico. The Mexican braceros are brought into the country under the supervision of the Ven- tura County Citrus Growers Committee which assigns them to the various organi- zations that do the picking. There also exist in the county eight grower associations which are directly re- sponsible for the pickers and their im- mediate supervisor. Each of these organi- gations is incorporated, directed by a board of directors made up of growers, and handles both orange and lemon opera- tions. These grower associations require all their members to become individual members of the Ventura County Citrus Growers Committee to be their procuring agent for harvest labor regardless of types or original source. The grower associations operate the labor camps and personnel hauling equipment, hire the picking fore- men, and pay all bills directly related to picking. The picking policy, however, is established by the packing house. THE TREE PRODUCTION INCENTIVE WAGE SYSTEM Since World War II, Ventura County has been using a unique wage system for paying lemon pickers. The next two sec- tions describe the specific system now in use, its concepts and history. The system is usually called the "tree production incentive wage system." Since the system is also applied to crops other than trees and even to nonagricultural enterprises, the name has serious faults. A phrase like "classified task incentive wage system" might be better. However, the tree production name is well established in agriculture and is used in this report. The wage rates for lemon pickers in Ventura County are given in table 1. A different rate structure is shown for each of the four different tree classes, arranged by tree size. Each class of trees is further divided into several fruit-size classes (ex- pressed by number of fruit per box) and yield-per-tree classes (expressed by boxes and fractions of boxes per tree). These various rates are necessary be- cause different orchards pick at very dif- ferent rates of pick in boxes per hour. Some picking is more than three times as fast as other picking. These differences are inevitable. No picker should be asked to pick in a slow-picking orchard without a higher rate of pay per box than he would accept in an average orchard. A variation is necessary in the rate of pay from orchard pick to orchard pick if equity is to be maintained for pickers. The Tree Production System is Simple It appears complicated only because it covers all kinds of picking. But we have no choice, fruit must be picked in all kinds of situations whether the picking is fast or slow. Setting the tree class: A sample of trees in every orchard block is measured from ground to highest fruit to be picked. If ground is sloped or terraced, the lowest ground side for a tree is used for measur- ing height. The packing house has a record of this height. Each tree class in the table has its own set of box rates. Yields: The box rate varies with dif- ferent yields of boxes per tree. The lower [5] Table 1 . Rates of pay in cents per box for lemon picking, by tree classes, by yields, and by fruit size, Ventura County, January 23, 1 964. Class It Class II Class III Class IV Yield Fruit size (number per box) Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 Under 240 240- Over 300 300 Under 240- 240 300 Over 300 Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 bxs/tree* cents 0-H 47 41 36 33 31 29 56 46 40$ 37 33 31 70 53 45 41 36 33 $ 57 48 42 38 35 32 30 64 75$ 54 59 46$ 51 42 45 38 41 35 37 32 35 66 72 55 60 47 51 $ 42 46 38 41 34 37 31 34 28 32 79 66 56 50 44 X 41 38 36 78 67 58 52 47 43 38 86 73 63 $ 56 51 46 42 95 y±-y 2 81* y-% 70 \i-\ 62 \-\y 2 54 \y 2 -i 50 2-3 46$ 3 + 35 39 43 * Field box capacity: 2,926 cubic inches. t Tree classification : Class I — Picked without a ladder. Class II — Ladder-picked trees less than 9V£ feet tall. Class III — Ladder-picked trees 9H to 12 feet tall. Class IV — Ladder-picked trees over 12 feet tall. $ Discussed in text. the yield, the higher the box rate. In table 1, the first column on the left shows the different yields used. The box rates in the second column vary from 29 cents per box to 47 cents per box, going higher with lower yields; the box rates in the last column on the right vary from 43 cents to 95 cents. Fruit size: Large fruit fills a box faster than small fruit; small fruit requires a higher box rate. Fruit is sized according to fruit count per box, under 240, 240 to 300, and over 300. Under each tree class there are three columns of figures, one for each fruit count. As an example, three of these figures are underlined in the class III columns and in the yield of 1 to 1 i/ 2 boxes per tree. Notice the box rate of each fruit count: 38 cents for under 240, 41 cents for 240 to 300, and 44 cents for over 300. To further emphasize this fruit size relation- ship, several examples are underlined. Each set of three figures has similar dif- ferences: smaller fruit (larger fruit count) pays a higher box rate. The effect of tree height: Tall trees are slower picking than small trees, if yields and fruit counts are the same. Notice the figures marked J in the \/ 2 to s/ 4 boxes per tree yield and each in the 240-300 fruit count. The box rate is higher in the taller trees, going up from 40 cents to 63 cents. How the rate of pay is set: The tree class is known before the crew goes into the orchard. The yield (boxes per tree) can be known only after the fruit has been picked. The number of boxes picked is divided by the number of trees picked. The fruit count (number per box) can be known only after the fruit has been picked and a sample of boxes have been counted out. IN NO CASE IS ANYONE'S OPIN- ION OR JUDGMENT USED; ONLY FACTUAL DATA ARE USED. For in- stance: If the picking is in class II trees, if the yield is between \\/ 2 and 2 boxes per tree, and if the fruit count is between 240 and 300 fruit per box, the box rate is 35 cents. Another example: Class III trees; yield of 1 to 1 1/ 2 boxes per tree; and fruit count of over 300; the box rate is 44 cents. Every box rate used under this system is set by this same method. [6] Rate of Pick Data The traditional method used in agri- culture for setting up an incentive rate of pay has been to estimate how much a spe- cific worker would earn at a given incen- tive pay, If, with experience, the earnings are found to be too low or too high, an appropriate adjustment has been made in the pay rate. In contrast to the traditional method, the method used for Ventura County lemon pickers, as far as possible, has been to measure the rates of work actually achieved by at least a large sample of workers in a large sample of orchards. The classification of orchards and orchard picks, wherever possible, has been the same as that of the rate-of-pay schedule. Workers have been used in large numbers, cer- tainly several hundred, all working under an incentive wage system. An attempt has always been made to exclude inexperi- enced workers — roughly those of less than two months' experience. Table 2 is a rate-of-pick schedule from which a rate-of-pay schedule such as table 1 can be constructed. The table on rates of pick shows, in terms of picking rates by the average picker, the influence of tree class, fruit size, and yield. Each classifica- tion is defined exactly the same as the com- parable classification in table 1 showing the rates of pay. Intended Level of Earnings Conversion from the rate-of-pick sched- ule to the rate-of-pay schedule is made by means of the "intended level of earnings." The intended level of earnings is divided by each successive rate of pick to find the appropriate rate of pay. The intended level-of-earnings relationship between ta- bles 1 and 2 is $1.37 per hour. (We wish to emphasize here, however, that there may be some error in table 2, the rate of pick schedule. The determination of aver- age rates of pick over a composite of condi- tions such as we are dealing with is most difficult. These difficulties are described in detail later in the bulletin but they relate to differences among workers, orchards, houses, and seasons. As of this date, for instance, management in Ventura County anticipates that experienced men should average about $1.30 an hour rather than the $1.37 which table 2 indicates). By "level of earnings" we mean the actual average earnings per hour of all workers under a given wage system for a season. In setting up the Ventura County Table 2. Rates of pick in boxes per hour for lemon picking by experienced pickers, by tree classes, by yields, and by fruit size, Ventura County, 1962 data. Class It Class II Class III Class IV Yield Fruit size (number per box) Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 Under 240 240- 300 Over 300 bxs/trees* boxes 0-}4 2.91 3.38 3.79 4.13 4.47 4.81 2.45 2.98 3.42 3.76 4.13 4.49 1.98 2.60 3.05 3.38 3.79 4.17 2.40 2.86 3.29 3.61 3.96 4.29 4.63 2.16 2.55 2.97 3.30 3.67 3.99 4.27 1.84 2.32 2.72 3.05 3.38 3.68 3.90 2.08 2.50 2.95 3.25 3.62 4.02 4.46 4.85 1.91 2.30 2.69 3.00 3.36 3.70 4.04 4.37 1.74 2.10 2.45 2.76 3.10 3.38 3.63 3.80 1.76 2.06 2.37 2.64 2.93 3.24 3.59 3.90 1.60 1.89 2.17 2.42 2.72 3.01 3.30 3.55 1.45 i^-i^ 1.70 y^-^i 1.96 %-i 2.22 l-i i/£ 2.53 1)^-2 2.78 2-3 3.00 3 + 3.20 * Field box capacity: 2,926 cubic inches. t Tree classification: Class I — Picked without a ladder. Class II — Ladder-picked trees less than 9H feet tall. Class III — Ladder-picked trees Wv to 12 feet tall. Class IV — Ladder-picked trees over 12 feet tall. [7] tree production wage system, use is made of an "intended level of earnings" to con- vert the rate of pick data into a rate-of-pay schedule. The level of earnings is the final realized rate of pay. The intended level of earnings is the original objective. If the rate-of-pick data are accurate, the two levels of earnings, the intended and the achieved, will be the same. The intended level of earnings along with the rate-of- pick data determine what the rate-of-pay schedule will be and thus what the ulti- mate level of earnings will be. Thus, in setting up a rate-of-pay schedule, data on rate of pick must be in hand and man- agement must decide what its intentions shall be as to the level of earnings. The rate-of-pick data should be based as much as possible on the measurement of actual work under incentives. It should be a purely objective measurement. The intended level of earnings is somewhat in contrast because it requires more judg- ment: it brings into the picture a wide range of considerations quite different in character from the rate-of-pick data. The term, "level of earnings" has a variety of meanings. It can be applied to one day's picking, to a payroll period, or to an entire season or year. It can apply to one man or to one crew, to all the crews in a packing house, or to all the crews in the county. It can apply to earnings under a particular rate or to all the rates in a schedule as they average out. In this bulletin, the term "level of earn- ings" includes all the pay rates in a sched- ule, unless otherwise specified. Each pay rate in the schedule gives an earning close to the over-all average. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that all the crews in Ventura County are included. The intended level of earnings is the focal point of decision as to the earnings of labor. As such, it is relatively stable, quite in contrast to the erratic actions in- herent in a single-box rate system. It is not the authors' function to determine what this intended level of earnings should be. Our purpose here is to present the rela- tionship that exists between the intended level of earnings, the rates of pay sched- ule, and the rates of pick data, and to point out the importance of the function which the intended level of earnings performs. BASIC CONCEPTS The whole conceptual system of the tree production incentive wage system differs materially from incentive systems com- monly found in agriculture. Most com- monly a single incentive rate is used and applied to all situations — or at least an attempt is made to do so. With reference to lemon picking we can say categorically that a single-box rate in a community is grossly inequitable to pickers in poor (slower) picking and is grossly inequitable to growers in good (faster) picking. A picker is seldom willing to accept an aver- age rate in all situations; in poor picking he stays away if he can. If the picker does accept this one rate it means the grower with a poor orchard gets his fruit picked at an average rate of pay only because a grower with a good orchard pays an ex- cessive rate. In such a system the good- orchard pick subsidizes the poor-orchard pi< k. The most common variation from a single-rate system is to use multiple rates, each set by successive agreements, day to day and orchard to orchard. If each rate is set before picking starts, it must use guess- work as to picking conditions. The guesses are often wrong. If the rate is too low, the crew may quit unless an adjustment up- ward is made. If the rate is too high the . cost to the grower is excessive but nothing can be done about it except to stop pick- ing. There can be a threat of a work stoppage every day. Without a classifica- tion of orchards and of picking conditions, there is no way of knowing what the vari- ous packing houses in a community are paying. A specific rate of pay has no mean- ing except in relation to specific picking conditions. There is misunderstanding and conflict between packing houses. In a time of rising wages such a practice is very apt [3] to lead to acceleration of the rising rates of pay. The tree production system is also a multiple rate system but the schedule of rates is set up initially as a composite struc- ture. No series of successive decisions are necessary. As a composite structure or schedule the tree production system is not entirely new. Certain elementary examples have been found in crops such as cotton and sugar beets, both in the United States and in some other countries such as Eng- land. But nowhere, to our knowledge, has this system been developed in such elabo- rate detail as in the Ventura County lemon picking industry. However, the details de- veloped there have general interest and wide applicability. They have long since been applied under a wide variety of cir- cumstances in urban industries and we have every reason to believe a wide appli- cation in agriculture is quite practical. To establish this general applicability we pro- pose here to outline what we consider to be the basic concepts of the system. 3 1. Rate of pick differs from worker to worker. Even if the opportunities of the work are made as equal as possible, capa- bility and effort vary among the workers. This basic concept of the incentive wage system is discussed in detail on pages 19 to 23. 2. Rate of pick differs from orchard to orchard. Differences in picking oppor- tunities depend on yield, tree height, tree variety, topography of the orchard, fruit size, age of trees, and other variables. How these factors influence the rate of pick is discussed on pages 23 to 30. 3. A man can be expected to pick lemons according to his capability only if he is paid on a strong incentive basis, such as a rate which is proportionate to output. Picking fruit is hard, dirty work, often done under unpleasant weather condi- tions. The worker on his own initiative and on his own standard of proper effort cannot be expected to exert himself as greatly under an hourly rate method as under an incentive pay system. Workers differ in natural, innate capa- bilities. Some are stronger than others. 3 An extensive literature on the subject exists. See, for example Aitkin, 1960, Baldamus, 1961; and Barnes, 1958. Some can work longer without tiring, some are quicker, some have better co- ordination than others. Some enjoy work- ing hard while others do not. These innate differences, however, do not fully explain differences in output. Differences in exertion also play a part and require incentive such as pay propor- tionate to output. Differences in capability are influenced by training. There are slow ways and fast ways of doing a task, and the worker will be anxious to learn the fast ways if the com- pulsion of proportionate pay is brought into play at an early stage of his learning period; by so doing, management can in- fluence the worker's development sub- stantially. Management can do little else to in fluence the rate of work than to offer pay proportionate to output. The wide dis- persion of pickers through an orchard, the wide differences among men in their pick- ing rate, and the differences in the physical factors in the orchard, make it difficult for supervisors to estimate the progress of a picker simply by looking at him; there is no objective basis on which to judge how hard a man is working. Supervision alone will not result in a reasonably full effort of the pickers. There are, of course, compulsions other than incentive pay. A worker, for instance, who very seriously wants to keep his job may work as fast on hourly as under in- centive rates. In fact, he may work harder. But it is difficult to determine when such compulsions operate and how effective they are; there are no objective criteria. This difficulty in recognizing or measuring these other compulsions is, in itself, a prime reason for using incentive pay. An incentive pay system, if properly set up, acts as a positive and constant influence toward more work, quite apart from the wishes of management. The worker him- self gauges its value. He balances his extra effort against the extra pay. The pay is exactly proportionate to output. Manage- ment feels justified in paying a certain amount to get its fruit picked; the work- ers feel justified in doing the work for this specific pay; this amount, no more and no less is paid and received for this extra effort if a proportionate pay rate is [9] used. Management is freed from making any decisions as to what is a reasonable effort, yet can operate in confidence that a reasonable effort will be made. Each worker is left free to make his own de- cision. The phrase "if properly set up" means that the incentive must be regarded favor- ably by the worker in every situation — a peculiarly difficult matter in lemon pick- ing. Under the tree production system, if picking is easy and fast in a particular orchard and if, therefore, pay rates are low, the reward for extra effort may ap- pear small on a per-box basis. In contrast, in an orchard that is difficult and slow to pick, the reward may appear much greater on a per-box basis. In both situations, however, if the incentive pay system is properly set up, the reward for extra ef- fort in extra returns per hour will be the same. The picker, can exert effort or not as he wishes, and will receive an extra re- ward which is stable for each individual when looked at from an hourly basis. A significant feature of a good inventive pay system is the acceptance, by both fast and slow workers, of their differences in earnings. The extra returns are the reward of greater capability and effort. There is rarely any objection to it. The worker can decide, for himself, if he want to work hard or not. 4. To earn wages in proportion to one's output not only is equitable but socially desirable. If a fast picker were paid less than a proportionate increase in earnings, compared to a slow picker, he would not be paid what he has earned; and the em- ployer would get some extra work done (that part due to the worker's extra capa- bility and effort) at less than full cost. On the other hand, if the same wage is paid to all, and the fast man is not paid propor- tionately more, the slower picker is paid for his work at more than his full con- tribution. Any such underpayment or overpayment of the worker is inequitable for worker and employer alike. The fast worker who receives extra pay for his extra work should have no feeling of unjustified payment for receiving it and the employer should have no feeling of unethical dis- crimination among his workers for pay- ing it. 5. Every picker is entitled to the same earnings per hour in successive orchards and under successive picking conditions, regardless of the physical factors in the orchards, assuming he makes a normal ef- fort. Workers are increasingly insistent on that point. In paying fruit pickers, fluctuations in earnings are often treated casually because it is argued that low earnings in one situa- tion will be balanced by high earnings in another; that equity will be achieved automatically. While it is true that a reasonable equity to pickers will be achieved in time, the balance, as a practical matter, must occur mostly within a payroll period. Workers become impatient if it takes more than a payroll period to balance out. Crews quickly become discouraged because of low earnings. To predict earnings in future orchards, however, is difficult. It requires an esti- mate, for instance, of what the yields will be and of how these yields will effect the rate of pick. Estimating yields is far more complex than the tree production wage system which depends on production data gathered as the crop is picked. The time required to achieve any such balance, moreover, can be very long. In Ventura County, for instance, where rates of pick are slow except in the spring and perhaps in the fall, a full year will nor- mally elapse before a complete balancing of earnings will have taken place. More- over, there are years of high yields and large fruit and years of low yields and small fruit. Earnings inevitably fluctuate from year to year if a single box rate is used all the time. It is not practical to wait such a long time until earnings can be balanced out. Finally, differences in earning will arise not only from differences in the picker's capability or effort but from picking con- ditions or opportunities. Such differences in earnings are not easily acceptable by laborers. They will compare earnings, and discontent is certain to result. 6. The grower's cost of picking should be related to the rate of pick to be achieved by the average man exerting a normal ef- fort. Differences in rate of pick among orchards quite properly result in dif- [10] ferences in cost of picking. On a very large ranch, the differences in earnings among pickers might be disregarded so far as the grower's equity is concerned. But where the cost is charged directly to successive growers, differences among the successive orchards because of differences in the level of earnings can be regarded as inequitable to the growers. If a picker is kept at a low rate of pay in an orchard simply on the argument that his poor earnings there will be compensated for elsewhere, the grower with the poor orchard is being subsidized by the high earnings of his pickers else- where. They would not otherwise pick his orchard. Growers who offer good picking opportunities and yet have to pay high earnings per hour to compensate the picker for this other poor picking are not treated fairly. Each grower should be asked to pay ex- actly what it really costs to pick his own orchard, measured in time for a given capability and effort. Overhead costs such as that of the cooperative packing-house manager may be charged on a pooling basis, but easily distributed costs, such as the direct costs of picking labor, should be charged on the exact costs involved. This is not only a matter of equity but a wise long-term production policy: high productivity is encouraged, low produc- tivity is discouraged. In any industry community, then, it seems desirable to maintain a constant level of earnings for any particular capa- bility and effort. 7. Where differences in picking condi- tions require a different rate of pay per box, these successive rates must be de- termined by physical measurements or classifications and not be subject to the vagaries of human judgment or the bias of human motives. The traditional method of payment on an incentive basis in agriculture is for the employer to offer a prospective employee some given rate of pay per unit of work, say boxes picked. The prospective em- ployee may or may not accept the offer. If he does not accept it the employer may either look for some one else to do the work or the two must bargain. The hiring for each orchard or block can be at a different rate. Each such hiring can be an occasion for controversy be- tween employer and employee. At bests judgments differ as to rates of pick to be expected, and in each case there is a chance to favor oneself. If the employer can have an orchard picked for less, he will do so; if the pickers can obtain higher rates, they will insist upon them. Frequently con- troversy can be expected where personal judgment enters into the rate of pay in every orchard. Employers have commonly attempted to set "going rates of pay" for the com- munity. Their object is to keep rates down but they also must attract and satisfy labor. A single rate per box for all picking in a community acts as a trip mechanism, automatically reset, to bring about dis- content and an argument for a change in rates. A poor earning situation, in certain orchards, would serve as justification for a higher rate. The higher earnings in an- other orchard would support this argu- ment: if one grower pays more per hour, why not others? The adoption of a higher rate for these poor earnings situations, however, would start a spiraling: the use of the single-box rate would raise earnings in good earning situations. This would justify another raise in the poor situations, and so on. It is inevitable that under these circumstances, the single-box rate for all pickings would tend to spiral upward, forcing higher earnings for pickers out of growers. A downward spiral is just as likely to occur under conditions that favor it. A high level of earnings can hardly be justi- fied if, elsewhere, pickers are available at lower levels of pay. So the single-box rate is reduced. If this rate is also being used in the area of lower level of pay, it will re- sult in further reductions of earnings, and so on. Where the only organization existing is that of the employers and where earnings fluctuate widely through a succession of orchards, one can assume that the em- ploying organization will make sure that there is always a good proportion of or- chards with a low level of earnings. A strong labor union, on the other hand, would use fluctuating earnings or dif- ferences in earnings as a prime cause for [ii insisting on a higher level of pay, by high- lighting poor earning situations. Emphasis, then, needs to be given to the trip mecha- nism inherent in a single-box rate system in a community. Earnings per hour in- evitably differ and justification is always at hand for a general wage change. There are, of course, limits to such a succession of changes. If earnings became too low, pickers would simply fail to show up and an adjustment upward in earnings would have to be made if the growers wanted their fruit picked. If, on the other hand, earnings became too high, growers could refuse to hire and let their crop go unharvested. But reliance on such limits either way is unwise and brings conflict to an industry. They may have to be ac- cepted where there is no good alternative. Fortunately, the tree production incen- tive wage system eliminates the trip mecha- nism aspects of a single-box rate wage system. An example of a wage schedule system that is easily subject to human motives is the so-called "crew average rate of pay" system. The system consists of a schedule of daily crew averages with an accompany- ing rate of pay for each average, all de- signed to pay the same earnings per hour. Table 3 presents such a schedule as an ex- ample, one actually used by important sec- tors in the lemon industry. At the end of the day, the crew average rate of pick is calculated. This rate of pick is found in the first column of the schedule and the rate of pay is found alongside in the second column. This rate of pay in Table 3. "Crew average rate of pay" incentive system. Piece rate schedule lists figures for crew average production for an eight hour day. Piece rate schedule Average earnings Crew average Rate of pay Dollars/8 hours boxes/ 8 hours 12-13 cents/box 70 t 65 60 56 52 y 2 49H 47 44^ 42 40 38H 36!^ 35 34 32H 31^ 30 29 28 27H 26^ 25H minimum $8.40 8.45 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.42 8.46 8.46 8.40 8.40 8.47 8.40 8.40 8.50 8.45 8.51 8.40 8.41 8.40 8.52 8.48 8.41 up to $9.10 13-14 9.10 14-15 9.00 15-16 8.96 16-17 8.92 17-18 8.91 18-19 8.93 19-20 8.90 20-21 8.82 21-22 8.80 22-23 8.86 23-24 8.76 24-25 8.75 25-26 8.84 26-27 8.78 27-28 8.82 28-29 8.70 29-30 8.70 30-31 31-32 8.68 8.80 32-33 8.74 33-34 8.67 cents per box is used for paying the crew. There are, of course, many part-days; in fact, an exact eight-hour day may be missed frequently. Pickers move during the day from grower to grower and a dif- ferent rate of pay is figured for each one. One procedure for calculating these part- days is to total both man hours and boxes The successive orchard picking as it exists in the California citrus industry. The picker is hired to work in a succession of orchards or blocks. Just what the particular succession will be for a particular picker is probably not known to anyone at the time of the hiring. Which orchards will be picked by which crews may not be decided until the time of the picking. The management may have a general plan for the succession of orchards to be picked but will not commit itself as it may be desirable to change the succession. Fruit in an orchard may be growing in size more rapidly than anticipated or changing in color so that it must be picked and stored quickly. In Ventura County, using braceros, the organiza- tion is even more centralized: it is countywide and both individuals and crews are moved from packing house to packing house. Under these conditions, it is unavoidable that picking opportunity in rate of pick varies. A single-box rate inevitably brings about fluctuations in earnings. 12 picked, divide the boxes by the man hours, and then multiply by eight. The same method can be used for days longer than eight hours. The schedule can be set up on a one-hour basis, if so wanted. The rest of the accounting process is identical with any multiple rate wage system such as the tree production incentive system. The ad- vantage of the crew average wage system over the tree production incentive wage system is that tree classifications, yields, and fruit sizes need not be determined. The third column in table 3 shows the minimum earnings for an eight-hour day. With the pay rates used, the minimum average would be $8.40 an eight-hour day, or $1.05 an hour. Commonly, rates of pick are not in even boxes so earnings would be above this minimum but in no case would they equal the amount shown as "up to." That higher earning level would be achieved only if a full extra box of fruit were picked, in which case the next-lower rate of pay would be used. No matter what the picking situation or the character of the pickers, the average picker will earn $8.40 or a little more in an eight-hour day. The crew knows this; it is made very clear in any description of the system. Also the crew average can not go much above this $8.40 and even that only as a matter of chance. If the crew de- cides to pick more slowly, their earnings remain the same. Slow men on the crew have a disparaging attitude toward the fast pickers because faster picking on the part of faster men raises the average rate of pick for the crew and thus lowers the box rate to be paid, thus lowering the earnings of the slow men. If everyone picks faster, no one gains anything. If everyone picks slower, no one loses anything. Crew supervisors have great difficulty in preventing a slowdown. How can they tell how hard someone is working just by looking at him? The men are scattered among the trees, most of them hidden most of the time. The work is somewhat slow-paced even by fast men, and it is im- possible to differentiate the degree of ef- fort. A sharp change in rate is noticeable but an experienced crew will change slowly. The crew's only problem in slow- ing down is to maintain earnings between the fast and slow men on a proportionate basis. The only specific information avail- able to the management is the amount of fruit picked. If it is decreasing, it may be because of picking conditions. Good man- agement, working closely with men who are new, can sometimes make the system work. With large experienced crews the problem appears quite impossible to con- trol. The crew average rate of pay sys- How the tree production incentive wage system strengthens the position of management. • Equity is achieved among workers. • Equity is achieved among growers and cost differences are justified. • A uniform system is established among competing packing houses throughout the industry. • Public relations can be improved. The public is giving increasingly more at- tention to the relationship beaween labor and management in agriculture. Fluc- tuations in earnings are subject to serious question. Incentive-wage ideas are widely criticized. This criticism will grow if earnings fluctuate widely and if indi- vidual motives and judgment are allowed to influence earnings. Properly set up, the tree production system will prevent most wide fluctuations in earnings. The system depends on production data. The erratic influence of human judgment and motives can be eliminated because day-to-day decisions play no part in oper- ations. The objective classification of tasks and the determination of work rates along with the achievement of a generally accepted level of earnings can win for fruit picking a position of respect and pride, something that now is sadly lacking. [13] tern has been common throughout the in- dustry for many years. It has not been sat- isfactory in the long run because it is sub- ject to manipulation by human motives. 8. A rate system tied to physical factors in the orchard which can be measured ob- jectively makes possible the establishment of an equitable uniformity in earnings over an entire industry. The same type of equity the incentive wage system estab- lishes among growers of a packing house organization is also established among packing house organizations. Equity among growers in costs is achieved indus- try-wide. This equity and uniformity in earnings extends over the entire season. 9. In essence, the rate-of-pay table con- stitutes a contract covering all the picking in an area during the entire season. As a contract system it is easily enforced. Each packing house can turn in to a central of- fice a report for each payroll period show- ing the average level of earnings received by the crew or crews. As shown in the dis- cussion on Earnings Stabilization (pages 30-32), there is a fluctuation in these earn- ings but the investigator can quite easily recognize when rates of pay are markedly out of line. Consequently a general con- trol is possible with very little work. If a detailed report is needed, all the pertinent information is factual; opinions and judg- ments are not involved; a conclusion as to whether or not the contract is being ad- hered to can be explicit. • the boss (crew foreman, field superin- tendent, or manager) cannot change or set the rate as he wishes: The rate is set by the table. A picker can check whether he has been paid the box rate shown in the table. He finds the tree class, yield, and fruit count and thus finds the box rate. • the picker always knows ahead of time what he will be paid: There is a specific prior agreement as to the box rate in all prospective picking situations. The only unknowns are the actual yield and the ac- tual fruit count. They are measured as the fruit is picked. They are matters of fact, not subject to opinion or bias. The picker need never be concerned about his rate of pay. • the grower can always determine if he has been charged the proper rate. He finds the tree class, yield, and fruit count and thus finds the box rate. HISTORY OF THE TREE PRODUCTION INCENTIVE WAGE SYSTEM Some kind of incentive wage system has been in use in Ventura County lemon picking at least since the early 1930's. Throughout the thirties and into the forties a combination rate was paid of 28 cents an hour plus an additional amount per box. Initially the box rate was as low as 3 cents but by the forties it had risen to 14 cents. By 1942 the system had become well established. The incentive rate was re- garded as necessary to obtain a reasonable effort from workers. The hour rate was fixed at 28 cents for two reasons. Earnings per hour on the single incen- tive rate fluctuated widely between or- chards and from month to month. Figure 2 presents a typical sequence. Almost all yields were low from August through January, and crew average rates of pick remained below two boxes per hour. A rate of pick of two boxes per hour brought 28 cents to the picker from his incentive rate of pay. A slower picker with a rate of one and one-half boxes per hour received 21 cents from his incentive rate. In both cases, the pickers also received an hourly rate of 28 cents. As the season pro- gressed, the yields increased to two boxes per tree, three, and even four, and crew average rates of pick rose to peaks of more than four boxes an hour. Incentive earn- ings per hour rose accordingly. During the rest of the season both yields and rates of pick gradually receded to the November level. In some houses there was commonly a small peak of yields and of rates of pick in the fall (see October, figure 2). Because of these fluctuations and other varying 14 NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY 5 1 5-1 5-i 4- 4- 4- 3- 3- 3- • 2- •f 2- I 2- 1- '■• 1- • i 1- 1 , , j-.. , 12 3 4 — i 5 12 3 4 5 \ \ \ 12 3 4 5 FEBRUARY MARCH T 1 1 1 » 12 3 4 5 icsrv;: APRIL i 1 r~n 1 12 3 4 5 YIELD (bxs/tree) MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST 1 r 1 2 5" 4- 3 2 I- SEPTEMBER -/.•• t r 3 4 OCTOBER 5-1 4 3 2- 1- 9 "i 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 Fig- YIELD (bxs/tree) 2. Individual crew orchard picks, by yield and by rate of pick, in successive months November 1954 to October 1955, House I. All picks four hours or longer. [15] circumstances, the quantity of fruit to be picked in an hour by an average picker varied widely, from less than two boxes an hour to more than five. The 28 cents an hour served as a "cushion" to smooth out these fluctuations to some degree. The second reason for paying 28 cents an hour was the custom of paying "wet time" — the time when a crew had been taken to the orchard but picking was de- layed because the trees were wet from fog or rain. This situation was quite common, and in fairness to workers the custom had developed of paying the hourly rate for their time. The time before picking started was recorded and named wet time. Picking costs have almost always been charged di- rectly to the grower. Charging wet time directly to the grower and making both rates 28 cents an hour eliminated the need to separate the wet-time rate and the hourly picking rate. It was done by sev- eral houses. Other houses, however, treated wet time as an overhead cost, chargeable to the entire association. These houses had to keep a separate time record for the wet time. The hourly rates for wet time and for picking could then be different but it was easier to avoid mistakes if they were the same. The problem of fluctuating earnings for pickers was not unique in Ventura County but it had aspects which made it more spe- cific than in other areas. The general na- ture of the fluctuations shown in figure 2 was accurate throughout the county except that the timing varied. The crop in the in- terior was earlier than on the coast; pickers in the interior would have good picking while picking was still slow on the coast. Later in the year the situation would be reversed, with a large volume of heavy yield picks being harvested on the coast while the interior had only low-yield picks. Variations occurred, sometimes seemingly, by chance. One orchard would have a high rate of pick, the other one a low rate. All packing houses in the county were using the same rate of pay per box. The local pickers were resident in the county, knew the various associations and their orchards, and knew where picking was good and where they could earn the most money. They moved about freely. Asso- ciations with good picking had an excess of pickers; those with poor picking would have difficulty in getting their work done. Twice each year with the ebb and flow of the seasonal crop harvest, there was an outbreak of discontent. Pickers moved be- cause of better earnings elsewhere and be- cause of rumors of good picking. Packing houses could not keep their crews together. Both pickers and management were dis- satisfied. One modification attempted was to raise the box rate at the start of light picking , and to change downward at the start of good picking. This system reduced fluctu- 4 ations but had several serious faults. It was difficult to reach agreement on when to change rates and how much to change. When box rates were raised, the growers objected. When box rates were lowered, the pickers objected. At any one time only one rate was in use and inevitably earn- ings varied widely from orchard to or- chard. What made the situation particularly critical in 1942 and 1943 was in part due to labor-management conflicts. A serious strike of pickers had occurred in the Spring of 1941. After the strike, which failed to obtain recognition for the union, the old pickers, largely Mexicans living in local towns, were discontented and many left for other work. Packing-house management was also dissatisfied and was looking for other pickers. The inflow of people from the Middle West provided a fair supply but these people looked for better jobs and most of them soon passed on to other opportunities. Also because of the war new jobs were opening up, and wages were rising. In this situation, the erratic earnings were particularly detrimental. Some asso- ciations found it extremely difficult to get their fruit picked. Several houses started to guarantee 65 cents an hour early in 1944. Men would then stay on the job but the incentive pay rates then had little or no effect and the rate of pick soon fell off. Costs rose sharply. University studies of the problem got underway in 1942 but not until 1944 were there any important developments. In the Spring of that year the county-wide or- ganization of citrus packing houses now known as the Ventura County Citrus 16] Table 4. Rates of pick in boxes per hour for lemon picking by experienced pickers, by tree classes, by yields, by fruit size, and by area, Ventura County, April 10, 1947. Yield Small* trees Mediumj trees Large t trees Very large§ trees Normall trees bxs/tree boxes per hour COASTAL o-}4 2.57 3.13 3.63 4.02 4.49 4.98 1.95 2.33 2.72 3.05 3.43 3.78 4.11 4.38 1.79 2.14 2.50 2.80 3.15 3.47 3.77 4.02 1.28 1.58 1.90 2.18 2.51 2.84 3.18 3.60 1.91 \i-\i 2.29 y 2 -y± 2.67 %-\ 2.99 \-\y 2 3.37 134-2 3.71 2-3 4.03 3 + 4.30 INTERIOR 0-H 2.33 2.77 3.15 3.43 3.78 4.13 1.51 1.82 2.14 2.42 2.75 3.09 3.34 3.47 1.39 1.68 1.97 2.22 2.53 2.84 3.07 3.18 1.16 1.45 1.74 2.00 2.27 2.51 2.74 2.90 1.48 li-y 1.79 y 2 -% 2.10 %-\ 2.37 \-\y 2 2.70 134-2 3.03 2-3 3.28 3 + 3.40 * All trees less than % l A feet tall. t Eurekas 9J/£ to 12 feet tall. t Eurekas 12 to 15 feet tall and Lisbons 9^ to 12 feet tall. § Eurekas over 15 feet tall and Lisbons over 12 feet tall. 1 1. Substitute for medium and large classes, or, 2. Substitute for all other lasses. (Usage varies where class exists.) Growers Committee set up a special sub- committee to encourage research on the problem. That fall a report was presented and in November an experimental tree production wage incentive system was in- troduced. A fortunate feature in Ventura County was that for many years back a uniform and quite accurate hourly record of pick- ing had been maintained by all lemon packing houses. This practice grew out of the practice of paying all pickers a fixed amount per hour which we have called a cushion. Wet time also encouraged it. These hourly records made possible studies of the rate of pick in various pick- ing situations; and also it allowed a check as to how well the wage system was work- ing out in terms of earnings per hour. Without this hourly record it would not be possible to have any accurate or prov- able idea of the earning situation. This is the reason why comparable studies are not possible in many areas. The initial tree production incentive wage system adopted in 1944 provided for an adjustment for yield only; there was no tree size adjustment. But pickers quickly discovered that they could obtain very high earnings per hour when picking small, young trees. Such picking did not last long but the fruit was big and easy to reach and the earnings were such that pickers would literally run from tree to tree. We called it "runaway picking." A schedule of smaller rates of pay per box was called for. At the same time it was found that large trees, particularly large Lisbons with their thorns and heavy folia- tion, slowed the rate of pick. Here a sched- ule was called for with higher rates of pay. Many of these adjustments had been an- ticipated in theory but experience was re- quired before management recognized the need for change and before the rates of work could be established. Within a year, however, all associations had accepted the system. The intended level of earnings set up in 1944 was 75 cents an hour. The ac- tual level of earnings achieved, county [17] wide throughout 1945, was within about 2 cents of this objective. During the next three years various modifications and adjustments were made. The record keeping techniques were worked out. In 1947, a careful reappraisal was made of the rates of pick (see table 4). The new rates were adopted as official and until 1963 served as the basis for the wage system. In 1954 a technical change was made. Before that year, the county was di- vided into two areas with different rates of pay schedules. The interior (see figure 1) with smaller fruit had rates of pay per box somewhat higher than the coastal area. In 1955, the entire county adopted a single rate of pay schedule with a new schedule made, however, for large fruit (less than 250 per box) and for small fruit (more than 300 per box). (See table 5.) The whole schedule was modified to fit the county-wide conditions. Since the same rates of pick data and the same intended level of earnings were used for both the old and the new wage schedules, the ac- tual level of earnings was practically the same as in the earlier system. The advan- tages gained were that the entire county was now on one rate schedule and that adjustments in the rate of pay were made whenever and wherever larger or smaller fruit were picked. The interior and coastal areas were far from being exclusive in the size of fruit each grew. Also any given or- chard could have a different size of fruit in one pick than in another. Two other significant changes were made during this period. The general level of wages was rising and at various intervals corresponding changes were made in the incentive rates of pay. The cushion was abandoned and the pickers paid only a straight box rate. The schedule of pay used, it was thought, provided enough adjustment among the various picking conditions to eliminate the need for the hourly rate as a cushion. Also it was thought that the use of straight box rates throughout the schedule as the sole payment was a more equitable method of payment as between fast and slow pickers. The wet-time pay was retained and raised to 35 cents an hour. During the last two years further changes have been made. The continuing rise in wage levels has forced upward the rates of pay. Changes developed in the technique of picking which permitted a faster rate of pick and made necessary a new study of the rates of pick. A new rate of pick schedule is now in use as the basis for the rate of pay schedule. The classifi- cation of trees by height has been changed. The tall trees, some over 18 feet, which were commonplace in 1944, were expen- sive to pick under the tree production wage system. Growers began to cut off their tree tops. This practice became so Table 5. Rates of pay in cents per box for lemon picking, by tree classes, by yields, and by fruit size, Ventura County, May 17, 1954. Small trees t Medium treest Large trees § Yield Fruit size (number per box) Under 250- Over 250 300 300 Under 250- Over 250 300 300 Under 250- Over 250 300 300 bxs/tree* o-x 40.9 45.0 49.1 33.5 36.8 40.2 28.9 31.8 34.7 26.1 28.7 31.3 23.4 25.7 28.1 21.1 23.2 25.3 55.0 60.5 66.0 45.9 50.5 55.1 39.3 43.2 47.2 35.1 38.6 42.1 31.2 34.3 37.4 28.3 31.1 34.0 26.1 28.7 31.3 24.4 26.8 29.3 82.0 90.2 98.4 66.5 73.1 79.8 55.3 60.8 66.4 48.2 53.0 57.8 41.8 46.0 50.2 37.0 40.7 44.4 33.0 36.3 39.6 29.2 32.1 35.0 H-H Yr-Vx M-\ \-\y 2 lJ^-2 2-3 . 3 + * Field box eapacitv 2,926 cubic inches, t Trees less than W 2 feet tall, t Trees 9M to 12 feet tall. § Trees over 12 feet tall. [18] common that special machines were de- vised for it. Large trees have disappeared; consequently, the county has eliminated any class of trees more than 15 feet tall. In fact, there are only a few orchards with trees taller than 12 feet. At the same time the county had come to recognize even more clearly the im- portance of graduation in pay for tree height and has instituted the use of three tree size classes for trees below 12 feet, in- stead of the two originally set up. Also an improvement in fruit-size classification has been made with the borderline num- ber per field box for large fruit set at 240 rather than 250 as set in 1954. These details of the history of the wage system in Ventura County are pertinent because of two unique developments there. First, the succession of picking opportuni- ties in successive orchards have been classi- fied so that in any class a worker under normal effort will experience a minimum of fluctuation in his earnings. Second, fairly elaborate statistical techniques have been used for determining normal rates of work in each class. The importance of these developments will be made clear in this report as it proceeds. INDIVIDUAL RATES OF PICK That rates of pick differ from worker to worker is one of the basic concepts of the tree production incentive wage system. Payment in proportion to output brings out these individual differences. Each worker recognizes that the picking of an additional box of fruit adds proportion- ately to his income. He therefore tends to exert himself to pick as fast as he can. Capability and effort vary widely, however, as table 6 indicates. This table shows the distribution of workers as to rate of pick in a typical crew. This crew data is pre- sented as internally typical but is not rep- resentative as to its general level of work. It is an "example" crew. These workers were in one crew, all working in one orchard of uniform char- acter, all paid the same box rate, and all supervised by the same crew boss. Every- thing possible was done to provide them with an equal opportunity. They worked, in line, down successive box roads, each road with three rows of trees on each side. Each worker was given a set of six trees. When he finished his set he went to the head of the line and took the next set; thus the set was his as a matter of chance. Differences in tree sets balanced out quickly by this method of operation. As a rule, these sets of trees are quite uniform. Despite this equality in opportunity, however, the pickers in this crew varied Table 6. Distribution of workers in an "example" lemon picking crew by rates of pick (boxes per hour) with standard devi- ation values derived from M = 2.57 and cr = ± 0.389. Standard deviation values bxs/hr {a) 3.35 = +2 .60 LU a .50 .40 < Q .30 z < .20 CO .10 locals y = .87 - .0388 x braceros y = .212 ♦ .1 x 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 RATE OF PICK (bxs/hr) 5.0 5.5 Fig. 5. Individual crew orchard picks, by rate of pick and standard deviation, with net regression relation- ship for bracero crews (dots) and for local crews (circles), May, 1962 data, Ventura County. Locals vs. Braceros Figure 5 also shows the standard deviation for pickers classified as locals. Their o- values are significantly larger than the a values for braceros. This contrast is a foreboding note in view of the anticipated ending of the contract Mexican pro- gram. The larger a means that the earnings of these locals will be more erratic than those of the Mexican Nationals. Such a condition also means that the stabilization characteristics of the tree production incentive wage system will be even more important. Every possible measure must be taken to develop a proper esprit de corps in the crews and every possible refinement adopted in the wage system which will contribute toward stabilized incomes. These locals will require very careful management. With good training, with time to gain experience and a feeling of unity, and with reasonable opportunities in earnings, there is good reason to think, however, that the problem can be worked out. RATE OF PICK AS INFLUENCED BY ORCHARDS AND ORCHARD PICKS Another basic concept of the incentive wage system is the differences in picking opportunities presented by successive or- chards. Table 2 indicates something of the spread a crew averages: from 1.45 boxes to 4.81 boxes per hour. The wage system has to deal with these differences. Figure 2 presents an elaborate picture of the dif- ferences among crew-days in rates of pick. In any given month there is a wide fluc- tuation. The May 1962 data, mentioned above, [23 offered an opportunity to analyze these fluctuations using crews whose individual makeup and experinece can be considered as highly consistent from orchard-day to orchard-day. Eleven crews are included from five houses, working a total of 2,883 man-days. The standard error of the weighted crew average rates of work, each crew's error measured from its own over- all mean, was ± 0.4972. This means that on 32 per cent of the days, the average rate of pick of a crew was one-half box or more per hour greater or less than its over-all average rate of pick. It also means that on nearly 5 per cent of the days, a crew's average rate of pick was one full box or more per hour more or less than on its overall average. Referring again to the situation in suc- cessive months, as shown in figure 2, it is apparent that, if a crew could be followed through a year, the fluctuation i n rates <>l pick would be greater than that shown for one month alone. This ever-present fluc- tuation in rates ol pick constitutes the basic problem with which we must deal in designing a wage system. Table 2 shows the rate-of-pick data on which the present ( l ( '(> 1 1 rate of pay sched- ule (table 1) is based. These data in the rate-ol-j)i( k table are measurements of the average rate of pick achieved l>\ pickers in cadi of the orchard situations described. Tree height, yield per tree, and the size ol fruit are the factors dealt with directly in this schedule. Yield The influence ol yield on rate of pick is made clear in figure 6 which shows the findings, in one study (1948), made of the relationship. Each dot represents a crew picking for one- da\ and is placed at a point representing both the yield and the rate of pick. The net-regression analysis indicates that p = 0.827 and that a sig- nificant relationship at the level of 1 per 6 • • 5 • • • • # . • t. • • • ^^^^^™ -C • •• • * " V) 4 • • •• • * • • r^"***^ . .• X • • ^ m • • -Q ' • "'• :^> — 7. • . : a *is^ m ' 3 — • o_ n :•*•: " ' • * u. ^^ ••• * o 2 — • ••• x' = 2.126936 + 1.457829 x 2 - .225125 Xj 2 uu • • 1— • < Q£ 1 1 J 1 i i 1 1 1 1 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 YIELD (bxs/tree) 3.0 3.5 4.0 Wp nnm!hn a cho C H re a W + 0r a hard i pic Jt' b l y l e ' d and rate of P ick > with curvilinear relationship, 1948 data. Source: Unpublished data, developed by the Statistical Laboratory, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Berkeley. [24] YIELD (bxs/tree) Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. 0.00 - 0.25 It ■ 12 |1 !i 1 1 ■ 14 ■■30 M Hi 0.25 - 0.50 ■ IE ■«t« ■ 9 |7 Is Is |3 |4 ■ 14 WM'a ■|21 ■ ' 0.50 - 0.75 ■ 12 ■ '9 Ho WM Be |3 IB \i ■ 12 |9 Is 0.75 - 1.00 2 |4 17 ■ is ■ is |7 ■ |4 ■ » H 1 |3 1.00 - 1.50 Is 1 14 Ho ■■"' ■■21 ■ 19 ■118 ■ 11 1 13 1.50 - 2.00 1 1 is ■■26 ■■28 ■■28 WM 17 2.00 - 3.00 |9 ■■23 ■ M ^ a* • a • a °D D a < m • a • - level ground o - some j lope ■ - mostly slope 1 — ■ • L □ - steep slope 1 1 2 3 YIELD (bxs/iree) Fig. 9. Individual crew daily orchard picks, by yield and by rate of pick, by terrain conditions, one orchard, 1954-55 data. Figure 9 shows the yield and rate of pick for each such day and the character of the terrain. By carrying out the study over a full year a complete range in yields was obtained. Throughout the range in yields there is a consistently wide belt of rates of pick. There is also a quite uniform scatter of the different terrain conditions. The only noticeable exception to this scatter is in the low yields where the picking on level land seems to be somewhat slower. This seems to bear out the opinion, sometimes expressed by management, that the adjust- ment for sloping ground and terraces has favored the picker — he can earn a little more in such picking. Management how- ever, does not object to this adjustment since it is felt that the slight extra earn- ing compensate for the more difficult work- ing conditions. Size of Fruit Size of fruit has been a troublesome fac- tor to measure. It obviously affects the rate of pick when the rate is measured by a container of fixed volume such as a field box. Picks have averaged from less than 150 fruit per field box to more than 400. The effect on the rate of pick is not pro- portional but to the picker it seems ex- treme. Before the present-day wage system adjustment was developed, pickers and even whole crews would become dis- couraged when they encountered very small fruit. The first attempt to adjust for size was to divide the county into two areas, the interior where smaller lemons grew, and a coastal area where larger sizes prevailed. Figure 10 shows one study made of sizes in various houses ranging from the most interior, Fillmore, to one just inside the coastal area, Saticoy. It will be noticed that Saticoy appears to have a materially larger size of fruit. The demarcation line between the two areas, interior and coastal, was made between Saticoy and Limoneira. The houses not named in figure 10 were either entirely coastal or largely so. Any fruit picked in the interior by them was to be paid for at interior rates. It was known that size fluctuations oc- curred in every house in both areas and that an adjustment needed to be made ■ ■ Li Sespe 1 y 20 h CL ^ 10 - LI Briggs ■ ■ 30 r- Limoneiro 20 - _ 1 1 1 _ ■ I II Soticoy I - I I L 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 FRUIT SIZE (no./bx) Fig. 10. Distribution of individual orchard picks by fruit size (number per field box) and by packing house, Ventura County, 1944 data. [27] 287.5 312.5 337.5 362.5 387.5 FRUIT SIZE (no./bx) Fig. 11. Average rates of pick by fruit size (num- ber per packed box), by rate of pick; over-all weighted rate of pick by fruit size (dashed lines); and net regression between over-all rate of pick and fruit size (heavy line); 1954-55 data. among successive picks. It was also de- sirable to eliminate the two schedules of pay in the county. In the spring of 1954 the schedule shown in table 5 was de- veloped, in which rates of pick were ad- justed to fruit sizes. There was very little statistical support for the fruit-size dif- ferentiation rates but they were used until the spring of 1963. The schedule as shown was designed to return a level of earnings of 95 cents an hour. The actual earnings achieved (figure 14) were very near to or right at 95 cents. Figure 11 shows one measurement at- tempt for fruit size. Trees were checked for height classification and special records were developed for fruit sizes. The fruit sizes shown refer to the old fruit-size classi- fication used for the old wooden shipping case. The data reflect the picking of 1,619,- 550 boxes of fruit with 625,988 man hours of work. Figure 11 indicates a wide diversity of relationships between fruif size and rate of pick. This diversity illustrates all our studies. It is evident that among the many influences affecting the rate of pick, fruit size is of varying importance. Close observation of crews, moreover, indicates that fruit size has a peculiarly psychological influence. The small sizes fill a bag so slowly that a picker becomes discouraged. The discouragement in itself slows the picker and its effect spreads through the crew. Something similar oc- curs sometimes with large sizes: they speed up the picking, but if it becomes faster than normal, the picker tires and an auto- matic adjustment soon takes place. The psychological relationships quite likely add to the erratic influence of fruit size on rate of pick. There is, however, a general relation- ship between fruit size and rate of pick, expressed in the slope from left to right in figure 11. The dashed lines represent slopes between the weighted average rates of pick in each fruit size class and the heavy line is a linear regression descrip- tion of the successive rates of pick. It is pertinent to note that the slope shown of -0.007897 x is supported by the finding of a 1948 study showing a slope of -0.007669 x (see figure 6). The special fruit size records used in the above analysis were obtained from the sampling data now used by all cooperative lemon packing houses in crediting growers with their pick. This sampling data is an elaborate and highly accurate system ap- plied to every lot of fruit received. This data was paired with the daily crew re- ports and an exact picture obtained of the fruit sizes picked by each crew each day in each orchard. The method appears to be applicable as a commercial means of obtaining fruit- size data for the payment of crews. Its problems of time lag and of accounting procedures are not particularly serious. Management will find it advantageous to use an impersonal satistically sound fruit- size description. The present method, to be accurate, requires a sample larger than five boxes, something which is difficult for the busy crew boss. Fortunately the three fruit-size classes are so set up that serious error can be avoided by the crew boss if he uses good [28 judgment. The important thing is to place extremely large sizes or extremely small sizes each in their own class, separated from the average. This the crew boss can pretty well do from what he can see as he works with the crew and the fruit. Errors will occur but not serious ones. We suspect that the main help from the counting and recording of the fruit from five boxes is the emphasis it gives to the problem. It will be noticed that the fruit size classification used in tables 1 and 2 is dif- ferent from the one set up in 1954, table 5. The dividing number of fruit between the medium and large is changed from 250 to 240. The original choice of 250 was merely a guess at a good demarcation line. A number of studies of fruit sizes had been made but they were not necessarily repre- sentative of the county-wide production. There was no time to make further studies. The situation in the spring of 1963 was not a great deal better but some informa- tion was available. Table 8 shows the in- formation available when the new sched- ule was set up. Table 8. Orchard picks classified as to fruit size and numbers of orchard picks with fruit counts available, by fruit size class, Ventura County, spring, 1963. Fruit size class fruit/ field box Under 250 250- 300 Over 300 Orchard picks classified Per cent 889 38 669 228 1,152 49 m 267 318 13 Orchard picks counted Average count (fruit/box) 216 325 From looking at table 8 one might con- clude that no change need be made. The average count of the small fruit was 25 counts from its line while the average count of the large fruit was only 22 counts from its line. However, the change over from 250 to 240 was made for the follow- ing reasons. The average count for the 250-300 class was 267, far closer to 250 than 300. In fact, it is only 17 from 250 but 33 from 300. Also it is only 39 from 228 but is 58 from 325. We are quite cer- tain the fruit sizes in the county are skewed toward the small sizes, as is in- dicated by these data, but some of this skewness would still be allowed for with the 240 demarcation line. Also, the system is set up only to take care of extreme sizes. A portion of 38 per cent in the large fruit size class seemed excessive for such a pur- pose. Since that decision was made, a fre- quency distribution has been made of all the size county data available of 1962 picking. A total of 3,906 orchard picks were included involving several million boxes of fruit. Figure 12 presents a bar- chart picture of these sizes. Picks ranged in fruit size from 150 per box to 424. Figure 12 shows a relative evenness of the slopes. In general such evenness indi- cates a degree of reliability in the data. The counts made of fruits in the sample boxes must have been reasonably accurate and objective. Whether in any given or- chard the sample was representative is an- other matter but an objective count of boxes chosen by chance would, in the numbers used here, result in a smooth curve. The crew bosses who count the fruit apparently are doing, within the limits of their instructions, a good job. Does the data indicate whether the present-day dividing lines for fruit sizes at 240 and at 300 are well chosen? The 300- plus group is far smaller than the 240- minus group. The 240-minus group has 1,468 orchard picks, the 240-300 group has 1,908, and the 300-plus group has 530. U wl 1 1 ■■■■-■ 1.1,1 I FRUIT SIZE Fig. 12. Distribution by number of orchard picks, by fruit size (number per box), 1962 data. [29 One might argue for a more equal dn ision or at least a division centering on the median peak in the bar chart. On the other hand, the skewness to the right plus the psychological importance of the small sizes may justify keeping the dividing line to the right. Also the 240 dividing line leaves a group on the left which is largely clustered together into a quite uniform grouping. Further study is called for be- fore any further change is justified. Other Variables There are many other variables which influence the rate of pick. The distribu- tion of fruit over or within the tree and the radius of the tree surface from the trunk can have an important influence. Trees skirted down low and loaded with fruit can slow workers materially. He;i\\ ground cover, soft dirt, rough ground, and wet conditions inevitably slow workeis. Room for walking and carrying bag and ladders also may influence rate of pick. These variables present three kinds of problems. One problem is the definition of each variable so that a clear demarcation can be made as to whether a particular pick should be classified one way or the other. For instance, one can easily determine that low tree skirts slow a picker. At what point, however, should one draw a line between a low tree skirt and the other tree skirts? The height of skirts varies with the load of the fruit so measurement might be required with every pick. The question does not seem insoluble but no good defini- tion, acceptable to management, has yet been worked out. The second problem is the measurement of the variable's influence. We have measured certain extreme cases in which < 1 r~ YIELD (b X ./tr.. ) Fig. 13. Average rates of pick for each yield class, with log curve fit, by two age classes of trees, 1954-55 data. Circles indicate trees less than ten years old. Dots indicate trees ten years or more in age. the height ol tree skins played a pari but ■hi\ measurement of a genera] class has been inexact enough to raise a question as to its validity. I he thud problem is to determine whether the differences justify a special rate or a special definition. The problem ma) not be important enough to justify sue I) .i step. "I Trees. Figure 13 shows the con- trast m rate of pick when trees are classed l>\ age. The distinction is dear. Probably the main reason for the difference is in the radius of the tree, the older trees being larger and more difficult to get into. Other features of the trees may play a part. Some thought has been given to making tree age a factor in classification but the ex- ceptions to the above measurement are too numerous to make such classifications worthwhile. EARNINGS STABILIZATION The tree production wage system aims at earnings stabilization— the capability of a wage system to eliminate or reduce the impact of orchard variables on earnings. Any measurement of the extent to which earnings are stabilized (or the impact of orchard variables reduced) is highly ap- plicable to our problem. The method of comparison is to use, on the one hand, the actual earnings received under the system; 30 on the other hand, we developed an over- all average "single rate" of pay in cents per box by dividing the actual mean earn- ings of all crews for all days by their mean rate of pick in boxes per hour. Our rates of pick as actually achieved in successive orchards were then multiplied by this single rate of pay. This single rate of pay per box would reflect all orchard influences on rate of pick and serve as a basis from which to determine the modifying in- fluence of the tree production wage system. Specifically, the impact of orchard vari- ables on earnings is reflected in the weighted daily average standard error of the mean ( ■» M 2 60 O 2 40 z < 30 _* ,. .*.• -1* "-- 1 •• #< ..** ***.* * ' ,«•• V- ■»V-H07""- * 112 *,- if; ■---*-«— * — - §r-~- -*--«-- : .-— w - ;i"Sf - "" I" •v •'•' / : 1954 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 TIME (payroll periods) 1961 1962 1963 Fig. 14. Average earnings per payroll period, all bracero crews, five to seven packing houses, 1954-63. Dots designate experienced crews, crosses crews with a significant number of inexperienced workers, and the two circles (in 1962) crews with transfers from orange crews. be levied against trees. As shown, industry income has been low in recent years. These low returns to growers are largely due to the high proportion of fruit sold in processed form and the low price received for it. The pertinent data in dollars per packed equivalent box shown in table 9 indicate that the prospect is discouraging. (Smith, 1961) Rising Wage Levels Wage levels have been rising in Ameri- can agriculture. The USDA Statistical Re- porting Service (1963) reports the index of farm wage rates for July 1, 1963 at 117, as compared with a base of 100 in 1957-59. Figure 14 presents a picture of earnings in Ventura County lemon picking. The horizontal scale represents the succession of payroll periods since April, 1954. The vertical axes show the level of earnings. Each dot, cross, or circle indicates the aver- age earnings per hour for that specific pay- roll period. The dots represent payroll periods when only experienced men were picking the crosses represent payroll pe- riods when significant numbers of workers were inexperienced, and the two circles represent crews that were shifted over from orange picking. The decision whether to use a dot, a circle, or a cross for a payroll period depended not only on the arrival Table 9. On-tree lemon values per equivalent packed box, fresh fruit and processed, with per cent of crop processed, for years shown.* Five-year On-tree values Per cent average 1934-35 to 1938-39 1939-40 to 1943-44 1944-45 to 1948-49 1949-50 to 1953-54 Crop year 1954-55 fresh $2.19 2.18 3.08 3.48 2.95 3.28 2.45 2.24 2.64 2.53 2.34 2.47 processed $0.25 0.24 -0.12 1.01 0.14 0.38 0.12 0.20 -0.38 -0.32 0.14 0.09 processed 19.7 32.7 29.7 37.1 34.4 31.9 40.6 40.3 49.2 48 4 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 32.6 46.7 1961-62 * Sunkist (1961 and 1963). [33 of a new contract group at or just before the start of that period, but also on their arrival some weeks earlier because their inexperience carried over for some time. While judgment was used in these matters, the data as to when such men arrived, were exact. 6 Data as to the use of inexperienced men were not available for 1956 and 1957. The data on earnings per hour were of all houses from which they were available, varying in number from five to seven, de- pending on the year. To keep data repre- sentative in one case we left out available data because that particular packing house in that year used locals with quite differ- ent earnings, not at all representative of the rest of the county. An important feature in figure 14 is the wave or cyclical form taken by the suc- cession of payroll earnings. In the winter, earnings were low. In the summer, earn- ings were high. Examination of the cycli- cal form indicates that the low position is associated with the use of inexperienced men. The dashed lines in figure 14 show the average earnings for longer periods, com- monly a year. The average of $1.12 for 1962 is 15 per cent above the average of 97 cents for 1957-59. The average of $1.20 for the summer of 1963, with the new rates of pay using inexperienced pickers, is 24 per cent above 1957-59. This latter figure is higher than the 17 per cent increase in farm wages for the United States as a whole. The increase in earnings up to the spring of 1963 was due to changes in pick- ing techniques. This increase is discussed in the next section. On April 1, 1963, a higher rate of pay schedule was adopted and the subsequent rise in earnings, even though inexperienced pickers were used, was due to the rates of pay. On January 31, 1964, a still higher rate of pay schedule was adopted, with an intended level of earnings set at $1.30 an hour. CHANGES IN PICKING PRACTICES AND STANDARDS In recent years, the following significant changes have been made in picking prac- tices: l.A longer interval is allowed between picks. Where formerly an orchard was picked from six to eight times during the year, today the normal practice is to pick four to six times. 2. The double clip is no longer insisted upon. Instead, pickers used the single clip wherever possible. Long stems are objected to but clipper cuts no longer cause con- cern as they once did. 3. The fruit is dropped into the bag less carefully. The bag is handled less care- fully. The bag is emptied into the box without the care once insisted upon. 4. The picker is not required to use the ring so much. 5. A specific color line is not held to so rigorously. 6. Ground fruit is picked up where for- merly it was prohibited. All these changes speed up picking with- out, however, any change in the rate of pay schedule. Under the first change listed above, the grower received a direct reduc- tion in cost because the picking was done in a higher yield class. The pickers' earn- ings were not changed because of the in- herent rules of the tree production wage " system. Under the other five changes listed, the pickers' earnings per hour were increased but the grower received no change in his direct labor costs; the grower gained, however, in the reduction of over- head costs brought about by fewer men being required with the faster picking. I Measurement of Change The amount of the change in practices and standards is measured in table 10. In this table the rates of pick for 1947 were taken from the rate of pay schedule set up in 1954 (table 5) but that schedule was m adapted from the rates of pick of 1947 (table 4). Table 10 shows that in every 8 From the office files, Ventura County Citrus Growers Committee. 34 D "O a »- i- 0) 0> Q. D ±: 1° D CN uu a, ^ n <1 a> v) to a) T3 Os O ■" C „ 5 s 8 a> c o — o> «/> c (D O D)_C C U D *_ -c c U <1) H| . D -Q O Q) .a * Q..Q o d ooococn.^i~coco s „ bC s NhlDOOMhWO o rtHN«M«N» 43 + + + + + + + + o ft £ ft 03 Cy 03 3 .S3 o 1 oco^-h^-io500oo HM«^*^M« o ,4 £ 3 S bo d u cS bfi d OOWiflNOHHtB Ah cj — i N IN M N IN N N e5 .d S~ + + + + + + + + O ft H S~ m 1 0>«0'*lDiO>OM So d s NNtDMHHNN u WMINININi-irtN C3 -d s~ + + + + + + + + o ft O S- 03 t ONHOllOOMf -h CM t»< d e CNOOOCO^HCOOl'^i M » N N N -H ^H c3 J3 S~ + + + + + + + + O ft «< S- 03 CO ^ « 1 Tt»• •* /° ° o ^^»» ,« ..•• GROUP •— ^•* • • ./' •. >% »' % ''••**' GROUP 1 V V • P A Y R O O COUNT 11 PERIODS Y AVERAGE 1 962 1 1 1963 1 10-28 11-25 12-23 1-20 2-17 DATE 3-17 4-14 Fig. 18. Average earnings of groups of braceros contracted for picking lemons before or at start of normal winter sag in earnings, by payroll periods, 1962-63. For description of groups see text. 1 1 men were chosen as Group II; they each earned at least $1.00 an hour in each of their first two payroll periods. Whether they had had some earlier experience we do not know but their earnings record shows that they were relatively faster. Group III consisted of 9 men, from one house, who had been employed in July, 1962, and repatriated in March, 1963. Group IV of 14 men were from another house. These last two groups were kept separate because their earnings experience differed to some degree from the others. All groups show a remarkably strong tend- ency to increase their earnings throughout this entire period. Group I of more than 60 men increased earnings in their fifth payroll period by 25 per cent over that of their first period. The same group showed an increase at the last of 14 payroll periods of another 20 per cent over that of the fifth period. The over-all increase for the 14 payroll periods was 50 per cent. The other classifications show a similar change although Group III and Group IV were somewhat erratic. Under the tree produc- tion wage system the earnings change must reflect the rate of pick; the data therefore, shows their progressive improvement in capability. It is particularly noteworthy [45 that this improvement is shown carrying through a total of 14 payroll periods or at least 140 working days. A second item to note about these work- ers picture in figure 18 is that their earn- ings did not sag during the winter. Figure 18 also indicates the county-wide average earnings of all braceros. While not so great as in other years the winter sag that year was substantial. The specific workers whose individual records were traced through this winter did not have any such sag. In fact their records showed a steady im- provement. This examination of the learning pe- riod has given no attention to quality of work either in terms of care used in clip- ping and handling the fruit or in the selec- tion of the fruit and the complete clean- ing from the tree of fruit which is ready for picking. Most of the time, lemon pick- ing is selective for size or color. These aspects are not easy to learn, and even ex- perienced pickers will make mistakes which may have a material effect on the quantity and quality of fruit picked. Neither has attention been given to the ease with which the picker did his work. Good work methods will do much to ease the required effort and to increase the picking rate that is possible. A field study of such factors, however, would have gone far beyond the scope of this project. Training of new workers is expensive. Commonly, beginners are guaranteed a minimum earning for a period of time. Extra supervision and special teachers are required. The slower picking rate means that more pickers are required, with all the attendant costs. A poorer quality of work is done. Recently it has been com- mon to contract braceros for only six weeks at a time which is not long enough for the men to learn how to pick. The increased cost due to the use of these inexperienced men must be substantial. IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGES Since March, 1962, employers of Mexi- can braceros have been required to pay a minimum wage (U. S. Dept. of Labor, 1962). In California this minimum is $1.00 an hour and is applied to each day's work. The desirability of any specific level of earnings is not a topic within this report but the impact of the minimum wage re- quirement on the wage system and the re- sulting efficiency of operations is highly pertinent. As has been stated, rates of work among individuals vary widely and efficiency and equity require that these differences be maintained. Also, successive orchards and orchard picks vary widely in the rate of pick which any given individual can achieve in them. The tree production wage system modifies these differences among orchards and orchard picks in their im- pact on the earnings of individuals. Each individual is kept under the pressure of an incentive wage system but his earnings from day to day are stabilized significantly as lar as orchard differences are concerned. The differences among workers are main- tained, however, and to an important de- gree are stabilized from day to day, season to season. The influence of a minimum wage de- pends on how close the minimum wage is to the particular earnings of a particular individual under the incentive system. If, for instance, an individual's earnings under the incentive system are $0.85 an hour but the minimum is $1.00, the time keeper is forced to pay $1.00 an hour and the incentive to pick fast is quickly de- stroyed. The effect is the same as that of the guarantee in use in 1944. The rate of pick can be expected to fall off materially. If the minimum equals the earnings of any of the workers, they will slow down; it is difficult to justify their doing other- wise. Moreover, those who earn just a little more under incentives than under the minimum will see little reason for their greater exertion, they too will slow down, even though their earnings drop a little. The influence of the minimum wage thus [46 tends to be progressive from picker to picker up the incentive levels of earnings. At what position can a minimum wage requirement be relative to the successive earnings levels under incentive rates and still not have a detrimental effect on the crew's rates of work? The answer lies in the distribution of rates of work within a crew, the variations in the rates of work among crews, the variations in successive orchard picks, and the variations in picking policy among the various houses. In the analysis of this problem, use will be made of the mean, M, and the standard deviation, a, as being recognized and stable descriptive measures of data that are ranked. Introductory "Example" Crew To introduce our discussion, we will use the data (table 6) of an actual crew on one specific day in one specific orchard. The distribution of the crew as to rates of work was normal. This crew is described in table 6 both in terms of a frequency distribution of the actual members and in terms of the resulting M and a values. Reference will be made to the actual fre- quency distribution but primary use will be made of the M and a values. In table 12 we apply these M and a values to the problem of the minimum $1.00 an hour wage. We do this by hypo- thetically placing the $1.00 minimum at four different levels or positions, that is, at M, at -\(j, at -2 a , and at -3 A «5 6 7 8 Q .48 .72 .96 1.20 1.44 1.68 1.92 2.16 3.12 3.36 3.60 3.84 4.08 4.32 4.56 1 5.75 6.00 6.24 6.48 6.72 6.96 2 8.40 8.64 ■n.04 8.88 11.28 9.12 11.52 13.92 - ' 10 9.36 11.7* 14.16 16.56 3 4 5 6 Fig. 21. Table of earnings used by timekeepers in recording earnings of pickers. [58] Frequently, a crew will pick in two or three different orchards in one day, and each orchard may have a different pay rate. An orchard is divided into blocks, each often quite different in character. Each block is treated separately on the field sheet. For each orchard or block the num- ber of boxes picked and the number of hours worked are recorded for each picker. Note that a separate section is provided for three different growers (or blocks). The grower's name and block number are shown at the top. For each orchard, the number of boxes picked and the number of trees from which the yield can be cal- culated are entered. The tree class (shown as size and kind) is entered. On either side there is space for entering sample counts of the number of fruit in five boxes and for entering their average number. From this information, tree class, yield, and fruit count, the pay rate is determined with the help of the pay schedule shown in table 1. The amount earned by each picker is cal- culated and entered in the field sheet. This rate of pay is applied to the boxes by the successive pickers and the amount earned entered. A common practice in the county is to use a table of earnings as shown in figure 21. The table is set up for all the pay rates shown in table 1. The time keeper selects the section under the pay rate used. The number of boxes are listed on the left side (the tens column) and at the top (the unit column); the earnings can be read off from the intersec- tion of the two numbers. With the pay rate at 23<^, for instance, and a picker of 47 boxes, the 4 of the 47 boxes is at the left side and the 7 is at the top. Earnings are $10.81. Earnings for each grower (or block) and for the day are totaled. The tree production wage system was regarded with apprehension by book- keepers when it was first introduced. It would have been arduous if the old record system had been continued. But with the bookkeeping system described above, the task became easier, and much less work was required than with the old payroll system in use with the old single rate sys- tem. The use of proved figures for every calculation made is particularly valuable in avoiding error and saving time. An interesting practice followed by many associations is to post a copy of each completed field sheet early the following day, where the members of a crew at their leisure can examine it. Crew members thus have an opportunity to check for errors. This practice has done much to foster an understanding of the system and to win the confidence of the pickers. In order that the information in our publications may be more intelligible it is sometimes necessary to use trade names of products or equipment rather than complicated descriptive or chemical iden- tifications. In so doing it is unavoidable in some cases that similar products which are on the market under other trade names may not be cited. No endorsement of named products is intended nor is criticism implied of similar products which are not mentioned. [59 LITERATURE CITED Aitkin, Hugh G. T. 1960. Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal; scientific management in action, 1908-1915. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge. Baldamus, W. 1961. Efficiency and Effort. Tavistock Publ., London. Barnes, Ralph M. 1958. Motion and Time Study. Fourth Ed. John Wiley and Sons, N.Y. California Citrus League 1963a. Picking, Hauling and Packing Costs for California-Arizona Citrus, 1961-62 season. Mimeo. April, unpaged. Los Angeles. 1963b. California-Arizona Citrus Cost of Production for 1962. Mimeo. Sept., pp. 2. Los Angeles. California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 1963. California Fruit and Nut Acreage. Sacramento. De Garmo, E. P., F. E. Davis, and Roy J. Smith 1952. New type Lemon Clipper. Calif. Agric. June, 6 (6). Hirsch, Werner Z. 1957. Introduction to Modern Statistics. The Macmillan Co., N.Y. App. table I. Perry, R. L., M. Johnson, I. L. Eaks, C. Waldapfel, R. J. Smith, and R. Rock 1959. Bulk Handling of California-Arizona Citrus Fruit. (Engineering-Fruit Quality-Eco- nomics) A series of papers published in The California Citrograph. Feb.-July, 44 (4-9). Reprinted. Phelps-Brown 1962. The Economics of Labor. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven. Smith, Roy J. 1947. The Relationship Between Earnings, Time Wages, and Incentive Wages. The Cali- fornia Citrograph. 33 (2):47. 1949. Damage to Citrus Fruit in Bulk Handling. The California Citrograph. May, 34(10): 425^47. 1953. Memorandum to Lemon Administrative Committee on Lemon Count. Dept. Agric. Econ., Univ. of California, Los Angeles, Processed. 12 pp. 1956. A Picking Experiment. The California Citrograph. Aug. 42 (10):340-345. 1961. The Lemon Prorate in the Long Run. J. Polit. Econ. Univ. of Chicago Press 69 (6): 573-586. and Russell L. Perry 1961. A One-Man Boom Hoist System for Handling Citrus Fruit. Paper presented to ASME Annual summer meeting, Los Angeles, June 11-15, 1961, New York pp. 1-9 (printed). and Daniel T. Seamount 1962. An Experimental Tree Working Machine. The California Citrograph. Dec. 48(2): 43-57. Sunkist Growers 1961. Statistical Information on the Citrus Fruit Industry. Marketing Research Department. 1963. Supplement of above publication. Table 13. Los Angeles. U.S. Department of Agriculture 1963. Farm Labor. Statistical Reporting Serv., Crop Reporting Board. Washington D. C. Processed. July 10, pp. 3. U. S. Department of Labor 1962. Secretary of Labor's Determination Pursuant to Title V of The Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951, as amended. Bur. Em- ployment Security, Employment Serv. Program. Letter No. 1281, March 29. Waugh, A. E. 1952. Elements of Statistical Method. Third Ed. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., N.Y. Co-operative Extension work in Agriculture and Home Economics, College of Agriculture. University of California, and United States Department of Agriculture co-operating. Distributed in furtherance of the Acts of Congress of May 8, and June 30, 1914. George B. Alcorn, Director, California Agricultural Extension Service. 7A„, t,'65(E74 L6)J.F.